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FILE No. WR 5 014/2 (Part A) (F1-42)

TITLE: ITALY :-
INTERNAL POLITICAL.

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WESTERN EUROPEAN

FILE No. WR 01412 (F-42) (Part A)

TITLE: ITALY: INTERNAL POLITICAL

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Mr Osborne	(1)	8/1	M. Osborne	34-37	11/6			
M. Arnew	34		Mr Osborne	40	11/6			
Mr Osborne	34	11/6	M. Osborne	38	12/6			
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Mr Osborne	11							
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Mr Osborne	(17)	11/6						
Mr Osborne	(19)	24/6						
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1982

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(42)

SAVING TELEGRAM

BY BAG
FROM ROME

(Top copy seems to have gone astray)

WRD 01412
REGISTRY
18 AUG 1982

Me B. D.B.
18/8

10 AUGUST 1982

CONFIDENTIAL

TO FCO SAVING NO. 39 OF 10 AUGUST 1982
AND TO INFORMATION SAVING PARIS, BONN, UKREP BRUSSELS,
WASHINGTON

(37)

MY TELNO 412: ITALY INTERNAL

1. For the first time since the war an Italian Government has fallen in August. This was a surprise to most politicians, including Pertini who came back regretfully from his Alpine retreat. The rebel voters on 4 August may not have expected a PSI reaction so fierce as to make a crisis inevitable; the rejected decree could have otherwise been presented again in a different form. Some observers see Spadolini as the victim of a Parliamentary "traffic accident", similar to that which brought down Cossiga in September 1980; absenteeism just before the recess aggravated the damage the rebels caused. But Spadolini was vulnerable while trying to put through a package of unwelcome but badly needed austerity measures, with DC and PSI Ministers increasingly at loggerheads over the contents.

2. Pertini's decision not to insist on a formal vote of confidence (para. 3 of my telno 410) has three explanations. The crisis originated in Parliament, not outside; the vote would have been a formality, given that the PSI had left the government; and to recall deputies from holiday would have introduced delay.

/ Nevertheless

CONFIDENTIAL

Nevertheless the decision reduces his credibility, given the numerous occasions on which he said that Spadolini's resignation would only be accepted if he were defeated in a vote of confidence.

3. Pertini has consulted the three largest parties and must now see the others before awarding a first mandate. If he follows tradition it will go to the outgoing Prime Minister, unless Spadolini has made clear that he does not wish to try again at this stage. The logical next step would be a DC mandate; the choice of candidate is Pertini's, but De Mita could suggest either one of his own supporters (like Piccoli) or alternatively Forlani, who leads the opposition group in the DC; the latter course could be an effective way of healing some of the internal party wounds left by the May Congress, and Pertini told me not long ago that Forlani would be his first DC choice.

4. The PCI have implied that they could support in Parliament a 'constitutional government' which had acceptable members and policies. The distinguishing feature of such a government would be greater independence for the Prime Minister from pressure from the coalition party secretaries; the practice of holding regular 'summits' at which the five leaders decide major policy issues would have to stop (Spadolini too abjured it on taking office, but slid back into the old ways as pressure mounted). This proposal is similar to the one launched by the PRI President, Visentini, last Spring. A second Spadolini government along these new lines would probably find favour with the PCI. This is the first time since the collapse of the Andreotti/Moro strategy of 'national solidarity' in 1979 that the PCI have given any undertaking to support a government on agreed conditions;

/ to

to minimise confusion or even alarm among the party base, it is described as an intermediate step towards the 'democratic alternative' (ie. left wing alliance) which remains their avowed aim. Their tactical objective is to reduce PSI pretensions by reopening a direct dialogue with the DC, with whom the composition and programme of such a government would have to be negotiated in advance. For the DC to accept such an offer, even as a temporary expedient, would require a radical change of direction.

5. All the parties are jockeying for position, and the outcome of the crisis remains uncertain. Pertini has spoken out against anticipated elections, and is likely to start by pressing this view on the parties. He could however be left with no alternative, if Craxi makes the price of his participation in a new government too high. A coalition without the PSI, especially at this stage of the legislature, would be weak; and the other parties would in any case be reluctant to shoulder all responsibility for unpopular economic measures, leaving Craxi to reap the electoral benefits.

6. The risk of elections as early as this autumn has therefore increased, and many commentators now see them as the lesser of two evils, given the impotence of the last government. (Culshaw's letter to Osborne of 4 February, not to all, gives relevant background on Parliamentary arithmetic and party aims.) The PSI say elections are essential, and would expect to gain several percentage points, hoping they can avoid being blamed by the voters for causing unnecessary elections. The PSDI and PLI might like elections from which they would gain, but are issuing statesman-like calls to avoid them and form another 5-party coalition; Longo (PSDI) was personally annoyed at Craxi's failure to consult him. The Republicans are tempted to capitalise on Spadolini's

/ success

success as Prime Minister while it is still fresh. The neo-fascist MSI and the Radicals make no secret of wanting elections. The new DC Secretary, De Mita, would like more time to settle in, and the DC have argued strongly against elections, but this could change if the only way of avoiding them proved to be acceptance of PCI support. Only the PCI, internally split and frightened of losing votes, are totally opposed to elections; they point out the damage which dissolution of Parliament would cause to the economy.

7. Unions and employers also want a government in place this autumn, not least as an interlocutor on the key issue of the scala mobile system of wage indexation, which lapses in the private sector in January 1983 unless a new agreement is reached. The country can indeed ill-afford a prolonged crisis and a pre-election period in which urgent economic decisions cannot be taken, the austerity measures cannot come into effect, and the PSBR continues to spiral upwards. But these considerations, to which all political leaders pay lip service, may not prove strong enough to permit the formation of a new coalition robust enough to carry through unpopular measures.

ARCULUS

LIMITED

WED

NEWS D

ECB (1)

ERD

PS

PS/MR HURD

PS/LORD BELSTEAD

PS/PUS

SIR J BULLARD

MR GOODISON

CABINET OFFICE

[COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING ST]

THIS TELEGRAM
WAS NOT
ADVANCED

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British Embassy
Via XX Settembre 80A 00187 Rome

Telex 61049 Telephone 4755.441

cc: Mrs Colvin, Mrs Dept

Mr Wolff: 13/8 pa (L1)

X doesn't take good for the Colombo visit. I believe Craxi has said no to a new coalition

J R Young Esq
WED
FCO

WRD 0412	
REC 11/11	
17 AUG 1982	
OFFICE	REGISTRY
	Action Taken
	✓ JS

Your reference

Our reference

Date

11 August 1982

on the basis of the previous one.

[Handwritten signature]
12/8

See Rob.

Europe Res 12/8

ITALY: FUNCTIONS OF CARETAKER GOVERNMENT

WIT

1. Please refer to our recent batch of telegrams on the government crisis leading to Spadolini's resignation, and also our telno 413 on the arms embargo against Argentina, in which we reported comments by Indelicato of the MFA that there was no prospect of early revocation of the Italian arms embargo decree because only the Council of Ministers could take this step and the Council was unlikely to meet now that the government had fallen. We said we would send you the text of the rules which govern the functions and powers of a caretaker government.

2. I attach the text. No doubt Roy Osborne can translate it if necessary. The two main points of interest to us are:-

- X/ i) no outward Ministerial visits or inward visits by Ministers of other countries; but Italian Ministers continue to participate in NATO and Community meetings;
- ii) no new Parliamentary bills or new decrees, except in the latter case if they are really necessary and urgent. These latter would in any case require subsequent Parliamentary approval. It looks to us therefore as if it will be hard for the caretaker government to revoke the existing arms embargo decree while the present crisis continues.

Yours ever,
Tom

T L Richardson

1962
Il Presidente del Consiglio dei Ministri, sen. Giovanni Spadolini, a seguito delle dimissioni del Governo presentate al Presidente della Repubblica, ha inviato una circolare ai Ministri e ai Sottosegretari richiamando la loro necessità di attenersi alle seguenti direttive circa lo svolgimento delle funzioni durante il periodo della crisi:

- 1) il Consiglio dei Ministri sarà convocato in via straordinaria esclusivamente per adempimenti costituzionali o per provvedere in casi di necessità ed urgenza, ivi compreso l'esame di leggi regionali ai sensi dell'art. 127 della Costituzione;
- 2) il Consiglio dei Ministri non approverà nuovi disegni di legge provvedendo soltanto alla presentazione di quelli già deliberati. Ove tuttavia ricorrano necessari presupposti di urgenza, si potrà provvedere all'emanazione di decreti-legge. In caso di mancata conversione dei decreti-legge potrà provvedersi all'approvazione di disegni di legge eventualmente necessari per regolare rapporti sorti sulla base dei decreti stessi. Si potrà inoltre provvedere agli adempimenti prescritti dalla Costituzione e dalle leggi per l'emanazione^{di} decreti legislativi solo per evitare la scadenza dei termini.

Non si emaneranno regolamenti governativi o ministeriali salvo che sia necessario per dare applicazione a leggi che prescrivano tali adempimenti entro scadenze predeterminate.

Non saranno emanate circolari od altre direttive che innovino la precedente normativa, salvo che sia richiesto da improrogabili esigenze di amministrazione derivanti da leggi o atti giurisdizionali;

- 3) non si procederà a nomine, designazioni e proposte, salvo che siano vincolate nei tempi da leggi o regolamenti. Si potranno concludere a termine le procedure già iniziate ed andrà in ogni caso salvaguardata la necessaria continuità dell'azione amministrativa che non sempre può essere assicurata dall'istituto della "prerogativa". Il Ministro delle Partecipazioni Statali e gli altri Ministri competenti daranno immediate istruzioni ad Enti, Società, Aziende dipendenti o controllate perchè durante la crisi di Governo di atten-

gano ai criteri sopra enunciati per quanto di loro competenza.

4) Sarà sospesa ogni missione all'estero di Membri di Governo e si notificherà agli Stati esteri l'opportunità, ⁹motivo della crisi, ./.

che siano sospese visite e missioni di autorità estere, salvo che si tratti di riunioni di Commissioni a livello tecnico e senza rilevanza politica, già programmate.

Sarà invece garantita la partecipazione italiana anche a livello governativo alle riunioni che si terranno in sede CEE, NATO e di cooperazione politica tra i Dieci.

5) Il Governo sarà presente alle discussioni relative: 1)- ai decreti-legge in corso di conversione; 2)- al bilancio dello Stato; 3)- alla legge finanziaria.

Esso esprimerà alla Presidenza delle Camere l'avviso che ogni altra attività legislativa debba essere sospesa. Comunque l'eventuale partecipazione di rappresentanti del Governo in Assemblea o Commissione dovrà essere autorizzata di volta in volta dalla Presidenza del Consiglio dei Ministri e dovrà svolgersi secondo le istruzioni che saranno impartite d'intesa con i Ministri competenti. Il Governo non risponderà ad interrogazioni né ad interpellanze, salvo casi eccezionali e previa intesa con la Presidenza del Consiglio dei Ministri;

6) I rapporti tra l'Amministrazione e le parti sindacali potranno continuare solo per la formulazione, sul piano tecnico, di ipotesi da trasmettere al nuovo Governo;

7) I Ministri predisporranno sollecitamente ogni utile elemento e documentazione sull'organizzazione e funzionamento dei Dicasteri ed uffici cui sono preposti nonché sullo stato dell'attività e delle iniziative per completa e tempestiva doverosa informazione in sede di passaggio di consegne al nuovo Governo.



GR 115

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FM ROME 111115Z AUG 82

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELEGRAM NO. 416 OF 11 AUG 82

INFO ROUTINE PARIS, BONN, UKREP BRUSSELS, WASHINGTON

MY SAVINGRAM 039: ITALY INTERNAL

1. SPADOLINI HAS ACCEPTED A MANDATE FROM PERTINI, WITH THE CUSTOMARY RESERVE. HIS CONTACTS WITH THE PARTIES BEGIN AT ONCE AND MAY LAST SEVERAL DAYS.
2. THE PSI HAVE LITTLE ENTHUSIASM FOR A SECOND SPADOLINI GOVERNMENT SIMILAR TO THE LAST, AND HAVE ALSO STRONGLY CRITICISED THE PCI PROPOSAL (PARA 4 OF TUR). SPADOLINI WILL NEED ALL HIS MEDIATORY SKILLS TO PERSUADE THEM TO JOIN A NEW COALITION AND STOP PRESSING FOR EARLY ELECTIONS. MEANWHILE THE DC AND OTHER LAY PARTIES ARE KEEPING A LOW PROFILE.

ARCULUS

[THIS TELEGRAM WAS NOT ADVANCED]

STANDARD

WED

ECD(E)

CONFIDENTIAL

257
 Pa. R. Os
 w/f



Foreign and Commonwealth Office
 London SW1A 2AH

Telephone 01- 233 3266

Your reference

Our reference

Date

11 August 1982

R N Culshaw Esq
 British Embassy
 ROME

WRD 0412

11 AUG 1982

ITALY'S LAY BLOC

1. Many thanks for your letter of 23 July which gave a very comprehensive picture of Italy's so-called Lay parties and the positions they occupy in the political scheme of things.
2. I was perhaps more struck by the difference between the parties than by an similarity. It is their lack of identity with the DC and Communists which lumps them together rather than a common aim. Presumably their present strength lies in their small size. Any significant increase in the lay vote would prompt individual parties to separate themselves more from each other.
3. The letter will provide a valuable document for reference, which we shall no doubt make good use of, not least while attempts to resolve the present crisis continue.

R P Osborne
 Western European Department

cc. Mrs K Colvin, Research Dept

CONFIDENTIAL

Reference

Embassy PA
38
Ri 1/8

Mr Wood

H/8 B/W 1 week

ITALY INTERNAL

1. When I was speaking to Mr Culshaw in Rome this morning on other matters, I asked where we stood on the visits to London by Sig. Colombo on 6 September, and Sig. Marcora the following day. Mr Culshaw told me that both Ministers intended to come to London but that we could not by any means count on the visits taking place. It appeared likely that Sig. Spadolini, the out-going Prime Minister, would be asked to form a new government, and that if he failed the next choice would be a Christian Democrat. The likelihood is that the first Mandate would be given to Piccoli, alternatively Sig. Forlani, himself a former Prime Minister, might try.

2. If a new government was formed along similar lines to the last one, the chances were that the DC would fight to retain the transport portfolio, in which case Sig. Marcora would retain his post. Colombo too could expect to retain his. There was, however, a risk that deliberations would continue for some time, especially as many of those who need to be consulted are at present on holiday. If Ministers Colombo and Marcora were to come to the UK as representatives or as members of a caretaker government, Mr Culshaw pointed out that they would, of course, be unable to take any decisions of importance. The value of both visits would in these circumstances be much reduced.

3. The Embassy will send a saving telegram as soon as the present rather confused picture becomes clearer.

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[Signature]

R P Osborne
Western European Department
W64 233 3266

10 August 1982

cc Mr Brown, MAED
Mr Whitney, ECD(I)

WED 0142

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11 AUG 1982

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INDEX	PA	Action Taken
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17/8

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GR 330

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DESKBY 091400Z

FM ROME 091220Z AUG 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NO. 412 OF 09 AUG 82
SAVING FOR INFO PARIS, BONN, UKREP BRUSSELS, WASHINGTON

37

WED 08/12

10 AUG 1982

INDEX

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1/1

1/2

MY TELEGRAM NO. 411: ITALY INTERNAL

1. SPADOLINI REMAINS PRIME MINISTER OF A CARETAKER GOVERNMENT UNTIL HIS SUCCESSOR IS APPOINTED. MINISTERS CONTINUE TO TRANSACT DEPARTMENTAL BUSINESS, BUT IN PRACTICE HARD DECISIONS REQUIRING CONSULTATION BETWEEN THE COALITION PARTIES ARE RARELY TAKEN DURING A PERIOD OF GOVERNMENT CRISIS. THE CABINET DOES NOT NORMALLY MEET DURING A CRISIS.
 2. THERE IS NO SIGN YET OF PARLIAMENT BEING RECALLED EARLIER THAN EXPECTED (END OF AUGUST). TO REMAIN IN FORCE, DECREE LAWS MUST BE RATIFIED WITHIN 60 DAYS OF PROMULGATION: SOME OF THOSE WHICH COMPRISE THE ECONOMIC PACKAGE WERE NOT DISCUSSED BEFORE PARLIAMENT WENT INTO RECESS. NO NEW BILLS WILL BE PRESENTED: SHOULD THE CRISIS LEAD TO DISSOLUTION OF PARLIAMENT AND ELECTIONS, THEN ALL DRAFT LEGISLATION WOULD AUTOMATICALLY FALL.
 3. THERE ARE TWO IMMEDIATE POSSIBLE SETBACKS FOR BRITAIN. FIRST, FUTURE ITALIAN COMMITMENT TO THE EH101 HELICOPTER IS AT RISK: THE BILL ON THE MILITARY VERSION, WHICH IS AT SENATE COMMISSION STAGE, WOULD HAVE TO GO BACK TO FIRST BASE IF THERE WERE ELECTIONS, AND A NEW MINISTER OF INDUSTRY MIGHT BE LESS KEEN THAN MARCORA ON THE CIVIL VARIANT. SECOND, COLOMBO'S ROOM FOR MANOEUVRE WILL BE LIMITED, ALTHOUGH HE WILL KEEP NATO AND EC COMMITMENTS, AND WE CANNOT COUNT ON HIM BEING THERE TO HELP US OVER THE EC BUDGET PROBLEM IN THE AUTUMN.
 4. NO MESSAGE NEED BE SENT UNTIL SPADOLINI'S SUCCESSOR IS KNOWN.
 5. PERTINI'S CONSULTATIONS WITH EX PRESIDENTS, LEADERS OF THE TWO HOUSES, AND ALL MAIN PARTIES SHOULD BE COMPLETED TOMORROW AND HE IS EXPECTED TO GIVE THE FIRST MANDATE ON 11 AUGUST. HE HAS GREAT RESPECT FOR SPADOLINI AND MAY INSIST THAT HE TRY AGAIN. BUT SPADOLINI'S PROSPECTS LOOK DIM UNLESS HIS MAJOR COALITION PARTNERS GIVE NEW ASSURANCES OF SUPPORT.
 6. FURTHER COMMENT ON THE BACKGROUND TO THIS UNEXPECTED CRISIS FOLLOWS BY TOMORROW'S BAG.
- FCO PLEASE PASS SAVING ADDRESSEES.

ARCULUS

LIMITED

(REPEATED AS REQUESTED)

WED

NEWS D

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PS/MR HURD

PS/LORD BELSTREAD

PS/PUS

SIR J BULLARD

MR GOODISON

CABINET OFFICE

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GR 83

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DESKBY 071430Z

FM ROME 071330Z AUG 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO
 TELEGRAM NO. 411 OF 07 AUG 82
 INFO PRIORITY PARIS BONN UKREP BRUSSELS AND WASHINGTON

MYTELEGRAM NO. 410: ⁽³⁵⁾ ITALY INTERNAL

IT WAS ANNOUNCED THIS AFTERNOON THAT THE GOVERNMENT HAD RESIGNED. PRIME MINISTER SPADOLINI WILL FORMALLY HAND HIS RESIGNATION TO PRESIDENT PERTINI LATER TODAY. PERTINI WILL BEGIN CONSULTATIONS WITH PARLIAMENTARY LEADERS AND THE POLITICAL PARTIES ON MONDAY MORNING AND HOPES TO HAVE THESE CONCLUDED BY THE FOLLOWING EVENING.

2. COMMENT FOLLOWS

ARCULUS

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- WED
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- ERD
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- PS/MR HURD
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- SIR J BULLARD
- MR GOODISON

GR 355

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35

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TOP	ONLY 2
INDEXED IN REGISTRY	
-9 AUG 1982	
REGISTRY	Section Taken
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DESKBY 061400Z

FM ROME 061240Z AUG 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NO. 410 OF 06 AUG 82

INFO ROUTINE PARIS, BONN, UKREP BRUSSELS, WASHINGTON

MY TELEGRAM NO. 383: ITALY INTERNAL

1. PARLIAMENTARY DISCUSSION OF THE GOVERNMENT'S FINANCIAL PACKAGE HAS NOT GONE SMOOTHLY. ON 04 AUGUST DC REBEL VOTES MEANT THAT THE GOVERNMENT WAS DEFEATED ON THE PROPOSALS TO CHANGE PETROLEUM TAX PROVISIONS AND TAX COLLECTION PROCEDURES. (PARA 1 OF MY SAVINGRAM 36). FORMICA, THE PSI MINISTER OF FINANCE WITH RESPONSIBILITY FOR TAXGATHERING, REFUSED TO PARTICIPATE IN A CABINET MEETING YESTERDAY WHICH THEREFORE HAD TO BE CANCELLED. THE PSI LEADER CRAXI DECIDED TO SUPPORT FORMICA, AGREED THAT ALL PSI MINISTERS SHOULD LEAVE THE GOVERNMENT, AND CALLED ON SPADOLINI TO RESIGN. ALL THIS CAME AS A SURPRISE TO MOST PEOPLE, INCLUDING SOME MINISTERS TO WHOM I HAVE SPOKEN.

32

WED 0901

- THE BACKGROUND IS A DIFFERENCE OF VIEW WITHIN THE PSI. THEIR MINISTERS FEARED UNPOPULARITY BECAUSE OF THE PACKAGE, AFFECTING THEM PERSONALLY AND THE PARTY'S ELECTORAL PROSPECTS. CRAXI HAD HOWEVER AGREED TO A SUMMER TRUCE WITH DE MITA (DC). THE UNEXPECTED SETBACK IN PARLIAMENT STRENGTHENED THE HAND OF THOSE FAVOURING A TOUGHER LINE. CRAXI MAY ALSO HAVE CALCULATED THAT THE ISSUE SHOWED THE PSI IN A GOOD LIGHT, SINCE THE DC APPEAR TO BE PROTECTING THE INTERESTS OF THEIR CLIENTS, INCLUDING PRIVATE PETROLEUM COMPANIES, AND SABOTAGING THE AGREED AUSTERITY MEASURES. BUT PROVOKING A CRISIS IN MID AUGUST IS NOT THE WAY FOR THE PSI TO WIN FRIENDS.
- SPADOLINI HAS GONE TO CONSULT PERTINI, ON HOLIDAY IN THE ALPS. THEY RETURN TO ROME TOMORROW, AND THE CABINET IS THEN EXPECTED TO MEET AT NOON. PARLIAMENT IS DUE TO GO INTO RECESS TODAY, BUT COULD BE RECONVENED IF THE PRESIDENT INSISTED ON A VOTE OF CONFIDENCE BEFORE LETTING SPADOLINI RESIGN.
- WITH THE PSI IN THEIR PRESENT MOOD IT WILL BE HARD TO PATCH THINGS UP. SPADOLINI MAY NOT SUCCEED IN GETTING EVEN A CARE-TAKER MANDATE. IN ANY CASE, THE DECREE LAWS ON THE ECONOMY MUST BE RATIFIED BY PARLIAMENT WITHIN 60 DAYS OF PROMULGATION (3/4 AUGUST), SO TIME IS SHORT TO RECONSTITUTE AN EFFECTIVE WORKING MAJORITY.

ARCULUS

LIMITED
WED
ECD(2)
ERD
PS
PS | MR HURD

PS | LORD BELSTEAD
PS | PUS
SIR J. BUNNARD
MR WOOLYSON

CONFIDENTIAL



Europe Dept (3)

Now looks likely that

Spadolini will resign.

Mr Goodison *Mr Wood*

M. Osborne 6/8

[Signature]
6/8

ITALIAN GOVERNMENT CRISIS

1. I have spoken with Mr Richardson in Rome about the piece in the news today that said that the Spadolini government is about to fall. Rome will be sending a brief telegram in due course. The government was defeated last night in a secret ballot on tax evasion. Some of their own supporters deserted them in the vote. The tax evasion proposal was part of the economic package agreed on when the government surmounted its last crisis at the beginning of July. The Socialists have now threatened to pull out. Spadolini has flown off to see the President, who is on holiday. The Embassy's guess is that the President will advise him to seek a vote of confidence when parliamentary business resumes at the end of this month.

WRD 01412.	
RECEIVED	RY
-6 AUG 1982	
DESK OFF	INDEX
INDEX	Action Taken
	<i>DR</i>

Mr Wood

A M Wood
Western European Department

6 August 1982

Thank you. I spoke accordingly to the Pössi meeting, who were not surprised to learn that a majority of Italian deputies were opposed to measures designed to prevent tax evasion.

[Signature]
6/8

33

CONFIDENTIAL

*Mr. Osborne o.r.
10/1/82*



British Embassy
Via XX Settembre 80A 00187 Rome

Telex 61049 Telephone 4755.441

*Mr Wood - if you have time
- this is a good letter, useful*

J R Young Esq
WED
FCO

Your reference *reference material*
Our reference 014/4 *Xp
4/8*
Date 23 July 1982

URG	0112
30 JUL 1982	
REGISTRY	
Action Taken	
<i>Mr Wood</i>	

Dear Rob,

*cc: Mr B. Donnelly PUSD
for info.*

ITALY'S 'LAY BLOC'

1. In the past two years it has become a commonplace here to speak of the 'lay bloc' in Italian politics as an emergent third force capable of dealing with the two major parties (DC and PCI) on something like equal terms: you will remember Acquaviva taking this line during your visit to Rome. The parties included in the term 'lay bloc' are the Socialists (PSI), Social Democrats (PSDI), Republicans (PRI), and Liberals (PLI); their combined electoral strength was 19% in the last general elections in 1979, but they have steadily gained votes since then. The untouchable neo-Fascist MSI and the unpredictable Radicals are lay in the strict sense, but are not considered part of the bloc, although the votes of the latter (3% in 1979, less now) are sometimes counted in to boost its apparent size.

2. These four parties have all been in central government since July 1981, when for the first time since 1946 the Liberals and Socialists agreed to co-operate at national level. All four were encouraged by the advent of one of their leaders, Spadolini, to the Palazzo Chigi - the first lay Prime Minister of the Italian Republic. Their support will be essential for Craxi (PSI) when he presses his claim to be Prime Minister - and Craxi feels that next time the DC agree to concede the Prime Ministership, it will be his by right, as leader of the largest lay party. This is therefore an opportune time to look at the lay bloc; the task is easier because all four parties have held Congresses in the last year or so; see my letters of 14 May 1981 (PSI), 4 June 1981 (PRI), 29 December 1981 (PLI), and 11 May 1982 (PSDI) - not copied to all recipients of this letter. The PSI even held another "mini-Congress" at the beginning of April in Rimini; various economic and constitutional proposals were discussed, without any votes or resolutions, but it was basically

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- 2 -

a propaganda exercise to keep the party in the limelight. At all these Congresses, the leaders have placed great emphasis on the need for the lay parties to stand together; the fiercest criticism has consistently been directed at the DC and PCI. The lay parties' disagreement over Falkland sanctions, when all except Craxi's PSI took fright at the degree of Italy's isolation in the EC and NATO, did however show that a controversial issue can split them down the middle.

3. The reason for this new alignment is not hard to find. All four parties sank very low in the 1976 general elections, when the PCI obtained a record 34% and even more of the lay electorate than usual voted DC just to prevent the PCI becoming the largest party. Thereafter the Moro/Andreotti policy of seeking ever closer co-operation between PCI and DC - known as 'national solidarity' - brought the risk that the minor parties might become less essential as coalition partners for the DC; the lay parties feared that, once isolated from the process of power-broking at national level, they would lose influence and votes; the smallest, the PLI, might almost have disappeared. The death of Moro and the subsequent volte-face of the PCI, who withdrew their Parliamentary support from the DC in January 1979, meant that this drastic scenario was not realised. Nevertheless, in the anxieties of that period were the seeds of the present lay rapprochement. Nor is it a coincidence that all four parties changed their leaders during those crucial years 1976-9, in every case choosing a much younger man. Craxi replaced De Martino in 1976; Zanone (PLI) replaced Malagodi in 1976; Romita (PSDI) took over from Tanassi in 1976 and gave way to Longo two years later; Spadolini became leader of the PRI after Ugo La Malfa's death in 1979. This generational change is one reason for their recent success; compared to Craxi and Zanone, the DC hierarchy looks like yesterday's men, even after De Mita's election as Secretary.

4. There has also been an element of ideological change, although its importance should not be exaggerated. The PLI are the clearest example; they have gradually moved from defending a right-wing position, opposed to state ownership and closely identified with big business and professional interests, to the promotion of liberal values in a much broader sense. Craxi has

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- 3 -

put the PSI more firmly than ever in the 'reformist' camp, relegating any left-wing alternative (ie. alliance with the PCI) to a distant future. Longo stresses the PSDI's links with European socialist partners and its commitment to social goals much more than the virulent anti-Communism which distinguished his party until a few years ago. Only Spadolini is really faithful to the line of his predecessor. These doctrinal moves have alienated some of the old guard in each party; but the veterans have nowhere else to go, and such losses as there have been are more than outweighed by the votes attracted away from the DC and PCI and by the enhanced appeal to new electors.

5. Another reason for the progress made by the lay parties is the incoherence of the strategies of the DC and the PCI. The DC show all the signs of having been in power too long; constructive ideas are few and they are rent by factional squabbles. Since Moro they have found no leader capable of guiding them into the 1980's, and the collapse of 'national solidarity' gave them no choice but to rely again on the lay bloc for their Parliamentary majority; a position of relative weakness, skilfully exploited by Craxi. The PCI are going through a difficult period, having moved away from the 'historic compromise' towards a left-wing ("democratic") alternative which may be ideologically attractive to the party faithful but is of little immediate relevance as long as Craxi leads the PSI; internationally, Afghanistan and Poland were severe tests for them. Against this background of stagnation in the two big parties, the attraction of a 'third force' in Italian politics is strong to many of the less committed electorate, and especially to the young.

6. Social change in Italy in the last ten years has also worked in favour of the lay parties, although in electoral terms the DC vote has held up better than many observers predicted. The transformation of Italian society may not be as rapid now as in the 1950's and early 1960's, but all the indicators show that the life style of ordinary Italians continues to change faster than in many other Western European countries. A few examples must suffice. Education in the south continues to become better and more widespread; workers are still moving off the land, although more slowly than before; divorce and abortion are both legal,

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- 4 -

and even the right of Italians to change sex is now recognised by Parliament; the number of telephones has doubled since 1971; the direct intervention of the Church in domestic politics is much reduced, although its implicit support for the DC remains a potent factor, especially in rural areas. There has been a belated growth in 'interest politics', eg. environmental and anti-nuclear, which the Radicals have been clever at exploiting. It is to this new generation of Italians in a changing society that the lay parties do their best to appeal; if they seem so far to have had only modest success, the explanation is to be found in the peculiar polarisation of the Italian electorate between DC and PCI, each with its staunch supporters and diehard enemies. But there is encouragement for the lay bloc in the fact that many of the 'new Italians' have not yet found a permanent electoral home.

7. If we accept that there are new opportunities in the 1980's for the lay parties, the next question is whether they can work together and combine their political weight. Differences of ideology and of policy on specific issues (eg. the welfare state, and most recently sanctions against Argentina) are a major stumbling block, at both local and national level. Craxi's PSI, bigger than the other three put together, is much the most radical and unpredictable. There is also a traditional distinction, reflected in their line-up at the European Parliament, between the social democratic wing (PSDI, and Craxi's PSI) and the liberal democratic (PRI and PLI); the former have had a little-used 'pact of consultation' since October 1980; the latter are also moving closer together, and may, for example, present joint lists for the Senate in the next elections (the Italian system of proportional representation, especially that used in Senate elections, penalises very small parties). As competitors for the same largely middle-class electorate, the lay parties are obliged to present independent images, not least to reassure their own supporters: this applies especially to the three smallest parties, whose approaches often seem similar to a foreign observer. Differences of historical background continue to be deeply felt, and loyalty to distinguished personalities in each party, in some cases even after their death, remains strong;

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- 5 -

it is this, as much as any policy disagreement, which prevents the PRI and the PLI from uniting. Another difficulty is that Craxi patently sees the lay bloc as a vehicle for his own ambitions and is ready to make policy compromises to achieve power; whereas the other parties think more in terms of retaining the small share of the action which they now have, and wish to stay faithful to the party traditions which are the basis of their appeal to their supporters. But despite these deep divisions, to have any chance of successfully managing partnership in government with the DC, any lay Prime Minister must first win and retain the support of the lay bloc: Spadolini's present difficulties are evidence of this.

8. The electoral prospects of the lay bloc are hard to assess and may in any case have changed by the time of the next general elections (which could take place in the autumn). Projections based on local election results, like those of June 1982, need to be treated with caution, because so many other factors apply when voting for a city or regional council; in particular, the consequences of PCI supremacy are regarded as less drastic. Nevertheless, it seems probable that the four lay parties between them will gain at least 5% compared with 1979, at the expense of the PCI, the Radicals, and perhaps the DC; this would still leave them several percentage points weaker than the two largest parties. Their best hope is for a weakening of both the PCI and the DC, permitting a natural "lay" vote in the latter to emerge; Ugo La Malfa once said that if everyone he met who claimed to be a Republican voted PRI, his party would have a majority. Some of the lay parties are also trying to make practising Catholics more welcome in their ranks; Craxi is said to have had some success with this tactic. On policy, the difficulty is that the lay bloc is in no sense a homogeneous unit. If they ever tried to define a joint programme, the edges would have to be hopelessly blurred; there is nothing in common between the extreme left of the PSI and the right of the PLI. It is also true that the more they have to exercise power, the harder it will be to satisfy all their supporters. There are therefore strict limits to how much progress the lay bloc can make in the short or medium term. Craxi could never count on the same degree of solidarity from the lay bloc as could

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- 6 -

Berlinguer from the PCI or even (in a tight spot) a DC Secretary from the various factions of his party.

10. Finally, we should consider whether further advances by the lay bloc would be in the interests of Britain or the West. (Such gains will not in the foreseeable future permit the lay bloc to govern alone; there will always be a DC restraining anchor, for the four parties could never agree to accept Parliamentary support from the only alternative source, the PCI). Much depends on where the new votes came from, and how they were distributed among the four parties. Votes lost by the PCI are most likely to go to the PSI (or even the DC) rather than to the three smaller parties; the second choice of DC supporters is much harder to predict. Craxi remains an unknown quantity, so that we should hope that his PSI do not prove to be the sole beneficiary of the lay bloc's progress; we can welcome extra percentage points for the other three parties with less hesitation. The essential point is that the commitment of the lay bloc to Western democracy and to the further development of Italy along present social and economic lines is not in doubt, so that any transfer of votes to them poses less risk than would a dramatic increase of support for the PCI. Finally, the effect on the other parties is important; if the advance of the lay bloc serves as a catalyst for renewal in the DC, or succeeds in focussing the attention of the Italian government more on the country's real problems (as Spadolini has to some extent done), then this will be good not just for Italy but for Europe as a whole. In recent years, the moment of greatest danger here for the West was probably 1976, when the Italian electorate faced too stark a choice between the corrupt DC establishment and the unknown PCI alternative; the emergence of a stronger third force in Italian politics, whatever its defects, has forced both the largest parties to do some hard thinking and has widened the possible permutations in Italian politics.

Yours ever,

Robert Culshaw
R N Culshaw

/cc:

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- 7 -

cc: Chanceries: All EC Posts
 Washington
 UKDEL NATO
 Mrs K Colvin, Research Dept, FCO
 Consulate General, Milan and Naples
 Consuls, Florence and Genoa

Your reference

Our reference

Date 12 July 1982

ABOVE ITALIAN SUMMIT; DURATION OF ITALIAN GOVERNMENTS

1. Your letter of 5 July to Roy Osborne.

2. I agree with your calculation of (nearly) ten months for the average post-war Italian Government taken from the 1945-1963 governments as a whole of 1 April to David Gladstone, 20. I also calculate the average length of government within the month (30 days), the dates, again, of each government.

It may be interesting, for reference purposes, in the attached list of Italian Foreign Ministers since 1951 which comprises a couple of months ago. Apart from Martino, Saragat and Ruffini, and since mid-1963, they have all been Christian Democrats.

Mrs E E Colvin
 West and Southern European Section
 Research Department

cc: Mr Osborne, WFO

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office
London SW1A 2AH

Telephone 01-

Europe (32)
Political Section
13/7

Mr R N Culshaw MVO
ROME

Your reference

Our reference

Date 12 July 1982

WRD *942*
13/7

26 JUL 1982

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ANGLO ITALIAN SUMMIT; DURATION OF ITALIAN GOVERNMENTS

1. Your letter of 5 July to Roy Osborne. — (30)
2. I agree with your calculation of (nearly) ten months for the average post-war Italian Government taken from the 1945 Farri Government (see my minute of 1 April to David Gladstone, copy attached). I also calculate the average length of Government crisis as one month (30 days), the dates, again, based on press sources.
3. You may be interested, for reference purposes, in the attached list of Italian Foreign Ministers since 1951 which I compiled a couple of months ago. Apart from Martino, Saragat and Nenni, and since mid-1969, they have all been Christian Democrats.

Mrs K F Colvin
West and Southern European Section
Research Department

c.c. Mr Osborne, WED ✓

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INFO SAVING WASHINGTON, PARIS, BONN, UKREP BRUSSELS, UKDEL NATO.
MY TELNO 369: SENATE DEBATE

1. A CLEVER PERFORMANCE BY SPADOLINI IN LAST WEEK'S SENATE DEBATE ON THE ECONOMY, TOGETHER WITH THE EUPHORIA OCCASIONED BY ITALY'S WORLD CUP VICTORY, HAVE GIVEN SPADOLINI'S GOVERNMENT A FURTHER LEASE OF LIFE. THE GOVERNMENT WON BY A COMFORTABLE MARGIN THE VOTE OF CONFIDENCE WHICH ENDED THE DEBATE ON 10 JULY. SPADOLINI'S ANALYSIS IN HIS SPEECH ON 8 JULY CONTAINED NOTHING NEW AND, IN PARTICULAR, CONTAINED NO CONCRETE ECONOMIC PROPOSALS. HE MERELY REAFFIRMED THE NEED TO REDUCE THE 1982 DEFICIT BY AT LEAST 10,000 BILLION LIRE, THROUGH A COMBINATION OF UNSPECIFIED SPENDING CUTS AND INCREASES IN TAXATION. HE SAID THAT STATE SECTOR FIRMS THEMSELVES, RATHER THAN INTERSIND (WHO REPRESENT THEIR MANAGEMENT COLLECTIVELY), SHOULD BE ASKED TO WITHDRAW THE DENUNCIATION OF THE SCALA MOBILE FOR THEIR EMPLOYEES. HE GAVE NO PLEDGE OF DIRECT GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION TO REFORM THE SCALA MOBILE, BUT HINTED THAT THE COST-OF-LIVING RISES MIGHT NOT IN FUTURE TAKE ACCOUNT OF VAT INCREASES. HE DID HOWEVER UNDERTAKE TO MAKE CONCRETE PROPOSALS FOR DEALING WITH THE PUBLIC DEFICIT AT THE SAME TIME AS PRESENTING THE 1983 FINANCE BILL (WHICH INCLUDES THE DRAFT STATE BUDGET FOR 1983) BY 31 JULY. TWO MONTHS EARLIER THAN USUAL AT DC INSISTENCE. PARTY SPOKESMEN SET OUT THEIR RESPECTIVE POSITIONS. THE COMPROMISE MOTION FINALLY PUT TO THE VOTE TOOK NOTE OF THE UNDERTAKINGS IN SPADOLINI'S TWO SPEECHES AND APPROVED HIS LINE IN THE VAGUEST POSSIBLE TERMS.

2. SPADOLINI WAS SUCCESSFUL IN DEFUSING A CRISIS PRODUCED BY THE PSI. HIS PRESCRIPTION THOUGH NOT AT FIRST WELCOMED BY THE DC, IN FACT CONTAINED UNDERLYING ELEMENTS OF ANDRIETTA'S AUSTERITY MEASURES.

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3. ALTHOUGH THE RISK OF GOVERNMENT CRISIS BEFORE THE SUMMER HAS DIMINISHED, IN THE LONGER TERM THE DIVERGENT APPROACHES OF ANDREATTA AND THE PSI WILL PROVE HARD TO RECONCILE. THE PCI REMAIN BITTERLY CRITICAL. THE CRUNCH MAY COME WHEN SPADOLINI IS FINALLY FORCED TO TABLE CONCRETE PROPOSALS ON THE ECONOMY AT THE END OF THE MONTH AND IN PARTICULAR ON MEASURES TO REDUCE THE 1982 PUBLIC DEFICIT. SPADOLINI MUST ALSO COPE WITH THE REACTION OF EMPLOYERS AND UNIONS; THE LATTER ARE BOUND TO EXERT MORE PRESSURE AS NEXT JANUARY'S DEADLINE FOR RENUNCIATION OF THE SCALA MOBILE IN THE PRIVATE SECTOR COMES CLOSER (THERE ARE ALREADY SIGNS OF THE COMMUNIST FEDERATION CGIL TAKING A HARDER LINE THAN THE OTHER TWO.

FCO PLEASE PASS SAVING ADDRESSEES.

ARCULUS

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

LIMITED

WED

ECD (1)

ERD

PS

PS/MR HURD

PS/LORD BELSTEAD

PS/PUS

SIR J BULLARD

MR GOODISON

[NOT ADVANCED]

Extra Internal Political



British Embassy
Via XX Settembre 80A 00187 Rome

Telex 61049 Telephone 4755.441

WRJ 014/2		
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Mr R P Osborne
WED
F C O

Our reference

Date 5 July 1982

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32

Dear Roy,

ANGLO-ITALIAN SUMMIT

1. Your letter WRJ 026/1 of 1 July to Tom Richardson.
2. It has for some time been part of the received wisdom that the average duration of post-war Italian Governments has been eight months. Seeing this again in cold print led me to check the figures. I make the average ten months, with an average duration for the crises following the falls of governments as one month. The figures are much the same whether one speaks of post-war or Republic governments.
3. Research Department might check my arithmetic. If it proves correct, we should make an appropriate amendment to the briefing next time.

Yours ever,

Robert Culshaw

R Culshaw

cc:
Mrs K. Colvin, Research Dept

Mr Young
Mr Wood

29



British Embassy
Via XX Settembre 80A 00187 Rome

Tellex 61049 Telephone 4755.441

Fascinating. Another excellent

reference paper.

Expressing too
Your reference

[Handwritten signature]

R P Osborne Esq
WED
PCO

Our reference 011/1

Date 30 June 1982

WRD 01412

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Dear Roy,

CHRISTIAN DEMOCRAT (DC) CONGRESS

- Rome Telno 245 (copy enclosed for Holy See, Madrid, Lisbon and Consular posts in Italy). I apologise for the delay in sending this full report; there is, however, one advantage, in that we now have a clearer picture of the organisation of the party under De Mita (para 11 below). The Annexes to this report describe the factions (correnti), the National Council, the Direzione, De Mita's Inner Cabinet (Ufficio Politico), and the Heads of Department (who often have few or no staff working to them).
- The DC held their 15th Congress in the EUR suburb of Rome from 2 - 6 May, in conditions of unprecedented security. 847 elected delegates represented the party's 1,390,000 members throughout Italy; membership has declined slightly in the last two years. A higher proportion of delegates than before came from the South, because the distribution is now based on the number of DC votes cast in each region rather than on party membership figures. In addition, 401 DC Parliamentarians and 75 "outsiders" (para 10 below) participated with the right to vote. The percentage of female delegates, at less than 3%, was lower than at any other recent major Italian party congress, and no woman holds a position of authority in the hierarchy. The delegates and the audience came from a wide range of social backgrounds, and were for the most part middle-aged: the party's youth movement made no impression at all on the Congress.

Foreign Participation

3. Many Christian Democrat parties in Europe and South America sent observers, and invited representatives also came from a number of other international organisations with close links to the DC. There were observers from the Afghan resistance and from Solidarnosc, both of whom predictably got standing ovations. The British Conservative party declined their invitation; the DC organisers were not sure whether this was due solely to the Falklands crisis.

/Election of Secretary



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Election of Secretary

4. A change to the DC statute meant that at this Congress the new Secretary (who is the party's effective leader) was to be directly elected by the delegates. Many in the DC had hoped that agreement could be reached on a single candidate, so that the Congress would strengthen party unity rather than reveal divisions, but at the last minute Forlani came forward to oppose De Mita. The struggle between them was a hard fought gladiatorial contest, with crowd reactions to match - De Mita in particular brought bus-loads of supporters from his home town. The delegates enjoyed their new power as king-makers; the lobbies were full of discussion of the merits of the candidates, rather than of political programmes.

5. The policies offered by the two men, who are old personal friends, differed only in emphasis. De Mita played on his Southern origins and presented himself as a new broom; his advance in the party has been rapid since he became Vice Secretary in December 1980, when Piccoli decided to appoint him as a representative of the then minority. He made light of his history of support for the Andreotti/Moro line of greater collaboration with the PCI, but was tougher than Forlani on Craxi and the PSI. He argued for modernisation of the Constitution, with particular reference to the role of Parliament, and said that the welfare system must be made more efficient (with the implication, popular in the South, that its budget would not be cut). Forlani was more polished and statesmanlike, and solidly in favour of the present relationship with the PSI. He appealed successfully for the party to stand up for its historic values, and was personally more popular with individual delegates and with the audience than the final voting figures might suggest; he did 9% better in the secret ballot for elections to the new National Council than in the open ballot for party Secretary. De Mita's election with 55% of the delegates' votes on the first ballot would have been a foregone conclusion but for the split in two factions (para 9 below) and the uncertain intentions of the "outsiders" (para 10 below). It was due to an agreement reached in back rooms between the faction leaders; Annex B shows their alignment. There was considerable bitterness between the rival groups of supporters, and the majority and minority have still not come to an agreement about the management of the party until the next Congress (para 11 below).

The Political Debate

6. Discussion of major topics like the economy was even more sparse than at most Italian party congresses. Unlike 1980, the DC's overall political strategy was not this time in doubt; no speaker questioned that the present five-party coalition should be continued. Relations with the PCI were not controversial; the
/Communists

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Communists themselves are not at present interested in renewed alliance with the DC, and the Area ZAC faction therefore did not press hard e.g. for an experimental partnership at local level. The PSI therefore became the reference point of the Congress, and a series of anti-Socialist diatribes were well received by the delegates. Some speakers like Colombo, Andreotti and Donat-Cattin tried to address Italy's real problems, but the DC were more in a mood to applaud polemics and respond to rhetoric about party pride. There were some unhelpful references to the Falklands (see Rome Telno 229, not to all), but neither this nor any other foreign affairs topic fired the enthusiasm of the Congress. The domestic programme on which De Mita was in theory elected (copy sent separately to FCO only) contained little that was new and its details have already been forgotten; he will be judged more by the success or failure of his tactics. His Southern backers see his election as a way of increasing their influence in the party; some observers think that this in itself will accentuate differences with Craxi's Milan-style PSI. Although in present circumstances De Mita has little scope for applying the pro-PCI line which remains close to his heart, there are already signs at local government level that he will seek to introduce rather more ambiguity into the DC's search for alliance partners, as a warning shot to the PSI. (I shall report separately on this). Above all, he was elected in the expectation that he would prove tougher with Craxi.

Political Effect of the Congress

7. Other Italian parties were not given a chance to speak at the Congress, but made known their reactions through the press. Craxi was enraged by the widespread criticism of his forcing tactics within the coalition, and PSI commentators made clear during the Congress that relations with a DC led by De Mita would become more difficult; their party newspaper passed a negative judgment on his election and on the Congress as a whole. The other lay parties took the view that the government coalition had not been strengthened by the Congress. The PCI were not very welcoming towards De Mita, but certainly glad that Forlani lost; given their policy of seeking a left-wing alternative government to replace the DC, they are bound to affect indifference to the party's internal manoeuvring. The main effect was on the DC themselves, whose confidence was boosted by a week in which they found themselves again at centre stage, culminating in the emergence of a new and perhaps stronger Secretary. Since then, the reasonable local election results (Rome Saving Telegram 26, not to all) and Craxi's relative quiescence have helped to give De Mita a breathing space.

Factions

8. Annex A gives details. There has been little change in their relative sizes since 1980, although Andreotti has gained some /percentage

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percentage points. Despite all the cries for renewal since the party's special assembly last November, the factions dominated this Congress, just as they have all its predecessors. A 20% threshold was imposed to limit the number of lists for the National Council, but the only effect of this was to make the factions amalgamate (see Annex B). It is likely that these heterogeneous lists will prove fissiparous, as personal and regional loyalties reassert themselves. The structure of the factions, which have separate finances, offices and newspapers, remains unchanged.

9. The size and compactness of the Area ZAC enabled them to present the winning candidate. Andreotti delivered his faction in return for the Area ZAC's support of his policy of 'national solidarity' as Prime Minister from 1976 - 1979, and because there is no love lost between him and Forlani. There are also rumours that he hopes to become Foreign Minister in the next cabinet reshuffle. The factions at the centre, whose role is usually decisive, were able to support De Mita because PCI collaboration in central government was no longer perceived to be a threat. The existing split in the Dorotei (dating back to Bisaglia's undignified resignation as Minister, when he felt Piccoli should have defended him better) was confirmed. The Fanfaniani suffered even worse damage; their leader has his eyes on the Presidency next time and therefore wanted above all to be on the winning side; most of the faction remained loyal to Forlani, filling the Congress with shouts of "Judas" when Fanfani rose to speak. After so much talk of the need for new faces and greater internal party democracy, it was a strange experience to watch all the old faction leaders (described by Andreotti as capi preistorici) speak to a rapt audience on the last evening of the Congress; they could have delivered much the same speeches in 1948. Those who supported De Mita have already begun to receive their rewards in terms of party positions; Piccoli, for example, is President of the DC. Others are no doubt waiting for the first government reshuffle to get a Ministerial post.

'Outsiders'

10. The presence of 75 outsiders (esterni) was a major innovation. Many critics dismissed it as window-dressing, but the fact remains that no other Italian party would give non-members such a role at its Congress. The outsiders who spoke added intellectual distinction to the proceedings but had little effect on the outcome; many were disillusioned enough not even to cast their votes. Nevertheless, the innovation was felt by the party leadership to be a success, demonstrating the DC's broad appeal as an inter-class party and reaffirming its traditional links with Catholic organisations. De Mita has broken tradition by appointing outsiders /to

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to head some departments (Annex E), but the practical effect of this may well be to reduce the departments' already slight weight in DC decision making: the DC has always profitted from its near-identification with the state to make use of the expertise and research staff of Ministers in each sector, rather than creating a parallel structure in the party.

Organisation of the DC

11. The organisational chart is not complete, because De Mita has yet to appoint Vice-Secretaries, but the pattern is clear. De Mita has placed his supporters in all key positions, and taken the opportunity to pay off political debts acquired before or during the Congress. The new party machine is not yet running smoothly. The minority, now known collectively as Forlaniani, remain uncertain whether to share responsibility for the present management of the party by accepting senior positions; Donat-Cattin has proved the most intransigent, arguing that it is better to see first how De Mita shapes up, especially in his first real clash with Craxi. The majority grouping which enabled De Mita to be elected may well gradually disintegrate, as the "preambolo" group did after the 1980 Congress; De Mita would then be left, like his predecessor, constantly looking for short-term tactical alliances within the party hierarchy to push through his policies (i.e. a policy of trasformismo). The fact that he was directly elected and is therefore hard to remove before the next Congress strengthens his hand; but just as the Prime Minister cannot carry on without the support of his coalition partners, so no DC Secretary can remain effective if a majority of the factions oppose him.

Conclusion

12. It is hard to resist the cynical conclusion that nothing has changed in the DC. The "new" grouping called PAF (Piccoli, Andreotti, Fanfani) is identical to one formed for similar ends in the early 1960's. The procedural innovations at this Congress made little difference and did not greatly improve the party's image. These are early days, but at first sight De Mita does not look like the man to lead the DC to new successes in the 1980's. Although cleverer than Piccoli, he is said to have the same narrow outlook; he has virtually no international experience (the joke is that his only visit abroad was to Milan) and this makes it more surprising that he has so far chosen to retain for himself the foreign affairs portfolio (with an adviser whose background is largely UNESCO). Patronage and raccomandazione (commendation by an influential party figure) continue to play an important role at every level of the party; the system for distributing entry passes at the Congress was a small but telling example. Proponents of renewal in the DC will find it harder now to get a hearing; almost none of their serious proposals has been implemented. In short, the DC faces

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the future after this Congress with its virtues and vices substantially unchanged, even though in the short-term De Mita may be better placed to stand up to Craxi and to reassert traditional DC claims to running the country. We shall examine in a forthcoming despatch what prospects the party has of maintaining its dominant position in Italian politics.

Yours ever,

Robert Culshaw.

R N Culshaw

cc: (without encls.)

Washington
Bonn
Paris
UKRep BRUSSELS
Athens
Lisbon
UKDel NATO
Holy See
Madrid

(with encls.)

Mrs K Colvin, Research Dept, FCO
PUSD
BCG MILAN
BCG NAPLES
BC FLORENCE
BC GENOA

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THE CORRENTI (FACTIONS) OF THE DC

Nb: these are not complete lists of delegates belonging to each faction. The most important members are given in the first column.

Area Zaccagnini (28%)Zaccagnini

Andreatta	Erminero
Belci	Fioret
Bodrato	Folloni
Cossiga	Fracanzani
De Mita	Gasco
Galloni	Garavaglia
Granelli	Gargani
Gui	Giglia
Gullotti	Giudice
Marcora	Golfari
Misasi	Grassi
Rognoni	Grippo
	Kessler
Angelini	La Morgia
Anselmi: Tina	La Placa
Aragnani	Ligato
Armato	Lussignoli
Bassetti	Martinazzoli
Bombardieri	Martini: M E
Bonalumi	Mastella
Bonifacio	Menziani
Bressani	Morlino
Brocca	Nicoletti
Cabras	Padula
Calcaterra	Pisanu
Calza	Puja
Carelli	Pumilia
Casoti	Rebecchini
Castaguetti	Rochi
Cazzella	Russo: G
Ciaffi	Salvi
Citterio	Sanza
Cortese	Silvestri
Dell'Andro	Tedeschi
De Poli	Urso
Di Capua	Zaniboni
	Zotta

Notes: Now the largest corrente. It was formed before the 1980 Congress and includes most of the Morotei, the Base, Nuove Forze (the splinter group from Forze Nuove) and the Gullottiani. Its news sheet is 'Il Confronto'.

/ Dorotei

Dorotei (25%)

Piccoli

Abis
 Bisaglia *
 Degan *
 Gaspari
 Cava
 Pandolfi
 Ruffini
 Speranza
 Tesini *
 Zamberletti

Aggradi
 Barba
 Bonelli
 Borruso
 Campagnoli *
 Casini
 Castelli
 Ciocci
 Cuminetti
 Danesi
 D'Angelo
 De Giuseppe
 Del Maso
 Fellini
 Ferretti
 Fusaro
 Gambino
 Giacometti *
 Iannotta
 Lattanzio
 Malvestio
 Manfredi

Mazzola *
 Mezzadri
 Mezzapesa
 Micheli
 Mizzani
 Mole
 Montemaggiore
 Moser
 Patriarca
 Pennacchio
 Pentello
 Petrucci
 Pucci
 Sarti *
 Scalia
 Scarlato
 Sedati
 Selva
 Speggorini
 Strigliani
 Tarabini
 Taviani
 Tomelleri

Notes: A corrente at the centre of the DC spectrum which has often been decisive in forming majorities within the party. In the past it has included also Andreotti, Moro, Colombo, and Rumor. At the 1982 Congress it split; most followed Piccoli in supporting De Mita's candidature for the Secretaryship, but about 40% (the most important of whom are marked with an asterisk above) aligned themselves instead with Forlani.

Andreotti, whose right hand man
 in Evangelista. Original power base was Lazio, but
 Andreotti has worked hard to establish the corrente
 elsewhere, with considerable success in the 300 / Andreottiani
 and Piemonte.

Andreottiani (16%)

Andreotti

Acquisto

Evangelisti

Pomicino

Scotti

Signorello

Amato

Quarta

Bellelli

Quattrone

Bisagno

V. Russo

Boffardi

Stammati

Bona

Tantolo

Bonsignore

Todini

Calleri

Zoppi

Carenini

Costa

Cristofori

Drago

Ferrara

Goria

Lima

Mecchelli

Merlino

Miroglio

Notes: Dominated by its leader, Andreotti, whose right hand man is Evangelisti. Original power base was Lazio, but Andreotti has worked hard to establish the corrente elsewhere, with considerable success in the South, Liguria, and Piemonte.

Nuove Cronache (13%) - Better known as Fanfaniani

Fanfani*

Arnaud

Bartolomei*

Bubbico*

D'Arezzo*

Darida*

Forlani

F M Malfatti

Natali

Radi

Aiardi

Azzaro*

Becchetti

Becciu*

Bosco*

Butini

Cerioni

Corder*

Cresci*

D'Aimmo

Del Rio*

De Vitto

Falcucci

Ferrari

Fornasari

La Loggia*

La Penna*

Lucchesi

Orsini

Parisi*

Pezzati

Quercini

G. Rossi*

Salvini

Scalfaro

Scipioni

Tambroni

Tombesi

Vincelli*

Notes: Main strength is in central Italy; very much linked to the fortunes of Fanfani himself. Badly split at this Congress: /only

only a minority (including those marked with an asterisk) followed Fanfani's lead and supported De Mita: the rest voted for Forlani who heckled Fanfani as a 'traitor'. (Forlani was for years Fanfani's protege but there have been personal difficulties between them in recent years; and Fanfani's strong ambition to be President of the Republic after Pertini meant that he wanted above all to be on the winning side).

Forze Nuove (8%)

Donat-Cattin

V. Colombo

Faraguti

Fontana

Foschi

Mannino

Leccisi

Lombardini

Napoli

Santuz

Sinesio

Notes: Donat-Cattin is the leader. Strongest in the North. The corrente closest to the Catholic trade union movement. Publishes a news sheet, 'Il dibattito'.

Colombei (3%)

E Colombo

Andriuli

Mazzarino

Spitella

Antoniozzi

Picchioni

De' Cocci

Savio

Notes: The friends of E. Colombo. Publishes a news sheet in Lazio called 'L'idea popolare'.

Rumoriani (2%)

Rumor
Andreoni
Guerzoni
C. Russo
Tiriolo

Notes: Neither Rumor nor his corrente have much influence. Rumor's position as President of the World Christian Democrat Union is something of a sinecure.

Proposta (2 - 3 %)

Mazzotta
G. Bianco
Segni

Ciccardini Mazzoli
Marabini Rossi di Montelera

Notes: A new grouping which pretends not to be a corrente. Distinguishing feature is stern opposition to the PCI. Publishes a news sheet, 'Proposta'.

Prandiniani (2%)

Prandini Bonferroni
 Cazora
 Leone
 P. Moro

Notes: A small group of ex-Fanfaniani owing allegiance to Prandini.

PAF (lista n. 1) 34.5%

Amintore FANFANI*
 Flaminio PICCOLI*
 Giulio ANDREOTTI*
 Antonio GAVA
 Franco EVANGELISTI
 Clelio DARIDA
 Filippo MICHELI
 Salvo LIMA
 Remo GASPARI
 Manfredi BOSCO
 Vito LATTANZIO
 Vincenzo SCOTTI
 Mauro BUBBICO
 Nicola SIGNORELLO
 Lucio ABIS
 Vincenzo RUSSO
 Vincenzo SCARLATO
 Bernardo D'AREZZO
 Antonio DRAGO
 Giancarlo TESINI
 Amerigo PETRUCCI
 Attilio RUFFINI
 Tommaso BISAGNO
 Andrea BORRUSO
 Girolamo LA PENNA
 Egidio CARENINI
 Silvio LEGA
 Nino CRISTOFORI
 Nicola QUARTA
 Corrado MONTEMAGGIORI
 Angelo BECCIU
 Mario D'ACQUISTO
 Davide BARBA
 Italo BECCHETTI
 Giovanni BONELLI
 Girolamo MEHELLI
 Vinicio STRIGLIONI
 Vito BONSIGNORE
 Gian Paolo CRESCI
 Giuseppe MERLINO
 Pasquale CIUFFREDA
 Claudio PONTELLO
 Giovanni SACCO
 Luigi GIOIA
 Emanuela SAVIO
 Giovanni DI BENEDETTO
 Giuseppe D'ANGELO
 Andrea CARRARA
 Leone PERA
 Aldo CORAZZI
 Angelo MONFREDI
 Giancarlo PASTIGATO
 Vittorio SBADELLA
 Benedetto TODINI
 Vittorio PELLEGRINI
 Pasquale PERUGINI
 Franco MAZZOLA
 Paolo Cirino POMICINO
 Bruno ORSINI

FORLANI (lista n. 2) 35.5%

Arnaldo FORLANI*
 Antonio BISAGLIA
 Carlo DONAT CATTIN
 Vittorino COLOMBO
 Franco Maria MALFATTI
 Mario MAZZARINO
 Roberto MAZZOTTA
 Elio TIRIOLO
 Giovanni PRANDINI
 Giorgio SPIELLA
 Luciano FARAGUTI
 Filippo PANDOLFI
 Mario SEGNI
 Costante DEGAN
 Virginangelo MARABINI
 Calogero MANNINO
 Rolando PICCHIONI
 Mario FERRARI AGGRADI
 Franco BONFERRONI
 Paolo CACCIA
 Publio FIORI
 Oscar Luigi SCALFARO
 Franco FOSCHI
 Carmine MENSORIO
 Natale PISICCHIO
 Giuseppe LEONE
 Giuseppe LUCCHESI
 Giovanni FONTANA
 Lorenzo NATALI
 Sandro FONTANA
 Carlo RUSSO
 Sergio ERCINI
 Marco FOLLINI
 Roberto MONGINI
 Gastone SAVIO
 Ettore BONALBERTI
 Gustavo SERVA
 Alessandro DUCE
 Ivo BUTINI
 Emerenzio BARBIERI
 Pier Ferdinando CASINI
 Gianni POTENZA
 Serafino GENEROSO
 Adriano BLASUTTI
 Emo DANESI
 Diego VERSACE
 Roberto MASSI
 Gianni CONTI
 Ernesto MARIOTTO
 Benito CAZORA
 Franco FAUSTI
 Nino PISONI
 Alberto CASALINI
 Franco MULAS
 Romano ARIOLI
 Giovanni FALLETTI
 Emilio COLOMBO*
 Mariano RUMOR*

AREA ZAC (lista n. 3) 30%

Benigno Zaccagnini*
 Ciriaco DE MITA*
 Beniamino ANDREATTA
 Guido BODRATO
 Paolo CABRAS
 Luigi GUI
 Antonino GULLOTTI
 Giovanni MARCORA
 Riccardo MISASI
 Virginio ROGNONI
 Tina ANSELMI
 Carlo FRACANZANI
 Luigi GIGLIA
 Luigi GRANELLI
 Bruno KESSLER
 Mino MARTINAZZOLI
 Giuseppe PISANU
 Angelo SANZA
 Nicola SANESE
 Gilberto BONALUMI
 Renato DELL'ANDRO
 Ugo GRIPPO
 Lodovico LIGATO
 Giovanni GALLONI
 Corrado BELCI
 Aldo CALZA
 Felice CALCATERA
 Pier Luigi CASTAGNETTI
 Adriano CIAFFI
 Guido FOLLONI
 Cesare GOLFARI
 Renato GRASSI
 Giorgio LA MORGIA
 Rosario NICOLETTI
 Carmelo PUJIA
 Angelo ROICH
 Sergio MATTARELLA
 Elzio ALBERTON
 Ranjero BENEDETTO
 Enzo SORICE
 Florindo DAIMMO
 Marco DE PETRO
 Vincenzo MANNINO
 Gervasio PAGANI
 Marino CORTESE
 Giuseppe MATULLI
 Luigi NANNIPIERI
 Alberto GAROCCHIO
 Clemente MASTELLA
 Giuseppe TONUTTI

* Member by right

ANNEX C

DIREZIONE, JUNE 1982

Dorotei (7)

*Gava
*Scarlato
*Lattanzio
*Pentello
*Micheli
Bisaglia
Pandolfi

Andreottiani (4)

*Andreotti
*Evangelisti
*Lima
*Quarta

Fanfaniani (5)

*Fanfani
*Bubbico
*Bosco
Butini
Malfatti

Area Zac (9)

*Martinazzoli
*Gullotti
*Mattarella
*Belci
*Misasi
*Granelli
*Cabras
*Galloni
*Ciaffi

Forze Nuove (4)

Donat-Cattin
Faraguti
Fontana
V. Colombo

Proposta (1)

Mazzotta

Colombei (1)

Spitella

Prandiniani (1)

Prandini

Of these 32 elected members, the 21 asterisked were supporters of De Mita at the 1982 Congress. There are also the following
/five

five ex officio members:

- *Piccoli (President)
- *De Mita (Secretary)
- *Tonutti (Administrative Secretary)
- G Bianco (Capogruppo, Chamber)
- *De Giuseppe (Capogruppo, Senate)

All DC ex-Prime Ministers and Party Secretaries have a right to be present at Direzione meetings, but not to vote.

Callisto Tanzi, Political Editor of "L'Espresso", the DC newspaper

NOTE: According to the new DC statute, the Ufficio Politico has 7 members: there is also one possible vacant place. It contains none of Forlani's supporters of the Congress.

ANNEX D

DE MITA'S UFFICIO POLITICO, JUNE 1982

Piccoli

De Mita

G. Bianco

De Giuseppe

Fanfani

Andreotti

Martinazzoli

Gava

Gullotti

Galloni (now Political Editor of "Popolo", the DC newspaper)

NOTE: According to the new DC statute, the Ufficio Politico may have between 7 and 11 members: there is thus one possible vacant place. It contains none of Forlani's supporters at the Congress.

ANNEX E

DC DEPARTMENT HEADS, JUNE 1982

Sanese	(Organisation)
Prof. Cappelletti	(Culture and Education)
Prof. D'Onofrio	(Local Government)
Goria	(Economy)
Fava	(Catholic bodies)
Bosco	(Institutions)
Borruso	(Social Affairs)
Nicoletti	(South)
Evangelisti	(Mass Activities)
Misasi	(Political Secretary of De Mita)
Mastella	(Press)

De Mita has also appointed four Advisers to the party:
Prof. Prodi, Prof. De Rita, Prof. Ruffilli, and Dott. Fabiani.
De Mita himself attains responsibility for foreign affairs,
but Maria Luisa Paronetto Valier will advise him.

R P Osborne

WED

...

Ref Savigny ram 26
of 16 June 1982



Europe (26)

Internal Postal

AS
4+

With the compliments of

Robert Curran

My apologies that DC copies upon,
not to mention two despatches on DC
and PCI, have been held up. Too
much Falkland Islanding!

15
6

BRITISH EMBASSY

ROME		BIC/12	
RECEIVED		BY	
- 7 JUL 1982			
OFFICE		REGISTRY	
INDEX		Action Taken	
		✓	

per
ra

Forte balzo in avanti del « polo » laico con successi vistosi del psi e del pri

Fermo il movimento sociale - Aumentano del tre per cento (rispetto alle precedenti comunali) i non votanti - Soddisfazione di Spadolini e Craxi - Adesso le forze politiche si preparano alla verifica

ROMA — Dal voto di ieri in 180 comuni sparsi in ogni parte d'Italia emergono risultati parziali contraddittori e a volte contrastanti, anche in centri situati a pochi chilometri di distanza l'uno dall'altro. Da una prima analisi a caldo, spiccano però alcune costanti, che i dati dell'ultima ora, a notte fonda, sembrano confermare.

Avanzano quasi ovunque i partiti del « polo » laico-socialista: psi, pri, psdi e, sia pure in misura minore, il più: tutti guadagnano in voti e in seggi rispetto alle precedenti elezioni politiche e comunali. I successi più vistosi sono per Spadolini e Craxi.

Calano invece, quasi ovunque, dc e pci; più i comunisti che lo scudo crociato: la media generale oscilla, con ripicchi ancora molto parziali, da uno a due punti in meno per entrambi i partiti. Una rapida « carrellata » su alcune situazioni locali rivela, per pci e dc, realtà politiche sulle quali Berlinguer e De Mita dovranno meditare a lungo: la dc perde a Trieste e guadagna, in modo a volte clamoroso, in Sicilia ed a Pantelleria; in quel crollo in Campania e in alcuni centri della Calabria ma tiene e a volte guadagna nelle Puglia, dove nelle ultime politiche i risultati erano stati negativi.

Il bipolarismo do-pci è comunque in crisi e questo « test » conferma che le preferenze di larghe fasce di elettori si

vanno spostando verso i partiti di democrazia laico-socialista. E' un test che conferma altri due dati emersi in precedenti consultazioni: il calo quasi generale del msi, anche in antiche, tradizionali roccaforti del Sud; l'incremento del « partito » della scheda bianca: è andato a votare un tre per cento in meno rispetto alle precedenti comunali (da 88 a 84,9).

Un dato inedito, e politicamente significativo, riguarda la democrazia proletaria, il partito che aveva organizzato il referendum per le liquidazioni. Se Capanna, dopo la nuova legge e il giudizio della Cassazione, puntava ad una rinvicina con queste elezioni, le sue speranze sono andate deluse: « dp » ha raccolto, dove si è presentato, percentuali irrisorie.

Questi risultati, ancora non definitivi, potranno influenzare l'imminente verifica, quel chiarimento politico più volte sollecitato soprattutto da Craxi? E' presto per dare una risposta netta e precisa a una domanda che tutta la Roma politica si pone in un momento in cui il governo continua a riscuotere successi nella lotta al terrorismo e ad affrontare sempre nuovi problemi per l'emergenza economica. Di certo, sembra difficile, per la dc, in questo momento, dire a Spadolini di preparare le valigie e di lasciare Palazzo Chigi.

Se ci sarà, come tutto lascia credere, l'appoggio di Craxi, la verifica, comunque sfoci (con una crisi o con un rimpasto) dovrebbe portare a una conferma dell'attuale Presidente del Consiglio. In altre parole, il prossimo governo dovrebbe essere uno Spadolini-bis.

Nel gran coro dei commenti al risultato, tra l'euforia dei laici e le cautele democristiane e comuniste, spicca, per la sua importanza politica, proprio la dichiarazione di Craxi. « Non si tratta di umori passeggeri, ma di un'onda lunga che continua e continuerà il suo corso. Essa accompagna e sostiene la nostra politica e la nostra iniziativa e ci incoraggia a svilupparla con coerenza e determinazione. Ne attendiamo e ne abbiamo bisogno, giacché si sono profilate e continuano ad emergere si-

tuazioni di difficoltà che affronteremo sapendo di poter contare su di una forte spinta ». Il psi dunque, non ha fretta anche se uno dei suoi sottosegretari, Scamarcio, che fu al centro tempo fa di

un « caso » che stava per provocare la crisi, rilancia, in un momento forse poco opportuno, la sua polemica anti-dc: « La dc di De Mita è servita e questo è solo l'antipasto ».

Luca Giurato

A Nardò crescono socialisti e pri

Comune di NARDÒ (Lecce)

PARTITI	COMUNALI '82		POL. '79 %	COMUNALI '76			
	VOTI	SEGGI		VOTI	SEGGI		
DC	8367	46,3	15	43,5	8318	51,5	17
PCI	2635	14,5	5	21,6	3260	20,2	6
PSI	3700	20,0	7	19,5	2651	16,4	5
PSDI	843	4,5	1	1,6	287	1,7	—
PR	734	4,4	1	1,3	—	—	—
PLI	—	—	—	1,2	—	—	—
PR	—	—	—	1,0	—	—	—
PDUP	—	—	—	1,4	—	—	—
NSU	—	—	—	0,2	216	1,3(1)	—
MSI	899	4,9	1	8,2	879	5,4	1
Altri	405(2)	2,2	—	—	574(2)	3,5	1

(1) Democrazia Proletaria; (2) Lista eterogenea

I votanti nei principali Comuni

	Comunali '82	Precedenti Comunali
Abano T.	90,5	92,7
Capua	88,7	89,8
Castellani	88,4	90,0
Ginosa	88,3	87,9
Grottaglie	88,7	90,8
Luridò	83,6	89,9
Nardo	81,7	83,8
Sulmona	76,8	75,9
Trieste	87,8	91,4
Media naz.	86,0	88,0

LECCE — A Nardò, secondo comune della provincia di Lecce (31.500 abitanti, 22.038 elettori), la dc continua a mantenere la maggioranza e potrebbe ottenere quindici o sedici seggi in consiglio comunale. I socialisti hanno ottenuto un discreto successo (aumentando di due seggi e passando a sette). Dai primi risultati è evidente che forse non si avrà la riconferma del

monocolore dc uscente (nella scorsa consultazione la democrazia cristiana ottenne 17 seggi con 8318 voti, pari a 51,45%). Si ipotizza, invece, un accordo tra dc, psi e forse anche con la partecipazione dei repubblicani, che potrebbero avere un seggio (nella precedente amministrazione si presentarono congiuntamente con i liberali e insieme conquistarono un seggio).

DIFFICOLTA' DEI DUE GRANDI PARTITI

A Trieste il Melone perde terreno avanza il psi, flessione dc e pci

Ritorno ai partiti tradizionali nei primi dati sulle consultazioni per la Provincia

DAL NOSTRO INVIATO SPECIALE

TRIESTE — Qualcosa cambia, nel panorama politico di Trieste. Mentre i risultati delle elezioni amministrative sono ancora parziali e si riferiscono allo scultino nei seggi della provincia, i dati appaiono già sufficienti per avere un orientamento, per i primi commenti sulle risposte dei triestini. I primi dati affluiscono al centro di raccolta della prefettura indicano una discesa sensibile del movimento autonomistico del «Melone»: una flessione che per il momento tocca quasi il 4 e mezzo per cento. Sull'altro fronte, si registra una crescita notevole del psi, intorno al 3 per cento, mentre denunciano un calo la democrazia cristiana, in una misura che supera i 2 punti, e il pct, sul 2 per cento. Un aumento superiore al punto fa registrare il partito repubblicano. Le percentuali sono confrontate con quelle delle votazioni provinciali che si tennero nell'80 in questa città.

Questo il quadro «abbozzato» dal responso di oltre 150 mila elettori. E già si intrecciano discorsi su quello che sarà il futuro di Trieste, all'uscita da una crisi che ha paralizzato le amministrazioni del Comune e della Provincia, affidate ai commissari. I fatti erano puntati sulla «lista per Trieste», che dal 1978 ha tenuto il centro della scena politica triestina, radunando migliaia di cittadini e mandando avanti una campagna municipalistica che intendeva

PARTITI	COMUNALI '82			POL. '79	COMUNALI '78		
	VOTI	%	SEGGI		VOTI	%	SEGGI
DC	30.473	19,3	00	23,8	49.790	26,0	17
PCI	29.873	18,9	00	20,7	35.675	18,7	12
PSI	12.216	7,7	00	3,7	7.408	3,9	2
PSDI	4.209	2,7	00	2,3	3.917	2,1	1
PRI	4.718	3,0	00	1,7	4.150	2,2	1
PLI	2.592	1,6	00	1,0	2.118	1,1	—
PR	—	—	—	—	11.551	6,0	3
PDUP	—	—	—	0,6	1.539	0,8	—
DP	1.976	1,3	00	—	1.160	0,6	—
NSU	—	—	—	0,6	—	—	—
MSI	12.024	7,6	00	6,4	12.519	6,5	4
DN-CD	—	—	—	0,5	1.912	1,0	—
U. Slov.	3.751	2,4	00	—	3.939	2,1	1
M. I. Trl.	913	0,6	00	—	2.899	1,5	1
M. Friull.	—	—	—	1,7	—	—	—
Ass. Trl.	48.612	30,7	00	30,6	52.651	27,5	18
Altri	6.756	4,2	00	—	—	—	—

esprimere protesta, sfiducia nei confronti dei partiti tradizionali e rivendicazioni di gestione autonoma.

Il fenomeno del «Melone» ha avuto momenti di crescita clamorosa, fino a costituire una specie di baluardo di fronte ai partiti tradizionali, che impostavano politiche diverse per l'avvenire di Trieste. Nessuno, alla vigilia di questa straordinaria competizione elettorale triestina, sembrava in grado di fare previsioni su quella che sarebbe stata la nuova prova della Lista. I cosiddetti melonisti, che avevano riversato sforzi nei comizi e nella propaganda, puntavano addirittura su un consolidamento delle loro posizioni, nonostante nel loro ambiente si co-

glessse qualche segno di nervosismo.

Oltretutto, come abbiamo rilevato nei giorni scorsi, il movimento municipalista triestino non appariva più così solido come in passato: per questa chiamata alle urne erano sorte, di fronte al «Melone», altre liste che si ispiravano al municipalismo, e in sostanza spezzavano quella che era la protesta di certe fasce di cittadini.

I risultati delle elezioni alla Provincia mostrano due cose: da un lato, la sensibile avanzata del psi, che tra i partiti tradizionali dovrebbe ora contare su un rapporto diverso nel difficile, tormentato dialogo sulle sorti di questa città; dall'altro, il cedimento

del «Melone», al quale evidentemente hanno contribuito anche quegli schieramenti che hanno finito per non condividere la politica condotta in questi anni dalla «lista per Trieste» e hanno preferito affrontare in «autonomia» la competizione elettorale.

Dal dati di cui finora si dispone, emerge dunque una situazione sulla quale, a Trieste, si dovrebbero impostare altri discorsi. Considerando il calo della «lista per Trieste», almeno per quanto riguarda le votazioni per la Provincia, appare piuttosto evidente che la protesta, la sfiducia, un certo senso esasperato di isolamento non hanno più nell'area triestina la consistenza di prima e che da una parte il movimento ha riversato voti sul partito socialista aprendosi a nuove prospettive, dall'altra s'è frantumato. Alcuni spazi comunque, a giudicare da questi primi dati, sono tolti alla democrazia cristiana e al partito comunista, per cui appare difficile delineare in questo momento i rapporti di forza.

Quello che le amministrative triestine dicono, per ora, è che i «melonisti» dovranno probabilmente mettersi a fare conti diversi, forse cercare incontri e trattative che prima seccamente rifiutavano, attestandosi sulle posizioni di difesa ad oltranza dei loro programmi, della loro politica sostanzialmente conservatrice.

Giuliano Marchesini

A Velletri trionfa l'effetto Spadolini

Lariano si conferma roccaforte della dc

Comune di VELLETRI (Roma)

PARTITI	COMUNALI '82			POL '79			COMUNALI '76		
	VOTI	%	SEGGI	%	VOTI	%	SEGGI		
DC	5904	22,6	9	30,9	7004	28,1	12		
PCI	8254	31,7	14	36,8	8502	34,2	14		
PSI	2544	9,7	4	4,8	2063	8,3	3		
PSDI	1613	6,2	2	3,1	1625	6,5	2		
PRI	6300	24,0	10	11,1	4551	18,3	8		
PLI	428	1,6	—	0,7	—	—	—		
PR	—	—	—	2,8	—	—	—		
PDUP	—	—	—	1,0	—	—	—		
NSU	—	—	—	0,3	—	—	—		
MSI	1052	4,0	1	7,8	1137	4,6	1		
Altri	—	—	—	0,7	—	—	—		

Comune di LARIANO (Roma)

PARTITI	COMUNALI '82			POL '79			COMUNALI '76		
	VOTI	%	SEGGI	%	VOTI	%	SEGGI		
DC	2578	56,5	12	44,8	2170	57,5	13		
PCI	781	17,1	3	29,3	920	24,4	5		
PSI	462	10,1	2	6,7	249	6,6	1		
PSDI	70	1,5	—	1,1	74	1,9	—		
PRI	422	9,3	2	6,4	216	5,7	1		
PLI	16	0,4	—	0,3	—	—	—		
PR	—	—	—	1,5	—	—	—		
PDUP	—	—	—	1,2	—	—	—		
NSU	—	—	—	0,6	—	—	—		
MSI	234	5,1	1	7,4	146	3,9	—		
Altri	—	—	—	0,7	—	—	—		

VELLETRI — E' il caso più clamoroso di «effetto Spadolini». I repubblicani, che erano al terzo partito locale, sono passati al secondo posto scavalcando la dc e venendo subito dopo il pci. Il partito del presidente del Consiglio è inabbiamente il vincitore in questa cittadina di 43 mila abitanti dove si sono riunite le condizioni più favorevoli per un successo fuori dalla norma. L'avanzata è stata infatti del 5,9 per cento rispetto alla precedente comunali, quasi esattamente 1 voti persi dalla dc (5,5 per cento).

I comunisti sono rimasti il primo partito, ma hanno perso il 2,5 per cento. Un risultato amaro in una zona dove il pci è tradizionalmente forte. Sono dati dei quali i dirigenti locali non riescono a darsi una ragione. Erano al governo as-

sieme ai repubblicani, ma questi hanno guadagnato e il pci ha perso. Ora si potrà formare comunque una nuova giunta pci-pri, ma i rapporti saranno diversi. Dirigenti nazionali repubblicani come Mammi ne traggono una conferma per dimostrare come l'elettorato del pri «rifutti questioni astratte di schieramento».

Guadagnano l'1,4 per cento anche i socialisti, che potrebbero entrare nella futura giunta. Compeltono per la prima volta i liberali con l'1,64 per cento, che non sarà tuttavia sufficiente a fargli ottenere un seggio in Comune. La leggera flessione socialdemocratica (0,3) non intacca il successo complessivo dell'area laico-socialista che guadagna 10 punti in percentuale.

LARIANO — Ad appena otto chilometri da Velletri, questo Comune ha una fisionomia del tutto diversa. Qui, il dato più rilevante è il crollo del pci che perde il 7,3 per cento a vantaggio dei socialisti (più 3,5) e dei repubblicani (più 2,6). Leggera la flessione dei democristiani (perdono un punto), i quali rimangono il partito di maggioranza assoluta con ampissimo distacco da tutti. Ed infatti ancora una volta la dc potrà governare da sola il Comune.

Settemila abitanti, roccaforte democristiana nel Castelli romani tradizionalmente «rossi», Lariano conferma anche lei la tendenza nazionale dell'avanzata di laici e socialisti. I socialisti, terzo partito dopo dc e pci, guadagnano un seggio, i repubblicani, quarto partito a pochissimi, terminando questa tendenza già qualche mese addie-

ma distanza dal psi, guadagnano anche loro un seggio. Anche qui, come a Velletri, leggera flessione dei socialdemocratici, che sono comunque una forza esigua e senza rappresentanza in Comune.

Avanza l'estrema destra missina che guadagna l'1,2 per cento e un seggio, a danno probabilmente delle dc. I liberali, presenti per la prima volta alle comunali, hanno avuto lo 0,4 per cento.

Dal raffronto con i risultati delle elezioni politiche del 1978, le differenze risultano ancora più rilevanti in peggio per il pci, ma in meglio per la dc. E' comunque questa una tendenza costante degli elettori italiani che solitamente penalizzano i comunisti nelle elezioni amministrative mentre «premano» la dc.

del movimento sociale

assisted to the economy and th

Il pci a Castellammare ha perso il 4% dei voti

NAPOLI — Il voto di Castellammare di Stabia si rivela come era nelle previsioni uno dei test elettorali più significativi e non solo per i riflessi che potrà avere sul governo locale. I primi dati — 64 sezioni scrutinate su 101 per complessivi 44.038 votanti su 50.799 elettori — confermano il rafforzamento dei cinque partiti della coalizione governativa, l'ampliamento del polo laico. Denunciano anche la sensibile contrazione del partito comunista con una perdita di oltre il 4 per cento, il lento costante sfaldamento del movimento sociale italiano.

La democrazia cristiana, che amministrava la città insieme con il partito socialdemocratico e il partito repubblicano, ha visto aumentare la propria percentuale di voti dal 40 al 41 per cento rispetto alle amministrative del '77 conservando la maggioranza relativa e restando un punto di riferimento per la futura gestione del governo municipale. Il psi di Bettino Craxi compie un sensibile passo in avanti, allarga la base dei consensi con un aumento dei voti del 5 per cento confermando di essere in stato di ascesa. Migliorano e consolidano le loro posizioni anche il pri, il psdi e il pli.

Il risultato elettorale ha sorpreso i dirigenti democristiani i quali, temendo una sconfitta, avevano candidato, come capolista l'on. Gava.

Comune di CASTELLAMMARE (Na)

PARTITO	COMUNALI '82			POL. '79	COMUNALI '77		
	VOTI	%	SEGGI		%	VOTI	%
DC	17.081	41,1	17	34,8	17.296	40,0	17
PCI	11.303	25,9	11	40,6	14.293	33,1	14
PSI	5.776	13,2	5	7,6	3.852	8,9	3
PSDI	2.889	6,6	2	3,1	2.199	5,1	2
PRI	3.346	7,7	3	2,3	2.921	6,8	3
PLI	1.060	2,4	1	0,6	158	0,4	—
PR	—	—	—	2,8	—	—	—
PDUP	—	—	—	1,0	—	—	—
NSU	—	—	—	0,2	—	—	—
MSI	1.348	3,1	1	5,9	1.675	3,9	1
Altri	—	—	—	1,1	796	1,8	—

Il regresso dei comunisti che avevano a Castellammare di Stabia un grosso elettorato rispecchia la crisi del partito annunciata fin dalle politiche del '79, crisi manifestatasi oltre che in quest'occasione anche in altre consultazioni elettorali nel napoletano e nella circoscrizione del popolare quartiere Stella - San Carlo all'Arena dove la democrazia cristiana ha compiuto il sorpasso.

Grosso successo del psi a Stella paese di Pertini

STELLA — Netto balzo in avanti del partito socialista nelle elezioni comunali di Stella (Savona), il paese natale di Sandro Pertini, e quasi sicura riconferma del sin-

daco uscente Andrea Pericle, primo cittadino di Stella da 12 anni e amico fraterno del presidente della Repubblica.

Queste ultime elezioni hanno fatto crollare numerosi primati: per la prima volta, dal dopoguerra, socialisti e comunisti si sono presentati divisi; la democrazia cristiana ha perduto quasi il 10% dei voti; «débacle» anche del partito comunista che ha perso il 7%. Il psi, invece, ha guadagnato il 16% dei voti.

Questo il dettaglio: votanti 1614 (86,54%) su 1871 aventi diritto. Schede bianche 45, schede nulle 45. Psi voti 554 (42,16%) precedenti regionali ('80) 26,8%. Lista della bilancia voti 139 (10,52%); pel voti 193 (14,69%); prec. reg. 21,1%. Dc voti 399 (30,37%); prec. reg. 39,4%. Pri voti 32 (2,44%); prec. reg. 1,1%.

A Capua vincono la dc e i laici

Comune di CAPUA (Caserta) (23 sezioni su 25)

PARTITI	COMUNALI '82			POL '79	COMUNALI '77		
	VOTI	%	SEGGI		VOTI	%	SEGGI
DC	5923	57,1	00	46,3	5467	50,2	16
PCI	1296	12,5	00	23,1	2752	25,2	8
PSI	1559	15,0	00	12,0	1125	10,3	3
PSDI	231	2,2	00	1,9	345	3,2	1
PRI	349	3,4	00	2,5	596	5,5	1
PLI	349	3,4	00	0,7	—	—	—
PR	—	—	—	2,2	—	—	—
PD	—	—	—	0,9	—	—	—
NS	—	—	—	0,5	—	—	—
MS	—	—	—	0,5	—	—	—
MSU	—	—	—	9,4	609	5,6	1
Altr	263	2,5	00	0,5	—	—	—
Altr	402	3,9	00	—	—	—	—

CAPUA — Successo pieno a Capua della dc che vede riconfermata la sua posizione di preminenza e guadagna in seggi e in percentuali. Anche i partiti del polo laico sottraggono voti ai comunisti che hanno registrato un notevole calo, del tutto inatteso, con una perdita di oltre il 12 per cento dei consensi. Inoltre anche il msi continua nella sua fase calante.

La vittoria della dc era scontata. Nella precedente gestione disponeva di 16 seggi su 30 con una percentuale del 50,2 per cento. Ora la porta al 58 per cento e quindi non si prospettano problemi nella futura guida della città anche se il sindaco uscente, il democristiano Dino Iocca, non ha rappresentato la sua candidatura.

Il psi nelle amministrative

del '77 era andato alle urne con grossi problemi interni, privo di omogeneità e ne aveva tratto vantaggio il pci. Ora invece passa dal 10,3 al 14,58 per cento.

Il partito di Longo deve registrare una lieve perdita di consensi: passa dal 3,10 all'1,92 per cento e analoga sorte è toccata al partito repubblicano che dal 5,7 è sceso al 3,2 per cento; mentre il pli ha potuto estendere la sua area di consensi raggiungendo il 3,5 rispetto allo 0,3. Da segnalare il successo della lista civica «Torre» balzata al quarto posto dopo la dc, il psi e il pci con un 4,63 per cento. Anche nel Casertano negli altri 13 Comuni impegnati nelle consultazioni odierne si conferma la tendenza del calo dei comunisti e del movimento sociale.

government should si confermando quel
difficult decisi che già qualche
tro si era verifica

A Gattinara tutto resta come prima

Comune di GATTINARA (Vercelli)

PARTITI	COMUNALI '82			POL. '79	COMUNALI '80		
	VOTI	%	SEGGI		VOTI	%	SEGGI
DC	2294	37,8	8	33,2	2083	33,7	7
PCI	1860	30,6	7	33,3	2123	34,4	7
PSI	809	13,3	3	10,6	847	13,7	3
PSDI	277	4,6	1	4,6	345	5,6	1
PRI	117	1,9	—	2,2	—	—	—
PLI	508	8,4	1	4,3	504	8,2	1
PR	—	—	—	3,5	—	—	—
PDUP	—	—	—	2,5	—	—	—
NSU	—	—	—	0,5	—	—	—
MSI	207	3,4	—	4,9	270	4,4	1
Altri	—	—	—	0,4	—	—	—

GATTINARA — Tutto come prima a Gattinara: i partiti hanno conservato i loro seggi, meno il msi che ha perso il suo e la dc, che ne ha guadagnato uno. Resta da vedere ora come le forze politiche potranno risolvere la crisi dell'amministrazione comunale, che dall'agosto scorso blocca l'attività cittadina.

La precedente giunta, composta da pcd, psi e psdi era entrata in crisi dopo che i socialdemocratici avevano ritirato il loro appoggio ai comunisti. Successivamente le dimissioni

del socialista costrinsero il pcd a governare da solo la città, mentre tutti i tentativi di trovare una nuova maggioranza fallivano. Il prefetto di Vercelli sciolse quindi il Consiglio, nominando un commissario straordinario.

Contrariamente a quanto avvenuto in altri Comuni, a Gattinara la percentuale dei votanti è stata superiore rispetto alle precedenti elezioni, toccando la quota dell'87% contro l'85 della consultazione del 1980.

Crollo pci a Luino in favore del psi

Comune di LUINO (Varese)

PARTITI	COMUNALI '82			POL. '79	COMUNALI '75		
	VOTI	%	SEGGI		VOTI	%	SEGGI
DC	3581	38,0	13	34,4	4368	45,2	14
PCI	1884	20,0	6	25,3	2636	27,4	9
PSI	2050	21,7	7	15,6	1358	14,2	4
PSDI	490	5,1	1	4,0	355	3,8	1
PRI	435	4,6	1	3,4	459	4,8	1
PLI	515	5,4	1	2,8	—	—	—
PR	—	—	—	5,3	—	—	—
PDUP	—	—	—	1,9	—	—	—
NSU	—	—	—	0,9	—	—	—
MSI	469	4,9	1	5,8	444	4,6	1
Altri	—	—	—	0,6	—	—	—

LUINO — Il più importante centro lombardo in cui si sono svolte le amministrative ha penalizzato la dc e il pcd, premilando il psi. Stando a dati non ancora ufficiali, la dc avrebbe perso un seggio, passando da 14 a 13; il pcd avrebbe perso addirittura 3 seggi, scendendo da 9 a 6; il psi avrebbe invece compiuto un sensibile passo in avanti, passando da 4 a 7 seggi. Immutata invece sarebbe la situazione degli altri partiti.

Luino era guardata con particolare interesse dal lea-

ders di tutti i partiti: rappresentava insomma un banco di prova importante per l'intera Lombardia. Ecco perché proprio a Luino, ai suoi 11.863 elettori, sono venuti personalmente a chiedere il voto Pietro Longo, Bettino Craxi, Giovanni Spadolini, il comunista Tortorella e Zanone.

Luino ha già più volte ribaltato i rapporti di forza in Consiglio comunale. Nel 1975, infatti, venne concessa la maggioranza alle sinistre e pcd, psi e psdi costituirono la giunta.

Abano: dc in crisi e successo del psi

Comune di ABANO TERME (Padova)

PARTITI	COMUNALI '82			POL. '79	COMUNALI '77		
	VOTI	%	SEGGI		VOTI	%	SEGGI
DC	3779	36,4	12	41,0	4072	42,7	14
PCI	2702	26,0	8	26,0	2898	30,4	9
PSI	1766	17,0	5	10,6	1219	12,8	4
PSDI	785	7,6	2	5,8	691	7,2	2
PRI	519	5,0	1	3,5	398	4,2	1
PLI	416	4,0	1	2,4	—	—	—
PR	—	—	—	4,6	—	—	—
PDUP	—	—	—	1,3	—	—	—
NSU	—	—	—	0,6	—	—	—
MSI	415	4,0	1	3,7	262	2,7	—
Altri	—	—	—	—	—	—	—

ABANO TERME — Molte le indicazioni emerse a conclusione delle due giornate di consultazioni che hanno interessato 12.201 elettori del 16 mila abitanti il centro termale.

Subito balza all'occhio il calo dello scudo crociato, che dal 42,7 per cento ottenuto nelle elezioni comunali del 27 marzo 1977 è sceso al 36,4 per cento, passando da 14 seggi che deteneva a 12; anche il partito comunista italiano ha registrato una flessione scenden-

do dal 30,4 per cento del 1977 al 26 per cento delle attuali consultazioni, passando da 9 a 8 seggi.

Il pli, che nel '77 non era presente, ha ottenuto il 4 per cento, conquistando un seggio. Anche il msi-dn ha conquistato un seggio. Il psi ha dal canto suo progredito: contro il 12,8 per cento ottenuto nelle consultazioni del '77, ora ha compiuto un sensibile balzo in avanti, passando al 17,5 per cento, e conquistando un seggio in più del '77, cioè cinque.

Pantelleria, la dc guadagna 4 seggi

Comune di PANTELLERIA (Trapani)

PARTITI	COMUNALI '82			POL. '79	COMUNALI '77		
	VOTI	%	SEGGI		VOTI	%	SEGGI
DC	3115	62,1	14	60,9	2.160	41,9	10
PCI	304	6,1	1	8,6	451	8,8	2
PSI	430	8,6	2	4,2	467	9,1	2
PSDI	128	2,5	—	1,6	170	3,3	—
PRI	249	5,0	1	2,5	205	4,0	—
PLI	—	—	—	0,5	—	—	—
PR	—	—	—	2,6	—	—	—
PDUP	—	—	—	0,8	—	—	—
NSU	—	—	—	0,2	—	—	—
MSI	613	12,2	2	12,7	617	12,0	3
Altri	—	—	—	5,4 ⁽¹⁾	378	7,3	1 ⁽²⁾

(1) 5,2% Destra nazionale; (2) Destra Nazionale

PANTELLERIA — Successo dc nell'isola di Pantelleria, uno dei tre comuni siciliani dove si è votato con la proporzionale. Gli altri partiti hanno perso tutti ad eccezione dei repubblicani che non avevano seggi e che ne hanno conquistato uno. I socialisti hanno tenuto. L'aumento democristiano attribuisce allo scudo crociato 14 dei 20 seggi del Consiglio comunale. Nelle precedenti consultazioni la dc ottenne 10 seggi su 20.

La nuova composizione del Consiglio di Pantelleria per-

tanto dovrebbe essere la seguente: dc 14 seggi, psi 2, msi 2, pci 1, pri 1. Tranne capovolgimenti dell'ultima ora la lista civica di sinistra «Rinnovamento pantesco» avrebbe perso l'unico consigliere.

BARI — E' stata nuovamente rinviata l'elezione dell'esecutivo regionale pugliese: dopo cinque ore di dibattito il Consiglio regionale ha preso atto che la crisi non è più «tecnica» ma «politica».

Il Consiglio regionale è stato riconvocato per il 22

Entenop.

cc: Mrs Colvin Res. Dept.
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Phone list

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Mr Young, 2/1/78

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cc: R F Osborne Esq; WED

well worth reading. Interesting
that Peters could return too. He
probably wouldn't do the 20 much good.

CALL ON THE PSI

1. I called on Acquaviva today. He was engaged in setting up a series of meetings at PSI headquarters with delegations from differing outlying regions of Italy.

2. Acquaviva said that the local election results had been excellent, and fully up to PSI expectations. Local factors were always important, and one should beware of any analysis which compared results like these with those from the last general election. In Naples, for example, where the circostrizionali elections had been held in the poorest area, there was a long left wing tradition dating back to the 19th century. In Trieste, the presence of the civic **Ad Amantea** party. In Trieste, the results showed that the outcome. Nevertheless the left and would encourage all the party.

Ad Amantea avanzano psi e psdi

3. I asked why Craxi choosing instead to s...
that there were two d...
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far remained mid-way
Socialist atmosphere
of those seeking a sh...
must avoid the blame

REGGIO CALABRIA —
Come previsto alla vigilia elettorale anche ad Amantea — il più grosso centro calabrese in cui si è votato — i due partiti socialisti hanno registrato un notevole incremento in percentuale e in seggi confermando quella tendenza che già qualche mese addietro si era verificata nella regione con le consultazioni di Lamezia Terme.

La dc, di fronte al 45,2% del 1977, quando conquistò 15 dei 30 seggi, stando ai primi dati dovrebbe registrare un calo di circa il 7% con una perdita di almeno 3 seggi. Il calo è interamente a vantaggio dei 2 schieramenti socialisti che prendono, voti anche a democrazia proletaria (nel 1977 ebbe un seggio) ed al pci che esse indebolito sfiorando appena il 20%.

Per contro il psi dovrebbe attestarsi attorno al 30% con una declina di consiglieri e il psdi sul 6-7% con due consiglieri (nessuno 5 anni addietro). Fressoché stazionario il msi col 5%, mentre completo insuccesso ha dovuto registrare il pri che si presentava per la prima volta.

ised more on the results, g...
Acquaviva replied within the PSI. Some convert the advance y position. Others wished are argued that the present assisted to face up to economy and the ums like that of labour government. Craxi had so sitions. The anti- had strengthened the hand ned true that the PSI

the PSI for a year of elections. De Mita within his party caused rice he would be prepared wo would not suffice, and to offer Craxi the Prime There were no signs that

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cc: R P Osborne Esq; WED

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CALL ON THE PSI

1. I called on Acquaviva today. He was engaged in setting up a series of meetings at PSI headquarters with delegations from differing outlying regions of Italy.
2. Acquaviva said that the local election results had been excellent, and fully up to PSI expectations. Local factors were always important, and one should beware of any analysis which compared results like these with those from the last general election. In Naples, for example, where the circonscrizionali elections had been held in the poorest area, there was a long left wing tradition dating back to Labriola Pèrè. In Trieste, the presence of the civic list distorted the outcome. Nevertheless the results showed that the PCI had lost most and would encourage all the lay parties.
3. I asked why Craxi had not yet capitalised more on the results, choosing instead to speak of an onda lunga. Acquaviva replied that there were two distinct tendencies within the PSI. Some wished to press for general elections, to convert the advance already made into a stronger parliamentary position. Others wished to let the tide go on rising, and therefore argued that the present government should simply be modified and assisted to face up to the difficult decisions required over the economy and the institutional question. Faced with problems like that of labour cost, Italy could not afford a vacuum in government. Craxi had so far remained mid-way between these two positions. The anti-Socialist atmosphere at the DC Congress had strengthened the hand of those seeking a showdown, but it remained true that the PSI must avoid the blame for causing a crisis.
4. Acquaviva said that the DC had asked the PSI for a year of peace, by which they meant a year without elections. De Mita needed time, not least to heal the breach within his party caused by the Congress. It was not clear what price he would be prepared to pay to the PSI; an extra minister or two would not suffice, and De Mita could not possibly bring himself to offer Craxi the Prime Ministership immediately after Spadolini. There were no signs that

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the DC would make major concessions on the government programme. The other lay parties might in any case not agree to a year of peace; the Republicans in particular were confident and did not fear elections. Acquaviva concluded that a truce until the autumn was the best for which the DC could realistically hope.

5. Acquaviva expected the verifica to be at the end of June. The DC might well claim the Prime Ministership, and Forlani was the most likely candidate because this would allow De Mita to conciliate the minority. Forlani would also be more acceptable to the PSI. The other possible outcome was agreement on a second Spadolini government, but there would have to be a reshuffle; Andreatta would probably not survive and Gava was expected to get a ministerial job.

6. I asked about the cohesion of the lay bloc. Acquaviva said that nothing had really changed. It was natural for the smallest parties to return to their roots and stress their separate identities, but in the end they had no choice but to band together. Craxi's style frightened the PLI in particular, and they were also worried by the number of business votes now moving to the PSI. Acquaviva remained confident that after the next general elections a reinforced lay bloc, with almost 30% of the votes and led by Craxi, would be the "hinge" of Italian politics.

7. I asked about the bill designed to enable Italians abroad to vote at Embassies or by post in Italian elections. Acquaviva said that the PSI opposed it in principle, since many of these emigrants had only tenuous ties with Italy and had no idea of current issues. He added with a smile that the PSI's other reason for opposing the bill was that they knew that the chances of the PSI winning as high a percentage of votes outside Italy as inside were very slim. The practical problems should also not be under-estimated; many Italian emigrants had good reasons for not keeping their civic papers etc. up-to-date. The DC, and especially Rognoni, were very keen on the bill but it had no chance of passing. The PSI also made much of the fact that this measure was not part of the government programme agreed with Spadolini. Emigrant votes had not been a factor in determining the PSI's attitude to Argentine sanctions; business pressure on many parties had been significant; Fiat, for example, had paid the costs of the Argentine delegation which came to Italy.

8. Acquaviva made a jocular reference to Britain's "lunatic war". I said that we were defending the principles of democracy and liberty, at great cost to ourselves. We agreed to differ.

9. We agreed to have lunch in July, at the end of the "season".

9 June 1982

R N Culshaw
R N Culshaw

RESTRICTED
SAVING TELEGRAM

(26)
Circ - Internal
Postcard.
RPO
4/6
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(25)

BY BAG
FROM ROME
TO FCO
SAVING NO. 26
15 JUNE 1982
RESTRICTED

WRJ . 01412
REGISTRY
21 JUN 1982
M. R. P. 1/16

TO FCO SAVING NO. 26 OF 15 JUNE 1982
AND TO INFORMATION SAVING ALL EC POSTS: UKDEL NATO: WASHINGTON:
CONSUS GENERAL NAPLES AND MILAN: CONSULS FLORENCE AND GENOA:
VICE CONSULS CAGLIARI, VENICE AND TRIESTE: HOLY SEE

ITALIAN LOCAL ELECTIONS

1. Local elections were held on 6/7 June in many Italian towns and in one province (Trieste). 900,000 electors were involved, and the results provide the best indicator this year of current electoral trends, although due allowance must be made for local factors. The turn-out was low by Italian standards at 84.9%, compared with 88% in the elections of 1976/7.
2. In the smallest towns (those with less than 5,000 inhabitants), the system of proportional representation is not used. If these are excluded, therefore, together with the provincial election in Trieste (to avoid double counting the results there), the overall percentage results were as follows:

	<u>1982</u>	<u>A</u>	<u>B</u>
Christian Democrats (DC)	31.1	35.7	34.3
Communists (PCI)	22.3	23.8	27.0
Socialists (PSI)	13.7	9.9	7.6
Social Democrats (PSDI)	4.5	3.0	2.9

Republicans (PRI)	4.3	3.1	2.1
Liberals (PLI)	1.7	0.6	1.0
Radicals (PR)	-	2.3	3.7
PDUP (Extreme Left)	-	0.5	1.1
DP (Extreme Left)	0.4	0.3	-
Neo Fascists (MSI)	5.3	5.3	6.7
Trieste List	10.1	10.3	11.4
Others	6.6	5.2	2.2

Column A represents the last comparable local elections, usually in 1977; Column B gives the general election voting in the same constituencies in 1979. The more fruitful comparison is with A, because

- a) different parties participated in the general elections; the presence of the Radicals, for example, probably cost the PSI at least 2% in 1979 and could do so again; but the Radicals do not have sufficient organisation or finances to contest every local election;
- b) in general elections, local issues and personalities are to a greater extent subordinated to national ones; there is also a move back towards the two largest parties, around one of which any central government majority must be formed;
- c) in local elections, the Italian voter feels free to vote positively for the party which appeals to him most, rather than casting what he perceives as the most effective anti-PCI (or anti-DC) vote; this helps the minor parties.

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3. The main conclusion to be drawn is that both the largest parties are in difficulties. The PCI are very much concerned, and changes of leadership at local level are expected in some of the areas where they did worst. At Castellamare, near Naples, they polled only 25.9% compared with 33.1% in 1977 and 40.6% in 1979, in a town of strong Communist sympathies which was affected by the earthquake. Lack of a coherent economic or political alternative at national level is thought to have disheartened part of their electorate; there is also a degree of confusion after the party's dispute with Moscow after events in Poland last December.

4. The DC controlled their decline better, and in the south may have been helped by the recent election of De Mita (from Avellino, near Naples) as Party Secretary. Trieste is rather a special case, because the local list which won over 30% of the votes took more electors away from the DC than from the other parties: if one were to exclude Trieste results altogether, the DC decline would be only just over 1% compared to 1977.

5. The four minor parties of the government coalition all gained ground. The PSI, starting from a low baseline, attracted new votes in towns of every kind. In minor elections in a poor quarter of Naples they tripled their percentage (at the expense of the PCI, who lost 9%, and the MSI). The overall improvement of 6.1% since 1979 was fully up to their expectations. The Republicans also did well, helped by Spadolini's good image as Prime Minister; at Velletri, a PRI stronghold, they gained 5.9%, mostly from the DC. The PSDI and PLI were satisfied with the results, although the latter remain perilously close to the point at which Italian political parties tend to disappear from sight.

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Overall, the 'lay bloc', as these four parties are known, won 24.2% of the votes, compared with 13.6% in 1979 and 16.6% in the last elections in these constituencies; their advance is similar to that achieved in the much more significant local elections of last June (Rome telno 239 of 1981).

6. All the parties have naturally made the best of these results. The PCI, however, could not disguise the setback and are likely now to be even less keen than before on anticipated general elections. The DC seem relieved that things did not go worse; they had already taken for granted some gains by the lay parties. Craxi (PSI) was at pains not to overemphasise the significance of his party's success, speaking of the process of PSI advance as a 'long wave': nevertheless, these results will make his threat of provoking general elections that much more alarming, the next time he uses it to get his own way in a discussion with coalition partners. The PSI are analysing the voting figures with great care to see how far they would be repeated in a general election. The votes they gain (mostly from the PCI) would not be sufficient to enable Craxi to deal with the DC or PCI on equal terms, even if he had the support of the whole 'lay bloc', which is far from certain. Nevertheless, the PSI's recovery since Craxi became Party Secretary in 1976 is impressive, and a general election result as good as that on 6/7 June would give them about 90 Deputies in the Chamber, instead of their present 62, with a consequent increase in their leverage within the coalition.

7. More detailed election results follow by bag for WED.

Rur
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FCOLWH
WED

THIS TELEGRAM
WAS NOT
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Foreign and Commonwealth Office
London SW1A 2AH

Telephone 01- 233 3266

R N Culshaw Esq MVO
British Embassy
ROME

Your reference 011/5
Our reference WRJ 014/2
Date 11 June 1982

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SERIALIZED	FILED
MAY 1982	
REGISTRY	
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PSDI CONGRESS

23

1. Thank you for your letter of 11 May in which you gave an account of the Milan Congress of the PSDI. The Congress itself sounded a rather dull affair but the picture that came across of the party, its aims, and the allegiances within it and between it and other parties, made fascinating reading.
2. I cannot recall ever having been asked to produce material on the PSDI - it tends to be lumped together with the other lay parties - but should such a request come my way I am now well prepared to reply.

R P Osborne
Western European Department

cc Mr Colvin

WRJ 014/2
15 JUN 1982
✓ 75

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Under: Cof: Mrs Colvin
Res Dept.
26
More water under the bridge



British Embassy
Via XX Settembre 80A 00187 Rome

Telex 61049 Telephone 4755.441

CONFIDENTIAL

[Handwritten signature]

R P Osborne Esq

WED
FCO

Your reference

4/6

Our reference 014/4

Date 14 May 1982

WED
FCO
21 MAY 1982

DESK OFFICER	REGISTRY
INDEX	PA
<i>[Signature]</i>	<i>[Signature]</i>
	Action Taken

Dear Ray,

ITALY INTERNAL: THE ANDREATTA AFFAIR

6. The possibility cannot be excluded that the verifica now proposed if it affects Andreatta's position, but there will be many more pressing subjects on the agenda. No-one can predict what will happen.

2. Three weeks later, the Andreatta affair looks to have been a storm in a tea cup; it has since been overshadowed by the DC Congress and by the domestic political repercussions of the Falklands issue. The judgement in our telegram that no-one gained from the affair still looks correct. The PSI showed their strength again, but did not achieve any tangible result; indeed their aggression probably increased the anti-Socialist mood at the DC Congress. For whatever reason, Craxi decided not to press for Andreatta's resignation or to provoke a Government crisis on the issue. One wonders therefore why he made such a fuss at the outset; it may be simply that the accusation of "national socialism" in the PSI touched him on a raw nerve (jokes comparing Craxi to Mussolini have been common currency in Rome for some time).

3. Andreatta was also scathing at Modena about Spadolini's performance and about the lay parties in general. This will not increase his popularity in the Cabinet, but no-one outside the PSI reacted strongly to what he said.

4. Andreatta himself remains Minister of the Treasury. His would be a difficult post to fill at the moment, with the delicate issue of liquidazioni (para 5 of my letter of 20 April) still unresolved; even his enemies concede that his technical ability is formidable. Indeed he scored a personal success at the DC Congress, mixing in his speech anti-Socialist barbs with a statement of his economic credo, and was on the side of the winner, De Mita.

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Index:

*cc: Mrs Colvin
Res Dept.
(24)*

More water under the bridge



British Embassy
Via XX Settembre 80A 00187 Rome

Telex 61049 Telephone 4755.441

R P Osborne Esq
WED
FCO

Your reference
Our reference 014/4
Date 14 May 1982

R.P.O.
u/s

WRD 014/4	
REGISTRY	
21 MAY 1982	
DESK OFFICER	REGISTRY
INDEX	PA Action Taken
	<i>Mr. Rossi</i>

Dear Ray,

ITALY INTERNAL: THE ANDREATTA AFFAIR

1. Rome telno 190. — (19)
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- 2 -

5. Nevertheless this episode and the implicit criticism of him by Pertini, must have done Andreatta some long term damage. The PSI will not quickly forgive him - although Craxi affected to the Ambassador not to be too bothered by the episode and indeed rather to like Andreatta's "pseudo-English air". I should be surprised if the loose talk heard two months ago about Andreatta as a possible DC Secretary or Prime Minister were repeated in the near future.

6. The possibility cannot be excluded that the verifica now expected in June may affect Andreatta's position, but there will be many more pressing subjects on the agenda. No-one can predict what will eventually cause the downfall of Spadolini's fragile coalition, but one way or another Andreatta's colleagues will probably ensure that it is not another incautious speech by the Minister of the Treasury.

Yours ever

R N Culshaw

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Rak pa
1/5

Mr. Young 1/5
you may wish to glance. A
very full account and useful work
for future reference.

(X)



British Embassy
Via XX Settembre 80A 00187 Rome
Telex 61049 Telephone 4755.441

Mr Osborne

Pls. send a short acknowledgment.

(23)
[Signature]

R P Osborne Esq
WED
FCO

Your reference

Our reference 011/5

Date 11 May 1982

1/5

see
(25)

URS	DATE
URS	DATE
17 MAY 1982	
REGISTRY	ACTIVITY
REGISTRY	ACTIVITY
<i>Mr. Osborne</i>	<i>[Signature]</i>

Dear Ray,

PSDI CONGRESS

1. The PSDI held their Congress in Milan from 24-28 March. The timing enabled them to recall both the centenary of the foundation of the PSLI (predecessor of the present party) and the 50th anniversary of the death of the Socialist pioneer, Turati. The presence of the PSDI's veteran President, Saragat, also provided a living link with the formation of the present PSDI in 1947, when he led the breakaway from the Italian Socialist Party over its policy of alliance ("popular front") with the PCI.

2. It was clear from the outset that Longo would be re-elected as Secretary; he could count on about 75% of the delegates' votes, and although about 30% owed personal allegiance more to Nicolazzi, he pledged his loyal support to Longo. The opposition was split into two groups: the traditional left, led by former secretary Romita, with about 10%; and a more recently formed group around Di Giesi, with about 12%. It was not easy to distinguish between the policies of these three groups at the Congress; Romita and Di Giesi put more emphasis on the PSDI's left-wing orientation and wanted a more open attitude towards the PCI, but the real point of difference concerned the distribution of power within the party. There is also within the PSDI a very strong element of regional loyalty; many of the party's leaders operate almost like local DC bosses.

3. Longo opened the Congress with a long speech delivered in a dull monotone. He spoke in favour of a patto di legislatura, and this was widely interpreted as reinforcing Spadolini's present government. He was firm with the DC, warning them against any attempt to impose hegemony in Italian politics. He claimed to be open-minded about the PCI and to have taken note of their break

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- 2 - .

with Moscow after Poland, but his tone was nevertheless anti-Communist. He spoke against early elections, but he produced many arguments calculated to appeal to specific interest groups such as the pensioners and the homeless, and there was a strong element of electioneering running through his speech. The passage which got most applause was his eulogy of Craxi, who was present. He said little about foreign policy, but gave full support to NATO and railed against the Siberian pipeline deal.

4. The four days of debate which followed were well attended but produced no surprises. Longo's supporters developed his arguments on specific themes, while the two minority groups sniped at details without questioning the overall strategy. Discussion of policy was limited, and the attention of the 720 delegates (only 10% of whom were women) was only really caught when speakers discussed relations with the other parties. Longo proposed at the outset that the present pact of consultation between the PSDI and PSI should be strengthened, and many speakers echoed this idea without saying how it should be implemented. On the PCI, all could agree with the long term aim of associating them with a left-wing alternative providing there were the necessary guarantees of its being democratic; Di Giesi thought it could happen relatively soon, while Romita insisted that the relative size of the non-Communist and Communist components of the left must first be changed. The only other significant party policy difference concerned the labour movement; Di Giesi and Romita both underlined the importance of an active PSDI presence in UIL, while Longo, who has to conciliate a right wing suspicious of the union movement, was more cautious.

5. All the other Italian parties except the MSI sent representatives to the Congress. Piccoli got a much better reception than at the PSI Congress in Palermo a year ago, although he replied firmly to Longo's criticisms and asked the PSDI to clarify their policy towards local government juntas (all groups in the PSDI support the party's present policy of allying with DC or PCI at local level, as opportunity offers). The PCI adopted a low profile. Craxi was received almost as if it was his own Congress; Saragat's opening statement had paid him a warm tribute, crediting him with having set the PSI on the reformist path and having adopted positions historically espoused by the PSDI.

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- 3 -

6. There were a large number of foreign socialdemocratic and other delegations; the only one to attract real attention was that of the Afghan Resistance Movement. The British Labour Party had been invited but pleaded lack of funds as an excuse for not attending, while the SDP were not invited on the grounds that they were not members of the Socialist International. A telegram of congratulations was, however, sent to Mr Jenkins, whose victory at Hillhead came on the second day, and the PSDI are in fact following the fortunes of the Alliance with close attention; Longo made reference to the SDP in his speech, after criticising the anti-European attitudes of the Labour Party and Mrs Thatcher's views on the EC budget.
7. The formal result of the Congress was that Longo was re-elected as Secretary, by overwhelming majority in a secret ballot, and Saragat remained President. The new, enlarged, Central Committee was also elected and it has now chosen a new Direzione; the distribution of responsibilities at the top level of the party is unlikely to change much.
8. After five days at this Congress, I find it little easier than before to describe the PSDI. The party has 200,000 members, 19 Deputies, and 10 Senators. It is rather middle-aged, and the youth movement (GSDI) is weak; in Lombardy, of a thousand theoretical GSDI members only 30 are active, and GSDI Congresses are packed with children of PSDI notables who vote along regional and factional lines. The party claims to be in some financial difficulties, and its newspaper "Umanita" loses money consistently; nevertheless there was no shortage of cash in Milan, for the party hired La Scala for an evening, brought some of the La Scala soloists to play at the Congress, produced endless gimmicks and mementoes, and gave dinner to a thousand delegates and observers at one sitting in a restaurant in central Milan. According to its published accounts, the increase in state funding was necessary to keep it in the black; how many taxpayers, seeing this extravagance, would feel they were getting value for money?
9. The PSDI polled 3.8% of the vote in the 1979 elections. Its weight in local government is greater than these national figures might suggest, and in the local elections of 1980 and 1981 it

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- 4 -

consistently attracted over 5% of the vote. Geographically it is strongest in the north of Italy and parts of the south, appealing to the middle class and skilled workers in medium and large cities. Its social composition has changed little over the years: the contadini of whom Saragat spoke were not much in evidence at the Congress. The recent Nicolazzi decree law on housing is a good example of its strategy. The law opposed evictions, thus attracting a good number of votes from tenants who risked being made homeless, but it also introduced the concept (revolutionary in Italy) of tacit agreement by local authorities to requests for building permits unless such requests were contested within three months: this second provision has naturally been described by the PCI and others as a speculators' charter, since the Italian bureaucracy cannot normally respond to anything within three months. Many support the party because of the material benefits they hope it will give them; its use of patronage, especially at local level, is akin to that of the DC. Some of its full time workers, and even politicians, are attracted because they find more space and more influence than they would in the PSI or DC; another factor is that Craxi's autocratic management of the PSI has prompted some moderates to leave and has dissuaded others from joining, in both cases to the PSDI's advantage.

10. In general the PSDI is a comfortable home for those who want moderate lay policies with a vague Socialist flavour, combined with a sound pro-Western foreign policy. Differences of history and personality continue to divide it from the PSI. In spite of calls at the Congress to strengthen consultations between the two parties, there was no suggestion that they should, for example, present joint lists at elections. The experience of re-unification in the 1960's underlined the risk of losing the right wing supporters of the PSDI and those on the left of the PSI who could not stomach any agreed programme. Even so, there would be advantage in closer combination, because the Italian electoral system tends to penalise small parties; one PSDI Under Secretary told me that to elect every one of their Deputies they needed 60,000 votes compared with 42,000 for the DC. Any such advantage would however be outweighed by the loss of electoral support. What is likely is that the PSDI will continue to operate as a stalking horse for Craxi on certain issues (like the Siberian pipeline), hoping for appropriate rewards when he eventually becomes Prime Minister.

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- 5 -

11. Longo's survival as Secretary is harder to explain. He was much damaged by involvement in the P2 scandal last summer, on which his defence was confused and unconvincing. But there are many masons in the PSDI, and since Longo was never implicated in any of Gelli's more shady dealings he managed to ride the storm. The PSDI's vote in local elections soon after the affair was not affected by the adverse publicity. Longo's strength is that he has brought the party electoral success and given it a greater degree of unity, as symbolised by the manner of his re-election. As a leader, he is reliable rather than inspiring, but his personal appeal is stronger than his public image might suggest. He gets on particularly well with Craxi, whom he has known since the time in the early 1960's when both worked for Nenni. He also survives because there is no strong candidate to replace him; Di Giesi and Nicolazzi are content to remain Ministers (and the portfolios of Labour and Public Works they hold reveal much about the party's priorities); Romita is a lack-lustre figure whose two years as Secretary were a failure - and after the failure of Andreotti's national solidarity strategy, there was no need for the PSDI to keep on a pro-PCI leader of his type. Barring a palace revolution, Longo therefore looks reasonably safe until the next Congress.

12. Given the lack of surprises or new policies, one is tempted to conclude that this Congress was little more than a public relations exercise, and that the hot air balloon which adorned it was an appropriate symbol. The PSDI may indeed gain a percentage point or two in the next general elections, but look destined to remain lightweight in Italian political terms. My reason for describing this Congress in some detail is that the small parties, collectively if not individually, do have some weight and should not be ignored when we analyse the political scene. I hope that this letter, together with the enclosed list of the recently elected Direzione, will serve as a point of reference on the PSDI for the Department for the two years until their next Congress.

Yours ever

R N Culshaw

R N Culshaw

cc: Mrs K Colvin, Research Dept
Consul-Generals: Milan, Naples
Consuls: Florence, Genoa

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Members by Right

SARAGAT, Giuseppe
LONGO, Pietro
CONTI PERSINI, Gianfranco
REGGIANI, Alessandro
CUOJATI, Giovanni
SIMEONI, Luigi

ALIBERTI, Giovanni
AMADEI, Giuseppe
AVERARDI, Giuseppe
BEMPORAD, Alberto
BIANCHI, William
CARIA, Filippo
CARIGLIA, Antonio
CATTANI, Venerio
CIAMPAGLIA, Alberto
CIOCE, Dante
COLLIO, Enzo
CORREALE, Paolo
CORTI KOSTIC, Ivanka
COSTI, Silvano
FACCHIANO, Ferdinando
FERRI, Mauro
GHINAMI, Alessandro
MACALUSO, Pasquale
MADAUDO, Dino
MALLAMACI, Benedetto
MARTONI, Anselmo
MASSARI, Renato*
MASTROSATO, Fabrizio
MATTEOTTI, Matteo
MORONI, Gianni
NICOLAZZI, Franco
ORLANDI, Flavio
ORSELLO, Giampiero
PAGANI, Maurizio
PAIA, Antonio
PRETI, Luigi
PULETTI, Ruggero*
RIVA, Dino
RUGGERO, Guido

RUSSO, Quirino
SABATINI, Angelo
SCHIETROMA, Dante
SILVESTRI, Primo
TANZINI, Angelo
VIZZINI, Carlo*

Sinistra Reformista

CIOCIA, Graziano
COMMODO, Michele
DI GIESI, Michele
INNOCENTI, Giampiero
MANCINI, Lamberto
RAVECCA, Lino

Sinistra Socialdemocratica

BUZIO, Luigi
FURNARI, Baldassarre
MANZOLINI, Gianni
ROMITA, Pierluigi
SOMMARIVA, Francesco

* Vice Secretaries

GR 348

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11 MAY 1982

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FM ROME 181255Z MAY 82

11 MAY 1982	
<i>M. M.</i>	<i>DB</i>
13/5	

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELEGRAM NO. 245 OF 18 MAY 82

INFO ROUTINE UKREP BRUSSELS

SAVING FOR INFO OTHER EC POSTS, WASHINGTON, UKDEL NATO

CHRISTIAN DEMOCRAT (DC) CONGRESS

1. THE DC CONGRESS ENDED ON 06 MAY. DE MITA WAS ELECTED TO REPLACE PICCOLI AS SECRETARY: HE WAS THE CANDIDATE OF THE PARTY'S LEFT WING, BUT WON BECAUSE HE ALSO ATTRACTED THE SUPPORT OF A NEW GROUP LED BY PICCOLI, ANDREOTTI AND FANFANI. HIS OPPONENT, FORLANI, GOT 45 PERCENT OF THE VOTES.
2. THE NATIONAL COUNCIL HAS BEEN ELECTED AND WILL CHOOSE A NEW PARTY DIREZIONE (THE MAIN DECISION-MAKING BODY BETWEEN CONGRESSES) LATER IN MAY. DE MITA'S FIRST TASK IS TO HEAL ANY RIFT CAUSED BY HIS DUEL WITH FORLANI: DISTRIBUTION OF PARTY POSTS, ESPECIALLY PARTY PRESIDENT AND VICE SECRETARY, IS THE TRADITIONAL METHOD.
3. THE STRUGGLE FOR THE SECRETARYSHIP DOMINATED THE CONGRESS. THERE WAS LITTLE SIGN OF ANY REAL ATTEMPT TO REJUVENATE THE PARTY, AS CALLED FOR BY THE ASSEMBLY LAST NOVEMBER. ALMOST ALL SPEAKERS ACCEPTED THAT THERE WAS AT PRESENT NO ALTERNATIVE TO THE PRESENT GOVERNMENT COALITION, BUT THE MOOD OF THE DELEGATES WAS ONE OF IRRITATION WITH THE PSI AND CRAXI PERSONALLY, AND DE MITA'S SUCCESS IS PARTLY DUE TO THE EXPECTATION THAT HE WOULD BE TOUGHER THAN FORLANI IN DEALING WITH CRAXI'S PRETENSIONS. DE MITA WAS ALSO MORE CREDIBLE AS A PROponent OF INSTITUTIONAL REFORM. IN THE PAST HE HAS STOOD FOR A MORE OPEN DC ATTITUDE TOWARDS THE PCI, AS REFLECTED IN THE GOVERNMENTS OF 1976-9, BUT THAT WAS NOT A MAJOR ISSUE AT THIS CONGRESS.
4. DE MITA'S FIRST MAJOR TEST IS LIKELY TO BE A MEETING WITH OTHER COALITION PARTY SECRETARIES TO DISCUSS THE GOVERNMENT'S PROGRAMME. CRAXI MAY APPROACH HIM WITH SUSPICION AND MAY STEP UP HIS DEMANDS IN CONSEQUENCE. MUCH WILL DEPEND ON WHETHER DE MITA CAN RALLY THE WHOLE OF THE DC BEHIND HIM AND RESTORE THE PARTY'S DAMAGED SELF-CONFIDENCE.
5. FULL REPORT ON THE CONGRESS FOLLOWS BY BAG.
FCO PSE PASS SAVING ADDRESSEES

ARCULUS

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]
[THIS TELEGRAM WAS NOT ADVANCED]

STANDARD

WED
ECD(E)

CONFIDENTIAL



BRITISH CONSULATE GENERAL
via F. Crispi, 122
80122 Naples

Europa
Stanno politici
Ra
24/4
(21)

13 April 1982

H E
Sir Ronald Arculus KCMG KCVO
H M Ambassador
ROME

WRJ 01412		29/4
29 APR 1982		
SEARCHED	SERIALIZED	INDEXED
FILED		
		DS

Research Dept
Info. Dept
Mo Osborne
29/4

Dear Ambassador,

VISITS IN NAPLES

1. When you called on the Prefect of Naples, Dott Riccardo Boccia, on 8 April the conversation turned to the Cirillo ransome scandal and the political crisis which it caused. Dott Boccia hinted that the payment of the ransome of £623,000 was linked to the local earthquake reconstruction racket. Perhaps building contractors had clubbed together to get Cirillo freed hoping that because of his former position in charge of housing on the Regional Giunta he would later help them to secure lucrative contracts (the Corriere della Sera of 13 April reports that nineteen building contractors are believed to have contributed to the ransome).

2. The real question was: where did the money come from? Did the DC pay having said from the beginning that they would never deal with the BR? The whole affair remained very mysterious. The present political crisis in Rome which again threatened to bring down the Spadolini Government was set in motion by the Cirillo scandal, but in Italy a scandal could be found to fit the circumstances. Craxi would use strategically whatever crisis was available at the time for his own ends. Dott Boccia added that Italian politics were very intricate and he wondered how foreign observers managed to follow developments.

3. The Prefect began by saying that there were half a million registered unemployed in Campania of which 155,000 were in Naples. He did not believe these figures. Many of these people were in fact doing several small undeclared jobs. He was investigating the problem in an attempt to get at the real figures.

4. The Mayor, Senator Maurizio Valenzi (PCI), on whom you called the same day, said he had just returned from Rome where he had made another plea for help in fighting the camorra. Gang warfare in Naples had now reached dramatic proportions. The city needed more police. He thought the new anti-camorra law enabling the courts to exile gang leaders to remote areas might have some effect but it was not enough. Raffaele Cutolo, the imprisoned leader of the Nuova Camorra, still had far too much power.

1. Dux, (through existing camorra) legislation would permit this anyway
2. There can be little doubt that BR funds, however laundered, were used for at least part of the ransom. A new law is now in the way in Rome - (17) 1/10

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5. The camorra was involved in illegal building projects financed from "black" funds on a huge scale. Flats were going up almost overnight on sites in and near Naples which had been earmarked for reconstruction. He believed there were people in the police and even in the judiciary who were involved or too frightened to act. Many innocent people were being cheated. The Municipality was handicapped in its fight against this type of abuse by bureaucracy and by the slow arrival of reconstruction funds from Rome.

6. The Mayor praised the new Prefect and said that he was much better than the last one. Dott Boccia called people to account in his office and got things done.

7. Senator Valenzi confirmed that the political crisis in the Municipal Council which followed the Cirillo scandal had been patched up. He claimed that there was no immediate danger to the Giunta. He believed that he was the only Mayor who could keep the Council together. There was no other candidate.

The Cirillo ransome

8. I attach the text of an interview with Cirillo (NAPOLI OGGI (DC), 14 April) in which he again denies that the DC paid the ransome and says that it was entirely a family rescue operation. He also denies that the camorra were involved in negotiations.

9. The scene has now shifted to Rome. Although the document published by UNITA' was a fabrication it remains true that the money was paid and that secret service agents and at least one of Cirillo's men did visit Cutolo in prison. The PCI made a tactical mistake by going into print too early and above all by attacking Scotti. But the mud is sticking to everything in sight. The relationship between the Naples DC leadership and the camorra and the nature of the dealings with the BR are far from clear. Raffaele Cutolo has again been shown to wield immense power here. A recent press report said he controls 4,000 followers in the Naples area including teenagers who are prepared to kill for as little as £100. It is this "industrialised" crime which, for the Prefect and the Mayor, is the single most serious obstacle to progress. The transfer of Cutolo this week to a maximum security prison on the island of Asinara off north Sardinia may help to clip his wings.

Yours ever,

John

John Church

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Rel. per of Res. Dept. (20)
to wife
Stam Dept. (para 7)
Mr Young
The impending crisis has now
been postponed. (Rome telno 190)
Wife



British Embassy
Via XX Settembre 80A 00187 Rome

Telex 61049 Telephone 4755.441

R P Osborne Esq
WED
FCO

Your reference
Our reference 014/4
Date 20 April 1982

Dear Roy,

WRD 01412
27 APR 1982
Mr Nuzik D/S

ITALY INTERNAL

15

1. Rome telno 181.

2. Spadolini's government has run into unforeseen difficulties. Andreatta, the DC Minister of the Treasury, made some provocative remarks at Modena on 17 April about the risk of "national socialism" if the PSI gained votes from the DC: without a return to mutual loyalty among the parties in government, the country would risk landing itself with a gauleiter or caudillo. The PSI reacted strongly, calling for his resignation. Andreatta's DC colleagues have rallied round him so far, with various explanations of what he meant to say; but there has been no apology or full retraction. The PSI are maintaining a hard line, refusing for example to participate in meetings with Andreatta, so that yesterday's Cabinet had to be postponed.

3. The PSI Direzione meeting tomorrow should make clearer whether their purpose is simply to discomfit the DC in advance of the DC Congress (2-6 May) or to produce a full scale crisis. The PSDI's expectation this morning was that, unless Andreatta resigns (which they claimed there was DC pressure on him to do), there would be a crisis culminating in elections at the end of June. At the moment there is disaster in every newspaper headline. Spadolini has urgently consulted Pertini and the coalition party leaders, and will need all his skills of mediation to lower the temperature.

4. The PSI have lost no opportunity in the past months of throwing their weight around within the coalition, and this may be seen as one more issue which they can exploit for the purpose. There are, however, two specific factors which may explain why they have gone so dramatically on to the offensive. First, the DC regional congresses are showing better results for the left wing of the party (favouring a more open attitude towards the PCI) than had

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- 2 -

been expected; if these results were duplicated at the Congress itself, Craxi's bargaining position would be weakened. Second, when addressing the PCI Central Committee last week, Berlinguer came out strongly against anticipated elections and went so far as to hint that another form of government (sc. indirect PCI support for a government led by the DC) might be considered in an attempt to prevent them. Another element is the longstanding hostility between Andreatta and some of his Socialist colleagues, notably Formica and Reviglio.

5. In many ways this is a paradigm of an Italian scandal. It has no policy substance, but could bring the government down if the offended party pushes it to the limit. It comes at a bad time for Italy, since the Finance Bill must be passed by the end of April, there is still no final agreement on the 1982 budget, and the liquidazioni issue remains unsolved (see para 5 of Rome savingram no. 15); cynics point out, however, that a general election would suffice to ward off the liquidazioni referendum. It is also not clear what could follow a crisis now. The time for elections before the summer is short, but not impossibly so; otherwise, a caretaker government to last until the autumn might emerge.

6. The storm could blow over as quickly as it arose. The political tension is, however, as great now as at any time this year, and even Andreatta's resignation (which would be a bitter pill for the DC, and especially its left wing, to swallow) might not defuse it. A Republican close to Spadolini told me this morning that Spadolini would try hard to find a solution but was prepared if necessary to go to Parliament next week (after approval of the Finance Bill) and throw in his hand. He would not soldier on against insuperable odds, damaging his own reputation and the Republicans' electoral prospects in the process.

7. Finally, as far as the Falklands are concerned this affair could have two effects. On the one hand, as Colombo told the Ambassador yesterday (Rome telno 176), Andreatta's own goal has given the PSI a better subject on which to attack the government than Argentine sanctions. But if a crisis did result, the ability of Italy to take rapid action on our behalf would of course be much impaired, and no politicians here would have much time or inclination to devote to foreign affairs issues.

Yours ever,

R N Culshaw

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FM ROME 221550Z APR 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO
 TELEGRAM NO. 190 OF 22 APR 82
 INFO PRIORITY UKREP BRUSSELS

MY TELEGRAM NO. 181: ITALY INTERNAL

1. THE ACTIVE INTERVENTION OF PERTINI OVER THE LAST TWO DAYS HAS PREVENTED A GOVERNMENT CRISIS. HE DESCRIBED THE WHOLE EPISODE AS "DISGUSTING", REPEATED HIS FIRM OPPOSITION TO ANTICIPATED ELECTIONS, AND PERSUADED THE DC AND PSI TO BURY THEIR DIFFERENCES UNTIL AFTER THE DC CONGRESS.
2. IN MAY THERE WILL PROBABLY BE A MEETING BETWEEN THE NEW DC LEADERSHIP AND THE SECRETARIES OF THE OTHER COALITION PARTIES, AT WHICH ANY SUBJECT (INCLUDING ARGENTINE SANCTIONS) COULD COME UP. BUT HOWEVER GREAT THE DIFFICULTIES WHICH EMERGE, IT WILL THEN BE TOO LATE FOR ELECTIONS BEFORE THE SUMMER.
3. THE POSITION OF ANDREATTA HIMSELF IS STILL UNCLEAR. HIS PARTY HAVE SUPPORTED HIM BUT SOME OF HIS COLLEAGUES FEEL THAT HIS CONDUCT LET DOWN THE DC AT A CRITICAL TIME. DIRECT PSI PRESSURE HAS BEEN REDUCED, BUT THERE IS SPECULATION THAT HE MAY NEVERTHELESS RESIGN, PERHAPS AFTER PILOTING THE 1982 BUDGET THROUGH PARLIAMENT (THE FINANCE BILL WAS FINALLY APPROVED LATE ON 20 APRIL).
4. IT IS HARD TO SEE WHO HAS GAINED FROM THIS AFFAIR. MOST OF THE DC MUST BE RELIEVED THAT THE RISK OF EARLY ELECTIONS HAS BEEN AVERTED, WHILE FOR CRAXI, PERTINI'S IMPLICIT CRITICISM OF ANDREATTA IS SOME COMFORT. THE PSI LEADERSHIP DECIDED YESTERDAY NOT TO FORCE A RESHUFFLE OR THE RESIGNATION OF SPADOLINI AT THIS STAGE, BUT THAT WILL NOT PREVENT THEM LOOKING AROUND FOR ANOTHER EXCUSE FOR A GOVERNMENT CRISIS.

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TO IMMEDIATE FCO
 TELEGRAM NO. 190 OF 22 APR 82
 INFO PRIORITY UKREP BRUSSELS

MY TELEGRAM NO. 181: ITALY INTERNAL

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TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NO. 181 OF 20 APR 82
INFO ROUTINE UKREP BRUSSELS

MY SAVINGRAM 015: ITALY INTERNAL

1. A PROVOCATIVE SPEECH BY ANDREATTA, THE DC TREASURY MINISTER, ON 17 APRIL ATTACKING THE PSI HAS LED TO A SERIOUS DISPUTE BETWEEN THE DC AND THE PSI.
2. YESTERDAY'S CABINET WAS POSTPONED, AND SPADOLINI IS NOW DEPLOYING ALL HIS SKILLS OF MEDIATION: HE HAS ALSO CONSULTED PERTINI. THE PSI ARE CONTINUING TO DEMAND ANDREATTA'S RESIGNATION. SO FAR THE DC ARE SUPPORTING HIM, AT LEAST IN PUBLIC, AND NO COMPROMISE IS IN SIGHT.
3. WHILE SPADOLINI MAY STILL FIND A WAY OUT, BOTH THE PRESS AND OUR CONTACTS ARE TODAY MORE THAN USUALLY PESSIMISTIC. THE PICTURE SHOULD BE CLEARER ONCE THE LEADERSHIPS OF THE DC AND PSI HAVE MET, TODAY AND TOMORROW. BUT WHATEVER THE OUTCOME, THIS EPISODE ILLUSTRATES THE INHERENT FRAGILITY OF SPADOLINI'S COALITION.
4. LETTER FOLLOWS, BY TODAY'S BAG.

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BY BAG
FROM ROME
TO FCO
SAVING NO. 15
13 APRIL 1982
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WRD	01412
16 APR 1982	
10 APR 1982	

TO FCO SAVING TELEGRAM NO. 15 OF 13 APRIL 1982
AND INFORMATION SAVING ALL EC POSTS, WASHINGTON, UKDEL NATO,
HOLY SEE, MILAN, NAPLES, FLORENCE AND GENOA

— (11) —
MY SAVING TELEGRAM NO. 11: ITALY INTERNAL

1. The political situation remains confused, and Spadolini continues to exercise all his skills of mediation to keep his coalition partners united. On some key-issues, like the 1982 budget, Spadolini has had to proceed with caution, and this may prove damaging to the economy. The political pressure on him is increasing, and his opponents argue that a different way of ensuring "governability" must be tried, however self-serving the arguments. But Spadolini still exudes confidence, and enjoys the backing of President Pertini.
2. The lack of confidence and direction of the Christian Democrats (DC) and the Communists (PCI) is helping Craxi, the Socialist leader (PSI), to increase the strength of the "lay bloc" of minor parties and to keep himself in centre stage. The lay bloc would expect to gain at least 5% in general elections, and most of those new votes would go to Craxi - although Spadolini's success as Prime Minister will also help his small Republican Party. At a PSI mini-Congress on 4 April Craxi said that he would not press

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his candidature for the Prime Ministership in this legislature; taken with his earlier statements about not wishing to see Spadolini replaced by a Christian Democrat, this suggests that he is thinking in terms of elections this year, since there is no other credible candidate to follow Spadolini. The PSI's weight in the coalition is sufficient to force elections, but Craxi must choose his time and his pretext carefully. He has set out no clear ideas on policy, as distinct from tactics.

3. It is a measure of Craxi's success that the other parties seem to do little but react to his forcing tactics. The small lay parties are content to let him make the running on their behalf, hoping thus to strengthen themselves vis-a-vis the two largest parties. For the PCI, Berlinguer criticised Craxi's latest speech: because of internal difficulties following the recent rift with Moscow, the PCI are ill-prepared for an election campaign, and their policy of "democratic alternative", meaning left-wing alliance with the PSI, is not a practical prospect for the time being. It would be very difficult, however, for Berlinguer to go so far as to support the DC in government by benevolent abstention, to postpone or avoid elections. The DC are in poor shape, with no generally agreed candidate for party secretary to replace Piccoli, and have again postponed their Congress, now planned for 2 May; this is widely interpreted as a stalling manoeuvre to put off the expected crisis, since they argue that only after their Congress can serious negotiations with coalition partners be begun. This pre-Congress phase exposes their factional squabbling, and no coherent strategy has been proposed: the one thing that unites them is their opposition to early elections. To parry demands from the coalition partners for clarificatory talks, Piccoli is to meet other party leaders bilaterally between now and the

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- 3 -

Congress; but he is now in baulk, and at best only stop-gap solutions could emerge.

4. An agreement about policy and Ministerial posts between the coalition parties, to last until the normal end of this legislature (1984) as an alternative to anticipated elections, looks unlikely at the moment. It might however be revived after any elections if the most difficult question, that of the Prime Ministership, could be resolved.

5. A crisis in the next month could occur even without deliberate provocation by Craxi or others: its most likely causes would be the Finance Bill (passed by the Chamber on 8 April, now again before the Senate), the 1982 Budget (which has to be approved by the end of April), or the new Bill on liquidazioni (severance payments). The Bill on liquidazioni must pass by the end of May to avoid a June referendum on the issue, which if successful would add an enormous amount to employers' labour costs. In any case, the pressure on Spadolini will increase after the DC Congress, when the new DC leadership will have to establish a working relationship with the minor parties. By then, however, the deadline will have passed for elections before the summer. At the moment, they are still technically possible but President Pertini, who must dissolve Parliament, would be hard to convince that they were justified, and the public show little enthusiasm.

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1) Reg Pl. copy to Mr. J.R. Young

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Mrs K. Corwin
Research Dept
by new bag

THE DC

1. I had an interesting talk on 19 March with On. Andrea Borruso, the head of Piccoli's office. A press cutting of his recent statement on the Secretaryship is attached.
2. Borruso began by underlining the features that would make the April Congress different from its predecessors. First, the presence of the esterni (with 10% of the delegates) would reinforce the DC's contact with its roots; from the beginning it had promoted values shared by organisations like the Christian Workers Movement and Catholic cultural or academic bodies, and their voice should be heard in the debate at this Congress about policy. It was not yet clear how the esterni would select their representatives, still less which way they would divide in corrente terms.
3. The second difference was the direct election of the Party Secretary. This had happened in 1976 with Zaccagnini, but the statute had not then been modified. Henceforth the Secretary would be answerable to the Congress rather than to the Consiglio Nazionale, although the latter would be able to vote to substitute him - by two-thirds majority - under certain circumstances yet to be defined but probably including ill-health, resignation, incapacity, or failure to implement policies agreed at the Congress. The Secretary would be free to choose his own staff and to allocate to Direzione members responsibility for sectors of work; Vice-Secretaries would be elected at the Congress. I asked whether in practice the Secretary would not still be bound to follow the rules of spartizione set out in the Manuale Cencelli; Borruso replied that such mechanical divisions no longer applied and that the new Secretary would have a mandate from the Congress to pick his team on merit.
4. Most important of all, Borruso felt that the November Assembly had cleared the air in the party and shown the DC's mature capacity for self-examination. There was broad agreement on the validity of the reforms introduced. The Congress could therefore look outward and ahead, addressing itself to Italy's real problems rather than internal wrangles. Another advantage over the 1980 Congress was that no alternative alliance strategy was seriously on offer this time; Borruso therefore expected a strong coherent majority in

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favour of continuing the present pentapartito throughout this legislatura or longer. Even those who disliked or distrusted Craxi would reluctantly accept this, although some might show the 'national solidarity' card in an attempt to limit PSI pretensions.

5. I asked about the role of correnti and in particular the minimum size of 10% agreed in principle by the Assembly. Borruso confirmed that the minimum for the Congress had not yet been fixed but would probably be 15%. It would be a good thing thus to make them fewer, but the real problem was the nature of correnti rather than their number or size. Different opinions were inevitable in a movement as broad as the DC, and were indeed proof of democratic vitality, in sharp contrast to the centralism of the PCI. But the present correnti were concerned more with personalities and access to power; their proliferation proved that, for there could not possibly be a dozen significantly different ideological positions; and members of a given corrente were obliged to support its line through thick and thin, rather than forming different partnerships on different subjects. The formal structure of the correnti - offices, newspapers, and financing - also needed dismantling but this would take time.

6. Predictably, Borruso said that Piccoli was the man best placed to renew the DC over the next three years. He had the necessary weight within the party and commanded respect from its right and left wings. He had accepted the Assembly's recommendations much more willingly than had other old leaders like Fanfani. Borruso added in confidence that this would be the last time Piccoli would bid for the Secretaryship (he made it sound like retirement, but I am not so sure: Piccoli may nourish hopes of being Prime Minister or even President). I asked whether a quarantenne as Secretary would not be a more fitting symbol of rinnovamento in the party; Borruso's answer was that Piccoli would surround himself with quarantenni who would thus become papabili in 3 years time (sic). He proceeded to rule out De Mita's chances of becoming Secretary; it made no sense to give the job to the pro-PCI left at a time when relations with the PSI were what really counted. On Forlani (the third candidate so far unofficially declared) he passed no comment.

7. We discussed the DC's appeal to young people in Italy. Borruso was worried about the disillusionment of the Italian youth of the 1980's with politics in general. The 1968 generation had politicised everything and gone to extremes. Their successors saw no value in any form of participation in the political process; this led usually to apathy, sometimes to the route of armed struggle. All parties were affected, but especially the DC and the PCI, both of whose youth federations were in difficulties. The DC's problem was not so much loss of votes as loss of credibility in young people's eyes.

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
The only remedy Borruso could suggest was that the DC leadership should demonstrate a more serious approach to issues affecting the young and should eliminate practices, which had brought the party into disrepute: then the values for which the DC stood would ensure it a good measure of support from this and future new generations of voters.

8. Finally I asked about the DC's electoral prospects. Borruso said the DC needed a year of consolidation and was therefore prepared to give full support to Spadolini if the alternative looked like early elections. A spell out of the limelight had in any case done them good. Unfortunately Craxi too well knew how badly the DC - and for different reasons the PCI - needed time to recover, and would seek to deny it to them. But Borruso was optimistic about the degree of unity attainable at the Congress and thought the DC would thereafter be able to limit the electoral damage to a loss of one or two percentage points.

9. Despite having the difficult task of promoting Piccoli and his rather vague policies, Borruso makes a good impression. He did an English course in Cambridge last summer, but I do not know whether he speaks English with any fluency. He will be worth keeping in touch with, especially if Piccoli is re-elected; I may see him in Milan next week, when Piccoli addresses the PSDI Congress.

10. I recommend that this minute be copied to WED and Research Department, since it helps to set the scene for the DC Congress.

19 March 1982


R N Culshaw

Borruso propone la riconferma di Piccoli

Quale segretario dc? Ecco l'identikit

L'avvicinarsi della scadenza congressuale democristiana sta producendo due distinti fenomeni. Il primo riguarda la tendenza dei possibili candidati alla segreteria (Piccoli, Forlani e De Mita) a scendere in campo il più tardi possibile per non venir «bruciati» anzitempo. Non a caso, ieri l'altro, Forlani ha tenuto a precisare che non intende candidarsi se non come segretario di tutto il partito. Ed anche De Mita mantiene il più rigoroso silenzio tanto da spingere Granelli a negare che la sinistra dc abbia già definito una preferenza nominativa ma di avere indicato una linea politica.

Ieri, vi è stata la replica indiretta di Piccoli attraverso un'intervista di Borruso, membro della segreteria politica. Borruso ha difeso la linea strategica del segretario uscente: «Non si può ridurre il congresso ad una scelta sui nomi ma ad un momento corale di dibattito della linea politica della Dc: quindi, un congresso di contenuti e non di nomi». Ha sottolineato che non si pone più, come al precedente congresso che vide la vittoria del «preambolo», una divisione tra filo-Psi e filo-Pci: «Vi è in tutti — ha aggiunto Borruso — la coscienza che si è chiusa un'epoca, quella che si è aperta nel 1948, per cui è necessario ridefinire un progetto economico-sociale di trasformazione della società italiana per gli anni



80. È, quasi casualmente, ha indicato in Piccoli l'identikit del segretario adatto a gestire questa nuova fase.

Il secondo fenomeno riguarda proprio i contenuti di questa nuova fase. Sembrava, dopo i

deludenti risultati elettorali delle amministrative nel giugno 1981, che la spinta al rinnovamento fosse irreversibile al fine di ridare smalto all'immagine offuscata della Dc. Tanto che, a novembre, si giunse all'assem-

blea di «rinnovamento» che sancì tre «nuove regole del gioco»:

- 1) eliminazione delle correnti considerate, nella relazione di Piccoli, il bubbone da estirpare;
- 2) elezione diretta del segretario a tutti i livelli;
- 3) apertura del partito agli «esterni» riconoscendo una «presenza» congressuale del dieci per cento.

Ma, a sei settimane dal congresso, molti esponenti dc mettono in dubbio questo rinnovamento. Taviani ha affermato che «sinché ci sarà il voto proporzionale le correnti continueranno a proliferare. Il limite del «quorum» può ridurre il numero al centro, ma tende ad accrescere il potere dei capicorrente e dei loro staffs». A sua volta, Donat Cattin, che nel luglio scorso si era dimesso dalla direzione invitando gli altri membri a seguire il suo esempio, ha espresso seri dubbi sul rinnovamento in corso polemizzando con l'area Zaccagnini e con la candidatura De Mita: «Far convergere al centro questa candidatura — ha detto — è un tentativo inutile». Dopo aver constatato che la candidatura Forlani può uscire solo da una «convergenza unitaria», Donat Cattin ha osservato che «l'orizzonte appare molto ristretto e si ha l'impressione che si restringa la legislatura».

G.C.


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abolished by legislation. There was in any case nothing to prevent an organisation giving money to an individual corrente leader and thus avoiding any obligation to enter the amount in the party balance sheet. Similarly, the provision requiring each party's accounts to be open to inspection by a special commission could be easily circumvented by keeping two sets of books. The most blatant device of all was in the version of article 2 of the new bill proposed by the Chamber, where access to financial information about wives and children was made dependent on their consent. Maresca's conclusion was that the whole exercise concerning transparency of funding was cosmetic, but that it suited the whole of the classe politica to maintain the illusion.

4. I attach also the major parties' published balance sheets for the financial year 1981, with a brief summary (Annex A) for the DC, PCI, and PSI. You will notice that they all rely heavily on state funding and some would have been in deep financial trouble without the back-dated increase. Italian parties spend much more money than their counterparts in eg. Britain: the smaller ones in particular would have had to restrict their propaganda and other activities if forced to finance themselves from their own resources. Only the PCI is to a major extent self-financed from membership fees etc. Despite the inadequacy of the published figures, most of those to whom I have spoken believe that they give a reasonable indication of the parties' financial situation. Information about loans (eg. Calvi), business funding etc. tends to be anecdotal and cited with more regard to political effect than to financial accuracy.

5. I find this subject fascinating but fear that Whitehall will not, unless a scandal emerges (as at present in the FRG). Some of the material collected will be useful background for the despatches in preparation on the DC and PCI. Meanwhile I recommend copying this minute, with mine of 15 September 1981 and the three legal texts, to Mrs Colvin in Research Department and to Mr R P Osborne for background information. It may also be of interest to our Consular posts.



R N Culshaw

18 March 1982

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C, D

1. I agree that the published figures may conceal more than they reveal. On the PCA figures, for example, it appears that the Party makes a profit on publishing press. Yet Party functionaries often complain of the drain that Winter makes on Party funds.

P. R. Nelson

19/3

UNCLASSIFIED

PARTY FINANCES 1981

All major parties have published balance sheets for 1981, in the form prescribed by Law 195. Figures (in billions of lire) for the DC, PCI, and PSI are as follows.

INCOME

	<u>DC</u>	<u>PCI</u>	<u>PSI</u>
I: Membership fees etc.	17.9	25.8	6
II: State funding (including backpayment for 1980)	38.7	29.4	11.5
III: Various (dividends, shares etc.)	0.7	1.5	0
IV: Receipts from publishing and special functions	2.5	20.6**	1.6
V: Special contributions	4.6*	-	0.3
<hr/>			
TOTAL	64.4	77.3	19.4
<hr/>			

EXPENDITURE

	<u>DC</u>	<u>PCI</u>	<u>PSI</u>
I: Contribution to costs of parliamentary groups	2.1	4.4	6.2
II: Central staff	8.3	10.9	3.6
III: Local party organisations	23.2	43.7	4.5
IV: Press etc.	15.4	19	4.3
V: General (rents etc.)	2.1	-	-
VI: Special expenses (election campaigns)	1.4	2.4	0.5

/VII

UNCLASSIFIED

- 2 -

VII: Previous commitments, debts etc.	11.9	-	-
<hr/>			
TOTAL	64.4	80.4	19.1
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* all ascribed to party members or associates

**reflects the fact that UNITA is a mass circulation newspaper

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my material

Mr Secretary
Minister
G.M.A. Secy. 12/2/81
Hope in

W.D. G.O.

RADICAL PARTY VIEWS

1. I had an hour this morning at the Chamber with the Radical Deputy Teodori.
2. The main subject was financing of political parties, on which a Government bill is now being debated in the Chamber. Teodori recalled that the existing 1974 law, which awarded Lire 45 billion annually to the political parties as a whole (in addition to reimbursement of electoral expenses etc.) had been opposed by only the Radicals and the PLI. But in 1978 when the Radicals had organised a referendum on the issue, 43% had voted in favour of abrogation. Since 1978, popular disillusionment with the existing political parties and doubts about the propriety of state funding for them had if anything increased. It was therefore clear that the present Government bill, doubling the amount and introducing indexation to take effect from 2 years ago, would not find favour with most electors and could only meet with Parliamentary approval if the parties conspired to disregard that basic fact. The Radicals therefore felt justified in using normal Parliamentary tactics (but not, as yet, full-blooded ostruzionismo) to oppose the bill. It was inappropriate for Parliament to give priority to this issue when widespread Government spending cuts were in prospect and the economy needed urgent attention. The Government bill was also inadequate on the transparency of political party funding and did not adequately cover the all-important issue of access to the media (which without state assistance could be beyond the resources of a small party). The Radicals had introduced an alternative bill in the Senate, and were not opposed to the principle of state funding; it should however be based on reimbursement of proven and legitimate expenses, together with improved facilities. Teodori concluded by saying that because of the number of articles (each requiring separate approval) the Government bill would require an enormous amount of Parliamentary time and might be dropped; even if it became law, the Radicals would have the option of calling another referendum on the subject in 1983 (ie. after the statutory five year interval).
3. We next discussed the Italian initiative on hunger. Teodori said that the Radicals had campaigned hard on this issue since 1979; Pannella's hunger strike, begun on 1 September and still continuing, was in this tradition. Spadolini had put forward his initiative at Ottawa partly to diffuse Radical opposition but mainly because he saw this as an opportunity to cut a dash on the world stage without makin

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any enemies (since no-one could openly oppose aid for the starving). Although cynical about his motives, the Radicals welcomed the initiative and hoped other countries could be successfully drawn in. In Italy the acid test would be disbursement, and here past experience was discouraging; three years ago Italy's total aid had been 0.07% of GNP, the lowest in the developed world. Even the present target of 0.34% within three years was modest when compared with the UN target of 0.7%. Nevertheless with help from other interested groups such as the churches and parts of the PSI the Radicals hoped to keep up progress, shifting emphasis away from development on to emergency famine relief and perhaps introducing the new concept of linkage between reduction in defence spending and increase in aid.

4. I also asked Teodori about the structure and prospects of the Radical party. He stressed that it was quite different from any other political party in Italy. It had only 3000 members and no major financial backing, yet had succeeded in attracting over 3% of the vote in the 1979 general elections. Its support was concentrated in the big cities and almost half of its voters were thought to be under 25. It remained more an alliance of pressure groups on specific issues (women's lib, gay liberation, abortion on demand, unilateral disarmament etc.) than a potential party of government with a comprehensive programme. It had relied heavily, especially in the 1976 elections, on the charismatic figure of Pannella to attract votes but this was less true now. Its support was bound to ebb and flow with the themes for which it campaigned, and this caused tension within the party; nevertheless they had considerable influence in many areas (7% of the vote in Rome, for example) and had only declined to participate in last June's administrative elections because of the expense and organisational difficulty of mounting a campaign, coupled with a general reluctance to become closely involved (and identified with the major parties) in the day to day business of administration. Teodori himself thought that the image of the Radicals "contra mundum" suited them best and that the present loose structure should be maintained. Party congresses had shown the near impossibility of agreeing a programme or assigning specific responsibility to party members. The Radicals should concentrate instead on getting better access to the media (it should be remembered that Teodori himself is a writer); at present no newspaper or magazine reflected their ideas faithfully, and the party had neither the funds nor the inclination to start a newspaper of their own. Radio Radicale on the other hand had been a huge success with a potential audience of 15 million (he did not say how many actually listened).

5. We touched briefly on foreign and defence policy. Teodori said that the Radicals did not have well established links with any foreign political parties. He outlined Radical views on


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- 3 -

disarmament in familiar terms but commented that 'it was not as easy to enlist recruits to the pacifist or neutralist cause' in Italy as in Northern Europe; the low key public reaction to the Comiso announcement had been a particular disappointment. I twisted his tail over Northern Ireland; he replied that this was a marginal issue on which only some Radicals felt strongly; the party as a whole were not campaigning against British policy, and no deputy had specific responsibility for the subject. I said that we hoped that statements by responsible Radicals would at least be factually accurate and that we should be pleased to discuss the matter or provide information at any time.

6. To my knowledge the only Radical with whom the Embassy have had recent dealings is Ajello. But the Radicals are important, not so much because of their electoral strength (which could be a passing phenomenon) as for the light they can shed on the weakness of Italy's institutions, modus operandi of the established parties, and the orientation of the young. I was therefore glad to find Teodori well disposed and willing to keep in touch. He made a good deal of sense on all the subjects we discussed (except defence, which is not his speciality). I believe he may also speak reasonable English, having spent some time studying in the United States.



R N Culshaw

15 September 1981

1. A valuable encounter. There should be a copy of your para 3 in the 'Hunger' file.
2. Aldo Ajello hardly seems to be a real Radical, incidentally. He got elected in the radical list after falling out with

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Craxi and leaving the PSI. But he told me he is not a member of the Radical party; nor did he attend the party congress. His main interest as you know, is foreign affairs and he shall hand over some way of returning to the socialist fold.

23/IX

Elenco dei senatori: BIGNARDI, CIPELLINI, SCAMARCO, BARSACCHIO, BOZZELLO VEROLE, INNOCENTI, MARAVALLE, NOVELLINI, PITTELLA, SEGRETO, SPIRELLI, DELLA BRIOTTA, FABBRI, FOSSA, JANNELLI, NOCI, PITRONIO, SCEVAROLI e TALAMONA (467); CROLLALANZA, FILETTI, FINESTRA, FRANCO, LA RUSSA Antonio, MARCHIO, MITROTTI, MONACO, PECORINO, PISANO, PISTOLESE, POZZO e RASTRELLI (709); BARTOLOMEO, BONIFACIO, DE VITO, DE GIUSEPPE, DONAT-CATTIN, MANCINO, SAPORITO, BAUSI, SCHIANO, GRANELLI, VALLANTE, NEMI, MURMURA, MEZZAPESA, MARCHETTI, FRACASSI, BORDI, VETTORI, BOMBARDIERI e COLOMBO (710); MALAGODI e PASSINO (783); CROLLALANZA, RASTRELLI, FILETTI, FINESTRA, FRANCO, LA RUSSA Antonio, MARCHIO, MITROTTI, MONACO, PECORINO, PISANO, PISTOLESE e POZZO (788); STANZANI GHEDINI e SPADACCIA (904); MODICA, BERTI, FERRALI e BENEDETTI (943).

Elenco della Camera dei deputati nella seduta del 3 dicembre 1981 (V. Stampato n. 2452)

Trasmissione dal Presidente della Camera dei Deputati alla Presidenza il 9 dicembre 1981

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SENATO DELLA REPUBBLICA

VIII LEGISLATURA

(N. 467-709-781-783-798-904-945-C)

RELAZIONE DELLA 1^a COMMISSIONE PERMANENTE

(AFFARI COSTITUZIONALI, AFFARI DELLA PRESIDENZA DEL CONSIGLIO E DELL'INTERNO, ORDINAMENTO GENERALE DELLO STATO E DELLA PUBBLICA AMMINISTRAZIONE)

(RELATORE BONIFACIO)

Comunicata alla Presidenza il 24 febbraio 1982

SUL

DISEGNO DI LEGGE

Disposizioni per la pubblicità della situazione patrimoniale e di titolari di cariche elettive e di cariche direttive di alcuni enti

*approvato dal Senato della Repubblica nella seduta dell'11 marzo 1981
in un testo risultante dall'unificazione dei disegni di legge
(V. Stampati nn. 467, 709, 781, 783, 798, 904 e 945)*

d'iniziativa dei senatori SIGNORI, CIPELLINI, SCAMARCO, BARSACCHI, BOZZELLO VEROLE, FINESSI, MARAVALLE, NOVELLINI, PITTELLA, SEGRETO, SPINELLI, DELLA BRIOTTA, FABBRI, FOSSA, JANNELLI, NOCI, PETRONIO, SCEVAROLLI e TALAMONA (467); CROLLALANZA, FILETTI, FINESTRA, FRANCO, LA RUSSA Antonino, MARCHIO, MITROTTI, MONACO, PECORINO, PISANO, PISTOLESE, POZZO e RASTRELLI (709); BARTOLOMEI, BONIFACIO, DE VITO, DE GIUSEPPE, DONAT-CATTIN, MANCINO, SAPORITO, BAUSI, SCHIANO, GRANELLI, VALIANTE, NEPI, MURMURA, MEZZAPESA, MARCHETTI, FRACASSI, BORZI, VETTORI, BOMBARDIERI e COLOMBO Vittorino (V.) (781); MALAGODI e FASSINO (783); CROLLALANZA, RASTRELLI, FILETTI, FINESTRA, FRANCO, LA RUSSA Antonino, MARCHIO, MITROTTI, MONACO, PECORINO, PISANO, PISTOLESE e POZZO (798); STANZANI GHEDINI e SPADACCIA (904); MODICA, BERTI, PIERALLI e BENEDETTI (945)

*modificato dalla Camera dei deputati nella seduta del 3 dicembre 1981
(V. Stampato n. 2452)*

*Trasmesso dal Presidente della Camera dei deputati alla Presidenza
il 9 dicembre 1981*

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DISEGNO DI LEGGE

ONOREVOLI SENATORI. — Le modifiche apportate dalla Camera dei deputati al testo approvato dalla nostra Assemblea nella seduta dell'11 marzo 1981 — a parte quelle meramente formali — sono le seguenti:

1) agli obblighi imposti nei numeri 1) e 2) dell'articolo 2 viene aggiunto (n. 3) quello concernente le spese e le obbligazioni per la propaganda elettorale. Già questa Assemblea aveva avvertito l'esigenza di allargare pur in questa direzione l'intervento legislativo volto a rendere possibile il controllo della pubblica opinione ed aveva impegnato il Governo ad elaborare una precisa proposta, da collegare alla più vasta riforma della disciplina delle spese elettorali. L'emendamento aggiuntivo introdotto dalla Camera dei deputati è da approvare: ma occorre tener ben presente che esso non deve far venir meno l'impegno ad una revisione dell'intera materia dei limiti della propaganda, dovendosi tener conto dell'imponenza dello sviluppo delle possibilità di uso delle comunicazioni di massa;

2) resta l'obbligo di deposito anche dell'attestazione patrimoniale del coniuge non separato e dei figli conviventi. Ma, mentre nel testo approvato dal Senato esso trovava il suo presupposto nel « non rifiuto » dell'interessato, l'emendamento ne richiede il « consenso ». La modifica è accettabile, perchè si muove nella logica di non imporre obblighi a soggetti « terzi », ma di prevedere, attraverso una forma di adesione, il loro assoggettarsi al controllo della pubblica opinione. L'emendamento rende ancor più irrilevante l'errore materiale del rinvio dell'articolo 3 all'ultimo, anziché al penultimo comma dell'articolo 2. L'irrilevanza — così unanimemente ha ritenuto la Commissione — sconsiglia la correzione, il cui unico effetto sarebbe quello di ulteriormente protrarre la definitiva approvazione di un provvedimento intorno al quale, nei due rami del Parlamento, c'è stato vastissimo consenso dei Gruppi politici;

DISEGNO DI LEGGE

3) l'articolo 6 fissa in tre mesi — anziché in due — dall'entrata in vigore della legge il primo adempimento (nn. 1 e 2, articolo 2) a carico degli attuali parlamentari;

4) in sede di terza lettura del testo poi diventato legge 18 novembre 1981, n. 659, l'estensore della presente relazione aveva messo in evidenza, a nome della Commissione e con rammarico, che le modifiche allora apportate dalla Camera dei deputati avevano eliminato la possibilità degli elettori di conoscere l'esistenza e l'entità dei contributi finanziari leciti (e soggetti, se superiori a determinati limiti, all'obbligo di dichiarazione). Il comma ora aggiunto all'articolo 8 colma siffatta lacuna;

5) il n. 3) dell'articolo 12 è modificato nel senso che l'attuazione degli obblighi ivi prevista è condizionata: a) al presupposto che si tratti di conti le cui spese di gestione annuali superino i 500 milioni; b) al concorso pubblico nella misura del 50 per cento di tali spese.

Onorevoli senatori, constatato che gli emendamenti apportati dalla Camera dei deputati non hanno minimamente alterato la struttura e la logica di fondo del testo (chè, anzi, le innovazioni illustrate ai numeri 1 e 4 hanno migliorato la complessiva disciplina) mi onoro, a nome della 1ª Commissione permanente, di sollecitarne l'approvazione. Nel formulare tale proposta la Commissione avverte la necessità di ribadire ancora una volta che il provvedimento, muovendosi nell'ambito di un più ampio indirizzo volto alla cosiddetta moralizzazione dei pubblici poteri, lungi dal poter assumere il significato di convalida di infondati e generalizzati sospetti, costituisce prova piena e non confutabile della volontà della classe politica di sottoporsi al controllo della pubblica opinione e della sua disponibilità a concorrere ad assicurare la trasparenza della vita pubblica.

BONIFACIO, relatore

DISEGNO DI LEGGE

APPROVATO DAL SENATO DELLA REPUBBLICA

Art. 1.

Le disposizioni della presente legge si applicano:

- 1) ai membri del Senato della Repubblica e della Camera dei deputati;
- 2) al Presidente del Consiglio dei ministri, ai Ministri, ai Sottosegretari di Stato;
- 3) ai consiglieri regionali;
- 4) ai consiglieri provinciali;
- 5) ai consiglieri di comuni capoluogo di provincia o con popolazione superiore ai 100.000 abitanti.

Art. 2.

Entro tre mesi dalla proclamazione i membri del Senato della Repubblica ed i membri della Camera dei deputati sono tenuti a depositare presso l'Ufficio di Presidenza della Camera di appartenenza:

- 1) una dichiarazione concernente i diritti reali su beni immobili e su beni mobili iscritti in pubblici registri; le azioni di società; le quote di partecipazione a società; l'esercizio di funzioni di amministratore o di sindaco di società, con l'apposizione della formula « sul mio onore affermo che la dichiarazione corrisponde al vero »;
- 2) copia dell'ultima dichiarazione dei redditi soggetti all'imposta sui redditi delle persone fisiche.

DISEGNO DI LEGGE

APPROVATO DALLA CAMERA DEI DEPUTATI

Art. 1.**Identico.****Art. 2.****Identico:****1) identico;****2) identico;**

- 3) una dichiarazione concernente le spese sostenute e le obbligazioni assunte per la propaganda elettorale ovvero l'attestazione di essersi avvalso esclusivamente di materiali e di mezzi propagandistici predisposti e messi a disposizione dal partito o dalla formazione politica della cui lista hanno fatto parte, con l'apposizione della

(Segue: Testo approvato dal Senato della Repubblica)

Gli adempimenti indicati nel precedente comma devono riguardare anche la situazione patrimoniale e la dichiarazione dei redditi del coniuge non separato e dei figli conviventi. In caso di rifiuto opposto da tali soggetti, il dichiarante ne fa attestazione.

Il termine previsto dal primo comma decorre per i senatori nominati ai sensi dell'articolo 59, secondo comma, della Costituzione dalla comunicazione della nomina e per i senatori di diritto, ai sensi dell'articolo 59, primo comma, della Costituzione, dal momento della cessazione dall'ufficio di Presidente della Repubblica.

Art. 3.

Entro un mese dalla scadenza del termine utile per la presentazione della dichiarazione dei redditi soggetti all'imposta sui redditi delle persone fisiche, i soggetti indicati nell'articolo 2 sono tenuti a depositare un'attestazione concernente le variazioni patrimoniali intervenute nell'anno precedente e copia della dichiarazione dei redditi. A tale adempimento annuale si applica l'ultimo comma dell'articolo 2.

Art. 4.

Entro tre mesi successivi alla cessazione dall'ufficio i soggetti indicati nell'articolo 2 sono tenuti a depositare una dichiarazione concernente le variazioni patrimoniali intervenute dopo l'ultima attestazione. Entro un

(Segue: Testo approvato dalla Camera dei deputati)

formula « sul mio onore affermo che la dichiarazione corrisponde al vero ». Alla dichiarazione debbono essere allegate le copie delle dichiarazioni di cui al terzo comma dell'articolo 4 della legge 18 novembre 1981, n. 659, relative agli eventuali contributi ricevuti.

Gli adempimenti indicati nei numeri 1 e 2 del comma precedente concernono anche la situazione patrimoniale e la dichiarazione dei redditi del coniuge non separato e dei figli conviventi, se gli stessi vi consentono.

I senatori di diritto, ai sensi dell'articolo 59 della Costituzione, ed i senatori nominati ai sensi del secondo comma dell'articolo 59 della Costituzione sono tenuti a depositare presso l'Ufficio di Presidenza del Senato della Repubblica le dichiarazioni di cui ai numeri 1 e 2 del primo comma, entro tre mesi, rispettivamente, dalla cessazione dall'ufficio di Presidente della Repubblica o dalla comunicazione della nomina.

Art. 3.

Entro un mese dalla scadenza del termine utile per la presentazione della dichiarazione dei redditi soggetti all'imposta sui redditi delle persone fisiche, i soggetti indicati nell'articolo 2 sono tenuti a depositare un'attestazione concernente le variazioni della situazione patrimoniale di cui al numero 1 del primo comma del medesimo articolo 2 intervenute nell'anno precedente e copia della dichiarazione dei redditi. A tale adempimento annuale si applica l'ultimo comma dell'articolo 2.

Art. 4.

Entro tre mesi successivi alla cessazione dall'ufficio i soggetti indicati nell'articolo 2 sono tenuti a depositare una dichiarazione concernente le variazioni della situazione patrimoniale di cui al numero 1 del primo

(Segue: Testo approvato dal Senato della Repubblica)

mese successivo alla scadenza del relativo termine, essi sono tenuti a depositare una copia della dichiarazione annuale relativa ai redditi delle persone fisiche.

Si applica il secondo comma dell'articolo 2.

Le disposizioni contenute nei precedenti commi non si applicano nel caso di rielezione del soggetto, cessato dalla carica per il rinnovo della Camera di appartenenza.

Art. 5.

Le dichiarazioni patrimoniali indicate nei precedenti articoli vengono effettuate su uno schema di modulo predisposto dagli Uffici di Presidenza del Senato della Repubblica e della Camera dei deputati, d'intesa tra loro.

Art. 6.

Entro due mesi dall'entrata in vigore della presente legge i membri in carica del Senato della Repubblica e della Camera dei deputati devono provvedere agli adempimenti indicati nell'articolo 2.

Art. 7.

Nel caso di inadempienza degli obblighi imposti dagli articoli 2, 3 e 6 il Presidente della Camera alla quale l'inadempiente appartiene lo diffida ad adempiere entro il termine di quindici giorni.

Senza pregiudizio di sanzioni disciplinari eventualmente previste nell'ambito della potestà regolamentare, nel caso di inosservanza della diffida il Presidente della Camera di appartenenza ne dà notizia all'Assemblea.

(Segue: Testo approvato dalla Camera dei deputati)

comma del medesimo articolo 2 intervenute dopo l'ultima attestazione. Entro un mese successivo alla scadenza del relativo termine, essi sono tenuti a depositare una copia della dichiarazione annuale relativa ai redditi delle persone fisiche.

Identico.

Identico.

Art. 5.

Identico.

Art. 6.

Entro tre mesi dall'entrata in vigore della presente legge i membri in carica del Senato della Repubblica e della Camera dei deputati devono provvedere agli adempimenti indicati nei numeri 1 e 2 del primo comma dell'articolo 2.

Art. 7.

Identico.

(Segue: Testo approvato dal Senato della Repubblica)

Art. 8.

Tutti i cittadini che siano iscritti nelle liste elettorali per le elezioni della Camera dei deputati hanno diritto di accesso alla conoscenza delle dichiarazioni previste nell'articolo 2, secondo le modalità stabilite nel successivo articolo 9.

Art. 9.

Le dichiarazioni previste nel n. 1) dell'articolo 2, nonché quelle previste dagli articoli 3 e 4 vengono riportate in apposito bollettino pubblicato a cura dell'Ufficio di Presidenza della Camera di appartenenza. Nello stesso bollettino devono essere riportate, per ciascun soggetto, le notizie risultanti dal quadro riepilogativo della dichiarazione dei redditi, depositata ai sensi dell'articolo 2, n. 2).

Il bollettino è a disposizione dei soggetti indicati nell'articolo 8.

Art. 10.

Per i soggetti indicati nell'articolo 1, n. 2), che non appartengono ad una delle due Camere, competente per l'applicazione di tutte le precedenti disposizioni è il Senato della Repubblica.

(Segue: Testo approvato dalla Camera dei deputati)

Art. 8.

Tutti i cittadini iscritti nelle liste elettorali per le elezioni della Camera dei deputati hanno diritto di conoscere le dichiarazioni previste nell'articolo 2, secondo le modalità stabilite nell'articolo 9.

Tutti i cittadini iscritti nelle liste elettorali per le elezioni della Camera dei deputati hanno altresì diritto di conoscere, secondo le modalità stabilite dal Presidente della Camera dei deputati, le dichiarazioni previste dal terzo comma dell'articolo 4 della legge 18 novembre 1981, n. 659.

Art. 9.

Le dichiarazioni previste nei numeri 1 e 3 del primo comma dell'articolo 2, nonché quelle previste dagli articoli 3 e 4 vengono riportate in apposito bollettino pubblicato a cura dell'Ufficio di Presidenza della Camera di appartenenza. Nello stesso bollettino devono essere riportate, per ciascun soggetto, le notizie risultanti dal quadro riepilogativo della dichiarazione dei redditi, depositata ai sensi del numero 2 del primo comma dell'articolo 2.

Identico.

Art. 10.

Per i soggetti indicati nel numero 2 dell'articolo 1, che non appartengono ad una delle due Camere, competente per l'applicazione di tutte le precedenti disposizioni è il Senato della Repubblica.

Per i soggetti indicati nel comma precedente i termini stabiliti dal primo comma dell'articolo 2 e dal primo comma dell'articolo 4 decorrono, rispettivamente, dal momento dell'assunzione della carica e dal momento della cessazione dalla medesima.

(Segue: Testo approvato dal Senato della Repubblica)

Art. 11.

Le disposizioni degli articoli da 2 a 9 si applicano anche ai soggetti indicati nei numeri 3, 4 e 5 dell'articolo 1, secondo le modalità stabilite dai rispettivi consigli.

La pubblicazione prevista nell'articolo 9 viene effettuata, per quanto riguarda le regioni, sul bollettino previsto dagli statuti per la pubblicazione delle leggi e, per quanto riguarda i consigli provinciali e comunali, su apposito bollettino.

Art. 12.

Le disposizioni di cui agli articoli 2, 3, 4, 6 e 7 si applicano, con le modificazioni di cui ai successivi articoli:

1) ai presidenti, vicepresidenti, amministratori delegati e direttori generali di istituti e di enti pubblici, anche economici, la cui nomina, proposta o designazione o approvazione di nomina sia demandata al Presidente del Consiglio dei ministri, al Consiglio dei ministri od a singoli Ministri;

2) ai presidenti, vicepresidenti, amministratori delegati e direttori generali delle società al cui capitale concorrano lo Stato o enti pubblici, nelle varie forme di intervento o di partecipazione, per un importo superiore al venti per cento;

3) ai presidenti, ai vicepresidenti, agli amministratori delegati ed ai direttori generali degli enti o istituti privati, al cui finanziamento concorrano lo Stato o enti pubblici in misura superiore al cinquanta per cento;

4) ai direttori generali delle aziende autonome dello Stato;

5) ai direttori generali delle aziende speciali di cui al regio decreto 15 ottobre 1925, n. 2578, dei comuni capoluogo di provincia o con popolazione superiore ai 100 mila abitanti.

(Segue: Testo approvato dalla Camera dei deputati)

Art. 11.

Identico.

Art. 12.

Identico:

1) identico;

2) identico;

3) ai presidenti, ai vicepresidenti, agli amministratori delegati ed ai direttori generali degli enti o istituti privati, al cui funzionamento concorrano lo Stato o enti pubblici in misura superiore al cinquanta per cento dell'ammontare complessivo delle spese di gestione esposte in bilancio ed a condizione che queste superino la somma annua di lire cinquecento milioni;

4) identico;

5) identico.

(Segue: Testo approvato dal Senato della Repubblica)

Art. 13.

Le dichiarazioni e gli atti indicati negli articoli 2, 3, 4 e 6 devono essere trasmessi, per quanto riguarda i soggetti indicati nei numeri 1, 2, 3 e 4 dell'articolo 12, alla Presidenza del Consiglio dei ministri e, per quanto riguarda i soggetti indicati nel numero 5 dello stesso articolo, al sindaco od al presidente dell'amministrazione locale interessata.

Art. 14.

La diffida di cui all'articolo 7 è effettuata per quanto riguarda i soggetti indicati nell'articolo 12, secondo i casi, dal Presidente del Consiglio dei ministri o dal sindaco o dal presidente dell'amministrazione locale interessata i quali, constatata l'inadempienza, ne danno notizia, rispettivamente, nella *Gazzetta Ufficiale* della Repubblica o nell'albo comunale o provinciale.

Si applicano le disposizioni degli articoli 8 e 9.

Art. 15.

Per i soggetti indicati nel n. 1) dell'articolo 12, la cui nomina, proposta o designazione o approvazione di nomina spettino ad organi della regione e per i soggetti indicati nei nn. 2) e 3) dell'articolo 12, per i quali la regione concorra, nella percentuale ivi prevista, al capitale o al finanziamento, le regioni provvedono ad emanare leggi nell'osservanza dei principi dell'ordinamento espressi dalla presente legge.

Art. 16.

All'onere finanziario derivante dalla presente legge si provvede nell'ambito degli stanziamenti di bilancio per il funzionamento di ciascuna Camera. Le regioni, le province ed i comuni provvedono con i fondi stanziati per il funzionamento dei rispettivi consigli.

(Segue: Testo approvato dalla Camera dei deputati)

Art. 13.

Identico.

Art. 14.

Identico.

Art. 15.

Per i soggetti indicati nel numero 1 dell'articolo 12, la cui nomina, proposta o designazione o approvazione di nomina spettino ad organi della regione, e per i soggetti indicati nei numeri 2 e 3 del medesimo articolo 12, per i quali la regione concorra, nella percentuale ivi prevista, al capitale o al funzionamento, le regioni provvedono ad emanare leggi nell'osservanza dei principi dell'ordinamento espressi dalla presente legge.

Art. 16.

Identico.

LEGGI E DECRETI

pe 82 file

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LEGGE 18 novembre 1981, n. 659.

Modifiche ed integrazioni alla legge 2 maggio 1974, n. 195, sul contributo dello Stato al finanziamento dei partiti politici.

La Camera dei deputati ed il Senato della Repubblica hanno approvato;

IL PRESIDENTE DELLA REPUBBLICA
PROMULGA

la seguente legge:

Art. 1.

A titolo di concorso nelle spese elettorali sostenute per le elezioni dei consigli delle regioni a statuto ordinario o speciale i partiti politici hanno diritto, per ciascuna regione, a un contributo finanziario a carico dello Stato.

Nell'ambito di un ammontare globale di venti miliardi di lire, il contributo per ciascuna elezione regionale viene determinato in base alla proporzione fra la popolazione del territorio regionale interessato e la popolazione del territorio nazionale.

Hanno diritto al contributo i partiti che abbiano avuto almeno un proprio candidato eletto e, in caso di elezioni concomitanti, almeno un proprio candidato eletto in una delle regioni.

Art. 2.

Ad integrazione della legge 8 agosto 1980, n. 422, ed in riferimento alle ultime elezioni che in ciascuna regione a statuto speciale hanno avuto luogo prima dell'entrata in vigore della predetta legge, i partiti politici hanno diritto ad un contributo finanziario a carico dello Stato nella misura globale di cinque miliardi di lire.

Hanno diritto al contributo i partiti che, almeno in una regione, abbiano avuto un proprio candidato eletto.

Nell'ambito della misura globale il contributo per le singole regioni viene determinato proporzionalmente in base al numero dei votanti.

Art. 3.

Per l'anno 1980 la somma da erogare a titolo di contributo di cui al primo comma dell'articolo 3 della legge 2 maggio 1974, n. 195, è fissata in lire 72.630 milioni. Con effetto dal 1° gennaio 1981 la stessa somma è fissata in lire 82.886 milioni annui.

A titolo di concorso nelle spese per la elezione dei rappresentanti italiani al Parlamento europeo è stabilito un contributo di lire quindici miliardi in favore dei partiti politici che abbiano ottenuto almeno un rappresentante.

I contributi per concorso nelle spese elettorali previsti nella presente legge e nell'articolo 1 della legge 2 maggio 1974, n. 195, sono erogati dal Presidente della Camera dei deputati ai partiti che ne abbiano diritto ed i cui legali rappresentanti ne facciano richiesta, secondo le seguenti proporzioni e modalità:

a) il venti per cento della somma stanziata è ripartita in misura eguale fra tutti i partiti che ne hanno diritto;

b) la somma residua è ripartita fra i partiti in proporzione ai voti ottenuti.

Tutte le somme di cui al comma precedente sono erogate in una unica soluzione entro trenta giorni dalla proclamazione dei risultati e, per quanto riguarda le integrazioni previste dal primo comma e dall'articolo 2, entro trenta giorni dall'entrata in vigore della presente legge.

Hanno altresì diritto al contributo di cui all'articolo 1 della legge 2 maggio 1974, n. 195, i partiti e le formazioni politiche che abbiano partecipato con proprio contrassegno alle elezioni della Camera dei deputati o del Senato della Repubblica ed abbiano ottenuto almeno un quoziente in una delle due Camere, nelle regioni il cui statuto speciale prevede una particolare tutela delle minoranze linguistiche.

La percentuale di cui al primo ed al secondo periodo dell'ultimo comma dell'articolo 3 della legge 2 maggio 1974, n. 195, è ridotta al novanta per cento.

Sono abrogati l'articolo 156 del testo unico delle leggi di pubblica sicurezza, approvato con regio decreto 18 giugno 1931, n. 773, nonché gli articoli 285 e 286 del regolamento di esecuzione, approvato con regio decreto 6 maggio 1940, n. 635.

All'onere derivante dalla presente legge, valutato in lire 32.630 milioni per l'anno 1980 e in lire 37.886 milioni per gli anni 1981 e 1982, si provvede, rispettivamente, a carico e con riduzione dei fondi speciali di cui al capitolo 6856 dello stato di previsione della spesa del Ministero del tesoro per gli anni finanziari medesimi.

Il Ministro del tesoro è autorizzato ad apportare, con proprio decreto, le occorrenti variazioni di bilancio.

Art. 4.

I divieti previsti dall'articolo 7 della legge 2 maggio 1974, n. 195, sono estesi ai finanziamenti ed ai contributi in qualsiasi forma o modo erogati, anche indirettamente, ai membri del Parlamento nazionale, ai membri italiani del Parlamento europeo, ai consiglieri regionali, provinciali e comunali, ai candidati alle predette cariche, ai raggruppamenti interni dei partiti politici nonché a coloro che rivestono cariche di presidenza, di segreteria e di direzione politica e amministrativa a livello regionale, provinciale e comunale nei partiti politici.

Nel caso di contributi erogati a favore di partiti o loro articolazioni politico-organizzative e di gruppi parlamentari in violazione, accertata con sentenza passata in giudicato, dei divieti previsti dall'articolo 7 della legge 2 maggio 1974, n. 195, l'importo del contributo statale di cui all'articolo 3 della stessa legge è decurtato in misura pari al doppio delle somme illegittimamente percepite.

Nel caso di erogazione di finanziamenti o contributi ai soggetti indicati nell'articolo 7 della legge 2 maggio 1974, n. 195, e nel primo comma del presente articolo, per un importo che nell'anno supera i cinque milioni di lire, sotto qualsiasi forma, compresa la messa a disposizione di servizi, il soggetto che li eroga ed il soggetto

che li riceve sono tenuti a farne dichiarazione congiunta, sottoscrivendo un unico documento, depositato presso la Presidenza della Camera dei deputati ovvero a questa indirizzato con raccomandata con avviso di ricevimento. La disposizione non si applica per tutti i finanziamenti direttamente concessi da istituti di credito o da aziende bancarie, alle condizioni fissate dagli accordi interbancari.

Nell'ipotesi di contributi o finanziamenti di provenienza estera l'obbligo della dichiarazione è posto a carico del solo soggetto che li percepisce.

L'obbligo di cui al terzo e quarto comma deve essere adempiuto entro tre mesi dalla percezione del contributo o finanziamento. Nel caso di contributi o finanziamenti erogati dallo stesso soggetto, che soltanto nella loro somma annuale superino l'ammontare predetto, l'obbligo deve essere adempiuto entro il mese di marzo dell'anno successivo.

Chiunque non adempie gli obblighi di cui al terzo, quarto e quinto comma ovvero dichiara somme o valori inferiori al vero è punito con la multa da due a sei volte l'ammontare non dichiarato e con la pena accessoria dell'interdizione temporanea dai pubblici uffici prevista dal terzo comma dell'articolo 28 del codice penale.

I segretari politici dei partiti che hanno usufruito dei contributi statali sono tenuti a pubblicare entro il 31 gennaio di ogni anno, sul giornale ufficiale del partito e su un quotidiano a diffusione nazionale, il bilancio finanziario consuntivo del partito, approvato dall'organo di partito competente e redatto secondo modello approvato dal Presidente della Camera dei deputati, d'intesa con il Presidente del Senato della Repubblica.

Nella relazione allegata al bilancio devono essere illustrate, analiticamente, le proprietà immobiliari, le partecipazioni del partito a società commerciali, la titolarità di imprese e i redditi comunque derivanti da attività economiche. Nella stessa relazione deve essere indicata la ripartizione dei contributi statali tra organi centrali e periferici, da effettuare secondo le percentuali e i criteri stabiliti dagli organi statuari competenti di ciascun partito.

Nella relazione di cui al comma precedente devono essere specificate, con indicazione dei soggetti eroganti, le eventuali libere contribuzioni di ammontare annuo superiore a lire cinque milioni erogate al partito, alle articolazioni politico-organizzative, ai raggruppamenti interni ed ai gruppi parlamentari e disciplinate dal presente articolo. In caso di inosservanza, l'importo del contributo statale di cui all'articolo 3 della legge 2 maggio 1974, n. 195, è decurtato in misura pari al doppio di quella delle contribuzioni libere non dichiarate.

Il bilancio deve essere certificato da un collegio composto da tre revisori dei conti iscritti nell'albo professionale da almeno cinque anni e nominati dal Presidente della Camera dei deputati, d'intesa con il Presidente del Senato della Repubblica, entro una rosa di almeno nove nomi, designati in base alle regole interne di ciascun partito. I componenti il collegio hanno accesso, anche disgiuntamente, su delega del collegio stesso, ai libri ed alle scritture contabili, che devono essere tenuti secondo le norme di una ordinata contabilità, nonché ai correlativi documenti amministrativo-contabili. I predetti libri, scritture e documenti devono essere conservati per almeno cinque anni dalla data di presentazione del bilancio.

Copia del bilancio del partito e della relazione illustrativa, sottoscritti dal responsabile amministrativo, della relazione dei revisori dei conti, da essi sottoscritta, e dei giornali ove è avvenuta la pubblicazione è trasmessa dal segretario del partito, entro il 28 febbraio successivo, al Presidente della Camera dei deputati.

Il Presidente della Camera dei deputati, d'intesa con il Presidente del Senato della Repubblica, controlla la regolarità della redazione del bilancio e delle relazioni, avvalendosi di un comitato tecnico composto da revisori ufficiali dei conti, iscritti nell'albo da almeno cinque anni e nominati, all'inizio di ogni legislatura, in riunione congiunta, dalle conferenze dei presidenti dei gruppi delle due Camere. Il comitato, per il controllo di regolarità, può richiedere ai responsabili amministrativi dei partiti chiarimenti nonché l'esibizione dei libri, delle scritture e dei documenti di cui al decimo comma, con l'obbligo del segreto, e redige, al termine, un rapporto.

In caso di inottemperanza agli obblighi o di irregolare redazione del bilancio, è sospeso fino alla regolarizzazione il versamento di ogni contributo statale e si applica l'articolo 4 della legge 2 maggio 1974, n. 195.

Il relativo decreto di sospensione è emanato dal Presidente della Camera dei deputati e dal Presidente del Senato della Repubblica secondo la rispettiva competenza.

I bilanci dei partiti, le relazioni previste dall'undicesimo comma, il rapporto di cui al dodicesimo comma e le rettifiche di bilancio irregolare vengono pubblicati in un supplemento speciale della *Gazzetta Ufficiale* della Repubblica.

L'articolo 8 della legge 2 maggio 1974, n. 195, è abrogato.

La presente legge, munita del sigillo dello Stato, sarà inserita nella Raccolta ufficiale delle leggi e dei decreti della Repubblica italiana. E' fatto obbligo a chiunque spetti di osservarla e di farla osservare come legge dello Stato.

Data a Roma, addì 18 novembre 1981

PERTINI

SPADOLINI — ANDREATTA —
LA MALFA — DARIDA

Visto, il Guardasigilli: DARIDA

DECRETO-LEGGE 20 novembre 1981, n. 660.

Trasferimento delle funzioni svolte dall'ENPI e dall'ANCC ed etichettatura di prodotti alimentari secondo la direttiva CEE.

II PRESIDENTE DELLA REPUBBLICA

Visti gli articoli 77 e 87 della Costituzione;

Ritenuta la necessità e l'urgenza di provvedere in materia di trasferimento delle funzioni svolte dall'ENPI e dalla ANCC, nonché di adeguare alle disposizioni comunitarie la normativa interna in materia di etichettatura di prodotti alimentari;

Vista la deliberazione del Consiglio dei Ministri, adottata nella riunione del 20 novembre 1981;

**Legge 2 maggio 1974, n. 195: « Contributo dello Stato
al finanziamento dei partiti politici »**

(in *Gazzetta Ufficiale* del 25 maggio 1974, n. 135)

Art. 1.

A titolo di concorso nelle spese elettorali sostenute per il rinnovo delle due Camere, i partiti politici di cui al presente articolo hanno diritto a contributi finanziari nella misura complessiva di lire 15 mila milioni.

L'erogazione dei contributi è disposta secondo le norme della presente legge, con decreti del Presidente della Camera dei deputati, a carico del bilancio interno della Camera.

Hanno diritto al contributo i partiti politici che abbiano presentato, con il medesimo contrassegno, proprie liste di candidati per l'elezione della Camera dei deputati in più dei due terzi dei collegi elettorali ed abbiano ottenuto, a' sensi dell'articolo 83 del decreto del Presidente della Repubblica 30 marzo 1957, n. 361, almeno un quoziente in una circoscrizione ed una cifra elettorale nazionale di almeno 300.000 voti di lista validi, ovvero una cifra nazionale non inferiore al 2 per cento dei voti validamente espressi.

Hanno diritto, altresì, al contributo i partiti e le formazioni politiche che abbiano partecipato con proprio contrassegno alle elezioni della Camera dei deputati ed abbiano ottenuto almeno un quoziente nelle regioni il cui statuto speciale prevede una particolare tutela delle minoranze linguistiche.

Art. 2.

I contributi per il rimborso delle spese elettorali sono versati ai partiti politici, su domanda dei rispettivi segretari politici in-

dirizzata al Presidente della Camera, secondo le seguenti modalità:

a) il 15 per cento della somma stanziata è ripartita in misura uguale tra tutti i partiti che ne hanno diritto a' termini del comma terzo del precedente articolo;

b) la somma residua è ripartita tra i partiti previsti dal terzo e dal quarto comma dell'articolo 1, in proporzione ai voti ottenuti nelle elezioni politiche della Camera dei deputati.

I contributi di cui alla lettera a) sono versati entro trenta giorni dalla proclamazione definitiva dei risultati da parte degli uffici elettorali.

I contributi di cui alla lettera b) sono versati, per un terzo, entro trenta giorni dalla proclamazione definitiva dei risultati da parte degli uffici elettorali e, per gli altri due terzi, in rate annuali per la durata della legislatura.

Art. 3.

A titolo di contributo per l'esplicazione dei propri compiti e per l'attività funzionale dei relativi partiti i gruppi parlamentari hanno diritto a finanziamenti per la somma annua complessiva di lire 45.000 milioni.

La predetta somma è iscritta per lire 15.000 milioni nel capitolo dello stato di previsione del Ministero del tesoro concernente le spese per il Senato della Repubblica e per lire 30.000 milioni nel capitolo del medesimo stato di previsione concernente le spese per la Camera dei deputati.

I contributi previsti dal primo comma sono versati entro il mese di gennaio di ciascun anno e sono ripartiti secondo i criteri seguenti:

a) il 2 per cento della somma stanziata è ripartito in misura uguale tra tutti i gruppi parlamentari, fermo restando quanto previsto dagli articoli 15, n. 3 e 16 dei rispettivi regolamenti della Camera dei deputati e del Senato della Repubblica;

b) il 23 per cento della somma stanziata è ripartito in misura uguale tra le rappresentanze parlamentari dei partiti di cui al terzo comma dell'articolo 1 e le componenti parlamentari dei gruppi misti appartenenti ai partiti di cui al quarto comma dell'articolo 1, nella misura di un decimo del contributo spettante ai partiti di cui al terzo comma dell'articolo 1, se composte di due o più membri, ovvero di un trentesimo se composte di un solo membro; a ciascun gruppo parlamentare diverso dal gruppo misto, che non rappresenti un partito politico organizzato che abbia partecipato alle elezioni politiche con proprio contrassegno, è attribuito un decimo dei contributi spettanti ai partiti di cui al terzo comma dell'articolo 1;

c) la somma residua è erogata ai gruppi parlamentari in misura proporzionale alla loro consistenza numerica.

I Presidenti delle Camere procedono, su domanda dei presidenti dei gruppi parlamentari, all'assegnazione dei contributi in base ad un piano di ripartizione compilato in conformità dei predetti criteri e approvato dai rispettivi uffici di presidenza.

I presidenti dei gruppi parlamentari sono tenuti a versare ai rispettivi partiti una somma non inferiore al 95 per cento del contributo riscosso, nei termini e nei modi stabiliti dai relativi statuti e regolamenti. La presidenza dei gruppi misti è tenuta a ripartire proporzionalmente tra i partiti nella cui lista sono stati eletti i componenti del gruppo medesimo una somma non inferiore al 95 per cento del contributo riscosso ai sensi della lettera c) del presente articolo.

Art. 4.

In qualsiasi caso di contestazioni o ritardo nella riscossione, il Presidente della Camera o il Presidente del Senato, secondo la rispettiva competenza, provvedono al deposito bancario della somma destinata al contributo. Le eventuali controversie sono decise dagli uffici di presidenza rispettivamente della Camera e del Senato.

Art. 5.

I partiti politici ed i gruppi parlamentari che intendono ottenere i contributi previsti dalla presente legge devono indicare nei loro statuti e regolamenti i soggetti, muniti di rappresentanza legale, abilitati alla riscossione.

Per la prima applicazione della presente legge, i segretari politici dei partiti e i presidenti dei gruppi parlamentari indicheranno, nella domanda, le persone fisiche abilitate a riscuotere i contributi.

Art. 6.

Le somme esigibili a titolo di contributo non possono essere cedute. Ogni patto in tal senso è nullo. I contributi previsti dalla presente legge non sono soggetti ad alcuna tassa nè imposta, diretta o indiretta.

Art. 7.

Sono vietati i finanziamenti o i contributi, sotto qualsiasi forma e in qualsiasi modo erogati, da parte di organi della pubblica amministrazione, di enti pubblici, di società con partecipazione di capitale pubblico superiore al 20 per cento o di società controllate da queste ultime, ferma restando la loro natura privatistica, a favore di partiti o loro articolazioni politico-organizzative e di gruppi parlamentari.

Sono vietati altresì i finanziamenti o i contributi sotto qualsiasi forma, diretta o indiretta, da parte di società non comprese tra quelle previste nel comma precedente in favore di partiti o loro articolazioni politico-organizzative o gruppi parlamentari, salvo che tali finanziamenti o contributi siano stati deliberati dall'organo sociale competente e regolarmente iscritti in bilancio e sempre che non siano comunque vietati dalla legge.

Chiunque corrisponde o riceve contributi in violazione dei divieti previsti nei commi precedenti, ovvero, trattandosi delle

società di cui al secondo comma, senza che sia intervenuta la deliberazione dell'organo societario o senza che il contributo o il finanziamento siano stati regolarmente iscritti nel bilancio della società stessa, è punito, per ciò solo, con la reclusione da 6 mesi a 4 anni e con la multa fino al triplo delle somme versate in violazione della presente legge.

Art. 8.

I segretari politici dei partiti che hanno usufruito dei contributi previsti nella presente legge, sono tenuti a pubblicare entro il 31 gennaio di ogni anno, sul giornale ufficiale del partito e su un quotidiano di diffusione nazionale, il bilancio finanziario consuntivo del partito, approvato dall'organo di partito competente e redatto secondo il modello allegato alla presente legge.

Nella relazione allegata al bilancio devono essere specificate, con la indicazione nominativa delle persone fisiche o giuridiche eroganti, le eventuali libere contribuzioni di ammontare superiore a lire 1.000.000.

Copia del bilancio del partito e dei giornali di cui al primo comma è trasmessa dal segretario politico del partito o dal presidente del rispettivo gruppo parlamentare della Camera, entro il 28 febbraio successivo, al Presidente della Camera dei deputati.

Il Presidente della Camera dei deputati, d'intesa con il Presidente del Senato, controlla la regolarità della redazione del bilancio avvalendosi di revisori ufficiali dei conti designati, in riunione congiunta, dalle conferenze dei presidenti dei gruppi delle due Camere.

In caso di inottemperanza agli obblighi previsti nel primo comma o di irregolare redazione del bilancio, è sospeso fino alla regolarizzazione il versamento di ogni tipo di contributo previsto nella presente legge e si applica il precedente articolo 4. I relativi decreti di sospensione sono emanati dal Presidente della Camera o dal Presidente del Senato, secondo la rispettiva competenza.

La rettifica del bilancio irregolare è soggetta alle stesse forme di pubblicità stabilite nel primo comma del presente articolo. Il bilancio deve essere sottoscritto dal responsabile amministrativo del partito.

Art. 9.

La erogazione ai gruppi parlamentari dei contributi previsti dal precedente articolo 3 nella misura annua ivi stabilita decorre dalla data di entrata in vigore della presente legge.

Art. 10.

All'onere complessivo previsto nella misura massima di lire 45.000 milioni per l'esercizio finanziario 1974 si provvede con riduzione di pari importo del capitolo 3523 dello stato di previsione del Ministero del tesoro.

Il Ministro per il tesoro è autorizzato a provvedere, con proprio decreto, alle occorrenti variazioni di bilancio.

BILANCIO DEL PARTITO

ENTRATE

Entrate annuali

Stato:

Borsa spese elettorali

Contribuzione annuale all'attività del
parlamentare alla Camera dei de-

Contribuzione annuale all'attività del
parlamentare al Senato

Contributi annuali ai gruppi parla-
mentari alla Camera e al Senato

Altri ricavi diversi

Entrate su partecipazioni e im-

piegati

Entrate su finanziamenti

Entrate finanziarie

Altre

Entrate editoriali

Contribuzioni

Attività statutarie

Altre

Entrate straordinarie degli an-

ALLEGATO

RISPILOGO

BILANCIO DEL PARTITO

ENTRATE

1) Quote associative annuali	L.
2) Contributi dello Stato:		
a) quote rimborso spese elettorali	»
b) contribuzione annuale all'attività del gruppo parlamentare alla Camera dei de- putati	»
c) contribuzione annuale all'attività del gruppo parlamentare al Senato	»
d) contribuzioni annuali ai gruppi parla- mentari alla Camera e al Senato	»
3) Proventi finanziari diversi:		
a) fitti, dividendi su partecipazioni e inte- ressi su titoli	»
b) interessi su finanziamenti	»
c) altri proventi finanziari	»
4) Entrate diverse:		
a) da attività editoriali	»
b) da manifestazioni	»
c) da altre attività statutarie	»
5) Atti di liberalità:		
a) contribuzioni straordinarie degli as- sociati	»
b) contribuzioni di non associati (privati, so- cietà private, organismi privati vari, con- tribuzioni di associazioni sindacali e di categoria)	»
	L.
<i>Totale entrate</i>	L.

SPESE

1) Personale	L.
2) Spese generali	»
3) Contributi alle sedi e organizzazioni periferiche (1)	»
4) Spese per attività editoriali, di informazione e di propaganda	»
5) Spese straordinarie per campagne elettorali	»
<i>Totale spese</i>	L.	<u>.....</u>

RIEPILOGO

<i>Totale entrate</i>	L.
<i>Totale spese</i>	»
<i>DIFFERENZA</i>	L.	<u>.....</u>

Art. 1. (C)

(1) E in facoltà dei partiti, secondo i propri statuti o regolamenti interni, presentare in allegato la distribuzione dei contributi fra le sedi e organizzazioni periferiche.

Art. 3 (*)

Le rate annuali previste dall'ultimo comma
legge 2 maggio 1974, n. 195, sono versate agli av
il mese di ottobre di ciascun anno della legislat

Senato app
giunzione del c
1974, n. 195. b

Il piano è pubblicato nella Gazzetta Ufficiale

**REGOLAMENTO DI ATTUAZIONE
DELLA LEGGE 2 MAGGIO 1974, N. 195, PER L'EROGAZIONE
DEL CONTRIBUTO DELLO STATO AL FINANZIAMENTO
DEI PARTITI POLITICI (1)**

Art. 1. (*)

I partiti politici e le formazioni politiche che ne hanno titolo ai sensi degli artt. 1 e 2 della legge 2 maggio 1974, n. 195, recante contributo dello Stato al finanziamento dei partiti politici, i quali intendono richiedere al Presidente della Camera il versamento dei contributi a titolo di concorso nelle spese elettorali sostenute per il rinnovo delle due Camere, debbono presentare documentata istanza a cura dei rispettivi segretari politici o rappresentanti legali, entro 30 giorni dalla celebrazione delle elezioni.

All'istanza vanno allegati i documenti rilasciati dagli uffici elettorali circoscrizionali o centrale ovvero dal Presidente della Giunta delle elezioni, che certifichino la sussistenza dei requisiti di cui ai commi III e IV dell'art. 1 della legge 2 maggio 1974, n. 195.

L'erogazione dei contributi è disposta con decreto del Presidente della Camera, ai sensi dell'art. 9 e seguenti del Regolamento di Amministrazione e contabilità della Camera dei Deputati, secondo il piano di ripartizione di cui all'articolo seguente.

(1) Approvato, per la parte di sua competenza, dal Consiglio di Presidenza del Senato nella seduta del 10 luglio 1974.

Identico regolamento è stato approvato dall'Ufficio di Presidenza della Camera dei Deputati nella seduta del 4 luglio 1974 e reso esecutivo con decreto del Presidente della Camera dei Deputati in data 10 luglio 1974.

(*) Gli articoli 1, 2, 3, 8, 10 e 12, contrassegnati con asterisco, concernono materie di esclusiva competenza degli organi della Camera dei Deputati.

Art. 2. (*)

L'Ufficio di Presidenza della Camera dei Deputati determina il piano di ripartizione della somma prevista dall'art. 1 della legge 2 maggio 1974, n. 195, in base ai dati, ai risultati elettorali e ai criteri di cui agli artt. 1 e 2 della legge medesima.

Il piano è pubblicato sulla *Gazzetta Ufficiale* della Repubblica Italiana.

Art. 3. (*)

Le rate annuali previste dall'ultimo comma dell'art. 2 della legge 2 maggio 1974, n. 195, sono versate agli aventi diritto entro il mese di ottobre di ciascun anno della legislatura.

Art. 4.

Il Consiglio di Presidenza del Senato approva annualmente il piano di ripartizione per l'assegnazione dei contributi indicati nell'art. 3 della legge 2 maggio 1974, n. 195, in conformità dei criteri ivi indicati.

Il piano è pubblicato sulla *Gazzetta Ufficiale* della Repubblica Italiana.

Art. 5.

Il Presidente del Senato assegna con proprio decreto, su richiesta dei Presidenti dei Gruppi parlamentari, i contributi previsti dall'art. 3 della legge 2 maggio 1974, n. 195, in conformità del piano di ripartizione di cui all'art. 4 del presente Regolamento.

Art. 6.

Gli interessati che intendono contestare il piano di ripartizione di cui all'art. 2 e il piano di ripartizione di cui all'art. 4

propongono motivata istanza al Consiglio di Presidenza entro 30 giorni dalla sua pubblicazione.

L'istanza è comunicata a cura del Presidente del Senato agli eventuali controinteressati, i quali possono produrre nei successivi venti giorni documenti e memorie.

Il Consiglio di Presidenza, sentiti gli interessati, ove ne facciano richiesta, decide entro venti giorni dalla scadenza del termine di cui al comma precedente.

In ogni altro caso di contestazione, l'interessato propone motivata istanza al Consiglio di Presidenza il quale, a seguito di opportune indagini, assume le conseguenti determinazioni.

Si osservano, in quanto applicabili, le disposizioni di cui al secondo e al terzo comma del presente articolo.

Art. 7.

Gli interessati devono produrre al Senato una copia dello Statuto e del Regolamento, autenticata dal Segretario del partito e dal Presidente del Gruppo parlamentare, dai quali risulti la indicazione del soggetto munito di rappresentanza legale abilitato alla riscossione dei contributi.

I segretari dei partiti politici devono indicare con apposito atto da essi autenticato la persona del responsabile amministrativo abilitato a sottoscrivere il bilancio.

Art. 8. (*)

Il Presidente della Camera dei Deputati contesta agli interessati l'inosservanza degli obblighi stabiliti nel primo comma dell'art. 8 della legge 2 maggio 1974, n. 195, e ne indica i motivi.

Gli interessati, entro 30 giorni dalla ricezione della nota di contestazione, possono inviare all'Ufficio di Presidenza della Camera documenti e memorie.

Si osservano, in quanto applicabili, le disposizioni di cui al terzo comma dell'art. 6.

Il Presidente della Camera comunica al Presidente del Senato la decisione dell'Ufficio di Presidenza ai fini dell'adozione del decreto di sospensione di cui all'art. 8, quinto comma, della legge 2 maggio 1974, n. 195.

Art. 9.

Il Presidente della Camera, ricevuta copia del bilancio finanziario consuntivo del partito, trasmessogli in conformità all'art. 8, comma terzo, della legge 2 maggio 1974, n. 195, procede, d'intesa con il Presidente del Senato, al controllo di cui al quarto comma dello stesso art. 8 con le modalità ivi indicate.

Il Presidente della Camera contesta agli interessati le irregolarità riscontrate nella redazione del bilancio a seguito del controllo effettuato ai sensi del comma precedente, e ne indica i motivi.

Gli interessati, entro trenta giorni dalla ricezione della nota di contestazione, possono inviare documenti e memorie al Presidente della Camera il quale le porta a conoscenza del Presidente del Senato.

Il Presidente della Camera, uditi gli interessati, ove ne facciano richiesta, decide, d'intesa con il Presidente del Senato, entro 30 giorni dalla scadenza del termine di cui al comma precedente, sentiti i rispettivi Uffici di Presidenza.

Nel caso in cui la predetta decisione confermi in tutto o in parte i rilievi contestati in precedenza, il Presidente della Camera e il Presidente del Senato emanano, secondo le rispettive competenze, i decreti di sospensione di cui all'art. 8, quinto comma, della legge 2 maggio 1974, n. 195.

Art. 10. (*)

Il Presidente della Camera può disporre con proprio decreto la sospensione del versamento del contributo fino alla decisione dell'Ufficio di Presidenza di cui all'art. 8 del presente Regolamento, dandone comunicazione al Presidente del Senato.

Art. 11.

Nei casi in cui, ai sensi della legge 2 maggio 1974, n. 195, e del presente Regolamento, vengano adottati dai Presidenti della Camera e del Senato decreti di sospensione dei contributi, le Amministrazioni della Camera e del Senato provvedono, su disposizione dei rispettivi Presidenti, al deposito presso un Istituto bancario della somma destinata a contributi e ne danno comunicazione agli interessati.

Nel caso di ritardo nella riscossione, l'avvenuto deposito della somma esonera le Amministrazioni della Camera e del Senato da ogni responsabilità.

Art. 12. (*)

Si osservano, per quanto applicabili, le disposizioni del Regolamento di Amministrazione e contabilità della Camera dei Deputati.

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Handwritten notes:
1. Mr. Young to James
17/3
v. Rob. per
124
Signature
17/3



British Embassy
Via XX Settembre 80A 00187 Rome

Telex 61049 Telephone 4755.441

R P Osborne Esq
WED
FCO

Your reference

Our reference 011/4

Date 11 March 1982

WR 20142	
17 MAR 1982	
REGISTRY	Action plan
<i>Handwritten initials</i>	<i>Handwritten initials</i>

Dear Roy,

MSI CONGRESS

1. The MSI, or Neo-Fascist party, held their 13th Congress in Rome from 18-21 February. We were invited to observe but declined. In principle we seek to avoid contacts with MSI members because of the risk that this could be exploited by the party to give it a spurious legitimacy (they have tried this tactic in the past with right-wing politicians in Britain and America): as you know, the MSI is 'outside the constitutional arc' in Parliamentary terms, and some of its representatives are suspected of sympathy for, if not direct involvement in, black (ie. right wing) terrorism. The US and FRG Embassies also declined invitations, but the French sent a young Second Secretary: from the Italian political parties only Pannella of the Radicals attended (see para 6 below).
2. At the Congress the division of the MSI into three factions was confirmed. The largest (73%) is led by Almirante, who has been the effective leader of the party ever since its foundation after the war. A second, 'Spazio Nuovo 82', with 19% support, is led by Pino Rauti, who wants to moderate the party's line so that it could be considered a possible partner by parties of the centre-right. A third, 'Destra 80', is headed by Franco Petronio but enjoys the indirect support of the party's President, Pino Romualdi: it began with about 8% of the 1195 delegates (only 79 of whom were women), but lost a little ground during the Congress.
3. Almirante's lengthy interventions were delivered in his usual abrasive but very eloquent style: for a man of 68 (the oldest Italian party secretary) his was an impressive performance. He argued that the Constitution of Italy should be changed, to allow direct election of a Head of State who would then appoint

/Ministers

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- 2 -

Ministers, a reduced role for political parties, and a unicameral Parliament with representation for social categories (shades of pre-war corporatism). He condemned terrorism and urged the reintroduction of the death penalty (which constitutionally would require declaration of a state of war) with execution 'twice over' for right-wing terrorists. He bitterly attacked politicians of other parties, especially Pertini, as well as popular targets like Qadhafi - 'we will take to the barricades if he comes to Italy'. He sent best wishes to Tejero, about to stand trial in Spain 'for trying nobly to block the advance of socialism/communism'. Above all he told the delegates to accept gladly the MSI's role as the party of glorious opposition.

4. Of his two main opponents only Rauti put forward a clearly different policy line; Destra 80 just wanted a change of personalities at the top. Rauti disagreed over the death penalty (and when the MSI presented a bill on this last month in Parliament almost half the party's Chamber group followed his lead and did not turn up to vote - all the other parties, with just 5 rebels, voted against it). He spoke out against the atmosphere of nostalgia for 1930's fascism which prevailed at the Congress. The party should face up to reality and come in from the cold: Almirante had built a fine ship, but the ship remained trapped in a bottle. He criticised US policy and international capitalism, but argued in favour of Italy's commitment to Europe (the party has 4 seats in the European Parliament). Finally he disagreed with Almirante's refusal to accept that the recent changes in PCI policy were of any importance.

5. The final voting brought no surprises. Almirante was re-elected Secretary by 738 votes to 270 (for Rauti) with 139 blanks. The division of seats on the Central Committee will be more or less unchanged, with Almirante controlling about 67%. The Committee must meet within a month of the Congress to allocate other party posts; because of Romualdi's open disagreement with Almirante's line it is widely expected that he will be replaced as party President.

6. Pannella spoke on the third day and has since been criticised for attending the Congress. He argued that the MSI should not be ostracised but rather encouraged to develop into a democratic party, away from its fascist origins. Courageously, he recalled before the stunned delegates the names of some of Italy's more distinguished opponents of fascism. His was a skilful oratorical performance; he is one of the handful of Italian politicians who

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- 3 -

can match Almirante in this regard.

7. The wider significance of this Congress, and of the MSI itself, is hard to assess. The party's inability to make Parliamentary alliances - the last such attempt, with the DC in 1960, was a disastrous failure provoking riots throughout Italy - brings a temptation to ignore it when considering the Italian political scene as a whole. But this would be a dangerous error. It remains Italy's fourth largest party, with 350,000 enrolled members and over 2 million votes at the last general election: in the present Parliament it has 30 Deputies and 13 Senators. Although regarded as 'outside the constitutional arc' it enjoys all the advantages of an established political party, including funding from the State; Parliament even observed the convention of calling a recess for the duration of the party Congress. Its natural constituency, as Almirante knows well, is composed of ordinary Italians opposed to communism who are fed up with the irrelevant manoeuvrings of the coalition parties (and would like the trains to run on time). The MSI also cleverly exploits nostalgia for pre-war Italy as fashioned by Mussolini: Vittorio Mussolini (the Dictator's son) was welcomed to the Congress platform with the Fascist salute and cries of 'Duce', and Almirante announced plans to celebrate in 1983 the centenary of Il Duce's birth. Fascination with the fascist period is widespread in Italy, and combined with monarchist sentiment - which the MSI has appropriated, although the party is now avowedly Republican - helps to explain the party's tenacious grip on about 5% of the electorate (far more in some parts of the South). Rome taxi-drivers, unless committed to the PCI, often make remarks which could be taken verbatim from a MSI pamphlet. Nor is the MSI's support confined to an older generation; the average age of their delegates at the Congress was 38.

8. Against this background it is less surprising that Almirante has dominated the MSI for so long. His party has a built-in liking for a charismatic leader, and his capacity for self-promotion is such that for most Italians he is the MSI (many commentators pointed out that he and Pannella are two of a kind in this respect). His rivals have been a dull lot, and the only plausible alternative in terms of policy - a modification of line, aimed at attracting right-wing votes from the established parties - seems to lead nowhere. Sporadic attempts to form an independent splinter group (eg. Destra Nazionale in the 1979 elections) have had no success. So Almirante continues to lead

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- 4 -

his strange assortment of right-wing extremists and malcontents through the political wilderness.

9. Finally, this Congress raises the question of the MSI's prospects. In introducing Pannella Almirante went so far as to say 'Fascism is here, not elsewhere' and added that anti-fascism was dead: the part of it remaining alive had gone to the Presidential palace. Support for fascism is a penal offence in Italy (and revival of the Fascist party is prohibited by Provision XII of the Constitution): Almirante qualified his remarks by interpreting fascism as a synthesis of State, nation, and working forces, but even so this bold admission of his party's links to Fascism (implicit also in his remarks about the MSI's 'model' originating 50 years ago) shows a measure of confidence that the political climate suits such a move - Piccoli, the DC Secretary, made this point to the Ambassador. Another pointer is that Almirante professes to have no fear of anticipated defections, partly because they would serve to discredit the system further, but also because polls lead him to think that the MSI vote would hold up well. As the other lay parties (including the PLI, who ten years ago were more representative of orthodox right-wing interests) jostle for position in the centre, there may indeed be more scope for the extreme right to capture new voters in search of a change. Recent successes against terrorism weaken their demands for a stronger response by the State, but there will always be other, socio-economic themes. In the long run, however, it will matter little if the MSI gain or lose a percentage point or two, as long as the other parties regard them as untouchable. Given that premiss, the only way the neo-fascists can have a direct effect on Italian politics in the 1980's is through extra-Parliamentary action, and that truth is not lost on some members of the MSI.

/for the party to exploit

Yours ever,

R N Culshaw

R N Culshaw

- cc: Mrs K Colvin, Research Dept, FCO
- W Marsden Esq, UKREP Brussels,
- Chanceries: Bonn
- Washington
- Consuls General: Milan
- Naples
- Consuls: Florence
- Genoa

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British Embassy
Via XX Settembre 80A 00187 Rome

Telex 61049 Telephone 4755.441

See Mrs Edwin, Research Dept

Mr Young 1/13
The embassy will be sending
a telegram on the outcome of
the summit meeting of coalition party

(13)

R P Osborne Esq
WED
FCO

Your reference sections on 4 March.

a.c. Mr Goodison

Our reference

Date

25 February 1982

WC 01412

17 MAR 1982

(5) Mr Goodison

Jean Roy

PSI TACTICS

- Robert Culshaw's letter of 4 February on the prospects of a spring election argued that Craxi was the prime mover. Developments in the past two weeks have borne out that thesis. Knowing that their support for the present coalition is essential, the PSI have kept up the pressure on a number of specific issues, and our recent contacts with their leaders all suggest that they may engineer a crisis before the summer recess; as an example, I enclose a copy of Michael Simpson-Orelbar's record of conversation with Martelli last week. The theme chosen to provoke the crisis is immaterial to them, but is unlikely to be foreign affairs (even Salvador).
- The "summit" of coalition party secretaries today will go beyond the foreign affairs topics, in particular Salvador, which were the original reason for summoning it (my letter of 16 February to Cowling in MCD anticipated this). It should be possible to reach a compromise line on Salvador. More difficult will be the Siberian pipeline, on which the PSI have now hardened their public opposition while still not quite matching Longo's complete rejection of the deal. I have reported by separate letter today to EESD, copy to you, a conversation I had with the MFA on Poland.
- Apart from foreign affairs, Craxi launched last weekend a strong attack on the monetarist policies of the DC Treasury Minister, Andreatta, and in particular on high interest rates. Andreatta defended himself in familiar terms, arguing that control of inflation was paramount, but Formica (Finance Minister) has since returned to the charge for the PSI. Rows between economic ministers from different coalition parties are nothing new, but the direct involvement of Craxi gives the present squabble added political significance. Craxi has also been gunning for Grandi, the (DC) President of ENI; we shall report the economic implications of this separately, since it forms part of a wider PSI attack on the system of nominating the top men in Italy's largest state-controlled organisations. This and other subjects must be tackled at this week's summit, and Craxi may have further shots in his locker; one of his most potent threats, so far not used, remains a change of policy on alliances at local government level.

/4. What this



4. What this adds up to is a series of PSI demands which Spadolini and the DC will find hard to satisfy without losing face. Craxi's main aim must be to stop the DC gradually recovering ground in the run up to their Congress at the end of April and beyond; and to profit from the PCI's current internal difficulties. He is confident that the PSI would make gains in an election held soon, and does not wish to risk seeing those gains eroded through inaction on his part; the results of two minor local elections in the last month will if anything have increased his confidence.

5. I shall make no predictions on early elections, since we shall have a better idea of likely developments after the "summit". This letter is simply to set the scene. But Spadolini's wish to postpone the Anglo-Italian summit (your 'phone call today), if confirmed, may be a straw in the wind portending at least an expected "crisi di governo" some time this spring.

Yours ever
Tom

T L Richardson

cc: HMG
MILAN

HMG
NAPLES

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- 2 -

EXTRACT FROM MINISTER'S RECORD OF HIS
CONVERSATION WITH ON. CLAUDIO MARTELLI,
DEPUTY SECRETARY OF THE PSI

3. When I said that the next British election did not have to take place until May 1984, he remarked that the present Italian legislature must finish at about the same time, but it was doubtful if it would last that long. When the "crisis" was to come, however, depended on many factors and he would not make a prediction. It would certainly not be over El Salvador. There were three possible outcomes. While a rimpasto would be no solution on its own, he did not exclude that the Government might carry on under Spadolini, but there would need to be agreement on a longer-term programme. Spadolini was popular but did not face up to the problems; (when I demurred, he admitted that Spadolini had done better than his immediate DC predecessors - but it would have been impossible not to).
4. Secondly, there could be a new Government, to which end the Socialists would put forward two demands: an acceptable long-term programme and the Prime Ministership. They would not insist on the latter: indeed, in the nature of things, they could not do so, since Craxi could only become Prime Minister with the agreement of the other parties. In that event, however, the programme would need to be an extremely convincing one, based on the reform of Italian institutions and widespread modernisation.
5. Failing agreement on this, Martelli continued, the PSI would insist on anticipated elections. He denied that the PSI was in too much of a hurry and acknowledged that a party which demanded anticipated elections should expect to lose them; but he maintained this

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EXTRACT FROM MINISTER'S RECORD OF HIS
CONVERSATION WITH ON. CLAUDIO MARTELLI,
DEPUTY SECRETARY OF THE PSI

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- 2 -

need not necessarily be the case when it did so in defensible circumstances (De Martino, the former PSI leader, had lost out in the 1976 election, because he had based his demand for anticipated elections on the unreasonable condition of the PCI's entry into the Government). Martelli's preference was, in fact, for anticipated elections this year. He honestly believed that the PSI would do better at the polls in one or two years' time, but the country's economic state demanded earlier political action. A government under Craxi should see out the remainder of the legislature: he denied - for what such denials are worth - that Craxi would seize the occasion after a few months to spring an election on his coalition colleagues.

6. On the problem of relations with the PCI, Martelli said that a return one day to a "union of the left" was not to be ruled out; such an alliance could embrace both socialist parties, the PRI and perhaps even the liberals. But he made it clear that the PSI/PCI alliance was not on for the moment, though a "dialogue" was possible. (He himself has been debating economic policy with Chiaromonte.) For the socialists three conditions would be necessary. They would want to be sure how definite was the possible rottura between the PCI and the CPSU; there would have to be a better balance between the PSI and the PCI; and the latter would have to clarify its economic policy: it was not enough to describe this as the abolition of capitalism, when already so much of Italy's industry was in the public sector. It sounded rather as if Martelli was consigning the concept as a practical proposition to the Greek Kalends, the more so after his answer to my final question about where the PSI saw its future in the longer-term. He said, with considerable conviction, that the PSI should form the core of a bloc embracing the other three lay parties, which should continue to be ready to co-operate with the DC.

7. Speaking about next week's vertice, Martelli said this should deal with other foreign policy issues - Poland and Eritrea, for example - not just El Salvador (cf. Mr Culshaw's record of your call on Senator Boniver). He showed no particular animus against Colombo, but described him as a man of the 50's and 60's who considered the Socialists fit only for eating frogs.

8. As I was leaving, I said the Ambassador was holding a series of lunches with the political parties and would like to arrange one for the PSI. Martelli welcomed this idea very warmly. I said that HMA's office would be in touch with Craxi's in due course.

MO

M K O Simpson-Orlebar

19 February 1982

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H of C
Minister✓ 2/3
v.c. EESD (para. 5)
Recard Dept

cc: IO

Mr J R Young, WED
HMCG, Naples
HMCG, Milan

0412	Mr. Osh...
WED	Mr. G...
WED	
- 8 MAR 1982	
REGISTRY	
Action Taken	
Mr. Young	Mr. M...

Mr. Osh... Rn 4/3
Mr. G... o/o

2/3

PSI VIEWS

- I note below the main points made by Acquaviva, Craxi's capo di segreteria, at the lunch which he organised yesterday for Mr Young. The other guests were On. Carlo Ripa Di Meana (member of the European Parliament), Dott. Scanni (PSI Foreign Affairs), H of C and me.
- Acquaviva was his usual ebullient and optimistic self. He explained that the PSI's medium term aim was to provide alternanza to the present DC hegemony, within the limits imposed by the presence of a large PCI. In the long term the PSI wanted to lead a government of the left in Italy, but for this there were two pre-conditions:
 - The PCI would have to demonstrate over time complete independence of Moscow, and improve its internal party democracy;
 - The relative size of the two major parties of the left would have to be changed. (If this means that the PSI alone must become larger than the PCI, it seems to me to relegate alternativa democratica to the distant future).

Acquaviva also explained the renewal within the party which Craxi had brought about since 1976 and pointed to electoral gains as evidence of his success.

- In Acquaviva's view the PCI's break with Moscow was fundamental, in view of the party's history. Berlinguer could not turn back. The old guard Stalinists were becoming fewer, and people lived too well in Italy to want to follow the Eastern European model. How could Communism take root in a country with 15 million house owners? Acquaviva added that international alignment was no longer the main obstacle to a closer association of the PCI in governing Italy. Ripa Di Meana was more cautious about the extent to which the rift with Moscow was irreparable.

4. Acquaviva told us that there was significant dissent within the PCI from Berlinguer's line. He saw the PCI as split evenly into three groups: pro-Moscow, led by Cossutta; Berlinguer's supporters; and the "right wing". Despite this 30% of opposition from the pro-Soviets Acquaviva thought the Berlinguer line would prevail. A formal split was also quite possible, and would benefit the PSI since it would make/easier by fulfilling the second of his pre-conditions (para 2 above). Ripa Di Meana did not envisage a formal split in the PCI. /their task


5. Acquaviva said that one important factor was the PCI's role in East/West relations. A thousand Italian businessmen and many enterprises depended on trade with Moscow, and for all except the very biggest, the PCI was needed to open the necessary doors in Moscow. Only organisations as big as ENI were able to dispense with such PCI assistance (and even they used it at times). Individuals with economic interests in Eastern Europe would need to be close to the PCI, if not actually members, and would want the breach with Moscow healed so that the PCI could continue to give them the access they require; paradoxically, although far from being Stalinists, they would tend to back Cossutta.

6. Acquaviva said that the PSI wanted elections without seeming to provoke them. The electoral gains were there for the taking, and it would be a mistake to postpone them too long. He expected the PSI to pick up votes from both the PCI and the DC, and scribbled down for us some predictions as follows:

- a) Lay bloc (regarded by him as a homogenous unit led by Craxi) → 30%;
- b) DC 32-35% (I protested that 32% was a dream, and he crossed it out);
- c) PCI 27%.

If the results tended in this direction Craxi would have the leverage to play a dominant role during the next legislature. On the mechanics of provoking an election, Acquaviva said that the theme was immaterial; it would however not be Salvador, and indeed no foreign affairs topic would appear to the Italian electorate as sufficient reason for calling elections. His message to us was that the Socialists would keep up the pressure on several fronts and that it would be difficult to reach the summer without elections.

7. I have sent Acquaviva a note on my own behalf thanking him for arranging this useful lunch. We may have a chance to reciprocate with Ripa Di Meana, who expressed interest in discussing Afghanistan (his pet subject).


R N Culshaw

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PSI VIEWS

1. I had a long talk yesterday with Acquaviva, Craxi's capo di segreteria. We began with the much-discussed verifica. Acquaviva said that Craxi's original agreement to join the Government had been made with a DC in which a clear majority (the preambolisti) actively favoured collaboration with the PSI. This majority no longer existed as a cohesive body. Craxi's request for clarification was therefore reasonable and should not be seen as a tactical manoeuvre. Although the DC's new system of electing their Secretaries should presuppose a clear statement of the various candidates' positions well in advance of any Congress, this was not happening; in particular, no-one was prepared to spell out policy on long term relations with the DC's Socialist partners in Government. Flirtation with the PCI after their Poland declaration was just a smokescreen to obscure this more basic issue. All the DC's capi storici feared Craxi and would keep him away from Palazzo Chigi as long as possible; they had monopolised power too long to wish to yield it readily to a real rival. The PSI by contrast did not see the issue in such personal terms; the main aim of a patto di legislatura was to establish a coherent programme - although it would also have to include agreement on distribution of Ministerial posts.

2. Acquaviva said that we should not rule out the possibility of a Government crisis, leading probably to early elections, before April. The DC could not count on a truce until their Congress, especially since they were deliberately allowing its date to slip. Craxi was the only party leader with nothing to fear from an election and he had the strength to force one (Acquaviva gave me the usual line about the PSI being the "needle of the balance" and having much more influence than their 10% following would suggest). It was true that the Italian electorate normally penalised the party which provoked anticipated elections, but Craxi might judge this risk worth taking, particularly if he could argue that otherwise no government programme could be implemented because of DC obstruction. Acquaviva stressed that no final decision had been

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reached, and that Spadolini's performance in the coming weeks was a factor; nevertheless his bet was that Craxi would blow the whistle at a time most inconvenient to the DC. (A 'phone call which Acquaviva had with a PSI federation in the North while I was there tended to confirm that the PSI are thinking seriously of the possibility of elections; Acquaviva was asking whether the local party organisation would have sufficient funds for a campaign this spring).

3. I asked why Craxi was in such a hurry. Acquaviva replied that Craxi always had in mind the disastrous results for the PSI of the centro-sinistra period, in which they had been blamed for Government shortcomings without getting significant parts of their Socialist programme implemented. The PCI's experience from 1976-79 showed how adept the DC were at operating a process of trasformismo. Craxi's reputation for relentless progress had to be maintained. His dilemma was precisely that he wished to become Prime Minister at the most opportune time, and preferably with a fresh mandate from the electorate (sic). To stand firm against two largest parties he would need the support of a "Socialist area" with at least 20% of the vote. /the

4. I asked whether the PSI's pact of consultation with the PSDI was not something of a liability, given Longo's poor image. Acquaviva replied that the PSDI could deliver 4% of the vote, and that the PSI were not identified with them or obliged to follow identical policies. The example of Mitterrand showed how important it was for Socialists of all types to unite against the forces of communism and conservatism. The PSDI was in any case not just Longo; there were younger radical members close in outlook to the PSI. Craxi wanted also to bring the Radicals into his camp. Two other reasons for trying to unite all the Socialist forces were the danger of being outflanked on the extreme left, and the fact that by a quirk of the Italian electoral system small parties presenting joint lists got more seats than if they campaigned separately; Acquaviva said that the PSI and PSDI would have had 7 more Senators in this Parliament if they had pooled their resources last time. (This was new to me but I shall check).

5. I asked about Martelli's relazione on terrorism to the PSI Direzione. Acquaviva spoke predictably about international links, and said that the Government's response had been incoherent so far. The use of one maximum security prison for all dangerous terrorists and the employment of the army in guard duties if necessary were obvious proposals. The PSI knew themselves to be in the terrorists'

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firing line, with Benvenuto particularly at risk. Craxi's own protection had increased (for the first time I saw a Carabinieri truck outside PSI headquarters). Of all the Party Secretaries Craxi would be the hardest to replace; to kill him would throw the whole of Italian politics into confusion. I asked about the factories; Acquaviva thought the union resistance to terrorist penetration had been satisfactory and this was why the Red Brigades were seeking targets elsewhere, eg. Dozier. (Forte of the PSI had taken a gloomier view about "industrial terrorism" with Mr M Richardson and me the day before).

6. We discussed Poland briefly. The PCI's statement was a step forward, but the DC left were exploiting it in order to cut the PSI down to size. The PSI had to keep hammering away on the question of the PCI's democratic credentials. The plain fact was that for change without an unacceptable/of risk Italy had to choose the PSI.

7. Acquaviva is a political fixer and very much part of the Craxi Mafia. He speaks very frankly to me and I should therefore prefer him not to be quoted by name. I have never before seen him so anxious as on this occasion about the possibility that the PSI might lose their momentum and be squeezed between a more respectable PCI and a more attractive DC. This anxiety clearly underlay the message he gave me about a probable crisis and elections. In my view, if Craxi could engineer elections, without damaging the PSI's image with the electorate, he would do so; but even if the PSI gained several percentage points it does not follow that he would immediately press for the Prime Ministership. A patto di legislatura in which he was guaranteed a spell at the Palazzo Chigi might suffice. As for Craxi's ability to provoke elections, the arithmetic of seats in Parliament suggests that PSI benevolent abstention at least is needed to ensure a working majority (I have asked Mr Tucknott to set out the figures for reference). Persistent DC absenteeism also increases the value of PSI support to the Government in transacting everyday business. Finally, Craxi has the powerful weapon of local government, where he can threaten withdrawal from many important centre-left juntas to align with the PCI.

8. We have now collected some interesting DC and PSI views on the likelihood of a Government crisis and/or elections. You may wish to consider copying all the minutes to WED, with a short covering letter saying that this is all speculation but serves to illustrate where the main protagonists think their interests lie. The letter

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could also set out the timetable of calling an election, which affects in particular Craxi's room for manoeuvre.

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22 January 1982

R N Culshaw
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MADRID, MADRID.

The "summit" of the five coalition party secretaries on 25 February (Head of Treasury's letter of that date to Osborne, WED), produced...
...we have reported separately the...
...mediation by Spadolini has defused a row between the Christian Democrats (DC) and the Socialists (PSI) over monetary policy and interest rates. Nevertheless, fundamental differences between the partners remain: every week brings a fresh threat to the government, and there is much talk of a "crisis" after, or conceivably even before, the EC Congress (paragraph 2 below), leading possibly to an election in late spring. Apart from the 1982 Finance Bill (which has to be passed by 31 March), there are issues like pensions and employees' terminal benefits that are provoking tension. Spadolini himself continues to display qualified confidence about his prospects. This summary summarizes the positions of the main parties.

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AND TO INFO SAVING ALL EC POSTS, WASHINGTON, UKDEL NATO, MADRID,
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ITALY INTERNAL

1. The "summit" of the five coalition party secretaries on 25 February (Head of Chancery's letter of that date to Osborne, WED), produced compromises on the foreign policy issues which were its genesis: we have reported separately the outcome on Poland and Salvador. Skilful mediation by Spadolini has defused a row between the Christian Democrats (DC) and the Socialists (PSI) over monetary policy and interest rates. Nevertheless, fundamental differences between the partners remain: every week brings a fresh threat to the government, and there is much talk of a "crisis" after, or conceivably even before, the DC Congress (paragraph 2 below), leading possibly to an election in late spring. Apart from the 1982 Finance Bill (which has to be passed by 31 March), there are issues like pensions and employees' terminal benefits that are provoking tension. Spadolini himself continues to display qualified confidence about his prospects. This savingram summarises the position of the main parties.
2. The DC are preparing for their Congress, to be held in Rome from 28 April to 2 May. Although no candidate for the Secretaryship has

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yet declared his hand, the various factions are manoeuvring for position and pronouncements by the party's leaders are now framed to take account of campaign requirements. The new secretary will have to demonstrate a degree of "renewal", as called for by the party in a special Assembly last November. More important, the Congress must pronounce on the DC's policy towards its coalition partners and the Communist (PCI) opposition. DC leaders argue that only after the Congress can an agreement be reached with the PSI on government policy and allocation of jobs in the second half of the legislature to 1984. Their real reason for delay is that the party needs further time to recover after the damaging P2 scandal and the shock of losing the Prime Ministership for the first time.

3. The PCI leadership have their hands full explaining Poland and the PCI's rift with the Soviet Union to the party base. In the long run, this greater independence of Moscow could bring them electoral gains, but the present degree of confusion would make it hard to run an effective campaign, especially while the PCI's "third way" between Marxism and social democracy remains so ill-defined. The Spadolini interlude therefore suits the PCI, and their opposition has been less fierce than when Cossiga or Forlani was Prime Minister. If forced into elections, they would campaign for the broad-left "alternative", but the PSI will not play while they remain so far behind the PCI in votes and seats.

4. Prima facie, the PSI have most to gain from elections: polls and recent local results suggest an advance of 3-4% on their 1979

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performance (10%). Craxi is ambitious and fears that delay could spoil his chances of being Prime Minister. He has raised the price of PSI support for the government, and is seeking a suitable issue to provoke a crisis (foreign affairs will not do). But it is hard for him to undermine a lay Prime Minister, and the recently repeated public opposition of fellow-Socialist President Pertini to anticipated elections (which finds an echo with the general public) is another restraining factor. In a TV interview on 7 March, Pertini repeated his forthright support of Spadolini and said he would like the Spadolini government to stay in being until 1984.

5. The smaller coalition parties are content either to support Spadolini or to face elections. The Social Democrats are already espousing popular causes, while Spadolini's own Republicans believe that his good image as Prime Minister will bring them gains.

6. There are thus three main possibilities for the next six months:

- (a) Spadolini survives any "crisis", and continues as Prime Minister into the Autumn, because neither DC nor PSI decide to unseat him;
- (b) Spadolini falls and from the resulting "crisis", either Craxi or a DC candidate is accepted as Prime Minister without an election;
- (c) Spadolini's fall leads to a spring or early summer election (mid-summer would be avoided), because no candidate for Prime Minister is able to command both DC and PSI support.

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
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VISIT TO VENETO AND MILAN

1. I spent a half day each in Venice, Treviso, Vicenza, and Verona last week, and a day and a half in Milan, to see how the Veneto region was weathering recent economic difficulties, and to discuss current prospects for the economy, as perceived from Milan, with bankers, employers and economic journalists. HM Consulate-General kindly arranged an excellent programme, which enabled me, on the whole, to see a local banker, an Assessore, and a Chamber of Commerce official in the course of each half day visit to the Veneto towns, meeting with the Marghera (Mestre-Venice) Port Authority, and (with Mr Young from WED) a representative range of economic opinion in Milan.
2. The Veneto region is very much a region of the small and medium enterprise, many relatively newly established, and a high level of artisan activity. The picture I was given was a remarkably consistent one from all my interlocutors. Economic activity had certainly slowed down in the area in 1981 for the usual reasons: high cost of money, increase in raw material prices, fall in demand, especially in overseas markets. But the slow down had not been ruinous (the region calculate an overall fall of 2% in production which compares to just under 3% for Italy as a whole). Some sectors (notably services and high quality shoes and textiles) have actually grown, and activity was expected to pick up slowly in the second half of the year. There were some black spots: machine tools had been hit hard by the recession in industrial country markets; so had the decorative glass and ceramic industries in Venice and Vicenza, and spectacles in Verona. Some low-cost, mass produced items were hit by competition from newly industrialised countries (the ski boot industry in the Province of Treviso had been virtually wiped out). Agriculture was still profitable (as you would expect on the rich alluvial plains) but the rising age of the agricultural population was a worry: few young people chose to follow their farmer fathers. The banks had recorded no exceptional rise in bankruptcies, and the capacity for self-financing by many of the small firms, especially in the artisan sector, rendered the cost of money less of a factor. It was, however, a factor in the decline in investment which was a general cause for concern. So was unemployment, especially of young people. But it was not possible to detect concern of the same order as that which I came across in Liguria and the Bresciano (or indeed Milan) last October. I have recorded separately more detailed notes on each place visited.
3. In Milan Mr Young and I were told that the recession was thought to have reached its nadir in December. There was guarded optimism for improvement in 1982, with some prospect for export-led recovery in the second half of the year. But times would still be difficult.

difficult. The high cost of money and credit ceilings were causing a worrying decline in investment, but it was reluctantly accepted that there was no alternative to a tight monetary policy until there were clearer signs of a slow down in inflation and of the PSBR being brought under control (on prospects for which there was increased scepticism in the present climate of political uncertainty). Indeed Cariplo thought that rates could go even higher if there was a political crisis causing a release of pressure on labour costs and state spending. Our interlocutor thought that the Belgian government's acceptance of modification of their indexation system in return for agreement on realignment of the Belgian franc within the EMS set a useful precedent for Italy. Everyone thought that the lira would have to be realigned in the EMS to effect a reduction in its effective rate vis-à-vis the DM later in the year, but expected the lira/\$ rate to remain roughly stable. Even so, the present rate still hurt, since it had imposed a new threshold for raw material import prices which would continue to have an impact as stocks were necessarily built up after being run down very heavily in 1981.

4. We had an entertaining meeting with the Rector of Boccone (Economic) University, who is a close friend of Spadolini's. We recalled that he had told HMA in July that the first six months would be crucial for Spadolini's attempt to impose a coherent economic policy, and asked him for his verdict at the end of those six months. He thought Spadolini had done pretty well, above all in raising the level of public consciousness of the need for greater economic discipline (it must be said that the journalists at lunch thought otherwise), and in the determination with which he had set about things. But the still-too-high PSBR, coupled with low levels of personal and corporate savings caused a drain on capital formation and the longer term outlook was poor. He feared that an upturn in activity would necessarily send the inflation rate upwards again. He thought Andreatta exaggerated when he said that a political crisis would be a disaster for the economy: but it would hardly be helpful.

Michael Richardson

Michael Richardson

2 March 1982

cc: (with attachments)

HMC G Milan
BVC Venice

(without attachments)

HMC G Naples
HMC Genoa
HMC Florence
Mr Young, WED, FCO ✓
Mr Garside, HM Treasury
Mr Porter, Bank of England
Mr Sullivan/Mrs Cesarini
Mr Morrice

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Mr Osborne, WED, }
Mrs Colvin, /FCO }
Research Dept. FCO }

with
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HMC Florence }
HMC Milan }
HMC Naples }

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VISIT TO PERUGIA: 11/12 FEBRUARY

1. I do not have much to add to the attached notes by HM Consul, Florence, and I.O. on the visit we paid to Perugia last month. I am grateful to Mr Eilbeck for arranging a full programme (attached).
2. The free city of Perugia was forcibly incorporated into the Papal States in 1540 by the Farnese Pope, Paul III. Today, with a population of 150,000, it is the seat of Umbria's Regional Government and the home of two universities: the old Italian University (20,000 students) and the Foreigners' University (10-12,000 students: I attended the opening of its academic year in June last year).
3. Top of the local problems were, as usual, housing and drugs; the Sindaco's most immediate concern was the effect on municipal programmes of the savage cut in the funds Perugia would be receiving this year from central government. Like other Italian towns with a fair spread of economic activity - agriculture, light industry, hand crafts and tourism - Perugia and its province have been relatively unaffected by the economic recession; we were told, for instance, that when a worker was laid off from one of the small registered ceramic factories at Deruta, he could usually get a job round the corner in one of the more numerous unregistered concerns - the black economy to the rescue! Workers were, however, being put in cassa integrazione at the town's biggest factory, Perugina. We were told that the situation was predictably worse in Umbria's other province, whose chief town, Terni, houses the first steel works built in Italy and other large industrial plants.
4. Perugia is a typical "red belt" town in that the giuntas at all three levels (region, province and city) are dominated by the communists and socialists. Rather surprisingly, the agreeable Sindaco described himself as a "non-political" socialist, because of his job in the magistrature. He had been working in Milan and was about to be transferred to Rome; he denied reports that this would involve his retiring as Sindaco. The official communists whom Mr Eilbeck and I saw all claimed their support of Berlinguer and his colleagues on the PCI's central direzione and minimised the extent of opposition. The Provincial President, for instance, said that only three out of the 110 delegates to the party's direzione for Umbria had voted against the party declaration on Poland; while, contrary to the impression given in the press, no more than about 40 of the audience of 1200 had applauded Cossuta at the end of the speech which he had given in Perugia the weekend before our visit. The fact that Cossuta was invited at all was ascribed to the local tradition of tolerance.


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It may be that Mr Nelson's interlocutor at La Nazione gives a truer picture of local feeling. Even so, I doubt whether, as far as Umbria is concerned, Berlinguer has all that much to worry about. In the Northern industrial towns there may well be a different story. (Naples, too, was described to me as being more ideologically conservative and thus reluctant to adapt to changes of policy.)

5. To this tradition of tolerance were ascribed the good relations in Umbria between the PCI and the Church; as if to symbolise this, the greeny bronze statue of Paul III outside the cathedral still gazes across the piazza, with quizzical benevolence, at the communist-occupied Palazzo dei Priori. I was told that the communist autorità sometimes had their differences with the Church over administrative questions - the Church is still a large owner of property - but they respected each other's ideologies. Stress was laid on the co-operation between Church and party in the Assisi peace march, and I believe it is true that the local clergy were far more prominent in that manifestation than they were in the larger one some weeks later in Rome. I should like to hear a Church view on all this, however.
6. Tolerance, too, was evident in the way all the local party officials seemed to get on well with each other. If PCI and PSI monopolise most of the assessore posts, the minority parties get their share of other administrative posts on offer. My interlocutors were a bit reluctant to comment on the effect of recent events on PCI/PSI relations, but the only DC official I met impressed on me his distrust of Craxi and his conviction that he was already working single-mindedly for a revamped union of the left.
7. One or two terrorist covi had been discovered in Perugia and the surrounding area, but I hope that it was not just the thought of his impending retirement which caused the Prefect to say that terrorism presented no great problem in his province. He admitted, as did others, that the Foreigners' University offered an open door through which undesirable elements could obtain entry to Italy (the most notorious example being the Pope's would-be assassin last year); but he maintained that it was equally in the interests of such elements not to cause trouble in Perugia itself. The group of British students whom we met at the University said their courses had been uneventful, though few of the Middle-Eastern students appeared to do any work.
8. Nor, according to its Rector, were there any great problems in the Italian University. He described his present day students as far more serious than their predecessors of 10 to 15 years ago. His only regret was the absence of entrata chiusa. Professor Dozza, urbane and energetic, is trying to establish formal links with a British University, such as Nottingham (to which he has paid more than one visit. The Sindaco, for his part, remains keen to twin Perugia with a town in the United Kingdom (it has French and German twins already); Mr Eilbeck is following this up, as he records.



M K O Simpson-Orlebar

2 March 1982

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Mr Simpson-Orlebar
Rome

1. You asked for a note about our recent visit to Perugia.
2. The general picture of Umbria painted by those to whom we spoke was one of a tranquil Region whose indigenous population was industrious, law-abiding and thrifty. Its geographical situation left Umbria, even now, to some extent insulated from the rest of the country, and it was not traversed by any major inter-city roads or railways. As the Rettore Magnifico of the University of Perugia told us, "no one ever comes to Umbria just by chance". The economy of the Region was founded on agriculture, smallish light industry and craft work, and tourism with a strong religious and cultural flavour that attracted visitors even in times of recession. Because of the nature of the economy the present recession had reached the Region somewhat later than other parts but its effects were now being felt.
3. The Prefect of Perugia, Dottor Elio Chialant, told us that the only significant problems of law and order stemmed from the presence of the University for Foreigners, whose students were nowadays drawn principally from third world countries. There was a fair amount of drug taking amongst these students, many of whom had slender resources and were driven to petty crime to obtain the price of their drugs. The Prefect did not consider that repressive measures were the answer to the drug problem, which he saw as a sociological one calling for intensive study, patience and understanding, and the provision by the State of facilities for helping and re-educating drug users and their families. There was, of course, no early prospect of such measures being introduced in Italy. Another problem caused by the presence of so many foreign students was pressure on the limited accommodation available. The Prefect cheerfully admitted that most of the students at the University for Foreigners were merely using it as a stepping stone to legitimising their status as students and securing a foothold in Italy. Many of them registered and moved on at once to other parts of Italy, becoming involved in the "submerged economy" or in terrorism, but armed with "student" identity cards which gave them a degree of protection against officialdom. (A notorious case in point was that of the Pope's assailant, who had spent two days in Perugia solely to register at the University for Foreigners.) Once here, according to the Prefect, they stayed, because in the majority of cases it was not politically practicable to deport them to their own countries. The Prefect struck me as being relaxed to the point of indifference, but his attitude is probably explained by the fact that he retires in two months' time and is coasting along until the glad day of his sixty-fifth birthday dawns.

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4. The Sindaco of Perugia, Dottor Giorgio Casoli, contributed to the general picture already outlined. The main issue of substance raised during our talk with him was prompted by the intervention of the Vice-Sindaco, Senatore Raffaele Rossi, who reminded us that during a similar visit by the Consul and Mr Scott in 1980, we had undertaken to try to arrange for Perugia to be twinned with a town in the United Kingdom. The Mayor was anxious to know when he might expect results. I was able to say that the office concerned in London was still actively engaged in looking for a suitable partner, but that the present stringent economic climate was making town councils reluctant to enter into fresh non-essential commitments. Nevertheless I undertook to press the matter and to see whether, as the Mayor suggested, it might be possible to find a town willing to enter into some rather less formal arrangement for the exchange of visits by schoolchildren etc.
5. The President of the Regional Giunta, Dottor Germano Marri, expressed concern about the effects of the recession on the Region. The few large enterprises were in crisis. He mentioned Perugina, the confectionery manufacturers, as a particular example and said that competition from Rowntree was a major factor. Many of the workers at the steel plant in Terni were in cassa integrazione, although there was some hope that if the Italian programme for the establishment of nuclear power stations were eventually to be expanded, the Terni plant would be called upon to manufacture the necessary pressure vessels which could not be made elsewhere in Italy. Incidentally, he said that the plant had been set up at Terni in the nineteenth century because of its position remote from the sea, which was then regarded as the most likely avenue of attack by unfriendly Powers.
6. Asked about the present state of dissension in the PCI, Dottor Marri tended to play this down. He said he had been present when Cossutta made his controversial speech, and that of the twelve hundred or so comrades present, a mere sixty or so had applauded him. The others had sat on their hands. Those who applauded had all been elderly (over fifty). It had not been by chance that Cossutta delivered his speech in Perugia; the Umbrians were noted for their tolerance. Dottor Marri thought that no more than 0.5 to 2% of the leadership of the Party supported the Cossutta line, but to know the views of the base, one would have to poll every member.
7. At the University of Perugia (which had been given a very good chit by the Prefect), the Rettore Magnifico, Professor Giancarlo Dozza, gave us a general account of the institution, which provides for most disciplines except engineering. He bemoaned the low entrance standards of Italian universities

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and the fact that there was no selection process or (certainly in the case of Perugia) restriction on numbers. The result was that the universities had become a parking place for school leavers, who gradually dropped out as they found other avenues of activity. He said that only one in ten of those who enrolled at the universities stayed the course and emerged with a degree. He referred disparagingly to the University for Foreigners which lowered the whole tone of Perugia, and he said that the Iranians, Iraqis and other third world students there were known locally as "the bedouins".

Dr. Albeck

R A EILBECK
15 February 1982

Mister

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Nr Culshaw

Thank you

cc Mr Eilbeck, Florence
no 16/2CONVERSATIONS IN PERUGIAI. Dr BRUNO BRUNORI - La Nazione

- 1) I called on Dott. Brunori in Perugia on 11 February. He is head of La Nazione's Perugia office. He said that La Nazione was the most widely read and trusted newspaper in Umbria, even though Umbria was a predominantly left-wing area. La Nazione has a reputation of being right of centre, although Dott. Brunori described it as covering that part of the political spectrum from the Socialists to the Liberals. In the South of Umbria, around Terni, La Nazione's influence wanes as the influence of Rome and the Rome newspapers grows. The other newspapers that cover Perugia cronache, and have small Perugia offices, are Il Messaggero, Paese Sera and L'Unità. La Nazione's area stretches from La Spezia to Terni and from Elba to Arezzo. To cover that area the paper produces 40 different editions; each different edition has the cronaca for a different small area.
- 2) Dott. Brunori spoke about the economy of Umbria. He said that the Province of Terni faced grave difficulties because of the problems of its steel and chemical industries which were all under public ownership. That situation reflected problems that affected the whole of Europe. Terni's problem was aggravated because the plans to specialise in providing components for nuclear power generation had not worked. Italy had not committed itself to nuclear power early enough, mainly because of opposition from the petroleum industry. Umbria was saved by the Province of Perugia. The economy was healthier there, where small and medium industries were more important. These industries had been able to conserve their export markets.
- 3) Dott. Brunori said that one of the problems facing Perugia at present was terrorism. It had been thought that Umbria was immune from this problem but recent discoveries of Red Brigade hideouts showed that this was not so. A second aspect of the problem was the activity of foreigners with links with terrorist groups who attended the University for Foreigners at Perugia. There were well-known cases of Arab terrorists setting out from Perugia to commit atrocities and there had been rumours of a base in Perugia for the training of Arab terrorists. Dott. Brunori said that the Israeli security services were active among the foreign student population. Most of these problems did not, however, affect the daily lives of the long-term residents of Perugia.

4) We spoke about the reactions to the speech of Armando Cossutta in Perugia the previous weekend. Dott. Brunori said that the opposition among the base of the PCI in Umbria to the line adopted by leadership was stronger than in some other parts of Italy. Some estimates said that between 30-50% of the PCI membership in Perugia were unhappy with the new line. There was a paradox in that the PCI in Umbria was now a bourgeois party, but it nonetheless retained strong psychological links with the Soviet Union which were reinforced by organized group trips to the USSR. / Indeed, Cossutta had emphasized that he would work through the party to change its line. He said that Cossutta's speech, as delivered, had been toned down from the prepared text that had been circulated beforehand. Cossutta had not wanted to raise the temperature of opposition to the leadership too high.

5) In the longer perspective the PCI was now getting over a difficult period it had faced in the 60's - 70's. At that time it had lost a lot of support among the young who had joined far left movements. The PCI was now in a much better position to attract them to its own ranks.

6) As regards the PSI Dott. Brunori said that the local party was firmly behind Craxi. The PSI sometimes faced difficulties in the Perugia area when, for example, the government decided that funds available to local government should be cut. Locally the PSI would feel the pinch of such decisions but it, nonetheless, felt - at least in part - responsible given the PSI's involvement in national government.

7) Dott. Brunori said that masonry was very important in dividing up jobs in Umbria. Masonry was widespread in all parties (except perhaps the PCI) including the DC. There had been attempts to purge the DC following the P2 scandal but these had not succeeded.

II. Sig. UMBERTO PAGLIACCI (PCI), President of the Provincial Administration

8) I joined the Minister and Mr Eilbeck for the call on Sig. Pagliacci. He is an agreeable and talkative man who has visited Britain twice. He spoke without great spark on the responsibilities of the Provincial Administration but was much more lively when the discussion moved to local politics.

9) As regards the PCI's current difficulties over its line on Poland, Sig. Pagliacci said that the majority of the local party agreed with the line of leadership. He admitted that there were those who were unhappy with this line and said that the party's attitude to the Soviet Union should not be a surprise to anyone. It had been foreshadowed for example in Togliatti's 'Pro Memoriale da Yalta'. Sig. Pagliacci said

.../that the extent

that the extent of dissent was greater in the industrial centres such as Lombardia. He also thought that it was mainly the older generation who objected to the current Berlinguer line because of their sentimental links with the Soviet Union, built up through the resistance for example. Sig. Pagliacci thought that it was right that the PCI should change. The world had changed and it now only made sense for the PCI to think of coming to power in a system where democratic liberties were guaranteed.

10) Sig. Pagliacci seemed a little discomfited in the discussion of the state of the local party following Sig. Cossutta's speech and I suspect that his presentation may overstate the unity of the party behind the Berlinguer line. He said that the local party had been annoyed that Sig. Cossutta had not warned them beforehand that he intended to make the controversial speech he finally delivered.

III. Sig. REMIGIO PANILLI, Federation Secretary of the PCI

11) I accompanied the Minister to call at the PCI Federation. The secretary had been held up and we were received by two young party functionaries. One dealt with organising, the other was the Federation's International Affairs expert. The latter did most of the talking. He said that most federations now have an International Affairs specialist. It was particularly appropriate in Perugia because of the presence of the University for Foreigners. This enabled the Perugia Federation to have direct contact with many foreign popular movements.

12) In the ensuing discussion our interlocutors emphasized the importance of the Peace Movement and the role that Perugia had played. It was significant that the last Peace March from Perugia to Assisi had been supported by all political forces in Umbria apart from the MSI. Even the Church and the DC had lent their support. The Cattolici di base were an important force that should not be overlooked.

13) The rest of the presentation concentrated on an idealistic remedy for the world's problems, including a 'real zero' option for the negotiations on euromissiles and a commitment by the industrialised world to assist the Third and Fourth worlds. We tried without much success to suggest that there were real political problems facing political leaders which made the achievement of the PCI'S ideal less easy than it might seem.

IV. MEETING WITH LOCAL PARTY SECRETARIES

14) The Minister gave a drink for the local party secretaries from the PRI, PSI, DC and PLI. The PCI International Affairs man also attended. The Social Democrat had had an accident. The occasion was friendly and all the secretaries got on well with one another and obviously knew one another well. There was no substantive discussion that I heard, rather friendly banter about one another's political positions.

PR Nelson

12 February 1982

Philip Nelson



VISIT TO PERUGIA - 11, 12 February 1982

Thursday 11 February

- am - arrive from Rome.
- meet HM Consul at Hotel Brufani, Piazza Italia 12, tel. 075/20.741
- 10:45 - leave Hotel Brufani with HM Consul for Prefettura
- 11:00 - Call on Prefect of Perugia, Dott. Elio Chialant
- 12:00 - Call on Mayor of Perugia, Dott. Giorgio Casoli
- lunch with Mayor of Perugia
- 15:30 - Call on President of the Provincial Administration, Sig. Umberto Pagliacci
- 16:30 - Call on Rettore of the University for Foreigners, Prof. Ottavio Prisciutti
- 17:00 - (approx.) meet group of British students at University for Foreigners
- 18:00 - P.C.I. *Pratica della Repubblica (Federale) tel 075-26941*
- 19:30 - Informal meeting with regional party Secretaries (DC, PSI, PLI, PRI, PSDI) at Hotel Brufani, followed by drinks
- dinner (no commitments)

Friday 12 February

- 9:40 - leave Hotel Brufani with HM Consul
- 10:00 - Call on President of the Regional Giunta, Prof. Germano Marri
- 11:00 - Call on President of the Regional Council, Avv. Enzo Paolo Tiberi
- 12:00 - Call on the Rettore of the University at Perugia, Prof. Giancarlo Dozza
- lunch (no commitments)

*Sig. Umberto Pagliacci
 President of the Provincia, Perugia (PCI)
 born in 1930. Formerly Vice-Secretary of Perugia, he later became
 Provincial Assessor and Senator.
 In 1978 he was made President of the Provincial Administration
 in Perugia, and the appointment was confirmed in 1980.*

Prefect, Dott. Elio Chialant

Born at Vittoria (Ragusa) on 15.4.1917, of Piedmontese parents.
Married, with one daughter.

He joined the public administration in January 1949. In 1973 he
was transferred to the Direzione Generale di Pubblica Sicurezza
del Ministero degli Interni, in Rome.

He has visited Britain, where he saw police training centres.
Appointed Prefect in December 1973, he was posted to the Prefettura
at Alessandria and served there until March 1978, when he was
appointed Prefetto di 1a Classe and transferred to Perugia.

Prof. Germano Marri
President of the Regional Giunta (PCI)

Dr. Marri is by profession a doctor of medicine. He has specialised
in diabetes, which he studied at the Royal Free Hospital in London.
He is particularly proud of having had an article of which he was
joint author printed in "The Lancet".
Now in his 40's, he has been an active PCI member since 1951.

Avv. Enzo Paolo Tiberi
President of the Regional Council (PRI)

Born in 1933, he is a Lawyer. A member of the PRI, he first served
in the Consiglio Comunale, then as a member of the Regional Council,
of which he became President in 1980.

Dott. Giorgio Casoli
Mayor of Perugia (PSI)

Born at Fabro (Terni) in 1928, he works in the Magistratura.
He was presented in a PSI electoral list as 'Indipendente' (since,
being in the Magistratura, he could not be described a party member)
and elected Mayor. This is the first time he has held political
office.
Formerly President of the Corte d'Assise e d'Appello at Milan, he is
now Presidente di Sezione di Cassazione.

Prof. Giancarlo Dozza
Rettore dell'Università

Born 1922, unmarried.
Formerly Dean of the Veterinary Faculty, he was made Rettore in 1976.

Prof. Ottavio Prisciutti
Rettore Università per Stranieri

Born 1908, he was 'Direttore dei Corsi' from 1940 to 1978.
Rettore since 1980.

Sig. Umberto Pagliacci
President of the Provincia, Perugia (PCI)

Born in 1930. Formerly Vice-Sindaco of Perugia, he later became
Provincial Assessore alle Finanze.
In 1979 he was made President of the Provincial Administration
"ad interim", and the appointment was confirmed in 1980.

Reference 011/1

Ref for future position

Mr Occhetto
Rho 4/2
Rho 1/3

(8) (7)

W2 -> 01412

DEI

-2 MAR 1982

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Minister		
HMA		

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copy to Mr Young, with whom I have today discussed most atypical DC views

Mr Calvin

IO
H of C
Minister
HMA

DC VIEWS

1. I had a long talk yesterday with Dott. Righi, Zaccagnini's capo di gabinetto. Although as humorous as ever, he took a sombre view of the party's immediate prospects. The three much-vaunted achievements of the November Assembly were empty:

- i) It was not a novelty for the Secretary to be elected. Zaccagnini had been elected by the 1976 Congress in preference to Forlani (this is true, but the point of the Assembly decision was to make the practice standard at all levels). In any case the correnti would still fix who should be elected;
- ii) The involvement of esterni was a red herring. They would split along corrente lines just like the party itself. Real reform had to be applied within the existing party structure;
- iii) Stipulating a minimum size for correnti did not touch the basic problem - and agreement had not even been reached on what the threshold should be. Small correnti would simply present joint lists to get a share of the spoils and then go their separate ways after the Congress. (In reply to my question, Righi added that the Manuale Cencelli would still be followed).

Righi concluded that the Assembly had introduced only presentational changes and ducked the real issues.

2. Righi said that Zaccagnini and the group of reformers who had supported him after 1976 were at last losing heart; he added bitterly that the only man who really knew how to reform the DC was Senzani (sic). As long as the bogey of a powerful PCI remained, the DC would remain the largest party and could control successive governments; if the PCI declined drastically, the DC would lose many votes to the lay parties and would be forced to re-think their

/strategy

strategy. The essential problem however that it was not possible to govern Italy effectively with over 40% of the voters "lost to democracy" (Righi was including the PCI, MSI, and extreme left). The long term strategy of the Area-Zac was unchanged, to encourage the PCI to participate constructively/at all levels. The difficulty at present was that the PCI for internal reasons would be unable to respond to any offer of a return to the policies of "national solidarity" (1976-79). As a first step the Area-Zac would propose at the DC Congress alliances at local level, including one or two regions, between the DC and PCI, where the only alternative was a broad left alliance; all the other lay parties adopted a similar strategy; why should the DC not do so, if it were in their own interests? Even a limited offer of this kind would be difficult for Berlinguer to accept. But for the DC there was no other way forward; the preambolo was dead, and there was no clear majority in the party for a long term strategy of alliance with the PSI, given the concessions that this would imply. Conditions were not right for anything resembling a historic compromise at national level, but the DC could give a clear signal in that direction. It was because of this need to mark time that the Area-Zac had decided to support Piccoli as Secretary when his original preambolo majority from the 1980 Congress disintegrated; the alternative would have been Forlani, who had even less vision. A similar compromise might have to be struck at the April Congress.

/in
Government

3. Righi thought the Congress would be held in Rome rather than Bari; facilities in Bari were inadequate, security would pose greater problems there, DC members of government found it difficult to leave Rome for five days, and costs in Rome would be much less (Lire 500 million instead of Lire 2 billion, according to Righi). The Area-Zac would present a united front, and hoped to increase their share of the delegates from 29% (at the last Congress) to about 35%. Differences within the faction were about tactics, not long term aims: Granelli, for example, had resigned the editorship of the faction's news sheet "Confronto" in disagreement with the policy of supporting Piccoli, but had not left the Area-Zac. New members of the Area-Zac were most likely to come from the disillusioned Andreottiani.

4. We discussed the PCI/CPSU split. Righi predictably said that it was confirmation of what the Area-Zac had believed for years, namely that Italian Communists were different and could safely be involved in the running of an advanced Western democracy like Italy. The viciousness of the Soviet attack showed how much of a threat the PCI's independent line posed to Moscow, not least because of its effect on Eastern Europe. There could be no going back for Berlinguer, and the Stalinist pro-Moscow base/would

/elements

/gradually

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- 3 -

gradually dwindle into insignificance. Unfortunately those Italian parties who had no real wish to bring the PCI, and with it the industrial working class, into the democratic area would now discover a whole series of other stumbling blocks, such as the lack of internal party democracy in the PCI. The right approach instead was to encourage the PCI to go further and define precisely what the "third way" would involve. On international reactions to any attempt to involve the PCI in central government, Righi said that / Mitterrand's appointment of PCF Ministers there could be little objection. The way should however be prepared by introducing DC/ PCI alliances at local level first. He recalled that domestic and foreign hostility to the idea of DC alliance with the Socialists in the early 1960's had been more sharply expressed than opposition to the historic compromise.

5. Righi said that all DC leaders were very worried about their personal security, since the discovery of the BR plan to attack DC headquarters in EUR last month. The BR were still a potent force and the present air of exultation in the press etc. was misplaced. Despite PSI claims to the contrary, the DC were the main political targets of left wing terrorism because they represented the establishment.

6. Finally, we discussed the basic appeal of the DC. Righi, himself a strict Catholic, stressed the confessional aspect. Political choices in Italy, at least where the PCI and DC were concerned, were based on faith and tended to remain unshaken for life. Above all the DC should emphasize its inter-class appeal and respond to the moral needs of Italians. De Gasperi's error after the war had been to assume that it was sufficient to meet Italy's material needs, and even the decisive break in party continuity after his death had not changed the policy of making economic progress the overriding objective. In his view the DC in this decade would face gradual decline if it could not offer a broader vision.

7. HMA will meet Righi and his wife at my dinner on 4 March. He is a complex man, but can be good company. As I was leaving he asked me what foreign observers would now think of Italy, whose one efficient organisation, the Red Brigades, had now been shown to have feet of clay.

10 February 1982

R. N. Culshaw
R N Culshaw

RESTRICTED

H P Osborne Esq
WED, FCO



With the compliments of

T L Richardson

BRITISH EMBASSY
via XX Settembre, 80/A
ROME
Telephone 4755551

26 February 1982

HMA
Minister
Mr Culshaw o/r
Mr Nelson

27
7
I am surprised at the extent
to which the PCI vote in Orte
help up. John
3/1

RECENT LOCAL ELECTIONS

- (19)
1. You asked about these; and I see that Mr Goodison's letter of 23 February to the Minister, which I am marking to you separately, also refers to the Lamezia results.
 2. I attach a table showing the results at Lamezia and Orte. The first thing to say is that we should not build too much on them. Their electorates are tiny, and voting in the Mezzogiorno (i.e. Lamezia) has over the years been more erratic than elsewhere.
 3. The differences in the results are as important as the similarities. True, in both the DC and MSI lost ground, and the PSI advanced. But in Lamezia the PCI and their allies performed badly while in Orte they held their vote. Lamezia is an encouragement to advocates of the "lay alternative" (41% of the vote, versus 32% in 1980). In Orte the lay parties obtained only 30.8% (28.3% in 1980), the PSI failed to become the swing party in terms of seats, and it took votes from the right and not as it had hoped from the PCI. The PCI claim that Orte vindicates their "democratic alternative". That said, the PSI gained more there (6.7%) than the results in the table shown, because they presented a joint list this time with the PRI and PR.
 4. Acquaviva was predictably delighted with the results when Mr Young met him; equally Mechini of the PCI was pleased about Orte. I see from the papers that On. Fiori for the DC said Orte was proof of a "worrying tendency"; the DC vote was dropping in the countryside as well as the big cities; all this was happening because the party had so far failed to renew itself.

Richardson
T L Richardson

cc: Mr Osborne
WED
FCO

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11/12

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LAMEZIA 8 FEBRUARY

Lamezia (Calabria)

	1980	1982
	%	%
DC	35	33.4
PSI	24.2	28.1
PSDI	5.9	8.1
PCI/DP/PDUP	23.2	19.2
PRI	1.9	5.1
PLI	-	0.4
MSI	6.3	5.7

(45,000 voted)

ORTE 22 FEBRUARY

Orte (Lazio)

	1980	1982
	%	%
	23.5	22.4
	24.6*	27.3*
	3.7	3.3
	41.1	40.9
	-	-
	-	-
	7.1	6.1

(6,000 voted)

*PSI with PRI and Radicals on list

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6

R. 4/3

British Embassy
Via XX Settembre 20A 00187 Roma

2/3
✓ i.e. Research Dept
Mr Osbourne
R. 4/3

H of C

cc: *✓* Mr J R Young, WED

8/4/3

MR YOUNG'S CALL ON ON. LATTANZIO

1. Lattanzio gave Mr Young a fairly standard account of DC views on a number of foreign policy issues. Of these I need only record the stress he laid on the need for contacts with parties and governments of all different types; in particular he quoted the example of his own recent visit to Yugoslavia, where he had found the Yugoslav Communist Party preoccupied by the PCI's "third way": such a position of neutrality between the two blocs was all right for Yugoslavia but perilous for Italy as a NATO member.

2. On domestic politics, Lattanzio was in favour of a more open dialogue with the PCI (which sounds to me rather like Piccoli's formulation) and thought their break with Moscow important. He did not however envisage any radical change of line emerging from the next DC Congress. There was general agreement in the party that a way had to be found of carrying forward the present coalition. On internal DC affairs, Lattanzio approved of the involvement of esterni (who will have 10% of the delegates) but did not support direct election of the Secretary: the latter had been tried in 1976 with Zaccagnini, and did not suit a party which depended more on a leading group (ie. capi correnti, although he did not use that phrase) than on one individual.

MUSICO

23 February 1982

PP R N Culshaw

<i>WRS 01412</i>	
REG. NO.	DATE
-2 MAR 1982	
REG. BY	DATE
<i>✓ DB</i>	

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*cf Mas Crain, his Dep
Mr Donnelly PASO.*



British Embassy
Via XX Settembre 80A 00187 Rome

Telex 61049 Telephone 4755.441

*Mr Young's wife
Mr G. ...
No info bet for the near future!*

⑤

⑬

R P Osborne Esq
WED
FCO

Your reference

Our reference 014/4

Date 4 February 1982

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12 FEB 1982			
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	<i>Mr Mack</i>	<i>DM</i>	

Dear Roy,

SPRING ELECTION?

③

1. Tom Richardson's letter of 28 January on the Ambassador's DC lunch promised a further report on the risk of a Government crisis leading to early elections. The release of General Dozier has given the Government a temporary fillip.
2. There are a number of factors militating against upsetting the Spadolini Government but the position remains broadly as set out in the Ambassador's Annual Review. The DC hope the ship can be kept on an even keel at least until after their party congress in April. The PSI fear that the DC are stringing them along. The smaller parties too want an overhaul of the Government's policy. All parties are digesting the results of the PCI's dramatic but incomplete split from the USSR on Poland. So anything may happen in the spring.
3. A Government crisis begins when the Prime Minister informs the President that he cannot carry on. There can be a crisi guidata, when the shape of the new coalition (and probably the identity of the new Prime Minister) is already clear or a crisi al buio, when negotiations must start from scratch. The second form of crisis is often provoked by an external event, eg. a major scandal; all political parties normally profess not to want to plunge the country into such confusion. In either case, the President gives a mandate either to the retiring Prime Minister or to another politician, and may repeat the process as many times as are needed to achieve success. If all the parties indicate a willingness to keep trying to produce a workable majority, this process can last months; if not, and the mood is for elections, the President would after a few weeks have little choice but to dissolve Parliament (in theory he could also dissolve one Chamber). Once Parliament has been dissolved, there must be a general election within 70 days; the minimum period of notice is 45 days.

14.

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*cf Mrs Clinton, her Dep
Mrs Donnelly PMSO.*



British Embassy
Via XX Settembre 80A 00187 Rome

Telex 61049 Telephone 4755.441

*Mr Young 10/2
Mr G...
No info held for the near future!*

(5)

(13)

R P Osborne Esq
WED
FCO

Your reference

Our reference 014/4

Date 4 February 1982

WED 014/4

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY

12 FEB 1982

DESK OFFICER		REGISTRY
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	<i>M. Mod</i>	<i>DM</i>

Dear Roy,

SPRING ELECTION?

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- 2 -

4. Elections are always held on a Sunday, and the period between April and June is much the most popular; the high turnout possible at that time of the year suits all major parties. Mid-summer would be impossible for elections, with half of Italy on holiday, and would also be inconvenient for a campaign. This means in practice that the other main possibility is November/December, but bad weather in parts of the country at that time of year would make administrative arrangements more difficult. This strong preference in Italy for the April to June period explains why the timing of the next DC Congress is so critical; originally planned for 2-6 April, it slipped first to the fourth week of April and now looks like being immediately after Easter. If a crisis developed soon afterwards, this would just allow time for a general election before the end of June, if the DC pressed for that.

5. The mechanics of provoking a crisis are also relevant. I give below the electoral arithmetic for both houses:

The Chamber of Deputies

<u>Government</u>		<u>Opposition</u>	
DC	262	PCI	191
PSI	62	MSI-DN	30
PSDI	20	PR (Radicals)	18
PRI	16	PDUP (Ultra Left)	6
PLI	9	Others (Indep. Left)	12
SVP	4		
Total	<u>373</u>	Total	<u>257</u>

The Senate

<u>Government</u>		<u>Opposition</u>	
DC (not including Fanfani, who as President customarily abstains)	138	PCI	94

/PSI

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- 3 -

PSI	33	Independent Left	16
PSDI	10	MSI	13
PRI	7	Others	4
PLI	2		
SVP	4		
	<hr/>		<hr/>
Total	194	Total	127
	<hr/>		<hr/>

You will see that the DC leadership can provoke a Parliamentary crisis at any time; so could a serious backbench DC revolt, but that is not likely in present circumstances, with a Congress in sight. The PSI role is critical; without an understanding with them it is in theory not possible to create a working majority - unless the PCI agree to support the government from outside, which would change the whole political spectrum, reverse the policy of alternative democratica, and confuse the PCI base hopelessly. PSI abstention, however, would not automatically cause the government to fall, even if the PSDI followed their lead. As for the PCI, their ability to provoke a crisis depends not on voting figures, although absenteeism on government benches can make even the present coalition majority wobble, but on their capacity to block the consensus between parties essential for the despatch of Parliamentary business. If, for example, the PCI refused to agree to Parliament's programme of work, it could become impossible to pass decree laws within the necessary 60 days.

6. Even with a working majority, a Prime Minister whose efforts were being frustrated at every turn might feel obliged to resign; we need only remember the success of stiff PCI opposition to Cossiga's second government. Local government coalitions are another important bargaining counter which Craxi, for example, might not hesitate to use.

7. It is against this background of timing and tactics that the possibility of early elections must be assessed. The DC would prefer to hold their Congress in peace, hoping that their image will improve and that a more cohesive majority may emerge which will permit a more convincing appeal to the electorate. They would be unlikely to make significant electoral gains in

/elections

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- 4 -

elections held before April. Meanwhile, despite the PCI's new look after its "excommunication" by Moscow, the DC have again ruled out any return to the compromesso storico. Instead, some of their leaders have been hinting (not very convincingly) at PSI leadership of a coalition, provided it is based on a patto di governo which runs the full course of this parliament (thereby avoiding any earlier election). The PCI's prime need is for time to lick internal party wounds (see Michael Simpson-Orlebar's letter of 1 February to Alan Goodison), and their calls for alternativa democratica continue to fall on deaf ears. The small parties can for this purpose be ignored.

8. That leaves the PSI, with all eyes on Craxi. The PSI reckon that they are certain of electoral gains: their present seats in Parliament are based on 9.8% of the vote, whereas in subsequent local elections they have averaged 12-13%. They see the DC as in disarray and without a convincing candidate for the Prime Ministership. They also fear that too long an association with this revamped centre-left coalition, without getting their programme implemented or winning the Prime Ministership, could damage their image with the electorate (as during the last centre-left period). All these are arguments for the PSI to press ahead, a tactic which also suits Craxi's ambitious temperament and thrusting style. Against that, the Italian electorate normally penalises the party which provokes an anticipated election; and the government's recent successes against the Red Brigades strengthen the argument that it should be given time to "finish the job". The presence of a Socialist at the Quirinale makes it more difficult for Craxi to fulfil his ambition. He must be worried that the PCI's "excommunication" by Moscow will enhance its appeal to many former Socialist supporters. And even after a successful election he might be denied the Prime Ministership, on the grounds that two lay incumbents in a row would be intolerable to the DC given their electoral weight. Some of Craxi's advisers argue that it would be better to let the DC have a brief and ineffectual period at the Palazzo Chigi before pulling the rug from under them.

9. We cannot know what Craxi will decide, and in any case there is always the risk of a sudden scandal like P2. Nevertheless, an engineered crisis leading to elections before the DC Congress in April now looks unlikely. One small piece of evidence is that the PSDI have just decided to go ahead with their Congress in March, having previously considered postponement; they are close

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- 5 -

to the PSI and it would be awkward for Craxi to move at a time of great inconvenience for them. The outlook after April is more obscure. If Craxi were disappointed by the results of the DC Congress, or if Spadolini lost his momentum, then elections in the late spring would become likely but by no means inevitable.

10. Finally, I enclose a copy of a note on election procedure prepared by James Adams three years ago. In doing so I do not mean to tip the scales of the balanced assessment in my last paragraph. You may need until the elections, whenever they are, to penetrate the impeccable logic of para 16 of the note.

Yours ever,

R N Culshaw

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THE ITALIAN GENERAL ELECTION - THE MACHINERY

Introduction

1. Italian electoral law is complex. Almost every type of election system known is in use, for some kind of council in Italy. The parliamentary election system differs for the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate. In most cases, however, the laws result in a reasonably equitable procedure for proportional representation, though parties attracting more than 10 per cent of the total valid votes cast tend to win slightly more than their fair share of seats, and parties polling less than 10 per cent slightly less. For results of 1976 (and 1972) elections see Table 1.

2. Timetable - June 1979 Elections

3 June 0600-2200	}	Voting.
4 June 0700-1400		
4 June 2000		First results announced for the Senate.
5 June around noon		Full results in terms of seats per party become known.
20 June (?)		Both Houses of Parliament meet.

3. Subsequently a new Government will be formed: on past form this will probably take between $1\frac{1}{2}$ and 2 months. Also on past form the sort of government which is then formed is sometimes a stop-gap, with a more stable government taking its place after about 6 months.

The Electorate

A. The Chamber of Deputies

4. Under the Constitution "Votes are personal, equal, free and secret. To vote is a civic duty". All citizens who have reached majority (now 18) must vote except those who lack legal capacity, who are condemned criminals whose civic rights have been expressly suspended, or who are unable to vote because of illness. (Polling stations are set up in the larger hospitals for those fit enough to use them). No penal sanction is imposed on those who do not vote, but failure to vote, if unexcused, is recorded for five years on an official register, an extract of which (the Fedina Penale) must be presented when a citizen changes his residence, registers a birth, marriage or death, or, frequently, applies for a new job. The turnout in Italian elections since the war has been very high, around 93 per cent.

The Voters' Roll for this election has been compiled on the basis of the 1971 Census, (the 1976 elections were held on the basis of the same Census.) 41,307,042 voters are eligible to take part in the elections for the Chamber; 20,061,101 men and 21,846,991 women. On past form about $1\frac{1}{2}$ million voters will be unable to vote because they cannot reach their polling stations, being abroad or elsewhere in Italy - there is no provision for voting by post or by proxy - and about the same number of ballot papers will be spoiled or blank.

B. The Senate.

6. The electorate for the Senate (minimum age 25) numbers about 35,600,000. There are about 5,700,000 people aged between 18 and 25 who will vote only for the Chamber, about 2,400,000 of whom will be voting for the first time. The difference in voting age causes a significant difference in the political complexions of the two Houses of Parliament (which under the Italian system have almost exactly equal legislative powers: there is no machinery for the Lower House to force legislation through an unwilling Senate). In the 1976 elections ~~the Proletarian Democrats and the Radicals~~, the Proletarian Democrats and the Radicals, won respectively 6 and 4 seats in the Chamber, whereas neither was represented at all in the Senate.

Election Procedure - the Chamber of Deputies

A. The Voting

7. With a few exceptions electors must vote within their constituencies and in their own "electoral sections" which normally correspond to municipalities, though large towns are divided into several. The electors are sent, three weeks before the elections, a certificate showing their constituency, section and the date, time and place of the voting. This card includes a tear-off slip to be presented at the polling station. Provision is made for correcting errors. Careful arrangements are made at polling stations to ensure the secrecy of the vote and avoid improper pressure. Each elector has one vote which must be cast for a party as such. Party symbols appear on the ballot papers, and the elector chooses the party he wishes to vote for by placing a cross through its symbol. There is room for confusion here. Some party symbols are similar. The symbols usually incorporate the name of the party or its acronym, but many of these are also similar, and there are still many illiterate voters in Italy.

8. In addition to selecting a party, the voter may, if he wishes, express a preference for up to three candidates of the party he has chosen, or up to four if the total number of deputies to be elected from his constituency is 16 or more. The names of the candidates are not on the ballot paper but a blank space is provided in the middle of it in which the names of the preferred candidates, or their numbers on the party's electoral list, may be written. In parts of the illiterate South, a candidate will frequently pass out stencils to the voters so that they can stencil in his number. As not all voters express preferences a relatively few preferences votes, roughly 20 per cent of the votes cast for the party, are enough to put a candidate near the top of that party's post-election order of preference. About $\frac{3}{4}$ per cent of ballot papers used are usually spoiled, probably because of the complicated nature of their format. They even include a warning that the voter will be fined if he makes off with the pencil that he is supplied with at the polling station.

/B. Allocation of Seats to Parties and Candidates

B. Allocation of Seats to Parties and Candidates

9. There are 630 Deputies, holding office for five years. Anyone who has the right to vote, and is over 25 may stand. For elections to the Chamber, Italy is divided into 32 constituencies, whose boundaries are fixed. Each constituency elects a number of candidates in proportion to its population (not electorate) as ascertained by the census preceding the previous general election. Table 2 shows the allocation of seats this time which is the same as in 1976. It was arrived at as follows:-

1. The total population (54,136,547) was divided by the number of seats available (630) to give a national quotient (85,931).
2. The population of each constituency was divided by this quotient to produce an initial allocation of seats to that constituency, and a remainder.
3. The 14 seats not allocated in step 2 were given to the 14 constituencies with the highest remainder.

10. A list system of PR is used in all constituencies except Val d'Aosta (for which see paragraph 12). Each party submits a list of candidates in each constituency in which it wishes to stand. Each list may contain as many candidates as there are seats to be filled in the constituency. They do not have to reside in the constituency, and may, stand in up to three, and also at the same time for the Senate. A candidate elected in more than one constituency must decide which he will sit for, and in the other(s), the next person in his party's post-election order of preference takes his place.

11. When voting is completed, the following process is carried out in each constituency.

1. The total number of valid votes cast in the constituency is divided by the number of seats allocated to that constituency plus two, to give the electoral quotient.
2. The total number of votes cast for each party is divided by the electoral quotient, and the result becomes the tentative number of seats granted to the party in the constituency. When this has been done for all parties, if the number of seats tentatively granted is not greater than the number of seats allocated to the constituency, the tentative distribution of seats becomes final.
3. If after step 2, more seats have been tentatively granted than are available in the constituency, a new, larger electoral quotient is obtained by dividing the total of votes by the total of seats plus one, and step 2 is repeated. If too many seats are again tentatively granted, a still larger quotient is obtained by dividing the total of votes by the number of seats tout court: this cannot produce too large a tentative distribution.

12. Val d'Aosta, the smallest constituency, elects only one deputy. Each party may therefore submit only one candidate, and so there is no preference vote. To be elected, a candidate must secure an absolute majority. If no one does on election day, a run-off is held between the leading two a fortnight later.

13. It normally occurs that not all the seats available in a constituency are distributed by Step 2 of paragraph 11 above even when the smallest electoral quotient is used. Each constituency office then informs the National Election Office of the electoral quotient of the constituency, the number of candidates elected by each party there, the remainders of votes for each party after the division of its total vote by the electoral quotient, and the number of seats unassigned. The National Office assigns all the unused seats using this formula:

1. Discard the remainders of all parties who have not both elected at least one candidate in one constituency and polled at least 300,000 votes altogether.
2. Add the unassigned seats.
3. Add the remainders of all parties not eliminated in Step 1.
4. Divide the total of remainders by the total of unassigned seats to obtain the national electoral quotient.
5. Divide each party's total of remainders by the national electoral quotient to find the number of unassigned seats to be granted to that party.
6. Give any seats still unassigned to the parties in proportion to the size of their remainders resulting from the division in Step 5.
7. For each constituency, allocate the unassigned seats to the parties to which seats have been assigned by Steps 5 and 6 in proportion to the ratios between each party's remainder in that constituency and the constituency's electoral quotient.

14. Now that all the seats have been assigned as between parties, in each constituency the preference votes cast for each candidate of a party which won seats in the constituency are counted, and candidates declared elected in descending order of their number of preferences. The "post-election preference list" of each party which has elected candidates in a constituency is kept, and if a deputy dies or resigns the next person on the list takes his place. By-elections are thus dispensed with.

Election Procedure - the Senate

15. Voting is as for the Chamber of Deputies, except that there are no lists and no preference votes: each party puts up one candidate per district, and voters again vote by crossing out their party's symbol on the ballot paper. There are 315 elected senators, who must be at least 40 years old, and are elected for five-year terms by regions. Table 3 shows the allocation of seats this time. It was worked out as follows:-

1. The five smallest regions were given a fixed allocation of seats, 1 for Val d'Aosta, 2 for Molise and 7 each for Trentino/Alto Adige, Umbria and Basilicata.
2. The total population of the other 15 regions (51,486,857) was divided by the number of seats left (291) to obtain the national quotient (176,930).
3. The population of each of these 15 regions was divided by the national quotient to give the initial allocation of seats by region.
4. 7 seats were left, and were given to the 7 regions with the largest remainders in Step 3.

16. The regions are divided into single-member constituencies. Each party may field only one candidate per constituency. Candidates may run in up to 3 constituencies, but in only one region. If a candidate received 65 per cent of the votes in his constituency, he is elected. Only a few candidates, running for the DC in Venetia or the DC or Südtiroler Volkspartei in Trentino-Alto Adige, are usually elected in this way. To decide which other candidates are elected, the D'Hondt system is used within each region. It works as follows:-

1. Divide the total number of votes in the region polled by each party by one, and assign one seat to the party with the highest total of votes.
2. Derive a new quotient for the party to which a seat was assigned in the previous Step, by increasing the divisor of its total party vote by one, compare this quotient with the other quotients previously derived, and assign one seat to the party presenting the highest total.
3. Repeat Step 2 until all seats have been assigned.

This allocates seats as between parties. Within each party the candidates are then selected who have achieved the highest percentages of the vote in their constituencies. (The highest percentage obtained by candidates who have stood in more than one constituency is considered.) This can easily mean that some constituencies appear "unrepresented" in the sense that none of the candidates who stand there is elected, while two or even three candidates from another constituency may take seats in the Senate. But the system ensures that the parties are represented more or less in proportion to the votes they receive, although because there is no national "settling-up" process, and because it takes more votes to elect a senator than a deputy, the larger parties are slightly favoured in elections to the Senate. (The lack of complete proportionality in representation in the Chamber is due, when it occurs, to the "wastage" of votes cast for small parties which do not succeed in electing a deputy on the first count.)

A Note on Preference Voting

17. One of the peculiarities of the Italian election system is its combination of proportional representation and preference voting. Most voters do not in fact use, or use only partly, their option to select the candidates of their choice: less than 20 per cent of the possible preference votes are usually cast in northern Italy, and about 45 per cent in the south.

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18. The largest proportion of preference votes are cast for the Christian Democrats, partly because a very wide spectrum of political opinions is represented in this party, and partly because, since the DC have been the mainstay of all governments since the war, it has mattered more to voters what sort of Christian Democrat has been elected. In fact, the Christian Democrat preference vote plays a large part in determining the kind of governments Italy is going to have. If the majority of preference votes goes to rightists in the party, the Government will tend to go right of centre, and if enough preference votes go to leaders of the left-wing groups, the Government will tend to lean leftwards (subject of course to the need to work with allies from other parties). The importance of securing preference votes, hence of winning a high place in the party's list of candidates, and therefore of gaining control of the party's administrative machinery, goes a long way to explain the DC's chronic division into factions. In 1976 some of the largest totals of preference votes, particularly in the North, went to younger DC candidates who belonged to no recognised factions but represented a new independent and generally right-wing image. The same phenomenon may to some extent be repeated this time.

1. Prof. Bellini said that his unit's work had been faced with considerable hostility and obstruction by the established authorities. But once they had got going in a collaborative spirit on specific projects (eg the development of university education with the Ministry of Education), suspicions had been dispelled and he believed that the unit's work would have to be continued. He certainly thought that its establishment would serve Bellini's administration.

2. He was keen to keep in touch with the Embassy, for whom he had been grateful on two recent occasions (he could not remember details) when his unit had asked for information on British practices. He specifically asked for anything we could tell him about the use and procurement of human technology in public service, and where decisions about it were taken in Britain, which, thanks to Mr Ussin's Cabinet Office, kindly we are able to give him.

Michael Richardson
Michael Richardson

2 February 1982

Mr Bellini/ Mrs Cesarini
Mr Bellini

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Italy Home

Radio

CALL ON THE HEAD OF THE PRIME MINISTER'S PROGRAMME MONITORING UNIT

1. I called on Prof. Zuliani, Head of the Dipartimento per l'Analisi e Verifica del Programma at the Palazzo Chigi on 29 January. His department is the second of the new units inserted into the Prime Minister's Secretariat by Spadolini to improve the process of co-ordination in the government machine and the Prime Minister's ability to keep a grip on the execution of the programme which forms the basis of his Mandate.

2. Prof. Zuliani who is serious and slightly smug, is a Professor of Statistics at Rome University and, like Prof. Arcelli, Head of the new economic unit at the Palazzo Chigi, has only agreed to stay long enough to see the unit set up. He has about 30 people working for him, mostly seconded from other government departments, and chosen not so much for their familiarity with particular fields, as for their abilities as computer technologists, statisticians, O and M specialists etc. His department's role is to take each part of the government's programme as announced in the Relazione Programmatica when it took office and follow it through from consideration in the various Ministries to legislation in Parliament (where applicable) and execution. His brief is also to make sure that inherited obligations from previous governments fit into the new government's programme and vice versa. The basis for this work is a computerised data system which has been installed in the Palazzo Chigi and which is also at the disposal of the rest of the Prime Minister's Secretariat.

(PAR
as was)

3. Prof. Zuliani said that his unit's work had been faced with considerable hostility and obstruction by the established Ministries. But once they had got going in a collaborative spirit on specific projects (eg the development of university education with the Ministry of Education) suspicions had been dispelled and he believed that the Unit's work would come to be valued. He certainly thought that its establishment would survive Spadolini's administration.

Hardy
copying

4. He was keen to keep in touch with the Embassy, for whose help he had been grateful on two recent occasions (he could not remember details) when his unit had asked for information on British practice. He specifically asked for anything we could tell him about the use and procurement of information technology in the public service, and where decisions about it were taken in Britain, which, thanks to Mr Unwin's (Cabinet Office) timely visit, I am able to give him.

Michael Richardson 0142

2 February 1982

Michael Richardson

cc:

Mr Sullivan/Mrs Cesarini
Mr Culshaw

R.P. Overton W&S too.

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Mr Young

(3)

Mr G. K. ...

Some interesting mod music.



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Via XX Settembre 80A 00187 Rome

Telex 61049 Telephone 4755.441

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[Signature]
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(3)

R P Osborne Esq
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1/2
Mr Goodison

Your reference

014/4

Our reference

Date

28 January 1982

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<i>Mr Martin DM</i>	

Jean Roy

DC VIEWS

1. I enclose my record of conversation at a lunch which the Ambassador gave for Andreotti, Cossiga and Forlani on 20 January. Michael Simpson-Orlebar and I were also present.
2. We shall write separately about the possibility of a government crisis leading to early elections. This is very much a matter of speculation, but the three DC leaders are not necessarily right to claim that Craxi could not force elections if the DC and the PCI were both opposed to them. As you know, it is not just a question of parliamentary arithmetic; and the PCI's dispute with the CPSU, which has come to a head since this lunch took place, will have an effect on the range of possible alliances open to all the parties. The permutations look like becoming still more complex.
3. You may like to know in this connection that the Ambassador has already planned a follow-up lunch with PCI leaders for February.

good

Yours ever,
Tom

T L RICHARDSON

cc: Mrs K Colvin
Research Department

J Callan Esq MVO OBE
Holy See

CONFIDENTIAL

Minister
Mr Cullenaw
Mr Seelye
Mr Nelson

49-afami

cc: HMA o.r.

HM AMBASSADOR'S LUNCH FOR ON. ANDREOTTI, ON. COSSIGA, & ON. FORLANI,
20 JANUARY

1. The following are my main recollections of what I thought was a most successful lunch with the last three DC ex-Prime Ministers. I expect I have missed some nuances.

2. Poland We began with a desultory discussion of Poland: the main point of interest, I think, was Andreotti's disquiet about President Reagan's statement that the Pope had written to him supporting American action so far over Poland. We have reported this point separately to London. Andreotti was in Warsaw a week or two before the military takeover: his son-in-law works in the Italian Embassy there.

PCI All three guests agreed that the PCI was taking a helpful stand against terrorism. Andreotti (who did most of the talking throughout) added, however, that he was slightly concerned at the possibility of a splinter party emerging to the left of the PCI, expressing sympathy for the terrorists and conferring some sort of respectability on them. As for internal dissension within the party, this had always been a feature: the novelty was to have it paraded so openly, eg. in the pages of Unità.

PSI They said that Craxi was flailing about, not quite knowing what to do next. The DC wanted a government which would last until the legislature had run its course; and, our guests claimed, Craxi could not call for early elections if both major parties (DC and PCI) were opposed. The PCI would be opposed because they probably reckoned that their electoral fortunes would improve, as and when the Polish crisis receded. Andreotti said that Craxi was probably making a similar calculation, which was why he was in a hurry to get his hands on the premiership. Asked if the DC could possibly accept two lay prime ministers in succession, Forlani eventually said that Craxi would be acceptable provided he saw out the legislative term, on the basis of a patto di legislatura (This was surprising, but Forlani appears to have said something similar to the press yesterday.) What would be intolerable, he continued, would be for Craxi to take over the Presidency now, and after only three months resigning and trying to provoke an early election on the grounds that he must have a majority to carry out his job. The DC expected that if there were nevertheless an early election the PSI would gain.


/ Spadolini

Spadolini Andreotti said that Spadolini had always taken PCI views too much into account, both before and after becoming the President of the Council. The PCI certainly preferred a Republican prime minister to either a DC or PSI one. There was an implication, again from Andreotti, that Spadolini was focussing too much on the economy and that the rest of his programme was rather obscure. It was folly, Andreotti and Forlani said, for any Italian leader to commit himself too tightly to an inflation target. Moro had made this mistake some years ago. The forecasters always proved wrong. If Spadolini tried to hold down prices in order to reduce the rate of inflation, the only outcome would be a yet greater government deficit, with a consequential effect on interest rates, etc.

Pertini I thought Andreotti was rather balanced on this subject given the trouble that the old man has sometimes caused the DC. He said that Pertini was a unifying force in today's Italy, and there were not so many of those around that Pertini's impact could be ignored. When Pertini first became President he had taken great trouble to consult his Ministers, as a constitutional Head of State should. He had sent Andreotti a draft speech late one night, then telephoned at 4.30 in the morning to ask if Andreotti disliked it: Andreotti had explained that he wanted Pertini to have a quiet night and that the text was fine. More recently, Pertini had taken to improvising statements and of casting some doubt on his Ministers. This was fine in an 80-year old, but would not be for any successor. The Constitution must be respected. Gronchi had stretched his authority a little, but it was "milk and honey" compared to Pertini.

The DC Congress Our guests claimed that the postponement was technical and had no political significance. There was, however, some suggestion that the delay might permit a more thorough discussion at the regional level of the candidates for the Secretaryship, so that these did not emerge at the last moment during the Congress itself.

The Correnti Here I may have missed the point: but I think Cossiga was arguing that it made no sense to have direct election of the Secretary and then to vote by proportional representation for Congress delegates. If this happened, the Secretary would find it hard to impose his will on Congress. He needed a majority of his own to make reforms work. I do not recall Andreotti or Forlani commenting directly, other than to say that they had both abstained on the question of direct election, because they doubted whether it would in fact make all that much difference. Nor did I get the impression that they believed that the correnti were on their way out.


Tom Richardson

21 January 1982

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Your reference IT/74/02

Our reference

Date 7 January 1982

WRB 01412

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ITALY: COUNTRY PROFILE

1. Thank you for your letter of 4 January and for sending me a copy of the draft internal political section of the country profile for Italy which had been prepared by the Consulate-General in Milan.
2. I agree that the piece as drafted was too cumbersome for the purpose for which it is required. Whole sections appear to be superfluous. Rather than attempting a further précis, I have myself prepared a draft offering, which I now enclose.
3. If you feel that the new draft errs on the side of brevity it can easily be expanded by adding those sentences from the Milan draft which are likely to be of current interest.

R P Osborne
Western European Department

ITALY - INTERNAL POLITICAL

1. Italy is a Parliamentary democracy with a Republican Constitution. The Head of State is the President of the Republic, now President Pertini, a veteran Socialist. The Head of Government (or Prime Minister) is the President of the Council of Ministers (equivalent to the British Cabinet but with a less developed sense of collective responsibility).

2. The Italian Constitution was promulgated on 22 December 1947 and has undergone little change since then. It provides for an upper and lower Parliament, elected by universal suffrage for a ~~session in~~ ^{maximum} term of five years. The functions of the two Houses are roughly identical, but voting in the Upper House, the Senate, is restricted to electors over the age of 25. The ~~above~~ vote for the lower House, the Chamber of Deputies, is open to all electors of 18 years or over. The President of the Republic is elected for a seven year period by the members of both Houses of Parliament and by representatives of the Regional Governments.

3. Since World War II the Christian Democrat (DC) party ^{dominant party in Italian politics, providing firm links with Italy's} has been the post-war Prime Ministers. Successive coalitions have been variously Centre, Centre Right and Centre-Left. For some periods the Christian Democrats have governed alone, with Parliamentary support from the neo-Fascists in 1968 and the Communists in 1978. In June 1981, however, a coalition government under the leadership of Senator Giovanni Spadolini took office. Senator Spadolini is the leader of the tiny Republican (PRI) party which commands only 3% of the

Italian vote. The Christian Democrats remain coalition partners, along with the Socialists (PSI) Social Democrat (PSDI) and Liberal (PCI) parties. The Italian Communist Party (PCI),—the largest Western European Communist Party with more than 30% of the vote,—remains firmly in opposition.

4. Senator Spadolini has made a vigorous start in his efforts to tackle the country's nagging economic problems. He has so far succeeded in bringing down Italy's rate of inflation to the present level of just over 18% and has made progress in his efforts towards ~~bringing~~ the control of inflation and the containment of labour costs. His coalition partners will not wish to sabotage these efforts. To do so could lead to early elections for which they are ill-prepared.

5. The major institutions of the Italian State, meanwhile, function at a low level of efficiency. Urban terrorism remains a constant threat and the Red Brigades have demonstrated time and again their ability to carry out spectacular operations. Despite ^{some success by} ~~the increases of~~ the security forces, helped by the confessions of 'repentant' terrorists from their prison cells, the immediate future holds no prospect of a change in this pattern.

EXPORT EUROPE

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Roy Osborne Esq
WED
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WRD 01412

-7 JAN 1982

Your ref :

Our ref : IT/74/02

Date : 4 January 1982

INDEX	NO.	Action Taken
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Dear Roy

ITALY : COUNTRY PROFILE

Further to our telephone conversation, I attach an extract from Milan's contribution to the above.

Their proposed section on the political situation is much longer than the norm for these profiles (it comes in a general section entitled 'Introduction to Italy') and I have reduced and amended it; even so it is still quite long. I would be grateful for your comments on the draft as amended.

If you would like to suggest additional parts or re-instatement of excised sections please let me know.

Some of our profiles include a list of Ministers. I doubt whether that is wise in view of the usual life expectancy of an Italian government, but if you think otherwise perhaps you could let me have a list!

Comments by this Friday, 8 January, would be appreciated.

Yours,
Mike

M A Burrows