

~~st~~

Part A

CONFIDENTIAL

(Circulate under cover and
notify REGISTRY of movement)

Begin: 3/3/82.

Ends: 2/6/82.



PO -CH /GH/0074



PART A

Chancellor's (Howe) Papers:

**NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY
ORGANISATION SUMMIT JUNE
1982**

Disposal Directions: 25 years

D. Anderson

26/7/95.

PART A



PM/82/5

PRIME MINISTER

EXCHEQUER

4 MAR 1982

ACTION Mr Hansford 4.3.

CST, FST,

Sir A Wass,

Sir A Rawlinson,

Mr Carey, Mr Ridley

3rd March 1982

A NOT minute which we can warmly welcome! See paras 5/6. (Paras 1-4 are standard sub-handled NUGOLIN FCO-ese)

NATO Summit

1. We have been giving thought to how we might get the best results and avoid the worst pitfalls at the NATO Summit on 10 June.
2. We both consider that the first priority should be to reaffirm the political solidarity of the Alliance. Recent events, mainly though not exclusively Poland, have severely tested relations between the United States and her European Allies, in particular the Federal Republic. President Reagan will no doubt wish the Allies to close ranks behind American leadership, using the Polish case as proof of the relevance and superiority of the Western values which NATO defends. The best way to reconcile varying points of view may be to think in terms of something like a policy declaration on East-West relations which can reassure Western public opinion that we have a clear sense of direction in Alliance affairs.
3. It is also obviously important that the Bonn meeting should strike the right note on arms control, bearing in mind particularly that a number of the principals attending the NATO Summit will go on immediately thereafter to the UN Special Session on Disarmament in New York. (There is already criticism from the disarmament lobby here and on the Continent at the holding of the NATO Summit at the same time as the UN meeting begins.) The NATO Summit will present an opportunity, against the background of President Reagan's 18 November speech and the INF talks in Geneva, to consolidate the high ground in the public debate. We need a restatement of the way in which multi-lateral arms control can, if realistically approached, contribute to Alliance security and a recommitment to that objective. We also need to remind people of the essentially defensive nature of NATO strategy and that maintaining Western





conventional defences is the best way to keep the nuclear threshold high. All this would come naturally enough as a culmination of the political counter-offensive launched by Mr Haig in the Alliance last year. We are therefore attracted by the idea that the Bonn meeting should endorse some declaratory language about arms control and Alliance security, based perhaps on the theme of 'guarantees for peace with freedom'. President Reagan's speech last November provided a handy text when he said 'no NATO weapons, conventional or nuclear, will ever be used in Europe except in response to attack'. We should also press the Americans to announce a date for the opening of Strategic Arms Reduction Talks, if that remains uncertain by June.

4. There are certain other political elements which may well be active in June. For example the Americans may wish to give further impetus to NATO's handling of out-of-area issues: the Summit could be the occasion for agreement on an approach which would balance greater Alliance recognition of the need to protect vital Western security interests out of area with greater American readiness to consult the Alliance about their own out-of-area policy; but there might be difficulties here over how far the US would be prepared to have their hands tied by the need for consultation with their European allies and there are signs that the Germans will need careful handling. If the ratification of Spain's entry into NATO can be successfully concluded by all the Allies in time, Spain's attendance at Bonn in her own right would be a significant gain for the occasion. But as always Papandreou's attitude is difficult to predict, both as to Spain and in relation to Turkey. Great care will be necessary in managing the Greek dimension and we certainly do not wish to play into his hands by raising expectations of the Summit too much in advance. *And the*

Rundown should also be covered

5. A further major question is whether the Bonn meeting would be the right moment to launch new work on putting NATO's existing resources to better defence use. With the steady growth in the real cost of defence equipment the subject of better value for money in defence might well arise. Certainly there now seems an



even greater awareness than a year or so ago of the need to think again about how to get a more cost-effective military output from a resource input comparable to if not greater than that of the Warsaw Pact. The Germans (who are engaged in a major defence review themselves) are already acutely conscious of this, without having formed any clear view of what should be done and the very difficult political and industrial impact of greater specialization within NATO has hardly been thought through in any country: in Washington President Reagan's latest budget is likely to be controversial on the Hill. There is a risk that the Americans will come forward with unacceptable demands to European governments for further real increases in defence spending by the Allies (SACEUR has already publicly mentioned 4%). We need to think now about how best to avoid the stage being set for a damaging row. If we can do so in a way that shows the Alliance making a real effort to put its conventional house in order, as the unavoidable corollary of any de-emphasis on nuclear strategy, this could also be a gain for Alliance unity.

While we
 discuss the
 implications
 of our
 interests!

6. It may not be easy to get the right work started. But if the terms of reference are chosen carefully, it may prove the best way of building bridges between American ambitions and German hesitations. There is no need to be too closely wedded to particular procedural solutions at this stage, and in any case we do not advocate a high-profile British initiative as such. But we believe there is a case for re-examining whether it would be timely for the Bonn meeting to commission a special NATO review or study on the theme of better value for money, with terms of reference on the lines indicated in the attachment to this minute. There are signs that the Americans might not be unreceptive. We would propose to explore thinking further with key Allies over the next few weeks. We will report further to OD colleagues as Alliance discussion about the Summit evolves.

/7. We are



7. We are copying this to OD colleagues and Sir Robert Armstrong.

JN

(J N)

C

(CARRINGTON)



Draft Terms of Reference

To examine how the Alliance can best fulfil its agreed strategic objectives in the light of changing political, economic and military circumstances and of the need to make the best use of all the human, material and financial resources available.

To consider what steps can be taken to exploit these resources in a better coordinated, more flexible and more cost-effective way.

To review the operation of the NATO force planning process in improving NATO's defence capabilities especially in the conventional field, bearing in mind in particular possible implications in the field of military and/or industrial specialisation.



2

Fill.

Are we warmly
welcoming?
PI pursued & draft

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

5 March 1982

JW

Dear Brian,

NATO Summit

The Prime Minister has seen the minute of 3 March on the above subject by the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary and the Defence Secretary.

She is content with the approach described therein.

I am copying this letter to the Private Secretaries to the members of OD and Sir Robert Armstrong.

y. n. l. w.

y. n. l. w.

Brian Fall, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

EXCHEQUER
 8 MAR 1982
 Mr Hambleton 8.3.
 CPT, FRT, Sir A. Warr,
 Sir A. Rawlinson,
 Mr Carey, Mr Ridley.

247
3

CONFIDENTIAL

FROM: M G RICHARDSON

DATE: 23 March 1982

- 1. MR WILSON *Mr Hansford*
- 2. CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER

cc ^{PS} CST
^{PS} FST
 Sir D Wass
 Sir A Rawlinson
 Mr Ridley
 Mr Carey
 Mr Hansford
 Mr Slater
Mr P. Wilson

*So much for my attempts
 to extract a warm
 welcome! But I
 suppose para 7 is right.
 We must certainly avoid
 "convergence lines"*

NATO SUMMIT : 10 JUNE

Lord Carrington and Mr Nott minuted the Prime Minister earlier this month about the forthcoming NATO summit. They highlighted matters which are likely to arise, and suggested the stance the UK should adopt and the role it might play. The Prime Minister has commented that she is content with the suggested approach. This submission outlines the background, and recommends the Chancellor not to enter the correspondence at this stage.

- 2. The joint minute considers a number of issues:
 - (a) the need for a reaffirmation of Alliance solidarity, perhaps by way of a policy declaration on East-West relations;
 - (b) the need to restate the commitment to arms control and the contribution it can make to Alliance security;
 - (c) the possibility of an agreed approach between the European allies and the US on out-of-area issues; and
 - (d) the possibility of launching a new initiative to seek ways of achieving better value for money from the resources currently allocated to defence.

All of these proposals seem sensible, although the Treasury has very little direct policy interest in the first three items.

- 3. The most interesting proposal is the possibility of using the summit to launch a study on how to make the most of the resources currently allocated to defence within NATO. A high profile British

CONFIDENTIAL

/initiative

initiative is not proposed. However, the Secretaries of State propose to explore the possibility with key Allies over the next few weeks and report to OD as discussion about the summit progresses. The subject of better value for money is one that should certainly be considered seriously. There seems to be a growing awareness within the Alliance of the need to maximise defence outputs from the resources currently allocated to it. The FRG for example, seem already to have abandoned the 3% target, and are currently considering ways in which the NATO aim could be translated into a more meaningful yardstick. Measurements based on the effectiveness of the level of military output, rather than the size of the raw expenditure input, have been suggested. A study on the theme of better value for money would therefore seem timely.

4. The Foreign and Defence Secretaries' obvious enthusiasm for the initiative should however be considered in the light of the fate of a previous initiative attempted by Mr Pym in December 1980. The aim then, which was enthusiastically supported by OD, was to promote a wide ranging review of the health of the Alliance. This was supposed to cover inter alia, effectiveness of effort, specialisation, and burden sharing. The initiative failed even to get off the ground. Alliance views on the proposed approach will therefore have to have changed radically if an initiative is to succeed now. But this is no reason for not trying, and the informal contacts which the Secretaries of State propose to make should give some idea of the likelihood of success.

5. There is one possible drawback to the proposed initiative. It could be used by the US administration as a peg for demands for further real increases in defence spending. This would be unwelcome. But such a proposal would probably be even more unacceptable to other NATO allies - few of whom have accorded to defence the same priority as HMG. The risk of such an outcome is worth running, because of the need for review; it is difficult to conceive NATO carrying on in perpetuity the way it is now.

6. The proposed initiative ought not to detract from the UK's quest for fairer distribution of NATO budget contributions (your letters of 19 January and 26 February refer); Lord Carrington and Mr Nott have already agreed to pursue this aim at the earliest opportunity.

Conclusion

7. The sort of review envisaged, if it could be launched, would be very welcome. But overoptimism now could be premature, and more circumspect realism might be taken as Treasury curmudgeonliness. Our advice, therefore, is not to enter the correspondence at this stage, but to await the outcome of the informal contacts with major allies to see whether the proposed initiative on value for money is a starter. Fresh consideration could then be given to the approach to be taken either in OD or in correspondence.

M G Richardson

M G RICHARDSON

I agree with this submission. There is a danger that the initiative might backfire but we should not do anything to discourage MOD or FCO from seeking better value for defence money.

JD

at first sight a warm welcome seemed called for. But an initiative of this kind could lead to suggestions for spending more money. Rather than qualifying our welcome, it would be better not to respond at all. If we are to join in, I do not think we should go further than No 10, who have said that the Prime Minister's consent will be required.

JH
23/3



PWP

cc: PS/Chief Secretary
PS/Financial Secretary
Sir Douglas Wass
Sir Anthony Rawlinson
Mr. Ridley
Mr. Carey
Mr. Hansford
Mr. Slater
Mr. I.P. Wilson

MR. RICHARDSON - DM

NATO SUMMIT

The Chancellor was grateful for your minute of 23 March about the initiative on greater cost-effectiveness in Alliance defence resource-allocation proposed in the joint minute of 3 March from the Foreign and Defence Secretaries. He notes your concern that we should avoid the Scylla of an optimistic response, and the Charybdis of a churlish one; and that the best course is to sail silently by. We are lashed to the mast, and will do and say nothing.

J.O.K.

J.O. KERR
24 March 1982

CONFIDENTIAL

PWP

5/5/82.



| | |
|--------------|---------------------------|
| EXCHEQUER | |
| - 6 MAY 1982 | |
| ACTION | Mr Hanford 6.5 |
| COMES TO | Colt, FST, Sir A. Wass, |
| | Sir A Rowlinson, Mr Carey |
| | Mr Ridley |

MO 13/1

2 minutes - Not ad by, but they had say exactly the same, and we ^{need} probably say nothing.

PRIME MINISTER

NATO SUMMIT

L.H.L.

In his minute dated 5th March 1982 your Private Secretary confirmed that you were content with the proposals in the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary's and my minute of 3rd March to discuss with key Allies the possibilities for new work to put the Alliance's existing resources to better defence use. I believe the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary is reporting to you on the outcome of these discussions, but I wished to let you know how I intend to proceed at next Thursday's NATO DPC meeting, especially in the light of some US counter proposals which were tabled in Brussels this week.

2. Given German and French misgivings as well as this latest US initiative, I do not see any future in our continuing to press for an independent study focussing particularly on possibilities for specialisation. But the problems that we sought to address through such a study will not go away, and the US proposals do not really cover them. What the US have proposed is a brief passage dealing with defence in the Summit Declaration itself, together with a separate statement to be issued at the Summit by the Heads of State/Government of those nations participating in the NATO integrated military structure. An "illustrative statement" suggesting what they have in mind for the latter is at Annex A.

3. Both this statement and the proposed US language for the Summit Declaration are essentially declaratory. But at next week's DPC, in welcoming the US wish to see an important Summit focus on conventional defence improvements, I shall suggest that this objective will make it all the more important to make the best use of all the resources available to the Alliance, and that this point should be covered in the communique. There will no doubt be further

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL



preparatory work for the Summit after the DPC meeting, and it should be possible for us to influence this in a direction that is consistent with both the US ideas and our own. The Canadians have also introduced some proposed Summit Declaration language that parallels our general philosophy, and this seems to have found a fair degree of support in Brussels.

4. I am copying this to colleagues in OD and to Sir Robert Armstrong.

SW

Ministry of Defence
5th May 1982

CONFIDENTIAL

Annex A.

SEPARATE SUMMIT STATEMENT
TOWARD AN IMPROVED NATO CONVENTIONAL DEFENSE

The enduring objective of the alliance is to provide security to the member nations and to safeguard for their peoples those rights and values which their nations cherish. Alliance leaders recognize the magnitude of the threat posed to their nations' security. They are convinced that the members of the alliance possess all the necessary material and human resources needed to counter this threat, and that improvements in the conventional force balance are essential to maintain international peace and stability.

To ensure alliance security and maintenance of an adequate mix of both conventional and nuclear forces, the chiefs of state and heads of governments participating in the alliance integrated military structure agreed to:

1. Endorse the new NATO force goals for 1983-88 and measures identified in the long-term defense program designed to correct critical deficiencies in conventional defense within the next five years.
2. Make additional improvements beyond these goals and measures as the economic situation improves.
3. Improve the readiness of Allied standing forces and the readiness and mobilization capability of reserve forces.
4. Cooperate in meeting challenges to common interests outside the Treaty area, particularly Southwest Asia, for which they recognize the alliance as a whole must plan, to support security efforts by Allies in outside areas and fill resulting gaps in European defense.
5. Undertake and complete, on an urgent basis, a study on the application of new technologies to conventional defense within established NATO strategy.
6. Take steps as necessary to ensure that the technological advantage of the West is not eroded by Warsaw Pact access to technology with security applications.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

2

Defense ministers are to monitor the implementation of these commitments. The heads of state and government directed that NATO military authorities report on priority conventional force improvements programs and on Allied performance in meeting alliance goals and commitments.

CONFIDENTIAL

S 15/82.

PM/82/32PRIME MINISTER

| | |
|--------------|--|
| CH/EXCHEQUER | |
| REC. | -6 MAY 1982 |
| ACTION | Mr Hansford b.s |
| COPIES TO | CST, FST, Sir D. Wass, Sir A Rawlinson, Mr Carey, Mr Ridley |

1. In early March you accepted the recommendations contained in Peter Carrington and John Nott's minute of 3 March about how to approach the NATO Summit.

2. Since then, we have discussed our ideas intensively with allies. There has been good progress on the political aspects of the Summit and general agreement on the points to be covered. There has, however, been rather slower progress on the defence aspects. In particular, there have been reservations about our idea of a NATO review on better value for money in defence. The French have been sympathetic but the Germans, while recognising the importance of the problem, have reservations about the idea of an independent review. The Americans have been most resistant, arguing that our objectives could more safely be achieved through work already going on in NATO, eg on standardisation; and that the proposed review might be exploited by some allies to duck out of commitments.

3. In the circumstances, I believe that, both at the forthcoming NATO Ministerial meetings and at the Summit, we should continue to emphasise the importance we attach to Alliance efforts to make better use of defence resources. We should try to ensure that in the Defence Planning Committee communique and in documents issued by the Summit there should be a clear reference to the need to cooperate more effectively in those areas where further economies are possible. But we should not pursue our proposal for a special review at either meeting.

4. I understand that John Nott is minuting to you in similar terms, and that this may affect his view on the question of Ministerial attendance at the Bonn Summit.

/5. I am



5. I am sending copies of this minute to our OD colleagues.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to be 'FP', with a horizontal line underneath.

(FRANCIS PYM)

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

5 May 1982

CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUERcc Chief Secretary
Sir Douglas Wass
Sir Kenneth Couzens
Sir Anthony Rawlinson
Mr. Carey
Mr. I.P. WilsonNATO SUMMIT

*
 I think you have a full set of the briefs which have been prepared for the Prime Minister and others for the meetings in Bonn on 9/10 June. The Prime Minister is to hold a prior briefing session tomorrow afternoon to which you are invited, and I also in Sir Kenneth Couzens' absence.

2. There seems to be even less than usual direct financial and economic interest in the prospective discussions, and the briefs for them.

Defence and Defence Expenditure

3. Considerable emphasis is likely, from the Americans, on the need to stiffen up defence. In terms of total resources, however, there are two points which protect us:

- we are in fact fulfilling the 3% real growth target, and can expect sympathy for the plea that there should be no further expansion until the world's economies are stronger;
- Germany and Netherlands, and some others, are finding it difficult enough to live with the 3% growth target, or are failing to do so, and will be reluctant to enter any new and larger commitments.

East/West Economic Relations

4. The main issues here were on the agenda at Versailles, although little progress was made. It is highly improbable that there will be disposition or opportunity for more useful discussion on these matters in Bonn, but the main points are:

- on East/West credit generally there seems to be little likelihood of early agreement on restricting credit; the most promising, and in some respects the most important, advance would be agreement on the export credit consensus. If the general subject is raised at all,

it would be worth rehearsing the importance of getting this settled;

- Polish debt is mentioned in Brief No.3, and the line there taken is the right one. You should know, however, that the possibility of the Poles seeking agreement with the banks on some rescheduling for 1982 has advanced a little further, in that there has now been an approach from the Poles, and the banks are considering how to respond;
- John Brown, etc will, we hope, have been dealt with separately between the Prime Minister and President Reagan during bilateral discussions tomorrow night or at breakfast on Wednesday (Department of Trade are putting in a brief inviting the Prime Minister to raise the subject again, and if President Reagan is not prepared after the brief mention at Versailles to give any constructive answer, to press him to reflect and offer an answer within the next week).

Falkland Islands

5. It will be premature for NATO to discuss implications of the Falkland Islands for future UK defence arrangements. If there is any accusation that a long confrontation in the South Atlantic will divert resources from their NATO aims, we should rely on the argument that this is premature, and avoid any commitments or restrictions on future deployment.

- and NB, expenditure on the Falklands, as in Vietnam, (or indeed on bases in the North-Quadrant) counts in the def. expenditure statistics, and is against the 3% target.

Other Issues

6. These seem to be entirely political and defence strategy subjects as presented. In just one or two places where the idea of military aid, etc., is mentioned, the briefing is suitably cautious. We are not expecting any great pressure.


(J. G. LITTLER)

2/6/82.

CONFIDENTIAL

NATO SUMMIT
9/10 June 1982

LIST OF BRIEFS

Serial Number

| | |
|---------|--|
| 1 | Steering Brief |
| Annex A | Outline of Prime Minister's Programme |
| Annex B | List of Heads of Government and Foreign Ministers |
| Annex C | Prime Minister's Statement |
| 2(a) | East/West Relations |
| 2(b) | East/West Economic Relations |
| 3 | Poland |
| 4 | Arms Control (including START, INF, MBFR, and UNSSD) |
| 5 | Defence Issues |
| 6 | CSCE (including CDE) |
| 7 | Southern Flank Issues |
| 8 | Arab/Israel |
| 9 | Iran/Iraq |
| 10 | Central America |
| 11 | Afghanistan |
| 12 | Namibia |
| 13 | Falkland Islands |

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

BRIEF NO 1

NATO SUMMIT
9/10 June 1982

STEERING BRIEF

INTRODUCTION

1. The Prime Minister's programme is at Annex A and a list of Heads of State/Government and Foreign Ministers attending is at Annex B.

2. The last Summit meeting of the North Atlantic Council (NAC) was in Washington in 1978. That Summit endorsed the Long Term Defence Programme, for improvements in NATO's conventional defences. The Bonn Summit this year sprung from a suggestion by Lord Carrington at the NAC last December, which was quickly taken up by the Secretary-General and the Americans. In the current state of both Transatlantic and East/West relations, it seemed a good moment to reaffirm the political solidarity of the Alliance at the highest level and to bring home to Western public opinion what NATO stands for.

3. It was an early British objective to have the Summit launch new work on putting NATO's existing resources to better defence use. But this practical approach did not attract sufficient support, particularly from the Americans. It will therefore be important not to give rise to exaggerated expectations of what the Bonn Summit is out to achieve by way of practical results. The emphasis will be on imparting a renewed sense of political direction rather than on concrete programmes of action. But if the Summit can strike the right note over the

/role of

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

role of defence and arms control in Western security, and can send out a firm but constructive signal about NATO's approach to the conduct of East/West relations, this will be a good outcome. It will also be President Reagan's first personal appearance with his European Allies on this side of the Atlantic and the occasion for welcoming Spain as a fully-fledged NATO Ally: both important pieces of political symbolism. It is planned to issue a General Summit Declaration and a separate statement on the need for strong conventional defence; the drafting of both is well advanced.

ORGANISATION OF THE MEETING

4. Heads of State/Government will be in Bonn for little more than 24 hours. The President of the FRG is hosting a dinner on the evening of 9 June. Proceedings on 10 June begin with a formal opening ceremony, followed by morning and afternoon discussion, attended by Heads of State/Government, Foreign Ministers and three officials per delegation. Heads of State/Government are expected to come with prepared statements, which are likely to take most, if not all, the time available. (The Prime Minister's statement is at Annex C.) The lunch on 10 June hosted by Chancellor Schmidt for Heads of State/Government alone (a separate lunch is being given by Herr Genscher for Foreign Ministers) should be a better opportunity for informal debate. The meeting is expected to end at 5.00 pm. Some Heads of State/Government will be staying on for Chancellor Schmidt's boat trip on the Rhine that evening.

UK OBJECTIVES

5. The following are the main UK objectives:

(a) to confirm Alliance support for our handling of the Falklands crisis;

/(b)

CONFIDENTIAL

(b) to help sustain a positive image of NATO as a flexible and defensive Alliance, dedicated to the preservation of Western values, through a combination of strong defences and a commitment to arms control;

(c) to maintain Alliance unity in the overall approach to the conduct of East/West relations, including economic relations; and to convey the appropriate signal to the East about the need for restraint and responsibility if East/West relations are to prosper;

(d) to welcome President Reagan's announcement of proposals for the opening of START, and to reaffirm Alliance support for a full programme of arms control proposals covering START, INF and MBFR as part of the Alliance's overall security policy;

(e) to promote a greater identity of view on how the Alliance should handle its interests beyond the NATO area;

(f) to achieve recognition of the need to improve conventional defences through more effective use of existing resources;

(g) to welcome Spain as a member of the Alliance.

OBJECTIVES OF OTHER ALLIES

6. American objectives are likely to focus on the need, as they see it, to stiffen up the European approach to East/West relations and to defence. They will resist any attempt explicitly to reaffirm the Harmel report (the foundation of the Alliance's detente policy of the '70s). If the Versailles Summit does not reach an outcome satisfactory to the Americans, President Reagan is likely to renew his efforts at Bonn to secure a tough line on East/West economic relations,

/particularly

CONFIDENTIAL

particularly official credits. If the Americans are happy with the outcome of Versailles, they will no doubt want to get the rest of the Allies on board. They will press for a European commitment to devote more resources to defence and to compensate for US defence preoccupations outside the NATO area. They will attach importance to the defence element in the Summit declaration as a means of balancing references to arms control.

7. The Germans probably recognise that the Americans will not accept an explicit endorsement of the Harmel report, but they will wish to see its basic philosophy reaffirmed. They will also resist any firm commitment to increased defence spending, while looking for a firm Alliance commitment to arms control. But their main aim will be to hold a 'successful' meeting, with a clear reaffirmation of Alliance unity. They will probably be prepared to pay a limited price to achieve this.

8. France, never an enthusiast for NATO Summits, will be represented in Bonn by M Mauroy, although President Mitterrand will attend the dinner on 9 June. They will go along with the Alliance exercise in reaffirming unity of purpose, while retaining their customary political freedom of manoeuvre and distancing themselves from the defence aspects of the discussion. They are likely to resist any American attempts to secure formal Alliance cooperation in pursuit of interests beyond the NATO area.

9. Other Allies, particularly the Scandinavians and Benelux, will want to lay heavy emphasis on the pursuit of arms control, to maintain explicitly the concept of detente, and to avoid any new commitment to increase defence spending. It seems unlikely that Greece will pursue her earlier demand for a territorial guarantee (by implication against Turkey), although she may be difficult on one or two other issues. Spain, as the

/newcomer

CONFIDENTIAL

newcomer will no doubt be on best behaviour. Portugal's interest lies in avoiding eclipse by Spain within the Alliance and is quietly pressing her case for increased military aid.

SUMMIT DECLARATION

10. Allied delegations to NATO have been working to agree the text of the declaration to be issued by Heads of State/Government at Bonn before the Summit starts. It is agreed that the Summit declaration should be short and should concentrate on a general statement of the Alliance's fundamental values and the principles underlying the Alliance's approach to international, in particular East/West, relations. The Americans are pressing, with our support, for a separate statement on conventional defence issues by the members of the Alliance's integrated military structure (ie. all except France), but the rest oppose this idea. Disagreement over this continues. Copies of the text of the declaration and the statement on defence issues (with disagreed texts in square brackets) are at Annex D.

11. Any statement by the Summit on the Falklands will probably be issued separately from the Summit declaration; it would be difficult to include it in the latter because of its more general nature.

SUMMARY OF BRIEFS

East/West Relations (Brief No 2(a))

12. We welcome President Reagan's 9 May speech, and the possibility of early Haig/Gromyko and Reagan/Brezhnev meetings. The Alliance should unite in support of US efforts to build on the President's speech. This should help bring pressure to bear on the Russians - which, combined with their current difficulties, might induce them to exercise restraint, and to make progress in

/the arms

CONFIDENTIAL

the arms limitations talks. We should be interested to hear how the Americans plan to pursue the dialogue on regional issues. [Brief No 2(b) on East/West Economic Relations will be submitted on 7 June after the Versailles Summit.]

Poland (Brief No 3)

13. There has been no real move by the Polish authorities to lift martial law, release those detained and resume a genuine dialogue with the Church and Solidarity. In these circumstances, our policy, which was recently reaffirmed in the communiqué following the NATO meeting of Foreign Ministers in Luxembourg on 17-18 May, should remain unchanged.

Arms Control (Brief No 4)

14. Arms control is only one element in Western Security policy and makes no sense unless underpinned by a robust approach to defence. But it is also a necessary concomitant to ensuring the political consensus for defence spending in the West. NATO's comprehensive approach to multilateral arms control negotiations has put the East on the defensive and is a convincing answer to unilateralism. This message bears repeating to our publics. The Summit is particularly timely for this, coming at the start of the UN Special Session on Disarmament. President Reagan's Administration, after a slow beginning, has now addressed the subject effectively. There are new US proposals for arms control in both intermediate range nuclear systems (INF) and strategic arms (START). The Alliance's US-inspired re-presentation of their position on MBFR will also give us a tactical initiative in the conventional field.

Defence Issues (Brief No 5)

15. The Alliance needs to maintain and improve its conventional defences in order to raise the nuclear threshold. The 3% commitment remains a useful objective. But resources over and above this are unlikely to be

/available

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

available in the immediate future. We therefore need to find ways of making better use of existing resources. The Alliance should agree a more coherent approach to the management of its out-of-area interests.

CSCE (Brief No 6)

16. There is unlikely to be much, if any, discussion of the CSCE. It would be premature, and risk polarisation of views between the US and some European members of NATO (in particular the FRG), to try to work out now what line the West should take when the meeting resumes in November.

Southern Flank Issues (Brief No 7)

17. The welcome reduction in tension in the Aegean between Greece and Turkey may not last. The Greek wish for a NATO Guarantee has still not been met, nor is it likely to be given the Turkish position. There may be complications for post-accession negotiations with NATO if Spain does not implement the Lisbon agreement. Portuguese requests for military assistance are under careful study (because of Portuguese helpfulness over the Falklands); but there is no hope for extension of this to Turkey. The Greeks may raise the Falklands as a parallel with Cyprus; we need to refute this firmly but in a placatory manner given Greek support on the Falklands.

Arab/Israel (Brief No 8)

18. Failure to solve the Palestinian problem will mean greater instability in the region (including Lebanon) and more opportunities for the Soviet Union. All Allies have a part to play in achieving a settlement involving mutual Palestinian/Israeli acceptance. The Israeli settlement policy threatens a negotiated solution: the US have the key role in ~~re~~straining Israel.

/Iran/Iraq

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

Iran/Iraq (Brief No 9)

19. Prospects for a settlement are not good, and there is little we can do to stop the war. Resort to the UN is unlikely to help. The situation places the Russians in a dilemma.

Central America (Brief No 10)

20. We recognise the primacy of US interests and share US concern at Soviet-backed Cuban activities in the area. But we also recognise the need to curb human rights abuses in El Salvador and Guatemala. We would welcome US views on the situation following the Salvadorean elections and the Guatemalan coup, and in the light of possible new contacts between the US and Nicaraguan Governments.

Afghanistan (Brief No 11)

21. The West must sustain international concern over Afghanistan. Indirect talks in Geneva under UN auspices may help increase the pressure on the Russians.

Namibia (Brief No 12)

22. Namibia is not likely to be a central subject for discussion at the Summit. But the Prime Minister may be asked where negotiations stand. The Five's Foreign Ministers agreed in Luxembourg on 17 May to accelerate negotiations, and announced their intention soon to put forward proposals on unresolved issues. These will relate mainly to impartiality of the electoral process and the size and role of the UN Transition Assistance Group. Foreign Ministers also agreed to support American negotiations aimed at securing withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola before Namibian independence; but the Five have not yet revealed this to other Western partners or raised with the Front Line States or SWAPO.

CONFIDENTIAL

Falkland Islands (Brief No 13)

23. [To follow].

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

2 June 1982

CONFIDENTIAL

NATO SUMMIT, BONN, 9 - 10 JUNE 1982
OUTLINE OF PRIME MINISTER'S PROGRAMME

WEDNESDAY 9 JUNE

- 18.15 Arrive Bonn
20.15 Dinner hosted by President of FRG and Frau Carstens

THURSDAY 10 JUNE

- 10.00 Opening Ceremony in Bundestag
11.05 Session in Federal Chancellery 'NATO Room'
13.10 'Family Photograph' at Federal Chancellery
13.15 Lunch hosted by Chancellor Schmidt in Palais
Schaumburg
15.15 Session in Federal Chancellery 'NATO Room'
17.00 Session ends
(approx)
17.30 Plane standing by for departure

OTHER HEADS OF GOVERNMENT AND FOREIGN MINISTERS DUE TO
ATTEND THE NATO SUMMIT IN BONN : 9 - 10 JUNE 1982

BELGIUM

M. Wilfried A E Martens

M. Leo Tindemans

CANADA

The Right Hon Pierre Elliott Trudeau

The Hon Mark MacGuigan

DENMARK

Mr Anker Joergensen

Mr Kjell Olesen

FRG

Herr Helmut Schmidt

Herr Hans-Dietrich Genscher

FRANCE

M. Pierre Mauroy

M. Claude Cheysson

GREECE

Mr Andreas Papandreou

Mr Yiannis Haralambopoulos

ICELAND

Professor Gunnar Thoroddsen

Dr Olafur Johanneson

/ITALY

ITALY

Sen. Giovanni Spadolini

O Emilio Colombo

LUXEMBOURG

M. Pierre Werner

Madame Colette Flesch

NETHERLANDS

Mr Andreas van Agt

(Prime Minister and Foreign Minister)

NORWAY

Mr Kare Isaachsen Willoch

Mr Svern Thorkild Stray

PORTUGAL

Dr Francisco José Pereira Pinto Balsemao

Professor André Goncalves Pereira

SPAIN

Dr Ing. Leopoldo Calvo-Sotelo Y Buestelo

Senor Don José Pedro Perez-Llorca Y Rodrigo

TURKEY

Mr Bulent Ulusu

Mr Ilter Turkmen

USA

Mr Ronald W Reagan

Mr Alexander M Haig

CONFIDENTIAL

ANNEX C

PRIME MINISTER'S STATEMENT

Our Alliance has existed for 33 years. Its purposes and the principles which inspired its foundation remain as vital to us now as they were in 1949, as the welcome we give our Spanish colleague here today shows so clearly. The historic and honourable traditions of Spain will enrich the Alliance; Spain's forces will strengthen it.

But we must not take the Alliance for granted. Too many people in the world are not as fortunate as we are. They do not live in freedom, in prosperity, in security, and under the rule of law. Our Alliance is a success. Europe has lived since its formation through the longest period of peace which any of us here has known. Why? Because we believe passionately in the values we share. And because we are ready to pay for defences strong enough to deter those who threaten them. Let us beware complacency - eternal vigilance is surely a small price to pay for our freedom: its loss may prove irredeemable.

Let us also beware the morbid preoccupation of doom-watchers who exaggerate the differences between us. It has become fashionable in recent times to be gloomy about the Transatlantic relationship. Some have even predicted the break-up of the Alliance. Of course we have differences of view. This is inevitable, and indeed welcome. It shows that we continue to enjoy the intellectual and political vitality that characterises healthy democracy. It is infinitely superior to the grey uniformity of the Warsaw Pact.

Nevertheless, I do not deny that the Alliance has been put to the test in recent months. It is easy to catalogue the problems over arms control, over economic relations

/with

CONFIDENTIAL

with the East, and between ourselves, over Central America, over the Middle East. The divide has not always been a transatlantic one - sometimes there have been differences within Europe too. But I believe that the Alliance has come through the tests well, and is tempered and strengthened thereby. In recent weeks we in Britain have had reason to be reminded of how much true Allies are worth. We have greatly appreciated the support we have received over the Falklands. We realise that in giving this our North American and our European allies have had difficult choices to make.

The purposes and principles our Alliance defends may not change, but we must be sufficiently flexible to adjust to changing circumstances. Some of us met at Versailles a few days ago. We discussed there the changing economic circumstances and the challenges which these present to us all. These changing circumstances affect our defence activities as much as any other aspect of our national life. We are all only too well aware of the steep and inexorable rise in the cost of maintaining sound defences. The United Kingdom attaches great importance to the NATO goal of 3% annual real increases in defence spending. We have budgeted to increase our own defence spending each year since it was introduced and will go on doing so. The United Kingdom is committed to plan to implement the target in full up to 1985/6. Nonetheless, we and all our Allies have found that the rise in the cost of defence equipment outstrips even this increase. And this rapid rise in the cost of defence equipment comes at a time when the Soviet Union has been introducing dramatic improvements in the quality of its armed forces, and during a period of particular economic difficulty for the West. Economic constraints mean that many Allies are unable to devote more resources to defence than they do at present, although I believe that even in present circumstances some of us could do more.

/The

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

The implications of this situation are clear. Unless we can find new ways of using the resources available more effectively, our defences will be eroded. One member of the Alliance after another will be obliged to abandon assets, either military or industrial, that they can no longer sustain. If we are to maintain our strength in spite of spiralling costs, we need urgently to review the way we allocate the resources we make available to maintain our security. Must a weapons system always be replaced by its equivalent successor? Could the task be achieved more effectively or more cheaply by other means? Do our forces mirror too closely those deployed by the Soviet Union? Could the task of deterring them be achieved differently? What scope is there for greater cooperation and closer collaboration between our forces and our defence industries? It may be that there are also some operational tasks which some members of the Alliance can undertake more effectively than others who, in turn, could take on a bigger role elsewhere. If so, limited specialisation might give us a more effective capability in our overall defence.

These are difficult questions to which there are no ready answers. They are, moreover, questions which have been asked before. But I do not believe that these are reasons for ignoring them, for they become more urgent every day. Indeed, they cannot be ignored if our defences are to remain credible. The only alternative is to increase our reliance on nuclear weapons. I do not believe that this is a credible option. Our defence policies must be based on popular support. Our peoples will not accept a defence policy which leaves us with nuclear retaliation as the only response to an attack by the Warsaw Pact. Nor do I believe that they would be right to do so. Such a policy would render the defence of Europe no longer credible in the eyes of a potential aggressor. But this means that we must also convince our publics that they must be prepared to

/pay the

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

pay the necessary economic price to maintain modern and effective conventional defences.

There is another area in which change is needed. Since the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, there has been recognition - some would say belated recognition - that our fortunes are affected by developments outside the NATO treaty area. Our dependence on imported oil, supplies and raw materials from all over the world means that we have a crucial interest in the maintenance of stability throughout the world. But we know that the system of deterrence which has maintained stability in Europe cannot be applied elsewhere. We need to devise a strategy which exploits the assets which we each possess, whether political, economic, commercial or military, to strengthen stability. We need to identify potential trouble spots, to agree upon our objectives and upon the measures necessary to achieve them. This does not require that the members of the Alliance should invariably support each other, whatever they are embarked upon, or that members should only embark upon activities which the others support. Nor does it require the Alliance to revise the North Atlantic Treaty to enable it to act firmly outside the North Atlantic Treaty area. But it certainly does require a recognition that our security no longer lies simply in the defence of European territory but also in global stability; and that we must assure this by all means, whether military, material or political which are available to us.

Innovation in our security policy requires innovation in our approach to arms control as well. The quest for arms control agreements must never be allowed to become a substitute for adequate defence. The litmus test must always be whether an agreement would genuinely serve our security interests. We must never mislead ourselves or our peoples into believing that the mere fact of negotiation

/will

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

will somehow result in an improvement in international relations; nor must we allow public pressure for progress to push us into agreements which do not genuinely improve our security.

I therefore welcome the approach which President Reagan has taken both with intermediate range nuclear forces (INF) and, more recently, in strategic nuclear forces (START) and the MBFR negotiations. I believe that his commitment to major reductions in nuclear weaponry is an approach which will command widespread respect and support. We must reject Soviet claims that the American negotiating position is no more than an attempt to retain Western superiority, by firmly emphasising that our approach is based on the principle of parity between the two major nuclear weapon states.

I do not underestimate the difficulties in achieving our objective. In START, the strongest guarantee of progress will be American determination to proceed with its strategic weapons programme; in the case of intermediate range nuclear forces, it will be European determination to proceed with the Cruise missiles and Pershing modernisation programme. We should not be deflected from our purpose by other developments, for it is our own interests, not those of the Soviet Union, which we seek to advance through these negotiations. Our message for the Soviet Union must be that we will not be deterred from maintaining strong defences but are, at the same time, ready to reduce the size of our forces by negotiated agreement. The President has called the bluff of Soviet disarmament rhetoric, exposing the Russians' calls for moratoria as empty posturing, and challenging them to match his bold call to cut rather than freeze the levels of armaments. The message for our peoples is that in nuclear and conventional forces alike, we are sincerely determined to achieve security at lower levels of

/weaponry

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

weaponry and that it is this approach rather than unilateral disarmament which will ensure peace and freedom.

The speech which President Reagan made in Illinois on 9 May not only called for the beginning of START talks, it also put forward a five-point programme for East/West relations. I greatly welcome this. The prospects for East/West relations remain very uncertain. Poland and Afghanistan will continue to symbolise that lack of Soviet restraint which has had such a sharply adverse impact on the international climate. Nevertheless, I believe that, as long as we remain united, our chances of achieving progress may be better than they have been for some time. It is also in our interests that we should keep open our lines of communication to the Russians. They must be exposed to the Western point of view across the whole range of international issues.

The President's imaginative arms reduction proposals have given the Alliance the initiative at a time when the Russians are beset with problems. Internally their economic and agricultural performance falls far short of planned targets, while externally they remain bogged down in Afghanistan and perturbed by the fundamental questions the Polish crisis has raised about the political and economic viability of the socialist system. For the Russians it must be a profound blow to find that their implanted system has, thirty or more years after the event, been so decisively rejected in Poland. Not even the repression of martial law has been enough to stifle the demands of the Polish people for political and economic reform. Indeed the resurgence of popular protest has merely served to emphasise the dangers of the sterile policy currently being pursued by the Polish regime with the encouragement and endorsement of the Russians. It is almost certainly too much to hope that the Russians will, even now, accept that force offers no way out of their
/predicament

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

predicament and that they must permit dialogue and reform if Poland is to emerge from its current state of political and economic breakdown. But this lack of imagination and flexibility could well prove costly. Blocking the path to peaceful change in Poland will only prolong and deepen the crisis, which will in turn increase its debilitating and destabilising effects on the whole Soviet system. This is a combination of circumstances which could incline the Russians towards greater restraint and responsibility, if not greater accommodation with the West, particularly if they are convinced that the Alliance's determination to defend its interests remains impervious to both bluster and blandishments. The best way of ensuring that they are left in no doubt on this score is to demonstrate that we are all fully behind the President in his efforts to build on his 9 May speech.

These NATO Summits do not happen very often, but we should make the most of them. Many words are spoken on such occasions, and fine declarations are issued which can all too easily be left to gather dust on the shelves of our Foreign Offices. I should like to close therefore by expressing the hope that the discussions we have held here in Bonn, with the help of the excellent hospitality from our German hosts, may prove to have reinforced the strength and unity of our Alliance in the months and years ahead; and will help in bringing home to our fellow citizens throughout the Alliance that a healthy NATO is the best guarantee of the enduring peace we all seek.

CONFIDENTIAL.

CONFIDENTIAL

SUPPLEMENTARY POINTS FOR USE AS REQUIRED IN THE PRIME
MINISTER'S STATEMENT

UNSSD II

On 16 June I shall be addressing the second UN Special Session on Disarmament which has just started in New York. My message will be that we should take a pragmatic view of disarmament and concentrate on the successful completion of existing negotiations (INF, START, MBFR) in the first instance. Presentation to the Western domestic audience will be important. We should avoid raising expectations that general and complete disarmament is round the corner. The West made that mistake last time and it contributed to the rise of public feeling in Europe, in particular against our nuclear deterrence strategy. We must emphasise the importance of balanced and verifiable negotiations to reduce arms in both the nuclear and non-nuclear fields and also bear in mind the need to keep the neutral and non-aligned countries committed to non-proliferation as far as possible. Alliance solidarity will be very important.

CONFIDENTIAL

CSCE

Persistent and flagrant violations of the Final Act by the Polish and Soviet authorities created a situation in which continued negotiation on a concluding document would have been impossible during the session in Madrid earlier this year. The adjournment until November 1982 which was agreed was, in the circumstances, the best way of preserving the CSCE process, as we are anxious to do. We hope that by the time the meeting reconvenes, it will be possible to make progress; but it would be premature to try to decide now what line we should take in November.

/GREECE/TURKEY/AEGEAN

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

GREECE/TURKEY/AEGEAN

We hope that both sides will work to secure a reduction in tension in the Aegean and that this will lead to bilateral negotiations, which provide the best way to resolve differences there.

NATO GUARANTEE FOR GREECE

The Allies are already committed to resolve disputes between themselves by peaceful means. It would be divisive for the Alliance collectively to refer to any particular such dispute.

/ARAB/ISRAEL

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

ARAB/ISRAEL

The Arab/Israel problem lies at the heart of the continuing tension in the Middle East. There is an ever-present risk that this tension will again erupt into a major crisis, in Lebanon or elsewhere, which would affect all our interests. Israel's withdrawal from Sinai was welcome, but it has not brought nearer a solution of the Palestinian problem. All our efforts must now be concentrated on achieving a comprehensive settlement which must take account of Palestinian rights as well as protecting Israel's security. If a comprehensive solution is to be reached, it is important that no party should attempt to foreclose options in the meantime. For this reason we are seriously concerned at Israel's expanding programme of settlements on the West Bank. Unless Israel can be restrained from pursuing this course, a settlement on the basis envisaged since the adoption of Resolution 242 will become impossible.

/IRAN/IRAQ

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

IRAN/IRAQ

The Iranian intentions in the conflict are worrying. Any move to invade Iraqi territory would have serious implications for the stability of the whole region. Our Arab friends are concerned and now fear that the conflict could escalate and engulf them. But there is little that the West can do directly to stop the war. Any moves by us to intervene would simply arouse Iranian anger and exacerbate the situation. We should continue to maintain an evenhanded position and to work in the margins. We can best help by supporting efforts in the UN and elsewhere, eg. the Non-aligned Movement, aimed at producing solutions which will lead to a just and honourable settlement acceptable to both sides.

/CENTRAL AMERICA

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

CENTRAL AMERICA

We continue to be concerned at the situation in Central America and the potential for further instability in the region. There is a clear need for an exchange of views about what is happening there.

/AFGHANISTAN

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

AFGHANISTAN

The West must ensure that Afghanistan does not become a forgotten issue as the Russians hope it will. Soviet use of force to impose a puppet communist regime on a non-aligned country has continuing implications for East/West relations. It is also a matter of grave concern to the non-aligned. Western Government should continue to take every opportunity to press for a Soviet withdrawal and to express their support for the Afghan people.


/NAMIBIA

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

NAMIBIA

The Five regret the delay to the Namibia negotiations caused by the rejection by SWAPO and the Front Line States of our revised proposals for the electoral system for the Namibian Constituent Assembly. But we remain committed to achieving our aim of beginning implementation of the UN Plan in 1982. To this end, as was announced by Foreign Ministers of the Five after their meeting in Luxembourg on 17 May, the Five intend soon to present new proposals on outstanding issues. If we are to regain momentum in these negotiations, we shall need the continued support of our partners: a success in Namibia would be a blow to Soviet influence in the region.

| | |
|--|---|
| DEPARTMENT/SERIES T639 PIECE/ITEM 122 (one piece/item number) | Date and sign |
| Extract details: ANNEX D 27 th May 1982 Page 1 |  |
| CLOSED UNDER FOI EXEMPTION S27 |  |
| RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3(4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT 1958 | |
| TEMPORARILY RETAINED | |
| MISSING AT TRANSFER | |
| NUMBER NOT USED | |
| MISSING (TNA USE ONLY) | |
| DOCUMENT PUT IN PLACE (TNA USE ONLY) | |

Instructions for completion of Dummy Card

Use black or blue pen to complete form.

Use the card for one piece or for each extract removed from a different place within a piece.

Enter the department and series,
eg. HO 405, J 82.


Enter the piece and item references, .
eg. 28, 1079, 84/1, 107/3

Enter extract details if it is an extract rather than a whole piece.

This should be an indication of what the extract is,
eg. Folio 28, Indictment 840079, E107, Letter dated 22/11/1995.
Do not enter details of why the extract is sensitive.

If closed under the FOI Act, enter the FOI exemption numbers applying to the closure, eg. 27(1), 40(2).

Sign and date next to the reason why the record is not available to the public ie. Closed under FOI exemption; Retained under section 3(4) of the Public Records Act 1958; Temporarily retained; Missing at transfer or Number not used.

| | |
|---|--|
| DEPARTMENT/SERIES T639 PIECE/ITEM 122 (one piece/item number) | Date and sign |
| Extract details: ANNEX D 27 th May 1982 Page 2 |  |
| CLOSED UNDER FOI EXEMPTION S27 | NO 250 7/6/16 |
| RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3(4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT 1958 | |
| TEMPORARILY RETAINED | |
| MISSING AT TRANSFER | |
| NUMBER NOT USED | |
| MISSING (TNA USE ONLY) | |
| DOCUMENT PUT IN PLACE (TNA USE ONLY) | |

9

Instructions for completion of Dummy Card

Use black or blue pen to complete form.

Use the card for one piece or for each extract removed from a different place within a piece.

Enter the department and series,
eg. HO 405, J 82.


Enter the piece and item references, .
eg. 28, 1079, 84/1, 107/3

Enter extract details if it is an extract rather than a whole piece.

This should be an indication of what the extract is,
eg. Folio 28, Indictment 840079, E107, Letter dated 22/11/1995.
Do not enter details of why the extract is sensitive.

If closed under the FOI Act, enter the FOI exemption numbers applying to the closure, eg. 27(1), 40(2).

Sign and date next to the reason why the record is not available to the public ie. Closed under FOI exemption; Retained under section 3(4) of the Public Records Act 1958; Temporarily retained; Missing at transfer or Number not used.

| | |
|---|---|
| DEPARTMENT/SERIES T639 PIECE/ITEM 122 (one piece/item number) | Date and sign |
| Extract details: ANNEX D Page 3 27 th May 1982 |  |
| CLOSED UNDER FOI EXEMPTION S27..... |  7/6/16 |
| RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3(4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT 1958 | |
| TEMPORARILY RETAINED | |
| MISSING AT TRANSFER | |
| NUMBER NOT USED | |
| MISSING (TNA USE ONLY) | |
| DOCUMENT PUT IN PLACE (TNA USE ONLY) | |

Instructions for completion of Dummy Card

Use black or blue pen to complete form.

Use the card for one piece or for each extract removed from a different place within a piece.

Enter the department and series,
eg. HO 405, J 82.



Enter the piece and item references, .
eg. 28, 1079, 84/1, 107/3

Enter extract details if it is an extract rather than a whole piece.

This should be an indication of what the extract is,
eg. Folio 28, Indictment 840079, E107, Letter dated 22/11/1995.
Do not enter details of why the extract is sensitive.

If closed under the FOI Act, enter the FOI exemption numbers applying to the closure, eg. 27(1), 40(2).

Sign and date next to the reason why the record is not available to the public ie. Closed under FOI exemption; Retained under section 3(4) of the Public Records Act 1958; Temporarily retained; Missing at transfer or Number not used.

| | |
|---|---|
| DEPARTMENT/SERIES T639 PIECE/ITEM 122 (one piece/item number) | Date and sign |
| Extract details: ANNEX D Page 4 27 th May 1982 |  |
| CLOSED UNDER FOI EXEMPTION S27 |  |
| RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3(4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT 1958 | |
| TEMPORARILY RETAINED | |
| MISSING AT TRANSFER | |
| NUMBER NOT USED | |
| MISSING (TNA USE ONLY) | |
| DOCUMENT PUT IN PLACE (TNA USE ONLY) | |

Instructions for completion of Dummy Card

Use black or blue pen to complete form.

Use the card for one piece or for each extract removed from a different place within a piece.


Enter the department and series,
eg. HO 405, J 82.

Enter the piece and item references, .
eg. 28, 1079, 84/1, 107/3

Enter extract details if it is an extract rather than a whole piece.
This should be an indication of what the extract is,
eg. Folio 28, Indictment 840079, E107, Letter dated 22/11/1995.
Do not enter details of why the extract is sensitive.

If closed under the FOI Act, enter the FOI exemption numbers applying to the closure, eg. 27(1), 40(2).

Sign and date next to the reason why the record is not available to the public ie. Closed under FOI exemption; Retained under section 3(4) of the Public Records Act 1958; Temporarily retained; Missing at transfer or Number not used.

| | |
|---|--|
| DEPARTMENT/SERIES T639 PIECE/ITEM 122 (one piece/item number) | Date and sign |
| Extract details: ANNEX D Page 5 27 th May 1982 |  |
| CLOSED UNDER FOI EXEMPTION S27 | Q RD 7/6/16 |
| RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3(4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT 1958 | |
| TEMPORARILY RETAINED | |
| MISSING AT TRANSFER | |
| NUMBER NOT USED | |
| MISSING (TNA USE ONLY) | |
| DOCUMENT PUT IN PLACE (TNA USE ONLY) | |

Instructions for completion of Dummy Card

Use black or blue pen to complete form.

Use the card for one piece or for each extract removed from a different place within a piece.

Enter the department and series,
eg. HO 405, J 82.



Enter the piece and item references, .
eg. 28, 1079, 84/1, 107/3

Enter extract details if it is an extract rather than a whole piece.

This should be an indication of what the extract is,
eg. Folio 28, Indictment 840079, E107, Letter dated 22/11/1995.
Do not enter details of why the extract is sensitive.

If closed under the FOI Act, enter the FOI exemption numbers applying to the closure, eg. 27(1), 40(2).

Sign and date next to the reason why the record is not available to the public ie. Closed under FOI exemption; Retained under section 3(4) of the Public Records Act 1958; Temporarily retained; Missing at transfer or Number not used.

| | |
|---|---|
| DEPARTMENT/SERIES T639 PIECE/ITEM 122 (one piece/item number) | Date and sign |
| Extract details: ANNEX D PAGE 6 27 th May 1982 |  |
| CLOSED UNDER FOI EXEMPTION 527 |  |
| RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3(4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT 1958 | |
| TEMPORARILY RETAINED | |
| MISSING AT TRANSFER | |
| NUMBER NOT USED | |
| MISSING (TNA USE ONLY) | |
| DOCUMENT PUT IN PLACE (TNA USE ONLY) | |

Instructions for completion of Dummy Card

Use black or blue pen to complete form.

Use the card for one piece or for each extract removed from a different place within a piece.


Enter the department and series,
eg. HO 405, J 82.

Enter the piece and item references, .
eg. 28, 1079, 84/1, 107/3

Enter extract details if it is an extract rather than a whole piece.
This should be an indication of what the extract is,
eg. Folio 28, Indictment 840079, E107, Letter dated 22/11/1995.
Do not enter details of why the extract is sensitive.

If closed under the FOI Act, enter the FOI exemption numbers applying to the closure, eg. 27(1), 40(2).

Sign and date next to the reason why the record is not available to the public ie. Closed under FOI exemption; Retained under section 3(4) of the Public Records Act 1958; Temporarily retained; Missing at transfer or Number not used.

| | |
|--|--|
| DEPARTMENT/SERIES T639 PIECE/ITEM 122 (one piece/item number) | Date and sign |
| Extract details: ANNEX D A-E 27 th May 1982 PAGE 1 |  |
| CLOSED UNDER FOI EXEMPTION .. 527 .. | AD 88 7/6/16 |
| RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3(4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT 1958 | |
| TEMPORARILY RETAINED | |
| MISSING AT TRANSFER | |
| NUMBER NOT USED | |
| MISSING (TNA USE ONLY) | |
| DOCUMENT PUT IN PLACE (TNA USE ONLY) | |

Instructions for completion of Dummy Card

Use black or blue pen to complete form.

Use the card for one piece or for each extract removed from a different place within a piece.

Enter the department and series,
eg. HO 405, J 82.


Enter the piece and item references, .
eg. 28, 1079, 84/1, 107/3

Enter extract details if it is an extract rather than a whole piece.

This should be an indication of what the extract is,
eg. Folio 28, Indictment 840079, E107, Letter dated 22/11/1995.
Do not enter details of why the extract is sensitive.

If closed under the FOI Act, enter the FOI exemption numbers applying to the closure, eg. 27(1), 40(2).

Sign and date next to the reason why the record is not available to the public ie. Closed under FOI exemption; Retained under section 3(4) of the Public Records Act 1958; Temporarily retained; Missing at transfer or Number not used.

| | |
|--|--|
| DEPARTMENT/SERIES T639 PIECE/ITEM 122 (one piece/item number) | Date and sign |
| Extract details: ANNEX D A-E 27 th MAY 1982 PAGE 2 |  |
| CLOSED UNDER FOI EXEMPTION | |
| RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3(4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT 1958 | |
| TEMPORARILY RETAINED | |
| MISSING AT TRANSFER | |
| NUMBER NOT USED | |
| MISSING (TNA USE ONLY) | |
| DOCUMENT PUT IN PLACE (TNA USE ONLY) | |

Instructions for completion of Dummy Card

Use black or blue pen to complete form.

Use the card for one piece or for each extract removed from a different place within a piece.

Enter the department and series,
eg. HO 405, J 82.

Enter the piece and item references, .
eg. 28, 1079, 84/1, 107/3

Enter extract details if it is an extract rather than a whole piece.
This should be an indication of what the extract is,
eg. Folio 28, Indictment 840079, E107, Letter dated 22/11/1995.
Do not enter details of why the extract is sensitive.

If closed under the FOI Act, enter the FOI exemption numbers applying to the closure, eg. 27(1), 40(2).

Sign and date next to the reason why the record is not available to the public ie. Closed under FOI exemption; Retained under section 3(4) of the Public Records Act 1958; Temporarily retained; Missing at transfer or Number not used.

CONFIDENTIAL

BRIEF NO 2(a)

NATO SUMMIT
9/10 June 1982

EAST/WEST RELATIONS

POINTS TO MAKE

US/Soviet Relations

1. Welcome President Reagan's 9 May speech. Should give West initiative on East/West relations, and helpful with public opinion. Also welcome possibility of Haig/Gromyko meeting later this month and Reagan/Brezhnev summit in October. Important to keep channels of communication open with Russians: impress Western view on them, and reduce their misconceptions.

Importance of Allied Unity

2. Russians confronted by internal and international difficulties (economic and agricultural performance; Poland; Afghanistan). If, in addition, they are faced by an Alliance united in support of US efforts to build on President's speech, they may be more disposed towards international restraint and genuine negotiation on arms limitations.

Dialogue

3. Interested to know how Americans intend to pursue dialogue with Russians on regional issues. Any sign Russians willing to talk seriously about, eg Central America or Namibia; or to exercise restraint on regional issues in interest of wider East/West relationship?

/ESSENTIAL FACTS

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

ESSENTIAL FACTS

East/West Relations

4. On 9 May, President Reagan delivered a major speech at Eureka College, Illinois, calling for the beginning of START negotiations and putting forward a 5-point programme for East/West relations. This consisted of: military balance, economic security, regional stability, arms reduction and dialogue. The Russians were dismissive of this programme, claiming it was nothing new and merely sought to secure one-sided advantages for the United States. Nevertheless, they will have been conscious that it was a well-judged initiative coming on the eve of the President's European visit and his attendance at the NATO Summit, and they will continue their efforts to discredit it (although their attitude to the START talks has been more positive - see Brief No 4).

US/Soviet Relations

5. President Reagan has made it clear he is prepared to hold a summit meeting with President Brezhnev later this year, as long as it is carefully prepared, has the prospect of a successful outcome and fits into the overall context of US/Soviet relations. The likely venue for such a meeting is a European neutral country (Austria, Finland, Ireland and Switzerland have all been mooted). October has been suggested as the date but it remains to be seen whether this would allow enough time for adequate preparations. Haig and Gromyko have already met, most recently in January this year, and there is a possibility that they will meet again later this month in New York, in the margins of the UN Special Session on Disarmament.

US/Soviet Dialogue on Regional Issues

6. According to the Americans they have had almost no bilateral discussions with the Russians on regional issues (Afghanistan,

/Poland

CONFIDENTIAL

Poland, etc). In his 9 May speech, however, the President emphasised the importance of regional stability to the wider East/West relationship but he gave no indication as to how the Americans intend to pursue this with the Russians.

Foreign and Commonwealth Office
1 June 1982

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

BRIEF NO 3

NATO SUMMIT
9/10 June 1982

POLAND

POINTS TO MAKE

Situation in Poland

1. Recent demonstrations have exposed underlying popular resistance to martial law. Solidarity remains symbol of popular resistance. Jaruzelski's dilemma remains: if he relaxes his grip, popular opposition emerges; but by itself martial law can provide no lasting solution to Poland's political and economic problems.

Western Policy

2. Should stand by NATO Declaration of 11 January. Western measures are continuing to exert pressure on the regime. Important for West to maintain firm and united line. Marginal relaxations of martial law so far not enough to warrant any change of policy.

Economic Assistance (if raised)

3. No question of new credits for Poland at present time. Clearly inappropriate, in the wake of the recent demonstrations, for the West to move ahead on rescheduling talks. It is nevertheless in West's long term interest to settle Poland's debt repayments in an orderly and controlled fashion. If Governments continue to hang back, the Poles may seek agreement with the Banks for 1982 and leave the Governments to one side. Resumption of rescheduling negotiations could be presented as 'calling Poles to account' and denying them de facto 100%

/relief

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

relief. Moment for this may come soon.

Possible Economic Reconstruction Programme for Poland (if raised)

4. Note President Reagan's reference in Illinois speech to US willingness to join in a programme of economic support to Poland if West's conditions met. Interested to know what kind of package US have in mind. Recall Western Governments' hesitation, even before martial law, to respond to Polish request for \$4 billion new credits: Polish hard currency needs in 1982 alone in the order of \$10 billion (without rescheduling). Would Western Government be able to offer package sufficiently attractive to persuade Jaruzelski (and Russians) to make political concessions?

5. In these circumstances, perhaps better at this stage to avoid a specific Western commitment which we might not be able to live up to. Could indicate instead our wish to 'restore a normal political and economic relationship with Poland when conditions are right'. Suggest we study this idea further in appropriate fora.

Polish Refugees (if raised)

6. Believe Western statements have helped deter Polish Government's attempts to force detainees to choose between imprisonment and exile. Useful to keep up pressure and demonstrate Western resolve unweakened.

ESSENTIAL FACTS

Internal Situation

7. Despite 'relaxations' announced on 28 April, fundamentals of martial law remain. Mass unofficial demonstration took place in Warsaw and other Polish cities on 1, 3, 4 and 13 May in support of Solidarity and in protest against martial law. Widespread if sporadic support for Solidarity's 15 minute strike call on 13 May, exactly 5 months after the imposition

/of martial

CONFIDENTIAL

of martial law. Over 2,000 arrested and 200 more interned.

Economic Assistance

8. Agreement to reschedule 1981 commercial debt signed on 6 April. On 18 March creditor Governments agreed there should be no change in present policy to suspend credits and 1982 rescheduling negotiations and informed Poles accordingly. Latter expected to make a further bid soon to resume rescheduling talks. Chairman of Polish Planning Commission referred in a public speech on 26 May to Poland's inability to meet its Western debts in 1982 without rescheduling help. Attitude of NATO partners especially US and FRG inflexible.

Rescheduling

9. Several arguments in favour of resuming dialogue with Poles: latter currently obtaining 100% relief and may be paying off other creditors, eg. Brazil. If Poles now negotiate a 1982 Rescheduling agreement with Banks, Governments will lose out.

Economic Reconstruction Programme for Poland

10. The US and to a lesser extent the FRG have indicated publicly their willingness to join in an economic reconstruction programme for Poland provided Western conditions for a political settlement in Poland are met. In his letter of 7 May to the Prime Minister President Reagan expressed the hope that the forthcoming summits would reaffirm this position.

11. Despite this public commitment however, private enquiries have revealed no clear idea in Washington or Bonn of how this might be pursued. Nor has this been approved by US or FRG Treasuries. There would be very considerable difficulties in finding the funds to back a British commitment to a package which would amount to not less than \$10 billion (including rescheduling) in 1982 to meet the Poles' foreign currency requirements and large sums for several years thereafter.

/Polish Refugees

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

Polish Refugees

12. NAC Communiqué of 18 May expressed view that Polish authorities should refrain from forcing Polish citizens into exile. This reinforced earlier individual statements by UK and others which we believe have been instrumental in dissuading Polish regime from following through its suggestion that detainees might be freed if they left Poland.

13. The UK has recently agreed to respond positively to a call from the Austrians for assistance in the resettlement of large numbers of Polish refugees presently in Austria. The criteria for acceptances into the UK are strict and the position will be subject to continuing review.

Aid

14. The British Government has allocated £11,500 as a grant-in-aid to the Ockenden Venture to assist in the coordination of humanitarian relief work for the Polish people undertaken by voluntary and Church agencies. We have also committed substantial sums through the European Community's Aid Programme. At present, the European Commission has arranged programmes worth £4.6 million.

Foreign and Commonwealth Office
1 June 1982

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

BRIEF NO 4

NATO SUMMIT
9/10 June 1982

ARMS CONTROL

POINTS TO MAKE

START/INF/MBFR

1. Welcome beginning of START negotiations. With INF proposals and new MBFR initiative, demonstrates Western commitment to arms control across the board.
2. Arms control not an alternative to strong defence. But public support for defence conditional on visible and exhaustive efforts to lower levels of weaponry.
3. Must demonstrate to Soviet Union that prepared to work strenuously to achieve results, but not at cost of one-sided agreements. Must convince public opinion that Western proposals for significant reductions in nuclear weapons, not Soviet freeze proposals, offer best disarmament prospects.
4. Brezhnev's recent statement extending SS20 moratorium eastwards shows Soviet concern about Western initiatives. Further Soviet cosmetic moves to be expected. Lesson of last two years is that unwavering NATO commitment to nuclear modernisation programmes offers best prospect of concrete progress on arms control.
5. Welcome US management of INF consultations; model for Alliance cooperation. Look forward to regular US briefing on START as negotiations get underway.

/6.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

6. Warmly support new MBFR proposal. Time right for substantive Western initiative. Important presentational advantages in announcing it now.

UNSSD II

7. A damage limitation exercise for the West. UK will take robust line and hope others will too. Cannot let NNA dictate pace or scope of arms control negotiations; these are best conducted in confidence between main military powers. But UNSSD II needs careful handling with an eye to domestic opinion and impact on non-proliferation regime.

ESSENTIAL FACTS

START (Strategic Arms Reduction Talks) (may be used freely)

8. Following his announcement of US proposal on 9 May, President Reagan announced on 31 May US/Soviet agreement to begin START on 29 June.

9. Main US objective to reduce element of strategic instability caused by the growth in heavy, accurate MIRVed ICBMs capable of a 'first strike' on US land-based missiles. Have proposed first stage negotiations aimed at significant reduction in numbers of warheads of at least one-third (current level on both sides estimated around 7,500) to equal ceilings, with no more than 50 per cent of residue deployed on land-based systems. Subsequent negotiations would aim at reductions in other elements of strategic nuclear arsenal, particularly the cumulative weight of warheads or 'throw-weight', with aim of equal ceilings below present US levels.

10. First phase would involve substantial reductions in US submarine-launched ballistic systems. But would also involve greater Soviet than American reductions in land-based system. Russians will also not like proposed second phase, since total Soviet throw-weight nearly

/three

CONFIDENTIAL

three times that of USA, with nearly one half concentrated on heavy SS18 ICBM which is of particular concern to US. Will also criticise absence of proposals on bombers and submarine-launched cruise missiles (though US has made it clear that both can be discussed).

11. Brezhnev responded on 18 May in general terms. Suggested 'freeze' on further deployment, and only minimal qualitative improvements; to be expected, and picks up recent Kennedy/Hatfield US Senate draft 'nuclear freeze' resolution. But while critical, Brezhnev was careful not to limit negotiating possibilities by going into details. Remarks thus suggest serious approach to talks. Americans have, equally predictably, rejected 'freeze' proposal, but have given general welcome to willingness to begin talks.

12. Americans have undertaken to give periodic NATO briefings supplemented by bilateral discussions. Such consultation arrangements acceptable to UK, although some European allies may press for fuller consultations.

INF (Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces) (may be used freely)

13. First round of the INF negotiations ended on 16 March. Next round began on 20 May. US is pursuing 'zero-option': in exchange for dismantling of all Soviet SS4s, 5s and 20s, NATO would forego planned deployment of Cruise and Pershing II missiles.

14. Soviet counter proposal, embodied in a draft treaty tabled on 25 May: reductions in what Russians call 'medium range' systems to 300 on each side within 5 years. Russians' definition of 'medium range' systems would lead to elimination of much of United States INF in Europe and prevent NATO modernisation. Soviet Union could retain all SS20 missiles currently deployed in European part of the USSR and many aircraft as well to counter-balance British and French strategic systems. NATO excludes these systems from current arms control on the grounds that any US/Soviet bilateral negotiations must achieve agreement on parity between the superpowers. But the Russians include them amongst 'medium range systems'.

CONFIDENTIAL

15. Most recent Soviet propaganda move was announcement that freeze on deployment of SS20s in Europe extended to all sites within range of Western Europe. Since freeze is conditional upon NATO not making practical arrangements for Cruise and Pershing deployments, could be lifted at any time.

MBFR (Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions)

16. After close consultation with ourselves and FRG, Americans tabled draft MBFR treaty in Alliance on 7 May. Replaces existing Alliance position (involving separately negotiated Phase I and Phase II agreements) with single, staged agreement. First stage (1 year for reductions, 1 year for verification) would consist of present essentially symbolic American and Soviet reductions (13,000 and 30,000 respectively), but would involve firm contractual commitments at the outset from all direct participants (ie. those whose forces are included in negotiations) to take significant share in subsequent reductions over next 5 years down to agreed common collective ceilings of 900,000 ground and air forces/700,000 ground forces. 'Up front' commitments a major concession by FRG. Other essential Western requirements, particularly prior agreement on data, adequate verification and stabilisation measures and residual ceiling of Soviet troops in area, would be maintained.

17. Draft Treaty text now agreed by other NATO allies. Although not expected to be any more negotiable than present Western position, will be effective response to unacceptable Eastern draft agreement tabled in Vienna on 18 February. Has important presentational potential since, in requiring firm commitments by all participants, meets an essential Eastern requirement; Alliance can thus convincingly demonstrate seriousness about conventional force reductions to public opinion. Announcement at Bonn

/Summit

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

Summit important in maximising presentational potential.

UNSSD II (Second UN Special Session on Disarmament)

18. UNSSD II, from 7 June to 9 July will review progress since UNSSD I (1978). It will also attempt to complete work on a 'comprehensive programme of disarmament' and will review disarmament machinery.

19. Nuclear weapons states will come under pressure from the NNA to commit themselves to nuclear disarmament within a fixed timescale or at the least to reduce 'vertical proliferation' as the price for maintaining control of 'horizontal proliferation'. NNA will try to insist on a legally binding timetable for complete nuclear disarmament.

Foreign and Commonwealth Office
1 June 1982

CONFIDENTIAL

NATO SUMMIT
9/10 June 1982

DEFENCE ISSUES

POINTS TO MAKE

Enhancement of conventional defence effort

1. Recognise need to improve conventional defences, both to meet growing conventional threat from Warsaw Pact and to allay public concern over threat of nuclear war by raising nuclear threshold.
2. UK committed to meeting 3% target until 1985/86. Imperfect yardstick, but better than nothing. Hope other Allies will do utmost to reach it. But unrealistic to expect anything more than this until marked improvement in economic climate.
3. Accordingly need to concentrate on ways of making more effective use of existing resources. Alliance should give serious consideration to this problem.

Public presentation of defence and arms control policies

4. Governments have central role in explaining complex questions at issue. Welcome greater attention now being given to public information effort in Alliance countries and at NATO.
5. Need to bring public face to face with reality without provoking such alarm as to cause despair.
6. NATO must demonstrate that committed to peace, but that peace can only be maintained through security policy combining strong defences and realistic arms control policy. This should be a major purpose of summit.

Rapid Deployment Force (RDF) and out-of-area issues

7. Clear that developments outside NATO area can crucially affect vital Western interests. Falklands crisis, which involves important issues of principle, demonstrates how rapidly such developments can occur.
8. Recognise that Alliance neither can nor should act as such outside NATO area. But cannot draw clear demarcation between interests within and outside area. Needs to be more discussion on how Alliance should handle this. We would welcome close consultation in NATO on specific out-of-area issues with view to identifying common objectives for out-of-area deployments in pursuit of vital Alliance interests.
9. Only few Alliance members have out-of-area capability. But role for all Allies in lending political support and 'taking up slack' where they can.
10. UK supports RDF concept and already provides help with overflights and en route access. Falklands demonstrates UK's capacity also to deploy out-of-area when necessary.

European Defence (if raised)

11. Effective European defence effort vital. But European aspirations must continue to find focus within existing Alliance arrangements. Principal means of enhancing European contribution may lie in close cooperation in both defence industrial and military fields so that scarce resources used to best effort.

ESSENTIAL FACTSEnhancement of conventional defence effort

12. Many European Allies finding it increasingly difficult

to meet commitment to annual real increase of 3% in defence spending. Accordingly some disillusionment with 3% aim; Germans and Dutch would like to drop it. Meanwhile Americans are pressing Europeans to go some way to match their current massive increases in defence spending (expected to be about 7% per annum in real terms). UK has good record on 3%. (Since present Government took office we have budgeted for increases every year in line with NATO 3% commitment; in practice 1982/3 expenditure expected to be 11% higher than 1978/79 - disregarding effect of Falklands crisis).

13. Major part of problem is rising cost of defence equipment, increasing much more rapidly than inflation, which with economic difficulties in Western Europe makes it very difficult to increase size of real defence effort. Demonstrates need to make more effective use of existing resources. In preparations for Summit UK suggested that Summit might commission Alliance study of ways of tackling this problem, including examination of scope for specialisation in defence industries and military roles, but idea did not attract much support. We should however continue to encourage Allies to think hard about this problem.

14. Americans are keen that focus on arms control at Summit should be balanced by references to need to improve conventional defences. Therefore proposing separate Summit declaration on this subject by members of Alliance's integrated military structure (ie. all except France). UK has supported this, but other Allies have opposed the idea.

/.....

Public presentation of defence and arms control policies

15. Growth in anti-nuclear movement has led most Allied Governments to increase public information effort on defence/arms control, although some Governments still reluctant to take initiative.

16. At NATO greater emphasis on information policy. NATO 'Force Comparisons paper' comparing Warsaw Pact and NATO forces published on 6 May. Useful reference document.

17. US Administration now recognise that talk of military superiority and war-fighting rather than deterrence counter-productive with Europeans. Fact that they now have their own anti-nuclear movement to contend with making them more sensitive to public presentation.

RDF and out-of-area issues

18. US briefings of Alliance on plans for RDF, for use in South-West Asia, have been heavy-handed and not matched by serious attempt to achieve political consensus on Alliance's approach to management of out-of-area interests. American demands for increased Allied peacetime presence in area, more economic and security assistance to regional countries, overflight rights and en route access for RDF, and greater European efforts within NATO area to compensate for diversion of US forces to RDF have irritated European Allies. Some Allies (especially Germans) fear that they are being asked to plan for commitments which are not strictly related to defence of Europe and thus that NATO may be required to act as such outside NATO area. But Americans argue that European reliance on Gulf oil much greater than that of US and that their efforts are therefore as much, if not more, in

European as in American interests.

19. UK relatively well placed because:

- (a) already provide 'security assistance' to countries in Middle East and South-West Asia;
- (b) provide Gulf patrol;
- (c) expanding Territorial army, thus going some way to meet US requirement for more reserves;
- (d) have limited capability for intervention beyond NATO area;
- (e) already provide help with en route access (particularly Diego Garcia);
- (f) give US political support within Alliance.

20. Judging by performance at Ministerial North Atlantic Council meeting in May, French likely to be particularly resistant to US pressure for greater Alliance involvement - or even consultation - in out-of-area issues.

European Defence

21. French and other political figures have speculated on a number of recent occasions about the future of European security arrangements.

22. For example, French Defence Minister, Monsieur Hernu, has alluded to discussions with France's European partners on 'modifications and new definitions for the Atlantic Alliance'. Monsieur Hernu's deputy, Monsieur Lemoine, has repeatedly emphasised French support for the Western European Union (WEU).

23 (NOT FOR USE) However, when M. Hernu met Mr Nott on 1 April he favoured improving consultations on defence questions between France, the FRG and the UK as the first requirement for strengthening the European defence effort, rather than new multilateral initiatives. This is our own preference.

24. Any attempt to refocus European defence efforts away from NATO would weaken links with US.

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

2 June 1982

CONFIDENTIAL

BRIEF NO 6

NATO SUMMIT
9/10 June 1982

CSCE

POINTS TO MAKE

Recent Session

1. West held together well and prevented East from establishing 'business as usual'.

Prospects for Resumed Session

2. Too early to say. Need to retain room for manoeuvre. Should not reach decisions on next round before we need to. Much will depend on events not least but not exclusively in Poland. Important to retain unity of purpose and aims at the next Session in November.

Conference on Disarmament in Europe (CDE)

3. Continue to regard CDE as important. Text in NNA draft provides good basis for discussion in right circumstances.

ESSENTIAL FACTS

Recent Session and Adjournment

4. Recent session adjourned on 12 March until 9 November. Participating States' declared intention is to complete work 'at the earliest possible time with the adoption of a substantial and balanced concluding document on the basis of RM39' (the draft concluding document tabled by the neutral and non-aligned (NNA) countries on 16 December 1981).

CONFIDENTIAL

5. The Session concentrated on Soviet and Polish violations of Final Act. East attempted unsuccessfully to resume negotiations. Western unity at times strained. FRG, Denmark and Greece showed some readiness to negotiate on substance; FRG only accepted adjournment reluctantly. US was firmly committed to early adjournment from outset.

Prospects

6. No Western preconditions concerning the principle of resumption. US inclined to maintain link between progress at Madrid and events in Poland; Europeans may be more inclined to favour return to negotiation on substance. Alliance will begin to sort out its position at meeting in Norway in September. Earlier attempts would risk polarization of views.


Conference on Disarmament in Europe (CDE)

7. NNA text includes a mandate for a CDE which is pretty close to being acceptable to UK. One or two areas where amendments could be made.

8. On 12 February, Lord Carrington told the press at Madrid that CDE might 'conceivably be pursued separately'. A subsequent press line stated that he thought progress unlikely on any CSCE issues in immediate future. CDE is part of 'balanced outcome' which is stated objective of Ten and Alliance at Madrid.

Foreign and Commonwealth Office
1 June 1982

CONFIDENTIAL

| | |
|---|--|
| DEPARTMENT/SERIES T639 PIECE/ITEM 122 (one piece/item number) | Date and sign |
| Extract details: BRIEF No 7 Page 1 |  |
| CLOSED UNDER FOI EXEMPTION S27 | AD SS 7/6/16 |
| RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3(4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT 1958 | |
| TEMPORARILY RETAINED | |
| MISSING AT TRANSFER | |
| NUMBER NOT USED | |
| MISSING (TNA USE ONLY) | |
| DOCUMENT PUT IN PLACE (TNA USE ONLY) | |

Instructions for completion of Dummy Card

Use black or blue pen to complete form.

Use the card for one piece or for each extract removed from a different place within a piece.

Enter the department and series,
eg. HO 405, J 82.


Enter the piece and item references, .
eg. 28, 1079, 84/1, 107/3

Enter extract details if it is an extract rather than a whole piece.

This should be an indication of what the extract is,
eg. Folio 28, Indictment 840079, E107, Letter dated 22/11/1995.
Do not enter details of why the extract is sensitive.

If closed under the FOI Act, enter the FOI exemption numbers applying to the closure, eg. 27(1), 40(2).

Sign and date next to the reason why the record is not available to the public ie. Closed under FOI exemption; Retained under section 3(4) of the Public Records Act 1958; Temporarily retained; Missing at transfer or Number not used.

| | |
|---|--|
| DEPARTMENT/SERIES T639 PIECE/ITEM 122 (one piece/item number) | Date and sign |
| Extract details: BRIEF No 7 PAGE 2 |  |
| CLOSED UNDER FOI EXEMPTION S27 | AO AS 7/6/16 |
| RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3(4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT 1958 | |
| TEMPORARILY RETAINED | |
| MISSING AT TRANSFER | |
| NUMBER NOT USED | |
| MISSING (TNA USE ONLY) | |
| DOCUMENT PUT IN PLACE (TNA USE ONLY) | |

Instructions for completion of Dummy Card

Use black or blue pen to complete form.

Use the card for one piece or for each extract removed from a different place within a piece.

Enter the department and series,
eg. HO 405, J 82.


Enter the piece and item references, .
eg. 28, 1079, 84/1, 107/3

Enter extract details if it is an extract rather than a whole piece.

This should be an indication of what the extract is,
eg. Folio 28, Indictment 840079, E107, Letter dated 22/11/1995.
Do not enter details of why the extract is sensitive.

If closed under the FOI Act, enter the FOI exemption numbers applying to the closure, eg. 27(1), 40(2).

Sign and date next to the reason why the record is not available to the public ie. Closed under FOI exemption; Retained under section 3(4) of the Public Records Act 1958; Temporarily retained; Missing at transfer or Number not used.

| | |
|--|--|
| DEPARTMENT/SERIES T639 PIECE/ITEM 122 (one piece/item number) | Date and sign |
| Extract details: BRIEF No 7 PAGE 3 |  |
| CLOSED UNDER FOI EXEMPTION S27 | 10/8/16 7/6/16 |
| RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3(4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT 1958 | |
| TEMPORARILY RETAINED | |
| MISSING AT TRANSFER | |
| NUMBER NOT USED | |
| MISSING (TNA USE ONLY) | |
| DOCUMENT PUT IN PLACE (TNA USE ONLY) | |

Instructions for completion of Dummy Card

Use black or blue pen to complete form.

Use the card for one piece or for each extract removed from a different place within a piece.

Enter the department and series,
eg. HO 405, J 82.


Enter the piece and item references, .
eg. 28, 1079, 84/1, 107/3

Enter extract details if it is an extract rather than a whole piece.

This should be an indication of what the extract is,
eg. Folio 28, Indictment 840079, E107, Letter dated 22/11/1995.
Do not enter details of why the extract is sensitive.

If closed under the FOI Act, enter the FOI exemption numbers applying to the closure, eg. 27(1), 40(2).

Sign and date next to the reason why the record is not available to the public ie. Closed under FOI exemption; Retained under section 3(4) of the Public Records Act 1958; Temporarily retained; Missing at transfer or Number not used.

| | |
|---|--|
| DEPARTMENT/SERIES T639 PIECE/ITEM 122 (one piece/item number) | Date and sign |
| Extract details: BRIEF No 7 PAGE 4 |  |
| CLOSED UNDER FOI EXEMPTION S27 | 7/6/16 |
| RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3(4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT 1958 | |
| TEMPORARILY RETAINED | |
| MISSING AT TRANSFER | |
| NUMBER NOT USED | |
| MISSING (TNA USE ONLY) | |
| DOCUMENT PUT IN PLACE (TNA USE ONLY) | |

Instructions for completion of Dummy Card

Use black or blue pen to complete form.

Use the card for one piece or for each extract removed from a different place within a piece.

Enter the department and series,
eg. HO 405, J 82.

Enter the piece and item references, .
eg. 28, 1079, 84/1, 107/3

Enter extract details if it is an extract rather than a whole piece.
This should be an indication of what the extract is,
eg. Folio 28, Indictment 840079, E107, Letter dated 22/11/1995.
Do not enter details of why the extract is sensitive.

If closed under the FOI Act, enter the FOI exemption numbers applying to the closure, eg. 27(1), 40(2).

Sign and date next to the reason why the record is not available to the public ie. Closed under FOI exemption; Retained under section 3(4) of the Public Records Act 1958; Temporarily retained; Missing at transfer or Number not used.

CONFIDENTIAL

BRIEF NO 8

NATO SUMMIT
9/10 June 1982

ARAB/ISRAEL

POINTS TO MAKE

1. Palestinian problem increasingly urgent. Failure to achieve negotiated settlement will mean increasing instability in the region, more opportunities for Soviet Union. Tension on Israel/Lebanon border one facet of this. Renewed hostilities there would be highly dangerous for Middle East peace.
2. Only basis for comprehensive settlement remains mutual acceptance by Palestinians and Israelis of each other's rights. All Allies have part to play in bringing this about.
3. Israeli settlement policy in Occupied Territories making negotiated peace on lines envisaged since 1967 unworkable. US have key role in ensuring Israelis do not foreclose Palestinian options before negotiations begin.

ESSENTIAL FACTS

4. The US have committed themselves to intensified efforts to reach agreement in the autonomy talks, but they may delay putting forward proposals until after the mid-term elections in November. In his speech in Chicago on 26 May, Mr Haig emphasised the US view that autonomy should lead to a genuinely transitional arrangement, leaving longer-term options open. The US see autonomy as the only process likely to achieve Israeli agreement and therefore the only hope of establishing a freeze on Israeli settlements in the Occupied Territories, which continue at an increasing pace.

/But

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

But Israel's proposals for limited autonomy are intended to be a stepping stone to annexation of the West Bank. The US will have to exert strong pressure on Israel if autonomy is to result in an arrangement safeguarding the Palestinians' right to self-determination. This is a minimum requirement if autonomy is to lead on to a wider negotiation involving the Palestinians themselves. A major role for the Europeans in the coming months will be to encourage the US in this direction. One way would be to lend support to the Egyptian definition of autonomy.

5. Mr Haig's speech showed that US attention is focussed on the autonomy talks, Lebanon and the Iran/Iraq war. But the Arabs are growing increasingly frustrated at what they see as the West's failure to respond adequately to a range of recent Israeli actions: the annexation of the Golan; the clamp-down on the West Bank and Gaza; and the announcement of plans to accelerate the settlements policy. Against this background the return of Sinai, though welcomed privately by many Arabs, has not brought a solution to the Palestinian problem any nearer. Indeed recent statements by Israeli Ministers to the effect that no further settlements will ever be given up in the cause of peace have made the task of achieving a negotiated settlement following Israeli withdrawal, as envisaged in Resolution 242, more difficult.

6. The scope for a greater European role is limited. But, in addition to putting our views to the Americans, we can continue to impress on the Arabs that it is in their interests to take the initiative with a peace proposal involving conditional acceptance of Israel. The moderates, encouraged by Egypt's experience and given confidence by her return to the fold, are receptive to this argument. But growing divisions in the Arab world resulting from the Iran/Iraq war make it unlikely that a unified Arab position on Arab/Israel can be achieved soon.

CONFIDENTIAL

7. Southern Lebanon: Since Israeli Air Force attacks on Palestinian targets, and limited PLO retaliations on 9 May, both sides have continued to observe ceasefire. But situation still tense. Although they have withdrawn some troops, the Israelis still have enough forces on the border to launch, without warning, a ground invasion designed to push PLO forces out of range of the Northern Israeli settlements. Any serious attack by the PLO, particularly one involving Israeli casualties, would provide the pretext.

Foreign and Commonwealth Office
1 June 1982

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

BRIEF NO 9

NATO SUMMIT
9/10 June 1982

IRAN/IRAQ

POINTS TO MAKE

West's Role

1. Little that we can do to stop the war. Declaration by the Ten (24 May) should help hold the position. Resort to UN (new US initiative) unlikely to bring peace nearer - UN treated Iran badly in September 1980.

Soviet Position

2. Soviets in a dilemma. Will wish to avoid making choice. If forced to make a decision would probably opt for Iraq.

ESSENTIAL FACTS

State of the War

3. Iran, in retaking Khorramshahr, has expelled the last major concentration of Iraqi forces from Iran. Iran can claim a clear moral and military victory over Iraq. Saddam Hussein has suffered an ignominious defeat and his leadership of the Ba'ath regime may now come under challenge.

Prospects for Peace

4. The expulsion of all Iraqi forces from Iranian territory will have met one of Iran's preconditions for peace and negotiated settlement. The downfall of Saddam Hussein, a

/recent

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

recent additional condition voiced in statements by the leadership in Tehran, may be their next goal. Iran may decide to turn the screw by making threatening gestures against Basra. Any invasion of Iraqi territory would have serious repercussions for Saddam Hussein. The prospects for an early ceasefire and negotiated settlement are not good.

Role of the West

5. Recent statement by the Ten is about as far as we should go for the moment. Understand US are thinking about bringing in the UN Security Council (Haig's Chicago speech). This will enrage Iran and not bring a settlement closer.

Soviet Position

6. Soviet Union in a dilemma. Wish to avoid making a choice between Iran and Iraq. Soviet/Iranian relations are not warm. If Soviet Union has to choose, she will probably opt to support Iraq.

Regional Factors

7. Moderate Arabs continue to be gravely perturbed by the prospects of a victorious Iran and the downfall of Saddam Hussein. Arab radicals (PDRY, Syria, Libya, PLO and Algeria) have come out in strong support for Iran. This may restrain Iran from invading Iraq and help end her isolation.

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

1 June 1982

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

BRIEF NO 10

NATO SUMMIT
9/10 June 1982

CENTRAL AMERICA

POINTS TO MAKE

1. Recognise importance of area to US. Shall support US policy there as far as politically possible.
2. Share US concern at Soviet-backed Cuban challenge in the area: support for guerrillas, especially in El Salvador and Guatemala; political and military assistance to Nicaragua. US views on developments and on proposed dialogue with Nicaragua?
3. Human rights considerations must also be taken into account. Authorities in El Salvador and Guatemala must demonstrate improvements.
4. Hope all parties in El Salvador can now work together to provide a basis for peaceful settlement. How does US see future?
5. (Defensive) British troops remain in Belize for a limited period to help protect Belize against external attack. No decision taken yet on timing of departure. Meanwhile we and Belize remain ready to resume negotiations with Guatemala.

ESSENTIAL FACTS

El Salvador

6. In the Constituent Assembly election of 28 March the

CONFIDENTIAL

/Christian



1941

1941

1941

1941

1941

1941

1941

1941

1941

1941

1941

1941

1941

1941

1941

1941

1941

1941

1941

1941

1941

1941

1941

1941

CONFIDENTIAL

Christian Democrats topped the poll but did not gain enough seats to outvote the right-wing parties. Those parties united around the leader of the extremist ARENA party who was elected President (Speaker) of the Assembly. Other right-wingers won the Assembly's other offices.

7. After four weeks of infighting and US pressure the moderate Sr Alvaro Magana was appointed interim President of the Republic. The Christian Democrats have three posts in his new Government. But ARENA control the key Ministries of Economy, Foreign Trade and Agriculture.

8. The right-wing have already forced the suspension of the previous government's land reform policies even though the US Government had urged that they be continued. This may undermine US Congressional support for further economic and military assistance on which El Salvador depends. US Congress (and international opinion generally) would also be watching for signs that the new Government are determined to end human rights abuses by those associated with the security forces.

9. The prospects for a negotiated solution with the armed opposition remain poor. So far neither side has made their position clear, although press reports suggest that President Magana has not ruled out dialogue. Meanwhile the infighting continues.

Guatemala

10. A 3-man military junta took power following a bloodless coup on 23 March. They annulled the Presidential elections of 7 March, claiming that they were corrupt. The coup leader, a 'born-again Christian', was previously known as a leftist. But the regime's overall political orientation has not become clear.

/11.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

11. There are some encouraging signs: a new Statute places great emphasis on respect for human rights and individual freedom; junta leaders claim to want the return of democracy and an end to corruption; civilians have been told to hand in their arms.

12. But Guatemala has an appalling human rights record (worse than El Salvador). Political moderates have been systematically eliminated over the years. The junta may not last.

Nicaragua

13. The leftward drift continues: 5,000-6,000 Cuban 'advisers'; military build-up helped by Cuba, the USSR and Eastern Europe; the statements by leaders re-affirm commitment to Marxism-Leninism.

14. In March a State of Emergency was declared on the pretext of deliberate US destabilization and the alleged threat from Nicaraguan exiles training in the USA and Honduras. Civil rights are suspended and the media censored. Border tension between Nicaragua and Honduras is growing.

15. There was an abortive attempt at a dialogue between the US and Nicaragua in 1981. Although the atmosphere remains distinctly sour, Nicaragua and the US have agreed to fresh talks. But the Americans do not seem optimistic. Their main aim is to curb Nicaraguan support for the Salvadorean insurgents. The chances of securing a worthwhile guarantee on this must be very slim.

Belize/Guatemala (Only as Background in case raised)

16. Before the 23 March coup in Guatemala Britain, Belize and Guatemala had agreed to make every effort to resolve Guatemala's claim to Belize. The coup put an end to those hopes for the time being. The junta have re-iterated Guatemala's claim; but their attitude is not yet clear.

CONFIDENTIAL

17. The Falklands Islands invasion has led to fresh popular protests in Guatemala over Belize. At the Rio Treaty meeting on the Falklands the Guatemalan Foreign Minister said that as both Guatemala and Argentina had had their sovereign territory robbed by force of British arms they were equally justified in seeking to restore the situation.

18. Nevertheless we have observed no visible signs that Guatemala might be preparing to invade Belize.

Foreign and Commonwealth Office
1. June 1982

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

BRIEF NO 11

NATO SUMMIT
9/10 June 1982

AFGHANISTAN

POINTS TO MAKE

1. Must not allow issue to drop from sight. Must continually remind Russians that Afghanistan remains a central issue in East/West relations.
2. Cordovez's indirect talks in Geneva unlikely to make progress but may possibly help increase pressure on Russians.
3. Do Americans see hope of Soviet movement on Afghanistan?

ESSENTIAL FACTS

4. Since the UNGA vote on 18 November 1981 (116-23-12), Afghanistan has attracted little international attention (apart from Afghanistan Day on 21 March). Western Governments generally continue to mention Afghanistan in public statements, (eg. Reagan's 'Eureka' speech on 9 May) but the issue risks becoming overlaid as other problems supervene.
5. Ten's initiative remains on table and there is no scope for a new Western initiative at present. The Islamic Conference is inactive. Americans see Afghanistan as offering more hope for movement than other issues but have provided no supporting evidence.
6. International activity centres on efforts of UN Secretary-General's Personal Representative, Cordovez, who recently visited Kabul, Islamabad and Tehran and reached agreement to resume 'indirect talks' in Geneva on 15 June.

CONFIDENTIAL

/Iran

CONFIDENTIAL

Iran may participate for first time. The Russians hope 'indirect talks' will lead to a deal between the Karmal regime and Pakistan, and have adopted constructive posture. But Pakistani and Iranian stance on essential requirements of Soviet withdrawal and non-recognition of Karmal regime may put pressure on Russians. Meanwhile Ten encouraging Cordovez to go to Moscow.

7. The growing number of refugees (now 2.6 million in Pakistan alone) is creating a serious humanitarian and financial problem. A conference could serve humanitarian and political purposes. Pakistan did not want to propose one this year but may next year ask the UNHCR to convene one.

Foreign and Commonwealth Office
1 June 1982

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

BRIEF NO 12

NATO SUMMIT
9/10 June 1982

NAMIBIA

POINTS TO MAKE

Regret Recent Lack of Progress

1. Regret that SWAPO and Front Line States rejected mixed electoral system proposed by Five for elections to Constituent Assembly. But we remain committed to aim of implementing UN Plan in 1982.

Five to Put Forward Proposals

2. Five intend soon to present new proposals on outstanding issues. We shall need support from non-Five countries so as to persuade governments and parties concerned to adopt positive and flexible attitudes towards the Five's proposals with the objective of achieving quick agreement.

Namibian Settlement Would Benefit West

3. Solution to Namibia problem would be diplomatic success for West and should help improve relations with Front Line States and Africa in general. Settlement would remove serious source of instability in region, and so reduce opportunities for Soviet bloc meddling.

Five to Maintain Present Negotiations

4. Five intend to continue negotiating approach, but ready to consider use of additional negotiating mechanisms

/in

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

future, including (if appropriate) all-party conference as requested by SWAPO.

ESSENTIAL FACTS

5. Despite a simplification proposed in early April, the Five have not achieved agreement on their proposals for constitutional principles for the Namibian Constituent Assembly, including a mixed electoral system under which half the Assembly members would be elected from single member constituencies and half by proportional representation from nation-wide party lists. SWAPO do not consider that the simplification goes far enough to meet their objection to the mixed system itself. The South African Government earlier accepted it in principle, but want the details to be decided later by their Administrator-General in the territory and the UN Special Representative. (NOT FOR USE: South Africa has declined to reconsider the question, eg. to accept an unmixed system as preferred by SWAPO. Unless the US can get South Africa to show more flexibility, the problem may have to be shelved.)

6. Foreign Ministers of the Five met in Luxembourg on 17 May to consider how to break the stalemate (communiqué attached). They announced that they intended soon to present the new proposals on outstanding issues, mainly on the size and role of the UN Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) and on impartiality of the electoral process.

7. (NOT FOR USE): Foreign Ministers were in part encouraged to accelerate the negotiations by American reports of South African willingness to show flexibility on practically all outstanding issues, and to contemplate an early date for beginning implementation of the UN Plan, well before the end of 1982. The Five agreed that the South African apparent

/change

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

change of heart should be taken at face value, and that new proposals on unresolved issues should accordingly be presented quickly to the parties concerned. The Five have also agreed to support American negotiations aimed at securing withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola during implementation of the UN Plan for a Namibia settlement.

Foreign and Commonwealth Office
1 June 1982

CONFIDENTIAL

NAMIBIA: COMMUNIQUÉ ISSUED BY FOREIGN MINISTERS OF THE FIVE,
LUXEMBOURG, 17 MAY 1982

The Foreign Ministers of Canada, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, the UK and the USA met in Luxembourg on 17 May 1982 to pursue their efforts to achieve an early settlement of the problem of Namibia in accordance with Security Council Resolution 435.

The Ministers noted the replies received from the parties concerned to the Five's proposal for constitutional principles for the Namibian constituent assembly. In the light of these replies, Ministers instructed their officials to accelerate the resolution of outstanding issues with a view to maintaining their target of beginning implementation of UNSCR 435 during 1982. They expect soon to present proposals to the parties concerned notably on impartiality and UNTAG.

They stressed the need for positive and flexible responses to these proposals when they are presented, in order to achieve early implementation of UNSCR 435.

The Ministers agreed to keep under review additional negotiating mechanisms which might prove useful as matters develop.

