

PREM19

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DEFENCE

(Modernisation of TNF in
Europe) (Part 1)

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PREM 19/15

PART 1 ends:-

USSR Embassy to MODBA 29.11.79

PART 2 begins:-

PM to Brezhnev 3.12.79

TO BE RETAINED AS TOP ENCLOSURE

Cabinet / Cabinet Committee Documents

Reference	Date
MISC 7 (79) 2 nd Meeting, Minutes	10.7.79
MISC 7 (79) 3 rd Meeting, Minutes	19.9.79
CC (79) 17 th Conclusions, Minute 2 (extract)	18.10.79

The documents listed above, which were enclosed on this file, have been removed and destroyed. Such documents are the responsibility of the Cabinet Office. When released they are available in the appropriate **CAB (CABINET OFFICE) CLASSES**

Signed *C. Wayland*

Date *27 October 2009*

PREM Records Team

016
Michael O/R.



ПОСОЛЬСТВО
СОЮЗА СОВЕТСКИХ
СОЦИАЛИСТИЧЕСКИХ РЕСПУБЛИК

29th November, 1979

Dear Mr.Alexander,

With reference to yesterday's exchanges in the House of Commons, in particular about the "reluctance" of the Soviet Union to negotiate on disarmament, the Ambassador has asked me to provide you with the enclosed text of A.A.Gromyko's statement and answers at the press conference in Bonn on 23rd November, 1979.

Yours sincerely,

V.Dolgov,
Counsellor at the USSR
Embassy

Mr.M.Alexander,
Private Secretary to the
Prime Minister,
10 Downing Street,
London SW1

29 NOV 1979



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NOV 29 1979

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ANDREI GROMYKO REPEATS OFFER OF IMMEDIATE
TALKS ON MEDIUM-RANGE NUCLEAR WEAPONS

Andrei Gromyko has reiterated the USSR's readiness to enter into negotiations straight away on the question of medium-range nuclear weapons in Europe.

Speaking at a press conference in Bonn on November 23 during an official visit to the Federal Republic of Germany, the USSR Foreign Minister said that negotiations should begin before the adoption of any decision to deploy new types of nuclear missiles in Western Europe.

The governments of some NATO countries, he pointed out, were openly saying that negotiations with the Soviet Union should be conducted from a position of strength.

"Such an approach", Andrei Gromyko declared, "amounts to laying down preliminary political conditions. This destroys the basis for negotiations".

The deployment of US medium-range nuclear weapons in Western Europe was not a path to détente and the improvement of the situation in Europe. On the contrary, it would represent a new stage in the arms race.

Alluding to western claims that NATO's plans were a reaction to the deployment by the Soviet Union of a certain type of weapon on its territory, referred to in the West as the SS-20, Andrei Gromyko said that what was actually taking place was the modernisation of existing types of missile launchers. The fact was that the NATO countries had also modernised their armaments, and more than once, including some similar types of weapons.

The USSR Foreign Minister stressed the special importance of observing the principle of equality and equal security of the parties in working out agreements.

"When Leonid Brezhnev and President Carter met in Vienna and signed the SALT-2 treaty", he said, "satisfaction was expressed on both sides regarding the fact that the negotiations had been conducted on the basis of the said principle.

"Furthermore, many statements have been made to the effect that at present there exists an approximate equality of forces between East and West. Now, however, all of a sudden, representatives of western countries, including the United States, assert

that there is no equality and that this will allegedly be reached only after the implementation of the NATO plans concerned.

"The question arises as to when the US President expressed the real position of the United States? Today or in Vienna? One statement contradicts the other. In reality, however, the implementation of the plans to deploy new types of nuclear weapons in Western Europe would lead to upsetting the balance of forces, whose existence was previously attested to tens of times by the leaders of the NATO countries".

Refuting the arguments used in the West to the effect that all these questions could be discussed while preparing the SALT-3 treaty, Andrei Gromyko observed:

"So far there is no agreement as to what countries will participate in negotiations on SALT-3. Some might say: it will, of course, be the Soviet Union and the USA. However, the question arises as to whether these two countries will be the only ones. The fact is that other countries also have strategic weapons.

"One must have equality, but between what and between whom? Why must the Soviet Union always proceed from the premise that only equality between the USA and the Soviet Union is at issue. What about the allies of the United States which possess nuclear weapons? This question also arises".

Referring to the presence of US bases in Europe, the so-called forward-based nuclear systems, Andrei Gromyko said that the Soviet Union had "made a concession" at the SALT-2 talks, agreeing to the SALT-2 treaty being signed without account being taken of this geographical factor, "which is profitable only to the West, to the United States".

"The Soviet Union has no similar advantage to offset the importance of this factor". Andrei Gromyko pointed out, stressing that this must also be taken into account.

Asked whether the Soviet Union deemed negotiations possible in the event of the adoption by the forthcoming NATO session of the decision on additional armaments, Andrei Gromyko said:

"The present position of the NATO countries, including the Federal Republic of Germany, as it stands today, destroys the basis for the negotiations. We have stated this to the government of the FRG.

"If such a decision is taken while our proposal to begin negotiations is rejected, the position of the western powers will thus destroy the basis for the negotiations. It will no longer exist. If such a situation arises, this will mean that some countries will have decided, if one can put it this way, to try their luck through a new spiral in the arms race".

The Soviet Foreign Minister recalled that, in his speech in Berlin, Leonid Brezhnev had clearly pointed out that if these plans were implemented the Soviet Union would be forced, in view of the circumstances, to take adequate steps in order to ensure the interests of its own security and the security of other member-countries of the Warsaw Treaty.

The implementation by the NATO countries of the plans to deploy new types of nuclear weapons would also complicate, significantly complicate, the possibility of achieving success at the Vienna talks, Andrei Gromyko pointed out. He reminded his audience that the proposals tabled by the socialist countries at the Vienna forum almost one and a half years ago had so far not been answered by the western participants in the negotiations.

The USSR Foreign Minister reaffirmed the readiness of the Soviet Union to discuss the question of a reduction in the number of Soviet medium-range missile launchers if no decision were taken by the forthcoming NATO session with regard to the deployment of US missiles in Europe.

*Type draft, & return
to me re MAP*

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

Dear Michael

29 November 1979

President Brezhnev's Letter to the Prime Minister

My letter of 5 November advised that any substantive reply to President Brezhnev's letter of 15 October should be sent in the second half of this month, and should take account of the communique issued by the Ministerial meeting of the Nuclear Planning Group on 13/14 November. The communique contained a good deal of useful material for a reply to recent Soviet moves on TNF issues, though it did not go as far as to give hard statistical information, as we had hoped. Several allied Heads of Government, including those of the FRG, the US, Denmark and Norway, have since sent replies to President Brezhnev. It would be timely therefore to decide whether a reply should go from the Prime Minister.

The principal Western response to President Brezhnev's letter and to the speech on which it was based will be made in the communique which follows the meeting of NATO Defence and Foreign Ministers on 12/14 December. I reported in my letter of 8 November that we are pressing ahead for decisions at these meetings, not only on TNF modernisation but also on TNF arms control, the reduction of US nuclear warheads, confidence building measures and new proposals for MBFR and Associated Measures (you will now have seen Lord Carrington's minute of 23 November on TNF Arms Control). One possible course of action would be to defer the reply until after these decisions have been taken. But in our view it would be preferable to get a reply in earlier. We cannot be certain that the British intentions for next month's NATO meeting will be realised in full; as you know, some of our less resolute allies have reservations about parts of the package. In view of current Soviet comments (most recently in Gromyko's press conference in Bonn on 23 November) that TNF modernisation will weaken the prospects for TNF arms control, there would also be advantage in putting on the record soon the fact that NATO envisages early US-Soviet negotiations.

We suggest therefore that a reply should be delivered by our Ambassador in Moscow in the course of this week. I attach a draft which you may wish to consider for this purpose. We also recommend that the gist of any message should be passed to our Allies after delivery, thus acting in the same way as other Allies who have sent replies.

I am sending copies of this letter and its enclosure to Brian Norbury (MOD) and Martin Vile (Cabinet Office).

M O D B Alexander Esq
10 Downing Street
LONDON

*Yours
P Lever*

*P.A.
(This is in the
briefing folder for
next week's
meeting of NISC,
& you know.)
Amis*

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Type 1 +

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

Top Secret.
Secret.
Confidential.
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Unclassified.

To:-

PROPOSED DRAFT REPLY FROM PRIME
MINISTER TO PRESIDENT BREZHNEV
(TO BE DELIVERED BY HM AMBASSADOR
AT MOSCOW)

From

Telephone No. Ext.

Department

PRIVACY MARKING

..... In Confidence

Thank you for the letter which your Ambassador delivered on 15 October, summarising the ideas set out in your speech on 6 October in East Berlin.

The British Government have welcomed the announcement that you intend to withdraw troops, tanks and other equipment from the German Democratic Republic; we take this as an encouraging sign that you too are concerned to make progress in the negotiations in Vienna and that it will be possible to reach agreements there leading to equal collective ceilings for NATO and Warsaw Pact forces in Central Europe. We have also noted with interest your ideas for expanding the scope of confidence building measures. We shall take these ideas seriously into account when preparing for the Madrid CSCE Review Conference, at which we and our Allies will have proposals of our own to make. We have welcomed in particular the indication that the Soviet Government would be willing to discuss the possibility of limiting long range nuclear weapons relevant to the European theatre. This is very much in line with thinking in NATO, where this subject has been under intense discussion for many months.

While I note what you say about the numbers of medium range bombers and missile launchers in the European part of the Soviet Union, I cannot overlook the fact that the overall capability of Soviet nuclear systems within range of Western Europe has greatly increased during this decade. At a time when NATO has not introduced any new land-based long range theatre nuclear systems, the latest Soviet systems

have been deployed in substantial numbers. As a result the Soviet Union's capability in this area has significantly improved in terms of warhead numbers, accuracy and survivability. This development has created an imbalance between the Soviet and Western forces, which has given rise to widespread anxiety in Western Europe. It is to prevent this imbalance from becoming more serious in the next decade that NATO is considering plans to modernise its long range theatre forces and to make full use of the opportunities for arms control. We attach equal importance to both parts of this programme.

In a speech which I delivered in Luxembourg on 18 October, I explained that the restoration of a military balance in Europe was not an end in itself but that it was the necessary condition for the development of relations between East and West. I argued for a realistic dialogue designed to build on our interests where they coincide and to limit the consequences where they conflict. It is in this spirit that I have studied your letter. The British Government look forward, in the coming months, to building on several of the ideas which you have put forward.

I also note your assurance that the Soviet Union does not seek military superiority. But I hope that you for your part will understand the real concern in Western Europe that, while the central strategic balance is being stabilised through SALT, there is a growing disparity in long range theatre nuclear capabilities, which adds to the existing imbalance in conventional forces in Central Europe. This imbalance cannot be ignored in the realistic pursuit of better East/West relations to which the British Government is committed.

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FM BONN 262045Z NOV 79

TO ROUTINE FCO

TELEGRAM NCABER 715 OF 26 NOVEMBER

*Prime Minister**Ant*

PERSONAL FOR PUS.

MY TELEGRAM NUMBER NO. 708 : GROMYKO'S VISIT TO BONN

ant

1. BLECH (POLITICAL DIRECTOR) TOLD THE MINISTER ON 26 NOVEMBER THAT THE GERMANS WISHED US TO BE AWARE OF ONE ASPECT OF THE DISCUSSIONS WITH GROMYKO WHICH HAD NOT BEEN COVERED IN VAN WELL'S BRIEFING. THIS WAS THE WAY IN WHICH GROMYKO HAD SINGLED OUT THE PRIME MINISTER FOR CRITICISM, PRIMARILY IN THE DISCUSSION OF TNF. HE HAD COMPLAINED PARTICULARLY OF THE PRIME MINISTER'S REFERENCE TO THE NEED FOR THE WEST TO NEGOTIATE QUOTE FROM A POSITION OF STRENGTH UNQUOTE WHICH HE HAD DESCRIBED AS AN ATTEMPT TO PUT THE SOVIET UNION UNDER QUOTE CRUDE PRESSURE UNQUOTE. LANGUAGE OF THIS KIND REVEALED THE MILITARISTIC CHARACTER OF WESTERN INTENTIONS LIKE QUOTE A PIECE OF IRON STICKING OUT OF THE SACK UNQUOTE. GENSCHER HAD REPLIED THAT NO SENSIBLE PERSON NEGOTIATED FROM A POSITION OF WEAKNESS; AS FOR IRON IN THE SACK, THE WEST REGARDED THE SS.20 AS A PIECE OF IRON IN THEIR BACK. GROMYKO RETURNED TO THE CHARGE MORE THAN ONCE. AT ANOTHER POINT, HE COMPLAINED THAT THE PRIME MINISTER SEEMED UNAWARE THAT THE WORLD WAS ON THE EDGE OF A STEEP SLOPE. ACCORDING TO BLECH, GENSCHER THEN SAID THAT THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT WAS BEING EXTREMELY UNJUST (AUSSERORDENTLICH UNRECHT) TO MRS. THATCHER. THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT HAD COME TO RECOGNISE IN HER A STATESMAN OF COURAGE AND WISDOM. HE REFERRED GROMYKO TO THE PRIME MINISTER'S HANDLING OF THE LUSAKA CONFERENCE. GROMYKO RETORTED BY ASKING GENSCHER WHETHER HE HAD READ THE SPEECH IN WHICH MRS. THATCHER REFERRED TO NEGOTIATING FROM A POSITION OF STRENGTH. GENSCHER REPLIED THAT THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT PREFERRED TO JUDGE MRS. THATCHER BY WHAT THEY KNEW OF HER FUNDAMENTAL ATTITUDES TO WORLD PROBLEMS RATHER THAN BY ISOLATED QUOTATIONS WHICH HE (GENSCHER) HAD NOT NECESSARILY READ.

2. BLECH OFFERED NO GLOSS ON THESE EXCHANGES. BUT HE WAS CONCERNED TO EMPHASISE THE INSISTENCE WITH WHICH GROMYKO HAD ATTACKED THE PRIME MINISTER AND THE FIRMNESS WITH WHICH GENSCHER HAD TAKEN UP THE CUDGELS ON HER BEHALF.

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PS/MR BLAKER

PS/PUS

MR BULLIARD

MR FERGUSSON

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FM BONN 261845Z NOV 79

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 711 OF 25 NOVEMBER

INFO IMMEDIATE UKDEL NATO

INFO PRIORITY MOSCOW WASHINGTON THE HAGUE COPENHAGEN BRUSSELS ROME

UKDEL VIENNA

INFO ROUTINE OTHER NATO POSTS

MIPT

GROMYKO'S VISIT TO BONN: PRESS CONFERENCE.

THE FOLLOWING IS OUR TRANSLATION OF TWO QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS WHICH OCCURRED DURING GROMYKO'S PRESS CONFERENCE ON 23 NOVEMBER. THE GERMAN TEXT, WHICH HAS ALREADY BEEN PASSED TO THE DEPARTMENT BY TELEPHONE, WAS A TRANSCRIPT BY THE AUSWERTIGES AMT OF A CONSECUTIVE TRANSLATION FROM THE RUSSIAN CARRIED OUT BY A RUSSIAN OFFICIAL.

QUESTION: I AM NOT YET CLEAR ABOUT WHETHER YOU WILL NEGOTIATE AFTER THIS NATO DECISION OR NOT

ANSWER: I HAVE SAID THAT THE PRESENT POSITION OF NATO BUT ALSO THE THE PRESENT POSITION OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC, AS IT STANDS AT PRESENT, DESTROYS THE BASIS FOR NEGOTIATIONS. WE HAVE STATED THIS TO THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT ACCORDINGLY.

QUESTION: DID YOUR ANSWER TO THE PREVIOUS QUESTION MEAN THAT THE SOVIET UNION WILL NOT BE PREPARED UNDER ANY CIRCUMSTANCES TO INITIATE NEGOTIATIONS ON EURO-STRATEGIC WEAPONS, IF NATO TAKES ITS DECISIONS AS PLANNED?

ANSWER: SHOULD THE DECISION BE TAKEN, SHOULD OUR PROPOSAL TO START IMMEDIATE NEGOTIATIONS, BE REJECTED, THE POSITION OF THE WESTERN SIDE WILL DESTROY THE BASIS FOR NEGOTIATIONS. NEGOTIATIONS CANNOT TAKE PLACE IF SOME COUNTRIES TRY TO SEEK THEIR FORTUNE IN A NEW ARMS RACE.

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TO IMMEDIATE FCC

TELEGRAM NUMBER 710 OF 26 NOVEMBER

INFO IMMEDIATE UKDEL NATO

INFO PRIORITY MOSCOW, WASHINGTON, THE HAGUE, BRUSSELS, ROME,

UKDEL VIENNA, COPENHAGEN

INFO SAVING OTHER NATO POSTS, BMG BERLIN

*Prime Minister**Paul**arb*

BY TELNO 708 : GROMYKO'S VISIT TO BONN

1. THIS AFTERNOON BLECH GAVE A FURTHER BRIEFING TO REPRESENTATIVES OF NATO COUNTRIES, WHICH TOOK ACCOUNT OF GROMYKO'S PRESS CONFERENCE ON 23 NOVEMBER AND A FURTHER HALF-HOUR TALK BETWEEN GENSCHER AND GROMYKO AT THE AIRPORT ON 24 NOVEMBER.

2. BLECH EXPLAINED THAT GROMYKO'S REMARKS IN THE PRESS CONFERENCE TO THE EFFECT THAT AN ALLIANCE DECISION ON THE MODERNISATION OF THEATRE NUCLEAR FORCES WOULD DESTROY THE BASIS FOR ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS HAD NOT BEEN USED DURING GROMYKO'S TALKS WITH SCHMIDT AND GENSCHER. MOREOVER THEY CONTRASTED MARKEDLY WITH THE MOST RECENT STATEMENTS BY THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP, FOR INSTANCE BREZHNEV'S SPEECH ON 6 OCTOBER, SAMYATIN'S REMARKS ABOUT A DOUBLE STRATEGY ON 7 NOVEMBER AND SAGLADIN'S INTERVIEW WITH THE WEST BERLIN NEWSPAPER QUOTE DIE WAHRHEIT UNQUOTE ON 19 NOVEMBER.

3. BLECH SAID THAT IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT THE JOINT COMMUNIQUE THE TEXT OF WHICH FOLLOWS BY TELGRAM, HAD BEEN AGREED AFTER THE PRESS CONFERENCE. THIS EMPHASISES THAT THERE IS NO REASONABLE ALTERNATIVE TO THE POLICY OF DETENTE AND THAT THE FORMULATION OF FURTHER STEPS IN THE FIELD OF DISARMAMENT AND ARMS CONTROL SHOULD BE ACCELERATED. IT WAS ALSO SIGNIFICANT THAT, CONTRARY TO USUAL PRACTICE AND AT RUSSIAN REQUEST, THE COMMUNIQUE REFERRED TO SCHMIDT'S INTENTION TO VISIT MOSCOW. THIS REFERENCE HAD ALSO BEEN INSERTED AFTER GROMYKO'S PRESS CONFERENCE.

4. DURING THE TALK WITH GENSCHER AT THE AIRPORT, GROMYKO HAD COMMENTED THAT THE TALKS HAD TAKEN PLACE IN A GOOD ATMOSPHERE. HE HAD EXPLAINED THAT THE SOVIET UNION COULD NOT SANCTION A NATO DECISION ON TNF. BREZHNEV WISHED TO NEGOTIATE WITHOUT SUCH A DECISION. IN GENERAL, BLECH SAID THAT THE TENOR OF THE TALK AT THE AIRPORT CORRESPONDED TO THE POSITIVE TONE OF THE REST

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OF THE TALKS RATHER THAN TO THAT ADOPTED DURING THE PRESS CONFERENCE. GROMYKO SEEMED TO WANT TO AVOID DRAMATISING THE SITUATION TO WHICH HIS REMARKS AT THE PRESS CONFERENCE HAD GIVEN RISE.

5. BLECH COMMENTED THAT THE RUSSIANS HAD CLEARLY GONE FURTHER IN THEIR OPPOSITION TO TNF MODERNISATION THAN HITHERTO. BUT GROMYKO COULD HARDLY HAVE SAID LESS IN PUBLIC WITHOUT GIVING THE IMPRESSION THAT THE SOVIET UNION WERE IN FACT ACQUIESCING IN THE ALLIANCE'S DECISIONS. THE GERMANS EXPECTED THEM TO CONTINUE THEIR CAMPAIGN OF OPPOSITION UP TO THE LAST MOMENT AND THE CONFERENCE OF FOREIGN MINISTERS OF THE WARSAW PACT WOULD GIVE THEM ANOTHER OPPORTUNITY TO DO SO. ONE POSSIBLE INTERPRETATION OF GROMYKO'S REMARKS WAS THAT THE RUSSIANS WOULD NOT BE PREPARED TO NEGOTIATE ON TNF BUT WOULD CONTINUE TO NEGOTIATE IN OTHER AREAS. IN THE GERMANS' VIEW HOWEVER, THE RUSSIANS WOULD PROVE WILLING TO NEGOTIATE, EVEN ON TNF, IF THE ALLIANCE TOOK ITS DECISIONS AS PLANNED. THE GERMAN VIEW REMAINED THAT THIS WAS WHAT THE ALLIANCE SHOULD DO. BLECH THEN DREW ATTENTION TO GENSCHER'S REMARKS ON TELEVISION ON 23 NOVEMBER WHEN HE SAID THAT NEGOTIATION COULD NOT BE CONDUCTED WITH PRECONDITIONS, NOR PURSUED OVER A TELEVISION SCREEN OR IN PRESS CONFERENCES: THEY MUST BE AT A NEGOTIATING TABLE

6. EVIDENTLY REFERRING TO THE POSITION OF THE DANISH GOVERNMENT, BLECH SAID THAT AT NO TIME DURING THE TALKS WITH GROMYKO HAD THERE BEEN ANY TRACE OF RUSSIAN INTEREST IN DELAYING NATO'S DECISION FOR 6 MONTHS OR A YEAR.

7. A TRANSLATION OF THE KEY SENTENCES IN GROMYKO'S PRESS CONFERENCE FOLLOWS IN MIFT.

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FM BONN 241240Z NOV 79

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 707 OF 24 NOVEMBER

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON UKDEL NATO

INFO PRIORITY ALL OTHER NATO POSTS, PARIS, MOSCOW, UKDEL VIENNA

INFO ROUTINE BMG BERLIN

GROMYKO'S VISIT TO BONN

1. GROMYKO ARRIVED IN BONN FROM MADRID IN THE EVENING OF 21 NOVEMBER AND LEFT IN THE MORNING OF 24 NOVEMBER. ON HIS ARRIVAL HE AND HIS WIFE DINED PRIVATELY WITH GENSCHER. THE FOLLOWING DAY WAS SPENT IN TALKS BETWEEN THE TWO FOREIGN MINISTER, BROKEN BY A RECEPTION GIVEN BY PRESIDENT CARSTENS. ON 23 NOVEMBER GROMYKO HAD BREAKFAST WITH THE CHANCELLOR AND SPENT FOUR HOURS IN TALKS WITH HIM AND GENSCHER. AN ACCOUNT OF THE DISCUSSIONS IS IN MIFT.
2. KOHL AND STRAUSS DECLINED INVITATIONS TO ATTEND THE PRESIDENT'S RECEPTION WITH THE RESULT THAT STRAUSS DID NOT MEET GROMYKO DURING THE VISIT. KOHL HOWEVER HAD AN HOUR AND A HALF OF PRIVATE TALKS AFTER GROMYKO'S PRESS CONFERENCE ON 23 NOVEMBER.
3. THE PRESS CONFERENCE LASTED NEARLY AN HOUR AND A HALF AND INCLUDED AN INTRODUCTORY STATEMENT, MADE WITHOUT NOTES, WHICH, WITH ITS TRANSLATION, LASTED FIFTY MINUTES. GROMYKO STARTED WITH A BRIEF REVIEW OF GERMAN-RUSSIAN BILATERAL RELATIONS IN WHICH HE PRAISED SCHMIDT FOR HAVING A CONSTRUCTIVE ATTITUDE TOWARDS EAST-WEST RELATIONS. HE THEN LAUNCHED INTO A STRONG ATTACK DIRECTED AT THE ALLIANCE AS A WHOLE ON THE PLANS FOR MODERNISATION OF THEATRE NUCLEAR FORCES, DRAWING ON BREZHNEV'S SPEECH OF 6 OCTOBER AND THE PRAVDA INTERVIEW OF 5 NOVEMBER. IN THE COURSE OF THIS ATTACK HE SAID QUOTE IF THIS NATO DECISION COMES ABOUT (ZUSTANDE KOMMT), NEGOTIATIONS WILL NO LONGER BE POSSIBLE UNQUOTE. THIS, AND REMARKS TO THE EFFECT THAT THE ALLIANCE DECISIONS AND THE POSITION OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT WOULD DESTROY THE BASIS FOR NEGOTIATIONS, WERE IN MARKED CONTRAST TO THE MORE FLEXIBLE LINE APPARENTLY TAKEN BY GROMYKO IN HIS TALKS WITH SCHMIDT AND GENSCHER AND HAVE TAKEN THE GERMANS BY SURPRISE. (FEDERAL GOVERNMENT SPOKESMAN HAD GONE ON RECORD IMMEDIATELY BEFORE THE PRESS CONFERENCE AS

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STATING THAT GROMYKO HAD MADE NO(NO) THREATS OF THIS KIND DURING THE TALKS). THE REMARKS ARE INTERPRETED IN THE GERMAN PRESS AS MEANING THAT THE SOVIET POSITION HAS HARDENED AND THAT THE SOVIET UNION WILL AFTER ALL REFUSE TO NEGOTIATE ABOUT TNF IF THE ALLIANCE TAKES THE DECISIONS ON MODERNISATION AS PLANNED. GENSCHER SUBSEQUENTLY GAVE A TELEVISION INTERVIEW IN WHICH HE STRESSED THAT NATO WOULD AGREE ON TNF MODERNISATION DESPITE GROMYKO'S WARNINGS.

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rd 23.11.79PM/79/94PRIME MINISTERTNF Arms Control

1. The TNF package, on which NATO Foreign and Defence Ministers will be invited to take decisions on 12 December, consists of a modernisation programme and a parallel arms control offer. The Defence Secretary is circulating a minute on the modernisation aspects. But we have not yet formally approved the arms control element in MISC 7, although we have endorsed the general idea - most recently in your message of 9 November to President Carter.
2. The Alliance's proposed arms control approach is set out in a report by the NATO Special Group. The report recommends twelve principles on which the handling of negotiations with the Soviet Union should be based. These are set out at Annex A. From our point of view the most importance are those dealing with the treatment of "allied" (ie British and French) systems (principle 6), the relationship between TNF arms control and modernisation (principle 1) and the substance of the Alliance negotiating offer (principles 11 and 12).
3. Principle 6 firmly states that TNF arms control negotiations should exclude "allied" systems. This is in line with the position we agreed to our MISC 7 meeting on 7 July. More recently, in the minute which I sent you on defence nuclear issues before President Giscard's visit, I suggest that our best policy is to keep out of the SALT process and to do everything possible to avoid any numerical constraints on our nuclear forces in SALT III. There was, however, some tendency in the Special Group to question whether principle 6 would prove realistic. But the Americans firmly rebutted any attempt to water down the text. From our point of view, it represents the best starting point for the Alliance to adopt in relation to TNF negotiations. If any

/UK



UK systems were drawn into these negotiations, it would be harder for us to insist on the exclusion of Polaris from SALT III as a whole. In my view this should be an important consideration when in due course we consider whether to acquire GLCMs of our own: it would be unrealistic to expect that UK owned GLCMs could be excluded from arms control negotiations if US owned systems of the same type and in the same location were included.

4. Principle 1 makes it clear that TNF modernisation must not be made hostage to arms control negotiations. The report firmly rejects the idea of a moratorium on TNF production while arms control negotiations go ahead, though it acknowledges that the scale of NATO's modernisation requirement could be reduced if arms control produces concrete results.

5. The recommended negotiating offer (principles 11 and 12) is for equal global ceilings on US and Soviet long range land-based theatre nuclear missiles within the framework of SALT III. In effect, this would involve upper limits on numbers of US GLCMs and Pershing II and on Soviet SS4, SS5 and SS20 missiles. It suits us to include this within the SALT III framework rather than as a negotiation clearly separate from central strategic systems.

6. We have consistently drawn attention to the desirability of constraining the Backfire bomber in addition to the SS20. The report states that Backfire "must be taken into account in the SALT III negotiations in an appropriate way". The Americans say that, because limitations on Backfire are a factor in the SALT II ratification debate, they are unable for political reasons to clarify this further at this stage. I think we can accept the present position. It commits the Americans to pursue the subject in SALT III (but not necessarily in the TNF context) and thus provides a basis for our pressing them again at a later stage.



7. The proposed arms control approach is deliberately broad brush. The Dutch and others regard a NATO arms control initiative as an essential accompaniment to decisions on modernisation. We have nevertheless successfully argued, together with the Americans and the Germans, that the Alliance should do nothing which would delay TNF modernisation or tie our hands in advance. I believe that the outcome is satisfactory. There are many points of detail which remain to be settled: for example, the size of the ceilings which the US should seek to negotiate on the Soviet systems consistent with NATO's own modernisation requirements. But our priority has been to obtain agreement on the outline of a coherent arms control policy without which support in the Alliance for the crucial TNF modernisation decision will not be forthcoming.

8. Subject to your views and those of our colleagues in MISC 7, I propose therefore that we should agree to endorse the plan before NATO for a negotiation on long-range theatre nuclear forces.

9. I am sending copies of this minute to the Defence Secretary, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, the Home Secretary and Sir Robert Armstrong.

(CARRINGTON)

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

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ANNEX A

The following principles designed to guide the United States in negotiation with the Soviet Union were agreed by the NATO Special Group set up to consider arms control negotiations involving theatre nuclear forces.

- 1) Arms control, involving TNF must be a complement to, not a substitute for, TNF modernisation.
- 2) Arms control negotiations involving TNF should be conducted within the SALT III framework.
- 3) Because negotiations in SALT III involving TNF would be of great significance to the overall security of the Alliance, there should be special consultative arrangements on positions to be taken in these negotiations.
- 4) Alliance objectives in SALT III negotiations involving TNF and in MBFR should be consistent and mutually supportive.
- 5) Negotiations on TNF in SALT III must be predicated on the US statement on grey area systems agreed with the Allies in the SALT II negotiations; "Any future limitations on US systems principally designed for theatre missions should be accompanied by appropriate limitations on Soviet theatre systems".
- 6) Arms control negotiations involving TNF should not include non-US Allied systems, nor should the US negotiate with the Soviets compensation for such systems.
- 7) Any agreement on TNF must ensure de jure equality both in ceilings and in rights.
- 8) Any arms control agreement involving TNF should be adequately verifiable.

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- 9) Negotiations involving TNF in the SALT III framework should further the objective of a balanced and stable overall nuclear relationship between the US and the USSR and should reflect the strategic unity of the Alliance as well as support the continuum of deterrence.

- 10) Arms control negotiations involving TNF should be a step-by-step process. The first step should focus on the most immediate threat, with the stringency and scope of limitations sought as ambitious as the Alliance can realistically expect to achieve and verify. Subsequent steps could provide an opportunity to expand the scope of systems covered and to increase the stringency of limitations sought, including reductions.

- 11) The initial step should focus on limiting and reducing the threat posed by those Soviet long-range theatre nuclear missile systems in a position to strike NATO, especially the most modern and capable of those systems - the SS20.
 - a) The aim should be to stop SS20 deployment short of their projected level, force the retirement of SS4S and SS5S, and thereby achieve a reduction in the overall threat.

 - b) Warheads-on-launchers would provide an effective unit of limitation on long-range theatre missiles.

 - c) The limitations should apply to worldwide long-range land-based theatre nuclear missile deployments. But they should especially restrict those deployments within striking range of NATO.

- 12) While initially focussing on long-range missiles, other elements of the TNF threat should also be taken into account.
 - a) Limits on long-range aircraft in general should not be sought in the first step, except for Backfire in an appropriate manner.

 - b) Short-range systems should not be addressed in the first step.

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FM FCO 201100Z NOV 79

TO PRIORITY CERTAIN MISSIONS

TELEGRAM NUMBER GUIDANCE 143 OF 20 NOVEMBER 1979

THEATRE NUCLEAR FORCE (TNF) MODERNISATION: SOVIET PROPAGANDA

1. THE SOVIET PROPAGANDA CAMPAIGN AGAINST NATO'S TNF MODERNISATION PLANS IS NOW IN FULL SWING, BOTH IN EUROPE AND IN PARTS OF THE THIRD WORLD. ITS IMPORTANCE FOR THE RUSSIANS IS CLEAR FROM ITS VOLUME AND FROM THE NUMBER OF SENIOR PARTY FIGURES BOTH CIVILIAN AND MILITARY WHO ARE INVOLVED. THE SOVIET OBJECTIVE SEEMS TO BE THREEFOLD: FIRST, IF POSSIBLE TO PREVENT NATO FROM APPROVING THE TNF MODERNISATION PROGRAMME (DUE TO BE DECIDED BY NATO FOREIGN AND DEFENCE MINISTERS ON 12 DECEMBER): SECONDLY, FAILING THAT, TO ESTABLISH AN IMAGE OF THE SOVIET UNION AS THE ARCHITECT OF THE ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS WHICH WILL PROBABLY FOLLOW AND TO PUT NATO ON THE DEFENSIVE: AND THIRDLY, AS A SUBORDINATE AIM, TO COUNTER WESTERN ANXIETY ABOUT THE SOVIET MILITARY BUILD-UP.

2. IT IS PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT AT THIS STAGE TO COUNTER THE FIRST OF THESE SOVIET AIMS. SO FAR NATO IS ON COURSE TO AGREE ON 12 DECEMBER A PACKAGE OF DECISIONS INVOLVING THE BASING OF 572 US CRUISE MISSILES AND PERSHING II BALLISTIC MISSILES IN WESTERN EUROPE AND A PARALLEL OFFER TO ENTER INTO ARMS NEGOTIATIONS ON THESE AND SIMILAR SOVIET SYSTEMS. BUT THERE ARE STRONG ANTI-NUCLEAR LOBBIES IN SEVERAL NATO COUNTRIES, NOTABLY THE NETHERLANDS, AND THERE IS CONSIDERABLE SCOPE FOR THE RUSSIANS TO EXPLOIT THIS MOOD IN BOTH THE SHORT AND LONG TERM.

LINE TO TAKE

3. WITH SUITABLE CONTACTS YOU SHOULD THEREFORE DRAW ON THE ARGUMENTS IN PARAS 4 - 14 BELOW TO REBUT THE VARIOUS SOVIET PROPAGANDA THEMES.

4. (THE RUSSIANS HAVE OFFERED TO NEGOTIATE IF TNF MODERNISATION DOES NOT TAKE PLACE. WHY NOT TRY TO NEGOTIATE CONSTRAINTS AND SUSPEND PLANS FOR MODERNISATION UNTIL THE RESULT OF THE NEGOTIATIONS IS KNOWN?). THE SOVIET UNION IS EQUIPPING ITSELF FAST WITH MODERN SOPHISTICATED SYSTEMS. AS A RESULT THERE IS ALREADY A GROWING IMBALANCE BETWEEN THE SOVIET UNION AND THE WEST. THE SLOW PROGRESS IN MBFR ILLUSTRATES THE DIFFICULTY OF NEGOTIATING A SATISFACTORY ARMS CONTROL ARRANGEMENT IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES. WE NEED POSITIVE DECISIONS TO MODERNISE NATO'S TNF BOTH TO GIVE THE RUSSIANS AN INCENTIVE TO NEGOTIATE LIMITS ON THEIR DYNAMIC SS20 AND BACKFIRE PROGRAMMES AND TO ENABLE THE WEST TO RECTIFY THE IMBALANCE IF ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS ARE NOT PRODUCTIVE. (SEE ALSO PARAGRAPH 11 BELOW).

5. (THE THROW-WEIGHT AND NUMBER OF LAUNCHERS OF MEDIUM-RANGE NUCLEAR SYSTEMS IN THE WESTERN SOVIET UNION HAVE NOT INCREASED IN THE LAST DECADE). THESE ARE HIGHLY SELECTIVE STATISTICS. THEY EXCLUDE, FOR EXAMPLE, THE SS.20 MISSILES EAST OF THE URALS WHICH CAN REACH ANY PART OF EUROPE. WHAT REALLY MATTERS IS THE SOVIET CAPABILITY (LAST WORD UNDERLINED) WITHIN STRIKING RANGE OF WESTERN EUROPE. THIS HAS GREATLY INCREASED IN THE LAST DECADE, IN TERMS OF WARHEAD NUMBERS, RANGE, ACCURACY AND TARGET COVERAGE.

6. (THERE IS ALREADY A BALANCE OF MEDIUM-RANGE SYSTEMS). THE PRESENT POSITION IS THAT NATO HAS 176 F.111S AND 56 VULCANS BASED IN EUROPE (AND THE VULCANS WILL BE PHASED OUT BY THE MID-80'S), WHEREAS THE SOVIET UNION HAS 60 SS.20S, 40 BACKFIRE BOMBERS, 450 OTHER MISSILES (SS.4 AND 5) AND 350 OLDER BOMBERS. MOREOVER, EACH SS.20 HAS 3 WARHEADS, AND THE BACKFIRE CARRIES UP TO 4, COMPARED WITH F.111'S 2. THIS GAP IN CAPABILITIES WILL WIDEN AS THE SOVIET BUILD-UP CONTINUES AND WESTERN TNF BECOME INCREASINGLY OUT OF DATE AND VULNERABLE.

7. (THE INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE OF STRATEGIC STUDIES CLAIMS THAT 'SOMETHING VERY CLOSE TO PARITY' NOW EXISTS BETWEEN THE THEATRE NUCLEAR FORCES OF NATO AND THE WARSAW PACT'). THE IISS IN THE SEPTEMBER EDITION OF 'THE MILITARY BALANCE' SAID THAT THE TREND IS 'MOVING IN FAVOUR OF THE WARSAW PACT'. THE INSTITUTE HAS SUBSEQUENTLY ISSUED A STATEMENT STRESSING THAT ITS POINTS

IN 'THE MILITARY BALANCE' HAD BEEN QUOTED OUT OF CONTEXT, EMPHASISING THAT THERE IS A 'PARTICULAR DISPARITY' IN LONG-RANGE THEATRE MISSILES, AND POINTING OUT THAT THE VULNERABILITY AND AGE OF NATO'S LONG-RANGE TNF ARE 'ONE OF THE STRONG MILITARY ARGUMENTS FOR THE MODERNISATION OF NATO'S TNF'.

8. (TNF MODERNISATION MARKS A STEPPING UP OF THE ARMS RACE). NATO PLANS MERELY TO MODERNISE AN EXISTING CAPABILITY, AS THE RUSSIANS HAVE BEEN DOING FOR THE LAST DECADE. NATO'S RELIANCE ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS WILL NOT BE INCREASED, NOR WILL THE NUMBER OF NATO'S NUCLEAR WARHEADS IN EUROPE. INDEED, THE LATTER MAY WELL DECREASE IF IDEAS NOW UNDER DISCUSSION IN NATO ARE ADOPTED.

9. (CRUISE MISSILES ARE A DANGEROUS NEW THREAT TO SOVIET TERRITORY). TECHNICALLY, CRUISE MISSILES ARE CERTAINLY NOT MORE THREATENING THAN THE SS.20, WHICH HAS MULTIPLE AND SEPARATELY TARGETABLE WARHEADS AS WELL AS BEING MOBILE. THE TNF MODERNISATION PROGRAMME ENVISAGES THAT CRUISE MISSILES AND PERSHING II WILL MERELY BRING UP TO DATE NATO'S EXISTING CAPABILITY FOR STRIKE AGAINST THE SOVIET UNION.

10. (THIS IS PART OF A CAMPAIGN TO REINTRODUCE THE NEUTRON BOMB). THERE IS NO CONNECTION WHATSOEVER BETWEEN THE NEUTRON BOMB AND TNF MODERNISATION. NATO POLICY ON THE NEUTRON BOMB REMAINS AS LAID DOWN IN APRIL 1978 WHEN PRESIDENT CARTER ANNOUNCED THAT HE HAD DECIDED TO DEFER THE PRODUCTION OF THIS WEAPON.

11. (TNF MODERNISATION WILL WEAKEN THE PROSPECTS FOR ARMS CONTROL). ON THE CONTRARY. THE ALLIANCE INTENDS IN PARALLEL TO OFFER TO NEGOTIATE ON LONG-RANGE THEATRE SYSTEMS. NATO'S POLICY FOR ARMS CONTROL HAS BEEN WORKED OUT IN SOME DETAIL OVER THE LAST YEAR - WELL BEFORE PRESIDENT BREZHNEV'S STATEMENT ON 6 OCTOBER. EXPERIENCE SHOWS THAT THERE WOULD BE NO PROSPECT OF REACHING AN EQUITABLE ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENT ON THE BASIS OF THE GROWING IMBALANCE IN EASTERN AND WESTERN TNF. WE SEE MODERNISATION AS BOTH RECTIFYING A DANGEROUS IMBALANCE AND PROVIDING REAL INCENTIVE FOR SERIOUS NEGOTIATION.

12. (TNF MODERNISATION CREATES THE RISK OF A 'EUROSTRATEGIC' BALANCE AND INCREASES THE RISK OF NUCLEAR WARFARE IN EUROPE). ONE OF THE GUIDING PRINCIPLES OF NATO'S APPROACH TO TNF

MODERNISATION HAS BEEN THAT IT MUST UNDERLINE THE LINKAGE BETWEEN NATO'S DEFENCE TRIAD OF CONVENTIONAL, THEATRE AND STRATEGIC FORCES. WITHOUT MODERNISATION, THE GAP BETWEEN NATO'S THEATRE SYSTEMS AND THE US STRATEGIC FORCES MIGHT APPEAR SO WIDE AS TO CREATE AN IMPRESSION THAT THEY WERE NO LONGER LINKED. BY FILLING THE GAP, THE MODERNISATION PROGRAMME WILL REDUCE THE RISK OF MISCALCULATION WITHOUT LOWERING THE NUCLEAR THRESHOLD.

13. (TNF MODERNISATION WILL UNDERMINE MBFR BY RETRACTING NATO'S OFFER TO LIMIT PERSHING I MISSILES). AS PART OF THE MODERNISATION PROGRAMME THE ALLIANCE IS CONSIDERING THE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL US PERSHING I MISSILES STATIONED IN EUROPE. NATO ENVISAGES THAT THE PERSHING II AND CRUISE MISSILES IN ITS MODERNISATION PROGRAMME SHOULD BE A SUBJECT OF NEGOTIATION IN SALT III. IT WOULD BE INAPPROPRIATE, BECAUSE OF THEIR RANGE, TO INCLUDE THEM AND EQUIVALENT SOVIET SYSTEMS IN MBFR. NATO IS IN ADDITION URGENTLY DISCUSSING PROPOSALS TO GIVE A NEW IMPETUS TO THE OTHER ELEMENTS OF THE MBFR NEGOTIATION.

14. (THE RUSSIANS CLAIM THAT THE DEPLOYMENTS OF THE SS.20 AND BACKFIRE WERE A RESPONSE TO THE ACQUISITION BY THE UNITED KINGDOM AND FRANCE OF NATIONAL SYSTEMS). THIS IS DISINGENUOUS. THE RUSSIANS HAVE PLENTY OF SUBMARINE LAUNCHED BALLISTIC MISSILES (SLBMS) COMPARABLE TO THE BRITISH AND FRENCH FORCES. WE ARE TALKING ABOUT LAND-BASED SYSTEMS. THE ALLIANCE WITHDREW ITS EQUIVALENT LAND-BASED SYSTEMS (THOR AND JUPITER) IN THE EARLY SIXTIES. THE SOVIET UNION BY CONTRAST HAS RETAINED ITS SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MEDIUM RANGE SYSTEMS (THE SS.4 AND SS.5) IN VERY LARGE NUMBERS. IN RECENT YEARS IT HAS ADDED NEW MODERN SYSTEMS TO ITS INVENTORY (SEE PARAS 5 AND 6).

CARRINGTON

BY TELEGRAPH TO:

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BRUSSELS (NATO)
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THE HAGUE
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Original on: —
France: July 79

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Defence: TNF
29

NOTE OF A MEETING HELD IN 10 DOWNING STREET AT 1445 ON MONDAY
19 NOVEMBER 1979

Present:

The Prime Minister President Giscard d'Estaing
Mr. C.A. Whitmore Monsieur Patrick LeClerc

* * * * *

The Prime Minister suggested, and President Giscard agreed, that their tete-a-tete should concentrate on broader international issues and that they should leave Community matters for the subsequent enlarged meeting in which they would be joined by Foreign and Finance Ministers.

East/West Relations and Defence Matters

The Prime Minister said that she had set out her views on East/West relations in her recent speech in Luxembourg. She had struck a forthright note on that occasion because she felt that President Brezhnev was attempting to influence the smaller European members in NATO in their defence policies and, in particular, to frighten them off the modernisation of Theatre Nuclear Forces. All this was part of a grand Soviet design which was aimed at giving them unassailable military power. Their eventual aim was to be able to force other countries to go along with Soviet objectives by threatening them with the use of force. We were already seeing how successful they could be in countries like Vietnam, Afghanistan and Ethiopia by the use of subversion and proxy forces. The Prime Minister continued that detente must be a two-way process and a prerequisite for it was that the West should be strong in defence terms. There needed to be some discussion of disarmament but it should be conducted from a position of strength. She was familiar with France's proposals for a European Disarmament Conference but she would like to hear what the President had to say about them. Our hope must be that by having more and more contact with the Soviet Union the Russians would eventually come to question their own social system. In the meantime, it was essential for the wellbeing of the free nations that there should be a European grouping

/which could

which could show the world that it could live together, protecting its political freedom with economic liberty. Nothing in these views of hers was new, for principles and ideals in this area did not change.

President Giscard said that he had read the Prime Minister's Luxembourg speech and he shared her general approach to East/West relations. He had met President Brezhnev several times and although he gave the impression that he was trying to bully the West, he, President Giscard, believed that President Brezhnev had some measure of dedication to peace. He did not believe that the Soviet Union were calculating on invading Europe over the next five to ten years. What then was their intention? In trying to assess Soviet objectives, we had to have in mind two factors. First, they were obsessed by the feeling that they should not be militarily inferior to the West. The lessons of the Cuban missile crisis had gone deep in the Soviet Union. Second, they were afraid that if there was a war, they would have to fight on two fronts, and all history showed that this was likely to lead to defeat. They calculated that if there was a war in Europe, China would interfere; and equally that if they fought China, the West would become involved. There was no doubt that, influenced by these two factors, the Soviet Union had built up a very powerful military establishment, though in the light of their weakness in many civil, industrial and technological fields in comparison with the West, he personally was not sure that they were as strong as some made out. What was the position of Britain and France in this situation? The period of American strategic supremacy was over. There was now a global balance at that level, and the United States would not use their strategic systems except in the most extreme circumstances. Even if they said that they were ready to use strategic nuclear weapons in defence of the West, he would be cautious in his evaluation of any such assurance. Probably because of the earlier American advantage at the strategic level,

/the Soviet Union

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the Soviet Union had built up over the years a substantial lead in TNF, yet they denied very strongly their advantage in this area. It was curious that they did so when they must know that our intelligence made the facts available to us, and he was unable to offer any explanation of their denials. He was, however, clear that it was absolutely essential that the West should develop similar systems. Although France was not involved directly in the consideration that was being given within the Alliance to the modernisation of TNF, he understood why many of the European allies were in favour of improving NATO's TNF. France would herself take similar national decisions, though the timing of them would be different. France had started studies twenty months ago to evaluate cruise missiles and a new Theatre ballistic missile system. The final report would be available in six to eight months' time and he expected that the decision would be to go for the ballistic missile.

The President repeated that he believed that the chances of early American intervention at the strategic level in any future conflict were not great. He did not believe that it would be possible to force the Americans to use their strategic weapons by launching the French force de dissuasion and it would be counter-productive for France to use its strategic weapons alone against the Soviet Union. In any case, he did not believe that conflict would turn into nuclear war quickly: on the contrary, he thought that the period of conventional war might be quite long. He had discussed this with Chancellor Schmidt who shared his views. These considerations underlined the importance of high quality conventional forces. France had recently been putting emphasis on improving their conventional forces and she expected to have broadly the same capability as Germany in three or so years' time. He regarded it as important that the United Kingdom should also have effective conventional forces. If the West made improvements in this way, it would reduce the opportunities open to the Soviet Union for blackmail and military intervention.

/President Giscard

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President Giscard said that the West should put the Soviet Union on the defensive on disarmament. It was absurd that the most heavily armed country in the world had for so long been posing as one of the keener supporters of disarmament. We must attempt to establish whether the Soviet Union were really ready to contribute to arms limitation. France was not being naive about this but thought it diplomatically important that the West should hold the initiative in this field. France had never been in favour of the MBFR negotiations because they did not believe that the talks would ever reach any positive conclusion and because they believed that it would be dangerous if there was an area in Central Europe where the Federal Republic was neutralised and disengaged but into which the Soviet Union could rapidly move the forces it had previously withdrawn. The French had therefore proposed a general European discussion on security. This was a way to oblige the Soviet Union to show its hand. If the Russians were ready to accept reductions in their forces stationed in the European part of their country, this would mean that they were serious about disarmament. The French proposals would mean that it would be less easy for the Russians to reintroduce their forces into the area covered by the negotiations. It would also offer a way of dismantling, even if only by a little, the structure of the Warsaw Pact which was militarily strong but weak politically and morally. The first Soviet reaction to the French proposals had been strongly against them because they meant that, for the first time, Soviet territory would be brought into an arms control negotiation. But, perhaps because they felt themselves to be on the defensive, they were now beginning to show signs of changing their view. It would not, however, be enough to get agreement on confidence-building measures (CBMs) alone. CBMs might impose some practical limitation on the Russians, but they would have no real political impact. France was therefore taking the line that CBMs must be accompanied by a process for reducing the level of armaments.

/ President Giscard

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President Giscard continued that he saw advantages in countries like Britain and France, which both had practical experience of the dangers of the world, studying international problems jointly. He thought, for example, that both countries might act together to exert their influence in the Caribbean where they both still had dependent territories. The influence of Cuba was growing stronger, and a number of former British colonies consistently voted with the Soviet Union at the United Nations. He hoped that France and Britain would co-operate to study the situation with a view to trying to persuade those Caribbean countries where they still had influence to take a moderate line. Another area where France and Britain should work together was the Pacific. Britain had given independence to a number of her former dependent territories, whereas France had tended to keep hers under French sovereignty. At international meetings former British colonies in the Pacific, like Fiji, often attacked France and her Pacific territories. He would like Britain to do what she could to get her former colonies to behave more reasonably. Again, he thought there should be an exchange of views on the subject. If Britain and France were to have regular consultations about these and other difficult parts of the world, we should be able to help each other in promoting stability.

The Prime Minister said that she too was worried about the Caribbean situation. In countries like Jamaica and Guyana subversion was widespread, though there were one or two countries like Barbados where the position was still much better. She thought that what was happening in the Caribbean was part of the general Soviet advance in the third world. Belize was a particular problem for Britain in this area. We did not want to keep Belize as a dependent territory but we had to prevent Guatemala taking over the country.

/ The Prime Minister

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The Prime Minister repeated the importance of not letting the Soviet Union blackmail NATO countries over TNF modernisation. Psychology played a significant part in East/West relations, and to give way to Soviet pressure would have a bad impact on the confidence of the Alliance. The United Kingdom had virtually taken the necessary decisions on TNF modernisation, and the essential thing now was to carry the Dutch and the Belgians with the rest of NATO. Britain would also have to take decisions soon on the replacement of its Polaris submarines. We had been worried about the non-circumvention provisions of the SALT II Treaty, and about the Protocol, but President Carter had assured us that the Americans would be able to make available to us the technology we needed to modernise our strategic forces. Replacing Polaris would be very expensive and this was why we were expecting to rely on American help, though Britain would continue to develop and produce its own warheads. If the President had any proposals for co-operation with the United Kingdom in this area and wished to suggest that there should be talks, we would be very happy to take part.

President Giscard said that he understood that the United Kingdom's choice might be constrained by budgetary reasons. He could see that it would be costly for Britain to go it entirely alone. France of course developed and produced her strategic systems without the help of other countries for reasons of national policy, but he understood that the United Kingdom's approach was different. As regards possible co-operation in this area between Britain and France, the Defence Ministers of the two countries met regularly and this was something they might discuss. The Prime Minister said that she was ready to leave it to them.

In replying to a question by President Giscard, the Prime Minister said that Britain had no intention of returning to conscription. We did not think that it would be an economical use of resources and we believed that we could play our part in the defence of the Alliance better by having highly professional regular forces. The re-introduction of conscription would be popular in certain quarters for social reasons but it would raise difficult political issues. President Giscard said that conscription was accepted in France for moral reasons. It was a positive factor

/for the

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Defence



MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1
Telephone 01 ~~980 7022~~ 2111/3

CONFIDENTIAL

19th November 1979

MO 14/10

Dear Richard,

L. V. Hunt

THE MILITARY BALANCE

- with MODBA

Roderic Lyne sent you in his letter of 24th September an assessment of the 1979/80 edition of The Military Balance published by IISS earlier that month.

In case you have not already added it to your papers, you may now care to have a copy of the text of a press release issued by IISS on 8th November about the passage in The Military Balance with which Roderic's letter dealt. You will see that while the release does not deal with all the points that are of concern to us, it does enter a number of important reservations, making it clear that the IISS text has been taken out of context; that the trend favours the Warsaw Pact; that there is a particular disparity in the category of warheads deliverable by theatre missiles at ranges over 1,000 miles (ie precisely in the area with which LRTNF modernisation is concerned); and, finally, that NATO LRTNF aircraft are becoming increasingly vulnerable. These are all important points and we consider, therefore, that the release is a highly satisfactory outcome of the various representations that have been made to the Institute about their original text.

I am sending copies of this letter to Roderic Lyne (FCO) and Martin Vile (Cabinet Office).

*Yours and
B M Norbury*

B M Norbury

M O'D B Alexander Esq
10 Downing Street

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MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
 19 NOV 1951
 10 NOV 1951

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Defence

FM F C O 091945Z NOV 79.

Lg
PmTO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1612 OF 9 NOV.

INFO PRIORITY MODUK.

THEATRE NUCLEAR FORCES.

PLEASE ARRANGE FOR THE FOLLOWING LETTER FROM THE PRIME MINISTER
TO PRESIDENT CARTER TO BE DELIVERED AS SOON AS POSSIBLE
(ORIGINAL FOLLOWS BY BAG).

BEGINS.

DEAR MR PRESIDENT,

THANK YOU FOR YOUR MESSAGE ABOUT THE NATO PROPOSALS FOR THE
MODERNISATION OF LONG-RANGE THEATRE NUCLEAR FORCES AND FOR A
PARALLEL EFFORT IN THE ARMS CONTROL FIELD.

AS YOU WILL KNOW FROM MY MESSAGE OF 28 JULY, I FULLY SHARE
YOUR VIEWS BOTH ON THE POLITICAL AND MILITARY SIGNIFICANCE OF
THESE EFFORTS AND ON THE SOUNDNESS OF THEIR CONTENT. LIKE YOU,
WE HAVE VIEWED THE EVOLUTION WITH MUCH SATISFACTION AS A MODEL
OF ALLIANCE COLLECTIVE DISCUSSION AND PLANNING; AND WE HAVE ADMIRED
THE VERY THOROUGH STAFF WORK AND THE WELL-JUDGED LEADERSHIP WHICH
THE UNITED STATES HAS CONTRIBUTED. WE SUPPORT THE OUTCOME WITHOUT
QUALIFICATION, AND ARE GIVING IT OUR STRONGEST POLITICAL BACKING.
I MYSELF HAVE TALKED ABOUT THE PLANS AT LENGTH RECENTLY WITH
PRIME MINISTER COSSIGA AND CHANCELLOR SCHMIDT; FRANCIS PYM HAS
HAD SPECIAL DISCUSSIONS WITH HIS GERMAN, DUTCH AND ITALIAN
COUNTERPARTS IN THE LAST FORTNIGHT; AND PETER CARRINGTON HAS
RAISED THE MATTER RECENTLY WITH VAN DE KLAUW AND FRYDENLUND.
IN ALL THESE CONTACTS WE HAVE MADE IT VERY CLEAR THAT WE ARE NOT
INTERESTED IN IDEAS FOR REDUCING THE SCOPE OF THE MODERNISATION
PROPOSAL, OR FOR ANY CHANGES WHICH WOULD MAKE MODERNISATION A
HOSTAGE TO ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS. THE NETHERLANDS POSITION
APART, WE HAVE BEEN GENERALLY ENCOURAGED BY THE ATTITUDES WE
HAVE FOUND.

SECRET

LIKE YOU, WE THINK THE IDEA OF REDUCING BY 1,000 THE US WARHEAD STOCKPILE IN EUROPE HAS MUCH ATTRACTION, FROM SEVERAL STANDPOINTS. WE ARE PARTICULARLY ATTRACTED BY THE FACT THAT, IN ANNOUNCING THE REDUCTION OF 1,000 WARHEADS AT THE SAME TIME AS TAKING TNF DECISIONS, THE ALLIANCE WOULD HAVE A CREDIBLE RATIONALE FOR LAYING TO REST THE OPTION III PART OF MBFR. THIS TACTIC WOULD BE MORE EFFECTIVE IF WE CAN ALSO DEMONSTRATE THAT WE ARE PREPARED TO GIVE A NEW IMPETUS TO THE TROOP REDUCTIONS ELEMENT OF MBFR. LIKE YOU, I HOPE, THEREFORE, THAT THE ALLIANCE WILL BE IN A POSITION TO ANNOUNCE NEW PROPOSALS IN MBFR BY THE TIME OF THE NATO DECEMBER MINISTERIAL MEETINGS.

THE DECEMBER DECISIONS ARE INDEED OF CRUCIAL IMPORTANCE. A SET BACK COULD SERIOUSLY DAMAGE THE ALLIANCE'S CREDIBILITY AND EFFECTIVENESS: BUT SUCCESS WOULD BE A MAJOR STEP FORWARD FOR OUR COMMON SECURITY. YOU CAN COUNT ON US FOR EVERY EFFORT TO REACH THAT OBJECTIVE.

WARM REGARDS,
YOURS SINCERELY,
MARGARET THATCHER.

ENDS.

CARRINGTON.

[COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING ST]

FILES

DEF-D

PS

PS|LPS

PS|MR HURD

PS|PUS

SIR.A.DUFF

MR.P.H.MOBERLY

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27

Defence

9 November 1979

The Prime Minister has asked me to thank you for your letter to her of 2 November enclosing a message to her from President Carter. I enclose a copy of the Prime Minister's reply. The signed copy is being delivered by our Embassy in Washington.

MICHAEL ALEXANDER

The Honourable Edward J. Streator

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cc FCO

DS

SUBJECT

Stewart

25



10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

9 November 1979

PRIME MINISTER'S

PERSONAL MESSAGE

SERIAL No. T139/79

Dear Mr. President,

2.11.79

Thank you for your message about the NATO proposals for the modernisation of long-range theatre nuclear forces and for a parallel effort in the arms control field.

As you will know from my message of 28 July, I fully share your views both on the political and military significance of these efforts and on the soundness of their content. Like you, we have viewed their evolution with much satisfaction as a model of Alliance collective discussion and planning; and we have admired the very thorough staff work and the well-judged leadership which the United States has contributed. We support the outcome without qualification, and are giving it our strongest political backing. I myself have talked about the plans at length recently with Prime Minister Cossiga and Chancellor Schmidt; Francis Pym has had special discussions with his German, Dutch and Italian counterparts in the last fortnight; and Peter Carrington has raised the matter recently with Van der Klaauw and Frydenlund. In all these contacts we have made it very clear that we are not interested in ideas for reducing the scope of the modernisation proposal, or for any changes which would make modernisation a hostage to arms control negotiations. The Netherlands position apart, we have been generally encouraged by the attitudes we have found.

Like you, we think the idea of reducing by 1,000 the US warhead stockpile in Europe has much attraction, from several standpoints. We are particularly attracted by the fact that, in announcing the reduction of 1,000 warheads at the same time as taking TNF decisions, the Alliance would have a credible

/rationale

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- 2 -

rationale for laying to rest the Option III part of MBFR. This tactic would be more effective if we can also demonstrate that we are prepared to give a new impetus to the troop reductions element of MBFR. Like you, I hope, therefore, that the Alliance will be in a position to announce new proposals in MBFR by the time of the NATO December Ministerial meetings.

The December decisions are indeed of crucial importance. A set back could seriously damage the Alliance's credibility and effectiveness; but success would be a major step forward for our common security. You can count on us for every effort to reach that objective.

Warm regards,

Yours sincerely

Rogers Thelma

The President of the United States of America

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cc FEO

26

9 November 1979

Theatre Nuclear Forces

The Prime Minister has seen your letter to me of 6 November on this subject. She has approved the text of the draft reply to President Carter which you enclosed but has amended it in line with the suggestions in Paul Lever's letter to me of 8 November.

I should be grateful if George Walden with whose copy of this letter I enclose the signed copy of the Prime Minister's letter, could arrange for its delivery in Washington. I have sent a copy to the United States Embassy here in London.

M. O'D. B. ALEXANDER

Brian Norbury, Esq.
Ministry of Defence.

SECRET

C Whitmore Esq



*With
the Compliments of
Sir Frank Cooper, G.C.B., C.M.G.
Permanent Under-Secretary of State*

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
SW1A 2HB

THE INTERNATIONAL
INSTITUTE FOR
STRATEGIC STUDIES

Registered Office: 23 Tavistock Street, London, WC2E 7NQ

Tel.: 01-379 7676

Cables: Strategy London

Chairman: Dr Ernst van der Beugel

Director: Dr Christoph Dertram

8th November, 1979

PRESS RELEASE

In The Military Balance 1979-1980, published in September, the International Institute for Strategic Studies presented a detailed study of the balance of theatre nuclear forces in Europe.

In the past weeks this analysis has repeatedly been quoted out of context to support opposition to the current plans by the North Atlantic Treaty members for the introduction of new, longer-range theatre nuclear weapons. Given the importance of this decision, and the Institute's aim of providing reliable information for the public debate, we feel it necessary to state what the study says and what it does not say.

The Institute's analysis does not lead to the conclusion that the modernization of NATO's theatre forces is unnecessary. We state in our study that 'something very close to parity now exists between the Theatre Nuclear Forces of NATO and the Warsaw Pact, although it is moving in favour of the Warsaw Pact'. The new American theatre weapons currently discussed in NATO will not be introduced before the end of 1983, and by then the margin in favour of the East will have further increased, if no action is taken now.

The Institute's analysis shows that there is a particular disparity in the category of warheads deliverable by theatre missiles at ranges over 1,000 miles. Here the figures show that the Warsaw Pact enjoys a 10 to 1 advantage if American strategic missiles allocated to SACEUR are excluded from the calculation. (In contrast to the Soviet theatre systems, these strategic missiles are counted in SALT).

The bulk of NATO's retaliatory nuclear forces consists of aircraft. Not only are these vulnerable to pre-emptive attacks, but it is becoming increasingly doubtful whether they will be able to penetrate the dense curtain of Warsaw Pact air defences. This latter point is indeed one of the strong military arguments for the modernization of NATO's theatre nuclear forces.



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

8 November 1979

Dear Michael,

Message from President Carter: Proposal for the Unilateral
Withdrawal of 1,000 Warheads from Europe

Lord Carrington has seen Brian Norbury's letter of 6 November to Michael Alexander with a suggested draft reply to President Carter's message to the Prime Minister on theatre nuclear forces. Lord Carrington supports the robust line which Mr Pym recommends on the need for clear decisions to be taken on TNF modernisation next month. He also agrees with the proposal that we should rid ourselves of the increasingly inconvenient Option III proposals in MBFR by announcing the withdrawal of 1,000 nuclear warheads at the same time as, in the context of TNF modernisation, a decision is taken to replace Pershing I by Pershing II.

One point on which Lord Carrington has reservations is Mr Pym's comment on the timing of a decision on the withdrawal of 1,000 nuclear warheads. First, thanks to leaks in the Dutch and US press the idea has already for some time been in the public domain. As Chancellor Schmidt pointed out to the Prime Minister these leaks mean that the proposal is a diminishing asset. Second, if a decision to withdraw warheads is to influence public and parliamentary opinion (especially in Holland), this card should not be played too late. The Dutch Parliament will be discussing TNF issues throughout November before the Dutch Cabinet reaches its decision on 7 December. Third, Mr Pym suggests that a move on warheads would help NATO to rid itself of Option III in MBFR; but, if we are to do this, we need to take a decision in principle soon that warheads should figure in the December package, so that appropriate adjustments to our MBFR policy can also be announced at the same time.

For these reasons Lord Carrington would prefer to see the last three sentences of paragraph 3 of the draft reply to President Carter omitted. MOD officials have looked at this point again in the light of yesterday's discussion in NATO and agree that deletion of these sentences would be appropriate. They have not been able to consult Mr Pym, but believe that, in the new circumstances, he would be content. Lord Carrington would also see advantage if NATO Ministers meeting in the NPG next week could take favourable note in their communique of the proposal for a reduction in warheads as a preliminary to a final decision, in parallel with a TNF decision, in mid-December.

/ Meanwhile

M O'D B Alexander Esq
10 Downing Street



Meanwhile we have received German and US proposals for a simplified MBFR Phase I agreement. These proposals would involve a reduction of 30,000 Soviet and 13,000 US soldiers (the Soviet reductions would be in addition to the withdrawal of 20,000 men and 1,000 tanks announced by President Brezhnev on 6 October). The German and American proposals envisage no armament reductions; and agreement would be required on only Soviet and US manpower data. This proposal is unlikely to have much attraction for the Russians. But our immediate objective is to regain the initiative in MBFR and to amend NATO's existing MBFR proposals in order to make them consistent with the TNF modernisation programme.

Subject to the Prime Minister's views and those of Mr Pym, we propose therefore to give strong support to these new proposals for MBFR and to urge the other Allies to reach agreement on them by the NATO Ministerial meeting in December.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Brian Norbury.

Yours etc

Paul Lever

1-8 NOV 1969

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5 6 7 8 9

SECRET

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MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1
Telephone 0178307000 218 2111/3

SECRET

MO 18/1/1

8th November 1979

Dear Michael,

for [unclear]

MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT CARTER:
PROPOSAL FOR THE UNILATERAL WITHDRAWAL
OF 1,000 WARHEADS FROM EUROPE

Paul Lever (FCO) commented in his letter of 8th November on mine of 6th November.

Mr Pym notes the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary's recommendations on the handling of the German and American proposals for a simplified MBFR Phase I and agrees that we should give them strong support and work for Alliance agreement by the December Ministerial meeting. Since the impact of these proposals depends heavily on their being part of an arms control package in parallel with decisions on TNF modernisation, he regrets the fact that extensive and accurate details appear to have been reported in the German press this morning.

Mr Pym has also noted Lord Carrington's views on his comment on timing of the decision on the withdrawal of 1,000 warheads; in the light of Tuesday's discussion in the Alliance he is content that the text of the message to President Carter should be amended as proposed by Lord Carrington, and that we should work for inclusion in the NPG communique of a reference to the proposed withdrawal on the lines suggested.

I am copying this letter to Paul Lever.


James [unclear]
Brian [unclear]

(B M NORBURY)

M O'D B Alexander Esq
10 Downing Street

SECRET

18 NOV 1979



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EXTRACT FROM A -

Subject copy on:
NATO: Visit of
Dr Luns: Sept 1979.

RECORD OF A DISCUSSION BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER AND THE SECRETARY GENERAL OF NATO, DR. JOSEPH LUNS AT No. 10 DOWNING STREET ON 7 NOVEMBER AT 1210 HOURS.

Present

Prime Minister
Sir Clive Rose
Mr. M.O'D. Alexander

Dr. Luns
Dr. Van Campen
Miss Borgman-Brower

TNF Modernisation

The Prime Minister referred to the fact that Mr. Brezhnev had made a further speech clearly intended to try to prevent the Dutch and Belgian Governments accepting modernised theatre nuclear forces on their territory. Dr. Luns said that he was very worried about the possibility that NATO might fail to take the necessary decisions in December. Such a failure would do immense harm. It would leave the impression that the Soviet Union rather than the Members of the Alliance decided what weapons the Alliance should have. It would damage the credibility of NATO's defences generally and of the deterrent in particular. It might result in a serious falling out between the United States and the European Members of NATO.

The Prime Minister recalled that when the Belgian Prime Minister had been in London he and M. Simonet had expressed concern about the effect on Belgian opinion of the wrong decision being taken in the Netherlands. They had stressed the links between the Flemish Socialist Parties and the Dutch. Dr. Luns said that the Belgians were taking a firmer line than the Dutch. Defence issues were not such a live issue in Belgium as they were in the Netherlands: the Belgians had other things to quarrel about - in any case it was possible to exaggerate the strength of the links between the Flemish community and the Dutch. Sir Clive Rose said that it would be wrong to assume that the Belgians would follow suit if the Dutch took the wrong decision. Dr. Luns commented on a recent vote at a meeting of the Atlantic Assembly in Ottawa. The Dutch had put forward a motion proposing that the Alliance should attempt to negotiate an arms control agreement with the Russians before deciding on the deployment of the modernised TNF. The motion had been rejected by 82 votes to 4.

/The Prime Minister

The Prime Minister commented on the undesirability of establishing a link between the ratification^{of}/SALT II and the TNF decision. Sir Clive Rose said that it would of course be wrong to make ratification a pre-condition for the TNF decision. But many members of the Alliance attached importance to arms control negotiations as a means of putting a ceiling on the Soviet Union's deployment of nuclear weapons. Such negotiations could only take place in the context of SALT III. SALT II was a pre-condition for SALT III. Dr. Luns said that this argument was of course reasonable but that even if SALT II was not ratified, the new TNF could be deployed. Sir Clive Rose agreed. The Prime Minister said that she was confident that SALT II would be ratified. The authority of the United States President to conduct negotiations was at issue: this argument would appeal to a sufficient number of senators to ensure that agreement was ratified. She thought that this was true even though President Carter's position had been complicated by the fact that the public was much better informed about the Soviet Union and about its lead in missiles than it had been ten years ago. The Prime Minister commented on the enormous effect that Mr. Solzhenitsyn's pronouncements had had.

The Prime Minister said that two aspects of the SALT II Agreement were of particular concern to the United Kingdom. It was essential that the protocol on cruise missiles should lapse on the due date. It was equally essential for it to be clear that the non circumvention clause should not inhibit the United States from passing to the United Kingdom technology related to the UK deterrent. Sir Clive Rose said that both issues had been taken up in the Senate and the position of the Administration would be confirmed as a result. Dr. Luns said that he was confident the Soviet Union would refrain from making difficulties on either issue. The Prime Minister concluded this part of the discussion by saying that it was essential that the right decisions should be taken on TNF modernisation. Dr. Luns said that next week's meeting of the Nuclear Planning Group would be crucial.

/France and NATO

CONFIDENTIAL

DB



Reference

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

7 November 1979

TNF Modernisation : The Dutch Position

The Prime Minister has seen your letter to me of 5 November on this subject. She is content that the possibility of a message from her to Mr. Van Agt should be held in reserve for the moment.

I am sending copies of this letter to Brian Norbury (Ministry of Defence) and Martin Vile (Cabinet Office).

M. O'D. B. ALEXANDER

Paul Lever, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CONFIDENTIAL

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SECRET

22

(1)



MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1
Telephone 01-~~2307822~~X 218 2111/3

SECRET

MO 18/1/1

6th November 1979

Prime Minister

You have argued that we ought to try to get something in exchange for the 1,000 warheads that this offer proposes we should give up. But to try to do so would necessitate considerable delay, would not help with the Dutch & would deprive us of an opportunity to have the initiative. You will recall that Chancellor Schmidt describes the warheads as "mush"!. Agree message to President Carter?

Dear Michael,

THEATRE NUCLEAR FORCES

Thank you for your letter of 5th November.

Paul Lever 6/11

Mr Pym concurs in Lord Carrington's advice (Paul Lever's letter of 5th November) that it would be premature for the Prime Minister to approach Mr Van Agt personally and that this option should be reviewed in the light of the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary's visit to The Hague and the discussion between Permanent Representatives in Brussels, both today. He feels, however, that in replying to President Carter the Prime Minister should stress the very considerable efforts UK Ministers have made to persuade European Allies to hold fast on TNF modernisation.

My Secretary of State sees two advantages in the proposal to make a unilateral reduction of 1,000 warheads from the US stockpile in Europe. Such a move should help to rally the Alliance on TNF modernisation. It will have considerable appeal to many of the European allies (including the Scandinavians) and thereby bring further pressure on the Dutch to come into line, although as regards the Dutch, Mr Pym considers that the move might most effectively have been made nearer the time of the December Ministerial decisions. He indicated to the US Secretary of Defence on the telephone yesterday afternoon that he had this doubt (the call had been arranged following the Bonn Summit to enable Mr Pym to report on UK efforts to hold the Alliance firm on TNF modernisation).

/ Secondly ...

M O'D B Alexander Esq
No 10 Downing Street

SECRET

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2.

Secondly my Secretary of State considers that it would help the Alliance to cut the knot of Option III in MBFR. The 1,000 warheads have been on offer in MBFR since 1975 as part of Option III (an offer to reduce 1,000 US nuclear warheads, 36 US Pershing I launchers and 54 US dual-capable aircraft). This offer is being overtaken by events. At the end of the year the Alliance will announce the replacement of US Pershing Is by Pershing IIs as part of a TNF modernisation package; it will also make clear that the replacement systems will not be covered by Option III but would be subject to an arms control offer covering long-range TNF. A unilateral reduction of 1,000 warheads in addition would provide the West with a good case for claiming that Option III had been effectively laid to rest. This could pave the way for a simplified Phase I agreement, as President Carter suggests. This would be restricted to reductions of US and Soviet ground forces and accompanied by appropriate verification and stabilizing measures.

If by December the Alliance can announce the reduction of 1,000 warheads and proposals to move MBFR forward it will enable us to match President Brezhnev's propaganda over the unilateral troop and tank reductions from the GDR and claim the high ground in MBFR. This will be valuable in itself, but could be particularly helpful in securing support for the TNF modernisation decision which remains our key objective at the December NATO Ministerial meetings.

The reductions can be easily accommodated since the US has kept many warheads in Europe for systems no longer deployed to cover those committed in Option III.

In the light of the above, Mr Pym recommends that the Prime Minister should reply to President Carter on the lines of the enclosed draft.

I am sending a copy of this letter to George Walden (FCO); FCO officials have been consulted about its terms.

Yours ever,
Brian Norbury

(B M NORBURY)

SECRET



- 6 NOV 1979



~~SECRET~~

DRAFT REPLY TO PRESIDENT CARTER

Thank you for your message about the NATO proposals for the modernisation of long-range theatre nuclear forces and for a parallel effort in the arms control field.

2. As you will know from my message of 28th July, I fully share your views both on the political and military significance of these efforts and on the soundness of their content. Like you, we have viewed their evolution with much satisfaction as a model of Alliance collective discussion and planning; and we have admired the very thorough staff work and the well-judged leadership which the United States has contributed. We support the outcome without qualification, and are giving it our strongest political backing. I myself have talked about the plans at length recently with Prime Minister Cossiga and Chancellor Schmidt; Francis Pym has had special discussions with his German, Dutch and Italian counterparts in the last fortnight; and Peter Carrington has raised the matter recently with Van der Klaauw and Frydenlund. In all these contacts we have made it very clear that we are not interested in ideas for reducing the scope of the modernisation proposal, or for any changes which would make modernisation a hostage to arms control negotiations. The Netherlands position apart, we have been generally encouraged by the attitudes we have found.

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/ 3. ...

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3. Like you, we think the idea of reducing by 1,000 the US warhead stockpile in Europe has much attraction, from several standpoints. We are particularly attracted by the fact that, in announcing the reduction of 1,000 warheads at the same time as taking TNF decisions, the Alliance would have a credible rationale for laying to rest the Option III part of MBFR. This tactic would be more effective if we can also demonstrate that we are prepared to give a new impetus to the troop reductions element of MBFR. Like you, I hope, therefore, that the Alliance will be in a position to announce new proposals in MBFR by the time of the NATO December Ministerial meetings. The precise timing is a matter for fine judgement. Our own inclination in this regard would have been not to make any early move on this. Influencing the Dutch is not the only consideration.

4. The December decisions are indeed of crucial importance. A setback could seriously damage the Alliance's credibility and effectiveness; but success would be a major step forward for our common security. You can count on us for every effort to reach that objective.

~~SECRET~~
SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL



10 DOWNING STREET

Reference

Top Copy on: Sci. and Technology.
Nov. 29, Spackley
Ed. Zuckerman ..

From the Principal Private Secretary

6 November 1979

Dear Brian,

When the Prime Minister saw Lord Zuckerman recently at a social function, she asked him to let her have a copy of a paper which he was due to give to the American Philosophical Society sometime this week.

The Prime Minister has now read the paper (a copy of which is enclosed) and, as she mentioned to the Defence Secretary when she saw him in the House last night, she fears that what Lord Zuckerman has to say from about page 23 onwards may well cause trouble in connection with both TNF modernisation and our plans for replacing Polaris. She does not believe, however, that there is anything that we can do about this, but she wishes to ensure that you and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office are not taken by surprise if the paper gives rise to difficulties.

I am sending a copy of this letter and of the paper to George Walden.

Yours,

John White.

Brian Norbury, Esq.,
Ministry of Defence

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

6 November 1979

PRESIDENT BREZHNEV'S LETTER TO THE PRIME MINISTER

The Prime Minister has seen your letter to me of 5 November and the draft enclosed with it. She has decided not to send an interim acknowledgement.

I am sending copies of this letter to Brian Norbury (MOD) and Martin Vile (Cabinet Office).

M. O'D. B. ALEXANDER

Paul Lever, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

Prime Minister

[Handwritten initials]

②



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

[Handwritten signature]
5 November 1979

Dear Michael,

TNF Modernisation: The Dutch Position

Since the Bonn Summit, we have given further thought to the idea, discussed with Chancellor Schmidt, that it might be timely to intervene with Mr Van Agt in order to encourage the Dutch Government to stand firm over TNF modernisation and that Lord Carrington might call on him in The Hague on 6 November.

Lord Carrington expects to discuss this subject at some length with the Dutch Foreign Minister during his visit to The Hague. It may well prove necessary to make further strong representations to the Dutch at Prime Ministerial level in the course of this month, not least because it is Mr Van Agt's party (the CDA) which is shaky on TNF. But we believe the possibility of a message from the Prime Minister should be held in reserve for the moment.

We do not know how Mr Van Agt will respond to the personal message on TNF which he apparently received from President Carter on 2 November. Nor is it clear what position the Dutch intend to adopt in the run-up to the NATO Ministerial meetings in mid-December. Their attitude may become clearer during Lord Carrington's visit tomorrow and also at a NATO meeting on TNF modernisation and arms control in Brussels the same day. Officials will have a further opportunity to assess the Dutch position and the tactics which we should adopt towards them during Anglo-Dutch talks in London on 9 November. If in the light of these exchanges it seems advisable for the Prime Minister to send a personal message to Mr Van Agt, there will still be ample time before the crucial Dutch parliamentary debate on TNF on 6 December.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Brian Norbury (Ministry of Defence) and Martin Vile (Cabinet Office).

Yours
[Handwritten signature]

[Handwritten signature]

(P Lever)
Private Secretary

M O'D B Alexander Esq
10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL

- 6 NOV 1979





Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

Prime Minister.

*You may like to know how
 matters stand. I see no point in
 sending an interim reply at this point.
 Agree no action for the moment?*

5 November 1979

Dear Michael,

Paul 5/41

President Brezhnev's Letter to the Prime Minister

As agreed in your letter of 22 October, we have made available to our Allies the text of President Brezhnev's letter of 15 October to the Prime Minister. In exchange, we have received copies of most of the letters sent to other NATO Heads of Government, which are broadly similar to the one sent to Mrs Thatcher.

We have also discussed with our Allies the broad lines on which any replies might be based. A consensus on this is likely to emerge in the next week.

There is no disposition in the Alliance to reply in haste. There has been general support for our suggestion that a useful first step would be to use the communique of the NATO Nuclear Planning Group Ministerial meeting on 13/14 November to put into perspective President Brezhnev's claim that Soviet medium range delivery systems have been reduced in number and in warhead yield during the last 10 years.

Once the facts of the TNF balance have been publicised in this way it would be easier for Heads of Government to explain in any replies using agreed statistics why we see TNF modernisation as an essential step towards achieving a more stable balance in these systems. A further advantage in deferring replies is that it may help to delay any further phase of the Soviet campaign to prevent TNF modernisation decisions in mid-December.

We would therefore advise that any substantive reply to President Brezhnev should be sent in the second part of November. If, meanwhile, the Prime Minister would like to send an interim acknowledgement (as we understand Chancellor Schmidt and others may do) you may wish to consider the enclosed draft, which avoids any commitment to a more substantive reply.

I am sending copies of this letter and its enclosure to Brian Norbury (MOD) and Martin Vile (Cabinet Office).

Yours etc

(P Lever)

M O'D B Alexander Esq
 10 Downing Street
 LONDON

DSR 11 (Revised)



DRAFT: ~~minute/letter/teletype/letter/despatch/note~~

TYPE: Draft/Final 1+

FROM:
Prime Minister

Reference

DEPARTMENT: TEL. NO:

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

TO:

Your Reference

- Top Secret
- Secret
- Confidential
- Restricted
- Unclassified

President Brezhnev [to be delivered via
H M Ambassador at Moscow]

Copies to:

PRIVACY MARKING

SUBJECT:

.....In Confidence

CAVEAT.....

I am writing to acknowledge the letter which Mr Lunkov delivered to me on 15 October, summarising the ideas set out in your speech of 6 October in East Berlin. This letter, which I understand has also been sent to other NATO Heads of Government, touches on a wide range of subjects and I shall, of course, consider it carefully.

Enclosures—flag(s).....

- 5 NOV 1979



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10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

5 November 1979

BF 6-11-79

THEATRE NUCLEAR FORCES

I enclose a copy of a letter which the Prime Minister has received from President Carter about Theatre Nuclear Force Modernisation.

I should be grateful if you could let me have a draft reply which the Prime Minister might send to President Carter by close of play tomorrow, Tuesday 6 November.

I am sending a copy of this letter and its enclosure to George Walden (FCO).

M. O'D. B. ALEXANDER

Brian Norbury, Esq.,
Ministry of Defence.

28.

SECRET

SECRET

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EMBASSY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
LONDON

November 2, 1979

Dear Prime Minister:

I have been asked to deliver the attached message to you from President Carter.

Sincerely,

Edward J. Streator
Edward J. Streator
Charge d'Affaires a.i.

Enclosure

The Rt. Hon. Margaret Thatcher, M.P.
Prime Minister
10 Downing Street
London SW1

SECRET

~~SUBJECT~~

SECRET

~~PERSONAL MESSAGE~~
SERIAL No. 1132/79

Original
'T'd
1.11.79.

Dear Madame Prime Minister:

As the Alliance enters the final phase of its deliberations on Theater Nuclear Force Modernization and Arms Control, I think we can all be proud of the quality and intensity of NATO consultations on this subject. In my judgment, the crucial December decisions will mark a watershed in the Alliance's resolve. They will demonstrate the determination in each of our countries to maintain a credible ladder of deterrence and simultaneously to show our publics that we will take the initiative to negotiate a significant reduction in the level of these weapons.

Because our cooperative efforts have been going so well, I was deeply concerned to learn that the Dutch are considering a proposal to cut the size of NATO's Modernization Program significantly. This would jeopardize the consensus each member of the Alliance has tried so hard to build, and I want you to know that I have written Prime Minister Van Agt to ask him not to introduce the Dutch proposal into the Alliance in the upcoming consultations. Any assistance you can give in this regard would also be helpful.

At the same time, we all need to help the Dutch with their political problems to the extent we can so that they can participate in the TNF program. In this regard I know you agree with me that we need to give all our publics vivid evidence of reduced NATO reliance on nuclear weapons and of the Alliance's dedication to the objectives of arms control.

That is why I am attracted to the idea that as an integral part of the NATO decision to deploy 572 long range theater nuclear force warheads in Europe, we could reduce our nuclear stockpile by 1,000 weapons. Such a step would be a concrete demonstration that through TNF modernization, we are not engaging in a nuclear build-up. It would also demonstrate our commitment to arms control, provide an opportunity to give MBFR a push forward with a streamlined NATO proposal, respond to Brezhnev's unilateral steps, and rationalize our nuclear stockpile. This possibility will be discussed at the next round of Alliance consultations on TNF.

SECRET

SECRET

-2-

We are approaching a crossroads. I am confident that by continuing to work together closely we will fully meet the challenge and move to a decision in December that will provide for needed improvements in NATO defenses and build a strong foundation for Alliance arms control efforts.

Sincerely,

/s/

Jimmy Carter

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Ref: A0564

SECRET

PRIME MINISTER

TNF

20. (1)

Prime Minister
Alpa para 2.
Yes out!
Print 2/x

The United States Embassy delivered at the Cabinet Office this morning the enclosed message to you from President Carter.

2. Your office may like to send it to the Secretary of State for Defence's office (with a copy to the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary's office) asking for a draft reply.

I am not sure that Chomally Schmidt is

3. In the light of his visit to Bonn with you the Secretary of State for Defence's provisional view is (I gather) that the Germans are reconciled to Dutch defection and will even so remain firm themselves provided that the Italians and Belgians do so. The Italian Defence Minister told Mr. Pym this morning that whatever the Dutch do, Italy will remain firm, even to the extent that the Italian Government would resign if their Parliament failed to accept this. So the Belgians seem to be the key. Mr. Pym will warn Lord Carrington, who is seeing M. Simonet in The Hague next week, of the importance of keeping the Belgians up to the mark. Lord Carrington will of course also be able to urge on the Dutch the importance of not defecting: that is perhaps a sufficient answer to the last sentence of the second paragraph of the President's letter.

Print

RA

(Robert Armstrong)

2nd November 1979

PRIME MINISTER'S

PERSONAL MESSAGE

SERIAL No. T 132/79T

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

*for Mante
Op*

19A

fg. [Signature] 15/41

SUBJECT

November 1, 1979

SECRET

Dear Madame Prime Minister:

As the Alliance enters the final phase of its deliberations on theater nuclear force modernization and arms control, I think we can all be proud of the quality and intensity of NATO consultations on this subject. In my judgment, the crucial December decisions will mark a watershed in the Alliance's resolve. They will demonstrate the determination in each of our countries to maintain a credible ladder of deterrence and simultaneously to show our publics that we will take the initiative to negotiate a significant reduction in the level of these weapons.

Because our cooperative efforts have been going so well, I was deeply concerned to learn that the Dutch are considering a proposal to cut the size of NATO's modernization program significantly. This would jeopardize the consensus each member of the Alliance has tried so hard to build, and I want you to know that I have written Prime Minister Van Agt to ask him not to introduce the Dutch proposal into the Alliance in the upcoming consultations. Any assistance you can give in this regard would also be helpful.


At the same time, we all need to help the Dutch with their political problems to the extent we can so that they can participate in the TNF program. In this regard I know you agree with me that we need to give all our publics vivid evidence of reduced NATO reliance on nuclear weapons and of the Alliance's dedication to the objectives of arms control.

SECRET

That is why I am attracted to the idea that as an integral part of the NATO decision to deploy 572 long-range theater nuclear force warheads in Europe, we could reduce our nuclear stockpile by 1,000 weapons. Such a step would be a concrete demonstration that through TNF modernization, we are not engaging in a nuclear build-up. It would also demonstrate our commitment to arms control, provide an opportunity to give MBFR a push forward with a streamlined NATO proposal, respond to Brezhnev's unilateral steps, and rationalize our nuclear stockpile. This possibility will be discussed at the next round of Alliance consultations on TNF.

We are approaching a crossroads. I am confident that by continuing to work together closely we will fully meet the challenge and move to a decision in December that will provide for needed improvements in NATO defenses and build a strong foundation for Alliance arms control efforts.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "Jimmy Carter". The signature is written in dark ink and is positioned to the right of the word "Sincerely,".

The Right Honorable
Margaret R. Thatcher, M.P.
Prime Minister
London

115 NOV 1979



Extract from record of discussion
between PM + Chancellor Schmidt
31 Oct 79

Original in Germany June 79
PM's meetings with Chancellor
Schmidt in Germany.

TNF Modernisation

The Prime Minister said that she saw President Brezhnev's recent speech in East Berlin as the opening shots in a psychological campaign to dissuade Western European members of NATO from agreeing to the modernisation of Theatre Nuclear Forces. The Soviet Union had applied similar pressure successfully over

/ERW, and they

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- 9 -

ERW, and they plainly believed that they could arouse fears amongst the more faint-hearted allies once again. This was why she had spoken out strongly in her recent speeches in Blackpool and Luxembourg. Britain was determined to fulfil its obligations in the defence field, and this was why we had agreed without a moment's hesitation to take an additional flight of 16 GLCMs (for which Chancellor Schmidt said he was very grateful). She had discussed TNF modernisation at length with Sr. Cossiga when she had visited Rome and she did not believe that the Italians would waver. She had, however, been worried that the Belgians and Dutch would not accept TNF on their soil. She had herself found during discussions in September that M. Simonet accepted the need for TNF modernisation, but it had been less clear what view M. Martens, who did not yet appear to be fully in the saddle, took. The Dutch seemed to see the greatest difficulties, and we and the Germans should do what we could to help them to overcome them. She was, however, clear that the Alliance could not settle for as little as half the proposed number of TNF in Europe: an essential pre-requisite of deterrents was the maintenance of the military balance. Moreover, the Alliance should not let itself get into the position where the Soviet Union was able to bargain its obsolete weapons against our new missiles. If the Soviet Union did not want NATO to have modern TNF, they would have to give up the SS20 and Backfire.

Chancellor Schmidt said that the present problem with longer range Theatre Nuclear Forces in Europe had begun with a double mistake by the United States and the Soviet Union. They had defined strategic systems as those weapons which could be launched from the territory of one of them to reach the soil of the other. This meant that intermediate range and medium range systems were outside the scope of then current arms limitation negotiations, and this had allowed the Soviet Union to build up in the 1960s a very considerable lead in systems of this kind. The Soviet Union had then decided to increase this lead still further with systems like the SS20, and they had made the mistake of thinking that they could get away with this step. The Americans had been slow to realise

/what was happening,

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what was happening, and he had had to wake them up by making public speeches a couple of years ago. But once the United States understood what the Soviet Union had been doing, they had decided rapidly on the need to modernise the Alliance's TNF and expected the allies to agree with them immediately. But a number of the Western European members of the Alliance had political difficulties over this. They had never had nuclear weapons stationed on their soil which could reach the Soviet Union. This was true of Belgium and the Federal Republic, but it was the Dutch who felt the problem most acutely. We were now at a critical moment in the Alliance's consideration of TNF modernisation. If the Dutch could not be brought along on TNF, their attitude might quickly spread to Belgium and then to Italy and the Scandinavian allies and even, possibly, to the Federal Republic. For this reason he had telephoned President Carter a month ago to suggest that the decision on TNF modernisation should be taken immediately, but the President had taken the view that such action might precipitate the very split with the Dutch which it was essential to prevent. The present position was not wholly comparable with what had happened on ERW. On that occasion the European allies had not let the United States down but, on the contrary, had given them all the help that they needed, even though this had been politically difficult for a number of them. It was President Carter himself who had drawn back at the last moment and who had let down his European allies. The Germans were doing all they could to help the Dutch over TNF modernisation both openly and privately. He had himself talked not only to the Dutch Prime Minister but also, privately, to Mr. Joop den Uyl, the Leader of the Opposition. He thought that it might help Dutch Ministers to remain firm if they could be given a military presentation which included details of the scale and nature of the threat posed by Soviet systems like the SS20. It was hard to believe that such information was not already available to the Dutch Government, and it might be that they preferred not to know. It might be helpful if the Prime Minister or Lord Carrington spoke to their Dutch colleagues.

/The International Situation

Extract from Record of
Discussion between PM &
Chancellor Schmidt Bonn, 31
Oct 79
Original Germany June 79
PM's meetings with Chancellor Schmidt
in Germany

Theatre Nuclear Forces (TNF)

The Prime Minister said that the immediate question was how to help the Dutch take the right decision about the deployment of theatre nuclear forces on their soil. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary pointed out that he would be seeing the Dutch Foreign Minister, Dr. Van Der Klaauw in the following week. The Chancellor said that both Dr. Van Der Klaauw and the Dutch Defence Minister were sound on the question of TNF modernisation. However, this was not the case where the Labour Opposition and the Christian Democratic Party were concerned. Herr Genscher added that the Christian Democratic Party had decided the previous evening that there would have to be two years of arms control negotiations with the Warsaw Pact before they would agree to the deployment of TNF. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary said that it was not clear exactly what the Christian Democratic Party had decided. If it merely meant that the missiles could not be deployed until after two years of negotiations, this would be of no particular significance since the missiles could in any case not be deployed before 1983. The Chancellor said that even if this was all that the Christian Democratic Party had said, it would be a decision of weakness. He asked whether the Prime Minister would be able to bring some influence to bear on the Dutch Prime Minister, Mr. Van Agt. He for his part intended to make a further attempt to persuade the Leader of the Opposition. His attitude was important because of the effect it would have on the actions of the Belgian Parties. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary said that it might be possible for him to see the Dutch Prime Minister during his forthcoming visit. The Prime Minister said that it might be helpful if she were to send a message to the Dutch Prime Minister asking him to see the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary.

Herr Genscher said that the Dutch Government might suggest reducing deployment on missiles in the Netherlands to half the proposed figure. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary and the Prime Minister said that this approach was unacceptable. Herr Genscher agreed and observed that if one country started to talk in terms of halving the number of missiles it would accept, the public elsewhere would wonder why the deployment in every country should not be halved. The Chancellor said that even though the

/agreed figure of

agreed figure of 576 missiles was an artificial one. It was essential that the Alliance should now stick to it. The Prime Minister said that it would be a very good idea for the whole of the Dutch Cabinet to see the NATO presentation on the military balance in Europe. She had seen it recently and had once again been impressed by the extent of the Soviet lead in various areas. Chancellor Schmidt said that this was an excellent idea. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary should find out whether the Dutch Cabinet had seen it and if not try to persuade Dr. Van Der Klaauw that they should do so. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary said that he would do this. He added that his discussions with the Norwegians on this subject had not been easy. Even though the Norwegians would not have to accept the missiles on their territory, they had seemed to be in some doubts about approving the programme. However, they were now coming round.

Chancellor Schmidt said that he had talked to President Carter on 29 October about the possibility of a US offer to withdraw unilaterally one thousand obsolete nuclear warheads from the Federal Republic. News of this idea had leaked to the newspapers. By making it official the Americans would:-

- (a) pre-empt the Dutch decision and make it easier to resist a reduced deployment of new weapons; and
- (b) counter balance the effect on world opinion created by Mr. Brezhnev's speech in Berlin.

NATO had 7,000 nuclear warheads on German soil: they probably needed only 700 or possibly 70! NATO's position would look more credible if 1,000 warheads were removed. However, President Carter had not so far been convinced. He accepted that it would be right to remove the warheads but thought that the decision should wait until the December NATO meetings. Chancellor Schmidt said that ^{the fact that} /the leaks that had already taken place meant that the potential impact of the proposal was already diminishing. The Prime Minister said that she was anxious that NATO should not make a gesture of this kind without making sure of getting something in return. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary said the return would be that the Dutch would remain on board. The Prime Minister wondered whether there was not a risk that NATO /would give up

would give up the warheads but fail to bring the Dutch along. Chancellor Schmidt said that one day soon he would in any case have to tell the Americans to take "this rubbish" away. The gesture of a unilateral withdrawal now would cost nothing and would look very good. It could be linked with the Option Three proposal which had been discussed in the context of the MBFR negotiations. The Russians had been offered this sort of reduction in NATO Forces in return for diminishing their own forces by 30,000 men and 1500 tanks. Mr. Brezhnev's statement had, in a sense, signalled that the Russians were willing to carry out their part of the Option Three bargain. NATO could do the same. It would not alter the military balance but would make it more difficult for the Dutch to insist on still further reductions.

Prime Minister Defence

The objective of TNF modernisation is to re-establish military balance in the European theatre. This is a pre-requisite for arms control discussions or agreements.

Arms control measures are, of course, highly desirable. There is therefore a link. I am prepared to see that link acknowledged by NATO in December.

I acknowledge the importance of SALT II, both for its own sake and as a prelude to SALT III. I want to see SALT II ratified. But I am not prepared to see SALT II made a condition for TNF modernisation.

And
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MINISTRY OF DEFENCE

MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1

Telephone 01-~~9307622~~ 218 2111/3

*copy on: Germany, June 79,
PM's mtg's with
Schmidt in Germany.*

CONFIDENTIAL

30th October 1979

MO 20/3/4

Prime Minister

Dear Michael,

*And
3/4*

BONN VISIT: DEFENCE MATTERS

At yesterday's briefing meeting for the Prime Minister's visit to Bonn, the Prime Minister asked for a clearer explanation of the meaning and interrelationship of the references (at the end of paragraph 2 of the brief on defence matters) to the arms control element of the TNF package and to linkage with SALT 2 ratification.

My Secretary of State sees the position as follows. Most of our Continental Allies, including the Germans, believe that if TNF modernisation is to be put over in their own countries it needs to be accompanied by some kind of offer to bring such systems eventually within an arms control negotiation. The details of any offer are undefined and still under discussion. But:

a. The United Kingdom is in no way committed to the inclusion of any UK systems - Polaris or its successor, any future UK Ground Launched Cruise Missiles force, or our other capabilities - in any negotiation. At present NATO's modernisation plans for Long Range Theatre Nuclear Forces are limited to United State-owned systems and the arms control move contemplated would be similarly limited.

b. We should not negotiate from weakness and must not therefore make any arms control offer in advance of a firm and specific decision to go ahead with modernisation.

/ We ...

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c. We should make it clear to public opinion that the Soviet Union has a substantial advantage in terms of its existing weapons - their LRTNF modernisation, in effect, is already far advanced.

It is envisaged that a comprehensive report on the position, covering both LRTNF modernisation and the accompanying arms control components, will be put to MISC 7 after the mid-November Nuclear Planning Group and before NATO decision-taking meeting on 12th December.

There is also a question about SALT 2 which may be raised. If SALT 2 were not ratified by the United States some of our Continental Allies try to say this would make it impossible to get TNF modernisation through their Cabinets and Parliaments. The Dutch in particular have been inclined to push matters to the point of making prior SALT 2 ratification a condition of TNF decisions on 12th December (you will have seen my letter to George Walden of 25th October). This needs to be quashed. It implies a SALT 2 timetable which the US Senate may find genuinely hard to meet; it might actively provoke Senators to resentment and so prove actually counter productive; and it could entail a further defeat for the West in the nuclear field.

Mr Pym believes that the Prime Minister might wish to urge the Chancellor not to support any conditions which give ground to the Russians but to remain ready (as the UK will be) to go ahead robustly with the TNF decisions even if SALT is not in the bag by 12th December.

I am copying this letter to Paul Lever (Foreign & Commonwealth Office) and Martin Vile (Cabinet Office).

Yours ever
Brian Norbury

(B NORBURY)

M O'D B Alexander Esq
10 Downing Street

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13 OCT 1978



[The body of the document contains several paragraphs of text that are extremely faint and illegible due to the quality of the scan. The text appears to be a formal report or memorandum.]

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Defence 19



MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1
Telephone 01-~~XXXXXX~~ 218 2111/3

MO 14/11

25th October 1979

Dear George,

VISIT OF DUTCH DEFENCE MINISTER

As you know, Mr Scholten, the Dutch Defence Minister, at his urgent request made a brief visit to London today to see my Secretary of State; he emphasised that he regarded the very fact of the visit as confidential. Mr Scholten had a brief meeting with Mr Pym, at which no officials were present; and discussion continued over lunch, at which Messrs Van Vloten and Van der Put and Mr M E Quinlan, Deputy Under Secretary (Policy and Programmes), were also present.

2. Discussion was confined to TNF modernisation. Mr Scholten made it clear that he himself was anxious to secure a positive Alliance decision in December, and was prepared to accept GLCM basing in the Netherlands, and he emphasised that he considered arms control negotiations should follow upon modernisation, rather than precede it. He was a convinced supporter of Dutch national nuclear armament. He was, however, at pains to make clear the extremely difficult questions for the Dutch Coalition Government posed by the reports of the High Level and Special Groups and he explained the elaborate Parliamentary timetable in the Netherlands for discussing the issues raised; he did not expect the Dutch Cabinet to reach a decision until shortly before the meeting of the NATO Defence Planning Committee in December.

3. Mr Scholten said that there were strong feelings in the Dutch Parliament that a decision on TNF modernisation should be conditional upon the ratification of SALT II;

/should ...

George Walden Esq
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

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should be accompanied by serious studies aimed at reducing the present obsolescent nuclear armouries in Europe; should involve the basing of less than the recommended number of 572 GLCMs; and should leave Option III (the nuclear option) in MBFR on the table. Of these considerations that which weighed most heavily with Mr Scholten was clearly the number of GLCMs and he returned several times to the argument that this figure was an arbitrary one, not explicitly justified by the HLG's report; it would be helpful if this overall number could be reduced, and as a consequence the number, 48, recommended for basing in the Netherlands could also be reduced.

4. The Secretary of State made it clear in response that the United Kingdom Government entirely understood the Dutch Government's Parliamentary problems, and were willing to do anything they could to help on presentation. Mr Pym emphasised, however, that he thought that it would be most unwise to start tampering with the overall number of 572 GLCMs which had been recommended on military grounds by the HLG, and was clearly justified in the face of the very significant military threat posed by the Warsaw Pact. It would be a very dangerous course indeed to start changing, and reducing, this number if there were no grounds for doing so other than purely tactical political ones. There would clearly be time, between a decision being reached and the deployment of the missiles, for there to be a reduction in numbers if complementary arms control negotiations with the Russians had meantime proceeded to a point which would make such a reduction militarily justifiable. Thus decisions on modernisation did not need to depend on ratification of SALT II, which would precede further arms control negotiations. It would not be possible to do this the other way round. Mr Pym agreed with Mr Scholten that the ultimate objective of the whole Alliance was "zero growth" but he emphasised that the Alliance really must negotiate from strength.

5. Mr Pym agreed that we would reflect on what Mr Scholten had said so that officials could pursue whether there was any help that could be given to the Dutch on presentation; he made it clear that there could be no change in the

/British ...

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British position on substance. MOD officials will be pursuing this with FCO officials with a view to considering what should be said to the Dutch before the meeting of the Nuclear Planning Group in The Hague on 12th-14th November.

6. I am sending copies of this letter to Michael Alexander (No 10) who will wish to take note of it in connection with the briefing for the Prime Minister's visit next week to Bonn, and to Martin Vile (Cabinet Office).

*Young and
Brian Norbury*

(B M NORBURY)

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10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

22 October 1979

Soviet Ambassador's Call

You wrote to me on 18 October about the further handling of President Brezhnev's letter to the Prime Minister. There would be no objection to the text of President Brezhnev's letter being given to our NATO allies if the other recipients are doing the same.

I am sending copies of this letter to Brian Norbury (Ministry of Defence) and Martin Vile (Cabinet Office).

M. O'D. B. ALEXANDER

Paul Lever, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

18 October 1979

Dear Michael,

Soviet Ambassador's Call

Thank you for your letter of 15 October. The Department have now compared the text of President Brezhnev's letter of 14 October with his speech of 6 October. The letter contains little that is new. I enclose a brief note of the main points of difference.

I also enclose a copy of the telegram which we have sent to brief out Embassy in Moscow, UKDEL NATO and selected other posts.

We are considering what advice to give to the Prime Minister about a reply. Our initial feeling, borne out by early reactions in NATO, is that it would be desirable to compare notes with our Allies in NATO, some of whom have already received similar messages, and to discuss with them how replies might be handled. We see no advantage in tying ourselves to a co-ordinated response. But it would be valuable to continue the process of discussing at NATO in what fora and on what general lines the Allies might reply to the speech. This would help to avoid the risk of some governments reacting at length and with important differences of nuance or argument which could later be exploited by the Russians. There is an emerging consensus at NATO that some reference to the TNF sections of the speech should be included in the Communique of the Ministerial Meeting of the Nuclear Planning Group on 14 November. As preparation for this, we would need to compare what Brezhnev said on 6 October with what he has since written to the various Allies.

In order to pursue this further, it would be helpful to have your agreement to our passing the text of President Brezhnev's letter to the Prime Minister to our NATO Allies (on the assumption of course that other recipients will do the same).

I am sending copies of this letter to Brian Norbury (Ministry of Defence) and to Martin Vile (Cabinet Office).

Yours *GL*

Paul

Paul Lever

M O'D B Alexander Esq
10 Downing Street

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BREZHNEV'S PROPOSALS OF 6 OCTOBER AND BREZHNEV'S LETTER OF
14 OCTOBER

1. Apart from minor reordering and abbreviations, Mr Brezhnev's letter of 14 October to the Prime Minister differs from his speech of 6 October in the following ways:

- (1) the threatening remarks directed against West Germany in the speech have been replaced by the minatory reference in the last paragraph of page 1 of the letter to the "consequences hidden in the deployment of the territory of your country of new types of American nuclear weapons";
- (2) the letter says (middle of second page) that Brezhnev's claims about Soviet missile deployment are indisputable and well-known to us;
- (3) Brezhnev's remarks on SALT II are lumped together with his remarks on TNF. In the speech they were separate. The new order of thought is more logical and links the TNF issue more directly, but in an unspecific way, to the coverage of SALT III;
- (4) On CBMs the speech proposed that big ground force exercises be notified "even earlier". The letter defines this as "not 3 weeks but one month in advance". This adds precision to what amounts to Soviet acceptance of a Western proposal at Belgrade.
- (5) The reference on page 3 to "measures of concrete reduction of armed forces and armaments in Central Europe "(the definite article in the translation is redundant) looks like an attempt to relate the Brezhnev proposals on troop reductions to MBFR. MBFR was not mentioned in the speech. (Soviet negotiators in Vienna have so far been at a loss to explain the link with MBFR and clearly await instructions.)

- (6) Both the speech and the letter say that all earlier proposals remain on the table but the letter is more specific about what these earlier proposals are. In particular it mentions non-first use of force (NOFUF), non-enlargement of alliances and extension of CBMs to the Mediterranean.
- (7) The letter says that the Russians are prepared to consider "other proposals".

File No.
Department DEFENCE
Initiated by P J GOULDEN
(Block Capitals)
Tel. Extn.

OUTWARD
TELEGRAM

Security Classification CONFIDENTIAL
Precedence PRIORITY
DESKBYZ

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(Security Class.) CONFIDENTIAL (Caveat/ Privacy marking)
(Codeword) (Deskby) Z

TO PRIORITY MOSCOW 16.10.79
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[TEXT]

MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT BREZHNEV TO THE PRIME MINISTER

1. The Soviet Ambassador delivered to the Prime Minister on 15 October the text of a letter ostensibly from Brezhnev (full text by telegram to you and UKDEL NATO only). The letter is essentially a personalised version of Brezhnev's 6 October speech, with minor precisions and additions culled from familiar Soviet disarmament policies. (There is for example a brief reference to no first use of nuclear or conventional arms and to non-expansion of military groupings).
2. The main message is that the Prime Minister should reconsider TNF modernisation and "assess thoroughly the consequences " of the basing of new long range TNF in the

UK. There is however no reference to British nuclear capabilities.

3. Sir Clive Rose was instructed to give an outline of this message to NATO Permanent Representatives yesterday, 16 October, and to enquire if other NATO Governments have received similar messages. He has reported that the Danes and West Germans had already received them; the Belgians and Norwegians were expecting to receive theirs shortly. It seems as though the texts of the messages are very similar; for instance, Chancellor Schmidt's letter, like the Prime Minister's, also omits the "threats".

4. For your own information, we are considering whether to recommend a reply to Brezhnev's letter. There is nothing new in the text compared with the speech, on which we already have a broad Alliance consensus. Our initial feeling is against coordinating a single Alliance reply to follow-up letters from Brezhnev. But we hope that Allies intending to reply will stick to the general line agreed in NATO.

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18 OCT 1979

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Prime Minister

Paul

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DESKBY 171700Z

FM WASHINGTON 171522Z OCT

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 3213

INFORMATION PRIORITY UK DEL NATO, MODUK (FOR DS17 DS12 DUS(P)), BONN.

INFORMATION ROUTINE UK DEL VIENNA, ANKARA, ATHENS, BRUSSELS, COPENHAGEN, LISBON, LUXEMBOURG, OSLO, OTTAWA, PARIS, ROME, REYKJAVIK AND THE HAGUE.

THEATRE NUCLEAR FORCES MODERNISATION.

1. TODAY'S PRESS REPORTS THAT BREZHNEV HAS SENT PERSONAL MESSAGES TO A NUMBER OF NATO LEADERS, INCLUDING THE FRG, UK, NETHERLANDS, NORWAY AND DENMARK, RESTATING HIS OFFER TO REDUCE TROOPS, TANKS AND MISSILES (SIC) IF NATO ABANDONED MODERNISATION PLANS (UK DEL NATO TEL NO 220 REFERS). SEE M.I.F.T. (NOT TO ALL).

2. THE WASHINGTON POST ALSO REPORTS THAT LATER THIS WEEK DAVID AARON (DEPUTY TO BRZEZINSKI) ACCOMPANIED BY BARTHOLOMEW (STATE DEPARTMENT) AND MC GIFFERT (DEFENSE DEPARTMENT) WILL HOLD CONSULTATIONS WITH "TOP OFFICIALS" IN WEST GERMANY, BRITAIN, ITALY, BELGIUM AND HOLLAND. THESE CONSULTATIONS WERE SCHEDULED BEFORE THE BREZHNEV SPEECH, AND WILL CONCENTRATE ON A TWO-PRONGED APPROACH: PROCEEDING WITH THE DEPLOYMENT OF MEDIUM-RANGE MISSILES WHILE NEGOTIATING LIMITS WITH THE RUSSIANS ON SUCH FORCES. THE REPORT CONCLUDES THAT "THE TARGET FIGURE OF 572 US MEDIUM-RANGE NUCLEAR MISSILES IS NOT FINAL, AND COULD BE REDUCED IF MOSCOW SHOWS WILLINGNESS TO ENTER NEW NEGOTIATIONS".

3. THE T.N.F. MODERNISATION ISSUE WAS PROMINENT DURING THE MARK-UP DISCUSSIONS YESTERDAY ON SALT II IN THE SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE. AFTER (ANTI-TREATY) HELMS ARGUED THAT THE SENATE SHOULD TAKE MORE TIME IN CONSIDERING THE ISSUES, AND WAS SUPPORTED BY GLENN, RANKING REPUBLICAN JAVITS URGED THAT THERE WAS A NEED TO MOVE QUICKLY SINCE "THE WESTERN ALLIANCE IS IN GRAVE PERIL". IF THE SENATE HAD NOT ACTED ON SALT II BY THE TIME NATO MET IN DECEMBER TO CONSIDER T.N.F. MODERNISATION, THE NECESSARY DECISIONS MIGHT NOT BE TAKEN. "IF THEY MAKE A DECISION AGAINST US AT THAT TIME, YOU'LL BE MIGHTY SORRY THAT YOU DIDN'T RUSH" JAVITS ARGUED.

4. THIS BROUGHT A RESPONSE FROM MINORITY LEADER BAKER, THAT THE DESIRES OF ALLIED COUNTRIES SHOULD NOT BE PERMITTED TO DETERMINE THE SENATE'S SCHEDULE. (PRO-TREATY) BIDEN REPLIED HEATEDLY THAT IT WAS NOT THE NEEDS OF THE ALLIES BUT "OUR NAKED SELF-INTEREST" THAT ARGUED FOR SPEEDY ACTION ON SALT. HE DEVELOPED THE THESIS, NOW GAINING GROUND IN WASHINGTON, THAT DEFEAT OF SALT COULD WELL CAUSE THE COLLAPSE OF THE DELICATELY BALANCED PLAN TO MODERNISE T.N.F., AND PERHAPS THE UNRAVELLING OF THE ALLIANCE, GIVEN THE ALLIES' DESIRE TO SALT APPROVED AS A SIGN THAT ARMS CONTROL EFFORTS WOULD CONTINUE. THIS ARGUMENT WAS DESCRIBED BY HELMS AS "POPPY-COCK".

HENDERSON

IMMEDIATE

NNNN

DELFO 006/17

OO FCO

OO MODUK (HEAD OF DS17)

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Mr. A. H. ...
W. J. ...
RC

CONFIDENTIAL

FROM UK DEL NATO 1725+ OCT 79

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NO 222 OF 17 OCTOBER 79

AND TO IMMEDIATE MODUK (HEAD OF DS17)

INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON.

No 10 J/S
As
Print

MY TEL NO 220; BREZHNEV'S MESSAGES ON TNF ETC.

1. GLITMAN (US) HAS NOW CIRCULATED A SYNOPSIS OF THE LETTER THAT CARTER HAS RECEIVED FROM BREZHNEV. (COPY FOLLOWS BY BAG). WE ARE LIKELY TO COME UNDER PRESSURE AT THE SPC MEETING ON 19 OCTOBER TO DO LIKEWISE, OR EVEN TO AGREE TO CIRCULATION OF FULL TEXTS OF MESSAGES TO HEADS OF GOVERNMENTS FOR PURPOSES OF COMPARISON. I SHOULD BE GRATEFULL FOR AUTHORITY TO CIRCULATE AT LEAST A SYNOPSIS OF THE LETTER TO THE PRIME MINISTER (WE CAN PREPARE THIS HERE).

2. AT THE SPC MEETING THE AMBASSADOR PROPOSES THAT I SHOULD TAKE THE FOLLOWING LINE ON HOW BEST TO RESPOND TO THE BREZHNEV LETTERS:-

(A) THE SUBSTANTIVE REPLY WILL COME IN THE FORM OF THE DECISIONS TO BE TAKEN IN DECEMBER, AND IT WOULD BE BETTER TO LEAVE THE LETTERS UNANSWERED UNTIL THEN;

(B) EVEN IF SOME RECIPIENTS FEEL THE NEED TO REPLY PROMPTLY, THERE IS NO NEED FOR ALL TO RESPOND AT THE SAME TIME;

(C) IT IS NOT NECESSARY NOR INDEED FEASIBLE TO TRY TO AGREE ON AN IDENTICAL REPLY, THOUGH IT WOULD BE USEFUL TO AGREE ON THE MAIN LINES;

(D) REPLIES SHOULD BE KEPT SHORT AND GENERAL IN ORDER TO AVOID THE RISK OF EXPOSING ANY POSSIBLE DIFFERENCES OF EMPHASIS WHICH THE RUSSIANS COULD EXPLOIT, OR OF BEING DRAWN INTO A CONTINUING CORRESPONDENCE.

3. THE AMBASSADOR WOULD LIKE TO DISCUSS THIS PROPOSED LINE WITH THE DEPARTMENT TOMORROW WITH A VIEW TO PREPARING MY INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE SPC MEETING.

SCOTT



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

15 October 1979

Dear George,

Soviet Ambassador's Call

The Soviet Ambassador called on the Prime Minister at 1630 this afternoon at his own request. He was accompanied by Mr. N.N. Ouspenski.

The purpose of Mr. Lunkov's call was to deliver a message to the Prime Minister from Mr. Brezhnev. I enclose a copy of the original together with a copy of the (rather indifferent) unofficial translation prepared by the Soviet Embassy.

Mr. Lunkov began the conversation by precisising at some length Mr. Brezhnev's message. In reply the Prime Minister asked Mr. Lunkov to convey her thanks to President Brezhnev for the message. She reminded Mr. Lunkov of her conversation at Moscow Airport with Mr. Kosygin when she had said that it was best for talks between Governments to be conducted on the basis of facts rather than of claims and assertions. As a result of satellite photography both sides knew a great deal about each others capabilities. We knew that the SS20 was a highly sophisticated modern weapon. It had three warheads and its accuracy was much greater than that of the preceding weapons system. It was targeted on Western Europe. Mr. Kosygin would be aware that the Prime Minister would not be taken in by claims that the military capability of the Soviet Union was not being improved or that it was for purely defensive purposes.

Turning to the general question of the nuclear balance, the Prime Minister said that who ever initiated a nuclear exchange would be responsible for bringing civilisation to a end. She did not know what view might be taken in the Soviet Union, but her own view was that no-one would survive a nuclear war. Nuclear weapons were not intended to be used: they were intended to deter. To achieve this end each side needed to deploy an equivalent capability at every level. It was likely that because of the deployment of the SS20 and the Backfire bomber a gap was opening up at the theatre nuclear force level. Since the Soviet Union had deployed these new weapons systems, it was essential for the West to put something equivalent into the field.

/At this point

CONFIDENTIAL

cc Master 578
+ visit of
Soviet Ambassador
Inference

At this point in the conversation Mr. Lunkov read an extract from an article in today's Manchester Guardian by Mary Kaldor. This claimed that it could be argued that it was the West which, by deploying cruise missiles and Pershing II, was introducing a new element in the East/West balance. The Prime Minister replied that this was "poppycock". The SS20 was a highly effective new system. Since it was being deployed, the West had no option but to try to catch up. If the Soviet Union cared to destroy its SS20 missiles and the Backfire bomber there would be no need for the West to catch up. Mr. Lunkov claimed that even Western experts recognised the existence of a balance between the two sides in nuclear weapons. The Prime Minister rejected the assertion and repeated that the Soviet weapons systems were new, sophisticated and of high quality. She had told Mr. Kosygin that he should not be too modest about Soviet military technology. Deterrence came through strength. The SS20 and the Backfire bomber were strong: the West would have to deploy equal strength.

Mr. Lunkov asked what could be done to stop the process of response and counter-response. The Prime Minister said that both sides would have to reduce together on a basis of confidence and of certain knowledge of the other side's capabilities.

The Prime Minister said that she would study Mr. Brezhnev's message in detail and, having done so, would consider the question of a reply. It might be that the Alliance would reply as a whole to Mr. Brezhnev's speech but it was possible that she would reply directly herself. If she were to do so, she hoped that Mr. Brezhnev would receive Sir Curtis Keeble as rapidly as she had agreed to receive Mr. Lunkov. Mr. Lunkov did not react to this point.

As Mr. Lunkov was taking leave of the Prime Minister, he raised the question of Chairman Hua's visit. He said that the Soviet Government regarded it as perfectly reasonable for the UK to develop their relations with the Chinese Government but that he hoped this would not be on an anti-Soviet basis. The Prime Minister said that the development of Anglo/Chinese relations need cause concern to no-one.

I am sending copies of this letter and its second enclosure to Brian Norbury (Ministry of Defence) and Martin Vile (Cabinet Office).

Yours ever

Richard Alexander

G.G.H. Walden, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MAILAGE
SERIAL No. 119/75T

Dear Mrs. Prime Minister,

I am sending You this letter in order to draw your attention to the questions of military detente and limitation of armaments in Europe.

I would like to summarise briefly the substance of our ideas and proposals on these questions laid down in my speech in Berlin on 6 October a.c.

1. The allegations that are disseminated in the West to the effect that the Soviet Union is building up its military strength on the European continent over and above its defence requirements have nothing in common with reality. They could not be regarded otherwise than an intention to cover up the development, adoption and carrying out the plans to deploy the new types of American nuclear missile weapons in Western Europe. In other words they have an end to break the balance of forces existing in Europe, to try to give military superiority to NATO.

One can say in advance that these attempts would hardly be successful. The Soviet Union and its allies would have to make the necessary additional steps to strengthen their security. No other option would be left for them.

It is quite clear however that the fulfilment of the mentioned plans by the NATO countries would inevitably lead to the aggravation of the situation in Europe and would to a great extent contaminate the international atmosphere as a whole.

I would like to express the hope, Mrs. Prime Minister, that your Government and You personally will consider over and over again all the aspects of this problem, will assess thoroughly the consequences hidden in the deployment on the territory of your country of new types of American nuclear missile weapons aimed at the USSR and its allies.

As for the Soviet Union, I have already repeatedly said and would like to say it again to You personally: we do not seek military superiority; we have never threatened and do not intend to threaten anybody. Our strategic doctrine is purely defensive in nature.

I also confirm again that the Soviet Union will never use nuclear arms against those states that renounce the production and acquisition of such arms and do not have them on their territory.

2. As I have most definitely stated in Berlin, the number of medium-range carriers of nuclear arms on the territory of the European part of the Soviet Union has not been increased by a single missile, by a single plane during the past ten years. On the contrary the number of launchers of medium-range missiles and also the yeild of the nuclear charges of these missiles have even been somewhat reduced. The number of medium-range bombers, too, has diminished. As for the territory of other states the Soviet Union does not deploy such means there at all. Already for a number of years now we have not been increasing the number of our armed forces stationed in Central Europe either. Those are indisputable facts, Mrs. Prime Minister, and I am sure that they are well known to the appropriate bodies in your country.

Moreover, we are prepared to reduce the number of medium-range nuclear weapons deployed in western areas of the Soviet Union as compared with the present level but, of course, only in the event of no additional medium-range nuclear weapons being deployed in Western Europe.

As is known, important talks on SALT-3 are impending. We are in favour of starting them immediately after the entry into force of the SALT-2 Treaty. Within the framework of these talks we agree to discuss the possibilities of limiting not only inter-continental but also other types of armaments, naturally, with due regard to all relevant factors and with strict observance of the principles of the equal security of the parties.

3. The Soviet Union motivated by a sincere desire to extricate from a blind alley the efforts made over many years to achieve military détente in Europe, to set an example of the transition from words to actual deeds, have decided, in agreement

with the leadership of the GDR and after consultations with other member-states of the Warsaw Treaty, unilaterally to reduce the number of Soviet troops in Central Europe. Up to 20,000 Soviet servicemen, a thousand tanks and also a certain amount of other military hardware will be withdrawn from the territory of the German Democratic Republic in the course of the next twelve months.

We hope that this new concrete manifestation of the peaceableness and good will of the Soviet Union and its allies will be duly assessed by the governments of countries-members of NATO and that they will follow our example.

4. Being in favour of a further strengthening of trust among states we are prepared in particular to reach agreement that prior notifications about big exercises of ground forces envisaged by the Helsinki Final Act, be made not three weeks but one month in advance and not from the level of 25,000 men as it is the case now but, say, from the level of 20,000 men. We are also prepared, on the basis of reciprocity, not to conduct military exercises involving more than 40,000-50,000 men. Besides that, we propose to notify timely not only about military exercises but also about movements of ground forces numbering more than 20,000 men in the area defined by the Helsinki Final Act.

I think, Mrs. Prime Minister, that the essence of the new initiatives, taken by the Soviet Union in consultation with other member-states of the Warsaw Treaty, speaks for itself. I would emphasize only one point - all of them are motivated by our desire to strengthen peace and security in Europe by supplementing political detente with measures of military detente, including the measures of concrete reduction of armed forces and armaments in Central Europe.

Naturally, all the proposals made earlier by member-states of the Warsaw Treaty, remain in force, including those concerning the conclusion among all participants of the All-European conference of a treaty on the non-first use of both nuclear and conventional arms; the non-expansion of military political groupings in Europe; the notifications about major air force exercises and naval exercises staged near the territorial waters

of other states-participants in the All-European conference; the extension of the confidence - building measures to the region of the Mediterranean.

On our part we shall be prepared to consider other proposals aimed at strengthening trust among states and lessening the danger of war in Europe.

These are the considerations about military detente and arms limitation in Europe, which I and my colleagues wanted to bring to your attention, Mrs. Prime Minister. I shall be glad to receive, if possible, an early reply from You on the matters raised by me.

Yours sincerely,

L.Brezhnev

14 October 1979

The Rt. Hon. Margaret Thatcher, M.P.
Prime Minister of Great Britain

Уважаемая госпожа Премьер-министр,

Направляю Вам это письмо с целью привлечь Ваше внимание к вопросам военной разрядки и ограничения вооружений в Европе.

Хочу кратко суммировать существо наших мыслей и предложений по этим вопросам, которые были изложены в моей речи в Берлине 6 октября с.г.

Первое. Распространяемые на Западе утверждения, будто Советский Союз наращивает на европейском континенте свою военную мощь в масштабах, не вызываемых потребностями обороны, не имеют ничего общего с действительностью. Их нельзя расценить иначе, как призванные служить прикрытием для разработки, принятия и осуществления планов размещения в Западной Европе новых видов американского ракетно-ядерного оружия. Другими словами — для того, чтобы сломать сложившееся в Европе равновесие сил, попытаться обеспечить блоку НАТО военное превосходство.

Из таких попыток, заранее можно сказать, вряд ли что получится. Советский Союз и его союзники были бы вынуждены осуществить необходимые дополнительные шаги по укреплению своей безопасности. Иного выхода у них не останется.

Совершенно ясно, однако, что реализация странами НАТО указанных планов неизбежно привела бы к обострению обстановки в Европе и во многом отравила бы международную атмосферу в целом.

Хотел бы выразить надежду, госпожа Премьер-министр, что Ваше правительство и Вы лично еще и еще раз обдумаете все стороны этой проблемы, тщательно взвесите, какими последствиями было бы чревато размещение на территории Вашей страны новых видов американского ракетно-ядерного оружия, нацеленного на СССР и его союзников.

Что касается Советского Союза, то я уже не раз говорил и хочу повторить вновь Вам лично: мы к военному превосходству не стремимся; никому не угрожали и угрожать не собираемся; наша стратегическая доктрина имеет сугубо оборонительную направленность.

Я также вновь подтверждаю, что Советский Союз никогда не применит ядерного оружия против тех государств, которые отказываются от производства и приобретения такого оружия и не имеют его на своей территории.

Второе. Как я заявил со всей определенностью в Берлине, за последние 10 лет на территории европейской части Советского Союза количество носителей ядерного оружия средней дальности не было увеличено ни на одну ракету, ни на один самолет. Наоборот, количество пусковых установок ракет средней дальности, как и мощность ядерных зарядов этих ракет, даже несколько уменьшились. Сократилось здесь и количество средних бомбардировщиков. На территориях же других государств Советский Союз такие средства вообще не размещает. Вот уже на протяжении ряда лет мы не увеличиваем также численность своих войск, размещенных в Центральной Европе. Таковы неопровержимые факты, госпожа Премьер-министр, и я уверен, что они хорошо известны соответствующим ведомствам Вашей страны.

Более того, мы выражаем готовность сократить по сравнению с нынешним уровнем количество ядерных средств средней дальности, развернутых в западных районах Советского Союза, но, конечно, только в том случае, если в Западной Европе не будет дополнительного размещения ядерных средств средней дальности.

Как известно, предстоят важные переговоры по ОСВ-3. Мы за то, чтобы начать их сразу после вступления в силу договора ОСВ-2. В рамках этих переговоров мы согласны обсудить возможности ограничений не только межконтинентальных, но и других видов вооружений, разумеется, с учетом всех относящихся сюда факторов и при строгом соблюдении принципа равной безопасности сторон.

Третье. Советский Союз, будучи движим искренним желанием вывести из тупика многолетние усилия по достижению военной разрядки в Европе и показать пример перехода от слов к реальным делам, по согласованию с ГДР и после консультаций с другими государствами-участниками Варшавского Договора, принял решение сократить в одностороннем порядке численность советских войск в Центральной Европе. В течение следующих 12 месяцев с территории ГДР будут выведены до 20 тысяч советских военнослужащих, тысяча танков, а также определенное количество другой военной техники.

Мы надеемся, что это новое конкретное проявление миролюбия и доброй воли Советского Союза и его союзников будет должным образом оценено правительствами стран-членов НАТО и что они последуют нашему примеру.

Четвертое. Будучи сторонниками дальнейшего укрепления доверия между государствами, мы готовы, в частности, договориться о

том, чтобы предусматриваемые Заключительным актом Совещания по безопасности и сотрудничеству в Европе предварительные уведомления о крупных военных учениях сухопутных войск делались не за три недели, а за месяц и не с уровня 25 тысяч человек, как сейчас, а, скажем, с уровня 20 тысяч человек. Мы готовы также на началах взаимности не проводить военных учений с участием более 40-50 тысяч человек. Кроме того, мы предлагаем заблаговременно уведомлять не только о военных учениях, но и о передвижениях сухопутных войск численностью более 20 тысяч человек в районе, который определен Заключительным актом.

Думается, госпожа Премьер-министр, что конкретное содержание новых инициатив, предпринятых Советским Союзом по согласованию с другими государствами-участниками Варшавского Договора, говорит само за себя. Подчеркну лишь одно — все они продиктованы заботой об укреплении мира и безопасности в Европе путем дополнения политической разрядки мерами военной разрядки, в том числе мерами реального сокращения вооруженных сил и вооружений в Центральной Европе.

Разумеется, остаются в силе и все ранее выдвинутые государствами-участниками Варшавского Договора предложения, в том числе относительно заключения между всеми участниками общеевропейского совещания договора о неприменении первыми друг против друга как ядерных, так и обычных вооружений, относительно нерасширения военно-политических группировок в Европе, относительно уведомления о крупных военно-воздушных учениях и военно-морских маневрах, проводимых вблизи территориальных вод других государств-участников общеевропейского совещания, относительно распространения мер доверия на район Средиземного моря.

Со своей стороны мы будем готовы рассмотреть и другие предложения, направленные на укрепление доверия между государствами и уменьшение опасности войны в Европе.

Таковы те соображения по вопросам военной разрядки и ограничения вооружений в Европе, которые я и мои коллеги хотели довести до Вашего сведения, госпожа Премьер-министр. Буду рад получить по возможности скоро Ваш ответ по затронутым мною вопросам.

С уважением,

Л. БРЕЖНЕВ

14 октября 1979 года

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Ronald Reagan

FM WASHINGTON 112237Z

Reagan

TO ROUTINE F C O

TELEGRAM NO. 3125 OF 11 OCTOBER

INFO MODUK(DS17), UKDEL NATO, MOSCOW, PARIS, BONN, THE HAGUE,
BRUSSELS AND UKDEL VIENNA.

MYTEL NO. 3064 : U.S. REACTIONS TO THE BREZHNEV SPEECH.

1. THE NOTE STRUCK BY PRESIDENT CARTER (MY TELEGRAM UNDER REFERENCE) IN THE FIRST HIGH LEVEL PUBLIC REACTION HERE TO BREZHNEV'S EAST BERLIN SPEECH HAS NOW BEEN ECHOED BY OTHER LEADING MEMBERS OF THE ADMINISTRATION.

2. IN AN ADDRESS YESTERDAY TO THE 25TH ANNUAL ASSEMBLY OF THE ATLANTIC TREATY ASSOCIATION VICE PRESIDENT MONDALE INCLUDED THE FOLLOWING PASSAGE :

QUOTE AS YOU KNOW JUST THIS PAST WEEK IN EAST BERLIN PRESIDENT BREZHNEV ANNOUNCED UNILATERAL REDUCTION OF CERTAIN SOVIET TROOPS TANKS AND OTHER MILITARY HARDWARE IN EASTERN EUROPE. WE WOULD WELCOME SUCH A REDUCTION BUT IT IS ABSOLUTELY ESSENTIAL THAT IT BE SEEN IN CONTEXT AND THAT CONTEXT INCLUDES THE FOLLOWING FACTORS :

FIRST SOVIET FORCES IN EUROPE TODAY VASTLY OUTNUMBER THOSE OF THE NATO ALLIANCE AND SO AS I SAID ON BEHALF OF THE PRESIDENT TO THE U.N. SPECIAL SESSION ON DISARMAMENT ON THE EVE OF THE 1978 NATO SUMMIT IN WASHINGTON WE IN NATO INCREASED OUR DEFENSE BUDGETS NOT OUT OF PREFERENCE BUT OUT OF NECESSITY A NECESSITY IMPOSED UPON US FOR EXAMPLE BY THE WARSAW PACT'S 3 TO 1 ADVANTAGE IN TANKS IN EUROPE.

SECOND THE SOVIET THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES HAVE BEEN BUILT UP. THE BACKFIRE BOMBER AND NOW THEIR NEW SS-20 AN INTERMEDIATE RANGE MOBILE BALLISTIC MISSILE SIGNIFICANTLY INCREASES SOVIET MILITARY CAPABILITY AGAINST TARGETS NOT ONLY IN EUROPE BUT ALSO IN ASIA AFRICA AND THE MIDDLE EAST.

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AND THIRD IT IS OBVIOUSLY IN THE SOVIET INTEREST TO LURE NATO AWAY FROM CRUCIAL CONVENTIONAL AND THEATER NUCLEAR FORCE MODERNIZATION.

WHILE WE MUST EXAMINE PRESIDENT BREZHNEV'S ANNOUNCEMENT CAREFULLY AND AFFIRMATIVELY WE MUST BEAR IN MIND THAT THE SELF-RESTRAINT IN THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES SHOWN BY THE NATO ALLIANCE OVER THE PAST TWO DECADES HAS NOT BEEN MET BY CORRESPONDING RESTRAINT ON THE PART OF THE SOVIETS. IT IS FOR THIS REASON THAT THE WORK OF NATO'S GROUPS ON THE TNF MODERNIZATION AND TNF ARMS CONTROL IS SO CRUCIALLY IMPORTANT AS IS THE DECISION WE WILL TAKE AS AN ALLIANCE LEADER THIS YEAR ON MODERNIZED THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES CAPABLE OF COUNTERING REAL AND EXISTING SOVIET TNF FORCES OPPOSED AGAINST OUR ALLIANCE. UNQUOTE

3. ON THE SAME OCCASION BRZEZINSKI'S SPEECH INCLUDED THE FOLLOWING PASSAGE :

QUOTE SUCH A SUSTAINED SQUARE BRACKETS SOVIET CEASE SQUARE BRACKETS EFFORT GOES WELL BEYOND WHAT COULD BE EXPLAINED AS MEETING A REASONABLE DEFENSIVE NEED. YET IN THE SAME PERIOD OF TIME NATO HAS DONE VIRTUALLY NOTHING TO UPGRADE ITS OWN LONG-RANGE THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES.

THE CHALLENGE WE NOW CONFRONT IS NOT ONLY A MILITARY ONE. I BELIEVE THAT WE HAVE FAR MORE TO FEAR FROM THE POSSIBILITY OF POLITICAL INTIMIDATION. SHOULD NATO BE VIEWED AS UNWILLING OR UNABLE TO RESPOND TO THREATS OF NUCLEAR WARFARE CONFINED TO THE EUROPEAN AREA - AS THE LACK OF ANY EFFECTIVE THEATER FORCES WOULD ALMOST CERTAINLY MAKE IT APPEAR TO BE - THE OPPORTUNITY FOR SOVIET POLITICAL PRESSURES WOULD BE CORRESPONDINGLY ENLARGED.

THAT IS THE CHALLENGE. THE CHOICE IS SQUARELY UP TO US. WE CAN AS AN ALLIANCE DECIDE TO DO NOTHING TO OFFSET THE SUBSTANTIAL MODERNIZATION IN SOVIET THEATER NUCLEAR FORCE : WE CAN SIT BY HOPING WE CAN COPE WITH THE CONSEQUENCE OF INEQUALITY : WE CAN ALLOW OURSELVES TO BE LULLED INTO PASSIVITY LEAVING THE ALLIANCE IN A SITUATION OF INEQUALITY AND GROWING VULNERABILITY. OR WE CAN TAKE EFFECTIVE ACTION NOW. THIS MEANS IN TURN THE DEPLOYMENT OF STRONG THEATER-BASED SYSTEMS CAPABLE OF REACHING SOVIET TERRITORY. UNQUOTE

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THE SAME MESSAGE WAS UNDERSCORED BY GENERAL ROGERS (SAC EUR) IN HIS OWN ADDRESS TO THE ATA : QUOTE THE ALLIANCE NOW FACES A VERY CRUCIAL DECISION CONCERNING THE MODERNISING OF OUR LONGER RANGE THEATRE NUCLEAR WEAPONS ... THERE IS NO QUESTION IN MY MIND AS TO THE MILITARY REQUIREMENT FOR SUCH MODERNISATION ... SURELY THE WEST MUST NOT PUT ITSELF IN THE POSITION OF LETTING THE SOVIET UNION DECIDE FOR US THE MEANS WE SHOULD USE TO DETER THE GROWING THREAT POSED BY THE SOVIET UNION AND THE WARSAW PACT. UNQUOTE

5. AT THE SAME TIME HAROLD BROWN WAS GIVING HIS FINAL TESTIMONY ON SALT II YESTERDAY TO THE SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE. HE COMPLETED THE ARGUMENT BY TELLING THE COMMITTEE THAT UNLESS THE SALT TREATY WAS PROMPTLY APPROVED IT WOULD BE IMPOSSIBLE TO GET THE NECESSARY WESTERN EUROPEAN SUPPORT FOR THE DEPLOYMENT IN EUROPE OF NEW TNF SYSTEMS TO MATCH RECENT SOVIET ADVANCES. WE MAY EXPECT THIS ARGUMENT WHICH HAS NOW ALSO BEEN PICKED UP IN PRESS COMMENT (EG JOSEPH KRAFT IN TODAY'S WASHINGTON POST TEXT BY BAG TO THE DEPARTMENT) TO BE INCREASINGLY USED BY THE ADMINISTRATION AS AN INCENTIVE TO ENCOURAGE DOUBTING SENATORS TO SUPPORT RATIFICATION OF SALT II. PARADOXICALLY BREZHNEV'S IMPLIED THREAT AGAINST NATO TNF DEPLOYMENT ENABLES THE ADMINISTRATION TO ARGUE THAT A FIRM RESPONSE FROM THE WEST REQUIRES EARLY RATIFICATION OF SALT IF A PROMPT AND POSITIVE ALLIANCE DECISION ON TNF IS NOT TO BE FOREGONE.

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TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 583 OF 11 OCTOBER

INFO IMMEDIATE MODUK ROME UKDEL NATO WASHINGTON

INFO PRIORITY MOSCOW THE HAGUE BRUSSELS PARIS

Prime Minister

and

ITALIAN PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT TO BONN: DEFENCE ISSUES.

1. ACCORDING TO THE CHANCELLOR'S OFFICE, THERE WAS AN ALMOST COMPLETE MEETING OF MINDS BETWEEN CHANCELLOR SCHMIDT AND PRIME MINISTER COSSIGA ON THE BREZHNEV SPEECH AND TNF. THEIR ASSESSMENT OF THE FORMER WAS THAT IT WAS A MOVE DESIGNED PRINCIPALLY TO AFFECT ALLIANCE DECISIONS ON TNF. THE PROPOSAL TO REDEPLOY MISSILES EAST OF THE URALS CLEARLY HAD NOTHING IN IT OF ADVANTAGE TO THE WEST. THE CHANCELLOR THOUGHT THAT THE POSSIBLE WITHDRAWAL OF UP TO 20,000 MEN AND 1,000 TANKS SHOULD BE LOOKED AT CLOSELY IN THE MBFR CONTEXT. BUT IT WAS NOT YET CLEAR EXACTLY WHAT IT AMOUNTED TO AND IN ANY CASE THE OFFER SHOULD NOT DETRACT FROM THE IMPORTANCE WHICH THE WEST ATTACHED TO REACHING AN AGREEMENT WITH THE EAST ON DATA. MORE GENERALLY THE RUSSIAN OFFER ADDED TO THE IMPORTANCE OF THE ARMS CONTROL ELEMENT IN THE TNF PACKAGE.

2. AS REGARDS TNF BOTH THE CHANCELLOR AND COSSIGA AGREED THAT THE BREZHNEV SPEECH WOULD HAVE NO EFFECT ON THE DETERMINATION OF BOTH GOVERNMENTS TO PRESS AHEAD WITH TNF MODERNISATION. DOMESTICALLY NEITHER HEAD OF GOVERNMENT THOUGHT THAT HE WOULD ENCOUNTER SERIOUSLY INCREASED DIFFICULTIES IN CARRYING THROUGH SUCH A PROGRAMME. OF THE TWO COSSIGA SEEMED TO BE THE MORE BULLISH ABOUT THIS, ALTHOUGH IT WAS ONLY A MATTER OF DEGREE. (HE HAD APPARENTLY ALREADY CLEARED HIS LINES WITH LEADERS OF ALL POLITICAL PARTIES EXCEPT BERLINGUER. CRAXI NEEDED SOME MORAL SUPPORT). COSSIGA ALSO SEEMS TO HAVE BEEN MORE ROBUST IN GIVING THE IMPRESSION THAT THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT WOULD NOT BE DEFLECTED FROM ITS COURSE, EVEN IF THE DUTCH, POSSIBLY FOLLOWED BY THE BELGIANS, WERE TO DECIDE THAT THEY COULD NOT AT THIS STAGE AGREE TO STATION LONG-RANGE TNF ON THEIR SOIL. WE WERE TOLD THAT IN THE CHANCELLOR'S VIEW SUCH A DEVELOPMENT WOULD BE QUOTE VERY SERIOUS INDEED UNQUOTE AND ALL EFFORTS SHOULD BE MADE TO PERSUADE THE

/ DUTCH

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DUTCH TO AGREE. BOTH COSSIGA AND THE CHANCELLOR AGREED THAT IT WOULD BE PREFERABLE FOR DECISIONS TO BE TAKEN RATHER EARLIER THAN DECEMBER BUT SCHMIDT TOLD COSSIGA THAT THERE APPEARED TO BE INSUPERABLE DIFFICULTIES IN THIS FOR THE DUTCH.

3. THE IMPRESSION WE GAINED FROM THIS ACCOUNT WAS THAT THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT WILL NOW INTENSIFY THEIR EFFORTS TO BRING THE DUTCH AND TO KEEP THE BELGIANS ON BOARD AND IS LOOKING FOR SUPPORT FROM OTHER MEMBERS OF THE ALLIANCE (COSSIGA WILL BE SEEING VAN AGT ON 13 OCTOBER): BUT IF THIS AIM SHOULD NOT BE ACHIEVED THEY WILL TAKE SOME SOLACE FROM CONTINUED ITALIAN PARTICIPATION.

WRIGHT

Fco WHITEHALL DIST:

WGD

SECRET

Weekend Box.

for Paul

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19



Prime Minister

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

Paul
- 11/x

9 October 1979

[Handwritten signature]

Dear Michael,

President Brezhnev's Speech in Berlin

We have been considering how to respond to President Brezhnev's statement in Berlin on 6 October about theatre nuclear forces, confidence building measures and Soviet troop and tank reductions. The attached paper, which has been approved by Lord Carrington, sets out a line which our delegation at NATO can use in concerting Alliance views. We will draw on this, taking account of the opinions of our Allies, in handling the media in the United Kingdom. Meanwhile, News Department here have a holding line based on contingency briefing drawn up in NATO last week, (UKDEL NATO telegram number 208).

I am sending a copy of this letter to Brian Norbury (MOD) and Martin Vile (Cabinet Office).

Yours etc

Paul

(P Lever)
Private Secretary

M O D'B Alexander Esq
10 Downing Street
LONDON

SECRET

10 OCT 1979



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PRESIDENT BREZHNEV'S BERLIN SPEECH

1. President Brezhnev's speech includes three eye-catching security initiatives: on Theatre Nuclear Forces (TNF), Confidence Building Measures (CBM) and Soviet troop and tank reductions from the GDR. Although not expressly linked in the statement, they are undoubtedly aimed at influencing the NATO programme of TNF modernisation. The Soviet ideas on troop/tank reductions and CBMs are, however, irrelevant to this issue. It will be very much in the Western interest to treat the three components separately.

TNF

2. President Brezhnev warns that TNF modernisation would upset the security balance in Europe and harm the European countries which accept basing of these US systems. He claims that the Soviet Union has in the last ten years reduced its medium-range bombers and missile launchers and the yield of the nuclear weapons they carry. He offers to reduce Soviet theatre systems "if no additional medium range nuclear weapons are deployed in Western Europe".

3. Taken with the rest of the speech, this line will undoubtedly make it harder to get agreement to TNF basing in continental Europe. There will be a strong temptation, especially for example in the Netherlands, to put arms control first and delay modernisation. The danger is that the timetable for deciding on modernisation will slip to well beyond the US and German elections, thus delaying (or perhaps even frustrating completely) the introduction of the new systems.

4. While we can welcome Soviet acceptance that there should be negotiations about the theatre nuclear forces of both sides, there is nothing in the proposals themselves to indicate that the existing serious imbalance in TNF will be rectified. The need for Alliance TNF modernisation therefore remains as pressing as ever. On no account should we allow modernisation to be a hostage to arms control.

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5. Given the known views of the Dutch we need therefore to present a convincing case in NATO for pressing ahead with parallel decisions in November on modernisation and arms control.

6. We can deploy the following arguments:

(a) President Brezhnev's figures are open to challenge. It is true that the number of long range theatre missiles and aircraft stationed in the Western part of the Soviet Union have been reduced in the last ten years. But Soviet capabilities in terms of accuracy, ability to penetrate, mobility and target coverage have increased very substantially. Moreover, a number of Soviet missiles is now targeted on Western Europe from points East of the Urals.

(b) The NATO programme is designed to plug a gap in the spectrum of NATO's nuclear capabilities. This gap is increasing as Western systems (eg Vulcan) become obsolescent and increasingly vulnerable to the more sophisticated Soviet weapons.

(c) The proposed TNF modernisation programme involves no increase in NATO's overall warhead numbers in Europe.

(d) Announcing his decision last year not to deploy enhanced radiation warheads (the Neutron bomb), President Carter said he was looking for Soviet restraint in response to this important concession. President Brezhnev's statement should be seen in this light.

(e) The Allies have not only been considering TNF modernisation; Ministers will in December also consider specific proposals for negotiations on TNF arms control. This will enable the Alliance to respond substantively to President Brezhnev's statement without endangering Alliance security interests.

/Troop/Tank Reductions

Troop/Tank Reductions

7. The announcement that 20,000 Soviet troops and 1,000 tanks will be withdrawn from the GDR in the next 12 months is to be welcomed. But reductions of this kind will not do much to diminish the existing numerical advantages both in manpower and in tanks enjoyed by the Warsaw Pact. This aspect of President Brezhnev's proposals should be put firmly in the MBFR context and the Alliance needs to get across the message that a Soviet move in this field is irrelevant to TNF modernisation.

8. In detail we could argue that:-

(a) The Soviet reductions are not numerically significant. The withdrawal of 20,000 troops will make little difference to the Warsaw Pact's superiority of over 160,000 ground forces in the MBFR area of Europe. A cut of 1,000 tanks will hardly impinge on the Warsaw Pact advantage of 16,800 against 6,500.

(b) Even these small reductions will be meaningless unless there is a commitment not to exceed in the future the residual level of Soviet manpower and tanks in central Europe.

(c) Nonetheless we welcome this move as a hint that the Soviet Union may be willing to negotiate in MBFR for equal collective ceilings for ground and air forces in central Europe. For this we need agreed figures for both sides, a subject on which the East has so far been unforthcoming.

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9. Our practical response in the MBFR negotiations will need careful thought. Soviet unilateral reductions will tend to undermine the idea which we have been discussing with the Germans and Americans of interim MBFR reductions for US and Soviet forces. One possible area for a Western response would be to bring forward unilaterally the US nuclear warhead reductions which we have so far made conditional on Soviet troop and tank reductions.

Confidence Building Measures

10. President Brezhnev repeats the proposal for an early conference on "military detente" (which we and our Allies are unwilling to concede until we see what happens at the CSCE review conference next year). The new elements on CBMs are:

(a) a reduction from 25,000 to 20,000 in the ceiling above which ground force exercises must be notified under the Helsinki Final Act;

(b) a ceiling of 20,000 for notification of major military movements (the West proposed 25,000 at Belgrade in line with the current ceiling for exercise notification);

(c) a limit of 40-50,000 men in the size of ground force exercises (the East proposed 50-60,000 at Belgrade).

The lower ceilings proposed in (a) and (b) are a modest move in the right direction. The limit at (c) is not welcome. NATO, dependent on reinforcement, holds many more large exercises than the East, and Alliance studies at the time of Belgrade suggested that 60,000 was the lowest figure which might be acceptable for a measure of this kind.

11. These ideas are relatively small beer and can be dealt with in due course in the CSCE framework. At this stage it will probably be enough to say that we are taking these ideas into account in preparations for the Madrid Conference, for which we too will have substantial proposals to make.

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/Conclusions

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Conclusions

12. In the light of the foregoing we should seek the agreement of our Allies to an Alliance response on the following lines:

(a) The build-up in Soviet longer range theatre nuclear capability in the last ten years has been substantial. No amount of juggling with selective statistics can hide this fact.

(b) The Western Allies now find themselves faced with highly sophisticated and already modernised long range TNF. Comparable forces on the Western side have however remained unmodernised. Some are now approaching obsolescence.

(c) It is against this background that the Allies have been discussing the modernisation of their long range TNF. Nothing in the Brezhnev statement alters the need for this.

(d) NATO has for some time been concerned to limit the Soviet long-range TNF build up. They therefore welcome this Soviet expression of willingness to negotiate. A substantive Western response will be given in parallel with decisions on the modernisation programme at the December Ministerial meetings.

(e) The decision to withdraw troops and tanks from East Germany is also welcome. It must, however, be seen in the context of the MBFR negotiations where Eastern agreement is needed on reductions to levels of approximate parity on the basis of acceptable data.

(f) The Soviet proposals on CBMs are under study and will be taken into account in Alliance preparations for the Madrid CSCE conference next year.

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FM UKDEL NATO 051830Z OCT 79

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 208 OF 5 OCTOBER 1979

AND TO IMMEDIATE MODUK (ATTENTION DCPR AND HEAD OF DS17), BONN,
EAST BERLIN, MOSCOW, AND WASHINGTON.

AND INFO PRIORITY BRUSSELS, THE HAGUE, ROME, AND PARIS,
INFO SAVING ALL OTHER NATO POSTS

M I P T : GUIDANCE ON LRTNF MODERNISATION AND ARMS CONTROL

1. FOLLOWING IS AGREED TEXT (WHICH CAN BE BROUGHT INTO USE
IMMEDIATELY):--

BEGINS.

"THE SOVIET UNION HAS FOR SOME YEARS UNDERTAKEN AN ACCELERATING
NUCLEAR BUILD-UP WHICH ALREADY INCLUDES THE DEPLOYMENT OF A LARGE
NUMBER OF NEW, POWERFUL, HIGHLY ACCURATE AND MOBILE LONG-RANGE
THEATRE NUCLEAR WEAPONS SYSTEMS TARGETTED AGAINST NATO EUROPE.
DESPITE THIS DEVELOPMENT, THE ALLIANCE SO FAR HAS NOT AUGMENTED
OR MODERNIZED ITS LONG-RANGE THEATRE NUCLEAR FORCES. THE SOVIET
BUILD-UP HAS NOT BEEN A SIMPLE ONE-FOR-ONE REPLACEMENT, BUT RATHER
THE INTRODUCTION OF SIGNIFICANT QUALITATIVE AND QUANTITATIVE
IMPROVEMENTS, SUCH AS THE SS-20 AND BACKFIRE. THE SS-20 IS A MOBILE
BALLISTIC MISSILE WITH MULTIPLE WARHEADS, EACH OF WHICH CAN REACH
ANY CITY IN EUROPE.

THE DISPARITY WHICH ALREADY EXISTS IN FAVOUR OF THE SOVIET UNION
IN LONG-RANGE THEATRE NUCLEAR FORCES IS THEREFORE GROWING WITH THESE
CONTINUING DEPLOYMENTS.

IN ORDER TO SUSTAIN AN EFFECTIVE NATO DETERRENT IN THE FACE OF THIS
SOVIET BUILD-UP, ALLIANCE MEMBERS ARE ACTIVELY CONSULTING ON THE
MODERNISATION OF NATO'S OWN LONG-RANGE THEATRE NUCLEAR FORCES.
IN EXAMINING HOW TO REALISE THE MOST EFFECTIVE WAY TO ACHIEVE THE
NECESSARY MODERISATION, THE ALLIANCE CONTINUES TO RELY ON THE US
STRATEGIC NUCLEAR DETERRENT TO UNDERPIN NATO'S STRATEGY.

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/IN

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IN PARALLEL, AND IN LINE WITH NATO'S BASIC POLICY OF DETERRENCE AND
DETENTE, ALLIES ARE ACTIVELY EXAMINING SERIOUS ARMS CONTROL MEASURES
AIMED AT REDUCING THE SOVIET BUILD-UP AND AT LIMITING LONG-RANGE
THEATRE NUCLEAR FORCES. SUCH AN APPROACH WOULD ADVANCE DETENTE BY
CONTRIBUTING TO A MORE STABLE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN EAST AND WEST.

ONCE ALLIANCE DECISIONS HAVE BEEN TAKEN ON MODERNISATION AND ARMS
CONTROL, THE US, FOLLOWING CONSULTATIONS WITHIN THE ALLIANCE, WILL
BE PREPARED TO ENTER INTO NEGOTIATIONS ON LONG-RANGE THEATRE NUCLEAR
SYSTEMS ON THE BASIS OF THE US STATEMENT AT THE CONCLUSION OF SALT II
THAT ANY LIMITATION ON US SYSTEMS PRINCIPALLY DESIGNED FOR THEATRE
MISSIONS SHOULD BE ACCOMPANIED BY APPROPRIATE LIMITATIONS ON SOVIET
THEATRE SYSTEMS. SUCH NEGOTIATIONS WOULD HAVE TO BE BASED ON THE
PRINCIPLE OF EQUAL RIGHTS AND SECURITY AND SHOULD NOT SERVE TO
CONTRACTUALISE THE CURRENT INEQUALITY THE SOVIETS HAVE CAUSED
THROUGH THEIR BUILD-UP TO DATE. THE US WILL ADOPT A POSITIVE AND
CONSTRUCTIVE ATTITUDE IN ANY NEGOTIATIONS WHICH MAY ENSUE."'
ENDS.

FCO PLEASE PASS SAVING COPIES TO ALL OTHER NATO POSTS.

ROSE

FINES
DEFENCED
ACDD
NEWS D
O L D
EES D
WED
DVED
NAD
PS
PS/LPS
PS/PUS
SIR. A. DUFF
MR. P. H. MOBERLY
MR. FERLUSSON

[PASSED SAVING AS REQUESTED]

CONFIDENTIAL

Defence

Extract from Planetary Session
Record PM/Cossiga - Rome
1979 : 5 October 1979.

very long. It was not easy to maintain an island of stability in an unstable world. So long as the general economic situation was unstable, that instability was likely to be reflected in currency fluctuations.

In reply to a question by the Prime Minister, Signor Pandolfi said that the discussions in Belgrade had concentrated on one medium and long term problem - the need to find a new reserve regime - and one short term problem - the Dollar. On the first issue, the consensus had been that neither a one currency system nor a multi currency system was desirable. They had decided therefore to study what seemed likely to be a better mechanism viz the substitution account. But it would not be easy to design a system that was attractive from the point of view of value maintenance and burden sharing. As regards the shorter term problem, no solutions had been found. The Germans were unwilling to produce additional liquidity or to accept Carter Bonds. Closer co-operation between the central banks would be required and the agreement of 1 November 1978 would have to be renewed on a firm basis.

Theatre Nuclear Forces

Signor Cossiga said that his Government was extremely anxious to avoid a prolonged hiatus between the forthcoming meeting of the Nuclear Planning Group, at which the question of Theatre Nuclear Forces modernisation would be discussed, and the subsequent Ministerial meetings of the Defence Planning Committee and the North Atlantic Council. He was anxious about the possibility that there would be Parliamentary and extra-Parliamentary pressure against the formal approval by Ministers of the recommendations of the Nuclear Planning Group. The Italian Government was not changing its policy but he knew that his concern about the gap between the two meetings was shared by other Governments, notably by the Germans and the Dutch. Signor Cossiga asked whether it would be possible either for the formal decision to be taken by the Permanent Representatives of all member Governments immediately after the NPG meeting or for the NPG meeting to be moved closer to the Ministerial meetings in December. It was important that the first decision should be definitive. The

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/sooner

sooner that decision could be taken the better.


The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary, having noted the importance of the forthcoming decision, said that there might be difficulties in either course. At the last meeting of the NAC it had been clear that a number of countries would insist on the TNF decision being a political one taken by all the Ministers at their December meeting. It would be difficult to get it through any earlier. Postponing the NPG to nearer the meeting would certainly reduce the gap but might be difficult to arrange. Perhaps the Italians should discuss the problem with the German and Dutch Governments at the meetings due to take place in the following week. The Prime Minister said that the British Government would be prepared to go along with any procedure that was acceptable to the other members of the Alliance and that enabled the decision to be taken with despatch. Signor Cossiga, agreeing, noted that Mr. Brezhnev had already begun to make propaganda on the subject and to claim that by seeking to modernise their Theatre Nuclear Forces, the members of the Alliance were playing with fire. The Prime Minister said that members of NATO must be prepared to counter-attack vigorously where propaganda was concerned. The Soviet Government already had Theatre Nuclear Forces. The Alliance needed them to counter-balance the Soviet capability. She saw no difficulty in conducting this argument.

Commercial Credit

In discussion over lunch, Signor Cossiga and the Prime Minister agreed that there would be advantage in trying to agree a common line on the question of the interest rates offered to the Soviet and Chinese Governments in credit agreements. This was relevant both in that the subject would certainly come up during Premier Hua's forthcoming visit and in that both Governments, like the French Government, had credit agreements with the Soviet Government coming up for renewal near the end of the year. It was agreed that the matter should be pursued by officials.

The plenary session ended at 1320 hours.

6 October 1979



BRIEF RECORD OF MAIN POINTS DISCUSSED AT THE TETE-A-TETE BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER AND SIGNOR COSSIGA AT 1900 ON 4 OCTOBER AT THE PALAZZO CHIGI.

Signor Cossiga said he was most grateful for this opportunity of a meeting with the Prime Minister, the first he had had with the Head of a foreign government. He spoke of the traditional friendly relations between Britain and Italy and of his own personal interest in British constitutional history.

Signor Cossiga said he would shortly meet Chancellor Schmidt and the Dutch Prime Minister, Mr van Agt, and then President Giscard in preparation for the Dublin Summit and to discuss TNF.

Italy had been shocked by the death of Lord Mountbatten. Both countries had a common obligation to fight terrorism. He was grateful for British collaboration in this field.

Signor Cossiga hoped that Anglo-Italian meetings could now be placed on an institutional basis. There were meetings between himself, the German and French leaders twice a year, and he hoped the same pattern could be established between Britain and Italy.

The Prime Minister thought that we should examine this idea. Such meetings should not be too long. Her present visit to Rome was the right length, ie inside 24 hours. We too had regular meetings with the Germans and French, and the more preparation that took place before European Council Meetings the better. Italy had a very important defence burden. Italy would also be the host at the forthcoming Economic Summit in Venice.

Signor Cossiga congratulated the Prime Minister on the British initiative on Rhodesia. In this problem, as in the very delicate question of South African relations with the rest of the world, Britain had a key role.

/The Prime Minister

The Prime Minister referred to the constitutional proposals which the parties at the Conference had until Monday to examine. It was vital to maintain momentum in these negotiations.

The Prime Minister went on to express sympathy for the recent earthquake disaster in central Italy. She also thanked Signor Cossiga for his efforts to resolve the Schild case, which could not be in more expert hands. Anything Italy and Britain could do together to combat terrorism had her whole-hearted support. This was a field in which she would also agree to extra expenditure.

Signor Cossiga said that as a Sardinian he felt particular concern for the Schild case. He handed the Prime Minister a document which he had prepared on this matter. He also referred to collaboration which had taken place with the British Metropolitan Police and M15 and M16. In this connection the Italian Government would do both what was possible and "what was impossible". They would arrange matters so that the Schild family could take any necessary initiative.

The Prime Minister then referred to the two most important problems relating to her visit, namely Community questions and Theatre Nuclear Forces. On the Community, there was no question of the British Government being anti-European, but there was this particular injustice concerning the Budget which had to be resolved soon. No doubt Italians had felt similarly about their problems relating to the CAP.

Signor Cossiga said that on the Community Italy was not in an easy situation. He was not an economic expert and was in the hands of his Economic Ministers. But before dealing with the Community he wished the Prime Minister to know what he was trying to achieve with respect to the Italian economy. [There then followed a lengthy explanation by Signor Cossiga of his economic strategy on lines which the Embassy has already reported.] In the course of this discussion and in reply to the Prime Minister's questions, Signor Cossiga said that as a former Minister for the Civil Service he personally enjoyed good relations with the trade unions and hoped that they would in the end do no more than make noises.

/Signor Cossiga

Signor Cossiga said that Italy's experience in the EMS had been relatively painless so far, and had in effect helped the Italian Government in their attempts to convince Italian political forces of the need to struggle against inflation. He perfectly understood that the fact that Britain was not a member of EMS was not in conflict with her membership of the Community as a whole.

Signor Cossiga then explained his Government's position on the Budget/convergence. Italy was in complete agreement with the rest of the Community on this subject. Anglo-Italian collaboration had resulted in the agreement achieved at the European Council at Strasbourg. But he had told President Jenkins that the Commission reference paper was not in complete accordance with the directives of the Strasbourg European Council. The problem was not exclusively one of the Budget, but was also one of the poorer regions which were to be found in Britain, Italy and Ireland. In addition to the resolution of the budgetary problem there had to be parallel measures, and the Commission had to reflect this in the reference document as a basis for the forthcoming Dublin Summit. He hoped that the Prime Minister would understand the Italian position and referred to the fact that his Government had been created in exceptionally difficult circumstances.

The Prime Minister hoped that a resolution of the budgetary problem would not have to wait. Britain was the third poorest country in the Community and the biggest single net contributor. This was a unique situation, with the exception of the Italian net budgetary deficit in 1978. The problem created sharp political resentment in Britain since it was neither reasonable nor just. Britain did not ask for benefit from the Community but should not be asked to pay heavily to it, particularly at a time when the British Government had had to introduce significant measures of economy. There was an immediate need for a solution and unless this could be obtained at Dublin the attitude of the British public could be very resentful. The Prime Minister added that she was very anxious to be constructive and quite accepted that those like Britain which were among the poorer countries [ie Italy and Ireland] should not be asked to pay more for a solution to the budgetary problem.

/Signor Cossiga

Signor Cossiga said that although the short-term objectives of the two countries might be different their objectives were surely the same. Britain faced in the short-term an imbalance in the budget while Italy suffered a hidden transfer of resources through the trade effects of the CAP. The Prime Minister made it clear that Britain also suffered from the requirement to buy dear Community products.

Signor Cossiga said that Britain and Italy should agree that the budget should be formed in order to increase expenditure on structural and regional support. He then spoke of the political price which Italy had to pay for concessions to Mediterranean countries. (NB: although in reply to Mrs Thatcher's question, he said that he was referring to the enlargement question, it seems likely that this was a reference to the Italian wish to be compensated for tariff concessions to third country Mediterranean suppliers, eg Cyprus).

He repeated that Italy and Britain should have the same objective viz to restructure the Budget so that there was more expenditure on regional and social funds; on structure; and on new research, energy and industrial policies, etc.

Signor Cossiga said that the Italians had a draft proposal for an addition to the Commission reference paper and he thought that Minister Malfatti would discuss this with Lord Carrington this evening.

The Prime Minister said that these were matters that had to be discussed at the Plenary meeting. The net payment of £1,000 m. a year to the Community Budget caused considerable political resentment in Britain and the matter had to be resolved in Dublin. Otherwise there could be no advance in Community policies. She did not wish to cause trouble in the Community or to dominate the Community with this issue. But it had to be got out of the way. This was a matter of equity. Once justice had been established we could make a more creative contribution to many questions for example to the reform of the CAP. The Agriculture Ministers only made little

/adjustments

adjustments to the CAP and never got to grips with the basic problem. Signor Cossiga agreed and said that although his Agriculture Minister was a personal friend he was one of his most difficult colleagues!

The conversation then turned to TNF. Signor Cossiga said that he was glad that SALT II had been successful and hoped the US Congress would ratify it soon. The Madrid Conference in 1980 was very important and there should be close co-operation between the European partners to prepare for this. In an international situation the only serious basis for detente was the re-establishment of a balance of forces between East and West. In a situation where the Soviet Union had conventional and strategic superiority, the TNF problem was vital. Italy was determined to take a positive decision. He had been shocked to read of the cynical way in which Gromyko had spoken to Minister Malfatti recently about the Soviet missiles (SS20) and Backfire bomber as if they were children's toys. These weapons were a threat to the whole of Europe as well as North Africa.

Signor Cossiga repeated that Italy would take a positive decision on TNF in the forthcoming alliance meetings. But it was highly desirable to have the approval of all the countries of the Alliance. Denmark and Norway though not nuclear countries should give their approval while all the existing nuclear countries should accept the modernisation of nuclear weapons. In this context his forthcoming meeting with the Dutch Prime Minister, Mr van Agt, was important. He intended to exert maximum pressure on him and the Dutch Foreign Minister, who would also be present. He was also trying to help Chancellor Schmidt by persuading German Christian Democrat contacts, eg Dr Eckt, Herr Strauss and Kohl, that they should not make party difficulties for the German Government. Signor Cossiga hoped that the British Government would also bring pressure on the Dutch. He, Cossiga, had an internal problem with the Italian Socialists and Chancellor Schmidt and the Dutch Government could, by a positive decision, also help him. This morning, 4 October, he had a special meeting in preparation for Mrs Thatcher's visit with his Foreign, Defence, and Interior Ministers as well as co-opted Ministers from /the

the Liberal and Social Democrat Parties in the Coalition. They completely agreed with his positive decision on TNF. When the time came to make an announcement this would be by a routine statement by the Defence Minister. Cossiga would not make a lot of speeches.

Nevertheless, he regretted that there would at present be a gap between the decision of the Nuclear Planning Group and the subsequent decisions in the Defence Planning Committee and the NATO Council. In that period the Soviet Union could bring damaging pressure to bear on Italy as well as on Germany and Holland. He, Cossiga, would not change his position but hoped something could be done to associate the countries of the Alliance which were not members of the Nuclear Planning Group with the latter's positive decision so that a definitive decision could be taken at the NPG. Finally, he intended to consult (he later said "inform") the PCI and try to make them accept that this was an opportunity of proving that they were independent of the Soviet Union.

The Prime Minister thanked Signor Cossiga for his resolute attitude.

As the Prime Minister was leaving Signor Cossiga made the expected request for British support for the candidature for Zichichi for the direction of CERN. He would also be approaching the Germans since there was a rival German candidate. He handed a document on this to the Prime Minister.

The Prime Minister said that she believed there was a study group which was producing a report and that we would be examining this.

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Defence 18



MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1
Telephone 01-~~XXXXXX~~ 218 2111/3

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MO 14/4/2

27th September 1979

Handwritten notes and signatures:
A large handwritten mark resembling a stylized 'Z' or '7' with a wavy line.
A signature that appears to be "Prime Minister".
A signature that appears to be "M. Simonet".
A signature that appears to be "M. A. Adam".
A signature that appears to be "Mr M E Quinlan".

Dear George,

CALL BY THE BELGIAN FOREIGN MINISTER

The Belgian Foreign Minister, at his request, paid a brief call on the Secretary of State for Defence at 5.15 pm today; M. Simonet was accompanied by M. A Adam, Minister-Counsellor (Political) at the Belgian Embassy, and the Secretary of State by Mr M E Quinlan, Deputy Under Secretary (Policy and Programmes).

The discussion was confined almost entirely to the planned modernisation of NATO's theatre nuclear forces (TNF). M. Simonet said that he was concerned that the Alliance should come to positive decisions soon; he had found the Germans robust about the basing of systems in the Federal Republic but they did not want to provide the sole national location on the continent, so that, for satisfactory arrangements to be concluded, complementary acceptance by the Belgians and the Dutch of the basing of systems on their territories was certainly needed. It was not easy for the Belgians to accept basing, and there were internal political difficulties given the fine balance of interests in the coalition, but he did not foresee major problems about Belgian agreement. The problem was the Dutch: even if the Dutch Social Democrats were not against NATO as such they seemed to oppose every necessary NATO decision (M. Simonet recalled the earlier controversy over the "neutron bomb").

/ The ...

G G H Walden Esq
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

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2.

The Secretary of State said that British difficulties on this were also not to be underestimated but he thought that we could cope; he observed that a decision should not be so difficult for Belgians as it was for the Germans; he was not sure that it would be productive to try to bring any particular pressure on the Dutch, at any rate at this stage although these had been a continuing dialogue with them. Mr Quinlan added that Dutch officials, at the meeting of the NATO High Level Group which had just concluded, had not revealed special apprehensions on the subject and, in discussions at the recent IISS Conference in Switzerland, he had gained the impression from a number of Dutch participants that the danger that it might have suited some in the Netherlands to break on this issue had passed.

M. Simonet said that he saw a way forward if the United Kingdom, the Danes and the Norwegians could all say that they agreed in principle to the proposals and were prepared to share in the financial burdens, setting this agreement within the framework of the need for a collective alliance decision. The Secretary of State commented that he thought some progress could be made at the Nuclear Planning Group in November.

In a brief discussion of the interaction between the ratification of SALT II and TNF modernisation the Secretary of State indicated that he thought that, in the end, SALT II would be ratified. M. Simonet concurred.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Michael Alexander at No 10.

*Your wtd.
Brian Norbury*

(B M NORBURY)

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- 1 OCT 1979 -

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MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1
Telephone 01-2622XXXX 218 2111/3

MO 14/4/2

26th September 1979

L. Punt 26/9

Dear Rodenich,

CALL ON THE SECRETARY OF STATE BY THE
BELGIAN FOREIGN MINISTER, 27TH SEPTEMBER 1979

We have heard from the Belgian Embassy that the Belgian Foreign Minister, M. Simonet, will pay a brief visit to London on Thursday 27th September. He has asked for a private meeting with the Secretary of State at 1630 on that day and the Secretary of State has now agreed.

We have delayed telling you about this because we were uncertain of what exactly M. Simonet wished to discuss. However, we now understand that apart from what the Belgian Charge d'Affairs called a general review, M. Simonet will wish to concentrate on the question of TNF Modernisation. He is likely to bring only one official along to the meeting.

I shall, of course, ensure that you and Michael Alexander, to whom I am copying this letter, receive a full record of the discussions between M. Simonet and the Secretary of State.

Yours sincerely,

(SUSAN AMBLER-EDWARDS)

R M J Lyne Esq
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

26 SEP 1979





Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

24 September 1979

Dear Michael,

*Fg
Phms*

"THE MILITARY BALANCE"

You asked for our assessment of the 1979/80 edition of "The Military Balance", published by the International Institute for Strategic Studies, which appeared last week.

As usual, the main statistical commentaries and tables on US/Soviet and NATO/Warsaw Pact forces rely heavily on unattributable MOD help and are authoritative. Of the two analytical articles which follow these main sections, the one on the East/West conventional balance in Europe is regarded by MOD and FCO as excellent. But the other analysis, assessing the European theatre nuclear force balance, to which MOD did not contribute, is more controversial.

In the second of these two articles, the IISS attempts to put qualitative weights on the deliverable nuclear warheads belonging to NATO and the Warsaw Pact. The Institute concludes that the situation is much closer to parity than is usually believed (a ratio of 1.13 to 1 in favour of the Warsaw Pact in terms of an overall weighted balance). The MOD and FCO regard the assumptions on which this conclusion is based as defective and misleading, often seriously so. To take only a few examples:

- (a) US Poseidon systems assigned to SACEUR account for almost a third of the weighted total assumed for the West. But no corresponding allowance is made for those Soviet central systems (such as the Yankee class SLBMs) which are almost certainly targetted on Europe. The analysis concedes that this may be an unwarranted distinction to make and notes that, if US Poseidons are also excluded, the Warsaw Pact's edge is 1.58 to 1.
- (b) The Soviet naval air force (which includes, for example, 30 Backfire bombers) is entirely omitted though some Western carrier-borne aircraft are included.
- (c) The qualitative weighting index, though ingenious, is arbitrary (the obsolescent Vulcan, for example, is given a qualitative rating only 5% below the ultra-modern Backfire).

/The conclusion

M O'D B Alexander Esq
10 Downing Street



The conclusion that something very close to parity now exists is for these (and other) reasons simply not borne out by the facts. Equally serious, the inclusion of medium systems, in which the West have a relative advantage, obscures the strategic significance of the Soviet Union's emerging superiority in long-range TNF. Moreover the article focusses on the situation in 1979/80 and only indirectly recognises that there is a potential gap (which will steadily increase if the Alliance does nothing to correct it) in long range theatre nuclear capabilities as a result of the dynamic SS20 and Back-fire programmes and the obsolescence of all NATO's longer-range systems.

Whether or not there is parity across the broad range of TNF today is irrelevant to the question whether NATO will need new longer-range systems in the mid-1980s to maintain a credible deterrent posture. Unfortunately Soviet and European critics of TNF modernisation will be able to make capital out of the article's main conclusion. Concern has already been expressed in Bonn. UK and FRG officials are now working jointly on a critical commentary to be circulated in the Alliance and used where necessary to counter the article's adverse message for TNF modernisation. But some damage has already been done.

I am sending a copy of this letter to David Omand in the Ministry of Defence.

yours ever
Roderic Lyne

(R M J Lyne)

SECRET



Defence 17
(2)

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MINISTRY OF DEFENCE WHITEHALL LONDON SW1A 2HB

TELEPHONE 01-218 9000
DIRECT DIALLING 01-218 2111/3

SECRET

MO 13/1/34

This is a confirmation of what you agreed with Sir P. Hunt this morning

Prime Minister

Am 29/9

PRIME MINISTER

UNITED STATES GROUND LAUNCHED CRUISE MISSILES
IN THE UNITED KINGDOM

At yesterday's MISC 7 consideration of long range theatre nuclear forces (LRTNF) - my minute to you of 17th September - we discussed the United States request that we should accept an extra flight of 16 GLCMs in the United Kingdom - bringing the proposed total to 160 - in order to help remove a difficulty with the Germans; and you gave me discretion to acquiesce in this if need be at whatever I judged the most productive time.

M.V.
2. I have now been able to consider the matter urgently. It appears to me that our interests are best served by giving agreement forthwith. In practice, what we can hope to gain by the concession is essentially goodwill (the US must know that it cannot be a particularly high-cost move for us). We therefore need to choose the timing to secure the maximum benefit from the concession. It is clear from a second plea which, I understand, came to the Cabinet Office from Mr Aaron of the National Security Council late yesterday that, in American judgement, a quick answer would relieve them of significant difficulties which even a short delay would create.

A need not.
3. I thought I should tell you immediately that I am accordingly sending personal messages to Dr Brown and Herr Apel telling them that although GLCM deployment is not without domestic difficulties for us we are prepared to accept an extra flight on the understanding that this will enable the Federal Republic to join us in firm support for a collective Alliance decision this year in favour of the US deployment plan as adjusted.

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2.

I am sending copies of this minute to our MISC 7 colleagues and to Sir John Hunt.

J.P.

20th September 1979

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SECRET



20 SEP 1979



CONFIDENTIAL

Defence

Ref. A0253

PRIME MINISTER

MISC 7: Long-range Theatre Nuclear Forces

BACKGROUND

The subject was last discussed at MISC 7 on 10th July in order to give guidance to the Secretary of State for Defence for his discussions in Washington with Dr. Brown. In his minute to you dated 17th September, Mr. Pym now reports on the present state of play and recommends that a decision should be taken in principle about the proposed basing in the United Kingdom of the United States-owned Ground Launched Cruise Missiles (GLCM). Your colleagues were generally favourable to this idea at the earlier discussion.

HANDLING


2. You will wish to invite the Secretary of State for Defence to introduce his paper. The points to be covered in subsequent discussion are:-
- (a) The decision to accept basing of United States GLCMs -
 - (i) Is the cost acceptable? It is not large.
 - (ii) How will British public opinion react? Overcoming safety fears will need a major public relations effort.
 - (iii) How should we secure maximum credit for our decision, both with the Americans and with our other Allies?
 - (b) The recommendation not to decide yet on whether to acquire in addition any GLCMs of our own (as replacement for our Vulcan bombers):
 - (i) Important to note that we should have difficulty providing our own warheads. Mr. Pym's minute about the Nuclear Weapons Programme and the troubles at Aldermaston, also dated 17th September, is relevant; but it is not on the agenda, and discussion of what to do about Aldermaston would be inappropriate in this forum since that is primarily a matter of Civil Service management which needs further examination.

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- (ii) As Mr. Pym says, the issue of United Kingdom-owned GLCMs should be considered at the same time as Ministers decide on a replacement for Polaris, i. e. probably in early November. But it may not be in our interest to recognise too openly that the two issues are linked. We do not want United States pressure over British LRTNF as a corollary of United States co-operation over a Polaris successor.
 - (iii) Need to be clear about the distinction between LRTNF modernisation, which is needed for the '80s, and Polaris replacement which is needed for the '90s and beyond. In deployment to NATO Polaris does have a useful theatre role, but its essential purpose is strategic - to act as our ultimate national deterrent. The same will go for its successor.
- (c) An arms control package -
- (i) As Mr. Pym notes, this will be needed for political reasons within the Alliance but must not be allowed to delay or get ahead of the modernisation programme. Lord Carrington's minute of 6th July, which MISC 7 endorsed on 10th July, outlined a way through the minefield.
 - (ii) You will wish to be guided by this, and any later developments, at your meeting with Chancellor Schmidt on 31st October.

CONCLUSION

3. Subject to the points made in discussion, the Committee might be guided -
- (i) To note the position set out in Mr. Pym's minute.
 - (ii) To agree in principle to accept the basing of United States-owned GLCMs in the United Kingdom.
 - (iii) To await Mr. Pym's proposals on the timing and method of presenting such a decision after discussion with the United States.
 - (iv) To note that Mr. Pym may be making proposals in due course about the acquisition of a new United Kingdom-owned LRTNF system which may be linked with a decision on our successor to Polaris.
 - (v) To note the arms control problem.


JOHN HUNT

18th September, 1979

SECRET

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MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1
Telephone 01-~~500 7000~~ 218 2111/3

SECRET

MO 13/1/34

18th September 1979

Dear Michael,

LONG RANGE THEATRE NUCLEAR FORCES

I regret to say that an error inadvertently appeared in paragraph 11b of the Defence Secretary's minute to the Prime Minister of 17th September concerning Long Range Theatre Nuclear Forces. The second line of that sub-paragraph should say "the basing of US-owned GLCMs" not "the basing of UK-owned GLCMs".

I am sending copies of this letter to the Private Secretaries to other members of MISC 7 and to Barry Hilton (Cabinet Office).

Yours sincerely,

John Gutteridge

(J D GUTTERIDGE)

M O'D B Alexander Esq
10 Downing Street

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MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
HEADQUARTERS
CANTONMENT



18 SEP 1959

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Copy No 1 of 18 copies

Page 1 of 4 pages

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MINISTRY OF DEFENCE WHITEHALL LONDON SW1A 2HB

TELEPHONE 01-218 9000
DIRECT DIALLING 01-218 2111/3

SECRET

MO 13/1/34

PRIME MINISTER

LONG-RANGE THEATRE NUCLEAR FORCES

This minute summarises the position reached on long-range theatre nuclear forces (LRNTF), and recommends a decision in principle on one aspect - the proposed basing in the United Kingdom of United States-owned ground launched cruise missiles (GLCM).

2. You will recall from the paper attached to my minute of 5th July the general case that NATO needs a major new effort in LRTNF. The United States have now proposed to station in five European countries (United Kingdom, Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Belgium and the Netherlands) a total of 572 long-range missiles. These would comprise 108 Pershing II ballistic missiles in the FRG, replacing 108 of the present shorter-range Pershing I; and 464 GLCM spread among the five countries. Deployment would begin about the end of 1983. The element proposed to go in the UK is 144 GLCM.

3. All these systems would be owned and operated by the US, unless the UK wished to take on some of the 144. (As Washington telegram No 2346 of 17th August shows, the US want us in any event, separately from the "572" programme, to replace our Vulcans with new long-range systems). Aside from any UK-owned systems, the US would meet the costs, except that they would want related installations to be financed from NATO common infrastructure funds and would hope that host countries would provide some security guards.

4. Discussions have been proceeding in NATO without commitment. The scheme has President Carter's full backing.

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Page 2 of 4 pages

All the four Continental host countries seem cautiously positive, but face varying degrees of political difficulty - for example, the Netherlands have particularly awkward public and Parliamentary opinion to manage, and the FRG say they cannot be the only Continental host. There is general agreement on the desirability of agreed collective decisions in December, and countries will be increasingly under pressure during the autumn, notably at the mid-November meeting of the Nuclear Planning Group, to make their positions clear.

5. Alongside work on a programme for new LRTNF systems NATO is considering what public proposal might be made to the Soviet Union about arms control in this field. Such a proposal is regarded as essential by our Continental Allies if an LRTNF programme is to have any chance of domestic political acceptance. Our own objectives have been to avoid any proposal which made the LRTNF programme a hostage to negotiations with the Soviet Union; to ensure that NATO did not make a proposal disadvantageous in itself; and to keep any UK-owned systems out. Work so far suggests that these objectives are being adequately met. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary will no doubt report when matters are further advanced.

6. I am moderately optimistic that NATO can be ready to reach decisions in December, but this will need care and is far from assured.

7. We shall need to decide what we ourselves should do about LRTNF. I regard it as out of the question that we should do nothing. As my note of 5th July brought out, the real choice is whether to accept the proposed UK basing of US missiles only; or whether to do anything on our own account as well. We do not have to settle the two aspects together.

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Page 3 of 4 pages

8. I believe that we could decide in principle to accept US basing, and that it would be helpful to the Alliance to take this decision now. There will be various details, including precise locations, to settle. A new deployment would attract public notice, and there would be criticism from various quarters like the CND; but I believe such difficulties are surmountable. A brief note on implications is attached. If we take the decision of principle, I would consult the US on how this could be most helpfully timed and presented in the Alliance context, and would then make proposals to my colleagues about future handling.

9. The costs to us of US basing cannot yet be calculated exactly, but they would be modest. Even if, which is not certain, the installation cost of the whole "572" programme became a net addition to the NATO common infrastructure programme, our share would only be an estimated £15m. Depending on detailed deployment, up to £55m would be spent in the UK.

10. The question of a new UK-owned force to maintain our "sub-strategic" long-range capability is much more complex. I see attraction in acquiring such a force; but difficult questions of resource priority arise, particularly in regard to the provision of UK nuclear warheads, which I would regard as essential in the long run if any such force were to be really worthwhile. I have drawn the attention of my colleagues in a separate minute to the grave problems we face at Aldermaston. More work needs to be done before I can formulate adequately based recommendations, which we could best consider when we address the question of a strategic successor to Polaris. I shall bring a report forward at that stage.

11. In brief, I invite my colleagues

a. to note the position reached in NATO
(paragraphs 2-6);

/ b. ...

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Page 4 of 4 pages

b. to agree that we should decide in principle to accept the basing of ^{UK} UK-owned GLCMs in the UK, and that I should make proposals on the timing and method of presenting such a decision after discussion with the US (paragraphs 8-9);

c. to note that I will put forward recommendations on any acquisition of new UK-owned LRTN systems at the same time as we consider a replacement for our strategic force (paragraph 10).

12. I am sending copies of this minute to our colleagues on MISC 7, and to Sir John Hunt.

17th September 1979

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ANNEX TO
MO 13/1/34
DATED: 17.9.79

IMPLICATIONS OF BASING US GLCMs IN THE UK

The Proposals

The US have proposed that 144 GLCMs should be based in the UK as part of a total deployment of 464 GLCMs in Europe. The force would be organised in flights of 16 missiles; each flight would comprise four mobile Transporter-Erector-Launchers (TEL) (sketch at Appendix) each capable of carrying and launching four missiles; two mobile Launch Control Centres (LCC); and about 12 support vehicles. The force would probably be based at existing USAF airfields, as Main Operating Bases (MOB). On the MOB, the four TELs and two LCCs at each flight would be stored in new specially-hardened shelters giving a high degree of survivability against pre-emptive conventional attack. The missiles would normally be kept in pressurised containers in the TEL firing tubes fuelled and with warheads attached. One or two flights would be permanently on Quick Reaction Alert at 10 minutes' notice to fire.

2. Since the shelters would not provide sufficient protection from nuclear attack, the US envisage that in time of tension or war the force would deploy in flights to pre-planned covert sites within 150 kms from the MOB, moving from site to site about every six hours under extreme threat conditions. They would want to practise off-base deployment in peacetime (but without warheads).

3. Some 400 US personnel would operate and maintain a 144-GLCM force; a further 550 would be required for security protection, and the UK would be asked to provide 160 of these. It is envisaged that the cost of new facilities (such as shelters and maintenance buildings) required for basing the new TNF systems in Europe should be borne on the NATO Infrastructure budget (partly so as to involve all NATO countries in the programme). There might be other support facilities not qualifying for NATO funding, but the cost would be small.

/ Implications ...

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Implications

4. The main points of initial staff appraisal of the US basing concept are as follows:

- a. Airfields are clearly the best choice for MOB, since they can readily provide the land and some of the installations and accommodation required. It is also important to be able to move the warheads and weapons to and from the US by air, avoiding public roads and ports.
- b. Off-base dispersal in wartime should be feasible (Emergency Powers would allow the use of private land) but for covert pre-surveying of sites in peacetime we would need to have control of US movements. Choice of covert sites avoiding conflict with other military activities might be difficult. MOD training lands could be used for practising off-base deployment in peacetime, though there would have to be some movement on public roads.
- c. While the storage of four missiles and warheads in each TEL should not present an unacceptable safety hazard, the US plan for holding 16 warheads (ie one flight) in one shelter could contravene our current nuclear safety rules. The Nuclear Weapons Safety Committee (which includes members from outside the Ministry of Defence) will advise on these issues when more detailed information is received from the US, but preliminary examination suggests that with some modification to the other shelter lay-out, or by reducing numbers of missiles in TELs, the problem is manageable.
- d. The UK's share of the addition to the NATO facilities in the Infrastructure budget would be about £15M. Depending on the pattern of deployment up to about £55M would be spent in the UK.
- e. The provision of 160 UK personnel for security duties, if desired, should not be an insuperable problem; the cost would be about £1M a year.

/ f. ...

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f. Public opinion on the deployment of these new systems would have to be carefully prepared, although US nuclear weapons have been stored in the UK for many years (Thor medium-range ballistic missiles were based here in the early 1960). Some sectors of opinion are bound to be hostile. The GLCMs should not be visible on their MOBs, but practising off-base dispersal would clearly be conspicuous. We might have to consider breaking with our policy of refusing to confirm or deny the whereabouts of nuclear weapons if we are to assure the public that warheads will not be deployed off-base for training.

g. It would be necessary to ensure that the new force was brought within the ambit of existing understandings about US consultation with HMG over any use of US nuclear forces based in the UK.


5. Detailed points in these various respects need further information and study by the Ministry of Defence and other Departments concerned.

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NATO UNCLASSIFIED



TRANSPORTER ERECTOR LAUNCHER (TEL)

SEP 1979



NOTE OF THE PRIME MINISTER'S TALK WITH THE BELGIAN PRIME MINISTER,
M. MARTENS, AT 10 DOWNING STREET ON WEDNESDAY 12 SEPTEMBER 1979

PRESENT:

Prime Minister	M. Wilfried Martens
Chancellor of the Exchequer	M. Henri Simonet, Minister of Foreign Affairs
Secretary of State for Defence	M. Robert Vaes, Belgian Ambassador in London
Lord Privy Seal	M. Jacques van Ypersele, PM's Chef de Cabinet
Sir Michael Palliser, FCO	M. Alfred Cahen, Foreign Minister's Chef de Cabinet
Sir Peter Wakefield, HM Ambassador, Brussels	
Mr. Michael Alexander	

* * * * *

Defence

The Prime Minister said that NATO would shortly have to take some major decisions if she was to maintain a credible defence capability against the Soviet Union. In particular there was the problem of Theatre Nuclear Force (TNF) modernisation. The Secretary of State for Defence ^{said that NATO} was agreed about the need to modernise TNF to meet the Soviet threat. The position of Belgium was important because Belgium was in a position to give a lead to small countries by accepting modernised TNF on its territory. It was essential that a decision be taken in December. There was a real risk that if decisions were not taken then, the Soviet threat would take on unacceptable proportions.

M. Simonet said that there were already tactical nuclear weapons based in Belgium. The question for the Belgian Government was whether they were willing to replace the short-range weapons systems with medium-range weapons systems. He would be visiting the Federal Republic on Monday and would pursue the question with the German Government. He was not concerned about American attitudes but was very anxious about those of the Germans. Belgium had been wrong-footed over the neutron bomb and did not intend that this should happen again. M. Simonet said that he was not clear what Chancellor

Schmidt wanted. There seemed to be a difference of attitude between the Chancellor and his Foreign Minister. Herr Genscher wanted to take a decision and talk about the arms control aspect later while the Chancellor seemed readier to accept a preliminary discussion about the possibility of a linked arms control proposal. M. Simonet said that he would put proposals to his Government when he was clear about the attitudes of the Federal Republic.

M. Simonet said the question was a very difficult one for the Dutch. They would prefer to leave the decision to others. It might be that religious and other groups in the Netherlands would force a full Parliamentary debate on TNF modernisation. If this happened, there would be no TNF based in the Netherlands. Such an outcome would pose major problems for Belgium. There were differences of opinion within the country and within the Parties there. His own Party, the Socialist Party, was split. The Flemish speaking Socialists in the north would want to keep in step with the Dutch. If, as a result, they came out against the basing of modernised TNF in Belgium they would try to blackmail the French speaking Socialists into pursuing the same policy. The Christian Democrats might well have similar problems because of the attitude of religious groups.

As regards the attitude of other members of the Alliance, M. Simonet said that he assumed the United Kingdom would have no difficulty with TNF modernisation since we already had weapons systems targetted on the USSR. However, the Scandinavians would clearly make no move. The attitude of the Italians was unknown to him but their decision would be very important for Belgium. Even if they were to accept only a token force it would be helpful. M. Simonet said that he thought it would be wrong and dangerous to leave it to Germany to decide alone whether or not to accept modernised TNF on her soil. It could spell the end of the Alliance because it would lead to a special relationship between the United States and the Federal Republic. Chancellor Schmidt was well aware of the dangers of such a special relationship because a situation where the Federal Republic was left alone with the United States to share the responsibility in this area created the possibility that one day the Federal Republic might do a deal with the Soviet Union. The

Soviet Union might well have drawn from the neutron bomb fiasco the lesson that it was enough simply to exert a little pressure on some members of NATO to get its way. Failure to agree on TNF modernisation could be the prelude to a period in the early 1980s when the imbalance on the tactical level in Europe would be so marked that the Soviet Union might be able to secure concessions on major issues, eg in the Mediterranean. This would in effect mean the Finlandisation of Western Europe. M. Simonet said that he would ensure that these factors were taken into consideration in the Belgian Cabinet's discussion of the issue. M. Simonet intended to fight for the right decision but if Belgium was left alone the situation would be very difficult.

M. Martens said that he had been told by Mr. Kissinger that the SALT II Agreement would not be ratified unless President Carter's Administration had taken a decision to proceed with TNF modernisation. It was important that the Europeans should not give the impression that they were refusing to take action. But the timing of a decision and clarification of the Federal Republic's intentions would be very important. It was an extremely delicate decision for the Belgian Government but would have to be taken by the end of the year. The Prime Minister said that it was essential that an effective capability to resist the Soviet Union was maintained. She wondered whether West European leaders were giving a sufficiently effective lead. Her own experience was that audiences were always quick to respond when addressed about the extent of the Soviet threat and about the need for a credible defence capability. It was all a question of resolve.

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SUBJECT

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FILE

PRIME MINISTER'S

PERSONAL MESSAGE

SERIAL No. TS1/79T

10 DOWNING STREET

cc FCO
MOD
CO

THE PRIME MINISTER

28 July 1979

Dear Mr. President,

Thank you for your message of 11 July about theatre nuclear forces. I share your view of the importance for the Alliance of reaching a firm decision this year to modernise long range theatre nuclear systems in Europe. You can count on our support in trying to achieve the necessary Alliance consensus, both on modernisation and on the arms control aspects.

We were grateful to you for sending David Aaron to explain your specific proposals. We shall be considering the options carefully. Francis Pym also had some useful discussions with Harold Brown, as a result of which a team of experts will be visiting Washington within the next few days to explore the technical and financial issues in more detail.

Yours sincerely,

Robert Hodgson

The President of the United States of America.

CONFIDENTIAL

VLB



3

10 DOWNING STREET

Prime Minister

This draft reply
has been agreed between
the FCW and MOI.
Background is attached
below.

BYM
27/7

~ Dear Mr. President ~

SECRET



MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1
Telephone 01-~~6307022~~ 218 2111/3

SECRET

MO 13/1/34

26th July 1979

Dear Bryan.

On 12th July 1979 you wrote to Paul Lever enclosing a copy of a message from President Carter to the Prime Minister about theatre nuclear force modernisation. You asked for consideration to be given, following the visit of the President's emissary, Mr Aaron, to a reply which the Prime Minister might send. We have agreed to take the lead.

By now you should have seen the records of Mr Aaron's meetings with the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary and Lord Strathcona, and with officials. I also sent you a note of the Defence Secretary's discussions with the US Secretary of Defence. There are many detailed technical and factual points still to be resolved before the Defence Secretary will be able to consult his colleagues again about the options discussed by MISC 7 on 10th July. A team of experts will be visiting Washington within the next few days to probe these points.

In the meantime, we believe that it would be advantageous if the Prime Minister were to send a short reply now expressing our recognition of the importance of the issue and our desire to act as a robust ally of the USA. A draft message which we have agreed with FCO officials is attached.

/ I am ...

B G Cartledge Esq.,
10 Downing Street

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I am sending a copy of this letter to Paul Lever
(Foreign and Commonwealth Office) and to Martin Vile
(Cabinet Office).

Yours sincerely,

Roger Fisher

(R L L FACER)

SECRET

SECRET

Thank you for your message of 11th July about theatre nuclear forces. I share your view of the importance for the Alliance of reaching a firm decision this year to modernise long range theatre nuclear systems in Europe. You can count on our support in trying to achieve the necessary Alliance consensus, both on modernisation and on the arms control aspects.

2. We were grateful to you for sending David Aaron to explain your specific proposals. We shall be considering the options carefully. Francis Pym also had some useful discussions with Harold Brown, as a result of which a team of experts will be visiting Washington within the next few days to explore the technical and financial issues in more detail.

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27 JUL 1979

Copies to be found on
1) Subject Nato: PM's
mtg with SACEUR.
2) Master Set of
records.



DEFENCE
COCO
MOD.

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

25 July 1979

Dear Paul,

INTRODUCTORY CALL ON THE PRIME MINISTER BY THE SUPREME ALLIED
COMMANDER, EUROPE, GENERAL BERNARD ROGERS AT 10 DOWNING STREET
ON 24 JULY

The new SACEUR, General Rogers, paid his introductory call on the Prime Minister at No. 10 on 24 July at 1800. The following is a summary of the main points which arose during half an hour's relaxed and informal discussion.

The Prime Minister expressed her concern over the lead enjoyed by the Warsaw Pact Forces in standardisation of weaponry and equipment. General Rogers said that he was reasonably optimistic that trends in NATO towards greater standardisation were moving satisfactorily; he agreed, nevertheless, that the Warsaw Pact at present enjoyed a significant advantage. The Prime Minister commented that this advantage extended into every aspect of conventional weaponry and into other fields as well. The momentum of Soviet military expenditure seemed unstoppable. General Rogers told the Prime Minister that all his studies had led him to the conclusion that 1982 would be a critical year for the West. Western vulnerability would be at its greatest, the Soviet Union would have a new leadership and the temptation for this leadership to test the West in some area or other might prove irresistible. The Alliance could not hope, by that time, to have made up all the ground which it had lost; but, General Rogers said, he was hopeful that NATO's cohesion and the determination of its members to make the Alliance work, together with the programme for improving NATO conventional capacity which was already under way, would enable the Alliance to weather this vulnerable period.

The Prime Minister expressed particular concern over the Soviet Union's lead in the field of chemical warfare. General Rogers said that he was hopeful that the United States would decide to go ahead with the production of binary weapons, in order to acquire a deterrent capability in this field which was at present lacking. Moreover, existing stocks of US chemical weapons were now deteriorating since there had been no restocking for a long period. Unless a decision to resume production were taken quickly, such minimal deterrent capacity as the United States still possessed would have disappeared by the early 1980s.

/General Rogers

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General Rogers went on to say that he could not over-emphasise how vital it was for the future of NATO that a decision on Theatre Nuclear Forces should be taken before the end of 1979. On this issue, the next few months would be crucial and the role of the UK could be decisive. Another field to which General Rogers intended, he said, to give attention was that of intelligence: the Alliance had to decide whether its intelligence machinery was adequate to determine Soviet intentions in good time and provide adequate notice of the need for Alliance reinforcements. General Rogers said that he proposed to examine all these matters and to make early recommendations.

The Prime Minister asked General Rogers how vulnerable, in his view, the Alliance is to Soviet penetration. General Rogers said that he had not yet been able to form a proper assessment of this; it was nevertheless clear that, at least in peace time, the US and the UK should be very careful about what information they released to NATO as a whole.

General Rogers told the Prime Minister that it would, in his view, be wrong to underestimate the economic and demographic problems of the Soviet Union and the impact which these clearly had on the morale of the Soviet armed forces and on that of her allies. He congratulated the Prime Minister on the very favourable impact which the Government's policies had already produced on the morale of the Armed Services in the UK.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Roger Facer (Ministry of Defence) and Martin Vile (Cabinet Office).

Yours ever,

Bryan Cartledge.

Paul Lever, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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Defence 2
Prime Minister

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Mr Gillmore (Defence Dept)

Call on the Secretary of State by Mr David Aaron

Mr David Aaron, President Carter's emissary on Theatre Nuclear Force issues, called on the Secretary of State this morning, accompanied by the American Ambassador and a member of the NSC staff. Lord Strathcona, Mr Wade-Gery and Mr Moberly were present.

Mr Aaron explained that the object of his current visits in Europe was to try to establish an agreed programme for Theatre Nuclear Forces modernisation on which decisions could be taken by the end of the year. His discussions with the Germans had been moderately encouraging. Chancellor Schmidt clearly wanted to take a decision within this time-scale but was pessimistic about the chances of agreeing on a fully-fledged arms control position by then and seemed to regard this as a pre-condition for modernisation. The Secretary of State said that his impression had been that the Germans wanted to take a decision in principle in favour of Theatre Nuclear Force modernisation, to start arms control discussions in parallel and then to decide on the final numbers of new systems in the light of those discussions. Mr Aaron said that the trouble was that the Germans wanted the decision on force modernisation to be accompanied by a specific arms control proposal, not just a commitment to enter discussions, and their ideas on the arms control side were complex, not well thought out, and would take some time to be refined. The Secretary of State asked whether the German attitude reflected their own domestic concerns or a desire to reassure smaller countries in the Alliance. Mr Aaron thought that it was a mixture of both.

Mr Aaron added that a further problem was that Chancellor Schmidt seemed still to be interested in sea-launched cruise missiles. Mr Aaron's own brief was not to close the door on this option but the Americans had little enthusiasm for it. Such systems would be expensive, would not be militarily effective and would have less deterrent value. The specific force proposals which the Americans themselves favoured were for a mixture of Pershing IIs and ground-launched cruise missiles. The 108 Pershing I missiles now in Germany would be replaced by the mark II version on a one for one basis; and ground-launched cruise missiles would be deployed elsewhere within the Alliance, perhaps by installing 36 launchers (each with 4 missiles) within the UK, 12 launchers in the Netherlands, 12 in Belgium, 24 in the FRG, and 24 in Italy. The Secretary of State asked whether the deployment in the UK was envisaged as a replacement for the British Vulcan bomber force or in addition to it. Mr Aaron replied that the thinking of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on this was not clear. His impression was that they thought that an overall deployment of this size, including 36 launchers in the UK, was what NATO as a whole needed. But that this was without prejudice to the UK's own requirements.

/ The



The Secretary of State asked whether the rest of the Alliance would be likely to endorse these proposals. Mr Aaron replied that the Belgians, including both the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister, had shown serious interest though they were concerned about reactions in the Netherlands. The Dutch were doubtful: the Government would like to help but were afraid of Dutch public opinion. At official level the Italians were interested but it was not clear how the new Italian Government would react. As regards the other members of the Alliance, the Americans would inform the Danes, Norwegians, Turks and Greeks of their proposals but were not suggesting their involvement in basing of new systems.

The Secretary of State said that it was important to avoid entering arms control negotiations about weapons which did not yet exist if this would impede NATO's acquisition of them. He asked how the British Government could help. Mr Aaron said that he hoped some influence could be brought to bear on the Germans to bring their arms control ideas down to a more practical level. The Secretary of State referred to the Protocol in the SALT II Treaty. This was the only aspect which gave the British Government some hesitation. He wondered whether there would not be pressure from the Russians to ensure that the limitations in the Protocol continued even after its expiry. Mr Aaron replied that there would both be domestic pressure in the United States and pressure from other international quarters in quite the contrary sense. He thought that the Russians now accepted that a US cruise missile programme was under way. By the time the Protocol expired, the US could well be far embarked on a programme to which they were committed to their Allies. On timing, he doubted whether SALT III negotiations would start until the SALT II Treaty was ratified. He was reasonably confident that ratification would happen in December.

Mr Aaron added that the French attitude towards SALT III seemed surprisingly positive. President Giscard, although stressing that France would not take part, had now endorsed the desirability of negotiations to cover Theatre Nuclear Forces. The Secretary of State said that the British attitude towards participation in SALT III was less clear-cut. It would suit Britain to have British nuclear forces excluded from the negotiations but he wondered whether this would be feasible. Speaking personally he thought it politically impossible for British nuclear forces to be discussed in an arms control forum where Britain was not present. But any British presence would change the whole nature of SALT.

Paul Lever
(P Lever)

17 July 1979

cc: PS Mr Cartledge (No 10)
 PS/Mr Hurd Mr Wade-Gery (Cabinet Office)
 PS/PUS PS/Secretary of State for Defence
 Sir A Duff
 Mr P Moberly

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Defence



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

13 July 1979

Dear Ambassador,

*p.o.
SM
13/7*

Theatre Nuclear Force Modernisation : Mr David Aaron's Visit

I have been asked to inform you that the Prime Minister was most grateful for President Carter's message about Mr David Aaron's visit to London on 16/17 July. She regrets that it will not be possible for her to see Mr Aaron herself. But, as you know, she has arranged for Lord Carrington to do so. In addition, Mr Aaron will see Mr Hurd and Lord Strathcona as well as senior officials from the Cabinet Office, the Ministry of Defence and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

(G G H Walden)
Private Secretary

His Excellency
The Honourable Kingman Brewster
Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary
Embassy of the United States of America
Grosvenor Square
LONDON
W1A 1AE

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13 JUL 1979



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Defence

cc MOD
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10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

12 July 1979

B/K 20-7-79

THEATRE NUCLEAR FORCE MODERNISATION: MR. DAVID AARON'S VISIT

As you probably know, Mr. David Aaron of the NSC is coming to London on 16/17 July, as part of a tour of NATO capitals, to discuss TNF modernisation and arms control. Arrangements have already been made for him to attend a meeting in the Cabinet Office, under Mr. Wade-Gery's chairmanship, on 17 July at 0930; to call on Mr. Hurd at 1115; and to meet, over a lunch given by the American Ambassador, Sir John Hunt, Sir Frank Cooper and Sir Antony Duff.

The Prime Minister yesterday received a message from President Carter about Mr. Aaron's visit, describing its purpose and asking whether Mr. Aaron could be received either by the Prime Minister herself or by "appropriate Cabinet members". I enclose a copy of the President's message.

The Prime Minister could not, in fact, receive Mr. Aaron on 17 July in view of her very heavy commitments on that day. It is in any case doubtful whether it would be appropriate for her to do so. Having seen President Carter's message, however, the Prime Minister would be grateful if the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary could agree to see Mr. Aaron himself, in place of the call on Mr. Hurd at present planned. As the Defence Secretary will be in Washington on the day of Mr. Aaron's visit, the Prime Minister suggests that Lord Strathcona might be present when Lord Carrington meets Mr. Aaron. You may also wish to consider whether, in the interests of continuity between this meeting and the subsequent meeting over lunch, Mr. Wade-Gery from the Cabinet Office should also be present.

I should be grateful if you would arrange for the American Ambassador to be informed that the Prime Minister is grateful for President Carter's message; that she regrets that it will not be possible for her to see Mr. Aaron herself; but that she has asked Lord Carrington to do so. (If Lord Carrington is

/not in fact

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- 2 -

not in fact free to see Mr. Aaron on 17 July, the Prime Minister hopes that the Lord Privy Seal might be able to do so instead.)

I should also be grateful if consideration could be given, in the light of Mr. Aaron's discussions in London, to a reply to President Carter's message which the Prime Minister might send in due course.

I am sending copies of this letter, and enclosure, to Roger Facer (MOD) and Martin Vile (Cabinet Office).

B. G. CARTLEDGE

Paul Lever, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

PRIME MINISTER

TNF MODERNISATION

In his message to you below, delivered by the American Ambassador today, President Carter expresses the hope that Mr. David Aaron, whom he is sending on a tour of the relevant NATO capitals to discuss TNF modernisation, can be received either by you or by an appropriate member of the Cabinet.

Mr. Aaron is due to arrive in London on the evening of 16 July and has to leave at 1600 on Tuesday, 17 July. Arrangements have already been made for him to attend a meeting of senior experts, under Mr. Wade-Gery's chairmanship, in the Cabinet Office at 0930 on 17 July; to call on Mr. Hurd in the FCO at 1115; and to meet, over lunch at the American Embassy, Sir John Hunt, Sir Frank Cooper and Sir Antony Duff.

I doubt whether you would wish to engage in a detailed discussion of TNF modernisation with Mr. Aaron at this stage and you would not, in any case, be free to do so on 17 July - you have a meeting of E Committee at 1000, immediately followed by a meeting of E(DL), followed by Questions in the afternoon. However, in view of President Carter's message, would you like to ask Lord Carrington (who has been taking part in the TNF modernisation discussions in NATO) to see Mr. Aaron in place of Mr. Hurd; if Lord Carrington is not free on the morning of 17 July, the Lord Privy Seal could perhaps see Mr. Aaron instead?

As you know, Mr. Pym will be in Washington at the time of Mr. Aaron's visit: if you agree, I shall suggest that Lord Strathcona might be present when Lord Carrington sees Mr. Aaron, to represent the MOD.

11 July 1979

Wade-Gery
of note
Frank Cooper?

BM -



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

11 July 1979

I am writing on the Prime Minister's behalf to thank you for your letter of 11 July with which you enclosed a message to her from President Carter about Mr. David Aaron's visit to London next week.

I shall bring President Carter's message to the Prime Minister's attention when she returns from Scotland this evening.

B/C

SOP

His Excellency The Honourable Kingman Brewster


EMBASSY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
LONDON

July 11, 1979

Dear Prime Minister:

I have been asked to deliver the attached message to you from President Carter, which was received at the Embassy this morning.

Sincerely,


Kingman Brewster
Ambassador

Enclosure

The Rt. Hon. Margaret Thatcher, M.P.,
Prime Minister,
10 Downing Street,
London, S.W. 1

Subject

PRIME MINISTER'S

PERSONAL MESSAGE

Dear Prime Minister:

SERIAL No. T42/79T

Alliance consultations on theater nuclear forces have reached a stage where I believe it would be useful to supplement those consultations with bilateral discussions. Accordingly, I would like to send my personal emissary on these issues, David Aaron, to meet with you or with your appropriate Cabinet members the week of July 16, 1979. He will also consult with the Federal Republic of Germany, the Netherlands, Italy and Belgium.

Alliance consultations so far reveal a broad consensus that Soviet nuclear efforts, especially such long-range theater nuclear forces as the SS-20, pose a military and political challenge to the Alliance. To meet this challenge, the Alliance needs to modernize by deploying long-range nuclear systems in Europe capable of reaching Soviet territory, and by being prepared to negotiate viable arms control agreements. This would demonstrate Alliance unity, strengthen the spectrum of deterrence, and maintain the perception in both East and West of a firm U.S. and allied commitment to the defense of Europe.

TNF modernization can only be undertaken on the basis of Alliance consensus, and broad participation in this effort. It will require steadfastness and determination to obtain an Alliance consensus on theater nuclear modernization and arms control, which I hope can be achieved by the end of the year. The work of the high level group on TNF modernization and the special group on TNF arms control is putting the Alliance in a position where such decisions are possible.

I am ready to do my part to lead the Alliance to a consensus, but I will need your support. David Aaron will be prepared to discuss with you in detail our thoughts on how a common Alliance TNF modernization and arms control approach can be achieved. In particular, he will be prepared to discuss possible specific roles which the United Kingdom might play in Alliance TNF modernization. The U.S. has under development the weapons system appropriate for TNF modernization and is prepared both to suggest the force mix and to make the systems available. On the basis of his discussions with you, we can move forward with full Alliance consideration leading to concrete TNF modernization and arms control decisions.

Sincerely,

Jimmy Carter

Defence

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Ref. A09932

PRIME MINISTER

Long Range Theatre Nuclear Forces and Theatre Nuclear Arms Control
(MISC 7)

These two papers by the Secretary of State for Defence (MO 13/1/34 of 5th July) and by the Foreign Secretary deal with different aspects of an important and difficult subject. Although neither paper seeks decisions now the outcome of the discussion will be important to Mr. Pym for his visit to Washington on 16th-18th July. He will clearly need to be able to give an initial impression of our present thinking on how we intend to modernise the long-range theatre nuclear forces which we contribute to NATO, and on how we think our plans should be reconciled with forthcoming arms control negotiations i. e. SALT III. I have underlined "theatre" because we are not here talking about the next generation of our strategic nuclear deterrent i. e. the succession to Polaris in its national and strategic role. We are talking about the succession to the longer-range nuclear weapons we have hitherto deployed in a theatre role in the North Atlantic area; not the short-range tactical weapons (Honest John, etc., currently being replaced by Lance) but the medium-range weapons we contribute to the Alliance viz. (a) the V-bombers carrying nuclear bombs and (b) Polaris in its non-strategic and non-national role. The confusing fact that Polaris has two roles should not be allowed to mislead the meeting into trying to discuss the strategic future as well. That will come soon, but separately.

HANDLING

2. Although the two papers are linked you may like to ask the Secretary of State for Defence to speak first and to concentrate on the options in paragraph 13 of the memorandum attached to his minute. There would be value in a first exchange of views on the following points:

- (a) Is it clear that we need new plans (i. e. new hardware decisions) of some kind? If no change is made in existing plans, the Vulcan bombers will phase out after 1983 and the United Kingdom nuclear contribution will then

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consist of the ageing Polaris force, the relatively short ranged Tornado and our provision of bases for United States F 111s. Mr. Pym convincingly dismisses this option.

- (b) Should we do no more than agree to new United States systems being based in the United Kingdom? Present indications are that the Americans would like the United Kingdom to provide Ground Launched Cruise Missiles (GLCMs) in their TNF modernisation programme. A cheap way of doing this would be to accept United States-owned GLCMs in this country. If the United States so wish, we might even offer to man and operate the systems for them although they should provide warhead custodians. But this would not be regarded as a truly national contribution; and there could be political problems in the apparent surrender of a national sovereignty involved.

- (c) Should we acquire from the Americans a United Kingdom system with United States warheads?

This is an arrangement which has worked in the past with our tactical nuclear weapons in Germany. But at that time we still had the V bombers as well. Once they are gone, public opinion may be less ready to accept an American finger on the safety catch of theatre nuclear weapons in which a great deal of British money will have been invested.

- (d) Should we acquire from the Americans a United Kingdom system with United Kingdom warheads? In many ways this is the most attractive option. But it is by far the most expensive and we could not develop and produce United Kingdom warheads for a new GLCM force before 1986 at the earliest.

- (e) Will we have a national capability to develop and produce a satisfactory warhead for a GLCM system?

We produced our own warhead for the Polaris missile but there are indications that United States nuclear warhead technology is now some way ahead of our own. Could we be sure that we could develop a satisfactory new warhead at a reasonable cost?

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(f) From our point of view do Ground Launched Cruise Missiles offer obvious advantages over Air Launched or Sea Launched Cruise Missiles? May the apparent United States preference that we should go for GLCM be partly designed to make it easier to get other European NATO allies to accept a new generation of ground launched theatre nuclear weapons? As the United Kingdom possesses a growing force of nuclear submarines should we dismiss the alternative of SLCM too readily?

(g) What are the cost implications of TNF modernisation? Mr. Pym says that no forward financial provision has been made for the modernisation of theatre nuclear weapons in the defence budget. If their costs have to be accommodated without significant addition of that budget, what is the order of magnitude of change which may have to be made to our other defence capabilities in order to accommodate it? There are already indications that the threat to the planned shape and size of the conventional forces is causing disquiet within the Ministry of Defence.

3. You may then wish to ask the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary to introduce his minute to you of 6th July (PM/79/62) about Theatre Nuclear Arms Control. The points to establish in subsequent discussion are

(a) Is there general agreement on the policy proposed in Lord Carrington's paragraph 8? Almost certainly yes. But it will not be easy to carry out, and further discussion should concentrate on the main areas of difficulty.

(b) Our views on the German three-phase approach (Lord Carrington's paragraph 4).

The Germans advocate a simultaneous approach on the problem of TNF modernisation and on negotiations on arms control within SALT III.

But it will not be easy to formulate a sensible SALT III negotiating position until we know where we want to go on TNF modernisation.

(c) Should the United Kingdom take part in SALT III negotiations?

No need to decide this yet. But the current state of Comprehensive Test Ban negotiations suggests that there could be risks in involving ourselves too deeply or too early.

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(d) Effect of SALT III negotiations

There are obvious political reasons for the Russians to insist on the inclusion in SALT III of nuclear weapon systems owned by the allies of the USA. If we are to agree, the political and military benefits to the whole Alliance must be clearly shown to be worth while.

Under pressure of negotiation in SALT III how is the United States attitude likely to develop? As cruise missiles are already on the SALT III agenda, are they a sensible system for the United Kingdom to adopt?


Mr. Pym does not specify a preferred option but clearly expects that GLCMs will be part of our future programme. What is the risk of moving in this direction at the same time as SALT III negotiations may be taking place? The United States may see British plans to acquire GLCMs partly as a negotiating chip. In what circumstances would we be prepared to contemplate modifying or abandoning our plans as part of the SALT III process?

(e) Should we be developing a SALT III negotiating position now?

This might involve the theoretical formulation of theatre nuclear weapons modernisation plans more ambitious than anything we could in fact afford, in order to have something which can be whittled down in the course of SALT III negotiation.

CONCLUSION

4. In the light of discussion, the Committee might be guided:-
- (a) To confirm that Mr. Pym has correctly identified the four principal options open to us.
 - (b) To agree that Mr. Pym should be guided, in his talks with Dr. Brown, by the main points emerging from the present discussion.
 - (c) To invite Mr. Pym to bring the matter before the Committee again as soon as he is in a position to recommend a preferred option.
 - (d) To accept the general lines of the policy on theatre nuclear arms control proposed by Lord Carrington.


JOHN HUNT

9th July, 1979



PM/79/62

PRIME MINISTERTheatre Nuclear Arms Control

1. When we discuss the Defence Secretary's ^{5/7} paper on our possible contribution to NATO's theatre nuclear force (TNF) modernisation programme, I think that we should also take stock of the Alliance's parallel work on theatre nuclear arms control.
2. The need for an arms control approach to accompany NATO's TNF modernisation programme arises from a number of political pressures. First, some of our Allies (notably the Dutch, Danes and Norwegians) have made it clear that such an approach is essential if they are to be associated with decisions on TNF modernisation. Second, the Soviet Union is pressing to negotiate on Western theatre nuclear systems in SALT III, and the Alliance needs to work out its response to this. Third, Cruise missiles, by virtue of their inclusion in the SALT II Protocol, are already on the SALT III agenda. Finally, concern about the threat posed by the Soviet SS20 makes it desirable to restrict this particular system. However the case for theatre nuclear arms control is primarily political and negotiations may offer only limited military benefits.
3. The issues are being studied in the Alliance by a Special Group. Its initial view is that any negotiation on theatre systems should take place within SALT III and should concentrate on modern Soviet long-range missiles, preferably with a separate limit on the Backfire bomber. The Americans will in any case make clear to the Russians shortly that any SALT III limitations on US theatre systems should be matched by comparable limitations on the Soviet side.
4. The Special Group's report will be ready in time to be considered by NATO Ministers with the report of the High Level Group on TNF modernisation before the end of the year. Most of the Allies, including the US and FRG, want an early decision to go ahead with TNF modernisation, coupled with a general offer to discuss theatre systems in SALT III. The Dutch, Danes and Norwegians, however, favour a more detailed proposal for early arms control negotiations, pending which TNF modernisation might be held in suspense. As a

/compromise



compromise, the Germans have suggested a 3-phase approach involving:

- (a) a start on the implementation of TNF modernisation decisions;
- (b) arms control negotiations within SALT III; and
- (c) a review of the final size of the TNF programme in the light of any concrete arms control results.

This may provide a basis for carrying the Scandinavians and Dutch with us while demonstrating to the Russians that the Alliance is definitely going ahead with a TNF programme.

5. It is agreed that, since European interests will be intimately involved in SALT III, there must be closer consultation than during SALT II. The important thing will be to ensure that we can influence US policy. This will best be achieved by preserving our close bilateral contacts with the Americans through Washington and the Alliance; and by seeking the maximum of common ground between ourselves and the Germans.

6. A particular problem of direct national concern, on which we are likely to need to decide before the end of this year, is whether British nuclear systems should be included in SALT III and whether the UK should participate in the negotiations. The Americans have so far been scrupulous in assuming that British and French systems should be excluded; and the French have made clear that they have no intention of participating. But the Russians are demanding that other nuclear powers beside the US should be involved in SALT III. This could be an important issue during the period of sparring before the shape of SALT III is finally agreed.

7. We cannot accept that British nuclear systems should be the subject of detailed discussion, and therefore liable to limitation, at a negotiation at which we are not present. But in the last resort we cannot prevent the Americans and Russians from taking our systems (and those of the French) indirectly into account in a bilateral SALT III. It is however too soon to judge how persistent Soviet pressure to secure the inclusion of British nuclear systems will be. Another question is whether all our long-range nuclear forces, including the Polaris force, might be involved rather than just our



Vulcan bombers and any successors they may have. In any case if there were to be any question of our systems being counted against overall Western totals, we would need to establish in advance with the Americans the precise conditions.

8. Against this background we need to consider the general lines on which we want both our own and Alliance policy to evolve during the coming months. I suggest that these should be:

- (a) We should support efforts to develop an arms control position which allows TNF modernisation to go ahead from December, while meeting the domestic concerns of our Allies;
- (b) We should avoid any constraints which would undermine the effectiveness of our nuclear forces. There is, however, no need yet for decisions about UK participation, or the inclusion of British nuclear forces, in SALT III;
- (c) We should revert to the question of the British role in SALT III in the light of further studies of the arguments for and against involvement. For the time being, we should go along with planning assumption in NATO that British systems will be excluded.

9. I am copying this minute to the Defence Secretary, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, the Home Secretary and Sir John Hunt.

(CARRINGTON)

Foreign and Commonwealth Office
6 July 1979

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Copy No 1 of 7 copies
Page 1 of 2 pages

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE WHITEHALL LONDON SW1A 2HB

TELEPHONE 01-218 9000
DIRECT DIALLING 01-218 2111/3

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MO 13/1/34

PRIME MINISTER

NATO LONG-RANGE THEATRE NUCLEAR FORCES

The modernisation of long-range theatre nuclear forces is of high importance to NATO defence. It has moreover become of political significance reaching beyond the strictly defence considerations; it is now a key test of NATO's collective will to ensure its security. The attached memorandum sets out the issue, the present position and the options open to us.

2. I am convinced that we must give our full political support to a resolute Alliance effort in this field; and that we must play a positive practical part. I am not yet ready to recommend what form our positive participation should take. We need to know more before we choose among the options. I intend, when I visit Washington on 16th - 18th July at Dr Harold Brown's invitation, to carry forward the process of exploration. I would make clear to him that while our general approach is firmly positive we have not at this stage reached decisions, even in principle, as between the main options.

3. In approaching this issue we must of course have in mind also the matter of a successor to Polaris, which I regard as the top priority in the nuclear field. I do not believe, however, that the implication of this need be regarded as narrowing our options in the LRTNF field. LRTNF decisions at least in principle are the more urgent, since NATO Governments all have to take a view by the end of the year.

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Page 2 of 2 pages


4. Meanwhile I should be grateful for my colleagues views on the issues and their agreement to my exploring them with Dr Brown in Washington. I am copying this to the Chancellor of the Exchequer, the Home Secretary, the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary and Sir John Hunt.

J.P.

5th July 1979

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Page 1 of 5 pages

LONG-RANGE THEATRE NUCLEAR FORCES

1. Great attention has become focussed upon the modernisation of NATO's long-range theatre nuclear forces (LRTNF). The issue is of high direct importance in terms of Alliance defence and deterrence. But its practical significance now goes wider. Particularly after the "neutron bomb" fiasco, this has become a major public test of the Alliance's ability to act resolutely and cohesively on security issues under the pressure of Soviet or Soviet-manipulated propaganda. If the Alliance's response is again weak or disunited, the repercussions may be far-reaching.

The LRTNF Role

2. NATO strategy is based on having a range of capability such that the Soviet Union could never be confident of overcoming NATO at one level without triggering a response at a higher level leading ultimately, if it persisted, to full-scale nuclear war. For this NATO needs options linking conventional forces to strategic nuclear ones. (The Soviet Union, though having a different doctrine, has itself a very full set of options). One of the major links is the option of limited nuclear strike into the USSR while still holding back the main strategic attack. The advent of US/Soviet strategic parity, codified in SALT, enhances the importance of this "sub-strategic" link.

3. The link is provided now mainly by a mix of NATO-committed submarines carrying ballistic missiles (SLBMs) and aircraft carrying free-fall bombs. The SLBMs are powerful weapons for this role, but NATO does not regard them as militarily ideal in all circumstances, they are not always seen as closely engaged to Europe and they tend to be identified with the strategic level of conflict. (This is true even of the UK weapons, not counted in SALT II, it seems unlikely that HMG would use our small Polaris force in "sub-strategic" strikes).

4. The present aircraft are 55 UK Vulcans (with UK weapons) and 170 US F. 111s, all based in England. The Vulcan cannot credibly be kept beyond 1982/83; the Tornado, which replaces it, is of considerably shorter range. The F.111s are more modern (though dating back to the 1960s), but they face improving Soviet air defences and an improving Soviet capacity for accurate pre-emptive strike provided by new weapons like the SS20 MIRVed IRBM, the BACKFIRE supersonic bomber and the F.111-equivalent FENCER swing-wing fighter-bomber. For all these reasons, NATO needs some new long-range in-theatre capability.

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5. The new Soviet weapons do not create NATO's military need to modernise, but they intensify it. Politically they have greatly heightened Western public awareness of the big and increasing lead (certainly over two to one) which the USSR has in long-range TNF targeted on Europe, notably the SS20, which are not constrained by SALT.

6. There is a firm consensus among NATO Defence Ministers that NATO needs to modernise and somewhat augment its long-range in-theatre (ie other than US SLBM) capability. As has been publicly acknowledged, a decision on how to do this should if possible be taken this year. The Alliance need is clear and increasingly urgent, and the US cannot go on funding costly development options without deployment plans. Moreover, both they and the FRG are keen to get the matter settled before their 1980 election campaigns get under way. All this points to the November/December NATO Ministerial meetings as crucial.

The Attitudes of Our Allies

7. The US fully accept the case for action in response to European concerns and have made it clear that they do not regard the SALT II Treaty and Protocol of the SALT III prospect as closing off any of the system options. They are plainly willing to make substantial deployments themselves, but not without firm support and the widest possible participation from their Allies.

8. The FRG strongly support the basic case, but for political reasons domestically and eastward set two limiting conditions:

- i. they do not wish to own (even under "dual-key" arrangements) nuclear systems capable of striking the USSR;
- ii. they will accept basing of US-owned systems of this class only if at least one other non-nuclear country will also accept.

Of these conditions the first will not change. We suspect, but cannot be sure, that the FRG may not in the end insist on the second if an impasse is reached.

9. Other NATO members generally accept the basic rationale for TNF modernisation. But only Belgium, the Netherlands and Italy look serious candidates for meeting the second FRG condition. Various modes of basing participation are being explored, but none is yet certain to be acceptable in any of the countries. The Dutch Government in particular faces grave domestic difficulty on the whole issue.

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Force Requirement and System Options

10. The issues have been processed by a US-led NATO body (the "High-Level Group" - HLG) of senior officers and officials not formally committing Governments.

22. There is no precise way of quantifying the requirement, but the HLG consensus favours a scale of new deployment giving a capability of between 200 and 600 warheads in all. The main options identified are:

- a. an extended-range version (PIIXR) of the Pershing ballistic missile system of which current shorter-range versions are already based in the FRG;
- b. cruise missiles of the type already being developed by the US. They could be air-launched (ALCM), ground-launched (GLCM), or sea-launched (SLCM) from submarines or surface ships;
- c. a new US MRBM existing as yet only on paper.

All these would be of US origin - European development and production procurement is wholly unattractive on cost and timescale grounds. PIIXR and the CMs could be available from 1983, a new MRBM (if proceeded with at all) not before the late 1980s.

12. The HLG consensus, which we believe is also the US preference, favours a mix based wholly or mainly on PIIXR and GLCM, though there remains some FRG interest in the possible addition of a surface-ship SLCM element.

Options for the United Kingdom

13. We do not have to commit ourselves immediately. But we must indicate our own preferences soon if we are to help forward an effective Alliance package and to influence its construction. In principle, we have four options:-

- I. Make no change in plans - let the Vulcans phase out, and point to our Polaris and Tornado contributions and our provision of bases for US F.111s.
- II. Make no change in UK plans, but agree to the basing of new US-owned systems - probably GLCMs - in the UK is the US so wish; they have so far made no enquiries. A possible variant might be to offer to man and operate the systems for the US, though they would still need to provide warhead custodians.

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- III. Acquire from the US a new UK-owned missile system, but with US warheads under dual-key custodial arrangements. We have done this in several fields in the past, and still do it for certain of our systems deployed in the UK and the FRG.
- IV. Acquire from the US a new UK-owned missile system and fit it with UK warheads. This is the only option which gives us a fully independent long-range theatre nuclear system (apart from any marginal capability provided by the Tornado).
14. Given the domestic political difficulties our Continental allies face and the exceptions they will certainly have of us, Option I - dissociation from a new Alliance effort - would probably cause its collapse. In my view our effective choice lies between II, III and IV.
15. For selective use on a limited scale BMs are much better than CMs; most of the USSR has no effective ABM defences, so that the number of missiles launched can be kept very low with good assurance that the target will be hit. However, PIIXR's range (1800 Km, against a CM figure on around 2500 Km) gives little coverage of the USSR from the UK. A new MRBM will be expensive; it may not be available at all; if it is, it will not be until about seven years or more after the Vulcans go. We are left therefore with CM options.
16. There is still uncertainty about the reliability of cruise missiles to air defences, and to ensure penetration it would be necessary to launch a considerable number. ALCMs and SLCMs give most scope for outflanking defences; submarine-launched CMs are moreover very hard for the enemy to pre-empt. But ALCMs would be more expensive than GLCMs. So would CMs on dedicated submarines; and adding a CM role to the task of our existing submarine force would degrade its conventional capability. On balance, GLCMs seem the most likely choice for any UK-owned force. (The Annex herewith reproduces some outline information on GLCMs provided by the US to the HLG).
17. Subject to more detailed study, it should be possible to base GLCMs (whether US or UK-owned) on existing UK airfields already housing nuclear forces. There would be plans for dispersal in emergency.
18. The size of any UK GLCM force (as in Option III and IV) is matter for judgment, in the light of total Alliance effort (paragraph 11 above) and of cost. A reasonable level might be 4-6 flights - 64-96 missiles. But this needs further consideration.

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19. Cost figures at this stage are very tentative - close estimates could be framed only after discussions with the US. On HLG information, however, the capital cost of a force of 64-96 GLCMs, excluding warheads, might lie in the bracket £100-200M. It might be possible to get some of the installations paid for by NATO common funding. (There are no proposals yet, but some are bound to be made, for Alliance cost-sharing of some kind). Annual running costs should be modest - perhaps around £5M - though any options other than just providing basing for US forces would add some 400-700 posts to the demands on our currently hard-pressed Service manpower.

20. We would not pay for US warheads (Option III). The cost of UK warheads, excluding special nuclear materials, might lie in the bracket £50-60M. Special nuclear material (being reusable capital assets managed as a single stock) are hard to cost for individual projects, and the net effect of a GLCM-warhead programme cannot be assessed in isolation from a general appraisal of our nuclear programme as a whole. All figures must be regarded as tentative at this stage.

21. Our predecessors made no specific forward financial provision for any LRTN effort (or for a Polaris successor) though there is some general contingency allowance in our forward costings. Though the costs in this area may not seem very large in relation to the role's importance, we shall not be able to accommodate them, save at severe damage to essential existing programmes, without continuing defence budget growth.

22. Costs aside, we should note that problems over nuclear warhead supply bear upon Option IV. Even if the urgent measures which I am recommending separately to put right the disastrous employment situation at Aldermaston are accepted and successful, we could not have UK warheads for a new GLCM force before about 1986, three years after the Vulcans go; and I cannot be confident even of this date until further studies, taking account of Polaris successor possibilities and any resultant questions of priority, are complete.

Next Steps

23. I am not ready yet to propose a particular choice among Options II-IV. We need further information on important aspects, notably the cost of GLCMs, the degree of their vulnerability to likely Soviet defences in the middle 1980s and later, and the position on US supply and continuing support. We must carry further our own studies bearing on UK warhead availability. And we need to know US views on how an adequate Alliance package can best be assembled.


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
ANNEX TO
MO 13/1/34
DATED 5TH JULY 1979

CRUISE MISSILE FAMILY



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CRUISE MISSILE



LENGTH	246" (with booster)	615CM
	219" (without booster)	548CM
DIAMETER	21"	525CM
WEIGHT	3200lbs (with booster)	1440Kg

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
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GLCM PERFORMANCE

MAXIMUM PENETRATION SPEED	.70 MACH	
ALTITUDE	200 FT AGL (SMOOTH TERRAIN)	60M
RANGE	2500 KM SYSTEM OPERATIONAL RANGE	
ACCURACY	200-350 FT	60-107M
WARHEAD (NUCLEAR)	VARIABLE	

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
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Refer to
Original
NATO - May 79
6
(The PM's mtg with
Sargent)

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

13 June 1979

Dear Paul,

General Haig's Farewell Call on the Prime Minister
at 10 Downing Street on 13 June 1979 at 1000

The Supreme Allied Commander Europe, General Haig, called on the Prime Minister at No. 10 this morning to say farewell before leaving his appointment. The following is a summary of the main points which arose during half an hour's conversation.

General Haig told the Prime Minister that the arrival in office of the new British Government had been a shot in the arm for NATO. The Prime Minister said that she had been surprised by the reluctance of some of the smaller NATO members to engage in the open discussion of defence matters; she said that a shot in the arm for the Alliance was clearly useful but much would depend on what other Governments were prepared to do. The Prime Minister went on to say that although her initial reaction to her first briefings on the East/West military balance had been one of discouragement, her considered conclusion had been that the West's superiority in human and material resources should enable it to respond to any challenge. General Haig agreed and commented that the Soviet Union would face major problems during the 1980s, both demographic - as a result of the high birth rate among the non-Russian peoples of the Soviet Union - and economic. There would be significant shortfalls in economic growth, industrial productivity and agriculture. The Soviet Union and its empire would also be subjected to strong centrifugal pressures, as the Pope's visit to Poland had demonstrated. General Haig said that he saw the period of the 1980s, and particularly the years between 1981 and 1987, as being one of the greatest danger but also of the greatest promise for the West and, in any event, the most crucial period since the end of the Second World War. The Prime Minister said that much would depend on who succeeded President Brezhnev and on the international climate in which he took office: his policies would be to a large extent determined by the depth of the resolve which he saw in the West.

/ General Haig

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-2-

General Haig told the Prime Minister that the new British Government was making an important contribution in the Nuclear Planning Group, where the positions adopted by the previous Government had been damaging: Chancellor Schmidt had earlier been pushed towards his own left-wing but his resolve was now much strengthened. So far as the problem of the deployment of Theatre Nuclear Weapons was concerned, General Haig thought that in the end the Belgians and the Italians could probably help by accepting such weapons on their territory, possibly with an element of phasing. General Haig described the Danish position, which he had recently discussed with Prime Minister Jorgensen, of insisting on the development of negotiating positions for the dismantlement of TNFs before embarking on a modernisation programme as a recipe for disaster.

The Prime Minister told General Haig that the West had dropped from a position of superiority to one of equivalence with the Warsaw Pact without, apparently, noticing it: her fear was that the West might, in the same way, drop from equivalence to inferiority. General Haig agreed that there was no military area in which the Soviet Union had not surprised the West by the pace of their technological advance: NATO's best estimate had been that the Soviet Union could not develop their new ICBM warheads until 1985; but these warheads would in fact be operational by 1981.

The Prime Minister told General Haig that she was particularly concerned by Soviet preparations for offensive chemical warfare. General Haig agreed that the West was fundamentally deficient in this area and that NATO had no deterrent capacity in the chemical warfare field. He hoped that President Carter would discuss this problem with President Brezhnev at the Vienna Summit, on the basis that if no progress was made in negotiations on chemical warfare the United States would have to develop an offensive system of its own. General Haig said that it would be helpful if the Prime Minister were to express her concern about this problem to other members of the Alliance, including the Americans. His personal view was that it was essential for the West to develop a binary system of chemical weapons.

Turning to the Comprehensive Test Ban negotiations, the Prime Minister said that she had considerable reservations about a CTB Treaty in view of the fact that the Russians could decouple their nuclear test explosions in underground caverns. Scientific opinion was apparently divided: British scientists seemed to agree that decoupling was possible whereas some American scientists thought that it was not. The Prime Minister said that she was also concerned about the problem of stockpile testing. General Haig said that he thought that the majority of US scientists regarded a threshold of 5 kts as the minimum which should be accepted. President Carter,

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however, had a strong preference for a total ban and had been encouraged in this by the British Labour Government. General Haig said that, in his personal view, a ban was naive and dangerous. He thought that this problem, too, would be discussed in Vienna.

In a discussion of SALT II, the Prime Minister explained that, although the British Government had a number of questions to ask about the Treaty, she had concluded that the political consequences of its non-ratification would be more serious than the defects of the Treaty itself. General Haig said that he thought that the outcome in Congress would be, not a series of amendments which the Soviet Union would never accept, but resolutions criticising parts of the Treaty but which would have no binding force on the President; they would simply be domestic, political face-savers. Several aspects of the SALT II agreement were, he thought, unsatisfactory; these included the protocol and the constraints on what the United States could do in the field of strategic arms development. He thought that the Congressional debate on SALT would continue until the end of 1979 and could well spill over into the Presidential campaign in 1980.

The Prime Minister told General Haig that the Government was at present considering the problem of a successor to the UK's Polaris deterrent; whatever choice was made, the UK would need technology from the United States. General Haig said that he felt very strongly that, in the strategic arms field, quality was more important than numbers; and that, therefore, the UK should go for a successor ballistic missile rather than for the cruise missile.

I should be grateful if you, and the other recipients of this letter, would ensure that it is given a suitably restricted distribution. I am sending a copy of this letter to Roger Facer (Ministry of Defence) and Martin Vile (Cabinet Office).

*Yours ever,
Roger Larnach.*

Paul Lever, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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Prime Minister

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FM THE HAGUE 311640Z MAY 79

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 137 OF 31 MAY

INFO ROUTINE MODUK, ALL NATO POSTS, UKDEL VIENNA,
INFO SAVING MOSCOW

2 files. *SW*
1/6

MY TELNO 132: NATO MINISTERIAL MEETING: THEATRE NUCLEAR FORCES (TNF)

1. IN RESTRICTED SESSION, VANCE (US) SAID THERE WAS AN URGENT NEED FOR CLOSE CONSULTATION BETWEEN THE ALLIES SO THAT THE ALLIANCE COULD WORK OUT ITS POSITION BEFORE SALT 3 NEGOTIATIONS BEGAN. IN SALT 3 THE SOVIET UNION WOULD CERTAINLY RAISE THE QUESTION OF FORWARD BASED SYSTEMS (FBS). THE ALLIANCE SHOULD THEREFORE PURSUE URGENTLY THE WORK OF THE HIGH LEVEL AND SPECIAL GROUPS (HLG AND SG) IN ORDER TO REACH A POSITION BEFORE THE END OF THIS YEAR.
2. FRANCOIS-PONCET (FRANCE) SAID THAT FOR FRANCE LONG RANGE THEATRE SYSTEMS WERE IDENTICAL TO CENTRAL STRATEGIC SYSTEMS. THE FRENCH THEREFORE COULD NOT TAKE PART IN THE WORK OF THE HLG OR SG. BUT THE FRENCH WOULD MAINTAIN THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THEIR NUCLEAR FORCES.
3. GENSCHER (FRG) SAID THE GERMANS WERE CONVINCED THAT TNF MODERNISATION WAS INDISPENSIBLE ON POLITICAL AND MILITARY GROUNDS. THE REASONS FOR THIS WERE THE GROWING OBSOLESCENCE OF EXISTING WESTERN EQUIPMENT, THE DEPLOYMENT OF THE SS20 AND BACKFIRE, AND THE FACT THAT AFTER SALT 2 THE QUOTE EURO-STRATEGIC BALANCE UNQUOTE WOULD HAVE A NEW DIMENSION. FURTHERMORE, IF THE ALLIANCE FAILED TO TAKE THE NECESSARY DECISIONS THE PSYCHOLOGICAL EFFECT WOULD BE DISASTROUS. THEY SHOULD AGREE ON A TNF PROGRAMME AND OFFER TO NEGOTIATE ON THAT BASIS. IT WAS WRONG TO THINK THAT ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS COULD REMOVE THE NEED FOR MODERNISATION. THE WORK OF THE HLG AND SG SHOULD BE KEPT IN STEP. DECISIONS MUST BE REACHED IN 1979. THE

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/ LEADING ROLE

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LEADING ROLE PLAYED BY THE US COULD NOT REPLACE THE ACT OF WILL
REQUIRED FROM THE EUROPEANS. PROGRESS IN ARMS CONTROL DEPENDED
UPON LEAVING THE WARSAW PACT IN NO DOUBT OF OUR READINESS TO
MAKE THE NECESSARY EFFORT ON TNF. THE ALLIANCE HAD A SINGLE INTEREST
IN TNF. DIVERSIFICATION OF VIEWS WOULD ONLY LEAD TO DIVISIONS
WITHIN THE ALLIANCE.

4. SEE MIFT.

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FM THE HAGUE 311720Z MAY 79

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 138 OF 31 MAY

INFO ROUTINE MODUK, ALL NATO POSTS, UKDEL VIENNA,,
INFO SAVING MOSCOW

MIPT: NATO MINISTERIAL MEETING: THEATRE NUCLEAR FORCES (TNF)

1. YOU SAID THAT HMG HAD MADE CLEAR THAT THEY WOULD MAINTAIN EFFECTIVENESS OF THE UK DETERRENT. WE WERE STUDYING URGENTLY WHAT WE COULD CONTRIBUTE TO A NATO PROGRAMME OF TNF MODERNISATION. THE QUESTIONS OF BASING AND PRESENTATION CREATED POLITICAL DIFFICULTIES FOR MANY COUNTRIES. BUT TIME WAS SHORT IF DECISIONS WERE TO BE REACHED BY THE END OF 1979. THE PROBLEMS RAISED BY SALT 3, TNF MODERNISATION AND THE WORK OF THE SPECIAL GROUP COULD NOT BE TREATED IN ISOLATION FROM EACH OTHER. THE ARMS CONTROL ISSUES SHOULD BE EXAMINED QUICKLY AND THE ALLIANCE SHOULD WORK OUT THE FEASIBILITY OF NEGOTIATING LIMITATIONS ON SOVIET SYSTEMS OF THIS KIND.

2. THE ALLIANCE NEEDED A COHERENT ARMS CONTROL POLICY WHEN IT CAME TO TAKE DECISIONS ON TNF MODERNISATION AND PRESENT THEM TO THE PUBLIC. EQUALLY, ARMS CONTROL WOULD BE INADEQUATE IF THE ALLIANCE HAD NOT DEMONSTRATED ITS RESOLVE TO MAINTAIN ADEQUATE THEATRE NUCLEAR FORCES. EXPERIENCE SHOWED THAT THE RUSSIANS WOULD NEGOTIATE SERIOUSLY ONLY IF THERE WAS EVIDENCE OF REAL DETERMINATION IN THE ALLIANCE. THIS SUGGESTED THAT NATO SHOULD DECIDE ON A MODERNISATION PROGRAMME AND HOW TO ACHIEVE IT BEFORE ATTEMPTING TO BARGAIN ABOUT LIMITATIONS. MEANWHILE IT WAS IMPORTANT FOR WORK ON MODERNISATION AND ON ARMS CONTROL TO PROCEED HAND IN HAND.

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/ 3. YOU POINTED

3. YOU POINTED OUT THAT ALL NATO COUNTRIES HAD SPECIAL DOMESTIC POLITICAL PROBLEMS. BUT IF THE ALLIANCE DID NOT TAKE THE NECESSARY DECISIONS THIS YEAR, IT WOULD FIND IT MUCH MORE DIFFICULT TO DO SO LATER. THE ABSENCE OF DECISIONS WOULD MOREOVER CALL INTO QUESTION NATO'S RESOLUTION. THE PRESENT MEETING SHOULD INSTILL A SENSE OF URGENCY INTO FURTHER DISCUSSIONS IN THE ALLIANCE ON THESE MATTERS.

4. SEE MIFT.

FCO PLEASE PASS TO SAVING ADDRESSEE

HERVEY

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FM UKDEL NATO 171430Z MAY 79

TO PRIORITY FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE -

TELEGRAM NUMBER 73 OF 17 MAY 1979,

AND TO PRIORITY MODUK (HEAD DS12),

INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON, BONN, OSLO, THE HAGUE,

INFO ROUTINE ANKARA, ATHENS, OTTAWA, LISBON, COPENHAGEN, BRUSSELS,

REYKJAVIK, PARIS, ROME, LUXEMBOURG.

NATO TNF MODERNISATION.

1. AS THE SECOND ITEM IN THE DPC RESTRICTED SESSION ON 16 MAY (SEE MIPT) BROWN (US) DESCRIBED THE GROWTH IN SOVIET TNF CAPABILITIES AS GOING BEYOND THEIR REASONABLE DEFENSIVE NEEDS. HE OUTLINED THE PROPOSALS BY THE HLG AND SAID THAT THE NPG, AND HE PERSONALLY, ENDORSED THESE IN MILITARY TERMS. THEY WERE BASED ON A MILITARY/POLITICAL ANALYSIS AND LEFT ROOM FOR POLITICAL FLEXIBILITY. THE QUESTION NOW WAS HOW TO REACH DECISIONS. CAREFUL EDUCATION OF PUBLIC OPINION AND GOVERNMENTS WOULD BE CALLED FOR, BOTH ON THE NEED TO DO SOMETHING IN THE FACE OF THE SOVIET THREAT AND ON THE RELATION BETWEEN MODERNISATION AND ARMS CONTROL ASPECTS WHICH THE US RECOGNISED REQUIRED PARALLEL CONSIDERATION. EVERY EFFORT SHOULD BE MADE TO REACH A DECISION BY DECEMBER AND IT SHOULD BE ALLIANCE-WIDE. SENSITIVE ISSUES WOULD BE INVOLVED IN REACHING A DECISION IN THIS TIMESCALE. BUT IT WAS ALSO NECESSARY TO RECOGNISE THE IMPORTANCE OF NATO RETAINING CREDIBLE TNF AS PART OF ITS SPECTRUM OF DETERRENCE. ANY GAP IN THE SPECTRUM WAS LIKELY TO BE EXPLOITED BY THE SOVIET UNION, IF NOT MILITARILY, IN AN EFFECTIVE POLITICAL SENSE. NATO MUST THEREFORE BE ABLE TO STRIKE TARGETS IN THE SOVIET UNION WITH IN-THEATRE SYSTEMS. THE US WAS READY TO TAKE THE LEAD ON THIS ISSUE BUT IT COULD NOT PROCEED ALONE.

2. THE CHAIRMAN OF THE MILITARY COMMITTEE UNDERLINED THE NEED TO MODERNISE LONG AND SHORT RANGE TNF SYSTEMS: AND FOR A DECISION THIS YEAR, BROWN AGREED WITH THE POINT MADE BY THE SECRETARY GENERAL THAT WITH WEAPONS LIKE THE SS-20 THE CURRENT CONCEPT OF THEATRE NUCLEAR FORCES WAS A FAR CRY FROM THAT OF BATTLEFIELD WEAPONS: AND THAT THIS CLOSING OF THE GAP BETWEEN TNF AND STRATEGIC SYSTEMS HAD BEEN EXPLOITED BY THE SOVIET UNION.

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13.

Defence 2

Prime Minister

18/5

Ans

3. MR PYM (UK) SUPPORTED BROWN'S STATEMENT. WHETHER OR NOT NATO LIKED IT, MODERNISATION OF ITS TNF WAS EMERGING AS A KEY ISSUE. WHILE EACH COUNTRY MUST HANDLE THE MATTER AS APPROPRIATE TO ITS DOMESTIC CIRCUMSTANCES, HE PLEDGED THE UK'S CLOSE, CONTINUING AND ACTIVE INTEREST. NATO'S ABILITY TO TAKE A DECISION IN 1979 WOULD BE SEEN AS A TEST OF ITS RESOLVE; AND DESPITE THE DIFFICULTIES HE HOPED THIS TIME-SCALE WOULD BE MET. HE ENDORSED THE VIEW THAT THE EDUCATION OF PUBLIC OPINION WOULD BE A CRUCIAL FACTOR: HE DID NOT BELIEVE THAT PUBLIC OPINION IN ANY OF THE NATO COUNTRIES YET APPRECIATED THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE SOVIET BUILD-UP AND THAT IT WAS BECAUSE OF THE LATTER THAT NATO WAS CONSIDERING THE MODERNISATION QUESTION. THE UK WOULD PLAY A FULL PART IN THE PREPARATION OF PUBLIC OPINION.

4. SOGAARD (DENMARK) SAID THAT THE SUBJECT WAS SENSITIVE ESPECIALLY FOR COUNTRIES IN WHICH WEAPONS WHICH COULD REACH SOVIET TERRITORY MIGHT BE BASED. THEY HAD STUDIED THE REPORT OF THE HLG AND WERE FOLLOWING THE PARALLEL WORK OF THE SPECIAL GROUP (SG) WITH CLOSE INTEREST. IN VIEW OF THE DIFFICULT POLITICAL ISSUES INVOLVED, IT WAS MOST IMPORTANT TO EXPLORE WAYS OF INCREASING NATO'S SECURITY THROUGH ARMS CONTROL. DENMARK'S POLICY WAS WELL KNOWN; THEIR DELIBERATIONS WOULD BE INFLUENCED BY THE WORK OF THE HLG AND SG AND THEY CONCURRED STRONGLY IN THE NEED FOR AN INTEGRATED APPROACH. FINAL DECISIONS MUST AWAIT THE CONCLUSION OF THE WORK OF BOTH GROUPS.

5. APEL (FRG), IN A MAJOR CONTRIBUTION, POINTED OUT THAT THERE WERE SEVERAL REASONS FOR MODERNISING NATO'S LONGER RANGE TNF: THE PENETRATION CAPABILITY OF NATO'S EXISTING LONGER RANGE SYSTEMS WAS BECOMING LESS AND THE SS-20 REPRESENTED "A NEW STIP, A QUALITATIVE CHANGE, A NEW THREAT". NATO NEEDED A WEAPON MIX WHICH WOULD PROVIDE SOMETHING OF THE SAME QUALITY. MOREOVER SALT 2 BY ACHIEVING PARITY IN STRATEGIC SYSTEMS WOULD CREATE EVEN MORE IMBALANCE IN THE EURO-STRATEGIC FIELD. THIS HAD LED NATO TO RECOGNISE THE NEED FOR A DECISION ON MODERNISATION WHICH HE THOUGHT WAS REQUIRED THIS YEAR; ALL THE NECESSARY ELEMENTS ON WHICH TO BASE A DECISION SHOULD BE AVAILABLE BY SEPTEMBER. THESE SHOULD BE HARMONISED, AND THE HLG AND SG SHOULD MEET TOGETHER THEN TO PUT THE FINISHING TOUCHES. CLEARLY THE SUBJECT WAS GOING TO RAISE DIFFICULT ISSUES IN PUBLIC BUT THIS POLITICAL DEBATE SHOULD BE STARTED (IT HAD DONE SO IN GERMANY) AS WE COULD BE SURE THAT /OTHERWISE

OTHERWISE THE RUSSIANS WOULD START IT FOR US. IT WOULD BE TOO LATE TO LEAVE THE DEBATE UNTIL THE LAST MOMENT. AN ARMS CONTROL APPROACH WAS NECESSARY NOT JUST FOR PRESENTATIONAL PURPOSES BUT IN ORDER TO BE CONSISTENT WITH THE ALLIANCE POLICY OF DEFENCE AND DETENTE. IT WAS RIGHT TO DRAW ATTENTION TO THE SS-20 IN THE COMMUNIQUE: IT REPRESENTED A THREAT WHICH IF ALLOWED TO DEVELOP WITHOUT ANY COUNTER ACTION FROM NATO, WOULD BE THE END OF ARMS CONTROL SINCE NATO WOULD NOT BE REGARDED BY THE SOVIET UNION AS A SERIOUS PARTICIPANT IN NEGOTIATIONS IF IT DID NOT DEMONSTRATE A FIRM WILL TO DEFEND ITSELF IF NECESSARY. APEL UNDERLINED THREE FACTORS WHICH WOULD BE IMPORTANT IN REACHING A DECISION. FIRSTLY, WE NEEDED DECISIONS AND ACTION: WE MUST NOT AWAIT POSSIBLE SUCCESS IN ARMS CONTROL. NEXT WHILE HE ACCEPTED THE US VIEW THAT THERE MUST BE A COMMON DECISION ON THE PART OF THE ALLIANCE AS A WHOLE, THIS COULD NOT REMOVE THE NEED FOR US LEADERSHIP AND RESPONSIBILITY. LASTLY, IT WOULD BE ESSENTIAL TO TAKE DEPLOYMENT CONSIDERATIONS INTO ACCOUNT: THE GERMAN POSITION WAS WELL KNOWN AND SO IT WOULD BE IMPORTANT TO DEMONSTRATE THAT THE DECISION TAKEN REPRESENTED A SINGLE ALLIANCE VIEW, TAKING ACCOUNT OF NATIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES. HE WAS SATISFIED WITH THE LAST NPG AND CONFIDENT THAT THE ALLIANCE WOULD STAND THE TEST WHICH THE MODERNISATION DECISION WOULD REPRESENT: CERTAINLY IF THE ALLIANCE COULD NOT TAKE THE DECISION IN GOOD TIME, REFLECTING BOTH MODERNISATION AND ARMS CONTROL ASPECTS, IT WOULD BE IN TROUBLE. FAILURE WOULD HAVE A WIDER IMPACT THAN SIMPLY IN THE FIELD OF TNF. ONLY THOSE WHO WERE STRONG COULD NEGOTIATE AND GUARANTEE PEACE.

6. VANDEN BOYNAENTS (BELGIUM), SPEAKING WITH SOME PASSION, SAID IT WAS ESSENTIAL TO AVOID THE MISTAKES WHICH HAD BEEN MADE OVER THE ERW (ERW) QUESTION: BUT HE WOULD PREDICT THE SAME WOULD HAPPEN OVER TNF MODERNISATION IF THE ALLIANCE WAS NOT CAREFUL. IT WAS ESSENTIAL FOR THE ALLIANCE TO DEVELOP ITS POLITICAL STRATEGY AS A BASIS FOR PUBLIC PRESENTATION OF THE ISSUES. THE MATTER WAS ALREADY IN THE PUBLIC DOMAIN. THERE WAS NO DOUBT THAT PUBLIC FEARS WOULD EMERGE AND THESE WOULD BE EXPLOITED BY THE RUSSIANS.

7. SCHOLTEN (NETHERLANDS) SAID THAT SALT 2 WOULD HAVE A BEARING ON THE QUESTION OF MODERNISATION AND ARMS CONTROL FOR TNF. HE REITERATED THE POINT HE MADE IN THE EUROGROUP THAT IT WOULD BE DISASTROUS IF A DECISION TO DEPLOY ERW COINCIDED WITH THE EFFORTS TO REACH A DECISION ON TNF MODERNISATION. MOREOVER, IN THE NETHERLANDS VIEW TNF MODERNISATION SHOULD NOT RESULT IN INCREASED ROLES /FOR

FOR NATO'S NUCLEAR FORCES. INDEED THEY CONSIDERED THAT NATO SHOULD STUDY WHETHER THE MODERNISATION OF ITS TNF WOULD NOT ALLOW LESS EMPHASIS TO BE PLACED ON SYSTEMS SUCH AS THOSE OF SHORTER RANGE. ON THE TIMING OF A DECISION, THE NETHERLANDS COULD NOT COMMIT HERSELF TO A FIXED SCHEDULE BUT WOULD ENDEAVOUR TO MEET THE END OF THE YEAR TARGET. HIS GOVERNMENT CONSIDERED THAT TNF MODERNISATION WAS NECESSARY BUT THAT IT WOULD BE OF THE GREATEST IMPORTANCE TO ACHIEVE AS CONCRETE AS POSSIBLE AN ARMS CONTROL APPROACH. HE AGREED WITH APEL THAT THE HLG AND SG SHOULD MEET TOGETHER.

8. HANSEN (NORWAY) ENDORSED EARLIER REMARKS ON THE NEED FOR A BROAD ALLIANCE CONSENSUS AND THE IMPORTANCE OF A COMPREHENSIVE MODERNISATION/ARMS CONTROL APPROACH. IT WOULD BE NECESSARY TO HAVE PROPOSALS FOR PARALLEL ARMS CONTROL MEASURES (PERHAPS TO BE CONSIDERED IN SALT 3) IN ORDER TO AVOID THE CHARGE THAT THE ALLIANCE WAS NOT READY TO NEGOTIATE IN EARNEST ON THESE MATTERS. NORWAY'S LONG STANDING POLICY ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS WOULD STAND; AND IN CONNECTION WITH RECENT PRESS SPECULATION HE WISHED TO SAY THAT THIS WOULD EXCLUDE THE DEPLOYMENT OF NUCLEAR SYSTEMS IN NORWEGIAN NAVAL VESSELS. HE UNDERLINED THAT PUBLIC SENSITIVITIES DIFFERED FROM COUNTRY TO COUNTRY.

9. FINALLY, IN RESPONSE TO A QUESTION FROM THE SECRETARY GENERAL AS TO WHETHER THE INCLUSION OF ALCMS IN NATO'S TNF MIX WOULD BE ADVANTAGEOUS POLITICALLY AND WITH PUBLIC OPINION, BROWN SAID THAT ALCMS WOULD APPEAR TO SOME SECTIONS OF PUBLIC OPINION AS THE SMALLEST CHANGE IN NATO'S WEAPON-MIX BUT THEY WERE PERHAPS THE MOST VULNERABLE TO A SOVIET ATTACK. HE WOULD NOT RULE OUT ANY KIND OF CRUISE MISSILE OR BALLISTIC MISSILES: DETAILED TECHNICAL DISCUSSIONS WERE NEEDED TO ARRIVE AT THE BEST MIX WHICH MIGHT INVOLVE DIFFERENT POSSIBILITIES IN DIFFERENT COUNTRIES IN VIEW OF THE DIFFERENT FACTORS FACED BY INDIVIDUAL NATIONS.

10. SEE MIFT FOR REMAINDER OF DISCUSSION.

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RECORD OF A MEETING BETWEEN THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH AFFAIRS AND THE DANISH FOREIGN MINISTER AT CHRISTIANSBORG CASTLE ON 17 MAY AT 9.15AM

Present:

The Rt Hon
The Lord Carrington PC
HE Miss A M Warburton
Mr M J E Fretwell
Mr G G H Walden
Mr D J E Ratford

Mr Henning Christophersen
Ambassador Eigil Jørgensen
Mrs Lise Østergaard
Ambassador Niels Ersbøll
Ambassador Ole Bierring
Ambassador Jens Christensen
Ambassador Peter Dyvig
Mr C Bo Bramsen
Mr H Schmiegelow

DEFENCE

1. Mr Christophersen said that he would like to mention the defence situation in the Nordic area. The Danes normally spoke of the "Nordic balance". But public opinion in a number of European and NATO countries was becoming preoccupied with the military situation, for example, in Northern Norway, and with the increasing Soviet military activity in that part of the Atlantic. Norway herself was concerned about the Soviet military build-up. This had been going on for some time in the Baltic too, and the Danes were naturally anxious. They understood that increased Soviet military activity in the Baltic was related to the development of the USSR as a global sea power. But they had mentioned their anxieties to the Russians many times in the last three or four years. Mr Christophersen had raised the subject with Mr Gromyko in New York last autumn, during a discussion on disarmament. He had advised Mr Gromyko to reduce Soviet military activities in the Baltic if the Russians wished to promote better relations between the two peoples. But this had not made much impression on Mr Gromyko.

2. All Nordic countries shared Danish concerns to some degree. But the Danes themselves would not change their defence policy, eg by accepting Finnish proposals for a new Nordic policy. Denmark had rejected these because of the problems they would create for the NATO Alliance. But discussion of the Finnish proposals would continue in the area.

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3. In response to a question from Lord Carrington, Mr Jørgensen said that increased Soviet activity had begun about five or seven years ago, though it had been less marked in the last two years. The Russians had been more active in the air as well as on the sea, and the result was that the warning time for Denmark had been reduced. The Danes felt more exposed than before, though they realised that these activities were not aimed specifically at them, but were part of a more general military build-up in the area. These developments were beginning to have their affect on public opinion.
4. Lord Carrington said he was puzzled by the Soviet attitude towards defence expenditure. It was odd that the Russians did not realise that enough was enough. Although this may seem a heretical thought, he himself suspected that pressures for increased military spending were built into the Soviet system, which was highly bureaucratised in this as in other areas. This was not to say that the situation described by the Danes did not have its dangers. Miss Warburton pointed out that it could also pay dividends by making public opinion more aware of the need to accept defence spending. Mr Christophersen confirmed this: public opinion polls on NATO were taken several times a year in Denmark, and the percentage favouring NATO membership had increased during the last two years for the first time since the early 1950s.
5. Lord Carrington said it had been suggested that Soviet actions may be in some measure a response to NATO's own attempts to repair its fences in the north, though he himself doubted this theory. He asked whether the Russians were trying to woo Norway away from NATO. Mr Christophersen said that they would not succeed in doing this. Norwegian public opinion was even more concerned than Danish opinion. The Norwegians had also been negotiating directly with the Canadians and the UK about earmarking more troops for Norway. Mr Jørgensen said that Soviet moves in the north were part of a wider pattern of attempts to divide Europe from the United States. He also speculated that the Kekkonen plan may have been genuinely Finnish and not necessarily inspired directly by the Russians.
6. Mrs Østergaard said that she was interested in Lord Carrington's remarks on the dynamics behind Soviet policy. The Soviet leaders were elderly and suspicious men. Soviet actions in the Nordic area should also be seen in the context of their world strategy. They were more active in Africa, the Middle East, the Far East and South East Asia, and were taking a more difficult line in East/West Relations. Lord Carrington agreed, but said that the Soviet leaders were cautious as well as old. When Mr Brezhnev disappeared, some of the younger people who might replace him could be more hawkish. There was something to be said for cautious old gentlemen.
7. Mr Christophersen agreed that the Soviet leaders were cautious, but thought that they were also prepared to be more hawkish if necessary. The Finns tended to anticipate Soviet pressures in their proposals and speeches. It was very important that the balance should not be upset by changes in Norwegian or Danish policy. Denmark

/was

was firmly opposed to special treaties or Kekkonen plans on nuclear weapons. They wished to keep a clear, sharp picture of their defence and foreign policy. The Swedes had a slightly different attitude but even they had been reluctant to respond to Finnish proposals. He thought that the military situation in the Nordic area would be discussed increasingly frequently in NATO and elsewhere.

8. On TNF modernisation, Mr Christophersen said that because of democratic pressures, Western Europe had failed to maintain a balance of conventional forces with the East. Instead, the West had tried to maintain superiority in strategic weapons, and by maintaining a high level of theatre nuclear weapons. If the Russians modernised their own theatre nuclear weapons, NATO would need to respond. He therefore understood the need to discuss eventual modernisation. But discussions on TNF arms control should proceed at the same time.

9. Lord Carrington said that it was difficult to discuss the control of weapons we did not yet possess. He also wished to say, for the Danes' ears only, that he thought the Americans were in danger of attaching disproportionate importance to SALT II. We were called upon to give a greater degree of support than the terms of the agreement warranted. But this in itself was a compulsion to support the treaty. His own view of SALT I was that it had been disadvantageous to the Americans, since it had allowed the Russians to catch up more quickly than they would otherwise have done. But he thought that SALT II would allow the Americans to take any necessary measures to maintain the effectiveness of their strategic nuclear deterrent. Our own main interest lay in cruise missiles and the transfer of nuclear technology, and we would be discussing this with the Americans. We must support SALT II though we would need to look closely at the terms of reference for SALT III. This was infinitely more important for Europe, and affected the modernisation of TNF. In this regard he hoped that the High Level Group would report soon.

10. Mr Christophersen said that when he had spoken of the importance of the arms control aspect of TNF, he had meant that we should consider carefully what the consequences of any decision on TNF modernisation would be for our arms control policy. If NATO decided to modernise TNF, it would be useful to be able to have an agreed line on arms control to put to the Russians. He asked whether it would be easier for the American Congress to ratify SALT if early decisions were taken on TNF modernisation? Lord Carrington said he doubted whether the timescale would fit. Mr Christophersen asked whether the UK foresaw the stationing of any modernised TNF on UK territory. Lord Carrington said that the stationing of nuclear weapons in the UK would be nothing new; we already had eg Vulcan bombers. Much would also depend on whether the new TNF were seaborne or airborne. But he would guess that the Germans would not consider the stationing of new TNF on UK soil as a sufficient incentive for them to agree to stationing in Germany. They wanted to share the burden with eg Belgium and Holland.

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Prime Minister

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DPC SPRING MEETING 1979.

1. THE SPRING MEETING OF THE NATO DEFENCE PLANNING COMMITTEE IN MINISTERIAL SESSION BEGAN AT NATO HQ IN BRUSSELS ON 15 MAY. THE DEFENCE MINISTERS OF ALL THE COUNTRIES PARTICIPATING IN THE DPC WERE PRESENT WITH THE EXCEPTION OF MR DANSON (CANADA).
2. THE MEETING OPENED WITH THE USUAL INTELLIGENCE BRIEFING BY THE IMS WHICH DREW ATTENTION TO CONTINUING INCREASES IN WARSAW PACT FORCES, WHOSE TECHNOLOGICAL SOPHISTICATION NOW ALSO RIVALLED THAT OF THE WEST. NO CHANGE WAS PERCEIVED OR EXPECTED IN SOVIET POLITICAL OBJECTIVES.
3. THE BRIEFING REVIEWED DEVELOPMENTS IN VARIOUS AREAS, WHICH TAKEN COLLECTIVELY WERE BOTH SIGNIFICANT AND DISTURBING. THE MOST SINGLE IMPORTANT DEVELOPMENT IN NUCLEAR FORCES WAS THE INCREASING DEPLOYMENT OF SS-20 MISSILE SYSTEMS THREATENING TARGETS IN WESTERN EUROPE. SOVIET GROUND FORCES HAD RECEIVED A WIDE RANGE OF MODERN WEAPON SYSTEMS. DEVELOPMENT OF NAVAL FORCES CONTINUED WITH THE PARTICULAR AIM OF PROJECTING POWER ABROAD FOR POLITICAL ENDS. MODERN AIRCRAFT WITH NEW WEAPONS WERE ALSO BEING INTRODUCED. IN THE FIELD OF AIR DEFENCE THE WARSAW PACT ENJOYED COMMONALITY OF EQUIPMENT, STANDARDISATION OF PROCEDURES AND MODERN EQUIPMENT.
4. THE BRIEFING ALSO REFERRED TO WARSAW PACT WEAKNESSES. NOT ALL MISSILE SILOES WERE HARDENED AND SUBMARINES WERE RELATIVELY NOISY. GROUND FORCES SUFFERED FROM OVER CENTRALISED COMMAND AND CONTROL AND LONG LINES OF COMMUNICATION. THE NAVY FACED IN PARTICULAR THE DISADVANTAGE OF A LACK OF MAJOR NAVAL ALLIES AND SUPPORT FACILITIES. IN AIR DEFENCE THE SOPHISTICATION OF EQUIPMENT ITSELF POSED MAINTENANCE PROBLEMS AND THERE WERE GAPS IN RADAR COVERAGE.

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5. ON THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC FRONT DETERIORATING RELATIONS WITH CHINA WERE NOTED. AFRICA AND THE MIDDLE EAST REMAINED LUCRATIVE TARGETS. INCREASES IN SOVIET DEFENCE EXPENDITURE OF 4-5 PERCENT A YEAR WERE EXPECTED TO CONTINUE. THERE WAS NO INDICATION THAT NON-SOVIET WARSAW PACT COUNTRIES WOULD NOT SUPPORT THE RUSSIANS IN THE EVENT OF EAST/WEST CRISIS.

6. A SEPARATE BRIEFING FOLLOWED ON THE NATO EXERCISE NORTHERN WEDDING HELD IN SEPTEMBER 1978. THIS HAD REVEALED SERIOUS WEAKNESSES IN THE ALLIANCE'S ABILITY TO OPERATE IN THE FACE OF SOVIET USE OF ELECTRONIC WARFARE (EW) WHICH DURING THE EXERCISE HAD CRITICALLY REDUCED DETECTION RANGES AND THE ABILITY OF NATO FORCES TO COMMUNICATE WITH EACH OTHER. IN WAR THE EW THREAT COULD BE EXPECTED TO BE EVEN MORE SEVERE. ALL THIS EMPHASISED THE IMPORTANCE OF THE PROGRAMMES RECOMMENDED BY TASK FORCE 7 OF THE LONG-TERM DEFENCE PROGRAMME (LTDP). MINISTERS COULD HELP BY ADDING THEIR WEIGHT TO THESE.

7. IN DISCUSSION, DR BROWN (US) AGREED WITH THE IMPORTANCE OF THE LTDP, BUT ADDED THAT WE SHOULD STRIVE FOR IMMEDIATE AND NOT JUST LONG TERM IMPROVEMENTS. THE SOVIETS CONCENTRATED ON THIS AREA AND WHAT NATO NEEDED WAS ACTUAL DEVELOPMENT, TRAINING PROCEDURES AND COOPERATION.

8. ITEM 2 ON THE AGENDA WAS THE CUSTOMARY STATEMENT BY THE CHAIRMAN OF THE MILITARY COMMITTEE (GENERAL GUNDERSEN, NORWAY) WHO BEGAN BY ANNOUNCING THE CHOICE OF ADMIRAL ROBERT FALLS (CANADA) AS HIS SUCCESSOR WITH EFFECT FROM 1 JULY 1980. CMC REFERRED TO THE FACT THAT THERE WAS NO SIGN OF REDUCTION IN WARSAW PACT MILITARY EFFORTS, AND TO THE PARTICULAR CONCERN OF THE MILITARY COMMITTEE AT THE IMBALANCE IN THEATRE NUCLEAR FORCES (TNF). MODERNISATION OF NATO'S OWN TNF WAS A FORMIDABLE TASK BUT THE INTELLIGENCE BRIEFING SUBSTANTIATED THE REQUIREMENT. HE WOULD SUPPORT ATTEMPTS TO LIMIT TNF LEVELS PROVIDED THAT THESE EFFORTS DID NOT IMPOSE RESTRAINTS ON NATO ALONE. CMC ALSO REFERRED TO THE RECENT WINTEX/CIMEX EXERCISE WHICH IN HIS VIEW WAS THE BEST OF ITS TYPE TO DATE. HE EXPRESSED THE HOPE THAT A SIMILAR EXERCISE COULD BE REPEATED IN 1981 WITH THE PARTICIPATION OF THE VITAL CIVILIAN AGENCIES. HE ADDED THAT A MAIN LESSON FROM THE EXERCISE WAS THE NEED FOR NATO TO FIND A MEANS OF COUNTERING ANY WARSAW PACT USE OF CHEMICAL WARFARE.

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9. REFERRING TO EVENTS BEYOND NATO BOUNDARIES CMC POINTED OUT THAT THE SITUATION HAD CHANGED SINCE NATO WAS ESTABLISHED: THE UK, FRANCE AND BELGIUM NO LONGER HAD THE COLONIAL POSSESSIONS AND THE SAME CONTROL OUTSIDE THE AREA WHICH THEY HAD HAD BEFORE. HE SUGGESTED THAT NATO HAD NOT TAKEN SUFFICIENT ADVANTAGE OF ITS CONSULTATIVE PROCESSES TO INFLUENCE EVENTS OUTSIDE THE NATO AREA. HE CALLED FOR MORE CONSULTATION; AND SUGGESTED THAT POSSIBLY ALSO THE COORDINATION OF THE ACTIVITIES OF INDIVIDUAL MEMBER NATIONS IN RELATIONS TO THE SITUATION OUTSIDE NATO'S BOUNDARIES WOULD BE JUSTIFIED. IT WAS VITAL TO SECURE THE ALLIANCE'S MARITIME LINES OF COMMUNICATION, AND SUPPLIES OF OIL AND RAW MATERIALS WHICH, IN HIS VIEW, WERE CLEARLY THREATENED. THE TIME HAD COME WHEN THE PROBLEM MUST BE FACED AND SOLUTIONS FOUND. FINALLY, CMC EXPRESSED HIS APPRECIATION TO THOSE COUNTRIES WHICH WERE ACHIEVING THE NATO AIM OF 3 PERCENT INCREASES IN ANNUAL DEFENCE SPENDING. HE CONCLUDED BY EXPRESSING THE VIEW THAT, GIVEN THE ACHIEVEMENTS IN THIS CONNECTION BY MANY COUNTRIES, ON BALANCE NATO HAD MADE PROGRESS COMPARED WITH THE POSITION THE YEAR BEFORE.

10. AT THE END OF THE STATEMENT BY CMC, VAN DEN BOYNAENTS (BELGIUM) STATED THAT HIS GOVERNMENT WERE READY TO AGREE THAT NAPMA (NATO AEW MANAGEMENT AGENCY) SHOULD BE LOCATED AT BRUNSUM IF THIS WAS FELT TO BE THE BEST SOLUTION. THIS STEP BY BELGIUM WAS WELCOMED BY THE SECRETARY GENERAL. CMC POINTED OUT THAT THE MILITARY COMMITTEE HAD EARLIER PROPOSED THAT PLAN DELTA (REVISED) SHOULD BE SUSPENDED AND SOUGHT CONFIRMATION THAT IT SHOULD NOW BE CANCELLED. THE SECRETARY GENERAL AGREED.

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Gene Minister

GM
16/11

MIPT: EUROGROUP MINISTERIAL MEETING.

THEATRE NUCLEAR FORCE

(TNF) MODERNISATION/GREY AREAS.

B.A.
15/11

1. AKMANDOR (TURKEY), FROM THE CHAIR, REVIEWED THE GROUND COVERED AT THE NPG. APEL (FRG) SAID THAT THE MEETING HAD BEEN AN IMPORTANT ONE. THE U S HAD SHOWN ITSELF READY TO ACCEPT ITS ROLE AS ALLIANCE LEADER AND NUCLEAR SUPER-POWER. BUT THE DECISION TO PRODUCE WOULD ONLY BE TAKEN IF THE ALLIANCE WAS READY AND ABLE TO ACCEPT THE WEAPONS AS A COLLECTIVE RESPONSIBILITY. PARTICIPATION AND DEPLOYMENT MUST BE AS BROADLY BASED AS POSSIBLE. THIS MEANT THAT THE HIGH LEVEL GROUP (HLG) MUST CONSIDER SEA-LAUNCHED AS WELL AS GROUND-LAUNCHED SYSTEMS.

2. TNF MODERNISATION WAS IMPORTANT BOTH FOR MILITARY REASONS, AS THE PRODUCTION AND DEPLOYMENT FOR SS20 AND BACKFIRE CONTINUED, AND FOR POLITICAL REASONS. NATO MUST PROVE THAT IT COULD TAKE COMMON DECISIONS: UNLESS IT COULD DO THIS, IT COULD NOT PRESENT ITSELF AS A CREDIBLE PARTICIPANT FOR THE SOVIET UNION IN ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS. IT WAS ESSENTIAL THAT THERE BE A DIRECT AND CLOSE LINKAGE BETWEEN DECISIONS ON TNF MODERNISATION AND ON THE ARMS CONTROL ASPECTS. THE ARMS CONTROL DIMENSION WAS NECESSARY NOT ONLY TO MAKE MODERNISATION ACCEPTABLE TO PUBLIC OPINION, BUT AS AN INTEGRAL PART OF NATO'S APPROACH TO THE PROBLEM FROM THE OUTSET. THE HLG SHOULD NOW PROCEED WITH THE ELABORATION OF A LIMITED NUMBER OF OPTIONS, AND AFTER THE SUMMER RECESS SHOULD COMBINE ITS SESSIONS WITH THE SPECIAL GROUP (SG) SO THAT THE REPORTS OF THE TWO GROUPS WOULD BE SO ALIGNED AS TO LEAD TO A COORDINATED SET OF DECISIONS. GREY AREA NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD BE INCLUDED IN SALT III. IT WOULD BE WRONG TO ADD THEM TO THE SUBJECT MATTER OF MBFR, AND A NEW FORUM WAS UNDESIRABLE.

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3. THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR DEFENCE EMPHASISED THE IMPORTANCE ~~ING~~ ATTACHED TO DEFENCE, AND THEIR INCREASING ANXIETY AT RECENT TRENDS IN THE BALANCE OF FORCES BETWEEN NATO AND THE WARSAW PACT. IT WAS VITAL TO MAINTAIN AN ADEQUATE DEGREE OF PREPAREDNESS. NATO'S NEXT 30 YEARS LOOKED LIKE BEING MUCH MORE DIFFICULT THAN THE LAST 30. HE ENDORSED WHAT APEL HAD SAID OF THE NEED FOR A COLLECTIVE APPROACH AND COMMON RESPONSIBILITY. TNF MODERNISATION WAS PERHAPS THE MOST IMPORTANT IMMEDIATE PROBLEM THAT NATO FACED. THE WORK OF THE HLG MUST GO HAND IN HAND WITH THAT OF THE SG: THE EFFECTIVENESS OF NATO'S DECISIONS ON TNF MODERNISATION WOULD CONDITION THE ALLIANCE'S ABILITY TO MOVE ON ARMS CONTROL. THE UK WOULD PLAY ITS FULL PART IN THE WORK AHEAD, AND IN THE SEARCH FOR DECISIONS. HE LOOKED FOR PROGRESS IN THE CRUCIAL AREA BY THE END OF THE YEAR.

4. SCHOLTEN (NETHERLANDS) THEN MADE FOUR POINTS:

(A) HE RE-EMPHASESED THAT THE NETHERLANDS ATTACHED THE SAME IMPORTANCE TO TNF MODERNISATION AS TO ARMS CONTROL:

(B) SALT WOULD HAVE TO BE "A REALITY" BEFORE ANY TNF DECISIONS COULD BE TAKEN:

(C) IT WOULD BE DISASTROUS IF DECISIONS HAD TO BE TAKEN ON TNF MODERNISATION AGAINST THE BACKGROUND OF A U S DECISION TO DEPLOY ERW:

(D) TNF MODERNISATION SHOULD ENABLE LESS EMPHASIS TO BE PLACED ON SHORTER RANGE SYSTEMS.

5. LAGACOS (GREECE) POINTED OUT THAT IT WOULD BE SOME YEARS BEFORE THE WEST COULD DEPLOY NEW SYSTEMS ONCE DECISIONS HAD BEEN TAKEN: HE POINTED TO THE PROBLEMS IN ARMS CONTROL TERMS OF TRADING PLANNED WESTERN SYSTEMS AGAINST EXISTING EASTERN ONES. APEL SAID THAT THE FIRST REQUIREMENT WAS A DECISION ON MODERNISATION. A FIRM WILL TO GO AHEAD WITH PRODUCTION AND DEPLOYMENT WAS THE PRECONDITION OF SUCCESSFUL NEGOTIATIONS. SUCH NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD NOT AIM AT A PARTIAL OR EUROSTRATEGIC PARITY, BUT AT OVERALL PARITY. THE RUSSIANS MUST BE CERTAIN THAT ONLY SUCCESSFUL NEGOTIATIONS COULD PREVENT NATO FROM DEPLOYING NEW SYSTEMS. HE AGREED WITH SCHOLTEN THAT THIS WAS THE WRONG TIME TO REVIVE THE ERW DEBATE: THE ERW WAS A BATTLE-FIELD WEAPON, AND WAS NOT NEEDED TO FILL ANY GAP IN THE CONTINUUM OF DETERRENCE.

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6. THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR DEFENCE ASKED HOW HE SHOULD UNDERSTAND SCHOLTEN'S REMARKS ON THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN A SALT II AGREEMENT AND TNF MODERNISATION. SALT II RATIFICATION MIGHT TAKE SOME TIME. SCHOLTEN SAID THAT HE HAD SAID AT THE NPG THAT HE COULD NOT COMMIT HIS GOVERNMENT ON THE TIMESCALE FOR DECISIONS. THE DUTCH HOPE THAT PROGRESS MIGHT BE POSSIBLE THIS YEAR HAD BEEN RELATED TO EXPECTATIONS ON SALT II. THE SIGNATURE OF A SALT II AGREEMENT WAS NOW IMMINENT, BUT THIS WAS NOT NECESSARILY THE SAME THING AS RATIFICATION.

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MR. CARTLEDGE


With your minute of 11th May you sent me your draft note of the Prime Minister's discussion with Chancellor Schmidt on nuclear matters.

I have a number of amendments to suggest. I think most of them are self-explanatory and do not affect the sense of the discussion. Some of them are purely technical (e.g. sometimes Schmidt used the phrase "ground launched missiles" clearly intending it to include Pershing IIs as well as GLCMs). The interesting points to get over are

- (i) the continued insistence on another non-nuclear weapon state being involved in deployment;
- (ii) the fact that Schmidt did not rule out SLCMs and indeed saw some political attraction in them;
- (iii) no mention however of ALCMs.

If however you have any doubts about my amendments, perhaps we could have a word.

Because my writing is messy in places I have had your note retyped: but I attach the original also so that you can see where the changes are.



(John Hunt)

15th May, 1979

PARTIAL RECORD OF THE PRIME MINISTER'S DISCUSSIONS WITH THE
FEDERAL GERMAN CHANCELLOR, HERR SCHMIDT, AT 10 DOWNING STREET
ON 11 MAY 1979 AT 1030

Present:

Prime Minister	HE Herr Helmut Schmidt
Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary	Herr Hans-Dietrich Genscher (Foreign Minister)
Chancellor of the Exchequer	Herr Matthofer (Minister of Finance)
Secretary of State for Defence	and officials
Lord Privy Seal	
and officials	

Nuclear Matters

[Following a discussion of SALT II, Chancellor Schmidt initiated a substantial exchange of views on Theatre Nuclear Forces in Europe and asked, at its conclusion, that it should not be recorded. The Prime Minister endorsed this and directed that the record should show only that "there was a discussion on nuclear weapons".]

Chancellor Schmidt said that, under the umbrella of talks on Theatre Nuclear Forces (TNF) modernisation, discussions were proceeding within the Alliance at official level on the future of nuclear weapons in Western Europe. Initially, this assessment had been confined to the high level military group which was considering what type or types of tactical and medium-range (which in Europe meant strategic) weapons should be stationed in Western Europe. These discussions had now been complemented by the meeting of the Special Group which was considering the arms control aspects of the question: and he thought it essential that these two sets of discussions should proceed in parallel. Defence Ministers had met recently in Florida and had envisaged a procedure by which, before the end of 1979, the NATO Council could take an integrated decision based on the conclusions of the high level and special groups. This was satisfactory but it needed to be given a political dimension. For example the military would always argue that GLCMs were more reliable than SLCMs but they ignored the fact that politically the latter might give rise to lesser problems.

Chancellor Schmidt went on to say that it would be difficult to help the United States, in any clearly defined way, to identify the goals of SALT III without a co-ordinated European view. It should be borne in mind that if the US/ Soviet Summit were to take place soon [news arrived during the meeting of the American announcement that the Summit was to take place in Vienna on 15/18 June/ President Carter and President Brezhnev might well cover a wide range of subjects including SALT III, MBFR, the CSCE follow-up meeting in Madrid, Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, the Middle East and Southern Africa. For his own part, he would welcome it if MBFR were to be given a push during the next few weeks. So far as SALT III was concerned, the FRG intended to ensure that she should not be singled out for the stationing of a new kind of nuclear weapon on her soil which would present a threat to the Soviet Union unless another non-nuclear weapon state within the Alliance did the same. Since 1945, there had been no nuclear weapons stationed on German soil which could reach Moscow. To put them on German soil alone would amount to a qualitative change in the FRG's defence procedure. The FRG already had 500,000 troops, well trained and of high quality, under arms, and was quite prepared to modernise this force further. The FRG would not, however, like anything to be done which would divide the FRG from her non-nuclear allies or create the misapprehension that the FRG was embarking on participation in the nuclear weapons field.

Lord Carrington said that the British Government shared the FRG view that there should be no public criticism of SALT II and that nothing should be done which could make things difficult for President Carter. The main UK interest was in the transfer of nuclear technology and the Government would be studying the final text of SALT II from that point of view. Lord Carrington said that he agreed that SALT III would be of vital importance to the West and to Europe in particular. He had been given the impression in Washington that SALT III would be a continuation of the long bilateral negotiation between the United States and the Soviet Union and this could become a permanent process. Europe should seriously consider whether it would be right to accept this. Lord Carrington said that he saw every advantage in the closest co-operation between the UK and the FRG in order to safeguard the European interest. He fully recognised the FRG's problems on the stationing of nuclear weapons. The Defence Secretary said that the urgent question

was TNF. Unless modernisation had been agreed upon it was pointless to discuss arms control measures. Serious risks would arise if the problem of TNF modernisation was not solved by the end of 1979. He had considered Chancellor Schmidt's suggestion that the work of the high level and special groups should be brought closer together and this was an interesting idea; but he still believed that it would be right to allow the high level group to reach its conclusions first. Perhaps the UK and the FRG should put Ministerial weight behind the high level group's activities and then endeavour to carry the Belgians, the Dutch and the Americans along with them. It would be important to consider very clearly the public opinion aspects of the TNF problem. Mr. Pym suggested that the Prime Minister and Chancellor Schmidt might instruct their Defence Ministers to take a more direct interest in the technical/military decisions of the high level group so that they would be in a stronger position in the special group.

The Prime Minister commented that the West had suffered a psychological defeat over the neutron bomb. She also found it hard to understand how the West had fallen from superiority to parity, and even inferiority, in the nuclear weapons field without really being aware of this. The full extent of the Soviet military build-up was now much more widely recognised in the UK and this would enable the Government to spend more on defence. The fact remained that NATO has no counter to the SS20 missile. The Government would be considering the question of a successor to the UK Polaris force. The Prime Minister asked Chancellor Schmidt if his position was that the FRG would not agree to the stationing of any new nuclear systems on her soil.

Chancellor Schmidt replied that if the Alliance were to decide that it would be necessary to have long-range ground-launched missiles as part of the TNF modernisation programme, the FRG could not agree to these being stationed only on Federal German soil. It would not be sufficient that these missiles might be stationed in the UK as well since nuclear weapons with the capacity to reach Moscow had always been deployed on British territory. It was essential that the FRG should not be the only non-nuclear power to have these weapons on her territory. Turning to the neutron bomb, Chancellor Schmidt

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said that he would like Lord Carrington and Mr. Pym to study exactly what had happened during that episode. He suggested that they should have a private talk with their German opposite numbers. Chancellor Schmidt added that he was not entirely persuaded by Mr. Pym's preference for allowing the high level group to reach its decisions on TNF modernisation before an integrated decision was attempted: and Lord Carrington agreed that Foreign Ministers had to be involved from the arms control aspect also.

It was noted that Mr. Pym and Herr Apel would meet in Brussels on 14 May: and it was agreed that both Mr. Pym and Lord Carrington would remain in close touch about these matters with their opposite numbers.

Chancellor Schmidt repeated if the outcome of TNF was proposals for deploying GLCMs or Pershing IIs this must be an Alliance decision and if Germany was to be involved in deployment she would want another non-nuclear weapon state involved also. No MRBMs under NATO control had been stationed on European soil since the late 1950s/early 1960s: they had been scrapped by the agreements between President Kennedy and Mr. Kruschev and Europe had thus had two decades without them. This reinforced the need to pay very close attention to the public opinion aspects of the question. The Soviet Union would do its best to arouse European opinion against the reintroduction of ground launched missiles, just as it had done with such success on the neutron bomb issue.

The Prime Minister agreed that the psychological battle was of great importance. The climate of opinion had now improved in the UK and, she thought, in the US: there had, however, been no such improvement in Belgium.

The discussion then turned to the political aspects of East/West relations.

11 May 1979

PARTIAL RECORD OF THE PRIME MINISTER'S DISCUSSIONS WITH THE
FEDERAL GERMAN CHANCELLOR, HERR SCHMIDT, AT 10 DOWNING STREET
ON 11 MAY 1979 AT 1030

Present:

Prime Minister	H.E. Herr Helmut Schmidt
Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary	Herr Hans-Dietrich Genscher (Foreign Minister)
Chancellor of the Exchequer	Herr Matthöfer (Minister of Finance)
Secretary of State for Defence	and officials
Lord Privy Seal	
and officials	

Nuclear Matters

[Following a discussion of SALT II, Chancellor Schmidt initiated a substantial exchange of views on Theatre Nuclear Forces in Europe and asked, at its conclusion, that it should not be recorded. The Prime Minister endorsed this and directed that the record should show only that "there was a discussion on nuclear weapons".]

Chancellor Schmidt said that, under the umbrella of talks on Theatre Nuclear Forces (TNF) modernisation, ^{discussions} ~~an assessment~~ _{at official level} ^{were} proceeding within the Alliance on the future of nuclear weapons in Western Europe. Initially, this assessment had been confined to the high level military group which was considering what type or types of tactical and medium-range (which in Europe meant strategic) weapons should be stationed in Western Europe. These discussions had now been complemented by the meeting of the Special Group which was considering the arms control aspects of the question: Finally, Defence Ministers had met recently in Florida and had envisaged a procedure by which, before the end of 1979, the NATO Council could take an integrated decision based on the conclusions of the high level and special groups.

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15-16
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This was satisfactory but it needed to be given a political dimension. For example the military had always argued that GERM's were more reliable than SGM's but ignores the fact that physically the latter might give rise to lesser problems.

/Chancellor Schmidt

Chancellor Schmidt went on to say that it would be difficult to help the United States, in any clearly defined way, to identify the goals of SALT III without a co-ordinated European view. It should be borne in mind that if the US/Soviet Summit were to take place soon [news arrived during the meeting of the American announcement that the Summit was to take place in Vienna on 15/18 June] President Carter and President Brezhnev ^{might well} ~~would~~ cover a wide range of subjects including SALT III, MBFR, the CSCE follow-up meeting in Madrid, Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, the Middle East and Southern Africa. For his own part, he would welcome it if MBFR were to be given a push during the next few weeks. So far as SALT III was concerned, the FRG intended to ensure that she should not be singled out for the stationing of ^{a new kind of} nuclear weapons on her soil, ^{which wd present a threat to the Soviet Union} ~~and she had no intention of being talked into this.~~ Since 1945, there had been no nuclear weapons stationed on German soil which could reach Moscow. To put them on German soil ^{alone} ~~now~~ would amount to a qualitative change in the FRG's defence procedure. The FRG already had 500,000 troops, well trained and of high quality, under arms, and was quite prepared to modernise this force further. The FRG would not, however, like anything to be done which ^{wd divide the FRG from her non-nuclear allies or} ~~could~~ create the misapprehension that the FRG was embarking on participation in the nuclear weapons field. ~~Now she is ready to accept the stationing~~

unless another non-nuclear weapon state within the Alliance did the same.

Lord Carrington said that the British Government shared the FRG view that there should be no public criticism of SALT II and that nothing should be done which could make things difficult for President Carter. The main UK interest was in the transfer of nuclear ^{technology} ~~weapons~~, e.g. the Cruise Missile, and the Government would be studying the final text of SALT II from that point of view. Lord Carrington said that he agreed that SALT III would be of vital importance to the West and to Europe in particular. He had been given the impression in Washington that SALT III would be a continuation of the long bilateral negotiation between the United States and the Soviet Union and this could become a permanent process. Europe should seriously consider whether it would be right to accept this.

/Lord Carrington

Lord Carrington said that he saw every advantage in the closest co-operation between the UK and the FRG in order to safeguard the European interest. He fully recognised the FRG's problems on the stationing of nuclear weapons. The Defence Secretary said that the ^{urgent question was TNF} crucial area was that of the TNFs. ^{Unless modernisation had been agreed upon it was possible to discuss arms control measures} Serious risks would arise if the problem of TNF modernisation was not solved by the end of 1979. He had considered Chancellor Schmidt's suggestion that the work of the high level and special groups should be brought closer together and this was an interesting idea; but he still believed that it would be right to allow the high level group to reach its conclusions first. Perhaps the UK and the FRG should put Ministerial weight behind the high level group's activities and then endeavour to carry the Belgians, the Dutch and the Americans along with them. It would be important to consider very clearly the public opinion aspects of the TNF problem. Mr. Pym suggested that the Prime Minister and Chancellor Schmidt might instruct their Defence Ministers to take a more direct interest in the technical/military decisions of the high level group so that they would be in a stronger position in the special group.

The Prime Minister commented that the West had suffered a psychological defeat over the neutron bomb. She also found it hard to understand how the West had fallen from superiority to parity, and even inferiority, in the nuclear weapons field without really being aware of this. The full extent of the Soviet military build-up was now much more widely recognised in the UK and this would enable the Government to spend more on defence. The fact remained that NATO had no counter to the SS20 missile. The Government would be considering the question of a successor to the UK Polaris force. The Prime Minister asked Chancellor Schmidt if his position was that the FRG would not agree to the stationing of ^{new nuclear systems} any ~~medium-range~~ missiles on her soil.

Chancellor Schmidt replied that if the Alliance were to decide that it would be necessary to have ^{long range} ground-launched ^{missile} MRBMs as part of the TNF modernisation programme, the FRG could not agree to these being stationed only on Federal German soil.

/It would not

It would not be sufficient that these missiles might be stationed in the UK as well since nuclear weapons with the capacity to reach Moscow had always been deployed on British territory. It was essential that the FRG should not be the only non-nuclear power to have these weapons on her territory. Turning to the neutron bomb, Chancellor Schmidt said that he would like Lord Carrington and Mr. Pym to study exactly what had happened during that episode. He suggested that they should have a private talk with their German opposite numbers. Chancellor Schmidt added that he was not entirely persuaded by Mr. Pym's preference for allowing the high level group to reach its decisions on TNF modernisation before an integrated decision was attempted: ✓

Lord Carrington agreed that former Ministers had to be involved from the arms control aspect also.

It was agreed that Mr. Pym and Herr Apel would meet in Brussels on 14 May: *it was agreed that both Mr. Pym & Lord Carrington will remain in close touch about these matters with their opposite numbers.*

Chancellor Schmidt went on to say that the main issue was *proposals for deploying GLBMs or cruise missiles (whether or not)* that of whether the Alliance needed a greater number of sea-launched missiles (SLBMs) or ground-launched ballistic missiles (GLBMs) with a longer range. *repeated if the means of TNF was Pershing II's this must be an Alliance or Perm decision and if Germany was to be involved this is deployment she would want another non-nuclear weapon state involved in this also.* If the Alliance had to rely on the latter, no country would volunteer to have them deployed on its territory. No MRBMs under NATO control had been stationed

on European soil since the late 1950s/early 1960s: they had been scrapped by the agreements between President Kennedy and Mr. Krushchev and Europe had thus had two decades without them. This reinforced the need to pay very close attention to the public opinion aspects of the question. The Soviet Union would do its best to arouse European opinion against the re-introduction of *ground launched missiles* GLBMs, just as it had done with such success on the neutron bomb issue.

The Prime Minister agreed that the psychological battle was of great importance. The climate of opinion had now improved in the UK and, she thought, in the US: there had, however, been no such improvement in Belgium.

The discussion then turned to the political aspects of East/West relations.

11 May 1979



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THE COMPLIMENTS OF THE
PRIVATE SECRETARY

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NOTE OF A MEETING BETWEEN
THE SECRETARY OF STATE AND THE GERMAN MINISTER OF DEFENCE
IN THE FRG DELEGATION, BRUSSELS
ON MONDAY 14TH MAY 1979 AT 5.30 PM

Present:

The Rt Hon Francis Pym MP
Secretary of State

Dr Hans Apel
Federal German Minister of Defence

HE Sir John Killick
United Kingdom Permanent
Representative to NATO

HE Mr Rolf Pauls
FRG Permanent Representative
to NATO

Mr M E Quinlan
DUS(P)

Dr W Stutzle
Head of the Planning Staff

Mr R L L Facer
PS/Secretary of State

General Tandecki
Colonel Kellern

Herr Apel asked how the increase in Armed Forces pay would be financed. Would it involve cuts in procurement? The Secretary of State said that it was not HMG's intention to meet the cost of the Forces' pay increase by cuts in the rest of the defence budget. The Government's economic policy involved changes in taxation and general restraint on public expenditure, but did not include cuts in defence expenditure. The previous Government had decided to give the Forces about two-thirds of the pay increase recommended by the independent Armed Forces Pay Review Body, while the Conservative party had, some nine months before taking office, committed themselves to paying in full whatever the Review Body recommended. The extra cost of the decision he had taken was £111M in a full year.

2. Herr Apel expressed surprise that other NATO countries were critical of the trilateral discussions on armaments co-operation when these discussions had made little progress. He looked

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forward to the next trilateral meeting in Bremen in early July. The Secretary of State said that trilateral meetings were necessary if progress was to be achieved.

Nuclear Matters

3. Herr Apel said that the Dutch condition that a decision on theatre nuclear force (TNF) modernisation should not be taken before SALT II was ratified created a problem, since he did not think that SALT II would be ratified before the end of the year. There would be value in a joint meeting of the High Level Group and the special group on arms control aspects later in the year when more progress had been made, with the aim of reaching a single decision on the whole question at the same time. It was important that the work of the two groups should be harmonised. In Germany this did not present difficulty since the same officials were responsible for both, but this was not true in all countries. Any decisions reached at the Nuclear Planning Group meeting in the autumn could only be provisional, especially as it was being held in the Netherlands. The subject would have to be discussed in the DPC and then in the North Atlantic Council with Defence Ministers present. It was important to reach a decision this year since there would be elections in both Germany and the United States next year. Delay was likely if the Dutch maintained their position. Though Mr Scholten did not contemplate using TNF modernisation simply as a bargaining counter in arms control, he wanted to see progress in the two issues in parallel in order to get TNF modernisation accepted by Dutch public opinion. He was an intelligent, brave and good Minister but he knew his public.

4. Sir John Killick asked whether sea-based TNF would be more acceptable to the smaller nations. Herr Apel said that though Mr Hansen had initiated a debate about sea-based systems the Norwegians would not accept new systems on their ships, which they regarded as part of their territory. DUS(P) said that the HLG had noted that sea-based systems would be expensive unless they were mounted on existing ships at the expense of NATO's conventional strength.

5. The Secretary of State asked which countries Germany had in mind as accepting land-based systems on their territory. Herr Apel said that Italy was a possibility, provided the Italians were not asked to provide money for them. There was no chance that the Scandinavian countries would accept them, although the Netherlands might if the following conditions were met: there should be no debate about the neutron weapon; there should be some reduction in the overall number of warheads in Europe (he commented that this was possible, especially if MBFR made progress); and if SALT II had been ratified. The difficulty

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was that the US Senate might ask the Alliance to modernise TNF as a precondition of ratification. Mr Pauls said that he thought the Belgian position was similar to the Italian. DUS(P) asked about the possibility of NATO infrastructure funding. Herr Apel said that the systems would have to be US-owned and manned. Germany would not accept double key systems which could reach Soviet territory: he had made this clear to Dr Brown, who accepted that the systems must be American. In that case common financing would not apply under ordinary rules. Dr Brown had told him that his provisional view was that if the Europeans accepted an increase in their conventional efforts then the US might finance these new systems themselves. The German position had been formulated that day in their Security Council. Britain and France should keep their present nuclear responsibilities, but any modernised TNF on German territory must be shared with some other - that is non nuclear - European nation. Sir John Killick asked whether Germany would like to see new British-owned nuclear weapons deployed on her territory. Herr Apel replied that he could not comment on a hypothetical question. DUS(P) asked whether it mattered to Germany what the United Kingdom chose to do. Herr Apel said that it did; he said that it would be a "minus" if the UK did nothing. Germany could not accept singularity among continental nations, not only for political reasons but also because the Russians would use it against her: all nations must accept responsibility. Sir John Killick asked whether any successor to the UK Polaris force would be relevant to TNF modernisation. Herr Apel replied that it certainly would. It was essential not to repeat the mistake of the Enhanced Radiation Weapon: firm decisions on production and deployment should be taken together. The Federal Security Council had decided that day that arms control negotiations on TNF must take place in SALT III in order to ensure a firm link with intercontinental systems. The negotiations should remain bilateral between the United States and the Soviet Union but Europeans should consider urgently, first nationally and then jointly how the machinery for NATO consultation could be improved. The Americans were still reluctant to include TNF in SALT III but the German position was that there must be only one negotiation, though perhaps taking place in several parts. The resulting situation must be one of overall balance over the whole range of Euro-strategic and intercontinental systems, with the aim of achieving global parity. As he had told Dr Brown, recent American action had changed the character of NATO since, for the first time, the Americans were trying to get a NATO consensus before taking their own decision. The Americans could not ask the Europeans to accept responsibility and then fail to consult them closely.

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Sir John Killick commented that the US objective was further reductions in intercontinental weapons for which they might be prepared to pay a price in TNF. Herr Apel agreed: it was for this reason that arms control negotiations on TNF must take place in SALT III. In answer to a question Herr Apel said that the French did not wish to take part in SALT III.

6. The meeting ended at 6.30 pm.

Secretary of State's Office

16th May 1979

HE Sir John Killick,
HM Ambassador, UKDEL NATO
HE Sir J Oliver Wright
HM Ambassador, Bonn
PS/Prime Minister
PS/Foreign and Commonwealth
Secretary
PS/Secretary of the Cabinet

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И 7 MAY 1979



END

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