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
IRELAND

(Taioseach's visits to UK)

(Part 1)

573
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PREM 19/79



SECRET
PART 1

Confidential Filing

Ireland

Part 1

May 1979

Visits to the U.K by the
Taoiseach. (Mr Lynch).

Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date
6.5.79							
10.5.79							
11.5.79							
15.5.79							
16.5.79							
30.5.79							
31.8.79							
3.9.79							
4.9.79							
6.9.79							
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PREM/79

PART 1 ends:-

Tel 260 from Dublin 6.9.79

PART 2 begins:-

Home Sec to PM 3.3.80

Ireland

(26)

IMMEDIATE

(21)

NORTHERN IRELAND: ADVANCE COPIES

PS

PS/SIR I GILMOUR

PS/PUS

~~MR FERGUSON~~ *MR. BULLARD*

Lord N Gordon-Lennox

HD/RID

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HD/OID (2)

NEWS DEPT

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~~RESIDENT OFFICE~~

N IRELAND OFFICE - PS TO SEC OF STATE
RM 66 A/2 GGS

N IRELAND OFFICE [4 copies]

SIR B CUBBON

MR JANES

MR MARSHALL

MR W J A INNES

CABINET OFFICE - SIR J HUNT

Mr R Wade-Jery

DIO

NO 10 DOWNING STREET

Mr Lynch appears to have kept, so far, his side of the agreement on the presentation of the meeting.

Prime Minister

Am: 6/9

Two

UNCLASSIFIED

FM DUBLIN 061055Z SEPTEMBER 79

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 260 OF 6 SEPTEMBER

AND TO IMMEDIATE NIO BELFAST

INFO ROUTINE WASHINGTON, BIS NEW YORK, MODUK

MEETING BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER AND MR LYNCH :
PRESS REACTIONS

1. YESTERDAY'S MEETING BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER AND MR LYNCH FOLLOWING THE CEREMONIAL FUNERAL OF LORD MOUNTBATTEN, IS THE LEAD STORY AND ATTRACTS EDITORIAL COMMENT IN ALL THREE DUBLIN DAILIES. THE TONE OF THE REPORTS IS FAIRLY LOW-KEY, REFLECTING THE LACK OF DETAILED INFORMATION RELEASED TO THE PRESS. IT IS ACKNOWLEDGED THAT DISCUSSIONS ABOUT WAYS OF IMPROVING SECURITY COOPERATION DOMINATED THE MEETING, AND THERE IS SOME DISAPPOINTMENT THAT MR LYNCH APPEARS TO HAVE MADE

IS SOME DISAPPOINTMENT THAT MR LYNCH APPEARS TO HAVE MADE LITTLE PROGRESS IN PRESSING FOR A NEW POLITICAL INITIATIVE. HOWEVER, IT IS GENERALLY AGREED THAT THE MEETING WAS CONDUCTED ON A FRIENDLY BASIS: THE IRISH TIMES QUOTES MR LYNCH AS SAYING: "I AM PERFECTLY SATISFIED THAT THERE HAS BEEN NO CHANGE IN THE STANDARD, THE LEVEL OR THE CORDIALITY OF RELATIONS BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES". THE REPORTS INDICATE THAT MR LYNCH RULED OUT ANY QUESTION OF "HOT PURSUIT" BY BRITISH SECURITY FORCES OVER THE BORDER AND HE ALSO REFUSED TO GIVE WAY ON THE EXTRADITION ISSUE.

2. THE EDITORIAL COMMENT IS SUBDUED. THE IRISH INDEPENDENT SUMS UP THE OUTCOME OF THE MEETING AS FOLLOWS: "NO POLITICAL INITIATIVE FOR THE TIME BEING, MORE COOPERATION BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES AND A TIGHTENING UP OF SECURITY MEASURES". THE IRISH TIMES ADOPTS A SLIGHTLY MORE SCEPTICAL AIR: "NOTHING SUBSTANTIAL YET APPEARS TO HAVE EMERGED FROM THE MEETING". THE EDITORIAL SUGGESTS THAT BOTH SIDES CAN PUT THEIR OWN GLOSS ON THE AGREED COMMUNIQUE, AND CONCLUDES WITH THE FAMILIAR THOUGHT THAT "A THOUSAND SECURITY INITIATIVES WILL NOT BRING A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT".

3. THE IRISH PRESS EDITORIAL, HEADLINED "LITTLE JOY FROM DOWNING STREET", APPEARS PARTICULARLY DOWNCAST: "THE TAOISEACH WAS AT A HEAVY PSYCHOLOGICAL DISADVANTAGE COMING INTO DOWNING STREET ON THE AFTERNOON OF THE FUNERAL OF ONE OF THE MOST ILLUSTRIOUS MEMBERS OF THE BRITISH ROYAL FAMILY KILLED BY IRISH ASSASSINS". IT CLAIMS THAT "IT WAS OBVIOUSLY A STERN UPHILL FIGHT TO TRY TO ADVANCE THE NEED FOR DEALING WITH THE CAUSE OF THE SITUATION WHICH PRODUCED LORD MOUNTBATTEN'S MURDER RATHER THAN THE EFFECTS". THE EDITORIAL SUGGESTS THAT WHAT SEEMS TO BE EMERGING FROM THE MEETING IS AN EFFORT TO IMPLEMENT THE CRIMINAL LAW JURISDICTION ACT WHICH WILL INVOLVE, PRESUMABLY, "TRYING TO FIND SOME FORMULA TO ENGAGE THE SECURITY FORCES OF NORTHERN IRELAND IN THESE CASES SINCE, WITHOUT THEIR EVIDENCE IT IS HARD TO SEE HOW CASES CAN BE BROUGHT UNDER THIS LAW". THE IRISH PRESS BITTERLY CONCLUDES THAT MR LYNCH, AFTER A MORNING SPENT IN UNDERGOING THE POWERFUL EMOTIONAL EFFECT OF BRITISH STATE CEREMONIAL AT ITS MOST IMPRESSIVE, WAS FACED "WITH THE SOUL DESTROYING TASK OF TRYING TO GET THE VISION AND WILL REQUIRED FOR A POLITICAL SOLUTION FROM A GOVERNMENT IMPLACABLY BENT ON SEEING IT AS A SECURITY MATTER ONLY".



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Principal Private Secretary

Ireland
cc M. Vile (C.O.)

6 September 1979

*Dear Howard,*VISIT OF THE TAIOSEACH, 5 SEPTEMBER 1979

When the Prime Minister saw Mr. Lynch yesterday she suggested to him during their *tete-a-tete* discussion that, as part of the general effort to improve co-operation in the security field between the British and Irish authorities, you should meet your Irish opposite number to identify ways in which the Garda and the Security Service can work even more closely together than now to obtain and exchange intelligence. Mr. Lynch agreed that such a meeting should take place.

You should know that the Prime Minister did not raise with Mr. Lynch the question of the political inhibitions that had limited what the two services have hitherto been able to accomplish together. Nor did she mention the possibility of the appointment of a member of the Security Service to our Embassy in Dublin, and of a similar appointment of a member of the Garda to London.

The Prime Minister and Mr. Lynch did not discuss how soon you and your opposite number should report on the outcome of your study of ways in which co-operation should be improved. But as you will see from the record of the plenary meeting, a copy of which is being sent to you separately, it was agreed that British and Irish Ministers should meet in about three weeks' time to take stock of the progress achieved in the follow-up on the various other proposals for greater Anglo/Irish security co-operation which were discussed yesterday. I suggest that you and your Irish colleague work to the same time scale.

We shall also be sending you separately, for your information, a copy of the record of the *tete-a-tete* discussion between the Prime Minister and Mr. Lynch. Because of its sensitivity I have not included in that record any mention of what the two Prime Ministers agreed about your meeting with your Irish opposite number.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Brian Cubbon at the Northern Ireland Office.

Yours sincerely,

Sir Howard Smith, KCMG

Chris Chubb

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10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

6 September 1979

Visit of the Irish Prime Minister

I enclose records of the tete-a-tete discussion between the Prime Minister and the Irish Prime Minister here yesterday and of the plenary session which took place after the tete-a-tete.

I am sending copies of this letter and its enclosures to John Chilcot (Home Office), Roy Harrington (Northern Ireland Office), Bill Beckett (Law Officers' Department), Martin Vile (Cabinet Office) and Sir Howard Smith.

M. O'D. B. ALEXANDER

G.G.H. Walden, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

6 September 1979

DISCUSSION BETWEEN THE FOREIGN AND COMMON-
WEALTH SECRETARY AND THE IRISH FOREIGN
MINISTER

After the lunch given yesterday by the Prime Minister for the Irish Prime Minister, the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary had an informal discussion with the Irish Foreign Minister. I enclose a record of the points made. I may have missed one or two details since I had to absent myself from the discussion on two occasions but I do not have the impression that any point of major substance was raised while I was away.

M. O'D. B. ALEXANDER

G. G. H. Walden, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

6 September 1979

MEETING WITH THE IRISH PRIME MINISTER

As you know, the Prime Minister gave a working lunch for the Irish Prime Minister yesterday. The discussion dealt with Community subjects. I enclose a record.

I am sending copies of this letter and its enclosure to Tony Battishill (H.M. Treasury), Roy Harrington (Northern Ireland Office) and Martin Vile (Cabinet Office).

M. D. B. ALEXANDER

G. G. H. Walden Esq
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

[Handwritten signature]

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JOINT STATEMENT BY THE PRIME MINISTER
AND THE TAOISEACH ISSUED FROM 10 DOWNING
STREET AT 18.15 ON WEDNESDAY 5 SEPTEMBER 1979

The Prime Minister, the Rt Hon Margaret Thatcher MP, had discussions today 5 September at No 10 Downing Street with the Taoiseach, Mr John Lynch TD, who was accompanied by Mr George Colley TD, Tanaiste and Minister of Finance and Mr Michael O'Kennedy TD, Minister for Foreign Affairs. The Rt Hon The Lord Carrington, Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, and the Rt Hon Humphrey Atkins MP, Secretary of State for Northern Ireland were present. The talks were preceded by a working lunch also attended by the Chancellor of the Exchequer, the Rt Hon Sir Geoffrey Howe QC, MP and by the Lord Privy Seal, the Rt Hon Sir Ian Gilmour Bt MP.

The talks took place in the context of Anglo-Irish relations, the European Community and international developments generally. The Taoiseach and the Prime Minister agreed on their determination to stamp out terrorism. They agreed that recent events require that the present extensive co-operation between the authorities of the two countries must now be substantially improved. For this purpose a number of suggestions were made by both governments which will now be actively followed up. There will be a further meeting at Ministerial level in about three weeks to review the progress which has been made in the development of these proposals.

The Prime Minister and the Taoiseach exchanged views about the prospects for political movement in Northern Ireland. The Prime Minister confirmed that Her Majesty's Government's policy was to seek an acceptable way of restoring to the people of Northern Ireland more control over their own affairs; Her Majesty's Government would make moves to that end at the appropriate time. The Taoiseach indicated the need for any form of administration in Northern Ireland to be acceptable to both sides of the community there.

On European Community affairs, matters likely to be raised under the presidency of Mr Lynch at the European Council in Dublin in November were discussed.

Both Prime Ministers agreed to maintain regular contact.

(DRAFT?)
COMMUNIQUE

Both sides expressed their determination to do all within their power to stamp out terrorism. They agreed (the Prime Minister made clear her view) that the achievement of this objective required an equal effort by both Governments and that greater cooperation between them was essential in order to make the necessary progress. The Prime Minister accordingly raised with the Taoiseach the specific security measures set out below which would make the fight against terrorism more effective. All the steps which HM Government are asking the Irish Government to introduce are ones which they are themselves ready to take in return: some of the measures are in fact already being implemented by the British security forces; and the others HM Government would be ready to put into force on a reciprocal basis if the Irish authorities introduced them.

RESTRICTED



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

5 September 1979

Dear Michael,

Visit of the Taoiseach: 5 September

I wrote to you yesterday about the arrangements for the Taoiseach's visit. The Irish Embassy have informed us of a further increase in the size of their delegation. A revised list is attached.

You should know that the Irish will probably wish to substitute Mr Maurice Horgan (Department of Finance) for Mr O'Rourke at the Prime Minister's lunch. We have indicated that this would not cause any difficulty.

I am sending copies of this letter to Tony Battishill (Treasury), Joe Pilling (NIO) and Martin Vile (Cabinet Office).

Yours ~~as~~

Paul Lever

M O'D B Alexander Esq
10 Downing Street

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IRISH GOVERNMENT DELEGATION

Ø	Mr J Lynch TD	-	An Taoiseach
Ø	Mr G Colley TD	-	Tánaiste, Minister for Finance and Minister for the Public Service
Ø	Mr M O'Kennedy TD	-	Minister for Foreign Affairs
Ø	Mr A O'Rourke	-	Secretary, Department of Foreign Affairs
Ø	Mr A Ward	-	Secretary, Department of Justice
/	Mr M Horgan	-	Second Secretary, Department of Finance
Ø	Dr E L Kennedy	-	Irish Ambassador in London
Ø	Mr D Nally	-	Deputy Secretary, Taoiseach's Office
Ø	Mr D Neligan	-	Assistant Secretary, Department of Foreign Affairs
Ø	Mr M J Donnelly	-	Assistant Secretary, Department of Justice
Ø	Mr W Kirwan	-	Assistant Secretary, Taoiseach's Office
Ø	Mr F Dunlop	-	Government Press Secretary
Ø	Mr S O'hUiginn	-	Counsellor, Department of Foreign Affairs
	Mr B McCarthy	-	Private Secretary to the Taoiseach
	Aide-de-Camp		
	2 Security Officers		

Total: 17

*Mrs Lynch will be accompanying the Prime Minister to London

ØAttending plenary session (Total: 13)

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Ireland (sitⁿ) FCO (8)

NOTE OF A PLENARY MEETING BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER AND THE
TAOISEACH, MR. J. LYNCH, T.D., AT No. 10 DOWNING STREET ON
WEDNESDAY 5 SEPTEMBER 1979 AT 1600

PRESENT

Prime Minister	An Taoiseach - Mr. J. Lynch TD
Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary	Mr. G. Colley (Tánaiste, Minister for Finance and Minister for the Public Service)
Secretary of State for Northern Ireland	Mr. M. O'Kennedy (Minister for Foreign Affairs)
Attorney General (for part of the time)	Mr. A. O'Rourke (Secretary, Department of Foreign Affairs)
H.E. Mr. W. R. Haydon	Mr. A. Ward (Secretary, Department of Justice)
Sir B. Cubbon	Mr. M. Horgan (Second Secretary, Department of Finance)
Mr. R. L. Wade-Gery	H.E. Dr. E. L. Kennedy (Irish Ambassador in London)
Mr. E. A. J. Fergusson	Mr. D. Nally (Deputy Secretary, Taoiseach's Office)
Mr. C. A. Whitmore	Mr. D. Nelligan (Assistant Secretary, Department of Foreign Affairs)
Mr. Ian Gow, M.P.	Mr. M. J. Donnelly (Assistant Secretary, Department of Justice)
Mr. H. James	Mr. W. Kirwan (Assistant Secretary, Taoiseach's Office)
Mr. M. O'D. B. Alexander	Mr. F. Dunlop (Government Press Secretary)
	Mr. S. O'Huiginn (Counsellor, Department of Foreign Affairs)
	Mr. B. McCarthy (Private Secretary to An Taoiseach)

The Prime Minister began the meeting by summarising the views that she had put to Mr. Lynch in the course of their tête-à-tête meeting. Events in the previous week had given both Governments a new opportunity. Both Prime Ministers were agreed that public opinion in their countries wanted terrorism stamped out. Whatever had been done in the past, it had not been enough. Law-abiding

/citizens

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citizens had to be given protection. Mr. Atkins would take a political initiative in Northern Ireland when he was ready to do so but this would not of itself stop terrorism. Other things could and should be done.

The Prime Minister stressed that everything for which she had sought Mr. Lynch's agreement she was ready to do herself. Reciprocity would be complete. Her proposals had been:-

- (a) - and most importantly - that facilities should be made available for the RUC to question suspected terrorists, in the presence of Gardai, in police stations in the Republic. This should be of considerable assistance in enabling both Governments to convert evidence into convictions;
- (b) that British Army helicopters should be allowed to conduct surveillance patrols within a zone 10-15 kilometres south of the border. Identical facilities would be extended to helicopters from the Republic operating north of the border;
- (c) that Gardai anti-terrorist patrols of the type recently discontinued in County Monaghan should be resumed;
- (d) that a Gardai liaison officer should be attached to the Headquarters of the RUC. HMG would be happy to appoint a RUC liaison officer in the reverse direction;
- (e) that Mr. Atkins and his opposite number, together with the heads of their respective police forces, should meet soon to ensure that words were translated into deeds;
- (f) that HMG should give any help the Irish Government thought useful with training relevant to the defeat of the terrorists.

/The Prime Minister

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The Prime Minister pointed out that HMG had in recent years given ample evidence of its willingness to extradite individuals, including British citizens, in the effort to stamp out terrorism. She mentioned the Littlejohn case and also the recent extradition agreement with the Federal Republic. She regarded the extradition issue as of major importance. The Prime Minister concluded by saying that no political initiative would deter the PIRA and the INLA unless measures like those which she had summarised were implemented.

Mr. Lynch said that the Prime Minister's summary had been an accurate one. He and Mrs. Thatcher were agreed that it was in the interests of both countries to stamp out completely this particularly evil form of terrorism. He noted that there was a significant economic cost to terrorism in loss of tourism and retardation of investment. Irish Governments had had to deal with the IRA for many years. The Offences Against the State Act had been passed in 1939 and strengthened in 1972. The Irish people had been as horrified as the British by the murder of Earl Mountbatten.

Turning to the specific proposals made by Mrs. Thatcher, Mr. Lynch said that the high degree of co-operation between the two Governments in dealing with terrorism had always been acknowledged. However, good though it might have been, it had not been ^{as} successful as might have been hoped. This needed to be looked into. On extradition, Mr. Lynch said the Irish Government could not make an agreement such as that which the UK had just concluded with the Federal Republic. It would be against the Irish Constitution. In any case a number of other EEC countries did not extradite their own nationals and some had reservations where political offences were concerned. The Irish Government would be signing the new EEC agreement on extradition shortly. In relation to the Littlejohn case, Mr. Lynch commented that the Irish Attorney General had had to swear an affidavit in the United Kingdom, before the extradition had been approved, that no political charge would be made against Littlejohn.

/Mr. Lynch said

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Mr. Lynch said that the incidence of terrorism on the border had been exaggerated. Far more of the incidents took place deep inside the Province than took place on the border. Hot pursuit was essentially a naval concept and would cause considerable problems if implemented in the border context. Over-flying of the Republic by helicopters was at present only possible when advance notice was given. Absence of this notice would give rise to difficulties. As regards hot pursuit on the ground, Mr. Lynch commented that so far as he knew terrorist crimes had seldom, if ever, been witnessed in a way that had permitted a pursuit which had subsequently been halted at the border.

Mr. Lynch also foresaw difficulties over the presence of the RUC in police stations south of the border. It was possible that sources of information at present available to the Gardai would dry up. Members of the RUC visiting the south in these circumstances might be exposed to physical danger. Mr. Lynch said he was not aware of the withdrawal of the Gardai unit which had been operating in County Monaghan. But he noted that the increase in other forms of terrorist activity, e.g., in robbing banks, had forced his Government to pull some people back from the border. Liaison between the Gardai and the RUC was already very highly developed. If more meetings were required this would cause no difficulty.

Mr. Lynch said that he agreed that a meeting between responsible Ministers should take place at an early date. On the Irish side Mr. O'Kennedy would participate because of the importance the Irish Government attached to the preservation of the political dimension. It might be difficult to achieve progress in the political sphere but progress was required. Mr. Lynch could see no reason why Ministers should not meet as regularly as they liked.

As regards the presentation of the outcome of his meeting with the Prime Minister, Mr. Lynch agreed that there must be some indication that an advance had been made. He agreed that words would not suffice. But he hoped that no details would be made public. Progress in the fields of security and intelligence could only be made if secrecy was maintained. He intended to refrain from saying or publishing anything specific.

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The Prime Minister stressed that the proposed meeting between the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland and the Irish Foreign Minister would have no point unless it reviewed the security initiatives discussed by her and Mr. Lynch. The Ministers should monitor things that were happening. If this were not going to be possible, it would be better to be frank about the absence of progress. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary said that the Prime Minister had put forward a number of suggestions for new anti-terrorist measures: did Mr. Lynch have any ideas of his own to propose?

Mr. Lynch said that his proposals would depend on the receipt of advice from his experts. He was not himself familiar with the border. However, he had encouraged co-operation in every way and intended to continue doing so. He saw some risk of confusion if there were too many cross-border links. However, he would have no objection if the Armies on either side of the border were to communicate with each other direct in situations of real urgency. He did not know if there were any technical difficulties, e.g. about reception, with such communications, but he was sure something could be worked out. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary said that the British and Irish Governments had been co-operating for the last nine years but that they were still not winning the battle against the terrorists. The recent incidents were horrifying in their political as well as their human implications. There must be more that could be done if the two Governments had the will. The Prime Minister stressed that she would be unable to restrain public opinion in this country if, having agreed on the threat, she and Mr. Lynch were unable to point to anything new that would be done.

Mr. Lynch said that it was his understanding that the military and police presence immediately to the north of the border was not as intense as that to its south. In South Armagh, the Army remained 10 miles back from the border. Mr. Colley said that the Irish Government had 2,000 men on the border dealing with people as they crossed it. British troops and policemen in the border areas were not close enough to deal with cross-border incidents as they occurred. In many areas there were long intervals between visits by Army patrols. It was difficult for

/the Irish

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the Irish Government to explain to its citizens in border areas the absence of a continuous British security presence on the other side. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary said that what was at issue was a difference in tactics in dealing with terrorists and that the discussion was unlikely to prove fruitful.

The Prime Minister asked whether the Irish side were prepared to get down to brass tacks or whether they were in fact refusing to agree to the proposals she had made and specifically to that relating to helicopter flights. Mr. O'Kennedy said that the Irish authorities agreed automatically when a request for a helicopter over-flight was received. Blanket clearance of the kind proposed by the Prime Minister would require legislation and public debate in the Dail. The consequence of such debate could be damaging. However, this was the first time the Irish Government had heard that the present practice of over-flights was unsatisfactory. Perhaps the area in which the helicopters were at present operating could be extended. Consideration could also be given to authorising a specific number of flights in a specific period. The political will to improve co-operation existed but the Irish authorities would not wish to advertise what they were doing.

Turning to the question of making it possible for RUC officers to question suspects in police stations in the Republic, the Prime Minister said that the expert and informed questioning which this would make possible would assist in the vital process of turning intelligence into evidence that could be used in Court. It would increase the chances of securing convictions. This was more important in that the Irish Government still saw difficulties with the extradition of its subjects. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary explained why HMG thought that RUC officers were more likely to secure confessions from those suspected of committing offences in the North. The Attorney General pointed out that RUC officers were so familiar with the situation in the North that suspects under interrogation frequently gave them valuable information inadvertently. Mr. Colley enquired whether the Courts in Northern Ireland would accept evidence obtained by a member of the Gardai in an RUC station. He said that the Irish Attorney General had expressed doubt about the admissibility in an Irish Court of

/evidence obtained

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evidence obtained by an RUC officer in the South. The Attorney General said that there would be no problem about admissibility in the North provided the judge accepted that the statement was obtained voluntarily. Mr. Lynch said that he would wish to check with the Gardai whether they would be prepared to agree to the British proposal. As he had said earlier, it was possible that the presence of RUC officers in Gardai stations would be counter-productive but he would certainly consider the idea further: perhaps the Chief Constable and the Gardai Commissioner could examine it together.

The Prime Minister enquired why the special Gardai unit which had been operating in County Monaghan had been withdrawn. Mr. Ward said that the unit had been withdrawn because the Gardai had felt that its operations were unsuccessful. The Prime Minister said that there had been less trouble to the north of the border while it was operating. Mr. Lynch said that he would have the question looked at again. He also agreed that liaison between the RUC and the Gardai should be re-examined with a view to seeing whether it could not be further improved. The Prime Minister repeated that HMG were keen to offer any assistance in the training field that the Irish authorities would think useful. Contact between the Gardai and Scotland Yard might, for instance, be increased. Mr. Lynch agreed that this might be followed up when Ministers met at the end of the month.

In the course of a brief discussion of the political dimension, Mr. Colley said that while he agreed a political initiative would not of itself inhibit the terrorists, security initiatives would not on their own be sufficient. The uncommitted on both sides of the border needed a lead. The Prime Minister said that she was well aware of the importance of giving a political lead. It was her intention to give the local people in Northern Ireland more responsibility. When proposals to this end were introduced she would not wish any group in Northern Ireland to have the power of veto over them. Mr. Lynch said that the consent of all substantial groups in Northern Ireland would be required for an initiative. A proposal concerned solely with local government would be unacceptable to the SDLP. The Prime Minister repeated that at some stage HMG would wish to put forward a proposal and would wish to make it

/clear that

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clear that no group had a veto over it. Mr. Lynch agreed that this was reasonable. There was then some discussion about the meaning of the phrase "general consent" in the Northern Ireland context. Mr. Colley attempted to argue that Northern Ireland was an artificial creation and adduced as evidence the fact that there had never been a change of Government in Stormont. He did not deny it when the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary pointed out that there were many states in the world whose creation might, for one reason or another, be said to be artificial but whose existence was nonetheless a fact.

In a discussion of the line to be taken with the press, radio and television after the meeting, Mr. Lynch was insistent both that no specific proposals should be mentioned and that it should appear that those proposals which were discussed had emanated from both sides. He wanted the communiqué to stress that both Governments were anxious to stamp out terrorism and that co-operation was already good but that more could be done. He anticipated that he would be pressed about specific proposals since these had already been widely discussed in the British press. But he was determined to refrain from giving detailed replies. He hoped that the British side would do likewise. The Prime Minister said that she saw no difficulty in saying nothing.

Following discussion of, and agreement on, the communiqué the meeting broke up at 1745 hours.

Paul

5 September 1979

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cc

Lebanon (sitn)
Overseas Aid (Lomé)
Vietnam Refugees
Sport (S. Africa)

NOTE OF A DISCUSSION AT NO. 10 DOWNING STREET ON WEDNESDAY, 5
SEPTEMBER 1979 AT 1445

PRESENT

Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary
Mr. M. D. M. Franklin
Mr. M. O'D. B. Alexander

Mr. M. O'Kennedy (Minister for
Foreign Affairs)

Mr. A. O'Rourke (Secretary,
Department of Foreign
Affairs)

The Middle East

The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary said that he thought the French might be proposing an initiative by the Nine on the situation in the Lebanon. He was inclined to agree that an initiative was required. If no one took action, the situation could only continue to deteriorate.

Mr. O'Kennedy agreed. The presence of an Irish contingent in Southern Lebanon meant that the situation was a source of particular concern to the Irish Government. Irish troops were being fired on: if an Irish soldier was killed pressure on the Irish to withdraw, which was not at present serious, would undoubtedly intensify. The Irish Prime Minister had an assurance from the Israelis that they would not fire on the Irish contingent but the fact was that the Israelis were active in the border zone. The Israelis claimed to support the UN mandate but the mandate was not working. Israeli support for the mandate seemed to be on a basis that was inconsistent with its continuance.

The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary asked about the views of the Irish Government on self-determination for the Palestinians. Mr. O'Kennedy said that his Government had always been content to rest on the position elaborated by the Nine. They recognised both the rights of the Palestinian people and the right of Israel to exist. They had never committed themselves to self-determination for the Palestinians. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary said that it was becoming increasingly difficult to ignore the realities of the situation. Unfortunately, acceptance of self-determination was inconsistent with the Camp David Agreement and

/would make

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would make life difficult for both the US and Egyptian Governments. Mr. O'Kennedy commented that Camp David no longer looked like a step towards the solution of the Middle East problem. He agreed with the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary that the Nine might be able to establish a common position on the problem in Southern Lebanon but that a common position on self-determination for the Palestinians was not at present feasible.

The Lome Agreement

Mr. O'Rourke said that the Lome Agreement might give rise to problems at the next Foreign Affairs Council. The Presidency had just received a letter from (Mr. O'Rourke thought) Mr. Adams of Barbados asking that some of the agreed texts should be re-opened. Mr. O'Kennedy said that his position was that there was no scope for further negotiation with the ACP countries. The most he would be prepared to envisage would be, perhaps, some discussion of the interpretation of the texts. Unfortunately, the Caribbean members of the ACP, who had now inherited the Presidency of the Group, had much less interest than the Africans in seeing the fund become operative. Mr. Franklin said that it would be wrong to show flexibility and that to do so would not lessen the strains emerging among the ACP countries.

Portugal

Mr. O'Kennedy said that one of the issues the Irish Presidency hoped to resolve at the Foreign Affairs Council on 18 September was the outstanding negotiation with Portugal over imports of automobiles. The political situation in Portugal was very delicate and further delay would not be helpful.

Vietnamese Refugees

The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary said that he understood that the Danish and Dutch Governments wanted to re-open the discussions about food aid for Vietnamese refugees. He was opposed to this until Waldheim's report on the refugees was available. Mr. O'Kennedy agreed and said that this was the position of the Community.

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On a different aspect of the Vietnamese refugee problem, Mr. O'Kennedy referred to the fact that his Government had recently offered to accept a batch of refugees from Hong Kong but only about half of the agreed number had arrived. The remainder had refused to come, evidently preferring to go to the United States. If it became apparent that this incident was part of a trend, the whole problem of refugee resettlement might become more complex. It would be difficult for countries like Ireland to play a role if the refugees insisted on going elsewhere.

Cambodia

The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary said that the situation in Cambodia was much worse than that in Vietnam. Mr. O'Kennedy agreed and regretted the absence of a position of the Nine. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary said that as he understood it the Red Cross were now distributing food in Cambodia: this appeared to create the possibility that the Nine could be more generous.

Mr. O'Kennedy said that he was aware of nothing that need inhibit the Nine from doing so. In fact he believed that M. Cheysson had succeeded in maintaining a food aid programme to Cambodia despite the absence of a Ministerial decision on the subject. The Nine would be free to increase the programme if they chose to do so. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary said that he thought it would be much better to do it in Cambodia than in Vietnam.

South African Rugby Tour

The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary and Mr. O'Kennedy agreed that the decision reached by the various Rugby Union Federations to invite the South Africans to tour the British Isles next month was very regrettable. After the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary had explained the difficulties facing HMG, Mr. O'Kennedy said that, if necessary, his Government would probably step in to prevent the tour taking place. But he expected the Irish Rugby Union Federation would in fact accept the view of the Irish Government and withdraw the invitation.

/Rhodesia and Namibia

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Rhodesia and Namibia

The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary briefed Mr. O'Kennedy on the present state of play on both these problems.

The meeting broke up at 1530.

Ans

5 September 1979

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*cf Master set
Ireland: situation
FCU (A)*

NOTE OF A MEETING BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER AND THE TAOISEACH HELD AT
10 DOWNING STREET AT 1445 ON WEDNESDAY 5 SEPTEMBER 1979

Present:

Prime Minister

Mr. J. Lynch, T.D.

Mr. C.A. Whitmore

Mr. D. Nally

* * * * *

The Prime Minister said that she was grateful to Mr. Lynch for being ready to have talks with her in the wake of the double tragedy which had occurred the previous week. Since the events of 27 August she had been making it clear in public that she was sure that he was as anxious as she was to stamp out terrorism: terrorism was a threat not just immediately to Northern Ireland but to democracy as a whole. The events of the previous week had aroused public expectation in the United Kingdom that concrete action would be taken to combat terrorism. The co-operative efforts which their two Governments had made in the past were not enough: the opportunity had to be seized to improve their joint efforts against the PIRA, and she saw the purpose of their meeting as being to discuss what measures their two Governments could take together.

Mr. Lynch said that the horror and revulsion which had been felt in the UK for the events of 27 August were matched by public reaction in the Republic, but to those feelings in their case was added shame that the deaths of Lord Mountbatten and those with him had occurred on Irish territory. He had been concerned that the reaction in the UK might have repercussions for Irish people living here, particularly since some British newspapers had given the impression that the deaths had been caused in some way by Irish negligence. He fully agreed with what the Prime Minister had said about the need to stamp out terrorism. Terrorism in the Irish Republic posed not only a security threat but was also damaging economically: in his view there was a real risk that terrorism might in the long term retard economic growth in the Republic, particularly because of its effect on foreign investment and tourism. Successive Irish Governments had taken a number of substantial steps to combat the activities of the PIRA. They had increased the strength of the Garda and of the Irish army; they had committed as many resources

/ as they

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as they could afford to the policing of the border; they had encouraged close and successful co-operation between the Garda and the RUC; and they had a range of anti-terrorist laws which was perhaps stronger than that of any other European country. The question now was what more could be done. Various ideas had been aired in the press such as direct co-operation between the British and Irish armies, RUC participation in the Garda's interrogation of suspected terrorists and joint British and Irish patrols on the border, but all these ideas would raise difficulties for the Irish Government.

The Prime Minister reiterated that existing co-operation between the two Governments in the security field was not working well enough and had to be improved. The feeling in the UK that members of the IRA were safe once they were south of the border was stronger than ever, and there would be severe public reaction in this country if today's meeting did not point the way towards substantial improvement in security co-operation between the authorities of their two countries. She had a number of specific measures to suggest - and she had been meticulous about not revealing in public before their meeting what she wished to put to him - but before they discussed the details of them, she wished to make it plain that all the steps which she was asking the Irish Government to take the British Government was ready to introduce itself on a reciprocal basis. She was seeking nothing which she was not prepared to offer in return.

The two Prime Ministers then discussed the following measures:

(a) Extradition and extra-territorial jurisdiction

The Prime Minister said that the British Government already extradited people in the UK to the Republic of Ireland. In the years 1976-78 the numbers had been 27, 31 and 26. Moreover, these figures included some of our own nationals who had been extradited to the Republic to face charges there. We had extradited the Littlejohn brothers to the Republic on charges of robbery and when one of them had been recaptured in the UK following their escape from custody while in the Republic, he had been returned again to the Irish authorities. Similarly we had in recent years extradited a number of British nationals to other foreign countries. We were prepared to do this in the interests of the rule of law, and we would like to see other countries, including the Republic, acting similarly. The British

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Government knew that the Irish Government had constitutional difficulties over extradition. She understood, for example, that the EEC Agreement relating to the European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism contained a special accommodation for the Republic by which it would have no obligation to extradite but which would impose an obligation to consider the prosecution of those whom it did not extradite. This made it all the more important that when the Irish Government did undertake such prosecutions it did so with the best possible chance of securing convictions. The key to getting evidence on which convictions would be obtained turned very often in terrorist cases on translating intelligence into evidence that would stand up in court. The RUC felt very strongly that this process would be helped enormously if they were allowed to participate in the Garda's interrogation of suspected terrorists who were questioned in the Republic about incidents in Northern Ireland. However much information the RUC gave the Garda about a particular suspect, interrogation was more likely to have a successful outcome if those conducting it included police officers with first hand knowledge of the case. The British Government would therefore like to see RUC officers allowed to interview, in Garda stations and in the presence of Garda officers, persons suspected of terrorist offences in the North. We were ready to provide the same facilities for the Garda in Northern Ireland. This measure would make a reality of the 1976 extra-territorial legislation.

Mr. Lynch said that extradition raised difficult constitutional problems for the Irish Government. Extradition was a judicial process which had never been intended to apply to people who were simply suspected of offences and who were wanted for interrogation. Moreover, a number of other European countries, including France, Denmark and Belgium, never extradited their own nationals. As regards the proposal that the RUC should participate directly in the Garda's interrogation of suspected terrorists held in the Republic, he was advised that this could be counter-productive. The Garda felt that such a practice might very well alienate the local population and jeopardise their readiness to supply intelligence to the Garda: this was particularly true in the rather special circumstances that affected the area a few miles south of the

/ border

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border with Northern Ireland. Moreover, the station in which interrogation took place might well be a target for terrorist action, and there would therefore be a physical risk to the Garda and RUC officers involved. A further problem about this proposal was that there was a very real risk, in the view of his Attorney General, that the courts in the Republic would exclude as inadmissible a confession which was obtained by interrogation for which an RUC officer had been present. This might seem extraordinary but the attitude of the Irish courts on matters of this kind could only be described as officious. Nonetheless, he recognised that something like 80% of all convictions obtained against terrorists depended on confessions resulting from interrogation and he was therefore prepared to look further at the Prime Minister's proposal.

(b) Garda Anti-terrorist Squad

The Prime Minister said that earlier this year the Garda had deployed to the border a special anti-terrorist squad which the RUC thought had been highly successful. Unfortunately it seemed that the unit had been disbanded after a ^{short} time. She would like to suggest that it should be revived.

Mr. Lynch said that he was not aware of any major change in the deployment of the Garda along the border, though it was true that in order to combat the rise in crime generally and in particular in IRA bank raids elsewhere in the Republic some police had been withdrawn from the border where it was thought that this would not be detrimental to security. He was ready to consider whether a squad of the kind the Prime Minister had described should be used along the border. Mr. Nally added that he understood that the special unit had been disbanded because the Garda had concluded that it was less effective than local forces using local knowledge.

/ (c)

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(c) Garda and RUC liaison officers

The Prime Minister said that co-operation between the RUC and the Garda would be much improved if a Garda liaison officer was attached to the RUC's headquarters and similarly there was an RUC officer at Garda headquarters.

Mr. Lynch said that a joint RUC/Garda Committee had been set up at Deputy Chief Constable level in 1974 and these liaison arrangements were still working. It might be that there was a need for some strengthening of these links.

(d) Helicopter overflights

The Prime Minister said that suggestions had appeared in the press that the British security forces should have the right of hot pursuit into the Republic. There was a misunderstanding about this. What the British Government would like to propose was that British helicopters should have standing authority to overfly the Republic to a depth of 10-15 kilometers in order to look for terrorists. We were not proposing that British troops or police should cross the border on the ground, but a measure of the kind she had described would do much to stop the PIRA thinking that they had a safe haven across the border. It might be possible for information from the helicopters to be transmitted direct to the Garda and the Irish army, instead of relaying it to them via the RUC: this might save a good deal of time.

Mr. Lynch said that it very rarely happened that the British security forces pursued suspected terrorists to the border and then saw them escape. As regards the overflight of helicopters, the Irish authorities already gave automatic approval for advance requests for permission for British helicopters to overfly Irish territory, even though this was a politically sensitive matter. He would consider the Prime Minister's proposal to see whether it would be effective in its operation.

/ (e)

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(e) Co-operation between the British and Irish armies

The Prime Minister said that there would be much to be gained if there was co-operation between the armies of the two countries on the border to match the co-operation between the RUC and the Garda.

Mr. Lynch said that he thought that there might be difficulties about this proposal. The Irish army operated in the Republic in aid of the civil power and they worked through the Garda. In any case, he understood that the RUC were sensitive about direct co-operation between the two armies and that they preferred to be the sole channel between the security forces on either side of the border.

The Prime Minister said that it was important that there should be a very early follow-up to the proposals which she had put to Mr. Lynch and which he had agreed to consider. She therefore suggested that the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland should meet the Irish Minister for Justice, Mr. Collins, together with the RUC Chief Constable and the Garda Commissioner, in the next two to three weeks to monitor progress. Mr. Lynch said that he saw the Irish Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. O'Kennedy, as the main counterpart of the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, though it was often desirable for Mr. Collins to be present when Mr. O'Kennedy and Mr. Atkins met. There was a risk that if only Mr. Collins saw the Secretary of State this would be interpreted in the Republic that the Irish Government was accepting that its security arrangements were in some way deficient. He was, however, ready to agree that there should be an early meeting between the Secretary of State, Mr. O'Kennedy and Mr. Collins.

Mr. Lynch went on to say that there were two further practical steps which he thought would help to improve the security situation. First, the British security forces frequently described the PIRA as highly professional and its weapons as sophisticated. Such epithets only enhanced the IRA's image in certain quarters and even helped them to recruit new members. There was much to be said for not using such terms and instead for playing down the PIRA's capabilities. Second, the British security authorities persistently complained publicly about what they saw as Irish ineptitude in dealing with the PIRA. Such

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criticism was counter-productive and should be stopped. The Prime Minister said that she agreed that we should not boost the PIRA's morale unnecessarily and she would draw the attention of the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland to what Mr. Lynch had said about the terms in which the PIRA was described.

The Prime Minister said that she would like to bring to Mr. Lynch's notice an interview by a Mr. Peter McMullen, a former member of the PIRA, which was reported in today's Daily Mail and Daily Mirror. McMullen had given details of how shipments of arms for the IRA were moved from the United States through the Republic and into Northern Ireland. She did not know how much truth there was in McMullen's allegations. The British Government was doing all it could to prevent arms reaching the PIRA in Northern Ireland and she assumed that the Irish Government was doing the same. Mr. Lynch said that it was possible that the PIRA brought arms into the Republic in containers, but container traffic was so substantial that it could not all be checked by the customs and so some arms might get through.

The Prime Minister said that the British Government would continue to strain to find a political solution to the Northern Ireland problem. But we had no rabbits ready to pull out of our hat, and given how long the problem had existed, this was not surprising. It would help enormously if people would stop talking about the total unity of Ireland. A majority of the population of the Six Counties had voted to remain part of the UK. There was nothing she could do about yesterday: she was concerned with practical steps for tomorrow. In any case it was out of the question that a political solution could be found that would satisfy the terrorists who were as much dedicated to the destruction of the Republic's existing forms of government as to the overthrow of Northern Ireland's political structure. She hoped that as the British Government explored the possibilities for political movement in Northern Ireland, Mr. Lynch would exert positively any influence he had with the local political parties. When we were ready to come forward with a political initiative, we would wish to discuss it with him.

Mr. Lynch said that he knew full well the difficulty of producing an initiative at any time that would gain the support of both communities in Northern Ireland. That difficulty was perhaps even greater at the moment than it had been in the recent past. Nonetheless, he believed that the cause of the present situation in Northern Ireland had to be tackled, and this required a political solution. He believed that the two Governments should work together if the British initiative

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when it was ready, was not to fail.

The Prime Minister proposed that at the plenary meeting she should summarise the proposals that she had put forward and that Mr. Lynch should describe briefly his reactions. The meeting might then usefully consider how the proposals should be followed up. This was all-important since both Governments would be judged publicly by what they did about improving their ability to fight terrorism and not by what they said. Mr. Lynch agreed with the Prime Minister's proposals for handling the plenary meeting. He did not believe the details of the measures to be taken to improve security should be disclosed in public, and this was the line that he intended to take at the press conference he was holding later that day. The Prime Minister said that it would nonetheless be necessary to make clear that concrete action was being taken.

AMS.

5 September 1979

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92 Master Set
Euro Pol (Budget)
Euro Pol (EMU)

NOTE OF A DISCUSSION OVER LUNCH AT NO. 10 DOWNING STREET, ON
WEDNESDAY 5 SEPTEMBER 1979

PRESENT

Prime Minister	The Taoiseach
Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary	Mr. G. Colley (Tánaiste, Minister for Finance and Minister for the Public Service)
Chancellor of the Exchequer	
Secretary of State for Northern Ireland	Mr. M. O'Kennedy (Minister for Foreign Affairs)
Lord Privy Seal	Mr. A. O'Rourke (Secretary, Department of Foreign Affairs)
Mr. M. D. M. Franklin	Mr. D. Nally (Deputy Secretary, Taoiseach's Office)
Mr. M. O'D. B. Alexander	

The Community Budget

The Prime Minister, introducing the discussion, said that the United Kingdom was at present grossly over-contributing to the Budget. Although the third poorest member of the Community in GDP terms, the United Kingdom was the largest net contributor, considerably ahead of France and the Federal Republic. This situation had to be corrected. HMG accepted that Ireland should be a net gainer from the Budget. But a British contribution on the present scale made no sense. HMG attached considerable importance to the maintenance of the timetable established by the European Council at its last meeting. The Presidency should ensure that this timetable was adhered to.

The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary stressed the political dimension. HMG still had a problem with public opinion in this country. Since coming to power in May, they had demonstrated their European credentials, e.g. by lifting a number of outstanding reservations. (Mr. Colley acknowledged HMG's helpfulness in this regard). If the UK received no satisfaction on the Budgetary issue, the political situation would become markedly more difficult.

Mr. Colley said that he wished to keep to the European Council's timetable but pointed out that any member country of the Community had the ability to impose delay. The Irish Government accepted the existence of the imbalance described by the Prime Minister but, like other members of the Community, did not see the situation solely in Budgetary terms. The question was

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/not simply

not simply one of contributions to and receipts from the Budget. There was the question of convergence. What value should one place on the provisions of the Rome Treaty for free trade in industrial products? The Prime Minister pointed out that the present arrangements meant that access was easier for the industrial products of other EEC members coming into the UK than for British agricultural products moving in the other direction. Mr. O'Kennedy repeated that it was wrong to look at the Community simply in terms of the Budget and to ignore the other benefits that it had brought. Its impact in the social and economic spheres had to be taken into account.

Mr. Colley said that there was a further problem. The Budget was approaching the ceiling imposed by the 1 per cent VAT limitation. It was important to take into account how the difficulties to which this would give rise would be faced. The problem could not be ignored in considering adjustments to the Budget of the kind sought by HMG. The Chancellor of the Exchequer said that the own resources problem was a real but separate issue. It needed to be looked at. The UK position was that the 1 per cent ceiling should not be raised. But for the moment it was important to concentrate on reform of the Budget. With 16 per cent of the GDP of the Community, the UK was paying 20 per cent of the contributions to the Budget and only receiving 10 per cent of the receipts.

Mr. O'Kennedy said that the Irish Government had inherited with the Presidency a set of themes and priorities. They wished to stick to those priorities and to take decisions wherever possible. They did not know the views of all their partners but so far things were going according to plan. Mr. Colley repeated that any one member country could prevent progress but that it was his intention to do everything possible to get the Budgetary issue to the Summit in a shape where decisions would be possible. Mr. Lynch, concluding this part of the discussion, said that the Irish Government recognised the problem and wished to adhere to the European Council's timetable.

/The EMS

The EMS


Mr. Lynch asked whether HMG had a timetable in mind for full adherence to the European Monetary System. The present situation was psychologically damaging in Ireland. People tended to think that the punt was doing badly. The Prime Minister said that she was not optimistic about the chances of an early decision on entry by HMG. The situation was at present unpredictable. Despite the easing of exchange controls, the value of the pound remained surprisingly high. Money had not flowed out of the country in the way that some had expected.

The Chancellor of the Exchequer said that the international currency world was markedly less stable than 12 months ago. Owing to the current problems of the dollar, to the OPEC price rise, and to sterling's petro-currency status, this would be a particularly difficult time for the UK to enter the EMS. HMG were not in any sense hostile to the EMS but were very conscious of the complexities of the present situation.

Mr. Colley said that it was clear that the sort of problem described by the Chancellor was likely to continue for some years. Would it prevent HMG joining the EMS throughout that time? Would HMG insist on a stable pound before taking a decision? The Prime Minister said that ^{much} would depend on our energy policy. If the UK became less oil dependent, it would be easier to control fluctuations in the currency. But this would be a long process. In general it was reasonable to say that a more stable pound would make it easier to join the EMS. The Chancellor of the Exchequer said that this was not simply a British interest. All the other members of the EMS had an equal interest in stability. To offer to join on the assumption that stability had been achieved and then to find that the assumption was false would be the worst outcome.

The lunch broke up at 1440 hours.

5 September 1979



JULY CLERK

REVISED GUEST LIST FOR THE PRIME MINISTER'S LUNCH
FOR MR. LYNCH AT 10 DOWNING STREET ON WEDNESDAY,
5 SEPTEMBER 1979 AT 1.00 P.M. FOR 1.15 P.M. IN THE
SMALL DINING ROOM

Prime Minister

Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary
Chancellor of the Exchequer
Secretary of State for Northern Ireland
Lord Privy Seal
Mr. M. D. M. Franklin, Cabinet Office
Mr. Michael Alexander

Mr. Jack Lynch, TD - Taoiseach
Mr. G. Colley - Deputy Prime Minister
Mr. M. O'Kennedy, TD - Minister for Foreign Affairs
Mr. A. O'Rourke - Secretary, Department of Foreign Affairs
Mr. D. Nally - Deputy Secretary, Taoiseach's office

REF.

DUTY CLERK

SEATING PLAN FOR THE PRIME MINISTER'S LUNCH
FOR MR. LYNCH IN THE SMALL DINING ROOM AT
10 DOWNING STREET ON WEDNESDAY, 5 SEPTEMBER
AT 1.00 FOR 1.15

Mr. Nally

Chancellor of the Exchequer

Mr. M. D. M. Franklin

Mr. G. Colley

Mr. M. O'Kennedy

Prime Minister

Foreign Secretary

Mr. Jack Lynch

Mr. A. O'Rourke

Lord Privy Seal

Sec. State for N. Ireland

Mr. Alexander

From: THE PRIVATE SECRETARY

Original filed
Ireland - Sit # 2

Prime Minister: This is the answer
(a veiled one) to the question you raised this
afternoon.

HOME OFFICE
QUEEN ANNE'S GATE LONDON SW1H 9AT

And
- 4/9

4 September 1979

Dear Michael

EXTRADITION

The extradition of people in the United Kingdom to other countries takes place under three different statutes.

Extradition to the Republic of Ireland takes place under the Backing of Warrants (Republic of Ireland) Act 1965 which covers the extradition to the Republic of citizens of other countries. I attach a table giving the number and offence classification of those extradited to the Republic of Ireland in the last three years and for part of 1975. The numbers are substantial. Although detailed statistics are not kept by nationality, the majority are citizens of the Republic of Ireland but some of these may have, or are entitled to claim, our citizenship as well. But they also include our own citizens; celebrated cases in recent years include that of Carlisle, a member of a Protestant para-military organisation who was extradited to the Republic of Ireland early this year in connection with postal bombs; and the two Littlejohn brothers who were extradited to the Republic of Ireland on charges of robbery - both escaped from custody while in the Republic and one, when recaptured in the United Kingdom, was again returned to the Republic.

The readiness of the United Kingdom to extradite freely its own as well as other countries' nationals is borne out by the other two branches of extradition. Extradition to Commonwealth countries takes place under the Fugitive Offenders Act 1967 and in the last six years 30 people have been extradited under that Act. The majority were nationals of the requesting Commonwealth countries concerned, but a substantial proportion were our own citizens. Extradition to foreign countries takes place under the Extradition Act 1870 and over the last six years 45 people have been extradited, of whom the great majority were nationals of the requesting state, though this total does include several of our own citizens as well. A number of foreign countries have, or used to have, a prohibition on extraditing their own nationals and nineteenth century bilateral extradition treaties between those countries and the United Kingdom sometimes contain a reciprocal prohibition on the extradition of our own nationals. For some years we have been actively seeking to renegotiate these treaties and in 1979, for example, a prohibition on extradition of nationals of either country between the United Kingdom and West Germany was removed.

Individual cases in recent years where our own citizens have been extradited include the cases of Godber to Hong Kong (1975), Gould to Australia (1977), the Jeffs brothers to New Zealand (1977), McDonald to the Netherlands (1978) and the Howe brothers to Australia in 1979.

I am sending copies of this letter to George Walden (FCO),
Roger Facer (MOD), Roy Harrington (NIO) and to Martin Vile
(Cabinet Office).

Yours truly
JAC

J. A. CHILCOT

Michael Alexander, Esq.

NUMBERS OF FUGITIVES EXTRADITED TO THE REPUBLIC OF IRELAND

	Aug-Dec 1975	1976	1977	1978
Murder	-	1	-	-
Other offences against the person.....	1	1	3	2
Sexual offences	-	-	1	-
Theft Act offences ...	12	19	24	18
Forgery	5	-	1	2
Other offences	2	6	2	4
	<hr/>			
TOTAL	20	27	31	26
	<hr/>			

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The communique is very much a first draft but you may
wish to glance at it & comment. (1)



Prime Minister

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

Paul
- 4/5

4 September 1979

Dear Michael,

mt

The Taoiseach's Visit

At the end of her briefing meeting this afternoon the Prime Minister asked for a draft press communique to be prepared setting out the list of points which we should be putting to Mr Lynch for action by the Irish authorities, in the clear understanding that this was unlikely to be welcome to or agreed by the Taoiseach. I attach a draft which has been prepared jointly by officials in the Northern Ireland Office and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. It has not, however, yet been seen by the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary.

During the briefing meeting there was also some discussion, in the context of the proposal for interrogation by the RUC, of the issues of extradition and extraterritorial jurisdiction; and Sir Brian Cubbon gave orally some of the background on the European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism and the EEC Agreement. You may find it useful to have a further note by officials covering these two subjects. The first paragraph of this note suggests that there is a strong case for not asking both for RUC interrogation in the Republic and for change in the Irish attitude to extradition.

I am sending copies of this letter to the Private Secretaries to the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, the Home Secretary, the Attorney General and to Martin Vile (Cabinet Office).

Yours etc

Paul

Paul Lever

M O'D B Alexander Esq
10 Downing Street

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Department

PRIVACY MARKING

.....In Confidence

PRIME MINISTER'S DISCUSSIONS WITH THE TAOISEACH AT No 10 DOWNING STREET ON WEDNESDAY, 5 SEPTEMBER

The Prime Minister, the Rt Hon Margaret Thatcher MP, had discussions today 5 September at No 10 Downing Street with the Taoiseach, Mr John Lynch TD, who was accompanied by Mr George Colley TD, Tanaiste and Minister of Finance and Mr Michael O'Kennedy TD, Minister for Foreign Affairs. The Rt Hon The Lord Carrington, Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, and the Rt Hon Humphrey Atkins MP, Secretary of State for Northern Ireland were present. The talks were preceded by a working lunch also attended by the Chancellor of the Exchequer, the Rt Hon Sir Geoffrey Howe QC, MP and by the Lord Privy Seal, the Rt Hon Sir Ian Gilmour Bt MP, at which European Community topics and other matters of mutual interest were discussed.

The Prime Minister raised with the Taoiseach the security measures set out below which the British security forces either already implement, or will be willing to implement on a reciprocal basis if the Irish authorities are prepared to do likewise. The Prime Minister made it clear that HM Government would be happy to consider comparable requests from the Irish Government on a similar basis.

In response, the Taoiseach indicated that [he would accept/must reject the proposals at and] but would consider the remaining proposals and be in further touch with Her Majesty's Government.

The proposals were:

- i. A range of specialised police facilities ~~should be provided~~ by the Irish authorities to enhance the/

*Interminable
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The equal on
both sides - key
points - cross-border
co-operation.
With nat. security.
must make
the changes.*

*Public in case
Living facilities are asked for the
prepared to give them in return.*

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the capabilities of the Garda in the border area and elsewhere to operate against terrorists. These should match existing capabilities of the RUC.

- ii. RUC officers should be permitted to interview in Garda stations, in the presence of members of the Garda, persons suspected of terrorist offences in the North~~er~~. A reciprocal facility was already already available to the Garda if they should wish to interview suspects held by the RUC.
- iii. A Garda Liaison Officer should be stationed in the RUC Headquarters to assist greater cooperation. The RUC would be happy to station a comparable member of their force in the South.
- iv. Helicopters of the British Army should have standing authority to overfly the Republic to a depth of 10 kilometres in order to maintain surveillance on fleeing terrorists, so that information on their whereabouts could be passed to the Garda. Again a reciprocal facility would be made available *to helicopters from the Army*

The Prime Minister proposed [and the Taoiseach agreed] that the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland and the Minister for Justice should hold an early meeting with the Chief Constable of the RUC and the Garda Commissioner in order to monitor progress on these points and to consider how more effectively to co-operate in bringing terrorists to justice on both sides of the border.

During the discussions the Taoiseach raised the question of future political progress in Northern Ireland [and in particular the need to take account of the concerns of the minority population]. The Prime Minister took careful note of the points which had been made, and confirmed that HM Government's policy was to seek an acceptable way of restoring to the people of Northern Ireland more control over their own affairs.

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EXTRADITION AND EXTRA-TERRITORIAL JURISDICTION

Our need to interrogate suspects in the South is particularly directed to the extra-territorial jurisdiction procedure, ie in many cases where we seek to have a man suspected of a crime done in the North tried in the South, we may need to require that the RUC should interview him to get the necessary evidence together. Since it is part of the procedure that the suspect should be arrested and held in custody by the Garda at some stage, there is a natural place for RUC questioning in it. It is however far from clear whether RUC questioning would fit so well into extradition procedures, since it is not necessary for the suspect to be held in custody in such cases. Apart from other reasons therefore, there is a strong case for not putting alternative requests to Mr Lynch, by asking both for RUC interrogation under the extra-territorial jurisdiction procedure and for a change in the Irish attitude to extradition. The complications inherent in a change in the constitution, which the Irish claim the introduction of extradition would require, are an additional argument for not insisting on this.

2 Article 29 of the Republic's constitution states that the Republic accepts the generally recognised principles of international law as its rule of conduct in its relations with other states. The view has prevailed in the Republic that the extradition of political offenders is contrary to the generally recognised principles of international law, and that, therefore, the extradition of political offenders is for them unconstitutional. This view, that international law precludes surrender in respect of political offences, is not one that is shared by the United Kingdom and it is evidently not held by the other states which have ratified or signed (without reservation) the European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism. However many extradition treaties do not oblige a state to extradite its own nationals - a point which Mr Lynch has often stressed. (Any PIRA suspect of Northern Ireland origin of course can claim Irish nationality.)

E.R.

3 It would be unrealistic to suppose that the Government of the Republic would be willing to move away from its interpretation of the generally recognised principles of international law.

The European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism

4 The Convention (a Council of Europe instrument) provides that certain serious "terrorist-type" offences are not to be regarded as offences of a political character for the purposes of extradition between contracting states, and embodies the principle that if a state refuses extradition it should refer the case to its own prosecuting authorities. Article 1 of the Convention lists a number of very serious crimes; the application of the Convention to these crimes is mandatory. Article 2 lists a number of less serious crimes and is discretionary. But Article 13 of the Convention recognises that a contracting state might be impeded for legal or constitutional reasons from fully accepting the obligations under Article 1 in relation to the grant of extradition for political crimes and permits contracting states to enter a reservation retaining discretion to prosecute rather than extradite, provided that they undertake to take into due consideration, when evaluating the character of the offence, any particularly serious aspects of the offence. Six states entered this reservation when signing the Convention: Sweden, Norway, Portugal, Italy, Denmark, and Cyprus. If the Republic of Ireland were to become a party to the Convention, but make this reservation, the gain for the United Kingdom would probably be minimal.

5 The Suppression of Terrorism Act 1978 enabled the United Kingdom to ratify the Convention without reservation. The Convention has been ratified by five other Council of Europe countries (Austria, Cyprus, Denmark, FRG, Sweden) and signed by 13 other countries. The Republic and Malta alone have neither signed nor ratified the Convention.

The EEC Agreement (The Belgium Protocol)

6 In accordance with declarations adopted at the 5th, 6th and 7th European Councils, an ad hoc group of senior officials of the Nine was set up to examine, under the guidance of Ministers of Justice, measures to combat international terrorism. This group drafted an agreement by which the Nine undertake to apply the European Convention

on the Suppression of Terrorism among themselves until such time as they should all have ratified the Convention without reservation. To this extent, it must be regarded as a purely temporary measure. The EEC Agreement contains a special accommodation for the Republic of Ireland, by which it would have no obligation to extradite, but an obligation to consider prosecuting those whom it does not extradite. It is likely that this Agreement will be formally opened for signature during the current Irish Presidency. The Suppression of Terrorism Act 1978 will enable the United Kingdom to become a party to this Agreement. While an Irish decision to become a party will no doubt be welcome, it will not in fact change the present situation as regards persons suspected of terrorist offences in Northern Ireland, who are already covered by the Criminal Jurisdiction Legislation.



The Department of Agriculture has received your letter of August 10, 1954, regarding the application for a license to export to the United States of America certain quantities of wheat and wheat flour. The Department is pleased to advise you that your application has been approved and that you may proceed with the exportation of the wheat and wheat flour to the United States of America. The Department will issue you a license to export the wheat and wheat flour to the United States of America. The license will be issued to you in the form of a license to export the wheat and wheat flour to the United States of America. The license will be issued to you in the form of a license to export the wheat and wheat flour to the United States of America.

CONFIDENTIAL

THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF HER BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT

COPY NO 1

VISIT OF THE TAOISEACH
5 SEPTEMBER 1979

LIST OF BRIEFS ISSUED IN THE MMV(79) SERIES

1. STEERING BRIEF
Brief by Foreign and Commonwealth Office
2. REPUBLIC OF IRELAND: INTERNAL
Brief by Foreign and Commonwealth Office
3. POLITICAL SITUATION IN NORTHERN IRELAND
Brief by the Northern Ireland Office
4. SECURITY SITUATION IN NORTHERN IRELAND
Brief by the Northern Ireland Office
5. SECURITY CO-OPERATION WITH THE IRISH GOVERNMENT
Brief by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office
6. INTELLIGENCE CO-OPERATION WITH THE IRISH GOVERNMENT
Brief by the Security Service
7. NORTHERN IRELAND: THE INTERNATIONAL DIMENSION
Brief by Foreign and Commonwealth Office
8. ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION BETWEEN NORTHERN IRELAND AND THE REPUBLIC (DEFENSIVE)
Brief by the Northern Ireland Office
9. ANGLO-IRISH TRADE AND ECONOMIC RELATIONS (INCLUDING THE CONTINENTAL SHELF)
Brief by the Department of Trade
10. THE IRISH IN GREAT BRITAIN
Brief by the Home-Office
11. COMMUNITY ISSUES:
 - a. The Presidency and the Community Timetable
 - b. Defensive points on Budget
 - c. Fisheries
 - d. CAP (Defensive)
 - e. EMS (If raised)
 - f. Other Community MattersBrief by Foreign and Commonwealth Office
12. UNITED KINGDOM ECONOMY
Brief by HM Treasury
13. ENERGY MATTERS
Brief by Foreign and Commonwealth Office

Master set
preserved on
CAB 133/493.

This set destroyed
except for No 6,
filed within.

R. Parman
11 Aug 09

a) Not to talk about Irish unity.

Builds vs Protestant position in North.

b) No matter of ~~border~~ ~~organization~~
can mean or i.u.

12 miles ←

P. Inter
= =.

U.F.F.
in Ulster

Not letting piece within a reasonable
time of withdrawal will be just.

London Agreement - U.S. in November.

Protestant instruments U.S.

Political Will.



10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

Self harm - Operation for Republic.

Whatever there - not good enough.

Under not enough - dead.

RUC

(i) Under -

+

(i) Patient Unit.
Some of the
Photo - contact
unit of the.

Intelligence Unit - Contact

(ii) R.U.C. - handle status - } to note
Case - R.U.C. - . } self of
introduction

(iii) Under - handle liaison - other
- Adv. You

(iv) - Under - only - 10-11 hours



10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

mentioned elsewhere

(v) Intelligence - 2 together
see similar - usual channels.

(vi) Intelligence

(vii) Co-operation between two
armies.

Minister of Foreign Affairs, London.

Chief Clerk
Foreign Office

RESTRICTED



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

4 September 1979

Dear Michael,

Handwritten initials and date: L.S. P... 5/9

Visit of the Taoiseach: 5 September

You wrote to George Walden today about the arrangements for the Taoiseach's visit on 5 September.

The Irish Embassy have now informed us that the Taoiseach will also be accompanied by the Deputy Prime Minister, Mr G Colley TD, Tanaiste ("Tornashta"), Minister for Finance and Minister for the Public Service, Mr A Ward, Secretary (PUS) Department of Justice, Mr W Kirwen, Assistant Secretary (AUS) Taoiseach's Office and Mr D Neligan, Assistant Secretary (AUS) Department of Foreign Affairs. The Irish delegation therefore will now be as indicated in the attached list. A brief personality note on Mr Colley is attached.

The Irish Embassy have said that in addition to the Taoiseach they hope it will be possible for the Prime Minister to include as guests in her working lunch tomorrow Mr O'Kennedy, Mr Colley, Mr O'Rourke and Mr Nally (i.e. substituting Mr Colley for Mr Kennedy on the list in your letter). They understand that in the circumstances the Prime Minister will not be able to include other members of the Irish delegation in the working lunch.

The Embassy have said that Mr Colley, Mr Kirwen and Mr Dunlop will not form part of the Irish delegation at the plenary talks following the lunch, but there is the possibility that Mr Colley may decide to do so at the last moment.

I am sending copies of this letter to Tony Battishill (Treasury), Joe Pilling (NIO) and Martin Vile (Cabinet Office).

Yours etc
Paul

Paul Lever

M O'D B Alexander Esq
10 Downing Street

RESTRICTED



ce Front Door

IRISH GOVERNMENT DELEGATION

Ø <i>Lunch</i> * Mr J Lynch TD	-	An Taoiseach
Ø <i>Lunch</i> Mr G Colley TD	-	Tánaiste, Minister for Finance and Minister for the Public Service
Ø <i>Lunch</i> Mr M O'Kennedy TD	-	Minister for Foreign Affairs
Ø <i>Lunch</i> Mr A O'Rourke <i>or Horgan</i>	-	Secretary, Department of Foreign Affairs
Ø Mr A Ward	-	Secretary, Department of Justice
Ø Mr M Horgan	-	Second Secretary, Department of Finance
Ø Dr E L Kennedy	-	Irish Ambassador in London
Ø <i>Lunch</i> Mr D Nally	-	Deputy Secretary, Taoiseach's Office
Ø Mr D Neligan	-	Assistant Secretary, Department of Foreign Affairs
Ø Mr M J Donnelly	-	Assistant Secretary, Department of Justice
Ø Mr W Kirwan	-	Assistant Secretary, Taoiseach's Office
Ø Mr F Dunlop	-	Government Press Secretary
Ø Mr S O'hUiginn	-	Counsellor, Department of Foreign Affairs
<hr/>		
Mr B McCarthy	-	Private Secretary to the Taoiseach
Aide-de-Camp		
2 Security Officers		

Total: 17

*Mrs Lynch will be accompanying the Prime Minister to London

Ø Attending plenary session (Total: 13)

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IRISH GOVERNMENT DELEGATION

Ø	* Mr J Lynch TD	-	An Taoiseach
	Mr G Colley TD	-	Tánaiste, Minister for Finance and Minister for the Public Service
Ø	Mr M O'Kennedy TD	-	Minister for Foreign Affairs
Ø	Mr A O'Rourke	-	Secretary, Department of Foreign Affairs
Ø	Mr A Ward	-	Secretary, Department of Justice
Ø	Dr E L Kennedy	-	Irish Ambassador in London
Ø	Mr D Nally	-	Deputy Secretary, Taoiseach's Office
Ø	Mr D Neligan	-	Assistant Secretary, Department of Foreign Affairs
	Mr W Kirwen	-	Assistant Secretary, Taoiseach's Office
	Mr F Dunlop	-	Government Press Secretary
	Aide-de-Camp		
	2 Security Officers		

Total: 13

* Mrs Lynch will be accompanying the Prime Minister to London

Ø Attending plenary session (Total: 7)

RESTRICTED



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

4 September 1979

Dear George,

VISIT OF THE IRISH PRIME MINISTER: ARRANGEMENTS

Since there have been a number of changes of course in the last few hours, it might be helpful if I summarise the arrangements for tomorrow as they now stand.

The talks will begin over lunch. Invitations have been issued for 1300 hours but presumably there may be some slippage since Mr. Lynch wishes to return to his Embassy to change after Lord Mountbatten's funeral.

The UK participants in the lunch will, apart from the Prime Minister herself, be the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, the Northern Ireland Secretary, the Lord Privy Seal, Mr. Franklin (Cabinet Office) and a Private Secretary. Invitations have gone, on the Irish side, to Mr. Lynch, Mr. O'Kennedy, Mr. O'Rourke, Mr. Kennedy and Mr. Nally.

After lunch, the Prime Minister will spend some thirty minutes in a tete-a-tete discussion with Mr. Lynch. You are considering whether the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary would like to take Mr. O'Kennedy back to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office or not.

The final part of the talks will take place in plenary session here at No. 10. The plenary session will probably begin between 1500 and 1515. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary and the Northern Ireland Secretary will participate on the UK side, ^{either} together with Messrs. Haydon, Wade-Gery, Fergusson, and/or one or two Private Secretaries. I would hope that attendance on the Irish side could be limited to three officials, i.e. Messrs. Kennedy, O'Rourke and Nally (in addition to Mr. Lynch, Mr. O'Kennedy and a Private Secretary).

I am sending copies of this letter to Tony Battishill (HM Treasury), Joe Pilling (Northern Ireland Office), Michael Richardson (Lord Privy Seal's Office) and Martin Vile (Cabinet Office).

Yours ever

Michael Alexander

G.G.H. Walden, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

26

NORTHERN IRELAND: ADVANCE COPIES

DESKBY 031700Z

3

PS

SIR I GILMOUR
PS/PUS
MR FERGUSSON
Lord A Gordon-Lennox
HD/RID
PUSD (2)
HD/IPD
HD/OLD (2)
NEWS DEPT

N IRELAND OFFICE - PS TO SEC OF STATE
RM 66 A/2 GGS

N IRELAND OFFICE [4 copies]

SIR B CUBBON
MR JAMES
MR MARSHALL
MR W J A INNES

CABINET OFFICE - SIR J HUNT
Mr R Wade-Jery.

DIO

NO 10 DOWNING STREET (2)

.....
.....

RESIDENT CLERK

Prime Minister

*Re Hayden's final pre-
meeting assessment.*

Print 4/9

GRPS 600
DESKBY 031700Z SEPTEMBER 79)
CONFIDENTIAL
FM DUBLIN 031540Z SEPT 79
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 247 OF 3 SEPTEMBER
AND TO NIO BELFAST
INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON AND BIS NEW YORK

MY TELNO 236 : MR LYNCH'S MEETING WITH THE PRIME MINISTER

1. AS WAS TO BE EXPECTED, LAST WEEK'S PUBLIC EXPRESSIONS OF SHAME, SHOCK AND REGRET HAVE BY NOW BEEN LARGELY FORGOTTEN OR OVERSHADOWED. THEY WERE EVEN SHORTER - LIVED THAN I HAD EXPECTED. JOHN TAYLOR'S PROVOCATIVE STATEMENT HAS, AS I PREDICTED (MY TUR), GIVEN IRISH MINISTERS AND OTHER SPOKESMEN A PERFECT OPPORTUNITY TO COUNTER-ATTACK AND THEY HAVE TAKEN FULL ADVANTAGE OF IT. SEE FOR INSTANCE THE STATEMENT BY JOHN KELLY, OF THE FINE GAEL OPPOSITION (MY TEL NO 238). THE MOST RECENT PUBLIC PRONOUNCEMENTS BY MR LYNCH AND MR COLLEY (MYTELNO 243 AND 244) ARE VERY UNHELPFUL, AND MAKE IT EXTREMELY DIFFICULT FOR THE IRISH TO MAKE SIGNIFICANT CONCESSIONS.

OF THE FINE SAIL OPPOSITION (MY TEL NO 238). THE MOST RECENT PUBLIC PRONOUNCEMENTS BY MR LYNCH AND MR COLLEY (MY TELNOS 243 AND 244) ARE VERY UNHELPFUL, AND MAKE IT EXTREMELY DIFFICULT FOR THE IRISH TO MAKE SIGNIFICANT CONCESSIONS.

2. THE NEWSPAPERS HERE HAVE PLAYED A MISCHIEVOUS ROLE. THE WORST OFFENDER IS THE POLITICAL CORRESPONDENT OF THE IRISH TIMES, DICK WALSH. HIS ARTICLE ON SATURDAY SUGGESTING THAT THE TAOISEACH WAS BEING SUMMONED TO LONDON FOR A REPRIMAND ABOUT INADEQUATE SECURITY IN THE REPUBLIC CAUSED MR LYNCH TO ISSUE A STATEMENT (YOUR TELNO 103) WHICH ONLY SERVED TO DRAW ATTENTION TO THE REPORT. THIS WAS REFLECTED IN A LEADER IN TODAY'S INDEPENDENT AND ALSO IN THE SUNDAY PAPERS; HEADLINES WERE QUOTE 'I'M NOT BEING CALLED TO LONDON' SAYS LYNCH UNQUOTE (PRESS); QUOTE LYNCH VISIT 'NOT LONDON SUMMONS' UNQUOTE (INDEPENDENT); QUOTE OUR DIPLOMATIC DISASTER UNQUOTE (WORLD). THE LAST ITEM DEALS MORE WITH MR LYNCH'S FAILURE TO RETURN EARLIER TO DUBLIN FROM HIS HOLIDAY. IN THE END MR LYNCH DID NOT COME WELL OUT OF IT ALL.

3. SEEN FROM HERE, IT IS IN OUR INTEREST THAT WE SHOULD GET AS MUCH COOPERATION FROM THE IRISH AS POSSIBLE. I FEEL I MUST SAY YET AGAIN THAT THE MORE WE TALK PUBLICLY ABOUT SECURITY COOPERATION, AND ESPECIALLY IF DETAILED MEASURES OR IDEAS ARE DISCLOSED, THE LESS IRISH MINISTERS FEEL THAT THEIR OWN PUBLIC OPINION WILL ALLOW THEM TO COOPERATE WITH US. THIS MAY BE ILLOGICAL BUT IT IS TRUE. EQUALLY, EVEN NOW THEY REMAIN OBSESSED BY 800 YEARS OF HISTORY. ANY SUGGESTIONS THAT THE BRITISH ARE TELLING THEM WHAT THEY MUST DO PRODUCES INSTANT REFLEX STATEMENTS ABOUT IRISH INDEPENDENCE AND SOVEREIGNTY. MR LYNCH'S BEHAVIOUR OVER THE WEEKEND IS AMPLE EVIDENCE OF THIS, AND IN HIS RTE INTERVIEW HE HAS PUBLICLY CHAINED HIMSELF TO THE RAILINGS BY SAYING THAT HE THINKS THAT HOT PURSUIT, ARMY-TO-ARMY COOPERATION AND RUC INTERROGATION IN THE SOUTH WOULD BE COUNTER-PRODUCTIVE AND WRONG. NONETHELESS, I BELIEVE WE SHOULD PRESS HIM ON ALL THREE ISSUES AND ON ANY OTHERS WE HAVE IN MIND. AGAIN, AS I RECOMMENDED IN PARA 2 OF MY TELNO 228, MR LYNCH SHOULD BE TOLD THAT TO TALK ABOUT IRISH UNITY AT PRESENT IS UNREAL AND, TO USE HIS OWN WORDS IN OTHER CONTEXTS, COUNTER-PRODUCTIVE.

4. I AM SURE THAT CAREFUL ATTENTION IS BEING GIVEN TO THE PRESS ARRANGEMENTS FOR WEDNESDAY'S MEETING. IF SUBSEQUENT BRIEFING BY US SUGGESTS THAT MR LYNCH HAS BEEN CARPETTED AND TOLD WHAT TO DO, THE PUBLIC REACTION HERE WILL BE SUCH AS TO MAKE IT MORE DIFFICULT FOR HIM TO MOVE TOWARDS US. IF THE POLITICAL REALITIES ON OUR SIDE ARE THOUGHT TO DEMAND THAT WEDNESDAY'S MEETING SHOULD BE PUBLICLY PRESENTED IN THAT WAY, THEN SO BE IT. SPEAKING

BY US SUGGESTS THAT MR LYNCH HAS BEEN CARPETTED AND TOLD WHAT TO DO, THE PUBLIC REACTION HERE WILL BE SUCH AS TO MAKE IT MORE DIFFICULT FOR HIM TO MOVE TOWARDS US. IF THE POLITICAL REALITIES OF OUR SIDE ARE THOUGHT TO DEMAND THAT WEDNESDAY'S MEETING SHOULD BE PUBLICLY PRESENTED IN THAT WAY, THEN SO BE IT. SPEAKING PERSONALLY, I AM TEMPTED BY SUCH PRESENTATION BUT IT WOULD NOT FURTHER OUR AIM OF IMPROVING SECURITY COOPERATION WITH THE REPUBLIC AND IT MIGHT EVEN JEOPARDISE EXISTING ARRANGEMENTS.

5. I HOPE THAT THE PRESENTATION OF WEDNESDAY'S DISCUSSIONS ON SECURITY CAN CONCENTRATE ON THE THEME THAT ONLY BY POOLING THEIR EFFORTS CAN THE AUTHORITIES IN THE UK AND THE REPUBLIC EFFECTIVELY COME TO GRIPS WITH THE PROBLEM OF TERRORISM, IN WHICH BOTH SIDES HAVE AN EQUAL INTEREST. I HOPE SOMETHING OF THIS KIND COULD BE EMBODIED IN A JOINT STATEMENT AFTER THE DOWNING STREET MEETING.

HAYDON

NNNN

SENT AT 03/1707Z JH
RECD AT 03/1707Z SHR

PRIME MINISTER

Visit of the Irish Prime Minister: Briefing and Attendance
at Talks

Since there are one or two points which have not so far been put to you for your approval in regard to the participation in the various meetings associated with Mr. Lynch's visit, it may be convenient if I summarise the proposed arrangements.

Briefing

The first part of the briefing will take place at 1400 tomorrow, Tuesday 4 September. Participating Ministers will be the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary, the Home Secretary, the Northern Ireland Secretary and the Attorney General. You have already agreed that the Head of the Security Service and the Deputy Head of the SIS should attend (the Head of the SIS is on leave). The following officials might also attend:-

- Sir B. Cubbon (Northern Ireland Office)
- Mr. Fergusson (Foreign and Commonwealth Office)
- Mr. Wade-Gery (Cabinet Office) (Mr. Wade-Gery has been responsible for co-ordinating the briefing)

Allowing approximately 90 minutes for discussion of Northern Ireland issues, you might wish to turn to EEC problems at about 1530. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary and the Northern Ireland Secretary would remain and would be joined by the Chancellor and by the Lord Privy Seal. There is relatively little on Wednesday's agenda of direct concern to the Ministry of Agriculture and Mr. Walker's office hope that you will agree he need not attend. You have already agreed that Mr. Franklin (Cabinet Office) and Mr. Butler (Foreign and Commonwealth Office) should be the officials attending this part of the briefing.

The Talks

You have decided that the Northern Ireland Secretary should be included in the guest list for the working lunch with Mr. Lynch which will be devoted to EEC topics. The FCO have suggested that the Lord Privy Seal should make way for the Northern Ireland Secretary. The guest list will therefore be, on the British side,

/Lord Carrington

Lord Carrington
Sir G. Howe
Mr. Atkins
Mr. Haydon (HM Ambassador, Dublin)
Private Secretary
Mr. Franklin

and, on the Irish side,

Mr. Lynch
Mr. O'Kennedy
Mr. O'Rourke (Department of Foreign Affairs)
Mr. Kennedy (Irish Ambassador, London) and
Mr. Nally (Taoiseach's Office)

After lunch there will be a session tete-a-tete between you and Mr. Lynch. When this is concluded there will be a plenary session attended, at Ministerial level, by Lord Carrington, Mr. Atkins and Mr. O'Kennedy. You may think it would also be right for the two Ambassadors to attend and for two officials on each side viz Sir B. Cubbon (NIO) and Mr. Fergusson (FCO) on the British side and Mr. O'Rourke (Department of Foreign Affairs) and Mr. ~~Nally~~ (Taoiseach's Office). One Private Secretary will be present on either side to take a note.

Photocall

It would be normal to have a photocall inside the Front Door immediately after Mr. Lynch's arrival. If you think that this would be too soon after your return from Westminster Abbey, the session with the photographers could no doubt be arranged upstairs at some point after lunch. I should be inclined to favour getting the session over as soon as possible.

Are the arrangements summarised above acceptable to you?

M. O'D. B. ALEXANDER

3 September 1979

PRIME MINISTER

AM has seen.
1. Mr Alexander Pugh
2. CF.

We have now heard that Mr. Lynch will be putting out a statement at 1600 hours (text attached). It seems to me pretty moderate in tone, and is simply intended - it appears - to explain his position against the charges in the Irish press that he has been summoned.

I have told the FCO that you are content to send Mr. Lynch a message on the lines of the draft which you have already seen. They strongly advise that this message should still go, notwithstanding the moderate tone of Mr. Lynch's statement. They feel he needs some re-assurance from us against further probable pressure from the Irish press.

Are you content for the message still to go?

Tim Lankester

1 September 1979

TEXT OF A STATEMENT TO BE MADE BY THE TAOISEACH AT 1600 ON
1 SEPTEMBER 1979

The Taoiseach in a statement refers to a report in today's "Irish Times" which was quoted in the RTE news feature "What it says in the papers". The report referred to alleged suggestions that the Taoiseach is being called to London next week to answer for the Republic's culpability not only for the Mountbatten murder but for the handling of security generally.

There is no question of the Taoiseach being called to London. When he paid a courtesy call on the Prime Minister on 10 May last a further substantive meeting was envisaged when Mrs. Thatcher and the Secretary of State had had time to familiarise themselves fully with the Northern Ireland situation. On Friday week last (24 August) the Taoiseach had preliminary enquiries made in London about the Prime Minister's availability for a possible meeting in October. On Thursday last (30 August) the Taoiseach received an invitation from the Lord Chamberlain on behalf of Buckingham Palace to attend the funeral at Westminster Abbey. The Taoiseach immediately accepted. Shortly afterwards the British Ambassador conveyed a message from Mrs. Thatcher that if the Taoiseach proposed to attend the Memorial Service she would be glad to meet him to discuss the tragic occurrence at Mullaghmore and its implications. The Taoiseach in his reply in agreeing that a very early meeting was now desirable expressed the hope that the meeting would pave the way for worthwhile progress in the variously closely related areas relevant to ending the violence. It was agreed on both sides and has been confirmed subsequent to the press report in question that the meeting would be on this basis.

PRIME MINISTER

VISIT OF THE TAOISEACH

At 1250 p.m. the Irish Ambassador telephoned the Foreign and Commonwealth Office to say that Mr. Lynch had read an article in the Irish Times this morning which suggested that he was being summoned to London next week to account for the tragedies of last Monday. Mr. Lynch was apparently absolutely incensed by this article, and told his officials that he intended to issue a statement today saying that it was not possible for him to come to London on this basis, and that the visit was cancelled.

The Irish Embassy official went on to say that Mr. Lynch's advisers had then gone over the programme for next Wednesday with him pointing out that you had invited him to lunch and that matters other than security were to be covered. As a result of this, Mr. Lynch had told officials that he would not cancel the visit provided the FCO now put out a statement that:-

- (i) other matters besides security were to be discussed; and
- (ii) the Taoiseach himself had suggested a meeting with you prior to last Monday's killings. (You will recall that Mr. Lynch sent you a message on 24 August inviting you to Dublin at some point).

The FCO advice is as follows:-

They say it would be absolutely wrong for us to be putting out a statement countermanding a misleading report in a foreign newspaper. But they think that something must be done to mollify Mr. Lynch, while at the same time not giving any impression of grovelling.

Their preference would be for you to make a telephone call to Mr. Lynch today saying:-

/(i)

- (i) how much you were looking forward to seeing him next Wednesday and that you were very glad he was coming (this would in effect be in response to his message at Flag A accepting your invitation).
- (ii) The talks will of course cover other matters besides security - in particular EEC issues.
- (iii) It is not surprising that some of the press reports both in Britain and in Ireland have been rather misleading and appear to be making trouble - by suggesting that security is to be the only issue under discussion and by ignoring the fact that Mr. Lynch had already suggested a meeting.

If you prefer not to speak to Mr. Lynch personally, the FCO suggest that you send a message on the lines of the attached draft (Flag B). This does not mention the press point. But our Ambassador in Dublin, when handing the message over, would say that we are surprised at some of the press reporting on the visit, and that HMG certainly have not been responsible for the impression that Mr. Lynch is being summoned.

At Flag C is the invitation which we sent to Mr. Lynch.

The FCO have been in touch with the Northern Ireland Office to keep them abreast of what is going on.

Tim Lankester

1 September 1979

It would be absurd to speak to Mr. Lynch. Please send the Flag B message. Ambassador needs any other information - he can point out that I said on radio that Mr. Lynch was as anxious to step out tomorrow as I was.
D.T.

SUGGESTED MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO THE TAOISEACH

Thank you for your letter of 30 August. I am looking forward very much to seeing you.

Recent tragic events have delayed my reply to your invitation of 24 August to have talks with you in Dublin in your capacity as President of the European Council as well as on Northern Ireland questions.

Thank you for your letter of 30 August. I am looking forward very much to seeing you.

Recent tragic events have delayed my reply to your invitation of 24 August to have talks with you in Dublin in your capacity as President of the European Council as well as on Northern Ireland questions.

X | I suggested in my letter of 30 August that we should meet during your visit to London next week to discuss Lord Mountbatten's horrifying murder and its implications. I thought I might also take up your kind invitation to discuss European Community topics. I propose therefore that we discuss EEC and other questions of this kind over lunch. After that we should have a private talk before we are joined by our colleagues to discuss security matters across /on both sides of/ the border.

I know that we are both equally anxious to stamp out terrorism. I hope that these arrangements are in line with what you too had in mind.

This is the PM's redraft of
the FCO draft. She asked
me to titillate it further
as necessary. I agreed
with FCO to change the
wording at X to 'cross border
security'.

R
3/9

I suggested in my letter of 30 August that we should meet during your visit to London next week to discuss Lord Mountbatten's horrifying murder and ~~its implications~~ ^{its implications}. I thought ~~it would be useful~~ ^{it would be useful} however, to take ~~the opportunity to broaden our talks to discuss~~ ^{the opportunity to broaden our talks to discuss} other topics. My intention therefore ~~is~~ ^{is} that we should discuss EEC and other questions of this kind over lunch, ~~before~~ ^{before} we have a private talk and are ~~then~~ ^{then} joined by our colleagues to discuss the range of issues arising out of the recent developments ^{on both sides of the border}. I hope that these arrangements are in line with what you too had in mind.

Speed out

INVITATION TO THE TAOISEACH

Appreciated your letter of condolence over the murder of Lord Mountbatten, his grandson Nicholas and of Paul Maxwell. You will know that the Dowager Lady Brabourne has since died from her terrible injuries.

I understand that an invitation has been extended to you to attend Lord Mountbatten's ceremonial funeral which is to take place at Westminster Abbey on Wednesday, 5 September. If, as I hope, you are coming to London, I should find it most valuable if we could meet during your visit to discuss this tragic affair and its implications.

If this is acceptable to you I suggest that our officials make the necessary arrangements.

RESTRICTED

GRS 150
RESTRICTED

SUBJECT

*pc Manteo
Ops*

FM FCO 011845Z AUG 79
TO FLASH DUBLIN
TELNO 109 OF 1 SEPT 79.

**PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE**

h.g. Hunt 3/5

SERIAL No. T95/79T

SEE MY TELNO 107.

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF A LETTER DATED 1 SEPTEMBER FROM THE
PRIME MINISTER TO MR JOHN LYNCH TD, AN TAOISEACH.

BEGINS.

THANK YOU FOR YOUR LETTER OF 30 AUGUST. I AM LOOKING FORWARD
VERY MUCH TO SEEING YOU.

RECENT TRAGIC EVENTS HAVE DELAYED MY REPLY TO YOUR KIND INVITATION
OF 24 AUGUST TO HAVE TALKS WITH YOU IN DUBLIN IN YOUR CAPACITY AS
PRESIDENT OF THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL AS WELL AS ON NORTHERN IRELAND
QUESTIONS.

I SUGGESTED IN MY LETTER OF 30 AUGUST THAT WE SHOULD MEET DURING
YOUR VISIT TO LONDON NEXT WEEK TO DISCUSS LORD MOUNTBATTEN'S
HORRIFYING MURDER AND ITS IMPLICATIONS. I THOUGHT I MIGHT ALSO TAKE
UP YOUR KIND INVITATION TO DISCUSS EUROPEAN COMMUNITY TOPICS.
I PROPOSE THEREFORE THAT WE DISCUSS EEC AND OTHER QUESTIONS OF
THIS KIND OVER LUNCH. AFTER THAT WE SHOULD HAVE A PRIVATE TALK
BEFORE WE ARE JOINED BY OUR COLLEAGUES TO DISCUSS CROSS-BORDER
SECURITY MATTERS.

I KNOW THAT WE ARE BOTH EQUALLY ANXIOUS TO STAMP OUT TERRORISM.
I HOPE THAT THESE ARRANGEMENTS ARE IN LINE WITH WHAT YOU TOO
HAD IN MIND.

ENDS

CARRINGTON

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FILES

RID
NEWS D
PS
PS/LPS
MR BULLARD
MR FERGUSSON
LORD N G LENNOX

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PS/SIR J HUNT, CABINET OFFICE
PS/S OF S NORTHERN IRELAND
PS/SIR B CUBBON (NIO)

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GRS 330

UNCLASSIFIED
FM FCO 011840Z SEP 79
TO FLASH DUBLIN
TELEGRAM NO 108 OF 1 SEPTEMBER 1979

fg. Amt - 3/3

SEE M I P T

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF STATEMENT RELEASED IN DUBLIN BY THE TAOISEACH'S OFFICE AT 1600 HOURS TODAY (1 SEPTEMBER).

BEGINS:

"THE TAOISEACH IN A STATEMENT REFERS TO A REPORT IN TODAY'S 'IRISH TIMES' WHICH WAS QUOTED IN THE R T E NEWS FEATURE 'WHAT IT SAYS IN THE PAPERS'. THE REPORT REFERRED TO ALLEGED SUGGESTIONS THAT THE TAOISEACH IS BEING CALLED TO LONDON NEXT WEEK TO ANSWER FOR THE REPUBLIC'S CULPABILITY NOT ONLY FOR THE MOUNTBATTEN MURDER BUT FOR THE HANDLING OF SECURITY GENERALLY.

THERE IS NO QUESTION OF THE TAOISEACH BEING CALLED TO LONDON. WHEN HE PAID A COURTESY CALL ON THE PRIME MINISTER ON 10 MAY LAST A FURTHER SUBSTANTIVE MEETING WAS ENVISAGED WHEN MRS THATCHER AND THE SECRETARY OF STATE HAD HAD TIME TO FAMILIRIZE THEMSELVES FULLY WITH THE NORTHERN IRELAND SITUATION. ON FRIDAY WEEK LAST (24 AUGUST) THE TAOISEACH HAD PRELIMINARY ENQUIRIES MADE IN LONDON ABOUT THE PRIME MINISTER'S AVAILABILITY FOR A POSSIBLE MEETING IN OCTOBER. ON THURSDAY LAST, AUGUST 30, THE TAOISEACH RECEIVED AN INVITATION FROM THE LORD CHAMBERLAIN ON BEHALF OF BUCKINGHAM PALACE TO ATTEND THE FUNERAL AT WESTMINSTER ABBEY. THE TAOISEACH IMMEDIATELY ACCEPTED. SHORTLY AFTERWARDS THE BRITISH AMBASSADOR CONVEYED A MESSAGE FROM MRS THATCHER THAT IF THE TAOISEACH PROPOSED TO ATTEND THE MEMORIAL SERVICE SHE WOULD BE GLAD TO MEET HIM TO DISCUSS THE TRAGIC OCCURANCE AT MULLAGHMORE AND ITS IMPLICATIONS. THE TAOISEACH IN HIS REPLY IN AGREEING THAT A VERY EARLY MEETING WAS NOW DESIRABLE, EXPRESSED THE HOPE THAT THE MEETING WOULD PAVE /THE

THE WAY FOR WORTHWHILE PROGRESS IN THE VARIOUS CLOSELY RELATED
AREAS RELEVANT TO ENDING THE VIOLENCE. IT WAS AGREED ON BOTH SIDES
AND HAS BEEN CONFIRMED SUBSEQUENT TO THE PRESS REPORT IN QUESTION
THAT THE MEETING WOULD BE ON THIS BASIS."

ENDS

CARRINGTON

FILES

RID

NEWS D.

PS

PS | LPS

MR BULLARD

MR FERGUSSON

LORD GLENNOX

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GRS 580

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FM F.C.O. 011835Z SEP 79

TO F L A S H DUBLIN

TELEGRAM NUMBER 107 OF 1 SEPTEMBER.

fs. Pmt 3/7

YOUR TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH FREE-GORE

VISIT OF IRISH PRIME MINISTER: 5 SEPTEMBER

1. COUNSELLOR, IRISH EMBASSY LONDON TELEPHONED FREE-GORE TODAY (1 SEPTEMBER) TO SAY THAT TAOISEACH HAD SEEN FRONT PAGE ARTICLE IN IRISH TIMES TODAY WHICH IMPLIED THAT THE TAOISEACH HAD BEEN SUMMONED TO LONDON BY BRITISH PRIME MINISTER AND WAS TO BE PUT IN THE DOCK OVER SECURITY. TAOISEACH HAD GAINED THE IMPRESSION THAT THE ARTICLE AROSE FROM BRITISH OFFICIAL SOURCES. (IN FACT THE ARTICLE SAYS QUOTE THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT HAS LET IT BE KNOWN THROUGH THE FOREIGN OFFICE AND OTHER SOURCES, THAT, AS FAR AS BRITAIN IS CONCERNED, THE TAOISEACH, MR LYNCH, IS BEING CALLED TO LONDON NEXT WEEK TO ANSWER FOR THE REPUBLIC'S CULPABILITY NOT ONLY FOR THE MOUNTBATTEN MURDERS BUT FOR THE HANDLING OF SECURITY GENERALLY QUOTE) HE HAD BEEN EXTREMELY ANGRY AND HAD INTENDED TO ISSUE A PRESS STATEMENT ANNOUNCING THAT IT WAS NOT POSSIBLE FOR THE HEAD OF A SOVEREIGN GOVERNMENT TO GO TO LONDON IN SUCH CIRCUMSTANCES AND THAT HE WOULD CANCEL HIS VISIT. HE HAD DECIDED NOT TO DO SO ONLY WHEN HE HAD BEEN MOLLIFIED BY LEARNING THAT THE PRIME MINISTER PLANNED A WORKING LUNCH ON 5 SEPTEMBER AT WHICH COMMUNITY AND OTHER MATTERS OF MUTUAL INTEREST WOULD BE DISCUSSED, FOLLOWED BY A TETE A TETE AND TALKS WITH MINISTERS/OFFICIALS PRESENT. BUT HE WANTED A STATEMENT TO BE ISSUED BY THE FCO TO SAY THAT AN EARLIER MEETING OF THE TWO PRIME MINISTERS HAD BEEN SUGGESTED BY MR LYNCH AND THAT OTHER MATTERS WOULD BE DISCUSSED IN ADDITION TO SECURITY.

12.

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2. COUNSELLOR SUBSEQUENTLY INFORMED FREE-GORE THAT FOR DOMESTIC POLITICAL REASONS, TAOISEACH HAD DECIDED TO ISSUE STATEMENT (SEE MIFT) AT 1600 HOURS TODAY. COUNSELLOR SAID STATEMENT HAD BEEN CAREFULLY DRAFTED TO AVOID CAUSING DIFFICULTIES HERE AND THAT TAOISEACH HOPED FOR EXPLICIT CONFIRMATION THAT IN EVENT OF PRESS ENQUIRIES WE WOULD CONFIRM FACTUAL CONTENT OF STATEMENT.

3. FOLLOWING CONSULTATION WITH SENIOR OFFICIALS AND WITH NO 10 FREE-GORE TOLD COUNSELLOR THAT IT WAS INAPPROPRIATE FOR US TO COMMENT IN LONDON ON A REPORT OF THIS KIND IN IRISH NEWSPAPERS. HE HAD BEEN INSTRUCTED HOWEVER TO TRANSMIT TO COUNSELLOR TEXT OF A LETTER (SEE MY SECOND IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING TELEGRAM) DATED TODAY WHICH THE PRIME MINISTER HAS WRITTEN TO THE TAOISEACH ACKNOWLEDGING HIS LETTER OF 30 AUGUST AND WHICH SET OUT HER INTENTIONS FOR THE TIMETABLE OF THEIR TALKS TOGETHER IN LONDON NEXT WEEK. COUNSELLOR WOULD NOTE THAT THE LETTER DEALT WITH THE TWO POINTS WHICH THE TAOISEACH HAD RAISED, IE HIS EARLIER INVITATION AND THE FACT THAT OTHER MATTERS IN ADDITION TO SECURITY WOULD BE DISCUSSED. FREE-GORE SAID THAT FCO SPOKESMEN, IF ASKED, WOULD CONFIRM THE FACTS IN THE TAOISEACH'S STATEMENT.

4. PLEASE CONVEY TEXT OF PRIME MINISTER'S LETTER TO TAOISEACH OR HIS REPRESENTATIVE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. IN DELIVERING TEXT YOU SHOULD SAY THAT PRIME MINISTER IS VERY GLAD THAT MR LYNCH IS ABLE TO COME TO LONDON AND THAT SHE IS LOOKING FORWARD TO INCLUDING EEC AND OTHER MATTERS OF MUTUAL INTEREST IN HER DISCUSSIONS WITH HIM. IF THE QUESTION OF PRESS REPORTS SHOULD COME UP, YOU MAY LIKE TO CONTRAST TONE TO TODAY'S UK PRESS WITH TENDENTIOUS AND INACCURATE ARTICLE IN THE QUOTE IRISH TIMES UNQUOTE. THERE IS NO QUESTION OF IRISH TIMES' STORY STEMMING FROM UK OFFICIAL SOURCES. HOWEVER, YOU SHOULD CONFIRM FREE-GORE'S RESPONSE TO COUNSELLOR THAT IT WOULD NOT BE APPROPRIATE IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES FOR ANY STATEMENT TO BE ISSUED COMMENTING ON A STORY OF THIS KIND IN AN IRISH NEWSPAPER.

CARRINGTON

FILES
RID
NEWS D.
PS
ps/lps.
MR BULLARD
MR FERGUSSON.
LORD N GLENNOX.

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Group/Class..... PREM 19
Piece 79

Letter to Cartledge dated
31 August 1979, enclosing
document MMV(79)6

Paper extracted and
temporarily retained
under Section 3(4)
pending completion of
review.
(date)..... 17 November 2009
(Signed)..... A Wayland

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Handwritten signature
31/8

Cabinet Office,
Whitehall,
London SW1

31st August, 1979

PS(79) 27

Dear Private Secretary,

Visit of the Taoiseach, 5th September, 1979

This letter sets out the briefing arrangements for the visit of Mr. Lynch on Wednesday, 5th September.

The list of briefs to be prepared, with an allocation of Departmental responsibility, is at Annex A. It should be noted that on this occasion, since discussion of EEC questions will take place over a working lunch, these will be covered by a single brief, to be co-ordinated by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office in consultation with the Departments indicated.

The instructions on format are at Annexes B and C.

Seventy-five copies of each brief should be sent to the Cabinet Office, 70 Whitehall, to arrive no later than 16.00 hours on Monday, 3rd September. They should be addressed to Mrs. Mary Wagner, who should be consulted (tel. no. 233 7628) about any technical points arising.

I am sending copies of this letter to the Private Secretaries to Sir Michael Palliser, Sir Douglas Wass, Sir Robert Armstrong, Sir Frank Cooper, Sir Brian Cubbon, Sir Kenneth Clucas, Sir Jack Rampton, Mr. Brian Hayes, Sir William Fraser, and Sir Howard Smith; to the Legal Secretary, Law Officers' Department; to Robert Wade-Gery and Michael Franklin, Cabinet Office, and to Michael Alexander (No. 10).

Yours sincerely,

(Signed) M.J. VILE

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ANNEX ALIST OF BRIEFS FOR VISIT OF THE TAOISEACH, 5th SEPTEMBER, 1979

<u>MMV(79)</u>		<u>Lead Department</u>	<u>In consultation with</u>
1.	Steering Brief	FCO	MOD NIO as appropriate
2.	Republic of Ireland: Internal	FCO	
3.	Political Situation in Northern Ireland	NIO	FCO
4.	Security Situation in Northern Ireland	NIO	FCO MOD
5.	Security Co-operation with the Irish Government	FCO	Home Office MOD NIO
6.	Intelligence Co-operation with the Irish Government	Security Service	FCO MOD NIO
7.	Northern Ireland: the Inter- national Dimension	FCO	Home Office NIO
8.	Economic Co-operation between Northern Ireland and the Republic	NIO	FCO Treasury as appropriate
9.	Anglo-Irish Trade and Economic Relations (including the Continental Shelf)	Trade	FCO Treasury NIO as appropriate
10.	The Irish in Great Britain	Home Office	FCO NIO

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<u>MMV(79)</u>		<u>Lead Department</u>	<u>In consultation with</u>
11.	Community Issues:	FCO	
	(a) The Presidency and the Community Timetable		Cabinet Office
	(b) The Budget		Treasury Cabinet Office
	(c) Fisheries		MAFF NIO DAFS Cabinet Office
	(d) CAP		MAFF Cabinet Office
	(e) Energy Matters		Energy Treasury Cabinet Office
	(f) EMS, Convergence etc.		Treasury Cabinet Office
	(g) Other Matters		Cabinet Office as appropriate
12.	United Kingdom Economy	Treasury	

INSTRUCTIONS ABOUT FORMAT

All briefs should be laid out in the same way with a top page in accordance with the specimen layout at Annex C. Those preparing briefs should note the following:-

- (a) Briefs should be concise. Each brief should if possible be no more than four sides long.
- (b) The main body of each brief should comprise two sections, a concise list of Points to Make, followed by a factual Background section which distinguishes clearly between information which can be freely used and information which should not be disclosed.
- (c) Briefs should be complete and self-contained and with all the information required on that particular subject. Briefs should not be divided into separate self-contained sub-sections.
- (d) Briefs should be typed in double spacing, using both sides of the paper. Pages should be numbered at the foot of each page.
- (e) The top page only should bear the symbol and number of the briefs in the top left-hand corner (e.g. MMV(79) 13), with the date of production below; a copy number in the top right-hand corner; the visit heading, the title of the brief (in capitals) and the name of the Department responsible (as in Annex C).
- (f) Briefs should bear at the foot of the last page, on the left-hand side, the name of the originating Department and the date of origin.
- (g) If late developments require a brief to be amended or updated, an addendum should be prepared. It should be set out in the standard way with the brief number (e.g. MMV(79) 13 Addendum) and title to which it relates at the top of the front page. The Private Secretary to the Secretary of the Cabinet should be informed when an addendum is in preparation.
- (h) Additions to the list of briefs in Annex A require the authorisation of the Private Secretary to the Secretary of the Cabinet.

CLASSIFICATION

ANNEX C

THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF HER BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT

MMV(79) Serial No.

COPY NO

Date of production

VISIT OF THE TAOISEACH
5 SEPTEMBER 1979

Leave 1½"
margin

SUBJECT Insert subject in capitals

Brief by name of originating Department e.g. Foreign and
Commonwealth Office

At the foot of the last page:-

Department of origin e.g. Foreign and Commonwealth Office

Date of origin

CLASSIFICATION

PRIME MINISTER

L.S. *Ambs*

Visit by the Irish Prime Minister: Attendance at the Talks

You decided yesterday evening that the Northern Ireland Secretary should not participate in next week's talks with Mr. Lynch. I understand that your decision was based, at least in part, on advice from the Home Secretary about the practice which had prevailed when he was the Northern Ireland Secretary.

Mr. Atkins is concerned about the implications for his position in Northern Ireland and for his standing in the eyes of the Irish authorities of his non-participation in the talks. He believes that it would be damaging to his credibility. His office have pointed out that both Mr. Rees (on two occasions) and Mr. Mason participated in talks between the then Prime Ministers of the UK and the Irish Republic. In particular Mr. Mason participated in the talks between Mr. Lynch and Mr. Callaghan in September 1977 and Mr. Lynch may well be expecting to see Mr. Mason's successor at next week's meeting.

I understand from the Home Secretary's office that Mr. Whitelaw would much regret it if his recollection of the situation as it existed some years ago were now to cause difficulties for Mr. Atkins.

Would you, in the light of the foregoing, wish to reconsider the question of the Northern Ireland Secretary's participation in the plenary session of talks on Wednesday? Attendance at the meeting will in any case be very limited.

Yes. Support

- ① Mr. Atkins joins us for lunch
- ② Mr. Lynch & I, have private talks. (accompanied only by *Ambs* & Rees.)
- ③ Mr. $\frac{1}{2}$ hr or so we are joined by { F.S. + Mr. Kennedy } for fuller session + Mr. *Ambs*
There 3 Irish Ministers had had private talks during previous 2 hrs.

31 August 1979

PRIME MINISTER

H. Am

①

Visit of the Irish Prime Minister: Briefing

Briefing for your meeting on Wednesday with Mr. Lynch will take place on Tuesday afternoon in two parts.

You are holding a meeting at 1400 to discuss the two shopping lists to be presented to Mr. Lynch. This meeting will in effect be the briefing meeting for that part of your discussions dealing with Northern Ireland. As already agreed, it will be attended by the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary, the Home Secretary, the Northern Ireland Secretary, the Attorney General and the Chiefs of the Security Service and the SIS.

The second part of the briefing, to deal with EEC issues, might conveniently be a continuation of the previous discussions. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary and the Northern Ireland Secretary would remain and would be joined by the Chancellor, the Lord Privy Seal, the Minister of Agriculture, Mr. Franklin (Cabinet Office) and Mr. Butler (Foreign and Commonwealth Office).

The briefs will be in your box on Monday evening.

Are these arrangements acceptable to you?

*To start
at 3.30
pm.*

Yes sir.

Am

H. Am

31 August 1979

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Prime Minister

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

*This seems to be on the right
line. Some EEC subjects are to
be discussed, the absence of the S.S. Ireland
is natural. Twelve is the maximum
number of places. Agree draft?*

31 August 1979

(1)

Mufaxed to Chag...

Ans 2/8

1/9/79

Dear Michael,

Visit of the Irish Prime Minister: 5 September

As requested in your letter of today's date, I attach a draft guest list for the working lunch which the Prime Minister proposes to give for Mr Lynch, the Irish Prime Minister, at 1pm on Wednesday 5 September.

The Irish Embassy have informed us that the Taoiseach will be accompanied by Mr O'Kennedy, the Irish Foreign Minister, Mr O'Rourke, the Secretary (PUS) of the Department of Foreign Affairs, Mr Nally, Deputy Secretary Taoiseach's Office, Mr Dunlop, Government Press Secretary, Mr McCarthy, PS to the Prime Minister, as well as by an aide-de-camp and two security officers.

The Irish Ambassador will also be in the Prime Minister's party. We do not think that the aide-de-camp need be included in the guest list, but the Irish team all the same numbers seven. We would therefore need to exclude the Press Secretary, if you wished to include all those suggested on our side. The alternative would be to increase the numbers all round to, say, fourteen, to allow one or two of our reserves to be drawn on.

I am copying this letter to the recipients of yours.

*Jans over
Steph*

(J S Wall)
Private Secretary

M O'DB Alexander Esq
10 Downing Street
LONDON SW1

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DRAFT GUEST LIST

PRIME MINISTER'S WORKING LUNCH FOR THE IRISH PRIME MINISTER
AT 1PM ON WEDNESDAY 5 SEPTEMBER

Host

Prime Minister

Irish Government Representatives

Mr J Lynch TD - An Taoiseach

Mr M O'Kennedy TD
Minister for Foreign Affairs

Mr A O'Rourke
Secretary, Department of Foreign
Affairs

Dr E L Kennedy
Irish Ambassador in London

Mr D Nally
Deputy Secretary, Taoiseach's Office

Mr F Dunlop
Government Press Secretary_7

UK Government Representatives:

Secretary of State for Foreign and
Commonwealth Affairs

Chancellor of the Exchequer

~~Lord Privy Seal~~ *R. Atkins*

Mr M D M Franklin,
Head European Secretariat
Cabinet Office

Mr R Haydon
HM Ambassador, Dublin

PS/Prime Minister

Total: 12

Reserves:

Mr M D Butler,
Deputy Under Secretary, FCO

Mr R L Wade Gery,
Cabinet Office

Original an

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Prime Minister

Ireland - Situation
Part 2



Are you content that preparation of briefing should continue on this basis. There will of course be an opportunity to discuss it on Tuesday?

PRIME MINISTER

POLITICAL PROGRESS IN NORTHERN IRELAND

No. when has not even been discussed with Cabinet.

1 July 31/8

When you see Mr Lynch next week to discuss security issues he will almost certainly ask about the Government's intentions for the political future of Northern Ireland. I believe - and I think Peter Carrington would too - that it will help to secure from him the kind of commitment we want on security if you were prepared to give him some indication of the direction in which we hope to move on the political front.

I was asked at our Ministerial (OD) Meeting on Northern Ireland held on 10 July, to bring forward proposals for consideration by colleagues before the end of the Recess. This work is well advanced and I expect to be able to bring forward considered proposals, which will have been discussed with the Departments most closely concerned, in about a month's time, during which period I shall have completed my second round of talks with the party leaders. The further development thereafter that I have in mind is that we should as early in the resumed session as we can, publish a White Paper setting out proposals on Northern Ireland policy in all its aspects, but with particular reference to political development.

The aim of that policy is clear and self-evident: ⁽¹⁾ the re-establishment of the rule of law in all parts of the Province under the protection of a conventional police authority, with the Army progressively withdrawn; ⁽²⁾ the re-development of a crippled economy to something nearer viability than now exists; ⁽³⁾ and the devolution to elected representatives of the people of Northern Ireland of powers and responsibilities for their internal government so that they can work out their own future together. *Locally n devolved gov for Stormont.*

No-one can foresee when the attainment of this objective might be possible. I am clear however that the present Government must declare its intentions this Autumn which will give reasonable expectations that measurable and visible progress will have been made towards it within say the next two to three years.

My provisional conclusions on political developments - subject to further consultations with colleagues - are as follows:

- (i) Direct rule must be brought progressively to an end and as soon as possible, for it does nothing to bring the communities together and simply leaves the United Kingdom Government exposed to criticism on every kind of issue (big and small) by all sides in the two communities, and internationally for failing to make progress.
- (ii) The political gap between the two communities is at present unbridgeable. Neither will at present accept a system of

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devolved, legislative and executive government which is acceptable to the other, although I believe such a system could be constructed - possibly a bicameral assembly with the upper chamber having entrenched powers to protect the minority against legislative or executive discrimination.

- (iii) The Government would plunge straight into a political dead-end if we were to bring forward proposals for a fully worked out scheme, however reasonable it might appear to us, which we then had to negotiate with both sides in the present temper. We must be ready to bring forward comprehensive proposals for direct negotiation at the right time, but that time is not yet.
- (iv) What we can actually do, however, is to embark on a process of re-engaging political activity in the government of the Province in a progressive way, aiming, I suggest, first of all for an assembly having only modest powers and with the executive government retained for an initial period in the hands of the Government at Westminster. Successive steps by which we would initiate such a process (which might at the very outset amount to appointing no more than a council of advisers for Northern Ireland Ministers) are still being worked out. They will need to be flexible so that we can adapt them as prospects for progress grow or diminish.

I believe that an approach to political devolution of this kind, which would allow democratic institutions to develop over a period of time, would be welcomed in the Province, where they are as fearful of haste as they are of each other; and I believe it would be recognised internationally as a responsible and constructive way forward. Much has still to be worked out and you and colleagues concerned will wish to give this very careful consideration. If we agree to proceed down this route then I would envisage, following the publication of proposals in a White Paper, that we should undertake a determined political campaign in the Province to convince opinion at all levels (and not just at the level of Westminster MPs) that we are set on a hopeful and constructive course.

You will not want to go into this with Mr Lynch but it may help you to respond to him in a positive way to have these thoughts in your mind. We must assume that on such a matter as this anything said to the Irish Government will eventually leak. I would see no harm in that provided that following your discussion with Mr Lynch you yourself, eg in a Press Statement or Press Conference, made a short statement about political intentions of a kind which you would make to him perhaps on the following lines:

- (a) The Government is committed to find an acceptable way of giving Northern Ireland people more control over their own affairs and respecting their basic right of democratic self-determination for their constitutional future.

- (b) The failure of previous forms of devolved government, and the conflicting aspirations of the two communities in Northern Ireland, make it difficult to conceive of an immediate and wholly acceptable form of legislative and executive internal self government for the Province.
- (c) Nevertheless, the Government wishes to see an end to the present arrangements for direct rule and believes the people of the Province generally share that wish. All the political leaders in the Province have expressed this view.
- (d) Accordingly we shall be making proposals as soon as possible after Parliament returns for first steps on the road to acceptable devolution of powers. These proposals will be extensively discussed with the people at all levels in the Province itself before specific measures are put before Parliament at Westminster later this session.
- (e) Meanwhile our policy on security - defeat of terrorism and extension of normal policing - is being vigorously pursued; and we are continuing within the broad framework of our economic policy for the United Kingdom as a whole, to maintain, and we hope restore, the economy of Northern Ireland itself.

If you were content to open up the subject in this way with the Taoiseach, I would follow the matter up in my next talk with Mr O'Kennedy on 17 September.

I am copying this minute to Peter Carrington, the other members of OD Committee and Sir John Hunt.

P.A.

31 August 1979

I see no possibility of opening up in this way with Mr. Kennedy. He would assume the general drift had been approved by Cabinet unless it has been dismissed. The minister can contemplate going to in approach for legislative and executive internal self government. The next rounds too much as if we are treating them as a colony - not as part of the U.K.

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Original on
Ireland - Situation
Part 2

CONFIDENTIAL



be you content for the N. Ireland
Secretary to proceed as in the final sentence -
at least until your meeting on Tuesday?

Prime Minister No - see
separate note -
- 3/8 out.

PRIME MINISTER

NORTHERN IRELAND: SECURITY DIRECTORATE

I have reflected on the discussion you had with Peter Carrington, Francis Pym and myself on Thursday afternoon about the arrangements for heading up the Security Directorate which is to be set up under my command in the Northern Ireland Office in Belfast. I would like to put some further considerations to you and suggest a new solution.

I was convinced by the general view of Cabinet yesterday that there is no significant public relations value in announcing the new Directorate: Francis Pym and I are agreed on the need for it to meet an existing inadequacy but the Government can hardly expect public acclaim for doing something as sensible as that. In my view the first priority is to set it up quickly and make it work effectively, as I am sure it will, under the direction of the Security Policy Group which I lead (the Chief Constable, the GOC, the Permanent Under-Secretary, and the Director and Co-ordinator of Intelligence).

I do not believe that the case against dramatising this step is in any way altered by appointing a distinguished figure to head up the Directorate under my command. The more prominence given to this appointment (which could, incidentally, make the man himself a prominent terrorist target forthwith) the more questions will be asked about his powers and his relationship to the GOC and the Chief Constable, and the answers are bound to diminish, not enhance his standing. Francis Pym and I are agreed that we are not instituting a Director of Security Operations with authority to command and control the security operations in the Province, military, police and civil. That would be wrong in principle, contrary to our policy and, indeed it could only be brought about by recalling Parliament to pass legislation to strip the police of their independent status and make them subordinate to me as Secretary of State. As it is, the Directorate as proposed will need very careful presentation to the RUC, who will greatly resent it if it appears that they - as an independent and Ulster force - are in any way to be taken over. The maintenance of their morale and status is fundamental to the effectiveness of our security policy. As I have emphasised to you, it is only by holding fast to this policy and extending normal policing throughout the Province that we shall get the Army out of Northern Ireland.

The leader of the Directorate and his team will be subordinate to, under the direction of, and accountable to the Security Policy Group which I lead; and it is the essence of their task (as was made clear in paragraph 5 of the Annexe to our Cabinet Paper) that their work should result in a more effective use of security forces while operating through existing command structures. It is I hope clear from this why

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CONFIDENTIAL

in our joint paper Francis Pym and I suggested that the leader of the team should be of a senior rank in the public service but not out-ranking the heads of the existing commands over whom he will have no authority.

This leads me to conclude that it is the quality of the man, not his eminence in another field, which we should be concentrating on - and I would certainly question the wisdom of putting someone into this as a post-retirement occupation.

Nevertheless, I recognise the concern you expressed on Thursday that the leader of this team should be a person of standing whose appointment would add to public confidence in Northern Ireland and in GB. I have to say that in my judgment an officer seconded from or retiring from the Diplomatic Service would signally fail to meet this requirement: a Foreign Office figure could and almost certainly would be spitefully attacked by Unionists as yet another indication of the GB mentality which treats Northern Ireland as a colony. If you conclude that a public figure is necessary then I would suggest that we should look in the direction of a distinguished policeman with experience in the deployment of large forces and in dealing with threats to security both by way of urban violence and terrorism. Such a person would be better qualified in my view to get the best out of the Security Directorate than someone new to this game. Some obvious names come to mind, including of course Sir Robert Mark. I suspect that, unfortunately, his appointment would not go down well in the Protestant community in the Province because of his membership of the Hunt Committee of 1969 which recommended the disbanding of the "B Specials" and the disarming of the RUC. I propose to consult further with Willie Whitelaw and Francis Pym to see whether someone of nearly equal standing, but perhaps younger, might be identified who could be seconded to my staff to head the Directorate.

I am copying this letter to the Home Secretary, the Foreign & Commonwealth Secretary, the Secretary of State for Defence and Sir John Hunt.

J.Pilling

on behalf of Mr Atkins in Belfast

31 August 1979

CONFIDENTIAL

RE

Cabinet has decided

See separate note.

① that the staff is a nucleus organization to coordinate & combine the activities of the Army the Police.

② that the decision be not announced until we think it is prudent to conduct operations in the field

③ that the person responsible for N.I. P.F.O.



10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

I find this memo somewhat confusing.

Cabinet has decided

1. that we set up a small organisation to co-ordinate and combine in the most effective way the activities of the Police and Army in the Province
2. that as a lot will depend on the personality of the man who heads this Combined Operation, the decision be not announced until he is found.
3. that he be responsible to (not under the command of) the S of S.

We cannot go back on these decisions.

After Cabinet and in furtherance of their decision two names were proposed one wholly military, and the other "diplomatic" with a lot of his service on the defence side. S of S for W. I. asked for him to bring forward further names. That is the only thing for which we are waiting.

I did not think a wholly military person was right and for the same reason I do not think a

wholly police person would be right. But I
am prepared to consider any further names.

~~But~~ I am convinced we need a
strong personality. A weak one would not
do the job and his failure would be
disastrous not only to the S-1's but to those the
Security Forces are there to protect. From my
discussion on Wednesday it is clear that a lot
needs to be done and we cannot delay much longer.

M.S.



HC N10 Ireland HS

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

31 August 1979

Visit of the Irish Prime Minister

I enclose a copy of a message to the Prime Minister from Mr. Lynch formally accepting the Prime Minister's invitation to talks next week.

I do not think that the message requires any further action, but you will note the link made by Mr. Lynch between the Prime Minister's invitation and his own tentative invitation to Mrs. Thatcher to visit Dublin in October. There is, perhaps, an implication that next week's meeting might take the place of the Dublin meeting. This is a point which, obviously, will have to be cleared up in the course of the discussions on Wednesday.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Ray Harrington (Northern Ireland Office).

M. O'D. B. ALEXANDER

Roderick Lyne, Esq.,

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

31 August 1979

I am writing to thank you for your letter of 31 August with which you enclosed a message from the Taoiseach to the Prime Minister.

I have of course brought Mr. Lynch's message to the Prime Minister's immediate attention.

MICHAEL ALEXANDER

His Excellency Dr. Eamon Kennedy

AMBASÁD NA hÉIREANN, LONDAIN



IRISH EMBASSY, LONDON.

17 Grosvenor Place
London SW1X 7HR

31st August 1979

Dear Private Secretary,

I should be most grateful if you would convey to the Prime Minister the enclosed message from the Taoiseach, Mr John Lynch, T.D.

Yours sincerely

Eamon Kennedy

for Eamon Kennedy
Ambassador

The Principal Private Secretary
to the Prime Minister
No. 10 Downing Street
London S.W.1.

31 AUG 1979



CONFIDENTIAL



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

31 August 1979

Visit of the Irish Prime Minister

The Prime Minister has now considered the arrangements for her meeting with Mr. Lynch next Wednesday afternoon, 5 September. She has decided that she would like the discussions to take place in two parts.

The first part of the talks would deal with EEC questions and would take place over a working lunch (maximum of 12 persons) at No. 10. The timing would be 1.00 for 1.15: this should allow time for the principals to get back from Westminster Abbey. I should be grateful for a draft guest list by 1700 this afternoon.

The second part of the meeting, which would take place immediately after lunch, would deal with Northern Ireland issues. The first half hour or so would be tete-a-tete. Thereafter the Prime Ministers would be joined by the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary, the Irish Foreign Minister (assuming it is confirmed that he will be coming to London) and appropriate officials.

I should be grateful if briefing for both parts of the discussion could reach me by 1700 on Monday 3 September. The briefing might conveniently be coordinated by the Cabinet Office.

I am sending copies of this letter to John Chilcot (Home Office), Roger Facer (Ministry of Defence), Roy Harrington (Northern Ireland Office) and Martin Vile (Cabinet Office).

J.S. Wall, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CONFIDENTIAL

DUBFO 022/31

OO FCO

RR NIO BELFAST

RR WASHINGTON

RR MODUK

GRPS 120

RESTRICTED

FM DUBLIN 311194Z AUGUST

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 239 OF 31 AUGUST 1979

INFO ROUTINE NIO BELFAST, WASHINGTON, MODUK

REF TELECON BARRIE/BLUNT:

MEETING BETWEEN PRIME MINISTER AND MR LYNCH

1. AT THE REQUEST OF RID, WE HAVE CONTACTED DUNLOP, HEAD OF GOVERNMENT INFORMATION SERVICE, TO ASK FOR AN EXPLANATION OF THE STATEMENT IN TODAY'S "GUARDIAN" (ATTRIBUTED TO AN "IRISH SPOKESMAN") SUGGESTING THAT THIS EMBASSY INFORMED THE IRISH GOVERNMENT ON 22 AUGUST THAT THE PRIME MINISTER WAS FAVOURABLY DISPOSED TO AN EARLY AUTUMN MEETING WITH MR LYNCH.

2. DUNLOP SAID THAT HE WAS PUZZLED BY THIS AND, AFTER MAKING ENQUIRIES, SAID THAT TO THE BEST OF HIS KNOWLEDGE ALL THAT HAD HAPPENED WAS THAT THE IRISH AMBASSADOR IN LONDON HAD MADE ENQUIRIES AT THE FCO ON 24 AUGUST ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF A MEETING.

CPSE ADVANCE COPY TO NO 10

HAYDON

PS
 PS/LPS
 PS/MS
 Sir A Duff
 M Ferguson
 Hds RID
 News D
 O/D
 PCD
 PS N° 10 DS.-

(+9)

(Files)

A.S.

News 3/8

GRS 200A
CONFIDENTIAL
DESKBY 311630Z

CONFIDENTIAL

FROM FCO 311540Z AUG 79
TO IMMEDIATE DUBLIN
TELEGRAM NUMBER 105 OF 31 AUGUST
AND TO PRIORITY NIO BELFAST

Lg. Phil - 3/5

FCO TELNO 102

MEETING BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER AND THE TAOISEACH

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF LETTER DATED 30 AUGUST FROM MR LYNCH TO THE PRIME MINISTER RECEIVED VIA THE IRISH EMBASSY IN LONDON TODAY.
BEGINS:-

TO THE RT. HON. MRS MARGARET THATCHER, M.P.
PRIME MINISTER

THANK YOU FOR YOUR MESSAGE CONVEYED TO ME TODAY BY THE BRITISH AMBASSADOR. I HAVE IN FACT HAD THE LORD CHAMBERLAIN INFORMED THAT, ACCOMPANIED BY MY WIFE, I PROPOSE TO REPRESENT MY GOVERNMENT AT THE FUNERAL AND MEMORIAL SERVICE FOR EARL MOUNTBATTEN IN LONDON NEXT WEDNESDAY.

YOU WILL BE AWARE THAT SOME DAYS BEFORE THE RECENT TRAGIC EVENTS, I HAD CAUSED EXPLORATORY ENQUIRIES TO BE MADE IN LONDON AS TO YOUR AVAILABILITY FOR A MEETING IN DUBLIN TO DISCUSS NORTHERN IRELAND AND OTHER MATTERS OF MUTUAL INTEREST, POSSIBLY IN OCTOBER NEXT. I AGREE, OF COURSE, THAT A VERY EARLY MEETING IS NOW DESIRABLE AND I AM ACCORDINGLY HAPPY TO ACCEPT YOUR INVITATION TO HOLD SUCH A MEETING ON THE OCCASION OF MY JOURNEY TO LONDON NEXT WEEK. I WOULD HOPE THAT OUR DISCUSSIONS WILL PAVE THE WAY FOR WORTHWHILE PROGRESS IN THE VARIOUS CLOSELY RELATED AREAS RELEVANT TO ENDING THE VIOLENCE WHICH HAS BROUGHT GRIEF TO SO MANY HOMES THROUGHOUT IRELAND AND IN BRITAIN OVER THE LAST TEN YEARS.

ENDS

CARRINGTON

FILES

RID
NAD
OID
IPD
WED
MAED
NEWS D
PS
PS/LPS
PS/MR HURD
PS/MR RUSSETT

PS/MR BLAKER
PS/PUS
SIR A DUFF
MR BULLARD
MR FERGUSSON
LORD M G LENNOX
MISS BROWN

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NORTHERN IRELAND

CONFIDENTIAL

RS

PS/SIR I GILMOUR

PS/PUS

MR FERGUSSON

Lord N Gordon-Lennox

HD/RID

FUSD (2)

HD/IPD

HD/OLD (2)

NEWS DEPT

N IRELAND OFFICE - PS TO SEC OF STATE
RM 66 A/2 GGS

N IRELAND OFFICE [4 copies]

SIR B CUBBON

MR JANES

MR MARSHALL

MR W J A INNES

CABINET OFFICE - SIR J HUNT

Mr R Wade-Gery

DIO

NO 10 DOWNING STREET (4)

ADVANCE COPY

IMMEDIATE

RESIDENT CLERK

228

PM (Falls + AD) Northern Ireland

2

OO FCO (DESKBY 310700Z AUGUST 79)

GRPSE 520

DESKBY 310700Z AUGUST 79

CONFIDENTIAL

FM DUBLIN 301810Z AUGUST 79

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 234 OF 30 AUGUST

Prime Minister: background
for your meeting next week
3/6

MY TELNO 228 : MEETING BETWEEN PRIME MINISTER AND MR LYNCH

1. YOU MAY FIND IT USEFUL TO HAVE MY ASSESSMENT OF THE IMPACT OF LORD MOUNTBATTEN'S MURDER ON MR LYNCH AND HIS GOVERNMENT AND AN EVALUATION OF THE EXTENT TO WHICH THIS OFFERS US AN OPPORTUNITY TO EXTRACT CONCESSIONS, ESPECIALLY ON SECURITY COOPERATION, WHICH HAVE SO FAR BEEN UNOBTAINABLE.

2. MR LYNCH AND OTHER MEMBERS OF THE GOVERNMENT ARE CLEARLY SHOCKED AND FULL OF REGRET AND SHAME. BUT THESE ARE CHEAP COMMODITIES IN THIS COUNTRY. I DO NOT THINK THAT RECENT EVENTS HAVE DONE MUCH MORE THAN NEUTRALISE FOR THE TIME BEING THE REPUBLICAN GROUNDSWELL WHICH WAS BUILDING UP IN FIANNA FAIL AS A RESULT OF BLANEY'S EUROPEAN ELECTION SUCCESS. THE PRESENT OFFERS THE BEST OPPORTUNITY WE ARE LIKELY TO GET FOR OBTAINING

OFFERS THE BEST OPPORTUNITY WE ARE LIKELY TO GET FOR OBTAINING CONCESSIONS FROM THE IRISH. BUT THIS DOES NOT MEAN THAT WE SHALL BE ABLE TO GET WHATEVER WE WANT E.G. REFORM OF THE CONSTITUTION TO ENABLE EXTRADITION FOR POLITICAL OFFENCES.

X 3. ON THE OTHER HAND, THERE IS A FAIR POSSIBILITY THAT WE CAN PERSUADE THE IRISH TO ADOPT PRACTICAL MEASURES TO IMPROVE SECURITY, BOTH ON THE BORDER AND ELSEWHERE, ESPECIALLY IF THEY CAN BE INTRODUCED WITHOUT A PUBLICITY FANFARE ON OUR PART. AS YOU WILL KNOW FROM MY DESPATCH OF 10 AUGUST AND OTHER REPORTS, MR LYNCH IS NOT AT PRESENT IN A STRONG POSITION VIS A VIS HIS PARTY OR THE COUNTRY. AGAIN, AS I HAVE SAID REPEATEDLY, THE IRISH ARE HYPERSENSITIVE TO CRITICISM, REAL OR IMPLIED FROM US, ESPECIALLY IF IT IS MADE PUBLICLY. IT WOULD, THEREFORE, BE UNWISE TO PRESENT ANY IMPROVEMENTS MADE BY MR LYNCH ON SECURITY AS CONCESSIONS TO US.

4. ON THE POLITICAL SIDE, CHANGES OF EMPHASIS IN EXISTING POLICY ARE CLEARLY A POSSIBILITY. HOWEVER, EVEN NOW FOR MR LYNCH THERE ARE CERTAIN BASIC BELIEFS OR MYTHS WHICH PUBLIC OPINION WILL NOT ALLOW HIM TO RENOUNCE EVEN IF HE WOULD BE HAPPY TO DO SO HIMSELF. HAVING SAID THAT I STILL THINK WE SHOULD TRY TO PERSUADE HIM THAT TO TALK ABOUT IRISH UNITY IS UNREAL (PARA 2 MY TUR).

5. I THINK THAT PROVIDED THAT WHAT WE ASK HIM TO GIVE DOES NOT LOOK REPEAT LOOK LIKE A MOVE AGAINST A UNITED IRELAND, THAT IT DOES NOT INVOLVE CHANGES TO THE CONSTITUTION AND THAT IT IS NOT MADE TO APPEAR LIKE A CONCESSION IMPOSED ON HIM BY BRITAIN, WE CAN EXPECT HIM TO BE AT LEAST RESPONSIVE. EVEN SO WE CANNOT EXPECT TO OBTAIN MANY UNREQUITED CONCESSIONS. IF WE REALLY WANT A LARGE MEASURE OF INCREASED SECURITY COOPERATION FROM MR LYNCH WE SHOULD TRY TO GIVE HIM SOMETHING WHICH HE CAN REPRESENT AS A MOVE IN THE DIRECTION OF POLITICAL PROGRESS. HE HIMSELF CAN ACCEPT AND GET HIS PEOPLE TO ACCEPT FAR MORE AS PART OF A BARGAIN THAN HE CAN AS REPARATIONS EXACTED BY THE BRITISH FOR IRISH SHORTCOMINGS.

6. IT IS WORTH REMEMBERING THAT HE HAS JUST RETURNED FROM PORTUGAL TO A HOSTILE DOMESTIC PRESS. HIS ABSENCE FROM DUBLIN AT A TIME WHEN THE PRIME MINISTER VISITED NORTHERN IRELAND HAS NOT GONE UNNOTICED. OVER THE NEXT FEW DAYS HE WILL BE CONCERNED TO DEAL WITH THAT CRITICISM: WHAT HE SAID AT HIS PRESS CONFERENCE TODAY SHOULD BE SEEN IN THAT LIGHT. AT BALDONNEL BOTH HE AND HIS WIFE WERE VERY DEFENSIVE ABOUT HIS NOT HAVING RETURNED EARLIER FROM PORTUGAL. WE CAN OFFER NO CONVINCING EXPLANATION WHY HE DID NOT

SHOULD BE SEEN IN THAT LIGHT. AT BALDONNEL BOTH HE AND HIS WIFE WERE VERY DEFENSIVE ABOUT HIS NOT HAVING RETURNED EARLIER FROM PORTUGAL. WE CAN OFFER NO CONVINCING EXPLANATION WHY HE DID NOT COME BACK EARLIER, ALTHOUGH HE MAY HAVE CONSIDERED THAT THERE WAS NO NEED TO RETURN UNTIL THE DAY OF THE REMOVAL OF LORD MOUNTBATTEN'S REMAINS. AS YOU WILL KNOW, IN IRISH CUSTOM THE REMOVAL OF THE REMAINS IS AN OCCASION OF EQUAL IMPORTANCE WITH THE FUNERAL.

HAYDON

NNNN

SENT AT 30/1900Z JAW

RECD AT 30/1900Z DD

We agreed verbally

Overlaken.

PRIME MINISTER

to ask Lynch Kennedy to work
with Lynch myself also to discuss
VISIT OF THE IRISH PRIME MINISTER Europe
Lynch - Irish Minister

for. Am 3/9

It would be helpful to settle today some of the details
of Mr. Lynch's meeting with you.

Andrews
Am.

Mr. Lynch is arriving on the evening of Tuesday ⁴ ~~3~~ September
and hopes to return to Dublin on the evening of the following
day. He will be accompanied by a very small group of officials.
However, it seems possible that Mr. O'Kennedy, who is at
present on holiday in Greece, and Mr. O'Rourke, the Permanent
Under-Secretary at the Irish Foreign Ministry, will be available
in London on Wednesday ~~3~~⁵ September.

Your own diary is free for most of Wednesday apart from
the funeral service itself. This will take up the second
half of the morning.

The natural time for you to see Mr. Lynch would perhaps
be at 3 p.m. I assume you would not wish to offer him a meal
on this occasion. One might envisage a two hour meeting,
30 minutes of which would be a tête-à-tête and which thereafter
would be in plenary session. If Mr. O'Kennedy attends on the
Irish side it would seem appropriate for the Foreign and
Commonwealth Secretary and the Northern Ireland Secretary to
be present. Attendance by officials might be limited to two
on either side.

I have told Departments that I assumed that you would
on this occasion wish to concentrate exclusively on Northern
Ireland affairs in your talk with Mr. Lynch and that briefing
on other matters of mutual interest will not be required. However
it is possible that, both for presentational reasons + because he at
present holds the EEC Presidency, Mr Lynch will wish to touch on
one or two other issues. Perhaps Dept's should produce some short
background briefs on other topics?

30 August 1979

Am

SUBJECT

AMBASSADOR NA NÉIRIANN, LONDAIN

T92/79



IRISH EMBASSY, LONDON

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T92/79

cc. Flo
N.I.D.

(2)

H. P. 3/5

Prime Minister

There is, perhaps, an implication
that next week's meeting will
make a subsequent bilateral in Dublin
unnecessary.

1 hr
- 31/8

To The Rt. Hon. Mrs Margaret Thatcher, M.P.
Prime Minister

Thank you for your message conveyed to me today by the British
Ambassador. I have in fact had the Lord Chamberlain informed
that, accompanied by my wife, I propose to represent my
Government at the funeral and Memorial Service for
Earl Mountbatten in London next Wednesday.

You will be aware that some days before the recent tragic events,
I had caused exploratory enquiries to be made in London as to
your availability for a meeting in Dublin to discuss Northern
Ireland and other matters of mutual interest, possibly in
October next. I agree, of course, that a very early meeting
is now desirable and I am accordingly happy to accept your
invitation to hold such a meeting on the occasion of my journey
to London next week. I would hope that our discussions will
pave the way for worthwhile progress in the various closely
related areas relevant to ending the violence which has brought
grief to so many homes throughout Ireland and in Britain over
the last ten years.

John Lynch
Taoiseach

30th August 1979

[Handwritten signature]

SUBJECT

CONFIDENTIAL

*Master
Ops.*

RS TO PM

GR 250

CONFIDENTIAL

PRIME MINISTER'S

FM FCO 301125Z AUG 79

PERSONAL MESSAGE

TO FLASH DUBLIN

SERIAL No. T 908/79T

TELNO 102 OF 30 AUG

INFO IMMEDIATE NIO (B), ROUTINE WASHINGTON.

*Sub
3/8*

REFERENCE TODAY'S TELECON FERGUSSON/BARRIE.

POSSIBLE MEETING BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER AND THE TAOISEACH.

1. FOLLOWING IS CONFIRMATORY TEXT OF A LETTER DATED TODAY 30 AUGUST FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO MR JOHN LYNCH TD, AN TAOISEACH.

BEGINS:

I APPRECIATED YOUR LETTER OF CONDOLENCE OVER THE MURDER OF LORD MOUNTBATTEN, HIS GRANDSON NICHOLAS AND OF PAUL MAXWELL. YOU WILL KNOW THAT THE DOWAGER LADY BRABOURNE HAS SINCE DIED FROM HER TERRIBLE INJURIES.

I UNDERSTAND THAT AN INVITATION HAS BEEN EXTENDED TO YOU TO ATTEND LORD MOUTBATTEN'S CEREMONIAL FUNERAL WHICH IS TO TAKE PLACE AT WESTMINSTER ABBEY ON WEDNESDAY 5 SEPTEMBER. IF, AS I HOPE, YOU ARE COMING TO LONDON, I SHOULD FIND IT MOST VALUABLE IF WE COULD MEET DURING YOUR VISIT TO DISCUSS THIS TRAGIC AFFAIR AND ITS IMPLICATIONS. IF THIS IS ACCEPTABLE TO YOU I SUGGEST THAT OUR OFFICIALS MAKE THE NECESSARY ARRANGEMENTS.

ENDS

CONFIDENTIAL

1/2

CONFIDENTIAL

2. IN THE LIGHT OF THE PRACTICAL ARRANGEMENTS, AT YOUR END, UNDERSTAND YOU WILL ARRANGE FOR THE MESSAGE TO BE HANDED OVER TO MR LYNCH SOON AFTER MIDDAY TODAY. IN HANDING OVER MESSAGE YOU SHOULD SAY THAT PRIME MINISTER'S INVITATION RESULTS FROM THE COLLECTIVE DECISION OF CABINET THIS MORNING.

3. GRATEFUL CONFIRMATION BY TELEPHONE AS SOON AS MESSAGE DELIVERED.

CARRINGTON

FILES
RID PCD
NAD
OID
IPD
VED
MAED
NEWS DEPT
PS
PS/LPS
PS/MR HURD
PS/MR RIDLEY

PS/MR BLAKER
PS/PUS
SIR A DUFF
MR BULLARD
MR FERGUSSON
LORD N G LENNOX
MISS BROWN

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NORTHERN IRELAND

CONFIDENTIAL



10 DOWNING STREET

Prime Minister

Answer.

Mr Lynch

p. a.
GHL
30/8

not coming through London,
he is already in Dublin.

If you agree, I shall
arrange for our Ambassador
to be instructed to deliver
the message at 11.30,
making it clear that
it results from a decision
of Cabinet this morning.

GHL
30/8



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

Prime Minister

29 August 1979

Do you agree to X1?

*Duty Clerk
29.8.79*

*FW impment.
Aug with Josselyn.*

*Jan
29/8*

Dear Mike,

Northern Ireland: Possible Meeting Between the Prime Minister and the Taoiseach - 5 September

Thank you for sending me a copy of your letter of 28 August to Joe Pilling (NIO).

With reference to your paragraph (ii) I understand that the Lord Chamberlain's Office has now issued an invitation by telegram to Mr Lynch. I am therefore enclosing a draft letter from the Prime Minister to the Taoiseach inviting him for talks with the Prime Minister in the event of his acceptance of the Lord Chamberlain's invitation.

X | If the Prime Minister agrees, we would propose to telegraph the text to Mr Haydon in Dublin for him to deliver personally to the Taoiseach as soon as possible after his return to Dublin tomorrow.

I am copying this letter to Joe Pilling (NIO), Martin Vile (Cabinet Office), Roger Facer (MOD) and John Chilcot (Home Office).

*Agreed
mt*

*James
Stephen*

(J S Wall)
Private Secretary

M A Pattison Esq
10 Downing Street
LONDON

Registry
No.

DRAFT LETTER

Type 1 +

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

Top Secret.
Secret.
Confidential.
Restricted.
Unclassified.

To: -

Mr John Lynch TD
An TaoiseachFrom
Prime Minister

Telephone No. Ext.

Department

PRIVACY MARKING

..... In Confidence

I appreciated your letter of condolence over the murder of Lord Mountbatten, his grandson Nicholas and of Paul Maxwell. You will know that the Dowager Lady Bradbourne has since died from her terrible injuries.

I understand that an invitation has been extended to you to attend Lord Mountbatten's ceremonial funeral which is to take place at Westminster Abbey on Wednesday 5 September. If, as I hope, you are coming to London, I should find it most valuable if we could meet during your visit to discuss this tragic affair and its implications. If this is acceptable to you I suggest that our officials make the necessary arrangements.



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

28 August 1979

Northern Ireland

This letter records the main points which arose from a meeting called by the Prime Minister at 1800 today at No.10, which was attended by the Home Secretary, Defence Secretary, the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, the Lord Privy Seal, the Chief of the General Staff and Mr. K.R. Stowe, to discuss the implications of Monday's tragic events in Northern Ireland and in the Irish Republic and the Government's next moves.

Decisions

- i It was agreed that the Defence Secretary and the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland would prepare a joint paper for Cabinet on 30 August (which is not to be circulated in advance) covering both the objectives which the Government should pursue in any future discussions with the Irish Government, in order to improve cross-border security and to stiffen the Irish Government's policies towards the terrorists; and possible ways of improving the British Government's own security effort in Northern Ireland, including the improvement of co-operation between the Army and the RUC in intelligence and operational matters.
- ii It was agreed that the FCO would pursue urgently the question of ensuring that the Taoiseach is invited to attend the ceremonial funeral of Lord Mountbatten in Westminster Abbey next week; and that the invitation, when extended, would be accompanied by a message from the Prime Minister inviting Mr. Lynch to meet her during his visit to London for talks on the Irish problem.

Discussion

i The events of 27 August

Mr. Atkins gave his colleagues a report on his visit to Warrenpoint earlier in the day and on his discussions with the security authorities in Northern Ireland. He said that although there were very strong indications that the bombs which ambushed the British convoy at Warrenpoint had been ^{deposited} from south of the border, there was as yet no firm evidence of this; and that, similarly, it had not yet been established that any small arms fire had come from south of the border. The Garda had already detained two suspects in connection with the

Warrenpoint explosions, and two more in connection with the murder of Lord Mountbatten and his companions in Irish waters.

ii Future relations with the Irish Republic

There was general agreement that the key to the situation in Northern Ireland lay in Dublin, and also to some extent with the Pope. The Prime Minister said that the Government had to take decisions on the future approach to the Irish Government and on what the UK required of the Republic. It was pointed out that, for so long as Ireland held the EEC Presidency, the Irish had cards which they could play against the UK. It was agreed that the British Government could, if necessary, take steps to make the rest of the world more aware of the shortcomings of the Irish Government's policies towards the terrorists and of their implications. This might help to change the Irish Government's attitude on the extradition issue. The UK might be able to exert some leverage against the Republic in the context of the UK Nationality Act, although any moves in this direction would be complicated by the fact that both countries were members of the EEC. It might also be possible to step up administrative action against Irish immigrants to the UK, on the lines of the steps already being taken at UK channel ports against Algerians and Turks. It was, however, agreed that before a more confrontational policy with regard to the Irish Republic was considered, a further attempt should be made - at a meeting between the Prime Minister and Mr. Lynch - to enlist the Irish Government's effective co-operation, particularly in the intelligence field. If no progress resulted, other measures would have to be considered.

iii Possible measures within Northern Ireland

Mr. Atkins informed his colleagues of possible new measures which could be adopted within the Province, all of which carried both advantages and disadvantages. These included: the re-introduction of executive detention; the high profile for security operations; increased use of UDR; more vigorous use of the SAS; changes in the law, e.g. making it possible to accept as evidence in court the testimony of police officers of the rank of superintendent or above concerning membership of proscribed organisations; the proscription of the Provisional Sinn Fein; the closing of border roads; the withdrawal of police from border areas, thus relieving the Army from the duty of protecting the police; and the dispatch of more troops to Northern Ireland (there was general agreement that this last option should not be pursued further).

There was also some discussion of how co-operation between the RUC and the Army, particularly in the intelligence field, could be improved, possibly by the appointment of one Director of Operations who could exercise overall day-to-day control of operations both by the police and by the Army. It was agreed that this and other possible measures should be considered in the joint paper which the

SECRET

- 3 -

Northern Ireland Office and Ministry of Defence are to prepare for Cabinet on 30 August.

Possible ways of improving our intelligence concerning terrorist activities south of the border were also discussed. It was agreed that an arrangement with the Irish Government whereby British helicopters could cross the border freely and conduct surveillance within an area of, say, five kilometres south into Irish territory, would be of very considerable assistance to border security operations.

I am sending copies of this letter to John Chilcot (Home Office), Roger Facer (Ministry of Defence), Michael Richardson (Office of the Lord Privy Seal), George Walden (Foreign and Commonwealth Office) and Martin Vile (Cabinet Office).

M. A. PATTISON

J.G. Pilling, Esq.,
Northern Ireland Office.

SECRET



Prime Minister

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

This arrived late
on Friday evening
and I'm afraid I had
not seen it before your
meeting with the
Home Secretary this morning.

24 August 1979

Dear Brian,

Possible Meeting Between the Prime Minister and the Taoiseach

The Irish Ambassador called on instructions this afternoon on Ewen Fergusson to transmit an invitation to the Prime Minister for a meeting between Mrs Thatcher and the Taoiseach. Mr Lynch, as President of the European Council, thought that it could be useful if, at an appropriate time before the European Council in Dublin at the end of November, he and Mrs Thatcher could discuss the main EEC issues. But he also clearly envisaged that an indispensable topic would be Northern Ireland.

So far as timing is concerned, Mr Lynch leaves for a week's visit to the United States on 7 November, where he will be seeing President Carter and will be visiting the main Irish centres. Before then, Chancellor Schmidt will be in Dublin on 15 and 16 October and Chairman Hua on 28 October. Any other date would suit Mr Lynch, but his preference is for the end of October.

As for location, the Irish thought that, both because of Mr Lynch's Presidency of the European Council and because the balance of visits in the past has tilted heavily in London's favour (Mr Kennedy handed over the attached note), it would be appropriate for the meeting to be in Dublin.

The Irish were anxious for an early decision because they suspected that both Mr Lynch's and Mrs Thatcher's diaries would be filling up rapidly! Mr Lynch returned from holiday next Thursday and it would be helpful to have some indication of our reaction fairly soon after that. Meanwhile, of course, the suggestion would be kept very confidential indeed.

I am writing to you immediately because you may find it useful to be aware of the Irish suggestion straightaway. I shall let you have our advice, if possible together with that of the NIO, early next week.

I am copying this letter and enclosure to Joe Pilling (NIO) and Martin Vile (Cabinet Office).

Jan eve,
Stephe

(J S Wall)
Private Secretary

B G Cartledge Esq
10 Downing Street
LONDON

24 AUG 1979





Mr Heath and Mr Cosgrave met in London in July 1973

Mr Heath and Mr Cosgrave met in Dublin in September 1973

Mr Wilson and Mr Cosgrave met in London in April and in
September 1974

Mr Wilson and Mr Cosgrave met in Dublin in November 1974

Mr Wilson and Mr Cosgrave met in London in March 1976

Mr Callaghan and Mr Lynch met in London in September 1977
and in November 1978

Mr Lynch paid a courtesy call on Mrs Thatcher in London
on 10 May 1979

Ireland. 2

MINISTRY OF AGRICULTURE, FISHERIES AND FOOD
WHITEHALL PLACE, LONDON SW1A 2HH



From the Minister

The Rt Hon Margaret Thatcher MP
The Prime Minister
10 Downing Street
LONDON
SW1

Prime Minister

To note.

30 May 1979

6/2/1
30/5

*Spoken to Lynch
- has come?
are the rules
my meeting
arranged?
pub*

to Prime Minister

p.a.


??!

I have read the record of the interesting talk which you had with Jack Lynch on 10 May. Bearing in mind that the Irish are the next in line to hold the Presidency of the EEC Councils I have been considering whether a further discussion with him would pay dividends in those areas for which I have responsibility, but I have come to the conclusion that it would not.

On the CFP we are seeking initially to persuade the Commission to present revised proposals more in line with our interests, and it will be better not to work on other Member States until we have made some progress with the Commission.

The CAP has been of great benefit to Irish agriculture. Since they became members of the EEC their farm prices have roughly doubled while the volume of their production has increased by about a third, giving them the 300 per cent increase in output in money terms which Mr Lynch mentioned to you. As one would expect from a net food exporting nation, their position under the FEOGA budget is one of healthy net receipts and the CAP has also had a very beneficial effect on their trade. For these reasons they are unlikely to accept our point of view and it seems to me that if we attempted to convert them we might do no more than forearm them for the difficult negotiations we are bound to have in the Council.

PETER WALKER



30 MAY 1979



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FM DUBLIN 161420Z MAY 79
TO PRIORITY FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 91 OF 16 MAY
AND TO PRIORITY NIO BELFAST

Prime Minister
Better than I would
have expected! You
Markus
17/5

MEETING BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER AND THE TAOISEACH

1. ON 15 MAY MR LYNCH MADE A SHORT STATEMENT IN THE DAIL ABOUT HIS RECENT TALKS WITH MRS THATCHER. HE STATED:

"MY VISIT TO LONDON ON THURSDAY LAST AROSE FROM AN INVITATION WHICH I ACCEPTED ON 26 FEBRUARY 1979 FROM THE HONOURABLE SOCIETY OF THE MIDDLE TEMPLE TO BE THEIR GUEST AT A DINNER ON THAT DAY. I AVAILED OF THE OCCASION TO PAY A COURTESY CALL ON THE PRIME MINISTER.

WHILE IT WOULD NOT BE CUSTOMARY TO GO INTO THE DETAILS, I CAN SAY THAT OUR CONVERSATION TOUCHED ON A WIDE RANGE OF SUBJECTS SUCH AS NORTHERN IRELAND, INCLUDING NORTH/SOUTH ECONOMIC COOPERATION, EEC, EMS, AND OTHER BILATERAL MATTERS. THE MEETING LASTED HALF AN HOUR AND WAS WARM AND CORDIAL. WE AGREED THAT A FURTHER MEETING COULD BE ENVISAGED FOR A SUITABLE OCCASION IN THE FUTURE TO DISCUSS MATTER S OF COMMON INTEREST".

2. THERE WAS LITTLE FURTHER DISCUSSION: PADDY HARTE ASKED A SUPPLEMENTARY ABOUT THE BREAK WITH STERLING AND WAS TOLD THAT IT HAD NOT BEEN DISCUSSED. THE SPEAKER THEN DISALLOWED A SUPPLEMENTARY FROM NEIL BLANEY WHO ASKED IF THERE HAD BEEN ANY REFERENCE TO A DECLARATION OF INTENT TO WITHDRAW BRITISH TROOPS FROM NORTHERN IRELAND AND ANOTHER SUPPLEMENTARY FROM PADDY HARTE ASKING WHETHER THE IRISH GOVERNMENT WOULD TAKE AN INITIATIVE REGARDLESS OF WHAT THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT MIGHT DO.

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From - THE PRIVATE SECRETARY

Ireland



NORTHERN IRELAND OFFICE
GREAT GEORGE STREET,
LONDON SW1P 3AJ

Bryan Cartledge Esq
10 Downing Street
SW1

15 May 1979

Dear Bryan

*MBPM
6/21
16/5*

TAOISEACH'S CALL ON PRIME MINISTER, 10 MAY 1979

In your letter of 10 May to Paul Lever you ask how the Prime Minister should respond if the Taoiseach issues a more formal proposal that they should meet again on 28 May on the occasion of Greece's accession to the Community.

The FC0 will no doubt be advising you qua other matters; but as far as Northern Ireland is concerned my Secretary of State would urge strongly that the Prime Minister should avoid a further early occasion for a meeting with Mr Lynch at which the inevitable expectation would be that substantive exchanges on Northern Ireland could take place. Mr Atkins is hoping very shortly to make the acquaintance of the leading politicians in Northern Ireland and to listen to their views. Thereafter, he hopes to have a meeting with the Irish Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr O'Kennedy - indeed, he has already sent a message to Dublin saying as much. In this way he would hope by the latter part of June to be in a position to tender the Prime Minister his considered advice on the line she should take when she next has a meeting with Mr Lynch (which could well be in the margins of the European Council towards the end of June). Anything earlier than that would in his view be premature and should be avoided.

I am copying this to Roger Facer (Ministry of Defence), Tom Harris (Department of Trade), Garth Waters (Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food) and Martin Vile (Cabinet Office).


Yours sincerely
Mike Hopkins

M W HOPKINS

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AND TO IMMEDIATE NIO BELFAST

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MEETING BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER AND MR LYNCH:
PRESS REACTION

1. YESTERDAY'S MEETING BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER AND MR LYNCH AT NO. 10 DOWNING STREET IS FRONT PAGE NEWS TODAY IN THE THREE MAIN DUBLIN DAILIES. MR LYNCH APPARENTLY DESCRIBED THE MEETING AS "WARM AND CORDIAL" AND IT CLEARLY EMERGES THAT THE TALKS WERE OF AN EXPLORATORY NATURE. MR LYNCH IS REPORTED TO HAVE EXPRESSED THE HOPE THAT THE NEW BRITISH GOVERNMENT WILL TAKE A POLITICAL INITIATIVE ON THE NORTH. THE PRIME MINISTER IS SAID TO HAVE LISTENED TO MR LYNCH'S VIEWS BUT TO HAVE SUGGESTED THAT SHE AND MR ATKINS WOULD NEED MORE TIME TO ACQUAINT THEMSELVES FULLY WITH THE CURRENT SITUATION IN THE NORTH BEFORE RESPONDING MORE DEFINITELY. ON CROSS BORDER SECURITY, MR LYNCH IS REPORTED TO HAVE POINTED OUT THAT FOR A LONG TIME THERE HAVE BEEN NO COMPLAINTS FROM THE BRITISH SIDE ABOUT SECURITY COOPERATION FROM THE REPUBLIC. MENTION IS ALSO MADE OF THE FACT THAT THE DISCUSSIONS TOUCHED BRIEFLY ON THE CAP AND THE EMS.

2. THE IRISH TIMES OFFERS THE ONLY EDITORIAL COMMENT IN WHICH IT STATES THAT BRITAIN AND THE REPUBLIC HAVE A COMMON INTEREST IN "NEGOTIATING THEMSELVES OUT OF A SHAMEFUL AND BLOODY FINAL ACT TO A LONG PAGEANT" AND CLAIMS THAT MR LYNCH WILL NOT HAVE GONE TO LONDON AS A SUPPLIANT. THE EDITORIAL ALSO SUGGESTS THAT IN DEALING WITH THE NORTHERN PROBLEM MRS THATCHER'S PRACTICALITY AS A WOMAN MAY HELP HER TO GET THROUGH TO THE ESSENTIALS "WOMEN HAVE OFTEN MORE CUTTING MINDS THAN MEN. THEY ARE LESS BEMUSED BY FANTASY AND MYTHOLOGY".

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10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

10 May 1979

B.F. 17/5

Dear Paul,

The Taoiseach's call on the Prime Minister
at 10 Downing Street on 10 May 1979

As you know, the Taoiseach, Mr. Jack Lynch, called on the Prime Minister at No.10 this afternoon at 1530. He was accompanied only by his Private Secretary, Mr. Dermot Nally. The following are the main points of substance which arose during half an hour's conversation.

Northern Ireland

Mr. Lynch said that he was very glad that the Government had come to office with a majority sufficient to allow them to take positive action. The Prime Minister said that she had complete confidence in the new Secretary of State for Northern Ireland and that she was sure that Mr. Atkins would carry out his responsibilities very successfully. Mr. Lynch referred with appreciation to the message which Mr. Atkins had addressed to the Irish Foreign Minister Mr. O'Kennedy. The Prime Minister said that they would of course be very satisfied to work for a solution to the Northern Ireland problem but that the problem was of a nature which did not yield to instant solutions. Mr. Lynch stressed that he was not attempting to force any substantive discussion of Northern Ireland on the Prime Minister and recognised that she would need time to study the problem.

Later in the discussion, Mr. Lynch said that the Irish Government were looking forward to a more positive political approach in Northern Ireland. He would not use the phrase "power sharing", which he knew would not be well received, but the Irish Government did hope to see some form of shared responsibility in the North. Mr. Lynch referred to the late Mr. Airey Neave's ideas on Regional Councils and went on to comment that the local authority regime in Northern Ireland had in his view tended recently to revert to the old system, with all the discrimination in housing and other matters which had been associated with it. This process could quickly break down the goodwill which had slowly been created. Mr. Lynch said that he thought that co-operation between the Northern Irish police and the Republic on security matters had been of a high standard. It was of course difficult to control everything which happened south of the border; the Irish Government had set up

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special courts and had made it possible for convictions to be obtained for membership of the IRA on the evidence of a senior Garda officer. But, Mr. Lynch said, the Government's task was made much more difficult when people like Mr. James Molyneaux talked about the Republic being a "haven for terrorists".

Mr. Lynch said that in his view Mr. Roy Mason had made a mistake in proclaiming so loudly that the security forces in Northern Ireland were getting the better of the IRA. This put the IRA on their mettle and spurred them on.

Economic matters

Mr. Lynch said that the CAP had been of great benefit to Irish farmers, enabling them to increase production by 300% in five years. The Anglo/Irish trade agreements, however, had been very unfavourable to the Republic. On the EMS, Ireland had feared that when she joined the scheme the pound sterling would depreciate against the Irish pound; in the event, the reverse had happened and this was a great help to Irish industry. Mr. Lynch said his Government warmly welcomed the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary's recent statement on the EEC and the British Government's positive approach to Europe. Under the Labour Government, the United Kingdom had seemed to be dragging its feet at every level. Mr. Callaghan had been slow to encourage the concept of the EMS and in both the Agricultural and Energy Councils progress had been very significantly obstructed by British positions. The same had been true over fisheries. The Prime Minister commented that fisheries policy was a problem of great difficulty for the United Kingdom: fish was a common resource without a common market. Acknowledging this, Mr. Lynch described Irish efforts to build up Ireland's fishing industry.

In conclusion, Mr. Lynch commented that cross-border economic co-operation between Northern Ireland and the Republic was going ahead very well - with a low profile, but effectively. The Prime Minister has said that she would like to be briefed on this:

I should be grateful if a note on the progress made in cross-border economic co-operation to date could be prepared in time to reach me by 17 May.

dealt with in Ireland - cross border co-op.

Mr. Lynch suggested to the Prime Minister that they should get in touch in due course, with a view to arranging a more substantive meeting; the Prime Minister said that she would need some time to study the issues which they would wish to discuss. Mr. Lynch suggested that the Prime Minister might join the other EEC Heads of Government in attending the signing ceremony for the accession of Greece to the Community, which was to be held on 28 May. The Prime Minister said that she could not commit herself at this stage. I should be grateful for advice

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how she should respond to any more formal invitation which may be addressed to her.

It was agreed that Mr. Lynch's visit to No. 10 would be described to the Press by both sides as a courtesy call and that it would be made clear that there had been no substantive political discussion. Questioned by journalists outside No. 10 (with the Prime Minister looking on) Mr. Lynch said that although Northern Ireland, security matters and cross-border economic co-operation had been mentioned during his talk with Mrs. Thatcher, none of these subjects had been covered in detail.

I am sending copies of this letter to Joe Pilling (Northern Ireland Office), Roger Facer (Ministry of Defence) Tom Harris (Department of Trade), Garth Waters (Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food) and Martin Vile (Cabinet Office).

BK

Paul Lever, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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tw



NORTHERN IRELAND OFFICE
GREAT GEORGE STREET,
LONDON SW1P 3AJ

Bryan Cartledge Esq
10 Downing Street
SW1

9 May 1979

Dear Bryan,

VISIT OF TAOISEACH: 10 MAY 1979

I have now consulted the Secretary of State about the proposal that the Taoiseach should make a call on the Prime Minister when he is on a private visit to London on 10 May. It needs to be clearly understood on both sides that this is only a courtesy call, and the Secretary of State suggests the Prime Minister might like to take the following line.

She might assure Mr Lynch that the British Government are fully seized of the importance of the problems of Northern Ireland, and intend to do all they can to find ways both of improving the security situation and of making political progress. We recognise the interest of the Government of the Republic in a peaceful resolution of these problems. It is too soon to discuss them in substance now, but the Taoiseach can rest assured that we shall not let matters lie. Once the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland has had some discussion with politicians in the North, he will get in touch with Mr Michael O'Kennedy, the Irish Foreign Minister, with a view to arranging a meeting to consider these matters further. (Mr Atkins is sending a message today, saying this.)

We should like the Prime Minister to stress that at this stage constructive progress will be impeded by public comment by either Government about the substance of the problem or about the Governmental contacts. The press briefing by both Governments should emphasise that the visit was a short courtesy call arising from a private visit which Mr Lynch had arranged before the election was called and that there was no substantive discussion on Northern Ireland matters, which will take place in due course.

I am copying this to Paul Lever and Martin Vile.

Yours ever,

Joe

J G PILLING

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TO IMMEDIATE DUBLIN

TELEGRAM NUMBER 34 OF 9 MAY

PLEASE CONVEY FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR NORTHERN IRELAND TO THE IRISH FOREIGN MINISTER.

BEGINS:

HAVING JUST BEEN APPOINTED AS SECRETARY OF STATE FOR NORTHERN IRELAND, I SHOULD LIKE TO TAKE THIS EARLY OPPORTUNITY OF EXTENDING MY GREETINGS TO YOU AND OF EXPRESSING MY HOPE THAT, ONCE I HAVE BEEN ABLE TO SETTLE IN, WE SHALL HAVE AN OPPORTUNITY OF MEETING. YOU WILL NOT EXPECT ME, IN THESE FIRST FEW DAYS, TO EXPRESS ANY VIEWS ON THE SUBSTANCE, STILL LESS THE SOLUTION, OF THE PROBLEMS OF NORTHERN IRELAND. I APPROACH THESE WITH, I HOPE, AN OPEN MIND, BUT WITH A DETERMINATION TO FIND WAYS BOTH OF MAKING POLITICAL PROGRESS AND OF IMPROVING THE SECURITY SITUATION. HER MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT IS FULLY SEIZED OF THE IMPORTANCE OF BRINGING PEACE AND CONSTITUTIONAL STABILITY TO NORTHERN IRELAND; AND WE RECOGNISE THE INTEREST OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC IN ACHIEVING THIS. MAY I SUGGEST THAT THE BEST HOPE FOR MAKING PROGRESS WILL LIE, NOT IN THE PUBLIC EXCHANGE OF ARGUMENT, BUT IN PRIVATE TALKS? IT IS MY HOPE, ONCE I HAVE MADE SOME CONTACT WITH POLITICIANS IN THE NORTH AND HAD AN OPPORTUNITY TO BEGIN TO SIZE UP THE COMPLEX OF PROBLEMS WHICH NEED RESOLUTION, THAT WE MAY BE ABLE TO MEET FOR A FRANK EXCHANGE OF VIEWS. IN THIS WAY I SHALL BE ABLE, AT AN EARLY STAGE IN THE FORMULATION OF MY OWN IDEAS, TO TAKE FULLY INTO ACCOUNT THE INTERESTS OF THE IRISH GOVERNMENT IN A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT AND IN COMBATTING TERRORISM.

IF I MAY, I SHALL BE GETTING IN TOUCH WITH YOU ABOUT A MEETING BEFORE VERY LONG.

ENDS.

2. YOU SHOULD MAKE IT CLEAR THAT THE MESSAGE IS A PRIVATE ONE: WE DO NOT PROPOSE TO PUBLISH IT NOR, INDEED TO ANNOUNCE THAT A MESSAGE HAS BEEN SENT. WE ACCEPT HOWEVER THAT THE FACT (THOUGH NOT, WE HOPE, THE CONTENT) WILL BECOME KNOWN IN DUBLIN. IF ASKED WE SHALL SAY NO MORE THAN THAT A COURTESY MESSAGE HAS BEEN SENT, IN ACCORDANCE WITH NORMAL DIPLOMATIC PRACTICE.

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PRIME MINISTER

The Taoiseach's Call, 1530 on Thursday, 10 May 1979

The Taoiseach, Mr. Jack Lynch, is calling on you for half an hour at 1530 tomorrow. It has been emphasised to the Irish, and to the Press, that this is a courtesy call, made possible by Mr. Lynch's private visit (to attend a dinner in the Middle Temple) and that it will not be the occasion for any substantive discussion on Northern Ireland or any other subject.

! Nevertheless, it will be impossible to sit for half an hour with Mr. Lynch without mentioning Northern Ireland at all. The Northern Ireland Office suggest that you should take the following line, which I think should enable you to hold the position:

"The British Government are fully seized of the importance of the problems of Northern Ireland. We intend to do all we can to find ways both of improving the security situation and of making political progress.

"We fully recognise the interest of your Government in a peaceful resolution of these problems. It is too soon to discuss them in substance now: but you can rest assured that we shall not let matters lie.

"Once the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, Humphrey Atkins, has had some discussion with the politicians in the North, he will get in touch with your Foreign Minister (Michael O'Kennedy) with a view to arranging a meeting to consider these matters further.

"I should like to stress frankly to you my belief that, at this early stage, constructive progress would be impeded by public comment by either Government about the substance of the Northern Ireland problem or about Governmental contacts between us. In briefing the Press, I think we should both

/ emphasise

emphasise that your visit to No. 10 today is in the nature of a courtesy call and that I was very glad to take advantage of your presence in London to meet you; but that it has not been, and could not be, the occasion for substantive discussion between us."

Would you like a photocall with Mr. Lynch in the Front Hall when he arrives?

Mr. Lynch will be accompanied only by his Private Secretary, Mr. Dermot Nally. Additional briefing (mainly background) is attached in the folder below.

Jim.

9 May 1979

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

9 May 1979

Dear Bryan,

Visit by the Taoiseach: 10 May

Thank you for your letter of 6 May. The Embassy in Dublin have now confirmed that 3.30 pm on 10 May is convenient for Mr Lynch.

I attach a short brief, together with a personality note on Mr Lynch, and recent relevant telegrams from Dublin. The Northern Ireland Office are sending separately suggestions as to the line which the Prime Minister might take on Northern Ireland.

Mr Lynch is likely to be accompanied by Mr Dermot Nally, Deputy Secretary in the Taoiseach's office.

There has already been speculation in Dublin that the Taoiseach would be seeing the Prime Minister during his visit to London. It has been agreed that the Irish will now confirm this to the press, emphasising that his visit is private and was arranged long before the British General Election; and that his call on the Prime Minister will be a courtesy one and not an occasion for substantive talks.

I am copying this to Joe Pilling (NIO) and Martin Vile (Cabinet Office).

Yours etc

Paul

P Lever
Private Secretary

Bryan Cartledge Esq
10 Downing Street

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COURTESY CALL ON THE PRIME MINISTER BY THE TAOISEACH
1530 PM., THURSDAY, 10 MAY

BRIEF BY THE FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

Line to Take

Northern Ireland

A separate brief is being provided by the Northern Ireland Office.

See minute /
If the recent speech by Mr. Tip O'Neill, Speaker of the US House of Representatives, is raised, the Prime Minister might say that she fully recognises the contribution Mr. O'Neill has made in combatting Provisional IRA propoganda in the US, even if his choice of words left something to be desired.

Anglo/Irish Relations

Britain and the Irish Republic have a special relationship which goes beyond our common concerns over Northern Ireland. It is appropriate therefore that Mr. Lynch is the first head of government to call at No 10 since the General Election. We look forward to continued close cooperation in economic matters, including cooperation between the Republic and Northern Ireland.

European Community

The Government is determined to work constructively on the problems of the Community and to find means to

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29 MAY 1979

develop it. Britain and the Irish Republic have many common interests in the Community, and we hope we can continue to work closely together.

Currency Problems

We hope that the ending of parity between the Pound Sterling and the Irish Pound (Punt) is not causing serious problems in the border areas between the Republic and Northern Ireland

BACKGROUND NOTES

Irish Internal Political Scene

Mr. Lynch's Fianna Fáil has the largest majority in the Republic's history and he need not go to the country until June 1982. His personal authority is unchallenged, though his government faces serious economic problems: unemployment of 10 per cent or higher, inflation rates similar to the UK, industrial relations as bad as any in Europe. A Post Office strike is entering its eleventh week. A proposed "national understanding" between government, employers and trade unions seems likely to come unstuck. Nevertheless the Republic achieved $6\frac{1}{2}$ per cent growth last year.

Anglo/Irish Relations

Good, though dominated by the Northern Ireland problem, and by a "big-brother complex" on the Irish side. Irish Ministers, including Mr. Lynch himself, find it hard to resist criticising the British from time to time. For example, on 6 May Mr. Lynch called for a more positive British attitude to the European Community and contrasted British complaints over our alleged disproportionate contribution to Community funds (£600 million in 1980) with the cost of the British presence in Northern Ireland (£1,000 million).

Northern Ireland

The Irish Government will certainly be looking for a new political initiative by HMG, but they have not so

far produced any clear ideas as to what this might be. They would like to see a devolved government in Northern Ireland with some form of power sharing or participation by the minority. On Irish unity Mr. Lynch's latest formulation was "it is the wish of the great majority of all the people on our island that we all will ultimately come together, by consent, under agreed structures freely negotiated and in harmonious relationship with Britain". The Irish have lately been showing some interest in "wooing" the unionists in Northern Ireland.

Terrorism

The Irish authorities cooperate closely with HMG in combatting the Provisional IRA (PIRA). But the resources of the Irish police are limited.

Currency Problems

At the start of the European Monetary System the Irish declared their intention to maintain parity with Sterling. Sterling's recent rise led to a break and the Irish punt now stands at a few pence discount. The Irish have imposed exchange controls against the UK. As yet there has been no need for the UK to impose exchange controls against the Republic. Trade seems not to have been seriously affected. There is some awkwardness in the border areas between Northern Ireland and the Republic: but insofar as anyone is blamed for this it is the Irish Government not HMG.

57 LYNCH, JOHN (JACK)

Taoiseach.

Born Cork 1917. Educated at Christian Brothers School, Cork; University College Cork; and King's Inns, Dublin. Civil Servant 1936-45; barrister 1945; Deputy for Cork City since 1948; Parliamentary Secretary (with Gaeltacht responsibilities) 1951-4; Minister for the Gaeltacht 1957; for Education 1957-9; for Industry and Commerce 1959-65; for Finance 1965-6; Taoiseach 1966-73 and from 1977.

Mr Lynch comes from an apolitical family. He was asked by the Cork Fianna Fail organisation to stand in the 1948 General Election and entered politics with no real convictions. He resumed his law practice in opposition, from 1965-7, with some success.

Mr Lynch gave no great evidence of promise until he became Taoiseach in 1966 as the compromise candidate in a contest between Mr Colley and Mr Haughey. As Taoiseach, he was initially liked rather for his lack of vices than for his virtues. He gained a reputation for honesty (he is still known as "Honest Jack") and for getting things done by affability and persuasion rather than by noisy argument. He came under criticism for weakness in handling his ambitious subordinates - especially Mr Blaney (qv). However, the arms smuggling conspiracy of 1970 and the Northern troubles revealed a surprising degree of ruthlessness and political acumen in crushing his critics and rivals. At the same time, he was much criticised for his delay in bringing the scandal into the open and for his retention of the discredited Mr Gibbons (qv) in his Government.

On Northern Ireland, Mr Lynch has declared his aim to be peaceful reunification by gradual stages over a long timescale. He speaks of the need to "reconcile the two traditions" in Ireland under a constitution devoid of religious slant. In opposition, however, he was forced to accept a policy statement in October 1975 calling for a British declaration of intent to withdraw from Northern Ireland. The Party's 1977 landslide election victory was a personal triumph for Mr Lynch. He led the campaign "from the front" and his personal vote in his Cork constituency was the highest ever recorded. He was thus able to appoint his own men to positions of influence and has retained for himself the conduct of Northern Ireland policy. His commitment to eventual unity remains, but he has drawn back some way from the 1975 policy statement. He is a lack-lustre speaker but makes up for this with the electorate by a remarkable popular touch.

Mr Lynch is a good Irish speaker though not a fanatic. He was one of the all-time stars of hurling and Gaelic football and his sporting reputation has been a great political asset.

He is easy and pleasant to meet and has always been friendly towards the Embassy.

Married in 1946 Mairin O'Connor, a vivacious and attractive personality, who has worked conspicuously to help her husband in his career. She is said to have lost enthusiasm for politics and would happily see her husband retire from the leadership gracefully. They have no children, a matter of regret to both.

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TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 78 OF 7 MAY

AND TO IMMEDIATE NIO BELFAST

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INTERVIEW WITH MR COLLEY ON RTE RADIO: 6 MAY 1979

1. MR COLLEY, THE IRISH MINISTER FOR FINANCE AND TANAISTE (DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER), YESTERDAY GAVE AN INTERVIEW ON THE RTE CURRENT AFFAIRS PROGRAMME "THIS WEEK", IN WHICH HE REITERATED AND EXPANDED THE POINTS MADE IN HIS SPEECH ON 3 MAY (SEE SMITH'S LETTER TO BLUNT OF 4 MAY NOT TO ALL). THE FOLLOWING ARE MAJOR EXTRACTS FROM THE INTERVIEW:

- A. "WHAT I HAVE IN MIND IS THAT THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT WOULD INDICATE ITS INTEREST IN ACHIEVING UNITY IN THIS COUNTRY BY CONSENT, BUT THAT IT WOULD ALSO INDICATE THAT IT DID NOT PROPOSE TO GIVE A PERMANENT VETO TO THE UNIONISTS ON WHAT MIGHT HAPPEN. I SAY THAT FOR A NUMBER OF REASONS: FIRST OF ALL, THE BASIC POSITION IS THAT OF COURSE THE UNIONISTS ARE, IF YOU LIKE, AN ARTIFICIALLY CARVED OUT MAJORITY LOCALLY. THEY IN FACT REPRESENT A MINORITY OF THE PEOPLE OF IRELAND AND ITS QUITE ILLOGICAL TO SAY THAT IF YOU CARVE OUT A SPECIAL ARTIFICIAL MINORITY AND YOU GIVE IT SOME SANCTION IN THE BRITISH PARLIAMENT, THEREFORE THAT IT CANNOT BE CHANGED. BUT IN PRACTICE, AND MUCH MORE IMPORTANT I THINK, IS THE FACT THAT AS LONG AS THERE IS ANY UNIONIST WHO TRIES TO THINK IN TERMS OF - IN REALISTIC TERMS - ABOUT THE FUTURE OF THE UNIONIST PEOPLE IN RELATION TO THE REST OF THE PEOPLE IN IRELAND IS ACCUSED, AND CERTAINLY IS IN DANGER OF BEING ACCUSED OF TREASON TO HIS OWN CAUSE. WE WOULD HAVE A MUCH MORE REALISTIC REACTION FROM UNIONISTS IF THAT RIGHT OF VETO WERE NOT GUARANTEED AND UNDER-WRITTEN BY THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT..!"

- B. "IT IS ALSO CLEAR NOW, I THINK, THAT BRITAIN'S ALLY, THE USA, WOULD WELCOME AND INDEED SUPPORT A POSITIVE INITIATIVE IN REGARD TO BREAKING THE LOG JAM IN THE NORTH.... I DO NOT THINK EITHER THAT IT IS UNTRUE TO SAY THAT OUR PARTNERS IN THE EEC WOULD CERTAINLY WELCOME A MOVE WHICH WOULD TEND TO BREAK THE LOG JAM NOBODY IS SUGGESTING, BY THE WAY I WANT TO MAKE IT CLEAR, THAT WHAT IS INVOLVED IS FORCING THE UNIONISTS INTO A UNITED IRELAND. THIS IS NOT AT ISSUE. IT IS A QUESTION OF CHANGING THE BASIC GROUND RULES UNDER WHICH THE UNIONISTS OPERATE SO THAT THEY BEGIN TO THINK AND TALK IN A REALISTIC WAY."
- C. "I THINK IT WOULD BE MISLEADING FOR ANYBODY TO IMAGINE THAT WHAT I SAID WAS SOMETHING NEW. WE HAVE SAID THIS ON A NUMBER OF TIMES BEFORE, THE TAOISEACH HAS LAID IT DOWN, IT IS PART OF BASIC GOVERNMENT POLICY IN REGARD TO THE NORTH. THE FACT THAT I WAS SPEAKING ON ELECTION DAY WAS COINCIDENTAL IN FACT I WAS SPEAKING ON THE ANNIVERSARY OF THE EXECUTION OF PADRAIG PEARSE. IT SO HAPPENED THAT IT WAS BRITISH ELECTION DAY
- D. "I ALSO DREW ATTENTION TO THE FACT WHICH TOO OFTEN IS OVERLOOKED BY TOO MANY PEOPLE AND THAT IS, WHAT IS THE POSITION OF THE NON-UNIONIST POPULATION OF NORTHERN IRELAND? ARE THEY TO BE LEFT FOREVER AS SECOND CLASS CITIZENS EITHER UNDER, AS I SAID, A REVIVED STORMONT OR UNDER DIRECT RULE? THEY ARE IN MY VIEW, IN FACT ALL THE PEOPLE OF NORTHERN IRELAND ARE SECOND CLASS CITIZENS UNDER WHAT IS CALLED DIRECT RULE WHICH IS, AS I SAID, DIFFICULT TO DISTINGUISH FROM OLD FASHIONED COLONIAL RULE. THEY HAVE VIRTUALLY NO SAY IN WHAT HAPPENS IN THE ARRANGEMENTS MADE BY THE GOVERNMENT IN DAY TO DAY. THEY CANNOT QUESTION IT EXCEPT IN A VERY LIMITED WAY AND IT IS VERY CLOSE TO OLD FASHIONED COLONIAL RULE. I DO NOT THINK IT IS A POSITION THAT IS SATISFACTORY FOR VERY MANY PEOPLE. INDEED, I DO NOT THINK IT IS VERY SATISFACTORY FROM THE BRITISH POINT OF VIEW.."

/E. "THE

E. "THE REALITY OF THE SITUATION IS THAT AT SOME STAGE SOME BRITISH GOVERNMENT IS SIMPLY GOING TO DECIDE WE HAVE HAD ENOUGH AND PULL OUT WITHOUT ANY REAL PREPARATION, WITHOUT GIVING THE UNIONISTS FOR INSTANCE THE OPPORTUNITY, IN THOSE CIRCUMSTANCES, TO PUT FORWARD THE KIND OF THINGS THEY WOULD LIKE TO SEE IN SUCH CIRCUMSTANCES. NOBODY WANTS TO SEE THAT, AND WHAT I AM TALKING ABOUT REALLY, IS SOMETHING THAT WOULD GIVE UNIONISTS AN OPPORTUNITY TO PREPARE FOR THAT SITUATION, WHICH I BELIEVE IS INEVITABLE, BUT TO PREPARE FOR IT IN A WAY THAT SUITS THEM AS WELL AS THE REST OF THE PEOPLE OF IRELAND".

2. LATER IN THE SAME RADIO PROGRAMME DR FITZGERALD, THE FINE GAEL LEADER, SHARPLY CRITICISED MR COLLEY, SAYING THAT HE HAD FOUND MR COLLEY'S SPEECH OF 3 MAY "DEEPLY DEPRESSING". WHAT MR COLLEY HAD SAID ABOUT THE "BRITISH GUARANTEE" WAS NONSENSE AND SHOWED A LACK OF UNDERSTANDING OF THE NORTHERN PROBLEM AND A LACK OF SENSITIVITY. THE "BRITISH GUARANTEE" SIMPLY ENSURED THAT HMG WOULD DO WHAT THE MAJORITY IN THE NORTH WANTED. DR FITZGERALD SAID THAT THIS WAS THE MOST THAT THE REPUBLIC COULD REASONABLY HOPE FOR.

3. DR FITZGERALD ALSO CALLED ON THE NEW BRITISH GOVERNMENT TO TRY AGAIN TO ESTABLISH A SYSTEM OF DEVOLVED SELF-GOVERNMENT IN THE NORTH WITH THE PARTICIPATION OF BOTH SECTIONS OF THE COMMUNITY: "THE FACT THAT SOMETHING FAILS IN PARTICULARLY UNFAVOURABLE CONDITIONS DOESN'T MEAN THAT IF YOU TRY AGAIN, WITH PERHAPS SOME IMAGINATION, MAKING SOME CHANGES IN THE FORMULA, TO GET PEOPLE OFF HOOKS THAT THEY ARE ON, THAT YOU WON'T HAVE CHANCE OF SUCCEEDING. I THINK THERE IS THAT CHANCE".

4. SEE ALSO MY TWO I.F.T.

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FM DUBLIN 081625Z MAY 79
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 82 OF 8 MAY
AND TO NIO BELFAST
INFO ROUTINE WASHINGTON AND MODUK

NEW BRITISH GOVERNMENT: IRISH PRESS REACTIONS

1. THE GENERAL TONE OF THE PRESS REACTIONS FOLLOWING THE APPOINTMENT OF THE NEW BRITISH GOVERNMENT HAS BEEN CAUTIOUS AND RESTRAINED. ATTENTION HAS, INEVITABLY, FOCUSSED LARGELY ON THE APPOINTMENT OF MR ATKINS AS NORTHERN IRELAND SECRETARY AND ON THE POSSIBILITY THAT THE NEW GOVERNMENT MAY EMBARK ON A POLITICAL INITIATIVE. MR ATKINS' APPOINTMENT HAS BEEN GREETED WITH A MIXTURE OF SURPRISE AND PUZZLEMENT. THE GENERAL OPINION IS THAT, ALTHOUGH HE IS NOT A WELL-KNOWN FIGURE AND HAS NO PERSONAL INVOLVEMENT IN THE NORTHERN PROBLEM, HE HAS IN HIS FAVOUR HIS EXPERIENCE AS CHIEF WHIP AND THE FACT THAT HE IS ALLEGED TO BE A "GOOD LISTENER". THE HOPE IS ALSO EXPRESSED THAT, AS A NEWCOMER TO THE NORTHERN PROBLEM, MR ATKINS MAY BRING FRESH IDEAS FOR DEALING WITH IT.

2. THE IRISH TIMES STATES IN AN EDITORIAL THAT MR ATKINS IS "RELATIVELY UNKNOWN" AND THAT, BECAUSE HE IS THE PRODUCT OF A PUBLIC SCHOOL WHICH GIVES THE BRITISH ARMY MANY OF ITS MOST NOTABLE OFFICERS, HE MUST KNOW "THE SERVICE ANGLE". THE EDITORIAL GOES ON TO ASK "WILL HE LEARN ABOUT THE HUMAN PROBLEM? THE GOVERNMENT HERE IS RIGHTLY ANXIOUS, BUT NOT UNWELCOMING". THE IRISH INDEPENDENT SAYS THAT THE VERY MOST THAT CAN BE SAID ABOUT MR ATKINS AT THIS EARLY STAGE IS THAT HE APPROACHES THE PROBLEMS OF THE NORTH WITH AN OPEN MIND. THE INDEPENDENT ARGUES THAT HE SHOULD BE GIVEN "A GOOD LONG TIME TO READ AND TALK HIMSELF INTO HIS NEW AND VERY ONEROUS POSITION BEFORE DEMANDS ARE MADE ON HIM", AND ALSO POINTS OUT THAT ALTHOUGH MRS THATCHER "BANGS THE LAW AND ORDER DRUM A LITTLE TOO LOUD FOR SOME PEOPLE'S TASTES, SHE MUST BE SHREWD ENOUGH TO REALISE THAT LAW AND ORDER WITH A POLITICAL INITIATIVE WOULD HAVE A MUCH BETTER CHANCE OF SUCCEEDING THAN OTHER APPROACHES HAVE IN THE PAST". THE CORK EXAMINER TAKES A SIMILAR LINE.

3. THE IRISH PRESS, ON THE OTHER HAND, ADOPTS A CARPING TONE, SUGGESTING THAT MRS THATCHER HAS INDICATED THAT NORTHERN IRELAND RATES PRETTY LOW IN HER LIST OF POLITICAL PRIORITIES BY PICKING A MAN WITH NO PREVIOUS MINISTERIAL EXPERIENCE FOR NORTHERN SECRETARY. HOWEVER, THE SAME PAPER ADMITS THAT MR ATKINS' APPOINTMENT MAY BE "GOOD NEWS IF IT ENABLES HIM TO BRING TO THE JOB A FRESH AND IMAGINATIVE APPROACH". COMMENTING ON THE CABINET AS A WHOLE, THE IRISH PRESS SAYS THAT THERE IS VERY MUCH A LOOK OF YESTERDAY'S MEN ABOUT IT.

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TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 83 OF 8 MAY

INFO IMMEDIATE NIO BELFAST

MY TELS NOS 78 AND 80, PARA 4: STATEMENT BY MR COLLEY

1. I SAW NELIGAN, DFA, THIS AFTERNOON AT HIS SUGGESTION. HE TOLD ME THAT MINISTERIAL GUIDANCE WAS NOW AVAILABLE ON THE LINE TO BE TAKEN WITH REGARD TO WHAT MR COLLEY HAD SAID ON "THE BRITISH GUARANTEE". WHAT HAD COME DOWN FROM THE TAOISEACH'S OFFICE WAS SIMPLY TO THE EFFECT THAT THERE HAD BEEN NO MODIFICATION IN IRISH POLICY ON THE NORTHERN QUESTION, WHICH REMAINED AS SET OUT IN RECENT STATEMENTS BY THE TAOISEACH HIMSELF AND THE MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS. NELIGAN WENT ON TO REPEAT WHAT NALLY HAD SAID TO ME YESTERDAY ABOUT THE CLEAR DIFFERENCE IN EMPHASIS BETWEEN THE TAOISEACH'S OWN RECENT STATEMENTS AND COLLEY'S SPEECH: THE TERMS USED BY MR COLLEY WERE NOT THOSE WHICH THE TAOISEACH WOULD HAVE USED. WHILE THERE WAS NO QUESTION OF MR COLLEY'S STATEMENT BEING OFFICIALLY DISOWNED, NELIGAN SAID THAT HE INTERPRETED THIS GUIDANCE TO MEAN THAT IT WAS REGARDED AS "ABERRANT".

2. SPEAKING PERSONALLY, NELIGAN ADDED THAT HE WAS CONCERNED ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY THAT COLLEY'S STATEMENT AND THE TAOISEACH'S REMARKS IN CORK MIGHT GIVE SOME IMPRESSION OF A CONCERTED ATTEMPT BY THE IRISH GOVERNMENT TO PUT IMMEDIATE PRESSURE ON THE NEW BRITISH GOVERNMENT WITH REGARD TO THE NORTHERN QUESTION. HE DID NOT HIMSELF BELIEVE THAT SUCH AN IMPRESSION WAS JUSTIFIED: TO THE BEST OF HIS KNOWLEDGE, THE STATEMENTS BY LYNCH AND COLLEY HAD NOT BEEN IN ANY WAY CONCERTED, NOR WAS THE IDEA OF PUTTING IMMEDIATE PRESSURE ON THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT IN LINE WITH ANY OF THE OFFICIAL BRIEFING FOR MINISTERS OF WHICH HE WAS AWARE. THAT SAID HOWEVER, NELIGAN NOTED THAT IT REMAINED IRISH GOVERNMENT POLICY TO LOOK TO THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT FOR AN INITIATIVE ON THE NORTH.

STAPLES

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CABINET OFFICE

MR FERGUSSON

MR PH MOBERLY

PS

PS/SIR R GILMOUR

PS/MR RIDLEY

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BRITAIN AND THE EEC

1. TODAY'S DUBLIN NEWSPAPERS ALL CARRY FRONT-PAGE REPORTS OF REMARKS WHICH THE TAOISEACH MADE TO NEWSMEN IN CORK ON 6 MAY AT A PRESS CONFERENCE TO INTRODUCE FIANNA FAIL CANDIDATES FOR THE FORTHCOMING EUROPEAN ELECTIONS. THERE IS NO TEXT OF MR LYNCH'S REMARKS.
2. HE IS REPORTED TO HAVE SAID THAT WITH HINDSIGHT IT APPEARED TO THE IRISH GOVERNMENT THAT GENERAL DE GAULLE WAS RIGHT IN 1961 IN VETOING BRITISH MEMBERSHIP OF THE COMMUNITY BECAUSE OF DOUBTS ABOUT THEIR DEDICATION TO THE EUROPEAN IDEAL. HE THOUGHT THAT IT WAS TIME THAT THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT DECIDED WHETHER OR NOT THEY WISHED TO MAINTAIN THE IDEA OF EUROPEAN UNITY AND HOPED THAT THE NEW GOVERNMENT WOULD SHOW A MORE OUTGOING ATTITUDE TO THE COMMUNITY THAN HAD BEEN THE CASE IN THE LAST TWO YEARS . BRITISH COMPLAINTS ABOUT THEIR CONTRIBUTION TO THE EUROPEAN BUDGET WERE UNREALISTIC. THE BRITISH PRESENCE IN THE NORTH WAS COSTING THEM £1,000, MILLION A YEAR. IN VIEW OF THIS THEY APPEARED TO BE MAKING A LOT OF NOISE ABOUT THE £600 MILLION WHICH THEY CLAIMED THEY WOULD BE PAYING TO THE COMMUNITY IN 1980. CLAIMS THAT THEY WILL SOON BE THE GREATEST NET CONTRIBUTORS TO THE COMMUNITY BUDGET IGNORED THE BENEFITS OF MEMBERSHIP TO BRITAIN PARTICULARLY THOSE ACCRUING FROM MCAS. BECAUSE OF HER INSISTENCE ON MAINTAINING A CHEAP FOOD POLICY BRITAIN WAS BENEFITTING TO THE EXTENT OF £1 MILLION A DAY BEING PAID BY OTHER EEC COUNTRIES EXPORTING TO BRITAIN. IN GENERAL THE BRITISH HAD BEEN DRAGGING THEIR FEET IN RELATION TO MANY ASPECTS OF THE COMMUNITY, PARTICULARLY THE CAP. THIS WAS NOT A FULLY REALISTIC ATTITUDE AS COMMUNITY MEMBERSHIP INVOLVED BOTH BENEFITS AND OBLIGATIONS.

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TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 80 OF 7 MAY

AND TO IMMEDIATE NIO BELFAST

INFO ROUTINE WASHINGTON AND BIS NEW YORK

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MY TELS 79 AND 78 : COMMENT

1. MR LYNCH'S REMARKS ARE DEPRESSING THOUGH NOT ENTIRELY SURPRISING. SOME OF THE CRITICISMS HAVE BEEN MADE BEFORE, NOTABLY THOSE ABOUT OUR SO-CALLED CHEAP FOOD POLICY WHICH IS SOMETHING OF AN OBSESSION WITH IRISH POLITICIANS OF ALL PARTIES, BUT IT IS THE FIRST TIME (THAT I AM AWARE) THAT THE GHOST OF GENERAL DE GAULLE HAS BEEN RATTLED IN IRELAND. THE TONE NEVERTHELESS APPEARS TO BE ONE MORE OF SORROW THAN ANGER. MR LYNCH MAY HAVE THOUGHT IT AN APPROPRIATE OCCASION TO PUT IT TO THE INCOMING BRITISH GOVERNMENT THAT MEMBER STATES ARE EXPECTING A MORE FORTH-COMING AND COMMITTED ATTITUDE TO EUROPE. HOWEVER, THE CONNEXION WHICH HE MADE BETWEEN CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE COMMUNITY BUDGET AND BRITISH GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURE IN THE NORTH IS DISOBLIGING, AND HIS STRICTURES ABOUT THE PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT'S EEC POLICY ARE VERY SHARP.
2. MR COLLEY'S SPEECH WAS MADE AT THE PEARSE MEMORIAL CEREMONY, I.E. IN A CONTEXT IN WHICH IT IS APPROPRIATE FOR SOMEWHAT REPUBLICAN REMARKS TO BE MADE BY A FIANNA FAIL MINISTER, PARTICULARLY A MINISTER LIKE MR COLLEY WHO IS KNOWN TO HOLD STRONG PERSONAL VIEWS ON THE SUBJECT. THE DATE OF THE CEREMONY IS FIXED BY THE ANNIVERSARY OF PEARSE'S EXECUTION AND IT IS A COINCIDENCE THAT THIS WAS ALSO THE DATE OF OUR ELECTION (AS MR COLLEY OBSERVED DURING THE RADIO INTERVIEW ON SUNDAY). BUT AS HIS REMARKS WERE REPEATED TO THE RADIO AUDIENCE, IT CANNOT SO EASILY BE CLAIMED THAT MR COLLEY WAS MERELY REPEATING WHAT HAD BEEN APPROPRIATE TO A PARTICULAR OCCASION. WHILE THE DUBLIN NEWSPAPERS THIS MORNING HAVE GIVEN LITTLE PROMINENCE TO COLLEY'S RADIO INTERVIEW, THUS IMPLYING THAT THEY SEE IT AS LITTLE MORE THAN A REITERATION OF THE SPEECH, THIS UNDERESTIMATES THE FACT THAT, BY SPEAKING ON RTE'S MOST POPULAR RADIO PROGRAMME OF THE WEEK, MR COLLEY WAS REACHING A MUCH LARGER AUDIENCE.

3. WE HAVE BEEN TOLD BY DUNLOP, THE GOVERNMENT SPOKESMAN, THAT COLLEY'S SPEECH WAS PREPARED ALONG THE GENERAL LINES OF AN OUTLINE LAID DOWN BY COLLEY HIMSELF AND THAT COLLEY APPROVED THE TEXT OF THE SPEECH BEFORE IT WENT OUT. THUS HE DID NOT MAKE HIS REMARKS BY MISTAKE. BUT IT ALSO SEEMS CLEAR THAT THE SPEECH WAS NOT CLEARED ROUND THE VARIOUS MINISTRIES INVOLVED, SINCE THE DFA SEEM GENUINELY TO HAVE HAD NO PRIOR KNOWLEDGE OF THE CONTENT. DUNLOP ALSO SAID THAT THE SPEECH WAS OF A TYPE WHICH WOULD HAVE BEEN CLEARED WITH THE TAOISEACH IF IT HAD BEEN MADE BY A JUNIOR MINISTER BUT SINCE COLLEY WAS TANAISTE THIS HAD NOT HAPPENED, DUNLOP CLAIMED THAT COLLEY'S SPEECH REFLECTED GOVERNMENT POLICY ALBEIT WITH A DIFFERENCE IN TONE FROM THE TAOISEACH'S RECENT FORMULATION OF POLICY. (COLLEY HIMSELF STATED THT THERE WAS NOTHING NEW IN HIS SPEECH).

4. I CALLED ON NALLY (DEPUTY SECRETARY, TAOISEACH'S OFFICE) THIS AFTERNOON. I EXPLAINED THAT, NO DOUBT ON ACCOUNT OF THE HOLIDAY TODAY IN LONDON, I HAD NO FURTHER INSTRUCTIONS ON THE PROPOSED CALL BY THE TAOISEACH ON THE PRIME MINISTER ON 10 MAY. NEVERTHELESS, IN VIEW OF THE INTEREST SHOWN BY THE MEDIA IN THE MOST RECENT REMARKS BY MR LYNCH AND MR COLLEY (MY TWO IPTS), I THOUGHT IT WOULD BE USEFUL IF HE COULD COMMENT IN ANY WAY ON WHAT HAD BEEN SAID BY THE TWO MINISTERS. NALLY SAID THAT HE HAD NOT YET HAD AN OPPORTUNITY TO DISCUSS MR COLLEY'S SPEECH WITH THE TAOISEACH, WHO WAS STILL IN CORK AND NOT EXPECTED BACK UNTIL LATE TODAY. SPEAKING PERSONALLY AND ON THE BASIS OF HIS OWN CLOSE KNOWLEDGE OF THE TAOISEACH'S THINKING, HE SAID THAT HE HAD DETECTED A CLEAR DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE POINTS MADE BY MR COLLEY AND THE TAOISEACH'S APPROACH TO THESE PROBLEMS: HE WAS EXTREMELY DOUBTFUL WHETHER WHAT MR COLLEY HAD SAID WAS TO BE REGARDED AS THE OFFICIAL POLICY LINE OF THE IRISH GOVERNMENT. HE COULD NOT COMMENT FURTHER UNTIL HE HAD HAD A CHANCE TO DISCUSS THIS WITH THE TAOISEACH HIMSELF SOME TIME TOMORROW.

/5. ON

5. ON THE TAOISEACH'S REMARKS IN CORK NALLY ADMITTED, SPEAKING STRICTLY PERSONALLY AND NOT FOR QUOTATION (PLEASE PROTECT), THAT HE WAS SURPRISED BY THE TONE OF WHAT LYNCH HAD SAID. HE ASKED WHETHER I HAD ANY COMMENT. I REPLIED THAT I HAD NO INSTRUCTIONS. I CALLED NALLY'S ATTENTION TO YOUR STATEMENT (AS REPORTED BY THE BBC THIS MORNING) ABOUT THE MORE POSITIVE ATTITUDE OF THE NEW BRITISH GOVERNMENT TO THE COMMUNITY. I COULD COMMENT ONLY LIKE HIMSELF ON A PERSONAL BASIS: IT SEEMED INEVITABLE THAT THE TAOISEACH'S REPORTED APPROVAL OF THE FRENCH VETO ON BRITISH ENTRY INTO THE COMMUNITY WOULD BE REGARDED AS DISOBLIGING, AND HIS REFERENCE TO BRITAIN'S SO-CALLED "CHEAP FOOD POLICY" AND HIS DESCRIPTION OF MCAS AS A SUBSIDY TO THE BRITISH CONSUMER AS UN-HELPFUL.

6. REVERTING TO MR LYNCH'S POSSIBLE CALL ON THE PRIME MINISTER, NALLY SUGGESTED THAT THESE WERE POINTS THAT COULD BE TAKEN UP THEN. I REMINDED NALLY THAT WE HAD BEEN TALKING ALL ALONG OF THE POSSIBILITY OF A SHORT COURTESY CALL, WITHOUT SUBSTANTIVE DISCUSSION OF OUTSTANDING PROBLEMS.

7. IMPLICATIONS FOR PROPOSED CALL ON PM BY MR LYNCH.

THE TAOISEACH'S REMARKS IN CORK AND COLLEY'S SPEECH ON 3 MAY WERE BOTH MADE IN SPECIAL CIRCUMSTANCES AND SHOULD BE SEEN IN THAT LIGHT. HOWEVER, THE FACT THAT BOTH THE TAOISEACH AND THE TANAISTE HAVE CHOSEN TO SPEAK IN THESE TERMS IS LIABLE TO BE SEEN HERE AS THE IRISH GOVERNMENT'S SERVING NOTICE ON THE NEW BRITISH GOVERNMENT RIGHT FROM THE OUTSET OF THE LINES THEY PROPOSE TO TAKE. YOU MAY THEREFORE WISH TO LOOK AGAIN AT THE QUESTION OF WHETHER IT IS APPROPRIATE FOR MR LYNCH TO BE INVITED TO SEE THE PRIME MINISTER ON 10 MAY PURELY FOR A COURTESY CALL.

8. WHATEVER THE ACTUAL CONTENT OF A MEETING BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER AND THE TAOISEACH, THE MEDIA IN THIS COUNTRY WOULD VERY PROBABLY INTERPRET IT AS THE FULFILMENT OF RECENT PUBLICISED SUGGESTIONS THAT MR LYNCH WOULD BE AN EARLY CALLER ON THE NEW BRITISH GOVERNMENT, LOOKING TO THEM FOR A NEW INITIATIVE ON THE NORTH. MOREOVER, GIVEN THESE LATEST MINISTERIAL STATEMENTS, IT MAY WELL BE DIFFICULT TO AVOID REFERENCE TO THEM EVEN IN THE SCOPE OF A SHORT MEETING (SEE NALLY'S SUGGESTION IN PARA 6 ABOVE). /IF I

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IF I AM RIGHT IN ASSUMING THAT THE PRIME MINISTER WOULD NOT AT THIS STAGE WISH TO SEE MR LYNCH FOR ANY SUBSTANTIVE DISCUSSION OF THE POLITICAL ISSUES WHICH HE AND MR COLLEY HAD RAISED , IT MIGHT THEREFORE BE SIMPLER TO CALL OFF THE PROPOSED MEETING. THIS COULD BE DONE PURELY ON THE GROUNDS OF THE MANY OTHER CALLS ON A PRIME MINISTER'S TIME AT THE PRESENT STAGE. IN THAT CASE, YOU MIGHT THINK IT APPROPRIATE TO INSTRUCT ME, IN CONVEYING THE MESSAGE, TO ADD THAT THE PRIME MINISTER LOOKED FORWARD TO AN EARLY OPPORTUNITY OF MEETING MR LYNCH, PERHAPS WITH THE SUGGESTION OF A BILATERAL MEETING DURING THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL NEXT MONTH.

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

8 May 1979

Dear Bryan,

The Taoiseach's Visit to London, 10 May

Thank you for your letter of 6 May about the Taoiseach's forthcoming private visit to London.

Lord Carrington has confirmed that he thinks it important that the Prime Minister should offer to see Mr Lynch. We are therefore arranging for our Embassy in Dublin to seek confirmation from the Taoiseach's Office that Mr Lynch would be able to call on the Prime Minister at 15.30 on 10 May.

I am sending copies of this letter to Joe Pilling (Northern Ireland Office) and Martin Vile (Cabinet Office).

Yours etc

Paul
(P Lever)
Private Secretary

Bryan G Cartledge Esq
10 Downing Street
LONDON

*P.O.
G.M.
9/5*

18 MAY 1979



CONFIDENTIAL



Ireland

DS.

BF 9/5/79

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

6 May 1979

The Taoiseach's visit to London, 10 May 1979

Thank you for your letter of 2 May about the forthcoming private visit to London by the Taoiseach on Thursday, 10 May.

In view of the mounting pressures on the Prime Minister's diary for the coming week, I decided to seek her view on a possible courtesy call at No.10 by Mr. Lynch without waiting for the further advice promised in your letter (which, together with Mike Hopkins' letter of 3 May to you, the Prime Minister has seen).

If the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary sees no objection to a call by the Taoiseach, the Prime Minister will be prepared to see Mr. Lynch for a brief courtesy call of no more than half an hour on 10 May at 1530. If Lord Carrington is content, I should be grateful if you would arrange for HM Ambassador in Dublin to seek early confirmation that Mr. Lynch would be able to come to No.10 at that time; and if it could be made clear to the Irish that, in view of the Prime Minister's heavy commitments on 10 May the call should be regarded as purely a courtesy one and that it will have to be of short duration.

I should be grateful if a short brief could be prepared for the Prime Minister's meeting with Mr. Lynch: this should reach me not later than 1300 on Wednesday, 9 May. It will be helpful if you could let me know at the same time who will accompany Mr. Lynch when he calls at No.10

I am sending a copy of this letter to Joe Pilling (Northern Ireland Office) and Martin Vile (Cabinet Office).

B. G. CARTLEDGE

Paul Lever, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CONFIDENTIAL

PRIME MINISTER

The Taoiseach (Mr. Jack Lynch)

The Irish Prime Minister, Mr. Lynch, is paying a private visit to London on 10 May to attend a dinner that evening in the Middle Temple. His office have indicated to our Ambassador in Dublin that although he is very much aware of your heavy commitments during the coming week, he would welcome the opportunity of meeting you on that day.

I attach advice from the FCO and from the Northern Ireland Office, which is to the effect that so long as his call were to be strictly of a courtesy nature and brief, there would on balance be advantage in your agreeing to see Mr. Lynch if you felt able to do so.

Agreed 10/5

There is clearly a risk that the Irish would give the Press a misleading impression of any conversation which you might have with Mr. Lynch, exaggerating its political substance and emphasising any statement of policy which Mr. Lynch might wish to make to you. The Irish have not been scrupulous in such matters in the past. However, I think there might be an equal risk that they would misrepresent the absence of any contact between you and Mr. Lynch during his visit to London; they might hint, for example, that you had declined to see him.

On balance, I think that it would be right for you to see Mr. Lynch, but in such a way as to make it obvious to the Press and to the public that his visit to No. 10 was no more than a courtesy call. This could be done if you were to see him immediately prior to Chancellor Schmidt's arrival at No. 10, planned for 17.30. If you were to ask Mr. Lynch to come here at 17.00 you could end the call at, say, 17.20 on the excuse of the Chancellor's imminent arrival and it would be clear to everybody that a call lasting only 20 minutes could not have contained any political substance.

Would you like to adopt this approach?

4 May 1979

I think you are reasoning that the timings too close. Suggest 1/2 hr. 3.30 → 4pm



NORTHERN IRELAND OFFICE
GREAT GEORGE STREET,
LONDON SW1P 3AJ

Paul Lever Esq
PS/Secretary of State for
Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
Downing Street
SW1

3 May 1979

Dear Paul

VISIT BY THE TAOISEACH: 10 MAY 1979

Thank you for sending Joe Pilling a copy of your letter of 2 May to Bryan Cartledge about the Taoiseach's private visit to London on 10 May.

We accept that it would be appropriate, if time can be spared, for the Prime Minister to offer Mr Lynch the opportunity of a short courtesy call as long as it can be clearly understood on both sides that it is to be - and is to be presented publicly as - no more than that. It will obviously be much too early for the new administration to be entering into any substantive discussion of Northern Ireland problems, and it will be desirable to make this quite clear when the invitation is issued - indeed, perhaps that point might be made through prior informal contact with the Irish.


We shall separately suggest to the new Secretary of State for Northern Ireland that he sends an early, private message to the Irish Minister for Foreign Affairs saying that he looks forward to a relatively early talk with him. The Prime Minister could mention this proposed meeting to the Taoiseach in confidence, with the implication that it would be the next substantive contact between the ^{TWO} Governments on the Northern Ireland problem.

I am copying this to Bryan Cartledge (No 10) and Martin Vile (Cabinet Office).

Yours sincerely
M W Hopkins

M W HOPKINS

23 MAY 1979



CONFIDENTIAL



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

2 May 1979

Dear Bryan,

Visit by the Taoiseach: 10 May 1979

Mr Jack Lynch will be paying a private visit to London on 10 May to attend a dinner that evening in the Middle Temple. His office have indicated that while he would certainly welcome an opportunity to meet the Prime Minister, he would not wish the latter to feel under any obligation to see him since he recognises the heavy pressures which there will be on the Prime Minister's time during the first week after the General Election.

The question is clearly one on which the Prime Minister in the new administration will wish to have the early advice of both the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary and the Northern Ireland Secretary, so that any invitation or message to Mr Lynch can be conveyed in good time. The purpose of this letter is both to draw your attention to the visit and to let you and the Northern Ireland Office know the advice which the Department expects to tender to the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary. This might make it possible, after the election, to clear a decision very rapidly.

We can be sure, whatever the outcome of the Election, that the Taoiseach will be looking forward to an early meeting with the Prime Minister to discuss matters of substance, especially Northern Ireland. Such a meeting will need to be carefully prepared and its timing will be a matter of some sensitivity in Northern Ireland. However a courtesy call on the Prime Minister, if it could be arranged, would do no more than emphasise the special nature of the Anglo-Irish relationship; it need not assume particular significance in the Northern Ireland context and the Department would hope that the Prime Minister could spare the time for a very brief meeting, despite the inconvenience of the timing. We should of course wish, in conveying any invitation, to make it quite clear that the Prime Minister would not want at this stage to engage in any substantive discussion about Northern Ireland; and press coverage would need to be handled with care.

As regards timing, Chancellor Schmidt is arriving on the evening of 10 May, which suggests that if the Prime Minister was prepared to see Mr Lynch, their meeting might take place earlier that day. Mr Lynch would probably be ready to adjust his travel plans accordingly.

/If

Bryan Cartledge Esq
10 Downing Street

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If a courtesy call cannot be arranged, you may think that it would be possible to arrange for a message of regrets to go from the Prime Minister to the Taoiseach, looking forward to an early meeting, for example at the European Council in Strasbourg on 21/22 June.

I am copying this letter to Joe Pilling (NIO) and Martin Vile (Cabinet Office).


Yours etc

A handwritten signature in blue ink, appearing to be 'Paul', written in a cursive style.

P Lever
Private Secretary

CONFIDENTIAL

23 MAY 1979



END

Filmed at the National
Archives (TNA) in London

February 2010