

S  
804

PREM 19/81

SECRET

PART 2

Confidential File

The Situation in Northern Ireland.  
Terrorist bombings resulting in  
the deaths of Lord Mountbatten and  
Members of the Security Forces at  
Warrenpoint. ~~Establishment of a Security Directorate~~

IRELAND

PT 1. MAY 1979

PT 2 AUGUST 1979

Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date
<del>30.8.79</del>							
<del>3.9.79</del>							
<del>5.9.79</del>							
<del>6.9.79</del>							
<del>11.9.79</del>							
<del>13.9.79</del>							
<del>26.9.79</del>							
<del>2.10.79</del>							
28.9.79							
- ENDS -							

PREM 19/81

PART 2 ends:-

pm to Galbraith MP 28.9.79

PART 3 begins:-

OB (79) 27 1-10-79

**TO BE RETAINED AS TOP ENCLOSURE**

**Cabinet / Cabinet Committee Documents**

Reference	Date
C (79) 34	30.8.79
Limited Circulation Annex to CC (79) 14 <sup>th</sup>	
Conclusions, Minute 1	30.8.79
JIC (79) (N) (IR) 7	6.9.79
CC (79) 15 <sup>th</sup> Conclusions, Minute 3	13.9.79
OD (79) 26	28.9.79

The documents listed above, which were enclosed on this file, have been removed and destroyed. Such documents are the responsibility of the Cabinet Office. When released they are available in the appropriate CAB (CABINET OFFICE) CLASSES

Signed *A Wayland*

Date 25 March 2010

**PREM Records Team**



in context  
pro

Original - G/R

10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

28 September 1979

Thank you for your letter of 8 September enclosing one from the Executive Committee of your Constituency Association.

I need hardly say that I fully share your Executive Committee's sense of disgust at the atrocities perpetrated by the Provisional IRA on 27 August; and I understand their feeling that more should be done about the way in which terrorists are able to exploit the border between Northern Ireland and the Republic. Indeed this was one of the main purposes of my discussion with the Taoiseach on 5 September. I am sure that the right answer is much improved co-operation between the security forces on both sides of the border, to deal with what is after all a threat to both Governments. A number of suggestions for improvement are now being actively pursued, and I am determined that there should be early progress. Mr Lynch told me that he shared the same determination.


As for the specific suggestions which your Constituency Association has put forward, they do pose some quite serious difficulties. It would be physically impossible to seal the border, given the length of our mutual frontier with the Republic and the nature of the country. And it would be impracticable given the very large number of checkpoints which would be required and the ease with which even these could be evaded, to introduce passports for movement between South and North in Ireland.

/To require

To require citizens of the Irish Republic to present passports when entering the rest of the United Kingdom would, I fear, be ineffective unless passport controls were instituted between Northern Ireland and the rest of the United Kingdom. That would clearly be unacceptable. In any case, there would be no significant contribution to security, given the very extensive powers possessed by the Government under the Prevention of Terrorism act.

(sgd) M T

The Honourable Thomas Galbraith, M.P.



Original in GPR

CC: Ho

10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

28 September 1979

*Dear Sir,*

Thank you for your letter of 29 August about the Ireland Act 1949 and its effect on the movement of citizens of the Republic of Ireland. The question you raise is one which has caused the Government much concern and which we are continuing to study. But I am not sure that the controls you have in mind would materially help in the struggle against the terrorists.

Citizens of the Republic of Ireland are not citizens of a Commonwealth country but the Ireland Act 1949 declares that they are not to be regarded as aliens. The arrangement is broadly reciprocal in that people born in the United Kingdom are not subject to the disabilities of aliens in the Republic of Ireland. Since 1952 the Republic of Ireland (with the Channel Islands and the Isle of Man) has been included in a "Common Travel Area" with the United Kingdom and there are in practice no immigration controls on travel within this area. The arrangement continues unaltered under the Immigration Act 1971.

But the absence of an immigration control does not mean that citizens of the Republic cannot be deported or refused entry. Those who are convicted of criminal offences, or whose presence here is not considered conducive to the public good can be deported in the same way as Commonwealth citizens and foreign nationals. People not already in the United Kingdom can be prohibited for the same reasons from entering. (These powers are to some extent limited in the case of those settled in the United Kingdom on 1 January 1973 when the Immigration Act 1971 came into force.)

/ Nor does

Nor does the absence of immigration control means that measures cannot be taken to deal with the movement of terrorists. Under the Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 1976 citizens of the Republic may be detained for questioning on entry into the United Kingdom. If they have been concerned with terrorism they can be excluded from the United Kingdom by order of the Secretary of State. There is a good deal to be said for concentrating the available resources on the people who are a threat to security rather than dissipating our resources in setting up a control - which could not be entirely effective - over everyone.

Thank you so much for writing. It is not going to be easy to get on top of the terrorist problem but the Government are determined to do so.

*Yours sincerely*

*Angus*

Sir Theo Constantine, C.B.E., D.L.



CONFIDENTIAL

CR 450

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FM WASHINGTON 281940Z SEP 79

TO PRIORITY F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 2906 OF 28 SEPTEMBER 1979

*Prime Minister*

*ms*

PERSONAL FOR SECRETARY OF STATE:

ARMS FOR NORTHERN IRELAND

1. WHEN I SAW VEST AT THE STATE DEPARTMENT TODAY IN THE ABSENCE OF VANCE I SAID THAT I UNDERSTOOD THAT VANCE WOULD BE WANTING TO HAVE A WORD WITH ME ABOUT IRELAND. I WAS AT HIS DISPOSAL BUT OF COURSE FULLY UNDERSTOOD HOW INEXTRICABLY INVOLVED HE WAS WITH ALL THE MINISTERS VISITING THE USA FOR THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY.

2. I WENT ON TO REFER TO OUR NEED TO SECURE AN EARLY DELIVERY OF A FURTHER 3,000 REVOLVERS. THE PLACING OF THIS ORDER HAD BEEN HELD UP BECAUSE OF THE PROMISED STATE DEPARTMENT REVIEW. THE POLITICAL DELICACY OF THIS SUBJECT IN THE USA WAS WELL UNDERSTOOD, BUT I MUST STRESS THAT NO LESS HIGH FEELINGS WERE RUNNING IN LONDON IN THE OPPOSITE DIRECTION. THE CONSERVATIVE PARTY CONFERENCE WAS TAKING PLACE IN EARLY OCTOBER AND PARLIAMENT WOULD BE RESUMING AFTER THAT. INDEFINITE DELAY OR A REFUSAL TO MEET A NEW ORDER WOULD BE BOUND TO PROVOKE A STRONG POLITICAL REACTION, APART ALTOGETHER FROM THE GREAT BENEFIT THAT IT WOULD AFFORD THE TERRORISTS.

3. VEST SAID THAT HE HAD NO IDEA WHAT WAS IN VANCE'S MIND BUT HE WOULD COMMUNICATE WITH HIM AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. HIS OWN VIEW WAS THAT CONGRESSIONAL OPINION ON THIS SUBJECT WAS JUST AS HARD AS EVER. MR VANCE HAD BEEN PERSUADED THAT ANY FURTHER APPROVALS FOR THE EXPORT OF ARMS FOR THE RUC WOULD DRIVE THE MODERATES IN CONGRESS INTO THE HANDS OF BIAGGI AND THE EXTREMISTS.

4. I SAID THAT NEVERTHELESS MR VANCE MIGHT HAVE SOME SUGGESTIONS THAT HE WANTED TO PUT TO ME. PERHAPS THERE WAS SOME CONCEIVABLE WAY ROUND THE PROBLEM. THE FUNDAMENTAL FACT WAS THAT TERRORISM REMAINED A GRAVE ISSUE AND THE RUC NEEDED THESE REVOLVERS TO DEAL WITH IT. WHEN THE US WERE PROVIDING ARMS ALL ROUND THE WORLD, E.G. FOR USE BY THE ISRAELIS TO BOMB THE LEBANON, IT WAS GOING TO BE DIFFICULT FOR PEOPLE IN THE UK TO UNDERSTAND WHY THEY SHOULD BE DENIED FOR USE IN FIGHTING TERRORISM IN NORTHERN IRELAND. /5.

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5. VEST SAID THAT NEVERTHELESS THE SUPPLY OF ARMS FOR THE RUC WAS AN EMOTIVE SUBJECT ON THE HILL AND HE WAS SURE THAT IF AN ORDER WAS SUBMITTED NOW THE LICENCE WOULD BE REFUSED. THERE WAS NO WAY OF AVOIDING THE NEED FOR A LICENCE. BUT HE ADDED THAT HE WOULD GET INTO TOUCH AS SOON AS HE HAD TALKED WITH VANCE BUT IT MIGHT NOT BE FOR A WEEK OR SO.

6. UNSATISFACTORY THOUGH THIS IS, I THINK THAT IT WOULD BE EXPEDIENT TO WAIT TO HEAR WHAT VANCE HAS TO SAY BEFORE PUTTING IN THE ORDER FOR THE 3,000 REVOLVERS.

HENDERSON

*ms*

F I L E S

HD/RID  
HD/N AM D  
PS  
PS/LPS  
PS/PUS  
SIR A DUFF  
MR BULLARD  
MR FERGUSSON

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PS/S OF S NORTHERN IRELAND

MR WHITMORE

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SIR J HUNT

CABINET OFFICE

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(X21)

**ADVANCE COPY**

*Files*

GRPS 430  
CONFIDENTIAL  
FM DUBLIN 261210Z SEPTEMBER 79  
TO IMMEDIATE FCO  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 310 OF 26 SEPTEMBER  
AND TO IMMEDIATE NIO BELFAST

*Premier Minister*  
*This sounds more encouraging:  
there have been some signs of Irish  
backsliding in earlier meetings.*  
*Paul*

YOUR TELNO 148 SECURITY COOPERATION

1. I SPOKE ON THE LINES OF YOUR TUR THIS MORNING TO O'ROURKE AND NELIGAN WHO WERE RECEPTIVE. I EMPHASISED ESPECIALLY THAT IT WAS ESSENTIAL THAT WHEN MINISTERS MET ON 5 OCTOBER THERE SHOULD BE POSITIVE, SUBSTANTIVE RESULTS AND WE SAW THE MEETING OF OFFICIALS TOMORROW AS ESSENTIAL ALSO IN PREPARING THE WAY FOR THE MINISTERS.

2. ON PARA 1(A) AND (B) OF YOUR TUR, THE IRISH SAID THAT THEY SAW THE OFFICIALS MEETING AS AN OPPORTUNITY TO CLARIFY, TO DISCUSS THE MERITS, DIFFICULTIES, FEASIBILITY AND PRACTICALITY OF THE IDEAS PUT FORWARD AT THE NO 10 DOWNING STREET MEETING. IN REPLY TO MY QUESTION, O'ROURKE SAID THERE WAS NO QUESTION THAT THE IRISH SIDE WOULD BE THERE JUST TO LISTEN. NELIGAN COMMENTED THAT THE OFFICIALS' REMIT IS, HOWEVER, NOT TO PREJUDICE THE SUBSTANTIVE ATTITUDE TO BE TAKEN BY MINISTERS AND TO STEER CLEAR OF ADOPTING A "NATIONAL POSITION".

I SAID THAT IT WAS IMPORTANT FOR US TO DISCUSS THE ITEMS LISTED IN OUR AIDE MEMOIRE, OF 7 SEPTEMBER, (YOUR TELNO 121) AND THE IRISH AGREED THAT ALL THE POINTS COVERED THEREIN WOULD BE DISCUSSED TOMORROW. O'ROURKE SAID THAT THE AIDE MEMOIRE HAD BEEN THE BASIS ON WHICH MINISTERS AND OFFICIALS HAD STUDIED THE OUTCOME OF THE NO 10 MEETING.

3. ON PARA 1(C) OF YOUR TUR, O'ROURKE SAID THAT HE THOUGHT THERE WOULD HAVE TO BE A DEGREE OF CONFIDENTIALITY ABOUT THE MEASURES TO BE TAKEN AND STRESSED THAT IT WAS THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THOSE MEASURES RATHER THAN THEIR PRESENTATION WHICH WAS REALLY IMPORTANT. WHEN I PRESSED HIM ABOUT THIS, HE SAID HE THOUGHT IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE TO MENTION TO THE PRESS, AFTER THE 5 OCTOBER MEETING, SOME OF THE MEASURES WHILE IT MIGHT BE DESIRABLE NOT TO REFER TO OTHERS. HE AGREED THAT IF WE DID NOT KNOW WHAT IRISH ATTITUDES WERE TO THE SPECIFIC PROPOSALS IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT FOR OFFICIALS TO WORK OUT SOME KIND OF LINE, AND HE FURTHER AGREED THAT THAT SUBJECT SHOULD BE FULLY DISCUSSED TOMORROW.

4. ON PARA 1(D) O'ROURKE SAID HE TOOK MY POINT COMPLETELY AND WOULD ENSURE THAT HIS MINISTER WAS SUITABLY BRIEFED.

5. O'ROURKE, IN THE COURSE OF OUR CONVERSATION, SAID HE THOUGHT THAT IT WOULD BE NECESSARY TO DISCUSS HELICOPTER OVERFLIGHTS AT SOME LENGTH TOMORROW AND NELIGAN SAID THAT THERE WAS ONE SUGGESTION FOR IMPROVEMENTS ON THE NORTHERN SIDE OF THE BORDER WHICH WOULD BE MENTIONED AT THAT MEETING.

6. WE ARE, AS YOU KNOW, AT PRESENT DISCUSSING WITH THE IRISH THE TIMING OF TOMORROW'S MEETING AND MEANWHILE THEY HAVE TOLD US THAT ON THEIR SIDE THEY EXPECTED THE DELEGATION TO BE LED BY DONELLY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE. THERE WOULD BE ANOTHER OFFICIAL FROM THAT DEPARTMENT, AND NELIGAN AND SWIFT OF THE DFA PLUS KIRWAN OF THE TAOISEACH'S DEPARTMENT WOULD BE PRESENT.

7. WE SHALL LET YOU KNOW AS SOON AS WE CAN ABOUT TIMING AND ANY CHANGES IN THE COMPOSITION OF THE IRISH DELEGATION.

HAYDON

NNNN

SENT AT 26/1315Z JAW

27

NORTHERN IRELAND: ADVANCE COPIES

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DIO

~~NO 10 DOWNING STREET~~

②

*Ernie Austin*

RESIDENT CLERK

*Amis*

26.9.

*ms.*

CONFIDENTIAL

FM DUBLIN 251800Z SEPT 79

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 309 OF 25 SEPT

AND TO IMMEDIATE NIO (DEFAST)

REPEATED FOR INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON AND BIRNEW YORK

MY TELNO (305) IRISH POLICY TOWARDS THE NORTH

1. IN HIS SPEECH AT THE AIRLIE HOUSE CONFERENCE ON SATURDAY 22 SEPTEMBER AND HIS LUNCH-TIME RADIO BROADCAST ON SUNDAY (TEXT ALREADY SENT BY BAG), MR LYNCH HAS GIVEN AN EXTENSIVE FORMULATION OF HIS NORTHERN POLICY. HE HAS THEREBY DEMONSTRATED HIS CONFIDENCE THAT FIANNA FAIL WILL RALLY BEHIND HIM, DESPITE SILE DE VALERA'S RECENT ATTACK, AND TAKEN UP AN ADVANTAGEOUS POSITION FOR THE PARLIAMENTARY PARTY MEETING ON 28 SEPTEMBER.

2. IN HIS SPEECH, HE ADMITTED THAT THE SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS WERE INSUFFICIENT AND THAT SECURITY COOPERATION HAD TO BE IMPROVED. HE STATED CLEARLY THAT THE MAIN PRIORITY IS DEVOLVED GOVERNMENT IN THE NORTH, HIGHLIGHTED THE VIEW THAT PROGRESS ON THE NORTH CAN ONLY BE BY CONSENT AND THAT THE TIME IS NOT YET RIPE FOR PROGRESS TOWARDS A UNITED IRELAND. HE OFFERED HIS GOVERNMENT'S SUPPORT FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR NORTHERN IRELAND ON CERTAIN CONDITIONS. HE ALSO GAVE SOME ENCOURAGEMENT TO AMERICAN INVESTMENT IN NORTHERN IRELAND (A CALL APPARENTLY ECHOED BY MR O'KENNEDY IN NEW YORK).

HE ALSO GAVE SOME ENCOURAGEMENT TO AMERICAN INVESTMENT IN NORTHERN IRELAND (A CALL APPARENTLY ECHOED BY MR O'KENNEDY IN NEW YORK). HE SPOKE OF THE "FUTILITY OF A POLICY BASED ONLY ON SECURITY" AND OF IRISH UNITY. HE WAS HIGHLY CRITICAL OF THE BRITISH MEDIA'S REACTION TO THE EVENTS OF 27 AUGUST. AS WITH MOST OF MR LYNCH'S STATEMENTS ON NORTHERN IRELAND IT WAS LIKE THE CURATE'S EGG, BUT ON THE WHOLE IT IS NOT UNHELPFUL IN ITS RELATIVE MODERATION AND THERE IS AGAIN A GLIMMER OF UNDERSTANDING OF HOW PROTESTANTS IN NORTHERN IRELAND FEEL ABOUT IRISH UNITY.

3. HIS MAIN PURPOSE IN MAKING THE SPEECH IS TO ENSURE THAT ALL FIANNA FAIL DEPUTIES HAVE A CHANCE TO LOOK CAREFULLY AT CURRENT POLICY AND EVEN TO RECEIVE THE REACTIONS OF THEIR CONSTITUENTS TO IT (APPARENTLY THERE WAS FOR A TIME APPREHENSION AMONG MR LYNCH'S ADVISERS THAT HE WOULD ONLY FORMULATE POLICY AT THE PARTY MEETING ON FRIDAY. THIS WOULD HAVE MEANT THAT DEPUTIES WOULD NOT HAVE HAD TIME TO CONSIDER THE QUESTION CAREFULLY AND MIGHT WELL HAVE FELT THAT THEY WERE BEING BOUNCED).

4. IT IS SIGNIFICANT THAT MR LYNCH HAS NOT DRAWN BACK IN ANY WAY FROM THE LINE TAKEN IN HIS MOST RECENT STATEMENTS ON THE NORTH, EVEN IN THE FACE OF MS VALERAS ATTACK. IT HAS OFTEN BEEN SUGGESTED THAT HE IS A GREAT CONCILIATOR, WHO TENDS TO WEAVE FROM SIDE TO SIDE TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF THE PREVAILING WIND. BUT ON THIS OCCASION HE HAS STAKED OUT THE GROUND CLEARLY AND FIRMLY. ANYONE WHO WISHES TO TAKE ISSUE WITH HIM WILL HAVE TO DO SO ON THE QUESTION OF POLICY AND NOT ON THE BASIS OF PERSONALITIES. IN HIS RTE INTERVIEW ESPECIALLY HE MADE IT CLEAR THAT HE EXPECTED THAT PARTY DISCIPLINE WOULD PREVAIL AND THAT PEOPLE WOULD CLOSE RANKS BEHIND HIS POLICY STATEMENT.

5. IT WILL BE INTERESTING TO SEE WHETHER MR LYNCH'S CONFIDENCE IS JUSTIFIED. MEMBERS OF THE DFA HAVE EXPRESSED IN PRIVATE THE VIEW THAT IT IS EASIER TO DEFEND A POLICY IN WHICH THE CLEAR OBJECTIVE IS DEVOLVED GOVERNMENT THAN IT IS TO DEFEND ONE WHICH INVOLVES A BALANCING ACT BETWEEN THE PRIORITIES OF A UNITED IRELAND AND DEVOLVED GOVERNMENT.

6. MR LYNCH HAS OF COURSE CHOSEN THE DATE OF 28 SEPTEMBER WITH CARE. IT IS THE DAY BEFORE THE PAPAL VISIT, COVERAGE OF WHICH IS BOUND TO SWAMP THE PRESS, RADIO AND TELEVISION THE FOLLOWING DAY.

HAYDON

CT

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*Bennie Austin*

2

*Ans*

26.9.79

*Ans*

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DESKBY FCO 260900Z  
DESKBY DUBLIN 260900Z  
FM UKMIS NEWYORK 252249Z SEPT 79  
TO IMMEDIATE FC 0  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1117 OF 25 SEPTEMBER  
INFO IMMEDIATE DUBLIN ROUTINE WASHINGTON

GENERAL ASSEMBLY: IRISH FOREIGN MINISTER'S SPEECH:  
NORTHERN IRELAND.

1. MR O'KENNEDY CONCLUDED HIS STATEMENT TODAY WITH A LENGTHY PASSAGE ON NORTHERN IRELAND. HIS THEME WAS THE PRESSING NEED FOR RECONCILIATION BETWEEN THE COMMUNITIES OF NORTHERN IRELAND, WHICH COULD ONLY BE BROUGHT ABOUT BY A POLITICAL INITIATIVE. IN DESCRIBING THE NORTHERN IRELAND CONFLICT AS QUOTE A PROBLEM OF THE DEEPEST AND MOST URGENT CONCERN TO US UNQUOTE, MR O'KENNEDY SPOKE OF QUOTE AN URGENT NEED TO CREATE THE CONDITIONS FOR PEACE UNQUOTE. HE PLEDGED THE IRISH GOVERNMENT TO COOPERATE IN THIS TASK.

2. ON TERRORISM, HE SAID:

QUOTE VIOLENCE ANYWHERE IN IRELAND IS AN ACT OF AGGRESSION AGAINST THE IRISH PEOPLE AS A WHOLE AND MUST BE DEALT WITH AS SUCH. THROUGHOUT IRELAND THERE IS DEEP ANGER AND OUTRAGE AT THE REPEATED ATROCITIES OF A CALLOUS FEW. AMONG THEIR VICTIMS HAVE BEEN EMINENT STATESMEN AND YOUNG CHILDREN AND THEY HAVE SHOWN THAT THEY WILL SHRINK FROM NO CRIME IN THEIR DELIBERATE CAMPAIGN OF PROVOKING POLARISATION AND CONFRONTATION. THE IRISH GOVERNMENT IS COMMITTING

POLARISATION AND CONFRONTATION. THE IRISH GOVERNMENT IS COMMITTING ITS FULL RESOURCES TO PROTECT THE BASIC HUMAN RIGHT OF EVERY PERSON TO LIFE AND SECURITY AGAINST TERRORISM AND TO DEFEND THE POLITICAL PROCESS AGAINST THE USURPATION OF A RUTHLESS MINORITY. WE HAVE PASSED AND IMPLEMENTED STRINGENT LEGISLATION TO MEET THIS THREAT AND TO PROVIDE THAT THOSE WHO PERPETRATE VIOLENCE IN ANY PART OF IRELAND MAY BE MADE ANSWERABLE BEFORE THE COURTS FOR THEIR CRIMES. UNQUOTE MR. O'KENNEDY ADDED THAT IRELAND'S EXPENDITURE ON SECURITY NOW REPRESENTED A HEAVIER ECONOMIC BURDEN PER HEAD FOR IRELAND THAN FOR THE UNITED KINGDOM. HE SPOKE OF QUOTE THE CLOSEST COOPERATION BETWEEN THE IRISH AND THE BRITISH SECURITY FORCES UNQUOTE AND THE CONSTANT CONSULTATION BETWEEN OUR TWO GOVERNMENTS.

3. ON THE NEED FOR A POLITICAL INITIATIVE MR O'KENNEDY SAID QUOTE POLITICAL FAILURE, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEPRIVATION AND THE LACK OF RESPECT AND TRUST BETWEEN THE TWO COMMUNITIES ARE ALL FACTORS WHICH ARE EXPLOITED BY THE MEN OF VIOLENCE IN A DELIBERATE STRATEGY OF HATRED AND CONFRONTATION. UNQUOTE. THIS COULD ONLY BE COUNTERED BY DETERMINATION ON THE PART OF GOVERNMENTS TO WORK FOR RECONCILIATION AND A POLITICAL SOLUTION. SUCCESS IN THIS ENDEAVOUR WOULD UNDERCUT THOSE DEDICATED TO VIOLENCE. MR O'KENNEDY STRESSED THE QUOTE CLOSEST RELATIONSHIP AND FUND OF GOODWILL BETWEEN THE IRISH AND BRITISH PEOPLES UNQUOTE. AN INITIATIVE BY THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT WAS ESSENTIAL IN ORDER THAT THE POLITICAL VOID WHICH SERVED THE INTERESTS OF THE VIOLENT MINORITY COULD BE FILLED.

4. FULL TEXT BY TODAY'S CONFIDENTIAL BAG TO RID.

PARSONS

NNNN



CONFIDENTIAL

file 15



10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

24 September 1979

The Prime Minister has seen your letter to me of 21 ~~September~~ on alternative supplies of firearms for the RUC. She has noted the intention of the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland to await the outcome of the review now under way in Washington before deciding on any further action.

I am sending copies of this letter to Paul Lever (FCO) and Martin Vile (Cabinet Office).

M. O'D. B. ALEXANDER

Roy Harrington, Esq.,  
Northern Ireland Office.

CONFIDENTIAL

file 15

**CONFIDENTIAL**

NORTHERN IRELAND OFFICE  
GREAT GEORGE STREET,  
LONDON SW1P 3AJ



Michael O'D B Alexander Esq  
10 Downing Street  
London SW1

21 September 1979

*Prime Minister*

*ms*

*Dear Michael,*

*I understand that the assessment of X may  
have optimistic: there is a suggestion that Americans may  
agree to supply Rugers in exchange for an understanding that  
we will not order them: However clearly we should await US  
decision before deciding what further action to take ourselves. I think*

In his letter of ~~23~~<sup>21</sup> August to Joe Pilling, Bryan Cartledge referred to the Prime Minister's request for a report on alternative supplies of firearms for the RUC. 2/5

We have now been into this again thoroughly, in consultation with the RUC. I am sorry that it has inevitably taken some time because of the need to check a number of technical points. The results are not encouraging.

Rugers (or comparable modern revolvers) are available in quantity only from sources which lead directly back to US manufacturers. Any attempt to make alternative arrangements while the US administration's review is going on would be doomed to failure, and would be likely to lessen the chances of their deciding to issue export licences in the normal way at the end of their review. If they decide to decline to issue further licences, it might be possible in a year or two to obtain some supplies of a British weapon (made by Sterling): but that weapon is as yet only at the design stage, and we cannot be certain of its suitability. The operational consequences for the RUC of a delay in the supply of new weapons could, if necessary, be borne. The consequences in terms of morale in the force, and political reactions, would be far more serious. In particular, the IRA would claim official US Government support, and Protestant opinion would draw its own conclusions from our apparent inability to obtain American support.

x | In the light of this review, the Secretary of State's conclusion is that in the immediate future there are no alternative supplies of suitable weapons. He has noted recent indications from Washington that their review is being speeded up, and there may be some reason to hope that, in the aftermath of 27 August, there is a slightly better chance of new export licences being issued. That remains the best chance for obtaining early supplies, and there is no immediate

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action available to us which would not jeopardise that chance. Meanwhile, we shall be keeping a close watch on development of the Sterling weapon.

... I attach an annex which discusses the background in a little more detail.

... I am sending a copy of this letter to Paul Lever (FCO) and Martin Vile (Cabinet Office).

*Yours ever,*

*Ry Harrington.*

**CONFIDENTIAL**

E. R.

**CONFIDENTIAL**

ANNEX

ARMS FOR THE RUC

The Type of Weapon

The RUC want to replace their present Walther automatic pistols with Ruger revolvers. The Walther requires both hands to cock and fire it, its low velocity rounds lack stopping power and it can jam. The revolver does not suffer from these disadvantages. The RUC are satisfied that a revolver is for those reasons the right type of weapon (other UK Police Forces take the same view) and that the Ruger is the best of this type.

Sources of Supply

The only present source of suitable modern revolvers in quantity, whether of Ruger or other manufacture, is the United States. A British firm, Sterling, have a revolver at the design stage but it cannot yet be evaluated. A French firm, Manurhin, produce a revolver, but only in small quantities and it costs four times as much as the Ruger.

The nature of the market for revolvers, which is small and specialised, is such that we could not place orders for the required quantities of Rugers or comparable US weapons without that becoming apparent to the US Government. That would apply whether such orders were placed with private firms in this country or abroad (because they could not supply such quantities from stock and would have to order from America) or were placed by the Home Office or Ministry of Defence (which would of course be even more obvious).

Operational Considerations

The next batch of Rugers is due early next year, so a refusal of new export licences for Rugers would not bite until then. The Walthers in service now will remain serviceable for some time to come, though it is obviously highly undesirable to leave police officers with a "second best" weapon with which to defend themselves when better weapons are, or should be, available from the US. The Chief Constable's assessment is that although it would be highly undesirable for new weapons not to be available for a year or two (the earliest date at which the Sterling might be available, if it proved to be suitable for RUC use) the operational consequences could if necessary be borne. The consequences in terms of morale in the RUC, and the political consequences referred to in the letter, would be more significant.

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21 SEP 1979

10 11 12 13 14  
15 16 17 18 19  
20 21 22 23 24

10 11 12



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MR W J A INNES  
CABINET OFFICE - SIR J HUNT  
Mr R Wade-Jery.  
DIO  
NO 10 DOWNING STREET

*(Correspondence about revolvers for the R.V.C.)*

~~RESIDENT CLERK~~

*L.A.*

*Phil 25/9*

OR 500

CONFIDENTIAL

FM WASHINGTON 212150Z SEP

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 2810 OF 21 SEP 79.

INFORMATION PRIORITY NIO BELFAST, DUBLIN AND BIS NEW YORK.

NORTHERN IRELAND : US ATTITUDES.

1. THE VISIT OF THE BRITISH AMERICAN PARLIAMENTARY GROUP (BAPG) THIS WEEK PROVIDED THE OPPORTUNITY FOR MR MICHAEL MATES MP, IN HIS CAPACITY AS CHAIRMAN OF THE BACKBENCH COMMITTEE ON IRISH AFFAIRS, TO HAVE PRIVATE MEETINGS TO DISCUSS NORTHERN IRELAND WITH THE PRINCIPAL AIDES TO SPEAKER O'NEILL AND SENATOR KENNEDY, THE CHAIRMAN AND OTHER INFLUENTIAL MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE AND VEST AND FUNSETH AT THE STATE DEPARTMENT. NORTHERN IRELAND WAS ALSO DISCUSSED DURING THE PARLIAMENTARY GROUP'S PLENARY MEETING WITH MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES. IN ADDITION, MR MICHAEL JOPLING HAD A PRIVATE MEETING WITH SENATOR KENNEDY, ON WHICH WE HAVE NOT YET HAD AN OPPORTUNITY TO DEBRIEF HIM.

2. ON ARMS FOR THE RUC, MR MATES'S DISCUSSIONS WERE NOT ENCOURAGING. O'DONNELL (SPEAKER O'NEILL'S AIDE, WHOM THE STATE DEPARTMENT SUSPECT PUT THE SPEAKER UP TO DEMANDING THE SUSPENSION OF ARMS SALES) SAID THAT IF THE STATE DEPARTMENT'S POLICY REVIEW RESULTED IN A RECOMMENDATION THAT ARMS SALES SHOULD BE RESUMED THIS WOULD REQUIRE "EXTENSIVE AND SERIOUS POLITICAL DISCUSSION" WITH THE SPEAKER. THE CLEAR IMPLICATION WAS THAT ONLY SIGNIFICANT PROGRESS TOWARDS POWER-SHARING IN NORTHERN IRELAND MIGHT CAUSE THE SPEAKER TO MODIFY HIS POSITION - BUT THAT US DOMESTIC POLITICAL CALCULATIONS WOULD, AS BEFORE, BE DECISIVE. CAREY PARKER (KENNEDY'S AIDE) STATED BALDLY THAT IF THE STATE DEPARTMENT'S DECISION TO SUSPEND EXPORT LICENCE APPROVAL WERE REVERSED, "THERE WOULD BE AN EXPLOSION IN THE US" AND CONGRESSIONAL HEARINGS, IN THE MOST UNFAVOURABLE CIRCUMSTANCES, WOULD BE INEVITABLE. PARKER ADDED THAT KENNEDY ACCEPTED THAT THE RUC MUST HAVE ACCESS TO THE WEAPONS IT NEEDED, BUT CONSIDERED IT POLITICALLY UNWISE FOR THESE TO BE BOUGHT IN THE UNITED STATES, SINCE THIS SIMPLY FUELLED IRISH-AMERICAN SUPPORT FOR THE IRA.


3. VEST (ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR EUROPEAN AFFAIRS) SAID IN TERMS (PLEASE PROTECT AT STATE DEPARTMENT'S SUBSEQUENT REQUEST) THAT WE COULD NOT EXPECT ANY MOVE ON ARMS FOR THE RUC "THIS CALENDAR YEAR" AND ADDED THAT NEXT YEAR ELECTORAL CONSTRAINTS COULD BE EXPECTED TO BE EVEN MORE PRESSING. FUNSETH (DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF NORTHERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS) SAID THAT IT WOULD BE HELPFUL IF LEADERS OF THE SDLP WERE TO COME OUT PUBLICLY AGAINST SUSPENSION OF ARMS SALES TO THE RUC. AT THE SAME TIME VEST COMMENTED THAT WE WOULD BE WELL ADVISED TO TREAT THE MATTER IN LOW KEY IN PUBLIC; THE MORE IT BECAME ELEVATED AS A POLITICAL ISSUE, THE MORE DIFFICULT IT WOULD BE TO RESOLVE.

4. IN ALL THESE DISCUSSIONS MR MATES STRESSED THE DEPLORABLE IMPRESSION MADE IN BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND BY THE SUSPENSION OF ARMS SALES AND THE BOOST IT GAVE TO PIRA MORALE. HIS PLEA THAT A PRACTICAL WAY ROUND THE PROBLEM BE FOUND MET WITH SYMPATHY AT THE STATE DEPARTMENT BUT NO ENCOURAGEMENT FROM ANY QUARTER TO SUPPOSE THAT A SOLUTION WAS IN SIGHT.

5. SEE M I F T FOR MR MATES'S DISCUSSIONS ON CONGRESSIONAL HEARINGS.

HENDERSON

CAN U PLS CHECK NEW YORK  
THEY SAY THEY ARE READING YOU BUT CANNOT SEND TO YOU  
K K K K



DSG  
Onguelin  
A/R.

10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

20 September 1979

Dear Goh.

Thank you for your letter of 3 September about the situation in Northern Ireland. It was most helpful to have this on the eve of my meeting with the Taoiseach.

Most of the points you made in your letter were touched on in the course of my talks with Mr. Lynch. As you know, he and I agree that the present extensive cooperation between the authorities of the two countries must be substantially improved. A number of suggestions were made by both Governments, including some of those mentioned by you, and these will be actively followed up.

I share your concern lest the outrage which followed the appalling events of Bank Holiday Monday should be allowed to fade without the achievement of any real change for the better in the present situation. I am determined that the impetus should be maintained. An early meeting between the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland and Irish Ministers is planned and we look for concrete results from this. However, I do not think that the introduction of selective detention or internment would be helpful. As regards James Abercorn's suggestion, I fear that security is not a matter for Community competence and that EEC funds would therefore not be available to finance the further improvement of the Irish Republic's security forces.

/ Thank you

DS



Thank you for your kind remarks about my visit to Northern Ireland. It made a deep impression on me. You may be sure that the achievement of progress in the Province will remain for me a high priority.

Y.  
Lansdown

Raymond

---

John Biggs-Davison, Esq., M.P.

NORTHERN IRELAND: ADVANCE COPIES

**IMMEDIATE**

PS/SIR I GILMOUR

PS/PUS

MR FERGUSSON

Lord N Gordon-Lennox

HD/RID

PUSD (2)

HD/IPD

HD/OID (2)

NEWS DEPT

N IRELAND OFFICE - PS TO SEC OF STATE  
RM 66 A/2 GGS

N IRELAND OFFICE [4 copies]

SIR B CUBBON

MR JANES

MR MARSHALL

MR W J A INNES

CABINET OFFICE - SIR J HUNT

Mr R Wade-Gery

DIO

NO 10 DOWNING STREET

RESIDENT CLERK

GRS 300

CONFIDENTIAL

FM DUBLIN 191734Z SEP 79

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 295 OF 19 SEPTEMBER

AND TO IMMEDIATE NIO BELFAST

FOLLOW UP TO DOWNING STREET SUMMIT

MY TEL NO 293

17.9.79

*Prime Minister*

*Ant*  
29

1. SWIFT (ANGLO/IRISH SECTION DFA) ASKED HEAD OF CHANCERY TO CALL TODAY TO DISCUSS RESULTS OF IRISH MINISTERS DELIBERATIONS YESTERDAY AFTERNOON.

2. SWIFT SAID THAT IRISH MINISTERS HAD HAD A LONG AND DETAILED DISCUSSION WHICH HAD NOT HOWEVER PRODUCED DEFINITE CONCLUSIONS. MINISTERS WANTED A FURTHER DISCUSSION BEFORE THE OFFICIAL LEVEL DISCUSSIONS BEGAN AND THEY WOULD BE MEETING AGAIN ON TUESDAY 25 SEPTEMBER TO REACH AGREEMENT ON THE UK REQUESTS. THIS WOULD BE THE LINE TO BE TAKEN BY OFFICIALS IN ANY DISCUSSION. IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE DATES FOR OFFICIAL DISCUSSIONS WOULD BE THURSDAY 27 SEPTEMBER OR FRIDAY 28 SEPTEMBER. SMITH SAID THAT THIS WAS LEAVING OFFICIAL DISCUSSION VERY LATE: OFFICIALS WOULD HAVE LITTLE TIME TO ADEQUATELY PREPARE THE GROUND. SWIFT REITERATED THAT IRISH MINISTERS HAD NOT YET DISPOSED OF THE QUESTIONS WHICH HAD BEEN RAISED BY HMG. MR O'KENNEDY WOULD BE IN TURKEY FOR THE REST OF THIS WEEK AND IRISH MINISTERS COULD NOT MEET

TURKEY FOR THE REST OF THIS WEEK AND IRISH MINISTERS  
BEFORE EARLY NEXT WEEK. THEY HAD ALSO DECIDED THAT OFFICIALS SHOULD  
NOT MEET UNTIL THEY HAD FINISHED THEIR DELIBERATIONS.

3. SWIFT SAID THAT IRISH MINISTERS HAD ALSO DECIDED THAT A PREPARA-  
TORY MEETING BETWEEN THE GARDA COMMISSIONER AND THE CHIEF CONSTABLE  
OF THE RUC WOULD QUOTE NOT BE USEFUL UNQUOTE AT THIS STAGE.

4. AS REGARDS THE MINISTERIAL MEETING ON 5 OCTOBER SWIFT ASKED WHAT  
LINE WE ENVISAGED TAKING WITH THE PRESS SINCE ONCE THE THREE WEEK  
DEADLINE SET BY THE DOWNING STREET SUMMIT HAD ELAPSED IT WAS NATURAL  
THAT THERE WOULD BE QUESTIONS ABOUT THE PROSPECTS FOR A MEETING.  
THE IRISH PROPOSED TO SAY THAT A DATE HAD BEEN FIXED EARLY IN  
OCTOBER BUT THEY WOULD WELCOME OUR VIEWS ON THIS POINT. SWIFT CON-  
FIRMED THAT MR COLLINS, THE MINISTER OF JUSTICE, WOULD ACCOMPANY  
MR O'KENNEDY TO LONDON AND SAID THAT IT WAS HIS UNDERSTANDING THAT  
THE GARDA COMMISSIONER WOULD ALSO BE PRESENT. HE SUGGESTED THAT IT  
WAS FOR US TO PROPOSE A TIMETABLE AND AN AGENDA FOR THE MINISTERIAL  
MEETING.

HAYDON-

NNNN

SENT 191753Z LJM/RECD 191753Z MB



Original in file

10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

19 September 1979

Dear Nicholas

Thank you for your letter of 29 August concerning the recent tragic events in Ireland.

I share the feeling of horror which you have expressed on behalf of your constituents at the brutal murder of Lord Mountbatten and the killing of 18 soldiers at Warrenpoint. As I made clear at the time, the Government will spare no effort to ensure that those responsible for these and similar terrorist outrages are brought to justice.

I do not accept that we are dealing with the terrorists with, to use your words, "kid gloves on". The security forces are constantly changing and refining their methods of operation in order to defeat the terrorists. As regards co-operation between the Republic of Ireland and the United Kingdom, Mr. Lynch agreed with me at our recent meeting that a substantial improvement was required. Such an improvement would further enhance the effectiveness of our security forces.

Great difficulties remain. There will be setbacks. But I do not agree that in the present circumstances the introduction of martial law would assist the security forces. There would be a grave risk that its principle effect would be to alienate ordinary law-abiding people from the forces of law and order.

/You enclosed with

You enclosed with your letter the Northern Ireland medal which Mr. Beaven has returned as a mark of his outrage at what occurred on 27 August. I sympathise with his feelings. If Mr. Beaven insists, I will of course have his medal returned to the Army Medal Office. But if, on reflection, he would prefer to retain the medal I would be happy to arrange for it to be sent back to him.

Yours ever

MT

Nicholas Winterton, Esq., MP

Weekend Box

(2)



*MS*

HOME OFFICE  
QUEEN ANNE'S GATE LONDON SW1H 9AT

18 September 1979

*Ln. MS*

Dear Michael,

Prime Minister: I asked for this note on "The Political Defence in Extradition" after your talks with Mr Lynch. (There has been a new argument on the question in the European Parliament.) You may like to glance through it. Paras 12-15 of the note make it clear that the Irish position is anomalous.

*MS 27/9*

EXTRADITION

You wrote to Beckett on 6 September about the political factor in extradition. It was subsequently agreed that the Home Office should prepare the analysis you requested. I am, therefore, enclosing a note on the political defence in extradition. I fear that it is a rather long document, but the subject does not lend itself to compression.

We have, bearing in mind the context of your request, put something of an Irish slant into our note; indeed some of it draws on briefing we provided for the Prime Minister's meeting with Mr Lynch.

It may be helpful if I were to comment on some of the observations made by Mr Lynch at the meeting lest they cause misunderstanding. He is quoted as saying that a number of other European countries including France, Denmark and Belgium never extradited their own nationals. Whilst this is true it has little bearing on the extradition to this country from the Republic of those suspected of terrorist offences. Under Part II of the Irish Extradition Act 1965, the extradition of Irish nationals may not be granted unless the relevant extradition provisions (treaties or arrangements) otherwise provide. (The result of this appears to be to substitute a discretion to withhold Irish nationals where the treaty affords one e.g. in the European Convention on Extradition to which the Republic is a party.) There is, however, no such provision under Part III of the 1965 Act which governs extradition to the United Kingdom and reciprocates our Backing of Warrants (Republic of Ireland) Act 1965, which similarly makes no provision for the withholding of nationals. (The United Kingdom traditionally never withholds its nationals in extradition.) Consequently the question of the Republic or the United Kingdom refusing to surrender its own nationals to each other does not arise: refusal of extradition must be justified on grounds other than those of nationality.

In the plenary session Mr Lynch claimed that the Irish Government could not make an agreement such as that which the United Kingdom had just concluded with the Federal Republic of Germany because this would be contrary to the Irish constitution. This assertion seems to be misconceived. The recent agreement in question was a modification of our extradition treaty with Germany

/which inter alia

From THE GREAT BRITAIN

Office of the Director of the FBI



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which inter alia relaxed that treaty's absolute prohibition on the surrender of nationals between the United Kingdom and the Federal Republic of Germany, and substituted a discretion to withhold them, it being recognised that the Germans would exercise their discretion and we would not.

Like many other European countries the Federal Republic possesses wide extra-territorial jurisdiction over offences committed by its nationals and in refusing to surrender them as it is required to do by its Constitution, the Federal Republic is prepared to try them for the offence for which extradition is sought. The European Convention on Extradition, to which the Federal Republic is a party, in fact obliges any Contracting Party to put the case to its prosecution authorities where extradition is refused on grounds of nationality, and in order to comply with that requirement, the Irish Republic assumed wide extra-territorial jurisdiction over its nationals in its 1965 legislation. As I have explained, however, the non-surrender of nationals is not a feature of the simplified backing of warrants arrangements between this country and the Irish Republic and it is difficult to understand the significance of Mr Lynch's comments.

What is at issue - and I hope our note brings this out - is the Irish unwillingness to relax the political safeguard in extradition, either bilaterally with the United Kingdom, or multilaterally by becoming party to the European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism. As you are no doubt aware, the Irish reasons for their belief that the extradition of political offenders is contrary to international law (and hence contrary to their Constitution) are set out in Chapter VI of the Report of the Law Enforcement Commission (1974, Cmnd. 5627). Our refutation is to be found in Chapter VII of the Report.

I am sending copies of this letter and enclosure to Bill Beckett (Law Officers' Department), George Walden (Foreign and Commonwealth Office), Roy Harrington (Northern Ireland Office) and Martin Vile (Cabinet Office).

Yours ever,  
JAC

(J A CHILCOT)

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## THE POLITICAL DEFENCE IN EXTRADITION

1. In general, it has been accepted international practice that persons accused or convicted of "political offences" may not be extradited. This practice originated in the 19th century when persons being proceeded against for political offences were usually liberals in opposition to repressive regimes; it became an established principle that such people, if unsuccessful in attempts to overthrow tyrannies should be granted asylum in countries to which they fled.

United Kingdom practice

2. The political safeguard in United Kingdom extradition law is given effect by section 3(1) of the Extradition Act 1870 in relation to extradition to foreign countries <sup>and</sup> by section 4(1) of the Fugitive Offenders Act 1967 in relation to extradition to Commonwealth countries. Extradition between the United Kingdom and Republic of Ireland takes place under a simplified procedure governed by the Backing of Warrants (Republic of Ireland) Act 1965 and the Republic's broadly reciprocal legislation. The political safeguard is contained in section 2(2) of the 1965 Act. Texts of these three provisions are to be found at Annex A.

3. The political safeguard in section 4(1) of the Fugitive Offenders Act 1967 is broadly in line with that of other European countries as expressed in Article 3 of the European Convention on Extradition (to which the United Kingdom is not a party). It is appreciably wider than in the 1870 Act, because in addition to the rule concerning political offences it provides that extradition shall not be granted where the request for extradition for an ordinary criminal offence has in fact been made for the purpose of prosecuting or punishing a person on

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account of his race, religion, nationality or political opinions or that the person's position may be prejudiced for any of these reasons. It is likely that this wider safeguard will be included in new UK extradition legislation and in the meantime the practice is to include it in our new extradition treaties whenever the other State agrees. The European Convention safeguard is somewhat broader than the one provided in the 1967 Act because it prohibits the surrender of a fugitive not only if the offence is regarded by the requested party as a political offence but also if the offence is regarded as one connected with a political offence. The Republic of Ireland's Extradition Act 1965, which is based on the European Convention, contains this additional safeguard; our own Act of 1965 does not.

#### Determination

4. When a request from a foreign or Commonwealth country is received the Secretary of State may refuse to give his order to the magistrate to hear the case if he considers that the offence in respect of which the return of the fugitive is sought is a political offence. The magistrate must direct that the fugitive be discharged if satisfied that the offence for which he is sought is political or that the intention of the requesting State is to try or punish him for such an offence; and the Divisional Court must if so satisfied do likewise on an application for habeas corpus. The Secretary of State has a parallel obligation to refuse to surrender the fugitive on such grounds as well as a general discretion to decline to surrender a fugitive committed by the courts for return on any ground as he thinks fit. In practice, the S of S is unlikely to discharge the fugitive on political grounds where the courts have held that no such grounds exist unless some new evidence is put before him.

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5. Under the Backing of Warrants (Republic of Ireland) Act 1965 the Secretary of State has no locus in the matter, and it is for the fugitive to convince the magistrate, or the Divisional Court on application for habeas corpus, that his offence was political. The simplified backing of warrants arrangements with the Republic of Ireland contain no speciality rule (by which the requesting State undertakes not to prosecute a fugitive for other offences committed before his surrender). It has, therefore, on occasion (eg the Littlejohn case) been necessary to seek an assurance that the fugitive will not be tried for other offences or offences of a political character if he is returned. This is not, however, a standard feature of our extradition arrangements with the Republic.

Judicial Interpretation in the United Kingdom

6. There is no statutory definition of an "offence of a political character" and there is little case law on the interpretation of this phrase. This is partly because of the paucity of political cases coming before the courts and also because of the exclusion from the field of crimes for which extradition may be granted of offences which by their nature are of a political character, such as treason and espionage.

7. In the case of Castoni (1891) it was held that some form of political disturbance was necessary to establish that a criminal offence was one of a political character, while in the case of Meunier (1894), an anarchist who was sought and surrendered for causing explosions in France, the judgement was based on the view that in order to count as an offence of a political character it must be aimed against the government of the State and not against all government. There is no subsequent authority until the case of Kolczynski (1955) in which the view was taken that the offences (principally revolt

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against the master of a ship on the high seas) were committed in order to prevent the offenders being prosecuted by an oppressive regime for a political offence (treason in leaving Poland and settling in another country), and that the prospect of such a prosecution gave the offences themselves a political character.

8. The judgement in Schtraks (1963-65) is important in that it shows that the provision is intended to give effect to the principle that there should be asylum for political refugees and that the safeguard does not operate to afford indiscriminate protection to persons who choose to represent that ordinary criminal offences have a political purpose. More recently, in the case of Cheng (1972) it was held by a majority judgement that (in the words of Lord Diplock):

"An act committed in a foreign State was not an 'offence of a political character' unless the only purpose sought to be achieved by the offender in committing it were to change the government of the State in which it was committed, or to induce it to change its policy or to enable him to escape from the jurisdiction of a government of whose political policies the offender disapproved but despaired of altering so long as he was there."

9. The case of Littlejohn, to which reference has been made, was dealt with in 1972 under the Backing of Warrants (Republic of Ireland) Act 1965. Littlejohn, who was sought by the Republic for armed robbery there, alleged that he and his brother had infiltrated the IRA and that the robbery, being an attempt to obtain cash to finance the IRA, was therefore an offence of a political character. The Divisional Court took the view that although Littlejohn and his brother had

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been concerned with the IRA and were not, in robbing the bank, intending to obtain money solely on their own account, there was not a sufficiently close political association to make the offence one of a political character.

10. These judgements are pragmatic rather than consistent; as was observed in the Kolczynski case "the words 'offences of a political character' must always be considered according to the circumstances existing at the time". But in general our courts have accorded a narrow interpretation to the words "an offence of a political character".

#### Irish Judicial interpretation

11. By contrast, the Irish Courts have tended to interpret the safeguard widely. In general they have taken the view that if the fugitive can show that he was politically motivated in committing the offence of which he is accused then the offence may be said to be "of political character". To uphold a claim to political motivation it has usually been sufficient to show that he is a member of a  organisation <sup>which has political objectives.</sup> such as the IRA. Furthermore the Irish Courts have placed a very wide construction on the phrase "an offence connected with a political offence" (see paragraph 3 above): thus, in the case of Bourke v Attorney-General (1969) the Supreme Court of the Republic of Ireland held by a majority that the escape of the spy, George Blake, from Wormwood Scrubs was a political offence; that Bourke's offence in assisting his escape was connected with that offence; and hence that extradition was precluded.

#### The European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism

12. In the light of their growing concern about terrorism, the Council of Europe elaborated the European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism. The Convention provides that certain serious, "terrorist-type" crimes, are not to be regarded as

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political offences, offences connected with a political offence, or offences inspired by political motives for the purposes of extradition between contracting States, and embodies the principle that if a State refuses extradition in respect of such crimes it should refer the case to its own prosecuting authorities

13. Article 1 of the Convention lists a number of very serious crimes of violence; the application of the Convention to these crimes is mandatory. (Article 2 also lists a number of less serious crimes in respect of which the removal of the political safeguard is discretionary; no prosecution obligation arises in respect of these crimes where extradition is refused). But Article 13 of the Convention recognises that a contracting State might be impeded for legal or constitutional reasons from fully accepting the obligations under Article 1 in relation to the grant of extradition for political crimes and permits contracting States to enter a reservation retaining discretion to prosecute rather than extradite, provided that they undertake to take into due consideration, when evaluating the character of the offence, any particularly serious aspects of the offence. The United Kingdom, which would have preferred to exclude any possibility of reservation under the Convention, has been active in lobbying a number of potential contracting States not to enter this reservation.

14. The Suppression of Terrorism Act 1978 enabled the United Kingdom to ratify the Convention without reservation. The Convention has been ratified by five other Council of Europe countries (Austria, Cyprus, Denmark, FRG, Sweden) and signed by 13 other countries. The Republic of Ireland and Malta alone have neither signed nor ratified the Convention. Reservations under Article 13 have been entered by Sweden, Norway, Portugal, Italy, Denmark and Cyprus.

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The Republic of Ireland's objection to the European Convention

15. Article 29<sup>3</sup> of the Republic's Constitution states that the Republic accepts the generally recognised principles of international law as its rule of conduct in its relations with other States. The view has prevailed in the Republic that the extradition of political offenders is contrary to the generally recognised principles of international law, and that, therefore, the extradition of political offenders is for them unconstitutional. Although the exercise of the facility to enter a reservation under Article 13 of the Convention when ratifying it (see paragraph 13 above) would result in the assumption of very limited extradition obligations the Republic has nevertheless held that it is precluded by its constitution from becoming party to the Convention. The view that international law precludes surrender in respect of political offences is not one shared by the United Kingdom Government, and it is evidently not held by the other States which have ratified or signed the European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism. Moreover, the Convention does not deny a fugitive a legitimate claim to political asylum. Article 5 of the Convention (included at the instigation of the United Kingdom) provides that there shall be no obligation to extradite if the requested State has substantial grounds for believing that the request for extradition has been made for the purpose of prosecuting or punishing a person on account of his race, religion, nationality or political opinion, or that the person's position may be prejudiced for any of these reasons.

The EEC Agreement

16. In accordance with declarations adopted at the 5th, 6th and 7th European Councils, an ad hoc group of senior officials of the Nine was set up to examine, under the guidance of Ministers of Justice, measures to combat international terrorism.

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This group drafted an agreement by which the Nine undertake to apply the European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism among themselves until such time as they should all have ratified the Convention without reservation. The EEC Agreement contains a special accommodation designed for the Republic of Ireland alone, by which it would have no obligation to extradite in respect of the offences in Article 1 of the Convention which it holds to be political offences or connected with a political offence, or inspired by political motives, but an obligation to consider prosecuting those whom it does not extradite. It is likely that this agreement will be formally opened for signature during October. The Suppression of Terrorism Act 1978, will enable the United Kingdom to become a party to this agreement at an early date. It is not, however, likely to come into force before 1981 because all<sup>the</sup>/Nine will first have to ratify it.

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## THE POLITICAL SAFEGUARD

Extradition Act 1870. Section 3(1).

A fugitive criminal shall not be surrendered if the offence in respect of which his surrender is demanded is one of a political character, or he proves to the satisfaction of the magistrate or the court before whom he is brought on habeas corpus, or the the Secretary of State, that the requisition for his surrender has in fact been made with a view to try or punish him for an offence of a political character.

Fugitive Offenders Act 1967. Section 4(1)

A person shall not be returned under this Act to a designated Commonwealth country, or committed to or kept in custody for the purposes of such return, if it appears to the Secretary of State, to the court of committal or to the High Court on application for habeas corpus or for review of the order of committal -

- (a) that the offence of which that person is accused or was convicted is an offence of a political character;
- (b) that the request for his return, though purporting to be made on account of a relevant offence, is in fact made for the purpose of prosecuting or punishing him on account of his race, religion, nationality or political opinions; or
- (c) that he might, if returned, be prejudiced at his trial or punished, detained or restricted in his personal liberty by reason of his race, religion, nationality or political opinions.

Backing of Warrants (Republic of Ireland) Act 1965. Section 2(2)

....nor shall such an order [For return to the Republic] be made if it is shown to the satisfaction of the court -

- (a) that the offence specified in the warrant is an offence of a political character, or
- (b) that there are substantial grounds for believing that the person named or described in the warrant will, if taken to the Republic, be prosecuted or detained for an offence, being an offence of a political character.

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GRS 540

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FM DUBLIN 171713Z SEPT 79

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 293 OF 17 SEPTEMBER

PS TO PM

*Prime Minister*

*Not very encouraging*

*no*      *think*

FOLLOW UP TO ANGLO-IRISH DOWNING STREET SUMMIT

1. HEAD OF CHANCERY CALLED TODAY ON SWIFT (COUNSELLOR, ANGLO-IRISH SECTION) TO DISCUSS THE PROPOSED MEETING OF OFFICIALS. SWIFT BEGAN BY EXPLAINING THAT IN THE IRISH VIEW THERE WERE NO EASY OR OBVIOUS IMPROVEMENTS WHICH COULD BE MADE TO EXISTING SECURITY CO-OPERATION; ALL THE EASY THINGS HAD BEEN DONE ALREADY. THE IRISH GOVERNMENT WERE HOWEVER COMMITTED TO PROGRESS BY THE TERMS OF THE DOWNING STREET COMMUNIQUE AND THIS MEANT THAT THEY WERE COMMITTED TO CHANGES IN THE PRESENT SYSTEM. BECAUSE THESE CHANGES WERE DIFFICULT TO PROCESS WITHIN THE GOVERNMENT MACHINERY THE IRISH WERE NOT YET AT A STAGE WHERE A MEETING OF OFFICIALS WOULD BE USEFUL. IRISH MINISTERS WOULD BE DISCUSSING QUESTIONS OF SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE AT A MEETING ON THE AFTERNOON OF TUESDAY 18 SEPTEMBER. OFFICIALS WOULD THEN KNOW WHERE THEY STOOD.

2. FOR THE IRISH IT WOULD BE MUCH EASIER IF THE MEETING OF OFFICIALS WAS TO BE IN DUBLIN BUT THEY DID NOT HAVE ANY FIRM VIEWS AS TO WHETHER IT WOULD BE PREFERABLE TO HAVE A FORMAL SESSION IN THE AFTERNOON, FOLLOWED BY AN INFORMAL DINNER, AND A FURTHER FORMAL SESSION THE NEXT DAY. BECAUSE OF TOMORROW'S MINISTERIAL MEETING THE EARLIEST TIME AT WHICH THE IRISH COULD POSSIBLY BE READY TO SPEAK WITH ONE VOICE AT AN OFFICIALS MEETING WOULD BE THE AFTERNOON OF WEDNESDAY 19 SEPTEMBER. HOWEVER, THE EARLIEST PRACTICAL DAY FOR TALKS WOULD BE THURSDAY OR EVEN FRIDAY. SWIFT ENQUIRED WHETHER WE ENVISAGED THIS AS THE FIRST OF SEVERAL OFFICIAL MEETINGS, OR AS THE ONLY PREPARATORY MEETING BEFORE THE MINISTERIAL MEETING. IF IT WAS THE ONLY MEETING THEN MAYBE THERE WAS NO REAL URGENCY. SMITH REPLIED THAT THE QUESTION COULD ONLY BE ANSWERED WHEN THE OFFICIAL MEETING WAS FINISHED. IF MORE STILL NEEDED TO BE DONE TO PREPARE THE MINISTERS MEETING PROPERLY THEN ANOTHER MEETING OF OFFICIALS WOULD BE NEEDED. SWIFT SAID THAT THE IRISH ASSUMED THAT THE MEETING WAS DESIGNED TO PREPARE THE MEETING OF MINISTERS IN THE CLASSIC WAY AND THAT IT WOULD DISCUSS PROCEDURE AND TACTICS AS WELL AS SUBSTANCE.

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3. SWIFT WAS NOT VERY FORTHCOMING OVER THE PROPOSED MEETING BETWEEN THE GARDA COMMISSIONER AND THE CHIEF CONSTABLE OF THE RUC. HE SAID THAT AS THE CHIEF CONSTABLE WAS ALREADY AWARE, THE NEXT FEW WEEKS WOULD BE EXTREMELY DIFFICULT FOR THE GARDA COMMISSIONER, BOTH BECAUSE OF THE POPE'S FORTHCOMING VISIT AND BECAUSE OF THE DEMANDS OF THE IRISH PRESIDENCY. THE GARDA COMMISSIONER HAD NO SPARE TIME AT ALL AND ACCORDINGLY WAS EXTREMELY RELUCTANT TO ENGAGE IN ANY MEETING UNLESS IT WAS ABSOLUTELY NECESSARY. IN ANY CASE THE IRISH WERE NOT CLEAR WHAT NEEDED TO BE DISCUSSED BETWEEN POLICE CHIEFS IN ADVANCE OF ANY POLITICAL DECISIONS, PARTICULARLY AS A CHANNEL OF COMMUNICATION BETWEEN THE TWO POLICE FORCES EXISTED ALREADY. SOME OF THE SUGGESTIONS WE HAVE MADE WERE OLD SUGGESTIONS WHICH HAD BEEN DISCUSSED MANY TIMES BETWEEN THE TWO CHIEFS OF POLICE AND INDEED BETWEEN THEIR PREDECESSORS. IN THE VIEW OF THE GARDA COMMISSIONER, OUR NEW SUGGESTIONS (1 TO 4 IN THE AIDE MEMOIRE) WERE CONCERNED WITH QUESTIONS OF INTERNAL GARDA ADMINISTRATION NOT QUESTIONS OF SECURITY CO-OPERATION AT ALL. THE GARDA COMMISSIONER COULD NOT NEGOTIATE THESE QUESTIONS, THOUGH HE WOULD NATURALLY BE INTERESTED IN THE VIEWS OF HIS COUNTERPART.

4. SWIFT PROMISED TO INFORM US AS SOON AS ANY DECISIONS WERE TAKEN ON THE IRISH SIDE.

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10 DOWNING STREET

Prime Minister

The only point I would  
add to this is that so  
far Lynch's public presentation  
of the results of the visit  
<sup>so far</sup> has been responsible. So was  
his response to Piri Se  
Valera's speech on Irish unity.

Am  
— 12/9



CONFIDENTIAL

PRIME MINISTER

Northern Ireland

You may wish to tell the Cabinet tomorrow about the talks with Mr. Lynch. You could do this under the Foreign Affairs item. I suggest however that, coming so soon after the Cabinet last considered Northern Ireland and before you have settled who is to have responsibility for co-ordinating security matters, it would be desirable to avoid any more general discussion of Northern Ireland matters.

2. You could draw on the following points:-

- (a) Mr. Lynch was persuaded to agree that terrorism must be stamped out; and that security co-operation between his authorities and ours must be "substantially improved".
- (b) Mr. Lynch was however defensive and ill at ease. He noted the economic damage which terrorism was doing to the Republic. He made little effort to press you for a "political initiative", or to dispute your point that no such initiative would satisfy the terrorists. He had no suggestions of his own to offer, either in the political or in the security field. His deputy, Mr. Colley, was not helpful.
- (c) It was agreed that in about 3 weeks time there should be a further Ministerial meeting (Mr. Atkins on our side and on theirs the Foreign and Justice Ministers, Mr. O'Kennedy and Mr. Collins); that the Chief Constable and his Dublin opposite number should be present; and that this meeting should establish the Republic's considered response to the proposals for increased security co-operation which you put forward.
- (d) Your security proposals were all reciprocal. The most important were:-
  - (i) the RUC to be allowed to question suspected terrorists in the Republic, in the Garda's presence;



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- (ii) British Army helicopters to be allowed to patrol up to 10-15 km into the Republic;
  - (iii) a Garda liaison officer to be appointed to RUC Headquarters.
- (e) Mr. Lynch was not forthcoming but he promised to study all your requests. He begged that none should be made public. You agreed to this for the time being; and so far he seems to have kept his side of the bargain. But if the Republican response at the Atkins/O'Kennedy/Collins meeting is too negative, we may need to threaten to go public thereafter. An RTE poll since Mr. Lynch was here suggests that Irish public opinion is moving in favour of greater security co-operation and strong anti-terrorist measures.

A handwritten signature in blue ink, appearing to read 'John Hunt', is written above the typed name.

(John Hunt)

12th September 1979



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(ii) British Army helicopters to be allowed to patrol up to

10-15 km into the Republic;

(iii) a Garda liaison office to be opened in LUC Headquarters.

(e) Mr. Lynch was not forthcoming in the previous study all year

ago. He hoped that some kind of deal could be struck. You

agreed to this for the time being; and to continue to have

kept his side of the bargain. But if the Republican response at

the Athina/O'Malley/Gelling meeting is too negative, we may

need to threaten to go public thereafter. An RTE poll since

Mr. Lynch was here suggests that Irish public opinion is moving

in favour of greater security co-operation and strong anti-terrorist

measures.

(John Hume)

13th September 1979

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FM DUBLIN 111220Z SEPTEMBER 79

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 280 OF 11 SEPTEMBER

AND TO PRIORITY NIO BELFAST

INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON AND BIS NEW YORK

*Prime Minister*

*W.*

*Ant. 11/5*

MY TELNO 275 : SILE DE VALERA'S SPEECH

1. SPECULATION ABOUT THE REASONS FOR AND TIMING OF THE SPEECH CONTINUES IN THE MEDIA AND AMONG THE PUBLIC. THERE ARE ALSO QUESTIONS ABOUT WHO MAY HAVE BEEN BEHIND IT, AND THERE IS MUCH TALK ABOUT MR CHARLIE HAUGHEY HAVING HAD A HAND IN IT. CONOR CRUISE O'BRIEN TOLD ME TODAY THAT "NO-ONE" BELIEVED MS DE VALERA HAD WRITTEN THE SPEECH AND HE, PERSONALLY, THOUGHT THAT HAUGHEY WAS BEHIND IT - "PART OF HIS CAMPAIGN TO SUCCEED JACK LYNCH". A SPEECH OF THIS KIND BY ANY FIANNA FAIL TD WOULD HAVE BEEN NEWS BUT FOR EAMON DE VALERA'S GRANDDAUGHTER TO HAVE MADE IT HAS REALLY PUT THE CAT AMONG THE PIGEONS. HOW SERIOUSLY, FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF MR LYNCH'S POSITION, THE GOVERNMENT AND FIANNA FAIL IT IS TOO SOON TO JUDGE. AS MR O'KENNEDY SAID TO ME LAST NIGHT, IN THE UNDERSTATEMENT OF THE WEEK, "IT HASN'T MADE THINGS EASIER FOR ANY OF US".

2. IN MY DESPATCH OF 10 AUGUST, I WROTE ABOUT SENSITIVITY THAT FIANNA FAIL WAS RETREATING FROM ITS TRADITIONAL REPUBLICANISM. MS DE VALERA'S OUTBURST IS A STRIKING EXAMPLE OF THAT FEELING AMONG SOME OF THE FAITHFUL AND AMONG THE EXTREMISTS. AGAIN, IT MAY, IN PART, BE A REACTION TO THE FACT THAT THE DOWNING STREET MEETING, ON 5 SEPTEMBER, CONCENTRATED ON SECURITY AND THAT MR LYNCH WAS BELIEVED, ONCE AGAIN, NOT TO HAVE GOT ANYTHING OUT OF THE



MEETING, ON 5 SEPTEMBER, CONCENTRATED ON SECURITY AND THAT MR LYNCH WAS BELIEVED, ONCE AGAIN, NOT TO HAVE GOT ANYTHING OUT OF THE TALKS SO FAR AS THE POLITICAL DIMENSION IN NORTHERN IRELAND IS CONCERNED. MR O'KENNEDY HINTED AS MUCH TO ME LAST NIGHT.

3. THERE IS NOW SPECULATION ABOUT HOW MUCH SUPPORT MS DE VALERA WILL RECEIVE FROM MINISTERS, BACKBENCHERS AND IN THE COUNTRY AS A WHOLE. TODAY'S DUBLIN PAPERS NAME FOUR FIANNA FAIL TDS AS EXPRESSING OPEN SUPPORT FOR HER, AND ESTIMATE THAT IN ALL 20 MEMBERS OF THE PARLIAMENTARY PARTY FEEL THE SAME WAY. IF SHE GETS A LOT OF SUPPORT, THAT COULD CAUSE REAL DIFFICULTIES IN THE PARTY, AND IT HAS CERTAINLY BEEN A BLOW TO MR LYNCH, ESPECIALLY AGAINST THE BACKGROUND THAT HE DID NOT COME WELL OUT OF THE EVENTS OF 27 AUGUST. HE WAS CRITICISED FOR NOT RETURNING EARLIER TO DUBLIN AND THEN WAS MADE TO LOOK SILLY WHEN, ON THE BASIS OF ONE PRESS ARTICLE, HE ISSUED A STATEMENT THAT HE WAS NOT BEING "SUMMONED" BY THE PRIME MINISTER TO LONDON. THOSE ARE BUT THE MOST RECENT SIGNS OF DISCONTENT IN THIS COUNTRY. IF YOU ADD TO THEM, UNEASE ABOUT THE HANDLING OF THE ECONOMY, STRIKES, TAXATION, UNEMPLOYMENT AND SO ON, MR LYNCH'S POSITION AND THE REPUTATION OF HIS ADMINISTRATION HAVE BEEN DAMAGED. HOWEVER, HIS FOLLOWING IS TREMENDOUS AND MS DE VALERA, DESPITE HER NAME, IS A YOUNG WOMAN OF NO GREAT EXPERIENCE.

4. SO FAR AS OUR IMMEDIATE AIMS ARE CONCERNED, IT WILL NOT MAKE THINGS EASIER FOR HIM TO IMPLEMENT THE IMPROVEMENTS IN SECURITY WHICH WE ARE PRESSING FOR NOR FOR HIM TO ACCEPT THAT THE NEXT MEETING OF MINISTERS WILL AGAIN BE CONCERNED WITH SECURITY. ON THE OTHER HAND, HE WILL BE HELPED IN THIS TO A CERTAIN EXTENT BY THE RECENT RTE POLL ON SECURITY MATTERS (COPY SENT BY BAG): THIS SHOWED SOME SIGNS OF MORE POSITIVE THINKING AMONG THOSE POLLED ON INCREASING GARDA POWERS TO DEAL WITH SUSPECTED TERRORISTS AND ON ARMY-TO-ARMY COMMUNICATIONS. THE SAME POLL SHOWED A FAIRLY EVEN SPLIT ON EXTRADITION OF TERRORISTS TO THE NORTH AND ON JOINT BORDER PATROLS. BUT A MAJORITY WAS AGAINST RUC PARTICIPATION IN POLICE INTERROGATIONS IN THE REPUBLIC.

5. IF MR LYNCH HAS THE NECESSARY QUALITIES OF LEADERSHIP AND, PERHAPS MORE IMPORTANTLY, OF DETERMINATION, HE CAN OVERCOME THESE DIFFICULTIES. I AM NOT SURE THAT HE HAS BUT I AM CERTAIN THAT WE MUST CONTINUE TO PUT ON THE PRESSURE TO SECURE OUR AIMS AND THE MINISTERIAL MEETING.

HAYDON

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TO IMMEDIATE FCO  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 275 OF 10 SEPTEMBER 1979  
INFO ROUTINE WASHINGTON, BIS NEW YORK, MODUK

*Prime Minister*  
*Mr Lynch's reaction to Miss de*  
*Valera lacks vigour but is*  
*broadly in line with the understanding*  
*reached with you last week*  
*Phms*

SPEECH BY SILE DE VALERA

1. YESTERDAY IN FERMOY, AT THE ANNUAL COMMEMORATION OF GENERAL LIAM LYNCH (CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE OLD IRA WHO DIED IN THE CIVIL WAR), MISS SILE DE VALERA MADE A HARD LINE REPUBLICAN SPEECH REITERATING THE TRADITIONAL FIANNA FAIL IDEAL OF IRISH UNITY. (MISS DE VALERA IS THE YOUNGEST FIANNA FAIL DEPUTY AND GRAND-DAUGHTER OF EAMON DE VALERA. SHE WAS ELECTED TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT IN JUNE.) SHE SAID THAT THE BRITISH DENIED THE IRISH PEOPLE THE RIGHT QUOTE TO HAVE A DEMOCRATICALLY ELECTED GOVERNMENT IN SOLE AND EXCLUSIVE CONTROL OF THE AFFAIRS OF ALL THE PEOPLE OF THE NATION UNQUOTE. QUOTE OUR LEADERS MUST NOW ONCE AGAIN PUT OUR CASE TO BRITAIN AND TO THE WORLD, WE MUST AT ALL TIMES BE READY TO COUNTER THE SKILLFUL BRITISH PROPAGANDA WHICH IS SADLY USED TO EFFECT EVEN IN THIS PART OF THE ISLAND. AT NO TIME MUST WE ALLOW OUR LEADERS TO SUCCUMB TO BRITISH PRESSURES WHICH SERVE ONLY TO FURTHER DIVIDE OUR PEOPLE. BECAUSE OF BRITISH PROPAGANDA SOME IRISH PEOPLE ARE NOW AFRAID TO EVEN USE THE WORDS, REPUBLICANISM, PATRIOTISM, IDEALISM, NATIONALISM..... IN ANY NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT WE SHOULD AT ALL TIMES STATE CLEARLY WHERE WE STAND. WE SEEK OUR NATIONAL FREEDOM ..... MANY SO-CALLED SOLUTIONS HAVE BEEN SUGGESTED UNDER SUCH NAMES AS A COUNCIL OF IRELAND OR

THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT WE SHOULD AT ALL TIMES STATE CLEARLY WHERE WE STAND. WE SEEK OUR NATIONAL FREEDOM ..... MANY SO-CALLED SOLUTIONS HAVE BEEN SUGGESTED UNDER SUCH NAMES AS A COUNCIL OF IRELAND OR DEVOLVED GOVERNMENT IN THE NORTH. AS THESE ARE ONLY HALF MEASURES THEY CAN ONLY SERVE TO EXACERBATE AND FESTER THE PROBLEM ..... A TRUE AND LASTING SOLUTION CAN ONLY BE FOUND IN AN ALL-IRELAND CONTEXT WITH ONE DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT TO DECIDE THE AFFAIRS OF THE WHOLE NATION, ANY TRANSITIONARY STEPS THAT DO NOT INCLUDE THIS PRINCIPLE BETRAY THE BELIEFS AND HOPES OF ALL THOSE PATRIOTS WHO DIED FOR THAT CAUSE ..... ~~PATRIOTISM~~ <sup>PARTITION</sup> IS AT THE ROOTS OF THE PRESENT TROUBLES IN THE NORTH. THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT NOW FIND THEMSELVES IN A POSITION WHERE THEY CAN NO LONGER CONTAIN THE VIOLENCE IN THE SIX COUNTY AREA. NOW AS THEY BEGIN TO REALISE THIS, THEY HAVE THE EFFRONTERY TO SEEK OUR COOPERATION IN HOT PURSUIT AS IT HAS NOW BECOME KNOWN. THEY HAVE THE EFFRONTERY TO ASK OUR PERMISSION FOR THEIR ARMY TO OPERATE A MILE OR SO OVER THE BORDER. IT MUST BE POINTED OUT TO THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT IN NO UNCERTAIN TERMS THAT THEY WERE THE CAUSE OF PARTITION AND THAT WE AT NO TIME WOULD WISH TO COOPERATE IN ANY SCHEME OF THEIRS WHICH WOULD ATTEMPT TO KEEP THE BORDER IN EXISTENCE. IN THE LAST WEEK, MR ATKINS HAD ALSO BEEN LOOKING FOR PERMISSION FROM THE IRISH GOVERNMENT TO ALLOW MEMBERS OF THE RUC TO BE PRESENT AT INTERROGATION IN DUBLIN. THIS PERMISSION MUST BE FLATLY REFUSED. THE RUC HAVE NO RIGHT WHATSOEVER TO BE PRESENT IN ANY CAPACITY WITHIN THE 26-COUNTY AREA. .... BRITISH GOVERNMENT ARE STILL APPLYING PRESSURE ON OUR GOVERNMENT IN RELATION TO EXTRADITION. CAN THE BRITISH HONESTLY BELIEVE THAT WE WOULD BE PREPARED TO EXTRADITE PEOPLE TO THE NORTH WITH THE NOW PROVEN ACTS OF BRUTALITY AND INJUSTICE THAT TAKE PLACE THERE. IT MUST BE REMEMBERED THAT THERE WOULD BE NO GUARANTEE OF JUST TREATMENT FOR THESE PEOPLE AS ONE IS EXTRADITED NOT AS A RESULT OF EVIDENCE OF CRIME BUT MERELY SUSPICION UNQUOTE. SHE ENDED BY SUGGESTING THAT IF LEGITIMATE POLITICIANS WERE NOT SEEN TO BE FURTHERING REPUBLICAN ASPIRATIONS THROUGH CONSTITUTIONAL MEANS, YOUNG PEOPLE WOULD TURN TO VIOLENCE TO ACHIEVE THEIR AIMS.

2. THIS PROMPTED AN IMMEDIATE REACTION FROM MR LYNCH. IN AN OFFICIAL STATEMENT HE SAID THAT MUCH OF WHAT MISS DE VALERA HAD SAID WAS OBVIOUSLY MOTIVATED BY HER UNDERSTANDABLE REACTION TO BRITISH POPULAR PRESS PROPAGANDA IN THE LAST TWO WEEKS. IN CONTRAST TO MISS DE VALERA HE SAID QUOTE AS A PRIORITY WE WANT TO SEE RECONCILIATION/ AND PEACE BETWEEN THE COMMUNITIES IN THE NORTH. WE SUPPORT THE SETTING UP OF A FORM OF DEVOLVED GOVERNMENT AND INSTITUTIONS TO WHICH BOTH COMMUNITIES CAN GIVE THEIR SUPPORT AND CONSENT UNQUOTE. HE WENT ON TO REJECT ANY IDENTIFICATION OF THE PROVISIONALS WITH THE MEN OF 68 YEARS AGO " WHO GENUINELY FOUGHT FOR OUR FREEDOMS, POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC" AND POINTED OUT THAT

PROVISIONALS WITH THE MEN OF 60 YEARS AGO " WHO GENUINELY FOUGHT FOR OUR FREEDOMS, POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC", AND POINTED OUT THAT EAMON DE VALERA, AS TAOISEACH, HAD TAKEN STRONG ACTION TO COMBAT THE ACTIVITIES AND ATROCITIES OF THE IRA WHO THEN AS NOW ATTACKED, MAIMED AND MURDERED MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY FORCES OF THIS STATE. HE SAID THAT SUCCESSIVE IRISH GOVERNMENTS WERE, AND THE PRESENT GOVERNMENT ARE DETERMINED TO END THESE ACTIVITIES BY EVERY LAWFUL MEANS AT THEIR DISPOSAL. TO THIS END THE SECURITY FORCES FULLY COOPERATED WITH THEIR COUNTERPARTS IN THE NORTH AND ELSEWHERE. AS AGREED IN LONDON LAST WEDNESDAY, THIS COOPERATION WOULD BE IMPROVED WHERE POSSIBLE AND TO THE FULLEST EXTENT POSSIBLE WITHIN THE LAW. HE ENDED BY POINTING OUT THAT MISS DE VALERA HAD NOT HITHERTO EXPRESSED DISAGREEMENT WITH GOVERNMENT POLICY AND SAID QUOTE I REGRET THE TONE AND TENOR OF DEPUTY DE VALERA'S REMARKS ESPECIALLY AT THIS TIME UNQUOTE. IN AN RTE INTERVIEW MISS DE VALERA TRIED TO DENY THAT HER SPEECH REPRESENTED CRITICISM OF MR LYNCH'S LEADERSHIP OF FIANNA FAIL.

3. PRESS REACTIONS TO MISS DE VALERA'S SPEECH ARE REMARKABLY CONSISTENT. THE HEADLINES INDICATE THE DEGREE OF CONCERN WHICH THE SPEECH HAD AROUSED: QUOTE STORM OVER NORTH CALL UNQUOTE (IRISH PRESS), QUOTE WHO IS BEHIND HARDLINE SILE? UNQUOTE (IRISH INDEPENDENT) AND QUOTE PROMPT LYNCH REPLY SHOWS CONCERN AT DE VALERA SPEECH UNQUOTE (IRISH TIMES). THE REPORTS BY THE IRISH PRESS AND IRISH TIMES POLITICAL CORRESPONDENTS TALK OF QUOTE A SHARP DIVISION WITHIN FIANNA FAIL ON NORTHERN IRELAND POLICY UNQUOTE AND A CHALLENGE TO MR LYNCH TO DEMONSTRATE HIS REPUBLICANISM QUOTE BY AIMING FOR UNITY INSTEAD OF SUCH HALF MEASURES AS DEVOLVED GOVERNMENT AS A SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEMS OF NORTHERN IRELAND UNQUOTE. THE INDEPENDENT CLAIMS THAT QUOTE THE TAOISEACH WAS OBVIOUSLY SEETHING WITH ANGER BECAUSE OF THE EFFECTS HER SPEECH WILL HAVE ON OPINION IN BOTH BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND ON THE POLICIES BEING ADOPTED BY THE IRISH GOVERNMENT IN RELATION TO SECURITY AND OTHER MATTERS.

4. ALL THREE DAILIES OFFER EDITORIAL COMMENT WHICH IS CRITICAL OF MISS DE VALERA. THE IRISH INDEPENDENT SAYS QUOTE A GREAT MANY PEOPLE IN THIS COUNTRY ARE BECOMING WEARY OF BELIGERENT SPEECHES ABOUT OUR POLITICAL DESTINY UNQUOTE AND STATES THAT QUOTE DEPUTY DE VALERA'S EXTRAORDINARY SPEECH CLEARLY SUGGESTS THAT MR LYNCH'S BACK SHOULD BE STIFFENED ON THE POLICY OF REPUBLICANISM UNQUOTE. IT ENDS WITH THE QUESTION QUOTE ARE WE IN FOR ANOTHER SERIES OF CARPETING? UNQUOTE. THE IRISH TIMES SAYS THAT MISS DE VALERA'S SPEECH, COMING AT A TIME WHEN PEOPLE ARE DIVIDED AND CONFUSED AND DESPERATELY LOOKING FOR LEADERSHIP, QUOTE WILL ONLY SERVE TO ADD TO THE GENERAL BEWILDERMENT AND ANXIETY UNQUOTE. THE EDITORIAL CLAIMS

DESPERATELY LOOKING FOR LEADERSHIP, QUOTE WILL ONLY SERVE TO ADD TO THE GENERAL BEWILDERMENT AND ANXIETY UNQUOTE. THE EDITORIAL CLAIMS THAT HER UNDERSTANDING OF NORTHERN IRELAND AFFAIRS ' ' APPEARS WOEFULLY INADEQUATE' '. IT SUGGESTS THAT HER SPEECH WAS ' 'A DIRECT CHALLENGE TO MR LYNCH AND HIS POLICY ON THE NORTH, WHATEVER THAT MAY BE ' '. THE IRISH TIMES REGRETS THAT MR LYNCH IN HIS REPLY TO MISS DE VALERA ' 'PERFORMED A SOFTSHOE SHUFFLE' ' RATHER THAN ASSERTING HIS AUTHORITY. EVEN THE IRISH PRESS, OWNED BY MISS DE VALERA'S UNCLE, COMPLAINS ABOUT THE TIMING OF HER SPEECH, CLAIMING THAT IT WILL QUOTE HAND A FLAIL TO THOSE ELEMENTS IN FLEET STREET, BRITISH POLITICS AND THE NORTH WHICH HAVE BEEN TAKING ADVANTAGE OF THE EVENTS OF ONE OF THE BLOODIEST WEEKS IN IRISH HISTORY TO PILLORY THE GOVERNMENT FORMED BY THE PARTY TO WHICH MISS DE VALERA BELONGS UNQUOTE. IT ALSO SUGGESTS THAT QUOTE THE DISSENSIONS OF 1970 ARE CERTAIN TO BE RE-ACTIVATED UNQUOTE (A REFERENCE TO THE ARMS TRAIL SCANDAL). THE IRISH PRESS POINTS OUT THAT QUOTE THE UNITY OF THE COUNTRY WILL NOT BE ACHEIVED BY ANY EFFORTS, IN THE WAKE OF MISS DE VALERA'S SPEECH TO CREATE DISUNITY IN THE RANKS OF THE LARGEST PARTY IN THIS COUNTRY ..... IT IS A TIME FOR HOLDING THE CENTRE NOT SUNDERING IT UNQUOTE.

#9

CORRECTIONS: PARA 1 LINE 27

WHO DIED FOR THAT CAUSE ..... PARTITION IS AT THE ROOTS OF ETC

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NNNN

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RECD AT 10/1740Z JW

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FM DUBLIN 111215Z SEPTEMBER 79

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 279 OF 11 SEPTEMBER

AND TO PRIORITY NIO BELFAST

MY TELNO 276: SECURITY COOPERATION WITH THE IRISH REPUBLIC

1. I SAW MR O'KENNEDY LAST NIGHT AND EMPHASISED THE IMPORTANCE OF ARRANGING THE NEXT MINISTERIAL MEETING BETWEEN 1-5 OCTOBER. I EXPLAINED THE DIFFICULTIES ABOUT 8 OCTOBER. HE REPLIED THAT HE WOULD DO HIS VERY BEST TO FALL IN WITH OUR WISHES. HE HAD NOT KNOWN, WHEN AT DOWNING STREET, HOW FULL HIS DIARY WAS DURING THE DATES SUGGESTED. O'ROURKE TOLD ME LATER THAT APART FROM RETURNING FROM THE US FOR THE PAPAL VISIT, HIS MINISTER WOULD LIKE TO BE AT THE UN FOR THE POPE'S ADDRESS TO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY ON 2 OCTOBER. HE THOUGHT HIS MINISTER WOULD HAVE TO COME VERY SOON TO A DECISION ON WHETHER HE WOULD RETURN TO NEW YORK AFTER THE POPE'S VISIT.
2. MR O'KENNEDY RAISED THE QUESTION OF ARMY-TO-ARMY COOPERATION AND SAID THAT THE TAOISEACH HAD HAD IN MIND BRITISH ARMY-TO-GARDA COMMUNICATION. I SAID THAT THAT WAS NOT OUR UNDERSTANDING AND HE COMMENTED THAT THAT ASPECT OF THE TALKS HAD INDEED BEEN 'CONFUSING'. WE AGREED THAT IT WAS A MATTER WHICH SHOULD BE PURSUED BY A MEETING OF OFFICIALS.

HAYDON

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MR FERGUSSON

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10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

B/F 13.9.79

6 September, 1979.

Extradition

As you will be aware, there has been a good deal of discussion in recent days about the operation of the statutes governing the extradition of individuals from the United Kingdom. The willingness of the British authorities to extradite in suitable instances is well established. The Prime Minister made some play in her talks with Mr. Lynch yesterday with specific examples provided by John Chilcot in his letter to me of 4 September (copy enclosed).

What is less clear to me is how what might be called the political dimension enters into the situation. As you may have seen from the record of yesterday's talks, Mr. Lynch claimed that in the Littlejohn case the Irish Attorney General had had to give an assurance before Littlejohn was returned that Littlejohn would not be charged with any political offence on reaching Dublin. It would be helpful to us here to have an analysis of how account is taken of the political factor in this sense in considering a request for extradition. It is clearly an element which looms large in Irish thinking on the subject.

I am sending copies of this letter to George Walden (Foreign and Commonwealth Office), Roy Harrington (Northern Ireland Office), John Chilcot (Home Office), and Martin Vile (Cabinet Office).

M. O'D. B. ALEXANDER

W.C. Beckett, Esq., C.B.,  
Law Officers' Department.

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*Original in  
C No  
CWO.H/E  
CSL  
Rooms*

10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

6 September 1979

Thank you for your telephone call asking for the recall of Parliament to consider measures in Northern Ireland.

I naturally share your deep concern about the recent tragic events in Ireland on both sides of the border, and the Government has thought very carefully indeed about your proposal that Parliament should be recalled. But after considering all the relevant factors, we do not feel that it would be appropriate to recommend this course of action.

I must emphasise that this decision in no way detracts from the seriousness with which the Government views recent events.

(SGD) MARGARET THATCHER

James Kilfedder, Esq., M.P.

*Identical letters sent to:-  
Tony Martin MP  
Bill Walker MP  
Ted Heath MP  
David Alton MP*

vb

CPS 320

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FM WASHINGTON 052201Z SEP 79

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NO 2545 OF 3 SEPTEMBER

INFO IMMEDIATE NIO BELFAST, DUBLIN

ROUTINE BIS NEW YORK

*Ant.*

MY IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING TELEGRAM: <sup>5-9</sup> NORTHERN IRELAND.

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT:

QUESTION.

MR SECRETARY, AS YOU KNOW, PRIME MINISTERS LYNCH AND THATCHER ARE MEETING TODAY. YOU OR THE DEPARTMENT RECENTLY SUSPENDED ARMS SALES TO THE ROYAL ULSTER CONSTABULARY. IN THE MEANTIME PEOPLE LIKE GOVERNOR CAREY HAVE EVEN STEPPED IN TO OFFER MEDIATION. MY QUESTION IS, WHEN WILL THIS STUDY THAT YOU ARE DOING NOW ON THIS BE COMPLETED AND ARE YOU CONTEMPLATING SUGGESTING TO MRS THATCHER AND THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT A NEW POLITICAL INITIATIVE TO TRY AND SOLVE THE PROBLEM.

ANSWER.

THE ANSWER IS THAT WE ARE NOT PLANNING TO SUGGEST A NEW POLITICAL INITIATIVE. OUR POSITION HAS BEEN, AND PRESIDENT CARTER STATED IT VERY CLEARLY IN 1977, A POSITION OF IMPARTIALITY. IT IS A POSITION OF CONDEMNING TERRORISM AND VIOLENCE AND IT IS A POSITION WHICH SUPPORTS THE BRINGING TOGETHER OF THE VARIOUS FACTIONS IN AN ATTEMPT TO TRY TO MOVE TOWARDS A PEACEFUL SOLUTION. IT IS AN IMMENSELY DIFFICULT PROBLEM AS ALL OF US KNOW - ONE OF THE MOST DIFFICULT OF THESE TYPES OF PROBLEMS THAT EXISTS THROUGHOUT THE WORLD. THE POSITION WHICH WE HAVE TAKEN IS SUPPORTED

/BY THE

BY THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT, BY THE IRISH GOVERNMENT AND BY THE POLITICAL PARTIES IN BOTH IRELAND AND NORTHERN IRELAND. FOR US TO INTRUDE OURSELVES AT THIS POINT INTO THE IRISH SITUATION IN MY JUDGEMENT WOULD NOT BE WISE. I THINK IT WOULD BE RESENTED BY THE PARTIES CONCERNED AND THEY ARE THE ONES THAT SHOULD DEAL WITH THIS ISSUE.

HENDERSON

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MR BULLARD  
MR FERGUSSON  
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FM WASHINGTON 052200Z SEP 79

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NO 2544 OF 5 SEPTEMBER

INFO IMMEDIATE DUBLIN, NIO BELFAST

ROUTINE BIS NEW YORK

NORTHERN IRELAND

1. AT HIS PRESS CONFERENCE TODAY MR VANCE WAS ASKED WHEN THE STATE DEPARTMENT REVIEW OF POLICY ON ARMS FOR THE RUC WOULD BE COMPLETED AND WHETHER THE US GOVERNMENT WERE CONTEMPLATING SUGGESTING A NEW POLITICAL INITIATIVE TO THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT. THE TEXT OF MR VANCE'S REPLY, IN WHICH HE AVOIDED ANY MENTION OF THE RUC POLICY REVIEW, IS IN MY IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING TELEGRAM.

2. AT DESK LEVEL THE STATE DEPARTMENT HAVE CONFIRMED THAT THEY ARE ACCELERATING THEIR WORK ON THE REVIEW, BUT ARE UNABLE TO FORECAST WHEN IT WILL BE COMPLETED.

HENDERSON

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*cc Ireland - Visit of Taoiseach*  
*Ireland*

JOINT STATEMENT BY THE PRIME MINISTER  
AND THE TAOISEACH ISSUED FROM 10 DOWNING  
STREET AT 18.15 ON WEDNESDAY 5 SEPTEMBER 1979

The Prime Minister, the Rt Hon Margaret Thatcher MP, had discussions today 5 September at No 10 Downing Street with the Taoiseach, Mr John Lynch TD, who was accompanied by Mr George Colley TD, Tanaiste and Minister of Finance and Mr Michael O'Kennedy TD, Minister for Foreign Affairs. The Rt Hon The Lord Carrington, Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, and the Rt Hon Humphrey Atkins MP, Secretary of State for Northern Ireland were present. The talks were preceded by a working lunch also attended by the Chancellor of the Exchequer, the Rt Hon Sir Geoffrey Howe QC, MP and by the Lord Privy Seal, the Rt Hon Sir Ian Gilmour Bt MP.

The talks took place in the context of Anglo-Irish relations, the European Community and international developments generally. The Tsoiseach and the Prime Minister agreed on their determination to stamp out terrorism. They agreed that recent events require that the present extensive co-operation between the authorities of the two countries must now be substantially improved. For this purpose a number of suggestions were made by both governments which will now be actively followed up. There will be a further meeting at Ministerial level in about three weeks to review the progress which has been made in the development of these proposals.

The Prime Minister and the Taoiseach exchanged views about the prospects for political movement in Northern Ireland. The Prime Minister confirmed that Her Majesty's Government's policy was to seek an acceptable way of restoring to the people of Northern Ireland more control over their own affairs; Her Majesty's Government would make moves to that end at the appropriate time. The Taoiseach indicated the need for any form of administration in Northern Ireland to be acceptable to both sides of the community there.

On European Community affairs, matters likely to be raised under the presidency of Mr Lynch at the European Council in Dublin in November were discussed.

Both Prime Ministers agreed to maintain regular contact.

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Original on  
Ireland (Lynch) May 79

NOTE OF A PLENARY MEETING BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER AND THE  
TAOISEACH, MR. J. LYNCH, T.D., AT No. 10 DOWNING STREET ON  
WEDNESDAY 5 SEPTEMBER 1979 AT 1600

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PRESENT

Prime Minister	An Taoiseach - Mr. J. Lynch TD
Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary	Mr. G. Colley (Tanaiste, Minister for Finance and Minister for the Public Service)
Secretary of State for Northern Ireland	Mr. M. O'Kennedy (Minister for Foreign Affairs)
Attorney General (for part of the time)	Mr. A. O'Rourke (Secretary, Department of Foreign Affairs)
H.E. Mr. W. R. Haydon	Mr. A. Ward (Secretary, Department of Justice)
Sir B. Cubbon	Mr. M. Horgan (Second Secretary, Department of Finance)
Mr. R. L. Wade-Gery	H.E. Dr. E. L. Kennedy (Irish Ambassador in London)
Mr. E. A. J. Fergusson	Mr. D. Nally (Deputy Secretary, Taoiseach's Office)
Mr. C. A. Whitmore	Mr. D. Nelligan (Assistant Secretary, Department of Foreign Affairs)
Mr. Ian Gow, M.P.	Mr. M. J. Donnelly (Assistant Secretary, Department of Justice)
Mr. H. James	Mr. W. Kirwan (Assistant Secretary, Taoiseach's Office)
Mr. M. G'D. B. Alexander	Mr. F. Dunlop (Government Press Secretary)
	Mr. S. O'Huiginn (Counsellor, Department of Foreign Affairs)
	Mr. B. McCarthy (Private Secretary to An Taoiseach)

The Prime Minister began the meeting by summarising the views that she had put to Mr. Lynch in the course of their tête-à-tête meeting. Events in the previous week had given both Governments a new opportunity. Both Prime Ministers were agreed that public opinion in their countries wanted terrorism stamped out. Whatever had been done in the past, it had not been enough. Law-abiding

/citizens

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citizens had to be given protection. Mr. Atkins would take a political initiative in Northern Ireland when he was ready to do so but this would not of itself stop terrorism. Other things could and should be done.

The Prime Minister stressed that everything for which she had sought Mr. Lynch's agreement she was ready to do herself. Reciprocity would be complete. Her proposals had been:-

- (a) - and most importantly - that facilities should be made available for the RUC to question suspected terrorists, in the presence of Gardai, in police stations in the Republic. This should be of considerable assistance in enabling both Governments to convert evidence into convictions;
- (b) that British Army helicopters should be allowed to conduct surveillance patrols within a zone 10-15 kilometres south of the border. Identical facilities would be extended to helicopters from the Republic operating north of the border;
- (c) that Gardai anti-terrorist patrols of the type recently discontinued in County Monaghan should be resumed;
- (d) that a Gardai liaison officer should be attached to the Headquarters of the RUC. HMG would be happy to appoint a RUC liaison officer in the reverse direction;
- (e) that Mr. Atkins and his opposite number, together with the heads of their respective police forces, should meet soon to ensure that words were translated into deeds;
- (f) that HMG should give any help the Irish Government thought useful with training relevant to the defeat of the terrorists.

/The Prime Minister



The Prime Minister pointed out that HMG had in recent years given ample evidence of its willingness to extradite individuals, including British citizens, in the effort to stamp out terrorism. She mentioned the Littlejohn case and also the recent extradition agreement with the Federal Republic. She regarded the extradition issue as of major importance. The Prime Minister concluded by saying that no political initiative would deter the PIRA and the INLA unless measures like those which she had summarised were implemented.

Mr. Lynch said that the Prime Minister's summary had been an accurate one. He and Mrs. Thatcher were agreed that it was in the interests of both countries to stamp out completely this particularly evil form of terrorism. He noted that there was a significant economic cost to terrorism in loss of tourism and retardation of investment. Irish Governments had had to deal with the IRA for many years. The Offences Against the State Act had been passed in 1939 and strengthened in 1972. The Irish people had been as horrified as the British by the murder of Earl Mountbatten.

Turning to the specific proposals made by Mrs. Thatcher, Mr. Lynch said that the high degree of co-operation between the two Governments in dealing with terrorism had always been acknowledged. However, good though it might have been, it had not been <sup>as</sup> successful as might have been hoped. This needed to be looked into. On extradition, Mr. Lynch said the Irish Government could not make an agreement such as that which the UK had just concluded with the Federal Republic. It would be against the Irish Constitution. In any case a number of other EEC countries did not extradite their own nationals and some had reservations where political offences were concerned. The Irish Government would be signing the new EEC agreement on extradition shortly. In relation to the Littlejohn case, Mr. Lynch commented that the Irish Attorney General had had to swear an affidavit in the United Kingdom, before the extradition had been approved, that no political charge would be made against Littlejohn.

/Mr. Lynch said

Mr. Lynch said that the incidence of terrorism on the border had been exaggerated. Far more of the incidents took place deep inside the Province than took place on the border. Hot pursuit was essentially a naval concept and would cause considerable problems if implemented in the border context. Over-flying of the Republic by helicopters was at present only possible when advance notice was given. Absence of this notice would give rise to difficulties. As regards hot pursuit on the ground, Mr. Lynch commented that so far as he knew terrorist crimes had seldom, if ever, been witnessed in a way that had permitted a pursuit which had subsequently been halted at the border.

Mr. Lynch also foresaw difficulties over the presence of the RUC in police stations south of the border. It was possible that sources of information at present available to the Gardai would dry up. Members of the RUC visiting the south in these circumstances might be exposed to physical danger. Mr. Lynch said he was not aware of the withdrawal of the Gardai unit which had been operating in County Monaghan. But he noted that the increase in other forms of terrorist activity, e.g., in robbing banks, had forced his Government to pull some people back from the border. Liaison between the Gardai and the RUC was already very highly developed. If more meetings were required this would cause no difficulty.

Mr. Lynch said that he agreed that a meeting between responsible Ministers should take place at an early date. On the Irish side Mr. O'Kennedy would participate because of the importance the Irish Government attached to the preservation of the political dimension. It might be difficult to achieve progress in the political sphere but progress was required. Mr. Lynch could see no reason why Ministers should not meet as regularly as they liked.

As regards the presentation of the outcome of his meeting with the Prime Minister, Mr. Lynch agreed that there must be some indication that an advance had been made. He agreed that words would not suffice. But he hoped that no details would be made public. Progress in the fields of security and intelligence could only be made if secrecy was maintained. He intended to refrain from saying or publishing anything specific.

The Prime Minister stressed that the proposed meeting between the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland and the Irish Foreign Minister would have no point unless it reviewed the security initiatives discussed by her and Mr. Lynch. The Ministers should monitor things that were happening. If this were not going to be possible, it would be better to be frank about the absence of progress. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary said that the Prime Minister had put forward a number of suggestions for new anti-terrorist measures: did Mr. Lynch have any ideas of his own to propose?

Mr. Lynch said that his proposals would depend on the receipt of advice from his experts. He was not himself familiar with the border. However, he had encouraged co-operation in every way and intended to continue doing so. He saw some risk of confusion if there were too many cross-border links. However, he would have no objection if the Armies on either side of the border were to communicate with each other direct in situations of real urgency. He did not know if there were any technical difficulties, e.g. about reception, with such communications, but he was sure something could be worked out. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary said that the British and Irish Governments had been co-operating for the last nine years but that they were still not winning the battle against the terrorists. The recent incidents were horrifying in their political as well as their human implications. There must be more that could be done if the two Governments had the will. The Prime Minister stressed that she would be unable to restrain public opinion in this country if, having agreed on the threat, she and Mr. Lynch were unable to point to anything new that would be done.

Mr. Lynch said that it was his understanding that the military and police presence immediately to the north of the border was not as intense as that to its south. In South Armagh, the Army remained 10 miles back from the border. Mr. Colley said that the Irish Government had 2,000 men on the border dealing with people as they crossed it. British troops and policemen in the border areas were not close enough to deal with cross-border incidents as they occurred. In many areas there were long intervals between visits by Army patrols. It was difficult for

the Irish Government to explain to its citizens in border areas the absence of a continuous British security presence on the other side. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary said that what was at issue was a difference in tactics in dealing with terrorists and that the discussion was unlikely to prove fruitful.

The Prime Minister asked whether the Irish side were prepared to get down to brass tacks or whether they were in fact refusing to agree to the proposals she had made and specifically to that relating to helicopter flights. Mr. O'Kennedy said that the Irish authorities agreed automatically when a request for a helicopter over-flight was received. Blanket clearance of the kind proposed by the Prime Minister would require legislation and public debate in the Dail. The consequence of such debate could be damaging. However, this was the first time the Irish Government had heard that the present practice of over-flights was unsatisfactory. Perhaps the area in which the helicopters were at present operating could be extended. Consideration could also be given to authorising a specific number of flights in a specific period. The political will to improve co-operation existed but the Irish authorities would not wish to advertise what they were doing.

Turning to the question of making it possible for RUC officers to question suspects in police stations in the Republic, the Prime Minister said that the expert and informed questioning which this would make possible would assist in the vital process of turning intelligence into evidence that could be used in Court. It would increase the chances of securing convictions. This was more important in that the Irish Government still saw difficulties with the extradition of its subjects. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary explained why HMG thought that RUC officers were more likely to secure confessions from those suspected of committing offences in the North. The Attorney General pointed out that RUC officers were so familiar with the situation in the North that suspects under interrogation frequently gave them valuable information inadvertently. Mr. Colley enquired whether the Courts in Northern Ireland would accept evidence obtained by a member of the Gardai in an RUC station. He said that the Irish Attorney General had expressed doubt about the admissibility in an Irish Court of

/evidence obtained

evidence obtained by an RUC officer in the South. The Attorney General said that there would be no problem about admissibility in the North provided the judge accepted that the statement was obtained voluntarily. Mr. Lynch said that he would wish to check with the Gardai whether they would be prepared to agree to the British proposal. As he had said earlier, it was possible that the presence of RUC officers in Gardai stations would be counter-productive but he would certainly consider the idea further: perhaps the Chief Constable and the Gardai Commissioner could examine it together.


The Prime Minister enquired why the special Gardai unit which had been operating in County Monaghan had been withdrawn. Mr. Ward said that the unit had been withdrawn because the Gardai had felt that its operations were unsuccessful. The Prime Minister said that there had been less trouble to the north of the border while it was operating. Mr. Lynch said that he would have the question looked at again. He also agreed that liaison between the RUC and the Gardai should be re-examined with a view to seeing whether it could not be further improved. The Prime Minister repeated that HMG were keen to offer any assistance in the training field that the Irish authorities would think useful. Contact between the Gardai and Scotland Yard might, for instance, be increased. Mr. Lynch agreed that this might be followed up when Ministers met at the end of the month.

In the course of a brief discussion of the political dimension, Mr. Colley said that while he agreed a political initiative would not of itself inhibit the terrorists, security initiatives would not on their own be sufficient. The uncommitted on both sides of the border needed a lead. The Prime Minister said that she was well aware of the importance of giving a political lead. It was her intention to give the local people in Northern Ireland more responsibility. When proposals to this end were introduced she would not wish any group in Northern Ireland to have the power of veto over them. Mr. Lynch said that the consent of all substantial groups in Northern Ireland would be required for an initiative. A proposal concerned solely with local government would be unacceptable to the SDLP. The Prime Minister repeated that at some stage HMG would wish to put forward a proposal and would wish to make it

clear that no group had a veto over it. Mr. Lynch agreed that this was reasonable. There was then some discussion about the meaning of the phrase "general consent" in the Northern Ireland context. Mr. Colley attempted to argue that Northern Ireland was an artificial creation and adduced as evidence the fact that there had never been a change of Government in Stormont. He did not deny it when the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary pointed out that there were many states in the world whose creation might, for one reason or another, be said to be artificial but whose existence was nonetheless a fact.

In a discussion of the line to be taken with the press, radio and television after the meeting, Mr. Lynch was insistent both that no specific proposals should be mentioned and that it should appear that those proposals which were discussed had emanated from both sides. He wanted the communiqué to stress that both Governments were anxious to stamp out terrorism and that co-operation was already good but that more could be done. He anticipated that he would be pressed about specific proposals since these had already been widely discussed in the British press. But he was determined to refrain from giving detailed replies. He hoped that the British side would do likewise. The Prime Minister said that she saw no difficulty in saying nothing.

Following discussion of, and agreement on, the communiqué the meeting broke up at 1745 hours.



5 September 1979

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Original on  
Ireland (Lynch) May 79

NOTE OF A MEETING BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER AND THE TAOISEACH HELD AT  
10 DOWNING STREET AT 1445 ON WEDNESDAY 5 SEPTEMBER 1979

Present:

Prime Minister

Mr. J. Lynch, T.D.

Mr. C.A. Whitmore

Mr. D. Nally

\* \* \* \* \*

The Prime Minister said that she was grateful to Mr. Lynch for being ready to have talks with her in the wake of the double tragedy which had occurred the previous week. Since the events of 27 August she had been making it clear in public that she was sure that he was as anxious as she was to stamp out terrorism: terrorism was a threat not just immediately to Northern Ireland but to democracy as a whole. The events of the previous week had aroused public expectation in the United Kingdom that concrete action would be taken to combat terrorism. The co-operative efforts which their two Governments had made in the past were not enough: the opportunity had to be seized to improve their joint efforts against the PIRA, and she saw the purpose of their meeting as being to discuss what measures their two Governments could take together.

Mr. Lynch said that the horror and revulsion which had been felt in the UK for the events of 27 August were matched by public reaction in the Republic, but to those feelings in their case was added shame that the deaths of Lord Mountbatten and those with him had occurred on Irish territory. He had been concerned that the reaction in the UK might have repercussions for Irish people living here, particularly since some British newspapers had given the impression that the deaths had been caused in some way by Irish negligence. He fully agreed with what the Prime Minister had said about the need to stamp out terrorism. Terrorism in the Irish Republic posed not only a security threat but was also damaging economically: in his view there was a real risk that terrorism might in the long term retard economic growth in the Republic, particularly because of its effect on foreign investment and tourism. Successive Irish Governments had taken a number of substantial steps to combat the activities of the PIRA. They had increased the strength of the Garda and of the Irish army; they had committed as many resources

/ as they

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as they could afford to the policing of the border; they had encouraged close and successful co-operation between the Garda and the RUC; and they had a range of anti-terrorist laws which was perhaps stronger than that of any other European country. The question now was what more could be done. Various ideas had been aired in the press such as direct co-operation between the British and Irish armies, RUC participation in the Garda's interrogation of suspected terrorists and joint British and Irish patrols on the border, but all these ideas would raise difficulties for the Irish Government.

The Prime Minister reiterated that existing co-operation between the two Governments in the security field was not working well enough and had to be improved. The feeling in the UK that members of the IRA were safe once they were south of the border was stronger than ever, and there would be severe public reaction in this country if today's meeting did not point the way towards substantial improvement in security co-operation between the authorities of their two countries. She had a number of specific measures to suggest - and she had been meticulous about not revealing in public before their meeting what she wished to put to him - but before they discussed the details of them, she wished to make it plain that all the steps which she was asking the Irish Government to take the British Government was ready to introduce itself on a reciprocal basis. She was seeking nothing which she was not prepared to offer in return.

The two Prime Ministers then discussed the following measures:

(a) Extradition and extra-territorial jurisdiction

The Prime Minister said that the British Government already extradited people in the UK to the Republic of Ireland. In the years 1976-78 the numbers had been 27, 31 and 26. Moreover, these figures included some of our own nationals who had been extradited to the Republic to face charges there. We had extradited the Littlejohn brothers to the Republic on charges of robbery and when one of them had been recaptured in the UK following their escape from custody while in the Republic, he had been returned again to the Irish authorities. Similarly we had in recent years extradited a number of British nationals to other foreign countries. We were prepared to do this in the interests of the rule of law, and we would like to see other countries, including the Republic, acting similarly. The British



Government knew that the Irish Government had constitutional difficulties over extradition. She understood, for example, that the EEC Agreement relating to the European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism contained a special accommodation for the Republic by which it would have no obligation to extradite but which would impose an obligation to consider the prosecution of those whom it did not extradite. This made it all the more important that when the Irish Government did undertake such prosecutions it did so with the best possible chance of securing convictions. The key to getting evidence on which convictions would be obtained turned very often in terrorist cases on translating intelligence into evidence that would stand up in court. The RUC felt very strongly that this process would be helped enormously if they were allowed to participate in the Garda's interrogation of suspected terrorists who were questioned in the Republic about incidents in Northern Ireland. However much information the RUC gave the Garda about a particular suspect, interrogation was more likely to have a successful outcome if those conducting it included police officers with first hand knowledge of the case. The British Government would therefore like to see RUC officers allowed to interview, in Garda stations and in the presence of Garda officers, persons suspected of terrorist offences in the North. We were ready to provide the same facilities for the Garda in Northern Ireland. This measure would make a reality of the 1976 extra-territorial legislation.

Mr. Lynch said that extradition raised difficult constitutional problems for the Irish Government. Extradition was a judicial process which had never been intended to apply to people who were simply suspected of offences and who were wanted for interrogation. Moreover, a number of other European countries, including France, Denmark and Belgium, never extradited their own nationals. As regards the proposal that the RUC should participate directly in the Garda's interrogation of suspected terrorists held in the Republic, he was advised that this could be counter-productive. The Garda felt that such a practice might very well alienate the local population and jeopardise their readiness to supply intelligence to the Garda: this was particularly true in the rather special circumstances that affected the area a few miles south of the

/ border

border with Northern Ireland.. Moreover, the station in which interrogation took place might well be a target for terrorist action, and there would therefore be a physical risk to the Garda and RUC officers involved. A further problem about this proposal was that there was a very real risk, in the view of his Attorney General, that the courts in the Republic would exclude as inadmissible a confession which was obtained by interrogation for which an RUC officer had been present. This might seem extraordinary but the attitude of the Irish courts on matters of this kind could only be described as officious. Nonetheless, he recognised that something like 80% of all convictions obtained against terrorists depended on confessions resulting from interrogation and he was therefore prepared to look further at the Prime Minister's proposal.

(b) Garda Anti-terrorist Squad

The Prime Minister said that earlier this year the Garda had deployed to the border a special anti-terrorist squad which the RUC thought had been highly successful. Unfortunately it seemed that the unit had been disbanded after a <sup>short</sup> time. She would like to suggest that it should be revived.

Mr. Lynch said that he was not aware of any major change in the deployment of the Garda along the border, though it was true that in order to combat the rise in crime generally and in particular in IRA bank raids elsewhere in the Republic some police had been withdrawn from the border where it was thought that this would not be detrimental to security. He was ready to consider whether a squad of the kind the Prime Minister had described should be used along the border. Mr. Nally added that he understood that the special unit had been disbanded because the Garda had concluded that it was less effective than local forces using local knowledge.

/ (c)

(c) Garda and RUC liaison officers

The Prime Minister said that co-operation between the RUC and the Garda would be much improved if a Garda liaison officer was attached to the RUC's headquarters and similarly there was an RUC officer at Garda headquarters.

Mr. Lynch said that a joint RUC/Garda Committee had been set up at Deputy Chief Constable level in 1974 and these liaison arrangements were still working. It might be that there was a need for some strengthening of these links.

(d) Helicopter overflights

The Prime Minister said that suggestions had appeared in the press that the British security forces should have the right of hot pursuit into the Republic. There was a misunderstanding about this. What the British Government would like to propose was that British helicopters should have standing authority to overfly the Republic to a depth of 10-15 kilometers in order to look for terrorists. We were not proposing that British troops or police should cross the border on the ground, but a measure of the kind she had described would do much to stop the PIRA thinking that they had a safe haven across the border. It might be possible for information from the helicopters to be transmitted direct to the Garda and the Irish army, instead of relaying it to them via the RUC: this might save a good deal of time.

Mr. Lynch said that it very rarely happened that the British security forces pursued suspected terrorists to the border and then saw them escape. As regards the overflight of helicopters, the Irish authorities already gave automatic approval for advance requests for permission for British helicopters to overfly Irish territory, even though this was a politically sensitive matter. He would consider the Prime Minister's proposal to see whether it would be effective in its operation.

/ (e)

(e) Co-operation between the British and Irish armies

The Prime Minister said that there would be much to be gained if there was co-operation between the armies of the two countries on the border to match the co-operation between the RUC and the Garda.

Mr. Lynch said that he thought that there might be difficulties about this proposal. The Irish army operated in the Republic in aid of the civil power and they worked through the Garda. In any case, he understood that the RUC were sensitive about direct co-operation between the two armies and that they preferred to be the sole channel between the security forces on either side of the border.

The Prime Minister said that it was important that there should be a very early follow-up to the proposals which she had put to Mr. Lynch and which he had agreed to consider. She therefore suggested that the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland should meet the Irish Minister for Justice, Mr. Collins, together with the RUC Chief Constable and the Garda Commissioner, in the next two to three weeks to monitor progress. Mr. Lynch said that he saw the Irish Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. O'Kennedy, as the main counterpart of the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, though it was often desirable for Mr. Collins to be present when Mr. O'Kennedy and Mr. Atkins met. There was a risk that if only Mr. Collins saw the Secretary of State this would be interpreted in the Republic that the Irish Government was accepting that its security arrangements were in some way deficient. He was, however, ready to agree that there should be an early meeting between the Secretary of State, Mr. O'Kennedy and Mr. Collins.

Mr. Lynch went on to say that there were two further practical steps which he thought would help to improve the security situation. First, the British security forces frequently described the PIRA as highly professional and its weapons as sophisticated. Such epithets only enhanced the IRA's image in certain quarters and even helped them to recruit new members. There was much to be said for not using such terms and instead for playing down the PIRA's capabilities. Second, the British security authorities persistently complained publicly about what they saw as Irish ineptitude in dealing with the PIRA. Such

criticism was counter-productive and should be stopped. The Prime Minister said that she agreed that we should not boost the PIRA's morale unnecessarily and she would draw the attention of the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland to what Mr. Lynch had said about the terms in which the PIRA was described.

The Prime Minister said that she would like to bring to Mr. Lynch's notice an interview by a Mr. Peter McMullen, a former member of the PIRA, which was reported in today's Daily Mail and Daily Mirror. McMullen had given details of how shipments of arms for the IRA were moved from the United States through the Republic and into Northern Ireland. She did not know how much truth there was in McMullen's allegations. The British Government was doing all it could to prevent arms reaching the PIRA in Northern Ireland and she assumed that the Irish Government was doing the same. Mr. Lynch said that it was possible that the PIRA brought arms into the Republic in containers, but container traffic was so substantial that it could not all be checked by the customs and so some arms might get through.

The Prime Minister said that the British Government would continue to strain to find a political solution to the Northern Ireland problem. But we had no rabbits ready to pull out of our hat, and given how long the problem had existed, this was not surprising. It would help enormously if people would stop talking about the total unity of Ireland. A majority of the population of the Six Counties had voted to remain part of the UK. There was nothing she could do about yesterday: she was concerned with practical steps for tomorrow. In any case it was out of the question that a political solution could be found that would satisfy the terrorists who were as much dedicated to the destruction of the Republic's existing forms of government as to the overthrow of Northern Ireland's political structure. She hoped that as the British Government explored the possibilities for political movement in Northern Ireland, Mr. Lynch would exert positively any influence he had with the local political parties. When we were ready to come forward with a political initiative, we would wish to discuss it with him.

Mr. Lynch said that he knew full well the difficulty of producing an initiative at any time that would gain the support of both communities in Northern Ireland. That difficulty was perhaps even greater at the moment than it had been in the recent past. Nonetheless, he believed that the cause of the present situation in Northern Ireland had to be tackled, and this required a political solution. He believed that the two Governments should work together if the British initiative

when it was ready, was not to fail.

The Prime Minister proposed that at the plenary meeting she should summarise the proposals that she had put forward and that Mr. Lynch should describe briefly his reactions. The meeting might then usefully consider how the proposals should be followed up. This was all-important since both Governments would be judged publicly by what they did about improving their ability to fight terrorism and not by what they said. Mr. Lynch agreed with the Prime Minister's proposals for handling the plenary meeting. He did not believe the details of the measures to be taken to improve security should be disclosed in public, and this was the line that he intended to take at the press conference he was holding later that day. The Prime Minister said that it would nonetheless be necessary to make clear that concrete action was being taken.

JMS.

5 September 1979

*of Ireland - visit of...* (2)

*Prime Minister: This is the answer  
(a v. clear one) to the question you raised this  
afternoon.*



HOME OFFICE  
QUEEN ANNE'S GATE LONDON SW1H 9AT

*Am...  
- 4/9*

4 September 1979

*Dear Michael*

EXTRADITION

The extradition of people in the United Kingdom to other countries takes place under three different statutes.

Extradition to the Republic of Ireland takes place under the Backing of Warrants (Republic of Ireland) Act 1965 which covers the extradition to the Republic of citizens of other countries. I attach a table giving the number and offence classification of those extradited to the Republic of Ireland in the last three years and for part of 1975. The numbers are substantial. Although detailed statistics are not kept by nationality, the majority are citizens of the Republic of Ireland but some of these may have, or are entitled to claim, our citizenship as well. But they also include our own citizens; celebrated cases in recent years include that of Carlisle, a member of a Protestant para-military organisation who was extradited to the Republic of Ireland early this year in connection with postal bombs; and the two Littlejohn brothers who were extradited to the Republic of Ireland on charges of robbery - both escaped from custody while in the Republic and one, when recaptured in the United Kingdom, was again returned to the Republic.

The readiness of the United Kingdom to extradite freely its own as well as other countries' nationals is borne out by the other two branches of extradition. Extradition to Commonwealth countries takes place under the Fugitive Offenders Act 1967 and in the last six years 30 people have been extradited under that Act. The majority were nationals of the requesting Commonwealth countries concerned, but a substantial proportion were our own citizens. Extradition to foreign countries takes place under the Extradition Act 1870 and over the last six years 45 people have been extradited, of whom ~~the~~ great majority were nationals of the requesting state, though this total does include several of our own citizens as well. A number of foreign countries have, or used to have, a prohibition on extraditing their own nationals and nineteenth century bilateral extradition treaties between those countries and the United Kingdom sometimes contain a reciprocal prohibition on the extradition of our own nationals. For some years we have been actively seeking to renegotiate these treaties and in 1979, for example, a prohibition on extradition of nationals of either country between the United Kingdom and West Germany was removed.

Individual cases in recent years where our own citizens have been extradited include the cases of Godber to Hong Kong (1975), Gould to Australia (1977), the Jeffs brothers to New Zealand (1977), McDonald to the Netherlands (1978) and the Howe brothers to Australia in 1979.

I am sending copies of this letter to George Walden (FCO), Roger Facer (MOD), Roy Harrington (NIO) and to Martin Vile (Cabinet Office).

*Y  
Lam. or  
John*

J. A. CHILCOT

Michael Alexander, Esq.




NUMBERS OF FUGITIVES EXTRADITED TO THE REPUBLIC OF IRELAND

	Aug-Dec 1975	1976	1977	1978
Murder .....	-	1	-	-
Other offences against the person.....	1	1	3	2
Sexual offences .....	-	-	1	-
Theft Act offences ...	12	19	24	18
Forgery .....	5	-	1	2
Other offences .....	2	6	2	4
	<hr/>			
TOTAL	20	27	31	26
	<hr/>			



REPUBLIC OF INDIA




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Ireland.

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10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

3 September 1979

Dear Roy,

Political Progress in Northern Ireland

The Prime Minister has seen the minute by the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, dated 31 August, on this subject.

The Prime Minister has noted that she sees no possibility of opening up discussions with Mr. Lynch in the way proposed in the final paragraph of Mr. Atkins' minute. The Irish Prime Minister would assume that the line being taken had been approved by Cabinet, whereas, the Prime Minister points out, it has not yet been discussed in Cabinet. The most that can be said to Mr. Lynch at present is that HMG are preparing the way for effective local government in Northern Ireland. To follow the other recommendations in Mr. Atkins' minute would be to sound too much as though Northern Ireland was being treated as a colony rather than as part of the United Kingdom.

I am sending copies of this letter to George Walden (Foreign and Commonwealth Office), to the Private Secretaries to the other members of OD, and to Martin Vile (Cabinet Office).

Yours ever

Michael Alexander

Roy Harrington, Esq.,  
Northern Ireland Office.

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JIS

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10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

3 September 1979

Sean Roy,

Northern Ireland : Security Directorate

The Prime Minister has seen the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland's minute, dated 31 August, on this subject. She has commented that she finds the minute somewhat confusing.

In the Prime Minister's view, Cabinet has decided (a) that a small organisation should be set up to coordinate in the most effective possible manner the activities of the RUC and the Army in Northern Ireland; (b) that much will depend on the personality of the individual chosen to head the Security Directorate; (c) that the head of the Security Directorate will be responsible to rather than under the "command" of the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland; and (d) that the decision to establish a Security Directorate will not be announced until its head has been chosen.

The Prime Minister notes that in discussion after Cabinet two candidates were proposed for the new post, one a military man and the other a diplomat who had extensive experience of defence issues. The Prime Minister does not consider that a man of exclusively military experience would be suitable. Equally, she is not convinced that a policeman would be right. She is convinced that in any case a strong personality is needed. A weak one would not do the job and his failure would be damaging not only to the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland but also to the security effort in general. The Prime Minister drew from her visit to Northern Ireland last Wednesday the conclusion that much needs to be done and that we cannot delay much longer. She is prepared to consider other names than those already mentioned but hopes that proposals will be forthcoming very soon and will reflect the points made above.

I am sending copies of this letter to John Chilcot (Home Office), George Walden (Foreign and Commonwealth Office), Roger Facer (Ministry of Defence) and Martin Vile (Cabinet Office).

Yours sincerely

Michael Alexander

Roy Harrington, Esq.,  
Northern Ireland Office.

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**TELLEX**  
THE BROADCAST REPORTING SERVICE  
**REPORT**

Ireland

(2)

Prime Minister:

You asked to see a transcript of Mr Atkins' remarks on the "World This Weekend" yesterday. The reference to "IRA pursuit" is at the top of ~~page 3~~; + to the role of Dublin at the bottom of page 4. Mr Lynch's remarks recorded here were not a response to Mr Atkins.

LORD MOUNTBATTEN KILLED BY IRA

Prud  
3/9

ms

ms

**RUSH**

For: NORTHERN IRELAND OFFICE

IAN PROUD

Prog: WORLD THIS WEEKEND

Service: RADIO 4

Serial: 82876/BB

Date: 2.9.79 Time: 1300

Duration: 15 minutes 50 seconds

**TELLEX**

50 Grosvenor Street London W1X 9FH Telephone 01 493 3931 TELEX 27688

GORDON CLOUGH:

This weekend the body of Lord Mountbatten awaits Wednesday's state funeral. The families of those who died with Lord Mountbatten and of the 18 soldiers killed on the same day are mourning less publicly but just as intensely as Lord Mountbatten's Royal Family. Last Monday's murders were clearly in the minds of Cardinal O'Fiaich and his Archbishops when they prepared the pastoral letter read today in all Roman Catholic churches both in the Republic and Northern Ireland. They quote Pope John Paul as having said "Violence generates violence, hatred generates hatred, and they both humiliate and degrade the human person". And the bishops urged their congregations to use the Pope's visit to the Republic at the end of the month as an occasion for them to reflect on the use of violence. And the bishops go on to say, "May the Pope's visit challenge all Irishmen to put an end to our murdering hates and replace them by Christ's love and forgiveness. May his visit speak to the hearts and consciences of all those engaged in campaigns of violence and bring them back to awareness of the horrible evil of murder and to the sense of the absolute sacredness of human life." Curiously that message wasn't read in St. Peter's Cathedral in the Falls Road in Belfast today.

After the ceremonial of next Wednesday's state funeral, a reminder of the evil of murder and the sacredness of human life that the letter speaks of, the British and Irish governments in the persons of the Prime Minister, Mrs. Thatcher and the Taoiseach, Mr. Jack Lynch, meet for talks on how they can get together to strengthen security and perhaps seek jointness on a new political solution of the long standing problems which led to last Monday's 21 murders.

Present at those talks of course will be the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, Mr. Humphrey Atkins. In an interview he's given to the World This Weekend, his first detailed statement since last Monday, Mr. Atkins insists that the British government's strategy remains the same, the defeat of terrorism, and he hopes to see Wednesday's talks leading to permanent co-operation between the Royal Ulster Constabulary in the North and the Garda in the South. Co-operation which, in Mr. Atkins' view, has already improved as a result of Monday's killings. Julian O'Halloran reminded Mr. Atkins of what the former Irish Minister, Doctor Conor Cruise O'Brien has described as the Dublin government's fatal ambivalence towards the IRA. In the light of that did Mr. Atkins think that this new found co-operation would turn out to be more than just short term?

HUMPHREY ATKINS:

Well this of course is our hope and we have heard over the last few days statements from the Taoiseach and the Minister for Justice and others condemning in absolute outright terms terrorism and reinforcing their determination to do their utmost to stamp it out. Now as I say the meeting which will take place on Wednesday will persue this further and I very much hope that they mean exactly what they say and that we can work together to get on top of this evil.

JULIAN O'HALLORAN:

What about the policing of the border? Is it possible do you think that an arrangement could be made whereby R.U.C. men and troops perhaps could follow known terrorists across the border into the South on specific occasions?

H.A.:

This is another strand in the whole struggle and it is one which we would like to be able to operate because it is more frustrating than you could believe possible when a suspect

is being pursued and comes through the border which everybody knows is unmarked and gets across and the pursuing forces have to stop. Now some arrangement for continuing that pursuit is I believe, essential.

J.O'H.:

How much do you fear a Protestant militant backlash in the North and what would you say to people who may be tempted now to join one of the Protestant para-military groups and hit back?

H.A.:

I would beg anybody not to do that because it is precisely what the Provisional IRA want. They would be delighted if sectarian violence was to break out again in Northern Ireland.

J.O'H.:

It has been written by one writer this week that there are four possibilities really as far as Northern Ireland is concerned, complete withdrawal, repartition, a revival of power sharing and continuance of direct rule in the same way. Now have you looked at all of those options?

H.A.:

Yes we have. I do not myself, and the government does not regard a withdrawal as an option because this is part of the United Kingdom and that is what the majority of the inhabitants want and it would be inconceivable that the authority of Her Majesty's Government should be withdrawn from any part of the United Kingdom if the inhabitants didn't want that to happen, so I don't regard that as an option. But all other options are being looked at as to how we can make progress and I am in the middle of a series of discussions at this moment with the party leaders in the province to see if we can find common ground upon which we can all advance. But that is what not only Her Majesty's Government want to do but it



is the declared policy of all the party leaders in the Province.

J.O'H.:

If you say you're looking at all other options then you are looking, are you, at something like either repartition or a different kind of federal relationship?

H.A.:

Look we must be clear about one thing. This is part of the United Kingdom and the people who live here want it to stay that way. Repartition must inevitably involve saying to a group of British subjects, the place where you now live used to be Britain but it isn't going to be anymore even though you want it to stay. So I don't believe that one can proceed on that line at all.

J.O'H.:

What ~~will~~<sup>role</sup>, if any do you think, the Dublin government could play in a political initiative as far as Northern Ireland is concerned?

H.A.:

The ultimate responsibility for the future of this part of the United Kingdom rests obviously with the government, with the Parliament in Westminster and people of the Province. There is no responsibility anywhere else in Dublin or any other part of the world. What, of course, is perfectly true, is that they have an interest. Of course they have an interest, they are next door and so clearly they are anxious to know what is going on, they are anxious to be, I won't say consulted, but to be kept informed and this I recognise as a genuine interest on their part and of course there are other interests that they have too, there is the joint economic interest, so there is the co-operation on the economic front. We hope very much that there's going to be great co-operation on the security front, but the political problem in the end rests firmly in Westminster.

J.O'H.:

It now seems though, doesn't it, that the Provisional IRA is better organised than ever, it may be smaller and that it is determined to escalate violence to an unacceptable level.

H.A.:

Yes you are quite right, it is differently organised to what it used to be, it is organised very much more on the lines of a terrorist organisation and it uses the traditional methods which terrorist organisations do not only of actions and activities but also for money raising, it robs banks, it uses intimidation, it uses persuasion, it uses rackets of all kinds to extort money from the population to buy arms and generally further its violent causes. It is essentially now a classic terrorist gang.

J.O'H.:

But is there any possibility if political solutions are being looked at at the same time as security measures that you could meet leaders of the Provisional IRA in the future sometime?

H.A.:

The leaders of the Provisional IRA have nothing whatever to do with political progress, that is not what they are interested in. They have said so publicly, they want to destroy the form of government that exists in the Province and when that is done, according to them, it won't be, but they say when it is done, then they will turn their attention to destroy the form of government that exists in Dublin. Now that they have publicly said and made it quite clear. They haven't got political aims, they've only got violent aims, and because of that I have no intention of talking to them.

J.O'H.:

You would totally rule out any meeting?

H.A.:

Yes.

J.O'H.:

Can we talk now about the American dimension on Ireland? Governor Carey announced early this month, didn't he, that you had agreed to meet him in New York with the Foreign Minister of the Republic, Mr. Michael O'Kennedy and that announcement caused you some embarrassment didn't it?

H.A.:

The proposition when I met Governor Carey was that we should have a further discussion to the one we had which was about security. What I was anxious to do and we are all still anxious to do it, is to bring home to the people in the United States, exactly what the Provisional IRA now is and what it is doing, because they have engaged themselves in propaganda in the United States and there are a number of people I fear, in the United States, who do not recognise what the Provisional IRA really is or what its aims are and over the years, they have raised far too much money in the United States. Now any opportunity for me or anyone else to inform public opinion in America of exactly what is happening seems to me to be useful. Now that was what I believe could be usefully done. Governor Carey I believe has had other ideas of having further discussions about political matters and so on which I and the government felt we could not, should not enter into because as I said before in the end the responsibility for political development in the Province rests with the government in London and with Parliament at Westminster.

J.O'H.:

Do you feel that the offices of people like Governor Carey, Senator Kennedy, Senator Moynihan, and Speaker Tip O'Neill, could be put to good use in what you see as the prime target in the United States of explaining to people there the situation as you see it and the British government sees it and stopping the funds going to the IRA?

H.A.:

Anyone who is prepared to help us in that very important task is most welcome and there are people who are doing it and the more that it is done and the more the message is given in America that this in fact is what is happening that the people of Northern Ireland are faced with a new and terrible terrorist gang with no scruples and no political ambition other than to overthrow government by force and stir up communal strife, the more we can do that, the better. And whoever is prepared to help us is welcome.

G.C.:

That was the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, Mr. Humphrey Atkins. Now while you've been hearing that interview with Mr. Atkins, listeners to Radio Telefis Eireann's equivalent to the World This Weekend, This Week, have been hearing an interview with the Taoiseach, Mr. Lynch. We've been recording that interview as it goes out, indeed it's still continuing. Gerald Barry asked the Irish Prime Minister whether the effects of last week's events would have long term repercussions.

JACK LYNCH:

Looking back almost one week after these horrible events I can say that the sense of shock and horror and shame has by no means diminished. I did say in my statement subsequently when I came home that I thought that it would inevitably be an impact on Anglo-Irish relations and the immediate aftermath of the horrible events, that there would of course inevitably be a sense of outrage amongst the British people and new anger and we can well understand that too, but I feel that in the calm perspective of the events that the British government will not react and certainly will do nothing, that would in any way prejudice the good relations that have existed for a long long time and I hope continues to exist and will continue to exist between our two countries.

GERALD BARRY:

Do you see the attacks as perhaps sinister indications of renewed and perhaps even more intensive IRA campaign of violence?

J.L.:

They certainly show a more sophisticated campaign, obviously some bombs are being detonated by remote control that has been a fairly new technique with the IRA, it certainly is as callous as anything we've seen ever since the beginning of the campaign in the North but I do not expect it to be an increasing in activity, perhaps they'll be able to do their things more effectively now and therefore our vigilance and our security will have to be all the more intense.

G.B.:

Well you refer to the natural and understandable horror and outrage in Britain particularly at the killing of Earl Mountbatten, now you've had time since you came back here to gauge the mood here. Do you still think you were right not to come back immediately when news came through of these deaths?

J.L.:

Well one can never be right or wrong in a situation like that because there are always different opinions as to what the right course of action is. If for example one noted political observer in his column yesterday said that it was right that I should not in any way exacerbate the sense of outrage or create any kinds of crisis.

G.B.:

Is there a special problem just north of the border and just south of the border that is related to old frictions between Britain and Ireland, that neither country is able to quite trust the other?

J.L.:

I wouldn't accept that in the slightest because on the border and as far as border security is concerned there is the completest degree of co-operation especially between the RUC and the Garda and from time to time that co-operation has been fully

acknowledged by successive British Prime Ministers, I can go back as far as Mr. Heath right through Mr. Wilson, through Mr. Callaghan and more recently Mrs. Thatcher. That has been completely acknowledged so there's no conflict, there's nothing whatever that can cause any lack of effectiveness from the co-operation point of view. The border itself is only a factor. Certainly the violence emanating from the border itself is very very limited. It's estimated that up to three percent of the total number of incidents, the vast majority of the violence is perpetrated deep into the Northern territory itself and mainly around Belfast.

G.B.:

Yet the British through their politicians, through their newspapers have consistently said that the South and the government here in particular are somewhat ambivalent about security on the Southern side.

J.L.:

Again I think that's misrepresentation and I think it's something that has been conveyed mainly by northern politicians to the British news media in the House of Commons. But I think that our presence on the border is more intense than that of the British Army and now the RUC. We've committed relatively far more resources into completing the border than the British have. As well as that, I can say that our presence is on the border at all places even though we can't police every hundred yards of it but it's quite on the border, all the patrols act on the border at several areas in particular anyway. North of the border from which the British Army draw back a considerable number of miles, five to ten miles and that's a hiatus there in the effectiveness of the Northern side's patrol of the border.

G.C.:

That was the Irish Prime Minister, Mr. Jack Lynch talking a few moments ago on our contemporary the RTE programme, This Week and the interviewer was Gerald Barry.

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FM WASHINGTON 312350Z AUG 79

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TEL NO 2515 OF 31 AUGUST 1979.

INFO PRIORITY NIO BELFAST, DUBLIN ROUTINE CG AND BIS NEW YORK.

*Prime Minister*  
*[Signature]* 3/3

M.I.P.T. U.S. ATTITUDES TO NORTHERN IRELAND.

1. THERE ARE TWO WAYS IN WHICH SOMETHING USEFUL MIGHT BE DONE TO INFLUENCE AMERICAN OPINION, FIRSTLY BY SOME GOVERNMENTAL ACTION AND SECONDLY BY ENHANCED PRESS AND TV COVERAGE. IT MAY BE VERY DIFFICULT, AS A DIRECT CONSEQUENCE OF THE PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING NEXT WEEK WITH MY LYNCH, TO HOPE THAT ANYTHING CAN SUDDENLY EMERGE IN THE FORM OF NEW POLITICAL PROPOSALS. BUT WHAT IS NEEDED, TO COPE WITH THE AMERICAN DIMENSION, IS TO KEEP OPEN THE PROSPECT OF SOME POLITICAL MOVE AND THE EMPHASIS MUST BE UPON A MOVE THAT IS AGREED TO BY BOTH LONDON AND DUBLIN. ALL THAT I THINK IT NEEDS TO HOLD THE SITUATION AT THIS STAGE IS FOR SOME STATEMENT TO BE MADE BY BOTH THE BRITISH AND IRISH GOVERNMENTS THAT APART FROM THE SECURITY SITUATION THERE IS A NEED FOR POLITICAL DISCUSSIONS ABOUT THE LONG TERM. THERE MAY OBVIOUSLY BE GREAT DIFFICULTIES ABOUT THIS AND IT MAY BE THOUGHT IMPRUDENT TO THINK IN THESE TERMS UNLESS WE KNOW EXACTLY HOW SUCH DISCUSSIONS MIGHT END. THE ONLY POINT I AM WISHING TO MAKE FROM HERE IS THAT ALL THAT IS NEEDED TO HOLD MODERATE POLITICAL OPINION IS FOR MIRRORS TO SHINE IN SUCH A WAY THAT THERE IS A SHAFT OF LIGHT FOR THE FUTURE.

2. ON THE SUBJECT OF PUBLIC RELATIONS THIS WEEK'S EVENTS HAVE PROMPTED A TIDE OF PRESS INTEREST HERE IN THE IRA AND ITS OVERSEAS LINKS; THIS IS SOMETHING NEW. WE ARE FEEDING SUITABLE EDITORIAL WRITERS WITH ALL THE MATERIAL THAT CAN BE MADE AVAILABLE SO AS TO EXPLOIT THE PRESENT INTEREST. I THINK THAT THE IRISH EMBASSY HERE AND IRISH INFORMATION MATERIAL SHOULD CUT MORE ICE THAN ANYTHING WE CAN PRODUCE. THE IRISH AMBASSADOR AND OTHER IRISH REPRESENTATIVES

/ HAVE

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HAVE INDEED BEEN PROMINENT IN DENOUNCING THE TERRORISTS. BUT WE HAVE TO BE READY TO DO OUR PART AND WHERE WE HAVE JUDGED IT EXPEDIENT TO REBUT OBVIOUSLY HOSTILE REMARKS, WE IN THIS EMBASSY, BIS AND CONSULS GENERAL HAVE MADE RADIO AND TV APPEARANCES. WE AND THE IRISH EMBASSY HAVE, HOWEVER, REFUSED TO TAKE PART IN PROGRAMMES ALONGSIDE THE IRISH NATIONAL CAUCUS OR OTHER IRA SYMPATHISERS.

3. FINALLY I SHOULD LIKE TO SUGGEST THAT A SPECIAL EFFORT SHOULD BE MADE TO GET PEOPLE TO COME TO THE UNITED STATES FROM THE IRISH REPUBLIC AND NORTHERN IRELAND SO AS TO EXPOUND THE REALITIES OF THE PROBLEM. I AM NOT THINKING OF PEOPLE IN OFFICIAL POSITIONS BUT IT COULD DO A WORLD OF GOOD IF CATHOLICS AND PROTESTANTS FROM NORTHERN IRELAND, SAY HUME AND SMYTH, COULD BE INDUCED TO TAKE PART IN DISCUSSIONS AND SEMINARS HERE. LIKEWISE CONOR CRUISE O'BRIEN COULD MAKE A HEALTHY IMPACT, THOUGH HE WOULD OF COURSE HAVE TO COME UNDER INDEPENDENT AUSPICES. ALL THIS NEEDS CAREFUL WORKING OUT BUT I BELIEVE THERE IS A GAP AND IT IS ONE THAT WOULD BE WORTH DISCUSSING WITH THE DUBLIN GOVERNMENT.

HENDERSON.

FCO/WH DISTN.

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Prime Minister

Ambs 3/5

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FM WASHINGTON 312345Z AUG 79

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TEL NO 2514 OF 31 AUGUST 1979

INFO PRIORITY NIO BELFAST, DUBLIN. ROUTINE CG AND BIS NEW YORK.

U.S. ATTITUDES TO NORTHERN IRELAND.

1. FOLLOWING THE ASSASSINATION OF LORD MOUNTBATTEN AND PRIOR TO THE PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING WITH MR LYNCH I WILL TRY TO DESCRIBE THE LIKELY TREND OF AMERICAN OPINION ON THIS ISSUE AND THE AFFECT TO THIS ON THE SECURITY SITUATION IN IRELAND. IN A SEPARATE TELEGRAM I WILL MAKE SUGGESTIONS FOR WHAT MIGHT BE DONE BOTH TO EXPLOIT THE PRESENT ATMOSPHERE GENERATED BY LORD MOUNTBATTEN'S ASSASSINATION AND TO MAKE SOME USEFUL IMPACT ON AMERICAN OPINION.

2. THE MURDERS HAVE PRODUCED A WAVE OF REVULSION AGAINST THE IRA. ALTHOUGH THERE IS NO SIGNIFICANT UNIONIST VOICE IN THE UNITED STATES, COMMENTATORS HAVE BEEN FORCED TO PAY SERIOUS ATTENTION TO THE PROTESTANT DIMENSION. BUT THE MOOD WILL NOT LAST AND EXTREMIST PRO-REPUBLICAN AMERICANS HAVE BEEN UNAFFECTED.

3. THE HEART OF THE PROBLEM HERE LIES IN THE FACT THAT THESE EXTREMISTS, LED BY THE IRISH NATIONAL CAUCUS (INC) AND THE NORTHERN IRISH AID (NORAID) AND SUPPORTED IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES BY 130 MEMBERS OF THE AD HOC COMMITTEE ON IRISH AFFAIRS LED BY BIAGGI, HAVE HARNESSSED AND DISTORTED FOR THEIR OWN PURPOSES THE SENTIMENTS OF THE 13 MILLION IRISH-AMERICANS IN FAVOUR OF IRISH UNITY. THE MOTIVES OF THE AMERICAN CONGRESSMEN WHO ARE LOUD IN DENOUNCING ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN NORTHERN IRELAND IS OBVIOUSLY POLITICAL: THEY SEEK TO STRENGTHEN THEIR HOLD ON THE IRISH - AND INDEED THE CATHOLIC - VOTE WHICH HAS BEEN TENDING TO WAVER (FOR VARIOUS REASONS EG GREATER PROSPERITY AND CARTER'S UNSOUNDNESS ON ABORTION.). THE AIM OF THE QUOTE FOUR HORSEMEN UNQUOTE (O'NEILL, CAREY, MOYNIHAM AND KENNEDY) IS TO TRY TO PREVENT IRISH AMERICAN OPINION FROM

/BEING

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BEING EXPLOITED IN THIS WAY. THEY HAVE CONSISTENTLY CONDEMNED THE VIOLENCE. BUT THEIR ADVOCACY OF PEACEFUL PROGRESS TOWARDS IRISH UNITY MUST REMAIN CREDIBLE, AND THEY WILL THEREFORE CONTINUE TO PRESS FOR VISIBLE MOVEMENT TOWARDS A POLITICAL SOLUTION.

4. THE PRESIDENT AND THE U.S. ADMINISTRATION WILL REMAIN EXTREMELY SENSITIVE TO THE IRISH-AMERICAN LOBBY. CARTER HIMSELF PROBABLY KNOWS VERY LITTLE ABOUT THE COMPLEXITY OF THE IRISH PROBLEM. BUT HE IS AWARE OF THE POTENTIAL INFLUENCE FOR GOOD OR ILL OF THE IRISH VOTE. HIS ATTITUDE WAS MADE CLEAR IN HIS STATEMENT OF AUGUST 1977, WHICH IT SHOULD BE REMEMBERED WAS ISSUED AT THE PROMPTING OF O'NEILL AND KENNEDY; THIS EMPHASISED U.S. IMPARTIALITY AND THEIR SUPPORT FOR A PEACEFUL SOLUTION ACCEPTABLE TO BOTH COMMUNITIES. THE ADMINISTRATION ARE ALSO SENSITIVE TO THE BEARING OF THE QUESTION ON ANGLO-AMERICAN RELATIONS AND THE MISHANDLING OF THE ISSUE OF ARMS SUPPLIES FOR THE RUC (THE REVIEW OF POLICY ON ARMS FOR THE RUC MAY WELL NOW BE SPEEDED UP).

5. LOOKING AHEAD AS REGARDS AMERICAN OPINION THE ISSUE IS WHETHER THE QUOTE FOUR HORSEMEN UNQUOTE AND THE MODERATES GENERALLY ARE GOING TO BE PREPARED TO WITHSTAND THE PRESSURE OF THE EXTREMISTS. THIS WILL DEPEND LARGELY ON HOW THEY SEE BRITISH POLICY DEVELOPING AND HOW CLOSELY DUBLIN AND LONDON ARE WORKING TOGETHER. MY IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING TELEGRAM DEALS WITH THIS. BUT THE POINT HERE IS THAT I THINK THERE IS A DANGER TO OUR INTERESTS IF THE EXTREMISTS' INFLUENCE BECOMES GREATER AT THE EXPENSE OF THE MODERATES.

6. IT MIGHT WELL BE THOUGHT THAT FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF LONDON IT DOES NOT REALLY MATTER WHAT THE AMERICAN ATTITUDE IS. THE IRA FOR INSTANCE ARE NOT GOING TO GIVE UP THE STRUGGLE EVEN IF THE IRISH-AMERICAN SUPPORT FOR THEM DIMINISHES. NOR DO THE IRA DEPEND ALL THAT MUCH UPON THE AMERICANS FOR MONEY OR ARMS, BOTH OF WHICH CAN BE OBTAINED ELSEWHERE. BUT THE QUESTION OF MORAL SUPPORT IS SURELY IMPORTANT. IF AMERICAN OPINION - AND THERE IS ALREADY A TENDENCY HERE TO SAY THAT THE BASIC TROUBLE DERIVES FROM A LACK OF RESOLUTION IN LONDON AND AN UNWILLINGNESS TO FORCE THE

/ UNIONISTS

CONFIDENTIAL

UNIONISTS BACK FROM THEIR COMPLETELY INTRANSIGENT POSITION -  
BECOMES MORE SYMPATHETIC TO THE IRA OR LESS UNDERSTANDING OF THE  
COMPLEXITIES OF THE PROBLEM AND OF LONDON AND DUBLIN'S  
SINCERE EFFORTS TO SOLVE IT, THEN THIS COULD PROVIDE AN ENORMOUS  
BOOST FOR THE IRA WITH OBVIOUS SECURITY IMPLICATIONS.

7. PLEASE SEE MY IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING TELEGRAM.

HENDERSON

FCO/WH DISTN.

RID

CONFIDENTIAL

Copied to Ireland  
Prime Minister (Lynch visit)

①



Are you content that preparation of briefing should continue on this basis. There will of course be an opportunity to discuss it on Tuesday?

PRIME MINISTER

No. I have not even been discussed with Cabinet.

1 Aug 31/8

POLITICAL PROGRESS IN NORTHERN IRELAND

When you see Mr Lynch next week to discuss security issues he will almost certainly ask about the Government's intentions for the political future of Northern Ireland. I believe - and I think Peter Carrington would too - that it will help to secure from him the kind of commitment we want on security if you were prepared to give him some indication of the direction in which we hope to move on the political front.

I was asked at our Ministerial (OD) Meeting on Northern Ireland held on 10 July, to bring forward proposals for consideration by colleagues before the end of the Recess. This work is well advanced and I expect to be able to bring forward considered proposals, which will have been discussed with the Departments most closely concerned, in about a month's time, during which period I shall have completed my second round of talks with the party leaders. The further development thereafter that I have in mind is that we should as early in the resumed session as we can, publish a White Paper setting out proposals on Northern Ireland policy in all its aspects, but with particular reference to political development.

①

The aim of that policy is clear and self-evident: the re-establishment of the rule of law in all parts of the Province under the protection of a conventional police authority, with the Army progressively withdrawn; the re-development of a crippled economy to something nearer viability than now exists; and the devolution to elected representatives of the people of Northern Ireland of powers and responsibilities for their internal government so that they can work out their own future together. *Locally n devolved gov for stormont.*

2

No-one can foresee when the attainment of this objective might be possible. I am clear however that the present Government must declare its intentions this Autumn which will give reasonable expectations that measurable and visible progress will have been made towards it within say the next two to three years.

My provisional conclusions on political developments - subject to further consultations with colleagues - are as follows:

- (i) Direct rule must be brought progressively to an end and as soon as possible, for it does nothing to bring the communities together and simply leaves the United Kingdom Government exposed to criticism on every kind of issue (big and small) by all sides in the two communities, and internationally for failing to make progress.
- (ii) The political gap between the two communities is at present unbridgeable. Neither will at present accept a system of

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devolved, legislative and executive government which is acceptable to the other, although I believe such a system could be constructed - possibly a bicameral assembly with the upper chamber having entrenched powers to protect the minority against legislative or executive discrimination.

- (iii) The Government would plunge straight into a political dead-end if we were to bring forward proposals for a fully worked out scheme, however reasonable it might appear to us, which we then had to negotiate with both sides in the present temper. We must be ready to bring forward comprehensive proposals for direct negotiation at the right time, but that time is not yet.
- (iv) What we can actually do, however, is to embark on a process of re-engaging political activity in the government of the Province in a progressive way, aiming, I suggest, first of all for an assembly having only modest powers and with the executive government retained for an initial period in the hands of the Government at Westminster. Successive steps by which we would initiate such a process (which might at the very outset amount to appointing no more than a council of advisers for Northern Ireland Ministers) are still being worked out. They will need to be flexible so that we can adapt them as prospects for progress grow or diminish.

I believe that an approach to political devolution of this kind, which would allow democratic institutions to develop over a period of time, would be welcomed in the Province, where they are as fearful of haste as they are of each other; and I believe it would be recognised internationally as a responsible and constructive way forward. Much has still to be worked out and you and colleagues concerned will wish to give this very careful consideration. If we agree to proceed down this route then I would envisage, following the publication of proposals in a White Paper, that we should undertake a determined political campaign in the Province to convince opinion at all levels (and not just at the level of Westminster MPs) that we are set on a hopeful and constructive course.

You will not want to go into this with Mr Lynch but it may help you to respond to him in a positive way to have these thoughts in your mind. We must assume that on such a matter as this anything said to the Irish Government will eventually leak. I would see no harm in that provided that following your discussion with Mr Lynch you yourself, eg in a Press Statement or Press Conference, made a short statement about political intentions of a kind which you would make to him perhaps on the following lines:

- (a) The Government is committed to find an acceptable way of giving Northern Ireland people more control over their own affairs and respecting their basic right of democratic self-determination for their constitutional future.



- (b) The failure of previous forms of devolved government, and the conflicting aspirations of the two communities in Northern Ireland, make it difficult to conceive of an immediate and wholly acceptable form of legislative and executive internal self government for the Province.
- (c) Nevertheless, the Government wishes to see an end to the present arrangements for direct rule and believes the people of the Province generally share that wish. All the political leaders in the Province have expressed this view.
- (d) Accordingly we shall be making proposals as soon as possible after Parliament returns for first steps on the road to acceptable devolution of powers. These proposals will be extensively discussed with the people at all levels in the Province itself before specific measures are put before Parliament at Westminster later this session.
- (e) Meanwhile our policy on security - defeat of terrorism and extension of normal policing - is being vigorously pursued; and we are continuing within the broad framework of our economic policy for the United Kingdom as a whole, to maintain, and we hope restore, the economy of Northern Ireland itself.

If you were content to open up the subject in this way with the Taoiseach, I would follow the matter up in my next talk with Mr O'Kennedy on 17 September.

I am copying this minute to Peter Carrington, the other members of OD Committee and Sir John Hunt.

*P.A.*

31 August 1979

*I see no possibility of opening up in this way with the Taoiseach. He would assume the general drift had been approved by Cabinet. Success is doubtful. The matter can be discussed. The next rounds too much as if we are looking for a colony - not as part of the UK.*

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5. AUG 1979



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*Copied to Ireland (Lynch Visit)*  
*Are you content for the N. Ireland*  
*Security to proceed as in the final sentence -*  
*at least until your meeting on Thursday?*  
Prime Minister No - see  
*separate note -*  
*3/8 ant.*

①



PRIME MINISTER

NORTHERN IRELAND: SECURITY DIRECTORATE

? I have reflected on the discussion you had with Peter Carrington, Francis Pym and myself on Thursday afternoon about the arrangements for heading up the Security Directorate which is to be set up under my command in the Northern Ireland Office in Belfast. I would like to put some further considerations to you and suggest a new solution.

? I was convinced by the general view of Cabinet yesterday that there is no significant public relations value in announcing the new Directorate: Francis Pym and I are agreed on the need for it to meet an existing inadequacy but the Government can hardly expect public acclaim for doing something as sensible as that. In my view the first priority is to set it up quickly and make it work effectively, as I am sure it will, under the direction of the Security Policy Group which I lead (the Chief Constable, the GOC, the Permanent Under-Secretary, and the Director and Co-ordinator of Intelligence).

? I do not believe that the case against dramatising this step is in any way altered by appointing a distinguished figure to head up the Directorate under my command. The more prominence given to this appointment (which could, incidentally, make the man himself a prominent terrorist target forthwith) the more questions will be asked about his powers and his relationship to the GOC and the Chief Constable, and the answers are bound to diminish, not enhance his standing. Francis Pym and I are agreed that we are not instituting a Director of Security Operations with authority to command and control the security operations in the Province, military, police and civil. That would be wrong in principle, contrary to our policy and, indeed it could only be brought about by recalling Parliament to pass legislation to strip the police of their independent status and make them subordinate to me as Secretary of State. As it is, the Directorate as proposed will need very careful presentation to the RUC, who will greatly resent it if it appears that they - as an independent and Ulster force - are in any way to be taken over. The maintenance of their morale and status is fundamental to the effectiveness of our security policy. As I have emphasised to you, it is only by holding fast to this policy and extending normal policing throughout the Province that we shall get the Army out of Northern Ireland.

The leader of the Directorate and his team will be subordinate to, under the direction of, and accountable to the Security Policy Group which I lead; and it is the essence of their task (as was made clear in paragraph 5 of the Annexe to our Cabinet Paper) that their work should result in a more effective use of security forces while operating through existing command structures. It is I hope clear from this why

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in our joint paper Francis Pym and I suggested that the leader of the team should be of a senior rank in the public service but not out-ranking the heads of the existing commands over whom he will have no authority.

This leads me to conclude that it is the quality of the man, not his eminence in another field, which we should be concentrating on - and I would certainly question the wisdom of putting someone into this as a post-retirement occupation.

Nevertheless, I recognise the concern you expressed on Thursday that the leader of this team should be a person of standing whose appointment would add to public confidence in Northern Ireland and in GB. I have to say that in my judgment an officer seconded from or retiring from the Diplomatic Service would signally fail to meet this requirement: a Foreign Office figure could and almost certainly would be spitefully attacked by Unionists as yet another indication of the GB mentality which treats Northern Ireland as a colony. If you conclude that a public figure is necessary then I would suggest that we should look in the direction of a distinguished policeman with experience in the deployment of large forces and in dealing with threats to security both by way of urban violence and terrorism. Such a person would be better qualified in my view to get the best out of the Security Directorate than someone new to this game. Some obvious names come to mind, including of course Sir Robert Mark. I suspect that, unfortunately, his appointment would not go down well in the Protestant community in the Province because of his membership of the Hunt Committee of 1969 which recommended the disbanding of the "B Specials" and the disarming of the RUC. I propose to consult further with Willie Whitelaw and Francis Pym to see whether someone of nearly equal standing, but perhaps younger, might be identified who could be seconded to my staff to head the Directorate.

I am copying this letter to the Home Secretary, the Foreign & Commonwealth Secretary, the Secretary of State for Defence and Sir John Hunt.

*Delivering*

*See memo - note.*

*Cabinet has decided*

*on behalf of Mr Atkins in Belfast*

*① that he set up a committee or jurisdiction to coordinate & combine the activities of the Army the Police.*

*② that the decision be not announced until the chief of the combined operations is ready*

*③ that he is responsible for 121 for N.I. P.S.A.*

31 August 1979

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31 AUG 1979



11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31

The only question to be decided is who is to be the head of Combined Operations.

We cannot go back on Cabinet decisions.

2 names have been proposed

S & J for NI; asked for time to put up other names. We want those other

names.

There is no question of the appointed person being under the "command" of S & J.

Alexander was under Churchill's "command".

One was the military head the other the political head. The security chief is responsible to the political chief. He is not under his "command".



10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

I find this memo somewhat confusing.

Cabinet has decided

1. that we set up a small organisation to co-ordinate and combine in the most effective way the activities of the Police and Army in the Province
2. that as a lot will depend on the personality of the man who heads this Combined Operation, the decision be not announced until he is found.
3. that he be responsible to (not under the "command of") the S.I.S.

We cannot go back on these decisions.

After Cabinet and in furtherance of their decision two names were proposed one wholly military, and the other "diplomatic" with a lot of his service on the defence side. S.I.S. for W.I. asked for him to bring forward further names. That is the only thing for which we are waiting.

I did not think a wholly military person was right and for the same reason I do not think a

Wholly police person would be right. But I  
am prepared to consider any further names.

~~But~~ I am convinced we need a  
strong personality. A weak one would not  
do the job and his failure would be  
disastrous not only to the J.I.I. but to those the  
Security Forces are there to protect. From my  
discussion on Wednesday it is clear that a lot  
needs to be done and we cannot delay much longer.

M.S.



Prime Minister

Ans  
3/9

PRIME MINISTER

I think I ought to let you know that I plan to be in Northern Ireland for the whole of the next two weeks - except for a brief trip to London for meetings on Tuesday and Wednesday and for Wednesday's funeral. If you need me for any meetings I can of course come back at short notice but I shall be trying to resist any other cause to come to London in order to have a solid spell moving about the Province.

H.A.

31 August 1979

Lg

Ans

out

SECRET

8

*Ireland.*

B 05805

PRIME MINISTER

NORTHERN IRELAND

As you will have seen, the two Secretaries of State have moved some way towards each other on the disputed point about how the new Security Directorate should be headed. Against this background, they are understandably anxious that this morning's Cabinet should concentrate on the conclusions of their paper rather than on its details.

*R Wade-Gery*

R L WADE-GERY

30 August 1979

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

PS TO PM

GRPS 250A

CONFIDENTIAL

FM DUBLIN 291600Z AUGUST 79

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 228 OF 29 AUGUST 79

AND TO IMMEDIATE NIO (BELFAST)

*Prime Minister*

*mb* *1/11/79*

(2)

ANGLO-IRISH SECURITY COOPERATION

1. MOST IRISH NOW APPEAR TO BE IN THE THROES OF REMORSE, SHAME AND DISGUST AT THE TRAGEDIES OF 27 AUGUST. THEY ARE ALSO APPREHENSIVE ABOUT RETALIATION IN THE SOUTH. THOUGH SOME OF THESE FEELINGS ARE SUPERFICIAL AND WILL BE SHORT-LIVED, I THINK THAT AS THE IRISH ARE ON THE DEFENSIVE, WE HAVE AN OPPORTUNITY TO PUT TO THEM PROPOSALS AND IDEAS WHICH, OVER THE YEARS, HAVE GOT NOWHERE IN DUBLIN.

2. ON THE POLITICAL SIDE, WE SHOULD TRY YET AGAIN TO PERSUADE THE IRISH GOVERNMENT THAT TO TALK ABOUT THE AIM OF IRISH UNITY IS UNREAL AND COUNTER-PRODUCTIVE. WE SHOULD EMPHASISE THE NEED TO DEAL WITH REALITIES.

3. ON SECURITY, OUR AIM SHOULD BE TO OBTAIN MORE EFFECTIVE COOPERATION ESPECIALLY ON THE BORDER. WE SHOULD, THEREFORE, SEEK AGREEMENT ON:-

- (A) DIRECT ARMY-TO-ARMY COOPERATION:
- (B) INTERROGATION BY THE RUC OF SUSPECTS IN THE REPUBLIC:
- (C) IMPROVED INTELLIGENCE GATHERING AND EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION ON BOTH SIDES OF THE BORDER:
- (D) JOINT PATROLS ON THE BORDER:
- (E) HOT PURSUIT ACROSS THE BORDER.

THERE ARE, NO DOUBT, OTHER PROPOSALS WHICH YOU MAY CONSIDER SHOULD BE PUT FORWARD.

4. IT MAY NOT BE POSSIBLE TO GET THE IRISH TO COOPERATE ON ANY OF THE ABOVE BUT I AM SURE THAT NOW IS THE TIME TO GO FOR THEM.

15. IF MR LYNCH

CONFIDENTIAL

PRIME MINISTER

cc Ireland

This is a copy. The original PM's visit  
has been extracted and  
retained under Section 3(4)

Northern Ireland

You may like to have, for the discussion for Cabinet tomorrow, a summary of the main points which arose from the briefing which you were given in Northern Ireland today by the Army and the RUC.

The Army

1. \* ~~~~~ \*
2. The Army favour the closure of a certain number (35) of border crossings, together with the necessary change in the law to allow them to be policed.
3. The Army favour improved integration of their own, and the RUC's operational control and the establishment of more joint operations rooms.
4. The Army would also like to see a Director of Operations appointed, to exercise overall day to day operational control, responsible only to the Secretary of State.
5. Possibly under the influence of Monday's events, the Army take a gloomy view of the PIRA's increasing operational and technical competence. They point out that in, e.g., the Crossmaglen area, 80 soldiers have been killed since the troubles began as against only 2 terrorists. The Army also have great respect for the PIRA's competence in, e.g., radio and electronics.

RUC

1. The RUC take a more optimistic view of the general course of the campaign against the PIRA.

\* ~ \* Passage deleted and  
retained under Section 3(4)  
AWayland, 25 March 2010



2. The RUC point out that the Garda will cooperate only with them and never with the Army.
3. The RUC go on to argue that the Garda's level of professional competence is nevertheless very low: they therefore attach importance to persuading the Irish to instruct the Garda to set up special crime and surveillance units. The RUC claim that whereas they have adapted successfully to the new type of enemy they now face, e.g., by switching the emphasis from interrogation to surveillance, the Garda have not changed their tactics, and are still using the old techniques.
4. The RUC are much less enthusiastic about the usefulness of joint operations rooms.
5. Although the RUC agree with the Army that the PIRA's new cellular structure is impossible to penetrate, they point out that PIRA members do talk loosely once an operation has been concluded, and that this can provide useful intelligence.
6. The RUC, unlike the Army (who in the border areas can move only by helicopter or on foot) are able to maintain regular road patrols by using hired unmarked vehicles.
7. The RUC claim that, if their strength were increased by 1,000, they should after 2½ years be able to relieve the Army of all but a reserve role.

To the above I would add one or two further thoughts:-

(a) There are very obvious discrepancies between the statistics of fatalities etc., which were given you by the Army and the RUC respectively: you may wish to have these figures analysed objectively.

/ (b)

(b) The fact remains that in 3 Brigade's area about 200 identified terrorists are holding down 3800 troops and 3700 UDR personnel. In the Province as a whole not more than 500 terrorists are holding down 12666 troops and 7522 UDR personnel - together with 6374 regular and 4560 part-time RUC.

(c) The RUC, who will be responsible for Ulster's law and order when the Army have left, inevitably take a rather different and longer-term view of the problem from that of the Army.

(d) You have seen the physical conditions in Crossmaglen, which are probably typical of the Army operational outposts: they are pretty dreadful. They, together with the constant tension, are perhaps not calculated to produce a very objective view of the overall problem.

(e) The fact remains that there is clearly a very deep difference of approach between the Army and the RUC, and it must be open to question whether significant improved cooperation between them can be achieved without some structural change (joint operations rooms, Director of Operations, or whatever) on the lines suggested by the Army - there has to be some way of adjudicating quickly between conflicting views in any given operational emergency.

BGC

29 August, 1979.

PRIME MINISTERNorthern Ireland: Security

(C(79)34)

## BACKGROUND

1. The Secretary of State for Northern Ireland and the Defence Secretary are meeting at about 8.00 p.m. this evening to finalise this joint paper. An advance copy will then be sent to No. 10. The paper will be circulated to-morrow, but only in the Cabinet Room, from which colleagues have been asked not to remove it.
2. This brief is based on the paper which officials expect to emerge from the Secretaries' of State meeting, which I shall attend. If important new points emerge there, I will provide a supplementary brief later to-night.
3. The paper is likely to set out the two Secretaries' of State agreed views
  - (a) that our firm policy should be to eliminate terrorism and restore normal policing;
  - (b) that to support the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland there should be established at Stormont a new Security Directorate bringing together the NIO, the Army and the RUC to monitor and plan operations on a continuous basis;
  - (c) that in the light of world reactions to last week-end's murders a new attempt should be made to enlist the Irish Government's greater co-operation over border operations and intelligence in particular;
  - (d) that if colleagues agree an early statement should be made by yourself covering (a) and (b) and the fact that Mr Lynch is being invited to London for early talks on deepening co-operation.



4. The paper is unlikely to resolve - and may therefore gloss over - one major difference between Mr Pym, who wants the Security Directorate headed by a person of some public standing, and Mr Atkins who does not. In Mr Pym's view, someone of stature is needed to ensure that the appointment makes a public impact and that the incumbent is able to knock NIO, RUC and Army heads together; his officials have mentioned names such as Sir Anthony Duff, Sir John Killick or (after his impending retirement) Sir Neil Cameron. Mr Atkins would prefer a routine NIO appointment. He does not want anyone who might undercut his own authority as Northern Ireland supremo; and his officials believe he would consider resigning on the issue.

5. This row is the latest manifestation of the MOD (and particularly Army) view that security operations are not being properly co-ordinated, which you will remember from the OD discussion on 10 July (OD(79)4th meeting). But the protagonists have moved some way towards each other since then: Mr Atkins in agreeing to a Security Directorate and Mr Pym in abandoning the idea of a Resident Minister.

#### HANDLING

6. This will be the first time that Cabinet have considered Northern Ireland. After inviting the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland and the Defence Secretary to introduce their joint paper, you may wish to ask the Foreign Secretary (or Lord Privy Seal) to comment on the references to the Republic. He is not expected to quarrel with them, beyond underlining the fact that the Dublin Government is short on resources and long on political inhibitions.

7. Some general discussion may then be appropriate. ~~But~~ There would be little advantage in allowing the point which still divides the two Secretaries of State to surface for discussion. But there may be comments on other issues which bear on the security problem: e.g. the Pope's non-visit, the antics of Governor Carey and the problem over the RUC's American weapons. There may also be views on how we might bring pressure to bear on the Republic; but you will not want any decisions in advance of your proposed meeting with Mr. Lynch.



CONCLUSION

8. You will wish to secure colleagues' agreement to the general lines of your proposed statement.

A handwritten signature in blue ink, appearing to read 'R. L. Wade-Gery'.

R L WADE-GERY

29 August 1979

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C(79) COPY NO

August 1979


NORTHERN IRELAND : SECURITY

JOINT MEMORANDUM BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR  
NORTHERN IRELAND AND THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR  
DEFENCE

1. We have been considering together since we took office the question of improving the effectiveness of our security operations in Northern Ireland, and the quality of the help we get from the Republic of Ireland. A number of questions are still under examination but recent events have led us to bring forward certain proposals now for immediate action, as set out in the Annexe to this memorandum.

2. If these proposals have the support of colleagues, it would enable the Prime Minister on behalf of the Government to make a public statement about security in Northern Ireland on the following lines:

i. We re-assert our determination to protect the people of the United Kingdom against terrorism using all our collective resources. Our aim remains the defeat of terrorism and the extension of normal policing.



**SECRET**

- ii. To achieve this we have decided that some changes are necessary now. These include the creation of a new Security Directorate in Northern Ireland accountable to the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland.
  
- iii. We share a common concern with the Republic of Ireland in defeating terrorism on both sides of the border. We have proposed a fresh approach to the Government of the Republic at the highest level to improve all aspects of our co-operation.

HA

FP

**SECRET**



WITH  
THE COMPLIMENTS OF THE  
PRIVATE SECRETARY

NORTHERN IRELAND OFFICE  
GREAT GEORGE STREET  
LONDON SW1P 3AJ



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~~SI~~(79)

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August 1979

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SECRET

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to the Government  
of the Republic

~~consultations with the Government of the Republic~~ at the highest level to improve all aspects of our cooperation.

JA FP

SECRET

SECURITY POLICY

1. The two-fold aim of security policy in Northern Ireland is to extend normal policing and to eliminate terrorism. In some parts of Northern Ireland the two parts of the objective can be pursued concurrently, in others the struggle against terrorism predominates. Throughout Northern Ireland the Army operates in support of the civil power.

2. There is, however, a clear public expectation that the Government will be examining security policy in the light of the events of the weekend. We have done this under the following heads:

- (i) The direction and co-ordination of the security effort in Northern Ireland;
- (ii) Security co-operation with the Republic of Ireland.

The direction and co-ordination of the security effort in Northern Ireland

3. We have concluded that the present arrangements for the direction of security operations under the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland could be improved, in particular the best use is not being made of our resources and unnecessary operational problems are created. We are both agreed on the need for action here. There are a number of constraints on us:

- (a) the ultimate authority of Ministers and in particular the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland must be maintained, not least because any apparent divorce between political policy and security policy will make political progress impossible;
- (b) The Chief Constable, whose Force plays an increasing part in the struggle against the terrorists, is accountable only to the law; he cannot be made accountable either to a Minister or to any other person without legislation;
- (c) Our policy is to proceed against the terrorist through the normal machinery of law and order, and not to follow the terrorist into detracting from the normal standards: to undermine the independence of the Chief Constable, or to put the RUC under some quasi military direction, would undermine our position;
- (d) We cannot afford to abandon either the elimination of terrorism or the extension of normal policing.

4. Within these constraints we think it is possible to make a significant change in our present arrangements, which will both improve the efficiency of our operations and have public impact. There is a danger of course that any changes following last weekend's incidents will be misrepresented by the Provisional IRA for their own purposes, but as a result of our discussion in recent weeks, we are convinced that

**SECRET**

**E.R.**

these changes are worth making in their own right. We can expect a large section of public opinion to welcome them.

5. The Secretary of State for Northern Ireland must remain responsible for securing the implementation of the Government's policy there. But he needs to be supported by better machinery than exists at present for the conduct and planning of security operations. He has already established a new security policy group to bring together on a regular basis the Chief Constable and GOC under his chairmanship to determine security policy. We now propose additionally a new Security Directorate in Stormont under the personal direction and control of the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland.

- (i) The Directorate would have a joint senior staff consisting of representatives of the Northern Ireland Office, the Army and the police (at Brigadier/Assistant Chief Constable level).
- (ii) It would maintain a 24 hour responsibility for monitoring developments, proposing initiatives and reporting as appropriate.
- (iii) The Directorate would be responsible for exercising central co-ordination on behalf of the Secretary of State where this is required. As appropriate, it could be augmented by more senior officers as necessary up to and including the Chief Constable and the GOC under the Secretary of State's direction.
- (iv) In conjunction where appropriate with the Director and Co-ordinator of Intelligence, it would work on forward planning of security policy operations both in pursuance of remits from the Secretary of State and on its own initiative.

A senior official would be appointed to head up the new Directorate and would be responsible to the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland. We would want a man of sufficient seniority and experience, perhaps of DUS rank, to be able to co-ordinate effectively all aspects of operational planning and to establish the right relationship with the Chief Constable and the GOC.

6. Co-ordination is equally important in the field. Problems arise on the ground when the security forces have to react to incidents. Quick decisions are required if both forces are to make full use of their separate resources and different skills. A working party, established by the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, has agreed that improvements in communication and understanding are needed. A detailed examination is already being made of individual areas in Northern Ireland. The Working Party is likely to recommend a clearer focus on the Divisional Police Chief Superintendent as the key commander and a more positive liaison between him (and his 24 hour-a day staff) and local army units.

**SECRET**

7. There are other measures we could consider: some of these can be dealt with now - for instance, a unilateral decision to reintroduce detention would be politically disastrous. But other ideas would be worth re-examining within the new Directorate, including the closure of certain border roads, the proscription of Provisional Sinn Fein, more vigorous use of the SAS, increased use of the UDR, possible changes in the law against terrorism. None of these is a matchwinner, but all could be looked at again by the new Directorate. Some are already under review, together with, of course, the scope for improving our intelligence effort.

#### Security Co-Operation with the Republic of Ireland

8. For the defeat of terrorism it is essential that the Republic:
- (a) Make a concerted and sustained effort against terrorists in the Border areas - involving closer co-operation with the RUC, swifter reaction to incidents, and the better organised surveillance of the Border;
  - (b) Mount a sustained campaign against the manufacture of home-made explosives in the South (from which comes most of the explosives used by terrorists in Northern Ireland);
  - (c) Put a far greater effort into acquiring intelligence about terrorists, and sharing it with us - and quickly.
9. We must take the opportunity given to us by recent events to secure, in the context of our general policy, co-operation from the Irish at the highest level leading to more effective action against terrorism. We must ask them to say publicly that they are doing this.

Cabinet Office,  
Whitehall,  
London SW1

29th August, 1979

PS(79) 26

Dear Private Secretary,

Cabinet: Northern Ireland

The memorandum by the Secretary of State for Defence and the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland (C(79) 34) shown on the agenda for tomorrow's Cabinet will not be circulated in advance. Copies will be available in the Cabinet Room for each Minister attending; these copies must not be taken away after Cabinet.

I am copying this letter to the Private Secretaries of all members of the Cabinet, the Minister of Transport and the Chief Whip.

Yours sincerely,

(Signed) M. J. VILE

From: THE PRIVATE SECRETARY



NORTHERN IRELAND OFFICE

GREAT GEORGE STREET,

LONDON SW1P 3AJ

Bryan Cartledge Esq  
10 Downing Street  
London SW1

28 August 1979

As.

Paul

~~Mr. Alexander~~

30/8

30/8

Dear Bryan

Further to this morning's telephone conversation, I attach some paragraphs on Northern Ireland which might be adapted for use in your replies to the messages you are receiving.

Yours sincerely  
Mike Hopkins

M W HOPKINS

## OUTLINE OF GOVERNMENT POLICY TOWARDS NORTHERN IRELAND

Northern Ireland is part of the United Kingdom and is therefore the responsibility of Her Majesty's Government. Both Labour and Conservative Governments have repeatedly pledged that there will be no change in the constitutional status of Northern Ireland without the consent of the people there. The present arrangements whereby Northern Ireland is subject to Direct Rule from Westminster are temporary and Government policy is accordingly directed at seeking an acceptable system of democracy in the North which gives the people more control over their own affairs. This means giving substantial responsibilities back to locally elected political representatives. Experience has shown however that to establish a system in which both Catholic and Protestant traditions have trust and confidence will require persuasion, time and patience. The Secretary of State has begun the task by having talks with Northern Ireland political leaders which will continue.

British troops are in Northern Ireland because as Northern Ireland is part of the United Kingdom they are helping the police to deal with a terrorist threat that they cannot deal with on their own. There is no question of the troops being withdrawn until the security situation permits it.

Whilst Northern Ireland is the responsibility of Her Majesty's Government the Republic of Ireland has an interest in what is happening in the North and also an influence on political developments there. The PIRA is no respecter of the Border and Ministers in the Republic have agreed that the combined efforts of both countries security forces in the Border areas can and must be improved. Her Majesty's Government and the Government of the Republic are determined to eradicate terrorism which the Republic recognises as being a threat not just to the people of Northern Ireland but also to themselves.



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28 AUG 1979  
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MR. CARTLEDGE

BH  
30/8

Mr. Alexander

Top Copy: Pm, Aug 79 :-  
Guidelines for determining  
the recipients of  
PM's letters to the  
next of kin of members  
of the security forces  
killed as a result of  
terrorist action in NI

The Prime Minister has now written to the next of kin of the 18 soldiers listed on the attached MOD note.

MOD confirmed to me this morning that the two listed as missing have been treated as dead from 1530 hours yesterday.

The Prime Minister raised this again last night. I mentioned to her that it would be difficult to make any distinction between these soldiers and future victims. She agreed, and said that it was her intention to write in the future.

I have told Defence and Northern Ireland that she has written these letters, and have asked Defence to notify us if, as is expected, more of Monday's casualties die. I have also asked that we should be informed of future security force deaths to enable the Prime Minister to write.

Decisions will have to be taken about the types of incident which will lead the Prime Minister to write to next of kin. Defence (David Omand) would like a letter from us giving guidance on this point.

MJP

Letter sent to David Omand.

For -  
Pm  
- 30/8

29 August, 1979.



10 DOWNING STREET

Bryan

PM has written to all 18  
on MoD list (the two  
"missing" have been  
created as dead from 1530  
yesterday).



10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

Tuesday, 28<sup>th</sup> August '79.

My dear Mr. Beard,

No words of mine can  
match the tragic loss which you  
and your family have suffered.  
We were all shocked and saddened  
by Monday's terrible news when we  
lost our brave and most  
comrades men. I wanted to let  
you know how deeply we all feel  
for you and how much we admire

Your husband's brave deeds.

Nothing can diminish your sorrow and you will need all your strength and courage to see you through the difficult days ahead. The thoughts and prayers of many people are with you and I hope will comfort and sustain you in the coming weeks and months.

Yours very sincerely

Margaret Thatcher



10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

Tuesday, 28<sup>th</sup> August 1979.

My dear Mr. Fursman,

You and your family  
have suffered a grievous and  
tragic loss and I write to say  
how very much we all feel for you.

A wave of shock and horror  
went through the Nation as Monday's  
events unfolded and we gradually  
realised how many brave and  
courageous men we had lost. Indeed

our very first. Those most-  
ready to respond to duty, those  
most willing to defend the things we  
stand for, they, and their families  
bore the brunt of the work of  
war.

Nothing can fill the gap in  
your lives but I hope that the countless  
acts of kindness you will receive, and  
the comfort of friends will help to  
sustain you in the difficult times  
ahead.

Yours very sincerely  
Margaret Shelden



10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

Tuesday, 28<sup>th</sup> August.

Dear Mr. & Mrs. Vere.

It is difficult to find words to express the grief and horror we all felt at the terrible events of Monday. You have suffered the loss of a deeply-loved son who gave his own life that we may live ours and hope for better days to come.

Having a family of my own, I can appreciate the depth of your sorrow. I can only offer to you a





10 DOWNING STREET

relations and my own deepest  
sympathies.

Monday's tragedies were the  
work of evil men. We must  
see that their way does not triumph.

Our thoughts and prayers are  
with you during the difficult days  
and weeks ahead.

Mr and Mrs Robert Vance  
21 Malton Drive  
Belfast  
N. Ireland.

Yours very sincerely,

Raymond Indictor

tmw



10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

Tuesday, 28<sup>th</sup> August.

My dear Mrs. Rogers,

No words of mine can  
match the grief you and your  
children will feel at the loss you  
suffered yesterday. The whole nation  
was shocked and saddened by the  
events of that terrible day.

We share your sorrow and  
I personally wanted to write and  
send you my deepest sympathies.



1917/18 04/12/000 01

Without ever like Sgt. Rogers,  
 the things Britain stands for  
 would be lost for ever. We will  
 never forget the sacrifice made,  
 and which you and your children  
 will have to bear for long days and  
 years.


Our thoughts are with you.

Yours very sincerely

Margaret Holton

Mrs. I.A. Rogers  
 c/o 2nd Bn Para  
 BFPO 805

tmw




10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

My dear Mrs. Kingland,

I write to express my  
deepest sympathies at the terrible loss  
you suffered on Monday. Such a  
young wife, such a fine future for  
you and your family, all taken away  
by the reckless and wicked acts of  
evil men.


I realize that no words of-  
mine can adequately tell you how

  
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENCE

much we feel for you at this  
time, and how we value that  
everything we value in Britain  
depends on the willingness of men  
like Private England to risk their  
lives for our sake.

My thoughts and prayers will  
be with you during the long and  
difficult days ahead.

Yours sincerely,



Mrs R.N. England  
c/o 2nd Bn Para  
BFPO 805

tmw



10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

My dear Mr. & Mrs. Jones,

I wanted to write and  
tell you how much I feel for you  
both at this time. You have  
suffered the most grievous loss of all -  
a fine young son, at the threshold  
of life, who gave everything that others  
might live to enjoy the things that he will  
never know. Having a family myself,  
I can appreciate the depth of your  
sorrow. A nation grieves with you.  
Monday's tragic events were



THE KING'S COLLEGE

the acts of evil men; we must see  
that their way does not triumph.

My thoughts and prayers will be  
with you during the difficult days  
ahead. I hope you will be  
sustained by the comfort of many  
friends. Britain has cause to be  
proud of the heroic acts of young men  
like Patrick Gordon.

Yours sincerely  
Margaret Thatcher

Mr. and Mrs. Reginald Jones  
24 Landover Road  
Blaenavon  
Gwent

Mr. & Mrs. Reginald Jones, \_\_\_\_\_



10 DOWNING STREET


THE PRIME MINISTER

Tuesday, 21<sup>st</sup> August '79.

My dear Mr. & Mrs. Vaughan-Jones,  
I write to send to you  
my deepest sympathies and to say  
how much I feel for you at this  
tragic time.

You have suffered the most-  
grievous loss of all; a dearly-loved  
young son who was such a fine  
person that he gave his life that others  
might enjoy the freedoms he will never  
again know. Ringed with your grief





TO DOWNING STREET

You will feel a sense of pride that  
when duty called Robert was not  
found wanting.

Words are not enough to  
restate your sorrow nor to express my  
anger and horror at these senseless  
acts of evil men.

I hope that the prayers and  
comfort of friends will help you  
through the difficult times that lie ahead.

Yours very sincerely,

Raymond J. Shelton

Mr and Mrs William  
Vaughan-Jones  
Penbryn, Vehaf VWCA-Y  
Corwen, Clwyd

DRE

tmw



10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

Tuesday, 28<sup>th</sup> August.

My dear Mrs. Jones,

I want to add my  
sympathies to those of the millions  
of people whose thoughts and prayers  
will be with you at this tragic time.

No words of mine are sufficient to  
match the grief you will feel. Lord  
Jones responded to the highest call of  
duty, and for us, the ordinary  
law-abiding people, he paid the  
final sacrifice. It is our duty to



THE QUEEN'S BARRACKS

that... made Britain a great nation.  
You will have to endure many  
long and difficult days & years ahead.

I hope that the comfort and  
kindness of friends will sustain  
you through them.

My deepest sympathies,


Yours sincerely

Margaret Roberts

Mrs. Leonard Jones  
c/o 2nd Bn Para  
BFPO 805

tmw





10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

Tuesday, 2<sup>nd</sup> August 1975

My dear Mrs. Ireland,

Words are pitifully inadequate to say how deeply we all feel for you in your tragic loss. A wave of anger and horror swept the nation as the events of last Monday unfolded and we realised just how many brave souls we had lost.

The paratroopers were a particularly fine body of men prepared to take

great risks in the service of their  
country. Your husband was never  
found wanting when the call of  
duty came. Britain owes so much  
to men like him.

For you, the days ahead will  
be long and difficult. The sympathies  
and thoughts of millions of people will  
be with you. I hope the kindness and  
comfort of friends will help you  
through the coming weeks and months.

Yours sincerely

Margaret Thatcher

Mrs. C.G. Ireland  
c/o 2nd Bn Para  
BFPO 805

tmw



10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

Tuesday, 28<sup>th</sup> August 1979

My dear Mr. and Mrs. Blair,

I write to express my profound sense of shock and horror at the terrible events of Monday which deprived you of a deeply-loved young son. My deepest sympathies to you both - although words seem pitifully inadequate at a time like this.

Having a family myself, I know exactly how you will feel. There will be a gap in your lives that nothing can ever fill. May I say that without-



THE RIGHT HONOURABLE LORD

never like Donald. Britain could not  
have been the great country she is.  
When the call of duty came, he responded  
with bravery and courage. We must  
try to live in such a way that his  
sacrifice is worth while.

Nothing can diminish your  
sorrow but I hope the thoughts & prayers  
of a grateful nation, and of friends will  
help you through the difficult days  
and months ahead.

Yours very sincerely

Margaret Thelma

Mr. and Mrs. Alexander Blair  
7 Crimond Place  
Kilsyth  
Strathclyde



10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

Tuesday, 28<sup>th</sup> August '79.

My dear Mrs. Andrews,

I write to send you my deepest sympathies at the grievous loss you have suffered. Words are pitifully inadequate at a time like this but the thoughts of millions of people are with you.

As the events of last Monday unfolded a wave of shock and horror went through our people as we gradually realised just how many of our fine young men were lost. The deaths



were those of - evil and cowardly  
men and we must do everything we  
can to see that they are brought to  
justice.

Your sorrow will indeed be  
great and I want you to know how  
much we feel for you. I trust that  
the comfort and kindness of friends  
will help you through the difficult days  
and months ahead.

Yours very sincerely  
A. J. Andrews

Mrs. N. J. Andrews  
c/o 2nd Bn Para  
BFPO 805

tmw




10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

Tuesday, 28<sup>th</sup> August 1979

My dear Mr. & Mrs. Baines.

I write to send you my deepest sympathies and to tell you how much I feel for you in your tragic loss. Gary must have been a particularly fine young man. He did more than his duty and he lost his life in the service of his fellow men. Our pride in his bravery and courage merges with a sense of outrage that the acts of evil men should have deprived him of his whole future.



TO THE DIRECTOR

GENERAL INVESTIGATION

Your grief will indeed be great and no words of mine can diminish it. I hope that in the difficult days and months ahead, the comfort and kindness of friends, and the thanks of a nation for our late son, will sustain you.

Yours very sincerely  
Margaret Thatcher

Mr and Mrs Stanley Barnes  
65 Waterford Road  
Ipswich  
Suffolk

tmw



10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

Tuesday, 28<sup>th</sup> August 1978.

My dear Mr. & Mrs. Dunn,

It is difficult to find words adequately to express the grief and horror we all felt at the loss of young life on Monday. Your sorrow will be great indeed, for you lost

Raymond at the tender age of 20 years.

There can be no greater sympathy and I want you to know just how much we feel for you.

Some of our bravest and finest souls were lost that day - and at the



Hands of evil men whose atrocities  
are rampant to us all.

We cannot undo what happened.

But I hope that the sympathy and  
kindness of friends will help to  
sustain you through the difficult  
times ahead.

With my deepest personal sympathy

Yours sincerely  
Margaret Thatcher

Mr. and Mrs. Percy Dunn  
56 Cranmore Avenue  
Park South  
Swindon  
Wiltshire



10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

Tuesday, 28<sup>th</sup> August 1979.

My dear Mr. and Mrs. Wood,

It is difficult to find words to express the grief and horror we all felt at the loss of young life we suffered on Monday.

So many fine young men of whom your son was one were struck down by evil men that day.

Paratroopers were especially brave and courageous souls, always ready to respond to the call of duty and to risk their lives in the service of-



THE STATE OF TEXAS

Dear fellow men,


Nothing can diminish you  
narrow or fill the gap that is left  
in your lives. But I want you to know  
how many millions of people feel for  
you and are thinking of you. I hope  
that the countless acts of kindness you  
receive will be some comfort to you  
and sustain you both in the difficult-  
times ahead.

Yours very sincerely

Raymond Thatcher

Mr and Mrs Eric Wood  
9 Broadmead  
Auriol Road  
London W.14.

tmw



10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER


28<sup>th</sup> August 1979.

My dear Mrs. Woods,

This week has indeed brought tragedy to your life and left you with a very heavy burden of grief. I send you my deepest sympathies. You have suffered a terrible loss; a young son, only 18 years old, who responded to the call of duty, was struck down by the acts of evil men.

No words of mine can diminish





22, 1877, 12/17/1911

1877, 12/17/1911

The sorrow you bear. A whole nation  
feels for you and grieves with you.  
A wave of horror went through us all  
as we gradually realized how many  
brave and courageous young men we  
had lost.

I hope that the kindness and  
comfort of friends will sustain you  
in the difficult days ahead.

Yours very sincerely

Margaret Thatcher

Mrs. Mary Woods  
227 Rothesay Road  
Blackburn  
Lancs



10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

Tuesday, 28<sup>th</sup> August 1979


My dear Mrs. Gies,

No words of mine can match the grief you and your children will feel at the loss you suffered yesterday. The whole nation was shocked and saddened at the events of that terrible day.

We share your sorrow and I personally wanted to write to say how much I feel for you.

Conrad Gies was a brave





10 DOWNING STREET


THE PRIME MINISTER

My dear Mrs. Blair,

My deepest sympathy to  
you and your family in your grief.

On Monday, we lost our  
bravest and most conspicuous men,  
men who followed the superb  
example set by Colonel Blair.

A nation's gratitude is due to him  
and more he led. A nation's sympathy  
and feeling comes to you in the



TO DONATE TO THE

ROYAL CANADIAN MOUNTED POLICE

difficult years that are ahead.

Yours very sincerely

Raymond DeLester

---

Mrs. D.N.A. Blair  
Balaclava House  
Colinton Road  
Edinburgh  
EH13 OTT.

tmw



10 DOWNING STREET


THE PRIME MINISTER

Tuesday, 28<sup>th</sup> August 1979.

My dear Mr. Nield,

My deepest sympathy to you in the previous loss of your son.

On Monday, we lost our bravest and most-courageous young men and Corporal Nield was one of them. He was a soldier who answered the call of duty and went to help his fellows in their hour of need. He made the final sacrifice and



10 DUNDEE STREET

We share your sorrow. His death  
was the work of evil men and we  
must ensure that their aims do  
not triumph.

No words of mine can  
fill the gap left in your life. But  
I hope that the comfort and kindness  
of friends will help you through  
the difficult days ahead.

Yours sincerely  
Margaret Thelma

D. Macleod Esq.  
28 Forestry Houses  
Inverness

tmw



PRIME MINISTER

The list you  
MINISTRY OF DEFENCE requested -  
MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1A 2HB

Telephone 01-218 2111 (Direct Dialling) I suggest  
01-218 9000 (Switchboard) you ignore  
the two

MO 19/3

28th August 1979

asked  
names for  
now

MP  
28/8  
nm.

Dear Mike,

You asked the Ministry of Defence  
Resident Clerk for a list of the next of kin  
of the soldiers killed in yesterday's  
tragic incident. This is attached.

16 letters here yours ever,  
Some of the names are the same - e.g. Jones - David  
(D B OMAND)  
but if you look they can't (I hope)  
be confused. They are in list order.  
(see underneath)  
At the back are the two articles  
letters - which I feel may  
be needed before the  
day is out. nm

Mike Pattison Esq  
10 Downing Street



WARRENFOINT EXPLOSION 28 AUGUST 1979-DEAD & MISSING BELIEVED KILLED

Serial	No	Rank	Surname	Christian Names	Unit	Age	Marital Status	Children if any	NOK & Relationship	Address of NOK
1.	23972659	Sgt (Drum Major)	✓ ROGERS	IAN ALBERT	2 Para	31	M	Two	Mrs Muriel Rogers Wife	C/O 2nd Bn Para - BFPO 805
2.	24246516	Pte	✓ VANCE	THOMAS ROBERT	2 Para	23	S		Mr&Mrs Robert Vance. Mother & Father	21 Falton Drive Belfast
3.	24329521	Pte	✓ ENGLAND	ROBERT NEVIS	2 Para	23	M	One	Mrs Karen England Wife	C/O 2nd Bn Para BFPO 805
4.	24464314	Pte	✓ JONES	JEFFREY ALAN	2 Para	18	S		Mr&Mrs Reginald Jones. Mother & Father	24 Landover Road, East Blaenavon, Gwent
5.	24154839	Cpl	✓ JONES	LEONARD	2 Para	26	M		Mrs Angela Jones. Wife	C/O 2nd Bn Para BFPO 805
6.	24441381	Pte	✓ JONES	ROBERT DYLAN	2 Para	18	S		Mr&Mrs William Vaughan-Jones Mother&Father	Penbryn, Yehaf VNCA-Y IRE, Corwen, CLWYD
7.	24319796	LCpl	✓ IRELAND	CHRISTOPHER GEORGE	2 Para	25	M	One	Mrs Janet Ireland Wife	C/O 2nd Bn Para BFPO 805
8.	24303123	LCpl	✓ BLAIR	DONALD FERGUSON	2 Para	23	S		Mr&Mrs Alexander Blair. Mother&Father	7 Crimond Place Kilsyth, Strathclyde
9.	24312985	Cpl	✓ ANDREWS	NICHOLAS JOHN	2 Para	24	M		Mrs Julie Andrews. Wife	C/O 2nd Bn Para BFPO 805
10.	24460214	Pte	✓ BARNES	GARRY IVAN	2 Para	18	S		Mr&Mrs Stanley Barnes. Mother&Father	65 Waterford Road Ipswich
11.	24372896	Pte	✓ DUNN	RAYMOND	2 Para	20	S		Mr&Mrs Percy Dunn Mother&Father	56 Cranmore Avenue Park South Swindon
12.	24428944	Pte	✓ WOOD	ANTHONY GEORGE	2 Para	19	S		Mr&Mrs Eric Wood Mother&Father	9 Broadmead, Auriol Rd London
13.	24464631	Pte	✓ WOODS	MICHAEL	2 Para	18	S		Mrs Mary Woods Mother	227. Pothesay Road Blackburn

14.	24282818	✓ Cpl	GILES	JOHN CHRISTIAN	2 Para	22	M	Two	Mrs Carol Giles Wife	C/O 2nd Bn Para BFPO 805
15.	30300	Maj	FURSMAN	PETER JAMES	2 Para	35	M	Three	Mrs Christine Fursman Wife	C/O 2nd Bn Para BFPO 805
16.*	240052239	WOII	BEARD	WALTER	2 Para	33	M	Two	Mrs Josette Beard Wife	C/O 2nd Bn Para BFPO 805
17.	460471	✓ Lt Col	BLAIR	DAVID NIGEL ANTHONY	1 CO HLDERS	40	M	Two	Mrs Anne Blair Wife	Balaclava House, Colinton Road Edinburgh EH13 OTT
18.	24352019	✓ LCpl	MACLEOD	VICTOR	1 CO HLDERS	24	S		Mr D Macleod Father	28 Forestry Houses Inverness

\* MISSING BELIEVED DEAD.

\* 2nd Bn Para - 2nd Battalion The Parachute Regiment  
British Forces Post Office 805

GR 200

*Pompe Minister*

*for hmt 30/8*

*hmt 29/8*

UNCLASSIFIED

FM WASHINGTON 281720Z AUG 79

TO ROUTINE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 2449 OF 28 AUGUST 1979,

INFO NIO (L), NIO (B), DUBLIN, BIS AND CG NEW YORK, BOSTON

DEATH OF LORD MOUNTBATTEN

1. SPEAKER O'NEILL ISSUED THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT TODAY, 28 AUGUST. BEGINS:

"I AM SHOCKED AND DEEPLY SADDENED BY THE I R A TERRORIST BOMBING YESTERDAY WHICH RESULTED IN THE DEATHS OF LORD MOUNTBATTEN, MEMBERS OF HIS FAMILY AND 17 BRITISH SOLDIERS. THESE REPREHENSIBLE ACTS WERE CARRIED OUT BY TERRORISTS WHO PURPORT TO BE ADVANCING THE CAUSE OF IRISH NATIONALISM. THESE TRAGIC DEATHS CANNOT BE CONDONED ON POLITICAL GROUNDS, AND THE PERPETRATORS MUST BE CONDEMNED IN THE STRONGEST TERMS. WE IRISH AMERICANS MUST REJECT THOSE WHO SEEK TO UNITE IRELAND THROUGH THE USE OF VIOLENCE, AND RENEW OUR COMMITMENT TO ACHIEVING A PEACEFUL RESOLUTION OF THE PROBLEMS OF NORTHERN IRELAND"

ENDS.

ROBINSON.

[COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING ST]

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*ant*

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CC master set

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NORTHERN IRELAND

NOTE OF A DISCUSSION BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER, THE HOME SECRETARY, THE DEFENCE SECRETARY AND THE LORD PRIVY SEAL AT 10 DOWNING STREET ON 28 AUGUST 1979 AT 1100

The Prime Minister said that she was aware of the concern which was being expressed by the Army in Northern Ireland over their lack of the powers which they considered necessary to defeat terrorism. The Government would have to consider deeply what their objectives in Northern Ireland really were. They would also have to consider how the Army could best be protected from the kind of tragedy which had befallen them on the previous day. The Prime Minister said that she was, however, now reinforced in the view which she had always held, namely that the key to the Northern Ireland problem lay in Dublin, with Mr. Lynch, and with the Pope.

The Secretary of State for Defence said that the Army was indeed unhappy, particularly about the security situation and intelligence co-ordination between themselves and the RUC. He was considering whether there might not be a case to appoint somebody to preside over the co-ordination of intelligence, under the Secretary of State's overall authority; whoever was appointed could remain permanently in Northern Ireland, rather than commuting between Westminster and Belfast. The difficulty was that somebody in this position might seem to be superior to the Secretary of State, even if he was in fact subordinate. The Lord Privy Seal expressed the view that a move of this kind would amount to no more than window dressing. The Prime Minister commented that it could also reflect adversely on the Secretary of State's authority. The Home Secretary thought that the appointment of a "security controller" would raise as many problems as it could solve, not least in terms of the appointee's relationship with the Secretary of State. The fact that he would not be responsible to the House of Commons would also raise problems. Mr. Whitelaw said that he nevertheless had the impression that intelligence co-ordination in Northern Ireland was now inadequate: he could not understand the deterioration

/which had

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which had taken place, since co-ordination in this field had been excellent at the time of his own involvement in the Province. The trouble seemed to be that the Army did not regard the RUC as being equal to the situation while the RUC disliked the Army behaving as policemen. Sir Ian Gilmour commented that the situation seemed to have got worse since the decision had been taken to push the RUC to the fore and to give the Army a lower profile.

On the security situation in general, Mr. Whitelaw said that the Army had defeated one enemy but now faced a new and more formidable one. The new cellular IRA was much more difficult to penetrate than the old IRA brigades. Sir Ian Gilmour asked whether the present opportunity could not be taken to insist on improved cross-border co-operation on the part of the Irish Government. The Irish should be persuaded to agree to free transit backwards and forwards across the border by helicopters; and there should be better co-operation between the British Army and the Garda. \*

\* Mr. Pym agreed that this was a good time to make a comprehensive approach to Mr. Lynch. Mr. Whitelaw suggested that he should be invited to come to London. There was general agreement that this should be done, and that if Mr. Lynch were to be invited to attend Lord Mountbatten's funeral he could come to see the Prime Minister at the same time. Sir Ian Gilmour pointed out that Mr. Lynch had already invited the Prime Minister to visit Dublin to discuss EEC matters: it would have to be made clear that the purpose of an earlier meeting in London would be quite different.

Mr. Whitelaw said that it would be necessary to prepare the Government's position very thoroughly on the extradition issue. Mr. Lynch invariably took refuge in the argument that in order to change the Irish law a referendum would be necessary and that the Government might lose it. The Prime Minister said that it was now clear that Ireland was harbouring known murderers.

\*~\* Passage deleted and closed, 40 years,  
under a FOI Exemption.

AWayland  
25 March 2010

/Mr. Whitelaw

Mr. Whitelaw said that, in the view of Sir David McNee, the Government would be justified in publishing the photographs of known terrorists who were being given refuge in the South. The Prime Minister said that she would need to have the Lord Chancellor's and the Attorney General's advice on this. The steps taken to apprehend Lord Mountbatten's murderers would be a good test of Irish intentions.


Concluding the discussion, the Prime Minister repeated that the Government must reflect on what its objectives in Northern Ireland were and whether they justified the present tragic level of loss of life. The Government must define the problem and their aims. It was agreed that the press should be told that the Prime Minister had met some of her Ministerial colleagues in order to have a preliminary discussion of recent events in Northern Ireland, in advance of the Secretary of State's return to London later in the day.

The discussion ended at 12 noon.

*SM.*

28 August 1979

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Ireland - Visit of Taoiseach

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10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

28 August 1979

Northern Ireland

This letter records the main points which arose from a meeting called by the Prime Minister at 1800 today at No.10, which was attended by the Home Secretary, Defence Secretary, the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, the Lord Privy Seal, the Chief of the General Staff and Mr. K.R. Stowe, to discuss the implications of Monday's tragic events in Northern Ireland and in the Irish Republic and the Government's next moves.

Decisions

- i It was agreed that the Defence Secretary and the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland would prepare a joint paper for Cabinet on 30 August (which is not to be circulated in advance) covering both the objectives which the Government should pursue in any future discussions with the Irish Government, in order to improve cross-border security and to stiffen the Irish Government's policies towards the terrorists; and possible ways of improving the British Government's own security effort in Northern Ireland, including the improvement of co-operation between the Army and the RUC in intelligence and operational matters.
- ii It was agreed that the FCO would pursue urgently the question of ensuring that the Taoiseach is invited to attend the ceremonial funeral of Lord Mountbatten in Westminster Abbey next week; and that the invitation, when extended, would be accompanied by a message from the Prime Minister inviting Mr. Lynch to meet her during his visit to London for talks on the Irish problem.

Discussion

i The events of 27 August

Mr. Atkins gave his colleagues a report on his visit to Warrenpoint earlier in the day and on his discussions with the security authorities in Northern Ireland. He said that although there were very strong indications that the bombs which ambushed the British convoy at Warrenpoint had been <sup>deton-</sup>ated from south of the border, there was as yet no firm evidence of this; and that, similarly, it had not yet been established that any small arms fire had come from south of the border. The Garda had already detained two suspects in connection with the

SECRET

Warrenpoint explosions, and two more in connection with the murder of Lord Mountbatten and his companions in Irish waters.

ii Future relations with the Irish Republic

There was general agreement that the key to the situation in Northern Ireland lay in Dublin, and also to some extent with the Pope. The Prime Minister said that the Government had to take decisions on the future approach to the Irish Government and on what the UK required of the Republic. It was pointed out that, for so long as Ireland held the EEC Presidency, the Irish had cards which they could play against the UK.

\* ~~~~~ \*

This might help to change the Irish Government's attitude on the extradition issue. The UK might be able to exert some leverage against the Republic in the context of the UK Nationality Act, although any moves in this direction would be complicated by the fact that both countries were members of the EEC. It might also be possible to step up administrative action against Irish immigrants to the UK, on the lines of the steps already being taken at UK channel ports against Algerians and Turks. It was, however, agreed that before a more confrontational policy with regard to the Irish Republic was considered, a further attempt should be made - at a meeting between the Prime Minister and Mr. Lynch - to enlist the Irish Government's effective co-operation, particularly in the intelligence field. If no progress resulted, other measures would have to be considered.

iii Possible measures within Northern Ireland

Mr. Atkins informed his colleagues of possible new measures which could be adopted within the Province, all of which carried both advantages and disadvantages. These included: the re-introduction of executive detention; the high profile for security operations; increased use of UDR; more vigorous use of the SAS; changes in the law, e.g. making it possible to accept as evidence in court the testimony of police officers of the rank of superintendent or above concerning membership of proscribed organisations; the proscription of the Provisional Sinn Fein; the closing of border roads; the withdrawal of police from border areas, thus relieving the Army from the duty of protecting the police; and the dispatch of more troops to Northern Ireland (there was general agreement that this last option should not be pursued further).

There was also some discussion of how co-operation between the RUC and the Army, particularly in the intelligence field, could be improved, possibly by the appointment of one Director of Operations who could exercise overall day-to-day control of operations both by the police and by the Army. It was agreed that this and other possible measures should be considered in the joint paper which the



Northern Ireland Office and Ministry of Defence are to prepare for Cabinet on 30 August.

Possible ways of improving our intelligence concerning terrorist activities south of the border were also discussed. It was agreed that an arrangement with the Irish Government whereby British helicopters could cross the border freely and conduct surveillance within an area of, say, five kilometres south into Irish territory, would be of very considerable assistance to border security operations.

I am sending copies of this letter to John Chilcot (Home Office), Roger Facer (Ministry of Defence), Michael Richardson (Office of the Lord Privy Seal), George Walden (Foreign and Commonwealth Office) and Martin Vile (Cabinet Office).

M. A. PATTISON

\* ~ \* Passage deleted and closed, 40 years,  
under a FOI Exemption.

AWayland  
25 March 2010

J.G. Pilling, Esq.,  
Northern Ireland Office.

This is a copy. The original has been extracted and closed, 40 years.

MR. CARTLEDGE

IRISH EVENTS

Action Outstanding (in no particular order)

Prime Minister wants next-of-kin addresses for the soldiers killed. She has been told that Mr. Atkins usually writes himself.

Funeral and associated arrangements to be confirmed. \*

Court mourning until the day of the funeral (inclusive). Half-masting tomorrow (Tuesday) and on the day of the funeral. Arrangements being made for RAF VC10 to collect the body. Irish State Pathologist examining the body tonight and current prospect is that it should be released after tomorrow morning.

\* ~

If available, the Prime Minister would like Mr. Pym to join her 1100 meeting.

\* ~ \* Passages deleted and closed, 40 years, under a FOI Exemption.  
C. Wayland, 25 March 2010

27 August 1979

MR. CARTLEDGE

IRISH EVENTS

Arrangements made

1. The Secretary of State for Northern Ireland spoke to the Prime Minister, and offered to come to No. 10 to report after his day in Belfast. Prime Minister agreed. This is likely to be early evening, time to be agreed tomorrow.
2. Meeting for the Prime Minister with Home Secretary and Lord Privy Seal set for ~~11.00~~ tomorrow morning.
3. Ken Stowe informed of Prime Minister's thoughts for Wednesday. He will call you early tomorrow to arrange to come over for further discussion.

27 August 1979



The National Archives

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10. IR.  
STATEMENT BY THE PRIME MINISTER, THE RT. HON. MARGARET THATCHER, MP

*P.O. Gen 30/8*

"By their actions today, the terrorists have added yet another infamous page to their catalogue of atrocity and cowardice. If reports of their involvement in the death of Lord Mountbatten prove true, they will earn the condemnation and contempt of people of goodwill everywhere. By the same token, the senseless murder of  members of the security forces has reinforced the repugnance felt for those who seek to advance their political ends by these evil means. The Government will spare no effort to ensure that those responsible for these and for all other acts of terrorism are brought to justice. The people of the United Kingdom will wage the war against terrorism with relentless determination until it is won."

10 Downing Street  
London SW1  
27 August 1979

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NOTE FOR THE RECORD

The Secretary of State for Northern Ireland telephoned the Prime Minister at 9.50 p.m. on Monday 27 August.

The Prime Minister said that the news was terrible but little could be discussed over the 'phone. Mr. Atkins said that he would be in the Province early tomorrow morning. The Prime Minister asked him to pass on her most sincere condolences. She asked what facts had so far been established. Mr. Atkins said that the incident had taken place at Carlingford Lough, where 300 yards of water divides the North from the South. There had been two big devices, probably detonated from the other side. The first had killed six men and wounded two. A helicopter which had come to assist met the second blast and seventeen men were killed. These included the Commanding Officer of The Queen's Own Highlanders, Colonel Blair.

Mr. Atkins said that he would travel tomorrow morning and if convenient for the Prime Minister he would come back to report to her in the afternoon. The Prime Minister asked that he should do so. She was concerned that, despite the appalling tragedy of today, this might not yet be the end.



27 August 1979

PART 1 ends:-

Washington TEL 2417 to FLO 24/8/79

PART 2 begins:-

Note for de leword (MAP) 27/8/79.