

PREM19

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IRELAND

(Northern Ireland situation)

(Part 3)

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PREM 19/82



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PART 3

Confidential Filing

The Situation in Northern Ireland.

Cross Border Security.

~~The appointment of Sir Maurice Oldfield as~~
Security Co-ordinator.


IRELAND

Part 1: May 1979

Part 3: October 1979

Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date
25 10.79							
3.10.79							
4.10.79							
8.10.79							
16.10.79							
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21.10.79							
23.10.79							
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PREM 19/82



PART 3 ends:-

Hunt to PM A0487 (S)

PART 4 begins:-

MA to N10 24.10.79 (S)

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12/10/79 13.

for Hunt (1)

Prime Minister

Ref. A0487

PRIME MINISTER

This is, obviously, a huge improvement. If you agree the text, I will circulate it to members of the other members of O.S. as a text which you + the Secretary of State have approved. Hunt 23/10

Statement on Northern Ireland

Following my talk with you after E this morning I got in touch with Mr. Stowe, and an entirely new, and much shorter, draft has been prepared and agreed between Mr. Stowe and me. A copy of this is attached. Mr. Stowe has now shown it to his Secretary of State who is well content with it.

There are two additional points which you will wish to note:

- (a) The only reference to security in the draft statement is now that in paragraph 13: but this is on the understanding that the Secretary of State will give a substantive reply on the security aspects in reply to a number of Questions which he will be answering before he makes his statement.
- (b) The Secretary of State is bound to get some difficult supplementaries following his statement: and the Northern Ireland Office will be sending you a draft of the proposed replies direct.

Thank you - that is much better

Jehx

JOHN HUNT

23rd October, 1979

SECRET

DRAFT STATEMENT BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR NORTHERN IRELAND - 15.30 HOURS ON 25 OCTOBER 1979

1. Mr. Speaker, I will, with permission, make a Statement about the Government of Northern Ireland.
2. The Government declared in The Queen's Speech that we propose "to seek an acceptable way of restoring to the people of Northern Ireland more control over their own affairs".
3. Since taking office in May, I have, for this purpose, had wide-ranging discussions in the Province, and a series of private meetings with each of the leaders of the Northern Ireland political parties represented in this House.
4. My discussions and meetings have confirmed the Government's view that it is right to transfer back to the people of Northern Ireland responsibility, to be exercised by locally elected representatives, for some at least of the powers of government presently exercised by Direct Rule from Westminster.
5. The political parties in Northern Ireland themselves, in their manifestos, asked for this, and there is widespread support for it in the Province.
6. There is, moreover, awareness that such a restoration of political responsibility can only be brought about in Northern Ireland by all parts of the community recognising and respecting the interests of others.
7. It will in due course be for this House to decide, on proposals put to it by Her Majesty's Government, what kind of powers and responsibilities are to be transferred to elected representatives of the people of Northern Ireland and through what kind of institutions they are to be exercised.
8. The Government wishes, however, to put forward proposals which, so far as possible, have the agreement of the people of Northern Ireland.

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9. We intend therefore to convene a Conference of the principal political parties in Northern Ireland to seek the highest level of agreement that we can on proposals for a transfer of responsibility which the Government might put before this House in due course.
10. We are, for this purpose, preparing a Consultative Document, which will be laid before Parliament, to serve as the basis of the Conference.
11. The Document will set out a range of powers and responsibilities which the Government for its part would be prepared to see transferred from the Westminster Government.
12. The Document will set out as options for consideration by the Conference a number of ways in which the transferred powers might be exercised; in each case with what Her Majesty's Government would regard as reasonable and appropriate safeguards for the minority.
13. Responsibility for law and order in the Province - which, as I indicated in my statement earlier today - remains the Government's overriding priority in Northern Ireland, would not be transferred.
14. I shall shortly be approaching the party leaders concerned to discuss with them the arrangements for a Conference to be convened as soon as possible and, I would hope, by the end of November.
15. Our aim will be to secure from the Conference, drawing on the proposals in the Consultative Document, workable and acceptable arrangements for giving the people of Northern Ireland greater responsibility for the conduct of their own affairs which we can then recommend to this House in fulfilment of our commitment in The Queen's Speech.

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10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

23 October 1979

Kear Nike,

Northern Ireland: Political Development

I wrote to you earlier this morning giving you the Prime Minister's reaction to the draft statement enclosed with the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland's minute to the Prime Minister of 22 October.

I have now had a chance to discuss the text with the Prime Minister. She has made it clear that, in addition to her comments on other sections of the draft statement, she is unhappy with paragraphs 9 and 10. She does not consider that the Government's position on the question of the outcome of any conference is as clear as paragraph 9 suggests. The Prime Minister considers that paragraph 10, and in particular the second sentence, is unclear and confusing.

You may think that the issues covered in paragraphs 9 and 10 might best be covered by a simple statement to the effect that:-

"We shall soon be laying before Parliament a consultative document which will describe a number of ways in which the commitment in The Queen's Speech might be met. All the options will provide what HMG would regard as reasonable and appropriate safeguards for the minority in Northern Ireland. None will envisage any transfer of responsibility for the maintenance of law and order from the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland."

I am sending copies of this letter to the recipients of my earlier letter.

Johns Smiley

Michael Alexander

M.W. Hopkins, Esq.,
Northern Ireland Office

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MB

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to
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10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

23 October 1979

NORTHERN IRELAND: POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT

The Prime Minister has seen Mr. Atkins' minute to her of 22 October on this subject. She has commented that the draft statement enclosed with the minute is too long and that much of it is not directly relevant to the question at issue. She has made a number of changes in the text which are summarised in the enclosure to this letter.

I am sending copies of this letter and its enclosure to John Chilcot (Home Office), Ian Maxwell (Lord Chancellor's Office), George Walden (Foreign and Commonwealth Office), Tony Battishill (HM Treasury), Brian Norbury (Ministry of Defence), Jim Buckley (Lord President's Office), Michael Richardson (Lord Privy Seal's Office), Stuart Hampson (Department of Trade) and Martin Vile (Cabinet Office).

M. O'D. B. ALEXANDER

M.W. Hopkins, Esq.,
Northern Ireland Office.

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DRAFT STATEMENT BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR NORTHERN IRELAND:
25 OCTOBER 1979

Paras 1 - 3: As drafted.

Paras 4 - 6: The Prime Minister considers that these could be omitted.

Para 7: The Prime Minister would omit the passage in square brackets.

The rest of the text should read as follows.

"8. These discussions and meetings have indicated - first, that it would be right to try to move away from the present arrangements for direct rule from Westminster; and second, that there is, in the Province, a willingness to accept that any restoration of political responsibility requires recognition and respect for the interests of others. At the same time, there are differences of view among the political parties and it will not be easy to secure agreement on the form that new constitutional arrangements should take.

9. The House will know that there is at present a wide gap between the elected District Councils and Parliament at Westminster. To begin to fill this democratic vacuum, the Government intends to arrange for the early setting up of a new elected assembly for the whole Province, with substantial responsibilities conferred upon it, and with reasonable and adequate safeguards for all sections of the community.

10. We shall soon be laying before Parliament a Consultative Document which will set out a number of ways in which powers might be exercised by an elected body. These will range from a regional council with limited executive powers at one extreme, to a legislative assembly supporting a regional government at the other, but with what HMG would regard as reasonable and appropriate safeguards for the minority in each case. None of the options would envisage any transfer of responsibility for the maintenance of law and order from the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland.

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- 2 -

11. It is the Government's intention to hold a Conference, under Government chairmanship, of the political leadership of the four main Parties in Northern Ireland. The purpose of such a Conference would be to discuss the first steps which might be taken to restore to the people of Northern Ireland greater responsibility for their own affairs. We intend to convene the Conference by the end of November. I shall shortly be approaching the Party leaders to discuss with them the detailed arrangements.

12. I hope that in the interests of all the people of Northern Ireland there will be a positive response to the Government's proposals. Northern Ireland needs political progress. There is an expectation in the Province itself, in this House and among our allies and friends abroad that some progress might now be possible. Our endeavour, Mr. Speaker, will be to proceed by agreement with all sections of the Community. This will certainly call for a great effort, patience and mutual trust. That I believe is what we owe the people of Northern Ireland and no less than they are entitled to expect of us.

SECRET

cc Martin Vile

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(1)



Prime Minister

Handwritten scribble

*Much too
long & much
N.I. involvement
Have cut-
it-down
not
secretly*

This is the minute which I mentioned to you. The draft statement is v. long & a bit hesitant

Handwritten initials and date
RWB
- 22/10

PRIME MINISTER:

NORTHERN IRELAND : POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT

At the meeting of OD on 17 October (OD(79)10th Meeting), it was agreed that I should make a statement in the House on Thursday 25 October, announcing that we intended to call a Conference of the Northern Ireland political parties by the end of November in pursuance of our commitment to return to the people of Northern Ireland more control over their own affairs.

I attach a draft Statement, which is tailored to take account of two recent political developments.

2. First, Ian Paisley came to see me at his request on Friday morning to discuss security. As you will know, he has in the last month been expressing dissatisfaction with the security scene in Northern Ireland; and his party, with some OUP members in support, is pressing for the implementation of a series of extreme security measures, few of which we should or could adopt: they include a curfew in Catholic areas, search and seize operations (again in Catholic areas), the abolition of remission for terrorist prisoners, the virtual closing of the border, and the threat of economic sanctions against the Republic. The meeting with Paisley turned out, predictably, to be a launching pad for a subsequent public statement by him that, until he could be satisfied about security, he would decline to have any further discussions with the Government on either political or security questions. This statement, although it made little or no impact in the English press, has made headlines in Northern Ireland.

3. Secondly, I asked Jim Molyneux to see me this morning following the OUP Conference and Paisley's statement, to establish whether or not the Official Unionists were likely to take the same line as

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Paisley. I did not, of course, directly raise the idea of a Conference, but using Paisley's statement as a starting point I was able to draw Molyneaux out on possible ways of proceeding. The general impression he gave was that on security many of his members shared Paisley's attitude, which reflected some strong feelings among Protestants in the Province, but nevertheless they would not stand out of further bi-lateral political talks if we proposed them, though they would much prefer that we simply "implemented" the Manifesto. But on one thing he was clear and adamant: he thinks that to get the parties to sit down together in any forum to consider the next steps in political development would positively impede progress, since they would each retreat to non-negotiable positions and would fail to reach agreement. He sees multilateral talks as leading straight to deadlock and while, under pressure, he might attend it would be with extreme reluctance and misgivings. I think we should take very careful account of his and his party's views on this - you may wish to see him yourself.

4. Meanwhile, however, my statement is drafted in terms which make it clear that while we intend to proceed with discussion of proposals and to do so by a Conference, we shall follow whatever course will best produce results on a reasonable timescale. I believe that the best chance lies in formal bilateral talks initially perhaps leading up to formal multilateral negotiations. Jim Molyneaux would then participate constructively, and I believe Paisley will join in after an interval.

5. I am ^{the} sending a copy of this to the Home Secretary, the Lord Chancellor, Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, the Defence Secretary, the Lord President of the Council, the Lord Privy Seal, and the Secretary of State for Trade, and to Sir John Hunt.

Joseph

3p

HA

22nd October, 1979
/ Signed on behalf of
the Secretary of State
in his absence_7

S E C R E T

22 OCT 1979



SECRET

DRAFT STATEMENT BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR NORTHERN IRELAND
AT 15.30 HOURS ON 25 OCTOBER 1979

Mr Speaker, I will, with permission, make a Statement about constitutional developments in Northern Ireland.

1. The Government's first - and overriding - duty in Northern Ireland is, and will be, to defend its people against terrorism, from whatever source it may come. Since I last reported to the House, before the Summer Recess, a number of grievous incidents in Ireland have, on both sides of the border, shown how serious the terrorist threat is. I have taken the first opportunity to re-affirm to the House our determination to defeat terrorism, so that the people of Northern Ireland can enjoy the fundamental right to live at peace under the rule of law.

2. I announced during the Recess, some further measures that we have taken to strengthen our hand against the terrorists and I referred to them in my replies to Questions earlier this afternoon. Following my Rt Hon Friend the Prime Minister's discussions on security with the Taoiseach, I have recently completed very constructive discussions with Ministers of the Government of the Republic of Ireland to improve across the

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border the effectiveness of our respective Security Forces. An increase of 1,000 in the establishment of the RUC has been approved, and recruiting is taking place. I have appointed a new Joint Staff under Sir Maurice Oldfield to improve co-ordination of all Civil and Military forces engaged in the fight against terrorists. All these measures have been designed to improve considerably the effectiveness of the Security Forces and to help them in their fight against terrorism.

3. I am sure the House would wish to pay tribute to the dedication and bravery of the men and women in the security forces who are engaged on our behalf in the struggle against terrorism; and those in the prison service coping daily with those who do not abide by the normal standards of civilised society.

4. The recent outrages have, understandably, created renewed anxiety among the ordinary people of the Province about their security. Some have taken the law into their own hand. On this the Government's position is quite clear: beating terrorists is a job for the professionals in the security forces working under the rule of law : it is no answer for people - however well-meaning - to take the law into their own hands. The Government unreservedly condemns the re-appearance - fortunately so far on a small scale - of sectarian violence.

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5. The House will also be aware that demands have been made for exceptional measures to be taken in the pursuit of law and order; a number of District Councils debated a common resolution asking for a variety of new measures to be taken against terrorism. Most of these ideas - like extradition, hot pursuit, the closure of cross-border roads - are not new. The Government's view is that a balance has to be struck, a balance between measures that are vigorous and effective and the need to respect the civil liberties and human rights of the law-abiding people who make up the overwhelming majority of the population of the Province. The Government, with the support of the Chief Constable and the GOC, believe that the right balance has been struck - although I shall, of course, keep the security situation under constant review.

6. The continuing terrorist threat - and we should frankly admit it - is an obstacle to the political development which I believe to be essential for the well-being of both communities in the Province. Indeed, it is the aim of the IRA to force the Government into a military response - they want a war. It is my belief that the security problems will not be solved by military or police action alone and that the reconciliation of the two communities in Northern Ireland will be greatly helped by political development. Those parties who say that they are not prepared to embark upon discussions with the Government are falling into the trap that the terrorists have set. Moreover, we do not accept that any one party should be accorded the

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right to exercise a veto on political developments. Progress on security must be matched by political progress.

7. The Government declared in the Queen's Speech that we proposed to "seek an acceptable way of restoring to the people of Northern Ireland more control over their own affairs." Since taking office in May, I have, for this purpose, had wide-ranging discussions in the Province. [I have had a series of private meetings with each of the leaders of the principal Northern Ireland political Parties. I should like to say especially to the Hon Members for Antrim South (Molyneaux); Antrim North (Paisley); and Belfast West (Fitt), that I am grateful to them for the frankness which they have shown in our separate discussions.]

8. These discussions and meetings have ^{with interest} ~~helped us to understand the positions of the political parties.~~ I have brought away from them two strong and positive impressions. First, ~~it is generally recognised among the political parties~~ that it would be right to try to move away from the present arrangements for Direct Rule from Westminster ~~this was common to all their manifestos;~~ and secondly, there is, in the Province, a willingness to accept that any restoration of political responsibility requires recognition and respect for the interests of others.

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At the same time, ~~there is no gain saying that~~ there are differences of view among the political parties and ~~that~~ it will not be easy to secure agreement on the form that new constitutional arrangements should take.

9. The House will know that there is at present a wide gap between the elected District Councils and Parliament at Westminster. To begin to fill this democratic vacuum, the Government intends to arrange for the early setting up of a new elected assembly for the whole Province, with substantial responsibilities conferred upon it, and with reasonable and adequate safeguards for all sections of the community.

10. We shall soon be laying before Parliament a Consultative Document which will set out a number of ways in which powers might be exercised by an elected body. These will range from a regional council with limited executive powers at one extreme, to a legislative assembly supporting a regional government at the other, but with what HMG would regard as reasonable and appropriate safeguards for the minority in each case. *Added law &*

Under sentence as present in para 12.

11. The Government's view is that, following the private discussions which I have had separately with the political parties in Northern Ireland, we should now go on to consider

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/together ...

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It is the Government's intention to hold

~~together the proposals for an elected body which will be set out in our consultative document. The simplest and most straightforward way of proceeding would be to bring together in a Conference under Government Chairmanship~~ ^{for} the political leadership of the four main parties in Northern Ireland. The purpose of such a Conference would be to ~~reach agreement on~~ ^{discuss} at least the first steps which might be taken to restore to the people of Northern Ireland greater responsibility for their own affairs. We ~~would like~~ ^{would} like to convene the Conference by about the end of November, ~~in the hope that we should then make sufficient progress to enable the Government to put proposals before Parliament in the early part of next year, for the election of a new representative body for the Province.~~

I shall shortly be approaching the Party leaders to discuss with them ^{the details of} the arrangements ~~for a Conference.~~

12. There are a number of issues which the Government has formed a firm view. First, there can be no return to the system of government under which Northern Ireland was ruled for half a century. Nor can we revive the specific arrangements which were tried and failed in 1974. We must therefore look for a new combination of arrangements which will enable all sections of the community to exercise their rights and fulfil their obligations. It will also, I think, be both expected and understood that the Conference will not be concerned with

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/changes ...

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~~changes in the constitutional status of the Province within the United Kingdom. There is no question therefore of putting before the Conference issues of that nature. Nor would our~~ ^{do not} proposals envisage any transfer of responsibility for the maintenance of law and order from the Secretary of State.

13. ~~The Government is, of course, aware of the attitudes already expressed by some political leaders in Northern Ireland in which they appear to turn their backs on any proposals for political discussions. I repeat that by so doing, they are playing the terrorists' game for them.~~

~~Northern Ireland needs political progress. All the political parties in Northern Ireland said, in their election manifesto only six months ago, that they want political progress. This House and the people of the United Kingdom will neither understand nor accept the attitude of those intent upon erecting barriers to any such progress.~~

14. I hope that, in the interests of all the people of Northern Ireland, there will be a positive response to the Government's proposals, ^{Northern Ireland needs political progress.} ~~for multilateral consultations in a Conference. We intend to proceed with these consultations based on the consultative document and will do so through whatever channels are open to us, although as I have indicated, the best channel in the Government's view would be an All-Party Conference leading on to proposals for an elected Council for the Province as a whole.~~


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15. ~~Mr Speaker, I believe that despite the record of past failures to meet adequately the political needs of Northern Ireland,~~ ^T there is an expectation in the Province itself, in this House, and among our allies and friends abroad, that some progress might now be possible, ~~to break the deadlock of the last five years.~~ The Government believes that it will have the backing of all members of this House in its appeal to the people of all sides of the community in Northern Ireland and to their political representatives to respond ~~positively to the Government's proposal.~~ Our endeavour, Mr Speaker, will be to proceed by agreement with all sections of the community. ~~This may mean modest rather than dramatic progress.~~ ^{It} will certainly call for a great effort, ~~great~~ patience and mutual trust and that I believe is what we owe the people of Northern Ireland and no less than they are entitled to expect of us.

SECRET

MJT

22 OCT 1979



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FM DUBLIN 181600Z OCT 79

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 352 OF 18 OCTOBER

AND TO PRIORITY NIO(BELFAST)

REPEATED TO ROUTINE WASHINGTON BIS NEW YORK MODUK

MY TELNO 348: ESRI SURVEY

1. IRISH POLITICIANS, FROM MR LYNCH DOWNWARDS, AND COMMENTATORS ARE BUSY TURNING THEMSELVES INSIDE OUT IN THEIR REACTIONS TO THE SURVEY. MESRS O'KENNEDY, FITZGERALD AND CLUSKEY HAVE ALL MADE STATEMENTS AND APPEARED ON RTE TELEVISION ON 16 OCTOBER. THE MAIN PREOCCUPATION HAS BEEN WITH THE FIGURE INDICATING THAT 21% OF PEOPLE IN THE REPUBLIC SUPPORT THE PIRA TO SOME DEGREE. THEY POINT TO THE EARLIER IMS/BBC SURVEY WHICH GAVE 2% ONLY IN SUPPORT OF THE PIRA. YESTERDAY MR LYNCH, WHILE ANSWERING QUESTIONS IN THE DAIL ON NORTHERN IRELAND (SEE MY TEL NO 349), SAID THAT HE WAS CONVINCED THAT NO MORE THAN 2% OF THE PEOPLE OF THE REPUBLIC SUPPORTED THE PIRA CAMPAIGN AND REPUDIATED ANY CONTRARY SUGGESTION BASED ON "THE FAULTY METHOD AND ANALYSIS" OF THE ESRI SURVEY.

2. MISS SILE DE VALERA HAS JUMPED ON THE BANDWAGON BY EXPLOITING THE FINDING THAT 72% ENDORSE BRITISH WITHDRAWAL "WITHOUT THE CONSENT OF THE MAJORITY IN NORTHERN IRELAND" THOUGH SHE HAS BEEN CAREFUL SO FAR NOT TO BE CRITICAL OF MR LYNCH.

3. PSF CLAIM THAT THE SURVEY VINDICATES THEIR DEMANDS FOR BRITISH WITHDRAWAL AND THAT "THE POLITICIANS ARE COMPLETELY OUT OF TOUCH WITH THE ASPIRATIONS OF THE PEOPLE...".

4. THE POLITICIANS HAVE BEEN DESCRIBING THE SURVEY AS "DAMAGING" AND "IRRESPONSIBLE", AMONG MANY OTHER EPITHETS, AND GENERALLY TAKING IT OUT ON THE AUTHORS. THERE HAS BEEN HARDLY ANY DISCUSSION OF THE MANY OTHER INTERESTING FINDINGS ON, E.G., EXTRADITION, SECURITY, PARTITION, ETC. NOR HAS THERE BEEN ANY SERIOUS DISCUSSION ABOUT THE FINDING THAT NEARLY 50% OF ROMAN CATHOLICS IN NORTHERN IRELAND SUPPORT REMAINING PART OF UUNITED KINGDOM.

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5. WHILE IT IS UNDERSTANDABLE THAT PEOPLE IN THE REPUBLIC ARE APPREHENSIVE ABOUT THE IMPACT OF THE SURVEY'S FINDINGS, ESPECIALLY SO FAR AS SUPPORT FOR THE PIRA IS CONCERNED, AN OPINION IN NORTHERN IRELAND, BRITAIN, THE USA AND ELSEWHERE, THE POLITICIANS ARE MAKING SOMETHING OF A SPECTACLE OF THEMSELVES. SOME OF THEM, DESPITE PROTESTATIONS TO THE CONTRARY, PROBABLY FEAR THE FIGURE OF 21% MAY NOT BE ALL THAT FAR OFF THE MARK. IN ANY EVENT, THERE CAN BE NO DOUBT THAT THE GOVERNMENT HAVE BEEN EMBARRASSED BY THE SURVEY'S FINDINGS.

HAYDON

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PS/MR RIDLEY
PS/MR BLAKER
PS/PUS
SIR A. DUFF
CHIEF CLERK
MR FIGG
MR BULLARD
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CF to note

10 DOWNING STREET

PPS in GR

THE PRIME MINISTER

18 October, 1979.

Dear Tony,

Thank you for your letter of 3 October about the Provisional Sinn Fein Press Conference held in Dublin after the Pope's visit. I did not see the broadcast myself, but I gather that the meeting was an open one attended by members of the Press and at which the local police were also present, and that the Sinn Fein representatives were subjected to some very searching questions. The Provisional Sinn Fein is the political wing of the Provisional Republican movement and is not proscribed in the Irish Republic nor, I should add, in Northern Ireland or Great Britain. I understand that during the Press Conference, when pressed by reporters for statements which would have implicated them directly in the illegal actions of the Provisional IRA, the spokesmen refused to answer, pointing out that those were matters for the Provisional IRA.

I am also told that the BBC's decision to include an item about the Conference in the news on 2 October was taken after very serious consideration and having full regard to their guidelines. The Home Secretary does not consider in all the circumstances that it would be right for him to consider issuing a direction to the broadcasting authorities in the matter.

/ As far as

As far as the authorities in the Irish Republic are concerned they, like ourselves, would undoubtedly like to be able to prefer charges against the leaders of the Provisional IRA, but we are both fighting terrorism within the law. To bring them to trial, evidence is needed that will convince the court. Nevertheless I believe that the Press Conference showed the total sterility of their philosophy of violence and their confusion in the face of some blunt questioning. No one who saw the Press Conference could feel anything but contempt.

Yours ever,

(SGD) MT

Tony Marlow, Esq., M.P.

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file 26
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Ireland

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

18 October 1979

NORTHERN IRELAND - CROSS
BORDER CO-OPERATION

The Prime Minister has seen your letter to me of 10 October on this subject. She has taken note of its contents.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Martin Vile (Cabinet Office).

M. O'D. B. ALEXANDER

Roy Harrington, Esq.,
Northern Ireland Office.

SECRET

[Handwritten signature]



10 DOWNING STREET

Prime Minister

The references to your own
attitude in the first sentence of
Sir John Hunt's brief are based
on the minute you wrote (but
subsequently deleted) on the advance
copy of the O.S. paper.

Ames

Ireland

CONFIDENTIAL

Ref. A0429

PRIME MINISTER

Prospects for Political Progress in Northern Ireland

(OD(79) 32)

BACKGROUND

There have been problems over this paper which I think you should be aware of in confidence, particularly since I understand that you are yourself not altogether happy with the paper and in particular had been expecting a discussion document at this meeting. At the end of this brief I suggest how these problems might be avoided in the next round.

2. You will remember that the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland originally wanted a Consultative Assembly, which would not be elected until 1981 and which would have no powers initially but on to which powers could be grafted later. OD felt that this was too slow and too lacking in substance, particularly - but by no means only - because of expectations generated by the Pope's visit. Accordingly Mr. Atkins was told to come back with proposals for a conference of the main Ulster political parties at which a number of different options could be put forward.

3. Following the OD discussion the story, which I hope very much you will not disclose that you know, has been as follows:-

- (i) The Secretary of State gave virtually no direction or steer to his officials.
- (ii) NIO officials welcomed the idea of a conference because they had felt it desirable to do something more positive and more quickly. They are not very sanguine that agreement will be reached on any of the more positive options: but even if these are rejected it will show where the blame lies and could enable us to proceed more quickly to the fallback idea of a Consultative Assembly.
- (iii) They are however convinced that it would be wrong to launch the conference publicly in advance of the SDLP Annual Conference on 2nd-4th November since the latter might then mandate Mr. Fitt, whatever his personal attitude, to an extreme position.

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- (iv) When the note by officials annexed to OD(79) 32, was submitted to Mr. Atkins he felt it very difficult to make up his mind. At heart he still wants to take this slowly whereas he knows his colleagues want him to move quickly. Hence his "dilemma" (second sentence of paragraph 3), and his attempt to square the circle by recommending early private consultations with the party leaders but no formal launching or discussion document until after the SDLP Conference.

HANDLING

4. You will want to ask the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland to introduce his paper: and you will then want to seek the views of the Home Secretary, the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary and the Secretary of State for Defence.

5. The issues for discussion seem to be:-

(a) Do the new proposals have a real chance of success?

I suspect that Mr. Atkins would still prefer his own more modest approach of a Consultative Assembly. I do not think that OD will agree with him. They will no doubt have to agree that the discussion document should not be published or the conference formally called until after the SDLP Conference (in any case it would now be virtually impossible to get a discussion document drafted and out in advance of the SDLP meeting). I have however got considerable reservations about the Secretary of State's proposal for further private consultations with the party leaders before the consultation document issues. These would probably leak and would detract from the impact of the initiative. In any case he cannot use these consultations, as he suggests, to discover whether the document would secure the parties' attendance at a conference without disclosing what will be in the document.

(b) How should the consultation document be produced?

There is now a good deal of urgency about this and, given the Secretary of State's indecisiveness, I think there would be advantage in establishing a small Ministerial group to consider a l'outrance a draft by NIO

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officials: and I think Mr. Atkins might quite welcome this. We could service it and make sure that timetables were adhered to and the right ground covered. I suggest that the group might comprise -

Home Secretary (In the Chair)
Secretary of State for Northern Ireland
Secretary of State for Defence
Lord Privy Seal

(c) Will the security position be affected by the new proposals?

It is possible that any new political initiative will raise the level of violence; that a major initiative will raise the level more than a modest one; and that a major initiative which failed would be worse still. But there are indications that the level of violence will tend to rise this winter anyhow. A political initiative which succeeds undoubtedly represents the best chance of reducing violence in the long term; and even if it does nothing to reduce the level of PIRA/INLA activity, it should certainly reduce the level of popular support they receive both sides of the border. The security authorities would not want to argue against a conference.

(d) What is the international reaction likely to be?

As the paper points out, it is difficult to assess whether the chances for a successful political initiative have been improved by the Pope's visit to Ireland but that visit has certainly increased expectation of a political initiative. The domestic political situation in the United States will in any case tend to focus attention on this issue as the Presidential Election draws closer. From these points of view the new proposals should be well received.

CONCLUSION

6. In the light of the discussion you might guide the Committee to agree that:-
- (i) The NIO should now urgently prepare a discussion document which would include the options in Annex B to OD(79) 32.

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- (ii) This draft discussion document should be considered by a small group consisting of the Home Secretary, the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, the Secretary of State for Defence and the Lord Privy Seal with a view to it going to OD and Cabinet in time for publication shortly after the SDLP conference on 2nd-4th November.
- (iii) In the meantime Mr. Atkins should refrain from canvassing the ideas that are likely to be in the discussion document with the party leaders.

J. Hunt

(John Hunt)

16th October, 1979

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NORTHERN IRELAND OFFICE
STORMONT CASTLE
BELFAST BT4 3ST

Tel. Belfast (0232) 63011
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(2)

Prime Minister

Michael Alexander Esq
10 Downing Street
LONDON SW1

Atkins
1/4

10. October 1979

Dear Michael,

NORTHERN IRELAND - CROSS BORDER CO-OPERATION

Thank you for your letter of 8 October recording the Prime Minister's comments on my Secretary of State's minute of 5 October about his talks on that day with Ministers of the Irish Republic.

Mr Atkins hopes that the Prime Minister will not underestimate the operational value of what was achieved: we obtained most of what we wanted - either in the terms requested or in a form which the Irish were better able to concede but which we are satisfied will have the same operational benefits. This was confirmed at a meeting yesterday with the GOC and the Chief Constable.

No.
On incident related helicopter flights, the Irish produced everything we wanted. The Army are entirely happy with the limitation to five kilometers, given that that and other arrangements will be subject to monthly reviews at which, if we can justify it, we can press for an extension. Present arrangements for overflight after giving prior notice will continue; and (a point which was not mentioned in my Secretary of State's brief report of 5 October) the Irish will be stationing a helicopter of their own at Dundalk to patrol the difficult border areas. We shall, therefore, have joint patrolling by helicopters. The proposed arrangements for communication between helicopters and the Garda, and between the British Army and Garda officers specially attached to their Army, are entirely satisfactory. The arrangements for nominated senior liaison officers are probably better than the original

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idea of an exchange of liaison officers, who would not have been available on a 24 hour a day basis. The Irish would not agree to RUC officers taking part in Garda interrogations, but produced cogent evidence set out in the minute of 5 October that any confessions which might have resulted would not have been admissible in their courts anyway. Instead, the Garda Commissioner has been given clearance by the Minister of Justice to find alternative ways of achieving the same end, for example by having an RUC officer on hand in the Garda Station ready to advise how to use any available intelligence from Northern Ireland. The Garda Commissioner is evidently now in a position to proceed with other more detailed and technical aspects of co-operation. The other suggestions put forward by the Garda Commissioner are regarded by the Chief Constable as perfectly satisfactory alternatives to his own suggestions.

When the Secretary of State reviewed the conclusions of the meeting with the GOC, the Chief Constable and the Security Co-ordinator yesterday, it was agreed that the meetings have produced a quite new and substantially higher level of co-operation on which we can build at the further meetings which are to take place.

I am sending a copy of this letter to members of OD and to Martin Vile.

Yours sincerely,

R A Harrington

R A HARRINGTON
Private Secretary

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17th OCT 1979

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R Whitmore
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af
PA

Clive Whitmore Esq
Private Secretary
10 Downing Street
LONDON SW1

10 th October 1979

Dear Sir

.... I enclose for the Prime Minister's information a full note of the discussions which my Secretary of State had with the Irish Minister for Foreign Affairs and Minister for Justice on Friday 5 October. This amplifies the brief report of the meeting set out in my Secretary of State's minute to the Prime Minister of 5 October.

I am sending copies to George Walden, Brian Norbury and Martin Vile, and to HM Ambassador in Dublin.

Yours sincerely,

R A Harrington

R A HARRINGTON
Private Secretary

11 OCT 1979



MEETING BETWEEN THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR NORTHERN IRELAND,
THE IRISH MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE IRISH MINISTER
FOR JUSTICE ON 5 OCTOBER 1979 IN LONDON

This meeting took place to follow up the proposals made at the meeting between the Prime Minister and the Taoiseach on 5 September. A list of those attending the present meeting is attached.

General:

2. The atmosphere in the meeting was friendly throughout, though the Minister for Justice, Mr Collins, who did most of the talking, went out of his way to score points related to the effectiveness of the RUC and the British Army whenever he could.

3. The Secretary of State opened the ~~meeting by~~ welcoming the two Irish Ministers, referring briefly to the Pope's visit to Ireland. He also mentioned the appointment of Sir Maurice Oldfield as security co-ordinator in the Northern Ireland Office, and explained the role which he would be performing. In reply, Mr O'Kennedy referred to the Pope's forthright condemnation of violence, which might prove to have a bearing on developments both north and south of the border. At a later stage in the proceedings, Mr O'Kennedy expressed his government's gratitude for the assistance which the RUC had given to the authorities in the Republic over the Pope's visit.

Police co-operation

4. The Secretary of State referred to the need to ensure effective policing on both sides of the border and asked for the reactions of the Irish Ministers to the proposals made at the Downing Street meeting that they should adopt measures which had been found to be particularly effective in the north, and would be made more effective if they were matched to corresponding activity in the south. These were:-

- (i) an anti-terrorist crime squad dedicated to action against terrorists in the border area;

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- (ii) a unit capable of carrying out high quality continuous surveillance of suspected terrorists;
- (iii) a uniformed patrol unit allocated fully to anti-terrorist patrols in border areas, and linked with the RUC in co-ordinated patrolling; and
- (iv) a unit to collate criminal intelligence on terrorists.

5. In reply, Mr Collins said that the Republic were not convinced that the effectiveness of measures in the north was all it could be and there might be improvements which could be adopted by the RUC. On their side, they had decided:

- (i) to increase the strength of the special Garda task force, enabling it to give a quicker response especially in difficult areas of the border;
- (ii) to increase the strength of the special investigation section of the Garda technical bureau so as to increase the teams available; and
- (iii) to increase the strength of the Garda generally in the border areas.

He believed these measures would improve the effectiveness of the Garda though their procedures would be kept under continuous review. He thought there was an implied note of criticism of the Garda in the suggestions which the British Government had put forward and he emphasised that the Garda were always willing to co-operate: he did not know of any incidents where they had declined to do so.

6. The Secretary of State welcomed the decisions which the Irish Government had taken which went a long way to meeting the points which we had raised, with the exception of surveillance.

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7. Sir Kenneth Newman, Chief Constable of the RUC, explained the increasing importance of surveillance in producing evidence more effective in obtaining convictions. It was particularly valuable as an appropriate weapon to use against the IRA's tighter cell structure, against which casual observation or reliance on informants were unlikely to be successful. It was, however, a highly skilled task and very costly in terms of manpower. Its advantage lay in building up a complete picture of a suspect's movements, his associates, and the vehicles which he used. At present this picture could not be complete in that it did not extend south of the border.
8. Mr Collins reiterated the Garda's willingness to help, and claimed that he was aware of occasions when the Garda had provided information but the RUC had been very slow to act on it. Sir Kenneth Newman commented that if that were so it was to be regretted, and was perhaps a sign of inadequate liaison between the two forces which the meeting might help to improve.
9. Commenting on surveillance, Mr McLaughlin suggested that surveillance requirements were different in the south. Surveillance was useful when directed against men engaged on a terrorist mission. On the south side of the border, he said, terrorists tended not to be engaged actively in terrorist work but to be resting. As a result surveillance could be something of a waste of time. He was aware that the RUC regarded supporting information derived from surveillance as a valuable aid in interrogating suspects. It was however less effective for that purpose in the Republic because their law gave suspects a right of early access to a solicitor, who would always advise the suspect to say nothing.
10. Mr Collins wondered whether, even if the Garda were unable to pass on information about suspects, security authorities in the north would be able to recognise and arrest them - this applied particularly to the army whose soldiers often spent only four months at a time in the Province. Sir Kenneth Newman confirmed that the police at least would be able to recognise terrorists. He confirmed that there were frequent instances of co-operation between the RUC and the Garda, but it tended to be on an ad hoc basis; its value would be improved if there were dedicated police units maintaining pressure on terrorists on both sides of the border -

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for example by means of pre-planned vehicle checks and searches.

11. Mr Collins commented that he would welcome a further exchange of information about the value of surveillance of the sort described by Sir Kenneth Newman. He was not yet convinced of its value in the common battle against terrorism, but he was open to conviction.

12. Sir Kenneth Newman enquired whether the new team added to the Garda technical bureau would be dedicated to the border areas. Mr McLaughlin replied that they would not, but that this did not diminish their effectiveness against terrorists: the main contribution from the south to the IRA's efforts took the form of finance, often through bank raids taking place far from the border. The technical bureau teams would in part be directed against such operations, although they would also be able to deploy specific units to difficult areas as the need arose.

13. Taking up the reference to ~~difficult areas~~, Mr Collins commented from the Irish point of view on the security problems of South Armagh. Some 70 per cent of border incidents took place there and the Irish Government were concerned that, for reasons of security which he recognised, police coverage was much lighter than elsewhere along the border. It would be of considerable value if through co-operation between the Forces the RUC could institute regular patrols which would go right up to the border, and which could be matched by the Garda.

Helicopters:

14. The Secretary of State explained that the use of helicopters could be valuable in two circumstances; first where they could be used in response to an incident where terrorists were observed from a helicopter fled across the border, and second for routine patrols.

15. Mr Collins commented that he thought the British had tended to exaggerate the importance of helicopters, and that in doing so in recent weeks they had attempted to make the government of the Republic a scape-goat for what happened at Warrenpoint. There was no justification

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for that. Notwithstanding that, and the great political sensitivity of the matter, his government had decided to make a major concession on this matter. In addition to the routine flights permitted after prior notification, his government were now prepared to permit flights by British helicopters over the border provided the following conditions were observed:-

- (i) Its use should be confined to serious incidents (a matter of life and death involving explosion or shooting, reasonable suspicion of the siting of an explosive device near the border capable of being detonated on the opposite side of the border, the tracking of a hijacked vehicle, the finding of persons dressed in combat jackets etc);
- (ii) flights should take place no more often than necessary, and should not extend further beyond the border than strictly necessary in the circumstances;
- (iii) such over flights should never extend more than 5 kilometers beyond the border;
- (iv) helicopters would be vulnerable to attack; there should be no recriminations if such attacks occurred though the government would do all they could to prevent such attacks;
- (v) helicopters should not normally fly at less than 1500 feet;
- (vi) the incursion should be reported to the Garda before or at the time of crossing the border, and a full report in writing should be submitted to the Department of Foreign Affairs within 24 hours;
- (vii) there should be no firing of weapons from helicopters in the air above the Republic; helicopters should not fly over towns and villages or in the vicinity of military installations;

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- (viii) helicopters should not land in the Republic;
- (ix) the British Government should indemnify the Republic against any damage caused by helicopters;
- (x) over flights should be restricted to daylight hours.

16. Mr Collins added subsequently that there would need to be direct communications between the helicopter and the Garda. This could probably be done by having helicopters fitted with "x-ray" radio sets similar to those already available to the Garda. The security forces in the Republic were improving their own capability, and would soon have a helicopter base at Dundalk to survey the border. The aircraft would have Garda observers on board.

17. Mr Collins emphasised repeatedly the extreme sensitivity of this measure, the importance that the conditions were strictly observed and the risk that if the facilities caused any serious problems as a result of abuse the offer would have to be withdrawn.

18. In reply the Secretary of State thanked Mr Collins for what he recognised as a valuable step but one which was of considerable sensitivity to the government of the Republic. The conditions imposed did not present any difficulty to the British Government with the exception of the limiting of such over flights to 5 kilometers from the border. Where the helicopter was following a vehicle this might give as little as three or four minutes for the Garda to be on the scene to intercept it. These problems were increased by the difficult configuration of the border.

19. After further discussion, it was agreed that because of concern on the British side about the limitation to 5 kilometers, and concern on the Irish side about the sensitivity of the measure, it would be subject to review at official level at monthly intervals. Such reviews on the

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British side would be handled through Sir Maurice Oldfield.

Communications across the border:

20. The Secretary of State emphasised that communications between the security forces on either side of the border could prove essential not merely to improve the effectiveness of any common effort against terrorists, but also in the interests of the safety of members of those forces. It was for those reasons that the British Government had suggested army to army communications should be established for use in emergencies.

21. Mr Collins replied that the constitutional position of the defence forces in the Irish Republic made communications between the two armies inappropriate. He accepted however that there was a need to improve the speed of communications, and the Irish army units in the border area would in future be accompanied by a Garda officer carrying suitable radio equipment to permit communication in the event of an emergency.

22. Any further improvements in communications across the border could be explored through the existing arrangements for co-operation between the Garda and the RUC with regard to communication.

Interrogation:

23. Mr Collins said that the Irish Government had considered the suggestion that RUC officers should be permitted to attend interviews in Garda stations south of the border when persons suspected of terrorist offences in the north were being interrogated. The crucial test of the validity of this suggestion was whether it would produce evidence, and their conclusion had been that it would not. The reason for this was the very restricted attitude taken by the Irish courts to the admissibility of evidence. The position of courts in Ireland under the constitution of the Republic was significantly different from that of the courts in the UK, and as his party had forecast when in opposition the Republic's Emergency Powers Act had proved to be ineffective. The provision for seven day detention had proved ineffective because the courts would not accept as admissible any confessions made during the detention period.

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For the same reasons, it was to be expected that the courts would decline to accept confessions obtained with the help of members of a police force of another jurisdiction who were not answerable to the Irish courts. Mr Collins was also concerned that to permit RUC officers to attend interrogations would be damaging to relations with local people who would be made less helpful as a result, and that terrorists would be likely to threaten the lives of RUC and Garda officers involved, when, as the law required, the whereabouts of the suspects were made known. The government of the Republic were willing to explore ways of improving co-operation between the RUC and the Garda, but this particular suggestion did not seem to them to be useful or practical.

24. The Secretary of State replied that the British government would certainly take up the offer of exploring co-operation between the two police forces. But he and the British government attached considerable importance to this point and were seriously disappointed that the Irish government felt unable to co-operate in this particular respect. Only by such means could the best use be made of background knowledge and any intelligence information available from the north. Merely to pass on the intelligence brief in writing would be insufficient.

25. In reply, Mr O'Kennedy emphasised the different constitutional position of their courts. As an alternative measure to the same end, he suggested looking again at establishing a composite court straddling the two jurisdictions. He would provide a detailed note explaining the constitutional position as a possible basis for further discussions.

26. The Secretary of State welcomed that suggestion, but reiterated his disappointment on the main issue. In reply, Mr Collins explained again that the effect on relations with the public in Ireland would be such that his government could not afford to try out a measure and have it fail because of the adverse effect that would result. He hoped that the discussions between the Garda and the RUC which he had suggested would prove to be beneficial for similar purposes, but he emphasised that it would be essential for the subjects of those discussions to be kept

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strictly confidential.

Training:

27. Mr Collins said that his government were willing in principle to consider the scope for co-operation in training. This was an operational matter which he would be happy to see discussed between the Chief Constable of the RUC and the Garda Commissioner.

RUC liaison officer in Garda HQ, and vice versa:

28. The Secretary of State explained that an exchange of liaison officers to be posted in the other force's headquarters would be a demonstrable and operationally valuable symbol of the co-operation between the two forces. Mr Collins felt however that such an arrangement would create a considerable risk to the safety of those concerned. His government had already arranged for border superintendents to be appointed whose job it was to keep in touch with their opposite numbers in the RUC. As an alternative to the British suggestion, to which he saw some objections, he would prefer to accept the suggestion of the Garda Commissioner that he should nominate particular officers to be available on a 24-hour basis for consultation with their opposite numbers in the RUC. As for the desirability of making public the degree of co-operation between the two forces, it was becoming increasingly well known that meetings took place between the Commissioner and the Chief Constable and although it would be undesirable for security reasons to publicise them in too much detail, some measures could be taken to make them a little more well known. Because of the security risks, however, it would be important for the nature of any additional publicity arrangements to be agreed between the two sides.

Other matters:

29. Under this heading Mr Collins referred to the need to ensure balance between measures taken in the south and those taken in the north. He asked what additional measures were in prospect in Northern Ireland.

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30. The Secretary of State explained the improving efforts being devoted to security matters within the existing policy of police primacy. In support of this policy the strength of the RUC was to be increased by 1000, and the Secretary of State expected that the appointment of Sir Maurice Oldfield as his security adviser would in due course improve the security efforts. He had also instituted internal reviews of security policy the existence of which was highly confidential. In particular, there had been a review of army/policy co-operation at all levels in the field of anti-terrorist operations. Consistently with this, he had improved the arrangements for his own security policy meeting with the GOC and the Chief Constable, at which he would in future have the additional support of Sir Maurice Oldfield. A second working party had looked at the scope for improved cross-border co-operation such as had been under discussion today. There had also been a special study of the problems of security in South Armagh.

31. In relation to South Armagh, Mr Collins commented that impression from his side of the border was that the forces in that area were virtual prisoners behind the security fences which protected them. This, and the intelligence assessment which had been leaked, tended to show that the army took a very pessimistic view of their effectiveness against the IRA.

32. The Secretary of State did not accept those comments, but acknowledged the desire of the British government to co-operate in improving the effectiveness of counter-terrorist measures.

33. Referring to the propaganda activities of the IRA, Mr O'Kennedy referred to the "H Blocks" and the Maze Prison. The Irish broadly shared our attitude on this position, although they would have liked us to find some way of improving the situation without conceding any of the principles at stake. On those principles, they certainly did not want the British government to change its position: it would not help the Irish government to deal with potentially similar situations at Portlaoise.

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34. Again on the subject of propaganda, Mr O'Kennedy mentioned the need to avoid presenting the IRA with propaganda opportunities. He had in mind the GAA pitch at Crossmaglen being used as a helicopter landing area. He thought that the dangers of the GAA being used by the IRA as a front for a protest was now quite remote but it was essential for the British government to watch out for propaganda traps of this sort.

35. Mr O'Kennedy referred to a compensation claim for property damaged in the Republic as a result of a bomb in the north. It appeared to be conceded that State to State compensation would be justifiable, but a claim by the private individual who had suffered in the incident seemed to be proceeding very slowly.

36. Mr Newington replied that on the basis of recent legal advice he hoped that the matter could be settled reasonably quickly. The crucial question had been whether the claimants' existing legal remedies had already been exhausted, or whether he should have begun an action in Northern Ireland. The latest legal advice was to the effect that he could not have taken action in Northern Ireland and that the way was therefore clear for compensation. The matter was however very complicated and a further meeting with representatives of the Republic of Ireland was to be held very soon.

37. Finally, before the meeting broke for lunch, Mr O'Kennedy referred briefly to the feeling against the UDR in some areas of Northern Ireland. It was regarded as a Protestant force and considerable care was needed in deployment in Northern Ireland.

Tete a tete:

38. During the break for lunch, the Secretary of State had a discussion for about 15 minutes with Mr O'Kennedy and Mr Collins. The main subject of discussion was political development within the Province.

The political situation:

39. Mr O'Kennedy recognised the understandable emphasis on security since the events of 27 August. But those events, coupled with the

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improving co-operation between the governments and the atmosphere created by the Pope's visit could combine to improve the prospects of political advance, and improved co-operation between the governments could also improve the prospects of political development. The problem in the north seemed to be that the moderates were isolated, leaderless and dispirited. It would be intolerable if Dr Paisley were permitted to hold a veto in respect of any political development. Such a veto would be unjustifiable: sensibly moderate Unionists, plus the SDLP, plus the Alliance party must get quite close to 50 per cent of the Northern Ireland electorate. This should provide a basis for discussion; and the new government of the United Kingdom had the advantage of a sound majority and the prospect of a five-year term of office. The government was in a strong position, and he would like to know how they intended to proceed.

40. In reply, the Secretary of State explained that although he had been having talks with political leaders ever since the election which had developed to a point of giving some grounds for optimism his approach had been to keep the content of these talks confidential. This had opened him to considerable political criticism, but he had felt it was the only way of exploring the extent of any common ground between the parties. He agreed with Mr O'Kennedy that the timing of a new initiative would be crucial. The key test for any new initiative was the acceptability to a broad range of opinion in Northern Ireland. He would continue with his efforts to find a basis for political progress through consultation with political leaders in the Province and within the British government. He recognised the interest of the government of the Republic, as immediate neighbours, in this subject and would keep them informed.

Economic matters:

41. Mr O'Kennedy reaffirmed his government's interest in economic co-operation. He believed that there was a growing recognition within the EEC that the border between Northern Ireland and the Republic was different from other borders and might on that ground be eligible for non-quota aid from the Regional Fund. Certainly in those areas there were pockets of unemployment at levels exceeding those of anywhere in the rest

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of Europe. In such circumstances our EEC partners should be willing to help.

Communique and publicity:

42. Having completed the agenda, the terms of the communique were agreed between the two sides. On the Irish side, they were most insistent that any measures which they had agreed to institute were matters of great political sensitivity in the Republic. For that reason, as well as to maintain the effectiveness of some of the measures which should not be publicised unnecessarily, it was agreed that the communique should not specify the measures ~~taken~~ and in discussions with the press after the meeting both sides should refuse to go into any details about what had been agreed.

43. In contributing to the communique, the Garda Commissioner and the Chief Constable of the RUC reported that in the private discussion they had had after lunch they had agreed that there were many points of similarity between the four suggestions originally put forward by the Chief Constable and the measures to which the Commissioner had referred during the course of the meeting. They had accordingly decided to establish a new joint RUC/Garda panel, to include representatives of the Garda's technical bureau and task force, and of the RUC's special patrol group and regional crime squad, in order further to improve the system of liaison between the two forces.

Further Meetings:

44. It was agreed that further meetings at Ministerial level would be needed. The next might take place within about three months, and would be preceded by meetings between officials.

R A Harrington

R A HARRINGTON
Private Secretary

10 October 1979

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MINISTERIAL MEETING IN LONDON: 5 OCTOBER 1979

List of those attending

Irish Delegation

Mr Michael O'Kennedy - Minister for Foreign Affairs
Mr Gerry Collins - Minister for Justice
Mr O'Rourke - Secretary (PUS), Department of Foreign Affairs
Mr Ward - Secretary (PUS), Justice Department
Dr Kennedy - Irish Ambassador in London
Mr McLaughlin - Garda Commissioner
Mr Donnelly - Assistant Secretary (AUS), Justice Department
Mr Neligan - Assistant Secretary (AUS), Department of
Foreign Affairs
Mr Swift - Counsellor, Department of Foreign Affairs
Mr Kirby - Principal, Justice Department
Mr Walshe - Counsellor, Information Division, Department
of Foreign Affairs
Mr O'hUiginn - Department of Foreign Affairs

British Delegation

Rt Hon Humphrey Atkins, MP, Secretary of State for
Northern Ireland
Mr Ken Stowe
Mr Robin Haydon, HM Ambassador in Dublin
Sir Kenneth Newman, Chief Constable of the RUC
Mr Marshall
Mr Burns
Mr Gilliland
Mr Newington (FCO)
Mr Harrington

[The Attorney General will join the meeting for lunch only]

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FM WASHINGTON 091600Z OCT 79
TO PRIORITY FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 3051 OF 9 OCTOBER
INFO NIO BELFAST

fc
Am

YOUR TELEGRAM NUMBER 1355 : ARMS FOR THE RUC.

1. VEST HAS NOW TOLD US THAT, AFTER DETAILED CONSIDERATION OF THE PROCEDURES HERE, HE IS CONVINCED THAT NO SOLUTION CAN BE FOUND THROUGH CHANGING THE FORM OF ORDER (FOR EXAMPLE BY OUR APPLYING FOR AN EXPORT LICENCE SHOWING HMG AND QUOTE FOR THE DEFENCE OF THE REALM UNQUOTE AS END USER AND PURPOSE). THE TROUBLE IS THAT, AS SOON AS AN EXPORT LICENCE WAS GRANTED ON THIS BASIS, THE FACT WOULD INEVITABLY LEAK, AND QUESTIONS WOULD BE ASKED BOTH HERE AND IN LONDON WHICH IT WOULD BE IMPOSSIBLE TO ANSWER WITHOUT SHOWING THAT THE UNDERTAKING TO CONGRESS WAS BEING CIRCUMVENTED.

2. I AM SURE THAT THE LINE PROPOSED IN PARAGRAPH 2 OF MY TELEGRAM NUMBER 3012, AND NOW BEING ENGAGED BY KINGMAN BREWSTER (YOUR TELEGRAM NUMBER 1355) IS THE MOST PROMISING AVAILABLE TO US. BUT MERELY FOR THE STATE DEPARTMENT TO CONFIRM THE ORDERS IN THE PIPELINE WILL NOT DO. AS WE UNDERSTAND IT HERE, THE ONLY ORDERS IN THE PIPELINE ARE FOR SPARE PARTS FOR THE M1 CARBINE AND AMMUNITION (MY TELEGRAM NUMBER 2008). AS FAR AS WE KNOW, THE ADMINISTRATION HAVE NOT BEEN FORMALLY TOLD YET OF AN ORDER FOR THE SECOND TRANCHE OF 3,000 REVOLVERS.

HENDERSON

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HD/NAD
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MR BULLARD
MR FERUSON

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SIR J. HUNT, CABINET OFFICE.

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FM F C O 031807Z OCT 79

TO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1355 OF 8 OCTOBER

INFO SAVING N I O BELFAST.

L.S. [Signature]

YOUR TELNO 3013: ARMS FOR THE RUC

1. THE US AMBASSADOR CALLED ON ME AT HIS REQUEST THIS MORNING, FOLLOWING AN EARLIER DISCUSSION WITH FERGUSSON WHICH APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN REFLECTED IN BREWSTER'S TALK WITH VEST, RECORDED IN TEL UNDER REFERENCE.
2. BREWSTER IS CLEARLY THINKING OF TAKING A PERSONAL INITIATIVE, BUT FIRST HE WISHED TO BE SURE THAT NOTHING IN MY PRIVATE DISCUSSION WITH THE US SECRETARY OF STATE MADE IT INAPPROPRIATE FOR HIM TO TAKE UP THE CUDGELS. I EXPLAINED THAT DURING THE TALK ON 24 SEPTEMBER I HAD STRESSED THE EXPLOSIVE REACTIONS WHICH THERE MIGHT BE ON THE PART OF U.N. PUBLIC OPINION IF THE BAN ON ARMS WERE MAINTAINED. MR VANCE HAD INDICATED HIS UNDERSTANDING OF THIS AND IT WAS LEFT, AS YOU KNOW, THAT FURTHER DISCUSSION WOULD TAKE PLACE BETWEEN YOU AND MR VANCE. I WENT ON TO TELL BREWSTER OF THE UNDERSTANDING WHICH YOU HAD RECEIVED FROM VEST THAT VANCE'S ANSWER WAS STILL NEGATIVE. BREWSTER QUALIFIED THIS BY SUGGESTING THAT THE ANSWER WAS TEMPORARILY, RATHER THAN PERMANENTLY, NEGATIVE. HOWEVER, HE BELIEVED THAT, BECAUSE OF THE CONJUNCTION OF RECENT EVENTS - THE MOUNTBATTEN MURDER, THE POPE'S VISIT, AND THE POSITIVE OUTCOME OF THE MEETING BETWEEN IRISH MINISTERS AND MR ATKINS - IT WOULD BE WORTH HIS REOPENING THE ISSUE. HE WAS THINKING OF PROPOSING A SOLUTION ON THE LINES OF THE FALL-BACK POSITION IN MY BRIEF FOR NEW YORK, A COPY OF WHICH YOU SHOULD HAVE, THAT THE OUTCOME OF THE STATE DEPARTMENT REVIEW SHOULD BE TO CONFIRM ORDERS IN THE PIPELINE (I.E. THE SECOND TRANCHE OF 3000 REVOLVERS, TOGETHER WITH SPARE PARTS, AMMUNITION, ETC FOR THE FIRST TWO TRANCHES AS NECESSARY) ON THE INFORMAL UNDERSTANDING THAT THE ORDER FOR THE THIRD TRANCHE WOULD BE DEFERRED UNTIL LATE IN 1980. I ENCOURAGED HIM TO GO AHEAD ON THAT BASIS, I DREW HIS ATTENTION SPECIFICALLY TO THE REFERENCE,

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IN PARA 4 OF THE COMMUNIQUE OF 5 OCTOBER FOLLOWING MR ATKINS' MEETING WITH IRISH MINISTERS IN LONDON, TO THE CALL FOR AID AND ASSISTANCE BY THE GENERAL PUBLIC ON EACH SIDE OF THE BORDER TO THE GARDA AND THE RUC IN THEIR COMMON TASK OF PROTECTING THE COMMUNITY.

CARRINGTON

FILES

HD/RII

HD/NAD

PS

PS/HPS

PS/PUS

SIR. A. DUFF

MR BULLARD

MR FERJUSSON

COPIES TO:

PS/SOFS NORTHERN IRELAND

MR WHITMORE, NO 10 DOWNING ST

SIR. J. HUNT, CABINET OFFICE.

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10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

8 October 1979

Northern Ireland: Cross-border Cooperation

The Prime Minister has seen your Secretary of State's minute of 5 October about his meeting that day with Messrs O'Kennedy and Collins.

The Prime Minister, while noting that progress has been made, has expressed some disappointment with the outcome. She does not think that enough has been achieved. She has asked, in particular, whether it is not the case that we wanted regular helicopter controls in order to get advance information of terrorist activity as well as follow-up after incidents. I should be grateful if you could let me have a note on this point.

I am sending copies of this letter to the Private Secretaries to the other Members of OD and to Martin Vile (Cabinet Office).

M. O'D. B. ALEXANDER

Roy Harrington, Esq.,
Northern Ireland Office.

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True



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PRIME MINISTER

cc Members of OD
Sir John Hunt

*I'm afraid
these amounts to 4
very high indeed.
We started regular
helicopter patrols
to get
advance information
as well as
follow-up the
initiation
out*

NORTHERN IRELAND : CROSS-BORDER COOPERATION

My meeting with Messrs O'Kennedy and Collins today was almost entirely devoted to cross-border cooperation. We went in detail through the points which you and the Taoiseach had remitted to us on 5 September; the Irish came well prepared and were evidently anxious to make a significant contribution. I believe that we made significant progress, which was reflected - but deliberately not spelled out - in the communique we issued, of which a copy is attached. I summarise the main points below.

2. We were able to record that both police forces are increasing their manpower: the extra 1,000 for the RUC on our side is going to be matched on theirs by more Gardai in selected border areas, and an increase in the capacity of the Special Task Force and of the Technical Bureau (both of which although not wholly dedicated to the border, could nevertheless have a great impact there). We agreed that certain border areas, notably South Armagh, needed re-inforcing on both sides. The Irish and the Commissioner clearly appreciated the Chief Constable's argument that long-term surveillance and in-depth investigations were a crucial element

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in bringing terrorists successfully before the courts. They agreed that the exchange of information across the border in both directions was a key to this.

3. They agreed that coordinated operations for pre-determined tasks are the best way of deploying manpower on either side, and that special efforts are needed in problem areas, especially coordinated patrolling in the more dangerous ones. The Gardai Commissioner and the Chief Constable agreed to review their procedures together and to make the changes that were necessary.

only?

4. Helicopters. The Irish came with a most carefully prepared and constructive concession: they are now ready to permit helicopters to cross the border as a direct follow-up of serious incidents, subject to a number of detailed operational conditions which we were able to accept. The only short-coming is their insistence that the maximum depth of penetration should be 5 kilometers at 1500 feet (i.e. visibility much further), while we regard 10 kilometers as the useful minimum. There was no immediate prospect of getting more than this. I had the GOC's Chief of Staff at hand and with his concurrence I accepted the offer, on the understanding that we should have to review the arrangement month-by-month. The Irish are equally insistent on this, since they are highly suspicious of the dangers of

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abuse, and frightened of the political side-effects of regular appearances of British helicopters in their border areas.

5. Communications between the two security forces. It is part of the agreement on helicopters that our Army Pilots should be able to communicate with the Garda on the ground. On ground-to-ground communication more generally, the Irish also conceded that there would be occasions when the British Army would need to get in touch without delay with the forces on the other side; to meet this point they are putting a Garda officer into every Army unit operating on the border so that direct communication will be available in emergencies.

6. RUC interviews of suspects in the South. The Irish argued strongly and with much supporting evidence that the Courts in the Republic would never admit statements which had been obtained with the participation of the RUC in the questioning. They claimed that in any event, given the rules currently applied by their Courts, police questioning unsupported by other evidence never yielded any results; also that to allow it would have the effect of drying up their current sources of information, and putting the policemen concerned on both sides at personal risk. They made it plain that they would not be able to give way over

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this, and suggested instead that we ought to tackle the problem by means of closer consultation between the RUC and Garda, which should bring improvements in the Garda performance over questioning.

7. I expressed our real disappointment that they could not help us on this point, but, guided by the Chief Constable who had a separate and very constructive meeting with the Garda Commissioner at which it was agreed that there were other routes to the same end, I did not make this an issue publicly. It was quite clear that the valuable breakthrough on helicopter overflights would have been at risk had I pressed the issue that far.

8. Training. The Irish set the tone on this point by thanking the RUC for the great help which the Garda had received in planning and operating security over the Pope's visit to the Republic. We had no trouble agreeing that since counter-terrorism was "a joint effort in a common cause" each force should help the other to the maximum, and that the Chief Constable and Commissioner could decide between them where each could best offer help.


9. Exchange of police liaison officers. The Irish dislike the idea of formal liaison officers. After I had pointed to the political effect of the proposal in demonstrating our joint dedication to the cause, they agreed that each force should

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nominate an officer who would be available round the clock as contact with the other headquarters. This arrangement could be made publicly known, as could the periodic meetings between the Chief Constable and Commissioner (though for security reasons they should not be announced beforehand).

10. I am sending copies of this letter to other members of OD and to Sir John Hunt.

A handwritten signature in blue ink, reading "Humphrey Atkins". The signature is written in a cursive style with a large initial 'H' and a long horizontal stroke extending from the end of the name.

SECRETARY OF STATE

5 October 1979

MEETING BETWEEN BRITISH MINISTERS AND MINISTERS OF
THE IRISH REPUBLIC ON 5 OCTOBER 1979

COMMUNIQUE

1. The Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, the Rt Hon Humphrey Atkins, MP, today met the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Irish Republic, Mr. Michael O'Kennedy, TD, and the Minister for Justice, Mr. Gerard Collins, TD. The Chief Constable of the RUC, Sir Kenneth Newman, and the Commissioner of the Garda Siochana, Mr. Patrick McLaughlin, were also present. The security situation and the general political situation in Northern Ireland were discussed. In relation to security Ministers reviewed progress in the development of proposals, discussed on 5 September between the Prime Minister and the Taoiseach, for a substantial improvement in the joint efforts of the two countries to stamp out terrorism.
2. On security cooperation both sides reaffirmed their common commitment to the eradication of violence. They agreed on a series of measures which they were satisfied would enhance the effectiveness of their common campaign against violence and their already extensive cooperation. The new measures are designed to inhibit the movement of terrorists on either side of the border and their ability to exploit that border, whether to commit criminal acts or to evade arrest. They include measures in relation to more

intensive patrolling on both sides of the border and improved coordination and communications between their security forces. It was agreed that an urgent study would be carried out jointly by the heads of the police forces to develop greater cooperation and expertise in a number of areas of police operations. In the interest of maximum effectiveness it was decided that operational details of the measures which were discussed and agreed would not be made public.

3. The Ministers stressed that their common interest in countering terrorism was not limited to the border area, and informed each other of developments in their respective jurisdictions. Ministers also welcomed the decisions of both Governments to increase the strength of their respective police forces.

4. The Ministers agreed that every effort should be made to make fuller use of the 1976 Extra-territorial legislation which allows terrorist suspects to be brought to trial in one jurisdiction for offences committed in the other. They recognise the crucial importance of evidence in securing convictions and expressed confidence that the general public on each side of the border would give all aid and assistance to the Garda and the RUC in their common task of protecting the community.

5. The Ministers also discussed the prospects for political progress in Northern Ireland. They noted that the Secretary of State was engaged in continuing private talks with political

leaders in Northern Ireland, and that in the light of these the British Government hoped before long to be in a position to put forward positive proposals for political development. The Irish Ministers emphasised the importance of an early initiative leading to acceptable political institutions which both sections of the community in Northern Ireland could support and sustain.

6. Ministers reviewed the progress on cross-border economic cooperation and expressed their joint determination to continue to cooperate in the interests of the economic well-being of the people of the border regions.

7. It was agreed that Ministers would continue to meet from time to time to review developments in all of these areas.

ZZ ROME

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FM FCO 050831Z OCT
TO FLASH ROME
TELEGRAM NUMBER 198 OF 5 OCTOBER

FOR WALDEN FROM LEVER

FOLLOWING TELEGRAM NOW REPEATED TO YOU AT REQUEST OF DEPT WAS
RECEIVED FROM WASHINGTON

FM WASHINGTON 042306Z OCT 79
TO PRIORITY FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
TELEGRAM NUMBER 3013 OF 4 OCTOBER 1979
INFO PRIORITY NIO BELFAST.

MY TELEGRAM NO 3012: ARMS FOR THE RUC.

1. VEST, STATE DEPARTMENT, SPEAKING PERSONALLY AND IN CONFIDENCE, HAS SUBSEQUENTLY TOLD US THAT HE DISCUSSED THE ISSUE TODAY ON THE SECURE TELEPHONE WITH KINGMAN BREWSTER, AND SUGGESTED TO KINGMAN BREWSTER THAT AS SOON AS THE LATTER WAS ABLE TO REPORT SUBSTANTIAL INDICATIONS OF NEW BRITISH PROPOSALS ON NORTHERN IRELAND, FOLLOWING THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR IRELAND'S REMARKS ON 2 OCTOBER, KINGMAN BREWSTER SHOULD ADDRESS A STRONG PERSONAL RECOMMENDATION TO VANCE. THIS WOULD BE ON THE LINES THAT THE SITUATION HAD NOW CHANGED, FOLLOWING LORD MOUNTBATTEN'S ASSASSINATION, THE POPE'S APPEAL AND THE PIRA'S REACTION TO THIS APPEAL, AND INDICATIONS OF GRADUAL POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT. VEST HAD ALSO SUGGESTED THAT KINGMAN BREWSTER SHOULD THEN SEND A SEPARATE AND PARALLEL MESSAGE TO SPEAKER O'NEILL ON THE SAME LINES SUGGESTING THAT IN THIS CHANGED STATE OF AFFAIRS THE SUSPENSION OF LICENCES FOR EXPORT OF ARMS FOR THE RUC SHOULD BE LIFTED.

2. VEST COMMENTED THAT, WHATEVER THE VIEWS ON EITHER SIDE, THE POLITICS OF THE THING HERE WERE THAT THE ADMINISTRATION HAD TO BE ABLE TO POINT TO SOME CHANGE IN THE SITUATION IF THE SUSPENSION WAS TO BE LIFTED.

3. SO IT IS CLEAR THAT HIS MIND IS MOVING ON VERY MUCH THE SAME LINES AS THE RECOMMENDATION IN PARAGRAPH 2 OF MY TELEGRAM UNDER REFERENCE. HE HAS PROMISED TO KEEP IN TOUCH WITH US.

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FM WASHINGTON 042306Z OCT 79

TO PRIORITY FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
TELEGRAM NUMBER 3013 OF 4 OCTOBER 1979
INFO PRIORITY NIO BELFAST.

Prime Minister

Rob

Paul

MY TELEGRAM NO 3012: ARMS FOR THE RUC.

1. VEST, STATE DEPARTMENT, SPEAKING PERSONALLY AND IN CONFIDENCE, HAS SUBSEQUENTLY TOLD US THAT HE DISCUSSED THE ISSUE TODAY ON THE SECURE TELEPHONE WITH KINGMAN BREWSTER, AND SUGGESTED TO KINGMAN BREWSTER THAT AS SOON AS THE LATTER WAS ABLE TO REPORT SUBSTANTIAL INDICATIONS OF NEW BRITISH PROPOSALS ON NORTHERN IRELAND, FOLLOWING THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR IRELAND'S REMARKS ON 2 OCTOBER, KINGMAN BREWSTER SHOULD ADDRESS A STRONG PERSONAL RECOMMENDATION TO VANCE. THIS WOULD BE ON THE LINES THAT THE SITUATION HAD NOW CHANGED, FOLLOWING LORD MOUNTBATTEN'S ASSASSINATION, THE POPE'S APPEAL AND THE PIRA'S REACTION TO THIS APPEAL, AND INDICATIONS OF GRADUAL POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT. VEST HAD ALSO SUGGESTED THAT KINGMAN BREWSTER SHOULD THEN SEND A SEPARATE AND PARALLEL MESSAGE TO SPEAKER O'NEILL ON THE SAME LINES SUGGESTING THAT IN THIS CHANGED STATE OF AFFAIRS THE SUSPENSION OF LICENCES FOR EXPORT OF ARMS FOR THE RUC SHOULD BE LIFTED.

2. VEST COMMENTED THAT, WHATEVER THE VIEWS ON EITHER SIDE, THE POLITICS OF THE THING HERE WERE THAT THE ADMINISTRATION HAD TO BE ABLE TO POINT TO SOME CHANGE IN THE SITUATION IF THE SUSPENSION WAS TO BE LIFTED.

3. SO IT IS CLEAR THAT HIS MIND IS MOVING ON VERY MUCH THE SAME LINES AS THE RECOMMENDATION IN PARAGRAPH 2 OF MY TELEGRAM UNDER REFERENCE. HE HAS PROMISED TO KEEP IN TOUCH WITH US.

HENDERSON

FILES

RID PS/MR HURD
NAD PS/MR RIDLEY
OID PS/MR BLAKER
IPD PS/FUS
WED SIR A DUFF
MAED MR BULLARD
PUSD MR FERGUSSON
NEWS D LORD N G LENNOX
PS MISS BROWN
PS/LPS

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FM WASHINGTON 042302Z OCT 79

TO PRIORITY FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
TELEGRAM NUMBER 3012 OF 4 OCTOBER 1979
INFO PRIORITY NIO BELFAST

MY TELEGRAM NO 2980: ARMS FOR THE RUC

1. IF AS IS LIKELY, THE US ADMINISTRATION FAILS TO RESPOND TO THE IDEA REFERRED TO IN MY TELEGRAM UNDER REFERENCE FOR PUTTING IN AN ORDER FOR REVOLVERS FOR THE UK FOR THE DEFENCE OF THE REALM WITHOUT ANY MENTION OF ULSTER, I THINK WE SHOULD ASSUME THAT, IF THEY DO RECEIVE SUCH AN ORDER, THEY WILL DO NO MORE THAN SIT ON IT. IF WE MUST PUT IN THE ORDER NOW I THINK WE WOULD PUT OURSELVES IN A BETTER POSITION IF WE ORDERED THE ARMS IN THIS WAY THAN BY DOING SO IN ANY OTHER: TO AVOID TOO CLOSE A PARALLEL WITH THE FIRST ORDER I SUGGEST THAT THE NEW ORDER SHOULD BE FOR THE WHOLE 6000 THAT WE REQUIRE. EVEN IF THIS DOESN'T GET US THE ARMS IT WOULD PUT THE AMERICANS IN AN AWKWARD POSTURE.

2. IF, HOWEVER, WE COULD AT THE SAME TIME INDICATE TO THE U S GOVERNMENT THAT NEW PROPOSALS ARE BEING PUT FORWARD REGARDING THE FUTURE OF NORTHERN IRELAND, THIS WOULD GREATLY STRENGTHEN OUR HAND. WE WOULD THEN BE ABLE TO SAY THAT THE PROSPECTS FOR NORTHERN IRELAND HAVE CHANGED SINCE VANCE AGREED WITH SPEAKER O'NEILL IN JULY ON A NEGATIVE LINE ON ARMS. I NOTE THAT THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR NORTHERN IRELAND, AFTER TALKS WITH POLITICAL LEADERS IN THE PROVINCE ON 2 OCTOBER, SAID THAT IT WAS HIS HOPE THAT SOON WE SHALL HAVE PREPARED THE GROUND SUFFICIENTLY TO BRING FORWARD PROPOSALS AT WESTMINSTER. IF THESE PROPOSALS ARE INDEED ON THE HORIZON, AND PARTICULARLY IF THEY ARE LIKELY TO BE OF A KIND WHICH THE SDLP ARE LIKELY TO WELCOME, THEN I SUGGEST THAT WE SHOULD TIME OUR APPROACH TO THE AMERICANS ON ARMS TO COINCIDE WITH THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE PROPOSALS AT WESTMINSTER AND MAKE A DETERMINED EFFORT TO GET THE ADMINISTRATION TO RESUME THE GRANTING OF LICENCES FOR THE ARMS. YOU MIGHT FOR EXAMPLE WANT TO GIVE THE ADMINISTRATION SOME INDICATION OF THE KIND OF PROPOSALS WE WILL BE MAKING, VERY SHORTLY BEFORE THEY ARE MADE: AND TO ACCOMPANY THIS INFORMATION WITH A VERY

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FIRM REQUEST THAT THE ADMINISTRATION RESPOND IN PARALLEL BY CHANGING THEIR POSITION ON THE ARMS ISSUE; BY LODGING SIMULTANEOUSLY NEW APPLICATIONS FOR THE BALANCE OF ALL ARMS WE ARE LIKELY TO REQUIRE FOR THE REMAINDER OF THIS YEAR AND NEXT (DESCRIBING THE PURPOSE AS BEING QUOTE FOR THE DEFENCE OF THE REALM UNQUOTE). AND POINTING VERY BLUNTLY TO THE CONSEQUENCES FOR ANGLO-AMERICAN RELATIONS IF THE BAN IS NOT LIFTED.

HENDERSON

FILES

RID

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PS

PS/HPS

PS/PUS

SIR A DUFF

MR FERGUSSON

LORD NG LENNOX

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FM WASHINGTON 042102Z OCT 79

TO PRIORITY FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
TELEGRAM NUMBER 3000 OF 4 OCTOBER 1979
INFO NIO BELFAST, DUBLIN, BIS NEW YORK.

*Rome Irish**ant*
ant

NORTHERN IRELAND: BRITISH INFORMATION EFFORT IN THE UNITED STATES.

1. WHEN I SAW YOU IN NEW YORK LAST WEEK WE HAD A WORD ABOUT US CONGRESSIONAL AND PUBLIC OPINION AND NORTHERN IRELAND. I SAID THAT THE MAIN PROBLEM WAS THE COMPLETE LACK OF UNDERSTANDING ON THE PART OF AMERICAN PUBLIC OPINION ABOUT THE POLITICAL REALITIES OF NORTHERN IRELAND AND IN PARTICULAR ABOUT THE STATE OF MIND OF THE PEOPLE OF THE PROVINCE; AND I SUGGESTED THAT WHAT WAS NEEDED WAS A SYSTEMATIC CAMPAIGN TO BRING THE FACTS HOME.
2. THE MAIN CURRENTS OF US PUBLIC OPINION ON NORTHERN IRELAND WERE DESCRIBED IN WASHINGTON TELS NOS .1684 AND 2514. THE PRINCIPAL CONCLUSIONS TO BE DRAWN, ARE:
 - (I) IN TERMS OF DOMESTIC US POLITICS WE HAVE NO QUOTE CONSTITUENCY UNQUOTE TO BALANCE THE POWERFUL IRISH AMERICAN ETHNIC LOBBY, WHICH OVERWHELMINGLY ESPOUSES IRISH UNITY.
 - (II) THIS SENTIMENTAL SUPPORT FOR IRISH UNITY IS BEING EXPLOITED IN A SUSTAINED AND INCREASINGLY SOPHISTICATED PROPAGANDA CAMPAIGN BY AMERICAN SYMPATHISERS OF THE IRA.
 - (III) THE IRISH GOVERNMENT AND THEIR REPRESENTATIVES HERE ARE BEST PLACED TO INFLUENCE OPINION WITHIN THE IRISH AMERICAN COMMUNITY AND WE SHOULD CONTINUE TO LEAVE THIS TASK TO THEM. WE CAN RELY ON THEM TO DENOUNCE TERRORISM, TO DISCOURAGE SUPPORT FOR THE IRA AND ORGANISATIONS SYMPATHETIC TO IT AND GENERALLY TO PREACH MODERATION. TO THE EXTENT THAT DUBLIN AND LONDON ARE SEEN TO BE WORKING IN HARMONY OVER NORTHERN IRELAND THE IRISH INFORMATION EFFORT IN THE US CAN USEFULLY COMPLEMENT OUR OWN. BUT WE CANNOT EXPECT THE IRISH TO EXPLAIN THE STATE OF OPINION IN NORTHERN IRELAND OR THE BASIS OF BRITISH POLICIES.
 - (IV) OUR PUBLIC RELATIONS EFFORT SHOULD THEREFORE BE DIRECTED PRIMARILY AT MODERATE AND/OR UNCOMMITTED MEMBERS OF CONGRESS (INCLUDING RESPONSIBLE IRISH AMERICAN POLITICIANS) AND OPINION MOULDERS IN THE PRESS, RADIO AND TELEVISION, BOTH AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL AND IN THE MAIN PROVINCIAL CENTRES.

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3. THE MAIN THEMES WE SHOULD AIM TO GET ACROSS TO THESE PEOPLE ARE:

(I) THE POLITICAL BACKGROUND TO THE SITUATION IN NORTHERN IRELAND AND, IN PARTICULAR, THE RANGE AND DIVERSITY OF LEGITIMATE NORTHERN IRELAND OPINION. WE NEED TO BRING OUT BOTH THE EXTENT OF COMMON GROUND IN THE ATTITUDES OF THE MAJORITY AND MINORITY COMMUNITIES AND THE STRENGTH WITH WHICH DIVERGENT OPINIONS ARE HELD.

(II) AGAINST THIS BACKGROUND, WE MUST CONTINUE PATIENTLY TO EXPLAIN HMG'S AIMS AND POLICIES, STRESSING THE IMPARTIALITY OF BRITISH ADMINISTRATION UNDER DIRECT RULE AND THE STRENGTH OF HMG'S COMMITMENT TO PROMOTING NEW POLITICAL ARRANGEMENTS ACCEPTABLE TO BOTH COMMUNITIES. AS I SUGGESTED IN MY TELNO 2515, IN ORDER FAVOURABLY TO INFLUENCE MODERATE US OPINION IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT WE SHOULD BE ABLE TO HOLD OUT THE PROSPECT OF POLITICAL PROGRESS.

(III) WE SHOULD MAKE A SPECIAL EFFORT TO IDENTIFY THE PIRA WITH CRUDE TERRORISM AND TO SEPARATE PIRA FROM THE POLITICAL PROCESS IN AMERICAN MINDS. THE MURDER OF LORD MOUNTBATTEN AND THE POPE'S DENUNCIATIONS OF VIOLENCE HAVE CREATED A MORE FAVOURABLE CLIMATE OF OPINION ON THIS SCORE. BUT WE SHALL NEED TO KEEP UP THE MOMENTUM BY OUR OWN EFFORTS - EG ON THE LINES SUGGESTED IN ROBINSONS LETTER OF 2 AUGUST TO STOWE (COPIED TO FERGUSSON) AND SQUIRE'S LETTER OF 8 AUGUST TO ALLAN (OID).

(IV) WE MUST CONTINUE TO DEFEND OUR HUMAN RIGHTS RECORD IN NORTHERN IRELAND. HOWEVER UNFAIRLY, WE SHALL REMAIN VULNERABLE TO ATTACK ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND MUST EXPECT THE EXTREMISTS TO EXPLOIT THIS THEME PERSISTENTLY AND UNSCRUPULOUSLY.

4. BRITISH OFFICIALS AND OFFICIAL INFORMATION SERVICES IN THE US CAN AND DO SEEK TO PROMOTE BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF HMG'S POLICIES AND TO COUNTER THE MORE OUTRAGEOUS MISREPRESENTATIONS OF THE BRITISH ROLE IN NORTHERN IRELAND WHICH APPEAR IN THE PRESS, TV AND RADIO. BUT IN GENERAL A BRITISH OFFICIAL VOICE OR SIGNATURE CARRIES MUCH LESS CREDIBILITY HERE THAN AN IRISH ONE (AMERICAN PUBLIC OPINION HAS IN ANY CASE BECOME DEEPLY SCEPTICAL OF ALL OFFICIAL PRONOUNCEMENTS FROM ANY SOURCE). IF WE ARE TO SUCCEED IN CONVEYING A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF PUBLIC OPINION IN NORTHERN IRELAND OUR PUBLIC RELATIONS EFFORT IN THE UNITED STATES NEEDS TO HAVE MORE OF A NORTHERN IRELAND ACCENT.

5. THERE ARE A NUMBER OF WAYS IN WHICH THIS MIGHT BE DONE AND WHICH HAVE ALREADY BEEN SUGGESTED TO THE DEPARTMENT (HALLS LETTER OF 14 JUNE TO ALLAN): FOR EXAMPLE.

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(I) WE SHOULD COMMISSION ARTICLES BY PROMINENT NORTHERN IRELAND PERSONALITIES FOR PUBLICATION IN THE US. MATERIAL BY MODERATE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE MINORITY COMMUNITY WOULD BE PARTICULARLY VALUABLE.

(II) WE SHOULD EXPLORE THE POSSIBILITY OF PROMOTING THE PUBLICATION OF SUITABLE MATERIAL IN THE CATHOLIC PRESS IN THE UK WHICH WE COULD THEN ARRANGE TO HAVE REPRODUCED IN THE US CATHOLIC PRESS, IN ORDER TO COUNTER THE INCREASING USE OF THE US CATHOLIC PRESS BY THE IRISH NATIONAL CAUCUS AS A VEHICLE FOR ANTI-BRITISH PROPAGANDA.

(III) WE SHOULD ENCOURAGE MODERATE NORTHERN IRELAND POLITICIANS CHURCHMEN, TRADE UNIONISTS ETC TO VISIT THE UNITED STATES TO PUT THEIR VIEWS ACROSS TO SUITABLE AUDIENCES HERE AND TO LOBBY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS (BUT WE SHOULD BE CAREFUL TO AVOID THEIR APPEARING AS OFFICIALLY SPONSORED PROPAGANDISTS: SUITABLE SPONSORSHIP WOULD THEREFORE REQUIRE THOUGHT). WE SHOULD NOT BE TOO CONCERNED IF WHAT THEY SAY IS NOT ALWAYS WHOLLY CONSISTENT WITH HMG'S POLICIES: THE OBJECT WOULD BE TO ENABLE THE VARIETIES OF NORTHERN IRELAND OPINION TO BE HEARD IN THE UNITED STATES.

(IV) LONDON BASED CORRESPONDENTS OF US NEWSPAPERS, AGENCIES AND NETWORKS SHOULD BE ENCOURAGED TO REPORT DIRECTLY AND REGULARLY FROM NORTHERN IRELAND (AND NOT JUST WHEN THERE IS A SENSATIONAL STORY TO BE COVERED).

6. I AM AWARE THAT MOST OF THESE SUGGESTIONS ARE ALREADY BEING CONSIDERED IN SOME FORM. BUT THEY MAY NEED TO BE BROUGHT TOGETHER SO THAT WE CAN MOVE FROM THE DEFENSIVE.

HENDERSON

FILES

RID PS/MR HURD
NAD PS/MR RIDLEY
OID PS/MR BLAKER
IPD PS/PUS
WED SIR A DUFF
MAED MR BULLARD
FUSD MR FERGUSSON
NEWS D LORD N G LENNOX
PS MISS BROWN
PS/LPS

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION
NORTHERN IRELAND



10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

4 October 1979

Original ~~to~~ ~~the~~ ~~HR~~

Constituent
NO.

Ireland

Thank you for your letter of 11 September about the situation in Northern Ireland, enclosing a letter from one of your constituents, Mrs. Brockman.

Following the brutal murder of Lord Mountbatten and the killing of 18 soldiers at Warrenpoint on the same day it is not surprising that you and Mrs. Brockman should feel that, in some way, we ought to hit back at the Government of the Irish Republic or at Irish citizens resident here. But this reaction is not entirely fair - the overwhelming majority of Irish citizens in this country are decent law-abiding members of the community. Although some public opinion might welcome dramatic action of the kind you suggest, I don't think it would help in the war against terrorism and that must be our first priority.

As regards the introduction of identity cards, there is no reason to suppose that such a measure would make it any easier to detect or apprehend terrorists. The police already possess a wide range of powers designed specifically to deal with the terrorist threat, and the Government would have no hesitation in seeking powers additional to those if we thought them necessary or helpful.

/When

B

When I met Mr. Lynch on 5 September we agreed that the present level of co-operation must be substantially improved and a number of suggestions for this purpose are now being actively followed up. I am determined to keep up the impetus and ensure that a real improvement in the situation is achieved. One example of the steps we are taking to improve our own efforts to combat terrorism is the appointment of a security co-ordinator in Northern Ireland. As we announced this week, Sir Maurice Oldfield will be beginning work on 8 October.

(SGD) MARGARET THATCHER

Peter Fry, Esq., M.P.

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(AMENDED DISTRIBUTION 4 OCTOBER 1979)

8:25 TO PM

FM WASHINGTON 032337Z OCT 79

TO PRIORITY F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 2980 OF 3 OCTOBER
INFORMATION NIO BELFAST.

Prime Minister
Paul

MY TELEGRAM NO 2906 : ARMS FOR THE RUC.

1. VEST (ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR EUROPE, STATE DEPARTMENT) ASKED ME TO CALL ON 3 OCTOBER. HE SAID THAT HE HAD RAISED THE MATTER OF ARMS WITH VANCE WHEN THE LATTER HAD BEEN IN WASHINGTON OVER THE WEEKEND TO DEAL WITH THE CUBAN AFFAIR. VANCE HAD ASKED HIM TO CONVEY TO ME HIS VIEW THAT IT WOULD BE BEST FOR NO NEW REQUESTS FOR ARMS FOR THE RUC TO BE PUT FORWARD DURING THIS PERIOD OF "POLITICAL LIABILITY". IN ANSWER TO MY QUESTION VEST CONFIRMED THAT VANCE HAD NOT MADE ANY SUGGESTIONS AS TO HOW WE MIGHT FIND A WAY ROUND THIS PROBLEM.

2. SPEAKING PERSONALLY, VEST ADDED THAT HE WAS NOT ANXIOUS TO SEE THE STATE DEPARTMENT'S POLICY REVIEW CARRIED FORWARD TOO FAST. HE COULD NOT SAY HOW LONG THIS MORATORIUM WOULD LAST, BUT LEFT ME IN NO DOUBT THAT IT WOULD BE UNTIL AFTER THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS. IT RAMINED HIS VIEW THAT ANY PRECISE ACTION WOULD CREATE SERIOUS POLITICAL DIFFICULTIES: THE CLEAR MESSAGE THE STATE DEPARTMENT HAD RECEIVED FROM SPEAKER O'NEILL WAS THAT A RECOMMENDATION TO RESUME SALES OF ARMS FOR THE RUC WOULD DRIVE O'NEILL AND OTHER MODERATES IN CONGRESS INTO THE ARMS OF THE EXTREMISTS. I POINTED OUT THAT INDEFINITE DELAY WOULD CAUSE NO LESS GREAT DIFFICULTIES IN THE UK. VEST SAID HE FULLY UNDERSTOOD THIS: BUT THE PROBLEM HERE WAS THAT WE WERE DEALING WITH IRRATIONAL EMOTIONS IN THE CONGRESS WHICH IT WOULD BE VERY RISKY TO STIR UP.

3. I WONDERED ALOUD IF IT MIGHT HELP IF I WERE TO DISCUSS THE PROBLEM WITH DEFENCE SECRETARY BROWN, SINCE THIS WAS A MATTER OF ARMS SUPPLIES TO A NATO ALLY. VEST CLEARLY DID NOT LIKE THIS IDEA AND POINTED OUT THAT THE QUESTION OF APPROVAL OF EXPORT LICENCE APPLICATIONS WAS EXCLUSIVELY A MATTER FOR THE STATE DEPARTMENT AND NOT THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE.

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/ 4. I ALSO

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4. I ALSO TOLD VEST THAT WHEN NORTHERN IRELAND CAME UP AT MR HOWELL'S BREAKFAST MEETING WITH DR SCHLESINGER ON 2 OCTOBER, SCHLESINGER HAD DESCRIBED THE SUSPENSION OF SALES OF ARMS FOR THE RUC AS SCANDALOUS AND HAD SAID THAT HE WOULD SPEAK TO BRZEZINSKI ABOUT IT.

5. IN FURTHER CONVERSATION I FLOATED THE POSSIBILITY THAT ARMS NEEDED BY THE RUC MIGHT BE ORDERED BY HMG FOR THE ARMED FORCES FOR GENERAL PURPOSES WITHOUT SPECIFYING THE END USE. THEY WOULD BE ORDERED BY HMG AND CONSIGNED TO A UK PORT OUTSIDE NORTHERN IRELAND. WE WOULD SAY THEY WERE FOR USE IN THE UK FOR THE DEFENCE OF THE REALM. IT WAS THEN UP TO US TO DO WHAT WE LIKED WITH THE WEAPONS. MIGHT IT NOT THEN BE POSSIBLE FOR EXPORT LICENCES TO BE APPROVED WITH NO QUESTIONS ASKED? VEST AND FUNSETH (DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF NORTHERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS) UNDERTOOK TO LOOK INTO THE EXACT WORDING OF THE EXPORT LICENCE APPLICATION FORM TO SEE IF THIS MIGHT BE FEASIBLE. BUT THEY WERE CLEARLY UNHAPPY. FUNSETH POINTED OUT THAT THE APPLICATION FORM (WHICH WAS AN OPEN DOCUMENT AVAILABLE FOR INSPECTION BY ANYBODY) REQUIRED A FAIRLY SPECIFIC DESCRIPTION OF THE END USE TO WHICH ARMS WOULD BE PUT. EVEN IF IT WERE POSSIBLE TO FUDGE THIS, IT WAS ALMOST INEVITABLE THAT NEWS OF A FURTHER LARGE ORDER FOR HANDGUNS OF THE TYPE ALREADY DELIVERED TO THE RUC WOULD GET OUT. OPPONENTS OF ARMS SALES IN CONGRESS WOULD BE ON THE LOOKOUT AND WOULD BE SURE TO CREATE FRESH TROUBLE.

6. THEY PROMISED TO GET INTO TOUCH WITH ME AGAIN AND I WILL BE TELEGRAPHING AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

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PS/LPS
PS/PUS
SIR A DUFF
LORD N G LENNOX
MR FERGUSSON

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FM DUBLIN 041012 OCT 79
TO ROUTINE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 321 OF 3 OCT
AND TO ROUTINE NIO BELFAST

Prime Minister

pub

LORD MOUNTBATTEN'S MURDER: TRIAL OF SUSPECTS

1. THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE HAVE CONFIRMED THAT, AS REPORTED IN THE PRESS, THE SPECIAL CRIMINAL COURT YESTERDAY FIXED 5 NOVEMBER FOR THE TRIAL OF FRANCIS MCGIRL AND THOMAS MACMAHON THE TWO MEN WHO ARE CHARGED WITH THE MURDER OF LORD MOUNTBATTEN.

HAYDON

and

F I L E S

RID	PS/MR HURD
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OID	PS/MR BLAKER
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FM DUBLIN 031457Z OCTOBER
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TELEGRAM NUMBER 319 OF 3 OCTOBER 1979
AND TO IMMEDIATE NIO BELFAST
INFO ROUTINE WASHINGTON, BIS NEW YORK AND MODUK

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Purd*

APPOINTMENT OF SECURITY CO-ORDINATOR: PRESS REACTIONS

1. THE APPOINTMENT OF SIR MAURICE OLDFIELD AS "SECURITY CO-ORDINATOR" IN NORTHERN IRELAND, IS REPORTED PROMINENTLY IN ALL THREE DUBLIN DAILIES, THOUGH IT HAS SO FAR ATTRACTED NO SUBSTANTIAL EDITORIAL COMMENT. THE HEADLINES ARE PREDICTABLE:-

" BRITAIN'S TOP SPY-CATCHER TO HEAD NORTHERN SECURITY DRIVE" (INDEPENDENT),

" JAMES BOND'S 'M' NEW HEAD OF NORTH SECURITY" (IRISH PRESS),
AND

" NI JOB FOR FORMER SECRET SERVICE HEAD" (IRISH TIMES).

2. THE REPORTS ARE LARGELY FACTUAL ALTHOUGH DAVID MCKITTRICK, THE IRISH TIMES NORTHERN EDITOR, DISCUSSES AT SOME LENGTH THE BACKGROUND TO THE APPOINTMENT. MCKITTRICK CLAIMS THE RUC AND ARMY SOURCES HAVE MADE NO SECRET OF THE FACT THAT RELATIONS BETWEEN THE FORCES HAVE IN SOME AREAS BEEN POOR AND SAYS THAT ARMY COMMANDERS HAVE BEEN ARGUING THAT THE RUC'S PRIVACY HAS BEEN PROVED INEFFECTIVE AND THAT A "SECURITY SUPREMO" WAS NEEDED. MCKITTRICK GOES ON TO SAY THAT SIR MAURICE'S APPOINTMENT WILL BE SEEN BY SOME AS A VICTORY OF SORTS FOR THE ARMY. HE ALSO CLAIMS THAT MANY OBSERVERS ASSUME THAT THE APPOINTMENT WILL MEAN "A GREATER EMPHASIS ON COVERT OPERATIONS, INTELLIGENCE GATHERING AND UNDERCOVER METHODS OF TACKLING THE PROBLEM OF THE PROVISIONAL IRA'S CELL STRUCTURE".

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Patricia Austin

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DESKBY 030830Z OCTOBER
FM DUBLIN 021750Z OCTOBER
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 318 OF 2 OCTOBER 1979

IMPACT OF THE PAPAL VISIT ON IRISH GOVERNMENT THINKING ON SECURITY AND THE POLITICAL SITUATION IN THE NORTH

1. WE ARE TOO CLOSE TO THE EVENTS FOR A FULL APPRAISAL OF THE IMPACT OF THE POPE'S VISIT TO BE POSSIBLE, AND I SHALL BE REPORTING ON THE VISIT AT GREATER LENGTH BY BAG. THE IRISH GOVERNMENT, TOO, WILL NO DOUBT NEED TIME TO ASSESS THE IMPLICATIONS FOR THEM, ESPECIALLY OF THE POPE'S VARIOUS SPEECHES WHILE HE WAS HERE. THERE REMAINS ALSO THE POSSIBILITY THAT THE POPE WILL ADD TO THESE BY SOME REFERENCE TO THE IRISH SITUATION DURING HIS VISIT TO THE USA. THE FOLLOWING THEREFORE REPRESENTS ONLY SOME PRELIMINARY THOUGHTS ON THE IRISH GOVERNMENT'S REACTIONS

TO THE VISIT IN RELATION TO:

- (A) THEIR WISH FOR A POLITICAL INITIATIVE BY HMG ON NORTHERN IRELAND
- (B) SECURITY COOPERATION.

POLITICAL INITIATIVE

2. THE IRISH GOVERNMENT WILL FEEL THAT THE POPE HAS CRITICISED HMG FOR "ALLOWING" A POLITICAL VACUUM TO EXIST IN THE NORTH, AND THEY WILL SEE THIS AS SUPPORT FOR THEIR OWN POSITION IN CONTINUING TO URGE ON US THE NECESSITY FOR SOME POLITICAL INITIATIVE TO FILL THE VACUUM. IRISH OFFICIALS HAVE ALREADY TOLD US (AT THE MEETING HERE ON 27 SEPTEMBER) THAT MR O'KENNEDY WILL RAISE THE POLITICAL SITUATION WHEN HE MEETS SOSNI ON 5 OCTOBER. THE POPE'S WORDS ON THIS SUBJECT MAY CAUSE HIM TO STRENGTHEN THE TERMS IN WHICH HE DOES SO. THERE IS THE FURTHER POINT THAT MR LYNCH NO DOUBT SEE HIS WATERVILLE SPEECH (MY TELS NOS 305 AND 309) AND HIS FACING DOWN OF THE CHALLENGE WITHIN HIS OWN PARLIAMENTARY PARTY BY SILE DE VALERA AS, AMONG OTHER THINGS, -A GESTURE IN OUR DIRECTION. THE IRISH GOVERNMENT MAY THEREFORE BE ENCOURAGED TO HOPE FOR SOMETHING TO EMERGE FROM US IN THE SHAPE OF WHAT THEY WOULD SEE AS A RECIPROCAL GESTURE.

SECURITY COOPERATION

3. THE POPE'S CONDEMNATION OF VIOLENCE IS UNLIKELY TO MAKE ANY IMPORTANT DIFFERENCE TO THE IRISH GOVERNMENT'S DECISIONS ON THE EXTENT OF SECURITY COOPERATION WITH US. THEY BELIEVE THAT THEY HAVE ALREADY EXPLAINED TO US (MOST RECENTLY AT THE OFFICIALS' MEETING ON 27 SEPTEMBER) THE CONSTRAINTS UNDER WHICH THEY OPERATE AND THE POPE'S WORDS HAVE NOT ALTERED THOSE. IN OTHER WORDS, THE IRISH WILL NOT HAVE BEEN INDUCED BY WHAT THE POPE SAID TO MAKE SUBSTANTIAL CONCESSIONS TO US WHICH THEY WOULD NOT OTHERWISE HAVE MADE. IT IS JUST POSSIBLE, HOWEVER, THAT THE UNEQUIVOCAL NATURE OF THE POPE'S CONDEMNATION OF VIOLENCE, COUPLED WITH THE FACT THAT IT HAS ALREADY BEEN PUBLICLY REJECTED BY PIRA AND PSF, MAY INDUCE THE IRISH TO BE SOMEWHAT MORE FORTHCOMING IN DISCUSSING THOSE AREAS OF SECURITY COOPERATION WHERE IT ALREADY SEEMS POSSIBLE THAT THEY MAY HAVE SOMETHING TO GIVE.

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DESKBY030830Z OCTOBER

08 TO PM

FM DUBLIN 021656Z OCTOBER

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 317 OF 2 OCTOBER 1979

AND TO IMMEDIATE NIO (B)

Prime Minister

Paul
- 3/4

TELECONS WITH NEWINGTON RID, THIS AFTERNOON: SECURITY
CO-ORDINATOR NORTHERN IRELAND

1. AS AGREED, I HANDED O'ROURKE, SECRETARY DFA, THE PRESS ANNOUNCEMENT AND ATTRIBUTABLE GUIDANCE, AT 1635 HOURS. I HAD EARLIER ARRANGED TO SEE THE MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS BEFORE NOON TOMORROW BUT HAD TO CANCEL THAT APPOINTMENT WHEN IT WAS DECIDED TO MAKE THE ANNOUNCEMENT TODAY. O'ROURKE UNDERTOOK TO INFORM MR O'KENNEDY OF SIR M OLDFIELD'S APPOINTMENT AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. THE MINISTER WAS AT A CABINET MEETING.
2. O'ROURKE'S FIRST REACTION WAS THAT HE VERY MUCH HOPED THE NEW APPOINTMENT WOULD WORK SINCE QUOTE WE ARE ALL ENGAGED IN THE SAME FIGHT AGAINST TERRORISM UNQUOTE.
3. AS AGREED, I MENTIONED THAT THE MEDIA WOULD NO DOUBT MAKE SOMETHING OF SIR M OLDFIELD'S LAST APPOINTMENT. O'ROURKE COMMENTED THAT HE FEARED THE IRA WOULD MAKE CAPITAL OF THAT IN SOME WAY. IN REPLY TO MY QUESTION HE SAID HE THOUGHT THEY MIGHT CLAIM THAT THERE WOULD NOW BE MORE SAS INVOLVEMENT AND UNDERCOVER ACTIVITY. HE HOPED THAT WOULD NOT BE THE CASE BUT FEARED THAT THAT WAS THE WAY THEIR MINDS WOULD WORK.
4. I STRESSED THE CO-ORDINATION ASPECT OF SIR M OLDFIELD'S TASK SEVERAL TIMES AND O'ROURKE ACCEPTED WHAT I HAD TO SAY. I ALSO EMPHASIZED THE POINTS IN THE UNATTRIBUTABLE BRIEF ABOUT THE OUTSTANDING QUALITIES OF THE CO-ORDINATOR.
5. I DID NOT HAVE TO STRESS THE FACT THAT A CIVILIAN HAD BEEN APPOINTED SINCE THIS WAS A POINT MADE BY O'ROURKE HIMSELF WHO ALSO NOTED, WITHOUT PROMPTING, THE LEADING ROLE OF THE POLICE, AS SET OUT IN THE ATTRIBUTABLE GUIDANCE.

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NID
cc: MOD
Mr. Gow
Original in C/R

10 DOWNING STREET



THE PRIME MINISTER

3 October 1979

Dear Sir,

Thank you for your letter of 13 September about Mr. Ross's objections to the training of the Ulster Defence Regiment at the Barry Buddon Training Area near Monifieth. I have now seen the correspondence to which you referred, and I can understand the strong reaction which it has evoked.

In his letter replying to Mr. Ross the Secretary of State for Defence has made it absolutely clear that as a regiment of the British Army operating in support of the police in Northern Ireland in their fight against terrorism and in their aim to restore law and order there the UDR deserve not only our admiration but our wholehearted support.

The standards demanded of the UDR are high, and it is imperative that they should have access to the most suitable training facilities whether they be in Northern Ireland or on the mainland of Great Britain. The Government have every intention of ensuring that such training continues as long as necessary.

I firmly believe that all responsible citizens in this country share my own high regard for the work of the UDR which they - full-time and part-time members alike - and the other security forces in Northern Ireland carry out in such hazardous

/ conditions.

23

conditions. You can be sure that the Government will lose no opportunity to express its support for the work of the UDR.

Y
ours ever

Raymond

James Kilfedder, Esq., M.P.

Included



10 DOWNING STREET

Prime Minister.

The Lord Chancellor is sitting
judicially to-morrow afternoon.
The Attorney General will attend
in his place.

The Secretary of State for Trade is
overseas.

You have agreed that the
Chief Secretary should attend in
Place of the Chancellor of Exchequer

Paul

2/10

OD 3/10/79

CONFIDENTIAL

*To
Ireland*



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

2 October 1979

EXTRADITION

Your letter to me of 18 ~~September~~ enclosed a paper on the political defence in extradition. The Prime Minister has read the paper with interest and is grateful for the trouble that went into its preparation.

I am sending copies of this letter to Bill Beckett (Law Officers' Department), George Walden (Foreign and Commonwealth Office), Roy Harrington (Northern Ireland Office) and Martin Vile (Cabinet Office).

M. O'D. B. ALEXANDER

J.A. Chilcot, Esq.,
Home Office.

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FM FCO 021730Z OCT 79

TO IMMEDIATE CERTAIN MISSIONS AND DEPENDENT TERRITORIES
GUIDANCE TELEGRAM NUMBER 113 OF 2 OCTOBER 1979

SECURITY COORDINATOR IN NORTHERN IRELAND

1. THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR NORTHERN IRELAND, WITH THE APPROVAL OF THE PRIME MINISTER, HAS APPOINTED SIR MAURICE OLDFIELD GCMG CBE AA SECURITY COORDINATOR, WITH EFFECT FROM 8 OCTOBER. SIR MAURICE OLDFIELD WILL ASSIST THE SECRETARY OF STATE IN IMPROVING THE COORDINATION AND EFFECTIVENESS OF THE FIGHT AGAINST TERRORISM IN NORTHERN IRELAND. HE WILL BE BASED IN NORTHERN IRELAND AND BE SUPPORTED BY A JOINT STAFF DRAWN FROM THE ROYAL ULSTER CONSTABULARY, THE ARMY AND THE CIVIL SERVICE WHICH WILL BE OPERATIONAL 24 HOURS A DAY.

LINE TO TAKE

2. IF ASKED WHY SIR MAURICE WAS APPOINTED, YOU SHOULD SAY UNATTRIBUTABLY THAT HE WAS CHOSEN BECAUSE OF HIS OUTSTANDING QUALITIES OF MIND, PERSONALITY AND INTEGRITY. HE IS CONSIDERED THE BEST MAN AVAILABLE TO HELP THE SECRETARY OF STATE TO ACHIEVE THE GOVERNMENT'S SECURITY OBJECTIVES. YOU MAY ALSO SAY UNATTRIBUTABLY THAT HE HAS THE BREADTH OF VISION, THE FORESIGHT AND THE DRIVE TO HELP THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR NORTHERN IRELAND TO GET THE BEST OUT OF THE SECURITY FORCES IN DAY TO DAY OPERATIONS WHERE QUICK AND COORDINATED DECISION TAKING IS ESSENTIAL AND TO DEVELOP SECURITY STRATEGY IN COORDINATION WITH THE GOVERNMENT'S OVERALL POLICY FOR THE PROVINCE.

3. IF ASKED ABOUT BRITISH PRESS REPORTS THAT A FORMER HEAD OF THE INTELLIGENCE SERVICE HAS BEEN CHOSEN YOU SHOULD NOT COMMENT. ANY PARTICULAR PAST EXPERIENCE HE MAY HAVE HAD IS INCIDENTAL. THE APPOINTMENT IS BASED ON HIS OUTSTANDING PERSONAL QUALITIES, AND NOT BECAUSE OF ANY PARTICULAR EXPERTISE AND

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EXPERIENCE THAT HE MAY HAVE ACQUIRED IN THE PAST.

4. IF ASKED IF THIS MEANS AN INCREASE IN INTELLIGENCE EFFORT YOU SHOULD SAY ALSO UNATTRIBUTABLY THAT THE SECURITY FORCES IN NORTHERN IRELAND NATURALLY DEPEND HEAVILY ON INTELLIGENCE IN DEALING WITH TERRORISM. THE MORE THEY HAVE THE BETTER. BUT THIS IS NOT THE REASON FOR SIR MAURICE OLDFIELD'S APPOINTMENT. THE GOVERNMENT'S AIM CONTINUES TO BE THE EXTENSION OF NORMAL POLICING BY THE RUC THROUGHOUT NORTHERN IRELAND. THE ARMY WILL CONTINUE TO OPERATE IN SUPPORT OF THE POLICE. AND THE SECURITY COORDINATOR'S PARTICULAR RESPONSIBILITY WILL BE TO IMPROVE THE COORDINATION OF THE EFFORTS OF THE POLICE AND THE ARMY.

5. FOR ADDITIONAL BACKGROUND, TO BE DRAWN UPON AS NECESSARY, SEE RETRACT 57402 TO CERTAIN POSTS.

CARRINGTON

BY TELEGRAPH:

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[ALL IMMEDIATE]

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PRIME MINISTER

Northern Ireland: Cross-Border Security
(OD(79) 27)

BACKGROUND

The purpose of this paper is to seek agreement for the line which the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland should take when he sees the Irish Foreign Minister, Mr. O'Kennedy, on 5th October: and I think you should keep the discussion strictly to that.

2. In particular there are two matters which are closely related but which would seem inappropriate to discuss in any detail on this occasion viz:-

(a) The Role of the Security Co-ordinator.

The appointment will have been announced before OD meets. The Ministers directly concerned all know the history to it: the Lord Chancellor and the Secretary of State for Trade will be missing: so it will come as a surprise only to the Lord President and the Chief Secretary. You could briefly say that the Ministers concerned all felt the need for someone to improve the co-ordination of the security forces: that the individual was chosen for his personal qualities and not his previous background: and that he is currently forming his own views on how he should operate. The main thing is to avoid any impression of intensified skullduggery.

(b) Improve Intelligence on Irish Terrorists Operating from the Republic.

A Working Party has just produced a Report on this which contains some new ideas. I hope to send to you and the Ministers directly concerned during the course of next week. However it contains some very sensitive information and proposals which would not be declared to the southern Irish and which ought not to go to the whole of OD. If, therefore, anyone raises the question of improved intelligence activities which would not be known to the Republic, I

SECRET

hope you can ride it off by saying that this is not relevant to Mr. Atkins' meeting with Mr. O'Kennedy which is what OD(79) 27 is about.

3. Since Ministers last discussed cross-border security a lot of work has been done both on considering the fullest possible range of cross-border security measures and methods of improving intelligence on Irish terrorists in co-operation with the Republic. A much greater degree of agreement has been reached between the Northern Ireland Office, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and the Ministry of Defence. The severely limiting factor has been the unwillingness of the Republic to contemplate some measures and their inability to implement others. Thus the Army in Northern Ireland would like to be able to pursue terrorists across the border and into the territory of the Republic. They would also like to be free to deal direct with the Irish Army on counter-terrorist matters and for the latter to have the same special powers as they enjoy themselves. The MOD including the CGS (but not HQ Northern Ireland) are persuaded that these proposals are not worth putting forward at the present time. However the fact that this attitude of mind exists in the army is an important background consideration to the proposals set out in OD(79) 27.

HANDLING

4. You will wish to invite the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland to introduce his paper and then ask the Secretary of State for Defence to comment. The points to establish in subsequent discussion are:-

- (a) Is the Secretary of State for Defence content with the way in which the cross-border security issue is being handled? Paragraph 3 above refers to the greater extent of agreement between the Northern Ireland Office and the Ministry of Defence: but in view of the earlier Departmental differences which still persist to some extent at lower levels, it is desirable that the Secretary of State for Defence's endorsement for Mr. Atkins' proposals should be unqualified.


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- (b) In addition to the proposals already put to the Irish (listed in paragraph 2 of the paper), what additional proposals should be put forward if the moment seems opportune. The suggestion in paragraph 3 about enabling Army Technical Officers to cross the border to deal with explosive devices on or near the border seems eminently sensible but there may be other high priority proposals which the Secretary of State for Defence may wish to put forward.
- (c) If the Irish Government are prepared to do less than we hope, what should our public attitude be? The NIO are now more optimistic than they were. The questions put in Dublin to our officials last week suggests that the Irish are certainly preparing to offer some overflight concessions for British helicopters, and they may also be offering other kinds of assistance although they seem unlikely to be willing to accept RUC officers being permitted to interview terrorist suspects in Garda stations. This helicopter concession will be welcome as the Army attach particular importance to improving the existing level of surveillance south of the border. If however the talks are not productive we shall be faced with a difficult decision. There would be an obvious temptation to put the blame where it lies and pillory the Irish Government publicly. This would certainly satisfy some elements of public opinion and views in the services. But it would also tend to reduce the effectiveness of whatever co-operation we can achieve with the Irish Government. Mr. Atkins recommends the alternative approach of making the best of things while being prepared in the worst case to send a strong personal but private message from yourself to Mr. Lynch. This may be right but I do not think he should let the Irish off the hook by agreeing to a communique expressing satisfaction with what is being done unless we are satisfied.

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CONCLUSION

5. Subject to the points made in discussion, the Committee might be guided to the conclusion that they support Mr. Atkins' proposed approach when he meets Mr. O'Kennedy.



(John Hunt)

2nd October 1979

Ref. A0342

PRIME MINISTER

Prospects for Political Progress in Northern Ireland

(OD(79) 26)

BACKGROUND

When Northern Ireland was discussed by the Cabinet on 30th August you agreed that the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland should bring forward early proposals for a political initiative to increase democratic participation in the processes of government in the Province. Work was already being done on this subject following the discussion at OD on 10th July. This paper by the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland is the result. It has been fully discussed at senior official level with the other Departments concerned.

HANDLING

2. You will wish to ask the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland to introduce his paper. You might then seek the views of the Home Secretary, the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary and the Secretary of State for Defence.

3. It will be all too easy to criticise the Secretary of State's proposals ("not enough substance", "too imprecise", etc.): but no-one has the "answer" to Northern Ireland and a political initiative of some kind is clearly necessary. The Secretary of State's objective has therefore been twofold - to find a course which will not meet downright opposition from one or other of the communities and to provide a structure on which further development can be built. In other words a minimalist approach with a carrot for good behaviour.

4. The main points to establish seem to be:-

- (a) Is the departure for the time being from the line stated in the Manifesto justified? The paper argues (paragraphs 1 and 2) that although we could accept a number of "model systems" to achieve the Manifesto aims none of them can be sold in present circumstances to both communities. An elected consultative assembly is therefore put forward both as a way out of the immediate impasse and as a basis on which to build later.


- (b) Will the new assembly be credible from the outset? It will not meet before the end of 1980, and it will be preceded by extended discussions with the main Party leaders to enable detailed proposals to be devised. But do we need to have clearer ideas ourselves now on how it might work, even if these are not spelt out in the proposed White Paper? For example, the relationship with Westminster described in paragraph 9 of the paper sounds very complex.
- (c) What is the international reaction likely to be? A consultative assembly may be criticised in the United States and the Republic of Ireland as a mere talking shop. On the other hand, there is an analogy with the Strasbourg Parliament to which we can point (i. e. cutting its teeth with no real powers). And even if this proposal does not succeed, it will be easier to lay the blame for lack of political progress on the leaders of the main parties in Northern Ireland rather than on Her Majesty's Government.
- (d) Is the new proposal likely to be of assistance in easing the security situation? This may depend to some extent on the international reaction, particularly in the Republic and in the United States. It is unlikely to influence the hard-line PIRA: but, particularly coming soon after the Pope's appeals, could well detach some of the PIRA's popular support and also make the Republic more co-operative on security measures.
- (e) Is there any better way forward? In paragraph 12 the paper mentions obvious risks to its proposed course and there may be other risks that are less obvious. Furthermore, some of the details of the present proposal are very imprecise. For example, the paper is not clear about the precise machinery whereby the new consultative assembly should be elected: this process of election may itself create major problems because of the risk that the issue of "straight" majority versus "weighted" majority may be in the forefront from the beginning, if the new body takes on the task of considering and reporting on Northern Ireland primary legislation and even being free to put forward legislative proposals of its own. The main virtue of the proposed course is that it

does offer some chance of slow but steady progress together with maximum scope for adjustments following discussions on points of detail with the Party leaders in Northern Ireland: and it is difficult to see any other course which would do this at the present time.

CONCLUSION

5. In the light of discussion on these points the Committee may be guided to reach the following conclusions:-

- (a) To agree with Mr. Atkins' analysis of the present political impasse in Northern Ireland.
- (b) To agree that despite this impasse, there is an urgent need for us to find a way forward to achieve political progress.
- (c) To agree that he should bring forward to the Committee a White Paper to fill out his proposals.


JOHN HUNT

2nd October, 1979

SECRET

Ireland IA



MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1
Telephone 01-~~9337022~~ 218 2111/3

(2)

SECRET

1st October 1979

MO 19/3

Pennie Amster

Paul - 2/x

Dear Mike,

VISIT TO NORTHERN IRELAND BY
THE DEFENCE SECRETARY

This is to let you know that the Defence Secretary is planning to visit Army units in Northern Ireland on Friday, 5th October. After briefing by the GOC at Lisburn he is planning to visit the 8th Brigade area (including Londonderry). Following our usual practice, for security reasons no Press announcement will be made until the day of the visit.

I am copying this letter to Michael Alexander at No 10.

Yours ever,

[Signature]

[Signature]

(D B OMAND)

M Hopkins Esq.,
Northern Ireland Office

SECRET

SECRET



- 2 OCT 1979

02
CONFIDENTIAL

(received midday Tuesday)
in PM's OD folder.



PRIME MINISTER

POSSIBLE PIRA REACTION TO THE POPE'S VISIT

At the OD meeting on Wednesday we shall be able to discuss the political consequences of the Pope's visit to Ireland, which may prove to be significant and beneficial. It is possible, however, that we may be faced suddenly with a situation which we have not discussed, namely a PIRA announcement of a ceasefire or of the offer of a ceasefire conditional upon certain responses by the Government. This minute sets out the line on which I suggest we should respond, so that we are not exposed to the criticism that we are losing the opportunity which the Pope has, almost magically, created.

Provisional Sinn Fein have announced their intention to hold a press conference on 2 October, at which PIRA's response is likely to be revealed. I doubt if the Pope's appeal for an end to violence is likely to be heeded by PIRA or INLA: they have settled for a long haul and will not give up without something substantial to show for it. Indeed, there has already been one attack today on the Army in Belfast, probably conducted by PIRA, which fortunately (and fortuitously) resulted only in two soldiers being slightly injured.

Nevertheless, we must be ready with an appropriate response to any move PIRA may make. I suggest that our response should be as follows:

- a. If PIRA were to declare a ceasefire (which would certainly be only for short-term tactical reasons) our response should be that we welcome any reduction of violence and that if terrorism dies then nothing could do more to encourage the restoration of political and economic progress in Northern Ireland. We should re-affirm, however, that our policy will continue to be to enforce the rule of law and that those who commit no crimes have nothing to fear.
- b. The more likely PIRA move is to declare that they will continue violence unless the British Government meets certain conditions. Our general response to such an approach must be that, as the Pope himself has said, political progress cannot be brought about by violence. If their conditions demand immediate political proposals, we must reaffirm that we shall bring our proposals to the Westminster Parliament when our consultations have been completed. If they demand moves towards "justice" (the word which the Pope himself used) such as the concession of special category status for "prisoners of war", we should emphasise that we shall discriminate neither against nor in favour of those convicted of terrorist offences. As the Pope said - "Nobody may ever call murder by any other name than murder the spiral of violence may never be given the distinction of unavoidable logic or

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
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necessary retaliation." If they demand civil rights for the Catholic minority we shall be able to stand firm on the record of successive British Governments in tackling discrimination.

c. Another possibility is that PIRA may seek covertly to negotiate a ceasefire, and there are already straws in the wind to suggest this possibility. I am re-inforcing my existing instructions to Ministerial colleagues and senior officials in my Department that such approaches are to be reported to me and that it is to be made clear in response to them that the Government is not prepared to enter into negotiations with terrorists.

If any of these situations arise, I shall, of course, consult you and colleagues most closely concerned very urgently so that we may avoid the Government being spuriously thrown on to the defensive. If, in the event, nothing emerges from PIRA before our meeting on Wednesday we can consider then how to respond to any subsequent PIRA moves of this kind.

I am sending a copy of this minute to the members of OD and to Sir John Hunt.



PP H A

(Signed on behalf of the
Secretary of State in his absence)

1 October 1979

2.

RE

CONFIDENTIAL

-2 OCT 1979





Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

1 October 1979

Dear Ray,

Lord Carrington's Interview
with CBS News

While he was in New York last week, Lord Carrington gave an interview on the CBS/TV breakfast news programme. I attach a transcript of the portion of the interview covering Northern Ireland.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Michael Alexander (No 10).

Yours etc

Paul Lever

Roy Harrington Esq
Private Secretary to the Secretary
of State for Northern Ireland
Government Offices
Great George Street
London SW1P 3AJ

fs. *[Handwritten initials]*



RICHARD HOTTELET: THERE IS ANOTHER MAJOR PROBLEM, A TERRIBLE PROBLEM THAT IS A DOMESTIC PROBLEM FOR YOU AS WELL AS A FOREIGN POLICY PROBLEM - NORTHERN IRELAND. WHAT IS HAPPENING THERE. AND HOW MUCH LONGER WILL IT GO ON THIS WAY?

LORD CARRINGTON: WELL WHAT IS HAPPENING THERE IS THAT A LOT OF TERRORISTS ARE MAKING THE SITUATION THAT MUCH MORE DIFFICULT TO SOLVE. I HAVE KNOWN LORD MOUNTBATTEN FOR OVER 30 YEARS.

AND TO SUPPOSE THAT THE MURDER OF LORD MOUNTBATTEN WHO HAD NOTHING TO DO WITH IRELAND, OR THE MURDER OF 17 BRITISH SOLDIERS WHO WERE THERE TO TRY AND KEEP THE PEACE IS GOING TO FURTHER A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT IN NORTHERN IRELAND IS ABSURD. I MEAN THE REAL TRUTH OF THE MATTER IS THAT THE PROVISIONAL IRA ARE DISRUPTIVE. THEY DON'T WANT A SETTLEMENT. THEY ARE ANARCHISTS. AND ANYBODY WHO THINKS THAT THEY ARE FIGHTING FOR CONSTRUCTIVE SOLUTION IN NORTHERN IRELAND IS WRONG. AND WE HAVE GOT TO STOP IT. MR. LYNCH, THE PRIME MINISTER OF THE REPUBLIC WHO SAY EXACTLY THE SAME THING AS ME ABOUT THIS. I MEAN THE PIRA MUST BE STAMPED OUT. BUT HAVING SAID THAT OF COURSE THERE IS THE POLITICAL DIFFICULTY IN NORTHERN IRELAND WHICH I THINK SOME PEOPLE SEEM TO THINK IS RATHER MORE SIMPLE THAN WE DO. THERE ARE A MILLION AND A HALF PEOPLE IN NORTHERN IRELAND. THE MILLION OF THEM ARE PROTESTANT AND HALF A MILLION - ROUGHLY - ARE CATHOLICS. AND THE PROTESTANTS DON'T WANT TO BECOME PART OF SOUTHERN IRELAND, AND THE CATHOLICS DON'T WANT TO LIVE IN NORTHERN IRELAND WHICH IS TOTALLY DOMINATED BY THE PROTESTANTS. AND EVEN IF YOU WANTED TO YOU CAN'T COERCE PEOPLE INTO DOING WHAT THEY DON'T WANT TO DO. AND SO YOU HAVE GRADUALLY GOT TO BUILD UP A CLIMATE IN WHICH PEOPLE CAN LIVE TOGETHER. AND YOU GET A POLITICAL SOLUTION WHICH WILL GRADUALLY EVOLVE AND THE PROVINCE CAN LIVE IN PEACE.

RICHARD HOTTELET: NOW IS THERE AN AMERICAN FACTOR IN THIS TOO. THE PROVISIONAL IRA - THE TERRORISTS - HAVE RECEIVED A LOT OF HELP AND ARE STILL GETTING A LOT OF HELP FROM THE UNITED STATES. IS THIS A SEVERE, SERIOUS COMPLICATION?

LORD CARRINGTON: WELL I HOPE THAT THOSE PEOPLE WHO FEEL DISPOSED TO CONTRIBUTE TO FUNDS DO LOOK AND HAVE A REALLY GOOD LOOK AT WHERE THE MONEY IS GOING. BECAUSE IF IT IS GOING TO WEAPONS AND ARMS AND TERRORISM IT IS PREVENTING A SETTLEMENT IN NORTHERN IRELAND AND NOT HELPING IT. AND I DO PRAY THAT PEOPLE DO THAT BECAUSE MORE MONEY, MORE WEAPONS THAT THE IRA GET - THE PROVISIONAL IRA GET - THE LESS LIKELY WE CAN GET SETTLEMENT.

RICHARD HOTTELET: DO YOU SEE THE OUTLINES OF A SETTLEMENT WHICH MIGHT APPEAL TO THE DIFFERENT ELEMENTS IN THIS PROBLEM?

LORD CARRINGTON: WELL WE HAVE TRIED A GREAT MANY THINGS IN THESE LAST TEN YEARS.

RICHARD HOTTELET: THERE IS SOME TALK OF NEW INITIATIVE...

LORD CARRINGTON: WELL, WE ARE AT THE MOMENT WORKING ON SOME IDEAS WHICH WE HOPE WILL LEAD IN THE END TO A DEFUSING OF THE WHOLE SITUATION. BUT I THINK IT WOULD BE A MISTAKE TO SUPPOSE THAT THERE IS SOME PANACEA, SOMETHING THAT YOU CAN PULL OUT OF A HAT WHICH IS GOING TO SOLVE SOMETHING WHICH HAS BEEN WITH US FOR 300 YEARS. WHAT WE MUST DO IS TO WORK PATIENTLY AND QUIETLY TO RECONCILE THE TWO COMMUNITIES IN NORTHERN IRELAND. AND THEN THEY MUST MAKE UP THEIR MINDS WHAT THEY WANT TO DO.

X

21 OCT 1979




PART 2 ends:-

Pm to Galbraith MP 28.9.79

PART 3 begins:-

OD (79) 27 1.10.79





END

Filmed at the National
Archives (TNA) in London

February 2010