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
IRELAND

(Northern Ireland situation)

(Part 4)

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PREM 19/83



Part 4

Confidential Filing

The Situation in Northern Ireland.


IRELAND

Part 1: May 1979

Part 4: October 1979

Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date
29.10.79							
5.11.79							
8.11.79							
9.11.79							
13.11.79							
15.11.79							
16.11.79							
27.11.79							
26.11.79							
28.11.79							

PREM 19/83



PART 4 ends:-

W. R. Haydon to CIA 29.11.79

~~MA to NIO 22/11/79~~

PART 5 begins:-

NIO to MA 7/12/79

Published Papers

The following published paper(s) enclosed on this file have been removed and destroyed. Copies may be found elsewhere in The National Archives.

1. House of Commons Hansard, 25 October 1979, columns 625-636, "Northern Ireland (Government)"
2. Cmnd. 7763: The Government of Northern Ireland – a Working paper for a Conference
Published by HMSO, 20 November 1979

Signed A. Dayland Date 22 October 2009

PREM Records Team

CONFIDENTIAL

MR. WHITMORE

*File
mw*

c. Sir Michael Palliser

NORTHERN IRELAND

I mentioned to the Prime Minister this morning in the car that it was possible that Mr. Jack Lynch might try to raise Northern Ireland with her in the margins of the European Council. There were reports this morning in the newspapers that following an answer by Mr. Lynch's Minister of State yesterday in the Dail, there would be diplomatic representations to HMG about the proposed Conference on the Consultative Document.

The Prime Minister's reaction was that she did not wish to discuss this matter in Dublin, especially as to do so might lead to mis-representation to the effect that she was trying to do a deal involving Northern Ireland and our contribution to the Budget. If I may say so, I think she is absolutely right to take this attitude.

What the Minister of State in fact said yesterday was "The Government (Irish) who had deliberately left it to the parties in Northern Ireland to give initial reactions to the Working Paper have now noted that the Paper has not met a basic criterion, referred to in our statement on 21 November, of acceptability to both sections of the community in the North. We would urge that further consideration be given to those aspects of the Paper which are the subject of current controversy so as to ensure that an appropriate climate for political progress is brought about." I attach the text of the Minister's statement.

In the course of supplementaries the Minister also said that the Government would make representations to HMG.

This morning, my Counsellor was summoned to the DFA and representations were made by a Counsellor in the DFA asking that further consideration should be given to the basis of the Consultative Document to see if a way could be found of meeting the criterion of acceptability.

/ All this is,

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

- 2 -

All this is, of course, a reference to the so-called Irish dimension which is dear to the SDLP and to a slightly lesser degree, perhaps, to the Irish Government.

I have spoken to the Deputy Prime Minister, Mr. Colley, Mr. Nally and Mr. Dunlop of the Taoiseach's office and all three played the possibility of discussion of the Conference being raised by Mr. Lynch with the Prime Minister in very low key. They said that they recognised that it was most unlikely that there would be an opportunity for it to be mentioned and claimed that they did not even know whether the Taoiseach would wish to do so even if there were time. I made discouraging noises to all three. The Prime Minister said that if it were to be mentioned at all she would prefer it to be between the Foreign Ministers.

We have reported the representations to London.

R. H.

W.R. HAYDON

29 November 1979

CONFIDENTIAL

DÁIL QUESTION addressed to the Taoiseach
by Deputy Neil T. Blaney for answer
on Wednesday, 28th November, 1979.

QUESTION:

To ask the Taoiseach if he will make a statement on the new British initiative announced for the Six Counties.

REPLY:

In replying to Parliamentary Questions on Government policy in relation to Northern Ireland on 17 October last I indicated our belief that ultimately the way to reconcile the two major traditions and to create permanent peace and stability in Ireland lay in the free and voluntary coming together of the people of Ireland under agreed political structures. I also said that the process of discussion and negotiation we favoured to that end would be promoted, without any question of imposing a solution, by a declaration by the British Government of their readiness to encourage the unity of Ireland, by agreement, in independence and in a harmonious relationship between the two islands. That remains our position. I also indicated that the immediate need was to end the political vacuum and stalemate in the North and that the immediate priority was therefore to establish in Northern Ireland a system of devolved administration which the majority of people in both sections of the community could support and sustain. The major responsibility for devising the form and substance of such a system rests with the British Government but a solution will require the co-operation of the two Governments and of both parts of the community in the North.

The Government, in their statement of 21st November, 1979, following publication of the British Government's Working Paper for the proposed Conference, recalled the indications given in that reply and on all

/....

other occasions on the way in which the Government would wish to see progress made. We indicated that we would be observing developments closely with a view to assessing whether any combination of the elements outlined in the British Working Paper was likely to meet the basic criteria of acceptability to both sections of the community in Northern Ireland and of bringing about the appropriate climate in which further political progress could be made in relation to all the aspects of this tragic and complex situation. I would draw attention here to the reference to "all the aspects".

The Government who had deliberately left it to the parties in Northern Ireland to give initial reactions to the Working Paper have now noted that the paper has not met a basic criterion, referred to in our statement of 21st November, of acceptability to both sections of the community in the North. We would urge that further consideration be given to those aspects of the paper which are the subject of current controversy so as to ensure that an appropriate climate for political progress is brought about.

Text

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Add 2

Mr. Haney: I should like the Minister to tell us what all that was about.~~and~~ Can he tell us specifically what is left, after the production of this document, of the Government's recently announced policy? In other words, what has happened and what is to happen in relation to the ignoring of the Irish dimension, the calling off of any thoughts of unity of the country and since power sharing is not on. This situation would appear to have taken care of all that was left of Fianna Fail policy.

Dr. Woods: Regarding the first part of the supplementary, I appreciate that the Deputy was not here when I started the reply but I will ensure that a copy of the full reply is made available to him afterwards so that he may ~~inspect~~ read it in detail. Regarding the Deputy's question about the Irish dimension, the Government's policy has been outlined in the House on innumerable occasions and that policy remains as it has been.

Mr. Haney: What I am really asking is whether, in view of the fact that through all the recent issues of Government policy in respect of the Six Counties we would appear to have been left ~~with~~ with but three aspects - ~~first~~ the Irish dimension, eventual unity which is a sort of pious wish and power sharing? Since all three of those aspects are now effectively wiped out and just not on so far as Mrs. Thatcher is concerned, where do we go from here in so far as Government policy is concerned?

Dr. Woods: First, the Deputy is being premature in assuming that all these aspects are now being left aside. There is continuing discussion and development in relation to the ~~the~~ recent British proposals and the Government, as I said in the reply initially, would urge that further consideration be given to those aspects of the paper which are the subject of current controversy. I understand that the other participants in these discussions are making their points of view quite clear also.

Mr. Cluskey: It is regrettable, though understandable, that the Taoiseach is not here to answer this very important question. However, can the Minister say whether the statement made by the Taoiseach during an RTE radio interview to the effect that at this time he would not insist on an Irish dimension, still hold?

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Dr. Woods: It would be false to suggest that the Taoiseach made such a statement to take out of context in such a way what was said. The Taoiseach has indicated that he would not press the formal structures at that stage but at all times he has continued to represent to the British Government in particular the need to encourage the ultimate ~~xxx~~ unification of Ireland and the need for the British Government to make clear their position in that respect. I might add also that the House would appear to be forgetting that the Taoiseach was the first person to get from the British Government an official recognition of an Irish dimension.

Mr. L'Estrange: That is not true.

Mr. Cluskey: On a point of clarification, in what way am I taking out of context the Taoiseach's reply during the interview concerned? Did not the Taoiseach state clearly on that occasion that at that point they would not insist on an Irish dimension? Have the Government changed their ~~x~~ view as expressed then and, if so, might the House be so informed

Dr. Woods: I am sure that if the Deputy wishes to table a question in relation to a specific point in context the Taoiseach would be glad to deal with the matter. There are innumerable references to the fact that the Taoiseach has made quite clear

Section U follows

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that he continues to pass ~~statements~~ and encourage the British Government at the same time that these negotiations are going to declare their interest in the ultimate unification of the country.

Mr. Cluskey: Would the Secretary of State not accept that one of the major factors in arriving at the sad situation we are at today with regard to Northern Ireland is the fact that the Government are facing continuously in about six different directions on Northern Ireland? Could they not be clear about what their position is with regard to Northern Ireland, the Irish dimension and the question of power sharing within the context of Northern Ireland? The Government cannot have it every way without serious consequences and risking for the loss of life in Northern Ireland.

did

Mr. Smith: The Deputy ~~does~~ not know what his own Government were doing.

Mr. Mithell: He never called the Taoiseach a liar.

Mr. Cluskey: It is about time the Government came clean

(Interruptions.)

Mr. P. Barry: Did I understand the Minister to say that the Government were ~~entering~~ entering into discussions about the aspects of the document that ~~is~~ were causing controversy? Is it not a fact that what is causing controversy is what is not in the document and not what is in it? Will ~~the~~ the Minister ask the Government to try to identify points that are controversial from the point of view of the minority population in the North and make representations to the Government of the United Kingdom in regard to them?

Dr. Woods: I can assure the Deputy that the Government will do that. In effect, the last paragraph of my reply is related to that matter if Deputies wish to read it when it is available in detail.

Mr. P. Barry: It is what is not in the document that is causing the trouble.

Mr. Kelly: Is it not a fact that the British Government at the end of 1973 solemnly declared that they would support the wish for unity in the North of Ireland if that wish was ever expressed by the majority in the North? Has not every party represented in the Dail voted for resolutions which had the same effect? What, therefore, remains to be done in the sense of getting a declaration which, as far as I am concerned, the British have already given? What more ~~is~~ does the Minister of State pretend - it is only pretence - that he wants the British to do?

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Dr. Woods: The Deputy is aware of the fact that the Sunningdale Agreement did run into difficulties subsequently -

Mr. M. O'Leary: Here in the House.

Dr. Woods: - and the Deputy can take it that the Taoiseach was quite conscious of that fact. I should like to be clear about the fact that that is not critical of the Agreement but in the development of policy subsequently one must take into consideration the after effects of the Sunningdale Agreement. The Taoiseach has made it clear that he continues to support an Agreement and procedures within ~~the North of~~ the North of Ireland which will receive the support of the majority of both communities, whatever name is put on such arrangements and agreements. They are currently a matter of discussion at this time.

Mr. Kelly: Neither the last Government or this Government have ever, formally or informally, denounced or back away from the Sunningdale Agreement. The fact that it did not work is neither here nor there. Is it not a fact that the British Government never receded or recoiled from the solemn declaration they then made? The declaration was to support Irish national unity if the majority in the North supported it that is still on record, has never been denounced, receded from or recoiled from. Is that not a fact?

Dr. Woods: I should like to make it clear that I was talking about the aftermath of the Sunningdale Agreement in that context.

Mr. Kelly: Why are the Government not satisfied to speak plainly to the British and hold them to the standards which were fought for and established at Sunningdale? We will never do better than that while that sort of thing goes on on the far side.

Mr. Blaney: What are the Government doing about this initiative? What have they done since it was published? Will the Minister and the Government take into consideration that there are other people vitally concerned with the partition of our country, particularly those immediately contiguous to it, as well as the majority and the minority in the Six Counties? Is it not now clear that Sunningdale, Executive, initiative and all the rest, that there is not any point in continuing with any of those half hearted measures? Does the Minister agree that we should be seeking what I thought Fianna Fail were leading up to a year or so ago, a declaration of intent to withdraw bad and baggage out of the country?

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Dr. Woods: In reply to the Deputy's question in relation to what the Government have been doing I should like to tell him that that is an record in the House. The matter was discussed on many occasions and the Taoiseach made clear statements about the matter in the House. It is ~~there~~ in very good and safe hands.

Do

Mr. Cluskey: ~~Did~~ the Government agree or disagree that in the document published by the British Government the possibility of power sharing exists?

An Ceann Comhairle: We are going into questions now covering many aspects.

Mr. Cluskey: I want the Government's view on the contents of a document which was published last week.

An Ceann Comhairle: That is a separate question.

Mr. Cluskey: It is not.

Mr. Woods: If the Deputy tables a separate question on that matter I will consider it.

Mr. Cluskey: Am I to take it from that reply that the Government have not considered the document?

Mr. Woods: No. I would prefer if the Deputy would not keep leading the press and other people in that way. Sometimes when the Deputy gets a half answer he leads off in another direction.

Mr. Cluskey: All I got in the last two and a half years were half answers.

Dr. Woods: From statements in the House and ~~with~~ statements witnessed by the Deputy the Government have made it clear their approach to this question and that they had the matter under consideration. I should like to repeat the last paragraph of my reply which I read slowly to give everybody an opportunity of hearing the points in it. I stated that the Government who had deliberately left it to the parties in Northern Ireland to give initial reactions to the Working Paper have now noted that the paper has not met a basic criterion, referred to in our statement on 21 November, of acceptability to both sections of the community in the North. I stated that we would urge that further consideration be given to those aspects of the paper which are the subject of current controversy so as to ensure that an appropriate climate for political progress is brought about. If the Deputy does not understand that I would gladly meet him later and, perhaps, explain it further.

U.4.

Mr. Cluskey: I do not want meeting afterwards; I want this matter clarified in the House. Am I to take it from this that on the important national question the Government have no independent view?

(Interruptions.)

Mr. Kelly: It is clear from what has been announced that it is just hot buttered toast compared with what Fianna Fail were saying in 1975 when in opposition. We will hear it again from them when they are in opposition.

An Ceann Comhairle: Since the question was taken Deputy Kelly has made about six statements. I am calling question No. 3.

Mr. M. O'Leary: I do not mean any disrespect to the Minister of State but I would prefer if the question was answered by the Taoiseach.

Dr. Woods: I have answered that question.

Mr. M. O'Leary: There was an altercation on another question and the Minister of State stood up. I would prefer the Taoiseach to answer that question.

An Ceann Comhairle: The Chair has no objection if the Minister is prepared to allow it to be re-answered by the Taoiseach.

Dr. Woods: I will read it again if the Deputy wishes.

Mr. M. O'Leary: I want the question postponed to be answered by the Taoiseach in the House and that is my right.

Dr. Woods: I am prepared to postpone the question although I have read the reply.

Mr. Cluskey: The Minister of State is subject to the ruling of the Chair, like the rest of us.

Mr. MacSharry: He knows that.

Mr. Briscoe: The Minister pays attention something which the Deputy does not.

Section V follows.

M10



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
From the Private Secretary

28 November 1979

You enclosed with your letter of 22 November to Nick Sanders a draft reply for the Prime Minister to send to Mr. James Kilfedder, M.P. I now enclose the text of the letter which the Prime Minister has sent to Mr. Kilfedder this afternoon.

M. D. B. ALEXANDER

Roy Harrington, Esq.,
Northern Ireland Office.





10 DOWNING STREET

[Handwritten signature]

file
cc NIO

THE PRIME MINISTER

28 November 1979

Dear Mr. Kilfedden

Thank you for your letter of 16 November about the question of representation of Members of Parliament at the Inter-Party Conference on Northern Ireland.

I have discussed your letter with Humphrey Atkins. We were glad to know that you support the Conference. I understand the point you make about representation but it does present a very real problem. The basis on which the Conference is to take place has been agreed and made public. To change the terms of the Conference while we are in the process of setting it up would lead to uncertainty and I am reluctant to risk this.

I realise this will be disappointing for you but I want to assure you that your letter has been carefully weighed. Since receiving it, Humphrey Atkins has been giving close attention to the question of how best to ascertain the views of elected representatives not participating directly in the Conference and of other sections of opinion. You can be confident that appropriate means of doing this will be found and that the views of non-participants will be given full weight.

/Westminster

Westminster MPs will, of course, have an opportunity to express their views in tomorrow's debate. They will also participate in the decisions which the House will ultimately take on whatever proposals the Government puts forward in the light of the Conference.

Yours sincerely

Raymond Johnston

James Kilfedder, Esq., M.P.

~~Mr. Harrington~~

c.c. Mr. Stowe
Mr. Marshall

F. J. Punt

MR. KILFEDDER

... As requested when we met the Secretary of
State a little while ago I attach an
alternative draft reply.

M. J. Moriarty

M.J. MORIARTY
27 November 1979

DRAFT LETTER

ADDRESSEE'S REFERENCE

TO	ENCLOSURES	COPIES TO BE SENT TO
James Kilfedder, Esq. MP		
(FULL POSTAL ADDRESS)		(FULL ADDRESSES, IF NECESSARY)

LETTER DRAFTED FOR SIGNATURE BY..... THE PRIME MINISTER
(NAME OF SIGNATORY)

Thank you for your letter of 16 November about the question of representation of Members of Parliament at the inter-party Conference on Northern Ireland.

Susained with
I have ~~shown~~ your letter to Humphrey Atkins, ~~and we have discussed it.~~ *I am glad to have your confidence*
~~I do understand your point of view and am not without sympathy for it.~~ *that you support the Conference.*

~~But it does present a very real problem to us. As a Government we are most anxious that this Conference should get off the ground, make progress and achieve the highest possible level of agreement on constitutional arrangements which will be widely acceptable in Northern Ireland. I know from what you say in your letter that you want that, too. In planning the Conference with that end in view we judged it essential that its composition should reflect the political views of the people of Northern Ireland. We therefore thought it right - and still think it right - to make it a Conference of representatives of the 4 main parties in Northern Ireland which together represent four out of five voters in Northern Ireland at the last general election.~~ *The basis on which the has to take place has been agreed & made public & I am glad to note from your letter that you support the Conference. To embark on [see over]*

To embark. . .

E.R.

If we had built the plan for representation at the Conference round all the Northern Ireland MPs at Westminster, it would, for obvious reasons, have been a less effective way than the one we have chosen for making the Conference representative of the political views of Northern Ireland people. I fear it would not have improved the Conference's chances of success.] Additionally, ^T to embark now on changes in the basis of representation at the Conference, while we are in the process of setting it up, would ^{inevitably} ~~I think~~ be bound to be damaging both to its prospects and to confidence in the whole of the Government's initiative. I am reluctant to revise this.

^{But} ~~Nevertheless~~ In the light of your letter Humphrey Atkins has been giving

I am sorry to have to give you a ~~disappointing~~ ^{disappointing} reply.] But I do ~~careful~~ ^{careful} thought to the question of how to ensure that the views of those not participating directly in the Conference are given full weight. ~~It is our intention to study~~ ^{But I do} ~~what you say, and will keep it in mind.~~ ^{carefully} ~~You and other Northern Ireland~~ ^{MPs will of course have an opportunity to express your views in} ~~means to establish of some substance would give an opportunity to other sections of~~ ^{opinion of other elected representatives.} ~~the Government's Working Paper~~ ^{Westminster MPs will, of course} ~~participate~~ ^{ultimately} ~~in the~~ ^{decisions which the House will have to take} ~~on the Government's proposals brought forward in the light of~~ ^{the Conference.}

In the light of what is said in the debate, and progress at the conference, we shall consider how ~~best~~ ^{best} the views of other sections of opinion, and of other elected representatives, can best be taken into account. ^{Finally} ~~Of course,~~

PRIME MINISTER

Handwritten: K.S. [Signature] 28/3

ULSTER

1. Herewith Memorandum which has been sent to me by Peter Utley, with whom I lunched a fortnight ago.
2. You will remember that in our Manifesto, we said this:-

"In the absence of devolved Government, we will seek to establish one or more elected regional councils with a wide range of powers over local services".
3. Earlier this month, Jim Molyneaux told me that when he agreed to deliver the Official Unionist Members of Parliament on our side in the crucial vote at 10.00 p.m. on Wednesday 28th March 1979, it was on the understanding that if our Party was elected in the General Election which followed, we would set up one or more elected regional councils. If Airey had not given a clear indication that this would be our policy, there is some doubt (to put it at its lowest) whether Jim Molyneaux could have delivered the Ulster Unionist votes.
4. Hence Jim Molyneaux's recent Statement in the House that the Official Unionists would give to the Government whatever help lay in their power in order to implement the Government's policy as set out in its own Manifesto.
5. Airey told me nothing of any undertaking to Molyneaux which had been given on 27th/28th March 1979 - and of course Airey was murdered two days later. Nevertheless, it is, of course, correct to say that the policy on which you and Airey had agreed for Ulster had the broad assent of the Official Unionists.

6. Airey believed that Direct Rule would have to continue for some time; I am in broad sympathy with the views which are expressed by Peter Utley in the attached Memorandum; I do not know enough about the current military/R.U.C. thinking to express a view about Utley's suggestion that detention without trial should be re-introduced.

7. Finally, I attach the really splendid article about Airey which Peter Utley has written in today's Telegraph.

27th November, 1979

Ian Gow

THOUGHTS ON ULSTER

My main anxiety is quite simply that I think the present object of our political strategy in Ulster is disastrously wrong. That object appears to be the restoration of some sort of devolved Parliament with substantial powers and the inclusion in the arrangement of some system of safeguards for the Catholic minority.

Suppose for a moment that this object is attainable. Its attainment would I maintain produce continuing long term disaster.

Devolved government, it is true, produced fifty years of relative peace, but the special conditions on which that peace depended were the following: the dominance in Ulster of a strong, coherent and relatively humane Unionist party which had no wish at all for self government in any field except internal security and which worked hand in glove with British Conservative governments and even with Attlee's Labour administration in 1945. All these conditions have irretrievably vanished. A devolved Parliament in Ulster in the years that lie ahead is likely to be dominated by hard line Protestants far more nervous and bitter than Craigavon and Brookeborough, feeling no special link with any British party and determined to rule the Province itself. The effectiveness of safeguards for the minority in those circumstances will depend on continual British interventions in Ulster politics which will be hotly resented. We seek devolution because we think that it will commit us less than integration; in this we are guilty of a supreme folly.

Indeed, the likely consequence of devolution is independence brought about in the most squalid and discreditable manner. There is an arguable case for independence obviously from Britain's point of view and even from Ulster's, but if that delicate operation is to be attempted it must be attempted deliberately and openly. I hope this will never be the case. I am, however, bound to say, that it is easier to imagine a stable relationship between Britain and Ulster arising from independence than it is to imagine such a relationship arising from devolved government.

I believe that if we are serious in our intention to keep the union, the only way to do it is by what has come to be called full integration. It is not administratively impossible to restore a measure of local government to Ulster and otherwise perpetuate direct rule. There is overwhelming evidence that this settlement would command the acquiescence of far more people in both communities than any other. That truth is obscured by the traditional resistance of Catholic politicians in the North. If, however, full integration were accompanied by regular Border polls, the great bulk of Catholic ^{OPINION} ~~feeling~~ would be RELATIVELY satisfied. This certainly appeared to be the conclusion which Airey Neave had reached (not perhaps without some regard to the importance of appealing to Official Unionists in the last Parliament) and which was embodied in our Manifesto. I believe that Humphrey Atkins has made a serious mistake in retreating from it.

Of course, the probability is that the present initiative will fail. Even so it will leave a deposit of damage behind it. If it is allowed to drag on for several months (which seems to be the present intention) it will regenerate intense friction between Protestant and Catholic politicians, confirm Paisley in a defiant and destructive role (the only one he knows how to play in spite of occasional superficial gestures of reasonableness aptly designed to exploit the credulity of British politicians and civil servants) and confirm also the growing support for Paisley among Protestant para-militaries. The IRA will profit immensely from all this and will intensify its campaign as soon as the Conference begins to generate animosity. The destabilising effect of this initiative will be immense; any improvement it may produce of our reputation in Dublin or the USA will be short lived and of little material value.

The damage, however, could now be limited. This could be done by abandoning the present plan to allow the Conference to continue for weeks and even months and instead putting a firm time limit on it. It would also help if the Secretary of State were to say now that if agreement commanding wide spread support is not reached on devolved government, HMG will have no alternative but to extend and improve direct rule adding local government institutions to it. I would earnestly plead for the consideration of both these possibilities.

Clearly, I cannot offer competent advice about the details of security policy. However, I would like to make one general point: I cannot think of any terrorist campaign in any part of the world which has been successfully defeated without recourse to executive detention. I do not believe that this has been tried and failed in Ulster. When executive detention was originally re-introduced there, the operation, as we all know, was both belated and mismanaged. Nevertheless it stemmed the rate at which violence was growing and no sooner had its beneficent effects begun to appear than we began to wield the weapon in the most uncertain manner, starting to release people or offer the prospect of release in return for political concessions from the S.D.L.P.. The argument now is that if executive detention were revived, a dangerous furor^{would arise} from the Catholic population, from the Dublin government and from the U.S.A.. The first two factors are considerably exaggerated: the Catholic population is worn out, and the Dublin government (as must now surely be clear) will give us no more and no less than it is already giving whatever we do. The point I wish to draw attention to, however, is this: the arguments deployed against detention are precisely those which have been, are being and will be deployed against the use of any effective anti IRA weapon. We were bullied into abandoning detention and into substituting for it dependence on interrogation; we have been bullied into blunting interrogation to the point of virtual uselessness and into substituting for it a new dependence on "under cover activities". Under cover activities will shortly come under the same criticism and are capable of being attacked much more effectively than either detention or interrogation. In any case, ~~to~~ ~~delay then~~ it would seem that under cover activities, short

of ad hoc assassinations, may not be effective: they yield intelligence but do they yield evidence? It is lack of evidence which creates the problem. ~~In any case~~, I have no doubt ^{EITHER} that under cover activities will begin to be modified as soon as the IRA draws the attention of liberal opinion to their existence.

What finally worries me are the methods by which policy towards Northern Ireland is formulated and the style of its presentation. The isolation of the Northern Ireland office from contact with opinion in the Province is notorious and perhaps inevitable. Over the years, however, that office to a greater extent even than other government departments has developed a pattern of thought and a series of automatic reactions of its own. Evidence for this is abundant. It is, for example, astonishing to me how often British politicians and civil servants engage in conversations with Northern Irish politicians without either making themselves understood or understanding what is said to them. Unless the Northern Ireland office is very adept at deception, it would seem that it is vastly surprised, for instance, at the lack of warmth of the reception given to the latest initiative. I, who talk regularly to Northern Irish politicians, was not in the least surprised. I repeat that all this may to some extent be inevitable, but if so the Northern Ireland office is in greater need of outside political advice than it acknowledges. I am surprised, for example, that it does not more often call on the shrewd and well informed opinion of Alistair Cooke of the C.R.D..

But the style in which policy is presented leaves even more to be desired. Imagine how irritating it is, if you have been bombed for ten years during which an essentially unchanging political crisis has been in progress, to be told that the new Secretary of State is acquainting himself from scratch with the nature of the problem to which he brings the advantages of a mind largely free from former contact with it. One of the great differences between the Irish and the English is that the Irish respond to eloquence while the English prefer understatement. It is hard to find eloquent English politicians to reach the hearts of Irishmen, but has the requirement been sufficiently recognised? The accents of policy are very important. As an illustration of what I mean, for example, I think one of the few British politicians (apart from Enoch) who might have gone over better in Ulster than Roy Mason (whose bluntness and lack of sophistication was a fair substitute for eloquence) was Teddy Taylor.

While these words were being written, the S.D.L.P., I understand, was deciding not to go to the proposed conference. If this is so, the initiative is presumably still-born. A dangerous period of disillusionment will now follow. I believe it can be ended only by a firm return to our Manifesto policy, but I am bound to add that I do not believe that this will carry credibility without some change in the personalities involved.

T.E.U.

November 1979

empty pills, pious platitudes and placebos.

HONOURING THE BRAVE

ONE OF THE WAYS in which a nation sustains its life is by constantly calling to mind the memory of those who have served it. Few such memories speak so directly and eloquently to the needs of our own time as that of the life and death of AIREY NEAVE. His legendary war-time career of which the highlight was the escape from Colditz, his part in the Nuremberg trials (sensitively recalled in a distinguished book), his quiet but incredibly effective career in post-war British politics and finally the supreme and terrible compliment paid to him by Irish terrorists who probably saw him as their most formidable political enemy—all this will secure his place in history.

Apart from love of his own country, the dominant theme of AIREY NEAVE's career was his passionate devotion to the cause of freedom. It is excellent news, therefore, that a memorial trust has been established in his honour to promote that cause by education and research and that this trust has already made a good start in raising funds. In recent years, libertarian thinking in this country has been too often restricted to economics—a bias from which AIREY NEAVE himself was refreshingly free. Subjects such as the means by which a free society can defend itself against terrorism without permanently injuring its own institutions, call urgently for examination.

Let us hope, at least, that gifts to the trust (to be sent to its secretary c/o the House of Commons) will be large enough to help us all to forget another less edifying news item—the report that a Tory-controlled council has recently declined (partly from fear of IRA reprisals) to add to its war memorial the name of one of the soldiers killed at Warrenpoint. AIREY NEAVE would have had his own comment to make on that kind of caution.

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10 DOWNING STREET

MR. ALEXANDER

James Kilfedder telephoned me at 1600 to say that he would very much like to have a reply to his letter - on which you still have the papers - before the Northern Ireland Debate on Thursday.

I said that I could not promise a reply for Thursday but that we would report his anxiety to the Prime Minister herself. May I leave you to do so if necessary at 2210 tonight?

MS

27 November 1979

CONFIDENTIAL

f.s.
V. Hunt

Ref. A0771

PRIME MINISTER

Northern Ireland - Political Initiative

You are due to see the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland this evening to discuss this subject in the particular context of Mr. Kilfedder's request that he and other Northern Ireland MPs should be invited to the Conference. A brief for this meeting is attached, and has also been given to the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland.

2. On the current position on the Conference generally, I believe that it is fair to say that it has been as well received as could possibly have been hoped and that the difficulties which are at present being encountered should not by any means be regarded as insuperable. As evidence of this, I attach a copy of a telegram dated 26th November from our Ambassador in Dublin suggesting that Mr. Hume and the SDLP may well be open to persuasion to attend. My other main point is that in your forthcoming visits to Dublin and Washington it is clearly important that you should be seen to have made a positive political initiative which is still a very live issue and in which you have confidence.

RA

(Robert Armstrong)

27th November, 1979

CONFIDENTIAL

Northern Ireland Political Initiative
Brief for a Meeting between the Prime Minister and
the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland
Tuesday, 27th November

Kilfedder

The occasion for this meeting is Mr. Kilfedder's request that he and other Northern Ireland MPs should be invited to the Conference.

Current position on the Conference

2. Since the Conference in the form conceived by the Government is still very much a live possibility, it would be a mistake to risk wrecking that possibility by giving in now to pressure to change the basis of representation. The Working Paper has been generally well received and is to be debated in the House on Thursday, 29th November. Of the four parties invited to the Conference, two (Alliance and DUP) have accepted, and one (OUP) has declined. The SDLP, following Gerry Fitt's resignation, now show every sign of wanting to attend, but will need some encouragement over the possibility of discussing an 'Irish dimension' (e. g. by having the right to table appropriate papers) to get them there. The Secretary of State will have a meeting with the SDLP next week (after John Hume's election as leader) to carry this forward; and will similarly at some point see Dr. Paisley (since it is useless to win the SDLP at the cost of losing the only Unionist representatives).

3. The Conference will therefore not open on 3rd December as originally hoped; but it has been postponed, not abandoned, and could still well meet before Christmas.

Other options

4. A Conference remains the Government's first choice; but, if it proves impossible to convene, the Working Paper would remain the starting point for alternative ways forward. Possibilities include multilateral discussions to seek a basis on which the parties could come together for substantive discussions; bilateral talks with Northern Ireland political parties about the Working Paper; a different sort of Conference (e. g. Paisley's idea of a conference of Westminster and/or district council representatives); some wider sounding of

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opinion in the Province; or perhaps an Inquiry. There are advantages and disadvantages in each of these approaches, which would need further thought before any of them could be confidently recommended.

The Government's attitude

5. Given the present state of play, the Secretary of State should reaffirm in Thursday's debate the Government's view that the Working Paper sets out the ground on which progress can be made; should amplify its ideas; and should reaffirm that an all-party Conference is the right approach. He should emphasise that it is still a feasible course; and may need to say something to help the SDLP to attend.

6. While stressing the preference for a Conference, he could make clear the Government's determination to make progress even if a Conference cannot be held, and could hint at the possibilities in paragraph 4 above.

7. Similarly, the Prime Minister in her forthcoming visits to Dublin and Washington will want to convey a clear impression of confidence in the Government's initiative, and of determination to see it through.

NORTHERN IRELAND: ADVANCE COPIES

24

Ireland

PS
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 NEWS DEPT

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 N IRELAND OFFICE [4 copies]
 MR K STOWE
 MR MARSHALL
 MR P W J BUXTON
 CABINET OFFICE - SIR J HUNT
 MR R WADE-GERY
 DIO

This is a copy. The original has been extracted and closed 40 years.

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NO 10 DOWNING STREET

IMMEDIATE

CONFIDENTIAL
 FM DUBLIN 261035Z NOVEMBER 79
 TO IMMEDIATE FCO
 TELEGRAM NUMBER 453 OF 26 NOVEMBER
 AND TO IMMEDIATE NIO BELFAST
 INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON BIS NEW YORK

W

NORTHERN IRELAND : CONSULTATIVE DOCUMENT

1. GARRET FITZGERALD CAME TO SEE ME, AT HIS REQUEST, AT HOME ON THE EVENING OF 24 NOVEMBER. HE HAD, HE SAID, TWO "INFORMED SUGGESTIONS" WHICH HE ASKED ME TO BRING TO YOUR ATTENTION AND TO THAT OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR NORTHERN IRELAND. SINCE HE HAS LONG BEEN A FRIEND AND SUPPORTER OF JOHN HUME, WAS IN TOUCH WITH HIM FROM 22-24 NOVEMBER AND SAW BRID ROGERS ON 24 NOVEMBER, IN DUBLIN, IT IS LIKELY THAT THEY PROBABLY ORIGINATED WITH HUME.

2. THE "INFORMAL SUGGESTIONS" ARE THAT :-

(A) IN ORDER TO SHORE UP JOHN HUME'S POSITION AFTER HE BECOMES LEADER OF THE SDLP, WHICH FITZGERALD ASSUMES HE WILL, IT IS OF THE GREATEST IMPORTANCE THAT HUME BE RECEIVED BY THE PRIME MINISTER AND BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR NORTHERN IRELAND:

(B) THE AGENDA OF THE CONFERENCE ON THE DOCUMENT SHOULD BE SO "WIDENED" AS TO ENABLE THE SDLP TO PARTICIPATE WITHOUT ALIENATING PAISLEY TO THE POINT WHERE HE WOULD REFUSE TO ATTEND.

ALIENATING PAISLEY TO THE POINT WHERE HE WOULD REFUSE TO ATTEND.

3. THE BACKGROUND TO THIS IS AS FOLLOWS, ACCORDING TO FITZGERALD. OVER THE PAST FEW YEARS, BECAUSE OF THE "POLITICAL VACUUM" IN NORTHERN IRELAND (A FAMILIAR THEME OF FITZGERALD) THE SDLP HAD SHIFTED THEIR POSITION SO THAT MUCH MORE EMPHASIS HAD BEEN LAID BY THAT PARTY UPON THE IRISH DIMENSION.*

*Passage deleted and closed, 40 years, under a
FOI Exemption @Wayland
22 October 2009*

*IT WAS THEREFORE ESSENTIAL TO SUPPORT HUME AND NOTHING COULD BE MORE CALCULATED TO ACHIEVE THAT THAN HIS BEING RECEIVED BY THE PRIME MINISTER. FITZGERALD KNEW THAT MALLON HAD INTENDED TO SEE MESSRS LYNCH AND O'KENNEDY ON 23 NOVEMBER IN DUBLIN (MY TELECON WITH NEWINGTON THAT DAY INFORMING HIM THAT DESPITE PRESS REPORTS THE TAOISEACH AND O'KENNEDY WOULD NOT SEE HIM) BUT HAD BEEN STOPPED FROM DOING SO BY HUME (WITH SOME ASSISTANCE FROM FITZGERALD) WHO TELEPHONED THE TAOISEACH'S OFFICE TO SAY THAT MALLON DID NOT REPRESENT THE SDLP AND IT WOULD THEREFORE BE QUITE WRONG FOR HIM TO BE SEEN BY MR LYNCH AND MR O'KENNEDY. HE DID NOT, SO FAR AS I KNOW, SEE EITHER, THOUGH HE DID MEET THE TAOISEACH'S MINISTER OF STATE, MICHAEL WOODS, ACCORDING TO THE PRESS.

4. ONE DIFFICULTY WAS, ACCORDING TO FITZGERALD, THAT MR LYNCH AND THE DFA WERE OUT OF TOUCH WITH THE SDLP. HUME HAD BEEN THE REAL LEADER FOR SOME TIME; NOT GERRY FITT. BUT BOTH THE IRISH GOVERNMENT AND HMG HAD DEALT WITH FITT AND HAD NOT TAKEN PROPERLY INTO ACCOUNT THE VIEWS OF HUME. FITT HAD BEEN AN EXCELLENT MAN IN WESTMINSTER TERMS BUT HE DID NOT FULLY REPRESENT THE VIEWS OF THE SDLP. RELATIONS BETWEEN LYNCH AND HUME HAD BEEN BAD FOR A LONG TIME. HE HAD TRIED TO ACT AS A GO-BETWEEN. THE IMPLICATION HERE WAS THAT WHEN FITZGERALD RAN THE DFA, THINGS WERE MUCH BETTER SO FAR AS CONTACTS WITH THE SDLP WERE CONCERNED. I THINK THAT IS PROBABLY CORRECT. BOTH GOVERNMENTS WERE THEREFORE OUT OF TOUCH WITH DEVELOPMENTS IN THAT PARTY. I DISPUTED THIS SO FAR AS HMG WERE CONCERNED.

5. ON THE CONFERENCE, FITZGERALD SAID HE HAD THOUGHT, WHEN HE FIRST READ THE CONSULTATIVE DOCUMENT THAT THE SDLP SHOULD ATTEND. HE STILL THOUGHT SO. HOWEVER, HE BELIEVED THEY WOULD NOT, INDEED COULD NOT, BECAUSE THE IRISH DIMENSION SEEMED TO BE EXCLUDED FROM CONSIDERATION. MOREOVER, THE SOSNI HAD SAID HE WOULD RULE "OUT OF ORDER" ANY DISCUSSION OF THE IRISH DIMENSION AND THAT HAD PUT THE "TIN HAT" ON THINGS. I POINTED OUT TO HIM WHAT MR

HAD PUT THE "TIN HAT" ON THINGS. I POINTED OUT TO HIM WHAT MR ATKINS HAD SAID IN REPLY TO SUPPLEMENTARIES, ON 22 NOVEMBER AND HE SAID THAT HE ACCEPTED THAT BUT COMMENTED THAT THAT REFERRED TO RELATIONS WITH THE REPUBLIC (NEXT WORD UNDERLINED) AFTER A REPRESENTATIVE BODY HAD BEEN ELECTED. SOMETHING HAD TO BE DONE TO INTRODUCE THE IRISH DIMENSION AT THE CONFERENCE. HOW TO DO IT? HE RECOGNISED THAT PAISLEY, WHOSE OVERRIDING INTEREST WAS POWER, SHOULD NOT BE ALIENATED BUT HUME, WHO WANTED TO ATTEND THE CONFERENCE AND TO NEGOTIATE A SOLUTION SHOULD SOMEHOW BE BROUGHT TO THE TABLE. WOULD IT NOT BE POSSIBLE TO "WIDEN" THE AGENDA, HAVING, SAY, ANOTHER ITEM, CALLED "OTHER MATTERS", WHICH COULD BE TAKEN TO COVER THE IRISH DIMENSION? HE DID NOT BELIEVE IT WAS BEYOND THE CAPACITY OF THE FCO AND NIO OFFICIALS, FOR BOTH OF WHOME HE SAID HE HAD THE GREATEST ADMIRATION, TO PRODUCE A FORMULATION WHICH WOULD ATTRACT HUME AND NOT REPEL PAISLEY. HE THOUGHT IT IMPORTANT THAT HUME SHOULD HAVE THE OPPORTUNITY OF DISCUSSING THIS WITH THE PRIME MINISTER. SOMETHING USEFUL COULD COME OUT OF SUCH A MEETING.

6. ON THE DOCUMENT ITSELF, FITZGERALD SAID HE THOUGHT THE "WEIGHTED VOTING" CONCEPTS IN SOME MODELS SHOULD INTEREST THE SDLP BUT THAT PARTY APPEARED TO THINK THAT THE DOCUMENT CAME DOWN HEAVILY ON THE SIDE OF THE MAJORITY. HE HIMSELF DID NOT THINK THAT WAS SO. I STRESSED THE FLEXIBILITY OF HMG'S APPROACH IN THAT CONTEXT AND IN OTHERS DURING THE CONVERSATION.

7. I UNDERTOOK TO CONVEY HIS VIEWS TO YOU.

8. THE ONLY COMMENTS THAT I THINK SHOULD BE VENTURED FROM DUBLIN ARE AS FOLLOWS. FITZGERALD CLEARLY ATTACHED GREAT IMPORTANCE TO HIS APPROACH TO ME. HE WANTS THE CONFERENCE TO TAKE PLACE WITH THE SDLP PARTICIPATING. HE IS, AS YOU KNOW, HIGHLY INTELLIGENT, SOPHISTICATED IN HIS POLITICAL VIEWS: VERY WELL VERSED IN NORTHERN IRELAND AFFAIRS, WITH MANY CONTACTS IN THE NORTH AND HE IS 100 PERCENT AGAINST VIOLENCE. OF COURSE, HE HAS HIS OWN AXES TO GRIND AND I CANNOT ENTIRELY EXCLUDE THE POSSIBILITY THAT AT SOME STAGE HE MIGHT, FOR HIS OWN POLITICAL PURPOSES, REVEAL OUR CONVERSATION. HE RESPECTS MR LYNCH AND HAS ALWAYS TOLD ME THAT THE LATTER'S HEART IS IN THE RIGHT PLACE SO FAR AS NORTHERN IRELAND AND ANGLO-IRISH AFFAIRS ARE CONCERNED. I THINK HIS INFLUENCE WITH THE SDLP IS AT PRESENT MORE SIGNIFICANT THAN MR LYNCH'S.

9. PLEASE SEE ALSO TELELETTER FROM STAPLES TO GEE NIO BELFAT (COPIED TO NEWINGTON RID) REPORTING THE FORMER'S CONVERSATION WITH PADDY HARTE, ON 23 NOVEMBER.
HAYDON

IMMEDIATE

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MR K STOWE

MR MARSHALL

MR P W J BUXTON

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MR R WADE-GERY

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NO 10 DOWNING STREET

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RESIDENT CLERK

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FM WASHINGTON 252320Z NOV
TO IMMEDIATE F C O
TELEGRAM NUMBER 3890 OF 25 NOVEMBER
INFORMATION DUBLIN.

mb

MY TEL NO 3881 : ARMS FOR THE R.U.C.

VEST (STATE DEPARTMENT) TOLD US YESTERDAY THAT, FOLLOWING OUR
APPROACH LAST WEEK (MY TEL NO 3818), VANCE HAD PUT A PAPER ON THE
ARMS SALES ISSUE TO PRESIDENT CARTER.
THE PRESIDENT HAD MINUTED : QUOTE I SHOULD GO AHEAD AND DO IT
UNQUOTE (THE IMPLICATION BEING THAT WE SHOULD GET WHAT WE ARE

ARMS SALES ISSUE TO PRESIDENT CARTER.

THE PRESIDENT HAD MINUTED : QUOTE I SHOULD GO AHEAD AND DO IT UNQUOTE (THE IMPLICATION BEING THAT WE SHOULD GET WHAT WE ARE ORDERING)

2. VEST EMPHASISED THAT THERE WERE A NUMBER OF PROBLEMS STILL TO BE OVERCOME, IN PARTICULAR THE ATTITUDE OF SPEAKER O'NEILL WITH WHOM THE ADMINISTRATION WERE IN TOUCH. BUT IT WAS THE AIM TO LET US HAVE AN ANSWER BEFORE THE PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT AND THE ADMINISTRATION WERE TRYING TO MAKE THAT ANSWER A POSITIVE ONE.

3. FROM WHAT WE KNOW OF O'NEILL'S ATTITUDE HE WILL BE VERY DIFFICULT TO MOVE. SO WE ARE FAR FROM BEING IN THE CLEAR YET. MEANWHILE, WHAT VEST HAS TOLD US REINFORCES THE NEED TO AVOID DISCLOSURE OF OUR APPROACH FOR THE TIME BEING (PARA 2 OF TELEGRAM UNDER REFERENCE).

HENDERSON

IMMEDIATE

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From: THE PRIVATE SECRETARY



NORTHERN IRELAND OFFICE
GREAT GEORGE STREET,
LONDON SW1P 3AJ

Michael Alexander Esq
10 Downing Street
LONDON SW1

23 November 1979

Annie Ainslie

Dear Michael,

AS

Paul
- 23/11

NORTHERN IRELAND CONFERENCE

In the light of developments since the publication of the Working Paper on Tuesday 20 November - specifically the negative reaction of the SDLP - my Secretary of State thought that it would be helpful to give his OD colleagues a brief statement of where we now stand and how he proposes to handle the situation - including, as appropriate, Press inquiries - in the next two or three days.

The Government's position is, in his view, a strong one. We have announced, in the Statement of 25 October, our firm commitment to mount a political initiative with the object of getting away from direct rule and with a Conference of the four main Northern Ireland political parties as our chosen vehicle. We have published as a basis for that Conference a Working Paper which has had a notably good reception in most quarters in Gt Britain and indeed in Northern Ireland and the Republic. Simultaneously with publication Mr Atkins sent out formal invitations in writing to the four party leaders to attend the Conference. Replies to those invitations are still awaited.

It is quite wrong to suggest, as the SDLP have been doing, that the Working Paper is slanted towards the Unionist's point of view. It plots out the middle ground on which, if anywhere, progress towards agreement can be made. It asks Nationalists to put aside - but not to abandon for ever - their aspirations towards Irish unity, discussion of which at the Conference would wreck any prospects of progress. Equally it makes it clear that the Government would not contemplate a return to Stormont type majority rule which is the first choice of the Unionists. Time and again the Working Paper reiterates the need for specific arrangements, constricting the normal powers of elected majorities, to safeguard the position of the minority.

Nor is it true that the various proposals in the Working Paper leave no place for an "Irish dimension". An Irish dimension exists where there is opportunity for institutionalising cross-border co-operation. An elected representative body in Northern Ireland would have ample opportunity to work out for itself a relationship with the Republic regarding those matters on which responsibility would be transferred to it - in particular in the economic field. My Secretary of State made this point in a personal letter to Mrs B Rodgers, Chairman of the SDLP, as soon as the SDLP's reaction was known, and he repeated it in the course of Supplementary Answers during

Question Time yesterday. This has been made known to HM
Ambassador Dublin.

The immediate reaction of the SDLP is unfortunate, but blame cannot be laid at the Government's door. If anyone is at fault it is Mr Fitt for not keeping better in touch with feeling in his party. But it is by no means a foregone conclusion that the SDLP will reject the invitation to the Conference. Private messages reaching us suggest that they want to come if they can find, or be found, a way of doing so. Leading SDLP Members are today travelling to Dublin and it may well be that they will take the opportunity of consulting their friends in Irish government circles. If so we believe that they will be told by the Irish to be sensible and accept the invitation. Through the FCO we have been in touch with Dublin to offer such briefing as may be helpful.

The Secretary of State is sure that for the next two or three days it will be right to stand firm on this position and await the reaction of the SDLP and that of other parties - the OUP Executive is meeting today. It would in his view be a mistake to make further immediate overtures to any of the parties, or to embark at this stage on proposals to change the basis of the Conference; such moves could only confuse further an already confused situation.

The next landmark is the debate in the House next Thursday, in which the Secretary of State will draw the threads together in the light of reactions from the parties and other developments up till then. He may well wish to take the opportunity at Cabinet on Wednesday of reporting to his colleagues on the line he proposes to take.

In conclusion, it is much too soon to conclude that a Conference on the basis which we have proposed cannot now take place - though it may now need to start a little later than 3 December. But, looking at the worst case, it has to be remembered that the Conference is not an end in itself. It is a means to the end of getting away from direct rule; but it is not the only means. Against the possibility - to put it no higher - that a Conference on the present basis cannot now be mounted, or will reach stalemate, we are already thinking about other possible means of carrying forward discussion in Northern Ireland of the proposals in the Working Paper; and my Secretary of State will wish to bring these ideas before OD Committee.

I am sending copies of this letter to the Private Secretaries to OD Members and to Martin Vile.

*Yours sincerely,
Mike Hopkins*

M W HOPKINS

CONFIDENTIAL

From: THE PRIVATE SECRETARY

*cc Blingham
S Gow*



NORTHERN IRELAND OFFICE
GREAT GEORGE STREET,
LONDON SW1P 3AJ

(2)

Rennie Rennie

Print 23/11

23 November 1979

amb

Michael Alexander Esq
10 Downing Street
London SW1

Dear Michael,

Thank you for sending me a copy of Mr Enoch Powell's draft speech due to be delivered this evening.

It is evident from the text that he is not in fact asserting that the Government has reached some sort of secret deal with the Government of the Republic: he is merely raising the spectre of it. It can be no coincidence that the speech is being circulated in advance of the OUP's Executive Committee meeting this evening. The speech therefore falls into place as a rationalisation of the OUP's (in practice, Mr Powell's) decision not to attend the Conference, and is in part perhaps an attempt to alarm the DUP by conjuring up an illusory threat to the Union. Nothing, of course, could be further from the truth.

We cannot stop Mr Powell delivering the speech (which will in any case already be in the hands of the press), and in his present state of mind it would be folly to try: something worse would result. Taking account of Mr Powell's fury at the calling of a conference, and the fact that he is not in terms accusing the Prime Minister of making a "secret deal" with the Republic, Mr Atkins suggests that there is little point in putting Mr Gow up to tackle Mr Powell. For reasons which we cannot fully understand, Mr Powell is at present looking hard for conspiracies and hints of deception, and such an approach could go wrong. As evidence of this, the speech refers to the Boundary Commission's report having been deferred at the Prime Minister's instigation. You will know that that is untrue: the Commission simply took longer than expected to reach agreement. Their ~~report is~~ ^{reports are} ready, and will be published on 8 January (but that must not be announced - the date is a matter for the Commission).

The line we propose to use in response to questions about the speech is quite simply that there is no truth whatsoever in Mr Powell's suggestion of a secret deal with the Government of the Republic, and the sequence of events over the last month or two requires no such assumption to be made. On the penultimate

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paragraph of his "open letter", when Mr Powell says that terrorism in Ulster cannot be bought off by constitutional changes, we shall make it clear that my Secretary of State entirely agrees, and has said so repeatedly - most recently at the end of his statement announcing publication of the White Paper, and during Questions yesterday.

As we agreed on the telephone, I leave it to you to pass this on to the Paymaster General's office.

Yours ever,

R. A. Harrington

R A HARRINGTON

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23 NOV 1978



22 November 1979

Speech by Mr. Powell

I enclose a copy of the speech which Mr. Powell intends to give tomorrow evening and about which we have spoken on the telephone.

You will no doubt wish to prepare a line to take in response to Mr. Powell's speech once it has been delivered. I do not think there can be any question of trying to dissuade Mr. Powell from making it. But if you agree with me that the allegations in Mr. Powell's speech are entirely without foundation, it might be worth suggesting to the Prime Minister that Mr. Gow should telephone Mr. Powell and tell him that this is the case.

MO' DBA

Roy Harrington, Esq.,
Northern Ireland Office.

CONFIDENTIAL

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Speech by the Rt. Hon. J. Enoch Powell, M.P. to the Garvaghy Branch of the South Down Unionist Association at the Carnew Orange Hall, Banbridge, Co. Down, at 8 p.m. Friday 23 Nov. '79

In politics there are times for private advice and times for public advice. Which is which, like everything else in politics, is a matter of judgment. It is my judgment that at this moment I might, without risk of doing harm and some chance of doing good, send an open letter to the Prime Minister. From what address could it be better sent than from this place in my own Ulster constituency?

What I have to say to her is to some extent prompted by my duty to my constituents (all of them) and to this province (the whole of it). But even more is at issue; for no national interest would be served if the Prime Minister, who is in some sense the nation's representative for the time being, were to be personally committed to a course of action which was based upon misapprehension and which might, in the outcome, cast doubt upon her candour.

When Mrs. Thatcher became Prime Minister, her general policy towards Northern Ireland had been firmly stated. She was committed to the maintenance of the parliamentary Union of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and had undertaken to try to remedy the principal disability under which this province labours as compared with the rest of the nation, namely, the virtual absence of local government, though the Conservative Party was not committed as to the exact way in which that lack might best be made good. She had authorised her spokesmen to inform the previous leader of the Ulster Unionist Party, Mr. West, that, whatever view might be taken of a devolved parliament and government - a "Stormont", to use the shorthand expression - such a development was not envisaged during the lifetime of the present parliament. It was in accordance with this position of the Prime Minister that the new Secretary of State proceeded in a commendably quiet and unostentatious fashion to acquaint himself with the province and move towards implementation of the Party's manifesto.

All this was changed three weeks ago. To the stupefaction of the House of Commons, the Secretary of State suddenly announced a constitutional conference at which the Government would seek agreement, if attainable, upon one of a range of options including

full legislative and executive devolution, with the sole exception security. The Northern Ireland Office was as much taken aback by the sudden change as was the House of Commons, which could hardly credit that the Secretary of State had not breathed a word of his intention to the party leaders with whom he had been in consultation a day or two before. It was soon rumoured that the Prime Minister personally had given the orders, as it was also rumoured that she personally had prompted the deferment of the publication of the Boundary Commission's draft proposals for Ulster's additional five or six seats in Parliament. The subsequent steps were pushed ahead at breakneck speed so that the conference could begin its work early in December; and in a unique interview given to the New York Times the Prime Minister announced that, in default of agreement, her government would "impose" constitutional changes on Northern Ireland, though that was not easy to reconcile with the Government's professed neutrality as between the various "options".

One thing is certain. If Prime Minister Lynch had given instructions for all this, it could not have been more closely in accordance with his wishes. In recent weeks he has been heard saying on both sides of the Atlantic that he was not looking for Britain's immediate withdrawal from Ulster but wanted instead to see a fully devolved government here as the first step to what the Irish Nationalist calls "re-unification", but with British troops responsible for security in the meantime. In this stance, which was hailed as "moderate", he asked the American government to withhold support from the I.R.A., was promised American money if agreement could be reached in Ulster, and incautiously let fall some words about helicopters on the Border which got him into hot water. The Daily Express had the flavour exactly, if unwittingly, right when a few days ago it concluded a leader favourable to Mr Lynch with the sentence: "Mrs Thatcher can strengthen Mr Lynch's hand at this time by reinforcing her proposed initiative on Northern Ireland".

I will only say this. If a personal deal had been made between Mr Lynch and the Prime Minister whereby she would do her best to fulfil the Taoiseach's political demands in return for unspecified assistance on his part in dealing with the I.R.A., the U.S.A., the E.E.C. or who knows what, not a single thing that has happened - from the apparent gaucherie of the Secretary of State to the emotionally charged involvement of the Prime Minister herself - would have needed to be different. It is against that background that I tonight address the following open letter to the Prime Minister.

"Dear Margaret,

I am venturing, as a senior Privy Councillor and one who has concerned himself deeply with the affairs of Ulster for the last ten years, to offer certain advice. I do so in the belief that you and I share the same devotion to the Union, the same sense of national honour and - in our differing situations - the same dedication to the safety and well-being of our fellow-subjects.

What I have to say is that any deal or agreement with the government of the Irish Republic, whereby that government would somehow assist Britain in return for political concessions in Ulster, would be the road to disaster. Quite apart from your own assertion, which I support, that the internal affairs of any part of the United Kingdom are the exclusive concern of the U.K. alone, there are two facts which it is vital to understand.

One fact is this. Whatever his own inclinations, Mr Lynch cannot deliver. No government of the Republic can be seen to be effectually assisting the security forces in Ulster against the I.R.A. and survive politically. That is the reality about the Republic. I make no complaint and no moral judgment. I only say: it is an unchanging fact of the situation.

The second fact is that our Roman Catholic fellow-citizens in Ulster can only be safe when the permanence of the parliamentary Union is placed beyond all reasonable doubt, because only that can deprive the I.R.A. of the power to terrorise and blackmail them. If Her Majesty's Government is - I do not say perceived, but even misunderstood - to be seeking constitutional arrangements which the Taoiseach could regard as the first step to "re-unification", the consequence will be an immense encouragement to the I.R.A. and the loss of many more lives than would otherwise have been claimed.

Please do not think that I underestimate the pressures upon you from those at home and abroad - in the Republic, on the Continent, in America and in the Foreign Office - who, even if they are well-intentioned, do not understand these realities. But they are pressures which have to be withstood for the sake of those who can only look to you. The idea that terrorism in Ulster can be bought off or counteracted by constitutional changes of any kind is a natural but dangerous delusion. The men of violence will interpret every move made under that impression as evidence that they are bound to win and are already winning; and the population at large will be rendered correspondingly more vulnerable and disheartened.

I have to warn you solemnly that, if Her Majesty's Government were now to throw the affairs of Ulster back into the melting pot of the dark era 1972 to 1975, it would incur a needless and fearful responsibility.

Yours ever,

Enoch"

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RM 66 A/2 CGS

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MR FERGUSSON

LORD N GORDON LENNOX

HD/RID

PUSD (2)

HD/IPD

HD/OID (2)

NEWS DEPT

MR K STOWE

MR MARSHALL

MR P W J BUXTON

CABINET OFFICE - SIR ~~FRANK~~

R ARMSTRONG

MR R WADE-GERY

DIO

NO 10 DOWNING STREET

CONFIDENTIAL

FM DUBLIN 221700Z NOVEMBER 79

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 448 OF 22 NOVEMBER 79

INFO PRIORITY NIO BELFAST WASHINGTON

Princ Amster

[Signature]

THE POSITION OF MR LYNCH

1. AS YOU WILL BE AWARE FROM OUR REPORTS, SPECULATION ABOUT MR LYNCH'S FUTURE AS LEADER OF THE FIANNA FAIL PARTY HAS BEEN A STAPLE DIET OF POLITICAL COMMENTATORS HERE FOR MORE THAN A YEAR. IT TENDS NATURALLY TO BECOME MORE PROMINENT WHENEVER THE GOVERNMENT ARE SEEN TO BE IN DIFFICULTIES OR TO HAVE SUFFERED A SETBACK AND THIS HAS BEEN PARTICULARLY SO IN RECENT WEEKS IN RELATION TO:

- (A) FIANNA FAIL'S LOSS OF TWO DAIL SEATS IN THE CORK BY-ELECTION
- (B) RUMBLINGS OF DISCONTENT AMONG FIANNA FAIL BACKBENCHERS OVER THE GOVERNMENT'S HANDLING OF THE NORTHERN ISSUE.

THE LATTER ASPECT WAS ACCENTUATED BY SILE DE VALERA'S SPEECH AT FERMOY IN SEPTEMBER AND MORE RECENTLY BY ALLEGATIONS THAT LYNCH HAD COMPROMISED IRISH SOVEREIGNTY IN HIS AGREEMENT WITH US ON BORDER SECURITY COOPERATION (THE SO-CALLED AIR CORRIDOR).

2. LYNCH'S CONTINUING AUTHORITY OVER FIANNA FAIL RESTS ON THE BELIEF THAT HE CAN LEAD THE PARTY TO VICTORY IN ELECTIONS; HIS ABILITY TO DO SO IS ESSENTIALLY BOUND UP WITH THE GOVERNMENT'S SUCCESS IN MANAGING THE ECONOMY. IT WOULD BE WRONG TO SUGGEST THAT THE GOVERNMENT ARE AT PRESENT IN ACUTE TROUBLE ON THIS SCORE. IT

THE GOVERNMENT ARE AT PRESENT IN ACUTE TROUBLE ON THIS SCORE. IT IS TRUE THAT THEY HAVE HAD TO SCALE DOWN ALL THE MAJOR TARGETS IN THEIR OVERALL ECONOMIC PLANNING BUT RECOGNITION THAT THIS HAS BEEN DUE TO FACTORS PARTLY OUTSIDE THEIR OWN CONTROL IS PROBABLY NOW GENERAL. IN ANY CASE THE SIGNS ARE NOT ALL BAD: UNEMPLOYMENT IS DOWN, IF NOT BY AS MUCH AS HAD EARLIER BEEN HOPED, AND INVESTMENT IS UP: THE MEDIUM-TERM PROSPECTS LOOK FAIRLY PROMISING. ON THE OTHER HAND, THERE ARE SOME PRESSING PROBLEMS ON THE INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS FRONT. POWER SUPPLIES AND COMMERCE ARE THREATENED BY POWER STATION AND DOCK STRIKES AND A BANK STRIKE HAS JUST STARTED.

3. LYNCH'S NORTHERN POLICY IS NOT CONTROVERSIAL FOR THE ELECTORATE AS A WHOLE. INDEED HIS LINE IS GENERALLY ACCEPTED BY FINE GAEL AND LABOUR ALSO, AS WELL AS BY MOST OF HIS OWN PARTY. THERE IS, HOWEVER, A HARLINE REPUBLICAN MINORITY IN FIANNA FAIL WHO ARE UNWILLING TO COMPROMISE ON THE IRISH UNITY ISSUE AND WHO ARGUE THAT CURRENT FIANNA FAIL NORTHERN POLICY NOT ONLY BETRAYS REPUBLICAN IDEALS BUT ALSO FAILS TO HOLD THE LOYALTY OF THE PARTY FAITHFUL, ESPECIALLY WHEN THEIR ALLEGIANCE IS TRIED BY ECONOMIC MISMANAGEMENT. IT IS THIS FACTION WHICH HAS BEEN RESTLESS SINCE LYNCH'S ALLEGED REVELATIONS ABOUT OVERFLIGHTS TO THE NATIONAL PRESS CLUB IN WASHINGTON. ALTHOUGH A FIANNA FAIL PARTY MEETING LAST WEEK REBUKED THE DEPUTY WHO HAD ACCUSED LYNCH OF LYING IN THIS CONNECTION (DUBLIN TELEGRAM NO 423), THE MURMURINGS CONTINUED AND IT LOOKED AS THOUGH THERE MIGHT BE A SHOWDOWN AT YESTERDAY'S PARLIAMENTARY PARTY MEETING. IN THE EVENT, THE MEETING PASSED OFF VIRTUALLY WITHOUT INCIDENT AND ALL DISCUSSION WAS POSTPONED UNTIL 5 DECEMBER, SIGNIFICANTLY THE FRIST WEDNESDAY AFTER THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL.

4. DR GARRET FITZGERALD TOLD ME LAST WEEK THAT LYNCH WAS IN "BIG TROUBLE" WITH THE DAIL, WITH HIS OWN PARTY AND WITH THE MEDIA BECAUSE HE WAS CRITICAL OF THEM FOR REPORTING AND COMMENTING ON WHAT HE HAD SAID IN THE STATES. HE ALSO BELIEVED THE SIGNS WERE THAT HAUGHEY WAS STARTING HIS BID FOR THE LEADERSHIP OF FIANNA FAIL, CITING ESPECIALLY THE FACT THAT HAUGHEY HAD NOT BEEN IN THE RECEPTION COMMITTEE OF MINISTERS AND OTHERS AT DUBLIN AIRPORT TO WELCOME LYNCH BACK FROM THE STATES ON 16 NOVEMBER. MUCH WAS MADE OF HIS ABSENCE BY THE MEDIA WHO DREW PARALLELS WITH THE RECEPTION COMMITTEE ORGANISED IN 1970 AFTER THE ARMS CRISIS WHEN MINISTERS AND OTHER PARTY MEMBERS ASSEMBLED (NEXT TWO WORDS UNDERLINED) EN MASSE AT THE AIRPORT TO WELCOME LYNCH BACK FROM THE STATES. THE FACT THAT MORE THAN ONE EXPLANATION WAS GIVEN FOR HAUGHEY'S NON-APPEARANCE ON 16 NOVEMBER SUGGESTS THAT

GIVEN FOR HAUGHEY'S NON-APPEARANCE ON 16 NOVEMBER SUGGESTS THAT HE HAD INTENDED IT AS SOME SORT OF POLITICAL GESTURE.

5. OTHERS TOO CLAIM TO DISCERN FROM HAUGHEY'S RECENT ACTIONS THAT HE IS MAKING A BID FOR THE LEADERSHIP. HE HAS MAINTAINED A HIGH PROFILE IN THE MEDIA FOR SOME MONTHS AND MADE SEVERAL PUBLICITY-CATCHING GESTURES, EVEN PROPOSING A FREE TOOTHBRUSH FOR EVERY IRISH CHILD AS WELL AS CAMPAIGNING STILL MORE VIGOROUSLY AGAINST TOBACCO ADVERTISING. (INCIDENTALLY IT CANNOT BE COINCIDENCE THAT MORE PICTURES OF HAUGHEY AND HIS WIFE HAVE APPEARED IN THE IRISH NEWSPAPERS IN THE MONTH SINCE THE HILLERY "SCANDAL" THAN IN ALL THE REST OF HIS PUBLIC CAREER PUT TOGETHER).

6. THE PROFESSIONAL HIBERNIOLOGISTS HAVE ALSO READ MUCH INTO THE ANNUAL PEARSE MEMORIAL SPEECH MADE BY HAUGHEY ON 10 NOVEMBER IN WHICH HE SUGGESTED THAT PEARSE, IF HE WERE ALIVE TODAY, WOULD BE TOTALLY OPPOSED TO PARTITION. CERTAINLY THE TAOISEACH, RIGHTLY OR WRONGLY, FELT THIS REQUIRED HIM TO ADD A SMALL SECTION TO A PREVIOUSLY PREPARED SPEECH TO THE EFFECT THAT IF PEARSE WAS ALIVE TODAY HE WOULD REJECT VIOLENCE AND WORK PEACEFULLY FOR NATIONAL UNITY.

7. IT IS HARD TO DRAW ANY DEFINITE CONCLUSION FROM ALL THIS, THOUGH IT DOES SEEM THAT PARTY DISCIPLINE HAS REASSERTED ITSELF WITHIN FIANNA FAIL, AT LEAST FOR THE TIME BEING, IN THE AWARENESS THAT IT WOULD DO THE IRISH NO GOOD FOR THE TAOISEACH TO GO INTO THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL WITH HIS AUTHORITY SEEN TO BE CONTESTED AT HOME. IN ANY CASE, I DOUBT WHETHER THERE IS AT PRESENT ENOUGH OPPOSITION WITHIN THE PARTY TO FORCE LYNCH OUT OF OFFICE, EVEN AFTER THE CORK BY-ELECTION RESULTS. HOWEVER, ONCE THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL IS OUT OF THE WAY, THE END OF THE YEAR, WHEN LYNCH HAS ALREADY PROMISED A GOVERNMENT RESHUFFLE, WILL BE CLOSE AT HAND. MOREOVER, THE TIME IS APPROACHING WHEN LYNCH WILL HAVE TO DECIDE WHETHER HE INTENDS TO LEAD FIANNA FAIL INTO THE NEXT GENERAL ELECTION. RECENT GESTURES BY HAUGHEY DO NOT YET, IN MY VIEW, AMOUNT TO A MAJOR CHALLENGE FOR THE LEADERSHIP, THOUGH THERE IS NO DOUBT THAT THIS IS WHAT HE AIMS AT EVENTUALLY. HIS CURRENT OBJECTIVE LOOKS MORE LIKE CHIPPING AWAY AT LYNCH'S AUTHORITY AND POSITION, SO AS TO MAKE THE BURDEN OF CONTINUING IN OFFICE LOOK UNATTRACTIVE TO LYNCH AND TO INDUCE HIM TO RESIGN VOLUNTARILY. I THINK HE MAY BE UNDERESTIMATING HIS MAN AND I AM NOT SURE WHETHER HAUGHEY HAS GOT HIS TIMING RIGHT; HE HAS BEEN WRONG ON THIS BEFORE.

RIGHT: HE HAS BEEN WRONG ON THIS BEFORE.

CCN LAST LINE OF PARA 3 SHOULD READ :

5 03

5 DECEMBER, SIGNIFICANTLY THE FIRST WEDNESDAY AFTER THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL.

HAYDON

NNNN

SENT AT 23/1444Z JAW

From: THE PRIVATE SECRETARY



NORTHERN IRELAND OFFICE
GREAT GEORGE STREET,
LONDON SW1P 3AJ

Michael Alexander Esq
10 Downing Street
LONDON SW1

L.S. Hunt 22/11
22 November 1979

Dear Michael,

The Secretary of State has so far received no formal replies to his letters of invitation to the Conference. But in the last 24 hours there has been much media reporting of parties reactions to the Conference Working Paper published on 20 November. More particularly there are reports that the SDLP have rejected the document "as a basis for a meaningful Conference". It is a fact that Gerry Fitt has resigned as leader and as a party member because of the attitude taken by the party to the document. Reports about all this will be bound to cause some excitement at Quarter Time later today and the Secretary of State thinks that the PM would wish to be aware of the line which he proposes to take.


... I attach a copy of the Answer which will be given to the first oral Question this afternoon, and of a couple of Notes for Supplementaries dealing with two key questions likely to be raised. The substantive Answer deliberately takes a straightforward factual line on the Conference, and the Supplementaries reflect a determination not to be rushed into ill-considered statements. The position is that the SDLP have now joined in the game of talking about conditions that must be fulfilled before they can attend. There are some signs that the Party has not properly understood the wide scope for discussion of their own ideas that the document offers to them; and it is at this stage too early to be certain that they will not be present. They have promised a reply in due course to a letter sent to them yesterday which attempted to clarify some points which an earlier SDLP statement had suggested might have been misunderstood. The position about attendance at the Conference is likely to be much clearer before next week's debate on the Working Paper.

Yours ever,

Roy Harrington

ROY HARRINGTON

22 NOV 1963



Date for answer: 22.11.79

22 November 1979

Oral Nos 1, 2, 3, 7, & 20

MR HAL MILLER (Bromsgrove and Redditch): To ask the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, which political parties have agreed to attend his conference on the reform of local government in Ulster; and when and for how long that conference will be convened.

MR MARTIN FLANNERY (Sheffield, Hillsborough): To ask the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, what is the latest position regarding the invitations and acceptances to the intended Conference on Northern Ireland.

MR IVOR STANBROOK (Orpington): To ask the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, if he will make a statement on the arrangements for the proposed conference on constitutional reform in Northern Ireland.

MR PHILIP WHITEHEAD (Derby North): To ask the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, when he expects to announce a date for his proposed conference on constitutional proposals for Northern Ireland.

MR MICHAEL LATHAM (Melton): To ask the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, whether he will make a statement on the progress of his proposed constitutional discussions.

MR ATKINS

I will, with permission Mr Speaker, answer this Question and Question Nos 2, 3, 7 and 20 together.

On 20 November I issued formal invitations to the [~~leaders of the~~] Ulster Unionist Party, the Democratic Unionist Party, the Social Democratic and Labour Party and the Alliance Party to attend a

Conference in Belfast, ~~starting in the week beginning 3 December~~

On the same day, I published and laid before Parliament a Working Paper (Cmnd 7763) which, in effect, provides a basis and agenda for this Conference. Although I have seen and heard reports of reactions by the parties, I have not yet received any formal replies to my letters of invitation.

1. What will you do if refusals by the parties to attend means that there is no Conference?

✓ The Government will continue "to seek an acceptable way of restoring to the people of Northern Ireland more control over their own affairs". We still believe that the best way to achieve this is by consultation with the main political parties in Northern Ireland and that at this date the best way of proceeding would be an inter-party Conference. We hope that this will take place. The Parties in Northern Ireland all said in their Manifestos that they wanted to make progress. The people of Northern Ireland will expect progress: and the Conference would be the best way of making progress.

2. Will the Government seek to impose a system of Government in Northern Ireland

In the end it will be for Parliament to decide what new arrangements should be made for the government of Northern Ireland. It will be the Government's responsibility to put proposals to Parliament; and we will not shirk this. But I do not wish to talk about imposing new arrangements. We recognise that if

C.R.

a new system of government is to be stable and effective it must be capable of attracting broad support in Northern Ireland itself; and our proposals to Parliament will take full account of this recognition.



10 DOWNING STREET

Prime Minister.

There is no brief for
your meeting with the
Attkins to-morrow evening.

But you may like to
glance again at these
letters.

Paul

A blue ink scribble or signature mark, possibly a stylized 'P' or a flourish.



NORTHERN IRELAND OFFICE
GREAT GEORGE STREET,
LONDON SW1P 3AJ

N. Sanders Esq
No 10 Downing Street
London
SW1.

22 November 1979

Dear Nick,

In your letter of 19 November you asked for advice on the terms of the reply to be sent to a request from Mr James Kilfedder MP that he, and the other two Northern Ireland MPs who are not members of the four political parties already invited to attend the Conference on the future government of Northern Ireland, should also receive invitations to be present.

7
I have to tell you that in my Secretary of State's view to accede to this request would have the most serious implications, both for the Government's own credibility on the Conference and for the success of the Conference itself.

On 3 October OD decided that there should be a Conference of "the main Ulster political parties". On 25 October, the Secretary of State's announcement to Parliament (which was of course cleared with No 10) referred to the Government's intention to convene a Conference of "the principal political parties in Northern Ireland"; and in questions afterwards he named the parties concerned. He has publicly resisted attempts either to exclude the Alliance Party or to bring in other parties or individuals. The four parties invited represent four out of five voters in Northern Ireland and a very broad range of political opinion there. If they can reach agreement, the arrangements they approve will certainly gain wide acceptance in the Province as a whole. A belated decision now to invite all Northern Ireland MPs, which is what Mr Kilfedder wants, would be widely regarded as a sign of Government weakness under pressure. why?

There can be no question of inviting only Mr Kilfedder in addition to those already invited. If he (an Independent Unionist with no party affiliations since he cut his link with the Ulster Unionist Party) were invited, we should also have to ask Mr Frank Maguire (the Independent member for Fermanagh and South Tyrone) and Mr John Dunlop (the member for Mid-Ulster and the sole representative of the United Ulster Unionist Party); and if Mr Dunlop is invited he would have the same right as, for example, Mr Paisley to bring a delegation from his party, whose leader, Ernest Baird, is already pressing for an invitation, thus increasing the membership of the Conference still further. Such an emphasis on the primacy of parliamentary parties and members would make the position of Alliance even more exposed. What has been done so far is to invite any party which got more than 10% of the votes in the last General Election: and this is a reasonable basis on which to stand.

the 4 parties
voters?

Even more important in terms of the outcome is the fact that if Messrs Kilfedder and Dunlop attend the Conference it would in practice greatly increase Ian Paisley's strength there, not the strength of the Official Unionists since on these matters there is a close identity of view among the three. (The UUUP and DUP never oppose each other at elections; and both avoid opposing Mr Kilfedder). Frank Maguire would not provide a balance, since he would almost certainly decline to come. The net result would be to strengthen greatly the most intransigent Unionist representation, and thus reduce the chances of reaching a reasonable level of agreement.

The Secretary of State's considered judgment is that Mr Kilfedder's request should be rejected, and he suggests that the Prime Minister should reply accordingly. I attach a short draft reply which she may wish to send.

Yours ever

Ry Harrington.

R A Harrington

PS. Michael Alexander is more loth of Mr. Atherton's very strong feelings about this, and that the question of Kilfedder's attendance at the Conference would come up during NIO questions this afternoon.

Ry

22 NOV 1979



DRAFT LETTER

FILE NUMBER.....

RESSEE'S REFERENCE.....

To	Enclosures	Copies to be sent to
James Kilfedder Esq MP		
(Full Postal Address)		(Full Address, if Necessary)

LETTER DRAFTED FOR SIGNATURE BY PRIME MINISTER
(Name of Signatory)

Thank you for your letter of 16 November in which you invite me to reconsider the question of representation of Members of Parliament at the inter-party Conference on Northern Ireland which was announced in the statement by the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland in his statement on 25 October.

I understand the strength of your view that all Northern Ireland's MPs should be invited to participate but, after careful consideration both Mr Atkins and I still judge it right to confine the Conference itself to representatives of the four main parties in Northern Ireland. We want the Conference to have the best chance of success, as a working Conference so that it can achieve the highest possible level of agreement on arrangements which will be widely acceptable in the Province. It must therefore reflect in its composition the political views of the people of Northern Ireland. The four political parties in Northern Ireland already invited by the Secretary of State represent four out of five voters in Northern Ireland at the last General Election; and the chances of a successful outcome would not be materially improved by enlarging the Conference to include all the Northern Ireland MPs at Westminster.

E.R.

In any event, Humphrey Atkins will be very willing to discuss the issues arising in the Conference with you personally so that we can take full account of your views in reaching our conclusions. You and the other Northern Ireland MPs will of course have an opportunity to express your views in next week's debate; and of course to participate in the final decisions which the House will have to take eventually on the Government's proposals.

I regret therefore that I cannot agree to your request.

From: THE PRIVATE SECRETARY

Ireland



NORTHERN IRELAND OFFICE
GREAT GEORGE STREET,
LONDON SW1P 3AJ

Michael Alexander Esq
10 Downing Street
London SW1

22 November 1979

Dear Michael,

kg
ms

Thank you for sending me, with your letter of 15 November, ✓
copies of the records of the Prime Minister's conversations
yesterday with Mr Molyneaux and Dr Paisley.

In our subsequent telephone conversation, you said that you would welcome advice on whether anything needed to be done as a result of the meeting with Dr Paisley, for example in response to his request for an early statement by the Prime Minister on security. As I told you on the telephone my Secretary of State was already convinced that it would be tactically wrong to accede immediately to Dr Paisley's demand for a statement. The DUP's announcement in response to the publication of the White Paper means that we need not look for any special announcement to win their acceptance of the invitation to a conference. My Secretary of State is, however, considering some ideas for greater involvement by local people in discussions with the security forces about the handling of security in their areas and this will be developed for announcement on a suitable occasion.

Dr Paisley promised to provide details of cases where persons convicted of terrorist offences were given such light sentences that they left court as free men. No such details have yet been provided, but the Secretary of State will mention the point to Dr Paisley when he sees him early next week.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Paul Lever.

Yours ever,

Ry Harrington -

R A HARRINGTON



NOV 22 11 12 AM '79

222 NOV 1979

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CABINET OFFICE - SIR ~~I HUNT~~ *R Armstrong*

HD/IPD

MR R WADE-GERY

~~HD/OID (2)~~

DIO

NEWS DEPT

NO 10 DOWNING STREET

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RESIDENT CLERK

ADVANCE COPY *Ans*

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FM DUBLIN 211840Z NOV 79

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 439 OF 21 NOV 79

FOR INFO TO NIO(BELFAST) WASHINGTON AND BIS NEW YORK

TAOISEACH'S TOUR OF THE USA

1. MR LYNCH TOLD ME IN PRIVATE CONVERSATION ON 16 NOVEMBER THAT HE WAS WELL PLEASED WITH HIS RECEPTION IN THE STATES THOUGH SOME "ODD THINGS" HAD BEEN HAPPENING IN THE REPUBLIC DURING HIS ABSENCE (A REFERENCE ESPECIALLY TO CRITICISM BY POLITICIANS AND THE MEDIA OF HIS WASHINGTON NATIONAL PRESS CLUB REMARKS ABOUT SECURITY COOPERATION). HE HAD BEEN MOST IMPRESSED BY TWO EVENTS. ONE WAS A PARTY GIVEN BY THE IRISH AMERICANS; IT WAS UNUSUALLY WELLATTENDED AND HIS REMARKS AGAINST VIOLENCE AND AID TO THOSE WHO PERPETRATED OR HELPED IT HAD BEEN RECEIVED "WITH ACCLAMATION". THE SECOND WAS WHEN HE APPEARED BEFORE THE FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE AT WHICH BIAGGI WAS PRESENT. HE HAD, HE SAID, IN HIS CRITICISM OF VIOLENCE "LAID IT ON PRETTY THICK" AND THAT WAS THE ONLY TIME THE HARD-BITTEN CONGRESSMEN HAD REACTED AT ALL TO HIS REMARKS ON NORTHERN IRELAND. HE THOUGHT THEY HAD BEEN GENUINELY MOVED.

Romi Amster

Ans
Ans

2. MR O'KENNEDY TOLD THE LORD PRIVY SEAL ON 19 , NOVEMBER THAT THE IRISH HAD BEEN VERY PLEASED THAT THERE HAD BEEN FEWER HOSTILE DEMONSTRATIONS AGAINST MR LYNCH'S ANTI-VIOLENCE REMARKS THAN ON PREVIOUS SIMILAR OCCATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES.

3. JOURNALISTS ACCOMPANYING MR LYNCH HAVE TOLD US THAT HE WAS STRONGER THAN EVER BEFORE IN HIS CONDEMNATION OF VIOLENCE AND THAT HIS REMARKS HAD BEEN WELL RECEIVED.

HAYDON

NNNN

SENT AT 211930Z JRW
RECD AT 211930Z RAF

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19x

PS

N IRELAND OFFICE - PS TO SEC OF STATE
RM 66 A/2 GGS

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MR FERGUSSON

MR MARSHALL

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MR P W J BUXTON

HD/RID

R Armstrong

PUSD (2)

CABINET OFFICE - SIR J HUNT

HD/IPD

MR R WADE-GERY

~~HD/OID (2)~~

DIO

NEWS DEPT

NO 10 DOWNING STREET

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RESIDENT CLERK

IMMEDIATE

ADVANCE COPY

OO BIS NEWYORK

Prime Minister ②
John Hunt
21. 11. 79

GRPS 172A

UNCLASSIFIED

FM DUBLIN 211750Z NOV 79

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 436 OF 21 NOV

FOR INFO IMMEDIATE NIO(BELFAST) WASHINGTON AND BIS NEW YORK

NORTHERN IRELAND: POLITICAL PROGRESS

1. THE FOLLOWING IRISH GOVERNMENT STATEMENT WAS ISSUED TO THE PRESS THIS EVENING 21 NOVEMBER.

QUOTE THE IRISH GOVERNMENT HAVE CONSISTENTLY STRESSED THE NEED FOR POLITICAL ACTION IN RELATION TO NORTHERN IRELAND. THE TAOISEACH, IN HIS STATEMENT IN DAIL EIREANN ON 17 OCTOBER AND ON ALL OTHER OCCASIONS HAS INDICATED THE WAY IN WHICH THE GOVERNMENT WOULD WISH TO SEE PROGRESS MADE. AS AN IMMEDIATE PRIORITY HE HAS CALLED FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A SYSTEM OF DEVOLVED ADMINISTRATION WHICH BOTH SECTIONS OF THE COMMUNITY IN NORTHERN IRELAND CAN SUPPORT AND SUSTAIN. THE GOVERNMENT HAVE NOTED THE PAPER PUBLISHED BY THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT AND WILL BE OBSERVING DEVELOPMENTS CLOSELY WITH A VIEW TO ASSESSING WHETHER ANY COMBINATION OF THE ELEMENTS OUTLINED IS LIKELY TO MEET THE BASIC CRITERIA OF ACCEPTABILITY TO BOTH SECTIONS OF THE COMMUNITY IN NORTHERN IRELAND AND OF BRINGING ABOUT THE APPROPRIATE CLIMATE IN WHICH FURTHER POLITICAL PROGRESS CAN BE MADE IN RELATION TO ALL THE ASPECTS OF THIS TRAGIC AND COMPLEX SITUATION. UNQUOTE

HAYDON

NNNN

SENT AT 211835Z JRW

22

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YRS 430

CONFIDENTIAL

DESKBY 210900Z

FM WASHINGTON 202315Z NOV 79

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NO 3818 OF 20 NOVEMBER

INFO DUBLIN

②
James Robinson
[Signature] *[Signature]*
21.11.79

YOUR TELNO 1683: ARMS FOR THE RUC

1. ROBINSON CALLED ON VEST (STATE DEPARTMENT) THIS MORNING AND SPOKE AS IN PARA 1 OF TELEGRAM UNDER REFERENCE. ROBINSON SAID THAT, IN ADDITION TO THE 3000 REVOLVERS PLUS SPARES AND AMMUNITION FOR WHICH THE STATE DEPARTMENT COULD EXPECT A LICENCE APPLICATION IN THE NEXT WEEK OR SO, WE WERE ALSO AWAITING AN ANSWER ON THE SPARES AND AMMUNITION FOR WHICH A LICENCE APPLICATION HAD BEEN MADE SOME TIME AGO.

2. VEST SAID HE WAS GRATEFUL FOR THE WARNING OF THE LICENCE APPLICATIONS AND OF THE FACT THAT THE ISSUE WOULD FIGURE PROMINENTLY IN THE PRIME MINISTER'S TALKS, IF NOT RESOLVED BEFORE 17 DECEMBER. HE COULD GIVE NO REACTION IN ADVANCE OF THE APPLICATION BEING RECEIVED BUT HE WAS NOT AWARE OF ANY FRESH DEVELOPMENTS IN WASHINGTON AND WE WERE ALREADY AWARE OF THE ADMINISTRATION'S PREFERENCE THAT THE MATTER NOT BE PURSUED AT THIS TIME.

3. ROBINSON AGAIN EMPHASISED THAT IT WAS BECAUSE OF THE SERIOUSNESS OF THE ISSUE THAT HE HAD BEEN INSTRUCTED TO SPEAK AS HE HAD. HE UNDERSTOOD FROM WHAT VEST HAD TOLD ME THAT THE ARMS ISSUE HAD COME UP DURING LYNCH'S VISIT BUT THAT LYNCH HAD NOT GIVEN A GREEN LIGHT. THIS DID NOT SURPRISE US GIVEN LYNCH'S POLITICAL PROBLEMS AND WE DID NOT OURSELVES FEEL THAT HIS REACTION IMPLIED MORE THAN A RELUCTANCE TO PULL THE ADMINISTRATIONS CHESTNUTS OUT OF THE FIRE. VEST SAID HE AGREED WITH THIS INTERPRETATION. HE HAD NO IDEA AT THIS POINT WHAT THE NEXT STAGE WOULD BE BUT REITERATED THAT THE ADMINISTRATION HAD NOT WANTED TO MAKE ANY MOVE AT PRESENT. VEST ADDED, SAYING THAT HE WAS DOING SO OFF THE RECORD, THAT THE FACT THAT WE WERE GOING AHEAD WITH AN APPLICATION DESPITE THE ADMINISTRATION'S PREFERENCE TO THE CONTRARY, INDICATED CLEARLY HOW SERIOUSLY WE VIEWED THE ISSUE. ROBINSON SAID THAT WHILE THE ADMINISTRATION MIGHT NOT WISH TO MOVE, THE IRA DID NOT STAND STILL AND PEOPLE CONTINUED TO BE MURDERED IN NORTHERN IRELAND.

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4. VEST MADE NO ATTEMPT TO ADVISE US TO DELAY ACTION AND CLEARLY RECOGNISED THAT WE HAD TAKEN A FIRM DECISION TO GO AHEAD WITH OUR APPLICATION.
5. ROBINSON SUBSEQUENTLY WENT OVER THE GROUND FULLY WITH BLACKWILL, BRZEZINSKI'S ASSISTANT FOR EUROPEAN AFFAIRS. BLACKWILL SAID THAT THIS APPROACH WAS VERY TIMELY. I SHALL BE REPORTING FURTHER ABOUT THIS .

HENDERSON

FILES

RID	PS/MR HURD
NAD	PS/MR RIDLEY
OID	PS/MR BLAKER
IPD	PS/PUS
WED	SIR A. DUFF
MAED	MR BULLARD
NEWS D	CHIEF CLERK
SEC D	LORD N G' LENNOX
FUSD	MISS BROWN
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PS/LPS	MR FERUSSON

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NORTHERN IRELAND

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10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

19 November 1979

I attach a copy of a letter the Prime Minister has received from James Kilfedder M.P. about the proposed Northern Ireland Conference. I should be grateful if you could let me have a draft reply for the Prime Minister to send to Mr. Kilfedder, to reach us by Friday, 23 November - or sooner if you judge it appropriate.

N. J. SANDERS

M.W. Hopkins, Esq.,
Northern Ireland Office.

5711



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

19 November 1979

I am writing on behalf of the Prime Minister to thank you for your letter of 16 November about the proposed Conference on Northern Ireland. I will place your letter before the Prime Minister and you will be sent a reply as soon as possible.

N. J. SANDERS

James Kilfedder, Esq., M.P.

From: THE PRIVATE SECRETARY

Ireland



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NORTHERN IRELAND OFFICE
GREAT GEORGE STREET,
LONDON SW1P 3AJ

Prime Minister

(2)

fa.

Ans.

PS/Rt Hon Margaret Thatcher MP
Prime Minister
10 Downing Street
London SW1

16 November 1979

Dear Private Secretary

The Secretary of State has asked me to send the Prime Minister an advance copy of a Command Paper which he will lay before Parliament on Tuesday 20 November. As you will see this is a Working Paper for the Conference of the main Northern Ireland political parties which the Secretary of State announced would be convened when he made his statement in the Commons on 25 October.

The Prime Minister may wish to know also that some background briefing about this paper and the Conference is being prepared separately and that arrangements will be made for this to be distributed on the Paymaster General's information net.


I am sending a copy of this letter to the Private Secretary of every Member of the Cabinet, and to Martin Vile.

*Yours sincerely
M W Hopkins*

M W HOPKINS

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HOUSE OF COMMONS
LONDON SW1A 0AA

MODRA
cc IG
Press Office

16 November 1979
R17

Dear Margaret

Last week I complained in PM Questions that Humphrey Atkins had not invited all Unionist MPs to the proposed conference on NI. I thought that my protest would have brought a favourable response from the Secretary of State. I am deeply upset that there is no change in his attitude.

I support the proposed conference & think I feel incensed at being left out, especially since I am the only ^{elector} representative of Unionist opinion who unequivocally supports a conference.



HOUSE OF COMMONS
LONDON SW1A 0AA

Apart from that I believe that
all West M.P.'s should be invited
This, in fact, only means an
additional three representatives —
Frank Marjani, Sam Dunlop &
myself.

Yours sincerely

Jim Kufedde

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file

DS



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

15 November 1979

The Prime Minister's Meetings
with Mr. Molyneaux and Dr. Paisley

I enclose copies of the records of the Prime Minister's conversations yesterday with Mr. Molyneaux and Dr. Paisley.

I am sending a copy of this letter and its enclosures to Paul Lever (Foreign and Commonwealth Office).

M. O'D. B. ALEXANDER

Roy Harrington, Esq.,
Northern Ireland Office.

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DS

NOTE FOR THE FILE

Line taken with the Press on the evening of 14 November about the Prime Minister's meeting with Dr. Paisley

I agreed the following line with the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland and Mr. Harrington after the Prime Minister had seen Dr. Paisley yesterday evening.

"The Prime Minister saw Dr. Paisley for 40 minutes this evening at Dr. Paisley's request. Dr. Paisley expressed disquiet about the present security situation in Northern Ireland. The Prime Minister summarised the actions taken by the Government and repeated her determination to keep up the pressure on the terrorists. She expressed her willingness to look into any problem which caused Dr. Paisley concern if he would produce more detail on the points at issue."

Ans

15 November 1979

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E.R.

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
Copy No 1.

See Distribution

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NORTHERN IRELAND OFFICE MEETING -
13 NOVEMBER 1979

The Note of the Northern Ireland Office Meeting which took place in London on Tuesday 13 November 1979 is attached.



B A BLACKWELL
Secretary

15 November 1979

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DISTRIBUTION OF NIOM MINUTES

1.	Mr B Cartledge	}	10 Downing Street London SW1
2.	Press Office		
3.	Mr M Vile	}	Cabinet Office 70 Whitehall London SW1
4.	Mr R L Wade-Gery		
5.	The Secretary JIC		
6.	Mr P Maxey		
7.	Mr D Heaton	}	Room 637 Home Office Queen Anne's Gate London SW1
8.	Miss Philippa Drew		
9.	Mr M J Newington		Republic of Ireland Department FCO Downing Street East London SW1
10- 29	Mr Cousins		Ministry of Defence Room 5336 Whitehall London SW1
30.	Mr W C Beckett		Attorney General's Office Royal Courts of Justice Strand London WC2A 2LL
31.	PS/Secretary of State		NIO(L)
32.	PS/PUS		NIO(L)
33.	Mr Marshall		NIO(L)
34.	Miss J Kelley		NIO(L)
35.	Mr R G Jones		NIO(L)
36.	Mr A Cowan		NIO(L)
37.	Mr M Moriarty		NIO(L)
38.	Mr F Corbett		NIO(L)
39.	Mr P W J Buxton		NIO(L)

40.	Mr J Hastie-Smith	Cabinet Office, 70 Whitehall SW1
41.	PS/Mr Rossi	NIO(L)
42.	PS/Mr Alison	NIO(L)
43.	PS/Mr Shaw	NIO(L)
44.	PS/Lord Elton	NIO(L)
45.	PS/Mr Goodhart	NIO(L)
46.	Mr A Wilson	NIO(L)
47.	Mr D Wyatt	NIO(B)
48.	Mr I Burns	NIO(B)
49.	Mr J A Hannigan	NIO(B)
50.	Brigadier B Davis	Chief of Staff HQNI Lisburn
51.	Civil Adviser	HQNI Lisburn
52.	Mr W R Haydon	C/o of Head of Chancery HM Embassy Dublin
53.	Mr J Parker	NIO(B) Stormont House
54.	Mr R D Clift	NIO(B) " "
55.	Mr C Davenport	NIO(B) " "
56.	Mr H Phillips	Home Office
57.	Mr Hall	NIO(L)
58.	PSO/Security Co-ordinator from 16/10/79	

E.R.

NIOM(79)7

NOTE OF A MEETING HELD IN THE NORTHERN IRELAND OFFICE ON
TUESDAY 13 NOVEMBER 1979 AT 12.00 PM

Present:

Mr Marshall	(Chairman)	
Miss Kelley	}	
Mr Moriarty		
Mr Hall		
Mr Jones		NIO
Mr Blackwell		
Mr Proud		
Mr Bengier		
Mr Stephen	}	
Mr Stephens		
Mr Cousins		MOD
Col. Jones		
Maj. Pheysey		
Mr Newington	FCO	
Mr Heaton	Home Office	

The Political Situation.

1. The Chairman outlined the probable course of events for the coming weeks. The Secretary of State had announced on 25 October his intention to hold a Conference of the main political parties. A Working Paper setting out a range of possible ways in which some functions of government might be transferred to elected representatives in Northern Ireland would be released on Tuesday 20 November at 11 am with appropriate publicity, including a press conference to be given by the Secretary of State in Belfast. To take account of Opposition and Unionist views there was likely to be a debate in the House of Commons on the Consultative Document in the week beginning 26 November.

2. It was hoped that the Conference itself would start at Stormont during the week beginning 3 December. Both the Alliance Party and the SDLP had accepted invitations and it was probable that the DUP would attend despite their public reservations about the right of the Alliance Party to attend and their pre-condition of an improvement in the security situation. With regard to the latter, it was hoped that Dr Paisley would be reassured by his meeting with the Prime Minister which was due to take place on 14 November, (the Prime Minister would also see Mr Molyneaux on the same day). The Official Unionists had so far refused to attend the conference but Mr Molyneaux might reconsider his position on studying the Consultative Document, especially since his absence would leave Dr Paisley as the sole representative of Protestant opinion in the Province.

3. There was no fixed time-scale envisaged for the Conference; it was assumed that there would be a plenary session at first which might last for 2 or 3 days, to be followed by bi-lateral and multi-lateral talks and a further plenary session. It was likely that this process would run into the New Year; the Government were looking for the highest level of agreement possible, and it was hoped that proposals based on this agreement could then be placed before Parliament.

Force Level Reductions

4. Mr Stephen said that the timing and presentation of the announcement of force level reductions were of great importance. One method would be to volunteer a statement or, alternatively, the reduction could simply be allowed to become known after the unit concerned had been told that they were not going to the Province. The Chairman preferred the news to be disclosed during one of the speeches in the EPA Renewal Debates which should take place between the start of the Conference and the Christmas recess, probably during the week beginning 10 December. In this way, the subject of force level reductions would not be raised before the Constitutional Conference started and, therefore, there would be less likelihood of attendance at the Conference becoming bedevilled by arguments over security. Mr Stephens drew attention to the fact that it might become increasingly difficult to avoid disclosure of the reduction after early December.

The District Council Resolutions

5. The Chairman said that a co-ordinated reply to the District Council Resolutions on security was being prepared and would be issued shortly.

Cross-Border Co-operation with the Irish Government

6. The Chairman reported that, as far as overflights were concerned, the only outstanding issue seemed to be that of air safety. He thought it important that the Dublin Embassy should draw the attention of the DFA to the fact that this was the one outstanding matter to be resolved. Mr Newington said that Mr Lynch, during his American tour, had been rather more forthcoming than before on overflights. Unfortunately his statement would on the one hand tend to convince the British public that little had been achieved while on the other causing problems for Mr Lynch in the Dail because what he had said went further than his previous statements made in the Dail itself. In view of this the DFA might want to delay matters and it was important that no further questions should be raised which would give them a further excuse for delay. The Chairman expressed surprise that no circumstances requiring overflights had so far arisen. If this situation persisted it would support the original Irish view that overflights were not an essential part of border security operations. Nevertheless, it was important that circumstances should not be fabricated to engineer requests for overflights.

Carrickmore

7. The Chairman said that the Metropolitan Police and the RUC were investigating the incident at Carrickmore involving the BBC Panorama team at the behest of the DPP to see if an offence under the Prevention of Terrorism Act had been committed. So far there had

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been no reaction to the "Guardian" report of PIRA VCPs in the border area, although the incident would seem to raise similar issues.

Date of Next Meeting

8. The date of the next meeting was provisionally fixed for Friday, 7 December at 12 pm. It would be confirmed later.

15 November 1979

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RECORD OF A CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER AND
DR. IAN PAISLEY AT THE HOUSE OF COMMONS ON 14 NOVEMBER 1979 AT 2045

Present

The Prime Minister	Dr. Ian Paisley, M.P.
Secretary of State for Northern Ireland	Mr. Robinson, M.P.
Mr. Ian Gow, M.P.	
Mr. Alexander	

* * * * *

Dr. Paisley said that he had bad news for the Prime Minister. He had just heard that Mr. Molyneaux had said on the radio that the Prime Minister had told him she intended to do nothing more on the security front. Mr. Molyneaux had been through the list of proposals he had put forward in August and claimed that the Prime Minister had rejected all of them (this was what Dr. Paisley said: it may well be that Mr. Molyneaux in fact referred to the proposals listed in the District Council resolution of 16 October). The official Ulster Unionists did not want a Conference and did not want to attend it. They simply wanted to re-organise local government. Turning to his own views, Dr. Paisley said that, as the figures showed, the security situation in Northern Ireland was bad. When he had last met the Prime Minister, in Stormont, he had forecast that the situation would deteriorate. Since then Mr. Neave had been killed. He wondered who would be gone next time he and the Prime Minister met.

Dr. Paisley then noted that Mr. Molyneaux had had a 40 minute meeting with the Prime Minister whereas it seemed that he was to have only 30 minutes. The Prime Minister arranged for her next meeting to be postponed for 15 minutes.

Dr. Paisley said that he represented the most slandered, most abused, most betrayed people in the United Kingdom: the Protestants of Northern Ireland. The vast majority of the people murdered and maimed in Northern Ireland were Protestants, the vast majority of businesses looted or destroyed were Protestant.

CONFIDENTIAL

/These

These were nonetheless the people who filled the ranks of the RUC while Mr. Fitt's Party refused to acknowledge the role of that organisation. Dr. Paisley said that the Prime Minister must make a declaration which would put heart into the Ulster people. This should be a firm declaration that the Government were determined to win rather than simply to hinder or obstruct the IRA.

Dr. Paisley said that two things were required on the security front. The first was a stronger deterrent. The Courts were not handing out sufficiently severe sentences. Mr. Robinson pointed out that between 25% and 35% of those found guilty of terrorist offences left the Court free men because they were given non-custodial sentences. 50% of those found guilty of membership of illegal organisations received similar sentences. About 100 cases in these categories went through the Courts each year. In reply to a question by the Prime Minister the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland said that there was no shortage of prison accommodation. There was a maximum prison sentence but no minimum. Dr. Paisley said that there was at present no deterrent against membership of an illegal organisation. The finding of such a deterrent was a matter requiring urgent consideration. There should inevitably be a prison sentence for any terrorist offence.

Dr. Paisley said that the second point requiring urgent attention was the removal of the possibility of sanctuary south of the border for terrorists. Mr. Lynch could be pushed on extradition and the Government should keep up the pressure on him. He was vulnerable. The business community in the Republic were up in arms because of the recent spate of bank robberies. There were 500,000 citizens of the Republic in the United Kingdom milking the social services. It should be made plain to Mr. Lynch that we could not go on receiving them with open arms if he was not going to take action on extradition. Moreover, it was essential that the Northern Ireland police should be able to question suspects south of the border. At present they encountered every kind of obstacle. If Mr. Lynch refused to play ball, the border between Northern Ireland and the Republic should be closed. The example of Cyprus showed that it would be perfectly feasible to seal the border.

/The Prime Minister

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The Prime Minister said that the Government were doing everything they could. She had shown her personal commitment by going to Northern Ireland in August. An experienced and influential man had been appointed to improve co-ordination. The police had asked for an extra 1,000 men: they were getting them. Other action was in hand which, for reasons that Dr. Paisley would understand, could not be fully revealed. The Army and the police were pleased with the way things were going. On the question of cross-border security, we had got more than we had ever got before even though it was, of course, less than we would have liked. Her objectives were exactly the same as Dr. Paisley's where security was concerned. Everything possible had to be done to protect the law-abiding. Hence the increased effort being made by the Government to support the police and the Army both in England and in Northern Ireland. But of course the task of the defenders of the law was always more difficult than that of the evil aggressors.

In response to an observation by the Prime Minister that she could not influence the work of the Courts in Northern Ireland, Mr. Robinson said that the Government did have the power to set minimum sentences. The Prime Minister pointed out that one difficulty of having very severe sentences was that there tended to be fewer convictions. Dr. Paisley asked whether the Prime Minister would nonetheless be prepared to look at the matter again. The Prime Minister said that she was not optimistic, but she was always prepared to look at a question again if new facts to justify the review were produced. Mr. Robinson said that it might be a good idea to reduce the discretion available to the Courts. One difficulty was that some Judges in Northern Ireland were sympathetic to those in the dock. The Prime Minister said that she could not be expected to entertain such comments. If Mr. Robinson and Dr. Paisley felt this was true, it would be open to them to make an address to both Houses of Parliament. Dr. Paisley said that this was not the real problem. The question was why people should put their lives at risk to get men into Court and then see the accused leave as free men. The Prime Minister said that if Dr. Paisley would produce the facts she would look at them.

/Dr. Paisley

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Dr. Paisley referred to the question of relations with the Republic and said that the Prime Minister had admitted that she had failed to get what she wanted from Mr. Lynch. The Prime Minister said that the Government had got more than they had ever achieved before and were profoundly grateful to Mr. Lynch for the efforts he was making. She very much hoped that Dr. Paisley would say nothing that might put co-operation between Britain and the Republic in jeopardy. Dr. Paisley asked again for an assurance that the Government would keep up the pressure. Mr. Lynch had given way in September because of the Mountbatten murders. He was still on the wrong foot and was almost ready to concede the British case on extradition. The Prime Minister asked Dr. Paisley to remember that Mr. Lynch had his own political problems. She would press on extradition when there was a sound and specific case.

The Prime Minister said she intended to maintain the pressure on the security front. But it had also seemed important to her to take a political initiative. It was essential to show the world that the Government were consulting with Ulster about the next steps. She was anxious that the Conference should be successful. Several options would be debated. The object would be to find the greatest area of agreement. The Conference was important not only for domestic reasons but also because of the international reaction, e.g. in the United States. The Government would be criticized if they put forward proposals without consultation. The Conference would not be a last step but a first step. The people in Northern Ireland had fewer opportunities to take decisions on a democratic basis than anyone else in the United Kingdom. There had to be improvement. The question was not whether there should be a move but in what direction it should take place. In response to an observation by Dr. Paisley that no political solution would stop the terrorists, the Prime Minister said that of course the IRA had to be defeated by security measures. The Government had made that commitment and intended to honour it.

Dr. Paisley said that the people of Ulster at present had no confidence in the Government. He wanted to be at the Conference table but the Prime Minister would have to help to get him there. Mr. Molyneaux should also be there. But neither would be present

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unless the Prime Minister made a statement assuring the people of Ulster that the Government had the will not only to secure a political settlement enabling the people to participate in decision-making but also to defeat the terrorists. Could he expect a statement within 12 hours that would put life and hope into the people of Ulster? If such a statement were forthcoming, it would get him to the Conference. The Prime Minister said that she had made a statement after the Mountbatten murders. She had seen Mr. Lynch. New security measures had been put in hand. In short, she had taken action. If there were more action to be taken she would take it. After Dr. Paisley had repeated his wish for a statement and the Prime Minister her pre-occupation with action rather than statements, Dr. Paisley said that the Prime Minister was not aware of the deterioration in the situation on the ground. She had a duty to do something about this. As an indication of the feeling of the people in Northern Ireland, Dr. Paisley produced two medals which had been sent to him by members of the UDR for return to the Prime Minister. The Prime Minister said that if Dr. Paisley would let her have the addresses of the men she would write to them.

The discussion ended at 2125.

Paul

15 November 1979

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cc: N10
fco

RECORD OF A DISCUSSION BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER AND THE LEADER OF THE OFFICIAL ULSTER UNIONIST PARTY, MR. JAMES MOLYNEAUX, MP, AT THE HOUSE OF COMMONS ON WEDNESDAY 14 NOVEMBER 1979 AT 1600

Present:

The Prime Minister

Mr. James Molyneaux, MP

The Secretary of State for Northern Ireland

Mr. Ian Gow, MP

Mr. Michael Alexander

* * * * *

The Prime Minister said that, as Mr. Molyneaux would know, Dr. Paisley had asked to see her to discuss the security situation in Northern Ireland. She had decided that she would like to see Mr. Molyneaux also. She was determined to get security raised to the highest possible level. Various actions were in hand. A security co-ordinator had been appointed. The Government were seeking closer co-operation across the border. The Secretary of State for Northern Ireland added that police recruiting had been significantly increased.

Mr. Molyneaux said that he was concerned about the advance publicity that had been given to the Prime Minister's meetings with himself and Dr. Paisley. He had been beseiged by the press with requests for interviews. He would be asked whether he had raised the points on the "shopping list" of 16 October produced by a number of District Councils. This was of course Dr. Paisley's list, not his. His own list, compiled in mid-August, was much more moderate and two items on it, calling for improved co-ordination and the expansion of the RUC, had already been dealt with. (Mr. Molyneaux handed over the two lists to the Prime Minister and copies are attached.)

The Secretary of State for Northern Ireland reverted to the point about police recruitment (no. 6 on Mr. Molyneaux's list) and said that at the end of this year, the RUC would have 180 additional men. He expected to be able to recruit, as promised, an additional 1,000 within 12 months. In response to a question

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/ from the Prime

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from the Prime Minister Minister, the Secretary of State said that the RUC was able to pick and choose among candidates. The 80 men recruited last month had been selected from 370 applicants. Mr. Molyneaux said that he feared that press interest would concentrate on the District Council shopping list rather than on his own. The Prime Minister said that the Government were doing a great deal. Not everything could be made public. But some of the points on Mr. Molyneaux's list, notably that dealing with detention, had enormous implications.

Turning to the political scene, the Prime Minister said she was determined to get more power into the hands of the people of Northern Ireland. It was the only part of the country whose population did not have local authority powers. She was determined that the status quo should not be maintained indefinitely. She was familiar with the scheme developed by Mr. Airey Neave. It was one of the options included in the White Paper. She very much hoped that Mr. Molyneaux would be prepared to have someone come to the forthcoming conference to argue the case in favour of the scheme. The biggest Party in Ulster should be present to defend the scheme it believed in. It would not show Ulster in a good light if that Party stayed away. The scheme favoured by the Official Ulster Unionists was not of course the only one on the agenda. The Government would be criticised if the views of others were not discussed. As it was, the Government was criticised for holding down Ulster. She wanted to show that the Government were consulting everyone concerned. Following these consultations she hoped to move down the path which found most support. It would be very difficult if there was no-one there to defend the case of the Official Ulster Unionists.

Mr. Molyneaux said that in the summer he had made the mistake of attempting to relieve the pressure on the Government to take an initiative by saying that he would support them in implementing their manifesto commitment. At the conference everyone would argue for their own option. If the Government were to decide in favour of the scheme favoured by his Party, they would be criticised for giving in to the Unionists. This had led him to conclude that

/ it would be

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- 3 -

it would be easier for the Government if the Unionists were not present. He would be happy to make it clear in public that he was neither obstructing nor boycotting the conference. The Prime Minister said that she recognised that there was no solution to which everyone would agree. In the end the Government would have to make up its own mind about the best way forward. Nonetheless, she would much regret the absence of Mr. Molyneaux's Party.

Mr. Molyneaux asked why Mr. Neave's plan for the establishment of a small, impartial committee to study the problem for three or four months and then to produce a report had been abandoned. The attraction of this approach would have been that it would have prevented the staking out of positions and provided the Government with an impartial recommendation which it could have said that it saw no reason to reject. The Prime Minister said that the problem was not one for experts. It was a political problem. People would have staked out their positions in relation to any scheme sooner or later. The Secretary of State for Northern Ireland said that there might still be a place for experts in advising whether any given scheme was or was not feasible. He added that Mr. Molyneaux's Party were the only supporters of the regional council approach. The Prime Minister said that she recollected having discussions with Mr. Molyneaux in the past whether there should be one or more council and what its title should be. Discussions at the conference would demonstrate the difficulties and advantages of the various approaches. She wanted them all set out clearly so that the problems the Government faced could be seen clearly. She was determined that no-one should have a veto once the Government had decided how it intended to proceed. Mr. Molyneaux said that he agreed that no-one should have a veto. He was not claiming one for his own Party. He would accept any outcome which was acceptable to the population at large.

The Prime Minister said that Mr. Molyneaux had always been very helpful. He was the first Ulster politician she had seen in the present series of talks. She did not want his voice to be missing at the conference and would be happy to say this to Mr. Powell. Mr. Neave had spent a lot of time on the scheme and she wanted the arguments in its favour to be put forward with

CONFIDENTIAL / vigour.

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vigour. Mr. Molyneaux said that the problem went wider than Mr. Powell. With one possible exception, the officers of his Party were agreed that participation in the conference would be a waste of time. Moreover, it would make it impossible for the Government to find a compromise. He had taken a firm position on this in the summer and would find it difficult to do a somersault now. In any case, he himself did not see merit in the idea of a conference.

The Secretary of State for Northern Ireland said that it looked as though Dr. Paisley, Mr. Fitt and Mr. Napier would all be there. Many detailed issues would have to be discussed. Mr. Molyneaux said that they would all put forward different ideas and that in any case the question of the structure to be adopted was more important than the detail. The Prime Minister asked about Dr. Paisley's position. The Secretary of State for Northern Ireland said that he wanted to go further than Mr. Molyneaux. He wanted any body established in Northern Ireland to have legislative as well as executive powers. Mr. Molyneaux said that would be his preference also if this were possible.

The Prime Minister commented that it was precisely in dealing with this kind of issue that Mr. Molyneaux's presence would be so useful. She wished to be clear that the Government were consulting all the Parties in Northern Ireland. She wanted to remove the widespread impression that the Government were imposing policies. She was determined to make progress. The world expected this. Moreover, there had been direct rule in Northern Ireland for many years. The political vacuum could not be allowed to continue. The Government had promised to take action on the security front before taking a political initiative. It had done so. If Mr. Molyneaux's Party decided not to attend it would reflect badly on them and they would be criticised in the media.

Mr. Molyneaux said that he did not think the Government's good intentions would be weakened if the Official Ulster Unionists stood aside. They did not want to go to a conference which would get involved in a lot of detail. This was why they had refused to touch Mr. Mason's last plan. The Government might say they

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/ did not

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- 5 -

did not intend to negotiate at the conference but the other participants would make them negotiate there. The Secretary of State for Northern Ireland said that the Government would be searching for the highest common factor at the conference. Mr. Molyneux said that he did not see why his Party could not express its views on the outcome of the conference after it had taken place.

The Prime Minister said that the Government intended to go ahead with the conference. If Mr. Molyneux decided not to attend, she hoped that his Party would at least put in a detailed document and send someone to read it. Mr. Molyneux said that if this were done, it would not be necessary to do it at the beginning of the conference. The Prime Minister repeated that the absence of the Official Ulster Unionists would reflect badly on them and that it would be very difficult for the Government to go ahead with the scheme favoured by Mr. Molyneux if his Party were not there to defend it. Mr. Molyneux said that he had not been aware of the "options exercise" before his Party Conference. He had said then, six days before the conference had been announced, that he would not encourage anyone to set up a useless talking shop. It was difficult for him to turn round now.

There was then some discussion of the two papers handed over by Mr. Molyneux. The Prime Minister left for another meeting in the middle of this discussion. As he said goodbye, Mr. Molyneux made it clear that in addition to the various other objections he had voiced to attendance of the conference, he himself thought the conference was a bad idea.

The Prime Minister left the discussion at 1645.

Am

14 November 1979

CONFIDENTIAL

SUMMARY OF SECURITY RESOLUTION PASSED BY A LARGE
NUMBER OF DISTRICT COUNCILS ON 16 OCTOBER, 1979

1. RECOGNISING THE WEAKNESS OF THE PRESENT SENTENCING POLICY AND ENSURING THAT IN ALL CASES THE PUNISHMENT FITS THE CRIME. IN THIS REGARD SUBSTANTIAL MINIMUM SENTENCES MUST BE INTRODUCED FOR TERRORIST OFFENCES, WITH A LIMITED PROVISION FOR EXEMPTION IN VERY EXCEPTIONAL CASES.
2. THE SYSTEM OF REMISSION MUST BE ENDED SO THAT ALL TERMS OF IMPRISONMENT ARE SERVED IN FULL.
3. FORSAKE ANY HOPE OF THE REPUBLIC OF IRELAND SOLVING OUR SECURITY PROBLEM FOR US, RECOGNISING THAT THE REPUBLIC SHARES THE IRA'S PRIMARY POLITICAL AIM, AND MAKE ONE FINAL DEMAND FOR EXTRADITION AND IF IT IS AGAIN REFUSED THEN PROCEED TO OSTRACIZE THE REPUBLIC ECONOMICALLY AND POLITICALLY.
4. EXERCISE THE RIGHT TO PURSUE TERRORISTS ACROSS THE BORDER.
5. ENSURE A MARKED CONCENTRATION OF SECURITY ALONG THE FULL LENGTH OF THE BORDER AND ENFORCE FULL-SCALE FRONTIER REGULATIONS AT ALL TIMES ON MAJOR CROSS-BORDER ROADS.
6. ALL MINOR CROSS-BORDER ROADS MUST BE RENDERED TOTALLY AND PERMANENTLY IMPASSABLE AND SURVEILLANCE MAINTAINED AT A VERY HIGH LEVEL.
7. CONCERTED SEARCH AND SEIZURE OPERATIONS MUST BE LAUNCHED IN ALL REPUBLICAN ENCLAVES IN NORTHERN IRELAND TO DISARM AND DEplete THE IRA.
8. CURFEW AND THE GREATER USE OF COVERT OPERATIONS MAY BE NECESSARY.

POINTS RAISED BY MR JAMES MOLYNEAUX, MP. DURING
A MEETING WITH MR MICHAEL ALISON, MINISTER OF
STATE AT THE NORTHERN IRELAND OFFICE, ON WEDNESDAY,
15 AUGUST, 1979.

1. THAT THE EXISTING DETENTION POWERS OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE BE USED SO AS TO REMOVE FROM CIRCULATION ANY KNOWN DIRECTORS OF TERRORISM AGAINST WHOM THERE IS NOT THE EVIDENCE NECESSARY TO SECURE A CRIMINAL CONVICTION, AND SO AS TO RETAIN IN CUSTODY THOSE CONVICTED TERRORISTS WHO WHO WOULD OTHERWISE BE FREE TO RESUME TERRORISM ON COMPLETING THEIR PARTLY REMITTED SENTENCES.
2. THAT THE REGULAR MILITARY FORCES BE SO DEPLOYED THAT, WITH THE SUPPORT OF THE R.U.C., U.D.R. AND H. M. CUSTOMS, CROSS BORDER MOVEMENT OF TERRORISTS AND OF THEIR ARMS AND EXPLOSIVES CAN BE CURTAILED.
3. THAT GREATER USE BE MADE OF S.A.S. AND SIMILAR PATROLS ALONG THE FRONTIER AND IN AREAS LIKE SOUTH COUNTY LONDONDERRY WHERE TERRORISM HAS BEEN RIFE, AND FOR THE RESTRAINTS IMPOSED ON SUCH OPERATIONS SINCE THE DUNLOY INCIDENT IN AUGUST, 1978 SHOULD BE REMOVED.
4. THAT THE STRENGTH AND VERSATILITY OF THE U.D.R. BE DEVELOPED SO AS TO RELIEVE REGULAR TROOPS FOR SPECIALISED TASKS.
- ✓ 5. THAT THE SYSTEM FOR CO-ORDINATING MILITARY AND POLICE OPERATIONS BE IMPROVED.
- ✓ 6. THAT THE ESTABLISHMENT CEILING OF THE R.U.C. BE RAISED AS PROMISED A YEAR AGO BY MR. ROY MASON, AND FOR THE EXPANSION OF THE R.U.C. RESERVE TO BE RESUMED SO THAT MORE REGULAR POLICE CAN BE ASSIGNED TO THE REGIONAL CRIME SQUADS AND THE SPECIAL PATROL GROUP RE-ENFORCED.
7. THAT EFFECTIVE PRESSURE, SUCH AS ECONOMIC SANCTIONS, BE BROUGHT TO BEAR UPON THE GOVERNMENT OF THE IRISH REPUBLIC TO INDUCE IT TO EXTRADITE THE PERPETRATORS OF TERRORIST CRIMES TO THE UNITED KINGDOM FOR TRIAL AND TO MAKE USE OF ITS EXISTING LAW TO DEAL WITH TERRORIST ACTIVITIES WITHIN THE REPUBLIC ITSELF.



NORTHERN IRELAND OFFICE
GREAT GEORGE STREET,
LONDON SW1P 3AJ

Michael Alexander Esq
10 Downing Street
London SW1

f.s. Pmt - 15/x,
13 November 1979

Prime Minister

*Mr Paisley will be accompanied by
Mr Robinson.*

Dear Michael

Pmt - 13/x1

MEETINGS WITH NORTHERN IRELAND POLITICAL LEADERS

I enclose briefing material for the Prime Minister's use when she sees Dr Paisley and Mr Molyneaux tomorrow.

- A
- B
- C

The briefing is in three sections, covering (a) Security, (b) the Political Situation, and (c) the Working Paper for the Conference. The meetings have, of course, been called, following Dr Paisley's original approach, to discuss the security situation in Northern Ireland; but my Secretary of State feels that the Prime Minister will be glad of this wider briefing given that there is of course a close connexion between security and the forthcoming Conference on political development. Dr Paisley has publicly stated that he will need to be satisfied about security before he will come to the conference table; the Prime Minister's meeting with him is therefore not only an occasion to convince him that the Government is doing everything practicable to combat terrorism, but also an opportunity to ensure that he is able to come to the Conference (as he clearly wishes to do), his presence there being of critical importance given Mr Molyneaux's present stance. Similarly, the meeting with Mr Molyneaux is likely to range beyond security questions to the question of his attendance and the implications of leaving Dr Paisley's party as the representative of the Unionists.

One further point: there is a reference on p.2 of today's "Guardian" to Dr Paisley making it a condition of his attendance at the Conference that the Alliance Party should not be invited. We believe this to be out of date. At one stage the DUP did lay this down as a condition; but Dr Paisley made no reference to it when he saw Mr Atkins and discussed the Conference last Friday, so we think it can be regarded as dead and should not be raised.

*Yours Sincerely
Mike Hopkins*

M W HOPKINS

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SECURITY

Dr Paisley has made progress on security a precondition for his Party's participation in the Conference. Mr Molyneux places equal emphasis on security, though he has not tied it to the Conference, which at present he is not proposing to attend anyway.

A summary of the main developments in the last two months (since Warrenpoint) is at Annex A. Statistics are in Annex B. Briefly, three major steps have been taken in (a) appointing the Security Co-Ordinator, (b) increasing the size of the RUC, and (c) reaching agreement on cross-border arrangements with the Republic. In addition, specific action has been taken, particularly in Belfast, to step up security, and further action is in hand.

Although in the last four weeks 5 members of the Security Forces and 2 Prison Officers have been killed, the same period has seen a number of successes (redhanded arrests, arms seizures, terrorists charged with murder), and increasing evidence of real co-operation from the South (Dublin arms seizure, increased joint patrolling - 57 in October). Just as important as the direct successes is the absence of any notable PIRA success.

The DUP were prime movers (supported by UUP) in drafting and circulation of the resolution on security which was adopted by 15 District Councils in October/November. A copy of the resolution is at Annex C, and a copy of the reply sent (to each Council) on 13 November at Annex D.

The prisons and the H-Block protests are a further element in security policy. The Government is sticking firmly to its policy of treating all newly convicted prisoners in the same way, whether they are terrorists or not. PIRA's claim for "political status" will continue to be refused. Prisoners protesting about this have only themselves to blame for the conditions in which they are living.

SECURITY SITUATION - DEVELOPMENTS SINCE 1 SEPTEMBER

Terrorism

Since 1 September there have been continuing attacks on members of the Security Forces and Prison Officers. In addition, sectarian violence has continued sporadically, with Loyalist terrorists killing a number of Catholics, as a reaction either to the Mountbatten and Warrenpoint murders or to attacks on members of the Ulster Defence Regiment and Prison Service.

2. The Provisional IRA's main activities have been: the murders and threatened further murders of Prison Officers; attacks on members of the Ulster Defence Regiment leading to 3 deaths; and continuing attacks on the regular Security Forces, leading to the deaths of one civilian and one soldier.

3. Attacks with explosive devices have continued with less success than previously. An attack in West Tyrone was foiled on 22 September as a result of help from the Garda.

4. Commercial bombing has been at a significantly lower level following car bomb attacks in August. Last weekend saw the first major use of cassette incendiaries since December 1978. Newry, Dungannon and Londonderry were targets and some premises were destroyed.

5. The Irish National Liberation Army have been involved in the murder of one of the 4 prison officers killed in the period, but otherwise appear to have been generally quiet.

6. Loyalist Terrorists: Sectarian killings and attacks have continued sporadically. A rash of such attacks followed Warrenpoint and have continued since in response to attacks on UDR and Prison Service members. Most recently, two Roman Catholics were shot dead on 8 November in East Belfast and shortly afterwards, a Protestant was murdered nearby in a tit for tat killing. On the following evening, overt sectarian violence flared when Protestant workers from an East Belfast factory were stoned by a Catholic mob.

Security Initiatives in the last two months

7. The appointment of Sir Maurice Oldfield as Security Co-Ordinator was a major organisational step designed to improve the effectiveness of the Security Forces in Northern Ireland.

8. The announced intention to increase the Royal Ulster Constabulary by 1,000 to a new ceiling of 7,500 is being implemented. Already the strength on duty is up to 6,600 and there are 80 policemen due to join the Force from the Training College in December.

9. The Government of the Republic has offered positive, real, help in dealing with our common security problems: most of the details have to be kept confidential if they are to be effective, but Mr Lynch has acknowledged publicly the agreement that British helicopters may in certain circumstances fly over Southern territory when dealing with terrorists. The find of 160 firearms by the Irish police in Dublin docks last week also reflected extensive co-operation between Irish and British authorities.

10. Fresh action has also been taken by Security Forces on the ground, for example:

- (a) A new Army base is being built at Whiterock in West Belfast. The new base will be strategically situated to pose a much greater threat to terrorists in West Belfast than the two bases it will replace.
- (b) An Army Observation Post has been placed on the top of a Tower Block housing a Nurses Home at the Royal Victoria Hospital in spite of the fears of the hospital staff. This difficult decision has been taken because the Tower is by far the tallest building in the area and gives unparalleled views of parts of West Belfast where PIRA have been very active.
- (c) In response to attacks on Prison Officers outside Crumlin Road Prison in Belfast, the number of police and army patrols have been increased, new guardposts, gates and fences built to protect officers using the car park.
- (d) Further steps are now being worked out to bring extra pressure to bear on terrorists both in Belfast and in border areas.

Security Force Operations and Successes.

11. The police and army have both mounted intensive efforts in the last fortnight to step up their overt presence to disrupt any terrorist plans for increased violence in response to the political initiative announced at the end of October. Unlike previous years this Autumn has yet to see a fresh increase in the terrorist campaign.

12. In the last three weeks 39 people have been charged with terrorist-type offences, including 5 with murder and 2 with attempted murder. Most of the charges are the result of detective work, but some were redhanded arrests by the Security Forces.

SECURITY STATISTICS 1976-1979

	<u>1976</u>	<u>1977</u>	<u>1978</u>	<u>1979</u> (up to early November)
<u>DEATHS</u>				
RUC/RUC(R)	23	14	10	12
Army/UDR	29	29	21	43
Civilians	245	69	50	45
TOTAL	<u>297</u>	<u>112</u>	<u>81</u>	<u>100</u>
<u>INJURIES</u>				
RUC/RUC(R)	303	183	274	129
Army/UDR	264	188	117	134
Civilians	2,162	1,027	548	480
TOTAL	<u>2,729</u>	<u>1,398</u>	<u>939</u>	<u>743</u>
<u>SHOOTING</u> <u>ATTACKS</u>	1,908	1,081	755	654
<u>EXPLOSIONS</u>	766	366	455	369
<u>BOMBS NEUTRALISED</u>	426	169	178	114
<u>FINDS IN NORTHERN</u> <u>IRELAND</u>				
Weapons	837	590	400	277*
Ammunition rounds	70,306	52,091	43,511	41,480
Explosives (lbs)	21,714	3,809	2,108	1,988

*excludes Dublin arms find

TEXT OF RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY 15 DISTRICT COUNCILS

"This Council, alarmed and exasperated by the fact that I.R.A. terrorism has been permitted to afflict our Province for ten long years, urgently demands its total elimination and defeat. We are convinced that this can only be achieved by stern security measures and not by political panderings or so-called initiatives. Security action alone will eliminate the I.R.A. Towards this end we call upon Her Majesty's Government to take the following steps forthwith:

1. Recognising the weakness of the present sentencing policy and ensuring that in all cases the punishment fits the crime. In this regard substantial minimum sentences must be introduced for terrorist offences, with a limited provision for exemption in very exceptional cases. In addition the system of remission must be ended so that all terms of imprisonment are served in full.
2. Forsake any hope of the Republic of Ireland solving our security problem for us, recognising that the Republic shares the I.R.A.'s primary political aim, and make one final demand for extradition and if it is again refused then proceed to ostracize the Republic economically and politically. Then exercise the right to pursue terrorists across the border.
3. Ensure a marked concentration of security along the full length of the border and enforce full-scale frontier regulations at all times on major cross-border roads. All minor cross-border roads must be rendered totally and permanently impassable and surveillance maintained at a very high level. As a corollary to this closing of the border, concerted search and seizure operations must be launched in all republican enclaves in Northern Ireland to

disarm and deplete the I.R.A. In this regard curfew and the greater use of covert operations may be necessary.

We remind the Government of its primary duty to the people of Northern Ireland and of its declaration of intent to win the war against terrorism and we urge it to demonstrate its sincerity by acting on these demands. We also call upon all Northern Ireland M.P.'s to declare their wholehearted support for these proposals and to mount a campaign in Parliament for their implementation."

DISTRICT COUNCILS' SECURITY PROPOSALS
MASTER DRAFT REPLY FROM PRIVATE SECRETARY

The Secretary of State has asked me to thank you for your letter of forwarding the Council's resolution on security.

I am also replying on behalf of the Prime Minister, to whom you copied the resolution on .

The Secretary of State has made it quite clear that it is the Government's firm intention to work determinedly towards the elimination of terrorist violence from Northern Ireland. The Government is fully committed to giving the security forces every support in their drive against the terrorists, and the Secretary of State is ready and willing to consider any new measures which will genuinely assist their effort. Such measures must, however, be practical and effective, they must not bear unfairly on those in the community who are not involved in terrorism and they must not undermine the progress already achieved in isolating the terrorists from both local and international support.

Turning to the particular suggestions contained in the resolution, the first part concerns legal penalties, sentencing policy and remission. There are already substantial penalties available for terrorist offences; and life imprisonment is the mandatory sentence for murder. However, the circumstances in which offences are committed vary considerably from case to case and in the interests of justice it is right that the judiciary should in general have discretion to vary the gravity of sentences accordingly. Sentencing itself is of course a matter for the judiciary and not something upon which it would be proper for the Secretary of State to comment.

The present remission scheme for prison sentences in Northern Ireland, which was introduced when the Government of the day started to phase out special category status for sentenced prisoners, reflects the

Government's determination to treat terrorists as criminals and to deal with them according to the process of law. The abolition of remission solely for those convicted of terrorist offences would run contrary to this aim and would amount in practice to the reintroduction of a type of special category status. On the other hand, the ending of remission for all prisoners, regardless of the offences of which they were convicted, would be so out of line with practice in the rest of the United Kingdom as to pose a major threat to the maintenance of discipline within the prisons, as well as severe problems of accommodation. Whatever the offence, remission is conditional upon good behaviour in prison. Every prisoner in Northern Ireland released with remission remains liable to be ordered to serve the balance of the sentence, in addition to any fresh sentence, upon a further conviction of an imprisonable offence.

There is no remission for life sentences. A prisoner serving a life sentence may be released by the Secretary of State on licence, subject to conditions; in cases of persons serving life imprisonment for murder this may be done only after consultation with the Lord Chief Justice and, if available, the trial judge. No person sentenced to life imprisonment for any terrorist offence (including murder) committed since the beginning of the present terrorist campaign has been released.

With regard to Part 2 of the resolution, there is no question of simply relying on the Republic of Ireland to solve our security problems. Nevertheless, effective co-operation with the authorities in the Republic is vital if terrorism is to be defeated. The Secretary of State does not share the resolution's pessimistic view of the prospects for this co-operation. At their meeting on 5 September the Prime Minister and My Lynch recognised that terrorism posed a common threat to their two countries. They also agreed upon the need for a substantial improvement in the already extensive co-operation between the two countries in efforts to stamp out terrorism. At the Secretary of State's own meeting with Irish Ministers on 5 October, a number of specific items were agreed upon for enhancing the effectiveness of the common campaign against terrorism. These include measures in relation to more intensive patrolling on both sides of the border and improved co-ordination

communications between the respective security forces. In the interest of maximum effectiveness it was decided that operational details of the measures discussed and agreed would not be made public.

As regards fugitive offenders, the Secretary of State has frequently made clear - most recently in his discussions with Ministers of the Irish Republic on 5 October - the Government's concern that those who commit terrorist crimes in Northern Ireland and flee to the Republic should be brought to justice. There are many ways of achieving this end; extradition is only one. The two Governments have agreed that the most effective means today is to ensure that fuller use is made of the extra-territorial criminal jurisdiction legislation, which allows terrorist suspects to be brought to trial in one jurisdiction for offences committed in the other. We are making every effort to make an effective tool of this legislation, which depends crucially - like every other effort to secure convictions against terrorists - upon the availability of evidence. In this connection, the police forces on both sides of the border need all the assistance that the general public can give them to carry out their common task of protecting the public. The Secretary of State is confident that members of District Councils will understand the importance of this.

Following the Ministerial meetings to which I have referred, the Secretary of State is convinced that there is a real commitment on the part of the authorities of the Republic to make progress in countering the threat which terrorism poses to both countries. He and his security advisers are also satisfied that the measures agreed on 5 October represent a major advance in security co-operation between the two countries and offer a substantially improved prospect of stamping out terrorism. In the light of this, the Government believes that any talk of punitive action against the Republic can only jeopardise what has been achieved in increased security co-operation.

The Secretary of State has noted the specific proposals in Part 3 of the resolution, aimed at rendering more effective the security effort. Some of them are consistent with current operational policy, for example the suggestion on covert operations, a subject to which a good deal of consideration has already been given. As regards some of the other proposals, however, I would again draw your attention to the criteria of effectiveness, practicability and impartiality, mentioned in the second paragraph of this letter.

The aim of the Government's security policy is to defeat the terrorists, from whatever part of the community, and to extend normal policing throughout Northern Ireland. The means of achieving this is through the RUC, with the Army acting in support, securing evidence on which to base successful prosecutions before the courts. The Secretary of State is confident that this policy will be facilitated by the recent appointment of Sir Maurice Oldfield, who has the task of achieving greater co-ordination and effectiveness in the efforts of the security forces against terrorism. The Secretary of State can well understand the feelings of anger which are aroused by the cowardly and evil activities of the terrorists, but does not feel that this should lead us into taking measures, which would be counter-productive and might well perpetuate tension and violence in the Province. Nor should the degree of success achieved by the security forces be underrated. So far this year [] charges have been brought for terrorist offences, [] of these for murder and [] for attempted murder. So far this year, too, [] people have been convicted for terrorist crimes; [] of these of murder and [] of attempted murder. These figures are by any standard a tribute to the work of the security forces. In the Secretary of State's view, we need to build upon what has so far been achieved, making adjustments where necessary in the means of implementing the Government's basic policy and striving to ensure that all parts of the community in Northern Ireland, together with the authorities in the Republic, are united in their determination to root out the evil of terrorism.

BRIEF FOR THE PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING WITH MR MOLYNEAUX
AND DR PAISLEY

THE POLITICAL SITUATION IN THE PROVINCE

Progress on the Government's initiative can be summarised as "so far so good". Three of the four political parties invited to the conference might each for different reasons have declined. Only the Official Unionists have done so. We can take cautious encouragement from the reactions of the Press and the many individuals with whom Ministers and officials have been in touch. The absence of out-of-hand condemnation of the Government's initiative (except by the Official Unionists) is in Northern Ireland terms encouraging.

2. It may be that the Government has caught a gentle tide. There are a number of reasons. The Warrenpoint and Mountbatten tragedies and the Pope's visit made no impact on the extremists on either side, but together they must have impressed on thinking men the need to break the deadlock. People are becoming aware of how exposed Northern Ireland is economically. The Government of the Republic are exercising a generally helpful influence. The past 4 years have been a period of political stagnation in the Province; some Ulstermen would agree that the time has now come to dust off the problem and have another look at it.

3. None of this means that the omens for the conference to succeed are encouraging at this stage. But positive influences can be brought to bear on the political parties as the Government's initiative develops. These are first the evidence, which we think the consultative document will provide, that there are a number of constitutional ways forward; and second the desire of the people of the Province to go beyond the sterile debate which has gone on for so many years. We hope to build on this desire.

4. Two negative influences could throw us off course. A serious deterioration in the security situation or an insensitive reaction to terrorist outrages could so raise the temperature on either side of the sectarian divide as to make it impossible for political leaders to give any ground during the conference. Secondly the conference may not reach agreement. Depending on how this happened it might tempt either Catholic or Protestant political leaders, or both, to confront HMG with demands for a settlement clearly favouring one side or the other. Such demands could have incalculable risks both in political and security terms. We need therefore to strike a nice balance; on the one hand emphasising the Government's determination to make progress and to take its own decisions, and on the other being careful to proceed step by step carrying the people of the Province with us.

5. The positions of the 2 party leaders the Prime Minister will be seeing are in summary as follows:

Dr Paisley:

Dr Paisley is at this stage perhaps the key figure. By default of the Official Unionist Party he promises to be the voice of the Protestant majority. His is not the sole authentic voice since many, perhaps a majority of Protestants, reject his fundamentalist bigotry. But he is an authentic voice and on many issues closest to the grass roots of Protestant opinion.

At his meeting with the Secretary of State on 9 November Dr Paisley was at pains to appear eminently reasonable. He has indicated that having been assured that the range of options to be considered by the conference will include "full blooded devolution" and having been received by the Prime Minister to discuss security, he will be content to attend the conference. We should not be misled into thinking that

SECRET

Dr Paisley will go into the conference in a spirit of compromise. We know from secret sources that he has contemplated leading a campaign against the Secretary of State and there are indications from the same sources that his aim in attending the conference is to wreck it. He will be reading the mood of the Protestant people very carefully and if he thinks that mood is right it cannot be excluded that at some point he will choose to lead a Protestant confrontation against the Government as happened in 1974 and 1977. Our reading is however that in the immediate short term his objectives are to supplant the Official Unionist Party by his own Democratic Unionist Party as the voice of Ulster Protestantism. To achieve that he needs to build on his success in the European elections by winning, as soon as he can persuade HMG to hold them, elections in the Province. This may give us a lever which we can use to get his acquiescence in some form of elected body as an agreed outcome of the conference.

Mr Molyneaux:

Mr Molyneaux has refused to attend the conference describing it as "time wasting". In his view it is for the Government to bring forward at Westminster proposals to implement the Conservative Party manifesto which he interprets as the introduction of an upper tier of local government. He sees no prospect of agreement between Northern Ireland parties on a form of devolution.

Mr Molyneaux's hard line is influenced by two factors. He is heavily under the influence of Mr Powell, a convinced integrationist. Secondly he tried to outflank Dr Paisley on the intransigent side of unionism (and was promptly outflanked by Dr Paisley on the liberal side).

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We think that Mr Molyneaux may have got it wrong. He is having no difficulty in holding his Parliamentary Party together but some dissenting Official Unionist voices are beginning to be heard in the Province. Mr Molyneaux's attendance is not a sine qua non for the conference. But we need him there if we can get him, both because any agreement reached at the conference will be fragile without the support of the Official Unionists and because if there is no agreement we shall wish to have the broadest possible range of views expressed on which to build in taking our own decisions about the next step. The Secretary of State is not pressing him to attend but equally every opportunity should be taken to point out to Mr Molyneaux that he is leaving the field open to Dr Paisley and that he may well find it difficult to persuade all his Party in the Province to follow him down this road of non-cooperation.

SECRET

NORTHERN IRELAND POLITICAL CONFERENCE


WORKING PAPER: ARRANGEMENTS FOR PUBLICATION, ETC.

1. The working paper is now with the printer. Advance copies will be circulated to members of the Cabinet later this week, and publication will be early next week, probably on Tuesday 20 November (subject to clearance with No. 10).
2. It is hoped to arrange a debate on the floor of the House of Commons in the week beginning Monday 26 November; the Conference will then begin in the week beginning 3 December in the Parliament Building at Stormont.
3. The working paper will be presented to Parliament, with an arranged PQ to draw attention to its forthcoming publication. The Secretary of State will preside at a Press Conference, and give television and radio interviews, in Belfast on the morning of publication. Simultaneously there will be background briefing of the Press, on a non-attributable basis, in London. Overseas posts, especially Washington and Dublin, will be fully briefed.
4. We are working on arrangements to give the working paper good and widespread publicity in Northern Ireland, using advertising and leaflets to promote interest in the Government's ideas. The Northern Ireland Ministers will be undertaking a Province-wide speaking campaign between publication and the Conference.

RECORD OF A TELEPHONE CONVERSATION BETWEEN MISS CAROLINE STEPHENS
AND MR. GERRY FITT, MP, AT 1620 ON TUESDAY 13 NOVEMBER 1979

I rang Mr. Fitt in Belfast to enquire whether he would like to meet with the Prime Minister tomorrow as both Mr. Paisley and Mr. Molyneaux were seeing her. Mr. Fitt said that Mr. Paisley had requested a meeting with the Prime Minister purely as a publicity stunt, and that Mr. Fitt had no intention of troubling the Prime Minister.

He said that he was well awf^e how busy she was, and that there were bound to be other instances in the future when he would wish to see her. He quite appreciated that she had offered to see him out of courtesy, and that he saw no point in wasting her time on this occasion. He also added that the situation was far too serious in Northern Ireland to play these sort of games.



13 November 1979

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Free

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

13 November 1979

ARMS FOR THE RUC

The Prime Minister has seen your letter to me of 12 November on this subject. She agrees that we should make it clear to both the State Department and the U.S. Ambassador that if the issue is not resolved before 17 December it is bound to figure prominently during her talks in Washington.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Roy Harrington (Northern Ireland Office).

M. O'D. B. ALEXANDER

sl

Paul Lever; Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

Prime Minister

Apex A?

12 November 1979

Ph... 12/11

[Handwritten signature]

Dear Michael,

Arms for the RUC

[Handwritten mark]

The Prime Minister will know that we have been making considerable efforts to persuade the US Administration to change their policy on the supply of arms for the RUC. The US Ambassador in London has been doing his best to get the issue resolved satisfactorily; and it is possible that following Mr Lynch's visit to the United States and the publication shortly afterwards of our Consultative Document on Northern Ireland, there may be some easing of Congressional pressures on the Administration. However, we have to face the fact that President Carter will be extremely reluctant to offend leading Irish Americans, especially now that Senator Kennedy has declared his candidature; and that in the last resort he may prefer to face a row with the British.

A

Lord Carrington would see advantage in our making it quite clear both to the State Department and to the US Ambassador here that if the issue is not resolved before 17 December it is bound to figure prominently during the Prime Minister's talks in Washington.

I should be grateful for confirmation that the Prime Minister would be content for us to speak to the Americans in these terms, preferably within the next week or so.

I am copying this letter to Roy Harrington in the Northern Ireland Office.

Yours etc

Paul

(P Lever)
Private Secretary

M O D B Alexander Esq
10 Downing Street
LONDON

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12 NOV 1979



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GRPS 300

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FM DUBLIN 091400Z NOVEMBER 79

TO PRIORITY F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 396 OF 9 NOVEMBER 79

INFO ROUTINE NIO BELFAST WASHINGTON

Prime Minister
[Signature]
12.11.

MURDER OF LORD MOUNTBATTEN

1. ON MONDAY 5 NOVEMBER THE TRIAL BEGAN IN DUBLIN OF FRANCIS MCGIRL AND THOMAS MACMAHON WHO HAD BEEN ARRESTED IN CO. LONGFORD ON 27 AUGUST AND CHARGED WITH THE MURDER OF LORD MOUNTBATTEN. REPORTS SUGGESTED THAT THE TRIAL WOULD LAST FOR AT LEAST THREE WEEKS AND THAT 90 WITNESSES WOULD BE CALLED. THE COMMISSIONER OF POLICE HAS TOLD ME HE THOUGHT IT WOULD LAST NO MORE THAN 10 DAYS. THE PROSECUTION SAID THAT THEIR CASE WAS "CIRCUMSTANTIAL AND BASED ON FORENSIC EVIDENCE". THEY HOPED TO SHOW THAT TRACES OF GELIGNITE, PAINT AND SAND WOULD LINK THE MEN WITH THE PLACING OF THE BOMB ON THE BOAT USED BY LORD MOUNTBATTEN.

2. THE PROSECUTION CLAIM THAT A YELLOW FORD CORTINA CAR WAS USED IN CONNECTION WITH THE EXPLOSION AND THEY CALLED A WITNESS WHO HAD SIGNED A STATEMENT TO THE EFFECT THAT HE HAD SEEN THE ACCUSED EXC^{HANGE} THIS CAR FOR A RED FORD ESCORT, THE CAR IN WHICH THEY WERE DRIVING WHEN THEY WERE ARRESTED.

3. THE VIEW OF JOURNALISTS AND MEMBERS OF MY STAFF WHO HAVE ATTENDED THE TRIAL IS THAT THE CASE IS NOT GOING WELL FOR THE PROSECUTION. THE CAR SALESMAN HAS CLAIMED THAT HE ONLY MADE THE WRITTEN STATEMENT UNDER DURESS AND THAT THE POLICE THREATENED HIM ON A NUMBER OF OCCASIONS. THE COURT HAVE AGREED THAT HE MAY BE REGARDED AS A HOSTILE WITNESS. THE ACCUSED THEMSELVES HAVE CLAIMED THAT THEY WERE THREATENED BY POLICE DURING INTERROGATION AND MCGIRL HAS DENIED THAT BEFORE THE POLICE MENTIONED THE EXPLOSION HE HAD SAID "I PUT NO BOMB IN THE BOAT".

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/4. ON

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4. ON WEDNESDAY TWO FORENSIC EXPERTS FROM GERMANY ARRIVED TO GIVE EVIDENCE FOR THE DEFENCE AND THE COURT AGREED TO ADJOURN THE TRIAL UNTIL MONDAY TO GIVE THE EXPERTS MORE TIME TO EXAMINE THE FORENSIC EVIDENCE SUBMITTED BY THE PROSECUTION. THEIR EVIDENCE AND THE EVIDENCE OF THE POLICE FORENSIC EXPERTS WILL BE CRUCIAL TO THE RESULT OF THE TRIAL.

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Free

259
Ireland

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

9 November 1979

DR. IAN PAISLEY

We spoke on the telephone late last night about the question of a meeting between the Prime Minister and Dr. Paisley to discuss security in Northern Ireland.

I enclose for your records a note of the conversation which took place on the telephone earlier yesterday evening between Dr. Paisley and Nick Sanders of this Office. Following receipt of Dr. Paisley's message, I spoke with Ken Stowe and the Prime Minister. The Prime Minister said that, notwithstanding the line in her letter to Dr. Paisley of 5 November, she would be prepared to see Dr. Paisley, Mr. Molyneaux and Mr. Fitt separately. I therefore rang Dr. Paisley at home at 2245 last night and, having apologised for any lack of clarity there might have been in the text of the Prime Minister's letter, said that the Prime Minister and the Secretary of State would, of course, be prepared to see him on his own. Dr. Paisley said he would get in touch with me on Monday to fix a time. He added that in the light of my call, the way was now clear for him to meet this morning with the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland as planned.

I made it clear to Dr. Paisley that the Prime Minister would be offering to see Mr. Molyneaux and Mr. Fitt on the same subject and that the order in which the meetings took place would depend on diary considerations. Dr. Paisley raised no objection to this.

M. O'D. B. ALEXANDER

Roy Harrington, Esq.,
Northern Ireland Office.

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From: THE PRIVATE SECRETARY



NORTHERN IRELAND OFFICE
GREAT GEORGE STREET,
LONDON SW1P 3AJ

(2)

Michael Alexander Esq
10 Downing Street
London SW1

AG

Prime Minister

This is essentially unchanged but
you may wish to glance through
9 November 1979
it again before the fo. ahead is
finally given.

mb

Printed 12/11

Dear Michael

The Secretary of State has asked me to send to you and to the Private Secretaries to the other members of OD a copy of the Consultative Document on the government of Northern Ireland in the form in which it has today been sent to the printers. He proposes to circulate copies to Cabinet colleagues on Thursday/Friday next and - subject to final approval from No 10 - to publish it simultaneously in London and Belfast on Tuesday, 20th November when it will be laid before Parliament as a Command Paper.

Mr Atkins explained to OD that the text before them was subject to drafting improvements and a number of these have been made. He wishes to draw attention particularly to paragraphs 25-28 which bring together, under a new heading of Administrative Costs and Feasibility, sentences bearing on this aspect which appeared in various paragraphs in the earlier draft. Mr Atkins considered that this aspect, and especially the importance of avoiding excessive bureaucracy, should be brought out more clearly given the weight which the Cabinet attaches to improving the management of government. There is nothing new in this material.

I am copying this letter and its attachment to Private Secretaries of all OD members, to the Private Secretary to the Paymaster General and to Martin Vile.

Yours sincerely
Mike Hopkins

M W HOPKINS

Enc.

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12 NOV 1979



The Government of Northern IrelandA Working Paper for a ConferenceIntroduction

1 For several ^{years} /the people of Northern Ireland have lived under a system of 'direct rule' from Westminster. Under this system no significant responsibilities are discharged by locally elected bodies. This has left the people of Northern Ireland with less responsibility for their own affairs than is the case in any other part of the United Kingdom. While these arrangements may be accepted in Northern Ireland as 'second best' they are not satisfactory as a continuing basis for the government of the Province. Her ^{Majesty's} /Government is therefore seeking a transfer of responsibility which will serve the best interests of Northern Ireland. Such a transfer cannot and must not be frustrated by terrorism.

1979

2 On 25 October /the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland announced that the Government would put to Parliament at an early date proposals for transferring to locally elected representatives some of the powers of government in Northern Ireland at present exercised from Westminster. To that end a Conference of the main political parties would be convened so that the Government might proceed with the highest possible level of agreement.

The Scope of the Conference

3. The Conference will be concerned essentially with a transfer of powers within the United Kingdom. Its task will be to establish the highest level of agreement on how to do this in ways which will best meet the immediate needs of Northern Ireland.
4. It is at present the clear wish of a substantial majority of the people in Northern Ireland to remain part of the United Kingdom, ^{therefore} The Conference will/not be concerned with the constitutional status of the Province and will not be asked to discuss issues such as Irish unity, or confederation, or independence. Nor, since there is no serious prospect of agreement on them, will the conference be invited to consider either a return to the arrangements which prevailed before 1972, or a revival of the system which obtained in the first five months of 1974. New patterns must be sought which take full account of the needs and anxieties of bothsides of the community.
5. ^{Majesty's Government} The objective of Her/ is the transfer of as wide a range of powers as can be agreed including if acceptable arrangements can be made, all the powers transferred under the 1973 Constitution Act. While the Government will be ready to recommend to Parliament any workable transfer of powers which may be acceptable to the people of Northern Ireland as a whole, there are in its view certain principles which must be observed. These are:
- (i) The powers should be transferred to the elected representatives of the people of Northern Ireland; and the over-riding authority of Parliament will (as elsewhere in the United Kingdom) be preserved;

- (ii) In the words of the Statement of 25 October, there will have to be "reasonable and appropriate arrangements to take account of the interests of the minority". Those arrangements will have to be acceptable to both sides of the community and also to Her Majesty's Government. The political divisions of the people of Northern Ireland are such that the alternation of the parties in government which is so important a feature of the Westminster system is unlikely to take place. In the Government's view it is essential for a transfer of powers to be made in a way which will take account of the interests of both parts of the community.
- (iii) Under any new arrangements, existing safeguards and remedies against discrimination on religious or political grounds should be at least maintained, and, if possible, improved.
- (iv) Responsibility for defence and foreign affairs (including relations with the European Community) will remain with the United Kingdom Government and Parliament, as will responsibility for the courts and electoral matters.
- (v) In the foreseeable future, given the Government's over-riding commitment to combat terrorism, responsibility for law and order will also remain with Westminster.
- (vi) The general power to raise revenue by taxation will remain with Westminster; but this would not rule out the possibility of a local power to levy a rate.

(vii) Public expenditure in Northern Ireland will continue as at present to be ^{assessed} / on the basis of need, and to be financed with support as necessary from the United Kingdom Exchequer.

6. The transfer of powers, which, the Government hopes, can be agreed at the Conference on the basis of these principles, need not be completed in one operation. It may be appropriate and desirable to consider arrangements for a progressive transfer over a period of time.

7. The Government will take whatever decisions are needed to implement any arrangements agreed in the Conference provided that those arrangements appear likely to be broadly acceptable to the people of Northern Ireland as a whole.

8. This Working Paper sets out in the following paragraphs a basis and an agenda for the Conference. It presents, in the form of various options for consideration, (i) ways in which transferred powers might be exercised; (ii) the range of powers and responsibilities which might be transferred from Westminster to local control; and (iii) ways of taking into account the interests of all sections of the community.

THE TASK OF THE CONFERENCE

9. The key issues to which the Conference will need to address itself are:-

- A. Institutions: what kind of elected body or bodies, how chosen, and with what form of executive body;
- B. Powers: the subjects in respect of which powers are to be transferred to the institutions: the extent of the power in each case, and whether and to what extent it should be legislative, executive, or advisory.
- C. The Minority: the way in which powers are to be exercised by the chosen institutions so as to safeguard the interests of the minority community.

10. Later paragraphs consider these three key issues in turn; and Appendix A of the Working Paper sets out models which illustrate various ways in which the key issues might be tackled.

A. INSTITUTIONS

11. The Conference will need to consider under this heading:-

- (i) the elected body or bodies to represent the Province;
- (ii) the smaller body or bodies needed for executive purposes and
- (iii) the relationship between the two.

It might also be appropriate for the Conference to consider whether the institutional arrangements might be supplemented by the establishment of committees with advisory or investigative functions.

Method of Election

12. It will be for consideration by what means an elected body should be chosen. Since 1973 all elections in Northern Ireland (except to Parliament at Westminster, to which special considerations of uniformity throughout the United Kingdom apply) have been on a basis of proportional representation with a single transferable vote. If that system were used again the parliamentary constituencies could serve as multi-member constituencies under proportional representation.

The Elected Body

13. The first form that devolution took in Northern Ireland in 1920 adopted the institutional model of Westminster - a legislature, consisting of an upper and a lower chamber, with the upper chamber ^{amending and} possessing/certain delaying powers. Such a system is familiar to the United Kingdom and has many strengths. It could be reproduced again for Northern Ireland. However, there was no upper chamber in the 1973 constitutional arrangements; and the general view in the 1975 Constitutional Convention was that a unicameral system was quite sufficient for devolved government in a territory of 1.5 million people. It is also the pattern in local government in the United Kingdom.

The Executive

14. It is usual for ^{policy formulation for} the day-to-day business of administration and for ^{small} decision-taking to be undertaken by a/ "Executive" authority accountable to a larger elected body. Executive responsibilities can be exercised by a "Cabinet" system (as at Westminster) or by committees (as in local government). Either of these arrangements would be suitable for use in Northern Ireland if substantial responsibilities were transferred from Westminster to elected

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representatives there. They could be used whether executive and legislative powers were transferred or whether the transfer was limited to executive responsibilities.

Committees

15. Besides the executive committee the other main type of committee of an elected body is the advisory or investigative committee, which is not empowered to exercise executive powers but, through reports to the elected body, gives advice to the Executive, or scrutinises its policies and proposals, or investigates matters at its own discretion. The 1973 Northern Ireland constitutional arrangements provided one example of such committees. The 1975 report of the Constitutional Convention offered another example. And the new select committees being established at Westminster provide a third. The committees' terms of reference (for example whether they should play a part in considering proposed legislation in addition to examining the actions of the Executive) may be subject to many variations, again according to how much power it is desired to vest in them.

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3: POWERS TO BE TRANSFERRED

16. Paragraph 5 of this Working Paper set out the functions which Her Majesty's Government believes should remain with the United Kingdom Government, either because they are essentially the functions of sovereign states (eg external defence and foreign policy) or for reasons specific to the present circumstances of Northern Ireland (eg responsibility for law and order). These functions set the outer limits to the powers that could be transferred to a Northern Ireland elected body.

17. Within those limits there is a wide range of important subjects capable of being transferred. They can be considered along two dimensions:

- (i) the range of subjects - eg industrial development, education - for which a new body would be responsible;
- (ii) within a given subject, the extent to which powers are to be transferred: there are three broad possibilities -
 - (a) transferring all executive and legislative powers;
 - (b) transferring all executive powers;
 - (c) transferring only those executive powers normally exercised by local authorities in Great Britain.

Thus, under (b) would be transferred in, eg the field of education, not only the powers of a local education authority in England but also those exercised there by the Secretary of State for Education and Science; whereas under (c) only the local education authority powers would be transferred.

18. Under the constitutions of 1920 and 1973 a broad range of subjects transferred to devolved government in Northern Ireland, including agriculture; employment and commerce; housing, roads and internal transportation; water and sewerage; town and country planning and protection of the environment; health, social services and social security; and ^{current} education. A brief statement of the /functions of the Northern Ireland Departments in relation to these subjects is at Appendix B. Responsibility for all of these subjects could be transferred again to a new elected body in Northern Ireland.
19. On the other hand, a more limited range of subjects (though not necessarily powers - see paragraph 17 (ii)) could be transferred to local control. For example, the subjects could be restricted to those that are the responsibility of local authorities in Great Britain. On this basis responsibility for agriculture, commerce, employment and the administration of the health service and the social security system would remain with central government at Westminster. Locally elected representatives would have no executive or legislative responsibility for those subjects, and electors in Northern Ireland (as in the rest of the United Kingdom) would exercise influence over the provision of those services through their elected representatives at Westminster.

Extent of powersExecutive and Legislative Devolution

20. The second dimension of devolution is the extent of the powers within each subject area that might be exercised by a new local administration. In both 1920 and 1973, if a subject was transferred, it was full executive and legislative responsibility for that subject which was transferred. Thus under both settlements all aspects of housing or employment or education in Northern Ireland/ were transferred and therefore came within the competence of the devolved government. Under new arrangements, it might be suitable for the same thing to happen again.

Executive Devolution

21. There are however other approaches; and these could radically affect the nature of the system of the government being established. First, while the range of subjects being transferred might be similar to 1973, the extent of powers being transferred within each subject area could be restricted to executive powers only. On this basis, the new body would have no power to pass legislation; this would remain a Westminster responsibility.

The new arrangements would fall somewhere in between the devolution known in Northern Ireland from 1921 to 1972 - and again in 1974 - and local government as it is known in Great Britain.

22. Within a system in which only executive powers were transferred, the extent of a new elected body's responsibilities could be further varied according to the precise degree of executive power that was to be exercised. It would be possible, for example, for locally-elected representatives to provide a political direction and control of Northern Ireland Departments in the discharge of all their executive functions. *
23. Alternatively only a proportion of executive powers in each subject area could be transferred to local control, the rest remaining with central government. In other words, the British local government example would be follows: local control would extend a certain distance vertically up each functional ladder; but beyond that point, control would remain with the United Kingdom government.

* Ever since 1921 the Northern Ireland Government Departments have discharged all their executive functions subject to the direction and control of their political heads. Until 1972, the political heads were Ministers of the Northern Ireland Government. Under direct rule, the Departments have discharged their functions subject to the direction and control of the Secretary of State.

24. If the range of functions and powers transferred were confined to those administered by local authorities in Great Britain - ie if there were no transfer of responsibility for legislation or overall policy - it would not be essential for them to be administered by a single authority for the whole Province. It would be possible to divide up the Province into two or more geographical areas, each with a regional body exercising this range of powers, provided that the population base of each were large enough to sustain the services being administered. The effect would be to create in NI an upper tier of local government on the Great Britain pattern.

Administrative costs and feasibility

25. In considering the subjects, and the powers within each subject area, which might be transferred it will be important to avoid unnecessary cost and excessive bureaucracy.

26. At present the Northern Ireland Departments discharge functions throughout the field of transferred subjects (as described in Appendix B). If full executive and legislative responsibility for all those subjects were transferred again (ie devolution on a scale comparable to 1920 or 1973) the existing Northern Ireland Government machine could be transferred in toto to serve the new elected body. Administrative upheaval, cost and disruption of service would be kept to a minimum.

27. If a range of subjects substantially less than that transferred in

the past (see paragraph 19) were transferred, certain consequences would flow. The Northern Ireland Departments, which have operated for almost 60 years within a Northern Ireland corpus of law and with consistent, inter-relating practices, would need to be split into two groups. One group, responsible for the newly transferred subjects, would come under the control of the new locally-based body. The other group responsible for the non-transferred subjects, would serve the United Kingdom Government at Westminster. There would be consequential effects on inter-service coordination, the level of bureaucracy and the efficiency of administration.

28. If the extent of powers transferred followed the "local government" pattern in Great Britain, (see paragraph 23), more far-reaching practical considerations arise. Following local government reorganisation in 1973, some Northern Ireland Departments are now responsible for both policy and administration of many services that in Great Britain are administered by local authorities. To adopt the British distinction between "central" and "local" government responsibilities in these fields would entail complex legislation to split the functions, staff and resources at present integrated in those Northern Ireland Departments. The establishment of such a "local government" system would not be compatible with any further transfer of powers to a new devolved government in Northern Ireland: there would be an insufficient range of functions for the devolved government to exercise; and with two separate tiers of government between the existing 26 district councils and Parliament at Westminster, Northern Ireland would be over-governed. If the new tier of local government consisted of a single body

there would be a real possibility of conflict between two regional administrations responsible to the same electorate. If, on the other hand, the new local government tier comprised two or more bodies, the other consideration already referred to would arise in a more acute form. The cost scale and complexity of the governmental reorganisation would be even greater if the existing single administrative structure had to be split not simply into separate functional parts (exercising on the one hand "central" and on the other "local" government powers) but also between different geographical locations requiring new local staff and premises.

External Checks

29. There is one further way of varying the extent of the powers to be transferred - by making the exercise of those powers directly subject to some outside authority. Constitutionally, of course, any devolved or local government is subject ultimately to Parliament at Westminster. But that general supremacy could be supplemented by specific powers for the Secretary of State, exercised with or without Parliament's approval depending on the circumstances in which they were to be used. Thus, as is already the case in local government in Great Britain, the Secretary of State could be furnished with explicit call-in powers to review particular decisions by the locally based body, or he could have default powers to step in where necessary action was not being taken. He might also have general powers of direction; or he could refer executive decisions or proposed legislation to Westminster for judgement. Certainly some power of override

would be essential to ensure that local decisions did not run counter to the United Kingdom's international obligations. Finally, some form of grant-in-aid will continue to be an important source of finance for any locally based government in Northern Ireland. It will be for consideration how far - remembering Her Majesty's Government's overall responsibility for public sector expenditure - the arrangements adopted should give the local administration a greater or smaller degree of financial freedom.

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C. The Exercise of Powers, and the Role of the Minority

30. It is in the Government's view essential to recognise that the particular circumstances of Northern Ireland require special arrangements to be made to protect the position of the minority community and to specify the role of its representatives in whatever new arrangements are adopted. This is because, given the basis on which support for political parties in Northern Ireland rests, the representatives of the minority community cannot so broaden their appeal as to expect to win office by way of any future election. Moreover, it is the perception of the minority community that the majority, in the exercise of the powers of government, have failed to take proper account of minority interests. In this situation it is necessary, if new arrangements for Northern Ireland are to gain the public confidence on which stability depends, that they should embrace a formula that gives appropriate recognition to the rights of both the majority and minority communities.

31. A wide range of devices is available to help to protect the position of the minority within different systems of government. The choice of which to use depends to some extent on the nature of the chosen institutional framework and the extent of powers to be exercised. But most are adaptable in some form or other to any arrangements for the exercise of either executive or legislative powers.

Minority Participation in Decision-Taking

32. First there is the possibility of various kinds (and degrees) of direct participation by minority representatives in those areas of government involving the taking of decisions. Thus, in an Executive made up of individuals each of whom was political head

of a department, provision could for example be made for the Executive posts to be filled:

- (i) by appointment, recognising certain criteria, as in 1973;
- (ii) in proportion to party strengths in the elected body (assembly);
- (iii) by election either by the assembly or by the electorate as a whole.

If executive powers resided in committees, each having responsibility for certain subjects, minority participation could take the form of a share of chairmanships and/or seats on committees. This could apply not only to executive committees but also (as was envisaged in the 1975 Convention Report) to non-executive committees

"Weighted"Votes

33. Alternatively the interest of the minority community could be secured indirectly by establishing certain procedures which required some degree of acknowledgment of minority interests from the majority. These procedures - and the degree of indirect involvement^{ment} of the minority community - could vary.
34. For example, it might be provided that initially and at specified intervals thereafter the Executive should submit itself to a vote of confidence on a "weighted" basis, ie it would have to obtain a majority large enough to have support from at least some representatives of other parties. In this way the Executive would have to satisfy those representatives by presenting general policies that took account of their interests in order to win their support in votes of confidence. If the Executive did not obtain the necessary degree of support in one of these weighted votes, it might then be obliged to seek authority from Westminster to continue, or it might fall.

35. The device of weighted votes could also be used, for example, so that the approval of executive committees, by a weighted majority, could be required for all proposed legislation before it was submitted to the full assembly; or key executive and/or legislative decisions (eg on financial matters) could require the weighted approval of the whole elected body; or the Secretary of State might be empowered to ask for a weighted vote either at his discretion or if certain criteria were fulfilled. A further option in a bicameral system where the approval of an upper chamber was required for legislation could be that a weighted majority vote could be required in that chamber before legislative proposals could proceed; alternatively, the upper chamber could be so constituted that the opposition parties had a representation disproportionate to their strength in the lower chamber.

Powers of appeal

36. Another safeguard is the conferring of a right of appeal, for example, by giving the Secretary of State power to refer back to the assembly decisions or proposals at the instance of a stated minority of members. Indeed a variety of safeguards by appeal can be envisaged each giving a right of appeal to some external authority against alleged abuse of power by the Executive; the appeal might be to the Secretary of State, to Westminster direct, or to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. The circumstances in which appeals might be made would need to be prescribed as would the powers to be given to the appellate body to intervene in the local government's actions.

External Safeguards

37. Finally, it would be possible to devise a range of statutory safeguards against abuse of power that would be specified from the outset of the transfer of powers. These

could be incorporated into a single Bill of Rights, unamendable by the local legislature, and laying down justiciable guide-lines with which local laws could not conflict. This would be in addition to the institutional safeguards already in existence, e.g. the present Ombudsmen. General oversight of human rights could rest with an independent agency.

Illustrative Examples

38. . . . Appendix A of this Paper offers as an aid to discussion certain examples of how various constitutional elements might be combined to construct actual models of government. None of the schemes is Her Majesty's Government's preferred solution. The Government would be prepared to take the decisions on which to base legislation to put into effect any of the models, or a variant of any one of them, which appeared capable of attracting the broadly based confidence of the people of Northern Ireland, and which would provide good and efficient government.



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QUESTIONS FOR DISCUSSION

39. The following questions, which arise from the issues considered earlier in this document and from the "model" systems of government illustrated in Appendix A, are set out as a framework or agenda for the Conference. It will be the Government's aim, in discussion and negotiation with the political parties in Northern Ireland at the Conference, to secure the highest level of agreement possible in providing the answers to these questions, so that the Government can then take the decisions on which to base legislation for a transfer to the people of Northern Ireland of greater responsibility for the conduct of their affairs.

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Institutional Framework

1. Should there be one elected body, or more?
2. What should be the method of election of the elected body or bodies?
3. In the case of one body, should there be one chamber or two; and if two, how should the upper chamber be chosen and what powers should it have?
4. Should the Executive be "cabinet-style" or "committee-style"?
5. What part (if any) should committees play in legislative or executive decision-making; could they have an investigative or advisory function?

Powers to be Exercised

6. Should the range or number of functions transferred be on the 1973 scale or more limited?
7. What should be the extent of the powers transferred: legislative and executive, or executive only?
8. If legislative, should they extend to primary legislation (subject to ~~over~~fride by the Westminster Parliament) or only to subordinate legislation?
9. If executive powers only are transferred, ie on local government lines, should they be confined to management or include responsibility for policy within a legislative framework?
10. How much financial power should be given to the elected body or bodies, and to the executive, as regards (a) the raising of revenue and (b) deciding how the available resources should be distributed?

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Role of the Minority

11. What are the best arrangements to take account of the interests of the minority community in decision-taking, whether legislative or executive: for example, should a proportion of posts be reserved to their representatives or should certain posts and/or decisions require approval by a weighted majority vote?

12. Should there be an established right of appeal by minority groups in the elected body (or bodies) to a higher authority with "override" or blocking powers?

ILLUSTRATIVE MODELS OF SYSTEMS OF GOVERNMENT

1. The models set out in this Appendix are illustrations of the variety of regional bodies that might be created in Northern Ireland. They show some (but certainly not all) of the ways in which the many elements might be combined to produce relationships between legislature and Executive, government and opposition, majority and minority, that might suit the present needs of Northern Ireland.
2. Several of the models have features in common. To aid the reader, the description of each model has been made self-contained, even though as a result there is a degree of repetition in the descriptions.
3. All the models incorporate, by way of illustration, a number of arrangements whose aim is to take account of the interests of the minority community by giving opposition parties a greater or lesser degree of influence on the way that executive and/or legislative decisions are taken. None of these arrangements is wedded to any particular institutional framework or to a system exercising any particular powers. Almost without exception they can be adapted to the needs of different systems. Some are in the form of safeguards providing the minority with, for example, the protection of a weighted vote; others offer positive participation in the formulation of decisions on legislation or executive action.

Where the exact balance should lie, and how the various arrangements should inter-relate with the political institutions to be established, will be matters for consideration by the Conference.

4. On a point of terminology, the term "assembly" is used to denote directly elected bodies exercising legislative powers: "council" is used to denote bodies with only executive powers. The adoption of this convention is a matter of convenience only and has no further significance.

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MODEL "A": A UNICAMERAL SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT WITH LEGISLATIVE AND EXECUTIVE POWERS

This model illustrates a structure similar to that of Westminster (or the former Stormont Parliament) but without an upper chamber. It shows how a select committee system might have a part to play, and it sets out some of the ways in which special arrangements for the opposition or minority might be built in to the structure to provide them with varying degrees of influence.

1. The Institutional Framework

- (i) An elected single-chamber assembly.
- (ii) A "cabinet" system of government (Executive) formed by the leader of the largest party or group of parties.
- (iii) A system of select committees to scrutinise Government Departments' policies and actions. A committee might be set up to cover each Northern Ireland Department with terms of reference similar to those of Westminster select committees.

2. The Powers to be exercised

- (i) The range of matters to be devolved (or "transferred") would be similar to that transferred in 1973: ie those matters currently the responsibility of the Northern Ireland Departments. (See Appendix B).
- (ii) The assembly would be able to legislate for Northern Ireland on all transferred matters. All legislative proposals passed by the assembly would require the approval of Her Majesty in Council before becoming law.

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- (ii) The members of the Executive would act as ministers in charge of the Northern Ireland Departments which would discharge executive functions throughout the transferred field.
- (iv) The Parliament and Government of the United Kingdom would retain responsibility for all matters not transferred (principally defence, foreign affairs, management of the economy, elections, courts administration, law and order). However, certain matters initially reserved to Westminster might be transferred at a later date.

3. The Role of the Minority

- (i) Various of the elements described in paragraphs 32-36 of this Paper could be built into the arrangements to enable the representatives of the minority community to exercise a greater or lesser influence on the decision-taking process. Examples are:
- (a) The Executive: the Executive might be obliged to submit itself to an initial or regular vote of confidence in the assembly by weighted majority thus requiring it to gain a measure of support from parties not represented in the Executive. As a result of that support, such a party might expect something in return eg some influence on the composition of the Executive (or even to gain some level of participation in it); an agreement over the introduction of particular legislation sought by opposition parties; or certain guarantees regarding the formulation of policies.

- (b) The legislature: it might be provided that all, or certain categories of, legislation had to be approved by weighted majority. This would ensure that proposals had support from some opposition members. Alternatively, there might be a right of appeal to the Secretary of State, asking him to intervene either by referring legislation back to the assembly or by requesting Parliament to decide whether it should be submitted to Her Majesty in Council for final approval
- (c) Select committees: the membership and chairmanships of these committees (which could have influence on both policy and legislation) could be allocated in such a way as to give the parties not forming the Executive a voice equal to that of those which did - 50% of the committee chairmanships and 50% representation on each committee.
- (d) Statutory safeguards: in addition to those safeguards against discrimination already in existence, a Bill of Rights for Northern Ireland might be enacted and the necessary arrangements made to ensure that it was enforceable in the courts.

Neither the institutional framework nor the powers to be exercised need follow the precise pattern illustrated in this model. The Secretary of State and/or Parliament could be given more extensive powers of intervention and override in the legislative and executive process. An upper chamber might be created to act as a check on legislation and executive action. Or the select committees could be given greater powers. Some of these alternatives are shown as elements in later models.

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MODEL "B": A BICAMERAL SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT WITH LEGISLATIVE AND EXECUTIVE POWERS.

This model illustrates a system of devolved government where there is an upper chamber through which the representative of the minority community might exert influence on the decision-taking process.

1. The Institutional Framework

- (i) An elected lower chamber.
- (ii) A "cabinet" system of government (Executive) formed by the leader of the largest party or group of parties.
- (iii) An upper chamber (the "Senate") which could be:
 - (a) wholly elected, either by the lower chamber or directly by the electorate;
 - (b) partly elected and partly nominated, either by the Secretary of State or by the parties represented in the lower chamber;
 - (c) nominated in equal parts by on the one hand the parties forming the Executive and on the other those in opposition.
- (iv) A select or advisory committee structure could be adopted if desired.

2. The Powers to be exercised

- (i) The range of matters to be transferred would be similar to that transferred in 1973 ie those matters currently the responsibility of the Northern Ireland Departments.
- (ii) The lower chamber would be able to legislate for Northern Ireland on all transferred matters. All legislative proposals

passed by the lower chamber would require the approval of Her Majesty in Council before becoming law.

- (iii) The members of the Executive would act as ministers in charge of the Northern Ireland Departments which would discharge executive functions throughout the transferred field.
- (iv) The Parliament and Government of the United Kingdom would retain responsibility for all matters not transferred (principally defence, foreign affairs, management of the economy, elections, courts administration, law and order). However, certain matters initially reserved to Westminster might be transferred at a later date.

3. The Role of the Minority

The special arrangements for those parties not participating in the Executive would centre on the Senate which could either be constituted as in paragraph 1 (iii) (C) above or which could be required to take all decisions by weighted majority. The Senate might be empowered to:

- (i) refer proposed legislation back to the lower chamber (in the manner of the House of Lords);
- (ii) block legislation altogether;
- (iii) refer proposed legislation to Westminster for approval;
- (iv) refer executive action to the Secretary of State and request him to exercise a power of override;
- (v) act in any of the above ways only when certain particularly sensitive matters were involved (eg possible discrimination against the minority community).

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In a system of this kind the role and influence of the representatives of the minority community is not a direct one. However with a Senate in possession of blocking powers, it is almost certain that a practice of consultation would develop so that the Executive was aware of Senate views and could, if it so wished, take account of them at an early stage. The indirect influence of the Senate could therefore be considerable.

MODEL "C" A SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT WITH LEGISLATIVE AND EXECUTIVE POWERS
OPERATING ON AN EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE BASIS

The system illustrated in this model applies a structure of executive committees, familiar in local government throughout the United Kingdom, to the exercise of full devolved powers. It shows ^{how} the interests of the minority community might be recognised in a variety of ways by giving their representatives places on the executive committees.

1. The Institutional Framework

- (i) An elected assembly.
- (ii) A system of executive committees appointed by the assembly whose chairmen would direct and control the Northern Ireland Departments in the discharge of their executive functions, and would present for approval by the assembly proposals for legislation.
- (iii) In performing their tasks the chairmen would be subject to general policy guidelines laid down by their committees.

2. The Powers to be Exercised

- (i) The range of matters to be transferred would be similar to that transferred in 1973 ie those matters currently the responsibility of the Northern Ireland Departments.
- (ii) The assembly would be able to legislate for Northern Ireland on all transferred matters. All legislative proposals passed by the assembly would require the approval of Her Majesty in Council before becoming law.

- (iii) The chairmen of the executive committees would act as ministers in charge of the Northern Ireland Departments which would discharge executive functions throughout the transferred field.
- (iv) The Parliament and Government of the United Kingdom would retain responsibility for all matters not transferred (principally defence, foreign affairs, management of the economy, elections, courts administration, law and order). However, certain matters initially reserved to Westminster might be transferred at a later date.
- (v) If it was desired not to transfer legislative responsibility, the system could initially exercise solely executive functions. All primary legislation would be reserved to Westminster, which might have regard to advice from the assembly. Responsibility for legislation could be transferred, if so desired, at a later stage.

3. The Role of the Minority

The normal convention in local authority arrangements in Great Britain is for the majority group to occupy the chairmanships of all the committees and a majority of the seats on each committee, thus giving them complete control. There are a number of ways in which that might be adapted.

- (i) The chairmanships and the seats on the committees would be allocated to the parties in proportion to their representation in the assembly.

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- (ii) The chairmanships would be filled by the majority group but the opposition is given special representation on each committee.
- (iii) The committees would have to approve all legislation by weighted majority before it was presented to the assembly.

Any of these methods would provide the opposition with considerable power to influence decisions. Both (i) and (ii), however, give the majority party or parties ultimate control since the committee chairmen would have to comply with policy guidelines laid down by the majority on the committee; (iii) gives restricted blocking powers to opposition members with reference only to legislative proposals.

MODEL "D": A SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT WITH EXECUTIVE BUT NO LEGISLATIVE POWERS OPERATING ON A COMMITTEE BASIS

This model sets out a system of executive government operating on lines similar to those of local government throughout Great Britain. The functions (both the range of subjects and the extent of powers) to be transferred would however be wider than those given to any local authority in Great Britain, having regard to the arguments set out in paragraphs 25 — 28 of this Paper.

1. The Institutional Framework

- (i) An elected council
- (ii) Executive committees of council members whose chairmen would direct and control the Northern Ireland Departments in the discharge of their functions.
- (iii) The chairmen being subject to guidance from their committees.

2. The Powers to be Exercised

- (i) The council would be responsible for all the executive functions of the Northern Ireland Government Departments (not just those functions which in Great Britain are discharged by local government authorities).
- (ii) The council would have no power to make primary legislation, though its role in relation to subordinate legislation would be for consideration and it might advise the Secretary of State on matters of primary legislation.

(iii) The Secretary of State (or, through him, the Westminster Parliament) would have certain powers of direction and override and default powers. The precise nature of these powers would be for consideration.

3. The Role of the Minority

Representative of the minority community could be given a greater or lesser role in the system by the introduction of mechanisms illustrated earlier, for instance:

- (i) The chairmanships and the seats on the committees could be allocated to the parties in proportion to their representation in the full council.
- (ii) The Chairmanships could be filled by the majority group but the opposition could be given special representation on each committee.
- (iii) The council might have to approve its advice on legislation by weighted majority before it was submitted to the Secretary of State.

Any of these methods would provide the opposition with considerable power to influence decisions. Both (i) and (ii), however, would give the majority party or parties ultimate control since the committee chairmen would have to comply with policy guidance laid down by the majority on the committee; (iii) would give some restricted blocking powers to opposition parties with reference only to legislative advice.

C.R.

MODEL "E": A SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT WITH EXECUTIVE BUT NO LEGISLATIVE POWERS BASED ON THE "CABINET" SYSTEM, BUT WITH ADVISORY COMMITTEES

This model illustrates a form of government exercising executive powers only, but which is a development of the arrangements in existence in local authorities in Great Britain.

1. The Institutional Framework

- (i) An elected council.
- (ii) An Executive which could be formed by the leader of the largest party or group of parties (see paragraph 3 below).
- (iii) Each member of the Executive would direct and control a Northern Ireland Department.
- (iv) Each member of the Executive would chair a functional committee with purely advisory powers.
- (v) Select committees might also be appointed with investigative powers.

2. The Powers to be Exercised

- (i) The Northern Ireland Government Departments, under the direction and control of members of the Executive, would discharge their present executive functions.
- (ii) The council would have no power to make primary legislation, though its role in relation to subordinate legislation would be for consideration, and it might advise the Secretary of State on matters of primary legislation.

(iii) The Secretary of State (or, through him, the Westminster Parliament) would have certain powers of direction and override and default powers. The precise nature of these powers would be for consideration.

3. The Role of the Minority

(i) The influence of the minority might be expressed in a number of ways:

- (a) The Executive might be obliged to submit itself to an initial or regular vote of confidence in the council by weighted majority thus requiring it to gain a measure of support from parties not represented in the Executive. In return for that support, such a party might expect something in return, eg some influence on the composition of the Executive (or even to gain some level of participation in it); or an agreement regarding the formulation of certain policies.
- (b) Functional Committees: special representation on these advisory committees might be given to the opposition parties.
- (c) Select Committees: the membership and chairmanships of these committees could be allocated in such a way as to give the parties not forming the Executive a voice equal to that of those which did - 50% of the committee chairmanships and 50% representation on each committee; they might also be empowered to call on the Secretary of State to use his powers of intervention. (See paragraph 2(iii) above).

C.R.

yes

- (ii) An alternative means of increasing the scope of minority representation to influence the decision-taking process could be for the council to elect a leader of the Executive by weighted majority vote. The returns those representatives might get for their support are similar to those outlined in paragraph 3(i)(a) above.

MODEL "F": A SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT WITH EXECUTIVE BUT NO
LEGISLATIVE POWERS EXERCISED BY ONE OR MORE LOCAL AUTHORITIES

This model illustrates a system in which one or a number of local councils exercise powers similar to those of local authorities in Great Britain. The precise number of bodies could be anything from one up to the eight county and county borough councils that existed in Northern Ireland up to the 1973 local government reorganisation. One option might be to have an Eastern Council, a Western Council and a Greater Belfast Council; another to follow the geographical areas of responsibility of either the Education or Health Area Boards.

1. The Institutional Framework

- (i) An elected council or councils.
- (ii) Each council having functional committees which look after day-to-day administration while matters of policy or principle are determined by the full council.
- (iii) The committee chairmen being wholly subject to the decisions of their committees.

2. The Powers to be Exercised

- (i) The council(s) would be responsible for those services currently the responsibility of English local authorities.*

* ie principally education, housing, planning, roads, social services. However it would be for consideration whether social services should in fact be separated from the administration of the health services (they are currently administered as a single unit in Northern Ireland); and whether water and sewerage should be a local responsibility (as in Scotland). Agriculture, employment and industry would not be transferred.



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- (ii) The extent of the responsibility of the council(s) would be limited in the same way as in Great Britain. Thus overall policy would be reserved to central government and the exact functions of the local authority would be spelt out in legislation.
- (iii) The council(s) would have no legislative powers (other than the power to make local byelaws).
- (iv) The Secretary of State would have default and call-in powers and power of direction.

3. The Role of the Minority

The normal convention in local authority arrangements in Great Britain is for the majority group to occupy the chairmanships of all the committees and a majority of the seats on each committee, thus giving them complete control. This might be adapted:

- a) by allocating the chairmanships and the seats to the parties in proportion to their representation in the full council;
- b) by giving all chairmanships to the majority party or parties but by giving the opposition special representation on each committee;
- c) by providing for weighted voting in certain circumstances either in the committees, in full council, or in both.

FUNCTIONS OF NORTHERN IRELAND DEPARTMENTSDepartment of Finance

Control of expenditure of Northern Ireland Departments; liaison with the United Kingdom Treasury and Northern Ireland Office on financial matters; borrowing; loan advances.

Economic and social planning and research; Government statistical services.

Striking of regional rate and collection of regional and district rates.

Provision and maintenance of public buildings; building regulations; valuation; Ordnance Survey;

Registration of births, marriages and deaths; registration of deeds; registration of title of land.

Law reform; Public Record Office; charities; Ulster Savings.

Miscellaneous licensing including intoxicating liquor, bookmakers.

Department of the Civil Service

General management and control of the Northern Ireland Civil Service; i.e. policy and central arrangements for recruitment, training, promotion, general career development and personnel management, welfare, retirement, industrial relations and security; the levels and deployment of manpower; pay, pensions, conditions of service; servicing the Central Whitley Council and its committees, and the Central Joint Co-ordinating Council for industrial civil servants.

Other functions include a central management consulting service for the NICS Computer Services, a united work study service and a medical advisory service. It also staffs the Civil Service Commission, an independent body responsible for the recruitment of permanent non-industrial staff for the NICS.



Department of Agriculture

Development of agriculture, horticultural, forestry and fishing industries. Administration of schemes related to farm, crops, fish and livestock improvement, plant and animal health, marketing and food processing; arterial drainage and inland navigation; agricultural advisory services, education and training; agricultural, horticultural, fisheries and veterinary research. The Department also acts as agents of the MAFF.

Department of Commerce

Industrial promotion and development including responsibilities in respect of the Northern Ireland Development Agency and Local Enterprise Development Unit. Energy supply and conservation, tourism, harbours, mineral development, consumer protection, registration of companies and scientific advice to industry.

Department of Education

Central policy, co-ordination, legislation and financial control of all aspects of the education service, library service and youth service. Oversight of the five area Education and Library Boards which are responsible for the local administration of much of these services.

General responsibility for museums, arts, sport, culture, recreation, community facilities including the payment of grants to District Councils in these areas.

Department of the Environment

Housing (policy, funding of the NI Housing Executive etc); town and country planning and comprehensive development; roads, bridges, car parking, street lighting and traffic management; water and sewerage services; certain supervisory powers over local government (the District Councils); internal public



transport (in conjunction with the Northern Ireland Transport Holding Company and its subsidiary operating companies for railway, buses, airports and road freight); control of pollution and protection and improvement of the urban and rural environment (including historic buildings and monuments); road safety; motor taxation (as the agent of the Department of Transport); funding etc of the Northern Ireland Fire Authority.

Department of Health and Social Services

Administration of the social security system, ie all cash social services such as sickness, unemployment, retirement, and supplementary benefits.

Administration of the health services including hospital and specialist services, family practitioner services and community care services. Administration of the personal social services including child care and adoption.

The Department delegates the administration of the health and personal social services to four Health and Social Services Boards. Certain central services required by the four Boards are provided on the Department's behalf by the Central Services Agency and the Northern Ireland Staffs Council for Health and Social Services.

Department of Manpower Services

Industrial relations, employment protection, the employment service, industrial training, counter-unemployment measures, employment of the disabled; health and safety. Functions in relation to Enterprise Ulster; Fair Employment Agency; Equal Opportunities Commission; Labour Relations Agency.

NOTE OF A CONVERSATION WITH DR. IAN PAISLEY AT 1845 ON THURSDAY,
8 NOVEMBER 1979

Dr. Paisley said that he had received the Prime Minister's latest letter to him. He was not sure whether she had been under a misconception, but there was no possibility of his agreeing to meet her with Mr. Molyneaux and Mr. Fitt. There were no circumstances under which he would enter into discussions with Mr. Fitt about Northern Ireland security matters.

He said that Mr. Atkins was anxious to meet him, but he could not do so until the position about his request to see the Prime Minister had been clarified. Dr. Paisley said that he had no wish to sabotage the conference, and had kept his party's position open, but he had to have a meeting with the Prime Minister.

He said that Mr. Molyneaux was "a different kettle of fish" to Mr. Fitt, but he did not see why Mr. Molyneaux should be present at any meeting with the Prime Minister.

Since the Secretary of State was anxious to meet him very soon, he wanted an early clarification of what the Prime Minister had intended to say.

He added that he was about to leave for Belfast and would be home at 2230.

MS

8 November 1979

NORTHERN IRELAND: ADVANCE COPIES

Prime Minister

PS

N IRELAND OFFICE - PS TO SEC OF STATE
RM 66 A/2 GGS

PS/SIR I GILMOUR

N IRELAND OFFICE [4 copies]

PS/PUS

MR FERGUSSON

MR K STOWE

LORD N GORDON LENNOX

ADVANCE COPY MR MARSHALL

HD/RID

MR P W J BUXTON

PUSD (2)

CABINET OFFICE - SIR J HUNT

HD/IPD

MR R WADE-GERY

HD/OID (2)

DIO

NEWS DEPT

NO 10 DOWNING STREET

MAD
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.....
RESIDENT CLERK

92x

(Fals)

and

CONFIDENTIAL

FM WASHINGTON 082346Z NOV 79
TO PRIORITY FCO
TEL NO 3623 OF 08 NOV 1979
INFO ROUTINE NIO BELFAST AND DUBLIN.

YOUR TELEGRAM 1589: ARMS FOR RUC.

1. MY INITIAL VIEWS ARE AS FOLLOWS. THE AMBASSADOR MAY WISH TO COMMENT FURTHER ON HIS RETURN FROM LONDON, WHEN WE MAY ALSO KNOW WHETHER LYNCH'S VISIT TO WASHINGTON HAS ADDED ANYTHING TO THE PICTURE.

2. IF IT IS THE CASE THAT NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE MANUFACTURERS ARE INCOMPLETE AND A LICENCE APPLICATION COULD NOT IN ANY CASE BE SUBMITTED NOW TO THE STATE DEPARTMENT, EVEN IF THE LATTER CHANGED THEIR POLICY, THEN I RECOMMEND THAT NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD BE PRESSED FORWARD TO A CONCLUSION WITHOUT DELAY. WE DO NOT NEED TO SEEK ANY UNDERSTANDING WITH THE STATE DEPARTMENT ABOUT THIS NEGOTIATING STAGE (WHICH, FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF THE U S ADMINISTRATION, MUST BY DEFINITION BE WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO THE STATE DEPARTMENT'S

MUST BY DEFINITION BE WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO THE STATE DEPARTMENT'S APPROVAL OF THE LICENCE APPLICATION). WE SHOULD SIMPLY INFORM THE STATE DEPARTMENT, AS A MATTER OF COURTESY, AND BECAUSE THEY WILL FIND OUT ANYWAY, THAT WE ARE PURSUING NEGOTIATION WITH STURM RUGER. (THE POSSIBILITY THAT THE U S ADMINISTRATION MIGHT BRING PRESSURE ON THE FIRM TO DELAY COMPLETION OF THE NEGOTIATIONS CAN PROBABLY BE DISCOUNTED, BECAUSE OF THE RISK THAT IT WOULD BECOME PUBLIC, AND CANNOT ANYWAY BE EXCLUDED BY NOT TELLING THE STATE DEPARTMENT WHAT WE ARE DOING).

3. IF THE STATE DEPARTMENT CONCLUDE THAT WE ARE PUTTING THEM UNDER PRESSURE, THIS WILL NOT MATTER, INDEED, ASSUMING THAT IT IS OUR INTENTION TO EXERT PRESSURE AT THE HIGHEST LEVEL TO GET A REVERSAL OF THE PRESENT U S POLICY, WE MUST ENSURE THAT THE ADMINISTRATION FULLY UNDERSTAND THIS NOW, AND THAT WE DO NOT LEAVE THEM TO DISCOVER IT DURING THE PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT. I THEREFORE RECOMMEND THAT WE SHOULD MAKE IT VERY CLEAR TO THE STATE DEPARTMENT HERE AND TO KINGMAN BREWSTER IN LONDON THAT IF THIS ISSUE IS NOT RESOLVED, IT IS BOUND TO FIGURE PROMINENTLY DURING THE PRIME MINISTER'S TALKS HERE ON 17 DECEMBER, AND THAT IT WILL THEREAFTER BE IMPOSSIBLE FOR US TO AVOID SHARP AND DAMAGING PUBLIC DIFFERENCES WITH THE UNITED STATES.

4. THE ARGUMENT FOR MAKING THIS CLEAR NOW IS THAT, ONCE THE AMERICANS UNDERSTAND THE STRENGTH OF OUR DETERMINATION, THEY WILL HAVE TO DECIDE WHETHER TO MAKE WHAT MOVES THEY ARE PREPARED TO MAKE BEFORE THE PRIME MINISTER REACHES WASHINGTON, OR AT OR AFTER HER MEETING WITH CARTER. IF THEY DECIDE TO CHANGE THEIR POLICY, FOR DOING SO BEFORE THE PRIME MINISTER GETS TO WASHINGTON, THIS WOULD AVOID THE IMPRESSION THAT CARTER WAS GIVING WAY TO PRESSURE: AND WOULD CLEAR THE DECKS FOR MORE PROFITABLE DISCUSSION OF OTHER ISSUES OF COMMON CONCERN. BUT IF WE ARE TO ENCOURAGE THIS LINE OF THINKING, WE NEED TO MOVE, TO MAKE OUR POSITION AND ITS IMPLICATIONS VERY CLEAR, DURING THE NEXT TWO WEEKS, AND NOT LEAVE THIS UNTIL THE BEGINNING OF DECEMBER WHEN, GIVEN THE CUMBERSOME PROCEDURES HERE, IT MAY BE TOO LATE TO GET DECISIONS TAKEN BEFORE THE PRIME MINISTER ARRIVES.

5. I ASSUME THAT NEGOTIATIONS WITH STURM RUGER WILL BE FOR 3,000 FURTHER GUNS AND ALL THE SPARES AND AMMUNITION WE SHALL NEED UP TO THE BEGINNING OF 1981, AND THAT THIS WOULD ENOUGH FOR US FOR THE NEXT YEAR. DESPITE THE REFERENCE TO 6,000 GUNS IN U S NEWS AND WORLD REPORT (OUR TELEGRAM NO 3579) I RECOMMEND LIMITING THE OPERATION TO THREE THOUSAND PLUS SPARES AND AMMUNITION BECAUSE THIS IS THE ARRANGEMENT PUT TO KINGMAN BREWSTER (WHO WILL HAVE PUT IT TO THE STATE DEPARTMENT) ON 5 OCTOBER

IT TO STATE DEPARTMENT) ON 5 OCTOBER.

IN ADOPTING THIS COURSE, WE MUST NOT UNDERESTIMATE THE OBSTACLES ON THE AMERICAN SIDE AND THE DIFFICULTY WE SHALL HAVE TO OVERCOME THEM. CARTER'S POLITICAL ADVISERS WILL TELL HIM THAT A QUARREL WITH BRITAIN IS LESS DAMAGING TO HIM THAN A QUARREL WITH THE IRISH VOTE. CARTER'S READINESS TO OFFEND LYNCH BY INVITING BIAGGI TO DINNER WITH HIM SHOWS THE MOOD HERE. CARTER'S POLITICAL PROBLEM IS TO WIN THE DEMOCRATIC NOMINATION AGAINST KENNEDY. HE WILL BE TOLD BY ADVISERS THAT THE TIME TO GIVE WAY TO THE BRITISH WILL BE AFTER HE IS SURE OF GETTING THE NOMINATION (WHICH CANNOT BE UNTIL NEXT MARCH/APRIL AT THE VERY EARLIEST AND COULD WELL BE MUCH LATER). IT IS ONLY A MONTH AGO (OUR TELEGRAM NO 2980) THAT VEST IN THE STATE DEPARTMENT WAS MAKING IT CLEAR TO US THAT THE ADMINISTRATION'S PRESENT POLICY WOULD NOT BE CHANGED UNTIL AFTER THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS. IT WILL BE ARGUED THAT A CHANGE OF POLICY ON ARMS FOR THE RUC COULD CAUSE A SERIOUS ROW WITH O'NEILL AND IN CONGRESS AND MAKE THE WHOLE QUESTION AN ELECTION ISSUE IN IMPORTANT CONSTITUENCIES WHICH WOULD DAMAGE THE PRESIDENT WITHOUT HELPING US.

7. AGAINST THIS, CARTER WILL BE CONSCIOUS THAT THE REPUBLICANS WOULD MAKE USEFUL CAPITAL OUT OF EVIDENCE THAT HIS ADMINISTRATION WAS BEING DISLOYAL TO ONE OF AMERICA'S CLOSEST ALLIES. BUT CARTER'S IMMEDIATE OPPONENT IS KENNEDY RATHER THAN THE REPUBLICAN PARTY.

8. THE STAKES ARE HIGH ON THE AMERICAN SIDE AS WELL AS ON OUR OWN. WE CANNOT BE SURE OF SUCCEEDING. BUT IF WE ARE TO PUT OUR HAND TO THIS WE SHOULD DO SO FIRMLY, LEAVING THE STATE DEPARTMENT IN NO DOUBT OF OUR INTENTIONS, AND WITHOUT DELAY. IN THE SAME CONTEXT WE SHOULD AT THIS STAGE AVOID GOING FURTHER IN PUBLIC THAN WE HAVE SO FAR.

ROBINSON

NNNN

9/14/5

GRS 440A

8:35 TO PM

CONFIDENTIAL

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Prime Minister

FROM FCO 071535Z NOV
TO PRIORITY WASHINGTON
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1589 OF 7 NOVEMBER
INFO ROUTINE NIO BELFAST DUBLIN

ms

ARMS FOR THE RUC

1. WE HAVE BEEN CONSIDERING WHAT MORE WE CAN DO TO IMPROVE THE CHANCES OF A SATISFACTORY RESOLUTION OF THIS ISSUE DURING THE PERIOD BETWEEN MR LYNCH'S VISIT TO THE U.S. AND THAT OF THE PRIME MINISTER. CERTAINLY IF THERE IS A CHANGE OF MOOD FOLLOWING MR LYNCH'S VISIT AND THE PUBLICATION OF THE NORTHERN IRELAND CONSULTATIVE DOCUMENT (PROBABLY ON OR SHORTLY AFTER 16 NOVEMBER), WE SHALL WANT TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF IT, PERHAPS AT SHORT NOTICE. AN IMMEDIATE PROBLEM, THE SIGNIFICANCE OF WHICH IS APPARENT FROM YOUR DISCUSSION WITH O'NEILL (YOUR TELNOS 3471 AND 3472), IS THAT A LICENCE APPLICATION HAS NOT YET BEEN SUBMITTED TO THE STATE DEPARTMENT IN RESPECT OF THE ADDITIONAL 3,000 RUGERS WE NEED. WE ARE TRYING TO FIND OUT HOW QUICKLY AN APPLICATION COULD BE SUBMITTED ONCE A DECISION HAD BEEN TAKEN TO GO AHEAD. CERTAINLY THERE WOULD BE SOME DELAY,
2. WE ARE THEREFORE CONSIDERING ENCOURAGING THE NORTHERN IRELAND POLICE AUTHORITY TO INSTRUCT VIKING ARMS TO RESUME NEGOTIATIONS WITH STURM RUGER FOR THE 3,000 REVOLVERS, PLUS, PERHAPS, ANY FURTHER SUPPLIES OF SPARES AND AMMUNITION WHICH MAY BE NEEDED OVER THE NEXT YEAR OR SO. THE AIM WOULD BE TO ENSURE THAT STURM RUGER ARE IN A POSITION TO SUBMIT A LICENCE APPLICATION TO THE STATE DEPARTMENT AT SHORT NOTICE WHEN WE JUDGE THAT THE TIME IS RIPE. WHICH MIGHT BE AS EARLY AS THE END OF NOVEMBER. WE WOULD NATURALLY HOPE TO DO THIS ON THE BASIS OF AN UNDERSTANDING WITH THE STATE DEPARTMENT. BUT WE WOULD NOT ALTOGETHER EXCLUDE THE POSSIBILITY OF GOING AHEAD EVEN IF THE STATE DEPARTMENT ADVISED THAT THEY SAW NO CHANCE OF LICENCES BEING GRANTED. IN SUCH CIRCUMSTANCES WE MIGHT BE CONCERNED TO SEE THAT THE ISSUE BE PRESENTED IN CLEAR CUT TERMS BEFORE THE PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT. AND THERE MIGHT BE DOMESTIC ARGUMENTS, ESPECIALLY IN NORTHERN IRELAND, FOR AVOIDING A SITUATION IN WHICH THE GOVERNMENT COULD BE ACCUSED OF TACITLY ACCEPTING AN AMERICAN BAN AND OF DISCOURAGING THE NORTHERN IRELAND POLICE AUTHORITY FROM ORDERING THE WEAPONS THEY NEED.

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/3. WE SHOULD

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3. WE SHOULD BE GLAD OF YOUR ADVICE ON THE POSSIBLE COURSE OF ACTION SUGGESTED IN PARA 2 AND IN PARTICULAR ON WHAT, IF ANYTHING, WE MIGHT SAY TO THE AMERICANS IF WE WERE TO DECIDE SO TO PROCEED. SEEN FROM HERE THERE WOULD BE SOME ADVANTAGE IN OUR TELLING THEM PRECISELY WHAT WE HAVE IN MIND, I.E. THAT WE WANT TO BE IN A POSITION TO RESPOND PROMPTLY IF, AS WE HOPE, THE STATE DEPARTMENT DECIDE OVER THE NEXT FEW WEEKS THAT OUR MOST IMMEDIATE REQUIREMENTS SHOULD BE MET. THEY MIGHT CONCLUDE THAT WE WERE PUTTING THEM UNDER PRESSURE. WOULD THIS MATTER?
CARRINGTON

F I L E S

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PS/LPS

PS/MR HURD
PS/MR RIDLEY
PS/MR BLAKER
PS/PUS

SIR A DUFF
MR BULLARD
MR FERGUSSON
LORD N G LENNOX
MISS BROWN

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION
NORTHERN IRELAND

Ireland

SIR ROBERT ARMSTRONG
CABINET OFFICE

Parliamentary Affairs : Northern Ireland

The Prime Minister has seen your minute to her of 6 November on this subject. She has approved the course of action your propose.

MICHAEL ALEXANDER

SA

7 November 1979

CONFIDENTIAL

Prime Minister

①

Ref. A0595

Agree?


PRIME MINISTER


Paul

Parliamentary Affairs: Northern Ireland

At Cabinet on 8th November, it would be useful if you could invite the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland to explain his proposed course of action in regard to the consultative document for the conference for Northern Irish political leaders to which OD agreed on 5th November, so that formal Cabinet approval can also be given to it.

2. This could be raised under Parliamentary Affairs, as the document is to be published as a White Paper on 16th (or 19th) November. The Secretary of State should be asked to circulate the final draft of his White Paper to the Cabinet for information, though I think you could say that, as it has been considered by Mr. Whitelaw's group and by OD, it can be circulated for information and that you do not propose to put it on the agenda for discussion.





ROBERT ARMSTRONG

6th November, 1979



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- 6 NOV 1979



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cc Press
MO

L10

10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

5 November 1979

Dear Mr. Paisley,

I and my colleagues share your concern, and the concern of all those who represent the people of Northern Ireland, about the continuing violence and terrorism. There can be no doubt about the Government's determination to defeat it, and I do not believe there is any doubt in Northern Ireland about that. If, however, you would find it helpful to discuss the security problem with me and the Secretary of State, I would be willing to try to arrange a meeting with you, and with Mr. Molyneux and Mr. Fitt, at an early date.

Yours sincerely
Robert

The Reverend Ian Paisley, M.P.

tw

SECRET

OD
DSG



Home Sec.
Ld. Chanc.
Foreign Sec.
Ch. Ex. IRELAND
Ld. Pres.
Ld. Privy Seal
Trade Sec

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

5 November 1979
+ C.O.
+ NIO.

NORTHERN IRELAND FORCE LEVEL

The Prime Minister has seen and taken note of the Defence Secretary's minute to her of 29 October about the proposal to withdraw a unit from Northern Ireland.

I am copying this letter to the Private Secretaries to the members of OD and to Martin Vile (Cabinet Office).

M. O'D. B. ALEXANDER

Brian Norbury, Esq.,
Ministry of Defence.

SECRET

HB

fw

CONFIDENTIAL

Ref. A0549

PRIME MINISTER

Northern Ireland: Political Development

(OD(79) 39)

BACKGROUND

When OD discussed political progress in Northern Ireland on 17th October you invited the Home Secretary to act as Chairman of a Ministerial Group consisting of the Secretary of State for Defence, Lord Privy Seal, Secretary of State for Northern Ireland and Lord Chancellor to supervise the preparation of a consultative document which would ultimately be laid before Parliament and serve as a discussion document to be tabled at a Conference with the leaders of the main Northern Irish political parties. This Ministerial Group has now met (although the Lord Privy Seal was unavoidably absent) and this memorandum by the Home Secretary is the result of their work.

2. The success of the proposed Conference still appears to be something of a gamble. The Alliance and the SDLP will probably come: so will Mr. Paisley. But the position of the Official Unionists is more doubtful, as Mr. Powell is strongly opposed.

HANDLING

3. You may care to invite the Home Secretary to introduce his paper. You may then care to invite the Lord Chancellor and Secretary of State for Northern Ireland to give their views as they have both played a significant part in the preparation of the consultative document. You may also wish to ask the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary for his views recognising that the unavoidable absence of the Lord Privy Seal from the Ministerial Group meeting may have resulted in insufficient weight having been given to the international reception of the consultative document. The points to establish in subsequent discussion are:-

CONFIDENTIAL

- Tone*
- (a) Does the document generally strike the right positive note? The crucial test is does it demonstrate the firm wish of Her Majesty's Government to make progress, while setting out the necessary limitations on the area within which any conference at this time can operate.
- Substance*
- (b) Is the general form of the consultative document sensible? The Ministerial Group spent a lot of time and effort on this point on which the Lord Chancellor made a major contribution. As much as possible has been relegated to a series of Appendices and the foreword has been made as short as possible. The object here is to make the document itself short and crisp and not containing details of models and functions on which the Government might subsequently be hooked.
- (c) Should the Ministerial Group be invited to give thought to the best way of publicly presenting the consultative document? The Secretary of State for Northern Ireland at the Ministerial Group meeting expressed enthusiasm for guidance from his colleagues and a willingness to submit a paper on this specific issue.
- (d) Is every possible kind of pressure being applied to the political leaders in Northern Ireland to ensure that they come to the Conference?
A number of OD members may be able to assist in this through contacts with religious, industrial, academic and trade union leaders of opinion in Northern Ireland.

CONCLUSION

4. In the light of discussion on these points the Committee might be guided to reach the following conclusions:-

- (a) To agree the consultative document subject to final editorial polishing.
- (b) To assist the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland in putting pressure on the Northern Irish political leaders.

RA

(Robert Armstrong)

2nd November, 1979



10 DOWNING STREET

MR. WHITMORE

*Done
K.W.*

Mr. Stowe telephoned, having received your letter of yesterday about Mr. Harry West.

Memo to Mr. Stowe
In that letter you said that the Prime Minister had had a meeting with Mr. Enoch Powell. Mr. Stowe said it would be invaluable to them to know what if anything passed in that meeting because Mr. Powell is very deeply engaged with them, not always helpfully.

Mr. Stowe will be in Belfast this afternoon if you would like to telephone him.

t.

2.11.79



NORTHERN IRELAND OFFICE
GREAT GEORGE STREET,
LONDON SW1P 3AJ

N Sanders Esq
Private Secretary
10 Downing Street
London SW1

Prime Minister
Agree proposal? *Am* 11x

1 November 1979

Dear Nick,

*Yes - but not
we can - but it
must be done
out. There is no need
to wait until Paisley
reluctant.*

Thank you for your letter of 29 October about Mr Paisley's request for a meeting with the Prime Minister on security in Northern Ireland. The Prime Minister will have noted from the DUP policy statement which Mr Paisley sent her that he is, in effect, saying that unless he gets satisfaction from the Prime Minister about security in the Province, he will not be prepared to talk about politics with the Secretary of State.

Mr Paisley's objective is to build himself up as "leader of the people of Northern Ireland" (his words) and it is to this end that he seeks to speak on equal terms (as he would see it) with the Prime Minister, especially on security. There are obvious dangers in enabling him to do this, whenever he finds or manufactures an occasion, by appealing over the head of the Secretary of State to the Prime Minister. It would therefore generally be better to stick to past practice with regard to MPs in Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales (including the leaders of "national" parties) and refer them to the territorial Secretary of State.

On this occasion there is a case for proceeding differently. There is at present some concern in Northern Ireland about security, heightened by the recent murders of soldiers and policemen and of off-duty members of the UDR and prison service, which Mr Paisley is exploiting. My Secretary of State considers that, if the Prime Minister would agree, it would have beneficial effects in Northern Ireland if she were to recognise this concern by agreeing to see not just Mr Paisley but the other two leaders of Northern Ireland political parties at Westminster concurrently, for a talk about security, if they so wished. If this were offered in terms to all three together it would assist in putting pressure on them publicly to sit similarly together at the proposed conference to discuss political development.

At such a meeting the Prime Minister would wish to be accompanied by the Secretary of State who would review security policy and operations in appropriate terms and deal with suggestions already made by the OUP and the DUP for additional measures - most of these are ill-

1 - NOV 1979.



..... 1

conceived and it would be helpful to give them all the same explanation of why that is so, while setting out positively the merits of the current security operational policy. As the Prime Minister will know this places more emphasis on surveillance and monitoring rather than routine deployment of armed men in the streets; and there is a good case to be presented.

As it happens Mr Paisley is out of the country at the moment and we understand that it will be ten days or so before he is back. It follows that no immediate meeting would be in prospect. Subject to the Prime Minister's commitments, a meeting shortly after the publication of the Conference discussion document would be timely in terms of bringing pressure to bear.

... If the Prime Minister agrees to this course she might wish to reply to Mr Paisley on the lines of the attached draft.

Yours sincerely,

R. A. Harrington

R A HARRINGTON

DRAFT REPLY FOR PRIME MINISTER TO SEND TO MR PAISLEY

I and my colleagues share your concern, and the concern of all those who represent the people of Northern Ireland, about the continuing violence and terrorism. There can be no doubt about the Government's determination to defeat it, and I do not believe there is any doubt in Northern Ireland about that. If, however, you and ~~the~~ ^{Dr Robinson and Dr Fitt} other leaders of political parties in Northern Ireland would find it helpful to discuss the security problem with me and the Secretary of State, I would be willing ~~to~~ ^{to try to} arrange a meeting ~~with you and Mr Robinson and Mr Fitt~~ at an early date.

Paul

Mike is prepared to wait another week.



3- 31/10/79

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

29 October 1979

As I told you on the telephone, the Prime Minister has this afternoon received a letter from the Reverend Ian Paisley enclosing a statement by the Democratic Unionist Party on the Government's proposals for Northern Ireland.

with
Ph
29/10/79

I should be grateful to have urgent advice on how the Prime Minister should reply to this letter. May we have something by close of play on Wednesday 31 October?

N. J. SANDERS

M.W. Hopkins, Esq.,
Northern Ireland Office.

SECRET

Copy No 1 of 23 copies 5



Page No 1 of 2 Pages

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE WHITEHALL LONDON SW1A 2HB

TELEPHONE 01-218 9000
DIRECT DIALLING 01-218 2111/3

(2)

SECRET

MO 19/3

PRIME MINISTER

NORTHERN IRELAND FORCE LEVEL

M

Prime Minister
The Defence Secretary ^{intends} ~~intends~~ to take
a Battalion (ie one out of the thirteen major
units deployed) out of N. Ireland. The Defence Secretary
& N. Ireland Secretary will be considering the timing.

Print
- 30/x

You know of my serious concern about the over-commitment of the Armed Forces and its effects upon the manning situation. The major cause is the continuing requirement to provide units for emergency tours in Northern Ireland from both UK Land Forces and BAOR, and for some time I have hoped to be able to make a reduction in the Province. The Northern Ireland Secretary's memorandum for our discussion of Northern Ireland security at OD on 10th July reported that we had commissioned a thorough study of the scope for reducing the force level there.

2. The Working Group set up to carry out this study has concluded that, while from the local security point of view there is no reason to propose a reduction in the number of major units deployed there, a reduction of one unit can be accepted if on wider grounds there is good reason for this change. Such a reduction is, I believe, extremely important in the interests of the Army as a whole and the Northern Ireland Secretary accepts that the security consequences of this change, which will be accompanied by redeployments within the Province, can be tolerated.

3. We have agreed, therefore, that one of the roulement units on 4½ month tours should be withdrawn and it is proposed to do this by not replacing a unit in West Belfast that is due to leave the Province early in February. The gap will be filled by redeployment of both resident and roulement units in the City. You and our OD colleagues will wish to be aware of this intention.

/ 4. ...

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Page 2 of 2 pages

SECRET

4. The reduction will of course be noticed and its presentation will have to be carefully handled. I am not sure that it need be formally announced, but we shall have to be ready to confirm it once the intended replacement unit has been told it will not be going. From the Army's point of view this should ideally be done early in November so as to avoid nugatory training by the replacement unit; but I fully recognise that the timing will have to take full account of the latest political and security developments. The Northern Ireland Secretary and I will be considering the presentational aspects and you will be consulted in the normal way before the change is announced or otherwise made public.

5. Copies of this minute go to OD colleagues and to Sir Robert Armstrong.

29th October 1979

SECRET
SECRET



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29 OCT 1979

CONFIDENTIAL

Ireland,



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

29 October 1979

The Prime Minister has seen your letter to her of 26 October together with its enclosure about Maurice Oldfield. She has asked me to thank you for both.

M. O'D. B. ALEXANDER

Kenneth Stowe, Esq., C.B., C.V.O.

F BIC

GB



Prime Minister.

2

To See. we have asked NIO for urgent advice.

ca

24/10/79

MT.

26/10/79

Dear Prime Minister,

On behalf of my two Parliamentary colleagues and myself I wish to make an urgent request to you for a meeting about Security in Northern Ireland.

I enclose a statement which my Party has just made on H.M.G.'s proposals for Northern Ireland. This statement explains our request for a Security meeting.

Sincerely
Roy Paisley

Enc.,



Ulster Democratic Unionist Party

296 ALBERTBRIDGE ROAD, BELFAST, BT5

NORTHERN IRELAND

Telephone: Belfast 56418/9

Telex: 748059

The Democratic Unionist Party has not only the will but the determination to see that a proper form of devolved Parliament and Government are established in Northern Ireland.

The Party believes that only such a Government can safeguard the future of the province within the United Kingdom, and that any tinkering with local Government would be a mere cosmetic exercise. Any local council reform should be the responsibility of devolved government.

Unlike the Official Unionists the D.U.P. is not prepared to settle for the proposal on mere local council reform in the Tory manifesto.

We welcome the fact that Her Majesty's Government are also determined to seek an acceptable way of restoring to the people of Northern Ireland more control over their own affairs, and to devolve powers of government at present exercised from Westminster.

The Democratic Unionist Party believes that the first thing that needs to be done is to re-establish confidence in the ballot box, and therefore puts clearly on record that any steps towards the establishment of a devolved government must be seen to have the approval through the ballot box of the majority of the Ulster people. They are perfectly prepared to accept the challenge that was put to the people of Scotland and Wales, the challenge of a referendum requiring a 40% majority.

We also welcome the clear statement of the Secretary of State on behalf of the Government that the responsibility for Northern Ireland and its future rests with the people of Northern Ireland, the Parliament of the United Kingdom and the Government of the United Kingdom, and that the Government of the South of Ireland will not be included in any talks on devolved government. This is both the legal and right attitude and must be maintained.

The elected members for Northern Ireland in the United Kingdom Parliament must be given their proper place in any consultation. If, as has been suggested by the Secretary of State, that the talks should only be among the representatives of the Democratic Unionist Party, the Official Unionist Party, the Alliance Party and the



Ulster Democratic Unionist Party

296 ALBERTBRIDGE ROAD, BELFAST, BT5

NORTHERN IRELAND

Telephone: Belfast 56418/9

Telex: 748059

S.D.L.P. then a Party like the Alliance Party, which has no elected representatives at Westminster, is going to find itself in a more favourable position than elected Unionist members of Parliament like Mr James Kilfedder and Mr John Dunlop. Such a position is basically wrong and is not acceptable to the Democratic Unionist Party. Hence my insistence in the House of Commons that the Consultative Document which is to set forth alternatives and also the Government's proposals for discussions should be referred to the Northern Ireland Committee of the House, on which all members from Northern Ireland serve. Of course the House of Commons itself should have the opportunity as a whole to consider the Consultative Document. The Democratic Unionist Party would then favour a properly elected Conference of the people of Northern Ireland to consider the Consultative Document; people with a mandate and not people who are non-elected. Parliamentary representatives have already a mandate to consider matters that are within the competence of the Parliament, but non-elected members, we feel strongly, are not the people to consider the future of Northern Ireland.

We welcome the fact that the Secretary of State, speaking on behalf of the Government, did not overrule the suggestion that at the end of the day the whole matter should be referred to a referendum of all the people of Northern Ireland.

The Democratic Unionist Party feels that if any Constitution is going to stick, it is not going to stick through any Parliamentary election or through a Parliamentary majority as a result of such an election but by a vote on the principle by the whole of the people of Northern Ireland, political personalities thus being left aside. If the people of Northern Ireland in such a referendum give their approval to the Constitution presented to them, then it is up to every democratic politician to work that system that has been chosen and approved of by the people.

There is, however, one priority consideration and that is the security of Northern Ireland. The Democratic Unionist Party is firmly on record as being far from satisfied with the present state of affairs in the security field. The present Government has failed the people of Ulster in this vital matter.

The Party approves fully the District Council's resolution on security and in fact has tabled that resolution in Westminster. So far only the Democratic Unionist members have signed that resolution.



Ulster Democratic Unionist Party

296 ALBERTBRIDGE ROAD, BELFAST, BT5

NORTHERN IRELAND

Telephone: Belfast 56418/9

Telex: 748059

The Democratic Unionist Party are now asking for an immediate meeting with the Prime Minister on the question of Northern Ireland's security. If as the result of that meeting they are satisfied that Her Majesty's Government are really going to take decisive steps in the security field, the Party will be prepared to play its full part along the lines indicated in this statement.



Permanent Secretary

NORTHERN IRELAND OFFICE
GREAT GEORGE STREET,
LONDON SW1P 3AJ

Prime Minister

(2)

Thank you very much
out.

Recd 26/10

26 October.

Dear Prime Minister.

Thank you so much for inviting Joan and me to your party for John and Madeleine Hunt. It was a splendid evening, and we both enjoyed it. There are now two special occasions at No 10 under your office as Prime Minister which we shall always remember.

You asked me about Maurice O'Leary. It will give you the flavour of his impact if you read the attached note (which I send you with Humphrey Atkins approval). The important point about it - and my real reason for sending it to you - is that when we discussed it with the GOC and the Chief Constable at the Secretary of State's Security meeting, Tim Cressy said for the record that it had the Army's backing 100% - and Ken Newman agreed.

And now, thank you again.

With all good wishes. Ken Stone.



SECRET

4

SPM(79)12

Note by Security Co-ordinator

"BUT ME NO BUTS"

1.. This might be regarded as a light-hearted title for a paper on a serious subject - and it might also be considered presumptuous for one who has been in Northern Ireland for exactly one week to make such a comment. I have however found the same refrain going through my talks at all levels and in all departments. It goes something like this:

"Our personal relations are very good but";

"We have no difficulty in agreeing at the operational level but there are questions of higher policy";

"Of course the task is clear but".

I suggest that while recognising the valid reasons for these reservations, our aim should be to convert the conjunction "but" into "and".

2. I do not propose to write a long paper. The issues have been argued and re-argued almost interminably. I always knew that Northern Ireland had many religions but I never realised that it could give rise to so much theology - and a good deal of it pretty dogmatic. I shall try to produce a framework of practical measures to ensure the quick and effective exploitation of opportunities and to resolve disputes before they hamper action.

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SECRET

3. There can be no controversy about the aim which is set out in the Secretary of State's statement in the House of Commons on 2 July:

"It is the Government's firm policy that we should continue in Northern Ireland to do our utmost to defeat terrorism, and to extend the pattern of normal policing throughout the whole of the Province. The implementation of these policies rests in the hands of the Royal Ulster Constabulary assisted by the Army."

Of course this statement itself produces a practical dilemma. While the two parts of the aim march together it is evident that where the security situation is serious - and not improving - top priority must be and be seen to be given to the first part. The degree of emphasis between one and the other will clearly need to be different in different parts of Northern Ireland, but where the security situation remains serious, timing is of the essence. We need measures which will produce visible results in the short term - say the next six months.

4. I do not consider it opportune or indeed practical to suggest the introduction at the present moment of a Joint Operations Staff. Such a staff would only duplicate, or triplicate if you wish, the existing chains of command in the RUC and the Army. We should, I suggest, first look critically at the arrangements for the conduct of operational liaison between the RUC and the Army at local level and then follow the channels from these arrangements upwards. Such an examination will enable us to determine what new joint organisation (if any) may be needed at the top. (I realise that there are differences between RUC and Army chains of command. The investigation should suggest means of ensuring that those differences do not impede efficient and effective action).

SECRET



SECRET

5. What then should be the first tasks of the Security Co-ordinator's staff? It must, I think, have a mixture of functions. It would have an investigative role and be prepared to serve as a court of appeal. It should produce independent advice on the planning, management and command problems relevant to security operations. It should act as a think-tank and also as a ginger group. It would not have executive powers and would discharge its responsibilities through the departments within whose constitutional responsibilities action lay. It should keep a 24-hour watch.

6. The group would be required to provide advice in conjunction with appropriate Departments in the following areas:

- (a) Operations of the Security Forces.
- (b) Intelligence. It is in my opinion impossible to detach intelligence or counter-intelligence from Operations since all Operations have a direct or indirect intelligence interest.
- (c) Public Relations - to ensure support in both offensive and defensive roles, taking into account not only impact in Northern Ireland but also in GB and foreign countries.
- (d) Co-ordination of support from other Northern Ireland Departments whose actions impinge directly or indirectly on operations against the terrorists.
- (e) It would be useful for the group to have access to legal and management services advice.

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7. The Chief Constable has already nominated an Assistant Chief Constable and the GOC a Brigadier to the staff. Until it is possible to determine the volume of work and the amount of travelling which may be required in Northern Ireland, it is not easy to estimate what the establishment should be. My best guess would be about 8 full-time officers with supporting staff and 2 or 3 part-time consultants. I would hope that about half the staff would be from the Northern Ireland Civil Service and/or the RUC.

8. It has been suggested that Stormont is not the ideal location for the Group. I understand the reasons for this advice but I believe they are outweighed by the need to be seen to be close to the Secretary of State, even apart from the practical difficulties of finding other accommodation in the short term.

9. As an envoi I tell a story of Allen Dulles who kept a card on his office desk. This card faced his visitor and read:

"Do you come with a solution to your problem or are you yourself part of it?"


Let us hope we can together find our solutions.

10. An outline organisation chart is at Annex A.

16 October 1979

SECRET

SUGGESTED ORGANISATION OF SECURITY CO-ORDINATOR'S STAFF



NOTES

- (a) Three "one-star" officers to act as operational "trouble-shooters".
- (b) A support service of initially four officers below the "one-star" level. (The functions shown are intended to be illustrative).
- (c) The civilian "one-star" officer will act as the Co-ordinator's Deputy in his absence.



26 OCT 1979

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FM DUBLIN 261020Z OCTOBER 79

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 371 OF 26 OCTOBER

AND TO NIO BELFAST

INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON, BIS NEW YORK

YOUR TELNO 184 : NORTHERN IRELAND : POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT

1. I HAD AN OPPORTUNITY LAST NIGHT AT A RECEPTION IN HONOUR OF CARDINAL O FIAICH, TO DISCUSS MR ATKINS' STATEMENT WITH THE TAOISEACH, MESSRS O'KENNEDY, COLLINS AND LENIHAN, VARIOUS MEMBERS OF THE DFA AND FRANK DUNLOP, THE GOVERNMENT SPOKESMAN.

2. MY GENERAL IMPRESSION IS THAT ALL WISH THE MOVE WELL WHILE RECOGNISING THE DIFFICULTIES: THEY WERE, BY THE TIME I SAW THEM, AWARE OF THE INITIAL REACTIONS BY NORTHERN PARTY LEADERS. MR COLLINS DESCRIBED IT AS "A GOOD EFFORT" AND WISHED IT LUCK. MR LENIHAN ALSO HOPED THE MOVE WOULD BE SUCCESSFUL AND REMARKED, PARTLY IN THE CONTEXT OF HIS MEETING WITH MR PETER WALKER ON 26 SEPTEMBER AND HIS FORTHCOMING VISIT TO LONDON. BUT ALSO IN THE CONTEXT OF THE STATEMENT, THAT THE ANGLO/IRISH RELATIONSHIP HAD "NEVER BEEN

THE STATEMENT, THAT THE ANGLO/IRISH RELATIONSHIP HAD "NEVER BEEN BETTER".

3. MR LYNCH MADE TWO COMMENTS: FIRST, THAT HE HAD HEEDED WHAT I HAD SAID TO O'ROURKE EARLIER IN CONNECTION WITH THE IRISH GOVERNMENT STATEMENT - THAT IT SHOULD NOT BE TOO WELCOMING WHILE AT THE SAME TIME OFFERING NO ENCOURAGEMENT TO ANY PARTY TO ADOPT A NEGATIVE APPROACH: SECOND, THAT THE STATEMENT MIGHT, AT LEAST FOR A WHILE, DISTRACT ATTENTION FROM THE ARGUMENT ABOUT THE SO-CALLED "HELICOPTER CORRIDOR" AND ARTICLE 29 OF THE CONSTITUTION.

4. THE OFFICIALS WERE ALL CAUTIOUS BUT MILDLY HOPEFUL, TAKING THE LINE THAT MR LYNCH HAD MADE CLEAR HIS POLICY ON THE NORTH IN HIS STATEMENT IN THE DAIL ON 17 OCTOBER.

HAYDON

NNNN

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TO PRIORITY F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 3409 OF 26 OCT 79

INFO NIO LONDON, NIO BELFAST, DUBLIN, BIS NEW YORK.

for Print

NORTHERN IRELAND.

1. FOLLOWING IS PRESS GUIDANCE ON MR ATKINS' STATEMENT PREPARED FOR USE IN ANSWER TO QUESTIONS BY STATE DEPARTMENT SPOKESMAN.

QUESTION: WHAT IS THE ADMINISTRATION'S REACTION TO THE BRITISH INITIATIVE?

ANSWER: (I) WE WARMLY WELCOME AND ENCOURAGE ALL EFFORTS TOWARDS A PEACEFUL SOLUTION OF THAT TRAGIC CONFLICT.

(II) WE HOPE THAT THE PEOPLE OF NORTHERN IRELAND WILL FIND THEIR WAY TO RECONCILIATION, COOPERATION AND PEACE, AND WOULD BE MOST PLEASED IF THIS UNDERTAKING LEADS TOWARDS THOSE GOALS. ASIDE FROM THESE GENERAL REMARKS I WOULD NOT HAVE ANY COMMENT ON SPECIFIC REACTIONS TO THE BRITISH PROPOSAL.

HENDERSON

NNNN



10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

26 October 1979

Thank you for your letter of 9 October about information work on Northern Ireland in the United States.

I agree that this is a most important matter. Our people have in fact been working hard on this and on his recent visit to New York Peter Carrington discussed with the Ambassador measures, which are now in hand, to step up our information effort.

While we will certainly keep in mind the idea of employing a public relations agency, given the nature of the problem and its high political content we are not convinced that this is the best way to proceed. Indeed it was tried some time ago with little success.

(SGD) MARGARET THATCHER

Julian Critchley, Esq., M.P.

vb

CONFIDENTIAL
From: THE PRIVATE SECRETARY



NORTHERN IRELAND OFFICE
GREAT GEORGE STREET,
LONDON SW1P 3AJ

Michael Alexander, Esq.,
10, Downing Street,
London, SW1.

25 October 1979

Dear Michael

for [unclear] 26/X

LUNCH WITH THE US AMBASSADOR

I enclose a note of some of the main points discussed at a lunch which my Secretary of State had with the American Ambassador yesterday.

I am sending a copy of this letter to George Walden.

R.A. Harrington

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

NOTE FOR THE RECORD

c.c. PS/SofS (L&B)
PS/PUS(L&B)
Mr. Marshall
Mr. Hannigan
Mr. Moriarty
Mr. Burns
Mr. Buxton
Mr. Gee
Mr. Gilliland
Mr. Corbett

The Secretary of State had lunch with Mr. Kingman Brewster, the United States Ambassador, at the Embassy on 24 October. Mr. Ed Streater and I were also present - there were no other guests.

The Irish American Element in US Politics

The Ambassador acknowledged the formidable ignorance of some American politicians on the nature of the problems in Northern Ireland, but said that the British Government must expect this to be a noisy issue during the primary campaigns. He drew a sharp distinction between the primary campaigns and the main presidential campaign, however: the Irish issue was an important matter to candidates having Irish Americans amongst their electorate, but this issue was localised. It was certainly not a national issue, and would in his view not feature in the presidential campaign even if Kennedy were a candidate.

So far as the present US administration's stance on Northern Ireland was concerned, he thought the campaigns for the primary elections were now sufficiently well advanced for any prospects of a significant change in the administration's policy to be considerably lessened. (By implication, this appeared to refer to the prospects for any form of US financial aid in Northern Ireland. In particular, it was noticeable that the conversation was steered quickly away from this aspect of Dr. Conor Cruise O'Brien's lecture of yesterday).

Arms for the RUC

The Ambassador believed that a political initiative by the British Government could be of considerable help in persuading the US Government to relax its position on arms for the RUC. He would welcome

any understanding of the American position which the Secretary of State might be able to show at questions on 25 October: it would on the other hand strengthen his position with his own administration if Mr. Paisley, in asking the question, were not similarly restrained. The Ambassador raised, and showed a persistent interest in, the question whether it would be possible to persuade Mr. Paisley to make a statement condemning protestant terrorism and parliamentary activities. Such a statement, though of much less significance than an initiative by the British Government, would be of considerable assistance to the US administration. The Secretary of State held out no prospect of Mr. Paisley making any such statement. Mr. Paisley did not claim the support of such organisations publicly, but he had established his position by occupying the extreme end of Ulster politics and he relied upon the support of such people.

A Political Initiative

The Secretary of State told the Ambassador that he would be making a statement in Parliament on 25 October, though its content was not mentioned. The Ambassador is making arrangements to attend question time and the statement in order to be in a position to report immediately to his Government. (In this connection there was some discussion of the terms on which journalists at the Ambassador's dinner for Congressmen Foley on 25 October might be expected to report. Mr. Streater will be making arrangements to make clear that the whole occasion will be on an off-the-record basis).

Visit of Mr. Lynch to the United States

The Ambassador asked whether his Government or that of the United Kingdom was in a stronger position to ask Mr. Lynch to emphasise the fact that the IRA represented a common threat to the Governments of the North and the South of Ireland. The Secretary of State suggested that, in view of the difficulties which Mr. Lynch was currently experiencing within his own party, such pressure would be most effective if it came from the United States but at the present stage was unlikely to be effective anyway. All agreed, however, that any statement by Mr. Lynch emphasising the common interest of both sides of the border and the common effort now being made as a result of the recent talks between the Government

of the Republic and of the United Kingdom would be most helpful both to the US Government and to the British Government.

Visit of the Prime Minister to the United States

The Ambassador said that he would hope to meet the Prime Minister before her impending visit to the United States to discuss the themes of her visit. He felt sure that Northern Ireland would feature in some degree. In this connection it would be very helpful to him and his Government if, in addition to the necessarily brief consultations between the Prime Minister and the Ambassador, the British Government would arrange for more informal preparation at official level between the Embassy, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, and the Northern Ireland Office. The Secretary of State said that he would welcome such contacts so far as the Northern Ireland Office was concerned and would draw this point to the attention of his colleagues.

R. A. Harrington

SECRET

3



NORTHERN IRELAND OFFICE
GREAT GEORGE STREET,
LONDON SW1P 3AJ

24 October 1979

Dear Michael

STATEMENT ON NORTHERN IRELAND

Following our telephone conversation this evening, I enclose 35 copies of the Statement which my Secretary of State is to make tomorrow, which you may like to have on hand for Cabinet in the morning.


Yours ever

R. A. Harrington

R.A. Harrington
Private Secretary

Michael Alexander, Esq.,
Private Secretary,
10 Downing Street.

SECRET



SECRET

STATEMENT BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR NORTHERN IRELAND -
15.30 HOURS ON 25 OCTOBER 1979

1. Mr Speaker, I will, with permission, make a Statement about the government of Northern Ireland.
2. The Queen's Speech declared the Government's intention "to seek an acceptable way of restoring to the people of Northern Ireland more control over their own affairs".
3. Since taking office in May, I have, for this purpose, had wide-ranging discussions in the Province, and a series of private meetings with leaders of the main Northern Ireland political parties represented in this House.
4. My discussions and meetings have confirmed the Government's view that it is right to transfer back to locally elected representatives some at least of the powers of government at present exercised from Westminster.
5. The political parties in Northern Ireland themselves, in their Election manifestos, asked for this, and there is wide-spread support for it in the Province.
6. There is, moreover, awareness that such a restoration of political responsibility can only be brought about in Northern Ireland by all parts of the community recognising and respecting the interests of others.
7. It will in due course be a matter for Parliament to decide, on proposals put to it by Her Majesty's Government,

SECRET

what kind of powers and responsibilities are to be transferred to elected representatives of the people of Northern Ireland and through what kind of institutions they are to be exercised.

8. The Government wishes, however, to put forward proposals which, so far as possible, have the agreement of the people of Northern Ireland.

9. We intend therefore to convene a Conference of the principal political parties in Northern Ireland to seek the highest level of agreement that we can on proposals for a transfer of responsibility which the Government might put before this House in due course.

10. We are, for this purpose, preparing a Consultative Document, which will be laid before Parliament, to serve as the basis of the Conference.

11. The Document will set out the range of powers and responsibilities which the Government for its part would be prepared to see transferred from Westminster.

12. The Document will set out as options for consideration by the Conference a number of ways in which the transferred powers might be exercised; and in each case with what H.M. Government would regard as responsible and appropriate arrangements to take account of the interests of the minority.

13. Responsibility for law and order in the Province, which - as I indicated in reply to Questions earlier today - remains the Government's overriding priority in Northern Ireland, would not be transferred.

14. I shall shortly be approaching the party leaders concerned to discuss with them the arrangements for a Conference to be convened as soon as possible and, I would hope, by the end of November.

15. Our aim will be to secure from the Conference, drawing on suggestions in the Consultative Document, workable and acceptable arrangements for restoring to the people of Northern Ireland greater responsibility for the conduct of their own affairs which we can then recommend to this House in fulfilment of our commitment in The Queen's Speech.

SECRET

From: THE PRIVATE SECRETARY

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NORTHERN IRELAND OFFICE
GREAT GEORGE STREET,
LONDON SW1P 3AJ

(2)

Michael Alexander, Esq.,
10, Downing Street,
London, SW1.

24 October, 1979

Lg. Prime Minister

Dear Michael,

and Phil 24/10

NORTHERN IRELAND: POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT

Flag A.

You will by now have seen a revised version of the statement to be made by my Secretary of State on Thursday 25 October.

I now enclose notes prepared to cover four key questions likely to arise out of the statement. Perhaps the most important, in the light of Mr. Paisley's recent attitude and our meeting with Mr. Molyneux described in my Secretary of State's minute of 22 October to the Prime Minister, is the first. It represents the theme which will run through the campaign, over the coming weeks, to exert pressure on Northern Irish political leaders to come to the table. The answer will be more effective if it is seen as reflecting a broad front of opinion in the House and the country: it would therefore be better that it should not be given to a Northern Ireland member, particularly if the member were Gerry Fitt and the Secretary of State thereby appeared to side with him against Paisley. For those reasons, and as a way of ensuring that this answer is given at an early stage in the exchanges following the statement, Mr. Atkins intends to suggest to Brynmor John that he should include this question in his supplementaries.

I am sending a copy of this letter to the Private Secretaries of members of OD committee, and to Martin Vile.

Yours ever,

R. A. Harrington

R. A. Harrington

SECRET

KEY SUPPLEMENTARY QUESTIONS:-

1. What if some or all of the Parties will not come?

Answer: That would be regrettable and I trust will not happen. This House and the people of Northern Ireland will not understand why any party should not attend when less than six months ago they all fought the Election on the basis that they wanted to make progress.

2. What happens if the Conference breaks up without reaching agreement?

Answer: The Government would put forward what it judged to be the best proposals for making progress in the light of views expressed at the Conference.

3. How can the Government expect the Conference to proceed when the security situation is still unresolved?

Answer: Progress on security and progress on political development go hand in hand. It will be playing into the hands of the terrorists to accept that every further outrage they commit constitutes a veto.

S E C R E T

4. Will the Republic be represented at the Conference; will the issue of Irish unity be on the Agenda?

Answer: No Sir: the Conference will be about implementation of the Queen's speech.

S E C R E T

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24 October 1979

Statement on Northern Ireland

As you know, there were further discussions among officials following my letters to you of yesterday on this subject. I now enclose a text of your Secretary of State's statement on Northern Ireland which has been agreed by both the Prime Minister and Mr. Atkins.

I am sending copies of this letter and its enclosure to the recipients of yesterday's correspondence.

MO'DBA

M.W. Hopkins, Esq.,
Northern Ireland Office.

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
PART 3 ends:-

Hunt to PM A0487 (5)

PART 4 begins:-

MA to NO 24.10.79





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