

PREM19

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RHODESIA


(Situation in)

(June 1 - July 4)

(Part 2)

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PART 3 begins:-

duwaka No 582 4.7.79

~~Fm Lagos No 399 5.7.79~~

PART 2 ends:-

Fm Delhi No 511 4.7.79

Rhodesia

CR 78

CONFIDENTIAL

FM DELHI 041215Z JULY

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 511 OF 04 JULY 1979

SECRETARY OF STATE'S VISIT TO DELHI: 2-3 JULY

MY IPT: RHODESIA

Prime Minister
 Lord Carrington's
 Discussion of
 Rhodesia with Mr.
 Desai in Delhi.
 GUN

1. IN RESPONSE TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE'S QUESTION, MR DESAI THOUGHT THIS WOULD BE THE MAIN ISSUE AT LUSAKA. BRITAIN WOULD BE VIEWED WITH SUSPICION. THE IMPRESSION WAS THAT THE UK WAS DETERMINED TO RECOGNISE MUZOREWA. IF WE DID, IT WOULD PRESENT THE GREATEST DANGER TO THE COMMONWEALTH. EVEN AFTER CONSULTATIONS, RECOGNITION WOULD BE DISASTROUS. HE DID NOT ACCEPT THAT ELECTIONS UNDER MARTIAL LAW WITHOUT A VOTERS LIST AND ON THE BASIS OF A CONSTITUTION APPROVED ONLY BY THE WHITE MINORITY WERE FREE. THE BRITISH WERE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE EXISTING SITUATION AND IT WAS UP TO US TO HAND-OVER POWER AFTER TRULY FREE ELECTIONS. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THAT THE ELECTIONS HAD BEEN FAR FREER AND MORE DEMOCRATIC THAN WAS USUALLY THE CASE IN AFRICA. IN ANY EVENT THEY COULD NOT BE IGNORED: THERE WAS A NEW SITUATION. ALL THE AFRICAN LEADERS CONSULTED BY LORD HARLECH, WITH THE POSSIBLE EXCEPTION OF MACHEL, HAD ACCEPTED THIS. BUT THEY HAD NOT ACCEPTED THE PRESENT CONSTITUTION. HMG WERE CONDUCTING GENUINE CONSULTATIONS AND HAD NOT YET ACQUIRED ENOUGH INFORMATION TO KNOW PRECISELY WHAT THE BEST SOLUTION WAS OR INDEED WHETHER ONE WAS POSSIBLE AT ALL. WE WANTED TO NARROW THE GAP BETWEEN THE PARTIES. MUZOREWA WAS COMING TO LONDON NEXT WEEK AND THE PATRIOTIC FRONT WOULD NOT BE NEGLECTED. THE RHODESIAN CONSTITUTION WAS CERTAINLY NOT PERFECT AND COULD PERHAPS BE AMENDED. HE WAS SPEAKING IN VERY STRICT CONFIDENCE ABOUT THE WAYS IN WHICH IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE TO MOVE TOWARDS AN AGREEMENT THAT WOULD BE ACCEPTED BY MOST OF THOSE CONCERNED. MR DESAI SAID HE COULD ACCEPT WHATEVER THE PATRIOTIC FRONT ACCEPTED, EVEN IF IT WAS THE PRESENT CONSTITUTION. WE SHOULD NOT EXPECT DEMOCRACY IN AFRICAN COUNTRIES. WE MUST AVOID GIVING AN OPENING TO SUPER-POWER INTERVENTION. MR SMITH MUST GO BUT NOT IN A DISHONOURABLE WAY. MR DESAI SAID THAT WE SHOULD HEED HIS COMMENTS AND FOR HIS

PART HE WAS READY TO CONSIDER SENSIBLE COMPROMISES. IF WE COULD CONVINCHE HIM, HE WOULD BE PREPARED TO WORK ACTIVELY, PERHAPS IN A SMALL GROUP IN LUSAKA, FOR SUCH A COMPROMISE. HE AGREED THAT WE COULD NOT IGNORE THAT A NEW SITUATION HAD ARISEN IN RHODESIA.

2. IN A SEPARATE PRIVATE CONVERSATION WITH VAJPAYEE, THE SECRETARY OF STATE TOOK MUCH THE SAME LINE, STRESSING THAT THERE WAS NOT THE SMALLEST CHANCE OF GETTING THE AGREEMENT OF THOSE IN RHODESIA TO ABANDON EVERYTHING AND START FROM SCRATCH. VAJPAYEE REACTED STRONGLY. HE DENOUNCED THE SHAM ELECTIONS, WARNED AGAINST DE FACTO (LAST TWO WORDS UNDERLINED) RECOGNITION AND STRESSED THE STRENGTH OF INTERNATIONAL AND COMMONWEALTH FEELING. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID FACTS COULD NOT BE NEGLECTED. THE ELECTIONS HAD CHANGED THINGS. PUBLIC OPINION IN THE UK WAS STRONG AND FELT SOME FOREIGN CRITICISM WAS UNFAIR. THIS ATTITUDE WOULD STRENGTHEN IF BRITAIN WAS GENERALLY ABUSED IN LUSAKA. HE STRESSED THAT SMITH MUST GO AND THAT WE WERE ALL TRYING TO ACHIEVE THE SAME END.

IT WAS A QUESTION OF MODALITIES ON WHICH

HE HAD NOT YET COME TO A CONCLUSION. VAJPAYEE SAID THAT SLIGHT CHANGES IN THE CONSTITUTION WOULD NOT BE ENOUGH. THERE WOULD NEED TO BE ELECTIONS UNDER UN AUSPICES. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THAT WE HAD A LONG TRADITION OF SUCCESSFUL DE-COLONISATION, THAT WE WERE TRYING TO DO MUCH THE SAME THING IN RHODESIA AND THAT ATTACKS ON THE UK OR ATTEMPTS TO GET BRITAIN TO BEHAVE IN A MANNER CONTRARY TO HER TRADITION WOULD BE COUNTER-PRODUCTIVE.

3. THE TONE OF THE TWO CONVERSATIONS WAS MARKEDLY DIFFERENT. DESAI'S TONE GOT WARMER AS THE CONVERSATION PROGRESSED AND BY THE END OF AN HOUR I JUDGED THAT HE HAD ACQUIRED CONFIDENCE IN THE SECRETARY OF STATE PERSONALLY. HE MADE IT PLAIN THAT HE WAS NOT DOGMATICALLY IN FAVOUR OF ANY PARTICULAR SOLUTION. WHAT WAS NEEDED WAS A SOLUTION TO WHICH ALL THE PEOPLE WHO REALLY MATTERED COULD AGREE. HE MADE NO PROMISES BUT UNDERTOOK THAT IF WE COULD COME UP WITH SOMETHING THAT SOUNDED LIKE A REASONABLE COMPROMISE, HE WOULD BE WILLING TO EXERT HIMSELF AT LUSAKA TO TRY TO BRING ABOUT AGREEMENT. VAJPAYEE TOOK A HARDER AND LESS SYMPATHETIC LINE AND

GONSALVES, THE NEW DEPUTY PUS WHO WAS WITH HIM, WAS EVEN LESS HELPFUL. THEY APPEARED TO HAVE NO FEELING FOR BRITISH PUBLIC OPINION OF FOR THE SITUATION IN RHODESIA OR EVEN FOR THE DIFFERENCES OF VIEW BETWEEN THE FRONT LINE LEADERS.

4. GIVEN THIS SITUATION I PUT FORWARD THE FOLLOWING PERSONAL COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS:

(A) IT IS UNFORTUNATE THAT DESAI WILL BE IN THE DRIVING SEAT AT LUSAKA. THE MINISTER OF INDUSTRIES TOLD ME THAT DESAI HAD VOLUNTEERED TO HIM THAT HE WAS "DELIGHTED" BY HIS CONVERSATION WITH THE SECRETARY OF STATE. WE SHOULD PLAY ON HIS CONFIDENCE IN THE S OF S AND IF POSSIBLE PUT TO HIM IN ADVANCE OF LUSAKA ANY POSITIVE PROPOSALS WE ARE CONSIDERING ADVANCING THERE. HE IS A GENUINE BELIEVER IN THE COMMONWEALTH AND WILL WANT TO WORK FOR A COMPROMISE SETTLEMENT.

(B) THE PRIME MINISTER'S PRINCIPAL SECRETARY, SHANKAR, TOOK ME ASIDE AND SAID SYMPATHETICALLY THAT WHATEVER THE TRUTH, OUR BEST TACTICS WOULD BE TO AVOID COMMITTING OURSELVES TO THE VIEW THAT THE ELECTIONS WERE FREE AND FAIR, BUT TO CONCENTRATE ON THE FACT THAT THERE WAS NOW A SIGNIFICANTLY NEW SITUATION IN RHODESAI. HE THOUGHT THIS WAS INCONTROVERTIBLE AND I BELIEVE THAT WITH THE INDIANS AT LEAST THIS IS THE RIGHT LINE.

(C) DESAI SEPARATELY TOLD ME THAT IT WAS VERY IMPORTANT THAT BRITAIN SHOULD NOT TRY TO AVOID THE COMMONWEALTH HEADS OF GOVERNMENT MEETING OR PROPOSE THAT IT BE MOVED FROM LUSAKA.

(D) DESAI IS BOUND TO BE INFLUENCED BY ADVICE FROM VAJPAYEE AND THE BRIEF WRITERS. IT IS EVIDENT THAT ON THE BASIS OF OUR CURRENT INSTRUCTIONS, GUIDANCE TELEGRAMS ETC, WE HAVE MADE NO SIGNIFICANT IMPRESSION UPON THEM. THIS BEING SO, I MUCH HOPE THAT A SENIOR EMISSARY FROM LONDON WHO IS FULLY IN THE KNOW CAN COME AND ARGUE WITH VAJPAYEE AND THE MEA. THEY MIGHT NOT BE CONVERTED, BUT THEY WOULD PROBABLY BE INFLUENCED. IDEALLY THIS SHOULD HAPPEN

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BEFORE THE BRIEFS FOR LUSAKA ARE WRITTEN. IT WOULD BE DESIRABLE THAT WE SHOULD CONDUCT THE EXERCISE WITH DESAI RECOMMENDED AT (A) ABOVE, AT THE SAME TIME. IF IT CAN BE FITTED INTO HIS PROGRAMME, YOU MAY THINK THAT LORD HARLECH WOULD BE THE BEST QUALIFIED PERSON, ESPECIALLY IF IT COMES TO PUTTING PROPOSITIONS TO DESAI.

THOMSON

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RHODESIA POLICY



Rhodesia

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

4 July 1979

FCO
- OK
G.A.
G.A.
1/7

Dear Bryan,

Mike Pattison wrote on 28 June asking for advice on how to respond to a letter addressed to the Prime Minister by Mr Mukome, the Rhodesian Foreign Minister.

This is a circular letter which has gone to a number of Ministers and MPs. We do not therefore recommend that the Prime Minister should reply to it. If you agree, however, we will ask Derek Day to acknowledge the letter suitably when he next sees Mr Mukome.

Yours etc

Paul
(P Lever)

B G Cartledge Esq
10 Downing Street

134-JUL-1979

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SECRET

Top copy in USA, May 1979
(UK/USA Relations)

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TRANSCRIPT OF A TELEPHONE CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER
AND THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ON TUESDAY 4 JULY 1979

Prime Minister: Hello, how are you?

President Carter: Just great. I hope you got home safely.

Prime Minister: Yes, very safely, to a lot to do.

President Carter: And did you have a good trip?

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T38/79T

Prime Minister: Very good, no trouble.

President Carter: That's good. Were you pleased with the outcome of the Summit?

Prime Minister: Yes, I was, but I was a bit appalled at the way in which we got through it. You know I was a bit disillusioned with summitry.....

President Carter personally be involved a little more in the preparation next time the last few days, because we really wasted half a day or maybe a day. There are three things I would like to discuss with you just to kind of summarise what we discussed privately. We're on an open line so I'll be

Prime Minister:..... you'll be circumspect.

President Carter: I hope that you can expedite getting me your advice after the visit to Rhodesia because Muzorewa's coming over here shortly and I need to have your

Prime Minister: Yes, indeed, I will see to that immediately.

President Carter: OK. Secondly, at the four-party breakfast we discussed the OPEC situation and I need to have some mechanism by which you and I can exchange ideas in a highly confidential way on it, just so you can let me have them - just the mechanism; you might give me your thoughts in a despatch then I'll respond.

/Prime Minister

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Prime Minister: Right, yes. That shall be done. I think we thought we would only talk to one other person about it. Mine will be Peter Carrington.

President Carter: Can you repeat that please?

Prime Minister: We thought that we'd each of us only talk to one other person in our own. Mine will be Peter Carrington.....

President Carter: I will discuss it with and I presume Lord Carrington with you?

Prime Minister: Yes, that's right.

President Carter: Well, then suppose I let Vance contact Carrington, Lord Carrington.

Prime Minister: Yes. Peter's not yet back because he went to Hong Kong, Delhi and Iraq and he will be returning tomorrow.

President Carter: Well Vance is still in Bali so he'll be a few days. We'll use that mechanism.

Prime Minister: Yes, we will.

President Carter: Thirdly, are you going to send someone out here to exchange letters on the security thing?

Prime Minister: The letter was signed; the person should have exchanged them. If not, I will send someone over. We'll attend to that immediately.

President Carter: OK, well I'll get the letter signed and get it worked out with you through our Foreign Ministers.

Prime Minister: Yes, all right.

President Carter: One other point that I'd like to talk to you briefly about. I've been asked by Senator Kennedy and Chip O'Neill to talk to you briefly about the Northern Ireland question, so that we don't

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FM DAR ES SALAAM 040725Z JULY 79

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 520 OF 4 JULY

INFO PRIORITY LAGOS, LUSAKA, GABORONE, MAPUTO, LUANDA,
WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK, MIRIMBA SALISBURY, PRETORIA

Prime Minister

*Gen
1/7*

YOUR TELNO 191: RHODESIA

1. PRESIDENT NYERERE SUMMONED ME YESTERDAY EVENING ON HIS RETURN FROM MWANZA AND ARUSHA.

W 2. HE SPOKE SOMBRELY, SAYING HE WANTED TO START WITH THE POSITIVE HOPES HE HAD HAD. HE HAD HOPED THAT THERE WOULD NOT BE IMMENSE DIFFICULTIES AT THE LUSAKA MEETING. HE BELIEVED THAT EVERYONE KNEW, INCLUDING BRITAIN, THAT THE BASIC PROBLEM IN RHODESIA WAS THE CONSTITUTION. HE HOPED THAT BRITAIN WOULD COME TO LUSAKA WITH PROPOSALS FOR THE CONSTITUTION ON WHICH THERE COULD BE BROAD AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE COMMONWEALTH COUNTRIES. (HE HAD HOPED IN THIS CONNEXION, THAT LORD HARLECH'S MISSION WAS NOT JUST TACTICAL DELAY.) THERE WOULD OF COURSE BE SOME DIFFERENCES EG OVER SPECIAL PROTECTION FOR MINORITIES (ON WHICH HE RESTATED HIS OWN POSITION AS ON PREVIOUS OCCASIONS). BUT HE BELIEVED THERE COULD BE AGREEMENT ON REASONABLE PROPOSALS WHICH WOULD BE BACKED BY THE COMMONWEALTH. THERE WOULD THEN BE THE TASK OF SELLING THE PROPOSALS TO THE SALISBURY PEOPLE AND THE PATRIOTIC FRONT. IT WOULD BE FOR THOSE WITH INFLUENCE IN SALISBURY TO WORK ON THE LEADERS THERE ANH

FOR THOSE WITH INFLUENCE ON THE PF TO WORK ON THEM, AND HE WOULD EXPECT THE FRONT LINE STATES TO PLAY THEIR PART ACTIVELY.

3. NYERERE WENT ON TO REPEAT HIS POSITION THAT HE SAW NO DISTINCTION BETWEEN LIFTING SANCTIONS AND RECOGNITION OR RETURN TO LEGALITY. SANCTIONS WERE NOW MORE NECESSARY THAN EVER, WHEN SALISBURY WAS ATTACKING ITS NEIGHBOURS. HE ADDED THAT IF THERE WAS A DISTINCTION AT ALL BETWEEN LIFTING SANCTIONS AND A RETURN TO LEGALITY, IT WAS THAT WHILE THE LATTER WAS ESSENTIALLY FOR BRITAIN ALONE AS THE COLONIAL POWER, THE FORMER WAS A UN MATTER.

CONFIDENTIAL

/4. RETURNING

4. RETURNING TO THE SUBJECT OF THE LUSAKA MEETING, HE REPEATED THAT HE DID NOT WANT QUARRELS. HE RECALLED WITH REGRET HOW "FRIENDS LIKE LEE KUAN YEW" HAD BEEN UNHAPPY ^{AT} THE WAY THE SINGAPORE COMMONWEALTH CONFERENCE HAD BEEN DOMINATED BY THE QUESTION OF THE SALE OF ARMS TO SOUTH AFRICA. BUT FOR THE PRIME MINISTER TO SAY THAT SHE DID NOT THINK THAT PARLIAMENT COULD RENEW SANCTIONS IN NOVEMBER WAS "DEFIANT". IN CONTRAST PRESIDENT CARTER WAS FIGHTING CONGRESS OVER SANCTIONS. HE BELIEVED THAT "IF THE CONSERVATIVE GOVERNMENT WANTED SANCTIONS THEY COULD HAVE THEM AND THEY SHOULD AT LEAST TRY TO MAINTAIN THEM". HE REFERRED TO A COMMENTARY IN THE GUARDIAN NEWSPAPER (WHICH I HAVE NOT SEEN) WHICH, HE SAID, HAD SPOKEN OF LACK OF LEADERSHIP BY THE GOVERNMENT ON SANCTIONS. HE CONCLUDED BY SAYING THAT IT LOOKED LIKE THE SAME DEFIANCE ("SIMPLY DEFYING AFRICA") AS THAT OF MR HEATH'S GOVERNMENT OVER THE SALE OF ARMS TO SOUTH AFRICA.

5. I SAID THAT I HAD KNOWN FROM MISS WICKEN OF HIS CONCERN. THAT FOLLOWING MY MEETING WITH HER THE PREVIOUS DAY I HAD REPORTED TO YOU AND THAT WHAT I NOW HAD TO SAY WAS ON INSTRUCTIONS WITH THE FULLEST AUTHORITY. I THEN SPOKE AS INSTRUCTED IN YOUR TEL UNDER REFERENCE.

6. PRESIDENT NYERERE TOOK NOTE, BUT MADE NO FURTHER COMMENT, AND CONCLUDED THE MEETING QUICKLY, BUT IN A FRIENDLY MANNER (IT WAS CLEAR FROM THE NUMBER OF PEOPLE WAITING TO SEE HIM THAT HE WAS PRESSED FOR TIME).

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RHODESIA POLICY

have another

Prime Minister:..... problem, yes.

President Carter:..altercation as we did with Speaker O'Neill and Vance. Do you have, I know in the campaign both you and Jim avoided that issue.

Prime Minister: We wouldn't have it as a Party issue at all. We'd have been wrong to have had it as a Party issue.

President Carter: Do you have any analysis that's been done within your own Party or Government that you might send to me that I could read over just to describe both the present situation and any prospects for the future.

Prime Minister: I will get one prepared and have it sent over. As a matter of fact my next appointment is with Humphrey Atkins, our Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, so that can be done.

President Carter: I don't have any background knowledge about it and just hearing directly from you about the present situation and prospects for the future would help to guide me..... any restraints on it otherwise I would like to share it confidentially with Senator Kennedy and O'Neill.

Prime Minister: Yes, I'll remember than when drafting it. Anything that's confidential to you I will put separately.

President Carter: Good. Well, right, thank you very much. I hope you have time to get some rest.

Prime Minister: It's not allowed to politicians. But it was very interesting I thought. Well, thank you very much for 'phoning. Best wishes. Goodbye.

President Carter: Goodbye

JM.

[RHODESIA: POLICY: ADVANCE COPIES]

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IMMEDIATE

PS
PS/SIR I. GILMOUR
PS/MR LUCE
PS/PUS
SIR A DUFF
~~MR DAY~~ N. Wilson

MR WILLIAMS
~~MR LEECH~~

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HD/WAD
MR FREELAND

LEGAL ADVISER RM K200A
MR STEEL LEGAL ADVISER RM K176

~~PS/NO 10 DOWNING STREET~~ (2)

SIR C ROSE
MR P.M. MAXEY
COL MOIR
MR P J FOWLER
DIO

CABINET
OFFICE

~~FOR ZIMBABWE DEVELOPMENTS UNIT~~

~~ADD MR LYNCH ODM
MR SLATER TREASURY~~

GR 130

CONFIDENTIAL

FM DAR ES SALAAM 040730Z JULY 79

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 521 J 4 WRLY

INFO PRIORITY LAGOS, LUSAKA, GABORONE, MAPUTO, LUANDA,
WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK, MIRIMBA SALISBURY, PRETORIA

MIPT: RHODESIA

1. WHILE THERE IS AN ELEMENT OF GENUINENESS IN PRESIDENT NYERERE'S EXPRESSIONS OF CONCERN ON THIS OCCASION, I THINK HE HAS ALSO DELIBERATELY TAKEN WHAT HE HAS SEEN AS AN OPPORTUNITY TO PUT US ON NOTICE OF THE IMMEDIATE AND STRONG REACTION WE MAY EXPECT TO ANY SLIGHTEST INDICATION THAT WE MAY BE CONTEMPLATING A UNILATERAL STEP IN THE DIRECTION OF EITHER LIFTING SANCTIONS OR RECOGNITION. I WOULD NOT BE SURPRISED IF HE FOLLOWS UP SPEAKING TO ME WITH A PERSONAL MESSAGE TO YOU OR TO THE PRIME MINISTER, AS HE HAS DONE ON OCCASIONS IN THE PAST. AS PREVIOUSLY REPORTED, I BELIEVE THAT, FOR HIS OWN REASONS, HE CONTINUES TO BE VERY ANXIOUS NOT TO BE FACED WITH DIFFICULT DECISIONS ON RHODESIA FOR THE MOMENT.

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6/17

TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELNO 388 OF 4 JULY 79
INFO IMMEDIATE TO MARIMBA SALISBURY
PRIORITY TO WASHINGTON, ROUTINE TO PRETORIA, GABERONE,
LUSAKA, LAGOS, MAPUTO, DAR ES SALAAM AND UKMIS NEW YORK.

YOUR TELEGRAM NO 93 OF 29 JUNE TO MARIMBA SALISBURY;
BISHOP MUZOREWA

1. ON RECEIPT OF TUR I SPOKE AGAIN ON 29 JUNE TO NJONJO FOLLOWING UP CONVERSATION REPORTED IN MY TELNO 376 TO FCO OF SAME DATE. I GAVE NJONJO DETAILS OF ARRANGEMENTS THAT HAD BEEN MADE FOR TALKS WITH THE BISHOP IN LONDON ON 13 JULY AND SAID THAT IT LOOKED AS IF THE EARLIEST HE COULD ARRIVE HERE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE REQUEST RECEIVED FROM GAYLARD WOULD BE 14 OR 15 JULY. I SAID IT WOULD BE HELPFUL IF PRESIDENT MOI FELT ABLE TO SEE THE BISHOP (AS IN PARA 2 OF TUR) AND ASKED IF HE WISHED TO INDICATE ANY PARTICULAR TIMING FOR THE BISHOP'S ARRIVAL IF HE AGREED TO SEE HIM.
2. NJONJO SAID THAT HE WOULD DISCUSS WITH THE PRESIDENT OVER THE WEEKEND AND LET ME KNOW HIS RESPONSE. NJONJO CAME TO SEE ME LAST NIGHT AND EXPLAINED THAT THE PRESIDENT HAD DECIDED ON FULL CONSIDERATION THAT IT WOULD NOT BE APPROPRIATE FOR BISHOP MUZOREWA TO COME HERE AFTER HIS LONDON VISIT SINCE THIS WOULD MEAN THAT A MEETING WITH PRESIDENT MOI WOULD BE HELD IN THE COURSE OF THE OAU MEETING BEING HELD IN MONROVIA. THE PRESIDENT FELT THAT THIS WOULD ATTRACT PUBLICITY AND CRITICISM WHICH WOULD NOT BE IN BISHOP MUZOREWA'S INTERESTS OR HIS OWN. HE ASKED THAT A RESPONSE ON THESE LINES SHOULD BE CONVEYED TO MUZOREWA BY APPROPRIATE MEANS. I SHOULD BE GRATEFUL IF THIS COULD BE DONE.

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3. AS YOU KNOW PRESIDENT MOI HAS BEEN RELUCTANT TO GO HIMSELF TO THE OAU SUMMIT MEETING IN MONROVIA. DR WAIYAKI WILL COVER THE MINISTERIAL SESSIONS AND VICE PRESIDENT KIBAKI WILL REPRESENT MOI AT THE SUMMIT SESSIONS. IT SEEMS TO ME THAT THE PRESIDENT HAS DECIDED THAT WIDE PUBLICITY COULD NOT BE AVOIDED FOR HIS RECEPTION OF BISHOP MUZOREWA HERE AND THAT THIS WOULD ATTRACT ADDITIONAL CRITICISM BECAUSE OF THE COINCIDENCE WITH THE OAU MEETING AND WITH MOI'S ABSENCE FROM THAT MEETING. I ASKED NJONJO WHETHER THE PRESIDENT'S DECISION DID NOT EXCLUDE THE POSSIBILITY OF A MEETING AT A LATER AND MORE CONVENIENT TIME. NJONJO CONFIRMED THAT IT DID NOT, BUT HE MADE NO SUGGESTION AS TO WHEN ANY MEETING MIGHT BE POSSIBLE

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RHODESIA POLICY

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SECRET

4 Rhodesia

PRIME MINISTERRhodesia

(OD(79) 10 and OD(79) 11)

BACKGROUND

1. In OD(79) 11 the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary proposes a strategy and timetable to bring Rhodesia to legal independence by this autumn. It rests on Lord Harlech's advice (OD(79) 10) that we could not get any international acceptance for the internal settlement as it stands, but that we could hope to get a considerable measure of acceptance if Britain gave a lead to obtain changes to the constitution, followed by a conference of all parties and another election or some other test of acceptability. Lord Harlech is due to attend the meeting after an overnight flight from Johannesburg in order to report on his exploratory discussions with Bishop Muzorewa on 3-4 July. It is essential for the proposed strategy that Muzorewa should be able both to accept and bring about the changes in the Rhodesian constitution and power structure which the strategy requires.

2. You discussed the Foreign Secretary's general approach with him and Lord Harlech before the latter went to see the Bishop: and you also discussed it in briefing for your own talk with Mr Fraser. This brief therefore concentrates mainly on the procedural aspects and the next steps. The strategy is not assured of success (and even if successful may still be accompanied by some damage to British interests particularly in Nigeria) but it offers the best chance of success and of containing the damage. If it fails, eg because the Bishop cannot be brought to accept the necessary changes (Mr Ian Smith may in particular prove once more to be a stumbling block), we shall face the very difficult question of whether the probable non-renewal of sanctions in November should be accompanied or followed by granting legal independence to Rhodesia. There is however no need to face this issue now. As you said in Canberra we are proceeding via stepping stones and we shall have to judge as we go which ones are safe to step upon.

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HANDLING

3. It should not be necessary to go through Lord Harlech's report on his first round of consultations in Africa (OD(79) 10) in any detail. I suggest you open the meeting by thanking him for this report and say that the Committee will be interested to hear later the results of his subsequent exploratory discussions in Salisbury. You might then invite the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary to introduce his paper (OD(79) 11) on the strategy to be followed. Lord Harlech could then be asked to report on his discussions in Salisbury with Bishop Muzorewa, Mr David Smith (as a leader of moderate Rhodesia Front opinion) and Mr Ian Smith (over his readiness to step down from the political scene). You may then want to report on your own discussions with Mr Clark and more particularly Mr Fraser.


4. The course of the subsequent discussion will be affected by whether Lord Harlech has reported a readiness in Salisbury to concede that the internal settlement needs to be modified and that Britain needs to be seen to be taking the lead. In earlier talks with Sir A Duff and Mr Day both black and white Rhodesian leaders took the line that they had already done all that could be expected of them. Some of them may think that if they stand tight Britain and the United States will have to lift sanctions and that recognition will follow. But more recent contacts have suggested a readiness to try to follow if Britain gives a lead in suggesting the changes now necessary. The Rhodesian leaders should be aware that they do not have a strong hand. The internal settlement has not reduced the level of fighting, its crippling burden on the economy or the haemorrhage of white skills through emigration.

5. If however Lord Harlech reports that the Rhodesian leadership still resist the idea of significant changes in the internal settlement Lord Carrington might be asked what opportunities exist for pressure to be brought on Bishop Muzorewa during his visits to the United States and Britain. He could also be asked how the internal settlement constitution can be altered and on the extent of Rhodesia Front support or acquiescence that would be needed (the alternatives seem to be either support from 16 out of 28 white MPs to produce 78 votes in favour of change or prior agreement on an amended constitution that could be imposed by Britain).

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6. Although you and Lord Carrington have discussed the strategy earlier, this is the first OD discussion since Lord Harlech's first report. Furthermore you will need some discretion from your colleagues to take decisions in concert with the Foreign Secretary. It will therefore be important to ensure that they endorse the main points of the strategy. In particular, does the Committee accept that British recognition of the internal settlement as it stands would not bring international acceptance? Does it agree that we should try to gain that acceptance by a determined policy including the preliminary steps set out by Lord Carrington in paragraph 8 of OD(79) 11 and an announcement after the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting on the lines of his paragraph 6? Does it agree with the line Lord Carrington proposes to take in the House of Lords on 10 July? The discussion ought of course also to cover the degree of risk to our interests in black Africa (especially Nigeria and Zambia), the extent to which the Patriotic Front could expect support from black African states if they refused to take part in a wider settlement or even to attend a conference, and the probable course of the civil war which on almost any scenario must be likely to continue.

8. Subject to the discussion you will probably want to guide the Committee to endorse the strategy and timetable outlined in OD(79) 11 but note that further discussion of it will be necessary after the Bishop's visit to London and before the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting.


John Hunt

4 July 1979

CONFIDENTIAL

VCS



FILE

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

4 July 1979

Rhodesia: Reply to President Kaunda

While I was in Tokyo with the Prime Minister, I arranged for you to be informed by No. 10 that the Prime Minister had approved, with some minor amendments, the text of the draft reply which you sent me with your letter of 25 June to President Kaunda's long letter of 8 June about Rhodesia. I now enclose the signed original of the Prime Minister's reply and should be grateful if you would arrange for it to be forwarded to Lusaka for delivery.

The Prime Minister wishes to make it clear that Mr. Patrick Cosgrave, to whom President Kaunda refers in the third paragraph of his letter, did not go to Lusaka as her representative; indeed, the Prime Minister was not even aware of his visit until he had returned to the U.K..

B. G. CARTLEDGE

J. S. Wall, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

A handwritten signature in blue ink, appearing to be 'J.S.W.' or similar, located in the bottom right corner of the page.

CONFIDENTIAL

Original filed
USA June '79
(Helm's visit)

CONFIDENTIAL



Rhodesia PS
file

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

4 July 1979

Dear Senator,

CALL ON THE PRIME MINISTER BY SENATOR JESSE HELMS AT 10 DOWNING STREET ON 4 JULY 1979

Senator Jesse Helms (Republican, North Carolina), following a written request by him for a private and confidential discussion with the Prime Minister about Rhodesia, called at No.10 at 10.30 this morning by prior arrangement. He was accompanied by Mr. Carbaugh and another personal assistant. The following is a summary of the main points which arose during half an hour's discussion.

The Prime Minister began the conversation by telling Senator Helms that she thought it desirable that their meeting should be given no publicity. In particular, she hoped that he would not consider it necessary to inform the other Conservative Members of Parliament whom he was meeting later in the day that he had called on her. In answer to questions, No.10 would if necessary confirm that he had made a brief call on the Prime Minister, in return for the Prime Minister's own meeting with him in Washington during her visit as Leader of the Opposition. Senator Helms accepted this, but with evident reluctance.

Rhodesia

Senator Helms told the Prime Minister that when President Carter had announced his "unfortunate" determination concerning sanctions against Rhodesia, he had suggested to the President that he should take an early opportunity of meeting Bishop Muzorewa. President Carter had telephoned him on the following day to ask him to invite the Bishop to visit the United States as his (the Senator's) guest. This was the genesis of Bishop Muzorewa's forthcoming visit to Washington on 7 July. President Carter, Mr. Vance and Dr. Brzezinski were taking the line that the US could not unilaterally move ahead of the UK on the Rhodesia issue. The Senator greatly feared, however, that any inordinate delay in recognising the Muzorewa Government would cause it to fall apart. The Prime Minister's own statements had been helpful but what was now needed was a clear statement by the US and British Governments together that sanctions would be lifted. This might

/enable

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enable Bishop Muzorewa to survive. The present mood on the Hill was generally supportive of lifting sanctions although some highly placed members of the Administration were in favour of holding back, thereby playing, in the Senator's view, into the hands of the terrorists. The best way of defeating the terrorists would be to revive the Rhodesian economy by lifting sanctions.

Mr. Carbaugh said that President Carter was now seeking a way out of the impasse. The Prime Minister should make it clear that the British Government intended to lift sanctions after Bishop Muzorewa's forthcoming visits to Washington and London. If she did not make this move before the Commonwealth meeting in Lusaka, the pressures there would be hard to resist. It would be much better to present the Lusaka meeting with a fait accompli. Mr. Carbaugh said that it would be wrong to anticipate that in these circumstances the Commonwealth would fall apart. It would be useful if Bishop Muzorewa could have had some firm indication of support and of an end to sanctions from the Prime Minister before he went to see President Carter.

The Prime Minister told Senator Helms that most African countries now accepted that there was a new situation in Rhodesia, following the elections in April. The next step was to determine whether the existing constitutional arrangements were, in accordance with the Fifth Principle, acceptable to the people of Rhodesia as a whole. The Prime Minister said that she did not share Senator Helms' approach to the Lusaka meeting. She thought it essential that the UK should attend that meeting in the position of being able to point to continuing consultations with all the parties concerned. The impact of any premature move on the forthcoming meeting of the Organisation of African Unity also had to be borne in mind. The Prime Minister said that she disagreed with Mr. Carbaugh on the desirability of presenting the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting with a fait accompli: it was essential to persuade some countries to go along with the UK - a wide degree of international acceptance would be essential to the future of Bishop Muzorewa's Government, which would be gravely handicapped by an unnecessary measure of African hostility towards it. For all these reasons, the Prime Minister said, she did not think it wise to make any further move before the Lusaka meeting.

As you know, the Prime Minister wishes knowledge of her meeting with Senator Helms to be confined to the smallest possible circle. The above account, therefore, is for the personal information of the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary only. Lord Carrington may wish to authorise you to convey the gist of it to the one or two senior officials who were directly concerned in preparing the brief for Senator Helms' call.

Yours ever,
Elizabeth

Stephen Wall, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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UNCLASSIFIED
FM WASHINGTON 032216Z JULY 1979
TO ROUTINE F C O
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1785 OF 3 JULY 1979.
INFO MIRIMBA SALISBURY
INFO SAVING PRETORIA.

Prime Minister

GM

4/7

KISSINGER'S INTERVIEW ON RHODESIA

1. A MAJOR INTERVIEW ABOUT RHODESIA GIVEN BY KISSINGER APPEARS IN TODAY'S WASHINGTON POST (FULL TEXT BY BAG).
2. KISSINGER CRITICIZED THE ADMINISTRATION FOR OPERATING ON THE FALSE ASSUMPTION THAT THIRD WORLD RADICALS COULD BE WON OVER BY CO-OPTING THEIR PROGRAMMES. IN RHODESIA, THE EFFECT OF THIS HAD BEEN TO PUT THE U S ON THE SIDE OF THOSE SEEKING TO SEIZE POWER BY MILITARY MEANS FROM THE ELECTED MODERATES. SINCE EXTREMISTS COULD NOT AFFORD TO BE IDENTIFIED WITH THE UNITED STATES, THE U S ADMINISTRATION'S SUPPORT FOR THEIR CAUSE WOULD ONLY SERVE TO RADICALISE THEM FURTHER. KISSINGER ARGUED THAT A MISTAKEN BELIEF THAT THE FUTURE WAS REPRESENTED BY RADICAL ELEMENTS IN AFRICA WAS LEADING THE U S INTO A VERBAL POSITION WHICH WAS RADICAL, A PRACTICAL POSITION WHICH WAS IMPOTENT AND A THEORY WHICH ENCOURAGED COMMUNIST INTERVENTION WHENEVER THE TIME WAS RIPE.
3. KISSINGER SUGGESTED THAT IT WAS WRONG TO CULTIVATE THE SUPPORT OF THE FRONT LINE STATES BY PURSUING POLICIES ACCEPTABLE TO THE PATRIOTIC FRONT, SINCE THIS WOULD MERELY ENCOURAGE THE EXTERNAL LEADERS TO INCREASE THEIR DEMANDS. INSTEAD, THE APPROPRIATE COURSE OF ACTION FOR THE U S SHOULD BE TO WELCOME THE PROGRESS ALREADY MADE BY THE MODERATES, (EVEN IF IMPROVEMENTS STILL NEEDED TO BE MADE), AND TO ADVOCATE A FINAL ROUND OF NEGOTIATIONS DURING WHICH NO MAJOR CHANGES IN U S POLICY WOULD BE MADE. HOWEVER, THE U S SHOULD ALSO MAKE IT CLEAR THAT IF THIS FINAL ROUND FAILED BECAUSE ONE GROUP WAS DETERMINED TO SEIZE POWER BY FORCE OF ARMS, THEN "THE U S SHOULD MOVE IN THE DIRECTION OF THE ELECTED GOVERNMENT. I AM NOT SAYING THAT THE U S SHOULD RECOGNIZE ONLY MUZOREWA, BUT IT SHOULD NOT DEVELOP A PUBLIC POSITION WHICH UNDERMINES THE ONE ELECTED LEADER IN RHODESIA AND ENCOURAGES GUERRILLA WAR RATHER THAN NEGOTIATIONS."
4. KISSINGER MAINTAINED THAT THE QUESTION OF SANCTIONS LIFTING WAS PRIMARILY A TACTICAL DECISION RELATING TO TIMING. "IF BRITAIN

/now

NOW LIFTS THE SANCTIONS IN NOVEMBER, IT WILL BE THE FALL GUY. . . IT WILL HAVE DONE SO IN THE FACE OF THE STATEMENT (JUNE 7) BY THE UNITED STATES WHICH WILL PLACE THE ENTIRE MORAL RESPONSIBILITY ON BRITAIN. THIS IS NOT RIGHT''.

5. KISSINGER SAID THAT A SOLUTION TO THE MAJOR PROBLEM OF SOUTH AFRICA REQUIRED A REASONABLE SETTLEMENT IN RHODESIA. CHANGE IN SOUTH AFRICA WAS IMPERATIVE FOR MORAL AND POLITICAL REASONS. HOWEVER, SUCH CHANGE MUST BE BROUGHT ABOUT PEACEFULLY, AND THE PRESENT ADMINISTRATION'S POLICY TOWARDS RHODESIA WOULD MAKE SUCH AN OUTCOME INHERENTLY LESS LIKELY.

6. SEE M I F T.

F C O PASS SAVING PRETORIA.

ROBINSON.

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ADDITIONAL DISTN.
RHODESIA POLICY

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

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FROM FCO 031600Z JUL 79
TO PRIORITY LUSAKA
TELEGRAM NUMBER 375 OF 3 JULY
INFO MIRIMBA SALISBURY

2

Prime Minister

6/4
4/7

ZAMBIA/RHODESIA

1. THE ZAMBIAN HIGH COMMISSIONER HAS SENT ME A LETTER IN THE FOLLOWING TERMS:

DEAR LORD CARRINGTON,

IN REACTION TO THE REPORTS WHICH HAVE BEEN CIRCULATING IN THE PAPERS HERE IN BRITAIN, THE HONOURABLE MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS HAS THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE.

"PLEASE REFER TO THE REPORTED POSSIBLE MEETING BETWEEN HIS EXCELLENCY THE PRESIDENT DR KAUNDA AND THE SO CALLED PRIME MINISTER MUZOREWA. BE ADVISED THAT THERE IS NO TRUTH IN THE REPORT AS THERE ARE NO PLANS FOR SUCH A MEETING EITHER FOR NOW OR IN FUTURE. OUR POLICY IS THAT THERE CANNOT BE SUCH A MEETING WITH A REBEL OR REBELS WITHOUT PRIOR CONSULTATIONS AMONG FRONTLINE STATES AND THAT INCLUDES NIGERIA. THEREFORE DISMISS THE REPORT WITH THE CONTEMPT IT DESERVES."

PLEASE ACCEPT THE ASSURANCES OF MY HIGHEST CONSIDERATION.

2. AN ACKNOWLEDGEMENT IS BEING SENT.

CARRINGTON

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(MR STEEL)
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PS/MR LUCE
PS/MR RIDLEY
PS/MR HURD
PS/PUS
SIR A DUFF
SIR A PARSONS
MR LEAHY
MISS BROWN
MR THOMAS
MR WILLSON
MR WILLIAMS
MR DAY

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION

RHODESIA POLICY
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10 DOWNING STREET

MR. CARTLEDGE

*Briefing requested
for 1700 on
11 July.*

The meeting with Bishop *Shel.*
Muzorewa is confirmed for
1500 on 13 July. Can I leave
it that you are organising
briefing please?

ej.

3 July 1979

CONFIDENTIAL

GR 530

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FM MIRIMBA SALISBURY 031815Z JUL 79

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 351 OF 3 JULY 79

INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON LUSAKA DAR ES SALAAM GABORONE MAPUTO
LAGOS LUANDA UKMIS NEW YORK AND PRETORIA

FROM LORD HARLECH

MIPT: RHODESIA

1. I HAD HALF-HOUR MEETINGS WITH CHIEF NDIWENI, DAVID SMITH AND
IAN SMITH DURING THE AFTERNOON OF 3 JULY.

2. NDIWENI READILY AGREED WITH ME THAT WHATEVER DIFFERENCE THE
INTERNAL PARTIES MIGHT HAVE OVER THE CONSTITUTION THEY SHOULD ALL
WORK WITHIN IT FOR CHANGE AND SHOW A UNITED FRONT TO THE OUTSIDE
WORLD. BUT SITHOLE WAS A DEAD LOSS. LIKE MUZOREWA, NDIWENI
SHOWED A SIMPLE FAITH IN THE READINESS OF THE OUTSIDE WORLD TO
FOLLOW THE BRITISH LEAD ON A SETTLEMENT. I ASSURED HIM OF THE
GOVERNMENT'S DETERMINATION NOT TO BE DIVERTED FROM ITS OBJECTIVE.

3. DAVID SMITH PRESSED ME TO SAY WHAT SORT OF CONSTITUTIONAL
AMENDMENTS HMG HAD IT IN MIND TO SUGGEST. I SAID THAT OUR
CONSULTATIONS WERE NOT YET COMPLETE AND MINDS WERE NOT MADE UP.
BUT IT WAS CLEAR THAT CRITICISM IN AFRICA AND ELSEWHERE SO FAR
HAD FOCUSED ON THE NUMBER OF SEATS RESERVED FOR WHITES (THE
PRINCIPLE OF SPECIAL REPRESENTATION FOR WHITES WAS NOT SERIOUSLY
QUESTIONED) AND THEIR EXTENSIVE POWERS OF VETO. HE DID NOT JIB
AT THIS, BUT EMPHASISED THAT THE WHITE POPULATION WERE JITTERY
AND MIGHT REACT BADLY TO A REDUCTION IN THEIR REPRESENTATION IN
PARLIAMENT. WHY NOT, AS AN ALTERNATIVE, INCREASE THE NUMBER OF
BLACK SEATS?

4. A MAJOR PROBLEM, HE SAID, WAS THE MAINTENANCE OF STANDARDS IN
THE PUBLIC SERVICE. AFRICANISATION FOR THE SAKE OF AFRICANISATION
DID NOT MAKE SENCE. BUT HE SEEMED DISPOSED AT LEAST TO LISTEN
WHEN I SUGGESTED THAT THERE MIGHT BE WAYS AND MEANS OF STARTING
ON AT LEAST COSMETIC CHANGES IN THE CIVIL SERVICE WITHOUT SERIOUSLY
LOWERING STANDARDS OR AFFECTING THE CAREER PROSPECTS OF EUROPEANS.

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5. DAVID SMITH CLAIMED THAT THE GOVERNMENT OF NATIONAL UNITY WAS A RESTRAINING INFLUENCE ON AFRICAN MINISTERS, WHO WOULD OTHERWISE BE HELL-BENT ON SMASHING ZAMBIA. IAN SMITH WAS A NONENTITY AT PRESENT. WHY HE STAYED ON WAS A MYSTERY. BUT HE COULD GUARANTEE THAT IAN SMITH WOULD GO ONCE THE GOVERNMENT WAS RECOGNISED AND SANCTIONS WERE REMOVED. HE CONCLUDED WITH THE FAMILIAR PLEA THAT SANCTIONS SHOULD BE LIFTED AS SOON AS POSSIBLE SO AS TO IMPROVE YOUTH EMPLOYMENT PROSPECTS AND REDUCE THE SCOPE FOR GUERILLA RECRUITMENT.

6. IAN SMITH SEEMED DEFEATED AND DEPRESSED. HE SPENT MUCH OF THE TIME ON A TENDENTIOUS EXPOSE OF THE WRONGS WHICH SUCCESSIVE BRITISH GOVERNMENTS HAVE DONE HIM IN THE PAST AND, LIKE MUZOREWA, CLAIMED THAT A CLEAR BRITISH LEAD WOULD BE FOLLOWED MORE WIDELY THAN WE BELIEVED. BUT IT WAS AT LEAST ENCOURAGING THAT HE DID NOT APPEAR TO RULE OUT IN PRINCIPLE THE POSSIBILITY OF CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS, STRESSING ONLY THE PRACTICAL IMPORTANCE OF AGREEING THEM IN ADVANCE WITH THE RHODESIAN GOVERNMENT BEFORE OUR PROPOSALS WERE MADE PUBLIC.

DAY

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(MR STEEL)
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PS/MR LUCE
PS/MR RIDLEY
PS/MR HURD
PS/PUS
SIR A DUFF
SIR A PARSONS
MISS BROWN
MR THOMAS
MR WILLSON
MR WILLIAMS

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION RHODESIA POLICY

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FM MIRIMBA SALISBURY 031815Z JUL 79

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 350 OF 3 JULY

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON

INFO PRIORITY LUSAKA DAR ES SALAAM GABORONE MAPUTO LAGOS

LUANDA UKMIS NEW YORK AND PRETORIA

PM has seen
EW
6/11
4/11

FROM LORD HARLECH: RHODESIA

1. I HAD A MEETING LASTING ONE AND A HALF HOURS ON 3 JULY WITH BISHOP MUZOREWA, MUNDAWARARA (DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER), MUKOME (FOREIGN MINISTER), GAYLARD AND GEORGE SMITH WERE ALSO PRESENT.

2. MY MAIN IMPRESSIONS FROM THE DISCUSSION WERE THAT MUZOREWA:

A) HAS MADE A TOTALLY DIFFERENT ASSESSMENT FROM US OF THE LIKELY AFRICAN REACTIONS TO A DECISION BY HMG TO GRANT INDEPENDENCE AND LIFT SANCTIONS ON THE BASIS OF THE STATUS QUO:

B) DEEPLY RESENTS THE UNFAIRNESS, AS HE SEES IT, OF OTHERS IN AFRICA AND ELSEWHERE PASSING UNFAVOURABLE JUDGEMENT ON A SETTLEMENT WHICH THE PARTIES IN RHODESIA HAVE WORKED OUT THEMSELVES; AND

C) IN SPITE OF HIS DISAPPOINTMENT AT HMG'S NOT HAVING LEGALISED HIS GOVERNMENT OR LIFTED SANCTIONS, IS AT THE SAME TIME HIGHLY APPRECIATIVE OF THE GOVERNMENT'S GENERAL ATTITUDE TOWARDS HIM AND OF THEIR WILLINGNESS, WHICH I EMPHASISED, TO WORK WITH HIM AND NOT AGAINST HIM FOR A SOLUTION.

3. IN MY INTRODUCTORY REMARKS I SOUGHT TO BRING OUT THE GOVERNMENT'S DETERMINATION TO SEIZE THE OPPORTUNITY WHICH THEY SAW AT PRESENT TO WORK QUICKLY FOR A SOLUTION TO OUR RESPECTIVE PROBLEMS. THERE WAS NO QUESTION OF ALLOWING ANY EXTREMIST PARTY OR GOVERNMENT TO STAND IN THE WAY OF A SETTLEMENT WHICH WAS BY OBJECTIVE STANDARDS FAIR AND REASONABLE AND HAD A PROSPECT OF WIDE INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT.

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AT THE SAME TIME, MY CONSULTATIONS AND MR LUCE'S SO FAR HAD SHOWN THAT, DESPITE THE WIDESPREAD APPRECIATION OF WHAT HAD ALREADY BEEN ACHIEVED IN RHODESIA, THERE WAS CRITICISM OF SOME SHORTCOMINGS IN THE PRESENT CONSTITUTION AND A WISH FOR A FINAL SOLUTION WHICH DERIVED ITS AUTHORITY FROM BRITAIN. NOT EVEN THE MOST MODERATE AFRICAN STATES WE HAD CONSULTED SO FAR WOULD FOLLOW OUR EXAMPLE IF WE SIMPLY RECOGNISED ON THE BASIS OF THE STATUS QUO. NOR WOULD WE GET BACKING FROM OUR FRIENDS AND ALLIES IN THE UNITED STATES OR THE EEC. THIS WAS THE PROBLEM TO WHICH WE NOW HAD URGENTLY TO ADDRESS OURSELVES.

4. MUZOREWA COUNTERED THIS VIGOROUSLY, CLAIMING THAT THE TEAMS HE HAD SENT ROUND AFRICA IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE RHODESIAN ELECTIONS HAD REPORTED TO HIM THAT PRACTICALLY ALL THE COUNTRIES CONSULTED HAD GIVEN THE IMPRESSION THAT THEY WERE SIMPLY WAITING FOR A BRITISH LEAD TO RECOGNISE HIS GOVERNMENT. IT WAS BLATANTLY UNFAIR FOR ANYONE ELSE NOW TO EXPECT HIM TO SHOW SIGNS OF GREATER FLEXIBILITY BEFORE THEY WOULD MAKE A MOVE TOWARDS HIM. THE PARTIES TO THE PRESENT CONSTITUTION WERE THOROUGHLY REPRESENTATIVE AND HAD HAD A RESPECTABLE ELECTION, WHICH WAS MORE THAN COULD BE SAID FOR MOST OF THEIR CRITICS GAYLARD ARGUED AT THIS POINT THAT WHATEVER THEY DID THEY WOULD NEVER GET THE AGREEMENT OF THE FRONT LINE STATES TO ANY SOLUTION WHICH TOOK THE PRESENT SET-UP AS ITS STARTING-POINT. WHAT THEY NEEDED WAS AN END TO SANCTIONS SO AS TO IMPROVE THEIR PROSPECTS OF WINNING THE WAR. MUNDAWARARA AND MUKOME SPOKE IN SUPPORT (THE FORMER WITH IMPRESSIVE FLUENCY FOR A BEGINNER IN GOVERNMENT). HMG WERE NOW SHIFTING THEIR GROUND AND SEEKING TO ESTABLISH FRESH CONDITIONS FOR RECOGNITION IN ADDITION TO THE SIX PRINCIPLES. IF THEY COMPLIED, HOW WERE THEY TO KNOW WE WOULD NOT SHIFT OUR GROUND AGAIN?

5. I DENIED THAT THERE WAS ANY INTENTION OF ADDING TO THE SIX PRINCIPLES, AND IN FURTHER ARGUMENT I HINTED VERY BROADLY TO MUZOREWA THAT, REGARDLESS OF THE RIGHTS AND WRONGS OF HIS PRESENT STAND, HE MIGHT FIND IT TACTICALLY ADVANTAGEOUS TO SHOW HIMSELF WILLING TO OFFER IMPROVEMENTS ON THE STATUS QUO IN ORDER TO EXPOSE THE INTRANSIGENCE OF THE PATRIOTIC FRONT AND CUT THE GROUND FROM UNDER THEIR FEET. HE REFUSED TO RISE TO THE BAIT AND DID NOT RESPOND DIRECTLY TO MY SUGGESTION THAT FOR SIMILAR REASONS HE SHOULD CONTINUE TO EXPRESS WILLINGNESS TO TALK TO THE PATRIOTIC FRONT.

CONCLUSION

6. IN SPITE OF THE BISHOP'S APPARENT STONEWALLING, I FORMED THE CLEAR IMPRESSION THAT HE WAS TALKING TO A LARGE EXTENT FOR THE EFFECT ON HIS COLLEAGUES. WHEN YOU SEE HIM IN LONDON, YOU MAY PERHAPS FIND THAT HE IS SUSCEPTIBLE TO ARGUMENT ON THE BASIS THAT CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGES ARE NEEDED TO PRODUCE A SOLUTION WHICH WILL BE ACCEPTABLE TO THE BRITISH PARLIAMENT AND PERHAPS TO THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY (ALTHOUGH HE PURPORTED TO BELIEVE EITHER THAT THEY WERE A LOST CAUSE OR WOULD SIMPLY FOLLOW OUR LEAD). I AM DUE TO HAVE ANOTHER MEETING WITH HIM ON TOMORROW AFTERNOON. I HOPE TO ARRANGE FOR THIS TO BE PRIVATE; IN THAT CASE I SHALL TRY TO PROBE HIS ATTITUDE FURTHER THAN WAS POSSIBLE TODAY. I URGED HIM TO LISTEN CAREFULLY TO VANCE.

7. SEE MIFT FOR A REPORT OF SUBSEQUENT MEETINGS WITH NDIWENI, DAVID SMITH AND IAN SMITH.

DAY

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 (MR STEEL)
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 PS/SIR I GILMOUR
 PS/MR LUCE
 PS/MR RIDLEY
 PS/MR HURD
 PS/PUS
 SIR A DUFF
 SIR A PARSONS
 MISS BROWN
 MR THOMAS
 MR WILLSON
 MR WILLIAMS

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RHODESIA POLICY

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2/0 Australia, May 79
Mtg's with Fraser.



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Principal Private Secretary

3 July 1979

Dear George,

Prime Minister's Visit to Canberra: Rhodesia

I attach the record of the meeting the Prime Minister had on Saturday 30 June with Mr. Fraser. As you will see, most of the discussion was about Rhodesia and the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting in Lusaka. Mr. Fraser floated the idea that the British Government should launch at Lusaka what he called a "process" which would explain to those taking part how we proposed to build on what had already been achieved in Rhodesia by bringing forward further constitutional changes in the direction of greater Africanisation and which would make clear how we intended to involve all the parties to the problem, including the Front-line States and the Patriotic Front leaders, in the consideration of these changes. You will see from the record that the Prime Minister explained why we had reservations about this approach, particularly since Mr. Fraser seemed to think that we should seek formal endorsement for it at Lusaka.

The following day at a dinner given by the High Commissioner Parkinson, the Secretary of the Department of Foreign Affairs, (who had not himself been present at the meeting on Saturday) gave John Hunt the attached piece of paper which he said set out the essentials of what the Australians believed the Prime Minister and Mr. Fraser had agreed. In fact this was no more than a summary of the line Mr. Fraser had pursued the previous day, and John Hunt and I explained to Parkinson and to Yeend, the Secretary of the Australian Cabinet, why we could not accept their piece of paper as an agreed resume of the Prime Ministers' talk. We left it at that, and John Hunt and I do not feel that there is any need to take the Australian attempt to get an agreed piece of paper any further. But it is probable that the Australians will want to have further consultations with us during the run-up to Lusaka. If they do, we expect them to approach us through Freeth here in London. The Prime Minister is content for further consultations to take place.

There is a further aspect about the Australian activity on Rhodesia and Lusaka which does not come out of the record. Donald Tebbit believes that Mr. Fraser is seeking a role for himself as an intermediary between Britain and the black African states who is going to find a way forward in Rhodesia which will

/forestall

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- 2 -

forestall an explosion at Lusaka which might wreck the Commonwealth. Mr. Fraser said nothing explicit about this possible role for himself at his meeting with the Prime Minister, but it seemed to us that his general approach to the issues he raised and a subsequent remark by Yeend to John Hunt lent support to Donald Tebbit's view. This is something which you will want to bear in mind if the Australians seek further consultations with us in the next couple of weeks.

I am copying this letter to Martin Vile (Cabinet Office).

Yours etc,

Shwi.

George Walden, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CONFIDENTIAL

- . Acknowledgement of the gains that have been made and which need to be protected.

- . Acknowledgement also of the deficiencies.

- . Agreement in principle that there is a need for further changes to the constitution in the direction of greater africanisation.

- . Announcement at Lusaka of the process to achieve this further constitutional change, involving also consultations with Rhodesians and other African States.

- . The final settlement, which should occur as quickly as possible, needs to be one which will have adequate support of independent African States.

- . There should be further discussions on these points before CHOGM.

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FM MAPUTO 030850Z JULY 79

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 140 OF 3 JULY

INFO LUSAKA LAGOS DAR ES SALAAM GABORONE LUANDA LILONGWE PRETORIA

MIRIMBA SALISBURY WASHINGTON UKMIS NEW YORK

2

Prime Minister

Gen

1/1

YOUR TELNO 350 TO LUSAKA: RHODESIA

1. HONWANA (PRESIDENTIAL ADVISER) CALLED ON ME LAST NIGHT. I MADE THE POINTS IN YOUR TUR.
2. HE HAD BEEN PRESENT WHEN LORD HARLECH SAW FOREIGN MINISTER CHISSANO. I SAID THAT WE UNDERSTOOD FRELIMO'S POLICY AND FEELINGS ON RHODESIA: BUT PERSONALLY I HAD BEEN DISAPPOINTED THAT CHISSANO HAD GIVEN SO LITTLE INDICATION OF HOW A COMPROMISE MIGHT BE REACHED: IT DID NOT SEEM TO ME REALISTIC TO DISMISS MUZOREWA AS HE HAD DONE. SURELY THE MOZAMBICANS NEEDED A QUICK PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT AS MUCH AS ANYONE. THEY SAID THAT THEY WOULD BE GUIDED BY THE PATRIOTIC FRONT (PF)'S VIEWS AND WOULD CONTINUE TO SUPPORT THE ARMED STRUGGLE: BUT WAS THERE NOT A POINT WHERE FRELIMO WOULD SEE AS IN THEIR OWN INTERESTS TO PERSUADE MUGABE TO SETTLE?
3. HONWANA REAFFIRMED MOZAMBIQUE'S RESOLUTION IN SUPPORT OF THE PF: TANZANIA HAD SHELTERED FRELIMO THROUGH TEN YEARS OF WAR. CHISSANO HAD SPOKEN AS HE HAD, SO AS TO LEAVE NO DOUBT IN OUR MINDS ABOUT MOZAMBIQUE'S POLICY. NO CHANGE WHATEVER WOULD HAVE OCCURRED IN RHODESIA, HAD IT NOT BEEN FOR THE GUERRILLA WAR. MUZOREWA HAD JUST STEPPED IN TO REAP THE REWARDS OF THE PF'S EFFORTS AND SACRIFICES. IT WAS UNREASONABLE TO EXPECT THE PF, MOZAMBIQUE OR ANYONE ELSE TO ACCEPT THIS. THE PF COULD NOT BE EXPECTED TO COME HOME TO ACCEPT THE EXISTING POWER STRUCTURE: THEY HAD TAKEN UP ARMS NOT SO MUCH TO GET RID OF SMITH, BUT TO CHANGE THE POWER STRUCTURE, WHICH REMAINED INTACT UNDER MUZOREWA'S NOMINAL CONTROL. I EXPLAINED THE CONSIDERABLE CHANGES THAT HAD OCCURRED: BLACK MAJORITY RULE WAS A REALITY, INSOFAR AS MUZOREWA NOW HAD FULL RESPONSIBILITY FOR ALL DECISIONS: AND IT WAS HARD TO IMAGINE THAT HE WOULD NOT WORK TOWARDS FURTHER CHANGES. HONWANA ACCEPTED THAT CHANGE HAD OCCURRED AND THAT MUZOREWA WAS A FIGURE TO BE RECKONED WITH. BUT HE FEARED THAT MUZOREWA, HAVING ACHIEVED POWER, WOULD BE KEEN TO DEMONSTRATE HIS STRENGTH AND WOULD SEE NO REASON TO GIVE UP THE POSITION HE HAD ACHIVED.

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4. HE CONFIRMED THAT MOZAMBIQUE WOULD CONSIDER ANY PROPOSALS FOR A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT. BUT, TO HAVE ANY HOPE OF SUCCESS, THESE SHOULD NOT EXCLUDE THE PF AND SHOULD NOT REQUIRE THEM TO RETURN ACCEPTING THE EXISTING POWER STRUCTURE. IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES HE THOUGHT IT WOULD BE VERY DIFFICULT TO SECURE A COMPROMISE BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES. MOZAMBIQUE WOULD BE GUIDED BY ZANU, BUT WOULD IN CERTAIN CIRCUMSTANCES SEEK TO INFLUENCE THEM: THE FRONT LINE STATES HAD IN THE PAST PUT GREAT PRESSURE ON THE PF, FOR INSTANCE AT THE TIME OF THE GENEVA TALKS.

5. BOTH A PROPOS MOZAMBIQUE'S POLICY AND THE OAU, HE SAID THAT HARSH WORDS DID NOT MEAN A REFUSAL TO NEGOTIATE. WE SHOULD NOT BE TOO CONCERNED ABOUT OAU RESOLUTIONS CONDEMNING MUZOREWA AND SUPPORTING THE PF: HE DOUBTED IF THEY WOULD SPECIFICALLY RULE OUT NEGOTIATIONS WITH MUZOREWA, AND THOUGHT THAT A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT WOULD THEREAFTER STILL BE POSSIBLE, IF DIFFICULT TO ACHIEVE.

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Prime Minister

6/11

TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELNO 387 OF 3 JULY 1979
INFO IMMEDIATE TO LUSAKA
PRIORITY TO MIRIMBA SALISBURY.

YOUR TELNO 357 TO LUSAKA: RHODESIA

1. TINY ROWLAND HAS JUST BEEN IN NAIROBI ACCOMPANIED BY PAUL SPICER OF HIS LONDON OFFICE. SPICER HAS TOLD US THAT ROWLAND HAS GONE ON BY PRIVATE AIRCRAFT TO LUSAKA TO SEE PRESIDENT KAUNDA TODAY

FINGLAND

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FROM LAGOS 031100Z JULY

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 386 OF 3 JULY 1979.

RFI IMMEDIATE MIRIMBA SALISBURY (FOR LORD HARLECH).

PRIORITY DAR ES SALAAM, GABORONE, MAPUTO, LUANDA, LILONGWE,
WASHINGTON AND UKMIS NEW YORK.

2
Prime Minister
✓
6/21
4/7 8.00

RHODESIA.

1. I CALLED ON ADEFOPE, COMMISSIONER FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, AND WAS ACCOMPANIED BY US AMBASSADOR EASUM WHO HAD BEEN INSTRUCTED TO SUPPORT OUR DEMARCHE. OSABASE, DIRECTOR OF AFRICA DEPARTMENT, ATTENDED.
2. I PREFACED MY REMARKS BY SAYING THAT I WAS AUTHORISED TO GIVE THE COMMISSIONER AN ASSURANCE THAT PRIME MINISTER'S STATEMENT IN CANBERRA ON THE PROBABLE OUTCOME OF A PARLIAMENTARY VOTE ON RENEWAL OF SANCTIONS IN NOVEMBER DID NOT QUALIFY OR CONTRADICT WHAT I WAS ABOUT TO SAY. THE OBJECTIVE OF THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT REMAINED TO BRING RHODESIA TO LEGAL INDEPENDENCE AND TO LIFT SANCTIONS IN CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH WOULD SECURE WIDE INTERNATIONAL ACCEPTANCE.
3. I THEN SPOKE AS INSTRUCTED YOUR TELNO 350 OF 28 JUNE TO LUSAKA, STRESSING PARTICULARLY OUR INTENTION TO CONSULT NIGERIA AGAIN BEFORE ANY FURTHER STEPS ARE TAKEN AND ALSO OUR HOPE THAT NIGERIA WOULD PLAY A HELPFUL ROLE AT THE FORTHCOMING MEETING OF THE OAU.
4. ADEFOPE LISTENED ATTENTIVELY BUT RATHER GLOOMILY TO ALL THIS. HE SAID THAT WHAT WE WERE ASKING APPROXIMATED TO A REVERSAL OF THE OAU POSITION ON ZIMBABWE. IT WAS QUITE UNREALISTIC TO EXPECT NIGERIA TO PRESS FOR SUCH A REVERSAL WHEN EACH WEEK BROUGHT NEWS OF FRESH ATTACKS UNLEASHED BY MUZOREWA-SMITH'S ARMED FORCES AGAINST MOZAMBIQUE, ZAMBIA AND ANGOLA. I REPLIED THAT ON-ONE DEPLORED THE CONTINUATION OF THE WAR MORE THAN MY GOVERNMENT AND IT WAS PRECISELY TO REACH A SETTLEMENT THAT WOULD BRING ALSO A RETURN OF PEACE TO ZIMBABWE AND HER NEIGHBOURING COUNTRIES THAT WE WERE MAKING SUCH STRENUOUS DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS.

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/ 5. THE COMMISSIONER

5. THE COMMISSIONER SAID THAT THE RHODESIAN ATTACKS WERE ONE PROBLEM, BUT NOT THE ONLY ONE. THE RECENT ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE LIFTING OF BRITAIN'S EMBARGO ON OIL FOR SOUTH AFRICA (SEE PAR. 1 BELOW), THE REPEATED SPEECHES ABOUT THE NEED FOR RECOGNITION, THE PRIME MINISTER'S REMARKS ABOUT SANCTIONS IN CANBERRA: THE FAILURE OF THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT TO INITIATE ANY PROSECUTIONS AS A RESULT OF THE DISCLOSURES BY BINGHAM, THESE WERE EXAMPLES OF A STEADY STREAM OF STATEMENTS AND EVENTS WHICH MADE IT EXTREMELY DIFFICULT FOR NIGERIA TO SUPPORT BRITISH POLICY ON ZIMBABWE.

6. AMBASSADOR EASUM THEN SPOKE IN GENERAL SUPPORT OF OUR INITIATIVE. THE UNITED STATES SUPPORTED BRITAIN'S NEW MISSION TO SALISBURY AND THEY HELD THAT THE LEGAL RESPONSIBILITY OF BRINGING RHODESIA TO INDEPENDENCE WAS THAT OF BRITAIN ALONE. THE UNITED STATES ALSO SUPPORTED THE POSITION REPORTED BY LORD HARLECH THAT THE PRESENT CONSTITUTION OF ZIMBABWE WAS NOT ACCEPTABLE AS IT STANDS AND THAT IT WAS IMPORTANT TO BRING TOGETHER ALL THE PARTIES INVOLVED. THE UNITED STATES DID NOT BELIEVE THAT THE PRESENT MUZOREWA REGIME COULD COMMAND INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT. THERE MUST BE FURTHER EVOLUTION. HOWEVER, THE UNITED STATES HELD THE VIEW THAT WHATEVER THE INADEQUACIES OF THE RECENT ELECTIONS, THEY WERE A FACT AND HAD PRODUCED A GOVERNMENT WHICH COULD NOT BE IGNORED.

7. IN SUPPORTING MY REQUEST FOR A CONSTRUCTIVE ATTITUDE AT THE OAU, EASUM SAID THAT WE WERE NOT ASKING FOR THE REVERSAL OR REJECTION OF PREVIOUS OAU RESOLUTIONS. WE WERE ASKING THAT NIGERIA SHOULD NOT SUPPORT ANY RESOLUTIONS THAT SOUGHT TO CONVEY EXCLUSIVE LEGITIMACY ON ANY CLAIM BY THE PATRIOTIC FRONT TO REPRESENT THE PEOPLE OF RHODESIA.

8. EASUM SAID THAT THE UNITED STATES HAD NO POSITION ON ANY FUTURE MOVES BY THE BRITISH PARLIAMENT ON SANCTIONS. THEY DID NOT KNOW WHAT THE UNITED KINGDOM WOULD DO. THE POSITION OF THE UNITED STATES ON SANCTIONS HAD BEEN MADE PLAIN BY THE PRESIDENT. IT WAS WELL KNOWN THAT THE UNITED STATES HAD CERTAIN PROBLEMS WITH CONGRESS AND MANY CONGRESSMEN DID NOT UNDERSTAND RHODESIA. BUT IT WAS FOR THE PRESIDENT AND NOT CONGRESS TO MAKE FOREIGN POLICY. THE PRESIDENT HAD STOOD FIRM ON THE QUESTION OF SANCTIONS.

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9. THE COMMISSIONER RAISED THE QUESTION OF SMITH AND I SPOKE AS IN PARAGRAPH 7 YOU TEL NO 330. AMBASSADOR EASUM THOUGHT THAT WHEN MUZOREWA VISITED WASHINGTON NEXT WEEK HE WOULD BE TOLD CLEARLY THAT SMITH WAS A VERY COMPLICATING FACTOR IN THE PRESENT SITUATION, THAT SANCTIONS WOULD NOT BE LIFTED AND THAT ALL PARTIES MUST BE INVOLVED IN A SETTLEMENT.

10. COMMISSIONER ADEFOPE REMINDED ME THAT HE HAD SAID TO LORD HARLECH THAT A PUBLIC STATEMENT BY BRITAIN HELPFUL TO NIGERIA'S POINT OF VIEW WAS NEEDED IF NIGERIA WAS TO BE ABLE TO MAKE THE KIND OF CONTRIBUTION AT THE OAU WHICH BRITAIN WAS REQUESTING. AMBASSADOR OSABASE ASKED WHETHER IT WOULD NOT BE POSSIBLE FOR LORD HARLECH TO PERSUADE MUZOREWA TO MAKE A PUBLIC ADMISSION THAT HE ACCEPTED THAT FURTHER CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE WAS NEEDED. IF SUCH A STATEMENT COULD BE MADE BEFORE THE OAU MEETING TOOK PLACE - AND IT WOULD CONVEENE ON FRIDAY OF THIS WEEK - THEN THERE WAS A POSSIBILITY THAT NIGERIA MIGHT BE ABLE TO MAKE USE OF SUCH A STATEMENT. I AGREED THAT I WOULD PASS THIS REQUEST ON TO YOU, WHO MIGHT BE ABLE TO INFORM LORD HARLECH OF IT WHILST HE WAS IN SALISBURY. AMBASSADOR EASUM WOULD PASS ON THE REQUEST TO WASHINGTON AND WASHINGTON WOULD EXPLORE POSSIBILITY OF MAKING A HELPFUL STATEMENT AT THE CONCLUSION OF MUZOREWA'S VISIT THERE.

11. I EXPLAINED TO THE COMMISSIONER THE POSITION REGARDING THE RESTRICTIONS PLACED ON THE EXPORT OF NORTH SEA OIL AND THE SWAP ARRANGEMENT RECENTLY APPROVED FOR BP ALONG THE LINES OF YOU TEL NO 330 OF 2 JULY. THE POSITION HAD BEEN MISUNDERSTOOD AND INACCURATELY DESCRIBED IN THE NIGERIAN PRESS. I PROMISED TO LET THE COMMISSIONER HAVE A NOTE IN WRITING EXPLAINING THE DETAILS.

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

2 July 1979

Dear Bryan,

Rhodesia

*b.a
6/11
47*

In paragraph 3 of Singapore telegram number 225, the Prime Minister asked for advice on a proposed parliamentary reply about Rhodesia and the renewal of sanctions.

The Lord Privy Seal and Lord Harlech recommend that the Prime Minister might reply on the lines of the attached draft and supplementaries; i.e. that the probability that sanctions will not be renewed in November is a parliamentary fact; but the Government will be pursuing with determination its efforts to achieve a solution involving wide international acceptance.

President Nyerere has asked about the Prime Minister's reply to questions in Canberra (Dar-es-Salaam telno 510 - copy enclosed). We propose to instruct our High Commissioner in Dar-es-Salaam on the lines set out in paragraph 2 above. The Prime Minister will wish to be aware that the Foreign Ministers of the Organisation for African Unity will be meeting in Monrovia from 5-13 July and the Heads of State will be meeting from 16-19 July. We have been taking steps to seek to reduce the danger that they will commit themselves to specific actions against the United Kingdom in the event of the non-renewal of sanctions and the granting of legal independence to Rhodesia.

It is also important to our bargaining position in Salisbury, in relation for instance to constitutional change, that we should make clear - as the Prime Minister did in reply to questions in Canberra - that the granting of legal independence to Rhodesia depends on a positive judgement by Her Majesty's Government on the basis of which independence is granted.

I enclose additional supplementaries on questions which may arise over the relationship between the non-renewal of sanctions and our treaty obligations; and the fact that what is at issue in the case of Rhodesia is not recognition but the granting of legal independence.

I am sending a copy of this letter with the enclosures to Martin Vile (Cabinet Office).

Yours etc

Paul
(P Lever)

Private Secretary

B G Cartledge Esq
10 Downing Street
LONDON

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[RHODESIA: POLICY: ADVANCE COPIES]

FLASH

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PS/SIR I. GILFLOUR
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HD/WAD

MR FREELAND LEGAL ADVISER RM K200A

MR STEEL LEGAL ADVISER RM K176

~~RESIDENT OFFICE~~

SIR C ROSE
MR P. M. MAXEY
COL MOIR
MR P. J. FOWLER
DIO
} CABINET
} OFFICE

~~FOR ZIMBABWE DEVELOPMENTS UNIT
ADD MR LYNCH CDM
MR SLATER TREASURY~~

GR 623

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FM SINGAPORE 020217Z JUL 79

TO FLASH FCO

TELNO 225 OF 2 JULY

FROM HUNT

PRIME MINISTER'S PRESS CONFERENCE IN CANBERRA ON 1 JULY: RHODESIA.

1. FOLLOWING IS FULL TRANSCRIPT OF PRIME MINISTER'S REPLY TO A QUESTION ABOUT RHODESIA AND SUPERCEDES SECOND PARA OF LAST NIGHT'S TELEGRAM FROM CANBERRA.

2. QUOTE QUESTION. PRIME MINISTER, WHAT IS THE TIMETABLE FOR THE RECOGNITION OF MUZOREWA'S REGIME? AND WAS IT REALLY NECESSARY AS REPORTED IN SOME SECTIONS OF THE AUSTRALIAN MEDIA THIS MORNING FOR OUR PRIME MINISTER, MR FRASER, TO ATTEMPT TO PERSUADE YOU NOT TO BE TOO HASTY IN REACHING YOUR DECISION? UNQUOTE.

THE PRIME MINISTER ANSWERED: QUOTE. THERE IS NOT A STRICT TIMETABLE ON RECOGNITION OF RHODESIA. WE ARE CLEARLY ANXIOUS TO TAKE AS MANY NATIONS WITH US AS POSSIBLE. I THINK MOST NATIONS REALISE THAT SOMETHING DIFFERENT HAS HAPPENED IN RHODESIA WITH THE HOLDING OF THESE ELECTIONS. THERE WERE ELECTIONS IN WHICH THERE WAS ONE PERSON

THESE ELECTIONS. THERE WERE ELECTIONS IN WHICH THERE WAS ONE PERSON ONE VOTE FOR FOUR DIFFERENT POLITICAL PARTIES AND IN WHICH 65 PER CENT OF THE PEOPLE TURNED OUT TO VOTE. NOW THAT IS QUITE GOOD IN ANY NATION ANYWHERE IN THE WORLD. IT IS PARTICULARLY GOOD IN A NATION IN AFRICA. NOW A NUMBER OF PEOPLE ARE BEING SLIGHTLY CRITICAL OF THE CONSTITUTION. MOST PEOPLE REALISE THAT THE HOLDING OF THESE ELECTIONS AND THEIR SUCCESS AND THE TURNOUT WERE IN FACT AN EVENT WHICH NO ONE CAN IGNORE, AND THAT SOMETHING VERY DIFFERENT HAS HAPPENED IN RHODESIA. NOW THAT IS THE BASIS ON WHICH TO BUILD.

SOME PEOPLE ARE BEING CRITICAL OF THE CONSTITUTION. EVERYONE ACCEPTS THERE IS A MAJORITY OF BLACK AFRICANS IN THE RHODESIAN PARLIAMENT AND THAT WE HAVE A BLACK PRIME MINISTER AND THAT THEREFORE THERE IS A BLACK MAJORITY GOVERNMENT. A NUMBER OF PEOPLE WOULD HOLD THAT PERHAPS THERE ARE TOO MANY WHITE PEOPLE IN POSITIONS WITHIN THAT PARLIAMENT AND WILL OBJECT TO THERE BEING PERHAPS 28 OUT OF A HUNDRED. THAT IS WHAT I HAVE HEARD ^{AS} SOME PEOPLE SAY.

NO ONE QUESTIONS THAT THERE IS A MAJORITY OF BLACK RHODESIANS IN PARLIAMENT, A MAJORITY OF BLACK MINISTERS IN THE CABINET AND A BLACK PRIME MINISTER. NOW STARTING FROM THAT BASIS IT MEANS THAT THERE IS A POSSIBILITY OF GETTING SOME AGREEMENT ON GOING FORWARD.

I WOULD SAY THIS VERY VERY FIRMLY. UNFORTUNATELY, THERE IS STILL TERRORISM OPERATING. WE MUST MAKE CERTAIN THAT THE BULLET DOES NOT BEAT THE BALLOT AND THAT THEREFORE THOSE PEOPLE WHO ARE STILL OPERATING TERRORISM DO NOT HAVE A VETO OVER ANY CONSTITUTION WHATSOEVER. THAT ULTIMATELY WHAT WE GET IN RHODESIA MUST BE WHAT THE PEOPLE OF RHODESIA THEMSELVES WANT. NOW IT IS IN THAT SPIRIT THAT WE ARE TRYING TO CONSULT WITH ALL OUR COMMONWEALTH PARTNERS AND SOME OUTSIDE THE COMMONWEALTH AND OF COURSE WITH AMERICA ON THE BEST WAY OF GOING FORWARD.

NOW THERE IS NOT A STRICT TIMETABLE FOR RECOGNITION. AS YOU KNOW PRESIDENT CARTER HAS SOME PROBLEMS OVER THE RESOLUTIONS ON SANCTIONS AND BRITISH SANCTIONS WOULD LAPSE IN NOVEMBER AND WE DOUBT VERY MUCH WHETHER A RENEWAL OF SANCTIONS WOULD GO THROUGH THE BRITISH PARLIAMENT. THAT GOES FOR SANCTIONS. RECOGNITION IS A SLIGHTLY WIDER PROBLEM AND COULD TAKE JUST A LITTLE BIT LONGER. UNQUOTE.

3. IN ANSWER TO QUESTIONS IN THE HOUSE, THE PRIME MINISTER DOES NOW WISH TO TAKE A DEFENSIVE LINE. SHE IS CONSIDERING RESPONDING TO QUESTIONS ABOUT THE RENEWAL OF SANCTIONS ON THE FOLLOWING LINES:

THE SITUATION WE NOW HAVE IN RHODESIA IS THAT 65.

QUOTE. THE SITUATION WE NOW HAVE IN RHODESIA IS THAT 65 PER CENT OF THE ADULT POPULATION HAVE VOTED, ON THE BASIS OF ONE PERSON, ONE VOTE, AND CHOOSING BETWEEN FOUR POLITICAL PARTIES, FOR A BLACK PRIME MINISTER, A PREDOMINANTLY BLACK GOVERNMENT AND A PREDOMINANTLY BLACK PARLIAMENT. WE HAVE THEREFORE A DIFFERENT SITUATION THAT CANNOT BE IGNORED. IT MAY BE THAT SOME FURTHER CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE WILL BE CONSIDERED BEFORE RECOGNITION AND HMG WILL BE CONSULTING FULLY ALL THOSE CONCERNED. NO DECISION HAS BEEN TAKEN YET, BUT ON THE BASIS OF THE PRESENT SITUATION I DOUBT WHETHER PARLIAMENT WOULD APPROVE THE RENEWAL OF SANCTIONS WHEN THEY FALL DUE FOR RENEWAL IN NOVEMBER. UNQUOTE.

4. GRATEFUL IF THIS LINE AND POSSIBLE SUPPLEMENTARY ANSWERS COULD BE CONSIDERED URGENTLY.

HENNINGS

[This ltr has been passed to Delhi]

NNNN

[R.C has received a copy]

DRAFT PARLIAMENTARY REPLY

"The situation we now have in Rhodesia is that 65% of the adult population have voted, on the basis of one person, one vote, and choosing between four political parties, for a black Prime Minister, a predominantly black government and a predominantly black Parliament. There is therefore a different situation on which we must seek to build. There has been criticism of the Constitution; and it remains to be seen if progress can be made towards ending the war. Our objective is to try to bring about conditions in which legal independence can be granted to Rhodesia with wide international acceptance."

DESKBY 021200Z
[RHODESIA: POLICY: ADVANCE COPIES]

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~~MR WILLIAMS~~
MR WILLIAMS

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MR P.H. MAXEY
COL MOIR
MR P J FOWLER
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MR FREELAND LEGAL ADVISER RM K200A
MR STEEL LEGAL ADVISER RM K176
RESIDENT CLERK

FOR ZIMBABWE DEVELOPMENTS DT
ADD MR LYNCH ODM
MR SLATER TREASURY

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DESKBY FCO 021200Z

FM DAR ES SALAAM 020900Z JULY 79
TO IMMEDIATE FCO

ADVANCE COPY

TELNO 510 OF 2 JULY

INFO IMMEDIATE LAGOS, GABORONE, MAPUTO, LUSAKAJUULUANDA,
MIRIMBA SALISBURY, LILONGWE, CANBERRA
PRIORITY WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK, PRETORIA

RHODESIA

1. ON THE INSTRUCTIONS OF PRESIDENT NYERERE, WHO IS IN MWANZAN UNTIL TOMORROW, MISS WICKEN ASKED TO SEE ME THIS MORNING. SHE SAID THAT THE PRESIDENT HAD HEARD WITH DEEP CONCERN THE REPORT OF A STATEMENT MADE BY THE PRIME MINISTER IN CANBERRA TO THE EFFECT THAT THE BRITISH PARLIAMENT WOULD NOT RENEW SANCTIONS AGAINST RHODESIA WHEN THEY LAPSED IN NOVEMBER. IT APPEARED FROM THE REPORTS THAT MRS THATCHER WAS MAKING A DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE REMOVAL OF SANCTIONS AND RECOGNITION OF THE GOVERNMENT OF BISHOP MUZOREWA. SO FAR AS THEY WERE CONCERNED THERE WAS NO DISTINCTION. (WITH PARA 4 OF MY TELNO 398 IN MIND, I REMARKED THAT THE PRESIDENT HAD PREVIOUSLY PUT THE POINT TO ME RATHER LESS CATEGORICALLY, THOUGH HIS BROAD SENSE WAS THE SAME). MISS WICKEN WENT ON THAT PRESIDENT NYERERE FELT THAT AS REPORTED MRS THATCHER'S STATEMENT WAS INCOMPATIBLE WITH WHAT LORD HARLECH HAD SAID TO HIM ABOUT THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT NOT YET HAVING TAKEN ITS DECISIONS. IF IN FACT WE HAD DECIDED TO REMOVE SANCTIONS IN NOVEMBER "WHAT WAS THE POINT OF THEIR COMING TO LUSAKA FOR THE CHOICE". MISS WICKEN ENDED

WE HAD DECIDED TO REMOVE SANCTIONS IN NOVEMBER "WHAT WAS THE POINT OF THEIR GOING TO LUSAKA FOR THE CHOGM". MISS WICKEN ENDED BY SAYING THAT SHE EXPECTED THE PRESIDENT TO ASK TO SEE ME ON HIS RETURN FROM MWANZA.

2. I ASKED MISS WICKEN TO CLARIFY WHAT SHE HAD SAID ABOUT GOING TO LUSAKA AND SHE REPEATED THAT WHILE THEY RECOGNISED THAT RHODESIA WAS ONLY ONE ITEM ON THE AGENDA OF CHOGM IT WAS SO IMPORTANT FOR THEM THAT IT WOULD NOT BE UNDERSTOOD IF THEY WERE TO ATTEND IN THE AFTERMATH OF A DECISION BY THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT TO LIFT SANCTIONS.

3. I SAID THAT THE REPORT I HAD HEARD OF THE PRIME MINISTER'S STATEMENT (AND I HAD NOT YET ANY INFORMATION ABOUT ITS ACCURACY) HAD SOUNDED MORE LIKE A POLITICAL PREDICTION ABOUT VIEWS IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS THAN A STATEMENT OF POLICY. MISS WICKEN SAID THAT THIS DID NOT HELP. SUCH A PREDICTION COMING FROM THE PRIME MINISTER HAD THE SAME EFFECT AS A STATEMENT OF POLICY. I DEMURRED AND WENT OVER AGAIN WITH MISS WICKEN ALL THE POINTS IN YOUR TELNO 350 TO LUSAKA WHICH MADE CLEAR THAT WE HAD NOT YET REACHED ANY FIRM CONCLUSIONS. MISS WICKEN WAS NOT MUCH CONVINCED AND ARGUED THAT EVEN IF THE DIFFICULTY OF REVOTING SANCTIONS IN PARLIAMENT IN NOVEMBER HAD TO BE ADMITTED, THE PRIME MINISTER SHOULD AT THE SAME TIME HAVE MADE CLEAR THAT THE GOVERNMENT HAD STILL NOT DECIDED WHAT IT WAS GOING TO DO OR TRY TO DO.

4. I SHOULD BE GRATEFUL FOR GUIDANCE ON WHAT I SHOULD SAY TO PRESIDENT NYERERE WHEN SUMMONED TO REACH ME NOT LATER THAN 0800Z TOMORROW 3 JULY.

MOON

NNNN

SUPPLEMENTARIES

1. If asked about the renewal of sanctions in November:
"I pointed out in Canberra the parliamentary fact that it is doubtful whether a renewal of sanctions would be approved by the British Parliament. Our objective is to bring about a situation in which legal independence can be granted and sanctions lifted with wide international acceptance."

2. Would not the non-renewal of sanctions put us in breach of our obligations under the United Nations Charter?

What we are aiming for is a solution which would enable us to grant legal independence to Rhodesia and lift sanctions in a context of wide international acceptance.

[As necessary] The renewal of sanctions under Section 2 of the Southern Rhodesia Act (1965) requires an affirmative vote in both Houses of Parliament.

3. Why has Britain not yet recognised Bishop Muzorewa's government?

In the case of Rhodesia, the question is not one of recognition but of the granting of legal independence, for which Britain has a constitutional responsibility. Our intention is to bring Rhodesia to independence with the widest possible international acceptance.

- 2 JUL 1979



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FM SINGAPORE 020217Z JUL 79

TO FLASH FCO

TELNO 225 OF 2 JULY

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by
JH*

FROM HUNT

PRIME MINISTER'S PRESS CONFERENCE IN CANBERRA ON 1 JULY: RHODESIA.

1. FOLLOWING IS FULL TRANSCRIPT OF PRIME MINISTER'S REPLY TO A QUESTION ABOUT RHODESIA AND SUPERCEDES SECOND PARA OF LAST NIGHT'S TELEGRAM FROM CANBERRA.

2. QUOTE QUESTION, PRIME MINISTER, WHAT IS THE TIMETABLE FOR THE RECOGNITION OF MUZOREWA'S REGIME? AND WAS IT REALLY NECESSARY AS REPORTED IN SOME SECTIONS OF THE AUSTRALIAN MEDIA THIS MORNING FOR OUR PRIME MINISTER, MR FRASER, TO ATTEMPT TO PERSUADE YOU NOT TO BE TOO HASTY IN REACHING YOUR DECISION? UNQUOTE.

THE PRIME MINISTER ANSWERED: QUOTE. THERE IS NOT A STRICT TIMETABLE ON RECOGNITION OF RHODESIA. WE ARE CLEARLY ANXIOUS TO TAKE AS MANY NATIONS WITH US AS POSSIBLE. I THINK MOST NATIONS REALISE THAT SOMETHING DIFFERENT HAS HAPPENED IN RHODESIA WITH THE HOLDING OF THESE ELECTIONS. THERE WERE ELECTIONS IN WHICH THERE WAS ONE PERSON ONE VOTE FOR FOUR DIFFERENT POLITICAL PARTIES AND IN WHICH 65 PER CENT OF THE PEOPLE TURNED OUT TO VOTE. NOW THAT IS QUITE GOOD IN ANY NATION ANYWHERE IN THE WORLD. IT IS PARTICULARLY GOOD IN A NATION IN AFRICA. NOW A NUMBER OF PEOPLE ARE BEING SLIGHTLY CRITICAL OF THE CONSTITUTION. MOST PEOPLE REALISE THAT THE HOLDING OF THESE ELECTIONS AND THEIR SUCCESS AND THE TURNOUT WERE IN FACT AN EVENT WHICH NO ONE CAN IGNORE. AND THAT SOMETHING VERY DIFFERENT HAS HAPPENED IN RHODESIA. NOW THAT IS THE BASIS ON WHICH TO BUILD.

SOME PEOPLE ARE BEING CRITICAL OF THE CONSTITUTION. EVERYONE ACCEPTS THERE IS A MAJORITY OF BLACK AFRICANS IN THE RHODESIAN PARLIAMENT AND THAT WE HAVE A BLACK PRIME MINISTER AND THAT THEREFORE THERE IS A BLACK MAJORITY GOVERNMENT. A NUMBER OF PEOPLE WOULD HOLD THAT PERHAPS THERE ARE TOO MANY WHITE PEOPLE IN POSITIONS WITHIN THAT PARLIAMENT AND WILL OBJECT TO THERE BEING PERHAPS 28 OUT OF A HUNDRED. THAT IS WHAT I HAVE HEARD SOME PEOPLE SAY.

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NO ONE QUESTIONS THAT THERE IS A MAJORITY OF BLACK RHODESIANS IN PARLIAMENT, A MAJORITY OF BLACK MINISTERS IN THE CABINET AND A BLACK PRIME MINISTER. NOW STARTING FROM THAT BASIS IT MEANS THAT THERE IS A POSSIBILITY OF GETTING SOME AGREEMENT ON GOING FORWARD.

I WOULD SAY THIS VERY VERY FIRMLY. UNFORTUNATELY, THERE IS STILL TERRORISM OPERATING. WE MUST MAKE CERTAIN THAT THE BULLET DOES NOT BEAT THE BALLOT AND THAT THEREFORE THOSE PEOPLE WHO ARE STILL OPERATING TERRORISM DO NOT HAVE A VETO OVER ANY CONSTITUTION WHATSOEVER. THAT ULTIMATELY WHAT WE GET IN RHODESIA MUST BE WHAT THE PEOPLE OF RHODESIA THEMSELVES WANT. NOW IT IS IN THAT SPIRIT THAT WE ARE TRYING TO CONSULT WITH ALL OUR COMMONWEALTH PARTNERS AND SOME OUTSIDE THE COMMONWEALTH AND OF COURSE WITH AMERICA ON THE BEST WAY OF GOING FORWARD.

NOW THERE IS NOT A STRICT TIMETABLE FOR RECOGNITION. AS YOU KNOW PRESIDENT CARTER HAS SOME PROBLEMS OVER THE RESOLUTIONS ON SANCTIONS AND BRITISH SANCTIONS WOULD LAPSE IN NOVEMBER AND WE DOUBT VERY MUCH WHETHER A RENEWAL OF SANCTIONS WOULD GO THROUGH THE BRITISH PARLIAMENT. THAT GOES FOR SANCTIONS. RECOGNITION IS A SLIGHTLY WIDER PROBLEM AND COULD TAKE JUST A LITTLE BIT LONGER. UNQUOTE.

3. IN ANSWER TO QUESTIONS IN THE HOUSE, THE PRIME MINISTER DOES NOW WISH TO TAKE A DEFENSIVE LINE. SHE IS CONSIDERING RESPONDING TO QUESTIONS ABOUT THE RENEWAL OF SANCTIONS ON THE FOLLOWING LINES:

QUOTE. THE SITUATION WE NOW HAVE IN RHODESIA IS THAT 65 PER CENT OF THE ADULT POPULATION HAVE VOTED, ON THE BASIS OF ONE PERSON, ONE VOTE, AND CHOOSING BETWEEN FOUR POLITICAL PARTIES, FOR A BLACK PRIME MINISTER, A PREDOMINANTLY BLACK GOVERNMENT AND A PREDOMINANTLY BLACK PARLIAMENT. WE HAVE THEREFORE A DIFFERENT SITUATION THAT CANNOT BE IGNORED. IT MAY BE THAT SOME FURTHER CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE WILL BE CONSIDERED BEFORE RECOGNITION AND HMG WILL BE CONSULTING FULLY ALL THOSE CONCERNED. NO DECISION

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HAS BEEN TAKEN YET, BUT ON THE BASIS OF THE PRESENT SITUATION I DOUBT WHETHER PARLIAMENT WOULD APPROVE THE RENEWAL OF SANCTIONS WHEN THEY FALL DUE FOR RENEWAL IN NOVEMBER. UNQUOTE.

4. GRATEFUL IF THIS LINE AND POSSIBLE SUPPLEMENTARY ANSWERS COULD BE CONSIDERED URGENTLY.

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(MR FREELAND)
(MR STEEL)
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PS/SIR I GILMOUR
PS/MR LUCE
PS/MR RIDLEY
PS/MR HURD
PS/PUS
SIR A DUFF
SIR A PARSONS
MISS BROWN
MR THOMAS
MR WILLSON
MR WILLIAMS

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION

RHODESIA POLICY
SA/RHO/UN

CONFIDENTIAL

GR 156

CONFIDENTIAL

DESKBY FCO 021200Z

FM DAR ES SALAAM 020900Z JULY 79

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 510 OF 2 JULY

INFO IMMEDIATE LAGOS, GABORONE, MAPUTO, LUSAKAJUULUANDA,
MIRIMBA SALISBURY, LILONGWE, CANBERRA
PRIORITY WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK, PRETORIA

*Ende me
2/1*

RHODESIA

1. ON THE INSTRUCTIONS OF PRESIDENT NYERERE, WHO IS IN MWANZA UNTIL TOMORROW, MISS WICKEN ASKED TO SEE ME THIS MORNING. SHE SAID THAT THE PRESIDENT HAD HEARD WITH DEEP CONCERN THE REPORT OF A STATEMENT MADE BY THE PRIME MINISTER IN CANBERRA TO THE EFFECT THAT THE BRITISH PARLIAMENT WOULD NOT RENEW SANCTIONS AGAINST RHODESIA WHEN THEY LAPSED IN NOVEMBER. IT APPEARED FROM THE REPORTS THAT MRS THATCHER WAS MAKING A DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE REMOVAL OF SANCTIONS AND RECOGNITION OF THE GOVERNMENT OF BISHOP MUZOREWA. SO FAR AS THEY WERE CONCERNED THERE WAS NO DISTINCTION. (WITH PARA 4 OF MY TELNO 398 IN MIND, I REMARKED THAT THE PRESIDENT HAD PREVIOUSLY PUT THE POINT TO ME RATHER LESS CATEGORICALLY, THOUGH HIS BROAD SENSE WAS THE SAME). MISS WICKEN WENT ON THAT PRESIDENT NYERERE FELT THAT AS REPORTED MRS THATCHER'S STATEMENT WAS INCOMPATIBLE WITH WHAT LORD HARLECH HAD SAID TO HIM ABOUT THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT NOT YET HAVING TAKEN ITS DECISIONS. IF IN FACT WE HAD DECIDED TO REMOVE SANCTIONS IN NOVEMBER "WHAT WAS THE POINT OF THEIR GOING TO LUSAKA FOR THE CHOGM?". MISS WICKEN ENDED BY SAYING THAT SHE EXPECTED THE PRESIDENT TO ASK TO SEE ME ON HIS RETURN FROM MWANZA.
2. I ASKED MISS WICKEN TO CLARIFY WHAT SHE HAD SAID ABOUT GOING TO LUSAKA AND SHE REPEATED THAT WHILE THEY RECOGNISED THAT RHODESIA WAS ONLY ONE ITEM ON THE AGENDA OF CHOGM IT WAS SO IMPORTANT FOR THEM THAT IT WOULD NOT BE UNDERSTOOD IF THEY WERE TO ATTEND IN THE AFTERMATH OF A DECISION BY THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT TO LIFT SANCTIONS.
3. I SAID THAT THE REPORT I HAD HEARD OF THE PRIME MINISTER'S STATEMENT (AND I HAD NOT YET ANY INFORMATION ABOUT ITS ACCURACY)

/HAD

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HAD SOUNDED MORE LIKE A POLITICAL PREDICTION ABOUT VIEWS IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS THAN A STATEMENT OF POLICY. MISS WICKEN SAID THAT THIS DID NOT HELP. SUCH A PREDICTION COMING FROM THE PRIME MINISTER HAD THE SAME EFFECT AS A STATEMENT OF POLICY. I DEMURRED AND WENT OVER AGAIN WITH MISS WICKEN ALL THE POINTS IN YOUR TELNO 350 TO LUSAKA WHICH MADE CLEAR THAT WE HAD NOT YET REACHED ANY FIRM CONCLUSIONS. MISS WICKEN WAS NOT MUCH CONVINCED AND ARGUED THAT EVEN IF THE DIFFICULTY OF REVOTING SANCTIONS IN PARLIAMENT IN NOVEMBER HAD TO BE ADMITTED, THE PRIME MINISTER SHOULD AT THE SAME TIME HAVE MADE CLEAR THAT THE GOVERNMENT HAD STILL NOT DECIDED WHAT IT WAS GOING TO DO OR TRY TO DO.

4. I SHOULD BE GRATEFUL FOR GUIDANCE ON WHAT I SHOULD SAY TO PRESIDENT NYERERE WHEN SUMMONED TO REACH ME NOT LATER THAN 0800Z TOMORROW 3 JULY.

MOON

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LEGAL ADVISERS
(MR FREELAND)
(MR STEEL)
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PS/MR LUCE
PS/MR RIDLEY
PS/MR HURD
PS/PUS
SIR A DUFF
SIR A PARSONS
MISS BROWN
MR THOMAS
MR WILSON
MR WILLIAMS

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION RHODESIA POLICY

2
CONFIDENTIAL

GRS 1600

UNCLASSIFIED

1 CANBERRA 020740Z JUL 79

TO FLASH FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 369 OF 02 JULY 1979

MY TELNO 365 AND YOUR TELNO 293

Re Rhodesia Sit (142)

*Info via
GWS
5/7*

1. FOLLOWING IS VERBATIM TRANSCRIPT OF THAT SECTION OF THE PRIME MINISTER'S SPEECH TO PRESS CLUB ON 1 JULY DEALING WITH RHODESIA:

QUOTE..... NOW IN THE FIELD OF OVERSEAS POLICY OF COURSE AUSTRALIA AND BRITAIN SHARE MEMBERSHIP OF THE BRITISH COMMONWEALTH. LET US NOT UNDER-ESTIMATE THE INFLUENCE WHICH THAT COMMONWEALTH TOO CAN HAVE ON WORLD AFFAIRS, AND I WANT TO PAY TRIBUTE TO MR FRASER'S INITIATIVE IN CALLING THE FIRST COMMONWEALTH REGIONAL CONFERENCE IN SYDNEY LAST YEAR. I WELCOME THE SUCCESSOR CONFERENCE PLANNED IN NEW DELHI IN 1980. BOTH OF US SEE THE COMMONWEALTH AS A UNIQUE BRIDGE, THE KIND OF BRIDGE THAT SPANS SO MANY OF THE CHASMS THAT NORMALLY DIVIDE THE WORLD - DIVISIONS OF COLOUR, CREED, CLIMATE, RELIGION, ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY.

ONE REGIONAL CONCERN THAT WE SHARE IS OUR COMMON INDIGNATION AND DISTRESS AT THE PROBLEM TO WHICH I HAVE REFERRED - THE TRAGIC PROBLEM OF REFUGEES IN THIS PART OF THE WORLD. WE ARE CONCERNED BY ITS CAUSE, TO WHICH I HAVE JUST REFERRED, AND WE ARE CONCERNED IN ITS CURE, AND WE ARE APPALLED BY THE SUFFERINGS OF THE THOUSANDS OF REFUGEES WHO HAVE BEEN CAST ADRIFT IN SOUTH EAST ASIA. WE OF COURSE HAVE A SPECIAL ANXIETY, FOR THE POSITION OF HONG KONG ON WHOM AN EXTRA AND UTTERLY DISPORPORTIONATE BURDEN HAS BEEN PLACED BUT SEEMS ABLE, IN THE SPIRIT OF THE FREE WORLD, TO RISE TO ALMOST ANY PROBLEM AND WILL NOT BE BEATEN IN TACKLING ANY PROBLEM. THIS IS PARTLY THE CAUSE OF OUR INITIATIVE IN PROPOSING A CONFERENCE UNDER UNITED NATIONS AUSPICES, A CALL WHICH HAS NOW MET WITH A RESPONSE.

NOW NEXT MONTH, COMMONWEALTH HEADS OF GOVERNMENT MEET IN LUSAKA AND THAT'S GOING TO BE AN IMPORTANT AND CHALLENGING MEETING AND I SHALL BE VERY SURPRISED IF THERE AREN'T SOME QUESTIONS TO ME ABOUT IT IN A MOMENT OR TWO. WE HAVE A POSITIVE APPROACH TO THE DIFFICULT PROBLEMS ON THE LUSAKA AGENDA. BRITAIN'S PARTICULAR CONCERN IS TO BRING PEACE AND STABILITY TO AFRICA, BUT ALSO TO KEEP DEMOCRACY IN AFRICA. THIS IS ONE OF OUR MAJOR PRIORITIES IN THE FIELD OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND

/ OF COURSE

OF COURSE SOUTHERN AFRICA PRESENTS TWO PARTICULARLY DIFFICULT PROBLEMS. ON NAMIBIA WE ARE WORKING WITH OTHER WESTERN COUNTRIES TO REACH EARLY AGREEMENT ON THE 5-POWER PLAN FOR UN-SUPERVISED ELECTIONS AND THE OTHER PROBLEM, OF COURSE, IS THE FUTURE OF RHODESIA. THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT IS DETERMINED TO BRING THE COUNTRY BACK TO LEGALITY WITH THE WIDEST POSSIBLE INTERNATIONAL RECOGNITION. WE ALSO INTEND TO DO EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO END THE WAR, WHICH IS CAUSING SUCH TERRIBLE SUFFERING IN RHODESIA ITSELF AND IN NEIGHBOURING COUNTRIES. NO WAY OF ACHIEVING THOSE AIMS IS EXCLUDED. NOW, AS YOU KNOW, IN TRYING TO ACHIEVE THOSE AIMS, WE HAVE EMBARKED ON A VERY INTENSIVE PROGRAMME OF CONSULTATIONS. LORD HARLECH WENT OUT TO SEE A NUMBER OF THE BORDERING AFRICAN COUNTRIES, BOTSWANA, ANGOLA, TANZANIA, ZAMBIA AND ALSO HE WENT TO MALAWI AND TO NIGERIA TO CONSULT WITH THEM. HE HAS RECENTLY RETURNED AND LET US HAVE HIS REPORT. TOMORROW HE IS GOING TO SEE BISHOP MUZOREWA AND BISHOP MUZOREWA IN TURN WILL THEN BE GOING TO THE UNITED STATES AT THE END OF THE WEEK AND COMING TO BRITAIN TO SEE US THE FOLLOWING WEEK. ALL OF THIS BECAUSE WE ARE ANXIOUS TO TAKE AS MANY NATIONS FORWARD AS POSSIBLE WITH US IN TRYING TO FIND A PEACEFUL SOLUTION WHICH GIVES DEMOCRACY TO RHODESIA, SO THERE IS A GOOD DEAL OF ACTIVITY GOING ON DESIGNED TO ACHIEVE THAT END.

THERE WILL BE FURTHER CONSULTATIONS AT THE HEADS OF GOVERNMENT MEETING IN LUSAKA - AND THAT WILL NOT BE THE END OF THE PROCESS. WE ARE TAKING FULL ACCOUNT OF THE VIEWS OF OUR FRIENDS AND PARTNERS IN THE COMMONWEALTH AND OUTSIDE. BUT OUR FIRST RESPONSIBILITY MUST BE TO THE PEOPLE OF RHODESIA - IT IS THEIR FUTURE WHICH IS AT STAKE, AND DEMOCRACY IS ABOUT WHAT THE PEOPLE INSIDE THE COUNTRY WANT TO BE THE FUTURE OF THEIR OWN GOVERNMENT. UNQUOTE

2. RHODESIA AND LUSAKA CHOGM WERE ALSO COVERED IN QUESTIONS:

IN ANSWER TO A QUESTION ABOUT THE QUEEN'S SAFETY AT LUSAKA:

"..... TOO LATE TO SWITCH THE VENUE OF THE COMMONWEALTH PRIME MINISTERS' CONFERENCE. THE DECISION ON HOW TO ADVISE HER MAJESTY OF COURSE RESTS WITH THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT, AND AS FAR AS ATTENDING THE COMMONWEALTH PRIME MINISTERS' CONFERENCE, IN CONSULTATION WITH THE PRIME MINISTERS IN THE COMMONWEALTH. AS FAR AS LEAVING BRITAIN IS CONCERNED, FOR STATE VISITS TO OTHER AFRICAN COUNTRIES WHICH THE QUEEN IS MAKING BEFORE SHE GOES TO LUSAKA, THEN IT DOES REST WITH US.

OBVIOUSLY THE SAFETY OF THE QUEEN IS OF PARAMOUNT IMPORTANCE, AND MAY MAKE IT PERFECTLY CLEAR THAT WE HOPE VERY MUCH THAT THE QUEEN WILL BE ABLE TO GO TO LUSAKA, AND WILL GO, TO ATTEND THE COMMONWEALTH PRIME MINISTERS CONFERENCE."

DOES BRITAIN HAVE A TIMETABLE FOR RECOGNITION, AND WAS IT NECESSARY FOR MR FRASER TO ATTEMPT TO PERSUADE YOU NOT TO BE TOO HASTY?

"..... I WASN'T AWARE THAT MEETINGS WERE BUGGED. (LAUGHTER). IF SO, PLEASE DO BETTER BUGGING, TO GET ACCURATE REPORTING. THERE ISN'T A STRICT TIMETABLE ON RECOGNITION OF RHODESIA. WE'RE VERY ANXIOUS TO TAKE AS MANY NATIONS WITH US AS POSSIBLE. I THINK MOST NATIONS REALIZE THAT SOMETHING DIFFERENT HAS HAPPENED IN RHODESIA WITH THE HOLDING OF THOSE ELECTIONS. THEY WERE ELECTIONS IN WHICH IT WAS ONE PERSON, ONE VOTE: FOR FOUR DIFFERENT POLITICAL PARTIES, AND IN WHICH 65 PER CENT OF THE PEOPLE TURNED OUT TO VOTE. NOW THAT'S QUITE GOOD IN ANY NATION: IF ANYWHERE IN THE WORLD, IT'S PARTICULARLY GOOD AT A NATION IN AFRICA. NOW A NUMBER OF PEOPLE HAVE BEEN SLIGHTLY CRITICAL OF THE CONSTITUTION, BUT MOST PEOPLE RECOGNISE THAT THE HOLDING OF THOSE ELECTIONS, AND THEIR SUCCESS, AND THE TURNOUT, WAS IN FACT AN EVENT WHICH NO ONE CAN IGNORE, AND SOMETHING VERY DIFFERENT HAS THEREFORE HAPPENED IN RHODESIA. NOW THAT IS THE BASIS ON WHICH TO BUILD: SOME PEOPLE HAVE BEEN CRITICAL OF THE CONSTITUTION: EVERYONE ACCEPTS THAT ^{THERE} IS A MAJORITY OF BLACK AFRICANS IN THE RHODESIAN PARLIAMENT, AND THAT WE HAVE A BLACK PRIME MINISTER, AND THAT THEREFORE THERE IS A BLACK MAJORITY GOVERNMENT. A NUMBER OF PEOPLE WOULD HOLD THAT PERHAPS THERE ARE ONE OR TWO TOO MANY WHITE PEOPLE IN POSITIONS WITHIN THAT PARLIAMENT, AND WOULD OBJECT TO THERE BEING PERHAPS 28 OUT OF 100; THAT IS WHAT I'VE HEARD SOME PEOPLE SAY. NO ONE QUESTIONS THAT THERE IS A MAJORITY OF BLACK RHODESIANS IN THE PARLIAMENT, A MAJORITY OF BLACK MINISTERS IN THE CABINET, AND A BLACK PRIME MINISTER. NOW STARTING FROM THAT BASIS, WE BELIEVE THAT THERE IS A POSSIBILITY OF GETTING SOME AGREEMENT ON GOING FORWARD, AND I WOULD SAY THIS, VERY, VERY FIRMLY: UNFORTUNATELY THERE IS STILL TERRORISM OPERATING. WE MUST MAKE CERTAIN THAT THE BULLET DOES NOT BEAT THE BALLOT: AND THAT THEREFORE THOSE PEOPLE WHO ARE STILL OPERATING TERRORISM DO NOT HAVE A VETO OVER ANY CONSTITUTION WHATSOEVER: THAT ULTIMATLY WHAT WE GET IN RHODESIA MUST BE WHAT THE PEOPLE OF RHODESIA THEMSELVES WANT. NOW IT'S IN THAT SPIRIT THAT WE ARE TRYING TO CONSULT WITH ALL OUR COMMONWEALTH PARTNERS, AND SOME OUTSIDE THE COMMONWEALTH, AND OF COURSE WITH AMERICA, ON THE BEST WAY

OF GOING FORWARD. NO, THERE'S NOT A STRICT TIMETABLE FOR RECOGNITION: AS YOU KNOW PRESIDENT CARTER HAS SOME PROBLEMS OVER A RESOLUTION ON SANCTIONS, AND BRITISH SANCTIONS WOULD LAPSE IN NOVEMBER, AND WE DOUBT VERY MUCH WHETHER A RENEWAL OF SANCTIONS WOULD GO THROUGH THE BRITISH PARLIAMENT. THAT GOES FOR SANCTIONS. RECOGNITION IS A SLIGHTLY WIDER PROBLEM, AND COULD TAKE JUST A LITTLE BIT LONGER.

WOULD YOU BE PREPARED TO RECOGNISE RHODESIA REGARDLESS OF THE VIEWS OF SOME OF THE BLACK NATIONS AT LUSAKA?

".....WELL, ULTIMATELY RHODESIA IS A BRITISH RESPONSIBILITY, AND THE BASIS OF SANCTIONS IS THAT HER ILLEGAL STATUS AROSE BECAUSE OF HER FAILURE TO FOLLOW SOME FIVE PRINCIPLES. FOUR OF THOSE PRINCIPLES HAVE NOW BEEN FOLLOWED, AND THE QUESTION IS WHETHER THE HOLDING OF THE ELECTIONS FULFILLED THE FIFTH PRINCIPLE. NOW THAT HAS NOT BEEN DECIDED, BUT WE DO RECOGNISE THAT WHAT WE OUGHT TO DO IS TO TRY TO TAKE AS MANY NATIONS ALONG WITH US IN RECOGNISING RHODESIA. THAT'S BEST NOT ONLY FOR BRITAIN AND RHODESIA, BUT FOR THE WHOLE OF THE FUTURE OF AFRICA IN THAT AREA. UNLESS WE CAN DO THAT, IT WILL BE DIFFICULT TO STOP THE TERRORIST ACTIVITIES FROM OTHER COUNTRIES INTO RHODESIA. SO WHAT DO YOU REALLY DO? YOU'RE ASKING FOR A CLEAR CUT QUESTION: I AM SAYING THE TIME HAS NOT YET COME TO ANSWER THAT QUESTION UNTIL WE'VE SEEN HOW MANY OTHER NATIONS WE CAN TAKE ALONG WITH US. BUT I DO BEG OF YOU NOT TO BE TOO PESSIMISTIC ABOUT THIS: AS I SAY, ALMOST ALL OF THEM, IN CONSULTATIONS WE'VE HAD, RECOGNISE THERE WAS A GREAT DIFFERENCE NOW, SINCE THOSE ELECTIONS, IN RHODESIA. DON'T FORGET, ONE PERSON ONE VOTE, FOR FOUR DIFFERENT POLITICAL PARTIES. NOT ALWAYS THE CASE IN AFRICA. WITH A 65 PER CENT TURNOUT. WITH A MAJORITY BLACK GOVERNMENT IN PLACE IN RHODESIA. THE BATTLE NOW IS NOT WHETHER IT'S GOING TO BE A BLACK OR WHITE RHODESIA - THAT'S ALREADY BEEN WON. IT'LL BE A BLACK MAJORITY RHODESIA. THE BATTLE NOW IS WHICH BLACK RHODESIA IS GOING TO HOLD SWAY IN RHODESIA, AND THAT'S PARTLY WHAT THE TERRORIST ACTIVITY IS ALL ABOUT.

WILL YOU BE GOING TO LUSAKA WITH YOUR OPTIONS OPEN ON ZIMBABWE/RHODESIA? WHAT ROLE DO YOU EXPECT MR FRASER TO PLAY THERE?

"..... I SHALL GO TO LUSAKA TRYING TO PERSUADE OTHER NATIONS TO COME ALONG WITH US. I'M SURE THE AUSTRALIAN PRIME MINISTER WILL HELP ME IN THAT OBJECTIVE".

● HAVE YOU CONSIDERED SOME SORT OF INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE?

''..... THAT WOULD MEAN INVOLVING, HAVING A CONTACT GROUP. NO, IN EFFECT WE OURSELVES ARE ACTING AS THAT CONTACT GROUP, THROUGH A SPECIAL EMISSARY LIKE LORD HARLECH, CONSTANTLY GOING ROUND TO THE AFRICAN COUNTRIES, ALSO WE'VE SENT RICHARD LUCE, WHO IS ONE OF THE JUNIOR MINISTERS AT THE FOREIGN OFFICE - YOU DON'T HAVE JUNIOR MINISTERS HERE; BUT ALL OF OUR MINISTERS HAVE JUNIOR INISTERS - HE'S BEEN GOING TO THE FRANCOPHONE AFRICAN COUNTRIES. I OF COURSE AM IN CONE

CT WITH WORLD LEADERS AS THEY COME THROUGH LONDON, HAVE BEEN IN CONTACT WITH PRESIDENT CARTER IN TOKYO, MR FRASER HERE: AND I'VE RECENTLY SEEN MR MULDOON. SO WE REALLY ARE A ONE-MAN, PLUS ONE-WOMAN, PLUS A FEW OTHERS CONTACT GROUP''.

CAN YOU REALLY ADVISE THE QUEEN TO GO THE LUSAKA IF THERE'S ANY RISK AT ALL?

''..... THE PARAMOUNT CONSIDERATION IS ALWAYS THE SAFETY OF HER MAJESTY. I HAVE NOT YET RECEIVED NIHE FINAL ADVICE WHICH I SHALL HAVE TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT BEFORE I DECIDE WHAT ADVICE TO TENDER''.

TEBBIT

[COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING STREET]

F I L E S

RHODESIA D
CCD
C AF D
SEAD
NEWS D
PS
PS/LPS
PS/PUS
SIR A DUFF
MR WILLIAMS
CABINET OFFICE

Rhodesia (Sit) Pt 2

GRS 130

UNCLASSIFIED

FM CANBERRA 011415Z JUL 79

TO FLASH FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 365 OF 02 JULY 1979

*Enter me
GWS
2/7*

YOUR TELNO 292

1. FOLLOWING IS THE SECTION OF TEXT ON RHODESIA FROM WHICH PRIME MINISTER SPOKE TO PRESS CLUB BEGINNING AT 0715Z ON 1 JULY: QUOTE

THE OTHER PROBLEM IS RHODESIA. MY GOVERNMENT ARE DETERMINED TO BRING THE COUNTRY BACK TO LEGALITY WITH THE WIDEST POSSIBLE INTERNATIONAL RECOGNITION. WE ALSO INTEND TO DO EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO END THE WAR, WHICH IS CAUSING SUCH TERRIBLE SUFFERING IN RHODESIA ITSELF AND IN NEIGHBOURING COUNTRIES. NO WAY OF ACHIEVING THESE AIMS IS EXCLUDED. WE HAVE EMBARKED ON A PROGRAMME OF INTENSIVE CONSULTATIONS. LORD HARLECH HAS RECENTLY RETURNED FROM AFRICA WHERE HE HAD CONSTRUCTIVE DISCUSSIONS WITH LEADERS OF THE COUNTRIES MOST CLOSELY CONCERNED. WE HAVE A SENIOR OFFICIAL IN SALISBURY, BASED IN LONDON, TO KEEP TOUCH WITH BISHOP MUZOREWA, TO PROVIDE HIM WITH ENCOURAGEMENT AND SUPPORT IN HIS DIFFICULT TASKS.

THERE WILL BE FURTHER CONSULTATIONS AT THE HEADS OF GOVERNMENT MEETING IN LUSAKA - AND THAT WILL NOT BE THE END OF THE PROCESS. WE ARE TAKING FULL ACCOUNT OF THE VIEWS OF OUR FRIENDS AND PARTNERS IN THE COMMONWEALTH AND OUTSIDE. BUT OUR FIRST RESPONSIBILITY MUST BE TO THE PEOPLE OF RHODESIA - IT IS THEIR FUTURE WHICH IS AT STAKE. UNQUOTE

/2.

2. PRIME MINISTER EXTEMPORISED TO SOME EXTENT, INCLUDING A PASSAGE IN WHICH SHE SAID THAT IT QUOTE WAS UNLIKELY UNQUOTE THAT PARLIAMENT WOULD APPROVE THE RENEWAL OF SANCTIONS IN NOVEMBER, ALTHOUGH THE QUESTION OF RECOGNITION WAS A WIDER ONE AND MIGHT TAKE LONGER TO RESOLVE.

3. WILL TELEGRAPH EXACT TRANSCRIPT TOMORROW.

TEBBIT

F I L E S

RHOD D
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LEGAL ADVISERS
(MR FREELAND)
(MR STEEL)
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PS/MR LUCE
PS/MR RIDLEY
PS/MR HURD
PS/PUS
SIR A DUFF
SIR A PARSONS
MISS BROWN
MR THOMAS
MR WILLSON
MR WILLIAMS

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION
RHODESIA POLICY

SUBJECT



PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T 36/79T

10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

1 July 1979

My dear President,

Thank you for your long and thoughtful letter on Rhodesia, which your High Commissioner gave me on 15 June. I value your frankness, and the trouble you took to make your position so clear. I have also been helped in understanding your views by Lord Harlech's account of his talk with you on 14 June. This was clearly a very useful meeting and I am grateful to you for discussing with him how we might move forward on this difficult problem.

I and my colleagues believe that the April election in Rhodesia, and the advent to power of Bishop Muzorewa's government, marked a significant change. We think that this step forward - as we regard it - does give us the opportunity to make a fresh attempt at finding and establishing a lasting settlement for Rhodesia. You for your part, if I understand you correctly, consider that this new government in Rhodesia is only one of the centres of power in the situation and you fear that we may attach too much importance to it.

Mr. President, I do not believe that this difference between our views need inhibit us from working together towards a common objective. In my view, that objective must be to bring Rhodesia to legal independence in circumstances which will command as wide international acceptance as possible. I believe that this can be done, and I look forward to discussing with you in Lusaka and with our other Commonwealth colleagues how it can be done.

/ As I have told

As I have told your High Commissioner, when she called to give me your letter, I do indeed attach great importance to maintaining close and friendly relations between our two countries; and I welcome the suggestion she put to me that you and I should meet together quietly, at an early stage in the Commonwealth Conference. Mr. Allinson will be in touch with you about arranging such a meeting.

I know how much it means to you and to your people to achieve a satisfactory and honourable settlement of the Rhodesia problem. It is my earnest wish that we should work together to bring about a peaceful solution which will gain wide international acceptance, thus benefiting not only Rhodesia but all the countries of the region.

With warm personal regards,

Yours sincerely
Margaret Thatcher

His Excellency Dr. Kenneth Kaunda

P. a.
G.W.
1/11

The situation we now have in Rhodesia is that 65 per cent of the adult population have voted, on the basis of one person, one vote, and choosing between four political parties, for a black Prime Minister, a predominantly black Government and a predominantly black Parliament. There is, therefore, a different situation on which we must seek to build. There has been criticism of the Constitution; and it remains to be seen if progress can be made towards ending the war. Our objective is to try to bring about conditions in which legal independence can be granted to Rhodesia with wide international acceptance.

First Line to Take

I pointed out in Canberra the Parliamentary fact that it is doubtful whether a renewal of sanctions would be approved by the British Parliament. Our objective is to bring about a situation in which legal independence can be granted and sanctions lifted with wide international acceptance.

CONFIDENTIAL

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CONFIDENTIAL.

DESKRY 301400Z JUN
FM FCO 301306Z JUN 79
TO IMMEDIATE KUALA LUMPUR
TELEGRAM NUMBER 176 OF 30 JUNE,
INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, MIRIMBA SALISBURY.

*Enter via
the
1/7*

FOLLOWING FOR PRIVATE SECRETARY.
HONG KONG TELEGRAM NUMBER 893 : RHODESIA.

1. LORD HARLECH GAVE MOOSE AND LAKE AN ACCOUNT OF THE MAIN CONCLUSIONS HE HAD DRAWN FROM HIS CONSULTATIONS IN AFRICA, EMPHASIZING THE GENERAL FEELING THAT:-
 - (A) THERE MUST BE IMPROVEMENTS ON THE PRESENT RHODESIAN CONSTITUTION;
 - (B) A SETTLEMENT MUST STEM FROM BRITAIN AS THE LEGALLY RESPONSIBLE AUTHORITY;
 - (C) THERE MUST BE AN ATTEMPT TO RESOLVE THE CONFLICTING CLAIMS OF THE INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL PARTIES;
 - (D) MR SMITH'S DEPARTURE WAS ESSENTIAL.
2. THE TALKS WERE CONTINUED WITH SIR A DUFF AND WITH MR DAY, WHO DESCRIBED THE SITUATION IN SALISBURY: BISHOP MUZOREWA HAD NOT YET SUCCEEDED IN ASSERTING HIS AUTHORITY OR INITIATING NEW POLICIES, BUT FEW PEOPLE REGARDED THE PRESENT CONSTITUTION AS INVIOLETE.
3. THE AMERICANS SAID THAT THEY HAD FORMED SIMILAR IMPRESSIONS. THEY FELT THAT THEY COULD HOLD OFF CONGRESSIONAL MOVES TO LIFT SANCTIONS UNTIL THE AUTUMN. THEY WOULD NOW HAVE TO BEGIN TO BE CLEARER ABOUT WHAT MR VANCE MEANT IN SPEAKING OF THE NEED FOR FURTHER PROGRESS. THEY AGREED THAT NO PARTY COULD BE ALLOWED TO EXERCISE A VETO OVER A SOLUTION.
4. THE AMERICANS PLACED MUCH EMPHASIS ON THE NEED TO GIVE THE PATRIOTIC FRONT A REAL CHANCE TO COME INTO THE QUOTE POLITICAL PROCESS UNQUOTE. WE ENCOURAGED THEM TO BE REALISTIC ABOUT THIS. WE MADE CLEAR THAT THE GOVERNMENT HAD NOT YET REACHED FIRM CONCLUSIONS. BUT IT MIGHT BE THAT THE BEST WAY FORWARD WOULD BE FIRST TO SEEK AGREEMENT ON AN INDEPENDENCE CONSTITUTION. THE FIRST PRIORITY WAS TO SEE HOW FAR LORD HARLECH COULD SUCCEED IN

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/PER SUADING

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PERSUADING BISHOP MUZOREWA TO ACCEPT THAT A VIABLE SOLUTION COULD BEST BE SOUGHT ALONG THE LINES SUGGESTED BY HIS CONSULTATIONS SO FAR. WHEN MUZOREWA VISITED WASHINGTON ON 10 JULY, WE HOPED THAT MR VANCE WOULD IMPRESS ON HIM THE NEED TO SHOW FLEXIBILITY AND TO WORK CLOSELY WITH US IF AN INTERNATIONALLY ACCEPTABLE SOLUTION WAS TO BE FOUND.

5. IN CONCLUSION IT WAS AGREED:-

- (A) THAT WE WOULD GIVE THE AMERICANS AN ACCOUNT OF LORD HARLECH'S DISCUSSIONS WITH MUZOREWA:
- (B) IN DOING SO WE WOULD SUGGEST IN MORE DETAIL THE LINE IT WOULD BE HELPFUL FOR MR VANCE TO TAKE WITH HIM:
- (C) THE AMERICANS WOULD SUPPORT THE FURTHER EFFORTS WE WOULD BE MAKING BEFORE THE OAU MEETINGS IN JULY TO CONVINCe COMMONWEALTH AND OTHER AFRICAN GOVERNMENTS THAT THE CONSULTATIONS IN WHICH WE WERE ENGAGED WERE GENUINE: AND THAT IT WAS IMPORTANT THAT THE OAU SHOULD NOT TAKE UP POSITIONS WHICH WOULD RENDER A SOLUTION MORE DIFFICULT.

6. ON THE LAST POINT, HM EMBASSY IN WASHINGTON HAVE PASSED TO THE STATE DEPARTMENT THE TEXTS OF OUR TELEGRAMS NUMBERS 350 TO LUSAKA AND 62 TO MONROVIA.

7. DAVIDOW, THE US OFFICIAL WHO WILL BE GOING TO SALISBURY, WAS PRESENT AT THESE TALKS.

CARRINGTON

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PLANNING STAFF
ES & SD
CCD
FRD
UND
LEGAL ADVISERS
(MR FREELAND)
(MR STEEL)
ECON D
PCD

DEF D
OJD
FS
PS/SIR I GILMOUR
PS/MR LUCE
PS/MR RIDLEY
PS/MR HURD
PS/PUS
SIR A DUFF
SIR A PARSONS
MISS BROWN
MR THOMAS
MR WILSON
MR WILLIAMS

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION RHODESIA POLICY

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Original in
Australia, May 79
Mtg with Fraser.

Extract.

RECORD OF A MEETING BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER AND THE
PRIME MINISTER OF AUSTRALIA, THE RT. HON. MALCOLM FRASER,
HELD IN PARLIAMENT HOUSE, CANBERRA, ON SATURDAY 30 JUNE,
1979 AT 1600

Present

The Prime Minister	The Rt. Hon. Malcolm Fraser, M.P.
Sir John Hunt	The Hon. Andrew Peacock, M.P.
H.E. Sir Donald Tebbit	Sir Geoffrey Yeend
Mr. C.A. Whitmore	Sir Gordon Freeth
	Mr. R. Holditch

* * * * *

Rhodesia

The Prime Minister said that she and Mr. Fraser had devoted most of their tête-à-tête discussion, which had begun an hour earlier, to the problem of Rhodesia. It had been one of the first tasks of her Government to convince black African countries that the UK was not holding up the recognition of Rhodesia until after the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting at Lusaka only to recognise Bishop Muzorewa's Government and to lift sanctions immediately the Conference was over. To dispel this suspicion the Government had sent Lord Harlech to visit the Front Line states, Nigeria and Malawi, and he seemed to have made good progress in convincing the Governments of those countries that we were genuinely trying to find a way forward. Lord Harlech had emphasised that the election in Rhodesia had been based on one man one vote, had been fought by four parties and had brought out 65 per cent of the electorate. Such an election was a factor in the Rhodesian situation which could not now be ignored. The critics had not, however, been disarmed and they were now arguing that the constitution on which the election had been conducted was unsatisfactory because it embodied a continuation of white power. But this was a misrepresentation of the constitution which contained no more than a blocking mechanism in favour of the whites. Even so there was a need for some development of the constitution for otherwise there was very little chance that the

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new Government in Rhodesia would win widespread international recognition. Lord Harlech had made his first report to the British Government and he was now going to Salisbury the following week to see whether Bishop Muzorewa recognised the need for some changes in the constitution and to assess the prospects of getting such changes accepted in Rhodesia. If the constitution was amended too drastically there was a risk that white confidence would be lost and this could lead to a large-scale exodus of whites. On the other hand, it was important to get Bishop Muzorewa to acknowledge the need for some movement on the constitution if his Government was to gain international recognition. The British Government's public position at present was that we were still engaged in consultations with the Governments most directly associated with the Rhodesian problem, but we were also exploring privately how the constitution might be changed, drawing upon the provisions of the constitutions of some of our former colonies.

We had also been taking soundings of the Francophone countries, with an eye on the OAU meeting on 7-8 July, and there were signs that some of these countries accepted that the Rhodesian election was now a major factor that could not be overlooked. President Moi of Kenya had also taken a similar line during a recent State Visit to London, though he had made the point that the constitution was not yet adequate.

The British Government also had its own domestic constraints. The renewal of sanctions in November was out of the question. There were those who argued that even if the conditions were not right by then for recognition, sanctions could be treated separately because they were something quite different from recognition and could be dropped in isolation. But there was also a good deal of pressure on the Government to go ahead now and recognise the Muzorewa Government. Those who took this line pointed out that the Government had recognised the new regime in Ghana almost immediately it had come into power, though, subsequently, it had executed two former Heads of State and a number of other senior officials. We had also recognised the Governments of Mozambique and Angola, even though democratic elections had never been held in those countries. It was suggested

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that if we were prepared to extend recognition in such cases, there was no reason why the same should not be done for the new Rhodesian Government. It was possible to argue in response that the regimes in Mozambique and Angola had never been illegal, but the question of recognition remained a highly sensitive one. Democracy was about the internal form of government which the people of a country wanted. The present Rhodesian constitution might not be perfect but the fact that 65 per cent of the electorate had voted showed that a majority of blacks had confidence in the constitution. It was therefore impossible for the British Government to accept that the bullet had the right of veto over the ballot. To take any other line would be to acknowledge that democracy could be subject to terrorism. Nonetheless, if it proved possible to go forward with proposals for changing the present constitution, efforts should be made to involve the Patriotic Front as well as the other parties in the Rhodesian situation in the consultations on the proposals. We could not however let Mr. Nkomo and Mr. Mugabe have any kind of veto. It was likely in practice that the Patriotic Front would accept only those proposals which would lead to their assumption of power. If they adopted an intransigent line of this kind, it would be important to put them on the wrong foot in relation to their front line hosts. They might of course refuse to discuss any constitutional change, but this too would weaken their position in relation to their hosts.

Mr. Fraser had suggested during their tête-à-tête discussion that no firm proposals for constitutional change should be made at Lusaka but that a procedure for bringing forward proposals for further political progress in Rhodesia should be launched before Lusaka and an effort made to get the black African governments to accept it. A factor in the pre-Lusaka situation was that Bishop Muzorewa was visiting the US and then the UK in the first two weeks of July, and we would be seeking to establish with him what constitutional changes he could accept.

Mr. Fraser said that there was no question of trying to reach agreement at the Lusaka meeting, which was now only four weeks away, on precise changes in the Rhodesian constitution. To attempt to do so would risk outright rejection of whatever proposals the UK put forward. Rather, the aim at Lusaka should be to gain acceptance of the general proposition

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that the constitution should be changed in the direction of greater Africanisation and that all the parties concerned, including Mr. Nkomo and Mr. Mugabe, should be involved in this process. If the Conference could agree on this broad approach of building on what had already been achieved in Rhodesia - and he acknowledged that the present constitution was a big step forward - it would give the people of that country and the rest of the Commonwealth confidence that solutions could be found. At the same time, once the black African countries could see that the UK was actively seeking constitutional changes and they could see the process by which such changes would be agreed, the heat would be taken out of the Rhodesian issue at Lusaka. He wished to re-emphasize, however, the importance of avoiding formal and detailed proposals for constitutional change at the Conference.

Mr. Peacock added that he did not believe that the UK could go any further than this. But many African countries and especially Nigeria, who was particularly inflexible, would not regard what Mr. Fraser was suggesting as going far enough.

The Prime Minister said that we should not underestimate what had already been achieved in Rhodesia: there was a black majority in the Rhodesian Parliament, and a majority of Ministers were now black. Bishop Muzorewa was in charge of the Government, though it was worrying that he was not doing more to exert his power in a practical sense and that there was so much dissension amongst the African politicians in Salisbury. What mattered now was that Bishop Muzorewa should move quickly to establish the authority of his Government. There was a narrow path to be trodden between finding the right measure of further constitutional change and undoing what had already been achieved to a point where the whites lost confidence and started to leave Rhodesia. Early progress in Rhodesia would also be needed to help justify the ending of sanctions in November. Her main aim at Lusaka would be to try to win support for recognition of Bishop Muzorewa's Government.

Mr. Fraser said that his Government believed that although Bishop Muzorewa could give orders, it was doubtful whether they would be carried out by the whites in executive positions. A good

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deal of power still remained in white hands. If we defended the present constitution too strongly this would be interpreted by the black African Governments as meaning that there would be no change in the constitution. This would risk serious difficulties at Lusaka. Yet he believed that the African countries wanted to see a way forward. Despite the strength of their feeling about Rhodesia, not even Nigeria could want war. He was therefore hopeful that the African countries would be ready to accept the kind of process for advance that he had described. If the Commonwealth supported the process but Mr. Nkomo and Mr. Mugabe still refused to participate in it, this would expose them. If, on the other hand, the UK were to recognise Bishop Muzorewa's Government without black African agreement, the outcome would be increased support for the Patriotic Front, perhaps even extending to greater direct military involvement by the Front Line states. If that happened Bishop Muzorewa would not last 12 months. There must be an adequate measure of acceptance by African Governments of whatever further constitutional and political changes in Rhodesia were put forward. If that were made clear, we might get through Lusaka without an explosion.

The Prime Minister said that President Nyerere and President Kaunda were in considerable difficulties and would probably welcome an agreement on Rhodesia. But they were committed to supporting Mr. Nkomo and Mr. Mugabe: President Kaunda, for example, did not dare withdraw his support for Mr. Nkomo. African involvement in and acceptance of any further changes in Rhodesia could not be tantamount to giving the Patriotic Front a veto on changes in the Rhodesian constitution. If Mr. Nkomo and Mr. Mugabe could be brought to a conference on constitutional change, there was a real danger that far from agreeing to the kind of process Mr. Fraser had in mind, they would seek to manoeuvre the consultations into deadlock, since they still believed that they would win power by force. But the British Government could not conceivably let itself appear to back the Patriotic Front against the mass of the Rhodesian population whom the guerillas were terrorising and who were the people who elected Bishop Muzorewa's Government. This was the weakness underlying the process suggested by Mr. Fraser.

/Sir John Hunt

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Sir John Hunt said that we might be able to get through Lusaka on the basis of African acquiescence that there had been change in Rhodesia, that there would be further constitutional advance and that this advance would need to be accepted within Rhodesia and, as far as possible, by the international community. But it was not clear what Mr. Fraser meant by the working out of a process. If he had in mind that the whole Commonwealth should be involved, this was impracticable and certainly would not produce agreement in Lusaka.

Mr. Fraser said that he doubted whether this would be a sufficient basis on which to get through Lusaka. He believed that the UK should work out how further change in the direction of increased Africanisation of the constitution was to be accomplished and how consultation was to be carried out with the parties. This should be explained at Lusaka and if the Conference accepted what was proposed, this would be a very big step forward. The African states would not support Bishop Muzorewa unless they could see in advance how further change was to be brought about. If their support was secured, Mr. Nkomo and Mr. Mugabe would have the choice of participating in the process or of isolation but if the African states did not give Bishop Muzorewa their support but on the contrary backed the Patriotic Front more actively, he would be lost, for the UK could not give him military protection.

Sir John Hunt said that we might be able to convince some members of the Commonwealth that the British approach was a genuine attempt to reach a solution. But many of them would want to leave the ball firmly in the UK's court. It would be very difficult to get them positively to accept the steps Mr. Fraser was proposing. The most we probably could hope to win was tacit understanding of how we were planning to play matters.

The Prime Minister said that the political difficulties of some of the black African leaders meant that we were unlikely to gain their active support for our way of making progress: acquiescence ex post facto was the best we could expect. We should avoid crystallising the position too much, since this

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could force the hand of the Front Line states. But we could not take too long: the longer we delayed, the more Soviet weapons would get into the hands of the terrorists and the longer we should be denying the Rhodesians the means to fight back. The Cubans and East Germans were becoming more and more strongly entrenched in Africa. The Soviet strategy was to establish a zone of influence right across Africa extending from the Horn of Africa through Zambia and Rhodesia to Angola. This would make it easier for them to shape events in Southern Africa, which was a vital source of raw materials for the West and which lay across the West's oil lifeline. Lee Kuan Yew had told her when she had met him recently that a factor which weighed with the Africans was that the Russians stood by their friends when they were in trouble, whereas the West did not.

Mr. Fraser said that he regarded the preservation of Western influence, and specially of British influence, in Africa as the paramount objective. If this could be achieved with British-style democracy, so much the better. But because a country had a black African type of Government, it did not necessarily mean that British influence need be diminished. This broad objective was more important than what happened to Bishop Muzorewa. He did not want to see terrorism win in Africa. But there was a choice of means of defeating terrorism. It could be done by superior force but this was very costly; or it could be done by undermining the terrorists' support. The latter course, however, required the support of African states. If it was eventually possible to devise a package of change for Rhodesia which was negotiable with both the Front Line states and Rhodesia, it would be easier to move Rhodesia in the direction of the Front Line states than vice versa, in order to win acceptance of the package and to obtain a constitution that would survive. He did not believe that he and the Prime Minister differed over their objectives, but there were differences of emphasis over how to reach those objectives. There should be further consultation between their two Governments before Lusaka. Mr. Peacock would be seeing the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary in London on 22/23 July.

/The Prime Minister

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The Prime Minister said that the British Government was moving cautiously and we might not be much further forward when Mr. Peacock came to London. They were moving forward on stepping-stones. They could see the next two or three stones but not yet those beyond them. They were not seeking confrontation with anyone over Rhodesia and after consultations the acceptance of the African states for what was proposed should not unreasonably be withheld. But it had to be borne in mind that Mr. Mugabe was a Marxist, and Marxists never changed their philosophy. Rhodesia, on the other hand, could reasonably claim that she had done all that could fairly be expected of her and could ask what more was required of her. One reason why the black leaders in Salisbury were falling out was that we had given no hint that Bishop Muzorewa would eventually have our full support and so emerge as the winner. We should take care not to throw away what had been accomplished already in Rhodesia for a gain we might not in the end achieve.

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FM LUSAKA 300825Z JUN 79

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 574 OF 30 JUNE

INFO IMMEDIATE DAR ES SALAAM, MAPUTO, GABORONE, LUANDA, LAGOS, LILONGWE, CANBERRA, WELLINGTON, WASHINGTON: ROUTINE PRETORIA, PARIS, UKMIS NEW YORK, OTTAWA.

Prime Minister

62M
17

YOUR TELNO (350) RHODESIA

1. I TOOK THE OPPORTUNITY OF BREAKFAST WITH PRESIDENT KAUNDA THIS MORNING (MIPT NOT TO ALL) TO DELIVER THE PRIME MINISTERS LETTER AND TO MAKE THE POINTS IN YOUR TUR.

2. THE PRESIDENT LISTENED ATTENTIVELY BUT MADE ONLY TWO COMMENTS. HE SAID THAT HE HOPED DISCUSSION ON RHODESIA COULD TAKE PLACE AT THE CONFERENCE IN A FAMILY ATMOSPHERE WITHOUT ANY CALLING OF NAMES AND IN CONSTRUCTIVE FASHION. A SOLUTION MUST BE FOUND AS THE ALTERNATIVE WAS TOO TERRIBLE TO CONTEMPLATE. HE ADDED THAT HE JUDGED LORD HARLECH TO BE AN HONEST MAN.

3. THE PRESIDENT WAS RECEPTIVE TO THE IDEA OF AN EARLY AND QUIET MEETING IN AUGUST WITH THE PRIME MINISTER AT THE CHGM.

It was his idea!
62M

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LEGAL ADVISERS
(MR FREELAND)
(MR STEEL)
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PS/SIR I GILMOUR
PS/MR LUCE
PS/MR RIDLEY
PS/MR HURD
PS/PUS
SIR A DUFF
SIR A PARSONS
MR LEAHY
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for Rhodesia Pt 2

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10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

2 July 1979

Prime Minister's Bilateral Meeting with Premier Clark of Canada
in the New Otani Hotel, Tokyo, on 29 June 1979 at 1900

By prior agreement, the Prime Minister had a short bilateral meeting with Premier Clark of Canada on the final day of the Economic Summit meeting in Tokyo, 29 June. Premier Clark, accompanied only by his Private Secretary, called on the Prime Minister in her hotel suite at 1900. Much of the conversation was devoted to domestic political matters. The following is a summary of the main points which arose on international issues.

Rhodesia and the CHGM

The Prime Minister summarised for Mr. Clark the security considerations of which she would have to take account in deciding whether to advise The Queen not to travel to Lusaka for her State Visit and for the CHGM. The Prime Minister indicated that, in certain circumstances, she might wish to consult Mr. Clark, among others, and seek his views. Present indications were, however, that President Kaunda was doing his best to implement his undertaking to secure the removal of ground-to-air missiles from the Lusaka area.

The Prime Minister went on to inform Mr. Clark of Lord Harlech's recent tour of the Front Line and other Southern African states. In the British Government's view, the Rhodesian elections had created a new situation; but it was clear that the Front Line Presidents would not accept the totality of the Rhodesian constitution. Lord Harlech would be travelling to Salisbury on 2 July for talks with Bishop Muzorewa and the Bishop himself would subsequently be travelling first to Washington and then to London. The British Government wished to use the advance which had taken place in Rhodesia as a basis for further movement. The Front Line Presidents seemed to believe that a final constitution for Zimbabwe-Rhodesia should be vetted or sponsored by the UK. The Government would try to get as far as they could in advance of the CHGM and would then have some proposals to make at that meeting.

/Mr. Clark

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Mr. Clark did not dissent from the Prime Minister's assessment and emphasised that he would like to be kept fully informed of further developments, through whatever channels the Prime Minister wished to designate. He, for his part, would ensure that the Canadian Government was not committed to any firm decision on Rhodesia in advance of the Lusaka meeting. The Prime Minister said that she would ensure that Mr. Clark was kept fully informed, through our High Commissioner in Ottawa. Mr. Clark told the Prime Minister that, although the Canadian High Commissioner in London had urged him to travel to Lusaka via London, he had decided to make his first visit as Premier to Francophone Africa and would therefore be visiting Senegal en route to Lusaka.



Prime Minister

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

May we give Heads
 of Government who have informed us of
 their own exchanges with
 President Kaunda the gist
 of your own reply to him?

29 June 1979

Dear Mike

Yes
 '79

Yes out

You wrote to Paul Lever on 27 June, authorising us to despatch the Prime Minister's reply to President Kaunda's letter, subject to a small amendment. Telegrams of instructions have now gone to Mr Allinson in Lusaka.

As Stephen Wall explained in his letter of 25 June to Bryan Cartledge enclosing our draft reply, President Kaunda's letter to the Prime Minister was on lines similar to the letters he sent to other Western Heads of Government including President Carter, Chancellor Schmidt and Mr Fraser. A number of these Governments informed us promptly of the content of these letters from President Kaunda. We believe it would be appropriate to respond by passing to our EEC partners, the Americans and the old Commonwealth, the gist of the reply to President Kaunda from the Prime Minister.

I should be grateful for confirmation that there is no objection to our doing this.


Yours sincerely
 Margaret

Margaret Turner (Miss)
 Private Secretary

Mike Pattison Esq
 10 Downing Street



-2 JUL 1979-



Prime Minister

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FM F C O 291900Z JUN 79

TO IMMEDIATE LUSAKA

TELEGRAM NUMBER 357 OF 29 JUNE

INFO IMMEDIATE HONG KONG (FOR PRIVATE SECRETARY), CANBERRA
(FOR CARTLEDGE) PRIORITY MIRIMBA SALISBURY AND NAIROBI.

RHODESIA.

FOR YOUR BACKGROUND INFORMATION, YOU SHOULD BE AWARE THAT NORMAN KIRKHAM OF THE SUNDAY TELEGRAPH, HAS SEEN "TINY" ROWLAND OF LONRHO. ACCORDING TO KIRKHAM, ROWLAND IS TRAVELLING TO LUSAKA SHORTLY, WHERE HE WILL MEET PRESIDENT KAUNDA ON 2 JULY. ROWLAND SAW NKOMO LAST WEEKEND, AND SPOKE TO CHIKEREMA SHORTLY BEFORE HIS RESIGNATION FROM THE UANC. ACCORDING TO KIRKHAM, ROWLAND ENCOURAGED CHIKEREMA TO RESIGN.

2.
KIRKHAM ADDED THAT ROWLAND'S OBJECTIVE WAS TO ARRANGE A MEETING BETWEEN MUZOREWA, NKOMO, SITHOLE AND CHIKEREMA, WITH KAUNDA PRESENT, IN LUSAKA IN THE NEAR FUTURE.

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FM NAIROBI 281315Z JUNE

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELNO 372 OF 28 JUNE 1979

INFO ROUTINE TO MIRIMBA SALISBURY LUSAKA PRETORIA
AND WASHINGTON

KENYA PRESS COMMENT AND REPORTS ON RHODESIA AND
COMMONWEALTH HEADS OF GOVERNMENT MEETING

1. THE KENYA PRESS HAS BEEN COMMENTING MORE FREELY THAN USUAL SINCE LAST WEEKEND ON CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS IN ZIMBABWE-RHODESIA, THOUGH NOT ALWAYS WITH CONSISTENCY.
2. THE SUNDAY NATION EDITORIAL ON 24 JUNE CONTAINED A SOMEWHAT UNUSUAL CALL FOR THE ARAB STATES TO USE THEIR OIL STRENGTH AGAINST THE WEST IN THE EVENT OF BRITAIN OR THE U S RECOGNISING OR LIFTING SANCTIONS AGAINST ZIMBABWE RHODESIA. EDITORIAL SAID THAT THE ARABS WERE CONTINUOUSLY THREATENING THE WEST OVER THE PALESTINE ISSUE AND HAD USED THEIR OIL WEAPON TWICE IN THAT CONTEXT, BUT SO FAR NIGERIA WAS THE ONLY OIL-PRODUCING COUNTRY WHICH HAD INDICATED ITS INTENTION TO INTERRUPT THE OIL FLOW IN THE EVENT OF RECOGNITION OF ZIMBABWE-RHODESIA OR THE LIFTING OF SANCTIONS. EDITORIAL SAID THERE WAS A MORAL OBLIGATION ON THE ARABS COUNTRIES TO SUPPORT THEIR RHETORIC WITH ACTION, WHICH WOULD FOR ONCE GIVE SO-CALLED AFRO/ARAB SOLIDARITY SOME SUBSTANCE.
3. THE DAILY NATION EDITORIAL ON 25 JUNE PRAISED THE REPORTED INTENTIONS OF PRESIDENT KAUNDA AND PREMIER MUZOREWA TO HOLD TALKS. EDITORIAL DESCRIBED THIS AS A BOLD MOVE BY PRESIDENT KAUNDA, AND SAID IT PROVIDED NEW HOPE FOR THE CREATION OF BETTER UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE MUZOREWA GOVT AND OTHER AFRICAN COUNTRIES. EDITORIAL SAID THAT THOUGH MANY AFRICAN COUNTRIES WOULD CONDEMN PRESIDENT KAUNDA'S MOVE THEIR ACCUSATIONS WOULD BE UNFAIR AND UNJUSTIFIED GIVEN ZAMBIA'S CRITICAL ECONOMIC SITUATION. ZAMBIA'S PARTNERS INCLUDED THE SO-CALLED FRONT-LINE STATES WHICH APPEARED TO BACK THE PATRIOTIC FRONT'S CONTINUED ARMED STRUGGLE, WHEREAS OTHER MODERATE

AFRICAN STATES SAW THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A GOVERNMENT BY THE PATRIOTIC FRONT IN SALISBURY AS A DANGEROUS MOVE LIKELY TO STRENGTHEN THE RUSSIAN AND CUBAN Foothold IN BLACK AFRICA. PRESIDENT KAUNDA'S MOVE TOWARDS CLOSER RELATIONS WITH THE MUZOREWA GOVT WAS A PRAGMATIC REALISATION THAT A SOLUTION TO THE RHODESIA CRISIS INVOLVED ACCEPTING THERE WAS A GOVERNMENT AND A PRIME MINISTER IN RHODESIA.

4. EDITORIAL SAID THERE WAS STILL LITTLE HOPE OF ENDING THE BLOODY WAR BEING WAGED BY THE PATRIOTIC FRONT, AND COMMUNIST INTERFERENCE WAS NOT LIKELY TO END UNTIL

UNTIL A PUPPET MARXIST REGIME WAS FORMED IN SALISBURY. THE LEADERS OF THE PATRIOTIC FRONT, BACKED BY THEIR COMMUNIST PAYMASTERS, WOULD BE AMONG THE FIRST TO CONDEMN THE MUZOREWA/KAUNDA CONFERENCE. BUT THE PATRIOTIC FRONT MUST REALISE THAT NO PEACE COULD BE ACHIEVED WITHOUT HONOURABLY ACCOMMODATING OTHER LEADERS VIEWS.

5. ON 27 JUNE ZAMBIAN FOREIGN MINISTER, MR WILSON CHAKULYA, APPARENTLY RETURNING TO ZAMBIA FROM INDIA, WAS REPORTED AS HAVING HELD A PRESS CONFERENCE IN NAIROBI AT WHICH HE EMPHATICALLY DENIED WESTERN PRESS REPORTS THAT PRESIDENT KAUNDA HAD PROPOSED A MEETING WITH RHODESIA TO DISCUSS ZAMBIA'S TRANSPORT PROBLEMS AND REOPENING THEIR COMMON BORDER. MR CHAKULYA SAID THAT ZAMBIA COULD ONLY TALK TO RHODESIA WITH THE CONSENT OF THE FRONT LINE STATES, AND ZAMBIA WOULD CONTINUE SUPPORT OF LIBERATION MOVEMENTS IN LINE WITH OAU POLICY. HE ALSO DENIED THAT THE COMMONWEALTH SUMMIT WOULD BE MOVED AWAY FROM LUSAKA.

6. THE DAILY NATION EDITORIAL ON THE SAME DAY HEADED 'LETS TALK TO MUZOREWA' SAID THAT DESPITE MR CHAKULYAS DENIAL ZAMBIA WAS FACING STARVATION BECAUSE OF THE RHODESIA BORDER CLOSURE. IF THE PROPOSED KAUNDA/MUZOREWA TALKS DID NOT PLACE THE SITUATION WOULD BECOME EVEN MORE COMPLICATED. IT WOULD BE DANGEROUS FOR THE COMMONWEALTH MEETING TO TAKE PLACE IN LUSAKA AND THE SAFETY OF THE HEADS OF STATE THERE COULD NOT BE GUARANTEED. A DECISION TO TRANSFER THE COMMONWEALTH SUMMIT FROM LUSAKA WAS NOT FOR MR CHAKULYA TO MAKE, AND THOUGH THE COMMONWEALTH SECRETARIAT IN LONDON HAD CONFIRMED IT WOULD TAKE PLACE AS SCHEDULED, THE VENUE WOULD BECOME MORE DANGEROUS WITH THE ESCALATION OF THE WAR.

7. ON THE RHODESIA CRISIS ITSELF EDITORIAL SAID THAT THE LUSAKA CONFERENCE WAS NO MORE LIKELY THAN PREVIOUS COMMONWEALTH MEETINGS TO FIND AN ACCEPTABLE SOLUTION. IT WAS OBVIOUS THAT A GOOD MANY LEADERS WOULD GO TO LUSAKA CONVINCED THAT BISHOP MUZOREWA SHOULD BE GIVEN A CHANCE TO PROVE THAT HIS BRAND OF MULTI RACIAL DEMOCRACY COULD WORK. BUT MILITANT AFRICAN AND OTHER LEADERS WOULD EQUALLY CONDEMN THE MUZOREWA REGIME. HOWEVER, WHETHER ONE LIKED IT OR NOT, HISTORY WAS MADE IN SALISBURY WHEN BLACK AND WHITE MPS AND SENATORS TOOK THEIR SEATS FOR THE FIRST TIME IN PARLIAMENT THERE.

8. THE STANDARD EDITORIAL ON 28 JUNE TOOK A DIFFERENT LINE, IN CONNECTION WITH BISHOP MUZOREWA'S REPORTED RECENT VISIT TO SOUTH AFRICA FOR SECRET TALKS WITH THE SOUTH AFRICAN PRIME MINISTER. EDITORIAL SAID THIS HAD DAMAGED MUZOREWA'S CHANCES OF RECOGNITION BY ANY AFRICAN STATE, AS HE HAD SHOWN THAT THERE WAS NO DIFFERENCE BETWEEN HIS GOVERNMENT AND THAT OF MR SMITH. MUZOREWA WOULD NOW BE CONDEMNED AS A TRAITOR JUST AS UNITA LEADER SAVIMBI WAS.

9. EDITORIAL SAID THAT INCLUSION OF MR SMITH IN MUZOREWA'S GOVERNMENT COMPROMISED MUZOREWA'S POSITION, THOUGH HE DEPENDED ON SUPPORT FROM SMITH AND THE RHODESIA FRONT. IT WAS LIKELY THAT SOUTH AFRICA WOULD DRAW CLOSER TO RHODESIA AS THE GUERRILLA WAR CONTINUES. BUT SINCE NO OTHER COUNTRY HAD RECOGNIZED HIS GOVERNMENT MUZOREWA HAD NO ALTERNATIVE.

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FM FCO 281830Z JUNE

TO IMMEDIATE LUSAKA

TELEGRAM NUMBER 347 OF 28TH JUNE 1979.

*Ende no
by
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MIPT : LETTER FROM PRESIDENT KAUNDA

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF PRIME MINISTER'S REPLY :

BEGINS:

THANK YOU FOR YOUR LONG AND THOUGHTFUL LETTER ON RHODESIA, WHICH YOUR HIGH COMMISSIONER GAVE ME ON 15 JUNE. I VALUE YOUR FRANKNESS, AND THE TROUBLE YOU TOOK TO MAKE YOUR POSITION SO CLEAR. I HAVE ALSO BEEN HELPED IN UNDERSTANDING YOUR VIEWS BY LORD HARLECH'S ACCOUNT OF HIS TALK WITH YOU ON 14 JUNE. THIS WAS CLEARLY A VERY USEFUL MEETING AND I AM GRATEFUL TO YOU FOR DISCUSSION WITH HIM HOW WE MIGHT MOVE FORWARD ON THIS DIFFICULT PROBLEM.

I AND MY COLLEAGUES BELIEVE THAT THE APRIL ELECTION IN RHODESIA, AND THE ADVENT TO POWER OF BISHOP MUZOREWA'S GOVERNMENT, MARKED A SIGNIFICANT CHANGE. WE THINK THAT THIS STEP FORWARD - AS WE REGARD IT - DOES GIVE US THE OPPORTUNITY TO MAKE A FRESH ATTEMPT AT FINDING AND ESTABLISHING A LASTING SETTLEMENT FOR RHODESIA. YOU FOR YOUR PART, IF I UNDERSTAND YOU CORRECTLY, CONSIDER THAT THIS NEW GOVERNMENT IN RHODESIA IS ONLY ONE OF THE CENTRES OF POWER IN THE SITUATION AND YOU FEAR THAT WE MAY ATTACH TOO MUCH IMPORTANCE TO IT.

MR PRESIDENT, I DO NOT BELIEVE THAT THIS DIFFERENCE BETWEEN OUR VIEWS NEED INHIBIT US FROM WORKING TOGETHER TOWARDS A COMMON OBJECTIVE. IN MY VIEW, THAT OBJECTIVE MUST BE TO BRING RHODESIA TO LEGAL INDEPENDENCE IN CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH WILL COMMAND AS WIDE INTERNATIONAL ACCEPTANCE AS POSSIBLE. I BELIEVE THIS CAN BE DONE, AND I LOOK FORWARD TO DISCUSSING WITH YOU IN LUSAKA AND WITH OUR OTHER COMMONWEALTH COLLEAGUES HOW IT CAN BE DONE.

AS I HAVE TOLD YOUR HIGH COMMISSIONER, WHEN SHE CALLED TO GIVE ME YOUR LETTER, I DO INDEED ATTACH GREAT IMPORTANCE TO MAINTAINING

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CLOSE AND FRIENDLY RELATIONS BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES; AND I WELCOME THE SUGGESTION SHE PUT TO ME THAT YOU AND I SHOULD MEET TOGETHER QUIETLY, AT AN EARLY STAGE IN THE COMMONWEALTH CONFERENCE. MR ALLINSON WILL BE IN TOUCH WITH YOU ABOUT ARRANGING SUCH A MEETING. I KNOW HOW MUCH IT MEANS TO YOU AND TO YOUR PEOPLE TO ACHIEVE A SATISFACTORY AND HONOURABLE SETTLEMENT OF THE RHODESIAN PROBLEM. IT IS MY EARNEST WISH THAT WE SHOULD WORK TOGETHER TO BRING ABOUT A PEACEFUL SOLUTION WHICH WILL GAIN WIDE INTERNATIONAL ACCEPTANCE, THUS BENEFITING NOT ONLY RHODESIA BUT ALL THE COUNTRIES OF THE REGION.

WITH WARM PERSONAL REGARDS.

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FM FCO 281840Z JUN 79

TO IMMEDIATE LUSAKA

TELEGRAM NUMBER 346 OF 28 JUNE

Antw me
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RHODESIA: LETTER FROM PRESIDENT KAUNDA.

1. MIFT CONTAINS TEXT OF THE REPLY FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO PRESIDENT KAUNDA'S LETTER OF 8 JUNE. YOU SHOULD ARRANGE TO DELIVER THIS PERSONALLY. THE SIGNED ORIGINAL FOLLOWS BY BAG.
2. IN DELIVERING THE MESSAGE, YOU SHOULD SAY THAT THE PRIME MINISTER IS LOOKING FORWARD TO A DISCUSSION WITH PRESIDENT KAUNDA AT AN EARLY STAGE IN THE COMMONWEALTH CONFERENCE. YOU SHOULD MAKE CLEAR THAT THE PRIME MINISTER'S STRONG PREFERENCE IS FOR A RESTRICTED MEETING WITH ONLY THE SECRETARY OF STATE AND A NOTE-TAKER PRESENT ON OUR SIDE.

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(cc: BGC)



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

28 June 1979

~~BF 4/7/79~~

I enclose the original of what appears to be a circular letter addressed to the Prime Minister by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Zimbabwe-Rhodesia.

12/6/79

Could I please have advice as to whether the Prime Minister need respond, and if so, in what terms. It would be helpful to have this by 4 July.

M. A. PATTISON

Paul Lever, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

27 June 1979

Stephen Wall wrote to Bryan Cartledge on 25 June, proposing a draft reply to a letter from President Kaunda.

The Prime Minister has now seen the proposed reply. She would like the first sentence of the final paragraph deleted. The second sentence of that paragraph, which will now become the first, should be amended to read:

"I know how much it means to you and to your people to achieve a satisfactory and honourable settlement of the Rhodesian problem."

Subject to this amendment, the reply may now be finalised and despatched.

M. A. PATTISON

KRP

Paul Lever, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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FM ABIDJAN 271747Z JUN 79

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 68 OF 27 JUNE

INFO PRIORITY LAGOS DAKAR ACCRA

INFO SAVING TO MONROVIA WASHINGTON LUSAKA PARIS AND LIBREVILLE

ZIMBABWE/RHODESIA: NIGERIAN VIEWS

1. WHEN PRESENTING MY CREDENTIALS TO PRESIDENT KOUNTCHE ON 23 JUNE I DISCUSSED RHODESIA AT LENGTH. HE READILY CONCEDED THAT SIGNIFICANT CHANGE OCCURED THERE BUT SAID IT WAS IMPORTANT FOR US NOT TO TAKE PRESIPITATE ACTION: WE SHOULD WAIT TO SEE WHETHER BISHOP MUZOREWA COULD DEMONSTRATE THAT HE WAS NOT A WHITE PUPPET AND THAT A GENUINE TRANSFER OF POWER TO THE MAJORITY HAD TAKEN PLACE (HE SEEMED QUITE WILLING TO ADMIT THIS POSSIBILITY). HE SAID AT LIBREVILLE MANY AFRICAN STATES HAD BEEN UNHAPPY THAT THE PATRIOTIC FRONT'S PRETENSIONS TO BE THE SOLE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE ZIMBABWEAN PEOPLE HAD BEEN ACCEPTED. THE TWO WINGS OF THE PATRIOTIC FRONT HAD CONFLICTING INTERESTS AND PAYMASTERS AND HE WAS HIGHLY SUSPICIOUS OF THE HARD-LINE ATTITUDES OF THE FRONT-LINE STATES AND THE PATRIOTIC FRONT: MIGHT NOT SOME OF THOSE INVOLVED HAVE MORE TO GAIN FROM INSTABILITY? AND IF THEY HAD NO WAR TO FIGHT WHAT WOULD BECOME OF NKOMO AND MUGABE? THEY NOW HAVE VESTED INTERESTS IN THEIR STATUS AS GUERILLA LEADERS IN A CIVIL WAR WHICH IS KILLING BLACKS RATHER THAN WHITES.
2. WHEN ASKED WHAT LINE MIGHT EMERGE FROM THE NEXT OAU MEETING KOUNTCHE SAID AFRICAN SOLIDARITY WAS SUPREMELY IMPORTANT AND NIGER WOULD NOT BREAK RANKS - THOUGH HE VOLUNTEERED THERE COULD BE SOME OAU MEMBERS IN FAVOUR OF RECOGNISING MUZOREWA IF HE COULD SHOW HE HAD GENUINE POWER.
3. COMMENT: KOUNTCHE IS STRAIGHTFORWARD IN STYLE BUT HAS A REPUTATION FOR PUTTING A GLOSS ON HIS POLICIES TO SUIT HIS AUDIENCE AND GIVEN THE STARK ATTITUDES TO RHODESIA OF THE MORE POWERFUL OF HIS NEIGHBOURS I FEAR HE MAY ONLY URGE MODERATION AT MONROVIA, IF AT ALL, ON THE LIKE-MINDED.

/ H.

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4. FOR HIS VIEW ON GHANA SEE MIFT.

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FCO PLEASE PASS SAVING TO MONROVIA WASHINGTON LUSAKA PARIS AND
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[REPEATED. AS REQUESTED]

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FM WASHINGTON 271736Z JUN 79
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NO 1704 OF 27 JUNE
AND TO PRIORITY MIRIMBA SALISBURY

MY TEL NO 1657:

BISHOP MUZOREWA'S VISIT

1. STATE DEPARTMENT HAVE NOW CONFIRMED THAT MUZOREWA WILL ARRIVE IN THE US ON 7 JULY. HE WILL BE ACCOMPANIED BY HIS FOREIGN MINISTER AND A MR AISHA JAMPIES. AN ADVANCE PARTY, INCLUDING THE BISHOP'S BROTHER ERNEST, SHOULD ARRIVE HERE ON 29 JUNE.
2. VANCE HAS AGREED TO SEE MUZOREWA, BUT NO FIRM DATE HAS BEEN FIXED. STATE DEPARTMENT, WHO ARE NOT (NOT) ORGANIZING THE VISIT, ARE UNAWARE OF ANY MEETING WITH THE PRESIDENT ON 10 JULY (MIRIMBA TELNO 335).
3. BEFORE WE TOLD THEM OF MUZOREWA'S PROJECTED VISIT TO LONDON ON 11-13 JULY, STATE DEPARTMENT HAD ASSUMED THAT MUZOREWA WOULD SPEND SOME CONSIDERABLE TIME IN THE US CANVASSING FOR RECOGNITION AND THE LIFTING OF SANCTIONS: THEY ARE RELIEVED THAT THE BISHOP'S VISIT HERE WILL NOW BE A BRIEF ONE.

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FM LUSAKA 261530Z JUN 79

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 526 OF 26 JUNE

INFO IMMEDIATE PRETORIA, MIRIMBA SALISBURY, DAR ES SALAAM,
GABORONE, MAPUTO, PRIORITY LUANDA, LAGOS, ADDIS ABABA, WASHINGTON,
UKMIS NEW YORK

MY TELNO 516: ZAMBIA/RHODESIA

DURING THE COURSE OF TODAY (26 JUNE), WE HAVE OBTAINED FURTHER
DETAILS WHICH SUPPLEMENT BUT DO NOT/NOT CONTRADICT THOSE IN MY
T.U.R.

2. THE ZAPU HOUSE IN ROMA SEEMS TO HAVE BEEN A RESIDENCE USED
BY SENIOR ZAPU OFFICIALS. THE SALISBURY DESCRIPTION OF IT AS
"AN INTELLIGENCE CENTRE" SEEMS EXAGGERATED, EVEN THOUGH ZAPU'S
HEAD OF SECURITY AND INTELLIGENCE, DOMISO DABENGWA, MAY HAVE
STAYED THERE.

3. FIVE HELICOPTERS WERE USED IN THE ROMA RAID AND THE CREWS
HAVE BEEN DESCRIBED TO US AS ALL-WHITE (THOUGH POSSIBLY SOME
AFRICAN GROUND TROOPS WERE INVOLVED). A SALISBURY COMMUNIQUE
WHICH WE HAVE PICKED UP TALKS OF ONE RHODESIAN KILLED AND ONE
INJURED.

4. THE HIGHEST CASUALTY FIGURES THAT WE HAVE HEARD ON THE
ZAMBIAN/ZAPU SIDE ARE 26 KILLED AND 20 INJURED. DIRECTOR FOR
EUROPE AT THE FOREIGN MINISTRY TOLD HEAD OF CHANCERY THAT CASUALTIES
HAD BEEN "HIGH" AND THAT THERE WERE POSSIBLY MORE ZAMBIANS
KILLED AND INJURED THAN ZAPU. MANY PEOPLE WOULD HAVE BEEN WALKING
TO WORK THROUGH ROMA AT THE TIME OF THE RAID. MNYANTHA ALSO
CLAIMED THAT ZIMBABWE HOUSE, IN A DIFFERENT AREA OF TOWN, HAD
BEEN ATTACKED.

5. CHIKUMBE CAMP WAS BOMBED SIMULTANEOUSLY BY RHODESIAN HUNTERS.
ZAPU ARE CLAIMING THAT CHIKUMBE IS STILL A FARMING CENTRE. QUITE
POSSIBLY THE AGRICULTURAL AREA OF THE CAMP WAS HIT.

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6. THE CONSENSUS OF OPINION IS THAT THE SUBSEQUENT SHOOTING IN OTHER AREAS OF TOWN WAS A PANICKY REACTION BY THE ZAMBIANS.
7. THERE MAY BE PRESS CONFERENCES TOMORROW, BUT ONE BY ZAPU SEEMS MORE LIKELY THAN ONE BY PRESIDENT KAUNDA.
8. THE PRESS AND SOME ZAMBIANS ARE SPECULATING THAT THIS WAS A DELIBERATE ATTEMPT TO EMBARRASS THE ZAMBIAN GOVT. AND UNDERMINE PROSPECTS FOR A SUCCESSFUL STATE VISIT AND COMMONWEALTH HEADS OF GOVERNMENT MEETING.

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TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 334 OF 26 JUNE

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON AND PRETORIA

U S REPRESENTATIVE IN SALISBURY

ACCORDING TO THE LOCAL REUTER REPRESENTATIVE, RODNEY PINDER, WHO IS NORMALLY RELIABLE, THE AUTHORITIES IN SALISBURY ARE UPSET AT THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF DAVIDOW'S APPOINTMENT. HE SAID THAT THEY WERE ANNOYED AT NOT BEING NOTIFIED BEFORE THE PUBLIC STATEMENT AND THEY ALSO REGRETTED HIS 'JUNIOR RANK'.

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10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

26 June 1979

B/F 4-779
In 00 Meeting

Dear Stephen,

Rhodesia

As you know, the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary brought Lord Harlech over to No.10 this morning, with Sir Antony Duff, for a discussion of Lord Harlech's recent mission to Southern Africa and of how the British Government should now move forward on the Rhodesia problem.

Lord Carrington outlined to the Prime Minister a possible course of future action on the following lines. Lord Harlech would visit Salisbury on 2 July for an exploratory discussion with Bishop Muzorewa on the possible amendment of the present Constitution. He would report the outcome to a meeting of OD on the morning of Thursday, 5 July. On 7 July, Bishop Muzorewa would be travelling to Washington and on 10 July Lord Carrington would himself be speaking in a foreign affairs debate in the House of Lords. On 11 or 12 July, Bishop Muzorewa would be coming to London and would call on the Prime Minister. In the meantime, Sir Antony Duff would have worked out possible constitutional amendments which would make the situation less unacceptable to the Front Line Presidents but without alienating the supporters of the internal settlement. These could be tried out on Bishop Muzorewa when he came to London. If the Bishop seemed willing to move beyond purely cosmetic changes, the British Government could then, at a time to be decided, make a public announcement of the amendments to the Constitution which it wished to sponsor and would publicly invite the Leaders of the Patriotic Front and the Bishop to attend a constitutional conference in London. The Patriotic Front would either decline the invitation, in which case they would have been publicly wrong-footed: or they would accept it and disrupt the conference, in which case they would be seen to be responsible for its breakdown. The British Government would then be in a position to recognise Zimbabwe-Rhodesia on the basis of an amended Constitution which would be known and seen to be acceptable to Bishop Muzorewa.

The Prime Minister said that she would be content with a scenario on these lines. She said that she attached importance, in the context of future debate with the Front Line Presidents, to being able to point to features of the amended Constitution which were shared by the Independence Constitutions of, e.g.

/Tanzania

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Tanzania, Kenya and Zambia. The Prime Minister said that the question of timing would also need careful consideration. She was anxious to move quickly, in order to get the British Government's proposals on the table before Bishop Muzorewa's Parliamentary Party suffered further defections. It was pointed out in discussion that there might be advantage in taking no public action before Lusaka, so that the Prime Minister could, at the CHGM, unveil the British Government's thinking; the Government could then go on to call for a constitutional conference after Lusaka but during the month of August. The Prime Minister agreed that Sir Antony Duff should do some further work on the timetable and that Lord Carrington would give the Prime Minister his recommendations in due course.

It was agreed that when the Prime Minister meets President Carter bilaterally in Tokyo on 29 June, she should inform him of Lord Harlech's recent consultations in Southern Africa, and of his forthcoming visit to Salisbury for further consultations with Bishop Muzorewa: she would not, however, inform the President at this stage of the Government's plans for further moves. She would tell President Carter that Lord Harlech's discussions had revealed a measure of flexibility among the Front Line Presidents and a chink of light on the possibility of finding a formula in which they could acquiesce. She would emphasise that it was clear that the Front Line Presidents would not necessarily object to some form of special constitutional position for the whites in Zimbabwe-Rhodesia and ask the President to ensure that Bishop Muzorewa, when he came to Washington, was pressed to make his Government into more of a going concern and to be seen to be in control of it.

In a short discussion of this morning's raid on Lusaka by Zimbabwe-Rhodesia forces, it was agreed that both President Kaunda and Bishop Muzorewa would have to give public undertakings, in advance of the CHGM, that they would refrain both from raids and from retaliation during the period of The Queen's visit to Zambia and of the CHGM.

In a discussion of the present situation in Uganda, the Prime Minister agreed that the Government should for the time being take no action to recognise President Binaisa but should await further developments. The Prime Minister did not disagree with Lord Carrington's suggestion that ex-President Lule should be allowed to come to the UK if and when President Nyerere released him from detention in Tanzania.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Martin Vile (Cabinet Office), and should be grateful if arrangements could be made for a meeting of OD on the morning of Thursday, 5 July.

*Your ever,
Bryan Cartledge.*

Stephen Wall, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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FM F C O 262009Z JUNE

TO IMMEDIATE TOKYO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 266 OF 26 JUNE.

FOLLOWING PERSONAL FOR WALDEN FROM WALL.

MALAYSIA.

1. PLEASE ASK THE EMBASSY TO SHOW YOU KUALA LUMPUR TEL NO. 217. GRATEFUL IF YOU COULD LET F C O AND KUALA LUMPUR KNOW IF THE SECRETARY OF STATE IS CONTENT WITH THE PROGRAMME. WE HAVE ASKED KUALA LUMPUR TO DRAFT NOTES FOR RJ SHORT SPEECH AND OTHER POSTS INVOLVED IN THE TOUR HAVE BEEN ASKED TO DO LIKEWISE AS NECESSARY.

ZAMBIA/RHODESIA.

For info.

[See BGC note on FCO to BGC 25.6.79]

2. WE DID NOT HEAR BEFORE THE PRIME MINISTER LEFT WHETHER SHE HAD APPROVED OUR DRAFT REPLY TO PRESIDENT KUANDA'S MESSAGE (MY LETTER TO CARTLEDGE OF 25 JUNE). IF APPROVED IN TOKYO IT WOULD BE HELPFUL IF TEXT COULD BE TELEGRAPHED TO LUSAKA.

CARRINGTON

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NOTE FOR THE RECORD

Rhodesia

The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary, Lord Harlech and Sir Antony Duff called on the Prime Minister on 26 June at 1030 in order to discuss the outcome of Lord Harlech's first mission in Southern Africa and its implications for the Government's next moves. Lord Harlech agreed with the Prime Minister's conclusion, from his reporting telegrams, that no change of heart would take place among the Front Line Presidents unless there was some amendment to the present constitution of Zimbabwe-Rhodesia. He said that even President Banda and Sir Seretse Khama were unable to stomach the idea of a constitution which had been cobbled together by Mr. Smith and his assistants and owed nothing to UK sponsorship. The Africans seemed to attach great importance to British input into any constitutional arrangement: even the Nigerians admitted that the UK's record on independence was good. It was, therefore, important to give the constitution a measure of UK sponsorship. The Prime Minister commented that the constitutional arrangements which had been offered to Rhodesia in 1963 and then on "Tiger" and "Fearless" were in fact less favourable than the present constitution.

The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary said that there were certain constraints of timing on the Government's future steps. There was a House of Lords debate on 10 July. Bishop Muzorewa would be going to Washington on 7 July and to London, where he would see the Prime Minister, on 11 or 12 July. Lord Carrington said that he proposed that Lord Harlech should go to Salisbury on 2 July, have exploratory discussions with Bishop Muzorewa and then report to a meeting of OD on 5 July.

Lord Carrington went on to say that it was clear that if the UK were to recognise Zimbabwe-Rhodesia straight away, without securing any amendments to the constitution, nobody in black Africa would support us. If, on the other hand, the UK were to make arbitrary changes in the constitution, the Government would have considerable political difficulties at home. It was therefore essential to convince Bishop Muzorewa that he must

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/himself

himself introduce constitutional changes. Sir Antony Duff was working out the minimum degree of change which would be necessary to win African support without upsetting the Rhodesian whites. Lord Harlech's consultations had shown that some of the Front Line Presidents accepted that there had to be a degree of constitutional entrenchment for the whites. If the Bishop could be persuaded to move beyond purely cosmetic changes towards a position which other Africans might be disposed to accept, the British Government could then make a public proposal to the effect that the constitution would be amended in certain respects, which would be specified, and that they therefore wished to invite the Patriotic Front leaders and Bishop Muzorewa to attend a constitutional conference in London. One of two things would then happen. Either the Patriotic Front would refuse the invitation, in which case they would be publicly wrong-footed: or they would attend the conference with the result that it would break down and they would be seen to be responsible for this. In either event, the British Government could then recognise Zimbabwe-Rhodesia on the basis of the amended constitution.

The Prime Minister said that it would be important to ensure that the amended constitution had aspects in common with the "standard" UK-sponsored constitutions which had been given to Tanzania, Kenya, Uganda and other countries; a degree of similarity would be needed for use in argument with the Front Line Presidents. Sir Antony Duff agreed and said that the amended constitution had to be sufficiently similar to the existing one to be acceptable to the supporters of the internal settlement but at the same time sufficiently different to be defensible outside Rhodesia. At present, the FCO judgement was that the first factor was the more important of the two. As an example of the kind of change which might be made, Sir Antony Duff said that the white representatives in Parliament could be reduced from 28 to 20 and the arrangements for Commissioners could be altered. Lord Carrington agreed that the power of the Commissions to impose a veto was a major problem with the present constitution.

/The Prime Minister

CONFIDENTIAL

- 3 -

The Prime Minister enquired about the timescale which was envisaged for this procedure. Lord Carrington said that he thought that the Prime Minister might float the Government's ideas at the CHGM in Lusaka. The Prime Minister indicated that she thought that progress would have to be faster than this, since Bishop Muzorewa's party might otherwise fall to pieces before the Government had taken action. Lord Carrington said that Sir Antony Duff would be giving further thought to the question of timing and proposals would be put to the Prime Minister in due course.

The Prime Minister said that, in answer to questions in the House, she would say that Lord Harlech's purpose during his forthcoming visit to Salisbury would be to engage in friendly consultations with Bishop Muzorewa in order to find a basis for a way forward.

In a short discussion of the activities of Mr. Tiny Rowlands and Lonrho, Lord Carrington commented that Mr. Rowlands was evidently trying to cobble together an opposition faction in the African National Congress which could eventually topple Bishop Muzorewa and bring Nkomo back to Salisbury.

In further discussion, it was agreed that the suggestion that junior FCO Ministers might begin to disclose some of the Government's thinking to backbenchers in the corridors of the House should not be pursued. Enough would be happening during the next few weeks to convey the feeling of movement and Lord Carrington would say in the debate on 10 July that the Government would have certain proposals to make in due course. It was agreed that a meeting of OD should be arranged for 5 July.

Lord Carrington told the Prime Minister that in Mr. Andy Young's view the US House of Representatives would not support the lifting of sanctions. If they did, President Carter would veto. But, in Mr. Young's view, the President would not impose his veto if the Zimbabwe-Rhodesia constitution had been modified in the meantime. Mr. Young had indicated that the British Government should not read too much into President Carter's

/determination

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determination on the sanctions issue; his main concern had been to establish the best basis for himself on which to argue with Congress. Mr. Young thought that President Carter was basically in favour of Bishop Muzorewa. It was agreed that when the Prime Minister saw President Carter bilaterally in Tokyo she should inform him about Lord Harlech's mission and consultations with Bishop Muzorewa but that she should not, at this stage, apprise him of the Government's plans for further moves. She would impress on him the need for Bishop Muzorewa to be made aware, when he visited Washington, of the importance of being seen to govern in Salisbury and to make his government a going concern. The Prime Minister would tell President Carter that Lord Harlech's talks had revealed a measure of flexibility among the Front Line Presidents; and that they had shown that there was some possibility of finding a formula in which they could acquiesce - there was a chink of light, she would say, for a possible solution. The Prime Minister would also stress to President Carter that the Front Line Presidents would not necessarily object to a special constitutional position for the whites in Zimbabwe-Rhodesia.

Uganda

In a short discussion of current developments in Uganda, the Prime Minister agreed that the British Government should take no action on the question of recognition of President Binaisa's regime for the time being but should await developments. She did not dissent from Lord Carrington's suggestion that ex-President Lule should be allowed to come to the UK when President Nyerere agreed to release him from detention.

BM,

CONFIDENTIAL



Prime Minister Foreign and Commonwealth Office
London SW1A 2AH

*Agree with this
Draft ready, and with*

25 June 1979

Dear Bryan,

*X - better?
No. 10 improved -
pa. G. M. 26/6*

Rhodesia: Letter from President Kaunda

Thank you for your letter of 15 June giving an account of the Zambian High Commissioner's call on the Prime Minister.

I enclose a draft reply which the Prime Minister may wish to send in response to President Kaunda's letter of 8 June. The draft takes account of Lord Harlech's meeting with the President on 14 June (Lusaka telegram no 426, copy enclosed). The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary considers it unnecessary to attempt to deal in any detail with President Kaunda's letter. But he thinks we should take the opportunity to express our own view on the changes in Rhodesia, while acknowledging the problems caused by the conflict and emphasising the importance we attach to continuing consultation.

The Prime Minister may wish to be aware that much of the substance of President Kaunda's letter appears to be generally similar to letters he has sent to certain other heads of Government, urging a broadly based solution, the withholding of recognition, and the maintenance of sanctions. (Lusaka telno 406, copy enclosed).

If the Prime Minister agrees, we would propose to send the text of the letter to President Kaunda by telegram to Lusaka for Mr Allinson to hand over. This is the course recommended by Lord Harlech in the telegram reporting his meeting with Kaunda. Mr Allinson would make clear the Prime Minister's preference for a restricted meeting with President Kaunda, with Lord Carrington and a note-taker present on our side.

*Yours ever,
Stephen*

(J S Wall)
Private Secretary

Bryan G Cartledge Esq
10 Downing Street
LONDON

CONFIDENTIAL

Registry
No.

DRAFT

Type 1 +

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

Top Secret,
Secret.
Confidential.
Restricted.
Unclassified.

To:-

President Kaunda

From

Prime Minister

Telephone No. Ext.

Department

PRIVACY MARKING

..... In Confidence

Thank you for your long and thoughtful letter on Rhodesia, which your High Commissioner gave me on 15 June. I value your frankness, and the trouble you took to make your position so clear. I have also been helped in understanding your views by Lord Harlech's account of his talk with you on 14 June. This was clearly a very useful meeting and I am grateful to you for discussing with him how we might move forward on this difficult problem.

I and my colleagues believe that the April election in Rhodesia, and the advent to power of Bishop Muzorewa's government, marked a significant change. We think that this step forward - as we regard it - does give us the opportunity to make a fresh attempt at finding and establishing a lasting settlement for Rhodesia. You for your part, if I understand you correctly, consider that this new government in Rhodesia is only one of the centres of power in the situation and you fear that we may attach too much importance to it.

Mr President, I do not believe that this difference between our views need inhibit us from working together towards a common objective. In my view, that objective must be to bring Rhodesia to legal independence in circumstances which will command as wide international acceptance as possible. I believe this can be done, and I look forward to discussing with you in Lusaka and with our other Commonwealth colleagues how it can be done.

As I have told your High Commissioner, when she called to give me your letter, I do indeed attach great
/importance

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importance to maintaining close and friendly relations between our two countries; and I welcome the suggestion she put to me that you and I should meet together quietly, at an early stage in the Commonwealth Conference. Mr Allinson will be in touch with you about arranging such a meeting.

~~I know how deeply and how tragically Zambia has suffered as a result of the Rhodesian problem. I know how much it means to you and to your people to achieve a satisfactory and honourable settlement. It is my earnest wish that we should work together to bring about a peaceful solution which will gain wide international acceptance, thus benefiting not only Rhodesia but all the countries of the region.~~

an early & honourable settlement of the Rhodesian problem.

With warm personal regards.

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028 800

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DESKBY 150900Z

FM LUSAKA 141600Z JUN 79

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 426 OF 14 JUNE

INFO IMMEDIATE DAR ES SALAAM, PRIORITY GABORONE, LAGOS, MAPUTO, LUANDA, CAPETOWN, MIRIMBA SALISBURY, WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK, PRETORIA.

FOLLOWING FOR SECRETARY OF STATE FROM LORD HARLECH.

RHODESIA

1. I HAD OVER AN HOUR AND A HALF WITH KAUNDA ON 14 JUNE. IT WAS DIFFICULT TO PIN HIM DOWN TO DISCUSSING POINTS OF SUBSTANCE, AND HIS OPENING REMARKS (AND MANY THAT FOLLOWED) AMOUNTED TO LITTLE MORE THAN A RECITAL OF PAST GRIEVANCES ON LINES WITH WHICH WE ARE FAMILIAR. BUT BOTH THE LENGTH OF THE INTERVIEW AND KAUNDA'S CONSISTENTLY FRIENDLY TONE CONVINCED ME THAT HE TOOK MY MISSION SERIOUSLY. I BELIEVE I LEFT HIM IN TURN IN A REASONABLY RECEPTIVE FRAME OF MIND AND DISPOSED TO BELIEVE THAT, WHILE THE GOVERNMENT'S OBJECTIVE WAS CLEAR, THE MEANS BY WHICH IT WAS TO BE ACHIEVED WAS STILL OPEN FOR CONSIDERATION.

2. KAUNDA'S OPENING STATEMENT EXPOUNDED HIS THESIS THAT BY REFUSING EFFECTIVE BACKING FOR NATIONALIST ASPIRATIONS IN SOUTHERN AFRICA THE WEST HAD PROMOTED CHINESE AND SOVIET OBJECTIVES IN THE REGION BY DRIVING THE LIBERATION MOVEMENTS AND THE FRONT LINE PRESIDENTS, AGAINST THEIR INCLINATIONS, TO SEEK ARMS AND SUPPORT FROM THE COMMUNISTS. IF BRITAIN WANTED TO COUNTER SOVIET INFLUENCE IN RHODESIA, WE COULD ONLY DO SO BY RECOGNISING THAT THE MUZOREWA-SMITH 'POWER CENTRES' WERE IN DECLINE AND BY ACTING QUICKLY TO ARRANGE A CEASE-FIRE ON A REALISTIC BASIS. HE THEN HARKED BACK TO THE ANGLO/AMERICAN PROPOSALS.

3. MAKING CLEAR THAT I PERSONALLY SYMPATHISED WITH MUCH IN KAUNDA'S ANALYSIS OF THE PAST, I URGED HIM NEVERTHELESS TO RECOGNISE THAT, AS WE SAW IT, SIGNIFICANT CHANGE HAD NOW TAKEN PLACE IN RHODESIA. WE WERE NOT ALONE IN THIS. PRESIDENT MOI HAD

(SPOKEN OF A

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SPOKEN OF A "NEW SITUATION" AND PRESIDENT CARTER OF "VERY ENCOURAGING PROGRESS". AT THE VERY LEAST BISHOP MUZOREWA DESERVED A CHANCE TO SHOW WHETHER OR NOT HE HAD ACHIEVED A POSITION OF GENUINE AUTHORITY. THERE WERE A NUMBER OF WAYS (WHICH I OUTLINED BRIEFLY) IN WHICH HMG FELT THAT FURTHER PROGRESS MIGHT BE MADE, GIVEN THE COOPERATION OF THE NEW ADMINISTRATION IN SALISBURY AND THE SUPPORT OF ZAMBIA AND OTHERS.

4. AFTER A LONG PAUSE, KAUNDA ASKED ME TO ELABORATE ON THE WAYS IN WHICH I THOUGHT THE CONSTITUTIONAL POSITION IN RHODESIA MIGHT BE OPEN TO IMPROVEMENT. THIS WAS THE "NERVE CENTRE" OF THE PROBLEM. I POINTED OUT THAT OUTSIDE CRITICISM OF THE NEW CONSTITUTION HAD FOCUSED ON THE PROPORTION OF WHITE REPRESENTATION IN PARLIAMENT AND THE POWER OF THE WHITES TO BLOCK CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS. IF SALISBURY COULD BE PERSUADED TO MAKE CHANGES IN THESE RESPECTS, IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE TO THINK IN TERMS OF PUTTING THE RESULTS TO SOME NEW TEST OF THEIR ACCEPTABILITY TO THE PEOPLE OF RHODESIA AS A WHOLE IN TERMS WHICH WOULD CARRY INTERNATIONAL CONVICTION. IN THIS PART OF THE TALK KAUNDA CONFIRMED THAT HE COULD NOT OBJECT IN PRINCIPLE TO THERE BEING A SPECIFIC NUMBER OF SEATS RESERVED FOR THE WHITE MINORITY FOR A LIMITED PERIOD. BOTH ZAMBIA AND TANGANYIKA HAD SUCH PROVISIONS ORIGINALLY.

5. KAUNDA URGED VERY STRONGLY THAT THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT SHOULD ITSELF PUT NEW CONSTITUTIONAL PROPOSALS TO THE FOUR "POWER CENTRES" (BY WHICH HE MEANS MUZOREWA, SMITH, NKOMO AND MUGADE). WE HAD DONE THE RIGHT THING BY NOT RECOGNISING THE NEW GOVERNMENT AT ONCE AND THIS GAVE US THE CHANCE TO GO ON TALKING TO THE EXTERNAL PARTIES. BUT IT WOULD BE HOPELESS TO USE THE EXISTING "ILLEGAL" CONSTITUTION AS THE STARTING POINT. IN ZAMBIAN EYES A RETURN TO LEGALITY THROUGH CONSTITUTIONAL MEANS WAS IMPORTANT (BY THIS I DO NOT THINK KAUNDA NECESSARILY MEANT A TEMPORARY RETURN TO DEPENDENT STATUS, THOUGH I SHOULD GUESS THAT THIS MIGHT INCREASE THE ATTRACTION FOR HIM OF ANY EVENTUAL SETTLEMENT).

6. KAUNDA MADE NO REFERENCE IN TERMS TO THE IDEA OF AN ALL-PARTY CONFERENCE. THE PROBLEM WAS ONE OF "SELLING FRESH IDEAS, WHICH WOULD NEED TO COME FROM HMG, TO ALL FOUR GROUPS. THE SOONER CONTACTS TO THIS END BEGAN, THE BETTER, AND HE DID NOT RULE OUT THE IDEA OF A COMMONWEALTH CONTACT GROUP BEING USED. ZAMBIA WAS READY TO SUPPORT ANY GENUINE EFFORT IN THIS DIRECTION.

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COMMENT

7. IT WOULD OBVIOUSLY BE UNWISE TO READ TOO MUCH INTO THE LINE KAUNDA TOOK WITH ME. HE STILL HANKERS AFTER THE UNATTAINABLE - A DECOLONISATION OF RHODESIA ON THE CLASSIC PATTERN. BUT HIS MIND IS NOT CLOSED AND HE APPEARED TO HAVE GAINED ENCOURAGEMENT FROM OUR TALK. IT WILL BE IMPORTANT TO TRY TO FOLLOW UP THIS FIRST CONTACT AS QUICKLY AND EFFECTIVELY AS POSSIBLE. ONE WAY TO DO THIS MIGHT BE TO ASK THAT MR ALLINSON SHOULD BE PERMITTED TO DELIVER PERSONALLY THE EVENTUAL REPLY TO THE LETTER FROM KAUNDA WHICH I UNDERSTAND MISS CHIBEKASUNDA HAS ASKED TO DELIVER TO THE PRIME MINISTER. I BELIEVE THAT THIS LETTER WILL BE FOUND TO BE SIMILAR IN TERMS TO THOSE WHICH HE HAS SENT TO PRESIDENT CARTER AND OTHERS, AND THAT HE WAS DRAWING ON ITS PHRASEOLOGY IN SPEAKING TO ME.

8. A ZAPU DELEGATION, LED BY SILUNDIKA, WILL BE CALLING AT THE HIGH COMMISSION TO SEE ME DURING THE MORNING OF 15 JUNE.

ALLINSON

FILES

RHOD D

SAFD

PUSD

PLANNING STAFF

LEGAL ADVISERS

(MR FREELAND)

(MR STEEL)

AS

PS/SIR I GILMOUR

PS/MR LUCE

PS/MR RIDLEY

PS/MR HURO

PS/MR MARTEN

PS/MR BLAKER

PS/PUS

SIR A DUFF

SIR A PARSONS

MR WILLSON

MR WILLIAMS

COPIES TO

PS/SIR G HUNT
CABINET OFFICE

MR CARTLEDGE
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1/2/79

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FM LUSAKA 130913Z JUN 79

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 406 OF 13 JUNE

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, CANBERRA, OTTAWA, PARIS, GABORONE,
PRIORITY PRETORIA, UMWIS NEW YORK, DAR ES SALAAM, MAPUTO, LAGOS

MY TELNO 395 OF 12 JUNE: RHODESIA

1. STEVE LOW HAS BEEN AUTHORISED TO BRIEF LORD HARLECH ON THE SUBSTANCE OF PRESIDENT KAUNDA'S LETTER TO PRESIDENT CARTER AND WILL DO SO THIS EVENING. NO ONE HAS FELT ABLE TO LET ME HAVE A COPY OF THE DOCUMENT AT THIS STAGE BUT (PLEASE PROTECT) HAVE IN FACT HAD SIGHT OF IT. THE LETTER BEARS THE HALLMARKS OF PRESIDENT KAUNDA'S OWN HANDIWORK AND IS LARGELY TAKEN UP WITH HIS VIEWS ON THE MUZOREWA/SMITH REGIME WHICH IS SEEN AS SIMPLY A CONTINUATION OF THE SMITH GOVERNMENT UNDER ANOTHER GUISE. IF THE REGIME IS RECOGNISED BY THE WEST CONFLICT WILL BE INTERNATIONALISED AND THE PATRIOTIC FRONT TURNED DEFINITELY TO THE EAST TO WHOM THEY ALREADY HAVE TO LOOK FOR THEIR WEAPONS.

2. ACCORDINGLY BRITAIN'S FRIENDS IN THE WEST ARE URGED TO PREVAIL ON US

- A) TO GIVE RHODESIA A BROAD BASIS AND LASTING SOLUTION
- B) TO WITHHOLD RECOGNITION OF MUZOREWA/SMITH REGIME AND TO HOLD FIRMLY TO SANCTIONS, ACCEPTING MUZOREWA/SMITH'S RULE AS ONLY A STAGE IN THE TRANSITION TO MAJORITY RULE
- C) TO ANNOUNCE A CLEAR POLICY POSITION ON RHODESIA DECLARING THE MUZOREWA/SMITH RULE AS ONLY ONE OF THE CONFLICTING FEATURES WHICH CHARACTERISE THE TRANSITIONAL STAGE OF THE TERRITORY AND TO CALL THE LEADERS BOTH INSIDE AND OUTSIDE RHODESIA TO AN ALL-PARTY CONFERENCE TO REACH A FINAL SETTLEMENT.

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/ 3. I WAS

3. I WAS INTERESTED TO SEE THERE WAS NO EXPLICIT CRITICISM OF BRITAIN OR ATTACK UPON US.
4. THE LETTER TO PRESIDENT GISCARD INVITED HIM TO VISIT ZAMBIA SOON TO SEE THINGS FOR HIMSELF (BUT PLEASE PROTECT FRENCH CHARGE'S HAVING REVEALED THIS TO US).

ALLINSON

F I L E S

RHOD D	LEGAL ADVISERS	PS/MR RIDLEY	ADDITIONAL DIST
OADS	(MR FREELAND)	PS/MR HURD	RHODESIA POLICY
NAD	(MR STEEL)	PS/FUS	
NEWS D	ECON D	SIR A DUFF	
FUSD	PCD	SIR A PARSONS	
PLANNING STAFF	DEF D		
ES & SD	OID	MR LEAHY	
CCD	PS	MISS BROWN	
FRD	PS/SIR I GILMOUR	MR THOMAS	
UND	PS/MR LUCE	MR WILLSON	
		MR WILLIAMS	

COVERING CONFIDENTIAL Prime Minister



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

25 June 1979

Dear Sir,

Rhodesia: Lord Harlech's Mission

--- Before her meeting tomorrow with Lord Harlech, the Prime Minister may wish to see the attached summary of the telegrams reporting Lord Harlech's discussions in Africa.

*Yours ever,
J S Wall*

(J S Wall)

B G Cartledge Esq
10 Downing Street

COVERING CONFIDENTIAL

LORD HARLECH'S MISSION

1. President Seretse Khama argued that the UK should take decisive action soon to exploit weaknesses in the present positions of both Bishop Muzorewa and the Patriotic Front. The latter would not take part in any negotiation initiated by Muzorewa. A British initiative would confirm our good intentions and expose intransigence by one side or the other. Negotiations might initially be conducted through a Western or Commonwealth contact group. Bishop Muzorewa could help by removing the special privileges of whites and their powers of veto over constitutional amendments. If constitutional changes were achieved with British authority and approved by the people, and fair elections held, Botswana would accept the outcome. A test of acceptability could be conducted under UN or purely British auspices.
2. President Kaunda considered that the constitutional position was the central issue. We should not use the existing Constitution as the starting point, but should put new constitutional proposals to the internal and external parties. He did not rule out a Commonwealth contact group.
3. President Nyerere said that there had been an advance in Rhodesia, but it had not gone far enough. There was not genuine majority rule. But discussion now had to be on the basis of the internal constitution. There could be some special protection for minorities, but they should not have the power of veto. The improvement of the Constitution was more important than the removal of Ian Smith. But an improved Constitution and a test of acceptability would not be sufficient. There should be fresh elections. The Patriotic Front might negotiate on the basis of constitutional proposals put forward by the UK.
4. President Banda said that the elections had produced a

/more

more hopeful situation, but recognition by the UK on the basis of the internal settlement would attract little support. The first priority was the removal of Smith and the second the amendment of the Constitution: the whites had too many reserved seats and too extensive veto powers. We should put forward our own proposals and not accept terms from Muzorewa.

5. The Mozambican Foreign Minister argued that the Rhodesian elections were null and void. The UK had to decide whether it wanted a confrontation or conciliation with the Patriotic Front. A clear statement of position by the UK and the US would be necessary to bring the Patriotic Front to talks. The UK should either reassert its authority in Rhodesia or support the war of liberation. There should be no question of acting as an intermediary between the two sides.

6. President Neto expressed appreciation of our consultations. He agreed that Bishop Muzorewa was an important factor; but he was a prisoner of the Rhodesian system. The solution was new elections, in which all parties could participate. But they could not be held under the control of the existing security forces.

7. Mr Mugabe and the ZANU delegation argued that, for an effective transfer of power, the illegal regime should be dismantled and its forces replaced by the Patriotic Front. The British Government could not act as a referee between Muzorewa and the Patriotic Front, or work on the basis of the present Constitution. We should put forward our own proposals. Agreement must be reached on the independence constitution before discussion of a ceasefire and transitional arrangements. Muzorewa's following would not be significant if he competed in an election with the Patriotic Front.

8. The ZAFU delegation in Lusaka argued that the elections had not resulted in a real transfer of power. New elections should be held, under conditions acceptable to the Patriotic Front.

9. The Nigerian Government expressed the same concern as others that a return to legality should come on a basis which derived its authority from Britain and was comparable with the process of decolonisation elsewhere in Africa. General Yar'Adua suggested that it would be helpful in the context of the OAU meetings and CHOGM for HMG to make a statement clarifying its intentions and confirming that no decision had been taken to legalise Rhodesian independence on the basis of the status quo.

Rhodesia Department
25 June 1979

CONFIDENTIAL

FROM FCO 251408Z JUNE 79

TO PRIORITY MONROVIA

TELEGRAM NUMBER 57 OF 25 JUNE

INFO PRIORITY ABIDJAN DAKAR KINSHASA PARIS WASHINGTON UKDEL NEW YORK .

FROM PS/MR. LUCE.

RHODESIA.

Prime Ministerbut
2/2/79*[Handwritten signature]*

1. MR LUCE SAW FOREIGN MINISTER DENNIS FOLLOWED BY PRESIDENT TOLBERT ON 23 JUNE. MAIN POINTS ON RHODESIA ARE GIVEN BELOW. /
2. THE LIBERIAN GOVERNMENT AGREED THAT THERE HAD BEEN CONSIDERABLE PROGRESS IN RHODESIA. HOWEVER EVEN IF THE ELECTIONS COULD BE DESCRIBED AS FREE AND FAIR THERE COULD BE NO DOUBT THAT THE REFERENDUM ON THE CONSTITUTION WAS INADEQUATE. ALL THE PARTIES MUST GET TOGETHER. THOUGHT WOULD HAVE TO BE GIVEN TO RESTRUCTURING THE CONSTITUTION TO PERMIT THIS. PERHAPS THE FIRST MOVE SHOULD BE TO IDENTIFY WHAT MUZOREWA WOULD BE PREPARED TO CONCEDE, THEN SEE WHAT NKOMO AND MUGABE COULD OFFER. LORD HARLECH MIGHT BE IN A GOOD POSITION TO IDENTIFY THE WAY FORWARD. THE LIBERIANS WOULD BE INTERESTED TO HEAR OUR VIEWS FOLLOWING HIS TOUR. THEY WOULD PROVIDE USEFUL BACKGROUND FOR DISCUSSIONS WITH NYERERE BEFORE THE OAU CONFERENCE AND WITH KAUNDA, NKOMO AND MUGABE.
3. PRESIDENT TOLBERT REFERRED TO HIS FRIENDSHIP FOR MUZOREWA. HE HAD BEEN IN CONTINUAL TOUCH WITH MUZOREWA AND WITH SITHOLE. HE WAS DISAPPOINTED THAT THEY HAD FALLEN OUT AND THAT CHIKEREMA HAD BROKEN AWAY. HE EXPECTED THE BISHOP TO GET IN TOUCH WITH HIM BEFORE THE OAU MEETING. AT THE OAU MEETING TOLBERT WOULD DO EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO PREVENT ESCALATION WHICH COULD PRECIPITATE A CATASTROPHE FOR AFRICA AND THE WORLD. THERE HAD TO BE ACCOMMODATION AND COMPROMISE.

4. ON SANCTIONS PRESIDENT TOLBERT SAID THE QUESTION NEEDED TO BE DEALT WITH CAREFULLY. THEY SHOULD NOT BE LIFTED PRECIPITATELY. TO DO SO WOULD ANTAGONISE A WIDE SPECTRUM OF AFRICAN OPINION. WHEN MUZOREWA HAD ASKED HIM ABOUT SANCTIONS HE HAD TOLD HIM THAT THE WHOLE PROBLEM OF RHODESIA MUST BE DEALT WITH FIRST.

CARRINGTON.

FILES
RHODESIA D
OADS
NEWS D
PS
PS/LPS
PS/MR. LUCE
PS/MR. RIDLEY
PS/MR. HURD
PS/PUS
SIR A DUFF
MR. WILLIAMS
MR. WILLSON

ADDITIONAL DISTN.
RHODESIA POLICY

408/306/3

ADMINISTRATIVE ARRANGEMENTS
FOR LORD HARLECH'S VISIT TO
SALISBURY, 2-4 JULY 1979

1. Lord Harlech, accompanied by Mr P J Barlow, Special Assistant, Rhodesia Department, is visiting Salisbury for talks on 3 and 4 July.

2. Tickets for the following travel arrangements are enclosed:-

Monday 2 July

SA 235	depart Heathrow	1815
	arrive Johannesburg	0745 (3 July)

Wednesday 4 July

BA 050	depart Johannesburg	1845
	arrive Heathrow	0705 (5 July).

The Alcock and Brown suite at Heathrow Terminal 3 has been reserved for both Lord Harlech's outward and return journeys.

3. Travel between Johannesburg and Salisbury and return will be by Learjet chartered from National Airways in Johannesburg. The aircraft will be ready for departure on the arrival of the commercial flight, to arrive in Salisbury by 1000 on 3 July, and will return the passengers in time to catch the return flight to London, ETD Salisbury 1600 on 4 July.

4. Lord Harlech and Mr Barlow will need only valid passports; no visas are required. Their cholera and smallpox immunisations will still be up-to-date.

5. The insurance of baggage at the expense of HMG is not permissible. In the case of loss of personal baggage while travelling or while in receipt of subsistence allowance, claims may be submitted up to a maximum of £200 (no one article to exceed £50) provided that the loss is not covered by an existing policy. The party are also advised to check that their personal insurance policies provide cover for travel by non-commercial flights and to consult their insurers if they are in any doubt about their position. At present claims on the Government are subject to a liability limit of £25,000.

6. Lord Harlech and Mr Barlow will stay at Mirimba House in Salisbury.

7. Mr Barlow will be documented as Special Courier for the trip. All classified material must be entered on the courier's waybill; those concerned are asked to contact Mr Chapman (233 3706).


8. A car has been arranged to take the party to Heathrow as follows:-

Mr Barlow	Park Door, FCO	1600
Lord Harlech	14A Ladbrooke Road, W11	1620

and a car will also meet them on return and take them home.

RESTRICTED

9. Transport in Salisbury will be arranged by our office there.
10. All costs will be borne on the DCS Vote subhead C3(2)(e). One third of the standard rate of subsistence (R\$28.20) will be paid in Salisbury.
11. Our office in Salisbury and the British Embassy in Pretoria will be responsible for administering the party. Any enquiries about these arrangements should be addressed to the undersigned.



J Oldershaw (Miss)
Conference and Visits Section
Protocol and Conference Department

FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

29 June 1979

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- 2 -

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DISTRIBUITION

No. 10 DOWNING STREET

Mr B G Cartledge

FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

Private Secretary

PS/Mr Luce

Sir Antony Duff

Chief Clerk

Mr D Day

Rhodesia Department: Mr R W Renwick
Mr P J Barlow

Southern African Department: Mr B L Barder

Accommodation and Services Department: Transport Section, Car Pool

Communications Operations Department: Mr L T Charrington (10)

News Department (1): Mr J Carroll (1)

Permanent Under-Secretary's Department: Mr R G Beer (2)

Protocol and Conference Department (10): Mr D Battsby-Dutton (1)

Resident Clerks

Security Department: Mr P L Bean

LONDON AIRPORT, HEATHROW

Senior Special Facilities Officer: Mr J E Bannister

BRITISH EMBASSY, PRETORIA

Mr R B Dorman (3)

BRITISH CONSULATE-GENERAL, JOHANNESBURG

Mr M T M Hannant (3)


MIRIMBA HOUSE, SALISBURY

Mr F Wilson (c/o Mr Barlow)

Lord Harlech (c/o Mr Barlow)

RESTRICTED

- 2 JUL 1979



FROM: THE RT. HON. JULIAN AMERY, M.P.



112, EATON SQUARE,
SW1W 9AA

TEL: 01-235 1543
01-235 7409

22nd June, 1979.

I understand that Senator Helms has invited Bishop Muzorewa to visit the United States shortly, that Mr. Vance has agreed to receive him and that the President has said, though only provisionally, that he is to do so likewise.

The Bishop, I am advised, planned to visit London on his way to Washington and hoped to see you and the Prime Minister. I understand however that Mr. Day in a recent private conversation with the Bishop ^{has} sought to discourage him from visiting London or Washington, suggesting instead the Bishop await your possible visit to Southern Africa.

The Bishop's side seems to have taken some umbrage at this suggestion. He is apparently determined to visit Washington but judges that his visit there would be more successful if he had first been received by the Prime Minister in London.

I cannot judge the ins and outs of all this but thought I should let you have a note of it before we meet on Monday.

✓ I am copying this letter to the Prime Minister.

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to be 'JA' with a flourish.

Julian Amery

The Rt. Hon. The Lord Carrington, KCMG, MC.

CONFIDENTIAL

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CONFIDENTIAL

FM WASHINGTON 222139Z JUNE 79
TO PRIORITY FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1657 OF 22 JUNE
INFO PRIORITY MIRIMBA SALISBURY.

Prime Minister

BM
23
no
out

MY TELNO 1535.

RHODESIA: VISIT OF MUZOREWA

FUNK (NSC STAFF MEMBER FOR AFRICA) TOLD US TODAY THAT MUZOREWA'S VISIT TO WASHINGTON WAS NOW FIXED FOR JULY 7. FROM MUZOREWA'S POINT OF VIEW FUNK SAID IT WAS A VISIT AT THE WRONG TIME UNDER THE WRONG AUSPICES. HE WAS ALMOST CERTAIN TO DAMAGE HIS CASE.

2. FUNK SAID HE HAD STRONGLY URGED THE SOUTH AFRICAN EMBASSY TO ADVISE MUZOREWA AGAINST A VISIT AT THIS TIME. THE CONGRESS HAVING FOCUSED ON RHODESIA, WAS MOVING ON. HE WAS CONVINCED THE HOUSE WOULD ENDORSE THE GENERAL APPROACH OF THE SOLARZ AMENDMENT WHICH IN EFFECT MEANT POSTPONING THE ISSUE TILL THE AUTUMN. THE ARGUMENT HAVING MOST EFFECT ON THE HILL WITH CONGRESSMEN WHO HAD LITTLE KNOWLEDGE OF OR STRONG VIEWS ON RHODESIA (THE MAJORITY) WAS THAT THE USA SHOULD NOT GET OUT AHEAD OF THE BRITISH ON THIS ISSUE. MUZOREWA COULD NOT HAVE A PUBLIC RELATIONS SUCCESS HERE. HIS VISIT WOULD SIMPLY DISTRACT HIM FOR HIS REAL JOB OF DEMONSTRATING THAT HE WAS IN CHARGE IN ZIMBABWE-RHODESIA.

3. FUNK SAID THAT ALTHOUGH VANCE WOULD NO DOUBT SEE HIM IT WAS DOUBTFUL THAT THE PRESIDENT WOULD. HE HIMSELF WOULD RECOMMEND AGAINST, BUT NO DECISION HAD BEEN TAKEN.

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SIR I GILMOUR
PS/MR HURD
PS/MR RIDLEY
PS/MR LUCE
PS/PUS
SIR A DUFF
SIR A PARSONS
MR DAY
MR LEAHY
MISS BROWN
MR THOMAS
MR WILLSON
MR WILLIAMS

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION

RHODESIA POLICY
SA/RHO/UN

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By - Nany in red

TO: The Prime Minister.
FROM: Patrick Cosgrave.

...1...

1. Soon after the election The American Spectator asked me to write a profile of any black African leader I might choose, provided a) I could interview him and b) that he could be considered a strategic figure.
2. This was an exciting assignment especially as I had never been to Africa, and my knowledge of the continent was wholly academic.
3. I chose Kenneth Kaunda. Bishop Muzorewa I had met in London, and I had been singularly unimpressed. But Kaunda had always rather interested me and, moreover, I was lucky enough to have a potential contact with him, in the person of Mr 'Tiny' Rowland of Lonrho, a mutual friend.
4. In due course the President invited me to come to see him and I spent several days in Zambia. In all I had three sessions with him, the first and longest lasting from six in the evening to the early hours of the following morning. I set myself to listen rather than to argue (though some argument of course occurred) and the drift of the conversation was such that I thought you might like to know about it; not least because a lot of it was about you and your policies, domestic as well as foreign.
5. I should mention at this point that Mr Rowland, in order the better to introduce me to the President, had sent him copies of all my books, including, of course, the one on you. So far as I could judge he had thoroughly read only two of them - the one on you and the one on the poetry of Robert Lowell: he himself writes poetry in his tribal dialect.

6. As you would know and expect the main thrust of his remarks on Britain and Southern Africa was along the lines of his total opposition to our recognising Zimbabwe-Rhodesia. However, within the context of that opposition I think a number of interesting and revealing points emerged, about his character, his domestic position, his relations with other African states, and about the future.
7. He seemed genuinely and unforcedly to have a very low opinion of the internal black leaders in Rhodesia. He claimed that Sithole is suffering from syphilis.
8. He takes the view that Nkomo is absolutely indispensable to a final settlement, not least because he is Shona and that tribe despite its importance is unrepresented in the present government. He believes that Nkomo can be brought into a peaceful settlement. He gave me the impression, without saying so in so many words, that he would himself enthusiastically support any move by a British government seeking to bring that about.
9. He freely confessed to there being serious rifts among the "front line states". His attitude to Nyerere verged on loathing. He made it clear that he would like to see Savimbi installed in Angola. I said, picking up a suggestion I had heard in London, that if this was done with the aid of South African arms he might not view it so favourably. To my amazement he said that any such support would have to be both discreet and quick.
10. It is important to say that in all our conversations the only people present were the President, myself, and a man called Tom M'tene, an old school friend of the President's and not in Zambian politics. I did, on another occasion,

²
met the Zambian Foreign Minister, Mr Chakulya, who seemed to me to be a very second rate figure. I stress the intimacy of our meetings in case it might be that Dr Kaunda would have expressed himself more discreetly on the following points had others been there.

11. He said plainly that while he felt himself perfectly secure in the affection and support of his people (and from what I could see in a short trip this seemed abundantly true) his general situation was parlous. His economy is faltering and his army weak. He could not put down the Nkomo-Mugabe forces even if he wanted to. He fears the Russians and the Cubans but does not feel strong enough to insist on the recall of the Soviet Ambassador in Lusaka, who serves as Moscow's liaison with the guerrillas. But he argued very strongly (and, to me at any rate, convincingly) that had he received stronger Anglo-American support in the past, or if he received such in the future, he could act much more decisively.
12. Throughout his demeanour was one of steadfast and determined cheerfulness. But I sensed a pervading gloom from time to time; and Mr M'tene confirmed this when we were chatting afterwards. A note I made after our first conversation reads "A man who wants to stop a coming conflagration but does not see how it can be stopped or what he can do."
13. Far from being hostile towards, or even neutral in respect of, Britain and the West he struck me as desperately anxious to be friendly. But he seemed rather sadly to have concluded that our main desire at the moment is to disentangle ourselves from his part of the world.

14. The President questioned me closely on the minutiae of our own politics, on the election, and especially on whether I truly believed you would succeed in your domestic aims. He told me he felt you two had not got on when you met and said (whether truly or not) that you had discussed a wide variety of subjects and agreed on only one, that you should be on Christian name terms. As far as I could judge (and he may, of course, have laid a little of this on for me) he seemed to have a genuine and quite deep personal respect for you; to be a little in awe of your achievements; and to feel it would be harder to bring about a meeting of minds with you than it would with a British Labour leader. He reminisced a lot and warmly about Mr Harold Macmillan and Iain Macleod.
15. It is hard to be certain on such short - if intense - acquaintance but I formed the impression of a sincere man, a devout Christian, somewhat emotional and perhaps inclined to fly off the handle (though he did not do so in my presence) but also a real patriot, beset by enormous troubles and problems, truly pro-Western at bottom and heartily in fear of the Soviet Union. I should perhaps add that these are quite unforced impressions. I lunched once with Mr Rowland before setting off, but he talked mainly about South Africa. And I have avoided checking impressions over with old Africa hands since I got back, in order to preserve uncluttered my own direct reactions. I may also, of course, be influenced by the fact that the President went so far out of his way to entertain and help me, gave me so much of his time and, in general, seemed so well disposed. I felt strongly that he is a man whom it would be worth making a big effort to help; or at least to flatter.

D. J. P. 10/1/68

CONFIDENTIAL



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Sho Lesia

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

21 June 1979

B/F 3-7-79
to check to Bryan
to briefing.

Bishop Muzorewa.

The Prime Minister has seen your letter to Bryan Cartledge of 19 June suggesting that she should see Bishop Muzorewa when he comes to London. She has agreed in principle to do so.

She has also seen and noted a copy of the letter which Stephen Hastings MP sent to the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary on 19 June and has commented that we must see Bishop Muzorewa.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Martin Vile (Cabinet Office).

N. J. SANDERS

J. S. Wall, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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Rhodesia VB
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10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

21 June 1979

Dear Mr Shipton,

Thank you very much for sending me a copy of the detailed and thorough report you and your team of observers prepared on the recent Rhodesian elections. I was interested to see that your conclusions were so similar to those reached by Lord Boyd and his team who observed the elections on behalf of the Conservative Party. As you will know, it is my Government's objective, by building on the changes in Rhodesia, to bring about a return to legality amid the widest possible international recognition.

7.6.79

I too am much looking forward to my forthcoming visit to Australia.

Yours sincerely
Margaret Thatcher

Roger Shipton, Esq., M.P.

VB

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GRS 600

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FROM LAGOS 210830Z JUNE

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELNO 327 OF 21 JUNE 1979.

RFI PRIORITY LUANDA, CAPE TOWN (EMBASSY).

ROUTINE LUSAKA, MAPUTO, GABORONE, DAR ES SALAAM, WASHINGTON AND
UKMIS NEW YORK.

FROM LORD HARLECH.

RHODESIA.

Mr B. Cartledge

No 10 D. St.

2

PRIME MINISTER

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1. THE ANGOLAN GOVERNMENT WERE OBVIOUSLY OUT TO SHOW THAT THEY WERE PLEASED WITH THE DECISION THAT I SHOULD VISIT LUANDA. THE ACTING FOREIGN MINISTER, VENANCIO DE MOURA, MET ME AND (LEAVING A CABINET MEETING TO DO SO) SAW ME OFF, AND SHORTLY BEFORE MY ARRIVAL THEY DECIDED TO ACCOMMODATE ME IN THE GOVERNMENT'S PRINCIPAL GUEST HOUSE. PRESIDENT NETO WENT OUT OF HIS WAY TO EMPHASISE, AT THE START OF THE TALK WE HAD ON 20 JUNE, HIS GRATIFICATION AT THIS FIRST CONTACT, ON A MATTER OF SUCH IMPORTANCE, WITH A SENIOR REPRESENTATIVE OF THE NEW BRITISH GOVERNMENT.
2. NETO'S BASIC ANALYSIS OF THE RHODESIA SITUATION WAS VERY SIMILAR TO CHISSANO'S (SEE LUSAKA TELNO 468 TO FCO), LEADING TO THE CONCLUSION THAT IN ALL IMPORTANT RESPECTS POWER WAS STILL IN THE HANDS OF THE WHITES AND THAT THE PRESENT POLITICAL SYSTEM MUST BE ENTIRELY REVISED. BUT HE INTRODUCED SOME INTERESTING NUANCES.
3. THUS NETO SUGGESTED THAT AS A PRELIMINARY TO A MEETING BETWEEN HMG AND THE PATRIOTIC FRONT, IT WOULD BE A "POSITIVE STEP" TO HOLD A MEETING BETWEEN BRITIAN AND THE FRONT LINE STATES TO RE-EXAMINE THE PROBLEM "IN A SERIOUS WAY". ALTHOUGH AT THE OUTSET HE EXPRESSED DOUBT ABOUT THE USEFULNESS OF A CONFERENCE OF ALL THE RHODESIAN PARTIES, HE ALSO SUGGESTED TOWARDS THE END OF OUR CONVERSATION THAT ONE WAY FORWARD MIGHT BE TO CREATE CONDITIONS FOR DIRECT TALKS BETWEEN THE PATRIOTIC FRONT AND THOSE NOW IN POWER IN SALISBURY TO CANCEL THE RESULTS OF THE APRIL ELECTIONS AND MAKE ARRANGEMENTS FOR NEW ONES IN WHICH ALL THE PARTIES WOULD PRESENT CANDIDATES. WHATEVER OUR VIEW OF THE PRACTICABILITY OF THIS IDEA, IT WAS PUT FORWARD IN A SERIOUS AND THOUGHTFUL MANNER.

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/4.NOR WAS

4. NOR WAS NETO BY ANY MEANS WHOLLY DISMISSIVE OF BISHOP MUZOREWA. HE AGREED THAT "SOME SMALL PROGRESS" HAD BEEN MADE WITH MUZOREWA'S ENTRY INTO THE GOVERNMENT, AND HAD NOTHING PERSONAL AGAINST HIM. HE WAS AN IMPORTANT ELEMENT IN THE POLITICAL SITUATION. THE TROUBLE WAS THAT HE DID NOT APPEAR TO BE AN ELEMENT CONTRIBUTING TOWARDS RHODESIA'S PROGRESS TOWARDS TRUE INDEPENDENCE. ANGOLA FEARED THAT RHODESIAN DEPENDENCE ON SOUTH AFRICA WAS NOW GOING TO INCREASE AND THAT THIS WOULD QUICKLY DEVALUE MUZOREWA'S POSITION. HE WAS A PRISONER OF THE SYSTEM.
5. NETO STRESSED THAT THE KEY TO THE SITUATION WAS TO PROVIDE, THROUGH NEW ELECTIONS, FOR A NEW POLITICAL STRUCTURE WHICH WOULD ALLOW ALL THE PATRIOTIC FORCES TO BUILD A TRULY INDEPENDENT COUNTRY. THE "PATRIOTIC FORCES" INCLUDED, BUT WERE NOT CONFINED TO, THE PATRIOTIC FRONT. IT WAS IMPORTANT TO SETTLE THE CONDITIONS IN WHICH NEW ELECTIONS WOULD TAKE PLACE, ESPECIALLY WHO WOULD BE IN CHARGE OF THE SECURITY FORCES. TO HOLD ELECTIONS UNDER THE CONTROL OF THE FORCES AT PRESENT OPPOSING THE PATRIOTIC FRONT WOULD BE MEANINGLESS.
6. NETO CONCLUDED BY ASKING ME EARNESTLY IF HE COULD PUT A DIRECT QUESTION TO ME - WOULD HMG RECOGNISE THE MUZOREWA GOVERNMENT? IN REPLY, I SAID THAT WHEN I HAD LEFT LONDON I HAD BEEN GIVEN THE TASK OF CONSULTING ALL THOSE I WAS SEEING IN THE COURSE OF MY PRESENT MISSION AND REPORTING FULLY ON THEIR VIEWS PRECISELY IN ORDER TO HELP THE GOVERNMENT TO DECIDE WHAT TO DO NEXT. NO DECISION HAD YET BEEN TAKEN TO RECOGNISE THE BISHOP'S GOVERNMENT.
7. NETO APPEARED TO BE SATISFIED BY THIS ANSWER AND BY MY EARLIER EXPLANATION OF MY MISSION. IF ANGOLA COULD MAKE A CONTRIBUTION, HOWEVER SMALL, TO THE SOLUTION OF THE PROBLEM, SHE WOULD. IN THE MEANTIME THEY WOULD BE DISCUSSING IT FURTHER WITH THE OTHER FRONT LINE STATES AND AT THE OAU, AND WOULD BE LOOKING TO OUR AMBASSADOR FOR BACKGROUND AS APPROPRIATE.

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8. PERHAPS WITH NAMIBIA AT THE BACK OF HIS MIND - THOUGH THE SUBJECT WAS NEVER MENTIONED - NETO WAS CLEARLY OUT TO GIVE ME AN IMPRESSION OF MODERATION, WITHIN THE LIMITS OF HIS OWN RADICAL OUTLOOK ON RHODESIA. PERHAPS WE SHOULD NOT SET TOO MUCH STORE BY THIS. BUT HE WOULD EVIDENTLY LIKE THE DOOR TO BE KEPT OPEN FOR THE TIME BEING, AS I URGED ON HIM, FOR CONCILIATION RATHER THAN CONFRONTATION. I BELIEVE ALSO THAT MY VISIT MAY HAVE BEEN USEFUL IN A WIDER CONTEXT BY SUGGESTING THAT WE ATTACH IMPORTANCE TO HEARING ANGOLAN VIEWS AND THAT THIS MAY BE HELPFUL TO THE POSITION OF OUR EMBASSY IN LUANDA.

BROWN

FILES
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PLANNING STAFF
LEGAL ADVS. (MR. FREELAND)
(MR. STEEL)

PS
PS/LPS
PS/MR. LUCE
PS/MR. RIDLEY
PS/MR. HURD
PS/MR. MARTEN
PS/MR. BLAKER
PS/PUS
SIR A DUFF
SIR A PARSONS
MR. WILLSON
MR. WILLIAMS

COPIES TO:
PS/SIR J HUNT CABINET OFFICE
MR. B. CARTLEDGE NO 10 DOWNING ST.

IMMEDIATE

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DESKBY 220900Z

[RHODESIA: POLICY: ADVANCE COPIES]

[Received in the K137 220922Z]

PS
 2 PS/SIR I. GILMOUR
 PS/MR LUCE
 PS/PUS
 SIR A DUFF
~~MR DAY~~ *Mr. Wilson*
 MR WILLIAMS
~~MR DEAHY~~

 HD/RHODESIA D (3)
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 HD/S AF D
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~~HD/JAD~~
 MR FABELAND LEGAL ADVISER RM K200A
 MR STEEL LEGAL ADVISER RM K176
~~RESIDENT CLERK~~

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PS/NO 10 DOWNING STREET (2)
 PS Sir J. Hunt Cabinet Office
 SIR C ROSE
 MR P. H. MAXEY
 COL MOIR
 MR P J POWLER
 DIO

CABINET OFFICE

~~FOR ZIMBABWE DEVELOPMENTS FUND~~
~~ADD MR LYNCH OIM~~
~~MR SLATER TREASURY~~

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CONFIDENTIAL

PRIME MINISTER
MS

DESKBY FCO 220900Z

[Handwritten signature]

FROM LAGOS 211630Z JUNE 1979
 TO IMMEDIATE FCO
 TELEGRAM NUMBER 336 OF 21 JUNE
 RFI PRIORITY DAR ES SALAAM, LUSAKA, MAPUTO, LUANDA, GABORONE,
CAPE TOWN, WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK, ROUTINE LILONGWE.

RHODESIA
 FOLLOWING FROM LORD HARLECH

1. I HAD A MEETING THIS MORNING (21 JUNE) WITH EXTERNAL AFFAIRS COMMISSIONER ADEFOPE SUPPORTED BY SENIOR OFFICIALS. I EXPLAINED THE PURPOSE OF MY MISSION ON THE USUAL LINES, EMPHASISING THAT HMG HAD NOT TAKEN ANY DECISIONS AND WOULD DECIDE ON THE COURSE TO PURSUE IN THE LIGHT OF MY REPORT AND OTHER CONSULTATIONS. ADEFOPE WAS COURTEOUS AND FRIENDLY BUT NON-COMMITTAL, MAKING IT CLEAR THAT THE REAL DISCUSSIONS WOULD BE WITH THE CHIEF OF STAFF, GENERAL YAR'ADUA.

2. AT THE BEGINNING OF THE MEETING WITH YAR'ADUA, HE SUGGESTED THAT WE SHOULD HAVE A RESTRICTED MEETING WITH ONLY ADEFOPE AND

2. AT THE BEGINNING OF THE MEETING WITH YAR'ADUA, HE SUGGESTED THAT WE SHOULD HAVE A RESTRICTED MEETING WITH ONLY ADEFOPE AND THE HIGH COMMISSIONER PRESENT. HE SAID HE WISHED TO EMPHASISE THE STRENGTH OF THE FEELING OF NIGERIANS AT ALL LEVELS ABOUT RHODESIA. THEIR DOUBTS ABOUT HMG'S RHODESIAN POLICY HAD BEEN STRENGTHENED BY CERTAIN STATEMENTS DURING THE BRITISH ELECTION CAMPAIGN ABOUT IMMIGRATION WHICH SEEMED ALL PART OF THE SAME RACIALIST APPROACH. THERE WAS WIDESPREAD BELIEF THAT HMG HAD ALREADY DECIDED TO RECOGNISE MUZOREWA AND WERE MERELY SPINNING OUT CONSULTATIONS UNTIL AFTER THE COMMONWEALTH CONFERENCE.

3. I REPEATED MY ASSURANCE THAT NO DECISIONS HAD BEEN TAKEN. YOU AND THE PRIME MINISTER WISHED TO SEEK THE VIEWS OF OUR FRIENDS IN THE COMMONWEALTH ON HOW WE COULD MOVE FORWARD, EG SHOULD WE TRY TO BRING TOGETHER THE VARIOUS RHODESIAN AFRICAN LEADERS IN A CONFERENCE, AND SHOULD WE PUT FORWARD OUR OWN PROPOSALS? HOW IMPORTANT WAS THE REMOVAL OF SMITH?

4. YAR'ADUA SAID THAT THE AFRICANS WERE APPREHENSIVE BECAUSE IT APPEARED THAT THE PURPOSE OF MY CONSULTATIONS WAS ONLY TO HELP HMG DECIDE WHETHER OR NOT TO RECOGNISE THE MUZOREWA GOVERNMENT AND WHETHER OR NOT TO LIFT SANCTIONS. IT BECAME APPARENT THAT THE PURPOSE OF MY CONSULTATIONS WAS TO ENABLE HMG TO PUT FORWARD NEW PROPOSALS THEN THE ATMOSPHERE WOULD BE VERY DIFFERENT. HE EMPHASISED THAT IF HMG RECOGNISED THE MUZOREWA GOVERNMENT NOW IT WOULD SHUT THE DOOR ON ANY FURTHER PROGRESS. AFRICAN COUNTRIES WOULD NO LONGER BE PREPARED TO TALK TO BRITAIN ON THIS ISSUE AS THEY HAD DONE OVER THE PAST FEW YEARS. RECOGNITION WOULD POLARISE THE ISSUE AND RULE OUT THE POSSIBILITY OF AN INTERNATIONALLY AGREED PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT. MANY WOULD CONCLUDE THAT ARMED STRUGGLE WAS THE ONLY WAY. HE RECALLED NIGERIA'S CONSISTENT SUPPORT FOR THE ANGLO/AMERICAN PROPOSALS AND THEIR EFFORTS TO PERSUADE THE PATRIOTIC FRONT TO ACCEPT THEM.

5. I SAID THAT IN MY TALKS WITH THE FRONT LINE PRESIDENTS THEY SEEMED TO ACCEPT THAT, DESPITE RESERVATIONS ABOUT THE ELECTIONS AND THE CONSTITUTION, MUZOREWA WAS AN IMPORTANT FACTOR IN THE SITUATION. IT WAS ALSO OUR VIEW THAT MUZOREWA WAS A SIGNIFICANT FACTOR WHO COULD NOT BE IGNORED. WHILE WE MIGHT ALL HOPE FOR AN IDEAL SOLUTION WHICH EVERYONE WOULD ACCEPT, WE HAD TO THINK OF WHAT WAS REALISTIC AND PRACTICAL. IF AFTER CONSULTATIONS HMG WERE TO PUT FORWARD PROPOSALS FOR A CONSTITUTION AND A PROCEDURE TO ASSESS ACCEPTABILITY WHICH MOST PEOPLE ACCEPTED AS FAIR, THIS WAS PERHAPS THE BEST WE COULD HOPE FOR.

6. YAR 'ADUA SAID THAT NIGERIA HAD NEVER BEEN OPPOSED TO ANY OF THE INDIVIDUAL RHODESIAN LEADERS AND THAT THEY HAD ALWAYS SUPPORTED PROPOSALS FOR AN ALL-PARTY CONFERENCE. NIGERIA DID NOT MIND WHO WON THE ELECTIONS, PROVIDED THEY WERE FAIR, OR WHAT FORM THE CONSTITUTION TOOK, PROVIDED THE CONSTITUTION WAS ACCEPTABLE TO THE RHODESIAN PEOPLE. OPPOSITION TO THE PRESENT REGIME WAS BASED ON:

- A) THE WAY THE CONSTITUTION CAME INTO BEING WITHOUT THE AFRICANS BEING CONSULTED;
- B) THE TERMS OF THE CONSTITUTION ITSELF WHICH GAVE THE MINORITY EXCESSIVE POWER. THE MAJORITY DID NOT HAVE DIRECT RESPONSIBILITY FOR LAW AND ORDER, WHICH WAS THE BASIC ELEMENT OF GOVERNMENT, AND THE MAJORITY IN PARLIAMENT DID NOT HAVE THE RIGHT OR POWER TO CHANGE THE SITUATION.

A THIRD REASON WAS THAT, DESPITE THEIR PRESENT SUPPORT OF THE ARMED STRUGGLE, NIGERIA FAVOURED A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT; BUT RECOGNITION OF THE PRESENT SITUATION WOULD NOT BRING THIS ABOUT. RECOGNITION BY HMG WOULD MERELY AGGRAVATE THE ARMED STRUGGLE. HMG WOULD THEN INEVITABLY BECOME INVOLVED SINCE IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT FOR THEM TO REJECT AN APPEAL FOR HELP FROM THE REGIME THAT IT RECOGNISED. THIS WOULD FINALLY RULE OUT A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT WHICH MIGHT SAFEGUARD MINORITY INTERESTS IN RHODESIA. THE PATRIOTIC FRONT WOULD HAVE TO TURN MORE AND MORE TO THE COMMUNISTS FOR HELP WHICH WOULD GREATER STRENGTHEN COMMUNIST INFLUENCE IN RHODESIA AND AFRICA GENERALLY.

7. I THANKED YAR' ADUA FOR HIS CLEAR EXPOSITION OF NIGERIAN VIEWS, WHICH I WOULD REPORT TO HMG. I EXPRESSED THE HOPE THAT RESOLUTIONS ON RHODESIA AT THE FORTHCOMING OAU MEETING WOULD NOT BE SO EXTREME OR RESTRICTIVE AS TO FURTHER COMPLICATE THE PROCESSES OF CONSULTATION. YAR 'ADUA SAID THAT THIS WOULD DEPEND ON WHETHER HMG WOULD MAKE A STATEMENT MEANWHILE OFFERING A NEW APPROACH. WITHOUT SUCH A STATEMENT MANY AFRICANS WOULD STILL BELIEVE THAT HMG INTENDED TO RECOGNISE MUZOREWA AFTER THE COMMONWEALTH CONFERENCE AND OAU RESOLUTIONS WOULD ACCORDINGLY BE CRITICAL AND HOSTILE.

8. THROUGHOUT YAR/ ADUA WAS CALM AND COURTEOUS IF FORTHRIGHT. HE WAS PERSONALLY FRIENDLY AND GOOD HUMOURED AND AT THE END OF OUR TALK ARRANGED THAT A POLICE ESCORT SHOULD TAKE ME TO THE AIRPORT.

BROWN

D/G

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Passed to Strarbourg

21/6/79

DWF G 253

LDX 482/21

PP FCO

MR CARTLEDGE

NO 10 Downing St

GRS 137

RESTRICTED

PERSONAL

FM CANBERRA 210710Z JUN 79

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 336 OF 21 JUNE

Smoke to FCO. No action. 24/6

T+2

FOLLOWING PERSONAL FOR CARTLEDGE (NO 10) FROM ROBERTS

1. YOU WILL BY NOW HAVE SEEN THE LETTER (COVERING THE REPORT) TO THE PRIME MINISTER FROM THE LEADER OF THE AUSTRALIAN PARLIAMENTARY OBSERVERS OF THE RHODESIAN ELECTIONS (MY LETTER OF 9 JUNE TO UPTON SPD). SHIPTON HAS NOW ASKED IF IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO SEE MRS THATCHER TO DISCUSS RHODESIA. WE HAVE EXPLAINED TO HIM THAT THE TIMETABLE PRECLUDES ANY SUCH MEETING BUT HAVE OFFERED INSTEAD THAT HE SHOULD MEET A SENIOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS ADVISER TO THE PM OVER A DRINK OR A MEAL - IF TIME AND PRESSURE OF WORK PERMIT.
2. WITH THIS CAVEAT, WOULD YOU BE PREPARED TO TALK TO SHIPTON ABOUT RHODESIA OVER A DRINK OR MEAL AT MY HOME (YOU WILL BE STAYING ONLY FIFTY YARDS AWAY), PREFERABLY ON THE SATURDAY?

TEBBIT

NNNN

[RHODESIA: POLICY: ADVANCE COPIES]

24x

PS
PS/SIR I. GILMOUR
PS/MR LUCE
PS/PUS
SIR A DUFF
~~MR DAY~~ ~~Mr. Wilson~~
MR WILLIAMS
MR LEAHY

PS/NO 10 DOWNING STREET (1/2)

SIR C ROSE
MR P. H. MAXEY
COL MOIR
MR P J FOWLER
DIO
CABINET
OFFICE

HD/RHODESIA D (3)

HD/C AF D
HD/S AF D

HD/UND
HD/NEWS D
HD/WAD

MR FREELAND LEGAL ADVISER RM K200A
MR STEEL LEGAL ADVISER RM K176

~~FOR ZIMBABWE DEVELOPMENTS FUN~~

~~ADD MR LYNCH ODM~~
~~MR SLATER TREASURY~~

~~REGISTER CLERK~~

ADVANCE COPY

IMMEDIATE

DESKBY 1300Z

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PRIME MINISTER
MS

GRS 1100

CONFIDENTIAL

DES-BY 211300Z

FM MIRIMBA SALISBURY 211000Z JUN 79

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 325 OF 21 JUN 79

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON AND PRETORIA

INFO PRIORITY GABORONE LUANDA LUSAKA LILONGWE MAPUTO LAGOS AND
DAR ES SALAAM

YOUR TELNO 84: BISHOP MUZOREWA

1. I SAW THE BISHOP ALONE THIS MORNING FOR 50 MINUTES.
2. I EXPLAINED OUR VIEWS ON HIS PROPOSED VISIT TO LONDON AS INSTRUCTED IN PARA 2 OF YOUR TUR. THE BISHOP SAID THAT HE UNDERSTOOD OUR POSITION. HOWEVER, IT SEEMED FAIRLY CERTAIN THAT HE WOULD BE SEEING PRESIDENT CARTER ON 16 JULY. PLANS FOR THIS VISIT WERE BEING KEPT STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL. HE WOULD WANT A DAY OR SO IN THE U S BEFORE HE SAW PRESIDENT CARTER. THIS WOULD MEAN THAT HE WOULD NEED TO TRAVEL TO THE U S ON ABOUT 6 OR 7 JULY. HE THOUGHT THAT IT WOULD BE PREFERABLE FOR HIM TO SEE THE PRIME MINISTER AND

IT WOULD BE PREFERABLE FOR HIM TO SEE THE PRIME MINISTER AND YOURSELF BEFORE A MEETING WITH PRESIDENT CARTER. IF, HOWEVER, DID NOT FEEL PARTICULARLY STRONGLY ABOUT THIS HE COULD STOP IN LONDON ON HIS WAY BACK FROM THE U S. HE WOULD BE GLAD TO SEE LORD HARLECH IN SALISBURY AT ANY CONVENIENT TIME.

3. WE AGREED THAT I WOULD DISCUSS THE TIMING OF THESE VARIOUS VISITS ON MY RETURN TO LONDON. I UNDERTOOK TO LET HIM HAVE SOME FURTHER SUGGESTIONS EARLY NEXT WEEK. I BELIEVE THAT THE BISHOP WILL FIT IN WITH WHATEVER PROGRAMME SEEMS MOST SUITABLE AND ACCEPTABLE TO US.

4. I THEN REFERRED TO THE STATEMENTS ISSUED RECENTLY BY THE GOVERNMENT HERE AND SPOKE ALONG THE LINES OF PARAS 3 AND 4 OF YOUR TUR. THE BISHOP SAID THAT HE TOOK NOTE OF OUR VIEWS. HE AGREED THAT IT WAS NOT HELPFUL TO ENTER INTO PUBLIC CONFRONTATION. HE COULD NOT GUARANTEE THAT HE MIGHT NOT FEEL OBLIGED IN THE FUTURE TO REACT TO SOME DEVELOPMENTS. HOWEVER, HE SAID THAT HE WOULD ENTER INTO A "GENTLEMAN'S AGREEMENT" TO REFRAIN FROM UNHELPFUL COMMENT. I URGED HIM TO LET ME KNOW IF, IN FUTURE, THERE WERE ASPECTS OF HMG'S POLICY THAT WERE WORRYING HIM. IT WOULD BE BETTER IF THIS COULD BE DISCUSSED PRIVATELY RATHER THAN THROUGH PUBLIC STATEMENTS. THE BISHOP REFERRED SPECIFICALLY TO OUR RECOGNITION OF THE NEW REGIME IN GHANA. HE SAID THAT THIS TOUCHED HIM PERSONALLY SINCE HE HAD KNOWN THE DEPOSED AND EXECUTED GHANAIAN LEADERS. THE BISHOP ADDED THAT HE HAD BEGUN TO FEEL THAT HMG WERE GOING BACK ON THEIR EARLIER COMMITMENTS IN RESPECT OF RHODESIA. HE NOW ACCEPTED OUR GOOD FAITH AND OUR DESIRE TO WORK WITH HIM AND NOT AGAINST HIM.

5. I GAVE THE BISHOP A GENERAL ACCOUNT OF MY CONVERSATIONS HERE WITH MINISTERS AND OTHERS. I REFERRED TO THE IMPRESSION THAT I HAD RECEIVED FROM MANY WHITES THAT THEY WERE READY TO SEE FURTHER PROGRESS AND CHANGE WHICH WOULD IMPROVE THE PROSPECTS FOR PEACE AND STABILITY. I SAID THAT THE WHITES WERE LOOKING TO HIM TO PROVIDE FIRM AND RESPONSIBLE GOVERNMENT. THEY VIEWED THE POSSIBLE ALTERNATIVES WITH LITTLE ENTHUSIASM. THEY NEEDED HIM AS MUCH, IF NOT MORE THAN HE NEEDED THEM. I HINTED THAT HE NEED NOT THEREFORE BE UNDULY CAUTIOUS IN HIS APPROACH TO NECESSARY CHANGE. THIS APPEARED TO BE A SOMEWHAT NEW THOUGHT TO HIM. HE SAID THAT HE KNEW WELL WHAT THE BLACKS EXPECTED AND WANTED. HE COULD NOT CLAIM TO BE SO WELL INFORMED ABOUT THE VIEWS AND ASPIRATIONS OF THE WHITES.

6. I ENQUIRED ABOUT HIS DISCUSSIONS IN SOUTH AFRICA. THE BISHOP DID NOT PROVIDE ANY DETAILS. HE SAID THAT WE WOULD NO DOUBT HAVE

6. I ENQUIRED ABOUT HIS DISCUSSIONS IN SOUTH AFRICA. THE BISHOP DID NOT PROVIDE ANY DETAILS. HE SAID THAT WE WOULD NO DOUBT HAVE RECEIVED AN ACCOUNT FROM THE SOUTH AFRICAN FOREIGN MINISTER DURING HIS VISIT TO LONDON. THE BISHOP DID VOLUNTEER THAT DISCUSSIONS HAD RELATED TO REGIONAL INTERDEPENDENCE AND TO THE NEED FOR CLOSE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC COOPERATION AS A MEANS OF ACHIEVING STABILITY AND PROGRESS. IN REPLY TO A QUESTION THE BISHOP SAID THAT HE WAS THINKING IN TERMS OF WIDE COOPERATION INVOLVING ZAMBIA, ZAIRE, MOZAMBIQUE "AND EVEN ANGOLA". HE EMPHASISED THE TREMENDOUS POTENTIAL THAT EXISTED IN THE REGION IF ONLY COMMON SENSE WOULD PERMIT ACTIVE COOPERATION BETWEEN THE STATES CONCERNED.

7. I ASKED ABOUT MR CHIKEREMA'S DECISION TO SET UP A NEW PARTY. THE BISHOP TENDED TO PLAY DOWN THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THIS. HE SAID THAT THE UANC HAD ONLY LOST 8 SEATS. IT WOULD HAVE BEEN INFINITELY WORSE IF CHIKEREMA HAD TAKEN 20 PEOPLE WITH HIM. THE UANC AND THEIR PARTNERS IN THE GOVERNMENT OF NATIONAL UNITY WERE STILL LEFT WITH A CLEAR MAJORITY IN PARLIAMENT. FUTHERMORE, CHIKEREMA DID NOT ENJOY AN SIGNIFICANT SUPPORT WITHIN THE COUNTRY OR THE PARTY. THE 800 MAN UANC NATIONAL CONGRESS HAD URGED HIM TO EXPEL CHIKEREMA FROM THE PARTY. THIS REVEALED HOW LITTLE SUPPORT HE HAD. THE BISHOP HAD HIMSELF HAD TO VETO SUCH A DECISION IN THE CAUSE OF UNITY. HE THOUGHT THAT AN ALLIANCE BETWEEN CHIKEREMA AND SITHOLE WAS POSSIBLE. HOWEVER, EVEN THAT WOULD NOT AFFECT THE GOVERNMENT'S MAJORITY IN PARLIAMENT.

8. THE BISHOP INDICATED, PRIVATELY, THAT HE WAS CONSIDERING AN AMENDMENT TO THE CONSTITUTION TO DEPRIVE THE CHIKEREMA SUPPORTERS OF THEIR SEATS IN PARLIAMENT. HE THOUGHT IT TOTALLY UNJUST THAT PEOPLE ELECTED ON A SPECIFIC PARTY ROLE SHOULD BE ALLOWED TO RETAIN THEIR SEATS AFTER THEY HAD LEFT THE PARTY. HE DID NOT AT THIS STAGE KNOW WHETHER HE WOULD WANT TO PRESS FOR SUCH AN AMENDMENT. ANOTHER WAY IN WHICH THE EFFECT OF CHIKEREMA'S DEFECTION MIGHT BE MINIMISED WOULD BE IF SOME MEMBERS OF OTHER PARTIES, I E THE UNFP OR ZANU (SITHOLE), CAME OVER TO THE UANC. IF THERE WAS A REASONABLE PROSPECT OF THIS IT MIGHT NOT BE TO THE BISHOP'S ADVANTAGE TO PRESS FOR A CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT. IN ANY EVENT, THE GOVERNMENT WOULD CONTINUE TO GOVERN IN THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE COUNTRY.

9. AS REGARDS SITHOLE, THE BISHOP THOUGHT THAT HE MIGHT STILL

9. AS REGARDS SITHOLE, THE BISHOP THOUGHT THAT HE MIGHT STILL TAKE UP HIS PLACE IN PARLIAMENT AND GOVERNMENT IF THE HIGH COURT EVENTUALLY DISMISSED HIS APPEAL. ALTERNATIVELY, HE MIGHT SEEK TO UNDERMINE THE STABILITY OF THE GOVERNMENT BY SUBVERSIVE METHODS. THIS WOULD NEED CAREFUL WATCHING.

9. I FOUND THE BISHOP MORE RELAXED THAN ON PREVIOUS OCCASIONS. GAYLARD'S PRESENCE HAD CLEARLY BEEN AN INHIBITING FACTOR. I THINK HE IS NOW ASSURED THAT WE WISH TO WORK IN COOPERATION WITH HIM TOWARDS OUR JOINT OBJECTIVE. WE SHALL STILL NEED TO WORK ON HIM IF WE ARE TO PERSUADE HIM TO MAKE THE MOVES NECESSARY FOR HIS GOVERNMENT TO ATTRACT WIDER INTERNATIONAL ACCEPTANCE. HE IS, I THINK, LOOKING FOR ADVICE AND GUIDANCE ON THESE MATTERS. WE SHALL BE BETTER ABLE TO JUDGE HOW FAR HE FEELS ABLE TO GO WITH US AFTER LORD HARLECH'S VISIT TO SALISBURY.

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PRIME MINISTER

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FM KINSHASA 201200Z JUN

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 140 OF 20 JUNE 1979

INFO ROUTINE DAR ES SALAAM, NAIROBI, DAKAR, ABIDJAN, MONROVIA, LUANDA, LUSAKA, MIRIMBA SALISBURY, MAPUTO, GABORONE, WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK, LIBREVILLE.

FROM PS/MR LUCE.

RHODESIA.

1. MR LUCE CALLED ON FOREIGN MINISTER NGUZA ON 19 JUNE AND HAD A WORKING BREAKFAST WITH PRESIDENT MOBUTU ON 20 JUNE. THE ZAIRE GOVERNMENT CLEARLY WELCOMED THE VISIT AND DISCUSSIONS WITH BOTH WERE FRIENDLY AND CONSTRUCTIVE. MAIN POINTS ARE GIVEN BELOW.
2. MOBUTU STRESSED THAT THE WAY FORWARD FOR RHODESIA WAS THROUGH DIALOGUE BETWEEN THE PATRIOTIC FRONT AND BISHOP MUZOREWA. THE BISHOP'S GOVERNMENT WAS A FACT. THE ELECTIONS HAD REPRESENTED A SIGNIFICANT CHANGE DESPITE THEIR IMPERFECTIONS. ZAIRE HAD SUPPORTED THE PATRIOTIC FRONT AND CONTINUED TO DO SO BUT THEY CONSIDERED THAT MUZOREWA ALSO DESERVED THE SUPPORT OF AFRICAN GOVERNMENTS. HE HAD PUT THESE VIEWS TO NYERERE (SEE KINSHASA TELNO 121). HE HAD BEEN VERY SURPRISED BY NYERERE'S ENCOURAGING REACTION. NYERERE HAD SAID THAT HE HIMSELF COULD NOT TAKE THE INITIATIVE TO BRING THE PATRIOTIC FRONT AND MUZOREWA TOGETHER BECAUSE HE WAS TOO COMMITTED BUT SAID THAT MOBUTU, WHO KNEW MUZOREWA AS WELL AS THE PATRIOTIC FRONT LEADERS, COULD TAKE AN INITIATIVE AND BRING ABOUT A DIALOGUE.
3. MR MOBUTU SAID THAT SUBSEQUENT DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN HIMSELF OR HIS FOREIGN MINISTER AND THE LEADERS OF ZAMBIA, ANGOLA, NIGERIA AND THE CONGO HAD DEMONSTRATED THAT NONE OF THESE GOVERNMENTS WAS OPPOSED TO AN INITIATIVE OF THIS KIND. LIKE TANZANIA, NIGERIA HAD TAKEN AN EXTREME POSITION BUT THEY HAD TOLD HIM THAT THEY WOULD LIKE TO SEE A DIALOGUE.

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4. MOBUTU MADE IT CLEAR THAT HE HOPED THAT IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO PREVENT RHODESIA BECOMING A MAJOR ISSUE AT THE OAU BY ESTABLISHING MOVEMENT TOWARDS A DIALOGUE IN THE INTERVENING WEEKS. THE ESSENTIAL THING WAS THAT MUZOREWA SHOULD ANNOUNCE HIS READINESS TO TALK TO THE PATRIOTIC FRONT. MOBUTU WAS SENDING AN EMISSARY TO SALISBURY ON 22 JUNE. HE WOULD TRY TO PERSUADE MUZOREWA OF THE NECESSITY OF TALKING TO THE PATRIOTIC FRONT. OTHERWISE THE FIGHTING IN RHODESIA WOULD GO ON AND THERE WOULD BE AN EXTREME ANTI-MUZOREWA RESOLUTION AT THE OAU CONFERENCE. THIS WOULD DO NO GOOD AT ALL.

5. MOBUTU'S OBJECTIVE IS A THREE-STAGE OPERATION: FIRST, MUZOREWA WOULD HAVE TO DECLARE HIS WILLINGNESS TO TALK TO THE PF LEADERS: SECONDLY, BOTH SIDES WOULD BE INVITED TO CHOOSE A SITE FOR THE DIALOGUE (HE WAS DEFINITELY NOT PROPOSING ZAIRE BUT NAIROBI COULD BE A STARTER): THIRDLY, AN ALL PARTY CONFERENCE.

6. MR LUCE TOLD MOBUTU THAT HE WOULD BE HAVING DISCUSSIONS WITH LORD HARLECH AND THE SECRETARY OF STATE IN LONDON EARLY NEXT WEEK. HE ASKED THAT WE SHOULD BE KEPT INFORMED OF THE RESULTS OF THE ZAIRE EMISSARY'S VISIT TO SALISBURY AND UNDERTOOK TO KEEP IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH THE ZAIRE GOVERNMENT OVER THE COMING WEEKS.

7. SEE ALSO KINSHASA TELNO 139 (NOT TO ALL).

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(MR STEEL)
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PS/MR LUCE
PS/PUS
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10 DOWNING STREET

Prime Minister

Stephen Hastings has sent you this copy of a letter to Lord Carrington about Rhodesia. It suggests that Bishop Muzorewa should be invited to London for discussions, given the deteriorating situation in Rhodesia.

19.6.79

We must see him - consult with MS
not hold.

20 June 1979

GR 350

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PRIME MINISTER

FM DAR ES SALAAM 201030Z JUNE 79

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 462 OF 20 JUNE

INFO IMMEDIATE LAGOS.

INFO PRIORITY MAPUTO, LUSAKA, LUANDA, GABORONE, CAPE TOWN,
MIRIMBA SALISBURY, WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK

RHODESIA

1. WE HAVE OBTAINED COPIES OF WORKING DOCUMENTS OF THE MEETING OF THE STANDING COMMITTEES OF THE OAU LIBERATION COMMITTEE WHICH BEGAN HERE ON 18 JUNE. ONE OF THESE, THE REPORT OF THE SECRETARY OF THE STANDING COMMITTEE ON GENERAL POLICY AND INFORMATION, CONTAINS RECOMMENDATIONS ON RHODESIA. THE MAIN ONES ARE AS FOLLOWS:-

"A. MEASURES BE TAKEN AGAINST BRITAIN TO PREVENT THE CONSERVATIVE GOVERNMENT FROM GOING AHEAD WITH THE RECOGNITION OF THE MUZOREWA/SMITH REGIME.

B. OAU MEMBER STATES WHO ARE ALSO MEMBER STATES OF THE COMMONWEALTH BE INVITED TO EXERT PRESSURE ON BRITAIN AT THE FORTHCOMING COMMONWEALTH CONFERENCE.

C. US CONGRESS BE CALLED UPON TO ADHERE TO PRESIDENT CARTER'S DECISION TO MAINTAIN SANCTIONS AGAINST THE ILLEGAL AND FASCIST REGIMES IN SOUTHERN AFRICA.

D. PRESIDENT CARTER BE COMMENDED FOR HIS RECENT DECISION TO MAINTAIN SANCTIONS.

E. UN SECURITY COUNCIL BE INVITED TO INTENSIFY ITS EFFORTS TO SEE TO IT THAT ALL MEMBERS OF THE UN OBSERVE ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AND THAT MANDATORY EMBARGOES ON ARMS AND OIL SALES ARE IMPOSED ON RACIST SOUTH AFRICA."

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2. EARLIER IN THE REPORT IN A PASSAGE HEADED "THE POSITION OF BRITAIN", THE SECRETARY NOTES THAT "IN NOVEMBER THIS YEAR SANCTIONS AGAINST THE ILLEGAL REGIME COME UP FOR RENEWAL BY THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT AND PARLIAMENT. IT IS DOUBTFUL WHETHER THIS WOULD GET THROUGH IN THE BRITISH PARLIAMENT WITH A 43 SEAT CONSERVATIVE MAJORITY". ANOTHER PASSAGE IN THE REPORT CALLS ON BRITAIN "TO ENTER INTO DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE PATRIOTIC FRONT ON THE PROGRAMME OF TRANSFER OF POWER TO THE MAJORITY, LED BY THE FRONT."

3. FULL TEXTS FOLLOW BY BAG ON 22 JUNE.

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SIR A DUFF

SIR A PARSONS

MR DAY

MR LEAHY

MISS BROWN

MR THOMAS

MR WILLSON

MR WILLIAMS

ADDITIONAL DIST
RHODESIA POLICY


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20 June 1979

I am writing on behalf of the Prime Minister to thank you for the copy you sent her of your letter to the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary of 19 June about Rhodesia. I will of course place it before the Prime Minister.

M J S

Stephen Hastings, Esq., M.C., M.P.



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FROM LAGOS 200900Z JUNE 1979

PRIME MINISTER

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 321 OF 20 JUNE

RFI IMMEDIATE LUANDA, PRIORITY ACCRA, DAR ES SALAAM, LUSAKA,
GABORONE, MAPUTO, CAPETOWN, WASHINGTON.

MY TEL NO 309 : LORD HARLECH'S TOUR.

1. OVER THE WEEKEND ONE OF OUR CONTACTS WHO IS CLOSE TO
GENERAL OBASANJO TOLD US THAT HE HAD PERSUADED HIM, WITH SOME
DIFFICULTY, TO AGREE TO RECEIVE LORD HARLECH. HOWEVER, LATER
NEWS FROM ANOTHER EXCELLENT SOURCE WAS THAT OBASANJO
WAS VERY ANGRY OVER OUR DECISION TO RECOGNISE THE RAWLINGS
REGIME IN GHANA ON THE SAME DAY AS A FORMER HEAD OF
STATE THERE WAS EXECUTED. HE WAS SAID TO BE COMPLETELY
DISILLUSIONED ABOUT THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT'S INSENSITIVITY
TO AFRICAN OPINION AND HAD THEREFORE DECIDED NOT TO RECEIVE
LORD HARLECH. SUCH A DECISION HAS NOT BEEN CONVEYED OFFICIALLY
TO US, BUT THE ARRANGEMENTS WHICH THE MINISTRY OF EXTERNAL
AFFAIRS ARE MAKING PROVIDE ONLY FOR DISCUSSIONS WITH THE
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS COMMISSIONER AND A CALL ON THE CHIEF OF STAFF.

2. THERE HAS BEEN LITTLE PRESS COMMENT ON OUR RECOGNITION OF
THE GHANA REGIME BUT IN PRIVATE A NUMBER OF NIGERIANS,
ESPECIALLY AMONG THE MILITARY, HAVE EXPRESSED STRONG CRITICISM
OF THE TIMING OF OUR ACT OF RECOGNITION. WE HAVE BEEN AND
ARE DOING OUR BEST TO EXPLAIN THAT FOR US RECOGNITION DOES
NOT IMPLY APPROVAL BUT ONLY RECOGNITION THAT A GOVERNMENT CONTROLS
THE COUNTRY: AND TO POINT OUT THAT INSTRUCTIONS TO RECOGNISE
WERE SENT BEFORE WE KNEW ABOUT THE EXECUTION OF GENERAL
ACHEAMPONG. BUT I FEAR THAT OUR POSITION HERE, ALREADY DIFFICULT, HAS
SUFFERED SOME FURTHER DAMAGE.

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PLANNING STAFF

LEGAL ADVISERS (MR FREELAND)
(MR STEEL)

PS

PS/LPS

PS/MR LUCE

PS/MR RIDLEY

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File

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Subject copy filed on
Singapore (May 79) 'Visit of
Lee Kuan Yew'



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

20 June 1979

Dear Sir,

The Prime Minister's Discussion with the
Prime Minister of Singapore, Mr. Lee Kuan Yew,
at 10 Downing Street on 20 June 1979

The Prime Minister's tête-à-tête discussion with Mr. Lee Kuan Yew this morning, which I have recorded in separate letters, was followed by a working lunch at which the other senior members of Mr. Lee's party, as well as the Home Secretary, the Secretary of State for Trade, Mr. Peter Blaker and our High Commissioner in Singapore, were present. During lunch, there was a discussion of the Rhodesia problem and, in particular, of its likely impact on the forthcoming Commonwealth Heads of Government meeting at Lusaka. The following is a summary of the main points that arose.

The Prime Minister told Mr. Lee that there could be no question of renewing United Kingdom sanctions against Rhodesia in November; it would simply not be possible to secure Parliamentary approval for this. It was clear that the discussions on Rhodesia at Lusaka would be very difficult. Mr. Lee suggested that the Prime Minister might study the "Shanghai Communique" as a classic example of how two irreconcilable views could be expressed and endorsed within a single document. Mr. Lee said that in his view it was essential that Bishop Muzorewa should invite the leaders of the Patriotic Front to meet him in Salisbury, in order to involve them in the democratic process of creating the new Zimbabwe/Rhodesia. If the Bishop could be persuaded to take this initiative, it was quite possible that Joshua Nkomo would be tempted to accept.

The Prime Minister stressed that the April elections had created a new situation, which offered the prospect of a settlement which could bring immense benefit, not only to Rhodesia, but to Zambia and the other countries of the region. Bishop Muzorewa was now genuinely in charge in Salisbury: but he was so far concentrating on his external relations and had not moved fast enough in promoting internal change. The Prime Minister said that she recognised that some amendments to the Constitution might be needed: but the white

/Members of Parliament

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Members of Parliament could operate a blocking mechanism and if any attempt were made to bypass it they might leave the country, thereby precipitating economic collapse. It was essential to give Bishop Muzorewa support, in order to encourage Sithole to cleave to him: if the Bishop seemed to be faltering, Sithole would split away and fulfil the most pessimistic forecasts of the whites. Mr. Lee repeated that Bishop Muzorewa should make it clear that he was ready to discuss the Constitution with the Patriotic Front, in return for an undertaking on their part to suspend terrorist activity.

Mr. Hennings suggested that a possible amendment to the Constitution might be an arrangement whereby the eight white Members of Parliament who were at present nominated by the other twenty members of the white caucus should, instead, be nominated by Parliament as a whole.

Mr. Lee made it clear that he, and some other Heads of Government who thought like him, were seeking some good reason for changing the position into which, as he put it, they had been corralled by Andrew Young and Dr. David Owen. If they were to turn through 180°, there had to be some development that would give them an excuse to do so. If the Patriotic Front were encouraged to believe they could win on their own, they would be unreceptive to any proposals which might be put to them: if they were uncertain of their prospects of winning unaided, however, the Patriotic Front might split through a change of position on the part of Nkomo. This, said Mr. Lee, would give Heads of Government like himself a good reason for changing their own stance. The Patriotic Front knew very well that no Commonwealth Government wanted a Marxist Rhodesia.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Martin Vile in the Cabinet Office.

*Yours ever,
Bryan Cardew.*

Stephen Wall, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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2 Rhodesia

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DESKBY 200800Z FCO

FM LUSAKA 20 0615Z JUN 79

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 468 OF 20 JUNE

INFO IMMEDIATE LUANDA, LAGOS

PRIORITY MAPUTO, GABORONE, CAPETOWN EMBASSY, MIRIMBA SALISBURY,
WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK, LILONGWE.Prime MinisterOW
20/6

FROM LORD HARLECH

arb

RHODESIA

1. MACHEL WAS BUSY WITH A MEETING OF THE PEOPLE'S ASSEMBLY AND WAS UNABLE TO SEE ME IN MAPUTO. I WAS, HOWEVER, ABLE TO MEET CHISSANO AND HONWANA FOR AN HOUR DURING THE AFTERNOON OF THE 18TH. WITHOUT BEING HOSTILE OR AGGRESSIVE, CHISSANO MADE IT PLAIN TO ME THAT MOZAMBIQUE REMAINS TOTALLY COMMITTED TO THE PATRIOTIC FRONT (I.E. IN EFFECT, ZANU) AND WILL CONTINUE TO TAKE ITS CUE ON RHODESIA FROM THEM.

2. IN THE EYES OF THE MOZAMBIQUE GOVERNMENT, CHISSANO SAID, THE ELECTIONS IN RHODESIA WERE NULL AND VOID. THERE WAS NO POINT IN DISCUSSING WHETHER OR NOT THEY WERE FREE AND FAIR, ANY MORE THAN DISCUSSING THE VALUE OF ELECTIONS WHICH THE PORTUGUESE HAD HELD IN MOZAMBIQUE BEFORE INDEPENDENCE - A PARALLEL TO WHICH HE IS EVIDENTLY MUCH ATTACHED.

3. THE DECISIVE FACTOR WAS STILL THE PATRIOTIC FRONT. WE HAD TO DECIDE WHETHER WE WANTED CONFRONTATION OR CONCILIATION WITH THEM. ALL THAT WOULD BRING THE PATRIOTIC FRONT TO TALKS, IN HIS VIEW, WAS A FIRM AND CLEAR STATEMENT OF POSITION BY BRITAIN AND THE UNITED STATES. IT WAS NO USE TWO GREAT POWERS SAYING THAT THEY COULD NOT COERCE SMITH, AND MOZAMBIQUE HAD BEEN ASKING OVER AND OVER AGAIN WHEN WE PROPOSED TO REMOVE HIM. IF WE WERE TO STRAIGHTEN THINGS OUT, WE HAD TO ACKNOWLEDGE THAT WE WERE THE COLONIAL POWER.

4. WHEN WE MADE PROPOSALS, MOZAMBIQUE'S ATTITUDE TO THEM WOULD BE DETERMINED BY THAT OF THE PATRIOTIC FRONT, BECAUSE THEY WERE THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE PEOPLE. IT WAS A WASTE OF TIME TRYING TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF PEOPLE LIKE MUZOREWA, EVEN THOUGH CHISSANO UNDER PRESSURE ACKNOWLEDGED HE HAD SOME SUPPORT. WE COULD NOT HOLD THE DOOR OPEN INDEFINITELY FOR EVERYONE WHO CAME ALONG WITH A CLAIM TO REPRESENT THE PEOPLE.

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5. IN THE MEANTIME, CHISSANO SAID, THERE WAS NO POINT IN DISCUSSING WHAT WAS GOOD OR BAD IN THE PRESENT RHODESIAN CONSTITUTION. MAYBE THE PATRIOTIC FRONT WOULD HAVE DRAFTED ONE WHICH WAS MUCH THE SAME. WHAT WAS IMPORTANT WAS WHO DECIDED WHAT THE CONSTITUTION SHOULD BE, JUST AS FRELIMO HAD DECIDED ONE FOR MOZAMBIQUE.

6. THE CHOICE FOR BRITAIN NOW, AS CHISSANO SAW IT, WAS EITHER TO REASSERT HER AUTHORITY IN RHODESIA (EVAN AT THIS STAGE) OR TO RECOGNISE REALITY - I.E. THE EXISTENCE OF A JUST WAR OF LIBERATION. IN THE LATTER CASE WE MIGHT BE ABLE TO CONTRIBUTE TOWARDS LIMITING THE DAMAGE. UP TO NOW WE HAD BEEN INEFFECTIVE IN EVERYTHING WE HAD DONE. THERE COULD BE NO QUESTION OF ACTING AS AN INTERMEDIARY BETWEEN GOOD AND EVIL. ONE HAD TO CHOOSE ONE OR THE OTHER. WHY WOULD WE NOT COMMIT OURSELVES NEVER TO RECOGNISE THE ILLEGAL REGIME?

7. I DO NOT BELIEVE I MADE ANY SIGNIFICANT IMPRESSION ON CHISSANO'S DEFENCES. HE DID IMPLY AT THE END OF OUR CONVERSATION THAT HIS GOVERNMENT'S MIND WAS NOT ENTIRELY CLOSED. MOZAMBIQUE WOULD HAVE TO DECIDE WHAT TO SUPPORT WHEN WE EVENTUALLY MADE A FIRM PROPOSAL. SEMI COLON "FOR THE PRESENT IT IS THE STRUGGLE, BUT ONCE WE SUPPORTED THE ANGLO-AMERICAN PROPOSALS". BUT THIS I THINK MEANT NO MORE THAN THAT THE MOZAMBIKANS WOULD BACK A PROPOSAL WHICH TRANSFERRED POWER TO THE PATRIOTIC FRONT WITHOUT THE NEED FOR FURTHER FIGHTING.

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LEGAL ADVISERS
(MR FREELAND)
(MR STEEL)

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FM LUSAKA 200635Z JUN 79

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 467 OF 20 JUNE

INFO IMMEDIATE LUANDA, LAGOS ..

INFO PRIORITY MAPUTO, GABORONE, CAPETOWN EMBASSY, MIRIMBA SALISBURY,
WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK, LILONGWE.

FROM LORD HARLECH

RHODESIA

1. ACCOMPANIED BY OFFICIALS, I HAD OVER AN HOUR'S TALK WITH MUGABE ON 18 JUNE IN MAPUTO. ON HIS SIDE TONGOGARA, TEKERE, KADUNCURI AND RICHARD HOVE WERE ALSO PRESENT. HE SPOKE CALMLY AND FLUENTLY. I COULD DETECT NO FLEXIBILITY IN HIS ATTITUDE.

2. AFTER I HAD GIVEN HIM AN ACCOUNT OF THE PURPOSE OF MY MISSION, MUGABE INSISTED THAT, WHATEVER VIEW HMG (AND OTHERS I HAD QUOTED) MIGHT TAKE OF RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN RHODESIA, THE PATRIOTIC FRONT COULD ONLY CONCLUDE THAT THERE HAD BEEN NO EFFECTIVE TRANSFER OF POWER IN THE COUNTRY AND NO SATISFACTORY TEST OF THE ACCEPTABILITY OF THE NEW CONSTITUTION. HARKING BACK TO THE AAP, HE ARGUED THAT BEFORE THERE COULD BE AN EFFECTIVE TRANSFER OF POWER, THE ILLEGAL REGIME MUST FIRST BE DISMANTLED. ITS ARMY, AIR FORCE AND POLICE MUST BE DISBANDED AND REPLACED BY THOSE OF THE PATRIOTIC FRONT. MUGABE CONCEDED THAT BISHOP MUZOREWA HAD A FOLLOWING OF HIS OWN IN RHODESIA. BUT IT WOULD NOT BE SIGNIFICANT IF THE PATRIOTIC FRONT WERE COMPETING AGAINST HIM IN AN ELECTION.

3. ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTION, MUGABE'S LINE WAS VERY SIMILAR TO THAT TAKEN WITH ME BY ZAPU REPRESENTATIVES (DAR ES SALAAM TELNO 441). THERE COULD BE NO QUESTION OF WORKING ON THE BASIS OF THE PRESENT CONSTITUTION OR OF HMG ACTING AS A "REFEREE" BETWEEN MUZOREWA AND THE PATRIOTIC FRONT. AS THE COLONIAL POWER, IT WAS UP TO BRITAIN TO INITIATE DISCUSSIONS WITH THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE PEOPLE (I.E. THE PATRIOTIC FRONT) AND PUT ITS PROPOSALS TO THEM. THE PATRIOTIC FRONT WOULD TAKE NO ACTION WHICH IMPLIED ANY DEGREE OF RECOGNITION OF MUZOREWA. MUGABE Poured SCORN ON THE IDEA OF EVEN TEMPORARY SPECIAL PROVISION FOR MINORITY REPRESENTATION IN PARLIAMENT, ARGUING THAT IT WAS COUNTER-PRODUCTIVE AND IN ANY CASE WRONG IN PRINCIPLE. THE DEPARTURE OF SMITH WOULD BE "IMMATERIAL" SO LONG AS THE PRESENT POWER STRUCTURE REMAINED IN BEING.

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PRIME MINISTER
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4. MUGABE INSISTED THAT DISCUSSION OF A CEASEFIRE AND OTHER TRANSITIONAL ARRANGEMENTS WOULD HAVE TO TAKE PLACE AFTER AGREEMENT HAD BEEN REACHED ON THE INDEPENDENCE CONSTITUTION. ASKED IF WOULD ACCEPT THAT A BRITISH OR COMMONWEALTH FORCE MIGHT HOLD THE RING DURING AN ELECTION, HIS REPLY WAS THAT THE PATRIOTIC FRONT WOULD NOT NOW ACCEPT THE IDEA OF "RAISING" ANY OTHER FORCE TO TAKE THE PLACE OF THEIRS.

5. MUGABE CLAIMED, I BELIEVE SINCERELY, THAT HE AND HIS ASSOCIATES WANTED FRIENDSHIP WITH BRITAIN BOTH BEFORE AND AFTER INDEPENDENCE. IF THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT PUT CONCRETE PROPOSALS TO THEM WHICH WERE POSITIVE AND EFFECTED A "CLEAR AND CORRECT" TRANSFER OF POWER, THE PATRIOTIC FRONT WOULD, AS ALWAYS, BE READY TO DISCUSS THEM WITH US, THE COLONIAL POWER. BUT THERE COULD BE NO QUESTION (AS HE CLAIMED HAD BEEN THEIR EXPERIENCE WITH THE PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT) OF OUR ABANDONING POSITIONS ONCE THEY HAD BEEN AGREED THROUGH NEGOTIATION.

CONCLUSIONS

6. I BELIEVE I SUCCEEDED IN PERSUADING MUGABE THAT (A) THE GOVERNMENT HAVE GENUINELY NOT MADE UP THEIR MINDS YET ABOUT THE NEXT STEPS THEY WISH TO TAKE TOWARDS ACHIEVING THEIR OVERALL OBJECTIVE, AND (B) THERE IS NO DIVERGENCE OF VIEW BETWEEN US AND THE AMERICANS ON THE NEED TO MAINTAIN SANCTIONS AT THIS TIME. HE GENUINELY WANTS TO KNOW WHAT WE PROPOSE TO DO NEXT. IN MY JUDGEMENT, HE WOULD COME TO A MEETING IN WHICH MUZOREWA TOOK PART, PROVIDED WE MAINTAINED AT LEAST THE FICTION THAT THE SALISBURY PARTIES WERE BROUGHT TO THE MEETING BY US AND THAT IT WAS HELD TO DISCUSS PROPOSALS WHICH WE HAD PUT FORWARD OURSELVES. BUT I DO NOT BELIEVE THAT HE WOULD ATTEND SUCH A MEETING PREPARED TO DO ANYTHING OTHER THAN, IN EFFECT, ACCEPT THE SURRENDER OF THE SALISBURY ADMINISTRATION. HE SAYS HE WOULD WELCOME AN ELECTION. BUT HE WOULD PROBABLY SEE THIS PRIMARILY AS A MEANS OF DISPOSING OF NKOMO'S CLAIMS TO POLITICAL POWER.

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MR STEEL LEGAL ADVISER RM K176
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SIR C ROSE
MR P. M. MAXEY
COL MOIR
MR P J FOWLER
DIO
} CABINET OFFICE

FOR ZIMBABWE DEVELOPMENTS FUND
ADD MR LYNCH ODM
MR SLATER TREASURY

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CONFIDENTIAL

DESKBY 221800Z FCO

FM LUSAKA 200635Z JUN 79

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 467 OF 20 JUNE

INFO IMMEDIATE LUANDA, LAGOS

INFO PRIORITY MAPUTO, GABORONE, CAPETOWN EMBASSY, MIRIMBA SALISBURY,
WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK, LILONGWE.

FROM LORD HARLECH

RHODESIA

1. ACCOMPANIED BY OFFICIALS, I HAD OVER AN HOUR'S TALK WITH MUGABE ON 19 JUNE IN MAPUTO. ON HIS SIDE TONGOGARA, YEKERE, KADUNGURI AND RICHARD HOVE WERE ALSO PRESENT. HE SPOKE CALMLY AND FLUENTLY. I COULD DETECT NO FLEXIBILITY IN HIS ATTITUDE.

2. AFTER I HAD GIVEN HIM AN ACCOUNT OF THE PURPOSE OF MY MISSION, MUGABE INSISTED THAT, WHATEVER VIEW HMG (AND OTHERS I HAD QUOTED) MIGHT TAKE OF RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN RHODESIA, THE PATRIOTIC FRONT COULD ONLY CONCLUDE THAT THERE HAD BEEN NO EFFECTIVE TRANSFER OF POWER IN THE COUNTRY AND NO SATISFACTORY TEST OF THE ACCEPTABILITY OF THE NEW CONSTITUTION. HARKING BACK TO THE AAP, HE ARGUED THAT BEFORE THERE COULD BE AN EFFECTIVE TRANSFER OF POWER, THE ILLEGAL REGIME MUST FIRST BE DISMANTLED. ITS ARMY, AIR FORCE AND POLICE MUST BE DISBANDED AND REPLACED BY THOSE OF THE PATRIOTIC FRONT.

Prime Minister

Ans

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CONCLUSIONS

6. I BELIEVE I SUCCEEDED IN PERSUADING MUGABE THAT (A) THE GOVERNMENT HAVE GENUINELY NOT MADE UP THEIR MINDS YET ABOUT THE NEXT STEPS THEY WISH TO TAKE TOWARDS ACHIEVING THEIR OVERALL OBJECTIVE, AND (B) THERE IS NO DIVERGENCE OF VIEW BETWEEN US AND THE AMERICANS ON THE NEED TO MAINTAIN SANCTIONS AT THIS TIME. HE

THE AMERICANS ON THE NEED TO MAINTAIN SANCTIONS AT THIS TIME. HE GENUINELY WANTS TO KNOW WHAT WE PROPOSE TO DO NEXT. IN MY JUDGEMENT , HE WOULD COME TO A MEETING IN WHICH MUZOREVA TOOK PART, PROVIDED WE MAINTAINED AT LEAST THE FICTION THAT THE SALISBURY PARTIES WERE BROUGHT TO THE MEETING BY US AND THAT IT WAS HELD TO DISCUSS PROPOSALS WHICH WE HAD PUT FORWARD OURSELVES. BUT I DO NOT BELIEVE THAT HE WOULD ATTEND SUCH A MEETING PREPARED TO DO ANYTHING OTHER THAN, IN EFFECT, ACCEPT THE SURRENDER OF THE SALISBURY ADMINISTRATION . HE SAYS HE WOULD WELCOME AN ELECTION. BUT HE WOULD PROBABLY SEE THIS PRIMARILY AS A MEANS OF DISPOSING OF NKOMO'S CLAIMS TO POLITICAL POWER.

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FM FCO 191238Z JUN 79

TO IMMEDIATE MIRIMBA SALISBURY

TELEGRAM NUMBER 84 OF 19 JUN

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON PRETORIA CAPE TOWN

PRIORITY GABORONE LUANDA LUSAKA LILONGWE MAPUTO LAGOS

DAR ES SALAAM

YOUR TELNOS 305 AND 306: BISHOP MUZOREWA

1. WE WERE GRATEFUL FOR THIS REPORT OF YOUR TALK WITH THE BISHOP. I AM CONCERNED THAT HE IS SHOWING AN INADEQUATE REALISATION OF THE PROBLEM CONFRONTING HIM - TO CONVINCe OTHER MEMBERS OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY THAT REAL CHANGE HAS TAKEN PLACE INSIDE RHODESIA - AND THAT HE TENDS TO LOOK TO EARLY RECOGNITION BY US AS A SOLUTION TO HIS DIFFICULTIES.
2. YOU SHOULD EXPLAIN TO THE BISHOP THAT YOU ARE BEING RECALLED TO LONDON FOR CONSULTATIONS WITH ME AND LORD HARLECH ON HIS RETURN FROM AFRICA. YOU SHOULD SAY THAT WE ARE CONSULTING THE PRIME MINISTER ABOUT A MEETING WITH BISHOP MUZOREWA, BUT THAT THE GOVERNMENT WOULD LIKE LORD HARLECH TO VISIT SALISBURY FOR CONSULTATIONS WITH HIM BEFORE HE COMES HERE. HE MIGHT THEREFORE WISH TO CONSIDER DEFERRING HIS VISIT BY A FEW DAYS. IF THE BISHOP ATTACHES IMPORTANCE TO A VISIT ON 5/6TH JULY YOU SHOULD NOT PUT HIM OFF. I AM NOT SEEKING TO AVOID A MEETING IN LONDON BUT I REALLY DO THINK IT WOULD BE MORE PROFITABLE FOR LORD HARLECH TO HAVE TALKED TO THE BISHOP FIRST.
3. IN SPEAKING TO THE BISHOP YOU SHOULD REFER TO THE STATEMENT REPORTED IN YOUR TELNO 303. WE HAVE ALSO NOTED REPORTS OF A STATEMENT MADE BY HIM AT THE WEEKEND ABOUT RECOGNITION OF THE NEW GOVERNMENT IN GHANA. IT IS NOT HELPFUL IF HE ATTACKS US IN PUBLIC. WE ARE SEEKING THE BEST POSSIBLE OUTCOME FOR RHODESIA, IN A VERY DIFFICULT SITUATION. HE KNOWS VERY WELL THAT IN OUR VIEW EARLY RECOGNITION WOULD NOT BE HELPFUL TO RHODESIA OR TO THE UK.

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WHAT IS AT STAKE IS THE GRANTING OF LEGAL INDEPENDENCE. RHODESIA IS IN A STATE OF WAR AND WE NEED TO TRY TO BRING IT TO INDEPENDENCE IN CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH OFFER THE BEST PROSPECT OF A DE-ESCALATION OF THE WAR AND OF FUTURE STABILITY. THIS SHOULD BE OUR COMMON OBJECTIVE.

4. IF THE BISHOP IS CONCERNED ABOUT THE PROBLEMS OR ABOUT OUR APPROACH TO THEM, YOU ARE IN SALISBURY TO DISCUSS THESE WITH HIM. IN OUR OWN PUBLIC STATEMENTS THE GOVERNMENT HAVE CONSISTENTLY EXPRESSED THEIR SUPPORT FOR BISHOP MUZOREWA AND THEIR RECOGNITION OF WHAT HAS BEEN ACHIEVED IN RHODESIA. WE HOPE THAT THE BISHOP WILL ADOPT A SIMILAR ATTITUDE AND MAKE CLEAR THAT HE IS CONCERNED TO WORK WITH US TO BRING RHODESIA BACK INTO THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY WITH THE WIDEST POSSIBLE RECOGNITION. WE ARE IN TOUCH WITH OTHER WESTERN GOVERNMENTS, AS WELL AS WITH THE COMMONWEALTH AND AFRICAN GOVERNMENTS. WE ARE DOING EVERYTHING WE CAN TO IMPROVE THE INTERNATIONAL ATMOSPHERE AND TO ENLIST THEIR SUPPORT. OUR EFFORTS ARE BEING MADE IN GOOD FAITH AND ARE BEING PURSUED VIGOROUSLY. BUT IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT WE SHOULD WORK CLOSELY TOGETHER IN PURSUIT OF OUR COMMON OBJECTIVE.

5. YOU SHOULD ADD THAT WE SHALL BE ABLE TO LET THE BISHOP HAVE A CLEARER IDEA OF THE MANNER IN WHICH WE SEE THE WAY AHEAD, AND OF THE CHOICES THAT WILL BE OPEN TO HIS GOVERNMENT, ON YOUR RETURN TO SALISBURY AND DURING LORD HARLECH'S VISIT. WE HAVE NO DESIRE TO DRAG MATTERS OUT. THERE WILL BE A NEED TO SHOW PROGRESS. BUT WE MUST SO MANAGE THINGS AS TO AVOID ACCUSATIONS THAT WE ARE PROCEEDING WITHOUT ADEQUATE CONSULTATION AND WE MUST OURSELVES BE IN A POSITION TO FORM A JUDGEMENT ON WHAT COULD HELP THE BISHOP TO ATTAIN HIS OBJECTIVE AND OURS.

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MR DAY
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MISS BROWN
MR THOMAS
MR WILSON
MR WILLIAMS

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FM MIRIMBA SALISBURY 190700Z JUN 79

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELNO 315 OF 19 JUNE

INFO PRIORITY PRETORIA CAPE TOWN MAPUTO DAR ES SALAAM LUSAKA
LUANDA GABORONE LAGOS UKMIS NAD WASHINGTON

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PRIME MINISTER
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1. I HAVE CONTINUED MY ROUNDS WITH CALLS ON THE MINISTERS OF HOME AFFAIRS, LAW AND ORDER AND EDUCATION, THE PRINCIPAL OF THE UNIVERSITY, AND THE COMMANDERS OF THE ARMY AND THE POLICE. I HAVE EXPLAINED THE OBJECTIVE SET BY HMG AND OUTLINED THE VARIOUS STEPS WE ARE TAKING TO CONSULT WITH INTERESTED PARTIES. I HAVE NOT SAID ANYTHING, AS YET, ABOUT LORD HARLECH'S DISCUSSIONS. I CONTINUE, AS APPROPRIATE, TO REAFFIRM OUR SUPPORT FOR THE BISHOP, BALANCING THIS WITH AN EXPLANATION THAT FURTHER CHANGES WILL BE NECESSARY IF WE ARE TO ACHIEVE OUR OBJECTIVE.

2. THE RECEPTION THAT I GET REMAINS MIXED. SOME RECOGNISE THAT THE STATUS QUO IS NOT SACROSANT, AND THAT FURTHER PROGRESS IS REQUIRED. OTHERS TEND TO QUESTION WHETHER FURTHER CHANGE IS EITHER DESIREABLE, OR POSSIBLE, AT THIS STAGE. VARIOUS ARGUMENTS ARE USED. THE WAR, THE LACK OF FINANCIAL RESOURCES, THE NEED TO RETAIN WHITE CONFIDENCE, ALL OR ANY OF THESE PRELUDE EARLY ACTION.

3. I AM INCREASINGLY BEING ASKED WHAT KIND OF CHANGE HMG ARE LOOKING FOR. I DRAW ATTENTION TO CERTAIN ASPECTS OF THE CONSTITUTION, TO THE COMPOSITION OF THE GOVERNMENT (I E SMITH) AND TO THE NEED TO DEMONSTRATE THE REALITY OF MAJORITY RULE. WITH THE MINISTER OF LAW AND ORDER I MENTIONED POLITICAL DETAINEES, CENSORSHIP AND PROHIBITED IMMIGRANTS. HE TOLD ME THAT THERE WERE NO PROHIBITED IMMIGRANTS NOW. I SUGGESTED THAT HE MIGHT MAKE THIS PUBLIC, IF IT WERE SO.

4. I SEE LITTLE SIGN OF EARLY MOVEMENT OVER AFRICANISATION OF THE CIVIL OR MILITARY SERVICES. MINISTERS AND THE COMMANDERS THAT I HAVE MET PLAY LIP-SERVICE TO THIS CONCEPT BUT HAVE NO IMMEDIATE PLANS OR IDEAS. THE FACT IS THAT THE WHITES DO NOT REALLY WANT IT AND THE BLACK MINISTERS ARE APPREHENSIVE OF PRESSING FOR IT. THERE IS ALSO A GENUINE PRACTICAL PROBLEM THAT THERE ARE RELATIVELY FEW EXPERIENCED AND WILLING BLACKS READY TO TAKE UP ANY OPPORTUNITIES THAT OCCUR.

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5. MY TALKS WITH THE ARMY AND POLICE COMMANDERS HAVE NOT THROWN ANY VERY NEW LIGHT ON THE SECURITY SITUATION. CARDS ARE PLAYED VERY CLOSE TO THE CHEST. I HAVE LITTLE DOUBT, HOWEVER, THAT THE LEVEL OF VIOLENCE REMAINS HIGH AND THAT THERE HAS BEEN NO REDUCTION SINCE THE NEW GOVERNMENT WAS FORMED. THE CONTRARY COULD BE THE CASE. THE MINISTER OF LAW AND ORDER MADE A POINT OF EMPHASISING THAT THE PATRIOTIC FRONT WERE STEPPING UP THEIR ATTACKS ON INNOCENT CIVILIANS IN AN ATTEMPT TO DESTROY THE MOZUZOREWA GOVERNMENT. I HAVE BEEN GIVEN A FIGURE OF 2,000 GUERILLAS KILLED IN THE FIRST 5 MONTHS OF THIS YEAR. THERE IS STILL NO FIRM EVIDENCE ABOUT THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE AMNESTY. IF IT WERE REALLY WORKING, I WOULD HAVE EXPECTED GREATER PUBLICITY FOR ITS SUCCESS. I WILL TRY TO FIND OUT MORE FROM GEN WALLS WHO I AM SEEING TODAY.

6. MINISTERS ARE NOW CONSIDERING THE PRESIDENTIAL SPEECH WHICH WILL BE DELIVERED AT THE OPENING OF PARLIAMENT ON JUNE 26. THIS WILL OUTLINE GOVERNMENT POLICY I HAVE BEEN URGING MINISTERS TO MAKE THE SPEECH AS POSITIVE AND FORWARD LOOKING AS POSSIBLE AND TO GIVE A CLEAR INDICATION OF THE CHANGE THAT THEY INTEND TO INTRODUCE, EVEN IF THE DETAILS HAVE TO BE FILLED IN AT A LATER STAGE. I HAVE STRESSED THE NEED TO SHOW THAT MAJORITY GOVERNMENT IS INDEED A REALITY AND IS DIFFERENT FROM WHAT HAS GONE BEFORE. I AM NOT CONFIDENT, HOWEVER, THAT THE HEAVY AND INFLUENTIAL HAND OF THE CIVIL SERVICE WILL NOT DILUTE BOTH THE LANGUAGE AND THE CONTENT.

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SIR A PARSONS

MR LEAHY

MISS BROWN

MR THOMAS

MR WILLSON

MR WILLIAMS

ADDITIONAL DIST
RHODESIA POLICY

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Prime Minister

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

19 June 1979

Sean Boyan,

Agree, in principle,
to see the Bishop
when he comes?

but
19/6

Yes not

Bishop Muzorewa

When Mr Day saw him on 14 June, Bishop Muzorewa said that he would like to see the Prime Minister in London on 5 or 6 July, though he could come at any convenient date. He is intending to go to the United States, where he will meet Mr Vance. It is not certain if he will be received by President Carter.

Lord Carrington believes it would be better if, before Bishop Muzorewa comes to London, Lord Harlech could have visited Salisbury to discuss possible ways forward with him and with leading members of his government. Mr Day will therefore suggest to Bishop Muzorewa that he might defer his visit by a few days. He will not, however, put the Bishop off if he cannot easily defer his visit. Lord Carrington anyway hopes that the Prime Minister will agree to see Bishop Muzorewa when he comes here.

I am copying this letter to Martin Vile (Cabinet Office).

Yours ever,
Steph

J S Wall

B G Cartledge Esq
10 Downing Street

19 JUN 1979



From: Stephen Hastings M.C., M.P.



HOUSE OF COMMONS
LONDON SW1A 0AA

RG
19th June, 1979

My dear Peter,

News reaching me and my friends from Rhodesia is disturbing:

1. The Rhodesians have arrested two C.I.A. agents and their American case officer; the latter is still under interrogation. Not unnaturally they suspect that any information picked up by the C.I.A. will be passed to the enemy. This seems to me a very silly exercise by the Americans, particularly with C.I.A. morale and standing as low as it has been allowed to become. It seems the South Africans are also well aware of hostile C.I.A. activity.
2. The Russians and their surrogates had apparently warned the Patriotic Front that no further aid would be forthcoming unless they managed to frustrate the elections. As we all know they failed. But now because of the lack of any positive reaction by the West a heavy build up of terrorists, particularly in Mozambique is again in progress fully supported by the Soviet Bloc.
3. The Rhodesians have so far held back from a pre-emptive strike in order to make matters easier for the British and Americans. They can do so no longer with safety and an attack is imminent.
4. On hearing of Carter's intention to continue sanctions the Bishop went to pieces. He is said to have "slumped" when he was told about it. There is no alternative to the Bishop and a real and imminent possibility that his nerve will crack finally unless he is given some personal reassurance.
5. The Rhodesians believe H.M.G. is intending more changes to the Constitution, but while these and other possible provisions such as the departure from office of Ian Smith are discussed with numbers of African leaders, and in spite of Derek Day's presence in Salisbury, no constructive proposals have hitherto been put to them. They have fulfilled the six principles. What are they supposed to do now?
6. The lack of any real response to the achievement of the elections and the effective handing over of power is beginning to cause the deepest foreboding among the farmers. "A few more weeks of stress and strain could occasion irreparable damage" is the way it was put to us. It has been repeatedly said and recognised that the farmers constitute the fabric of the country. Many have already left, their courage is not inexhaustable.
7. In conclusion I do urge you to do something positive to sustain the determination of the Rhodesian farmers and the Bishop as quickly as possible. Could the Prime Minister or you not invite him to London for discussions?



HOUSE OF COMMONS
LONDON SW1A 0AA

8. I do truly appreciate the difficulties you face although personally I am convinced they are made greater, not less, with time, and that an early recognition after acceding to office would have been the best course for us. However this may be the price of further delay is soon going to be the collapse of Rhodesia. It would be folly to gamble on anything else. If Rhodesia disintegrates, gone is any chance of a multi-racial base from which to promote the Western cause in Africa and the consequent loss of a vital strategic position and the raw materials which go with it. I cannot accept that the preservation of some sort of cosmetic unity within the Commonwealth is worth that. The motives of those involved are undoubtedly mixed, muddled, or just plain dubious.

9. Finally, why do we not make suitable play with the wealth of hard evidence of Russian sanctions busting on a massive scale? What possible point can there be in sustaining their reputation in Africa?

I am sorry to burden you with this but so much is at stake for us, both abroad and at home.

I am copying this to the Prime Minister

John Carrington
Steve

The Rt. Hon. Lord Carrington K.C.M.G., M.C.



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

19 June 1979

Dear Bryan,

Rhodesia : Australian Observers' Report

--- I enclose a copy of the report prepared by a group of Australian parliamentarians on the Rhodesian elections which came to us via our High Commission under cover of a letter from the group's leader Mr Roger Shipton, Chairman of the Australian Parliament's Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence. 7.6.79

Both political parties were represented on the group. Their conclusion that the elections were as free and fair as could be expected in the circumstances is similar to Lord Boyd's but expressed in more positive language.

--- I enclose a brief draft reply to Mr Shipton which we suggest might go from the Prime Minister.

Yours ever,
Stephen

(J S Wall)

B G Cartledge Esq
10 Downing Street



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19 JUN 1979

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DRAFT LETTER

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SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

Top Secret,
Secret,
Confidential,
Restricted,
Unclassified.

To:-

Roger Shipton Esq MP
Parliament House
Canberra

From
Prime Minister
Telephone No. Ext.

Department

PRIVACY MARKING

..... In Confidence

Thank you very much for sending me a copy of the detailed and thorough report you and your team of observers prepared on the recent Rhodesian elections. I was interested to see that your conclusions were so similar to those reached by Lord Boyd and his team who observed the elections on behalf of the Conservative Party. As you will know, it is my Government's objective, by building on the changes in Rhodesia, to bring about a return to legality amid the widest possible international recognition.

I too am much looking forward to my forthcoming visit to Australia.

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FM LUANDA 191951Z

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 223 OF 19 JUNE

INFO IMMEDIATE LAGOS

INFO PRIORITY LILONGWE, LUSAKA, MAPUTO, GABORONE, MIRIMBA SALISBURY,
CAPETOWN EMBASSY, WASHINGTON AND UKMIS NEW YORK

FROM LORD HARLECH

RHODESIA

Prime Minister

SW
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W

1. I SAW BANDA ALONE FOR 45 MINUTES AT ZOMBA ON 19 JUNE. HE WAS CLEARLY DELIGHTED THAT WE WERE CONSULTING HIM, BUT HE HAS OF COURSE SIMPLISTIC VIEWS ON THE RHODESIAN SITUATION. IT IS BRITAIN'S PROBLEM AND WE SHOULD DECIDE ON OUR TERMS FOR A SETTLEMENT AND STICK TO THEM NO MATTER WHAT THE PATRIOTIC FRONT, "THEIR FRIENDS" OR THE AMERICANS MIGHT THINK. IT WAS NONE OF THEIR BUSINESS. CARTER HAD ONLY BEEN ELECTED BECAUSE OF THE NEGRO VOTE AND THAT COLOURED HIS POLICY TOWARDS AFRICA, OF WHICH HE KNEW NOTHING.

2. WHEN I HAD BROUGHT HIM DOWN TO EARTH HE SAID THAT IF WE TRIED TO RECOGNISE ON THE BASIS OF THE INTERNAL SETTLEMENT HE THOUGHT WE WOULD GET LITTLE SUPPORT AND FIND OURSELVES IN SERIOUS TROUBLE. HE ENTIRELY AGREED THAT THE ELECTIONS IN APRIL HAD BROUGHT ABOUT A NEW AND MORE HOPEFUL SITUATION ON WHICH WE SHOULD BUILD. MUZOREWA HAD SUBSTANTIAL SUPPORT, MAINLY BECAUSE HE WAS A SHONA. HE PERSONALLY INCLINED TO SITHOLE WHO WAS A FRIEND, BUT IT WAS NOW CLEAR HE HAD LITTLE SUPPORT AND HE HAD TOLD HIM SO.

3. WHEN I ASKED HIM WHAT FURTHER ACTION WAS NEEDED ARISING FROM THE INTERNAL SETTLEMENT HE SAID WITH GREAT EMPHASIS THAT THE MOST IMPORTANT WAS THE REMOVAL OF SMITH. AFRICAN SUSPICIONS WOULD NEVER BE EXTINGUISHED SO LONG AS HE WAS IN GOVERNMENT. (THIS I SUSPECT MAY BE TYPICAL OF THE ATTITUDE OF LEADERS LESS CONCERNED ABOUT THE MINUTIAE OF THE CONSTITUTION THAN NYERERE OR KAUNDA). NEXT HE PUT SOME AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION. THERE WERE TOO MANY SEATS RESERVED FOR THE WHITES AND THEY HAD TOO EXTENSIVE VETO POWERS. FINALLY, OF COURSE, ANY PROPOSALS MUST

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BE BRITISH PROPOSALS. AS THE RESPONSIBLE POWER WE COULD NOT PUT OURSELVES IN THE POSITION OF ACCEPTING TERMS FROM MUZOREWA, ALTHOUGH HE CLEARLY WOULD MUCH PREFER TO SEE MUZOREWA COME OUT ON TOP RATHER THAN NKOMO OR MUGABE.

4. I SAID WE WERE WORRIED IN CASE FOOLISH ACTION WAS TAKEN AT THE OAU OR COMMONWEALTH CONFERENCES WHICH WOULD ONLY COMPLICATE OUR TASK. HE EXPRESSED CONTEMPT FOR THE OAU BUT SAID HE WOULD PROBABLY SEND HIS FOREIGN MINISTER AND WOULD TELL HIM TO DO WHAT HE COULD TO ENCOURAGE MODERATE OPINION. AS FOR THE LUSAKA MEETING HE WOULD OF COURSE TRY AND BE HELPFUL BUT HE ADDED RATHER SADLY THAT HE NO LONGER KNEW THE LEADERS IN SUCH COUNTRIES AS NIGERIA, GHANA AND KENYA. HIS PARTING SHOT WAS THAT HE DID NOT SEE WHY RHODESIA WAS ANY BUSINESS OF NIGERIA AND WAS PLEASED THAT MUZOREWA HAD COUNTERED THEIR CRITICISM OF HIS ELECTIONS BY ASKING WHAT ELECTIONS THEY HAD HAD.

5. BANDA PRIDES HIMSELF ON BEING A LONE WOLF. BUT IT WAS INTERESTING TO HEAR THESE VIEWS ON THE SITUATION EXPRESSED BY AN AFRICAN MODERATE ANXIOUS TO SUPPORT BRITAIN IN WHATEVER SHE DOES AND WHO HAS NO USE FOR THE LEADERS OF THE PATRIOTIC FRONT.

FCO PLEASE PASS TO ALL

BYATT

[PASSED AS REQUESTED]

FILES.
RHODESIA D
BAFD
PUS
PLANNING STAFF
LEGAL ADVISERS (MR FREEHANI)
(MR STEEL)
PS
PS/KPS
PS/MR LUCE
PS/MR RIDKEY
PS/MR HURD
PS/MR MARTEN

PS/MR BLAKER
PS/PUS
SIR A. DUFF
SIR A. PARSONS
MR WILKINSON
MR WILKINSON

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CABINET OFFICE.
MR. B. CARTLEDGE,
10 DOWNING ST.

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GR 100

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FM DAR ES SALAAM 021030Z JULY 79

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELNO 452 OF 18 JUNE

INFO PRIORITY MAPUTO, LILONGWE, LUANDA, LAGOS, MIRIMBA SALISBURY,
INFO ROUTINE WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK, CAPE TOWN

Ends - na
4/7

LORD HARLECH'S VISIT

1. THE TANZANIAN DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER, FOMU, WHO WAS PRESENT WHEN LORD HARLECH SAW MR MKAPA, HAS COMMENTED TO THE US AMBASSADOR THAT HAVING MET LORD HARLECH THE TANZANIANS ARE SATISFIED THAT WE ARE SERIOUSLY SEARCHING FOR AN ACCEPTABLE SETTLEMENT FOR RHODESIA AND NOT MERELY ENGAGED IN A TACTICAL TIME-WINNING OPERATION. FOMU MADE A SIMILAR OBSERVATION TO THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR IN SLIGHTLY LESS DEFINITE TERMS ALONG THE LINES THAT THEY WERE PREPARED TO GIVE US THE BENEFIT OF THE DOUBT.

ENDS.

MOON

[NOTE BY COD: THIS IS A MISSING TELEGRAM REPEATED AT OUR REQUEST]

FILES
RHODESIA D
S AF D
PUSD
PLANNING STAFF
LEGAL ADVISERS (MR FREELAND)
(MR STEEL)

COPIES TO:

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CABINET OFFICE

~~MR B CARTLEDGE~~
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PS
PS/LPS
PS/MR LUCE
PS/MR RIDLEY
PS/MR HURD
PS/MR MARTEN
PS/MR BLAKER
PS/PUS
SIR A DUFF
SIR A PARSONS
MR WILLSON
MR WILLIAMS

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TO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON

TELEGRAM NUMBER 693 OF 18 JUNE 1979

See p 3

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T26A/79T

PRIME MINISTER'S MESSAGE TO THE PRESIDENT

1. THE PRIME MINISTER SIGNED ON 15 JUNE HER REPLY TO MR CARTER'S MESSAGE OF 13 MAY (OUR TELNO 502). SIGNED ORIGINAL FOLLOWS BY BAG BUT PLEASE NOW PASS TO THE WHITE HOUSE FOR TRANSMISSION TO THE PRESIDENT TEXT AS FOLLOWS.

DEAR MR PRESIDENT,

AS YOU KNOW I DEFERRED A FULL REPLY TO YOUR MESSAGE OF 13 MAY UNTIL MY COLLEAGUES AND I HAD BEEN ABLE TO TALK TO MR VANCE.

THOSE TALKS WERE MOST VALUABLE. CY VANCE WILL HAVE REPORTED TO YOU. BUT I THOUGHT YOU WOULD WISH TO KNOW MY THOUGHTS ON THE POINTS MADE IN YOUR MESSAGE.

YOUR RIGHTLY GAVE PRIDE OF PLACE TO SALT AND THE FUTURE STRATEGIC BALANCE. WE HAVE FOLLOWED THE SALT II DEVELOPMENTS WITH CLOSE ATTENTION AND ARE GRATEFUL FOR THE CARE YOU HAVE TAKEN TO KEEP US INFORMED. I SHARE YOUR CONVICTION THAT THE SUBSEQUENT DEBATE ON RATIFICATION OF THE TREATY WILL BE OF CRITICAL IMPORTANCE. AS I SEE IT, YOU IN THE UNITED STATES PARTICULARLY IN YOUR DIALOGUE WITH THE SENATE, AND WE AND OUR OTHER ALLIES HAVE TO STRIKE THE RIGHT BALANCE IN SUPPORTING THE RATIFICATION OF SALT II WHILE AT THE SAME TIME ENSURING THAT OUR PUBLIC OPINION UNDERSTANDS THE NEED FOR THE ALLIANCE TO MAINTAIN AND MODERNISE ITS NUCLEAR FORCES. CY VANCE ASSURED PETER CARRINGTON AT THE OUTSET OF HIS DISCUSSIONS THAT SALT II WAS WHOLLY COMPATIBLE WITH THE RETENTION OF A STRONG US DEFENCE CAPABILITY. WE WELCOME THAT. BOTH SIDES OF THE EQUATION WILL NEED TO BE EMPHASISED IN THE NEXT FEW MONTHS, IF WE ARE TO AVOID CREATING A FALSE SENSE OF SECURITY THAT MIGHT UNDERMINE THE CONTINUING DEFENCE EFFORT THE ALLIANCE MUST MAKE.

I NOTE WHAT YOU SAY ABOUT THE IMPORTANCE OF EUROPEAN VIEWS IN THE RATIFICATION DEBATE THAT LIES AHEAD OF YOU. AND I ACCEPT THAT THE ATTITUDE OF BRITAIN, AS A NUCLEAR POWER, WILL BE SCRUTINISED PARTICULARLY CLOSELY. ON OUR REACTIONS TO DATE WE HAVE

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/DONE OUR BEST

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DONE OUR BEST TO BE HELPFUL, BOTH IN OUR NATIONAL STATEMENTS AND IN THE COMMUNIQUE OF THE NATO DEFENCE PLANNING COMMITTEE AND FOREIGN MINISTERS' COUNCIL. WE HAVE CONSISTENTLY SUPPORTED EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE LIMITATIONS ON STRATEGIC ARMS AND I HAVE MADE IT QUITE CLEAR THAT I HOPE THE TREATY WILL BE RATIFIED. MAY I ASK YOU TO LET ME KNOW AT ANY STAGE HOW BEST YOU THINK WE CAN CONTINUE TO HELP ?

AS YOU KNOW, OUR REACTIONS SO FAR HAVE BEEN GOVERNED BY THE VIEW THAT A STATEMENT ON THE SUBSTANCE OF THE AGREEMENT MADE AFTER ONLY A BRIEF PERIOD IN GOVERNMENT AND BEFORE WE HAD THE OPPORTUNITY TO STUDY THE FULL TEXT OF THE TREATY WOULD NOT HAVE CARRIED CONVICTION EITHER WITH THE PUBLIC HERE OR WITH YOUR CONGRESS. BUT I ASSURE YOU THAT, WITHIN THE ALLIANCE AND IN OUR PUBLIC STATEMENTS, WE WILL DO ALL WE CAN TO ASSIST YOU IN SECURING RATIFICATION.

CY VANCE WILL HAVE CONFIRMED TO YOU THAT ONE ASPECT OF THE SALT II NEGOTIATIONS THAT HAD GIVEN US, AS IT HAD OUR PREDECESSORS, SERIOUS CAUSE FOR CONCERN WAS THE WORDING ON NON-CIRCUMVENTION AND THE POSSIBILITIES FOR NUCLEAR TRANSFERS IN THE FUTURE. I THEREFORE MUCH APPRECIATE THE CATEGORICAL ASSURANCES IN THIS RESPECT THAT HE GAVE US. THIS WILL ALLOW US WHEN QUESTIONED, IN PARLIAMENT AND ELSEWHERE, AS WE SHALL BE, TO CONFIRM UNEQUIVOCALLY THAT OUR INTERESTS ARE SAFEGUARDED.

LOOKING AHEAD, I FULLY SHARE YOUR VIEW OF THE IMPORTANCE OF FULFILLING THE LONG-TERM DEFENCE PROGRAMME. PETER CARRINGTON FRANCIS PYM AND I ALL UNDERLINED TO CY VANCE THE STRENGTH OF OUR COMMITMENT TO THE NATO TARGET OF 3 PERCENT GROWTH IN DEFENCE EXPENDITURE. I AGREE TOO THAT WE NEED TO ENSURE THAT CONCRETE DECISIONS ON THEATRE NUCLEAR FORCE MODERNISATION ARE TAKEN BY THE ALLIANCE BY THE END OF THIS YEAR, AND IN THAT RESPECT THE RECENT NATO COUNCIL MEETING MARKED A MAJOR STEP FORWARD. AS FOR SALT III, I HAVE NO DOUBT THAT CY VANCE'S VISIT HAS GIVEN ADDED IMPETUS TO WHAT I HOPE WILL BE A PERIOD OF INTENSIVE CONSULTATION BOTH WITHIN THE ALLIANCE AND BETWEEN OUR TWO GOVERNMENTS. FOR THIS REASON I VERY MUCH WELCOME YOUR POSTSCRIPT AND LOOK FORWARD TO HEARING YOUR VIEWS ON SALT III AT ANY TIME.

ON THE COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN NEGOTIATIONS IT IS GOOD OF YOU TO HAVE ARRANGED FOR YOUR SCIENCE ADVISER TO COME OVER HERE TO BRIEF ME ON THE TECHNICAL ASPECTS AND ON YOUR OWN THINKING. CLEARLY WE NEED TO KEEP IN CLOSE TOUCH ON THIS.

YOU WILL HAVE HEARD THAT, IN RESPONSE TO THE CONCERN WHICH BOTH YOU AND HELMUT SCHMIDT HAD EXPRESSED, WE HAVE RECENTLY ANNOUNCED A DOUBLING OF THE CONTRIBUTION PROMISED BY THE PREVIOUS ADMINISTRATION TO THE TURKEY RESCUE OPERATION. I AM NO LESS PERSUADED THAN YOU OF THE STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE OF TURKEY. BUT I MUST STRESS THAT POUNDS STERLING 15 MILLION IS ABSOLUTELY AS FAR AS WE CAN GO, BEYOND THE SUBSTANTIAL SUMS WE ARE ALREADY PROVIDING TO THE TURKS THROUGH THE EEC, GIVEN OUR DETERMINATION TO CUT PUBLIC EXPENDITURE IN THE UK. AND I THINK WE ALL AGREE THAT THE TURKS MUST COME TO AN AGREEMENT WITH THE IMF BEFORE OUR CONTRIBUTIONS ARE PAID OVER.

I SHARE YOUR CONCERN ABOUT SOUTHERN AFRICA. I AGREE THAT CLOSE COLLABORATION BETWEEN US WILL BE OF GREAT IMPORTANCE AS WE TRY TO RESOLVE THE PROBLEMS WHICH CONCERN US EQUALLY IN THAT AREA. ON RHODESIA WE WELCOMED THE TALKS WITH CY VANCE. DAVID HARLECH IS NOW IN AFRICA FOR DISCUSSIONS WITH THE COMMONWEALTH AND OTHER AFRICAN GOVERNMENTS DIRECTLY CONCERNED. WE SHALL BE CONSIDERING THE WAY FORWARD IN THE LIGHT OF HIS REPORT: AND WE SHALL WISH TO KEEP IN THE CLOSEST TOUCH WITH YOU OVER THIS PROBLEM.

PETER CARRINGTON AND CY VANCE HAVE BEEN IN CLOSE TOUCH ABOUT THE VARIOUS IDEAS ON NAMIBIA WHICH WE PUT FORWARD AFTER RICHARD LUCE'S VISIT TO THE AREA, AND I THINK YOU, WE AND OUR OTHER PARTNERS ARE NOW LARGELY AGREED ON THE NEXT STEPS.

MY MEETING WITH MR BEGIN WAS PROFOUNDLY DISHEARTENING. I WELL UNDERSTAND YOUR CAUTION ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF MAKING PROGRESS IN THE WEST BANK NEGOTIATIONS. I EMPHASISED TO MR BEGIN THE DANGER WHICH CONTINUED EXPANSION OF ISRAELI SETTLEMENTS REPRESENTS TO THE AUTONOMY NEGOTIATIONS AND ALSO THE NEED TO HELP PRESIDENT SADAT. BUT HE WILL NOT LISTEN AND EVEN RESENTS THE SUBJECT OF SETTLEMENTS BEING RAISED AT ALL.

PETER CARRINGTON WILL DISCUSS WITH HIS COMMUNITY COLLEAGUES HOW THEY CAN BEST HELP. FOR OUR PART WE SHALL CONTINUE TO SUPPORT YOUR GENERAL APPROACH WITH ITS EMPHASIS ON THE NEED TO ACHIEVE A COMPREHENSIVE SETTLEMENT. WE SHALL BE HAPPY TO KEEP IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH MR STRAUSS AS YOU SUGGEST.

AS FOR THE DIVISIONS IN THE ARAB WORLD, I DOUBT WHETHER ANY EARLY PROGRESS TOWARDS RECONCILIATION BETWEEN PRESIDENT SADAT AND SOME OF THE MORE MODERATE ARAB GOVERNMENTS IS POSSIBLE. THE FIRST STEP MUST BE TO URGE PRESIDENT SADAT HIMSELF TO STOP HIS ATTACKS ON HIS

NATURAL ALLIES SUCH AS THE SAUDIS AND THE JORDANIANS. I WAS GLAD TO HEAR THAT YOUR AMBASSADOR IN CAIRO HAS BEEN ABLE TO HELP WITH THIS. I EXPECT TO SEE KING HUSSEIN IN THE NEXT WEEK AND SHALL URGE ON HIM THE NEED NOT TO COMMIT HIMSELF IRREVOCABLY AGAINST THESE PEACE NEGOTIATIONS.

BOTH FOREIGN MINISTER SONODA, AND HIS COLLEAGUE, MR ESAKI, WHOM I HAVE SEEN RECENTLY, UNDERLINED THE IMPORTANCE THE JAPANESE ATTACH TO THE TOKYO SUMMIT. I ACCEPT THAT SUCH MEETINGS CAN BE USEFUL AND I SHALL BE INTERESTED TO TAKE PART IN IT WITH YOU AND OUR FIVE OTHER COLLEAGUES. BUT I MUST ADMIT THAT PREVIOUS MEETINGS IN THE SERIES HAVE STRUCK ME AS SOMETIMES LONGER ON DIAGNOSIS THAN ON PRESCRIPTIONS. THE PROBLEM WE FACE THIS TIME ARE EVEN MORE ACUTE THAN BEFORE, WITH THE ENERGY SHORTAGE AGGRAVATING AN ALREADY UNCERTAIN SITUATION. I HOPE WE SHALL BE ABLE TO GET NEARER TO FINDING SOLUTIONS - BUT FRANKLY I AM NOT OPTIMISTIC. ON ONE POINT I WHOLLY AGREE WITH YOU. WE MUST TRY TO DEAL ONLY WITH A LIMITED NUMBER OF SPECIFIC ISSUES AND AVOID THE OVER-GENERALISED APPROACH. I HOPE ALSO THAT WE SHALL BE ABLE TO AVOID A COMMUNIQUE WHICH DEALS MAINLY IN PIOUS PLATITUDES.

WE WERE ABLE TO ASSURE BOTH JAPANESE MINISTERS OF THE IMPORTANCE WE ATTACH TO A HEALTHY AND CONSTRUCTIVE RELATIONSHIP WITH THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT, BOTH BILATERALLY AND THROUGH THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY. I THINK THERE IS A LIMIT TO HOW FAR OTHERS CAN OR SHOULD GO IN ADVISING THE JAPANESE HOW TO RUN THEIR AFFAIRS, BUT I AGREE THAT THE CONTINUING JAPANESE TRADE SURPLUS IS A CAUSE FOR CONCERN FOR US ALL. ALTHOUGH THE LATEST FIGURES ARE SLIGHTLY MORE REASSURING, THIS MAY BE NO MORE THAN TEMPORARY, AS THE DEPRECIATION OF THE YEN ONCE AGAIN LEADS TO AN INCREASE IN JAPANESE EXPORTS.

FINALLY, I SHOULD LIKE BRIEFLY TO MENTION ONE SUBJECT NOT COVERED IN YOUR LETTER TO ME. I AM VERY CONCERNED ABOUT THE REFUGEE SITUATION IN SOUTH EAST ASIA, AND IN PARTICULAR ABOUT THE INCREASING FLOOD OF BOAT REFUGEES FROM VIETNAM. THE IMPACT IN HONG KONG, WHERE OVER 50,000 VIETNAMESE REFUGEES HAVE ARRIVED THIS YEAR, IS NOW VERY SERIOUS INDEED. THE UNITED STATES AND A HANDFUL OF OTHER COUNTRIES INCLUDING BRITAIN, ARE MAKING A SUBSTANTIAL CONTRIBUTION. BUT WHAT

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IS NEEDED IS A CONCERTED INTERNATIONAL EFFORT BOTH TO GET MORE COUNTRIES TO OPEN THEIR DOORS TO THESE UNFORTUNATE REFUGEES, AND TO EXERT MORE EFFECTIVE PRESSURE ON THE VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT TO STOP EXPORTING THEIR UNWANTED PEOPLE, AND WE NEED TO ACT SOON - WHICH IS WHY I HAVE ASKED DR WALDHEIM TO CONVENE AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE UNDER UN AUSPICES. I HOPE WE CAN COUNT ON YOUR SUPPORT. I AM LOOKING FORWARD TO OUR MEETING IN TOKYO.

YOURS TRULY ..
MARGARET THATCHER.

CARRINGTON

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FILES

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HD/DEF D

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HD/S AF D

HD/RHOD D

HD/NENAD

HD/MED

HD/FRD

HD/FED

HD/ES & SD

HD/SEAD

HD/HK & GD

PS

PS/LPS

PS/MR. RIDLEY

PS/MR. HURD

PS/MR. LUCE

PS/PUS

SIR A DUFF

SIR A PARSONS

MR. BULLARD

MR. BUTLER

MR. CORTAZZI

MR. LEAHY

MISS BROWN

MR. P. H. MOBERLY

MR. FERGUSON

MR. WILLIAMS

MR. P. C. MOBERLY

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10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

WJ/VL/B
Rhodesia Sit
cc CO.
Subject Commonwealth -
June 1979 - (Visit of
the Commonwealth
Secretary-General - Mr
18 June 1979 Ramphal)

Dear Sir,

Call on the Prime Minister by the Commonwealth
Secretary General at 10 Downing Street on
18 June 1979

The Commonwealth Secretary General, Mr. Ramphal, paid his first call on the Prime Minister at No. 10 at 1715. Sir Antony Duff was present. The following is a summary of the main points which arose during just over an hour's discussion.

The Commonwealth

Mr. Ramphal said that he could report to the Prime Minister that the Commonwealth was in good shape. Rhodesia presented a special problem but, apart from that, the Commonwealth was at a high level of collective confidence. The period which had been marked by doubts on the part of the new members as to whether the Commonwealth was practicable or useful, and on whether it was still dominated by the UK, had passed; and the general mood was now more confident and relaxed. The public view of the Commonwealth was, however, less satisfactory. There was still a tendency to see the UK's decision to join the EEC as an act of voluntary separation from the Commonwealth, despite the fact that this view was not held to any significant extent, if at all, within the Commonwealth itself. Some countries, such as Australia and New Zealand, had their own problems with the EEC and there were current difficulties over the Lome renegotiation: but there was no hostility whatsoever within the Commonwealth to UK membership of the Community. The Commonwealth was, Mr. Ramphal said, highly valued in the international community, particularly by men like Secretary General Waldheim and Mr. McNamara. They recognised that the Commonwealth community was sufficiently small to make it possible to do business within it but that, at the same time, it had a wide geographical and racial spread. For these reasons, the Commonwealth could draw on an immense reservoir of international goodwill.

/Rhodesia

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Rhodesia

Some remarks by Mr. Ramphal about the nature of the meetings of Commonwealth Heads of Government led into a discussion of the substance of the Rhodesia problem. The Prime Minister said that there would be certain things which she would have to say and do about Rhodesia which she was convinced were right: once the grounds for Rhodesia's illegal status had been purged, certain consequences had to follow. The UK and others had recently recognised a number of African regimes - for example, Uganda and Ghana - who did not owe their authority to any kind of democratic elections and whose constitutions were in no way superior to the present constitution of Zimbabwe/Rhodesia. At Lusaka, all those concerned would have to put forward their respective views on Rhodesia; but, the Prime Minister said, it would be important to avoid a heated argument about the issue. Mr. Ramphal said the Front Line Presidents would tend to argue that the First Principle had not yet been fulfilled and that Rhodesia did not in fact enjoy majority rule; President Carter's determination would have reinforced them in this view. Lord Harlech's mission might, Mr. Ramphal said, contribute to a good climate for discussion and perhaps point the way forward. Mr. Ramphal emphasised that the Front Line Presidents, even President Machel, had a very real concern lest developments in Rhodesia could lead eventually to the strengthening of Soviet influence in Southern Africa.

The Prime Minister expressed the view that President Machel was not particularly well placed to talk about Soviet influence. In the eyes of the ordinary British citizen, there was now no reason for not helping Bishop Muzorewa. If he were not supported, the war would intensify. Rhodesia could contribute so much to the region, not least to Zambia, and the British Government had a duty to bring Rhodesia back to legality and to lift sanctions. When Mr. Ramphal suggested the the Front Line Presidents might take the line that the war should first be ended by discussions leading to a ceasefire, the Prime Minister pointed out that some of the Front Line Presidents were harbouring terrorists on their territory. The Prime Minister recalled President Kaunda's statement to her that "force was the only way". The Prime Minister stressed that the British Government was confronted by a problem of timing: sanctions would lapse in November since there was no way in which Parliamentary approval could be won for their renewal. The Prime Minister said that her fear was that the talks in Lusaka would get nowhere and that positions would then harden on all sides.

/Mr. Ramphal

Mr. Ramphal said that he thought that the Front Line Presidents were taking their discussions with Lord Harlech very seriously: none of the Heads of Government wanted the Lusaka meeting to be another Singapore - they did not wish the fabric of the Commonwealth to be damaged. Mr. Ramphal explained that he thought that the other Heads of Government would react positively to a frank explanation by the Prime Minister, in restricted session, of the Parliamentary dimension to the Government's handling of the Rhodesia problem although they would, of course, respond by describing their own political difficulties on the issue. Sir Antony Duff said that he thought that the Front Line Presidents were genuinely concerned that a solution should be found but that the issues had been totally obscured by emotion and by their hatred for Mr. Smith; since 1976, they had seen no way of making progress except by means of force. A thorough political discussion in restricted session at Lusaka could create an easier relationship which would be valuable to the UK when the Government did what it would have to do. The Prime Minister said that it would be important to show the African Heads of Government that she was not simply waiting to recognise Bishop Muzorewa's regime as soon as the Lusaka Conference was over. In further discussion of Rhodesia, the Prime Minister stressed that it would be important to give Bishop Muzorewa some kind of support and encouragement in order to strengthen him against the possibility of a Marxist Zimbabwe under Mugabe. The Prime Minister made it clear that there could be no accommodation with terrorism of any kind: she was not prepared to accept arguments to the effect that what could not be achieved politically should be achieved by the bullet. When Mr. Ramphal said that he thought that the Patriotic Front would be more interested in negotiation than in the continued use of force, the Prime Minister commented that they were only interested in negotiations if they were confident of ending up on top. Mr. Ramphal said that President Nyerere would take the view that there would be a better chance of keeping Marxism out of Rhodesia by reaching a settlement now, even if Robert Mugabe were to become President.

C.H.G.M.

Mr. Ramphal told the Prime Minister that he would be sending her a letter about the procedure for the C.H.G.M.. He explained the importance of the restricted sessions at these meetings. It would be important to choose the right moment to begin the discussion on Rhodesia. The Prime Minister agreed that this part of the debate could best begin once a good relationship had been established on other issues; her own preference would be to tackle Rhodesia on the Friday afternoon. Mr. Ramphal strongly agreed with this approach

/ and said

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and said that he thought that President Nyerere would be the best opening speaker in the discussion on Rhodesia; he could be relied upon to tackle the matter in a balanced manner and to set the tone for what followed. Mr. Ramphal said that the Conference would then adjourn for the weekend but that there would be opportunities on Saturday and Sunday for bilateral discussions from which he hoped that some convergence of view would emerge. He had been urging President Kaunda to take the chair for the discussion of Rhodesia, in the hope that the duties of chairmanship would act as a constraint on his sometimes emotional approach.

Mr. Ramphal went on to say that he hoped that the Prime Minister could agree to be one of the four speakers who would respond to President Kaunda's speech of welcome to the participants on the first day of the meeting; the other speakers he had in mind were Mr. Malcolm Fraser, President Zia of Bangladesh and, if he attended the meeting, General Obasanjo of Nigeria. The Prime Minister said that she would be prepared to make one of the opening speeches, provided that her speech could be the last of the four. She said that she appreciated that Mr. Ramphal was trying to be helpful to her in making his proposal.

Mr. Ramphal said that after the opening session, which was the only public occasion during the meeting, there would be a general debate on the international political situation, which he hoped Mr. Desai would open; this would cover such topics as detente, disarmament and the changing power structure in the world. On the Thursday morning, there would be a specific debate on the problems of South East Asia, including those of Indo-China, the policies of the "new" China and of the Vietnamese refugees. He had been intending to ask the Malaysian Prime Minister to open this debate but in view of recent developments doubted whether he would now be suitable. Mr. Ramphal said that he hoped that the Prime Minister would take part in this debate and say a word about the problems of Hong Kong. These debates, together, would take the meeting up until the afternoon of Friday, 3 August and the discussion of Rhodesia could then begin. Other political topics which would be tackled at the beginning of the following week were Belize and Cyprus. These would be followed by an economic debate, to be opened by Mr. Fraser and in which Mr. Manley would speak on the deficit situation in the l.d.c.s. Mr. Ramphal said that he hoped that the Prime Minister would tell the meeting, during this debate, about the Economic Summit in Tokyo. Finally, Mr. Ramphal said, there would be a number of functional issues to discuss: follow-up to the Bangalore Meeting on industrialisation, multilateral aid programmes and, Mr. Ramphal suggested, the phenomenon of the micro-states.

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- 5 -

I should be grateful if Mr. Ramphal's suggestions for the Lusaka agenda could be borne in mind in the preparation of the draft list of briefs for the C.H.G.M..

I am sending a copy of this letter to Martin Vile (Cabinet Office).

Yours ever,

Bryan Cook

J. S. Wall, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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Rhodesia

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10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

18 June 1979

Rhodesia: Chinese Assistance to ZANU

Thank you for your letter of 8 June about the current level of Chinese assistance to ZANU. The Prime Minister has seen your letter and has noted the position.

H. G. CARTLEDGE

J.S. Wall, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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FM DAR ES SALAAM

TO IMMEDIATE FCO DESKBY

171330Z

TELNO 444 OF 17 JUNE

INFO IMMEDIATE MIRIMBA SALISBURY, PRETORIA EMBASSY, LUSAKA
LAGOS, MAPUTO, LUANDA, LILONGWE, WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK

FROM LORD HARLECH

MY IPT

RHODESIA

1. I SAW PRESIDENT NYERERE THIS MORNING, 17 JUNE. I EXPLAINED MY MISSION AND OUTLINED SOME OF THE OPTIONS-- SMITHS DEPARTURE, AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION, A TEST OF ACCEPTABILITY, BRINGING THE PATRIOTIC FRONT AND BISHOP MUZOREWA TOGETHER FOR TALKS, AND IF SO HOW, DEPLOYMENT OF A COMMONWEALTH CONTACT GROUP, THE HOLDING OF NEW ELECTIONS. I STRESSED HOWEVER THAT WHAT WAS DESIRABLE WAS NOT NECESSARILY OBTAINABLE.

2. IN RESPONSE, PRESIDENT NYERERE BEGAN BY SAYING THAT HE DID RECOGNISE THAT THERE HAD BEEN A POLITICAL CHANGE IN THE SITUATION AS A RESULT OF THE ELECTIONS IN RHODESIA AND HE UNDERSTOOD THE PUBLIC REACTION IN BRITAIN TO THE NEW SITUATION. BUT THE PUBLIC DID NOT UNDERSTAND THE SALISBURY CONSTITUTION: THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT DID AND KNEW IT WAS NOT GENUINE MAJORITY RULE. NYERERE ACCEPTED HOWEVER THAT THE NEW SITUATION DID REPRESENT AN ADVANCE. THE PROBLEM WAS THAT IT DID NOT GO FAR ENOUGH, AND WE WERE NOT YET IN A POSITION TO APPEAL FOR THE APPROVAL OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY AND TO PERSUADE THE RHODESIAN PEOPLE TO ACCEPT IT. BISHOP MUZOREWAS REGIME COULD NOT BE RECOGNISED BECAUSE OF THE UNSATISFACTORY FEATURES OF THE CONSTITUTION: BY IMPLICATION, IF THE CONSTITUTION WERE SATISFACTORY HE, NYERERE, WOULD RECOGNISE THE GOVERNMENT. HE WOULD MAKE UP HIS OWN MIND REGARDLESS OF THE PATRIOTIC FRONT.

3. NYERERE WENT ON TO SPEAK OF SMITH HAVING SCORED A VICTORY IN THE SENSE THAT, AFTER ALL THE TALKS ON THE BASIS OF THE ANGLO/AMERICAN PROPOSALS, DISCUSSION NOW HAD TO BE ON THE BASIS OF THE INTERNAL CONSTITUTION. WE NOW HAD THE OPPORTUNITY

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TO AMEND AND IMPROVE THAT CONSTITUTION. BUT IN ADDITION IT WOULD STILL BE NECESSARY FOR THERE TO BE FRESH ELECTIONS. NYERERE MADE CLEAR THAT HE WAS NOT OPPOSED TO SOME SPECIAL PROTECTION FOR MINORITIES, EG THROUGH RESERVED SEATS, BUT THEY SHOULD NOT HAVE OTHER SPECIAL POWERS (HE SPOKE OF "VETO POWERS"). HE THOUGHT THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT COULD PERSUADE BISHOP MUZOREWA TO MAKE THE NECESSARY CHANGES BECAUSE WE WERE "THE LAST OPPORTUNITY" FOR THE SALISBURY GOVERNMENT.

4. NYERERE COMPLAINED THAT BISHOP MUZOREWA WAS MAKING THINGS EXTREMELY DIFFICULT. HE HAD REACHED OFFICE AS A RESULT OF A COMBINATION OF POLITICAL EFFORTS AND THE MILITARY PRESSURE. NYERERE WOULD EXPECT THE BISHOP TO RECOGNISE THIS. BUT WHEN HE SPOKE HE SOUNDED JUST LIKE SMITH, THREATENING ZAMBIA AND MOZAMBIQUE AND THE PATRIOTIC FRONT, AND TALKING OF APPEALING TO SOUTH AFRICA. (I COMMENTED ON THE LAAGER ATMOSPHERE IN SALISBURY. WE HOPED THAT ONE OF THE RESULTS OF MR DAY BEING THERE WOULD BE TO BRING GREATER UNDERSTANDING OF THE OUTSIDE REALITIES.)

5. WITH REFERENCE TO PRESIDENT CARTERS STATEMENT ON SANCTIONS, I STRESSED THAT THERE WAS NO DISAGREEMENT BETWEEN US AND THE AMERICANS OVER MAINTAINING SANCTIONS. INDEED WE HAD URGED THE AMERICANS NOT TO LIFT THEM AT THIS TIME. NYERERE SAID HE WAS RELIEVED TO HEAR THIS.

6. I ASKED HOW IMPORTANT WAS THE DISAPPEARANCE OF MR SMITH. THE PRESIDENT SAID THIS WAS NOT SO IMPORTANT (I AM NOT SURE THAT I WOULD BE INCLINED TO TAKE THIS TOO LITERALLY). WHAT MATTERED WAS THE CONSTITUTION. "IF MR SMITH WERE TO BE ELECTED AS PRIME MINISTER UNDER A FAIR CONSTITUTION, HE, NYERERE, WOULD BE THE FIRST TO WELCOME HIM IN THE OAU". IN ANSWER TO ANOTHER QUESTION, NYERERE MADE CLEAR THAT AN IMPROVED CONSTITUTION AND A TEST OF ACCEPTABILITY WOULD NOT BE SUFFICIENT. DESPITE HIS RELIEF AT THE FINDINGS OF THE PEARCE COMMISSION HE DID NOT CARE FOR TESTS OF ACCEPTABILITY. THE AFRICAN PEASANT IN RHODESIA OR EVEN THE AVERAGE BRITISH VOTER DID NOT HAVE THE CAPACITY TO FORM A JUDGMENT ON SO HIGHLY COMPLICATED AN ISSUE AND THUS THIS WAS NOT A FAIR PROCEDURE. THERE HAD TO BE ELECTIONS.

7. PRESIDENT NYERERE DID NOT EXPECT THE OAU TO ADOPT DETAILED RESOLUTIONS. AT THEIR MONROVIA MEETING THEY WOULD OF COURSE SUPPORT THE CONTINUATION OF THE WAR AND REJECT MUZOREWAS GOVERNMENT. NYERERE

/SAID

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SAID THAT HE HIMSELF DID NOT WANT TO SEE THE MEETING IN MONROVIA "FUELLING THE FIRE". ANY STATEMENT BY THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT WHICH IMPROVED THE ATMOSPHERE WOULD HELP HIM.

8. I SAID I HAD BEEN DEPRESSED BY MY MEETING WITH ZAPU LEADERS IN LUSAKA. THEY HAD BEEN INFLEXIBLE AND UNCOMPROMISING, THOUGH POSSIBLY BECAUSE THEY FELT THEY COULD NOT BE OTHERWISE IN THE ABSENCE OF MR NKONO. NYERERE SAID THAT HE WAS CONFIDENT THAT THE PATRIOTIC FRONT WOULD BE PREPARED TO TALK, AS HE BELIEVED THEY SHOULD. THEY COULD NOT AGREE TO TALKS WITH MUZOREWA BECAUSE THAT WOULD GIVE HIM STATUS. NOR COULD THEY BE EXPECTED TO AGREE FORMALLY TO TALK ON THE BASIS OF THE INTERNAL CONSTITUTION. WE, THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT, WOULD HAVE TO PUT FORWARD PROPOSALS AND WHILE THESE MIGHT BE AMENDMENTS TO THAT CONSTITUTION, THEY WOULD HAVE TO BE PRESENTED AS OUR PROPOSALS. ON THIS BASIS THE PATRIOTIC FRONT WOULD, HE BELIEVED, BE WILLING TO ENTER DISCUSSIONS. NYERERE DID NOT SEE MUCH GOOD COMING FROM A COMMONWEALTH CONTACT GROUP.

9. I HAD A PRELIMINARY MEETING WITH MKAPA ON 16 JUNE, BUT HE MADE NO POINT THAT WAS SIGNIFICANTLY DIFFERENT FROM ANY MADE BY NYERERE.

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LEGAL ADVISERS
(MR FREELAND)
(MR STEEL)
ECON D
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PS/MR LUCE

PS/MR RIDLEY
PS/MR HURD
PS/FUS
SIR A DUFF
SIR A PARSONS
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MR THOMAS
MR WILLSON
MR WILLIAMS

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FIVE

cc C.O.
Copied to Master
+ Commonwealth
CHGM

DSG

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

~~B/F 19.6.79.~~

15 June 1979

Dear Stephen,

Call on the Prime Minister by the High Commissioner of Zambia
on 15 June 1979

The Zambian High Commissioner, Miss Chibesakunda, called on the Prime Minister today, at her own request, at 1515 in order to deliver a message from President Kaunda on Rhodesia. I enclose a copy of President Kaunda's message, on which I should be grateful for early comments and for advice on how the Prime Minister should respond. The following is a summary of the main points which arose during a discussion which lasted for 40 minutes.

CHGM, Lusaka

Miss Chibesakunda told the Prime Minister that President Kaunda sent her his very best wishes and that he was looking forward to seeing her in Lusaka. The President would greatly welcome an opportunity to have an informal meeting with the Prime Minister, on the margin of the Lusaka Conference and at as an early a stage as possible, in order to discuss Rhodesia. The Prime Minister indicated that she would be glad to do this and suggested that the meeting should be restricted to two a side (she would like the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary to be present) with note-takers. Miss Chibesakunda suggested that the meeting might take place on the evening of the Prime Minister's arrival in Lusaka and the Prime Minister undertook to look into this possibility.

The Prime Minister said that Miss Chibesakunda would have noticed that the British Government were encountering one or two problems in connection with The Queen's presence in Lusaka for the CHGM. The Government was engaged in quiet enquiries relating to The Queen's security and concerning, in particular, the possibility of an attack on The Queen's aircraft by ground-to-air missiles. The Prime Minister of New Zealand, Mr. Muldoon,

/ had called

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had called on her on 11 June and had mentioned to her his concern for The Queen's safety. Mr. Muldoon had subsequently decided to share his concerns with the press. As a result of this, the Prime Minister was having to deal with a number of questions in the House of Commons and with suggestions that the conference should be moved to an alternative venue. In reply, the Prime Minister was saying that she hoped that The Queen would go to Lusaka and that The Queen's safety was a paramount consideration. The Government were thus doing everything they could to provide reassurance: but the final reassurance could only come from President Kaunda if he were to ensure that all missiles were removed from the guerilla forces in Zambia and that no maverick fired one. The Prime Minister said that The Queen wished to go to Lusaka, that she herself wished The Queen to do so and that she, the Prime Minister, would go to Lusaka in any case. The Queen's safety, however, had to be seen to be protected and the Prime Minister was answerable to Parliament for this. She had to judge that everything possible had been done to ensure the safety of The Queen's aircraft, both on its inward and on its outward flights, although she recognised that there could be no guarantees.

Miss Chibesakunda said that she appreciated the Prime Minister's concern. The Zambian Government was aware of the problem and had done all in their power to ensure The Queen's safety. She pointed out that the incidents which had given rise to concern in the UK had all happened outside Zambian territory: she had every confidence so far as the territory under President Kaunda's control was concerned. Within Zambia's own borders, the Zambian Government could give the necessary guarantees.

Miss Chibesakunda went on to suggest that the Prime Minister might use the British Government's influence with the Rhodesian forces as well: they, too, were undisciplined and the UK should exert leverage on them. Miss Chibesakunda undertook to report the Prime Minister's remarks to President Kaunda.

Rhodesia

After handing over President Kaunda's message, Miss Chibesakunda told the Prime Minister that the President had asked her to say that he hoped the Prime Minister would keep very much in mind the fact that the Zambian and British Governments shared the same goal. Zambia needed a stable neighbour to the south. The British Government's present approach to the Rhodesia problem was, in President Kaunda's view, the surest way of opening Southern Africa to Eastern bloc influence. President Kaunda hoped that the UK would concentrate on bringing the parties together in order to discuss a cease-fire and to tackle the real causes of the present war.

/President Kaunda

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- 3 -

President Kaunda wished the Prime Minister to know, Miss Chibesakunda said, that if any action should be taken to deprive one of the parties to the conflict of access to the UK, this would create the possibility of access to other powers, in the East. The Prime Minister asked what was meant by "access to the UK". Miss Chibesakunda said that if the Patriotic Front were to feel that the UK was reinforcing the internal arrangements in Salisbury without regard to the Patriotic Front's interests, the Patriotic Front would have to look elsewhere for support. The Prime Minister commented that Nkomo was already receiving funds from the Soviet Union, and Mugabe assistance from the Chinese. Miss Chibesakunda replied that Nkomo would have no reason to seek such help if the root causes of the war were to be removed.

The Prime Minister asked Miss Chibesakunda if Nkomo would take part in an All-Party Conference: Miss Chibesakunda replied that Nkomo would take part in a genuine attempt to reach a solution and that Mugabe would also do so, on certain conditions, such as a change in the Rhodesian constitution. Miss Chibesakunda asked whether there was any scope for a transitional period in Salisbury to allow all the parties to adjust to the new situation. The Prime Minister said that Bishop Muzorewa was now undoubtedly in charge in Salisbury. She was certainly concerned by the problems which existed between him and Mr. Sithole but the fact remained that a 64 per cent election turnout, and the high vote which the Bishop had received, could not be ignored.

Miss Chibesakunda argued that there had been no basic change in Rhodesia and that the new constitution was deficient by international standards. The Prime Minister commented that both Zambia and the UK recognised a number of states, such as Angola, Mozambique and Uganda, in which no elections had been held and whose constitutions neither Government would accept for their own people. If the last of the six principles were shown to have been satisfied, the ground for Rhodesia's illegality would have disappeared. Everybody agreed that there was now a new situation in Rhodesia.

Miss Chibesakunda said that, as Rhodesia's neighbour, Zambia did not believe that there had been a change there: the status quo still existed. Would Bishop Muzorewa be able to cope with the continuing war? The Prime Minister remarked that one feature of the war had been attacks on mission schools. Miss Chibesakunda said that the incidents involving Viscount aircraft had been regrettable but there was no evidence that the so-called terrorists had attacked mission targets; there was, on the other hand, evidence that these attacks had been carried out by the Selous Scouts, disguised in guerilla uniforms. The Patriotic Front only used terror as a last resort. The Prime Minister recalled that Nkomo had told Mr. Cledwyn Hughes,

/ during his mission

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during his mission to Southern Africa, that the Patriotic Front could achieve what they wanted by the gun. When Miss Chibesakunda seemed disposed to question the good faith of Lord Boyd's team of observers which had covered the elections in Rhodesia, the Prime Minister remarked that she was beginning to wonder whether she would be welcome in Lusaka and brought the conversation to an end.

I should be grateful if you would ensure that this letter is given a suitably limited distribution. I am sending a copy to Martin Vile (Cabinet Office).

Yours ever,

Brian Carrivick.

J. S. Wall, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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TO IMMEDIATE FCO DESKBY
171330Z DESKBY 171330²
TELNO443 OF 17 JUNE

Prime Minister

INFO IMMEDIATE MIRIMBA SALISBURY PRETORIA EMBASSY LAGOS
LUSAKA MAPUTO LUANDA LILONGWE WASHINGTON UKMIS NEW YORK

*By
19/6/68*

FROM LORD HARLECH : RHODESIA

ans

1. MY LEFT RECORDS MY TALK WITH PRESIDENT NYERERE THIS MORNING. HE WAS CHEERFUL, MOST FRIENDLY AND RELAXED THROUGHOUT AND DURING A SHORT PRIVATE TALK I HAD WITH HIM ALONE.
2. I HAVE THE FOLLOWING MAIN IMPRESSIONS FROM THE TALK:

- (1) HE IS PREPARED TO BE HELPFUL, THOUGH WITHIN FAIRLY CONFINED LIMITS.
 - (2) IF HE IS TO HELP, THERE MUST BE SUBSTANTIAL IMPROVEMENT TO THE CONSTITUTION AND THEN ELECTIONS.
 - (3) HE ACCEPTS THAT THE ANGLO/AMERICAN PLAN IS NOW PAST HISTORY. WHILE RECOGNISING THAT FUTURE NEGOTIATION MUST NOW START FROM THE BASIS OF THE INTERNAL CONSTITUTION, TO SAVE PATRIOTIC FACE WE SHOULD BE PREPARED TO TAKE THE LEAD IN PUTTING FORWARD FRESH PROPOSALS AS OUR OWN.
 - (4) HE BELIEVES THAT THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT CAN EXERCISE CONSIDERABLE PERSUASION WITH MUZOREWA AND THE INTERNAL PEOPLE BECAUSE, AS HE SAYS, WE ARE THEIR LAST OPPORTUNITY,..
 - (5) HE WILL NEED TO SATISFY HIMSELF PERSONALLY OF THE ACCEPTABILITY OF A REVISED CONSTITUTION THOUGH HE WOULD NOT EXPECT TO FIND HIMSELF IN AGREEMENT ON EVERY DETAIL. BUT HE CLAIMS THAT IF HE IS BROADLY SATISFIED HE WILL SUPPORT IT AND RECOMMEND IT TO THE PATRIOTIC FRONT AND THEIR FRIENDS.
 - (6) HE DOES NOT SEE MUCH MERIT IN DEVICES SUCH AS TEST OF ACCEPTABILITY OR A COMMONWEALTH CONTACT GROUP.
- MOON

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LEGAL ADVISERS
(MR FREELAND)
(MR STEEL)
ECON D
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PS/SIR I GILMOUR
PS/MR LUCE

PS/MR RIDLEY
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MR WILLIAMS

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

Dear Bryan

15 June 1979

Call by the Zambian High Commissioner

I enclose briefing for Miss Chibesakunda's call on the Prime Minister this afternoon.

You will see that the points to make refer to the fact that Lord Harlech will be seeing Patriotic Front representatives. This is because Lord Harlech has now made arrangements to meet the Patriotic Front. He will not be seeing Mr Nkomo, but will see one of the deputies, Mr Silundika.

*Yours ever,
Stephen*

(J S Wall)
Private Secretary

Bryan G Cartledge Esq
10 Downing Street
LONDON

15 JUN 1979

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PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING WITH THE ZAMBIAN HIGH COMMISSIONER
15 JUNE 1979

RHODESIA

POINTS TO MAKE

1. Lord Harlech had a very good talk with President Kaunda yesterday on possible ways of making progress on Rhodesia. We shall consider next steps when Lord Harlech returns, in the light of discussions with other Front Line Presidents and General Obasanjo.
2. We shall be looking for a constructive discussion at Lusaka on Rhodesia. The starting point for our discussion should be what has been achieved there. There is evidence of wide popular support for Bishop Muzorewa.
3. We are not excluding any of the ways of bringing Rhodesia to legal independence with wide international recognition. An attempt to achieve a wider agreement is not ruled out, if any realistic basis could be found. The Commonwealth could have a role to play in this. Lord Harlech will be seeing Patriotic Front representatives. But the wishes of the Rhodesian people, as expressed in the elections, must be taken fully into account.
4. (if raised) President Carter's "determination". We are in close touch with the Americans about Rhodesia. President Carter's "determination" recognised the progress which had been made. We intend to build on that progress.

Prime Minister's Meeting with Miss Chibesakunda. Zambia/Rhodesia15 June 1979Essential Facts

1. Miss Chibesakunda recently returned from a two week visit to Lusaka for consultations: before leaving, she told the Lord Privy Seal that her visit was in connection with preparations for the Heads of Government Meeting.
2. The message that Miss Chibesakunda will hand to the Prime Minister deals with Rhodesia. It is expected to be on broadly similar terms to the letters to President Carter and French, Canadian and Australian Heads of Government handed over by President Kaunda to their representatives in Lusaka on 11 June. We have no text: gist in Lusaka telno 406. The letters advocate an all-party conference and ask governments to persuade the UK not to lift sanctions or recognise Rhodesia.
Flag A
3. Lord Harlech's talk with President Kaunda yesterday (14 June) was friendly, and Lord Harlech believes that, although he would prefer a "classical" decolonisation exercise in Rhodesia, his mind is not closed on the possible ways forward and he appeared to gain some encouragement from the talk. (Lusaka telno 426).
Flag B
4. President Kaunda needs a settlement in Rhodesia. Zambia has borne an increasingly high economic cost as a result of the conflict. The former independence of the Zambian and Rhodesian economies was disrupted by sanctions. Nevertheless the rail and road routes through Rhodesia and Botswana to South African ports remain vital to Zambia. Confidential talks have been held very recently between officials of the two countries about the possible reopening of road routes and other transport questions. The presence in Zambia of 15-20,000 ZIPRA guerrillas is a source of concern, not least because they attract Rhodesian cross-border attacks. But President Kaunda has maintained his firm commitment to Mr Nkomo and ZAPU. There is a history of personal animosity between him and Bishop Muzorewa. He has not yet responded to the Bishop's offers of reconciliation. However he told Lord Harlech privately that he did not rule out the possibility of a meeting with Bishop Muzorewa (Lusaka telno 427).
Flag C

5. Miss Chibesakunda was a member of the delegation of Commonwealth High Commissioners who called, with Mr Ramphal, on Lord Carrington on 23 May to express their concern about the implications for the Commonwealth if we recognised the Muzorewa Government. Lord Carrington assured them that the Commonwealth would be fully consulted over Rhodesia.

Flag D 6. President Carter's "determination". In his statement about the Rhodesian elections President Carter recognised the progress which had been made, but took the view that the Constitution, which had not been voted on by the African electorate, was intended to perpetuate white control over the army, the judiciary and the Civil Service. The US Senate has passed an amendment to the Defence Department's Appropriation Bill which would require sanctions to be lifted by 30 June. A similar amendment is proposed to the State Department Authorisation Bill. These amendments will be considered by the House of Representatives. The outcome is uncertain but Mr Vance has made it clear that the Administration will strongly resist the lifting of sanctions at this stage. (A Presidential veto could only be overturned by a two-thirds majority in both Houses, but would have to be applied to the Bill as a whole.)

7. Mr Day has reported from Salisbury that there is a recognition that some changes in the Constitution might be necessary to secure wider acceptance. There is no sign at this stage of de-escalation of the war. The Rhodesian military commander, General Walls, considers that there will be a hard fight ahead in the next few months.

MR FREELAND LEGAL ADVISER RM 1200A
MR STEEL LEGAL ADVISER RM K176
~~ASSISTANT CLERK~~

ADM MR BLATER TREASURY

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FM LUSAKA 130913Z JUN 79

TO IMMEDIATE FCC

TELEGRAM NUMBER 406 OF 13 JUNE

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, CANBERRA, OTTAWA, PARIS, GABORONE,
PRIORITY PRETORIA, UMNIS NEW YORK, DAR ES SALAAM, NAPUTO, LAGOS

NY TELNO 395 OF 12 JUNE: RHODESIA

1. STEVE LOW HAS BEEN AUTHORISED TO BRIEF LORD HARLECH ON THE SUBSTANCE OF PRESIDENT KAUNDA'S LETTER TO PRESIDENT CARTER AND WILL DO SO THIS EVENING. NO ONE HAS FELT ABLE TO LET ME HAVE A COPY OF THE DOCUMENT AT THIS STAGE BUT (PLEASE PROTECT) HAVE IN FACT HAD SIGHT OF IT. THE LETTER BEARS THE HALLMARKS OF PRESIDENT KAUNDA'S OWN HANDWORK AND IS LARGELY TAKEN UP WITH HIS VIEWS ON THE MUZOREWA/SMITH REGIME WHICH IS SEEN AS SIMPLY A CONTINUATION OF THE SMITH GOVERNMENT UNDER ANOTHER GUISE. IF THE REGIME IS RECOGNISED BY THE WEST CONFLICT WILL BE INTERNATIONALISED AND THE PATRIOTIC FRONT TURNED DEFINITELY TO THE EAST TO WHOM THEY ALREADY HAVE TO LOOK FOR THEIR WEAPONS.

2. ACCORDINGLY BRITAIN'S FRIENDS IN THE WEST ARE URGED TO PREVAIL ON US

A) TO GIVE RHODESIA A BROAD BASIS AND LASTING SOLUTION

B) TO WITHHOLD RECOGNITION OF MUZOREWA/SMITH REGIME AND TO HOLD FIRMLY TO SANCTIONS, ACCEPTING MUZOREWA/SMITH'S RULE AS ONLY A STAGE IN THE TRANSITION TO MAJORITY RULE

C) TO ANNOUNCE A CLEAR POLICY POSITION ON RHODESIA DECLARING THE MUZOREWA/SMITH RULE AS ONLY ONE OF THE CONFLICTING FEATURES WHICH CHARACTERISE THE TRANSITIONAL STAGE OF THE TERRITORY AND TO CALL THE LEADERS BOTH INSIDE AND OUTSIDE RHODESIA TO AN ALL-PARTY CONFERENCE TO REACH A FINAL SETTLEMENT.

3. I WAS INTERESTED TO SEE THERE WAS NO EXPLICIT CRITICISM OF BRITAIN OR ATTACK UPON US.

4. THE LETTER TO PRESIDENT GISCARD INVITED HIM TO VISIT ZAMBIA SOON TO SEE THINGS FOR HIMSELF (BUT PLEASE PROTECT FRENCH CHARGE'S HAVING REVEALED THIS TO US).

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PP CAPE TOWN

MIRIMBA SALISBURY

PP WASHINGTON

PP UKMIS NEW YORK

PP PRETORIA

GRS 870

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DESKBY 152900Z

FM LUSAKA 141600Z JUN 79

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 426 OF 14 JUNE

INFO IMMEDIATE DAR ES SALAAM, PRIORITY GABORONE, LAGOS, MAPUTO,
LUANDA, CAPETOWN, MIRIMBA SALISBURY, WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK,
PRETORIA.

FOLLOWING FOR SECRETARY OF STATE FROM LORD HARLECH.

RHODESIA

1. I HAD OVER AN HOUR AND A HALF WITH KAUNDA ON 14 JUNE. IT WAS DIFFICULT TO PIN HIM DOWN TO DISCUSSING POINTS OF SUBSTANCE, AND HIS OPENING REMARKS (AND MANY THAT FOLLOWED) AMOUNTED TO LITTLE MORE THAN A RECITAL OF PAST GRIEVANCES ON LINES WITH WHICH WE ARE FAMILIAR. BUT BOTH THE LENGTH OF THE INTERVIEW AND KAUNDA'S CONSISTENTLY FRIENDLY TONE CONVINCED ME THAT HE TOOK MY MISSION SERIOUSLY. I BELIEVE I LEFT HIM IN TURN IN A REASONABLY RECEPTIVE FRAME OF MIND AND DISPOSED TO BELIEVE THAT, WHILE THE GOVERNMENT'S OBJECTIVE WAS CLEAR, THE MEANS BY WHICH IT WAS TO BE ACHIEVED WAS STILL OPEN FOR CONSIDERATION.

2. KAUNDA'S OPENING STATEMENT EXPOUNDED HIS THESIS THAT BY REFUSING EFFECTIVE BACKING FOR NATIONALIST ASPIRATIONS IN SOUTHERN AFRICA THE WEST HAD PROMOTED CHINESE AND SOVIET OBJECTIVES IN THE REGION BY DRIVING THE LIBERATION MOVEMENTS AND THE FRONT LINE PRESIDENTS, AGAINST THEIR INCLINATIONS, TO SEEK ARMS AND SUPPORT FROM THE COMMUNISTS. IF BRITAIN WANTED TO COUNTER SOVIET INFLUENCE IN RHODESIA, WE COULD ONLY DO SO BY RECOGNISING THAT THE MUZOREWA-SMITH "POWER CENTRES" WERE IN DECLINE AND BY ACTING QUICKLY TO ARRANGE A CEASE-FIRE ON A REALISTIC BASIS. HE THEN

QUICKLY TO ARRANGE A CEASE-FIRE ON A REALISTIC BASIS. HE THEN
MARKED BACK TO THE ANGLO/AMERICAN PROPOSALS.

3. MAKING CLEAR THAT I PERSONALLY SYMPATHISED WITH MUCH IN
KAUNDA'S ANALYSIS OF THE PAST, I URGED HIM NEVERTHELESS TO
RECOGNISE THAT, AS WE SAW IT, SIGNIFICANT CHANGE HAD NOW TAKEN
PLACE IN RHODESIA. WE WERE NOT ALONE IN THIS. PRESIDENT MOI HAD
SPOKEN OF A "NEW SITUATION" AND PRESIDENT CARTER OF "VERY
ENCOURAGING PROGRESS". AT THE VERY LEAST BISHOP MUZOREWA DESERVED
A CHANCE TO SHOW WHETHER OR NOT HE HAD ACHIEVED A POSITION OF
GENUINE AUTHORITY. THERE WERE A NUMBER OF WAYS (WHICH I OUTLINED
BRIEFLY) IN WHICH HMG FELT THAT FURTHER PROGRESS MIGHT BE MADE,
GIVEN THE COOPERATION OF THE NEW ADMINISTRATION IN SALISBURY AND
THE SUPPORT OF ZAMBIA AND OTHERS.

4. AFTER A LONG PAUSE, KAUNDA ASKED ME TO ELABORATE ON THE WAYS
IN WHICH I THOUGHT THE CONSTITUTIONAL POSITION IN RHODESIA MIGHT
BE OPEN TO IMPROVEMENT. THIS WAS THE "NERVE CENTRE" OF THE
PROBLEM. I POINTED OUT THAT OUTSIDE CRITICISM OF THE NEW CONSTITU-
TION HAD FOCUSED ON THE PROPORTION OF WHITE REPRESENTATION IN
PARLIAMENT AND THE POWER OF THE WHITES TO BLOCK CONSTITUTIONAL
AMENDMENTS. IF SALISBURY COULD BE PERSUADED TO MAKE CHANGES IN
THESE RESPECTS, IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE TO THINK IN TERMS OF PUTTING
THE RESULTS TO SOME NEW TEST OF THEIR ACCEPTABILITY TO THE PEOPLE
OF RHODESIA AS A WHOLE IN TERMS WHICH WOULD CARRY INTERNATIONAL
CONVICTION. IN THIS PART OF THE TALK KAUNDA CONFIRMED THAT HE
COULD NOT OBJECT IN PRINCIPLE TO THERE BEING A SPECIFIC NUMBER
OF SEATS RESERVED FOR THE WHITE MINORITY FOR A LIMITED PERIOD.
BOTH ZAMBIA AND TANGANYIKA HAD SUCH PROVISIONS ORIGINALLY.

5. KAUNDA URGED VERY STRONGLY THAT THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT SHOULD
ITSELF PUT NEW CONSTITUTIONAL PROPOSALS TO THE FOUR "POWER CENTRES"
(BY WHICH HE MEANS MUZOREWA, SMITH, NKOMO AND MUGABE). WE HAD
DONE THE RIGHT THING BY NOT RECOGNISING THE NEW GOVERNMENT AT ONCE
AND THIS GAVE US THE CHANCE TO GO ON TALKING TO THE EXTERNAL PARTIES.
BUT IT WOULD BE HOPELESS TO USE THE EXISTING "ILLEGAL"
CONSTITUTION AS THE STARTING POINT. IN ZAMBIAN EYES A RETURN
TO LEGALITY THROUGH CONSTITUTIONAL MEANS WAS IMPORTANT (BY THIS
I DO NOT THINK KAUNDA NECESSARILY MEANT A TEMPORARY RETURN TO
DEPENDENT STATUS, THOUGH I SHOULD GUESS THAT THIS MIGHT INCREASE
THE ATTRACTION FOR HIM OF ANY EVENTUAL SETTLEMENT).

6. KAUNDA MADE NO REFERENCE IN TERMS TO THE IDEA OF AN ALL-PARTY
CONFERENCE. THE PROBLEM WAS ONE OF "SELLING FRESH IDEAS, WHICH
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COMMENT

7. IT WOULD OBVIOUSLY BE UNWISE TO READ TOO MUCH INTO THE LINE KAUNDA TOOK WITH ME. HE STILL HANKERS AFTER THE UNATTAINABLE - A DECOLONISATION OF RHODESIA ON THE CLASSIC PATTERN. BUT HIS MIND IS NOT CLOSED AND HE APPEARED TO HAVE GAINED ENCOURAGEMENT FROM OUR TALK. IT WILL BE IMPORTANT TO TRY TO FOLLOW UP THIS FIRST CONTACT AS QUICKLY AND EFFECTIVELY AS POSSIBLE. ONE WAY TO DO THIS MIGHT BE TO ASK THAT MR ALLINSON SHOULD BE PERMITTED TO DELIVER PERSONALLY THE EVENTUAL REPLY TO THE LETTER FROM KAUNDA WHICH I UNDERSTAND MISS CHIBEKASUNDA HAS ASKED TO DELIVER TO THE PRIME MINISTER. I BELIEVE THAT THIS LETTER WILL BE FOUND TO BE SIMILAR IN TERMS TO THOSE WHICH HE HAS SENT TO PRESIDENT CARTER AND OTHERS, AND THAT HE WAS DRAWING ON ITS PHRASEOLOGY IN SPEAKING TO ME.

8. A ZAPU DELEGATION, LED BY SILUNDIKA, WILL BE CALLING AT THE HIGH COMMISSION TO SEE ME DURING THE MORNING OF 15 JUNE.

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FM LUSAKA 141615Z JUN 79
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 427 OF 14 JUNE

FROM LORD HARLECH.

MY TELNO 426: RHODESIA

1. IN A SHORT PRIVATE CONVERSATION FOLLOWING THAT REPORTED IN THE TUR, I BROACHED WITH KAUNDA (WITHOUT SAYING HOW THE SUGGESTION HAD ORIGINATED) THE POSSIBILITY OF A MEETING BETWEEN HIM AND BISHOP MUZOREWA. IN REPLY HE SAID THAT HE DID NOT RULE THIS OUT. BUT A MEETING WOULD HAVE TO BE OPEN AND TO HAVE SOME PURPOSE WHICH HAD BEEN CLEARLY DEFINED AND AGREED IN ADVANCE.

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[RHODESIA: POLICY: ADVANCE COPIES]

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SIR C ROSE
MR P. H. MAXEY
COL NOIR
MR P J FOWLER
DIO } CABINET OFFICE

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HD/WAD
MR FREELAND *M. Wilton* LEGAL ADVISER RM K200A

MR STEEL LEGAL ADVISER RM K176

RESIDENT CLERK

FOR ZIMBABWE DEVELOPMENTS FUND
ADD MR LYNCH ODM
MR SLATER TREASURY

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FM WASHINGTON 072335Z JUN 79

TO FLASH FCO

TELNO 1396 OF 7 JUNE

INFO IMMEDIATE MIRIMBA SALISBURY, CAPE TOWN, DAR ES SALAAM,
GABORONE, LAGOS, LUSAKA, MAPUTO,

INFO PRIORITY UKMIS NEW YORK, LUANDA, PRETORIA.

RHODESIA: PRESIDENTIAL DETERMINATION

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF A STATEMENT MADE BY PRESIDENT CARTER AT
1720 WASHINGTON TIME TODAY.

2. BEGINS.

AFTER THE MOST CAREFUL AND THOROUGH CONSIDERATION, I HAVE
MADE A DECISION ON THE ZIMBABWE-RHODESIAN SANCTIONS. FIRST, I AM
ABSOLUTELY CONVINCED THAT THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE UNITED STATES
WOULD NOT BE SERVED BY LIFTING THE SANCTIONS.

SECOND, I AM EQUALLY CONVINCED THAT THE BEST INTERESTS OF
THE PEOPLE OF ZIMBABWE-RHODESIA WOULD NOT BE SERVED BY LIFTING
OF THE SANCTIONS.

FINALLY, IT IS CLEAR TO ME THAT ALTHOUGH THERE HAS BEEN SOME
VERY ENCOURAGING PROGRESS MADE IN THAT COUNTRY, THAT THE ACTION
TAKEN HAS NOT BEEN SUFFICIENT TO SATISFY THE PROVISION OF THE UNITED
STATES LAW DESCRIBED IN THE SO-CALLED CASE-JAVITS AMENDMENT.

IN REACHING THIS DECISION, WE HAVE CAREFULLY ASSESSED RECENT
EVENTS IN ZIMBABWE-RHODESIA. WE HAVE CONSULTED VERY CLOSELY WITH
THE BRITISH WHO RETAIN BOTH LEGAL AND HISTORIC INTERESTS AND
RESPONSIBILITIES FOR THAT COUNTRY.

...IN THE APRIL ELECTIONS APPEARS TO HAVE

RESPONSIBILITIES FOR THAT COUNTRY.

THE ACTUAL VOTING IN THE APRIL ELECTIONS APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN ADMINISTERED IN A REASONABLY FAIR WAY UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES. BUT THE ELECTIONS WERE HELD UNDER A CONSTITUTION THAT WAS DRAFTED BY AND THEN SUBMITTED ONLY TO THE WHITE MINORITY, ONLY 60 PERCENT OF WHOM THEMSELVES SUPPORTED THE NEW CONSTITUTION.

THE BLACK CITIZENS, WHO CONSTITUTE 96 PERCENT OF THE POPULATION OF ZIMBABWE-RHODESIA, NEVER HAD A CHANCE TO CONSIDER NOR TO VOTE FOR OR AGAINST THE CONSTITUTION UNDER WHICH THE ELECTIONS WERE HELD.

THE CONSTITUTION PRESERVES EXTRAORDINARY POWER FOR THE FOUR PERCENT WHITE MINORITY. IT GIVES THIS SMALL MINORITY VASTLY DISPROPORTIONATE NUMBERS OF VOTES IN THE COUNTRY'S PARLIAMENT. IT GIVES THIS FOUR PERCENT CONTINUED CONTROL OVER THE ARMY, THE POLICE, THE SYSTEM OF JUSTICE, AND THE CIVIL SERVICE, AND IT ALSO LETS THE FOUR PERCENT MINORITY EXERCISE A VETO OVER ANY SIGNIFICANT CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM. MOREOVER, WHILE THE CASE-JAVITS AMENDMENT CALLED FOR FREE PARTICIPATION OF ALL POLITICAL FACTIONS OR GROUPS IN THE COUNTRY IN THE RECENT ELECTION, THE INTERNAL REPRESENTATIVES OF THE OPPOSING POLITICAL PARTIES WERE BANNED FROM THE ELECTION. THEY WERE UNABLE TO PARTICIPATE IN THE POLITICAL PROCESS. THEY WERE PROHIBITED FROM HOLDING MEETINGS, FROM HAVING POLITICAL RALLIES, FROM EXPRESSING THEIR VIEWS AGAINST VOTING IN THE ELECTION, AND EVEN PREVENTED FROM ADVERTISING THEIR VIEWS IN THE NEWS MEDIA.

FOR THESE REASONS, I CANNOT CONCLUDE THAT THE ELECTIONS WERE EITHER FAIR OR FREE. NOR CAN I CONCLUDE THAT THE OTHER CONDITION OF THE UNITED STATES LAW HAS BEEN FULLY MET. THE AUTHORITIES IN ZIMBABWE-RHODESIA HAVE EXPRESSED THEIR WILLINGNESS TO ATTEND AN ALL-PARTIES MEETING, BUT THEY HAVE NOT INDICATED THEY ARE PREPARED TO NEGOTIATE SERIOUSLY ABOUT "ALL RELEVANT ISSUES". ALL RELEVANT ISSUES HAVE TO BE CONSIDERED IN ORDER TO COMPLY WITH THE UNITED STATES LAW.

WE WILL, OF COURSE, CONTINUE TO KEEP THE QUESTION OF THE OBSERVANCE OF SANCTIONS UNDER REVIEW. I SINCERELY HOPE THAT FUTURE PROGRESS CAN BE MADE AND MADE RAPIDLY. ALONG WITH THE BRITISH, WE WILL PARTICULARLY LOOK FOR PROGRESS TOWARDS A WIDER POLITICAL PROCESS AND MORE LEGITIMATE AND GENUINE MAJORITY RULE. IN SO DOING, WE WILL REPORT TO THE CONGRESS AND OBVIOUSLY CONSULT WITH THE CONGRESS ON A MONTHLY BASIS ON THE PROGRESS BEING MADE IN ZIMBABWE-RHODESIA.

THE POSITION THAT I HAVE OUTLINED BEST SERVES NOT ONLY AMERICAN INTERESTS, BUT THE INTERESTS OF OUR ALLIES IN A REGION OF THE WORLD OF INCREASING IMPORTANCE TO US. IT SHOULD PRESERVE OUR DIPLOMATIC AND TIES OF TRADE WITH FRIENDLY AFRICAN GOVERNMENTS AND ALSO LIMIT

AND TIES OF TRADE WITH FRIENDLY AFRICAN GOVERNMENTS AND ALSO LIMIT AND THIS IS VERY IMPORTANT -- LIMIT THE OPPORTUNITY OF OUTSIDE POWERS TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THE SITUATION IN SOUTHERN AFRICA AT THE EXPENSE OF THE UNITED STATES.

NO OTHER GOVERNMENT ON EARTH HAS EXTENDED DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS OR RECOGNITION TO THE ZIMBABWE-RHODESIAN GOVERNMENT.

HOWEVER, THESE ACTIONS OF THE UNITED STATES THAT I AM DESCRIBING SHOULD HELP AND ENCOURAGE THE NEWLY-ELECTED AUTHORITIES, INCLUDING MR. MUZOREWA, TO INTENSIFY THEIR EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE GENUINE MAJORITY RULE, AN END TO APARTHEID AND RACISM, BASED ON FIRM, REASONABLE, CONSTITUTIONAL PROCESSES THAT EXEMPLIFY THE VERY PRINCIPLES ON WHICH THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT HAS BEEN FOUNDED.

I CONSIDER THIS PRINCIPLE TO BE EXTREMELY IMPORTANT TO REPRESENT IN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS WHAT OUR NATION STANDS FOR, WHAT OUR PEOPLE BELIEVE IN.

I RECOGNIZE, TO BE PERFECTLY FRANK WITH YOU, THAT I DO NOT HAVE A MAJORITY OF SUPPORT IN THE UNITED STATES SENATE. MY GUESS IS THAT AT THE PRESENT TIME IN THE HOUSE WE WOULD HAVE DIFFICULTY IN THIS POSITION PREVAILING. BUT BECAUSE IT IS A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE TO ME PERSONALLY, AND TO OUR COUNTRY, BECAUSE I SEE THE PROSPECT OF OUR NATION BEING SERIOUSLY DAMAGED IN ITS RELATIONSHIP WITH OTHER COUNTRIES, IN SOUTHERN AFRICA, AND ELSEWHERE, BECAUSE TO LIFT SANCTIONS AT THIS TIME WOULD DIRECTLY VIOLATE INTERNATIONAL LAW, OUR PAST AGREEMENTS EVER SINCE PRESIDENT JOHNSON UNDER THE UNITED NATIONS, AND WOULD NOT CONTRIBUTE TO THE BEST INTERESTS OF EITHER OUR COUNTRY OR THE PEOPLE OF ZIMBABWE-RHODESIA, I INTEND TO DO EVERYTHING I CAN WITHIN MY POWER TO PREVAIL IN THIS SITUATION.

IT MEANS A LOT TO OUR COUNTRY TO DO WHAT IS RIGHT AND WHAT IS DECENT, AND WHAT IS FAIR, AND WHAT IS PRINCIPLED. AND IN MY OPINION THE ACTION THAT I HAVE DESCRIBED FULFILLS THESE REQUIREMENTS.

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FM F C O 151826Z JUNE 1979

TO PRIORITY CANBERRA

TELEGRAM NUMBER 233 OF 15 JUNE

INFO WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK, GABORONE, DAR ES SALAAM, ST
 LUSAKA, MAPUTO, MIRIMBA SALISBURY, CAPETOWN,
 INFO SAVING LUANDA, ACCRA, NAIROBI.

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*Prime Minister**out**SM 19/79*

RHODESIA.

1. AT A MEETING TODAY WITH AUSTRALIAN FOREIGN MINISTER, I IMPRESSED ON HIM THE GOVERNMENT'S VIEW THAT RHODESIA SHOULD BE BROUGHT BACK TO LEGALITY WITH THE WIDEST POSSIBLE ACCEPTANCE BY THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY. THERE WAS NOT MUCH TIME, SINCE SANCTIONS WERE DUE TO BE RENEWED IN NOVEMBER, AND IT WOULD BE IMPOSSIBLE TO GET A RENEWAL ORDER THROUGH THE COMMONS. EVEN IF THAT WERE POSSIBLE, THERE WOULD BE NO HOPE IN THE LORDS.

2. I WAS THEREFORE DETERMINED TO DO MY UTMOST TO GET AN AGREED SETTLEMENT, EVEN THOUGH SUCCESS SEEMED UNLIKELY. LORD HARLECH HAD NOT HAD TOO BAD A MEETING WITH KAUNDA AND, IF THERE COULD BE SOME TEST OF ACCEPTABILITY OF THE CONSTITUTION AMONG THE AFRICANS (WHICH WOULD BE VERY DIFFICULT) THERE MIGHT BE SOME HOPE. A PROBLEM WAS THAT BISHOP MUZOREWA DID NOT KNOW WHAT TO DO, BUT NEEDED TO LOOK LIKE A LEADER. NYERERE WAS MORE AMENABLE THAN KAUNDA. MR PEACOCK SAID THAT THE AUSTRALIANS HAD RECEIVED A VERY TOUGH MESSAGE FROM KAUNDA.

3. I REPEATED THAT WE WERE DETERMINED TO LOOK FOR A SETTLEMENT: IF WE FAILED, WE SHOULD NEED TO MINIMISE THE DAMAGE. I UNDERTOOK TO KEEP IN TOUCH WITH THE AUSTRALIANS. I AGREED TO SEE MR PEACOCK AGAIN WHEN HE CALLED IN LONDON ON ABOUT 21 JULY ON HIS WAY TO VISIT GHANA, KENYA AND TANZANIA PRIOR TO THE CHGM.

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FM MIRIMBA SALISBURY 150730Z JUN 79

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 376 OF 15 JUNE

INFO IMMEDIATE CAPE TOWN PRETORIA MAPUTO WASHINGTON LUSAK A DAR ES
SALAAM GABORONE LAGOS LILONGWE AND LUANDA

13629
MPT: BISHOP MUZOREWA

1. THE TONE OF THE MEETING WAS AMICABLE, THOUGH SERIOUS. GAYLARD WAS PRESENT FOR MOST OF THE TIME. HE LEFT WHEN I ASKED THE BISHOP IF I MIGHT HAVE A FEW WORDS IN PRIVATE. I TOOK THIS OPPORTUNITY TO RESTATE HMG'S SUPPORT FOR HIM: HE MUST NOT DOUBT THIS. NOR MUST HE IGNORE THE NEED FOR SOME MOVEMENT ON HIS PART. THIS WAS ESSENTIAL IF WE WERE TO MAKE PROGRESS. WE MAY HAVE DIFFERENT VIEWS ON THE SPEED AT WHICH WE COULD MOVE. THIS SHOULD NOT HOWEVER DISTRACT US FROM OUR COMMON OBJECTIVE. THIS DID NOT PROVOKE ANY FURTHER RESPONSE BEYOND AGREEMENT THAT WE MUST CONTINUE TO TALK TO EACH OTHER FRANKLY.

2. I FIND IT HARD TO JUDGE WHETHER MUZOREWA WAS SPEAKING HIS OWN MIND OR WHETHER HE IS MERELY REFLECTING ADVICE FROM HIS WHITE COLLEAGUES AND ADVISERS. WHICHEVER IS THE CASE, WE HAVE TO ACCEPT THAT THERE IS A STRONG AND GROWING FEELING THAT EARLY RECOGNITION AND THE LIFTING OF SANCTIONS WOULD, WITHOUT DOUBT, RESULT IN A DE-ESCALATION OF THE WAR, BY DEFECTIONS, BY FREEING THE ECONOMY, AND BY WIDESPREAD ACCEPTANCE OF THE MUZOREWA GOVERNMENT. THIS SAME VIEW WAS FORCEFULLY IMPRESSED ON ME YESTERDAY EVENING BY THE MINISTER FOR HOME AFFAIRS, WHO FURTHER ARGUED THAT THE RETENTION OF SANCTIONS POSITIVELY PENALISES THE GOVERNMENT IN THEIR DEFENCE AGAINST THE PATRIOTIC FRONT.

3. LIP-SERVICE IS PAID TO THE ARGUMENT THAT THE GOVERNMENT HAVE TO MAKE FURTHER CONTRIBUTION TO THE SEARCH FOR PEACE. THERE IS HOWEVER A DISTINCT RELUCTANCE TO FACE UP TO THIS. THIS IS DUE TO A FEAR, NO DOUBT FED BY THE WHITE MINISTERS, THAT ANY TAMPERING

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WITH THE CONSTITUTION OR THE INTRODUCTION OF SIGNIFICANT MEASURES AIMED AT BLACK ADVANCEMENT WOULD UNDERMINE WHITE MORALE. MUZOREWA KNOWS THAT HE CANNOT CONTINUE TO PROSECUTE THE WAR WITHOUT THE WHITES, SO HE FEELS HE CANNOT TAKE RISKS IN THIS DIRECTION AT THIS TIME. I BELIEVE THAT THESE FEARS ARE UNJUSTIFIED AND WILL AIM TO GET THIS ACROSS TO HIM AT OUR NEXT MEETING.

4. IT WAS PROBABLY INEVITABLE THAT SOME OF THE EARLY EUPHORIA SHOULD WEAR OFF AS THE NEW GOVERNMENT CAME FACE TO FACE WITH THE REALITIES OF THEIR SITUATION. PART OF THE PROBLEM IS THAT THEY RAISED THE EXPECTATION OF PEACE UNWISELY HIGH IN THE ELECTION CAMPAIGN AND ARE NOW DESPERATE TO DELIVER. THEY HAVE SET THEIR SIGHTS ON RECOGNITION AND THE LIFTING OF SANCTIONS AS THE CURE FOR ALL ILLS. AT PRESENT THEY REGARD THIS AS THEIR DUE. THEY ARE HOWEVER LIKELY TO PAY A REASONABLE PRICE IF THEY FEEL ASSURED THAT THESE TWO CONCESSIONS WILL BE MADE.

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MR THOMAS

MR WILLSON

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Prime Minister

FM LUSAKA 141615Z JUN 79

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 427 OF 14 JUNE

SW
18/6

FROM LORD HARLECH.

MY TELNO 426: RHODESIA

1. IN A SHORT PRIVATE CONVERSATION FOLLOWING THAT REPORTED IN THE TUR, I BROACHED WITH KAUNDA (WITHOUT SAYING HOW THE SUGGESTION HAD ORIGINATED) THE POSSIBILITY OF A MEETING BETWEEN HIM AND BISHOP MUZOREWA. IN REPLY HE SAID THAT HE DID NOT RULE THIS OUT. BUT A MEETING WOULD HAVE TO BE OPEN AND TO HAVE SOME PURPOSE WHICH HAD BEEN CLEARLY DEFINED AND AGREED IN ADVANCE.

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FM LUSAKA 141600Z JUN 79

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 426 OF 14 JUNE

INFO IMMEDIATE DAR ES SALAAM, PRIORITY GABORONE, LAGOS, MAPUTO, LUANDA, CAPETOWN, MIRIMBA SALISBURY, WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK, PRETORIA.

Prime Minister

6/18/79

FOLLOWING FOR SECRETARY OF STATE FROM LORD HARLECH.

RHODESIA

1. I HAD OVER AN HOUR AND A HALF WITH KAUNDA ON 14 JUNE. IT WAS DIFFICULT TO PIN HIM DOWN TO DISCUSSING POINTS OF SUBSTANCE, AND HIS OPENING REMARKS (AND MANY THAT FOLLOWED) AMOUNTED TO LITTLE MORE THAN A RECITAL OF PAST GRIEVANCES ON LINES WITH WHICH WE ARE FAMILIAR. BUT BOTH THE LENGTH OF THE INTERVIEW AND KAUNDA'S CONSISTENTLY FRIENDLY TONE CONVINCED ME THAT HE TOOK MY MISSION SERIOUSLY. I BELIEVE I LEFT HIM IN TURN IN A REASONABLY RECEPTIVE FRAME OF MIND AND DISPOSED TO BELIEVE THAT, WHILE THE GOVERNMENT'S OBJECTIVE WAS CLEAR, THE MEANS BY WHICH IT WAS TO BE ACHIEVED WAS STILL OPEN FOR CONSIDERATION.

2. KAUNDA'S OPENING STATEMENT EXPOUNDED HIS THESIS THAT BY REFUSING EFFECTIVE BACKING FOR NATIONALIST ASPIRATIONS IN SOUTHERN AFRICA THE WEST HAD PROMOTED CHINESE AND SOVIET OBJECTIVES IN THE REGION BY DRIVING THE LIBERATION MOVEMENTS AND THE FRONT LINE PRESIDENTS, AGAINST THEIR INCLINATIONS, TO SEEK ARMS AND SUPPORT FROM THE COMMUNISTS. IF BRITAIN WANTED TO COUNTER SOVIET INFLUENCE IN RHODESIA, WE COULD ONLY DO SO BY RECOGNISING THAT THE MUZOREWA-SMITH "POWER CENTRES" WERE IN DECLINE AND BY ACTING QUICKLY TO ARRANGE A CEASE-FIRE ON A REALISTIC BASIS. HE THEN HARKED BACK TO THE ANGLO/AMERICAN PROPOSALS.

3. MAKING CLEAR THAT I PERSONALLY SYMPATHISED WITH MUCH IN KAUNDA'S ANALYSIS OF THE PAST, I URGED HIM NEVERTHELESS TO RECOGNISE THAT, AS WE SAW IT, SIGNIFICANT CHANGE HAD NOW TAKEN PLACE IN RHODESIA. WE WERE NOT ALONE IN THIS. PRESIDENT MOI HAD

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SPOKEN OF 'A "NEW SITUATION"' AND PRESIDENT CARTER OF "VERY ENCOURAGING PROGRESS". AT THE VERY LEAST BISHOP MUZOREWA DESERVED A CHANCE TO SHOW WHETHER OR NOT HE HAD ACHIEVED A POSITION OF GENUINE AUTHORITY. THERE WERE A NUMBER OF WAYS (WHICH I OUTLINED BRIEFLY) IN WHICH HMG FELT THAT FURTHER PROGRESS MIGHT BE MADE, GIVEN THE COOPERATION OF THE NEW ADMINISTRATION IN SALISBURY AND THE SUPPORT OF ZAMBIA AND OTHERS.

4. AFTER A LONG PAUSE, KAUNDA ASKED ME TO ELABORATE ON THE WAYS IN WHICH I THOUGHT THE CONSTITUTIONAL POSITION IN RHODESIA MIGHT BE OPEN TO IMPROVEMENT. THIS WAS THE "NERVE CENTRE" OF THE PROBLEM. I POINTED OUT THAT OUTSIDE CRITICISM OF THE NEW CONSTITUTION HAD FOCUSED ON THE PROPORTION OF WHITE REPRESENTATION IN PARLIAMENT AND THE POWER OF THE WHITES TO BLOCK CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS. IF SALISBURY COULD BE PERSUADED TO MAKE CHANGES IN THESE RESPECTS, IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE TO THINK IN TERMS OF PUTTING THE RESULTS TO SOME NEW TEST OF THEIR ACCEPTABILITY TO THE PEOPLE OF RHODESIA AS A WHOLE IN TERMS WHICH WOULD CARRY INTERNATIONAL CONVICTION. IN THIS PART OF THE TALK KAUNDA CONFIRMED THAT HE COULD NOT OBJECT IN PRINCIPLE TO THERE BEING A SPECIFIC NUMBER OF SEATS RESERVED FOR THE WHITE MINORITY FOR A LIMITED PERIOD. BOTH ZAMBIA AND TANGANYIKA HAD SUCH PROVISIONS ORIGINALLY.

5. KAUNDA URGED VERY STRONGLY THAT THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT SHOULD ITSELF PUT NEW CONSTITUTIONAL PROPOSALS TO THE FOUR "POWER CENTRES" (BY WHICH HE MEANS MUZOREWA, SMITH, NKOMO AND MUGABE). WE HAD DONE THE RIGHT THING BY NOT RECOGNISING THE NEW GOVERNMENT AT ONCE AND THIS GAVE US THE CHANCE TO GO ON TALKING TO THE EXTERNAL PARTIES. BUT IT WOULD BE HOPELESS TO USE THE EXISTING "ILLEGAL" CONSTITUTION AS THE STARTING POINT. IN ZAMBIAN EYES A RETURN TO LEGALITY THROUGH CONSTITUTIONAL MEANS WAS IMPORTANT (BY THIS I DO NOT THINK KAUNDA NECESSARILY MEANT A TEMPORARY RETURN TO DEPENDENT STATUS, THOUGH I SHOULD GUESS THAT THIS MIGHT INCREASE THE ATTRACTION FOR HIM OF ANY EVENTUAL SETTLEMENT).

6. KAUNDA MADE NO REFERENCE IN TERMS TO THE IDEA OF AN ALL-PARTY CONFERENCE. THE PROBLEM WAS ONE OF "SELLING FRESH IDEAS, WHICH WOULD NEED TO COME FROM HMG, TO ALL FOUR GROUPS. THE SOONER CONTACTS TO THIS END BEGAN, THE BETTER, AND HE DID NOT RULE OUT THE IDEA OF A COMMONWEALTH CONTACT GROUP BEING USED. ZAMBIA WAS READY TO SUPPORT ANY GENUINE EFFORT IN THIS DIRECTION.

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COMMENT

7. IT WOULD OBVIOUSLY BE UNWISE TO READ TOO MUCH INTO THE LINE KAUNDA TOOK WITH ME. HE STILL HANKERS AFTER THE UNATTAINABLE - A DECOLONISATION OF RHODESIA ON THE CLASSIC PATTERN. BUT HIS MIND IS NOT CLOSED AND HE APPEARED TO HAVE GAINED ENCOURAGEMENT FROM OUR TALK. IT WILL BE IMPORTANT TO TRY TO FOLLOW UP THIS FIRST CONTACT AS QUICKLY AND EFFECTIVELY AS POSSIBLE. ONE WAY TO DO THIS MIGHT BE TO ASK THAT MR ALLINSON SHOULD BE PERMITTED TO DELIVER PERSONALLY THE EVENTUAL REPLY TO THE LETTER FROM KAUNDA WHICH I UNDERSTAND MISS CHIBEKASUNDA HAS ASKED TO DELIVER TO THE PRIME MINISTER. I BELIEVE THAT THIS LETTER WILL BE FOUND TO BE SIMILAR IN TERMS TO THOSE WHICH HE HAS SENT TO PRESIDENT CARTER AND OTHERS, AND THAT HE WAS DRAWING ON ITS PHRASEOLOGY IN SPEAKING TO ME.

8. A ZAPU DELEGATION, LED BY SILUNDIKA, WILL BE CALLING AT THE HIGH COMMISSION TO SEE ME DURING THE MORNING OF 15 JUNE.

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LEGAL ADVISERS
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(MR STEEL)

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FM LUSAKA 140625Z JUN 79

TO IMMEDIATE FCC

TELEGRAM NUMBER 414 OF 14 JUNE

Prime Minister

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INFO IMMEDIATE GABORONE, DAR ES SALAAM, MAPUTO, LUANDA, MIRIMBA
SALISBURY, LAGOS, WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK, PRIORITY LILONGWE
CAPETOWN EMBASSY, PRETORIA.

FOLLOWING FOR SECRETARY OF STATE FROM LORD HARLECH

RHODESIA

1. I HAD TWO HOURS WITH SERETSE KHAMA ON 13 JUNE. HE WAS ACCOMPANIED
BY MOGWE AND LEGWAILA. THE ATMOSPHERE WAS FRIENDLY AND RELAXED.
SERETSE IS CLEARLY ANXIOUS TO BE HELPFUL THOUGH (FOR TACTICAL
REASONS) MUCH ATTACHED TO THE IDEA OF AN ALL-PARTIES CONFERENCE AS
THE NEXT STEP TOWARDS A SOLUTION.

2. AFTER I HAD GIVEN AN ACCOUNT OF THE AIMS OF MY MISSION, ALONG
THE LINES WE AGREED BEFORE MY DEPARTURE, THE PRESIDENT SAID HE
PARTICULARLY WELCOMED MY ASSURANCE THAT THE GOVERNMENT WAS NOT
APPROACHING THE PROBLEM WITH ITS MIND ALREADY MADE UP ABOUT THE
SOLUTION IT PROPOSED TO ADOPT. IT WOULD BE DANGEROUS IF THIS IDEA
TOOK ROOT, PARTICULARLY SINCE A NUMBER OF CONFERENCES WERE ABOUT
TO TAKE PLACE, STARTING WITH THE OAU MEETINGS, AT WHICH ALL SORTS
OF RESOLUTIONS WOULD BE PUT FORWARD AIMED AT LIMITING OUR FUTURE
FREEDOM OF ACTION UNLESS WE HAD ALREADY GIVEN AN INDICATION THAT
WE WERE PREPARED TO MOVE IN A DIRECTION WHICH THE INTERNATIONAL
COMMUNITY WOULD FIND ACCEPTABLE.

3. THE STARTING POINT FOR BOTSWANA WAS THAT THE NEW REGIME IN
RHODESIA WAS NO DIFFERENT FROM MR SMITH'S. ITS CONSTITUTION HAD
NOT BEEN GRANTED BY THE LEGAL AUTHORITY, I.E. BRITAIN, THE PATRIOTIC
FRONT HAD HAD NO HAND IN DRAFTING IT, AND IT HAD BEEN APPROVED ONLY
BY "A CERTAIN PERCENTAGE" OF THE PEOPLE. BOTSWANA DID NOT REGARD
THE ELECTION AS "FREE AND FAIR" BY ANY STANDARD OR IN ANY CONTEXT.
FOR HMG TO LEGALISE THE PRESENT SITUATION WOULD THEREFORE BE WRONG
AND WOULD RISK PROVOKING AN EAST-WEST CONFRONTATION.

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4. THE PRESIDENT AND MUGWE ARGUED THAT THE TIME WAS NOW RIPE FOR SOME DECISIVE ACTION BY HMG AIMED AT EXPLOITING THE WEAKNESSES, AS THEY SAW IT, IN BOTH SIDES' PRESENT POSITIONS. BISHOP MUZOREWA, THOUGH ENCOURAGED BY HIS ELECTORAL SUCCESS AND THE LATEST SENATE VOTE ON SANCTIONS, HAD NOT YET BEEN RECOGNISED BY HMG AND THE DETERMINATION UNDER CASE/JAVITS HAD GONE AGAINST HIM. ON THE OTHER HAND THE PATRIOTIC FRONT'S SELF-CONFIDENCE HAD TAKEN A KNOCK. THEY WOULD BE APPREHENSIVE THAT THE BISHOP MIGHT SUCCEED IN DELIVERING HIS PROMISES TO BRING THE FIGHTING MEN HOME AFTER THE ELECTION. IF WE DID NOT ACT NOW, THE RISK WAS THAT BOTH SIDES, AND PARTICULARLY THE PATRIOTIC FRONT, WITH ENCOURAGEMENT FROM THE OAU AND THE NON-ALIGNED, MIGHT FALL BACK INTO THEIR EARLIER INTRANSIGENCE AND WE SHOULD GET NOWHERE.

5. IF BRITAIN TOOK THE INITIATIVE, THIS COULD SERVE TO CONFIRM HMG'S GOOD INTENTIONS AND HELP TO EXPOSE WHICH SIDE WAS REALLY BEING UNREASONABLE OR INTRANSIGENT. THERE WAS NO FUTURE IN A NEGOTIATION OR OTHER MOVE INITIATED BY THE BISHOP - THE PATRIOTIC FRONT WOULD SIMPLY REFUSE TO TAKE PART. IF THE BRITISH INITIATIVE TOOK THE FORM OF A MOVE TO START A NEGOTIATION BETWEEN THE PARTIES, THE PRESIDENT DID NOT RULE OUT THE IDEA THAT THIS MIGHT, INITIALLY AT LEAST, BE CONDUCTED THROUGH A WESTERN OR COMMONWEALTH CONTACT GROUP RATHER THAN A FORMAL CONFERENCE.

6. MAKING IT CLEAR THAT THE OPTION OF A FURTHER ATTEMPT AT A COMPREHENSIVE NEGOTIATION HAD NOT BEEN RULED OUT - THOUGH PREVIOUS EXPERIENCE OF FORMAL MEETINGS BETWEEN THE PARTIES SUGGESTED THEY COULD DO LITTLE GOOD UNLESS SUBSTANTIAL PROGRESS HAD ALREADY BEEN MADE BEFOREHAND - I SOUGHT TO ENGAGE THE PRESIDENT IN A DISCUSSION OF WHAT HE THOUGHT BISHOP MUZOREWA COULD DO IN ANY CASE TO ENCOURAGE A CHANGE IN AFRICAN ATTITUDES TO HIM. IN THIS CONTEXT I REFERRED TO SMITH'S POSITION, THE POSSIBILITY OF CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGES AND THE QUESTION OF A FURTHER TEST OF ACCEPTABILITY OR FRESH ELECTIONS.

7. IN REPLY THE PRESIDENT REITERATED THAT NOTHING INITIATED BY BISHOP MUZOREWA ON HIS OWN COULD POSSIBLY GAIN OUTSIDE ACCEPTANCE OR RECOGNITION. CONVERSELY, ANYTHING WHICH CLEARLY STEMMED FROM THE LEGITIMATE AUTHORITY STOOD AT LEAST A CHANCE OF BEING CONSIDERED. NEVERTHELESS, IF MUZOREWA COULD REMOVE THE PRESENT SPECIAL PRIVILEGES OF WHITES (AS A RACIAL GROUP RATHER THAN AS INDIVIDUALS

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A POINT TO WHICH THE BATSWANA CLEARLY ATTACH GREAT IMPORTANCE) AND THEIR POWERS OF VETO OVER CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS, THIS WOULD BE "INTERESTING" AND MIGHT BE AN ENCOURAGING DEVELOPMENT IN THE RUN-UP TO A NEGOTIATION WITH THE PATRIOTIC FRONT. THE UNSPOKEN THOUGHT HERE WAS, I BELIEVE, THAT SUCH MOVES BY THE BISHOP MIGHT HELP TO HIGHLIGHT PATRIOTIC FRONT INTRANSIGENCE.

8. PRESIDENT KHAMA MADE IT CLEAR THAT, WHILE HE DID NOT BELIEVE SMITH WOULD HAVE MOVED TO HIS PRESENT POSITION WITHOUT PATRIOTIC FRONT PRESSURE, BOTSWANA DID NOT THINK THIS GAVE THE PATRIOTIC FRONT AN AUTOMATIC RIGHT TO RULE. IF CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGES HAD BEEN BROUGHT ABOUT WITH BRITISH AUTHORITY, THE PEOPLE AS A WHOLE HAD APPROVED THE RESULT, AND FAIR ELECTIONS HAD TAKEN PLACE, BOTSWANA WOULD ACCEPT THE OUTCOME, WHATEVER IT WAS. THEY URGED ME TO CHALLENGE THE OTHER FRONT LINE PRESIDENTS - ESPECIALLY MACHEL AND NETO - TO CONFIRM THAT THIS WAS THEIR UNDERSTANDING TOO.

9. IN RESPONSE TO MY PROBING ABOUT THE NATURE OF A POSSIBLE TEST OF ACCEPTABILITY, THE PRESIDENT SAID HE THOUGHT IT COULD BE CONCLUDED UNDER UN OR PURELY BRITISH AUSPICES. IT WAS GENERALLY ACCEPTED THAT WE WERE, OR SHOULD BE, IN CHARGE IN RHODESIA. IF WE CONDUCTED A TEST OURSELVES IT WOULD NOT BE FOR ANYBODY ELSE TO LOOK BEHIND IT, EVEN IF THEY DID NOT LIKE THE OUTCOME. (I SUSPECT, BUT DID NOT SAY, THAT THIS VIEW IS OVER-SANGUINE).

10. IN A SHORT PRIVATE TALK AFTERWARDS, I URGED SEREQUE TO IMPRESS ON HIS COLLEAGUES THAT HMG'S INITIATIVES INCLUDING MY MISSION WERE NOT DESIGNED MERELY TO GET US THROUGH A DIFFICULT PERIOD BETWEEN NOW AND THE COMMONWEALTH CONFERENCE. I THEN SAID THAT, WHILE WE HAD JUST DISCUSSED IN THE WIDER MEETING, SOLUTIONS BOTSWANA WOULD IDEALLY LIKE TO SEE, NONE OF THESE MIGHT BE OBTAINABLE. AFTER THE FULLEST CONSULTATIONS WE MIGHT HAVE TO MAKE A JUDGEMENT AS TO WHAT WAS THE BEST WE COULD REALISTICALLY ACHIEVE. WE HOPED THAT THE RESULT THOUGH PERHAPS NOT ENDORSED BY ALL THE FRONT LINE STATES MIGHT BE SUCH THAT THEY WOULD NOT ACTIVELY OPPOSE IT.

11. HE DID NOT GIVE A DIRECT ANSWER BUT DID CONCEDE THAT ALL-PARTY AGREEMENT WAS VERY UNLIKELY TO BE ACHIEVED. HIS OWN EXPERIENCE WITH MUZOREWA, NKOMO AND MUGABE FORCED HIM TO THIS CONCLUSION. HE

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TRUSTED HMG TO DO THEIR BEST. THE PATRIOTIC FRONT EXISTED IN NAME ONLY. THE STRUGGLE BETWEEN THEM HAD LITTLE TO DO WITH IDEOLOGICAL DIFFERENCES BUT RESULTED FROM PERSONAL RIVALRY OR ANTI-PATHY AND WOULD CONTINUE.

12. HE BELIEVED THAT KAUNDA, BUT EVEN MORE OTHERS IN ZAMBIA WERE GROWING DISENCHANTED WITH THE ARMED STRUGGLE AND THE PRESENCE OF ZAPU FORCES ON THEIR TERRITORY. FOR DIFFERENT REASONS NYERERE WAS ALSO MORE ANXIOUS FOR A SETTLEMENT THAN FORMERLY.

13. FINALLY SERETSE EXPRESSED CONCERN THAT THE RUSSIANS AND ALLIES WOULD CONTINUE TO ENCOURAGE THE PATRIOTIC FRONT TO FIGHT ON WHATEVER SETTLEMENT WAS ACHIEVED. I REPLIED THAT IF THEY DID SO IN CIRCUMSTANCES WHERE THE FRONT LINE STATES AND THE PEOPLES OF RHODESIA HAD ACCEPTED OR ACQUIESCED IN A SETTLEMENT THEN IT WOULD BECOME APPARENT THAT THEY WERE ACTING IN THEIR OWN SELF - INTEREST AND NOT THE INTERESTS OF THE AFRICAN PEOPLE. THEN THERE MIGHT BE A CASE FOR US AND THE USA TO BRING HOME TO THE SOVIETS THAT UNLESS THEY DESISTED, PROGRESS ON ARMS LIMITATIONS, TECHNICAL EXCHANGES AND OTHER MEASURES DEAR TO THEM WOULD BE IN JEOPARDY.

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FILES

RHODESIA D

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PLANNING STAFF

LEGAL ADVISERS (MR FREELAND)
(MR STEEL)

PS

PS/SIR I GILMOUR

PS/MR LUCE

PS/MR RIDLEY

PS/MR HURD

PS/MR MARTEN

PS/MR BLAKER

PS/PUS

SIR A DUFF

SIR A PARSONS

COPIES TO

PS/SIR JOHN HUNT
CABINET OFFICE

MR B CARTLEDGE
NO 10 DOWNING ST

MR WILLSON
MR WILLIAMS

PRIME MINISTER

has seen.

You requested a list of your engagements for tomorrow. They are as follows:

0930	Media Briefing
1130	Talks with Prime Minister Andreotti
1300	Lunch for Prime Minister Andreotti
1500	Tour of the sections of the building you have not yet visited
1730	Meeting on Common Fisheries Policy
1930	Farewell dinner for Ken Stowe

The PM will see the Zambian HC at 1515

14 June 1979

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FM MIRIMBA SALISBURY 141545Z JUN 79

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 305 OF 14 JUNE

INFO IMMEDIATE CAPRE TOWN PRETORIA LUSAKA GABORONE MAPUTO LUANDA
LAGOS DAR ES SALAAMEAND WASHINGTON

YOUR TELNO 77: MEETING WITH BISHOP MUZOREWA

- Prime Minister*
Gu
196
aw
1. I SAW THE BISHOP FOR ONE HOUR AND TEN MINUTES THIS AFTERNOON. I SAID THAT I HAD READ CAREFULLY THE STATEMENT THAT HE HAD ISSUED ON 13 JUNE (MY TELNO 303). I ASKED IF HE COULD GIVE ME SOME FURTHER BACKGROUND TO HIS THINKING.
 2. THE BISHOP SAID THAT HE HAD BEEN GREATLY ENCOURAGED BY THE ATTITUDE TAKEN TOWARDS RHODESIA BY THE CONSERVATIVE PARTY DURING THEIR ELECTION CAMPAIGN. SIR A DUFF'S VISIT HAD REINFORCED HIS VIEW THAT THE NEW BRITISH GOVERNMENT UNDERSTOOD THE NATURE OF THE CHANGES THAT HAD TAKEN PLACE AND WERE MOVING IN A FAVOURABLE DIRECTION. HE WAS FURTHER CONFIRMED IN THIS VIEW BY MY ARRIVAL IN SALISBURY AND OUR INITIAL CONVERSATION. SINCE THEN HE HAD GOT THE IMPRESSION THAT HMG WERE BEGINNING TO MOVE BACKWARDS. HE REFERRED TO STATEMENT S (UNSPECIFIED) BY MR VANCE. IT APPEARED THAT WE WERE NOW PREPARED TO ACCEPT DELAY IN MAKING PROGRESS OVER RHODESIA, AND WERE FALLING IN WITH THE U S APPROACH WHICH WAS SCARCELY DIFFERENT FROM THAT IF THE LABOUR GOVERNMENT. THIS WOULD ONLY ALLOW OPPOSITION TO HIS GOVERNMENT TO BUILD UP. FURTHER PRESSURES WOULD BE APPLIED UPON HMG IN AN ATTEMPT TO FRIGHTEN THEM AWAY FROM A COURAGEOUS STAND. DELAY WOULD ONLY MAKE MATTERS MORE DIFFICULT.
 3. AS REGARDS THE NEIGHBOURING STATES HE REFERRED AGAIN TO THE LETTERS THAT HE HAD SENT AFTER THE ELECTION. THERE HAD STILL BEEN NO RESPONSE. ON THE CONTRARY VARIOUS MEETINGS WERE BEING HELD BETWEEN FRONT LINE STATES AT FOREIGN MINISTER LEVEL AND AT OTHER LEVELS AND CALLS WERE BEING MADE FOR AN ESCALATION OF THE WAR. THIS WAS NOT A SITUATION WHICH HE COULD IGNORE.

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/ 4. IN REPLY

4. IN REPLY I REFERRED TO U S STATEMENTS ON THE LINES OF PARA 1 OF YOUR TUR. I WENT TO REASSURE HIM OF OUR SUPPORT AS INSTRUCTED IN THE FIRST SENTENCE OF PARA 2 OF YOUR TUR.

5. REFERRING TO MY PREVIOUS CONVERSATION WITH HIM (MY TELNO 266) I ASKED WHETHER HE COULD GIVE ME ANY INDICATION OF THE FURTHER STEPS THAT HE MIGHT HAVE IN MIND TO GAIN WIDER ACCEPTANCE FOR HIS GOVERNMENT. I ALSO REFERRED TO THE PROMISE OF FURTHER CHANGES THAT HE HAD MADE IN HIS SPEECH ON 2 JUNE. THE BISHOP WAS NOT TO BE DRAWN. HE SAID THAT THE COUNTRY FACED A DIFFICULT SITUATION. THEY WERE IN THE MIDST OF A WAR. IT WAS ESSENTIAL THAT HE SHOULD RETAIN THE CONFIDENCE AND SUPPORT OF ALL THE PEOPLE. THERE WAS THUS A NEED FOR CAUTION. AT THIS POINT I STRESSED THAT IT WAS ESSENTIAL FOR THERE TO BE SOME EVIDENCE OF FURTHER CHANGE IF HMG WERE TO ACHIEVE THE OBJECTIVE THAT THEY HAD SET THEMSELVES AND WHICH I UNDERSTOOD WAS ALSO HIS OBJECTIVE. THE BISHOP ARGUED THAT RHODESIA HAD DONE ALL THAT WAS ASKED OF HER. THEY SHOULD NOT BE ASKED TO MAKE FURTHER CHANGES. THE CONSTITUTION HAD BEEN THRASHED OUT AFTER A PROLONGED DEBATE AND AFTER CAREFUL CONSULTATIONS WITHIN THE VARIOUS POLITICAL PARTIES INVOLVED. IT THEREFORE GENUINELY REPRESENTED THE VIEWS OF THE PARTIES AND THE PEOPLE. I AGAIN STRESSED THE NEED FOR SERIOUS CONSIDERATION OF THE POSSIBILITY OF FURTHER CHANGE BUT DECIDED IN THE LIGHT OF HIS SOMEWHAT NEGATIVE RESPONSE NOT TO LABOUR THE POINT FURTHER AT THIS STAGE.

6. THE BISHOP ASKED ME WHAT WE MEANT BY "WIDE INTERNATIONAL ACCEPTANCE". I SAID THAT IDEALLY WE WOULD LIKE TO BRING RHODESIA BACK TO LEGALITY IN CONDITIONS THAT WOULD ENABLE ALL COUNTRIES TO ACCORD IMMEDIATE RECOGNITION. THIS DID NOT SEEM REALISTIC AT THE PRESENT STAGE. IT WAS HOWEVER IMPORTANT, FOR RHODESIA AS MUCH AS ANYONE ELSE, THAT SHE SHOULD RE-ENTER THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY WITH AS MUCH SUPPORT AND UNDERSTANDING AS POSSIBLE. I COULD NOT QUANTIFY THIS. HMG WERE NOT PREPARED TO ACCEPT A VETO FROM ANY INDIVIDUAL STATE. THIS HAD BEEN MADE CLEAR PUBLICLY. WE WERE HOWEVER WORKING FOR A SOLUTION WHICH COULD ATTRACT INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT.

THE BISHOP EXPRESSED ONCE AGAIN THE VIEW THAT IF HMG RECOGNISED THE PRESENT SITUATION IN RHODESIA MANY COUNTRIES WOULD FALL IMMEDIATELY INTO LINE. IF WE GRASPED THE NETTLE THE PROBLEM WOULD BE SOLVED. "FINISH" HE ADDED. IF BRITAIN DECLARED RHODESIA TO BE LEGALLY INDEPENDENT NO ONE COULD CONTINUE TO ARGUE ABOUT ILLEGALITY. HE URGED US NOT TO UNDERESTIMATE THE IMPORTANCE OF SUCH A MOVE. IN REPLY I EXPLAINED THAT, AS THE PRIME MINISTER HAD SAID, HMG HAD TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT WIDER INTERNATIONAL IMPLICATIONS. OUR RELATIONS WITH MANY COUNTRIES AROUND THE WORLD WITHIN THE COMMONWEALTH AND EUROPE, INSIDE AND OUTSIDE AFRICA WERE OF GREAT IMPORTANCE TO US. WE COULD NOT IGNORE THE POSSIBLE EFFECT UPON THESE RELATIONSHIPS OF DECISIONS THAT MIGHT BE TAKEN OVER RHODESIA.

8. THE BISHOP SAID THAT HE WOULD BE VISITING THE UNITED STATES AND WAS EXPECTING TO SEE PRESIDENT CARTER ON 10 JULY. HE WOULD LIKE TO SEE THE PRIME MINISTER IN LONDON BEFORE THEN. HE SUGGESTED 5 OR 6 JULY THOUGH HE WOULD COME AT ANY CONVENIENT DATE. HE ASKED ME TO CONVEY THIS REQUEST TO YOU. I UNDERTOOK TO DO SO. I SAID THAT I DID NOT OF COURSE KNOW WHAT PLANS MINISTERS MIGHT HAVE AT THAT TIME BUT I WOULD HOWEVER LET HIM KNOW WHEN I RECEIVED A RESPONSE. MUZOREWA RAISED THIS WITH ME BEFORE I HAD A CHANCE TO TELL HIM OF LORD HARLECH'S PROPOSED VISIT TO SALISBURY.

9. SEE MIFT.

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(MR STEEL)
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PS/MR LUCE

PS/MR RIDLEY
PS/MR HURD
PS/PUS
SIR A DUFF
SIR A PARSONS
MR LEAHY
MISS BROWN
MR THOMAS
MR WILLSON
MR WILLIAMS

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FM WASHINGTON 142225Z JUNE 79

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1522 OF 14 JUNE

INFO MARIMBA SALISBURY CAPE TOWN DAR ES SALAAM GABORONE LAGOS
LUSAKA MAPUTO UKMIS NEW YORK LUANDA AND PRETORIA.

Prime Minister

BW
19/6

MY TELEGRAM NUMBER 1506 : RHODESIA

aw

1. SENATE HAVING APPROVED THE AMENDED DEFENCE AUTHORISATION BILL, ACTIVITY IN CONGRESS ON SANCTIONS AGAINST RHODESIA NOW SHIFTS TO THE HOUSE, SOLARZ (CHAIRMAN OF THE HOUSE AFRICA SUB-COMMITTEE) IS WORKING TO PREVENT AMENDMENTS SIMILAR TO SENATOR BYRD'S FROM BEING PUT FORWARD. (A NUMBER OF BILLS ARE PENDING FROM WHICH IT MIGHT NOT BE EASY TO REMOVE SANCTIONS-LIFTING AMENDMENTS). TO AVOID THIS THREAT, SOLARZ AIMS TO INTRODUCE A PRE-EMPTIVE DRAFT BILL OF HIS OWN INTO THE HOUSE FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE TOMORROW 15 JUNE WHICH WILL CONCERN ITSELF EXCLUSIVELY WITH THE QUESTION OF SANCTIONS.
2. THE EFFECT OF THIS BILL WOULD BE TO WELCOME THE ADVANCE TOWARDS MULTI-RACIAL DEMOCRACY REPRESENTED BY THE APRIL ELECTIONS, TO RECOGNISE HMG'S CONTINUING PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITY FOR FINDING A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT, AND TO INSTRUCT THE PRESIDENT TO TERMINATE SANCTIONS BY 1 DECEMBER 1979 UNLESS HE DETERMINES IN WRITING TO CONGRESS THAT THE ACTIONS OF THE GOVERNMENT OF RHODESIA/ZIMBABWE DO NOT CONVINCINGLY DEMONSTRATE THE EXERCISE OF GENUINE MAJORITY RULE AND THAT LIFTING SANCTIONS WOULD BE AGAINST U S NATIONAL INTERESTS.
3. THE STATE DEPARTMENT BELIEVE THAT THERE ARE SUFFICIENT VOTES IN THE HOUSE FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE TO APPROVE A BILL ALONG THESE LINES: IT MIGHT THEN BE INTRODUCED TO THE FLOOR OF THE HOUSE FOR DEBATE TOWARDS THE END OF NEXT WEEK. IT HAS BEEN DELIBERATELY FRAMED TO DRAW AS WIDE SUPPORT AS POSSIBLE FROM THE MANY CONGRESSMEN WHO WISH TO ACKNOWLEDGE THE PROGRESS MADE IN RHODESIA BUT WHO WERE IMPRESSED BY SECRETARY VANCE'S ARGUMENTS EARLIER THIS WEEK THAT THE PREMATURE LIFTING OF SANCTIONS WOULD SERIOUSLY HARM U S INTERESTS IN AFRICA. THE PARLIAMENTARY HANDLING AND WORDING OF THE BILL ARE STILL UNDER DISCUSSION. ITS FINAL FORM AND, STILL MORE, ITS FATE REMAIN UNCERTAIN.

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4. IF THE SOLARZ MOVE FAILS AND IF SANCTIONS LIFTING LEGISLATION COMES FORWARD IN SOME OTHER FORM, PROBABLY WITHIN THE NEXT 2 - WEEKS, THE PRESIDENT WILL HAVE TO DECIDE WHETHER TO VETO. VANCE TOLD ME LAST NIGHT THAT THE PRESIDENT CERTAINLY WOULD VETO ANY SUCH LEGISLATION. THIS HAS BEEN CONFIRMED TO US BY WHITE HOUSE SOURCES. WE JUDGE IT UNLIKELY THAT EITHER THE SENATE OR HOUSE WOULD BE ABLE TO RAISE THE TWO THIRDS MAJORITY REQUIRED TO OVER-RIDE ANY PRESIDENTIAL VETO.

5. THE EFFECT OF THIS CONFUSED CONGRESSIONAL SITUATION WILL PROBABLY BE TO DELAY ANY CHANGE IN EXISTING U S SANCTIONS POLICY FOR SOME TIME. A PRINCIPAL THEME OF THE ADMINISTRATION'S ARGUMENTS THIS WEEK HAS BEEN THE NEED TO LET HMG, WHOSE RESPONSIBILITY FOR FINDING A BROADLY ACCEPTABLE SETTLEMENT IS INTERNATIONALLY RECOGNISED, REACH THEIR OWN DECISIONS FIRST. THERE IS A GOOD DEAL OF SYMPATHY IN CONGRESS FOR THE VIEW THAT U.S. INTERESTS WOULD BEST BE SERVED BY WAITING UNTIL HMG HAS ACTED.

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LEGAL ADVISERS
(MR FREELAND)
(MR STEEL)
ECON D
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DEF D
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PS
PS/SIR I GILMOUR
PS/MR LUCE

PS/MR RIDLEY
PS/MR HURD
PS/PUS
SIR A DUFF
SIR A PARSONS
MR LEAHY
MISS BROWN
MR THOMAS
MR WILLSON
MR WILLIAMS

ADDITIONAL DIST
RHODESIA POLICY
SA/RHO/UN

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GRS 380

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FM CANBERRA 140500Z JUN 79

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 312 OF 14 JUNE 1979

INFO IMMEDIATE LUSAKA, WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK AND JOHANNESBURG
(FOR LORD HARLECH)

LUSAKA TELNO 395: RHODESIA

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF AUSTRALIAN HIGH COMMISSIONER'S REPORTING
TELEGRAM GIVEN TO US IN STRICT CONFIDENCE BY THE DFA:

" ON THE EVENING OF 11 JUNE, I WAS SUMMONED TO STATE HOUSE IN
LUSAKA, ALONG WITH THE AMERICAN AMBASSADOR (LOWE), THE CANADIAN
HIGH COMMISSIONER AND THE FRENCH CHARGE, TO SEE PRESIDENT KAUNDA. IN
TIME WE WERE USHERED INTO THE PRESIDENT'S PRIVATE STUDY FOR A CHAT
LASTING ABOUT FIVE MINUTES, DURING WHICH KAUNDA HANDED TO US LETTERS
ON THE RHODESIAN QUESTION ADDRESSED TO OUR HEADS OF GOVERNMENT.
FULL TEXT OF THE LETTER BY IFT.

KAUNDA TOLD ME HE HAD DECIDED TO SEEK THE HELP OF VARIOUS
WESTERN LEADERS TO PERSUADE THE BRITISH CONSERVATIVE GOVERNMENT TO
"ACT CORRECTLY" ON RHODESIA. HE SAID THE TIME HAD COME TO TRY TO
EXTINGUISH THE SPARK THAT COULD IGNITE A CONFLAGRATION IN AFRICA THAT
WOULD "MAKE THE FRENCH REVOLUTION LOOK LIKE A SUNDAY SCHOOL
PICNIC". RHODESIA WAS ONLY THE BEGINNING. THE FLAME WOULD SPREAD TO
NAMIBIA AND ULTIMATELY ENGULF SOUTH AFRICA. HE FEARED GREATLY THAT
HIS PREDICTIONS MADE SINCE 1966 OF THE DANGERS OF RACIAL WARFARE IN
SOUTHERN AFRICA WERE ABOUT TO BE REALISED. AS PRESIDENT OF A
COUNTRY WHICH HAD ALREADY SACRIFICED SO MUCH IN THE CAUSE OF A JUST
SOLUTION TO THE RHODESIAN PROBLEM, HE WAS NOW MAKING AN URGENT
APPEAL FOR HELP TO AUSTRALIA AND OTHER KEY WESTERN COUNTRIES WHICH
MIGHT HAVE SOME INFLUENCE ON BRITAIN.

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/KAUNDA SAID

*Info re
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KAUNDA SAID THAT MRS THATCHER HAD REVEALED HER GOVERNMENT'S MAIN CONCERN WAS SOVIET INFLUENCE IN AFRICA. IF THIS WERE THE CASE, THE BRITISH MUST REALISE THAT BY FRUSTRATING THE PATRIOTIC FRONT'S LEGITIMATE AIMS, THEY WERE FORCING THE FREEDOM FIGHTERS TO RELY ON COMMUNIST ASSISTANCE. THEY HAD NO OTHER SOURCE OF WEAPONS AVAILABLE TO THEM. IN THIS WAY THE BRITISH WERE DEFEATING THEIR OWN ENDS. THE SITUATION WAS FRAUGHT WITH DANGER AND COULD ONLY LEAD TO RACIAL, TRIBAL AND IDEOLOGICAL HOSTILITY AND AN ESCALATION OF SUPER-POWER RIVALRY AND PRESENCE ON THE CONTINENT.''

2. WE ASSUME YOU NOW HAVE A COPY OF THE PRESIDENT'S LETTER.

3. FCO PLEASE REPEAT FURTHER IF NECESSARY.

TEBBIT

F I L E S

RHOD D	LEGAL ADVISERS	PS/MR RIDLEY	ADDITIONAL DIST
OADS	(MR FREELAND)	PS/MR HURD	RHODESIA POLICY
NAD	(MR STEEL)	PS/PUS	
NEWS D	ECON D	SIR A DUFF	
FUSD	PCD	SIR A PARSONS	
PLANNING STAFF	DEF D		
ES & SD	OID	MR LEAHY	
CCD	PS	MISS BROWN	
FRD	PS/SIR I GILMOUR	MR THOMAS	
UND	PS/MR LUCE	MR WILLSON	
		MR WILLIAMS	



Prime Minister

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

The Zambian High Commissioners decided that we would prefer to wait to see you rather than see Mr. Lule. Could you give her ten minutes at 1700 on Friday, 15 June?

13 June 1979

Dear Bryan,

Zambia

That everyone wants - But
ten minutes on Friday 15 June
Can I see the whole bill?

You asked for our advice over the question of Miss Chibesakunda's request to call on the Prime Minister with a message from President Kaunda.

It is traditional Commonwealth practice that High Commissioners have in principle the right of direct access to the Prime Minister and that this is one privilege which they enjoy and which Ambassadors do not. We have quoted this principle to the Zambians in order to obtain access to President Kaunda for our High Commissioner in Lusaka and it was because of this principle that Miss Chibesakunda saw the Prime Minister on 15 March 1978. Our High Commissioner in Lusaka has had a number of meetings with President Kaunda, mostly with distinguished visitors. But he has had at least one bilateral meeting with President Kaunda in the last six months.

Lord Harlech will be seeing President Kaunda tomorrow at 11.30 a.m. In these circumstances Lord Carrington recommends that the Prime Minister should, if at all possible, see Miss Chibesakunda but that it should be made clear to her that the Prime Minister can only spare five or ten minutes from a very crowded programme.

Yours ever,
Stephen

(J S Wall)
Private Secretary

Bryan G Cartledge Esq
10 Downing Street
LONDON

13 JUN 1979



CONFIDENTIAL

Prime Minister

GRS 300

CONFIDENTIAL

FM LUSAKA 130913Z JUN 79

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 406 OF 13 JUNE

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, CANBERRA, OTTAWA, PARIS, GABORONE,
PRIORITY PRETORIA, UKMIS NEW YORK, DAR ES SALAAM, MAPUTO, LAGOS

AM 14/6

MY TELNO 395 OF 12 JUNE: RHODESIA

1. STEVE LOW HAS BEEN AUTHORISED TO BRIEF LORD HARLECH ON THE
SUBSTANCE OF PRESIDENT KAUNDA'S LETTER TO PRESIDENT CARTER AND
WILL DO SO THIS EVENING. NO ONE HAS FELT ABLE TO LET ME HAVE
A COPY OF THE DOCUMENT AT THIS STAGE BUT (PLEASE PROTECT) HAVE
IN FACT HAD SIGHT OF IT. THE LETTER BEARS THE HALLMARKS OF
PRESIDENT KAUNDA'S OWN HANDIWORK AND IS LARGELY TAKEN UP WITH
HIS VIEWS ON THE MUZOREWA/SMITH REGIME WHICH IS SEEN AS SIMPLY
A CONTINUATION OF THE SMITH GOVERNMENT UNDER ANOTHER GUISE. IF
THE REGIME IS RECOGNISED BY THE WEST CONFLICT WILL BE INTERNAT-
IONALISED AND THE PATRIOTIC FRONT TURNED DEFINITELY TO THE EAST
TO WHOM THEY ALREADY HAVE TO LOOK FOR THEIR WEAPONS.

2. ACCORDINGLY BRITAIN'S FRIENDS IN THE WEST ARE URGED TO
PREVAIL ON US

- A) TO GIVE RHODESIA A BROAD BASIS AND LASTING SOLUTION
- B) TO WITHHOLD RECOGNITION OF MUZOREWA/SMITH REGIME AND TO
HOLD FIRMLY TO SANCTIONS, ACCEPTING MUZOREWA/SMITH'S RULE
AS ONLY A STAGE IN THE TRANSITION TO MAJORITY RULE
- C) TO ANNOUNCE A CLEAR POLICY POSITION ON RHODESIA DECLARING
THE MUZOREWA/SMITH RULE AS ONLY ONE OF THE CONFLICTING
FEATURES WHICH CHARACTERISE THE TRANSITIONAL STAGE OF THE
TERRITORY AND TO CALL THE LEADERS BOTH INSIDE AND OUTSIDE
RHODESIA TO AN ALL-PARTY CONFERENCE TO REACH A FINAL
SETTLEMENT.

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/ 3. I WAS

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3. I WAS INTERESTED TO SEE THERE WAS NO EXPLICIT CRITICISM OF BRITAIN OR ATTACK UPON US.
4. THE LETTER TO PRESIDENT GISCARD INVITED HIM TO VISIT ZAMBIA SOON TO SEE THINGS FOR HIMSELF (BUT PLEASE PROTECT FRENCH CHARGE'S HAVING REVEALED THIS TO US).

ALLINSON

F I L E S

RHOD D	LEGAL ADVISERS	PS/MR RIDLEY	ADDITIONAL DIST
OADS	(MR FREELAND)	PS/MR HURD	RHODESIA POLICY
NAD	(MR STEEL)	PS/PUS	
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ES & SD	OID	MR LEAHY	
CCD	PS	MISS BROWN	
FRD	PS/SIR I GILMOUR	MR THOMAS	
UND	PS/MR LUCE	MR WILLSON	
		MR WILLIAMS	

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Carter
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Zambia's crisis erodes Zimbabwe sanctions

By Tony Hawkins

Special to

The Christian Science Monitor

Salisbury, Zimbabwe Rhodesia

Zimbabwe Rhodesians expect a major hole soon will be blown in the Western policy of sanctions against this country — and that it will be done by their next-door neighbor, Zambia.

Signs are growing that Zambia's President Kaunda, who last October was forced to reopen his southern rail route through Zimbabwe Rhodesia to import essential goods and export Zambian copper, soon will have to ask Prime Minister Abel Muzorewa to reopen the road links as well.

The Zambian economy reportedly is in a very serious state and must import upwards of 200,000 tons of maize (corn) via the southern rail route in the next few months if a food crisis in Zambia is to be avoided.

At present, only about 4,000 tons of traffic is crossing the Victoria Falls bridge from the south each day. The main reason for the holdup is that it apparently is taking the Zambians about 60 days to turn round rail wagons and send them back south — instead of the six days that it should take.

Bishop Muzorewa, the new Rhodesian black leader, is being advised by at least some of his advisers to adopt a hard line with President Kaunda and demand a quid pro quo in the form of a withdrawal of support by Zambia from the Patriotic Front guerrilla forces based in Zam-

bia and loyal to Joshua Nkomo.

The bishop is expected to tell President Kaunda that Zimbabwe Rhodesia can hardly be expected to feed Zambia while guerrillas based inside Zambia launch attacks against this country — and even attack the railways bringing vitally needed supplies to Zambia.

Salisbury officials believe that the economic and food situation in Zambia is deteriorating so rapidly that the Zambian President soon will be forced to make a pragmatic choice between continued support for Mr. Nkomo's guerrillas and food for his people.

Political experts in Salisbury believe that President Carter knows that not much time remains for the economic sanctions weapon to be used against this country effectively. They point out that even if the United States Congress does support the President's stance, the British Parliament is most unlikely to do the same.

It is felt here to be inconceivable that Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher would ask the British House of Commons next November to reimpose economic sanctions, which lapse automatically every November.

Analysts here say the US President is using the sanctions weapon while it still exists to try to exert last-minute pressure on Bishop Muzorewa to renege on parts of the 1979 Constitution and make changes to it.

Officials here stress that Mr. Carter has failed to specify precisely what he expects Bishop Muzorewa to do. In other words, says one official, there is a great possibility that if he were to make concessionary changes in line with the Carter administration's criticism, he still would have no guarantee at all that Mr. Carter would then regard these changes as sufficient.

Officials say this underlines the likelihood that the US President is more concerned with Nigeria's oil and his home political fences than with the rights and wrongs of the Zimbabwean Constitution.

me that display advertisements in leading South African newspapers advertising posts for schoolteachers drew dwindling replies over four years — 37, 17, seven, two — and family fears caused withdrawals.

The schools, some of them established 20 years ago, have to fall back on the wives of a few civil affairs officials and on national servicemen for teachers.

The same applies to staff helping the blacks towards self-sufficiency in forestry, Kiaat and teak timber-milling and agriculture. (Even /Kung Bushmen are being taught irrigation farming.)

Says Nel: "Our war here is a 20% military effort and 80% civil — and we are having a hard time winning the 80% for lack of personnel to back us up."

Psychologically, the war looks as though it is being won. Civil development has been going on for five years. The military here are closer to the people than in Ovambo, where civil action is not so much needed among people already provided with considerably more in the way of infrastructure and facilities.

Military service itself is popular. The locally recruited 34 Battalion of the Defence Force finds its selection board faced with six times as many volunteers as it wants, says their commanding officer, Major Charles Hochappel, who has been in Kavango on and off for four years.

The recruits go through 12 months of training — five basic, four on counter-insurgency tactics, one on leave, then a month on individual training and two on orientation generally.

They emerge accustomed to three meals a day instead of one, sleeping in beds with sheets as well as blankets — and standard South African Defence Force rates of pay. Twenty have already reached the rank of corporal and theoretically there is no limit to their promotion. Some have already shown up well in "contact situations" — encountering terrorists.

Eastwards from Kavango, past the Bushmen in the lonely panhandle of the Caprivi and in the thoroughly romantic region of east Caprivi between the Chobe and Zambezi rivers, one finds another fledgling black infantry unit, 33 Battalion.

The fourth intake of this unit is training at Katima Mulilo under bilingual Major Geoff Preston-Thomas. Its story is the same as 34 Battalion's at Rundu — 500 applicants for 100 vacancies, all educated to Standard V or better and able to read and write in English.

In Ovambo and Kavango, apart from the vernaculars, the educational, military and civil language medium used between black and white is Afrikaans. In Caprivi, because of the past influence of British administrators in the adjacent territories of Bechuanaland and the Rhodesias English was paramount; and the common tongue of all 12 tribes in the region is Lozi, the language of the people north of the Zambezi who enslaved them.

They were never really subjected to white colonial rule and even today the whites are few in number: South African soldiers and civil aid officials; Seventh Day Adventist missionaries, who have established the largest following,



Ruacana patrol: black and white intelligence officers interrogate Ovambo

plus missionaries from the Dutch Reformed and Roman Catholic Churches.

The Caprivians number about 31 000, with two major tribes — the Mafue, six out of ten, and the Basubia, three out of ten. They dominate the 32-member legislative assembly that came into being just over three years ago.

The two great tribal chiefs are automatically members of the assembly and each chooses nine additional members from his own tribe. (The remaining 12 are elected.) And the two chiefs alternately act as chief minister for six months of the year.

Over the years, only 400 locals have "gone over" to Swapo. Even their names are known.

Among the palms and baobabs of Katima Mulilo you are a long, long way from anywhere — by road to railhead at Grootfontein, 960 km; to Windhoek, 1 500 km; to Johannesburg by air, 1 700 km; to Luanda, also about 1 700 km.

The Mafue and Basubia are not influenced by Swapo politically and plainly not interested in Swapo, even though Katima Mulilo is at "Terro Corner" where the cut-line and the Zambezi boundaries meet and Caprivi, Zambia and Angola come together.

From time to time the terrorists lob mortar shells at Katima and the Zambian soldiery, sometimes trigger-happy, open fire across the river. But Katima is very well fortified against any assault, although none has yet come.

Five years ago at "Terro Corner" I saw a section holding a little outpost at the former mine labour recruiting office of the Wenela organisation. On a visit this May I found a substantial force there under the command of London-born, South African-educated Major William James ("Lee") Le Crerar, and Wenela transformed into a formidable, bunkered fortress.

The acting commander of this military sub-area, Major Fred Oelscher, usually has to send his troops out on far-ranging, week-long patrols to contact the enemy — or to find no sign of him but only elephant and buffalo. So it was a triumph when recently a patrol 80 km out into

western Caprivi followed tracks and uncovered, under two metres of sand, a cache of enemy arms weighing 2 700 kg.

Among the weapons were two Chinese 60 mm mortars, but the rest was Russian — a TM-46 landmine, masses of anti-personnel mines, AK-47 ammunition, bombs for 75 mm and 82 mm mortars, shells for 82 mm recoilless guns . . .

Troops out of Katima in April killed 50 Swapo, 22 of them in follow-up operations. But to flush out Swapo generally entails crossing the border on pre-emptive sweeps, cleaning up the big, well-established but usually deserted bases. These forays have been so successful that it has taken the Swapo commanders about five months to build up to aggressive strength again.

Pre-emptive forays from the Caprivi into Zambia as well as Angola and from Ovambo into Angola by air as well as armour and assault troops, will continue as long as Swapo chooses battle instead of ballot.

Prime Minister P W Botha has warned that if neighbouring states serve as terrorist launching sites "they will pay dearly for their mistakes".

This week it was clear that Angola at least would have to reconcile itself to hot-pursuit retaliation to the stepped-up campaign of atrocities that in recent days have led to the murders of a grandmother, two children and a farmer, more abductions, landmine destruction, a successful, large-scale clash with infiltrators and emergency measures close to martial law which Administrator-General Steyn has imposed over wide regions.

Reaction is intense. Dirk Mudge, chairman of the Democratic Turnhalle Alliance and the newly-approved interim National Assembly, has called for "vengeance", Steyn for "restraint by the angered people". And Foreign Minister Pik Botha has demanded an explanation from UN Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim for the organisation's "continued silence" on terrorist atrocities and about its support for Swapo.

Original USA - June 79
Call a PM by Mr
David Rockefeller

NOTE FOR THE RECORD

cc: Mr. Cartledge
Mr. Wolfson

Mr. David Rockefeller called on the Prime Minister at 1000 on Tuesday 12 June. The following are the main points which came up in their discussion.

Mr. Rockefeller said that the position of the U.S. Congress on the Muzorewa Government was very helpful. However, President Carter was moving cautiously. He hoped that the Prime Minister might possibly be able to push the President when she met him in Tokyo in the direction of recognition and lifting of sanctions. The U.S. would certainly need the U.K.'s support if recognition and the lifting of sanctions were to take place. The Prime Minister said that she would certainly be raising the matter with the President. In her view, there was a good case for lifting sanctions - based on the turn out in the Rhodesian elections and the way in which it had been conducted. In any case, she did not think it would be possible to get a new sanction order through the House of Commons in November.

Mr. Rockefeller raised the question of a long-term residence for the Shah. At present, he was of course in Mexico - and the Mexican President had to be applauded for agreeing to have him; but he was afraid that Mexico could only be a temporary refuge. He well understood the reasons why both the U.K. and the U.S.A. had so far been unable to offer the Shah refuge; but he was very unhappy that neither of the two great free nations had been able to help. The Prime Minister said that the only reason why the U.K. had been unable to offer the Shah refuge was the risk to our staff at the Tehran Embassy; the Mexicans did not have this problem because they had closed their Embassy. In time, it might be possible to offer him refuge.

Mr. Rockefeller said that Chase Manhattan were planning to conduct a publicity campaign through the American Press arguing the case for capitalism and the Conservative economic philosophy.

/ He hoped

He hoped that this would have some impact in the U.S.; but it might also be helpful in Britain - and if it were successful in the U.S., it might be extended to the European edition of the Herald Tribune. He himself would be addressing a Conference of international bankers in London the following day on this basic theme. Mr. Rockefeller went on to say that he would like to keep in touch with the Prime Minister's Office on his approach so as to be of maximum help to the Conservative Administration. The Prime Minister said that this would indeed be useful, and she asked David Wolfson to establish contact with Mr. Rockefeller's London office.

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13 June 1979

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Original on
Kenya: Moi visit
May 79

NOTE OF A TETE-A-TETE DISCUSSION BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER AND
PRESIDENT DANIEL ARAP MOI OF KENYA AT 10 DOWNING STREET ON
13 JUNE 1979 AT 1045

Present:

Prime Minister
Mr. B. G. Cartledge

President Moi
Mr. Philip Ndegwa
(Chief Economic Adviser
to President Moi)

* * * * *

Welcoming President Moi, the Prime Minister said that his visit to London was a great pleasure and delight to the British people. The United Kingdom regarded Kenya in a very special light and admired the stability and internal cooperation which had been achieved there. The relationship between Kenya and the U.K. was a very special one. The Prime Minister said that she was aware that Kenya faced some problems at present, including those which were affecting her balance of payments position.

President Moi agreed with the Prime Minister that Kenya's long relationship with the U.K. had a special character; the two countries belonged to one family. He was very grateful for what the U.K. had done for Kenya in the past. British help had enabled Kenya to overcome her early difficulties, which had sometimes seemed insuperable. The problem which now confronted Kenya was, as a result of the unfriendly attitude of some of her neighbours, including Somalia, a feeling of insecurity among the Kenyan people. In the past, the Kenyan Government had concentrated its efforts on economic development and on raising the Kenyan standard of living. Now, however, as a result of the policies pursued by Amin, Siad Barre and the Tanzanian Government, Kenya had been obliged to make considerable purchases of arms from the U.K., United States, France and West Germany. The current Kenyan Budget totalled about £762 million, of which £250 million was devoted to defence. Kenya was importing from the U.K. alone defence equipment worth £113 million during the period up to 1987. A payment of £20 million was due in four months' time in respect of these purchases.

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Kenya had also made purchases totalling about £200 million from the U.S., France and West Germany. President Moi said that he would be very grateful if the U.K. could discuss with these NATO partners how all of them could help Kenya to overcome her balance of payments difficulties. The U.K. had made available a loan of £80 million of project aid for the period 1979/82 and half of this would be spent on imports from the U.K. But Kenya's exports were quite insufficient to cover all these liabilities. President Moi said that he very much hoped that the U.K. could help Kenya to bridge the gap, if only by extending the term of the repayments already due. He would be making similar requests to the American, French and German Governments. He was especially anxious that Kenya should not be put into the position of having to default on payments, thereby damaging her credit-worthiness. The Prime Minister recalled that the U.K. had already waived repayments on previous loans amounting to £68 million. It had now been agreed that £80 million in project aid should be offered for the period 1979/82. In addition, the Prime Minister said, the British Government were prepared to offer Kenya the transfer of £15 million of this project aid to programme aid, thereby bringing forward the payments to the Kenyan Government. This might help Kenya to overcome her immediate problems.

Mr. Ndegwa said that Kenya had applied to the U.K. for £30 million of further programme aid: the Prime Minister's offer, therefore, still left a shortfall of £15 million. The Prime Minister pointed out that the British Government also had its problems. The Government of the U.K. had just embarked on a new programme designed to create extra wealth for the country. Despite the commitments resulting from this, however, the U.K. was anxious to help Kenya and had therefore offered the accelerated payment of £15 million. She thought that this was a reasonable compromise to take account of the problems of both sides. Mr. Ndegwa said that the finance of Kenya's defence purchases from the U.K. carried a satisfactory interest rate of 7.5%, but the repayment term was short: it would be impossible for Kenya to meet her commitments ^{without} default. The repayments which Kenya would have to make between now and 1986 on defence

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purchases totalling £200 million, plus interest and escalation costs, would amount to much more than she could hope to earn by her exports. Mr. Ndegwa agreed that the Prime Minister's offer of a £15 million switch from project to programme aid would be helpful but repeated that it was too little to solve Kenya's problems. The Prime Minister asked Mr. Ndegwa to send her a list of the defence contracts with U.K. companies on which payments were due so that she could see the facts. The Prime Minister said that she would certainly consider Kenya's problem, but could not be over-optimistic about the outcome. President Moi said that he would certainly send the Prime Minister a factual note.

The Prime Minister asked President Moi about Kenya's relations with her neighbours. President Moi said that he thought that Somalia was now doing what she could to be helpful. He himself proposed to visit Saudi Arabia in June and President Siad Barre might fly to Riyadh while he was there. If this meeting went well, it could make a helpful contribution to Kenyan/Somalian relations. So far as Uganda was concerned, the situation was fluid. He had been to meet President Nyerere at Arusha in order to hear his explanation of Tanzania's invasion of Uganda. President Nyerere had told him that he would like Kenya and the U.K. to provide significant help for Uganda in its present difficulties. President Moi had told President Nyerere that he would do what he could. President Moi commented, however, that any aid given to Uganda from outside would have to be properly managed: at present, lawlessness was still rampant there and Uganda lacked a proper Civil Service, an army and a police force. It was important, and he had urged President Nyerere in this sense, that President Lule should be given the freedom to take his own decisions. The Kenyan Vice President would be travelling to Kampala to discuss the refugee problem and military links. If the situation in Uganda could be stabilised, Kenya would have a good prospect of peace.

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Turning to Zimbabwe, President Moi said that President Kaunda had asked Kenya for maize but problems had arisen over transport. It had eventually been agreed to send the maize by sea from Mombasa.

President Moi told the Prime Minister that he had discussed Zimbabwe/Rhodesia with President Nyerere, who had acknowledged that a change had taken place there. President Nyerere nevertheless maintained that Bishop Muzorewa should not be content with what he had got so far. The Prime Minister told President Moi about Lord Harlech's mission to South Africa. She said that the British Government was finding increasing recognition that the April elections in Rhodesia could not be ignored. There had been an enormous turn out - bigger than several in the U.K. and there was an increasing feeling that something had happened which had wholly altered the situation and could provide the basis for a peaceful settlement. The prize for Southern Africa was enormous: Zimbabwe/Rhodesia could provide her neighbours with food. Whatever else might be said, Zimbabwe/Rhodesia had held elections on the basis of one man, one vote and in which four political parties had taken part. President Moi agreed that a settlement would bring great rewards.

The Prime Minister repeated that Zimbabwe/Rhodesia was a rich country and that the prize of a peaceful settlement would be immensely valuable not only for Southern Africa but for the West as a whole. President Moi said that he agreed absolutely. The Prime Minister told President Moi that Lord Harlech would have consultations with Joshua Nkomo and Robert Mugabe if he saw fit and thought it wise to do so. It was unrealistic to expect Zimbabwe/Rhodesia to move straight from its previous situation to a perfect democracy. She nevertheless hoped that if the Government proceeded gradually a settlement could eventually be achieved.

President Moi said that Kenya agreed that a new situation had been created. But, although it was true that the President and the Prime Minister of Zimbabwe/Rhodesia were now black, a real transfer of power had not taken place. The continued exclusion of

/those outside

those outside the country would prolong instability and cause continuing and unnecessary loss of life. Kenya was strongly opposed to this. He had advised Bishop Muzorewa privately not to adopt a hard line towards the Patriotic Front but to leave it to them to refuse his invitations to discussions, thereby putting them at a disadvantage.

President Moi pointed out that Kenya herself had based her human rights safeguards on the protection of individuals rather than on the protection of communities. He had done his best to persuade Angolan factions to come together in the interests of the Angolan nation but he had been given scant encouragement.

The Prime Minister asked President Moi whether the continued presence of Ian Smith in the new Government presented a stumbling block. President Moi said that it did, especially since there was no full definition of the powers of the Prime Minister of Zimbabwe/Rhodesia. The Constitution could not be amended without the consent of the Europeans. President Moi said that his main concern, however, was that the loss of lives, whether white or black, should on no account be used as a political tactic.

Mr. Ndegwa said that the British Government could help to create a new situation in Zimbabwe/Rhodesia simply by urging Bishop Muzorewa to make it clear that he would be willing at least to discuss a new Constitution for the country. It seemed certain that the Front Line Presidents would not agree to take part in discussions on the basis of the existing Constitution. The Prime Minister commented, and President Moi agreed, that some of the Constitutions over which the Front Line Presidents presided were far from ideal. President Moi added that democracy had to be based on freedom of choice - on the ballot box, rather than on the barrel of a gun. The Prime Minister told President Moi that the British Government had a clear duty to bring Rhodesia back to legality: an opportunity had been missed in Geneva in 1974. There was now a new opportunity and the Government would take it. President Moi said that Nkomo and Mugabe would lose face if a new Constitution were to emerge in Salisbury. Bishop Muzorewa should be persuaded to bring this about.

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The discussion ended at 1125 and the talks continued in plenary session.

M.M.

13 June 1979

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PM / Moi Plenary extracts
1130 Hours at No 10
13 June 1979

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Original on:
Kenya: Moi visit
May 79

President Moi said that Kenya thought that stability was essential; the African continent was bleeding and its people were tired of war. Kenya believed in the principle of one man, one vote, and thought that power should come from the ballot box and not from the barrel of a gun. The elections in Zimbabwe/Rhodesia had created a new situation: but Kenya rejected the present constitution in that country because a transfer of power to the African majority had not been affected. Bishop Muzorewa could not be brushed aside but his position did not embody real power. Progress could only be made through discussions conducted on the basis of understanding and the love of peace. Kenya's own experience in forming a constitution had shown that guarantees could be formulated which removed all fears: under the Kenyan constitution every individual was protected and there were now more Europeans in Kenya than at the time of independence. In Nairobi, there was no feeling of pressure and, President Moi said, he would like to see the same situation brought about in Zimbabwe/Rhodesia.

President Moi went on to say that before the meeting of Commonwealth Heads of Government took place in Lusaka there would be a Conference of the OAU in Liberia. He himself would be on a visit to Malawi at the time of the OAU meeting but his Vice-President would attend instead. By the time the Lusaka meeting took place, all views would have been expressed and everybody would see what had to be done. President Moi said that he hoped that the British Government could convince Mr. Smith that discussions must take place in order to stop the bloodshed and achieve a genuine transfer of power; this was what President Nyerere, too, wanted. The present Zimbabwe/Rhodesia constitution created the possibility of attacks on the communities who were given entrenched rights under it. It was much better to rely on the protection of the property and rights of individuals rather than of groups. It was essential to generate confidence; elections could not be held in an atmosphere of hate.

At the Prime Minister's invitation, the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary described the objectives of Lord Harlech's mission to Southern Africa. Kenya was certainly the prototype of how things should be done. Lord Carrington said that he nevertheless thought

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it a mistake to underestimate the extent to which power had been transferred in Salisbury. The British representative in Salisbury, whose presence there did not constitute recognition of the Muzorewa Government, had given a vivid description of the extent to which Bishop Muzorewa was now operating at the centre of Government whereas Mr. Smith was relegated to a subordinate and inactive position. He recognised that this view was not generally accepted outside Zimbabwe and that Bishop Muzorewa must be seen to be running the country. The purpose of Mr. Day's mission in Salisbury was, not to recognise the regime, but to influence Bishop Muzorewa in this direction. Lord Carrington said that some countries, particularly Nigeria, had been very critical of the elections but it was impossible to ignore a turn-out of nearly 65%. Lord Harlech's purpose would be to see if there was any room for flexibility in the positions of the Front Line Presidents; he would also try to move Bishop Muzorewa and bring him closer to the other African leaders. The present constitution was not one that he himself would have written; it was worth remembering, however, that the constitution had not been imposed on the Africans but negotiated with Bishop Muzorewa, Mr. Sithole and Chief Chirau. Lord Carrington pointed out that in 1974 Joshua Nkomo had been prepared to accept an almost identical constitution.

President Moi said that the British Government seemed to be looking for an escape route. The two leaders at present outside Zimbabwe enjoyed substantial support inside the country and they could not be expected to come back straightaway. This meant that there would continue to be unnecessary loss of life. The elections had now created a situation and the next move had to be decided. Support for Bishop Muzorewa would not necessarily bring stability to the area but it could prolong the war. Lord Carrington pointed out that Nkomo and Mugabe might not necessarily have won much support in the April election, had they chosen to take part in it. He hoped that President Nyerere would be helpful. As President Moi knew, sanctions would come up for renewal by the British Parliament in November and it had to be faced that it would not be possible to secure Parliamentary agreement to this.

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The Prime Minister said that this explained the British Government's concern to achieve an early settlement. Despite the time factor, however, the Government wished to consult their Commonwealth partners and to carry their friends along with them. The price of a peaceful settlement was enormous. The Prime Minister asked President Moi to what extent he thought that Ian Smith posed an obstacle to a settlement. President Moi said that, however little Government work Mr. Smith might be doing in Salisbury, he was certainly an obstacle. He was not responsible to anybody except himself. Lord Carrington commented that Ian Smith saw himself as a card to be played; he would leave if recognition and the lifting of sanctions could be secured. President Moi commented that Mr. Smith did not wish to go unrecognised.



Top Copy to FCO.

MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
SALISBURY

12th June, 1979.

Following the inauguration of the new government of Zimbabwe Rhodesia, I am taking this opportunity to address you in my capacity as Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Executive Council of Zimbabwe Rhodesia.

The election of the majority rule government on the 21 April was the final step in satisfying the six principles for a return to constitutional legality which have been the cornerstone of British policy since 1965.

As a result of the declaration of independence in 1965 by a former government economic sanctions were imposed upon my country and international recognition withheld. It is now my Government's wish to rectify this situation and recover the opportunities for international understanding which were lost between 1965 and 1978. We hope that reason will prevail in the international community, as it has done in my country, to ensure that Zimbabwe Rhodesia may return to its proper position within the comity of nations and enjoy diplomatic and trading relations with those countries with whom rapport can be established.

As you know there are forces with ulterior motives engaged against us who are doing their utmost to undermine our new democratic government, alleging that it is not representative of the people and does not take cognisance of the external nationalist alliance. The people of my country answered this in their own way.


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Not only did 63,9% of the electorate vote for the establishment of the new government, they also demonstrated their acceptance of our new constitution. It is a matter of record that the external factions were generously given every opportunity to participate peaceably in the electoral process but they refused because they knew their chances of obtaining a majority of the popular vote were not good.

Now as a new democratic nation (perhaps the only truly multiracial state in Africa) we intend to go forward and develop all our resources to their full potential for the benefit of our people.

Bearing all this in mind I do hope that you will support moves within your sphere of influence to lift economic sanctions and to grant recognition to Zimbabwe Rhodesia at an early date.

Yours sincerely,



D. MUKOME
MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

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Prime Minister

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TO PRIORITY FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1476 OF 12 JUNE 79.

INFORMATION ROUTINE MARIMBA SALISBURY, CAPETOWN, DAR-ES-SALAAM, GABORONE, LAGOS, LUSAKA, MAPUTO, UK MIS NEW YORK, LUANDA AND PRETORIA.

RHODESIA.

1. SECRETARY VANCE TESTIFIED THIS MORNING 12 JUNE BEFORE SEPARATE SESSIONS OF THE HOUSE FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEES.

2. HIS STATEMENT (TEXT BY BAG TO FCO ONLY) ACKNOWLEDGED THAT CONSIDERABLE PROGRESS HAD BEEN MADE TOWARDS MAJORITY RULE IN RHODESIA. HOWEVER INHERENT PROBLEMS IN THE CONSTITUTION AND RESTRICTIONS ON PARTICIPATION IN THE ELECTIONS CONVINCED THE ADMINISTRATION THAT SANCTIONS SHOULD NOT BE LIFTED UNDER THE TERMS OF THE CASE-JAVITS AMENDMENT.

3. TOGETHER WITH HMG, THE ADMINISTRATION WOULD THEREFORE CONTINUE TO SUPPORT EFFORTS TOWARDS A PEACEFUL SOLUTION. THE U.S. REMAINED CLOSELY IN TOUCH WITH THE NEW BRITISH GOVERNMENT OVER HMG'S CONSULTATIONS IN THE REGION, AND WOULD SHORTLY BE APPOINTING A MEMBER OF THE U.S. EMBASSY IN SOUTH AFRICA TO VISIT SALISBURY TO "COOPERATE WITH THE BRITISH EMISSARY".

VANCE CONFIRMED THAT THE ADMINISTRATION WOULD KEEP THE SANCTIONS QUESTION " UNDER CONSTANT REVIEW IN THE LIGHT OF PROGRESS TOWARD A WIDER POLITICAL PROCESS AND MORE LEGITIMATE AND GENUINE MAJORITY RULE" AND WOULD REPORT MONTHLY TO THE CONGRESS. HE DECLINED TO PRESCRIBE THE PRECISE FORM WHICH SUCH PROGRESS SHOULD TAKE ALTHOUGH THE US WOULD NOT ALLOW ANY PARTY A VETO OVER ITS POLICIES.

/ s. VANCE

4. VANCE URGED CONGRESS NOT TO ACT PRECIPITATELY; IN PARTICULAR THE LIFTING OF SANCTIONS WOULD UNDERCUT CURRENT BRITISH EFFORTS TO FIND A SETTLEMENT. IT WOULD BE WRONG TO LIFT SANCTIONS OR ENDORSE THE SALISBURY ARRANGEMENTS AT A TIME WHEN BRITAIN WAS REVIEWING THE SITUATION AND EXPLORING MEANS BY WHICH THE PROSPECTS FOR FURTHER PROGRESS AND A SETTLEMENT COULD BE IMPROVED. THE BRITISH POSITION WAS CRUCIAL AND IT WAS IMPORTANT FOR THE US TO REFRAIN FROM TAKING ANY ACTIONS WHICH WOULD COMPLICATE HMG'S ABILITY TO DEAL WITH THE PROBLEM IN THE COMING MONTHS.

5. VANCE ALSO ARGUED THAT THE LIFTING OF SANCTIONS WOULD DAMAGE THE AMERICAN ABILITY TO WORK FOR A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT AND WOULD DAMAGE US RELATIONS WITH AFRICAN AND OTHER DEVELOPING NATIONS AT A TIME WHEN THEIR COOPERATION WAS PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT. THIS COULD ONLY BE TO THE ADVANTAGE OF COUNTRIES SEEKING TO EXPAND THEIR INFLUENCE IN AFRICA AT AMERICAN EXPENSE.

6. SEE M.I.F.T.

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PS/MR RIDLEY

PS/MR HURD

PS/PUS

SIR A DUFF

SIR A PARSONS

MR LEAHY

MISS BROWN

MR THOMAS

MR WILSON

MR WILLIAMS

ADDITIONAL DIST
RHODESIA POLICY

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FM TRIMBA SALISBURY 120855Z JUN 79

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 289 OF 12 JUNE

INFO PRIORITY PRETORIA CAPE TOWN MAPUTO LUSAKA GABORONE LUANDA

DAR ES SALAAM LAGOS UKMIS NEW YORK AND WASHINGTON

INFO ROUTINE ADDIS ABABA

Prime Minister

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13/26

MIPT

AT.

CALL ON IAN SMITH

1. I CALLED ON SMITH YESTERDAY. HIS OFFICE IS LOCATED WITHIN THE COMBINED OPERATIONS HEADQUARTERS, WHICH IS PART OF THE MAIN GOVERNMENT BUILDING HOUSING THE PRIME MINISTER, FOREIGN MINISTER AND MINISTER OF FINANCE. I DELIVERED THE PRIME MINISTER'S LETTER. FULL RECORD FOLLOWS BY BAG.
2. SMITH HAD NOTHING NEW TO OFFER. HE STILL HOPES FOR EARLY AND BOLD ACTION BY HMG BEFORE THE LUSAKA CONFERENCE AND BEFORE FURTHER PRESSURES BUILD UP AGAINST US. HE REPEATED HIS BELIEF THAT KAUNDA WOULD PRIVATELY WELCOME DECISIVE ACTION BY US, EVEN THOUGH HE WOULD HAVE TO EXPRESS PUBLIC DISMAY. HE IS CONVINCED THAT RECOGNITION AND THE LIFTING OF SANCTIONS WOULD BRING THE WAR TO AN EARLY END. HE TENDED TO BRUSH ASIDE MY SUGGESTION THAT THIS WAS FAR FROM CERTAIN.
3. I OUTLINED HMG'S POLICY AND SOUGHT TO EXPLAIN THE NEED TO BRING ABOUT WIDER INTERNATIONAL ACCEPTANCE OF THE CHANGES THAT HAD TAKEN PLACE. HE AGAIN THOUGHT THAT WHERE WE LED THE REST WOULD FOLLOW. I CITED THE VIEWS OF THE AUSTRALIAN PRIME MINISTER AS AN INDICATION OF THE KIND OF DOUBT THAT STILL REMAINED IN COUNTRIES NOT BASICALLY ILL-DISPOSED TO RHODESIA. HE SAID THAT HE HAD BEEN SHOCKED BY THIS. I STRESSED THAT IT NEVERTHELESS REMAINED A FACT THAT HE AND WE HAD TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT. OUR RELATIONS WITH OUR EUROPEAN AND COMMONWEALTH FRIENDS WERE IMPORTANT TO US AND COULD NOT BE DISMISSED.

CONFIDENTIAL

4.

4. SMITH GAVE NO CLEAR INDICATION OF HIS INTENTIONS. HE SAID THAT HIS PRESENT POSITION WAS DIFFICULT. THE CHANGE WAS NOT WHAT HE WANTED, BUT HE HAD TO ACCEPT IT. HE WOULD HAVE PREFERRED TO MAKE A CLEAN BREAK AND WITHDRAW FROM THE GOVERNMENT. BUT LARGE NUMBERS OF PEOPLE STILL WANTED HIM TO STAY. SOME OF THE BLACK MINISTERS WERE VOLATILE. HE AND HIS WHITE COLLEAGUES COULD HELP TO RESTRAIN THEM. HE HAD EXPERIENCE WHICH COULD BE USEFUL TO THE NEW PRIME MINISTER. IT WAS NOT, HOWEVER, EASY FOR HIM TO SIT BACK AND SEE DECISIONS BEING TAKEN WHICH HE THOUGHT MISGUIDED. HE DID NOT SAY PRECISELY WHAT HIS TASK AS MINISTER WITHOUT PORTFOLIO WOULD BE. HE WOULD TAKE LN ANY JOB GIVEN TO HIM.

5. SMITH STUCK ME AS SOMEWHAT DISPIRITED AND WEARY. PERHAPS THIS IS HIS USUAL Demeanour. HE CERTAINLY LACKED ANY FIRE. HE DID NOT VOLUNTEER AN INTENTION TO WITHDRAW ONCE SANCTIONS WERE LIFTED, AND I DID NOT PRESS HIM ON THIS. HE APPEARS SINCERELY TO BELIEVE THAT HE IS DOING A SERVICE TO THE WHITE COMMUNITY BY STAYING ON. SOMEHOW HE WILL HAVE TO BE DISABUSED OF THIS IF HE IS TO BE MOVED.

DAY

FILES

RHOD D
OADS
HAD
NEWS D
PUSD
PLANNING STAFF
ES & SD
CCD
FRD
UHD

LEGAL ADVISERS
(MR FREELAND)
(MR STEEL)

ECON D
FGD
DEF D
OID
PS
PS/SIR I GILMOUR
PS/MR LUCE

PS/MR RIBLEY
PS/MR HURD
PS/PUS
SIR A DUFF
SIR A PARSONS

MR LEAHY
MISS BROWN
MR THOMAS
MR WILLSON
MR WILLIAMS

ADDITIONAL DIST
RHODESIA POLICY

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see Miss Verheul

PRIME MINISTER

Zambian High Commissioner

The Zambian High Commissioner, Miss Chibesakunda, has asked whether she may call on you urgently in order to deliver a message from President Kaunda. In view of the far from urgent nature of the last Zambian message which you agreed to receive, I have asked the Foreign Office to make enquiries about the nature of this one. If they conclude that it is not sufficiently important to justify you seeing Miss Chibesakunda very soon in a busy week, I suggest that you might ask Mr. Luce to see Miss Chibesakunda on your behalf. *Yes ok.*

If, however, FCO advice is that you should receive her if at all possible, could you agree to do so over in the House at, say, 1815 tomorrow, 12 June, for 10 minutes only? *Yes.*

I have informed the Zambian H/C that the PM cannot see the H/C today and has asked Mr. Luce to see her instead.

11 June 1979

J.H.
13/6

J.R.

I hope to be in the morning room available to M.P.s - of the Prime Minister's Committee. I will see her if absolutely needed but doubt the wisdom of it.
ok.

GR 1130

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CONFIDENTIAL

DESKBY 110930Z

FM MIRIMBA SALISBURY 110715Z JUN 79

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 281 OF 11 JUNE

INFO IMMEDIATE PRETORIA CAPE TOWN MAPUTO GABORONE DAR ES SALAAM
LUANDA LUSAKA LAGOS UKMIS NEW YORK AND WASHINGTON
INFO ROUTINE ADDIS ABABA

PROGRESS REPORT

1. I HAVE NOW HAD MY FIRST ROUND OF TALKS WITH MUZOREWA, HIS MORE SENIOR COLLEAGUES, REPRESENTATIVES OF BUSINESS AND AGRICULTURAL ORGANISATIONS (BOTH BLACK AND WHITE) AND WITH SENIOR PUBLIC SERVANTS. THE FOLLOWING ARE MY PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS.
2. THERE IS NO CLEAR OR CONCLUSIVE EVIDENCE OF THE BISHOP'S STABILITY OR OVERALL ACCEPTABILITY OF THE BISHOP'S GOVERNMENT. ON THE FACE OF IT, THE TRANSFER OF POWER TO THE MAJORITY HAS BEEN ACCOMPLISHED. THE BISHOP IS INSTALLED IN THE PRIME MINISTER'S OFFICE, AND IS SURROUNDED BY BLACK FACES. GAYLARD REMAINS CABINET SECRETARY, BUT IS KEEPING A LOW PROFILE. OTHER BLACK MINISTERS ARE ESTABLISHING THEMSELVES IN THEIR OFFICES WITH THE COOPERATION AND SUPPORT OF THE WHITE CIVIL SERVANTS. THE PRESS IS GIVING FULL PUBLICITY TO THE ACTIVITIES AND STATEMENTS OF THE BLACK MINISTERS. IT ALL LOOKS FINE, BUT MANY ARE NOW WAITING TO SEE SOME SUBSTANCE TO THE CHANGE.
3. SUCH STEPS AS HAVE BEEN TAKEN SO FAR APPEAR LITTLE DIFFERENT TO THOSE TAKEN BY THE MINORITY GOVERNMENT, E G THE RAID INTO MOZAMBIQUE, AND THE APPOINTMENT OF A WHITE TO HEAD THE AMNESTY DIRECTORATE (MY TELNO 278). NO INDICATIONS HAVE YET BEEN GIVEN ABOUT THE GOVERNMENT'S POLICIES ON SUCH ISSUES AS LAND DISTRIBUTION, GREATER EDUCATION OPPORTUNITIES FOR BLACKS OR JOB OPPORTUNITIES. TO BE FAIR IT IS, TOO SOON TO EXPECT DETAILED PROPOSALS. MAJOR MEASURES WILL HAVE TO GO THROUGH PARLIAMENT WHICH DOES NOT MEET UNTIL THE END OF THE MONTH. HOWEVER, SOME SIGNS OF ACTIVITY AND SOME CLEARER INDICATION OF THE CHANGES THAT ARE ON THE WAY WILL BE NEEDED SOON IF THE BLACKS ARE NOT TO BECOME DISILLUSIONED, NOT TO MENTION OUTSIDE OPINION.

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Prime Minister

AS

BM
13/6

4. THE ONE ISSUE THAT TOUCHES EVERYONE IS THE WAR. THE BISHOP PROMISED PEACE. IN PRACTICE THE VIOLENCE HAS PROBABLY INCREASED. MORE BLACKS AND WHITES ARE BEING KILLED. THE PATTERN OF THE WAR IS UNCHANGED. NEITHER THE PATRIOTIC FRONT NOR THE SECURITY FORCES ARE GETTING THE UPPER HAND. THE BLACK FARMER AND HIS FAMILY ARE CAUGHT BETWEEN THE TWO. THE BISHOP'S ELECTION VICTORY GAVE THE FARMER HOPE. THIS HAS NOT BEEN FULFILLED. THERE IS NO EASY WAY OUT FOR THE BISHOP. HE HAS HAD NO RESPONSE TO HIS OFFER OF RECONCILIATION WITH THE FRONT LINE STATES. THERE IS NO SIGN OF THE PATRIOTIC FRONT BEING PREPARED TO NEGOTIATE ON ANY BASIS LIKELY TO BE ACCEPTABLE HERE. NOR CAN HE WIN AN OUTRIGHT MILITARY VICTORY. HE THEREFORE LOOKS TO HMG EITHER TO INDUCE THE FLS TO WITHOLD THEIR SUPPORT FOR THE PF, OR TO LIFT SANCTIONS AND THEREBY ENABLE RHODESIAN TO BUILD UP HER OWN ECONOMIC AND MILITARY STRENGTH SO THAT SHE CAN MORE EFFECTIVELY FIGHT THE PF, AND PROVIDE A BETTER LIFE FOR THE BLACKS.

5. IAN SMITH REMAINS A WILD CARD. I AM SEEING HIM TODAY. NO-ONE CAN YET SAY WHAT INFLUENCE HE WILL EXERT IN THE NEW GOVERNMENT. THERE IS WIDE AGREEMENT AMONGST BLACK AND WHITE THAT THE BEST WAY HE CAN NOW SERVE RHODESIA IS TO WITHDRAW FROM POLITICS. PEOPLE DISCUSS THIS OPENLY AND WITHOUT PROMPTING. I DO NOT BELIEVE THAT HIS DEPARTURE WOULD SERIOUSLY HARM WHITE MORALE. I WOULD NOT GO AS FAR AS MR BOTHA (PARA 2, SECOND SENTENCE OF CAPE TOWN TELNO 348) SOME MIGHT QUIT, BUT RHODESIA WOULD PROBABLY BE BETTER OFF WITHOUT THEM. DAVID SMITH IS CERTAIN THAT IAN SMITH WILL GO ONCE HE IS SURE THAT SANCTIONS WILL BE LIFTED. HE MAY BE RIGHT. IT IS UNLIKELY THAT THE BISHOP OR OTHERS WILL PUT PRESSURE ON HIM TO GO EARLIER. THEY TOO MAY SEE HIM AS A VALUABLE CARD IN THEIR HANDS. IF WE ARE NOT TO RENEW SANCTIONS IN NOVEMBER, WE MUST DO ALL WE CAN TO ENSURE THAT SMITH GOES BEFORE THEN, OTHERWISE WE SHALL HAVE DISCARDED OUR HIGHEST TRUMP.

6. I HAVE NOT YET MET ANYONE WHO REGARDS THE CONSTITUTION AS INVIOATE. NO-ONE HAS PRECISE IDEAS ON WHAT MIGHT OR COULD BE DONE, BUT ATTENTION TENDS TO FOCUS ON THE NUMBER OF WHITE SEATS AND THE POWERS OF THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSIONS. WHITES WOULD, I BELIEVE, GO ALONG WITH CHANGE IF IT BROUGHT A GUARANTEE OF RECOGNITION AND THE REMOVAL OF SANCTIONS, AND THE PROSPECT OF A DE-ESCALATION IN THE WAR.

7. I HAVE BEEN DISAGREEABLY SURPRISED AT THE LACK OF UNDERSTANDING AMONGST BOTH BLACK AND WHITE OF THE INTERNATIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE RHODESIA PROBLEM. THEY SEE IT IN STARK TERMS: COMMUNISM V WESTERN STANDARDS. THEY TEND TO DISMISS THE NEED FOR HMG TO HEED BROADER NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL INTERESTS. THEIR PROLONGED INTERNATIONAL ISOLATION HAS LEFT A MARK.

8. THE BISHOP'S POSITION IS STILL A QUESTION MARK. IT WOULD BE UNREASONABLE TO EXPECT HIM TO SEPARATE HIMSELF FROM THE WHITE-DOMINATED APPARATUS OF GOVERNMENT. HE HAS TO RELY ON THE SYSTEM AND THE PEOPLE HE INHERITED. ADVICE PUT TO HIM FROM THESE QUARTERS IN BOUND TO CARRY A TRADITIONAL STAMP. HE WILL HAVE TO SHOW MUCH FIRMNESS AND INITIATIVE IF HE IS TO GIVE HIS ADMINISTRATION A DISTINCTIVE STYLE AND FLAVOUR. THERE IS NO SIGN OF THIS YET. IT IS TOO EARLY TO ASSESS WHO HIS PRINCIPAL LIEUTENANTS WILL BE. THE DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER IS BEING TIPPED BY A NUMBER OF PEOPLE, THOUGH OTHERS WILL CERTAINLY BE JOCKEYING FOR POSITION. THE DANGER IS THAT HE WILL BE PULLED IN SEVERAL DIRECTIONS AT ONCE AND THUS LOSE MOMENTUM.

9. AGAINST THIS BACKGROUND, LORD HARLECH MIGHT DRAW ON THE FOLLOWING IN HIS CONVERSATIONS:

(A) THERE IS NO EVIDENCE THAT IAN SMITH IS EXERTING A MAJOR INFLUENCE ON THE NEW GOVERNMENT. MANY BLACKS AND WHITES CONSIDER HE SHOULD GO.

(B) IT IS WIDELY RECOGNISED THAT THE CONSTITUTION IS DEFECTIVE AND THAT CHANGE IS NECESSARY. THE EXTENT OF THE CHANGE WILL BE INFLUENCED BY THE DEGREE OF CERTAINTY THAT IT WILL BRING ABOUT SOME INTERNATIONAL RECOGNITION AND A RUN-DOWN OF THE WAR.

(C) THE BISHOP AND HIS GOVERNMENT ARE GENUINELY PREPARED TO BE RECONCILED WITH THEIR NEIGHBOURS AND WITH THE PF (PROVIDED THE LATTER DO NOT PROPOSE IMPOSSIBLE CONDITIONS). THEY ARE READY AND ANXIOUS TO TALK.

(D) THE MAIN VICTIMS OF THE FIGHTING ARE THE BLACKS. THEY WILL BACK ANYONE WHO HELPS TO BRING THE BLOODSHED TO AN END; THEY WILL CONDEMN THOSE WHO ENCOURAGE GREATER VIOLENCE. POLITICS SCARCELY ENTER INTO IT.

CONFIDENTIAL

10. DURING THE COMING WEEK, I PROPOSE TO:

(A) TALK AGAIN TO THE BISHOP AND CONTINUE MY CALLS ON MINISTERS ETC:

(B) ENCOURAGE THE BISHOP AND HIS COLLEAGUES TO DO MORE TO STAMP THEIR OWN AUTHORITY ON THE GOVERNMENT AND TO GIVE A CLEARER PUBLIC INDICATION OF THE OVERALL POLICIES THAT THEY INTEND TO PERSUE:

(C) PROBE FURTHER THE MATURE AND EXTENT TO WHICH THE CONSTITUTION MIGHT BE AMENDED WITHOUT CAUSING MAJOR DIFFICULTIES.

DAY

F I L E S

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PS/MR LUCE

PS/MR RIDLEY

PS/MR HURD

PS/PUS

SIR A DUFF

SIR A PARSONS

MR DAY

MR LEAHY

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MR THOMAS

MR WILLSON

MR WILLIAMS

ADDITIONAL DIST
RHODESIA POLICY



~~SECRET~~ COPY

subject filed on
Commonwealth: CHAM State House
Policy March 1978 Lusaka, Republic of Zambia

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T23A/797

8th June, 1979.

My Dear Prime Minister,

May I again congratulate you on your deserved assumption to the high office of Prime Minister of Great Britain. As I said in my earlier note, I look forward to meeting you at the forthcoming Commonwealth Conference here in Lusaka and offer my congratulations in person.

I cannot over-emphasize the importance of your country to Zambia. Britain is one of Zambia's biggest trading and development partners. And in terms of the incalculable practical demands of everyday life, the Zambian people have more ties with the people of Britain than with any other people in the world. This tradition of close relations is and must continue to be of benefit to both of us. It is the buttress of our mutual co-operation.

I thought I should write you early and somewhat at length on Rhodesia which, as you know, for Zambia is a problem of the highest priority. In this connection I thank you for sending Mr. Patrick Cosgrave for a quiet exchange of views on this matter. I hope by now you have had the opportunity to hear his report of the meeting I had with him.

Rhodesia - the thorny rebellion by Ian Smith against the British Crown - is clearly the only problem that has forcibly come to divide Zambia and Britain sharply and one that has continually soured our otherwise very warm fellowship.

/...

Rt. Hon. Mrs. Margaret Thatcher,
Prime Minister of Great Britain and Northern Ireland,
10 Downing Street,
LONDON.



I am therefore writing to put to you my candid view of the rule that has now been set up in Rhodesia by the rebel leader Ian Smith as a further twist to the thirteen-year constitutional crisis in that rebel territory. This new phase marks the point at which you are directly entering the crisis of the Rhodesian rebellion as Prime Minister of Great Britain.

I will confine myself to this current situation. But in doing so, I am assuming that you already understand Zambia's involvement, contribution and firm stand on the Liberation Struggle in Rhodesia from its beginning to this day. This position remains unchanged. And it is with this background that I am looking at the new development in Rhodesia.

As you are aware, the events that have been taking place inside Rhodesia have culminated into the conversion of Rhodesia to Zimbabwe-Rhodesia and into the formation of a coalition government by Bishop Abel Tendekayi Muzorewa and rebel leader Ian Douglas Smith - the Muzorewa/Smith rule.

As you equally know, this process inside Rhodesia leading to the formation of the Muzorewa/Smith rule followed a path separate from and opposed to the path of the process that was preferred and promoted by the international community and acknowledged by the fighting Liberation Movement of Zimbabwe.

Whatever its negative and positive aspects, the Muzorewa/Smith political framework for Rhodesia is a creation that lies outside and is contrary to the intentions of the fighting Liberation Movement and the intentions of the international community as clearly expressed in the United Nations, the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) and other progressive forums around the world as well as in the long liberation struggle and war by the people of Rhodesia.

In this respect the Muzorewa/Smith rule, as a solution for the Rhodesian crisis, is an imposition upon the fighting Liberation Movement and the international community in the same manner that the unilateral declaration of independence (UDI) by Ian Smith in 1965 was an imposition.

To all intents and purposes, the Muzorewa/Smith rule is a direct extension and growth of the original UDI. It is not a break from UDI. It is Smith's own response - damning response - to the Rhodesian and international attitude towards the abnoxious political conditions foisted by his UDI and rebellion on Rhodesia.



Smith has not broken his stand. He has not broken his rebellion. He has merely reorganised and reconstituted his set-up in order to survive the new Rhodesian, African and international political environments forced upon the territory by the armed liberation struggle against him in the colony.

As a result of this new development, two crucial questions, calling for answers, have arisen and are actively exercising everyone's mind. These are:-

- (a), notwithstanding its negative and positive aspects, is the Muzorewa/Smith rule the right formula for Rhodesia - right in the sense that it is the kind of rule that the fighting Liberation Movement of Zimbabwe and the international community have considered and accepted as the final solution? The answer obviously to this question is a Big No.
- (b) regardless of the negative reply to (a) above, is the Muzorewa/Smith rule a formula that has the capacity to end the war and to settle the Rhodesian crisis once and for all? The answer to this question is also a big no.

It is my considered view that no person who has closely followed, lived with and has been fully involved with the drama of the Rhodesian rebellion over the past thirteen years can candidly answer the above two questions differently.

The truth of the matter is that rather than being a solution, the new Muzorewa/Smith rule is a further strategy for more war in Rhodesia. By this strategy the white rebel leader has made it possible for a black and equally rebel leader in the context of the fighting Liberation Movement, to lead politically the white side against the black side in the Liberation War. Smith has merely succeeded in indigenising the rebellion in his determination to carry on and have his own political way. He has barricaded his institutionalised white rebellion with a body of political blacks.



My perception of the present new turn of events and the manoeuvring by Smith in Rhodesia (and this is crystal clear in my own mind) is that the Western world, if it swallows the Muzorewa/Smith bait, hook, line and sinker, will now be effectively tricked into taking a dangerous position which will damage not only the destiny of Zimbabwe but damage materially the vital interests of the West in Southern Africa. That damage could well tilt the political attitude of the entire African continent against Western sentiment for a long time, especially for the decisive near future.

As I see it, while the Muzorewa/Smith strategy may provide the apparently tired West with the excuse to walk away from the Rhodesian crisis, that same strategy is the device that will have the West running back in panick when the whole of Southern Africa will burst into flames. The difference between now and that time will be that the West will have permanently lost a great deal in material interests; and will have lost almost completely the edge of advantage it now has to solve the remaining three problems in Southern Africa largely by negotiation. The West's insensibility and lack of foresight will have plunged the region into an ideological war as finally the only option to rub out intrrenched racism.

As I see it, the Muzorewa/Smith rule

- (a) neither covers the whole area of the constitutional crisis in Rhodesia nor does it exhaust the crisis.
- (b) cannot and will not end the Liberation war. It does not have the ideological capacity to do so.
- (c) will on the contrary escalate the war and more Rhodesians will die and are already dying each day than before the so-called election to impose this new rule.
- (d) will not, despite the intrrenched clauses and the special political barricade of political blacks, retain the whites in Rhodesia. The whites will run away and lose their property. Nothing will protect them. Many will die.



- (e) will cause a quick transformation of the war from firstly, a mere liberation struggle to a white-inspired black to black civil war which will as quickly transform into a purist ideological conflict.
- (f) will commit the West in Rhodesia on the wrong side of liberation and force the West to fight from this negative approach not only in Rhodesia but also in Namibia and South Africa and be seen generally by Africa to take a negative political line towards the broader aspirations of the continent.
- (g) will commit firmly the black liberation forces in Rhodesia, Namibia and South Africa to the East to whom the fighters will be ever grateful for military assistance.
- (h) the Muzorewa/Smith framework has drawn to itself some characteristics of the solution being sought for to make it look like that solution. But in truth and reality it is far from that solution. It is an artful resemblance. The rebellion and the war in Rhodesia cannot and will not be ended by deceptive resemblances. A straight, clear-cut and hard solution is called for and it is upon this that legality peace and stability can be restored to Rhodesia.

While the West has not participated in the military support of the armed struggle in Rhodesia, it has nevertheless participated noticeably in finding a just and fair negotiated settlement. Significant steps have been taken towards such a settlement.

As things now stand, the Muzorewa/Smith rule is a desperate attempt by Ian Smith to stand in the way of this fair and just negotiated solution. It would be both unfair, misguided and totally wrong to ask (a) the international community, (b) Africa, (c) Frontline States and (d) the fighting Liberation Movement of Rhodesia to trade all their past and present efforts and sacrifices in return only for the Muzorewa/Smith rule which is an incomplete process and one clearly without the capacity to end the crisis and bring peace and stability to the territory.



May I, indeed, say that it is not possible for me to see the Rhodesian crisis as a person from the West would see it. I only see the Rhodesian crisis as an African, as a member of the Frontline States, as a person who has been involved in it from its beginning, as a leader who has given the crisis the highest priority and one whose country and people have suffered tremendous sacrifices in search of a fair and just solution by supporting firmly negotiation, struggle and war.

But however, if I were for one moment to look at the Muzorewa/Smith rule not as I am, but from the side of the West and therefore attach some kind of value to it, the highest positive value I would give to this rule is that it is one reality though unfortunate among many and more valuable realities in the current transitional process of Rhodesia from a rebellious colony to a free and independent state.

In this context, I would say the new Muzorewa/Smith rule is a reality, just like the UDI itself, that has to be taken into account with the other more constructive realities in the honest and impartial search for the solution to the crisis.

But in whatever positive way one looks at it, the Muzorewa/Smith rule does not and cannot constitute the complete and final solution that the blacks of Rhodesia took arms to find and one for which thousands have been and continue to be killed, maimed and to suffer horrors. The Muzorewa/Smith rule is not the finality of the desired settlement. For anyone person to allow oneself even to appear to see this rule as a finality is to open oneself to dangerous reckless political cheating.

No one can cheat the people of Zimbabwe into independence. No genuine independence, peace and stability will be brought to Rhodesia by a trick no matter how clever such a deception might be conceived and carried out.

In my view the new Government of the United Kingdom should do the one thing which only that Government alone can do at this point in the Rhodesian constitutional crisis:

- (a) resolve to act to give Rhodesia speedily a broad-based and lasting solution.

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- 7 -

- (b) in preference for this broad-based and lasting solution, firmly withhold recognition of the Muzorewa/Smith rule as a finality in the settlement of the Rhodesian crisis and hold equally firmly to the existing order of sanctions imposed upon the rebellion by the free will of international community.
- (c) accept the Muzorewa/Smith rule as only one of the many conflicting realities and centres of power in the crucial transition of the territory of Rhodesia from a colony in rebellion to a free and united independent state in the African and world community.
- (d) endorse the true fact that the Muzorewa/Smith rule taken alone and in isolation is not and can never be a rising centre of power but a fading centre of power in the broad process of the political evolution of Rhodesia.
- (e) announce publicly a clear policy position on Rhodesia declaring the Muzorewa/Smith rule as only one of many conflicting features which characterise the transition of the territory and call upon the elements of the leadership inside and the elements of the leadership outside Rhodesia to an all party conference to reach a finality in the settlement of the crisis.

If the new Administration in Britain pronounced itself clearly and firmly on the above, it would immediately give the correct political standing and direction to the new Muzorewa/Smith rule. This approach would promote the forward movement to a fair, just and broad-based independence incorporating the participation of all the significant elements of the leadership of political life in Rhodesia and move the whole country towards a political process and rule that would be genuinely and freely acceptable to Rhodesians and the international community.

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- 8 -

As I see it, the new Government in Britain must act correctly in Rhodesia and avoid taking a narrow and precipitous course which will destroy the forward movement to a broad-based and lasting solution which is already in sight and obviously within reach.

In generating and maintaining the forward movement to an all party conference leading to the establishment of an all party political framework and election for Zimbabwe, the new British Government should seek the vigorous assistance of all those able and willing to help to end this crisis. The Government should avoid blurring the clarity of its vision by isolating and over-emphasizing the individual centres of power in the current crisis of the transition.

All significant centres of power in Rhodesia must have access to the confidence of the British Government as the coordinator of the decolonisation. Britain must not overplay the Muzorewa/Smith set-up inside Rhodesia vis-a-vis the Patriotic Front of the fighting Liberation Movement. Taking into account all things, the logic of political change has it that the fighting Liberation Movement is certainly the rising or expanding centre of power in the evolution of Rhodesia. It is futile to attempt to neutralise it. The positive effort must be directed to harnessing and giving this centre of power full and effective play in a broad and firmly-controlled process of change.

While Zambia's position is abundantly clear and her firm support for the Liberation Movement remains completely unchanged, I have written to you to show in my view what action and how that action can be accepted and acted upon by Britain as the colonial authority in order to reach a broader finality in the settlement of the Rhodesian constitutional crisis as from this moment in time.

Britain has an inescapable duty to God, humanity and the people of Rhodesia to see this problem settled correctly once and for all. The problem of Rhodesia has for a long time now been ripe for solution but only for the will and resolution of Britain to act correctly and decisively.

/...



- 9 -

As always, Zambia stands ready to do everything in her power to support and contribute to any honest and correct resolve to bring to an end the rebellion and tragic situation in Rhodesia and give the territory a broad-based settlement that can end the war and upon which can be built peace and stability. Zambia needs a free, independent, peaceful and viable Zimbabwe.

I have instructed my High Commissioner in London to remain ready to consult with you on the spot and render any help you may require of her in promoting a broad-based settlement for Rhodesia as quickly as possible.

I send you, Your Excellency, kindest regards and personal best wishes.

God bless.

Yours sincerely,

KD

~~Kenneth David Kaunda~~
PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF ZAMBIA



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

Prime Minister

London SW1A 2AH

You enquired
about this.

8 June 1979

Dear Bryan,

Gut
13
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MS

Rhodesia: Chinese Assistance to ZANU

In your letter of ~~6~~ June about Lord Harlech's mission to Southern Africa, you asked for advice on whether Mr Mugabe was still receiving aid from the Chinese. The recent evidence suggests that China is continuing to provide ZANU with shipments of light arms and ammunition, though in limited quantities. ZANU are known to be dissatisfied with the Chinese philosophy that the war should be fought by guerrillas relying on light arms, with the quality and quantity of Chinese arms supplied and their failure to supply heavy equipment, especially surface to air missiles. Nevertheless ZANU have so far resisted pressure from the USSR and GDR to break their links with China. They also get arms from certain African countries, in particular Mozambique and Ethiopia. Direct Soviet supplies continue to be given only to Nkomo's ZAPU, though ZANU may hope to get more access to Soviet equipment as a result of the attempts which have recently been made (though so far with limited success) to impose greater unity on the two wings of the Patriotic Front.

Yours ever,
Stephen

(J S Wall)

B G Cartledge Esq
10 Downing Street

11 JUN 1979



CR 548

CONFIDENTIAL

FM WASHINGTON 082104Z JUN

TO PRIORITY F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1416 OF 8 JUNE

INFO IMMEDIATE MIRIMBA SALISBURY, CAPETOWN, DAR ES SALAAM,
GABORONE, LAGOS, LUSAKA, MAPUTO

PRIORITY UKMIS NEW YORK, LUANDA, PRETORIA.

MIPT: RHODESIA: PRESIDENTIAL DETERMINATION.

1. BEFORE MAKING HIS STATEMENT, CARTER BRIEFED SENATE AND HOUSE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEES PLUS SENATORS TSONGAS (D. MASS) (WHO HAS SHOWN STRONG INTEREST IN AFRICA) AND KENNEDY (D. MASS). REP SOLARZ HAS SINCE TOLD THE PRESS THAT HE BELIEVES THAT THE ADMINISTRATION'S SUPPORTERS IN THE HOUSE HAVE QUOTE MORE THAN A FIGHTING CHANCE UNQUOTE. SENATORS SCHWEIKER, HAYAKAWA AND HELMS HAVE MADE PREDICTABLY CRITICAL STATEMENTS ABOUT THE DETERMINATION. BUT JAVITS HAS INDICATED THAT HE WILL RESERVE JUDGEMENT. (JAVITS' STAFF TELL US IN CONFIDENCE (PLEASE PROTECT) THAT HIS CAUTION WAS INFLUENCED BY A MESSAGE FROM THE EGYPTIANS TO THE EFFECT THAT THE LIFTING OF US SANCTIONS WOULD HAMPER EGYPTIAN EFFORTS TO SECURE MODERATE BLACK AFRICAN SUPPORT FOR THE ISRAEL/EGYPT PEACE TREATY).
2. IN THE FIRST SUBSTANTIVE PRESS COMMENT, TODAY'S WASHINGTON POST SAYS QUOTE CARTER DID NOT HAVE THE POLITICAL TACT TO SHOW HIMSELF MORE THAN GRUDGINGLY OPEN TO THE SUBSTANTIAL PROGRESS MADE TOWARD DEMOCRATIC RULE IN SALISBURY, AND EAGER TO PRESERVE AND CONSOLIDATE THOSE GAINS BY HELPING TO END THE IMMINENT THREAT POSED TO THEM BY THE WAR. HE HAD THE CLUMSINESS TO VIRTUALLY DISMISS PRIME MINISTER MUZOREWA AND THE ARROGANCE TO SAY THAT HIS DECISION WAS IN THE INTEREST OF THE PEOPLE OF ZIMBABWE RHODESIA - THIS DESPITE THE FACT OF THEIR PARTICIPATION IN THE RECENT POLL. CAN JIMMY CARTER'S POLICY BE SAVED FROM JIMMY CARTER? TUNE IN ON THE SENATE MONDAY. UNQUOTE.
3. THE ADMINISTRATION WILL WORK TO POSTPONE CONGRESSIONAL ACTION UNTIL HEARINGS HAVE TAKEN PLACE ON 12 AND 13 JUNE. BUT IT IS GENERALLY EXPECTED THAT THE SENATE WILL VOTE ON 13 JUNE (IF NOT BEFORE) ON AN AMENDMENT TO THE DEFENCE DEPARTMENT APPROPRIATIONS BILL (INTRODUCED BY SENATOR HARRY BYRD AND APPROVED UNANIMOUSLY BY THE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE) WHICH WOULD PERMIT US TRADE WITH RHODESIA AFTER 30 JUNE AT THE LATEST. THE WHITE HOUSE TELL US THAT

Prime Minister

SM
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CONFIDENTIAL

THEY WILL QUOTE GO ALL OUT UNQUOTE TO DEFEAT THIS, ALTHOUGH THEY DO NOT EXPECT TO SUCCEED. BUT THEY WILL AIM AT LEAST TO SECURE MORE THAN THE 19 VOTES THEY OBTAINED IN THE LAST SENATE VOTE ON RHODESIA ON 15 MAY (MY TELNO 1135). THE ADMINISTRATION HOPE TO DO BETTER IN THE HOUSE, WHERE THEY EXPECT A SIMILAR SANCTIONS LIFTING AMENDMENT TO THE HOUSE VERSION OF THE DEFENCE DEPARTMENT BILL OR AN INSTRUCTION TO HOUSE CONFEREES TO SUPPORT WHATEVER PROVISION HAS BEEN APPROVED BY THE SENATE. IF THE HOUSE BILL CONTAINS AN AMENDMENT TO LIFT SANCTIONS THE ADMINISTRATION AND THEIR SUPPORTERS WILL CHALLENGE IT ON THE GROUNDS OF NON-GERMANESS (WHICH CAN BE DONE IN THE HOUSE BUT NOT IN THE SENATE) WHEN IT COMES TO THE HOUSE FLOOR IN ABOUT TWO WEEKS TIME. RENEWAL OF THE EXPORT ADMINISTRATION BILL'S RESTRICTIONS ON EXPORT OF ALASKAN OIL, THE OTHER LIKELY VEHICLE FOR A HOUSE VOTE ON RHODESIAN SANCTIONS, IS NOW NOT EXPECTED TO BE TAKEN ON THE FLOOR UNTIL THE WEEK BEGINNING 18 JUNE.

4. MAJORITY VOTES IN BOTH SENATE AND HOUSE ARE REQUIRED TO SUSTAIN AN AMENDMENT TO LIFT SANCTIONS. THE PRESIDENT HAS A VETO BUT MUST APPLY IT TO THE BILL AS A WHOLE.

THE ADMINISTRATION HAS A STRONG INTEREST IN EARLY IMPLEMENTATION OF BOTH THE DEFENCE DEPARTMENT AND THE EXPORT ADMINISTRATION BILLS.

ROBINSON

[COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING STREET]

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PS/MR LUCE

PS/MR RIDLEY

PS/MR HURD

PS/FUS

SIR A DUFF

SIR A PARSONS

MR LEAHY

MISS BROWN

MR THOMAS

MR WILLSON

MR WILLIAMS

CABINET OFFICE

ADDITIONAL DIST

RHODESIA POLICY

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2

GR 475

CONFIDENTIAL

FM MIRIMBA SALISBURY 080720Z JUN 79

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 275 OF 8 JUNE

INFO PRIORITY PRETORIA CAPE TOWN MAPUTO GABORONE LUSAKA DAR ES SALAAM

LAGOS WASHINGTON AND UKMIS NEW YORK

INFO ROUTINE ADDIS ABABA

Prime Minister

Gen "6

MEETING WITH REVEREND SITHOLE

1. I CALLED ON SITHOLE YESTERDAY AT HIS PARTY HEADQUARTERS.
2. AS REGARDS PARTICIPATION IN THE GOVERNMENT, SITHOLE SAID THAT HE HAD EVIDENCE FROM THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY THAT THERE HAD BEEN GROSS IRREGULARITIES DURING THE ELECTION. THE ELECTION RESULT DID NOT REPRESENT THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE: IT WAS THE WILL OF THE RHODESIA FRONT. HE HAD ASSEMBLED SWORN AFFIDAVITS TO THIS EFFECT. THESE WOULD BE SUBMITTED SHORTLY TO THE HIGH COURT. ZANU COULD NOT TAKE PART IN A RIGGED GOVERNMENT. TO DO SO WOULD BE TO LOSE CREDIBILITY WITH THEIR SUPPORTERS. THEY WOULD ALSO LOSE CONTROL OF THEIR GUERRILLA FORCES, WHOM THEY WERE AT PRESENT KEEPING ON A LEASH. I ASKED WHAT HE WOULD DO IF THE HIGH COURT FOUND AGAINST HIM. HE SAID THAT HIS CENTRAL COMMITTEE WOULD HAVE TO CONSIDER THEIR ATTITUDE.
3. SITHOLE DERIDED THE BISHOP AND HIS GOVERNMENT. NEITHER THE BISHOP NOR THE PRESIDENT COULD CLAIM TO BE NATIONALISTS. THEY HAD NOT FOUGHT OR SUFFERED IN THE STRUGGLE. THE NEW MINISTERS WERE VIRTUALLY UNKNOWN FIGURES. THE RHODESIA FRONT STILL HELD ALL THE CARDS. THEIR MEN REMAINED AS COMMANDER OF COMBINED OPERATIONS, CHIEF JUSTICE, POLICE COMMISSIONER AND DIRECTOR OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE ORGANISATION. I ENQUIRED WHETHER THIS WOULD HAVE BEEN DIFFERENT HAD HE BECOME PRIME MINISTER. THE CONSTITUTION, WHICH HE HAD NEGOTIATED, DID NOT PROVIDE FOR ANY CHANGES IN THESE POSTS. HE ACCEPTED THIS, BUT SAID THAT, HAD ZANU FORMED THE GOVERNMENT, THEY WOULD NOT HAVE BEEN BEHOLDEN TO THE RHODESIA FRONT FOR THEIR VICTORY AND COULD THEREFORE HAVE TOLD THE PUBLIC SERVICES AND MILITARY WHAT TO DO.

14.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

4. IN REPLY TO A QUESTION ABOUT AN ALL-PARTY CONFERENCE, I SAID THAT HMG WERE NOT AT THIS STAGE EXCLUDING ANY POSSIBLE SOLUTION. IF ALL THOSE CONCERNED, INSIDE AND OUTSIDE RHODESIA, WERE READY TO SIT DOWN NAD REACH AGREEMENT ON A PROCEDURE FOR THE RETURN TO LEGALITY, WE WOULD WELCOME THIS. I ASKED SITHOLE WHETHER HE THOUGHT THIS WAS POSSIBLE. HE DID NOT.

5. SITHOLE IS CLEARLY DETERMINED TO SEE THROUGH HIS ATTACK ON THE ELECTION PROCESS. HE CANNOT REALLY BELIEVE THAT HE WILL BE SUCCESSFUL IN THE COURTS. IF, THEREAFTER, HE PERSISTS IN HIS BOYCOTT OF THE GOVERNMENT AND PARLIAMENT, HE MAY HAVE SOME DIFFICULTY IN HOLDING THOSE IN HIS PARTY WHO HAVE WON SEATS. HIS POLITICAL FUTURE MUST BE IN DOUBT.

DAY

FILES

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LEGAL ADVISERS

(MR FREELAND)

(MR STEEL)

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PS/MR LUCE

PS/MR RIDLEY

PS/MR HURD

PS/PUS

SIR A DUFF

SIR A PARSONS

MR DAY

MR LEAHY

MISS BROWN

MR THOMAS

MR WILLSON

MR WILLIAMS

ADDITIONAL DIST
RHODESIA POLICY

[RHODESIA: POLICY: ADVANCE COPIES]

26

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Prime Minister

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PS/MR LUCE
PS/PUS
SIR A DUFF
~~MR DAY~~
~~MR WILLIAMS~~
~~MR LEAHY~~
.....

PS/NO 10 DOWNING STREET (2)

Jan 7/6

HD/RHODESIA D (3)

SIR C ROSE
MR P.M. MAXEY
COL MOIR
MR P J FOWLER
DIO
CABINET OFFICE

HD/C AF D
HD/S AF D

HD/UND
HD/NEWS D

HD/VAD
MR FREELAND LEGAL ADVISER RM K200A

~~FOR ZIMBAWE DEVELOPMENTS FUND~~

~~ADD MR LYNCH ODM
MR SHAPIRO TREASURY~~

MR STEEL LEGAL ADVISER RM K176

GR 700

CONFIDENTIAL

FM MIRIMBA SALISBURY 080655Z JUN 79

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 274 OF 8 JUNE

INFO PRIORITY PRETORIA CAPE TOWN MAPUTO GABORONE LUSAKA

DAR ES SALAAM LAGOS WASHINGTON AND UKMIS NEW YORK

INFO ROUTINE ADDIA ABABA

CALL ON MINISTER OF FINANCE

1. I SAW DAVID SMITH FOR AN HOUR AND A HALF YESTERDAY. AFTER SOME INTRODUCTORY REMARKS, IN WHICH I DREW ATTENTION TO THE RESERVATIONS EXPRESSED BY A NUMBER OF COUNTRIES ABOUT THE CHANGES THAT HAD TAKEN PLACE HERE, HE ASKED ME WHAT THESE MISGIVINGS WERE. I SAID THAT THEY FOCUSED ON TWO MAIN POINTS:

- (A) THE CONTINUED PRESENCE OF IAN SMITH IN THE GOVERNMENT;
- (B) THOSE FEATURES OF THE CONSTITUTION THAT APPEARED TO LEAVE THE WHITES WITH A DISPROPORTIONATE INFLUENCE.

2. DAVID SMITH SAID THAT THE IAN SMITH PROBLEM NEED NOT WORRY ANYMONE. HE MEANT IT WHEN HE SAID THAT HE WOULD GO WHEN HE WAS CONFIDENT RHODESIA WOULD BE RECOGNISED AND SANCTIONS LIFTED. WE COULD COUNT ON THIS. AS REGARDS HIS PRESENT POSITION IN THE GOVERNMENT, IAN SMITH'S INFLUENCE WAS MINIMAL. I SAID THAT THIS MAY BE THE CASE, BUT IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT, IF NOT IMPOSSIBLE, TO CONVINCING MANY PEOPLE OF THIS, SO LONG AS HE CONTINUED TO HOLD MINISTERIAL OFFICE.

3. AS REGARDS THE CONSTITUTION, DAVID SMITH ARGUED THAT IT HAD

3. AS REGARDS THE CONSTITUTION, DAVID SMITH ARGUED THAT IT HAD BEEN HAMMERED OUT IN DETAIL BY THE PARTIES TO THE TRANSITIONAL GOVERNMENT AND REPRESENTED AN ACCEPTABLE COMPROMISE. THE PROVISIONS RELATING TO THE PUBLIC SERVICE, THE JUDICIARY AND THE ARMED SERVICES WERE DESIGNED TO ENSURE THE CONTINUANCE OF GOOD AND IMPARTIAL ADMINISTRATION. THIS WAS WANTED BY BOTH BLACKS AND WHITES. IT WOULD HELP NO ONE IF THE QUALITY OF ADMINISTRATION WAS LOST. THE CHANGE WOULD COME IN DUE COURSE WHEN BLACKS WORKED THEIR WAY THROUGH THE SYSTEM. TEN YEARS WAS NOT A LONG TIME IN THE HISTORY OF A COUNTRY. WE MIGHT EVEN SEE SOME BLACKS REACHING SENIOR POSITIONS BEFORE THEN. I SAID THAT THERE WAS GREATER URGENCY THEN THIS IF IT WAS TO BE DEMONSTRATED THAT A REAL TRANSFER OF POWER HAD TAKEN PLACE.

4. I ENQUIRED WHETHER ONE WAY OF BRINGING MORE AFRICANS INTO THE DECISION-MAKING PROCESS MIGHT BE THROUGH THE USE OF POLITICAL ADVISERS IN DEPARTMENTS. (GAYLARD HAD PREVIOUSLY ASKED ABOUT OUR PRACTICE IN THE UK.). SMITH SAID THAT THIS WAS ALREADY HAPPENING. THE PRIME MINISTER'S OFFICE HAD SEVERAL POLITICAL ADVISERS. THIS WAS CREATING PROBLEMS SINCE THEY WERE ASKING FOR SALARIES WELL ABOVE PUBLIC SERVICE RATES. SIMILAR ADVISERS MIGHT BE ATTACHED TO OTHER DEPARTMENTS. IN ANY EVENT, EACH WHITE MINISTER HAD A BLACK DEPUTY MINISTER FOR WHOM THERE WAS NO REAL ROLE. TO SOME EXTENT, HE WOULD BE A POLITICAL WATCHDOG.

5. SMITH EMPHASISED THE IMPORTANCE HE ATTACHED TO THE LIFTING OF SANCTIONS. HE WAS NOT SO MUCH CONCERNED WITH THE EFFECT THIS WOULD HAVE ON IMPORTS AND EXPORTS AS THE HELP IT WOULD PROVIDE IN BRINGING IN DEVELOPMENT CAPITAL. THIS WOULD ENABLE THE GOVERNMENT TO GET ON WITH THE DEVELOPMENT SCHEMES WHICH WERE CRUCIAL TO BLACK ADVANCEMENT.

6. ON RELATIONS WITH SOUTH AFRICA, SMITH AGREED THAT IT WOULD BE UNWISE FOR THE NEW GOVERNMENT TO TAKE ANY STEPS AT THIS STAGE, EITHER FORMALLY OR INFORMALLY, TO DEVELOP CLOSER LINKS. THIS WOULD CLEARLY WEAKEN ITS PROSPECTS OF GAINING WIDE RECOGNITION. ON THE OTHER HAND HE WARNED THAT UNDUE DELAY IN RECOGNISING THE BISHOP COULD FORCE HIM, AGAINST HIS WILL, IN THAT DIRECTION.

7. WE DISCUSSED AT SOME LENGTH THE NEED FOR THERE TO BE SOME DEMONSTRABLE EVIDENCE THAT MAJORITY RULE WAS NOW A REALITY. I FOUND SMITH SOMEWHAT RELUCTANT TO ACCEPT THAT THERE WAS ANY PROBLEM HERE. WE AND OTHERS COULD REST ASSURED THAT THE PUBLIC SERVICE WOULD FAITHFULLY CARRY OUT THE DIRECTIONS OF THE GOVERNMENT. MINISTERS WOULD SHOW THAT THEY WERE MASTERS OF THEIR OWN DEPARTMENTS.

MINISTERS WOULD SHOW THAT THEY WERE MASTERS OF THEIR OWN DEPARTMENTS.

8. SMITH WAS AS WELCOMING AND OPEN AS I HAD BEEN LED TO BELIEVE HE WOULD BE. I WAS, HOWEVER, SURPRISED AND DISAPPOINTED AT HIS APPARENT LACK OF REALISATION THAT THE NEW GOVERNMENT HAD A MAJOR TASK ON ITS HANDS IF IT WAS TO DEFUSE THE CRITICISM BEING DIRECTED AT IT FROM QUARTERS WHICH ARE NOT BASICALLY UNSYMPATHETIC.

9. GRATEFUL IF ALL RECIPIENTS WOULD EXERCISE MAXIMUM DISCRETION OVER PARA 2 ABOVE.

DAY

IMMEDIATE

NNNN

PRIME MINISTER

Rhodesia

M. Jacques Wahl, Director General at the Elysée, telephoned me this morning to say that President Giscard wished you to know of some information which had reached the French Government from very reliable sources. This was to the effect that President Mobutu of Zaire would be inclined to accord formal recognition to Bishop Muzorewa's Government in Zimbabwe/Rhodesia if the UK were first to take the lead in recognising the Bishop's regime.

I thanked M. Wahl and said that I knew you would be most grateful to President Giscard for passing on this interesting information.

I have informed Lord Carrington.

BW
SH

ms.

PA BW
11/6

8 June 1979

(b) Personal Members of the party are advised to check that their personal insurance policies provide cover for travel by non-commercial flights and to consult their insurers if they are in any doubt about their position. At present claims on the Government are subject to a liability limit of £25,000

6. PASSPORTS, VISAS AND HEALTH

(a) Each member of the party must have a valid passport.

(b) Visas are normally required for entry to Tanzania, Mozambique and Nigeria, but posts will be asked to arrange for them to be issued on arrival.

(c) The party should carry valid certificates of vaccination against smallpox and inoculation against cholera and yellow fever. Paludrine against malaria has been distributed by Conference Section.

7. ACCOMMODATION

Wherever possible the party will stay with Heads of Mission or other members of staff. Where they stay in hotels, Lord Harlech will have a suite to enable him to hold meetings and receive visitors.

8. SECURITY

(a) Mr Barlow will be documented as Special Courier for the whole trip. All classified material carried by any member of the party must be entered on the Courier's Waybill. Those concerned should contact Mr Chapman (233 3706)

(b) All classified material will be deposited overnight with Mission Registries for safe keeping.

9. ENTERTAINMENT

An entertainment allowance to be spent on the authority of Lord Harlech will be available to the party. Mr Barlow will keep an account of any major items of official entertainment.

10. TRANSPORT

(a) A car will take the party to Heathrow, details to be arranged.

(b) Transport in Africa will be arranged by the posts concerned, who will hire if necessary.

11. PRESS ARRANGEMENTS


It is not expected that there will be any formal press conferences or briefings. Lord Harlech and his party will rely on BBC broadcasts and those British newspapers which are available at posts for the UK news.

12. FINANCE

- (a) All costs will be borne on the DCS Vote subhead C3(2)(e)
- (b) When staying with Heads of Mission or other members of staff, the party will receive one-third of the appropriate standard rate of subsistence.
- (c) When staying at hotels, they will sign the bills for accommodation, meals and refreshments, which will then be sent to the nearest diplomatic post for settlement in full.
- (d) Mr Barlow will carry travellers cheques on behalf of the party to cover any unforeseen contingencies.

13. ADMINISTRATION

Posts will be responsible for administering the party in Africa. Any enquiries about these arrangements should be addressed to the undersigned.



Miss J Oldershaw
Conference and Visits Section
Protocol and Conference Department

FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
8 June 1979

CAPITALS AND COUNTRIES TO BE VISITED

(Not necessarily in chronological order)

<u>Capital</u>	<u>Country</u>	<u>Local Time</u>
Gaborone	Botswana	GMT + 2
Dar-es-Salaam	Tanzania	GMT + 3
Lusaka	Zambia	GMT + 2
Maputo	Mozambique	GMT + 2
Lilongwe	Malawi	GMT + 2
Lagos	Nigeria	GMT + 1
Johannesburg	South Africa	GMT + 2

London is at present on GMT + 1

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Chief Clerk

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Mr P J Barlow

East African Department: Mr J A Robson

Southern African Department: Mr B L Barder

Accommodation and Services Department: Transport Section Car Pool

Communications Operations Department_ Mr L T Charrington (10)

News Department(1): Mr J Carroll (1)

Permanent Under-Secretary's Department: Mr R G Beer (2)

Personnel Operations Department: Secretarial Branch: Miss J D Robertson

Protocol and Conference Department (10): Mr D Battsby-Dutton (1)

Resident Clerks

Security Department: Mr P L Bean

London Airport, Heathrow

Senior Special Facilities Officer_ Mr J E Bannister

British High Commission: Lusaka
(Head of Chancery)

British High Commission: Gaborone
(Head of Chancery)

British High Commission: Lilongwe
(Head of Chancery)

British High Commission: Lagos
(Head of Chancery)

British Embassy: Maputo
(Head of Chancery)

British Embassy: Cape Town
(Head of Chancery)

EACH MEMBER OF THE PARTY



PARLIAMENT OF AUSTRALIA

JOINT COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND DEFENCE
PARLIAMENT HOUSE, CANBERRA, A.C.T. 2600

7 June 1979

Mrs Margaret Thatcher
Prime Minister
House of Commons
LONDON UNITED KINGDOM

My dear Prime Minister

I have pleasure in enclosing herewith a copy of the Report of the Australian Parliamentary Observer Group on the Zimbabwe Rhodesia Common Roll Elections which I tabled in the House of Representatives today.

I hope the opportunity arises to meet you again during your visit to Australia.

I might add that we look forward to your visit strengthening relations between our two countries.

I also enclose further copies for your use.

Yours sincerely

Rogershipton

ROGER SHIPTON, M.P.
Member for Higgins,
Chairman of Joint Committee
on Foreign Affairs and Defence.

c.c. Sir Donald Tebbit
British High Commission

Attached to file.

REPORT OF AUSTRALIAN PARLIAMENTARY

OBSERVER GROUP

ON THE

ZIMBABWE RHODESIA COMMON ROLL ELECTIONS

14-28 APRIL 1979

REPORT OF AUSTRALIAN PARLIAMENTARY

OBSERVER GROUP

on the

ZIMBABWE RHODESIA COMMON ROLL ELECTIONS

14-18 APRIL 1979

May 1979

Members of the Australian observer group:

The Hon. G.M. Bryant, E.D., M.P.
The Hon. J.D.M. Dobie, M.P.
Mr R.F. Shipton, M.P.

Parliamentary Officer: Mr J. Vander Wyk

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REPORT

1. Australian Parliamentary Group

The Australian Parliamentary observer group, comprising three members of the Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence, went to Zimbabwe Rhodesia in response to an invitation by the Minister for Foreign Affairs in a reply to a question without notice on 4 April concerning the sending of observers from Australia. The Minister said:

I understand that the parliamentary Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence is examining this matter. I advised senior officers of my Department who were to appear before the Committee to indicate to it that, should the Committee wish to send observers on behalf of that Committee or on behalf of the Parliament - not on behalf of the Government - they would go with my blessing. It would then be a matter for the Committee, in conjunction with the Minister for Administrative Services, to determine the size of the delegation and, in conjunction with my colleague the Minister for Finance, to determine the funding for the delegation. I see some benefit in a parliamentary delegation's observing the elections; but I lay stress on the fact that the members of the delegation would be going as representatives of the Parliament and not as a sign of the Government's endorsement of the elections.

(Hansard, H of R, p. 1476)

At a subsequent meeting the Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence agreed that an Australian Parliamentary observer group should go, subject to the following conditions:

- . they would not be attending as delegates of the Committee.
- . their going did not imply recognition of the existing government of Zimbabwe Rhodesia.
- . efforts should be made for the group to meet representatives of the Patriotic Front.

Funding for fares to and from Zimbabwe Rhodesia, and all the group's expenses while in Zimbabwe Rhodesia, were met by the Australian Government.

The observer group left Australia on 14 April and returned on 28 April. It was in Zimbabwe Rhodesia from 15 April to 26 April, together with some 70 international observers and 250 - 300 members of the international Press.

A list of international observer groups at the Zimbabwe Rhodesia common roll elections is appended - See Attachment 1.

2. Attempts to meet Patriotic Front

With reference to the third condition a number of efforts were made to arrange meetings with Patriotic Front leaders in countries neighbouring Zimbabwe Rhodesia. These included:

- . Contacts by the Australian Embassy in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, with representatives of both ZANU and ZAPU.
- . Contacts by the Department of Foreign Affairs with Patriotic Front representatives at the United Nations in New York.
- . Contacts with Patriotic Front representatives inside Zimbabwe Rhodesia by members of the delegation.

Initially one or two of the contacts appeared promising, but attempts to arrange a meeting fell through when it became known that the group was observing the Zimbabwe Rhodesia common roll elections. A Patriotic Front representative in Dar es Salaam, for example, cabled that he was disappointed that Australian Parliamentarians had seen fit to observe the elections. He was generally discouraging about the possibility of arranging a meeting. The ZANU representative at the U.N. in New York cabled that his organisation was "very disturbed" at reports of what the delegation members had been saying in Salisbury. The short notice prior to departure from Australia made further attempts to arrange a meeting impracticable.

3. The Group's Activities

In the five days of the elections the Australian Parliamentary group observed voting at more than 25 static and mobile polling stations located in urban, rural or tribal areas in various parts of the country. A number of the polling stations were in areas in which guerillas were said to be active. Transport, including Dakotas, DC7s, Puma helicopters, armoured vehicles, buses and cars, was provided by the Transitional Government, as were armed escorts.

For four of the five days observers and Press went on government-arranged tours of polling stations. Visits could be made to polling stations anywhere but security and transport were only guaranteed on the scheduled tours because of stretched manpower resources. Nevertheless, observers were able to make non-scheduled visits to polling places during these tours, as we did on a number of occasions, and on the final day of polling observers and Press were able to go where they wished with transport and full security provided.

The Australian observer group visited polling stations in Salisbury, in and around Umtali, in areas close to the Mozambique border north and south of Umtali, in and around Mtoko in the north and Bulawayo in the south-west, in the Triangle area and in the Wankie-Victoria Falls area. The general pattern was for members of the group to split up, which enabled us to observe more polling stations than we could have if we had remained in a group. We made comparisons daily and we also compared notes with other observers and the media who visited polling stations in other parts of the country.

We spoke to dozens of voters, polling officials, party candidates and scrutineers. Interviews were conducted with members of the Executive Council (Bishop Abel Muzorewa, Chief Jeremiah Chirau and Mr Ian Smith), co-ministers in the Transitional Government (including the co-ministers for Foreign Affairs, Mr P.K. van der Byl and Mr Kesiwe Malindi, and the co-minister for Education, Health, Manpower and Social Affairs, Mr Rowan Cronje), public servants (including the Solicitor-General, Mr L.G. Smith - the chief draftsman of the new Constitution, the Secretary of the Ministry of Law and Order, Mr P. Claypole, and the four members of the Public Service Board, Messrs Hardwick, de Bruijn, Sleigh and Malaba), leading black and white businessmen, academics (including the Director of the Centre for Inter-racial Studies at the University of Salisbury, Prof. Marshall Murphree), trade unionists, students and groups opposed to the elections, as well as members of the National Unifying Force and internal supporters of the Patriotic Front. Mr J. Wass, research officer to The Hon. G.M. Bryant, E.D., M.P. who accompanied the observer group at his own expense, visited detainees in prison on behalf of the group.

In addition we attended daily briefing sessions by representatives of the election directorate, police and security forces, addresses by each of the four members of the Executive Council (Bishop Muzorewa, Rev. Sithole, Chief Chirau and Mr Smith), and daily briefing sessions on local conditions at each of the major polling centres visited.

A summary of our activities is appended - See Attachment 2.

4. Background

Before reporting the group's findings we feel we should present some background to the elections.

(1) Zimbabwe Rhodesia

Zimbabwe Rhodesia is a landlocked country with an area of 390,245 sq. km. - just under half the area of N.S.W. The official estimate of its population as at 30 June 1978 is 6 640 000 blacks, 260 000 whites and 34 100 Asians (mainly Indians) and coloureds. The emigration of more than 12 000 whites since June 1978 reduced the white population in April to less than 250 000. The black population is currently estimated at 6 800 000, making the ratio of whites to blacks 1 to 27.

(2) Previous Elections

Zimbabwe Rhodesia has had four other elections since UDI in 1965: 1965, 1970, 1974, and 1977. Electoral arrangements have varied a little from election to election, but essentially there have been two rolls - both drawn up on a property/income basis. Since 1969 voters on the "A" roll have been whites, Indians and coloureds, and voters on the "B" roll have been blacks. The "A" roll elected 50 candidates and the "B" roll 15 or 16. Up to this year only some 20 000 to 40 000 blacks have participated in a national election. The 1979 common roll elections are the first to be held in Zimbabwe Rhodesia since 1965 at which there have been no property or income qualifications, and at which all blacks aged 18 or more have been entitled to vote.

(3) Constitutional Referendum

The current elections are the outcome of the internal settlement agreement of 3 March 1978. The election process may be said to have begun on 20 January 1979 when a proposed majority rule constitution was put to a referendum of white electors. Of the

71.5% of whites voting, 85% voted in favour of the new constitution. A Constitution Bill was presented to the Rhodesian Parliament on 7 February 1979 and was passed on 20 February 1979. Those parts of the Constitution which related to the conduct of the elections came into force prior to the elections; the remainder came into force with the establishment of the new government.

(4) Constitutional Provisions

The provisions of the Constitution relating to the Legislature are outlined below, and are shown schematically on the following page.

The Legislature consists of a President and a Parliament comprising a House of Assembly and a Senate. The President, who acts on the advice of the Prime Minister and Executive Council, is appointed by an electoral college consisting of all the senators and all members of the House of Assembly.


The Senate consists of 30 members of whom 10 are blacks elected by the 72 black members of the House of Assembly, 10 are whites elected by the 28 white members of the House of Assembly and 10 are African chiefs elected by the Council of Chiefs. Of these, five are from Mashonaland and five from Matabeleland.

The House of Assembly consists of 100 members. Seventy-two members are blacks elected by voters on the common roll for 72 constituencies. However, for the first Parliament, these members were to be elected on a party-list system and not on a constituency basis.

Twenty seats are for whites elected on a preferential voting system by voters enrolled on the white voters roll for 20 constituencies. An additional eight white members are elected by the 92 members of the House of Assembly referred to above from 16 white candidates who have been nominated by the 28 white members of the previous House of Assembly. For the purposes of the first election, the 16 candidates were to be nominated by the 50 white members of the previous House of Assembly.

At the end of 10 years or after the second Parliament, whichever is the later, a commission will be established to review the question of retaining the 28 white seats.

All male and female citizens who are 18 years or more, whether black, white, coloured or Asian, are eligible to be enrolled on the common voters roll.



N.B.—For the first election the 16 candidates for the special eight white seats will be nominated by the 50 white members of the House of Assembly when Parliament was prorogued.

In addition, all whites who have attained the age of 18 or more are eligible to be enrolled on the white voters roll.

For the first election those entitled to vote were all persons over 18 who were either citizens or who had been permanently resident in Zimbabwe Rhodesia for a continuous period of two years before the election.

Provision was also made in the Constitution for the first government elected to be a government of national unity, with each party with five seats or more in the House of Assembly being represented in the Executive Council in proportion to the number of seats held by it.

For a summary of the main provisions of the Constitution other than the Legislative provisions outlined in this section - See Attachment 3.

(5) Electoral Supervisory Commission

A seven man Electoral Supervisory Commission under the chairmanship of Judge J.B. Macaulay, was sworn in by the Chief Justice of the High Court prior to the elections. The Commission, comprising five blacks and two whites, was charged with ensuring that the elections were free and fair. Persons making charges of election irregularities or on related matters were asked in Press notices to communicate their information to the Commission.

(6) The Election Process

The common roll elections witnessed by the Australian Parliamentary observer group were part of a wider body of elections. These commenced in early April with the election of 20 representatives by voters enrolled on the white voters roll. The Rhodesia Front won all 20 of the white seats - 16 unopposed and four contested.

The common roll elections observed by the Australian group took place from 17 to 21 April. On 26 April the 50 white members of the previous House of Assembly formed an electoral college to nominate the panel of 16 whites from which eight were to be subsequently elected. This election took place on 7 May when the black and white members of the House of Assembly then elected, with the exception of the 12 ZANU(Sithole) members who refused to take part and two MPs who were absent, formed an electoral college to choose the eight non-constituency

members. Elections for the Senate commenced on 17 May when separate electoral colleges were held to elect five Senator Chiefs from Mashonaland and five from Matabeleland. On 23 May the black members of the House of Assembly elected 10 black Senators and the white members elected 10 white Senators. Again, ZANU (Sithole) did not take part.

(7) The Common Roll Elections

The 72 blacks who contested the common roll elections were elected on a party list system, under which voters indicate their choice of political party rather than candidate. Each competing party receives a number of seats calculated on the proportion of votes cast for that party in relation to the total votes cast in the election. Each party wishing to participate in the election has to register its intent and to lodge a list of the names of its candidates on or before a nomination day prior to the elections. The party list system is used in a number of countries, including Holland, West Germany and Israel.

In the case of the Zimbabwe Rhodesia common roll elections the country was divided into eight electoral districts to encourage parties to nominate candidates representative of each district. Parties had to nominate candidates for each district, which was allocated a number of seats based on the estimated number of voters in that district. The allocations were:

Manicaland	10 seats	(402 700 voters)
Mashonaland		
Central	5 seats	(187 800 voters)
Mashonaland East	15 seats	(588 300 voters)
Mashonaland West	6 seats	(264 300 voters)
Matabeleland		
North	10 seats	(383 400 voters)
Matabeleland		
South	5 seats	(191 200 voters)
Midlands	11 seats	(419 600 voters)
Victoria	10 seats	(388 900 voters)

(For a map of electoral districts - See Attachment 4).

A party had to obtain at least 10% of the vote cast in any electoral district in which it was competing for it to be eligible to have seats allocated to it in that district.

Parties were represented on ballot papers by name and by an election symbol distinctive to each party. Common roll voters had to indicate the party of their choice by a cross or other satisfactory mark in the square next to the relevant party name and symbol.

Prior to the elections the Transitional Government instituted a widespread information programme to encourage persons to vote, to explain the election process and eligibility of voters and emphasising that the elections would bring majority rule. Nearly all such advertisements stated "We are all going to vote" and "That is what the people want".

A difference between the white roll elections and the common roll elections was that the white representatives were elected on a constituency basis and by preferential voting.

For a comparison with other elections in Africa and white representation - See Attachment 5.

(8) Procedures for the Common Roll Elections

Some 700 polling stations (including 240 mobile stations) were established in urban and rural locations to provide as wide a spread of polling locations as possible, given the security situation.

Polling officers were required to check eligibility to vote by conducting a check of age and residential qualifications where they entertained doubts. In such cases prospective voters were requested to produce or return with documentary evidence or a satisfactory person to vouch for them.

Polling officers were also required to check that a person had not voted previously. Each voter had to dip his fingers in a colourless liquid containing a dye visible only under ultra-violet light and which stayed on a person's fingers for a week or more. Before voting a person had to place both hands in a black scanning box containing an ultra-violet light to check whether he had dye on his fingers and therefore had voted before. If not, the voter was given a numbered ballot paper, stamped on the back with the stamp of that particular polling station, and directed to a polling booth. If a voter was unsure as to what to do polling officials were empowered to explain the ballot paper and how a vote should be indicated.

Once a voter had marked his paper he was required to fold it so that his mark could not be seen but so that the polling station stamp on the

reverse was visible to the polling official at the ballot box. The voter would then place his ballot in the box.

Representatives of the competing political parties, international observers and the Press were able to enter polling stations at any time and scrutinise the voting process. They were also empowered to be present at the sealing and re-opening of ballot boxes and to affix their own seals if they so desired. Full ballot boxes, and at the end of the election period all ballot boxes, were returned to regional counting centres in each of the eight electoral districts.

(9) The Security Situation

To safeguard polling stations and voters a major security operation was mounted, involving some 100 000 police and servicemen in a general mobilisation. Armed police and/or members of the security forces were present at all polling stations and in some locations were entrenched in sandbagged emplacements. Protection and transport were available, on a request basis, to voters proceeding to and from polling stations.

From 12 April when the general mobilisation for the elections began to 22 April, the day after the elections concluded, 230 guerillas, 14 members of the security forces and seven members of the security force auxiliaries had been killed.

(Official figures for lives lost in the guerilla war to the end of 1978 are 6 150 guerillas, 4 821 black civilians, 774 members (of all races) of the security forces and 294 white civilians. The death toll for 1978 alone was 5 320, including 2 450 guerillas, 2 406 black civilians, 282 members of the security forces and 173 white civilians. These figures do not include an estimated 3 000 or more killed in raids on neighbouring countries).

Martial law, first proclaimed on 24 September 1978 in selected areas, applied to some 80% - 90% of the country at the time of the elections. Curfews were also in force in a number of areas.

5. The Pre-election Period

We arrived two days before the elections and thus our observation of the lead-up to the elections was physically limited. We have, nevertheless, made an assessment of the pre-election period based on our observations, on authoritative information obtained by us and as a result of extensive discussions with a range of persons who were there for the lead-up. We spoke to members of the international Press and other observers, government officials, party workers and candidates, members of the security forces and police, members of the auxiliary forces (including former members of the Patriotic Front), white farmers and employees, businessmen, trade unionists, academics and certain groups critical of the elections.

The issues we canvassed included:

- . the campaign to explain the Constitution and persuade people to vote instituted by the Transitional Government.
- . the campaigning of the parties contesting the election, and the role, if any, played in such campaigning by those auxiliary forces which were party-aligned.
- . the activities and involvement of authorities such as district commissioners and their assistants, police, members of the security forces and auxiliaries under their control.
- . the role played by tribal authorities.
- . the degree of freedom to campaign both at public meetings and in the Press, having regard to government constraints on the one hand and Patriotic Front pressures on the other.
- . the role, if any, played by employers in encouraging or persuading employees to vote.
- . the degree of freedom to comment allowed the media.
- . the effect on the election process of a guerilla war situation.

We offer the following assessments as the result of our

observations and widespread discussions.

(1) The campaign to explain the Constitution and the election process was a reasonably fair one. We noted the use in some government election advertisements of statements such as "Use your vote and win the peace", "Your vote can stop the war" and "Your vote can bring peace". Such advertisements might be regarded as political propaganda in that they identified voting with an end to the guerilla war - a possible but by no means a certain outcome. In this connection it was interesting to observe that when asked why they were voting, many rural blacks, particularly women, replied in terms such as "for peace" or "an end to the war" or "to bring the boys back".

We also noted an absence of advertising material explaining that voting was voluntary and people did not have to vote. We do not regard this as being important as we come from a country where voting is compulsory but, had such material been provided, it would have added credibility to these particular elections which were widely regarded, rightly or wrongly, as a test of support between the Transitional Government and the Patriotic Front.

(2) In the areas of campaigning by the parties, and the roles played by party-aligned auxiliary forces, government authorities and employers, we did come across reports of varying degrees of pressure or intimidation being applied to persuade people to vote. We found it difficult to check the authenticity of such reports and our efforts were not made easier by the difficulty of pinning down what was meant by "pressure" or "intimidation". The mere fact that an employer might give his employees a day off to vote and that he offered to provide transport might constitute a subtle form of pressure for those who view black employees in the context of a deferential society, while others might regard only a threat of dismissal as pressure or intimidation. To some voters the presence of armed and uniformed security force personnel at or near polling stations might have been intimidating while to others their presence was a safety precaution without which they would not have voted. Members of the group were struck by the fact that of all the voters they spoke to in the course of five days of visiting polling stations they received only one direct allegation by voters of an employer intimidating people into voting. The employer concerned denied the allegation.

(3) We did hear conflicting reports of pressures being applied by Patriotic Front forces inside Zimbabwe Rhodesia. In a few tribal areas members were told that Patriotic Front guerillas were actually encouraging people to vote. When asked why they would do this the reply was usually along the lines that the men had been in the field for some years, they were tired of being in the bush and of fighting, they would like to come home and they thought a black majority rule government might help them to come home. A related reply was that they had been fighting for majority rule and this would be achieved in the elections. A third reply described these men as "fence sitters" who were hedging their bets. Some of these reports came from party officials in the areas concerned. We were unable to determine the authenticity of such reports.

We were also told of threats, intimidation and physical violence being applied by the Patriotic Front to stop people voting. An example was the movement, by threats, of potential voters from their kraals to isolated areas of bush for the duration of the elections so that they could not vote. These reports came, in the main, from senior security officers at briefings in Salisbury and in regional centres and at which those officers were subject to cross-examination by the international Press present. Similar reports also came from party officials in the field. While unable to verify such reports directly, we did note that, during the elections:

- . at least 17 polling stations were attacked, mostly outside polling hours, resulting in minor damage to some stations and one death.
- . at least 7 groups and individuals going to the polls were fired on, resulting in two minor casualties.
- . a line of voters waiting at a booth were fired on but no one was injured.
- . a number of landmine incidents occurred, at least two of them involving voters. In one case 41 people were injured when their truck struck a landmine while returning from a polling station. Four of the injured subsequently died. In another case three men

going to a polling station were killed in a landmine blast.

- . a number of instances occurred of people being beaten or attacked because they had voted or wished to vote.
- . a number of instances occurred of kraals being vacated, burnt or destroyed because the occupants had voted or said they wish to vote. One of our group visited such a deserted kraal.

We believe some pressures and intimidation were applied on the one hand to dissuade people from voting and on the other to persuade them to vote. While we cannot reliably gauge the extent of either they probably cancelled each other out.

(4) The media within Zimbabwe Rhodesia was generally pro-Transitional Government and hence supported the elections. But taking into account its pro-government attitude, and the constraints imposed on it by government regulation - such as not being able to name Patriotic Front parties and leaders and thus having to refer to Joshua Nkomo, for example, as a "nationalist leader based in Zambia" - we feel the Zimbabwe Rhodesian Press played a reasonable role. The Rev. Sithole's charges of electoral irregularities, for example, were given prominent coverage. Also, there was no censorship of the international media in any form.

We noted that while bans on the activities of internal groupings representing the Patriotic Front had been in force since September 1978, senior government officials did state that peaceful activity would be permitted during the elections. However, we saw little evidence of campaigning against the elections in the internal Press.

(5) We found it difficult to gauge the effect of the war situation prior to and during the elections. That 80% - 90% of the country was under martial law and that significant parts of the country were under strong guerilla pressures must have had some effect. What is remarkable is that the elections were able to be conducted in such a situation with such thoroughness and openness. Martial law appeared to us to be an administrative expedient rather than placing the country in a state of siege.

We had heard reports that large areas of the Zimbabwe Rhodesian countryside were under guerilla control and that as a result elections could not be held successfully in those areas. While low polls in certain areas of known guerilla concentration did point to a guerilla influence in those areas we became satisfied, from our own observations and wide contacts, that no significant areas were under effective and continuous guerilla control.

(6) On balance, we do not consider the criticisms we have made or the shortcomings we have listed to be sufficient to invalidate the elections in our eyes.

6. The Election Process

The matters to which the Australian group addressed itself in observing the election process included:

- . the mechanics of the polling process, the secrecy of the ballot and the manning and location of polling stations.
- . an assessment of voters' conceptions (why they were voting and who or what they thought they were voting for) and their understanding of the voting process.
- . the role of the parties at polling stations and whether inducements or threats were made or implied to influence votes.
- . the presence of party scrutineers and observers inside polling stations and at the counting of votes.
- . checks made to ensure eligibility for voting.
- . the security of ballot boxes; the counting of votes.
- . the effect of the presence of uniformed and armed security force personnel.

We drew the following conclusions:

(1) We are satisfied that an earnest endeavour was made to locate polling stations at as many convenient locations throughout the country as was possible within the limits of stretched manpower resources and a guerilla war situation. Some 700 stations, both mobile and static, were in operation during the five days of the elections, manned in the main by civil servants and teachers.

We are also satisfied that the mechanics of the polling process were in accord with practices in most Western democracies and that the secrecy of the ballot was preserved. Many blacks had to have the mechanics of the polling process explained to them in the polling station, but this appeared to be done, in our presence, with fairness and impartiality. There were occasional reports that a few polling officials, in the course of advising illiterate blacks how to vote, had indicated a preference for one party or another but the group is satisfied from its own observations that such incidents, if they did occur, were isolated ones. Party observers able to speak the appropriate languages were present at most stations and their presence as well as that of other polling officials would have limited such practices.

(2) We found that voters' conceptions of the election tended to vary with their level of education and the degree of their urbanisation. Educated, urban blacks when asked who or what they were voting for would usually nominate a party or party leader. Less educated blacks, and particularly rural women, tended to be less positive. While a number nominated parties the majority answered that they were voting for black rule, or for peace, or to end the war, or to bring "the boys" home from the bush.

(3) Party representatives outside polling stations appeared to behave just as they would in Australia or other Western democracies - handing out election material and how-to-vote tickets. If anything they were a more colourful and happier group - singing and dancing and mixing in the main in a friendly fashion with representatives from other parties.

We found no evidence of intimidation of voters or the offering of inducements outside polling stations by party representatives, although several unsubstantiated reports of such incidents did appear in the Press. We did see several

instances of husbands telling wives how to vote or wives consulting husbands but this appeared to be prevented by polling officials as much as possible and by directing husbands and wives to separate polling booths to mark their ballot papers. More often than not in tribal areas husbands would wait until the wives had voted before voting themselves.

(4) Observers from the local political parties were present at the majority of polling stations visited, but not as many or as regularly as the group might have expected. These observers were free to observe all proceedings within a polling station except the actual marking of the ballot paper, and they were also free to affix their own seals to ballot boxes at the end of each day's voting and to be present when the seals were broken, the boxes opened and votes counted. International observers and members of the Press enjoyed the same rights as party scrutineers.

The Australian group, together with party scrutineers, several other international observers and the Press, observed the opening of ballot boxes and the counting of votes for the Salisbury area of the Mashonaland East electoral district. We encountered no irregularities.

(5) There were checks on age and residential qualifications. Some abuses may have taken place in this area as the decision on whether documentary or other satisfactory evidence should be produced depended only on a polling official's assessment of a person's age or residential status. We consider such instances, if they did occur, would have had only a marginal effect. We did, in fact, witness a number of under-age persons being refused. We also saw persons being required to return with proof of age or residential status before being allowed to vote.

(6) Under the Emergency Powers (Elections) Regulations teachers, black and white, were required to act as polling officials, and a number were due to appear in court on charges of having refused to act as polling officers under the regulations, but we did not get details.

While we believe that teachers, as in Australia, are particularly well-suited to the roll of polling officials because of their professional background and local knowledge, we do not believe there should have

been any compulsion. Accordingly, we consider that any charges pending against teachers who did refuse to take part should not be proceeded with.

(7) We do not regard the criticism that there was no registration of voters as valid in the Rhodesian situation. Despite the lack of a roll of electors it was virtually impossible for electors to vote twice. Each voter's fingers were marked by an indelible dye visible only under ultra-violet light.

This dye stayed on at least a week. Any person attempting to vote twice would be detected as all would-be voters were required to have their fingers checked for traces of the dye prior to being given a ballot paper. In fact, we noted considerable publicity given to at least one person arrested for attempting to vote twice, and that a number of others who attempted to vote twice were turned away.

(8) We reject the allegation that the presence of armed police and security force personnel influenced the elections. We are satisfied that those whom we witnessed voting did so voluntarily.

7. The Election Results

Before stating our conclusions we present the results of the elections and an explanation of the number of votes and the percentage poll.

(1) Results of the Common Roll Elections

The final figure for the poll was 1 869 077 out of an estimated voting population of 2.9 million, i.e. 64.45% of the voting population.

The five parties competing in the election were:

- . United African National Council - UANC
(Leader: Bishop Abel Muzorewa)
- . Zimbabwe African National Union (Sithole)
- ZANU (Sithole)
(Leader: Rev. Ndabaningi Sithole)
- . United National Federal Party - UNFP
(Leader: Chief Kayisa Ndiweni)
- . Zimbabwe United People's Organisation
- ZUPO

(Leader: Chief Jeremiah Chirau)

- . National Democratic Union - NDU
(Leader: Mr Henry Chihota)

Of the parties competing the UANC gained 67.27% of valid votes cast, ZANU (Sithole) gained 14.59%, UNFP gained 10.79%, ZUPO gained 6.35% and the NDU gained 1%. Spoilt papers totalling 66 319 constituted 3.55% of the total poll.

All candidates for the common role seats were representatives of political parties.

The number of seats won by each party was:

UANC	51
ZANU (Sithole)	12
UNFP	9
ZUPO	0
NDU	0
	<hr/>
	72

(white seats 28)

The results, by electoral districts, were:

Mashonaland East

		<u>Seats</u>	<u>%</u>
NDU	18 175	-	3.31
UANC	428 599	15	78.17
UNFP	20 292	-	3.70
ZANU (Sithole)	39 461	-	7.20
ZUPO	41 767	-	7.62
Spoilt	11 302		2.00
Total:	559 596		

Successful candidates:

UANC: Bishop Abel Muzorewa, Mr Silas Mundayarara, Mr Simon Paraffin, Mr Claudius Nhongonhema, Mr George Nyandoro, Mr Ben Mutasa, Mr Enoch Dumbutshena, Mr Dennis Nyamuswa, Mrs Beatrice Mutasa, Mr Farai Muzorewa, Mr Essiah Zhuwarara, Mr Lazarus Mtungwazi, Mr Raymond Madzima, Mrs Evelyn Shava and Mr Avis Chikwana.

Mashonaland Central

		<u>Seats</u>	<u>%</u>
UANC	138 360	5	80.67
UNFP	9 598	-	5.59
ZANU (Sithole)	16 968	-	9.90
ZUPO	6 582	-	3.84
Spoilt	4 160		
Total:	175 668		

Successful candidates:

UANC: Mr Mucheki Kachidza, Mr Reki Mashayamombe, Mr Misheck Chagadama, Mr Actor Mupinyuri and Mr Terence Mashambanhaka.

Mashonaland West

		<u>Seats</u>	<u>%</u>
UANC	245 737	6	83.42
UNFP	12 941	-	4.40
ZANU (Sithole)	24 682	-	8.37
ZUPO	11 228	-	3.81
Spoilt	8 938		2.94
Total:	303 526		

Successful candidates:

UANC: Mr Titus Mukarati, Mr Ronald Sadomba, Mr Josiah Mudzengi, Mr Stanlake Samkange, Mr Boniface Gumbo and Mr James Chikerema.

Manicaland

		<u>Seats</u>	<u>%</u>
UANC	97 994	6	53.65
UNFP	8 398	-	4.60
ZANU (Sithole)	69 136	4	37.85
ZUPO	7 115	-	3.90
Spoilt	5 308		2.82
Total:	187 951		

Successful candidates:

UANC: Mr Edward Mazaiwana, Mr David Mukome, Mr Simpson Mtambanengwe, Mr Elijah Nyandoro, Mr John Chrimbani and Mr Maxwell Chambara.

ZANU (Sithole): Rev. Ndabaningi Sithole,

Mr Noel Mukono, Mr David Zamchiya and Mr Arnold Sawanha.

Victoria

		<u>Seats</u>	<u>%</u>
UANC	75 403	6	56.14
UNFP	13 543	1	10.08
ZANU (Sithole)	35 549	3	26.46
ZUPO	9 840	-	7.32
Spoilt	7 300		5.15
Total:	141 635		

Successful candidates:

UANC: Mr Francis Zindoga, Mrs Smollie Mugudubi, Mr Christopher Sakala, Mr Herbert Zimuto, Mr David Munandi and Mr John Mashakada.

ZANU (Sithole): Mr Leonard Nyemba, Mr Edward Watungwa and Mr Julius Chimedza.

UNFP: Mr Peter Mandaza.

Midlands

		<u>Seats</u>	<u>%</u>
UANC	137 120	7	60.62
UNFP	24 006	1	10.62
ZANU (Sithole)	47 525	3	21.00
ZUPO	17 551	-	7.76
Spoilt	10 855		4.57
Total:	237 057		

Successful candidates:

UANC: Mr Misheck Hove, Mr Lovemore Mbanga, Mr Joseph Bheka, Mr Lewis Gumbo, Mr John Nyahwata, Mr Edmund Macheke and Mr John Kokera.

ZANU (Sithole): Mr James Dzvova, Mr Edward Chitane and Mr William Kambasha.

UNFP: Mr Elijah Mukuchambano.

Matabeleland South

		<u>Seats</u>	<u>%</u>
UANC	10 318	1	20.0
UNFP	30 318	3	58.9
ZANU (Sithole)	7 365	1	14.3
ZUPO	3 502	-	6.8
Spoilt	5 534		9.7
Total:	53 037		

Successful candidates:

UNFP: Mr Zephania Bafana, Mr Timothy Ndlovu and Mr Robert Siyoka.

UANC: Mr Joel Sigola.

ZANU (Sithole): Mr Abraham Khumalo.

Matabeleland North

		<u>Seats</u>	<u>%</u>
UANC	79 108	5	40.84
UNFP	75 350	4	38.90
ZANU (Sithole)	22 242	1	11.48
ZUPO	16 985	-	8.78
Spoilt	12 922		6.25
Total:	206 607		

Successful candidates:

UANC: Mr Ernest Bulle, Mr David Mutasa, Mr Walter Mthimkhulu, Mr Morgan Machiya and Mr Gerald Mthimkhulu.

UNFP: Mr Lwazi Mahlangu, Mr Peter Nkomo, Mr Geshom Maplanka and Mr Brown Luza.

ZANU (Sithole): Mr Phineas Sithole.

(2) The Number of Votes and the Percentage Poll

The number of voters estimated to be in Zimbabwe Rhodesia as at the end of March 1979 was put at 2.8 million blacks and 100 000 whites. The figures were arrived at by making demographic projections from 1969 census figures and taking into account other available data (migration figures, employment statistics etc.).

Voting population estimates were also made for each of the eight electoral districts. As it turned out the total number of votes cast in two districts, Mashonaland West and Mashonaland Central, was marginally more than 100% of the estimated voter population of each district. The explanation given was that electoral district voting population figures were estimated six months earlier and did not necessarily agree with actual numbers on the ground at the time of the election because of:

- . inter-provincial migration
- . large movements of population from rural to urban areas to seek safety from harassment by guerillas
- . movement of voters from one province to another to vote where they were not known and could not be identified as having voted.
- . seasonal movement of itinerant labour in the cotton, sugar and tobacco industries.

8. The Patriotic Front

A number of those who have queried the elections claim that they could not be regarded as free and fair because the parties in the Patriotic Front were not included. The Transitional Government in response claims that the leaders of both ZANU and ZAPU were repeatedly invited to take part in the negotiations leading up to the 3 March 1978 Agreement, in the Transitional Government itself and in the elections. Statements such as the following made by Mr Ian Smith on 8/12/78 are cited to support these claims:

We have invited them (Mr Mugabe and Mr Nkomo) to participate. We invited them to participate in our conference which led to the March 3rd Agreement. At least a dozen times subsequently we have invited them to come back and participate and offered them the same position as the rest of us in the Transitional Government, seats on the Executive Council, Ministers in the Ministerial Council but they have not accepted because they believe they have the support of the British and the U.S. Administrations and indeed they have today and the Administrations of these two countries are opposed to us. This puts the Patriotic Front in a very powerful position where there is a

chance that they can come in without going through an election and being all powerful.

On 2 May 1978 bans on peaceful political activity by ZANU and ZAPU inside Zimbabwe Rhodesia were lifted. The bans were reimposed on 18 September 1978 after the internal leaders of ZAPU and the People's Movement (the then internal organisation of ZANU) had been detained or redetained because, according to an Executive Council statement, they had "openly vowed to work against the (March 3) Agreement".

In a statement issued on 5 February 1979 the Executive Council declared:

The Executive Council once more extends an invitation to the leaders of the Patriotic Front to return and take part in the election and thus join with us all to ensure a peaceful transition to majority rule.

On 6 March 1979 the Executive Council stated:

It (the ban on the Patriotic Front parties) would be lifted if the Patriotic Front, even at this late stage, was to indicate its readiness to participate peacefully in the election, from which it has never been excluded. The Patriotic Front leaders excluded themselves because they dare not put their popularity to the democratic test of the ballot box.

And, earlier, on 2 March 1979 Bishop Muzorewa stated:

... Furthermore, let me also remind you that from the day the constitutional talks leading to the March 3rd Agreement began, to this day, there has always been an open invitation to the leaders of the so-called Patriotic Front to come and join us in making a peaceful transition to majority rule. There always have been, and, there still are, two empty chairs in the Executive Council for those two people outside. However, they have persistently refused to take them...

The above quotations indicate that the Patriotic Front parties had the opportunity to take part in the recent elections even if only, after the March 3 Agreement, within the limits of that Agreement. Despite bans on the Patriotic Front within Zimbabwe Rhodesia, we were told by senior government officials that peaceful activity by Patriotic

Front supporters was permitted during the elections.

We noted that a number of persons were detained by police prior to and during the elections.

Some newspaper sources have put the figure of those detained as high as a thousand, but the Australian observer group was told by the Ministry of Law and Order that although at the time of the March 3 Agreement 950 persons were in detention, subsequent to the Agreement this figure was brought down to 112 in a programme of phased releases. A later upsurge of violence led to an increase in detentions and at the time of the elections there were 226 persons in detention.* In addition about 100 persons were specially detained in Bulawayo "for security reasons" for the period of the elections, and 16 were detained in Salisbury and one in Gatooma. In a letter dated 26 April the Secretary for Law and Order, Mr P. Claypole, informed the group that the 17 detained in Salisbury and Gatooma had been released and that those detained in Bulawayo would all be released "within the next few days".

We also noted that a general amnesty guaranteeing the safety of Patriotic Front forces wishing to return was announced by the Transitional Government prior to the elections and guaranteed by the four members of the Executive Council.

For a copy of the amnesty announcement by the Executive Council, and a guarantee from the Commander of Combined Operations - See Attachment 6.

Most of the political parties competing in the elections have stated they would grant amnesty to guerilla forces and that no one should be detained without trial. Thus the UANC, in its party manifesto entitled "The Winners" states (p.5.):

The UANC Government will grant amnesty to political prisoners.

The UANC Government will grant amnesty to guerilla forces and the security forces who have been fighting one another for the past few years to give everyone an opportunity to start anew under radically changed circumstances.

The UANC believes that no man shall be detained without trial, and will therefore ensure that in every case a trial before detention is provided.

* Of the 226, some have been in detention 10 years or longer.

ZANU (Sithole), in its policy statement, has almost identical provisions.

9. Claims of Irregularities

Members of the observer group attended a Press conference called by the leader of ZANU (Sithole), the Rev. N. Sithole, on the afternoon of 24 April - after the results of the elections were known - to announce his dissatisfaction with the conduct of the elections. It should be recalled that at the end of the previous day - the first day of counting - he had issued a statement saying the elections were fair and "clearly above board". Nor did Mr Sithole, in public statements during the elections, make any reference to irregularities. On the evidence produced to us at the Press conference we believe there is no validity in his claim of "gross irregularities" having occurred. This view was shared by senior members of the international Press present.

Furthermore, the Electoral Supervisory Commission, comprising four blacks and three whites, in its Second Interim Report made public on 2 May, declared that the elections were "substantially free and fair". The Commission had received a number of complaints and comments from individuals but stated that most were of a general character and "impossible to verify". Only one specific complaint had been lodged alleging employer intimidation of employees. The Commission also concluded that martial law had had little effect on the elections. No formal complaint of irregularities had been lodged by ZANU (Sithole).

(For a copy of the Electoral Supervisory Commission's Second Interim Report - See Attachment 7).

ZANU (Sithole) claims it decided not to lodge complaints with the Electoral Supervisory Commission as the Commission in an earlier report had stated that the elections were free and fair. In the view of ZANU (Sithole) the Commission thereby disqualified itself from being able to conduct an independent inquiry.

ZANU (Sithole) instead lodged a petition with the Executive Council on 30 April calling for an independent commission of inquiry to investigate immediately "gross irregularities" in Zimbabwe Rhodesia's common roll elections. Irregularities alleged included breaches of laws and regulations governing the elections, people having voted before the official start of the elections, people having voted more than once, busing people to vote, certain candidates invoking spirit mediums, undue influence on people to vote or not to vote for certain parties, intimidation by auxiliary

forces, election officials directing some voters whom to vote for, employers ordering voters to vote for certain political parties, and prisoners being selected for release on condition that they voted for a particular party. Copies of the petition were sent to the election directorate and Electoral Supervisory Commission.

The Executive Council rejected the petition after a two-hour meeting on 1 May on the grounds that machinery already existed for the investigation of complaints about the election (the Electoral Supervisory Commission). Anyone dissatisfied with its verdict could go to the High Court.

ZANU (Sithole) announced on 2 May that it would institute proceedings in the High Court to have the elections declared invalid. ZANU (Sithole) meanwhile would not take up its 12 parliamentary seats.

10. Conclusions

(1) We were welcomed as observers wherever we went in Zimbabwe Rhodesia. Persons from all backgrounds, both blacks and whites, were particularly grateful that representatives of the Australian Parliament were present during the elections.

At no stage were we limited in any way in what we wished to see or do. We were able to speak to anyone we wished without hindrance, even detainees in prison.

(2) We are satisfied that the common roll elections were conducted in a free and fair manner, openly and in accord with usual democratic practices, particularly considering that they were the first universal franchise elections to be conducted in Zimbabwe Rhodesia.

(3) We were impressed by the impartiality, professionalism and efficiency of the public servants who organised and conducted the elections.

(4) We consider that voters had a genuine choice between candidates from differing political parties. All parties were free to register and to nominate candidates (though there was no provision for Independents in this first election). The parties participating were able to campaign freely and vigorously.

The Patriotic Front parties were invited to take part on a number of occasions but did not do so.

- (5) A large proportion of voters appeared to see the elections not so much in terms of a choice between parties but as a means of achieving black majority rule and, hopefully, an end to the guerilla war. Many voters asked why they were voting replied for peace, an end to the war, for majority rule or to bring "the boys" home from the bush.
- (6) There was a national campaign to encourage people to vote, and there were also pressures on people not to vote.
- (7) We were most impressed by the fact that some 64% of the estimated voting population turned out to vote. This is a high proportion when compared with most other voluntary voting democracies. We do not believe that such a large number of voters could have been forced to go to the polls against their will.
- (8) An election in which 64% of the adult population voted must be regarded as a major step towards majority rule and strengthens Zimbabwe Rhodesia's case for recognition and the lifting of sanctions.
- (9) That persons voted voluntarily is also borne out by the remarkably low percentage of informal votes - 3.55%. This is a particularly low figure when it is remembered that a large number of those voting were illiterate and that the vast majority were voting for the first time in their lives.
- (10) In the broader context of the elections we acknowledge that certain difficulties still remain. There are questions about the degree to which the Patriotic Front parties would have been able to share in drawing up the Constitution under which the elections were held had they wished to take part. We doubt whether the Patriotic Front parties are willing to take part in elections at all.
- (11) We do not think it is profitable for us to equate the numerical relationship between black and white members of the Parliament with an effective transfer of power. This will only be determined in practice. The Constitution is more flexible than we had been led to believe and offers full opportunity for effective majority government.
- (12) The elections were held and were held successfully. A predominantly black government, led by Bishop Muzorewa, exists in Zimbabwe Rhodesia. We urge that government to make an earnest attempt at rapprochement with the minority parties within the Parliament and with the Patriotic Front parties so that the peace which has for so long proved so elusive is achieved.

We believe also that there is a responsibility on the part of the minority parties and the Patriotic Front parties to play their part in achieving a lasting and peaceful solution.

G.M. Bryant, M.P.

J.D.M. Dobie, M.P.

R.F. Shipton, M.P.

INTERNATIONAL OBSERVER GROUPS AT THE
ZIMBABWE RHODESIA COMMON ROLL ELECTIONS

United Kingdom: Conservative Party (6)
Anglo-Rhodesian Society (6)
British Parliamentary Human
Rights Group (2)

U.S.A.: American Legion (2)
Heritage Foundation (1)
Freedom House (9)
American Conservative Union (4)
Institute of American Relations (4)
American Rhodesia Association (3)
American Security Council (2)

West Germany: Hans Seidel Stiftung (7)

Canada: Federation of Church and Business
People (1)

South Africa: South African Diplomatic Mission (3)
South African Institute of
International Affairs (1)
German South African Association (1)
National Union of South African
Students (2)

Mauritius: Parti Mauricien Social Democrate (1)

France: Christian Democratic Union (1)
Unofficial Parliamentary Group (4)

Belgium: Senate group (3)

European
Parliament: European Conservative Group (1)

Australia: Parliamentary group (3)

ZIMBABWE RHODESIA COMMON ROLL ELECTIONS

Australian Parliamentary Observer Group

Itinerary and Activities

The three members of the Australian Parliamentary Observer Group arrived in Zimbabwe Rhodesia on 15 April 1979 and departed on 26 April 1979. The common roll elections were held on 17-21 April 1979.

A. Polling stations and briefings

Members of the group, both individually and together, visited a variety of polling stations, mainly static but including some mobile, in various parts of the country. Most of the polling stations visited are listed below, together with an outline of daily schedules during the election period:

(1) Umtali area (Manicaland Province) (Tuesday, 17/4/79)

Briefing, Umtali: On geography, population, security situation and polling stations in the Manicaland Province, which has a common border of some 550 k. with Mozambique and is one of the major operational areas of the guerilla war. The province contains 31 Tribal Trust Lands and an estimated population of one million. Main crops are tea, timber, coffee, maize and tobacco. Within the province were 82 polling stations, including 13 mobiles. Several polling stations were attacked just prior to the elections.

Polling stations visited include:

- . Mutasa District Commissioner's Office, north of Umtali.

- . Zindi Protected Village (7k. from Mozambique border, in the Honde Valley).
- . Nyanyadzi District Irrigation Scheme, west of Melsetter, and about 100 k. south of Umtali.
- . Danganvura High School, Umtali (in the Danganvura township, one of three around Umtali; normally the township has a population of about 10,000 but this was estimated to have nearly doubled at the time of the elections because of an influx of refugees from the TTLs).
- . Moffatt Hall, Umtali (near Sakubve township and an industrial estate)
- . Magistrate's Court, Umtali

Debriefing, Salisbury: By Mr M.J. Thompson, Chairman of the Election Directorate, Mr E.W. Pope-Simmonds, Registrar-General of Elections, Brigadier Peter Rich, of Combined Operations Headquarters, Assistant Commissioner G.E. Hedges, of the British South Africa Police, Judge J.B. Macaulay, Chairman of the Electoral Supervisory Commission and by Mr J. Gaylard, Secretary to the Executive Council and Ministerial Council and Head of the Prime Minister's Department. Questions.

Address: By Bishop Abel Muzorewa, Leader of the UANC. Questions.

(2) Mtoko area (Mashonaland East Province)
(Wednesday, 18/4/79)

Briefing, Mtoko: On geography, population, security situation and polling stations in the Mashonaland East province north-east of Salisbury. Area comprises mainly Tribal Trust Lands and three African Purchase Areas, plus white

farming areas. There had been mortar and small arms attacks on three polling stations and a number of casualties as a result of a land mine blast on a road between two polling stations. Auxiliary forces operate in several of the TTLs, and the guerilla pressure in six of the TTLs was said to be among the highest in the country.

Polling stations visited include:

- . Mtoko village
- . Nyahondo School, Budjga Purchase Area
- . Dombwe, south of Mtoko, in the Mangwende Tribal Trust Land
- . Mrewa, also in the Mangwende Tribal Trust Land
- . two other polling stations.

Debriefing, Salisbury: By members of the Election Directorate, Police, Combined Operations, and by the Registrar-General of Elections. Questions.

Address: By Rev. Ndabaningi Sithole, Leader of ZANU. Questions.

(3) Salisbury area (Mashonaland East Province)
(Thursday, 19/4/79)

Polling stations visited include:

- . Beverley Rocks Motel (serving an industrial estate and also an adjoining predominantly white suburb)
- . Rufaro Recreation Hall, Mabvuka Local Government Area
- . Mabvuka Area D Club Room (African township)
- . Tafara Township

Debriefing, Salisbury: By members of the Election Directorate, Police, the Registrar-General of Elections, and Lt.-Gen. Peter Walls, Commander of Combined Operations. Questions.

Address: By Chief Jeremiah Chirau, Leader of ZUPO. Questions.

(4) Bulawayo area (Matabeleland North Province)
(Friday, 20/4/79)

Briefing, Bulawayo: The province, together with Matabeleland South, contains a higher proportion of the Ndebele Tribe than other provinces. It is claimed that Nkomo's support is strongest in these areas. Some 129 polling stations situated in Matabeleland North, including 32 in and around Bulawayo, Zimbabwe Rhodesia's second city. Slightly more than 100 persons were detained under the Emergency Regulations in the Bulawayo area prior to the elections. Auxiliary forces operate in the province. A guerilla who had surrendered to authorities offered for interviews with observers and Press.

Polling stations visited include:

- . Mahlebezulu School, Tshabalala Township
- . Induba School, Iminyela Township (near Joshua Nkomo's still-maintained house)
- . District Commissioner's Office, Bulawayo, where we inspected sealed ballot boxes ready to be opened Monday for the counting of votes
- . Belmont, an industrial area
- . Barham Green, a predominantly white suburb

Debriefing, Salisbury: By members of the Election Directorate, Police, Combined Operations and the Registrar-General of Elections.

Address: By Mr Ian Smith, Prime Minister and Leader of the Rhodesia Front.

- (5) Visits to polling stations of own choice/individual arrangements (Saturday, 21/4/79)

One member of the group visited polling stations in the Salisbury area, another in the Wankie and Victoria Falls area and the third at Triangle, in southern Rhodesia.

Polls closed finally at 7.00 p.m.

- (6) Final briefing (Sunday evening, 22/4/79)

Briefing by members of the Election Directorate, Police, Combined Operations and the Secretary for Internal Affairs, Mr Don Yardley.

Observers were told that since the general mobilisation on 12 April 230 guerillas, 14 members of the security forces and seven members of security force auxiliaries had been killed. A small number of civilians going to or coming from polling stations were killed or injured in landmine incidents, and several voters were wounded in small arms attacks on polling stations.

- (7) Counting of votes commenced Monday, 23/4/79, and concluded the next day.

B. Discussions

Members of the Australian observer group held private discussions or interviews with a wide variety of persons, black and white, including politicians, public servants, businessmen, academics, trade unionists, former guerillas and others. The more prominent of them included :

- . Prime Minister Mr Ian Smith
- . Bishop Abel Muzorewa, Leader of the UANC
- . Mr Ismail Adam, Secretary for Financial Affairs, UANC
- . Mr Adam Kara, Director of Elections, UANC
- . Mr George Nyandoro, Secretary for External Affairs, UANC
- . Mr J. Gaylard, Head, Prime Minister's Department, and Secretary to the Executive Council and Ministerial Council
- . Mr P.K. van der Byl, Joint Minister of Foreign Affairs
- . Mr Kesiwi Malindi, Joint Minister of Foreign Affairs
- . Mr Rowan Cronje, Joint Minister of Education, Health, Manpower and Social Affairs
- . Mr L.G. Smith, Solicitor-General and chief draftsman of the new Constitution for Zimbabwe Rhodesia
- . Mr P. Claypole, Secretary of the Ministry of Law and Order
- . Four members of the Public Service Board: Mr S. Hardwick (Chairman),

- Mr Griffiths Malaba, Mr L. de Bruijn
and Mr R. Sleigh
- . Mr Terry Goss, Chairman of Triangle Ltd.
 - . Prof. Marshall Murphree, Director,
Centre for Inter-racial Studies,
University of Salisbury
 - . Lt.-Gen. Peter Walls, Commander of
Combined Operations
 - . Mr P.W.J. Chipudhla, a black business-
man
 - . Lt.-Col. W.M. Knox, Chairman, Rhodesia
Front Party

The observer group also attended a seminar conducted by the Rhodesian Promotion Council on the various aspects of the Zimbabwe Rhodesian economy. Speakers at the seminar were :

- . Mr C.G. Tracey, Chairman, Rhodesian
Promotion Council
- . Mr Boyman Mancama, Member of the
Executive Committee, Rhodesian Promotion
Council
- . Mr Dennis Norman, President, Rhodesia
National Farmers' Union (RNFU)
- . Mr Gary Magadzire, President,
African Farmers' Union (AFU)
- . Mr Don Bulloch, President, Rhodesia
Tobacco Association (RTA)
- . Mr W.V. Rickards, Chairman, Rio
Tinto (Rhodesia) Ltd.
- . Mr John Hillis, President, Association
of Rhodesian Industries (ARnI)
- . Mr Ben Mucheche, President, African
Chambers of Commerce of Rhodesia (ACCOR)
- . Mr Brian Grubb, Vice-president, ACCOR

Opportunities for discussions also presented themselves at a number of functions attended by members of the observer group, and at Press conferences and briefing sessions.

SUMMARY OF THE MAIN PROVISIONS
OF THE NEW
ZIMBABWE RHODESIA CONSTITUTION

Apart from the provisions relating to the legislature, outlined in the report, the following are the principal provisions of the new Zimbabwe Rhodesia Constitution.

The Executive

Executive authority is vested in the President, who acts on the advice of the Executive Council except where he is specifically required to act on the advice of the Prime Minister or some other specified authority. The President is appointed for a six year term and is eligible for re-appointment for one further period of six years. He is appointed by an electoral college comprising members of the House of Assembly and the Senate.

The President appoints as Prime Minister the person he considers best able to command a majority in the House of Assembly.

The President may at any time declare a state of emergency or martial law. A declaration of a state of emergency must be approved by the House of Assembly or it ceases to have effect after 14 days. If a declaration is approved, it can continue in force for up to six months and can be renewed from time to time by resolution.

The Judicature

Judicial authority is vested in the High Court, whose judges are appointed by the President on the advice of a Judicial Service Commission. This Commission consists of the Chief Justice as Chairman, the Chairman of the Public Service Commission and one other member appointed by the President on the advice of the Chief Justice. The third member must be a High Court judge or an advocate or attorney of not less than ten years' standing.

A person eligible for appointment as a judge must have been a judge of a superior court in a country in which the common law is Roman-Dutch and English is an official language or the person has been qualified to practice as an advocate for not less than ten years in Zimbabwe Rhodesia or in a country in which the common law is Roman-Dutch and English is an official language.

Current laws continue in force until such time as they are amended or repealed by the new legislature.

Commissions and Public Offices

(a) Public Service and Prison Service:

A Public Service Commission is responsible for regulating and controlling the organisation of the Public Service and the Prison Service, including all appointments. The Commission consists of a Chairman and two to four other members appointed by the President. The Chairman and at least one other member or, if there are more than three members of the Commission, at least two other members shall be persons who have held the post of Secretary, Deputy Secretary or Under Secretary in a Public Service Ministry, or an equivalent grade, for at least five years. The Commission is required to give preference to persons who, in its opinion, are the most efficient and suitable for appointment.

(b) Police Force:

The Police Force, established for preserving internal security and maintaining law and order, is under the command of the Commissioner of Police, who is appointed by the President on the recommendation of the Judicial Service Commission. A person may not be appointed as Commissioner of Police unless he has held the rank of Assistant Commissioner or a more senior rank for at least five years.

A Police Service Commission is responsible for considering grievances, to consider proposals to dismiss, to make regulations for the general well-being and good administration of the force and its maintenance in a high state of efficiency. The Commission consists of a Chairman and two to four other members appointed by the President. The Chairman is the Chairman of the Public Service Commission, and of other members appointed at least two must be persons who have held the rank of Assistant Commissioner or a more senior rank for at least five years.

(c) Defence Forces

The Defence Forces consist of the Army, the Air Force and any other branch established by law. The Commander of each branch is responsible for the administration and operations of that branch. Each Commander is appointed by the President on the recommendation of a board consisting of the retiring Commander or, if he is not available, the Chairman of the Defence Forces Service Commission, one of

the other Commanders and a third member appointed by the President who is a Secretary of a Ministry in the Public Service. There is provision for the Prime Minister, if he considers it necessary, to appoint a person recommended by the Commanders of the Army and Air Force as Commander of Combined Operations.

A Defence Forces Service Commission is responsible for considering grievances, to consider proposals to dismiss, to make regulations for the general well-being and good administration of the Forces. The Commission consists of a Chairman and two to four members appointed by the President. The Chairman is the Chairman of the Public Service Commission, and of the other members at least two must be persons who have held the rank of colonel in the Army or group captain in the Air Force, or a more senior rank, for at least five years.

Finance

As in Australia, there will be one Consolidated Revenue Fund into which all revenues will be paid, unless a law provides for the payment of any such revenues into another fund.

Pension rights of public officers or former public officers are protected, and a scheme is also to be introduced to encourage present public servants and members of the police and armed forces to continue to serve.

Declaration of Rights

Included in the Constitution is a justiciable Declaration of Rights and the High Court will have the power to declare any law in contravention of the Declaration ultra vires. The main provisions in the Declaration relate to:

- . Protection of right to life.
- . Protection of right to personal liberty.

Although the Legislature will be able to introduce a preventive detention law any such law will have to provide for the establishment of a tribunal to review cases within 30 days and thereafter at least every 180 days. The Government

will be obliged to release a detained person on the recommendation of the tribunal and a detained person will be entitled to appear before the tribunal in person or by his legal representative.

- . Protection from slavery and forced labour.
- . Protection from inhuman treatment.
- . Protection from deprivation of property.

A person's property can't be acquired unless the High Court or a court established for the purpose is satisfied that the acquisition is necessary in the interests of defence, public safety, public order, public morality, public health, town and country planning, utilization for a purpose beneficial to the public generally or a section thereof or the settlement of land for agricultural purposes.

In the case of the settlement of land for agricultural purposes, the land may only be acquired if it has not been substantially used for agricultural purposes for a continuous period of at least five years unless the failure to use the property was because of public disorder, in which case any period of non-use will be disregarded. Where property is compulsorily acquired, the owner will be entitled to receive adequate compensation.

Any law which extinguishes or diminishes any right to pension benefits will be regarded as a law providing for the acquisition of a right in property.

- . Protection from arbitrary search or entry.
- . Protection of the law

- . Protection of freedom of conscience.
- . Protection of freedom of expression.

Included in freedom of expression is a guarantee that no religious denomination or person may be prevented from establishing or maintaining schools.

- . Protection of freedom of assembly and association.

Includes the right to belong to political parties, trade unions or other associations and also the right not to be compelled to belong to an association.

- . Protection of freedom of movement
- . Protection from discrimination

Discrimination in written laws or under written laws is prohibited.

For a period of ten years the High Court will not be able to declare ultra vires any existing laws which contravene the Declaration. This does not preclude the repeal or amendment of any such law.

Citizenship

Dual citizenship is protected.

Ombudsman

An Ombudsman is to be appointed by the President on the advice of the Judicial Service Commission.

Entrenchments

Certain provisions such as those relating to the Head of State, the Executive, the Legislature, the Judiciary, the Service Commissions and the Services and Forces, Finance, the Declaration of Rights, the amendment of the Constitution and the transitional provisions are specially entrenched. Such provisions are not capable of amendment unless the amending Bill receives the affirmative votes of at least 78 members of the House of Assembly.

The amendment of any other provision of the Constitution requires the affirmative votes of two-thirds of the total membership of the House of Assembly. In addition, any Bill to amend the Constitution requires the affirmative votes of two-thirds of the total membership of the Senate, but if this cannot be obtained the Bill may, after 180 days, be sent to the President for his assent despite the failure of the Senate to approve it.


At the end of ten years or after the second Parliament, whichever is the later, a Commission will be established to review the question of retaining the 28 white seats. The Chairman will be the Chief Justice or a judge of the High Court nominated by him and four other members, two of whom will be elected by the 28 white members of the House of Assembly and two will be appointed by the President. If that Commission recommends that the white seats should be abolished or reduced, a Bill to give effect to the recommendation may be passed by 51 members of the House of Assembly and the Bill will not be submitted to the Senate. If the white seats are abolished or reduced, the existing 72 black seats will not be reserved exclusively for blacks and the 20 members of the Senate who are not Chiefs will be elected by all the members of the House of Assembly and not two separate groups.

Various provisions of the Electoral Act, the Education Act, the Medical Services Act and the Housing Standards Control Act will be declared in the Act concerned to be specially entrenched provisions and consequently will also not be capable of amendment unless approved by 78 members of the House of Assembly.

General

There are also a number of general provisions, such as those concerning the appointment of Chiefs, remittability of pensions and the use of English as the official language.

ZIMBABWE RHODESIA - MAP OF ELECTORAL DISTRICTS



THIS is how Rhodesia has been divided into eight provinces, in accordance with the proposed party list system of proportional representation for the election of the 72 black seats in the new National Government.

Seats will be allocated in proportion to the numbers of potential voters in each province. The estimated voters and number of seats in each province are included.

PARTY LIST PROVINCES

OTHER ELECTIONS IN AFRICA AND WHITE REPRESENTATION
Other Elections

The following points have been made by the Transitional Government's Ministry of Foreign Affairs in support of their case that the common roll elections for Zimbabwe Rhodesia were democratic, especially when taken in the context of elections in the rest of Africa. At the time of writing we were not able to independently verify the information presented by the Ministry.

- (1) Registration of voters: There was no registration of voters in Zimbabwe Rhodesia for the election. All citizens over the age of 18, plus all persons over 18 resident for more than two years, were eligible to vote. Identification could be requested to prove age or residence. The system is not unique in Africa. Gabon has no registration of voters nor did Mozambique for its 1978 elections. Swaziland had a form of registration in 1978 where the man as head of the family had to register wives and children over the age of 18, but no proof of citizenship was required. In addition Angola has had no registration of voters and also no election.

Nor is the participation of residents in the voting unique. Tanzania in 1965 ruled that people in the border areas and constituencies would be automatically eligible to vote on a residential qualification of five years.

- (2) Electoral procedure: In order to prevent people attempting to vote more than once, Zimbabwe Rhodesia required all voters to put their hands in a colourless, odourless substance that only showed up under a special light. Other countries have had similar requirements.

Kenya in 1974 announced its intention of using an indelible dye to prevent malpractice.

Tanzania has also made use of indelible ink.

The voting in Zimbabwe Rhodesia was carried out by means of secret ballot. This is not always the case in the rest of Africa. Mozambique's one party candidates in the 1978 elections were elected at public meetings. The Senegal constitution stipulates a secret ballot but voters in 1978 had the option of the secret ballot or vote in public, and only in 1974 were Kenya's electoral laws changed to provide for a secret ballot. (People previously had to cast their ballots in the presence of a presiding officer. In addition each candidate was allocated a separate ballot box).

- (3) Electoral system: Zimbabwe Rhodesia opted for a regional party list system. The same system is used in Senegal while the Ivory Coast works on a national party list system.

There were five parties contesting the 72 common roll seats in the new Zimbabwe Rhodesia Assembly. The only other multi-party states in Black Africa are Botswana, Senegal, Gambia, Lesotho (appointed not elected), Mauritius, Morocco and Sierra Leone. The rest can be regarded as one party states or military dictatorships.

- (4) Reserved seats: There were 28 seats reserved for whites under the new Zimbabwe Rhodesia Constitution (for a period of 10 years or the duration of two Parliaments). While this particular system is unique to Zimbabwe Rhodesia the practice of reserved seats is common in Africa:

Malawi - National Assembly of 78 - 63 elected and 15 appointed by the President.

Sierra Leone - Parliament of 100 - 85 elected, 12 chiefs elected by the Tribal Authorities, up to 3 appointed by the President.

Zambia - Parliament of 136 - 125 elected, the Speaker and 10 appointed by the President.

Tanzania - a total of 206 - 106 elected and 100 non-elected (regional party secretaries, President's nominees and those chosen by the Revolutionary Council).

Kenya - National Assembly of 170 - 158 elected and 12 nominated by the President.

Lesotho - National Assembly at present all nominated. The Assembly comprises chiefs, nominees for distinguished service and members of political parties including opposition parties.

Mozambique - People's Assembly of 226 members none of whom are directly elected, the direct elections being only at the local level, while at the district, city, provincial and national level the elections are indirect, each tier of the assemblies electing those in the tier above. Apart from those represented in this manner, there are also included the Central Committee of FRELIMO, the Executive Committee, ministers and vice ministers, provincial governors and representatives of the armed forces.

(5) Percentage poll: Percentage polls in Africa can vary greatly and are by no means always high:

<u>Swaziland</u>	1978	-	55%	of registered electorate		
<u>Gabon</u>	1973	-	99.6%		"	"
<u>Botswana</u>	1969	-	54%	"	"	"
	1974	-	33%	"	"	"
<u>Zambia</u>	1968	-	77%	"	"	"
	1973	-	39%	"	"	"
	1978	-	65%	"	"	"
<u>Tanzania</u>	1975	-	93%	"	"	"
<u>Ghana</u>	1978	-	40%	roughly in referendum electorate		
<u>Senegal</u>	1978	-	63%	of registered electorate		

White Representation

Information again provided by the Zimbabwe Rhodesia Ministry of Foreign Affairs indicates that the constitutional provision for reserved white seats for a limited period is not unique in Africa.

Malawi reserved three seats for whites out of a total of 53 in the Legislative Assembly when gaining independence, and Zambia reserved 10 out of 75 seats for whites. Britain agreed to the following distribution of seats in the Tanzanian legislature at the time of her independence:

- 50 open seats (black)
- 11 Asian seats
- 10 white seats
- 2 white ex officio
- 8 nominated seats (4 went to whites, 2 to blacks, 1 to Arabs and 1 to Goans)

AMNESTY NOTICES

TO ALL ZANLA FORCES



In order that all the people of Zimbabwe/Rhodesia can take part in the one-man, one-vote Majority Rule Elections in April, we, the Executive Council, in a unanimous decision, have instructed the Commander of Combined Operations, Lieutenant General G. P. Walls, G.L.M., D.C.D., M.B.E., as follows:

"That any member of the ZANLA Forces who returns home in peace before the election will be well treated. They will be fed, clothed and given proper medical treatment. They will be integrated with the Interim Government Auxilliaries (Pfumo reVanhu) under the command of Combined Operations, and will be armed for this purpose. On no account will those returning members of the Zanla Forces be stopped from voting in the elections in April, should they wish to do so."

BISHOP THE HON. A. T. MUZOREWA

REV. THE HON. N. SITHOLE

SENATOR CHIEF THE HON. J. S. CHIRAU

THE HON. I. D. SMITH

A GUARANTEE FROM THE COMMANDER OF COMBINED OPERATIONS



In accordance with the instructions I have received from the Executive Council:

I guarantee the safety of all Zanla Forces who wish to return home before the Elections. You will come to no harm at the hands of the Security Forces. You will be fed and clothed and given proper medical treatment. If you so wish, arrangements will be made for your transfer to the Interim Government Auxilliaries (Pfumo reVanhu) under the command of Combined Operations. The Pfumo reVanhu already have many ex-Zanla Forces working with them. You will be supplied with your own weapon and will be allowed to choose your area of operation. If you wish to be reunited with your family and operate in their area, this can be arranged. You will be allowed to participate with no restriction in the April Elections. This will enable you to play an important part in the establishment of the first black Majority Rule Government in Zimbabwe/Rhodesia.

Come home before the Elections in April 1979, and I guarantee you a safe return.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "G. P. Walls". The signature is fluid and cursive, with a horizontal line at the end.

LT. GEN. G. P. WALLS, G.L.M., D.C.D., M.B.E.

SECOND INTERIM REPORT

of the

ELECTORAL SUPERVISORY COMMISSION

as submitted to the

JOINT MINISTERS OF INTERNAL AFFAIRS

ELECTORAL SUPERVISORY COMMISSION

SECOND INTERIM REPORT

The Honourable the Joint Ministers of Internal Affairs

The Commission has the honour to submit this second Interim Report for your information, as follows :-

1. It has not been possible to have the services of Mr. Madeya, a member of the Commission. After being sworn in, all efforts to communicate with him at his home in the Gutu District have proved abortive.
2. Since our first report the elections for the four contested Constituency seats have been held, the candidates in the other sixteen having been returned unopposed. We have also had the elections for the seventy-two Common Roll Seats.
3. On the information available to us at this stage, we are satisfied that the conduct of this side of the general election has been free and fair.

Attention is drawn to Chapter IX of the Electoral Act, 1979 (No. 14 of 1979), which provides machinery for challenging the legality of any election of a member of the House of Assembly. Therefore, it is open to any dissatisfied candidate to present an election petition to the High Court. Consequently our opinion is subject to anything contrary emerging from any such election petition proceedings.

4. The Commission is required to report on whether the preparation for, and conduct of the election for the common roll seats has resulted in a free and fair election.
5. It seems to us that to have a free and fair election the proceedings must, in the first instance, be conducted in terms of the Electoral Act, 1979, which is designed in its provisions to eliminate illegal, corrupt and irregular practice. We consider, too, that it must result in an authentic expression of the electorate's will in relation to the contestants. That the contesting parties did not include the Patriotic front, whose supporters were therefore unable to cast their votes for

it, is due to the fact that this party refrained from registering itself as a contestant at the nomination court, held in terms of Section 175. (3) of the Act. We understand that the party was publicly invited, on many occasions, to participate in the election but chose not to avail itself of that procedure. It does not lie in the mouth of this party to claim, now, that the election was not representative of the electorate's will when it has, itself, deprived it's supporters of the opportunity of expressing their wishes. To sum up then, the election must be accepted as having been free and fair as between the contesting Parties, and in relation to the electorate.

6. Since our first report was filed it has been possible to observe the extent and efficacy of the preparations for the election. It is difficult to conceive of any further step which could have been taken to ascertain the wishes of this new and inexperienced electorate. We consider that a very high degree of expertise, forethought and execution, characterised both the preparation for and the actual election.
7. Four main aspects of the election have engaged our particular attention. These are :-
 - (a) the secrecy of the ballot.
 - (b) reasonable and free access to polling stations, both static and mobile.
 - (c) freedom to vote or to abstain from voting, including the factors of undue influence and intimidation.
 - (d) compliance with the procedural and administrative aspects of the electoral process, as required by the Electoral Act, 1979.
8. The Commission, consisting of the Chairman and five members, (Mr. Madeya being absent) visited the polling points set out in Annexure "A", over the period of the five days of the election. One of the members inspected the storage of the boxes in Salisbury, and also attended the counting at Salisbury, Concession, Bindura, Shamva, Goromonzi and Marandellas.
9. Our monitoring could only be conducted in the time available on the basis of tests over a fair variety of polling stations. In a sense, the exercise involved the same approach as that adopted by an auditor.

In the course of these visits we consulted with party representatives, when these were available, which was not often; with Provincial and District Commissioners or their assistants, Presiding Officers and Polling Officers and last, but not least, the voters themselves. Four members of the Commission are black men, and two white; two of the former are Shona speaking and two Sindebele. They are familiar with the traditions, culture and attitudes of their respective tribal groups and are in a favourable position to elicit the confidence of their own people.

The prevailing impression gained by these members was that the people wanted, where possible, to participate in the election and to exercise their voting rights.

Our sources of information also include views expressed to members by observers and pressmen, who also visited several areas, though not necessarily the same ones as we did.

10. In response to advertisements in the press, complaints and comments have been received from a number of individuals. No formal complaint has been lodged with us by any of the contesting Parties. Apart from a matter drawn to our attention at Rusape, by Mr. Chikosi, a candidate, who expressed satisfaction with the actual conduct of the election there, we have not on these visits been approached by any representatives of the parties with allegations of irregularity occurring in the course of the election. It appears that, in the early stages, prior to Polling, some obstruction of candidates desiring to enter Tribal Trust Land occurred. This seems to have been corrected immediately, and we were assured by District Commissioners and Security Force Officers that candidates had been provided with protection and access to meetings arranged in the Tribal Trust Land whenever this was requested and where security allowed it.
11. Most of the complaints were of a general character and impossible to verify. Where some substance in them appeared to be likely, action was taken to draw these to the attention of the appropriate authority. In the main they were of minor importance and dealt with by the officials concerned. In some cases the complaints bordered on extreme technicality.

12. It is necessary now to deal in more detail with the aspects in paragraph 7, to which we have given particular attention :-

- (a) From our observations at all points we found the secrecy of the ballot to be scrupulously honoured by polling officials. There has not been any suggestion, from any observer, pressman, or member of the public brought to our attention of any breach of this requirement.
- (b) Despite the threat of a terrorist presence in some areas, the manner of deployment of the security forces, in depth and away from the precincts of polling stations, and the provision of mobile stations in the more sensitive areas, as well as in the farming lands, afforded reasonable access to polling booths for those desirous of exercising the vote. Admittedly, there were areas where the risk of interdiction by terrorists could not be eliminated completely. Adequate notice of the movement of mobile stations in the sensitive areas appears to have been given, either by distribution of leaflets or by hailing from aeroplane. The reports of attendance at these mobile stations indicate that the public readily made use of them where a terrorist presence did not inhibit this. In one instance, the public removed itself to an area screened by a hill, away from its residential area and sent a message to the District Commissioner to send a mobile station to where the group had concealed itself from terrorist observation. The result was a substantial poll at that station. We were told of many instances where voters requested the Security Forces to provide protection and transport.

It seems to us that the mere fact that these mobile stations were successful in recording fair returns in the remote areas demonstrates the readiness of the communities affected, to participate in the electoral process, when some form of security force protection was available near their homes.

- (c) Substantially, in our observations, there was freedom to vote, or to abstain from voting, according to the voters conscience. There are, however, three aspects of the factors of intimidation or undue influence which call for some comment :-

(1) Possible undue influence arising from the presence and activity of the auxiliary units in Tribal Trust Land.

We are satisfied that the presence of the Security Forces proper was more of a protection than an intimidatory factor. Their deployment away from the neighbourhood of polling stations was undertaken specifically to avoid any element of undue influence arising. In one instance brought to our attention, a group of voters, near which a contact with terrorists occurred, quietly took cover under the protection of the security forces. We have experienced no single instance where any member of the public claimed that his conduct, in relation to the election, was influenced in the course of polling, by a member or members, of the Security Forces. The general attitude according to our observation was one of acceptance of the Forces as an assurance of protection.

In one instance, a report was received, through the Secretary to the Roman Catholic Bishop at Gwelo, that auxiliaries stationed near Zhombe Mission had threatened members of staff of the consequences they would incur if they did not record a vote. No preference for any party was indicated. This complaint is presently the subject of investigation by JOC Grapple. About 12 members of the staff were involved. As the complaint was not presented by the priest in charge at the mission, the precise facts were not available to us for checking in the short time spent at Gwelo.

To sum up on the influence of auxiliaries, it is not possible to say that undue influence, compelling voters to go to the poll, has not been exercised. There may well have been instances of this. We were assured by Security Force Officers however, that steps had been taken to deploy the auxiliaries in a manner which would prevent them from having any influence in the electoral exercise during the latter's five day term.

Our enquiries at the JOCs revealed that auxiliaries were only deployed in limited areas over the country, that the majority of them had been recently recruited by the Security Forces themselves, and bore no allegiance to any particular party. In this respect, and generally, we were unable to detect any undue influence arising from inter-political party rivalry during the election.

(ii) Possible undue influence arising from the relationship of employer and employee.

It is necessary to appreciate that the system of mobile polling stations, calling at industrial sites and central points in the farming areas, operated to avoid dislocation of programmes of work. This objective seems to us eminently fair and proper. That scope exists in these situations for undue influence to arise, is apparent. We were unable to detect that there had been any such abuse. Farm labourers questioned indicated they were participating on the particular occasion, because transport was available. No person alleged that he had come against his wish. The farm labourer in Zimbabwe-Rhodesia, unlike his counterpart in the western world, cannot, when his day is done, catch a bus or take other transport to the nearest village to cast his vote. The nature of the briefing which District Commissioners gave to Area Co-ordinating Committees, with whom the routes and times of calling of mobile polling stations were arranged, was, we were told by the District Commissioners, specifically directed against a farmer compelling his labourer to vote against his will. Had no transport or other facility been provided to overcome the absence of other means of attending at a station, the criticism might well have been advanced that the poll was not a true reflection of the electorate's wishes, owing to the number of persons precluded from casting their votes.

Whilst the Problem of overcoming distance is not present to the same degree in the case of mobile stations calling at industrial sites, the principle of convenience to both employer and employee is. Here too, the mere relationship of employer and employee is insufficient, in our view, to warrant the inference of undue influence having been used.

Only general allegations on this subject have been put about. No complaint of any specific act of undue influence in this field has been made, save in one instance, where a written complaint was received from a labourer in Bulawayo. Here, the names of certain industrial firms were mentioned, but without details of the particular incidents constituting the threats to any particular person or persons. It is of interest to observe that the complainant in this case stated that some voters ignored the alleged threat by deliberately spoiling their ballot papers.

(iii) We have heard it suggested that the educational programme conducted by the Government, preparatory to the election, amounted to implicit undue influence or intimidation. Legitimate educational work, designed to impress on the voter the importance of using his democratic right, can only be regarded as undue influence by some process of tortuous reasoning. It is hardly necessary to add that this conduct cannot be brought within the provisions of Section 112, which penalises "undue influence". There would have been no possible objection if the political parties had conducted the educational process themselves. However, Government would have failed in its duty if it had not provided the electorate with the rudiments of exercising its newly acquired right. The political parties were not equipped to undertake a programme of this nature, one which had never been undertaken in this country before the present time.

13. Whilst on the subject of intimidation, it might be as well, at this point, to say something on intimidation directed to keeping the electorate away from the polling stations. Our attention was directed to this aspect of terrorist activity most forcibly in the areas of North East Mashonaland, and in the provinces of Victoria, Matabeleland North and Matabeleland South. There is no question but that terrorist forces were bent on disrupting the Elections. Were it not for the protection given by the Security Forces, serious interference might have occurred. In the event however, the public was able to exercise its right, even in sensitive areas, in a surprisingly effective manner. The pattern of voting appears unmistakable. In the areas along the Botswana border and in other

areas where a terrorist presence was significant, polling dropped. Where the threat was less strong, polling proceeded in relaxed conditions. Of two possible explanations which, inferentially, may be regarded as causing the lower polling in Matabeleland South and Victoria, viz : intimidation by terrorists, or abstention voluntarily, through the absence of a leader or party other than the contestants, the more cogent one appears to us to have been the former. We arrive at this conclusion because in those portions of the badly affected areas, where the Security Forces were able to offer reasonable protection, even if only temporarily, the polling was significantly higher.

14. The Commission enquired closely into the application of Martial Law to major areas of the country, and ascertained that the powers available to the Security Forces were being invoked only to a minor extent. In recent months minimal action was taken, with the exception of one instance in Bulawayo, where about one hundred persons were detained as a pre-emptive measure to forestall a plan by terrorists to disrupt the elections in the urban area by armed force. The detained persons were involved in this plan. The detentions were under the 30 day provision of the law and we were assured these persons would be allowed to vote, if they so desired. Martial Law as it is applied to the areas affected is really a misnomer. The powers are used solely in relation to combating terrorist action and have minimal impact on the day-to-day living of the populace, which falls under the normal jurisdiction of the civil courts.
15. It has been suggested also, in certain quarters, that censorship in this country inhibits free and fair elections. The fact is that foreign pressmen and observers had absolute freedom to transmit any copy they desired, special dispensatory legislation having been passed for that purpose. Control remained over the local press media however, and then only in respect of the publication of matter affecting the security of the country.

There is no substance in this suggestion.

16. Since the matter has received some publicity, despite the explanations in the press, we comment on the subject of the apparent discrepancy between the actual poll in certain provinces and the estimated number of voters in these provinces, resulting in an excess of the former figure over the latter. There is little to add to the explanation given in the Herald of the 24th April by the Registrar-General, which provides a complete and logical answer. From the Commission's point of view, the only figures we are concerned with are the total voter population, namely 2 900 000 and the total figure polled, 1 869 077. On this basis the percentage poll is 64,45%. We accept the estimate of the Director of Census and Statistics of the total number of voters in the country. Nothing has been adduced to establish that that figure is erroneous. Estimates of the eligible voters in each province, made by another body for the purpose of distributing seats between the provinces, cannot affect the percentage calculation of 64,45%. The relevance of this percentage is not that it establishes, in itself, that the election was free and fair, but merely as confirmation of what may otherwise be found to be so. It shows that a satisfactory proportion of the eligible voters expressed its view.
17. There remains the final factor in paragraph 7(d) to which we have directed particular attention, namely, compliance with the procedural and administrative requirements of the Act. It would be naive to believe that no mistakes or irregularities have occurred in an election of this complexity, with an unsophisticated and inexperienced electorate. It is proper, however, to bear in mind that the exercise was carried out by a Civil Service that has successfully handled numerous elections in the past, whose integrity and honesty has not, so far as we are aware, been impugned.

With this as a background, the approach we adopted in assessing the propriety or otherwise, of the whole election, was to weigh the irregularities and mistakes brought to our attention in the light of the inquiry - "Has this election substantially resulted in a genuine expression of the electorate's preferences?".

On the information available at this date the answer must, in our judgment, be in the affirmative.

We find some support for this approach in Section 156 of the Act, which though it applies to election petitions presented to the Court, may be regarded as a useful guide in the issue we have to report on.

Section 156 reads as follows :-

156. No election shall be set aside by the General Division by reason of any mistake or non-compliance with the provisions of this Act if it appears to the General Division that the election was conducted in accordance with the principles laid down in this Act and that such mistake or non-compliance did not affect the result of the election.
18. Any undue influence or intimidation which may have been directed to participation and thus to increase the poll is balanced, if not outweighed, by the very real and proved intimidation by terrorists, resulting in a reduction of the poll. But for the latter, the percentage of the poll is likely to have been substantially higher.
19. When this report was in its drafting stage, the Commission received a photostat copy of a letter addressed by the Secretary General of the Zimbabwe African National Union to the President of his Party. No covering letter accompanied this document and no formal complaint of the irregularities referred to therein has been lodged with the Commission. The Secretary of this Commission has been directed to enquire whether the Party concerned intends to lodge any complaints with the Commission for the purpose of investigation and inclusion in its report to the Ministers. Since no particulars have been supplied, it is not possible to do more at this stage.

20. Accordingly, and subject to any such formal complaint, and any other complaint being made, and the submission of particulars, we report on the information so far available to us, that the Common Roll Election has been substantially a free and fair one.

Signed at Salisbury this 25th day of April 1979

J.B. Macaulay	: Chairman
R.H. Christie	: Member
A. Ndebele	: Member
Z. Ngalane	: Member
S.M. Mbirimi	: Member
P.D. Chaya	: Member

POLLING STATIONS VISITED

<u>MTOKO DISTRICT</u>	:	District Commissioner's Office, Mtoko Mashambanaka, Uzumba Tribal Trust Land Community Hall, Mrewa Township	
<u>UMTALI DISTRICT</u>	:	District Commissioner's Office, Umtali Magistrate's Court, Umtali Sakubva Community Hall, Sakubva Moffat Hall Dangamvura Community Centre Makomwe Sub-Office, Marange T.T.L. Chibuwe, Musikavanhu Tribal Trust Land	17 April 1979
<u>RUSAPE DISTRICT</u>	:	District Commissioner's Office, Rusape Community Hall, Vengere Township	
<u>VICTORIA DISTRICT</u>	:	Bikita Business Centre	
<u>BULAWAYO DISTRICT</u>	:	Khami Tshabalala Township Small City Hall	18 April 1979
<u>MA'TABELELAND</u>	:	Plumtree, District Commissioner's Office District Commissioner's Office, Tjolotjo District Commissioner's Office, Inyati Shangani Sports Club, Shangani	
<u>GWELO DISTRICT</u>	:	District Commissioner's Office, Gwelo Monomatapa Community Hall Mkoba Community Hall Mobile, Harben Park Donga Business Centre, Selukwe	19 April 1979
<u>UMVUMA DISTRICT</u>	:	District Commissioner's Office, Umvuma	
<u>ENKELDOORN</u>	:	District Commissioner's Office, Enkeldoorn Sadza Static, North Sabi Tribal Trust Land	
<u>SALISBURY DISTRICT</u>	:	Narira School, Harare Township Waterfalls T.M.B. Ruvheneke School, Glen Norah Zimbabwe Community Centre, Old Highfield	20 April 1979
<u>BANKET DISTRICT</u>	:	Banket Mobile in farming area.	21 April 1979



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TO FLASH FCO

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INFO IMMEDIATE MIRIMBA SALISBURY, CAPE TOWN, DAR ES SALAAM,
GABORONE, LAGOS, LUSAKA, MAPUTO,

INFO PRIORITY UKNIS NEW YORK, LUANDA, PRETORIA.

RHODESIA: PRESIDENTIAL DETERMINATION

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF A STATEMENT MADE BY PRESIDENT CARTER AT
1720 WASHINGTON TIME TODAY.

2. BEGINS.

AFTER THE MOST CAREFUL AND THOROUGH CONSIDERATION, I HAVE
MADE A DECISION ON THE ZIMBABWE-RHODESIAN SANCTIONS. FIRST, I AM
ABSOLUTELY CONVINCED THAT THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE UNITED STATES
WOULD NOT BE SERVED BY LIFTING THE SANCTIONS.

SECOND, I AM EQUALLY CONVINCED THAT THE BEST INTERESTS OF
THE PEOPLE OF ZIMBABWE-RHODESIA WOULD NOT BE SERVED BY LIFTING
OF THE SANCTIONS.

FINALLY, IT IS CLEAR TO ME THAT ALTHOUGH THERE HAS BEEN SOME
VERY ENCOURAGING PROGRESS MADE IN THAT COUNTRY, THAT THE ACTION
TAKEN HAS NOT BEEN SUFFICIENT TO SATISFY THE PROVISION OF THE UNITED
STATES LAW DESCRIBED IN THE SO-CALLED CASE-JAVITS AMENDMENT.

IN REACHING THIS DECISION, WE HAVE CAREFULLY ASSESSED RECENT
EVENTS IN ZIMBABWE-RHODESIA. WE HAVE CONSULTED VERY CLOSELY WITH
THE BRITISH WHO RETAIN BOTH LEGAL AND HISTORIC INTERESTS AND
RESPONSIBILITIES FOR THAT COUNTRY.

THE ACTUAL VOTING IN THE APRIL ELECTIONS APPEARS TO HAVE
BEEN ADMINISTERED IN A REASONABLY FAIR WAY UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES.
BUT THE ELECTIONS WERE HELD UNDER A CONSTITUTION THAT WAS DRAFTED
BY AND THEN SUBMITTED ONLY TO THE WHITE MINORITY, ONLY 60 PERCENT
OF WHOM THEMSELVES SUPPORTED THE NEW CONSTITUTION.

THE BLACK CITIZENS, WHO CONSTITUTE 96 PERCENT OF THE
POPULATION OF ZIMBABWE-RHODESIA, NEVER HAD A CHANCE TO CONSIDER NOR
TO VOTE FOR OR AGAINST THE CONSTITUTION UNDER WHICH THE ELECTIONS
WERE HELD.

/THE CONSTITUTION

Prime Minister

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Gm
H

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THE CONSTITUTION PRESERVES EXTRAORDINARY POWER FOR THE FOUR PERCENT WHITE MINORITY. IT GIVES THIS SMALL MINORITY VASTLY DISPROPORTIONATE NUMBERS OF VOTES IN THE COUNTRY'S PARLIAMENT. IT GIVES THIS FOUR PERCENT CONTROL OVER THE ARMY, THE POLICE, THE SYSTEM OF JUSTICE, AND THE CIVIL SERVICE, AND IT ALSO LETS THE FOUR PERCENT MINORITY EXERCISE A VETO OVER ANY SIGNIFICANT CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM. MOREOVER, WHILE THE CASE-JAVITS AMENDMENT CALLED FOR FREE PARTICIPATION OF ALL POLITICAL FACTIONS OR GROUPS IN THE COUNTRY IN THE RECENT ELECTION, THE INTERNAL REPRESENTATIVES OF THE OPPOSING POLITICAL PARTIES WERE BANNED FROM THE ELECTION. THEY WERE UNABLE TO PARTICIPATE IN THE POLITICAL PROCESS. THEY WERE PROHIBITED FROM HOLDING MEETINGS, FROM HAVING POLITICAL RALLIES, FROM EXPRESSING THEIR VIEWS AGAINST VOTING IN THE ELECTION, AND EVEN PREVENTED FROM ADVERTISING THEIR VIEWS IN THE NEWS MEDIA.

FOR THESE REASONS, I CANNOT CONCLUDE THAT THE ELECTIONS WERE EITHER FAIR OR FREE. NOR CAN I CONCLUDE THAT THE OTHER CONDITION OF THE UNITED STATES LAW HAS BEEN FULLY MET. THE AUTHORITIES IN ZIMBABWE-RHODESIA HAVE EXPRESSED THEIR WILLINGNESS TO ATTEND AN ALL-PARTIES MEETING, BUT THEY HAVE NOT INDICATED THEY ARE PREPARED TO NEGOTIATE SERIOUSLY ABOUT "ALL RELEVANT ISSUES". ALL RELEVANT ISSUES HAVE TO BE CONSIDERED IN ORDER TO COMPLY WITH THE UNITED STATES LAW.

WE WILL, OF COURSE, CONTINUE TO KEEP THE QUESTION OF THE OBSERVANCE OF SANCTIONS UNDER REVIEW. I SINCERELY HOPE THAT FUTURE PROGRESS CAN BE MADE AND MADE RAPIDLY. ALONG WITH THE BRITISH, WE WILL PARTICULARLY LOOK FOR PROGRESS TOWARDS A WIDER POLITICAL PROCESS AND MORE LEGITIMATE AND GENUINE MAJORITY RULE. IN SO DOING, WE WILL REPORT TO THE CONGRESS AND OBVIOUSLY CONSULT WITH THE CONGRESS ON A MONTHLY BASIS ON THE PROGRESS BEING MADE IN ZIMBABWE-RHODESIA.

THE POSITION THAT I HAVE OUTLINED BEST SERVES NOT ONLY AMERICAN INTERESTS, BUT THE INTERESTS OF OUR ALLIES IN A REGION OF THE WORLD OF INCREASING IMPORTANCE TO US. IT SHOULD PRESERVE OUR DIPLOMATIC AND TIES OF TRADE WITH FRIENDLY AFRICAN GOVERNMENTS AND ALSO LIMIT AND THIS IS VERY IMPORTANT -- LIMIT THE OPPORTUNITY OF OUTSIDE POWERS TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THE SITUATION IN SOUTHERN AFRICA AT THE EXPENSE OF THE UNITED STATES.

/NO OTHER

NO OTHER GOVERNMENT ON EARTH HAS EXTENDED DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS OR RECOGNITION TO THE ZIMBABWE-RHODESIAN GOVERNMENT.

HOWEVER, THESE ACTIONS OF THE UNITED STATES THAT I AM DESCRIBING SHOULD HELP AND ENCOURAGE THE NEWLY-ELECTED AUTHORITIES, INCLUDING MR. MUZOREWA, TO INTENSIFY THEIR EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE GENUINE MAJORITY RULE, AN END TO APARTHEID AND RACISM, BASED ON FIRM, REASONABLE, CONSTITUTIONAL PROCESSES THAT EXEMPLIFY THE VERY PRINCIPLES ON WHICH THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT HAS BEEN FOUNDED.

I CONSIDER THIS PRINCIPLE TO BE EXTREMELY IMPORTANT TO REPRESENT IN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS WHAT OUR NATION STANDS FOR, WHAT OUR PEOPLE BELIEVE IN.

I RECOGNIZE, TO BE PERFECTLY FRANK WITH YOU, THAT I DO NOT HAVE A MAJORITY OF SUPPORT IN THE UNITED STATES SENATE. MY GUESS IS THAT AT THE PRESENT TIME IN THE HOUSE WE WOULD HAVE DIFFICULTY IN THIS POSITION PREVAILING. BUT BECAUSE IT IS A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE TO ME PERSONALLY, AND TO OUR COUNTRY, BECAUSE I SEE THE PROSPECT OF OUR NATION BEING SERIOUSLY DAMAGED IN ITS RELATIONSHIP WITH OTHER COUNTRIES, IN SOUTHERN AFRICA, AND ELSEWHERE, BECAUSE TO LIFT SANCTIONS AT THIS TIME WOULD DIRECTLY VIOLATE INTERNATIONAL LAW, OUR PAST AGREEMENTS EVER SINCE PRESIDENT JOHNSON UNDER THE UNITED NATIONS, AND WOULD NOT CONTRIBUTE TO THE BEST INTERESTS OF EITHER OUR COUNTRY OR THE PEOPLE OF ZIMBABWE-RHODESIA, I INTEND TO DO EVERYTHING I CAN WITHIN MY POWER TO PREVAIL IN THIS SITUATION.

IT MEANS A LOT TO OUR COUNTRY TO DO WHAT IS RIGHT AND WHAT IS DECENT, AND WHAT IS FAIR, AND WHAT IS PRINCIPLED. AND IN MY OPINION THE ACTION THAT I HAVE DESCRIBED FULFILLS THESE REQUIREMENTS.

JAY

F I L E S

RHOD D	LEGAL ADVISERS	PS/MR HURD
OADS	(MR FREELAND)	PS/PUS
NAD	(MR STEEL)	SIR A DUFF
NEWS D	ECON D	SIR A PARSONS
PUSD	PCD	MR LEAHY
PLANNING STAFF	DEF D	MISS BROWN
ES & SD	OID	MR THOMAS
CCD	PS	MR WILLSON
FRD	PS/SIR I GILMOUR	MR WILLIAMS
UNL	PS/MR LUCE	
	PS/MR RIDLEY	

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TELEGRAM NUMBER 294 OF 07 JUNE

AND ROUTINE UKMIS NEW YORK, CAPE TOWN, WASHINGTON

SAVING TO WELLINGTON

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Prime Minister

Very much in line with Lord Boyd's report - you "l"

MY TELS NO 221 AND 246: AUSTRALIAN OBSERVERS' REPORT ON RHODESIAN ELECTIONS.

1. THE AUSTRALIAN OBSERVERS' REPORT WAS FINALLY TABLED IN FEDERAL PARLIAMENT TODAY (COPY BY BAG TO RENWICK, RHODESIA DEPT). CONCLUSIONS ARE AS FOLLOWS:

(1) WE WERE WELCOMED AS OBSERVERS WHEREVER WE WENT IN ZIMBABWE RHODESIA. PERSONS FROM ALL BACKGROUNDS, BOTH BLACKS AND WHITES, WERE PARTICULARLY GRATEFUL THAT REPRESENTATIVES OF THE AUSTRALIAN PARLIAMENT WERE PRESENT DURING THE ELECTIONS.

AT NO STAGE WERE WE LIMITED IN ANY WAY IN WHAT WE WISHED TO SEE OR DO. WE WERE ABLE TO SPEAK TO ANYONE WE WISHED WITHOUT HINDRANCE, EVEN DETAINEES IN PRISON.

(2) WE ARE SATISFIED THAT THE COMMON ROLL ELECTIONS WERE CONDUCTED IN A FREE AND FAIR MANNER, OPENLY AND IN ACCORD WITH USUAL DEMOCRATIC PRACTICES, PARTICULARLY CONSIDERING THAT THEY WERE THE FIRST UNIVERSAL FRANCHISE ELECTIONS TO BE CONDUCTED IN ZIMBABWE RHODESIA.

(3) WE WERE IMPRESSED BY THE IMPARTIALITY, PROFESSIONALISM AND EFFICIENCY OF THE PUBLIC SERVANTS WHO ORGANISED AND CONDUCTED THE ELECTIONS.

(4) WE CONSIDER THAT VOTERS HAD A GENUINE CHOICE BETWEEN CANDIDATES FROM DIFFERING POLITICAL PARTIES. ALL PARTIES WERE FREE TO REGISTER AND TO NOMINATE CANDIDATES (THOUGH THERE WAS NO PROVISION FOR INDEPENDENTS IN THIS FIRST ELECTION). THE PARTIES PARTICIPATING WERE ABLE TO CAMPAIGN FREELY AND VIGOROUSLY.

THE PATRIOTIC FRONT PARTIES WERE INVITED TO TAKE PART ON A NUMBER OF OCCASIONS BUT DID NOT DO SO.

(5) A LARGE PROPORTION OF VOTERS APPEARED TO SEE THE ELECTIONS NOT SO MUCH IN TERMS OF A CHOICE BETWEEN PARTIES BUT AS A MEANS OF ACHIEVING BLACK MAJORITY RULE AND, HOPEFULLY, AN END TO THE GUERRILLA WAR. MANY VOTERS ASKED WHY THEY WERE VOTING REPLIED FOR PEACE, AN END TO THE WAR, FOR MAJORITY RULE OR TO BRING "THE BOYS" HOME FROM THE BUSH.

/ (6)

(6) THERE WAS A NATIONAL CAMPAIGN TO ENCOURAGE PEOPLE TO VOTE, AND THERE WERE ALSO PRESSURES ON PEOPLE NOT TO VOTE.

(7) WE WERE MOST IMPRESSED BY THE FACT THAT SOME 64 PER CENT OF THE ESTIMATED VOTING POPULATION TURNED OUT TO VOTE. THIS IS A HIGH PROPORTION WHEN COMPARED WITH MOST OTHER VOLUNTARY VOTING DEMOCRACIES. WE DO NOT BELIEVE THAT SUCH A LARGE NUMBER OF VOTERS COULD HAVE BEEN FORCED TO GO TO THE POLLS AGAINST THEIR WILL.

(8) AN ELECTION IN WHICH 64 PER CENT OF THE ADULT POPULATION VOTED MUST BE REGARDED AS A MAJOR STEP TOWARDS MAJORITY RULE AND STRENGTHENS ZIMBABWE RHODESIA'S CASE FOR RECOGNITION AND THE LIFTING OF SANCTIONS.

(9) THAT PERSONS VOTED VOLUNTARILY IS ALSO BORNE OUT BY THE REMARKABLY LOW PERCENTAGE OF INFORMAL VOTES - 3.55 PER CENT. THIS IS A PARTICULARLY LOW FIGURE WHEN IT IS REMEMBERED THAT A LARGE NUMBER OF THOSE VOTING WERE ILLITERATE AND THAT THE VAST MAJORITY WERE VOTING FOR THE FIRST TIME IN THEIR LIVES.

(10) IN THE BROADER CONTEXT OF THE ELECTIONS WE ACKNOWLEDGE THAT CERTAIN DIFFICULTIES STILL REMAIN. THERE ARE QUESTIONS ABOUT THE DEGREE TO WHICH THE PATRIOTIC FRONT PARTIES WOULD HAVE BEEN ABLE TO SHARE IN DRAWING UP THE CONSTITUTION UNDER WHICH THE ELECTIONS WERE HELD HAD THEY WISHED TO TAKE PART. WE DOUBT WHETHER THE PATRIOTIC FRONT PARTIES ARE WILLING TO TAKE PART IN ELECTIONS AT ALL.


(11) WE DO NOT THINK IT IS PROFITABLE FOR US TO EQUATE THE NUMERICAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN BLACK AND WHITE MEMBERS OF THE PARLIAMENT WITH AN EFFECTIVE TRANSFER OF POWER. THIS WILL ONLY BE DETERMINED IN PRACTICE. THE CONSTITUTION IS MORE FLEXIBLE THAN WE HAD BEEN LED TO BELIEVE AND OFFERS FULL OPPORTUNITY FOR EFFECTIVE MAJORITY GOVERNMENT.

(12) THE ELECTIONS WERE HELD AND WERE HELD SUCCESSFULLY. A PREDOMINANTLY BLACK GOVERNMENT, LED BY BISHOP MUZOREWA, EXISTS IN ZIMBABWE RHODESIA. WE URGE THAT GOVERNMENT TO MAKE AN EARNEST ATTEMPT AT RAPPROCHEMENT WITH THE MINORITY PARTIES WITHIN THE PARLIAMENT AND WITH THE PATRIOTIC FRONT PARTIES SO THAT THE PEACE WHICH HAS FOR SO LONG PROVED SO ELUSIVE IS ACHIEVED.

/WE

WE BELIEVE ALSO THAT THERE IS A RESPONSIBILITY ON THE PART OF THE MINORITY PARTIES AND THE PATRIOTIC FRONT PARTIES TO PLAY THEIR PART IN ACHIEVING A LASTING AND PEACEFUL SOLUTION.

TEBBIT



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LEGAL ADVISERS (MR FREELAND)
(MR STEEL)

ECON D
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DEF. D

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PS
PS/SIR I SIMMONS
PS/MR LUCE
PS/MR RIDLEY
PS/MR HURD
PS/PUS
SIR A DUFF
SIR A PARSONS

MR LEAHY
MISS BROWN
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FM MIRIMBA SALISBURY 060715Z JUNE 79

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 267 OF 6 JUNE

INFO PRIORITY CAPE TOWN PRETORIA MAPUTO GABORONE DAR ES SALAAM

LAGOS LUSAKALUANDA UKMIS NEW YORK WASHINGTON

INFO ROUTINE ADDIS ABABA

MIPT

MEETING WITH BISHOP MUZOREWA

1. THERE WAS NO DOUBT ABOUT THE SINCERITY OF THE BISHOP'S WELCOME. HE DID NOT QUESTION THE NATURE OF MY APPOINTMENT OR EXPRESS ANY DISAPPOINTMENT THAT I WAS NOT TO BE MORE FORMALLY ACCREDITED. HE IS CLEARLY READY TO DO BUSINESS WITH US ON THIS BASIS. HE DID NOT RAISE THE QUESTION OF RECIPROCITY.
 2. GAYLARD, WHO INTRODUCED ME TO THE BISHOP, STAYED THROUGHOUT. I BELIEVE THIS WAS PLANNED. HE ONLY INTERVENED ON THE ONE OCCASION. HE MADE NO ATTEMPT TO PROMPT OUR DISCUSSION. THE BISHOP FIRMLY TOOK THE LEAD. HE STRUCK ME AS CONFIDENT AND ASSURED. AFTER SOME INITIAL FORMALITY, HE RELAXED AND REFRAINED FROM SET SPEECHES. HE STATED, SPECIFICALLY, THAT HE WOULD WELCOME ANY SUGGESTIONS OR ADVICE, THAT WE MIGHT WISH TO GIVE HIM.
 3. I AM ENCOURAGED BY THE TONE OF THIS INITIAL CONTACT. WE NOW HAVE A GOOD BASE FROM WHICH TO OPERATE.
 4. I WAS, HOWEVER, CONCERNED AT THE REFERENCE TO PRESSURE ON ZAMBIA. THIS IS OBVIOUSLY IN THE FOREFRONT OF THE BISHOP'S MIND. I HOPE I SOUNDED AN ADEQUATE NOTE OF CAUTION. I WILL TAKE THIS UP AGAIN WITH THE FOREIGN MINISTER TODAY.
- DAY

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MR LEAHY

MR THOMAS

MR WILLSON

MR WILLIAMS

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FM MIRIMBA SALISBURY 060700Z JUNE 79

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 266 OF 6 JUNE

INFO PRIORITY CAPE TOWN PRETORIA MAPUTO GABORONE DAR E SALAAM

LUSAKA LUANDA LAGOS WASHINGTON UKMIS NEW YORK

INFO ROUTINE ADDIS ABABA

Prime Minister

2 hrs. by
Yo

MEETING WITH BISHOP MUZOREWA

1. I HAD AN HOUR'S MEETING WITH MUZOREWA YESTERDAY AFTERNOON. GAYLARD (SCABINET SECRETARY) WAS PRESENT. I DELIVERED THE LETTER FROM THE PRIME MINISTER AND YOURSELF. I EXPLAINED THE NATURE OF MY MISSION AND OUTLINED OUR POLICY AND INTENTIONS ON THE LINES OF MINISTERIAL STATEMENTS. I EXPRESSED THE HOPE THAT I MIGHT HAVE REGULAR ACCESS TO THE BISHOP AND HIS COLLEAGUES, AND INVITED HIM TO CALL ME AT ANY TIME THAT HE WISHED. I DREW PARTICULAR ATTENTION TO OUR OBJECTIVE OF A RETURN TO LEGALITY WITH WIDE INTERNATIONAL RECOGNITION AND DESCRIBED THE WAY IN WHICH WE PLANNED CONSULTATIONS WITH OUR COMMONWEALTH AND EUROPEAN FRIENDS, AND WH OTHERS CONCERNED.
2. THE BISHOP CONVEYED A WARM WELCOME TO ME, BOTH AS A REPRESENTATIVE OF HMG AND PERSONALLY. HE SAID THAT HE AND HIS COLLEAGUES ATTACHED GREAT IMPORTANCE TO THE DECISION OF HMG TO SEND AN EMISSARY TO SALISBURY. THEY DID NOT INTEND "TO SHOUT ABOUT IT" AS THEY REALISED THAT THIS WOULD NOT BE HELPFUL. BUT, IN THEIR HEARTS, THEY REGARDED IT AS OF GREAT SIGNIFICANCE. THE BISHOP SAID HE WOULD BE READY TO SEE ME AT ANY TIME. I WAS FREE TO SEE ANYONE I WISHED. THIS FOLLOWED A REFERENCE BY ME TO A POSSIBLE CALL ON SITHOLE.
3. ON RELATIONS WITH THE FRONT LINE STATES, MUZOREWA CONFIRMED THAT HE HAD HAD NO REPLIES TO HIS MESSAGES (PARA 2 OF MIRIMBA TELNO 256). HE DESPAIRED OF KAUNDA. HE HAD OFFERED ZAMBIA MUTALLY BENEFICIAL ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL COOPERATION AND FRIENDSHIP.

HE

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HE NOW SAW LITTLE, IF ANY, HOPE OF AN ACCOMMODATION. KAUNDA WOULD BE THE LAST PERSON TO RECOGNISE THE NEW GOVERNMENT HERE. THE BISHOP THOUGHT THAT ECONOMIC PRESSURE MIGHT BE THE ONLY WAY TO MAKE KAUNDA SEE SENSE.

4. I ADVISED CAUTION AND RESTRAINT. LORD HARLECH WOULD BE TRYING TO INSTIL IN THE FRONT LINE PRESIDENTS A GREATER UNDERSTANDING OF THE CHANGE THAT HAD TAKEN PLACE IN RHODESIA. THIS WHOLE EXERCISE COULD BE PREJUDICED IF IT TOOK PLACE AGAINST A BACKGROUND OF ECONOMIC AND MILITARY ACTION BY RHODESIA. I HOPED THEREFORE THAT HE AND HIS COLLEAGUES WOULD WEIGH CAREFULLY THE SERIOUS CONSEQUENCES OF SUCH ACTION AT THIS TIME. THE BISHOP SAID THAT HE RECOGNISED THE DANGERS. HE COULD NOT, HOWEVER, DISREGARD THE CONTINUED THREATS EMANATING FROM ZAMBIA AND MOZAMBIQUE. IN A REFERENCE TO THE RAID INTO MOZAMBIQUE OF JUNE 4, HE SAID THAT ANY GOVERNMENT WHICH HAD REFRAINED FROM TAKING ACTION ON THE BASIS OF THE INFORMATION KNOWN WOULD HAVE BEEN WHOLLY IRRESPONSIBLE. NEVERTHELESS, HE WOULD KEEP IN MIND THE POINT I HAD MADE.

5. ON DEALING WITH OTHER AFRICAN STATES, THE BISHOP WAS ENCOURAGED BY THE PRELIMINARY REPORTS HE HAD RECEIVED FROM HIS EMISSARIES. ALL THE COUNTRIES VISITED (HE LISTED ZAIRE, IVORY COAST, SENEGAL, LIBERIA, SIERRA LEONE, WITH KENYA TO COME) HAD SHOWN UNDERSTANDING AND SYMPATHY, THOUGH NONE WERE READY TO TAKE A LEAD ON RECOGNITION. HE SAID THAT THE RESPONSE FROM BOTSWANA, LESOTHO AND SWAZILAND HAD BEEN PARTICULARLY WARM.

6. THE BISHOP ASKED WHETHER WE WOULD ADVISE HIM TO SEND SOMEONE TO THE UNITED STATES TO STRENGTHEN THE HANDS OF RHODESIA'S FRIENDS THERE. GAYLARD, IN HIS SOLE INTERVENTION, SAID THEY FEARED THAT THEIR CASE WAS GOING BY DEFAULT IN THE U S AND THE UK AND THAT THEY SHOULD TRY TO COUNTER THE PRESSURES BUILDING UP AGAINST OUR GOVERNMENTS. I SAID THAT I THOUGHT THAT BOTH HMG AND THE U S GOVERNMENT WERE FULLY ALIVE TO THE CHANGES THAT HAD TAKEN PLACE HERE. THE PROBLEM WAS NOT IN LONDON OR WASHINGTON, BUT ELSEWHERE. HE NEEDED TO CONVINCED OTHERS OF THE REALITY OF THE NEW SITUATION IN RHODESIA. HE WOULD KNOW OF THE MISGIVINGS OF MANY COMMONWEALTH COUNTRIES AND SOME IN EUROPE. IT MIGHT BE BETTER TO DIRECT HIS ATTENTION THERE. I FLOATED THE IDEA OF INVITING SOME COMMONWEALTH REPRESENTATIVES OR THE COMMONWEALTH SECRETARY-GENERAL TO RHODESIA TO SEE FOR THEMSELVES.

7. THE BISHOP DID NOT PRESS ME ON SANCTIONS OR RECOGNITION. HE SAID THAT HE UNDERSTOOD THE VARIOUS PRESSURES BEING APPLIED ON US. NEVERTHELESS HE STILL HOPED FOR BOLD AND DECISIVE ACTION. HE ADDED RUEFULLY THAT, IF THERE WERE A COUP IN SALISBURY TOMORROW AND A DIFFERENT BLACK GOVERNMENT INSTALLED, HALF THE OAU WOULD RECOGNISE AT ONCE, WHILST HE WAS STILL WAITING AFTER THE COMPLETION OF AN EXHAUSTIVE DEMOCRATIC PROCESS.

8. I ENQUIRED ABOUT THE CHANGES THAT HE HAD FORECAST IN HIS SPEECH ON JUNE 2. (PARA 4 OF MY TELNO 256) HE DID NOT ELABORATE. HE DID HOWEVER SAY THAT HE REALISED THAT HIS GOVERNMENT HAD TO PROVE ITSELF IF IT WAS TO SECURE WIDER ACCEPTANCE. I DID NOT PRESS THE MATEREEE MATTER FURTHER AT THIS STAGE.

9. SEE MIFT.

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Rhodesia MB

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

B/F 13-6-79

6 June 1979

Dear Sir,

Lord Harlech's Mission to Southern Africa

The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary brought Lord Harlech to call on the Prime Minister this morning, to discuss his mission to Southern Africa as the emissary of the Government. The following is a summary of the main points which arose during a short discussion.

The Prime Minister told Lord Harlech that President Giscard, judging from her talk with him on the previous day, was disposed to be helpful over Rhodesia. There was clearly the beginnings of a more realistic appraisal in Africa of the Rhodesian situation and we should do our best to build on this. Lord Harlech told the Prime Minister that his recent talk with the American envoy, Mr. Loewenstein, who had just returned from unofficial talks with Presidents Nyerere and Kaunda, showed that there was some sign of movement in the thinking of the Front Line Presidents and that some of them might be keen to get off the hook. If they could be persuaded to give a lead, many other African Heads of Government would be only too ready to follow.

The Prime Minister expressed some concern that if Bishop Muzorewa could not be persuaded to move quickly, Mr. Sithole might abandon the internal settlement which would make it much more difficult for the British Government to defend. She recalled that President Kaunda had told her that his whole attitude towards Rhodesia would change if Mr. Smith were to retire from the scene; looking at it from Mr. Smith's point of view, however, she could well understand that he would wish to hang on until recognition was certain. The Prime Minister went on to say that she thought it was essential to make a thorough assessment of the relationship between the guerrillas and their supporters and how these could be changed to the disadvantage of the former. We should look for any leverage which the U.K. could bring to bear on the Front Line Presidents

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- 2 -

to induce them to deny money or territory to the Patriotic Front forces. Lord Carrington said that one future possibility might be a fresh test of acceptability of an amended constitution: if this were to be internationally supervised, or at least internationally recognised, the ground would be cut from under the feet of Nkomo and Mugabe, who would be reluctant to take part in an election themselves since their relatively meagre popular support would thereby be exposed. Lord Carrington told the Prime Minister that the Soviet Union were evidently trying to persuade the Front Line Presidents to form a Rhodesian Government in exile but Lord Harlech thought that the Russians could be encouraged not to make trouble, on the grounds that this would endanger the ratification of the SALT 2 Treaty. Lord Carrington said that if the United States were to lift sanctions within the next few weeks, the U.K. would be in a very difficult position at Lusaka.

The Prime Minister agreed that Lord Harlech would have to see Nkomo and Mugabe, since they were essential factors in bringing about a ceasefire, distasteful though she found the prospect. (The Prime Minister asked whether Mugabe was still receiving aid from the Chinese: I should be grateful for advice on this.)

There was some discussion of what would happen to Nkomo and Mugabe, and to their guerrilla forces, if the new Government in Salisbury were to win recognition: how would Presidents Kaunda and Machel get rid of them? Lord Harlech said that it might prove necessary to send a minimal Commonwealth force to give President Kaunda some assistance in clearing the guerrillas out of Zambia.

The Prime Minister said that it was essential to make President Kaunda do something about the ground-to-air missiles in guerrilla hands in advance of the C.H.G.M. in Lusaka. If the missiles could once be taken away from the guerrillas, it might prove possible to ensure that they did not receive any more. The Queen's visit to Zambia, and the Conference in Lusaka, were strong cards which should be used to put pressure on President Kaunda.

B. G. CARTLEDGE

J. S. Wall, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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Original held
France (Vint) May 79

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10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

6 June 1979

B/F 13-6-79

The Prime Minister's Talks with President Giscard d'Estaing
in Paris on 5 June 1979

The Prime Minister's discussions with President Giscard at the Elysee in Paris yesterday fell into three parts: a tête-à-tête talk of one hour, for which only notetakers were present; a further hour's discussion, for which the Prime Minister and President Giscard were joined by the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary and M. Raymond Barre; and informal conversation over lunch, during which very few matters of political substance were raised.

I enclose a copy of my note of the discussions before lunch. It was very clear that President Giscard regarded these discussions, and particularly his tête-à-tête conversation with the Prime Minister during the first hour, as particularly private and confidential in nature. I should therefore be grateful if you would take special care in the handling of this record and if you would ensure both that it is seen only by Ministers and officials with a real need to be aware of its contents and that those who do see it are aware of its sensitivity. I should also be grateful if you would ensure that, with the exception of a copy which may be sent to HM Ambassador in Paris for his personal information, no extracts are copied outside the FCO without reference to me. I am myself sending certain extracts to HM Treasury the Ministry of Defence, Department of Energy and to MAFF and shall copy my covering letters to you for information.

The Prime Minister is seeing the Secretary of State for Energy this afternoon and will take this opportunity of following up with him President Giscard's suggestion of bilateral Anglo/French consultations in advance of the European Council meeting at Strasbourg. I shall be seeking advice from the Defence Secretary on how President Giscard's further suggestion of bilateral

/consultations

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-2-

FCO "Covered in Luce's mission, Cleared with No 10"

consultations on strategic nuclear matters might be pursued. So far as the FCO is concerned, I should be grateful if you would let me know in due course if the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary proposes to follow-up President Giscard's suggestion of an approach to President Tolbert with a view to diminishing the risk of an unhelpful statement on Rhodesia by the forthcoming OAU Conference.

I am sending a copy of this letter and, strictly for Sir John Hunt's personal information, of its enclosure, to Martin Vile (Cabinet Office).

B. G. CARTLEDGE

G.G.H. Walden, Esq
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

KBB

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- 11 -
PM/Giscard Meeting Note : 5 June 1979

Original on: China
France: PM's visit: May 1979.

would be needed against the possibility of further trouble from

the miners during the coming winter. The Government might, therefore, have to reconsider.

President Giscard asked who in the British Government would be responsible for preparing the UK position on energy at the European Council in Strasbourg. The Prime Minister said that she thought she would. Lord Carrington asked whether President Giscard was suggesting that it would be useful to have bilateral consultations on energy in advance of the European Council and President Giscard confirmed that he was. It was agreed that bilateral consultations would be arranged, at the highest practicable level, as a matter of urgency.

South Africa

Lord Carrington explained that the proposals put forward by the Five on Namibia were still blocked by South Africa. The British Government, which might have^a little leverage with the South Africans who felt that the new Government had a better understanding of South Africa's internal problems than the Labour Government, had decided to send an Envoy, Mr. Luce, to assess the prospects for reviving the U.N. Secretary General's proposals. Mr. Luce's assessment was that there might just be a chance of succeeding in this; if so, it was important to take it since the consequences of abandoning the plan would be very serious. The Five had therefore agreed to have another try. Lord Carrington expressed the view that the prospect of a move to impose economic sanctions against South Africa had such grave implications for the Western world that every step towards that situation demanded very careful consideration. The Prime Minister said that the British Government, for their part, could not possibly contemplate sanctions against South Africa.

Turning to Rhodesia, Lord Carrington said that the British Government's position was that five conditions had been laid down for Rhodesia's return to legality and that, by the end of 1978, the only one of those remaining unsatisfied was that requiring any settlement to be put to the test of its acceptability to the Rhodesian

/ people

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people as a whole. The Conservative Party had therefore sent observers to assess the validity of the elections held in Rhodesia last April: their report had shown that, in all the circumstances, the elections had been both free and fair. The last remaining pre-condition for Rhodesia's return to legality had, therefore, been broadly satisfied. The new Rhodesian constitution was not perfect but this was a matter for the people of the country. Looked at from the standpoint of Rhodesia/Zimbabwe, however, recognition by the UK alone would not amount to very much: what the country needed was wide international recognition. The new British Government had therefore decided to build on the recent elections and to send an Envoy to meet the Front Line Presidents, and others, to see if there was any flexibility in their attitude to the recognition issue. Progress would clearly not be easy but there were some encouraging signs, including the fact that President Nyerere seemed, at present, to be less denunciatory of the internal settlement than, for example, President Kaunda. When the British Government emissary, Lord Harlech, returned from his mission it would be possible to make a better assessment of the possibility of bringing Nkomo and Mugabe on the one hand, and Bishop Muzorewa on the other, closer together. The timetable, however, was very tight given the forthcoming Commonwealth Heads of Government meeting in Lusaka at the beginning of August.

The Prime Minister commented that most of the countries to be represented in Lusaka could not claim to hold elections on the basis of one man, one vote, with a choice between four different political parties. A more crucial deadline was, so far as the United Kingdom was concerned, the fact that sanctions against Rhodesia would lapse in November unless renewed by Parliament. There was no prospect whatsoever of such a renewal. The Prime Minister said that she, for her part, was convinced that the test of acceptability had been satisfactorily completed; this was, after all, a matter for the people inside Rhodesia to decide. It was now the British Government's duty to restore Rhodesia to full independence. She had found both the United States and the FRG co-operative in their attitude to this objective.

/President Giscard

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President Giscard said that he would be happy to see a more active British policy in Africa. So far as South Africa was concerned, he agreed that sanctions must be avoided. The South African regime was not, however, acceptable in terms of its internal policies. Everything possible should be done to create a more democratic approach in South Africa. On Namibia, President Giscard agreed with Lord Carrington that the plan of the Five should not be abandoned: it was a fact that South Africa had been deceived by the United Nations. Turning to Rhodesia, President Giscard said that he had never understood the policy pursued by the United Kingdom in recent years. He had always believed that a moderate African Government offered the right solution and this would not be achieved without a new commitment to Rhodesia by the UK. What was required was a solution on the Kenyan pattern. Continuing pressure from the Front Line Presidents could only result in the installation of a radical regime in Salisbury and a bloody exodus by the Whites. The attitude of the other African countries would, however, pose serious difficulties; they had formed a collective position and most of them had links with the guerrillas. President Giscard commented that the Prime Minister could face really serious problems at the Lusaka meeting with, for example, Nigeria. The Prime Minister agreed and said that Nigeria had already taken steps to deprive British firms of contracts.

President Giscard went on to say that at the Francophone African Summit meeting at Kigali which he had recently attended he had found the position of many Heads of State and Government to be moderate towards Rhodesia; they seemed to recognise the importance of the elections which had taken place. There was, however, a problem over timing: the time was not yet right for international recognition of the new Government of Zimbabwe/Rhodesia. The prospects would be better if Bishop Muzorewa's regime was seen to adopt progressive internal measures. France, for her part, would try to use her influence helpfully: but the UK might be well advised to move forward step by step.

/ The Prime Minister

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The Prime Minister said that the British Government would certainly not recognise Bishop Muzorewa's regime before the Commonwealth Conference in Lusaka. The critical time would be between that Conference and the Parliamentary debate on sanctions in November. Lord Carrington said that more would be known of the American attitude when President Carter made his determination on the Case/Javits amendment: this would probably be to the effect that the settlement was not acceptable as it stood but could be made so. There was no real distinction between the lifting of sanctions, which were imposed by a mandatory UN resolution, and recognition of the new regime.

President Giscard repeated that the French Government would do everything it could to be helpful on this issue. He pointed out that the next meeting of the Organisation of African Unity would take place before the Commonwealth meeting in Lusaka and that the one could very well have an effect on the other. The President of Liberia would be Chairman of the OAU Conference and it would obviously be useful if the UK were to make contact with him. The best outcome from the OAU meeting would be the appointment of a Committee to review the situation in Rhodesia, thus postponing any immediate judgement as to the new regime's legality. In that situation, the UK's hands would still be free at the time of Lusaka. If the OAU Conference adopted a public position, this could only be a negative one. The Prime Minister agreed and said that the prize for the West in a peaceful settlement in Rhodesia would be enormous: a prosperous Rhodesia would bring great benefit to the whole region.

Defence

The Prime Minister said that the British Government was being pressed by President Carter to support Salt II. The Government had some worries about it but had concluded that the consequences of failure by the United States Congress to ratify the Treaty would be more serious than any shortcomings in the Treaty itself. The UK was concerned about the Soviet SS20 missile, to which the Russians could easily add a third stage. The British Government also faced major decisions on the replacement of its Polaris deterrent and would have to choose between a new missile of that type or cruise missiles. She understood that France would soon have its own

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

5 June 1979

Dear Byron,

Rhodesia: Lord Harlech's Mission to Africa

I understand that Lord Harlech may be calling on the Prime Minister at 11 am on 6 June to discuss his mission to Africa.

I enclose a copy of the proposed itinerary for Lord Harlech's visit to Africa this month, as it stands at present. There may be difficulty in arranging a meeting with President Nyerere at the start of the mission. In that case it looks as if the most likely date for a meeting with him will be 17 June, and the programme will have to be re-arranged accordingly.

We are seeking to arrange for Lord Harlech to meet the leaders of the Patriotic Front in accordance with the Prime Minister's wishes as set out in your letter of 1 June.

I am also enclosing with this letter a copy of draft terms of reference of Lord Harlech's mission. These have not yet been approved by Lord Carrington but he will see them before Lord Harlech's meeting with the Prime Minister.

*Yours ever,
Stephen*

J S Wall

B G Cartledge Esq
10 Downing Street

Prime Minister

*This is badly expressed!
What it means is: "with a
U.K. witness present, as you
insisted"! Lord Carrington
will be with Lord Harlech.*

*By
5/6*

RHODESIA: LORD HARLECH'S MISSION TO AFRICA

TERMS OF REFERENCE

1. The Government's objective is to return Rhodesia to legality in conditions of the widest possible international recognition, and a de-escalation of the war.

2. The widest possible international acceptance is vital to the prospects for peace in Rhodesia, to our ability to limit damage to our interests elsewhere in Africa, in the United Nations and in our relationship with our allies and the Commonwealth, and to reduce the scope for the Soviet Union to increase its influence in Africa. If it is possible to win the acceptance of a number of African governments, this will in the long run affect the ability of the Patriotic Front to continue the war.

3. The purpose of Lord Harlech's mission is to begin a process of consultation with African and other governments in order to promote our objective. The first step is to consult the Front Line Presidents and the Nigerian government in an attempt to establish:

- a. to what extent they are prepared to accept that fundamental political change has taken place in Rhodesia; and
- b. what prospect there is of their supporting or at least acquiescing in a settlement of the Rhodesia question which is based on that change or on building on the progress which has been achieved.

LORD HARLECH'S MISSION TO AFRICA
PROVISIONAL ITINERARY

12 June	Arrive Nairobi 0800 hrs (local) by BA 051. Pick up Anglo-Transvaal HS 125 and proceed immediately to Dar es Salaam
pm 12 June/ am 13 June	Meeting with President Nyerere
13 June (pm)	Dar es Salaam - Lusaka
14 June 11.30 am	Meet President Kaunda
15 June	Lusaka - Gaborone
16 June	Meet President Khama
17 June	Gaborone - Maputo
18 June	Meet President Machel
19 June (am)	Maputo - Lilongwe
19 June (pm)	Meet President Banda
20 June	Lilongwe - Lagos
21 June	Meet Federal Military Government
22 June	Lagos - London (scheduled flight)



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

5 June 1979

Dear Mike,

WBPM 3.
ACKW 5/6

Lord Harlech

Lord Harlech will be leaving for Africa next week for consultations about Rhodesia. His precise itinerary is still under discussion but it will include Dar-es-Salaam, Lusaka, Gaborone, Maputo, Lilongwe and Lagos. He expects to be away from 11th to about 22nd June.

Lord Harlech would like to call on the Prime Minister before his departure and Lord Carrington recommends that he should do so, so that he can hear at first hand how the Prime Minister sees his mission and so that he can speak with added authority during his talks in Africa. Would this be possible?

Since Lord Harlech leaves for Africa on Monday, his call would need to take place during the course of this week.

I am copying this letter to Martin Vile (Cabinet Office).

Yours ever,
Stephen

J S Wall

Mike Pattison Esq
10 Downing Street



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SUBJECT

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10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

**PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T20/79T**

5 June 1979

Dear Prime Minister

Thank you for your letter of 19 May and for letting me know how you see the Rhodesia issue. I agree that this is going to be one of the most difficult issues facing us and the Commonwealth. I welcome your wish to keep in close touch about it.

As you will know, Lord Boyd and his team of observers have reported that the elections in Rhodesia were conducted fairly, were as free as possible in the circumstances and that in their view the result represented the wishes of the majority of the electorate. Our objective now is to work with the new administration in Salisbury to bring Rhodesia back to legality with the widest possible international recognition.

Peter Carrington welcomed the chance to discuss our approach with Sir Gordon Freeth, and with Mr. Campbell and Mr. Griffiths during their recent visit to London. During the next few weeks we shall be carrying out further consultations to help us decide on the best way forward. David Harlech will be visiting Africa to sound out the Commonwealth and other African Governments most directly concerned and we will be considering the best way to proceed in the light of his report. As you will know, we are also arranging for a senior official to go to Salisbury so that we can keep in the closest touch with Bishop Muzorewa and seek to influence the policies of his Government in directions which may help him to win international acceptance.

/ Peter Carrington

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Peter Carrington hopes to have a chance to discuss the whole problem with Andrew Peacock in London later this month and we shall want to keep in the closest possible touch with you about this problem and how we should handle it in relation to the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting in Lusaka. I am delighted that we shall now be able to meet before then in Canberra.

Yours sincerely

M.T.

The Rt. Hon. Malcolm Fraser, CH, MP.

CONFIDENTIAL

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GR 750

CONFIDENTIAL

FM DAR ES SALAAM 041050Z JUNE 79

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 398 OF 4 JUNE

INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK, WASHINGTON
INFO PRIORITY MIRIMBA SALISBURY, LUSAKA, GABORONE, LUANDA,
MAPUTO, LAGOS, ADDIS ABABA

Prime Minister

BM

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RHODESIA

1. PRESIDENT NYERERE SUMMONED THE US AMBASSADOR AND MYSELF THIS MORNING 4 JUNE. HE BEGAN BY REFERRING TO THE MEETING WITH PRESIDENTS MACHEL AND KAUNDA IN MAPUTO IN APRIL AT WHICH THE FORMATION BY THE PATRIOTIC FRONT OF A PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT HAD BEEN DISCUSSED. HE SAID THAT HE HAD BEEN GREATLY RELIEVED WHEN THE PATRIOTIC FRONT AT THEIR SUBSEQUENT MEETING IN ADDIS ABABA HAD CONCLUDED THAT THIS WOULD NOT BE A WISE STEP. PRESIDENT MENGISTU HAD ALSO BEEN WORRIED ABOUT IT. THE OUTCOME OF THE ADDIS ABABA MEETING HAD THEREFORE BEEN MOVEMENT TOWARDS GREATER PATRIOTIC FRONT UNITY AND THE QUASHING FOR THE TIME BEING OF THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT IDEA.
2. PRESIDENT NYERERE REHEARSED AGAIN THE ARGUMENTS AGAINST THE FORMATION OF A PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT. IT WOULD DIVIDE THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY AND PROVOKE CONFRONTATION. MOREOVER HE HAD ARGUED IN A LETTER TO PRESIDENT KAUNDA AFTER THE MAPUTO MEETING THAT THE POSITION OF THE FRONT LINE STATES WAS NOT TO RECOGNISE ANY RHODESIA GOVERNMENT BUT TO RECOGNISE THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT AS HOLDING RESPONSIBILITY. FOR THEM TO ASK THE WORLD TO RECOGNISE A PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT COULD HAVE DANGERS FOR THEM IN THAT RESPECT ALSO.
3. FROM THIS PRESIDENT NYERERE WENT ON TO EXPRESS THE HOPE THAT LONDON AND WASHINGTON REALISED THAT RECOGNITION OF BISHOP MUZOREWA'S GOVERNMENT HELD SIMILAR DANGERS. (THE IMPLICATION WAS VERY CLEAR THAT THE REPLY TO ANY RECOGNITION OF BISHOP MUZOREWA WOULD BE LIKELY TO BE THE FORMATION OF A PROVISIONAL PATRIOTIC FRONT GOVERNMENT AND INTENSIVE LOBBYING FOR RECOGNITION OF AND SUPPORT FOR THAT GOVERNMENT).

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4. AMBASSADOR SPAIN ASKED WHETHER PRESIDENT NYERERE "SAW A DISTINCTION BETWEEN RECOGNITION AND REMOVAL OF SANCTIONS. NYERERE REPLIED "INTELLECTUALLY YES, POLITICALLY NO". THE LIFTING OF SANCTIONS WOULD INEVITABLY LOOK LIKE SOME DEGREE OF RECOGNITION. MOREOVER, BISHOP MUZOREWA WAS NOT BEING HELPFUL IN TALKING IN THREATENING LANGUAGE AGAINST ZAMBIA, MOZAMBIQUE AND THE FREEDOM FIGHTERS. TO LIFT SANCTIONS WOULD BE SEEN AS GIVING MUZOREWA MORE POWER TO CONTINUE THE WAR. PRESIDENT NYERERE MENTIONED THAT HE WOULD BE PARTICULARLY WORRIED ABOUT PRESIDENT KAUNDA'S REACTIONS. WITH REGARD TO A RETURN TO LEGALITY AS DISTINCT FROM RECOGNITION, NYERERE SAID THAT IF THE BRITISH WERE REALLY GOING TO TAKE OVER THAT WOULD BE ONE THING BUT HE FEARED IT WAS TOO LATE FOR THIS. SIMPLY TO ACCEPT THE LEGALITY OF BISHOP MUZOREWA'S GOVERNMENT, LIKE THE LIFTING OF SANCTIONS, WOULD ONLY BE TO REMOVE ANOTHER MEANS OF PRESSURE ON HIM.

5. IN SOME ELABORATION OF THE LAST POINT IN ANSWER TO QUESTIONS, PRESIDENT NYERERE SEEMED TO INDICATE THAT HE PERSONALLY WAS READY TO SEE NEGOTIATIONS ON THE BASIS OF IMPROVEMENTS IN THE INTERNAL CONSTITUTION BEING TRADED AGAINST A RETURN TO LEGALITY AND THE REMOVAL OF SANCTIONS AND THIS WOULD BE A PROPER THING TO ATTEMPT. ASKED BY MR SPAIN IF HE THOUGHT THAT SUCH NEGOTIATIONS COULD BE BETWEEN BISHOP MUZOREWA'S GOVERNMENT AND THE UK AND US ALONE (IE EXCLUDING THE PATRIOTIC FRONT), NYERERE REPLIED OBLIQUELY FIRST SAYING THAT IT SEEMED TO HIM A PRACTICAL FACT THAT FUTURE NEGOTIATIONS WOULD NOW HAVE TO TAKE THE INTERNAL CONSTITUTION AS THEIR STARTING POINT BUT THEN SAYING THAT HE WOULD RATHER THE UK/US "DESCRIBED THE NEGOTIATING VEHICLE AS ALL PARTIES TALKS".

6. PRESIDENT NYERERE MADE CLEAR THAT HE WAS SPEAKING FOR HIMSELF ALONE AND WHAT HE HAD TO SAY WAS IN NO WAY A REPORT OF THE OUTCOME OF THE MEETING OF FRONT LINE FOREIGN MINISTERS IN DAR ES SALAAM OVER THE WEEKEND. ON THAT HE SAID HE WAS HIMSELF STILL

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AWAITING A BRIEFING. MR MLOKA, PRINCIPAL SECRETARY MFA, WHO WAS PRESENT, SAID THAT EVERYTHING HAD BEEN IN THE PRESS (SEE MY TELNO 393) AND NYERERE ADDED THAT HE THOUGHT WE COULD REST ASSURED THAT NOTHING NEW HAD COME OUT OF THE MEETING.

MOON

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PS/MR LUCE

PS/MR RIDLEY

PS/MR HURD

PS/PUS

SIR A DUFF

SIR A PARSONS

MR DAY

MR LEAHY

MISS BROWN

MR THOMAS

MR WILLSON

MR WILLIAMS

ADDITIONAL DIST
RHODESIA POLICY

3



10 DOWNING STREET

Prime Minister

You approved
this in draft. I have
amended the last
sentence to take
account of your
forthcoming visit to
Australia.
Yours
46

Dear Prime Minister ~

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P S TO P M
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Prime Minister

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4/6

1 MIRIMBA SALISBURY 031500Z JUNE 79

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 255 OF 3 JUNE

INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON LUSAKA DAR ES SALAAM MAPUTO LUANDA
GABORONE CAPE TOWN PRETORIA AND LAGOS

1 CALLED ON GAYLARD (CABINET SECRETARY) ON JUNE 2. I WILL SEE MUZOREWA ON JUNE 5 WHEN I WILL DELIVER THE LETTER FROM THE PRIME MINISTER AND YOURSELF. JUNE 4 IS A PUBLIC HOLIDAY.

2. GAYLARD TOOK MUCH THE SAME LINE AS HE HAD WITH DUFF ON MAY 16. THE LIFTING OF SANCTIONS WOULD HAVE A SIGNIFICANT EFFECT. IT WOULD LIFT THE MORALE OF THE WHITE COMMUNITY, SLOW DOWN THE EXODUS, AND RELEASE RESOURCES FOR ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT WHICH WOULD BENEFIT BOTH BLACK AND WHITE. HE ACCEPTED, HOWEVER, THAT THE REMOVAL OF SANCTIONS ALONE WOULD NOT SOLVE THE PROBLEM. AN END TO THE WAR, AND OF THE WHITE CALL-UP, WAS EQUALLY IMPORTANT.

3. I DREW GAYLARD'S ATTENTION TO THE STATEMENTS MADE IN PARLIAMENT BY THE PRIME MINISTER, THE LORD PRIVY SEAL AND YOURSELF AND LEFT THE TEXTS WITH HIM. I EMPHASISED THAT HMG RECOGNISED THE FUNDAMENTAL CHANGE THAT HAD TAKEN PLACE AS A RESULT OF THE ELECTIONS HERE AND THAT THEY WISHED TO BUILD ON THAT PROGRESS. GAYLARD HOPED THAT RHODESIA WOULD NOT HAVE TO GO THROUGH ANOTHER ELECTION OR THE LIKE FOR SOME TIME. THE COST IN MONEY AND ECONOMIC DISRUPTION HAD BEEN ENORMOUS. I SUGGESTED THAT NO POSSIBILITIES SHOULD BE EXCLUDED AT THIS STAGE, IF THE OUTCOME COULD BE A PEACEFUL AND LASTING SOLUTION.

4. GAYLARD COULD OFFER NO EXPLANATION OF SITHOLE'S PRESENT ATTITUDE OR ANY FORECAST OF HIS FUTURE INTENTIONS. HE EXPLAINED THAT THE TIME FOR SITHOLE TO MAKE AN APPEAL TO THE HIGH COURT HAD NOW PASSED.

5. GAYLARD SAW NO PROSPECT OF NKOMO ACCEPTING THE NEW SITUATION IN RHODESIA 'EVEN IF ALL THE SEATS RESERVED FOR THE WHITES' WERE ABOLISHED. I POINTED OUT THAT NKOMO'S OPINION WAS NOT THE ONLY ONE THAT MATTERED AND THAT MOVES OF THIS KIND COULD MAKE A REAL IMPACT ELSEWHERE.

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6. ON THE RETURN OF PATRIOTIC FRONT SUPPORTERS, GAYLARD HAD NO DETAILS. HE THOUGHT THERE WAS SOME MOVEMENT, BUT BELIEVED IT WAS TOO SOON TO SEE ANY REAL TREND EMERGING. HE SAID THAT THE BISHOP WAS APPOINTING A CABINET COMMITTEE TO LOOK AFTER REHABILITATION. IT WOULD PLAN NEW EDUCATIONAL AND TRAINING SCHEMES AND JOB CREATION PROGRAMMES. THE OBJECT WOULD BE TO ENCOURAGE THOSE OUTSIDE TO RETURN AND DISCOURAGE FURTHER DEFECTIONS. I ENCOURAGED GAYLARD TO PRESS ON WITH MEASURES, SUCH AS IMPROVED AMNESTY TERMS, WHICH MIGHT HELP TO BRING THE FIGHTING TO AN END.

DAY

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LEGAL ADVISERS
(MR FREELAND)
(MR STEEL)
ECON D
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PS
PS/SIR I GILMOUR
PS/MR LUCE

PS/MR RIDLEY
PS/MR HURD
PS/PUS
SIR A DUFF
SIR A PARSONS
MR DAY
MR LEAHY
MISS BROWN
MR THOMAS
MR WILLSON
MR WILLIAMS

ADDITIONAL DIST
RHODESIA POLICY

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Rhodesia 24

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

1 June, 1979.

Dear Stephen,

Rhodesia

I wrote to you on 29 May to convey the Prime Minister's views on Lord Harlech's forthcoming consultations in Southern Africa.

The Prime Minister and the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary had a further discussion about Lord Harlech's mission this morning. Lord Carrington explained that Lord Harlech's tour of Southern Africa would have two objectives: to find out whether there was any flexibility in the position of the Front Line Presidents, and also to minimise, so far as possible, the damage which might result to British interests from their current attitude towards the Government's Rhodesia policy. If Lord Harlech did not make contact with the Leaders of the Patriotic Front, the Front Line Presidents would be unlikely to regard his mission as a genuine attempt to achieve settlement, and would probably dismiss it as bogus. Lord Carrington said that he entirely shared the Prime Minister's opinion of Joshua Nkomo and Robert Mugabe, but believed that it would be right for Lord Harlech to see them. The Prime Minister suggested that Lord Harlech might meet President Kaunda and Nkomo together. It was agreed that if this were not, in the event, practicable, Lord Harlech should see Nkomo and Mugabe only in the presence of additional UK witnesses such as our High Commissioner in Lusaka and our Ambassador in Maputo. Lord Carrington pointed out that if, in the event, Nkomo were to refuse to see Lord Harlech, this would do no harm to the Government's public case.

I am sending copies of this letter to the Private Secretaries to the other members of OD and to Martin Vile (Cabinet Office).

*Yours ever,
J.S. Wall*

J.S. Wall, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CONFIDENTIAL

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PART 2 begins:-

BGC to FCO 1.6.79

PART 1 ends:-

FCO to BGC 31.5.79





END

Filmed at the National
Archives (TNA) in London

February 2010