

# PREM19

# 108

## RHODESIA

(Situation in)

(July 4 - 30)

(Part 3)

5B  
830

PREM 19/108







PART 4 begins:-

Pretoria 400 31.7.79

PART 3 ends:-

PM to Viscount Colville 30.7.79



## Published Papers

The following published paper(s) enclosed on this file have been removed and destroyed. Copies may be found elsewhere in The National Archives.

House of Lords Hansard  
Columns 757-764

10/07/79  
Rhodesia

House of Commons Hansard  
Columns 620-624

25/07/79  
Southern Africa

Signed Wayland Date 29 October 2009

**PREM Records Team**



Rhodesia



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

Prime Minister

Agree to reply to  
the Bishop in these

terms? *Yes*  
a/r

For reply - see  
30 July 1979 *PS*

*Yes not.*

Dear Mike,

Rhodesian Representation in the UK

[A]

Bishop Muzorewa has written to the Prime Minister asking if the Rhodesians could appoint representatives to London to explain to people in the UK the changes that have taken place in Rhodesia. I attach a copy of Mirimba Salisbury Telno 448, giving the text of the Bishop's letter.

In the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary's view, the best way of responding positively to this request is to suggest that the Bishop expands the office in London of his Party organisation, the UANC (like the other major Rhodesian nationalist organisation, the UANC has had an office in London for some time). There seems no reason why the Rhodesians should not be able to use this as a satisfactory base for information activities of the kind the Bishop has in mind. When a preliminary approach was made to Mr Day on this question by the Rhodesian Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Mr Morrison, and Mr Day mentioned that there would be difficulties in setting up a new Rhodesian office in London but indicated that there would be less difficulty in building on an existing office here, Mr Morrison did not demur at this approach.

The difficulty about the establishment of a new Zimbabwe Rhodesia office in London with any kind of representative function is that it would put us in breach of mandatory Security Council Resolution No 277 which requires all UN member states "to sever all diplomatic, consular, economic, trade, military and other relations with Rhodesia". There could be objections on these grounds to the expansion of the activities of the other Rhodesian office in the UK, the Rhodesian Pensions Office, which exists to look after the interests of Rhodesian pensioners in this country and Rhodesian students here.

The Prime Minister may wish to be aware that the US Government are considering a similar request by Bishop Muzorewa, for permission to post representatives in Washington and New York. We have already advised them, in response to an enquiry, that our preferred solution with regard to Rhodesian representatives to London would be to attach them to the UANC office.

M Pattison Esq  
10 Downing Street

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/If the

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-2-



/ If the Prime Minister agrees with the proposed draft reply to Bishop Muzorewa, we would propose to transmit it to Salisbury for delivery by Mr Day.

Yours WSL

Paul

P Lever  
Private Secretary

CONFIDENTIAL

Registry  
No.

DRAFT Letter

Type 1 +

## SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

Top Secret.  
Secret.  
Confidential.  
Restricted.  
Unclassified.

To:- Bishop Muzorewa

From  
Prime Minister

Telephone No. Ext.

Department

## PRIVACY MARKING

..... In Confidence

*25 July*

Thank you for your ~~recent~~ letter which I have received through Mr Derek Day, *and which was awaiting me in London on my return from Lusaka. In the* ~~I was very glad that you were able to visit London recently and that we had the~~ *meanime, you will have received my message so* ~~opportunity for such useful discussions. I am delighted~~ *you about the outcome of the Commonwealth Heads of* ~~that you were pleased with your visit.~~ *Government meeting.*

On the subject of Rhodesian representation in London, I quite understand that you wish people in the United Kingdom to be given a more accurate view of the changes that have taken place in Rhodesia. I fully support that objective and, as you know, the British Government are doing all they can to impress the facts of the situation on those who remain sceptical about the substantial progress that has already taken place. I am happy to say that we see no difficulty in your expanding the existing UANC office in London, so that its staff can undertake information activities of the kind you have in mind. I believe that this would be the best way of achieving your aims.

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4IRIMBA SALISBURY 261400Z JUL 79  
 TO IMMEDIATE FCO  
 TELNO 448 OF 26 JULY

NY TELNO 426: RHODESIAN REPRESENTATIVES IN UK

FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF A LETTER FROM BISHOP MUZOREWA TO THE PRIME MINISTER:  
 THE PRIME MINISTER OF ZIMBABWE RHODESIA WOULD LIKE TO EXPRESS HIS APPRECIATION OF THE OPPORTUNITY AFFORDED TO HIM AND THE MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF ZIMBABWE RHODESIA TO MEET THE PRIME MINISTER OF GREAT BRITAIN IN LONDON ON FRIDAY THE 13 TH OF JULY 1979. HE WOULD LIKE TO THANK THE PRIME MINISTER OF GREAT BRITAIN FOR THE WARM SPIRIT AND CONSTRUCTIVE WAY WITH WHICH SHE RECEIVED HIM WHICH SAME SPIRIT WAS SHOWN BY HER FOREIGN MINISTER AND HIS MINISTRY.

DURING OUR VISIT TO LONDON, MY MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS MENTIONED THAT WE FEEL IT IS ESSENTIAL, IN THE INTERESTS OF OUR COUNTRY, THAT WE SHOULD BE PERMITTED TO STATION REPRESENTATIVES IN LONDON WHO WILL BE ABLE TO EXPLAIN TO THE PEOPLE IN THE UNITED KINGDOM THE CHANGES THAT HAVE TAKEN PLACE IN ZIMBABWE RHODESIA. MUCH OF THE OPPOSITION TO OUR NEW CONSTITUTION IS BASED ON IGNORANCE AND MISINFORMATION AND THIS SITUATION CAN ONLY BE REMEDIED BY OUR COUNTRY HAVING SOME REPRESENTATIVES IN LONDON. LORD CARRINGTON SAID THAT IF A REQUEST WAS SUBMITTED IN WRITING, FAVOURABLE CONSIDERATION WOULD BE GIVEN THERETO AND CONSEQUENTLY I HEREBY FORMALLY REQUEST THAT PERMISSION BE GIVEN FOR MY COUNTRY TO SEND A MINIMUM OF TWO REPRESENTATIVES TO LONDON. WE HAVE FOUND MR DEREK DAY'S PRESENCE IN ZIMBABWE RHODESIA TO BE VERY USEFUL AND I HAVE NO DOUBT THAT WE WOULD FIND IT EVEN MORE BENEFICIAL TO HAVE SOME REPRESENTATIVES IN LONDON.

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 PS/MR. LUCE  
 PS/MR. RIDLEY  
 PS/MR. HURD  
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 SIR A DUFF  
 SIR A PARSONS  
 LORD N G LENNOX  
 MISS BROWN  
 MR. THOMAS  
 MR. WILLSON  
 MR. WILLIAMS

ADDITIONAL DISTN.  
 RHODESIA POLICY

CONFIDENTIAL

13 JUL 1979





*Chodera*

10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

30 July 1979

*Dear Mark,*

Now that Parliament has risen for the Recess, I should like to express to you, on behalf of the Government and of the Conservative Party, my warm thanks for your work as a member of the team which observed and reported on the Rhodesian elections last April. Your report has been of immense assistance to the Government during a Parliamentary period in which Southern Africa has in both Houses loomed so large.

We have made clear in Parliament that the cornerstone of our policy is the progress that has been made in Rhodesia as a result of the elections, and that it was your Report that enabled us to form the view that this progress marked a decisive step towards black majority rule and hence towards satisfying the Six Principles. But your Report has not only been influential in Parliament and in the UK. Throughout the world this has been read with interest and attention, as our Diplomatic Missions have testified to us, and it has shown more than any pronouncements by the British Government could have done to bring home to a world inclined to be sceptical that a significant change has taken place in Rhodesia.

We are now entering a decisive phase in our search for a settlement. I know that you, like the other members of the team, have excellent contacts in Rhodesia who will listen to what you have to say and respect your views. Anything you can do to persuade influential Rhodesians that the British Government is working with their best interests at heart will be of great help and I would much appreciate it.

*Yours*

*Harold*

The Viscount Colville of Culross, Q.C.

*HS*



10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

*Report is in file*  
*Lord Colville*  
*For Mr. Whitaker delete phrase in brackets*

25/7

Now that Parliament has risen for the Recess, I should like to express to you, on behalf of the Government and of the Conservative Party, my warm thanks for your work as a member of the team which observed and reported on the Rhodesian elections last April. Your report has been of immense assistance to the Government during a Parliamentary period in which Southern Africa has in both Houses loomed so large.

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~~*Thank you for your kind letter. I will be in touch with the relevant*~~

The Viscount Colville of Culross, Q.C.

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FM FCO 301700Z JUL 79  
TO IMMEDIATE LUSAKA  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 544 OF 30 JULY

FOLLOWING FOR PRIVATE SECRETARY.

POST-WAR INDEPENDENCE CONSTITUTIONS IN THE COMMONWEALTH  
PATTERN.

1. THE GENERAL PATTERN FOR INDEPENDENCE CONSTITUTIONS GRANTED  
BY THE UNITED KINGDOM AFTER 1945 (LEAVE ASIDE INDIA AND PAKISTAN)  
WAS :

A. AN ELECTED LEGISLATURE (OR, IF BI-CAMERAL, AN ELECTED  
LOWER HOUSE):

B. A WESTMINSTER MODEL EXECUTIVE, IE PRIME MINISTER COMMANDS  
MAJORITY IN LEGISLATURE/LOWER HOUSE AND CHOOSES HIS  
ADMINISTRATION. WHERE THERE WAS A DEPARTURE FROM THE  
WESTMINSTER MODEL (EG ZAMBIA), PROVISION IS MADE FOR AN  
ELECTED EXECUTIVE PRESIDENT, APPOINTMENTS TO THE CABINET  
ARE MADE BY THE PRESIDENT FROM MEMBERS OF THE LEGISLATURE  
(THE EXECUTIVE PRESIDENT BECAME THE PATTERN IN MANY  
COUNTRIES WITHIN A YEAR OR TWO OF INDEPENDENCE):

C. A JUDICIARY: CHIEF JUSTICE APPOINTED ON ADVICE OF PRIME  
MINISTER, OTHER JUDGES BY OR ON ADVICE OF A JUDICIAL  
SERVICE COMMISSION:

D. PUBLIC AND POLICE SERVICES: TOP POSTS (EG ATTORNEY-  
GENERAL, AMBASSADORS, SECRETARY TO CABINET, PERMANENT  
SECRETARY, COMMISSIONER OF POLICE) APPOINTED ON ADVICE OF  
HOLDER OF POLITICAL OFFICE, OTHERS BY THE PUBLIC OR POLICE  
SERVICE COMMISSION; MINISTERS HAVE DIRECTION AND CONTROL  
OVER PUBLIC DEPARTMENTS:

E. A BILL OF RIGHTS IN A FORM WHICH WOULD GIVE DOMESTIC  
EFFECT TO THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS. THE  
CONVENTION ITSELF HAD BEEN APPLIED TO MANY TERRITORIES  
WHEN THEY WERE DEPENDENCIES BUT LAPSED ON INDEPENDENCE:

F. AMENDMENT OF THE CONSTITUTION.

G. PROVISION WAS NOT MADE IN A MONARCHICAL FORM CONSTITUTION FOR  
CONTROL OVER OR APPOINTMENT TO THE ARMED FORCES. SUCH PROVISION  
WAS MADE IN REPUBLICAN CONSTITUTIONS WHERE SUCH POWERS WERE  
VESTED IN THE PRESIDENT (SEE ZAMBIA, SECTION 49).

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2. IN GENERAL THE 1979 CONSTITUTION FOLLOWS THE PLAN OF THE PATTERN (DESPITE A PRESIDENT, IT IS BASED ON THE WESTMINSTER MODEL) THOUGH IN OBSESSIVE DETAIL (170 SECTIONS COMPARED WITH 125 FOR ZAMBIA AND 91 FOR GOLD COAST), BUT THERE ARE THE FOLLOWING UNUSUAL FEATURES:

A. 28 OUT OF 100 MEMBERS OF THE LOWER HOUSE OF THE LEGISLATURE ARE WHITES NOT ELECTED ON A COMMON ROLL:

B. DURING THE FIRST PARLIAMENT /5 YEARS, THE PRIME MINISTER HAS NOT A FREE CHOICE OF MINISTERS. HE MUST APPOINT IN PROPORTION TO SEATS HELD BY POLITICAL PARTIES IN LOWER HOUSE.

C. CHIEF JUSTICE APPOINTED ON ADVICE OF (IE IN ACCORDANCE WITH ADVICE OF) JUDICIAL SERVICE COMMISSION.

D. QUALIFICATIONS OF PUBLIC SERVICES COMMISSION SUCH AS TO INHIBIT APPOINTMENT OF AFRICANS TO THE HIGHER RANKS OF THE PUBLIC AND POLICE SERVICES. NO EXCEPTION OF TOP POSTS FROM APPOINTING POWERS OF PUBLIC SERVICES COMMISSION AND EXTENSION OF QUOTE JUDICIAL PROTECTION UNQUOTE OF TENURE OF OFFICE TO COMMISSIONER OF POLICE AND DIRECTOR OF PRISONS (ALSO TO ATTORNEY -GENERAL, BUT THIS IS EXPLICABLE SINCE HE HAS POWERS OF DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS). PSC VERY WIDE POWERS TO MAKE REGULATIONS FOR THE PUBLIC SERVICES.

E. BILL OF RIGHTS HEDGED BY UNUSUAL EXCEPTIONS, EG PREVENTIVE DETENTION OTHERWISE THAN IN AN EMERGENCY, COMPULSORY ACQUISITION OF PROPERTY SUBJECT TO JUDICIAL PROCESS, AND EXCLUSION OF EXISTING LAWS FROM SCRUTINY FOR PERIOD OF TEN YEARS.

F. 120 SECTIONS AND 2 SCHEDULES OF CONSTITUTION AND CERTAIN OTHER LAWS CAN ONLY BE AMENDED IF 78 MEMBERS OF LOWER HOUSE VOTED FOR THEM (IE THE WHITES CAN BLOCK SUCH AMENDMENTS); OTHER CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS REQUIRE TWO-THIRDS MAJORITY IN BOTH HOUSES. THE DETAIL IN WHICH THE CONSTITUTION IS WRITTEN (INCLUDING A PROVISION FOR AN OMBUDSMAN AND A VERY UNUSUAL SECTION ESTABLISHING A STATUTORY CORPORATION COMMISSION ON THE LINES OF THE PSC) MAKES THE PROVISION RESTRICTING AMENDMENT UNUSUALLY WIDE.

G. DETAILED PROVISION FOR APPOINTMENTS TO AND CONTROL OF ARMED FORCES, TO INSULATE THEM FROM MINISTERS (INCLUDING QUOTE JUDICIAL PROTECTION UNQUOTE OF TENURE OF COMMANDERS OF MILITARY FORCES').

ZAMBIA 1964

3. ZAMBIA BECAME INDEPENDENT AS A REPUBLIC WITH AN EXECUTIVE PRESIDENT:

A. PRESIDENT AND 75 MEMBERS OF UNI-CAMERAL LEGISLATURE ELECTED. PRESIDENT MAY NOMINATE UP TO 5 MEMBERS:

B. C. D. AND E. COMPARABLE WITH PATTERN (SAVE FOR AN EXCEPTION FOR RUSTICATION TO THE RIGHT OF PERSONAL LIBERTY). (IN THE NEW 1973 CONSTITUTION, ZAMBIA HAD BECOME A ONE-PARTY STATE WHERE THERE WAS A PRELIMINARY ELECTION FOR CANDIDATES FOR THE ASSEMBLY AND ALL QUOTE SPECIFIED UNQUOTE OFFICES WERE SUBJECT TO A QUOTE LEADERSHIP CODE UNQUOTE):

F. CONSTITUTION AMENDMENTS: TWO-THIRDS MEMBERS OF ASSEMBLY.

G. COMMAND OF, AND APPOINTMENTS TO, THE DEFENCE FORCES VESTED IN THE PRESIDENT.

4. TANGANYIKA BECAME INDEPENDENT AS A MONARCHY WITH A GOVERNOR-GENERAL AND PRIME MINISTER (WESTMINSTER PATTERN).

A. 71 ELECTED MEMBERS OF UNI-CAMERAL LEGISLATURE (OF WHOM, BY A SAVING PROVISION, 11 WERE ASIANS AND 10 EUROPEANS FOR THE FIRST PARLIAMENT) PLUS A POSSIBLE TEN MEMBERS NOMINATED BY THE PRIME MINISTER. IN POLITICAL TERMS, THE REPRESENTATION OF THE MINORITIES HAD LITTLE MEANING. ALL WERE MEMBERS OF TANU, NYERERE'S PARTY. OF MORE SIGNIFICANCE WAS THE 1964 INTERIM CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA UNDER WHICH 52 OUT OF 186 MEMBERS OF THE ASSEMBLY NOMINATED, NOT ELECTED, WITH THE AGREEMENT OF THE PRESIDENT OF ZANZIBAR (THUS GIVING ZANZIBAR WITH 3 PER CENT OF TOTAL POPULATION ALMOST 30 PER CENT OF PARLIAMENTARY SEATS).

B. C. AND D. ARE IN PATTERN. BUT LATER THERE WERE CONSIDERABLE POWERS TAKEN FOR AFRICANISATION OF THE PUBLIC SERVICES.

E. THERE WAS NEXT WORD UNDERLINED NO BILL OF RIGHTS. NYERERE INSISTED THAT IT WAS UNNECESSARY AND THAT THE STRONGEST SAFEGUARD OF INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS WAS A DEMOCRATIC ASSEMBLY. WITHIN THE NEXT 3 YEARS, PARLIAMENT ENACTED A PREVENTIVE DETENTION ACT (THE SWAPO DISSIDENTS WERE FLOWN TO TANZANIA TO BE HELD UNDER THIS ACT WHEN THEY APPLIED IN ZAMBIA FOR HABEAS CORPUS), A MINIMUM SENTENCES ACT WITH MANDATORY CORPORAL PUNISHMENT IN CERTAIN CASES (? SINCE REPEALED), CONSIDERABLE CHANGES IN THE LAW OF PROPERTY AND THE CONSOLIDATION OF THE TRADE UNION MOVEMENT IN A PARA-STATAL ORGANISATION WHERE THE MINISTER OF LABOUR WAS ALSO SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE TRADE UNION ORGANISATION.

F. ALTERATIONS OF CONSTITUTION REQUIRED TWO-THIRDS MAJORITY.

G. NO PROVISION IN CONSTITUTION FOR ARMED FORCES. WHEN TANZANIA BECAME A REPUBLIC, THE EXECUTIVE PRESIDENT BECAME COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF AND FUNCTIONS OF THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL WERE VESTED IN THE PRESIDENT.

BOTSWANA 1966

5. BOSWANA BECAME INDEPENDENT AS A REPUBLIC WITH AN EXECUTIVE ELECTED PRESIDENT.

A. 31 ELECTED, 4 SPECIALLY ELECTED MEMBERS AND THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL IN A UNI-CAMERAL LEGISLATURE:

B. AS PATTERN, WITH POSSIBILITY OF UP TO 4 MINISTERS/ASSISTANT MINISTERS WHO ARE NOT MEMBERS OF ASSEMBLY:

C. D. AND E. AS PATTERN (SAVE IN E. FOR AN EXCEPTION FOR RUSTICATION TO THE RIGHT OF PERSONAL LIBERTY):

F. ALTERATIONS OF CONSTITUTION TWO-THIRDS MAJORITY (PRECEDED, IF FOR ALTERATION SECTION, BY A REFERENDUM).

G. PRESIDENT HAS SUPREME COMMAND OF, AND POWER TO DIRECT AND MAKE APPOINTMENTS TO, THE ARMED FORCES.

KENYA 1963

6. KENYA BECAME INDEPENDENT AS A MONARCHY WITH A GOVERNOR-GENERAL AND PRIME MINISTER. THE INDEPENDENCE CONSTITUTION WAS CONSIDERABLY INFLATED BY PROVISIONS FOR REGIONS AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT-THE REGIONS HAVING THEIR OWN ASSEMBLIES.

A. A BI-CAMERAL LEGISLATURE: SENATE 41 ELECTED MEMBERS: HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES - BETWEEN 110 AND 130 ELECTED MEMBERS AND ONE-TENTH SPECIALLY ELECTED MEMBERS:

B. AS PATTERN:

COUNCIL (CONSISTING OF MINISTER AND REGIONAL REPRESENTATIVES) TO COORDINATE. INSPECTOR-GENERAL APPOINTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE ADVICE OF POLICE SERVICE COMMISSION. PUBLIC SERVICE; TOP APPOINTMENTS (ATTORNEY-GENERAL PERMANENT SECRETARIES, AMBASSADORS, ETC) APPOINTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE ADVICE OF PUBLIC SERVICES COMMISSION;

E. AS PATTERN, SAVE FOR EXCEPTION RE LIBERTY FOR RUSTICATION;

F. AMENDMENT OF CONSTITUTION: 3/4 OF ALL MEMBERS OF EACH HOUSE;

G. NO PROVISION.

7. WITH THE ADOPTION OF A REPUBLICAN CONSTITUTION, THE PROVISIONS FOR THE REGIONS AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT FALL AWAY, THE EXECUTIVE IS VESTED IN THE PRESIDENT AND THE LEGISLATURE BECOMES UNI-CAMERAL, WITH ELECTED AND 10 NOMINATED MEMBERS, PLUS THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL.

B. C. AND D. THEN REVERTED TO THE PATTERN.

F. AMENDMENT ON NOT LESS THAN 65 PER CENT OF ALL MEMBERS OF THE ASSEMBLY.

G. THE PRESIDENT BECOMES COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF.

NIGERIA 1960.

8. NIGERIA BECAME INDEPENDENT AS A MONARCHY OF A THREE-REGION, PLUS FEDERAL TERRITORY, FEDERATION.

A. A BI-CAMERAL LEGISLATION: SENATE - 12 SELECTED BY EACH REGIONAL LEGISLATURE; 4 FROM FEDERAL TERRITORY, PLUS 4 NOMINATED BY PRIME MINISTER; HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES - 305 ELECTED MEMBERS.

B. AND C. AS PATTERN.

D. INSPECTOR- GENERAL OF POLICE APPOINTED BY POLICE SERVICE COMMISSION NEXT TWO WORDS UNDERLINED AFTER CONSULTING PRIME MINISTER (COMPARABLE PROVISIONS FOR REGIONAL COMMISSIONERS AND PREMIERS OF REGIONS). CIVIL-PUBLIC SERVICE AS PATTERN.

E. A SOMEWHAT TERSER VERSION OF THE PATTERN THAN USUAL.

F. COMPLICATED, BUT BASICALLY TWO-THIRDS OF BOTH HOUSES PLUS, FOR MANY SECTIONS, RESOLUTIONS OF BOTH HOUSES OF AT LEAST TWO REGIONS.

G. NO PROVISION IN CONSTITUTION.

GHANA 1957.

9. THE GOLD COAST BECAME INDEPENDENT AS A MONARCHY (WESTMINSTER MODEL).

A. SPEAKER AND NOT LESS THAN 104 ELECTED MEMBERS IN A UNI-CAMERAL LEGISLATURE.

B. THE PATTERN, BUT RATHER MORE LACONIC THAN IT BECAME LATER.

C. AND D. AS PATTERN.

E. THERE WAS NO BILL OF RIGHTS IN THE CONSTITUTION.

F. AMENDMENT OF CONSTITUTION : TWO-THIRDS MAJORITY.

G. NO PROVISION RE THE ARMED FORCES.

MALAWI 1964.

10. MALAWI BECAME INDEPENDENT AS A MONARCHY (WESTMINSTER MODEL).

GENERAL ROLL AND 3 MEMBERS ELECTED ON SPECIAL ROLL (EUROPEANS).

B. C. AND D. AS PATTERN.

E. PATTERN, WITH COMMON FORM EXCEPTION FOR RUSTICATION.

F. AMENDMENT OF CONSTITUTION: TWO-THIRDS MAJORITY.

G. NO PROVISION RE THE ARMED FORCES.

MAURITIUS.

11. MAURITIUS BECAME INDEPENDENT AS A MONARCHY (WESTMINSTER MODEL)

A. UNI-CAMERAL LEGISLATURE OF 62 ELECTED MEMBERS AND 8 ADDITIONAL MEMBERS, ALLOCATED BETWEEN THE PARTIES BY THE ELECTORAL SUPERVISORY COMMISSION TO QUOTE ENSURE A FAIR AND ADEQUATE REPRESENTATION OF EACH COMMUNITY UNQUOTE. (THERE ARE FOUR: QUOTE A HINDU COMMUNITY, A MUSLIM COMMUNITY, AND A SINO-MAURITIAN COMMUNITY UNQUOTE, AND THE GENERAL POPULATION).

B. AND C. AS PATTERN (EXCEPT SENIOR PUISNE JUDGES APPOINTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH ADVICE OF CHIEF JUSTICE).

D. RELEVANT COMMISSION HAS POWER TO APPOINT TO TOP OFFICES BUT BEFORE APPOINTING COMMISSIONER OF POLICE, THE POLICE SERVICE COMMISSIONER MUST CONSULT PRIME MINISTER AND APPOINTMENTS TO SECRETARY TO CABINET, PERMANENT SECRETARY SHALL BE MADE WITH CONCURRENCE OF PRIME MINISTER.

E. PROVISION FOR PREVENTIVE DETENTION.

F. AMENDMENT OF CONSTITUTION: MAJORITY OF THREE-QUARTERS IN SOME CASES, TWO-THIRDS IN OTHERS.

G. NO PROVISION FOR ARMED FORCES.

SUMMARY OF UNUSUAL FEATURES.

12. A. THERE ARE A NUMBER OF PROVISIONS FOR SPECIAL CATEGORIES OF MEMBERS - SEE TANZANIA, MALAWI, MAURITIUS AND ALSO ZAMBIA AND KENYA.

B. -

C. SEE KENYA AND MAURITIUS.

D. SEE KENYA, NIGERIA AND IN PART MAURITIUS.

E. NO BILL OF RIGHTS: TANGANYIKA, GHANA.  
PREVENTIVE DETENTION: TANGANYIKE, MAURITIUS.

F. NONE OF THE CONSTITUTIONS IN PARAGRAPHS 3-11 ABOVE PRESCRIBE S 78 PER CENT, THOUGH A NUMBER PRESCRIBE 75 PER CENT. NONE, HOWEVER, PROVIDES AN OVERTLY RACIAL BLOCKING MECHANISM.

G. THERE ARE NO COMPARABLE PROVISIONS TO THOSE IN RHODESIA.

CARRINGTON

NNNN

SENT AT 2/30/2045Z JD



10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

30 July 1979

*Dear Charles.*

Now that Parliament has risen for the Recess, I should like to express to you, on behalf of the Government and of the Conservative Party, my warm thanks for your work as a member of the team which observed and reported on the Rhodesian elections last April. Your report has been of immense assistance to the Government during a Parliamentary period in which Southern Africa has in both Houses loomed so large.

We have made clear in Parliament that the cornerstone of our policy is the progress that has been made in Rhodesia as a result of the elections, and that it was your Report that enabled us to form the view that this progress marked a decisive step towards black majority rule and hence towards satisfying the Six Principles. But your Report has not only been influential in Parliament and in the UK. Throughout the world this has been read with interest and attention, as our Diplomatic Missions have testified to us, and it has shown more than any pronouncements by the British Government could have done to bring home to a world inclined to be sceptical that a significant change has taken place in Rhodesia.

We are now entering a decisive phase in our search for a settlement. I know that you, like the other members of the team, have excellent contacts in Rhodesia who will listen to what you have to say and respect your views. Anything you can do to persuade influential Rhodesians that the British Government is working with their best interests at heart will be of great help and I would much appreciate it.

*Yours sincerely*  
*Harold*

Sir Charles Johnston, TD.

HS

VLB



10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

30 July 1979

*Dear Mr.*

Now that Parliament has risen for the Recess, I should like to repeat in this letter the warm thanks which I have already expressed to you personally and in the House, on behalf both of the Government and of the Conservative Party, for your invaluable work as leader of the team which observed and reported on the Rhodesian elections last April. Your report has been of immense assistance to the Government during a Parliamentary period in which Southern Africa has in both Houses loomed so large.

We have made clear in Parliament that the cornerstone of our policy is the progress that has been made in Rhodesia as a result of the elections, and that it was your Report that enabled us to form the view that this progress marked a decisive step towards black majority rule and hence towards satisfying the Six Principles. But your Report has not only been influential in Parliament and in the UK. Throughout the world this has been read with interest and attention, as our Diplomatic Missions have testified to us, and it has shown more than any pronouncements by the British Government could have done to bring home to a world inclined to be sceptical that a significant change has taken place in Rhodesia.

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*Thank you for your kind letter. I will be in touch when we return from Durban.*

The Rt. Hon. Viscount Boyd of Merton, C.H.

*Your own  
Margaret*



10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

30 July 1979

Dear Mr. Hudson

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Yours sincerely  
Margaret Thatcher

Miles Hudson, Esq.

HS

VLB



10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

30 July 1979

*Dear Rodney,*

Now that Parliament has risen for the Recess, I should like to express to you, on behalf of the Government and of the Conservative Party, my warm thanks for your work as a member of the team which observed and reported on the Rhodesian elections last April. Your report has been of immense assistance during a Parliamentary period in which Southern Africa has in both Houses loomed so large.

We have made clear in Parliament that the cornerstone of our policy is the progress that has been made in Rhodesia as a result of the elections, and that it was your Report that enabled us to form the view that this progress marked a decisive step towards black majority rule and hence towards satisfying the Six Principles. But your Report has not only been influential in Parliament and in the UK. Throughout the world this has been read with interest and attention, as our Diplomatic Missions have testified to us, and it has shown more than any pronouncements by the British Government could have done to bring home to a world inclined to be sceptical that a significant change has taken place in Rhodesia.

We are now entering a decisive phase in our search for a settlement. I know that you, like the other members of the team, have excellent contacts in Rhodesia who will listen to what you have to say and respect your views. Anything you can do to persuade influential Rhodesians that the British Government is working with their best interests at heart will be of great help and I would much appreciate it.

*Yours ever*  
*Harold Wilson*

The Lord Elton

HLB



VLB



10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

30 July 1979

*Dear Mr. Drinkwater,*

Now that Parliament has risen for the Recess, I should like to express to you, on behalf of the Government, my warm thanks for your work as a member of the team which observed and reported on the Rhodesian elections last April. Your report has been of immense assistance to the Government during a Parliamentary period in which Southern Africa has in both Houses loomed so large.

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We are now entering a decisive phase in our search for a settlement and I am very much aware of the difficult decisions that lie ahead. In making them the first-hand account which your own report gave will be invaluable.

*Yours sincerely,  
Margaret Thatcher*

John Drinkwater, Esq., Q.C.

HLB



10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

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Now that Parliament has risen for the Recess, I should like to express to you, on behalf of the Government, my warm thanks for your work as a member of the team which observed and reported on the Rhodesian elections last April. Your report has been of immense assistance to the Government during a Parliamentary period in which Southern Africa has in both Houses loomed so large.

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We are now entering a decisive phase in our search for a settlement. ~~I know that you, like the other members of the team, have excellent contacts in Rhodesia who will listen to what you have to say and respect your views. Anything you can do to persuade influential Rhodesians that the British Government is working with their best interests at heart will be of great help and I would much appreciate it.~~ and I am very much aware of the difficult decision

that lies ahead. In making  
them the first hand account which  
your own report give

John Drinkwater, Esq., Q.C. will be  
involved.

LUSFO 003/30

PP LAGOS

PP FCO

RR MIRIMBA SALISBURY

GRS 150

CONFIDENTIAL

FM LUSAKA 302325Z JUL 79

TO PRIORITY LAGOS

TELEGRAM NUMBER 002 OF 30 JULY

INFO FCO, ROUTINE MIRIMBA SALISBURY

FROM SECRETARY OF STATE

YOUR TELNO 488 TO FCO: RHODESIA

1. THE POINTS IN YOUR PARAGRAPH 4 ARE WELL TAKEN.
2. THE PRIME MINISTER IS HOWEVER CONSCIOUS OF THE RISK THAT A MEETING WITH OBASANJO WOULD RESULT IN HIM LAYING DOWN CONDITIONS FOR A SETTLEMENT WHICH WE SHOULD HAVE TO REFUSE. A CALL AT LAGOS IS NOT ENTIRELY RULED OUT BUT THE PRIME MINISTER WISHES TO ASSESS THE ATMOSPHERE AT LUSAKA BEFORE TAKING A DECISION.
3. MEANWHILE IT WOULD BE HELPFUL IF, (NEXT THREE WORDS UNDERLINED) WITHOUT MAKING ENQUIRIES, YOU WOULD KEEP YOUR EARS OPEN FOR ANY INDICATION OF ABASANJO'S MOVEMENTS. WOULD HE, AS FAR AS YOU KNOW, BE FREE TO SEE THE PRIME MINISTER IF SHE OFFERED TO COME TO LAGOS ON 8 AUGUST? IF THE PRIME MINISTER DID GO TO LAGOS, IT WOULD NOT BE HER INTENTION TO STAY LONGER THAN THE TIME REQUIRED FOR A MEETING.

ALLINSON

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*Butler*

*BYM*  
*3/17*

SUBJECT

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FM YAOUNDE 301400Z JUL 79  
TO IMMEDIATE FCO  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 90 OF 30 JUL 79

PRIME MINISTER'S  
PERSONAL MESSAGE  
SERIAL No. 754/79T

754/79T

MY TELNO 88  
ZIMBABWE RHODESIA

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF MESSAGE TO PRIME MINISTER FROM CANADIAN  
PRIME MINISTER,  
BEGINS

THANK YOU VERY MUCH FOR YOUR MESSAGE ABOUT THE HANDLING OF THE  
RHODESIAN ISSUE AT LUSAKA, AND FOR THE TEXT OF YOUR JULY 25  
STATEMENT TO THE HOUSE OF COMMONS. THE INFORMATION YOU HAVE  
PROVIDED ON THE MANNER IN WHICH YOU INTEND TO PROCEED IS MOST  
HELPFUL. I FULLY AGREE WITH YOU THAT THE LUSAKA MEETING SHOULD  
ACHIEVE A GOOD RESULT ON RHODESIA. WE TOO ARE ANXIOUS TO DO  
WHAT WE CAN AT LUSAKA TO THIS END.

I SHALL BE LOOKING FORWARD TO DISCUSSING THIS MATTER WITH YOU  
BEFORE THE SOUTHERN AFRICA ITEM COMES UP IN PLENARY.

WITH BEST WISHES

YOURS SINCERELY

JOE CLARK

ENDS

RICHARDS

[COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING STREET]

FILES

RHODESIA D  
OADs  
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PS  
PS/LPS  
PS/MR LUCE  
PS/PUS  
SIR A DUFF  
MR WILLIAMS  
MR WILLSON

CONFIDENTIAL

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00 LUSAKA

GR 330

CONFIDENTIAL

FM SINGAPORE 300420Z JUL

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 273 OF 30 JUL 79

AND TO IMMEDIATE LUSAKA.

*Heck au  
Be. Pm has  
Seen*

*Atam*

*Prime Minister*

*BLW  
31/6*

YOUR TELS 177 AND 173: RHODESIA.

1. I DELIVERED PRIME MINISTER'S MESSAGE TO MR LEE ON MORNING OF 23 JULY. (I HAD SENT HIM TEXT OF THE PRIME MINISTER'S HOUSE OF COMMONS SPEECH OF 25 JULY ON THE PREVIOUS DAY).

2. LEE DID NOT COMMENT ON THE MESSAGE WHEN I SAW HIM OFF AT THE AIRPORT LATER THAT DAY. EARLIER, HOWEVER, HE HAD COMMENTED TO ME THAT IF COMMONWEALTH COUNTRIES WERE TO GO ALONG WITH THE LAPSE OF SANCTIONS SHOULD THE LEGISLATION NOT BE RENEWED IN NOVEMBER, IT WAS IMPORTANT THAT THEIR LEADERS SHOULD BE CONVINCED THAT THE CHANGES TO BE MADE IN THE RHODESIA CONSTITUTION WOULD BE RADICAL AND SUFFICIENT TO MAKE IT UNREASONABLE FOR THE EXTERNAL PARTIES NOT TO TAKE PART IN A PEACEFUL SOLUTION.

3. I HAD REPLIED THAT CHANGING THE CONSTITUTION TO ENABLE IT TO PASS MUSTER WITH THE SIX PRINCIPLES DID NOT INVOLVE TOTAL REWRITING. THERE HAD ALWAYS BEEN A LARGE MEASURE OF COMMON GROUND BETWEEN US AND THE RHODESIANS IN PREVIOUS CONSTITUTIONAL PROPOSALS, BUT NEGOTIATIONS HAD FOUNDERED ON THOSE SENSITIVE PROVISIONS NECESSARY TO ENSURE SATISFACTION OF THE PRINCIPLES. BUT IF WE FOUND THOSE PRINCIPLES SATISFIED IT FOLLOWED THAT WE SHOULD CONFER LEGAL INDEPENDENCE IN DISCHARGE OF OUR CONSTITUTIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES. PREVIOUSLY WE HAD EXCEPTIONALLY BEEN PREPARED TO CONCEDE INDEPENDENCE BEFORE MAJORITY RULE HAD BEEN ATTAINED. THAT POSITION HAD SHIFTED BECAUSE OF THE CHANGES THAT HAD OCCURRED WITH RHODESIA: THERE WAS NOW THE PROPECT THAT WE COULD CONFER INDEPENDENCE IN CONFORMITY WITH THE PRINCIPLES IN CONDITIONS OF MAJORITY RULE.

HENNINGS

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FM F C O 301823Z JUL 79  
TO IMMEDIATE LUSAKA  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 545 OF 30 JULY

FOLLOWING FOR PRIVATE SECRETARY FROM RHODESIA DEPT.  
RHODESIA: NON-RENEWAL OF THE SOUTHERN RHODESIA ACT 1965.  
WE WERE ASKED TO CONSIDER WHAT IT WOULD BE OPEN TO THE OPPOSITION  
TO DO IN THE AUTUMN IF IT BECAME PLAIN THAT THE GOVERNMENT WAS NOT  
PREPARED TO LAY A DRAFT ORDER FOR THE EXTENSION OF SECTION 2 OF  
THE SOUTHERN RHODESIA ACT 1965, IN CIRCUMSTANCES IN WHICH THE  
OPPOSITION DID NOT REPEAT NOT CONSIDER THE LIFTING OF SANCTIONS  
JUSTIFIED.

2. THE SIMPLEST FORM OF ACTION OPEN TO THE OPPOSITION WOULD BE  
TO EMBARRASS THE GOVERNMENT BY MOTIONS FOR ADJOURNMENT AND OTHER  
DEBATES ON ITS GENERAL CONDUCT OF RHODESIAN AFFAIRS. IT COULD  
ALSO SEEK TO FORCE THE GOVERNMENT'S HAND IN RELATION TO SANCTIONS  
(IE THROUGH A SPECIFIC MOTION TO THE EFFECT THAT, HAVING REGARD  
TO THE SITUATION AND OUR OBLIGATIONS UNDER ARTICLE 25 OF THE  
UN CHARTER, THE HOUSE WOULD WELCOME THE LAYING OF A DRAFT ORDER TO  
EXTEND SECTION 2 OF THE 1965 ACT). THIS IS PERHAPS UNLIKELY,  
SINCE IT WOULD MEAN AN ATTEMPT TO PRE-EMPT THE GOVERNMENT'S  
CONDUCT OF FOREIGN POLICY. BUT A PRIVATE MEMBER COULD TABLE SUCH  
A MOTION EVEN IF THE OFFICIAL OPPOSITION DID NOT.

3. SUCH A MOTION IS, WE THINK, THE MOST THAT COULD BE CONTEMPLATED  
BY A PRIVATE MEMBER OR MEMBERS, WHETHER OR NOT THEY ARE PRIVY  
COUNCILLORS. THERE IS, APPARENTLY, A DOCTRINE WHICH WOULD INHIBIT  
A PRIVATE MEMBER, EVEN IF A PRIVY COUNCILLOR, FROM HIMSELF LAYING  
A DRAFT OF AN ORDER TO EXTEND SECTION 2 OF THE 1965 ACT. (WE BELIEVE  
THAT THERE WAS CORRESPONDENCE IN 1967 BETWEEN THE HOUSE OF LORDS  
AND THE PRIVY COUNCIL OFFICE CONCERNING A PROPOSAL BY A MEMBER  
OF THE LORDS, WHO WAS ALSO A PRIVY COUNCILLOR, TO LAY AN ORDER  
IN DRAFT TO BRING THE EASTER ACT 1928 INTO FORCE. THE AUTHORITIES  
OF THE HOUSE OF LORDS CAME TO THE VIEW THAT MEMBERS OF THE PRIVY  
COUNCIL WHO WERE NOT MEMBERS OF THE GOVERNMENT HAD NO RIGHT  
OF INITIATIVE IN RELATION TO ORDERS IN COUNCIL, AND THAT IT  
FOLLOWED THAT DRAFT ORDERS COULD ONLY BE INITIATED BY MINISTERS.  
IN THE EVENT, NO ORDER IN COUNCIL WAS MADE UNDER THE EASTER ACT.  
WE ARE CHECKING THIS.)

CARRINGTON

NNNN



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

27 July 1979

*Dear Bryan*

*MAP*

Trade Unionism in Rhodesia

You wrote on 18 July enclosing a copy of Professor Hutchinson's letter of 9 July to the Prime Minister (copied to Mr Prior) about encouraging trade unionism in Rhodesia.

I now enclose a copy of Rhodesia Department's / reply, on which the Department of Employment were consulted.

I am copying this letter to Ian Fair at the Department of Employment.

*Yours ever,  
Stephen.*

J S Wall

B G Cartledge Esq  
10 Downing Street



**Foreign and Commonwealth Office**  
London SW1A 2AH

Telephone 01- 233 8149

Prof John Hutchinson  
Graduate School of Management  
University of California at Los Angeles  
Los Angeles  
CALIFORNIA 90024

Your reference

Our reference

Date

27 July 1979

*Dear Professor Hutchinson,*

Thank you for your letter of 9 July to the Prime Minister, to which I have been asked to reply.

Over the past year or so, we understand that there have been some efforts, albeit piecemeal, by Western European and American trade union organisations to help the development of trade unionism in Rhodesia. No doubt such contacts will increase once Rhodesia has become a legally independent state.

As I am sure you are aware, it is the British Government's aim to bring Rhodesia to legal independence on a basis which we believe should be acceptable both to the people of Rhodesia and to the international community. The Government intend, after the Commonwealth Heads of Government meeting is over, to put forward firm proposals to achieve a proper basis for legal independence for Rhodesia. Following a settlement of this kind, there would certainly be scope for contacts of all kinds with a view to promoting a stable and prosperous Rhodesia. We share your belief that a democratic and unified trade union movement could make a major contribution to the country's future.

*Yours sincerely,*

Miss R J Spencer  
Rhodesia Department



CONFIDENTIAL



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

27 July 1979

Dear Byza,

*Handwritten:* G.A.  
Byza  
9/7

Rhodesia

I enclose:

- / (a) a suggested timetable for the period between now and the possible constitutional conference;
- / (b) a note on the most important of the changes that we would wish to see made to the Constitution.

Both these papers are obviously illustrative rather than definitive; but we hope they will help consideration of the steps to be taken.

*Handwritten:* Jan eve,  
*Signature:* J S Wall

J S Wall

B G Cartledge Esq  
10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL



Prime Minister

Treasury Chambers, Parliament Street, SW1P 3AG  
01-233 3000

To be aware

27 July 1979

BM  
27/7

*Des P. etc*

*[Handwritten signature]*

RHODESIA : DEBTS TO THE UK

I hesitate to bother you with this subject just before Lusaka, especially as I know you are mindful of the need to safeguard our economic interests consistently with pursuing our strategy for bringing Rhodesia to legal independence. That is why I did not raise at OD the question of the debts outstanding to the UK from before UDI. I mention them now only because of the very large amounts at stake.

Arrears of about £100 million in service payments due on these debts remain outstanding, and there are large payments also due on the same debts in the future. About half the arrears are due to private creditors in the UK; I believe the Council of Foreign Bondholders, who represent the interests of most of them, have already been in touch with your people, and are contemplating early talks with the authorities in Salisbury. The remaining arrears are owed to HMG. Rhodesia's economy is in a mess, and they will clearly need time before they can pay the arrears and service payments on the amounts due in the future. All the same, I am sure that we must make sure at the outset that the new authorities accept liability for servicing these debts.

We therefore need to establish the new authorities' responsibility for these debts in the legal arrangements governing a constitutional settlement, in the form of a commitment to honour the external debt obligations of the pre-UDI Rhodesian Government. Quite apart from the large sums involved, I am sure that domestic criticism of a constitutional settlement would be fuelled by any failure on our part to clarify the position on debts. In due course, we shall also need to ensure that the respective interests of the private creditors and of HMG are duly co-ordinated in any related negotiations with the Rhodesians.

I am copying this letter to the Prime Minister, other members of OD, and to Sir John Hunt.

*[Handwritten signature]*  
(GEOFFREY HOWE)

The Rt. Hon. The Lord Carrington, KCMG, MC.

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JUL 1979

[RHODESIA: POLICY: ADVANCE COPIES]

PS (4)  
PS/SIR I GILMOUR  
PS/MR LUCE  
PS/PUS  
SIR A DUFF  
MR WILLSON  
MR WILLIAMS

ADVANCE COPY

PS/NO 10 DOWNING STREET (1)

... ..  
... ..

IMMEDIATE

MR R L WADE-GERY  
MR P M MAXEY  
COL MOIR  
MR P J FOWLER  
DIO  
SIR J HUNT

CABINET  
OFFICE

HD/RHODESIA D (3)  
HD/C AF D  
HD/S AF D  
HD/UND  
HD/NEWS D  
HD/WAD

FOR ZIMBABWE DEVELOPMENTS FUND

ADD MR LYNCH ODM

MR SLATER TREASURY

MR FREELAND  
LEGAL ADVISER RM K200A

MR FIFOOT  
LEGAL ADVISER RM K164

RESIDENT CLERK

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GRS 105

CONFIDENTIAL

FM OTTAWA 271945Z JUL 79

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 326 OF 27 JULY

YOUR TELNOS 211 AND 215 : RHODESIA

1. UNFORTUNATELY MR CLARK AND MISS MACDONALD HAVE ALREADY LEFT ON AN OFFICIAL VISIT TO THE CAMEROON FROM 28-31 JULY, AFTER WHICH THEY WILL GO STRAIGHT ON TO THE CHGM (THEY WILL BE GOING ON TO TANZANIA AND KENYA AFTER THE CHGM FROM AUGUST 9-11).

2. WE DELIVERED THE TEXT OF MRS THATCHER'S SPEECH OF 25 JULY ABOUT SOUTHERN AFRICA TO THE DEA YESTERDAY, BUT THIS WAS TOO LATE TO GET IT INTO MISS MACDONALD'S BRIEFING.

3. IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE TO PASS A COPY OF THE SPEECH AND OF MRS THATCHER'S MESSAGE IN YOUR SECOND TUR THROUGH THE BRITISH AND CANADIAN EMBASSIES IN YAOUNDE.

FORD

na MAP

CONFIDENTIAL

GRS 80  
CONFIDENTIAL  
DESKBY 280700Z  
FM FCO 271806Z JUL 79  
TO IMMEDIATE LAGOS  
TELNO 438 OF 27 JULY  
INFO CANBERRA

VISIT OF AUSTRALIAN PRIME MINISTER TO NIGERIA: RHODESIA.

1. MIFT CONTAINS THE TEXT OF A PERSONAL MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO MR FRASER ABOUT RHODESIA. COULD YOU ARRANGE FOR IT TO BE DELIVERED TO MR FRASER AS SOON AS POSSIBLE AFTER HIS ARRIVAL IN LAGOS ON 28 JULY. PLEASE ALSO ENSURE THAT HIS PARTY HAVE COPIES OF THE PRIME MINISTER'S SPEECH OF 25 JULY ON SOUTHERN AFRICA (VS 046/79).

CARRINGTON

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PLANNING STAFF  
ES & SD  
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LEGAL ADVS (MR. FREELAND)  
(MR. FIPOLT)  
ECCN D  
P & CD  
SPD

DEF D  
OID  
PS  
PS/SIR I GILMOUR  
PS/MR. LUCE  
PS/MR. RIDLEY  
PS/MR. HURD  
PS/PUS  
SIR A DUFF  
SIR A PARSONS  
LORD N G LENNOX  
MISS BROWN  
MR. THOMAS  
MR. WILLSON  
MR. WILLIAMS

ADDITIONAL DISTN.  
RHODESIA POLICY

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DESKBY 280700Z  
FM FCO 271807Z JUL 79  
TO IMMEDIATE LAGOS  
TELNO 439 OF 27 JULY  
INFO CANBERRA

PRIME MINISTER'S  
PERSONAL MESSAGE  
SERIAL No. 750A/79T

MIPT: PERSONAL MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO MR FRASER.

1. TEXT IS AS FOLLOWS:

DEAR MALCOLM,

AS YOU KNOW, I FOUND OUR DISCUSSIONS IN CANBERRA ABOUT RHODESIA PARTICULARLY VALUABLE. THANK YOU FOR KEEPING CLOSELY IN TOUCH SINCE THEN THROUGH ANDREW PEACOCK.

PETER CARRINGTON TALKED TO ANDREW PEACOCK ON 24 JULY ABOUT THE BEST WAY TO HANDLE THIS QUESTION AT LUSAKA AND I THOUGHT IT MIGHT BE USEFUL IF I BROUGHT YOU UP TO DATE WITH OUR THINKING BEFORE YOU SEE GENERAL OBASANJO. I SHALL OF COURSE BE INTERESTED IN ANYTHING YOU CAN TELL US ABOUT HIS PRESENT VIEWS ON RHODESIA.

WE SHALL DO ALL WE CAN TO EXPLAIN OUR APPROACH ON RHODESIA FRANKLY TO THE COMMONWEALTH AT LUSAKA, AND TO GAIN THEIR UNDERSTANDING. WE SHALL SHOW THAT WE WISH TO DEAL WITH THE UNDERSTANDABLE CONCERNS OF THE COMMONWEALTH. WE SHALL CONTINUE TO EMPHASISE THAT IT IS IMPORTANT FOR RHODESIA THAT ANY SETTLEMENT SHOULD BE ACCEPTED INTERNATIONALLY, AND THAT WE ARE SEEKING TO INVOLVE THE PATRIOTIC FRONT. AT THE SAME TIME, I AM CONVINCED IT WOULD BE A MISTAKE TO LET THE COMMONWEALTH MEETING DEVELOP INTO A NEGOTIATING FORUM ABOUT THE SPECIFIC PROPOSALS FOR A SETTLEMENT. THIS WOULD MAKE IT MUCH MORE DIFFICULT TO ACHIEVE A FAIR AND GENERALLY ACCEPTABLE SOLUTION. IT MUST BE FOR THE UNITED KINGDOM TO TAKE THE LEAD WHILE DEMONSTRATING TO ALL CONCERNED THAT WE ARE GENUINELY TAKING ACCOUNT OF THEIR VIEWS.

I SET OUT OUR GENERAL APPROACH IN MY SPEECH IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS ON 25 JULY. I STRESSED THAT WE WISHED TO HELP THOSE WHO ACCEPTED DEMOCRATIC AND PEACEFUL WAYS OF RESOLVING THE PROBLEM; THAT WE SHOULD CONTINUE TO BE GUIDED BY THE SIX PRINCIPLES; THAT WE WERE WHOLLY COMMITTED TO GENUINE BLACK MAJORITY RULE IN RHODESIA;

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/AND THAT

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AND THAT WE WOULD AIM TO MAKE OUR PROPOSALS COMPARABLE TO THE BASIS ON WHICH INDEPENDENCE WAS GRANTED TO OTHER FORMER BRITISH TERRITORIES IN AFRICA. SOME OF OUR COMMONWEALTH PARTNERS, INCLUDING NIGERIA, HAVE SAID THAT THEY WILL ACCEPT ANY GOVERNMENT IN SALISBURY WHICH HAS A PROPER DEMOCRATIC AND CONSTITUTIONAL BASIS, AND THAT THEIR OBJECTION TO BISHOP MUZOREWA'S ADMINISTRATION IS THAT THEY DO NOT CONSIDER IT TO HAVE BEEN ESTABLISHED IN A FULLY DEMOCRATIC MANNER. THOUGH THE OUTCOME OF THE OAU SUMMIT AT MONROVIA IS DISCOURAGING, I HOPE THAT THESE GOVERNMENTS WILL ACCEPT THAT OUR INTENTION TO ACHIEVE A DEMOCRATIC AND CONSTITUTIONAL SETTLEMENT IS RIGHT AND WILL SEE THE STRENGTH OF OUR ARGUMENT THAT THOSE WHO HAVE SO FAR SOUGHT TO BRING MAJORITY RULE BY FORCE SHOULD NOW PARTICIPATE IN A DEMOCRATIC AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROCESS.

I HOPE YOU WILL EMPHASISE TO GENERAL OBASANJO THAT THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT ARE NOT GOING TO LUSAKA WITH THEIR MINDS MADE UP ON THE PRECISE TERMS OF A SETTLEMENT. I HAVE DESCRIBED IN MY SPEECH THE PRINCIPLES BY WHICH WE SHALL BE GUIDED. BUT WE HAVE DELIBERATELY REFRAINED FROM PUTTING FORWARD SPECIFIC PROPOSALS UNTIL WE HAVE HAD A CHANCE TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF THE DISCUSSIONS AT LUSAKA.

I VERY MUCH LOOK FORWARD TO SEEING YOU THERE AND TO HAVING AN EARLY TALK.

WITH BEST WISHES,

YOURS SINCERELY,  
MARGARET THATCHER.

CARRINGTON

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PLANNING STAFF  
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(MR. FIFOOT)  
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PS/MR. RIDLEY  
PS/MR. HURD  
PS/PUS  
SIR A DUFF  
SIR A PARSONS  
LORD N G LENNOX  
MISS BROWN  
MR. THOMAS  
MR. WILLSON  
MR. WILLIAMS  
CONFIDENTIAL

ADDITIONAL DISTN.  
RHODESIA POLICY

CONFIDENTIAL



~~Prime Minister~~

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

Agree to send here  
two messages? yes

London SW1A 2AH

Dear Bryan,

27/7 27 July 1979

PM has seen and agrees,  
+ a similar message to  
Clark. FCO informed -

Rhodesia

27/7  
P.A.

Lord Carrington thinks it would be useful to send personal messages on Rhodesia to certain Heads of Government before they or their delegations reach Lusaka.

The Australian Prime Minister will be visiting Lagos from 28 July. His discussions with General Obasanjo may influence the Nigerian approach to the Commonwealth Meeting. Lord Carrington recommends that the Prime Minister should send a personal message to Mr Fraser, to follow up recent exchanges with the Australian Government on this subject (and to reach him before his meeting with General Obasanjo). The proposed text of the message is in the attached draft telegram to Lagos.

The Prime Minister of Singapore told the British High Commissioner on 19 July that he hoped we would give him a "confidential assessment" of how we intended to play the Lusaka meeting. Mr Lee Kuan Yew, who could have an important moderating influence at Lusaka, would certainly appreciate a personal message from the Prime Minister before his departure. A text is proposed in the enclosed draft telegram to Singapore.

The Canadian Foreign Minister indicated to Mr Blaker on 21 July that she was keen to be kept up to date on our policy on Rhodesia. Lord Carrington does not consider a personal message from the Prime Minister to Mr Clark to be necessary, but is sending separate instructions to the High Commissioner to brief Miss MacDonald. He is also sending instructions to Sir J Thomson to brief the Indians (in view of the change of Government it seems best for him to do this orally, rather than to send a message).

I should be grateful if you could let me know whether the Prime Minister approves of the proposed messages. It should not be necessary to send signed copies to follow delivery of the telegrams, as the Prime Minister will be seeing Mr Fraser and Mr Lee Kuan Yew in Lusaka. The message to Mr Fraser will need to be despatched this evening, Friday 27 July, if it is to be sure of reaching him before he sees the Nigerian Head of State.

Just even,  
Stephen

(J S Wall)  
Private Secretary

B G Cartledge Esq  
10 Downing Street  
LONDON

CONFIDENTIAL



11 12 11 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

27 JUL 1979

File No.....

Department .....

Drafted by  
(Block Capitals) .....

Tel. Extn.....

OUTWARD

TELEGRAM

Security Classification CONFIDENTIAL
Precedence IMMEDIATE
DESKBY <del>27 2200</del> 28 0750 Z

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COMMS. DEPT.  
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TO IMMEDIATE LAGOS  
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REPEATED TO (for info) ROUTINE CANBERRA

SAVING TO (for info) .....

Distribution:-

Files

Rhodesia <sup>Poker</sup> Dept

[TEXT]

VISIT OF AUSTRALIAN PRIME MINISTER TO NIGERIA :  
RHODESIA

1. MIFT contains the text of a personal message from the Prime Minister to Mr Fraser about Rhodesia. Could you arrange for it to be delivered to Mr Fraser as soon as possible after his arrival in Lagos on 28 July. <sup>Please</sup> ~~Could~~ you also ensure that his party have copies of the Prime Minister's speech of 25 July on Southern Africa (VS 046/79).

Copies to:-

File No.....

Department .....

Drafted by  
(Block Capitals) .....

Tel. Extn.....

OUTWARD  
TELEGRAM

Security Classification
CONFIDENTIAL
Precedence
IMMEDIATE
DESKBY .....Z

FOR COMMS. DEPT. USE	Despatched (Date) ..... (Time) .....Z	POSTBY .....Z
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PREAMBLE

(Time of Origin) ..... Z (G.M.T.) (Restrictive Prefix).....  
 (Security Class.) ...CONFIDENTIAL... (Caveat/  
 Privacy marking) .....  
 (Codeword) ..... (Deskby)..... Z

TO IMMEDIATE LAGOS Tel. No. .... of .....  
 (precedence) (post)

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REPEATED TO (for info) .....ROUTINE..CANBERRA.....

SAVING TO (for info) .....

Distribution:-

Rhodesia Policy  
SPD

Copies to:-

[TEXT]

MIPT: PERSONAL MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO  
MR FRASER

1. Text is as follows:

Dear Malcolm

As you know, I found our discussions in Canberra about Rhodesia particularly valuable. Thank you for keeping closely in touch since then through Andrew Peacock.

Peter Carrington talked to Andrew Peacock on 24 July about the best way to handle this question at Lusaka and I thought it might be useful if I brought

/you

you up to date with our thinking before you see General Obasanjo. I shall of course be interested in anything you can tell us about his present views on Rhodesia.

We shall do all we can to explain our approach on Rhodesia frankly to the Commonwealth at Lusaka, and to gain their understanding. We shall show that we wish to deal with the understandable concerns of the Commonwealth. We shall continue to emphasise that it is important for Rhodesia that any settlement should be accepted internationally, and that we are seeking to involve the Patriotic Front. At the same time, I am convinced it would be a mistake to let the Commonwealth Meeting develop into a negotiating forum about the specific proposals for a settlement. This would make it much more difficult to achieve a fair and generally acceptable solution. It must be for the United Kingdom to take the lead while demonstrating to all concerned that we are genuinely taking account of their views.

I set out our general approach in my speech in the House of Commons on 25 July. I stressed that we wished to help those who accepted democratic and peaceful ways of resolving the problem; that we should continue to be guided by the Six Principles; that we were wholly committed to genuine black majority rule in

/Rhodesia

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

Rhodesia; and that we would aim to make our proposals comparable to the basis on which independence was granted to other former British territories in Africa. Some of our Commonwealth partners, including Nigeria, have said that they will accept any government in Salisbury which has a proper democratic and constitutional basis, and that their objection to Bishop Muzorewa's administration is that they do not consider it to have been established in a fully democratic manner. Though the outcome of the OAU Summit at Monrovia is discouraging, I hope that these governments will accept that our intention to achieve a democratic and constitutional settlement is right; and will see the strength of our argument that those who have so far sought to bring majority rule by force should now participate in a democratic and constitutional process.

I hope you will emphasise to General Obasanjo that the British Government are not going to Lusaka with their minds made up on the precise terms of a settlement. I have described in my speech the principles by which we shall be guided. But we have deliberately refrained from putting forward specific proposals until we have had a chance to take account of the discussions at Lusaka.

I very much look forward to seeing you there and to having an early talk.

With best wishes

Yours sincerely

Margaret Thatcher

File No. ....  
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Drafted by .....  
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TELEGRAM

Security Classification CONFIDENTIAL
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FOR COMMS. DEPT. USE	Despatched (Date) ..... (Time) .....Z	POSTBY .....Z
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TO IMMEDIATE SINGAPORE Tel. No. ....of .....  
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Distribution:-

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Rhodesia Dept  
Policy

SE Asia D.

Copies to:-

[TEXT]

YOUR TEL NO 260 : RHODESIA

- The Prime Minister has decided to send a personal message to Mr Lee Kuan Yew to follow up her discussion with him on 20 June about Rhodesia. The text is in MIFT. Grateful if you could deliver this to Mr Lee Kuan Yew as soon as possible, together with the text of the Prime Minister's speech of 25 July (VS046/79).

File No. ....

Department .....

Drafted by .....

(Block Capitals) .....

Tel. Extn. ....

OUTWARD

TELEGRAM

Security Classification CONFIDENTIAL
Precedence IMMEDIATE
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TO IMMEDIATE SINGAPORE (precedence) (post) Tel. No. ....of .....

AND TO (precedence/post) .....

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SAVING TO (for info) .....

Distribution:-

Rhodesia Policy  
SE Asia Dept

[TEXT]

MIPT: RHODESIA

1. Text of the Prime Minister's personal message to Mr Lee Kuan Yew is as follows:

I am glad we have been able to keep in close touch about the Commonwealth Meeting and the Rhodesia problem. Our talk about this when you were here in June was particularly useful. John Hennings will have given you a copy of my speech on Southern Africa of 25 July. It may be helpful if I let you know briefly how we intend to proceed at Lusaka.

/We have

Copies to:-

We have made clear our intention to take account of Commonwealth feeling on Rhodesia. In return we look to the Commonwealth to show understanding that the United Kingdom is seeking a fair and democratic settlement. A settlement which allowed those who rely on force to achieve their ends rather than those who seek to advance their cause by democratic and constitutional means would be manifestly unjust.

At Lusaka we shall show that we wish to deal with the understandable concern of the Commonwealth, for example about the extent of the protection given to the white minority in the present Rhodesian Constitution. We shall continue to emphasise that we shall be guided by the Six Principles accepted by successive British Governments; that we are aiming to make proposals comparable to the basis on which independence was granted to other former British territories in Africa; and that we are seeking to involve the Patriotic Front. We shall not try to negotiate specific proposals for a settlement at Lusaka; I am convinced this will only make a settlement harder to achieve. We shall deliberately refrain from putting forward proposals until we have had a chance to take account of the discussions at Lusaka.

I am looking forward very much to seeing you there. I hope we shall have a chance to discuss Rhodesia privately before the plenary session. I understand that Sonny Ramphal

/ hopes

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN



hopes that the discussion on Rhodesia will start on the afternoon of Friday 3 August. I think this makes good sense and will enable us to talk about other subjects before then. It is important to achieve a good result on Rhodesia<sup>and</sup> to avoid the entire meeting being dominated by South<sup>or</sup> African issues. But I know I am preaching to the converted on that score.

With best wishes

Yours sincerely

Margaret Thatcher

SUBJECT

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DESKBY 280030Z

FM FCO 271805Z JUL 79

TO IMMEDIATE SINGAPORE

TELNO 178 OF 27 JULY

PRIME MINISTER'S  
PERSONAL MESSAGE  
SERIAL No. T-508/79T

CP 020/16	
30 JUL 1979	

MIPT: RHODESIA.

1. TEXT OF THE PRIME MINISTER'S PERSONAL MESSAGE TO MR LEE KUAN YEW IS AS FOLLOWS:

I AM GLAD WE HAVE BEEN ABLE TO KEEP IN CLOSE TOUCH ABOUT THE COMMONWEALTH MEETING AND THE RHODESIA PROBLEM. OUR TALK ABOUT THIS WHEN YOU WERE HERE IN JUNE WAS PARTICULARLY USEFUL. JOHN HENNINGS WILL HAVE GIVEN YOU A COPY OF MY SPEECH ON SOUTHERN AFRICA OF 25 JULY. IT MAY BE HELPFUL IF I LET YOU KNOW BRIEFLY HOW WE INTEND TO PROCEED AT LUSAKA.

WE HAVE MADE CLEAR OUR INTENTION TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF COMMONWEALTH FEELING ON RHODESIA. IN RETURN WE LOOK TO THE COMMONWEALTH TO SHOW UNDERSTANDING THAT THE UNITED KINGDOM IS SEEKING A FAIR AND DEMOCRATIC SETTLEMENT. A SETTLEMENT WHICH ALLOWED THOSE WHO RELY ON FORCE TO ACHIEVE THEIR ENDS RATHER THAN THOSE WHO SEEK TO ADVANCE THEIR CAUSE BY DEMOCRATIC AND CONSTITUTIONAL MEANS WOULD BE MANIFESTLY UNJUST.

AT LUSAKA WE SHALL SHOW THAT WE WISH TO DEAL WITH THE UNDERSTAND-ABLE CONCERN OF THE COMMONWEALTH, FOR EXAMPLE ABOUT THE EXTENT OF THE PROTECTION GIVEN TO THE WHITE MINORITY IN THE PRESENT RHODESIAN CONSTITUTION. WE SHALL CONTINUE TO EMPHASISE THAT WE SHALL BE GUIDED BY THE SIX PRINCIPLES ACCEPTED BY SUCCESSIVE BRITISH GOVERNMENTS; THAT WE ARE AIMING TO MAKE PROPOSALS COMPARABLE TO THE BASIS ON WHICH INDEPENDENCE WAS GRANTED TO OTHER FORMER BRITISH TERRITORIES IN AFRICA; AND THAT WE ARE SEEKING TO INVOLVE THE PATRIOTIC FRONT. WE SHALL NOT TRY TO NEGOTIATE SPECIFIC PROPOSALS FOR A SETTLEMENT AT LUSAKA: I AM CONVINCED THIS WILL ONLY MAKE A SETTLEMENT HARDER TO ACHIEVE. WE SHALL DELIBERATELY REFRAIN FROM PUTTING FORWARD PROPOSALS UNTIL WE HAVE HAD A CHANCE TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF THE DISCUSS-IONS AT LUSAKA.

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/I AM LOOKING

CONFIDENTIAL

I AM LOOKING FORWARD VERY MUCH TO SEEING YOU THERE. I HOPE WE SHALL HAVE A CHANCE TO DISCUSS RHODESIA PRIVATELY BEFORE THE PLENARY SESSION. I UNDERSTAND THAT SONNY RAMPHAL HOPES THAT THE DISCUSSION ON RHODESIA WILL START ON THE AFTERNOON OF FRIDAY 3 AUGUST. I THINK THIS MAKES GOOD SENSE AND WILL ENABLE US TO TALK ABOUT OTHER SUBJECTS BEFORE THEN. IT IS IMPORTANT TO ACHIEVE A GOOD RESULT ON RHODESIA AND TO AVOID THE ENTIRE MEETING BEING DOMINATED BY SOUTHERN AFRICAN ISSUES. BUT I KNOW I AM PREACHING TO THE CONVERTED ON THAT SCORE.

WITH BEST WISHES,

YOURS SINCERELY,  
MARGARET THATCHER.

CARRINGTON

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SIR A PARSONS  
LORD N G LENNOX  
MISS BROWN  
MR. THOMAS  
MR. WILLSON  
MR. WILLIAMS

ADDITIONAL DISTN.  
RHODESIA POLICY

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28



10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

27 July 1979

RF 13.8.79

Rhodesia

The Prime Minister has asked me to send you, for the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary's information, the enclosed account by Richard Ryder of his recent conversation with Patrick Cosgrave about the future plans of the Reverend Sithole and James Chikerema. The Prime Minister would of course be interested in any comments which Lord Carrington may have on this account.

B. G. CARTLEDGE

Stephen Wall, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CONFIDENTIAL

Please show to  
Foreign Secretary.

PM

Prime Minister

Within the next two months, Patrick Cosgrave will be taking up a post in Glasgow as Managing Editor of the Glasgow Herald Group of newspapers, owned by Lonrho.

During the past two months, Patrick Cosgrave has travelled to Lusaka, and has had several 'journalistic' meetings with African politicians, all of which I assume have been arranged by Tiny Rowland. Cosgrave will be at the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference next week with his family having been flown out to Lusaka probably by Rowland.


I was placed in the slightly invidious position of being rung by Cosgrave last night primarily in connection with a talk that he had had in London with the Rev Sithole on Monday morning, 23rd July. The principal points to emerge were as follows:-

1. On Friday of this week (27 July) the Rev Sithole will take up his seats in the Rhodesian Parliament. He will then exercise his right under the new constitution to a cabinet post and believes he will be offered the Ministry of Health. He will immediately form an alliance with James Chikerema and they expect further defections from Bishop Muzorewa's followers to increase their combined strength by three. This, obviously puts the Bishop in an increasingly difficult position in relation to the black members of parliament. He is now perilously close to having to depend on Mr Smith and his followers for a parliamentary majority. While, of course, there is nothing theoretically wrong constitutionally with such an arrangement, obviously it would nonetheless constitute a severe blow to the Bishop's moral position both in Rhodesia itself and in Africa generally. The stability, or instability of his government, as well as its prospects for survival may influence the attitude of HM Government towards recognition.
2. Cosgrave asked Dr Sithole why he had changed his mind about staying out of the parliament. He had the following reasons.
  - (a) He stayed out, he said, because of his conviction that in certain areas of the country the election had been rigged against him.

.../Cont

- (b) He has been much encouraged in recent days by the High Court's finding for Mr Chikerema. You will recall that when Mr Chikerema broke away from the Bishop's group in parliament, the Bishop attempted to have him and his followers banned from taking their seats. Dr Sithole expressed surprise that the Court found for Mr Chikerema; he had expected what he called a 'political' decision. He now feels that he has a far better chance than he had expected of putting his case about the election rigging to the Court.
- (c) He also feels that the situation is changing so rapidly that he would be foolish to adhere to his original decision to boycott the new parliament.
3. Sometime on Friday 27th July, Dr Sithole and Mr Chikerema will hold a joint press conference to announce the formation of their new alliance and to express its policy in a way summarised in the rest of this memo.
  4. The essential tactical element in their policy is the conviction that Mr Joshua Nkomo must be brought in to the government of Zimbabwe. An objective which Lonrho have been pursuing with great energy of late.
  5. The essential political element in their platform will be the removal of the entrenched clauses in the present Rhodesian constitution. They would then want a fresh general election, to be held under British supervision. They - and all the other black leaders Patrick has spoken to in recent weeks - are adamantly opposed to a United Nations force.
  6. Dr Sithole and Mr Chikerema would immediately argue for the ending of air raids on Zambia. They are seeking to build a bridge to President Kaunda. They will argue that, had it not been for the guerilla war, and Zambia's hospitality to the Patriotic Front, Mr Smith would never have been pressured into going as far as he has gone.
  7. Both Dr Sithole and Mr Chikerema are convinced that Mr Nkomo can be separated from Mr Mugabe.
  8. Cosgrave had lunch recently with Mr Josiah Chinamano, who is Mr Nkomo's representative in this country and travels a great deal on his behalf. Cosgrave is advised, however, that the real political brains in the Chinamano family are to be found in Mr Chinamano, who was also at his lunch. The Chinamanos insisted that the alliance between Mr Nkomo and Mr Mugabe is unbreakable. His conviction, however, is that this argument is merely a convenient front to be put up against questions from people like himself.

9. In all Cosgrave's conversations with African leaders in recent weeks, one of the things to come across most strongly is their conviction that only you and your Government can materially alter the future direction of Rhodesian history. Nobody has any confidence, or even interest, any more in the American position. Mr Young is despised nearly as much as President Carter.
10. Cosgrave expected - certainly in talking to Dr Sithole, Mr Chikerema and Mr Chinamano - to find that your remarks about the unlikelihood of Parliament renewing sanctions in November would excite a great deal of hostility. However, all the people Cosgrave talked to are so convinced that a settlement must be arrived shortly after Lusaka: that November, to them, is rather like the next century. If there is no substantial movement over the next few weeks, they are, they are convinced that chaos would supervene.
11. The general desire, therefore, is for a round table conference to be chaired by Britain. Cosgrave has heard various suggestions about the kind of conclusion it would be expected to come to - apart from the one seen to be essential by all the black leaders, the removal of the entrenched clauses. One of the most interesting is the suggestion that the President of Zimbabwe should be elected by universal suffrage and, while not being purely decorative, should nonetheless enjoy some powers, rather along the lines of the presidency of Portugal. The general hope is that Mr Nkomo would be delighted to achieve such a position. Although he is only 61 years of age, his somewhat gross appetites, especially in the matter of food and drink, have, Cosgrave is told, undermined his health.
12. Sithole left London on Monday night to fly to Kenya. Both he and Mr Chikerema will have meetings with President Moi and his Attorney General Mr Charles Njonjo, before the Lusaka Conference opens. They told Cosgrave that they are confident of President Moi's support for the general line they are taking. Cosgrave understands further, that Mr Nkomo will also be in Nairobi today, Tuesday 24th July. A meeting between them all took place this afternoon.



Richard  
24.7.79

CONFIDENTIAL

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CONFIDENTIAL

FM LUSAKA 261440Z JUL 79

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 762 OF 26 JULY

AND TO PRIORITY JOHANNESBURG, PRETORIA

INFO PRIORITY MIRIMBA SALISBURY, DISTRESS LONDON

*Enter via  
(falls to London)*

*for  
27/7*

ZAMBIA/RHODESIA

1. THE US EMBASSY HAVE SHOWN US IN CONFIDENCE A REPORT OF INFORMATION GIVEN TO THEIR CONSULATE-GENERAL IN JOHANNESBURG BY AN AMERICAN BUSINESSMAN WHO HAD BEEN IN CONTACT WITH COL. RON REID-DALY OF THE SELOUS SCOUTS.
2. REID-DALY HAD SPOKEN ABOUT THE CONTINUED IMPRISONMENT IN ZAMBIA OF MICHAEL BORLACE, (A BRITISH SUBJECT WHOSE CASE WE HAVE REPORTED FULLY IN THE DISTRESS SERIES), ADMITTING THAT BORLACE WAS A MEMBER OF THE SELOUS SCOUTS AND THAT HE HAD BEEN INVOLVED IN THE PLANNING OF OPERATIONS INTO ZAMBIA. HE SAID THAT BORLACE HAD BEEN INSTRUCTED TO HOLD NOTHING BACK UNDER INTERROGATION AND HAD ACCORDINGLY NOW TOLD THE ZAMBIANS ALL HE KNEW. HOWEVER REID-DALY'S INFORMATION WAS THAT BORLACE WAS STILL UNDERGOING TORTURE. IT HAD BEEN HOPED TO ARRANGE AN EXCHANGE OF PRISONERS UNDER WHICH HE WOULD BE RETURNED TO RHODESIA. REID-DALY THREATENED THAT IF NOTHING WAS DONE FOR BORLACE, THE SELOUS SCOUTS WOULD LAUNCH MORE RAIDS AGAINST LUSAKA AFTER THE CHOGM AND THE CURRENT CEASEFIRE.
3. REID-DALY ALSO SAID THAT THE TWO BRITISH PILOTS WHO HAD SUBSEQUENTLY BEEN ARRESTED (RILEY AND MEAKIN) WERE NOT/NOT SELOUS SCOUTS, BUT WERE CONTACTS OF BORLACE.
4. REID-DALY SAID THAT THE RHODESIANS WERE RELUCTANT TO INVOKE BRITISH GOOD OFFICES IN COMMUNICATING WITH THE ZAMBIANS (BORLACE HAS EXHIBITED THE SAME RELUCTANCE IN DEALINGS WITH US) AND HOPED THE AMERICANS WOULD HELP. THE AMERICANS, HOWEVER, APPEAR TO HAVE TOLD THEIR INFORMATNT THAT THE BRITISH CHANNEL WAS THE CORRECT ONE AND TO HAVE ADVISED HIM TO CONTACT THE BRITISH CONSULATE-GENERAL.

CONFIDENTIAL

/ 5. REID-DALY'S



CONFIDENTIAL

5. REID-DALY'S TRACK RECORD MIGHT SUGGEST THAT, IF HE INDEED SPOKE AS REPORTED, HE WAS REFLECTING FEELING WITHIN THE SELOUS SCOUTS ABOUT THE FATE OF ONE OF THEIR COMRADES, RATHER THAN A POLICY DECISION BY THE SALISBURY REGIME TO LAUNCH FURTHER COMMANDO-STYLE RAIDS INTO LUSAKA. NEVERTHELESS, THIS IS DISTURBING.
6. IT WAS NOT/NOT CLEAR THAT THE US EMBASSY WERE AUTHORISED TO SHOW US THEIR REPORT, SO PLEASE PROTECT THEIR CONFIDENCE.

ALLINSON

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MR. WILLSON  
MR. WILLIAMS

ADDITIONAL DISTN.  
RHODESIA POLICY

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DESKBY 261600Z

FM NAIROBI 261440Z JUL 79

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 449 OF 26 JULY

INFO IMMEDIATE LUSAKA, MIRIMBA SALISBURY, PRETORIA, DAR ES

SALAAM AND WASHINGTON

M.I.P.T. KENYA/RHODESIA

*Encl na  
27/7*

1. TODAY'S PRESS CARRIES BRIEF REPORTS OF SITHOLE'S REMARKS ADDRESSING PRESS REPRESENTATIVES AT NAIROBI AIRPORT YESTERDAY DURING HIS STOP-OVER ON HIS WAY FROM LONDON TO SALISBURY. SITHOLE SAID THAT HE HAD BEEN ON A 5-DAY VISIT TO BRITAIN TO HOLD DISCUSSIONS WITH THE BRITISH LAWYERS WHO WOULD REPRESENT HIS PARTY IN A HIGH COURT PETITION WHICH HE HAD FILED ALLEGING THAT THE APRIL GENERAL ELECTIONS IN ZIMBABWE RHODESIA HAD BEEN RIGGED, WITH INTIMIDATION, CORRUPTION AND OTHER ILLEGAL PRACTICES.

2. SITHOLE IS REPORTED AS SAYING THAT HE WAS ASHAMED OF THE BOMBINGS IN ZAMBIA BY THE ZIMBABWE-RHODESIA GOVERNMENT. ZAMBIA HAD SACRIFICED A GREAT DEAL FOR THE ATTAINMENT OF MAJORITY RULE IN ZIMBABWE AND HAD PLAYED A LEADING ROLE IN MAKING THE SMITH REGIME RELEASE HIM AND MANY OTHERS FROM DETENTION.

3. SITHOLE SAID THE PRESENT RHODESIAN CONSTITUTION HAD MANY MISTAKES WHICH NEEDED TO BE CORRECTED, ALTHOUGH HE SUPPORTED IT. VARIOUS DISCRIMINATIVE PRACTICES AND INSTITUTIONS HAD BEEN ABOLISHED. THE PATRIOTIC FRONT GUERRILLAS WERE NOT HIS ENEMIES, AND HE WAS SPEAKING WITH THEM BECAUSE THEY WERE PART OF THE NECESSARY PRESSURES TO BRING ABOUT MAJORITY RULE, THE ACCEPTANCE OF WHICH WAS A RESULT OF THE ARMED STRUGGLE.

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FM MIRIMBA SALISBURY 261400Z JUL 79  
TO IMMEDIATE FCO  
TELNO 448 OF 26 JULY

*Prime Minister*  
*Advice on a reply*  
*is in preparation.*  
*27/7*

MY TELNO 426: RHODESIAN REPRESENTATIVES IN UK

FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF A LETTER FROM BISHOP MUZOREWA TO THE PRIME MINISTER:

THE PRIME MINISTER OF ZIMBABWE RHODESIA WOULD LIKE TO EXPRESS HIS APPRECIATION OF THE OPPORTUNITY AFFORDED TO HIM AND THE MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF ZIMBABWE RHODESIA TO MEET THE PRIME MINISTER OF GREAT BRITAIN IN LONDON ON FRIDAY THE 13 TH OF JULY 1979.

HE WOULD LIKE TO THANK THE PRIME MINISTER OF GREAT BRITAIN FOR THE WARM SPIRIT AND CONSTRUCTIVE WAY WITH WHICH SHE RECEIVED HIM; WHICH SAME SPIRIT WAS SHOWN BY HER FOREIGN MINISTER AND HIS MINISTRY.

DURING OUR VISIT TO LONDON, MY MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS MENTIONED THAT WE FEEL IT IS ESSENTIAL, IN THE INTERESTS OF OUR COUNTRY, THAT WE SHOULD BE PERMITTED TO STATION REPRESENTATIVES IN LONDON WHO WILL BE ABLE TO EXPLAIN TO THE PEOPLE IN THE UNITED KINGDOM THE CHANGES THAT HAVE TAKEN PLACE IN ZIMBABWE RHODESIA. MUCH OF THE OPPOSITION TO OUR NEW CONSTITUTION IS BASED ON IGNORANCE AND MISINFORMATION AND THIS SITUATION CAN ONLY BE REMEDIED BY OUR COUNTRY HAVING SOME REPRESENTATIVES IN LONDON. LORD CARRINGTON SAID THAT IF A REQUEST WAS SUBMITTED IN WRITING, FAVOURABLE CONSIDERATION WOULD BE GIVEN THERETO AND CONSEQUENTLY I HEREBY FORMALLY REQUEST THAT PERMISSION BE GIVEN FOR MY COUNTRY TO SEND A MINIMUM OF TWO REPRESENTATIVSS TO LONDON. WE HAVE FOUND MR DEREK DAY'S PRESENCE IN ZIMBABWE RHODESIA TO BE VERY USEFUL AND I HAVE NO DOUBT THAT WE WOULD FIND IT EVEN MORE BENEFICIAL TO HAVE SOME REPRESENTATIVES IN LONDON.

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MISS BROWN  
MR. THOMAS  
MR. WILLSON  
MR. WILLIAMS

ADDITIONAL DISTN.  
RHODESIA POLICY

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CONFIDENTIAL

Prime Minister

CONFIDENTIAL

FM MIRIMBA SALISBURY 260915Z JUL 79

TO PRIORITY FCO

6/11

TELNO 447 OF 26 JULY

27/11

INFO ROUTINE PRETORIA MAPUTO WASHINGTON UKNIS NEW YORK LUANDA  
GABORONE LUSAKA AND DAR ES SALAAM

ATTITUDES TOWARDS CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE

1. THE MINISTER OF COMMERCE AND INDUSTRY, MR BULLE, TOLD ME LAST NIGHT THAT MUZOREWA HAD REPORTED PERSONALLY TO THE CABINET ON 24 JULY ON HIS VISITS TO WASHINGTON AND LONDON. HE HAD SPECIFICALLY REFERRED TO PRESSURES BEING APPLIED TO HIM TO ACCEPT CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE. HE HAD SPELLED OUT THE AREAS IN WHICH CHANGE WOULD BE NECESSARY, I. E. THE BLOCKING MECHANISM AND THE COMMISSIONS. BULLE SAID THAT THE RHODESIA FRONT MEMBERS OF THE CABINET HAD LISTENED TO THIS REPORT WITHOUT MAKING ANY COMMENT OR CRITICISM. HE FOUND THIS SURPRISING AND ENCOURAGING.

DAY



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SIR A DUFF  
SIR A PARSONS  
LORD N G LENNOX  
MISS BROWN  
MR. THOMAS  
MR. WILLSON  
MR. WILLIAMS

ADDITIONAL DISTN.  
RHODESIA POLICY

CONFIDENTIAL

Zimbabwe

Telephone No. 27005  
Telegraphic Address: EXTERNAL



MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS,  
PRIVATE BAG 185 H,  
SALISBURY.

25th July, 1979

**PRIME MINISTER'S  
PERSONAL MESSAGE  
SERIAL No. T49C/79T**

T49C/79T  
The Rt. Hon. Margaret Thatcher  
The Prime Minister of Great Britain

The Prime Minister of Zimbabwe Rhodesia would like to express his appreciation of the opportunity afforded to him and the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Zimbabwe Rhodesia to meet the Prime Minister of Great Britain in London on Friday the 13th of July 1979. He would like to thank the Prime Minister of Great Britain for the warm spirit and constructive way with which she received him; which same spirit was shown by her Foreign Minister and his Ministry.

During our visit to London, my Minister of Foreign Affairs mentioned that we feel it is essential, in the interests of our country, that we should be permitted to station representatives in London who will be able to explain to the people in the United Kingdom the changes that have taken place in Zimbabwe Rhodesia. Much of the opposition to our new Constitution is based on ignorance and misinformation and this situation can only be remedied by our country having some representatives in London. Lord Carrington said that if a request was submitted in writing, favourable consideration would be given thereto and consequently I hereby formally request that permission be given for my country to send a

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minimum of two representatives to London. We have found Mr. Derek Day's presence in Zimbabwe Rhodesia to be very useful and I have no doubt that we would find it even more beneficial to have some representatives in London.

A.T. MUZOREWA  
PRIME MINISTER

cc Lusaka folder  
(CF - mean means)

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

Prime Minister

Dear Bryan,

HW  
2077

25 July 1979

Rhodesia

The Prime Minister mentioned to the Secretary of State the other day that she had been impressed by what Bishop Muzorewa said to her on 13 July about the position of minorities under the Tanzanian Constitution. He had claimed that in this respect the provisions of the Tanzanian constitution were very much more generous than those of the Rhodesian Constitution.

This is not so, for the reasons set out in the attached note.

In brief, in the first parliament at the independence of Tanganyika (as it then was), 21 out of 71 elected seats were reserved for European and Asian candidates, elected by voters on the common roll without distinction of race. These members had no power to block constitutional amendments acting on their own.

Under the constitution of Zimbabwe-Rhodesia, on the other hand, 28 out of 100 seats are reserved for whites, 20 of whom are directly elected by whites and 8 by the other members of parliament from a list of 16 nominated by the whites in the previous House of Assembly. A wide range of constitutional amendments and bills on other matters can only be passed into law with the affirmative vote of at least 78 members of the House of Assembly, which gives the white members acting alone an effective veto on them.

Yours ever,

Stephen

(J S Wall)  
Private Secretary

Bryan G Cartledge Esq  
10 Downing Street  
LONDON



## REPRESENTATION OF MINORITIES IN THE TANZANIAN CONSTITUTION

1. Tanganyika achieved independence in December 1961. The independence Constitution provided for universal adult suffrage, but this provision did not operate for the first Parliament, which had been elected before independence (i.e. in August 1960). The first general election based on universal adult suffrage took place only in 1965 after Tanzania (i.e. the Union of Tanganyika and Zanzibar in 1964) had become a de jure one party state.

2. The legislature elected in 1960 consisted of 71 elected members, plus 8 nominated and two ex-officio members (at independence, these last became additional nominated members). The franchise gave the vote on a Common roll to those adults of any race who could read or write English or Swahili, or had an income of £75 or over, or held a prescribed office. At the time it was estimated that there was a potential electorate of 750,000 (out of a total population of 9 million); the great majority of the voters were African. 21 of the 71 elected seats were reserved, 10 for European candidates and 11 for Asians. But voting for these was also on the Common Roll - i.e. there was no separate voting by the minority communities for minority candidates. Nor did the European and Asian members have power to block constitutional amendments acting on their own. The only special requirement regarding bills to amend provisions of the Constitution was that they must be supported on second and third reading by the votes of not less than two-thirds of all members of the National Assembly.

3. The present (1977) Constitution of Tanzania makes no provision for special representation of Europeans or Asians in Parliament. But only 106 out of 233 members of parliament are elected by universal adult suffrage. Of the remainder, 52 are nominated members representing Zanzibar (which has about 3.5% of the total population of Tanzania). The other 75 are mainland nominated members, ex-officio members, or representatives of "mass organisations".

### 4. Zimbabwe-Rhodesia

Under the 1979 Rhodesian Constitution, the House of Assembly consists of 100 members. 72 are black elected by voters on a common roll. 20 are whites elected by voters on a white voter's roll. Eight are whites elected by the other 92 members from a list of 16 nominated by the 50 white members of the previous House of Assembly. Most provisions of the Constitution are "specially entrenched"; any bill to amend them must receive the affirmative votes of at least 78 members of the House of Assembly. These arrangements are to last for at least the first ten years after the adoption of the Constitution.

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25 JUL 1979



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EPS TO PRIME MINISTER

FM MIRIMBA SALISBURY 251215Z JUL 79 NO 10 DOWNING STREET


TO IMMEDIATE FCO

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TELNO 444 OF 25 JULY

INFO PRIORITY PRETORIA MAPUTO GABORONE LUSAKA WASHINGTON LUANDA

DAR ES SALAAM AND UKMIS NEW YORK

Prime Minister  
for 26/7  


MEETING WITH SECRETARY OF FINANCE

1. I CALLED ON DAVID YOUNG, SECRETARY OF FINANCE THIS MORNING.
  
2. WE HAD A GENERAL DISCUSSION ABOUT THE RHODESIAN ECONOMY AGAINST THE BACKGROUND OF THE BUDGET WHICH IS TO BE PRESENTED TO PARLIAMENT TOMORROW. YOUNG SAID THAT THE MAIN PROBLEM WAS THE INTENSIFICATION OF THE WAR WHICH NOW ABSORBED 37 PERCENT OF ALL GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURE. AN END OF THE WAR WAS ESSENTIAL BOTH IN TERMS OF FINANCE AND RESOURCES. SO LONG AS IT WENT ON AT THE PRESENT LEVEL THE POSSIBILITIES FOR SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT WOULD BE LIMITED. AS REGARDS SANCTIONS, HE ESTIMATED THAT THE LIFTING OF SANCTIONS BY THE MAJOR WESTERN COUNTRIES WOULD RESULT IN SAVINGS OF SOME 15 PERCENT IN FOREIGN EXCHANGE. HE ADMITTED THAT THIS WAS AN APPROXIMATE FIGURE BUT WAS THE BEST ESTIMATE THAT HE COULD MAKE. YOUNG ACCEPTED THAT THE LIFTING OF SANCTIONS WOULD NOT BE THE ANSWER TO ALL POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC PROBLEMS. NEVERTHELESS, IT WOULD RELIEVE SOME OF THE EXISTING PRESSURES AND RELEASE SOME ADDITIONAL RESOURCES FOR OTHER PURPOSES. HE SPECIFICALLY MENTIONED THE DELAY IN DEVELOPING NEW POWER RESOURCES AT WANKIE. HE SAID THAT PLANS SHOULD HAVE BEEN IMPLEMENTED IN MID 1977. THERE HAD ALREADY BEEN A DELAY OF 2 YEARS. THESE PLANS WERE IMPORTANT TO FUTURE DEVELOPMENT NOT ONLY IN RHODESIA BUT ALSO IN ZAMBIA. I HAD HEARD QUITE INDEPENDENTLY THAT PLANS FOR A NEW POWER STATION AT WANKIE ARE BEING ACTIVELY REVIVED AND IT HAS BEEN SUGGESTED TO ME THAT A CONTRACT HAS ALREADY BEEN AWARDED TO WEST GERMANY.
  
3. I POINTED OUT TO YOUNG THAT OUR EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE WIDER INTERNATIONAL ACCEPTANCE OF THE CHANGES THAT HAVE TAKEN PLACE IN RHODESIA WERE DESIGNED IN PART TO ENSURE THAT, WHEN RECOGNITION CAME, RHODESIA WOULD BE ABLE TO DRAW ON INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT FINANCE. HOWEVER, UNLESS THIS WIDER INTERNATIONAL ACCEPTANCE WERE FORTHCOMING THEY WOULD FIND IT INCREASINGLY DIFFICULT TO TAP MULTILATERAL FINANCIAL SOURCES, I.E. IBRD AND THE EEC.

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4. I ASKED YOUNG FOR HIS VIEWS ON THE POSSIBILITY OF FURTHER CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE. HE SAID THAT THE WHITE COMMUNITY WOULD BE CAUTIOUS AND THAT WE COULD HAVE SOME PROBLEMS. MUCH WOULD DEPEND UPON THE NATURE OF THE PROPOSALS THAT WE WOULD BE PUTTING FORWARD. HE, LIKE OTHERS, DREW ATTENTION TO THE SENSITIVE ISSUE OF THE POLICE SERVICES COMMISSION AND THE DEFENCE FORCES SERVICES COMMISSION. HOWEVER HE DID NOT RULE OUT CHANGE. HE THOUGHT THAT THERE WAS ROOM FOR MANOEUVRE IN THE CONSTITUTION AND WAS FAIRLY CONFIDENT THAT THE WHITES WOULD BE REASONABLE. HE ARGUED THAT THE WHITES HAD BEEN UNWISE TO INSIST ON SO MANY RESTRICTIVE PROVISIONS WITHIN THE EXISTING CONSTITUTION. HE SAW NO REASON WHY WE COULD NOT GET AWAY WITH SOME CHANGES IN RESPECT BOTH OF THE BLOCKING MECHANISM AND OF THE COMMISSION'S. HE ARGUED THAT WE SHOULD TAKE THE BISHOP INTO OUR CONFIDENCE IN THESE MATTERS AND CLAIMED THAT, ON A PREVIOUS OCCASION, THINGS WENT WRONG BECAUSE THE FIRST THING THAT PEOPLE IN RHODESIA HAD HEARD ABOUT PROPOSED CHANGES WERE LEAKS ORIGINATING FROM ABROAD.

5. YOUNG REFERRED SPECIFICALLY TO THE STATUTORY CORPORATIONS COMMISSION (ARTICLE 164). HE HAD ARGUED STRONGLY THAT THERE WAS NO NEED FOR THIS PROVISION IN THE CONSTITUTION. THE NECESSARY ARRANGEMENTS COULD BE MADE BY LEGISLATION. HE THOUGHT THAT NO TEARS WOULD BE SHED IF THIS PARTICULAR PROVISION WERE OMITTED FROM ANY REVISED CONSTITUTION.

6. HE REAFFIRMED THAT THE MAIN FACTOR IN EVERYONE'S MIND AT PRESENT WAS THE WAR. IF WE COULD PRODUCE A FORMULA WHICH HELD OUT AT LEAST THE PROSPECT OF A DE-ESCALATION IN THE FIGHTING HE THOUGHT THAT THERE WAS EVERY CHANCE OF IT BEING ACCEPTED.

7. I OUTLINED OUR OWN POLICIES AND OBJECTIVES. I EXPLAINED THAT HMG HAD NO WISH TO UNDERMINE WHITE CONFIDENCE OR MORALE. THEY ACCEPTED THE IMPORTANCE OF THE WHITE COMMUNITY FOR THE FUTURE SECURITY AND PROSPERITY OF RHODESIA. NEVERTHELESS, SOME CHANGE WAS ESSENTIAL IF WE WERE TO ATTRACT WIDER INTERNATIONAL ACCEPTANCE AND THUS HAVE SOME PROSPECT OF BRINGING ABOUT A DE-ESCALATION OF THE FIGHTING. THE CHANCES THAT WE WOULD BE PROPOSING WOULD NEED TO BE SIGNIFICANT ENOUGH TO ATTRACT INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT BUT NOT SO RADICAL AS TO DESTROY WHITE CONFIDENCE. WE WERE THEREFORE WORKING TO VERY NARROW MARGINS. IN THIS SITUATION IT WAS IMPORTANT THAT THE WHITE COMMUNITY SHOULD KEEP IN THE FOREFRONT OF THEIR MINDS THE MAJOR OBJECTIVES OF A RETURN TO LEGALITY, INTERNATIONAL ACCEPTANCE AND A DE-ESCALATION IN THE WAR.

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FM WASHINGTON 242202Z JUL 79  
 TO PRIORITY FCO  
 TELEGRAM NO 2060 OF 24 JULY

*Prime Minister*  
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MIPT: MEETING WITH PRESIDENT CARTER: RHODESIA

1. WHEN I SAW PRESIDENT CARTER TODAY HE SPOKE ABOUT BISHOP MUZOREWA. HE UNDERSTOOD THAT YOU HAD SPOKEN TO VANCE AND THAT YOU WERE WORRIED, ON THE BASIS OF WHAT MUZOREWA HAD SAID, THAT THE PRESIDENT HAD NOT MADE CLEAR THE FIRM US POSITION ABOUT THE NEED TO MODIFY THE CONSTITUTION ETC. THE PRESIDENT SAID THAT HE HAD LEFT MUZOREWA IN NO DOUBT AT ALL ABOUT THIS. THERE HAD BEEN NO CHANGE IN THE FIRMNESS OF US POLICY ON THE SUBJECT.
2. IN THE PRESIDENT'S VIEW THERE HAD NOT BEEN A FAILURE OF UNDERSTANDING ON MUZOREWA'S PART BUT MISREPRESENTATION. IT WAS ESSENTIAL FOR THE BRITISH AND US GOVERNMENTS TO WORK TOGETHER. I THANKED THE PRESIDENT FOR HIS CLARIFICATION WHICH I WOULD TRANSMIT IMMEDIATELY. I ADDED THAT I HAD SEEN VICE PRESIDENT MONDALE THAT MORNING WHO HAD MADE THE POSITION ABUNDANTLY CLEAR.
3. I REFERRED TO THE FORTHCOMING COMMONWEALTH HEADS OF GOVERNMENT MEETING. THE PRESIDENT ASKED ABOUT THE QUEEN'S SECURITY THERE. I SAID THAT HER MAJESTY WAS A GREAT FIGURE IN AFRICA AND HER PRESENCE AT LUSAKA WAS A SIGNIFICANT EVENT. PRESIDENT CARTER SAID THAT HER MAJESTY WAS A GREAT FIGURE IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA TOO, A REMARK THAT HE REPEATED.

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TO IMMEDIATE CANBERRA

TELEGRAM NO 349 OF 24 JULY

INFO PRIORITY LAGOS, LUSAKA, WASHINGTON.  
RHODESIA

*Prime Minister*

*for  
26;*

1. THE AUSTRALIAN FOREIGN MINISTER TOLD ME THIS AFTERNOON THAT HE WAS GRATEFUL TO US FOR KEEPING THE AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT SO FULLY INFORMED ABOUT THE DEVELOPMENT OF OUR RHODESIA POLICY. THEY WERE IN CONTACT WITH MANY OF THE OTHER COMMONWEALTH GOVERNMENTS. THEY ACCEPTED THAT BOTH RHODESIA AND THE HANDLING OF THE PROBLEM AT LUSAKA WERE A BRITISH RESPONSIBILITY. THEY WANTED TO HELP, AND MIGHT BE ABLE TO PLAY A MEDIATORY ROLE: BUT WOULD NOT SEEK TO DO SO AT THE EXPENSE OF OUR OWN PLANS. THEY HOPED THAT WE WOULD RECOGNISE AT LUSAKA THAT THE EXISTING RHODESIAN CONSTITUTION HAD SERIOUS INADEQUACIES. BUT THEY UNDERSTOOD THE POINT WE HAD MADE TO THEM THAT WE COULD NOT AFFORD TO SEE THE C H O G M DEVELOP INTO A NEGOTIATING FORUM ABOUT PROPOSALS FOR A RHODESIA SETTLEMENT.

2. I SAID I WAS GRATEFUL AND RELIEVED TO HEAR THIS. FOR US TO PUT PRECISE PROPOSALS ON THE TABLE IN LUSAKA AND THEN SEEK TO NEGOTIATE THESE WITH ALL THE OTHER COMMONWEALTH GOVERNMENTS PRESENT THERE WOULD BE A RECIPE FOR DISASTER. THE PRIME MINISTER WOULD EXPLAIN OUR POLICY IN GENERAL TERMS: AND WOULD HOPE TO BE ABLE TO MAKE A FORTHCOMING RESPONSE AT THE CONCLUSION OF THE DISCUSSION.

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SIR A DUFF  
SIR A PARSONS  
LORD N G LENNOX  
MISS BROWN  
MR. THOMAS  
MR. WILLSON  
MR. WILLIAMS

ADDITIONAL DISTN.  
RHODESIA POLICY

MR CORTAZZI

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*27/7*

NOTE FOR THE RECORD

Rhodesia: Call on the Prime Minister by the Rt. Hon. Julian Amery, MP

Mr. Julian Amery came to see the Prime Minister in her room at the House at 2200 on 24 July to discuss the debate on Southern Africa which had been arranged for the following day.

Mr. Amery told the Prime Minister that Bishop Muzorewa had been very bitter, in his talks with him, about the lack of recognition in the UK for what had been achieved in Rhodesia. It was essential that the Government should be very cautious in tampering with the existing constitution there. Zimbabwe/Rhodesia had already been accorded the quintessence of recognition, by virtue of the fact that the Prime Minister had received the Bishop at No. 10 and had sent a Government representative to Salisbury. Mr. Amery urged the Prime Minister to stress the Government's desire to work with the Salisbury regime. The UK had strong cards in its hand, namely the capacity to provide economic aid, diplomatic support and if necessary military supplies to Zimbabwe/Rhodesia. He was aware that the F.C.O., and some Ministers, feared a new Vietnam in Rhodesia and direct confrontation with the Soviet Union in Southern Africa. These fears were, however, belied by the failure of the Patriotic Front even to disrupt the April elections in Rhodesia, by the failure of SWAPO to sabotage the internal arrangements in Namibia and by the failure of Mozambique, Angola and Zambia to stand up to Rhodesian raids across their frontiers. If Bishop Muzorewa's regime was seen to be established and successful, the effect on Marxist Angola would be catastrophic. This explained Angola's opposition to the Bishop, and Mozambique's opposition to him was similarly motivated.

Mr. Amery told the Prime Minister that if the UK could halt the tide of Soviet imperialism in Southern Africa that tide would recede. He thought the Government had committed a great blunder in failing to recognise Bishop Muzorewa's regime as soon as it was established. There would have been explosions of

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indignation in the US and in Africa: but positions had now hardened and the task would be more difficult. It was essential that the Prime Minister should give nothing away at Lusaka, where the Africans would do their best to tie her down. It would be a difficult meeting and there would be riots in the streets. Mr. Amery said that he hoped that the Prime Minister would not go for the classical, colonial prescription so far as Zimbabwe/Rhodesia's constitution was concerned. Rhodesia had always been quite unlike our other colonies. Equally it would be wrong to put Bishop Muzorewa on the same scale as Nkomo, or even Sithole and Chikerema.

The Prime Minister asked what Mr. Sithole was doing now. Mr. Amery replied that he was acting democratically: he would probably return to the Government after the court had ruled on the April elections.

Mr. Amery went on to say that the choice before the Government was either to niggle at the Bishop's regime or to applaud, support and assist it. The South Africa treasure house was crucial to the OECD countries and had to be defended against the Soviet Union. The Prime Minister said that the first task was to get through the Lusaka meeting. It had to be faced that if we wanted the Africans and other Commonwealth Members to acquiesce in the Muzorewa regime it was no use hitting out at them too much. It was in any case wrong that the Bishop should have to rely on the whites as much as the constitution at present obliged him to do. Mr. Amery said that Bishop Muzorewa could not survive without the support of the armed forces, the civil service and white dominated sectors of the economy. He recognised, however, that the UK's commercial interests would be very hard hit when the Bishop achieved recognition, especially in Nigeria.

*Am.*

26 July 1979

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Subject filed on Israel: Mr  
Kidron's call. July 79

THE ISRAELI AMBASSADOR'S FAREWELL CALL ON THE PRIME MINISTER IN  
THE HOUSE OF COMMONS ON 24 JULY 1979 AT 1600

The Israeli Ambassador, Mr. Kidron, called on the Prime Minister in the House of Commons on 24 July to say goodbye.

Mr. Kidron told the Prime Minister that he was deeply concerned by current developments in Washington and hoped that the West would soon find strong leadership: the present situation, if prolonged, could seriously harm both the West and Israel. Mr. Kidron said that if oil prices were to run riot, the West might be confronted with political demands by the oil producers which could be very damaging to Israeli interests. He had been disturbed by the recent EEC Statement on the Middle East. The peace which had been achieved between Israel and Egypt was a delicate plant. The issue of the settlements should be viewed in proportion and the Western media were inclined to exaggerate it.

Mr. Kidron condemned Dr. Kreisky for inviting Yassar Arafat to meet him in Vienna. He warmly commended M. Mendes-France, who had refused to attend the meeting when Yassar Arafat declined to return affirmative answers to three questions: did Israel have the right to exist, would he accept Resolution 242 as the basis for negotiations and would he abandon the tactic of terrorism?

Mr. Kidron said that he very much hoped that the UK would not always blindly follow the French line; it had to be recalled that France had initially rejected President Sadat's initiative. If the UK would give a lead in Europe on Middle East matters, the Dutch and the Danes would certainly follow it.

The Prime Minister commented that President Sadat was now out on a limb. Mr. Kidron agreed and said that if the financial help from the West which Sadat was expecting were not forthcoming, he would be in a very dangerous situation. It was important that the Palestinians should be brought into the current round of negotiations but the PLO was exerting pressure on them to refrain from coming forward and they were scared.

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In a short discussion of Rhodesia, Mr. Kidron told the Prime Minister that Mr. Sithole had called on him on 20 July. He had said that he had refrained from joining Bishop Muzorewa's government because he wished to expose the falsification of the April election results. He nevertheless still supported the internal settlement and would join the government eventually; he had already been offered a choice between three Ministerial portfolios. His contacts with the Israeli Embassy had been in the context of an earlier Israeli offer to accept black Rhodesians for agricultural training.

The Prime Minister wished Mr. Kidron well in his next post, Canberra.

*BM*

Distribution

Private Secretary to Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary

24 July 1979

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FM DAR ES SALAAM 230900Z JULY 79

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELNO 626 OF 23 JULY

INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK, GABORONE, LUSAKA,  
MAPUTO, LUANDA, LAGOS, MIRIMBA SALISBURY, ADDIS ABABA

*Chiodera 2*  
*Prime Minister*  
*Gen*  
*27/7*

PRESIDENT NYERERE'S PRESS CONFERENCE: RHODEISA

1. AT A PRESS CONFERENCE ON 21 JULY GIVEN IN CONNECTION WITH THE STATE VISIT, PRESIDENT NYERERE MADE THE FOLLOWING POINTS ON RKAEEEEEE RHODESIA IN RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS:

1. A NEW SITUATION IN RHODESIA: MUZOREWA WAS PRIME MINISTER AFTER "SOME KIND OF ELECTION": THERE WAS A PARLIAMENT WITH A BLACK MAJORITY, AND A BLACK PRESIDENT: THERE WAS UNDOUBTEDLY A NEW SITUATION IN RHODESIA, BUT THE FACT WAS THAT SMITH HAD WON. THUS IT WAS NOW MUCH MORE DIFFICULT...TO EXPLAIN THAT SMITH STILL HAD THE POWER: "IT WAS NOT THE BISHOP, WHO WAS WAGING WAR ON ZAMBIA". THE BISHOP WAS NO MORE THAN "A BLACK FACE COVERING THE POWER OF THE MINORITY".

2. LIFTING OF SANCTIONS AND RECOGNITION OF THE MUZOREWA GOVERNMENT: NYERERE SAID THAT IF BRITAIN RECOGNISED RHODESIA THIS WAS PURELY A MATTER BETWEEN THE BRITISH AND THE TANZANIANS. WHILE THE COMMONWEALTH WAS "NOT BRITISH PROPERTY ANY MORE", IT WAS MORE DIFFICULT TO THINK OF A COMMONWEALTH WITHOUT BRITAIN

THAN ONE WITHOUT TANZANIA. BUT IF BRITAIN SOUGHT TO MAKE RHODESIA A MEMBER OF THE COMMONWEALTH, "WE WOULD PULL OUT", JUST AS TANZANIA HAD THREATENED TO LEAVE THE COMMONWEALTH IN 1960 IF SOUTH AFRICA REMAINED A MEMBER. "A DECISION BY BRITAIN ALONE TO RECOGNISE THE GOVERNMENT OF RHODESIA, WHICH IS NOT RECOGNISED BY THE REST OF AFRICA OR THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY IS A DECISION TO CREATE ANOTHER SOUTH AFRICA". ASKED IF TANZANIA WOULD BREAK DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED KINGDOM IF THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT RECOGNISED RHODESIA, PRESIDENT NYERERE REFUSED TO ANSWER THAT "HYPOTHETICAL QUESTION". TO A FURTHER QUESTION "YOU WOULD DO WHAT?", HE REPLIED "I WAIT".

/3. FRONT LINE

3. FRONT LINE PRESSURE ON PATRIOTIC FRONT: THE NEW SITUATION IN RHODESIA COMPLICATED MATTERS FOR THE FREEDOM FIGHTERS. NYERERE SAID HE WAS CERTAINLY PREPARED TO SPEAK TO THEM AND THOUGHT THAT THEY MIGHT LISTEN CLOSELY, BUT THE LATTER WAS "NOT THE SAME AS ACCEPTING WHAT I SAY". HE WAS SURE THAT THE PATRIOTIC FRONT WAS PREPARED TO MEET THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT AT ANY TIME, AND THAT THEY WOULD NOT REFUSE TO COME IF MUZOREWA WAS THERE.

4. POSSIBLE TANZANIAN RECOGNITION OF MUZOREWA: NEITHER MUZOREWA NOR SMITH MEANT ANYTHING. ALONE OF INTEREST WERE THE CIRCUMSTANCES IN WHICH THE GOVERNMENT CAME TO POWER: "IF THERE WAS A DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION AND SMITH OR MUZOREWA WAS FREELY ELECTED, THEN WE WOULD RECOGNISE THEM". BRITAIN "WOULD MAKE THEMSELVES FOOLISH" IF THEY SAID THAT THE PRESENT ARRANGEMENT WAS DEMOCRATIC. BRITAIN WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR SEEING THAT THERE WAS A DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION AND FREE ELECTIONS AND IT WAS WITHIN BRITAIN'S POWER TO EXERCISE THIS RESPONSIBILITY.

5. MUZOREWA AND THE OAU: IT WAS OBVIOUS, NOW THAT OAU HAD RECOGNISED THE PATRIOTIC FRONT AS THE SOLE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE PEOPLE OF ZIMBABWE, THAT MUZOREWA HAD DESTROYED HIS OWN POSITION IN AFRICA.

6. COMPARISONS: ASKED ABOUT THE TANZANIAN ATTITUDE TOWARDS RHODESIA GIVEN THE EXISTENCE OF OTHER LESS DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENTS IN AFRICA, NYERERE SAID THAT IN THE PAST BRITAIN HAD INSISTED THAT THERE SHOULD NOT BE INDEPENDENCE BEFORE DEMOCRATIC ELECTIONS. THE ONLY GOVERNMENT HE WOULD ACCEPT WAS ONE THAT WAS DEMOCRATICALLY ELECTED. "AS SOON AS I SEE A DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION I WILL BACK IT UP, AND FREE ELECTIONS, AND THE RESULTS OF FREE ELECTIONS."

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FM MIRIMBA SALISBURY 231420Z JUL 79

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 436 OF 23 JULY

INFO PRIORITY PRETORIA MAPUTO WASHINGTON DAR ES SALAAM LUSAKA  
LUANDA UKMIS NEW YORK AND LAGOS.

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Prime Minister  
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MEETING WITH DR KAMUSIKIRI.

1. I CALLED UPON KAMUSIKIRI THIS MORNING. HE IS NOT YET ESTABLISHED IN HIS OWN OFFICE SO WE MET IN ONE OF THE RECEPTION ROOMS IN THE PRIME MINISTER'S OFFICE. HIS PRECISE TITLE IS STILL UNCLEAR. HE IS VARIOUSLY DESCRIBED AS THE PRIME MINISTER'S PRINCIPAL PRIVATE SECRETARY OR AS HIS SENIOR ADVISER.

2. FOLLOWING ON MY CONVERSATION WITH MUZOREWA ON 21 JULY ( MY TEL NO 430) KAMUSIKIRI SAID THAT MUZOREWA HAD BEEN GREATLY ENCOURAGED BY HIS CONVERSATIONS IN LONDON. HE WAS NOW TOTALLY CONVINCED OF OUR SINCERITY. HE SAID THAT THE BISHOP HAD TOLD A NUMBER OF PEOPLE THAT HE WAS CONVINCED THAT GOD WAS NOW WORKING FOR THE BENEFIT OF RHODESIA THROUGH HMG.

3. I LEAD KAMUSIKIRI ON TO A DISCUSSION OF CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND IN PARTICULAR THE BISHOP'S ATTITUDE. I REFERRED TO HIS REPORTED STATEMENTS IN AN AUSTRALIAN RADIO INTERVIEW THAT NEITHER THE U S NOR THE UK GOVERNMENTS WERE "REALLY SERIOUS" ABOUT CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE. DR KAMUSIKIRI SAID THAT HE THOUGHT THIS WAS A MISUNDERSTANDING. THE BISHOP THOUGHT IN SHONA. WHAT HE WAS CONFIDENT HE MEANT WAS THAT NEITHER GOVERNMENT HAD YET PUT "SERIOUS" (I E DETAILED) PROPOSALS TO HIM. DR KAMUSIKIRI WAS CERTAIN THAT MUZOREWA ACCEPTED AND AGREED ON THE NEED FOR CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE. THE BISHOP HIMSELF FOUND THE RIGID CONSTRAINTS OF THE PRESENT CONSTITUTION IRKSOME. HE WANTED TO DEMONSTRATE TO ALL OF THE PEOPLE IN RHODESIA, BOTH BLACK AND WHITE, THAT HE COULD EXERCISE HIS POWERS AS A TRULY DEMOCRATIC LEADER. HE COULD NOT DO SO IF THE CONSTITUTION PLACED UNDEMOCRATIC CONSTRAINTS UPON HIM. KAMUSIKIRI SAID THAT HE HAD ADVISED THE BISHOP THAT HMGS INSISTANCE UPON CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE WAS A BLESSING IN DISGUISE. IT WOULD ENABLE THE CHANGES THAT SHOULD IN ANY EVENT BE BROUGHT ABOUT TO COME AS A RESULT OF OUTSIDE

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INITIATIVE. HE INDICATED THAT THE BISHOP ACCEPTED THIS. KAMUSIKIRI ADDED THAT IT WAS FAR BETTER FOR CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE TO OCCUR IN THE CONTEXT OF THE GRANTING OF LEGAL RECOGNITION AND THE LIFTING OF SANCTIONS THAN FOR THE GOVERNMENT TO HAVE TO INTRODUCE CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS AFTER LEGAL INDEPENDENCE.

4. AGAINST THIS BACKGROUND I QUESTIONED WHETHER IT WAS REALLY NECESSARY FOR THE BISHOP OR OTHERS TO CAST DOUBTS IN PUBLIC STATEMENTS ON THE NEED FOR CHANGE. KAMUSIKIRI SAID THAT THERE WERE REALLY 3 REASONS FOR THIS:

A) THE BISHOP DID NOT WANT TO GIVE HIS HAND AWAY IN ADVANCE

B) HE DID NOT YET KNOW PRECISELY WHAT WAS BEING ASKED OF HIM

C) HE DID NOT KNOW FOR CERTAIN THAT CHANGE WOULD SECURE THE PRIZE OF RECOGNITION AND THE LIFTING OF SANCTIONS.

5. I CONFIRMED THAT WE WERE NOT EXPECTING THE BISHOP HIMSELF TO PUT FORWARD PROPOSALS FOR AMENDING THE CONSTITUTION. NOR WOULD WE EXPECT HIM TO COME OUT STRONGLY IN FAVOUR OF CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE. ON THE OTHER HAND IT WAS UNDESIRABLE THAT HE SHOULD BOX HIMSELF IN BY IMPLYING THAT NO CHANGE WOULD BE NECESSARY OR ACCEPTABLE. KAMUSIKIRI SAID HE REALISED THE NEED TO MAINTAIN A CAREFUL BALANCE BETWEEN TOO POSITIVE OR TOO NEGATIVE A POSTURE.

6. ON THE ATTITUDES OF THE WHITES TO CHANGE KAMUSIKIRI SAID THAT HE HAD DISCUSSED THIS WITH BRADLEY OF THE FOREIGN MINISTRY WHO HAD ACCOMPANIED THE BISHOP ON HIS VISIT TO WASHINGTON AND LONDON. BRADLEY HAD SAID THAT THE WHITES WERE ENCOURAGED BY THE LONDON VISIT AND THAT A HIGH PERCENTAGE WOULD GO ALONG WITH CHANGE AS THE PRICE OF A LASTING SETTLEMENT. KAMUSIKIRI ALSO SAID THAT A NUMBER OF WHITE BANKERS AND FARMERS HAD CALLED ON HIM TO SAY THAT THEY FULLY SUPPORTED THE BISHOP AND WERE NOT OPPOSED TO CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE.

7. KAMUSIKIRI RAISED THE INTERNAL SITUATION. HE SAID THAT RECENT DEVELOPMENTS HAD CAUSED THE BISHOP CONSIDERABLE CONCERN. THE COURT DECISION OVER CHIKEREMA HAD BEEN A BLOW. THERE WAS NOW THE PROSPECT OF A SITHOLE/CHIKEREMA ALLIANCE. THE ACTION ON 20 JULY

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AGAINST THE AUXILLIARIES HAD REVEALED THAT A NUMBER OF THE UANC AUXILLIARIES WERE SUPPORTING CHIKEREMA. THROUGHOUT ALL THIS THE RHODESIAN FRONT HAD REMAINED SILENT AND HAD NOT MADE ANY STATEMENTS IN FAVOUR OF NATIONAL UNITY. ALL OF THIS WAS CONFUSING AND WORRYING. IT WAS NOT CLEAR HOW MATTERS WOULD END. AGAINST THIS BACKGROUND IT WAS UNDESIRABLE FOR THE BISHOP TO COME OUT WITH STATEMENTS WHICH MIGHT EITHER ALIENATE ONE SECTION OF THE COMMUNITY (I E THE WHITES) OR EXPOSE SURFACE TO POTENTIAL ENEMIES AMONGST THE BLACKS.

8. I SAID THAT WE UNDERSTOOD THE BISHOP'S DESIRE TO MAINTAIN WHITE CONFIDENCE. IT SEEMED TO ME THAT IT WAS EQUALLY IMPORTANT TO SATISFY INTERNAL BLACK OPINION, WHICH HAD BEEN LED TO EXPECT GREAT THINGS FROM A BLACK GOVERNMENT AND NOW HAD A FEELING OF ANTICLIMAX. FURTHERMORE, IT WAS IMPORTANT TO DEMONSTRATE TO EXTERNAL OPINION THE REALITY OF THE TRANSFER OF POWER. I FEARED THAT INSUFFICIENT ATTENTION HAD BEEN PAID TO THIS ASPECT OF THE PROBLEM. THERE HAD BEEN NO REALLY CLEAR STATEMENTS OF GOVERNMENT POLICY ON ISSUES SUCH AS EDUCATION, EMPLOYMENT OR LAND DISTRIBUTION. SOME DECISIONS, WHICH WE WELCOMED, HAD BEEN TAKEN ON DETAINEES AND PROHIBITED IMMIGRANTS. THESE WERE HOWEVER ONLY PARTIAL MEASURES AND HAD NOT MADE THE KIND OF IMPACT THAT WAS REQUIRED. I SAW THE NEED FOR SOME MORE VISIBLE ACTION IN THIS DIRECTION.

9. KAMUSIKIRI SAID THAT HE AGREED AND THAT HE HAD ALREADY SPOKEN TO MUZOREWA ON THESE LINES. HE RAISED THE USUAL PROBLEM ABOUT FINANCE BUT AGREED THAT DECLARATIONS OF POLICY COULD BE MADE WITH AN EXPLANATION THAT IMPLEMENTATION COULD NOT BE GUARANTEED UNTIL RESOURCES WERE AVAILABLE. I ENCOURAGED KAMUSIKIRI TO GIVE THIS MATTER CONSTANT ATTENTION AND, IN PARTICULAR, URGED HIM TO REFLECT UPON THE EFFECT OF EXTERNAL OPINION OF ANY DECISIONS THAT MIGHT BE TAKEN, OR NOT TAKEN, BY THE GOVERNMENT.

10. KAMUSIKIRI IS CLEARLY DEVELOPING A VERY CLOSE RELATIONSHIP WITH THE BISHOP AND IS TRUSTED BY HIM. THIS WAS APPARENT DURING MY CALL ON THE BISHOP ON 21 JULY. MY CONTACTS WITH KAMUSIKIRI SO FAR SUGGEST THAT THE INFLUENCE THAT HE WILL BRING TO BEAR ON THE BISHOP WILL BE SOUND AND GENERALLY HELPFUL FROM OUR POINT OF VIEW.

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HE IS INFINITELY MORE THOUGHTFUL AND BALANCED THAN SOME OF THE OTHER ADVISERS AROUND THE BISHOP. HE SAID THAT HE IS ANXIOUS TO KEEP IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH US AND I HAVE ENCOURAGED HIM TO CONTACT ME IF THERE ARE ANY PROBLEMS IN HIS MIND OR THE BISHOP'S OVER WHICH HE THINKS WE MIGHT BE ABLE TO HELP.

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*Choderon*



HOME OFFICE  
QUEEN ANNE'S GATE LONDON SW1H 9AT

23 July 1979

*NSM  
6/21  
29/7*

*Dear George*

The Home Secretary, together with Sir Robert Armstrong and myself, was given lunch by the American Ambassador today.

Apart from the usual pleasantries and some general conversation about Northern Ireland and one or two other aspects of the domestic political scene, the talk centered on Southern Africa.

In particular, the Home Secretary interpreted Mr Brewster as delivering a clear message (which has no doubt been made before this to the Foreign Secretary) that the US administration would be looking to the British Government to press for some constitutional improvement in Rhodesia/Zimbabwe before the expiry of sanctions in November and any debates thereon.

Mr Brewster's theme was that while the elections themselves may have represented a genuine majority view, there must be much more doubt (despite the Boyd report) that the constitution itself under which the elections had been fought was equally acceptable given the entrenchment of special provisions particularly regarding the field of law, order and justice.

As to American opinion both in Congress and in the country, it was Mr Brewster's view that the large majority against the continuation of sanctions was not one that would necessarily survive substantive discussion of the future of Rhodesia following the CHGM.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Bryan Cartledge at No. 10.

*Yours ever  
JAC*

(J A CHILCOT)

G G H Walden Esq





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24 JUL 1968



LETTERCODE/SERIES <i>PREM 19</i>	INITIAL RELEVANT BOX
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Prime Minister

FM MAPUTO 210830Z JULY 79

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 164 OF 21 JULY

INFO DAR ES SALAAM MIRIMBA SALISBURY LUSAKA PRETORIA WASHINGTON  
GABORONE LILONGWE LUANDA NAIROBI MOSCOW UKMIS NEW YORK

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MY TELNO 163: RHODESIA(NOT TO ALL)

[Below] 1. YESTERDAY I CALLED ON TEKERE, ZANU SECRETARY GENERAL, TO DISCUSS MUGABE'S INTERVIEW WITH TEMPO. I SAID THAT I HAD BEEN ADVOCATING A NEW ATTEMPT AT A SETTLEMENT INVOLVING THE PATRIOTIC FRONT (PF). BUT MUGABE'S REMARKS ABOUT PRECONDITIONS, IF TAKEN AT FACE VALUE, STRENGTHENED THE POSITION OF THOSE IN THE UK WHO ARGUED THAT FURTHER NEGOTIATIONS WAS POINTLESS AND THAT THE ONLY COURSE WAS TO RECOGNISE THE INTERNAL SETTLEMENT.

2. TEKERE SAID THAT MUGABE HAD SAID NOTHING NEW: HMG WOULD HAVE TO RECOGNISE THAT ZANU'S POSITION WAS FIRM. PRESSED, HE SAID THAT ZANU WERE WAITING KEENLY FOR NEW PROPOSALS FROM US, THEY WOULD STUDY THEM CAREFULLY. EVEN IF THEY DISLIKED THEM, THEY WOULD COME TO ANY MEETING WE CALLED, EVEN IF ONLY TO SAY THEY COULD NOT ACCEPT THEM: ZANU DID NOT LIKE REFUSING TO GO TO CONFERENCES.

3. HE WARNED AGAINST HMG ATTEMPTING A QUOTE SHORT-CIRCUIT UNQUOTE SOLUTION: THEY SHOULD ACKNOWLEDGE THE REALITIES OF THE SITUATION: ANY ATTEMPTED SETTLEMENT, THAT DID NOT DO SO, WOULD FAIL, AS IN THE PAST AND THE WAR WOULD GO ON. I SAID THAT ON THE CONTRARY, IF THE WAR WAS TO BE HALTED AND LIVES SPARED (HIS ELDEST SON HAS JUST JOINED UP), EVERYBODY SHOULD BE STRIVING TO FIND A COMPROMISE SOLUTION.

4. I NOTED THAT THE PF CONDEMNED MUZOREWA FOR CONTINUING ATTACKS ON THEM AND FOR HAVING THUS BECOME THEIR ENEMY: YET THEY ALSO SAID, HE WAS A HELPLESS PUPPET OF THE SAME OLD POWER STRUCTURE. IF THE LATTER WERE TRUE, THEY MIGHT FEEL PITY OR CONTEMPT, BUT SURELY NOT HATRED FOR HIM: COULD THEY NOT WORK, THROUGH CONTACTS WITH HIM, TOWARDS FURTHER CHANGES IN THE POWER STRUCTURE? HE REJECTED THIS: MUZOREWA WAS A TRAITOR, EVEN THOUGH HE HAD NO POWER: THEY WOULD NOT TALK TO TRAITORS.

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5. HE CLAIMED TO HAVE CONTACTS IN THE RHODESIAN ARMY. CERTAIN INDIVIDUALS FROM THAT ARMY WOULD BE WELCOME IN A NEW ZIMBABWEAN ARMY, BUT NOT WHOLE UNITS.

6. THUS IT SEEMED THAT ZANU, WHILE MAINTAINING AN INTRANSIGENT LINE, ARE NOT LIKELY TO TRY TO PREVENT FURTHER NEGOTIATIONS BY SEEKING TO IMPOSE IMPOSSIBLE PRE-CONDITIONS.

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TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 430 OF 21 JULY

INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON DAR ES SALAAM LUSAKA MAPUTO LUANDA

PRETORIA UKMIS NEW YORK GABORONE AND LAGOS

Prime Minister

You should see these  
three ltr. before 01)  
this afternoon. - You  
23/7

MEETING WITH MUZOREWA

1. I CALLED ON THE BISHOP THIS AFTERNOON AT HIS OFFICIAL RESIDENCE. DR KAMUSIKIRI WAS PRESENT. WE HAD AN HOUR'S CONVERSATION, FOLLOWED BY A TOUR OF THE GARDEN.

2. I ENQUIRED WHETHER THE BISHOP HAD HAD ANY FURTHER THOUGHTS ARISING OUT OF HIS VISIT TO LONDON AND WASHINGTON. HE SAID THAT HE HAD NOTHING REALLY NEW TO SAY. HE WAS HOWEVER SOMEWHAT CONCERNED AT WHAT MIGHT HAPPEN IN THE VACUUM BETWEEN HIS RETURN FROM HIS TRAVELS AND THE ANNOUNCEMENT BY HMG OF THEIR FUTURE POLICIES. THE WHITES WERE UNDOUBTEDLY JITTERY AND IT WAS IMPORTANT THAT THEY SHOULD, WITHOUT UNDUE DELAY, BE ABLE TO BE GIVEN SOME REASSURANCE ABOUT THE NATURE AND THE EXTENT OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGES THAT THEY MIGHT BE EXPECTED TO ACCEPT. HIS OWN POSITION WOULD ALSO BE ADVERSLY AFFECTED IF PEOPLE COULD SEE THAT SOME REAL PROGRESS TOWARDS A SETTLEMENT WAS BEING MADE.

3. IN THIS CONTEXT, I ASKED THE BISHOP HOW THE WHITES IN THE SECURITY FORCES HAD RESPONDED TO HIS VISITS OVER THE PAST TWO DAYS. HE SAID THAT THEY HAD SHOWN ANXIETY THAT THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT HAD IT IN MIND TO TEAR UP THE EXISTING CONSTITUTION AND START AGAIN FROM SCRATCH. HE HAD TAKEN THE LINE THAT:

A) THE BRITISH AND THE AMERICANS WERE SERIOUS IN THEIR INSISTENCE THAT THEIR WOULD HAVE TO BE CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE IF WIDER INTERNATIONAL ACCEPTANCE WAS TO BE SECURED. HE HAD EXPLAINED THAT THE ASPECTS OF THE CONSTITUTION TO WHICH WE HAD DRAWN ATTENTION WERE THE BLOCKING MECHANISM AND THE COMMISSIONS. HE HAD ADDED THAT, IN HIS VIEW, THE PROPOSALS THAT WE WERE LIKELY TO PUT FORWARD WOULD NOT BE UNREASONABLE.

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B) HE HAD STRESSED THAT, AS A RESULT OF HIS TALKS IN LONDON, HE WAS FULLY SATISFIED THAT HMG WISHED TO WORK WITH HIS GOVERNMENT TO ACHIEVE AN HONOURABLE SETTLEMENT, AND THAT THERE WAS NO CAUSE FOR THE WHITES TO BE SUSPICIOUS OF OUR INTENTIONS.

4. THE BISHOP MADE NO ATTEMPT TO ARGUE WITH ME THAT HIS GOVERNMENT HAD DONE ALL THAT WAS NECESSARY AND THAT NO FURTHER CHANGE WAS CALLED FOR. IT SEEMED TO ME THAT HE HAS ACCEPTED THE REALITY OF THE SITUATION AS PUT TO HIM IN LONDON AND WASHINGTON, AND IS NOW STARTING THE PROCESS OF BRINGING OPINION ROUND TO ACCEPTING THE NEED FOR MORE PROGRESS. I TOLD HIM THAT I WOULD BE WORKING IN THE SAME DIRECTION.

5. I ENQUIRED ABOUT THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE HIGH COURT RULING ON THE CHIKEREMA APPEAL. HE SAID THAT THE DECISION WAS BAD FOR HIM. HE WAS BY NO MEANS CONFIDENT THAT OTHERS MIGHT NOT NOW DECIDE TO CHANGE SIDES. THE DECISION WOULD CERTAINLY ENCOURAGE THOSE WHO WANTED TO MAKE LIFE DIFFICULT FOR HIM. THERE WAS NOT MUCH HE COULD DO ABOUT IT. IN THEORY, THE SPEAKER COULD DECIDE THAT CHIKEREMA AND HIS COLLEAGUES WERE NOT ENTITLED TO TAKE THEIR SEATS. BUT THE SPEAKER HAD ALREADY COMMITTED HIMSELF IN THE CONTRARY SENSE AND COULD NOT NOW RETRACT. HE WAS AWARE OF CONTACTS BETWEEN CHIKEREMA AND SITHOLE DESIGNED TO SET UP A LOOSE COALITION IN OPPOSITION TO HIS GOVERNMENT. HE THOUGHT THAT THE PROSPECT OF THIS MIGHT ENCOURAGE SITHOLE TO RETURN TO PARLIAMENT. HE DOUBTED WHETHER NDIWENI WOULD DESERT THE GOVERNMENT. HE WAS HOWEVER CLEARLY CONCERNED AND DEPRESSED AT THESE DEVELOPMENTS AND AT THE EFFECT THAT THEY WOULD HAVE ON THE STABILITY AND AUTHORITY OF HIS GOVERNMENT.

6. I SUGGESTED THAT YESTERDAYS CLASHES WITH SITHOLE'S AUXILIARIES AND THE MANY DEATHS WOULD NOT HELP THE SITUATION. HE SAID THAT HE COULD NOT HAVE DELAYED THE OPERATION ANY LONGER. HE HAD HAD LARGE NUMBERS OF PEOPLE COMING TO HIM COMPLAINING OF THE EXCESSES OF THE AUXILIARIES, BOTH HIS AND SITHOLE'S. THE OPERATION HAD GONE OFF SMOOTHLY IN 6 OF THE 8 AREAS CONCERNED. THE TROUBLE HAD ONLY ARISEN WHEN THE SECURITY FORCES WERE RESISTED. HE REGRETTED THE DEATHS, BUT HAD HE NOT ACTED, EVEN MORE PEOPLE COULD HAVE BEEN KILLED AS A RESULT OF UNAUTHORISED ACTION BY AUXILIARIES.

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7. I FOUND MUZOREWA'S ATTITUDE MORE FORTHCOMING ON THIS OCCASION. I BELIEVE THAT HIS VISIT TO LONDON HAS CONVINCED HIM, PERSONALLY, OF THE SINCERITY OF OUR INTENTIONS AND OF OUR REAL DESIRE TO WORK WITH HIM TO FIND AN ACCEPTABLE SOLUTION. HE STILL DOES NOT NECESSARILY ACCEPT OUR JUDGMENT ON THE LIKELY ATTITUDE OF OTHER COUNTRIES TOWARDS RHODESIA, BUT NOW REALISES THAT OUR VIEWS ARE FIRMLY AND SINCERELY HELD. HE THEREFORE HAS TO WORK WITH US ON THAT BASIS. I ENQUIRED WHETHER HE WOULD EXPECT SERIOUS DIFFICULTY IN BRINGING THE HARD-CORE MEMBERS OF THE RHODESIA FRONT TO ACCEPT CHANGES IN THE CONSTITUTION. HE SAID THAT THIS DID NOT WORRY HIM TOO MUCH, PROVIDED THE CONSTITUTIONAL PACKAGE PUT TO THE WHITES CONTAINED FIRM ASSURANCES ON RECOGNITION AND SANCTIONS. IT WOULD BE A TOTALLY DIFFERENT MATTER IF THEY WERE ASKED TO SWALLOW CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND TOLD THAT THE OTHER MATTERS WERE FOR LATER DISCUSSION. I SAID THAT THIS WAS NOT WHAT WE HAD IN MIND.

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TO PRIORITY FCO

TELNO 428 OF 21 JULY

INFO ROUTINE WASHINGTON

PUBLIC COMMISSIONS

1. BOTH GAYLARD AND AIR MARSHALL MUSSELL HAVE TOLD ME THAT, A WEEK OR SO AGO, THE CABINET NOMINATED TWO BLACK MEMBERS TO SERVE ON SOME OF THE PUBLIC COMMISSIONS. THE NOMINEES WERE NOT CONSULTED IN ADVANCE AND HAVE, FOR WHAT GAYLARD DESCRIBED

GOOD REASONS, DECLINED TO SERVE. OTHER SUITABLE CANDIDATES ARE NOW BEING SOUGHT.

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O IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 427 OF 21 JULY

INFO PRIORITY LUSAKA MAPUTO GABORONE PRETORIA LUANDA DAR ES SALAAM  
AND WASHINGTON

## ATTITUDES TOWARDS CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE

1. IN CONVERSATIONS ON JULY 20 WITH THE CABINET SECRETARY (GAYLARD) AND THE AIR FORCE COMMANDER (AIR MARSHALL MUSSELL) I PROBED THEIR ATTITUDES TOWARDS CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE.
2. GAYLARD , NOT SURPRISINGLY, WAS THE LESS FORTHCOMING. HE REPEATED THAT THE EXISTING CONSTITUTION HAD BEEN THRASHED OUT BETWEEN BLACKS AND WHITES AND REPRESENTED A BALANCED COMPROMISE WHICH SHOULD NOT BE TAMPERED WITH. HE THOUGHT THAT WE WOULD FIND BLACK MINISTERS FAIRLY INFLEXIBLE ON THIS ISSUE. THEY WERE DETERMINED TO AVOID ACTION WHICH COULD UNDERMINE THE LOYALTY AND CONFIDENCE OF THE SECURITY AND POLICE FORCES UPON WHOM THEIR POWER AND AUTHORITY ULTIMATELY RESTED.
3. GAYLARD NEVERTHELESS CONCEDED THAT THERE WAS SCOPE FOR A CERTAIN AMOUNT OF "TIDYING UP" IN THE CONSTITUTION. HE SPECIFICALLY REFERRED TO THE 8 SPECIAL WHITE SEATS (ARTICLE 22(2C)) WHICH SHOULD CLEARLY NOT BE LEFT IN THE GIFT OF THE RHODESIAN FRONT. THESE SEATS SHOULD BE OPEN TO NORMAL WHITE CONSTITUENCY ELECTION.
4. AS REGARDS THE PUBLIC COMMISSIONS GAYLARD EMPHASISED THE IMPORTANCE OF THE POLICE AND DEFENCE SERVICES COMMISSIONS. THE INDEPENDENCE OF THESE BODIES FROM POLITICAL INFLUENCE MUST BE PRESERVED. HE DID NOT HOWEVER RULE OUT SOME REFORMULATION OF THESE PROVISIONS TO GIVE THE PRIME MINISTER MORE APPARENT INFLUENCE OVER SENIOR APPOINTMENTS. HE ADVISED THAT IF ANY MOVES WERE MADE IN THIS DIRECTION IT SHOULD BE MADE CLEAR THAT ADDITIONAL AUTHORITY WAS BEING GIVEN TO THE PRIME MINISTER HIMSELF AND NOT TO OTHER MINISTERS.
5. GAYLARD PRESSED ME ON DETAILS OF THE PROPOSALS THAT WE INTENDED TO PUT FORWARD AND ON THE PROCEDURE WE INTENDED TO FOLLOW. ON THE LATTER HE SAID THAT THERE WAS A FEAR THAT WE WOULD NEGOTIATE SOMETHING WITH THE BISHOP, TAKE THIS TO THE PATRIOTIC FRONT WHO

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WOULD POCKET IT AND DEMAND MORE: THEN WE WOULD COME BACK TO THE BISHOP WITH FURTHER DEMANDS. I EXPLAINED THAT I COULD NOT AT THIS STAGE BE PRECISE ON EITHER PROPOSALS OR PROCEDURE. IT HAD HOWEVER BEEN MADE CLEAR TO THE BISHOP IN LONDON THAT HMG WOULD THEMSELVES BE FORMULATING FIRM PROPOSALS TO ACHIEVE A FAIR AND REASONABLE SETTLEMENT. THESE PROPOSALS WOULD BE PUT TO THE PARTIES CONCERNED. REASONABLE COUNTER-SUGGESTIONS FROM ANY SIDE WOULD BE CONSIDERED. BUT WE DID NOT INTEND BEING PUSHED AROUND AND WOULD NOT BE GIVING ANYONE A VETO. THE FEARS TO WHICH HE HAD REFERRED THEREFORE SEEMED TO ME UNFOUNDED.

6. ON THE ATTITUDE OF THE WHITE COMMUNITY TO CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE I WAS UNABLE TO DRAW GAYLARD VERY FAR. HE COMMENTED THAT IAN SMITH WOULD REMAIN AN IMPORTANT ELEMENT IN THIS. IF WE COULD CARRY HIM WITH US, HE WAS STILL IN A POSITION TO DELIVER THE WHITE COMMUNITY. IN THIS CONTEXT GAYLARD ADVISED US TO WORK CLOSELY WITH GEORGE SMITH WHOSE VIEWS IAN SMITH RESPECTED.

7. MUSSELL PROVED MORE OPENMINDED. HE FOCUSED AT ONCE ON THE CRITICISMS OF THE POWERS OF THE COMMISSIONS. HE SAID THAT THE PROVISIONS IN THE EXISTING CONSTITUTION WERE INTENDED TO SECURE THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE SECURITY FORCES FROM POLITICAL PRESSURE. HE POINTED OUT THAT, UNDER THE CONSTITUTION, SERVICES COMMANDERS WERE APPOINTED BY THE (BLACK) PRESIDENT (ARTICLE 103(2)) ON THE RECOMMENDATION OF A SELECTION BOARD (ARTICLE 103(6)) WHICH WOULD HAVE CONSULTED THE PRIME MINISTER (ARTICLE 103(2)(11)). IT WAS NOT THEREFORE THE CASE THAT THE PRIME MINISTER WOULD HAVE NO SAY IN SUCH APPOINTMENTS. AS REGARDS DISMISSAL, MUSSELL CLAIMED THAT A COMMANDER COULD BE REMOVED FROM OFFICE AND CITED THE RECENT EXAMPLE OF GENERAL HICKMAN. HOWEVER THIS POWER OF DISMISSAL DOES NOT, AS FAR AS I AM AWARE, RESIDE IN THE PRIME MINISTER.

8. ON THE GENERAL QUESTION OF CHANGE, MUSSELL WAS REASONABLY FLEXIBLE. HE SAW DANGER IN EXTENSIVE CHANGES TO THE CONSTITUTION AND LAID STRESS ON THE IMPORTANCE OF MAINTAINING THE CONFIDENCE OF THE WHITES. HE DID NOT HOWEVER, DEMUR FROM THE PROPOSITION THAT SOME CHANGES WHICH DID NOT UNDERMINE WHITE CONFIDENCE AND WHICH HELD OUT THE PROSPECT OF LEGAL INDEPENDENCE AND A DE-ESCALATION IN THE WAR WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE TO THE WHITE COMMUNITY. HE CERTAINLY DID NOT TAKE THE VIEW THAT THE SECURITY

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FORCES WOULD RESIST ANY CHANGE OF ANY KIND. I EMPHASISED THAT SOME CHANGES WERE ESSENTIAL IF WE WERE TO BRING ABOUT THE WIDER INTERNATIONAL ACCEPTANCE WHICH WAS IN THE INTERESTS OF BOTH RHODESIA AND THE UNITED KINGDOM, STRESSING AT THE SAME TIME OUR ACCEPTANCE OF THE VITAL ROLE THAT THE WHITE COMMUNITY STILL HAD TO PLAY.

9. MUSSELL HAD JUST RETURNED FROM A TOUR OF THE RURAL DISTRICTS WITH MUZOREWA. HE SAID THAT DURING HIS TOUR MUZOREWA HAD BEEN SEEKING TO ENCOURAGE NATIONAL UNITY AND TO WIN FURTHER SUPPORT FOR HIS GOVERNMENT. HE HAD SAID THAT HE HAD BEEN ENCOURAGED BY HIS VISITS TO WASHINGTON AND LONDON AND CONSIDERED THAT THE PROSPECTS FOR A FAIR AND LASTING SETTLEMENT WERE NOW GOOD. ACCORDING TO MUSSELL, MUZOREWA HAD INDICATED TO HIS AUDIENCES THAT SOME FURTHER CHANGES MAY BE NECESSARY AND THAT HE, MUZOREWA, THOUGHT THAT THESE WOULD BE BROADLY ACCEPTABLE.

10.. I NOW HAVE AN APPOINTMENT WITH MUZOREWA FOR 21 JULY AT 4 PM.

11. WE SHOULD NOT READ TOO MUCH INTO THE ATTITUDES EXPRESSED BY GAYLARD AND MUSSELL. I WAS HOWEVER, ENCOURAGED THAT, IN NEITHER CASE, WAS THERE TOTAL HOSTILITY TO THE IDEA OF CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE. IT IS SIGNIFICANT THAT BOTH FOCUSED ON THE IMPORTANCE OF THE POLICE AND DEFENCE SERVICES COMMISSIONS. IT MAY BE MORE DIFFICULT FOR US TO GET AGREEMENT ON CHANGE IN THESE TWO AREAS THAN OVER THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION. IT WOULD BE WRONG TO CONCLUDE FROM THESE CONVERSATIONS THAT WE SHALL EASILY CARRY THE WHITES WITH US. GAYLARD'S REFERENCE TO THE CONTINUING IMPORTANCE OF IAN SMITH IS OMINOUS. HOWEVER, THE FLEXIBLE ATTITUDE SHOWN BY ONE OF THE THREE SERVICE COMMANDERS IS PROMISING.

~~DMY~~

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SIR A DUFF  
SIR A PARSONS  
LORD N G LENNOX  
MISS BROWN  
MR. THOMAS  
MR. WILLSON  
MR. WILLIAMS

ADDITIONAL DISTN.  
RHODESIA POLICY

GPS 300

UNCLASSIFIED

FM MAPUTO 201000Z JULY 79

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 163 OF 20 JULY

INFO LUSAKA DAR ES SALAAM MIRIMBA SALISBURY

MY TELNO 152: RHODESIA

1. QUOTE TEMPO UNQUOTE HAS PUBLISHED INTERVIEWS WITH MUGABE AND NKOMO. TEXTS BY BAG (NOT TO DAR). FOLLOWING ARE MAIN POINTS.

2. MUGABE EXPLAINED THAT THE JOINT OPERATIONAL COMMAND, SET UP AT THE ZAPU/ZANU MEETING IN MAPUTO, WAS NOT A SINGLE COMMAND, BUT ONE WHERE THE TWO GROUPS WORKED TOGETHER TO IMPLEMENT TASKS AGREED ON IN THE COUNCIL FOR DEFENCE. PATRIOTIC FRONT (PF) POLITICAL COOPERATION HAD SERVED TO RESIST BRITISH MACHINATIONS AT GENEVA AND IN THE UK/US PROPOSALS, WHICH AIMED AT CREATING A NEO-COLONIAL SITUATION. MILITARY COOPERATION TOO HAD NOW BEEN ESTABLISHED. HE DID NOT DENY THAT MUZOREWA HAD SENT MESSAGES TO THE PF LEADERS AFTER THE ELECTIONS; BUT, AS HE WAS NOW PART OF THE ENEMY REGIME, THE PF'S ONLY ANSWER WOULD BE WITH BULLETS. HMG WERE SEARCHING FOR A BASIS ON WHICH THEY COULD RECOGNISE THE REGIME; LORD HARLECH HAS ARGUED THAT THERE HAD BEEN CHANGES; MUGABE HAD REJECTED THIS AND TOLD LORD HARLECH THAT THE WAR WOULD CONTINUE, WHETHER HMG RECOGNISED THE REGIME OR NOT. BEFORE ANY NEW TALKS, HMG SHOULD MAKE CLEAR THAT, AS IN 1977/78, THEY STILL ACCEPTED THAT THE INTERNAL REGIME SHOULD BE DISMANTLED AND ITS FORCES REPLACED BY PF FORCES. QUOTE IF THESE PRECONDITIONS ARE NOT ACCEPTED BY THE BRITISH, WE DO NOT SEE THAT THERE IS A BASIS FOR TALKS. UNQUOTE ALL AFRICAN STATES WERE FIRM IN THEIR OPPOSITION TO THE SMITH-MUZOREWA REGIME. IMPERIALISM WAS THE MAIN ENEMY, SEEKING TO MAINTAIN ITS DOMINATION OF THE AREA IN ANOTHER WAY.

13. NKOMO'S

3. NKOMO'S INTERVIEW IS IN THE SAME VEIN. HE MANAGED TO CLAIM THAT THE PF HAD DEFEATED SMITH, AT THE SAME TIME AS SAYING THAT NOTHING HAD CHANGED IN RHODESIA. EACH INTERNAL POLITICIAN WAS SHIFTING HIS GROUND TO TRY AND SAFEGUARD HIMSELF, IN THE FACE OF INEVITABLE PF VICTORY. APPARENT CHANGES OF GOVERNMENT IN THE UK DID NOT CHANGE BRITAIN'S IMPERIALIST DESIGNS. ANY NEW NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD BE ON A MILITARY BASIS, ATTEMPTS AT A POLITICAL SOLUTION HAVING FAILED.

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MISS BROWN  
MR. THOMAS  
MR. WILLSON  
MR. WILLIAMS

ADDITIONAL DISTN.  
RHODESIA POLICY

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Prime Minister

FM WASHINGTON 201614Z JULY  
 TO IMMEDIATE FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE  
 TELEGRAM NUMBER 2007 OF 20 JULY 1979.

You should be aware of this.

!! not by copy

1. UNDER THE HEADING QUOTE STORM SIGNALS FROM 10 DOWNING ST  
 UNQUOTE TODAY'S WASHINGTON POST CARRIES A REPORT BY EVANS AND  
 NOVAK WHICH READS AS FOLLOWS.

BEGINS

NEWS TRAVELED FAST TO WASHINGTON FROM NO 10 DOWNING STREET THAT  
 PRIME MINISTER MARGARET THATCHER, A CONSERVATIVE WITH THE WIT TO  
 KNOW HER OWN MIND, IS NOT GOING TO BE PUSHED AROUND BY PRESIDENT  
 CARTER'S LIBERAL ACTIVISTS IN THE STATE DEPARTMENT.

THAT KNOWLEDGE, RELAYED TO FOGGY BOTTOM AS THATCHER WAS DECIDING  
 TO MOVE FASTER THAN THE LABOR GOVERNMENT TOWARD TERMINATING  
 SANCTIONS AGAINST RHODESIA, POSES THIS WORD OF CAUTION FOR JIMMY  
 CARTER: THE POWER SHIFT TO THE TOUGH-MINDED, SELF-CONFIDENT TORY  
 NOW RUNNING AFFAIRS HERE COULD SPELL TROUBLE BETWEEN THE UNITED  
 STATES AND ITS CLOSEST ALLY. THE LIKELIEST SOURCE OF TROUBLE LIES  
 IN CONFLICTING POLICIES OVER ZIMBABWE-RHODESIA -- BUT IT WILL NOT BE  
 RESTRICTED TO THAT.

FORMER PRIME MINISTER JAMES CALLAGHAN, ONE OF THE SHREWDEST  
 FOREIGN LEADERS IN UNDERSTANDING THE FREE-WHEELING WAYS OF SOME OF  
 SECRETARY OF STATE CYRUS VANCE'S TOP AIDES, SMELLED THE TROUBLE  
 AT ONCE. IN A TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH PRESIDENT CARTER JUST  
 AFTER LOSING THE MAY 3 ELECTION TO THE CONSERVATIVES, CALLAGHAN  
 GENTLY BUT POINTEDLY WARNED CARTER THAT HE WOULD NOW BE DEALING  
 WITH A DIFFERENT CUP OF TEA IN MARGARET THATCHER (QUOTE ATTILA THE  
 HEN UNQUOTE SHE IS CALLED BY SOME SUBORDINATES AND BUREAUCRATS IN  
 AWE OF HER TART TONGUE AND SHARP MIND)

BE GENEROUS, CALLAGHAN ADMONISHED CARTER, BE UNDERSTANDING,  
 THERE ARE ROUGH WATERS AHEAD, BUT THEY CAN BE NEGOTIATED AND THE  
 ALLIANCE CAN TAKE THE PRESSURE. WHAT CALLAGHAN WAS CORRECTLY  
 PREDICTING WAS A CLASH OF WILLS AND POLICIES WHEN THATCHER'S  
 TORY IDEOLOGY COLLIDES WITH MCGOVERNITE INFLUENCES STILL DOMINANT  
 IN KEY BUREAUS OF VANCE'S STATE DEPARTMENT.

THE STRAINS WILL GO BEYOND POLITICAL DISAGREEMENTS OVER SANCTIONS AND RECOGNITION FOR ZIMBABWE-RHODESIA. FOR EXAMPLE, EVEN THOUGH THATCHER GAVE A QUICK PUBLIC NOD TO THE NEW STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION TREATY (SALT II), SHE HAS RAISED FAR TOUGHER QUESTIONS THAN DID THE LABOR GOVERNMENT OVER HIGHLY CONTROVERSIAL QUOTE NONCIRCUMVENTION UNQUOTE CLAUSES OF THE TREATY AFFECTING U S WEAPONS AND TECHNOLOGY SUPPORT FOR EUROPE.

ONE BRITISH OFFICIAL, WHO PRIVATELY CONGRATULATED CARTER AFTER THATCHER PUBLICLY SUPPORTED SALT II, WAS SURPRISED AT CARTER'S HEATED RESPONSE. YES, SAID THE PRESIDENT, BUT I WISH SHE WERE SAYING THE SAME THING IN PRIVATE.

LIKEWISE, THATCHER IS TAKING A STAND ON THE MIDDLE EAST FAR MORE SYMPATHETIC TO THE PALESTINIANS' DEMAND FOR A HOMELAND ON THE WEST BANK THAN THE LABOR GOVERNMENT AND MANY U S POLITICIANS. THIS PUTS HER IN THE GENERALLY PRO-ARAB EUROPEAN CAMP, ADDING TO WORLD PRESSURE ON CARTER TO START BEARING DOWN ON ISRAEL.

BUT THE RHODESIAN TANGLE MARKS THE GREATEST CONTRADICTION BETWEEN THATCHER AND CARTER'S AFRICAN EXPERTS, LED BY UNITED NATIONS AMBASSADOR ANDREW YOUNG. THATCHER REJECTED POST-ELECTION PRESSURES ORIGINATING NOT IN CARTER'S WHITE HOUSE BUT IN YOUNG'S OFFICE AND THE STATE DEPARTMENT'S AFRICAN BUREAU. THESE PRESSURES SOUGHT TO PRESERVE THE DISCREDITED QUOTE ANGLO-AMERICAN PLAN UNQUOTE AUTHORED BY THE LABOR GOVERNMENT.

INDEED THERE WAS ANGER NOT ONLY AT 10 DOWNING STREET BUT ALSO IN THE BRITISH FOREIGN OFFICE -- MORE DISCIPLINED AND LESS IDEOLOGICAL -- OVER CARTER'S TECHNICALLY ACCURATE BUT HIGHLY MISLEADING STATEMENT ABOUT THE VOTE THAT APPROVED THE NEW RHODESIAN CONSTITUTION. CARTER, TAKING THE LEAD FROM HIS AFRICAN ADVISERS, SAID ON JUNE 7 THAT QUOTE ONLY 60 PERCENT UNQUOTE OF THE WHITES QUOTE SUPPORTED THE NEW CONSTITUTION. UNQUOTE THAT FORMULATION-- QUOTE ONLY 60 PERCENT UNQUOTE-- SOUGHT TO MINIMIZE SUPPORT FOR THE CONSTITUTION AND BISHOP MUZOREWA'S VICTORY IN THE WIDELY HAILED APRIL GENERAL ELECTION.

IN FACT, THE CONSTITUTIONAL BALLOTING, WITH ONLY WHITES ELIGIBLE TO VOTE, PRODUCED A QUOTE YES UNQUOTE VOTE OF 85 PERCENT (IN A TURNOUT OF MORE THAN 71 PERCENT ). CARTER'S AIDES RATCHETED THAT 85 PERCENT DOWN TO 60 PERCENT BY ADDING THE ENTIRE 29 PERCENT WHO



DID NOT VOTE ONTO THE NEGATIVE COLUMN, A DEVICE THAT WOULD GIVE CARTER HIMSELF ONLY 27 PERCENT OF THE VOTE IN 1976. QUOTE CAN'T THEY DO SIMPLE ARITHMETIC IN THE WHITE HOUSE? UNQUOTE ONE TOP-LEVEL THATCHER OFFICIAL COMPLAINED TO US.

IT WAS NOT A MATTER OF SIMPLE ARITHMETIC, BUT AN AMERICAN PROPAGANDA EFFORT THAT BACKFIRED AT 10 DOWNING STREET. THATCHER HAS NOW USED CONSERVATIVE REPUBLICAN SEN JESSE HELMS TO CONVEY TO CARTER HER REFUSAL TO EXTEND SANCTIONS BEYOND THEIR NOVEMBER EXPIRATION DATE. SHE SPENT 50 MINUTES WITH HELMS IN AN UNPUBLICIZED JULY 4 MEETING IN LONDON: HELMS NEVER GOT CLOSE TO A LABOR GOVERNMENT.

CARTER UNDERSTANDS WHAT HAS HAPPENED AT 10 DOWNING STREET. HE IS LIKELY TO FOLLOW THATCHER'S LEAD IN THE FORMER BRITISH COLONY. WHETHER HE DOES OR NOT, THATCHER IS ONE WOMAN NOT INTERESTED IN THE WOMAN'S PREROGATIVE TO CHANGE HER MIND. ENDS

HENDERSON

[COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING STREET]

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CONFIDENTIAL

PRIME MINISTER

Rhodesia  
(OD(79) 21 and 19)

BACKGROUND

The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary's main paper (OD(79) 21) carries forward the policy agreed in OD on 5th July. It reports on Bishop Muzorewa's Washington and London talks and seeks approval for detailed steps over the next few weeks, leading up to a constitutional conference in London in early September. As background Lord Carrington's other paper (OD(79) 19) considers the damage which our political and economic interests in Black Africa and elsewhere might suffer as a consequence of our Rhodesia policy.

2. Decisions reached on this item will affect both the line to be taken in the Debate on 25th July and also how the hand is to be played at the Lusaka Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting (CHGM). Your CHGM briefing meeting on 25th July will concentrate on subjects other than Rhodesia.

3. The timetable envisaged by Lord Carrington (which does not take account of the Debate) is as follows:-

- (i) You make a statement on Rhodesia (Annex C, paragraphs 1-7) at the CHGM as part of your statement on Southern Africa (to issue as PMVT(79) A3).
- (ii) You announce at a later stage of the CHGM our intention to summon a constitutional conference in early September (final paragraph of Annex C).
- (iii) Very soon after the CHGM we issue invitations to all parties to attend a constitutional conference. We simultaneously publish the outline proposals for an independence constitution set out at Annex A.
- (iv) Also very soon after the CHGM confidential discussions start with Bishop Muzorewa and Rhodesian leaders over possible detailed changes in the Constitution and Public Service Commissions (on the lines of Annex B).

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- (v) Early in September we hold the constitutional conference, attended by the Rhodesian Government and the Patriotic Front (or by the former alone if the latter have refused), and present detailed proposals for change in the Constitution and Public Service Commissions in which we would hope to have it (confidentially) agreed that Bishop Muzorewa would acquiesce.

4. This timetable seems sensible, though it will have to be kept under review in the light of developments. It does not however take account of what you might say in the Debate on 25th July. You will not want to take a significantly different line in the House to what you say in Lusaka: yet you will not want to damage your own negotiating hand by revealing too much prematurely - in particular you will presumably not want to spell out to the House the likely steps after Lusaka

5. At OD on 5th July you were concerned that our tactics should not rule out the fall-back position, if all else fails, of ending sanctions and granting legal independence to Rhodesia on the basis that even the present constitution had satisfied the Six Principles. The tactics now proposed in OD(79) 21 do not seem to rule out this course. In so far as they involve talking about a new British-imposed constitution and admission that the existing constitution goes too far in entrenching the rights of the minority (paragraph 4 of the statement at Annex C), they would provide a handle (which would be there anyway) to the opponents of recognition. On the other hand, anything less would be likely to lead us into almost total international isolation, with damaging consequences at the top end of the scale considered by the paper on our interests at risk (OD(79) 19). There seems also to be a reasonable chance that Bishop Muzorewa, in the light of his Washington and London visits, will accept, and persuade the whites to acquiesce in, the changes set out in Annex B, in return for the prize of British recognition. If so we would have a face-saver which could enable many African states to avoid a break with Britain which would be liable to be at least as expensive for them as for us. The big question is whether it will be sufficient to avoid drastic Nigerian action against our interests.

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HANDLING

6. You will wish to ask the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary to introduce his two papers.

7. Discussion of the background paper on the threat to our interests should be kept to a minimum. The paper does not adequately set out the range within which the damage we suffer may vary. But the plain fact is that no one knows. The only important points for the meeting are:-

- (i) that some damage is probably unavoidable;
- (ii) that worst-case damage, if our present policy fails, is likely to be extremely severe.

8. In discussion of the policy paper, you will wish to probe into how likely it in fact is that Bishop Muzorewa and a sufficient number of the whites can be brought to acquiesce in constitutional change. How great is the danger of our precipitating a mass white exodus? And how likely is Bishop Muzorewa himself to survive his present local difficulties?

9. If the Committee accept the main lines of the paper you may wish to go through each of the stages proposed (as in paragraph 3 above). In particular does the Committee accept the draft at Annex C for the statement(s) to be made at Lusaka? Does it accept Annex B as a basis thereafter for confidential discussions with the Rhodesians? Does it accept Annex A for the proposals we should publish at the time that all parties are invited to the constitutional conference? Should a further statement also be made to reassure the white minority as tentatively suggested in Lord Carrington's paragraph 4(b)? Or would that merely enable the Patriotic Front to denounce the conference as a sham?

10. This is probably as far as the Committee can take the matter now. But events will not stand still (cf. Mr. Fraser's unhelpful letters to President Kaunda, Mr. Clark and Mr. Muldoon); and you and the Foreign Secretary will need reasonable flexibility from your colleagues to play the hand in Lusaka within the general framework of this policy.

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11. You may wish to remind the Committee that if this strategy is to work it will be essential for all parties to preserve confidentiality on the detail of the changes we seek (Annex B) and on the discussions in Rhodesia.

CONCLUSION

12. Subject to the course of the discussion you may wish to guide the Committee:-

- (a) to take note of the dangers of damage to our interests (OD(79) 19);
- (b) to endorse the strategy and timetable proposed by the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary (OD(79) 21);
- (c) to note that Lord Carrington will report back to his colleagues for a decision on the details of the proposals we should table at the constitutional conference, in the light of events between now and then;
- (d) to invite Lord Carrington to report the Committee's conclusions orally at Cabinet on 26th July.

John Hunt

20th July, 1979

CONFIDENTIAL

file

DS



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

20 July 1979

Subject file  
- Sri Lanka - Call by Premadasa  
- May 79

Dear Sir,

CALL ON THE PRIME MINISTER BY THE PRIME MINISTER OF SRI LANKA,  
MR. R. PREMADASA, AT 10 DOWNING STREET ON 19 JULY 1979

The Prime Minister of Sri Lanka, Mr. Premadasa, called on the Prime Minister at No.10 on 19 July at 1730. He was accompanied by his wife - who was expected to take her leave after a few minutes but in the event remained firmly ensconced throughout the discussion, by the Sri Lankan High Commissioner and by his Private Secretary Mr. Weerakoon. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary and Mr. Cortazzi were present. The following is a summary of the main points which arose during an hour's discussion.

CHGM

Noting that both she and Mr. Premadasa would be attending their first Commonwealth Heads of Government meeting, the Prime Minister said that she expected the main value of the meeting at Lusaka to lie in the opportunities which it provided for personal contact between the Heads of Government taking part; an atmosphere of warmth and understanding could be helpful in resolving problems after the meeting was over. The Prime Minister said that although Southern African issues would clearly be high on the agenda at Lusaka, they should not dominate it: there were major problems in other parts of the world which needed to be discussed. The Prime Minister asked Mr. Premadasa if he planned to make a major intervention himself. Mr. Premadasa told the Prime Minister that he had already circulated a position paper on the question of Commonwealth co-operation in the field of urban development. There was in South Asia a serious shortage of architects, urban planners and also of building materials. He hoped that it would be possible to achieve some pooling of the Commonwealth's resources in this field.

Rhodesia

The Prime Minister asked Mr. Premadasa how his Government viewed the problem of Rhodesia. Mr. Premadasa recalled that Rhodesia had been discussed at the last meeting of the Non-Aligned in Colombo. The Sri Lankan Government wanted democracy to prevail and for the rights of minorities, as well as those of the majority,

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to be protected. Sri Lanka wished to see fair play. Mr. Premadasa then read out, from a typed card, the full text of the relevant decision of the Co-ordinating Bureau of the Non-Aligned, which denounced Bishop Muzorewa's "illegal" regime and expressed full support for the Patriotic Front. The Prime Minister commented that this resolution would seem to indicate more interest in supporting terrorism than in democracy.

#### Non-Aligned Movement

The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary said that the UK and other western Governments were deeply concerned by the implications of the inclusion of Cuba and Vietnam in the Non-Aligned Movement. It was important that democratic countries, such as Sri Lanka, should keep a very sharp eye on the activities of these countries and on the future course of events in the Movement. The Cuban claim that non-alignment could be equated with support for the Soviet Union was a dangerous concept. The Prime Minister agreed and said that this position was unhelpful to the genuinely non-aligned countries. The fact was that the Cubans were very much aligned and acted as proxies for the Russians.

#### Sri Lankan Affairs

Mr. Premadasa told the Prime Minister that, despite continuing propaganda about Sri Lanka's community problems, these problems had in fact ceased to exist as a result of measures which the Government had taken. The Tamil language was now embodied in the constitution and there was only one class of citizen in Sri Lanka. A small section of the Tamil community nevertheless continued to demand a separate state, despite the fact that this idea was unpopular even within the Tamil community as a whole. The terrorist activities of the Naxalites continued to be troublesome and the Sri Lankan Government were preparing anti-terrorist legislation which had been virtually copied from the UK's Prevention of Terrorism Act.

Mr. Premadasa told the Prime Minister that the Sri Lankan economy was on the up-turn, following the Government's relaxation of the rigid state controls imposed by the previous administration; these had simply bred corruption. The construction industry and agriculture were now booming. Sri Lanka was keen to attract investment from the UK and could offer foreign investors very attractive conditions. The Sri Lankan Government was grateful for the assistance which the UK, the FRG and Sweden had provided for the Mahaweli power and irrigation project: if this project succeeded, it would constitute a major breakthrough for the economy of Sri Lanka. The Prime Minister made it clear to Mr. Premadasa that the Government were having to take a very hard look at UK aid programmes as part of their drive to reduce public expenditure. Mr. Premadasa referred to delays in the provision of UK assistance for the Victoria Dam scheme and expressed the strong hope that this would not fall victim to any cuts which the British Government were making in their aid programme.

/At the

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At the end of the discussion Mr. Premadasa invited the Prime Minister to pay a visit to Sri Lanka as soon as possible. The Prime Minister thanked him and said that this was a tempting offer which she would bear in mind.

I am sending copies of this letter to Martin Hall (HM Treasury), Tom Harris (Department of Trade) and Martin Vile (Cabinet Office).

Yours ever,  
Roger Carridge.

Stephen Wall, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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PRIME MINISTER

Rhodesia: Message from Dr. Kissinger

Dr. Kissinger has passed the attached personal message to you through Sir Niko Henderson.

Much as I respect Dr. Kissinger, I think the message is a little off-beam in some respects. The "confrontation" (i.e. Front Line) states are pressing for much more than constitutional changes - they flatly reject the outcome of the elections and are inclined to dismiss proposals for constitutional change as mere cosmetic tinkering. It is certainly true that Bishop Muzorewa's "constitutionality" is a major asset to him: but, equally, some features of the constitution - especially the Commission's - are a source of weakness to him.

I think the comparison with Nicaragua is a little far-fetched.

May I ask for Lord Carrington's comments on the message?

No need!

out.

Bill

P-a.  
Bill  
20/7

19 July 1979

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FM MIRIMB SALISBURY 181400Z JUL 79  
TO IMMEDIATE FCO  
TELNO 419 OF 18 JULY

FOR RHODESIA DEPT

Prime Minister  
Mr. Muzorewa (if he drafted  
his statement himself)  
is very forward - but 19/7

THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT IS BEING ISSUED BY MR MUKOME, THE MINISTER  
OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS TODAY. HIS OFFICE HAS PASSED A COPY TO US.  
BEGINS:

COMMONWEALTH SECRETARY GENERAL SHRIDATH RAMPHAL HAS TAKEN IT UPON  
HIMSELF TO SIT IN JUDGEMENT UPON ZIMBABWE RHODESIA. WE IN ZIMBABWE  
RHODESIA WOULD SUGGEST THAT HE, IN COMPANY WITH MANY OTHER  
POLITICIANS POLISHING THEIR INTERNATIONAL IMAGES AND PLAYING TO THE  
THIRD AND COMMUNIST WORLDS, SHOULD RETURN TO A CLOSE ANALYSIS  
OF THE FACTS AND IGNORE IDEOLOGICAL DIFFERENCES. I SHOULD LIKE  
TO REMIND THE SECRETARY GENERAL OF A FEW OF THESE PERTINENT FACTS.

FIRST OF ALL MR RAMPHAL SHOULD REMEMBER THAT WHEN HE REFERS TO OTHER  
DEMOCRACIES HE SHOULD KEEP TO THE PRINCIPLE OF NON-INTERFERENCE  
IN THE DOMESTIC AFFAIRS OF THOSE DEMOCRACIES. WE IN ZIMBABWE  
RHODESIA WILL DETERMINE OUR OWN WAYS OF CONDUCTING OUR AFFAIRS,  
AND WILL BROOK NO SUCH INTERFERENCE BASED ON IDEOLOGY. WE WILL  
CERTAINLY BE GRATEFUL FOR WELL-REASONED ADVICE BASED ON PRACTICAL  
ISSUES - BUT JUST BECAUSE OUR WAYS DO NOT SUIT SOME FOREIGNER -  
PARTICULARLY SOMEONE WHO IS NOT EVEN A FELLOW AFRICAN - IS NO  
REASON FOR US TO PAY ANY ATTENTION.

WHILST TOTALLY REJECTING MR RAMPHAL'S RIGHT TO LEVEL ANY CRITICISM  
I SHOULD JUST LIKE TO POINT OUT TO HIM THAT WHAT HE TERMS CHANGES  
OF "MARGINAL OR COSMETIC CONSEQUENCE" WE REGARD AS MAJOR  
DEVELOPMENTS IN OUR EVOLUTION. IF THE KISSINGER PROPOSALS OF  
1976 ARE BROUGHT TO MIND, OR INDEED THE SETTLEMENT PROPOSALS  
AGREED BETWEEN THE RHODESIAN GOVERNMENT AND SIR ALEC DOUGLAS-HOME  
IN DECEMBER 1971, IT IS QUITE SELF-EVIDENT THAT WE HAVE ACHIEVED  
FAR MORE BY INTERNAL NEGOTIATION THAN BY IMPOSED SOLUTION FROM  
OVERSEAS INTERESTS. WE DO HAVE SAFEGUARDS FOR WHITE ZIMBABWE  
RHODESIANS AND THIS BLACK AND WHITE COOPERATION WILL ENSURE THAT  
ZIMBABWE RHODESIA WILL CONTINUE TO STAND HEAD AND SHOULDERS ABOVE  
THE REST OF BLACK AFRICAN STATES.

(IN FACT

IN FACT I WOULD GO SO FAR AS TO SUGGEST THAT MANY OF THE COUNTRIES  
OPPOSING ZIMBABWE RHODESIA MAY BE DOING SO NOT FROM A POSITION OF  
HIGH SOUNDING PRINCIPLE, BUT OUT OF FEAR THAT ZIMBABWE RHODESIA  
WILL CONTINUE TO OUTSTRIP ITS NEIGHBOURS IN ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE  
AND THE MAINTENANCE OF HIGH STANDARDS.

WE IN ZIMBABWE RHODESIA ARE TRUE DEMOCRATS. THE NEW GOVERNMENT  
WAS VOTED INTO POWER BY 65 PERCENT OF THE ELECTORATE, AND WE  
BUILD ON A FIRM FOUNDATION OF INTER-RACIAL COOPERATION. AS DEMOCRATS  
WE ARE PREPARED TO ALLOW MR RAMPHAL HIS DISSENTING OPINION EVEN ..  
IF IT IS BASED ON PREJUDICE AND HUNGER FOR INTERNATIONAL ACCLAIM.  
BUT IT IS ONLY FAIR TO EXPECT IN RETURN THAT HE SHOULD ACCEPT  
THAT WE WILL CONTINUE TO GO FORWARD WITH OUR IDEAS DESPITE HIS  
DISLIKE FOR THEM.

ENDS

WILSON

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PS/MR. LUCE  
PS/MR. RIDLEY  
PS/MR. HURD  
PS/PUS  
SIR A DUFF  
SIR A PARSONS  
LORD N G LENNOX  
MISS BROWN  
MR. THOMAS  
MR. WILLSON  
MR. WILLIAMS

ADDITIONAL DISTN.  
RHODESIA POLICY

GR 900

UNCLASSIFIED

FM MIRIMBA SALISBURY 180915Z JUL 79

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELNO 415 OF 18 JULY

INFO ROUTINE PRETORIA GABORONE MAPUTO LUSAKA WASHINGTON AND

UKMIS NEW YORK

INFO SAVING DAR ES SALAAM

PS TO PRIME MINISTER

NO 10 DOWNING STREET

WHITEHALL

*Prime Minister*  
*Paras. 1 and 3.*  
*Ben*  
*19/7*  
*mb*

ZIMBABWE RHODESIA PRESS ROUNDUP FOR 18 JULY

1. IN A STATEMENT ISSUED AFTER A CABINET MEETING YESTERDAY, DR MUNDAWARARA, DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER, SAID THAT THE CABINET FULLY SUPPORTED BISHOP MUZOREWA'S DECLARATION THAT THE EXPERTISE OF WHITES IS RECOGNISED AND THAT THEY ARE NOT EXPATRIATES. HE SAID THAT THE BISHOP HAD POINTED OUT THAT SANCTIONS AND ILLEGALITY HAD NOT BEEN IMPOSED ON THE COUNTRY BECAUSE OF DETAILS IN THE CONSTITUTION. HE HAD THEREFORE REJECTED THE IDEA OF CHANGING THE CONSTITUTION. "AFRICAN STATES HAVE OFTEN BEEN ACCUSED OF TEARING UP THEIR CONSTITUTIONS AFTER INDEPENDENCE, AND THIS WOULD APPEAR TO BE WHAT WE ARE BEING ASKED TO DO". DR MUNDAWARARA CHAIRED THE CABINET MEETING AS BISHOP MUZOREWA WAS RESTING AFTER HIS VISIT TO THE UNITED STATES AND BRITAIN.

2. REV SITHOLE LEFT FOR NAIROBI YESTERDAY ON WHAT A PARTY SPOKESMAN DESCRIBED AS A "PRIVATE VISIT TO MEET FRIENDS". THE HERALD SAYS THAT IT IS BELIEVED THAT MR SITHOLE WENT TO MEET ONE OF THE LAWYERS WHO WILL FIGHT HIS PARTY'S CASE IN THE HIGH COURT ON 8 AUGUST ALLEGING "GROSS IRREGULARITIES" IN THE ELECTION.

3. IN A REPORT FROM LONDON, THE HERALD SAYS THAT MR ERNEST BULLE, THE MINISTER OF COMMERCE AND INDUSTRY, WAS "AN OBVIOUSLY CONFIDENT AND CHEERFUL MAN" WHEN HE FINISHED TALKS YESTERDAY WITH BRITISH GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS. IT SAYS THAT HE HAD COMPLETED TWO DAYS OF CONSULTATIONS WITH SENIOR OFFICIALS IN THE FCO AND DTI. THE REPORT SAYS THAT MR BULLE STAYED BEHIND AFTER BISHOP MUZOREWA'S VISIT "AT THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT'S SUGGESTION". BUT THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT, "WITH AN EYE TO THE COMMONWEALTH SUMMIT IN LUSAKA NEXT MONTH, IS NOT ADMITTING TO INVITING MR BULLE TO EXTEND HIS VISIT". MR BULLE IS TO VISIT SWITZERLAND, FRANCE AND GERMANY BEFORE RETURNING TO SALISBURY. A HERALD EDITORIAL SAYS THAT THE

/ FACT THAT

FACT THAT MR BULLE HAS BEEN HAVING TALKS ABOUT THE ADVANTAGES OF AN ASSOCIATION WITH THE EUROPEAN COMMON MARKET IS "THE MOST CONVINCING INDICATION YET OF THE IMPENDING REMOVAL OF TRADE SANCTIONS". THE EDITORIAL SAYS THAT MR BULLE SAID THAT HIS TALKS INVOLVED PLANNING IN ANTICIPATION OF AN END TO SANCTIONS. "THIS IS INDEED LIGHT AT THE END OF THE TUNNEL".

3. THE HERALD REPORTS THAT MR SHRIDATH RAMPHAL HAS CONFIRMED THAT HE HAD BEEN IN TOUCH WITH BISHOP MUZOREWA AND MR JOSHUA NKOMO ABOUT SECURITY DURING THE COMMONWEALTH MEETING IN LUSAKA. HE IS REPORTED TO HAVE REFERRED TO "THE PRETENCE OF MAJORITY RULE" AT PRESENT IN THE COUNTRY BUT SAID THAT PROGRESS COULD COME OUT OF IT.

4. MR CHRIS SAKALA, PUBLICITY SECRETARY OF THE UANC, HAS SAID THAT MR JOSHUA NKOMO'S STATEMENT THAT "WAR IS BETTER THAN NEGOTIATIONS" IS "DISGUSTING, TO SAY THE LEAST". HE SAID THAT MR NKOMO'S REJECTION OF AN ALL-PARTY CONFERENCE, "SHOWS HIM IN HIS TRUE COLOURS" AND THAT THE TWO EXTERNAL LEADERS REALISED THE ONLY WAY THEY COULD COME TO POWER WAS BY WAY OF THE BULLET AND NOT THE BALLOT BOX".

5. MR JAMES DZVOVA, PUBLICITY SECRETARY OF ZANU (SITHOLE), YESTERDAY ISSUED A STATEMENT CALLING FOR CHANGES IN ENTRENCHED CLAUSES IN THE CONSTITUTION BY WHICH POWER REMAINED "IN THE HANDS OF A VIRTUALLY ALL-WHITE CIVIL SERVICE AT THE EXPENSE OF THE MAJORITY OF THE PEOPLE". HE SAID THAT IN ITS PRESENT FORM THE CONSTITUTION WAS A STUMBLING BLOCK IN THE BID FOR INTERNATIONAL RECOGNITION AND THE LIFTING OF SANCTIONS.

6. A COMBINED OPERATIONS HEADQUARTERS COMMUNIQUE HAS REPORTED THE DEATHS OF 3 MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY FORCES, ONE OF WHOM WAS AN AMERICAN, 12 TERRORISTS, 5 TERRORIST COLLABORATORS AND ONE BLACK CIVILIAN.

7. THE HERALD REPORTS FROM MONROVIA THAT PRESIDENT TOLBERT HAS SAID THE OAU HEADS OF STATE MUST KEEP OPEN THE DOOR TO AN ALL-PARTY CONFERENCE ON ZIMBABWE RHODESIA WHILE GIVING MAXIMUM SUPPORT TO THE PATRIOTIC FRONT.

8. IN A REPORT FROM JOHANNESBURG, THE HERALD SAYS THAT ZAMBIAN SECURITY MEN ARE HOLDING THE MAN THEY BELIEVE MASTER-MINDED LAST APRIL'S ATTACK ON JOSHUA NKOMO'S HOME AND HEADQUARTERS IN LUSAKA. HE IS SAID TO BE THE RHODESIAN AIR FORCE'S HIGHEST DECORATED PILOT, FLT LT MICHAEL BORELACE. BORELACE, A FORMER RAF AND ROYAL NAVY FLEET AIR ARM PILOT, IS REPORTED TO HAVE JOINED THE RHODESIAN AIR FORCE IN 1975 BUT QUIT LAST JULY AT THE END OF HIS 3 YEAR ENGAGEMENT AND JOINED THE SELOUS SCOUTS. HE IS SAID TO BE A BRITISH CITIZEN WHO HAD ARRIVED IN ZAMBIA FROM BRITAIN AS "SIMPLY A TOURIST". THE ZAMBIANS ARE REPORTED TO HAVE PICKED HIM UP ON 30 MARCH FOR USING A FALSE PASSPORT UNDER THE ALIAS MICHAEL BOURHILL. IT IS SAID THAT HE COULD FACE THE DEATH SENTENCE IF THE ZAMBIANS FIND HIM GUILTY OF SPYING.

9. THE HERALD SAYS THAT REPORTS THAT BRITISH MIDLAND AIRWAYS MAY BE FERRYING EAST GERMAN MILITARY ADVISERS FROM EAST BERLIN TO MAPUTO ARE BEING INVESTIGATED BY THE BRITISH AIRLINE PILOTS ASSOCIATION.

10. ABOUT 150 BLACK PRIMARY SCHOOL TEACHERS YESTERDAY PEACEFULLY DEMONSTRATED OUTSIDE THE MINISTRY OF EDUCATION OVER INEQUALITY OF WAGES. THE DEMONSTRATORS WERE COMPLAINING THAT THEY HAD THE SAME QUALIFICATIONS AS NEWLY QUALIFIED TEACHERS BUT WERE RECEIVING SUBSTANTIALLY LOWER WAGES. A SPOKESMAN CLAIMED THAT THE GOVERNMENT HAD JUSTIFIED THIS BY SAYING THAT NEW TEACHERS HAD BEEN TRAINED "IN GOOD SCHOOLS AND THAT WE ARE OLD AND OUT OF DATE".

11. A 21 YEAR OLD SALISBURY SCHOOL PUPIL HAS APPEARED IN COURT IN CONNECTION WITH THE ATTACK ON THE HOME OF THE GREEK ORTHODOX ARCHBISHOP OF ZIMBABWE RHODESIA. HE WAS NOT ASKED TO PLEAD AND WAS REMANDED IN CUSTODY UNTIL 31 JULY.

SUMMARY ENDS

FCO PASS SAVING TO DAR ES SALAAM

WILSON

[PASSED AS REQUESTED]

RHODESIA PLANNING DISTRIBUTION

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FM MONROVIA 181630Z JUL 79

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TO PRIORITY FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 76 OF 18 JULY

FROM CARRUTHERS

OAU - NKOMO

*[Handwritten signature]*

*Prime Minister*

*SM  
19/7*

NKOMO, SPEAKING ON BEHALF OF THE LIBERATION MOVEMENTS AT THE OPENING SESSION OF THE SUMMIT, MADE A HIGHLY EMOTIONAL AND INTEMPERATE ATTACK UPON BRITAIN, THE WESTERN COUNTRIES AND THE MUZOREWA REGIME. HE SOON DEPARTED FROM HIS PREPARED TEXT IN A RABBLE-ROUSING EXTEMPORE ADDRESS, WHICH RECEIVED INTERMITTENT BUT GENERALLY MODEST APPLAUSE. MANY HEADS OF STATE, INCLUDING NYERERE AND TOLBERT NEVER APPLAUDED AT ANY STAGE.

2. HIS ATTACK ON BRITAIN WAS FOR DECEITFUL MANOEUVRES IN PUTTING FORWARD A PUPPET REGIME THROUGH BOGUS ELECTIONS, FOR TRYING TO CREATE CONFLICT BETWEEN THE LIBERATION MOVEMENTS AND THE FRONT LINE STATES AND FOR WORKING TO UNDERMINE AFRICA ITSELF. HE ACCUSED THE WESTERN COUNTRIES OF SUPPORTING THE RACIST REGIMES AND OF BEING THE OPPRESSORS OF SOUTHERN AFRICA. HE DECLARED THAT IT WAS NOT THE COMMUNISTS, NOT THE SOCIALISTS COUNTRIES, AND NEVER HAD BEEN, WHO HAD OPPRESSED THE PEOPLE OF AFRICA.

3. NKOMO DECLARED THAT RESOLUTIONS WERE NOT ENOUGH AND THE HAD NOW COME FOR OUTRIGHT ACTION. HE APPEALED FOR FULL SUPPORT IN THE AREA AND FOR THE FRONT STATES WHO DESERVED MORE THAN THEY HAD ALREADY BEEN GIVEN.

*[Handwritten signature]*

*14.*

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4. INITIAL REACTIONS TO NKOMO'S SPEECH SUGGEST IT WAS A TACTICAL ERROR, IN BAD TASTE AND UNSUITED TO THE DIGNITY OF THE SUMMIT. SOME DELEGATIONS PRIVATELY DEPLORED THE REFERENCE TO THE COMMUNISTS AND SOCIALIST COUNTRIES. SOME SEE THE SPEECH AS A SIGN OF DESPARATION. MANY THINK IT WILL HAVE DAMAGED HIS CAUSE THOUGH NONE ARE PREPARED TO SOFTEN THEIR HOSTILITY TO MUZOREWA. THE RESERVATIONS OF SOME ABOUT THE PATRIOTIC FRONT HAVE BEEN UNDERLINED BUT ITS ENDORSEMENT AS THE SOLE LEGITIMATE AND AUTHENTIC REPRESENTATIVE ZIMBABWE REMAINS PROBABLE AS THE MINIMUM REACTION TO THE CONSTITUTION AND ELECTIONS UNDER THE INTERNAL SETTLEMENT.

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MISS BROWN  
MR. THOMAS  
MR. WILLSON  
MR. WILLIAMS

ADDITIONAL DISTN.  
RHODESIA POLICY



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FM WASHINGTON 182322Z JUL 79

TO PRIORITY F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1992 OF 18 JULY 1979

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NO DISTRIBUTION

FOLLOWING PERSONAL FOR WHITMORE, NO 10  
FROM AMBASSADOR (NO OTHER DISTRIBUTION)  
BISHOP MUZOREWA

1. KISSINGER HAS JUST TELEPHONED ME TO SAY THAT MRS THATCHER TOLD HIM THAT HE COULD SEND A MESSAGE THROUGH ME FOR HER EYES ONLY. HE NOW WISHED TO DO THIS.
2. HE WANTED THE PRIME MINISTER TO BE IN NO DOUBT OF HIS VIEW WHICH WAS THAT THOSE WHO WERE PRESSING FOR CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGES IN THE CONFRONTATION STATES, WERE REALLY SEEKING TO UNDERMINE MUZOREWA. IN KISSINGER'S VIEW MUZOREWA'S CONSTITUTIONALITY WAS HIS MAIN ASSET.
3. HIS IMPRESSION WHEN HE SAW MUZOREWA HERE WAS THAT HE WAS DISCOURAGED. KISSINGER'S VIEW IS THAT MUZOREWA IS NOT INFINITELY RESILIENT: HE COULD BREAK. HIS FEELING, AS INDEED KISSINGER'S, IS THAT THESE IDEAS FOR TINKERING WITH THE NUMBERS OF WHITES IN THE GOVERNMENT AND ADMINISTRATION MUST BE SEEN IN THE LIGHT OF WHAT WE ARE REALLY TRYING TO DO. TO KISSINGER SUCH MANOEUVRES ARE LIKE TRYING TO SQUARE THE CIRCLE AND WE WILL END UP WITH ANOTHER NICARAGUA.
4. IN TRANSMITTING THIS MESSAGE I SHOULD ADD THAT I DO NOT THINK KISSINGER IS EXPECTING ANY REPLY.

HENDERSON

**CONFIDENTIAL**

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DESK 181730Z

FM F.C.O. 181625Z JUL 79

TO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON

TELEGRAM NUMBER 870 OF 18 JULY

INFO PRIORITY CANBERRA, OTTAWA, WELLINGTON, E.E.C. POSTS, MURMBA  
SALISBURY, PRETORIA.*Info re  
GWS  
19/7*

RHODESIA: BISHOP MUZOREWA'S VISIT TO LONDON

1. PLEASE GIVE THE AMERICANS IN CONFIDENCE THE FOLLOWING ACCOUNT OF BISHOP MUZOREWA'S TALKS WITH THE PRIME MINISTER AND MYSELF.
2. YOU SHOULD THANK THE AMERICANS FOR THE PROMPT ACCOUNT WE WERE GIVEN OF BISHOP MUZOREWA'S TALKS WITH THE PRESIDENT AND WITH MR VANCE. THIS WAS VERY HELPFUL TO THE PRIME MINISTER AND MYSELF.
3. IN OUR TALKS WITH HIM OUR FIRST OBJECTIVE WAS TO CONVINCED BISHOP MUZOREWA THAT THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT FULLY APPRECIATED THE MAGNITUDE OF HIS AND HIS COLLEAGUES' ACHIEVEMENT AND THUS TO ENCOURAGE HIM TO TRUST AND COOPERATE WITH US IN WORKING FOR A SETTLEMENT.
4. MUZOREWA ARGUED THAT IF BRITAIN PROCEEDED TO GRANT LEGAL INDEPENDENCE ON THE BASIS OF THE UNDERLINE FOLLOWING TWO WORDS STATUS QUO, OTHER COUNTRIES, INCLUDING MANY AFRICAN COUNTRIES, WOULD FOLLOW OUR LEAD. WE TOLD MUZOREWA THAT OUR CONSULTATIONS HAD SHOWN THAT THIS SIMPLY WAS NOT THE CASE. THE WAR WOULD CONTINUE AND RHODESIA WOULD NOT SECURE THE INTERNATIONAL ACCEPTANCE IT NEEDED TO GIVE IT A PROSPECT OF A MORE STABLE FUTURE.
5. MUZOREWA SAID THAT THE NEW GOVERNMENT HAD BEEN DEMOCRATICALLY ELECTED. THEY HAD NOT BEEN RESPONSIBLE FOR THE ILLEGAL DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE. THEY HAD MAJORITY RULE AND MUCH FREER ELECTIONS THAN THOSE OF MOST OF THEIR THIRD WORLD CRITICS.
6. WE SAID THAT WE ACCEPTED THE FULL EXTENT OF THE PROGRESS WHICH HAD BEEN MADE. BUT OUR CONSULTATIONS HAD SHOWN THAT THERE WAS WIDESPREAD CRITICISM OF CERTAIN ASPECTS OF THE CONSTITUTION, IN PARTICULAR THE WHITE BLOCKING POWER IN PARLIAMENT AND THE MEMBERSHIP AND POWERS OF THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSIONS. THERE WAS A GENERAL

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/ DEMAND.

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DEMAND THAT A SOLUTION SHOULD BE SEEN TO STEM FROM THE UNITED KINGDOM AS THE CONSTITUTIONALLY RESPONSIBLE AUTHORITY.

7. MUZOREWA SAID THAT THE CONSTITUTION HAD BEEN AGREED BY THE INTERNAL PARTIES. HE EMPHASISED THE NEED TO MAINTAIN WHITE CONFIDENCE. WE SAID THAT WE ALSO ATTACHED IMPORTANCE TO THIS. THE PRINCIPLE OF SPECIAL REPRESENTATION FOR MINORITIES WAS WIDELY ACCEPTED AND THERE WERE MANY PRECEDENTS AMONG CONSTITUTIONS GIVEN TO OTHER BRITISH TERRITORIES ON INDEPENDENCE. THERE SHOULD NOT BE A NEED FOR RADICAL CHANGE. BUT IT WAS IMPORTANT THAT RHODESIA SHOULD BE BROUGHT TO LEGAL INDEPENDENCE ON THE BASIS OF A CONSTITUTION WHICH BRITAIN COULD SHOW TO BE COMPARABLE WITH OTHER INDEPENDENCE CONSTITUTIONS.

8. IN THE COURSE OF THESE DISCUSSIONS IT WAS MADE CLEAR TO MUZOREWA THAT IT WOULD BE ESSENTIAL TO OFFER THE EXTERNAL PARTIES AN OPPORTUNITY TO TAKE PART. MR MUKOME ASKED WHAT OUR ATTITUDE WOULD BE IF THE PATRIOTIC FRONT SOUGHT TO DRAG OUT DISCUSSIONS WHILE THE WAR CONTINUED. WE SAID A GENUINE ATTEMPT MUST BE MADE TO INVOLVE THE EXTERNAL PARTIES BUT THEY SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO BLOCK A SOLUTION BY SEEKING TO IMPOSE UNREASONABLE CONDITIONS.  
COMMENT.

9. WE BELIEVE THAT MUZOREWA LEFT LONDON MORE OR LESS CONVINCED THAT WE WERE INDEED SEEKING A SETTLEMENT THAT WOULD TAKE ACCOUNT OF AND BUILD ON WHAT HAD BEEN ACHIEVED IN RHODESIA: WHILE ACCEPTING THAT CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE WILL BE NECESSARY, AND THAT WE INTEND TO INVOLVE THE EXTERNAL PARTIES.

10. OTHER POSTS SHOULD CONTINUE TO DRAW AS NECESSARY ON GUIDANCE TELNO 90. THE ABOVE IS FOR THEIR BACKGROUND INFORMATION ONLY.

CARRINGTON

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SIR A PARSONS

LORD N G LENNOX

MISS BROWN

MR. THOMAS

MR. WILLSON

MR. WILLIAMS

ADDITIONAL DISTN.  
RHODESIA POLICY

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# CONFIDENTIAL

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CONFIDENTIAL

~~SUBJECT~~ CONFIDENTIAL

*Rhodesia*  
*Butler*  
*6/21*  
*1977*

FM F C O 181100Z JUL 79

TO IMMEDIATE DAR ES SALAAM

TELEGRAM NUMBER 245 OF 18 JULY.

PRIME MINISTER'S

PERSONAL MESSAGE

SERIAL No. T47/79T

YOUR TEL NO 576: RHODESIA.

1. PLEASE HAVE THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER DELIVERED TO PRESIDENT NYERERE.

DEAR MR PRESIDENT

THANK YOU FOR YOUR LETTER OF 10 JULY ABOUT RHODESIA. I AM GRATEFUL TO YOU FOR SETTING OUT YOUR VIEWS SO CLEARLY.

I LOOK FORWARD TO DISCUSSING ALL THESE QUESTIONS WITH YOU AT LUSAKA. MEANWHILE, I NEED TO REFLECT ON WHAT YOU AND OTHERS HAVE TOLD ME, ON THE CONSULTATIONS WHICH DAVID HARLECH HAD WITH SEVERAL GOVERNMENTS IN AFRICA, AND ON THE TALK I HAVE JUST HAD WITH BISHOP MUZOREWA. THE WAY FORWARD IS NOT EASY, AS I AM ACUTELY AWARE. BUT IN CONSIDERING IT I SHALL BE FORTIFIED BY THE BELIEF THAT WE SHARE A COMMON OBJECTIVE - THAT IS TO REACH A JUST AND PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF THIS LONGSTANDING PROBLEM WHICH WILL REST ON THE FOUNDATIONS OF AN END TO THE FIGHTING, AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL EXERCISE OF POWER BY THE MAJORITY.

I DO HOPE WE CAN SET ASIDE SOME TIME FOR A TALK IN LUSAKA SO THAT WE CAN GO INTO THE ISSUES IN GREATER DEPTH. I LOOK FORWARD TO SEEING YOU THERE.

WITH BEST WISHES  
YOURS SINCERELY  
MARGARET THATCHER  
CARRINGTON

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MISS BROWN  
MR. THOMAS  
MR. WILLSON  
MR. WILLIAMS

ADDITIONAL DISTN.  
RHODESIA POLICY

CONFIDENTIAL



File 1/15.  
Rhodesia

10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

18 July 1979

TRADE UNIONISM IN RHODESIA

I enclose a copy of a letter which has been addressed to the Prime Minister by Professor John Hutchinson (and of which he has sent the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary and the Secretary of State for Employment copies) about trade unionism in Rhodesia.

I should be grateful if, in consultation with the Department of Employment, you would arrange for a suitable reply to be sent to Professor Hutchinson on the Prime Minister's behalf and if a copy could be sent to me in due course for our records here at No. 10.

I am sending a copy of this letter and enclosure to Ian Fair (Department of Employment).

B. G. CARTLEDGE

J. S. Wall, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

JWS



flsb

10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

18 July 1979

I am writing on the Prime Minister's behalf to thank you for your letter of 9 July about trade unionism in Zimbabwe Rhodesia. Your letter is being given consideration and a reply will be sent to you as soon as possible.

B. G. CARTLEDGE

Professor John Hutchinson.

flsb

GRS 1100

CONFIDENTIAL

Prime Minister

CONFIDENTIAL

FM CANBERRA 170840Z JUL 79

Inept and, so far as  
Kaunda is concerned,  
wholesale.

6/17  
19/7

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 412 OF 17 JULY

INFO-PRIORITY WASHINGTON WELLINGTON LUSAKA MIRIMBA-SALISBURY  
OTTAWA LAGOS

1. HEAD OF CHANCERY WAS SUMMONED THIS AFTERNOON BY HEAD OF THE INTERNATIONAL DIVISION IN DEPARTMENT OF PRIME MINISTER AND CABINET AND SHOWN IN CONFIDENCE (BUT NOT GIVEN) COPIES OF THREE LETTERS SENT TODAY BY MR FRASER TO PRESIDENT KAUNDA, MR CLARK AND ( A MUCH SHORTER ONE) TO MR MULDOON. HOLDICH STRESSED THAT MR FRASER WAS MOST CONCERNED ABOUT THE ZIMBABWE ISSUE AT THE LUSAKA CHOGM. THE LETTERS, WHICH HAD BEEN VERY CAREFULLY DRAFTED BY MR FRASER, MR PEACOCK AND BY SENIOR OFFICIALS, WERE AN ATTEMPT TO BE HELPFUL. AND EVERY EFFORT HAD BEEN MADE NOT TO MIS-REPRESENT BRITISH VIEWS. HOLDICH ADDED THAT THE AUSTRALIANS' AIM IN DRAFTING A PRECISE SUMMARY OF THE BRITISH POSITION (THE QUOTE SIX POINTS UNQUOTE REFERRED TO IN MYTELNO 378 AND YOUR TEL NO 320 - NOT TO ALL) HAD BEEN TO ENSURE THAT THEY DID NOT MISREPRESENT US.

2. THE LETTERS TO PRESIDENT KAUNDA AND MR CLARK ARE OF ALMOST IDENTICAL LENGTH AND SUBSTANCE AND GIVE A BRIEF ACCOUNT OF MR FRASER'S TALKS WITH THE PRIME MINISTER. HE DESCRIBES HIS OWN VIEW THAT QUOTE RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN ZIMBABWE COULD BE REGARDED AS A STEP -- BUT ONLY A STEP -- TOWARDS A SETTLEMENT.....THE CONSTITUTION UNDER WHICH THE ELECTIONS WERE HELD HAS DEFICIENCIES AND NEEDS AMENDMENT IN THE DIRECTION OF GREATER AFRICANISATION.....UNQUOTE. ANY SETTLEMTH IF IT IS TO STICK AND RESULT IN THE ENDING OF THE WAR MUST QUOTE HAVE SUBSTANTIAL SUPPORT OR ACCEPTANCE FROM AFRICAN STATES. UNQUOTE.

3. MR FRASER'S TWO LONGER LETTERS CONTINUE QUOTE. MRS THATCHER OBVIOUSLY FEELS STRONGLY THAT THE ELECTIONS IN ZIMBABWE WERE A SIGNIFICANT ADVANCE. I ACCEPT THAT WE ARE DEALING NOW WITH A NEW SITUATION BUT IN MY VIEW IT IS NOT ONE THAT IN ITSELF

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PROVIDES A BASIS FOR A LASTING SETTLEMENT. UNQUOTE.  
THERE WERE DEFICIENCIES IN THE CONSTITUTION, IN PARTICULAR  
THE CONTINUATION OF ENTRENCHED PROVISIONS FOR THE WHITE  
COMMUNITY. QUOTE. I URGED MRS THATCHER TO GO TO LUSAKA  
ABLE TO SAY THAT BRITAIN WAS INVOLVED IN AN EXTENSIVE  
PROCESS OF CONSULTATION AIMED AT AMENDING THE CONSTITUTION  
IN THE DIRECTION OF GREATER AFRICANISATION AND TOWARDS A  
SETTLEMENT THAT WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE BOTH TO THE PEOPLE OF  
ZUMBABWE AND TO OTHER AFRICAN STATES. UNQUOTE

4. MR FRASER WRITES THAT THE PRIME MINISTER QUOTE  
ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THERE WERE DEFICIENCIES IN THE PRESENT  
SITUATION IN ZIMBABWE AND ACCEPTED THAT FURTHER CHANGE WAS CLEARLY  
NEEDED BOTH IN RELATION TO THE CONSTITUTION AND IN THE  
DIRECTION OF ACHIEVING A MORE THOROUGH-GOING FORM OF  
MAJORITY RULE IN ZIMBABWE. WE DID NOT SEEK TO DEFINE THE  
EXTENT OF THESE CHANGES. UNQUOTE.

5. THE LETTERS CONTINUE THAT THE PRIME MINISTER QUOTE  
RECOGNISED THE NEED FOR ADEQUATE AFRICAN SUPPORT UNQUOTE  
AND HAD REFERRED TO LORD HARLECH'S EXTENSIVE CONSULTATIONS.  
THE PRIME MINISTERS HAD AGREED THAT QUOTE THE LUSAKA  
MEETING WOULD BE AN IMPORTANT ELEMENT IN THE PROCESS OF  
CONSULTATIONS DIRECTED TOWARDS A SETTLEMENT. IF WE CAN  
DEVISE FORMULATIONS AT LUSAKA WHICH WILL HELP THIS PROCESS  
ALONG, THEN WE SHALL HAVE ACCOMPLISHED A GREAT DEAL. UNQUOTE.

6. ....QUOTE....MRS THATCHER IS MOST SORELY PRESSED BY THE  
NOVEMBER DEADLINE WHEN IT IS POSSIBLE THAT THE BRITISH  
PARLIAMENT WILL REFUSE TO RENEW BRITISH SANCTIONS. IN VIEW  
OF THIS IT IS OBVIOUSLY MOST IMPORTANT TO MAKE SIGNIFICANT  
PROGRESS TOWARDS A SETTLEMENT BEFORE THAT TIME. UNQUOTE.

7. MR FRASER CONCLUDES HIS LETTERS TO PRESIDENT KAUNDA  
AND MR CLARK BY SEEKING THEIR VIEWS ON QUOTE WHETHER THE  
FOLLOWING BROAD POSITION PROVIDES THE POSSIBILITY FOR A WAY  
THROUGH THIS MATTER AT LUSAKA:

A. RECOGNITION THAT WHAT HAS HAPPENED IN ZIMBABWE IS A STEP  
FORWARD BUT ONE THAT NEEDS BUILDING ON.

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/ B. ACKNOWLEDGEMENT



CONFIDENTIAL

B. ACKNOWLEDGEMENT THAT THERE IS NEED FOR FURTHER CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE TO REMOVE THE DEFICIENCIES IN THE CONSTITUTION AS IT NOW STANDS AND TO ACHIEVE GREATER AFRICANISATION.

C. ACCEPTANCE BY THE MEETING OF A PROCESS AIMED AT ACHIEVING CHANGES IN THE CONSTITUTION THAT WOULD MAKE IT MORE GENERALLY ACCEPTABLE - BUT WITHOUT ANY PRECISE DEFINITION OF THE SPECIFIC CHANGES THAT MIGHT BE REQUIRED, BECAUSE OF THE DIFFICULTY OF OBTAINING AGREEMENT ON THIS AT A MEETING AS LARGE AS CHOGM.

D. RECOGNITION OF THE FACT THAT IF IT IS TO SURVIVE ANY SETTLEMENT NEEDS ADEQUATE ACCEPTANCE FROM THE AFRICAN STATES. UNQUOTE.

8. THE LETTER TO MR CLARK HAS AN ADDITIONAL PARAGRAPH. QUOTE. CHOGM THIS YEAR IS LIKELY TO PROVE A DIFFICULT MEETING AND I HOPE THAT COUNTRIES LIKE CANADA AND AUSTRALIA WILL BE ABLE TO EXERCISE A HELPFUL MODERATING INFLUENCE. UNQUOTE.

9. HOLDICH OBSERVED THAT THE SHORTER LETTER TO MR MULDOON WAS SENT SIMPLY BECAUSE QUOTE WE COULD NOT LEAVE HIM OUT UNQUOTE. MR MULDOON HAD HIS OWN PROBLEMS OVER RHODESIA, AND THE AUSTRALIANS DID NOT WANT HIM TO QUOTE ROCK THE BOAT UNQUOTE. AFTER STATING THAT MR FRASER HAD LENGTHY AND FRANK DISCUSSIONS WITH THE PRIME MINISTER QUOTE I BELIEVE THAT THEY WERE FRUITFUL UNQUOTE THE LETTER TO MR MULDOON HAS AS ITS SUBSTANCE ONLY PARAGRAPHS 4 AND 5 ABOVE.

10. HOLDICH SAID THAT COPIES OF THESE LETTERS WERE BEING SENT TO AUSTRALIA HOUSE FOR THE PERSONAL INFORMATION OF SIR GORDON FREETH AND HIS DEPUTY. NO OTHER LETTERS ALONG THESE LINES WERE IN PROSPECT. MR FRASER HOWEVER WOULD BE SPEAKING IN SIMILAR TERMS TO GENERAL OBASANJO IN LAGOS AND TO MR MANLEY (POSSIBLY BY TELEPHONE) AS WOULD MR PEACOCK WHEN HE VISITED NAIROBI AND DAR ES SALAAM ON HIS WAY TO LUSAKA.

DUDGEON

[COPIES SENT TO NO.10 DOWNING ST]

FILES:

RHOD'D

SPD

PS

PS/IPS

PS/MR LUCE

PS/MR BLAKER

PS/PUS

SIR A. DUFF

MR CORTAZZI

MR WILLIAMS

MR MURRAY

COPIES TO:

SIR J. HUNT CABINET OFFICE

X



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

*Prime Minister*

London SW1A 2AH

*Agree to reply to President Nyerere in the terms of the draft telegram below? SW 17/7*

17 July 1979

*Dear Bryan,*

*and*

Rhodesia: President Nyerere's Letter

*FCO informed  
P.A.  
SW  
17/7*

*[Signed original now OK?]*

President Nyerere wrote to the Prime Minister on 10 July about Rhodesia (Dar-es-Salaam telno 576 enclosed).

The approach outlined by President Nyerere would involve us in seeking to negotiate at the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting in Lusaka a new Constitution for Rhodesia and arrangements under which new internationally supervised elections would be held. This is not at all the manner in which we intend to proceed. It will be an important part of our strategy to avoid a discussion at Lusaka of detailed constitutional proposals, which could only lead to attempts to impose a fresh set of conditions for the granting of independence.

In Lord Carrington's view, it is undesirable to show our hand in advance of the Commonwealth Conference. Lord Carrington considers, therefore, that the best course will be for the Prime Minister to avoid replying to President Nyerere's letter in any detail and to send a polite but non-committal reply in the terms of the attached draft telegram.

*Yours ever,*

*Stephen*

(J S Wall)  
Private Secretary

Bryan G Cartledge Esq  
10 Downing Street  
LONDON

17 JUL 1979



File No. ....  
Department .....  
Drafted by SIR A DUFF  
(Block Capitals) .....  
Tel. Extn. ....

OUTWARD  
TELEGRAM

Security Classification
CONFIDENTIAL
Precedence
IMMEDIATE
DESKBY .....Z

FOR COMMS. DEPT. USE	Despatched (Date) ..... (Time) .....Z	POSTBY .....Z
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PREAMBLE

(Time of Origin) ..... Z (G.M.T.) (Restrictive Prefix) .....  
 (Security Class.) CONFIDENTIAL (Caveat) .....  
 (Codeword) ..... (Deskby) ..... Z  
 (Privacy marking) .....

TO IMMEDIATE DAR ES SALAAM Tel. No. ....of .....  
(precedence) (post)

AND TO (precedence/post) .....  
.....

AND SAVING TO .....

REPEATED TO (for info) .....

SAVING TO (for info) .....

Distribution: -

[TEXT]

YOUR TELNO 576: RHODESIA

1. Please have the following message from the Prime Minister delivered to President Nyerere.

Dear Mr President

Thank you for your letter of 10 July about Rhodesia. I am grateful to you for setting out your views so clearly.

Copies to: -

I look forward to discussing all these questions with you at Lusaka. Meanwhile, I need to reflect on what you and others have told me, on the consultations which David Harlech had with several governments in Africa, and on the talk I have just had with Bishop Muzorewa. The way forward is not easy, as I am acutely aware. But in considering it I shall be fortified by the belief that we share a common objective - that is to reach a just and peaceful settlement of this

/longstanding

CONFIDENTIAL

longstanding problem which will rest on the foundations of an end to the fighting, and the constitutional exercise of power by the majority.

I do hope we can set aside some time for a talk in Lusaka so that we can go into the issues in greater depth. I look forward to seeing you there.

With best wishes

Yours sincerely

Margaret Thatcher

CARRINGTON

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

CONFIDENTIAL

[RHODESIA: POLICY: ADVANCE COPIES]

X-24

2

PS  
PS/SIR I. GILMOUR  
PS/MR LUCE  
PS/PUS  
SIR A DUFF  
Mr. Willson.

~~PS/NO 10 DOWNING STREET~~ / (2)

MR WILLIAMS

! ... ..

HD/RHODESIA D (3)

HD/C AF D  
HD/S AF D

HD/UND  
HD/NEWS D  
HD/WAD

MR FREELAND LEGAL ADVISER RM K200A

MR ~~STEEL~~ <sup>FIFoot</sup> LEGAL ADVISER RM ~~K200~~ 190.

SIR C ROSE  
MR P.M. MAXEY  
COL MOIR  
MR P J FOWLER  
DIO  
Sir J Hunt

CABINET OFFICE

(Jes)

GRS 403

UNCLASSIFIED

FM NAIROBI 160815Z JULY

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELNO 412 OF 16 JULY 79

INFO WASHINGTON AND MIRIMBA SALISBURY

*Prime Minister*  
*but*  
*16/7*  
*p.a.*

OAU CONFERENCE : RHODESIA -KENYAN ATTITUDE.

1. VICE PRESIDENT KIBAKE GAVE AN INTERVIEW TO THE "NAIROBI TIMES" BEFORE HE LEFT ON 14 JULY TO REPRESENT KENYA AT THE MONROVIA OAU SUMMIT.

2. TEXT OF THE NAIROBI TIMES ARTICLE IS AS FOLLOWS:

MR KIBAKE SAID THERE WAS NO POINT IN AFRICA CLOSING ITS EYEST TO WHAT HE TERMED "THE VERY SIGNIFICANT CHANGES" IN ZIMBABWE RHODESIA SINCE THE ELECTIONS HELD LAST MAY UNDER THE INTERNAL SETTLEMENT ACCORD.

KIBAKI ALSO SAID IT WOULD BE WRONG FOR THE OAU TO FAIL TO APPRECIATE THESE CHANGES AND WORK TOWARDS A PROMOTION OF A ROUND TABLE CONFERENCE INVOLVING THE HOME BASED AFRICAN MOVEMENTS HEADED BY BISHOP ABEL MUZOREWA AND THE PATRIOTIC FRONT ALLIANCE OF MESSRS JOSHUA NKOMO AND ROBERT MUGABE.

AFRICA SHOULD NOT NOW GET INVOLVED IN A SITUATION WHERE IT WOULD APPEAR SHE WAS ENCOURAGING BROTHER AFRICANS TO FIGHT THEIR BROTHER AFRICANS. "THERE IS NO RESPONSIBLE ELDER IN ANY AFRICAN FAMILY WHO WOULD ENCOURAGE BROTHERS TO FIGHT,"

KENYA WAS NOT, HOWEVER, SATISFIED WITH THE NEW RHODESIAN CONSTITUTION AND THE MANNER IN WHICH THE ELECTIONS WERE CONDUCTED.

CONSTITUTION AND THE MANNER IN WHICH THE ELECTIONS WERE CONDUCTED.  
"BUT THERE HAS BEEN A CHANGE: "WE NOW SEE A PRIME MINISTER WHO IS AFRICAN. AFRICANS IN RHODESIA HAVE PARTICIPATED IN CHOOSING THE PRESENT MEMBERS OF PARLIAMENT. SO TO US, THERE IS NO POINT IN ANYONE CLOSING HIS EYES AND REFUSING TO SEE NEW REALITIES. THERE HAS BEEN A VERY SIGNIFICANT CHANGE. HE SAID THAT WAS ONE OF THE THREE MAIN POINTS WHICH THE KENYAN DELEGATION WOULD STRESS IN ITS PRIMARY STATEMENT BEFORE THE AFRICAN LEADERS' ASSEMBLY. THE SECOND POINT WAS THE DEFINITION OF THE ROLE OF KENYA AND OTHER OAU MEMBERS OUGHT TO PLAY UNDER THE CHANGED CIRCUMSTANCES IN RHODESIA. "AS A MEMBER OF THE OAU, WE SEE OUR ROLE AS DOING EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO ENCOURAGE A PEACEFUL SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM AND THEREFORE WE WILL SUPPORT ALL EFFORTS AIMED AT GETTING ALL THE RHODESIAN LEADERS TO MEET AT ONE TABLE AND SETTLE THEM CONSTITUTIONALLY", THE OAU, THE VICE PRESIDENT WARNED, SHOULD NOT DO ANYTHING WHICH WOULD ENCOURAGE THE PARTIES IN THE RHODESIAN CONFLICT TO CONTINUE FIGHTING. "WE KEEP FORGETTING THAT SMITH HAD AFRICAN TROOPS, EVEN THOUGH THEY WERE LED BY WHITE OFFICERS, AND THESE ARE NOW UNDER THE MUZOREWA GOVT. TO LET OUR BROTHERS CONTINUE TO KILL EACH OTHER IS IRRESPONSIBLE" HE SAID. HE SAID IT WAS KENYA'S VIEW THAT THE OAU SHOULD COMMIT ITSELF TO A POLICY OF SEEKING A LASTING SOLUTION ACCEPTABLE TO THE WARRING PARTIES.

OF THE THIRD POINT WHICH KENYA WOULD RAISE IN MONROVIA OVER THE RHODESIA QUESTION, KIBAKI SAID: "AS OF NOW, THE OAU HAS NO FORCES OF ITS OWN WHICH COULD BE USED FOR THE PURPOSES OF WAR IN RHODESIA, OR IN NAMIBIA OR SOUTH AFRICA FOR THAT MATTER. WE MUST THEREFORE EITHER DECIDE TO ESTABLISH SUCH A FORCE OR STOP COMMITTING OURSELVES TO RESOLUTIONS WHICH ARE IMPOSSIBLE TO IMPLEMENT".

ASKED WHETHER THIS DID NOT REPRESENT A DEPARTURE FROM KENYA'S STAND ON NON-RECOGNITION OF THE MUZOREWA GOVERNMENT, KIBAKI REPLIED: "THE QUESTION OF RECOGNITION IS NOT REALLY THE ISSUE NOW. THE ISSUE, NOW IS WE MUST ACCEPT THE REALITY THAT MUZOREWA IS THE PRIME MINISTER. WHO ELSE DO WE TAKE TO REPRESENT THE REALITY? YOU CANT GET AWAY FROM THE FACT THAT MUZOREWA IS THE PRIME MINISTER."

"ON THE OTHER HAND, IF WE TOOK THE VIEW THAT WE ONLY SHOULD RECOGNISE THE PATRIOTIC FRONT WE ARE BEING NEGATIVE."

ENDS.

+



Prime Minister

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

Dear Bryan,

Do you agree that the Americans may be misled on your talk with Bishop Muzorewa in the terms of the attached draft telegram?

16 July 1979

JSW  
17/7

Rhodesia; Bishop Muzorewa's Visit to London

The Americans gave us an account of Bishop Muzorewa's discussions with President Carter and Mr Vance before the Bishop's arrival in London. They will be concerned to know the outcome of the discussions with the Prime Minister and Lord Carrington. I attach a draft telegram which has been approved by Lord Carrington and which, if the Prime Minister agrees, will be sent to our Embassy in Washington for use with Mr Vance's office. It will be important in carrying the Americans with us to place some emphasis on the need to offer the Patriotic Front an opportunity to participate (though we should not, of course, allow them to dictate the conditions on which they might do so). The telegram is drafted to take account of this point.

Yours ever,  
Stephen

(J S Wall)  
Private Secretary

Bryan G Cartledge Esq  
10 Downing Street  
LONDON

FCD informed of PM's comments: will advise draft re. accordingly.

JSW  
17/7

p.a.

don't think it does justice to the case Muzorewa put. We've made it quite clear that we are not making any charges to the Patriotic Front. We've made it quite clear that we are not making any charges to the Patriotic Front. We've made it quite clear that we are not making any charges to the Patriotic Front.



File No. ....  
 Department RHODESIA  
 Drafted by R W RENWICK  
 (Block Capitals) .....  
 Tel. Extn. 233 5698

OUTWARD  
 TELEGRAM

Security Classification CONFIDENTIAL
Precedence IMMEDIATE
DESKBY .....Z

FOR COMMS. DEPT. USE  
 Despatched (Date) ..... POSTBY .....Z  
 (Time) .....Z

PREAMBLE  
 (Time of Origin) .....Z(G.M.T.) (Restrictive Prefix).....  
 (Security Class.) CONFIDENTIAL (Caveat/Privacy Marking).....  
 (Codeword) ..... (Deskby).....Z  
 TO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON Tel. No. .... of .....  
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 AND SAVING TO.....  
 REPEATED TO (for info) PRIORITY: CANBERRA, OTTAWA, WELLINGTON, EEC POSTS  
NIRINBA SACISBURY, PRETORIA  
 SAVING TO (for info).....

Distribution:-  
 Rhodesia Policy

Copies to:-

[TEXT]  
 RHODESIA: BISHOP MUZOREWA'S VISIT TO LONDON  
 1. Please give the Americans in confidence the following account of Bishop Muzorewa's talks with the Prime Minister and myself.  
 2. Our first objective was to convince Bishop Muzorewa that the British government fully appreciated the magnitude of his ~~his~~ and his colleagues' achievement and thus to encourage him to trust and cooperate with us in working for a settlement.  
 3. Muzorewa argued that if Britain proceeded to grant legal independence on the basis of the status quo,

other countries, including many African countries, would follow our lead. We told Muzorewa that our consultations had shown that this simply was not the case. The war would continue and Rhodesia would not secure the international acceptance it needed to give it a prospect of a more stable future.

4. We added that our consultations had shown that there was widespread criticism of certain aspects of the Constitution, in particular the white blocking power in Parliament and the membership and powers of the public service commissions. There was a general demand that ~~the basis for~~ a solution should be seen to stem from the United Kingdom as the constitutionally responsible authority.

5. Muzorewa said that the Constitution had been agreed by the internal parties and that it was essential to maintain white confidence. We said that we <sup>also</sup> attached ~~no less~~ importance to this.

The principle of special representation/ was <sup>for minorities</sup>

widely accepted and there were many precedents <sup>among constitutions</sup> given to other British territories on independence elsewhere. ~~But~~ it was important that Rhodesia

brought to should be/ legal independence on the basis of a Constitution which Britain could show to be comparable with other independence Constitutions.

6. In the course of these discussions it was made clear to Muzorewa that it would be essential

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to offer the external parties an opportunity to take part. Mr Mukome asked what our attitude would be if the Patriotic Front sought to drag out discussions while the war continued. We said a genuine attempt must be made to involve the external parties but they should not be allowed to block a solution by seeking to impose unreasonable conditions.

7. Comment

We believe that Muzorewa left London more or less convinced that we were indeed seeking a settlement that would take account of and build on what had been achieved in Rhodesia; while accepting that constitutional change will be necessary, and that we intend to involve the external parties.

8. Other posts should continue to draw as necessary on guidance telegram No 90. The above is for their background information only.

CARRINGTON

CONFIDENTIAL

17 JUL 1979



CONFIDENTIAL

Rhodesia



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

cc Martinville,  
Cabinet Office.

16 July 1979

Dear Bryan,

BM  
16/7

Bishop Muzorewa's Call on the Prime Minister  
on 13 July 1979

Thank you for your letter of 13 July enclosing the record of Bishop Muzorewa's call on the Prime Minister on Friday.

Page 8 of the record records Lord Carrington as saying that Mr Nkomo and Mr Mugabe were very unlikely to attend a constitutional conference. Lord Carrington has asked me to let you know that he did not intend to suggest that the Patriotic Front leaders were unlikely to attend a constitutional conference. What he was intending to say was that the Patriotic Front were unlikely to agree to the kind of proposals which we would put forward at a constitutional conference; not that they would not attend a conference in the first place.

Yours ever,  
Stephen

J S Wall  
Private Secretary

Bryan Cartledge Esq  
10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL

16 JUL 1979



2



10 DOWNING STREET

PM has  
seen

Prime Minister

You asked to  
see the text of  
his interview with  
Dr. Kissinger.

by  
13  
/7

The former secretary of state was interviewed last week in New York by Stephen S. Rosenfeld of the editorial page staff.

Q: Where did you leave Rhodesia?  
 A: The biggest problem in southern Africa was the relationship between the white and the black communities and the growing attempt of outside powers—especially the Soviet Union and Cuba—to use this process for their own geopolitical ends. We attempted to find a position which responded to the aspirations of the black majority, and at the same time permitted the black and white communities to live side by side.

We thought this essential for two reasons: First, if we could bring about a biracial society on the basis of black majority rule in Rhodesia while protecting minority rights, this would provide a bridge to solving the much more difficult problems of South Africa. Secondly, it would give us a platform compatible with our principles, from which we could resist radical and outside powers attempting to exploit this process for essentially geopolitical reasons.

By October 1976 we had arranged a conference, in which all the black Rhodesian leaders and Ian Smith participated—the only time all parties joined a negotiation. That conference started about three or four days before our election. After the defeat of Ford, it was clear that a different policy toward Africa would be followed by the new administration. As a result, the conference stalemated until the inauguration. Shortly afterward the conference blew up, partly because the radical members escalated their demands and partly because the new administration had lost interest in the existing framework.

Q: A "different policy"?  
 A: Overall in respect to Africa and also specifically toward Rhodesia. Certainly all the pronouncements promised a new approach to African problems and the tilt would be more toward the radical side.

Q: Thereby giving the Patriotic Front some reason to wait around a bit for a better deal?

A: The impression was created that the emotional sympathies were on the side of Mugabe. This tended to push Nkomo even closer to Mugabe and both thought they would get a better deal by holding out.

Q: How would you describe the Carter approach?

A: I believe that the administration approach operates on the assumption that we can win

*"We run the risk of a verbal position that is radical, a practical position that is impotent, and a theory justifying Cuban and Soviet intervention."*

over the Third World radicals by co-opting their program. For the moderate group this may be possible. But for the rest I believe that it dooms us to chasing a mirage. The ideological radicals are usually anti-U.S., almost always anti-capitalist. Paradoxically, the closer we seek to approach this ideological group, the further we drive them away. Third World radicals cannot afford to be identified with the United States, and beyond a point approaching them radicalizes them even more.

Q: Wasn't your own Rhodesia plan co-opting some of the radical program?

A: My plan was to co-opt the program of moderate evolutionary reform, that is to say majority rule, and minority rights. At the same time we sought to create a kind of a firebreak between those whose radicalism was ideological and those whose radicalism was geared to specific issues. We could meet the demands for majority rule; we never thought we could co-opt the ideological radicals; our goal was to isolate them.

Q: How did you feel about the administration's understanding of African problems?

A: I believe they're operating on their own theory with which I do not agree.

Q: Still?

A: Still. I think, in the case of Andy Young, they are applying the experience of the American civil-rights movement in the South. Young made a noble contribution there but the African context is totally different. The practical effect of this misconception is that in Africa we have been operationally on the side of the ideological radicals as against the moderates. The radicals have adopted a program of majority rule so extreme as to be incompatible with the survival of the minority and, therefore, incompatible with the peaceful evolution of the larger problem of South Africa.

Q: Does the internal settlement meet the requirements of your own plan of 76?

A: The issue is not any particular plan but a direction—specifically, where should be the weight of the American policy? Should we be on the side of those who are willing to rely on evolution, or on the side that seeks its aim by guerrilla warfare? Should we encourage the side willing to work for a biracial society, or the side who want a kind of absolute majority rule?

I fear that we have been in practice in favor of the radicals against the moderates. That course will lead to war between the races. But it is not too late to change; we still have some margin for maneuver and some time. This is why I am speaking out.

Q: One hears from this administration that if

*"We cannot keep proclaiming that we learned the dangers of universal intervention in Vietnam and then elaborate a doctrine which amounts to universal intervention."*

the United States is going to have the cooperation of the front-line states and of the rear-line states, if you will, like Nigeria, it has to make a political offer that even the radical Patriotic Front people will find acceptable.

A: But this reasoning will lead us to a vicious circle, because if the side that threatens to continue fighting can set the terms, then we are encouraging the continuation of the fighting and an escalation of radical demands. The inevitable result will be that the most radical element will dominate.

Take the example of the sanctions. I could see that a prudent administration would want to wait until it has a consensus, at least with Britain and with some other countries, on the lifting of sanctions. In that case we have a problem of timing. This could be accomplished without—as the administration has done—putting ourselves philosophically totally on the radical side.

When the White House attacked the constitutional provisions for protecting the minority as undemocratic, it really challenged any concept of constitutional guarantees. It is, after all, the essence of constitutional guarantees that they give the minority powers relatively disproportionate to their numbers. If the majority can do anything it wishes, you would not need constitutional guarantees. The criticism that the minority has disproportionate power could also be made against our Constitution. The Bill of Rights means that the majority of the Congress cannot do certain things.

In the case of Rhodesia we have gone beyond a tactical decision on lifting sanctions. We have put ourselves philosophically on the side of the radical version of majority rule. We have given political support to those who want to come to power by military means.

Q: Cyrus Vance is a good lawyer. How does he make this kind of mistake?

A: I would like to express my very high regard for Cyrus Vance. He is one of the most thoughtful and decent people I know and I sympathize with what he is up against. It is a different philosophy by the administration. Cyrus Vance's associates—certainly Andy Young—believe that the wave of the future is represented by the radical elements in Rhodesia and Africa. Therefore, they will not adopt a position that would be objected to either by the so-called Patriotic Front or by other radical African leaders.

This course will gain us short-term support. In the long term it will either fail and, when our impotence is patent, sour our relations with Nigeria and Tanzania. Or it will write the script for Soviet and Cuban intervention. Or it will succeed in Rhodesia and thereby make South Africa insoluble. We run the risk of a verbal position that is radical, a practical position that is impotent, and a theory justifying Cuban and Soviet intervention whenever they judge it is time to heat up conditions again.

Q: Vance and Carter profess to be pretty much at ease at the spectacle of nominally radical regimes coming to power in Rhodesia and perhaps elsewhere, too. They figure that the Soviet component is easy to exaggerate, and that local nationalism will take over.

A: I don't share this view because it is surely not relevant to southern Africa; nor is there much evidence for it elsewhere. It will force us inexorably on the road in which we produce chaos without contributing to a solution.

Q: Is Soviet policy in Rhodesia particularly inflammatory?

A: I would characterize it as maintaining the option of becoming inflammatory when it suits their purpose and giving enough support to the radical element to prevent an evolutionary solution. The growing radical trend is reflected in Nkomo's attitude. In 1975 and 1976, he was the

Henry Kissinger  
 On the US &  
 Rhodesia



only Rhodesian leader that we dealt with, and so far as I know, Nkomo relied on the West. Since then he must have made the judgment that the wave of the future is represented by the radical and pro-Soviet orientation; he has moved to what, in his view, are the dominant trends. Our present policy is driving Nkomo inexorably to the radical side.

Q: Now we are waiting for the British to move in November on sanctions.

A: If the administration had said that the Rhodesian elections were essentially fair, that a biracial society with the protection of the minorities is just, even if some provisions could be improved; that the United States would prefer to see one more round of negotiation and pending that round of negotiation would make no major changes, I would have gone along. Especially if we had also made clear that if these negotiations failed because one group was determined to seize power by military means, then we would move in the direction of the elected government. I am not saying that the United States should recognize only Muzorewa, but it should not develop a public position which undermines the one elected leader in Rhodesia, and encourages guerrilla war rather than negotiations.

Q: There seem to be some tactical moves to accommodate that point of view. It's reported that Carter will probably see Muzorewa when he comes here.

A: This will be a step in the right direction. It is not natural for us, however, to lecture black leaders against minority rights. Our own black community could never have made its progress under undiluted majority rule.

If Britain now lifts the sanctions in November, it will be the fall guy. It will have done so in the face of a statement [June 7] by the United States, which will place the entire moral responsibility on Great Britain. This is not right; whatever one can say about this election, it was certified as relatively free by many impartial observers.

Q: Does the handling of this problem have wider application in the Third World?

A: I would raise questions whether the proclivity of many in the administration of leaning toward the ideological radicals impales us on the horns of a dilemma where our rhetoric is out of step with our capacities; our stated objectives out of tune with our public opinion. This is a prescription for impotence; it deprives us of any platform on which to stand if outside powers again decide to intervene.

Q: Do you find us in Nicaragua favoring the radical element?

A: I don't know enough about the various political alternatives in Nicaragua to have a reliable judgment. My impression is we did enough to unsettle the existing government but not



enough to put over a moderate alternative, if there is one. As a result, by default, the dominant element threatens to become the Sandinistas, who are fundamentally anti-U.S. The radicals oppose us—painful as this may be for some to admit—not because of our policies but because of our social and economic structure.

Q: But are you now describing a situation in which we are locked, like it or not, to the Somozas of this world?

A: No, I—

Q: They always are operating in a situation which blocks out the growth of moderates.

A: No, it means that [when we move we must have a political purpose, not simply a rhetorical affirmation]. I could have understood a decisive move to replace Somoza with a moderate element. But this would have required the kind of covert action so much decried today.

Q: In the absence of a viable, moderate alternative, one would do better to stick with the devil one knows, with the shahs? With the Somozas?

A: I wouldn't put the shah into the same category. Somoza is a clearly less acceptable choice. But we have to make up our mind. We cannot keep proclaiming that we learned the dangers of universal intervention in Vietnam and then elaborate a doctrine that amounts to universal intervention.

If the sole alternative to Somoza is the Sandinistas, we may reap the whirlwind. If the radical left becomes dominant in Central America, even Mexico will feel the pressure. So we should not define our alternatives by platitudes like "sticking with Somoza." We have no mission to change every unpopular ruler; but if we attempt it we must assume responsibility for an outcome compatible with our values and our international responsibilities.

Q: But there are always people who will tell you that the Sandinistas in Nicaragua or the Islamic people in Iran or the Patriotic Front in Rhodesia are essentially nice guys. Andy Young said about one of the Patriotic Front persons, for instance, that he followed the Oakland Raiders.

*"I fear that we have been in practice in favor of the radicals against the moderates. That course will lead to war between the races."*

A: I have no question that they're nice guys individually. The issue is political and geopolitical. Fundamentally, if we adopt the radical rhetoric, and program, we produce chaos and win no adherents. We will fall short of doing what the radicals demand, namely to support them with arms, with organization and with training for guerrilla wars. Eventually they will look elsewhere for these elements and they can do so based on our own doctrine.

Nor should we kid ourselves: The genuine ideological radicals prefer to come to power by struggle; they do not want compromise or "coalition government." I have noticed a statement by the Sandinistas the other day in which they said they want a revolutionary road to power. Within their frame of reference this is entirely honest, even honorable, despite the fact that it is against our interests. The same was essentially true of the Khomeini people in Iran, who also rejected compromise and coalition. Whether we like it or not, our natural allies are reformers, not radicals; moderate progressives, not ideologues.

Q: Isn't there a serious problem in distinguishing a moderate from a radical?

A: Certainly. That is what leaders are chosen to decide, however.

Q: One response would be that the Somozas are going to go into history's dust bin sooner or later and it's not the nuances of American policy that make the difference, it's the forces of history, and so we had better get with it, find the wave.

A: But then if we are going to get in the front of it, then we'd better have some sense of direction or we will be engulfed ourselves.

Q: But even you believe that we can come to a certain relationship with whatever new government emerges in Iran.

A: We certainly should develop the best possible relationship with the new government in Iran, however much I deplore our tactics last fall. Iran is an important country with which we must deal. But what has happened there has already radicalized the Middle East and gravely weakened our interests, undermined our friends in the area, regardless of what accommodation we eventually reach with Iran.

Q: Why aren't the Mexicans and other Latin countries in a better position to exert an influence in Nicaragua?

A: Because the Mexicans are in a terribly ambivalent position. They have a domestic ideology that makes it impossible to be to the right of the United States in international politics. They have basically a doctrine of nonintervention in the domestic affairs of other American states. We can therefore drive Mexico further left than its judgment would dictate by the wrong kind of rhetoric, even more so by the wrong kind of actions. I know Mexico did not want Castro in Nicaragua, even when it sees no way to stop us from our course or finds it difficult to say so. I certainly favor a democratic, moderate government in Nicaragua; having gone this far we better make sure that we get this rather than a Castroite regime.

Q: What's the prognosis in Rhodesia?

A: A continuation of the war in which we

*"We still have time to promote peaceful, progressive change."*

have no clear-cut program or direct means of affecting the outcome. But we still have time; it is not too late to change course; we can still promote a peaceful moderate evolution. And I would happily support the administration in such a course.

Q: You see a deadlock in South Africa?

A: Major changes in South Africa are imperative for moral as well as political reasons. South Africa must dismantle the apartheid legislation. The offenses to human dignity that are involved in the separation of the races cannot go on. A political process by which the black majority can have a larger share in governmental power must begin.

Now, how to achieve this peacefully is an extremely complicated problem because parliamentary government developed in essentially homogeneous societies. And how you have a participation in government more commensurate with the numbers, without at the same time transforming the oppression of the majority by the minority into an oppression of the minority by the majority, that's a very subtle problem.

We should be on the side of change and also on the side of electoral processes; on the side of progress but also on the side of peaceful evolution. This is difficult and delicate, but not impossible. We still have time to promote peaceful, progressive change.

But it makes a lot of difference whether it is done in an atmosphere of moderation and evolution and an attempt of conciliation by both sides, or whether it is done in an atmosphere in which every change has been achieved by military means.

Q: Would your view that the United States should be very careful about trying to manage change, unless it has some clear view of where the other shore is, apply to internal developments in South Africa?

A: In general, yes. In South Africa, however, change is essential and we must be on its side. But we should also encourage democratic processes. I believe that this is more easily achievable and the outcome will be more humane with an attitude of compassion for the complexity of the problem than with an attitude of encouragement of the most radical elements.

Q: Even though understanding for the complexity can often be manipulated to make it come out as support for the status quo?

A: Any proposition can be manipulated for undesirable ends. I trust that we are wise and strong enough to know the distinction. I am asking us to define a position which reflects our values, but our values do not require the encouragement of radicalism. And we must be aware of the international dangers lest we create chaos without having an alternative.

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13 JUL 1979

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TO IMMEDIATE F.C.O.  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1934 OF 13 JULY.  
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2

Prime Minister

*BM*  
*147*

MY TELNO 1923: MUZOREWA'S VISIT TO THE U.S.

1. THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT WAS ISSUED BY THE WHITE HOUSE FOLLOWING PRESIDENT CARTER'S MEETING WITH BISHOP MUZOREWA:

QUOTE

PRESIDENT CARTER MET WITH BISHOP MUZOREWA THIS AFTERNOON BECAUSE OF THE PRESIDENT'S DEEP PERSONAL COMMITMENT TO HELP FIND A SOLUTION FOR THE PEACEFUL TRANSFER OF RESPONSIBLE POLITICAL AUTHORITY FROM THE WHITE MINORITY TO THE BLACK MAJORITY IN ZIMBABWE-RHODESIA.

IN A FRANK EXCHANGE OF VIEWS, THE PRESIDENT EMPHASIZED HIS SINCERE DESIRE TO SEE AN END TO THE BITTERNESS AND BLOOD-SHED IN ZIMBABWE-RHODESIA. HE BELIEVES THIS CAN BE ACCOMPLISHED BY THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A BROADLY BASED CONSENSUS ON CONSTITUTIONAL PROCEDURES AND ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESSES WHICH ARE RESPONSIVE TO THE LEGITIMATE POLITICAL ASPIRATIONS OF ALL THE PEOPLES OF ZIMBABWE-RHODESIA.

THE PRESIDENT RESTATED HIS INTENTION TO WORK CLOSELY WITH THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED KINGDOM, WHICH HAS THE PRIMARY LEGAL AND HISTORIC RESPONSIBILITY TO BRING ZIMBABWE-RHODESIA TO INDEPENDENCE BASED ON FULL POLITICAL PARTICIPATION AND HUMAN RIGHTS GUARANTEES FOR ALL ITS CITIZENS. HE EXPRESSED THE HOPE THAT THE MUZOREWA ADMINISTRATION WOULD WORK CLOSELY WITH THE UNITED KINGDOM IN SEEKING NON-MILITARY, POLITICAL MEANS TO FURTHER THIS GOAL.

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PS/MR. RIDLEY  
PS/MR. HURD  
PS/PUS  
SIR A DUFF  
SIR A PARSONS  
LORD N G LENNOX  
MISS BROWN  
MR. THOMAS  
MR. WILLSON  
MR. WILLIAMS

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Rhodesia

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Prime Minister

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TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TEL NO 1923 OF 13 JULY 1979

INFO ROUTINE MIRIMBA SALISBURY, UKMIS NEW YORK, PRETORIA, DAR  
ES SALAAM, LUSAKA, MAPUTO, LUANDA, MBABANE, LAGOS, MONROVIA.

*[Handwritten scribble]*

*[Handwritten initials]*  
1377

MUZOREWA'S VISIT TO THE U.S.

1. WITH POLITICAL ATTENTION FOCUSSED ON SALT RATIFICATION AND ENERGY, MUZOREWA'S VISIT TO WASHINGTON PASSED OFF QUIETLY. HIS DECLARED INTENTION WAS TO ACQUAINT HIS HOSTS WITH SIMPLE FACTS. BUT THE AMERICANS' REFUSAL TO ALTER THEIR EXISTING POLICY MAY HAVE MADE THE BISHOP MORE AWARE OF THE WIDER POLITICAL REALITIES INVOLVED IN SEEKING A BROADLY ACCEPTABLE SETTLEMENT IN RHODESIA. HIS OWN ARGUMENTS FOR RECOGNITION (HE SEEMS TO HAVE SPOKEN LESS ABOUT THE RAISING OF SANCTIONS) WON NO NEW SUPPORT IN THE ADMINISTRATION, AND MUZOREWA MAY NOW CONCLUDE THAT A CHANGED AMERICAN ATTITUDE TOWARDS HIS GOVERNMENT WILL REQUIRE ALTERATIONS TO THE RHODESIAN CONSTITUTION.

2. ALTHOUGH HE GAINED NO CONCESSIONS OF SUBSTANCE, MUZOREWA'S MEETING WITH THE PRESIDENT WAS A BIG PRESENTATIONAL CONCESSION AND A MORALE-BOOSTER FOR HIM; EVEN IF HE CANNOT ASSERT THAT THE MEETING CONSTITUTED RECOGNITION FOR HIS REGIME, THE BISHOP CAN NONETHELESS CLAIM TO HAVE RECEIVED A HIGHER LEVEL WELCOME THAN THAT ACCORDED TO MANY LEGITIMATE HEADS OF AFRICAN STATES. IN PUBLIC STATEMENTS, MUZOREWA SAID THAT, ALTHOUGH HE WAS ENCOURAGED, HE COULD NOT REVEAL THE SUBSTANCE OF HIS DISCUSSIONS IN WASHINGTON UNTIL AFTER HIS TALKS WITH HMG; IN PRIVATE HE APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN DISAPPOINTED BY HIS FAILURE TO CONVERT THE ADMINISTRATION TO HIS VIEWS.

13. THE VISIT

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3. THE VISIT CREATED COMPARATIVELY LITTLE INTEREST, EDITORIAL AND CONGRESSIONAL COMMENT BEING CONFINED TO RESTATEMENTS OF EXISTING POSITIONS. MUZOREWA'S JOURNEY TO WASHINGTON IS UNLIKELY BY ITSELF SUBSTANTIALLY TO INCREASE DOMESTIC PRESSURE ON THE ADMINISTRATION TO LIFT SANCTIONS OR GRANT RECOGNITION.

ROBINSON

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FM FCO 121400Z JULY 1979

TO IMMEDIATE CERTAIN MISSIONS AND DEPENDENT TERRITORIES  
GUIDANCE TELEGRAM NUMBER 89 OF 12 JULY 1979Prime Minister

DWA

13/7

RHODESIA: IMMUNITY FOR PERSONS ATTENDING MEETINGS AND  
CONSULTATIONS

1. AN ORDER IN COUNCIL HAS BEEN MADE TODAY TO MAKE GENERAL PROVISION TO ENSURE THAT THE GOVERNMENT ARE ABLE TO CARRY ON IN THE UNITED KINGDOM CONSULTATIONS TO ACHIEVE A SETTLEMENT IN RHODESIA WITH ANY OF THE PARTIES CONCERNED, NOTWITHSTANDING THAT THE LATTER MAY HAVE BEEN ASSOCIATED WITH UNCONSTITUTIONAL ACTIVITIES IN RHODESIA.

LINE TO TAKE

2. THE ORDER IS A GENERAL ONE. IT CONFERS IMMUNITY, BY ANALOGY WITH THE DIPLOMATIC PRIVILEGES ACT 1964, ON PERSONS SPECIFICALLY NAMED BY THE FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH SECRETARY.

3. IT HAS BEEN MADE AT THIS TIME BECAUSE WE BELIEVE IT ESSENTIAL THAT RHODESIANS WITH WHOM WE NEED TO CONSULT SHOULD BE ABLE TO VISIT THE UNITED KINGDOM FREELY AND WITHOUT FEAR OF PROSECUTION WHICH MIGHT OTHERWISE BE INSTITUTED IN CONNECTION WITH ACTIONS IN CONSEQUENCE OF THE ILLEGAL DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE IN RHODESIA AND SUBSEQUENT UNCONSTITUTIONAL ACTION.

4. BISHOP MUZOREWA AND HIS PARTY ARE HERE FOR CONSULTATIONS WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ORDER: THE PRIME MINISTER AND THE SECRETARY OF STATE HAVE SEEN HIM TODAY IN PURSUIT OF THE GOVERNMENT'S STATED OBJECTIVE OF BRINGING RHODESIA TO LEGAL INDEPENDENCE WITH WIDE INTERNATIONAL ACCEPTANCE.

BACKGROUND (TO BE DRAWN ON AT YOUR DISCRETION)

5. IT WOULD CLEARLY BE INTOLERABLE IF RESPONSIBLE RHODESIANS WERE TO BE PREVENTED FROM COMING TO LONDON FOR CONSULTATIONS BECAUSE OF THE POSSIBILITY THAT THEY MIGHT BE THE SUBJECT OF A PRIVATE PROSECUTION WHEN THEY ARRIVED HERE.

/6.

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6. MISS JOAN LESTOR AND OTHERS SOUGHT TO INSTITUTE A PRIVATE PROSECUTION AGAINST BISHOP MUZOREWA ON THE GROUNDS THAT HE SEEKS TO DEPRIVE HER MAJESTY OF PART OF HER DOMINIONS (THE OFFENCE OF TREASON-FELONY) AND OF MURDER. THE APPLICATION FOR A WARRANT WAS DUE TO BE HEARD AT BOW STREET TODAY. ALTHOUGH IT WAS MOST UNLIKELY TO SUCCEED, IT WAS ESSENTIAL TO ENSURE THAT THE BISHOP WOULD NOT BE LIABLE TO ARREST DURING HIS VISIT. THE SECRETARY OF STATE HAS THEREFORE SIGNED A CERTIFICATE UNDER THE ORDER IN RESPECT OF THE BISHOP.

7. THE SECRETARY OF STATE HAS POWERS TO USE THE ORDER TO ENABLE ANYONE CONCERNED TO COME TO LONDON FOR CONSULTATIONS IN CONNECTION WITH A SETTLEMENT (IT COULD THEREFORE BE APPLIED, IF APPROPRIATE, TO PATRIOTIC FRONT LEADERS OR TO ANYONE ELSE).

CARRINGTON

BY TELEGRAPH

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WELLINGTON  
NEW DELHI  
DACCA  
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RABAT  
TUNIS  
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ISLAMABAD  
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File Rhodesia



10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

13 July 1979

*Dear Sir,*

BISHOP MUZOREWA'S CALL ON THE PRIME MINISTER ON 13 JULY, 1979

Bishop Muzorewa, accompanied by his Minister for External Affairs, Mr. Mukome, called on the Prime Minister at No. 10 this afternoon at 1445. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary and Sir Antony Duff were present at the meeting. I enclose a copy of my note of the discussion, which lasted for just over three-quarters-of-an-hour.

I should be grateful if you would ensure that the record, parts of which are particularly sensitive, is given a very restricted distribution indeed.

I am sending a copy of this letter, and enclosure, to Martin Vile (Cabinet Office).

*Yours ever,*

*Ryan Cardwell.*

J.S. Wall, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

*pl*



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← Master Set of Records.

NOTE OF THE PRIME MINISTER'S DISCUSSION WITH BISHOP ABEL MUZOREWA,  
PRIME MINISTER OF ZIMBABWE-RHODESIA, AT 10 DOWNING STREET, ON  
13 JULY 1979

---

Present:

The Prime Minister

Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary

Sir Antony Duff

Mr. B.G. Cartledge

Bishop Muzorewa

Mr. Mukome (Minister for  
External Affairs)

\* \* \* \* \*

When the Prime Minister had welcomed Bishop Muzorewa, and the Bishop had in turn congratulated the Prime Minister on her election victory, the Prime Minister said that although she did not wish to cover the same ground as Lord Carrington during the Bishop's morning session of talks with him, she thought it would be useful to summarise the British Government's position once more.

The Prime Minister told Bishop Muzorewa that everybody in the United Kingdom recognised that he and his colleagues had come a tremendously long way. She never failed to tell everybody she met that Rhodesia had held elections on the basis of one person, one vote, in which there had been a 65 per cent turn out and which had resulted in the election of a black Prime Minister, with a black President, a black majority in Parliament and a black majority in the Cabinet. Zimbabwe-Rhodesia had covered the greater part of its journey towards independence. The British Government wished to take as many people as they possibly could with them in winning acceptance for the new situation in the country; this was the purpose of the consultations which had been carried on in recent weeks. From these consultations, two points had come across very strongly. The first was that the constitution of Zimbabwe-Rhodesia would have to be comparable to the constitutions which the UK had given

/to other

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to other African countries at their independence. Secondly, the constitutional arrangements would have to be seen to have originated with, and to have been approved by, the UK.

The Prime Minister went on to say that the constitutional changes which the UK thought necessary would not be such as to undermine the confidence of the white population in Rhodesia. Bishop Muzorewa was very wise to insist on retaining this confidence, in the interests of his country's future economic success. The changes would, moreover, be quite small in relation to the distance which Rhodesia had already travelled. The Prime Minister pointed out to Bishop Muzorewa that the kind of changes the UK had in mind would in fact increase his own powers as Prime Minister. It was astonishing that he, as Prime Minister, should have to submit new appointments to the independent commissions. There were also too many white Members of Parliament, who were able to operate a blocking mechanism. The Prime Minister repeated that changes to these aspects of the constitution would, nevertheless, be minor in relation to what Rhodesia had already achieved. Rhodesia had already covered 90 per cent of the distance: the UK wanted her to travel the remaining 10 per cent of the way, so that the British Government could say that the constitution was legal and comparable to those which had been granted in the past.

The Prime Minister said that the British Government was determined that if they regarded revised constitutional arrangements as being right, they would not be blocked or dictated to by anybody or at any conference. Having come so far, it would be foolish if Rhodesia were to fail to take the final step. The Prime Minister repeated that the British Government had no wish to undermine the confidence of the whites. They were speaking to Bishop Muzorewa as friends and they wanted to see rapid progress over the last phase. Sir Anthony Duff was already engaged in a detailed comparison of the constitution of Zimbabwe-Rhodesia with the constitutions of other former British colonies in Africa. Many of these constitutions had allowed

/for the special

# CONFIDENTIAL

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for the special representation of minorities: there could be no objection of principle to this and minorities had to be protected. The Prime Minister emphasised that the British Government were not seeking immediate or instant changes. They were concerned to work towards the ending of sanctions, as rapidly as possible; but, at the forthcoming conference in Lusaka, they would not propose to set out the constitutional changes which they had in mind in detail. This was purely a matter between Bishop Muzorewa and the UK. At Lusaka, she and Lord Carrington would simply say that they would be making proposals for a constitutional basis on which Zimbabwe-Rhodesia could be brought to legal independence. Thereafter, if the proposals were acceptable to the Bishop, the British Government would invite him and the representatives of the Patriotic Front to a conference. If the Patriotic Front refused to attend, this would not give them a power of veto over progress to independence. There would then have to be a test of acceptability but it should be possible to complete the whole process by the end of October.

Lord Carrington said that he had only one point to add, namely that unless the kind of changes which the Prime Minister had outlined took place, no country of any importance would recognise Zimbabwe-Rhodesia, even if the UK had done so. The Prime Minister agreed and pointed out that Lord Harlech's consultations had shown that even President Banda and President Seretse Khama had made it clear that changes to the constitution were essential. The British Government must be able to argue, with other African governments, <sup>they had themselves accepted comparable constitutions when</sup> that/they had achieved independence and that they consequently had no right to object to the constitution of Zimbabwe-Rhodesia.

Lord Carrington said that it was important to be able to wrong-foot the bullies: if this were done, there would be a much better chance of putting an end to the war in Rhodesia. In a brief reference to Mr. Ian Smith, the Prime Minister said that he would presumably leave the Government as soon as he was certain that independence and the lifting of sanctions were in prospect.

/Bishop Muzorewa

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Bishop Muzorewa told the Prime Minister how much he appreciated the new and positive attitude of the British Government towards his country. The visits to Salisbury of Sir Antony Duff, Mr. Day and Lord Harlech had made a very great difference to the situation and he and his colleagues in Salisbury now knew that the British Government were trying to help. The Bishop said that the Prime Minister clearly understood some of his concerns. But he still believed, on the basis of the reports which he had received from his representatives, that many in Africa would follow a clear lead from the UK. If the British Government were to decide to lift sanctions or to recognise his regime, they would find that they had support even if no changes had taken place in the existing constitution. Sanctions, after all, had not been imposed because of defects in a constitution: they had been imposed as a result of rebellion against the British Crown. But now the people of Zimbabwe-Rhodesia were sovereign and had spoken up for government by the people. Zimbabwe-Rhodesia nevertheless remained Britain's responsibility and it was therefore up to Britain to give a lead. Inevitably, there would be some shouting and name-calling: but, the Bishop said, many would follow the UK.

The Prime Minister replied that she wished that this were true. But it did not accord with the British Government's own information. Telegram after telegram which she had read showed that there was still some way for Rhodesia to go. The Prime Minister emphasised that it would strengthen the Bishop's own hand if he were to get rid of the commissions and if he were to increase the number of black Members of Parliament - it might be easier to add to the black membership rather than reducing the white membership.

Bishop Muzorewa said that a key problem was the fact that in the present situation all the members of the white community were sensitive and frightened. The situation following the

/achievement

# CONFIDENTIAL

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achievement of black majority rule was in any case a delicate one: but in Zimbabwe-Rhodesia it was greatly aggravated by the war. The whites were wondering in what way Bishop Muzorewa was any different from other African leaders. He could only show them how different he was through his own actions. Any move towards constitutional change would frighten the whites. The Prime Minister replied that the British Government was only asking that Rhodesia should have a constitution similar to that which had been given to other African states on independence. She asked the Bishop whether it would be helpful for Lord Carrington to visit Salisbury immediately after the Lusaka conference. This might strengthen the confidence of the white population. Lord Carrington said that it might be better if somebody other than he were to go; such a visit could, in any case, have an unsettling rather than a reassuring effect on the whites.

The Prime Minister said that the opponents of the internal settlement argued that power had not really been transferred to the Africans. She assured them that it had. The critics then pointed to the blocking mechanism and to the commissions. If these aspects of the constitution were changed, the critics' argument would crumble. The British Government would also be able to say that the constitution was comparable to others. It would be possible, in those circumstances, for the UK to bring the United States along with her; the American attitude had already changed significantly, as a result of the British Government's efforts.

Lord Carrington said that the United States would probably be able to come along with the UK. But the US would certainly not support the UK if recognition were to be given on the basis of the constitution as it stood.

Bishop Muzorewa said that Zimbabwe-Rhodesia's problem was that they had already done so much and would have hoped for

/some reward

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some reward for what had already been achieved. For example, sanctions could be lifted now, in return for what had already been done, and legality restored in return for the further changes which the British Government wanted. This procedure would create greater confidence in the white community. If they were given some reward now, the whites would face the second stage of change with greater confidence. The Prime Minister said that this approach would create political problems in her own Party. The timescale of the process which the British Government had in mind would in fact be very short: once constitutional changes had been made, the UK would move very fast. Lord Carrington pointed out that a further difficulty in the course suggested by the Bishop would be that it would undermine the procedural approach which the Government had in mind: if sanctions had already been lifted, nobody would take the British Government's further efforts at all seriously. The Prime Minister asked Lord Carrington whether it would be possible for him to go to Salisbury any earlier, before Lusaka. Lord Carrington pointed out that this would be interpreted, at Lusaka, as collusion between London and Salisbury; the British would be accused of ganging up with the Rhodesians.

Sir Antony Duff, referring to the comparative constitutional study on which he was working, said that the independence constitutions of both Tanzania and Zambia had provided for special minority representation. Bishop Muzorewa agreed and commented that the Tanzanian constitution, in particular, had been extremely generous to minorities.

The Prime Minister repeated that it would be necessary to work very fast. Bishop Muzorewa would not have long to wait. The UK would send somebody to visit Salisbury, with specific proposals, very soon after the end of the Lusaka conference on 8 August. Lord Carrington said that Lord Harlech's and Mr. Day's talks with members of the white community in Zimbabwe-Rhodesia showed that many whites, for example David Smith, admitted that there was a need for some change.

/Mr. Mukome

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Mr. Mukome said that the unfortunate factor in the situation was that his country was engaged in a war. Any leak concerning the possibility of constitutional change would gravely undermine the confidence of the white members of the security forces, since they would have no means of knowing how extensive the changes were likely to be. Their suspicions would be aroused. The whites argued that the British Government had set out six principles which must be fulfilled. These had all now been carried out and they would have expected the British Government to acknowledge this. Instead, they were told that there were still weaknesses in the constitution and that they could not reap the benefit of what they had done until changes had been made. They were always being asked for more. It was true that some of the changes which the British Government wanted to see concerned aspects of the constitution which the Africans themselves had tried to get rid of. But their retention was the price which the Africans had to pay for being able to keep the terrorists down, which could not be done without the help of the whites. The Prime Minister said that it would have to be made very clear to the white community that the changes for which the British Government were asking represented the end of the process. She told Bishop Muzorewa that she would have to take the whole of her Party with her if sanctions were to be lifted. Lord Carrington added that unless there was some move on the constitution, a number of Conservatives would vote against the removal of sanctions.

The Prime Minister said that the way forward which she had indicated should be acceptable to the Bishop and his people and it would also enable the British Government to bring the Americans, and others, along with them. She and her colleagues had no interest in those who wanted the bullet to win in Rhodesia. Bishop Muzorewa told the Prime Minister that at the end of his meeting with President Carter, the President had said that the US Government would follow whatever lead the British Government gave. Lord Carrington pointed out that

/what the President

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what the President had in mind in saying this was precisely the kind of procedure which he and the Prime Minister had been outlining.

Bishop Muzorewa asked about the timetable which the Prime Minister had in mind. The Prime Minister said that the UK's proposals for changes in the constitution could be put forward by the middle of August and a constitutional conference convened in September. The whole process could be completed by the end of October. When the British Government made its proposals, Bishop Muzorewa could make it clear that he and his people would accept the new constitution if the UK were to grant Zimbabwe-Rhodesia legal independence. Lord Carrington pointed out that if Nkomo and Mugabe did, in fact, agree to attend the constitutional conference, the next steps would have to be arranged rather differently; but they were very unlikely to come. The Prime Minister said that if they did attend, and accepted the proposals, there would be no argument against an immediate return to legality.

Mr. Mukome said that he feared that the Patriotic Front leaders might be advised by the Front Line Presidents to accept invitations to the constitutional conference in order to buy more time. If this happened, the confidence of the whites would be undermined and Zimbabwe-Rhodesia would lose a great many of her most skilled people. He could foresee a situation in which the Patriotic Front might attend a conference and drag it out while the war continued. Sanctions would remain in force at the same time, while the Patriotic Front were supplied with more new weapons. The timescale of what the UK was proposing was much too long.

Bishop Muzorewa said that another problem lay in the Prime Minister's reference to a further test of acceptability. The

/British Government



# CONFIDENTIAL

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British Government should not under-estimate what the people of Zimbabwe-Rhodesia had been through during the last election, turning out to vote at the risk of their lives. Lord Carrington said that this stage was still some way off. Sir Antony Duff told Bishop Muzorewa that he was permanently concerned by all the things which might go wrong along the road to a settlement. It was impossible to perceive exactly how matters would turn out: but both the British Government and the Bishop were certain of their objectives and the only sensible approach was to move forward step by step, tackling problems as and when they arose. He was now more optimistic about the prospects for a settlement than he had been for a very long time.

The Prime Minister said that the British Government certainly possessed the resolve to carry matters to a conclusion. Lord Carrington added that they were also working to a timetable.

After a short discussion of what should be said to the press, it was agreed that both sides would adhere strictly to the three paragraphs of the attached note, omitting the second paragraph of the original draft press line.

Concluding the discussion, the Prime Minister repeated that the British Government had the resolve to help Zimbabwe-Rhodesia towards legal independence within a limited time.

The meeting ended at 1535.

*Byu.*

13 July 1979



10 DOWNING STREET

The Prime Minister and Lord Carrington have discussed with Bishop Muzorewa ways of making progress towards the Government's stated objective of bringing Rhodesia to legal independence with wide international acceptance.

The Government will be continuing its consultations with particular reference to the discussions at the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting in Lusaka.

There will be further discussions with Bishop Muzorewa and his colleagues as necessary in Salisbury and elsewhere.

13 July 1979

MR. CARTLEDGE  
MR. RYLANDS  
MR. TAYLOR  
DETECTIVES  
FRONT DOOR  
MR. JAMES

The following people will arrive  
at 3.30 for a photocall of the Prime  
Minister with Bishop Muzorewa at 3.30  
today:-

COI	-	T. Moore
Central Press	-	D. Aulds
Financial Times	-	R. Taylor
BBC Stills	-	N. Spurling
BBC	-	E. Smales
		P. Farrer
ITN	-	J. Collings
		W. Moss
Thomson Regional News- papers	-	C. Travis.

JAN LUKE

13 July, 1979

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Subject copy: United Nations  
Visit of Sec-General

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NOTE OF THE PRIME MINISTER'S DISCUSSION WITH THE UNITED NATIONS  
SECRETARY GENERAL, DR. KURT WALDHEIM, AT 10 DOWNING STREET, ON  
THURSDAY 12 JULY 1979 AT 1700 HOURS

Present:

The Prime Minister	Dr. Kurt Waldheim
The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary	Mr. Brian Urquhart (Under-Secretary General for Special Political Affairs)
Sir Anthony Parsons	Mr. W.B. Buffum (Under-Secretary General for Political and General Assembly Affairs)
Mr. B.G. Cartledge	Mr. A. Rohan (Deputy Executive Assistant to the Secretary General)

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Refugees from Indochina

After welcoming Dr. Waldheim, the Prime Minister raised the problem of Vietnamese refugees and stressed that the British Government's objective was not only to achieve progress over their resettlement but also to put a stop to the enforced exodus at its source. The Prime Minister said that the United States had succeeded in holding communism at bay in Vietnam over a long period, for which she had received scant thanks: the exodus from communism was now beginning. The only source of effective pressure on Vietnam was the Soviet Union but, the Prime Minister said, her conversation with Mr. Kosygin in Moscow had shown not only that the Russians had no intention of exerting pressure on the Vietnamese but that, on the contrary, they supported the Vietnamese policy. A major operation was in progress in South East Asia designed to destabilise the region. The Chinese were already unpopular in the area, because they were successful; this was being deliberately exploited. For these reasons, the British Government had not hesitated to pillory Vietnam in Parliament. Lord Carrington told the Prime Minister that he had already warned Dr. Waldheim that he would have some unpleasant things to say about Vietnam at the forthcoming Geneva meeting; he knew that Dr. Waldheim did not altogether approve but he did not think that he would stand in the way. The Prime Minister said that it was essential that the West should demonstrate that it stood for certain values.

CONFIDENTIAL Dr. Waldheim

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Dr. Waldheim told the Prime Minister that he was very well aware of her preoccupation with the refugee problem and shared her deep concern. He had deliberately stressed the humanitarian aspect of the problem for consideration in Geneva, since if the argument became too political before the meeting took place Vietnam might refuse to attend it and the meeting would degenerate into a shouting match instead of doing anything to help the refugees themselves. A political debate on the refugee problem would simply lead to sterile confrontation. Dr. Waldheim said that there could be no doubt that the Vietnamese Government was deliberately forcing the refugees to leave: he had raised the matter repeatedly, both with Mr. Pham Van Dong and with the Vietnamese Ambassador at the United Nations. The Vietnamese argued that the refugees were leaving voluntarily and retorted with counter-accusations that a propaganda campaign was being waged against them. He had suggested to Mr. Pham Van Dong that Vietnam should arrange for a phased and orderly departure of the refugees, in cooperation with the United Nations High Commissioner. Despite his representations, the Vietnamese were continuing to behave exactly as before. The Vietnamese Ambassador was now pleading that his Government could not completely control the long Vietnamese coastline and that the Chinese were deliberately exacerbating the problem. Dr. Waldheim said that he had pointed out to the Vietnamese that they were rapidly losing the widespread international sympathy, for example in Scandinavia, which their country had previously enjoyed.

The Prime Minister commented that, meanwhile, Vietnam was continuing to confiscate the wealth and possessions of those whom they were throwing out and was shooting<sup>at</sup> them as they left. This was a question not of a shouting match but of sheer barbarism. It should be pilloried publicly: this could produce an effect, as the Belgrade meeting to review the CSCE had produced an effect on the East Europeans, who witnessed the pillorying of the Soviet Union in that forum. It was essential that the United Nations should be seen to stand for something and to condemn barbarism.

Dr. Waldheim explained that, under the United Nations Charter, the Secretary General had no authority to convene a conference such as that which was about to take place in Geneva. He had nevertheless

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/ gone ahead

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gone ahead out of respect for the Prime Minister and in the belief that her objective was to promote a humanitarian solution of the refugee problem. He had decided to break the United Nations rules of procedure, since he knew that if he had adhered to them by taking the matter first to the Security Council, the discussion would have been long and contentious. For the reasons he had explained to the Prime Minister, he had throughout stressed the humanitarian aspect of the meeting and had done his best to invite a representative selection of countries. Despite all his efforts, he was already coming under fire, for example, from the Chinese for not inviting Kampuchea. The Prime Minister said that attacks should not concern one if the policies were right. The fact was that Vietnam was pursuing a policy of barbarism, under the protection of the Soviet veto in the Security Council. Under the same protection, a number of developments which the UN had been established to prevent were gathering momentum, such as the spread of Soviet subversion through the use of proxies. The Prime Minister told Dr. Waldheim that she was very grateful to him for convening the Geneva meeting and congratulated him on his decision to bypass the rules of procedure. She was nevertheless very concerned by a number of current trends affecting the UN, such as the growing number of small islands, especially in the Caribbean, which were being taken over by Cuban or other communist influence and, despite their small size, commanded a vote in the General Assembly. Although the UN had been designed to protect freedom, it was becoming increasingly difficult for the organisation to fulfil this objective.

Dr. Waldheim said that the UN was indeed handicapped by some of the shortcomings in its Charter and also by the behaviour of some Western Governments, who, for example, voted for political reasons in favour of help for the third world but then voted against providing money for it. Too many UN members were ambiguous in their approach to the world's problems: they were keen to win political credit but reluctant to pay the price. Mr. Gromyko had told him that the Soviet Union was just as concerned as the West about the problems of the UN, but the Soviet Union nevertheless continued to vote against the UN budget.

/ Dr. Waldheim

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Dr. Waldheim told the Prime Minister that he would do everything possible to make the Geneva meeting on refugees a success and hoped that positive results could be achieved; his concern was to avoid a political conference, which could not produce results. He was certain that many delegates would nevertheless speak their mind about Vietnam and he himself proposed to include a reference to Vietnam's responsibility for the situation in his opening statement to the meeting. The Prime Minister, referring to the United Nations as a whole, said that every procedural device should be employed in order to put the Western point of view across and the Western objective should be to perpetuate the values which the West stood for, rather than tolerating perpetual retreat in the face of barbarism and tyranny. Referring to the problems which the refugee situation had created for Hong Kong, the Prime Minister said that Hong Kong constituted a remarkable tribute to the free world and to what the Chinese could achieve when they were free.

Dr. Waldheim gave the Prime Minister an account of the separate but related problem of the 160,000 refugees from Kampuchea who had crossed the border into Thailand and whom the Thais, despite an undertaking to the contrary which General Kriangsak had given him, were forcibly repatriating into Kampuchea. This policy had resulted in a very large number of deaths. The Thais had now said that they would suspend their repatriation policy provided the international community would assist them, with money, in housing and caring for the Kampuchean refugees. Dr. Waldheim mentioned the two islands, in Indonesia and the Philippines, which were being used as processing centres, but agreed with Lord Carrington that these were being used only for refugees who already had a new destination to go to.

The Prime Minister expressed the view that the OPEC countries, with their great financial resources which would now be further increased by the rise in oil prices, should be persuaded to make a direct contribution to solving the refugee problem. Dr. Waldheim told the Prime Minister that OPEC would be represented at the Geneva meeting, as would be Latin America.

/ Tokyo Economic Summit

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Tokyo Economic Summit

Dr. Waldheim asked the Prime Minister if she had derived any encouragement from the Economic Summit Meeting in Tokyo. The Prime Minister said that the meeting had simply re-affirmed the basic truth that if demand and supply were out of balance the price mechanism had to be adjusted so that balance could be restored. The European participants had already agreed that the demand for oil had to be depressed, but that this could not be done by Europe alone. It was agreed at Tokyo that if it could be demonstrated to Saudi Arabia that, by depressing demand, the shortfall in the supply of oil to the West was only, say, 5 per cent, Saudi Arabia might agree to increase her output sufficiently to fill that gap. As Sheikh Khalifa had told her in Bahrain on her way back to London, the Arabs had no desire to hurt the West since this hurt their own interests as well.

Lord Carrington commented that all the Tokyo participants had chosen the base line for their restriction of demand which happened to suit them best.

The Prime Minister went on to say that most economic problems had their origin in political problems. The Middle East was a prime example of this: the first great oil shortage had sprung from the conflict between Israel and Egypt and the new shortage had resulted from the internal political problems of Iran. A major success in Tokyo had been agreement on the importance of developing new sources of energy supply, especially nuclear power. There had also been agreement on the need to improve communication with the OPEC countries and to make them feel that they were being included in the political dialogue. In the last resort, however, the problem of oil could only be solved through a solution to the political problems of the Middle East. The West was at present witnessing the creation by the Soviet Union of a belt of instability across Africa and Asia. A settlement which could restore stability to the Middle East would be a great prize.

Middle East

/ Lord Carrington



Middle East

Lord Carrington asked Dr. Waldheim whether he had it in mind to take any new initiative on the Middle East. Dr. Waldheim said that he fully shared the Prime Minister's view of the situation: without a comprehensive settlement in the Middle East, there could be no solution to the West's economic problems. For this reason, he had proposed that a preparatory conference should be held, under UN auspices, one purpose of which would be to re-involve the Arab states and the Soviet Union in the negotiating process. He had recently discussed this question with President Ceausescu of Romania, who agreed with him that a new international conference offered the only hope of progress. The first step would be to take soundings among the Arabs and then to organise a conference in which both they and the PLO could take part. There would be little hope of progress, however, if the Israelis maintained their present policy on new settlements on the West Bank. To his surprise, Mr. Gromyko had told him recently that the Soviet Union no longer wished to return to Geneva; this had indeed been a Soviet objective before the Camp David Agreement, but to go back to Geneva now would, in the Soviet view, imply approval, or at least recognition, of the bilateral treaties. Dr. Waldheim commented that the Russians were very adept at hiding behind the positions of the Arab extremists.

Lord Carrington asked Dr. Waldheim whether he would wait for the Camp David process to run into the sand before launching his own initiative, or whether he set a time limit to it. Dr. Waldheim said that he proposed to make it clear, when he spoke at the Conference of the OAU, that it was important to begin consultations with the Arabs on how to move forward.

Sir Anthony Parsons expressed the view that Geneva was now tainted by history, as well as bedevilled by the problem of Paléstinian representation. What was now needed was a fresh resolution in the Security Council which would formally establish the rights of the Palestinians but not in terms which would inevitably attract a United States veto. The Camp David process could then be allowed to continue until Mr. Strauss was obliged to admit that no further progress could be made. The problem

/ could then

could then go back to the Security Council so that the Secretary General could be given a new mandate. Dr. Waldheim said that he agreed with Sir Anthony Parsons' comments about Geneva: if he waited too long to launch his initiative, however, President Sadat would find himself in serious difficulties. He remained convinced, that an international conference offered the only way forward. The Prime Minister said that a new Security Council resolution could perhaps go a bit further than Resolution 242 on the question of the national identity of the Palestinians; but the difficulty lay in securing the cooperation of Mr. Begin.

#### Southern Africa

Dr. Waldheim asked the Prime Minister for her view of the situation in South Africa. The Prime Minister expressed the view that if they were not constantly being put in the public stocks, the South Africans might move faster than anybody expected. South African industry was a dynamo in promoting Africanisation. The Nationalist Party had recently been defeated in a by-election. The Prime Minister said that the best catalyst for further progress in Southern Africa would be a settlement in Rhodesia. The West should constantly bear in mind the strategic position which South Africa occupied, across the West's life-lines for oil and raw materials.

Dr. Waldheim said that negotiations with South Africa over Namibia had been very difficult, despite the help which the Group of Five had given. He thought that the British Government might now be in the best position of the Five to resume the effort; it was important to pick up the loose ends and try to put a settlement package together again.

Turning to Rhodesia, Dr. Waldheim said that President Kaunda had kept him informed of his contacts with the Prime Minister. Dr. Waldheim expressed the view that Bishop Muzorewa's Government should be regarded as a transitional stage towards a final settlement in Rhodesia.

/ The Prime Minister

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The Prime Minister said that it should be constantly borne in mind that Rhodesia had recently conducted elections on the basis of one person, one vote in which the people had been able to choose between four different political parties. The elections had produced a black president, a black Prime Minister, a black majority in the Cabinet and a black majority in the Parliament. This was a colossal advance. The situation in Rhodesia now was infinitely closer to democracy than the situation which existed in many of the countries most critical of Bishop Muzorewa's regime. If the UK were now to go too far in pressing for changes in the constitution, this might upset the white population and the Rhodesian economy could collapse. President Kaunda, for example, had turned out too many whites and the result was that he was now unable to feed his people. Rhodesia could be self-sufficient in food and could also help her neighbours. Bishop Muzorewa had expressed the view that it was essential to encourage the whites to remain so that the economy could be efficiently run in the interests of the black population. The Prime Minister said that Bishop Muzorewa had done everything which had been asked of him: he had been advised to work for a substantial turn out in the elections and he had achieved this. The present constitutional position was not perfect, but few constitutions were.

Dr. Waldheim said that it would be possible to help Bishop Muzorewa by means of new elections to be held under international supervision. He thought that Rhodesia's problems could be solved if the Muzorewa Government were regarded as transitional. The Prime Minister recalled that Rhodesia's last elections had been assessed by observers both from the UK and Australia. The many representatives of the media who had been in Rhodesia at the time had found no defects in the electoral procedures. The conflict in Rhodesia now was not between black and white but between black and black. It was essential that the internal settlement should not be upset: it should be built upon. Joshua Nkomo had made it very clear to Mr. Callaghan's envoy, Mr. Cledwyn Hughes, that he intended to achieve his aims by force.

/Dr. Waldheim

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Dr. Waldheim said that he feared that if no solution could be found soon, there would simply be an endless guerilla war. The Prime Minister said that the British Government would do everything possible to achieve an acceptable settlement: but the UK would have to take others along with her. Lord Carrington agreed and said that recognition by the UK alone would not be much help to Rhodesia. It was essential to chart a middle course between changes which would be acceptable to international opinion and changes which could be accepted by the white population. It was certainly necessary to give Bishop Muzorewa reassurance: but it was also important to convince him of the necessity for changes to the constitution. The Prime Minister said that too radical changes might bring the whole structure down. One way of achieving a better Parliamentary balance would be to add more black members instead of reducing the number of white members.

Concluding the discussion, the Prime Minister said that she greatly looked forward to Dr. Waldheim's official visit to the UK later in the year. The meeting ended at 1810.

*John*

12 July 1979

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10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

12 July 1979

My dear Bishop.

I am grateful to you for writing to me on 19 June to express your concern over the consequences of the continuing war in Rhodesia. You urge the British Government to lift sanctions and to recognise the government in Salisbury which assumed office following the elections in April.

I and my colleagues in the British Cabinet share to the full your deep concern over the continuing bloodshed in Zimbabwe-Rhodesia and the tragic consequences of the war for the people of your country. I am convinced that the best road to peace lies through Zimbabwe-Rhodesia's return to legal independence with the widest possible degree of international acceptance. In pursuit of this goal, the British Government have engaged in urgent consultations through which we hope to identify the best way forward. As you know, Lord Harlech has had talks with a number of Heads of Government in Southern Africa and he visited Salisbury on 2 July for talks with Bishop Muzorewa. I shall myself see Bishop Muzorewa in London tomorrow, following his discussions in Washington with President Carter. As Lord Carrington said in Parliament on 10 July, we hope, once our round of consultations is complete, to put forward proposals which will be accepted as fair and reasonable by the people of Rhodesia and the international community.

/ You may

You may like to keep in touch with Mr. Derek Day, at Mirimba House in Salisbury, about further developments; I know he will be glad to hear from you.

Yours sincerely

Margaret Tholester

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The Right Reverend the Bishop of Mashonaland

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

12 July 1979

Dear Bryan,

Prime Minister

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Bishop Muzorewa's Visit

I enclose a brief, which has been approved by Lord Carrington, for the discussions with Bishop Muzorewa on 13 July. The Annex on the Constitution - in particular paragraph 5 - has been revised in the light of the discussion in the Defence and Oversea Policy Committee on 5 July.

Objectives

Lord Carrington thinks that our objectives at this stage should be to persuade the Bishop that:

- (a) it is our intention to work with him for a solution which will help to win international acceptance and hold out a prospect of a de-escalation of the war;
- (b) legal independence will have to stem from Britain as the constitutionally responsible authority. Some constitutional changes are likely to be necessary to help to win wider acceptance. We will wish to discuss the possibilities further with him;
- (c) he should go on expressing willingness to talk to the Patriotic Front and be ready in due course to participate in a meeting designed to demonstrate whether they are prepared to participate in a settlement on any reasonable basis;
- (d) he will need to take opportunities to assert his leadership, demonstrate that there has been a genuine transfer of power and that he is taking action to promote the interests of the African majority.

Confidentiality

Lord Carrington will emphasise the confidentiality of the discussions with himself and with the Prime Minister. It will be important to avoid anything said in them being misrepresented in such a way as to cause unnecessary difficulties vis-à-vis the summit meeting of the Organisation of African Unity on 15-19 July and the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting.

/Line

Bryan Cartledge Esq  
10 Downing Street

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Line to Take with the Press

If the Prime Minister agrees, Lord Carrington will tell Bishop Muzoresa that after the talks we will take the following line with the press:

- (a) The Prime Minister and Lord Carrington have discussed with Bishop Muzorewa ways of making progress towards the Government's stated objective of bringing Rhodesia to legal independence with wide international acceptance;
- (b) The discussions have encouraged us to believe that it will be possible, once the Government's consultations have been completed, to put forward proposals to bring Rhodesia to legal independence in conditions which should be accepted as fair and reasonable by the people of Rhodesia and the international community.
- (c) The Government will be continuing its consultations with particular reference to the discussions at the CHOGM in Lusaka;
- (d) There will be further discussions with Bishop Muzorewa and his colleagues as necessary in Salisbury and elsewhere;
- (e) [If asked what specific proposals were discussed.]  
The Government have not put forward any specific proposals at this stage. It will be our intention to do so when our consultations have been completed.

Lord Carrington would propose to ask Bishop Muzorewa to take a line as closely comparable to this as possible in his own statements to the press.

*Yours ever,  
Stephen*

J S Wall  
Private Secretary



12 JUL 1979



POINTS TO MAKE

1. The Government's intention is to work with Bishop Muzorewa and his colleagues to achieve a solution. There will be no undue delay. Our action will be based on what has been achieved inside Rhodesia. We recognise the full extent of the progress which has been made.
2. Our objective is to bring Rhodesia to legal independence in conditions which will offer the best prospect of achieving a wide measure of international acceptance. This Government will not allow the Patriotic Front or radical African states or others to impose a veto on progress. But it is essential to carry our principal allies and partners with us. It is important also, to the future prospect of peace and stability for Rhodesia, that we carry with us the more moderate states in Africa. We hope in this way to give independent Rhodesia the best possible start in life, and to bring about a de-escalation of the war.
3. Lord Harlech's consultations in Africa have shown that there is a general recognition and indeed a demand that a settlement must stem from Britain as the legally responsible authority. It is our responsibility to bring Rhodesia to legal independence. As the constitutionally responsible authority, we have to form a judgment on the constitutional basis on which legal independence is granted.
4. [ If Bishop Muzorewa argues that Britain should "recognise" his government immediately and lift sanctions. ] If we proceeded immediately, it is unlikely that any other country except South Africa would follow suit. Our principal allies - the French, Germans and Americans - would not do so. We have been in touch with the Presidents and Foreign Ministers of most African states. Even Presidents Banda and Seretse Khama have told us that they cannot normalise their relations with Rhodesia unless there is some progress beyond what has already been achieved and a solution is seen to stem from Britain. What is at issue in the case of Rhodesia is not recognition but the granting of legal independence. The lifting of sanctions is a step to which we wish to proceed as soon as possible. But Rhodesia's greatest need is for international acceptance.
5. We want to work with Muzorewa towards a common goal. He should trust our good intentions and work with us. But this does mean two basic things. First, to obtain any measure of international acceptance, there

have to be some changes in the Constitution.

We recognise the need to preserve the confidence of the white community and of the Rhodesian security forces. But there are features of the present Constitution which have attracted criticism and for which there is no parallel in the independence constitutions we have granted to any other country. These relate to the proportion of seats held by the white community - 28 out of 100 - and the extent of their blocking power; and the character of the Public Service commissions - see Annex A. 7

6. Second, there is a need to offer the external parties the opportunity to participate in the setting up of an independent Rhodesia. We have no intention of allowing the Patriotic Front to exercise a veto over a settlement. At the least, we must be able to demonstrate, if - as is probable - the Patriotic Front do not respond, that responsibility for the failure to achieve a wider agreement lies with them. Bishop Muzorewa has said that he is prepared to take part in talks with them. We welcome this. We will not allow the Patriotic Front to block a solution we believe to be right.

7. Nor will we allow the CHOGM to dictate the terms on which we will grant independence to Rhodesia. We will make clear that this is our responsibility. We will state our intentions at the CHOGM in terms which will discourage attempts to lay down conditions for independence which would be likely to operate in favour of the Patriotic Front. We will proceed after the meeting to put forward proposals for Rhodesia's independence which (a) will be based on what has been achieved in Rhodesia, and (b) should in our view be accepted as fair and reasonable both inside and outside Rhodesia. We will make clear that we intend to carry out our constitutional responsibilities; that we must make the final judgment on the basis for legal independence; and that we will take the necessary constitutional steps (including a conference) to enable us to do so. If we are satisfied that what is agreed is acceptable, we will proceed to grant legal independence on that basis.

8. We do not ask the Bishop to announce, let alone to attempt to make, any constitutional changes now. That would be premature and would give away cards that will be needed later. We will keep in close touch with him as our planning develops and discuss with him the parts that we each should play in the run-up to a settlement. It will meanwhile be indispensable for the Bishop to show that he is in control in Salisbury and that changes are taking place which will benefit the African population. We can help him and we intend to do so; but we cannot solve Rhodesia's internal problems.

9. [ If the Bishop argues that he cannot make changes which would affect the position of the white minority. ] It is essential to preserve the confidence of the white population. There is no need for extensive changes. But it is in their interests to accept some modifications to win international acceptance and enable sanctions to be lifted not only by us, but by others. If it is not possible to achieve this and the war intensifies, there will be an increasing white exodus.

10. [ In conclusion. ] The Bishop should have confidence in our determination to bring matters to a conclusion and to build on what has been achieved inside Rhodesia. We intend to work with him to that end. We look to him to co-operate with us in bringing Rhodesia to legal independence. We believe we can help him to win wider international acceptance. Action by Britain alone cannot have a decisive effect on the situation in Rhodesia. When independence is granted and sanctions are lifted, there will be damage to our interests elsewhere. But we will not be dissuaded by this if we can agree on a solution we believe to be right.

## RHODESIA: ESSENTIAL FACTS

1. Bishop Muzorewa has succeeded in containing for the time being the threat to his government posed by the defection of Chikerema and six other UANC MPs. The Rhodesian High Court has given an interim judgement to the effect that the MPs in question will not be permitted to retain their seats if they leave the UANC (the elections having taken place on a party list system). If this judgement is upheld, this will be a disincentive to further defections. But Muzorewa still faces problems within his own party. There is a feeling among his supporters and in the country generally that he has not yet taken action to assert his authority or made changes which would help to advance the interests of the African population. Sithole is continuing to boycott the new Parliament with 11 other MPs. His support inside Rhodesia is limited and his reputation outside it low. But his criticism of the election has brought additional problems of external acceptance. Chief Ndiweni is cooperating with Bishop Muzorewa in the government coalition, but still has federalist ambitions.

## THE SECURITY SITUATION

2. There has been no slackening in the intensity of the war. The series of cross-border attacks carried out by the security forces before the elections against Patriotic Front bases in Zambia, Mozambique and Angola, and the mobilisation of all available manpower to protect the election won the Rhodesians a respite. Considerable damage has been inflicted on the organisation and morale of the Zambia-based forces of Nkomo. But, as General Walls has acknowledged, guerrilla activity within Rhodesia is once again running at a high level, particularly that carried out by ZANLA (Mugabe). The Rhodesian authorities estimate that there are at present 11,000 guerrillas belonging to ZANLA operating inside the country. The military stalemate will continue so long as the morale of Rhodesian whites and a

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high level of South African support are sustained. But the Rhodesians will not make significant military progress unless there are defections from ZANU and ZAPU. So far only a handful of guerrillas have taken up the offer of an amnesty.

#### EXTERNAL ACCEPTANCE

3. Bishop Muzorewa is likely to argue that if Britain "recognised" his government many other countries would follow suit. The Rhodesians have few contacts with other governments. Our own high level contacts (at President and Foreign Minister level) with other African Governments indicate that even the most moderate Presidents would not accept a solution based on the status quo. Nor would the Americans, our EEC partners, the Australians or the Canadians. If however it is possible to achieve some modification to the Constitution and demonstrate that it is the Patriotic Front who are the obstacles to a wider agreement, there will be a chance of winning the support of our principal allies and partners, including the United States. The lifting of sanctions by a number of western countries acting together would have an important effect on the Rhodesian economy (though it would not of itself bring an end to the war). A split in the OAU with some states leaning towards Bishop Muzorewa would have an effect on the extent of support for the Patriotic Front. Recognition by Britain alone would not be likely to have an effect on those fighting on the other side.

#### THE CONSTITUTION

4. It will be important to assure Bishop Muzorewa that we shall not be looking for constitutional changes of a kind which would upset white confidence. Many of the provisions in the existing Constitution are common form. But the Constitution contains features which are not comparable with those of any other independence Constitutions we have granted in the past. The granting of legal independence to Rhodesia involves a judgement by HMG on the constitutional basis on which independence is granted. We cannot disclaim that

/responsibility.

responsibility. There is a recognition elsewhere in the international community that there is a need for special provisions to protect the interests and preserve the confidence of the white community. But under the existing constitutional arrangements Bishop Muzorewa has no power to dismiss a Minister (the parties nominate their representatives in the Government and the Prime Minister has to accept their nominees). The 28 white MPs (8 of whom are not elected by the white electorate, but were simply nominated by the Rhodesian Front) have powers to block not only major constitutional amendments, but any change to 125 of the 170 clauses of the Constitution covering a very wide range of legislation. The effect of the public service commissions has already been to prevent Bishop Muzorewa making an appointment of his own choice to succeed Mr Gaylard as Cabinet Secretary, or for an African deputy to assist the new Cabinet Secretary (Mr George Smith). There is no need to envisage changes which would upset the confidence or efficiency of the civil service (and still less of the armed forces). What is needed is provision for progressive Africanisation - and some demonstrable signs of progress. Unless changes of this kind can be effected, there will not be much prospect of Bishop Muzorewa retaining African support. An analysis of the Constitution, with possible modifications, is set out at Annex A.

#### THE UNITED STATES ATTITUDE

5. Bishop Muzorewa will be coming to London from a visit to Washington, where he saw President Carter and Mr Vance. Mr Vance impressed upon him that he should work with Britain, as the constitutionally responsible authority, to find a basis for legal independence which would win wider acceptance. [The State Department record of the meeting is at Annex B.] President Carter has made public his view that certain aspects of the Constitution are designed to preserve white control. The Americans are concerned that an effort should be made to ascertain whether the Patriotic Front would participate in any reasonable arrangements. There is little evidence that they would be prepared to do so. But

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it would help Bishop Muzorewa's position vis-à-vis the outside world if this were clearly seen to be the case. Bishop Muzorewa has already stated publicly his willingness to attend a conference with representatives of the external parties.

#### THE NEXT STEPS

6. At the Commonwealth Conference in Lusaka it will be our intention to announce that the British government will be making proposals to bring Rhodesia to legal independence on a basis which we believe should command the support of the international community. We would announce that we propose to hold a constitutional conference in London in the first week of September. We would define the basis on which that Conference would be held in general terms, on lines which would be fully compatible with the present Rhodesian Constitution subject to certain modifications. The Patriotic Front would be invited to attend such a Conference. They would not however be allowed to exercise a veto over what we would regard as a reasonable agreement.

7. If Bishop Muzorewa is prepared to cooperate in this strategy, we believe that by these means we should be able to under-cut external criticism of the Rhodesian Constitution and the basis on which independence would be granted. We also believe that it should be possible to help thereby to reduce support for the Patriotic Front. But as Mr Vance told Muzorewa, there is no chance that any of the neighbouring countries will accept his government unless Mr Smith honours his promise to withdraw from it by the time independence is granted and sanctions are lifted.

8. The Bishop may show a disposition to try to rest on the status quo in the expectation that sanctions in any event will not be renewed in November. But this would not help him politically. The war is at present costing 1 million Rhodesian dollars (£675,000) a day. There is little prospect of economic revival in such circumstances. If Bishop Muzorewa is to consolidate his authority inside

/Rhodesia



Rhodesia, he will need to show momentum towards a settlement. We can help him to achieve this and gain wider international acceptance, if he is prepared to cooperate with us to that end.

Rhodesia Department  
11 July 1979

CONFIDENTIAL

## THE RHODESIAN CONSTITUTION

1. The areas of the Rhodesian Constitution which have been most widely criticised are:

- (a) the extent of white representation in Parliament and the power of the white representatives to block legislation acting on their own; and
- (b) the membership and terms of reference of the defence and public service commissions, which at present inhibit even gradual Africanisation.

Our objective would be to achieve changes which would not undermine the confidence of the white community, but would render the Independence Constitution defensible to international and democratic opinion and more comparable to those we have agreed in granting independence to certain other African countries.

## WHITE REPRESENTATION IN PARLIAMENT

2. Special representation of white and other minorities in Parliament - at least for a limited period after independence - is acceptable in principle to much African opinion; and there are precedents elsewhere in the Commonwealth. Thus in Tanganyika out of the 71 seats in the then existing National Assembly which was continued in office at independence, 10 were reserved for Europeans and 11 for Asians. This arrangement lasted for the remainder of the life of that National Assembly and was then replaced by provision for up to 10 additional nominated members who included Europeans and Asians. Similar arrangements were made for Zambia where, for the remainder of the life of the existing National Assembly which was continued in office at independence, 10 out of 75 members had been elected by Europeans on a "reserved roll". Thereafter, there was provision for up to 5 additional nominated members. In Kenya there was no express reservation of seats for racial minorities, but 12 out of 117 seats in the Lower House were specially elected by the constituency members sitting as an electoral college. This was designed to achieve, and did achieve, the election of Europeans. There was no comparable provision in Nigeria, which had no permanent non-indigenous population of any size; minority interests (essentially tribal and regional)

CONFIDENTIAL

and regional) were supposed to be protected by the federal structure of the Constitution.

3. Under the present Rhodesian Constitution, the whites have the power, acting on their own, to block a wide range of constitutional and other bills. They have 28 seats out of 100 in the Lower House and a very wide variety of bills, not restricted to those involving constitutional amendment, require a positive vote of 78 members before they can become law. This situation is without parallel elsewhere.
4. Criticism of it could be met in several ways, alone or in combination, eg:
  - (a) the majority required to pass the bills in question could be reduced so that the Europeans no longer had a blocking power by themselves;
  - (b) the number of white seats could be reduced. (But to curtail the blocking power this would need to be accompanied by a reduction in the required majority, as at (a), or by an increase in the black seats, as at (c));
  - (c) the number of black seats could be increased to give them the required majority; or
  - (d) the range of bills required to be passed by the required majority could be restricted.
5. We suggest that we might aim for
  - (a) 20 white seats in a Lower House of 100, with 70 or at most 75 votes to be required for major measures (ie those dealing with specially entrenched sections of the Constitution); or
  - (b) 28 white seats in a house of 120, with <sup>or 85</sup> 80 votes required for major constitutional measures.

It would alternatively be possible to aim for a reduction in the number of specially entrenched provisions so that they are restricted to those which relate directly to the protection of minority rights (we estimate that this might include 62 out of 170 Sections of the Constitution instead of 125 as at present); but this would still need to be accompanied by some adjustment in the proportion of white seats.

## POWERS OVER THE PUBLIC SERVICES AND DEFENCE FORCES

6. Under the present arrangements there are independent Commissions and similar Boards controlling appointments to, and removals from, the public service, the police force, and defence forces and the judiciary. These provisions are not objectionable in themselves, but the qualifications for membership of the Commissions and Boards are such that almost all members in each case will for many years be Europeans. This, coupled with the terms of reference of the Commissions, will inhibit even gradual Africanisation of the senior ranks of the defence and public services and of the judiciary in the foreseeable future. We know that Bishop Muzorewa wished to appoint an African to succeed the Cabinet Secretary, but was unable to do so in the face of opposition from the Public Service Commission. Nor was he able to appoint an African as Deputy Secretary. There is a need for simple amendments to attenuate the European dominance of the various Commissions, to open up the way for progressive Africanisation and to give the Prime Minister a greater voice in the selection and retention of his senior officials and service commanders.

## OTHER MATTERS

7. Changes in other areas are less essential. But the present Constitution makes a coalition government obligatory for the life of the first Parliament and entitles every group with more than five MPs to automatic representation in the Cabinet. The Prime Minister has to accept the parties' nominees for the Cabinet seats: he has no power to dismiss a Minister. Bishop Muzorewa is already finding these requirements irksome. There may be a need for changes in the constitutional requirements in this area, without prejudice to the political desirability of a coalition government on more normal terms.

8. There are other areas of the Constitution where improvements, though not essential, may be desirable - eg to make it easier to acquire land (with adequate compensation for existing owners) for settlement by Africans.

Rhodesia Department

11 July 1979


PRIME MINISTER

We have been asked, of course, for a photographic facility here at No 10 when Bishop Muzorewa arrives tomorrow. It would normally be fairly routine, and I think you would probably wish to do it.

But it is a sophisticated political situation. And I wonder in fact if such a photograph might be used to embarrass delicate negotiations later. I am thinking, for example, of a poster campaign in Lusaka at the worst, or widespread distribution of the photograph throughout the African press at the best, thus establishing you as a partnership. Although the Bishop was photographed with Cy Vance, he was not photographed with the President.

We could set it up at quite short notice, so I wonder if perhaps we could have a word on your return from Southall please?

*I am Chris-Lenny do have a photograph later.*



Henry L James  
12 July 1979

[2/23]

IMMEDIATE

24

[RHODESIA: POLICY: ADVANCE COPIES]

ADVANCE COPY

PS  
PS/SIR I. GILMOUR  
PS/MR LUCE  
PS/PUS  
SIR A DUFF  
Mr Willson

PS/NO 10 DOWNING STREET /

MR WILLIAMS  
? ... ..

SIR C ROSE  
MR P. H. MAXEY  
COL MOIR  
MR P J FOWLER  
DIO  
Sir J Hunt

CABINET OFFICE

HD/RHODESIA D (3)

HD/C AF D  
HD/S AF D  
HD/UND  
HD/NEWS D  
HD/WAD

MR FREELAND LEGAL ADVISER RM K200A  
MR STEEL LEGAL ADVISER RM K176  
RESIDENT CLERK

Prime Minister

17, 1

GR 200

CONFIDENTIAL

FL MIRIMBA SALISBURY 121305Z JUL 79

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 403 OF 12 JULY

FOR RHODESIA DEPT

1. CHIEF CHIRAU HAS ASKED ME TO CONVEY A REQUEST THAT HMG CALL A MEETING OF RHODESIAN POLITICAL PARTY LEADERS IN LUSAKA DURING THE COMMONWEALTH CONFERENCE. HE BELIEVED THAT IN THIS WAY MOST OF THE AFRICAN LEADERS WHO HAD INFLUENCE ON THE OPPOSING SIDES WOULD BE ABLE TO BRING PRESSURE ON THEM.

2. THE CHIEF SAID THAT HE WAS ALARMED AT RECENT POSTURES BY BISHOP MUZOREWA. HIS CONTINUAL COMMENTS ABOUT SANCTIONS APPEARED TO INFER THAT HE WAS MORE WORRIED ABOUT THE ECONOMY THAN ABOUT THE HUNDREDS OF PEOPLE WHO WERE DYING.

3. I TOLD THE CHIEF THAT I WOULD PASS ON HIS REQUEST BUT I SAID THAT, APART FROM ANYTHING ELSE, THERE WOULD BE SEVERE ADMINISTRATIVE PROBLEMS ABOUT HOLDING A MEETING IN LUSAKA DURING CHOGM.

4. CHIEF CHIRAU WAS ACCOMPANIED BY KINGDOM SITHOLE WHO, SINCE HIS RESIGNATION FROM THE UNFP, APPEARS TO HAVE BECOME HIS CHIEF AIDE. ZUPO HAS MOVED FROM ITS COMFORTABLE OFFICES IN A DOWNTOWN OFFICE BLOCK TO A MUCH MORE MODEST APARTMENT BLOCK IN A CHEAPER PART OF TOWN.

WILSON

NNNN

IMMEDIATE

MR. CARTLEDGE ✓

*p.a. [unclear] 12/7*

The Secretary of State's view is that it would be better to avoid having to lay an order at this point if we can because:

- (a) It builds up the whole Joan Lester business if we have to respond to that by laying an order;
- (b) It looks better if the Bishop is upheld by the natural processes of the law rather than our having to intervene to prevent the law from getting at him.

But the Secretary of State feels that if there is any doubt about the position then we will have to lay the order. The present position is that the Attorney General's office are talking privately to the Magistrate's Court to see whether the Magistrate if he were disposed to decide in favour of Joan Lester might defer his verdict for consideration over the weekend in which case the Bishop would be protected. We will know the outcome later in the afternoon. Meanwhile an order has been drafted and we are taking steps to see if a Privy Council meeting could be held tomorrow morning in order for an order to be laid. We are also arranging for Derek Day who is meeting the Bishop when he arrives at 9.00 tonight to tell him not to worry.

~~RICHARD DALES~~

12 July 1979



INCOMING TELEGRAM

2

UNCLASSIFIED

IMMEDIATE

12 03 32

FROM: STATE

NO: 179629

ACTION

10K-3

AMB	
BCH	
PAO	
POL	7
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CUSTOMS	
DAO	
D.E.A.	
F.A.A.	
FBIS	
I.R.S.	
LEGATT	
MARI	
SUSLO	
TRADE	
TREAS	
USCG	
A/COUNG	
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A/PERS	
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A/SY	
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CCA	2
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POUCH	
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TOTAL:	25

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 FM SECSTATE WASHDC  
 TO RUDTC/AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 5466  
 ALL AFRICAN DIPLOMATIC POSTS  
 RUEHBC/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA PRIORITY 2543  
 RUFNPS/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 6173  
 RUEHDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 2563  
 INFO RUEHIA/USICA WASHDC  
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 UNCLAS STATE 179629

cc: No. in all  
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 SA A Jell  
 No Day  
 No. Williams

FROM AF/P ALAFD POSTS TAKE AS PRIORITY  
 E.O. 12065 N/A  
 TAGS: SOPN

Prime Minister  
 Jul 14/79

SUBJECT: WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT FOLLOWING THE MEETING  
 BETWEEN PRIME MINISTER MUZOREWA AND PRESIDENT CARTER AT  
 CAMP DAVID, JULY 11, 1979.

BELOW IS THE TEXT OF THE STATEMENT ISSUED BY JODY  
 POWELL FOLLOWING PRESIDENT CARTER'S MEETING WITH BISHOP  
 MUZOREWA AT CAMP DAVID.

BEGIN TEXT: PRESIDENT CARTER MET WITH BISHOP MUZOREWA THIS  
 AFTERNOON BECAUSE OF THE PRESIDENT'S DEEP PERSONAL COM-  
 MITMENT TO HELP FIND A SOLUTION FOR THE PEACEFUL TRANSFER  
 OF RESPONSIBLE POLITICAL AUTHORITY FROM THE WHITE MINORITY  
 TO THE BLACK MAJORITY IN ZIMBABWE-RHODESIA.

IN A FRANK EXCHANGE OF VIEWS, THE PRESIDENT EMPHASIZED HIS  
 SINCERE DESIRE TO SEE AN END TO THE BITTERNESS AND BLOOD-  
 SHED IN ZIMBABWE-RHODESIA. HE BELIEVES THIS CAN BE  
 ACCOMPLISHED BY THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A BROADLY BASED  
 CONSENSUS ON CONSTITUTIONAL PROCEDURES AND ADMINISTRATIVE  
 PROCESSES WHICH ARE RESPONSIVE TO THE LEGITIMATE POLITICAL  
 ASPIRATIONS OF ALL THE PEOPLES OF ZIMBABWE-RHODESIA.

THE PRESIDENT RESTATED HIS INTENTION TO WORK CLOSELY  
 WITH THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED KINGDOM, WHICH HAS THE  
 PRIMARY LEGAL AND HISTORIC RESPONSIBILITY TO BRING  
 ZIMBABWE-RHODESIA TO INDEPENDENCE BASED ON FULL POLITICAL  
 PARTICIPATION AND HUMAN RIGHTS GUARANTEES FOR ALL ITS  
 CITIZENS. HE EXPRESSED THE HOPE THAT THE MUZOREWA  
 ADMINISTRATION WOULD WORK CLOSELY WITH THE UNITED KINGDOM  
 IN SEEKING NON-MILITARY, POLITICAL MEANS TO FURTHER THIS  
 GOAL. END TEXT.

VANCE  
 BT  
 #9629

CONFIDENTIAL

2

IMMEDIATE

FROM: STATE  
NO: 179368

ACTION	
INFO	
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PAO	
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COHCL	
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FBIS	
I.R.S.	
LEGATT	
MARI	
SUSLO	
TRADE	
TREAS	
USCG	
A/COUNS	
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CCA 2	
CG/CS	
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CHRON (4 D)	
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POUCH	
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TOTAL:	4420

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 TO RUDIC/AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 5446-47  
 RUTAAM/AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM IMMEDIATE 8674  
 RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY GABORONE IMMEDIATE 8376  
 RUEHSA/AMEMBASSY PRETORIA IMMEDIATE 6348  
 RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY MAPUTO IMMEDIATE 8944  
 RUTA0H/AMEMBASSY LUSAKA IMMEDIATE 8510  
 RUEHOS/AMEMBASSY LAGOS IMMEDIATE 8062  
 RUTAMA/AMEMBASSY MONROVIA IMMEDIATE 1129  
 INFO RUEHDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 2548  
 RUEADWW/ WHITE HOUSE IMMEDIATE 2378

Prime Minister  
 This is the  
 Americans' own  
 word on the  
 President's  
 meeting with  
 Bishop  
 Muzorewa.  
 GJM  
 13

CONFIDENTIAL

STATE 179368

NODIS

E.O. 12065: GDS 7/11/85 (MOOSE, RICHARD M.)

TAGS: PDEV, RH, US

SUBJECT: RHODESIA: BISHOP MUZOREWA'S MEETING WITH PRESIDENT CARTER

1. SUMMARY. PRESIDENT CARTER MET TODAY (JULY 12) WITH BISHOP MUZOREWA AT CAMP DAVID. SECRETARY VANCE WAS THE ONLY OTHER PERSON PRESENT FOR THE SUBSTANTIVE DISCUSSION. THE PRESIDENT MADE ALL OF THE POINTS WHICH PRIME MINISTER THATCHER HAD SUGGESTED. THE BISHOP'S RESPONSE FOLLOWED THE LINES OF HIS CONVERSATION YESTERDAY WITH SECRETARY VANCE. ON THE RETURN HELICOPTER FLIGHT, MUZOREWA IMPLIED TO SECRETARY VANCE, FOR THE FIRST TIME IN HIS WASHINGTON VISIT, THAT HE HAS BEGUN TO CONSIDER THE POSSIBILITY OF CHANGES. IN DOING SO HE RAISED THE QUESTION OF WHAT THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT WOULD DO TO HELP HIM IF HE LOST THE CONFIDENCE OF THE WHITES. END SUMMARY.

2. IN HIS MEETING TODAY AT CAMP DAVID WITH BISHOP MUZOREWA PRESIDENT CARTER, ACCOMPANIED BY SECRETARY VANCE, STATED THE U.S. POSITION ON RHODESIA IN TERMS SIMILAR TO THOSE EMPLOYED BY SECRETARY VANCE YESTERDAY (JULY 11). EARLY IN THE CONVERSATION THE PRESIDENT REITERATED THE POINTS SUGGESTED BY PRIME MINISTER THATCHER, INCLUDING:

- MUZOREWA NEEDS WIDE INTERNATIONAL ACCEPTANCE;
- THE Z/R CONSTITUTION MUST BE CHANGED PARTICULARLY THE BLOCKING POWER;
- THERE MUST BE A REAL TRANSFER OF POWER, INCLUDING IN THE CIVIL SERVICE, JUDICIARY, POLICE AND MILITARY;
- SMITH MUST GO; AND,
- THE WAR MUST BE BROUGHT TO AN END.

PRESIDENT CARTER DID NOT DISCUSS EITHER NEW ELECTIONS OR A CONSTITUTIONAL REFERENDUM.

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3. BISHOP MUZOREWA RESPONDED TO THE PRESIDENT'S POINTS ALONG THE SAME LINES HE HAD USED WITH SECRETARY VANCE YESTERDAY. HE ARGUED THAT THE PEOPLE OF ZIMBABWE-RHODESIA DID IN FACT SUPPORT THE CONSTITUTION. PRESIDENT CARTER SAID THAT HE DID NOT AGREE WITH HIM.

4. ON THE RETURN HELICOPTER RIDE TO WASHINGTON, THE BISHOP SENT HIS AIDES TO ONE SIDE IN ORDER THAT HE MIGHT SPEAK PRIVATELY WITH SECRETARY VANCE. HE ASKED WHAT HE SHOULD DO: WOULD IT BE ENOUGH JUST TO REMOVE THE 28 SEAT WHITE BLOCKING POWER? SECRETARY VANCE SAID THAT THE BISHOP MUST GO BACK TO FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES. THE BISHOP MUST GAIN THE SUPPORT OF HIS PEOPLE. IN ORDER TO DO THIS HE MUST DEMONSTRATE THAT A REAL TRANSFER OF POWER HAS OCCURRED AND THAT HE IS IN FACT GOVERNING THE COUNTRY. SIMPLY REMOVING THE WHITE BLOCKING POWER WOULD NOT BE ENOUGH. REAL CHANGES MUST BE MADE. THE USG WILL NOT SPECIFY THESE AS THEY MUST BE WORKED OUT BY MUZOREWA WITH THE BRITISH. SECRETARY VANCE THEN UNDERScoreD THE BASIC POINTS MADE BY THE PRESIDENT, INCLUDING THE NEED FOR SMITH TO GO AND A DEMONSTRATION THAT THE CONSTITUTION IS SUPPORTED BY THE PEOPLE. SECRETARY VANCE EMPHASIZED THE NECESSITY FOR THE BISHOP TO DO HIS UTMOST TO MAKE POSSIBLE AN END TO THE FIGHTING. THIS WOULD REQUIRE MEANINGFUL CHANGES WHICH WOULD CONVINCe HIS NEIGHBORS THAT HE HAD BROUGHT ABOUT REAL MAJORITY RULE.

5. MUZOREWA SAID THAT HE WOULD "GO TALK WITH THE BRITISH" BUT THAT "THEY MUST ANSWER ONE QUESTION: IF I DO THESE THINGS AND LOSE THE WHITES, WHAT ARE THE BRITISH PREPARED TO DO TO HELP ME IN A CONTINUING WAR? I RUN A REAL RISK OF

LOSING THEM (THE WHITES)." SECRETARY VANCE QUESTIONED WHETHER THIS WERE TRULY THE CASE. MUZOREWA CONCEDED, "WELL, IT IS A RISK." HE OBSERVED THAT HE HAD THE FEELING THAT THE AMERICANS AND THE BRITISH "SAW THINGS VERY MUCH ALIKE." SECRETARY VANCE CONFIRMED THAT THIS WAS THE CASE.

6. SECRETARY VANCE TOLD MUZOREWA THAT THE USG WISHED MUZOREWA WELL; THAT WE FEAR HE WILL FAIL IF HE DOES NOT MAKE SERIOUS CHANGES. THE BISHOP COMMENTED THAT THE SECRETARY'S WORDS WERE "THE FIRST COMFORTING THING I HAVE HEARD." SECRETARY VANCE TOLD MUZOREWA THAT Z/R HAD GREAT POTENTIAL, THAT IT WAS A FERTILE LAND WITH POTENTIAL FOR INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT. Z/R COULD BE VERY SUCCESSFUL IF THERE WERE PEACE. IT WOULD BE TRAGIC TO SEE IT TORN APART, ITS PEOPLE HURT AND THEIR ASPIRATIONS BLOCKED. ON PARTING THE BISHOP SAID THAT HE HOPED TO SEE SECRETARY VANCE IN Z/R "SOON." SECRETARY VANCE REPLIED, "SOMEDAY."

7. COMMENT: MUZOREWA'S QUESTION ABOUT THE SUFFICIENCY OF REMOVING THE WHITE BLOCKING POWER WAS THE FIRST INDICATION DURING THE WASHINGTON VISIT THAT MUZOREWA IS TAKING SERIOUSLY OUR INSISTENCE UPON CHANGE. HIS QUESTION ABOUT THE POSSIBLE FLIGHT OF WHITES, AND THE ACTIVESSUPPORT HE MIGHT THEN EXPECT IN A CONTINUING WAR, POINTS UP THE IMPORTANCE OF EMPHASIZING TO MUZOREWA THAT MAKING THE KIN; OF PROGRESS WHICH AFRICANS WILL REGARD AS FAIR IS ESSENTIAL IF THE WAR IS TO BE BROUGHT TO AN END. VANCE  
BT

**SUBJECT**

*Top copy on Rhodesia, Pt. 3*

GR 1100

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FM DAR ES SALAAM 110915Z JULY 79

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 576 OF 11 JULY

FOR PRIVATE SECRETARY

**PRIME MINISTER'S**

**PERSONAL MESSAGE**

**SERIAL No. T41A/79T**

*T41A/79T*

*Enter no  
by  
m*

WE HAVE JUST BEEN GIVEN A COPY OF A LETTER DATED 10 JULY FROM PRESIDENT NYERERE TO THE PRIME MINISTER THE ORIGINAL OF WHICH WE UNDERSTAND WILL BE HANDED OVER IN LONDON.

TEXT AS FOLLOWS:

DEAR MRS THATCHER,

YOU WILL BY NOW HAVE RECEIVED FROM THE BRITISH HIGH COMMISSIONER TO TANZANIA A REPORT ABOUT MY EXPRESSION OF CONCERN OVER BRITAIN'S RHODESIA POLICY AFTER I HAD LISTENED TO PRESS REPORTS OF YOUR OWN REMARKS IN AUSTRALIA.

I HAVE NEVERTHELESS DECIDED TO WRITE TO YOU BECAUSE I AM VERY ANXIOUS THAT THERE SHOULD BE NO MISUNDERSTANDING BETWEEN US ON A MATTER WHICH IS SO VERY IMPORTANT TO MY COUNTRY AND TO AFRICA GENERALLY. IT IS MY DESIRE, AND THE DESIRE OF MY GOVERNMENT, TO COOPERATE WITH THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT IN BRINGING AN END TO THE WAR IN RHODESIA AS RAPIDLY AS POSSIBLE IN THE ONLY WAY THIS CAN BE DONE - THAT IS, BY THE ACHIEVEMENT OF A REAL TRANSFER OF POWER TO THE MAJORITY BY PEACEFUL MEANS.

AS I EXPLAINED TO LORD HARLECH, WE ACCEPT THAT THERE IS A NEW REALITY IN RHODESIA NOW THAT BISHOP MUZOREWA HAS BEEN MADE PRIME MINISTER. TO THE UNINITIATED AND ONLY CASUALLY INTERESTED MEMBER OF THE PUBLIC IT MAY NOW (AS DISTINCT FROM BEFORE) APPEAR THAT MAJORITY RULE HAS BEEN ATTAINED. BUT NEITHER THE TANZANIAN NOR THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT IS SO IGNORANT. WE BOTH KNOW THAT THE CONSTITUTION UNDER WHICH BISHOP MUZOREWA SITS IN HI PRIME MINISTERIAL OFFICE IS NOT ONE WHICH COULD BE ACCEPTED BY ANY DEMOCRAT AS INVOLVING A REAL TRANSFER OF POWER FROM THE MINORITY TO THE MAJORITY. BEFORE THERE CAN BE ANY HOPE OF A NEGOTIATED PEACE IN THAT COUNTRY, THEREFORE, MAJOR CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGES WILL HAVE TO BE INTRODUCED AND GENUINE INTERNATIONALLY SUPERVISED ELECTIONS WILL HAVE TO BE ACCEPTED BY ALL PARTIES TO THE CONFLICT.

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/I HAD NOT

I HAD NOT BEEN ANTICIPATING ANY MAJOR DIFFERENCE BETWEEN BRITAIN AND TANZANIA ON THIS POINT. I FULLY REALISE THAT YOUR GOVERNMENT GIVES A HIGH PRIORITY TO 'BRINGING RHODESIA TO LEGAL INDEPENDENCE UNDER CONDITIONS OF THE WIDEST POSSIBLE INTERNATIONAL RECOGNITION'. BUT RHODESIA IS A MATTER OF HIGH PRIORITY FOR TANZANIA ALSO, AND THERE DOES NOT SEEM TO ME TO BE ANY AUTOMATIC CONFLICT BETWEEN YOUR OBJECTIVE AND AFRICA'S DETERMINATION ON MAJORITY RULE BEFORE INDEPENDENCE. I HAD THEREFORE BEEN HOPING THAT, AFTER THE CONSULTATIONS WHICH YOUR GOVERNMENT HAS BEEN HOLDING WITH AFRICAN STATES AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, BRITAIN WOULD BE COMING TO THE COMMONWEALTH CONFERENCE WITH THE KIND OF DRAFT CONSTITUTION FOR RHODESIA WHICH WOULD BE GENERALLY RECOGNISED BY ALL MEMBERS AS GIVING GENUINE MAJORITY RULE TO RHODESIA. THERE IS CERTAINLY NO REASON WHY SUCH A CONSTITUTION SHOULD NOT INCLUDE SOME PROVISIONS DESIGNED TO ASSUAGE REASONABLE FEARS OF THE WHITE AND ASIAN MINORITY CITIZENS ABOUT THEIR FUTURE SECURITY.

I HAD ANTICIPATED FURTHER THAT THERE WOULD BE NO GREAT DIFFICULTY ABOUT REACHING AGREEMENT AT THE COMMONWEALTH ON SUCH A PROPOSED CONSTITUTION SINCE BRITAIN HAS GREAT EXPERIENCE AND CERTAINLY UNDERSTANDS THE INCONSISTENCY OF MAJORITY RULE AND MANY MAJOR PROVISIONS IN THE EXISTING SALISBURY CONSTITUTION. IT WOULD SUBSEQUENTLY BE THE WORK OF BRITAIN AND HER FRIENDS TO GET THESE PROPOSALS ACCEPTED IN SALISBURY, AND OF AFRICAN STATES TO USE THEIR INFLUENCE TO THE SAME END ON THE PATRIOTIC FRONT.

YET IT IS QUITE OBVIOUS THAT A BRITISH ANNOUNCEMENT THAT IT INTENDS TO LIFT SANCTIONS COME WHAT MAY, IS QUITE INCOMPATIBLE WITH ANY HOPES OF GETTING AN END TO THE WAR THROUGH AN AGREED SOLUTION. SALISBURY WOULD KNOW THAT IT SIMPLY HAS TO BE OBSTINATE UNTIL NOVEMBER, WHEN IT WOULD GET WHAT IT WANTS AND NEEDS. THE PATRIOTIC FRONT WOULD REGARD BRITAIN AS HAVING DECLARED ITSELF TO BE A SUPPORTER OF IAN SMITH AND BISHOP MUZOREWA, AND WOULD DISREGARD ANY SUGGESTIONS IT MADE. ZAMBIA AND MOZAMBIQUE - AND ALSO TANZANIA - WOULD NATURALLY DRAW THE CONCLUSION THAT BRITAIN IS UNCONCERNED ABOUT RHODESIAN ATTACKS ON THOSE INDEPENDENT COUNTRIES AND INDEED IS WILLING TO INCREASE THE POWER OF RHODESIA TO CARRY OUT SUCH ATTACKS.

CONFIDENTIAL

I DO UNDERSTAND THE POLITICAL PROBLEM WHICH WILL FACE YOUR GOVERNMENT IF, IN NOVEMBER, YOU HAVE COME TO THE CONCLUSION THAT SANCTIONS CANNOT YET BE LIFTED. BUT YOUR GOVERNMENT HAS A MAJORITY IN THE BRITISH PARLIAMENT, AND ON THIS ISSUE YOU WOULD HAVE LABOUR PARTY SUPPORT. A FAILURE TO RENEW SANCTIONS COULD ONLY RESULT FROM A DELIBERATE DECISION ON THE PART OF YOUR GOVERNMENT. YOUR POSITION IS IN THIS RESPECT DIFFERENT FROM THAT OF PRESIDENT CARTER, WHO HAS NONETHELESS MADE CLEAR THE INTENTION OF HIS ADMINISTRATION TO FIGHT FOR THE POWER TO ABIDE BY HIS COUNTRY'S INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS IN THE INTERESTS OF PEACE. FOR IT IS OF COURSE A FACT THAT ALTHOUGH BRITAIN INITIATED THE PROPOSAL AT THE UNITED NATIONS, SANCTIONS AGAINST RHODESIA ARE NOW A UNITED NATIONS MATTER AND UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW CAN ONLY BE WITHDRAWN BY THE DECISION OF THE UNITED NATIONS. A DECISION BY YOUR GOVERNMENT TO LIFT SANCTIONS CAN ONLY BE A DELIBERATE AND UNNECESSARY DEFIANCE OF WORLD OPINION GENERALLY AND AFRICA IN PARTICULAR.

I HAVE EXPLAINED TO YOUR HIGH COMMISSIONER THAT I DO NOT UNDERSTAND THE DISTINCTION YOU WERE REPORTED AS MAKING IN AUSTRALIA BETWEEN RECOGNITION OF RHODESIA - WHICH I UNDERSTAND YOU SAID MIGHT COME LATER - AND THE LIFTING OF SANCTIONS. IF THERE IS AN ACADEMIC DISTINCTION TO BE MADE AT ALL - AND IT IS ONLY ACADEMIC - IT WOULD SEEM TO ME TO IMPLY A POSSIBILITY OF RECOGNISING RHODESIA BUT CONTINUING SANCTIONS, AND NOT THE OTHER WAY ROUND. FOR SANCTIONS WERE IMPOSED AS A MARK OF THE INTERNATIONAL UNACCEPTABILITY OF MINORITY RULE IN RHODESIA, COMBINED WITH BRITAIN'S INCAPACITY OR UNWILLINGNESS TO CARRY OUT ALONE ITS LEGAL RESPONSIBILITY TO INSTITUTE CHANGE IN THAT COLONY. THE PRESENT RHODESIAN CONSTITUTION HAS NOT CHANGED THE WORLD'S JUDGEMENT, FOR IT IS GENERALLY RECOGNISED BY THOSE INTERESTED AS MERELY PUTTING A BLACK FRONT TO WHAT IS BASICALLY THE SAME POWER SITUATION.

MADAM PRIME MINISTER: I WOULD LIKE TO REPEAT WHAT I SAID AT THE BEGINNING OF THIS LETTER. IT IS THE EARNEST DESIRE OF MY GOVERNMENT TO MAINTAIN AND INDEED TO STRENGTHEN THE FRIENDSHIP AND COOPERATION BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES. THE TERRIBLE WAR IN RHODESIA NEEDS TO BE BROUGHT TO AN END AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE. IT HAS ALREADY CAUSED TOO MUCH SUFFERING.

I VERY MUCH HOPE THAT IS THE INTENTION OF YOUR GOVERNMENT TO SEEK TO COOPERATE WITH AFRICA TO THIS END, AND THAT THE REPORTS OF YOUR WORDS IN AUSTRALIA GAVE A FALSE IMPRESSION. IF SO I CAN ONLY APOLOGISE FOR WRITING THIS LETTER, AND ASSURE YOU THAT THERE WILL BE NO LACK OF RESPONSE FROM TANZANIA. AND INDEED I CLOSE THIS OVER-LONG LETTER WITH SOME CONFIDENCE SINCE FOR I CANNOT BELIEVE THAT BRITAIN WISHES TO DEFY AFRICA AND THE WORLD IN THE INTERESTS ONLY OF SUPPORTING A CONSTITUTION IN RHODESIA WHICH ENTRENCHES RACIALIST PRIVILEGE BEHIND THE CAMOUFLAGE OF A SUPERFICIALLY DEMOCRATIC VENEER.

I SEND MY PERSONAL GOOD WISHES TO YOU. YOURS SINCERELY,  
JULIUS K NYERERE.

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MR WILLIAMS  
SIR A PARSONS

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MR STRATTON

COPIES TO:

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TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1877 OF 11 JULY

INFO PRIORITY MIRIMBA SALISBURY, PRETORIA, UKMIS NEW YORK.

MY IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING TELEGRAM: RHODESIA: VANCE/MUZOREWA MEETINGS

1. SUMMARY. SECRETARY VANCE MET WITH BISHOP ABEL MUZOREWA ALONE TODAY FOR APPROXIMATELY ONE AND A HALF HOURS. THE SECRETARY MADE ALL THE POINTS SET FORTH IN THE MESSAGES TO THE PRESIDENT FROM PRIME MINISTER THATCHER AS WELL AS THOSE CONVEYED IN AMBASSADOR BREWSTER'S CONVERSATION WITH IAN GILMOUR. IT WAS AGREED THAT DISCUSSION OF THE NEED FOR CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGES WOULD BE CONTINUED TOMORROW AT MUZOREWA'S MEETING WITH THE PRESIDENT AND THE SECRETARY. THE SECRETARY FOUND IT SIGNIFICANT THAT MUZOREWA CONCENTRATED ON THE QUESTION OF RECOGNITION AND AT NO POINT MENTIONED SANCTIONS AS SUCH. SECRETARY VANCE FOUND MUZOREWA MORE SELF-CONFIDENT THAN AT HIS LAST MEETING WITH HIM. WHILE NOT NEGATIVE, MUZOREWA WAS ESSENTIALLY NON-RESPONSIVE TO THE SECRETARY'S MAIN POINTS. END SUMMARY.

2. SECRETARY VANCE OPENED THE CONVERSATION BY ASKING BISHOP MUZOREWA'S VIEW OF THE CURRENT SITUATION IN ZIMBABWE-RHODESIA (Z-R). MUZOREWA ACKNOWLEDGED THAT HE WAS HAVING A HARD TIME AND THAT THE ANSWER TO HIS PROBLEMS DEPENDS UPON WHAT THE UK AND US WILL DO. IF THESE GOVERNMENTS SUPPORT HIM HE WOULD BE ACCEPTED BY A LARGE NUMBER OF OTHER STATES AND A MOMENTUM WOULD BUILD TO HIS BENEFIT. IF THE UK AND US DO NOT SUPPORT HIM, IT WILL BE DIFFICULT FOR HIM TO SURVIVE. THE WAR WAS NOT GOING WELL AND THE PATRIOTIC FRONT ARE PREPARED TO FIGHT ON.

3. SECRETARY VANCE TOLD THE BISHOP THAT THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT IS FACED WITH THE DECISION WHETHER TO RECOGNIZE THE GOVERNMENT OF Z-R. THIS QUESTION IS UP TO THEM. THE BRITISH HAVE RECOGNIZED THE PROGRESS WHICH HAS BEEN MADE, ARE PREPARED TO WORK WITH MUZOREWA AND WISH TO ENSURE THE WIDEST POSSIBLE ACCEPTANCE OF Z-R. IT IS CRITICAL THAT MUZOREWA BE PREPARED TO ENGAGE IN THIS PROCESS.

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4. IN ORDER TO FIND A SOLUTION TO THE RHODESIA PROBLEM THERE WOULD NEED TO BE CHANGES IN THE CONSTITUTION SUCH AS ELIMINATION OF WHITE BLOCKING POWER, GREATER BLACK REPRESENTATION IN THE PUBLIC SERVICES AND DEFENSE FORCES, TOGETHER WITH A GENUINE ATTEMPT TO ACHIEVE A WIDER AGREEMENT PERMITTING AN END TO THE WAR.

5. SECRETARY VANCE RECALLED THAT MUZOREWA HAD PREVIOUSLY TOLD HIM THAT THE PRESENT CONSTITUTION WAS NOT ONE WHICH HE HAD WANTED TO SIGN. MUZOREWA HAD SAID AT THE TIME THAT HE HAD TO TAKE WHAT SMITH HAD OFFERED OR BREAK WITH SMITH AND GO HIS OWN WAY. MUZOREWA HAD SAID THAT HE DID NOT LIKE THE 28 WHITE SEATS AND THAT HE WISHED THAT THEY WERE NOT THERE. IN VIEW OF THIS, THE SECRETARY ASKED WHY IT WAS NOT NOW POSSIBLE FOR MUZOREWA TO UNDERTAKE CHANGES. MUZOREWA RESPONDED THAT IF HE WERE TO GO BACK ON PROVISIONS SUCH AS THE 28 WHITE SEATS HE WOULD BE ACCUSED OF BREAKING HIS WORD TO THE WHITES. THIS WOULD BE DIFFICULT FOR HIM POLITICALLY AND WOULD MAKE IT IMPOSSIBLE FOR HIM TO HOLD THE WHITES IN THE COUNTRY, AND THAT HE NEEDED THEM.

6. SECRETARY VANCE SAID THAT HE UNDERSTOOD THAT PROBLEM, BUT SUPPOSE THE BRITISH SAID THAT IN ORDER TO ACHIEVE LEGAL INDEPENDENCE THE CONSTITUTION WOULD HAVE TO BE CHANGED TO REMOVE THE BLOCKING POWERS AND TO DO AWAY WITH VARIOUS ENTRENCHED CLAUSES. MUZOREWA COULD THEN SAY TO THE WHITES THAT THESE CHANGES MUST BE MADE IN ORDER TO ACHIEVE LEGALITY. MUZOREWA RESPONDED, THOUGHTFULLY, QUOTE I TAKE YOUR POINT. UNQUOTE THE SECRETARY SAID THAT THE PRESIDENT WOULD WANT TO TALK ABOUT WHAT MUZOREWA WAS PREPARED TO DO. IT WAS AGREED THAT THIS WOULD BE DISCUSSED FURTHER TOMORROW.

7. SHIFTING THE FOCUS, THE SECRETARY ASKED WHY THE BISHOP SHOULD NOT JUMP AT THE CHANCE TO INCREASE GREATLY THE NUMBER OF BLACK RHODESIANS IN THE ARMED SERVICES, POLICE AND CIVIL SERVICE. MUZOREWA RESPONDED THAT HE OBVIOUSLY WOULD LIKE TO DO SO, BUT THAT HE DID NOT HAVE ENOUGH QUALIFIED PEOPLE AVAILABLE. FOR EXAMPLE, MUZOREWA HAD FOUND HIS OWN OFFICE STAFFED BY FIVE WHITE PERSONS. ALL BUT ONE, GEORGE SMITH, HAVE NOW BEEN REPLACED BY HIS OWN PEOPLE. SMITH, HOWEVER, WAS A COMPETENT PERSON AND HE WAS GLAD TO HAVE HIM (GEORGE SMITH IS ACCOMPANYING THE MUZOREWA PARTY).

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8. MUZOREWA NOTED THAT THE ARMY IS ALREADY 82 PERCENT BLACK, BUT THE SECRETARY COMMENTED THAT THE OFFICERS ARE ALMOST ENTIRELY WHITE. MUZOREWA SAID THAT HE COULD NOT REPLACE THE WHITE OFFICERS, FOR EXAMPLE, WHO COULD TAKE GENERAL WALLS' PLACE? THE SECRETARY RESPONDED THAT THE REAL PROBLEM WAS THAT MUZOREWA DID NOT HAVE THE POWER TO REPLACE AN OFFICIAL SUCH AS WALLS: THE WHITES COULD BLOCK SUCH A CHANGE. MUZOREWA RESPONDED THAT THE SECRETARY DID NOT UNDERSTAND THE CONSTITUTION, THAT IT DID NOT PREVENT HIM FROM MAKING SUCH CHANGES. (NOTE: ACCORDING TO OUR READING OF THE CONSTITUTION MUZOREWA IS ABSOLUTELY WRONG ON THIS POINT AND THE SECRETARY MAY TAKE THIS POINT UP WITH HIM TOMORROW.)

9. SECRETARY VANCE ASKED MUZOREWA WHY HE DID NOT GET RID OF SMITH. MUZOREWA ARGUED THAT HE NEEDED SMITH TO HOLD THE WHITES. ASKED UNDER WHAT CIRCUMSTANCES SMITH COULD GO, MUZOREWA'S RESPONSE WAS THAT SMITH WOULD GO IN EXCHANGE FOR RECOGNITION. THE SECRETARY ASKED HOW MUZOREWA COULD BE SURE: DID HE TRUST SMITH? MUZOREWA BELIEVED THAT HE COULD TRUST SMITH BUT THAT SMITH WOULD NOT LEAVE IN RETURN FOR THE PROSPECT OF FUTURE RECOGNITION. SECRETARY VANCE EXPRESSED DOUBT THAT SMITH COULD BE TRUSTED AND POINTED OUT THAT UNTIL SMITH IS GOTTN RID OF Z-R'S NEIGHBORS WILL NEVER ACCEPT THE NEW GOVERNMENT.

10. PURSUING THE QUESTION OF NEIGHBORING PARTIES, THE SECRETARY ASKED MUZOREWA ABOUT NKOMO AND MUGABE. MUZOREWA SAID THAT HE HAD WRITTEN TO BOTH BUT HAD RECEIVED NO REPLY. THE SECRETARY ASKED WHETHER MUZOREWA WOULD BE PREPARED TO INVITE THEM TO A MEETING. MUZOREWA SEEMED WILLING TO CONSIDER THIS BUT THE SUBJECT WAS NOT PURSUED AND THERE WAS NO DISCUSSION OF WHAT NKOMO AND MUGABE MIGHT BE INVITED TO DISCUSS.

11. MUZOREWA SAID THAT HE HAD WRITTEN THE FRONT LINE PRESIDENTS BUT THAT THEY WOULD NOT TALK TO HIM: HIS ONLY CONTACT HAD BEEN AN INDIRECT ONE WITH PRESENT NYERERE. THE SECRETARY EXPRESSED THE BELIEF THAT NYERERE WOULD BE PREPARED TO ACCEPT A NEW GOVERNMENT IN Z-R IF THE CONSTITUTION WER AMENDED, IF SMITH WERE GONE AND IF MUZOREWA WERE TO MAKE A GENUINE EFFORT TO REACH AGREEMENT WITH THE PATRIOTIC FRONT. NYERERE WOULD NOT ALLOW THE PATRIOTIC FRONT

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TO PLAY A BLOCKING ROLE. IF THE PATRIOTIC FRONT WERE TO REFUSE A GENUINE OFFER THIS WOULD NOT INHIBIT NYERERE FROM MAKING HIS OWN DECISION. THE SECRETARY ON THE OTHER HAND DOUBTED THAT PRESIDENT SAMORA MACHEL WAS PREPARED AT THIS TIME TO HAVE ANYTHING TO DO WITH Z-R AUTHORITIES. CONTINUING, HE FELT THAT KAUNDA'S ATTITUDE WOULD DEPEND ON NKOMO AND THAT NETO HAD TOO MANY PROBLEMS OF HIS OWN, PARTICULARLY WITH NAMIBIA, TO BE INTERESTED IN RHODESIA.

12. AT ONE POINT THE SECRETARY ASKED MUZOREWA ABOUT CHIKEREMA AND SITHOLE. MUZOREWA REPLIED, QUOTE CHIKEREMA IS FEATHERING HIS OWN NEST AND YOU KNOW ABOUT SITHOLE. UNQUOTE

13. THE SECRETARY ASKED MUZOREWA WHAT HE EXPECTED OUT OF THE COMMONWEALTH CONFERENCE IN LUSAKA. IN MUZOREWA'S VIEW THAT WILL DEPEND UPON WHAT THE UK AND US DO OR DON'T DO. THE SECRETARY EXPRESSED BELIEF THAT THE COMMONWEALTH WOULD RECOGNIZE THE REALITIES OF THE NEW SITUATION PROVIDED MUZOREWA WAS PREPARED TO MOVE. OTHERWISE HE SAID, THE OUTCOME WILL BE BAD FROM MUZOREWA'S POINT OF VIEW.

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LORD N G LENNOX  
MISS BROWN  
MR. THOMAS  
MR. WILLSON  
MR. WILLIAMS

ADDITIONAL DISTN.  
RHODESIA POLICY

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TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 1874 OF 11 JULY

INFO ROUTINE MIRIMBA SALISBURY.

RHODESIA

1. TODAY'S WASHINGTON POST CARRIES ARTICLE FROM LONDON BY LEONARD  
DOWIE AND JAY ROSS UNDER HEADING "THATCHER TO OFFER MUZOREWA  
PLAN" "SUGGESTS REFORMS IN ZIMBABWE-RHODESIA TO GAIN WORLD  
ACCEPTANCE"

2. TEXT AS FOLLOWS:

THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT TODAY SAID IT WILL PROPOSE A NEW PLAN FOR  
RESTORING ZIMBABWE-RHODESIA TO LEGALITY AND MAKING THE MULTIRACIAL  
GOVERNMENT OF PRIME MINISTER ABEL MUZOREWA ACCEPTABLE TO THE REST  
OF THE WORLD.

PRIME MINISTER MARGARET THATCHER'S FOREIGN SECRETARY, LORD  
CARRINGTON, ANNOUNCED THAT, AS A RESULT OF PRELIMINARY  
CONSULTATIONS WITH AFRICAN LEADERS, BRITAIN INTENDED "TO MAKE FIRM  
PROPOSALS OF OUR OWN TO BRING RHODESIA TO LEGAL INDEPENDENCE ON A  
BASIS WHICH WE BELIEVE SHOULD BE ACCEPTABLE TO THE INTERNATIONAL  
COMMUNITY."

THOSE PROPOSALS WOULD INCLUDE CHANGES IN MUZOREWA'S GOVERNMENT  
AND CONSTITUTION TO REDUCE THE POWER RESERVED FOR ZIMBABWE-RHODESIA'S  
3 PERCENT WHITE MINORITY, ACCORDING TO BRITISH GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS.  
THEY SAID THATCHER AND CARRINGTON WILL URGE MUZOREWA IN MEETINGS  
HERE LATER THIS WEEK TO SEEK CHANGES IN CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS  
PRESERVING WHITE CONTROL OVER THE MILITARY, POLICE, CIVIL SERVICE,  
JUDICIARY AND THE PROCESS FOR AMENDING THE CONSTITUTION.

LORD HARLECH, BRITAIN'S SPECIAL EMISSARY TO ZIMBABWE-RHODESIA'S  
BLACK AFRICAN NEIGHBORS AND NIGERIA, FOUND THAT SOME OF THEIR  
LEADERS MIGHT ACCEPT MUZOREWA'S GOVERNMENT IF SUFFICIENT CONSTITUT-  
IONAL CHANGES WERE MADE, ACCORDING TO ONE WELL-INFORMED BRITISH  
OFFICIAL. THE OFFICIAL WOULD NOT NAME THESE LEADERS.

"THEY DON'T RULE MUZOREWA OUT IF HE DEMONSTRATES THAT HE IS IN  
CHARGE AND MAKES THOSE CHANGES," THE OFFICIAL SAID. "SOME OF  
THEM ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THERE HAD TO BE SOME SPECIAL PROTECTION OF  
WHITES - AS THERE WAS WHEN THEY WERE GRANTED INDEPENDENCE FROM  
BRITAIN - BUT THEY FELT THE RHODESIAN CONSTITUTION JUST WENT TOO  
FAR."

OFFICIALS HERE SAY MUZOREWA APPARENTLY DOES NOT BELIEVE THAT HE

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Prime Minister

Senator Helms (or his staff)  
- have evidently given the  
press some briefing on your  
talks with him. But  
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CAN GET THE NECESSARY SUPPORT FROM WHITES TO MAKE THE CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGES. BUT THE OFFICIALS ADD THAT THE BRITISH FOREIGN OFFICE HAS RECEIVED AN INFORMAL REPORT THAT SOME INFLUENTIAL WHITES WERE READY TO AGREE TO CHANGES, SO LONG AS THEIR SECURITY WAS NOT COMPROMISED, AND WERE WAITING FOR MUZOREWA TO ASK THEM.

BRITISH OFFICIALS HAVE LITTLE HOPE THAT THE PLAN THEY DEVISE WILL BE ACCEPTABLE TO THE PATRIOTIC FRONT REBELS LED BY JOSHUA NKOMO AND ROBERT MUGABE, WHO ARE CONTINUING THEIR GUERRILLA WAR AGAINST MUZOREWA'S GOVERNMENT FROM BASES IN NEIGHBORING ZAMBIA AND MOZAMBIQUE. ONE SOURCE SAID BRITAIN'S GOAL WOULD BE TO WIN ENOUGH AFRICAN AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT FOR THE BRITISH PLAN TO ISOLATE THE REBELS AND FORCE THEIR DEFEAT OR REPATRIATION.

IT IS ALSO CLEAR THAT THATCHER'S CONSERVATIVE GOVERNMENT REMAINS COMMITTED TO MUZOREWA AS THE DEMOCRATICALLY ELECTED BLACK LEADER OF ZIMBABWE-RHODESIA AND DETERMINED TO FIND A WAY TO GIVE HIS GOVERNMENT LEGAL RECOGNITION.

THATCHER SAID IN A PRESS CONFERENCE IN AUSTRALIA LAST MONTH AND PRIVATELY IN A MEETING WITH U.S. SEN JESSE HELMS (R-N.C.) LAST WEEK THAT BRITAIN'S 13-YEAR OLD ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AGAINST ZIMBABWE-RHODESIA WILL BE ENDED WHEN THEY COME UP FOR RENEWAL IN BRITAIN'S CONSERVATIVE-CONTROLLED PARLIAMENT IN NOVEMBER.

SHE IS UNDER HEAVY PRESSURE FROM THE RIGHT WING OF HER PARTY IN BOTH THE HOUSE OF COMMONS AND HOUSE OF LORDS TO END SANCTIONS AND MOVE MORE QUICKLY TO GIVE MUZOREWA'S GOVERNMENT LEGAL RECOGNITION.

BUT HER COMMITMENT TO RESTORE ZIMBABWE-RHODESIA TO LEGALITY HAS BEEN PUBLICLY CRITICIZED BY MUCH OF BLACK AFRICA AND THE REST OF THE BRITISH COMMONWEALTH. THE ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY SUMMIT MEETING NEXT WEEK IN MONROVIA, LIBERIA, IS BOUND TO PRODUCE MORE CRITICISM.

THATCHER COULD FACE ADDITIONAL PROBLEMS WHEN THE COMMONWEALTH NATIONS MEET NEXT MONTH IN LUSAKA, ZAMBIA, THE BASE FOR NKOMO'S GUERRILLAS. LUSAKA HAS SUFFERED FREQUENT MILITARY ATTACKS FROM ZIMBABWE-RHODESIA.

THERE HAVE BEEN FEARS HERE THAT A CONFRONTATION OVER ZIMBABWE-RHODESIA AT THE CONFERENCE, WHICH BOTH THATCHER AND QUEEN ELIZABETH II WILL ATTEND, COULD LEAD TO THE BREAKUP OF THE COMMONWEALTH. BRITAIN'S ECONOMIC TIES WITH NIGERIA, ITS BIGGEST TRADING PARTNER, ALSO ARE THREATENED.

THATCHER TOLD HELMS, THE CHIEF SUPPORTER OF THE MUZOREWA GOVERNMENT IN THE U S SENATE, THAT SHE WAS AFRAID OF THE COMMONWEALTH

(MEETING,

MEETING, ACCORDING TO INFORMED SOURCES. SHE TOLD HELMS THAT SHE WANTED TO CONVINCENOUGH BLACK AFRICAN NATIONS TO SUPPORT THE BRITISH PLAN FOR RECOGNIZING ZIMBABWE-RHODESIA TO WIN OVER A MAJORITY OF THE COMMONWEALTH MEMBERS.

ALTHOUGH THE BRITISH PLAN WILL NOT BE COMPLETED AND ANNOUNCED UNTIL AFTER THE COMMONWEALTH MEETING, THATCHER WILL BE CONSULTING WITH THE OTHER HEADS OF GOVERNMENT IN LUSAKA ON ITS LIKELY CONTENTS. HER GOVERNMENT'S HOPE IS TO HAVE THE MOST ACCEPTABLE PLAN POSSIBLE READY BEFORE THE ECONOMIC SANCTIONS COME UP FOR RENEWAL IN PARLIAMENT HERE IN NOVEMBER.

IN HIS ANNOUNCEMENT TODAY OF BRITAIN'S INTENTIONS, CARRINGTON MADE NO MENTION OF THE UNITED STATES. THE PREVIOUS LABOR GOVERNMENT HERE AND THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION HAD JOINTLY DRAWN UP A SETTLEMENT PLAN FOR ZIMBABWE-RHODESIA THAT FAILED TO GAIN ACCEPTANCE. BRITISH GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS SAID THE UNITED STATES WOULD BE CONSULTED BUT THAT THE PLAN LIKELY WOULD BE SOLELY BRITISH.

U.S. OFFICIALS, ATTEMPTING TO FORESTALL ATTEMPTS BY CONSERVATIVES IN CONGRESS TO FORCE RECOGNITION OF THE MUZOREWA GOVERNMENT, HAVE EMPHASIZED IN RECENT MONTHS THAT THE PROBLEM IS BASICALLY A BRITISH ONE NOW AND THE NEXT MOVE WAS UP TO BRITAIN.

IN MAKING HIS ANNOUNCEMENT IN A SPEECH IN THE HOUSE OF LORDS HERE TODAY, CARRINGTON NOTED THAT BRITAIN DID NOT SHARE THE "DISPOSITION IN SOME SECTIONS OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY TO SEEK TO IGNORE THE CHANGES WHICH HAVE TAKEN PLACE IN RHODESIA TO ARGUE THAT BISHOP MUZOREWA SHOULD BE TREATED IN THE SAME WAY AS THE PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT OF IAN SMITH."

BUT CARRINGTON SAID THAT LORD HARLECH, IN HIS CONSULTATIONS WITH GOVERNMENT LEADERS IN NIGERIA, ZAMBIA, TANZANIA, BOTSWANA, MALAWI, ANGOLA AND MOZAMBIQUE, "FOUND IN AFRICA ENCOURAGING RECOGNITION THAT MAJOR CHANGES HAD TAKEN PLACE "IN ZIMBABWE-RHODESIA WITH THE ELECTION BY BLACK AND WHITE VOTERS OF A MULTI-RACIAL GOVERNMENT.

HE SAID THEY ALSO MADE CLEAR, TO HARLECH THEIR CRITICISMS OF THE NEW RHODESIAN CONSTITUTION AND THEIR "RECOGNITION AND INDEED EVEN A DEMAND THAT A SOLUTION MUST SPRING FROM BRITAIN, AS THE LEGALLY RESPONSIBLE AUTHORITY" FOR ITS FORMER COLONY.

CARRINGTON SAID HARLECH ALSO MET WITH REPRESENTATIVES OF THE PATRIOTIC FRONT AND COMMUNICATED "THE VIEW AND ATTITUDES" OF THE AFRICAN PRESIDENTS AND THE PATRIOTIC FRONT TO MUZOREWA. HE ALSO CONVEYED BRITAIN'S "CONVICTION THAT THE PRESENT SITUATION GIVES US THE OPPORTUNITY TO WORK WITH HIM FOR A LASTING AND GENERALLY ACCEPTABLE SETTLEMENT," CARRINGTON SAID.

(CARRINGTON)

CARRINGTON SAID HE BELIEVED THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT, THROUGH ITS NEW CONTACTS WITH THE MUZOREWA GOVERNMENT, IS NOW "IN A BETTER POSITION TO INFLUENCE EVENTS IN RHODESIA THAN AT ANY TIME" SINCE IAN SMITH DECLARED WHITE-RUN RHODESIA'S UNILATERAL INDEPENDENCE IN 1965 AND WAS OUTLAWED BY BRITAIN AND THE WORLD.

MANY OBSERVERS FEEL THAT MUZOREWA'S CHANCES TO MAINTAIN POWER ARE DECREASING MARKEDLY AS THE GUERRILLA WAR CONTINUES AND HE FAILS TO GAIN RECOGNITION. LAST MONTH, MUZOREWA LOST HIS ABSOLUTE MAJORITY IN THE RHODESIAN PARLIAMENT WITH THE DEFECTION OF AN EIGHT-MEMBER BLOC LED BY JAMES CHIKEREMA.

WHITE EMIGRATION, WHICH HAD SLOWED EARLIER THIS YEAR, HAS INCREASED AGAIN TO ABOUT 1,400 A MONTH. SINCE WHITES FORM THE BACK BONE OF THE MILITARY AND POLICE FORCES, A CONTINUING EXODUS COULD DOOM MUZOREWA NO MATTER WHAT THATCHER DOES.

ANOTHER POTENTIALLY CRUCIAL TEST WILL COME NEXT MONTH WHEN THE SPRING PLANTING SEASON BEGINS. THERE IS GROWING CONCERN THAT MANY WHITE FARMERS WILL CUT BACK OR STOP PLANTING BECAUSE OF FEARS FOR THEIR SAFETY, WHICH WOULD BE ANOTHER BAD BLOW TO THE ALREADY WEAKENED ECONOMY.

ROBINSON

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TELNO 396 OF 11 JULY

INFO ROUTINE PRETORIA MAPUTO LUSAKA DAR ES SALAAM LUANDA GABORONE  
WASHINGTON AND UKMIS NEW YORK

Prime Minister

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ZAPU

1. CIPHAS MSIPA, A LEADING ZAPU MEMBER RECENTLY RELEASED FROM DETENTION, CALLED ON ME LAST NIGHT. HE HAD JUST RETURNED FROM A VISIT TO LUSAKA FOR CONVERSATIONS WITH NKOMO.

2. MSIPA SAID THAT THE PURPOSE OF HIS VISIT TO LUSAKA WAS TO ESTABLISH WHETHER HE AND NKOMO WERE STILL THINKING ON THE SAME LINES. MSIPA SAID THAT PRESS REPORTS OF NKOMO'S LATEST THINKING HAD LEFT HIM CONFUSED. HE WAS REASSURED BY HIS VISIT.

3. HE HAD TACKLED NKOMO ABOUT AN ALL-PARTY CONFERENCE, TO WHICH MSIPA STILL ATTACHED IMPORTANCE. NKOMO HAD INDICATED THAT HE WOULD BE READY TO ATTEND A CONFERENCE CALLED BY HMG. AS REGARDS RELATIONS WITH MUZOREWA, MSIPA FOUND NKOMO BITTER. THE BISHOP WAS PERSISTING WITH THE SMITH POLICY OF ATTACKS INTO ZAMBIA AND MOZAMBIQUE. HE APPEARED TO HAVE GONE OVER TO THE ENEMY AND HAD THUS BECOME A TRAITOR. HE WAS ALSO TAKING ADVANTAGE OF THE PROLONGED SACRIFICES OF OTHERS IN ASSUMING POWER IN RHODESIA. I ENQUIRED WHETHER MSIPA SAW ANY PROSPECT OF A RECONCILIATION BETWEEN MUZOREWA AND NKOMO. HE THOUGHT THIS WOULD BE DIFFICULT, BUT CONSIDERED IT IMPORTANT THAT AN ATTEMPT BE MADE.

4. MSIPA THOUGHT THAT TWO WAYS IN WHICH MUZOREWA COULD ENHANCE HIS CREDABILITY IN AFRICAN NATIONALIST CIRCLES WOULD BE TO STOP THE ATTACKS ON ADJOINING COUNTRIES AND LIFT THE BAN INSIDE RHODESIA ON ZAPU AND ZANU. I ASKED WHETHER SUCH GESTURES WOULD BE RECIPROCATED BY THE EXTERNAL LEADERS I E A DE-ESCALATION OF THE WAR. MSIPA DID NOT THINK THAT THIS WOULD BE LIKELY IN THE SHORT TERM.

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5. AS TO THE FUTURE MSIPA, AND MORE FORCEFULLY HIS COLLEAGUE, PHILIP CHIPHUDLHA, LOOKED FOR AN INITIATIVE FROM HMG TO BRING TOGETHER THE VARIOUS AFRICAN NATIONALIST LEADERS FOR DISCUSSIONS. THE PEOPLE WANTED PEACE ABOVE ALL ELSE. THEY ARGUED THAT FAIR PROPOSALS, NOT LOADED IN FAVOUR OF ANY PARTY, SHOULD BE BUT FORWARD BY HMG. IF THESE WERE REJECTED BY ANY SINGLE PARTY, WE SHOULD GO AHEAD WITH THOSE STILL READY TO COOPERATE. THEY STRESSED THE NEED FOR HMG TO ACT IMPARTIALLY AND NOT TO GIVE THE APPEARANCE OF HAVING DECIDED, IN ADVANCE, TO BACK MUZOREWA AGAINST THE REST. I POINTED OUT THAT WE COULD NOT IGNORE THE POLITICAL REALITY WITHIN RHODESIA AND THE CONSIDERABLE ELECTORAL SUPPORT WON BY THE BISHOP.

6. CHIPHADLHA ARGUED THAT INVITATIONS TO A CONFERENCE SHOULD BE SENT OUT TO MUZOREWA, NKOMO AND MUGABE, AS THE THREE PRINCIPAL ACTORS LEFT ON THE STAGE. HE FEARED THAT THE INCLUSION OF SITHOLE, CHIKEREMA, NDIWENI ETC WOULD PREVENT REAL PROGRESS. MSIPA WAS MORE OPEN-MINDED. HE SAW THE ATTRACTION OF A SMALLER CONFERENCE, BUT SAW DIFFICULTY OVER THE EXCLUSION OF, E G, SITHOLE.

7. THE PURPOSE OF MSIPA'S CALL WAS, I BELIEVE, TO INDICATE HIS STRONG SUPPORT FOR A FURTHER ATTEMPT BY HMG TO BRING MUZOREWA TOGETHER WITH THE PATRIOTIC FRONT LEADERS AND TO URGE US, IN THE INTERESTS OF SECURING A SETTLEMENT WHICH WILL HOLD OUT THE PROSPECT OF PEACE, NOT TO GIVE EXCLUSIVE BACKING TO THE BISHOP AT THIS STAGE. MSIPA HOPES TO TALK TO THE BISHOP WHEN HE RETURNS. HE ALREADY HAS ACCESS TO THE GOVERNMENT THROUGH A CLOSE RELATIONSHIP WITH THE MINISTER OF LAW AND ORDER, ZINDOGA.

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SIR A DUFF  
SIR A PARSONS  
LORD N G LENNOX  
MISS BROWN  
MR. THOMAS  
MR. WILLSON  
MR. WILLIAMS

ADDITIONAL DISTN.  
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
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RHODESIA: MOVES TO ARREST BISHOP MUZOREWA

1. The "Guardian" reports this morning that the Anti-Apartheid Movement may try to obtain the arrest of Bishop Muzorewa on charges of treason, felony and murder.
2. According to Section 3 of the British Nationality Act, no British subject who is not a UK citizen is liable to criminal proceedings by virtue of anything done in Rhodesia, unless he would be so liable if he were an alien in respect of an act done in a foreign country. That means that a Rhodesian who is not also a citizen of the UK and colonies is not criminally liable in the UK for something done in Rhodesia unless, say, a Frenchman would be criminally liable here in respect of a similar act committed in France. There are in practice very few acts committed elsewhere for which aliens would be criminally liable in this country: one example might be conspiracy to commit a criminal act in the UK. The charges which the AAM may attempt to bring do not appear to fall into this category.
3. Any question in the House about what the Lord Privy Seal intends to do should be countered by: "That is a question for my Rt Hon and Learned Friend, the Attorney General". Any purely factual enquiry about the possibility of Bishop Muzorewa's arrest could be countered by "It will be for the Magistrate to decide. He will no doubt take into account all relevant considerations including Section 3 of the British Nationality Act".
4. Legal Advisers agree.

11 July 1979



Miss R J Spencer  
Rhodesia Department

cc: Parliamentary Unit ✓  
News Department  
Mr Fifoot, Legal Advisers  
Mr Renwick





*Original  
in G/R*

*JS  
cc fco  
Press Office*

10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

11 July 1979

*Dear Ian*

Thank you for your letter of 26 June about Rhodesia.

I hope that you will not under-estimate the urgency or the determination with which the Government are proceeding in our attempts to achieve a solution. If we are to help Rhodesia to the extent we wish, it is essential to carry with us as much as possible of the international community. It has been necessary to consult our friends and allies; and David Harlech, as you know, has been carrying out consultations in Africa. As Peter Carrington made clear in the debate yesterday in the House of Lords, when we have completed our consultations we shall be making proposals to bring Rhodesia to legal independence with the widest possible international acceptance.

*Yours etc*

*Harlech*

Ian Lloyd, Esq., MP.

*lw*

T 41A (79T)

T Munge - Tel 576 Dar es Salaam 11.7.79

THE STATE HOUSE,  
DAR ES SALAAM,  
TANZANIA.

10th July, 1979.

Rt. Hon. Mrs. Margareth Thatcher,  
The Prime Minister,  
10 Downing Street,  
London, S.W.1.

Dear Mrs. Thatcher,

You will by now have received from the British High Commissioner to Tanzania a report about my expression of concern over Britain's Rhodesia policy after I had listened to press reports of your own remarks in Australia.

I have nevertheless decided to write to you because I am very anxious that there should be no misunderstanding between us on a matter which is so very important to my country and to Africa generally. It is my desire, and the desire of my government, to cooperate with the British Government in bringing an end to the war in Rhodesia as rapidly as possible in the only way this can be done - that is, by the achievement of a real transfer of power to the majority by peaceful means.

As I explained to Lord Harlech, we accept that there is a new reality in Rhodesia now that Bishop Muzorewa has been made Prime Minister. To the uninitiated and only casually interested member of the public it may now (as distinct from before) appear that majority rule has been attained. But neither the Tanzanian nor the British Government is so ignorant. We both know that the constitution under which Bishop Muzorewa sits in his Prime Ministerial office is not one which could be accepted by any democrat as involving a real transfer of power from the minority to the majority. Before there can be any hope of a negotiated peace in that country, therefore, major constitutional changes will have to be introduced and genuine internationally supervised elections will have to be accepted by all parties to the conflict.

I had not been anticipating any major difference between Britain and Tanzania on this point. I fully realise that your Government gives a high priority to 'bringing Rhodesia to legal independence under conditions of the widest possible international recognition'. But Rhodesia is a matter of

.../2

high priority for Tanzania also, and there does not seem to me to be any automatic conflict between your objective and Africa's determination on majority rule before independence. I had therefore been hoping that, after the consultations which your Government has been holding with African states and the United States of America, Britain would be coming to the Commonwealth Conference with the kind of draft constitution for Rhodesia which would be generally recognised by all members as giving genuine majority rule to Rhodesia. There is certainly no reason why such a constitution should not include some provisions designed to assuage reasonable fears of the White and Asian minority citizens about their future security.

I had anticipated further that there would be no great difficulty about reaching agreement at the Commonwealth on such a Proposed constitution; Britain has great experience and certainly understands the inconsistency of majority rule and many major provisions in the existing Salisbury constitution. It would subsequently be the work of Britain and her friends to get these proposals accepted in Salisbury, and of African states to use their influence to the same end on the Patriotic Front.

Yet it is quite obvious that a British announcement that it intends to lift sanctions come what may, is quite incompatible with any hopes of getting an end to the war through an agreed solution. Salisbury would know that it simply has to be obstinate until November, when it would get what it wants and needs. The Patriotic Front would regard Britain as having declared itself to be a supporter of Ian Smith and Bishop Muzorewa, and would disregard any suggestions it made. Zambia and Mozambique - and also Tanzania - would naturally draw the conclusion that Britain is unconcerned about Rhodesian attacks on those independent countries and indeed is willing to increase the power of Rhodesia to carry out such attacks.

I do understand the political problem which will face your Government if, in November, you have come to the conclusion that sanctions cannot yet be lifted. But your Government has a majority in the British Parliament, and on this issue you would have Labour Party support. A failure to renew sanctions could only result from a deliberate decision on the part of your Government. Your position is in this respect different from that of President Carter, who has nonetheless made clear

the intention of his Administration to fight for the power to abide by his country's international obligations in the interests of peace. For it is of course a fact that although Britain initiated the proposal at the United Nations, sanctions against Rhodesia are now a United Nations matter and under international law can only be withdrawn by the decision of the United Nations. A decision by your Government to lift sanctions can only be a deliberate and unnecessary defiance of world opinion generally and Africa in particular.


I have explained to your High Commissioner that I do not understand the distinction you were reported as making in Australia between recognition of Rhodesia - which I understand you said might come later - and the lifting of sanctions. If there is an academic distinction to be made at all - and it is only academic - it would seem to me to imply a possibility of recognising Rhodesia but continuing sanctions, and not the other way round. For sanctions were imposed as a mark of the international unacceptability of minority rule in Rhodesia, combined with Britain's incapacity or unwillingness to carry out alone its legal responsibility to institute change in that colony. The present Rhodesian constitution has not changed the world's judgement, for it is generally recognised by those interested as merely putting a black front to what is basically the same power situation.

Madam Prime Minister: I would like to repeat what I said at the beginning of this letter. It is the earnest desire of my Government to maintain and indeed to strengthen the friendship and cooperation between our two countries. The terrible war in Rhodesia needs to be brought to an end as quickly as possible. It has already caused too much suffering.

I very much hope that it is the intention of your Government to seek to cooperate with Africa to this end, and that the reports of your words in Australia gave a false impression. If so I can only apologise for writing this letter, and assure you that there will be no lack of response from Tanzania. And indeed I close this over-long letter with some confidence; for I cannot believe that Britain wishes to defy Africa and the world in the interests only of supporting a constitution in Rhodesia which entrenches racialist privilege behind the camouflage of a superficially democratic veneer.

I send my personal good wishes to you.

Yours sincerely,

  
Julius K. Nyerere

Rhodesia

STATEMENT ON RHODESIA BY THE RIGHT HON SIR  
IAN GILMOUR MP, LORD PRIVY SEAL, IN THE  
HOUSE OF COMMONS ON TUESDAY 10 JULY 1979

With your permission, Mr Speaker, I shall make a statement about the Government's policy on Rhodesia. As the House is aware, it is the Government's objective to build on the substantial progress made in Rhodesia in order to bring that country to legal independence with wide international acceptance and to enable Rhodesia to live at peace with its neighbours.

My right hon and noble Friend, Lord Harlech, agreed to carry out consultations with other Governments on the best way to achieve this objective. He has held discussions with the Presidents of Zambia, Tanzania, Botswana, Malawi and Angola; with the Mozambique Government and with the Federal Military Government in Nigeria. He also met representatives of the two wings of the Patriotic Front. My hon Friend, Mr Luce, has held discussions with the President of the Organisation of African Unity and with other African governments. Lord Harlech explained the Government's view that there has been a fundamental change in Rhodesia. He found an encouraging recognition that major changes had taken place, though there was criticism of the Constitution. It was put to him that a solution must stem from the British Government, as the legally responsible authority, and that an attempt should be made to bring the war to an end.

/Lord Harlech



Lord Harlech saw Bishop Muzorewa and his senior colleagues in Salisbury last week. He explained the views expressed to him elsewhere in Africa and assured Bishop Muzorewa of our intention to work with him, as with others, for a settlement.

Later this week my right hon Friend the Prime Minister and my right hon and noble Friend the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary will be continuing these discussions with Bishop Muzorewa in London.

We have also been in touch with our partners in Europe, with the United States Government, and with other Commonwealth and African Governments. The Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting in Lusaka in August will have an important place in our further consultations.

The Government intend to carry out their constitutional responsibility to bring Rhodesia to legal independence in accordance with the wishes of the people of that country. When our consultations have been completed, we shall make proposals designed to bring Rhodesia to legal independence on a basis which we believe should be acceptable to the international community.

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FM WASHINGTON 102152Z JULY  
TO IMMEDIATE FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1865 OF 10 JULY 1979  
INFO MIRIMBA SALISBURY.

Prime Minister

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RHODESIA.

1. UNDER THE HEADLINE QUOTE THATCHER MAKES A U-TURN ON RECOGNIZING RHODESIA UNQUOTE, TODAY'S WASHINGTON STAR CARRIES A FRONT PAGE REPORT BY FRANK MELVILLE OF TIME-LIFE (FULL TEXT BY BAG).

2. THE ARTICLE CLAIMS THAT FOLLOWING THE VISITS TO AFRICA BY LORD HARLECH, THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT NOW ACCEPTS THAT IT CANNOT AFFORD TO BE ISOLATED IN ITS POLICY TOWARDS RHODESIA. HMG IS THEREFORE DEMANDING QUOTE FAR-REACHING CHANGES UNQUOTE IN THE RHODESIAN CONSTITUTION WHICH WILL WIN THE SUPPORT OF AFRICAN GOVERNMENTS BEFORE BRITAIN GRANTS RECOGNITION TO MUZOREWA'S GOVERNMENT. IAN SMITH'S RESIGNATION IS ALSO DESCRIBED AS BEING A QUID PRO QUO FOR U K RECOGNITION.

3. THE ARTICLE ASSERTS THAT THIS REPRESENTS A MAJOR REVERSAL OF POLICY. IN REPLY TO QUESTIONS, WE PROPOSE TO REFER TO YOUR 3 JULY PRESS CONFERENCE (BAGHDAD TELNO 226 TO F C O) AND TO CONFIRM THAT IT HAS BEEN AND REMAINS HMG'S POLICY TO BRING RHODESIA TO LEGALITY WITH THE WIDEST POSSIBLE INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT.

ROBINSON

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PS/MR. HURD  
PS/PUS  
SIR A DUFF  
SIR A PARSONS  
LORD N G LENNOX  
MISS BROWN  
MR. THOMAS  
MR. WILLSON  
MR. WILLIAMS

ADDITIONAL DISTN.  
RHODESIA POLICY

JOHN HUTCHINSON  
PROFESSOR OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS  
GRADUATE SCHOOL OF MANAGEMENT  
UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA AT LOS ANGELES  
LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA 90024

July 9, 1979

TEL: (213) 825-3134 OFFICE  
(213) 825-2503 OFFICE  
(213) 476-2527 RESIDENCE

The Rt. Hon. Margaret Thatcher, M.P.  
House of Commons  
London SW1  
ENGLAND

Dear Prime Minister:

I have been conducting a correspondence about Zimbabwe Rhodesia with Frederick O'Neal, the black president of the Actors and Artistes, the parent theatrical union in the United States. O'Neal is also a vice president of the AFL-CIO and responsible for its activities in Africa, and a prominent figure in the American black community -- I suppose he rates as the leading black trade unionist.

I have attached a copy of my last letter. At his initiative the correspondence is going to President Carter and leading members of the black and trade union communities. This letter to you will not.

The issue is free trade unionism in Zimbabwe Rhodesia. My view is that if we encourage and help it we could make an enormous difference to the development of free institutions and stable government there -- through direct political effect in Zimbabwe Rhodesia and indirect exemplary effect overseas.

There are legitimate black and white (and racially mixed) trade unions in Zimbabwe Rhodesia. I attended the opening merger talks in Salisbury last October, and have only this week heard that unity among all unions regardless of race is close to consummation.

They need help, but receive no encouragement or assistance of consequence from abroad. Despite their unquestionable bona fides they are ignored by the TUC, by the AFL-CIO (except for an exploratory visit last year) and by the rest of the international free trade union movement.

Let me suggest that you assign somebody to prepare proposals for the encouragement of free trade unionism in Zimbabwe Rhodesia.

Those proposals could embrace:

1. a declaration on the contribution of legitimate trade unions (the word legitimate is used in the United States to distinguish free trade unions from the Soviet state labor organizations or from company-dominated unions) to freedom and stability in the developing countries.

July 9, 1979


2. the appointment of a standing trade union mission in Salisbury.
3. the conducting of trade union education programmes in Zimbabwe Rhodesia.
4. assistance to the Salisbury Government in developing proposals for apprenticeship and other job training. (I have already met with the government officer responsible for such activity in Salisbury and he would greatly welcome such help.)
5. the sponsorship of fraternal trade union visits between the United Kingdom and Zimbabwe Rhodesia.
6. the awarding of trade union scholarships to union officers and members -- the scholarships tenable at both home and abroad.

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I think such action would have a salutary effect, putting both the TUC and the AFL-CIO on their mettle. It would be useful to involve the Conservative Trade Unionists (who would gain in appeal on grounds of both political nonpartisanship and the traditional appeal of other words if they were called the Free Trade Unionists), causing both the TUC and the AFL-CIO to look to their flanks and laurels. It could help to stabilize and legitimize Zimbabwe Rhodesia. It would also stake out a claim by British Conservatives as the guardians of free trade unionism. Not a bad day's work.

Congratulations on your statement in Australia about sanctions and eventual recognition. It lit up the dark corridors here.

Yours very sincerely,



P.S. It might be well to emphasize that the term "free trade unionism" is one of great historical importance in the international labor movement, not least in the United States. It was conceived as and is meant to be the antithesis of Communist labor systems.

JH:bs

cc: Lord Carrington  
James Prior, MP  
John Bowis, CTU

JOHN HUTCHINSON  
PROFESSOR OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS  
GRADUATE SCHOOL OF MANAGEMENT  
UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA AT LOS ANGELES  
LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA 90024

July 9, 1979

TEL: (213) 825-3134 OFFICE  
(213) 825-2503 OFFICE  
(213) 476-2527 RESIDENCE

Mr. Frederick O'Neal, President  
Associated Actors and Artistes of America, AFL-CIO  
1500 Broadway  
New York, New York 10036

Dear Mr. O'Neal:

Thank you for your letter of June 29. I appreciate your interest, and would enjoy our correspondence were it not for the tragedy that underlies it.

Let me respond to some of your points:

1. You note that the blacks in Zimbabwe Rhodesia did not vote in the referendum. That is true, but the quite genuine purpose behind the white-only referendum was to show beyond doubt that the white minority accepted majority rule. A low turnout in the general election would have been one means of showing general displeasure at the Constitution, but as you know, the turnout was some 64 percent -- or more than three times what it was in President Carter's Georgia last time around.

Meanwhile it would be interesting to tabulate the emerging states which had referenda on their constitutions. The United States of course did not, and I suspect very few African and Asian ex-colonies did. Why the fuss about Zimbabwe Rhodesia? Why the special standard?

2. You dispute my contention that the decision makers in Rhodesia are black. There are of course several white ministers in the Cabinet, but they are in a minority, and do not include the Prime Minister. The army and civil service have white senior staff, but it is transitional, and under a black government anyway.

What is it you object to? The presence of white faces? Must every face be black? The black leaders of Zimbabwe Rhodesia want non-racial government. Don't you?

3. You dispute my view that the American liberal and left community, black and white, is not interested in constitutional government for Africa.

I don't know what you would use for evidence. I am as opposed as you are to the use of constitutional forms as a cloak for racism, in South Africa as you charge or elsewhere, but where are the American black critics of African autocracy?

July 9, 1979

Indeed I think there is something afoot perhaps more sinister than indifference to constitutional freedom.

There is a spirit of retribution at work, a determination among the black and white liberals of America that moderate blacks and whites in Africa shall suffer for colonial sins, that salvation shall be theatrical in style and monochrome in color, that there shall be black power rather than non-racial freedom, and that blood and tyranny are acceptable costs.

I think Ndabaningi Sithole was right last Spring when he suggested that an African coup in Rhodesia would have pleased the American liberal left. I suspect that if the Patriotic Front, flanked by the Cubans and the East Germans and other proconsuls of the enemy, had marched on Salisbury and massacred a few thousand moderates we would have erupted in hosannas and recognized overnight.

I don't think that the American liberal community, under its present black and white leadership, is simply indifferent to constitutional government for Africa. I think it is contemptuous of the Africa capacity for constitutional government. I think it is an enemy of African freedom.

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I suppose we could trade prejudices forever, but I hope we can agree on free trade unionism.

I am greatly familiar with the work of the AFL-CIO in the field, and have in fact spent a good part of my working life in it. It is precisely because I believe that the record of the AFL-CIO in free trade unionism is distinctive and without even faint comparison, precisely because there is almost nowhere else for new and struggling labor movements to turn but to the AFL-CIO, that I believe it is such a tragedy that we are doing nothing -- nothing -- for free trade unionists in Zimbabwe Rhodesia.

Where would they turn?

To the ICFTU? The ICFTU has had a token and generally useless presence in Salisbury for years, and has no intention of helping.

To the British TUC? That organization, with which I have had some association since boyhood, is far more interested in bedding with the strumpet labor organizations of Eastern Europe.

To the Western Europeans and the Scandinavians? They are more parasitical than President Carter, whose support for lasting sanctions you applaud.

You will recall that last year the AFL-CIO sent a team under Vice President Martin Ward to examine and report on the prospects of legitimate trade unionism in Zimbabwe Rhodesia. I have this past week received a letter from one of the chief negotiators in Salisbury for the coming merger of black and

July 9, 1979

white trade unions there. He says inter alia:

"We have in fact accomplished what the AFL-CIO delegation urged upon us on their visit in May, 1978, and at this moment we need the greatest encouragement possible to accomplish our aims and objects. This could be done by the AFL-CIO accepting us as the recognized body for labour in this part of the world, and assist us in getting sanctions lifted as soon as possible, so that we can create more employment for our people by expanding commerce and industry. I don't have to remind you that we would not be doing any good by having a massive, united organization representative of unemployed workmen!

Unfortunately it has been brought to my attention that money is being made available from outside the country to create unrest in industry by faceless and nameless people who are working under the guise of trade unions. To me, that is a warning shot being fired of communist inspired attempts to destroy the unity and merger of the three major labour union organizations of the country, for they see in us a well laid foundation for a democratic, free trade union labour movement. Should we not receive support at this vital moment....?

I am enclosing a couple of press cuttings that will give you an idea of what is taking place....I would request that, if at all possible, you contact the AFL-CIO, asking them to at least confirm receipt of my letter, even if they do not answer the queries raised therein, as in the past, for it is a bit soul-destroying to send correspondence and not even receive the courtesy and dignity of an acknowledgement!"

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I believe with you that a further (but I think final) effort should be made to reach an agreement between the Salisbury Government and the Patriotic Front, but it should not be at the cost of constitutional government and free trade unionism. The signs are clear enough. Joshua Nkomo's armed forces are probably now under the effective control of East Germans. Robert Mugabe is committed to a Marxist one-party state and thus the elimination of legitimate trade unionism. Which side are we on?

I believe that Zimbabwe Rhodesia offers the best prospect in African history for democratic self-determination and enduring constitutional government. But even if the Internal Agreement and the Constitution and the election were the frauds you say they are, what argument is that for turning our backs on legitimate trade unionism?

I do not understand at all the argument that we should wait until Zimbabwe Rhodesia has a constitution and government of which we approve. It is arrogant and useless. What if the West boycotts Zimbabwe Rhodesia into disintegration? What if sanctions destroy the ability of Zimbabwe Rhodesia to meet the conditions we ourselves impose? What if the Cubans and East

July 9, 1979

Germans escort the Patriotic Front -- prior to the inevitable bloody contest for power between Nkomo and Mugabe -- to Salisbury? What will you do? Deplore? Bemoan? Pass a resolution? What about free labor then?

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Let me repeat a previous suggestion.

Organize a free trade union mission to Zimbabwe Rhodesia. Give your brethren the palm of your hand rather than the back of it. Ask what you can do for them, not tell them what they must do to please the lethal liberals of Manhattan.


I would be glad to help you. I will be in Salisbury in August and would gladly meet you there and introduce you to those who need your fraternity. I would gladly work with you there and in London and Washington to develop proposals and projects for free trade union activity in a constitutional Zimbabwe Rhodesia. Let me help you.

It seems to me we have a simple choice. We either help the free trade unionists in a difficult and most dangerous circumstance, or we stand aside and leave them to their enemies.

You know what Adlai Stevenson said about Eleanor Roosevelt. "She would rather light a candle than curse the darkness."

You could light a lamp for free labor in Zimbabwe Rhodesia. Who will, if you and your brothers do not? Isaiah 41, 6.

Fraternally,



JH:bs

cc: President Jimmy Carter  
Secretary Cyrus Vance  
Secretary Ray Marshall  
George Meany, AFL-CIO  
Lane Kirkland, AFL-CIO  
Members of the Executive Council, AFL-CIO  
Vernon Jordan, National Urban League  
Benjamin Hooks, NAACP  
Jesse Jackson, PUSH  
Ernest Lee, AFL-CIO  
Fred Hoehler, AFL-CIO  
Patrick O'Farrell, AALC  
George Houser, American Committee on Africa  
Douglas Fraser, UAW  
Dorothy Height, NCNW



# Trade unionists in talks on merger

Herald Correspondent  
BULAWAYO.

TWO Bulawayo trade unionists attending current negotiations to merge three national groupings of trade unions, Mr Imineas Sithole and Mr Brian Holleran, said yesterday they are impressed by the goodwill between the negotiators.

Mr Sithole, president of the African Trades Union, said: "I feel that the era of working together as a united labour movement has already started. What remains to be done is just the administrative work to bring the new umbrella organisation into operation."

## PROGRESS

Mr Holleran, general secretary of the Trades Union Congress, said: "From our side we are very pleased indeed with the progress being made and the spirit of goodwill and co-operation being shown."

"We have made a great deal of progress towards drafting a new constitution. We still have to find a suitable name for the new organisation."

The organisations negotiating the merger are the ATUC, the TUC and the ZFL (Zimbabwe Federation of Labour).

The next meeting will be on June 30 and July 1, in the Jameson Hotel, Salisbury.

Once the constitution is in draft form it will be submitted to the general

councils of the three organisations for comment, possible amendment, and acceptance.

"The long-term objective is one organisation incorporating all trade unions in the country," Mr Holleran said.

At the meeting in Salisbury last weekend, were Mr Howard Bloomfield, president of the TUC; Mr

Holleran, general secretary; Mr Sithole, president of the ATUC; Mr Moses Derah, general secretary, ATUC; Mr Elsiego Soko, deputy president, ATUC; Mr Ephraim Tsvaringo, president, ZFL; Mr Abisnai Kupfuma, general secretary, ZFL; and an observer from the Commercial Workers' Union.

The Herald, Thursday June 21 1979

## MERGER PROGRESS

THE final draft of a constitution for a new organisation representing nearly 50 trade unions and between 300 000 and 400 000 employees throughout the country is likely to be prepared at a meeting on July 1 of the three national bodies representing unions.

A meeting of the presidents and senior officials of the Zimbabwe Federation of Labour, the African Trade Union Congress and the Trades Union Congress of Rhodesia in Salisbury at the week-end made considerable progress towards a final draft constitution.

"Only a few items are outstanding, and these should be decided at our next meeting scheduled for July 1," said Mr Howard Bloomfield, president of the TUC.

The draft will then be presented to the executive councils of the three national bodies.

It is hoped that the new organisation will be set up before the end of the year.

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FROM F C O 091855Z JULY  
TO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 814 OF 9 JULY 1979.

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RHODESIA:

1. FOLLOWING ARE THE TEXTS OF TWO MESSAGES SENT BY THE PRIME MINISTER TO PRESIDENT CARTER ON 7 JULY.

BEGINS

DEAR MR PRESIDENT,

THANK YOU FOR TELEPHONING ME ABOUT THE DISCUSSIONS WHICH YOU WILL BE HAVING WITH BISHOP MUZOREWA IN WASHINGTON. I UNDERTOOK TO LET YOU HAVE OUR IMPRESSIONS OF DAVID HARLECH'S CONSULTATIONS IN AFRICA WITH BISHOP MUZOREWA. THESE FOLLOW THIS MESSAGE.

IN YOUR TALKS WITH BISHOP MUZOREWA, IT WOULD HELP US IF YOU WOULD IMPRESS ON HIM THE NEED TO WORK CLOSELY WITH US TO ENABLE US TO FULFIL OUR CONSTITUTIONAL RESPONSIBILITY. I THINK IT IS IMPORTANT THAT BISHOP MUZOREWA SHOULD BE MADE TO FEEL THAT WE DO REALISE THE FULL EXTENT OF THE PROGRESS WHICH HAS BEEN MADE. IT IS OUR CONCERN TO BRING RHODESIA TO INDEPENDENCE IN CONDITIONS WHICH OFFER THE PROSPECT OF A MORE SECURE AND STABLE FUTURE. TO THAT END WE MUST WORK TO SECURE THE WIDEST POSSIBLE INTERNATIONAL ACCEPTANCE. BUT WE NEED HIS TRUST AND UNDERSTANDING AND HELP IF WE ARE TO BE SUCCESSFUL.

PETER CARRINGTON AND I WILL BE HOLDING TALKS WITH BISHOP MUZOREWA IN LONDON ON 13 JULY. IT WOULD BE VERY HELPFUL TO US TO HAVE AN ACCOUNT OF YOUR DISCUSSIONS WITH HIM. WE SHALL WISH TO KEEP IN THE CLOSEST TOUCH WITH YOU AS WE SEE THE WAY AHEAD.

WITH BEST WISHES, MARGARET THATCHER.

DEAR MR PRESIDENT,

LORD HARLECH'S CONSULTATIONS.

1. THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT'S OBJECTIVE IS TO BUILD ON THE PROGRESS WHICH HAS BEEN ACHIEVED IN RHODESIA TO BRING THE TERRITORY TO LEGAL INDEPENDENCE WITH THE WIDEST POSSIBLE INTERNATIONAL RECOGNITION.

2. WE HAVE NOT YET COMPLETED THE POLITICAL CONSULTATIONS WHICH WE HOPE WILL HELP TO INDICATE HOW BEST WE CAN ACHIEVE THIS OBJECTIVE. THE DISCUSSIONS WHICH LORD HARLECH HAS HAD WITH AFRICAN LEADERS SO FAR HAVE SUGGESTED THAT:

- (A) THERE IS A DISPOSITION IN AFRICA TO ACCEPT THAT THE ELECTIONS IN RHODESIA HAVE CREATED A NEW REALITY AND THAT THE NEW GOVERNMENT HAS CONSIDERABLE POPULAR SUPPORT. FEW DISPUTE THE NEED FOR SPECIAL MEASURES TO REASSURE THE WHITE MINORITY IN RHODESIA OR THE PRINCIPLE OF SOME SPECIAL REPRESENTATION FOR WHITES IN PARLIAMENT;
- (B) THERE IS A GENERAL CONVICTION THAT AN INTERNATIONALLY ACCEPTABLE SOLUTION WILL HAVE TO STEM FROM BRITAIN AS THE LEGAL AUTHORITY;
- (C) SUCH A SOLUTION WOULD NEED TO INCLUDE CERTAIN CHANGES IN THE CONSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS (IN PARTICULAR IN RELATION TO THE BLOCKING POWER OF THE WHITES IN PARLIAMENT AND INDICATIONS THAT THERE HAS BEEN A GENUINE TRANSFER OF POWER OVER THE PUBLIC SERVICE AND THE DEFENCE FORCES); AND
- (D) THERE SHOULD BE A FINAL ATTEMPT TO ACHIEVE A WIDER AGREEMENT WHICH COULD BRING AN END TO THE WAR. (IF THE PATRIOTIC FRONT FAIL TO RESPOND TO A GENUINE ATTEMPT TO INVOLVE THEM THAT WOULD CREATE A NEW SITUATION).

3. WHEN LORD HARLECH MET BISHOP MUZOREWA IN SALISBURY ON 3 AND 4 JULY, HE PUT THESE POINTS TO HIM AND STRESSED THAT THERE WAS NO QUESTION OF ALLOWING OTHERS TO IMPOSE A VETO ON PROGRESS. THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT WERE DETERMINED TO TAKE THE OPPORTUNITY PRESENTED BY THE CHANGES WHICH HAD TAKEN PLACE IN RHODESIA TO WORK FOR AN EARLY SOLUTION. BUT IT WOULD BE ESSENTIAL TO CARRY OUR FRIENDS AND PARTNERS WITH US. IT WOULD BE IMPORTANT TO THE FUTURE PROSPECTS OF STABILITY AND PROSPERITY FOR RHODESIA THAT WE SHOULD SEEK ALSO TO CARRY AS MUCH AFRICAN OPINION AS POSSIBLE WITH US. BY THESE MEANS WE SHOULD BE AIMING TO ACHIEVE A DE-ESCALATION OF THE WAR; AND THIS WAS IN OUR VIEW THE MOST EFFECTIVE WAY IN WHICH WE COULD HELP. THE BISHOP'S REAL NEED WAS FOR INTERNATIONAL ACCEPTANCE; THIS WAS THE WAY TO BRING AN END TO THE WAR.

4. BISHOP MUZOREWA RESENTED THE UNFAIRNESS, AS HE SEES IT, OF OTHERS IN AFRICA AND ELSEWHERE PASSING UNFAVOURABLE JUDGEMENT ON A SETTLEMENT WHICH THE PARTIES IN RHODESIA

HAVE WORKED OUT THEMSELVES. BUT HE IS APPRECIATIVE OF OUR WILLINGNESS, WHICH LORD HARLECH EMPHASISED, TO WORK WITH HIM FOR A SOLUTION.

5. LORD HARLECH'S IMPRESSION WAS THAT OTHER MEMBERS OF THE BISHOP'S GOVERNMENT (INCLUDING MR MUNDAWARARA AND MR DAVID SMITH) ACCEPT THAT SOME CHANGES IN THE CONSTITUTION MAY NEED TO BE MADE. THEY WILL NOT, HOWEVER, BE PREPARED TO CONTEMPLATE CHANGES WHICH WOULD HAVE THE EFFECT OF UNDERMINING THE CONFIDENCE OF THE WHITE COMMUNITY. WE TOO ACCEPT THE NEED TO RETAIN THE CONFIDENCE OF THE WHITE COMMUNITY.

6. LORD HARLECH ALSO SAW MR IAN SMITH, WHO NO LONGER APPEARED TO BE PLAYING A PROMINENT ROLE IN THE GOVERNMENT. THERE WAS AN EXPECTATION IN SALISBURY THAT HE WOULD LEAVE THE GOVERNMENT BY THE TIME SANCTIONS WERE LIFTED OR INDEPENDENCE GRANTED.

WITH BEST WISHES,

MARGARET THATCHER.

ENDS

CARRINGTON

F I L E S  
HD/RHOD DEPT  
PS  
PS/LPS  
PS/MR LUCE  
PS/PUS  
SIR A DUFF  
MR WILLIAMS

[COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING ST]

CONFIDENTIAL



10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

9 July 1979

RHODESIA, MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT CARTER

Thank you for your letter of 6 July, with which you enclosed a draft of a message which the Prime Minister might send to President Carter about Rhodesia, in advance of the President's meeting with Bishop Muzorewa in Washington on 10 July.

The Prime Minister was content with the draft message and with its annex, subject to the addition of one sentence to paragraph 5 of the latter, namely:

"We, too, accept the need to retain the confidence of the white community".

The message and its annex were duly despatched to the White House over the hot line on the morning of 7 July and I enclose, for the record, copies of the final texts.

I am sending a copy of this letter and its enclosure to Martin Vile (Cabinet Office).

B. G. CARTLEDGE

J. S. Wall, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CONFIDENTIAL



10 DOWNING STREET

PRIME MINISTER

You seemed happy at the end of the diary meeting to leave Bishop Muzorewa's appointment as it was i.e. 1500-1630 on Friday 13 July. In fact it is the day for one of your David Wolfson lunches which was not made clear on the diary and we have already invited a dozen people. Guest list already approved by you.

*Ed.*      *amb.*

9 July 1979

CONFIDENTIAL

GRS 200  
CONFIDENTIAL  
DESKBY 081600Z  
FROM LAGOS 081445Z  
TO IMMEDIATE FCO  
TELNO 410 OF 8 JULY 1979.

*Ende m  
m  
9/7*

FOR JOHNSON, WAD, FCO.

RHODESIA.

1. MANAGER SHELL BP HERE IS REPORTING TODAY TO SHELL HEADQUARTERS IN LONDON THAT HE HAS BEEN RELIABLY INFORMED THAT NIGERIAN GOVERNMENT HAVE APPROVED A RANGE OF PUNITIVE MEASURES AGAINST BRITISH COMMERCIAL INTERESTS. THESE MEASURES WOULD BE TAKEN STEP BY STEP AS AND WHEN HMG MAKE FURTHER STATEMENTS OR TAKE FURTHER ACTIONS WHICH THE NIGERIAN GOVERNMENT JUDGE TO BE INIMICAL TO AFRICAN INTERESTS. THE MEASURES ARE SAID TO INCLUDE REDUCTION OF UK EXPATRIATE QUOTAS BY 50% , NATIONALISATION OF BP 'S SHARE OF SHELL - BP, EMBARGO OF INPORTS FROM BRITIAN AND TOTAL NATIONALISATION OF ALL UK ASSOCIATED COMPANIES.
2. ACCORDING TO SHELL'S SOURCE THE F M G HAVE AUTHORISED THE HEAD OF STATE TO DESPATCH TO ZAMBIA THREE BATTALIONS OF THE NIGERIAN ARMY AND TO WITHDRAW NIGERIA FROM THE COMMONWEALTH WHENEVER IN HIS JUDGEMENT EITHER OF THESE MEASURES IS WARRENTED.
3. SHELL'S SOURCE ALSO TOLD THEM THAT AS AN IMMEDIATE REPRISAL AGAINST BP, NIGERIANS WILL REQUIRE FORFEITURE OF BP'S EQUITY SHARE OF CRUDE OIL WHICH AT PRESENT AMOUNTS TO SOME 300,000 BARRELS PER DAY. BP WOULD RECEIVE PAYMENT AT OFFICIAL PRICE FROM N N P C.
4. SHELL'S INFORMATION IS THAT THESE ACTIONS HAVE BEEN DECIDED UPON IN RESPONSE TO WHAT THE NIGERIANS SEE AS A SERIES OF PROVOCATIVE STATEMENTS AND ACTIONS BY HMG WHICH ARE UNDERMINING INITIALLY FAVOURABLE IMPRESSION CREATED BY LORD HARLECH'S CONSULTATIONS. F M G ARE DETERMINED TO ADOPT A CORRESPONDINGLY AGGRESSIVE AND HARD-NOSED POLICY AND TO COMMIT NIGERIA TO SUCH A POLICY IN WAYS WHICH ANY INCOMING CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT WILL FIND DIFHUCULT TO REVERSE.

CONFIDENTIAL

/5. SHELL HAVE

CONFIDENTIAL

5. SHELL HAVE NOT YET INFORMED THEIR BP COLLEAGUES HERE OF THE FOREGOING WITH THE EXCEPTION OF PARAGRAPH THREE ABOVE. THEY REQUEST US TO MAINTAIN SIMILAR DISCRETION...
6. SHELL HAVE NOT REVEALED THEIR SOURCE TO US, BUT THEY CLAIM THAT HE IS WELL PLACED. WE HAVE NO CORROBORATION OF DETAILS OF THIS INTELLIGENCE BUT IT IS IN LINE WITH OUR GENERAL ASSESSMENT.

KENN Y

FILES  
RHOD.D.  
OADS  
N AM D  
NEWS D  
PUSD  
PLANNING STAFF  
ES & SD  
CCD  
FRD  
UND  
LEGAL ADVS (MR. FREELAND)  
(MR. FIFOOT)  
ECON D  
P & CD

DEF D  
OLD  
PS  
PS/SIR I GILMOUR  
PS/MR. LUCE  
PS/MR. RIDLEY  
PS/MR. HURD  
PS/PUS  
SIR A DUFF  
SIR A PARSONS  
LORD GORDON LENNOX  
MISS BROWN  
MR. THOMAS  
MR. WILLSON  
MR. WILLIAMS

ADDITIONAL DISTN.  
RHODESIA POLICY

2  
CONFIDENTIAL



[RHODESIA: POLICY: ADVANCE COPIES]

IMMEDIATE

PS  
PS/SIR I. GILMOUR  
PS/MR LUCE  
PS/PUS  
SIR A DUFF  
Mr Willson

*ps/Load Hackett*

PS/NO 10 DOWNING STREET

MR WILLIAMS  
! ... ..  
HD/RHODESIA D (3)  
HD/C AF D  
HD/S AF D

SIR C ROSE  
MR P.M. MAXEY  
COL MOIR  
MR P J FOWLER  
DIO  
*Sir J Hunt*

CABINET  
OFFICE

HD/UND  
HD/NEWS D  
HD/WAD  
MR FREELAND LEGAL ADVISER RM K200A  
MR ~~STEEL~~ LEGAL ADVISER RM K126190  
RESIDENT CLERK

*Passed to  
Cheques 7.7.  
(Jills)*

CONFIDENTIAL  
DESKBY 071500Z  
FM MIRIMBA SALISBURY 071315Z  
TO IMMEDIATE FCO  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 374 OF 7 JUL 79  
AND TO IMMEDIATE LUSAKA

FOR RESIDENT CLERK: PLEASE INFORM RENWICK  
COMMONWEALTH CONFERENCE

1. FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF A STATEMENT BY MUZOREWA TO BE  
ISSUED AT 1600Z TODAY:

BEGINS

" THE STATEMENT REPORTED TO HAVE BEEN MADE BY MR NKOMO  
ON 6 JULY HAS BEEN DRAWN TO MY ATTENTION. HIS CLAIM THAT OUR  
RECENT ATTACKS WERE DIRECTED AT REFUGEE CAMPS IS FALSE. WE  
HAVE ALREADY PUBLISHED FULL DETAILS OF THE MANY TONS OF SOVIET  
MILITARY EQUIPMENT DESTROYED BY OUR SECURITY FORCES ON THEIR  
ATTACK LAST SUNDAY ON THE ZIPRA ARMS DEPOT NEAR LUSAKA, WHICH  
IS REGISTERED AS THE U.N. AS A REFUGEE CAMP.

" MY PRIME AIM IS TO RESTORE PEACE TO MY COUNTRY AND I  
HAVE THEREFORE TAKEN NOTE OF MR NKOMO'S LIMITED UNDERTAKING TO  
REFRAIN FROM MILITARY ACTIVITIES AT THE BORDER BETWEEN MY COUNTRY  
AND ZAMBIA FOR THE DURATION OF THE COMMONWEALTH CONFERENCE.  
I HAVE ALSO NOTED, HOWEVER, THAT HE INTENDS TO CONTINUE  
TERRORIST ATTACKS WITHIN ZIMBABWE RHODESIA. IT WOULD BE  
HELPFUL IF HE COULD EXTEND HIS LIMITED UNDERTAKING TO COVER

TERRORIST ATTACKS WITHIN ZIMBABWE RHODESIA. IT WOULD BE HELPFUL IF HE WOULD EXTEND HIS LIMITED UNDERTAKING TO COVER THE CURRENT MASSIVE BUILD-UP BY ZIPRA OF RUSSIAN MILITARY EQUIPMENT WITHIN ZAMBIA, AS WELL AS THE ATTACKS ON INNOCENT CIVILIANS BY HIS MEN INSIDE ZIMBABWE RHODESIA. I WOULD BE PREPARED TO RESPOND POSITIVELY TO SUCH AN UNDERTAKING.

"I MUST STRESS THAT THE ACTIONS OF OUR SECURITY FORCES IN ZAMBIA ARE DEFENSIVE AND, WHERE NECESSARY, PRE-EMPTIVE. THEY ARE DIRECTED SOLELY AGAINST ZIPRA AND NOT AGAINST THE PEOPLE OF ZAMBIA OR THE ZAMBIAN SECURITY FORCES. IN THIS CONTEXT OUR OWN SECURITY FORCES WILL TAKE NO ACTION WHICH WOULD ENDANGER HER MAJESTY QUEEN ELIZABETH OR ANYONE ATTENDING THE COMMONWEALTH CONFERENCE."

ENDS

2. THE STATEMENT IS LESS THAN SATISFACTORY. I HOPE, NEVERTHELESS, WE MAY BE ABLE TO GIVE IT A QUALIFIED WELCOME AS WE HAVE DONE THE STATEMENT ISSUED BY NKOMO. THE FINAL SENTENCE OF THIS STATEMENT CONTAINS, AS FAR AS I AM AWARE, THE FIRST PUBLIC ASSURANCE FROM SALISBURY THAT NO MILITARY ACTION WILL BE TAKEN WHICH COULD ENDANGER THE QUEEN OR COMMONWEALTH LEADERS. THIS, AT LEAST, IS A STEP FORWARD.

3. MIFT CONTAINS AN ACCOUNT OF MY DISCUSSION TODAY WITH WALLS AND GAYLARD.

DAY

NNNN

~~Subject~~  
Subject

PRIME MINISTER'S  
PERSONAL MESSAGE  
SERIAL No. T40a/79T

CAB/WTE 002/07

00 WTE  
DE CAB £1348 1880916  
ZNY MMNSH  
O 070915Z JUL 79  
FM CABINET OFFICE LONDON  
TO WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON  
ZEM

S E C R E T  
TEL NO MISC 060 DATED 7 JULY 1979.  
FOLLOWING PERSONAL FOR PRESIDENT CARTER WHITE HOUSE  
FROM PRIME MINISTER THATCHER.

DEAR MR PRESIDENT,

LORD HARLECH'S CONSULTATIONS.

1. THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT'S OBJECTIVE IS TO BUILD ON THE PROGRESS WHICH HAS BEEN ACHIEVED IN RHODESIA TO BRING THE TERRITORY TO LEGAL INDEPENDENCE WITH THE WIDEST POSSIBLE INTERNATIONAL RECOGNITION.

2. WE HAVE NOT YET COMPLETED THE POLITICAL CONSULTATIONS WHICH WE HOPE WILL HELP TO INDICATE HOW BEST WE CAN ACHIEVE THIS OBJECTIVE. THE DISCUSSIONS WHICH LORD HARLECH HAS HAD WITH AFRICAN LEADERS SO FAR HAVE SUGGESTED THAT:

(A) THERE IS A DISPOSITION IN AFRICA TO ACCEPT THAT THE ELECTIONS IN RHODESIA HAVE CREATED A NEW REALITY AND THAT THE NEW GOVERNMENT HAS CONSIDERABLE POPULAR SUPPORT. FEW DISPUTE THE NEED FOR SPECIAL MEASURES TO REASSURE THE WHITE MINORITY IN RHODESIA OR THE PRINCIPLE OF SOME SPECIAL REPRESENTATION FOR WHITES IN PARLIAMENT.

(B) THERE IS A GENERAL CONVICTION THAT AN INTERNATIONALLY ACCEPTABLE SOLUTION WILL HAVE TO STEM FROM BRITAIN AS THE LEGAL AUTHORITY.

(C) SUCH A SOLUTION WOULD NEED TO INCLUDE CERTAIN CHANGES IN THE CONSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS (IN PARTICULAR IN RELATION TO THE BLOCKING POWER OF THE WHITES IN PARLIAMENT AND INDICATIONS THAT THERE HAS BEEN A GENUINE TRANSFER OF POWER OVER THE PUBLIC SERVICE AND THE DEFENCE FORCES); AND

(D) THERE SHOULD BE A FINAL ATTEMPT TO ACHIEVE A WIDER AGREEMENT WHICH COULD BRING AN END TO THE WAR. (IF THE PATRIOTIC FRONT FAIL TO RESPOND TO A GENUINE ATTEMPT TO INVOLVE THEM THAT WOULD CREATE A NEW SITUATION).

3. WHEN LORD HARLECH MET BISHOP MUZOREWA IN SALISBURY ON 3 AND 4 JULY, HE PUT THESE POINTS TO HIM AND STRESSED THAT THERE WAS NO QUESTION OF ALLOWING OTHERS TO IMPOSE A VETO ON PROGRESS. THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT WERE DETERMINED TO TAKE THE OPPORTUNITY PRESENTED BY THE CHANGES WHICH HAD TAKEN PLACE IN RHODESIA TO WORK FOR AN EARLY SOLUTION. BUT IT WOULD BE ESSENTIAL TO CARRY OUR FRIENDS AND PARTNERS WITH US. IT WOULD BE IMPORTANT TO THE FUTURE PROSPECTS OF STABILITY AND PROSPERITY FOR RHODESIA THAT WE SHOULD SEEK ALSO TO CARRY AS MUCH AFRICAN OPINION AS POSSIBLE WITH US. BY THESE MEANS WE SHOULD BE AIMING TO ACHIEVE A DE-ESCALATION OF THE WAR: AND THIS WAS IN OUR VIEW THE MOST EFFECTIVE WAY IN WHICH WE COULD HELP. THE BISHOP'S REAL NEED WAS FOR INTERNATIONAL ACCEPTANCE: THIS WAS THE WAY TO BRING AN END TO THE WAR.

4. BISHOP MUZOREWA RESENTED THE UNFAIRNESS, AS HE SEES IT, OF OTHERS IN AFRICA AND ELSEWHERE PASSING UNFAVOURABLE JUDGEMENT ON A SETTLEMENT WHICH THE PARTIES IN RHODESIA HAVE WORKED OUT THEMSELVES. BUT HE IS APPRECIATIVE OF OUR WILLINGNESS, WHICH LORD HARLECH EMPHASISED, TO WORK WITH HIM FOR A SOLUTION.

5. LORD HARLECH'S IMPRESSION WAS THAT OTHER MEMBERS OF THE BISHOP'S GOVERNMENT (INCLUDING MR MUNDAWARARA AND MR DAVID SMITH) ACCEPT THAT SOME CHANGES IN THE CONSTITUTION MAY NEED TO BE MADE. THEY WILL NOT, HOWEVER, BE PREPARED TO CONTEMPLATE CHANGES WHICH WOULD HAVE THE EFFECT OF UNDERMINING THE CONFIDENCE OF THE WHITE COMMUNITY. WE TOO ACCEPT THE NEED TO RETAIN THE CONFIDENCE OF THE WHITE COMMUNITY.

6. LORD HARLECH ALSO SAW MR IAN SMITH, WHO NO LONGER APPEARED TO BE PLAYING A PROMINENT ROLE IN THE GOVERNMENT. THERE WAS AN EXPECTATION IN SALISBURY THAT HE WOULD LEAVE THE GOVERNMENT BY THE TIME SANCTIONS WERE LIFTED OR INDEPENDENCE GRANTED.

WITH BEST WISHES MARGARET THATCHER.

£1348

NNNN

SENT AT 070938Z JM  
RECD AT 070938Z  
AND QSL AT 0939KTKK  
TKS

PRIME MINISTER'S  
PERSONAL MESSAGE  
SERIAL No. ....

Subject copied to  
Rhodesia - sat - p 3.

*SUBJECT*

T40/79T

CAB/WTE 001/07

OO WTE  
DE CAB £1347 1880915  
ZNY MMNSH  
O 070910Z JUL 79  
FM CABINET OFFICE LONDON  
TO WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON  
ZEM

S E C R E T

TELNO MISC 059 DATED 7 JULY 1979.  
FOLLOWING PERSONAL FOR PRESIDENT CARTER WHITE HOUSE  
FROM PRIME MINISTER THATCHER.

PRIME MINISTER'S  
PERSONAL MESSAGE  
SERIAL No. T40/79T

DEAR MR PRESIDENT,

THANK YOU FOR TELEPHONING ME ABOUT THE DISCUSSIONS WHICH YOU WILL BE HAVING WITH BISHOP MUZOREWA IN WASHINGTON. I UNDERTOOK TO LET YOU HAVE OUR IMPRESSIONS OF DAVID HARLECH'S CONSULTATIONS IN AFRICA AND WITH BISHOP MUZOREWA. THESE FOLLOW THIS MESSAGE.

IN YOUR TALKS WITH BISHOP MUZOREWA, IT WOULD HELP US IF YOU WOULD IMPRESS ON HIM THE NEED TO WORK CLOSELY WITH US TO ENABLE US TO FULFIL OUR CONSTITUTIONAL RESPONSIBILITY. I THINK IT IS IMPORTANT THAT BISHOP MUZOREWA SHOULD BE MADE TO FEEL THAT WE DO REALISE THE FULL EXTENT OF THE PROGRESS WHICH HAS BEEN MADE. IT IS OUR CONCERN TO BRING RHODESIA TO INDEPENDENCE IN CONDITIONS WHICH OFFER THE PROSPECT OF A MORE SECURE AND STABLE FUTURE. TO THAT END WE MUST WORK TO SECURE THE WIDEST POSSIBLE INTERNATIONAL ACCEPTANCE. BUT WE NEED HIS TRUST AND UNDERSTANDING AND HELP IF WE ARE TO BE SUCCESSFUL.

PETER CARRINGTON AND I WILL BE HOLDING TALKS WITH BISHOP MUZOREWA IN LONDON ON 13 JULY. IT WOULD BE VERY HELPFUL TO US TO HAVE AN ACCOUNT OF YOUR DISCUSSIONS WITH HIM. WE SHALL WISH TO KEEP IN THE CLOSEST TOUCH WITH YOU AS WE SEE THE WAY AHEAD.

WITH BEST WISHES, MARGARET THATCHER.

£1347

NNNN

SENT AT 070927Z JM

PRIME MINISTER

*p.e.*  
*9/11*

The following is the text of a statement issued by Bishop Muzorewa this afternoon:

"The statement reported to have been made by Mr. Nkomo on 6 July has been drawn to my attention. His claim that our recent attacks were directed at refugee camps is false. We have already published full details of the many tons of Soviet military equipment destroyed by our security forces on their attack last Sunday on the ZIPRA arms depot near Lusaka, which is registered at the UN as a refugee camp. My prime aim is to restore peace to my country and I have therefore taken note of Mr. Nkomo's limited undertaking to refrain from military activities at the border between my country and Zambia for the duration of the Commonwealth Conference. I have also noted, however, that he intends to continue terrorist attacks within Zimbabwe-Rhodesia. It would be helpful if he extended his limited undertaking to cover the current massive build-up by ZIPRA of Russian military equipment within Zambia, as well as the attacks on innocent civilians by his men inside Zimbabwe-Rhodesia. I would be prepared to respond positively to such an undertaking.

I must stress that the actions of our security forces in Zambia are defensive and, where necessary, pre-emptive. They are directed solely against ZIPRA and not against the people of Zambia or the Zambian security forces.

/In

In this context our own security forces will take no action which would endanger Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth or anyone attending the Commonwealth Conference."

The final sentence of this statement contains, as far as the Foreign Office are aware, the first public assurance from Salisbury that no military action will be taken which could endanger The Queen or Commonwealth leaders.

Duty Clerk

7 July 1979

SAVING TELEGRAM,

K BAG  
RESTRICTED

IPS TO PRIME MINISTER

*Pime Minster*

NO 10 DOWNING STREET

FROM LIBREVILLE

TO F C O SAVING NO 02 OF 6 JULY 1979 WHITEHALL

*By 18/7*

RFI SAVING TO LUSAKA, KINSHASA, DAKAR, ABIDJAN, NAIROBI, KHARTOUM, YAOUNDE  
ADDIS ABABA, LUANDA, ACCRA, DAR ES SALAAM.

*out.*

MY TELNO 76 OF 4 JULY : RHODESIA / ZIMBABWE

*11*

1. During the course of our talk, the Foreign Minister said that in Gabon's view, if fresh elections were held tomorrow in which the exterior parties also took part, Bishop MUZOREWA would still win easily enough. The revelation of the May elections was the extent of the support he enjoyed. That was why Gabon agreed that the time had come to rally maximum international support behind him. But as for recognition, they would not, of course, take any action in advance of the U.K.

*1*

2. The constitution was not altogether satisfactory as it stood : and he hoped that we and other countries who had some leverage could help eliminate some of the more undesirable features of the entrenched clauses. Furthermore, it would be easier for other African countries to accept a Muzorewa Government if Mr. Smith were not a member.

3. Minister Martin Bongo agreed that the position of a number of the African countries who supported the Patriotic Front in public was more flexible in private. If any way forward towards a compromise between the internal and external parties seemed really possible, many would become less negative. But the prospects for the forthcoming OAU meeting seemed hardly encouraging. His delegation would obviously want to block any attempt to have the Patriotic Front recognized as the sole legitimate representatives of the Zimbabwe people. [How far Gabon will really be prepared to take any initiative is another matter - see below.]

4. I should add that when a visiting US Under Secretary of State from the State Department, Mr Dalley, saw Mr. Ngomo-Obiang ( State Secretary for Foreign Affairs ) about the same subject yesterday ( by which time my US colleague had received instructions to support my demarche ), Ngomo-Obiang was more cagey than his Minister and went further in implying that if at Monrovia the tide was flowing fast against Muzorewa, Gabon would not try too hard to swim against it alone.

MACRAE

RHODESIA PLANNING DISTN,  
RHOD.D.

CONFIDENTIAL

VLS



FILE

10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

6 July 1979

The Prime Minister's Message to President Kaunda

You wrote to Mike Pattison on 29 June, asking whether the gist of the Prime Minister's letter of 1 July to President Kaunda, in reply to his message about Rhodesia, could be conveyed to our E.E.C. partners, the Americans and the Old Commonwealth.

The Prime Minister is content that this should be done.

B. G. CARTLEDGE

Miss Margaret Turner,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CONFIDENTIAL

J.P.



CONFIDENTIAL

PM: Has seen  
Message sent A.B.J.

PRIME MINISTER

Rhodesia : Reply to President Carter

P.A.  
B.M.  
9/5

In response to President Carter's telephone call to you I attach a draft message approved by Lord Carrington which you may wish to send to President Carter, with an account of the Foreign Office's impressions of Lord Harlech's consultations in Africa. President Carter is expected to see Bishop Muzorewa in Washington on 10 July. If you are content with this message and annex, could you please inform Debbie Sansford who will then give the Duty Clerk the all-clear to send them over the hot line immediately.

B.G.C.

6 July 1979

CONFIDENTIAL

FOLLOWING PERSONAL FOR PRESIDENT CARTER, WHITE HOUSE,  
FROM PRIME MINISTER THATCHER

---

SECRET

7 JULY 1979

MESSAGE BEGINS:

Dear Mr. President,

Thank you for telephoning me about the discussions which you will be having with Bishop Muzorewa in Washington. I undertook to let you have our impressions of David Harlech's consultations in Africa and with Bishop Muzorewa. These follow this message.

In your talks with Bishop Muzorewa, it would help us if you would impress on him the need to work closely with us to enable us to fulfil our constitutional responsibility. I think it is important that Bishop Muzorewa should be made to feel that we do realise the full extent of the progress which has been made. It is our concern to bring Rhodesia to independence in conditions which offer the prospect of a more secure and stable future. To that end we must work to secure the widest possible international acceptance. But we need his trust and understanding and help if we are to be successful.

Peter Carrington and I will be holding talks with Bishop Muzorewa in London on 13 July. It would be very helpful to us to have an account of your discussions with him. We shall wish to keep in the closest touch with you as we see the way ahead.

With best wishes,

Margaret Thatcher

MESSAGE ENDS

ANNEXLord Harlech's consultations

1. The British Government's objective is to build on the progress which has been achieved in Rhodesia to bring the territory to legal independence with the widest possible international recognition.
2. We have not yet completed the political consultations which we hope will help to indicate how best we can achieve this objective. The discussions which Lord Harlech has had with African leaders so far have suggested that:
  - a. There is a disposition in Africa to accept that the elections in Rhodesia have created a new reality and that the new Government has considerable popular support. Few dispute the need for special measures to reassure the white minority in Rhodesia or the principle of some special representation for whites in Parliament;
  - b. There is a general conviction that an internationally acceptable solution will have to stem from Britain as the legal authority;
  - c. Such a solution would need to include certain changes in the constitutional arrangements (in particular in relation to the blocking power of the whites in Parliament and indications that there has been a genuine transfer of power over the public service and the defence forces); and,
  - d. There should be a final attempt to achieve a wider agreement which could bring an end to the war. (If the Patriotic Front fail to respond to a genuine attempt to involve them that would create a new situation.)

3. When Lord Harlech met Bishop Muzorewa in Salisbury on 3 and 4 July, he put these points to him and stressed that there was no question of allowing others to impose a veto on progress. The British Government were determined to take the opportunity presented by the changes which have taken place in Rhodesia to work for an early solution. But it would be essential to carry our friends and partners with us. It would be important to the future prospects of stability and prosperity for Rhodesia that we should seek also to carry as much African opinion as possible with us. By these means we should be aiming to achieve a de-escalation of the war; and this was in our view the most effective way in which we could help. The Bishop's real need was for international acceptance: this was the way to bring an end to the war.

4. Bishop Muzorewa resented the unfairness, as he sees it, of others in Africa and elsewhere passing unfavourable judgement on a settlement which the parties in Rhodesia have worked out themselves. But he is appreciative of our willingness, which Lord Harlech emphasised, to work with him for a solution.

5. Lord Harlech's impression was that other members of the Bishop's Government (including Mr. Mundawarara and Mr. David Smith) accept that some changes in the Constitution may need to be made. They will not, however, be prepared to contemplate changes which would have the effect of undermining the confidence of the white community. *We too accept the need to retain the confidence of the white community.*

6. Lord Harlech also saw Mr. Ian Smith, who no longer appeared to be playing a prominent role in the Government. There was an expectation in Salisbury that he would leave the Government by the time sanctions were lifted or independence granted.

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*Has seen*



Prime Minister

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

6 July 1979

*If you are copied with this message and annex, could you please inform Debbie at Chequers, who will then give the Duty Clerk the all clear to send them over the Hot Line immediately.*

*Dean Bryan,*

*SW 6/7*

Rhodesia: Reply to President Carter

*P.C.  
SW  
9/7*

In response to President Carter's telephone call to the Prime Minister, I enclose a draft message, approved by Lord Carrington, which the Prime Minister may wish to send to President Carter, with an account of our impressions of Lord Harlech's consultations in Africa. President Carter is expected to see Bishop Muzorewa in Washington on 10 July.

The message and its enclosure might be transmitted over the direct line from No 10 to the White House. In that event, if the Prime Minister agrees, we should let our Embassy in Washington know what has been passed to the President.

*Jan even.*

*Stephen*

J S Wall  
Private Secretary

Bryan Cartledge Esq  
10 Downing Street

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SSN 1347  
DTG 070910Z

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DSR 11 (Revised)  
059

DRAFT: minute/letter/teleletter/despatch/note

TYPE: Draft/Final 1+

FROM: ~~Prime Minister~~

Reference

DEPARTMENT: TEL. NO:

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

TO: ~~President Carter~~

Your Reference

- Top Secret
- Secret
- Confidential
- Restricted
- Unclassified

*PERSONAL*  
 FOLLOWING FOR PRESIDENT  
 CARTER, WHITE HOUSE, FROM <sup>Copies to:</sup> PRIME MINISTER  
 THATCHER.  
 SECRET, 7 JULY 1979.

PRIVACY MARKING

~~SUBJECT~~  
Dear Mr. President,

.....In Confidence

CAVEAT.....

Thank you for telephoning me about the discussions which you will be having with Bishop Muzorewa in Washington. I undertook to let you have our impressions of David Harlech's consultations in Africa and with Bishop Muzorewa. These follow this message.

In your talks with Bishop Muzorewa, it would help us if you would impress on him the need to work closely with us to enable us to fulfil our constitutional responsibility. I think it is important that Bishop Muzorewa should be made to feel that we realise the full extent of the progress which has been made. It is our concern to bring Rhodesia to independence in conditions which offer the prospect of a more secure and stable future. To that end we must work to secure the widest possible international acceptance. But we need his trust and understanding and help if we are to be successful.

Enclosures—flag(s).....

Peter Carrington and I will be holding talks with Bishop Muzorewa in London on 13 July. It would be very helpful to us to have an account of your discussions with him. We shall wish to keep in the closest touch with you as we see the way ahead.

*With best wishes,  
Margaret Thatcher.*

1348

070915

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ANNEX

SECRET

DSR 11C

LORD HARLECH'S CONSULTATIONS.

1. The British Government's objective is to build on the progress which has been achieved in Rhodesia to bring the territory to legal independence with the widest possible international recognition.
2. We have not yet completed the political consultations which we hope will help to indicate how best we can achieve this objective. The discussions which Lord Harlech has had with African leaders so far have suggested that:
  - (a) there is a disposition in Africa to accept that the elections in Rhodesia have created a new reality and that the new government has considerable popular support. Few dispute the need for special measures to reassure the white minority in Rhodesia or the principle of some special representation for whites in Parliament;
  - (b) there is a general conviction that an internationally acceptable solution will have to stem from Britain as the legal authority;
  - (c) such a solution would need to include certain changes in the constitutional arrangements (in particular in relation to the blocking power of the whites in Parliament and indications that there has been a genuine transfer of power over the public service and the defence forces); and
  - (d) there should be a final attempt to achieve a wider agreement which could bring an end to the war. (If the Patriotic Front fail to respond to a genuine attempt to involve them that would create a new situation.)
3. When Lord Harlech met Bishop Muzorewa in Salisbury on 3 and 4 July, he put these points to him and stressed that there was no question of allowing others to impose a veto on progress. The British Government were determined to take the opportunity presented by the changes which had taken place in Rhodesia to work for an early solution. But it would be essential to carry our friends and partners with us. It would be important to the future prospects of stability and prosperity for Rhodesia that we should

/seek

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seek also to carry as much African opinion as possible with us. By these means we should be aiming to achieve a de-escalation of the war; and this was in our view the most effective way in which we could help. The Bishop's real need was for international acceptance: this was the way to bring an end to the war.

4. Bishop Muzorewa resented the unfairness, as he sees it, of others in Africa and elsewhere passing unfavourable judgement on a settlement which the parties in Rhodesia have worked out themselves. But he is appreciative of our willingness, which Lord Harlech emphasised, to work with him for a solution.

5. Lord Harlech's impression was that other members of the Bishop's government (including Mr Mundawarara and Mr David Smith) accept that some changes in the Constitution may need to be made. They will not, however, be prepared to contemplate changes which would have the effect of undermining the confidence of the white community.\*

6. Lord Harlech also saw Mr Ian Smith, who no longer appeared to be playing a prominent role in the government. There was an expectation in Salisbury that he would leave the government by the time sanctions were lifted or independence granted.

Insert: -

\* We too accept the need to retain the confidence of the white community.

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*Original in R.*



10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

6 July 1979

Dear Julian;

<sup>142</sup> Thank you for copying to me your note of 22 June to Peter Carrington about Bishop Muzorewa's plans. It was kind of you to pass on the information to us before the meeting on Monday.

As you know, Peter and I will be seeing Bishop Muzorewa this month. - and there is no question of discouraging him to make this visit to London.

Yours ever,

(SGD) MT

The Rt. Hon. Julian Amery, MP.

SECRET

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RS 200  
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FM CANBERRA 050330Z JUL 79  
TO PRIORITY FCO  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 376 OF 5 JUL

Prime Minister

*am  
by  
H*

FOLLOWING PERSONAL FOR DUFF

AUSTRALIAN VIEWS ON RHODESIA

1. WHEN I SAW MR FRASER YESTERDAY ON OTHER BUSINESS, HE REVERTED BRIEFLY TO HIS DISCUSSIONS WITH THE PRIME MINISTER ON FUTURE MOVES FOR A SETTLEMENT IN RHODESIA. HE SAID THAT WHILE THEY HAD SPOKEN OF THE POSSIBILITIES OF OUR BEING ABLE TO AGREE CONSTITUTIONAL MODIFICATIONS WITH THE MUZOREWA GOVERNMENT, THERE WAS ONE ASPECT OF THIS WHICH HAD NOT BEEN SPECIFICALLY MENTIONED AND WHICH HE THOUGHT WOULD BE IMPORTANT. HE SAID THAT, IN HIS VIEW, ANY CONSTITUTIONAL MODIFICATIONS WHICH MIGHT BE NEGOTIATED SHOULD BE PUT TO THE PEOPLE OF RHODESIA BY WAY OF A REFERENDUM AND THAT ALL THE PARTIES CONCERNED SHOULD UNDERTAKE IN ADVANCE TO ABIDE BY THE OUTCOME OF SUCH A REFERENDUM. HE FELT THIS MIGHT BECOME AN IMPORTANT FACTOR IN SECURING ASSENT AT LUSAKA AND ELSEWHERE FOR THE KIND OF ON-GOING PROCESS WHICH THE PRIME MINISTER AND HE HAD DISCUSSED.

2. MAY I LEAVE IT TO YOU TO GIVE THIS TELEGRAM OR ITS CONTENTS ANY FURTHER DISTRIBUTION YOU MAY THINK APPROPRIATE?

TEBBIT

FILES

HD / RHODESIA D  
PS  
PS / LPS  
PS / MR LUCE  
PS / PUS  
SIR A. DUFF  
MR WILLIAMS

COPIES TO  
~~PS~~ / NO 10 DOWNING ST  
SIR J. HUNT CABINET OFFICE

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GR 950

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MIRIMBA SALISBURY 051400Z JUL 79

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELNO 364 OF 5 JULY

INFO ROUTINE PRETORIA MAPUTO GABORONE LUSAKA DAR ES SALAAM LUANDA  
LAGOS WASHINGTON AND UKMIS NEW YORK

Prime Minister

yes 9/1

*[Handwritten signature]*

INTERNAL CHANGES

1. MUZOREWA URGED LORD HARLECH TO DISCUSS WITH GAYLARD AND GEORGE SMITH ISSUES ARISING FROM FURTHER CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE. THIS WAS NOT POSSIBLE DURING LORD HARLECH'S VISIT. I THEREFORE SAW GAYLARD AND SMITH THIS MORNING. WE HAD A GENERAL DISCUSSION, ALTHOUGH THE ISSUE OF CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AROSE.

2. GAYLARD ENQUIRED WHAT KIND OF CHANGES WE HAD IN MIND. I EXPLAINED THAT I WAS NOT IN A POSITION TO ENTER INTO DETAILED DISCUSSION AT THIS STAGE. HE WOULD HOWEVER BE AWARE OF THE GENERAL CRITICISMS OF THE CONSTITUTION THAT HAD BEEN VOICED. THESE RELATED PRINCIPALLY TO THE BLOCKING MECHANISM WHICH ENABLED THE WHITE MINORITY TO PREVENT ANY CHANGES TO LARGE SECTIONS OF THE CONSTITUTION, SOME OF WHICH RELATED DIRECTLY TO CONTINUING WHITE INFLUENCE IN THE PUBLIC SERVICE. I ADDED THAT THERE WAS NO OBJECTION IN PRINCIPLE TO THE CONCEPT OF RESERVED SEATS IN PARLIAMENT FOR A MINORITY. THE ISSUE RAISED WITH US BY MANY WAS THE EXTENT TO WHICH THESE RESERVED SEATS GAVE THE MINORITY A VIRTUAL VETO IN CERTAIN AREAS.

3. GAYLARD SAID THAT THESE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS HAD BEEN FULLY DISCUSSED WITH ALL THE PARTIES TO THE INTERNAL SETTLEMENT. IT HAD BEEN AGREED THAT IT WAS ESSENTIAL FOR THE STABILITY AND PROSPERITY OF THE COUNTRY THAT WHITE CONFIDENCE SHOULD BE MAINTAINED AND THAT THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE COUNTRY SHOULD REMAIN IN RESPONSIBLE HANDS. THE BLACK COMMUNITY ATTACHED AS MUCH IMPORTANCE TO THIS AS THE WHITES. THERE WAS A COMMON DESIRE TO AVOID THE KIND OF CHAOS THAT HAD DEVELOPED IN OTHER AFRICAN COUNTRIES AFTER INDEPENDENCE AND THE PREMATURE DISMANTLEMENT OF A PREVIOUSLY EFFICIENT ADMINISTRATION. THE ELEMENTS OF THE CONSTITUTION TO WHICH I HAD REFERRED WOULD ONLY LAST FOR 10 YEARS. THIS WAS NOT LONG IN THE HISTORY OF A COUNTRY.

1/4.

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# CONFIDENTIAL

4. I ACKNOWLEDGED THE IMPORTANCE OF MAINTAINING WHITE CONFIDENCE. HOWEVER, OUR OBJECTIVE AND THAT OF THE BISHOP WAS TO CREATE CONDITIONS IN WHICH THERE COULD BE STABILITY WITH THE COUNTRY AND THE PROSPECT OF PEACE. IT SEEMED TO ME THAT NEITHER WOULD BE LIKELY UNLESS SOME FURTHER CHANGES WERE CONTEMPLATED. I WAS ALREADY HEARING SOME RUMBLINGS WITHIN THE BLACK POPULATION AT THE APPARENT LACK OF PROGRESS BEING MADE BY THE NEW GOVERNMENT. WHAT HMG WERE SEEKING TO ACHIEVE WAS A SITUATION IN WHICH INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL STABILITY COULD BE SECURED IN A WAY WHICH DID NOT UNDERMINE WHITE MORALE AND WHICH HELD OUT A PROSPECT FOR THE BEST POSSIBLE FUTURE FOR RHODESIA. IF THIS COULD BE ACHIEVED AS A RESULT OF SOME FURTHER CHANGES IN THE CONSTITUTION I THOUGHT THAT MOST PEOPLE, BLACK AND WHITE, WOULD BE PREPARED TO ACCEPT SOME CHANGES. GAYLARD AND SMITH LISTENED ATTENTIVELY. I THINK THEY MAY BE BEGINNING TO RECOGNISE THAT SOME MOVEMENT WILL BE ESSENTIAL IF WE ARE TO ACHIEVE OUR JOINT OBJECTIVE.

5. GAYLARD ENQUIRED WHAT OUR VIEWS WERE ON AFRICANISATION. HE CLEARLY FEARS THAT WE WISH TO PRESS THE BISHOP TO MOVE MUCH FASTER THAN THE WHITES WILL REGARD AS DESIRABLE. HE ONCE AGAIN ARGUED THE NEED FOR EFFICIENT ADMINISTRATION AND POINTED OUT THAT THOSE ENTERING THE PUBLIC SERVICE HAD DONE SO IN THE EXPECTATION THAT THEY WOULD HAVE A FULL CAREER AND THE CHANCE OF REACHING SENIOR POSTS. IF THESE PROSPECTS WERE NOW REMOVED THERE COULD BE A SIGNIFICANT EXODUS FROM THE PUBLIC SERVICE WHICH THE COUNTRY AS A WHOLE COULD NOT AFFORD. I SAID THAT THIS PROBLEM WAS RECOGNISED BY HMG. WE WERE NOT SEEKING THE DISINTEGRATION OF THE PUBLIC SERVICE. WE REALISED THAT PROGRESS COULD NOT BE MADE AS SWIFTLY AS SOME OF THE MORE EXTREME CRITICS OF THIS COUNTRY DEMANDED. IT WAS, HOWEVER, IMPORTANT FOR PEOPLE INSIDE AND OUTSIDE THE COUNTRY TO SEE THAT A START WAS BEING MADE. GAYLARD MENTIONED THAT MUZOREWA HAD WANTED TO APPOINT A BLACK PARTY MEMBER AS CABINET SECRETARY IN HIS PLACE. GAYLARD HAD ARGUED AGAINST THIS AND SMITH HAD EVENTUALLY BEEN APPOINTED. IN THIS CONTEXT I SAID THAT IT MIGHT HAVE BEEN TACTICALLY WISE FOR THE BISHOP AT THE SAME TIME TO HAVE NOMINATED A SUITABLY QUALIFIED BLACK AS A DEPUTY SECRETARY. THIS WOULD HAVE MADE A FAVOURABLE IMPACT BOTH INSIDE THE COUNTRY AND OUTSIDE. GAYLARD ARGUED THAT IN FACT THIS HAD BEEN DONE WITH THE APPOINTMENT OF DR KAMUSIKIRI AS PRINCIPLE PRIVATE SECRETARY. I SAID THAT IF THIS WAS THE INTENTION IT WAS UNFORTUNATE THAT MORE HAD NOT BEEN MADE OF THIS PARTICULAR APPOINTMENT.

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6. GAYLARD ASKED WHETHER IAN SMITH'S POSITION WITHIN THE GOVERNMENT WAS A MAJOR FACTOR FOR EXTERNAL OPINION. I REPLIED THAT SMITH'S POSITION INVARIABLY AROSE IN DISCUSSION WITH THIRD WORLD REPRESENTATIVES. HE WAS REGARDED IN THESE QUARTERS AS A SYMBOL OF MINORITY RULE AND WHATEVER POSITION HE MIGHT NOW OCCUPY IN THE GOVERNMENT THERE WOULD BE INTENSE SUSPICION OF HIS CONTINUING INFLUENCE. I GAVE IT AS MY PERSONAL VIEW THAT HIS DEPARTURE FROM THE POLITICAL SCENE WOULD GREATLY IMPROVE THE PROSPECTS FOR WIDER INTERNATIONAL RECOGNITION. GAYLARD PRODUCED THE TRADITIONAL ARGUMENT THAT SMITH'S PRESENCE WAS A REASSURANCE TO THE WHITE COMMUNITY AND THAT HE AND OTHER WHITE MINISTERS ACTED AS A RESTRAINING INFLUENCE ON THEIR BLACK COLLEAGUES, MANY OF WHOM WERE URGING MILITANT POLITICAL AND MILITARY ACTION AGAINST ZAMBIA.

7. MOST OF THIS CONVERSATION COVERED FAMILIAR GROUND. I THINK, HOWEVER, THAT IT IS NOW BECOMING MORE READILY UNDERSTOOD THAT HMG ARE GENUINLY ANXIOUS TO WORK WITH THE NEW GOVERNMENT HERE TO ACHIEVE AN ACCEPTABLE SETTLEMENT AND THAT SOME OF THE MISTRUST AND SUSPICION THAT EXISTED IS BEGINNING TO EVAPORATE.

DAY

## FILES

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PS/MR LUCE  
PS/MR RIDLEY  
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MR THOMAS  
MR WILLSON  
MR WILLIAMS

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION  
RHODESIA POLICY

3  
CONFIDENTIAL

GRS 185

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*Prime Minister*

*Rhodesia 2*

CONFIDENTIAL

*With friends like this.....*

FROM LAGOS 051130Z

PS TO PM  
NO 10 DOWNING ST

*Ben  
477*

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELNO 399 OF 5 JULY 1979.

RFI MIRIMBA SALISBURY, LUSAKA, DAR ES SALAAM, GABORONE, MAPUTO,  
CANBERRA AND WASHINGTON.

RHODESIA - AUSTRALIA.

1. A DELEGATION OF FIVE AUSTRALIAN PARLIAMENTARIANS, LED BY SENATOR CONNOLLY (LIBERAL) VISITED NIGERIA FROM 1-4 JULY. IN THE COURSE OF THEIR VISIT THEY HAD TALKS WITH THE HEAD OF STATE AND THE COMMISSIONER FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, GENERAL ADEFOPE, M ACCORDING TO A NIGERIAN GOVERNMENT PRESS RELEASE WHICH IS REFLECTED IN TODAY'S PAPERS ADEFOPE TOLD THE DELEGATION THAT THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT'S RHODESIAN POLICY WAS "HASTENING THE DEATH OF THE COMMONWEALTH". SENATOR CONNOLLY IS REPORTED TO HAVE TOLD GENERAL ADEFOPE THAT "AUSTRALIA HAD DONE ALL SHE COULD TO RESTRAIN THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT BUT SHE DID NOT APPEAR TO HAVE SUCCEEDED". WM MY AUSTRALIAN COLLEAGUE WHO ACCOMPANIED THE DELEGATION IN ITS CALLS ON THE HEAD OF STATE AND ADEFOPE HAS TOLD ME THAT SENATOR CONNOLLY DID NOT MAKE THE STATEMENT ATTRIBUTED TO HIM. BUT HE APPARENTLY TOLD ADEFOPE THAT AUSTRALIAN POLICY ON RHODESIA WAS DIFFERENT FROM THAT OF THE UK SINCE THE AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT DID NOT APPROVE OF THE MUZOREWA REGIME AND DID NOT INTEND TO RECOGNISE IT.

3. THE AUSTRALIAN PRIME MINISTER IS DUE TO PAY AN OFFICIAL VISIT TO NIGERIA FROM 28-31 JULY. THE NIGERIANS WILL NO DOUBT TAKE EVERY OPPORTUNITY DURING THIS VISIT TO TRY TO BRING OUT THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN AUSTRALIAN AND BRITISH POLICIES OVER RHODESIA.  
KENNEDY

FILES

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION  
RHODESIA POLICY

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PS/PUS  
SIR A DUFF  
SIR A PARSONS

PCD

MR WILLSON  
MR WILLIAMS

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PM's notes at the OD on 5 July



10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

Comments on some of Commission's -  
recommendations in review.

① You can't initiate debt - bit of the people.

② Block in voting: the bill is the result on  
the side that which never did.

2. similar (?)

③ Constitution not perfect - matter in the  
system in Africa

④ I don't do something - payment  
Aurore's authority?

Frequency does not change, just over time



10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

For advice.

- ① Other candidates.
- ② Mr's article in Sunday Express
- ③ Name - U.N. changed letter  
what is the change.





10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

Mozambique being kept alive by  
S. Africa - Air?

Anglo Siam Railway - closed - Air?

If settlement - effect Narath's + Johnson

Provision - strike middle class  
black intellectuals in cities.

London - You are supporting talking your  
own kind!

Stop the talking.

and answer.

GRS 275

UNCLASSIFIED

FM LUSAKA 041340Z JUL 79

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 582 OF 4 JULY

INFO PRIORITY DAR ES SALAAM, MAPUTO, GABORONE, LAGOS, LUANDA,  
PRETORIA, MIRIMBA SALISBURY, ROUTINE WASHINGTON, ADDIS ABABA.

2  
Prime Minister  
OK  
97

YOUR TELNOS 360 AND 361: RHODESIA SANCTIONS

1. THE PRIME MINISTER'S REMARKS HAVE BEEN REPORTED PROMINENTLY IN THE LOCAL PRESS. THERE HAS BEEN NO/DIRECT ZAMBIAN GOVERNMENT REACTION, OTHER THAN THE REMARKS OF PRIME MINISTER LISULO WHO IS REPORTED TO HAVE SPOKEN TO THE ZAMBIA SOCIETY IN LONDON ON 2 JULY. THE TEXT OF HIS SPEECH IS DOUBTLESS AVAILABLE TO YOU.

2. TODAY'S (4 JULY) TIMES OF ZAMBIA PRINTS A MEASURED EDITORIAL WHICH IS AT PAINS TO STRESS THAT THE QUEEN WILL BE AN HONOURED GUEST WHEN SHE VISITS LUSAKA AND THAT ZAMBIANS HAVE NO/NO QUARREL WITH THE QUEEN OR THE BRITISH PEOPLE. BUT ZAMBIANS DO NOT/NOT AGREE WITH THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT'S READING OF THE RHODESIAN SITUATION. THE TIMES FAILS TO SEE HOW THE HOUSE OF COMMONS, WITH ITS COMFORTABLE GOVERNMENT MAJORITY, COULD REFUSE TO RENEW SANCTIONS IF A THREE LINE WHIP WAS PUT ON. CLEARLY EQUATING THE LIFTING OF SANCTIONS WITH RECOGNITION OF THE SALISBURY REGIME, THE TIMES SAYS THAT MRS THATCHER SHOULD NOT/NOT LOOK AT THE RHODESIA ELECTIONS OUTSIDE THE CONTEXT OF THE CONSTITUTION ON WHICH THEY WERE BASED. THE EDITORIAL ENDS BY PAYING TRIBUTE TO THE SKILLS WHICH HAVE WON MRS THATCHER HER PLACE IN HISTORY AS BRITAIN'S FIRST LADY PRIME MINISTER. IT APPEALS TO HER TO ENSURE HER PLACE AS A TRULY GREAT PRIME MINISTER BY SOLVING THE RHODESIA PROBLEM. BUT, SAYS THE TIMES, THIS CANNOT BE ACHIEVED BY RECOGNISING THE "SHAKY" MUZOREWA REGIME.

ALLINSON

FILES

RHOD D.  
NEWS D.

PS.

PS/LORD PRIVY SEAL

PS/MR LUCE

PS/PUS

SIR A DUFF

MR WILLIAMS.

[COPIES SENT TO LORD DOWNING]







END

Filmed at the National  
Archives (TNA) in London

February 2010