

PREM19

109

RHODESIA

(Situation in)

(July 31 - August 8)

(Part 4)

PART 4
(CHGM)

Confidential Filing


The situation in Rhodesia (covering the duration of the CHGM in Lusaka - July - August 1979.)

RHODESIA

Part 1 : April 1979

Part 4 : July 1979

Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date
8.8.79 9.8.79 - Part 4 ends -							
<p>PREM 19/109</p>							



PART 5 begins:-

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9.8.79

PART 4 ends:-

FCO to BGC + atts

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PRIME MINISTER

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

9 August 1979

Dear Bryan

Letter from Bishop Muzorewa to the Prime Minister

I enclose Bishop Muzorewa's reply to the message the Prime Minister sent to him from Lusaka. The Bishop's reply was brought by Derek Day, who returned to London for consultations this morning.

Yours ever,
Stephen

sub.

(J S Wall)
Private Secretary

B G Cartledge Esq
10 Downing Street

Would you ask
Lord C. to help ??
in to see me?

sub.
PM saw M. Day
on 10/8. sub. 02.

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T62/79T



ZIMBABWE RHODESIA

PRIME MINISTER
SALISBURY

8 August 1979

SUBJECT

Mrs. M. Thatcher
Prime Minister of Great Britain

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T62/79T

Dear Mrs. Thatcher,

I wish to express my sincerest appreciation to you for your personal message presented to me by Mr. Derek Day regarding the position agreed upon by the Commonwealth Heads of Government on Zimbabwe Rhodesia in Lusaka.

Although I and all the people of Zimbabwe Rhodesia are terribly disturbed over certain aspects of the Lusaka Accord, I am however appreciative of the difficulties which were in the background of the proceedings.

I look forward to receiving the full text of your proposals to us.

With best wishes,

Yours sincerely,

ABEL T. MUZOREWA

Original on:
Commonwealth: July 79
CHGM Bilaterals.

NOTE OF THE PRIME MINISTER'S FAREWELL CALL ON PRESIDENT KAUNDA OF ZAMBIA AT THE END OF THE COMMONWEALTH HEADS OF GOVERNMENT MEETING IN LUSAKA, ON 8 AUGUST 1979

Present

The Prime Minister
Mr. C.A. Whitmore
Mr. B.G. Cartledge

President Kaunda
Mr. Mark Chona

* * * * *

[At President Kaunda's request the Prime Minister called on him at his Villa in Mulungushi Village, Lusaka, on 8 August at 0910.7

President Kaunda said that he was delighted that the Prime Minister had come to Lusaka. He recognised that the advance build-up given to her visit by the Zambian press had not been very encouraging: but he wished to tell the Prime Minister that in his view the successful outcome of the week's discussions had been due, in no small measure, to the spirit in which the Prime Minister herself had approached them. This had been the first Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting she had attended and, naturally, she had come to Lusaka not knowing what to expect. As he had said publicly at the Press Association dinner on 6 August, the Prime Minister would be in his prayers: neither he nor she had an easy task ahead.

After thanking President Kaunda very warmly for his hospitality and for the way in which he had steered the week's discussions to such a successful conclusion, the Prime Minister said that the main difficulty now would be to bring the hostilities to an end. As Lee Kuan Yew had said during the meeting, it was no easy task to persuade people to abandon an armed struggle, since violence tended to become a way of life. Some people actually enjoyed it. It would be necessary to give a very firm lead from the top. The Prime Minister asked President Kaunda whether, in his view, President Machel

/shared their

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- 2 -

shared their anxiety to bring the fighting to an end. President Kaunda replied that he was certain that President Machel was with them 100 per cent. He was a man with a good political sense and would certainly bring pressure to bear on Robert Mugabe. The Prime Minister told President Kaunda that by early September significant progress should have been made towards a Constitutional Conference.

The Prime Minister congratulated President Kaunda very warmly on the organisation of the Conference which had, she said, been a terrific feat. The President had had to cope with thirty-nine prima donnas and had done so superbly. President Kaunda admitted that he was tired but added that he was also very happy.

The discussion ended at 0930.

BM.

cc PS/FCO
Sir John Hunt

8 August 1979

~~N 009/08~~

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RESTRICTED
FM CG NEW YORK 081600Z AUG
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 22 OF 8 AUGUST

Prime Minister

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9/8

p.o.

PLEASE PASS TO NUMBER 10 THE FOLLOWING FOR THE PRIME MINISTER FROM
CHANCELLOR DUCHY OF LANCASTER IN NEW YORK.

QUOTE CONGRATULATIONS ON YOUR SUCCESS IN LUSAKA. I HAVE RECEIVED
THE NOTICE OF THE CABINET MEETING ON FRIDAY, ALONG WITH A
RECOMMENDATION THAT IT IS NOT NECESSARY FOR ME TO ATTEND. I HAVE
APPOINTMENTS HERE IN NEW YORK WITH THE METROPOLITAN MUSEUM AND THE
MUSEUM OF MODERN ART AND WILL, THEREFORE, NOT BE PRESENT ON
FRIDAY.

I WANT YOU TO KNOW THAT I FULLY SUPPORT THE PROPOSED SETTLEMENT
AND ANY CONSEQUENT MEASURES YOU CONSIDER NECESSARY.

ST JOHN-STEVAS

UNQUOTE

ans

BOOTH

AM

SAVING TELEGRAM

BY BAG

FROM PARIS

UNCLASSIFIED

TO FCO TEL NO 89 SAVING OF 8 AUGUST 1979

RHODESIA: FRENCH PRESS REACTIONS

1. This afternoon's Le Monde carries an important leader headed "Hope of a settlement in Rhodesia" which gives unaccustomed praise to the British role.
2. After noting that past history rules out excessive optimism, the article comments that the Lusaka agreement is a new political fact exemplifying Mrs Thatcher's pragmatism and lucidity, and an event in British internal politics. The leader continues: "On the substance of the problem the Lusaka agreement represents a good and important precedent in that for the first time Great Britain - under a Conservative Government - and a dozen self-styled progressive African countries have agreed, with naturally differing *arrière-pensées*, on a common analysis and have together worked out the broad lines of a political scenario for restoring peace and genuine democracy in the rebel colony. Who would have forecast such a consensus at the opening of the conference a mere week ago?... In every true compromise each side makes concessions of presentation and of substance but, if Mrs Thatcher and Mr Nyerere were able to agree, it is certainly because the British Prime Minister had gone most of the way. She adopted a new and moderate tone... There is evidently no longer any question of unilateral recognition of the Muzorewa regime by Britain, a prospect often mentioned a few weeks ago. Without really abandoning the Bishop Mrs Thatcher is refusing to treat him as a privileged interlocutor. He is no longer in her eyes more than one amongst other aspirants for power..."
3. "With typically Anglo-Saxon understatement some of Britain's African partners have discovered to their surprise and delight an "unexpected flexibility" in this "iron lady" who had been described to them as wedded to "reactionary" dogmas. In fact as a good strategist Mrs Thatcher decided her position primarily in the light of political considerations. She made no mystery of these during her press conference: the need to avoid Britain's being isolated in the Commonwealth, the desire to deal tactfully with her African partners and in particular the powerful Nigeria, and the wish to respond positively to the moderation of the front line States which were tired of the war and whose help is one of the keys to success in the negotiations. In Lusaka Mrs Thatcher earned her diplomatic spurs. She has without a doubt helped her country's position in Africa and in the Third World in the longer term".

Prime Minister

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4. The rest of the French press have tended to give wide and favourable coverage to the agreement on Rhodesia reached at Lusaka; though some doubts have been expressed about the chances of success for an all-party conference.

FCO please repeat elsewhere as necessary.

H. B. MENT

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MISS BROWN
MR. THOMAS
MR. WILLSON
MR. WILLIAMS

ADDITIONAL DISTN.
RHODESIA POLICY

GRS 320

CLASSIFIED

FROM LAGOS 081420Z

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELNO 554 OF 8 AUGUST 1979.

AND ROUTINE LUSAKA, UKMIS NEW YORK, MIRIMBA SALISBURY, DAR ES
SALAAM, PRETORIA, WASHINGTON, MAPUTO, GABORONE, LUANDA, LILONGWE
AND NAIROBI.

2

Prime Minister

Aug 9/8
m.

NIGERIAN PRESS.

1. THE LUSAKA AGREEMENT HAS NOT SO FAR BROUGHT ABOUT ANY CHANGE IN THE ATTITUDE OF THE GOVERNMENT-OWNED "DAILY TIMES" WHICH TODAY CARRIES 3 FURTHER HARD-LINE FEATURE ARTICLES ABOUT BRITAIN'S RELATIONS WITH AFRICA.
2. AN ARTICLE HEADED "ROW OVER BP", SAYS THAT "ORDINARILY, THE FIRST WORLD (THE WEST) DOES NOT REGARD THE THIRD WORLD..... IN THEIR VIEW, THE RAW MATERIALS THAT ARE PLENTIFUL IN THE THIRD WORLD EXIST ONLY TO SUPPLY THE NEED OF THE FIRST WORLD". THE ARTICLE THEN ATTACKS BRITISH PRESS REACTIONS TO THE NIGERIAN GOVERNMENT'S TAKEOVER OF BP. THE ARTICLE GOES ON TO DESCRIBE THE SIZE OF BRITAIN'S ECONOMIC INTERESTS IN SOUTH AFRICA BUT STRESSES THAT THESE ARE NOW SMALLER THAN BRITISH INTERESTS IN NIGERIA AND THUS "IF BRITAIN MARCHES AROUND THE WORLD SAYING THAT NIGERIA CANNOT HURT IT, IT IS NOT TELLING THE TRUTH".
3. ANOTHER ARTICLE "TALKING OF BARKING AND BITING" CONTAINS A PROLONGED ATTACK ON THE ECONOMIST'S "BARK AND BITE" ARTICLE OF LAST MAY, WHICH SUGGESTED THAT NIGERIA MIGHT NOT REACT STRONGLY AGAINST BRITISH POLICIES ON RHODESIA. "BEFORE THE EDITORS OF THE ECONOMIST MAKE SEEMINGLY OMISCIENT ANALYSIS AND ASSERTIONS ABOUT ANY NATION OR PEOPLE THEY SHOULD AT LEAST HAVE THE HUMILITY AND PATIENCE TO TRY AND LEARN SOMETHING ABOUT CONTEMPORARY EVENTS IN THAT COUNTRY". THE THRUST OF THE ARTICLE IS THAT NIGERIA AND BRITAIN ENTERED A COLLISION COURSE ON RHODESIA WHEN MRS THATCHER BECAME PRIME MINISTER AND THE BRITISH PRESS ONLY MADE THE CONFRONTATION WORSE. THE WRITER SAYS HE IS PROUD TO NOTE THAT THE NIGERIAN GOVERNMENT HAS CONFIRMED THAT ALL OTHER BRITISH INVESTMENTS (APART FROM BP) IN NIGERIA CAN FEEL SAFE. "THIS IS A REALISTIC AND MATURE POSTURE IN SHARP CONTRAST TO THE STANCE OF THOSE NIGERIANS WHO HAVE CALLED ON THE GOVERNMENT TO NATIONALISE VIRTURALLY EVERYTHING IN SIGHT". THE WRITER ADDS THAT THE

FEDERAL

FEDERAL GOVERNMENT HAS SHOWN THAT IT CAN BARK AND BITE VERY HARD AND "WITH RESPECT TO SOUTHERN AFRICA MULTI-NATIONAL COMPANIES MUST NOW DECIDE WHAT SIDE OF THE FENCE THEY ARE ON".

4. THE FINAL ARTICLE "THE BULLYING OF JOHN BULL", CLAIMS THAT NIGERIA'S "BOLD ACTION" HAS DONE WHAT "YEARS OF TIRESOME CHEST BEATING RHETORIC HAS FAILED TO DO" - TO SHOW THAT AFRICANS, AT LEAST NIGERIANS, WILL GO TO ANY LENGTHS TO RID THE CONTINENT OF RACIST MINORITY REGIMES". "THE 22ND COMMONWEALTH SUMMIT" SHOULD BE REMEMBERED AS THE MEETING AT WHICH BRITAIN FINALLY DECIDED TO FACE REALITY ON THE ZIMBABWE ISSUE.... THIS WOULD NOT HAVE BEEN POSSIBLE WERE NIGERIA TOO TIMID TO TAKE IT UPON ITSELF TO BULLY JOHN BULL"

BROWN

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PS/MR. HURD
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SIR A PARSONS

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RHODESIA POLICY

MISS BROWN
MR. THOMAS
MR. WILLSON
MR. WILLIAMS

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TO PRIORITY FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 883 OF 8 AUGUST

INFO PRIORITY DAR ES SALAAM, GABORONE, MAPUTO, LUANDA, MIRIMBA
SALISBURY, PRETORIA, LAGOS, NAIROBI.

CHOGM: RHODESIA AND ANGLO/ZAMBIAN RELATIONS

2

Prime Minister

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ant.

1. BOTH THE TIMES OF ZAMBIA AND ZAMBIA DAILY MAIL EDITORIALS TODAY (8 AUGUST) ARE FULL OF PRAISE FOR MRS THATCHER. THE TIMES EDITORIALIST COMMENTS THAT THROUGH HER BRITAIN AND THE REST OF THE COMMONWEALTH FEEL A NEW DETERMINATION TO SOLVE WHAT HAS FOR FOURTEEN YEARS BEEN "A RUNNING SORE" IN BRITAIN'S RELATIONS WITH BLACK AFRICA. HE SINGLES OUT FROM MRS THATCHER'S SPEECH TO THE PRESS CLUB ON 6 AUGUST HER COMMENT THAT THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT INTEND NOW TO MOVE SWIFTLY WITH THE PARTIES TO DRAW UP AN INDEPENDENCE CONSTITUTION. BUT THE PAPER CAUTIONS THAT TO DRAW UP A CONSTITUTION THAT ALL PARTIES CAN SUPPORT WILL NOT BE EASY. HOWEVER, IF THIS IS ACHIEVED THEN THE FURTHER NECESSARY STEPS (A LIST OF REGISTERED VOTERS SEMI COLON A DECISION ON THE COMPOSITION OF THE AUTHORITY TO SUPERVISE ELECTIONS SEMI COLON AND THE PREPARATIONS FOR A TRANSFER OF POWER TO THE MAJORITY) CAN BE TAKEN BEFORE CHRISTMAS.

2. THE DAILY MAIL COMMENDS THE "FRANKNESS AND SINCERITY OF PURPOSE" DISPLAYED BY MRS THATCHER DURING THE DISCUSSIONS WHICH, WITH HER "KEENNESS TO LISTEN AND APPRECIATE THE FEELINGS OF OTHER DELEGATES, HAS BROUGHT A RAY OF HOPE THAT A SOLUTION IS IN SIGHT". IN MARKED CONTRAST TO THE TONE OF SOME OF ITS EARLIER LEADERS, THE PAPER COMMENTS THAT THE FRICTION CREATED BY THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE BRITISH AND THE ZAMBIANS IS NATURAL BETWEEN VERY CLOSE FRIENDS. THIS, EXPLAINS THE EDITORIALIST, IS WHY THE ZAMBIANS HAVE SPOKEN FRANKLY TO MRS THATCHER. BUT THE MAIL ALSO REPEATS PRESIDENT NYERERE'S WARNING THAT THIS IS BRITAIN'S LAST CHANCE TO SOLVE THE PROBLEM PEACEFULLY. ANOTHER FAILURE SAYS THE PAPER WILL LEAD TO THE PATRIOTIC FRONT TREBLING THEIR FIGHTING CAPACITY WITH ARMS FROM "THOSE COUNTRIES THE WEST FEARS MOST". AGAIN QUOTING PRESIDENT NYERERE, THE MAIL WARNS THAT SMITH AND SOUTH AFRICA ARE LIKELY TO PRESENT OBSTACLES TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF MRS THATCHER'S PLANS. BUT, CONCLUDES THE LEADER, IT IS IN BRITAIN'S INTEREST TO CARRY THE PLAN THROUGH.

3. ANOTHER FRONT PAGE ARTICLE IN THE DAILY MAIL MISREPORTS MRS THATCHER'S PRESS CONFERENCE YESTERDAY (7 AUGUST). ACCORDING TO THE ARTICLE "WHITEHALL" ADMITTED THAT PLESSEY HAD BEEN SUPPLYING SOUTH AFRICA WITH MILITARY EQUIPMENT AND TRAINING THEIR DEFENCE PERSONNEL SINCE 1976. MRS THATCHER IS ALLEGED TO HAVE SAID THAT THE TRAINING RESULTED FROM A CONTRACT THE LABOUR GOVERNMENT HAD SIGNED WITH THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT, AND TO HAVE PROMISED TO REVIEW THE CONTRACT WHEN IT EXPIRES AT A DATE UNKNOWN.

4. BOTH PAPERS CARRY ARTICLES REPORTING A PRESS CONFERENCE GIVEN ON 7 AUGUST BY EDGAR TEKERE, ZANU SECRETARY GENERAL. THEY BOTH QUOTE HIM AS SAYING THAT THE PATRIOTIC FRONT WOULD NOT SIT AT THE SAME CONFERENCE TABLE WITH BISHOP MUZOREWA AND THAT THEY WOULD NEGOTIATE ONLY WITH BRITAIN. ACCORDING TO THE MAIL TEKERE IS SAID TO HAVE STATED THAT THE PATRIOTIC FRONT WOULD INSIST THAT THEIR ARMY SHOULD REPLACE "THE REBEL ARMY" AS A CONDITION FOR ATTENDING THE CONFERENCE. ASKED IF HE WAS DISAGREEING WITH THE FRONT LINE STATES HE REPORTEDLY REPLIED THAT THEY WERE MERELY ADVISERS TO THE PATRIOTIC FRONT. HE DID, HOWEVER, CONCEDE THAT THE PF ACCEPTED THE CONFERENCE COMMUNIQUE ON RHODESIA BUT QUALIFIED THIS BY SAYING THAT THEY REGRETTED THE INCLUSION OF "A RACIST ELEMENT IN THE TALKS".

5. THE TIMES GIVES A MORE MODERATE ACCOUNT. TEKERE IS QUOTED AS SAYING THE PF WELCOMED THE PROPOSALS MADE BY THE COMMONWEALTH GOVERNMENTS, BUT HOPED THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT WOULD STICK TO THE SPIRIT OF THE DECLARATION. THE "NATIONALISTS" WERE, HE SAID, WILLING TO CONSIDER ANY MEANINGFUL PROPOSALS INTRODUCED AT THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE BY WHITEHALL. HE IS FURTHER REPORTED AS SAYING THAT THE COMMUNIQUE ENCOMPASSED THE BASIC PRINCIPLES WHICH HAD CONSISTENTLY GUIDED THE PATRIOTIC FRONT IN PREVIOUS DISCUSSIONS WITH THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT. THE COMMONWEALTH HAD, HE CONSIDERED EMERGED UNITED IN ITS OPPOSITION TO THE SALISBURY "SHAM" ELECTIONS AND THE "TREACHEROUS" CONSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS.
ALLINSON

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MR. WILSON
MR. WILLIAMS

ADDITIONAL DISTN.
RHODESIA POLICY

GR 320

UNCLASSIFIED

FM WASHINGTON 082148Z AUGUST 79

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 2238 OF 8 AUGUST

INFO IMMEDIATE LUSAKA ROUTINE MIRIMBA SALISBURY.

Prime Minister

9/2

MT.

MY TEL 2220: RHODESIA: US EDITORIAL COMMENT.

1. THE NEW YORK TIMES OF 8 AUGUST CARRIES AN EDITORIAL ON THE AGREEMENT REACHED IN LUSAKA.

"THE TALENT OF THE BRITISH FOR DIPLOMACY MUST LIE IN THE GENES. THE EMPIRE IS LOST, YET GIVE THEM A PROBLEM IN FOREIGN POLICY AND THEY REVERT INSTINCTIVELY TO THE STYLE THAT LONG KEPT THEM GREAT. AFTER ONLY A FEW WEEKS IN OFFICE MRS THATCHER IS PROVING IT AGAIN WITH THE PROBLEM OF ZIMBABWE RHODESIA THE TRICK OF COURSE WILL BE TO SELL THE AGREEMENT TO THE CONTENDING FORCES. AND IF IT FINALLY FAILS, THEN AT LEAST BRITAINS (AND AMERICANS) STAND A CHANCE OF AVOIDING THE BLAME FOR LEAVING A COLONIAL STRUCTURE THAT IS PRODUCING A DESTRUCTIVE CIVIL WAR. IT SOUNDS DIFFICULT BECAUSE IT IS. IF IT ALSO SOUNDS A LITTLE TRICKY, WELL, THAT IS DIPLOMACY AS PLAYED BY THE MASTERS". THE EDITORIAL ALSO POINTS OUT THAT "THE AMERICAN INTEREST LIES VERY CLOSE TO THE NEW BRITISH APPROACH. PRESIDENT CARTER KNOWS THIS AND HAS STRUGGLED HARD TO KEEP CONGRESS FROM TYING HIS HANDS. AMERICANS NOW NEED TO HELP MRS THATCHER MOSTLY BY STANDING ASIDE".

2. THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR OF 7 AUGUST CARRIED A FAVOURABLE EDITORIAL WHICH BEGAN:

/"LIGHT IS

"LIGHT IS BEGINNING TO BREAK THROUGH ON THE WHOLE VEXED ISSUE OF ZIMBABWE-RHODESIA. THE PLAN ADOPTED AT THE COMMONWEALTH CONFERENCE IN LUSAKA PROVIDES PERHAPS THE BEST OPPORTUNITY SINCE RHODESIAN INDEPENDENCE TO RESOLVE THE POLITICAL CONFLICT AND BRING THE LONG AND TRAGIC CIVIL WAR TO AN END". THE EDITION ALSO COMMENTS ON THE ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES, WHICH IT ASSERTS HAS "DOMINATED THE DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS OF RECENT YEARS". THE U.S. ADMINISTRATION HAS "NOW WISELY TAKEN A BACK SEAT TO PLAY AN IMPORTANT BUT QUIETLY SUPPORTING ROLE".

ROBINSON

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MR. WILLSON
MR. WILLIAMS

ADDITIONAL DISTN.
RHODESIA POLICY

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Prime Minister

CONFIDENTIAL

FM WASHINGTON 081720Z AUG 79

TO ROUTINE FCO

TEL NO 2230 OF 8 AUG 1979

INFO ROUTINE MIRIMBA SALISBURY.

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RHODESIA

1. SEKOU TOURE, ON A VISIT TO THE U.S., SAW CARTER THIS MORNING. HARROP, STATE DEPARTMENT, WHO WAS PRESENT, TOLD ME THAT SEKOU TOURE'S ATTITUDE ON RHODESIA WAS MODERATE AND HELPFUL. HE ACCEPTED THE LUSAKA AGREEMENT, AND SEEMED TO SUPPORT IT. HE ADMITTED THAT HE HAD SUPPORTED THE MONROVIA RESOLUTION, BUT ACCEPTED THAT IT WAS NO SOLUTION, AND THAT THE SOLUTION MUST COME FROM QUOTE A RECONCILIATION AMONG THE LEADERS UNQUOTE. MUZOREWA WAS A RESPECTED AND HONEST MAN. ON THE OTHER HAND, THE OAU RESOLUTION HAD GIVEN A STATURE TO THE CADRES OF THE PATRIOTIC FRONT WHICH COULD NOT BE IGNORED.

ROBINSON

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ADDITIONAL DISTN.
RHODESIA POLICY

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UNCLASSIFIED

FM KINSHASA 081300Z AUG

TO ROUTINE FCO

TELNO 174 OF 8 AUGUST 1979

INFO ROUTINE LUSAKA, LAGOS, DAR ES SALAAM, GABORONE, MAPUTO,
LUANDA, BRUSSELS, MARIMBA SALISBURY.

INFO SAVING ACCRA, NAIROBI, ABIDJAN, MONROVIA, WASHINGTON, PARIS,
BONN (FCO PLEASE PASS ALL SAVING).

STATEMENT BY MOBUTU ON ZIMBABWE-RHODESIA.

1. PRESIDENT MOBUTU MADE A STATEMENT ON RHODESIA TO LOCAL PRESS
IN KINSHASA YESTERDAY 7 AUGUST. FOLLOWING IS A ROUGH TRANSLATION
OF MAIN PARTS.

2. QUOTE. I AM PLEASED AT THE POSITIVE RESULT ACHIEVED BY THE
COMMONWEALTH HEADS OF STATE AND GOVERNMENT IN LUSAKA REGARDING THE
DIFFICULT PROBLEM OF ZIMBABWE. IT SHOULD BE REMEMBERED THAT AT
THE RECENT OAU SUMMIT IN MONROVIA, I PUT FORWARD CONCRETE PRO-
POSALS WITH A VIEW TO BRINGING TOGETHER AT THE CONFERENCE TABLE
ALL THE SONS OF ZIMBABWE, WHETHER THEY ARE WITHIN OR OUTSIDE THE
COUNTRY.

3. ZAIRE, A GREAT COUNTRY IN THE HEART OF AFRICA, COULD NOT IGNORE
ITS RESPONSIBILITIES TOWARDS ITS BROTHER-COUNTRY WHICH HAS SUFFERED
AND TO WHICH THE ZAIRIAN PEOPLE IS ATTACHED BY SO MANY LINKS.
NATURALLY THE MAIN RESPONSIBILITY FOR BRINGING THIS COUNTRY TO
INDEPENDENCE IN CONDITIONS WHICH ARE ACCEPTABLE TO AFRICA AND
THE WORLD MUST BE ASSUMED BY THE UNITED KINGDOM AS THE ADMINI-
STERING POWER.

4. AFRICA SHOULD NOT GET STUCK IN A POSE OF PERPETUAL CONDEMNATION.
WE ALL KNOW WHAT IS UNACCEPTABLE, BUT IT IS NECESSARY TO GET AWAY
FROM WELL WORN PATHS AND PROPOSE DYNAMIC SOLUTIONS. IN MAKING
MY PROPOSALS TO THE OAU SUMMIT, I TOOK CARE TO CONSULT A GREAT
NUMBER OF MY AFRICAN COLLEAGUES AS WELL AS THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT,
OF WHOM I RECEIVED THE VICE MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS, MR
RICHARD LUCE.

Prime Minister

SM
9/12

ans.

5. THE DECISION OF THE COMMONWEALTH HEADS OF STATE AND GOVERNMENT GIVES ME PARTICULAR PLEASURE BECAUSE IT COINCIDES WITH AND EVEN REINFORCES MY POSITION. IT IS NOW TIME THAT ALL THE SONS OF ZIMBABWE SHOULD UNDERSTAND THAT IT IS IN THEIR INTERESTS TO SEIZE THIS NEW CHANCE WHICH HAS BEEN OFFERED TO THEM. I APPEAL TO MY BROTHER LEADERS OF ZIMBABWE TO BE MORE FLEXIBLE AND TO ACCEPT THAT IN THE PRESENCE OF THE ADMINISTERING POWER THEY CAN DISCUSS FREELY THE FUTURE OF THEIR COUNTRY. I ADVISE THEM TO REPLACE THE BATTLE FIELD WITH THE TABLE TOP. IN THIS PEACE INITIATIVE WHICH MAY OPEN UP NEW PROSPECTS OF AN INDEPENDENT ZIMBABWE, ZAIRE OFFERS ALL ITS ASSISTANCE UNQUOTE.

CORMACK.

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PS/MR. LUCE
PS/MR. RIDLEY
PS/MR. HURD
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SIR A PARSONS
MISS BROWN
MR. THOMAS
MR. WILLISON
MR. WILLIAMS

ADDITIONAL DISTN.
RHODESIA POLICY

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REQUESTED

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CONFIDENTIAL

● PRETORIA 081340Z AUG

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TEL NO 435 OF 8/8/79

INFO IMMEDIATE MIRIMBA SALISBURY WASHINGTON UKMIS NEW YORK
PRIORITY LUSAKA DAR ES SALAAM MAPUTO GABORONE LUANDA LAGOS*Prime Minister**But
9/8**ant.*

RHODESIA: SOUTH AFRICAN VIEWS

1. VAN HEERDEN GAVE REID TODAY A RELATIVELY OPTIMISTIC INSIGHT INTO SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT REACTIONS TO THE AGREEMENT REACHED AT CHOGM ON RHODESIA. HE SAID THAT THE AGREEMENT HAD HAD AN UNSETTLING EFFECT BECAUSE THE SOUTH AFRICANS WERE ALWAYS ANXIOUS ABOUT THE UNKNOWN. THERE HAD, HE SAID, BEEN A STRONG INCLINATION TO REACT WITH A TRECHANTLY WORDED STATEMENT BUT WISER COUNSELS HAD PREVAILED AND IT HAD BEEN DECIDED TO WAIT FOR AS FULL AN ACCOUNT AS POSSIBLE OF WHAT WAS ENVISAGED.
2. VAN HEERDEN SAID THAT THERE WERE FEATURES OF THE AGREEMENT WHICH THE SOUTH AFRICANS DID NOT LIKE, SUCH AS A NEW ELECTION, BUT HE ACCEPTED REID'S ARGUMENT THAT IT WAS IMPOSSIBLE TO CONCEIVE OF AN INDEPENDENCE CONSTITUTION WHICH DID NOT PROVIDE FOR ELECTIONS GIVEN THE PRIZE THAT WAS WITHIN OUR GRASP, ELECTIONS WERE A PILL THAT COULD BE SWALLOWED. VAN HEERDEN ALSO AGREED THAT IT WAS VERY SATISFACTORY THAT WE HAD THE FULL SUPPORT OF THE COMMONWEALTH FOR THE ADOPTION OF A CONSTITUTION WITH GUARANTEES FOR THE WHITES SEMICLN AND THAT WE HAD MADE IT CLEAR THAT WE WERE NOT GOING TO ALLOW THE PATRIOTIC FRONT A POWER OF VETO.
3. THIS LED VAN HEERDEN TO URGE US TO UNDERSTAND THAT THE KEY CONCERN OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT WAS SECURITY. THEY WOULD LOOK EXTREMELY CLOSELY AT WHAT PLANS WERE WORKED OUT FOR THE CONTROL OF THE ARMED FORCES. WHAT THEY FEARED ABOVE ALL WAS AN EXODUS OF THE WHITES FROM RHODESIA PRECIPITATED BY A LOSS OF CONFIDENCE IN SECURITY.
4. VAN HEERDEN ALSO STRESSED THE VITAL IMPORTANCE OF OUR KEEPING THE SOUTH AFRICANS IN TOUCH AND INFORMED OF OUR THINKING.

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5. REID TOOK THE OPPORTUNITY TO MAKE THE POINTS TELEPHONED BY SIR A DUFF LAST NIGHT IE THAT THE SOUTH AFRICANS SHOULD SEE THE DECLARATION ON RACISM AND THE PASSAGE IN THE COMMUNIQUE ON SOUTH AFRICA IN THEIR CONTEXT. THEY COULD HAVE BEEN WORSE AND WE HAD SUCCEEDED IN MAKING THEM LESS ABRASSIVE. VAN HEERDEN TOOK THIS ON BOARD, AND ASKED FOR THE TEXTS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. GRATEFUL IF THESE COULD BE SENT BY FASTEST MEANS.

6. I AM SEEING PIK BOTHA LATER THIS AFTERNOON TO DELIVER THE MESSAGE IN LUSAKA TEL NO 12 TO PRETORIA.

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Prime Minister

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FM MIRIMBA SALISBURY 080900Z AUG 79

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 496 OF 8 AUGUST

INFO PRIORITY PRETORIA MAPUTO LAGOS DAR ES SALAAM LUANDA
G LUSAKA GABORONE WASHINGTON AND UKMIS NEW YORK

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RHODESIA: REACTION TO CHGM'S STATEMENT

1. I UNDERSTAND FROM GEORGE SMITH (CABINET SECRETARY) THAT
YESTERDAY'S CABINET MEETING ENDORSED THAT BISHOP'S LINE THAT THE
GOVERNMENT SHOULD NOT AT THIS STAGE OVER-REACT TO THE LUSAKA
STATEMENT. THEY WILL WAIT AND SEE WHAT DETAILED PROPOSALS ARE
PUT FORWARD BY HMG BEFORE ADOPTING FIRM ATTITUDES.

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FM FCO 081740Z AUG 79

TO PRIORITY WASHINGTON

TELEGRAM NUMBER 992 OF 8 AUGUST

ant

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF MESSAGE FROM CYRUS VANCE TRANSMITTED BY
U S AMBASSADOR TODAY.

BEGINS:-

DEAR PETER:

I SEND WARM CONGRATULATIONS ON THE WAY THAT THE ZIMBABWE/
RHODESIA ISSUE HAS BEEN HANDLED AT THE COMMONWEALTH CONFERENCE.
YOU AND THE PRIME MINISTER HAVE HANDLED THE MATTER WITH
GREAT SKILL. THE RESULT IS AN EXCELLENT ONE AND YOU CAN
COUNT ON OUR FULL SUPPORT.

SINCERELY,
CY VANCE

ENDS.

CARRINGTON

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Prime Minister

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TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 308 OF 8 AUGUST

INFO IMMEDIATE LUSAKA, DAR ES SALAAM, MAPUTO AND GABORONE
INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK AND PRETORIA.

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MY TELNO 306 OF 7 AUGUST (NOT TO ALL)

ANGOLA: RHODESIA - CALL ON PRESIDENT NETO

ms.

1. HAVING ASKED TO DELIVER TEXT IN LUSAKA TELNO 847 OF 5 AUGUST, I WAS CALLED AT SHORT NOTICE TO SEE PRESIDENT NETO LAST NIGHT (7 AUGUST). I HAD HALF AN HOUR WITH HIM ALONE, APART FROM HIS SECRETARY WHO TOOK NOTES.

2. I RECALLED THE PRESIDENT'S CONVERSATION WITH LORD HARLECH (LAGOS TELNO 327 OF 21 JUNE), SAYING I BELIEVED NETO WOULD FIND THAT THE TEXT AGREED BY THIRTY NINE COMMONWEALTH LEADERS AT LUSAKA COVERED POINTS HE HAD MADE TO LORD HARLECH.

3. NETO READ CAREFULLY THROUGH THE TEXT, TAKING HIS TIME AND PAUSING TO SAY THAT WHILE HE FOLLOWED A CONVERSATION IN ENGLISH HE NEEDED LONGER TO READ. WHEN HE HAD DONE HE LOOKED AT ME FOR A TIME BEFORE SAYING QUIETLY QUOTE-IT IS SATISFACTORY. FINALLY, GREAT BRITAIN IS ASSUMING HER RESPONSIBILITIES WHICH UP TILL NOW SHE HAS NEVER WANTED TO DO- UNQUOTE. AT A LATER STAGE HE COMMENTED THAT THE TEXT ACCORDED MORE OR LESS WITH LINE ADOPTED AT FRONT LINE PRESIDENT'S MEETING AT LUSAKA ON EVE OF THE COMMONWEALTH CONFERENCE. HIS FINAL COMMENT WAS QUOTE VAMOS A VER UNQUOTE - LET US SEE.

4. I GAVE NETO TEXT OF THE PRIME MINISTER'S SPEECH IN PARLIAMENT ON 25 JULY AND DREW HIS ATTENTION TO SPEECHES INTERVIEWS AND BRIEFING GIVEN AT LUSAKA (RETRACTS 47507, 50407, AND LUSAKA TELNO 852 OF 6 AUGUST). I POINTED TO THE PRIME MINISTER'S CLEARLY EXPRESSED WISH TO PRESS AHEAD, WITH FULL COMMONWEALTH SUPPORT, TO IMPLEMENTATION OF THE TEXT AGREED AT LUSAKA.

5. NETO NOTED A REFERENCE TO MOCAMBIQUE IN RELATION TO THE PATRIOTIC FRONT. ANGOLA HE SAID WOULD ALSO HAVE AND ACTIVE PART TO PLAY, ALTHOUGH THE PROBLEM OF ZIMBABWE WAS FURTHER AWAY

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PHYSICALLY THAN THAT OF NAMIBIA, QUOTE WE OUGHT TO REACH PEACEFUL SOLUTIONS FOR BOTH PROBLEMS UNQUOTE. I SAID I HAD DETECTED A CONTINUING NOTE OF SCEPTICISM IN SOME OF THE REPORTING OF THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT'S POSITION BY ANGOLAN MEDIA. I SINCERELY HOPED THAT THE PRESIDENT WOULD GIVE HIS SUPPORT TO THE PRIME MINISTER IN THE WEEKS AHEAD, PARTICULARLY OVER CONVINCING THE PATRIOTIC FRONT THAT THEY SHOULD TAKE PART IN ELECTIONS. HE HAD TOLD LORD HARLECH THAT THIS WAS WHAT HE WANTED. A CEASEFIRE WAS A CLEAR PRE-CONDITION FOR RHODESIA, AS FOR NAMIBIA.

6. NETO REPLIED THAT DECISIONS MUST COME FROM THE PARTIES THEMSELVES; ANGOLA DID NOT WANT TO OVER-PERSUADE THEM. I INSISTED THAT THERE WOULD STILL BE MUCH NEED OF PERSUASION AMONG THOSE INVOLVED IN THE PROBLEM OF RHODESIA, AS WELL AS THOSE CONCERNED WITH NAMIBIA. NETO TOOK THIS AS A REFERENCE TO NUJOMA AND SMILED. BUT HE WENT ON TO MAKE A POINT WHICH MAY PROVE A DIFFICULTY WITH HIM. ELECTIONS IN NAMIBIA WOULD BE UNDER UN SUPERVISION AND, ACCORDING TO THE UN PROPOSAL, SAG FORCES WOULD HAVE BEEN WITHDRAWN OR RESTRICTED. IF THE PATRIOTIC FRONT WERE TO BE PERSUADED TO PARTICIPATE IN ELECTIONS THERE WOULD HAVE TO BE INTERNATIONAL SUPERVISION E.G. BY THE UN; AND (AND) THE QUOTE FORCES OF THE PATRIOTIC FRONT WOULD HAVE TO BE INVOLVED UNQUOTE. A FRESH ELECTION QUOTE CONTROLLED UNQUOTE BY RHODESIAN FORCES WOULD BE NO BETTER THAN THE QUOTE MUZOREWA ELECTIONS IN APRIL UNQUOTE, PARTICULARLY IF SOUTH AFRICAN POLICE AND SECURITY SERVICES WERE STILL PRESENT. I REFERRED NETO TO LUSAKA TEXT (G) EMPHASISING PROVISIONS FOR SUPERVISION UNDER BRITISH GOVERNMENT AUTHORITY AND FOR COMMONWEALTH OBSERVERS. NETO COMMENTED ONLY THAT QUOTE-OBSERVERS CANNOT BE IN EVERY CORNER-UNQUOTE. I HOPE IT WILL BE POSSIBLE TO RETURN TO THIS ASPECT WITH HIM LATER ON INSTRUCTIONS.

7. NETO AGREED THAT IT WOULD BE USEFUL FOR HIM TO BE KEPT IN TOUCH WITH DEVELOPMENTS FOLLOWING LUSAKA. HE EXPECTED THAT A FURTHER FRONT LINE PRESIDENT'S MEETING WOULD BE HELD FAIRLY SOON AND WAS WAITING TO HEAR FROM 'THE CHAIRMAN' PRESIDENT NYERERE.

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CONFIDENTIAL

8. LUSAKA TEXT AND TEXTS OF PRIME MINISTER'S SPEECHES OF 25 JULY AND THOSE OF LUSAKA HAVE ALSO BEEN DELIVERED TO ANGOLAN FOREIGN MINISTRY FOR MINISTER AND VICE MINISTER (BOTH CURRENTLY TRAVELLING) AND TO MPLA PARTY SECRETARY FOR EXTERNAL RELATIONS WHO ACCOMPANIED PRESIDENT NETO TO FLP MEETING AT LUSAKA ON 30 JULY.

FCO PLEASE PASS TO ALL

BYATT

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

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RHODESIA POLICY

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CONFIDENTIAL

FM MAPUTO 080810Z AUGUST 79

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 189 OF 8 AUGUST

INFO LUSAKA DAR ES SALAAM MIRIMBA SALISBURY GABORONE LILONGWE
PRETORIA WASHINGTON UKMIS NEW YORK LUANDA LAGOS NAIROBI

MY TELNO 16 TO LUSAKA: CHGM - MOZAMBIQUE

1. THERE IS STILL NO EDITORIAL COMMENT ON THE CHGM AGREEMENT ON RHODESIA. TODAY'S PRESS REPORTS THAT ZANU SECRETARY-GENERAL, TEKERE, YESTERDAY WELCOMED IT. HE HOPED THAT HMG WOULD REMAIN FAITHFUL TO IT, ON BEHALF OF THE PATRIOTIC FRONT (PF), TEKERE SAID THAT IT INCLUDED THE PF'S BASIC PRINCIPLES: BUT THEY DEPLORED THE INTRODUCTION OF SPECIAL RACIAL PRIVILEGES. THE CHGM HAD CHANGED MRS THATCHER'S LINE. THE COMMONWEALTH WAS UNITED IN OPPOSITION TO THE PRESENT RHODESIAN CONSTITUTION AND ELECTIONS. AGREEMENT WAS NECESSARY ON MILITARY AND OTHER MATTERS, BEFORE THERE COULD BE A CEASEFIRE.

2. VOICE OF ZIMBABWE, HOWEVER, YESTERDAY SAID THAT ZANU HAD GIVEN A QUOTE LOW-PROFILE REACTION UNQUOTE TO THE CHGM COMMUNIQUE. THEIR INFORMATION DEPARTMENT HAD ISSUED A STATEMENT SAYING THAT ZANU'S POSITION WAS WELL KNOWN: THEIR ATTENDANCE AT A CONFERENCE WOULD DEPEND ON ACCEPTANCE OF THREE PRECONDITIONS: THE SMITH REGIME AND ITS INSTITUTIONS MUST BE LIQUIDATED: FULL MILITARY, POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC POWER MUST PASS TO THE PEOPLE, WITH NO RACIST OR OTHER LIMITATIONS: THE RACIST ARMY AND POLICE FORCE MUST BE DISARMED AND DEMOBILISED.

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3. SUCH RAPID REHEARSAL OF SO-CALLED PRECONDITIONS IS DEPRESSING, BUT TO BE EXPECTED. ZANU ARE PROBABLY KEEN TO ESTABLISH A FIRM NEGOTIATING POSITION: I CANNOT BELIEVE THAT THEY REALLY EXPECT THEIR PRE-CONDITIONS TO BE MET AND DOUBT IF THEY WILL REFUSE TO COME TO A CONFERENCE, IF THEY ARE NOT (MY TELNO 164, NOT TO ALL, IS RELEVANT: BUT TOO MUCH RELIANCE SHOULD NOT BE PLACED ON TEKERE'S REMARKS THEN ABOUT ATTENDING A CONFERENCE).

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TO IMMEDIATE PRETORIA
TELEGRAM NUMBER 012 OF 8 AUGUST

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BEGINS

THANK YOU FOR THE MESSAGE FROM THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT OF 31 JULY, WHICH REACHED THE PRIME MINISTER AND ME HERE JUST BEFORE THE COMMONWEALTH MEETING STARTED. YOU WILL REALISE THAT I WANTED TO WAIT TO SEE HOW THE CONFERENCE WENT BEFORE REPLYING SEMICLN AND I HAVE NOW HAD YOUR MESSAGE OF 6 AUGUST TOO.

2. I AM SORRY TO SEE FROM YOUR SECOND MESSAGE THAT YOU FIND DIFFICULTY WITH SOME ASPECTS OF THE STATEMENT ON RHODESIA WHICH WAS ISSUED ON 5 AUGUST. I CANNOT IN THE SPACE OF THIS MESSAGE SPELL OUT THE WHOLE BACKGROUND OF THE NEGOTIATION WHICH LED TO THIS STATEMENT. BUT I HOPE THAT ON REFLECTION YOU WILL AGREE THAT IT REFLECTS SOME VERY IMPORTANT CHANGES IN THE ATTITUDES OF OUR COMMONWEALTH PARTNERS.

3. FIRST, AND PERHAPS MOST IMPORTANT, IS THE RECOGNITION IN THE STATEMENT (WHICH WAS BROUGHT OUT EVEN MORE CLEARLY IN PRESIDENT NYERERE'S SPEECH AT THE BEGINNING OF OUR DEBATE) THAT THERE HAVE BEEN SIGNIFICANT POLITICAL CHANGES IN SALISBURY.

4. THE SECOND IMPORTANT POINT IS THE EXPRESSED CONFIDENCE OF THE COMMONWEALTH IN BRITAIN TO EXERCISE, UNTRAMMELLED BY CONDITIONS OR COMMITTEES, OUR CONSTITUTIONAL RESPONSIBILITY TO BRING RHODESIA TO LEGAL INDEPENDENCE.

5. THIRD, YOU WILL HAVE NOTICED THAT THERE HAS BEEN NO REFERENCE TO THE POSITION TAKEN AT THE OAU SUMMIT IN MONROVIA ABOUT THE PATRIOTIC FRONT BEING THE SOLE LEGITIMATE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE RHODESIAN PEOPLE.

CONFIDENTIAL

/6. FOURTH

6. FOURTH, WE SECURED A REFERENCE IN THE STATEMENT TO THE END OF SANCTIONS, AS A "MAJOR OBJECTIVE", NOT ONLY OF THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT BUT OF ALL THE SIGNATORIES. AND FINALLY, YOU WILL NOTE THAT WE HAVE RETAINED THE PRINCIPLE OF SAFEGUARDS FOR MINORITIES IN RHODESIA, NAMELY OF COURSE THE WHITES.

7. WHATEVER YOUR MISGIVINGS ON FIRST READING, I AM SURE YOU WILL RECOGNISE THE PROGRESS THAT WE HAVE MADE IN ALL THESE AREAS. AS THE PRIME MINISTER SAID IN A PRESS CONFERENCE TODAY, NONE OF THIS WOULD HAVE BEEN POSSIBLE HAD IT NOT BEEN FOR THE PROGRESS ALREADY MADE WITHIN RHODESIA IN THE PARIL ELECTIONS. WE HAVE NO INENTION OF BELITTLING THAT ACHIEVEMENT, NOR OF STARTING AGAIN FROM SCRATCH. OUR AIM REMAINS, TO BRING RHODESIA TO INDEPENDENCE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE WITH WIDE INTERNATIONAL RECOGNITION. THERE WILL BE NO GOING BACK ON THAT PLEDGE. NOR DO WE INTEND TO BE SIDE-TRACKED FROM OUR DETERMINATION TO BUILD ON WHAT HAS ALREADY BEEN ACHIEVED IN RHODESIA.

8. WE OF COURSE RECOGNISE YOUR OWN INTEREST IN RHODESIAN DEVELOPMENTS, AND THE IMPLICATIONS FOR THE WHOLE OF SOUTHERN AFRICA OF EVENTS THERE. THAT IS WHY I SO MUCH WELCOMED THE OPPORTUNITY TO TALK TO YOU IN LONDON SEMICLN AND WHY I WANT TO KEEP IN THE CLOSEST POSSIBLE TOUCH WITH YOUR THINKING, AND TO EXPLAIN TO YOU HOW WE SEE THE WAY FORWARD. I SHOULD HAVE LIKED TO HAVE TALKED TO YOU MYSELF WHILE I WAS IN THE AREA, BUT UNFORTUNATELY I MUST GO STRAIGHT BACK TO LONDON WITH THE PRIME MINISTER FOR A CABINET MEETING-AT WHICH RHODESIA WILL BE DISCUSSED. I AM, HOWEVER, GIVING URGENT CONSIDERATION TO THE POSSIBILITY OF SENDING ONE OF OUR MOST SENIOR MEN TO SEE YOUR PEOPLE (AND YOU YOURSELF IF YOU COULD FIND THE TIME) IN THE NEAR FUTURE. OUR INTERESTS IN THESE MATTERS ARE MUTUAL AND WE SHARE YOUR WISH TO WORK TOGETHER.

9. MEANWHILE I DO HOPE YOU WILL NOT COME TO ANY PREMATURE CONCLUSIONS ABOUT WHAT HAS HAPPENED IN LUSAKA, NOT LEAST BECAUSE WE MUST BOTH AVOID GIVING THE WHITES IN RHODESIA CAUSE FOR ALARM OR DESPONDENCY. IN MY VIEW THERE IS NO SUCH CAUSE. ON THE CONTRARY,

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I BELIEVE THAT LUSAKA HAS GIVEN US A SIGNIFICANT PUSH FORWARD TOWARDS OUR OBJECTIVE. WHATEVER THE PRESS MAY TELL YOU, THERE HAS BEEN NO CHANGE IN OUR BASIC POSITION, AND NO CHANGE IN OUR DETERMINATION TO BRING RHODESIA SAFELY TO THE SETTLEMENT WE ALL WANT TO SEE. I HAVE NO ILLUSIONS ABOUT THE DIFFICULTIES THAT STILL LIE ON THE ROAD AHEAD OF US, BUT WE HOPE TO OVERCOME THESE WITH THE CLOSE COOPERATION OF SOUTH AFRICA, AMONGST OTHERS.

10. YOU WILL SEE FROM THIS OVERLONG MESSAGE THAT OUR THOUGHTS HERE HAVE BEEN VERY LARGELY CONCENTRATED ON RHODESIA. BUT I AM ACUTELY CONSCIOUS OF OUR EQUALLY IMPORTANT MUTUAL CONCERN OVER NAMIBIA. I AM VERY GLAD THAT JAMES MURRAY WILL BE WITH YOU SHORTLY, AND I THINK, FROM WHAT I HAVE HEARD FROM OTHER QUARTERS THAT THERE IS NOW SOME PROSPECTS OF OUR TOGETHER BREAKING THE DEADLOCK WE HAVE BEEN IN FOR THE LAST SEVERAL MONTHS.

WITH WARM REGARDS,

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FM LUSAKA 081000Z AUG 79

TO IMMEDIATE PRETORIA

TELEGRAM NUMBER 011 OF 8 AUGUST

INFO IMMEDIATE FCO

PRETORIA TELNO 020

MY IFT CONTAINS THE TEXT OF A MESSAGE FROM THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HONOURABLE R F BOTHA, WHICH HE HANDED TO ME ON HIS DEPARTURE FOR LONDON FOR YOU TO DELIVER TO HIM.

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RHODESIA POLICY

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(WRITTEN IN LUSAKA)

FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

LONDON


7 August 1979

Dear Boya,

Prime Minister's Message to Bishop Muzorewa

The Prime Minister might wish to add to the formal message she has already sent to Bishop Muzorewa the following paragraph which could be written on the bottom of the signed copy:-

"You have had to face many challenges since you assumed the leadership of Zimbabwe-Rhodesia and I do not underestimate the difficulties ahead. But I hope from what the British Government have done since we came into office, and from our talks together, that you trust our good faith and our determination to work with you to achieve a settlement."

Yours ever,


(J S Wall)

Private Secretary

Bryan G Cartledge Esq
10 Downing Street
LONDON

DRAFT LETTER FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO BISHOP MUZOREWA

Approved - p.a.
MSO 6/8

Mr. Day will have given you the text of the statement on Zimbabwe Rhodesia agreed by the Commonwealth Heads of Government here. We have not wavered from the objective which we set ourselves and which I have described in the House of Commons and to the meeting in Lusaka, namely to bring Zimbabwe Rhodesia to legal independence with wide international acceptance. We now have the agreement of the Commonwealth as a whole that the constitutional responsibility for this rests with the British Government. They welcomed our indication that the next step would be for the United Kingdom to convene a constitutional conference of all the parties concerned. Above all, the Commonwealth have now accepted that it must be a major objective to bring about the cessation of hostilities and an end to sanctions, as part of the process of implementing a lasting settlement.

This is in accordance with the programme I outlined to you. It is left to the British Government to work out detailed proposals and to put these to the parties concerned. I shall be in touch with you shortly about these proposals and we shall keep in the closest contact about carrying forward all aspects of our policy.

The Commonwealth has endorsed the need for a negotiated solution to the problem of Zimbabwe Rhodesia. This paves the way for real progress towards the peace that you and all Rhodesians want and need.



EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Lusaka

August 7, 1979

Handwritten: Enter na
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Dear Steve:

Enclosed are texts of excerpts from White House press briefings which might be of interest to Lord Carrington.

I hope they prove useful to you.

Sincerely,

[Signature]
John R. Clingerman
Chargé d'Affaires ad interim

Enclosures:
Two excerpts

Handwritten:
Sr A. Duff

AS/PA
AS/PA
Sr A. Duff
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W. Ferris
[Signature]
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TELEGRAM

ACTION: PCLC

UNCLASSIFIED AUGUST 7, 1979 (0945L)

INFO:

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Classification

R 070152Z AUG 79
FM SESTATE WASHDC
TO ALL AFRICAN DIPLOMATIC POSTS
R UDT/AMEMBASSY LONDON 6600
R LEHBC/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 2927
R LESKN/AMEMBASSY KINGSTON 9070
R UFNPS/AMEMBASSY PARIS 7516
R UTABA/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA MONROVIA 3157
BT
UNCLAS STATE 204997

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TAGS: SOPN

SUBJECT: COMMONWEALTH CONFERENCE: WHITE HOUSE REACTION TO
RHODESIA COMMUNIQUE

FOLLOWING IS EXCERPT FROM WHITE HOUSE SPOKESMAN'S DAILY
PRESS BRIEFING, AUGUST 6:

Q: HAS THE PRESIDENT SENT A MESSAGE TO MRS THATCHER IN
CONNECTION WITH THE RHODESIA POLICY?

A: MR. POWELL: I WILL GIVE YOU A BRIEF COMMENT ON THAT.
YOU WILL HAVE TO DEPEND ON STATE ON ANYTHING FURTHER. THE
PRESIDENT HAS EXPRESSED HIS SATISFACTION THAT THE AGREEMENT
IS A SIGNIFICANT STEP FORWARD, AS WELL AS HIS HOPE THAT IT
CAN SERVE AS A BASIS FOR A JUST AND LASTING SETTLEMENT IN
ZIMBABWE-RHODESIA. HE HAS TOLD MRS. THATCHER THAT WE LOOK
FORWARD TO CONSULTING ON DETAILS OF THE PROGRESS BEING
MADE AND HE HAS EXPRESSED HIS SUPPORT FOR THE NEW INITIA-
TIVE.

Q: THAT WAS IN A PHONE CALL, HE TOLD HER THAT?

A: MR. POWELL: WE ARE INFORMED YESTERDAY -- MRS. THATCHER
INFORMED THE PRESIDENT OF THE FACT THAT 39 HEADS OF GOVERN-
MENT OF THE BRITISH COMMONWEALTH MEETING IN LUSAKA HAD
AGREED ON A COMMUNIQUE TO SERVE AS A BASIS FOR MOVEMENT
TOWARD A SETTLEMENT IN ZIMBABWE-RHODESIA. THAT WAS NOT IN
A PHONE CALL, THAT WAS THROUGH DIPLOMATIC MESSAGES, AS WAS
THE PRESIDENT'S RESPONSE.

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TELEGRAM

ACTION: POLC UNCLASSIFIED AUG 7, 1979 (0913L)

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KIGALI KINSHASA LISBON LONDON LUBUMBASHI MASERU MOGADISCIO
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UNCLAS STATE 204466

FROM AFXP

E.O. 12065: N/A

TAGS: SOPN

SUBJECT: DEPARTMENT OF STATE PRESS BRIEFING, AUGUST 6, 1979

FOLLOWING IS AN UNOFFICIAL, UNCORRECTED EXCERPT OF AFRICA
PORTIONS, FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE PRESS BRIEFING.
IF NECESSARY, OFFICIAL VERSION WILL FOLLOW:

TODAY THE SPOKESMAN WAS TOM RESTON.

WE ARE PLEASED WITH THE AGREEMENT ON RHODESIA REACHED BY
THE COMMONWEALTH NATIONS IN LUSAKA. IT REPRESENTS A SIGNI-
FICANT STEP TOWARD ACHIEVING A JUST AND LASTING SETTLEMENT.

WE LOOK FORWARD TO LEARNING MORE FROM THE BRITISH ABOUT
THEIR INITIATIVE AND HOW WE CAN BE SUPPORTIVE OF THIS PRO-
CESS WHICH THEY HAVE SET IN MOTION.

Q: YOU REFERRED TO "WE LOOK FORWARD." IS THERE ANY FORMAL
SESSION SET UP BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND BRITAIN TO
PURSUE THIS?

HOW WOULD YOU LEARN MORE?

A: I AM NOT AWARE THAT WE HAVE SET UP ANY FORMAL TIME OR
MEETING TO GO INTO THIS WITH THE BRITISH. AS IN THE PAST,
WE WILL BE SUPPORTIVE OF THEIR EFFORTS AND I HAVE NO DOUBT
THAT WE WILL BE DISCUSSING THESE MATTERS IN DETAIL WITH
THEM. BUT IT IS THEIR INITIATIVE.

Q: IS THERE ANY PARTICULAR AMBIGUITY THAT HAS STRUCK THE

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UNITED STATES ABOUT THE BRITISH STATEMENT OR ARE YOU LOOKING
FOR MORE DETAIL?

A: NO. THERE IS NO PARTICULAR AMBIGUITY ABOUT THIS. BUT
WE WILL BE CONSULTING WITH THEM ABOUT THE PROGRESS OF THEIR
INITIATIVE AS IT GOES ALONG.

Q: WAS THE UNITED STATES CONSULTED BEFORE THE BRITISH WENT
AHEAD WITH THIS PLAN OR AS THEY WORKED OUT NEGOTIATIONS IN
LUSAKA ON THIS PLAN?

DID WE HAVE ANY PART IN THE SHAPING OF THE BRITISH PROPOSAL?

A: LET ME SAY THAT THE GOVERNMENT AND MRS. THATCHER HAS
INDICATED REPEATEDLY THAT THEIR POLICY TOWARD RHODESIA
WOULD BE MADE IN FULL CONSULTATION WITH OTHERS INTERESTED
IN THE MATTER AND WITH CONCERNED GOVERNMENTS AND THAT THE
COMMONWEALTH CONFERENCE IN LUSAKA WOULD BE THE CULMINATION
OF THE PROCESS OF CONSULTATIONS WHICH THAT GOVERNMENT BEGAN
IN MAY WHEN IT CAME INTO OFFICE.

THE LUSAKA COMMUNIQUE CONFIRMS WHAT THE BRITISH HAVE SAID
ALL ALONG ABOUT TAKING FULLY AND SERIOUSLY INTO ACCOUNT
THEIR OWN CONSTITUTIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES AND THE VIEWS OF
OTHER CONCERNED GOVERNMENTS.

THEY HAVE BEEN TALKING WITH US AND WE HAVE BEEN TALKING
WITH THEM ABOUT THE RHODESIA PROBLEM RIGHT ALONG EVER SINCE
THEY CAME INTO OFFICE.

Q: SO THAT, SPECIFICALLY ON THIS PROPOSAL THE ANSWER IS
"YES"?

A: WE HAVE BEEN TALKING WITH THEM ABOUT THE QUESTION OF
RHODESIA AND I THINK YOU CAN ASSUME THAT WE HAVE BEEN AWARE
OF THEIR THINKING AND THEY HAVE BEEN AWARE OF OURS.

BUT I WANT TO EMPHASIZE THAT IT IS AN INITIATIVE TAKEN NOT
BY THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT BUT BY THE GOVERNMENT OF
THE UNITED KINGDOM WHICH HAS THE LEGAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR
THAT COUNTRY.

Q: YOU ARE AWARE, I GUESS, OF THE THREE PARTIES DIRECTLY
CONCERNED. TWO OF THEM, BISHOP MUZOREWA AND MR. NKOMO,

APPEAR TO TOTALLY REJECT IT OUT OF HAND.

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DO YOU HAVE ANY THOUGHTS ON THEIR SUMMAR REJECTION?

A: WELL, THE ONLY THOUGHTS I HAVE ARE THAT I JUST THINK IT IS TOO EARLY TO ASCERTAIN WHAT THE CONSIDERED ATTITUDE OF OTHER INTERESTED PARTIES WILL BE TOWARD THIS INITIATIVE. I DON'T THINK ANYBODY HAS ANY ILLUSIONS ABOUT THE DIFFICULTIES THAT WILL LIE AHEAD. BUT WE, NEVERTHELESS, HOPE THAT ALL PARTIES WILL GIVE THE BRITISH INITIATIVE THEIR SERIOUS CONSIDERATION AS OFFERING THE BEST HOPE FOR A SOLUTION.

Q: IN THIS PROCESS WILL THE UNITED STATES HAVE ANY DIRECT TALKS WITH NKOMO TO TRY TO BRING HIM AROUND TO THIS VIEW OF YOUR'S?

A: I WOULDN'T BE SURPRISED IF WE DID. WE HAVE BEEN TALKING WITH MR. NKOMO AND OTHERS INVOLVED IN THIS DISPUTE BOTH WITHIN RHODESIA AND OUTSIDE RHODESIA FOR QUITE A NUMBER OF MONTHS AND EVEN YEARS NOW AND I WOULD ASSUME THAT THOSE TALKS WOULD CONTINUE.

BUT I WANT TO EMPHASIZE TO YOU, LADIES AND GENTLEMEN, THIS IS AN INITIATIVE BY HER MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT. THAT IS WHERE THE WEIGHT OF THIS INITIATIVE IS COMING FROM.

Q: WHAT HAS BROUGHT ON THIS? IT SEEMS TO BE A DRASTIC TRANSFORMATION OF THE AMERICAN ROLE FROM A PERIOD WHEN THIS GOVERNMENT WAS INTENSELY INVOLVED -- INFACIT, LEADING THE EFFORT TO FIND A SOLUTION FOR RHODESIA -- AND NOW WE ARE JUST A CONCERNED GOVERNMENT. WHAT IS BEHIND THIS?

A: NO. I WOULDN'T DESCRIBE OUR PAST ROLE, IN THE FIRST PLACE, AS A LEADING ROLE OR THE LEADING ROLE. WE HAVE ALWAYS BEEN CONSULTING CLOSELY WITH THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT ON THESE MATTERS RIGHT ALONG.

SO, I WOULD REJECT THE PREMISE OF YOUR QUESTION THAT WE WERE PLAYING THE ROLE OF THE LEADER IN THE EFFORTS WHICH HAVE GONE UP TO THIS POINT.

AS I SAID, I THINK IN MY ANSWER TO ONE OF THE QUESTIONS HERE, WHAT MRS. THATCHER AND HER GOVERNMENT HAVE DONE AT LUSAKA IS TO CONFIRM OR RECONFIRM WHAT THE BRITISH HAVE SAID ALL ALONG, WHICH IS THAT THEY INTEND TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT VERY SERIOUSLY THEIR CONSTITUTIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES

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AND THEIR LEGAL JURISDICTION OVER THE TERRITORY OF THAT
SADLY TROUBLED NATION.

Q: CAN I JUST FOLLOW THAT UP?

A: YES.

Q: WHAT ROLE WOULD THE UNITED STATES PLAY?

A: WE WILL BE SUPPORTIVE OF THE BRITISH INITIATIVE AND WE
WILL BE CONSULTING WITH THEM ABOUT THE PROGRESS OF THEIR
INITIATIVE.

Q: TO FOLLOW THAT UP THOUGH, YOU ARE SWEARING IN A NEW
AMBASSADOR TODAY, I BELIEVE, TO ZAMBIA.

A: THAT IS CORRECT.

Q: THERE WAS A TIME WHEN A SPECIALIST FROM THE BRITISH
FOREIGN OFFICE AND A STATE DEPARTMENT MAN SORT OF TRAVELED
IN TANDUM TRYING TO -- BECAUSE THE PROBLEM GOES BEYOND JUST
THAT ONE, I THINK YOU CALLED IT NATION, BUT AT LEAST THAT
ONE TERRITORY.

WHO WILL RUN THAT OPERATION OR WILL YOU HAVE THAT KIND OF
AN OPERATION CONTINUING WITH ONE MAN SPECIALLY CHARGED WITH
IN THE FIELD CONSULTATION AND WILL THAT BE THE NEW
AMBASSADOR OR WILL IT BE SOMEONE ELSE? OR IS THAT -- OR IS
THE LAST QUESTION CORRECT, THAT WE ARE DEFERRING PRETTY
MUCH TO THE BRITISH NOW?

A: THIS IS A BRITISH INITIATIVE AND IT IS FOR THEM TO PURSUE
AS THEY BEST SEE FIT.

NOW, IT IS NOT TO SAY THAT AMBASSADOR DESIGNATE WISNER OR A
NUMBER OF OTHER AMERICAN AMBASSADORS IN SOUTHERN AFRICA OR A
NUMBER OF OTHER AMERICAN PERSONNEL IN SOUTHERN AFRICA WILL
NOT BE INVOLVED IN CONSULTING WITH THE BRITISH AND REPORTING
BACK AS IS THEIR JOB TO OUR GOVERNMENT ABOUT WHAT IS GOING
ON IN THE AREA.

I DON'T HAVE SPECIFIC DUTIES TO BREAK OUT FOR YOU ABOUT WHAT
EACH AND EVERY AMERICAN DIPLOMAT IS GOING TO BE DOING IN THE
AREA.

AS YOU KNOW, WE HAVE DESIGNATED A DIPLOMATIC OFFICIAL OUT OF

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PRETORIA TO TRY TO MAINTAIN SOME SORT OF ONGOING DIALOGUE
WITH THE INTERNAL AUTHORITIES IN RHODESIA-ZIMBABWE. I
DON'T HAVE ANY CHANGE IN HIS PARTICULAR FUNCTION IN THIS
SITUATION.

BUT WE WELCOME AND SUPPORT WHAT THE GOVERNMENT AND MRS.
THATCHER IS PREPARED TO DO.

Q: WHAT DO YOU JUDGE AS CHANGED IN THIS SITUATION SINCE THE
DAYS OF THE UK-US INITIATIVE?

A: WELL, I THINK I AM REALLY GOING TO HAVE TO REFER YOU TO
THE SPEECH OF MRS. THATCHER IN LUSAKA AND THE COMMUNIQUE
WHICH EMERGED OUT OF THE CONFERENCE OF THE NATIONS OF THE
BRITISH COMMONWEALTH.

Q: THE CANADIAN FOREIGN MINISTER CHARACTERIZED THIS SOLU-
TION AS THE ANGLO-AMERICAN PLAN WITHOUT THE AMERICANS.

COULD YOU SAY IN WHAT RESPECT, IF ANY, IT DIFFERS FROM THE
ANGLO-AMERICAN PLAN?

A: I THINK REALLY I AM GOING TO HAVE TO LET YOU FALL BACK
ON YOUR OWN RESOURCES ABOUT THAT. I HAVE NO COMMENT ON
WHAT THE CANADIAN FOREIGN MINISTER SAID.

BUT AS FOR TEXTURAL COMPARISONS BETWEEN THE ANGLO-AMERICAN
PLAN AND WHAT MRS. THATCHER SAID, I THINK YOU WILL JUST HAVE
TO MAKE THAT CLOSE ANALYSIS FOR YOURSELF.

Q: WILL THE UNITED STATES HAVE A REDUCED ROLE IN RESOLVING
THE RHODESIAN CONFLICT IN COMPARISON WITH THE FIRST TWO AND
A HALF YEARS OF THIS ADMINISTRATION?

A: I REALLY DON'T HAVE ANY LEVELS TO OFFER YOU.

Q: THE REPORTS OUT OF LUSAKA TALK NOW ABOUT MOVING TOWARDS
SOME SORT OF A CONFERENCE TRYING TO BRING THESE DIFFERENT
PEOPLE TOGETHER.

DO YOU EXPECT THE UNITED STATES TO TAKE PART IN SUCH A
CONFERENCE?

A: I DON'T HAVE ANYTHING ON THAT FOR YOU.

AS FOR WHAT THE INITIATIVE SPECIFICALLY MEANS, I AM GOING
TO HAVE TO REFER YOU TO THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT FOR THAT.

Q: WELL, IT SEEMS TO ME MEANING LEAVING US OUT TEMPORARILY.

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I AM JUST WONDERING IF WE HAVE DRAWN BACK FROM THIS POSITION IN THE LAST COUPLE OF YEARS WHEREBY WE WERE TRYING TO HELP ORGANIZE A CONFERENCE IN WHICH WE WOULD PARTICIPATE. THE ALL PARTIES CONFERENCE IDEA.

A: YOU ARE GOING TO HAVE TO DRAW YOUR OWN JUDGMENTS. BUT,

AS I SAID, IN THE ORIGINAL ANNOUNCEMENT, WE LOOK FORWARD TO TALKING WITH THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED KINGDOM, FIRST OF ALL, ABOUT DETAILS OF THEIR INITIATIVE AND, SECOND OF ALL, HOW WE CAN BEST BE SUPPORTIVE, HOW THEY THINK WE CAN BEST BE SUPPORTIVE AS THE PROCESS OF THIS INITIATIVE UNFOLDS.

NOW, I AM NOT GOING TO TRY TO MAKE A JUDGMENT HERE TODAY AT THE BEGINNING OF AUGUST AS TO WHAT WE MIGHT BE DOING ON SEPTEMBER 21ST. I JUST CAN'T MAKE THAT FOR YOU.

Q: YOU SAY YOU ARE PLEASED WITH THE AGREEMENT REACHED ON RHODESIA.

ARE YOU ALSO PLEASED THAT MRS. THATCHER'S GOVERNMENT HAS NOW BACKED OFF ITS ELECTION CAMPAIGN POSITION ON DOING SOMETHING DIFFERENT?

A: I HAVE NO COMMENT.

Q: I WOULD RATHER CONCENTRATE ON U.S. POLICY A LITTLE BIT.

I THINK IT IS SAFE TO SAY THAT THE STATE DEPARTMENT'S AFRICAN POLICY WAS ON THE ROPES FOR A WHILE ON THE HILL AND IN THE FIELD.

DO YOU FEEL VINDICATED BY WHAT HAS HAPPENED OF LATE? ARE YOU FEELING NEW SURGES OF CONFIDENCE THAT U.S. POLICY TOWARD ZIMBABWE-RHODESIA IS BEING REINFORCED?

A: THAT IS A QUESTION I REALLY HAVE NO COMMENT ON. I THINK WE ARE DOING THE BEST WE CAN. THERE ARE PEOPLE BEING KILLED IN THE AREA AND WHAT WE HAVE BEEN TRYING TO DO ALL ALONG IS TO TRY TO HELP SOLVE THE KILLING AND TRY TO BRING ABOUT THAT MEASURE OF JUSTICE WHICH WILL ALLOW PEOPLE TO LIVE WITH ONE ANOTHER IN PEACE.

Q: THERE ARE SOME CYNICS WHO CHARGE THAT THE BRITISH HAVE TAKEN THE SURPRISING POSITION DUE TO PERSUASIVE ACTIONS BY

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THE NIGERIAN GOVERNMENT IN THE FIELD OF OIL.

ARE YOU AT ALL CONCERNED THAT THIS NEW INITIATIVE IS A RESULT OF ECONOMIC PRESSURE?

A: I THINK THAT IS A QUESTION YOU WOULD HAVE TO ASK THE FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE IN LONDON.

Q: SINCE THERE ARE AMERICAN COMPANIES WHICH OPERATE IN NIGERIA JUST THE SAME WAY AS BP USED TO OPERATE THERE, AREN'T YOU CONCERNED THAT THE NIGERIANS MIGHT USE THE SAME METHOD TO FORCE YOU TO CHANGE OR TO ADOPT CERTAIN POLICIES?

A: I THINK THERE WAS SOME SUGGESTION ABOUT THAT IN SOME PRESS SPECULATION LAST WEEK AT SOME POINT. LET ME SEE IF I CAN DIG OUT SOME GUIDANCE WHICH I THINK WE DID HAVE ON THAT KIND OF SPECULATION. I HAVE NOTHING TO OFFER NOW.

Q: WHAT REPORTS DOES THE STATE DEPARTMENT HEAR FROM EQUATORIAL GUINEA? IS THE GOVERNMENT THERE FALLING? AND WHAT ARE WE DOING IN RESPONSE TO IT?

A: WE HAVE SEEN REPORTS THAT THE MINISTER OF DEFENSE OF EQUATORIAL GUINEA, MR. TEODORO MBAZOGO, HAS ARRESTED PRESIDENT MASIE.

AS YOU KNOW, HOWEVER, WE HAD SUSPENDED DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH THAT GOVERNMENT IN 1976 AND WE HAVE NO FURTHER DETAILS ON THE COUP AT THIS TIME.

AS TO WHO MR. MBAZOGO IS, WE HAVE SEEN REPORTS THAT HE IS A DISTANT RELATIVE OF PRESIDENT MASIE AND THAT HE HAD RECEIVED MILITARY TRAINING IN SPAIN.

AS TO THE STATUS OF OUR DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS, THE UNITED STATES SUSPENDED DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH THE GOVERNMENT OF EQUATORIAL GUINEA IN MARCH OF 1976. OUR AMBASSADOR AT THAT TIME WAS MR. HERBERT SPIRO. HE WAS RESIDENT IN THE CAMEROON.

IN MARCH OF '76 HE AND THE CONSUL, WILLIAM MITTHOFFER, HAD BEEN ON A ROUTINE VISIT TO EQUATORIAL GUINEA WHEN WITHOUT APPARENT PROVOCATION THEY WERE DECLARED PERSONA NON GRATA.

THE SITUATION IN EQUATORIAL GUINEA IS STILL UNCLEAR, BUT WE ARE WATCHING IT CLOSELY TO SEE HOW IT EVOLVES AND WILL RE-

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VIEW OUR POLICIES ACCORDINGLY.

AS TO THE QUESTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS THERE, WE HAVE VOTED TO SUPPORT AN INVESTIGATION BY THE UNITED NATIONS' COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND WE HAVE ALSO CONTRIBUTED ASSISTANCE TO REFUGEE RELIEF EFFORTS THROUGH THE UN HIGH COMMISSIONER ON REFUGEES.

THAT IS BECAUSE, AS YOU WILL HAVE NOTED FROM THE RECORD HERE, FROM THIS PODIUM, WE HAVE ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS VOICED OUR STRONG CONCERN ABOUT THE HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATION AS IT HAS OBTAINED THERE IN THE PAST.

THAT IS ABOUT THE SUM AND SUBSTANCE OF WHAT I CAN GIVE YOU ON THAT. VANCE

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7 August 1979

PRESS STATEMENT: PRIME MINISTER RT HON R.D. MULDOON

The Commonwealth was working at it's best when it produced the agreed statement on Rhodesia. There have been suggestions that only the British Government made concessions. I think it is important to give credit to the African Commonwealth countries too, for the very substantial modifications they were prepared to make in their previous position.

Less than three weeks before Commonwealth Heads of Government met, the Organization of African Unity Heads of Government were holding their own meeting at Monrovia. It is interesting to compare the Resolution on Zimbabwe produced at the Monrovia meeting with the one that has now been agreed here in Lusaka.

The most radical difference between the two documents lies in the premises on which they are based. The O.A.U. resolution is founded on the proposition that the independence of Zimbabwe can only be secured by armed struggle. The Commonwealth statement envisages that genuine black majority rule can be secured for the people of Zimbabwe by a process of negotiation. All the differences between the two documents flow from that primary distinction.

Thus:

- (1) The O.A.U. resolution stigmatises some parties to the conflict ("convinced that that the puppet minority regime established through the sham and illegal elections is a continuation of the Rhodesian minority racist regime") and claims that others are Zimbabwe's only representatives ("reaffirming that the Patriotic Front is the sole, legitimate and authentic representative of the people of Zimbabwe"). The Commonwealth statement on the other hand "recognised that the search for a lasting peace must involve all parties to the conflict."

- (2) The O.A.U. resolution reaffirmed "condemnation and total rejection of the treacherous so-called internal constitution and the illegal elections stemming from it." The Commonwealth statement "recognised that the internal settlement constitution is defective in certain important respects." By implication it leaves open the possibility of building on the changes which have already occurred.

- (3) The O.A.U. resolution calls for the intensification of the war ("reaffirms that the legitimate armed struggle being waged by the Patriotic Front must be intensified") and calls simply for the maintenance of sanctions. The Commonwealth statement accepts "that it must be a major objective to bring about a cessation of hostilities and an end to sanctions as part of the process of implementation of a lasting settlement."

As this analysis shows, the logic of the O.A.U. approach was that the war would go on, suffering would continue and, quite likely, outside powers would become involved. The logic of the Commonwealth approach is that the war must be stopped, negotiations must take place and there must be a future for both black and white in Rhodesia. I congratulate my fellow Commonwealth members for agreeing to that compromise. I congratulate Margaret Thatcher and Julius Nyerere for leading us towards it.

OO MIRIMBA SALISBURY

OO PRETORIA

OO WASHINGTON

GRS 4000

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FM LUSAKA 071600Z AUG

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 372 OF 7 AUGUST

AND TO IMMEDIATE NUMBER TEN (FCO PLEASE PASS) A
COI, MIRIMBA SALISBURY, PRETORIA, WASHINGTON

FOLLOWING FOR NEWS DEPARTMENT FROM FENN

CHGM

1. THE PRIME MINISTER GAVE AN ON THE RECORD OPEN PRESS
CONFERENCE AT THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY TODAY AT 12.15 PM.
FOLLOWING IS EDITED TRANSCRIPT:

WASHINGTON STAR: THERE ARE REPORTS FROM PRETORIA TODAY THAT
THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT HAVE ALREADY SAID THEY WILL SUPPORT
THE MUZOREWA GOVERNMENT IF IT REJECTS THIS CURRENT PEACE PLAN.
HOW CONFIDENT ARE YOU THAT YOU CAN GET SALISBURY TO THE BARGAINING
TABLE?

PRIME MINISTER: WELL I HOPE AND BELIEVE THAT SALISBURY WILL COME
TO THE BARGAINING TABLE. I ALSO SAW BISHOP MUZOREWA'S STATEMENT
AND I THINK I MUST MAKE IT QUITE CLEAR, I DON'T THINK WE WOULD
HAVE GOT AS FAR AS WE HAVE AND SO QUICKLY AS WE HAVE UNLESS WE
HAD IN RHODESIA AN ELECTION ON THE BASIS OF ONE PERSON ONE VOTE.
AS PRESIDENT NYERERE STATED VERY GRAPHICALLY IN HIS OPENING SPEECH
ON THE DEBATE ON RHODESIA, THIS RESULTED IN A BLACK PRESIDENT,
A BLACK PRIME MINISTER, AND A MAJORITY OF BLACK RHODESIANS IN
THE PARLIAMENT. THAT WAS A TREMENDOUS STEP FORWARD, AND PROVIDED
THE BASIS OF WHAT WE HAVE BEEN ABLE TO DO THIS TIME. BUT AS YOU
KNOW SOME PARTIES DID NOT ACTUALLY FIGHT THAT ELECTION, ALTHOUGH
THEY WERE INVITED, PARTICULARLY BY SITHOLE, TO DO SO. SO WE NOW
HAVE TO GO AHEAD TO GET A CONSTITUTION UPON WHICH FULLY DEMOCRATIC
ELECTIONS WITH ALL PARTIES WILL BE HELD, AND I BELIEVE THEY WILL
COME TO THE NEGOTIATING TABLE.

CYPRUS RADIO AND TV: COULD YOU PLEASE CLARIFY THE POSITION OF
YOUR GOVERNMENT ON THE CYPRUS ISSUE AND WHETHER THE £200 MILLION
TO BE PAID BY BRITAIN TO CYPRUS IS STERLING OR CYPRUS POUNDS.

PRIME MINISTER: I AM SORRY, I CANT GO INTO DETAILS ON THAT.
PRESIDENT KYPRIANOU SPOKE TO ME ABOUT THESE MATTERS WHILE HE WAS
HERE AND I SAID I WOULD LOOK INTO IT.

CANADIAN BROADCASTING: THE PATRIOTIC FRONT HAVE CALLED BISHOP
MUZOREWA A TRAITOR, AND SAID THEY WOULD NOT NEGOTIATE WITH A
TRAITOR. HOW CONFIDENT ARE YOU THAT YOU CAN GET THE PATRIOTIC
FRONT TO THIS CONFERENCE.

PRIME MINISTER: I CAN ONLY ISSUE INVITATIONS ON THE BASIS THAT
THIS IS WHAT THE COMMONWEALTH CONFERENCE IS EXPECTING ME TO DO
AND IS SUPPORTING ME IN DOING. THE COMMONWEALTH IS PUTTING
CONFIDENCE IN BRITAIN AND WE ARE THE POWER TO GO AHEAD AND DO
IT. WE SHALL IN FACT TRY TO CARRY OUT THE DUTY THEY HAVE PLACED
UPON US AND WE HOPE THAT EACH AND EVERY ONE OF THEM, INSOFAR AS
THEY ARE ABLE, WILL BRING PRESSURE TO BEAR ON THE PATRIOTIC FRONT
TO COME ALONG TO A CONFERENCE TO GET THE NEW CONSTITUTION IN THE
FIRST PLACE.

Enter no

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QUESTIONER: THERE WAS A REPORT THAT YOU SAID THE U S WAS NOT GOING TO PLAY A ROLE IN RHODESIA. THE U S HAS A ROLE AND INFLUENCE IN SOUTH AFRICA, WHICH IN TURN HAS INFLUENCE ON RHODESIA.

PRIME MINISTER: WELL THE UNITED STATES WOULD NOT EXPECT TO PLAY A ROLE IN ANY CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE. I HAVE NOT THE SLIGHTEST SHADOW OF DOUBT THAT WHEN WE ARE SUCCESSFUL IN COMPLETING ALL THE PROCESSES, SET OUT AT THIS CONFERENCE, THE U S WILL BE AMONG THE FIRST TO RECOGNISE AN EXCELLENT CONSTITUTION. I BELIEVE THAT THE U S WOULD BE VERY COOPERATIVE. WE DID HAVE A VERY HELPFUL LETTER FROM PRESIDENT CARTER YESTERDAY SUPPORTING US IN THE WISE MOVES WE WERE TAKING. THEY ARE BEING VERY HELPFUL, AND WE ARE VERY GRATEFUL.

QUESTION: THERE ARE RUMOURS THAT YOUR FOREIGN SECRETARY FLEW TO SALISBURY YESTERDAY.

PRIME MINISTER: THEY ARE TOTALLY AND UTTERLY FALSE. DIDNT YOU SEE HIM AROUND? NO HE DID NOT GO TO SALISBURY. THE VC10 CAME BACK TO TAKE US BACK ON WEDNESDAY. WE CANT GO BACK WITHOUT AN AEROPLANE.

QUESTION: I WOULD LIKE TO KNOW WHAT KIND OF A RECEPTION YOU EXPECT FROM YOUR OWN PARTY NOW THAT YOUR STAND HAS DRASTICALLY CHANGED SINCE COMING TO LUSAKA?

PRIME MINISTER: I HATE TO DISILLUSION YOU, BUT MY STAND HAS NOT DRASTICALLY CHANGED SINCE COMING TO LUSAKA. WE CAREFULLY HAD DEBATES ON RHODESIA IN PARLIAMENT BEFORE WE CAME AND WE SET OUT THE MAIN LINES OF THE APPROACH WHICH WE WERE GOING TO TAKE HERE. THEY WERE DERIVED FROM THE VERY EXTENSIVE CONSULTATIONS WE HAD HAD WITH THE AFRICAN COUNTRIES AND OTHERS BEFORE COMING HERE. I IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS AND LORD CARRINGTON IN THE HOUSE OF LORDS. THE REALLY NEW THING THIS TIME IN A COMMONWEALTH CONFERENCE HAS BEEN THE ALMOST UNIVERSAL WILL AND DESIRE TO TRY TO GET AGREEMENT ON THE WAY FORWARD. IF YOU LOOK AT MY POSITION IT HAS BEEN PRETTY WELL THE SAME THE WHOLE TIME. THE ELECTIONS IN RHODESIA WERE A TREMENDOUS STEP FORWARD, BUT WE WERE STILL LEFT WITH SOME DEFECTS IN THE CONSTITUTION, AND SOME CONSIDERABLE OTHER PROBLEMS. ONE WHICH HAS BOTHERED US, WAS HOW TO BRING AN END TO THE HOSTILITIES. BECAUSE THERE IS NO FUTURE FOR ANY COUNTRY IF YOUR CROPS CAN BE BURNED, YOUR CATTLE TAKEN, YOUR FAMILY KILLED. THERE IS NO FUTURE STABILITY IN ANY COUNTRY UNLESS YOU CAN BRING THAT TO AN END, AND I BELIEVE THE PRESENT COMMUNIQUE OFFERS SOME HOPE OF THAT. AND THE OTHER THING WAS HOW TO BRING AS MANY COUNTRIES ALONG WITH US AS POSSIBLE IN RECOGNISING RHODESIA. NOW THOSE TWO THINGS WILL EXPLAIN THE COURSE WE HAVE TAKEN. BUT YOU WILL FIND AN ASTONISHING CONSITENCY ABOUT THEM IF YOU LOOK BACK INTO TIME.

QUESTION: I WAS THINKING ABOUT THE STATEMENT YOU WERE REPORTED TO HAVE MADE IN AUSTRALIA IN WHICH BRIATIN WAS TO LIFT SANCTIONS AND RECOGNISE RHODESIA.

PRIME MINISTER: NO, WOULD YOU LOOK IN FACT AT THE QUESTION I WAS ASKED AND THE REPLY I GAVE. I SAID THAT I THOUGHT IT WAS DOUBTFUL WHETHER WE WOULD GET A NEW ORDER FOR SANCTIONS THROUGH PARLIAMENT. WE ARE NOW TRYING TO DO - IT WILL START VERY QUICKLY ON THE NEW CONSTITUTION AND I HOPE WE WILL HAVE GOT SOME VERY CONSIDERABLE WAY BEFORE THE QUESTION EVER ARISES IN NOVEMBER, AND THAT WAS ALWAYS OUR STRATEGY AND OUR TACTIC. SO I HOPE WE WILL BE A LONG WAY ALONG THE PATH BEFORE THAT ARISES.

VOICE OF AMERICA: QUOTING THE BBC THIS MORNING, MR BOTHA SAID THAT WHAT HAS GONE ONE HERE IS AN UNACCEPTABLE MANOEUVRE AND ALSO

VOICE OF AMERICA: QUOTING THE BBC THIS MORNING, MR BOTHA SAID THAT WHAT HAS GONE ON HERE IS AN UNACCEPTABLE MANOEUVRE AND ALSO THAT YOUR GOVERNMENT HAS BEEN IN TOUCH WITH PRETORIA. CAN YOU ELABORATE ON WHAT YOU ARE TELLING THEM AND HOW MUCH YOU EXPECT TO BE WORKING THROUGH THIS CHANNEL IN ORDER TO BRING THE INTERNAL SETTLEMENT IN SALISBURY TO THE NEGOTIATING TABLE?

PRIME MINISTER: WELL I MUST BEG TO DISAGREE WITH MR BOTHA. TO US THIS IS THE POSSIBLE WAY THROUGH. I DON'T UNDERESTIMATE THE DIFFICULTIES OF GETTING THROUGH. I NEVER DO. I AM NOT A STARRY EYED POLITICIAN. THIS HAS BEEN ON THE TABLE IN BRITAIN SOME 15 YEARS, BUT I DO THINK THERE IS MORE HOPE NOW OF GETTING IT THROUGH. OF COURSE WE ARE IN TOUCH THROUGH OUR EMBASSIES ALMOST ACROSS THE WORLD IN ANY COUNTRY THAT HAS A SPECIAL INTEREST IN THIS PROBLEM. AND WE ARE OF COURSE IN TOUCH IN THE SAME WAY WITH SOUTH AFRICA AS WE ARE WITH MANY MANY OTHER COUNTRIES.

QUESTION: YOU SAID YOU WOULD GET ALL THIS PROBLEM OUT OF THE WAY SO THERE WOULDN'T BE A PROBLEM WHEN SANCTIONS CAME UP FOR RENEWAL IN NOVEMBER. BUT YOU HAVE ANOTHER DEADLINE IN YOUR OWN PARTY CONFERENCE. WHAT TIMETABLE DO YOU HAVE IN MIND?

PRIME MINISTER: ONE CAN'T GIVE A VERY STRICT TIMETABLE. I CAN TELL YOU THAT WE ARE HAVING A CABINET MEETING ON FRIDAY MORNING TO SORT OUT THE PROPOSALS, AND THEN WE SHALL HOPE VERY QUICKLY TO SEND OUT INVITATIONS TO A CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE. IF THOSE ARE ACCEPTED, WE CAN GET ON WITH THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE WELL BEFORE THE PARTY CONFERENCE. I BELIEVE THAT MY OWN PARTY WILL ACCEPT THAT THIS IS THE WAY FORWARD; THEY ARE JUST AS CONCERNED AS I AM TO SECURE AN END TO HOSTILITIES. THEY KNOW THE POSITION IN RHODESIA: 1,000 WHITE PEOPLE HAVE BEEN LEAVING THERE EVERY MONTH, SOME 500 PEOPLE, THE VAST MAJORITY OF WHOM ARE BLACK, ARE BEING KILLED EVERY WEEK IN RHODESIA. THE WAR CONTINUES. WHAT KIND OF FUTURE DOES THAT OFFER ANYONE IN RHODESIA IF THE WAR GOES ON? THERE IS NO FUTURE UNLESS WE CAN STOP THAT, AND THE WHOLE SIGNIFICANCE OF THIS COMMUNIQUE IS THAT IT OFFERS A WAY OF STOPPING THAT, THAT IS A TREMENDOUS PRIZE, THAT'S WHAT WE ARE TRYING TO ACHIEVE FOR RHODESIA - A TREMENDOUS PRIZE ALSO FOR THE SURROUNDING COUNTRIES BECAUSE THEY TOO EXPERIENCE VERY CONSIDERABLE DIFFICULTIES ECONOMICALLY AND PERSONALLY BECAUSE OF THE WAR. I THINK MY OWN PARTY WILL BE THE FIRST TO UNDERSTAND THAT.

AUSTRALIAN BROADCASTING: PRESIDENT NYERERE SAID THAT THERE IS NO NEED TO PRESSURE THE PATRIOTIC FRONT AS THEY WILL BE AT THE TALKS. HE SEEMED TO THINK THE PROBLEM YOU HAD WOULD BE GETTING BISHOP MUZOREWA AND IAN SMITH THERE. ON WHAT TERMS DO YOU THINK YOU CAN GET THE RHODESIANS TO COME?

PRIME MINISTER: IF JULIUS NYERERE CAN DEAL WITH HIS PROBLEMS, I HOPE YOU WILL ACCEPT THAT I CAN DEAL WITH MINE. I BELIEVE THAT THEY WILL COME FOR EXACTLY THE SAME REASONS AS I HAVE BEEN POINTING OUT. THE PRIZE, IF WE ARE SUCCESSFUL, IS ENORMOUS, PARTICULARLY FOR ALL THE RHODESIANS. THESE POSSIBILITIES WOULD NOT BE OPENING UP UNLESS YOU HAD ALREADY GOT IN RHODESIA, AS A RESULT OF THE EFFORTS OF THE PEOPLE INSIDE RHODESIA, ONE PERSON ONE VOTE LEADING TO, IN JULIUS NYERERE'S WORDS, BLACK PRESIDENT, BLACK PRIME MINISTER BLACK MAJORITY PARLIAMENT.

QUESTION: BUT WHAT STATUS WILL THE MUZOREWA GOVERNMENT HAVE AT THE CONFERENCE TABLE?

PRIME MINISTER: WE REALLY HAVEN'T GOT AS FAR AS DEFINING EACH AND EVERY STATUS. ALL OF THIS HAS TO GO BEFORE MY CABINET. UNTIL IT DOES WE CANNOT GIVE ANY FURTHER DETAILS.

CANADA: WHAT WOULD BRITAIN DO IF BISHOP MUZOREWA WONT COME TO

CANADA: WHAT WOULD BRITAIN DO IF BISHOP MUZOREWA WONT COME TO THE BARGAINING TABLE?

PRIME MINISTER: I AM ALWAYS BEING ASKED WHAT WILL HAPPEN IF SOMEONE WONT COME. I DONT THINK WE SHOULD START OFF ON THAT BASIS. WE SHALL ISSUE INVITATIONS AND WE ARE REASONABLY CONFIDENT THEY WILL COME TO THE CONFERENCE TABLE. IF THEY ARE NOT, ALL RIGHT WE HAVE TO THINK AGAIN.

QUESTION: WOULD THE DISCUSSION BE VALID IF THE CURRENT GOVERNMENT IN SALISBURY IS NOT REPRESENTED?

PRIME MINISTER: WE ARE WORKING ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT EVERYONE WHO IS INVITED WILL COME TO THE CONFERENCE TABLE. YOU OBVIOUSLY CANT HAVE A NEW CONSTITUTION FOR RHODESIA UNLESS INTERNAL REPRESENTATIVES OF RHODESIA ARE THERE. IT IS JUST NOT POSSIBLE.

AUSTRALIAN TV: IF THE NEW CONSTITUTION IS NOT ACCEPTED ARE YOU THEN PREPARED TO GO ABOUT RENEWING SANCTIONS?

PRIME MINISTER: YOU ARE AGAIN TRYING TO GET MUCH FURTHER ALONG THE ROAD THAN ONE CAN POSSIBLY GET. YOU CANNOT FORETELL WHAT WILL HAPPEN. WE HAVE FIRST TO TRY TO GET A NEW CONSTITUTION. UNTIL WE GET THAT WE CANNOT SAY EXACTLY WHAT WILL HAPPEN AFTER THAT. ALL I CAN SAY IS THAT WE HAVE THE SIGNATURE OF THE HEADS OF GOVERNMENT OF 39 NATIONS OF THE COMMONWEALTH IN SUPPORTING US ON THE COURSE UPON WHICH WE HAVE EMBARKED AND GIVING US THEIR FULL CONFIDENCE TO EMBARK UPON IT. THIS I BELIEVE IS THE MOST ENCOURAGING THING THAT HAS HAPPENED, AND GIVES US AN EXCELLENT BASIS COUPLED WITH THE PREVIOUS ELECTIONS IN RHODESIA, THE POSSIBILITY OF ENDING HOSTILITIES AND THE POSSIBILITY OF GETTING OTHER NATIONS TO RECOGNISE THE BEST BASIS WE HAVE EVER HAD. WE CAN ONLY TAKE THAT AND USE IT.

VOICE OF GERMANY: DO YOU ENVISAGE IN A RETURN TO LEGALITY THE USE OF BRITISH TROOPS AT ANY TIME?

PRIME MINISTER: NO. WE HAVE NO CONTEMPLATION OF THE USE OF BRITISH TROOPS. THE WORD SUPERVISION IN THE COMMUNIQUE REFERS TO ADMINISTRATIVE SUPERVISION. I HAVE NO CONTEMPLATION WHATSOEVER OF THE USE OF BRITISH TROOPS.

NZPA: DO YOU EXPECT THE CONSTITUTIONAL TALKS TO BE HELD IN LONDON?

PRIME MINISTER: I WOULD NOT QUARREL WITH THAT CONCLUSION.

IRN: IN THE LIGHT OF WHATS COME OUT OF THE AGREEMENT DO YOU NOW ACCEPT THAT THE APRIL ELECTIONS IN RHODESIA WERE NOT FAIR AND FREE?

PRIME MINISTER: WOULD YOU PLEASE LOOK AT MY ANSWER IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS ON THAT. NO, I AM SORRY, I THINK NOONE WOULD SAY, CERTAINLY WE WOULD NOT SAY, THAT THOSE ELECTIONS AS SUCH WERE NOT FREE AND FAIR. THAT IS NOT THE PROBLEM. THE QUESTION IS THE CONSTITUTION. YOU HAVE SEEN THE BOYD REPORT. HE CAME TO THE CONCLUSION THAT TECHNICALLY THEY WERE FREE AND FAIR. WE HAVE NOT OURSELVES MADE A FINAL DETERMINATION. I DONT THINK THERE IS ANY REASON TO DISSENT FROM OUR OBSERVERS THERE, BUT THAT HAS NOT BEEN THE PROBLEM. THE PROBLEM IS THE CONSTITUTION ON WHICH THOSE ELECTIONS WERE HELD, AND WHILE THE VAST MAJORITY OF IT IS VERY SIMILAR TO CONSTITUTIONS WE HAVE GIVEN TO OTHER PEOPLE, THERE ARE TWO PARTICULAR FACTORS. ONE IS THE BLOCKING MECHANISM FOR ALTERING THAT CONSTITUTION, BECAUSE YOU KNOW IT REQUIRES 78 OUT OF 100 PEOPLE IN THE PARLIAMENT TO VOTE

PRIME MINISTER: WOULD YOU PLEASE LOOK AT MY ANSWER IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS ON THAT. NO, I AM SORRY, I THINK NOONE WOULD SAY, CERTAINLY WE WOULD NOT SAY, THAT THOSE ELECTIONS AS SUCH WERE NOT FREE AND FAIR. THAT IS NOT THE PROBLEM. THE QUESTION IS THE CONSTITUTION. YOU HAVE SEEN THE BOYD REPORT. HE CAME TO THE CONCLUSION THAT TECHNICALLY THEY WERE FREE AND FAIR. WE HAVE NOT OURSELVES MADE A FINAL DETERMINATION. I DONT THINK THERE IS ANY REASON TO DISSENT FROM OUR OBSERVERS THERE, BUT THAT HAS NOT BEEN THE PROBLEM. THE PROBLEM IS THE CONSTITUTION ON WHICH THOSE ELECTIONS WERE HELD, AND WHILE THE VAST MAJORITY OF IT IS VERY SIMILAR TO CONSTITUTIONS WE HAVE GIVEN TO OTHER PEOPLE, THERE ARE TWO PARTICULAR FACTORS. ONE IS THE BLOCKING MECHANISM FOR ALTERING THAT CONSTITUTION, BECAUSE YOU KNOW IT REQUIRES 78 OUT OF 100 PEOPLE IN THE PARLIAMENT TO VOTE FOR A CHANGE, WHICH IS HIGHER THAN ANY OTHER AND WOULD REQUIRE AT LEAST 6 WHITES TO VOTE FOR BLACK MEMBERS. AND THE OTHER IS THE COMMISSIONS. AND THE CRITICISM HAS COME FAR MORE ON THE CONSTITUTION THAN ON THE MANNER OF CONDUCTING THE ELECTIONS. AFTER ALL YOU THE WORLDS PRESS WERE INTO THE ELECTIONS. I DIDNT HEAR YOU CRITICISE.

QUESTION: NOW THAT THE QUEEN HAS LEFT SAFELY AND YOU ARE STILL HERE, HOW WOULD YOU REGARD THE SECURITY SITUATION IN THIS COUNTRY?

PRIME MINISTER: WE SEEM TO HAVE HAD RATHER A LOT OF PEOPLE GUARDING US AND THEY HAVE BEEN VERY EFFECTIVE. WE ARE VERY GRATEFUL. WE ARE STILL HERE.

QUESTION: PRESIDENT NYERERE REFERRED TO THE RESETTLEMENT FUND FOR THE RHODESIAN WHITES, AND I WOULD LIKE TO KNOW IF THERE HAS BEEN MORE TALK OF IT AND IF BRITAIN WOULD FUND THAT.

PRIME MINISTER: THERE HAS BEEN NO MORE TALK OF IT AT ALL. WE HAVENT GOT AROUND TO TALKING ABOUT THOSE PARTICULAR THINGS. THERE ARE OTHER THINGS IN ADDITION TO A CONSTITUTION, BUT THE FIRST HURDLE IS A CONSTITUTION, AND WE WILL TACKLE THAT FIRST.

RADIO DENMARK: WHICH PARTIES WILL BE INVITED FROM RHODESIA, WILL IT JUST BE THE GOVERNMENT?

PRIME MINISTER: WE WILL HAVE TO SORT THIS OUT AT THE CABINET THAT WILL TAKE PLACE ON FRIDAY.

ITN: YOU HAVE MADE IT CLEAR THAT NO PARTY HAS A VETO. IF THE MAJORITY OF THOSE WHO COME TO YOUR CONFERENCE ACCEPT A REASONABLE CONSTITUTION, BUT ONE PARTY DOESNT, ARE YOU PREPARED TO ENFORCE THAT CONSTITUTION IF NECESSARY?

PRIME MINISTER: I AM NOT SURE WHAT YOU MEAN. WHAT DO YOU MEAN, ENFORCE A CONSTITUTION? YOU CANT ENFORCE A CONSTITUTION YOU CAN DEMONSTRATE TO THE WORLD THAT THIS IS THE KIND OF CONSTITUTION WHICH THE OTHER FORMER COLONIAL TERRITORIES HAVE GOT ON INDEPENDENCE - WHAT SOME OF THEM HAVE DONE WITH IT SINCE INDEPENDENCE IS NOT FOR ME TO COMMENT UPON. THIS IS THE KIND OF CONSTITUTION WHICH BRITAIN GIVES UPON INDEPENDENCE. YOU CANNOT ENFORCE IT. YOU CAN ONLY SAY THAT THOSE THINGS WHICH WERE DEFECTIVE IN THE RHODESIAN CONSTITUTION HAVE NOW GONE, LEAVING THE KIND OF A DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION ON WHICH WE WOULD GIVE INDEPENDENCE. THAT IS THE STATE THAT WE WOULD THEN GET TO, AND IT WOULD BE OPEN TO THE WHOLE WORLD TO SEE. BUT I CANT ENFORCE IT.

ITN: IF ONE PARTY REJECTS IT AND ALL THE OTHERS ACCEPT IT?

PRIME MINISTER: WE HAVE IN FACT TO SAY TO THE COMMONWEALTH WHO CHARGED US WITH FINDING A CONSTITUTION WHICH IS DEMOCRATIC: WE HAVE FOUND IT. LOOK AND SEE WHO DISAGREES.

MELBOURNE HERALD: IT HAS BEEN ALLEGED BY THE BRITISH PRESS THAT YOU WERE MIGHTILY DISPLEASED WITH WHAT WAS ALLEGED TO BE THE PREMATURE DISCLOSURE BY THE AUSTRALIANS OF THE WORDING OF THE COMMUNIQUE. IS THAT TRUE, AND IF SO WOULD MR FRASER BE OFF YOUR CHRISTMAS CARD LIST?

PRIME MINISTER: NO HE WOULD NOT BE OFF MY CHRISTMAS CARD LIST. THERE IS NO POINT IN GOING THROUGH WHAT HAPPENED AND WHERE. WE GOT THE COMMUNIQUE WE WANTED AND ITS A VERY GOOD ONE.

QUESTION: WHY DID YOU HAVE TO COME TO LUSAKA TO SAY YOU WOULD PRESENT CONSTITUTIONAL PROPOSALS, WHY COULDN'T IT JUST HAVE BEEN YOUR PARTY'S CAMPAIGN AND YOUR GOVERNMENT'S POLICY BEFORE COMING HERE.

PRIME MINISTER: ISN'T IT VERY MUCH BETTER NOT TO DO EVERYTHING BEFORE YOU COME TO LUSAKA, BUT TO CONSULT WITH YOUR PARTNERS. WHAT WE HAVE GOT NOW IS THE RESULT WHICH I THINK GIVES US THE BEST CHANCE OF GOING AHEAD. LOOK AT THE RESULTS AND THE POSSIBILITIES, NOT AT THE WHY NOTS.

QUESTION: YOU HAVE CONSISTENTLY SAID THAT BRITISH TROOPS WERE NOT AN ISSUE. PRESIDENT KAUNDA SAID EARLIER THAT IF IN 1965 THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT HAD SHOWN THE WILL TO ENFORCE ITS RESPONSIBILITIES AGAINST UNILATERAL ACTION IN RHODESIA, PERHAPS WE MIGHT NOT BE IN THE SITUATION WE ARE NOW. IS THERE ANY KIND OF TROOP COMMITMENT HIDDEN IN THE BACKGROUND?

PRIME MINISTER : NONE WHATSOEVER.

JOHN DICKIE, DAILY MAIL: WHAT MAKES YOU CONFIDENT THAT YOU CAN DELIVER THE GOODS WHICH A SUCCESSION OF PREVIOUS PRIME MINISTERS HAVE BEEN UNABLE TO DO WITH THE AFRICANS AND THE FRONT LINE STATES? IS IT PERHAPS YOUR ABILITY TO DANCE WELL WITH PRESIDENT KAUNDA?

PRIME MINISTER: I DONT SINK TO THAT SORT OF TRITE REMARK. SELF CONFIDENCE IS NOT MY FORTE. BUT I AM A JOLLY GOOD TRIER.

JOHN DICKIE: WHAT IS THE CHANGED SITUATION?

PRIME MINISTER: THERE IS A CHANGED SITUATION FIRST, THERE IS NOW IN RHODESIA ONE PERSON ONE VOTE UPON WHICH ELECTIONS HAVE BEEN HELD. SO THE PEOPLE IN RHODESIA WERE ABLE TO ELECT THEIR OWN PRIME MINISTER FROM THOSE CANDIDATES WHO PRESENTED THEMSELVES AT ELECTION. THAT ITSELF WAS A TREMENDOUS ADVANCE AND WE MUST NEVER UNDERESTIMATE IT. SECOND, ALL THE COUNTRIES, INCLUDING THE HOSTS TO THE DISPUTE, GENUINELY WANT TO END THE HOSTILITIES. THEY REALISED IF WE DONT HAVE A TRY NOW THE CHANCE MAY BE LOST FOREVER. THIRD THINGS CANNOT GO ON LIKE THIS IN RHODESIA, YOU DO NEED REASONABLE PEACE IN WHICH TO CONTINUE YOUR LIFE. FOURTH, THERE HAS BEEN A FANTASTIC CONVERGENCE OF WILL IN THIS COMMONWEALTH CONFERENCE, AND IT SEEMED THAT EVERYONE NOT ONLY WANTS THE SAME THING BUT IS PREPARED TO INVEST BRITAIN WITH THE CONFIDENCE TO GO AHEAD AND TRY TO DO IT. PLEASE DONT THINK THAT I UNDERESTIMATE THE DIFFICULTIES. I DONT. IT COULD STILL FOUNDER BUT WE MUST TRY BECAUSE I FEEL THAT IF WE DONT SUCCEED NOW THAT OPPORTUNITY MAY BE LOST FOR EVER.

INDIAN JOURNALIST: BEFORE THE CONSTITUTION COMES INTO BEING DO YOU ENVISAGE AN INTERIM GOVERNMENT BEING SET UP.

PRIME MINISTER: THE FIRST THING TO DO IS TO TRY TO GET THE NEW CONSTITUTION. UNTIL WE HAVE GOT THAT THERE IS NO POINT IN THINKING BEYOND THAT STAGE. LETS TAKE IT ONE STEP AT A TIME. WHEN WE HAVE SUCCEEDED IN DOING THAT WELL THEN WE HAVE TO NEGOTIATE THE NEXT STEP.

SWAPO INFORMATION AND PUBLICITY: ON 8 MAY 1978 THE SOUTH AFRICAN

SWAPO INFORMATION AND PUBLICITY: ON 3 MAY 1978 THE SOUTH AFRICAN TROOPS INVADDED ANGOLA AND MASSACRED MORE THAN 800 WOMEN, CHILDREN AND OLD PEOPLE UNARMED, AND IT HAS NOW COME TO THE KNOWLEDGE OF THE READING PUBLIC THAT PLESSEY COMPANY IN SOUTH AFRICA IS GIVING OR SELLING MOST UP TO DATE RADAR SYSTEM TO SOUTH AFRICAN ARMY, AND THAT THE ARMY IS FULLY INTEGRATED WITH THE BRITISH ARMY. TALKING ABOUT NAMIBIA, WHICH IS NEITHER ENGLISH NOR AFRIKAANS, ARE YOU GOING TO ALLOW THIS TO HAPPEN AND MASSACRE THE UNFORTUNATE PEOPLE OF NAMIBIA WHO ARE BARELY ONE MILLION. BECAUSE IF YOU DO, THE CONSEQUENCES WILL BE TOO GHASTLY TO CONTEMPLATE.

PRIME MINISTER: TWO POINTS. AS FAR AS NAMIBIA IS CONCERNED, WE ARE ONE OF THE FIVE NATIONS COMPRISING THE CONTACT GROUP. THERE IS ONE ENVOY NOW REPRESENTING THOSE FIVE NATIONS, JAMES MURRAY. HE GOES TO SOUTH AFRICA FURTHER TO NEGOTIATE THIS WEEKEND. SO LETS SEE WHAT HAPPENS AS A RESULT OF THOSE NEGOTIATIONS. I HOPE THEY WILL BE SUCCESSFUL. SECOND, AS FAR AS THE PLESSEY CONTRACT IS CONCERNED, IT WAS NEGOTIATED FULLY BY THE LABOUR GOVERNMENT IN CHARGE IN BRITAIN IN 1976. I DO NOT KNOW ITS DETAILS, WE WILL HAVE A LOOK AT IT WHEN WE GET BACK.

QUESTION: WE WERE TOLD BY JAMES CALLAGHAN THAT BRITAIN NEEDS NAMIBIAN URANIUM.

PRIME MINISTER: WELL, MAY I TELL YOU THAT WE ARE BUYING URANIUM FROM AUSTRALIA. URANIUM FROM NAMIBIA IS NOT A DECISIVE POINT.

AUSTRALIAN JOURNALIST: AT WHAT STAGE IN THE PROCESS WOULD YOU BE HOPEFUL THERE COULD BE A CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES IN RHODESIA?

PRIME MINISTER: I THINK IF WE GET AN AGREED CONSTITUTION ONE WOULD HAVE REASON TO EXPECT THAT HOSTILITIES WOULD CEASE, CERTAINLY BEFORE ELECTIONS TAKE PLACE.

RADIO FRANCE INTERNATIONAL: THE COMMONWEALTH HAS TAKEN A SOMEWHAT DIFFERENT POSITION FROM THE OAU SUMMIT, WHICH RECOGNISED THE PATRIOTIC FRONT AS THE SOLE REPRESENTATIVE. HAVE YOU ANY COMMENT?

PRIME MINISTER: INDEED, YES, I WAS VERY PLEASED THAT THE COMMONWEALTH TOOK NO STEPS IN THAT DIRECTION WHATSOEVER. WHEN WE DEBATED RHODESIA IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS, BOTH SIDES OF THE HOUSE REJECTED THAT CONCLUSION OF THE OAU, THE LABOUR SIDE AND THE CONSERVATIVE SIDE. THE COMMONWEALTH HAS TAKEN BOTH A VERY MUCH MORE REALISTIC VIEW AND A VERY MUCH BETTER VIEW.

ZIMBABWE REPORTER: I WOULD LIKE TO KNOW WHY YOU DID NOT MAKE ANY EFFORT AND YOU WERE NOT WILLING TO MEET THE PATRIOTIC FRONT LEADERS WHO MIGHT HAVE BEEN AVAILABLE HERE IN LUSAKA DURING THE CONFERENCE?

PRIME MINISTER: WHEN YOU HAVE 38 CO-PARTNERS TO TALK TO, THATS QUITE A LOT IN THE TIME AVAILABLE. MR NKOMO DID MAKE OVERTURES AND THE FOREIGN SECRETARY SAID HE WOULD BE HAPPY TO MEET HIM, BUT IT NEVER CAME TO ANYTHING.

ALLINSON

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FM LUSAKA 070755Z AUG 1979

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 863 OF 7 AUGUST

AND TO IMMEDIATE COI

FOR NEW DEPARTMENT FROM FENN

MY TELNO 861: CHGM RHODESIA: PRESS CLUB

1. IN HIS IMPROMPTU REPLY TO THE PRIME MINISTER'S SPEECH, PRESIDENT KAUNDA INCLUDED A TRIBUTE TO MRS THATCHER. HE SAID THAT HE DETECTED IN HER THE SINCERITY OF PURPOSE AND WILLPOWER NECESSARY TO SOLVE THE RHODESIA PROBLEM. HE HAD NEVER IN HIS HEART OF HEARTS ENTERTAINED HATRED FOR THE BRITISH PEOPLE. AFTER SOME DISOBLIGING REMARKS ABOUT THE PRIME MINISTER'S PREDECESSORS, KAUNDA CONTINUED THAT HE HAD GOT TO KNOW THE IRON LADY A LITTLE BETTER IN RECENT DAYS. THIS HAD GIVEN HIM CONFIDENCE THAT SHE WAS A BRITISH LEADER WHO HAD THE COURAGE TO MAKE THE RIGHT DECISIONS. AS A BELIEVER, HE WOULD PRAY FOR HER.

FCO PSE PASS TO NO 10

ALLINSON

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*Enter via
5/21/79
JS*

CONFIDENTIAL
FM 00 071440Z AUG 79
TO IMMEDIATE LUSAKA
TELEGRAM NO 693 OF 7 AUG 1979

Prime Minister

*Sir A. Duff has copies
cc also PS/No 10
PS/FCO
Sir J. Hunt
Sir M. Patten
Mr. ...
COD ...*

FOLLOWING FOR DUFF: RHODESIA: SUPERVISION OF ELECTION
FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF SUPPLEMENTARY PAPER BY RHODESIA DEPARTMENT: *file*

RHODESIA: SUPERVISION OF AN ELECTION

1. THE DEPARTMENT WERE ASKED TO GIVE SOME FURTHER THOUGHT TO THE PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS OF BRITISH SUPERVISION OF AN ELECTION IN RHODESIA. THE FOLLOWING ASSUMES THAT:-

- (A) THERE WILL BE A FAIRLY "HIGH PROFILE" OPERATION ON THE LINES DISCUSSED IN PARAGRAPHS 12 AND 13 OF THE PAPER CIRCULATED WITH BARLOW'S MINUTE TO SIR A DUFF OF 27 JULY;
- (B) THE BISHOP'S GOVERNMENT WILL CONTINUE TO BE RESPONSIBLE FOR ALL ASPECTS OF THE ADMINISTRATION (INCLUDING LAW AND ORDER AND THE CONDUCT OF THE ELECTION ITSELF); AND
- (C) THERE WILL BE COMMONWEALTH OBSERVERS.

2. THE FIRST PRIORITY MUST BE TO IDENTIFY AND APPOINT A PERSON OF SUITABLE CALIBRE TO LEAD THE SUPERVISION TEAM (DESIGNATED FOR CONVENIENCE IN THIS PAPER AS THE BRITISH ELECTION COMMISSIONER). IT IS SUGGESTED THAT HE SHOULD BE:-

- (A) A HIGH COURT JUDGE; OR
- (B) A SENIOR EX-COLONIAL CIVIL SERVANT WITHOUT CONNECTIONS WITH RHODESIA; OR
- (C) A FORMER SENIOR OFFICER (BUT THIS WOULD PROBABLY RAISE RHODESIAN HACKLES).

WE ARE LOOKING AT POSSIBILITIES.

THE COMMISSIONER WOULD HAVE TO BE PREPARED TO DEVOTE THE WHOLE OF HIS TIME TO THE OPERATION FOR AT LEAST THREE MONTHS (STARTING IN EARLY SEPTEMBER). HIS FIRST PRIORITY WOULD BE TO ASSESS HIS TASK HIMSELF AND MAKE DETAILED RECOMMENDATIONS ON ITS EXECUTION, INCLUDING STAFFING. TO DO THIS HE WOULD NEED A SMALL SUPPORTING STAFF (ON SECONDMENT FROM FCO?) FROM THE START, HEADED BY AN OFFICER AT D S GRADE 4 OR 5.

3. SUBJECT TO THE COMMISSIONER'S OWN RECOMMENDATIONS, AND ASSUMING THAT REGISTRATION OF ELECTORS IS RULED OUT (BECAUSE OF THE TIME FACTOR AND SECURITY PROBLEMS), THE MISSION WOULD THEN FALL INTO FOUR PHASES:-

- (A) UP TO THE START OF THE ELECTION CAMPAIGN.
THIS WOULD INCLUDE (FOLLG TWO WORDS UNDERLINED) INTER ALIA:-
 - (I) AGREEING SYMBOLS TO BE ALLOCATED TO THE PARTIES, THE FORMAT OF THE BALLOT PAPER, ETC;
 - (II) AGREEING WITH THE PARTIES AND THE RHODESIAN ELECTION COMMISSION PROCEDURES FOR THE SUBSEQUENT PHASES;
 - (III) SUPERVISING PRINTING, PACKING, ETC OF BALLOT PAPERS (THIS COULD PRESUMABLY, AND PREFERABLY, BE DONE IN THE UK); AND
 - (IV) ESTABLISHING AN OFFICE (OR OFFICES) IN RHODESIA, AND TRANSPORT AND OTHER ARRANGEMENTS FOR SUBSEQUENT PHASES.
- (B) DURING THE ELECTION CAMPAIGN. AT LEAST TWO SUBORDINATE COMMISSIONERS WOULD PROBABLY HAVE TO BE AVAILABLE IN EACH OF THE 8 PROVINCES THROUGHOUT THE CAMPAIGN IN ORDER TO OBSERVE ITS CONDUCT AND TO HEAR COMPLAINTS AND REPRESENTATIONS.
- (C) DURING AND AFTER THE VOTE. IDEALLY, AT LEAST TWO OBSERVERS WOULD HAVE TO BE AVAILABLE AT EACH POLLING CENTRE TO ENSURE CONTINUOUS SUPERVISION OF THE VOTE AND SUPERVISE SEALING AND TRANSPORT OF BALLOT BOXES. THE COMMISSIONER WOULD SUPERVISE COUNTING (TO BE CENTRALISED IN PROVINCIAL CAPITALS?).
- (D) FINALLY, THE COMMISSIONER WILL HAVE TO DEAL WITH COMPLAINTS

4. THE STAFFING REQUIREMENTS WILL NOT BE UNIFORM THROUGHOUT EACH PHASE. PEARCE HAD THREE DEPUTY CHAIRMEN, 21 COMMISSIONERS, AND AN IFCO SECRETARIAT OF 5 (PLUS TYPISTS AND L E STAFF). PHASES (B) AND (D) WILL PROBABLY REQUIRE SOMETHING COMPARABLE, THOUGH PHASE (A) WILL SURELY BE FEASIBLE WITH LESS (RECRUITMENT AND BUILD-UP COULD STILL BE TAKING PLACE AT THIS STAGE). THE COMMISSIONERS WOULD (AS IN THE CASE OF PEARCE) HAVE TO BE RECRUITED OR SECONDED (FOLLG TWO WORDS UNDERLINED) AD HOC AND SHOULD INCLUDE SOME SENIOR UK (EX-) LOCAL GOVERNMENT OFFICERS WITH EXPERIENCE OF ELECTION ADMINISTRATION.

5. THE CRUCIAL STAFFING QUESTIONS WILL ARISE IN PHASE (C), WHERE MUCH DEPENDS ON HOW THE RHODESIANS INTEND TO CARRY OUT THE VOTING - IE BY SIMULTANEOUS POLLING ON ONE DAY (AT HOW MANY CENTRES ?) OR POLLING AT MOBILE CENTRES SPREAD OVER A PERIOD. IN APRIL 1979 THE COMBINATION OF 441 STATIC AND 244 MOBILE POLLING STATIONS PROVIDED NO LESS THAN 2,000 POLLING PLACES. IF THIS PATTERN WERE REPEATED IT WOULD MAKE 100 PER CENT EFFECTIVE SUPERVISION THROUGHOUT THE VOTE IMPRACTICABLE EXCEPT AT VERY HIGH COST. SOME MEANS WOULD THEREFORE HAVE TO BE FOUND TO REDUCE THE NUMBER OF STATIONS AND/OR WORK OUT A SCHEME FOR REDUCED COVERAGE COMBINING, SAY, FULL COVER OF URBAN POLLING PLACES AND SPOT CHECKS ON OTHERS. CRITICISM OF INADEQUATE COVERAGE DURING PHASE (C) COULD BE COUNTERED BY STRENGTHENING THE COMMISSIONER'S ROLE IN PHASE (D). IT IS ALSO FOR CONSIDERATION WHETHER THE COMMONWEALTH OBSERVERS SHOULD BE AUTONOMOUS OR WHETHER THEY SHOULD SHARE THE SUPERVISION OF POLLING IN PHASE (C) AND REPORT THEIR FINDINGS TO THE COMMISSIONER. PARTICULARLY IN THE ABSENCE OF A REGISTER, IT WILL BE VITAL TO THE SUCCESS OF THE OPERATION TO BE ABLE TO DEMONSTRATE THAT THERE HAS BEEN AN EFFECTIVE EXTERNAL CHECK ON DOUBLE VOTING.

PATRIOTIC FRONT PARTICIPATION

6. THE ABOVE IS DRAFTED ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT THE PATRIOTIC FRONT DO NOT PARTICIPATE IN THE ELECTION (WHICH WILL MEAN THAT THERE IS STILL A GUERRILLA WAR AND ALL THE BRITISH ELECTION COMMISSIONERS STAFF ARE EXPOSED TO MORE OR LESS PERSONAL RISK). IF THE PATRIOTIC FRONT DO PARTICIPATE, THE TASK OF THE COMMISSIONER IS LIKELY TO BE MORE ONEROUS IN THAT THERE WILL BE MORE COMPLAINTS OF ELECTORAL MALPRACTICE DURING THE CAMPAIGN AND MORE STAFF WILL THEREFORE BE NECESSARY IN PHASE (B). ON THE OTHER HAND, PATRIOTIC FRONT PARTICIPATION PRESUPPOSES A CEASEFIRE. STAFF WOULD THEREFORE BE IN LESS DANGER AND POSSIBLY THEREFORE EASIER TO RECRUIT. IT SHOULD BE POSSIBLE TO ORGANISE POLLING ON A MORE "NORMAL" FOOTING THAN IN APRIL 1979 (EG DISPENSING WITH MOBILE STATIONS, CONCENTRATING POLLING IN FEWER CENTRES, AND CONDUCTING THE POLL OVER A SHORTER PERIOD). FEWER OBSERVERS MIGHT THEREFORE BE NEEDED TO PROVIDE RESPECTABLE COVERAGE IN PHASE (C). CONSIDERATION MIGHT EVEN BE GIVEN IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES TO RECRUITING SUITABLE LOCAL WHITES (IE NOT KNOWN R F SUPPORTERS) AS POLL OBSERVERS (NOT, OF COURSE, AS COMMISSIONERS).

QCARRINGTON

NNNN

PP. ES SALAAM

PP GABORONE

PP LUANDA

PP WASHINGTON

PP UKMIS NEW YORK

GR 1550

CONFIDENTIAL

FM MIFIMBA SALISBURY 071300Z AUG 79

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 491 OF 7 AUGUST

INFO IMMEDIATE LUSAKA

INFO PRIORITY PRETORIA MAPUTO LAGOS DAR ES SALAAM GABORONE

LUANDA WASHINGTON AND UKMIS NEW YORK

RHODESIA: REACTION TO CHMG STATEMENT

1. I MET THIS MORNING, AT THEIR REQUEST, THE MEMBERS OF THE PRIVATE SECTOR CO-ORDINATING COMMITTEE. THIS GROUP REPRESENTS WHITE PRIVATE ENTERPRISE BODIES COVERING FARMING, TOBACCO, MINING, OTHER INDUSTRY AND CHAMBERS OF COMMERCE.
2. I WAS INVITED TO EXPLAIN THE POSITION REACHED AFTER LUSAKA. I DISTRIBUTED THE TEXT OF THE LUSAKA STATEMENT. I EXPLAINED THE GENESIS OF THIS DOCUMENT AND POINTED OUT THAT IT WAS CONSISTENT WITH EARLIER STATEMENTS OF POLICY MADE BY THE PRIME MINISTER AND THE SECRETARY OF STATE. I DREW ATTENTION TO THE SIGNIFICANT CONTRAST BETWEEN THE ATMOSPHERE AFTER THE CAU CONFERENCE IN MONROVIA AND THE SITUATION AFTER THE DISCUSSIONS IN LUSAKA. WE NOW HAD FULL COMMONWEALTH SUPPORT FOR A PROGRAMME DESIGNED TO ACHIEVE A FAIR, PEACEFUL AND LASTING SOLUTION TO THE RHODESIA PROBLEM.

3. VARIOUS POINTS AROSE IN DISCUSSION:

(A) TIMING

I WAS ASKED ABOUT THE FUTURE TIMETABLE. IT WAS IMPRESSED UPON ME THAT THERE WAS AN URGENT NEED FOR FINAL DECISIONS. THE HOPE WAS EXPRESSED THAT HMG WOULD NOT PUT UP WITH ANY FILIBUSTERING TACTICS AND THAT WE WOULD PRESS AHEAD WITH THE PRESENTATION OF DETAILED PROPOSALS. I ASSURED THOSE PRESENT THAT THERE WAS NO DESIRE ON THE PART OF HMG TO DELAY MATTERS UNNECESSARILY. I POINTED OUT THAT THE PRIME MINISTER WOULD BE DISCUSSING THESE ISSUES IN CABINET ON 10 AUGUST. THEREAFTER, I THOUGHT THAT EVENTS WOULD MOVE FAIRLY QUICKLY. WE WERE CERTAINLY NOT PREPARED TO PUT UP WITH OBSTRUCTIVE AND DELAYING TACTICS, NO MATTER WHERE THEY ORIGINATED.

(B) RETURN TO LEGALITY

THERE WAS CONSIDERABLE INTEREST AT WHAT STAGE IN THE PROCESS LEGAL INDEPENDENCE WOULD BE GRANTED. WOULD THIS BE BEFORE OR AFTER THE LIFTING OF SANCTIONS? WHERE WOULD ELECTIONS FIT IN? I SAID THAT THE PRECISE TIMING OF THESE VARIOUS STAGES WOULD BE A MATTER FOR FURTHER DISCUSSION. THE IMPORTANT THING WAS TO GET THE PROCESS UNDER WAY AND TO OBTAIN EARLY AGREEMENT ON AN INDEPENDENCE CONSTITUTION. THIS COULD BE THE KEY TO A RETURN TO LEGALITY FROM WHICH OTHER EVENTS WOULD FOLLOW.

Prime Minister

SW
7/2

(C) ELECTIONS

THIS ISSUE PRODUCED MOST QUESTIONS. CONSIDERABLE, THOUGH CALM, CONCERN WAS EXPRESSED AT THE LIKELY COST, DISRUPTION AND POLITICAL RISKS INVOLVED IN A FURTHER ELECTION. THERE WERE DOUBTS WHETHER MUZOFEWA WOULD BE CONTENT TO PUT HIS PRESENT POLITICAL POSITION AT RISK IN ANOTHER ELECTION. THERE WERE ALSO QUESTIONS ABOUT THE CONSEQUENCES IF NKOMO AND/OR MUGABE AGREED TO PARTICIPATE IN AN ELECTION. IN SUCH CIRCUMSTANCES IT WAS ASSUMED THAT THE ELECTION RESULT WOULD BE INDECISIVE AND A BITTER AND PERHAPS VIOLENT POWER STRUGGLE WOULD ENSUE. WHAT GUARANTEE COULD THERE BE THAT MUGABE AND NKOMO WOULD ACCEPT THE VERDICT OF THE ELECTORATE IF IT WENT AGAINST THEM? LOOK AT SITHOLE. I ACKNOWLEDGED THAT FRESH ELECTIONS WOULD CREATE DIFFICULTIES. I COULD OBVIOUSLY NOT GIVE ANY GUARANTEES ABOUT THE SITUATION THAT MIGHT DEVELOP AFTER AN ELECTION. THIS WOULD DEPEND UPON THE DECISIONS OF THE ELECTORATE THEMSELVES. I URGED THOSE PRESENT, HOWEVER, TO KEEP FIRMLY IN MIND OUR OVERALL OBJECTIVE, WHICH WAS TO SECURE A SOLUTION WHICH WOULD WIN WIDE INTERNATIONAL ACCEPTANCE. NEW ELECTIONS CONDUCTED UNDER BRITISH AUTHORITY, WOULD MAKE IT DIFFICULT FOR ANYONE TO QUESTION THE LEGITIMACY OF THE INDEPENDENCE PROCESS. THIS COULD BE THE BEST WAY OF WINNING THE INTERNATIONAL RECOGNITION THAT RHODESIA NEEDED. THERE WERE SOME RISKS, BUT THE RISK OF NOT PROCEEDING ON THIS PATH WAS EVEN GREATER.

(D) CEASE-FIRE

THERE WAS INTEREST IN THE TIMING OF A CEASE-FIRE. WOULD IT COME BEFORE A CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE OR NOT UNTIL THE ELECTIONS? THERE WERE ALSO SOME MISGIVINGS AS TO WHETHER NKOMO AND MUGABE WERE SUFFICIENTLY IN CONTROL OF THEIR FORCES TO SECURE A GENUINE CEASE-FIRE. I SAID THAT HMG HAD MADE IT CLEAR ON MANY OCCASIONS THAT THEY CONSIDERED THERE WAS NO LONGER ANY JUSTIFICATION FOR WAR. WE WOULD THEREFORE BE SEEKING TO ACHIEVE A CEASE-FIRE AT THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE STAGE. I COULD NOT SAY PRECISELY WHEN THIS MIGHT COME ABOUT.

(E) CONSTITUTION

I WAS ASKED IN WHAT WAY WE THOUGHT THE CONSTITUTION DEFECTIVE. I WENT OVER THE USUAL GROUND ON THE BLOCKING MECHANISM AND THE SERVICE COMMISSIONS. I DREW ATTENTION TO PREVIOUS STATEMENTS BY HMG ABOUT THE NEED TO RETAIN WHITE CONFIDENCE AND EXPERTISE. I SUGGESTED THAT THE EXISTING CONSTITUTION HAD OVER-INSURED IN THIS RESPECT AND THAT THERE WAS AMPLE ROOM FOR AMENDMENT. THERE WAS NO INCLINATION BY ANY MEMBER OF THE GROUP TO ARGUE THAT NO CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE COULD BE CONTEMPLATED. THERE WAS A RECOGNITION, GRUDGING IN SOME CASES, THAT CHANGE WAS INEVITABLE. AS SO OFTEN, THE AREA OF MAIN CONCERN WAS THAT RELATING TO THE CONTROL OF THE SECURITY FORCES AND THE OTHER FORCES OF LAW AND ORDER. FOLLOWING FROM REFERENCE IN THE PRESS TO A "NEW" CONSTITUTION, I WAS ASKED WHETHER THE WHOLE OF THE EXISTING CONSTITUTION WAS REGARDED AS INVALID. I POINTED OUT THAT THE LUSAKA STATEMENT HAD REFERRED TO THE INTERNAL SETTLEMENT CONSTITUTION AS BEING DEFECTIVE "IN CERTAIN IMPORTANT RESPECTS". MANY OF THE FEATURES OF THE EXISTING CONSTITUTION HAD FEATURED IN OTHER INDEPENDENCE CONSTITUTIONS. WE WERE NOT SEEKING TO DESTROY ALL THAT HAD BEEN ACHIEVED. BUT RATHER TO BUILD UPON IT.

4. THIS MEETING REVEALED THAT THERE ARE SERIOUS ANXIETIES, NOT SO MUCH ABOUT OUR OBJECTIVES OR THE BASIC POLICY, BUT ABOUT THE LIKELIHOOD OF ACHIEVING A SUCCESSFUL OUTCOME. THERE WERE TWO MAIN AREAS OF CONCERN:

(A) WILL HMG REALLY BE PREPARED TO STAND UP TO THE PRESSURES THAT WILL NO DOUBT BE APPLIED BY THE PATRIOTIC FRONT AND THEIR SUPPORTERS? WILL THEY BE PREPARED TO GO AHEAD WITH THE GRANTING OF LEGAL INDEPENDENCE IF NEITHER WING OF THE PATRIOTIC FRONT (AND POSSIBLY THE FRONT LINE STATES) WERE PREPARED TO ACCEPT A CONSTITUTIONAL FORMULA AGREED BETWEEN HMG AND THE PRESENT RHODESIAN GOVERNMENT? I SAID THAT NO-ONE SHOULD UNDERESTIMATE THE RESOLVE OF HMG IN THIS MATTER. WE WERE COMMITTED TO FINDING A SATISFACTORY SOLUTION. ONE IMPORTANT RESULT OF THE LUSAKA CONFERENCE WAS THAT THE COMMONWEALTH AS A WHOLE HAD NOW ACKNOWLEDGED THAT CONSTITUTIONAL RESPONSIBILITY RESTED WITH HMG. THERE HAD ALSO BEEN AGREEMENT ON THE PROCESS BY WHICH LEGAL INDEPENDENCE SHOULD BE REACHED. WE HAD ALSO MADE IT CLEAR THAT NO INDIVIDUAL OR PARTY WOULD BE GIVEN A VETO OVER THE EVENTUAL DECISION.

(B) WAS THERE ANY REAL PROSPECT OF THE PATRIOTIC FRONT ACCEPTING A CONSTITUTION WHICH WOULD ALSO BE ACCEPTABLE TO THE EXISTING RHODESIAN GOVERNMENT? TO MANY PRESENT, THIS SEEMED IMPROBABLE, IF NOT IMPOSSIBLE. I SAID THAT THIS WAS PRECISELY WHAT A CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE WAS INTENDED TO ESTABLISH. HMG WOULD BE PUTTING FORWARD DETAILED PROPOSALS FOR A CONSTITUTION COMPARABLE TO THAT ON WHICH INDEPENDENCE HAD BEEN GRANTED TO OTHER COLONIAL TERRITORIES WITH, AS THE LUSAKA STATEMENT HAD PROVIDED, "APPROPRIATE SAFEGUARDS FOR MINORITIES". THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT WOULD BE PREPARED TO LISTEN TO THE VIEWS OF THE PARTIES CONCERNED BUT IN THE END IT WOULD BE FOR THEM TO DECIDE WHAT FORM OF INDEPENDENCE CONSTITUTION COULD BE PASSED THROUGH THE BRITISH PARLIAMSDT. WE HOPED TO CARRY AS WIDE A RANGE OF OPINION WITH US AS POSSIBLE. I REPEATED THAT THERE WOULD BE NO VETOS.

5. THIS WAS A GENERALLY REASSURING MEETING. MAJOR INTEREST FOCUSED, AS EXPECTED, ON THE CONSTITUTION AND NEW ELECTIONS. BUT NONE OF THOSE PRESENT EXCLUDED PROGRESS ON EITHER COUNT. THERE ARE SERIOUS DOUBTS AS TO WHETHER WE WILL EVER BRING THE PATRIOTIC FRONT AND THE FRONT LINE STATES TO MOVE WITH US ALL THE WAY ALONG THE ROAD TO LEGAL INDEPENDENCE. THERE ARE STRONG DOUBTS THAT HMG WILL IN THE END GIVE IN TO EXTERNAL PRESSURES RATHER THAN CARRY THROUGH A POLICY WHICH THEY BELIEVE TO BE RIGHT. HOWEVER, ON THE EVIDENCE OF THIS MORNING'S MEETING, THERE IS A CLEAR DISPOSITION TO GIVE US THE BENEFIT OF THE DOUBT AT THIS STAGE AND TO HOPE FOR THE BEST. I DETECTED NO EVIDENCE WHATSOEVER THAT THE AGREEMENT ANNOUNCED IN LUSAKA WOULD LEAD TO AN EXODUS OF WHITES FROM RHODESIA (PARA 2 OF PRETORIA TELNO 19 TO LUSAKA). THIS STRIKES ME AS A FURTHER EXAMPLE OF SABRE-RATTING BY THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT ENCOURAGED BY ITS EXTREMIST HARD-LINE CONTACTS IN SALISBURY.

6. THE REACTIONS TO DATE OF MUZOREWA (MY TELNO 18 TO LUSAKA), OTHER SENIOR REPRESENTATIVES (MY TELNO 487), POLITICAL LEADERS AND THE PRESS (MY TELNO 498) AND THE WHITE BUSINESS ESTABLISHMENT, AS REPRESENTED AT THE MEETING REPORTED ABOVE, ARE THE BEST THAT WE COULD HOPE FOR. THERE WILL BE CONTINUED SHIPING, BUT THE GENERAL MOOD IS TO WAIT AND SEE THE NATURE OF THE DETAILED PROPOSALS TO BE PUT FORWARD ON THE CONSTITUTION AND ELECTIONS. JUDGMENT WILL BE RESERVED UNTIL THEN. THERE IS APPREHENSION LEST THIS IS YET ANOTHER IN THE LONG SEQUENCE OF "FAILED INITIATIVES", BUT ALSO HOPE THAT, AT LAST, THE END MAY BE IN SIGHT.

DAY

NNNN

LQY 41/7

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PP LUSAKA

PP GABORONE

PP DAR ES SALAAM

PP LUANDA

PP WASHINGTON

PP UKMIS NEW YORK

GR575

UNCLASSIFIED

FM MIRIMBA SALISBURY 070945Z AUG 79

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 490 OF 7 AUGUST

INFO PRETORIA LUSAKA MAPUTO

WASHINGTON AND UKMIS NEW YORK

RHODESIA: CHGM STATEMENT

MY TELNO: 487

1. REACTION REPORTED IN TODAY'S HERALD HAS BEEN GENERALLY MILD. IN A RHODESIAN FRONT STATEMENT, MR ANDRE HOLLAND AND WING CDR ROB GAUNT URGED PEOPLE TO QUOTE SIT TIGHT AND KEEP COOL AS WE HAVE DONE SO OFTEN IN THE PAST UNQUOTE. THEY SAID THAT RESPONSE TO THE PROPOSALS AMONG SENIOR MEMBERS IN THE PARTY HAD BEEN QUOTE GENERALLY COOL. THE GENERAL FEELING SEEMS TO BE ONE OF WAIT AND SEE WHAT THE BRITISH SUBMIT ON PAPER UNQUOTE.

2. REV SITHOLE HAS SAID THAT THE ANNOUNCEMENT IS QUOTE MOST WELCOME UNQUOTE AND HE HAS URGED MRS THATCHER NOT TO ALLOW ANYONE TO VETO HER QUOTE POSITIVE AND FORWARD-LOOKING POLICY UNQUOTE. HE SAID THAT HER INTENTIONS QUOTE IF PURSUED HONESTLY AND SERIOUSLY, MAY LEAD TO THE LONG-AWAITED SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM FACING THIS COUNTRY UNQUOTE. PROFESSOR STANLAKE SAMKANGE, FOR THE ZIMBABWE DEMOCRATIC PARTY, SAID THAT HIS PARTY HAD NOT YET SEEN THE TRUTH UNQUOTE. HE SAID THAT HIS PARTY HAD NOT YET LEARNED US TO THE CONCLUSION THAT THE MARCH AGREEMENT AND NULLIFIES THE APRIL ELECTION UNQUOTE. IANA-AP REPORTS THAT ANOTHER ZDP PARTY CONFERENCE AS A MEANS OF ENDING THE WAR AND ACHIEVING A LASTING PEACE AND A GENUINE BLACK MAJORITY RULE. CHIEF CHIRAU OF ZUPO IS QUOTED AS SAYING THAT THE PEACE PLAN MARKED A WATER-SHED IN THE SEARCH FOR QUOTE GENUINE BLACK MAJORITY RULE UNQUOTE. HE DESCRIBED IT AS QUOTE BOLD, CONSTRUCTIVE AND REALISTIC UNQUOTE. MR NICK MCNALLY, PRESIDENT OF THE NATIONAL UNIFYING FORCE, SAID THAT THE PROPOSALS QUOTE OFFERED THE GREATEST OPPORTUNITY, THE PRIME MINISTER WILL EVER HAVE TO MAKE HIS MARK IN HISTORY AS THE FMAN WHO BROUGHT PEACE TO HIS COUNTRY UNQUOTE. HE HOPED THAT BISHOP MUZOREWA WOULD RESPOND POSITIVELY TO THE CALL FOR A CONFERENCE. SIR ROY WELENSKY IS REPORTED TO HAVE SAID IN LONDON THAT THE PROPOSALS DID NOT CONTAIN QUOTE A FULL COMMITMENT UNQUOTE TO END THE WAR AND HE CALLED FOR A REFERENDUM.

3. THE HERALD CARRIES A REPORT ON THESE REACTIONS AND ON BISHOP MUZOREWA'S STATEMENT (MY TELNO 18 TO LUSAKA) UNDER THE HEADLINE: QUOTE BISHOP ATTACKS LUSAKA PLAN - SETTLEMENT PROPOSALS 'AN INSULT TO THE ELECTORATE' UNQUOTE. IN AN EDITORIAL SAYS THAT QUOTE FROM WHAT HAS BEEN SEEN OF THE NEW BRITISH SETTLEMENT PLAN SO FAR, IT IS UNLIKELY TO SETTLE ANYTHING UNQUOTE. HOWEVER, IT SAYS THAT BISHOP MUZOREWA HAS BEEN WISE TO ADOPT A QUOTE WAIT AND SEE UNQUOTE ATTITUDE, AS THE FINAL PROPOSALS COULD BE SOMEWHAT DIFFERENT. IT SAYS QUOTE MRS THATCHER SURELY DOES NOT BELIEVE THE BISHOP WILL AGREE TO ATTEND AN ALL-PARTY CONFERENCE TO DRAW UP A NEW CONSTITUTION ... PERHAPS IT IS NOT PERFECT. BUT IT WAS DESIGNED TO LAST TEN YEARS, WHICH IS A LOT LONGER THAN MOST WHITEHALL-DESIGNED CONSTITUTIONS HAVE LASTED IN AFRICA UNQUOTE. BUT QUOTE IF BRITAIN COULD CONVINCED US THAT AN ALL-PARTY CONFERENCE MIGHT HELP TO END THE WAR, THAT, OF COURSE, WOULD BE SOMETHING ELSE UNQUOTE. THE EDITORIAL SAYS THAT PROPER PREPARATION WOULD BE ESSENTIAL AND THAT THE BISHOP WOULD BE FULLY JUSTIFIED IN INSISTING ON A CEASE-FIRE AS A CONDITION FOR HIS ATTENDANCE. IT ENDS BY SAYING THAT THE MOST IMPORTANT QUESTION OF ALL IS QUOTE WHAT WOULD HAPPEN IF THE TERRORIST LEADERS DISPLAYED THEIR USUAL INTRANSIGENCE AND THE CONFERENCE FAILED? WOULD THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT THEN DEFEY NIGERIA AND THE OTHER AFRICAN STATES AND RECOGNISE US? UNQUOTE

DAY

MEMPH

*

SEEN THE FULL TEXT BUT WOULD LOOK AT IT WITH AN OPEN MIND.

V

Prime Minister

8/27/79

.00 FCO

00 LUSAKA

PP PRETORIA (A)

PP MAPUTO (A)

PP LAGOS

PP DAR ES SALAAM

PP LUANDA

PP GABORONE

PP WASHINGTON

PP UKNIS NEW YORK

GR 575

CONFIDENTIAL

FM MIRIMBA SALISBURY 070650Z AUG 79

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 487 OF 7 AUGUST

INFO IMMEDIATE LUSAKA

INFO PRIORITY PRETORIA MAPUTO LAGOS DAR ES SALAAM LUANDA
GABORONE WASHINGTON AND UKNIS NEW YORK

RHODESIA: CHGM STATEMENT

1. I HAVE BEEN SOUNDING OUT WHITE (MORRISON, SECRETARY OF FOREIGN MINISTRY), ASIAN (MOHAMED ADAM, PRIME MINISTERS ADVISER) AND BLACK (BULLE, MINISTER OF COMMERCE) REACTION TO THE CHGM STATEMENT.
2. MORRISON'S ATTITUDE WAS PREDICTABLE. THE STATEMENT (WHICH HE STILL HAD NOT READ) HAD COME AS A SHOCK. WE WOULD ENCOUNTER WHITE OPPOSITION. HE DID NOT FOCUS PARTICULARLY ON THE CALL FOR FRESH ELECTIONS AND SEEMED MORE INTERESTED TO KNOW WHETHER THE PRIME MINISTER WOULD BE ABLE TO CARRY HER PARTY WITH HER AT THE OCTOBER PARTY CONFERENCE. WHEN PRESSED, HE WAS HARD PUT TO EXPLAIN WHAT OBJECTIONS HE HAD TO THE STATEMENT - BUT HE REMAINED UNHAPPY WITH IT. THIS IS TYPICAL OF THE REFLEX ACTIONS OF MANY WHITES.
3. ADAM WAS IMPRESSED AT THE CONTRAST BETWEEN THE ATTITUDES STRUCK BY THE AFRICAN STATES AT THE OAU SUMMIT AND THE OUTCOME AT LUSAKA. HE THOUGHT THEY PROMISED WELL FOR THE FUTURE. HE EMPHASISED THAT MUZOREWA WAS STANDING FIRM AGAINST PRESSURES TO PICK A QUARREL WITH HMG. HE EXPECTED SOME OF THE WHITE MINISTERS TO CAUSE TROUBLE AT CABINET ON 7 AUGUST, BUT SEEMED CONFIDENT THAT MUZOREWA WOULD HAVE THE BACKING OF ALL THE UANC MINISTERS AND WOULD HOLD HIS GROUND. MUZOREWA, INCIDENTALLY, HAD A MEETING WITH ALL THE UANC MINISTERS AT HIS RESIDENCE LATE YESTERDAY EVENING. THIS HAVE GIVEN HIM AN OPPORTUNITY TO GET THEM INTO LINE. MAKE MUCH OF THE ELECTION ISSUE.

Prime Minister

Quite encouraging.

mf *Gen*
7/5x

4. BULLE BEGAN BY ASKING WHAT HMG WERE UP TO . HE THEN READ THE TEXT OF THE CHGM STATEMENT AND AFTER A DISCUSSION DURING WHICH I REPEATED THE POINTS THAT I HAD MADE TO MUZOREWA AND KAMUSIKIRI (MY TELNO 14 TO LUSAKA), HE AGREED THAT THERE WAS LITTLE IN IT TO COMPLAIN OF AND MUCH TO APPLAUD. HE ENQUIRED ABOUT THE TIMING OF THE ELECTIONS AND WONDERED HOW WE COULD POSSIBLY COMPLETE THE WHOLE CONSTITUTIONAL AND ELECTORAL PROCESS BY MID-NOVEMBER. I SAID THAT THIS MIGHT WELL PROVE IMPOSSIBLE, BUT WE SHOULD CONCENTRATE FIRST ON REACHING AN AGREEMENT ON CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE. HE DID NOT SERIOUSLY QUESTION THE PRINCIPLE OF NEW ELECTIONS.

5. I HAD A BRIEF EXCHANGE AT MUZOREWA'S DINNER WITH THE SOUTH AFRICAN REPRESENTATIVE HERE, VAN VUUREN. HE QUESTIONED THE ACCEPTABILITY OF NEW ELECTIONS. I CONCEDED THAT THERE WOULD BE DIFFICULTIES BUT POINTED OUT THAT ELECTIONS MIGHT BE A RELATIVELY SMALL PRICE FOR RHODESIA, AND SOUTH AFRICA , TO PAY FOR A PEACEFUL AND NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT. I URGED HIM NOT TO BE NEGATIVE.

6. THESE REACTIONS WERE LESS CRITICAL THAN I EXPECTED. THERE IS, HOWEVER, STILL PLENTY OF TIME FOR SECOND THOUGHTS, AND I HAVE NOT YET SOUNDED OUT REALLY HARD-CORE WHITE OPINION. THE BISHOP'S STATEMENT (MY TELNO 18 TO LUSAKA) HAS TO SOME EXTENT OCCUPIED THE MIDDLE GROUND AND MADE IT DIFFICULT FOR ANYONE PUBLICLY TO REJECT THE CHGM STATEMENT WITHOUT INDIRECTLY ATTACKING THE BISHOP.

7. MUZOREWA DID NOT, HIMSELF, RAISE THIS MATTER AT DINNER LAST NIGHT. IT IS CLEARLY NOT IN THE FOREFRONT OF HIS MIND AND HE DID NOT GIVE ANY IMPRESSION OF SERIOUS CONCERN. HE IS RESTING ON HIS STATEMENT AND AWAITING OUR NEXT MOVE.

8. ALL IN ALL, THE REACTION TO DATE HAS BEEN MILDER THAN I ANTICIPATED.

CCN: LAST WORD OF PARA 7 SHOULD BEAD MOVE.

DAY

NNN

PRIME MINISTER

PRESS CONFERENCE

Further to my note of yesterday, the following further quotation from your speech in the House on 25 July 1979 may be helpful:-

"We have not yet decided on the matter" (i.e. on whether the Fifth Principle had been fulfilled) "because we have wanted to go another way - a way that we believe will be better for Rhodesia in the long run. It is a way that we believe will bring more countries along with us, and if we go along that consultation route, it will be to the benefit of Rhodesia. It is a way in which we can gain that country's acceptance to legal independence".

Ian Gow

7 August 1979

PRESS CONFERENCE

1. Conservative Party Manifesto

Our Manifesto stated:-

"The Conservative Party will aim to achieve a lasting settlement to the Rhodesia problem based on the democratic wishes of the people of that country. If the Six Principles, which all British Governments have supported for the last fifteen years, are fully satisfied following the present Rhodesian election, the next Government will have the duty to return Rhodesia to a state of legality, move to lift sanctions, and do its utmost to ensure that the new independent state gains international recognition."

2. Debate on The Queen's Speech, 15 May, 1979

You said:-

"The Government welcome the major change which has taken place in Rhodesia as a result of the recent elections and the emergence of an African majority Government. It is our objective to build on that change to achieve a return to legality in conditions that secure wide international recognition."

3a. Debate on Rhodesia, 25 July, 1979

You said:-

"We explained" (to the Bishop when he was in London) "that the British Government were engaged in a process of consultation with a view to bringing Rhodesia to legal independence with the widest possible international acceptance."

3b. Earlier in the same speech, you said:-

"Our election Manifesto re-affirmed our commitment to those Six Principles. It made clear our intention to achieve a settlement based on the democratic wishes of the people of Rhodesia and to ensure that the country, when it proceeds to independence, gains international recognition."

4. Statement at the Opening Session of the CHGM, 1 August, 1979

You said:-

"The United Kingdom has pledged itself to exercise its constitutional responsibility for Rhodesia. The aim is to bring Rhodesia to legal independence on a basis which the Commonwealth and the international community as a whole will find acceptable."

5. Statement at CHGM on 3 August, 1979


You said:-

"Our aim is, as I stated it during our Opening Session, to bring Rhodesia to legal independence on a basis which the Commonwealth and the international community as a whole will find acceptable."

6. Communique issued at CHGM

The Heads of Government stated:-

- (a) "that they were wholly committed to genuine black majority rule" - the precise phrase which you used in the House on 25 July 1979 (Column 626).
- (b) "that the internal settlement constitution is defective in certain important respects" - the very words which you had used in your speech to the CHGM on 3 August 1979.
- (c) "that it is the constitutional responsibility of the United Kingdom to grant legal independence" - which compares with the wording of the Manifesto which stated that "the next Government will have the duty to return Rhodesia to a state of legality".


Ian Gow

6 August 1979

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RETRACT 45926 AUG

ITEM: RHODESIA

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF PRIME MINISTER'S INTERVIEW WITH PETER SNOW ON ITN "NEWS AT ONE" ON MONDAY SIX AUGUST, FOLLOWING ANNOUNCEMENT OF AGREEMENT ON RHODESIA AMONG COMMONWEALTH LEADERS AT CHGM AT LUSAKA.

PETER SNOW: WHO MADE THE CONCESSIONS TO GET THIS AGREEMENT?

PRIME MINISTER: WELL, I DO NOT THINK IT IS A QUESTION OF CONCESSIONS. WE ALL WANT TO SEE RHODESIA SOLVED. IT HELPS NOT ONLY RHODESIA, WHICH OBVIOUSLY IS EXTREMELY IMPORTANT BECAUSE SHE IS SUFFERING BITTERLY., IT ALSO HELPS ZAMBIA AND TANZANIA AND BOTSWANA BECAUSE THEY TOO, THEIR ECONOMIES ARE GRIEVOUSLY AFFECTED. CONCESSIONS, I THINK I FELT THIS: HAD WE GONE AHEAD AND RECOGNISED ALONE, WE SHOULD HAVE BEEN TOTALLY ALONE AND IT WOULD NOT HAVE SOLVED THE PROBLEM BECAUSE THE WAR AND THE HOSTILITIES WOULD HAVE STILL GONE ON. WHAT THEN WOULD HAVE HAPPENED? WHITE PEOPLE WOULD HAVE GONE ON LEAVING RHODESIA AT THE RATE OF 1,000 (ONETHOUSAND) A MONTH, AS THEY ARE NOW. BLACK AND WHITE WOULD HAVE GONE ON BEING KILLED AT THE RATE OF 500 (FIVEHUNDRED) A WEEK, MAINLY BLACK. WE SHOULD HAVE PUT BISHOP MUZOREWA IN A TERRIBLE POSITION, THEN THERE WOULD HAVE BEEN A DEMAND THAT WE SHOULD GO IN AND HELP, AND WE COULD NOT POSSIBLY DO THAT. THIS IS WHY WE HAD TO MOVE TOGETHER TO GET THE SUPPORT OF THE FRONT LINE STATES TO SAY, "LOOK, IF WE GET THE CONSTITUTION RIGHT IN THE SAME WAY AS WE GAVE YOU A CONSTITUTION, THEN THERE IS NOTHING FOR YOU TO FIGHT AGAINST". AND THEY AGREED THAT.

PETER SNOW: HOW DO YOU ANSWER THE CHARGE THAT WAS MADE IN LONDON THAT YOU SOLD OUT THE RHODESIANS AND THEIR NEWLY-ELECTED BLACK PRIME MINISTER IN ORDER TO APPEASE THE COMMONWEALTH?

PRIME MINISTER: WELL, I WILL REACT JUST IN THE SAME WAY I HAVE TRIED TO INDICATE. I AM ANXIOUS FOR THE BALLOT TO WIN IN RHODESIA. I BELIEVE PASSIONATELY IN THE BALLOT BOX OVER THE BULLET. MY PROBLEM WAS THAT IF WE WENT AHEAD TOTALLY ALONE, HOW WERE WE GOING TO END THE WAR? IT COULD HAVE BEEN INTENSIFIED. IT COULD HAVE BEEN IN AN EVEN WORSE POSITION. AMERICA WOULD NOT HAVE COME ALONG WITH US., EUROPE WOULD NOT. NOR WOULD THE AFRICAN STATES. AND THE PRIZE I WAS GOING FOR WAS TO GET THE COMMONWEALTH WITH US, AMERICA WITH US, SO THAT WE NOT ONLY MORE OF US RECOGNISED THEM TOGETHER, WHICH WE PUT IN THE MANIFESTO, YOU KNOW, AT THE TIME OF THE ELECTION, BUT THE VITAL END OF THOSE HOSTILITIES WOULD HAVE BEEN A CHANCE TO SEIZE.

PETER SNOW: SO YOU HAVE IN A SENSE CHANGED YOUR MIND SINCE YOU BECAME PRIME MINISTER?

PRIME MINISTER: NO, I HAVE NOT CHANGED MY MIND. I HAVE PUZZLED AND PUZZLED AND PUZZLED AWAY HOW, WHAT WAS THE WAY TO BRING AN END TO THE WAR AND THE ONLY WAY IN THE END THAT ONE COULD THINK OF WAS TO TRY TO GET THE CONSENT OF THOSE FROM WHOSE TERRITORIES THE HOSTILITIES ARE BEING CONDUCTED, AND I THINK THAT PERHAPS THAT IS A GREAT ACHIEVEMENT. AND AS YOU YOURSELF REMARKED, IT IS ASTONISHING THAT WE MANAGED TO DO IT STILL WITH THREE DAYS TO GO.

PETER SNOW: WHAT DOES BRITISH SUPERVISION OF THE ELECTIONS MEAN?
DOES THAT MEAN THAT YOU MIGHT HAVE TO PUT BRITISH TROOPS OR POLICE IN
THERE?

PRIME MINISTER: OH, NO, NO. IT IS ADMINISTRATIVE SUPERVISION. NO,
NO. WE ARE NOT THINKING OF PUTTING TROOPS IN THERE. THIS AGAIN HAS
BEEN A PROBLEM ALL ALONG. IF WE DID RECOGNISE AND LEAVE BISHOP
MUZOREWA ALONE AND THE HOSTILITIES INCREASED AND HE THEN CAME TO
ASK US FOR AID, WHAT WOULD WE DO? WE HAVE GOT TROOPS IN GERMANY,
TROOPS IN IRELAND, TROOPS IN HONG KONG, WE COULD NOT HAVE DONE IT.
WE HAD TO TRY TO GET A SOLUTION THAT WOULD LEAD TO PEACE.

PETER SNOW: BUT SUPPOSE THE GUERRILLAS AT SOME TIME AFTER THEY
ASSENT TO THE AGREEMENT - IF THEY DO - CHANGE THEIR MINDS AND
START FIGHTING? WOULD NOT YOU THEN HAVE TO DEFEND THOSE THAT
ACCEPTED THE AGREEMENT?

PRIME MINISTER: I THINK YOU WILL FIND THAT THE FRONT LINE STATES,
BEING A PARTY TO THIS AGREEMENT, WILL BRING VERY CONSIDERABLE
PRESSURE TO BEAR ON THEM. AFTER ALL, WHEN WE GOT THE KIND
OF CONSTITUTION WHICH IS WHOLLY THE KIND WHICH WE GAVE TO ALL
THE OTHER MEMBERS OF THE COMMONWEALTH - WHICH CAN BE SEEN TO BE
THE KIND - WHAT IS THERE TO FIGHT ABOUT? NO-ONE IS MORE AWARE
THAN I AM THAT A NUMBER OF BRITISH PRIME MINISTERS AND PREVIOUS
COMMONWEALTH CONFERENCES HAVE FOUNDERED ON THIS. I CAN ONLY TELL
YOU WHAT THEY TELL ME: THAT THERE IS A WILL AND A RESOLVE AND
THE BELIEF THIS TIME THAT THERE IS A REAL CHANCE OF A KIND THAT
THERE HAS NOT BEEN THERE BEFORE. THEY WANT TO SOLVE IT AND SO
DO WE.

PETER SNOW: AND BISHOP MUZOREWA - WILL HE ACCEPT?

PRIME MINISTER: I VERY MUCH HOPE SO. BECAUSE LOOK, WHAT THERE
IS, IT IS GOOD NEWS FOR BISHOP MUZOREWA. HE HAS ALREADY GOT ONE
PERSON, ONE VOTE, AND THAT WAS A TREMENDOUS STEP FORWARD, AND
A MAJORITY BLACK PARLIAMENT, AND A MAJORITY BLACK ADMINISTRATION.,
THAT WAS A TREMENDOUS STEP FORWARD, AND LET US ACKNOWLEDGE IT,
AND THE CONFERENCE ACKNOWLEDGED IT, THAT THE CONSTITUTION HAS
CHANGED, AND WE CAN BUILD ON THAT, AND WE CAN BRING IN THE OTHER
PART, WHICH JUST, I HOPE SO MUCH, WILL ACHIEVE OUR GOAL.

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TELNO 861 OF 6 AUG

AND TO C O I.

CHGM: RHODESIA: PRIME MINISTER'S SPEECH AT PRESS CLUB.

FOR NEWS DEPARTMENT, FROM FENN.

1. THE PRIME MINISTER PRESENTED THE AWARDS AT THE ZAMBIAN PRESS ASSOCIATION DINNER TONIGHT. HER SPEECH WAS NOTABLY WELL RECEIVED BY THE ZAMBIAN HOSTS, AND THE PRESS. SHE TOOK THE FIRST DANCE WITH PRESIDENT KAUNDA.

2. FOLLOWING IS THE PASSAGE IN HER SPEECH WHICH DEALT WITH RHODESIA.

BEGINS.

THIS UNIQUELY QUOTE COMMONWEALTH UNQUOTE ATMOSPHERE GIVES US AMPLE OPPORTUNITY FOR A CONSTRUCTIVE DIALOGUE.

YOU WILL ALL BY THIS TIME KNOW THAT A STRIKING EXAMPLE OF THE WAY THE COMMONWEALTH HEADS OF GOVERNMENT WORK TOGETHER, AND THE WAY THAT THE COMMONWEALTH CAN BE OF REAL HELP OVER DIFFICULT PROBLEMS, HAS JUST BEEN GIVEN BY THE PUBLICATION OF THE STATEMENT WE AGREED YESTERDAY IN REGARD TO RHODESIA. THIS COMMUNIQUE' REPRESENTS NEW HOPE FOR ALL THOSE WHO HAVE BEEN AFFECTED OVER THE YEARS BY THE PROBLEM. THE STATEMENT DOES TWO VERY IMPORTANT THINGS. FIRST, IT RECORDS FIRM COMMONWEALTH AGREEMENT THAT ONLY BRITAIN CAN GIVE RHODESIA LEGAL INDEPENDENCE. SECOND, AND THIS IS A GREAT THRILL FOR US, IT AFFIRMS THE CONFIDENCE OF THE COMMONWEALTH IN BRITAIN TO DO THAT.

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THIS IS VERY SIGNIFICANT, MOST HELPFUL.
IT MEANS THAT WE HAVE FULL COMMONWEALTH SUPPORT AND
ENCOURAGEMENT AND GOODWILL TO MOVE FORWARD ALONG THE
PATH DESCRIBED TO OUR COLLEAGUES AND INDICATED PUBLICLY.
THE STATEMENT IS A FIRM AND WELCOME POINT FROM WHICH
TO START A NEW INITIATIVE.
WE MEAN NOW AT HOME TO MOVE SWIFTLY TOWARDS OUR IMMEDIATE OBJECTIVE
OF WORKING WITH THE PARTIES TO DRAW UP AN INDEPENDENCE
CONSTITUTION.
BUT ABOVE ALL WE WANT TO MOVE QUICKLY TO THE MOST IMPORTANT
GOAL OF ALL, AND THAT IS AN END TO THE HOSTILITIES.
I SAID IN MY SPEECH ON FRIDAY THAT I SIMPLY DID NOT BELIEVE
THAT THERE IS ANYTHING NOW DIVIDING THE PEOPLE OF RHODESIA
WHICH IS WORTH THE USE OF THE BOMB AND THE GUN TO KILL AND
MAIM MEN, WOMEN AND CHILDREN BY THE THOUSAND, OR WHICH CAN
JUSTIFY THE MISERY OF THE HUNDREDS OF THOUSANDS IN REFUGEE
CAMPS.
THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT AND THE COMMONWEALTH ARE DEEPLY CONSCIOUS
OF THE URGENT NEED TO BRING PEACE TO THE PEOPLE OF RHODESIA AND
TO RHODESIA'S NEIGHBOURS, AND I KNOW YOU ARE TOO. THE MESSAGE
OF THE COMMONWEALTH MEETING IS THAT ALL OUR PARTNERS ARE JUST
AS CONSCIOUS OF THIS NEED AS BRITAIN AND ZAMBIA.
I AM GRATEFUL TO MY COMMONWEALTH COLLEAGUES FOR THE HELPFUL AND
CONSTRUCTIVE WAY IN WHICH WE HAVE WORKED TOGETHER ON THIS PROBLEM
OVER THE LAST FEW DAYS. WE HAVE WORKED CLOSELY AT THE PROCESS
OF PERSUADING ONE ANOTHER.
WE HAVE TALKED LONG AND EARNESTLY TOGETHER.
WE HAVE SAT TOGETHER TO ANALYSE THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF
THE PROBLEM OF RHODESIA. WE WOULD NEVER HAVE REACHED
THE CONCLUSION WE DID WITHOUT YOUR INSPIRING LEADERSHIP,
MR PRESIDENT.
WE HAVE DISCUSSED HOW TO WORK TOWARDS A SOLUTION.
IT HAS BEEN A WONDERFUL AND INSPIRING EXPERIENCE.
THIS MEETING, MY FIRST HEADS OF GOVERNMENT MEETING, HAS SHOWN
THE COMMONWEALTH AT ITS MOST POSITIVE.
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Eric MA
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FOLLOWING FOR NEWS DEPT FROM FENN

CHGM: RHODESIA

1. THE PRIME MINISTER GAVE AN ON THE RECORD PRESS BRIEFING FOR BRITISH CORRESPONDENTS IN LUSAKA TODAY 6 AUG. FOLLOWING IS EDITED TRANSCRIPT.

PRIME MINISTER... YOU WILL HAVE SEEN THE COMMUNIQUE WHICH WAS ISSUED LATE LAST NIGHT. I WOULD JUST LIKE TO MAKE TWO POINTS AT THE OUTSET. I HAVE HAD TWO PROBLEMS ON MY MIND ABOUT RHODESIA IN ADDITION TO THE OBVIOUS ONE.

2. THE FIRST PROBLEM WAS HOW TO FIND A SOLUTION WHICH WOULD BRING AN END TO HOSTILITIES. NO RECOGNITION, OR EVEN RESTORATION OF LEGALITY BY ONE NATION AS SUCH WOULD NECESSARILY HAVE BROUGHT ABOUT AN END TO HOSTILITIES. WITHOUT THAT WE SHOULD HAVE CONTINUED TO HAVE SOMETHING LIKE 500 PEOPLE KILLED EACH WEEK, AND THE WAR MIGHT EVEN HAVE ESCALATED. WE SHOULD HAVE CONTINUED TO HAVE ABOUT 1000 WHITE RHODESIANS LEAVING EACH MONTH. SO WE HAVE BEEN VERY MUCH EXERCISED FOR QUITE A TIME TO TRY TO FIND SOME KIND OF FORMULA OR SUPPORT FROM OTHERS WHICH COULD LEAD TO THE HOPE THAT WE COULD BRING ABOUT AN END TO HOSTILITIES. I BELIEVE THAT THIS OFFERS THE PROMISE THAT THAT MAY HAPPEN. IF THE PRESENT COMMUNIQUE CAN BE TRANSLATED INTO FULL EFFECT WE REALLY HAVE THE SUPPORT OF THE FRONT LINE STATES, THOSE STATES WHO ARE THEMSELVES ACTING AS HOSTS FOR THE PEOPLE WHO ARE ATTACKING RHODESIA, AND THAT REALLY IS ONE OF THE TREMENDOUS PLUSES THAT WE HAVE THE SUPPORT OF THOSE FRONT LINE STATES, PROVIDED WE GET A REASONABLY DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION, PARTICULARLY IN THE TWO RESPECTS WHICH I SPELLED OUT BOTH IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS AND HERE. THATS POINT NUMBER ONE, HOW TO BRING AN END TO THE HOSTILITIES. WE HAVENT BROUGHT AN END YET, BUT THIS COURSE OFFERS THE PROSPECT AND HOPE.

3. THE SECOND ONE IS HOW TO BRING OTHER NATIONS WITH US IN WHAT FOR THEM WOULD BE RECOGNITION OF RHODESIA, FOR US OF COURSE ITS LEGALITY, WHICH IS SLIGHTLY DIFFERENT. AND HAD WE GONE WHOLLY ALONE I DONT THINK IN THE END IT WOULD HAVE BEEN VERY MUCH HELP TO RHODESIA. IT WOULD STILL HAVE LEFT HER ISOLATED, LEFT US ISOLATED, IF ANYTHING SERIOUS HAPPENDED WE MIGHT HAVE BEEN CALLED UPON TO HELP, AND I DONT THINK WE WOULD HAVE BEEN IN A POSITION TO GIVE IT. SO YOU FIND THAT THROUGHOUT ALL THE COMMENTS WE HAVE MADE ABOUT RHODESIA FOR QUITE A LONG TIME NOW, YOU WILL FIND SOMEWHERE THE PHRASE THAT WE WISH TO COME TO RECOGNITION, TO LEGALITY, IN CONDITIONS WHICH WILL GAIN WIDE INTERNATIONAL ACCEPTANCE.

4. SO THOSE WERE THE TWO THINGS. YOU WILL ASK ME WHAT I THINK THE PROSPECTS ARE. ITS VERY DIFFICULT TO MAKE A JUDGEMENT, BUT IT IS A TREMENDOUS PLUS FIRST TO HAVE GOT THE COMMONWEALTH SUPPORT, AS WE HAVE IN THIS VERY WELL BALANCED COMMUNIQUE. AND SECONDLY TO HAVE GOT THEIR CONFIDENCE AND TRUST THAT BRITAIN IS CONSTITUTIONALLY RESPONSIBLE AND MUST CARRY OUT THE PROCESS FOR RHODESIA, IN THE SAM WAY AS HSE HAS FOR OTHER COMMONWEALTH COUNTRIES.

JOHN DICKIE, DAILY MAIL: HOW DO YOU THINK WE CAN GET THE TROOPS INTO RHODESIA IN SUFFICIENT NUMBERS TO SUPERVISE THE ELCTIONS?

PRIME MINISTER: WHAT TROOPS ? SUPERVISION MEANS ADMINISTRATIVE SUPERVISION WE DO NOT ANTICIPATE ANY BRITISH ROOPS GOING TO RHODESIA.

TOM ARMS, THOMSON NEWSPAPERS: HOW THEN WILL YOU SUPERVISE THE ELECTIONS?

PRIME MINISTER: YOU DONT NECESSARILY NEED TROOPS TO DO IT. BY THE TIME YOU COME TO ELECTIONS YOU SHOULD HAVE GOT A CEASEFIRE. THIS IS EXACTLY WHY I STARTED OUT WITH THE POINT ON HOSTILITIES. YOUR FIRST STEP IS TO TRY TO GET THE CONSTITUTION. QUITE A LOT OF THAT CONSTITUTION WILL BE COMMONW WITH THE EXISTING TEXT FOR THE SIMPLE REASON THAT THEY HAVE TAKEN QUITE A LOT OF IT BROM BRITISH COMMON FORM.

QUESTION: DO YOU HAVE ANY GUARANTEES OR UNDERTAKINGS THAT THE PATRIOTIC FRONT WILL NOT IN THE DAYS AHEAD ONCE AGAIN BEDEVIL NEGOTIATIONS BY PUTTING FORWARD EXCESSIVE DEMANDS?

PRIME MINISTER: WE HAVE NO GUARANTEES. WE HAVE ONLY THE WAY WE HAVE GONE PREVIOUSLY, WHICH IS NEGOTIATING WITH ALL THE PARTIES. BUT THE HOPE THAT THE COMMUNIQUE FROM THIS CONFERENCE OFFERS IS THAT EACH AND EVERY ONE OF ITS CLAUSES IT HAS THE SUPPORT OF OUR COMMONWEALTH PARTNERS WHO ARE JUST AS ANXIOUS TO BRING AN END TO HOSTILITIES AS WERE ARE, AND TWO OF THEM, TANZANIA AND ZAMBIA ARE IN FACT THE MOST GOVERNMENTS TO THOSE WHO PENETRATE RHODESIA IN HOSTILE FASHION.

QUESTION: PRIME MINISTER MANLEY JUST TOLD US HALF AN HOUR AGO THAT THERE WAS NO QUESTION OF GETTING A CEASEFIRE IN RHODESIA BEFORE THE FOUR PARTIES MET. IT THAT A DIFFERENCE BETWEEN HIS POINT OF VIEW AND YOURS?

PRIME MINISTER: BEFORE THE FOUR PARTIES MET? I AM INTRIGUED, WHICH FOUR PARTIES? I WOULDNT START TO PUT A GLOS S ON THIS THING. I DOUBT VERY MUCH WHETHER ONE WOULD GET A CEASEFIRE IMMEDIATELY. ONE HAS TO SHOW SOME PROGRESS TOWARDS THE COURSE OF ACTION ENVISAGED IN THE COMMUNIQUE. BUT I HOPE VERY MUCH WE WILL BE ABLE TO GET IT BEFORE A FURTHER ELECTION IS HELD.

TOM ARMS: WHO ARE THE PARTIES THAT WOULD ATTEND AN ALL PARTY CONFERENCE?

PRIME MINISTER: WE HAVE YET TO DECIDE THAT. I AM HAVING A CABINET ON FRIDAY, WHEN WE GET BACK. BECAUSE IT IS THE BRITISH CABINET, THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE BRITISH PARLIAMENT WHICH HAS TO PUT THIS THROUGHT, AND YOU WILL NOTICE THE REFERENCES MADE IN THREE CLAUSES IN THE COMMUNIQUE TO THE BRITISH GOVT BEING RESPONSIBLE.

TOM ARMS: DO YOU THINK MR SMITH WILL BE INVITED?

PRIME MINISTER: IF YOU ASK THAT SUPPLEMENTARY YOU WILL GET A NIL ANSWER.

IRN: HAVE YOU BEEN IN TOUCH WITH BISHOP MUZOREWA AND IF SO WHAT REACTION HAS HE SHOWN?

PRIME MINISTER: I HAVE NOT PERSONALLY BEEN IN TOUCH WITH HIM. I READ HIS REACTIONS FROM THE NEWS. I SAW BISHOP MUZOREWA IN LONDON. CERTAINLY HE HAS BEEN INFORMED OF THE COMMUNIQUE. HE HAS BEEN INFORMED THROUGH THE USUAL CHANNELS.

QUESTION: DO YOU KNOW WHAT HIS REACTION TO THIS WAS?

PRIME MINISER: CERTAINLY HE MADE A STATEMENT AFTER THE SPEECH THAT I MADE AT THE OPENING, WHICH WAS REALLY THE BONES FOR THE COMMUNIQUE.

QUESTION: YOU MENTIONED THE SUPPORT FOR THIS COMMUNIQUE BY TANZANIA AND ZAMBIA. THERE IS ANOTHER IMPORTANT FACTOR, MOZAMBIQUE. HAVE YOU BEEN GIVEN TO UNDERSTAND THAT THE MOZAMBIQUANS WOULD GO ALONG WITH THIS?

PRIME MINISTER: NO, WE CANT. THIS IS A COMMONWEALTH CONFERENCE, AND WE CAN ONLY GET THE SUPPORT OF THOSE WHO ARE AT THE CONFERENCE. I WOULD HAVE THOUGHT IN THE END, YOU KNOW, IT WOULD BE TO MOZAMBIQUES ADVANTAGE TO GET RHODESIA BACK WORKING SUCCESSFULLY AND ECONOMICALLY ONCE AGAIN, BECAUSE AFTER ALL SO MUCH OF MOZAMBIQUES PROSPERITY DEPENDED AS ACTING AS PORTS TO HTHE HINTERLAND. IF YOU ASKED ME IF I HAVE HAD ANY GUARANTEES, THE ANSWER IS NO.

NICK ASHFOR, THE TIMES. PRIME MINISTER MANLEY SAID THAT SANCTIONS WOULD ONLY BE LIFTED WHEN A LASTING SETTLEMENT WAS ACHIEVED. IF IT IS NOT ACHIEVED BY NOVEMBER WHAT WILL HAPPEN TO SANCTIONS IN PARLIAMENT?

PRIME MINISTER: THE COMMONWEALTH CONFERENCE IS ONLY THE FIRST STEP. WE HAVE NOW GOT TO START OFF AND SEE HOW WE GET ON. I AM VERY CAUTIOUS IN ANY FORCAST WHICH I MAKE.

MARTIN DICKSON, FT. CAN YOU GIVE SOME INDICATION OF THE TIME SCAL E OF THE NEXT FEW STEPS?

PRIME MINISTER: WELL, WE GO TO CABINET ON FRIDAY, AND THEN WE SHALL - I HAVE A REASONABLY CLEAR DIARY, SO WE SHALL GET ON AS FAST AS WE CAN.

QUESTION: MANY OF THE AFRICAN STATES HAVE SUGGESTED THAT THE BRITISH PRIME MINISTER HAS SOFTENED HER ATTITUDE SINCE YOURS SPEECH IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS. DO YOU AGREE?

PRIME MINISTER: NO, IF YOU GO THROUGH YOU WILL FIND AN ASTONISHING CONSISTENCY AND SIMILARITY BETWEEN THE THREE. INDEED, I THINK YOU MIGHT EVEN HAVE HAD AN ANALYSIS INDICATING THAT. BUT THEN, I WAS NEVER AS HARD AS THEY THOUGHT.

MICHAEL WALL, ECONOMIST. DOES THE BRITISH AUTHORITY WHICH IS ACCEPTED BY THE COMMONWEALTH IMPLY THAT DURING THE TRANSITION BRITISH AUTHORITY WOULD HAVE TO BE ASSERTED THROUGH A COMMISSION ER OR SOME FIGUREHEAD WITHIN THE COUNTRY?

PRIME MINISTER: WHEN WE HAVE DONE THE CONSTITUTION WE WILL HAVE TO START TO NEGOTIATE ON THE TRANSITION PERIOD. ITS NOT ONLY THE FACT THAT THE COMMONWEALTH ACCEPTS IT, IT IS A LEGAL FACT. WE ARE THE LEGALLY, CONSTITUTIONALLY RESPONSIBLE POWER, AUTHORITY THE COMMONWEALTH HAS RECOGNISED THIS AND GIVEN US EVERY SUPPORT IN THE THINGS MENTIONED IN THE COMMUNIQUE.

QUESTION: I WAS THINKING REALLY OF WHO WILL RUN THE GOVT DURING THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD.

PRIME MINISTER: THIS HAS TO BE NEGOTIATED. YOU CANT NEGOTIATE THIS IN 39 PEOPLE IN THE COMMONWEALTH. IT HAS TO BE NEGOTIATED BETWEEN THE RESPONSIBLE AUTHORITY, WHICH IS BRITAIN, AND THE PARTIES TO THE NEGOTIATIONS.

DAVID ADAMSON, DAILY TELEGRAPH: WHAT SORT OF SAFEGUARDS DO YOU ENVISAGE FOR TH E WHITE MINORITIES IN RHODESIA?

PRIME MINISTER: THE CUSTOMARY SAFEGUARDS ARE SEATS FOR THE WHITES. YOU WILL FIND FOR EXAMPLE IN THE TANGANIKAN INDPENDENCE CONSTITUTION OUT OF I THINK SOME 71 MEMBERS 10 WERE RESERVED FOR THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY AND 11 FOR THE ASIANS. IT IS QUITE CUSTOMARY IN COUNTRIES WHICH HAVE A SUBSTANTIAL MINORITY LIVING THEIR PERMANENTLY TO ALLOCATE A SPECIAL QUOTA OF SEATS TO THEM.

COLIN LEGUM, OBSERVER: PREVIOUS INITIATIVES HAVE ALWAYS BROKEN DOWN IN THE IMPLEMENTATION BECAUSE SALISBURY HAS OBJECTED. HOW DO YOU INTEND TO ADDRESS YOURSELF TO SALISBURY THIS TIME?

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PRIME MINISTER: I THINK THAT THAT IS PRETTY OBVIOUS BOTH TO SALISBURY AND TO THE CAPITALS IN ZAMBIA, TANZANIA AND BOTSWANA AND THE OTHERS. WHAT STRUCK ME THIS TIME WAS THAT EVERYONE RECOGNISED THE URGENCY OF THE PROBLEM AND THAT THE CHANCE MIGHT NOT OCCUR AGAIN. THERE HAS BEEN WHAT WAS REFERRED TO IN THE COMMUNIQUE AS NEW DIMENSIONS SINCE THE LAST COMMONWEALTH CONFERENCE MET. ONE OF THOSE NEW DIMENSIONS IS OF COURSE ONE PERSON ONE VOTE, RESULTING IN THE ELECTION OF A BLACK PRESIDENT, A BLACK HEAD OF ADMINISTRATION, A BLACK MAJORITY PARLIAMENT A BLACK MAJORITY CABINET. THAT REALLY WAS, AS WE HAVE CONSTANTLY SAID, A VERY VERY GREAT ADVANCE, AND IT OFFERED THE PROSPECT OF BUILDING UPON IT.

DAVID PALMER, F: THERE IS A GENERAL ASSUMPTION THAT THE CONFERENCE WILL BE HELD IN LONDON. IS THAT ASSUMPTION CORRECT?

PRIME MINISTER: I WOULD NOT QUARREL WITH IT.

PATRICK KEATLY, THE GUARDIAN: HOW HAS THE AGREEMENT HERE CHANGED THE DIPLOMACY, WHEN COMPARED WITH THE VIEW FROM LONDON?

PRIME MINISTER: WE HAVE GOT THE ASSURANCE OF THEIR SUPPORT. DOES IT NOT STRIKE YOU AS RATHER REMARKABLE THAT WE HAVE GOT THIS KIND OF COMMUNIQUE AND SECONDLY THAT WE HAVE GOT IT REASONABLY QUICKLY. JUST CONTRAST THIS WITH THE APPROACH OF THE OAU A FEW WEEKS AGO, WHEN THEY SAID THAT THE PATRIOTIC FRONT WERE THE SOLE NEGOTIATORS. NOW THAT WAS REJECTED IN THE DEBATE ON BOTH SIDES OF THE HOUSE OF COMMONS IN LONDON: WE COULD NOT POSSIBLY ACCEPT THAT. LOOK AT THE DIFFERENCE IN APPROACH AND ATTITUDE BETWEEN THE OAU AND THE APPROACH AND ATTITUDE OF THE COMMONWEALTH COUNTRIES. THEY HAVE COME IN A FEW WEEKS A MUCH FURTHER WAY THAN I HAVE COME.

BOB CARVELL, EVENING STANDARD: DO YOU FEEL YOU WILL SEE THE SAME UNITY WHEN YOU GET HOME?

PRIME MINISTER: I THINK I WILL BE ABLE TO COPE. PETER AND I TOGETHER WILL BE ABLE TO COPE WONT WE?

LORD CARRINGTON: UNDOUBTEDLY.

QUESTION: WOULD YOU ENVISAGE AN EARLY RECALL OF PARLIAMENT TO DISCUSS THIS?

PRIME MINISTER: WELL WE HAVENT GOT FAR ENOUGH YET. THE LAST THING WE DID, THE LAST WEEK IN PARLIAMENT WE HAD A DEBATE ON RHODESIA, AND AS I SAY IF YOU LOOK AT THAT SPEECH VERY CAREFULLY AND COMPARE IT WITH THE OPENING SPEECH HERE YOU WILL FIND VERY CONSIDERABLE SIMILARITIES, NOT ONLY IN THOUGHT BUT IN ACTUAL PHRASEOLOGY ITSELF.

QUESTION: ARE THERE ANY PLANS FOR YOURSELF OR YOUR FOREIGN MINISTER TO VISIT SALISBURY?

PRIME MINISTER: NO WE HAVE MADE NO PLANS FOR IT AT ALL. I THINK WE NEED TO GO HOME FIRST AND START ONE OR TWO THINGS IN TRAIN.

JOHN DICKIE, DAILY MAIL: DO YOU THINK COMMONWEALTH OBSERVERS WILL BE ENOUGH TO ENSURE NO INTIMIDATION AS HAS BEEN SEEN IN THE PAST?

PRIME MINISTER: WE WERE DESPERATELY ANXIOUS TO HAVE AS MANY OBSERVERS AS WE CAN. LAST TIME THERE WERE ELECTIONS WE WENT IN AND OBSERVED, THE AUSTRALIANS SENT IN OBSERVERS, THE WORLDS PRESS WAS THERE, WHICH IF I MIGHT SAY SO IS ONE OF THE BIGGEST SAFEGUARDS. I AM NOT FLATTERING YOU, ITS A FACT OF LIFE, FOR WHICH I AM PROFOUNDLY GRATEFUL. WHEN YOU HAVE A CRITICAL ELECTION I THINK YOU WANT IT OBSERVED BY AS MANY PEOPLE AS POSSIBLE.

SUNDAY TELEGRAPH: THE PATRIOTIC FRONT HAVE INSISTED ALL ALONG THAT DISBANDMENT OF THE RHODESIAN SECURITY FORCES IS A PRECONDITION BEFORE GOING TO ANY TALKS. WILL THIS FIT INTO THE FORMULA YOU HAVE WORKED OUT?

PRIME MINISTER: THE THING THIS TIME IS THAT THE HOST COUNTRIES TO THE PATRIOTIC FRONT, EXCEPT MOZAMBIQUE, HAVE PUT THEIR NAMES TO THIS COMMUNIQUE. CLEARLY THEY EXPECT THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE PATRIOTIC FRONT TO BE INTERESTED IN GETTING DEMOCRACY ON THE BASIS OF SIMILAR CONSTITUTIONS IN RHODESIA TO THOSE WE HAVE GIVEN ELSEWHERE. THIS IS THE NEW CRITICAL THING. THERE IS GOING TO BE PRESSURE ON THE PATRIOTIC FRONT TO AGREE TO THE KIND OF CONSTITUTION THAT BRITAIN HAS GIVEN ELSEWHERE, AND I HOPE THEREFORE THAT WILL ENABLE US TO MOVE FORWARD FIRST ON THE CONSTITUTION, WE WILL TRY TO TALK THAT OUT FIRST, THEN THE NEGOTIATIONS ON THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD. NOW IT WILL BE AN AWFUL TRAGEDY IF HAVING GOT THE CONSTITUTION BEHIND US, IT FOUNDERED ON A TRANSITIONAL PERIOD. BECAUSE THE EXISTENCE OF THIS COMMUNIQUE FROM THE COMMONWEALTH CONFERENCE WE ARE LIKELY TO FIND MORE PRESSURE BROUGHT TO BEAR ON THOSE WHO ARE DIFFICULT THAN EVER BEFORE, BECAUSE THEY DO ALL REALISE THE URGENCY AND THEY REALLY DO WANT A SETTLEMENT. OTHERWISE, WE SHOULD NEVER HAVE GOT A COMMUNIQUE SO QUICKLY.

REUTERS: MR NKOMO'S SPOKESMAN ISSUED A STATEMENT THIS MORNING DISPUTING THAT THE CASE OF RHODESIA CAN BE HANDLED IN A SIMILAR WAY TO DECOLONISATION BECAUSE THERE HAS BEEN A WAR. DO YOU ACCEPT THE SITUATION IN RHODESIA IS DIFFERENT?

PRIME MINISTER: WE REMAIN LEGALLY IN THE SAME POSITION: WE ARE CONSTITUTIONALLY RESPONSIBLE FOR A COLONY. AND ONLY THE BRITISH PARLIAMENT CAN BRING A COLONY WHICH IS AN ILLEGAL STATE TO A LEGAL STATE. NO ONE ELSE CAN DO IT, SO THE LAW OF IT IS THE SAME.

REUTERS: YOU DONT ACCEPT THEIR ARGUMENT THAT THEY HAVE A SPECIAL ROLE TO PLAY BECAUSE OF THE WAR THEY HAVE BEEN FIGHTING?

PRIME MINISTER: ONE ASSUMES THEY WILL COME AND TALK ABOUT THE CONSTITUTION.

QUESTION: WILL YOU BE ESTABLISHING DIRECT BRITISH RULE, FOR SOME PERIOD HOWEVER SHORT?

PRIME MINISTER: YOU ARE TRYING TO GET FAR FURTHER THAN WE CAN GET AT THE MOMENT. FAR FURTHER.

QUESTION: COULD YOU SAY WHETHER YOUR EXPERIENCES HERE OVER THE RHODESIAN DEBATE HAVE IN ANY WAY CHANGED YOUR ASSESSMENT OF THE COMMONWEALTH AS AN ORGANISATION?

PRIME MINISTER: NO. HOW SHOULD IT CHANGE IT? I AM DELIGHTED THAT IT PULLED TOGETHER, AS A UNITY ON THIS.

JOHN ELLISON, DAILY EXPRESS: DO YOU ANTICIPATE WHEN YOU GET BACK SOME SUGGESTIONS FROM THE TORY PARTY THAT YOU HAVE SOLD OUT TO AFRICAN OPINION HERE AND THAT YOU HAVE AS IT WERE PULLED THE RUG OUT FROM UNDER THE INTERNAL SETTLEMENT IN SALISBURY. HOW WOULD YOU DEAL WITH IT?

PRIME MINISTER: JUST EXACTLY AS I STARTED OFF, BY DEALING WITH IT HERE. IF ONE WENT AHEAD WHOLLY ALONE TO RECOGNISE NOW, FIRST I THINK THERE WOULD BE VERY LITTLE PROSPECT OF THE WAR CEASING, AND A LOT OF PROSPECT OF IT ESCALATING. THE GREATEST PRIZE IN ADDITION TO THE BALLOT BOX THAT THEY WANT IN RHODESIA, WHETHER THEY ARE BLACK OR WHITE, IS TO LEAD THEIR LIVES IN PEACE. TO BE ABLE TO FARM THEIR FARMS, NOT HAVE THEIR STOCK TAKEN, THAT IS THE GREATEST PRIZE. IF WE WENT ABOUT IT WITHOUT TRYING TO GET THAT PRIZE WE SHOULD BE CULPABLE, CULPABLE. WE ALSO WANT OTHER COUNTRIES TO RECOGNISE RHODESIA. IT WAS PAINFULLY OBVIOUS THAT UNLESS WE TRIED TO GET OTHER COUNTRIES ALONG WITH US WE SHOULD HAVE BEEN ALONE. THIS WAY, PROVIDED IT SUCCEEDS, AND DONT THINK I AM STARRY EYED ABOUT IT, IT IS A VERY VERY MUCH BETTER PROSPECT FOR THE PEOPLE IN RHODESIA NOW THAN THE WAY YOU WERE SUGGESTING. I HOPE I MAKE IT PERFECTLY CLEAR THAT I DO FEEL THAT VERY STRONGLY INDEED.

TOM ARMS: BEFORE THE ELECTION YOU SAID THAT IF THE BOYD REPORT JUDGED THE ELECTIONS IN RHODESIA TO BE FREE AND FAIR YOU COULD SEE NO REASON NOT TO IMMEDIATELY RECOGNISE AND LIFT SANCTIONS. WHAT HAS HAPPENED SINCE THEN THAT HAS CAUSED AN ALTERATION?

PRIME MINISTER: BUT IT HASNT. YOU HAVE LEFT OFF THE THIRD LEG, AS YOU ALWAYS DO IF YOU ASK THAT QUESTION. AND THAT IS WHY THE QUESTION DOESNT HOLD WATER. MAY I READ IT OUT TO YOU, THE MANIFESTO. "AND DO ITS UTMOST TO ENSURE THAT THE NEW INDEPENDENT STATE GAINS INTERNATIONAL RECOGNITION". IT IS OUR OBJECTIVE TO BUILD ON THAT CHANGE TO ACHIEVE A RETURN TO LEGALITY AND CONDITIONS THAT SECURE WIDE INTERNATIONAL RECOGNITION. ALWAYS, ALWAYS WE HAD THAT IN MIND. YOU WILL USUALLY FIND A REFERENCE TO THE WAR CEASING, AND I DONT THINK IT COULD COME ABOUT UNLESS WE HAVE THE SUPPORT OF THE FRONT LINE STATES.

QUESTION: AS A RESULT OF THE COMMUNIQUE HAVE THERE BEEN ANY ASSURANCES FROM THE NIGERIANS ON SANCTIONS AGAINST BRITISH TRADE?

PRIME MINISTER: NO. AS FAR AS I AM AWARE, NIGERIA HAS MADE NO COMMENT. BUT THEY AGREED TO THE COMMUNIQUE. IT WAS FORMALLY BROUGHT BEFORE THE MEETING, REPORTED TO THE MEETING THIS MORNING.

QUESTION: WHAT WAS THE TURNING POINT ON ALL THIS. WHAT WAS THE MOMENT WHEN YOU KNEW YOU HAD MADE IT AS FAR AS THE COMMUNIQUE WAS CONCERNED?

PRIME MINISTER: I DIDNT KNOW THAT I HAD MADE IT, UNTIL THE COMMUNIQUE WAS ISSUED. YOU NEVER DO. THATS WHY I HAVENT BEEN TO SEE YOU BEFORE. WHEN DID I KNOW? THESE THINGS CAN ALWAYS FALL UNTIL IT IS ACTUALLY AGREED AND ISSUED, AND THAT IS WHY I NEVER COME OUT AND SAY WE ARE GETTING ON WELL OR I AM AFRAID ITS TRICKY TODAY. I WOULD RATHER WAIT UNTIL I CAN SAY YEA OR NAY. AND I STILL STRESS ITS A HARD ROAD AND WILL REQUIRE A GREAT DEAL OF SKILL. I HAVE GOT A VERY GOOD FOREIGN SECRETARY TO EXERCISE THAT SKILL.

QUESTION: COULD YOU MAKE A COMMENT ON MR RAMPHAL'S ROLE?

PRIME MINISTER: HE HAS BEEN A SUPERB SECRETARY-GENERAL. AND DONE EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO GET ALL THE COMMONWEALTH TOGETHER, HE REALLY HAS. HE HAS WORKED EXTREMELY HARD. I WOULD ALSO PAY TRIBUTE THE CHAIRMAN (KAUNDA) AS WELL, BECAUSE HE HAS. I HAVE BEEN IN SOME NEGOTIATIONS BEFORE, THE DESIRE ULTIMATELY TO COME OUT WITH SOMETHING CONSTRUCTIVE HAS BEEN GREATER I THINK IN THIS GATHERING THIS TIME THAN ANYTHING I HAVE EXPERIENCED BEFORE.

QUESTION: DO YOU THINK THE PRESENCE OF THE QUEEN HELPED THE MOOD?

PRIME MINISTER: I WOULD NOT SAY ANYTHING THAT WOULD INVOLVE THE QUEEN IN POLITICS. SHE IS A MARVELLOUS PERSON AND EVERYONE ELSE UNDERSTAND THAT TOO.

JOHN DICKIE: WHAT ABOUT PRESIDENT NYERERE?

PRIME MINISTER: YES, HE AND I WERE ASTONISHINGLY CLOSE TOGETHER FROM THE START. BUT YOU SEE WE DIDNT COME HERE WITHOUT HAVING PREVIOUSLY DONE A GREAT DEAL OF CONTACT AND CONSULTATION. LORD HARLECH WENT ROUND TO SEVEN AFRICAN STATES, HE WENT ROUND TO BOTSWANA, TANZANIA, ZAMBIA, MALAWI, ANGOLA, MOZAMBIQUE, NIGERIA. RICHARD LUCE THEN WENT ROUND TO THE FRANCOPHONE COUNTRIES: IVORY COAST, SENEGAL, ZAIRE, AND ALSO TO THE SUDAN AND LIBERIA. SO WE DID QUITE WIDE CONSULTATION IN AFRICA ITSELF. I MENTIONED IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS THAT WE WERE ABLE TO SAY CERTAIN THINGS HAD EMERGED IN COMMON. A GREAT RECOGNITION THAT THERE WAS A NEW SITUATION IN RHODESIA SINCE THE ELECTIONS: ONE PERSON ONE VOTE WAS A TREMENDOUS ADVANCE. SECONDLY, THAT THERE WERE TWO PARTICULAR CRITICISMS OF THE CONSTITUTION ON THE BLOCKING MECHANISM. NOW YOU FIND ALL THE SUBSIDIARY CRITICISMS GO BACK TO THAT, BECAUSE I THINK THERE ARE ABOUT 120 ENTRENCHED CLAUSES OUT OF 170. THEY ARE ENTRENCHED BECAUSE OF THE BLOCKING MECHANISM, WHICH AS YOU KNOW TO CHANGE THE CONSTITUTION REQUIRES THE VOTES OF 78 PEOPLE OUT OF 100, AND THERE ARE 28 WHITE SEATS IN THE ASSEMBLY. THE OTHER WAS A CERTAIN AMOUNT OF CRITICISM ABOUT THE WAY SOME OF THE COMMISSIONS WORK. FOR EXAMPLE MUZOREWA CANT EVEN CHOOSE HIS OWN CABINET SECRETARY, HE HAS TO BE APPOINTED BY A COMMISSION, ALL KINDS OF THINGS LIKE THIS. THEY WERE NOT AGAINST COMMISSIONS AS SUCH BECAUSE A NUMBER OF PEOPLE HAVE HAD JUDICIAL COMMISSIONS WHOSE ADVICE HAS HAD TO BE TAKEN. THEY WERE NOT AGAINST SOME PROVISION FOR MINORITIES, BECAUSE QUITE A NUMBER OF THEM HAVE THAT IN THEIR CONSTITUTIONS. SO THE FIRST ONE WAS A NEW SITUATION, THE SECOND WAS THAT PARTICULAR THING ON THE CONSTITUTION. THE THIRD ONE WAS AN ASTONISHINGLY CLEAR UNDERSTANDING THAT THE NEW INDEPENDENCE CONSTITUTION OUGHT TO COME FROM BRITAIN, BECAUSE THEY HAVE GOT ALL OF THEIRS FROM BRITAIN TOO. WE STARTED OFF WITH A PRETTY FIRM BASE, KNOWING WHAT QUITE A NUMBER OF THE PEOPLE WHO WERE THERE WOULD BE LIKELY TO SAY. I SAW MALCOLM FRASER, I SAW CARTER, I SAW MULDOON. PRESIDENT MOI WAS VERY HELPFUL TOO.

QUESTION: CAN WE TAKE IT PRIME MINISTER THAT DURING THESE VISITS BY YOUR EMISSARIES THE SUBJECT UNDER DISCUSSION WAS NOT RECOGNITION OF THE INTERNAL SETTLEMENT, BUT THE RECOGNITION OF SOMETHING QUITE DIFFERENT.

PRIME MINISTER: THE SUBJECT UNDER DISCUSSION WAS HOW TO MOVE FORWARD WITH OUR OBJECTIVE TO BUILD ON THAT CHAIN WHICH WAS TO ACHIEVE A RETURN TO LEGALITY AND CONDITIONS TO SECURE WIDE INTERNATIONAL RECOGNITION. THEY WERE GENUINE CONSULTATIONS. I CANT STRESS TOO MUCH HOW USEFUL IT WAS. AND WE WERE IN TOUCH WITH THE UNITED STATES. I SAW PRESIDENT CARTER IN TOKYO. AND PRESIDENT CARTER HAS SENT US A MESSAGE. LORD HARLECH DID GO AND SEE THE BISHOP AND THE BISHOP WENT TO SEE PRESIDENT CARTER AND THEN CAME OVER TO SEE ME, AND AS YOU KNOW HE HAD HIS FOREIGN SECRETARY WITH HIM.

QUESTION: WILL THE FINAL COMMUNIQUE HAVE THIS REMARKABLE PHRASE OF BLACK MAJORITY RULE, WHICH IS EITHER TANTOLOGICAL OR RACIST?

PRIME MINISTER: TECHNICALLY I CAN UNDERSTAND YOUR POINT. BUT PERHAPS, WITH THE HISTORY OF IT, YOU CAN UNDERSTAND WHY IT WAS PUT IN THIS WAY. I DONT THINK I CAN FAULT YOUR LOGIC, I BELIEVE IT IS IMPECCABLE.

QUESTION: THE WORD "TERRORIST" HAS BEEN APPLIED TO THE PATRIOTIC FRONT IN SOME QUARTERS. WOULD YOU IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES REGARD THAT AS STILL APPROPRIATE?

PRIME MINISTER: IF I MIGHT SAY SO, I DONT THINK ITS A HELPFUL QUESTION. BECAUSE ITS NOT A HELPFUL QUESTION, AND I MIGHT GIVE A SINGULARLY UNHELPFUL REPLY, I SHALL NOT IN FACT REPLY.

QUESTION: INAUDIBLE (REACTIONS IN SALISBURY)

PRIME MINISTER: FIRST REACTIONS WERE ENCOURAGING. WE HOPE THAT WHEN THEY LOOK AT THE THING AS A WHOLE THEY WILL GAIN EVEN MORE CONFIDENCE IN IT. SOME OF THE EARLIER INDICATIONS COMING OUT WERE THAT THEY WERE QUITE PREPARED TO HAVE A CHANGED CONSTITUTION IN THE WAYS THAT HAD BEEN INDICATED.

QUESTION: DID YOU SEND THE COMMUNIQUE TO PRESIDENT CARTER?

PRIME MINISTER: WE DID SEND THE COMMUNIQUE TO PRESIDENT CARTER, WHO INDICATED THAT WE HAD HIS FULL SUPPORT IN THE PROCESS WHICH WE HAVE SO WISELY SET IN MOTION.

ALLINSON

NNNN

OO BRUSSELS

OO LUXEMBOURG

OO ROME

OO DUBLIN

OO UKREP BRUSSELS

GRS 900

UNCLASSIFIED

FM LUSAKA 060730Z AUG 79

TO FLASH FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 852 OF 6 AUGUST

AND TO FLASH NUMBER TEN (FCO PLEASE PASS) AND IMMEDIATE COI
INFO IMMEDIATE MIRIMBA SALISBURY, PRETORIA, JOHANNESBURG,
DAR ES SALAAM, GABORONE, MAPUTO, LUANDA, LAGOS, CANBERRA,
WELLINGTON, WASHINGTON, OTTAWA, UKMIS NEW YORK, KINGSTON, PARIS,
BONN, COPENHAGEN, THE HAGUE, BRUSSELS, LUXEMBOURG, ROME, DUBLIN,
UKREP BRUSSELS

FOLLOWING FOR NEWS DEPARTMENT FROM FENN

MY TELEGRAM NO 845: CHGM: RHODESIA: PRESS

1. THE AGREEMENT HAS NOW BEEN PUBLISHED. THE PRIME MINISTER
GAVE RADIO INTERVIEWS THIS EVENING, 5 AUGUST, TO BBC RADIO AND
COI. FOLLOWING IS TRANSCRIPT OF COI INTERVIEW WITH JUSTIN
PHILLIPS:

JUSTIN PHILLIPS: PRIME MINISTER, WHAT EXACTLY HAS BEEN AGREED
TODAY?

PRIME MINISTER: A TREMENDOUS AMOUNT IN THE COMMUNIQUE. FIRST,
A RECOGNITION THAT ONLY BRITAIN CAN GIVE RHODESIA BACK LEGALITY.
SECOND, TOTAL CONFIDENCE IN BRITAIN TO DO THAT. THIRD, REALISATION
THAT WE HAVE NOT ONLY GOT TO FIND THE RIGHT CONSTITUTION WHICH
CURES DEFECTS IN THE EXISTING ONE, BUT ALSO WE HAVE GOT TO FIND
A WAY BY DOING THAT OF ENDING THE HOSTILITIES. YOU KNOW WHAT
MEANS MORE TO THE PEOPLE OF RHODESIA, BLACK OR WHITE, THAN
ANYTHING ELSE IS THAT THE WAR SHOULD CEASE, THAT THEY SHOULD BE
ABLE TO CHOOSE THEIR OWN GOVERNMENT, AND TO LOOK FORWARD TO AN
ERA OF PEACE OF STABILITY. WE HAVE GOT THE WHOLE OF THE COMMON-
WEALTH WITH US ON RECOGNISING THAT AND BACKING BRITAIN TO GO AHEAD
AND DO OUR LEVEL BEST TO ACHIEVE IT.

JUSTIN PHILLIPS: HOW WAS THIS AGREEMENT REACHED IN FACT?
BECAUSE AT THE START OF THE CONFERENCE OPINION SEEMED TO BE SOME
WAY APART BETWEEN BRITAIN AND SOME OF OUR PARTNERS.

PRIME MINISTER: WELL, YOU KNOW WE GOT OFF TO A GOOD START. THEY
KINDLY ASKED ME TO DO A SPEECH AT THE OPENING OF THE CONFERENCE
AND THAT WAS VERY WELL RECEIVED. AND IF A THING STARTS WELL ITS
A VERY GOOD OMEN FOR IT TO GO ON. WE WERE TWO DAYS TALKING BEFORE
WE CAME ON TO THE RHODESIAN PROBLEM, SO WE GOT TO KNOW ONE ANOTHER
FAIRLY WELL. IF PEOPLE HAD ANYTHING TO SAY, THEY GOT IT OFF THEIR
CHESTS AT THE BEGINNING AND THEN WE WENT INTO THE SMALLER SESSIONS
AND WERE ABLE TO GET AN ENORMOUS MEASURE, NOT ONLY OF AGREEMENT,
BUT ALSO GOODWILL AND SORT OF IMPETUS, A MOMENTUM. WE MUST GO
AHEAD BECAUSE NOW WE HAVE GOT THE KIND OF CHANCE WE HAVENT HAD FOR
YEARS. WE MUST TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THAT OPPORTUNITY. AND THE
INTERESTING THING WAS THE TRUST AND THE POSITIVE ATTITUDE THE
WHOLE TIME.

JUSTIN PHILLIPS: HOW MUCH OF A BREAK THROUGH DO YOU CONSIDER THIS TO BE?

PRIME MINISTER: I AM ALWAYS CAUTIOUS BECAUSE I DONT LIKE TO RAISE HOPES UNTIL WE HAVE GOT SOMETHING TO SHOW. BUT I CAME HERE THINKING THAT WE WOULD HAVE QUITE A DIFFICULT CONFERENCE TO GET COMMONWEALTH SUPPORT. IT HASNT BEEN. THEY HAVE PUT THEIR TRUST IN US. THEY HAVE GIVEN US THEIR SUPPORT. THEY HAVE GIVEN US THEIR SUPPORT NOT ONLY FOR THE CONSTITUTION, BUT IN STRESSING THAT WE NEED TO GET RID OF HOSTILITIES AS WELL. BECAUSE THAT IS WHAT MEANS MOST TO THE PEOPLE OF RHODESIA AND ALSO FOR THE COUNTRIES AROUND.

JUSTIN PHILLIPS: WHO IS THIS GOOD NEWS FOR, IN FACT, THIS AGREEMENT?

PRIME MINISTER: WHO IS IT GOOD NEWS FOR. ITS GOOD NEWS FOR THE PEOPLE IN RHODESIA. BECAUSE YOU KNOW THEY HAVE HAD ONE PERSON ONE VOTE AND MADE IT QUITE CLEAR THAT THEY BELIEVE IN RESOLVING PROBLEMS BY THE BALLOT BOX. ITS GOOD NEWS FOR ALL PEOPLE WHO BELIEVE IN DEMOCRACY, AND WANT TO RESOLVE DIFFICULTIES THAT WAY. ITS ALSO GOOD NEWS FOR THE COMMONWEALTH, GOOD NEWS THAT THEY COULD BE SO UNITED IN THEIR SUPPORT. ITS GOOD NEWS I THINK FOR ALL DEMOCRATIC NATIONS THAT A GROUPING LIKE THE COMMONWEALTH COULD TAKE SUCH A POSITIVE ATTITUDE, AND ITS GOOD NEWS FOR US AT HOME.

JUSTIN PHILLIPS: NOW THAT YOU HAVE THIS AGREEMENT WHAT HAPPENS NOW?

PRIME MINISTER: WE GET BACK TO LONDON IN THE EARLY HOURS OF THURSDAY MORNING, BECAUSE WE HAVE STILL TO FINISH SOME OTHER THINGS AT THE CONFERENCE. I HAVE ALREADY CALLED A CABINET FOR FRIDAY. I DONT WANT TO LOSE ANY TIME. WE WILL SORT OUT PROPOSALS THERE AND I HOPE THAT VERY QUICKLY, WITHIN A MATTER OF WEEKS AFTER THAT, WE WILL BE ABLE TO GET ALL PARTIES TOGETHER, AND THEN WE SHALL START PRETTY INTENSIVE PERIOD OF PERSUASION AND NEGOTIATION. BUT WITH THE KNOWLEDGE THAT THE COMMONWEALTH IS BEHIND US.

JUSTIN PHILLIPS: WOULD YOU SAY THE CONFERENCE HAS BEEN A SUCCESS.

PRIME MINISTER: THE CONFERENCE HAS CERTAINLY BEEN A SUCCESS, HOW FAR WE CAN BUILD ON THAT SUCCESS IS YET TO BE DECIDED. BUT THEY HAVE GIVEN US A TREMENDOUS START. THE REST WILL DEPEND UPON THE WILL OF THE PARTIES WHO TAKE PART. AND THE WILL BEHIND THEM OF ALL THE AFRICAN STATES, TANZANIA, ZAMBIA, BOTSWANA, WHOSE FUTURE IS SO INTIMATELY BOUND UP WITH THAT OF RHODESIA, WHOSE PROSPERITY IS BOUND UP WITH RHODESIA, AND THE PEACE OF WHOSE PEOPLES DEPENDS ON THE FUTURE OF RHODESIA.

JUSTIN PHILLIPS: PRIME MINISTER, THANK YOU VERY MUCH.

ALLINSON

NNNN

FOLUS 029/06

OO LUSAKA

GR 250

CONFIDENTIAL

FM PRETORIA 061720Z AUG.

TO IMMEDIATE LUSAKA

TELEGRAM NUMBER 020 OF 06 AUGUST 1979.

INFO IMMEDIATE FCO, MIRIMBA SALISBURY,

PRIORITY WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK, PARIS, BONN, DAR ES SALAAM,
MAPUTO, GABORONE, LUANDA AND LAGOS.

MIPT

FOLLOWING IS TEXT.

MESSAGE FROM THE HON R F BOTHA TO THE RT HON LORD CARRINGTON,
FOREIGN SECRETARY

I HAVE TODAY, AT MY REQUEST, RECEIVED THE OFFICIAL TEXT OF THE
PASSAGE ON RHODESIA WHICH THE COMMONWEALTH HEADS OF
GOVERNMENT IN LUSAKA HAVE AGREED UPON FOR THEIR FINAL
COMMUNIQUE.

THERE ARE CERTAIN PASSAGES IN THIS COMMUNIQUE WHICH CAUSE
GRAVE CONCERN AND ON THE FACE OF IT COULD HAVE DISASTROUS
EFFECTS FOR THE WHOLE OF SOUTHERN AFRICA.

MY GOVERNMENT VIEWS THE MATTER TO BE OF SUCH OVER-WHELMING
IMPORTANCE THAT IT CONSIDERS AN URGENT DISCUSSION BETWEEN
OUR TWO GOVERNMENTS IMPERATIVE.

YOU WOULD REALISE THAT BECAUSE OF MY GOVERNMENT'S RIGHTFUL
INTEREST IN STABILITY IN SOUTHERN AFRICA, BUT ALSO IN THE
INTEREST OF UNITED KINGDOM/SOUTH AFRICA RELATIONS, SOUTH
AFRICA CANNOT TOO LONG DELAY SETTING OUT ITS ATTITUDE ON
THIS ISSUE IN A PUBLIC STATEMENT.

DEVELOPMENTS ON RHODESIA HAVE A DIRECT BEARING ON THE
SOUTH WEST AFRICA ISSUE AND IN VIEW OF THE IMPENDING VISIT
OF SIR JAMES MURRAY IT IS ESSENTIAL TO HAVE THE PROPOSED
EXCHANGE OF VIEWS THIS WEEK.

PRETORIA
6 AUGUST 1979

LEAHY

NNNN

[Handwritten signature]

Prime Minister

[Handwritten initials]
7/8

CONFIDENTIAL
FM PRETORIA 061740Z AUG.
TO IMMEDIATE LUSAKA

TELEGRAM NUMBER 19 OF 06 AUGUST 1979.
INFO IMMEDIATE FCO, MIRIMBA SALISBURY.
INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK, PARIS, BONN,
DAR ES SALAAM, MAPUTOS, GABORONE, LAGOS AND LUANDA.

Prime Minister

*SW
7/18*

FOR PRIVATE SECRETARY TO SECRETARY OF STATE

MY TELNO 423 TO FCO: CHGM - RHODESIA

MS

1. FOURIE ASKED ME TO CALL THIS EVENING TO RECEIVE A MESSAGE FROM HIS MINISTER, PIK BOTHA, TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE. TEXT IN MIFT.

2. I ASKED FOURIE IF HE COULD TELL ME WHICH PARTICULAR PASSAGES IN THE COMMUNIQUE CAUSED "GRAVE CONCERN" TO THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT. HE SAID THAT THEY WERE CONCERNED ABOVE ALL WITH THE PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS OF WHAT HAD BEEN AGREED AND IN PARTICULAR WHETHER THERE WAS LIKELY TO BE AN EXODUS OF WHITES FROM RHODESIA AS A RESULT. THE SORT OF QUESTIONS THEY HAD IN MIND - AND HE EMPHASISED THAT THIS WAS NOT AN EXHAUSTIVE LIST - WAS:

- (I) WHAT WAS MEANT BY "GENUINE BLACK MAJORITY RULE"?
- (II) WHAT IS THE SCOPE OF THE MEASURES THAT WILL BE REQUIRED TO CORRECT THE DEFECTS IN THE CONSTITUTION?
- (III) WHAT IS THE TIMING OF THE VARIOUS STAGES IN (F), (G), (H) AND (I) OF THE COMMUNIQUE?
- (IV) IS IT STILL EXPECTED THAT SANCTIONS WILL BE LIFTED BY 15 NOVEMBER?
- (V) IS THERE TO BE ANY "TAMPERING" WITH THE RHODESIAN ARMED FORCES?
- (VI) WHAT HAPPENS IF ALL THE PARTIES INVITED TO THE CONFERENCE DO NOT AGREE TO ATTEND?

3. I ALSO ASKED FOURIE WHAT FORM THE SAG WANTED THE "URGENT DISCUSSION BETWEEN OUR TWO GOVERNMENTS" TO TAKE. HE SAID THAT WHAT THEY HAD IN MIND WAS THAT THE SECRETARY OF STATE MIGHT VISIT SOUTH AFRICA BRIEFLY ON HIS WAY BACK TO LONDON FROM LUSAKA. I SAID THAT I DID NOT THINK THIS WOULD BE POSSIBLE, SINCE THE SECRETARY OF STATE HAD TO BE BACK IN LONDON FOR AN IMPORTANT CABINET MEETING ON FRIDAY. HE THEN ASKED WHETHER ANY OTHER MINISTER MIGHT BE AVAILABLE TO COME HERE. I SAID THAT I DID NOT KNOW WHETHER MR LUCE WOULD BE FREE AND IN ANY CASE I WONDERED WHETHER IT MIGHT CAUSED SOME

AWKWARDNESS TO HAVE A MINISTER HERE TALKING ABOUT RHODESIA AT THE SAME TIME AS SIR JAMES MURRAY WAS HERE DISCUSSING

NAMIBIA. FOURIE SAID THAT THEY WERE HOPING THAT THE TALKS ON RHODESIA COULD TAKE PLACE BEFORE MURRAY STARTED HIS DISCUSSIONS NEXT WEEKEND. I QUESTIONED WHETHER THIS WOULD BE PRACTICABLE, BUT PROMISED TO SEE WHAT COULD BE DONE.

4. COMMENTS ARE IN MY SECOND FOLLOWING TELEGRAM.

LEAHY

LPT 594/06

204997/6

00 LUSAKA DESKBY 061500Z

00 FCO

See by 17.

00 DAR ES SALAAM

00 LUANDA

00 GABORONE

Prime Minister

00 LAGOS

00 WASHINGTON

00 UKMIS NEKW YORK

6/11
6/15

GR 600

UNCLASSIFIED

DESKBY 061500Z LUSAKA ONLY

FM MIRIMBA SALISBURY 061300Z AUG 79

TO IMMEDIATE LUSAKA

TELNO 18 OF 6 AUGUST

INFO IMMEDIATE PRETORIA MAPUTO FCO DAR ES SALAAM LUANDA GABORONE
LAGOS WASHINGTON AND UKMIS NEW YORK

MY TELNO 14: CHGM RHODESIA STATEMENT

MJZOREWA HAS ISSUED THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT.

BEGINS

"WHAT HAS EMERGED FROM THE COMMONWEALTH CONFERENCE IN LUSAKA, SO FAR AS ZIMBABWE RHODESIA IS CONCERNED, ARE SOME POSITIVE ELEMENTS AND SOME WHICH STILL REQUIRE FURTHER SUBSTANTIAL CLARIFICATION.

"A PLEASING FACTOR IS THAT AT LAST THE COMMONWEALTH LEADERS AS A WHOLE HAVE ACCEPTED THE REALITY OF THE SITUATION WHICH NOW EXISTS IN THIS COUNTRY AND ACKNOWLEDGE THAT SUBSTANTIAL CHANGES HAVE TAKEN PLACE. I NOW EXPECT THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT TO EMPHASISE TO THE OTHER MEMBERS OF THE COMMONWEALTH, AND THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY AS A WHOLE, THIS NEW REALITY OF A BLACK MAJORITY GOVERNMENT IN ZIMBABWE RHODESIA MUCH MORE POSITIVELY THAN IT HAS DONE PREVIOUSLY.

"ALSO, ANOTHER FACTOR IS THAT NOW EVERYONE IS IN AGREEMENT WITH ME AND ACCORDS WITH MY AMNESTY POLICY THAT CONTINUED BLOODSHED MUST CEASE, AND I HOPE THAT THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT AND OTHER COMMONWEALTH LEADERS WILL ENSURE THAT ATTACKS FROM OUTSIDE ZIMBABWE RHODESIA WILL COME TO AN END.

"INSOFAR AS THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT'S AGREEMENT TO SUPERVISE FRESH ELECTIONS IS CONCERNED, THE POINT MUST BE MADE THAT THE MAJORITY OF INTERNATIONAL OBSERVERS, INCLUDING THE GROUP FROM THE BRITISH CONSERVATIVE PARTY LED BY LORD BOYD, SENT HERE SPECIFICALLY BY MRS THATCHER, WERE COMPLETELY SATISFIED THAT THE ELECTIONS HELD IN APRIL WERE FREE AND FAIR AS WELL AS BEING CONDUCTED UNDER DEMOCRATIC PRINCIPLES.

"IT IS, THEREFORE, TOTALLY UNFAIR AND, IN FACT, AN INSULT TO THE ELECTORATE AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THIS COUNTRY, TO SUGGEST THAT THEY MEANT ABSOLUTELY NOTHING, AND THAT WE HAVE TO START OVER AGAIN. ||

"IF IT IS ACCEPTED THAT A NEW REALITY AND NEW CIRCUMSTANCES EXIST IN ZIMBABWE RHODESIA, IT MUST ALSO BE ACCEPTED THAT THESE HAVE BEEN BROUGHT ABOUT SOLELY AS A CONSEQUENCE OF THE UNIVERSAL ADULT SUFFRAGE ELECTIONS AND OUR OWN EFFORTS WHICH INSTALLED A BLACK MAJORITY GOVERNMENT IN POWER FOR THE FIRST TIME. THEY CANNOT HAVE IT BOTH WAYS. I HOPE, THEREFORE, THAT THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT, WHICH HOLDS RESPONSIBILITY FOR ENSURING THAT FURTHER PROGRESS WILL BE ACHIEVED TOWARDS SOLVING OUR PROBLEMS, WILL DISPLAY SANITY IN THIS REGARD AND THAT IT WILL PREVAIL. ||

"THERE ARE MANY OTHER POINTS FROM THE LUSAKA STATEMENT WHICH NEED TO BE CLARIFIED BY THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT, AND I LOOK FORWARD TO RECEIVING THIS AS A MATTER OF URGENCY. UNTIL THAT GOVERNMENT HAS DONE SO IN DETAIL, IT WOULD BE PREMATURE FOR ME TO COMMENT UPON THEM, AND IT WILL BE MY INTENTION TO DEAL WITH SPECIFIC ITEMS IN THE PROPOSALS AS AND WHEN THEY ARE PUT BEFORE ME IN DETAIL.

"IN CONCLUSION, I WOULD LIKE TO ASSURE ALL THE PEOPLE OF ZIMBABWE RHODESIA THAT THE INTERESTS OF THIS COUNTRY AND ITS PEOPLE ARE PARAMOUNT, AND I WILL ONLY CONSIDER THOSE PROPOSALS WHICH I AM SATISFIED WILL SERVE THIS PURPOSE."

ENDS

DAY

NNNN

ACTION COPY

LQY 996/06

LPT 583/06

RR LUSAKA

GR 175
RESTRICTED
FM MIRIMBA SALISBURY 061035Z AUG 79
TO ROUTINE LUSAKA
TELNO 17 OF 6 AUGUST

Handwritten notes:
6/2/79
Hw
Yx

FOR PRIVATE SECRETARY TO PRIME MINISTER

1. A MRS CREEWEL, THE NATIONAL PRESIDENT OF THE NATIONAL COUNCIL OF WOMEN OF ZIMBABWE RHODESIA, HAS TELEPHONED ABOUT THE REFUSAL OF THE KENYA GOVERNMENT TO ALLOW A SOUTH AFRICAN DELEGATION TO ENTER KENYA TO ATTEND A CONFERENCE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COUNCIL OF WOMEN. A RHODESIAN DELEGATION HAD ALSO PLANNED TO ATTEND THE MEETING IN KENYA. IN VIEW OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN EXPERIENCE, THEY HAVE CANCELLED THEIR PLANS.
2. MRS CREEWEL WISHED TO CONVEY TO THE PRIME MINISTER A STRONG PROTEST AT THE TREATMENT METED OUT TO THE SOUTH AFRICAN DELEGATION AND TO EXPRESS THE HOPE THAT WE MIGHT INTERVENE WITH THE KENYAN AUTHORITIES. SHE SAID THAT HER ORGANISATION HAD RECENTLY EXCHANGED CORRESPONDENCE WITH MRS THATCHER.
3. I POINTED OUT THAT IT WAS NOT FOR US TO MAKE REPRESENTATIONS ON BEHALF OF A SOUTH AFRICAN ORGANISATION. NEVERTHELESS I AGREED TO TRANSMIT THIS MESSAGE BUT GAVE NO PROMISE ABOUT ANY ACTION WITH THE KENYAN GOVERNMENT.

DAY

NNNN

FOLUS024/06

RR LUSAKA

GPS 140

UNCLASSIFIED

FM MAPUTO 061110Z AUGUST 79

Ø ROUTINE LUSAKA

TELEGRAM NUMBER 15 OF 6 AUGUST

INFO FCO MIRIMBA SALISBURY DAR ES SALAAM GABORONE LUANDA LILONGWE
PRETORIA

[Handwritten signature]
Prime Minister

[Handwritten initials]
7/8

MY TELNO 14: CHGM - MOZAMBIQUE

11. QUOTE NOTICIAS UNQUOTE REPORTS THE WEEKEND NEGOTIATIONS AS IMPORTANT STEPS TOWARDS TRUE INDEPENDENCE FOR ZIMBABWE. AFRICAN PRESSURE FORCED THE BRITISH TO CHANGE THEIR POSITION. SOURCES SAID THAT BRITAIN HAD AGREED TO A NEW CONSTITUTION, NEW ELECTIONS AND NOT TO DEMAND A CEASEFIRE AS A PRECONDITION FOR NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE PATRIOTIC FRONT (PF). ZANU AND ZAPU ARE SAID NOT TO BE READY TO ACCEPT A CEASEFIRE, BEFORE TALKS HAVE STARTED ON THE NEW CONSTITUTION AND THE ORGANISATION OF ELECTIONS. KAUNDA AND NYERERE ARE SAID TO HAVE MADE CLEAR THAT ONLY HMG AND THE PF HAVE DECISIVE ROLES IN THE SEARCH FOR A SOLUTION. NOTICIAS ANTICIPATES THAT MRS THATCHER WILL MEET MAJOR OPPOSITION IN HER OWN PARTY ON RETURNING HOME.

DOBLE

NNNN

[Handwritten initials]

LPT 567/06

ZZ LUSAKA

OO FCO

See 4/1/79

PP DAR ES SALAAM

OO LUANDA

OO GABORONE

OO LAGOS

OO WASHINGTON

OO UKMIS NEW YORK

Prime Minister

4/1/79

GR 900

CONFIDENTIAL

FM MIRIMBA WHLISBURY 060815Z AUG 79

TO FLASH LUSAKA

TELNO 14 OF 6 AUGUST

INFO IMMEDIATE FCO PRETORIA MAPUTO DAR ES SALAAM LUANDA GABORONE
LAGOS WASHINGTON AND UKMIS NEW YORK

MY TELNO 11: RHODESIA

HQM I DELIVERED THE TEXT IN YOUR TELNO 847 TO KAMUSIKIRI AT THE
PRIME MINISTER'S RESIDENCE AT 0445Z THIS MORNING. MUZOREWA WAS
NOT YET UP. I WAS ASKED TO WAIT. I SAW HIM AT 0600Z.

2. I EXPLAINED HOW THE STATEMENT HAD BEEN PREPARED AND CONFIRMED
THAT IT HAD BEEN APPROVED BY ALL HEADS OF GOVERNMENT. I DREW
ATTENTION TO THE REMARKABLE CONTRAST BETWEEN THE POSITION
TAKEN UP AT THE END OF THE OAU CONFERENCE IN MONROVIA AND THE
POSITION NOW ENDORSED BY THE COMMONWEALTH AS A WHOLE. AT MONROVIA
THE PATRIOTIC FRONT WAS ACCEPTED AS THE SOLE AND LEGITIMATE
REPRESENTATIVE OF THE PEOPLE OF ZIMBABWE: THE WAR WAS ENDORSED
AS THE WAY TO A SOLUTION TO THE RHODESIAN PROBLEM: BRITISH
POLICIES WERE VIOLENTLY ATTACKED. THIS WAS THE BACKGROUND AGAINST
WHICH THE COMMONWEALTH CONFERENCE HAD BEGUN. THE STATEMENT THAT
HAD NOW BEEN AGREED REPRESENTED APPROVAL OF THE BASIC POLICY
THAT HAD BEEN FOLLOWED BY THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT AND THAT THE
PRIME MINISTER HAD OUTLINED TO HIM IN LONDON. IT RECOGNISED THAT
THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR FINDING A SOLUTION TO THIS PROBLEM
RESTED WITH HMG. OUR PLAN FOR A CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE NOW
HAD COMMONWEALTH SUPPORT. THERE WAS A RECOGNITION THAT WE SHOULD
ACHIEVE A CEASE-FIRE AND AN END TO SANCTIONS. THERE WAS NO
ENDORSEMENT OF THE PATRIOTIC FRONT. ALL OF THESE WERE SIGNIFICANT
ADVANCES AND I HOPED THAT THE BISHOP WOULD SEE THEM IN THIS
LIGHT.

3. MUZOREWA, WHO WAS ALREADY LATE FOR A MEETING, SAID THAT HE
WOULD STUDY THE STATEMENT CAREFULLY AND BEAR MY REMARKS IN MIND.
HIS PRESENT REACTION WAS THAT THE LUSAKA AGREEMENT WAS "HALF
AND HALF". HE SAID THAT HIS GOVERNMENT WOULD BE ISSUING SOME
STATEMENT COMMENTING ON THE AGREEMENT. I SAID THAT I WOULD
WELCOME ADVANCE NOTICE OF SUCH A STATEMENT IF THAT WERE POSSIBLE.
I HOPED THAT IT WOULD RECOGNISE THE EXTREMELY CONSTRUCTIVE NATURE
OF THE AGREEMENT REACHED AT CHGM. IF THERE WERE ASPECTS OF THE
AGREEMENT ON WHICH HE WOULD LIKE TO HAVE FURTHER CLARIFICATION, I HOPED
THAT THIS COULD BE DONE BY WAY OF CONFIDENTIAL EXCHANGES RATHER
THAN PUBLIC STATEMENTS.

1 HOB 1602

00 WASHINGTON

00 PRETORIA

00 DAR ES SALAAM

00 NAIROBI

00 GABORONE

00 LAGOS

00 UKMIS NEW YORK

00 LUANDA

GPS

CONFIDENTIAL

FM NAIROBI SALISBURY 35542Z AUG 70

TO FLASH LUSAKA

TELEGRAM NUMBER 413 OF 6 AUGUST

INFO IMMEDIATE FCC WASHINGTON PRETORIA DAR ES SALAAM NAIROBI
GABORONE LAGOS UKMIS NEW YORK AND LUANDA

MIPT: RHODESIA.

FOLLOWING IS DRAFT TEXT.

BEGINS.

MR DAY WILL HAVE GIVEN YOU THE TEXT OF THE STATEMENT ON
ZIMBABWE RHODESIA AGREED BY THE COMMONWEALTH HEADS OF GOVERNMENT.
OUR DISCUSSIONS HERE HAVE BEEN HARD, BUT CONSTRUCTIVE. WE
HAVE NOT WAVERED FROM THE OBJECTIVE THAT WE DISCUSSED WHEN WE
MET IN LONDON, NAMELY TO BRING ZIMBABWE RHODESIA TO LEGAL INDEP-
ENDENCE WITH WIDE INTERNATIONAL ACCEPTANCE. WE NOW HAVE THE
AGREEMENT OF THE COMMONWEALTH AS A WHOLE THAT THE CONSTITUTIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY FOR THIS RESTS WITH THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT AND
THAT THE NEXT STEP IS FOR THE UNITED KINGDOM TO CONVOKE A
CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE OF ALL THE PARTIES CONCERNED. THIS
IS IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROGRAMME I OUTLINED TO YOU. IT
IS LEFT TO THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT TO WORK OUT DETAILED PROPOSALS
AND TO PUT THESE TO THE PARTIES CONCERNED. I SHALL BE IN TOUCH
WITH YOU SHORTLY ABOUT THESE PROPOSALS AND I WANT TO KEEP IN
THE CLOSEST CONTACT ABOUT THE FURTHER IMPLEMENTATION OF OUR
POLICY IN ALL ITS ASPECTS.

THE COMMONWEALTH HAS ENDORSED THE NEED FOR A NEGOTIATED
SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM OF ZIMBABWE RHODESIA. THIS PAVES THE
WAY FOR REAL PROGRESS TOWARDS THE PEACE THAT YOU AND YOUR PEOPLE
WANT AND DESERVE. I AM DETERMINED TO ACHIEVE THIS, WITH YOUR
HELP AND COOPERATION.

ENDS.

DAY

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6/10
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00 MAPUTO

00 GABORONE

00 LAGOS

00 UKMTS NEW YORK

00 LUANDA

GPB 34J

CONFIDENTIAL

FM MIRIMBA SALISBURY 160517Z AUG 70

TO FLASH LUSAKA

TELEGRAM NUMBER 312 OF 6 AUGUST

INFO IMMEDIATE FCO WASHINGTON PRETORIA DAR ES SALAAM MAPUTO
GABORONE LAGOS UKMTS NEW YORK AND LUANDA.

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File me
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7/8

YOUR TELNO 3 AND YOUR TEL3 TO FCO NOS 346 AND 347: RHODESIA.

1. RUMOURS ARE ALREADY FLYING ON THE BASIS OF PRESS AND RADIO REPORTS FROM LUSAKA. I THEREFORE SAW KAMUSIKIRI LAST NIGHT TO PREPARE THE GROUND, AS INSTRUCTED. HE HAS AN AM BRIEFING MEETING TODAY WITH THE BISHOP. I EXPLAINED ABOUT THE SMALL GROUP (TO WHICH THE BBC HAD ALREADY REFERRED) AND ADDED THAT THEY HAD BEEN WORKING ON A STATEMENT WHICH WOULD HOPEFULLY BE AGREED BY THE CONFERENCE AS A WHOLE. I UNDERTOOK TO LET THE BISHOP HAVE THE TEXT AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. I DID NOT DISCLOSE THE CONTENTS BUT GAVE AN INDICATION OF THE GROUND THAT IT MIGHT COVER, INCLUDING A REFERENCE TO FURTHER ELECTIONS. THIS IS AN ISSUE THAT IS HIGHLY SENSITIVE HERE AND IT SEEMED SENSIBLE TO GIVE SOME ADVANCE WARNING OF IT. I DID NOT GO INTO DETAIL. I EMPHASISED THAT THE STATEMENT THAT WE EXPECTED TO EMERGE WOULD NOT INHIBIT HMG FROM PURSUING THE POLICY THAT THEY HAD ALREADY OUTLINED. I ADDED THAT ENDORSEMENT BY THE COMMONWEALTH AS A WHOLE OF A PEACEFUL AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROCESS TO LEGAL INDEPENDENCE WOULD BE A MAJOR STEP FORWARD.

2. KAMUSIKIRI UNDERTORE TO PASS THIS ON TO THE BISHOP, IN CONFIDENCE. HE AGREED THAT THE GOVERNMENT SHOULD REFRAIN FROM COMMENT UNTIL A TEXT WAS AVAILABLE. HE FORECAST AN UNFAVOURABLE REACTION TO A CALL FOR FRESH ELECTIONS. THIS WOULD NOT BE WELCOME TO THE BISHOP. IT WOULD BE OPPOSED BY THE WHITES. IT WOULD ALSO APPAL THE POPULATION AS A WHOLE, WHO WERE JUST GETTING OVER THE ENORMOUS EFFORT REQUIRED TO CONDUCT THE APRIL ELECTION. I SOUGHT TO QUIETEN THESE ANXIETIES.

3. MUZOREWA IS LIKELY TO HAVE A ROUGH RIDE IN CABINET ON 7 AUGUST OVER THE ELECTION ISSUE. IT WOULD HELP HIM TO HAVE A PERSONAL MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER ABOUT THE RHODESIA DISCUSSIONS AND THEIR OUTCOME. MIFT CONTAINS A SUGGESTED DRAFT. I WOULD NEED AN AGREED TEXT BY 1900Z ON 6 AUGUST.

DAY

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OO GABORONE

OO LAGOS

OO UKMIS NEW YORK

OO LUANDA

GR 180

CONFIDENTIAL

FM LUSAKA 061635Z AUG 79

TO FLASH MIRIMBA SALISBURY

TELNO 11 OF 6 AUG

INFO IMMEDIATE FCO, WASHINGTON, PRETORIA, DAR ES SALAAM, MAPUTO, GABORONE, LAGOS, UKMIS NEW YORK AND LUANDA.

PRIME MINISTER'S

PERSONAL MESSAGE

SERIAL No. T57/79T

SUBJECT

MA
DL
T/Y

YOUR TELNOS 012 AND 013

PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO BISHOP MUZOREWA:

QUOTE

DEAR BISHOP MUZOREWA,

MR DAY WILL HAVE GIVEN YOU THE TEXT OF THE STATEMENT ON ZIMBABWE-RHODESIA AGREED BY COMMONWEALTH HEADS OF GOVERNMENT HERE. WE HAVE NOT WAIVERED FROM THE OBJECTIVE WHICH WE SET OURSELVES AND WHICH I HAVE DESCRIBED IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS AND TO THE MEETING IN LUSAKA, NAMELY TO BRING ZIMBABWE-RHODESIA TO LEGAL INDEPENDENCE WITH WIDE INTERNATIONAL ACCEPTANCE. WE NOW HAVE THE AGREEMENT OF THE COMMONWEALTH AS A WHOLE THAT THE CONSTITUTIONAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR THIS RESTS WITH THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT. THEY WELCOMED OUR INDICATION THAT THE NEXT STEP WOULD BE FOR THE UNITED KINGDOM TO CONVENE A CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE OF ALL THE PARTIES CONCERNED. ABOVE ALL THE COMMONWEALTH HAVE NOW ACCEPTED THAT IT MUST BE A MAJOR OBJECTIVE TO BRING ABOUT A CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES AND AN END TO SANCTIONS AS PART OF THE PROCESS OF IMPLEMENTATION OF A LASTING SETTLEMENT.

IT IS LEFT TO THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT TO WORK OUT DETAILED PROPOSALS AND TO PUT THESE TO THE PARTIES CONCERNED. I SHALL BE IN TOUCH WITH YOU SHORTLY ABOUT THESE PROPOSALS AND I WANT TO KEEP IN THE CLOSEST CONTACT ABOUT THE FURTHER IMPLEMENTATION OF OUR POLICY IN ALL ITS ASPECTS.

THE COMMONWEALTH HAS ENDORSED THE NEED FOR A NEGOTIATED SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM OF ZIMBABWE-RHODESIA. THIS PAVES THE WAY FOR REAL PROGRESS TOWARDS THE PEACE THAT YOU AND ALL RHODESIANS WANT AND NEED.

UNQUOTE

ALL INSON



10 DOWNING STREET

T57/79T

THE PRIME MINISTER

6 August 1979

My dear Bishop Muzorewa,

Mr. Day will have given you the text of the statement on Zimbabwe Rhodesia agreed by the Commonwealth Heads of Government here. We have not wavered from the objective which we set ourselves and which I have described in the House of Commons and to the meeting in Lusaka, namely to bring Zimbabwe Rhodesia to legal independence with wide international acceptance. We now have the agreement of the Commonwealth as a whole that the constitutional responsibility for this rests with the British Government. They welcomed our indication that the next step would be for the United Kingdom to convene a constitutional conference of all the parties concerned. Above all, the Commonwealth have now accepted that it must be a major objective to bring about the cessation of hostilities and an end to sanctions, as part of the process of implementing a lasting settlement.

This is in accordance with the programme I outlined to you. It is left to the British Government to work out detailed proposals and to put these to the parties concerned. I shall be in touch with you shortly about these proposals

/and we shall

and we shall keep in the closest contact about carrying forward all aspects of our policy.

The Commonwealth has endorsed the need for a negotiated solution to the problem of Zimbabwe Rhodesia. This paves the way for real progress towards the peace that you and all Rhodesians want and need.

You have had to face many challenges since you assumed the leadership of Zimbabwe-Rhodesia and I do not underestimate the difficulties ahead. But I hope from what the British Government has done since we came into office, and from our talks together, that you trust our good faith and our determination to work with you to achieve a settlement.

Warm personal regards.

Yours sincerely,

Margaret Thatcher

Bishop Abel Muzorewa

FOI S 034/06

OO LUSAKA

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CONFIDENTIAL

FM FCO 061933Z AUG 79

TO IMMEDIATE LUSAKA

TELEGRAM NUMBER 687 OF 6 AUGUST

INFO IMMEDIATE MIRIMBA SALISBURY

FOLLOWING FOR DUFF: RHODESIA: VISITING PROGRAMME

1. LORD HARLECH HAS TOLD US THAT HE WOULD BE AVAILABLE TO TRAVEL TO WASHINGTON OR AFRICA DURING THE NEXT FEW WEEKS, IF HE WERE ASKED TO DO SO.
2. WE SUGGEST THE FOLLOWING PROGRAMME OF CONSULTATIONS.
 - (A) WASHINGTON. LORD HARLECH MIGHT AIM TO SEE MR VANCE AND OFFICIALS TO EXPLAIN OUR PLANS EARLY NEXT WEEK (MR VANCE WILL BE ON HOLIDAY FROM 16 AUGUST).
 - (B) PRETORIA. A SENIOR OFFICIAL (PERHAPS YOURSELF, SEE BELOW) MIGHT VISIT PRETORIA FOR TALKS WITH PIK BOTHA AND FOURIE IN THE COURSE OF NEXT WEEK (IT WOULD BE BEST TO TALK TO THE SOUTH AFRICANS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE AFTER THE INVITATIONS HAVE FORMALLY BEEN CONVEYED TO THE PARTIES: AND LORD HARLECH'S VISIT TO AFRICA WOULD COME TOO LATE).
 - (C) SALISBURY. IN THE LORD PRIVY SEAL'S VIEW, IT WOULD NOW BE VERY DIFFICULT TO ASK LORD BOYD TO GO TO SALISBURY TO EXPLAIN OUR PLANS TO THE GOVERNMENT, OR TO REASSURE THE WHITES. HOWEVER, HE BELIEVES THAT IT IS PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT TO GET SOMEONE TO SALISBURY QUICKLY, WHO CAN SPEAK AUTHORITATIVELY OF THE GOVERNMENT'S PLANS, FOLLOWING CHGM AND FRIDAY'S CABINET. THERE ARE TWO POSSIBILITIES: LORD HARLECH OR YOURSELF. LORD HARLECH (WHO WE ENVISAGE VISITING WASHINGTON NEXT WEEK) WOULD BE ABLE TO SPEAK LESS WELL TO MUZOREWA, HAVING NOT BEEN IN LUSAKA. THE LPS THINKS THAT YOU MIGHT BEST TAKE THIS ON, IF YOU WERE ABLE TO DO SO. YOU COULD PUT OUR PROPOSALS TO MUZOREWA, DEAL WITH HIS QUESTIONS (HE HAS SAID PUBLICLY THAT HE NEEDS CLARIFICATION - MIRIMBA TELNO 18 TO LUSAKA), AND ALSO HAVE PERHAPS TWO OR THREE MEETINGS WITH GROUPS OF INFLUENTIAL WHITES. YOU COULD RETURN VIA PRETORIA. THIS NEED NOT PRECLUDE A VISIT BY LORD HARLECH LATER.
 - (D) LUSAKA/MAPUTO. LORD HARLECH MIGHT BE ASKED TO GO TO LUSAKA AND MAPUTO IN THE SECOND HALF OF THIS MONTH FOR PRELIMINARY DISCUSSIONS ON OUR CONSTITUTIONAL PROPOSALS AND OTHER MATTERS IN PREPARATION FOR A CONFERENCE, IF THE PATRIOTIC FRONT LEADERS WOULD LIKE HIM TO DO SO. IF HE DOES, WE WOULD CONSIDER NEARER THE TIME WHETHER IT WOULD BE USEFUL FOR HIM TO VISIT DAR ES SALAAM, GABORONE, OTHER FLS OR LAGOS. IF LORD HARLECH GOES TO THE FLS, IT WOULD PROBABLY BE APPROPRIATE FOR HIM TO VISIT SALISBURY.

CARRINGTON

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DESKBY 062100Z
FM FCO. 061855Z AUG 79
TO IMMEDIATE LUSAKA
TELEGRAM NUMBER '684 OF 6 AUGUST.

FOR DUFF.
M I P T.
FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF DRAFT ANNEX D.

RHODESIA :- TIMETABLE.

- AUGUST 10 MR DAY TELLS BISHOP MUZOREWA THAT WE SHALL BE MAKING A PUBLIC MOVE NEXT WEEK AND WILL GIVE HIM ADVANCE WARNING OF IT; AND DISCUSSES COMPOSITION OF A RHODESIA DELEGATION TO A CONFERENCE.
- SAT AUGUST 11
- SUN AUGUST 12
- AUGUST 13 MR DAY SHOWS INVITATION AND PUBLIC STATEMENT(S) PRIVATELY TO BISHOP MUZOREWA.
- (OR LATER) LORD HARLECH VISITS WASHINGTON (?)
- AUGUST 14 AM. INVITATION IS FORMALLY ISSUED TO BISHOP MUZOREWA AND TO THE PATRIOTIC FRONT LEADERS.
EVENING. INVITATION AND ACCOMPANYING STATEMENTS ARE PUBLISHED. SUPPORTING ACTION IS TAKEN WITH THE FRONT LINE PRESIDENTS AND OTHERS.
- AUGUST 15 OFFICIALS BEGIN TALKS IN SALISBURY.
WE OFFER HIGH-LEVEL VISITS TO BISHOP MUZOREWA AND PATRIOTIC FRONT (POSSIBLY BY LORD BOYD AND LORD HARLECH RESPECTIVELY).
SQUARE BRACKETS BEGIN WORK IN SALISBURY CONTINUES. POSSIBLE TALKS AT OFFICIAL LEVEL WITH PATRIOTIC FRONT. WORK IN LONDON CONTINUES ON PREPARATION OF DOCUMENTS FOR THE CONFERENCE.
- AUGUST 15-31 POSSIBLE HIGH-LEVEL VISITS TO PATRIOTIC FRONT (IF THEY WISH), SALISBURY (TO ENCOURAGE THE WHITES AND THE BISHOP); AND PRETORIA (TO ENCOURAGE THE SOUTH AFRICANS TO PLAY A CONSTRUCTIVE ROLE) CABINET OR OD MEET TO APPROVE DETAILED PROPOSALS FOR CONDUCT OF THE CONFERENCE. SQUARE BRACKETS END.
- SAT SEPT 1
- SUN SEPT 2
- SEPT 3 DELEGATES ASSEMBLE IN LONDON.
- SEPT 4 CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE OPENS AT LANCASTER HOUSE.
CARRINGTON

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CONFIDENTIAL

SKBY 062100Z

FM FCO 061855Z AUG 79

TO IMMEDIATE LUSAKA

TELEGRAM NUMBER 683 OF 6 AUGUST

FOLLOWING FOR DUFF: RHODESIA: TELECON DUFF/WILLIAMS.

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF DRAFT CABINET PAPER.

BEGINS:

RHODESIA

1. MY COLLEAGUES WILL WISH TO HAVE AN ACCOUNT OF THE DISCUSSION ON RHODESIA AT THE CHGM IN LUSAKA AND TO CONSIDER THE NEXT STEPS IN OUR HANDLING OF THIS QUESTION.

CHGM

2. THE PRIME MINISTER'S STATEMENT DURING THE OPENING DISCUSSION ON SOUTHERN AFRICA ON 3 AUGUST CLOSELY FOLLOWED THE LINE TAKEN IN HER SPEECH IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS ON 25 JULY. THE PRIME MINISTER EMPHASISED THAT THERE COULD BE NO QUESTION OF IGNORING THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE POLITICAL CHANGE WHICH HAD TAKEN PLACE IN RHODESIA. BUT OUR CONSULTATIONS HAD SHOWN THAT THERE WAS STRONG CRITICISM OF CERTAIN ASPECTS OF THE NEW RHODESIAN CONSTITUTION, AND A DESIRE TO INVOLVE THE PRESENT EXTERNAL PARTIES IN THE SEARCH FOR A SOLUTION. THERE WAS ALSO A WIDESPREAD VIEW THAT ANY SOLUTION OF THE PROBLEM MUST DERIVE ITS AUTHORITY FROM BRITAIN AS THE RESPONSIBLE COLONIAL POWER. WE HAD EVERY INTENTION OF DISCHARGING OUR RESPONSIBILITY IN THIS RESPECT HONOURABLY AND ON A BASIS COMPARABLE WITH THE ARRANGEMENTS WE HAD MADE FOR THE INDEPENDENCE OF OTHER COUNTRIES.

3. IN KEEPING WITH THE TONE SET BY PRESIDENT NYERERE IN HIS OPENING STATEMENT, THE SUBSEQUENT DISCUSSION WAS CONSTRUCTIVE AND HELPFUL, THOUGH SOME INTERVENTIONS (NOTABLY GENERAL ADEFOPE'S) WERE MORE CRITICAL THAN OTHERS. IT WAS EVENTUALLY AGREED TO SET UP A SMALL GROUP (CONSISTING OF PRESIDENTS KAUNDA AND NYERERE, PRIME MINISTERS MANLEY AND FRASER, GENERAL ADEFOPE AND THE SECRETARY-GENERAL) TO DRAFT A PASSAGE ON RHODESIA FOR THE FINAL COMMUNIQUE AND AGREE IT WITH THE PRIME MINISTER AND MYSELF.

4. THE FINAL TEXT OF THIS PASSAGE, AS AGREED UNANIMOUSLY BY HEADS OF GOVERNMENT, IS AT ANNEX A. WE HAD HOPED TO AVOID MAKING A REFERENCE TO A CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE WHILE IN LUSAKA. BUT THERE WAS INTENSE PRESSURE ON THIS QUESTION AND AN ANNOUNCEMENT WAS GENERALLY EXPECTED. WE THEREFORE AGREED TO THE INCLUSION OF THE FORM OF WORDS IN PARAGRAPH H WHICH, BECAUSE IT IS A MATTER FOR CABINET DECISION, FALLS SHORT OF ANNOUNCING IN TERMS THAT WE HAVE DECIDED TO CALL A CONFERENCE. FRESH ELECTIONS REFERRED TO IN PARAGRAPH G ARE ESSENTIAL TO ANY SETTLEMENT IF IT IS TO GAIN SUFFICIENT INTERNATIONAL ACCEPTANCE TO MAKE IT VIABLE AND BRING THE WAR TO AN END. THIS PARAGRAPH DOES NOT COMMIT US TO ADMINISTER THESE ELECTIONS, BUT ONLY TO ARRANGE WHATEVER DEGREE OF SUPERVISION WE MAY THINK NECESSARY IN ORDER TO ENABLE US TO DEMONSTRATE TO THE WORLD THAT THEY ARE FREE AND FAIR. THE PROVISION FOR COMMONWEALTH OBSERVERS SHOULD NOT GIVE TROUBLE.

5. I BELIEVE WE HAVE EVERY REASON TO FEEL SATISFIED WITH THE OUTCOME OF THE DISCUSSION. WE HAVE AVOIDED THE IMPOSITION OF A FRESH SET OF CONDITIONS FOR THE GRANTING OF INDEPENDENCE TO RHODESIA, AND HAVE RESISTED ATTEMPTS TO INVOLVE US IN NEGOTIATING WITH THE COMMONWEALTH A SPECIFIC PROGRAMME OR AN OUTLINE OF OUR PROPOSALS. BISHOP MUZOREWA HAS NOT BEEN CONDEMNED, NOR HAS THERE BEEN ANY RECRIMINATION OVER SANCTIONS. THERE IS NO ECHO OF THE OAU LANGUAGE ON THE PATRIOTIC FRONT AS QUOTE SOLE LEGITIMATE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE PEOPLE OF ZIMBABWE UNQUOTE. THERE IS NO CALL FOR FURTHER UN INVOLVEMENT. WE HAVE SECURED AN ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF THE NEED FOR SAFEGUARDS FOR MINORITIES. THE COMMUNIQUE THROWS A HEAVY ONUS ON THE PATRIOTIC FRONT AND THEIR FRIENDS TO CO-OPERATE IN THE SEARCH FOR A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT. IT LEAVES OPEN, ON THE OTHER HAND, THE QUESTION OF HOW WE SHOULD PROCEED IF THE PATRIOTIC FRONT SHOW THEMSELVES UNWILLING TO NEGOTIATE IN GOOD FAITH AND LEAVE THE CONCLUSION OF A SETTLEMENT TO US AND THE BISHOP'S GOVERNMENT.

FURTHER ACTION

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CONTINGENCY PLANS HAVE ALREADY BEEN MADE FOR A CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE TO START IN LONDON ON 4 SEPTEMBER: WE NEED NOW TO BEGIN LAYING THE GROUNDWORK FOR THIS, IN TERMS WHICH WILL GIVE THE MAXIMUM REASSURANCE TO THE SALISBURY GOVERNMENT AND ITS SUPPORTERS (AND IN PARTICULAR TO WHITE RHODESIANS), WHILE AT THE SAME TIME WE DEMONSTRATE TO THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY THAT WE ARE MAKING, IN GOOD FAITH, A SERIOUS ATTEMPT TO REACH A SETTLEMENT ON A BASIS WHICH TAKES ACCOUNT OF THE VIEWS EXPRESSED TO US IN OUR CONSULTATIONS WITH THEM. BISHOP MUZOREWA'S INITIAL PRIVATE REACTION TO THE CHGM COMMUNIQUE WAS CAUTIOUS, THOUGH HIS FIRST PUBLIC COMMENT PREDICTABLY EXPRESSED RESENTMENT AT THE CALL FOR NEW ELECTIONS. HE WILL NEED MUCH CAREFUL ENCOURAGEMENT FROM US. IN PARALLEL WITH THIS, WE NEED TO CONTINUE TO IMPRESS ON PRESIDENT NYERERE AND HIS COLLEAGUES IN THE QUOTE FRONT LINE STATES UNQUOTE THE PART WE EXPECT THEM TO PLAY IN GETTING THE EXTERNAL PARTIES TO THE CONFERENCE, AND TO ENCOURAGE SOUTH AFRICANS TO BE HELPFUL.

7. OUR FIRST OBJECTIVE SHOULD BE TO PUBLISH, BY MID-AUGUST, A STATEMENT OF OUR OUTLINE PROPOSALS FOR AN INDEPENDENCE CONSTITUTION. SUCH A STATEMENT SHOULD MEET THE FOLLOWING CRITERIA:

A. IT SHOULD SKETCH THE OUTLINE OF AN EVENTUAL INDEPENDENCE CONSTITUTION WHICH WOULD BE COMPARABLE WITH THE TERMS ON WHICH INDEPENDENCE WAS GRANTED TO OTHER COMMONWEALTH COUNTRIES, ESPECIALLY IN AFRICA:

B. IT SHOULD ENABLE BISHOP MUZOREWA TO MAKE CLEAR TO WHITE OPINION IN RHODESIA THAT HE CAN DISCUSS OUR PROPOSALS WITHOUT COMPROMISING ESSENTIAL MINORITY INTERESTS.

C. IT SHOULD BE IN SUCH TERMS THAT WE CAN CLAIM TO THE AFRICAN PRESIDENTS AND OTHERS THAT A REFUSAL BY THE PATRIOTIC FRONT TO ATTEND A CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE ON THIS BASIS WOULD BE UNREASONABLE AND A PROOF OF BAD FAITH ON THEIR PART. WE SHOULD BE READY TO MAKE A SEPARATE STATEMENT AT THE TIME THE PROPOSALS ARE PUBLISHED, EMPHASISING THE IMPORTANCE WE ATTACH TO ENABLING THE WHITE COMMUNITY TO PLAY A FULL PART IN THE FUTURE OF THE COUNTRY AND HOLDING OUT A FIRM PROMISE OF LEGAL INDEPENDENCE AND THE LIFTING OF SANCTIONS ONCE THE PROPOSALS ARE IMPLEMENTED.

8. IT WILL BE DESIRABLE TO CONFINE OUR INITIAL PRESENTATION TO THE BARE OUTLINE OF THE INDEPENDENCE CONSTITUTION. IF WE EXPOSED THE FULL EXTENT TO WHICH WE WERE PREPARED TO INCORPORATE THE SUBSTANCE OF THE EXISTING CONSTITUTION INTO OUR OWN PROPOSALS, WE SHOULD GIVE THE PATRIOTIC FRONT AND THEIR SUPPORTERS IN AFRICA A CHANCE TO CLAIM THAT WE WERE CLEARLY AIMING FOR A SOLUTION BASED ON THE INTERNAL SETTLEMENT. IT IS VERY LIKELY THAT, ONCE THEY GET TO A CONFERENCE, THE PATRIOTIC FRONT WILL REJECT OUR PROPOSALS. BUT WE SHOULD NOT MAKE IT EASY FOR THEM TO CLAIM THAT IT IS NOT WORTH THEIR WHILE ATTENDING THE CONFERENCE AT ALL. THIS WOULD ONLY MAKE IT MORE DIFFICULT FOR US TO DEMONSTRATE THAT IT IS THEIR INTRANSIGENCE WHICH IS THE MAIN OBSTACLE TO A WIDER AGREEMENT.

9. A DRAFT FOR SUCH A STATEMENT OF OUR OUTLINE PROPOSALS FOR A CONSTITUTION IS ATTACHED AT ANNEX B. THIS IS LARGELY COMPATIBLE WITH THE EXISTING RHODESIAN CONSTITUTION: BUT THE SIDE-LINED PASSAGES INDICATE THE POINTS ON WHICH CHANGES WILL HAVE TO BE MADE. I BELIEVE THAT IT SHOULD BE POSSIBLE TO SECURE BISHOP MUZOREWA'S ACQUIESCENCE IN SUCH CHANGES, WITHOUT SERIOUS DAMAGE TO WHITE CONFIDENCE. THE LIMITED CHANGES WE HAVE IN MIND ARE SET OUT IN

ANNEX C .

10. I ENVISAGE THAT THE PROPOSALS WOULD BE ISSUED SIMULTANEOUSLY WITH AN INVITATION TO THE BISHOP'S GOVERNMENT AND THE EXTERNAL PARTIES TO ATTEND A CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE IN LONDON IN EARLY SEPTEMBER. THE TERMS OF THE INVITATION WOULD MAKE CLEAR THAT:
(A) OUR OBJECTIVE IS AGREEMENT ON AN INDEPENDENCE CONSTITUTION TO BE GRANTED BY BRITAIN:

(B) OUR PROPOSALS OUTLINE THE SORT OF CONSTITUTION WHICH WE ARE PREPARED TO ENACT AND WHICH WE BELIEVE SHOULD COMMEND ITSELF TO THE PARTIES AND TO INTERNATIONAL OPINION AS A BASIS FOR LEGAL INDEPENDENCE (THOUGH IF ALTERNATIVE ARRANGEMENTS WERE AGREED BY ALL PARTIES, WE SHOULD BE PREPARED TO ACCEPT A SOLUTION ON THAT BASIS).

11. WE SHOULD NOW START DISCUSSING IN DETAIL, WITH THE BISHOP AND HIS OFFICIALS, THE CHANGES SET OUT IN ANNEX C SO AS TO BE IN A POSITION TO TABLE FULLY WORKED OUT PROPOSALS AT THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE. THE DETAILED PROPOSALS WE WOULD TABLE AT THE CONFERENCE WILL BE WORKED OUT IN THE LIGHT OF OUR DISCUSSIONS WITH THE RHODESIANS AND CIRCULATED TO MY COLLEAGUES LATER IN AUGUST. WE SHALL HAVE TO MAKE A PARALLEL OFFER TO CONSULT WITH THE PATRIOTIC FRONT BEFORE THE CONFERENCE, BUT IT IS UNLIKELY THAT THIS WILL REVEAL ANY WILLINGNESS TO COMPROMISE ON THEIR PART.

12. MEANWHILE, WE HAVE BEEN KEEPING OUR FRIENDS AND ALLIES OUTSIDE THE COMMONWEALTH, ESPECIALLY THE AMERICANS, INFORMED OF PROGRESS. WE MAY NEED TO CONSIDER WHETHER FURTHER HIGH-LEVEL ACTION - EG A VISIT TO WASHINGTON BY LORD HARLECH - IS NECESSARY FOR THIS PURPOSE OR TO KEEP BOTH THE SALISBURY GOVERNMENT AND THE EXTERNAL PARTIES ON COURSE FOR THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE. THE OUTLINE TIMETABLE AT ANNEX D SETS OUT A PROGRAMME FOR THESE AND OTHER STEPS.

13. I INVITE MY COLLEAGUES TO TAKE NOTE OF THE UNANIMOUS AGREEMENT REACHED AT THE COMMONWEALTH CONFERENCE AT LUSAKA AND TO APPROVE THE PROPOSALS FOR FURTHER ACTION IN PARAGRAPHS 6 TO 12 ABOVE

14. ANNEXES B AND C ARE THE SAME AS THE ANNEXES TO THE OD PAPER. TEXT OF ANNEX D IS IN MIFT.

ENDS

CARRINGTON

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PRIME MINISTER ~~SUBJECT~~

PERSONAL MESSAGE

SERIAL No.

TS8/79 T

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7/8*

August 6, 1979

Dear Madame Prime Minister:

I was pleased to receive your message concerning the Commonwealth agreement on the communique dealing with a settlement in Rhodesia.

You and the other leaders of the Commonwealth nations in Lusaka have taken a significant step forward in producing a document which holds the promise of serving as the basis for a just and lasting settlement.

We look forward to consulting with you on the details of your progress during the coming days. Meanwhile you have my full support in the process which you have so wisely set in motion.

Sincerely,

Jimmy Carter

SUBJECT
PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T56/79

SFO 005/05

OO WASHINGTON (DESKBY 051700Z)

OO FCO

GRS 150
CONFIDENTIAL
D E D I P
FM LUSAKA 051545Z AUGUST
DESKBY 051700Z WASHINGTON
TO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON
TELNO 003 OF 5 AUGUST 1979
INFO FCO

Endu SA
6/21
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MIPT: FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF PERSONAL MESSAGE FROM PRIME MINISTER TO PRESIDENT CARTER:-

'' DEAR MR PRESIDENT,

I BELIEVE WE ARE NEAR TO SECURING AGREEMENT IN LUSAKA TO A COMMUNIQUE IN WHICH THE COMMONWEALTH RECOGNISE THE NEW SITUATION IN RHODESIA AND ARE WILLING TO WORK WITH US TO BRING RHODESIA TO INDEPENDENCE.

I ENCLOSE THE TEXT OF THE PASSAGE FROM THE COMMUNIQUE WHICH HAS BEEN WORKED OUT BY A SMALL GROUP OF US INCLUDING PRESIDENT KAUNDA, PRESIDENT NYERERE AND THE NIGERIAN COMMISSIONER FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS. WE HOPE TO HAVE IT ENDORSED BY OUR OTHER COLLEAGUES TOMORROW. OF COURSE WE MAY STILL RUN INTO DIFFICULTIES SEMI CLN AND I SHALL LET YOU KNOW AS SOON AS THE DEBATE IS OVER.

YOU WILL SEE THAT THE TEXT PICKS UP MOST OF THE POINTS WHICH I MADE IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS TEN DAYS AGO. I BELIEVE THAT THE SUPPORT OF THE COMMONWEALTH FOR THIS POLICY WILL ENABLE BISHOP MUZOREWA TO WORK WITH US FOR THE KIND OF CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE ABOUT WHICH YOU TALKED TO HIM AT CAMP DAVID. WE MUST CONTINUE TO GIVE HIM ALL THE ENCOURAGEMENT WE CAN.

I SHALL BE CONSULTING MY COLLEAGUES WHEN I GET HOME AND WILL BE IN TOUCH AGAIN THEREAFTER. BUT YOU WILL SEE FROM THE COMMUNIQUE THE LINES ON WHICH WE ARE THINKING AND I WANTED YOU TO HAVE ADVANCE NOTICE OF IT.

WARM PERSONAL REGARDS,

MARGARET THATCHER .''

ALL INSON

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SUBJECT
PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. TS6A/79J

Final (see also
Communique)

STATE HOUSE
LUSAKA
REPUBLIC OF ZAMBIA

5 August, 1979.

Dear Colleague,

As you probably know a number of colleagues have worked hard and closely with me over this week-end to develop a set of proposals that gives full expression to our collective commitment and is, I trust, acceptable to all Commonwealth Governments as the way forward for Zimbabwe.

The attached text is the result of our labours. You should know that agreement upon it was reached on the basis of close negotiation and in a spirit of understanding and co-operation of which I believe we can all be proud as Commonwealth members.

I very much hope that it will command your support and that of all other colleagues. I believe the most propitious procedure for us now would be to have the text endorsed as our collective view by the Executive Session first thing tomorrow morning to conclude the debate on Southern Africa at this point. You will appreciate the importance of maintaining the confidentiality of the text meanwhile.

I appeal to you for your understanding, co-operation and support.

Your sincerely,

The Rt. Hon Mrs Margaret Thatcher
MP
Prime Minister
BRITAIN

10
Kenneth David Kaunda

TEXT OF STATEMENT APPROVED BY HEADS OF GOVERNMENT
IN RESTRICTED SESSION ON 5 AUGUST, 1979

SOUTHERN AFRICA

Heads of Government had a frank discussion on the current problems of Southern Africa and their implications for the Commonwealth and the wider international community. While recognising that certain developments since their Meeting in London have added new dimensions, they remained concerned by the potential dangers inherent in the existing situation. They therefore stressed the urgent need for finding satisfactory solutions to the remaining problems of this region.

In relation to the situation in Rhodesia, Heads of Government therefore:

- a. confirmed that they were wholly committed to genuine black majority rule for the people of Zimbabwe;
- b. recognised, in this context, that the internal settlement constitution is defective in certain important respects;
- c. fully accepted that it is the constitutional responsibility of the British Government to grant legal independence to Zimbabwe on the basis of majority rule;
- d. recognised that the search for a lasting settlement must involve all parties to the conflict;
- e. were deeply conscious of the urgent need to achieve such a settlement and bring peace to the people of Zimbabwe and their neighbours;
- f. accepted that independence on the basis of majority rule requires the adoption of a democratic constitution including appropriate safeguards for minorities;
- g. acknowledged that the government formed under such an independence constitution must be chosen through free and fair elections properly supervised under British Government authority, and with Commonwealth observers;
- h. welcomed the British Government's indication that an appropriate procedure for advancing towards these objectives would be for them to call a constitutional conference to which all the parties would be invited; and
- i. consequently, accepted that it must be a major objective to bring about a cessation of hostilities and an end to sanctions as part of the process of implementation of a lasting settlement.

UNCLASSIFIED
FM F C O 051715Z AUG 79
TO IMMEDIATE LUSAKA
TELEGRAM NUMBER 662 OF 5 AUGUST
AND TO UKMIS NEW YORK AND WASHINGTON
INFO PRIORITY PRETORIA, DAR ES SALAAM, LUANDA, MAPUTO AND MIRIMBA
SALISBURY.

FOR FENN FROM MCCREY.

TEXT 1.

WORLD THIS WEEKEND INTERVIEW WITH MR DOUGLAS HURD 5 AUGUST.

INTRODUCTION.

SO THE IMPRESSION IS CLEARLY GROWING AMONG CORRESPONDENTS IN LUSAKA THAT THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT'S LINE HAS CHANGED SIGNIFICANTLY AND AS I SAID SOME CONSERVATIVE BACKBENCHERS ARE ALREADY EXPRESSING THEIR ANXIETY IN PRETTY STRONG TERMS. LAST YEAR YOU MAY REMEMBER ONE HUNDRED AND FIFTY MPS REBELLED AGAINST THEIR LEADERSHIP'S ADVICE TO SUPPORT THE RENEWAL OF SANCTIONS AGAINST RHODESIA AND THE CONSERVATIVE PARTY CONFERENCE WAS AT ITS ROUGHEST WHEN THE LATE MR JOHN DAVIS TRIED TO DEFEND THE POLICIES OF SANCTIONS AND NON-RECOGNITION. DOES THE GOVERNMENT'S PRESENT ATTITUDE INDICATE A CHANGE THE MINISTER OF STATE AT THE FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE MR DOUGLAS HURD, DENIES THAT THERE IS ANY CHANGE IN THE GOVERNMENT'S POSITION BUT I PUT IT TO HIM THAT IT HAD BEEN THOUGHT THAT MRS THATCHER'S ORIGINAL INSTINCTS HAD BEEN TO RECOGNISE MUZOREWA'S GOVERNMENT AND TO LIFT SANCTIONS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

A. WELL PEOPLE TALK DON'T THEY ABOUT INSTINCTS AND SO ON. THE ONLY SAFE THING TO GO ON IS WHAT THE PRIME MINISTER HAS ACTUALLY SAID AND WHAT SHE SAID IS IT IS ENTIRELY CLEAR, AND I AM SURE RIGHT, IF WE HAD GONE AHEAD AND RECOGNISED THE MUZOREWA GOVERNMENT ON DAY ONE WE WOULD HAVE DONE IT ABSOLUTELY ALONE AGAINST THE WISHES AND VIEWS OF AUSTRALIA, CANADA, THE WHOLE COMMONWEALTH, UNITED STATES AND EUROPE. I DON'T THINK THAT THAT WOULD HAVE GIVEN THE RHODESIANS A LOT OF HELP.

Q. ON THE OTHER HAND WASN'T IT THE CONSERVATIVE PARTY'S POLICY BEFORE THE ELECTION TO SAY THAT THE INTERNAL SETTLEMENT WAS ADEQUATE, THAT THE ANGLO/AMERICAN PROPOSALS WERE NOT AND THEY BACKED THE INTERNAL SETTLEMENT RIGHT THE WAY THROUGH?

A. WELL THIS WAS THE BIG DIFFERENCE BETWEEN OUR APPROACH AND DAVID OWEN. PEOPLE WHO SAY IT IS THE SAME REALLY DON'T KNOW THE BACKGROUND AT ALL. DAVID OWEN DISLIKED THE INTERNAL SETTLEMENT AND ALWAYS Poured COLD WATER ON THE ELECTIONS. WHAT WE ARE SAYING AND WHAT MARGARET THATCHER HAS BEEN SAYING AT LUSAKA IS LOOK THESE ELECTIONS ARE A BIG STEP FORWARD. IT IS NOT THE FULL ANSWER BUT FOR HEAVENS' SAKE LET US BUILD ON THAT TO GET THE FULL ANSWER.

Q. IT IS NOT THE FULL ANSWER. WHAT MARGARET THATCHER IS SAYING IS IT IS A TOTALLY INADEQUATE ANSWER. TO SAY THAT SHE WANTS TO HAVE NEW ELECTIONS, A NEW REFERENDUM, A NEW CONSTITUTION IN WHICH THE WHITE BLOCKING VOTE WILL BE REMOVED AND THE COMMISSIONS WILL BE RADICALLY REVISED.

A. YOU ARE RACING AHEAD OF WHAT SHE SAID. WHAT SHE IS DOING NOW IS COMPLETING THE CONSULTATIONS THEN SHE WILL COME BACK, LORD CARRINGTON WILL COME BACK, BRITISH GOVERNMENT WILL MAKE ITS OWN PROPOSALS TO THE PARTY'S CONCERN.

Prime Minister

By

6/8

nb

Q. IT IS NOT ONLY THE PRESS WITH RESPECT MR HURD WHO ARE RUSHING AHEAD IT MAY BE THAT SOME OF YOUR OWN BACKBENCHERS ARE RUSHING AHEAD BECAUSE THERE IS ALREADY TALK FROM THE PEOPLE WHO WERE DEEPLY OPPOSED TO THE REIMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS LAST YEAR SAYING THAT MRS THATCHER IS ABOUT TO EMBARK ON A SELL OUT OF THE WHITE RHODESIANS?

A. WELL I THINK THAT TALK, IF IT EXISTS, IS FOOLISH.

Q. YOU WILL RECALL AS WELL AS I DO THE EXTRAORDINARY SCENES OF THE CONSERVATIVE CONFERENCE LAST YEAR WHEN JOHN DAVIS WAS TRYING TO DEFEND THE DECISION NOT TO LIFT SANCTIONS AND NOT TO RECOGNISE WHEN THE RIGHT-WING OF THE PARTY, IF I CAN PUT IT THAT WAY, WAS PRACTICALLY BAYING FOR ITS BLOOD BECAUSE OF THE KITH AND KIN ARGUMENTS THAT WERE BEING ADVANCED REPEATEDLY.

A. YES. THEY DIDN'T REALISE THAT THEY WERE ATTACKING A SICK MAN, AND IT WASN'T THEIR FAULT, AND IT IS PERFECTLY NATURAL THAT PEOPLE WHO FEEL STRONGLY ABOUT RHODESIA AND WHO THERE ARE A GREAT MANY IN THE CONSERVATIVE PARTY I AM GLAD TO SAY, SHOULD FEEL IMPATIENT: BUT THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT HAS TO DEAL WITH THE REAL WORLD AND IN THE REAL WORLD THE INTERESTS OF RHODESIA AND OF BRITAIN ARE TO HAVE A SETTLEMENT WHICH IS ACCEPTED. IF YOU CAN GET IT, WHICH IS ACCEPTED BY THE GREATEST POSSIBLE NUMBER OF OUR FRIENDS AND ALLIES.

Q. BUT IF THE SETTLEMENT THAT IS BEING PROPOSED IS GOING TO DIMINISH THE POLITICAL INTERESTS OF THE WHITES IN RHODESIA, IF THE BLOCKING VOTE IS GOING TO BE REMOVED AND IF THE COMMISSIONS ARE GOING TO BE ALTERED AND THE CONTROL OF THE ARMY AND OF THE LAW AND ORDER OF ENFORCEMENT FORCES AND OF THE LAW AT LARGE IS GOING TO BE PLACED IN THE HANDS OF THE BLACK MAJORITY AND BE TAKEN AWAY FROM THE HANDS OF THE WHITE MINORITY DO YOU THINK THERE IS GOING TO BE ANYTHING LIKE THE SCALE OF REVOLT INSIDE THE CONSERVATIVE PARTY AS THERE WAS LAST YEAR?

A. WELL I THINK THIS IS WHERE YOU WITH RESPECT ARE RACING AHEAD A BIT. SOME OF THOSE AREAS MAY BE COVERED IN THE PROPOSALS WHICH THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT WILL PUT FORWARD BUT AS THERE IS NOTHING CUT AND DRIED ABOUT THE GOVERNMENT'S POSITION AT THE MOMENT, WHAT WILL HAPPEN IS THAT WHEN THEY COME BACK FROM LUSAKA, THE PRIME MINISTER AND THE FOREIGN SECRETARY WILL LOOK AGAIN AT THE EXACT PROPOSALS WHICH THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT WILL THEN PUT: SO THERE IS NOTHING CUT AND DRIED WITH THEM AS OF THIS SUNDAY MORNING.

Q. NO BUT IF THEY ARE GOING TO GET THE SUPPORT OF THE FRONT LINE STATES, OF PRESIDENT NYERERE, OF PRESIDENT KAUNDA AREN'T THEY GOING TO HAVE TO DO SOMETHING ABOUT COERCING TO GET THE SETTLEMENT ACCEPTED.

A. WE ARE GOING TO HAVE TO COVER SOME OF THOSE AREAS AND IT IS VERY INTERESTING THAT BISHOP MUZOREWA WELCOMED THE PRIME MINISTER'S SPEECH IN LUSAKA AS DID NYERERE. YOU KNOW RHODESIA IS A COUNTRY IN AFRICA. IF IT IS ACTUALLY GOING TO HAVE A PEACEFUL PROSPEROUS FUTURE IT IS GOING TO HAVE TO LIVE ALONGSIDE ITS NEIGHBOURS. NOW IT IS STILL A LONG SHOT, IT MAY BE IT IS STILL ODDS AGAINST WHAT WE ARE TRYING TO DO: BUT FOR HEAVENS' SAKE THIS IS THE BEST CHANCE TO RHODESIA AND WE OUGHT TO PURSUE IT FOR AS LONG AS WE CAN IN THE HOPE OF GETTING IT.

Q. BUT MRS THATCHER SEEMS DETERMINED TO GET A SOLUTION THROUGH BEFORE 15 NOVEMBER WHEN THE SANCTIONS ORDER WOULD BE RE-MADE.

A. WHILE THAT IS RIGHT. WE HOPE THE QUESTION OF THE SANCTIONS ORDER WILL BECOME IRRELEVANT AND THERE IS A CHANCE. I MEAN IT IS TRUE THAT THERE HAS BEEN A GREAT ADVANCE IN RHODESIA. IT IS TRUE THERE IS BLACK MAJORITY RULE. IT IS TRUE THAT THERE HAVE BEEN ELECTIONS MORE SUCCESSFUL THAN MOST PEOPLE EXPECTED AND IT IS TRUE THAT SLOWLY THE FRONT LINE STATES AND OTHERS IN AFRICA AND THE COMMONWEALTH ARE COMING TO SEE THAT. NOW THEY STILL HAVE CRITICISMS FOR THE CONSTITUTION AND WHAT IS GOING ON, THE QUESTION IS WHETHER ONE CAN PUT THOSE TWO THINGS TOGETHER - THE ACHIEVEMENTS IN RHODESIA AND THE CRITICISMS WHICH STILL EXIST IN ORDER TO GET A SETTLEMENT.

Q. WELL LET ME GIVE YOU A THOROUGHLY HYPOTHETICAL QUESTION THEN. IF THE REPORTED PROPOSALS ARE THE ONES WHICH ARE EVENTUALLY INCORPORATED IN THE COMMONWEALTH CONFERENCE COMMUNIQUE, IF THOSE WERE THE ONES THAT WERE BEING PUT TO THE CONFERENCE AND TO PARLIAMENT, DO YOU THINK THAT THE CONSERVATIVE PARTY IN PARLIAMENT WILL BE PREPARED TO ACCEPT THEM?

A. IF THE GOVERNMENT WERE ABLE TO COME AT THE END OF THE SUMMER TO THE CONSERVATIVE PARTY IN PARLIAMENT AND SAY, HERE ARE PROPOSALS WHICH WE ARE PUTTING OR HAVE PUT TO THE PARTY THEY ARE DESIGNED TO BRING ABOUT RHODESIAN INDEPENDENCE WITH THE GREATEST POSSIBLE INTERNATIONAL ACCEPTANCE, YOU MAY NOT LIKE THIS OR THAT PART OF IT BUT THIS IS THE DESIGN AND IT SEEMS TO BE WORKING, THEN I CANNOT HONESTLY THINK THAT MANY CONSERVATIVES WOULD BE OPPOSED.

TEXT 2.

KEATLEY INTERVIEW FROM LUSAKA WORLD THIS WEEKEND
SUNDAY 5 AUGUST: VERBATIM TRANSCRIPT

A: THEY ARE UP AT STATE HOUSE THE RESIDENCE OF PRESIDENT KENNETH KAUNDA AND THERE THE REAL INNER CORE OF THIS CONFERENCE, THE SEVEN LEADERS WHO COUNT, ARE IN A SMALL ROOM OVER COFFEE, FRAMING THE ACTUAL FORMULA ON RHODESIA WHICH WILL BE BORNE FORTH PUBLICLY AT THE END OF THIS CONFERENCE WHICH IS STILL THREE DAYS AWAY. BUT IT IS THE OLD FORMULA OF WHAT WE WOULD CALL A SMOKE-FILLED ROOM, EXCEPT THAT KAUNDA DOES NOT SMOKE AND I GATHER THAT THE OTHERS DO. MRS THATCHER IS THERE FLANKED BY LORD CARRINGTON AND IT LOOKS AS IF THEY'VE DONE IT, THAT THE HARD WORKING SESSION YESTERDAY PRODUCED GENERAL AGREEMENT. IT WAS DRAFTED OVERNIGHT BY OFFICIALS WHO WORKED THROUGH THE NIGHT. THIS MORNING THEY SAT DOWN AND LOOKED AT THE DRAFT, THEY GAVE IT THE FINAL TOUCHES AND, GOD WILLING, THAT IS THE FORMULA OF THE WAY AHEAD FOR RHODESIA, THE WHOLE BUSINESS OF CONFERENCES AND SUMMITRY WHICH COULD OR SHOULD CRACK THE NUT.

Q: DOES THIS FORMULA, AS FAR AS ONE CAN TELL, FOLLOW THE OUTLINE OF THE SIX POINTS THAT MRS THATCHER AND THE OTHER LEADERS THRASHED OUT THE OTHER DAY? (COMMENT: I TAKE THIS TO BE A REFERENCE TO THE KEATLEY/MCMANUS PIECE.)

A. IT CERTAINLY DOES, AND I THINK IT HAS TO ALSO TAKE ACCOUNT OF THE VERY DIFFICULT POINT OF A CEASE-FIRE: THAT IS TO SAY AT SOME POINT WHEN IT LOOKS AS IF THERE IS A REAL CONSTITUTION ON THE STANDARD BRITISH PATTERN, MAJORITY RULE, EVERYONE VOTING, ONE MAN ONE VOTE, WHEN THEY HAVE GOT THAT THEN THEY HAVE TO APPEAL TO BOTH SIDES: GENERAL WALLS WITH HIS RHODESIA FORCES, THE GUERRILLA ARMIES IN THE BUSH - WILL YOU NOW OBSERVE A STANDSTILL TO ALLOW AN ELECTION OR REFERENDUM TO GO AHEAD. AND THAT IS WHERE WE NEED THE AUTHORITY OF THIS SUMMIT IN LUSAKA, THE 39 FELLOW MEMBERS AND THE 7 KEY PEOPLE WHO CALL THEMSELVES NOW THE CAUCUS AND WHOSE NAMES HAVE JUST BEEN REVEALED THIS MORNING.

Q WHO ARE THEY
Q WHO ARE THEY

A: WELL KENNETH KAUNDA IS THE CHAIRMAN OF THE TIGHT LITTLE GROUP BUT INITIATORS APPEAR TO BE MALCOLM FRASER OF AUSTRALIA AND MICHAEL MANLEY, THE PRIME MINISTER OF JAMAICA, BECAUSE AS SOON AS THEY LANDED HERE EACH OF THEM VISITED THE MEMBERS OF THIS GROUP AND REALLY SET IT UP. NOW THE OTHERS ARE MRS THATCHER, JULIUS NYERERE, THE PRESIDENT OF TANZANIA, THE SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE COMMONWEALTH MR RAMPHAL, AND A SURPRISE HERE, THEY HAVE ENLISTED GENERAL HENRY ADEFOPE OF NIGERIA NOT BECAUSE HE IS SUCH A FRIEND OF BRITAIN, AFTER THE OIL EPISODE HE CAN'T BE, BUT BECAUSE IT IS THE BIGGEST NATION IN AFRICA, ITS THE HEAVYWEIGHT AND HE HAS BEEN SO CRITICAL. AND YOU WANT THAT CRITIC INSIDE THE CAUCUS RATHER THAN OUTSIDE. NOW THESE ARE THE SEVEN LEADERS, THERE IS ONE OTHER. THEY VERY PRACTICALLY INVITED LORD CARRINGTON AS BRITISH FOREIGN SECRETARY, HE WILL BE IN ON EVERY BIT OF IT. SO THERE'S THE TEAM.

Q: IS THIS GOING TO BE AN ATTEMPT AT A VERY ACCELERATED SETTLEMENT? TIMING FOR MRS THATCHER IS OF THE ESSENCE, WHEN SHE COMES BACK SHE IS GOING TO HAVE TO FACE THE CONSERVATIVE PARTY CONFERENCE BEFORE SHE FACES PARLIAMENT, AND THERE IS ALREADY TALK AMONGST CONSERVATIVE BACK BENCHERS THAT THIS DEAL IS A SELL OUT. WHITE RHODESIANS ARE BEING SOLD OUT, THE THATCHER LINE HAS BEEN CHANGED VERY RADICALLY. IS IT YOUR IMPRESSION THAT IT HAS BEEN CHANGED?

A: THAT IS THE VIEW OF CORRESPONDENTS HERE. NOW THE BRITISH OFFICIALS ARE VERY CONCERNED ABOUT THIS BECAUSE MRS THATCHER HAS TOLD THEM THAT SHE HAS NOT SHIFTED HER POSITION. INDEED ONE OF THE PHRASES USED WAS THAT ALL SHE HAS DONE SINCE SHE CAME TO OFFICE AT THE BEGINNING OF MAY IS GRADUALLY TO UNFOLD HER POLICY ON RHODESIA AS YOU MIGHT TAKE OFF THE OUTER LAYERS OF AN ONION. WELL, THIS IS VERY INGENIOUS AND IT IS OBVIOUSLY MEANT TO PLACATE THE RIGHT WINGERS, THE KNIGHTS IN THE SHIRES, AND THE LOCAL CONSERVATIVE ASSOCIATIONS IN BRITAIN, TO FEEL THAT SHE HAS NOT SHIFTED. IT IS ALSO AIMED, ODDLY ENOUGH AT THE TRADE UNIONS IN BRITAIN BECAUSE THEY FEEL HERE THAT IF MRS THATCHER IS PROVED TO BE FLEXIBLE, WHICH SHE IS AND THAT IS GOOD, AT THE SAME TIME THEY DON'T WANT TO THINK THAT TRADE UNIONS WOULD FEEL THAT SHE COULD EASILY BE CHANGED ON HER POLICIES ON DOMESTIC ECONOMIC MATTERS IN BRITAIN. THEY WANT TO SHOW THAT SHE IS A PERSON WHO STANDS FIRM AND DOESN'T SHIFT, SO THEY ARE TRYING TO PERSUADE US THAT MRS THATCHER IS STILL WHERE SHE WAS, BUT THE VIEW HERE IS SHE HAS SHIFTED AND THIS WAS PUT TO ONE OF THE AUSTRALIANS - HE SAID HAVE A TALK TO THE PRIME MINISTER - I AM TOLD THAT THE AUSTRALIAN PRIME MINISTER SIMPLY GAVE FULL AGREEMENT AND SAID OF COURSE SHE HAS SHIFTED. I ADMIRE SOMEONE WHO LISTENS TO FACTS AND ADJUSTS ACCORDINGLY. ONE AUSTRALIAN OFFICIAL WAS EVEN TOUGHER, AND HE SAID MRS THATCHER IS COMING WITH US INTO THE REAL WORLD.

Q: AND IS THE REAL WORLD AS THE AUSTRALIAN OFFICIALS OR AS OTHER PEOPLE MIGHT SEE IT THE REAL WORLD, OR SOMETHING VERY SIMILAR TO THE REAL WORLD OF THE ANGLO-AMERICAN PROPOSALS.

A: IT IS BOUND TO BE BECAUSE THAT WAS CONFIRMED BY WHITEHALL OFFICIALS WHO HAVE BEEN WITH THIS PROBLEM SINCE UDI FOR 14 YEARS AND THEY KNOW WHAT THE ELEMENTS HAVE TO BE. THE GREAT THING THOUGH IS IN THE PAST YOU ONLY HAD MR VANCE OF THE U S AND THE BRITISH FOREIGN SECRETARY DR OWEN TRYING TO EXERT PRESSURE - NOW YOU HAVE GOT THE CONCERTED PRESSURE OF 39 NATIONS HERE AND 7 PARTICULAR MEMBERS OF THAT CAUCUS, WHO ARE RELENTLESS IN GETTING A REAL AGREEMENT AND ONE OF THOSE 7 IS NIGERIA, AND THEY ARE MILITANT, CONSERVATIVE FREE ENTERPRISE GOVERNMENT, BUT MILITANT ON THIS PROBLEM, AND THEY HAVE ONLY TAKEN OVER A THIRD OF BRITISH ASSETS IN THAT COUNTRY, THEY STILL HOLD TWO-THIRDS SO THAT THERE IS SOME VERY POWERFUL LEVERAGE HERE FOR ACTION.

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TO IMMEDIATE LUSAKA

TELEGRAM NUMBER 661 OF 5 AUGUST

Top Copy

FOLLOWING FOR WHITMORE (PRIME MINISTER'S PARTY) FROM SANDERS,
10 DOWNING STREET.

1. YOU MAY WISH TO SEE THE SUNDAY TELEGRAPH AND OBSERVER LEAD ARTICLES ON RHODESIA. THE TELEGRAPH'S IS BY IAN WALLER AND READS: QUOTE.

THE PRIME MINISTER'S PLAN FOR ENDING THE RHODESIAN CRISIS, WHICH SHE IS DISCUSSING WITH COMMONWEALTH LEADERS IN LUSAKA THIS WEEKEND, HAS BEEN RECEIVED WITH DISMAY BY MANY CONSERVATIVES. IT IS SEEN - AND NOT ONLY BY THE RIGHT WING BUT BY THE MANY TORY SUPPORTERS OF THE INTERNAL SETTLEMENT- AS A CAPITULATION TO THE DEMANDS OF THE AFRICAN STATES AND A TRIUMPH FOR THE FOREIGN OFFICE, HEADED BY LORD CARRINGTON, AND SEEMS CERTAIN TO LEAD TO HEATED CONTROVERSY.

IT IS GENERALLY BELIEVED THAT MRS THATCHER'S OWN INSTINCT WAS TO RECOGNISE BISHOP MUZOREWA'S GOVERNMENT IN SALISBURY AS A DEMOCRATICALLY ELECTED BLACK GOVERNMENT AND END SANCTIONS AGAINST RHODESIA IN NOVEMBER.

INSTEAD SHE MADE IT CLEAR THAT THERE MUST BE FAR REACHING CHANGES IN THE NEW ZIMBABWE RHODESIA CONSTITUTION WITH AN END TO WHITE CONTROL OVER KEY GOVERNMENT OFFICES AND THE POWER OF THE WHITE MINORITY TO BLOCK CHANGES IN THE CONSTITUTION.

THE ESSENCE OF HER MESSAGE WAS THAT THERE HAD TO BE GENUINE BLACK MAJORITY RULE, ACCEPTABLE TO THE COMMONWEALTH AND INTERNATIONAL OPINION BEFORE BRITAIN COULD RECOGNISE THE NEW REGIME. AMERY'S CRITICISM.

SOME CONSERVATIVES LAST NIGHT DESCRIBED THE PLAN AS QUOTE A SELL-OUT UNQUOTE. MR JULIAN AMERY, A FORMER CONSERVATIVE MINISTER AND MP FOR BRIGHTON PAVILION, DESCRIBED MRS THATCHER'S SPEECH AS QUOTE VERY DOUBTFUL DIPLOMACY UNQUOTE. THERE WAS NOTHING THAT HE COULD SEE IN WHAT PRESIDENT NYERERE HAD SAID EARLIER TO JUSTIFY MRS THATCHER VOLUNTEERING CHANGES IN RHODESIA'S CONSTITUTION.

QUOTE I SUSPECT THE AFRICAN LEADERS WILL TAKE THE CONCESSIONS AND THEN ASK FOR MORE. I AM DEEPLY WORRIED BY THE IMPLICATION THAT THE SO CALLED PATRIOTIC FRONT LEADERS MUST BE INVOLVED IN RHODESIA'S FUTURE: QUOTE IT WOULD GIVE THOSE TERRORISTS THE SAME VETO THEY HAD UNDER THE OWEN-VANCE PROPOSALS. ON THE POSITIVE SIDE, I AM GLAD TO SEE MRS THATCHER MADE NO SUGGESTION THAT SANCTIONS WOULD BE RENEWED IN NOVEMBER. UNQUOTE.

MR PATRICK WALL, CONSERVATIVE MP FOR HALTEMPRICE, SAID QUOTE THIS IS WHAT THE FOREIGN OFFICE HAVE WANTED ALL ALONG. THEY HAVE ALWAYS HAD A WAR AGAINST IAN SMITH AND WILL CONTINUE TO DO SO. I DONT THINK THE PRIME MINISTER HAD ANY REAL ALTERNATIVE. IT IS REALLY UP TO THE RHODESIANS NOW TO REJECT THE COMPROMISE. UNQUOTE.

IN HER SPEECH AT THE OPENING OF THE DEBATE ON RHODESIA MRS THATCHER INDICATED HER HOPES FOR A CONFERENCE OF ALL THE PARTIES INVOLVED, POSSIBLY IN LONDON AND SHE HOPES NO LATER THAN SEPTEMBER. HER AIM IS TO KEEP THE MOMENTUM SHE HAS SET OFF IN LUSAKA GOING AND TO FORCE ALL SIDES TO COME TO A DECISION ABOUT RHODEISA'S FUTURE.

AMONG THOSE WHO IT IS UNDERSTOOD SHE WASNTS TO TAKE PART IN THE CONFERENCE WOULD BE THE TWO GUERRILLA LEADERS, MR JOSHUA NKOMO AND MR ROBERT MUGABE. THE FORMER SHE ONCE DENOUNCED AS A QUOTE MURDERER UNQUOTE AFTER THE SHOOTING DOWN OF A CIVILIAN RHODESIAN AIRCRAFT AND TERRORIST ATTACKS ON THE COUNTRY FROM HIS BASE IN ZAMBIA. DOUBT CAST.

IT IS THE POSSIBILITY OF THEIR PRESENCE THAT HAS MOST ANGERED MANY CONSERVATIVES. IT MUST ALSO CAST DOUBT ON THE WILLINGNESS OF BISHOP MUZOREWA, AND LEADERS OF THE WHITE RHODESIANS TO TAKE PART IN THE PROPOSED CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE.

TO SOME IT WILL SEEM AS IF MRS THATCHER HAS CAST FOR HERSELF THE ROLE OF GENERAL DE GAULLE WHO, AFTER WINNING AN ELECTION ON KEEPING ALGERIA PART OF FRANCE PROMPTLY ACCEDED TO THE ALGERIAN DEMANDS FOR INDEPENDENCE.

MRS THATCHER HAS UNDOUBTEDLY WON FRIENDS FOR HERSELF AMONG THE AFRICAN AS WELL AS THE AUSTRALIAN AND CANADIAN LEADERS BY HER CHANGE POLICY. BUT THERE IS NOW THE PROSPECT OF A STORM AHEAD IN HER OWN PARTY.
UNQUOTE.

2. THE OBSERVER'S IS BY ADAM RAPHEL AND READS:
QUOTE.

MRS THATCHER FACES STRONG OPPOSITION FROM WITHIN THE CONSERVATIVE PARTY TO HER NEW INITIATIVE ON RHODESIA.

THE PLAN FOR A NEW CONSTITUTION AND AN ALL-PARTY CONFERENCE IN LONDON WAS LAST NIGHT SENDING SHOCK WAVES DOWN THE RIGHT WING OF HER PARTY.

MR JULIAN AMERY, MP FOR BRIGHTON PAVILION AND FORMER CONSERVATIVE MINISTER OF STATE AT THE FOREIGN OFFICE, SAID HE WAS SERIOUSLY CONCERNED BY REPORTS OF MRS THATCHER'S SPEECH TO THE COMMONWEALTH CONFERENCE IN LUSAKA.

I THINK IT IS A GREAT PITY SHE SAID THAT THE RHODESIAN CONSTITUTION WAS DEFECTIVE AND INDEED RATHER GRATUITOUS TO SAY SO IN THE PRESENCE OF LEADERS OF ONE PARTY STATES LIKE TANZANIA AND ZAMBIA AND MILITARY DISTATORSHIPS LIKE GHANA, MR AMERY SAID.

HE BELIEVED THE PRIME MINISTER'S SPEECH WOULD MAKE BRITAIN'S TASK OF ACHIEVING A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT MORE DIFFICULT BECAUSE THE LEADERS OF THE FRONT LINE STATES WOULD SIMPLY PRESS FOR FURTHER CONCESSIONS.

MR STEPHEN HASTINGS, MP FOR MID-BEDFORDSHIRE, SAID HE THOUGHT MRS THATCHER'S INITIATIVE WAS DEEPLY DISTURBING.

I CANNOT SEE WHY SHE FOUND IT NECESSARY TO CRITICISE THE CONSTITUTION IN THESE TERMS. SHE MUST BE VERY CONSCIOUS OF THE ADVICE SHE RECEIVED FROM LORD BOYD THAT IT HAD ONLY BEEN ACHIEVED WITH GREAT DIFFICULTY AND THAT IT WOULD BE UNWISE TO TAMPER WITH IT.

MR HASTINGS SAID THAT IF THE FINAL OUTCOME WAS ON THE LINES BEING HINTED AT, THEN MRS THATCHER WOULD HAVE COME PRECIOUS NEAR TO DOING WHAT GENERAL DE GAULLE DID IN ALGERIA. WE APPEAR TO HAVE RETURNED TO THE POSITION ADOPTED BY DR OWEN HE ADDED. THE DEEP SHOCK ON THE RIGHT OF THE PARTY AT WHAT APPEARS TO HAVE TAKEN PLACE IN LUSAKA HAS NOT YET HAD TIME TO COALESCE. BUT MRS THATCHER MUST EXPECT TO HAVE A ROUGH TIME AT THE PARTY CONFERENCE AT BLACKPOOL IN OCTOBER.

THE DEPTH OF FEELING AND THE PARTY'S CLOSE LINKS WITH WHITE SETTLERS MEAN THAT THE TORIES WILL STRONGLY RESIST ANY SETTLEMENT ACCEPTABLE TO THE PRESENT RHODESIAN LEADERSHIP.

MRS THATCHER IS CLEARLY AWARE OF THE DANGERS OF A BACKLASH. SHE HAD ALREADY ACKNOWLEDGED PUBLICLY THAT IT WAS IMPOSSIBLE FOR HER GOVERNMENT TO RENEW THE SANCTIONS ORDER AGAINST RHODESIA WHICH LAPSES IN NOVEMBER.

BUT THE RIGHT WING'S SATISFACTION WITH THIS STATEMENT, MADE AT AN IMPROMPTU PRESS CONFERENCE IN AUSTRALIA AFTER THE TOKYO SUMMIT LAST MONTH, NOW LOOKS PREMATURE.

WITH HER OPTIONS CLOSING, THE PRIME MINISTER LOOKS AS IF SHE HAS DECIDED TO MAKE AN IMPORTANT SHIFT IN HER POSITION. DURING THE ELECTION, SHE WAS RESTRAINED WITH SOME DIFFICULTY BY HER COLLEAGUES FROM PROMISING IMMEDIATE RECOGNITION OF THE NEW RHODESIAN GOVERNMENT.
UNQUOTE.

CARRINGTON

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DE KBY 051700Z MIRIMBA AND PRETORIA

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELN 0 840 OF 5 AUG 79

AND TO IMMEDIATE MIRIMBAS SALISBURY PRETORIA

WASHINGTON UKMIS NEW YORK PARIS BONN COPENHAGEN THE HAGUE

BRUSSELS LUXEMBOURG ROME DUBLIN UKREP BRUSSELS DAR ES SALAAM

MAPUTO GABORONE LAGOS AND LUANDA

M I PT

FOLLOWING IS TEXT:

BEGINS

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HEADS OF GOVERNMENT HAD A FRANK DISCUSSION ON THE CURRENT PROBLEMS OF SOUTHERN AFRICA AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS FOR THE COMMONWEALTH AND THE WIDER INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY. WHILE RECOGNISING THAT CERTAIN DEVELOPMENTS SINCE THEIR MEETING IN LONDON HAVE ADDED NEW DIMENSIONS, THEY REMAINED CONCERNED BY THE POTENTIAL DANGERS INHERENT IN THE EXISTING SITUATION. THEY THEREFORE STRESSED THE URGENT NEED FOR FINDING SATISFACTORY SOLUTIONS TO THE REMAINING PROBLEMS OF THIS REGION.

IN RELATION TO THE SITUATION IN RHODESIA, HEADS OF GOVERNMENT THEREFORE:

A. CONFIRMED THAT THEY WERE WHOLLY COMMITTED TO GENUINE BLACK MAJORITY RULE FOR THE PEOPLE OF ZIMBABWE SEMI CLN

B. RECOGNISED, IN THIS CONTEXT, THAT THE INTERNAL SETTLEMENT CONSTITUTION IS DEFECTIVE IN CERTAIN IMPORTANT RESPECTS SEMI CLN

C. FULLY ACCEPTED THAT IT IS THE CONSTITUTIONAL RESPONSIBILITY OF THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT TO GRANT LEGAL INDEPENDENCE TO ZIMBABWE ON THE BASIS OF MAJORITY RULE SEMI CLN

D. RECOGNISED THAT THE SEARCH FOR A LASTING SETTLEMENT MUST INVOLVE ALL PARTIES TO THE CONFLICT SEMI CLN

E. WERE DEEPLY CONSCIOUS OF THE URGENT NEED TO ACHIEVE SUCH A SETTLEMENT AND BRING PEACE TO THE PEOPLE OF ZIMBABWE AND THEIR NEIGHBOURS SEMI CLN

F. ACCEPTED THAT INDEPENDENCE ON THE BASIS OF MAJORITY RULE REQUIRES THE ADOPTION OF A DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION INCLUDING APPROPRIATE SAFEGUARDS FOR MINORITIES SEMI CLN

G. ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THE GOVERNMENT FORMED UNDER SUCH AN INDEPENDENCE CONSTITUTION MUST BE CHOSEN THROUGH FREE AND FAIR ELECTIONS, PROPERLY SUPERVISED UNDER BRITISH GOVERNMENT AUTHORITY, AND WITH COMMONWEALTH OBSERVERS SEMI CLN

H. WELCOMED THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT'S INDICATION THAT AN APPROPRIATE PROCEDURE FOR ADVANCING TOWARDS THESE OBJECTIVES WOULD BE FOR THEM TO CALL A CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE TO WHICH ALL THE PARTIES WOULD BE INVITED SEMI CLN AND

I. CONSEQUENTLY, ACCEPTED THAT IT MUST BE A MAJOR OBJECTIVE TO BRING ABOUT A CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES AND AN END TO SANCTIONS AS PART OF THE PROCESS OF IMPLEMENTATION OF A LASTING SETTLEMENT

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TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELNO 839 OF 5 AUGUST
INFO IMMEDIATE TO MIRIMBA SALISBURY PRETORIA WASHINGTON
UKMIS NEW YORK PARIS BONN COPENHGAEN THE HAGUE BRUSSELS
LUXEMBOURG ROME DUBLIN UKREP BRUSSELS DAR ES SALAAM MAPUTO
GABORONE LAGOS AND LUANDA

Enter na

MY TELNO 929 (NOT TO ALL) CHGM - RHODESIA
FROM DUFF

*GJM
48*

1. DURING WEEKEND SMALL GROUP (KAUNDA, NYERERE, MANLEY, FRASER ADEFOPE, RAMPHAL) HAVE HAD TWO MEETINGS WITH THE PRIME MINISTER AND THE SECRETARY OF STATE. THEY HAVE NOW AGREED ON DRAFT PASSAGE FOR COMMUNIQUE CONTAINED IN MY MIFT. THIS IS BEING DISTRIBUTED TO OTHER HEADS OF GOVERNMENT LATER THIS EVENING. INTENTION IS THAT, AT BEGINNING OF TOMORROW MORNING'S MEETING, CHAIRMAN (KAUNDA) WILL INVITE HEADS OF GOVERNMENT TO AGREE:

- A. THAT THIS TEXT SHOULD BE INCLUDED IN FINAL COMMUNIQUE.
- B. THAT SOUTHERN AFRICA DEBATE SHOULD BE CLOSED (AND MEETING WOULD THEN RETURN AT ONCE TO WORLD ECONOMIC SITUATION).

2. IF AGREEMENT IS FORTHCOMING, TEXT WILL BE RELEASED TO THE PRESS DURING THE MORNING.

3. ADEFOP'S AGREEMENT TO THE TEXT WAS RELUCTANT. IT IS THEREFORE POSSIBLE THAT, ON INSTRUCTIONS FROM LAGOS, HE WILL RENEGE TOMORROW MORNING. IT IS ALSO POSSIBLE THAT SOME OTHER HEADS OF GOVERNMENT, MIFFED AT BEING EXCLUDED FROM THE SMALL GROUP, WILL RAISE DIFFICULTIES. WE WILL INFORM YOU BY FLASH TELEGRAM OF THE OUTCOME. MEANWHILE (SINCE WE ARE ALREADY BEING ACCUSED OF LEAKING TOO MUCH TO THE PRESS) IT IS VERY IMPORTANT THAT THIS TEXT SHOULD NO LEAK FROM A BRITISH SOURCE.

4. EUROPEAN POSTS SHOULD INFORM GOVERNMENTS ON 6 AUG AFTER (AFTER) RECEIPT OF CONFIRMATORY TELEGRAM FROM US THAT TEXT IS AGREED AND UKREP BRUSSELS SHOULD SIMILARLY INFORM MR JENKINS. PRIME MINISTER IS SENDING PERSONAL MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT CARTER. FCO SHOULD INFORM HOME SECRETARY AS SOON AS POSSIBLE THIS EVENING, AND SHOULD ALSO INFORM SIR P MOORE FOR THE QUEEN.

4. FOR MIRIMBA

(A) WE WILL OFCOURSE SEND YOU FLASH TELEGRAM TOMORROW WHEN TEXT IS AGREED, BUT IF YOU ARE ALREADY SEEING MUZOREWA BEFORE THEN YOU SHOULD BEGIN TO PREPARE THE GROUND WITH HIM EVEN BEFORE TEXT IS MADE PUBLIC. YOU COULD EXPRESS PRIME MINISTER'S APPRECIATION OF THE STEADY AND STATESMANLIKE LANGUAGE HE USED AT HIS RALLY YESTERDAY.

(B) POINTS TO STRESS ARE I THINK OBVIOUS BUT YOU SHOULD KNOW THAT DRAFTING OF (G) GAVE CONSIDERABLE DIFFICULTY. AS IT HAS FINALLY COME OUT IT CLEARLY DOES NOT COMMIT US TO ADMINISTERING THE ELCTIONS, BUT ONLY TO ARRANGE WHATEVER DEGREE OF SUPERVISION WE MAY AT THAT TIME THINK NECESSARY IN ORDER TO ENABLE US TO DEMONSTRATE TO THE WORLD THAT THEY ARE FREE AND FAIR. PROVISION FOR COMMONWEALTH OBSERVERS SHOULD GIVE NO TROUBLE SINCE, AS IN APRIL, ANY RHODESIAN GOVERNMENT WOULD WELCOME AS MANY INTERNATIONAL OBSERVERS AS POSSIBLE.

(C) CAUTIOUS WORDING OF (H) WAS MADE NECESSARY BY PRIME MINISTERS NEED TO CONSULT HER COLLEAGUES BEFORE TAKING DEFINITE

(C) CAUTIOUS WORDING OF (H) WAS MADE NECESSARY BY PRIME MINISTERS
NEED TO CONSULT HER COLLEAGUES BEFORE TAKING DEFINITE
DECISION TO CALL A CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE.

6. FOR PRETORIA.

PRIME MINISTER IS PARTICULARLY CONCERNED THAT YOU SHOULD
DO WAHTEVER YOU CAN TO PREVENT SOUTH AFRICANS FROM CRITICISING
THIS AGREEMENT AND FROM ATTEMPTING TO SET THE RHODESIANS
AGAINST IT (OF CERTAIN RECENT REPORTS) . THE AGREEMENT
IS SATISFACTORY -INDEED, BETTER THAN WE MIGHT HAVE HOPED SEMI
CLN AND IT IN NOW WAY INHIBITS US FROM PURSUING THE COURSE
ON WHICH THE GOVT EMBARKED BEFORE THE CHGM. IF THE FULL
MEETING TOMORROW MORNING ENDORSES THE DRAFT WE SHALL HAVE
ACHIEVED WHAT WE SET OUT TO DO.

7. FCO PLEASE INFORM OTHER COMMONWEALTH AND FOREIGN
POSTS CONCERNED TOMORROW MORNING ON RECEIPT OF CONFIRMATORY
TELEGRAM.

ALL INSON

RECEIVED
BY A. J. J. J. J.
100 P. M. 1966

CONFIDENTIAL
DESKBY 041700Z
FM LIMBA SALISBURY 041315Z AUG 79
TO IMMEDIATE LUSAKA
TELNO 17 OF 4 AUGUST
INFO IMMEDIATE FCO

FOR DUFF

YOUR TELNO 7: RHODESIA

1. I LUNCHEDED TODAY WITH KAMUSIKIRI. WE REVIEWED DEVELOPMENTS AT CHOGM.

2. KAMUSIKIRI VOLUNTEERED THAT MUZOREWA WAS ENCOURAGED BY THE PRIME MINISTER'S STATEMENT OF 3 AUGUST. THE FULL TEXT OF WHICH WAS GIVEN TO HIM YESTERDAY AFTERNOON. THIS WAS FURTHER CONFIRMATION THAT HMG WERE ADHERING TO THE POLICY THAT HAD BEEN OUTLINED TO HIM IN LONDON. HE WOULD NOT BE PROVOKED INTO CRITICAL COMMENT. I ASSURED KAMUSIKIRI THAT THERE HAD BEEN NO CHANGE IN OUR POLICY, AND THAT WE INTENDED TO KEEP CLEARLY IN TOUCH WITH THE BISHOP AS THE SITUATION DEVELOPED. I DREW ATTENTION TO SOME OF THE MORE SENSATIONAL PRESS REPORTING AND ADVISED HIM TO DISCOUNT THIS. HMG'S POLICY WAS AS STATED BY MRS THATCHER.

3. KAMUSIKIRI SAID THAT MUZOREWA WAS NEVERTHELESS UNDER CONSTANT PRESSURE FROM THOSE WHO REMAINED SUSPICIOUS OF HMG AND WHO ADVOCATED PUBLIC REBUTTALS OF EACH AND EVERY STATEMENT. THE BISHOP WOULD, HOWEVER, STAND FIRM AGAINST THIS PRESSURE. HE HAD NO CAUSE TO QUESTION OUR SINCERITY.

4. AS REGARDS RECENT SOUTH AFRICAN BEHAVIOUR, KAMUSIKIRI THOUGHT THAT SOME OF THIS MIGHT BE ATTRIBUTED TO SOME WHITES HERE WHO DID NOT FEEL ABLE TO CRITICISE (OR PROMPT) THE BISHOP DIRECTLY AND WERE THEREFORE GETTING AT HIM THROUGH SOUTH AFRICA.

5. KAMUSIKIRI SAID THAT THERE WAS SOME MYSTIFICATION AT THE CONCILIATORY NATURE OF NYERERE'S SPEECH. WAS THIS GENUINE, OR WAS HE ONLY TRYING TO BUY TIME FOR THE PATRIOTIC FRONT TO IMPROVE THEIR MILITARY POSITION? I SAID THAT IT WAS PROBABLY TOO SOON TO DRAW FIRM CONCLUSIONS. WHATEVER THE MOTIVE, IT WAS TO RHODESIA'S ADVANTAGE THAT THE PRESENT MOOD IN LUSAKA WAS TOWARDS CONCILIATION RATHER THAN CONFRONTATION. WE SHOULD ENCOURAGE THIS AND NOT FRUSTRATE IT.

6. KAMUSIKIRI RAISED THE QUESTION OF ELECTIONS. THE PROSPECT OF THIS CLEARLY DOES NOT PLEASE THE BISHOP. I EXPLAINED THAT THIS REMAINED AN OPEN QUESTION, THOUGH IT COULD NOT BE EXCLUDED. IF WE ARE TO MAKE ANY STATEMENT ON ELECTIONS AT LUSAKA IT WOULD BE DESIRABLE TO GIVE THE BISHOP SOME WARNING.

7. KAMUSIKIRI WAS GOING ON DIRECT TO THE BISHOP, AND WOULD PASS ON THE ASSURANCES THAT I HAD GIVEN.

8. SO FAR, SO GOOD. THE BISHOP'S NERVE IS HOLDING. THERE IS NO INDICATION AT ALL OF HIS PARTING COMPANY WITH US.

DAY

NNNN

SENT AT 1354Z/04 HH

Prime Minister
See 4 of 17
Gen
4/8

LUSFO 003/04

OO FCO

GRS 500
UNCLASSIFIED
FM LUSAKA 041120Z AUG 79
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 833 OF 4 AUGUST

FCO PLEASE PASS TO NO 10 DUTY PRESS OFFICER (ANSON) AND TO
FCO RESIDENT CLERK

FOLLOWING FOR NEWS DEPARTMENT FROM FENN

MIPT: CHGM: PRESS: COMPARATIVE STATEMENTS ON RHODESIA.

COMPARISON OF TEXTS BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER'S SPEECH IN THE
HOUSE OF COMMONS ON 25 JULY AND HER STATEMENT AT CHOGM IN THE
DEBATE ON FRIDAY 4 AUGUST:

HOUSE OF COMMONS

CHOGM

1. "AT THIS POINT, I SHOULD
LIKE TO MAKE CLEAR THAT WE ARE
WHOLLY COMMITTED TO GENUINE
BLACK MAJORITY RULE IN
RHODESIA."

1. "THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT ARE
WHOLLY COMMITTED TO GENUINE BLACK
MAJORITY RULE IN RHODESIA."

2. "WE ARE CONSCIOUS OF
BRITAIN'S RESPONSIBILITIES
TOWARDS RHODESIA A FIRM
VIEW ON THE PART OF ALL THE
LEADERS TO WHOM (LORD HARLECH)
SPOKE WAS THAT A SOLUTION TO
THE RHODESIAN PROBLEM MUST STEM
FROM THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT AS
THE LEGALLY RESPONSIBLE
AUTHORITY."

2. "WE ACCEPT THAT IT IS OUR
CONSTITUTIONAL RESPONSIBILITY TO
GRANT LEGAL INDEPENDENCE ON THAT
BASIS AND THAT ONLY BRITAIN CAN
DO IT."

3. "WE SHALL AIM TO MAKE THE
PROPOSALS COMPARABLE TO THE
BASIS ON WHICH WE GRANTED
INDEPENDENCE TO OTHER FORMER
BRITISH TERRITORIES IN AFRICA
..... SECONDLY, (IT) (OUR
PROPOSALS) WILL BE SIMILAR TO
THE BASIS UPON WHICH INDEPEND-
ENCE HAS BEEN GRANTED TO OTHER
AFRICAN STATES."

3. "WE ACCEPT THAT OUR OBJECTIVE
MUST BE TO ESTABLISH THAT INDEPEND-
ENCE ON THE BASIS OF A CONSTITUTIO
COMPARABLE WITH THE CONSTITUTIONS
WE HAVE AGREED WITH OTHER
COUNTRIES."

Enter r r

*off
4/8*

4. "TERRIBLE WAR STILL RAGES IN RHODESIA IT IS IMPERATIVE THAT WE SEEK A SOLUTION THAT CONTRIBUTES TO A BETTER AND MORE SECURE FUTURE FOR THE PEOPLE OF RHODESIA AND OF THE NEIGHBOURING COUNTRIES (OUR PROPOSALS) WILL BE ADDRESSED TO ALL THE PARTIES TO THE CONFLICT."

5. "OUR CONCERN IS TO FIND A SOLUTION WHICH, WHILE ACCEPTABLE TO OTHER GOVERNMENTS, WILL ENABLE THE WHITE COMMUNITY TO PLAY A FULL PART IN THE FUTURE OF THE COUNTRY. (LORD CARRINGTON IN THE HOUSE OF LORDS ON 10 JULY): "IT IS THE GOVERNMENT'S INTENTION, WHEN OUR CONSULTATIONS HAVE BEEN COMPLETED, TO MAKE FIRM PROPOSALS OF OUR OWN, STEMMING FROM THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT AS THE CONSTITUTIONALLY RESPONSIBLE AUTHORITY, TO BRING RHODESIA TO LEGAL INDEPENDENCE ON A BASIS WHICH WE BELIEVE SHOULD BE ACCEPTABLE TO THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY."

6. "WE SHALL AIM TO MAKE THE PROPOSALS COMPARABLE TO THE BASIS ON WHICH WE GRANTED INDEPENDENCE TO OTHER FORMER BRITISH TERRITORIES IN AFRICA THERE HAS BEEN CRITICISM

OF THE BLOCKING POWER OF THE

WHITE MINORITY, AND THE

CHARACTER AND POWERS OF THE

PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSIONS.

OUR CONCERN IS TO FIND A SOLUTION WHICH, WHILE ACCEPTABLE TO OTHER GOVERNMENTS, WILL ENABLE THE WHITE COMMUNITY TO PLAY A FULL PART IN THE FUTURE OF THE COUNTRY.

ALLINSON

NNNN

4. "WE ARE DEEPLY CONSCIOUS OF THE URGENT NEED TO BRING PEACE TO THE PEOPLE OF RHODESIA AND HER NEIGHBOURS: WE WILL THEREFORE PRESENT OUR PROPOSALS AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE TO ALL THE PARTIES AND AT THE SAME TIME CALL ON THEM TO CEASE HOSTILITIES AND MOVE FORWARD WITH US ON A SETTLEMENT".

5. OUR AIM IS, AS I STATED IT DURING OUR OPENING SESSION, TO BRING RHODESIA TO LEGAL INDEPENDENCE ON THE BASIS WHICH THE COMMONWEALTH AND THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY AS A WHOLE WILL FIND ACCEPTABLE."

6. "I REFER OF COURSE TO THE PROVISIONS WHICH MAKE IT POSSIBLE FOR THE WHITE MINORITY TO BLOCK IN THE PARLIAMENT CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGES THAT WOULD BE UNWELCOME TO THEM. THIS IS A VALID CRITICISM -

SUCH A BLOCKING MECHANISM HAS NOT

APPEARED IN ANY OTHER INDEPENDENCE

CONSTITUTION AGREED BY THE BRITISH
PARLIAMENT

NOTE OF A MEETING BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER AND THE PRIME MINISTER OF AUSTRALIA HELD IN HORIZON HOUSE, LUSAKA, AT 1045 ON SATURDAY 4 AUGUST 1979

Present

The Prime Minister

Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary

Mr. C.A. Whitmore

The Rt. Hon. Malcolm Fraser

The Hon. Andrew Peacock

Mr. A.D. Campbell

The Prime Minister said that there was likely to be pressure put on her at the meeting of the Commonwealth Heads of Government later that morning to go into more details about British plans for Rhodesia than she had done in her statement to the Lusaka Conference the previous day. To do so would make the task for the British Government at home much more difficult, for it would appear to the public that we had given in to African coercion. None the less, the fact was that the British Government had to move much much faster than was generally realised. It was essential that something had been achieved by the time of the Conservative Party Conference which would be held in early October. We had already done some work on the Rhodesian constitution, and we expected to have contacts with all the parties by the beginning of September. This was an indication of how rapidly we now had to move. She was, however, concerned that the Patriotic Front might step up its military action during the next few weeks in order to bring pressure to bear on the British Government.

The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary said that British public opinion was one problem. A second was to avoid arousing suspicions in Salisbury about the British Government's plans to a point where there was a refusal to contemplate the amendment of the constitution. So far, Bishop Muzorewa had managed to hold the line but the mistrust of the whites for what we were doing could easily be aroused.

Mr. Fraser said that when he and President Nyerere had met earlier that day, the President had said that he saw no problem about Bishop Muzorewa participating in the new elections which would be required following agreement on in the new constitution as the Prime Minister of Rhodesia. President Nyerere appeared anxious to marshal as many

/arguments

arguments as possible to persuade the Patriotic Front to participate in the process of trying to reach agreement upon a new constitution. At the same time he seemed to want to be able to maximise the isolation of the Patriotic Front if they refused to take part in the talks. President Nyerere was focussing on what would happen during the period between agreement upon the constitution and the holding of fresh elections and he seemed to visualise some form of transitional government. His main concern was that there should clearly be a manifestation of British authority during this transitional period, although he did not seem to rule out the possibility that this would have to be done using the fabric of the existing administration in Rhodesia.

The Prime Minister agreed that the Patriotic Front would be wrong-footed if they were invited to attend talks on the constitution and they refused to attend. As regards transitional arrangements, there was bound to be a gap between reaching agreement on the constitution and holding elections. We would have to discuss with the parties participating in the talks what arrangements should be made for the interim period. It was not for Britain to dictate now what should be done: it had to be remembered that Rhodesia had been self-governing since 1923.

The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary said that it was important that we did not get drawn into discussion about transitional arrangements now. If this happened, it would give those we wanted to participate in the talks on the constitution an excuse for not attending. We had to give complete priority now to trying to reach agreement upon the constitution. Once that had been achieved, it should not be so difficult to decide upon transitional arrangements. Indeed, if the area of discussion at the constitutional conference was to be extended now to include transitional arrangements, there might be a suspicion that Britain did not want to reach agreement.

Mr. Fraser said that he did not believe that President Nyerere would want to go into the details of the transitional arrangements. His only concern was likely to be that all should agree that it would be necessary for British authority, in some form, to be exercised during the interim period.

/The Prime Minister

The Prime Minister said that there was a very real risk that if attempts were made to pin us down on the transitional arrangements, the constitutional conference would fail and the opportunity to solve the Rhodesia problem would then be lost. The only winners would, in the long run, be the Soviet Union. One of the British Government's difficulties was that even now, despite her speech the previous day, some countries - and in particular Nigeria - believed that Britain was pursuing the course which had been advocated by Mr. Julian Amery. His argument was that Rhodesia had become illegal because the six principles had not been satisfied. But he maintained that all the principles had now been fulfilled, including the fifth. Lord Boyd and Lord Home had also taken the view that, as a result of the April elections, the fifth principle had been met. Mr. Amery argued that both morally and in fact the basis of illegality had disappeared and the necessary legal steps should now be taken to restore legality and to recognise Bishop Muzorewa's government. Given that the April elections had been based on one man, one vote, and had had a 65 per cent turn-out, there was undoubtedly considerable substance in the view that the fifth principle had been fulfilled and that to restore legality would be the honourable course to take. But the British Government had deliberately not made a judgement about whether the fifth principle had been satisfied because to take the view that it had been fulfilled on the basis of the April elections would not be enough to carry other countries with us, and for this reason the British Government was seeking another way forward. This required us to make constitutional proposals which dealt with the two problems of the blocking mechanism and the Public Service Commissions in the present Rhodesian constitution. There was in fact nothing in that constitution which prevented the Rhodesians from removing its defects. The votes of only six white members of the Rhodesian Parliament were needed to allow Bishop Muzorewa to make the necessary amendments, and it should not be difficult for him to gain such support.

The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary said that a new factor in the situation was that the Front Line Presidents now recognised that they had got too far out on a limb in their support for the Patriotic Front and they were now trying to distance themselves from Mr. Nkomo and Mr. Mugabe.

/Mr. Fraser

Mr. Fraser said that the Front Line Presidents had political problems of their own and it would be difficult for them to distance themselves from the Patriotic Front. They would need sound and convincing arguments which they could use to justify this course.

The Prime Minister said that Britain's critics were taking an internally inconsistent line. They said that the United Kingdom should give Rhodesia a new constitution. But at the same time they were trying to fetter the United Kingdom in the exercise of its responsibility by, for example, raising the question of the transitional arrangements. There was no need for them to attempt to establish Britain's responsibility by going into the transitional arrangements now. The responsibility was already ours, and they could not fetter it. But what they could do was to abort our exercise of it.

Mr. Fraser said that he agreed that the right approach was to concentrate on reaching agreement on the constitution and only thereafter to work out the transitional arrangements with all the parties. All President Nyerere was seeking to do was to establish that technically Britain was the constitutional authority in Rhodesia in the interim period between reaching agreement on the constitution and holding the elections. President Nyerere was also likely to want a reference to free and fair elections in the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting communique. There was also something to be said for mentioning sanctions and recognition in the communique: it might, for example, be desirable to say that at a certain point sanctions would be lifted and recognition given.

The Prime Minister said that if we had too much in the communique, we might well defeat the cause which we were desperate to see succeed. The communique should not describe future elections as free and fair, since many people already felt that the April elections deserved that description. Moreover, she could not agree with Mr. Fraser's proposal that the communique should contain a reference to sanctions and recognition in the terms he had suggested. To include a reference on those lines would enable the Patriotic Front to see that we never reached the point at which sanctions could be lifted and recognition given. We did not want a communique that would embarrass us in the negotiations on the constitution. Ideally, the communique should say only that efforts would be made to reach agreement on the constitution.

JWS.

PATRIOTIC FRONT

MEMORANDUM TO THE COMMONWEALTH

SUMMIT CONFERENCE AUGUST 1 - 8, 1979.

N.A.
JW

Your Excellencies,

We would like to thank the President, Government and people of Zambia for having braved the idea of drawing Commonwealth members to this theatre of war so that they hear and feel for themselves the agonies inflicted on freedom seeking peoples by cunning and brutal racists. We believe that since the Commonwealth comprises, largely, countries that have known the value of freedom because they sweated for it through sacrifice, it should play a decisively positive role in the interest of the yet oppressed. This explains why we are addressing you, Your Excellencies, on our issue, the liberation of our mother country, Zimbabwe.

We consider the meeting of Commonwealth Heads of State and Government, at this historical juncture in Southern Africa, an extremely important international event. We believe the plight of the oppressed millions in Southern Africa, in particular the raging war of national liberation in Zimbabwe cannot escape the attention of this conference. Ruins caused by the racist aggressions on neighbouring territories are not far to demonstrate from the conference site and the atmosphere of war pervades the whole region.

The Rhodesian racists and their external supporters faced with imminent and inevitable defeat, are resorting to some desperate tactics in order to avert their downfall. They have installed a puppet regime and increased their genocide of the African population and escalated their aggressions on neighbouring countries and the refugee camps. These horrid and inhuman acts are too well known to warrant any comment. This means the armed confrontation between the forces of national liberation on the one hand and those of racism, fascism, greed and darkness on the other has reached a stage of a choice between life and death, obviously a stage of no compromise.

cont...../2

The African continent through the O.A.U. and the entire world community through its supreme organ the United Nations - at the General Assembly and Security Councils levels - have made their choice. They have chosen the side of freedom, justice, truth and genuine democracy for an independent Zimbabwe. In short they have supported the Patriotic Front in its struggle for the elimination of racism, fascism and oppression. They have rejected the so-called internal settlement which is the continuation of the same minority racist regime only camouflaged by the black face of the traitor Bishop Muzorewa. They have recognized the legitimacy of the Patriotic Front's struggle for national liberation and given it diplomatic and material support.

It goes without saying that members of the Commonwealth are members of these international bodies as well, in their different stations. They are thus part and parcel of these valuable contributions to the liberation of Zimbabwe. It is, however, the turn of the Commonwealth entity, at this particular juncture, in its own right as an international body, to declare its open and unequivocal position on the side of uncompromised freedom and justice. It is our hope that no Commonwealth country will defy Security Council resolution 448 (1979) April, and O.A.U. resolution 719 of Monrovia 1979, which not only rejected the fraudulent Rhodesian elections but also any results that flowed from the racist constitution based on the March 3 so-called internal settlement of 1978.

On the Rhodesian question the British Government, consistent with its colonialist tradition, has, of course, marched out of step with the majority members of United Nations but more in step with the South African racist regime. So has a considerable section of the United States Senate. These are forces that are determined to reverse the forward march of history back to the dark ages of imperialism, racism and exploitation. These forces speak of "new developments in Zimbabwe", of "the need to include the Patriotic Front after some modifications of the racist Rhodesian constitution", of "appointing more Africans in the Rhodesian army, police and the entrenched commissions",

cont...../3

of "lifting sanctions to enable Bishop Muzorewa to deliver the goods", of "a dialogue between Muzorewa and the Patriotic Front", of "protecting minority (racist) interests".

We cannot but read mischievous arrogance in someone who acknowledges that the treacherous and racist Rhodesian constitution is undemocratic and then proceeds to insist that its undemocratic result should be accepted as a basis for solving the Rhodesian problem. How does a venomous snake produce a non-venomous one?

Any approach based on fitting, including or creating room for the accommodation or participation of the Patriotic Front within the framework of the so-called internal settlement or its constitution, whether modified or not, is a non-starter and totally unacceptable to the Patriotic Front. No one is in any doubt, including the advocates of the mischievous ideas of "fitting the Patriotic Front" in an undemocratic and racist framework, as to what genuine freedom and independence is. It is clear that the architects of the Rhodesian Constitution did not aim at generating a democratic process. On the contrary the authors simply reformulated the old ideas of racism and exploitation in camouflaged terms. They were lucky for their act of deceit to find black collaborators, like Bishop Muzorewa, who have dedicated themselves to the cause of unequalled betrayal of their people and have sold their souls to the devil. Hence their trotting around the world, addressing themselves to the money issue to lift sanctions and enrich themselves and not to the demand for the people of Zimbabwe to exercise absolute sovereignty in a genuinely independent and truly democratic Zimbabwe.

The war of national liberation being waged by the Patriotic Front is to achieve genuine independence for Zimbabwe with absolute sovereignty restored to its people in a totally democratised system. It is our determination to defend that achievement but the exercise of that sovereignty shall be the democratic right of a free people.

cont...../4

The instruments of power, the army, the police, the civil administration, the judiciary and control of the economy must be those born out of this independence and ready to defend it. All structures that have resisted the freedom of the people must be dismantled because they cannot loyally serve what they chose to frustrate.

The solution of the Rhodesian problem must reflect fully these objectives to the unqualified satisfaction of the struggling people of Zimbabwe under the leadership of the Patriotic Front.

The Patriotic Front has always clearly understood that the principle of negotiation to bring about a correct and acceptable settlement could not be excluded in any conflict. It must be understood, as well, that the conflict in Zimbabwe has escalated to a war and as such the solution to it must be approached concretely and seriously and not through playing around with constitutional tricks and niceties. There are two parties to the resolution of the raging conflict - the struggling people of Zimbabwe under the leadership of the Patriotic Front on the one hand and the British Government on the other, as the colonial authority, with the Rhodesian minority regime as its extension whatever shades of differences it has with it or colour it wears.

We have heard the unclear statement of "bringing Rhodesia to legality". That is a British parliamentary problem. It should not be assumed to mean bringing about the just independence of the people of Zimbabwe. The legality we know is that of eliminating the illegitimate existence of the minority Rhodesian regime with its British colonial roots and of conforming to international demands already made by the United Nations on the question of Zimbabwe's independence.

Your Excellencies,

The need for a Commonwealth firm stand on the Zimbabwe question is made even more imperative by racist South Africa's involvement. The racist regime of South Africa has guaranteed to thwart genuine independence in Zimbabwe through a military pact with the puppet, Bishop Muzorewa.

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Racist South Africa is known to be the door into Rhodesia for all international subversive forces to the liberation of Zimbabwe. Racist South Africa is known to be the mentor and material supplier to General Walls (Rhodesia) for all the aggressions into and subversions of the Governments of independent states of Angola, Zambia, Botswana and Mozambique. The role of racist South Africa is not only to frustrate the liberation struggles of Southern Africa but to draw a wider international war into the region in the hope of weakening the entire independent Africa into neo-colonial regimes.

The Patriotic Front for its part is determined to pursue the fight relentlessly to ensure that Zimbabwe is so truly independent that it will never become South Africa's breeding ground for subversion to independent Africa.

Your Excellencies,

We do not take lightly, though with no surprise, the expressed intention of the British Government in collusion with some reactionary elements in the United States Congress and racist South Africa to violate the United Nations imposed sanctions against the Rhodesian minority and illegal regime. The imposition of sanctions was a political act by the international community to quarantine and isolate the Rhodesian regime. Violation of the sanctions by lifting them outside the authority of the United Nations is a political act of according recognition to the Rhodesian regime. We are not surprised at the intentions of the British Government to that end because the people who feel the pinch of sanctions is the transnational corporations based in the United Kingdom and the United States and their racist agents in Rhodesia.

We therefore call upon the Commonwealth Conference to:-


- (a) come out categorically and unequivocally in total rejection of the so-called internal settlement of March 3, 1978, the racist constitution based on


cont...../6

that settlement and the fraudulent elections that were conducted under it in April, 1979.

- (b) declare firm support for all United Nations General Assembly and Security Council Resolutions on Zimbabwe.
- (c) declare that there can be no unilateral lifting of sanctions by any member of the Commonwealth in violation of the United Nations resolutions.
- (d) condemn the aggressions by the racist regimes of Rhodesia and South Africa on the Frontline States and on refugee camps of Zimbabweans.
- (e) condemn the recruitment of mercenaries for Rhodesia and to call upon the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia and New Zealand to take concrete measures to prevent recruitment of their nationals as mercenaries and punish those that have served the evil cause of racism.
- (f) support the Patriotic Front in its just struggle for a truly democratic and independent Zimbabwe.

Presented by


Joseph Msika
PF (ZAPU)


Edgar Tekere
PF (ZANU)

SECRETARY GENERALS

3rd August, 1979.
LUSAKA.
ZAMBIA.



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

3 August 1979

Dear Mr Cartledge

Rhodesia

It may conceivably be of use to you to have the attached comparison of what the Prime Minister said today and what she said in the House of Commons on 25 July. The note was prepared for Lord Carrington to deal with press allegations that what the Prime Minister said this morning was radically different to anything she had said before.

Yours
ever
B Pitts

PP (J S Wall)
Private Secretary

Bryan G Cartledge Esq
10 Downing Street
LONDON

COMPARISON OF TEXTS BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER'S SPEECH IN THE HOUSE OF
ON 25 JULY AND HER STATEMENT AT CHOGM IN THE DEBATE ON FRIDAY 4 AUGUST

CHOGM

1. "The British Government are wholly committed to genuine black majority rule in Rhodesia."

2. "We accept that it is our constitutional responsibility to grant legal independence on that basis and that only Britain can do it."

3. "We accept that our objective must be to establish that independence on the basis of a constitution comparable with the constitutions we have agreed with other countries."

4. "We are deeply conscious of the urgent need to bring peace to the people of Rhodesia and her neighbours: we will therefore present our proposals as quickly as possible to all the parties and at the same time call on them to cease hostilities and move forward with us on a settlement."

HOUSE OF COMMONS

1. "At this point, I should like to make clear that we are wholly committed to genuine black majority rule in Rhodesia."

2. "We are conscious of Britain's responsibilities towards Rhodesia a firm view on the part of all the leaders to whom [Lord Harlech] spoke was that a solution to the Rhodesian problem must stem from the British Government as the legally responsible authority."

3. "We shall aim to make the proposals comparable to the basis on which we granted independence to other former British territories in Africa Secondly, [it] [our proposals] will be similar to the basis upon which independence has been granted to other African states."

4. "Terrible war still rages in Rhodesia It is imperative that we seek a solution that contributes to a better and more secure future for the people of Rhodesia and of the neighbouring countries [Our proposals] will be addressed to all the parties to the conflict."

CHGM

5. Our aim is, as I stated it during our opening session, to bring Rhodesia to legal independence on a basis which the Commonwealth and the international community as a whole will find acceptable.

6. "I refer of course to the provisions which make it possible for the white minority to block in the Parliament constitutional changes that would be unwelcome to them. This is a valid criticism - such a blocking mechanism has not appeared in any other independence constitution agreed by the British Parliament. It is clearly wrong that the

House of Commons

5. Our concern is to find a solution which, while acceptable to other governments, will enable the white community to play a full part in the future of the country.

[Lord Carrington in the House of Lords on 10 July]: "It is the government's intention, when our consultations have been completed, to make firm proposals of our own, stemming from the British Government as the constitutionally responsible authority, to bring Rhodesia to legal independence on a basis which we believe should be acceptable to the international community."

6. We shall aim to make the proposals comparable to the basis on which we granted independence to other former British territories in Africa. There has been criticism of the blocking power of the white minority, and the character and powers of the public service commissions. Our concern is to find a solution which, while acceptable to other governments, will

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TELEGRAM NUMBER 825 OF 3 AUGUST
AND TO FLASH DAR ES SALAAM, MAPUTO, GABORONE, LUANDA, LAGOS,
MIRIMBA SALISBURY, PRETORIA, NAIROBI,
IMMEDIATE PARIS, BONN, OTTAWA, WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK,
ADDIS ABABA, MONROVIA, CANBERRA, JOHANNESBURG

*Endy na
Blen
4/8*

CHGM: SOUTHERN AFRICA

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF STATEMENT BY THE PRIME MINISTER DURING THE OPENING DEBATE ON SOUTHERN AFRICA THIS MORNING. IT IS BEING RELEASED TO THE PRESS AND YOU MAY USE IT ACCORDINGLY.

2. QUOTE

I IMAGINE THAT IT IS ON THE QUESTION OF RHODESIA THAT MY COLLEAGUES WILL WISH ME TO SPEAK SEMICLON AND I THEREFORE PROPOSE TO CONFINE MY OWN INTERVENTION TO THAT SUBJECT.

THE PROBLEM OF RHODESIA HAS HUNG OVER THE COMMONWEALTH FOR MANY YEARS. THE PRESENT TROUBLE BEGAN IN 1965 WHEN THE THEN RHODESIAN GOVERNMENT MADE THE ILLEGAL DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE. THIS WAS FOLLOWED BY YEARS IN WHICH THE EFFORTS OF SUCCESSIVE BRITISH GOVERNMENTS TO ACHIEVE A SETTLEMENT BASED ON THE WISHES OF A MAJORITY OF THE PEOPLE OF RHODESIA WERE FRUSTRATED, YEARS IN WHICH THE POLITICAL RIGHTS OF THE MAJORITY WERE DENIED. THEN CAME THE WAR WHICH HAS BROUGHT GREAT HARDSHIP AND SUFFERING BOTH INSIDE RHODESIA AND IN NEIGHBOURING COUNTRIES.

WHAT BEGAN AS A STRUGGLE BETWEEN THE WHITE MINORITY AND THE BLACK MAJORITY HAS MORE RECENTLY TAKEN ON A VERY DIFFERENT DIMENSION. THERE IS NOW AN AFRICAN PRESIDENT, AN AFRICAN PRIME MINISTER AND AN AFRICAN MAJORITY IN PARLIAMENT. THERE HAVE BEEN ELECTIONS IN WHICH FOR THE FIRST TIME THE AFRICAN MAJORITY HAVE BEEN ABLE TO ELECT THE LEADERS OF THE GOVERNMENT. THERE ARE THOSE WHO SEEM TO BELIEVE THAT THE WORLD SHOULD SIMPLY GO ON TREATING BISHOP MUZOREWA AS IF HE WERE MR. SMITH. BUT THE CHANGE THAT HAS TAKEN PLACE IN RHODESIA CANNOT BE DISMISSED AS OF NO CONSEQUENCE.

IT IS THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT'S VIEW THAT WE MUST USE THE OPPORTUNITY CREATED BY THE CHANGES WHICH HAVE TAKEN PLACE IN RHODESIA TO SEE IF WE CAN NOW FIND THE SOLUTION WHICH HAS ELUDED US FOR SO LONG, AND TO BRING AN END TO THE WAR. WE OWE IT TO THE PEOPLE OF RHODESIA TO DO ALL WE CAN, ALL OF US, TO HELP ALL OF THEM, TO RESOLVE THEIR POLITICAL DIFFERENCES PEACEFULLY RATHER THAN BY FORCE.

I SIMPLY DO NOT BELIEVE THAT THERE IS ANYTHING NOW DIVIDING THE PEOPLE OF RHODESIA WHICH IS WORTH THE USE OF THE BOMB AND THE GUN TO KILL AND MAIM MEN, WOMEN AND CHILDREN BY THE THOUSAND, OR WHICH CAN JUSTIFY THE MISERY OF THE HUNDREDS OF THOUSANDS IN REFUGEE CAMPS. IN THE CHANGES THAT HAVE NOW TAKEN PLACE WE SURELY HAVE THE BASIS FROM WHICH TO TRY TO DEVELOP A SOLUTION WHICH WILL COMMAND GENERAL INTERNATIONAL ACCEPTANCE.

AS YOU KNOW, ON THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT'S BEHALF, LORD HARLECH SAW THE HEADS OF GOVERNMENT OF SEVEN AFRICAN STATES AND ALSO MR MUGABE AND REPRESENTATIVES OF MR NKOMO. RICHARD LUCE SAW THE GOVERNMENTS OF A FURTHER FIVE AFRICAN COUNTRIES. WE HAVE ALSO BEEN IN TOUCH WITH ALL OUR OTHER COMMONWEALTH FRIENDS AS WELL AS WITH OUR EUROPEAN COMMUNITY PARTNERS AND THE UNITED STATES. THE CONSULTATIONS WE HAVE HAD SO FAR HAVE BEEN OF GREAT VALUE TO THE GOVERNMENT IN HELPING TO IDENTIFY WHAT THE SOLUTION SHOULD BE. I SHOULD LIKE TO TAKE THIS OPPORTUNITY TO THANK PERSONALLY ALL THOSE HEADS OF GOVERNMENT HERE TODAY WHO HAVE HELPED US IN THIS WAY.

FROM OUR CONSULTATIONS CERTAIN COMMON FACTORS EMERGE CLEARLY. THE STRONGEST IS THE VIEW THAT THE CONSTITUTION UNDER WHICH BISHOP MUZOREWA HAS COME TO POWER IS DEFECTIVE IN CERTAIN IMPORTANT RESPECTS. I REFER OF COURSE TO THE PROVISIONS WHICH MAKE IT POSSIBLE FOR THE WHITE MINORITY TO BLOCK, IN THE PARLIAMENT, CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGES THAT WOULD BE UNWELCOME TO THEM. THIS IS A VALID CRITICISM - SUCH A BLOCKING MECHANISM HAS NOT APPEARED IN ANY OTHER INDEPENDENCE CONSTITUTION AGREED TO BY THE BRITISH PARLIAMENT. THE PRINCIPLE THAT THERE SHOULD BE SOME GUARANTEED REPRESENTATION FOR MINORITY COMMUNITIES DURING A CERTAIN MINIMUM PERIOD FOLLOWING THE TRANSFER OF POWER ON INDEPENDENCE IS NOT NEW - AND I THINK WE ALL RECOGNISE THE IMPORTANCE TO RHODESIA OF ENCOURAGING THE EUROPEAN MINORITY TO REMAIN AND TO CONTINUE TO PLAY A USEFUL PART IN THE LIFE OF THE COMMUNITY. BUT THAT IS A VERY DIFFERENT MATTER FROM ENABLING THEM TO BLOCK ALL CHANGE.

THE OTHER MAIN CRITICISM OF THE CONSTITUTION RELATING TO THE COMPOSITION AND POWERS OF THE VARIOUS SERVICE COMMISSIONS IS ALSO VALID. IT IS CLEARLY WRONG THAT THE GOVERNMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE ADEQUATE CONTROL OVER CERTAIN SENIOR APPOINTMENTS.

THOSE CONSULTED ALSO CONSIDERED IT ESSENTIAL THAT THE SEARCH FOR A SOLUTION SHOULD INVOLVE THE PRESENT EXTERNAL PARTIES, SO THAT THEIR SUPPORTERS OUTSIDE THE COUNTRY MIGHT RETURN HOME IN PEACE AND PLAY THEIR FULL PART IN POLITICAL LIFE.

LASTLY, IN CONSIDERING THE CONSULTATIONS WE HAVE HAD SO FAR, I HAVE BEEN IMPRESSED BY THE GENERAL CONVICTION THAT ANY SOLUTION OF THE RHODESIA PROBLEM MUST DERIVE ITS AUTHORITY FROM BRITAIN AS THE RESPONSIBLE COLONIAL POWER.

THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY HAS LOST FEW OPPORTUNITIES TO REMIND US THAT IT IS BRITAIN'S CONSTITUTIONAL RESPONSIBILITY TO BRING RHODESIA TO LEGAL INDEPENDENCE ON A BASIS OF JUSTICE AND DEMOCRACY FULLY COMPARABLE WITH THE ARRANGEMENTS WE HAVE MADE FOR THE INDEPENDENCE OF OTHER COUNTRIES. WE ACCEPT THAT RESPONSIBILITY AND HAVE EVERY INTENTION OF DISCHARGING IT HONOURABLY.

MR CHAIRMAN, AS I MENTIONED EARLIER, THE CONSULTATIONS WE HAVE HAD WITH OUR COMMONWEALTH PARTNERS OVER THE LAST TWO MONTHS, AND INDEED WITH MANY OTHER GOVERNMENTS, HAVE BEEN MOST HELPFUL. WE HAVE LOOKED FORWARD TO THIS MEETING AS AN IMPORTANT STAGE IN THAT PROCESS OF CONSULTATION BEFORE WE DECIDE OUR POLICY AND INITIATE WHAT WE ALL PROFOUNDLY HOPE WILL BE THE FINAL APPROACH TO A SOLUTION.

I LOOK FORWARD VERY MUCH TO HEARING ANY FURTHER VIEWS OF COLLEAGUES HERE: BUT YOU WILL HAVE GATHERED THAT WE THINK WE CAN BEGIN TO SEE THE FORM THAT AN ATTEMPT AT A SOLUTION OUGHT TO TAKE.

LET ME THEREFORE, BEFORE THIS DEBATE CONTINUES, MAKE CERTAIN POINTS ABOUT THE BRITISH POSITION QUITE CLEAR.

(I) THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT ARE WHOLLY COMMITTED TO GENUINE BLACK MAJORITY RULE IN RHODESIA:

(II) WE ACCEPT THAT IT IS OUR CONSTITUTIONAL RESPONSIBILITY TO GRANT LEGAL INDEPENDENCE ON THAT BASIS AND THAT ONLY BRITAIN CAN DO IT:

(III) WE ACCEPT THAT OUR OBJECTIVE MUST BE TO ESTABLISH THAT INDEPENDENCE ON THE BASIS OF A CONSTITUTION COMPARABLE WITH THE CONSTITUTIONS WE HAVE AGREED WITH OTHER COUNTRIES:

(IV) WE ARE DEEPLY CONSCIOUS OF THE URGENT NEED TO BRING PEACE TO THE PEOPLE OF RHODESIA AND HER NEIGHBOURS: WE WILL THEREFORE PRESENT OUR PROPOSALS AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE TO ALL THE PARTIES, AND AT THE SAME TIME CALL ON THEM TO CEASE HOSTILITIES AND MOVE FORWARD WITH US TO A SETTLEMENT.

OUR AIM IS, AS I STATED IT DURING OUR OPENING SESSION, TO BRING RHODESIA TO LEGAL INDEPENDENCE ON A BASIS WHICH THE COMMONWEALTH AND THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY AS A WHOLE WILL FIND ACCEPTABLE.

I BELIEVE THAT WE NOW HAVE A CHANCE TO ACHIEVE THIS, AND WE MUST TAKE IT.

UNQUOTE

3. FOR RHODESIA DEPARTMENT. PLEASE REPEAT FLASH TO ALL OTHER COMMONWEALTH POSTS AND IMMEDIATE TO ALL OTHER RELEVANT POSTS.

ALLINSON

NNNN

Prime Minister

This is probably just
as well, given
Rhodesian preoccupations.

We can reply on
your return.

Agreed mb

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TO IMMEDIATE LUSAKA
TELNO 654 OF 3 AUGUST

FOLLOWING FOR CARTLEDGE (PRIME MINISTER'S PARTY) FROM
PATTISON (10 DOWNING STREET)

BEGINS

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF MESSAGE RECEIVED TODAY FROM
WHITE HOUSE. PLEASE ADVISE IF YOU WISH US TO SEND ANY
RESPONSE BEFORE YOUR RETURN TO LONDON.

MESSAGE BEGINS:

"DEAR MADAME PRIME MINISTER,
AMBASSADOR HENDERSON HAS SPOKEN TO ME OF YOUR DESIRE
TO MAKE A WORKING VISIT TO WASHINGTON DURING THE PERIOD
16-18 SEPTEMBER.

UNFORTUNATELY, THOSE DATES FALL IN THE MIDDLE OF
ONE OF MY MOST HECTIC PERIODS - THE EARLY WEEKS
OF THE AUTUMN SESSION OF THE CONGRESS. I WOULD
MUCH PREFER IT IF WE COULD MEET AT A TIME WHEN THIS
AND OTHER COMMITMENTS WOULD NOT CURTAIL THE TIME
I WANT TO DEVOTE TO YOUR VISIT.

I AM, HOWEVER, EAGER FOR US TO MEET AGAIN BEFORE
THE END OF THE YEAR. COULD YOU POSSIBLY COME IN THE
MIDDLE OR LATTER PART OF NOVEMBER? IF THAT SEEMS
CONVENIENT FOR YOU, I WOULD BE GRATEFUL IF YOU COULD
SUGGEST SOME POSSIBLE DATES. I AM LOOKING FORWARD
TO SEEING YOU AND RENEWING THE DISCUSSIONS I FOUND
SO FRUITFUL IN TOKYO.

SINCERELY,
JIMMY CARTER "

MESSAGE ENDS.

CARRINGTON.

NNNN

Original on
Commonwealth July 79
CHGM Bilaterals.

NOTE OF A CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER AND PRESIDENT MOI OF KENYA
AT PRESIDENT MOI'S BUNGALOW IN MULUNGUSHI VILLAGE, LUSAKA, ON 3 AUGUST 1979
AT 1900 HOURS

<u>Present:</u>	Prime Minister	H.E. Mr. Daniel T. Arap Moi, MP - President of Kenya
	Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary	The Hon. Charles Njonjo, MP - Attorney-General
	Mr. B. G. Cartledge	The Hon. Dr. Munyua Waiyaki, MP Minister for Foreign Affairs

* * * * *

The Prime Minister asked President Moi what had happened during the restricted session earlier in the afternoon, after her departure. President Moi said that the question of the Secretary-Generalship had been discussed. India, alone, had expressed reservations about the present Secretary-General but everybody else present had agreed that Mr. Ramphal should continue in office for a further five years. The Prime Minister said that Mr. Mehta was a fine person who had loyally served a number of Indian Prime Ministers; but that Mr. Ramphal was doing very well and should continue.

The Prime Minister said that President Moi had asked her to look at the question of possible assistance to Kenya in easing the burden of her defence expenditure commitments. She had asked for advice on how the UK could help and had sent it back repeatedly for further consideration by officials. She wished very much that the UK could have done more: but the most that could be done was to accelerate the £15 million in programme aid which had already been agreed. The UK had massive debts of her own and, despite all her own efforts, the British Government could not possibly do any more.

The Prime Minister expressed her gratitude to President Moi for the moderate line which he had taken during the morning debate on Southern Africa. She felt very deeply indeed about the continuing bloodshed in Rhodesia; she had never believed that anybody had the right to pursue their aims by means of violence. She assured President Moi that the British Government would move very quickly on Rhodesia as soon as the Lusaka Conference had ended. There had already been a major debate in the House of Commons on Southern Africa and the intensive consultations which the Government had initiated were continuing during the CHGM. She asked President Moi to understand, however, that it was simply not possible for her, politically or constitutionally, to formulate final proposals about a Rhodesian settlement until after the Lusaka Conference. The Prime

/Minister

Minister commented that if she had formulated firm proposals in advance of Lusaka she would have been accused of refusing to listen to African opinion. But when she explained that she simply could not formulate specific proposals in advance of further consultation not only in Lusaka but with her colleagues in London, she was again attacked for not going far enough. In her speech that morning, she had tried to outline the UK approach more clearly. The British Government's aim was to give Rhodesia a constitution similar to those given to other newly independent states who were now colleagues within the Commonwealth. If all concerned adopted a reasonable approach, this objective could be achieved. The outcome, however, must not be determined on the basis of personal preferences for certain individuals rather than on that of a democratic constitution.

President Moi said that he wished to thank the British Government for all the help it had already given to Kenya, including the writing off of debts at a time of acute difficulty for his country. The acceleration of the new amount of programme aid already agreed by the UK would be of great assistance to Kenya. It might be that, in time, additional resources could be made available. The President recalled his recent visit to the UK with great pleasure, and said that he had been most appreciative of the warm reception accorded him by The Queen, by the Government and by all the people of the United Kingdom. The UK was providing Kenya with valuable technical assistance and also with trained teachers. Kenya herself gave help to Malawi, Lesotho and Zimbabwe in the field of vocational training, and especially in agriculture. The President said that he himself attached great importance to the development of youth and that his Government received significant help in this field from the UK. The UK was also helpful to Kenya in Brussels, in the context of her relations with the EEC.

Turning to Rhodesia, President Moi said that Kenya would help the UK as much as she could, both in public speeches and in private. President Moi said that following his discussions in Arusha, he had the impression that President Nyerere had very much come down to earth. He had emphasised, at Arusha, that a real change had taken place to which the appointment of a black President and a black Prime Minister gave testimony. President Nyerere had gone so far as to say (and the President asked not to be quoted) that he would welcome a visit by Bishop Muzorewa, whether in / or on neutral ground, in, for example, Kenya. President Moi said that he had not liked President Binisa's remarks in the meeting about elections.

/ The Prime Minister

The Prime Minister said that there was no point in having a good constitution if it was never operated. Its value could be tested only in the light of practical experience. President Moi urged the Prime Minister to speed up the presentation of her case so that her critics had no time to concert their tactics. The Prime Minister agreed that this made sense.

President Moi said that it was essential to put an end to the loss of life in Rhodesia. The Prime Minister said that Sir Seretse Khama was sympathetic towards the UK's approach and as keen as anybody to get talks under way. It would probably be better if such talks were not to be held in Salisbury, but they could take place anywhere in East Africa or, of course, in London. The problem of integrating the guerrilla armies into Rhodesia's security forces was real and difficult. It should be approached step by step: the security forces were apprehensive of integration and the re-organisation should be approached with due care and deliberation.

President Moi went on to say that he was deeply concerned about Uganda. Mr. Lule was a pleasant man, but Kenyans knew Uganda and people there were suspicious of anybody who had any connection with Amin. Mr. Lule had been one of the few who had no such connection, having left the country before Amin seized power, and the people therefore trusted him. Kenya, however, had serious problems with the Sudan: Amin was there with between 35,000 and 40,000 troops, most of them massed on the South Sudanese border, but some of them positioned in Zaire. President Moi said that the Commonwealth should oblige the South Sudan to compel the rebels to respect frontiers. Ugandan people should be allowed to take the final decision on their political future but an imposed political/economic solution could not work.

The Prime Minister asked President Moi whether he thought that Amin would invade Uganda. President Moi and his colleagues said that this was virtually certain and commented that although Tanzania still had 30,000 troops in Uganda, the country had no other defensive military resources. The apparent acquiescence of the OAU in the removal of a fellow Head of State was an uncomfortable precedent.

Lord Carrington asked about Mr. Obote's plans. President Moi replied that Obote would definitely take over from Binaisa before too long. Existing disagreements should be resolved, but the bitterness of the Buganda against Obote was an obstacle. President Moi expressed the view that, given genuine freedom of choice, the people of Uganda would choose Mr. Lule as their President.

/ Lord Carrington

Lord Carrington asked whether the Sudan would support Obote. President Moi said that the Sudan would not. Tanzania would continue to give Obote full support since President Nyerere greatly admired him. President Moi said that in the meantime his Government was trying to resolve their difficulties with the Somalis.

Reverting to the question of Rhodesia, Lord Carrington said that his real concern was that some members of the Commonwealth would pressure the Prime Minister into making her proposals more specific. If the Prime Minister and he were able to return to London with a clear picture of where she wanted to go and without conditions having been imposed upon her, there would be hope for a settlement. President Moi repeated that it would be essential to pick up speed in this process.

The discussion ended at 1935.

bjm

3 August 1979

Original on ~~Spain~~ ^{July 79}
Commonwealth
CHGM Bilaterals

NOTE OF A MEETING HELD BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER AND THE PRESIDENT OF BOTSWANA IN MULUNGUSHI VILLAGE, LUSAKA, AT 1816 ON FRIDAY 3 AUGUST 1979

Present

The Prime Minister

HE Sir Seretse Khama

Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary

The Hon. A.M. Mogwe

Mr. C.A. Whitmore

HE Mr. A.W. Kgarebe

The Prime Minister said that she would welcome Sir Seretse Khama's assessment of how the Commonwealth Heads of Government discussion on Rhodesia that morning had gone. She was very worried about how the Rhodesian problem was going to develop: it had now existed for fourteen years and there was still no solution to it. Some of their colleagues that morning had said that recent changes in Salisbury, such as the April elections, were unimportant and could be ignored. They had made it plain that they saw Bishop Muzorewa as Mr. Smith's puppet. She accepted that there were aspects of the constitution such as the blocking mechanism in favour of the whites which were defective, as she had said in her statement to the Conference that morning. But there was no gain-saying that there had been an election based on one man, one vote, which had enabled the people of Rhodesia to choose their own Prime Minister who had a black majority in his Cabinet, and to elect a Parliament with a majority of black members. This was something on which we could and must build. If we did not, the opportunity would slip by and might be lost forever: this was something which we simply could not afford to let happen. She had been encouraged by the similarities between her speech and that of President Nyerere that morning. But she had been discouraged by the later speakers. She hoped that they were doing no more than letting off steam. During the recent debate in the House of Commons she had declined to put forward detailed proposals for a solution of the Rhodesia problem, taking the line that there were further consultations to be undertaken at the CHGM and that it would be wrong to pre-empt these. She had said much the same thing that morning, though she had gone a little further. None the less, a number of Heads of Government had pressed her to go into details. But it was impossible for her to put

/forward

forward proposals of this kind in Lusaka when she had not yet consulted the British Cabinet. What she now had to do was to return to London at the end of the Conference, to review all the consultations which had been held in recent weeks and then to formulate proposals which, when she had the approval of her Cabinet, could be put to all the parties. As she had said that morning, the British Government would move very quickly. Perhaps the most important reason for speed was the weekly toll of killings in Rhodesia about which she felt both bitterly and deeply. Although the present British Government had been in power for only three months, they had already moved rapidly and resolutely on Rhodesia. She had set out in her speech that morning what the British Government saw as wrong in the present situation in Rhodesia, and they were determined to put it right. This seemed to her to be a reasonable approach, although she recognised that politics were not based on reason. Although the constitutional responsibility remained Britain's, the British Government wanted help.

Sir Seretse Khama agreed that the position of the British Government was a reasonable one. He felt that this was an occasion for talking openly. All that the various parties to the Rhodesia problem were seeking was power for themselves. When they talked of democratic constitutions they were speaking a different language from Britain and Botswana. Botswana believed in free elections and thought that such elections should be held in Rhodesia. They did not agree with the recent OAU resolution describing the Patriotic Front as the sole legitimate representatives of the people of Rhodesia, and he believed that the resolution should be ignored. Similarly, he did not believe that the United Nations had much to offer. He felt the way ahead should rest on what the Commonwealth had to say about the issue. What was needed was a Commonwealth resolution on Rhodesia which put the emphasis on human rights and democracy. As for that morning's discussion, he thought that the Prime Minister's statement had been well received, as had President Nyerere's.

The Prime Minister said that there were marked similarities between what she and President Nyerere had said, and she and he knew each other's mind well.

Mr. Mogwe said that the Prime Minister's statement had had both positive and negative aspects. One of the latter was the argument that Bishop Muzorewa was not Mr. Smith. More importantly, there was uncertainty about British intentions with regard to the constitution. Although the constitution had been described as defective, it was not clear whether Britain was thinking of simply amending the existing one, which was the constitution that had brought Bishop Muzorewa to power, or of coming forward with a totally new one. If it was proposed to proceed by amending the present constitution, this would lead to trouble. Botswana had not found it necessary to provide for minorities in her constitution. Her minorities were part and parcel of Botswana society. None the less, it was clear from the morning's discussion that many of the participants at the CHGM were ready to accept that the Rhodesian constitution should make provision for minorities but that what was not acceptable was entrenchment. In approaching the problem of the constitution, Britain should remember that many members of the Commonwealth were also members of the OAU. He was sure that it was not the Prime Minister's intention to rock the Commonwealth boat unnecessarily.

The Prime Minister said that there was bound to be considerable similarity between any constitution proposed by Britain and the existing Rhodesian constitution. Most constitutions enshrined certain general principles, though there were often differences of detail to take account of the particular circumstances of the countries concerned. The present Rhodesian constitution contained some clauses taken from the 1961 constitution, some based on the Anglo-American proposals and some which reflected the constitutional position in the United Kingdom. The question was whether it really mattered if, in appropriate cases, clauses from the existing constitution were precisely carried over into any new constitution put forward by Britain or whether it was essential to use different language. The reality surely was that what counted was what the constitution actually said. It would not be a constitution for those seeking power. Rather, it would be a reasonable and democratic constitution intended to enable the people of Rhodesia to choose their own leaders. She doubted whether it would ever be possible to produce a

/constitution

constitution which satisfied every member of the Commonwealth. But it was of paramount importance to devise a constitution which would be acceptable to the British Parliament.

Sir Seretse Khama said that it was essential that Britain devised a constitution and remained in charge of the exercise. It would be a big mistake if the British Government allowed Muzorewa to take over the production of the new constitution.

The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary said that there would be absolutely no doubt that what would be put forward would be Britain's proposals for the constitution. We would have to be able to assure the British Parliament that the proposals were just and reasonable and were comparable to the terms of earlier independence constitutions which we had given to other countries. It would then be for the parties to the Rhodesia problem to accept or reject what we offered. The difficulty was that while Sir Seretse Khama was talking rightly about democracy, many of the players in the cast were not interested in democracy.

The Prime Minister re-emphasised that there was no question of the constitution being anything other than a British proposal and that it would have to be one which could be got through the British Parliament.

Mr. Mogwe repeated that Britain could not just take the "Smith-Muzorewa constitution" and amend it. Everybody was expecting the United Kingdom to come forward with what would seem to be a new constitution of its own for Rhodesia, even if much of the language in it was the same as that of the existing constitution.

The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary said that this was precisely what we were going to do, but there was no escaping the fact that some of our language would be the same as the present language, if only because Britain had prepared the 1961 constitution, some of which had been carried over into the present constitution.

/In reply to a

In reply to a further question by Mr. Mogwe about what had been meant by the remark that Bishop Muzorewa was not Mr. Smith, the Prime Minister said that Bishop Muzorewa was the Prime Minister of Rhodesia, enjoying a black majority in his Cabinet and a black majority in Parliament. He was running the daily business of the Government. He was the head of the security forces. There was nothing in the constitution that made it necessary for him to defer to Mr. Smith or made it inevitable that he would be a weak Prime Minister. If the reality was otherwise, this was not the fault of the constitution. But it was true that his power was fettered in two respects. First, he could not change the constitution without the support of at least six white members of the Rhodesian Parliament. In her own view she would not have thought it difficult for the Bishop to win that support, if he wished. But she recognised that others took a different view, and she accepted that these provisions in the present constitution would have to be changed. Second, there was the problem of the Public Service Commissions. It was, of course, quite normal to have commissions of this kind to restrict the powers of the executive in making certain senior appointments. But it was ridiculous that Bishop Muzorewa could not decide who should be the secretary of his own Cabinet. Changes would plainly be needed in this area as well. There was, of course, a lot of pressure on Bishop Muzorewa to show that he was bringing about substantial change in Rhodesian society, but this was difficult for him. The fact was that much of the racially discriminatory legislation which had caused so much offence in the past in Rhodesia had been abolished before the Bishop came to power, and there was now very little more that he could do in this field.

Sir Seretse Khama said that, legalistically speaking, Bishop Muzorewa was not the Prime Minister, since he had come to power under an arrangement which had not been approved by the United Kingdom as the constitutional authority.

Mr. Mogwe said that since the British Government had not given its approval for the April elections he did not see how Bishop Muzorewa could be different from Mr. Smith. So long as Africa did not accept the present arrangements in Rhodesia, the war would go on. This was not

/what Botswana

what Botswana wanted: she wanted to see an end to the problem. But Botswana's great fear was that at the forthcoming Conference of the Non-Aligned at Havana, just as at the recent OAU Conference, the Patriotic Front would be confirmed as the sole legitimate representatives of the Rhodesian people, and this could only encourage and strengthen them. This was why it was important for Britain to do something now, but nobody knew what the United Kingdom's proposals were.

The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary said that there was a contradiction in the line which many countries were taking. They all said that it was the United Kingdom alone who had constitutional responsibility for Rhodesia; and Britain accepted that responsibility. Indeed, the Prime Minister had gone further in her statement that morning when she had said that we not only accepted our responsibility, but that we would try to achieve a constitution which was comparable with earlier independence constitutions granted by the United Kingdom and which got rid of the two difficulties in the existing Rhodesian constitution. But if attempts were made to tie Britain down and to force her to go beyond what the Prime Minister had said - which was what the Nigerians were attempting to do - it would put us in an impossible position and would be bound to lead to the failure of the present attempts to find a solution. The British Government was on a tightrope over Rhodesia. We had to think not only of the African parties - both inside and outside Rhodesia - to the problem, but we also had to have in mind public opinion in the United Kingdom, which was very largely behind Bishop Muzorewa. If Britain did anything which appeared in Salisbury to be a sell-out to the Patriotic Front, there would be no question of getting the whites to agree to change the constitution. Britain was surrounded by different pressures, and we needed all the help we could get if we were not to fall off the tightrope.

Sir Seretse Khama said that he understood the metaphor of the tightrope. There had undoubtedly been a disposition in Salisbury when the Conservative Government had been elected ^{to believe} that everything would be rosy. In the event the actions of the British Government had made the Salisbury regime change its view. At the same time the Prime Minister's various speeches and statements had made the Patriot Front realise that the United Kingdom was prepared to talk. His fear was that the British Government would

/recognise

recognise Bishop Muzorewa while the OAU recognised only the Patriotic Front. This was why he argued for a Commonwealth position which avoided both of these extremes. He wanted to keep Britain on the tightrope. He was sure that there was no intention on the part of African people to push the United Kingdom into doing anything which the United Kingdom did not think was right. But it was not only Britain which faced a problem. Some of the Front Line Presidents had come to realise that they had made a mistake by encouraging the leaders of the Patriotic Front to think that they were going to be the "top dogs" and they were trying to undo their error. It was, however, a difficult process.

Mr. Mogwe said that similarly Britain should not give precedence to Bishop Muzorewa, whatever view they took of him privately. It was vital that Britain convened an all-party meeting. If Bishop Muzorewa was allowed to convene it, it would be impossible to bring all of the parties along. The Prime Minister said that President Nyerere in his speech that day had gone a long way to put distance between the Front Line Presidents and the Patriotic Front in the way Sir Seretse Khama had described. He clearly wanted Britain, and nobody else, to put the new system in Rhodesia into place. There was no question of a process in which Bishop Muzorewa was in the lead. Britain would chair an all-party Conference involving both the Patriotic Front and the internal parties. Bishop Muzorewa would be neither in front of nor behind the other participants. She was very grateful to Sir Seretse Khama for what had been a most helpful meeting.

JWS.

4 August 1979

PRIME MINISTER'S SPEECH ON SOUTHERN AFRICA

FRIDAY, 3 AUGUST, 1979

LUSAKA

Southern Africa has seldom been far from the forefront of our consideration over the two years since heads of government last met in London. The problems of Southern Africa are of course not limited to Rhodesia.

We have had a helpful contribution from Mr. Clark on Namibia. Our fears and anxieties about Southern Africa itself are unfortunately likely to be with us for a long time. But I imagine that it is on the question of Rhodesia that my colleagues will wish me to speak; and I therefore propose to confine my own intervention to that subject.

The problem of Rhodesia has hung over the Commonwealth for many years. The present trouble began in 1965 when the then Rhodesian government made the illegal declaration of independence. This was followed by years in which the efforts of successive British governments to achieve a settlement based on the wishes of a majority of the people of Rhodesia were frustrated, years in which the political rights of the majority were denied. Then came the war which has brought great hardship and suffering both inside Rhodesia and in neighbouring countries.

What began as a struggle between the white minority and the black majority has more recently taken on a very different dimension.

*President
M. Nkomo
has said*

There is now an African President, an African Prime Minister and an African majority in Parliament.

/There have been

There have been elections in which for the first time the African majority have been able to elect the leaders of the government. There are those who seem to believe that the world should simply go on treating Bishop Muzorewa as if he were Mr. Smith. But the change that has taken place in Rhodesia cannot be dismissed as of no consequence.

It is the British Government's view that we must use the opportunity created by the changes which have taken place in Rhodesia to see if we can now find the solution which has eluded us for so long, and to bring an end to the war.

We owe it to the people of Rhodesia to do all we can, all of us, to help all of them, to resolve their political differences peacefully rather than by force.

I simply do not believe that there is anything now dividing the people of Rhodesia which is worth the use of the bomb and the gun to kill and maim men, women and children by the thousand, or which can justify the misery of the hundreds of thousands in refugee camps.

In the changes that have now taken place we surely have the basis from which to try to develop a solution which will command general international acceptance.

We have already had extensive consultations.
As you know, on the British Government's behalf, Lord Harlech saw the Heads of Government of seven African states and also Mr. Mugabe and representatives of Mr. Nkomo.

Richard Luce saw the governments of a further five African countries. We have also been in touch with all our other Commonwealth friends as well as with our European Community partners and the United States. The consultations we have had so far have been of great value to the Government in helping to identify what the solution should be. I should like to take this opportunity to thank personally all those Heads of Government here today who have helped us in this way.

/From our consultations

From our consultations certain common factors emerge clearly.

- ① The ~~most significant~~, I think, is the view that the constitution under which Bishop Mazorewa has come to power is defective in certain important respects.

I refer of course to the provisions which make it possible for the white minority to block, in the Parliament, constitutional changes that would be unwelcome to them.

This is a valid criticism - such a blocking mechanism has not appeared in any other independence constitution agreed to by the British Parliament. //

The principle that there should be some guaranteed representation for minority communities (during a certain minimum period following the transfer of power on independence) is not new - and I think we all recognise the importance to Rhodesia of encouraging the European minority to remain and to continue to play a useful part in the life of the community.

But that is a very different matter from enabling them to block all ~~progress~~ ^{change}.

- ② The other main criticism of the constitution relating to the composition and powers of the various service commissions is also valid.

It is clearly wrong that the government should not have adequate control over ^{urban} senior appointments.

- ③ Those consulted also considered it essential that the search for a solution should involve the present external parties, so that their supporters outside the country might return home in peace and play their full part in political life.

/Finally,

④ ^{Lankly}~~Finally~~, in considering the consultations we have had so far, I have been impressed by the general conviction that any solution of the Rhodesia problem must derive its authority from Britain as the responsible colonial power.

The international community has lost few opportunities to remind us that it is Britain's constitutional responsibility to bring Rhodesia to legal independence on a basis of justice and democracy fully comparable with the arrangements we have made for the independence of other countries.

We accept that responsibility and have every intention of discharging it honourably.

Mr. Chairman, as I mentioned earlier, the consultations we have had with our Commonwealth partners over the last two months, and indeed with many other governments, have been most helpful. We have looked forward to this meeting as an important stage in that process of consultation before we decide our policy and initiate what we all profoundly hope will be the final approach to a solution.

I look forward very much to hearing any further views of colleagues here; but you will have gathered that we think we can begin to see the form that an attempt at a solution ought to take.

/ Let me therefore

Let me therefore, before this debate continues, make certain points about the British position quite clear.

- (i) the British Government are wholly committed to genuine black majority rule in Rhodesia;
- (ii) we accept that it is our constitutional responsibility to grant legal independence on that basis and that only Britain can do it;
- (iii) we accept that our objective must be to establish that independence on the basis of a constitution comparable with the constitutions we have agreed with other countries;
- (iv) we are deeply conscious of the urgent need to bring peace to the people of Rhodesia and her neighbours; we will therefore present our proposals as quickly as possible to all the parties, and at the same time call on them to cease hostilities and move forward with us to a settlement.

Our aim is, as I stated it during our opening session, to bring Rhodesia to legal independence on a basis which the Commonwealth and the international community as a whole will find acceptable.

I believe that we now have a chance to achieve this, and we must take it.

CONFIDENTIAL



10 DOWNING STREET

Spate J-
cc Tsy
Original on
Commonwealth July 79
CHEM Bilaterals

From the Principal Private Secretary

2 August 1979

Dear George,

MEETING BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER AND PRESIDENT ZIA OF BANGLADESH

When President Zia of Bangladesh, who was accompanied by his Foreign Minister and the Bangladeshi High Commissioner in London, entertained the Prime Minister and the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary to breakfast today in his villa in Mulungushi Village, Lusaka, the discussion concentrated almost wholly on British aid to Bangladesh.

The President said that Bangladesh had a major problem in trying to feed itself. The World Bank had recently reported that the Bangladeshi agricultural programme should be four times its present size. Food imports were at a high level, notwithstanding successful efforts in recent years to increase food production. This year food imports would be even higher than usual because his country was suffering from an unprecedented drought. They also had difficulties in the field of energy, though in the long term this should not be a problem. Bangladesh had enormous reserves of coal and its reserves of natural gas were estimated to be the eleventh largest in the world. No oil had yet been discovered but a number of oil firms, including BP, were showing an interest once more in exploration. In the immediate future, however, Bangladesh was very dependent, in both the industrial and agricultural fields, on foreign aid. He understood the reasons why the United Kingdom was contemplating making reductions in the aid which it gave to his country and he wondered whether it might ease our difficulties if our assistance took the form of long-term loans.

The Bangladeshi High Commissioner then gave some examples of the activities of British firms in Bangladesh. A company known as Imeg, which was being backed by a consortium of American, Swiss, German and British banks, was negotiating for a contract to explore a natural gas field, convert the gas into LNG and then export it. Bangladesh's natural gas potential was huge: there were proven reserves of 9,000 billion cubic feet. There were extensive opportunities for British firms to exploit. The President added that the Americans had described Bangladesh as "floating on a sea of gas".

The High Commissioner continued that following a conversation with the British Secretary of State for Employment, his Government were now in touch with British firms about the development of the fishing potential of the Bay of Bengal. The United Kingdom was also one of the biggest participants in a consortium that was constructing a large petro-chemical plant for the production of fertilisers. This was a typical aid project and its successful completion would have considerable

/ benefits

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benefits at a number of levels of the economy right down to individual peasant farmers. The scheme was now approaching its final phase, but unfortunately, as part of its plans for reducing its aid programme, the United Kingdom was now threatening to cut back its contribution, even though the orders for the equipment which was needed to finish the plant had already been placed. In 1978/79 Britain had disbursed aid worth £40 million to Bangladesh. The comparable figure for 1979/80 was estimated to be £66 million. Britain was now proposing to limit expenditure in 1979/80 to the 1978/79 level. Much of current expenditure was required to finance projects which had been started as long ago as 1972 and which, like the petro-chemical plant, were now well advanced. Similarly, there were technical assistance programmes which were already being implemented but which now appeared to be jeopardised by the proposed cuts in the British aid programme. Bangladesh had planned to send 320 students to the United Kingdom in the present year. Of these, some 90 were either already in the United Kingdom or were virtually on their way when the order to freeze the programme came. The rest had been preparing to leave for Britain but had now been told to stand down. This sudden turn of events had inevitably had political repercussions in his country. The possibility of reductions in British aid had come as a severe shock to the system in Bangladesh. The sums of money involved were a drop in the ocean for Britain, but for Bangladesh they were substantial. If necessary, Britain should give Bangladesh special treatment. Bangladesh had been receiving aid for only eight years, whereas India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka had been enjoying British assistance for over thirty years. It was unjust - and he used this word advisedly even though he recognised that it was a strong term - for Britain to treat his country in exactly the same way as others when cuts in aid had to be made. Bangladesh had given 1½ million lives for democracy, and it should therefore be protected. Britain had a special relevance in this situation. Moreover, Britain not only gained the direct and immediate benefits of the exports tied to its aid for Bangladesh, but the future leaders of the country who were being educated in the United Kingdom would be encouraged to look to Britain to help meet Bangladesh's needs in the long term.

The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary said that President Zia and the High Commissioner had made a very eloquent case against any reduction in Britain's aid to Bangladesh. Unfortunately, many other countries could make exactly the same case. It had to be borne in mind that Britain was already giving aid only to deserving countries. If we said that we could no longer afford to maintain our aid programme at its planned level, this was bound to seem unjust to countries like Bangladesh. But the British Government faced major economic problems. It had inherited from its predecessor public expenditure programmes which the country could no longer afford and which therefore had to be reduced. It would be impossible to convince the British public that the United Kingdom's aid programme should be left untouched, when other public expenditure programmes such as the education service, housing and the road programme were being reduced.

The Prime Minister said that the cut in the aid programme was in fact very small. She had come to listen to what President Zia had to say, and she recognised that there were longstanding projects which were coming to maturity this year and next. She understood the difficulties that would arise if these programmes were denied adequate finance in their final stages. The British Government would review their aid programme to Bangladesh project by project before deciding on any changes as a result of the need to cut public expenditure. If the problem of Rhodesia could be solved, it would no longer be necessary to give aid to Mozambique, which was running at £22 million in the present year.

/ After she had

After she had left President Zia's villa, the Prime Minister asked the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary to arrange for a review of our aid programme to Bangladesh to be carried out on the lines she had described to the President. She also said that we should look closely for savings in our aid programmes which were not tied to British exports. It was a pity that we could not make more use of the European Community's food surpluses for countries like Bangladesh which were having very real difficulties in feeding their populations.

The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary said that he and the Chancellor of the Exchequer had instituted a study to see how to make the best use of the available money in the aid programme. There was at present some disagreement about what our approach should be. There were those on the one hand who argued that we should concentrate our aid on Commonwealth countries, for to do otherwise implied that the Commonwealth meant nothing. On the other hand, there were others who felt that we should concentrate our aid on projects that brought the best return for British firms. A possible way forward was to tie aid to British industry but, in the process, to do as much as possible for Commonwealth countries.

The Prime Minister would be grateful if the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary could let her know, in due course, what conclusions he and the Chancellor of the Exchequer had come to as a result of their review of the aid programme.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Tony Battishill (HM Treasury) and Martin Vile (Cabinet Office).

Yours ever,
Muriel.

G.G.H. Walden, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

Original on:
Commonwealth ^{July 79}
CHGM Bilateral.

NOTE OF THE PRIME MINISTER'S CONVERSATION WITH THE PRIME MINISTER OF CANADA, MR. JOE CLARK, IN THE CONFERENCE ROOM IN MULUNGUSHI HALL, LUSAKA, ON 2 AUGUST 1979 AT 1820 [as the fourth session of the CHGM ended late, the Prime Minister and Mr. Clark agreed to stay behind in the Conference Room in order to have the bilateral discussion which was to have taken place at Horizon House at 1800]

Present

The Prime Minister
Mr. B.G. Cartledge

Premier Clark
Miss Flora MacDonald

* * * * *

Outlining her approach to the debate on Southern Africa on the following day, the Prime Minister stressed to Mr. Clark that she could not accept the imposition on the United Kingdom of any conditions for bringing Rhodesia back to independence. Mr. Clark said that there could well be strong pressures during the Conference to force the UK's hand. The Prime Minister made it clear that, both from a political and from a constitutional point of view, it was simply not possible for her to return to London committed to any particular course of action. Mr. Clark agreed.

The Prime Minister gave Mr. Clark a general account of the impressions which she had derived from her bilateral conversations with President Nyerere and President Kaunda. Mr. Clark said that these coincided almost exactly with those which he had from his own discussions. He had found President Nyerere, in particular, very reasonable. The question was, would these attitudes hold during the forthcoming debate? Miss MacDonald said that she thought that they would if the Prime Minister could impress on the Conference a clear sense of direction in UK policy, for example a clear indication of determination to achieve changes in the constitution and to create the conditions in which a ceasefire would be possible. The Prime Minister said that a ceasefire and the withdrawal of support for the terrorists by the Front Line States was absolutely vital. The point had to be made that, given a reasonable constitution for Rhodesia, the Patriotic Front would have nothing to fight against.

Mr. Clark asked whether the Prime Minister had given thought to the participation of the Rhodesians outside the country in the constitutional forms. His own discussions had confirmed that there was considerable

/discontent

discontent with the reserved powers of the whites in the Rhodesian Parliament and with the operation of the Commissions. He thought that the degree of support which could be achieved for a new constitution would depend on the extent to which the Patriotic Front could be involved in the new political process. The Prime Minister said that the Patriotic Front could not be given a right of veto over a constitution which was reasonable in terms of the constitutions which Britain had given to other newly independent countries. Miss MacDonald said that President Kaunda had told the Canadians that Zambia would back, even against the Patriotic Front, a constitution which was genuinely reasonable. Mr. Clark agreed that this was so but asked whether the Front Line Presidents could really deliver.

Mr. Clark went on to say that Canada wanted to be as helpful as possible to the UK in the handling of the Rhodesia issue. He had told the Canadian press that the British Prime Minister would be a model of patient understanding. He had also made it clear to the press that any solution on Rhodesia could only come after, and not during, the CHGM. He had outlined to the press five points which he thought could be the probable elements in a settlement. These were: changes to the existing constitution; participation in a settlement by the Patriotic Front; the departure of Ian Smith, who had become a symbol to the Africans; the means of assuring popular support for a settlement; and guarantees from the Front Line States of a cessation of hostilities. The Prime Minister said that these points really represented the limit to which the UK could go. Miss MacDonald said that it was important that Ian Smith should not be in a key position in the Salisbury Government, even if he were to be elected to Parliament.

The Prime Minister said that the main objections which had been raised on the Commissions under the present constitution were justified. It was, however, relevant that President Kaunda had said in a public interview that if Mr. Smith were to be elected on the basis of a democratic constitution, he would work with him. Mr. Clark agreed and added that President Nyerere had spoken in virtually identical terms.

/Mr. Clark

Mr. Clark went on to say that the real problem would be the Communique. He thought that the debate on the following day should go quite well. Miss MacDonald said that it would be important, during the debate, for the UK to give a sense of direction which could act as a point of reference during the informal discussions over the weekend. Mr. Clark told the Prime Minister that her speech at the opening session had been excellent but that President Kaunda's had been disappointing. He was hopeful that if some progress could be made towards agreement on the Communique during the coming weekend, it might be possible to avoid a continuation of the debate on Monday. It would be important, during Friday's debate, to prevent the discussion from becoming too drawn out, since this would inevitably get into too much detail. Mr. Clark said that he might suggest to Mr. Malcolm Fraser that they should both abstain from intervening in the discussion. Ideally, the UK and the Front Line States should be the only participants.

Mr. Clark made the further point that it would be important, from the point of view of subsequent leverage on the Front Line States, that it should be driven home to them that they, too, had an obligation to create the circumstances for a settlement. President Nyerere had implied in private discussion with him that he would be prepared to send his own troops into Zambia if President Kaunda needed help in dealing with the guerrillas. President Nyerere had also said categorically that, given an acceptable constitution, he would deny asylum to Mugabe.

The Prime Minister agreed with Mr. Clark that the Front Line States had to offer a quid pro quo; and they must also be made to accept that the Patriotic Front did not have a right of veto. Once a constitution had been agreed, the identity of the elected Prime Minister was a matter for the Rhodesians and was nobody else's business. Mr. Clark agreed; he said that it was clearly in Zambia's interest to achieve stability, given the current economic problems. He suggested that the Prime Minister's objective during Friday's debate should be to reassure rather than to rebut. Miss MacDonald commented that it would be difficult for President Nyerere, having spoken in virtually identical terms to at least three or four heads of government, to take an entirely different line during the debate.

The discussion ended at 1850.

B.M.

2 August 1979

Private Secretary

c.c. Private Secretary/Prime Minister

Sir J Hunt

PUS

Sir A Duff

Mr James

Mr Barltrop

Head of Chancery Lusaka

Prime Minister

byw

4/8

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MR NKOMO'S PRESS CONFERENCE

1. Mr Nkomo held a press conference at Victory Camp on 2 August as part of a visit organised for foreign journalists accredited to CHGM. The camp is 15 miles from Lusaka on the Great North Road. It accommodates 13,000 refugees, of which 8,000 are young girls (there is a boys' camp elsewhere). There was no apparent sign of guerrilla presence. The following account, pieced together from reports of journalists, may be of interest.

British Politics

2. Asked whether his task would not be easier if the Labour Party were in power, Mr Nkomo replied that the Labour Party was doing its job as the Opposition, which is what it is good at. It is no good at all at government. The Conservative Party is the party of government in Britain, so things are in their natural state of affairs.

The Prime Minister

3. Asked whether he would meet with Mrs Thatcher, Mr Nkomo replied that he did not think so. She is a beautiful lady, but (according to my informers, rather wistfully) I do not think she wants to see me. 24 hours in Lusaka seems to have done some good for her.

Prospects for Talks

4. Asked what were the prospects for renewed talks for a settlement, Mr Nkomo replied: you have had more wars in Europe than we have had here. At the end you talked to the enemy. So would we. But you do not talk to traitors. (This was understood to mean that Mr Nkomo would talk to Mr Ian Smith, but not to Bishop Muzorewa or Mr Sithole.) The Commonwealth will do its best to work things out. But the questions


is whether Britain, which claims to have legal authority, will follow this advice. The Patriotic Front was engaged in a fight against Fascism. The Smith regime was Fascist. The entire Rhodesia Front was Fascist. (The implication was that the removal of Smith would not be enough.) The Bishop, although a religious man, had joined the Fascist side. It made him impatient when people talked about this or that constitutional change in an unconstitutional constitution.

Mr Nkomo's future

5. Asked about his future, Mr Nkomo said that he had grown grey in the service of Zimbabwe. After the victory he might agree to be Prime Minister for a few months. But then he would give way to younger men. He deserved a rest after 30 years of service.

The Union Jack

6. Teased about having sat at the Opening Ceremony under the Union Jack, Mr Nkomo asked what was so funny. As a boy he had been proud to hoist the flag. But in fact he had been sitting behind President Kaunda as the guest of the host government, and this was perfectly normal.

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read 'N. M. Fenn', with a horizontal line underneath the name.

N M Fenn

2 August 1979

PP OTTAWA

PP PARIS

PP BONN

PP UKMIS NEW YORK

CONFIDENTIAL

H/c
R/C/CHG-07

Prime Minister

3/8

no

GR 330

CONFIDENTIAL

FM MIRIMBA SALISBURY 028045Z AUG 79

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 475 OF 2 AUGUST

INFO IMMEDIATE LUSAKA

INFO PRIORITY PRETORIA MAPUTO DAR ES SALAAM GABORONE LUANDA
LAGOS WASHINGTON OTTAWA PARIS BONN AND UKMIS NEW YORK

PRETORIA TELNOS 400-402: RHODESIA

1. MR BOTHA IS UNDOUBTEDLY EXAGGERATING IN TALKING OF AN "IMMINENT COLLAPSE" IN RHODESIA. THIS WOULD ONLY HAPPEN IF SOUTH AFRICA CUT OFF ALL FINANCIAL AND LOGISTIC SUPPORT, AS FOURIE HAS ADMITTED (PRETORIA TELNO 409).
2. I DISCUSSED THE SECURITY SITUATION WITH GENERAL WALLS ON 1 AUGUST. HE SAID THAT IT HAD MARGINALLY IMPROVED OVER THE PAST 2 TO 3 WEEKS. OPERATIONS AGAINST ZANLA IN THE SOUTH HAD MET WITH SOME SUCCESS. HE WAS STILL CONCERNED AT THE SITUATION THAT WOULD DEVELOP IF ZIPRA COMMITTED ITS FULL STRENGTH TO THE FIGHTING. HE WAS NOT THEREFORE COMPLACENT, BUT THERE WAS NO HINT OF IMMINENT DISASTER.
3. SIMILARLY WITH THE ECONOMY. THE RECENT BUDGET (MY TELNO 452) CONTAINED NO PANIC MEASURES. IN A RECENT PRIVATE CONVERSATION WITH THE FINANCE MINISTER, SMITH WAS AT PAINS TO IMPRESS UPON ME THE BASIC SOUNDNESS OF THE ECONOMY. HE READILY ADMITTED THAT THERE WOULD BE SERIOUS PROBLEMS IF THE WAR CONTINUED INDEFINITELY AND SANCTIONS DID NOT COME OFF IN THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE, BUT HE DID NOT VISUALISE AN EARLY ECONOMIC COLLAPSE.
4. I SHARE MR LEAHY'S VIEW THAT THE SOUTH AFRICANS ARE TRYING TO MAKE FLESH CREEP. THE SITUATION HERE IS NOT THAT CRITICAL - YET. BUT (SEE MY TELNO 461) THERE COULD BE A RAPID DETERIORATION IF ALL PROSPECTS OF A SETTLEMENT WERE LOST. IF THE SOUTH AFRICANS WANT TO AVERT THIS, THEY WOULD BE WELL ADVISED TO PERSUADE THE LEADERSHIP HERE, BLACK AND WHITE, TO GIVE SERIOUS AND SYMPATHETIC CONSIDERATION TO THE PROPOSALS SHORTLY TO BE PUT FORWARD BY HMG.

DAY

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PP GABORONE

PP WASHINGTON

PP UKMIS NEW YORK

PP LAGOS

GR 750

CONFIDENTIAL

FM MIRIMBA SALISBURY 020800Z AUG 79

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 474 OF 2 AUGUST

INFO IMMEDIATE LUSAKA

INFO PRIORITY PRETORIA MAPUTO DAR ES SALAAM LUANDA GABORONE

WASHINGTON UKMIS NEW YORK AND LAGOS

MEETING WITH GENERAL WALLS

1. I CALLED ON GENERAL WALLS ON 1 AUGUST. I ENQUIRED ABOUT THE SECURITY SITUATION. WALLS SAID THAT IT WAS A BIT BETTER. ZANLA WAS STILL THE MAIN PROBLEM. A RECENT OPERATION IN THE SOUTH OF THE COUNTRY BY THE SECURITY FORCES HAD HAD SOME SUCCESS, THOUGH HE WOULD NOT CLAIM A REAL VICTORY. ONE OF THE PROBLEMS WAS THAT THE MUJIBAS (TERRORIST COLLABORATORS) WERE VERY GOOD AT WARNING THE TERRORISTS OF THE APPROACH OF THE SECURITY FORCES. A CAMPAIGN WAS NOW BEING PLANNED AGAINST THE MUJIBAS. ZIPRA CAUSED LESS PROBLEMS, THOUGH THEY COULD NOT BE DISCOUNTED. IN THE GOKWE AREA, WHERE SECURITY FORCE AUXILIARIES HAD BEEN CLEARED OUT WITHOUT REPLACEMENT, ZIPRA HAD MOVED IN. FRESH FORCES WOULD HAVE TO BE PUT INTO THIS AREA TO DEAL WITH THE SITUATION. HIS MAIN ANXIETY WAS HOW TO CONTAIN THE SITUATION IF ZIPRA DECIDED TO PUT ALL ITS FORCES INTO THE FIELD. THE SECURITY FORCES WOULD THEN BE DANGEROUSLY STRETCHED.

2. WALLS REFERRED TO EXERCISES IN CONVENTIONAL WARFARE, INCLUDING TANKS, BEING CONDUCTED BY ZANLA IN THE MANICA AREA INSIDE MOZAMBIQUE. COMMUNIST ADVISERS WERE INVOLVED IN THESE EXERCISES AND WALLS STATED THAT 5 OR 7 RUSSIANS HAD DIED DURING A RHODESIAN RAID ON MOZAMBIQUE. A VEHICLE IN WHICH THEY HAD BEEN TRAVELLING HAD CRASHED AND EXPLODED. THE BODIES HAD BEEN TAKEN TO A MORTUARY IN MOZAMBIQUE. HE FEARED THAT THE PATRIOTIC FRONT WOULD TRY TO DRAG OUT ANY DISCUSSIONS ON CONSTITUTIONAL PROPOSALS SO THAT THEY COULD CONTINUE THEIR PLANNING FOR INTENSIFIED MILITARY ACTIVITY, WITH ATTACKS BEING LAUNCHED FROM BOTH MOZAMBIQUE AND BOTSWANA.

3. WALLS ALSO MENTIONED UNCONFIRMED REPORTS, RECEIVED IN THE PAST FEW DAYS, THAT "PALE FACES" HAD BEEN SEEN WITH ZANLA FORCES INSIDE RHODESIA. HE DID NOT BELIEVE THAT THE RUSSIANS OR THE EAST GERMANS WOULD RISK THEIR OWN PERSONNEL IN THIS WAY AND WAS THEREFORE TREATING THESE REPORTS WITH RESERVE.

4. COMMENTING ON THE RECENT ACTION AGAINST THE SECURITY FORCE AUXILIARIES (MY TELNO 431), WALLS SAID THAT THE GOVERNMENT HAD FACED A REAL PROBLEM. A NUMBER OF UNITS, MAINLY ZANU SITHOLE, HAD GOT QUITE OUT OF HAND. THEY WERE TERRORISING THE POPULATION

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AND EXTORTING LARGE SUMS OF MONEY: UP TO 50 RHODESIAN DOLLARS PER FAMILY. SOMETHING HAD TO BE DONE. THE AUXILIARIES AT GOKWE REFUSED TO OBEY INSTRUCTIONS AND OPENED FIRE ON THE SECURITY FORCES WHO HAD NO ALTERNATIVE BUT TO DEFEND THEMSELVES. AT THE OTHER CAMP WHERE THERE HAD BEEN CASUALTIES, THE FINAL ULTIMATUM HAD BEEN GIVEN BY THE ZANU SITHOLE MILITARY COMMANDER HIMSELF, BUT THIS HAD BEEN IGNORED. FOLLOWING THE ACTION ON 20 JULY THE SITUATION WAS MUCH IMPROVED.

5. ON ATTITUDES TO CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE, WALLS SAID THAT HE FOUND THAT BLACK MINISTERS WERE ALMOST MORE CAUTIOUS THEN THE WHITES. THEY WERE DETERMINED NOT TO UNDERMINE WHITE CONFIDENCE, ON WHICH THE GOVERNMENT DEPENDED FOR ITS SURVIVAL. MANY WHITES WERE STILL SUSPICIOUS OF OUR INTENTIONS. THEY FEARED THAT, HAVING MADE CONCESSIONS, THEY WOULD BE ASKED FOR STILL MORE. I WENT OVER THE GROUND WITH WALLS, DRAWING HIS ATTENTION TO THE PRIME MINISTERS SPEECH OF 25 JULY, OF WHICH I HAD SENT HIM A COPY, I IMPRESSED UPON HIM ONCE AGAIN THE SINCERITY OF OUR DESIRE TO REACH A FAIR AND HONOURABLE SOLUTION TO THIS PROBLEM AND THE NEED TO GET AWAY FROM THE DISTRUST OF THE PAST. I ARGUED THAT A PACKAGE CONTAINING REASONABLE CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE, LEGAL INDEPENDENCE, THE LIFTING OF SANCTIONS AND THE PROSPECT OF A DE-ESCALATION OF THE WAR MUST BE BETTER THAN ANY FORESEEABLE ALTERNATIVE. I URGED HIM TO USE HIS INFLUENCE TO ENSURE THAT OUR PROPOSALS, WHEN THEY WERE TABLED, WERE GIVEN MOST SERIOUS STUDY. WALLS AGREED THAT THIS SHOULD BE DONE.

~~WALLS~~ WILL NOT HIMSELF REJECT CHANGE ~~OUT OF~~ HAND. NOR WILL HE ~~BLINDLY~~ FOLLOW THE LEAD OF IAN SMITH, ABOUT WHOM HE SPOKE IN HARSHLY CRITICAL TERMS. IT WILL BE IMPORTANT THEREFORE TO GO OVER OUR DETAILED PROPOSALS WITH WALLS IN AN EFFORT TO CONVINCHE HIM THAT THEY DO NOT UNDERMINE THE BASIC SAFEGUARDS FOR THE WHITES AND THAT THEY HOLD OUT A GOOD PROSPECT OF A STABLE FUTURE FOR RHODESIA. IF WE CAN GET HIM ON OUR SIDE, WE SHALL HAVE A POWERFUL ALLY IN OUR DEALINGS WITH BOTH THE WHITES AND THE BISHOP, WHO HAS TRUST IN WALLS.

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CONFIDENTIAL

Prime Minister

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CONFIDENTIAL

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TO FLASH LUSAKA

TELNO 9 OF 2 AUGUST

INFO IMMEDIATE FCO AND PRETORIA

FOR DUFF

YOUR TELNO 5: RHODESIA

1. I HAD AN APPOINTMENT THIS MORNING WITH KAMUSIKIRI. WHILE WAITING, MUZOREWA CALLED ME IN.

2. MUZOREWA SAID THAT HE WISHED ME TO KNOW THAT HE WAS MUCH ENCOURAGED BY THE PRIME MINISTER'S STATEMENT AT THE OPENING OF THE COMMONWEALTH CONFERENCE. IT WAS CLEAR THAT HMGS WERE STILL PURSUING THE COURSE THAT HAD BEEN OUTLINED TO HIM BY THE PRIME MINISTER IN LONDON. HE ALSO WANTED US TO KNOW THAT THERE WOULD BE NO CRITICAL COMMENT OR STATEMENTS ABOUT HMGS'S PRESENT STAND (KAMUSIKIRI TOLD ME SUBSEQUENTLY THAT MUZOREWA HAD REPRIMANDED MUKOME FOR HIS STATEMENT IN PARLIAMENT YESTERDAY. (MY TELNO 477 TO FCO). MUZOREWA WANTED TO ASSURE ME THAT HE RETAINED FULL CONFIDENCE IN HMGS INTENTIONS.

3. I SAID THAT I WOULD CONVEY THESE VIEWS TO THE PRIME MINISTER IN LUSAKA. I NOTED THAT THERE WOULD BE NO CRITICAL PUBLIC COMMENT OF HMGS ATTITUDE AND ENQUIRED WHETHER THIS WOULD ALSO APPLY TO RECENT SPEECHES AND STATEMENTS BY OTHER COMMONWEALTH LEADERS. MUZOREWA SAID THAT HE WOULD HAVE TO DISAPPOINT ME OVER THIS. HE COULD NOT OVERLOOK THE RECENT REMARKS BY KAUNDA. THERE WOULD BE A REACTION. HE ASSURED ME, HOWEVER, THAT THIS REACTION WOULD BE VERBAL AND THAT NO MILITARY ACTION WAS CONTEMPLATED.

4. A SUBSEQUENT CONVERSATION WITH KAMUSIKIRI HE SAID THAT STRONG PRESSURE HAD BUILD UP YESTERDAY AFTER KAUNDA'S STATEMENT. THIS HAD FOCUSED ON 3 ISSUES: (A) NKOMO'S PRESENCE AT THE OPENING OF THE CONFERENCE, (B) KAUNDA'S ASSERTION THAT RHODESIA WAS STILL A BRITISH RESPONSIBILITY FOLLOWED BY REMARKS INDICATING THAT HE AND AFRICA EXPECTED THEIR VIEWS TO PREDOMINATE, (C) KAUNDA'S REFERENCE TO AN INTENSIFICATION OF THE WAR AGAINST SOUTHERN AFRICA.

5. KAMUSIKIRI SAID THAT PRESSURES FOR SOME RESPONSE HAD COME NOT ONLY FROM WITHIN THE COUNTRY. THE SOUTH AFRICAN PRIME MINISTER HAD TELEPHONED TO ASK HOW MUZOREWA INTENDED TO REACT TO THESE LATEST PROVOCATIONS.

6. KAMUSIKIRI AGAIN GAVE AN ASSURANCE THAT MUZOREWA WOULD RESIST PRESSURES FOR ANY MILITARY RESPONSE. HE COULD NOT HOWEVER, REMAIN MUTE. DOMESTIC OPINION REQUIRED SOME RESPONSE. A STATEMENT WAS THEREFORE LIKELY TO BE MADE LATER TODAY CRITICISING KAUNDA'S REMARKS, POINTING OUT THAT THE "EVILS" TO WHICH HE REFERRED NO LONGER EXISTED, CONDEMNING KAUNDA'S THREAT OF AN INTENSIFICATION OF THE WAR, COMMENTING ON THE THOUGHTLESSNESS OF THOSE WHO PERMITTED NKOMO TO ATTEND THE OPENING SESSION AND POINTING OUT THAT IF THERE IS TO BE WAR IN SOUTHERN AFRICA IT SHOULD BE AGAINST POVERTY AND IGNORANCE. AT MY SUGGESTION KAMUSIKIRI AGREED TO REMOVE FROM THE PROPOSED STATEMENT A COMMENT ON NKOMO'S PERSONAL INSULTS AGAINST MRS THATCHER. HE AGREED THAT IT WAS PREFERABLE TO LEAVE THE PRIME MINISTER HERSELF TO DEAL WITH THIS.

7. THERE SEEMS NO DANGER THEREFORE OF AN IMMINENT RHODESIAN RAID INTO ZAMBIA. ALL THE INDICATIONS ARE THAT MUZOREWA WILL STAY HIS HAND AT LEAST UNTIL THE END OF THE COMMONWEALTH CONFERENCE. HE REALISES THE GRAVE POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES OF A RAID INTO ZAMBIA AT THIS TIME. CONTINUED ZIPRA INFILTRATION FROM ZAMBIA IN DIRECT VIOLATION OF THE ASSURANCES GIVEN BY NKOMO NEVERTHELESS INCREASES THE PRESSURES UPON HIM.

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Commonwealth Information

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COMMONWEALTH HEADS OF GOVERNMENT MEETING
LUSAKA, AUGUST 1979

FINAL COMMUNIQUE

1. Commonwealth Heads of Government met in Lusaka from 1 to 7 August, 1979. Of the 39 countries which attended the Meeting, 27 were represented by their Presidents or Prime Ministers. The President of Zambia, Dr. Kenneth Kaunda, was in the Chair.
2. They sent a message of felicitations to Her Majesty the Queen as Head of the Commonwealth. They welcomed with special pleasure the opportunity of meeting in Lusaka the capital of Zambia, an African nation in the forefront of the struggle for human emancipation. They expressed deep appreciation for the excellent arrangements for the Meeting made by the Zambian Government and gratitude for the hospitality extended to them.
3. Heads of Government warmly welcomed their colleagues from Solomon Islands, Dominica, St. Lucia and Kiribati, which had become members of the association since their last Meeting, and extended similar greetings to Tuvalu which had acceded to special membership.
4. Heads of Government, recognising the growing contribution which the Commonwealth is capable of making to the solution of world problems, reaffirmed the importance which they attach to meeting together and the opportunity this gives for consultations aimed at forging a consensus on some of the major issues facing the world.

Lusaka Declaration of the Commonwealth on Racism and Racial Prejudice

5. Heads of Government approved unanimously and proclaimed the Lusaka Declaration of the Commonwealth on Racism and Racial Prejudice.

World and Commonwealth Trends

6. In considering political trends since their last Meeting, Heads of Government were conscious of the gravity and complexity of the problems now facing the international community, in particular in South-east Asia, Southern Africa, the Middle East and the Mediterranean. They were concerned that many of these problems, some of long standing, were now assuming critical dimensions. Their analysis of political trends was made against the sombre background of mounting economic difficulties which they subsequently examined in greater detail. They noted that the intractability of international economic problems was increasingly a cause of political instability in many parts of the world and frequently made it difficult for governments to take positive steps within their own societies necessary to promote social and economic justice consistent with respect for basic human rights. In Southern Africa the stubborn persistence of apartheid and racist policies was seen as a matter of grave concern to the Commonwealth and Heads of Government acknowledged that further delay in the satisfactory resolution of that issue could lead to divisions within the Commonwealth itself and jeopardise further the peace and security of the entire region.

7. Focusing on these and other international problems, Heads of Government recognised that no single power or group of powers could any longer impose solutions; lasting solutions required collective action by the international community as a whole. Heads of Government looked to the Commonwealth to play a significant part in upholding shared principles, reconciling differences of approach, harmonising divergent interests and building a more secure basis for world peace and prosperity.

South-east Asia

8. Heads of Government reviewed the serious situation in South-east Asia resulting from the armed conflicts in Indo-China. They expressed concern at the continuing conflicts and tensions in the region, and the fact that these were being exacerbated by outside powers. They warned that there was a real danger of the conflicts escalating over a wider area.

9. Heads of Government condemned all acts of armed intervention in the region which violated the universally accepted principles of respect for a country's sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence. Affirming the right of the peoples of the region to determine their own future free from outside interference, subversion or coercion, they called for the speedy withdrawal of all foreign forces from the areas of conflict. Urging all states in South-east Asia to develop peaceful, friendly and harmonious relations, Heads of Government noted with approval the efforts being made for the early establishment of a zone of peace, freedom and neutrality in the region, and called upon all states to lend their fullest support to these efforts.

Refugees

10. Heads of Government expressed deep concern at the global growth of the international refugee problem. They turned their attention to the particular problems of refugees in Africa, South-east Asia and the Eastern Mediterranean.

11. They recalled the longstanding concern of the Commonwealth at the enforced movements of refugees as a result of harassment by the authorities in Namibia, Zimbabwe and South Africa. They expressed their concern at the additional burden thus imposed on independent countries in Southern Africa in discharging a humanitarian obligation to receive and support the peoples concerned.

12. Heads of Government expressed grave concern at the enormity of the problem of refugees leaving the countries of Indo-China, in particular Vietnam, arising from the situation in that region and which is causing severe political, socio-economic and security problems for the other countries and territories in South-east Asia. They noted that this problem, if unchecked, will have a destabilising effect on the region. They expressed their appreciation for the contribution being made in the South-east Asian region by Malaysia and Hong Kong in particular, and the large-scale programmes for resettlement including those being undertaken by Australia, Britain, Canada and New Zealand. They appealed to all members of the international community to increase their contributions to and actively co-operate with the work of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees for whose operations they expressed their admiration and support.

13. In this regard, they noted with approval the statement of the United Nations Secretary-General Dr. Waldheim that "the countries of origin must respect the right of emigration and family reunification, while avoiding any action leading to their people departing the country under conditions which would put their lives in jeopardy. This obligation stems from the basic right of individuals to stay in their country or to leave as a matter of free will." They also noted that at the recent United Nations Geneva Conference on Indo-China Refugees, Vietnam had undertaken to co-operate with the international community in regulating the orderly departure of these refugees. They expressed the hope that Vietnam will continue to show a positive attitude and assist in finding an effective and permanent solution to this refugee problem.

Southern Africa

14. Heads of Government had a frank discussion on the current problems of Southern Africa and their implications for the Commonwealth and the wider international community. While recognising that certain developments since their Meeting in London have added new dimensions, they remained concerned by the potential dangers inherent in the existing situation. They therefore stressed the urgent need for finding satisfactory solutions to the remaining problems of this region.

15. In relation to the situation in Rhodesia, Heads of Government therefore:

- a. confirmed that they were wholly committed to genuine black majority rule for the people of Zimbabwe;
- b. recognised, in this context, that the internal settlement constitution is defective in certain important respects;
- c. fully accepted that it is the constitutional responsibility of the British Government to grant legal independence to Zimbabwe on the basis of majority rule;
- d. recognised that the search for a lasting settlement must involve all parties to the conflict;
- e. were deeply conscious of the urgent need to achieve such a settlement and bring peace to the people of Zimbabwe and their neighbours;
- f. accepted that independence on the basis of majority rule requires the adoption of a democratic constitution including appropriate safeguards for minorities;
- g. acknowledged that the government formed under such an independence constitution must be chosen through free and fair elections properly supervised under British Government authority, and with Commonwealth observers;
- h. welcomed the British Government's indication that an appropriate procedure for advancing towards these objectives would be for them to call a constitutional conference to which all the parties would be invited; and
- i. consequently, accepted that it must be a major objective to bring about a cessation of hostilities and an end to sanctions as part of the process of implementation of a lasting settlement.

16. Heads of Government stressed that the grave problems afflicting the Southern Africa region stemmed from the racist policies of the South African regime embodied in the system of apartheid. In order formally to express their abhorrence of all forms of racist policy, wherever and however they might be manifested, they agreed to make a special declaration on this subject. This has been published as the Lusaka Declaration of the Commonwealth on Racism and Racial Prejudice. This declaration reaffirms the Commonwealth rejection of all policies designed to perpetuate apartheid, racial segregation or other policies based on theories that racial groups are or may be inherently superior or inferior.

17. Heads of Government deplored South Africa's continued refusal to implement the relevant Security Council resolutions providing for Namibia's independence and the UN Secretary-General's proposals outlined in his report of 26 February 1979. They commended the positive response of those Commonwealth Governments which had been requested by the Secretary-General to provide military or civilian personnel as part of the proposed UN Transitional Assistance Group for Namibia.

18. Heads of Government condemned the steps taken by South Africa to establish an illegal National Assembly inside Namibia following the holding of the so-called elections last December. They declared that these developments contravened the relevant Security Council resolutions and were in defiance of the efforts of the international community to bring to an end South Africa's illegal occupation of Namibia and to secure for its people genuine independence.

19. Heads of Government recalled that in repeatedly condemning South Africa's policies, the UN General Assembly and Security Council had warned South Africa that it faced international action under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter if it did not agree to the implementation of the UN proposals for Namibia. They therefore called upon South Africa to comply with the decisions of the international community.

20. Taking note that two of their members had played a role as part of a Five-power initiative with the South African authorities in attempting to secure South Africa's co-operation in implementing the decisions of the Security Council with regard to Namibia, Heads of Government expressed the earnest hope that this effort would contribute to expediting Namibia's passage to genuine independence.

21. Meeting for the first time in full Session in Africa, Heads of Government paid tribute to the outstanding contribution of African countries in general and African Commonwealth countries in particular, to the development of a more humanitarian international community and to the evolution of the Commonwealth along relevant and enlightened lines. They paid special tribute to the Front-Line States and to Nigeria for their active support to the various initiatives seeking negotiated solutions to the problems of Rhodesia and Namibia.

22. Heads of Government expressed satisfaction at the effective manner in which the Commonwealth Committee on Southern Africa had discharged its responsibilities in the past two years. Having considered its Report, Heads of Government endorsed those recommendations which were put forward unanimously. They authorised the Committee to continue its work, and to intensify its collaboration with the United Nations on all questions of mutual concern and interest.

23. In endorsing the recommendations of the Commonwealth Committee on Southern Africa regarding Commonwealth humanitarian assistance to Southern Africa, Heads of Government noted with approval the contribution of the Commonwealth, made both bilaterally and multilaterally, to international assistance for manpower development for Zimbabwe and Namibia. In this context, Heads of Government commended the Secretariat's assistance programmes as cost-effective and efficiently administered and agreed that they should be expanded in scope subject to the availability of resources.

24. Heads of Government noted with concern that as the conflict has escalated in Zimbabwe, its effects have increasingly spilled over into the neighbouring Commonwealth states of Botswana and Zambia as well as into Mozambique. The Meeting called on the international community to increase its assistance to the Front-Line States in order to alleviate the damage to their development caused by the persistent problems of Southern Africa. Heads of Government, noting with approval the technical assistance programme financed by the Commonwealth Fund for Mozambique would welcome continued Commonwealth assistance, agreed that the Fund should continue to remain available to member Governments as a channel for such assistance. The Meeting concluded that, while significant bilateral and multilateral assistance is already being provided to the Front-Line States and Southern Africa to which individual Commonwealth countries make an important contribution, the needs of the region justify further international assistance on a substantial scale. Against the background of a collective Commonwealth commitment and in response to the requests of member Governments, the Secretary-General was asked to supplement the activities of other international agencies by assisting in contingency planning including regional studies in anticipation of the emergence of independent and internationally accepted governments in Zimbabwe and Namibia.

Cyprus

25. Reviewing developments concerning Cyprus since their last Meeting, Heads of Government noted with satisfaction and endorsed the Kyprianou-Denktash agreement of 19 May 1979 under the auspices of the United Nations Secretary-General but expressed their grave concern at the failure to achieve a just and lasting solution to the Cyprus problem.

26. They regretted the lack of progress in the inter-communal talks which should be based on the said agreement and expressed the hope that these talks could be resumed at the earliest possible date with a view to reaching a just and lasting solution on the basis of the United Nations Resolutions relevant to the question of Cyprus and in accordance with the Kyprianou-Denktash agreement of 19 May 1979.

27. Heads of Government also regretted the non-implementation of General Assembly and Security Council Resolutions on Cyprus. They called once more for the urgent implementation of General Assembly Resolution 3212 (XXIX) as endorsed by Security Council Resolution 365 (1974) which, together with subsequent United Nations Resolutions, were to form the basis of settling the Cyprus question.

28. They expressed concern at the fact that foreign troops still occupied part of the territory of the Republic of Cyprus and stressed the urgent need for the voluntary return of displaced persons to their homes in safety, respect for the human rights of all Cypriots, including the tracing of and accounting for those missing on both sides, and non-interference in the demographic structure of the Republic of Cyprus.

29. They noted the proposal of the President of the Republic of Cyprus presented at the Tenth Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly on Disarmament for the total demilitarisation and disarmament of the Republic of Cyprus which was put forward as a significant contribution to the search for a solution of the Cyprus problem.

30. They reaffirmed their solidarity with the Government and people of Cyprus and in this respect reiterated their determination to help in the achievement of a political settlement based on the independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and non-alignment of the Republic of Cyprus.

31. Heads of Government believing further that the Commonwealth Committee on Cyprus, established in 1975 at their Meeting in Kingston, could play a more constructive role in the achievement of a just and lasting solution of the problem of Cyprus, decided to ask the Commonwealth Secretary-General to convene the Committee at Ministerial level whenever appropriate and under the same terms of reference.

Belize

32. Heads of Government reviewed developments over Belize and noted with appreciation the work of the Commonwealth Ministerial Committee on Belize. They reaffirmed their full support for the legitimate aspirations of the people of Belize for early and secure independence on the basis of territorial integrity, and again acknowledged that any settlement of the question must command the full consent of the Government and people of Belize. Heads of Government renewed their commitment to the search for an acceptable solution and in this regard requested the Committee, consonant with its mandate, to intensify its efforts to mobilise even further international support for Belize. Noting that there were on-going talks with Guatemala and bearing in mind the special responsibilities of Britain as the administering power, they welcomed the British Government's readiness to resume negotiations with a view to producing an internationally acceptable settlement in accordance with the Charter and relevant resolutions of the United Nations.

Middle East

33. Heads of Government reviewed the serious situation in the Middle East with particular reference to the central question of Palestine. Recalling the relevant United Nations Resolutions they emphasised that a just and permanent peace can only be achieved on the basis of a fully comprehensive solution which upholds the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people including their right to a home land. In this respect the Commonwealth members of the United Nations Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People drew particular attention to the Committee's recommendations. Heads of Government expressed their grave concern that the Palestinian problem is still unresolved and that it continues to pose a serious threat to peace and security in the Middle East, the Mediterranean and throughout the world. Most Heads of Government recognised that the Palestine Liberation Organisation is the only legitimate representative of the Palestinian people struggling justifiably for an independent Palestinian State.

Mediterranean

34. Heads of Government emphasised that the security of Europe, the Mediterranean and the Middle East were inter-related and that Europe has a contribution to make to the search for just and durable solutions to conflicts in the region. In this respect, the further implementation of the Mediterranean Chapter agreed upon and incorporated in the Helsinki Final Act, four years ago, would enhance both European and Mediterranean security as well as Middle East peace, thus contributing to the development of security and co-operation throughout the area. Heads of Government agreed that greater stability in the Mediterranean would enable the countries of the Region and Europe to pursue freer and closer co-operation amongst themselves and also with Commonwealth members.

Indian Ocean

35. Heads of Government reviewed developments in the Indian Ocean region since their last Meeting. They noted, with regret, that not much progress had been made in implementing the United Nations Declaration of 1971 on the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace. They also noted that Great Power military presence in the Indian Ocean, instead of decreasing, had actually increased. They urged the Great Powers and the major maritime users of the Indian Ocean to co-operate more actively with the littoral and hinterland States and with the Ad Hoc Committee of the United Nations for the implementing of this Declaration.

36. Heads of Government noted, with satisfaction, that the USA and the USSR have agreed that their representatives would meet to discuss the resumption of talks, which they hoped would contribute to the establishment of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace. They expressed the wish that these talks would be resumed early.

South Asia

37. Heads of Government noted with satisfaction that the countries of the South Asian subcontinent were making earnest efforts to increase co-operation among themselves, thus contributing positively to stability and peace in the area.

Economic Matters

38. Heads of Government reviewed developments in the world economy since they last met in London in 1977. They noted with deep concern the deterioration since then in the world economic situation. A continuation of this trend would pose grave problems for all countries. The developing countries, especially the poorest among them, were facing particularly grim prospects and there was a real danger that unless remedial measures were taken urgently, existing disparities in income and wealth between the rich and poor countries would widen further. They noted that a large part of the world's population continued to live in intolerable poverty with little hope for a better future. They recognised that this persistence of mass poverty further highlighted the urgent need for a more rational and equitable economic order. They reaffirmed their commitment to structural change and policies to improve growth in order to reduce poverty and increase living standards.

39. Heads of Government noted that the increasingly inter-dependent world economic system depended for its healthy functioning on the efficient deployment of global resources and affording all countries an equitable opportunity to participate in it. This would require acceptance by all of structural change and the adoption of policies to effect such change and to improve prospects for global economic growth, the restraint of inflation and the fuller employment of human and material resources. Higher rates of growth were particularly urgent for the developing countries.

40. Heads of Government noted that the period since 1973 had witnessed slower growth in international economic activity and in international trade by comparison with the previous quarter century. Recent assessments by international organisations for the medium term outlook were for a continuation of slow growth or even a further deterioration in growth prospects.

41. Heads of Government considered that a continuation of slow growth in the global economy would further damage the prospects for reducing poverty and raising living standards in developing countries. Such a continuation would also be contrary to the economic interests of developed countries and could have adverse effects on the economic, social and political structures of all countries. These circumstances called for bolder endeavours and a new approach to the formulation of policies and to improving the public understanding of the need for change in the countries participating in the inter-dependent international system. For the decision-making process to be sufficiently responsive, it would require better information and involvement at the highest political level.

42. Against the background, Heads of Government requested the Secretary-General to commission an in-depth report by a group of eight to ten independent experts from Commonwealth countries chosen from appropriate fields. Their task would be to investigate and report on the factors inhibiting structural change and a sustained improvement in economic growth in both developed and developing countries, in particular the acceleration of growth in developing countries. The report, which should be clearly focused, should assess the importance of and the relationship between possible constraints, such as protection and adjustment policies, inflation, subsidies both on production and exports, fluctuations in commodity prices, availability and cost of energy resources, including oil, and factors inhibiting investment, transfer of technology and international flows of official and private resources.

43. The report should identify specific measures by which developed and developing countries, Commonwealth and non-Commonwealth, might act to reduce or eliminate such constraints as a matter of urgency. They recognised that this would require attention at the highest political level. The group, which would be assembled by the Secretary-General after appropriate consultation with member governments, should report in time to assist Commonwealth Governments in their preparation for the Special Session of the UN General Assembly in 1980.

44. Heads of Government expressed concern about the serious balance of payments problems faced by many developing countries and some developed countries also. They noted that, among other serious and persisting factors, recent developments in the oil market had aggravated these problems. This would call for appropriate adjustment policies and might necessitate emergency assistance in many cases. They recognised that orderly arrangements for financing these deficits were in the interest of all countries and therefore constituted an important challenge to the international community. They welcomed recent agreement on an increase in the IMF quotas, new allocations of SDRs and the establishment of the Supplementary Financing Facility since it represented a step towards the goal of much-needed monetary reform. They also welcomed prospects for an early enlargement of the capital of the IBRD, and stressed the need to keep under close review the resources available from international institutions.

45. Heads of Government noted the new guidelines on conditionality which had been adopted by the IMF. While all countries accepted the need for reasonable conditions, and the need to adopt appropriate adjustment policies, it was important to have regard to individual domestic, social and political circumstances. These considerations are of especial importance to small island developing and other specially disadvantaged states. They accordingly recognised the need for the international financial institutions to keep their operational policies under review.

46. Heads of Government discussed the effects of recent developments in the field of energy on the growth prospects of developed and developing countries. Mindful of the serious effects on the world economy of recent trends, they noted that the developing countries consumed only a small proportion of the world's oil and this mostly for essential purposes in agriculture, industry and transport. In discussing the relationship between the supply and cost of energy they recognised the particularly difficult economic problem that the energy deficient developing countries were currently having to face. Heads of Government noted that many countries had embarked upon major programmes to conserve energy and reduce their dependence on imported oil. They called upon the international community to develop the necessary institutional mechanisms to deal with this most important subject and to ensure that the necessary financial and technological resources were mobilised to ensure rapid development of both renewable and non-renewable sources of energy. The Heads of Government noted that special measures would need to be taken to assist the energy deficient developing countries to reduce this deficiency and the effect it is having upon their economic development.

47. Heads of Government noted that the Multilateral Trade Negotiations had been concluded since their last Meeting and that agreement had been reached on tariffs and some non-tariff barriers. Heads of Government recalled the hope expressed at their last Meeting that the Negotiations would provide significant benefits to developing countries. They recognised that the results fell far short of the aspirations of the developing countries. They noted that there had been little or no progress on liberalisation of world agricultural trade and trade in tropical products. On the other hand, they noted that progress had been made in the liberalisation of trade in industrial products. While noting failure so far to reach agreement on a safeguard code, they expressed the hope that the negotiation of such a code, satisfactory to all concerned, would be completed without delay. They agreed that countries should not take unilateral action against imports in a manner inconsistent with established international trade rules. They noted that the danger of protectionism was ever present and urged countries to resist protectionist pressures wherever they arise. They believed this would assist the efforts of developing countries to secure better and more stable access to the markets of industrialised countries, and hoped that every effort would be made to achieve this.

48. Heads of Government noted the strong dissatisfaction of the Commonwealth African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries with the outcome of the negotiation for a successor to the Lome Convention. This concerned many aspects of the Lome Convention, including the dissatisfaction of the mineral exporting ACP countries with the proposed mineral assistance scheme and its failure to deal with the urgent problem of unstable export earnings for minerals.

49. They reviewed developments in the North/South dialogue, particularly the results of the Fifth Session of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) in Manila. They expressed disappointment at the lack of faster progress towards more effective international co-operation in the areas of trade and finance, and concern at the slow pace of recent international negotiations on specific measures to promote the evolution of a new international order from which all countries could benefit. They acknowledged, however, that one element of progress had been the agreement regarding the basic elements of the Common Fund. They welcomed this development and noted with satisfaction the contribution made by the Commonwealth in helping to bring about a convergence of positions on the Common Fund following initiatives taken at their last Meeting. They urged early completion of final arrangements for the establishment of the Fund as scheduled, including pledges to the Second Window. They stressed the need to accelerate the setting up of effective international commodity agreements, in respect of commodities of export interest to developing countries, to stabilise commodity prices, and to fulfil the objectives of the Common Fund. They recognised the need for effective mechanisms for consultations between producers to be developed within the framework of the Commonwealth.

50. Heads of Government noted that the Final Report of the Team of Industrial Specialists had been completed and considered by a Meeting of Commonwealth Ministers on industrial co-operation held in Bangalore in March 1979. They acknowledged that effective industrialisation was an essential element in development strategy and that international action must support and reinforce policies to accelerate the pace of industrialisation in developing countries. In this context, they endorsed the Commonwealth Action Programme agreed at the Meeting of Commonwealth Ministers. They approved the establishment of an Industrial Development Unit in the CFTC with proposed additional financial resources of £5 million for the initial three-year period, and requested the Secretary-General to proceed with the establishment of a Unit with functions and initial staffing as proposed by him.

51. Heads of Government expressed concern over the international food security situation. They agreed that a meeting of Commonwealth Ministers of Agriculture and Food be held before or during the forthcoming FAO Council Meeting. The meeting could usefully encompass such essential elements as food security, production and distribution, as well as the transfer of technology for the manufacture of agricultural inputs. To facilitate the discussion at the proposed Ministerial Meeting, the Secretariat was asked to prepare a study of these issues.

52. Developed Commonwealth countries recognised the importance of increased and stable flows of aid, finance and investment to developing countries. Heads of Government expressed deep concern at the declining trend in Official Development Assistance in relation to national income, having regard to the internationally agreed 0.7 per cent target. They called for further improvement in the terms and conditions of aid, particularly for poor countries. In this connection, they noted with satisfaction the improvement effected by major Commonwealth donor countries in the terms of their aid to developing countries.

53. Heads of Government welcomed the opportunity to discuss for the first time the special disadvantages that beset the growing number of smaller member countries, particularly the island developing countries and certain other specially disadvantaged member countries. They agreed that in order to offset the disadvantages of small size, isolation and scarce resources which severely limit the capacity of such countries to achieve their development objectives or to pursue their national interests in a wider international context, special measures of support were required. They noted in particular the growing needs of small island states for specialised assistance to enable them to take effective advantage of the resources within their 200 mile Exclusive Economic Zones. In order to facilitate the exploitation of such resources, they hoped for early completion of the UN Conference on the Law of the Sea in a manner which would reflect in a balanced way the interests of all countries.

54. Heads of Government considered a memorandum by the Secretary-General analysing the problems of island developing and other specially disadvantaged countries, and proposing a wide range of measures designed to supplement existing bilateral and multi-lateral assistance to these countries. They commended the memorandum as a constructive basis for practical action. They requested the Secretary-General to pursue the programme of action recommended for the Secretariat, as resources permit and recipient countries request, and urged member Governments carefully to consider implementing those measures recommended. Heads of Government believed that the Commonwealth could thus respond both multilaterally and bilaterally to the special needs of smaller and specially disadvantaged members. They requested the Secretary-General, acting in close consultation with the countries concerned, to convene as necessary a committee to make recommendations on additional or improved programmes of assistance for consideration by Commonwealth Governments.

55. Heads of Government reaffirmed their belief in the value of regional co-operation as a means of promoting accelerated growth and development. They noted the active participation of Commonwealth countries in a wide range of regional associations in five continents and agreed that the Secretariat should continue to assist efforts directed at fostering and strengthening regional and inter-regional co-operation. Recognising the valuable contribution which Commonwealth consultation at the regional level could make in enhancing co-operation on matters of Commonwealth interest and promoting Commonwealth objectives, Heads of Government expressed satisfaction at the successful outcome of the first meeting of Heads of Government of the Asia/Pacific region held in Sydney in February 1978. They commended the initiatives flowing from the Sydney Meeting and hoped that progress in the consultative and working groups that had been established would contribute to the success of the next Heads of Government Regional Meeting in New Delhi in 1980.

Commonwealth Fund for Technical Co-operation

56. Heads of Government recorded their appreciation of the work of the Commonwealth Fund for Technical Co-operation, and in particular of the expeditious and flexible way in which the Fund responded to a wide variety of requests. They agreed that, while maintaining its reputation for informality and cost-effectiveness, the Fund expressed in a practical way the ideals of mutual assistance and functional co-operation and thus strengthened multilateral links amongst Commonwealth countries and peoples. Recognising the need of the Fund to grow in order to maintain its ability to meet the expanding requirements of Commonwealth Governments, and to be innovative in response to new needs, including housing, urbanisation and protection of the environment, Heads of Government called for a positive approach by all members to the provision of additional real resources and they welcomed the intention expressed at the Meeting by a number of developed and developing countries to make significant increases in their contributions.

International Year of the Child

57. Cognisant of the fact that their Meeting was taking place during the International Year of the Child, Heads of Government recognised that the future economic and social wellbeing of all Commonwealth countries depends in large measure on the extent to which the special needs and aspirations of children are fulfilled. They agreed that all future development planning should reflect this important priority.

Commonwealth Youth Programme

58. Heads of Government reaffirmed the original objectives of the Commonwealth Youth Programme and noted that it was the only Programme providing for extensive inter-governmental co-operation in this field. They recognised that the need for mobilising young people to assist in the development process was even more pressing now than when the Programme was first launched in 1973. It was therefore a matter for concern that inadequate funding of the Programme was severely limiting its capacity to assist Commonwealth Governments in a crucial area of co-operation. In commending the work of the three regional centres in providing essential training for young administrators and field workers it was recognised that unless the Programme received more funds this vital aspect of its activities would be placed in jeopardy.

59. Heads of Government strongly endorsed the request of the Secretary-General for an increase of at least one-third in pledges to the Commonwealth Youth Programme. They agreed that the funds available to the Programme for the biennium 1980-82 should be increased to £1 million per annum. In determining its minimum voluntary contribution to the target figure they suggested that each Government might be guided by its assessed percentage contribution to the Commonwealth Secretariat's administration budget and that all member Governments should endeavour to increase their pledges to make good the deficit. They also agreed that the Commonwealth Youth Affairs Council at its meeting early in 1980 should review the management, budget, structure, activities and future direction of the Programme.

Commonwealth Foundation

60. Heads of Government commended the cost-effectiveness and imaginative work of the Commonwealth Foundation in developing and strengthening professional co-operation throughout the Commonwealth. They agreed that the Foundation's mandate should, subject to a review of its priorities, be expanded as recommended by the Advisory Committee on Relationships between the Official and the Unofficial Commonwealth in areas including culture, information, social welfare and rural development. In order to make good the erosive effects of inflation, and to permit the envisaged expansion in the Foundation's activities, the target for the Foundation's income was set at £1.1 million, although it was recognised that realisable resources were unlikely to exceed £900,000 in 1979-1980.

The Official and Unofficial Commonwealth

61. Heads of Government considered the Report of the Advisory Committee on relationships between the official and the unofficial Commonwealth and endorsed the conclusion that non-governmental organisations were an under-utilised resource. They agreed that official Commonwealth bodies at all levels, national, international and regional, should make a determined drive to establish regular exchanges with the unofficial sector. In this way the energies and expertise of non-governmental organisations would be more effectively harnessed to programmes of social and economic development, and to increasing information, understanding and appreciation of the Commonwealth among the general public. At the national level, Governments should take appropriate measures to improve contact with NGOs and to channel assistance to and through them. They requested the Secretary-General to encourage Commonwealth consultative bodies dealing with technical and professional matters to invite representatives of NGOs to meetings in an observer capacity.

Women and Development

62. Heads of Government noted that in conformity with the decision taken at their London Meeting in 1977, the Secretary-General had carried out an assessment of all Secretariat programmes with a view to ensuring that appropriate provision was made for women both as participants in and as beneficiaries of such programmes.

63. Heads of Government also noted that the review revealed scope for greater involvement of women in Secretariat programmes and for those programmes to be more relevant to the needs of women. They recognised that to achieve significant and quick progress in this area a focal point was needed within the Secretariat to assist the Secretary-General in responding to identified needs and priorities of Governments and help the Secretariat to plan its programmes so as to take full account of the needs of women. They, therefore, agreed that an Adviser to the Secretary-General be appointed, with such supporting staff as were necessary, to co-ordinate and monitor action in this area.

64. It was recognised, however, that to a large extent progress depended on the policies of member Governments. In particular Governments should be encouraged to ensure that women played their full part in activities organised and training programmes funded by the Secretariat, and that in their requests for assistance, development projects which would be of direct benefit to women should receive due priority.

Commonwealth Human Rights Commission

65. Heads of Government reaffirmed the importance attached by Commonwealth Governments to the observance of human rights as proclaimed in the Singapore Declaration and other international instruments and welcomed in principle the initiative by the Government of The Gambia for the establishment of a Commonwealth Human Rights Commission. They decided that Governments be urged by the Secretary-General to communicate to him by the date of the next Commonwealth Law Ministers' Meeting, the views requested on the subject by Law Ministers at their Winnipeg Meeting in August 1977. They also requested the Secretary-General to appoint a suitably qualified and representative Working Party to make recommendations for the consideration of Commonwealth Governments.

Commonwealth Film and Television Institute

66. Heads of Government welcomed in principle the proposal by the Government of Cyprus for the establishment of a Commonwealth Film and Television Institute which would operate as a non-governmental institution. They invited the Secretary-General to undertake, with relevant Commonwealth institutions, a detailed study for the feasibility of the proposal and report to Commonwealth Governments, if possible within a year.

Communication and Media in the Commonwealth

67. Heads of Government endorsed the establishment of a select committee to identify the most pressing communication and media problems, with particular reference to the needs of developing countries, as a basis for the identification of regional and national communications priorities in Commonwealth countries and of suitable forms of practical co-operation to meet these problems. They asked the Secretary-General to determine, in consultation with Commonwealth Governments, the size and composition of the select committee bearing in mind the need to obtain a representative cross-section of Commonwealth opinion. The Committee could include representatives not only of Commonwealth Governments but also of relevant Commonwealth non-governmental organisations.

68. Heads of Government acknowledged the desirability of expanding media exchanges between Commonwealth countries and proposed that such exchanges be co-ordinated by the Secretariat, in consultation with the Commonwealth Foundation and the Governments concerned, and on the basis of voluntary contributions.

Report of the Secretary-General

69. Heads of Government commended the Seventh Report of the Secretary-General and noted with appreciation the progress made in various areas of Commonwealth activity since their last Meeting.

Next Meeting

70. Heads of Government accepted with pleasure the invitation of the Government of Australia to hold their next Meeting in Australia in 1981.

LUSAKA DECLARATION OF THE COMMONWEALTH ON RACISM
AND RACIAL PREJUDICE

We, the Commonwealth Heads of Government, recalling the Declaration of Commonwealth Principles made at Singapore on 22 January 1971 and the statement on Apartheid in Sport, issued in London on 15 June 1977, have decided to proclaim our desire to work jointly as well as severally for the eradication of all forms of racism and racial prejudice.

The Commonwealth is an institution devoted to the promotion of international understanding and world peace, and to the achievement of equal rights for all citizens regardless of race, colour, sex, creed or political belief, and is committed to the eradication of the dangerous evils of racism and racial prejudice.

We now, therefore, proclaim this Lusaka Declaration of the Commonwealth on Racism and Racial Prejudice.

United in our desire to rid the world of the evils of racism and racial prejudice, we proclaim our faith in the inherent dignity and worth of the human person and declare that -

(i) the peoples of the Commonwealth have the right to live freely in dignity and equality, without any distinction or exclusion based on race, colour, sex, descent, or national or ethnic origin;

(ii) while everyone is free to retain diversity in his or her culture and lifestyle, this diversity does not justify the perpetuation of racial prejudice or racially discriminatory practices;

(iii) everyone has the right to equality before the law and equal justice under the law;

(iv) everyone has the right to effective remedies and protection against any form of discrimination based on the grounds of race, colour, sex, descent, or national or ethnic origin.

We reject as inhuman and intolerable all policies designed to perpetuate apartheid, racial segregation or other policies based on theories that racial groups are or may be inherently superior or inferior.

We reaffirm that it is the duty of all the peoples of the Commonwealth to work together for the total eradication of the infamous policy of apartheid which is internationally recognised as a crime against the conscience and dignity of mankind and the very existence of which is an affront to humanity.

We agree that everyone has the right to protection against acts of incitement to racial hatred and discrimination, whether committed by individuals, groups or other organisations.

We affirm that there should be no discrimination based on race, colour, sex, descent or national or ethnic origin in the acquisition or exercise of the right to vote; in the field of civil rights or access to citizenship; or in the economic, social or cultural fields, particularly education, health, employment, occupation, housing, social security and cultural life.

We attach particular importance to ensuring that children shall be protected from practices which may foster racism or racial prejudice. Children have the right to be brought up and educated in a spirit of tolerance and understanding so as to be able to contribute fully to the building of future societies based on justice and friendship.

We believe that those groups in societies who may be especially disadvantaged because of residual racist attitudes are entitled to the fullest protection of the law. We recognise that the history of the Commonwealth and its diversity require that special attention should be paid to the problems of indigenous minorities. We recognise that the same special attention should be paid to the problems of immigrants, immigrant workers and refugees.

We agree that special measures may in particular circumstances be required to advance the development of disadvantaged groups in society. We recognise that the effects of colonialism or racism in the past may make desirable special provisions for the social and economic enhancement of indigenous populations.

Inspired by the principles of freedom and equality which characterise our association, we accept the solemn duty of working together to eliminate racism and racial prejudice. This duty involves the acceptance of the principle that positive measures may be required to advance the elimination of racism, including assistance to those struggling to rid themselves and their environment of the practice.

Being aware that legislation alone cannot eliminate racism and racial prejudice, we endorse the need to initiate public information and education policies designed to promote understanding, tolerance, respect and friendship among peoples and racial groups.

We are particularly conscious of the importance of the contribution the media can make to human rights and the eradication of racism and racial prejudice by helping to eliminate ignorance and misunderstanding between people and by drawing attention to the evils which afflict humanity. We affirm the importance of truthful presentation of facts in order to ensure that the public are fully informed of the dangers presented by racism and racial prejudice.

In accordance with established principles of International Law and, in particular, the provisions of the International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination, we affirm that everyone is, at all times and in all places, entitled to be protected in the enjoyment of the right to be free of racism and racial prejudice.

We believe that the existence in the world of apartheid and racial discrimination is a matter of concern to all human beings. We recognise that we share an international responsibility to work together for the total eradication of apartheid and racial discrimination.

We note that racism and racial prejudice, wherever they occur, are significant factors contributing to tension between nations and thus inhibit peaceful progress and development. We believe that the goal of the eradication of racism stands as a critical priority for governments of the Commonwealth, committed as they are to the promotion of the ideals of peaceful and happy lives for their people.

We intend that the Commonwealth, as an international organisation with a fundamental and deep-rooted attachment to principles of freedom and equality, should co-operate with other organisations in the fulfilment of these principles. In particular the Commonwealth should seek to enhance the co-ordination of its activities with those of other organisations similarly committed to the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms.

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FM MIRIMBA SALISBURY 010300Z AUG 79

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 466 OF 1 AUGUST

INFO IMMEDIATE LUSAKA

INFO PRIORITY PRETORIA MAPUTO DAR ES SALAAM LUANDA GABORONE
LAGOS WASHINGTON AND UKMIS NEW YORK

MY TELNO 463: SITHOLE

Prime Minister
2/18

1. I CALLED ON SITHOLE YESTESDAY AFTERNOON. HE SAID THAT HE EXPECTED TO TAKE HIS SEATS IN PARLIAMENT ON 2 AUGUST. IN REPLY TO MY QUESTION, HE SAID THAT IT WAS HIS INTENTION ALSO TO TAKE UP THE TWO SEATS IN THE CABINET RESERVED FOR HIS PARTY. HE WOULD TAKE THE MINISTRY OF HEALTH. HE ADDED THAT HE HAD NOT YET BEEN IN TOUCH WITH THE BISHOP ABOUT THIS, BUT THAT HE COULD NOT BE DENIED THE TWO POSTS. HE HAD NO INTENTION OF UNDERMINING THE GOVERNMENT FROM WITHIN. HE WAS PREPARED TO WORK WITH THE BISHOP TO MAKE THE GOVERNMENT OF NATIONAL UNITY A SUCCESS. HE CLAIMED THAT THE GOVERNMENT WOULD FAIL IF IT WENT ON AS IT WAS. IT WAS NOT ACTING AS A TRUE MAJORITY GOVERNMENT. HE AIMED TO INJECT REAL PURPOSE INTO THE GOVERNMENT. THIS WAS WHY HIS PARTY HAD DECIDED TO PARTICIPATE IN PARLIAMENT AND THE GOVERNMENT.

2. SITHOLE SAID THAT HE WAS STILL FULLY COMMITTED TO THE MARCH 3 AGREEMENT, OF WHICH HE CLAIMED TO BE THE PILLAR. BUT THE AGREEMENT WAS NOT WORKING AS IT SHOULD. THE CONSTITUTION HAD BEEN SHOWN TO BE DEFECTIVE IN A NUMBER OF WAYS (UNSPECIFIED). THE COUNTRY WAS PLEADING FOR RECOGNITION, WHICH WOULD NOT COME WITHOUT CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE. THEREFORE CHANGES WOULD HAVE TO BE ACCEPTED. THIS IMPLIED A NEED FOR FURTHER ELECTIONS. THESE WOULD COME IN ANY EVENT IF HE WON HIS HIGH COURT CASE. HE IS CLEARLY COUNTING ON FRESH ELECTIONS FOR ONE REASON OR OTHER.

3. SITHOLE DREW ATTENTION TO HIS PARTY'S CALL FOR THE DISMISSAL OF GENERAL WALLS. HE ARGUED THAT NO COMMANDER RESPONSIBLE FOR A MASSACRE ON THE SCALE OF THE 20 JULY KILLINGS COULD BE KEPT IN OFFICE. THE BLACKS HAD LOST CONFIDENCE IN HIM AND IT WOULD NOT DO THE WHITES ANY GOOD TO SUPPORT SOMEONE IN WHOM THE BLACKS HAD NO CONFIDENCE. I QUESTIONED WHETHER THE GOVERNMENT AS A WHOLE WOULD FEEL DISPOSED TO SACK WALLS. SITHOLE SAID THAT HE WOULD ANYHOW HAVE MADE HIS POINT. I SEE NO POSSIBILITY OF WALLS BEING DISMISSED.

4. I ENQUIRED WHAT POLICIES SITHOLE WOULD BE URGING ON THE CABINET. HE SAID THAT HE WOULD CALL FOR AN END TO ATTACKS ON ZAMBIA AND THE OTHER NEIGHBOURING STATES. RHODESIA MUST HAVE GOOD RELATIONS WITH HER NEIGHBOURS. IT MADE NO SENSE TO HUMILIATE KAUNDA AND TO BRAG ABOUT THE SUCCESS OF RAIDS ON ZAMBIA. HE HAD NO QUARREL WITH THE NGOOD RELATIONS DEVELOPED WITH SOUTH AFRICA. THE SAME RELATIONSHIP MUST BE BUILT UP WITH THE OTHERS. COMMENTING ON THE LACK OF RESPONSE, TO DATE, TO OVERTURES MADE BY THE BISHOP, SITHOLE COMMENTED THAT THIS WAS BECAUSE RHODESIA DID NOT YET HAVE A REAL MAJORITY GOVERNMENT. WHEN IT WAS SEEN THAT THE BLACKS WERE IN EFFECTIVE CHARGE, THERE WOULD BE A RESPONSE.

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5. ON INTERNAL AFFAIRS, SITHOLE SAID THAT IT MUST BE SHOWN THAT THE BLACKS WERE INSTALLED WITHIN ALL THE DECISION MAKING PROCESSES. THEY MUST BE ABLE TO INFLUENCE THE DECISIONS OF THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSIONS ETC. HE COULD DEFEND EXISTING ARRANGEMENTS TO OTHER AFRICAN COUNTRIES. IF CHANGES WERE MADE, HE WOULD BE PREPARED TO GO OUT AND SELL THE INTERNAL AGREEMENT.

6. I ENQUIRED ABOUT HIS RELATIONS WITH CHIKEREMA. HE SAID THAT THERE WAS NO TRUTH THAT HE HAD CONCLUDED AN ALLIANCE WITH CHIKEREMA. ALLIANCES OF THIS KIND DIDN'T WORK: LOOK AT THE PATRIOTIC FRONT.

7. MUZOREWA WILL FIND SITHOLE AN UNCOMFORTABLE BED-FELLOW IN THE GOVERNMENT. HE SAYS THAT HE DOES NOT INTEND TO UNDERMINE THE GOVERNMENT BUT I EXPECT HIM TO BE HIGHLY CRITICAL, INSIDE GOVERNMENT, AND IN PUBLIC, OF WHAT HE SEES AS THE SHORTCOMINGS OF THE BISHOP. HE WILL PRESS FOR MORE FORCEFUL POLICIES TO BENEFIT THE BLACKS AND TO CONTROL WHITE DOMINATION. IN THE SHORT TERM, HOWEVER, THERE WILL BE SOME BENEFIT IN HIS RETURN TO THE FOLD IF IT ENABLES THE GOVERNMENT HERE TO PUT ON A GREATER SEMBLANCE OF UNITY TO THE OUTSIDE WORLD.

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PRETORIA 021530Z AUG

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TEL NO 418 OF 1/8/79

INFO IMMEDIATE LUSAKA (FOR PM'S PARTY)

INFO PRIORITY MIRIMBA SALISBURY WASHINGTON OTTAWA PARIS BONN

UKMIS NEW YORK DAR ES SALAAM GABORONE MAPUTO LUANDA LAGOS

Prime Minister

*8/8
3/8*

YOUR TELNO 584 TO LUSAKA: SOUTH AFRICAN MESSAGE ON RHODESIA AND NAMIBIA

1. WHEN I CALLED ON PIK BOTHA THIS AFTERNOON, HE WENT OVER MUCH THE SAME GROUND AS HE DID THE OTHER DAY (MY TELNO 401). I TOLD HIM THAT I THOUGHT I MIGHT BE ABLE TO GIVE HIM A CONSIDERED REPLY TO THE MESSAGE BEFORE LONG. HE REPLIED THAT HE HOPED THIS WOULD NOT JUST BE FOR THE RECORD, SINCE MATTER HAD NOW REACHED A POINT IN SOUTHERN AFRICA WHERE WE AND THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT NEEDED TO THINK CAREFULLY TOGETHER ABOUT THE NATURE OF THE THREAT AND WHAT WE WERE HOPING TO ACHIEVE. WE MUST HAVE A LOT OF COMMON INTERESTS AND HE WOULD NOT BELIEVE THAT WE WANTED TO SEE A GENERAL COLLAPSE IN THE AREA. THE SAG FELT STRONGLY THAT THE KEY TO THE RHODESIA CRISIS WAS THE LIFTING OF SANCTIONS. ONCE THIS HAD BEEN DONE THE ECONOMIC AND SECURITY SITUATIONS WOULD BEGIN TO IMPROVE AND OTHER THINGS WOULD FALL INTO PLACE. I SAID THAT I WOULD CERTAINLY WELCOME THE OPPORTUNITY TO EXCHANGE VIEWS WITH HIM AT GREATER LENGTH AFTER CHOGM. IN THE MEANTIME, IT SEEMED TO ME THAT IT WAS NOT JUST A QUESTION OF WHEN SANCTIONS WERE LIFTED BUT HOW THEY WERE LIFTED. UNLESS THIS COULD BE DONE WITH REASONABLE INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT IT WOULD NOT LEAD TO A DE-ESCALATION OF THE SECURITY SITUATION AS THE SAG HOPED BUT WOULD ALMOST CERTAINLY MAKE IT WORSE. BOTHA SAID THAT HE UNDERSTOOD THIS, BUT TIME WAS OF THE ESSENCE. THE SAG KNEW FROM THE AMOUNT OF AID WHICH THEY NOW HAD TO GIVE RHODESIA HOW FRAGILE THE SITUATION THERE WAS. UNLESS THE SITUATION BEGAN TO IMPROVE SOON, THEY COULD NOT GO ON WITH THIS INDEFINITELY.

2. ON NAMIBIA BOTHA SAID THAT HE DID NOT THINK THAT THE FIVE PROPERLY REALISED HOW DIFFICULT THE INTERNAL POLITICAL SITUATION IN THE TERRITORY HAD BECOME FOR THE SAG. THE WHITE BACKLASH WAS BECOMING STRONGER ALL THE TIME AND IT WAS FOR THIS REASON THAT THE SAG HAD DECIDED TO CHANGE THE ADMINISTRATOR-GENERAL SO ABRUPTLY. (HE MADE NO PRETENCE THAT THE CHANGE HAD BEEN MADE PURELY ON PERSONAL GROUNDS.) VILJOEN WAS A STRONG MAN WHO WOULD STAND UP TO PERSONAL ATTACKS WELL. HE WAS ALSO THE RIGHT MAN TO CARRY THROUGH THE POLICY OF DISMANTLING DISCRIMINATION IN NAMIBIA WHICH WAS NOW UNDER ATTACK. IF THE CONSERVATIVE WHITE ELEMENTS THERE THOUGHT THAT HE WOULD SIDE WITH THEM THEY WERE IN FOR A SURPRISE.

3. IN THE LIGHT OF THIS CONVERSATION, I WOULD BE INCLINED TO LEAVE A REPLY TO THE SAG MESSAGE UNTIL AFTER CHOGM, WHEN IT MAY BE POSSIBLE TO SAY SOMETHING MORE SUBSTANTIAL ABOUT RHODESIA. ON THE OTHER HAND THERE IS A CASE FOR SETTING THE RECORD STRAIGHT WITHOUT DELAY ON NAMIBIA AND IF YOU THINK THIS ARGUMENT OUTWEIGHS THE OTHER I WOULD NOT OBJECT.

LEAHY


~~~~~ ZUJ ZZ FOR 2

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FM PRETORIA 012120Z AUG.

TO FLASH LUSAKA

TELEGRAM NUMBER 19 OF 01 AUGUST 1979

INFO FLASH FCO AND MIRIMBA SALISBURY

RHODESIA

FOREIGN MINISTER, PIK BOOHA, HAS JUST TELEPHONED AN URGENT WARNING TO ME THAT RHODESIANS ARE SO INCENSED BY PRESIDENT KAUNDA'S REMARKS AT C.H.G.M. ABOUT "DESTROYING MUZOREWA" THAT THERE WAS LIKELY TO BE AN IMMEDIATE "SECURITY PROBLEM". HE DID NOT ELABORATE AND ASKED NOT TO BE QUOTED. BUT HE CLEARLY IMPLIED THAT A RHODESIAN RAID INTO ZAMBIA IS IMMINENT. HE SAID THAT HE WAS SORRY BUT THERE WAS "NOTHING HE COULD DO".

LEAHY

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Prime Minister

BW

2/8



Distributed All  
+ HgC. 2/4/8

LQY NR 933/02

LPT 5/9/02

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CONFIDENTIAL  
FM PRETORIA 021510Z AUG  
TO IMMEDIATE LUSAKA  
TAL NO 17 OF 1/3/79  
INFO IMMEDIATE MIRIMBA SALISBURY  
PRIORITY FCO

Prime Minister

2/4/8

FOR DUFF.

YOUR TELNO 005 TO MIRIMBA SALISBURY: RHODESIA

1. WHEN I SAW PIK BOTHA THIS AFTERNOON HE TOLD ME THAT HE HAD NOW RECEIVED A CATEGORICAL ASSURANCE FROM THE RHODESIANS (I GATHER FROM EJLLE) THAT THEY WOULD NOT TAKE ANY ACTION AGAINST ZAMBIA DURING CHOGM. THEY HAD EVEN AGREED TO GIVE HIM THIS ASSURANCE IN WRITING. HE SAID THAT LAST NIGHT, ON THE OTHER HAND, WHEN HE HAD BEEN IN TOUCH WITH THEM AND HAD BEEN TRYING TO SOOTHE THEIR ANGER OVER KAUNDA'S REMARKS HE HAD SUDDENLY GOT THE FEELING THAT THEY WERE HOLDING OUT ON HIM AND NOT BEING ENTIRELY FRANK. THIS WAS UNUSUAL AND HAD MADE HIM VERY UNEASY SEMICLN HENCE HIS TELEPHONE CALL TO ME.
2. I AM SORRY ABOUT THE FALSE ALARM. I CAN ONLY SAY THAT IT WAS NOT OF MY MAKING AND WAS OBVIOUSLY BASED ON A HUNCH.

LEAHY

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arb.



Original on  
Commonwealth ~~Sp~~ Friday 79  
CHGM Bilaterals.

NOTE OF THE PRIME MINISTER'S CONVERSATION WITH THE PRIME MINISTER OF  
NEW ZEALAND, MR. ROBERT MULDOON, AT HORIZON HOUSE, LUSAKA, ON 1 AUGUST  
1979 AT 1800

Present

The Prime Minister  
Mr. B.G. Cartledge

The Rt. Hon. Robert Muldoon  
Mr. A.M. Bisley (Prime  
Minister's Department)

\* \* \* \* \*

The Southern Pacific

~~Mr. Muldoon told the Prime Minister that he was very concerned about the total withdrawal of the UK's diplomatic presence from the South Pacific islands. The leaders of the new micro-states were totally inexperienced and vulnerable. The Prime Minister of Tuvalu, for example, had put the whole of his country's reserves on deposit with a real estate speculator in Texas, Greenacres Real Estate. The same Prime Minister had just made a down-payment of \$50,000 for a leadership course in the United States. Kiribati was in a similar predicament. In both islands, the local leadership relied heavily on New Zealand's High Commissioners for advice but they could do with a great deal more.~~

~~The Prime Minister expressed considerable concern at what Mr. Muldoon had told her and said that she would ask for a report.~~

Rhodesia

The Prime Minister said that some of the speeches made during the CHGM opening ceremony that morning had not been very helpful, but this was not unexpected. She told Mr. Muldoon that three main points had emerged from Lord Harlech's consultations during his mission to Southern Africa as the British Government's envoy. Firstly, there was general agreement that the April elections in Rhodesia had changed the situation and that a 65 per cent turn-out could not be ignored. Secondly, all were agreed that only the UK could give Rhodesia legal independence. Finally, it was generally agreed that there were shortcomings in the present constitution: criticism had centred on the reserved powers

/for the



for the white Members of Parliament and on the way in which the Commissions operated. The Prime Minister said that no decisions had yet been put to the Cabinet for endorsement but the Government would be sticking to the position that the UK had given other countries in Africa honourable independence constitutions and would do the same for Rhodesia. Time, however, was running out and it was more than ever essential to stop the war. The British Government would tell the Front Line States that if the UK could secure reasonable changes in Rhodesia's existing constitution (but without losing the confidence of the white population) and produce what would be seen by the world to be a reasonable constitution they, the Front Line States, should be prepared to say that they would not continue their support for the Patriotic Front, if the leaders of the Patriotic Front still criticised the situation. The Prime Minister told Mr. Muldoon that her private discussions so far indicated that some, at any rate, of the Front Line Presidents would accept this approach while expressing some doubts as to whether they could actually succeed in persuading the Patriotic Front to stop the war.

The Prime Minister went on to say that Rhodesia had come an enormously long way during the past two years. There was no point in other African countries supporting an armed struggle against a constitution which was in many respects so similar to those which they had themselves been given on independence. Mr. Muldoon said that he would expect President Kaunda and President Nyerere to create difficulties during the CHGM discussions on Rhodesia, although Sir Seretse Khama might be easier. President Kaunda's popularity had suffered a significant decline and he was experiencing great problems with his own Party. Mr. Muldoon said that he had been impressed, during the previous twenty-four hours, by the extent to which President Kaunda seemed to be the prisoner of his Party and to which he acted merely as its mouthpiece. The young Turks were moving up behind him and, in the meantime, he was faced by immense economic problems. It might make a great deal of sense for both Zambia and Tanzania to go hard for a solution on Rhodesia which would put an end to the fighting and enable them to rebuild their shattered economies. The Australian Foreign Minister, Mr. Peacock, had apparently found that Nyerere was taking a very different line in private to that which he still adopted in public.

/Mr. Muldoon



Mr. Muldoon agreed with the Prime Minister that the April elections had been a major triumph for Bishop Muzorewa: the vote, however, had been above all a vote for peace. The Prime Minister commented that it had equally been a vote against terrorism. Mr. Muldoon expressed the view that similar votes in Zambia and Tanzania, if they could be held, would produce the same result.

Mr. Muldoon went on to say that he thought that a solution might lie in getting some of the key figures at present in Lusaka who were concerned with the Rhodesia problem to meet privately together on the margins of the Conference, and particularly during the coming weekend at State House, to hammer out the terms of a CHGM declaration or statement with which they could live. When the Prime Minister said that the British Government would have to move very fast as soon as the Conference was over, Mr. Muldoon replied that it was equally important to make progress during the CHGM itself. From this point of view, it was essential that the Prime Minister should not take too hard a line in the CHGM debate on Rhodesia on 3 August.

The Prime Minister said that it would be equally important not to seem to be taking part in an onslaught on Bishop Muzorewa. The Bishop was understandably frightened of losing the confidence of his white population or, alternatively, if he acquiesced in too drastic changes in the constitution, losing his own credibility.

Mr. Muldoon said that, in his view, the white Rhodesians were already resigned to black majority rule. Ideally, one would wish to see Bishop Muzorewa, Joshua Nkomo and Robert Mugabe working together in the Cabinet of an independent Rhodesia. <sup>But</sup> / life was not like that and any such outcome would evoke cries of betrayal from the Patriotic Front. Mr. Muldoon said that he nevertheless believed that if, in Lusaka, an agreed statement or declaration could be worked out, to the effect that given certain specified changes in the constitution the CHGM accepted that hostilities should end, this would be a major step forward. Such a statement would, of course, have to be supported both by President Nyerere and President Kaunda. Nigeria would probably prove to be the most awkward customer in discussing such a proposal.

/The Prime Minister



The Prime Minister told Mr. Muldoon about Nigeria's nationalisation of BP. Mr. Muldoon mentioned that Commissioner Adefope, who was leading the Nigerian delegation in Lusaka, was a difficult man and given to sudden snap decisions, such as that which had pulled the Nigerian team out of the Commonwealth Games at Edmonton. Mr. Muldoon said that he thought that Kenya would be helpful, since the Kenyans would like to see Nyerere back down. There were many other countries which would acquiesce in such an arrangement and the West Indians, for example, would always back the winning side. Mr. Muldoon commented that Mr. Michael Manley had calmed down a great deal during the past two years: he had foregone his ambition to lead the Third World and was now concentrating on remaining the leader of Jamaica. Mr. Muldoon repeated that if Nyerere and Kaunda could be persuaded to adopt a softer public line, the whole Rhodesia problem could quite possibly be settled in Lusaka. The Prime Minister said that she saw little sign of this so far.

When Mr. Muldoon reverted to his idea of asking Mr. Ramphal to coordinate private discussions on the margin of the Conference, the Prime Minister said that she would not want a Commonwealth committee or any body of that kind. She accepted that the UK had to consult as widely as possible in order to achieve the maximum acceptance for Rhodesia's return to legality. It was important to stress that Bishop Muzorewa had demonstrated the possibility of achieving one's objectives by peaceful and democratic means.

Mr. Muldoon said that politicians often had to settle for second best and Bishop Muzorewa was clearly willing to do so. The Prime Minister said that she admired him for it; she recognised the importance of retaining the confidence of the whites. Mr. Muldoon said that Tanzania was faced by serious problems as a result of its action in Uganda; President Nyerere was clearly ready to look for a peaceful way out, and so was President Kaunda. Their governments, unlike the governments of New Zealand or the United Kingdom, could easily survive a drastic U-turn in their policies towards Rhodesia. After a week, the Zambian press would be hailing President Kaunda as the great peacemaker. Mr. Muldoon expressed his conviction that it should be possible to work along the lines of the Gleneagles weekend, by bringing together a limited number (five or six) of the countries directly interested in the Rhodesia problem, during the

/coming weekend,



coming weekend, and to entrust Mr. Ramphal with the orchestration. An agreed text could be arrived at and then presented to the full Conference on the morning of Monday, 6 August. The other countries could then simply be asked to endorse the text, which could consist of a fairly lengthy preamble followed by a short list of the specific constitutional proposals which the UK would put forward. These might include the condition that Ian Smith should retire from government. A declaration or statement on these lines would give the British Government something to build on. He thought it likely that neither Nkomo nor Mugabe any longer believed that following the elections that time was on their side. They were getting older and there were rivals for their positions. Mr. Muldoon commented, in passing, that he thought that Mr. Fraser was on the wrong tack and that his current statements on Southern Africa contained an excessive element of appeasement.

Mr. Muldoon agreed with the Prime Minister that the battle in Rhodesia was no longer between black and white but between black and black; racialism was no longer the dominant issue - tribalism was now the greater danger.

The conversation ended at 1845.

*BM*

1 August 1979





MAP  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

1 August 1979

Dear Mike

Letter to the Prime Minister from Mr Roger Shipton

I enclose a letter to the Prime Minister from Mr Roger Shipton, the Australian MP who led the Australian Parliamentary group who observed the Rhodesian elections in April. The letter comes via our High Commission in Canberra.

Mr Shipton's letter is merely an acknowledgement of the Prime Minister's letter of 21 June, which thanked Mr Shipton for sending her a copy of his report. A further reply is not therefore required.

*in Lusaka*

Yours ever

*Paul*

(P Lever)  
Private Secretary

M Pattison Esq  
10 Downing Street  
LONDON SW1





PARLIAMENT OF AUSTRALIA  
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

39A GLENFERRIE ROAD  
MALVERN, VIC. 3144  
TEL. 509 5500

ROGER SHIPTON, M.P.  
MEMBER FOR HIGGINS

13th July 1979

My Dear Prime Minister Pt 2.

Thank you for your letter of 21st June.

I support you in your Government's objective of building on the changes in Zimbabwe-Rhodesia, to bring about a return to legality amid the widest possible international recognition.

May I congratulate you on the success of your visit to Australia.

Yours sincerely,

A handwritten signature in blue ink that reads "Roger Shipton".

(Roger Shipton)

The Rt. Hon. Margaret Thatcher,  
Prime Minister,  
10 Downing Street,  
London.



CONFIDENTIAL

Original on  
Commonwealth July 79  
CHGM Bilaterals.

NOTE OF THE PRIME MINISTER'S DISCUSSION WITH LIFE PRESIDENT BANDA OF  
MALAWI IN THE MULUNGUSHI VILLAGE, LUSAKA, ON 31 JULY 1979 AT 1630

Present: Prime Minister Life President Banda  
Mr. B. G. Cartledge

\* \* \* \* \*

After giving the Prime Minister an enthusiastic account of The Queen's visit to Malawi, Dr. Banda told her that it should be her turn next. The Prime Minister thanked Dr. Banda and went on to say that the CHGM would be a difficult meeting for the United Kingdom at which complex issues affecting her would be raised. The local press had not given the meeting an encouraging start. The Prime Minister said that she would greatly welcome Dr. Banda's advice on how to approach the meeting. It was important that Rhodesia should not dominate the Conference: the problems of South East Asia, the Caribbean and of the refugees were all of great importance, as was the future of the world economy, and all these questions should be given proper weight. Nevertheless, Rhodesia would inevitably be the main focus.

The Prime Minister said that she had tried to make the British Government's position clear in the House of Commons a week before; but no decisions had been put to the Cabinet for approval. The British Government first wished to complete the process of consultation on which it had embarked and the CHGM was its last stage. The Government was concerned to bring genuine majority rule to Rhodesia, to restore legality to that country and to stop the war which was costing 500 African lives every week. Lord Harlech's mission had shown that there were three points on which everybody was agreed: that the election in Rhodesia was a great advance which had changed the situation; that it was the responsibility of the UK to restore Rhodesia to legality; and that the new constitution was open to criticism with regard to the blocking power of the minority of white Members of Parliament and to the manner in which the Commissions operated. The fact that the Prime Minister could not choose his own top officials, rather than the existence of the Commissions as such, was open to challenge. The situation should be reversed so that the Prime Minister had the power while the Commissions were consulted. The Prime Minister repeated that she would welcome Dr. Banda's advice, as an old hand at Commonwealth meetings and as an old friend, on how to tackle these issues in Lusaka.

/ Dr. Banda

CONFIDENTIAL



Dr. Banda asked the Prime Minister whom she had already seen. The Prime Minister said that she had called on President Nyerere, whose views did not appear to be very different from those which the British Government had recently put forward. She had stressed to President Nyerere that it was vital to end the war and that Rhodesia's return to legality should be the signal for its termination. The question was, would Rhodesia's return to legality be sufficient in itself to bring the war to an end? The Prime Minister said that she assumed that all the participants in the Conference wished to achieve an acceptable settlement in Rhodesia : she would welcome Dr. Banda's views.

Dr. Banda said that the Prime Minister might not like his views. He had maintained, ever since 1965, that Rhodesia was Britain's problem and that Britain should solve it as she thought best. Other countries must accept the course which Britain chose to adopt; they had no right to interfere or to dictate to Britain. Some governments threatened to leave the Commonwealth if Britain failed to take this or that step: when Mr. Wilson had asked him for advice, he had said that these countries should be told that they were welcome to leave the Commonwealth if that was their wish. Dr. Banda said that he had never changed this view and still believed that nobody should dictate to the UK.

The Prime Minister said that she totally accepted this assessment. The UK had given Malawi an independence constitution as the result of agreement between their two governments; the same had been true of Nigeria and of other countries. The same should be true with regard to Rhodesia. But it was also important that this should be the signal to an end to the war and that other countries should recognise Rhodesia in company with the UK. Dr. Banda repeated that it was all right for the UK to consult and to discuss; but she should not accept dictation from anybody.

Reverting to the constitution, the Prime Minister said that the two criticisms which had been made of it - relating to the blocking mechanism and to the Commissions - were valid. The blocking mechanism did not appear in this form in any other independence constitution, although there were many precedents for reserved Parliamentary seats for minorities. Dr. Banda commented that, nevertheless, some people might oppose this provision, on the grounds that all Parliamentary seats should be elective. The Prime Minister

/ said



said that the function of reserved seats was to give confidence to minority groups. Dr. Banda agreed and recalled that Malawi's independence constitution had contained such a provision.

The Prime Minister said that she accepted that Rhodesia should follow precedent and accept her constitution from the UK. The UK nevertheless wanted other countries to recognise Rhodesia as well; and to help to bring the war to an end.

Dr. Banda, telling the Prime Minister that he would like to speak freely and honestly, said that some people were disposed to introduce the factor of their personal friendships into the Rhodesian problem. This should not be allowed to happen. It would be quite wrong if he were to say that he would like a friend of his to be President of Rhodesia. Mr. Sithole was his friend, but he had told him frankly that only two men could assume power in a democratic Rhodesia: Bishop Muzorewa or Mr. Mugabe. This was because they were both Shonas. Dr. Banda said that he did not like Mugabe because he was too close to the Russians; but he was a Shona nevertheless. Joshua Nkomo could never rule Rhodesia since he came from a minority tribe and had no chance of winning power. Bishop Muzorewa commanded a majority, whether one liked him or not. The Bishop hoped to make his government acceptable to the rest of the world but it was the UK's problem to bring this about.

Dr. Banda commented that what had happened in Rhodesia was not just an advance but a revolution. Many people forgot that Rhodesia had never been a British colony in the classical sense, but the private property of Cecil Rhodes and subsequently of a company. Eventually, in 1922, the Rhodesians had been asked to choose between union with South Africa, union with Northern Rhodesia or going it alone. Not wishing to accept Boer rule or indefinite support for a poor Northern neighbour, the Rhodesians had chosen to go it alone. This did much to explain, although not to excuse, the phenomenon of UDI.

The Prime Minister said that, given the current attitudes of the local press, the situation could only get better. Dr. Banda said that he thought that the press would remain sour for a while longer yet. The Prime Minister said that she was anxious not to drag her feet in resolving the Rhodesia problem and Dr. Banda agreed that she should not. It was sometimes argued that Nkomo and Mugabe would continue to fight on after independence had been granted. He did not share this view, which assumed that the Russians would

/ intervene



intervene openly; there was so far no evidence that they might. The Prime Minister asked whether Mugabe was under Russian control. Dr. Banda replied that he thought not; equally, President Machel was not in his view a client of the Soviet Union. Shonas like Robert Mugabe were very individualistic by temperament. The Prime Minister commented that this should make them capitalistic as well!

The discussion ended at 1720.

*Byu.*

31 July 1979



Original on  
Commonwealth July 79  
CHGM Bilaterals

NOTE OF THE PRIME MINISTER'S DISCUSSION WITH THE RT. HON. MALCOLM FRASER,  
PRIME MINISTER OF AUSTRALIA, AT HORIZON HOUSE, LUSAKA, ON 31 JULY 1979  
AT 1830

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Present

The Prime Minister

The Rt. Hon. Malcolm Fraser

The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary

The Rt. Hon. Andrew Peacock

Mr. B.G. Cartledge

Notetaker

\* \* \* \* \*

After an initial discussion of the internal political situation in Nigeria, Mr. Fraser said that the line on Rhodesia in Lagos was still tough. Commissioner Adefope, however, was pleasant to deal with and would say rather little at the CHGM. Mr. Fraser said that he had only learned a few minutes before his departure from Lagos of the rumour that the Nigerian Government intended to nationalise BP in Nigeria. He had put it to the Nigerians that this would be an unhelpful step to take on the eve of the CHGM. The Nigerians had retorted that this step was being taken because BP had been selling oil to South Africa; they insisted that the measure was unrelated either to the CHGM or to the Rhodesia problem.

The Prime Minister told Mr. Fraser that, despite a vitriolic local press about Bishop Muzorewa and herself, the atmosphere of her private talks had been quite different. The same applied to the line which President Nyerere had taken with the press on the previous evening after the Front Line Summit. The moderate Africans now accepted that only the UK could give Rhodesia her independence constitution while maintaining that this must lead to genuine black majority rule. The Prime Minister said that the Africans to whom she had spoken clearly expected that events would now move quickly, almost as if they had had

/enough of



enough of the present situation. Many Africans now accepted that the Rhodesia elections had been a significant advance and could not be ignored. There was also general agreement that some parts of the constitution required amendment and that it was important that Rhodesia should be recognised by other countries than the UK.

In response to a question from Mr. Fraser, the Prime Minister said that the British Government had taken no final decisions. The proposals which the Government would eventually make would be addressed to all the parties to the conflict: the war simply had to be stopped. The Prime Minister said that she hoped that if a right and reasonable constitution could be devised, the grounds on which the Front Line States played host to the guerrillas would be removed.

Lord Carrington said that he had already asked President Nyerere whether, if there were to be general agreement on an amended constitution, the Patriotic Front would then stop the war. Nyerere had said that he would try and that the Patriotic Front could not continue their activities without the support of the Front Line States. Mr. Fraser recalled that General Obasanjo had told him that if Ian Smith were to be elected in Salisbury on the basis of a genuinely democratic constitution, he would send him a telegram of congratulations. The General had urged that changes should be made to the present constitution and that this should lead to supervised elections; supervision by the present government in Salisbury would not be trusted. Mr. Peacock told the Prime Minister that President Nyerere had said to him that Tanzania

/trusted the



trusted the British, who had carried out these independence operations before. Nyerere had suggested that the UK should send observers to a new round of Rhodesian elections and that these need not all be British. President Nyerere had admitted that he might have difficulty in selling this approach to the Patriotic Front.

Lord Carrington commented that this approach seemed to ignore the difficulty, which had so often proved insuperable, of what was to be done about the Rhodesian security forces. Mr. Fraser said that President Kaunda (whom he had just seen) had not raised this problem. Kaunda had taken the line that there were two essential preconditions. These were that there should be no recognition of the Muzorewa regime and no lifting of sanctions until the whole process of making and accepting proposals had been completed. These proposals should be put by the UK to a constitutional convention. Kaunda had taken his usual line about the inevitability of Soviet, Cuban or East German intervention if the war were to continue much longer.

The Prime Minister said that President Nyerere had agreed that there could be no sanctions against a genuinely democratic constitution. Mr. Peacock said that if President Nyerere were to be satisfied, during the next few days, with the Prime Minister's approach - of discussing, consulting, consulting again and then deciding - the British approach to the CHGM itself might be critical.

Lord Carrington said that it was now planned to begin the discussion of Southern Africa on the morning of Friday, 3 August, and to conclude it on Monday, 6 August. The Prime Minister and he would then fly home to consult their colleagues and then would get on with their proposals. Mr. Fraser said that he thought it very important that the Africans at the CHGM should go home to their countries prepared to testify /that the



that the UK was now on the right track so far as Rhodesia was concerned. Mr. Peacock pointed out that, in this context, they might like to see something included in the Communique to tie the UK down. The Prime Minister suggested that the press should be told that she and Lord Carrington were to get down to the working out of proposals as soon as they returned to the UK. They could give an indication of the broad timescale. Mr. Fraser said that it would be very helpful to know more about the time-scale of the UK scenario. If the time-scale were to be very short it might not be necessary to meet President Kaunda's precondition that recognition should not be given nor sanctions lifted until proposals on the constitution had been put and accepted.

The Prime Minister said that it was essential to get into a position in which Africans would be encouraged to say that it did not matter who reached the top so long as the constitutional basis was right.

Mr. Peacock recalled that President Nyerere had once told him that he would be happy to work with Bishop Muzorewa.

The Prime Minister said that the UK had given "reasonable" constitutions to all her former colonies. What they did with these constitutions subsequently was their own business. The main difficulty would be with the whites in Rhodesia. Bishop Muzorewa was anxious not to lose his credibility.

Mr. Peacock said that President Moi of Kenya would, he thought, present no problem. Mr. Fraser said that the key would be what the Africans needed in order to live with their own public opinion, while the UK continued her process of negotiation. The Prime Minister and Lord Carrington agreed that the UK advisers should be put to work on possible formulations for inclusion in the Communique.

/ Mr. Peacock



Mr. Peacock expressed the view that if the revised constitution were to enshrine the basic essential elements, the Patriotic Front would be out-maneuvred. It should be borne in mind that Nyerere was faced with acute problems as a result of the cost of stationing his troops in Uganda. It seemed clear that he intended to keep them there for some time yet. Mr. Fraser said that one card for the UK to play would be to offer to arrange independent supervision of new elections in Rhodesia, rather than leaving it to the present regime there.

Lord Carrington said that he very much doubted whether the Patriotic Front would agree to anything which the UK could propose. Nkomo knew that he would have no chance of victory in a "free and fair election", since he was not a Shona. Equally, Mugabe would be doubtful of victory and ideologically opposed to the process. Mr. Fraser said that changes to the constitution were essential in order to detach the Front Line States from their support of the Patriotic Front. The Prime Minister said that the worst problem still remained that of how to get rid of Nkomo and Mugabe; the Prime Minister commented that they had nowhere to go other than Rhodesia.

Lord Carrington said that if the UK could get President Nyerere and President Kaunda to accept that the UK Government were being very reasonable, the two Presidents might perhaps be screwed down into abandonment of the Patriotic Front if the Front were to reject the UK's constitutional proposals.

The discussion ended at 1930.

31 July 1979



Original on:  
Commonwealth: CHGM Bilaterals  
July 79

NOTE OF A MEETING BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER AND PRESIDENT NYERERE OF TANZANIA HELD AT MULUNGUSHI VILLAGE, LUSAKA AT 1530 ON TUESDAY 31 JULY

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|                 |                                    |                       |
|-----------------|------------------------------------|-----------------------|
| <u>Present:</u> | Prime Minister                     | President Nyerere     |
|                 | Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary | The Hon. B. Mkapa     |
|                 | Mr. C. A. Whitmore                 | H.E. Mr. Daniel Mloka |
|                 | Mr. B. G. Cartledge                |                       |

\* \* \* \* \*

Rhodesia

The Prime Minister said that the aim of the British Government was to bring Rhodesia back to legality under genuine black majority rule. The question was how to achieve that aim. The British Cabinet had not yet taken a decision: Britain wished to wait for the CHGM. President Nyerere had been very helpful in letting Lord Harlech have his views. He had attended the meeting of Front Line States the previous day. And he would be opening the Conference's debate on Southern Africa. Could he help on the problem of how the British Government should accomplish its objective?

President Nyerere said that there should be no difference between Africa and Britain about the objective of genuine majority rule for Rhodesia. As the Prime Minister had said, the problem was how to get there. The Conference should try to agree upon this aim, and then all should pull their weight together on the means of achieving it. But they would have to rely heavily on the Prime Minister. The United Kingdom had the responsibility for achieving the objective. The others could only help.

The Prime Minister agreed that the responsibility for bringing Rhodesia back to legality was Britain's. This was one of the three main points on which Lord Harlech's and Mr. Luce's consultations had shown that there was general agreement. The second was that as a result of the elections something different had happened in Rhodesia on which it was possible to build. Third, there was widespread criticism of the present Rhodesian constitution. This focussed on the provisions for a blocking mechanism for the whites and for the public service commissions. It would be helpful to know how the Front Line States saw the matter generally.

/President Nyerere



President Nyerere said that he could summarise very simply the position which the Front Line States had agreed upon the previous night. They did not believe that a situation had yet been reached in Rhodesia where there was a government that should be recognised and sanctions lifted. More positively, they thought that Britain should look at the constitution, whether the present one or a new one. It was not so much a matter of whether there had been free and fair elections: it was the constitution that was the main problem. There was no difficulty about making provision in the constitution to reserve seats for minorities. Tanzania's independence constitution had done this, though subsequently the minorities had come to feel that there was no need for such an arrangement and the constitution had been amended accordingly. Moreover, he saw the value of public service commissions which were intended to stop excessive interference by the executive. The problem with the present Rhodesian constitution, however, was the particular powers which were entrenched for the white minority. He hoped that the Prime Minister would be able to help progress to be made to a point where the Commonwealth countries could say that the constitution proposed for Rhodesia was a democratic one that they could support. There should then be fresh elections, and some method would need to be devised to satisfy the Commonwealth that the elections were free and fair. They might need to be supervised by the Commonwealth or by the UK. If the Commonwealth agreed on a constitution and it was announced that fresh elections would be held on the basis of the constitution, that would be enough to allow him to say that he no longer supported the war and to persuade the Patriotic Front to stop hostilities. He could not guarantee that the Patriotic Front would then cease fighting, but the fact was that they could not continue the war without the support of the Front Line States. This was how the Front Line States were approaching the problem, and he would be speaking in this sense when he opened the Conference's debate on Southern Africa.

The Prime Minister said that if President Nyerere addressed the Conference in such terms, she would be able to make much the same speech as she had made in the House of Commons on 25 July. It might then be possible to move forward. At the moment, Rhodesia was bleeding to death, with 500 deaths a week. But if Rhodesia could be brought back to legality and sanctions lifted, the prize for Rhodesia itself and for its neighbours was enormous. She could help feed the surrounding countries and she had raw materials to export. Britain recognised that once independence had been granted, an independent country could follow what constitutional course it wished. But the blacks in Rhodesia wanted to keep the confidence of the whites who could help sustain the Rhodesian economy. This admirable approach was an indication of their maturity.

/ The Prime Minister



The Prime Minister added that she did not want to see an exodus of Rhodesians of any kind.

When President Nyerere asked the Prime Minister whether she had the power to achieve the British Government's objective on Rhodesia, the Prime Minister said that she had to carry her Cabinet and the British Parliament with her. In response, President Nyerere said that if anybody had the power to solve the problem, it was Britain.

Uganda

~~In response to the Prime Minister's enquiry about developments in Uganda, President Nyerere said that a new phase had begun and Uganda was trying to settle down. Professor Lule, who had been a personal friend, had expected him to back him with the Tanzanian army. President Binaisa was now in power, and Tanzania would help him. The fact was that Tanzania was stuck in Uganda, where the local army and police were ineffective. He would pull out if someone else would take over. Keeping the Tanzanian army in Uganda was very expensive. But there was no alternative to staying on for the time being.~~

Namibia

~~President Nyerere said that SWAPO, who had been represented at the Front Line meeting on the previous evening, wanted peace in Namibia. Elections had taken place there, but they had done nothing towards the implementation of the U.N. plans. Tanzania would help the U.N. Secretary-General as far as they could.~~

~~The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary said that when the Conservative Government had come to power, they had felt that they had a card to play with the South African government because they had not been associated with what the South Africans regarded as the duplicity of the Five. He had therefore seen the South African Foreign Minister, Mr. Pik Botha, and had persuaded him not to reject the U.N. plan. But Mr. Botha was concerned about the interpretation of aspects of the plan. If these difficulties could be overcome, he would stick with the plan. Sir James Murray, who had been appointed to speak for the Five, was going to South Africa for further discussions. There was therefore a chink of light.~~

President Nyerere said that he would put it no higher than that.

The discussion ended at 1600.

31 July 1979

*JWS.*



CONFIDENTIAL

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Not circulated  
BGE

NOTE FOR THE RECORD

THE PRIME MINISTER'S DINNER WITH PRESIDENT KAUNDA OF ZAMBIA IN LUSAKA  
ON 31 JULY

Commenting on the discussion over the dinner which, with the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary, she attended as President Kaunda's guest at the State House in Lusaka on 31 July, the Prime Minister said that the only significant advance over what she had been told by President Nyerere earlier in the day was Kaunda's statement to the effect that if the United Kingdom got the Rhodesia constitution right, he would be bringing pressure to bear, in advance of new elections, to bring the fighting to an end. President Kaunda had also said that if the United Kingdom were to offer a constitution which was in his judgement fair and reasonable, and if President Nkomo were to refuse to accept it, he would take this into account in deciding what action he should adopt vis-a-vis Nkomo. Kaunda had claimed that Zambia wanted to see dramatic changes in the constitution and that the United States and the United Kingdom did so, too. The Prime Minister had made it clear to Kaunda that this was not true so far as the UK was concerned.

B.M.

31 July 1979

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July 79.



FCO

OO LUSAKA

GRS 130

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FM SOFIA 310615Z JUL

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 129 OF 31 JULY

AND TO IMMEDIATE LUSAKA

ZIMBABWE - RHODESIA

BULGARIAN PRESS HAS REPORTED ARRIVAL OF MUGABE IN SOFIA ON SUNDAY AT INVITATION OF CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF COMMUNIST PARTY. HE WAS RECEIVED BY BALEV, PRESIDENT ZHIVKOV'S CHEF DE CABINET AND NEWLY APPOINTED PARTY SECRETARY, WHO ACCOMPANIED HIM TO LAY A WREATH ON MAUSOLEUM OF GEORGI DIMITROV.

2. YESTERDAY HE SAW KUBADINSKI, POLITBURO MEMBER AND CHAIRMAN OF FATHERLAND FRONT: AND WAS RECEIVED BY ZHIVKOV. HE EXPRESSED THANKS FOR THE QUOTE DISINTERESTED HELP AND SUPPORT UNQUOTE GIVEN BY BULGARIA TO THE PEOPLE OF ZIMBABWE. ZHIVKOV SPOKE OF THE UNCHANGING SOLIDARITY OF THE BULGARIAN PARTY AND PEOPLE WITH THE STRUGGLE OF THE PATRIOTIC FRONT, THE ONLY LEGAL REPRESENTATIVES OF THE ZIMBABWE PEOPLE, AGAINST IMPERIALIST ATTEMPTS TO IMPOSE A NEOCOLONIALIST SOLUTION.

3. MUGABE IS ACCOMPANIED MY KAMBIRAY KANGAY AND REX NONGO.

CLOAKE

NNNN

*Pm has been seen* *Hofo* *au*  
*bl. 2*

*Cham* *31/7*

*Prime Minister*

*31/7*



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LTX105/31

OO LUSAKA

OO FCO

PP GABORONE

PP MAPUTO

PP LUANDA

PP LAGOS

PP PRETORIA

PP MIRIMBA SALISBURY

PP CANNBERRA

GR 4503

CONFIDENTIAL

FM DAR ES SALAAM 311200Z JULY 79

TO IMMEDIATE LUSAKA

TELNO 23 OF 31 JULY

INFO IMMEDIATE FCO

INFO PRIORITY GABORONE, MAPUTO, LUANDA, LAGOS, PRETORIA,

MIRIMBA SALISBURY, CANNBERRA

*Prime Minister*

*AM*

*1/8*

VISIT TO TANZANIA BY AUSTRALIAN FOREIGN MINISTER  
FOR PRIVATE SECRETARY

1. THE ACTING AUSTRALIAN HIGH COMMISSIONER HAS GIVEN ME AN UNOFFICIAL ACCOUNT OF TALKS BETWEEN MR PEACOCK AND PRESIDENT NYERERE ON 30 JULY. HE DID NOT ATTEND HIMSELF AND HIS BRIEFING WAS ON THE BASIS OF A MINUTE BY MR PEACOCK REPORTING TO HIS PRIME MINISTER. THERE HAS BEEN NO REPORT OF THE TALK TO CANNBERRA AS YET SO PLEASE PROTECT.
2. THE MAIN POINTS WERE AS FOLLOWS:
  - (A) NYERERE WAS GOING TO LUSAKA TO BE HELPFUL.
  - (B) HE WAS ENCOURAGED BY RECENT TRENDS IN BRITISH THINKING. THE PRESIDENT WAS NOT SPECIFIC BUT MR PEACOCK THOUGHT THAT THIS MAY HAVE BEEN A REFERENCE TO THE PRIME MINISTER'S RECENT STATEMENT IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS).
  - (C) ALTHOUGH NYERERE HAD HOPED THAT BRITISH COULD COME TO LUSAKA WITH SPECIFIC PROPOSALS FOR CHANGES IN THE RHODESIAN CONSTITUTION HE RECOGNISED THAT THIS MIGHT NOT BE POSSIBLE AND HE HOPED THAT THERE WOULD BE IMMEDIATE PROGRESS TOWARDS ACHIEVING "ACCEPTABLE" CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE FOLLOWED BY FRESH ELECTIONS IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE COMMONWEALTH CONFERENCE.
  - (D) IF THE CONSTITUTION WAS AMENDED IN AN "ACCEPTABLE WAY" (NYERERE WAS APPARENTLY NOT WILLING TO BE DRAWN ON DETAILS) HE AND THE OTHER FRONT LINE STATES (FLS) WOULD DO THEIR BEST TO ENSURE THE PATRIOTIC FRONT ADOPTED A CONSTRUCTIVE ATTITUDE. IF THEY DID NOT THE FLS WOULD NOT CONTINUE TO "UNDERWRITE THE WAR".
  - (E) GIVEN ACCEPTABLE CHANGES IN THE CONSTITUTION AND THE PROSPECT OF CONSTRUCTIVE ALL-PARTY TALKS HE WOULD DO HIS BEST TO ENSURE THAT THERE WOULD BE A CEASE-FIRE EITHER IMMEDIATELY BEFORE THE TALKS OR, AT SECOND BEST, VERY SOON AFTER THEY HAD STARTED. HIS OWN ASSESSMENT WAS THAT THE PATRIOTIC FRONT WOULD FIND IT VERY DIFFICULT TO ACCEPT A CEASE-FIRE BEFORE TALKS TOOK PLACE.
  - (F) HE DID NOT NECESSARILY VISUALISE A DIRECT ROLE FOR THE FLS IN ALL PARTY TALKS. BUT THEY WOULD HELP IF THEY COULD.
  - (G) ON SANCTIONS NYERERE SAID THAT HE COULD NOT UNDERSTAND THE PRIME MINISTER'S ATTITUDE. SHE COULD USE HER MAJORITY TOGETHER WITH THE LABOUR PARTY TO ENSURE A RENEWAL OF THE ORDER. MR PEACOCK REPLIED THAT UNDER PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES SHE COULD ONLY DO SO AT THE EXPENSE OF A SPLIT IN THE CONSERVATIVE PARTY BUT IF THERE WAS PROGRESS TOWARDS A SETTLEMENT BY NOVEMBER THE PARLIAMENTARY ATMOSPHERE COULD BE DIFFERENT AND HE THOUGHT THAT SHE MIGHT BE ABLE TO CARRY HER PARTY WITH HER IN RENEWING THE ORDER FOR A FURTHER PERIOD.
  - (H) PEACOCK EMPHASISED (AND NYERERE AGREED) THAT AUSTRALIA



00 LUSAKA

00 FCO

PP GABORONE

PP MAPUTO

PP LUANDA

PP LAGOS

PP PRETORIA

PP MIRIMBA SALISBURY

PP CANBERRA

GR 4543

CONFIDENTIAL

311200Z JULY 79

FM DAR ES SALAAM

TO IMMEDIATE LUSAKA

TELNO 28 OF 31 JULY

INFO IMMEDIATE FCO

INFO PRIORITY GABORONE, MAPUTO, LUANDA, LAGOS, PRETORIA,

MIRIMBA SALISBURY, CANBERRA

VISIT TO TANZANIA BY AUSTRALIAN FOREIGN MINISTER  
FOR PRIVATE SECRETARY

1. THE ACTING AUSTRALIAN HIGH COMMISSIONER HAS GIVEN ME AN UNOFFICIAL ACCOUNT OF TALKS BETWEEN MR PEACOCK AND PRESIDENT NYERERE ON 30 JULY. HE DID NOT ATTEND HIMSELF AND HIS BRIEFING WAS ON THE BASIS OF A MINUTE BY MR PEACOCK REPORTING TO HIS PRIME MINISTER. THERE HAS BEEN NO REPORT OF THE TALK TO CANBERRA AS YET SO PLEASE PROTECT.

2. THE MAIN POINTS WERE AS FOLLOWS:

(A) NYERERE WAS GOING TO LUSAKA TO BE HELPFUL.

(B) HE WAS ENCOURAGED BY RECENT TRENDS IN BRITISH THINKING. THE PRESIDENT WAS NOT SPECIFIC BUT MR PEACOCK THOUGHT THAT THIS MAY HAVE BEEN A REFERENCE TO THE PRIME MINISTER'S RECENT STATEMENT IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS).

(C) ALTHOUGH NYERERE HAD HOPED THAT BRITISH COULD COME TO LUSAKA WITH SPECIFIC PROPOSALS FOR CHANGES IN THE RHODESIAN CONSTITUTION HE RECOGNISED THAT THIS MIGHT NOT BE POSSIBLE AND HE HOPED THAT THERE WOULD BE IMMEDIATE PROGRESS TOWARDS ACHIEVING "ACCEPTABLE", CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE FOLLOWED BY FRESH ELECTIONS IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE COMMONWEALTH CONFERENCE.

(D) IF THE CONSTITUTION WAS AMENDED IN AN "ACCEPTABLE WAY", (NYERERE WAS APPARENTLY NOT WILLING TO BE DRAWN ON DETAILS) HE AND THE OTHER FRONT LINE STATES (FLS) WOULD DO THEIR BEST TO ENSURE THE PATRIOTIC FRONT ADOPTED A CONSTRUCTIVE ATTITUDE. IF THEY DID NOT THE FLS WOULD NOT CONTINUE TO "UNDERWRITE THE WAR".

(E) GIVEN ACCEPTABLE CHANGES IN THE CONSTITUTION AND THE PROSPECT OF CONSTRUCTIVE ALL-PARTY TALKS HE WOULD DO HIS BEST TO ENSURE THAT THERE WOULD BE A CEASE-FIRE EITHER IMMEDIATELY BEFORE THE TALKS OR, AT SECOND BEST, VERY SOON AFTER THEY HAD STARTED. HIS OWN ASSESSMENT WAS THAT THE PATRIOTIC FRONT WOULD FIND IT VERY DIFFICULT TO ACCEPT A CEASE-FIRE BEFORE TALKS TOOK PLACE.

(F) HE DID NOT NECESSARILY VISUALISE A DIRECT ROLE FOR THE FLS IN ALL PARTY TALKS. BUT THEY WOULD HELP IF THEY COULD.

(G) ON SANCTIONS NYERERE SAID THAT HE COULD NOT UNDERSTAND THE PRIME MINISTER'S ATTITUDE. SHE COULD USE HER MAJORITY TOGETHER WITH THE LABOUR PARTY TO ENSURE A RENEWAL OF THE ORDER. MR PEACOCK REPLIED THAT UNDER PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES SHE COULD ONLY DO SO AT THE EXPENSE OF A SPLIT IN THE CONSERVATIVE PARTY BUT IF THERE WAS PROGRESS TOWARDS A SETTLEMENT BY NOVEMBER THE PARLIAMETARY ATMOSPHERE COULD BE DIFFERENT AND HE THOUGHT THAT SHE MIGHT BE ABLE TO CARRY HER PARTY WITH HER IN RENEWING THE ORDER FOR A FURTHER PERIOD.

(H) PEACOCK EMPHASISED (AND NYERERE AGREED) THAT AUSTRALIA DID NOT AND COULD NOT HAVE A CENTRAL ROLE IN RHODESIA BUT THEY WOULD DO WHAT THEY COULD TO HELP.

3. MR PEACOCK ALSO HAD A MEETING WITH THE TANZANIAN FOREIGN MINISTER WHICH COVERED ESSENTIALLY THE SAME GROUND.

4. UNDER HEADLINE "AUSTRALIA REJECTS SALISBURY REGIME", TODAY'S DAILY NEWS CONTAINS A FRONT PAGE ACCOUNT OF MR PEACOCK'S BRIEF PRESS CONFERENCE WHICH HE HELD SHORTLY BEFORE HIS DEPARTURE FOR LAGOS ON 31 JULY. MR PEACOCK IS REPORTED TO HAVE SAID THAT AUSTRALIA WILL NOT RECOGNISE THE "SMITH/MUZOREWA REGIME", AND CALLED ON THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT TO ENSURE AN ORDERLY TRANSFER OF POWER TO THE AFRICAN MAJORITY. HE IS ALSO REPORTED TO HAVE SAID THAT THE REGIME'S CONSTITUTION HAS TO BE CHANGED TO ENSURE THE MAJORITY PARTICIPATE IN THE AFFAIRS OF THEIR COUNTRY.

HINCHCLIFFE

NNNN

*Prime Minister*  
*gen*  
*1/8*



RR PRETORIA (A)

RR GABORONE

RR DAR ES SALAAM

RR WASHINGTON

RR UKMIS NEW YORK

GR 540  
UNCLASSIFIED  
FM MIRIMBA SALISBURY 311250Z JUL 79  
TO PRIORITY FCO  
TELNO 464 OF 31 JULY  
INFO PRIORITY LUSAKA  
ROUTINE PRETORIA MAPUTO GABORONE DAR ES SALAAM WASHINGTON  
AND UKMIS NEW YORK

*Cham*  
**ACTION**

*Page 2*  
*bc* *1/8*  
Prime Minister

*By*  
*1/8*

1. FOLLOWING ARE EXTRACTS OF THE MAIN PARTS OF BISHOP MUZOREWA'S STATEMENT AT HIS PRESS CONFERENCE ON 28 JULY.

BEGINS:

THE WHITE RACIST MINORITY GOVERNMENT, AND ALL THE INIQUITOUS RACIALISTIC LEGISLATION, IS A THING OF THE PAST. THEY NO LONGER EXIST IN ZIMBABWE RHODESIA. THEY HAVE GONE FOREVER. UDI OF 1965 WAS SWEEP AWAY IN 1979, AND REPLACED BY TRUE FREEDOM AND INDEPENDENCE THROUGH THE WILL OF ALL THE PEOPLE OF THIS COUNTRY.

AS MINISTER OF COMBINED OPERATIONS AND MINISTER OF DEFENCE I HAVE EXECUTIVE CONTROL AND ULTIMATE AUTHORITY OVER ALL MILITARY MATTERS. THE MILITARY COMMANDERS OPERATE UNDER MY DIRECT POLICY DIRECTIVES. THEIR LOYALTY TO ME PERSONALLY, AND TO THE STATE, IS BEYOND QUESTION. SIMILARLY, THE MINISTER OF LAW AND ORDER, MR FRANCIS ZINDOGA, HOLDS EXECUTIVE POWERS OVER THE POLICE. AT THE SAME TIME, HE CONTROLS ALL SYSTEMS OF JUSTICE AND THE CIVIL SERVICE. THEIR LOYALTY AND DEDICATION ARE EQUALLY ASSURED. THE ARMY IS ALREADY 35 PERCENT BLACK AND THE POLICE CONSISTS OF 75 PERCENT BLACK PERSONNEL.

THE LAND TENURE ACT, AND ALL RACIALISTIC SEGREGATION LAWS, HAVE BEEN REMOVED FROM THE STATUTE BOOK THROUGH THE ABOLITION OF THE 1969 CONSTITUTION. EQUALISATION OF THE VARIOUS SECTORS AND SECTIONS OF OUR SOCIETY IS NOW RAPIDLY TAKING PLACE. I BELIEVE THAT WE ARE WORKING TOWARDS POSITIVE CHANGE AT A REASONABLE AND ACCEPTABLE SPEED.



... ARE CITIZENS BY BIRTH, SOME GOING BACK TO THE FIFTH GENERATION. THEY SHOULD, IN FACT, BE PROPERLY TERMED AS WHITE AFRICANS. WHATEVER THEY PRODUCE, AND WHATEVER CONTRIBUTION THEY MAKE, IS FOR THE BENEFIT OF ALL THE PEOPLE, NOT ONLY FOR THEMSELVES. THE CONCESSIONS WE HAVE GIVEN THEM, AT LEAST FOR THE INITIAL CRUCIAL STAGE OF ANY COUNTRY'S DEVELOPMENT, IS A SMALL PRICE TO PAY TO RETAIN THEIR SKILLS AND EXPERTISE. THEY ARE INDISPENSIBLE IF ZIMBABWE RHODESIA IS TO FLOURISH AND FULFIL ITS TREMENDOUS ECONOMIC, INDUSTRIAL, MINING AND AGRICULTURAL POTENTIAL.

WE AGREED TO AN ALL PARTY CONFERENCE WITHOUT PRE-CONDITIONS. (THE PATRIOTIC FRONT) REFUSED BOTH OF THESE APPROACHES. THE PATRIOTIC FRONT WAS INVITED TO PARTICIPATE IN THE DRAFTING OF THE NEW CONSTITUTION AND TO TAKE PART IN THE ELECTIONS. AGAIN THEY DECLINED.

AS A RESULT, WE HAD NO ALTERNATIVE BUT TO GO AHEAD WITH OUR DEMOCRATIC PLANS. THROUGH THESE, WE HAVE EFFECTED A PEACEFUL AND RECONCILIATORY TRANSFER OF POWER FROM WHITE MINORITY TO BLACK MAJORITY RULE.

I HAVE CONTACTED MR NKOMO AND MR MUGABE IN WRITING.

I DECLARED TO THEM MY HONEST INTENTION OF ENTERING INTO DIAOLUGE WITH THEM AND ANYONE TRULY AND SINCERELY INTERESTED IN FOLLOWING THE SAME COURSE AS MY GOVERNMENT, AND SEEKING PEACE FOR THIS COUNTRY AND OUR PEOPLE.

AFTER ALL WE HAVE ACHIEVED, AND WHAT WE ARE ATTEMPTING TO DO, IN INTERNATIONAL RECOGNITION IS WITHHELD AND SANCTIONS ARE MAINTAINED AGAINST US.

WHERE IS THE JUSTICE, WHERE THE MORALITY IN THIS SITUATION? BY COMPARISON, ELSEWHERE IN AFRICA, COUP IS FOLLOWED BY A COUNTER COUP AND THE LATEST MILITARY USURPER IS RECOGNISED BY THE FREE WORLD, EVEN WHILE HE IS BUSY EXECUTING HIS PREDECESSOR.

ENDS

2. (FOR FCO) A FULL COPY OF THE PRESS STATEMENT FOLLOWS BY BAG.  
DAY

NNNN



FCO

OO LUSAKA

PP PRETORIA (-A)

PP GABORONE

PP WASHINGTON

PP DAR ES SALAAM

PP UKMIS NEW YORK

GR 720A

UNCLASSIFIED

FM MIRIMBA SALISBURY 1210Z JUL 79

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 463 OF 31 JULY

IMMEDIATE LUSAKA

INFO PRIORITY MAPUTO GABORONE WASHINGTON DAR ES SALAAM  
AND UKMIS NEW YORK

*Chan*

*H. J. ...  
18/8*

*[Stamp]*

*Prime Minister*

*BM  
1/8*

1. AT A PRESS CONFERENCE TODAY, REV SITHOLE ANNOUNCED THAT HIS PARTY WILL TAKE UP ITS 12 SEATS IN PARLIAMENT. HE SAID THAT THE PARTY WAS SATISFIED THAT ITS POINT ON THE IRREGULARITIES IN THE ELECTION HAD BEEN SUFFICIENTLY MADE. THEY HAD COLLECTED ALL THE NECESSARY EVIDENCE AND IT WAS NOW UP TO THE HIGH COURT TO HOLD PUBLIC HEARINGS. REV SITHOLE SAID THAT THE PEOPLE NOW ANTICIPATED NEW GENERAL ELECTIONS. THERE WAS A FEELING THAT THE ASPIRATIONS OF THE AFRICAN PEOPLE WAS BEING BETRAYED. THE MOMENTUM OF THE 3 MARCH AGREEMENT WAS DISSIPATING WITH POSSIBLY DISASTROUS CONSEQUENCES. IT WAS FOR THIS REASON THAT ZANU FELT THAT THEY SHOULD PARTICIPATE IN THE PARLIAMENT. ON BEING ASKED WHETHER ZANU WOULD TAKE UP ITS CABINET SEATS AND WHO THE MINISTERS WOULD BE, HE SAID THAT THIS HAD YET TO BE DECIDED.

2. REV SITHOLE ALSO GAVE DETAILS OF 16 RESOLUTIONS PASSED AT THE ZANU INTERPROVINCIAL CONGRESS LAST WEEK. THESE WERE THAT THE CONFERENCE:

1) "UNRESERVEDLY CONDEMNED THE COLDBLOODED MASSACRE OF 133 AUXILIARIES IN THE GOKWE AREA" AND DEMANDED THE DISMISSAL OF GEN WALLS, AS THE MAN RESPONSIBLE. THIS MASSACRE AMOUNTED TO NOTHING MORE THAN TERRORISM. AN IMMEDIATE PUBLIC ENQUIRY WAS ALSO DEMANDED.

2) DEPLORED THE USE OF POLICE AND SECURITY FORCES IN FURTHERING THE AIMS OF A PARTICULAR POLITICAL PARTY. THEY HAD BEEN USED TO SEARCH OFFICES AND HOMES OF ZANU OFFICIALS, TO DETAIN ZANU OFFICIALS, AND TO MASSACRE AUXILIARIES.

3) CONDEMNED THE "GESTAPO-TYPE" ACTIVITIES OF ZISO REVANHU.

4.) DEMANDED CHANGES IN THE INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS ACT AND CALLED FOR THE ABOLITION OF WAGE DISPARITIES. A MINIMUM WAGE OF 150 DOLLARS PER MONTH WAS ALSO DEMANDED.

5) CALLED FOR AN END TO SEX DISCRIMINATION.

NNNN



6) CALLED FOR THE INCLUSION OF AFRICANS IN ALL DECISION-MAKING BODIES.

7) CALLED FOR IMMEDIATE INTEGRATION IN THE SECURITY FORCES. THIS WOULD INCLUDE "RETURNING GUERRILLAS, ACCEPTABLE ELEMENTS OF THE SECURITY FORCES, AND AUXILIAIRES".

8) CALLED FOR THE DISBANDMENT OF ALL PROTECTED VILLAGES.

9) CRITICISED THE APPOINTMENT OF A WHITE MAN AS HEAD OF THE AMNESTY DIRECTORATE.

10) DEMANDED THE IMMEDIATE RELEASE OF ALL DETAINEES, POLITICAL PRISONERS AND RESTRICTEES. IT ALSO CALLED FOR DR EDSON SITHOLE TO BE LOCATED AND RETURNED HOME.

11) DEMANDED EQUAL DISTRIBUTION OF SOCIAL WELFARE WITHOUT REGARD TO POLITICAL AFFILIATION.

12) DEMANDED THE IMMEDIATE RETIREMENT OF IAN SMITH.

13) DEMANDED THE IMMEDIATE ABOLITION OF MARTIAL LAW AND THE STATE OF EMERGENCY.

14) CONSIDERED THAT THE DEMANDS OF THE AFRICAN PRIMARY TEACHERS WAS JUSTIFIED, DEPLORED THEIR ARREST AND CALLED FOR THEIR RELEASE.

15) DEMANDED CHANGES TO THOSE ASPECTS OF THE CONSTITUTION WHICH DEPRIVED BLACKS OF EFFECTIVE CONTROL OF THE COUNTRY.

16) PASSED A VOTE OF CONFIDENCE IN THE LEADERSHIP OF REV SITHOLE.

3. IN A QUESTION AND ANSWER SESSION, REV SITHOLE SAID THAT HE DID NOT KNOW WHEN THE 12 MPS WOULD TAKE UP THEIR SEATS. HE SAID HE WAS PREPARED TO WORK WITH THE GOVERNMENT OF NATIONAL UNITY UNDER THE 1979 CONSTITUTION UNTIL IT WAS CHANGED. ASKED ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF A REFERENDUM ON THE CONSTITUTION, HE SAID THAT THAT WOULD HELP. ONE GREAT PROBLEM WAS THAT THE AFRICAN PEOPLE HAD NOT PARTICIPATED IN THE REFERENDUM PRIOR TO THE ELECTION. ASKED WHETHER HE WOULD SUPPORT THE GOVERNMENT IN ITS EFFORTS TO GAIN RECOGNITION AND THE LIFTING OF SANCTIONS, HE SAID HE HAD ALWAYS WORKED FOR THAT. HE DENIED THAT HE HAD MET ANYONE FROM THE PATRIOTIC FRONT ON HIS RECENT TRIP OVERSEAS. BUT IT WAS IMPORTANT TO KEEP THE DOORS OPEN SO THAT NONE OF THE PARTIES COULD CLAIM THAT THEY HAD NOT BEEN ACCORDED THE OPPORTUNITY OF TAKING PART IN THE SETTLEMENT ISSUE. HE BELIEVED THAT THE SECURITY OF THE WHITES LAY ONLY IN DOING THE RIGHT THING AND NOT IN PAPER GUARANTEES. AT PRESENT THE GOVERNMENT HAD AN AFRICAN FACE BUT A WHITE SUBSTANCE. MR SITHOLE CLAIMED THAT A "JUNIOR BRITISH OFFICIAL" HAD TOLD HIM IN LONDON THAT BRITAIN WAS ABOUT TO MAKE "AN IRREVERSIBLE DECISION" ON RHODESIA. HE REMARKED THAT NO FOREIGNERS COULD MAKE DECISIONS ON THE COUNTRY WHICH ITS INHABITANTS COULD NOT REVERSE.

4. THE PRESS CONFERENCE WAS ATTENDED BY ABOUT 100 ZANU SUPPORTERS WHO CLEARED MOST OF THE REMARKS MADE BY REV SITHOLE.

*CHEERED?*

DAY

NNNN



Sir J Hunt  
CONFIDENTIAL

all

OO LUSAKA

RR PRETORIA

RR MAPUTO

RR DAR ES SALAAM

RR LUANDA

RR LAGOS

RR GABORONE

RR WASHINGTON

RR UKMIS NEW YORK

GR 303

CONFIDENTIAL

FM MIRIMBA SALISBURY 310300Z JUL 79

TO IMMEDIATE ECO

TELNO 461 OF 31 JULY

INFO IMMEDIATE LUSAKA

INFO ROUTINE PRETORIA MAPUTO DAR ES SALAAM LUANDA LAGOS GABORONE

WASHINGTON AND UKMIS NEW YORK

CHAM

Im has  
seen

Prime Minister

Para 6. is a useful  
corrective to South African

falls of woe. Yes  
31/7

PROSPECTS FOR A SETTLEMENT

1. AS THE LUSAKA CONFERENCE APPROACHES, ATTITUDES WITHIN RHODESIA TOWARDS A SETTLEMENT ARE BECOMING CLEARER.

ATTITUDE OF MUZOREWA

2. THE BISHOP NOW ACCEPTS THE SINCERITY OF HMG IN THEIR SEARCH FOR A FAIR AND ACCEPTABLE SOLUTION. HE ALSO RECOGNISES, THOUGH HE STILL DOES NOT SHARE, OUR BELIEF THAT CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE IS ESSENTIAL IF WE ARE TO ATTRACT INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT FOR A RETURN TO LEGALITY. HE IS NOT OPPOSED TO CHANGE, AND WOULD PROBABLY WELCOME IT, PROVIDED THE CHANGES PROPOSED ARE NOT OF A KIND TO PROVOKE A WHITE EXODUS. HE WILL NOT ACTIVELY ADVOCATE CHANGE, BUT WILL BE PREPARED TO CONSIDER ANY PROPOSALS PUT TO HIM. HE SAID SO IN HIS PRESS STATEMENT OF 23 JULY. HE IS CONCERNED AT HIS INTERNAL POLITICAL POSITION. THE ACTIVITIES OF SITHOLE AND CHIKEREMA HAVE WEAKENED HIS AUTHORITY. HIS INABILITY, SO FAR, TO PRODUCE REAL EVIDENCE OF AFRICAN ADVANCEMENT HAS BEGUN TO RAISE DOUBTS IN THE MINDS OF THE BLACKS. HE NEEDS A SETTLEMENT, OR AT LEAST THE CLEAR PROSPECT OF ONE, TO REVIVE HIS FORTUNES AND TO PREVENT A FURTHER EROSION OF HIS POSITION IN THE COUNTRY.



THERE IS STILL A DEEP SUSPICION OF HMG'S INTENTIONS. THE  
ALIBI OF THE PAST 15 YEARS DIES HARD. THERE ARE DOUBTS WHETHER  
WE WILL BE PREPARED TO STAND UP TO THE ANTICIPATED STRONG  
OPPOSITION FROM THE COMMONWEALTH AND OTHER THIRD WORLD COUNTRIES,  
AND WHETHER THEY WILL REALLY PUT MAJOR INTERESTS AT RISK FOR THE  
SAKE OF RHODESIA. THERE IS NERVOUSNESS ABOUT THE CONSTITUTIONAL  
CHANGES THAT HMG WILL BE PROPOSING. THE WHITES ARE DETERMINED TO  
RETAIN WITHIN THE CONSTITUTION SUFFICIENT SAFEGUARDS TO ENSURE  
ORDERLY GOVERNMENT AND ADMINISTRATION. NEVERTHELESS, THERE IS A  
WIDESPREAD DESIRE TO FIND A SOLUTION THAT WILL HOLD OUT A  
PROSPECT OF A DE-ESCALATION IN THE WAR, AND THEY WILL BE PREPARED  
TO PAY A PRICE FOR THAT.

4. IAN SMITH'S ATTITUDE TO PROPOSED CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE WILL  
CARRY CONSIDERABLE WEIGHT. WE WILL FIND IT DIFFICULT TO CARRY  
THE WHITES WITH US IF SMITH REMAINS IMPLACABLE OPPOSED. HE WILL  
NOT DISCLOSE HIS HAND UNTIL HE SEES WHAT IS BEING ASKED OF THE  
WHITES.

#### SECURITY SITUATION

5. THE SECURITY SITUATION IS NOT GOOD. MUGABE'S ZANLA IS ACTIVE  
IN MANY PARTS OF THE COUNTRY. THE SECURITY FORCES SHOW NO SIGNS  
OF GETTING ON TOP OF THEM, IN SPITE OF THE INCREASING 'KILL-RATE'.  
NKOMO'S ZIPRA CAUSES LESS IMMEDIATE CONCERN SINCE IT HAS FEWER  
MEN COMMITTED INSIDE THE COUNTRY AND BECAUSE THE RAIDS ON ITS  
BASES IN ZAMBIA HAVE DISRUPTED ITS PLANS AND ORGANISATION. THE  
SECURITY FORCES ARE IN NO DANGER OF DEFEAT: NEITHER CAN THEY HOPE  
TO ACHIEVE A TOTAL MILITARY VICTORY. THE SITUATION COULD CHANGE,  
IF THERE WERE SIGNIFICANT WHITE DEFECTIONS FROM THE FORCES.  
MORALE WOULD CRUMBLE AND THE WILL TO FIGHT WOULD BE LOST. THE  
PROSPECTS OF A PATRIOTIC FRONT VICTORY WOULD BE ENHANCED.  
THIS IS AN ADDED REASON WHY A SETTLEMENT WHICH WILL PRESERVE  
WHITE CONFIDENCE IS SO IMPORTANT TO THE BISHOP.

#### THE ECONOMY

6. THE RECENT BUDGET HAS UNDERLINED THE BASIS SOUNDNESS OF THE  
ECONOMY. SANCTIONS ARE A SERIOUS IRRITANT AND A BRAKE ON  
DEVELOPMENT, BUT THEY ARE NOT A CRITICAL FACTOR. THE MAIN THREAT  
TO THE ECONOMY IS THE CONTINUATION OF THE WAR. MOST WHITE FARMERS  
WILL GO AHEAD AND PLANT THEIR CROPS THIS AUTUMN IN ANTICIPATION  
OF A SETTLEMENT. IF THIS DOES NOT MATERIALISE, SOME COULD THROW  
IN THEIR HANDS. THE BREAKDOWN OF THE AGRICULTURAL SECTOR WOULD  
UNDERMINE THE WHOLE FABRIC OF THE ECONOMY. THERE WOULD BE  
SIMILAR REPERCUSSIONS IN THE BUSINESS, COMMERCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL  
SECTORS. THE WHITE AGRICULTURAL AND BUSINESS COMMUNITIES WANT TO  
CONTINUE THEIR PROFITABLE ACTIVITIES HERE. MANY OF THEM HAVE  
NOWHERE ELSE TO GO. THEY ARE THEREFORE COUNTING ON A FAIR  
SETTLEMENT.

#### CONCLUSIONS

7. (A) MUZOREWA NEEDS A SETTLEMENT AND WILL CONSIDER CONSTITUTIONAL  
CHANGE.
- (B) THE WHITES ARE SUSPICIOUS AND APPREHENSIVE. THEY ARE  
CHARY OF CHANGE. SMITH'S INFLUENCE REMAINS STRONG, BUT  
SOME CHANGE WILL BE ACCEPTABLE IF THIS IS THE KEY TO A  
FINAL SETTLEMENT.
- (C) FAILURE TO ACHIEVE A SETTLEMENT WOULD LEAD TO A  
DETERIORATION IN THE SECURITY AND ECONOMIC SITUATIONS AS  
THE WHITE EXODUS GATHERED MOMENTUM.

DAY

CONFIDENTIAL.

NNNN



CONFIDENTIAL

GR 452

CONFIDENTIAL

FM WASHINGTON 312044Z JUL 79

TO PRIORITY F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 2136 OF 31 JULY

INFO PRIORITY LUSAKA ROUTINE MTRIMBA SALISBURY.

*CHAM*  
*Bo. 18*  
**ACTION**

*Prim Minister*

RHODESIA.

1. A CONGRESSIONAL CONFERENCE (JOINT SENATE/HOUSE) COMMITTEE IS CURRENTLY HARMONIZING TEXTS OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS AUTHORIZATION ACT PASSED BY THE HOUSE ON 24 APRIL AND THE SENATE ON 15 MAY. INTEREST CENTRES ON A CLAUSE WHICH THE SENATE ATTACHED TO ITS VERSION OF THE ACT EXPRESSING THE SENSE OF CONGRESS THAT POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN RHODESIA DICTATED THAT SANCTIONS SHOULD BE LIFTED. HOUSE OPPONENTS OF THE ADMINISTRATION'S POLICY FAILED IN AN ATTEMPT TO INSTRUCT THE HOUSE CONFEREES TO SUPPORT THE SENATE'S ADDITION ON 11 JUNE. VOTING IN THE SENATE HAS CONSISTENTLY OPPOSED US SANCTIONS, WHILE THE HOUSE HAS GENERALLY SUPPORTED THEIR CONTINUED ENFORCEMENT FOR THE TIME BEING. *BLW*  
*1/8*

2. AT A MEETING ON 30 JULY, A COMPROMISE AMENDMENT (APPROVED BY CONGRESSMAN SOLARZ AND SENATOR HELMS) WAS AGREED UPON WHICH WOULD REQUIRE THE PRESIDENT TO END SANCTIONS BY 15 NOVEMBER 1979 UNLESS HE FINDS THAT TO DO SO WOULD BE AGAINST THE NATIONAL INTEREST. APART FROM THE SUBSTITUTION OF 15 NOVEMBER FOR 15 OCTOBER, THIS FORMULATION CLOSELY FOLLOWS THE WORDING CONTAINED IN SOLARZ'S BILL WHICH WAS PASSED BY THE HOUSE ON 28 JUNE (MY TEL 1740). HOWEVER THE AMENDMENT, WHICH WOULD BE BINDING ON THE ADMINISTRATION IF PRESIDENT CARTER WERE TO APPROVE THE ACT, ALSO STIPULATES THAT ANY PRESIDENTIAL DECISION TO RETAIN SANCTIONS AFTER 15 NOVEMBER COULD BE OVER-TURNED BY A MAJORITY VOTE IN BOTH HOUSES. THE 15 NOVEMBER DEADLINE PROPOSED IN THE AMENDMENT WOULD FREEZE THE SANCTIONS ISSUE UNTIL HMG HAD PRESENTED THEIR PROPOSALS AND THE QUESTION OF RENEWAL OF THE SANCTIONS ORDER BY PARLIAMENT HAD BEEN RESOLVED. AFTER THIS, ITS SPONSORS ASSUME, AN ENTIRELY NEW SITUATION MIGHT EXIST. DESPITE ITS UNWELCOME ASPECTS THE PRESIDENT MAY THEREFORE PREFER TO AVOID A DIRECT CONFLICT WITH CONGRESS NOW BY ACCEPTING THE COMPROMISE WORDING IN THE AMENDED ACT AND THUS LEAVING HIS POLICY INTACT FOR SEVERAL MORE MONTHS.

3. WE HAVE BEEN TOLD IN CONFIDENCE (PLEASE PROTECT) BY STATE DEPARTMENT THAT THEY HAVE NOT ACTIVELY SUPPORTED SOLARZ IN HIS NEGOTIATIONS WITH HELMS OVER THE COMPROMISE, SINCE THE OUTCOME IMPINGES TO SOME EXTENT ON EXECUTIVE PREROGATIVE. HOWEVER, WITH CONGRESS DUE TO BEGIN ITS SUMMER RECESS LATER THIS WEEK, AND CONSIDERATION OF THE DEFENCE AUTHORIZATION BILL STILL SOME WAY OFF, THERE IS SATISFACTION IN THE ADMINISTRATION THAT PRESSURE ON IT TO CHANGE ITS POLICY HAS FOR THE TIME BEING BEEN CONTAINED.

ROBINSON

CONFIDENTIAL



00 PARIS  
00 BONN  
00 UKMIS NEW YORK  
PP DAR ES SALAAM  
PP GABORONE  
PP APUTO  
PP LUANDA  
PP MAGOS

GR 230  
CONFIDENTIAL

DESKBY 311300Z (LUSAKA ONLY)  
FM PRETORIA 311720Z JUL.  
TO IMMEDIATE FCO  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 402 OF 31 JULY 1979.  
INFO IMMEDIATE LUSAKA (FOR PRIME MINISTER'S PARTY)  
INFO IMMEDIATE MIRIMBA SALISBURY, WASHINGTON, OTTAWA, PARIS  
BONN AND UKMIS NEW YORK.  
INFO PRIORITY DAR ES SALAAM, GABORONE, MAPUTO, LUANDA AND  
LAGOS.

MY TWO IPT'S

1. BOTH THE TEXT OF THE MESSAGE AND ITS TIMING ON THE VERY EVE OF THE LUSAKA CONFERENCE SEEM CURIOUS TO ME AS A NEW-COMER TO THE SOUTH AFRICAN SCENE. THE FIRST PART DEALING WITH NAMIBIA APPEARS TO BE PREPARING THE GROUND FOR A NEW STATEMENT OF POLICY BUT INSTEAD GOES OFF AT A TANGENT OVER THE THREAT OF COMMUNIST SUBVERSION IN SOUTHERN AFRICA. WITH SIR JAMES MURRAY STILL TO COME HERE I SUPPOSE WE SHOULD BE THANKFUL THAT IT THUS TAILS OFF INCONCLUSIVELY ON NAMIBIA.

2. I FIND IT DIFFICULT TO BELIEVE, ALTHOUGH MR DAY WILL BE ABLE TO JUDGE THIS BETTER THAN I, THAT MATTERS IN RHODESIA HAVE DETERIORATED SO FAR AND SO FAST AS TO JUSTIFY THE PANICKY TONE OF BOTH THE MESSAGE AND MR BOTHA'S ACCOMPANYING REMARKS. ITS MAIN PURPOSE MUST BE, THEREFORE, TO STIFFEN OUR RESISTANCE IN THE FACE OF THE EXPECTED ATTACKS AT LUSAKA BY THE AFRICAN COUNTRIES. WHEN AT ONE POINT IN OUR CONVERSATION I REMARKED THAT THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT WAS NOT THE SORT TO BE BLOWN EASILY OFF COURSE, MR BOTHA SAID THAT HE DID NOT WISH TO SUGGEST IT WAS. I TAKE THIS TO MEAN THAT HE DID.

LEAHY

Prime Minister

OGM  
31/7



00 F C O  
00 LUSAKA (DESKBY 311730Z)  
00 MIRIMBA SALISBURY  
00 WASHINGTON  
00 OTTAWA  
00 BONN  
00 UKMIS NEW YORK  
PP DAR ES SALAAM  
PP GABORONE  
PP MAPUTO  
PP LUANDA  
PP LAGOS

GR 700  
CONFIDENTIAL  
FM PRETORIA 311750Z  
DESKBY 311730Z (LUSAKA ONLY)  
TO IMMEDIATE FCO  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 401 OF 31 JULY 1979.  
INFO IMMEDIATE LUSAKA (FOR PRIME MINISTER'S PARTY)  
INFO IMMEDIATE MIRIMBA SALISBURY, WASHINGTON, OTTAWA, BONN  
UKMIS NEW YORK  
INFO PRIORITY DAR ES SALAAM, GABORONE, MAPUTO, LUANDA AND LAGOS.  
RHODESIA.

1. ALTHOUGH I HAVE NOT YET PRESENTED MY CREDENTIALS I WAS SUMMONED URGENTLY BY THE MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, MR PIK BOTHA, THIS AFTERNOON TO RECEIVE A MESSAGE FROM THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT ON RHODESIA.  
THE TEXT IS IN MIFT.
2. MR BOTHA SAID THAT HE WAS CONVEYING THIS MESSAGE ON THE EXPRESS INSTRUCTIONS OF THE PRIME MINISTER, MR P W BOTHA. THE LATTER HAD JUST ADJOURNED A CABINET MEETING IN ORDER TO MAKE IT POSSIBLE FOR HIM, PIK BOTHA, TO SEE ME. THE PRIME MINISTER HAD CONSIDERED TELEPHONING MRS THATCHER HIMSELF TO CONVEY THE MESSAGE PERSONALLY, BUT BECAUSE OF THE OBVIOUS DIFFICULTIES ABOUT DOING THIS WHILE MRS THATCHER WAS IN LUSAKA HAD DECIDED TO CONVEY THE MESSAGE THROUGH ME INSTEAD. IT AMOUNTED TO AN URGENT APPEAL FROM THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT TO HMG TO LIFT SANCTIONS WITHOUT DELAY. THE REASON FOR THE APPEAL WAS THAT THE SAG BELIEVED - AND MR BOTHA REPEATED THAT THE PRIME MINISTER FELT THIS PERTICULARLY STRONGLY ~~FA~~ THAT RHODESIA WAS IN DANGER OF 'IMMINENT COLLAPSE'. THE SAG HAD INFORMATION WHICH INDICATED THAT BOTH THE SECURITY AND ECONOMIC SITUATIONS WERE WORSE THAN EVEN BISHOP MUZEREWA UNDERSTOOD. IF SANCTIONS WERE NOT LIFTED VERY SOON THE COUNTRY WOULD FALL APART WITH VERY SERIOUS CONSEQUENCES FOR THE WHOLE OF SOUTHERN AFRICA. MOREOVER, SOUTH AFRICA ITSELF COULD NOT GO ON POURING MONEY INTO RHODESIA IN THESE CORCUMSTANCES, IE WHILE SANCTIONS CONTINUED.
3. MR BOTHA WAS AT PAINS TO MAKE IT CLEAR THAT HE WAS NOT EXAGGERATING THE SERIOUSNESS OF THE SITUATION IN RHODESIA. HE HALF ADMITTED THAT THERE HAD BEEN OCCASIONS IN THE PAST WHEN HE MIGHT HAVE EXAGGERATED IN THE COURSE OF FORECASTING DEVELOPMENTS IN AFRICA AND HE WAS AWARE THAT HIS WESTERN COLLEAGUES HAD NOT ALWAYS TAKEN HIS WARNINGS SERIOUSLY. THIS TIME THERE WAS NO EXAGGERATION. ON THE OTHER HAND, IF SANCTIONS WERE LIFTED SOON, IT WOULD HAVE AN IMMEDIATE PSYCHOLOGICAL EFFECT IN RHOSEIA AND WOULD LEAD TO A DE-ESCALATION OF THE FIGHTING THERE BY 50 PER CENT OR MORE OVER THE NEXT 12 TO 18 MONTHS. IF BRITAIN WOULD GIVE THE LEAD, HE FELT SURE THAT THE UNITED STATES WOULD FOLLOW SUIT AND PROBABLY FRANCE AND THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY TOO. IF THEY DID, IT WOULD NOT MATTER MUCH WHAT THE SECURITY COUNCIL DID. IN ANY CASE ANY STRONG REACTIONS FROM THE AFRICAN COUNTRIES WOULD NOT LAST LONG AND THERE WERE DIFFERENCES OF OPINION AMONGST THEM.
4. I ASKED MR BOTHA WHETHER HE HAD READ THE PRIME MINISTER, S SPEECH IN THE ADJOURNMENT DEBATE ON SOUTHERN AFRICA IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS ON 25 JULY. HE FIRST OF ALL SAID QUOTE WE KNOW ALL ABOUT THAT UNQUOTE, BUT WHEN I PASSED A COPY OF IT ACROSS THE TABLE TO HIM HE AT ONCE HAD COPIES MADE SO THAT HE COULD SEND ONE TO MR P W BOTHA. I DREW HIS ATTENTION IN PARTICULAR TO THE PASSAGE IN THE PRIME MINISTER'S REPLY TO THE SUPPLEMENTARY QUESTIONS FROM MR IOAN EVANS IN WHICH SHE POINTED OUT THAT IF WE BROUGHT RHODESIA TO LEGAL INDEPEB NECE FIRST SANCTIONS WOULD FALL BECAUSE THE UN SANCTIONS MOTION DEPENDED ON THEIR BEING A STATE OF ILLEGALITY IN RHODESIA. I ALSO POINTED OUT THAT THE PRIME MINISTER HAD EMPHASISED THAT THERE WAS NOT MUCH TIME LEFT. MR BOTHA SAID THAT LIFTING SANCTIONS WAS MORE URGENT THAN RECOGNITION, WHICH COULD WAIT UNTIL LATER. THE SAG HAD THEMSELVES NOT YET RECOGNISED THE MUZOREWA GOVERNMENT. BISHOP MUZOREWA WAS NOT IN A POSITION AT PRESENT TO MAKE CONCESSIONS ON CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGES WITHOUT RISKING AN EXODUS OF THE WHITES. HE WOULD BE MUCH BETTER ABLE TO DO THIS, HOWEVER, ONCE THE SECURITY AND ECONOMIC SITUATIONS HAD BEEN RESTORED AS A RESULT OF THE LIFTING OF SANCTIONS.
5. MR BOTHA SAID THAT WHATEVER THE FORMAL POSITION MIGHT BE BRITAIN AND SOUTH AFRICA HAD A QUOTE SHARED RESPONSIBILITY UNQUOTE FOR RHODESIA AND HE WANTED US TO WORK IN HARMONY OVER IT. THE SAG WERE NOT ASKING US TO APPROVE OF SOUTH AFRICA'S INTERNAL POLICIES OR TO GIVE UP OUR STRONG FEELINGS ABOUT APARTHEID -THERE WAS NO APARTHEID IN RHODESIA- BUT THEY DID WANT US TO UNDERSTAND LIKE THEM THE SERIOUSNESS OF THE WITUATION IN RHODESIA AND THE NEED TO ACT QUICKLY.

LEAHY

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*See by 11:00 AM.*  
*Prime Minister*  
*(26th)* *SAG* *21/7*



LPT 408/31

00 F C O  
 00 LUSAKA ( DESKBY 311700Z)  
 00 MIRIMBA SALISBURY  
 00 WASHINGTON  
 00 OTTAWA  
 00 PARIS  
 00 BONN  
 00 UKMIS NEW YORK  
 PP DAR ES SALAAM  
 PP GABORONE  
 PP MAPUTO  
 PP LUANDA  
 PP LAGOS

*Prime Minister*  
*April 28*

CONFIDENTIAL

DESKBY 311730Z (LUSAKA ONLY)

GR 300

FM PRETORIA 311630Z

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 400 OF 31 JULY 1979.

INFO IMMEDIATE LUSAKA (FOR PRIME MINISTER'S PARTY)

INFO IMMEDIATE MIRIMBA SALISBURY, WASHINGTON, OTTAWA, PARIS,

BONN AND UKMIS NEW YORK

INFO PRIORITY DAR ES SALAAM, GABORONE, MAPUTO LUANDA AND LAGOS.

MIPT: RHODESIA.

THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT FEELS THAT, IN CONSULTATION WITH THE PEOPLE OF THE TERRITORY AND TAKING THEIR WISHES INTO ACCOUNT, IT HAS FULLY COMPLIED WITH ALL THE DEMANDS MADE OVER THE YEARS FOR A SOLUTION OF THE SOUTH WEST AFRICA PROBLEM, I.E.

- (1) INDEPENDENCE FOR THE TERRITORY AS A WHOLE
- (2) ONE-MAN-ONE-VOTE
- (3) REMOVAL OF DISCRIMINATION ON THE BASIS OF COLOUR
- (4) THE HOLDING OF FREE AND FAIR ELECTIONS
- (5) THE RIGHT OF ALL SOUTH WEST AFRICANS TO RETURN TO PARTICIPATE PEACEFULLY IN THE POLITICAL PROCESS
- (6) RELEASE OF DETAILEES WHEREVER HELD.

IN THE VIEW OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT THE CAUSE OF MODERATION IS BEING PURPOSELY AND SYSTEMATICALLY UNDERMINED BY SOVIET STRATEGY IN THE SOUTHERN AFRICA SUB-CONTINENT, AIMED AT SUBVERTING THE GOVERNMENTS OF THIS REGION. IT IS CLEAR THAT THESE EXTERNAL FORCES ARE SEEKING TO IMPOSE RULERS OF THEIR CHOICE IN AN ATTEMPT TO ESTABLISH THEIR HEGEMONY ACROSS THE SUB-CONTINENT, THEREBY SECURING FOR THEMSELVES A PERMANENT POSITION FROM WHENCE TO CARRY OUT THEIR DESIGNS ON THE OTHER COUNTRIES OF AFRICA AND MONOPOLIZE THE RESOURCES OF SOUTHERN AFRICA. THE TIME HAS COME FOR ALL RESPONSIBLE GOVERNMENTS TO GIVE SERIOUS CONSIDERATION TO THIS THREAT.

*IF SANCTIONS ARE NOT*

THE SAME APPLIES TO RHODESIA WHERE THE SITUATION HAS BECOME CRITICAL.

↑ LIFTED SOON THERE IS REAL DANGER THAT THE COUNTRY WILL COMPLETELY COLLAPSE AND DISINTEGRATE, WITH INCALCULABLE CONSEQUENCES FOR THE WHOLE OF SOUTHERN AFRICA AND THE WESTERN WORLD INCLUDING THE UNITED KINGDOM.

THE PSYCHOLOGICAL EFFECT OF THE LIFTING OF SANCTIONS WILL IN THE OPINION OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT LEAD TO A DE-ESCALATION OF THE WAR IN ZIMBABWE/RHODESIA. MANY OF THOSE FIGHTING IN THE RANKS OF NKOMO AND MUGABE ARE AT PRESENT SITTING ON THE FENCE AND ARE WAITING FOR THE RIGHT PSYCHOLOGICAL MOMENT TO MAKE THEIR FINAL CHOICE.

*BEA SIGNAL*

ON THE CONTRARY, FAILURE TO LIFT SANCTIONS WOULD TO THOSE SAME GROUPS OF INDIVIDUALS TO CONTINUE AND EVEN STEP UP THE FIGHTING. THEY TOO KNOW WHAT EFFECT THE LIFTING OF SANCTIONS WILL HAVE ON THE MORALE OF THE PEOPLE OF ZIMBABWE/RHODESIA.

IN SHORT, THE LIFTING OF SANCTIONS WOULD LEAD TO DE-ESCALATION SEMI COLON THE FAILURE TO DO SO WOULD LEAD TO AN INCREASE IN THE KILLINGS AND DESTRUCTION AND CHAOS.

IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT WOULD URGE HER MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT NOT TO BE SWAYED BY RADICAL DEMANDS WHICH ARE BOUND TO BE MADE DURING THE COMMONWEALTH CONFERENCE TO DELAY THE LIFTING OF SANCTIONS AGAINST ZIMBABWE/RHODESIA.

LEAHY

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CCN... PARA BEGGING THE SAME APPLIES... IF SANCTIONS ARE NOT LIFTED SOON THERE IS A REAL DANGER THAT THE COUNTRY



PART 4 begins:-

Pretoria 400 31.7.79

PART 3 ends:-

PM to Viscount Colville 30.7.79











END

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February 2010