

PREM19

110

RHODESIA

(Situation in)

(August 9 - 30)

(Part 5)

PREM 19/110



Rhoderia

PART 5 ends:-

FCO to BGC 30.8.79.

PART 6 begins:-

Pres Bongo to PM 31.8.79



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

cc Zambia May 79
Rhodesia

h.s. Phils 3/5

(2)

Prime Minister:

30 August 1979

Dear Bryan,

These are the answers to two points that you raised on the attached letter.

Rhodesia

Thank you very much, Phils 30/8

Your letter of 28 August in reply to mine of 22 August about Rhodesia asked for advice on two specific points raised by the Prime Minister.

On the first point, I can confirm that the UK aid programme in 1979/80 will be 2% higher in real terms than it was last year. On the second, the position is that the British High Commission in Lusaka has been instructed to postpone signing of the £10 million loan agreement with the Zambian Government until given the go-ahead from London. The Zambians are of course well aware of this offer of aid which was made by the previous Government last August.

Yours ever,

Stephe

(J S Wall)
Private Secretary

Bryan G Cartledge Esq
10 Downing Street
LONDON

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CRS 288

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FM WASHINGTON 301912Z AUG 79
TO PRIORITY FCO
TEL NO 2482 OF 30 AUGUST 1979.

VANCE/RHODESIA.

1. VANCE CAME PERSONALLY TO THE EMBASSY THIS AFTERNOON TO SIGN OUR CONDOLENCE BOOK FOR LORD MOUNTBATTEN.

2. HE SAID THAT, ON HIS RETURN FROM HOLIDAY THIS MORNING, HE HAD SEEN MOOSE AND LAKE AND WAS VERY HAPPY INDEED WITH THE MEETING THEY HAD HAD IN LONDON AND THE WAY THINGS WERE PROGRESSING ON RHODESIA. SO FAR EVERYTHING HAD GONE SPLENDIDLY, AND WE HAD HIS FULL SUPPORT.

3. I SAID I KNEW YOU WERE LOOKING FORWARD TO SEEING HIM LATER IN SEPTEMBER, EITHER HERE OR IN NEW YORK. VANCE SAID THAT HE TOO LOOKED FORWARD TO SEEING YOU. HE WOULD BE IN NEW YORK ALMOST CONTINUOUSLY IN THE LATTER PART OF SEPTEMBER/EARLY OCTOBER, RETURNING TO WASHINGTON ONLY FOR THE VISITS OF THE MEXICAN PRESIDENT AND THE POPE. SO A MEETING IN NEW YORK MIGHT BE EASIER.

ROBINSON

FILES

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LEGAL ADVISERS
(MR FREELAND)
(MR FIFOOT)
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PS/NO 10 DOWNING STREET

IMMEDIATE

MR R L WADE-GERY)
MR P M MAXEY)
COL MOIR) CABINET
MR P J FOWLER) OFFICE
DIO)
~~SIR J HUNT~~)

.....
HD/RHODESIA DEPT (3)

HD/C AF D
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FOR ZIMBABWE DEVELOPMENTS FUND
MR LYNCH ODM
MR BLAUER TREASURY

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HD/NEWS DEPT
HD/WAD
MR FREELAND LEGAL ADVISER RM K200A
MR FIFOOT LEGAL ADVISER RM K164
RESIDENT CLERK

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Chalderia Kelly
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Prime Minister

And 3/2

GR 1837

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FROM LAGOS 371500Z AUGUST 1979

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 673 OF 30 AUGUST

RFI PRIORITY DAR ES SALAAM, GABORONE, MAPUTO, LUANDA, MIRIMBA
SALISBURY, PRETORIA, UKMIS NEW YORK, WASHINGTON.

YOUR TEL NO 670 (TO LAGOS ONLY):

RHODESIA/NIGERIA

1. GENERAL OBASANJO RECEIVED ME FOR FORTY-FIVE MINUTES THIS AFTERNOON. I BEGAN BY THANKING HIM FOR HIS MESSAGE OF CONDOLENCE TO THE QUEEN ON LORD MOUNTBATTEN'S DEATH AND CONGRATULATING HIM AND HIS GOVERNMENT FOR THEIR RECENT SUCCESSFUL DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS ON CHAD AND FOR THEIR REMARKABLE ACHIEVEMENT IN SUCCESSFULLY CONCLUDING THEIR PROGRAMME OF ELECTIONS WHICH WILL LEAD TO CIVILIAN RULE.
2. I THEN HANDED OVER THE TWO MESSAGES FROM THE PRIME MINISTER. AFTER HE HAD READ THEM I SAID I WOULD LIKE TO SPEAK MAINLY ABOUT

2. I THEN HANDED OVER THE TWO MESSAGES FROM THE PRIME MINISTER. AFTER HE HAD READ THEM I SAID I WOULD LIKE TO SPEAK MAINLY ABOUT RHODESIA SINCE THIS HAD BEEN THE MAIN CAUSE OF OUR DIFFICULT RELATIONS IN RECENT MONTHS. NIGERIAN SUSPICIONS OF HMG'S INTENTIONS REGARDING THE MUZOREWA REGIME AND SANCTIONS WERE PERHAPS UNDERSTANDABLE IN THE EARLY STAGES. HOWEVER, WE HAD ENGAGED SERIOUSLY IN CONSULTATIONS WITH OUR COMMONWEALTH PARTNERS AND HAD TAKEN PARTICULAR NOTE OF NIGERIAN VIEWS AS EXPRESSED BY THE CHIEF OF STAFF TO LORD HARLECH. THE PRIME MINISTER'S STATEMENTS JUST BEFORE AND DURING THE LUSAKA CONFERENCE TOOK NIGERIAN VIEWS FULLY INTO ACCOUNT AND HAS SUBSEQUENTLY BEEN ENDORSED BY THE WHOLE COMMONWEALTH LUSAKA AGREEMENT. WE HAD SHOWN OUR COMMITMENT TO THE LUSAKA AGREEMENT BY THE SPEED WITH WHICH WE HAD PROCEEDED TO ORGANISE A CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE FOR NEXT MONTH. THUS WE HAD NOT ONLY ANNOUNCED A POLICY WHICH MET AFRICAN AND NIGERIAN WISHES BUT WERE ENERGETICALLY PURSUING IT. IT THUS SEEMED TO ME THAT RHODESIA WAS NO LONGER A BONE OF CONTENTION BETWEEN US AND WE SHOULD BE ABLE TO RESUME OUR CLOSE AND FRIENDLY RELATIONS IN AN ATMOSPHERE OF CONFIDENCE AND TRUST. I HOPED THAT GENERAL OBASANJO AGREED.

3. OBASANJO SAID THAT HIS ATTITUDE TO THE LUSAKA AGREEMENT WAS " I SHALL BELIEVE IT WHEN I SEE IT". HE HAD TO CONFESS THAT HE WAS SCEPTICAL ABOUT THE CHANCES OF AN AGREEMENT ON RHODESIA HAVING SEEN SO MANY PREVIOUS EFFORTS RUN INTO THE SAND. IF THE FORTHCOMING CONFERENCE WERE SUCCESSFUL " IT WOULD BE TO THE ETERNAL CLORY OF BRITAIN AND THE COURAGE AND STATESMANSHIP OF MRS THATCHER". BUT HE COULD NOT BE OPTIMISTIC.

4. I SAID I HOPED THAT HIS SCEPTICISM WOULD NOT PRECLUDE FULL NIGERIAN SUPPORT FOR OUR EFFORTS AT THE CONFERENCE. WE CERTAINLY DID NOT UNDER-ESTIMATE THE DIFFICULTIES BUT WE BELIEVED THAT THERE WAS A BETTER CHANCE OF SUCCESS NOW THAN FOR A LONG TIME. HOWEVER, WE COULD NOT SUCCEED WITHOUT THE ACTIVE SUPPORT OF ALL OUR FRIENDS BECAUSE THE DIVERGENT VIEWS OF THE RHODESIAN PARWUTIES WOULD MEAN THAT GREAT PRESSURE WOULD HAVE TO BE BROUGHT TO BEAR TO BRING THEM TO AGREE TO A SETTLEMENT ON THE LINES AGREED AT LUSAKA. OBASANJO REPLIED " WE SHALL CERTAINLY SUPPORT IT", WHILE CONTINUING TO EXPRESS RESERVATIONS. SINCE THE PRESENT BRITISH GOVERNMENT IN ITS EARLY DAYS SEEMED TO BE READY TO RECOGNISE MUZOREWA, IT WAS UNDERSTANDABLE THAT THE PATRIOTIC FRONT HAD RESERVATIONS ABOUT BRITAIN AS AN IMPARTIAL ARBITER. THEY WERE SUSPICIOUS THAT THE CONFERENCE WAS JUST A DEVICE TO MAKE MUZOREWA MORE RESPECTABLE SO THAT IN DUE COURSE HIS

RECOGNISE MUZOREWA, IT WAS UNDERSTANDABLE THAT THE PATRIOTIC FRONT HAD RESERVATIONS ABOUT BRITAIN AS AN IMPARTIAL ARBITER. THEY WERE SUSPICIOUS THAT THE CONFERENCE WAS JUST A DEVICE TO MAKE MUZOREWA MORE RESPECTABLE SO THAT IN DUE COURSE HIS GOVERNMENT COULD BE ENDORSED. IF THIS WERE SO, NIGERIA WOULD CERTAINLY NOT SUPPORT THE CONFERENCE. HOWEVER, IF THE AIM WAS TO PRODUCE A GENUINE INDEPENDENCE CONSTITUTION AND ELECTIONS WHICH WERE SEEN BY THE WORLD TO BE FREE AND FAIR, THEN HE WOULD SUPPORT THE CONFERENCE AND WOULD BE READY TO RECOGNISE WHOEVER WAS THE VICTOR OF THE ELECTIONS, WHETHER IT WAS MUZOREWA OR EVEN SMITH. " SO ON THIS BASIS WE WILL SUPPORT IT."

5. I SAID THAT AN IMMEDIATE OCCASION FOR SUCH SUPPORT WAS COMING UP VERY SOON, IE THE NON-ALIGNED CONFERENCE IN HAVANA. WE WERE CONCERNED THAT THE HAVANA CONFERENCE WOULD ADOPT AN EXTREME RESOLUTION WHICH WOULD MAKE OUR TASK IN LONDON EVEN MORE DIFFICULT AND WE HOPED IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE FOR NIGERIA TO GIVE SUPPORT TO A RESOLUTION GIVING SOME ENDORSEMENT TO THE LUSAKA AGREEMENT. OBASANJO, WITHOUT GIVING A POSITIVE REPLY, SAID THAT HE DID NOT THINK THAT THE HAVANA CONFERENCE WOULD ADOPT A RESOLUTION WHICH WOULD PREJUDICE THE SUCCESS OF THE LONDON CONFERENCE. (I AM AFRAID I DID NOT ASK HIM WHETHER HE HIMSELF WOULD BE GOING).

6. I SAID IT WAS IMPORTANT THAT WE SHOULD BE AGREED ON THE WAY AHEAD ON SOLVING THE RHODESIA PROBLEM ITSELF. ~~7275-3-2-1~~ SO CONCERNED TO REPAIR THE DAMAGE WHICH THE RECENT DISAGREEMENT HAD CAUSED TO OUR BILATERAL RELATIONS. THE NIGERIAN PRESS WAS STILL IN GENERAL HOSTILE TO US AND IT HAD NOT REFLECTED THE FACT THAT THE LUSAKA AGREEMENT HAD BEEN A GREAT SUCCESS AND HAD RESOLVED ANGLO-NIGERIAN DIFFERENCES OVER RHODESIA. I HOPED IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE FOR HIS GOVERNMENT TO MAKE A STATEMENT EXPRESSING ITS ENDORSEMENT OF THE LUSAKA AGREEMENT AND ITS FULL SUPPORT FOR THE FORTHCOMING LONDON CONFERENCE. OBASANJO SAID HE WOULD PREFER TO WAIT AND SEE HOW THE CONFERENCE WENT. REFERRING TO THE FAILURE OF PREVIOUS ATTEMPTS AT A SETTLEMENT, INCLUDING THE ANGLO-AMERICAN PROPOSALS WHICH NIGERIA HAD FIRMLY SUPPORTED, HE SAID THEY HAD BEEN BITTEN SEVERAL TIMES AND WERE THEREFORE VERY SHY.

7. PICKING UP THIS LAST PHRASE I SAID THAT BRITISH COMMERCIAL INTERESTS HAD BEEN BITTEN VERY HARD BY THE EMBARGO ON THE RECEIPT OF TENDERS FROM BRITISH FIRMS FOR MAJOR GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS. THIS HAD BEEN IMPOSED SPECIFICALLY IN THE CONTEXT OF RHODESIA "PENDING CLARIFICATION OF THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT'S POLICY".

THIS HAD BEEN IMPOSED SPECIFICALLY IN THE CONTEXT OF RHODESIA
"PENDING CLARIFICATION OF THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT'S POLICY".
THIS POLICY HAD NOW BEEN CLARIFIED TO THE ENTIRE SATISFACTION
OF THE COMMONWEALTH AND WE HOPED THEREFORE OF NIGERIA. THERE
WAS NO JUSTIFICATION WHATEVER FOR ITS CONTINUATION AND I HOPED
THAT HE COULD ASSURE ME THAT IT WOULD BE LIFTED FORTHWITH.
OBASANJO'S FIRST REACTION WAS TO SAY, "LET'S WAIT AND SEE WHAT
HAPPENS AT THE LONDON CONFERENCE". I PROTESTED VIGOROUSLY THAT
THIS WAS MOST UNFAIR. WE COULD NOT GUARANTEE SUCCESS AT THE LONDON
CONFERENCE : ALL WE COULD PROMISE WAS TO DO OUR BEST TO ACHIEVE
A SETTLEMENT ON THE BASIS AGREED BY THE COMMONWEALTH. THE
CONDITIONS FOR LIFTING THE EMBARGO HAD BEEN AMPLY FULFILLED
AND ITS CONTINUATION IN PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES WOULD ONLY BE
REGARDED AS AN UNFRIENDLY ACT. HE TOOK THIS VERY WELL WITH A
SMILE AND SAID THAT HE WOULD CONSIDER IT. AS I KNEW THESE
DECISIONS WERE COLLECTIVE ONES I AGREED BUT ASKED HIM TO PUT
THE QUESTION BEFORE THE SMC AT THE FIRST OPPORTUNITY.

9. I THEN REFERRED TO THE PASSAGE IN MRS THATCHER'S MESSAGE IN
WHICH SHE SAID SHE WOULD BE ASKING ME TO TALK TO HIM ABOUT BP.
HE SAID BRUSQUELY, "FORGET ABOUT IT. I DON'T WANT TO TALK
ABOUT BP". THE TONE WAS SUCH THAT I JUDGED THAT I MIGHT
JEOPARDISE THE GAINS FROM THE MEETING SO FAR IF I PURSUED THE
QUESTION.

10. OBASANJO IN CONCLUSION SAID THAT HE SHARED MY HOPE THAT
BRITAIN'S RELATIONS COULD REVERT TO THEIR FORMER FRIENDLINESS,
AND HE WOULD BE REPLYING TO MRS THATCHER'S MESSAGE IN DUE COURSE.
BUT AS TO THE METHOD OF CONDUCTING THESE RELATIONS, HE WANTED
TO WARN US AGAINST USING PEOPLE OUTSIDE THE GOVERNMENT AS
CHANNELS OF COMMUNICATION : HE WAS SURE I KNEW TO WHAT HE WAS
REFERRING. (I ASSUMED FROM THIS THAT HE WAS AWARE OF BP'S VARIOUS
EFFORTS TO ESTABLISH CONTACT WITH SENIOR FIGURES IN THE FMG
AND/OR SHAGARI THROUGH VARIOUS NON-OFFICIAL PEOPLE : BUT HE
MIGHT ALSO HAVE BEEN REFERRING TO OUR OWN USE OF UNOFFICIAL
SOURCES AS WELL AS OFFICIAL CHANNELS TO GET THROUGH TO HIMSELF
(IN ORDER TO FIX MY APPOINTMENT.)

11. FINALLY, PICKING UP AN EARLIER COMMENT OF HIS ABOUT THE
IRRESPONSIBILITY OF THE NIGERIAN PRESS, I SAID I HAD BEEN
CONCERNED ABOUT CRITICISM OF MRS THATCHER'S MESSAGE TO THE
PRESIDENT-ELECT AND SUGGESTIONS THAT THIS INVOLVED INTERFERENCE
IN INTERNAL AFFAIRS. I SAID IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES I HOPED
IT WOULD NOT BE MISUNDERSTOOD IF I ASKED TO PAY MY RESPECTS
ON THE PRESIDENT-ELECT AT SOME TIME IN THE NEAR FUTURE : I THOUGHT
IT WOULD BE PARTICULARLY USEFUL TO KEEP HIM ADVISED ON THE

IT WOULD NOT BE MISUNDERSTOOD IF I ASKED TO PAY MY RESPECTS ON THE PRESIDENT-ELECT AT SOME TIME IN THE NEAR FUTURE: I THOUGHT IT WOULD BE PARTICULARLY USEFUL TO KEEP HIM BRIEFED ON THE PROGRESS OF THE RHODESIA CONFERENCE. OBASANJO SAID HE SAW NO OBJECTION WHATSOEVER BUT THOUGHT THE SECOND HALF OF SEPTEMBER WOULD BE THE RIGHT TIME AND ADVISED ME TO SEEK AN APPOINTMENT THROUGH THE MINISTRY OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

COMMENT

12. THIS WAS A TOUGH INTERVIEW WHICH CONFIRMED OBASANJO'S RAHTER GRUDGING ACCEPTANCE OF LUSAKA. I THEREFORE FEAR THAT NIGERIAN SUPPORT AT THE LONDON CONFERENCE WILL NOT BE WHOLE-HEARTED UNDER THE PRESENT MILITARY GOVERNMENT, AND FROM THIS POINT OF VIEW WE MUST HOPE THAT THE MOMENT TO APPLY FULL PRESSURE ON THE PATRIOTIC FRONT WILL COME AFTER THE CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT HAS TAKEN OVER HERE.

13. AS REGARDS THE EMBARGO ON CONTRACTS, I THINK I SUCCEEDED IN SHIFTING HIM FROM HIS POSITION OF "WAIT AND SEE". IF HE DOES BRING THE MATTER UP AT THE SMC AS HE INDICATED HE WOULD, THEN THE SUPPORT OF DANJUMA AND YAR'ADUA SHOULD ENSURE THE LIFTING OF THE EMBARGO.

14. I SHALL COMMENT SEPARATELY ON BP (NOT TO ALL).

BROWN

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DESKBY 302230Z

FM FCO 302135Z AUG 79

TO IMMEDIATE MIRIMBA SALISBURY

TELEGRAM NUMBER 185 OF 30 AUGUST

kg. Amt - 3/5

YOUR TELNOS 577 AND 578: RHODESIA CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE:
MESSAGE FROM BISHOP MUZOREWA.

1. BISHOP MUZOREWA'S MESSAGE BEARS THE HALL-MARKS OF HAVING BEEN DRAFTED BY HIS OFFICIALS AND DEALS WITH A NUMBER OF POINTS WHICH HAVE BEEN THE SUBJECT OF DISCUSSION WITH YOU. THE PRIME MINISTER IS CONTENT THEREFORE THAT YOU SHOULD REPLY ORALLY ON HER BEHALF, MAKING THE FOLLOWING POINTS:

I. THE PRIME MINISTER WAS GLAD TO HAVE THE BISHOP'S FORMAL ACCEPTANCE OF THE INVITATION TO THE CONFERENCE. SHE WAS PLEASED TO HEAR THAT HE FOUND MR FIFOOT'S VISIT USEFUL. IT FULFILLED OUR UNDERTAKING TO LET THE BISHOP KNOW PRIVATELY WHAT CHANGES IN THE 1979 CONSTITUTION WE REGARD AS INDISPENSABLE. WE HAVE NOT HAD SIMILAR DISCUSSIONS WITH OTHER PARTIES AND IT IS MOST IMPORTANT THAT MR FIFOOT'S VISIT SHOULD REMAIN CONFIDENTIAL.

II. THE PROPOSALS WHICH WE HAVE PUBLISHED WERE SHOWN BY YOU TO THE BISHOP, AND ARE INTENDED AS A FRAMEWORK FOR DISCUSSION AT THE CONFERENCE. THEY IMPLEMENT THE PRIME MINISTER'S UNDERTAKING IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS ON 25 JULY TO PUT FORWARD FIRM PROPOSALS TO BRING RHODESIA TO LEGAL INDEPENDENCE ON A BASIS COMPARABLE TO THAT ON WHICH WE GRANTED INDEPENDENCE TO OTHER FORMER BRITISH TERRITORIES. THE CONSTITUTIONAL RESPONSIBILITY TO MAKE SUCH PROPOSALS RESTS WITH US.

III. THE PRIME MINISTER SHARES THE BISHOP'S REGRET THAT THE PATRIOTIC FRONT HAVE NOT BEEN WILLING TO AGREE TO A CEASEFIRE.

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IV. THE PRIME MINISTER MADE CLEAR THAT CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGES WOULD BE NECESSARY AT HER MEETING WITH BISHOP MUZOREWA ON 13 JULY. YOU SHOULD IMPRESS UPON THE BISHOP THAT IT IS ESSENTIAL TO HIS PROSPECTS OF WINNING INTERNATIONAL ACCEPTANCE THAT, THROUGHOUT THE CONFERENCE, HE SHOULD APPEAR TO BE ADOPTING A REASONABLE AND POSITIVE ATTITUDE. WE DO NOT WANT THE CONFERENCE TO BREAK DOWN ON AN EQUAL DISPLAY OF INTRANSIGENCE BY BOTH SIDES. THERE ARE NO PRE-CONDITIONS, BUT HE WILL NEED TO BE PREPARED TO NEGOTIATE SERIOUSLY ON THE BASIS OF THE FRAMEWORK WE HAVE PUT FORWARD.

V. AS REGARDS THE ADMINISTRATIVE ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE CONFERENCE, IT IS FOR THE BISHOP TO DECIDE HOW MANY DELEGATES AND SUPPORTING STAFF HE NEEDS TO BRING TO LONDON. BUT YOU SHOULD POINT OUT THAT IT WAS ONLY IN RESPONSE TO THE BISHOP'S REQUEST TO YOU THAT WE AGREED TO INCREASE THE NUMBER FOR WHOM WE WOULD ACCEPT FINANCIAL RESPONSIBILITY TO TWENTY.

VI. IN RESPONSE TO THE BISHOP'S REQUEST, WE WILL INCREASE THE NUMBER OF DELEGATES ADMITTED TO THE CONFERENCE ROOM TO SIXTEEN (EIGHT AT THE TABLE AND EIGHT BEHIND). THERE IS NO SEATING ROOM FOR NUMBERS LARGER THAN THIS. WE HAVE INCREASED THE NUMBER OF CARS ALLOCATED TO THE BISHOP'S DELEGATION.

CARRINGTON

FILES

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(MR FIFCOOT)
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RHODESIA POLICY

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FM FCO 301944Z AUG 79
TO PRIORITY LUSAKA
TELNO 745 OF 30 AUGUST

Rg. Pmt 31/8

*Papers
L.C.R.*

ZAPU REQUEST FOR AID FOR RHODESIAN REFUGEES

1. EDWARD NDLOVU, ZAPU SECRETARY FOR PROJECTS, WROTE TO THE PRIME MINISTER ON 30 JUNE (LETTER RECEIVED ON 25 JULY) TO SEEK IMMEDIATE FOOD AID FOR THE 55,000 RHODESIAN REFUGEES CURRENTLY IN ZAMBIA AND 22,000 ZAPU EXPECTED FROM BOTSWANA. HE ALSO SOUGHT FINANCIAL AND MATERIAL AID TO START A NUMBER OF LONGER-TERM REFUGEE CAMP SELF-HELP PROJECTS AIMED AT EDUCATING AND TRAINING REFUGEES IN PREPARATION FOR THEIR RETURN TO RHODESIA AFTER A SETTLEMENT. THE MAIN FIELDS MENTIONED ARE: PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION, AGRICULTURE AND IRRIGATION, INDUSTRY AND TRADES, COMMUNICATIONS, TRANSPORT, MEDICAL SERVICES, AND CONSTRUCTION. HE ALSO LISTS ASSISTANCE TO WAR VICTIMS. A COPY FOLLOWS BY BAG.

2. WE ARE NOT IN A POSITION TO MAKE FUNDS AVAILABLE TO ZAPU FOR THEIR REFUGEES AT THIS STAGE. YOU SHOULD MAKE IT CLEAR THAT THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT ARE DEEPLY CONCERNED ABOUT THE FUTURE WELL-BEING OF RHODESIA AND ALL ITS PEOPLE AND THAT WE ARE ANXIOUS TO DO ALL WE CAN TO END THE WAR AND THUS ENABLE THOSE OUTSIDE RHODESIA TO RETURN HOME. OUR APPROACH TO A SETTLEMENT, ENDORSED BY COMMONWEALTH GOVERNMENTS AND NOW TO BE PURSUED AT THE CONFERENCE ON 10 SEPTEMBER, MENTIONS CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES AS A MAJOR OBJECTIVE. YOU COULD MENTION THE GOVERNMENT'S ASSISTANCE FOR RHODESIAN REFUGEES IN FRONT LINE STATES THROUGH CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE UNHCR, ICRC AND WORLD FOOD PROGRAMME SCHEMES, AS WELL AS THROUGH THE EUROPEAN DEVELOPMENT FUND, AND THE ALLOCATION LAST YEAR OF US DOLLARS 525,000 OF BRITISH FUNDS TO UNHCR SPECIFICALLY FOR ZAPU'S SCHOOL. YOU SHOULD SAY THAT WE ARE NOT ABLE TO PROVIDE ASSISTANCE TO ZAPU FOR REFUGEES IN VIEW OF CUTBACKS IN THE AID PROGRAMME GENERALLY.

CARRINGTON

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NOTE FOR THE RECORD

RHODESIA

f.s. [Signature] 7/5

The Leader of the Opposition telephoned me this morning to say that he had received a letter from President Nyerere, dated 11 August, about Rhodesia; and that he thought he should pass on certain points in it for the background information of those concerned with the forthcoming Constitutional Conference.

Mr. Callaghan said that President Nyerere's understanding was that the British Government would produce a draft constitution before the end of August and that "we" (presumably the Front Line Presidents) would have a chance to look at it before the Conference assembled. President Nyerere said that if the draft seemed satisfactory he would urge the Patriotic Front to take part in the Conference and that if the Conference seemed to be taking place on the right basis he would also urge the Patriotic Front to drive hard for an agreement with the UK. President Nyerere emphasised in his letter, however, that the UK must lead at the Conference and not merely act as a mediator. President Nyerere went on to say that he was not intending to support a continuation of the war for the benefit of any particular individual.

In President Nyerere's view, "a Lord Carver" would be needed to deal with the problem of the Army in Rhodesia. He also thought that the UK should take full responsibility for the interim period.

President Nyerere claimed to have been given a commitment by the Prime Minister, at Lusaka, that sanctions would not be lifted on the basis of the existing constitution. But, he went on to say, Mrs Thatcher evidently hoped to resolve the Rhodesia problem before the sanctions issue comes up again in November.

President Nyerere did not anticipate any difficulty with President Machel in winning acceptance for a new constitution and an end to the war. President Nyerere ended his letter by saying that if the Conference succeeded, he would do everything he could to help with the next stage.

CONFIDENTIAL / Mr. Callaghan

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Mr. Callaghan asked that his confidence in conveying these points from President Nyerere's private letter to him should be respected. He felt that he owed the President a reply on the question of when the Government proposed to produce its draft constitution and asked whether he could be given this information on a confidential basis. I explained that I was about to leave No. 10 and said that Mr. Alexander would be in touch with him.

h.m.

30 August 1979

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PRIME MINISTER

H.S. Hunt 3/5

RHODESIA: MEETING WITH THE FOREIGN AND
COMMONWEALTH SECRETARY AT 5.00 P.M.

I attach some current papers which may be relevant to your discussion with Lord Carrington this afternoon. The top paper, relating to the message sent to you by Bishop Muzorewa last week, covers the text of a draft telegram instructing Mr. Day to give your reply orally to the Bishop. You may like to agree the text now.*

I have included a copy of the text of your message to President Nyerere. The top copy will be in your signature folder this evening.

* Since dictating this I have learnt that Mr Day is seeing the Bishop at 08.30 to-morrow. It would therefore be helpful to get the telegram 30 August 1979 on its way later to-day.

Hunt 30/8

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DESKBY 301200Z

FM FCO 301050Z AUG 79

TO IMMEDIATE DAR ES SALAAM

TELEGRAM NUMBER 287 OF 30 AUGUST

PERSONAL MESSAGE

SERIAL NO.

7919/79T
mt
3/8

YOUR TELNO 695: RHODESIA

1. PLEASE TRANSMIT THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO PRESIDENT NYERERE. IN DOING SO YOU SHOULD SAY THAT THE PRIME MINISTER LOOKS FORWARD TO SEEING HIM OVER DINNER ON 14 SEPTEMBER.

BEGINS

THANK YOU FOR YOUR MESSAGE ABOUT RHODESIA. I AM GLAD TO BE KEEPING IN TOUCH AND GRATEFUL TO YOU FOR SETTING OUT YOUR THOUGHTS IN ADVANCE OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE. I LOOK FORWARD TO SEEING YOU IN LONDON ON 14 SEPTEMBER, TO DISCUSS THE POSITION THEN REACHED AT THE CONFERENCE.

YOU RAISED THE QUESTION OF THE PARLIAMENTARY REPRESENTATION OF THE WHITE COMMUNITY. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE POINT YOU MAKE, BUT WE HAVE TO HAVE REGARD TO THE REALITY OF THE SITUATION IN RHODESIA, BOTH IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE, AND IN THE LIGHT OF WHAT IS LIKELY TO BE PRACTICABLE. I DO NOT IN FACT REGARD IT AS UNREASONABLE THAT (FOR THE FIRST FEW YEARS AFTER INDEPENDENCE ONLY) THERE SHOULD BE PROVISION FOR THE ELECTION OF A NUMBER OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE MINORITY COMMUNITY BY THAT COMMUNITY THEMSELVES. SUCH A PROVISION HAS BEEN A COMMON FEATURE OF MOST PREVIOUS ATTEMPTS TO ACHIEVE A SETTLEMENT. A PROVISION OF THIS SORT IS BY ITS NATURE TRANSITIONAL: AND IT MUST NOT OPERATE IN SUCH A WAY AS TO ALLOW THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE MINORITY TO EXERT A BLOCKING POWER OVER A WIDE RANGE OF LEGISLATION. THIS WOULD BE UNPRECEDENTED: I MADE CLEAR AT LUSAKA MY VIEWS ON THIS POINT

I MUCH AGREE WITH YOUR SECOND POINT. WE DO INDEED INTEND TO ACT AT THE CONFERENCE AS THE DE-COLONISING POWER. WE HAVE CONVENED A CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE AND ITS TASK WILL BE TO REACH AGREEMENT ON THE INDEPENDENCE CONSTITUTION FOR ZIMBABWE. WE ARE -- DELIBERATELY -- ADOPTING A STEP BY STEP APPROACH: UNLESS WE SEEK TO BUILD UP AREAS OF AGREEMENT BEFORE MOVING ON TO TACKLE OTHER DIFFICULTIES, WE SHALL GET NOWHERE. WE HAVE PUT FORWARD OUTLINE PROPOSALS FOR A CONSTITUTION. IF THERE IS A MEASURE OF AGREEMENT ON THAT OUTLINE, WE SHALL BE READY TO BRING FORWARD AS NECESSARY MORE DETAILED PROPOSALS.

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ONCE PROGRESS HAS BEEN MADE TOWARDS AGREEMENT ON THE INDEPENDENCE CONSTITUTION, WE CAN MOVE ON TO DISCUSS THE MANNER IN WHICH IT SHOULD BE IMPLEMENTED. THE FIRST POINT MUST BE ACCEPTANCE BY THE PARTIES THAT NEW ELECTIONS WILL BE HELD, PROPERLY SUPERVISED UNDER THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT'S AUTHORITY. WE HAVE EXERCISED THAT AUTHORITY BEFORE AND COMMONWEALTH OBSERVERS WOULD BE PRESENT TO SEE HOW IT WAS EXERCISED ON THIS OCCASION. AS I SAID IN LUSAKA, WE ARE PREPARED TO CARRY OUT OUR RESPONSIBILITY IN THIS AND IN OTHER RESPECTS. THE ARRANGEMENTS FOR NEW ELECTIONS MUST PERMIT THE PARTIES TO PARTICIPATE IN THEM WITH AN EQUAL CHANCE OF SUCCESS. IT WILL BE OUR RESPONSIBILITY TO ENSURE THAT THAT IS SO; AND THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE COMMONWEALTH TO WITNESS THE MANNER IN WHICH THE ELECTIONS ARE CARRIED OUT.

THERE IS ONE PARTICULAR WAY IN WHICH WE NEED YOUR HELP IN THIS VENTURE. THE SUCCESS OR FAILURE OF OUR DETERMINED EFFORT TO ACHIEVE A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT IS LIKELY TO DEPEND ON THE INFLUENCE YOU AND THE OTHER COMMONWEALTH AFRICAN LEADERS ARE ABLE TO EXERT. IT WILL BE EXTREMELY DIFFICULT TO GET BISHOP MUZOREWA AND HIS COLLEAGUES TO ACCEPT DIFFERENT CONSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS ON THE KEY ISSUES AND TO AGREE THAT NEW ELECTIONS SHOULD BE HELD. THERE WILL BE NO CHANCE OF AGREEMENT IF, FOR THEIR PART, THE LEADERS OF THE PATRIOTIC FRONT REJECT, AS THEY HAVE DONE IN THEIR STATEMENT IN DAR ES SALAAM, THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT'S CONSTITUTIONAL PROPOSALS AND ITS AUTHORITY TO SUPERVISE ELECTIONS. I NOTE THAT MR MUGABE IS ALREADY SAYING THAT HE EXPECTS THE CONFERENCE TO FAIL.

IT IS OUR INTENTION AT THE CONFERENCE TO ACT AS SUGGESTED IN YOUR MESSAGE. WE MUST SEEK TO GET AS MUCH AGREEMENT AS POSSIBLE FROM BOTH SIDES. WE ARE DETERMINED TO TRANSFER POWER ON THE BASIS OF A CONSTITUTION WHICH WE CAN DEFEND AS A DEMOCRATIC DOCUMENT AND WHICH THE REST OF THE WORLD WILL RECOGNISE AS SUCH. THAT IS EXACTLY OUR APPROACH. BOTH SIDES WILL I HOPE REALISE THAT IT IS LIKELY TO BE COSTLY FOR THEM IF THEY SEEK TO FRUSTRATE A POLITICAL SOLUTION ON THESE LINES.

WARM PERSONAL REGARDS

CARRINGTON

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FM FCO 301914Z AUG 79

TO IMMEDIATE MIRIMBA SALISBURY
TELEGRAM NUMBER 183 OF 30 AUGUST
AND TO IMMEDIATE LUSAKA AND MAPUTO
INFO PRIORITY DAR ES SALAAM PRETORIA WASHINGTON

RHODESIA CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE:
ARRANGEMENTS FOR OPENING SESSION

kg
Paul
30/8

1. THE OPENING SESSION OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE WILL BE HELD AT 3.30 PM ON MONDAY 10 SEPTEMBER. (AMONG OTHER THINGS THIS WILL LEAVE THE MORNING FREE FOR A MEETING OF DELEGATION SECRETARIES TO DISCUSS ADMINISTRATIVE ARRANGEMENTS). THE FIRST SESSION WILL BE CONFINED TO MY OPENING STATEMENT FOLLOWING WHICH THE MEETING WILL BE ADJOURNED TO THE FOLLOWING DAY TO ALLOW DELEGATIONS TIME FOR REFLECTION BEFORE THEIR OWN OPENING STATEMENTS.
2. AS IS NORMAL PRACTICE AT A CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE, I PROPOSE TO HOLD A RECEPTION FORV THE DELEGATIONS AT 6.00 PM ON 10 SEPTEMBER TO WHICH I WOULD ALSO INVITE MINISTERS, MEMBERS OF PARLIAMENT, COMMONWEALTH HIGH COMMISSIONERS ETC. FOR YOUR OWN INFORMATION, I INTEND TO GO ON WITH THE RECEPTION EVEN IF ONE SIDE OR THE OTHER REFUSES TO ATTEND. BUT IT WOULD BE SENSIBLE TO TELL THEM OF THE PLAN IN GOOD TIME AND TO KNOW THEIR REACTIONS. PLEASE THEREFORE INFORM THE RHODESIAN AUTHORITIES (LUSAKA AND MAPUTO SHOULD INFORM ZAPU AND ZANU), DRAWING ATTENTION TO THE OPPORTUNITY THE RECEPTION WILL GIVE THEM TO MEET PEOPLE WHO ARE INTERESTED IN, BUT NOT DIRECTLY INVOLVED IN, THE CONFERENCE.
3. YOU SHOULD ALSO INFORM THE RESPECTIVE PARTIES THAT PLAN TO GIVE A DINNER FOR BISHOP MUZOREWA'S DELEGATION ON 12 SEPTEMBER AND FOR THE PATRIOTIC FRONT ON 13 SEPTEMBER.

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LEGAL ADVISERS
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(MR FIFCOT)
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PS/MR LUCE
PS/MR RIDLEY
PS/MR HURD
PS/FUS
SIR A DUFF
LORD N G LENNOX
MISS BROWN
MR WILLSON
MR BYATT

**ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION
RHODESIA POLICY**

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TELNO 598 OF 30 AUGUST

INFO PRIORITY PRETORIA MAPUTO LAGOS LUSAKA LUANDA DAR ES SALAAM
GABORONE UKMIS NEW YORK AND WASHINGTON

ZIMBABWE RHODESIA: CHANGE OF NAME

Prime Minister
[Signature]
30/8

1. MUZOREWA'S ANNOUNCEMENT ON 25 AUGUST THAT "RHODESIA" WOULD BE DROPPED FROM THE NAME OF THE STATE HAS SPARKED OFF A CONTROVERSY.

2. FOLLOWING IAN SMITH'S REMARKS IN SOUTH AFRICA THAT THE DROPPING OF RHODESIA FROM THE NAME WOULD CAUSE CONCERN TO THE WHITES AND THAT PEOPLE SHOULD THINK AGAIN, THE CAUCUS OF THE RHODESIA FRONT HAS ISSUED A STATEMENT SAYING THAT THEY COULD NOT SEE "ANY VALID REASON FOR CHANGING THE NAME OR ANY PART OF THE CONSTITUTION AT THIS TIME". THE STATEMENT POINTED OUT THAT THE PRESENT NAME HAD BEEN REACHED AS A RESULT OF A COMPROMISE AMONG THE VARIOUS POLITICAL PARTIES TO THE TRANSITIONAL GOVERNMENT AND "THE FEELING OF THE RF CAUCUS WAS THAT THE NAME SHOULD NOT BE CHANGED".

3. THE UNFP HAS ALSO EXPRESSED SOME RESERVATIONS ABOUT A CHANGE IN THE NAME AT THIS TIME . (MY TELNO 590, PARA 5).

4. I ASKED GEORGE SMITH YESTERDAY HOW THIS CONTROVERSY HAD ARISEN, SINCE MUZOREWA HAD GIVEN THE IMPRESSION THAT THE DECISION TO CHANGE THE NAME HAD BEEN APPROVED BY THE CABINET. SMITH SAID THAT THE MATTER HAD BEEN RAISED AT THE CABINET MEETING ON 21 AUGUST AND THAT AGREEMENT HAD BEEN REACHED MERELY TO CONSULT THE PARTY CAUCUSES BEFORE TAKING A FINAL DECISION. MUZOREWA HAD THEN BEEN ASKED A QUESTION ON THIS TOPIC AT ONE OF HIS AMNESTY MEETINGS AND ANNOUNCED THAT THE DECISION HAD BEEN TAKEN. THIS WAS IN FACT PREMATURE.

5. THE NAME OF THE STATE IS NOT ONE OF THE ENTRENCHED CLAUSES OF THE CONSTITUTION. IT REQUIRES ONLY A TWO-THIRDS' MAJORITY (68 VOTES) TO PASS AN AMENDMENT. THE GOVERNMENT COULD THEREFORE

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CONFIDENTIAL

CARRY AN AMENDMENT WITHOUT ANY WHITE VOTES, PROVIDED VIRTUALLY ALL THE BLACK MEMBERS SUPPORT IT. IF THE WHITES DO VOTE AGAINST, WHICH SEEMS POSSIBLE AT THIS STAGE, MUCH WILL DEPEND UPON THE FINAL ATTITUDE OF THE UNFP MEMBERS.

6. THIS COULD DEVELOP INTO THE FIRST SERIOUS CLASH BETWEEN BLACK AND WHITE IN PARLIAMENT SINCE THE FORMATION OF THE MAJORITY GOVERNMENT .

7. THE PRESS HAS REPORTED BRITISH OFFICIALS AS HAVING WELCOMED THE DECISION TO RENAME THE COUNTRY IN LINE WITH THE FIRST POINT IN OUR OUTLINE PROPOSALS FOR A CONSTITUTION.

DAY

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ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION
RHODESIA -POLICY

2.
CONFIDENTIAL

TO: THE PRIME MINISTER.

...1...

Spare.

From: Patrick Cosgrave.

1. I spent the whole of last Saturday (August 25) with Mr Joshua Nkomo who came to London to see me ^{you} ~~to~~ his way to the Havana conference. My new newspaper, the Glasgow Herald, is planning a major series on Southern Africa to coincide with the opening of the constitutional conference and I am therefore seeing nearly all of the relevant leaders for long private sessions before the writing begins. I will not myself be signing any of the articles we publish and so, at this stage of the business our lengthy conversations are confidential. It occurred to me, however, that an account of my talk with Mr Nkomo might be of some interest to you, especially since, it appears to me, he distrusts many British officials and politicians.

2. Over the day Mr Nkomo made a whole series of points which reflect what I can only call his moral position on the general situation. In general, these covered ground familiar to any British newspaper reader, but represent a different interpretation of events from, say, that of The Daily Telegraph. He held to his views with such passion that I judge them to be important to him and set down the more relevant here.
 - a) Mr Nkomo resents emphasis (such as your own) on the advance over the previous situation represented by the internal settlement. For, he says, no advance would have taken place without the guerrilla war, and therefore he arrogates to himself a considerable share of the credit for any developments that have taken place.
 - b) In regard to the nature of the war Mr Nkomo argues that as many, if not more, atrocities have been perpetrated by the present Security Forces as by the Patriotic Front. Although, he says, he would not personally have sanctioned the shooting down of the famous Viscount he retrospectively justifies it as an attempt to get General Walls. I understand General Walls accepts the logic of this argument.
 - c) Although he in no way dwells on his own prison experience he is clearly marked by it. Even leaders, such as the Rev. Sithole, whom he despises, have some standing in his eyes because of their long and bitter imprisonments

for political activities which nobody could reasonably judge to be unreasonable. This is a vital part of his emotional argument.

3. I was wrong in what I said to Richard last week about the undesirability from the African point of view of Mr Ian Smith attending the conference, a view which I picked up from Mr Sithole. Mr Nkomo's view is that it is actually desirable for Mr Smith to attend, for two reasons
 - a) Because, as the de facto leader of the white community Mr Smith has genuine standing in the matter.
 - b) Because, he believes, Mr Smith could effectively manipulate the official Rhodesian delegation from Salisbury, and obstruct the conference, as it were, by remote control.
4. Mr Nkomo avers that there are almost no imaginable circumstances which would cause him to leave the conference or obstruct its workings.
5. So far as he is concerned he sees Zimbabwe-Rhodesia as moving, via the conference, to a new constitution and new elections, which he expects to win. The absolutely crucial problem, as he sees it, is how these elections are to be supervised and policed. We returned to this subject so many times, and he discoursed on it at such length, that I venture to believe that it is, for him, the make or break issue at the conference, more important, even, than the precise character of the constitution itself, on which he seems ready to compromise.
6. The background to his view of the question of supervision and policing is his - as he puts it - long experience of the untrustworthiness of British governments (and the Americans) in the matter of any arrangements being made. Though not, at present at least, markedly well disposed towards yourself he seems at least half-persuaded - by Dr Kaunda and myself, among others - that you are a more trustworthy person than any of your recent Labour predecessors, and he is inclined to believe that he can work in amity and trust with you. Labour governments, in particular, he

despises, and he claims that he has had numerous experiences of the double-dealing of Dr Owen. (I should mention here that his associate Mr Jesiah Chinamano told me some weeks ago that, while Mr Nkomo's allies were revelling in the election of a Labour government in 1974, he insisted that the black man's cause had been set back by this event, and that the Tories were much more reliable).

7. This residual mistrust, however, has led Mr Nkomo to two conclusions.
 - a) That, although Britain should exercise the main legal authority during the transitional period, there being in Rhodesia a British governor acting as chairman of whatever body is set up to supervise the elections, he would oppose and fear the full exercise of policing powers by Great Britain alone. He says he was, for this reason, much encouraged by your statement in Lusaka to the effect that you did not foresee a large scale deployment of British troops in the country during a transitional period.
 - b) Whatever countries make up a transitional policing force - and he thinks these should be drawn solely from Commonwealth countries - he thinks that force should be formally put together by the United Nations. Aside from the fact that, in his view, the Commonwealth does not have the executive machinery to set up and run such a force, he feels that one constituted solely through the Commonwealth secretariat and led by Britain would give you altogether too much effective control over the situation, since he believes that Dr Kaunda and others, hypnotised, almost, by yourself, would go along with anything the British decided. We argued this one for quite a while, partly because I am myself particularly suspicious of the UN, and I get the impression that his view on this matter is negotiable.

8. Mr Nkomo recounted to me at length how, as he remembers it, discussion of the nature of the policing force proceeded in the past. He is absolutely opposed to the election being under the supervision of the present security forces, and he is adamant that he will not dissolve his own forces in advance of an election. He claims that he put a solution of the dilemma to the Anglo-American negotiators which the Americans were prepared to accept but Dr Owen was not, since he feared too much opposition in the House of Commons. This solution, in effect, would confine the most professional (in the sense of full-time) elements in both the Security Forces and the Patriotic Front to barracks and institute joint patrols by the remaining elements, under the supervision of officers from whatever outside force is doing the general policing. There are a great many complicated facets of this argument, but that is the essence of his position.

9. As to the constitution itself, Mr Nkomo will propose an executive Presidency and a bicameral legislature. The Upper House will have no significant powers, except those of delay, such as the House of Lords now enjoys. He expects the alliance of Chief Chirau in such a proposal. (The Chief, you will recall, though he won no seats in the last election, now sits in the Senate).

10. I naturally pressed Mr Nkomo as hard as I could on his apparent alliance with the Eastern bloc. His comments certainly made up a coherent whole, and I am prepared to believe that he believes his argument. It goes as follows:
 - a) He and his allies have been fighting for independence from British or white Rhodesian rule for many years, and they are determined not to exchange that rule for any other.
 - b) In their treatment of him the Russians have neither sought post-independence guarantees nor, even, questioned him as to the nature of confidential

exchanges between himself and British or American officials or politicians. In this, he recognises, they are being "very cæver indeed", expecting to gain in the future from restraint now.

- b) He therefore fully recognises the danger to himself and his country's independence from his involvement with the East.
- d) However, given the nature of the situation in recent years (see 2(a) above) Mr Nkomo says that he simply could not have got arms from anywhere other than the Eastern countries to carry on the necessary war of independence. Since he was never prepared to give up the struggle he was, he says, forced into a desperate and risky expedient. And, he avers, if this conference fails, he will be forced further along that road. On the other hand, if the conference succeeds, Britain will have a staunch friend in Central Africa, to add to Zambia and Malawi.
- e) I should add that there was nothing whatever threatening in Mr Nkomo's tone when he was making that last point. He spoke, rather, with sadness of what might be necessary.

11. A prolongation of the war would, he sees, speed up the white exodus. This, he says, he would deeply regret, and he will be making a series of speeches trying to persuade that population that they will have nothing to fear in an independent Zimbabwe under his control. Though he says it is now far too late in the day to introduce a constitution exactly paralleling those offered to e.g. Kenya and Tanzania^{Gambia} on their independence, he is prepared reluctantly to accept the idea that there should, at least for a time, be a number of reserved seats in the new legislature for whites and Asians, though he is utterly opposed to entrenched clauses of the kind which make up the better part of the present constitution.

12. Though he is somewhat ambiguous on the subject of the make-up of the security forces in the future, several interesting indications emerged from our conversation on this subject.
- a) He regards General Walls as a straight man with whom he can deal. This impression I have had from many black leaders, though not from Dr Sithole, who is inflamed by what he regards as General Walls's murder of 183 of his followers. However, Dr Sithole, I believe, will move with the wind; and he is convinced that there is no future for him outside an alliance with Mr Nkomo.
 - b) He regards as ludicrous Mr Mugabe's insistence on the prior break-up of the present Security Forces. Though he said nothing definite, I got the impression throughout the day that Mr Nkomo is less than enthusiastic about his ally and that he foresees a breach between them, possibly at the conference, which will not break his heart.
 - c) In this connection I foresee a conference alignment of Nkomo, Sithole and Chikerama, and that alliance going to the polls in any election the conference arranges.
13. As regards Mr Nkomo personally, I found a man tired, suspicious, watchful, intelligent and scarcely able to believe that the end of a long struggle may be in sight. He is respectful of rather than warm towards yourself, fascinated by the account of you in my book (I think this was not flattery of myself, but interest in, if I may put it this way, my raw material). I really believe that a tête-a-tête (confidential or secret if necessary) between you two would go a very long way towards a successful outcome of the conference.
14. I hope you have found these various African notes I have been sending you of use and interest. As you know, my consultancy ended last month, but I am more than anxious to be of any help I can in the days ahead, and you have only to command me. On October 1 I formally take over as Editor in Chief of the Outram's

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Group, with the Herald as its flagship, and I will have complete editorial and budgetary control, with the particular brief of adding a new Sunday and a new Daily to our little empire. This means that you will have thirty two newspapers (thirty four eventually) in enthusiastic support of your cause. It is not a strictly relevant point on which to end a paper about Africa, but I hope you will be pleased to hear it.

pc

SECRET

This is a copy. The original 2
has been extracted and
retained under Section 3(4) 3



1. Mr. Alexander

2. Prime Minister *Lusaka.*

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

29 August 1979

Dear Buzan,

*GBL
30/8*

Pa. Pmt 31/8

Rhodesia: Approach to President Kaunda

As agreed *~* met President Kaunda on 27 August. I
enclose her account of the meeting.

President Kaunda was anxious to hear of our plans for the
Conference. It is very useful that we were able to secure his
support for the step by step approach we shall be adopting at
the Conference, i.e. insistence that the first stage must be
to seek agreement on the outline of the independence Constitution,
rather than engaging immediately in discussion of the
"transitional" arrangements.

The area of main concern to President Kaunda - and which
was also touched on in President Nyerere's message - is that
we should be prepared to exercise effective control over the
process for new elections in Rhodesia. President Kaunda is
also, in effect, seeking assurance that we are not excluding the
possibility of a Commonwealth force or some other neutral force
if this is needed to police an agreement. Against this background
he would be prepared to exert his influence with the Patriotic
Front to participate in elections to be held under our control.
President Kaunda added that, if genuinely impartial elections
are held and the Patriotic Front did not win, Zambia would no
longer support them.

The Secretary of State proposes that we should make
arrangements for *~* to continue these discussions with
President Kaunda on his return from Havana to Lusaka on 9 - 10
September. We will also be in touch with President Kaunda's
representative, Mr Mark Chona, who is coming to London before the
Constitutional Conference. In the light of these discussions,
President Kaunda may ask for a meeting with the Prime Minister
in London during the Constitutional Conference.

We shall be submitting separately advice on the manner
in which we might deal with the points raised by President Kaunda.

*Yours ever,
Stephen*

(J S Wall)
Private Secretary

B G Cartledge Esq
10 Downing Street

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The following is an account by * ~~~~~ *
of her meeting with President Kaunda:

1. I SAW PRESIDENT KAUNDA FROM 1945 to 2130 ON 27 AUGUST AND SPOKE TO THE BRIEF PROVIDED. MARK CHONA WAS PRESENT AT THE MEETING, CLEARLY BY THE WISH OF THE PRESIDENT.

2. THE PRESIDENT EXPRESSED RELIEF AND SATISFACTION AT THE VISIT. HE TOOK NOTE OF THE PRIME MINISTER'S POSITION AND SAID IN THE STRONGEST TERMS THAT HE TRUSTED HER ABSOLUTELY. HE ALSO AGREED SPECIFICALLY THAT THE LONDON CONFERENCE OFFERS THE VERY LAST CHANCE TO NEGOTIATE A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT, AND SHARES THE PRIME MINISTER'S PROFOUND CONCERN ABOUT THE CONSEQUENCES OF FAILURE BOTH FOR ZAMBIA AND RHODESIA. HE SAID, HOWEVER, THAT HE HAD BECOME ANXIOUS ON TWO POINTS.

FREE AND FAIR ELECTIONS

3. WHILE THE PRESIDENT FULLY ACCEPTS THAT THE PRIME MINISTER IS DETERMINED THAT BRITAIN SHALL CARRY OUT HER CONSTITUTIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES, HE STILL FEELS DOUBTFUL HOW AND IN WHAT WAY BRITAIN/

* ~~~~~ * Names deleted and retained
under Section 3(4)

AWayland

29 October 2009

SECRET

BRITAIN WILL ENSURE THAT THE ELECTIONS ARE INDEED FREE AND FAIR. THE INSTRUMENT TO BE USED TO SUPERVISE AND ORGANISE THE ELECTIONS - THE ADMINISTRATION IN SALISBURY - IS THE SAME AS THE INSTRUMENT WHICH PUT MUZOREWA INTO POWER, AND ITS MEMBERS ARE ONLY HUMAN. THE PRIME MINISTER, SAID THE PRESIDENT, WOULD DO WELL TO RECOGNISE THAT THERE IS GENUINE FEAR, NOT TO BE DISMISSED LIGHTLY, WITHIN THE PATRIOTIC FRONT THAT UNDER PRESENT CONDITIONS THE SALISBURY ADMINISTRATION COULD NOT OPERATE IMPARTIALLY. THIS IS A POINT ON WHICH THE CONFERENCE COULD FOUNDER. THE PRESIDENT ADDED THAT ZAMBIA, SHOULD IT PROVE AFTER THE ELECTIONS SEEM TO BE VALID AND FREELY AND FAIRLY CONDUCTED, THAT THE PATRIOTIC FRONT DO NOT WIN, WOULD NO LONGER SUPPORT THEM. ZAMBIA IS NOT COMMITTED TO INDIVIDUALS, BUT TO THE RIGHT OF THE PEOPLE OF ZIMBABWE TO MAKE A GENUINE CHOICE. HE FELT THAT LONDON WAS FAR FROM THE SCENE. WHATEVER TRUST COULD BE PLACED AND WAS PLACED IN THE PRIME MINISTER AND IN BRITAIN'S GENUINE INTENTION, THERE IS AN EQUALLY GENUINE FEAR THAT ELECTIONS WILL NOT BE CONDUCTED WITH ADEQUATE SUPERVISION. HE REPEATED HERE THE GENUINE TRUST THAT WAS FELT AT PRESENT OF BRITAIN'S INTENTIONS, "EVEN BY NIGERIA".

THE PRESIDENT ACCEPTED THAT THE PARTICIPATION BY THE FRONT IN ELECTIONS WOULD GO FAR TO MEET DOUBTS ABOUT EFFECTIVE SUPERVISION, BUT HE REPEATED THAT THIS WAS A GENUINE ANXIETY ABOUT WHICH BRITAIN MUST BE PREPARED TO DO SOMETHING. HE ACCEPTED THAT SUPERVISION BY THE UN WAS NOT PRACTICABLE BOTH BECAUSE INEVITABLE DELAYS WOULD SLOW THE MOMENTUM AND BECAUSE SUCH A PROPOSAL WOULD BE RESISTED IN SALISBURY, BUT IT WAS CLEAR THAT HE NEEDED ASSURANCE THAT BRITAIN WOULD PLAY A FULL PART IN THE SUPERVISION ON THE GROUND. SEMI COLON COMMONWEALTH OBSERVERS WOULD NOT BE ENOUGH.

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THE STEP BY STEP STRATEGY

4. THE PRESIDENT UNDERSTOOD THE REASONS FOR HMG'S INTENTION TO TAKE THE CONFERENCE IN A DEFINITE ORDER, AGREEING FIRST ON THE CONSTITUTION, PROCEEDING FROM THAT TO THE SETTING UP OF ELECTIONS AND THE MACHINERY FOR THIS, AND ONLY THEN EXAMINING THE MILITARY QUESTIONS ARISING FROM THE CEASEFIRE AND SEPARATION OF FORCES ETC. HE COMMENDED THIS STRATEGY AND WOULD GIVE IT HIS FULL SUPPORT. HE WAS PARTICULARLY PLEASED THAT THIS WOULD NOT BE A SECOND GENEVA. HOWEVER, THIS BROUGHT HIM TO THE SECOND QUESTION ON WHICH HE FELT CONSIDERABLE ANXIETY.

GUARANTEES FOR THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD: THE MILITARY QUESTION

5. PRESIDENT KAUNDA SAID THAT HE WAS SATISFIED THAT BRITAIN MEANT TO DISCHARGE HER CONSTITUTIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES IN RESPECT OF THE ELECTION. HE SOUGHT, HOWEVER, SOME REASSURANCE ON THE WAY IN WHICH THE SECURITY OF THE ELECTIONS WOULD BE ENSURED, AND THE SUBSEQUENT CEASEFIRE WOULD BE SECURED. AT THIS POINT MARK CHONA INTERVENED, WITH A REFERENCE TO AN ARTICLE BY MR HEATH APPARENTLY DISCERNING THE NEED FOR COMMONWEALTH SUPERVISION, INCLUDING THE POSSIBLE USE OF A COMMONWEALTH FORCE. THE PRESIDENT COMMENTED THAT THE PRIME MINISTER HAD MADE CLEAR THAT THERE COULD BE NO QUESTION OF USING UK TROOPS. THE QUESTION AROSE WHAT MEASURES WOULD BE ENVISAGED TO ENSURE THAT EG "THE AUXILIARIES" OF SITHOLE AND OTHERS DID NOT DISRUPT THE ELECTIONS. WHILE THE PRESIDENT ACCEPTED THAT THE ISSUES FACING THE CONFERENCE MUST BE TAKEN IN THE ORDER ENVISAGED BY HMG, HE REGARDED IT AS ESSENTIAL THAT SOMETHING SHOULD BE SAID AT A VERY EARLY STAGE DURING THE CONFERENCE TO MAKE IT CLEAR THAT HMG WAS READY TO FACE THIS PROBLEM AND, IDEALLY, HAD CONTINGENCY PLANS FOR DISCUSSION AT THE RIGHT MOMENT.

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6. EVEN AT THE TIME OF THE ANGLO-US INITIATIVE IT HAD BEEN RECOGNISED THAT SOME MACHINERY TO MAINTAIN THE CEASEFIRE MUST BE AVAILABLE. THE PRESIDENT STRONGLY RECOMMENDED THAT THE PRIME MINISTER SHOULD ENSURE THAT THE OPENING SPEECH AT THE CONFERENCE STATED CLEARLY THAT THE PROBLEMS OF THE CEASEFIRE WOULD BE DISCUSSED IN DUE COURSE AND THAT THE MECHANICS WOULD BE CONSIDERED BOTH FOR SUPERVISION OF THE ELECTIONS, AND FOR ENFORCEMENT OF THE ELECTORAL OUTCOME AND THE CEASEFIRE. IT WAS ABSOLUTELY VITAL THAT IT SHOULD BE MADE CLEAR FROM THE OUTSET OF THIS CONFERENCE THAT THERE WAS NO INTENTION BY HMG TO SIDESTEP THIS ISSUE. IF THIS WERE NOT MADE CLEAR THERE WOULD BE CONSIDERABLE SUSPICION. EVERYONE RECOGNISED THAT THE MILITARY QUESTION WAS THE MOST SENSITIVE ONE AND IT WAS ESSENTIAL THAT ASSURANCES COULD BE GIVEN THAT IT WOULD BE EXAMINED. (THE PRESIDENT ADDED LATER THAT AN ASSURANCE OF THIS KIND WOULD BE CRUCIAL IN SECURING THE GOODWILL AND CONSTRUCTIVE SUPPORT OF MR NKOMO.) IF NO SUCH ASSURANCES WERE GIVEN, WE COULD BE SURE THE QUESTION WOULD BE RAISED AT THE OUTSET. IT WAS IMPORTANT TO SHOW THAT WE HAD SPECIFIC PROPOSALS UNDER CONSIDERATION.

CONTINGENCY PLANS FOR A COMMONWEALTH FORCE ?

7. THE PRESIDENT WAS CLEARLY GREATLY EXERCISED ABOUT THIS ISSUE. HE WAS PARTICULARLY CONCERNED ABOUT THE TIME IT WOULD TAKE TO ASSEMBLE A COMMONWEALTH FORCE, IF THAT IS WHAT HMG ENVISAGED. AT THIS POINT, ENCOURAGED BY MARK CHONA, HE ASKED ME POINT-BLANK WHAT HMG'S PLANS WERE IN THIS REGARD. I SAID HMG WAS FULLY AWARE OF THE CRUCIAL IMPORTANCE OF THIS PROBLEM, WHICH HAD UNDOUBTEDLY BEEN UNDER CONSIDERATION, BUT THE FIRST REQUIREMENT WAS TO GET BOTH SIDES TO THE CONFERENCE TABLE PREPARED TO BE CONSTRUCTIVE. THE OBJECT OF MY VISIT HAD BEEN TO EXPLAIN

/s/ ...

AND SECURE HIS SUPPORT FOR THE STEP-BY-STEP APPROACH AND THE GENERAL PRELIMINARY THINKING OF HMG. THE FACT THAT I WAS NOT ABLE TO GIVE HIM ANY CATEGORIC ASSURANCES ON HOW HMG PROPOSED TO DEAL WITH THE QUESTION OF ENFORCEMENT AND GUARANTEES DID NOT MEAN THAT SERIOUS THOUGHT WAS NOT BEING GIVEN TO THIS SEMICOLON BUT HMG WISHED ABOVE ALL NOT TO HAVE TO PREJUDGE SUCH ISSUES BEFORE THE CENTRAL QUESTION OF THE CONSTITUTION HAD BEEN RESOLVED BY ALL PARTIES.

8. HE SAID THAT HE WAS INCREASINGLY CONSCIOUS OF HOW SHORT WE WERE OF TIME. HE WISHED TO SAY TO THE PRIME MINISTER THAT HE WOULD BE GREATLY HEARTENED IF HE COULD BE PRIVATELY ASSURED THAT SPECIFIC CONTINGENCY PLANS ON THE QUESTION OF SENDING A COMMONWEALTH FORCE WERE BEING CONSIDERED. SUCH A KNOWLEDGE WOULD MAKE ALL THE DIFFERENCE TO HIS CAPACITY TO LEAN ON THE PATRIOTIC FRONT SINCE HE BELIEVED THAT THE CONFERENCE COULD FOUNDER ON THIS ISSUE ALSO. HE IS SATISFIED THAT MR NKOMO'S PRESENT MOOD IS SERIOUS AND CONSTRUCTIVE. BUT HE TOO WILL BE LOOKING TO SEE HOW SERIOUS HMG IS. HE STRESSED AGAIN THAT A FRANK STATEMENT AT THE OUTSET BY HMG AT THE BEGINNING OF THE CONFERENCE RECOGNISING AND DEFINING THE CRITICAL ISSUES, AND ENGAGING TO DISCUSS THEM IN THEIR DUE TIME, WOULD BE CRUCIAL IN CONVINCING NKOMO OF HMG'S GOOD FAITH AND SERIOUS INTENT. SUCH A STATEMENT WOULD LARGELY DISARM NKOMO AND EVEN MUGABE.

/THE ...

THE NON-ALIGNED SUMMIT IN HAVANA

9. REVERTING TO THE LUSAKA CONFERENCE, THE PRESIDENT SAID THAT THE LONDON CONFERENCE IS THE OUTCOME OF THE DECISION OF THE COMMONWEALTH COUNTRIES, OF WHICH ZAMBIA IS ONE, TO TRUST HMG AND IS THE EVIDENCE THAT THEY ARE TAKING THE PROSPECTS LAID OUT BY HMG SERIOUSLY. IN A REFERENCE TO THE FORTHCOMING NON-ALIGNED CONFERENCE IN HAVANA, HE POINTED OUT THAT A NUMBER OF THE COMMONWEALTH COUNTRIES WHO HAD BEEN AT LUSAKA WOULD BE THERE IN FORCE. HE BELIEVED THAT ANY RESOLUTIONS PASSED ON RHODESIA WOULD, AS A RESULT, BE CONDITIONAL IE THEY WOULD BE ON THE LINES OF "IF THERE ARE NO RESULTS FROM THE LONDON CONFERENCE, THEN". HE ADDED THAT EVEN OAU MEMBERS OUTSIDE THE COMMONWEALTH HAD SENT HIM MANY POSITIVE MESSAGES ACTIVELY SUPPORTING THE PROPOSALS MADE AT LUSAKA. THERE WOULD BE A STRONG BODY OF COMMONWEALTH MEMBERS AT HAVANA.

POSSIBLE MEETING WITH THE PRIME MINISTER

10. THE PRESIDENT WAS CLEARLY GREATLY EXERCISED TO KNOW (EMPHASISING THAT HIS WAS FOR HIS OWN PERSONAL REASSURANCE) WHETHER HMG HAS SPECIFIC CONTINGENCY PROPOSALS TO GUARANTEE THE ENFORCEMENT OF THE AGREED RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE LONDON CONFERENCE WITHIN RHODESIA DURING THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD. HE WAS CLEARLY ANXIOUS TO MEET THE PRIME MINISTER IF THIS WERE IN ANY WAY POSSIBLE, BUT EQUALLY CLEARLY HE WISHED TO FEEL THAT THE MEETING WOULD BE MEANINGFUL. HE SAID THAT THERE WERE TWO POSSIBILITIES: HMG COULD EITHER DEAL WITH MARK CHONA IN LONDON (CHONA WILL NOT BE ACCOMPANYING HIM TO HAVANA BUT WILL BE COMING TO LONDON AHEAD OF TIME BEFORE THE LONDON CONFERENCE) OR HE COULD RECEIVE A SECOND VISIT FROM ME AFTER HIS OWN RETURN FROM HAVANA ON /ROUT 9/14 SEPTEMBER. IN THE LIGHT OF WHAT HMG HAD TO SAY EITHER THROUGH THE MEDIUM OF MARK CHONA OR THROUGH A SECOND VISIT

/FROM ...

FROM ME, HE WOULD BE ABLE TO DECIDE WHETHER HE OUGHT TO MAKE A SPECIAL VISIT TO LONDON HIMSELF IN ORDER TO SEE THE PRIME MINISTER. IT WAS CLEAR THAT HE VERY MUCH WISHES TO SEE THE PRIME MINISTER, PARTICULARLY IN VIEW OF HER PROPOSED MEETING WITH PRESIDENT NYERERE, BUT WAS EQUALLY CLEAR THAT HE WOULD LIKE TO BE SURE THAT HE WOULD THEN LEARN SOMETHING TO HIS ADVANTAGE. HE INDICATED THAT, ARMED WITH SOME SPECIFIC REASSURANCE ON ONE OR BOTH OF THE QUESTIONS ON WHICH HE WAS ANXIOUS, HE WOULD EXERT ALL THE INFLUENCE AT HIS DISPOSAL ON MR NKOMO. (BECAUSE OF THE PRESENCE OF MARK CHOMA, I LAID NO SPECIFIC STRESS ON HIS RELATIONSHIP WITH MR NKOMO AND HE, TOO, SPOKE THROUGHOUT OF THE PATRIOTIC FRONT, BUT IT WAS CLEAR THAT NKOMO WAS MEANT.)

11. THE PRESIDENT, WHO SENT WARM MESSAGES TO "HIS DANCING PARTNER", LEAVES FOR HAVANA ON 29 AUGUST AT 2630 (LOCAL TIME). IF IT WERE POSSIBLE TO GIVE HIM SOME INTERIM REPLY, THANKING HIM FOR HIS COMMENTS AND GIVING SOME ENCOURAGEMENT FOR HIS PROPOSAL FOR A MEETING, THIS WOULD UNDOUBTEDLY HAVE A USEFUL EFFECT ON THE EVE OF HIS DEPARTURE TO HAVANA. MY IMPRESSION WAS THAT HE IS GENUINELY ANXIOUS ABOUT BOTH THE POINTS HE RAISED AND REASSURANCE ON THESE ISSUES IS PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT AT THIS STAGE. HE WAS ALREADY ANXIOUS THAT HE HAD HAD NO PERSONAL MESSAGES SINCE THE LUSAKA CONFERENCE, A SITUATION WHICH HE CLEARLY CONTRASTED WITH THE INVITATION TO PRESIDENT NYERERE.

30 AUG 1979





Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

Prime Minister:

Agree telegram
at Kelag A?

29 August 1979

Dear Boyan,

Phm 23/8

fg. Phm 23/8

Rhodesia Conference: Message from Bishop Muzorewa

Mirimba Salisbury telno 577 (copy enclosed) conveyed a message from Bishop Muzorewa to the Prime Minister raising a number of points in connection with the Constitutional Conference.

The tone of the message is not very encouraging, but may be taken to reflect the wish of the white officials concerned to set out a hard negotiating position. It is not in fact the case that we agreed not to publish any constitutional proposals without prior consultation. During Bishop Muzorewa's visit to London, the Prime Minister undertook to let him know privately the changes in the 1979 Constitution which we regard as indispensable. This was the purpose of Mr Fifoot's visit to Salisbury, the usefulness of which the Bishop acknowledges. The outline of the main elements we would wish to see in a constitutional settlement, which was published simultaneously with the invitations to the Conference, was intended to establish the necessary framework for negotiation (and was in fact shown by Mr Day to Bishop Muzorewa before it was published).

On the question of a ceasefire, the Bishop's attitude is entirely reasonable. We have never expected the Salisbury Administration to agree to a ceasefire unless the Patriotic Front also do so.

The Bishop's assertion that no amendments to the existing constitution are necessary and the call for sanctions to be lifted immediately is a position he knows from his conversation with the Prime Minister that we cannot accept.

The message also raises administrative points which should be pursued by Mr Day. In response to requests from both sides we have already raised the number for whom we shall be prepared to pay from 12 to 20. This appears to us to be a very reasonable arrangement and there would seem to be no need to raise the number further. We could not in any case increase the numbers from Salisbury without making a similar offer to the Patriotic Front. On other points, we can increase the numbers to be admitted to the Conference room to sixteen, and we will provide two additional cars for the Bishop's delegation.

/Lord

CONFIDENTIAL



/ Lord Carrington agrees with Mr Day's recommendation
(Mirimba Salisbury telno 578) that, rather than sending a
formal reply to the Bishop's message, Mr Day should be
instructed to reply on the Prime Minister's behalf.

/ I enclose a draft telegram of instructions to Salisbury.

/ I shall be writing separately about the question of
Rhodesian representation in London, about which the
Bishop has sent a further message (Mirimba Salisbury telno
579).

*Yours ever,
Stephen*

(J S Wall)
Private Secretary

B G Cartledge Esq
10 Downing Street
LONDON

CONFIDENTIAL

30 AUG 1979

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DESKBY 241600Z

FM MIRIMBA SALISBURY 241337Z AUG 79

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 577 OF 24 AUGUST

RHODESIA CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF A LETTER FROM MUZOREWA TO THE PRIME MINISTER DATED 22 AUGUST, DELIVERED THIS AFTERNOON:

BEGINS

I AM VERY PLEASED THAT YOUR GOVERNMENT IS STILL DETERMINED TO WORK CLOSELY WITH MY GOVERNMENT IN A JOINT ATTEMPT TO SOLVE OUR CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEM. THE VISIT TO SALISBURY BY MR FIFOOT TO DISCUSS THE VARIOUS ISSUES ON THE CONSTITUTION WITH MY ADVISERS HAS CERTAINLY BEEN VERY HELPFUL AND I APPRECIATE IT VERY MUCH.

ON BEHALF OF MY GOVERNMENT, I ACCEPT YOUR FORMAL INVITATION TO ATTEND A CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE AT LANCASTER HOUSE, LONDON, ON THE 10TH SEPTEMBER, 1979. THIS ACCEPTANCE IS ON THE UNDERSTANDING THAT THERE ARE NO PRECONDITIONS TO THE CONFERENCE.

ON MY RETURN FROM MY VISIT TO LONDON I REPORTED TO MY COLLEAGUES ON THE BASIS OF MY DISCUSSIONS WITH YOU AND WITH THE SECRETARY OF STATE THAT I HAD BEEN ASSURED THAT AFTER THE COMMONWEALTH CONFERENCE YOUR GOVERNMENT WOULD SEND A REPRESENTATIVE TO ZIMBABWE RHODESIA TO DISCUSS YOUR CONSTITUTIONAL PROPOSALS WITH MY GOVERNMENT AND ONLY AFTER SUCH DISCUSSION WOULD ANY PROPOSALS ON YOUR PART BE PUBLISHED. MY DEPUTY, AFTER HIS SUBSEQUENT VISIT TO LONDON, REPORTED IN THE SAME TERMS TO CABINET. MY MINISTERS WERE THEREFORE VERY PERTURBED WHEN I INFORMED THEM OF YOUR INVITATION AND THE OUTLINE OF YOUR PROPOSALS WHICH WERE BEING PUBLISHED AS THEY FELT THAT THIS PREMATURE PUBLICATION WAS CONTRARY TO THE VERY EXPLICIT UNDERTAKINGS THAT HAD BEEN GIVEN TO ME AND TO MY DEPUTY. THEY THOUGHT THAT THIS DID NOT BODE WELL FOR THE FUTURE NEGOTIATIONS.

IN YOUR INVITATION THERE ARE A NUMBER OF POINTS TO WHICH I FEEL I MUST REPLY.

CONFIDENTIAL

/FIRST

CONFIDENTIAL

FIRST, YOU URGE US TO OBSERVE A CEASEFIRE. IT IS OUR EARNEST DESIRE TO ACHIEVE A CEASEFIRE BUT IT IS THE PRIMARY DUTY OF MY GOVERNMENT TO PROTECT THE COUNTRY AND ITS CITIZENS FROM INCURSIONS FROM OUTSIDE THE COUNTRY. IN NO WAY, THEREFORE, CAN I HOLD OUT ANY HOPE FOR A CEASEFIRE UNLESS YOU AND OTHER INTERESTED PARTIES CAN PERSUADE THE PATRIOTIC FRONT TO STOP THEIR TERRORIST ACTIVITIES AGAINST MY COUNTRY AND ITS PEOPLES AND CAN GIVE SOME GUARANTEE THAT THEY WILL DO SO.

SECOND, YOU STATE THAT THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROPOSALS REPRESENT THE KIND OF CONSTITUTION WHICH YOUR GOVERNMENT BELIEVES "SHOULD BE ACCEPTABLE TO THE RHODESIAN PEOPLE". THE PRESENT CONSTITUTION OF ZIMBABWE RHODESIA WAS NEGOTIATED BY THE PEOPLE OF THIS COUNTRY FOR THIS COUNTRY. THIS WAS THE COURSE THAT A FORMER SECRETARY OF STATE, LORD HOME, TOLD US TO FOLLOW. THE RECENT ELECTIONS, WHICH LORD BOYD AND HIS PARTY CONFIRMED WERE FREE AND FAIR, SHOWED CONCLUSIVELY THAT THE PRESENT CONSTITUTION IS ACCEPTABLE TO THE PEOPLE OF THIS COUNTRY.

THIRD, YOU APPEAL TO US TO APPROACH THE NEGOTIATIONS IN A CONSTRUCTIVE AND FORWARD-LOOKING SPIRIT AND TO LAY THE FOUNDATIONS FOR A FREE, INDEPENDENT AND DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY IN WHICH ALL RHODESIANS, WHATEVER THEIR RACE OR POLITICAL BELIEFS, WILL BE ABLE TO LIVE IN SECURITY AND AT PEACE WITH EACH OTHER AND THEIR NEIGHBOURS. IT IS MY OPINION THAT THE AGREEMENT WHICH WAS SIGNED IN SALISBURY ON THE 3RD MARCH, 1978, DID LAY THE FOUNDATIONS FOR A FREE, INDEPENDENT AND DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY AND THAT OUR PRESENT CONSTITUTION WILL ENABLE SUCH A SOCIETY TO BE ESTABLISHED. IN THE LIGHT OF THIS, I DO NOT CONSIDER THAT ANY AMENDMENTS TO OUR CONSTITUTION ARE NECESSARY. WE HAVE NOW COMPLIED FULLY WITH THE SIX PRINCIPLES LAID DOWN BY SUCCESSIVE BRITISH GOVERNMENTS AND THEREFORE I CALL UPON YOU TO LIFT SANCTIONS FORTHWITH, WITHOUT WAITING FOR THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE TO BEGIN.

AT FIRST I WAS GIVEN TO UNDERSTAND THAT YOUR GOVERNMENT WAS PREPARED TO MEET THE COSTS OF SENDING 12 DELEGATES TO LONDON AND ACCOMMODATING THEM THERE DURING THE CONFERENCE. IN THE CASE OF MY DELEGATION, I AND MY MINISTERS WHILST IN LONDON WILL STILL BE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE GOVERNING OF ZIMBABWE RHODESIA. CONSEQUENTLY, IT WILL BE NECESSARY FOR US TO REMAIN IN CONSTANT TOUCH WITH AFFAIRS

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

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CONFIDENTIAL

FM MIRIMBA SALISBURY 241425Z AUG 79

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 578 OF 24 AUGUST

MIPT: RHODESIA CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE.

1. I AM SURPRISED AT THE ARGUMENTATIVE TONE OF THE BISHOP'S LETTER. I CAN ONLY ASSUME THAT HE WANTS TO BE ABLE TO DEMONSTRATE TO HIS CABINET COLLEAGUES THAT HE IS BEING FIRM.
2. THE POINT ABOUT PRIOR CONSULTATION (PARA 3 OF THE LETTER) HAS ALREADY BEEN MADE ORALLY (MY TELNO 531: PARA 1(C)). THIS HAS BEEN INCLUDED FOR THE RECORD.
3. THE ASSERTION THAT NO AMENDMENTS TO THE EXISTING CONSTITUTION ARE NECESSARY I WOULD REGARD AS AN INTITIAL NEGOTIATING POSITION. THE BISHOP KNOWS THAT WE COULD NEVER ACCEPT THIS, AS HIS EARLIER REFERENCE TO FIFOOT'S VISIT INDICATES.
4. HE MUST ALSO REALISE THAT THE CALL FOR AN IMMEDIATE LIFTING OF SANCTIONS IS UNREALISTIC. THE LUSAKA AGREEMENT MADE IT CLEAR THAT THE REMOVAL OF SANCTIONS WAS RELATED TO THE REST OF THE PROGRAMME APPROVED AT CHGM.
5. THE APPEAL TO HMG TO MEET THE COSTS OF ALL 40 SALISBURY DELEGATES IS A TRY-ON. I HAVE MADE IT CLEAR THAT 20 IS THE MAXIMUM THAT WE WILL PAY FOR.
6. THE REQUEST OF ADDITIONAL PLACES AT THE CONFERENCE TABLE IS NOT UNEXPECTED. IF WE WISH TO KEEP THE NUMBERS AT TWELVE, I MIGHT BE ABLE TO PERSUADE PEOPLE HERE TO ACCEPT THIS, ON THE UNDERSTANDING THAT ALL 8 ADDITIONAL ADVISERS (MY TELNO 565) WOULD BE ADMITTED TO LANCASTER HOUSE AND THAT ANY 12 OUT OF THE TEAM OF 20 (MY TELS NOS 562 AND 565) MAY BE SEATED IN THE CONFERENCE ROOM AT ANY ONE TIME.

CONFIDENTIAL

17.

CONFIDENTIAL

7. I TOLD THE DEPUTY CABINET SECRETARY ON 22 AUGUST THAT ADDITIONAL TRANSPORT WOULD BE PROVIDED FOR THE OFFICIAL PARTY OF 20. (YOUR TELNO 162).

8. I DOUBT WHETHER THE BISHOP IS EXPECTING ANY FORMAL REPLY TO THIS LETTER. I WILL HOWEVER NEED TO RESPOND ORALLY ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE POINTS I.E. FINANCE AND ADMISSION TO THE CONFERENCE, AND WOULD BE GRATEFUL FOR INSTRUCTIONS.

DAY

F I L E S

RHOD D
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FUSD
PLANNING STAFF
ES & SD
CCD
FRD
UND
LEGAL ADVISERS
(MR FREELAND)
(MR FIFOOT)
ECON D

PCD
DEF D
OID
PS
PS/SIR I GILMOUR
PS/MR LUCE
PS/MR RIDLEY
PS/MR HURD
PS/FUS
SIR A DUFF
LORD N G LENNOX
MISS BROWN
MR WILLSON
MR BYATT

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION
RHODESIA POLICY

CONFIDENTIAL

IN ZIMBABWE RHODESIA AND, FOR THIS PURPOSE, IT WILL BE NECESSARY TO HAVE OFFICIALS SUCH AS ADVISERS, SECRETARIES, CYPHER CLERKS AND SECURITY PERSONNEL, ACCOMPANYING MY DELEGATION. AFTER I MENTIONED THIS TO MR DAY, HE APPARENTLY CONTACTED YOU AND YOU HAVE NOW AGREED THAT THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT WILL ACCEPT FINANCIAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR SENDING 20 DELEGATES TO THE CONFERENCE AND ACCOMMODATING THEM IN LONDON. IN MY VIEW, ALTHOUGH I APPRECIATE YOUR GESTURE, THIS IS STILL NOT ADEQUATE. AS MY DELEGATION MUST REPRESENT ALL THE PARTIES WHO ARE MEMBERS OF THE GOVERNMENT OF NATIONAL UNITY, IT WILL CONSIST OF APPROXIMATELY 40 PERSONS. I WOULD BE GRATEFUL, THEREFORE, IF YOU WOULD AGREE TO MEET THE FINANCIAL COSTS OF THE FULL PARTY. IT IS, AFTER ALL, AT THE REQUEST OF THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT THAT WE ARE TRAVELLING TO LONDON, IN THIS CONNEXION I AM INFORMED THAT YOU INTEND TO LIMIT ADMISSION INTO THE CONFERENCE ROOM TO 12 DELEGATES. AS I INTEND HAVING 12 MINISTERIAL OR POLITICAL DELEGATES, I FEEL THAT MY GOVERNMENT CANNOT BE ADEQUATELY REPRESENTED AT THE CONFERENCE UNLESS 16 PEOPLE ARE PERMITTED TO ENTER THE CONFERENCE ROOM. THIS WILL ENABLE ME TO HAVE MY LEGAL AND OTHER ADVISERS WITH ME AT THE MEETINGS, WHICH I AM SURE YOU WILL AGREE IS ESSENTIAL. ALSO, IN THE LIGHT OF THE ABOVE, 4 CARS WILL NOT BE SUFFICIENT FOR MY DELEGATION. COULD NOT THE NUMBER BE INCREASED SLIGHTLY?

ENDS

DAY

FILES

RHOD D
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N AM D
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PLANNING STAFF
ES & SD
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FRD
UND
LEGAL ADVISERS
(MR FREELAND)
(MR FIFOOT)
ECON D

PCD
DEF D
OID
PS
PS/SIR I GILMOUR
PS/MR LUCE
PS/MR RIDLEY
PS/MR HURD
PS/FUS
SIR A DUFF
LORD N G LENNOX
MISS BROWN
MR WILLSON
MR BYATT

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION

RHODESIA POLICY

3

CONFIDENTIAL

File No.

OUTWARD

Security Classification
CONFIDENTIAL

Department RHODESIA

TELEGRAM

Precedence
IMMEDIATE

Drafted by
(Block Capitals) R. W. RENWICK

Tel. Extn 233. 5698

DESKBY Z

FOR
COMMS. DEPT.
USE

Despatched

(Date)

(Time).....Z

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PREAMBLE

(Time of Origin) Z(G.M.T.)

(Restrictive Prefix)

(Security Class.) CONFIDENTIAL

(Caveat/
Privacy Marking)

(Codeword)

(Deskby)

To IMMEDIATE MIRIMBA SALISBURY Tel. No. of
(precedence) (post)

AND TO (precedence/post)

AND SAVING TO

REPEATED TO (for info)

SAVING TO (for info)

Distribution:-

Rhodesia Policy

(TEXT)

YOUR TELNOS 577 AND 578: RHODESIA CONSTITUTIONAL
CONFERENCE: MESSAGE FROM BISHOP MUZOREWA

Copies to:-

1. Bishop Muzorewa's message bears the hall-marks of
having been drafted by his officials and deals with
a number of points which have been the subject of
discussion with you. The Prime Minister is content
therefore that you should reply orally on her behalf,
making the following points:

i. The Prime Minister was glad to have the Bishop's
formal acceptance of the invitation to the
Conference. She was pleased to hear that he

/found

found Mr Fifoot's visit useful. It fulfilled our undertaking to let the Bishop know privately what changes in the 1979 Constitution we regard as indispensable. We have not had similar discussions with other parties and it is most important that Mr Fifoot's visit should remain confidential.

ii. The proposals which we have published were shown by you to the Bishop, and are intended as a framework for discussion at the Conference. They implement the Prime Minister's undertaking in the House of Commons on 25 July to put forward firm proposals to bring Rhodesia to legal independence on a basis comparable to that on which we granted independence to other former British territories. The constitutional responsibility to make such proposals rests with us.

iii. The Prime Minister shares the Bishop's regret that the Patriotic Front have not been willing to agree to a ceasefire.

iv. The Prime Minister made clear that constitutional changes would be necessary at her meeting with Bishop Muzorewa on 13 July. You should impress upon the

/Bishop

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

Bishop that it is essential to his prospects of winning international acceptance that, throughout the Conference, he should appear to be adopting a reasonable and positive attitude. We do not want the Conference to break down on an equal display of intransigence by both sides. There are no pre-conditions, but he will need to be prepared to negotiate seriously on the basis of the framework we have put forward.

As regards the,

- v. ~~The~~ administrative arrangements for the Conference, are ~~a matter for you to pursue.~~ It is for the Bishop to decide how many delegates and supporting staff he needs to bring to London. *mm* [But HMG cannot meet the costs of more than twenty delegates.] It was only in response to the Bishop's request to you that we agreed to increase the number for whom we would accept financial responsibility to twenty.

- vi. In response to the Bishop's request, we will increase the number of delegates admitted to the Conference Room to sixteen (eight at the table and eight behind). There is no seating room for numbers larger than this. We have increased the number of cars allocated to the Bishop's delegation [to six.]



from the Private Secretary

BRITISH EMBASSY

35 rue du Faubourg Saint-Honoré
75008 - PARIS

Telephone : 266.91-42


29 August 1979

M O'D B Alexander Esq
10 Downing Street

Dear Mr Alexander,

I enclose a sealed letter to the Prime Minister from
President Senghor of Senegal. The Embassy of Senegal here
asked us to pass it on.

22.8.79
T 82R/79T

Yours sincerely,

E Breedon

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T90A/79T.

Subject

Rhodesia

ADVANCE COPY

2

BSBFCO 002:30

OO FCO DESKBY 301630Z AUG

GRS 210

SECRET

DESKBY 301630Z

FROM BRASILIA 30:1514Z AUG 79

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 185 OF 30 AUGUST

~~PS/10/10 Jarvis &~~

PS.

(2)

Prime Minister

Amis

LETTER FOR PRIME MINISTER FROM PRESIDENT KAUNDA WAS HANDED OVER
HERE THIS MORNING. TEXT AS FOLLOWS:

BEGINS.

29TH AUGUST 1979

DEAR MARGARET,

I THANK YOU FOR SENDING YOUR SPECIAL ENVOY TO LUSAKA. I FOUND
YOUR MESSAGE VERY USEFUL.

LAST NIGHT I SAW HER AGAIN AND TOLD HER THEN THAT I WOULD LIKE
TO BE BRIEFED AS SOON AS I RETURN TO LUSAKA ROUND ABOUT SEPTEMBER
9TH, 1979. I ALSO TOLD HER TO LET YOU KNOW THAT I WOULD BE SENDING
MY SPECIAL ASSISTANT (POLITICAL), MR MARK C. CHONA TO BE AROUND
IN LONDON A COUPLE OF DAYS BEFORE THE CONFERENCE STARTS. IT IS
A PITY THAT DUE TO PRESSURE OF WORK I AM UNABLE TO COME THROUGH
LONDON AT THIS CRUCIAL TIME.

BEFORE CONCLUDING THIS LETTER, I JUST WISH TO LET YOU KNOW THAT
REFLECTING OVER THE ISSUE OF YOUR SPECIAL ENVOY COMING BACK TO
LUSAKA AGAIN, I HAVE A CHANGE OF MIND. 9TH SEPTEMBER WILL BE
VERY CLOSE TO THE CONFERENCE ITSELF AND THEREFORE DANGERS OF
LEAKAGES WILL NOT BE AN IMPORTANT FACTOR AT THAT TIME. IT IS
THEREFORE IMPORTANT THAT WE RETURN TO NORMAL DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS
OF COMMUNICATIONS - EITHER THROUGH MY HIGH COMMISSIONER IN LONDON
OR YOUR OWN IN LUSAKA. MY CHANGE OF MIND ON THIS SUBJECT IS DUE
TO THE OBVIOUS IMPORTANCE OF THE MATTER OVER WHICH WE ARE EXCHANGING
VIEWS.

I WISH YOU GOD'S BLESSINGS AND GUIDANCE IN THE VERY DIFFICULT
TASK YOU ARE UNDERTAKING ON BEHALF OF ALL OF US.

AS ALWAYS,
KENNETH

KENNETH DAVID KAUNDA
PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF ZAMBIA.

2. ORIGINAL BY BAG.

STATHAM

X-25
2

PS
PS/SIR I GILMOUR
PS/MR LUCE
PS/PUS
SIR A DUFF
MR WILLSON
MR BYATT
LORD N. G. LENNOX

IMMEDIATE

PS/NO 10 DOWNING STREET

MR R L WADE-GERY)
MR P M MAXEY)
COL MOIR) CABINET
MR P J FOWLER) OFFICE
DIO)
SIR J HUNT)

.....
HD/RHODESIA DEPT (3)
HD/C AF D
HD/S AF D
HD/UND
HD/NEWS DEPT
HD/WAD
MR FREELAND LEGAL ADVISER RM K200A
MR FIFOOT LEGAL ADVISER RM K164

~~FOR ZIMBABWE DEVELOPMENTS FUND~~
~~ADD MR LYNCH ODI?~~
~~MR SLATER TREASURY~~

Prime Minister

ha
Prime Minister
Prime Minister
29/8

GRS 157
UNCLASSIFIED
FM LUSAKA 290910Z AUG 79
TO PRIORITY FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 952 OF 29 AUGUST
INFO PRIORITY DAR ES SALAAM, GABORONE, LAGOS, ROUTINE PRETORIA,
WASHINGTON, MAPUTO, LUANDA, UKMIS NEW YORK, MIRIMBA SALISBURY
MY TELNO 946: RHODESIA CONFERENCE

1. WHEN THE NEW U S AMBASSADOR PRESENTED HIS CREDENTIALS YESTERDAY (28 AUGUST), PRESIDENT KAUNDA APPEALED PUBLICLY TO THE PARTICIPANTS AT THE FORTHCOMING RHODESIA CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE TO BE "VERY SERIOUS". DESCRIBING THIS AS "THE LAST CHANCE" TO FIND A PEACEFUL SOLUTION TO THE RHODESIA PROBLEM, KAUNDA SAID THAT ZAMBIA, THE FRONT LINE STATES AND AFRICA AS A WHOLE WANTED THE CONFERENCE TO BE A SUCCESS. HE WARNED THAT THE ALTERNATIVE WOULD BE A CATASTROPHE IN SOUTHERN AFRICA WHICH WOULD BE DIFFICULT TO CONTAIN. KAUNDA HOPED THAT THERE WOULD BE AN ATMOSPHERE OF COMPROMISE WITH ALL PARTICIPANTS CONTRIBUTING POSITIVELY TO THE ACHIEVEMENT OF THE DESIRED GOAL, WHICH HE DESCRIBED AS "GENUINE INDEPENDENCE" FOR RHODESIA.

ALLINSON



Original in GTR. JFA

Rhodesia F20
CWO
RWS Off.

10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

28 August 1979

Dear Nicholas.

Thank you very much for your letter of 15 August. I was sorry to read of your concern over the agreement reached at the recent Commonwealth Conference at Lusaka.

I know that you have followed the Rhodesian problem carefully for several years, and I hope that on further study of what was achieved in Lusaka you will, like Bishop Muzorewa, have come to a less critical view. For there has been no basic change in our position. The Government remain committed to bringing Rhodesia to legal independence as soon as possible. But as we said in our manifesto and have made clear all along, we must do all we can to ensure that Rhodesia gains wide acceptance in the international community. One theoretical possibility would have been to grant independence to Bishop Muzorewa as soon as we took office. We came to the conclusion that this would not be the best course either for Britain or for Rhodesia, and I am sure, looking back, that we were right. Such action would not have gained international acceptance for Rhodesia, since it was clear that all our friends and allies took a different view. Nor would it have stopped the war - indeed fighting might have intensified.

Now, as a result of the agreement reached at Lusaka, we are working in a different context. We have the unanimous support of the Commonwealth for the British Government's efforts to bring Rhodesia to legal independence. We also have the acceptance of all Commonwealth countries, including three of the Front Line States (without whose support the Patriotic Front would be virtually incapable of continuing the struggle), that it must be a major objective to bring about a cessation of hostilities and an end to sanctions.

/Of course

Of course I have no illusions about the difficulties which lie ahead. The Constitutional Conference which we have called for 10 September will not be easy. But we are determined that no one party shall have the right to operate a veto.

As you will understand, I have thought very deeply about the right way to carry through our responsibility to Rhodesia. There is always room for differing views about tactics. But you will, I am sure, accept that neither I nor my colleagues have any intention of departing from the objective on which we were all agreed before and during the election. We have started our effort to secure a stable and democratic future for Rhodesia, and do not intend to be deterred from it.

You know - I am very concerned when I receive a critical letter from you although I am the first person to understand why. Please - could you understand my reasons?

Yours ever

Nicholas Winterton, Esq., MP.

Margaret

tw

CONFIDENTIAL

cc Zambia - May 79

HS



Rhodesia:

BF

4/9/79

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

28 August 1979

Rhodesia

Thank you for your letter of 22 August about the scope, or rather the lack of it, for exercising leverage through our aid programmes on certain Commonwealth countries in order to influence their attitudes towards the Rhodesia problem.

The Prime Minister has seen your letter and has taken note of the background. She has raised two specific questions. Firstly, the Prime Minister is under the impression that, inspite of the present Government's cuts, the UK aid programme in 1979/80 will still be 2% higher than it was last year: is this the case? Secondly, the Prime Minister would be glad to have confirmation that the additional £10 million in agricultural aid which is to be offered to Zambia, and which she asked to be withheld for the time being for tactical reasons, is in fact still in abeyance. I should be grateful for advice on both points.

B. G. CARTLEDGE

J.S. Wall, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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FM BELGRADE 271100Z AUG 79

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 126 OF 27 AUGUST

Prime Minister

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*AM
28/8*

MUGABE PRESS CONFERENCE

1. ON EVE OF DEPARTURE FROM BELGRADE YESTERDAY EVENING MUGABE SPOKE TO FOREIGN PRESS. FOLLOWING IS SUMMARY OF CONFERENCE.

2. MUGABE SAID THWT HE AND HIS DELEGATION WERE IN YUGOSLAVIA TO CONSOLIDATE FRIENDSHIP AND SOLIDARITY AND BRIEF YUGOSLAVS ON POLITICAL AND MILITARY SITUATION IN ZIMBABWE. HE HAD DISCUSSIONS WITH SOCIALIST ALLIANCE PRESIDENT, KURTOVIC AND FOREIGN MINISTER, VRHOVEC AND BRIEFED THEM ON BRITISH MOVES TO HOLD A CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE.

3. THE PATRIOTIC FRONT WOULD ATTEND THIS CONFERENCE BUT BRITAIN'S CONSTITUTIONAL PROPOSALS WERE EFFECTIVELY AN ATTEMPT TO REBUILD THE INTERNAL SETTLEMENT CONSTITUTION ON WHICH BASIS THE PUPPET REGIME OPERATED. IT WAS INTERNATIONALLY ACCEPTED THAT THIS CONSTITUTION WAS ILLEGAL. AN ILLEGAL CONSTITUTION COULD NOT THEREFORE CONSTITUTE A VALID BASIS FOR ANY CONFERENCE. THE FRONT ACCORDINGLY REJECTED BRITAIN'S PROPOSALS SINCE THEY WERE BASED ON A CONSTITUTION WHICH SOUGHT TO ENTRENCH MINORITY RIGHTS. THE FRONT WOULD THEMSELVES BE OFFERING A NEW BASIS FOR DISCUSSION.

4. BRITAIN NOW SOUGHT TO ACT IN ZIMBABWE AS A FULL DE-COLONISING POWER. BUT ONLY LAST YEAR IT HAD ACCEPTED THAT IT NO LONGER HAD FULL POWERS TO BRING ABOUT A DE-COLONIALIZING PROCESS AND HAD SOUGHT THE INVOLVEMEENT OF THE UN AND PARTNERED ITSELF WITH AMERICA. THROUGH THEIR ARMED STRUGGLE THE FREEDOM FIGHTERS HAD IN EFFECT CARRIED OUT THE DE-COLONISING PROCESS TO THE SITUATION WHEN THE SETTLER REGIME WAS NOW ON THE VERGE OF DEFEAT. THEY, THEREFORE, NOT THE BRITISH, HAD THE RIGHT TO THIS POSITION AND WOULD REJECT ATTEMPTS TO INSTALL BRITAIN AS THE DE-COLONISING POWER.

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5. BRITAIN, ESPECIALLY THE PRESENT GOVERNMENT HAD PRONOUNCED ITSELF IN DEFINITE ALLIANCE WITH SMITH AND MUZOREWA. HOW COULD SUCH A GOVERNMENT PLAY AN UNBIASED PART IN THE HOLDING OF FREE ELECTIONS. IT SHOULD BE RECOGNISED INTERNATIONALLY THAT NO SOLUTION COULD BE ACHIEVED WITHOUT THE PATRIOTIC FRONT LAYING DOWN ITS ARMS. BUT THIS WOULD NOT HAPPEN MERELY BECAUSE BRITAIN HAD CONVENED A CONFERENCE. ONLY WHEN THE FRONT WAS SATISFIED THAT THE QUESTION OF INDEPENDENCE MEANT TRANSFER OF POWER TO THE PEOPLE COULD A CEASEFIRE BE CONSIDERED.

6. THE PATH TO INDEPENDENCE ENVISAGED UNDER THE PREVIOUS ANGLO-AMERICAN PROPOSALS WAS REALISTIC. DEFINITE PREREQUISITES WERE FOR THE SETTLER REGIME AND ITS ARMED FORCES TO BE SCRAPPED AND FOR THE LIBERATION FORCES TO CONSTITUTE THE PEOPLE'S ARMY. THE PATRIOTIC FRONT WOULD BE MAKING THESE POINTS TO THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT REMINDING THEM THAT THESE STEPS WERE AGREED LAST YEAR. THEY WOULD INSIST THAT BRITAIN UPHOLD THIS PROCESS SINCE IT ALONE COULD WORK THE IRREVERSIBLE MECHANISM FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF INDEPENDENCE AND TRUE DEMOCRACY IN ZIMBABWE.

7. ASKED ABOUT HIS EXPECTATIONS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE MUGABE SAID THAT THE BRITISH WERE IN THE HABIT OF AVOIDING SOLUTIONS FOR ZIMBABWE. HE COULD NOT SEE A BRITISH CONSERVATIVE GOVERNMENT ARRIVING AT A SOLUTION THAT WAS ACCEPTABLE, BUT IF IT DID, SO MUCH THE BETTER. MUGABE REFUSED TO GIVE DETAILS OF HIS NEW PROPOSALS BUT SAID THESE INVOLVED "UNFETTERED INDEPENDENCE VIA DEMOCRATIC PROCESSES, NO RESERVATION OF PRIVILEGES FOR THE WHITE MINORITY AND A COMPLETE DISBANDMENT OF THE FORCES OF ILLEGAL REGIME".

8. ASKED WHETHER HE WOULD INSIST ON A DIFFERENT BASIS FOR TALKS IN LONDON, MUGABE SAID THAT HE WOULD ONLY NEGOTIATE WITH BRITAIN AS THE CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY. THE PATRIOTIC FRONT WOULD SUBMIT THEIR PLAN TO BRITAIN AND PROPOSE THAT THIS SHOULD CONSTITUTE THE BASIS FOR DISCUSSION. OTHER PARTIES WOULD NO DOUBT SUBMIT OTHER PROPOSALS AND THEY WERE ENTITLED TO DISCUSS THESE WITH THE UK. THE PATRIOTIC FRONT WOULD BE PREPARED TO SIT IN THE SAME ROOM AS SMITH AND MUZOREWA BUT IT WOULD ONLY NEGOTIATE WITH BRITAIN.

9. MUGABE HOPED THAT THE NON-ALIGNED SUMMIT IN HAVANA WOULD GIVE THE FRONT THE FULL STAMP OF BEING THE SOLE AND LEGITIMATE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ZIMBABWE PEOPLE, TO STRENGTHEN ITS HAND. HE HOPED

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HAVANA WOULD ALSO SUPPORT THE FRONT'S APPROACH TO THE LONDON TALKS. ASKED ABOUT THE THEORY OF A NATURAL ALLIANCE BETWEEN THE NON - ALIGNED AND THE SOCIALIST BLOC, MUGABE DIMISSED THIS AS PREPOSTEROUS. MUGABE REFUSED TO DISCLOSE WHICH COUNTRY HIS DELEGATION WOULD VISIT NEXT.

10. YUGOSLAV PRESS REPORTING HAS EMPHASISED THE NON-ALIGNED CONTENT OF CONFERENCE AND HAS SO FAR AVOIDED PUTTING TOO NEGATIVE A TONE ON MUGABE'S COMMENTS ON RHODESIA CONFERENCE.

11. RHODESIA DEPT. PLEASE PASS AS NECESSARY.

FARQUHARSON

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LEGAL ADVISERS
(MR FREELAND)
(MR FIFOOT)
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PS/MR LUCE
PS/MR RIDLEY
PS/MR HURD
PS/PUS
SIR A DUFF
LORD N G LENNOX
MISS BROWN
MR WILLSON
MR BYATT
MR FER²YUSSON

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION
RHODESIA -POLICY

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FM DAR ES SALAAM 250845Z AUG 79

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 694 OF 25 AUGUST

INFO PRIORITY MIRIMBA SALISBURY, LUSAKA, GABARONE, LAGOS,
LUANDA, MAPUTO, UKMIS NY, WASHINGTON

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Pmt 25/8

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Prime Minister
2 (m)
25/8
[Signature]

RHODESIA. FOR PRIVATE SECRETARY.

1. MIFT (TO YOU ONLY) CONTAINS THE TEXT OF A PERSONAL MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT NYERERE TO THE PRIME MINISTER WHICH WAS DELEVERED TO ME BY MISS WICKEN THIS MORNING. THE MESSAGE IS IN REPLY TO THE PRIME MINISTERS ONE CONTAINED IN FCO TELNO 271.

2. IN DELIVERING THE LETTER MISS WICKEN (WHO I IMAGINE AS USUAL PLAYED A PART IN ITS DRAFTING) EMPHASISED THE IMPORTANCE "THEY" ATTACHED TO THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT BEING SEEN TO HAVE THE AUTHORITY ON THE GROUND TO ENSURE THAT THE ELECTIONS ARE CONDUCTED AND SUPERVISED PROPERLY.

3. MISS WICKEN ALSO TOLD ME THAT THERE WOULD NOW BE NO (RPT) NO FRONT LINE SUMMIT ON RHODESIA THIS WEEKEND OR NEXT WEEK. INSTEAD THE LEADERS WOULD GET TOGETHER IN THE MARGINS OF THE NONALIGNED MEETING IN HAVANA. SHE HAD JUST SEEN THE CUBAN DRAFT COMMUNIQUE AND COMMENTED THAT THEY WOULD WORK HARD TO KNOCK IT INTO THE CORRECT SHAPE. I IMAGINE THAT SHE HAD THE SECTION ON RHODESIA PARTICULARLY IN MIND.

4. I WILL LEAVE IT TO YOU TO REPEAT NYERERES MESSAGE AS APPROPRIATE IN CONSULTATION WITH NO. 10.
HINCH CLIFFE

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FM DAR ES SALAAM 250900Z AUGUST 79

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 695 OF 25 AUGUST

T84/79T

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T84/79T

MIPT: RHODESIA. FOR PRIVATE SECRETARY
TEXT OF MESSAGE AS FOLLOWS:

THANK YOU FOR YOUR LETTER AND ITS ENCLOSURES. I WAS VERY
GLAD TO RECEIVE THESE DOCUMENTS WHEN I RETURNED TO DAR ES
SALAAM ON TUESDAY, 21ST AUGUST.

FIRST LET ME SAY THAT YOUR OUTLINE PROPOSALS FOR A RHODESIAN
CONSTITUTION SEEM TO ME TO BE FULLY IN LINE WITH THE LUSAKA
AGREEMENT.

THERE ARE HOWEVER THREE POINTS I WOULD LIKE TO MAKE NOW THAT
I HAVE CONSIDERED THE DOCUMENTS YOU SENT TO ME. THE FIRST
IS ON A DETAIL IN YOUR OUTLINE. I NOTICE THAT YOU ENVISAGE
THE WHITE MEMBERS OF THE RHODESIAN PARLIAMENT BEING ELECTED
ONLY BY WHITE CITIZENS. I UNDERSTAND THAT IDEA, AND I AM
SURE IT IS WHAT IAN SMITH WOULD LIKE. BUT I THINK IT WOULD
BE A MISTAKE FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF THE MINORITY COMMUNITY
ITSELF, ESPECIALLY IN THE LONG RUN. THE ORIGINAL TANGANYIKAN
PRACTICE WAS THAT CANDIDATES FOR THE EUROPEAN SEATS HAD TO
BE EUROPEANS, NOMINATED BY EUROPEAN CITIZENS FROM THAT
CONSTITUENCY, BUT THE WHOLE MULTI-RACIAL ELECTORATE TOOK PART
IN THE CHOICE BETWEEN THOSE EUROPEANS WHO HAD BEEN NOMINATED.
THIS SYSTEM HAD TWO IMPORTANT ADVANTAGES. FIRST, IT MEANT
THAT THE EUROPEAN CANDIDATES HAD TO CONSIDER THE INTERESTS
AND IDEAS OF THE AFRICAN VOTERS AS WELL AS THE EUROPEAN VOTERS,
AND IN PARTICULAR AVOID PROVOCATIVE RACIAL STATEMENTS.
SECONDLY, THE AFRICAN VOTERS WERE FORCED TO CONSIDER EUROPEAN
CANDIDATES AS POTENTIAL POLITICAL ALLIES, RATHER THAN AS PEOPLE
AUTOMATICALLY HOSTILE TO THEMSELVES. THE SYSTEM THUS BROKE
DOWN RACIAL STEREOTYPES AND ASSISTED THE POLITICAL INTEGRATION
OF THE TWO COMMUNITIES. I BELIEVE IT IS AN IMPORTANT RESULT
OF HAVING STARTED WITH THIS SYSTEM THAT WE IN TANZANIA NOW
HAVE SEVERAL NON-AFRICANS WHO WERE ORIGINALLY ELECTED TO THE
RESERVED SEATS BUT WHO NOW GET ELECTED TO PARLIAMENT ON THEIR
OWN MERITS IN COMPETITION WITH AFRICAN CANDIDATES IN THEIR
CONSTITUENCY.

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LET ME NOW

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LET ME NOW TURN TO MORE BASIC POINTS, WHICH SEEM TO ME TO BE CRUCIAL TO THE SUCCESS OF THIS NEW INITIATIVE ON RHODESIA. I BELIEVE IT IS VITAL THAT BRITAIN SHOULD NOT GO TO THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE AS A 'NEUTRAL', ARBITRATING BETWEEN CONTENDING GROUPS. BRITAIN, UNDER THE LEADERSHIP OF LORD CARRINGTON AS CHAIRMAN, SHOULD ATTEND AND ACT AT THE CONFERENCE AS THE DE-COLONISING POWER IT IS. IT SHOULD SHOW ITSELF ANXIOUS TO GET AS MUCH AGREEMENT AS POSSIBLE FROM ALL THOSE INVOLVED, AND WILLING TO COMPROMISE ON DETAILS, BUT AS DETERMINED TO TRANSFER POWER TO PEOPLE ELECTED UNDER A CONSTITUTION WHICH BRITAIN CAN DEFEND AS A DEMOCRATIC DOCUMENT AND WHICH THE COMMONWEALTH AND THE REST OF THE WORLD WILL RECOGNISE AS SUCH. IF BRITAIN ATTENDS THE CONFERENCE AS AN ARBITRATOR ONLY, THE RHODESIANS WILL ARGUE INTERMINABLY AND SOON START TRYING TO MAKE THE OTHER PARTY - OR BRITAIN ITSELF - APPEAR AS THE ONE RESPONSIBLE FOR THAT BREAK-UP OF THE CONFERENCE WHICH THEY THEMSELVES DESIRE. I CANNOT STRESS TOO STRONGLY THE IMPORTANCE WHICH I BELIEVE THIS MATTER TO HAVE FOR THE SUCCESS OF THE CONFERENCE.

MY SECOND POINT FOLLOWS ON FROM THAT. IN LUSAKA WE STATED THAT FREE AND FAIR ELECTIONS WOULD BE "PROPERLY SUPERVISED UNDER BRITISH GOVERNMENT AUTHORITY, AND WITH COMMONWEALTH OBSERVERS". THE WORRY WHICH REMAINS IN MY MIND - AND I BELIEVE YOU WOULD RATHER THAT I WAS COMPLETELY FRANK WITH YOU ON THESE IMPORTANT MATTERS - IS WHETHER YOUR GOVERNMENT WILL BE ABLE - POLITICALLY AND IN OTHER WAYS - TO GET ITSELF INTO THE POSITION WHERE IT REALLY DOES HAVE SUFFICIENT AUTHORITY AND POWER ON THE GROUND TO CARRY OUT THIS FUNCTION TO THE FULL. I NOYICED THAT YOU RESERVED THE RIGHT TO MAKE THE INTERIM ARRANGEMENTS, AND I AM NOT QUESTIONING THAT; HOW YOU GET AUTHORITY AND EXERCISE IT IS - I FULLY ACCEPT - YOUR AFFAIR. BUT THE ACTUAL EXISTENCE OF YOUR AUTHORITY IN RHODESIA IS CRUCIAL TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF A DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION THERE AND TO OUR ABILITY TO HELP IN GETTING THESE ARRANGEMENTS ACCEPTED BY THE PATRIOTIC FRONT AND AFRICA. I CAN ARGUE FOR BRITAIN'S AUTHORITY AND IMPARTIALITY BETWEEN THE PARTIES FIGHTING THE ELECTION. I CANNOT ARGUE FOR AUTHORITY WIELDED IN PRACTICE BY THOSE WHO ARE NOW RUNNING RHODESIA - ANY MORE THAN YOU COULD DO IT IT WERE WIELDED BY THE PATRIOTIC FRONT. I DO REALISE THAT IN RAISING THIS POINT I AM DISCUSSING THE 'INTERIM' BEFORE THE CONSTITUTION IS SETTLED WHEREAS YOUR

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STRATEGY IS TO DEAL WITH ONE STEP AT A TIME. BUT I DO SO BECAUSE GETTING AGREEMENT ON THE CONSTITUTION - WHICH WILL ITSELF GREATLY EASE THE INTERIM ARRANGEMENTS - WILL BE AFFECTED BY THE EMPHASIS AND IMPORTANCE BRITAIN GIVES TO SATISFYING EVERYONE THAT IT REALLY INTENDS TO EXERCISE AUTHORITY DURING THE ELECTIONS AND THE RUN-UP TO THEM. IT IS REALLY A CHICKEN AND EGG SITUATION.

I SUPPOSE THAT BOTH MY MAJOR POINTS AMOUNT TO THE SAME THING: THAT BRITAIN HAS TO PLAY THE LEADING ROLE IN THIS AGREED PROCESS OF DE-COLONISING RHODESIA ON A DEMOCRATIC BASIS. I DO NOT BELIEVE THAT IS AN EASY THING FOR A BRITISH GOVERNMENT TO DO IN THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE 1970S - I HAVE ALREADY SEEN REPORTS THAT NEWSPAPER EDITORS ETC. ARE CALLING UPON YOUR GOVERNMENT TO BE 'NEUTRALS' AT THE CONFERENCE. AND I DO RECOGNISE THE SPECIAL DIFFICULTY OF BRITAIN ASSUMING AUTHORITY IN RHODESIA, WHERE IT HAS NEVER EXERCISED IT ON THE GROUND. BUT I AM CONVINCED THAT THE OBVIOUS EXISTENCE OF BRITISH AUTHORITY DURING THE INTERIM, AND AT THE CONFERENCE, IS THE ONLY WAY TO SUCCESS.

THIS LETTER COMES TO YOU WITH MY VERY WARM PERSONAL GREETINGS. I HOPE IT WILL BE POSSIBLE FOR US TO MEET IN THE NOT TOO DISTANT FUTURE.

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cc Tanzania
Nyerere Visit

SUBJECT

T84/79T

① F.C.D.

THE STATE HOUSE,
DAR ES SALAAM,
TANZANIA.

PRIME MINISTER'S *Reply sent*

PERSONAL MESSAGE

SERIAL No. T84/79T ② f.c.

24th August, 1979.

Mrs. Margaret Thatcher, M.P.,
The Prime Minister,
10 Downing Street,
London, S.W.1.

Am!
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Dear Mrs. Thatcher,

Thank you for your letter and its enclosures. I was very glad to receive these documents when I returned to Dar es Salaam on Tuesday, 21st August.

First let me say that your Outline Proposals for a Rhodesian Constitution seem to me to be fully in line with the Lusaka Agreement.

There are however three points I would like to make now that I have considered the documents you sent to me. The first is on a detail in your Outline. I notice that you envisage the White Members of the Rhodesian Parliament being elected only by White citizens. I understand that idea, and I am sure it is what Ian Smith would like. But I think it would be a mistake from the point of view of the Minority Community itself, especially in the long run. The original Tanganyikan practice was that candidates for the European seats had to be Europeans, nominated by European citizens from that constituency, but the whole multi-racial electorate took part in the choice between those Europeans who had been nominated. This system had two important advantages. First, it meant that the European candidates had to consider the interests and ideas of the African voters as well as the European voters, and in particular avoid provocative racial statements. Secondly, the African voters were forced to consider European candidates as potential political allies, rather than as people automatically hostile to themselves. The system thus broke down racial stereotypes and assisted the political integration of the two communities. I believe it is an important result of having started with this system that we in Tanzania now have several Non-Africans who were originally elected to the Reserved Seats but who now get elected to Parliament on their own merits in competition with African candidates in their constituency.

Let me now turn to more basic points, which seem to me to be crucial to the success of this new initiative on Rhodesia.

I believe it is vital that Britain should not go to the Constitutional Conference as a 'neutral', arbitrating between contending groups. Britain, under the leadership of Lord Carrington as Chairman, should attend and act at the Conference as the de-colonising power it is. It should show itself anxious to get as much agreement as possible from all those involved, and willing to compromise on details, but as determined to transfer power to people elected under a constitution which Britain can defend as a democratic document and which the Commonwealth and the rest of the world will recognise as such. If Britain attends the Conference as an arbitrator only, the Rhodesians will argue interminably and soon start trying to make the other party - or Britain itself - appear as the one responsible for that break-up of the Conference which they themselves desire. I cannot stress too strongly the importance which I believe this matter to have for the success of the Conference.

My second point follows on from that. In Lusaka we stated that free and fair elections would be "properly supervised under British Government authority, and with Commonwealth observers". The worry which remains in my mind - and I believe you would rather that I was completely frank with you on these important matters - is whether your Government will be able - politically and in other ways - to get itself into the position where it really does have sufficient authority and power on the ground to carry out this function to the full. I noticed that you reserved the right to make the interim arrangements, and I am not questioning that; how you get authority and exercise it is - I fully accept - your affair. But the actual existence of your authority in Rhodesia is crucial to the implementation of a democratic constitution there and to our ability to help in getting these arrangements accepted by the Patriotic Front and Africa. I can argue for Britain's authority and impartiality between the Parties fighting the election. I cannot argue for authority wielded in practice by those who are now running Rhodesia - any more than you could do if it were wielded by the Patriotic Front.

I do realise that in raising this point I am discussing the 'interim' before the constitution is settled, whereas your strategy is to deal with one step at a time. But I do so because getting agreement on the constitution - which will

itself greatly ease the interim arrangements - will be affected by the emphasis and importance Britain gives to satisfying everyone that it really intends to exercise authority during the elections and the run-up to them. It is really a chicken and egg situation.

I suppose that both my major points amount to the same thing: that Britain has to play the leading role in this agreed process of de-colonising Rhodesia on a democratic basis. I do not believe that is an easy thing for a British Government to do in the political and economic circumstances of the 1970s - I have already seen reports that newspaper editors etc. are calling upon your Government to be 'neutrals' at the Conference! And I do recognise the special difficulty of Britain assuming authority in Rhodesia, where it has never exercised it on the ground. But I am convinced that the obvious existence of British authority during the interim, and at the Conference, is the only way to success.

This letter comes to you with my very warm personal greetings. I hope it will be possible for us to meet in the not too distant future.

Yours sincerely,

Julius K. Nyerere

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FM WASHINGTON 24²⁰50Z AUG 79
TO PRIORITY FCO
TELEGRAM NO 2422 OF 24 AUGUST

h.g. Smith

Prime Minister

*and
over
28/8*

MY TEL NO 2362: RHODESIA

1. I ASKED MOOSE AND LAKE TO LUNCH TODAY PRIOR TO THE TALKS IN LONDON ON 28 AUGUST. LAKE WAS KEEN TO REGISTER THREE POINTS:-

I. THE U.S. ADMINISTRATION WERE VERY CONTENT THAT HMG WERE NOW TAKING THE LEAD WITH THE AMERICANS IN SUPPORT. THEY WERE ENTIRELY HAPPY WITH THE OUTCOME OF THE COMMONWEALTH CONFERENCE, AND OUR SUBSEQUENT MOVES.

II. THERE WERE SOME SECONDARY POINTS ON WHICH THEY SHOWED CONCERN, NOTABLY THE IMPORTANCE OF ENSURING THAT THE FRONT LINE STATES WERE IN A POSITION TO BRING PRESSURE TO BEAR ON THE PATRIOTIC FRONT WHEN NECESSARY. LAKE ENTIRELY ACCEPTED THAT THERE WAS NO QUESTION OF OBSERVERS QUOTE IN THE ROOM UNQUOTE BUT THE PATRIOTIC FRONT TENDED TO BEHAVE WORSE WHEN THE FLS WERE NOT WATCHING THEM AND IT WOULD BE IMPORTANT THAT THE FLS SHOULD BE IN A POSITION TO LEAN ON THE PATRIOTIC FRONT WHEN NECESSARY. WE EXPLAINED THE ACTION ALREADY TAKEN AT HEAD OF GOVERNMENT LEVEL TO KEEP IN TOUCH WITH COMMONWEALTH MEMBERS OF THE FLS AND WITH NIGERIA.

III. THEY LOOKED FORWARD TO DISCUSSING HOW THE U.S. ADMINISTRATION COULD HELP TO BACK UP OUR EFFORTS DURING THE CONFERENCE.

2. MOOSE SAID THAT WHEN PROMINENT U.S. JOURNALISTS HAD ASKED HIM HOW HE FELT ABOUT QUOTE BEING FROZEN OUT UNQUOTE OF THE RHODESIA NEGOTIATIONS, HE HAD NO DIFFICULTY IN TAKING THE LINE THAT RHODESIA WAS THE CONSTITUTIONAL RESPONSIBILITY OF THE BRITISH: IT WAS ENTIRELY APPROPRIATE THAT THE BRITISH SHOULD BE IN THE LEAD, WITH THE U.S. IN SUPPORT. HE THOUGHT THAT THE OUTCOME OF THE COMMONWEALTH HEADS OF GOVERNMENT MEETING IN LUSAKA HAD BEEN QUOTE BRILLIANT UNQUOTE. ALTHOUGH THERE WAS A GOOD DEAL OF NERVOUSNESS, PARTICULARLY IN ANGLOPHONE AFRICA, ABOUT THE DIRECTION OF THE U.S. ADMINISTRATION'S AFRICAN POLICIES FOLLOWING THE RESIGNATION OF ANDREW YOUNG, HE THOUGHT THIS WOULD SETTLE DOWN. ANDY YOUNG'S FORTHCOMING TRADE PROMOTION VISIT TO WEST AFRICA AND

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POSSIBLY ELSEWHERE WOULD HELP. YOUNG HIMSELF WAS QUOTE VERY SATISFIED UNQUOTE WITH THE RHODESIAN POLICY AS IT NOW STOOD. THE PATRIOTIC FRONT, ALMOST ALONE AMONGST GOVERNMENTS AND POLITICAL MOVEMENTS IN AFRICA AND THE THIRD WORLD, HAD MANAGED TO BE QUOTE UNGRACIOUS AND CRITICAL UNQUOTE OF ANDY YOUNG AND HIS RESIGNATION.

3. MOOSE RECOGNISED THAT THE AMERICANS WERE NOT AS CLOSELY INVOLVED IN THE REASONING LEADING UP TO OUR POLICY CONCLUSIONS AS HAD BEEN THE CASE IN THE PAST. HE HAD NO COMPLAINT ABOUT THAT AND WAS VERY HAPPY WITH THE WAY BRITISH POLICY WAS WORKING OUT SO FAR.

4. I EXPLAINED THAT YOU WERE DELIBERATELY AVOIDING BEING DRAWN INTO DETAILED ELABORATION OF OUR CONSTITUTIONAL PROPOSALS OR OF THE DISCUSSION OF THE TRANSITIONAL ARRANGEMENTS. WE WERE ALL VERY FAMILIAR WITH THE ISSUES INVOLVED. MOOSE AND LAKE THOUGHT THIS WAS RIGHT. THEY BOTH STRESSED THEY WOULD NOT BE COMING TO LONDON WITH THE IDEA OF SEEKING A LARGER ROLE OR OF PRESSING FOR GREATER DETAIL ABOUT HOW WE WOULD REACT IN HYPOTHETICAL CIRCUMSTANCES.

5. MY IMPRESSION IS THIS REPRESENTS THE GENUINE POSITION OF THE ADMINISTRATION (CF FUNK'S VIEW IN MY TELEGRAM UNDER REFERENCE AND EARLIER REMARKS BY AARON). IF WE ARE ABLE TO MAKE PROGRESS AT THE CONFERENCE THE AMERICANS HAVE EVERYTHING TO GAIN; IF WE DO NOT, THEY LOSE NOTHING BY BEING OUT OF THE LIMELIGHT. IT IS A U.S. INTEREST THAT THE CONFERENCE SUCCEED. I BELIEVE WE CAN COUNT ON THE U.S. ADMINISTRATION TO DO ALL THEY CAN TO HELP.

6. FOR RESIDENT CLERK: RENWICK SHOULD SEE OVER THE WEEKEND.

ROBINSON

F I L E S
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PS/LPS
PS/MR BLAKER
PS/MR LUCE
PS/FUS
MR WILLSON
MR BYATT
MR HALL

COPIES TO:
SIR J HUNT
CABINET OFFICE
PS/NO 10 DOWNING STREET

24 August 1979

TXU 408/27

AMENDMENT NO 1
TO THE
ADMINISTRATIVE PLAN
FOR THE
CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE ON RHODESIA
LONDON, SEPTEMBER 1979

Rhodesia
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Please amend the Administrative Plan (Ref No TXU 408/27) dated 15 August to read as shown below:

1. Paragraph 2. PROGRAMME OF EVENTS

(a) Subject to confirmation, the Secretary of State is expected to greet the visiting delegates in the Main Hall of Lancaster House at 1530 hours on Monday 10 September. Delegates will then proceed to the State Drawing Room for the first session: the Secretary of State will make a speech and then invite the Delegates to adjourn to the Chairman's Room for an informal reception.

2. Paragraph 3. PARTICIPANTS

(c) Each of the two visiting delegations has been invited to send twenty official representatives: in addition they will each be allowed to bring four members of their supporting staff into Lancaster House.

3. Paragraph 4. ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE VISITING DELEGATIONS

(a) Travel and Subsistence

Under arrangements made by Rhodesia Department, in conjunction with Finance Department, the FCO will pay travel, hotel accommodation and subsistence (if required, from 7 September onwards) for the twenty official representatives in the two delegations; details have been issued separately to those concerned. Travel costs will be charged to DCS Vote 5, Subhead A4(1), hotel and subsistence costs to DCS Vote I, Subhead C3 (2)(e).

(b) Hotel Accommodation (for official members of delegations)

(i) The Carlton Tower Hotel, Cadogan Place, SW1
Telephone No 01 235 5411

For the Salisbury Administration
(one suite plus 19 single rooms)

(ii) The Royal Garden Hotel, Kensington High Street, W8
Telephone 01 937 8000

For the Patriotic Front
(two suites plus 18 single rooms)

(c) Transport Arrangements

PCD have arranged for 6 cars to be allocated to each visiting delegation. For security reasons these are being provided by the GCS and will be garaged overnight in their Marsham Street garage. Some of these cars will be equipped with radio telephones.

/4. Paragraph 6

4. Paragraph 6. CONFERENCE SECRETARIAT

Mr J M Willson, Special Counsellor to African Affairs, has been appointed Secretary-General. The names of other members of the Secretariat and their reporting dates are shown in the revised Appendix I attached.

5. Paragraph 7. PRESS ARRANGEMENTS

(c) Detailed press arrangements will be shown in the Press Plan, which will be issued separately. There will be a press rehearsal at Lancaster House at 1100 hours on Friday 7 September.

6. Paragraph 8. SECURITY

(c) Security guards for the Press Centre will be provided under arrangements made by PCD, in consultation with Security Department.

7. Paragraph 9. PASSES

(b) The lists of those requiring passes for access to Lancaster House or the Press Centre should be sent to Mr Beer (PUSD) not later than 3 September by:-

<u>Rhodesia Department</u>	i) UK Delegation (including Whitehall Departments).
	ii) Visiting Delegations (plus 2 photographs of each visitor).
<u>Protocol and Conference Department</u>	i) The Conference Secretariat
	ii) The Press Centre Staff
	iii) Catering Staff
	iv) Post Office Staff
	v) HMSO Staff
	vi) CSMA Staff
<u>PSA (Mr Ball)</u>	PSA & DOE Staff
<u>GHF (Mr Hutton)</u>	GHF Staff
<u>Special Branch</u>	SB Representatives
<u>Press Centre Manager</u>	Press Representatives Press Attachés

8. Paragraph 10. SECURITY FACILITIES

(b) PSA have arranged for construction work on Stable Yard Block to cease during the period of the Conference. The Metropolitan Police are making special arrangements at Warwick House (owned by Humphreys & Glasgow) where work will continue.

9. Paragraph 11. WORKING ACCOMMODATION AT LANCASTER HOUSE(a) Meeting Rooms

(i) Meetings will take place in the State Drawing Room on the first floor. In addition, Room 212 on the second floor (seating 24 at table) will be available if required for working groups.

(ii) In the State Drawing Room, the UK Delegation will have 7 seats at the table plus 5 behind: the two other Delegations will have 8 seats at the table plus 4 seats behind: there will also be 5 seats at the table for the Secretariat. Part of the table will be removed to give access for cameramen during photo-calls. The table layout is given in the revised Appendix III attached.

(c) Room Allocations

Revised details are given in the attached amendment to Appendix IV.

10. Paragraph 15. ENTERTAINMENT

Rhodesia Department are considering the official entertainment programme: if required GHF will arrange a Ministerial luncheon or dinner and a reception; the cost of any other entertainment, including working luncheons at Lancaster House, will be borne by the FCO.

E.B. Chaplin

Miss E B Chaplin
Conference and Visits Section
Protocol and Conference Department
3/G 233 5037

24 August 1979

DISTRIBUTION: As for TXU 408/27 of 15 August 1979
excluding: DS Missions in Salisbury
Lusaka
Maputo
Dar-es-Salaam

This is a copy. The original has been extracted and retained under Section 3(4)

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFERENCE STAFF

APPENDIX I
(Amendment No 1)

(as known at 24 August)

A THE CONFERENCE SECRETARIAT

<u>Serial No</u>	<u>Name</u>	<u>Designation</u>	<u>Reporting Date*</u>
1	Mr J M Willson	Secretary-General	-
2	Mr R S Dewar	Assistant Sec-General	-
3	Mr R G Bowen	Liaison Officer Salisbury Admin- istration	At airport on arrival of dele- gation
4	Mr K Evetts	Liaison Officer, ZANU	"
5	Mr A Singleton	Liaison Officer, ZAPU	"
6	Mr M M Hall (PCD)	Conference Officer, (Visit- ing Delegations)	7 September
7	Mr L A Coles	Conference Officer (Lancaster House)	6 September
8	Miss M Edward	Assistant Conference Off- icer (Information Desk)	6 September
9	Mr M C Raven	Record Taker	7 September
10	Miss J Dutton	Record Taker	"
11	Miss E A Urquhart	Record Taker	"
12	Mr R W Barnett	Record Taker	"
13	Mr D T Cox	Documents Officer	7 September a.m.
14	Mr P Westhorpe	Documents Clerk	"
15	Mr P D J Ellis	Documents Clerk	"
16	Mrs I Brookes	Duplicator Operator	7 September p.m.
17		Duplicator Operator	
18	Mrs E E Sheehan	Superintendent of Typists	7 September p.m.

* At Lancaster House, except as shown

/19. Miss E McKnight


CONFIDENTIAL

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
APPENDIX I
(Amendment No 1
CONTINUED)

<u>Serial_No</u>	<u>Name</u>	<u>Designation</u>	<u>Reporting_Date*</u>
19	Miss E McKnight	Shorthand Typist	7 September p.m.
20	Miss M Stewart	Shorthand Typist	"
21	Miss M Scott	Shorthand Typist	"
22	Mrs D Gibson	Shorthand Typist	"
23	Mrs M Couchman	Copy Typist	"
24	Miss H Bonnett	Audio Typist	"

B SECURITY STAFF

1	Mr R G Beer	Security Co-ordinator	3 September
2	*  *	Security Adviser	
3	Major M Ramsey	OC RMP Detachment	8 September
4	Mr A J M Dunlop	Assistant Security Coordinator	28 August (to PUSD)
5	Mr B J Lester Smith	Pass Clerk	3 September
6	Mr D Pendlebury	Pass Clerk	"
		RMP Detachment (15)	8 September
		FCO Security Officers	

C PRESS STAFF (FCO)

1	Mr N Fenn	Conference Spokesman	
2	Mr C R L de Chassiron	Assistant Conference Spokesman	*  * name deleted and retained under Section 3(4). @Wayland 29 October 2009
			3 Miss C Wheeler

At Lancaster House, except as shown

CONFIDENTIAL

APPENDIX I
(Amendment No 1
CONTINUED)

<u>Serial_No</u>	<u>Name</u>	<u>Designation</u>	<u>Reporting_Date*</u>
3	Miss C Wheeler	Secretary to Mr Fenn	
4	Mr D Kerr	Press Centre Manager	20 August (to PCD)
5	Miss B J Connolly	Assistant to Mr Kerr	3 September
6	Mr D Healy	Information Room	4 September
7	Miss V Dean	Information Room	"

Other Press Centre Staff will be shown in the Press Plan.

OTHER STAFF TO BE NOMINATED

Post Office telephone operators and controllers

CSMA Nurse

Catering Staff


FCO Messengers: Press Centre (2)
Lancaster House (2)

* At Lancaster House, except as shown.

CONFIDENTIAL

LAYOUT
IN THE
STATE DRAWING ROOM
(1st FLOOR)

APPENDIX III
(AMENDMENT N°1)
24 AUGUST



* IF APPROVED 4 FURTHER SEATS BEHIND CAN BE PROVIDED FOR THE SALISBURY AND PATRIOTIC FRONT DELEGATIONS

CONFIDENTIAL

APPENDIX IV
(Amendment No 1)ROOM_ALLOCATION_-_LANCASTER_HOUSE

<u>FIRST_FLOOR</u>	<u>ALLOCATED_TO</u>	<u>Tel_Extn</u>	<u>Night_Line</u>
State Drawing Room	Main Conference Room	-	-
West Ante Room	-	2	1
West Drawing Room	Chairman's Office	2	1
Music Room	Delegates' Lounge	4	1
Royal Gallery	Delegates' Telephones	4	4
East Ante Room	Conference Officers	1	1
	Information Desk	1	1
Long Gallery	Major Press briefings	-	-
Room 108	Private Office	2	1
Room 109	2 Secretaries (Secretariat)	2	1
Room 110	Secretary-General and Assistant Secretary-General	2	1
<u>SECOND_FLOOR</u>			
Room 214	Record Takers	2	1

CONFIDENTIAL

C_PRESS_STAFF

<u>Serial_No</u>	<u>Name</u>	<u>Designation</u>	<u>Reporting_Date*</u>
1.	Mr N Fenn	Conference Spokesman	
2.	Mr C R L de Chassiron	Assistant Conference Spokesman	
3.	Miss C Wheeler	Secretary to Mr Fenn	
4.	Mr D Kerr	Press Centre Manager	20 August (to PCD)
5.	Miss B J Connolly	Assistant to Mr Kerr	3 September
6.	Mr D Healy	Information Room	4 September

Other Press Centre Staff are shown in the Press Plan

OTHER_STAFF_TO_BE_NOMINATED

Post Office telephone operators and controllers

CSMA Nurse

Catering Staff

FCO Messengers: Press Centre (2)
Lancaster House (2)


* At Lancaster House, except as shown

APPENDIX II

P A S S E S

<p>TYPE A ----- (Green - with Green Stripe for Delegates)</p>	<p>For Delegates & Secretariat</p>	<p>Giving access through- out Lancaster House and The Press Centre</p>
<p>TYPE B ----- (Green, over- printed "STAFF")</p>	<p>For supporting staff</p>	<p>Giving access to Lancaster House and Press Centre <u>excluding</u> unsupervised access to Meeting Rooms.</p>
<p>TYPE C ----- (Blue)</p>	<p>For the Press (2 photographs required)</p>	<p>Giving access to Press Centre only</p>
<p>TYPE C1 ----- (Blue with Blue diagonal stripe)</p>	<p>For Press Attachés</p>	<p>Giving access to Press Centre only</p>
<p>TYPE D ----- (Yellow - over-printed "STUDIO PASS")</p>	<p>For Press (restricted issue)</p>	<p>For those who require access to the studios in the basement of Lancaster House</p>
<p>TYPE E ----- Various colours (over printed "ROTA PASS")</p>	<p>For Press</p>	<p>For rota occasions</p>

TABLE LAYOUT IN MUSIC ROOM



APPENDIX IV

ROOM ALLOCATION

<u>GROUND_FLOOR</u>	<u>ALLOCATED_TO</u>	<u>TELEPHONE</u> <u>---EXIN---</u>	<u>NIGHT</u> <u>_LINE</u>
Entrance Hall	Security Desk/Call Up	3	1
Room 18	Police	1	1
Room 2	Special Branch	3	1
Room 3	Pass Clerks	1	-
Library	Security Coordinator	3	1
Gold Room	Entertainment	-	-
Red Room	"	-	-
State Dining Room	"	-	-
East Dining Room	"	1	-
Room 12	First Aid	1	-
 <u>FIRST_FLOOR</u>			
Long Gallery	Major Press briefings	-	-
Music Room	Main Conference Room	-	-
West Drawing Room	Chairman's Office	2	1
West Ante Room	Private Office	2	1
State Drawing Room	Delegates Lounge	4	1
East Ante Room	Conference Officers	3	2

/East Ante
Room

<u>FIRST FLOOR</u>	<u>ALLOCATED TO</u>	<u>TELEPHONE EXTN</u>	<u>NIGHT LINE</u>
East Ante Room	Information Desk	1	1
Veronese Room		-	-
Royal Gallery	Delegates' telephones	4	4
Room 108	Secretary General and Assistant Secretary General	3	1
Room 109	2 Secretaries (Secretariat)	2	1
Room 110	Record Takers	2	1
 <u>SECOND FLOOR</u>			
Room 200	ZAPU Delegation	2	1
201	"	2	1
202	Photocopy Room	1	-
203	" "	1	-
204	ZANU Delegation	2	1
205	"	2	1
206	UK Liaison Officers	1	1
207	PSA	1	1
208	Salisbury Administration Delegation	2	1
209	"	2	1

<u>SECOND FLOOR</u>	<u>ALLOCATED TO</u>	<u>TELEPHONE EXIN</u>	<u>NIGHT LINE</u>
Room 210	Salisbury Administration Delegation	2	1
211	"	2	1
212	Drafting Groups	-	-
213	UK Delegation	2	1
214	"	2	1
215	Typists	2	1
216	Reproduction Room	2	1
216A	Documents Officer & Documents Clerks	1	1
219	HMSO	1	1
221	Messengers	1	1
222	HMSO	1	1

Lancaster House Extensions to the Press Centre will be shown in the Press Plan

DISTRIBUTION

FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

PS to Secretary of State
PS to Lord Privy Seal
PS to Mr Luce
PS to Mr Blaker
PS to PUS

Sir Antony Duff
Mr Williams AUSS
Lord N Gordon-Lennox
Mr J M Willson
Rhodesia Department (3)

A & S D (Mr Caiger, Marlborough House)
Commonwealth Coordination Department
COD (Mr Charrington)
CTSD (Mr Ware)
" (Mr C K Davies)
Finance Department (Mr F Callaghan)
IPD
Legal Advisers (Mr Fifoot)
MAED
Nationality and Treaty Department (Miss Shepherd)
News Department: Mr Fenn
Mr Knight Smith (2)

OID Mr Allan
Planning Staff
POD Mr McCarthy
PSD Mr Benest
PCD (10)
PUSD Mr Beer
Resident Clerks
SAFD
Security Department Mr Maher

NO 10 DOWNING STREET
PS to The Prime Minister

CABINET OFFICE

PS to Sir John Hunt

CENTRAL OFFICE OF INFORMATION

Mr Kelly, Overseas Controller

DEPARTMENT OF THE ENVIRONMENT

Mr J R Hare

GOVERNMENT CAR SERVICE

Miss S Withington

GOVERNMENT_HOSPITALITY_FUND

Mr C F R Barclay
Mr W Hutton

HMSO

Mr R Tinkler (2)

HOME_OFFICE

Mr G E Guy

LORD_CHAMBERLAIN'S_OFFICE

Sir E Penn
Mr P D Hartley

METROPOLITAN_POLICE

Deputy Assistant Commissioner Helm , New Scotland Yard
Commander J H Cracknell, Cannon Row
Chief Inspector Hord, Cannon Row
Inspector D Mabon, St James's Palace Police Unit
Traffic Branch, Cannon Row

SPECIAL_BRANCH

Det Supt D Fisher (2)

PSA

Mr K A MacInnes
Mr D C Ball (4)
Mr R J Lilley (3)
Mr H Jones (2)

HM_DIPLOMATIC_MISSIONS

Salisbury
Lusaka
Maputo
Dar-es-Salaam

23

2

PS

PS/SIR I GILMOUR
PS/MR LUCE
PS/PUS
SIR A DUFF
MR WILLSON
MR BYATT
LORD N G LENNOX

**PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE**
SERIAL No. T83a/79

PS/NO 10 DOWNING STREET

MR R L WADE-GERY)
MR P M MAXEY)
COL MOIR) CABINET
MR P J FOWLER) OFFICE
DIO)
SIR J HUNT)

.....
HD/RHODESIA DEPT (3)

HD/C AF D
HD/S AF D

HD/UND
HD/NEWS DEPT
HD/WAD

MR FREELAND LEGAL ADVISER RM K200A
MR FIFOOT LEGAL ADVISER RM K164

~~RESIDENT CLERK~~

~~FOR ZIMBABWE DEVELOPMENTS FUND~~

~~ADD MR LYNCH ODI?~~
~~MR SLATER TREASURY~~

Prime Minister

*Advice is
in preparation. 24/8*

IMMEDIATE

OO FCO DESK BY 241600Z

CR870

CONFIDENTIAL

DESKBY 241600Z

T83a/79T

FM KIRINBA SALISBURY 241337Z AUG 79

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 577 OF 24 AUGUST

*It is a very reasonable
letter. I hope we
can agree to his
request
not.*

ADVANCE COPY

IMMEDIATE

*Overlakes.
B-a-6/1*

RHODESIA CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF A LETTER FROM MUZOREWA TO THE PRIME MINISTER
DATED 22 AUGUST, DELIVERED THIS AFTERNOON:
BEGINS

I AM VERY PLEASED THAT YOUR GOVERNMENT IS STILL DETERMINED TO WORK
CLOSELY WITH MY GOVERNMENT IN A JOINT ATTEMPT TO SOLVE OUR
CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEM. THE VISIT TO SALISBURY BY MR FIFOOT TO
DISCUSS THE VARIOUS ISSUES ON THE CONSTITUTION WITH MY ADVISERS HAS
CERTAINLY BEEN VERY HELPFUL AND I APPRECIATE IT VERY MUCH.

ON BEHALF OF MY GOVERNMENT, I ACCEPT YOUR FORMAL INVITATION TO ATTEND
A CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE AT LANCASTER HOUSE, LONDON, ON THE
10TH SEPTEMBER, 1979. THIS ACCEPTANCE IS ON THE UNDERSTANDING
THAT THERE ARE NO PRECONDITIONS TO THE CONFERENCE

10TH SEPTEMBER, 1979. THIS ACCEPTANCE IS ON THE UNDERSTANDING THAT THERE ARE NO PRECONDITIONS TO THE CONFERENCE.

ON MY RETURN FROM MY VISIT TO LONDON I REPORTED TO MY COLLEAGUE ON THE BASIS OF MY DISCUSSIONS WITH YOU AND WITH THE SECRETARY OF STATE THAT I HAD BEEN ASSURED THAT AFTER THE COMMONWEALTH CONFERENCE YOUR GOVERNMENT WOULD SEND A REPRESENTATIVE TO ZIMBABWE RHODESIA TO DISCUSS YOUR CONSTITUTIONAL PROPOSALS WITH MY GOVERNMENT AND ONLY AFTER SUCH DISCUSSION WOULD ANY PROPOSALS ON YOUR PART BE PUBLISHED. MY DEPUTY, AFTER HIS SUBSEQUENT VISIT TO LONDON, REPORTED IN THE SAME TERMS TO CABINET. MY MINISTERS WERE THEREFORE VERY PERTURBED WHEN I INFORMED THEM OF YOUR INVITATION AND THE OUTLINE OF YOUR PROPOSALS WHICH WERE BEING PUBLISHED AS THEY FELT THAT THIS PREMATURE PUBLICATION WAS CONTRARY TO THE VERY EXPLICIT UNDERTAKINGS THAT HAD BEEN GIVEN TO ME AND TO MY DEPUTY. THEY THOUGHT THAT THIS DID NOT BODE WELL FOR THE FUTURE NEGOTIATIONS.

IN YOUR INVITATION THERE ARE A NUMBER OF POINTS TO WHICH I FEEL I MUST REPLY.

FIRST, YOU URGE US TO OBSERVE A CEASEFIRE. IT IS OUR EARNEST DESIRE TO ACHIEVE A CEASEFIRE BUT IT IS THE PRIMARY DUTY OF MY GOVERNMENT TO PROTECT THE COUNTRY AND ITS CITIZENS FROM INCURSIONS FROM OUTSIDE THE COUNTRY. IN NO WAY, THEREFORE, CAN I HOLD OUT ANY HOPE FOR A CEASEFIRE UNLESS YOU AND OTHER INTERESTED PARTIES CAN PERSUADE THE PATRIOTIC FRONT TO STOP THEIR TERRORIST ACTIVITIES AGAINST MY COUNTRY AND ITS PEOPLES AND CAN GIVE SOME GUARANTEE THAT THEY WILL DO SO.

SECOND, YOU STATE THAT THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROPOSALS REPRESENT THE KIND OF CONSTITUTION WHICH YOUR GOVERNMENT BELIEVES "SHOULD BE ACCEPTABLE TO THE RHODESIAN PEOPLE". THE PRESENT CONSTITUTION OF ZIMBABWE RHODESIA WAS NEGOTIATED BY THE PEOPLE OF THIS COUNTRY FOR THIS COUNTRY. THIS WAS THE COURSE THAT A FORMER SECRETARY OF STATE, LORD HOME, TOLD US TO FOLLOW. THE RECENT ELECTIONS, WHICH LORD BOYD AND HIS PARTY CONFIRMED WERE FREE AND FAIR, SHOWED CONCLUSIVELY THAT THE PRESENT CONSTITUTION IS ACCEPTABLE TO THE PEOPLE OF THIS COUNTRY.

THIRD, YOU APPEAL TO US TO APPROACH THE NEGOTIATIONS IN A CONSTRUCTIVE AND FORWARD-LOOKING SPIRIT AND TO LAY THE FOUNDATIONS FOR A FREE, INDEPENDENT AND DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY IN WHICH ALL RHODESIANS, WHATEVER THEIR RACE OR POLITICAL BELIEFS, WILL BE ABLE TO LIVE IN SECURITY AND AT PEACE WITH EACH OTHER AND THEIR NEIGHBOURS. IT IS MY OPINION THAT THE AGREEMENT WHICH WAS SIGNED IN SALISBURY ON THE 3RD MARCH, 1978, DID LAY THE FOUNDATIONS FOR A FREE,

ON THE 3RD MARCH, 1978, DID LAY THE FOUNDATIONS FOR A FREE, INDEPENDENT AND DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY AND THAT OUR PRESENT CONSTITUTION WILL ENABLE SUCH A SOCIETY TO BE ESTABLISHED. IN THE LIGHT OF THIS, I DO NOT CONSIDER THAT ANY AMENDMENTS TO OUR CONSTITUTION ARE NECESSARY. WE HAVE NOW COMPLIED FULLY WITH THE SIX PRINCIPLES LAID DOWN BY SUCCESSIVE BRITISH GOVERNMENTS AND THEREFORE I CALL UPON YOU TO LIFT SANCTIONS FORTHWITH, WITHOUT WAITING FOR THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE TO BEGIN.

AT FIRST I WAS GIVEN TO UNDERSTAND THAT YOUR GOVERNMENT WAS PREPARED TO MEET THE COSTS OF SENDING 12 DELEGATES TO LONDON AND ACCOMMODATING THEM THERE DURING THE CONFERENCE. IN THE CASE OF MY DELEGATION, I AND MY MINISTERS WHILST IN LONDON WILL STILL BE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE GOVERNING OF ZIMBABWE RHODESIA. CONSEQUENTLY, IT WILL BE NECESSARY FOR US TO REMAIN IN CONSTANT TOUCH WITH AFFAIRS IN ZIMBABWE RHODESIA AND, FOR THIS PURPOSE, IT WILL BE NECESSARY TO HAVE OFFICIALS SUCH AS ADVISERS, SECRETARIES, CYPHER CLERKS AND SECURITY PERSONNEL, ACCOMPANYING MY DELEGATION. AFTER I MENTIONED THIS TO MR DAY, HE APPARENTLY CONTACTED YOU AND YOU HAVE NOW AGREED THAT THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT WILL ACCEPT FINANCIAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR SENDING 20 DELEGATES TO THE CONFERENCE AND ACCOMMODATING THEM IN LONDON. IN MY VIEW, ALTHOUGH I APPRECIATE YOUR GESTURE, THIS IS STILL NOT ADEQUATE. AS MY DELEGATION MUST REPRESENT ALL THE PARTIES WHO ARE MEMBERS OF THE GOVERNMENT OF NATIONAL UNITY, IT WILL CONSIST OF APPROXIMATELY 40 PERSONS. I WOULD BE GRATEFUL, THEREFORE, IF YOU WOULD AGREE TO MEET THE FINANCIAL COSTS OF THE FULL PARTY. IT IS, AFTER ALL, AT THE REQUEST OF THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT THAT WE ARE TRAVELLING TO LONDON, IN THIS CONNEXION I AM INFORMED THAT YOU INTEND TO LIMIT ADMISSION INTO THE CONFERENCE ROOM TO 12 DELEGATES. AS I INTEND HAVING 12 MINISTERIAL OR POLITICAL DELEGATES, I FEEL THAT MY GOVERNMENT CANNOT BE ADEQUATELY REPRESENTED AT THE CONFERENCE UNLESS 16 PEOPLE ARE PERMITTED TO ENTER THE CONFERENCE ROOM. THIS WILL ENABLE ME TO HAVE MY LEGAL AND OTHER ADVISERS WITH ME AT THE MEETINGS, WHICH I AM SURE YOU WILL AGREE IS ESSENTIAL. ALSO, IN THE LIGHT OF THE ABOVE, 4 CARS WILL NOT BE SUFFICIENT FOR MY DELEGATION. COULD NOT THE NUMBER BE INCREASED SLIGHTLY?

ENDS

DAY

IMMEDIATE

NNNN

CONFIDENTIAL

GR 566

CONFIDENTIAL

FM MIRIMBA SALISBURY 231300Z AUG 79

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELNO 573 OF 23 AUGUST

INFO PRIORITY PRETORIA MAPUTO LAGOS DAR ES SALAAM LUSAKA

WASHINGTON UKMIS NEW YORK LUANDA AND GABORONE

2
Prime Minister

Sh
24/8

aw

PARA 3 OF YOUR TELNO 156: RHODESIA CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE

1. I SAW CHIKEREMA THIS MORNING AND CONFIRMED THAT HIS PARTY WOULD NOT BE RECEIVING AN INVITATION TO PARTICIPATE IN THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE. CHIKEREMA TOOK THIS WITHOUT PROTEST. HE SAID THAT HE HAD NOT EXPECTED ANY OTHER REPLY.

2. CHIKEREMA SAID THAT HE WOULD, NEVERTHELESS, BE BRINGING A DELEGATION TO LONDON FOR THE DURATION OF THE CONFERENCE TO BRING INFLUENCE TO BEAR UPON THE DELEGATES. HE WANTED THE CONFERENCE TO SUCCEED AND WOULD BE DOING WHAT HE COULD TO HELP US TO THIS END.

3. ON THE BISHOP'S DELEGATION (MY TELNO 562) CHIKEREMA WELCOMED THE INCLUSION OF IAN SMITH. SMITH REMAINED THE LEADER OF THE WHITE COMMUNITY AND THIS WAS A FACT THAT COULD NOT BE IGNORED. THE PATRIOTIC FRONT AND OTHERS WOULD MAKE A PUBLIC FUSS ABOUT SMITH'S PRESENCE IN LONDON BUT THIS WOULD NOT ADVERSELY AFFECT THEIR ATTITUDE IN THE CONFERENCE ITSELF. CHIKEREMA ALSO WELCOMED THE INCLUSION OF SITHOLE AND NYANDORO. HE WAS CRITICAL ABOUT THE INCLUSION OF MUNDAWARARA AND ZINDOGA, WHOM HE DISMISSED AS IRRELEVANT.

4. I ASKED CHIKEREMA FOR HIS VIEW ON THE PROSPECTS FOR A SUCCESSFUL CONFERENCE. HE WAS NOT UNDULY PESIMISTIC. HE HAD RECENTLY MET PATRIOTIC FRONT REPRESENTATIVES IN NAIROBI. IT WAS CLEAR THAT THE ATTACKS BY RHODESIAN FORCES ON PATRIOTIC FRONT BASES IN ZAMBIA AND MOZAMBIQUE WERE HAVING A NOTICEABLE EFFECT. THE HOST COUNTRIES WERE BECOMING DISENCHANTED WITH THE ACTIVITIES OF THE PATRIOTIC FRONT ON THEIR TERRITORY AND THE DAMAGE WHICH THE WAR WAS DOING TO THE ECONOMIES OF THE NEIGHBOURING STATES. IT WAS BECOMING INCREASINGLY CLEAR THAT THE PATRIOTIC FRONT COULD

CONFIDENTIAL

/NOT

CONFIDENTIAL

NOT WIN A TOTAL MILITARY VICTORY. THERE WAS THEREFORE GROWING PRESSURE FOR A SETTLEMENT WHICH WOULD BRING THE WAR TO AN END.

5. AS REGARDS THE ROLE OF PATRIOTIC FRONT FORCES DURING ANY TRANSITIONAL ARRANGEMENT, CHIKEREMA SAID THAT HMG MUST NOT AGREE TO THE DISMANTLEMENT OF THE EXISTING POLICE AND SECURITY FORCES. THEY WERE THE ONLY GUARANTORS OF LAW AND ORDER IN THIS COUNTRY. THE FORCES OF THE PATRIOTIC FRONT WERE TOTALLY UNTRAINED. IF THEY TOOK OVER, CHAOS WOULD ENSUE. IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE TO INTEGRATE SOME PATRIOTIC FORCE ELEMENTS INTO THE EXISTING SECURITY FORCES. THE EXISTING POLICE FORCE SHOULD REMAIN UNTOUCHED. CHIKEREMA SAID THAT HE WOULD BE ARGUING ON THESE LINES WITH PATRIOTIC FRONT REPRESENTATIVES IN LONDON.

6. CHIKEREMA SUPPORTED THE PROPOSAL FOR NEW ELECTIONS BASED ON A NEW CONSTITUTION. HE EXPECTED MUZOREWA TO CONTINUE HIS OPPOSITION TO ELECTIONS PRIMARILY BECASUE HE COULD NOT HOPE TO WIN AS MANY SEATS NEXT TIME ROUND. CHIKEREMA DOUBTED WHETHER ANY SINGLE POLITICAL PARTY WOULD WIN AN OVERALL MAJORITY IN NEW ELECTIONS, WHETHER OR NOT THE PATRIOTIC FRONT PARTICIPATED. THERE WOULD THEREFORE BE A NEED FOR A COALITION, HE ARGUED STRONGLY FOR A GOVERNMENT OF NATIONAL UNITY FOR THE FIRST 5 YEARS OR SO OF LEGAL INDEPENDENCE.

7. CHIKEREMA SHOWED NO BITTERNESS ABOUT OUR DECISION NOT TO INVITE HIS PARTY TO LANCASTER HOUSE. HE GAVE THE IMPRESSION THAT HE WISHED TO BE HELPFUL IN HIS ACTIVITIES OUTSIDE THE CONFERENCE ROOM.

DAY

FILES

RHOD D	PCD
OADS	DEF D
N AM D	OID
NEWS D	PS
FUSD	PS/SIR I GILMOUR
PLANNING STAFF	PS/MR LUCE
ES & SD	PS/MR RIDLEY
CCD	PS/MR HURD
FRD	PS/FUS
UND	SIR A DUFF
LEGAL ADVISERS	IORD N G LENNOX
(MR FREELAND)	MISS BROWN
(MR FIFOOT)	MR WILLSON
ECON D	MR BYATT

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION

RHODESIA POLICY

2
CONFIDENTIAL

S E C R E T

SR 143

SECRET

DEDIP

PERSONAL

FH FCO 231715Z AUG 79

TO IMMEDIATE LUSAKA

TELEGRAM NUMBER 733 OF 23 AUGUST 1979

19
Rhodesia
Min Williams (no date)
29/8
Enter no. 811
29/8

PRESIDENT KAUNDA

1. PLEASE TELL PRESIDENT KAUNDA THAT THE PRIME MINISTER WOULD VALUE AN OPPORTUNITY TO DISCUSS WITH HIM OUR APPROACH TO A RHODESIA SETTLEMENT IN ADVANCE OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE. IF PRESIDENT KAUNDA IS PASSING THROUGH LONDON ON HIS WAY TO THE NON-ALIGNED CONFERENCE, THE PRIME MINISTER WOULD BE GLAD TO SEE HIM ON THAT OCCASION.
2. YOU SHOULD ADD THAT IF THIS POSES DIFFICULTIES, THE PRIME MINISTER WOULD LIKE TO SEND DAPHNE PARK TO SEE HIM TO EXPLAIN OUR APPROACH AND ENLIST HIS SUPPORT FOR IT. IT WILL BE IMPORTANT FOR MISS PARK TO SEE KAUNDA BEFORE THE CONFERENCE OPENS. WOULD THE PRESIDENT BE ABLE TO SEE HER IN LUSAKA NEXT WEEK?
3. FOR YOUR OWN INFORMATION THE PRIME MINISTER HAS A HEAVY PROGRAMME AND WOULD THEREFORE BE WELL CONTENT WITH THE ARRANGEMENT IN PARA 2 ABOVE.
4. YOU WILL BE AWARE THAT PRESIDENT NYERERE WILL BE SEEING THE PRIME MINISTER IN LONDON ON 15 SEPTEMBER.

CARRINGTON

F I L E S

HD/RHODESIA D
PS
PS/LPS
SIR A DUFF
MR BYATT
MR SANKEY

COPIES TO:

MR CARTLEDGE
NO 10 DOWNING STREET

S E C R E T

Rhodesia

QAGR 190
UNCLASSIFIED
FM MIRIMBA SALISBURY 230725Z AUG 79
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 565 OF 23 AUGUST
INFO WASHINGTON PRETORIA DAR ES SALAAM LUSAKA MAPUTO LUANDA
UKMIS NEW YORK LAGOS

Info MA
24/8

MY TELNO: 562: RHODESIA CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE

- THE 8 ADVISERS ACCOMPANYING THE BISHOP'S PARTY ARE:
 - MR MOHAMED ADAM (LEGAL ADVISER TO PRIME MINISTER: UANC)
 - MR CHRIS ANDERSEN (MINISTER OF JUSTICE: RHODESIA FRONT)
 - DR J KAMUSIKIRI (PRIVATE SECRETARY TO PRIME MINISTER: UANC)
 - MR G PINCUS (LEGAL ADVISER: UNFP)
 - MR G S SMITH (CABINET SECRETARY)
 - AIR VICE MARSHAL HAWKINS (DIPLOMATIC REPRESENTATIVE IN SOUTH AFRICA)
 - MR D ZAMCHIYA (MINISTER OF HEALTH: ZANU (SITHOLE))
 - MR G MUTAMBANENGWE (LEGAL ADVISER).

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PS/MR. LUCE
PS/MR. RIDLEY
PS/MR. HURD
PS/PUS
SIR A DUFF

LORD N G LENNOX
MISS BROWN

MR. WILLSON
MR. BYATT

ADDITIONAL DISTN.
RHODESIA POLICY

President Senghor of Senegal to PM

22. 8. 79

UNOFFICIAL TRANSLATION

As you are aware, I have followed with the closest attention the work of the last Commonwealth Conference held at Lusaka. It gives me the opportunity to send you my warmest congratulations.

Without denying your own political ideas, you have accepted a balanced solution to the Rhodesian problem which goes in the direction of democracy. It is precisely this kind of pluralist democracy which Senegal is working to encourage throughout Africa.

M. O'D. B. ALEXANDER

1 September 1979

SUBJECT

Le Président de la République

PRIME MINISTER'S

PERSONAL MESSAGE

SERIAL No. T82^{CE}/79T

VERSION

~~Duplex~~, le

XXXXXXX

22 août 1979

Madame le Premier Ministre,

L'Ambassade de Grande Bretagne à Dakar m'a transmis votre message personnel.


Comme vous l'avez deviné, j'ai suivi, avec la plus grande attention, les travaux de la dernière Conférence du Commonwealth, tenue à Lusaka. C'est l'occasion, pour moi, de vous adresser mes chaleureuses félicitations.

Sans renier vos idées politiques, vous avez accepté une solution équilibrée du problème rhodésien,

.../...

qui va dans le sens de la Démocratie. C'est, précisément, cette démocratie pluraliste que le Sénégal travaille à favoriser partout en Afrique.


Veillez accepter, Madame, l'hommage de ma très haute et respectueuse considération.



Léopold Sédar SENGHOR.

Madame Margaret THATCHER
Premier Ministre britannique
LONDRES

- 3 SEP 1979





Prime Minister

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

You enquired about this following your talk with Sir Anthony Parsons about handling Rhodesia in the Security Council. 22 August 1979

Dear Bryan, The problem is clearly less one of exerting leverage or offering inducements than of damage limitation. JHM 23/8

Rhodesia and the Security Council

Thank you for your letter of 9 August in which you said that the Prime Minister would like the maximum advantage to be taken of such leverage as our aid programmes may give us towards keeping relevant Commonwealth countries in line over Rhodesia.

The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary has asked me to let you know that in the case of some key African countries there is no scope within present financial ceilings for encouraging their support through the 1979/1980 aid allocation. On the contrary, we may soon be faced with criticism arising from cuts in this year's allocations.

We have had to reduce allocations sharply this year because of the cuts and the high level of commitments. We have reached agreement with the Treasury on the reduced allocations by programme and it has now become essential to take the steps required to ensure that, programme by programme and overall, expenditure is contained within these figures. The cuts as they will be perceived by many of the recipient countries will be more severe than the figure of £50 million against an Aid Programme of over £800 million would imply. This is because of the high degree of commitment at the beginning of the year (reported to you in a note dated 30 May) and consequently high rate of expenditure during the first months of the present Financial Year: great stringency is needed to bring things back into balance in the remainder of the year.

Annex 1 lists illustratively recipient countries which are either of major intrinsic importance, or of particular significance (eg as Front Line States, prominent in the Non-Aligned Group, or members of the Security Council) in relation to Rhodesia, with an indication of the nature of the cuts about which they are now being approached and informed. The very large cuts for India, for example, are being explained by a special mission from the ODA now in Delhi.

There is now virtually no free money left within the Aid Programme this year. The contingency reserve with which we started the year has been virtually fully committed on such things as the emergency or balance of payments aid for Kenya, Uganda, Turkey, the Vietnam refugees etc: only sums of £2 million or £3 million in total could possibly be found from this source.

/You



You may also wish to see (Annex 2) cases where signatures of Aid Agreements are pending. In most cases (Kenya is the main exception) signature of the agreement will not entail cash expenditure for this year and would not, therefore, worsen the problems described above. We are considering urgently whether there is any way of minimising the adverse impact which would be caused by the cuts set out in Annex I.

Lord Carrington will also shortly be considering the 1980/1981 Aid Programme as a whole, which will be a little smaller in real terms (though larger in money terms) than this year. Lord Carrington will be considering bilateral aid allocations but clearly disappointments lie ahead. Compensation for hardship this year can be offered to very few and only at the expense of others.

Yours ever,

Stephen

(J S Wall)
Private Secretary

Bryan G Cartledge Esq
10 Downing Street
LONDON

① Am I not right in thinking that in spite of "cuts" the Aid programme is 2% more this year (or is it not?) than last year?

② The day before we left Zambia I was told a further £10m had been agreed for Agricultural Aid to Zambia. I refused to say so

CONFIDENTIAL

would we see how the Rhodesia talks go. What has happened to the £10m? not

1979-80 AID ALLOCATIONS FOR SELECTED COUNTRIES AND POTENTIAL FOR 'LEVERAGE'

	<u>£ million</u>		<u>Comments</u>
	<u>Aid Framework as at</u>		
	<u>April</u>	<u>August</u>	
KENYA	20.6	18.4	Kenya fully supports HMG's approach to a Rhodesia settlement, and no question of leverage arises. The object in providing programme aid was to <u>speed</u> disbursements in 1979-80. We are, however, reducing project aid expenditure by £2.2m.
ZAMBIA	30.2	27.4	Reductions being applied this year total £2.8m. A new aid agreement is due for signature (see Annex II). There is also a strong probability of an allocation of food aid, to delay which would lay us open to charges of inhumanity.
LESOTHO	6.9	6.0	Expenditure under existing agreements can be delayed by administrative means, but the local Governments may complain very loudly at the slowing-down of disbursements. Reductions are £0.9m for Lesotho and £1.0m for Botswana.
BOTSWANA	7.1	6.1	
NIGERIA	4.6	4.3	Curbs on supplementing expatriate staff can be applied now, but savings from this will be small.
TANZANIA	20.5	18.0	The start of some important projects already agreed is being delayed. This will reduce expenditure by £2.5m this year. But a new request for aid will be coming forward in the autumn, although that would not involve expenditure before 1980-81.

/JAMAICA

	<u>Aid Framework as at</u>		<u>£ million</u>
	<u>April</u>	<u>August</u>	<u>Comments</u>
	JAMAICA	6.8	4.6
BANGLADESH	46.4	40.5	Under existing agreements the Bangladesh Government had expected up to £66m. A revised expenditure figure of £40.5m had been set to take account of reduction in the aid programme but, following the Prime Minister's meeting with President Zia we are examining programmes urgently to see whether another £2m can be provided.
INDIA	177.1	140.3	The Government of India had expected to receive some £200m in UK aid in 1979-80. The original ODA planning figure of £177m has had to be reduced to £140m to take account of reduction of the aid programme and other pressures within it. Officials are flying to New Delhi on 20 August to discuss this revision. The Indians will obviously be badly disappointed at the figure. There is a formal agreement to be signed covering debt relief measures this year (£31m, included in the £140m total) to which we are already committed.

(i) KENYA

Aid agreements covering the new tranche of £65m project aid over the next three years and £15m programme aid will be ready for signature shortly. The Prime Minister herself agreed this aid with President Moi, and any delay in signing the agreements would be likely to cause adverse reactions.

(ii) BOLIVIA

We are ready to conclude an agreement to provide £17.5m over 4-5 years to re-equip tin mines owned by the Bolivian mining corporation, COMIBOL. All equipment would be British. The project was postponed on human rights grounds in 1977, but reconsidered in February 1979 following improvements in human rights. The Bolivians have been led to expect that the project would go ahead following the installation of a civilian government. Such a government was installed earlier this month, and Lord Trefgarne attended the inauguration ceremony. The NUM has always taken a strong interest in the project and following a recent visit to Bolivia will be urging that the project be implemented. Bolivia currently has the Latin American seat on the UN Security Council.

(iii) CYPRUS

A £7.5m project aid loan has been offered and an agreement is due to be signed shortly. No expenditure would occur before 1980-81 at the earliest. To delay or withdraw it would be likely to stimulate the Cypriots to press more vigorously their claims for over £200m in connection with facilities provided for the Sovereign Base Areas.

(iv) SRI LANKA

In Lusaka the Prime Minister offered aid totalling £100m over 6 years to Mr Premadasa in support of the Victoria project. We must now conclude an agreement with the Sri Lanka Government, although costs in the first year of the project (probably 1980-81) may amount to £17m.

(v) JAMAICA

A further £5m of programme assistance was pledged at the World Bank's Caribbean Group meeting in June this year. An agreement implementing this pledge has yet to be signed.

(vi) ZAMBIA

The new £10m tranche of project aid for agricultural development due for signature is expected by President Kaunda. To withhold signature at this time would cause serious misunderstanding in our relations with Zambia.



23 AUG 1979

CONFIDENTIAL

GR 425

CONFIDENTIAL

FM MIRIMBA SALISBURY 221230Z AUG 79

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELNO 563 OF 22 AUGUST

INFO PRIORITY PRETORIA MAPUTO LAGOS DAR ES SALAAM LUSAKA LUANDA
GABORONE WASHINGTON AND UKMIS NEW YORK

MIPT: RHODESIA: CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE

1. MUZOREWA HAS OPTED FOR A FULL DELEGATION OF MINISTERS, SITHOLE APART. THIS IS AGAINST THE ADVICE OF SOME THAT HE SHOULD HAVE SETTLED FOR A SMALLER MINISTERIAL TEAM AND THE INCLUSION OF SOME OFFICIAL ADVISERS AMONGST THE 12. HIS DECISION MAY, IN PART, HAVE BEEN TO ENSURE THAT HE HAD SUFFICIENT BACKING FROM A STRONG UANC TEAM TO COUNTER-ACT THE POSSIBLE MAVERICK TACTICS OF SITHOLE, AND PERHAPS OF SMITH.
2. THE REMAINDER OF THE DELEGATION, OF WHICH I HAVE NOT YET RECEIVED DETAILS, WILL PRESUMABLY INCLUDE SENIOR ADVISERS SUCH AS GEORGE SMITH.
3. THE UANC TEAM IS A REASONABLE ONE. MUNDAWARARA AND BULLE WILL PROVIDE SOME SOUND COMMONSENSE. ZINDOGA AND MUKOME ARE SOMETHING OF WILD CARDS, BUT THE BISHOP SHOULD BE ABLE TO KEEP THEM ON A FAIRLY TIGHT REIN. NYANDORO HAS THE ADVANTAGE OF BEING A RECOGNISED AND LONGSERVING AFRICAN NATIONALIST. HE IS ALSO CLOSE TO CHIKEREMA AND HIS INCLUSION IS ABOUT AS FAR AS THE BISHOP COULD GO TOWARDS CHIKEREMA WITHOUT ACTUALLY INCLUDING HIM IN THE DELEGATION.
4. SITHOLE IS THE ONLY NON-MINISTER. HIS INCLUSION WILL HAVE CAUSED THE BISHOP MUCH HEART-SEARCHING AS HE CAN NOT BE RELIED UPON TO FOLLOW, AT THE CONFERENCE, A COMMON LINE WITH THE BISHOP. HE IS THE JOKER IN THE PACK. HOWEVER, HIS PRESENCE GIVES THE BISHOP'S DELEGATION GREATER CREDITIBILITY AS REPRESENTING THE DIVERSITY OF AFRICAN OPINION INSIDE RHODESIA.
5. I WOULD NOT EXPECT NDIWENI OR BAFANAH TO PLAY A PROMINENT ROLE. THEY MAY WELL, FOR THE RECORD, ARGUE BRIEFLY THE CASE FOR A FEDERAL CONSTITUTION, BUT OTHERWISE ARE LIKELY TO FOLLOW THE BISHOP'S LEAD.

CONFIDENTIAL

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Prime Minister

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23/8

[Handwritten signature]

16.

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6. IAN SMITH'S INCLUSION HAS LOOKED INCREASINGLY PROBABLE OVER THE PAST FEW DAYS. IF HE HAD TO BE INCLUDED, THE PRESENCE OF DAVID SMITH AS WELL IS PROBABLY THE BEST BALANCE THAT COULD HAVE BEEN PROVIDED. THE BISHOP HAS PRESUMABLY RECKONED THAT HE NEEDS IAN SMITH'S SUPPORT TO CARRY THE WHITES THROUGH CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGES. HE MAY ALSO HAVE CONCLUDED THAT IT WAS ONLY FAIR THAT IAN SMITH SHOULD BE GIVEN AN OPPORTUNITY TO PLAY A PART IN WHAT, IT IS HOPED, WILL BE THE FINAL ACT OF THE RHODESIAN DRAMA.

7. IF THERE HAD TO BE A MINISTERIAL TEAM OF THIS SIZE, THE COMPOSITION, IAN SMITH APART, IS PROBABLY AS GOOD AS WE COULD HAVE EXPECTED.

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ADDITIONAL DISTN.
RHODESIA POLICY

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MISS BROWN
MR.THOMAS
MR.WILLSON
MR.BYATT

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FM MIRIMBA SALISBURY 250650Z AUG 79

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 579 OF 25 AUGUST

INFO WASHINGTON

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T83/797

YOUR TELNO: 149: RHODESIAN REPRESENTATION IN LONDON

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF LETTER FROM MUZOREWA TO THE PRIME MINISTER, DATED 22 AUGUST, DELIVERED 24 AUGUST:

BEGINS

THANK YOU FOR YOUR LETTER WHICH WAS HANDED TO ME BY MR DAY, CONCERNING ZIMBABWE RHODESIAN REPRESENTATION IN LONDON.

I AM THE HEAD OF THE GOVERNMENT OF NATIONAL UNITY IN ZIMBABWE RHODESIA AND THEREFORE CANNOT ACCEPT THAT EXPANDING THE EXISTING UANC OFFICE IN LONDON WOULD BE THE BEST WAY OF ACHIEVING OUR AIMS. OUR REPRESENTATIVES MUST NOT BE POLITICAL - THEY MUST BE MEMBERS OF THE GOVERNMENT.

I SINCERELY HOPE THAT YOU WILL BE ABLE TO REVIEW THE MATTER EXPEDITIOUSLY AND ACCEDE TO MY REQUEST TO BE ABLE TO STATION REPRESENTATIVES OF MY COUNTRY IN LONDON. ALTHOUGH YOU SAY THAT THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT ARE DOING ALL THEY CAN TO IMPRESS THE FACTS OF THE SITUATION ON PEOPLE IN ENGLAND, I KNOW THAT THEY CANNOT BE AS EFFECTIVE AS OUR OWN REPRESENTATIVES. ESPECIALLY, AS THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT HAS SAID THAT OUR PRESENT CONSTITUTION IS "DEFECTIVE", THEY CAN HARDLY BE REGARDED AS IMPARTIAL IN THE EFFORT TO PERSUADE PEOPLE IN YOUR COUNTRY OF WHAT WE HAVE ACHIEVED HERE.

ENDS

2. ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT WE WOULD NOT BE PREPARED TO AUTHORISE THE OPENING OF A NEW ZIMBABWE-RHODESIAN OFFICE IN LONDON, WOULD YOU WISH ME TO GO BACK TO THE BISHOP (VIA KAMUSIKIRI) TO SEE IF I COULD GET HIM TO ACCEPT OUR ORIGINAL PROPOSAL, POINTING OUT THAT WE HAD SUGGESTED ATTACHMENT TO THE UANC OFFICE AS A PRACTICAL ARRANGEMENT,

/WHICH.

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WHICH OVERCAME CONSTITUTIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL PROBLEMS (IE, UN RESOLUTIONS), AND THAT IT WOULD NOT INHIBIT THE ACTIVITIES OF HIS REPRESENTATIVES?

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(MR PIFOOT)
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PS/MR LUCE
PS/MR RIDLEY
PS/MR HURD
PS/PUS
SIR A DUFF
LORD N G LENNOX
MISS BROWN
MR WILSON
MR BYATT

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RHODESIA-POLICY (RESTRICTED)

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FM MIRIMBA SALISBURY 220720Z AUG 79

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELNO 557 OF 22 AUGUST

Prime Minister

I omitted to tell you only today that Mr Fifoot returns to London tonight (Thursday) so could not come to see you.

MY TELNO 550 AND MIPT: RHODESIA CONSTITUTION

(e.g. Fifoot's)

1. THESE MEETINGS HAVE BEEN EXTREMELY VALUABLE. THEY HAVE MET THE RHODESIAN DESIRE TO HAVE A MORE DETAILED INDICATION OF OUR THINKING ON CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE. THE BISHOP AND HIS COLLEAGUES WILL NOW BE AWARE OF THE EXTENT OF THE KIND OF CHANGES THAT WE ARE LOOKING FOR.

*you
23/8*

MF

2. THE REACTION FROM SMITH AND GILES HAS BEEN SURPRISINGLY MILD. THEY HAVE NOT CHALLENGED, IN ANY SIGNIFICANT WAY, THE SUGGESTIONS FOR 20 PERCENT RESERVED SEATS, A 70 PERCENT MAJORITY FOR CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT, OR THE INTRODUCTION OF PRIME MINISTERIAL CONTROL OVER SENIOR APPOINTMENTS. SMITH APPEARED TO APPROACH THE DISCUSSIONS MORE AS A CONSTITUTIONAL DRAFTSMAN THAN A POLITICALLY-CONSCIOUS CABINET SECRETARY.

3. WE SHOULD NOT, HOWEVER, BE LULLED INTO A SENSE OF FALSE SECURITY. I WOULD EXPECT THE REACTION FROM MINISTERS, PARTICULARLY OF THE RHODESIA FRONT, TO BE MARKEDLY LESS RESTRAINED. THE REMOVAL OF ANY WHITE BLOCKING POWER OVER SUCH MATTERS AS THE COMMISSIONS, IS UNLIKELY TO BE CONCEDED WITHOUT A STRUGGLE AND THEY MAY WILL BY UNMOVEABLE ON THE DECLARATION OF RIGHTS AND PENSIONS (EVEN THOUGH SMITH DID NOT ADOPT TO THE LATTER). WE MAY FIND IT NECESSARY TO ACCEPT A GREATER DEGREE OF ENTRENCHMENT THAT THAT INDICATED BY FIFOOT AT THIS ROUND OF TALKS IF THE BISHOP IS TO BE ABLE TO CARRY THE WHITE COMMUNITY WITH HIM.

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Prime Minister

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FM MIRIMBA SALISBURY 220700Z AUG 79
TO PRIORITY FCO
TELNO 556 OF 22 AUGUST

MY TELNO 550: RHODESIA CONSTITUTION

1. FIFOOT AND I CALLED ON SMITH AND GILES ON 21 AUGUST AT THEIR REQUEST. THEY WISHED TO CLARIFY SOME POINTS ARISING OUT OF THE MEETING REPORTED IN MY TUR. THESE INCLUDED THE GENERAL DIRECTIVE OF THE PRESIDENT ON APPOINTMENTS (PARA 9 OF MY TUR); THE QUALIFYING PERIOD FOR MEMBERSHIP OF COMMISSIONS (PARA 8) AND THE ENTRENCHMENT OF OTHER LAWS (PARA 14) . NONE OF THESE QUESTIONS RAISED ISSUES OF SUBSTANCE.

2. SMITH ARGUED THAT THE DECLARATION OF RIGHTS SHOULD BE, SPECIALLY ENTRENCHED (WITH A WHITE BLOCKING POWER) ALONG WITH THE RESERVED SEATS FOR THE WHITES. THE DECLARATION WAS FUNDAMENTAL TO THE CONSTITUTION AS A WHOLE. FIFOOT REPEATED THAT A BLOCKING POWER FOR A MINORITY WAS UNPRECEDENTED (EVEN IF AN EXCEPTION COULD BE CONTEMPLATED IN RESPECT OF THE WHITE SEATS). THE DECLARATION MIGHT HOWEVER BE PROTECTED BY A HIGHER MAJORITY. DID SMITH THINK THAT ANY OTHER PROVISIONS SHOULD BE ENTRENCHED BY SUCH A HIGHER MAJORITY? SMITH REFERRED ONLY TO THE POSITION OF THE SENATE IN THE LEGISLATIVE STRUCTURE.

3. SMITH SAID THAT HE HAD GIVEN A BRIEF ORAL REPORT OF OUR MEETING ON 20 AUGUST TO CABINET ON 21 AUGUST. HE WOULD NOW BE SUBMITTING A FULL REPORT TO THE PRIME MINISTER.

/4. I MENTIONED

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CONFIDENTIAL

4. I MENTIONED AGAIN THAT IT WAS ESSENTIAL THAT OUR DISCUSSIONS ON THESE MATTERS SHOULD REMAIN CONFIDENTIAL AND ASKED HIM TO ENSURE THAT THIS WAS IMPRESSED UPON ALL CABINET MINISTERS AND OTHERS WHO MIGHT BE INFORMED OF THE TALKS. SMITH SAID HE HAD MENTIONED THE NEED FOR CONFIDENTIALITY AT THIS MORNING'S CABINET.

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MISS BROWN

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FM FCO 220815Z AUG 79
TO PRIORITY MONROVIA
TELEGRAM NUMBER 86 OF 22 AUGUST

Eric ra

RHODESIA: MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT TOLBERT TO THE
PRIME MINISTER.

*Hu
24/8*

1. THE PRIME MINISTER HAS RECEIVED THE FOLLOWING
MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT TOLBERT BY TELEGRAM DATED 9 AUGUST:
BEGINS:

QUOTE YOUR EXCELLENCY.

I HAVE FOLLOWED WITH KEEN INTEREST THE ACTIVITIES OF THE
COMMONWEALTH SUMMIT MEETING WHICH WAS HELD IN LUSAKA AND
NOW THAT IT HAS COME TO A CLOSE I SEIZE THIS OPPORTUNITY
TO EXTEND TO YOU MY HEARTFELT CONGRATULATIONS FOR THE
OUTSTANDING SUCCESSES ACHIEVED DURING THIS HISTORIC
CONFERENCE WHICH HAS BEEN REPORTED AS THE MOST SUCCESSFUL
COMMONWEALTH SUMMIT IN RECENT YEARS. I WAS INDEED
GRATIFIED TO LEARN OF DECISION TAKEN REGARDING THE
PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF THE ZIMBABWEAN QUESTION AND I
TRUST THAT ALL CONCERNED AND PARTICULARLY THE INTER-
NATIONAL COMMUNITY WILL GIVE EVERY SUPPORT FOR ITS
SUCCESSFUL IMPLEMENTATION TO AVOID ANY FURTHER BLOODSHED
AND THE ESCALATION OF HOSTILITY TO THE DISTRESS OF HUMANITY.
UPON LEARNING OF THIS IMPORTANT DECISION ON MONDAY THE
SIXTH WHEN I HAD THE OCCASION TO RECEIVE THE CREDENTIALS OF THE
AMERICAN AMBASSADOR TO LIBERIA I PUBLICLY WELCOMED THE DECISION
FOR AS I UNDERSTAND IT PROVIDES FOR BRITAIN TO DRAW UP A NEW
CONSTITUTION FOR THE TERRITORY AND TO SUPERVISE FRESH ELECTIONS
TO BE ATTENDED BY COMMONWEALTH OBSERVERS. I ALSO NOTED THAT IT
CALLS FOR AN ALL-PARTY CONFERENCE INCLUDING REPRESENTATIVES OF THE
PATRIOTIC FRONT TO BE ARRANGED BY BRITAIN WHICH WOULD LEAD TO A
CEASE FIRE AND THE LIFTING OF SANCTIONS. I STATED FURTHER THAT THE
COMMONWEALTH SUMMIT REALIZING THE DEFECTIVE CHARACTER OF THE
PRESENT ZIMBABWE RHODESIA CONSTITUTION, RECOGNIZED THE
CONSTITUTIONAL RESPONSIBILITY OF BRITAIN TO GRANT LEGAL INDEP-
ENDENCE TO THAT COUNTRY ON THE BASIS OF MAJORITY RULE FOR SUCH
A DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION WILL OF COURSE INCLUDE SAFEGUARDS FOR
THE RIGHTS OF THE MINORITY. IT IS THEREFORE MY FERVENT HOPE THAT THIS
MATTER WILL BE TIMELY RESOLVED IN THE INTEREST OF PEACE IN AFRICA
AND OUR ONE WORLD.

WITH RENEWED SENTIMENTS OF MY HIGHEST CONSIDERATION AND ESTEEM.
WR TOLBERT JR UNQUOTE
ENDS.

2. PLEASE CONVEY THE PRIME MINISTER'S WARM THANKS TO THE
PRESIDENT FOR HIS MESSAGE, WHICH CROSSED WITH THE PRIME MINISTER'S
OWN MESSAGE OF 14 AUGUST TO HIM (OUR TEL NO 78). YOU SHOULD SAY
THAT THE PRIME MINISTER IS MOST GRATEFUL FOR HIS SUPPORT, AND FOR
FACT THE PRESIDENT TOOK AN EARLY OPPORTUNITY TO EXPRESS THIS PUBLICLY
CARRINGTON

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PS/MR. RIDLEY

PS/MR. HURD

PS/PUS

SIR A DUFF

SIR A PARSONS

LORD N G LENNOX

MISS BROWN

ADDITIONAL DISTN.
RHODESIA POLICY

COPIES TO

MR BYATT

W.41.

RESTRICTED



File B

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

22 August 1979

I am writing on the Prime Minister's behalf to thank you for your letter of 21 August, with which you enclosed the signed original of The Rt. Hon. Malcolm Fraser's letter to the Prime Minister dated 15 August.

B. G. CARTLEDGE

His Excellency The Honourable
Sir Gordon Freeth, K.B.E.

lw

RESTRICTED

Rhodesia



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

22 August 1979

Dear Bryan,

*P. J. M.
2/8*

Professor Hutchinson: Rhodesia

Thank you for your letter of 17 August, enclosing a copy of the letter dated 10 August the Prime Minister has received from Professor Hutchinson about the Rhodesian constitution.

The letter to the Prime Minister covers a copy of a longer letter addressed to Bishop Muzorewa which is not particularly helpful in the context of our efforts towards a settlement which would gain international recognition. There are no special points that should be brought to the attention of the Prime Minister. Professor Hutchinson himself is an inveterate writer to foreign governments on the subject of Rhodesia, and we do not think you need add to the acknowledgement you have already sent.

Professor Hutchinson has also sent a copy of his proposals to Lord Carrington.

*Yours ever,
Stephen*

(J S Wall)
Private Secretary

B G Cartledge Esq
10 Downing Street
LONDON

RESTRICTED

22 AUG 1979



RHODESIA: POLICY: ADVANCE COPIES!
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MR WILLSON
MR WILLIAMS *Syabt*
LORD N G LENNOX

PS/NO 10 DOWNING STREET
MR R L WADE-GERY)
MR P M MAXEY)
COL MOIR) CABINET
MR P J FOWLER) OFFICE
DIO)
SIR J HUNT)

.....
HD/RHODESIA DEPT (3)
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HD/NEWS DEPT
HD/WAD
MR FREELAND LEGAL ADVISER RM K200A
MR PIFOOT LEGAL ADVISER RM K164
Hd ccd
~~RESIDENT CLERK~~
Conf Sec PCD

~~FOR ZIMBABWE DEVELOPMENTS DIV~~
ADD ~~MR LYNCH ODIT~~
~~MR SLATER TREASURY~~

Prime Minister
hm
22/8

CONFIDENTIAL

DESKBY 221200Z

FM MIRIMBA SALISBURY 221040Z AUG 79

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 562 OF 22 AUGUST

INFO IMMEDIATE PRETORIA MAPUTO DAR ES SALAAM LUSAKA GABORONE

LUANDA LAGOS WASHINGTON AND UKMIS NEW YORK

IMMEDIATE

ADVANCE COPY

RHODESIA: CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE

1. THE COMPOSITION OF THE OFFICIAL DELEGATION FROM RHODESIA WILL BE:

1. BISHOP MUZOREWA

2. DR S MUNDAWARARA, DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER

3. MR E BULLE, MINISTER OF COMMERCE AND INDUSTRY AND VICE-PRESIDENT OF THE UANC

4. MR F ZINDOGA, MINISTER OF LAW AND ORDER

5. MR D C NUKONE, MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

5. MR D C MUKOME, MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
6. MR G NYANDORO, MINISTER OF LANDS AND NATURAL RESOURCES
7. REV M SITHOLE, PRESIDENT OF ZANU
8. MR L NYEMBA, MINISTER OF ROADS AND ROAD TRAFFIC
9. CHIEF K NDIVENI, MINISTER OF MINES AND PRESIDENT OF UNFP
10. MR Z BAFANAH, MINISTER OF WATER DEVELOPMENT
11. MR I D SMITH, MINISTER WITHOUT PORTFOLIO AND LEADER OF THE RHODESIA FRONT
12. MR D C SMITH, MINISTER OF FINANCE.

2. NUMBERS 1-6 ABOVE REPRESENT THE UANC, NUMBERS 7 AND 8 ZANU (SITHOLE), 9 AND 10 THE UNFP, AND 11 AND 12 THE RHODESIA FRONT.

3. THE COMPOSITION OF THIS DELEGATION IS BEING PUBLISHED HERE AT 1230Z TODAY.

DAY.

181111



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OO MIRIMBA SALISBURY

PP LUSAKA

PP DAR ES SALAAM

PP GABORONE

PP PRETORIA

GRS 596

Prime Minister

SM

23/8

SM

CONFIDENTIAL

FM FCO 211630Z AUG 79

TO IMMEDIATE MIRIMBA SALISBURY

TELEGRAM NUMBER 163 OF 21 AUGUST

INFO PRIORITY LUSAKA, DAR ES SALAAM, MAPUTO, GABORONE, PRETORIA,
WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK, PARIS, BONN

RHODESIA: SITHOLE

1. SITHOLE AND MUKONO (ZANU(S) FOREIGN AFFAIRS SPOKESMAN) CALLED AT THE FCO ON 21 AUGUST AND WERE SEEN BY BYATT (AUS) AND RENWICK.
2. SITHOLE PRESENTED PROPOSALS ON TRANSITIONAL ARRANGEMENTS (TEXT IN MIFT, NOT TO ALL). HE WAS TOLD THAT DURING THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE, THE GOVERNMENT WISHED TO CONCENTRATE ATTENTION INITIALLY ON THE INDEPENDENCE CONSTITUTION AND THE PROPOSALS PUT FORWARD BY THE UK. WE SHOULD DEFINE THE DESTINATION BEFORE DISCUSSING HOW TO GET THERE. TO DISCUSS THE TRANSITIONAL ARRANGEMENTS AT THE OUTSET WOULD DISTRACT ATTENTION FROM THE CENTRAL CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES AND GIVE THOSE WHO WISHED TO CREATE DIFFICULTIES AN OPPORTUNITY TO DO SO, WHEREAS AGREEMENT ON THE CONSTITUTION WOULD GIVE IMPETUS TO DISCUSSION OF THE WAY IT SHOULD BE PUT INTO EFFECT. AS STATED IN THE LUSAKA COMMUNIQUE, THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT ACCEPTED THAT IN THAT EVENT THERE SHOULD BE ELECTIONS SUPERVISED UNDER BRITISH GOVERNMENT AUTHORITY.

3.

C O N F I D E N T I A L

3. SITHOLE ACCEPTED THESE ARGUMENTS AND AGREED NOT TO PUT HIS PAPER FORWARD AT THE PRESENT TIME, OR TO TABLE IT AT THE BEGINNING OF THE CONFERENCE.

4. OTHER POINTS DISCUSSED WERE:

(A) CONSTITUTIONAL PROPOSALS: SITHOLE SAID THAT HE ACCEPTED THE LUSAKA COMMUNIQUE AND WANTED THE BRITISH INITIATIVE TO SUCCEED. A NEW CONSTITUTION SHOULD NOT EMBODY THE PRESENT ENTRENCHED CLAUSES.

(B) DELEGATIONS: SITHOLE ARGUED THAT CHIKEREMA SHOULD BE INVITED: HE WAS ONE OF THE 'REAL NATIONALIST ELEMENTS'. BYATT SAID THAT THE INVITATIONS WERE BASED ON THE REALITIES OF THE SITUATION IN WHICH THE CONFLICT WAS TAKING PLACE. PARITY WAS THE ONLY BASIS FOR THE INVITATIONS WHICH WOULD HAVE COMMANDED ACCEPTANCE. WE MUST LEAVE THE DECISION ABOUT THE SALISBURY DELEGATION TO BE TAKEN IN SALISBURY.

(C) SITHOLE SAW THE RETENTION OF WHITE CONTROL OF THE SECURITY FORCES. POLICE AND CIVIL SERVICE AS THE GREATEST IMPEDIMENT TO A SETTLEMENT. MILITARY AND POLICE COMMANDERS CONTINUED TO RESIST THE INTEGRATION OF AFRICANS IN THE OFFICER CORPS. IN THE CIVIL SERVICE THE WHITES HAD A VESTED INTEREST IN RETAINING THEIR PRESENT POSTS, AND WOULD CLING MORE STRONGLY TO THEM THAN TO THEIR PRIVILEGED REPRESENTATION IN THE ASSEMBLY.

(D) SITHOLE ASKED HOW WE WOULD REACT TO WALK-OUTS AT THE CONFERENCE AND WHETHER WE WOULD ALLOW ANY PARTY TO EXERCISE A VETO. HE WAS TOLD THAT WE WOULD NOT. ON PROCEDURAL MATTERS, THERE WAS STRONG INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT FOR THE HOLDING OF THE CONFERENCE:

THERE WOULD BE LITTLE SYMPATHY FOR THOSE WHO SOUGHT TO RAISE SECONDARY DIFFICULTIES.


(E) PASSPORTS: SITHOLE SUGGESTED THAT DURING THE CONFERENCE PERIOD THE GOVERNMENT SHOULD CONCEDE ENTRY

CONFIDENTIAL

FACILITIES TO RHODESIAN PASSPORT HOLDERS. WE SAID THAT WE SAW NO NEED TO CHANGE OUR EXISTING PROCEDURES: AS IN THE PAST, WE WOULD TAKE THE NECESSARY STEPS TO PROVIDE APPROPRIATE TRAVEL DOCUMENTS FOR PEOPLE DIRECTLY CONCERNED WITH THE CONFERENCE.

(F) PRESS LINE: IT WAS AGREED THAT THE PRESS WOULD BE TOLD THAT SITHOLE HAD CALLED TO SEEK CLARIFICATION OF THE GOVERNMENT'S APPROACH TO THE CONFERENCE AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROPOSALS. THERE WOULD BE NO FURTHER COMMENT.

CARRINGTON



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(MR. FIFOOT)
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PS/MR. LUCE
PS/MR. RIDLEY
PS/MR. HURD
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SIR A DUFF

LORD N G LENNOX
MISS BROWN
MR. THOMAS
MR. WILLSON
MR. BYATT - 3 -

ADDITIONAL DISTN.
RHODESIA POLICY

CONFIDENTIAL



AUSTRALIAN HIGH COMMISSION · LONDON

THE HIGH COMMISSIONER

The Hon Sir Gordon Freeth KBE

21 August 1979

Dear Prime Minister

I refer to my letter of 15 August 1979 which enclosed the text of a letter to you dated 15 August from my Prime Minister, the Rt Hon Malcolm Fraser, C.H., M.P.

....

I now enclose the original of Mr Fraser's letter.

*Yours sincerely
Gordon Freeth*

(Gordon Freeth)

The Rt Hon Mrs Margaret Thatcher, MP,
Prime Minister,
10 Downing Street,
LONDON.

CONFIDENTIAL

GRS 428

CONFIDENTIAL

FM CANBERRA 210610Z AUG 79

TO ROUTINE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 472 OF 21 AUGUST

P S TO P M
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2

Prime Minister

*Sam
22/8*

CHOGM: RHODESIA

1. THE PRIME MINISTER HAS GIVEN ME THE ADVANCE TEXT OF A STATEMENT HE WILL MAKE TO PARLIAMENT SHORTLY (DATE NOT YET DECIDED) ON THE LUSAKA CHOGM.

2. THE GREATER PART OF THE TEXT IS DEVOTED TO RHODESIA. HE EXPRESSES HIS ADMIRATION FOR THE "COURAGE AND VISION" OF THE PRIME MINISTER (AND OF PRESIDENTS KAUNDA AND NYERERE). THE STATEMENT CONTINUES "...

IT IS GREATLY TO THEIR CREDIT AND REPRESENTED STATESMANSHIP OF A HIGH ORDER. THE BRITISH PRIME MINISTER, FOR HER PART, COMMITTED HER GOVERNMENT WITHOUT QUALIFICATION TO THE GOAL OF GENUINE BLACK MAJORITY RULE IN RHODESIA. IN HER SPEECH OF 3 AUGUST, SHE RECOGNISED THE VALIDITY OF THE CRITICISMS MADE OF THE PRESENT CONSTITUTION...
...MRS THATCHER ALSO ACCEPTED THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT TO BRING THE COUNTRY TO LEGAL INDEPENDENCE ON A BASIS WHICH THE COMMONWEALTH AND THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY AS A WHOLE WILL FIND ACCEPTABLE. SHE UNDERTOOK TO PRESENT PROPOSALS AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE TO ALL THE PARTIES.....

....PRESIDENT KAUNDA AND PRESIDENT NYERERE SHOWED A RESTRAINT AND PATIENCE, AND A CONFIDENCE IN THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT, WHICH WERE AN ESSENTIAL ELEMENT IN CREATING THE TRUST NECESSARY FOR AGREEMENT AND PROGRESS. THEY WERE NOT IN THE BUSINESS OF CONFRONTATION AND POINT-SCORING.....

... THESE NINE POINTS OF THE COMMUNIQUE DO NOT AMOUNT TO A SETTLEMENT OF THE ZIMBABWE SITUATION. NEITHER THE MUZOREWA GOVERNMENT NOR THE PATRIOTIC FRONT - ZANU AND ZAPU - WERE PARTIES TO THE DISCUSSION AND A SETTLEMENT WILL REQUIRE THEIR AGREEMENT.....IF THE SETTLEMENT DOES NOT SUCCEED, THE PROSPECT IS FOR AN INTENSIFICATION OF THE WAR, A GREATER RESORT TO COMMUNIST ARMS AND GREATER TURMOIL FOR THE WHOLE OF SOUTHERN AFRICA. AS FAR AS THE WHITE COMMUNITY OF THAT COUNTRY IS CONCERNED, IT CAN ONLY HOPE FOR A STABLE AND PEACEFUL EXISTENCE AS PART OF A GENUINE MULTI-RACIAL SOCIETY. CONTINUING WARFARE WILL LEAD TO ITS DISINTEGRATION AND EXODUS.

CONFIDENTIAL

/THE PATRIOTIC

CONFIDENTIAL

THE PATRIOTIC FRONT CAN ONLY HOPE TO PARTICIPATE IN THE GOVERNING OF THE COUNTRY ON THE BASIS OF SUCH A SETTLEMENT. THE FRONT-LINE STATES HAVE AN INTEREST IN ENDING THE STATE OF WAR WHICH FORCES THEM TO ACCEPT SACRIFICES AND THREATENS TO INVOLVE THEM DIRECTLY IN OTHER PEOPLE'S CONFLICTS. BRITAIN HAS AN INTEREST IN ENDING A SITUATION WHICH HAS PERHAPS CAUSED IT MORE INTERNATIONAL EMBARRASSMENT THAN ANY OTHER OVER THE LAST DECADE. THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY AT LARGE CAN ONLY BENEFIT FROM REMOVING A POTENTIAL SOURCE OF CONFLAGRATION AND GREAT POWER RIVALRY. AUSTRALIA, AS A MEMBER OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY SHARES THIS CONCERN FOR PEACE AND STABILITY IN SOUTHERN AFRICA. ENDS

TEBBIT

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PUSD	PS/MR LUCE
PLANNING STAFF	PS/MR RIDLEY
ES & SD	PS/MR HURD
CCD	PS/PUS
FRD	LORD N G LENNOX
UND	MISS BROWN
LEGAL ADVISERS	MR MURRAY
(MR FREELAND)	MR BYATT
(MR FIFOOT)	
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FM MIRIMBA SALISBURY 210715Z AUG 79

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 550 OF 21 AUGUST

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Prime Minister

GR
21/8

[Handwritten mark]

RHODESIA CONSTITUTION

1. FIFOOT AND I MET YESTERDAY WITH GEORGE SMITH (CABINET SECRETARY) AND GILES (GOVERNMENT LEGAL DRAFTSMAN). FIFOOT EXPLAINED THAT HE HAD NOT COME TO NEGOTIATE AMENDED TEXTS OF THE CONSTITUTION BUT WISHED TO HOLD AN EXPLORATORY DISCUSSION INWHICH HE WOULD INDICATE THE POINTS IN THE EXISTING CONSTITUTION WHICH CAUSED DIFFICULTY TO HMG. FIFOOT WILL BRING WITH HIM A FULL RECORD OF THE MEETING. THIS TELEGRAM SUMMARISES THE MAIN POINTS.

2. WHITE SEATS IN THE ASSEMBLY AND BLOCKING POWERS.

FIFOOT EXPLAINED THAT THE EXISTING DISTRIBUTION OF SEATS BETWEEN BLACK AND WHITE WAS, ON ANY BASIS, VERY DIFFICULT TO JUSTIFY. OUR PRESENT THINKING WAS THAT 20 PERCENT RESERVED SEATS FOR WHITES WAS THE HIGHEST THAT COULD BE CONTEMPLATED. AS FOR THE MAJORITY REQUIRED TO AMEND THE CONSTITUTION, THERE WAS NO PRECEDENT FOR A MINORITY TO EXERCISE A BLOCKING POWER. OUR PRESENT THINKING WAS THAT THE MAJORITY REQUIRED SHOULD BE SOMETHING LIKE 70 PERCENT OF THE TOTAL MEMBERSHIP OF THE HOUSE OF ASSEMBLY. WE WERE NOT WEDDED TO ANY PARTICULAR NUMBERS OF SIZE FOR THE HOUSE OF ASSEMBLY. IF THE NUMBER OF WHITE MEMBERS REMAINED AT 28, THE NUMBER OF BLACK SEATS WOULD HAVE TO BE INCREASED. ALTERNATIVELY, IF THE TOTAL SIZE OF THE HOUSE COULD BE LEFT AT 100, THIS WOULD REQUIRE A DECREASE IN THE WHITE SEATS TO 20 AND AN INCREASE OF THE BLACK TO 80.

3. ON THE BLOCKING MECHANISM, FIFOOT SAID THAT WE RECOGNISED THAT SPECIAL PROVISION WOULD HAVE TO BE MADE, FFR AN INITIAL PERIOD, TO ENTRENCH THE NUMBER OF WHITE SEATS IN THE ASSEMBLY. A POSSIBILITY WAS TO MAKE THE RELEVANT PROVISION UNAMENDABLE FOR THAT PERIOD. IF THE WHITES HAD NO BLOCKING POWER AS SUCH, IT WAS

CONFIDENTIAL

/ QUESTIONABLE

QUESTIONABLE WHETHER THERE NEEDED TO BE TWO LEVELS OF CLAUSES REQUIRING DIFFERENT MAJORITIES FOR AMENDMENT, AND WE VISUALISED A STRAIGHT 70 PERCENT VOTE FOR ALL.

4. FIFOOT SAID THAT THE PRESENT 10-YEAR PERIOD DURING WHICH THE EXISTING ENTRENCHMENT OF THE WHITE SEATS WOULD REMAIN SEEMED UNDULY LONG. AGAIN WE HAD NO SPECIFIC PERIOD IN VIEW, BUT 5 YEARS WAS NOT UNREASONABLE. FURTHERMORE, THE TEMPORARY NATURE OF THIS ARRANGEMENT WOULD BE BETTER INDICATED IF THE SPECIAL PROVISIONS LAPSED AUTOMATICALLY AFTER A PERIOD OF YEARS (WITH A POWER OF RENEWAL) RATHER THAN THAT THEY SHOULD REQUIRE SOME SPECIAL ACT OF THE ASSEMBLY TO BRING ABOUT THEIR TERMINATION.

5. SMITH'S REACTION TO THESE SUGGESTIONS WAS THAT THE GOVERNMENT OF NATIONAL UNITY HAD AGREED THAT 28 PERCENT WAS A FAIR BALANCE BETWEEN BLACK AND WHITE FOR THE INITIAL 10 YEARS OF THE NEW GOVERNMENT. HE THOUGHT THAT THAT WOULD REMAIN THE GOVERNMENT'S VIEW. HE CLAIMED THAT THE SECRETARY OF STATE HAD INDICATED IN LONDON THAT HE HAD NO OBJECTION TO 28 WHITE SEATS. I SAID THAT THIS WAS SO, BUT THAT IT HAD BEEN MADE CLEAR AT THAT TIME AND SUBSEQUENTLY THAT 28 WHITE SEATS WOULD ONLY BE ACCEPTABLE IF THE OVERALL PROPORTION WERE ADJUSTED. THIS WAS REFERRED TO IN POINT NUMBER 5 OF OUR OUTLINE PROPOSALS FOR A CONSTITUTION.

6. SERVICE COMMISSIONS

FIFOOT INDICATED THAT IT WAS NOT ACCEPTABLE THAT THE ELECTED GOVERNMENT, THROUGH THE PRIME MINISTER, SHOULD BE UNABLE TO EXERCISE CONTROL OVER THE MOST SENIOR APPOINTMENTS IN GOVERNMENT. HE ALSO MENTIONED THAT IT WAS ABNORMAL THAT A PRIME MINISTER SHOULD BE DENIED THE RIGHT OF REMOVING A MINISTER WITH WHOM HE NO LONGER FELT THAT HE COULD WORK. WE STRESSED THAT WE WERE NOT OBJECTING TO THE PRINCIPLE OF A GOVERNMENT OF NATIONAL UNITY AS SUCH - INDEED IT WAS OBVIOUSLY DESIRABLE - BUT MERELY TO THIS RESTRICTION ON THE FREEDOM OF ACTION OF THE PRIME MINISTER.

7. ON SENIOR APPOINTMENTS FIFOOT SUGGESTED THAT ONE SOLUTION COULD BE TO VEST THE RIGHT OF APPOINTMENT IN THE PRESIDENT ACTING ON THE ADVICE OF THE PRIME MINISTER AFTER CONSULTATION WITH THE

APPROPRIATE COMMISSION. HE SAID THAT THIS PROVISION COULD BE RESTRICTED TO SERVICE COMMANDERS, THE COMMISSFONER OF POLICE, SECRETARIES OF GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS, THE AUDITOR GENERAL AND THE ATTORNEY GENERAL. THERE NEED BE NO CHANGE IN RESPECT OF APPOINTMENTS BELOW THIS LEVEL. IT WOULD ALSO BE NORMAL FOR THE CHIEF JUSTICE TO BE APPOINTED ON THE ADVICE OF THE PRIME MINISTER. WE POINTED OUT THAT THERE WAS NO PRECEDENT FOR PROTECTING THE TENURE OF THE SERVICE COMMANDERS, THE POLICE COMMISSIONER OR THE DIRECTOR OF PRISONS IN RESPECT OF WHOM NORMAL SERVICE REGULATIONS RELATING TO DISMISSAL SHOULD APPLY.

8. ON THE COMPOSITION OF THE VARIOUS COMMISSIONS, WE CONFINED OURSELVES TO SUGGESTING THAT THE 5-YEAR QUALIFICATION PERIOD FOR CERTAIN OF THE MEMBERS WAS UNNECESSARY.

9. FIFOOT ALSO REFERRED TO THE NEED, IN RESPECT OF ALL THE COMMISSIONS, FOR SOME DISCRETIONARY PROVISION ENABLING THE PRESIDENT TO ISSUE DIRECTIVES DESIGNED TO ACHIEVE A SUITABLE REPRESENTATION OF THE VARIOUS COMPONENTS OF THE POPULATION IN THE SERVICE OF THE REPUBLIC.

10. SMITH COMMENTED THAT, UNDER THESE SUGGESTIONS, IT WOULD BE OPEN TO THE PRIME MINISTER TO APPOINT AS POLICE COMMISSIOBNER OR AS A SERVICE COMMANDER SOMEONE FROM OUTSIDE RHODESIA. HE DID NOT BELIEVE THAT THIS WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE. WE POINTED OUT THAT IT WAS NOT HMG'S INTENTION THAT THE PRIME MINISTER SHOULD GO OUTSIDE THE COUNTRY TO FILL SUCH POSTS. FIFOOT SUGGESTED THAT THIS POINT MIGHT BE GOT OVER BY SPECIFYING THAT SUCH APPOINTMENTS WOULD BE MADE WITHIN THE APPROPRIATE SERVICE.

11. SMITH THOUGHT THAT THERE WOULD ALSO BE NEED TO RETAIN NOME PROVISION RELATING TO THE QUALIFICATIONS OF PERSONS APPOINTED AS SERVICE COMMANDERS OR POLICE COMMISSIONER.

12. SMITH FURTHER COMMENTED THAT THE RHODESIA FRONT MINISTERS WOULD BE MORE LIKELY TO ACCEPT A THANGE IN THIS AREA LF THE CONSTITUTION IF THE APPROPRIATE COMMISSION WAS REQUIRED TO ACT "WITH THE CONCURRENCE OF" THE PRIME MINISTER RATHERLBY THE PRIME MINISTER "AFTER CONSULTATION".

13. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS

FIFOOT REFERED TO CERTAIN SECTIONS OF THE DECLARATION OF RIGHTS (PAPAER C) TO WHICH WE THOUGHT AMENDMENTS MIGHT BE DESIRABLE.

14. ENTRENCHED CLAUSES

IN ADDITION TO THE PROPOSAL THAT THE CONSTITUTION COULD BE AMENDED BY A 70 PERCENT VOTE OF THE HOUSE (PARA 2 ABOVE), FIFOOT MENTIONED THAT WE HAD RESERVATIONS ABOUT CERTAIN OTHER LAWS OUTSIDE THE CONSTITUTION WHICH WERE ENTRENCHED (SECTION 160 OF THE CONSTITUTION).

15. OTHER POINTS

FIFOOT EXPLAINED THAT THERE WERE A NUMBER OF OTHER ISSUES (BARLOW'S LIST) SUCH AS DEBT SETTLEMENT, SUMMARY EXECUTION, ETC., WHICH WE WOULD AT SOME STAGE NEED TO DISCUSS FURTHER.

16. SMITH SAID THAT HE WOULD LIKE TO CONSIDER THE IDEAS THAT HAD BEEN PUT FORWARD AND THAT HE WOULD PROBABLY LIKE A SECOND MEETING TODAY TO CLARIFY SOME POINTS. AT PRESENT, FIFOOT PROPOSES TO RETURN ON WEDNESDAY NIGHT.

DAY

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PS/MR.LUCE
PS/MR.RIDLEY
PS/MR.HURD
PS/PUS
SIR A DUFF

ADDITIONAL DISTN.
RHODESIA POLICY

LORD N G LENNOX
MISS BROWN
MR.THOMAS
MR.WILLSON
MR BYATT



cc fro
File 16.

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

21 August 1979

I am writing on the Prime Minister's behalf to thank you for your letter of 21 August, in which you were good enough to convey a message to Mrs. Thatcher from the Prime Minister of Canada, Mr. Clark.

I am of course bringing Mr. Clark's message to the Prime Minister's immediate attention.

E. G. CARTLEDGE

Christian Hardy, Esq.

T82B/79T

SUBJECT



Prime Minister

(2)

Ans - 6/9

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T82B/79T

JAMAICA HOUSE
KINGSTON, JAMAICA

R6.9. 21st August, 1979

cc. FCO + Fy. Ans

Dear Margaret,

Thank you for your kind letter enclosing the text of the invitation sent to Bishop Muzorewa and the Patriotic Front to attend the Constitutional Conference on September 10. As you know, I shared with you and the others at Lusaka genuine pleasure in the progress that we were able to make. All delegations there felt that you had acted with courage and wisdom.

As you say, difficult days lie ahead but I for one feel that there may be a better chance now than at any time in the past.

Please accept my very best wishes for a successful outcome to the talks that are about to begin.

Yours sincerely,

Michael

Michael Manley

The Rt. Hon. Mrs. Margaret Thatcher,
Prime Minister,
10 Downing Street,
London

JANICE ROBERT
MAY 1979

RECEIVED
SEP 11 1979
PAGE 2

It is with a great deal of pleasure that I am writing to you regarding the information that you have provided to me. I am sure that you will find the information that I have provided to you to be of great value. I am sure that you will find the information that I have provided to you to be of great value. I am sure that you will find the information that I have provided to you to be of great value.

SEP 9 1979

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12

Very truly yours,

JANICE ROBERT
1234567890
1234567890

SUBJECT

T82/79T

cc. FCO

2pps

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HAUT-COMMISSARIAT DU CANADA,
MACDONALD HOUSE,
1 GROSVENOR SQUARE,
LONDON, W1X 0AB.



CANADIAN HIGH COMMISSION,
MACDONALD HOUSE,
1 GROSVENOR SQUARE,
LONDON, W1X 0AB.

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE

SERIAL No. T82/79T

-> See 20/8/79 for signed copy.

August 21, 1979.

Prime Minister

SH
2/8

Dear Prime Minister,

I have been asked by the Prime Minister of
Canada to convey the following message:

"Dear Prime Minister,

I would like to thank you for your
message on Rhodesia. As I have told you
personally and have repeated in public
statements since Lusaka, your contribution
to the success of the conference is
immeasurable. I have studied the consti-
tutional proposals which your government
has drafted and in my view they provide
a most positive basis for discussion at
the constitutional conference scheduled for
September 10.

Clearly the road ahead will be a
difficult one with opposing sides having
what they regard as essential and often
contradictory interests to protect. As
your government embarks on this process of
negotiation you may be assured of my con-
tinued personal support and that of my
government for your efforts to achieve a
settlement.

Yours sincerely,

Joe Clark"

Respectfully yours

Christoph Hardy,
Acting High Commissioner

The Rt. Hon. Margaret Thatcher, MP,
Prime Minister,
10 Downing Street,
LONDON.



RECEIVED
MAY 10 1964
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE
WASHINGTON, D.C.

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE
WASHINGTON, D.C.

[Faint handwritten notes, possibly "L. 10/10"]

[Handwritten mark, possibly "2"]

[Large, very faint handwritten signature or text, possibly "G. W. ..."]

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CONFIDENTIAL

ECLIPSE

FM WASHINGTON 202230Z AUG 79

TO ROUTINE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 2362 OF 20 AUGUST

Prime Minister

and ²³/₇₈

RHODESIA

FUNK (NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL ADVISER ON AFRICA) ASKED US TODAY HOW WE INTERPRETED CURRENT AMERICAN POLICY ON RHODESIA. WE SAID WE THOUGHT IT WAS CLEAR THAT THE U.S. ADMINISTRATION FULLY ACCEPTED (INDEED WELCOMED) THAT H.M.G. WERE NOW IN THE LEAD, WITH THE U.S. ADMINISTRATION IN SUPPORT; AND THAT THE LATTER SEEMED SATISFIED WITH THIS APPROACH. WE THOUGHT THE PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE TO THE PRIME MINISTER AFTER THE COMMONWEALTH CONFERENCE (LUSAKA TELNO 6 TO WASHINGTON) BORE OUT THIS INTERPRETATION.

2. FUNK, SPEAKING PERSONALLY, SAID THAT WE MIGHT PICK UP SOME SIGNALS FROM MOOSE AND LAKE (WHO BOTH HAD A LONG-STANDING PERSONAL INVESTMENT IN THE RHODESIA PROBLEM) THAT THE U.S. ADMINISTRATION OUGHT TO BE MORE INVOLVED IN THE PLANNING OF THE NEXT STAGE. HE HAD DECLINED TO GO WITH THEM TO LONDON NEXT WEEK TO AVOID THE IMPRESSION OF A POLICY FORMING VISIT. BRZEZINSKI (AND, HE ASSERTED, THE PRESIDENT) THOUGHT IT WAS RIGHT FOR BRITAIN TO BE IN THE LEAD. NOT ONLY WAS THIS THE BEST POSTURE FOR THE U.S. ADMINISTRATION DOMESTICALLY, IT WAS ALSO BEST FOR THE SUCCESS OF THE NEGOTIATIONS. IN THE PAST THESE HAD BEEN BEDEVILLED BY THE IDEA IN THE MINDS OF EACH OF THE PARTIES THAT THEY NEED NOT MAKE TOUGH CONCESSIONS BECAUSE THEY COULD RUN OFF TO THEIR FRIENDS IN THE U.S. CONGRESS OR THE U.S. ADMINISTRATION WITH SPECIAL PLEADING ON THIS OR THAT ISSUE. HE THOUGHT THE COMMONWEALTH COMMUNIQUE COULD NOT BE BETTERED FOR THE WAY IN WHICH IT BROUGHT EQUAL PRESSURE TO BEAR ON ALL PARTIES.

3. WE SAID WE THOUGHT THE NEED TO KEEP UP THIS PRESSURE WAS VERY MUCH IN YOUR MIND - HENCE THE SPEED WITH WHICH H.M.G. WERE MOVING AHEAD. IT HAD TO BE CLEAR THAT H.M.G. WERE TAKING THE DECISIONS FOR THERE TO BE A CHANCE OF SUCCESS AT THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE. BUT IT WAS ESSENTIAL THAT THE U.S. SHOULD BACK US UP IN PUBLIC AND IN PRIVATE WHEN THE DIFFICULT ISSUES CAME TO THE FORE.

4. FUNK SAID THAT THE NSC HAD AGREED TO THE REFERENCE TO CONSULTATION IN THE PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE TO THE PRIME MINISTER UNDER PRESSURE FROM THE STATE DEPARTMENT ONLY BECAUSE THEY FELT IT ESSENTIAL FOR THE U.S. ADMINISTRATION TO BE SEEN TO BE CLOSELY LINKED WITH H.M.G. HE HOPED WE WOULD NOT BE MISLEAD INTO THINKING THE AMERICANS WANTED TO HAVE THE SAME DEGREE OF INVOLVEMENT AS UNDER THE A.A.P., WHATEVER MOOSE AND LAKE MIGHT SAY NEXT WEEK. HE ASKED THAT IN REPORTING HIS REMARKS WE SHOULD NOT POINT THESE UP AS INSTITUTIONAL DISAGREEMENTS BETWEEN THE STATE DEPARTMENT AND THE N.S.C. THE BROAD THRUST OF U.S. POLICY WAS AGREED. HE SIMPLY WISHED TO REMOVE ANY NUANCES THERE MIGHT BE SUGGESTING THE U.S. ADMINISTRATION WANTED A LARGER ROLE OR WOULD BE HAPPIER WITH THE OLD AAP RELATIONSHIP. ON THE CONTRARY THE WHITE HOUSE THOUGHT OUR PRESENT POLICY OFFERED THE BEST CHANCE OF A WAY FORWARD, THOUGH THE ODDS REMAINED LONG.

ROBINSON

FILES

HD/RHOD.D

HD/NAMD

PS

PS/LPS

PS/MR BLAKER

PS/MR LUCE

PS/PUS

MR WILLSON

MR BYATT

MR HALL

COPIES TO:

SIR J. HUNT

CABINET OFFICE

PS/NO 10 DOWNING ST.

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

FCO low: "OK"

by
21/8 pa.

20 August 1979

Dear Bryan,

Thank you for your letter of 13 August with which you sent me a copy of a telegram addressed to the Prime Minister about the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting in Lusaka.

The President's message crossed with a message from the Prime Minister to him in his capacity as current Chairman of the OAU (FCO telegram no 78 to Monrovia enclosed) about arrangements for the Rhodesia Constitutional Conference.

I enclose a draft telegram which instructs our Ambassador in Monrovia to thank the President on the Prime Minister's behalf for his message of congratulation. The latter's warm terms are a striking contrast to the resolution passed on Rhodesia at the OAU Heads of State Conference over which the President presided last month, and the message can be taken as a much more accurate reflection of President Tolbert's own views. It is particularly encouraging that, as he says in the message, he took an early opportunity to express his support publicly.

Yours ever,

(J S Wall)
Private Secretary

Bryan G Cartledge Esq
10 Downing Street
LONDON

CONFIDENTIAL

20 AUG 1979



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FROM F.C.O. 131425Z AUG 79

TO IMMEDIATE MONROVIA

TELEGRAM NUMBER 79 OF 13 AUGUST 1979

DESKBY 131500Z

RHODESIA

1. PLEASE TRANSMIT THE FOLLOWING PERSONAL MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO PRESIDENT TOLBERT, TO REACH HIM FIRST THING TOMORROW 14 AUGUST.
BEGINS:

DEAR MR PRESIDENT, YOU WILL HAVE SEEN THE TEXT OF THE AGREEMENT ON RHODESIA WHICH WAS REACHED AT THE COMMONWEALTH HEADS OF GOVERNMENT MEETING IN LUSAKA ON 5 AUGUST. WE BELIEVE THAT THIS AGREEMENT HAS MADE IT POSSIBLE TO ESTABLISH A NEW BASIS FOR PROGRESS TOWARDS A SOLUTION TO THE RHODESIAN PROBLEM WHICH HAS POSED SUCH A THREAT TO THE STABILITY OF SOUTHERN AFRICA.

IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE TERMS OF THAT AGREEMENT WE ARE NOW ISSUING INVITATIONS TO BISHOP MUZOREWA AND THE LEADERS OF THE PATRIOTIC FRONT TO ATTEND A CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE IN LONDON. THIS WILL BE THE FIRST STEP IN A PROCESS WHICH IS BOUND TO BE DIFFICULT. I KNOW THAT YOU YOURSELF HAVE ALWAYS FAVOURED A SETTLEMENT INVOLVING NEGOTIATIONS WITH ALL THE PARTIES TO THE CONFLICT, AS YOU EXPLAINED TO RICHARD LUCE WHEN YOU KINDLY RECEIVED HIM IN JUNE. I AM THEREFORE COUNTING ON YOUR SUPPORT IN OUR EFFORTS TO BRING A LASTING SETTLEMENT BASED ON GENUINE BLACK MAJORITY RULE IN RHODESIA.
YOURS SINCERELY,

MARGARET THATCHER

ENDS:

2. YOU MAY DRAW ON FCO TELNOS 139-142 TO MIRANDA SALISBURY IN TALKING TO GOVERNMENT TO WHICH YOU ARE ACCREDITED. YOU SHOULD ALSO MAKE FULL USE OF GUIDANCE MATERIAL.

CARRINGTON

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MISS BROWN
MR. THOMAS
MR. WILLSON
MR. WILLIAMS

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Drafted by
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~~Sir A Parsons~~

~~Lord N G Lennox~~
Miss Brown
Mr Thomas
Mr Willson
Mr Williams, Mr Byatt

[TEXT] see T62^{AA}/797
RHODESIA: MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT TOLBERT TO THE PRIME MINISTER

1. The Prime Minister has received the following message from President Tolbert by telegram dated 9 August:
BEGINS:
"Your Excellency,
I have followed with keen interest the activities of the Commonwealth Summit Meeting which was held in Lusaka and now that it has come to a close I seize this opportunity to extend to you my heartfelt congratulations for the outstanding successes achieved during this historic conference which has been reported as the most successful Commonwealth summit in recent years. I was indeed gratified to learn of decision taken regarding the peaceful settlement of the Zimbabwean question and I trust that all concerned and particularly the international community will give every support for its successful implementation to avoid any further bloodshed and the escalation of hostility to the distress of
-1- /humanity.

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humanity. Upon learning of this important decision on Monday the sixth when I had the occasion to receive the credentials of the American Ambassador to Liberia I publicly welcomed the decision for as I understand it provides for Britain to draw up a new constitution for the territory and to supervise fresh elections to be attended by Commonwealth observers. I also noted that it calls for an all-party conference including representatives of the Patriotic Front to be arranged by Britain which would lead to a cease fire and the lifting of sanctions. I stated further that the Commonwealth Summit realizing the defective character of the present Zimbabwe Rhodesia constitution, recognized the constitutional responsibility of Britain to grant legal independence to that country on the basis of majority rule for such a democratic constitution will of course include safeguards for the rights of the minority. It is therefore my fervent hope that this matter will be timely resolved in the interest of peace in Africa and our one world.

With renewed sentiments of my highest consideration and esteem.

WR TOLBERT JR

ENDS

2. Please convey the Prime Minister's warm thanks to the President for his message, which crossed with the Prime Minister's own message of 14 August to him (our telno 78). You should say that the Prime Minister is most grateful for his support, and for fact that President took an early opportunity to express this publicly.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

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FM F C O 201600Z AUG 79
TO IMMEDIATE MOSCOW
TELNO 485 OF 20 AUGUST

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Prime Minister

CALL ON THE SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTER: RHODESIA.

me *Gu*
21/8

1. ON YOUR RETURN TO MOSCOW PLEASE SEEK AN EARLY CALL ON GROMYKO SAYING THAT YOU HAD CONVERSATIONS WITH THE PRIME MINISTER AND ME ON 10 AUGUST. YOU HAVE DISCRETION TO CALL INSTEAD ON A DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER BUT ONLY IF IT IS QUITE CLEAR THAT GROMYKO CANNOT RECEIVE YOU REASONABLY SOON.
2. YOU SHOULD SAY THAT WE REMAIN READY TO WORK FOR IMPROVED BRITISH-SOVIET RELATIONS AND THAT WE LOOK FOR A MATCHING EFFORT FROM THE SOVIET SIDE. DETENTE MUST BE A TWO-WAY PROCESS AND APPLY THROUGHOUT THE WORLD INCLUDING IN AFRICA.
3. YOU SHOULD GO ON TO SAY THAT I HAVE INSTRUCTED YOU TO MENTION IN PARTICULAR THE PROBLEM OF RHODESIA, WHERE WE ARE TRYING TO DEAL WITH AN EXCEPTIONALLY DIFFICULT SITUATION. YOU SHOULD SAY THAT WE CONSIDER IT IMPERATIVE THAT A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT, BASED ON GENUINE MAJORITY RULE, SHOULD BE ACHIEVED. IN OUR VIEW, THE AGREEMENT REACHED AT CHGM IN LUSAKA PROVIDES A BASIS FOR REAL PROGRESS TOWARDS THAT OBJECTIVE. THIRTY-NINE NATIONS OF THE COMMONWEALTH, REPRESENTING A CROSS-SECTION OF INTERNATIONAL OPINION, HAVE STRONGLY ENDORSED OUR APPROACH TO A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT IN RHODESIA AND OUR DECISION TO CALL A CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE. THEY HAVE ACCEPTED THE OBJECTIVE OF SEEKING A CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES AND AN END TO SANCTIONS AS PART OF THE PROCESS OF IMPLEMENTING A LASTING SETTLEMENT. THESE NATIONS INCLUDE THREE STATES SUFFERING DIRECTLY FROM THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE RHODESIAN CONFLICT. WE AND OUR COMMONWEALTH PARTNERS THEREFORE HOPE THAT OTHER MEMBERS OF THE UNITED NATIONS WILL GIVE THE FULLEST SUPPORT TO OUR EFFORTS TO END THE BLOODSHED THROUGH A JUST SETTLEMENT. AS A FIRST STEP WE HAVE PUT FORWARD CONSTITUTIONAL PROPOSALS AND HAVE INVITED THE LEADERS OF THE PATRIOTIC FRONT AND THE SALISBURY ADMINISTRATION TO A CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE IN LONDON FROM 10 SEPTEMBER. YOU SHOULD GO ON TO SAY THAT I THEREFORE HOPE THAT THE SOVIET UNION

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WILL DO WHATEVER IS IN ITS POWER TO HELP US BRING ABOUT AN ACCEPTABLE AND PEACEFUL SOLUTION WHICH WOULD BE IN THE INTERESTS NOT ONLY OF THE PEOPLE OF RHODESIA BUT OF STABILITY IN SOUTHERN AFRICA AS A WHOLE.

4. FOR THE REST, YOU SHOULD BE GUIDED BY GUIDANCE TELEGRAMS 100 AND 101 AND VERBATIM 50.

5. YOU SHOULD ALSO SAY THAT I HOPE TO SEE GROMYKO IN NEW YORK IN SEPTEMBER.

CARRINGTON.

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PS/MRHURD
PS/MR BLAKER
PS/PUS
SIR. A. DUFF
MR FERLYSSON
MR WILKSON

COPIES TO:

~~MR CARTLEDGE~~
NO 10 DOWNING ST.

PS/CABINET OFFICE
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CANADA

PRIME MINISTER · PREMIER MINISTRE

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T82/79T

Ottawa, K1A 0A2
August 20, 1979.

Dear Prime Minister:


I would like to thank you for your message on Rhodesia.

As I have told you personally and have repeated in public statements since Lusaka, your contribution to the success of the Conference is immeasurable. I have studied the constitutional proposals which your Government has drafted and in my view they provide a most positive basis for discussion at the Constitutional Conference scheduled for September 10.

Clearly the road ahead will be a difficult one with opposing sides having what they regard as essential and often contradictory interests to protect. As your Government embarks on this process of negotiation you may be assured of my continued personal support and that of my Government for your efforts to achieve a settlement.

Yours sincerely,

The Right Honourable Margaret Thatcher,
Prime Minister of Great Britain



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Prime Minister

FM LUSAKA 200855Z AUG 79

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TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 919 OF 20 AUGUST
INFO IMMEDIATE MIRIMBA SALISBURY, MAPUTO, DAR ES SALAAM,
PRIORITY LUANDA, LAGOS, GABOSRONE, UKMIS NEW YORK, WASHINGTON,
ADDIS ABABA

RHODESIA: CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE

DAR ES SALAAM'S 681 OF 19 AUGUST.

1. JOSHUA NKOMO INFORMED ME THIS MORNING THAT THE PATRIOTIC FRONT WOULD ATTEND THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE AND THIS WOULD BE ANNOUNCED THIS MORNING (20 AUGUST). HE SAID HE WISHED TO INFORM ME BY TELEPHONE AS HE FEARED THAT THE FORMAL LETTER WOULD NOT REACH ME BEFORE THE PRESS ANNOUNCEMENT WAS MADE. WHEN ASKED IF THE TEXT OF THE LETTER WAS ONE OF SIMPLE ACCEPTANCE, HE SAID THAT WOULD BECOME CLEAR WHEN WE RECEIVED THE LETTER.

2. NKOMO SAID HE RETURNED FROM DAR ES SALAAM LAST NIGHT. HE ALSO SAID HE WAS NOT AWARE THAT THE FLS PRESIDENTS WERE TO HOLD A MEETING IN THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE.

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TO IMMEDIATE FCO (DESKBY 191130Z)

TELNO 681 OF 19 AUGUST

INFO IMMEDIATE LUSAKA MIRAMBA SALISBURY MAPUTO

INFO PRIORITY LUANDA LAGOS GABORONE UKMIS NEW YORK WASHINGTON

ADDIS ABABA

FOR RHODESIA DEPT DUTY OFFICER :

RHODESIA : MEETING OF PATRIOTIC FRONT.

1. ZANU AND ZAPU LEADERS HELD SEPERATE MEETINGS YESTERDAY BUT MUGABE AND NKOMO ARE APPARENTLY MEETING NOW. THEY MAY STAY ON HERE UNTIL TOMORROW AS PRESIDENT NYERERE IS SAID TO BE RETURNING FROM HIS UP-COUNTRY HOLIDAY THEN.
2. ON THEIR ARRIVAL YESTERDAY THE TWO LEADERS HELD SEPARATE NEWS CONFERENCES. THE MAIN POINTS WERE
 - A) NO CEASEFIRE BEFORE ANY CONSTITUTIONAL TALKS (MUGABE AND NKOMO BOTH SAID THIS)
 - B) NO SINGLE FORCE SHOULD BE IN CHARGE DURING THE INTERIM PERIOD RESPONSIBLE FOR ENSURING THAT ELECTIONS WERE FREE AND FAIR. THE PF FORCES MUST HAVE A ROLE IN SUPERVISING LAW AND ORDER BUT IT WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE FOR THEM TO WORK ALONG SIDE U.N.

TROOPS.

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/C) PF FORCES

Prime Minister

20/8

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C) PF FORCES SHOULD FORM THE NEW ZIMBABWE ARMY AS PART OF THE ARRANGEMENTS AGREED FOR THE NEW INDEPENDANT STATE TO TAKE EFFECT AFTER THE ELECTIONS.

ACCORDING TO THE LOCAL REUTERS CORRESPONDANT POINTS (B) AND (C) EMERGED AS A RESULT OF MUGABE CLARIFYING IN REPLY TO QUESTIONS EARLIER STATEMENTS (MADE IN MAPUTO) THAT THE PRESENT RHODESIAN ARMY WOULD HAVE TO BE DISMANTLED AND REPLACED BY P.F. TROOPS AS PART OF THE ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE INTERIM PERIOD. ACCORDING TO REUTERS NKOMO'S REPLIES TO SIMILAR QUESTIONS WERE INCOHERENT.

3. ALTHOUGH NEITHER MAN WOULD SAY SO THE PRESS CORRESPONDANTS HAD THE FIRM IMPRESSION FROM THE TONE OF THEIR REMARKS THAT THE P.F. WOULD ACCEPT THE INVITATION TO THE LONDON TALKS. AN ANNOUNCEMENT TO THIS EFFECT MAY BE MADE THIS AFTERNOON.

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FM MIRIMBA SALISBURY 180715Z AUG 79

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELNO 544 OF 18 AUGUST

INFO PRIORITY PRETORIA AND WASHINGTON

Prime Minister

mm
20/8

RHODESIA: MEETING WITH DAVID SMITH

1. I CALLED ON DAVID SMITH (MINISTER OF FINANCE) YESTERDAY.
2. SMITH SAID THAT MUZOREWA HAD CONSULTED HIM ABOUT THE INCLUSION OF SITHOLE IN THE DELEGATION FOR THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE. HE HAD ADVISED THAT SITHOLE BE INCLUDED. IT WAS PREFERABLE TO HAVE HIM IN THE TEAM RATHER THAN LEAVE HIM TO SNIPE FROM THE SIDELINES. ACCORDING TO SMITH, THE BISHOP SAID THAT HE WAS COMING ROUND TO THE SAME CONCLUSION. WE KNOW THAT HE HAS BEEN RECEIVING SIMILAR ADVICE FROM OTHERQUARTERS.
3. DAVID SMITH RAISED THE QUESTION OF IAN SMITH. HE SAID THAT, IN HIS VIEW, IAN SMITH SHOULD BE INCLUDED IN THE DELEGATION. ANY AGREEMENT REACHED WOULD HAVE TO BE SOLD TO THE WHITES IN RHODESIA. IAN SMITH WAS STILL THE BEST PERSON TO DO THIS. HE WAS NOW MORE MODERATE IN HIS VIEWS AND WOULD MAKE NO PROBLEMS FOR THE BISHOP IN LONDON. DAVID SMITH ASKED MY VIEWS.
4. I SAID THAT HMG LEFT THE CHOICE ENTIRELY TO THE BISHOP. I ADDED, AS A STRICTLY PERSONAL COMMENT, THAT I ACCEPTED THE CONSIDERABLE INFLUENCE THAT IAN SMITH HAD OVER THE WHITES. NEVERTHELESS HIS PRESENCE IN LONDON COULD IMPEDE THE PROCESS OF FINDING AN ACCEPTABLE SETTLEMENT. SMITH REMAINED A SYMBOL OF MINORITY DOMINATION AND HIS INCLUSION IN THE DELEGATION WOULD CREATE A PSYCHOLOGICAL ATMOSPHERE THAT WOULD NOT BE HELPFUL. FURTHERMORE, HIS PRESENCE WOULD, IN MY VIEW, DIMINISH THE CREDITABILITY OF THE BISHOP AND REVIVE THE ALLEGATIONS THAT SMITH RETAINED EFFECTIVE CONTROL IN RHODESIA. THE DISADVANTAGES OF HIS INCLUSION OUTWEIGHED THE ADVANTAGES.

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5. DAVID SMITH TOOK IN THESE POINTS AND WILL NO DOUBT CONSIDER THEM. IT WAS , HOWEVER, FAIRLY CLEAR FROM HIS INITIAL REMARKS THAT, IF ASKED OF THE BISHOP (WHICH HE SAYS HE HAS NOT YET BEEN) HE WILL FAVOUR IAN SMITHS INCLUSION IN THE DELEGATION.

6. WE DISCUSSED BRIEFLY THE NEED FOR CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE. HE DID NOT FORESEEE INSUPERABLE PROBLEMS AS THE BASES OF OUR OUTLINE. HE WENT SO FAR AS TO SAY THAT THE SENIOR CIVIL SERVANTS IN HIS MINISTRY WOULD RAISE NO OBJECTIONS TO A FORMULA WHICH RESTORED CONTROL OVER SENIOR APPOINTMENTS TO MINISTERS, AFTER DUE CONSULTATION WITH THE PUBLIC SERVICES COMMISSION.

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MISS BROWN
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FM FCO 171545Z AUG 79

TO IMMEDIATE MIRIMBA SALISBURY

TELEGRAM NUMBER 156 OF 17 AUGUST

INFO IMMEDIATE PRETORIA, PRIORITY LUSAKA, GABORONE, LUANDA, DAR ES SALAAM, WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK.

Prime Minister

by
20/8

YOUR TELNO 531: RHODESIA CONFERENCE

1. YOU CAN TELL BISHOP MUZOREWA THAT WE HAVE NO INTENTION OF CHANGING THE ARRANGEMENT WHEREBY HE, AS THE ELECTED HEAD OF THE SALISBURY ADMINISTRATION, IS INVITED TO APPOINT THE DELEGATION. WE HAVE NOTED FROM THE RHODESIAN CABINET STATEMENT THAT THE INTENTION IS TO INCLUDE REPRESENTATIVES OF ALL PARTIES IN THE GOVERNING COALITION. WE HAVE NO INTENTION OF ADDRESSING INVITATIONS TO THE INDIVIDUAL POLITICAL PARTIES.
2. YOU SHOULD EXPLAIN THE POSITION TO CHIRAU (YOUR TELEGRAM NO 524) IN AS CONCILIATORY A MANNER AS POSSIBLE. YOU SHOULD SAY THAT WE APPRECIATE THE FACT THAT HE HAS BEEN A CONSTANT ADVOCATE OF A CONFERENCE. WE HOPE THAT HIS INFLUENCE IN THE PERIOD BEFORE AND DURING THE CONFERENCE WILL BE EXERTED TO HELP TO PROMOTE THE CHANCE OF A SUCCESSFUL OUTCOME.
3. AT AN APPROPRIATE MOMENT, YOU SHOULD REPLY ACCORDINGLY TO CHIKEREMA (YOUR TELNO 525), SAYING THAT I HAVE RECEIVED HIS MESSAGE BUT THAT WE DO NOT INTEND TO ADDRESS SEPARATE INVITATIONS TO ALL THE INDIVIDUAL POLITICAL PARTIES (THIS HOLDS GOOD ALSO FOR THE PATRIOTIC FRONT). FOR YOUR BACKGROUND GUIDANCE, IT WOULD OF COURSE BE OPEN TO THE BISHOP TO INCLUDE CHIKEREMA IN HIS DELEGATION, THOUGH HE IS MOST UNLIKELY TO DO SO. CHIKEREMA'S CLAIM TO ATTEND BY VIRTUE OF HIS SEVEN SEATS IN PARLIAMENT IGNORES THE FACT THAT THEY WERE ELECTED AS MEMBERS OF THE U A N C. WE EXPECTED CHIKEREMA TO REACT BADLY, BUT IF WE WERE TO TAKE A DIFFERENT VIEW THIS WOULD CAUSE SERIOUS PROBLEMS WITH MUZOREWA.

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4. WE AGREE THAT YOU SHOULD NOT INITIATE FURTHER DISCUSSION WITH SITHOLE. IF APPROACHED, YOU SHOULD REFER AGAIN TO OUR EXPECTATION THAT THE DELEGATION WILL BE AS REPRESENTATIVE AS POSSIBLE (WHILE THIS IS A MATTER BETWEEN HIM AN MUZOREWA, IT IS CLEARLY IMPORTANT THAT SITHOLE'S PARTY, WHICH WON 12 SEATS IN THE ELECTIONS, SHOULD BE REPRESENTED).

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MR.WILLIAMS

ADDITIONAL DISTN.
RHODESIA POLICY

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

17 August 1979

Dear Bryan,

and

Prime Minister

BGM
17/8

Rhodesia Reactions to the Invitations to the Constitutional
Conference

I enclose a summary of the reactions so far to the Government's announcement about the Constitutional Conference on Rhodesia.

The response has been satisfactory. Bishop Muzorewa has accepted the invitation. The composition of his delegation has not yet been decided, but it will be based on the Salisbury administration. We have confirmed that the representation from Salisbury is for Muzorewa to decide (he has sought reassurance on this point). This - as expected - has brought protests from the minor parties (Chikerema and Chirau), but there is no question of issuing separate invitations to them.

The Patriotic Front are reported to have rejected a ceasefire in advance of the negotiations. But it is clear that they would find themselves in an extremely difficult position if they refused to attend the Conference. Mr Nkomo and Mr Mugabe are due to meet this weekend to decide their reply.

President Nyerere may press us to be more specific about our proposals before the conference and we all resist this. But the Tanzanian Foreign Minister has described the outline constitution as a reasonable one, commenting that it should cause no problems if taken strictly on its merits.

I am copying this letter and enclosure to Martin Vile (Cabinet Office).

Yours ever,
Stephen

(J S Wall)
Private Secretary

B G Cartledge Esq
No 10 Downing Street

RHODESIA: FIRST REACTIONS TO THE INVITATION TO THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE AND THE OUTLINE PROPOSALS FOR CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGES

1. On 14 August the formal invitations to attend the Constitutional Conference in London on 10 September together with an outline of the proposed Constitution were delivered to Bishop Muzorewa, Mr Nkomo and ZANU Vice-President Muzenda. On the same day texts of these documents were transmitted to governments in Commonwealth countries, the United States, the EEC and other interested states.

THE SALISBURY ADMINISTRATION

2. The invitation was considered by Bishop Muzorewa's government at a special Cabinet meeting on 15 August. A statement issued afterwards said that it had been decided to accept. The statement stressed the fact that the government held office as a result of the April elections and that consequently the delegation would consist of representatives of the government of national unity. The invitation was accepted on the basis that there would be no preconditions. The Bishop's party (the UANC) have issued a statement welcoming our proposals and accepting the possibility of some constitutional change.

3. The invitation and the proposals had been handed over in advance to Bishop Muzorewa. He was relieved to learn that there would be no participation from other Commonwealth Governments and that the composition of the Salisbury delegation would be for him to decide. He reiterated his worries about new elections. In further comments to Mr Day on 16 August, Muzorewa expressed concern about the possibility of invitations being issued to further parties to attend the Conference. He also said that his Cabinet would have hoped for prior consultation on the British Government's outline proposals for an independence constitution.

4. The Secretary to the Cabinet, Mr George Smith, sought to argue that our proposals, except for the public service commissions, involved no change from the existing Constitution. An FCO Legal Adviser is now in Salisbury for discussions with Mr Smith.

5. Chief Chirau, who was defeated at the April elections, has complained about his exclusion from the Conference. Mr Chikerema, leader of the break-away Zimbabwe Democratic Party, has also protested. We shall be sticking to the line that the Salisbury delegation is for Muzorewa to decide.

PATRIOTIC FRONT

6. The invitation and outline of the Constitution was handed to Nkomo at Heathrow. He asked few questions, but objected to the provision for the police and armed forces commissions. He also questioned the basis on which Bishop Muzorewa was being invited. He rang the FCO the next day to say that he had no further points to raise but would be replying within ten days when he had discussed the proposals with his colleagues.

7. In Maputo, Mr Mugabe telephoned from Rwanda as the invitation was being handed over to ZANU Vice-President Muzenda. Muzenda said that he could not comment and only asked who else was being invited other than Bishop Muzorewa.

FRONT LINE STATES

8. The Mozambican Foreign Minister said that the Mozambicans would have to await Patriotic Front reactions before commenting. The Government-controlled newspaper has commented favourably, but said that ZANU could not accept proposals based on the existing Constitution.

9. In Dar es Salaam the documents were handed to a senior official in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and to President Nyerere's personal adviser, Miss Wicken. Miss Wicken's reaction indicated that President Nyerere may try to press us to put forward more detailed proposals (which he would try to pre-negotiate) before the conference opens but the Tanzanian Foreign Minister has welcomed our proposals.

10. Sir Seretse Khama expressed pleasure at the speed with which we were acting and hoped that both sides would accept the invitation. He said that the Patriotic Front would isolate themselves if they refused to attend. He has reservations about special representation for the white minority, but is prepared to accept this. The Botswana Foreign Minister has announced that Botswana do not accept that the Patriotic Front can be regarded as the sole representatives of the people of Zimbabwe.

SOUTH AFRICA

11. The South African Foreign Minister reacted more calmly than after the Lusaka agreement. He found some parts of the proposals encouraging, and said that it was right to discourage the parties from taking up firm positions before the conference began. He said that the South African Government would be guided in their views by those of the Salisbury Government.

UNITED STATES

12. The State Department have offered to give their assistance in the run-up to the Conference, and have instructed their posts overseas to give general support to the UK's current moves.

EEC

13. Reactions from EEC capitals have been very favourable. The Dutch have said that the Netherlands will give the proposed constitutional conference their fullest support. The Danish Foreign Minister has replied to the Secretary of State with a message of congratulation.

OTHER COUNTRIES

14. Although the communiqué signed by Mr Manley on his visit to Mozambique was unhelpful, the reaction from other Commonwealth countries has been generally encouraging. Mr Fraser has issued a public statement strongly supporting the Government's announcement. The Canadians have said that they will do whatever is necessary to support our initiative.

15. Of countries outside the Commonwealth and the EEC, Portugal has made a helpful offer of support.

UN SECRETARY-GENERAL

16. In a personal message to Lord Carrington, Dr Waldheim has promised to support in the search for a settlement "consonant with the principles laid down by the United Nations".

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

17 August 1979

CONFIDENTIAL

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

17 August 1979

ant
Prime Minister

Dear Bryan,

MM
17/8

Rhodesia

In your letter of 9 August, you asked for advice on President Khama's remarks to the Prime Minister about the need to "work on" President Kaunda,

As Seretse Khama indicated, all the Front Line states are war-weary. They are also dissatisfied with the disunity and - at times - exaggerated claims of the Patriotic Front. But President Machel is strongly committed to support for ZANU (Mugabe) and his attitude to the Rhodesia conflict is influenced by the experience of FRELIMO in Mozambique. President Kaunda is committed to Mr Nkomo. But it is Zambia which has most to gain from a settlement. Lord Carrington agrees therefore that we should work on President Kaunda to exert maximum pressure for a settlement.

Lord Carrington discussed with Lord Harlech yesterday the need for a further visit to Africa at the end of the month to see Presidents Kaunda, Nyerere, Khama and Machel. There are disadvantages, as this could lead to attempts by President Nyerere or others to try to pre-negotiate with us the kind of constitutional proposals we shall be putting forward at Lancaster House. But Lord Harlech would be prepared to make a round of visits if necessary; and we shall in any event be working on the terms of an approach to President Kaunda.

Lord Carrington has sought Mr Day's views on the proposed visit to Salisbury by Mr Blaker and Tony Duff. Mr Day thinks that such a visit could be useful, though he

/would

B G Cartledge Esq
No 10 Downing Street

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- 2 -

would like to give further advice on this next week.
If Mr Blaker goes to Salisbury, it would be necessary also
to offer a visit by Lord Harlech to the Front Line States,
including discussions with the Patriotic Front.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Martin Vile
(Cabinet Office).

Yours ever,
Stephen

(J S Wall)
Private Secretary

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cc PS ✓
PS Mr Blaker

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Rhodesia Dept

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DACCA TL 248

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PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

FROM: F S MILES, DACCA

FILE REF: 22/5 17 AUGUST 1979

FOLLOWING FOR: D F MURRAY AUSS.

1. YOU HAVE PROBABLY SEEN MY TELEGRAMS NUMBERS 268 AND 269 OF 16 AUGUST RECORDING THE CALL I MADE WITH MARTIN HINE ON THE FOREIGN MINISTER, WHEN WE DISCUSSED RHODESIA, VIETNAM AND KAMPUCHIA, THE LATTER IN THE CONTEXT OF THE COMING NON-ALIGNED SUMMIT IN HAVANA.
2. I THINK YOU MAY ALSO BE INTERESTED TO KNOW THAT PROF SHAMSUL HUQ, WHO ALWAYS SPEAKS WITH SINCERITY, SAID THAT THE PRESIDENT AND HIMSELF HAD BEEN MOST HEARTENED BY THE SPIRIT OF THE COMMONWEALTH HEADS OF GOVERNMENT MEETING IN LUSAKA. THE COMMONWEALTH, HE SAID, HAD BECOME MUCH MORE THAN A CLUB AND WAS TACKLING PROBLEMS IN A CONSTRUCTIVE WAY.
3. THE PRESIDENT AND HE HAD GREATLY APPRECIATED THE VERY FRIENDLY PERSONAL CONTACTS WITH MRS THATCHER AND LORD CARRINGTON. ON RHODESIA, HUQ THOUGHT THE PRIME MINISTER HAD BEEN "STATESMANLIKE AND VERY OBJECTIVE". HE HAD ALSO BEEN MOST IMPRESSED BY HER CLARITY OF EXPRESSION IN HER CONFERENCE STATEMENTS. HE ALSO PAID TRIBUTE TO THE FOREIGN SECRETARY, REMARKING ON HIS WISDOM AND GREAT EXPERIENCE OF WORLD AFFAIRS.
4. SUBSEQUENTLY, AMINUL ISLAM, DIRECTOR, MFA, WHO HAD BEEN PRESENT AT OUR DISCUSSION, TOLD US THAT IN LUSAKA PRESIDENT ZIA AND SHAMSUL HUQ HAD URGED AFRICAN DELEGATIONS TO BE MODERATE, AND WILLING TO COMPROMISE, ON RHODESIA. THE BANGLADESHIS THOUGHT THAT THEY MAY HAVE HAD SOME EFFECT.
5. THE FOREIGN MINISTER TOLD US, INCIDENTALLY, THAT PRESIDENT ZIA HAD RAISED WITH MRS THATCHER THE PROBLEMS CREATED BY OUR AID DEFERMENTS IN DELAYING IMPORTANT PROJECTS. HE SAID THE PRIME MINISTER HAD UNDERTAKEN TO LOOK INTO THIS. SHAMSUL HUQ HAD ALSO MENTIONED THE MATTER SEPARATELY AND INFORMALLY TO LORD CARRINGTON.

F S MILES

NNNN

Rhodesia

BF 28.8.79



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

17 August 1979

I enclose a copy of a letter which has been addressed to the Prime Minister by Professor John Hutchinson about the Rhodesian constitution. I have sent a simple acknowledgement which does not promise a reply.

I shall be grateful if you would let me know if there are any points in Professor Hutchinson's letter or in its enclosure of which the Prime Minister should be made aware.

B. G. CARTLEDGE

J.S. Wall, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

17 August 1979

I am writing on the Prime Minister's behalf to thank you for your letter of 10 August about Rhodesia's constitution, with which you enclosed a copy of your recent letter to Bishop Abel Muzorewa.

E. G. CARTLEDGE

Professor John Hutchinson



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

17 August 1979

I am writing on the Prime Minister's behalf to thank you for your letter of 16 August, in which you conveyed to her the text of a message from the Prime Minister of New Zealand, the Rt. Hon. Robert Muldoon, about Rhodesia.

I am of course bringing your letter to the Prime Minister's immediate attention.

B. G. CARLEDGE

His Excellency the Honourable L.W. Gandar



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

16 August 1979

I am writing on the Prime Minister's behalf to thank you for your letter of 15 August, with which you were good enough to enclose the text of a letter to the Prime Minister from the Prime Minister of Australia, the Rt. Hon. Malcolm Fraser.

I am, of course, bringing Mr. Fraser's letter to the Prime Minister's immediate attention.

B. G. CARTLEDGE

His Excellency The Hon. Sir Gordon Freeth, KBE.

CCM

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GR 540

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FM MIRIMBA SALISBURY 161300Z AUG 79

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 1539 OF 16 AUGUST

INFO PRIORITY PRETORIA MAPUTO LUSAKA GABORONE LUANDA DAR ES SALAAM
LAGOS WASHINGTON AND UKMIS NEW YORK

Prime Minister

Gen
17/8

RHODESIA: CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE

1. I CALLED ON SITHOLE TODAY AT HIS REQUEST.
2. SITHOLE ASKED FOR CLARIFICATION ABOUT THE STATUS OF OUR INVITATION TO MUZOREWA, WAS HE BEING INVITED AS PRIME MINISTER OR HEAD OF THE GOVERNMENT OF HEAD OF THE "SALISBURY ADMINISTRATION"? HE ALSO ASKED WHY WE HAD ISSUED INVITATIONS IN THIS WAY AND NOT TO THE LEADERS OF THE VARIOUS POLITICAL PARTIES IN RHODESIA.
3. I TOLD SITHOLE THAT HMG WISHED TO CONDUCT A SUCCESSFUL CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE. THE PROCEDURE THAT THEY WERE FOLLOWING WAS IN THEIR VIEW THE ONE MOST LIKELY TO ACHIEVE SUCCESS. IT RECOGNISED THE POLITICAL REALITY IN RHODESIA FOLLOWING THE INTERNAL SETTLEMENT, THE LOCALLY AGREED CONSTITUTION, THE ELECTIONS AND THE EMERGENCE OF BLACK MAJORITY RULE WITH A REPRESENTATIVE ADMINISTRATION LED BY MUZOREWA. I ADDED THAT ZANU (SITHOLE) HAD BEEN FULLY ASSOCIATED WITH THIS WHOLE PROCESS AND HAD NOW TAKEN THEIR PLACE IN THE GOVERNMENT OF NATIONAL UNITY. IT SEEMED TO US SENSIBLE TO INVITE THE BISHOP TO SELECT A DELEGATION ON THE BASIS OF THESE REALITIES. I ADDED THAT IT WAS IMPRESSION THAT ZANU (SITHOLE) AGREED WITH HMG THAT THE EXISTING CONSTITUTION WAS DEFECTIVE AND THAT AMENDMENTS WERE NECESSARY. I WOULD THEREFORE HAVE EXPECTED THEM TO WELCOME OUR PLAN FOR A CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE AND TO DO ALL THAT THEY COULD TO ENSURE ITS SECCESS.
4. SITHOLE SAID THAT THERE WAS NO DIFFERENCE BETWEEN US ON OUR OBJECTIVES. HIS CONCERN WAS ABOUT THE PROCEDURE THAT WE WERE FOLLOWING. HE WOULD HAVE PREFERRED US TO ADDRESS INVITATIONS TO THE HEADS OF POLITICAL PARTIES. HE DID NOT LIKE THE IDEA OF LEAVING DISCRETION FOR THE SELECTION OF A DELEGATION IN THE HANDS OF MUZOREWA. WHAT WOULD HAPPEN IIF THE BISHOP ONLY BROUGHT

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UANC DELEGATES WITH HIM? I SAID THAT I COULD NOT ANSWER HYPOTHETIC QUESTIONS. HOWEVER, THE STATEMENT ISSUED YESTERDAY BY THE BISHOP INDICATED THAT HE INTENDED THE DELEGATION TO INCLUDE REPRESENTATIVES FROM THE GOVERNMENT OF NATIONAL UNITY WHICH NOW INCLUDED SITHOLE'S PARTY.

5. WE ARGUED AROUND THIS ISSUE FOR SOME TIME WITHOUT COMING TO ANY PRECISE CONCLUSIONS. HOWEVER, I URGED SITHOLE TO CONSIDER HIS ATTITUDE MOST CAREFULLY AND SAID THAT HMG HOPED AND EXPECTED THAT THE DELEGATION TO LONDON WOULD INCLUDE AS BROAD A REPRESENTATION OF OPINION AS POSSIBLE.

6. SITHOLE IS IN SOMETHING OF A DILEMMA. IT SEEMS PROBABLE THAT THE BISHOP WILL MAKE UP HIS DELEGATION PRIMARILY OF MINISTERS FROM THE GOVERNMENT OF NATIONAL UNITY. THIS MEANS HE COULD INVITE ONE OR BOTH OF THE ZANU (SITHOLE) MINISTERS, AND NOT SITHOLE HIMSELF. THIS IS WHY SITHOLE WOULD MUCH PREFER INDIVIDUAL INVITATIONS TO PARTIES SO THAT HE COULD ENSURE THAT HE PERSONALLY ATTENDS THE CONFERENCE. ONE WAY OUT FOR SITHOLE WOULD BE FOR HIM TO REPLACE ONE OF HIS TWO MINISTERS IN THE CABINET, THUS ENSURING HIMSELF OF A PLACE AT THE CONFERENCE TABLE. HE MAY BE REDUCED TO THIS AS A LAST RESORT.

7. SITHOLE DID NOT ASK FOR ANY FURTHER REACTION FROM HMG. I WILL NOT TACKLE HIM FURTHER ON THIS UNLESS APPROACHED.

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PS/MR. RIDLEY
PS/MR. HURD
PS/PUS
STR A DHEF
LORD N G LENNOX
MISS BROWN
MR. WILLSON
MR. WILLIAMS

ADDITIONAL DISTN.
RHODESIA POLICY

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JS

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

16 August 1979

RHODESIA

I enclose a copy of a letter which has been addressed to the Prime Minister (and which she has not yet seen) from Mr. Malcolm Fraser, in response to her message to him about the Constitutional Conference on Rhodesia.

Subject to your views, no action seems to be called for on Mr. Fraser's letter.

B. G. CARTLEDGE

J.S. Wall, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to be 'J.S. Wall'.

CONFIDENTIAL

GR 760

CONFIDENTIAL

FM MIRIMBA SALISBURY 161230Z AUG 79

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 531 OF 16 AUGUST

INFO IMMEDIATE PRETORIA MAPUTO LUSAKA GABORONE DAR ES SALAAM
LUANDA LAGOS WASHINGTON AND UKMIS NEW YORK

RHODESIA CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE

1. I SAW MUZOREWA THIS MORNING AT HIS REQUEST. HE CONFIRMED THAT WE WOULD SHORTLY RECEIVE WRITTEN ACCEPTANCE OF THE INVITATION TO THE CONFERENCE ON 10 SEPTEMBER. HE ALSO WISHED TO GIVE ME SOME BACKGROUND TO HIS CABINET'S DISCUSSIONS ON OUR PROPOSALS AND MADE THE FOLLOWING POINTS:

(A) HIS GOVERNMENT ASSUMED THAT WE WERE CALLING A CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE AND NOT AN ALL-PARTY CONFERENCE. WE WOULD HAVE SEEN FROM THE STATEMENT ISSUED AFTER YESTERDAY'S CABINET MEETING (MY TELNO 521) THAT THE INVITATION ADDRESSED TO HIM WAS REGARDED AS AN INVITATION TO THE GOVERNMENT OF NATIONAL UNITY. THE FURTHER ASSUMPTION WAS THAT NO OTHER INVITATIONS WERE BEING ISSUED TO POLITICAL PARTIES INSIDE RHODESIA. MUZOREWA CONSIDERED THAT HMG WOULD BE "FOOLISH" TO ISSUE ANY SUCH FURTHER INVITATIONS. IT WAS OF COURSE UP TO US TO DECIDE EVENTUALLY WHAT TO DO. MUZOREWA DID NOT STATE SPECIFICALLY THAT HE WOULD WITHDRAW HIS ACCEPTANCE IF OTHER PARTIES WERE INVITED. IT WAS NEVERTHELESS CLEAR FROM HIS REMARKS THAT HE WOULD REGARD ANY SUCH ACTION AS GOING AGAINST OUR STATED DESIRE TO WORK IN CLOSE CO-OPERATION WITH HIM.

I UNDERTOOK TO REPORT HIS VIEWS. I ADDED THAT, AS HE WOULD KNOW, I HAD YESTERDAY SEEN CHIEF CHIRAU AND MR CHIKEREMA. THEY HAD ARGUED THEIR CASE FOR SEPARATE REPRESENTATION AT THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE. I TOLD THE BISHOP THAT I HAD TOLD BOTH OF THEM THAT I HAD NO INDICATION THAT HMG INTENDED TO RECONSIDER THEIR DECISION ON INVITATIONS.

CONFIDENTIAL

/ (B) THE BISHOP

2

Prime Minister

SM
17/8

(B) THE BISHOP SAID THAT HMG'S DECISION TO OFFER TO MEET THE COST OF ONLY 12 DELEGATES CREATED REAL PROBLEMS FOR HIM. HE WOULD BE BRINGING A NUMBER OF MINISTERS WITH HIM TO LONDON AND WOULD HAVE TO MAINTAIN CLOSE TOUCH WITH SALISBURY AND CONDUCT GOVERNMENT BUSINESS WHILST HE WAS AWAY. THIS MEANT THAT HE WOULD NEED A FAIR NUMBER OF SUPPORTING STAFF. HIS GOVERNMENT WOULD FIND IT HARD TO MEET ALL THE EXPENSES OVER AND ABOVE THOSE OF 12 DELEGATES. HE HAD INSTRUCTED HIS OFFICE TO WORK OUT THE NUMBERS INVOLVED AND LET ME HAVE DETAILS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. HE PUT TO ME A "STRONG REQUEST" THAT HMG WOULD BE UNDERSTANDING OVER THE MEETING OF THESE ADDITIONAL EXPENSES. I SAID THAT MY INSTRUCTIONS REFERRED ONLY TO EXPENSES FOR THE 12 OFFICIAL MEMBERS OF THE DELEGATION. I HAD THAT MORNING GIVEN TO THE CABINET SECRETARY THE DETAILS OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE ARRANGEMENTS (YOUR TELNO 145) . THIS CONTAINED NO PROVISION FOR ADDITIONAL EXPENDITURE BY HMG. I WOULD, HOWEVER, PUT THE POINT TO LONDON WITHOUT ANY COMMITMENT. THE BISHOP PRESSED HARD ON THIS POINT AND SAID THAT HE FELT SURE THAT WE WOULD UNDERSTAND HIS DIFFICULTY AND BE HELPFUL. THIS WOULD BE IN THE SPIRIT OF THE CLOSE AND FRIENDLY RELATIONSHIP THAT HAD DEVELOPED BETWEEN US OVER THE PAST 3 MONTHS.

(C) THE BISHOP WISHED US TO KNOW THAT HIS CABINET COLLEAGUES HAD BEEN DISTRESSED AT THE PUBLICATION OF OUR OUTLINE PROPOSALS FOR AN INDEPENDENCE CONSTITUTION WITHOUT ANY PRIOR CONSULTATION. HE CLAIMED THAT BOTH HE AND THE DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER HAD BEEN GIVEN FIRM ASSURANCES IN LONDON THAT THERE WOULD BE CONSULTATION BEFORE PROPOSALS OF THIS KIND WERE PUBLISHED. THE MANNER IN WHICH WE HAD PROCEEDED HAD CAUSED DOUBTS IN SOME PEOPLE'S MIND AS TO OUR SINCERITY. I SAID THAT IT WAS UNFORTUNATE IF THERE HAD BEEN ANY MISUNDERSTANDING IN THIS RESPECT. THE BISHOP DID NOT PURSUE THE MATTER FURTHER SO I LET IT REST. GEORGE SMITH REVERTED TO THIS POINT AFTERWARDS AND I POINTED OUT TO HIM THAT WE HAD INDEED GIVEN THE BISHOP PRIOR NOTIFICATION OF OUR INTENTIONS . OUR PROPOSALS HAD ONLY BEEN APPROVED BY THE

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CABINET IN LONDON ON 10 AUGUST. I HAD RETURNED AT ONCE TO SALISBURY AND HAD SEEN MUZOREWA AS SOON AS POSSIBLE ON 13 AUGUST. WE COULD NOT HAVE GIVEN HIM ANY EARLIER NOTIFICATION. FURTHERMORE, WE WOULD BE ENTERING INTO MORE DETAILED CONSULTATION WHEN FIFOOT ARRIVES HERE. I DO NOT RECOMMEND PURSUING THIS MATTER ANY FURTHER.

2. I WILL LET YOU HAVE DETAILS OF THE BISHOP'S DELEGATION AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. HE WILL TAKE IT VERY BADLY IF WE DECLINE TO MEET HIM IN ANY WAY OVER EXPENSES FOR MORE THAN 12 DELEGATES. IT WILL ALSO MAKE LIFE MORE DIFFICULT FOR HIM WITH HIS CABINET COLLEAGUES. I REALISE THAT THIS IS AN UNWELCOME DEVELOPMENT. I HOPE NEVERTHELESS THAT SERIOUS CONSIDERATION WILL BE GIVEN TO SOME KIND OF ADDITIONAL FINANCIAL HELP, WHATEVER THE SOURCE. I WILL DO WHAT I CAN TO KEEP THE DEMANDS TO THE MINIMUM.

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PS/MR. HURD
PS/PUS
SIR A DUFF

ADDITIONAL DISTN.
RHODESIA POLICY

LORD N G LENNOX
MISS BROWN

MR. WILLSON
MR. WILLIAMS
- 3 -
CONFIDENTIAL



New Zealand High Commission

CONFIDENTIAL

Reference

T80/79T

New Zealand House
Haymarket
London SW1Y 4TQ
Telephone: 01-930 8422 Ext:
Telex: 24368

cc FCO

16 August 1979

Prime Minister

Rt. Hon. Mrs Margaret Thatcher
10 Downing Street
London SW1

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T80/79T

SM
17/8

I have been asked by Rob Muldoon to convey to you the following reply to your recent message to him about Rhodesia:-

"Dear Margaret

Thank you for the message which your High Commission sent me on 14 August. I am very much aware of the great difficulties in bringing about a settlement in Rhodesia, but there can be no doubt of the importance of the achievement in Lusaka in agreeing on the framework within which the effort should be made.

I will of course continue to support you as you work towards a peaceful solution to the conflict. I would be glad to be kept up with the play for, as I am sure you know, I want to be as helpful and constructive as I can.

Best wishes,

Yours sincerely

R. D. Muldoon"

(L. W. Gandar)
High Commissioner



17 AUG 1979

RECEIVED
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

CONFIDENTIAL

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FM MIRIMBA SALISBURY 160730Z AUG 79
TO PRIORITY FCO
TELNO 529 OF 16 AUGUST
INFO WASHINGTON

Prime Minister

on
16/8
and

RHODESIA

1. BULLE (MINISTER OF COMMERCE) HAS TOLD ME, IN CONFIDENCE, THAT THE GOVERNMENT MAY DECIDE NEXT WEEK TO RELEASE ALL REMAINING POLITICAL PRISONERS. THE LAWYERS ARE SAID TO BE RAISING SOME OBJECTIONS, BUT BULLE CLAIMS THAT HE IS ARGUING STRONGLY THAT POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS SHOULD PREVAIL.

2. BULLE ALSO SAID THAT HE HAS PUT TO HIS COLLEAGUES A PROPOSAL THAT THE NAME OF THE STATE SHOULD BE AMENDED FORTHWITH TO ZIMBABWE. HE BELIEVES THAT THIS IS INEVITABLE AT SOME STAGE AND THAT THE GOVERNMENT SHOULD TAKE THE CREDIT FOR TAKING THE DECISION VOLUNTARILY, RATHER THAN UNDER PRESSURE FROM ELSEWHERE.

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SIR A PARSONS
LORD N G LENNOX
MISS BROWN
MR. THOMAS
MR. WILLSON
MR. WILLIAMS

ADDITIONAL DISTN.
RHODESIA POLICY

CONFIDENTIAL



Rhodesia

10 DOWNING STREET

Bryan,

dm
16/7

Vanessa rang to say
the PM. has seen your
telex, but made no
comments.

15/03
15.8.79

Gillian.

GO AHEAD PLEASE K
TO PRIME MINISTER
FROM BRYAN CARTLEDGE

Telex to Islay 15.8.79 16.30 hrs

FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF TWO TELEX RECEIVED FROM SALISBURY THIS
AFTERNOON

RHODESIA CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE

ONE FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF STATEMENT ISSUED AFTER THIS MORNINGS
CABINET MEETING

BEGINS

THE CABINET AT THE SPECIAL MEETING HELD THIS MORNING DECIDED TO
ACCEPT THE INVITATION WHICH THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT HAS EXTENDED TO
THE PRIME MINISTER TO ATTEND A CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE IN LONDON
ON 10 SEPTEMBER 1979. IN ACCEPTING THE INVITATION IT WAS
EMPHASISED THAT THE GOVERNMENT HOLDS OFFICE BY VIRTUE OF THE
RECENT ELECTIONS HELD IN ZIMBABWE RHODESIA ON THE BASIS OF UNIVERASAL
ADULT SUFFRAGE AT WHICH OVER 64 PER CENT OF THE ELECTORATE VOTED
SEMICOLON WHICH ELECTIONS WERE ACCEPTED BY ALL RESPONSIBLE OBSERVERS,
INCLUDING THOSE FROM THE CONSERVATIVE PARTY, AS BEING FREE AND FAIR.
CONSEQUENTLY, THE GOVERNMENT REPRESENTS THE COUNTRY AND THE
DELEGATION WILL THEREFORE CONSIST OF REPRESENTATIVES FROM THE
GOVERNMENT OF NATIONAL UNITY. IN THE PAST, WHEN PROPOSALS FOR
A CONFERENCE ON OUR CONSTITUTIONAL POSITION HAVE BEEN UNDER
DISCUSSION, IT HAS ALWAYS BEEN ON THE BASIS THAT NO PRECONDITIONS
ARE LAID DOWN. IT IS ON THIS BASIS THAT THE GOVERNMENT HAS
ACCEPTED THE INVITATION FROM THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT.

2. THE TWO MINISTERS FROM THE ZANU (SITHOLE) PARTY ARE BEING
SWORN IN TODAY. THE PARTY THUS BECOMES PART OF THE GOVERNMENT
OF NATIONAL UNITY.

3. TOMORROW I EXPECT TO RECEIVE A FORMAL WRITTEN ACCEPTANCE
DAY

NNNNNNNNNN

RHODESIA: MEETING WITH GENERAL WALLS

1. I SAW WALLS YESTERDAY AFTERNOON AND GAVE HIM COPIES OF OUR
OUTLINE CONSTITUTION PROPOSALS AND STATEMENT. I EXPLAINED OUR
PLANS FOR THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE AND WENT OVER THE
ARRANGEMENTS FOR COMPOSITION OF DELEGATIONS AND OBSERVERS ETC.
I ASSURED HIM THAT ATTENDANCE AT THE CONFERENCE WOULD BE CONFIDENCED
TO THE DELEGATIONS FROM SALISBURY AND THE PARTIOTIC FRONT.
HE DID NOT AT THE TIME READ THE DOCUMENTS THAT I HANDED TO HIM
BUT SAID HE WOULD STUDY THEM CAREFULLY.
2. I HAD NOT SEEN WALLS SINCE THE LUSAKA AGREEMENT ON RHODESIA.
HE, LIKE OTHERS, HAD IMAGINED THAT THAT AGREEMENT REPRESENTED IN
SOME WAY A TREAT BY HMG FROM THEIR EARLIER DECLARED POLICIES.
I REFUTED THIS AND POINTED TO THE CONSISTENCY BETWEEN THE LUSAKA
STATEMENT AND EARLIER STATEMENTS BY THE PRIME MINISTER AND YOURSELF.
I ALSO DREW ATTENTION TO THE GREAT DIFFERENCE IN APPROACH BETWEEN
LUSAKA AND MONROVIA. THIS REPRESENTED SIGNIFICANT MOVEMENT BY OTHERS
AND NOT BY HMG. HE SEEMED TO ACCEPT THIS. NEVERTHELESS HE
EXPRESSED GRAVE MISGIVINGS AT THE PROSPECT OF A FURTHER ELECTION.
HE BELIEVED THAT THIS WOULD LEAD TO FURTHER BLOODSHED. THE EFFORT
INVOLVED IN MOUNTING THE LAST ELECTION HAD BEN ENORMOUS. THE
COUNTRY COULD NOT GO THROUGH THAT AGAIN. I ARGUED THAT AN ELECTION
WAS A NATURAL DEVELOPMENT FROM A CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE AND
SUGGESTED THAT, IF THIS WERE THE PRICE FOR A FINAL AND LASTING
SETTLEMENT IT WAS WORTH PAYING. THE LATERNATIVE COULD BE EVEN
W MORE DIS AGREEABLE. WALLS WAS NOT NECESSARILY CONVINCED BUT I
THINK HIS MIND REMAINS OPEN.
3. WALLS REFERRED TO REPORTS IN THIS MORNING'S PRESS OF A
STATEMENT BY CONSERVATIVE BACKBENCHERS THAT HE SHOULD REPRESENT
THE WHITES AT A CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE. HE REGARDED THIS AS
IRRESPONSIBLE AND UNHELPFUL. HE WAS DOING HIS BEST TO CONVINCCE OPINION
THAT THE SECURITY FORCES WERE NOT POLITICAL AND WERE THE SERVANT
OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE DAY. HE SERVED A BLACK MINISTER OF
DEFENCE AND COMBINED OPERATIONS (.7MUZOREWA). HE DID NOT WANT
TO BE LABELLED AS A PREPSENTATIVE OF THE WHITE MINORITY.
4. WALLS SEEMED MORE TIRED AND DISPIRITED THAN ON PREVIOUS
OCCASIONS. I DID WHAT I COULD TO REINFORCE HIS TRUST IN OUR
INTENTIONS.

DAY

11.
Keeps: Rhodesia

I. GENERAL

1. The sanctions and related measures currently applied by the UK Government derive from a number of different sources. Some are imposed by Orders in Council made under section 2 of the Southern Rhodesia Act 1965. Some derive from the exercise of powers conferred by other legislation not enacted specifically for the Rhodesian situation; especially the Exchange Control Act 1946 and the Import, Export and Customs Powers (Defence) Act 1939. Some derive from the exercise of a purely prerogative power, eg to issue or withhold passports. In some cases there is an overlap of powers so that a particular activity (eg the import of Rhodesian goods into the United Kingdom) is simultaneously prohibited under two distinct pieces of legislation. In some cases one aspect of a particular transaction is prohibited by one piece of legislation (eg the export of goods from Rhodesia is prohibited by an Order in Council under the 1965 Act) while another aspect is prohibited by a different piece of legislation (eg the payment for those goods would be prohibited under the Exchange Control Act).

2. The above summary refers to the position in the UK itself. A substantially similar position obtains in the Channel Islands and the Isle of Man and in the colonial dependencies. But, both in the Islands and in the colonial dependencies, the equivalent legislation to the Orders under the Southern Rhodesia Act 1965 consists of Orders under the United Nations 1946. These Orders are not subject to annual renewal.

II. PARTICULAR SANCTIONS

(a) Direct UK/Rhodesia trade

3. The import of Rhodesian goods into the United Kingdom and the export of United Kingdom goods destined for Rhodesia are prohibited both by "the 1968 Sanctions Order" (the Southern Rhodesia (United Nations Sanctions) (No 2) Order, 1968, made under the 1965 Act) and by the general licensing system which

/operates

operates under "standing" subordinate legislation which is itself made under the Import, Export and Customs Powers (Defence) Act 1939. As regards both imports and exports, certain exceptions are permitted (eg humanitarian exports to Rhodesia, personal effects, etc) and there is also a power to grant individual licences.

(b) Indirect UK/Rhodesia trade

4. The involvement of United Kingdom nationals, including United Kingdom companies, in the export of goods from Rhodesia (otherwise than to the United Kingdom), the supply of goods to Rhodesia (otherwise than from the United Kingdom) and the carrying of such exports and imports in British ships or aircraft are all prohibited by various provisions of the 1968 Sanctions Order.

(c) Exchange Control

5. All transfers of funds to Rhodesia or for the benefit of a person resident in Rhodesia require Treasury consent under the Exchange Control Act 1946. In addition, monies due here to Rhodesian residents have to be held in a blocked account which can only be drawn on with Treasury permission. Treasury consent for the transfer of funds to Rhodesia or for payment out of blocked accounts here is not usually granted but there are established humanitarian and similar exceptions, eg pensions and payments for medical and educational supplies.

6. In addition to these restrictions on the transfer of funds in the narrow sense, the Exchange Control Act also entails certain restrictions on the disposal by United Kingdom residents of their assets (eg shareholdings) in Rhodesia and there are also certain restrictions under the Income and Corporation Taxes Act 1970 on the disposal by United Kingdom companies of their shareholdings in Rhodesian subsidiaries.

(d) Civil aviation

7. All flights into or out of Rhodesia (and therefore all flights between Rhodesia and the United Kingdom) by British and Rhodesian aircraft are prohibited by certain provisions of

/the

the 1968 Sanctions Order, and so are all "interlining" arrangements between British and Rhodesian airlines and operators.

(e) Recruitment for employment in Rhodesia

8. It is an offence under one of the provisions of the 1968 Sanctions Order to put out advertisements encouraging persons to take up employment or residence in Rhodesia or to do any other act calculated to encourage members of the public to take up such employment or residence. This prohibition is the effective obstacle to organised and public recruiting here for "mercenaries" to serve in the Rhodesian forces. Licences to advertise can be granted in exceptional cases and we in fact regularly issue licences in respect of, eg medical and educational posts where the employment is not to be exclusively in the European sector.

(f) Travel restrictions

9. We impose travel restrictions on Rhodesians in a number of ways :-

- (i) Rhodesian passports are not recognised as valid and a person who presents one on arrival in this country is refused admission unless he can establish that he is in fact a United Kingdom citizen or unless there is some humanitarian reason for admitting him.
- (ii) While we would ordinarily give a United Kingdom passport to a Rhodesian who is a United Kingdom citizen - and we have set up arrangements to enable this to be done through the Consulate-General in Johannesburg - and while, if there is a genuine and respectable need for travel, we would in present circumstances ordinarily give a United Kingdom passport even to a person who is solely a Rhodesian citizen, we refuse to issue a United Kingdom passport (even to a United Kingdom citizen) when the person concerned is a suspected sanctions-breaker or active supporter of the Salisbury regime. (But we do not apply this to the "internal" African Nationalist leaders.)
- (iii) We refuse admission to this country to persons who are

suspected sanctions-breakers or active supporters of the Salisbury regime (again excluding the "internal" African nationalists) and we do that even to persons who are United Kingdom citizens with the right of abode here if they are ordinarily resident in Rhodesia.

(g) Insurance

10. The Government has obtained a voluntary undertaking from the United Kingdom insurance industry that their members will not insure goods exported from, or destined for import into, Rhodesia in contravention of sanctions or the property of commercial, industrial or public utility undertakings in Rhodesia.

(h) Trade names, etc

11. It is an offence by virtue of an Order made in 1977 under the 1965 Act to license the use of a trade name, trademark, or registered design for the purposes of a commercial, industrial or public utility undertaking in Rhodesia.

III RELATED MEASURES

12. Apart from the above measures, which are sanctions properly so-called, we have from time to time taken a number of related measures which may be viewed as measures "against" the illegal regime or as measures predicated on its illegality. Among the most important are the following :

(a) Reserve Bank

13. By Orders made under the 1965 Act in 1965 and 1967, the Salisbury Board of the Reserve Bank of Rhodesia was displaced by a Governor and Board of Directors (now just a single Governor and Trustee) in London in whom there were vested all the assets of the Bank in this country (mainly investments and deposits to the value of about £9 million). The purpose was to ensure that these assets could not be used by the Salisbury Board for the

CONFIDENTIAL

Prime Minister

TXU 408/27

15 AUGUST 1979

You may like to know that all the details are well in hand.

ADMINISTRATIVE PLAN
FOR THE
CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE ON RHODESIA
LONDON, SEPTEMBER 1979

*Old
17/8*

me

NOTES

(a) On documents etc the official title of this meeting will be shown as "Constitutional Conference - September 79".

(b) The purpose of this paper is to inform all departments concerned about the general administrative plans; further details about administrative arrangements, delegation lists and telephone directories, etc, will be circulated later to those concerned.

1. DATE AND PLACE OF MEETING

The Constitutional Conference will open at Lancaster House, St James's, SW1 (telephone number 01-839 3488) on Monday 10 September 1979, under the chairmanship of the Secretary of State. The duration of the meeting is uncertain.

2. PROGRAMME OF EVENTS

(a) Subject to confirmation, the Secretary of State is expected to greet the visiting delegates in the Main Hall of Lancaster House at 1000 hours on Monday 10 September. Delegates will then proceed to the Music Room for the first session.

(b) The times of the daily sessions are likely to be:-

1000 hours to 1300 hours
1500 " " 1730 "

It is not yet known whether any meetings will take place during the weekend of 15/16 September.

3. PARTICIPANTS

Under arrangements made by Rhodesia Department the following delegations have been invited to attend the Conference:-

- (a) The Salisbury Administration (Bishop Muzorewa)
- (b) The Patriotic Front (ZAPU - Mr Nkomo/ZANU - Mr Mugabe)
- (c) Each of the two visiting delegations has been invited to send twelve official representatives: in addition they will each be allowed to bring four members of their supporting staff into Lancaster House.

/4.

4. ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE VISITING DELEGATIONS

(a) Travel and Subsistence

Under arrangements made by Rhodesia Department, the FCO will pay travel, hotel accommodation and subsistence for the twelve official representatives in the two delegations; details have been issued separately to those concerned, and costs will be charged to DCS Vote 5.

(b) Hotel Accommodation

PCD have reserved the following hotel accommodation for the visiting delegations:-

(i) The Carlton Tower Hotel, Cadogan Place, SW1
Telephone No 01-235 5411
For the Salisbury Administration
(one suite plus 11 single rooms)

(ii) The Royal Garden Hotel, Kensington High Street, W8
Telephone No 01-937 8000
(two suites plus 10 single rooms)

Four other rooms have been reserved in each hotel for support staff but HMG will not be financially responsible for these rooms.

(c) Transport Arrangements

PCD have arranged for 4 cars to be allocated to each visiting delegation. For security reasons these are being provided by the GCS and will be garaged overnight in their Marsham Street garage. These cars will be equipped with radio telephones.

5. ARRIVAL AND DEPARTURE ARRANGEMENTS

Rhodesia Department have advised PCD that an official greeter should meet the three principal participants on arrival; and will advise later whether any other FCO officials should be present. PCD (Visits Section) will make the necessary arrangements and book the VIP lounges: similar arrangements will be made in due course for the departure of the three principals.

6. CONFERENCE SECRETARIAT

An FCO Consellor will be appointed by POD to act as Secretary General. The names of other members of the Secretariat and their reporting dates are shown at Appendix I.

7. PRESS ARRANGEMENTS

(a) The Conference Spokesman will be Mr N M Fenn, News Department, FCO.

(b) The Government Press Centre, Little St James's Street, SW1 (Press switchboard Telephone No 930 6776) will be staffed from Monday 3 September. Mr D Kerr will be the Press Centre Manager;

/until

This is a copy. The original
has been extracted and
retained under Section 3(4)³

until Friday 31 August he will be working in PCD (Telephone No 233 8617).

(c) Detailed press arrangements are shown in the Press Plan, which will be issued separately.

8. SECURITY

(a) Mr R Beer, FCO (PUSD) (233 5038), will coordinate the security arrangements, in consultation with ~~Mr Kerr~~ (Security Service). Mr Beer will issue the overall Security Plan.

(b) The London District Provost Company, RMP, will provide security guards within Lancaster House. RMP officers and NCOs will be in uniform, but they will not be armed.

(c) Security guards for the Press Centre will be provided under arrangements made by Mr R Beer.

(d) From 0800 hours on Saturday 8 September access to Lancaster House will be restricted to pass-holders only.

(e) From Monday 10 September, until the end of the Conference, Stable Yard will be closed to the public. During this period the Metropolitan Police will ensure access for the residents of St James's Palace.

(f) The hand baggage of ALL persons entering Lancaster House may be searched by the security authorities.

(g) In an emergency resulting from a terrorist incident, the senior uniformed Police Officer present will take charge and order the evacuation of buildings in the Lancaster House complex if this should be necessary.

9. PASSES

(a) Types of passes to be used are shown in Appendix II. Passes will be printed under arrangements made by PCD, for issue by Mr Beer (in consultation with Mr Kerr for press passes)

(b) The lists of those requiring passes for access to Lancaster House or the Press Centre should be sent to Mr Beer (PUSD) by :-

Rhodesia Department

i) UK Delegation (including Whitehall Departments)

ii) Visiting Delegations (plus 2 photographs of each visitor)

Protocol & Conference Department

i) The Conference Secretariat
ii) The Press Centre staff
iii) Catering Staff
iv) Post Office Staff
v) HMSO Staff
vi) CSMA Staff

PSA (Mr Ball)

PSA & DOE Staff

* name deleted
and retained under
Section 3(4).
AWayland, 29.10.09
Special

Special Branch

SB Representatives

Press Centre ManagerPress Representatives
Press Attachés10. SECURITY FACILITIES

(a) PSA are making the necessary arrangements to reinstate the security systems in the Lancaster House complex, including provision of protective canvas screens around the garden of Lancaster House and chestnut paling in the area of Green Park adjacent to Lancaster House.

(b) PSA are trying to arrange for construction work on Stable Yard Block and Warwick House (owned by Humphreys & Glasgow) to cease during the period of the Conference.

(c) PSA will arrange for the ground floor and basement at No 8 Cleveland Row to be available for the Metropolitan Police.

(d) PCD are arranging for the basement at Marlborough House to be available for the Metropolitan Police for the period of the Conference.

11. WORKING ACCOMMODATION AT LANCASTER HOUSE(a) Meeting Rooms

(i) Meetings will take place in the Music Room on the first floor. In addition, Room 212 on the second floor (seating 24 at table) will be available if required for working groups.

(ii) In the Music Room, the UK Delegation will have 9 seats at the table plus 3 behind: the two other Delegations will have 8 seats at the table plus 4 seats behind: there will also be 5 seats at the table for the Secretariat. Part of the table will be removed to give access for cameramen during photo-calls. The suggested table layout is given at Appendix III.

(b) Offices

On the first floor there will be offices for the Secretary of State, Private Office and 3 rooms for the Secretariat. Offices for the Salisbury Administration (4 rooms) and ZAPU and ZANU (2 rooms each) will be available on the second floor.

(c) Room Allocation

Except for the Library and Room 3, which are required by 0900 hours on Monday 3 September, all accommodation at Lancaster House will be ready for occupation by 1000 hours on Friday 7 September. The room allocation is given at Appendix IV.

(d) The detailed furnishing list will be notified by PCD direct to PSA.

/(e)

(e) One office for the Conference spokesman and three offices for visiting Delegation Press Officers will be available in the Press Centre.

12. OFFICE MACHINERY AND STATIONERY

Office machinery and stationery will be provided by HMSO. Common-user stationery and electric typewriters will be provided for the visiting Delegations in their Offices at Lancaster House. Detailed requirements will be notified to HMSO by PCD, in conjunction with Mr Kerr for the Press Centre requirements.

13. RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS

- (a) All sessions will be recorded by Secretariat Summary.
- (b) For the opening and closing session, PCD will arrange for CSD to provide verbatim writers.
- (c) PSA will provide tape-recordings of all sessions in the Music Room (and a playback machine in the Secretariat).

14. TELEPHONES

(a) PCD have asked the Post Office to man the Lancaster House Conference Switchboard (01-839 3488) as follows:-

Friday 7 September	0900 hours to 1800 hours
Monday 10 September until the end of the Conference	0900 " " 2000 " daily (or later if required)
Monday 3 September to Thursday 6 Sept	Night lines are to be used
Sat/Sun 8,9, and 15-16 September	Night lines will be used

(b) Telephone extensions and night lines will be provided as shown at Appendix IV.

(c) At Lancaster House the cost of telephone calls within the UK will be met by HMG. The cost of overseas calls will be recovered from the caller under arrangements made by the Conference Officer.

(d) Telephone requirements for the Press Centre are shown separately in the Press Plan.

15. ENTERTAINMENT

Rhodesia Department are considering the official entertainment programme: there will probably be a GHF reception on the evening of Monday 10 September. In addition GHF will arrange a Ministerial luncheon or dinner if required: the cost of any other entertainment, including working luncheons at Lancaster House, will be borne by the FCO.

16. CATERING

PCD have arranged for Ring and Brymer to provide:-

(a) For Delegates - in the Delegates Lounge, morning coffee and afternoon tea: the bar for Delegates to be opened at end of each morning and afternoon session for half an hour (PCD will obtain the necessary authority from the Chief Clerk).

(b) Buffet style working lunches, for Delegates only, in the State Dining Room if required. The Caterers should be given 24 hours notice.

(c) For Secretariat and Staff, in the Household Dining Room on the ground floor, morning coffee and afternoon tea free of charge plus sandwiches on sale.

(d) Late night suppers for staff working after 2000 hours.

(e) In the Press Centre a bar selling liquor and sandwiches with coffee free of charge. (See details in the Press Plan).

17. MEDICAL

PCD have arranged with CSMA for a nurse to be on duty at Lancaster House on all meeting days.

18. FLOWERS

PSA will arrange for potted plants to be provided on the ground floor of Lancaster House in the Main Hall and in the State Drawing Room on the first floor.

19. FLAGS

PSA will arrange for the Union Flag to be flown on the roof of Lancaster House on meeting days.

20. PARKING

(a) There will be no parking space in Stable Yard, owing to the restrictions imposed by the fencing round Stable Yard Block. PSA will arrange parking space for all cars etc, including press vehicles, on the Horse Ride at the back of Lancaster House.

(b) PCD will provide blue windscreen stickers for Delegations, Secretariat and Staff, and yellow windscreen stickers for press vehicles.

21. FINANCE

(a) The customary allied services will be provided by PSA, HMSO, COI and GHF.

(b) Details of costs to be borne by the FCO are being circulated separately to those concerned.

22. ORGANISATION OF THE CONFERENCE

(a) Mr C D Powell has been attached to Rhodesia Department to coordinate the preparations and follow-up arrangements for the Conference: queries on political matters should be referred to him (233 3607).

/(b)

(b) Administrative arrangements for the Conference are being coordinated by Protocol and Conference Department, FCO and enquiries should be addressed to:

Mr L A Coles	233 3218	Administrative arrangements with the Lancaster House Complex, and
Mr M M Hall	233 8601	Administrative matters relating to the overseas participants.

E. B. Chaplin

E B Chaplin (Miss)
Conference & Visits Section
Protocol & Conference Department
233 5037

15 August 1979

/Distribution

*This is a copy. The original
has been extracted and retained
under Section 3(4)*

CONFERENCE STAFF

(as known at 15 August)


A THE CONFERENCE SECRETARIAT


<u>Serial_No</u>	<u>Name</u>	<u>Designation</u>	<u>Reporting_Date</u> *
1		Secretary- General	
2	Mr R S Dewar	Assistant Sec-General	
3	Mr R G Bowen	Liaison Officer Salisbury Administration	At airport on arrival of delegation
4		Liaison Officer, ZANU	"
5	Mr A Singleton	Liaison Officer, ZAPU	"
6	Mr M M Hall (PCD)	Conference Officer, (Visiting Delegations)	7 September
7	Mr L A Coles	Conference Officer (Lancaster House)	6 September
8	Miss M Edward	Assistant Conference Officer (Information Desk)	6 September
9	Mr M C Raven	Record Taker	7 September
10	Miss J Dutton	Record Taker	"
11	Miss E A Urquhart	Record Taker	"
12		Record Taker	
13	Mr D T Cox	Documents Officer	7 September am
14	Mr P Westhorpe	Documents Clerk	"
15		Documents Clerk	

* At Lancaster House, except as shown

<u>Serial_No</u>	<u>Name</u>	<u>Designation</u>	<u>Reporting_Date*</u>
16	Mrs I Brookes	Duplicator Operator	7 September pm
17		Duplicator Operator	
18	Mrs E E Sheehan	Superintendent of Typists	7 September pm
19	Miss E McKnight	Shorthand Typist	"
20	Mrs M Stewart	Shorthand Typist	"
21	Miss M Scott	Shorthand Typist	"
22	Miss H Bonnett	Audio Typist	"
23	Mrs M Couchman	Copy Typist	"
24		Copy Typist	

B SECURITY STAFF

1	Mr R G Beer	Security Co-ordinator	3 September
2	*  *	Security Adviser	
3	Major M Ramsey	OC RMP Detachment	8 September
4	Mr A J M Dunlop	Assistant Security Coordinator	28 August (to PUSD)
5	Mr B J Lester Smith	Pass Clerk	3 September
6		Pass Clerk	
		RMP Detachment (15)	8 September
		FCO Security Officers	

*  * Name deleted and retained under Section 3(4). *Wayland*
29 October 2009

* At Lancaster House, except as shown

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2

GR 468

CONFIDENTIAL

P S TO P M
NO 10 DOWNING ST

FM MIRIMBA SALISBURY 151220Z AUG 79

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 525 OF 15 AUGUST

INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON

Handwritten signature - Bismar Minister

MY TELNO 517 (NOT TO ALL); RHODESIA; CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE

Handwritten initials
GM
16/8

1. CHIKEREMA CALLED ON ME THIS MORNING ACCOMPANIED BY SAMKANGA, DUMBUTSHENA AND SHUWARARA.

2. CHIKEREMA REFERRED TO HIS LETTER TO YOU (MY TUR) AND RE-STATED HIS REQUEST THAT THE ZIMBABWE DEMOCRATIC PARTY RECEIVE A SPECIFIC AND INDIVIDUAL INVITATION TO ATTEND THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE. HE ARGUED THAT THE ZDP WAS THE MAIN OPPOSITION PARTY IN PARLIAMENT AND AS SUCH WAS ENTITLED TO BE INVITED TO THE CONFERENCE. HE CLAIMED THAT IT WOULD BE UNPRECEDENTED FOR A POLITICAL PARTY REPRESENTED IN PARLIAMENT TO BE EXCLUDED FROM A CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE. HE COULD NOT BELIEVE THAT THE NUMBERS ATTENDING THE CONFERENCE WAS A MAJOR RESTRAINT. OTHER CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCES IN THE PAST HAD BEEN ATTENDED BY MANY MORE THAN 24 REPRESENTATIVES FROM THE COUNTRY CONCERNED. HE ASSUMED THAT OUR DECISION TO INVITE BISHOP MUZOREWA TO SELECT THE DELEGATION WAS SPECIFICALLY DESIGNED TO EXCLUDE THE ZDP. HE CONSIDERED THAT THERE MUST HAVE BEEN SOME COLLUSION BETWEEN THE BISHOP AND HMG ON THIS MATTER. CHIKEREMA CLAIMED THAT THE ZDP REPRESENTED A WIDE SECTION OF OPINION WITHIN RHODESIA AND THAT DECISIONS TAKEN IN THE ABSENCE OF THEIR REPRESENTATIVES COULD NOT BE REGARDED AS BEING ACCEPTABLE TO THE PEOPLE AS A WHOLE.

3. I REFUTED THE SUGGESTION THAT THERE HAD BEEN ANY COLLUSION BETWEEN HMG AND THE BISHOP. THE DECISION ON INVITATIONS HAD BEEN TAKEN BY HMG ALONE AND REPRESENTED IN THEIR VIEW THE BEST WAY OF ACHIEVING A SUCCESSFUL OUTCOME TO THE CONFERENCE. HMG WOULD TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE INTERESTS OF PARTIES NOT REPRESENTED AT THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE AND WOULD BE READY TO LISTEN TO THEIR VIEWS AT ANY TIME. CHIKEREMA SAID THAT HE WAS NOT INTERESTED IN CONVEYING HIS VIEWS INDIRECTLY. HE WISHED TO BE PRESENT AT THE CONFERENCE.

Handwritten note
/4. I UNDERTOOK

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4. I UNDERTOOK TO CONVEY THESE VIEWS TO YOU BUT ADDED THAT, IN MY PERSONAL VIEW, I THOUGHT IT UNLIKELY THAT HMG WOULD BE PREPARED TO RECONSIDER THE DECISIONS ALREADY TAKEN. CHIKEREMA ASKED ME TO OBTAIN A FORMAL REPLY TO HIS REQUEST FOR AN INVITATION TO HIS PARTY TO ATTEND THE CONFERENCE. I SAID THAT I WOULD PUT THIS TO YOU AND LET HIM KNOW AS SOON AS I RECEIVED ANY RESPONSE.

5. CHIKEREMA WILL NOT READILY TAKE 'NO' FOR AN ANSWER. HE BELIEVES, ON THE BASIS OF PRECEDENT, THAT HIS PARTY HAS A RIGHT TO ATTEND THE CONFERENCE. IF, AS I ASSUME, WE ARE NOT PREPARED TO EXTEND AN INVITATION TO HIM (TO DO SO WOULD OPEN THE FLOOD GATES), WE SHOULD BE PREPARED FOR A STRONG VERBAL REACTION. THE ZDP ARE LIKELY TO DO ALL THEY CAN TO CAST DOUBTS UPON THE VALIDITY OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE AND TO MAKE LIFE AS DIFFICULT AS THEY CAN FOR MUZOREWA. NEVERTHELESS, I SEE NO ALTERNATIVE BUT TO STAND FIRM ON THIS ISSUE. GRATEFUL FOR INSTRUCTIONS.

DAY

FILES
RHOD. D.
OADS
N AM D
NEWS D
PUSD
PLANNING STAFF
ES & SD
OCD
FRD
UND
LEGAL ADVS (MR. FREELAND)
(MR. FIFOOT)
ECON D
P & CD

DEF D
OIC
PS
PS/SIR I GILMOUR
PS/MR. LUCE
PS/MR. RIDLEY
PS/MR. BURD
PS/PUS
SIR A DUFF
LORD N G LENNOX
MISS BROWN
MR. WILLSON
MR. WILLIAMS

ADDITIONAL DISTR.
RHODESIA POLICY

CONFIDENTIAL

2

GR 440

CONFIDENTIAL

FM MIRIMBA SALISBURY 151200Z AUG 79

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 524 OF 15 AUGUST

INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON

Prime Minister

SM
16/8
art

RHODESIA: CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE

1. I CALLED THIS MORNING ON CHIEF CHIRAU AT HIS REQUEST. HE WAS ACCOMPANIED BY THE MEMBERS OF HIS EXECUTIVE COUNCIL.

2. OUR CONVERSATION DEALT EXCLUSIVELY WITH THE QUESTION OF THE INVITATION TO THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE. CHIEF CHIRAU POINTED OUT THAT HE HAD BEEN THE ONLY CONSISTENT ADVOCATE OF ALL-PARTY TALKS. HE CONSIDERED THAT HE WAS BETTER PLACED THAN ANY OTHER POLITICAL LEADER TO PLAY A MEDIATORY ROLE BETWEEN THE INTERNAL PARTIES AND THE EXTERNAL LEADERS. HIS PARTY WERE NOT SEEKING POLITICAL POWER BUT WISHED TO ASSIST IN THE SEARCH FOR AN ACCEPTABLE SOLUTION. HE WAS DISAPPOINTED AT THE PROCEDURE ADOPTED BY HMG IN RESPECT OF INVITATIONS TO THE CONFERENCE. HE WAS NOT OPPOSED TO MUZOREWA AS SUCH. MUZOREWA DID NOT HOWEVER SPEAK FOR THE PEOPLE OF RHODESIA AS A WHOLE. IF ALL POLITICAL PARTIES WERE NOT INVITED TO THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE, THERE COULD BE NO CERTAINTY THAT THE RESULT WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE IN RHODESIA. CHIRAU MADE IT CLEAR THAT HE WOULD NOT ACCEPT AN INVITATION TO FORM PART OF A DELEGATION LED BY MUZOREWA. IF HE DID SO, HE WOULD DENY HIMSELF THE OPPORTUNITY OF SPEAKING OUT ON ISSUES TO WHICH HE ATTACHED IMPORTANCE. HE THEREFORE ASKED HMG TO RECONSIDER ITS DECISION AND TO INVITE HIM TO BE PRESENT AT THE CONFERENCE IN HIS OWN RIGHT.

3. I UNDERTOOK TO CONVEY CHIRAU'S VIEWS TO YOU. I DREW ON PARA 10 OF YOUR TELNO 139 AND POINTED OUT THAT BISHOP MUZOREWA WAS FREE TO CHOOSE WHOEVER HE WISHED TO ACCOMPANY HIM TO LONDON FOR THE CONFERENCE. WE HOPED THAT HIS DELEGATION WOULD CONTAIN AS BROAD A REPRESENTATION OF OPINION AS POSSIBLE. I POINTED OUT THAT HMG HAD FROM THE OUTSET TAKEN THE VIEW THAT THE ELECTIONS IN RHODESIA HAD CREATED A NEW REALITY. THE INVITATION TO MUZOREWA

1 TO HEAD

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CONFIDENTIAL

TO HEAD THE DELEGATION ACKNOWLEDGED THAT REALITY. I WAS PRESSED ON THE PRECISE STATUS OF THE INVITATION TO MUZOREWA (I. E. WAS IT ADDRESSED TO "THE GOVERNMENT") BUT DECLINED TO GET INTO TOO MUCH DETAIL.

4. CHIRAU IS CLEARLY SORE AT BEING LEFT OUT. HE STILL BELIEVES THAT HE HAS A ROLE TO PLAY IN BRINGING THE VARIOUS RHODESIAN ELEMENTS TOGETHER. HE WAS ADAMANT THAT HE WOULD NOT JOIN IN A DELEGATION LED BY MUZOREWA.

5. ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT WE HAVE NO INTENTION OF CHANGING OUR MINDS ABOUT INVITATIONS AND THAT WE ARE NOT THEREFORE PREPARED TO RECONSIDER THE MATTER AS REQUESTED BY CHIRAU, I SHOULD BE GRATEFUL FOR INSTRUCTIONS AS TO HOW I SHOULD RESPOND TO HIS REQUEST. HE IS EXPECTING SOME FURTHER COMMUNICATION FROM US.

DAY

FILES
RHOD. D.
OADS
N AM D
NEWS D
PUSD
PLANNING STAFF
ES & SD
CCD
FRD
UKD
LEGAL ADVS (MR. FREELAND)
(MR. FIFOOT)
ECON D
P & CD

DEF D
OID
PS
PS/SIR I GILMOUR
PS/MR. LUCE
PS/MR. RIDLEY
PS/MR. HURD
PS/PUS
SIR A DUFF

LORD N G LENNOX
MISS BROWN

MR. WILLSON
MR. WILLIAMS

ADDITIONAL DISTN.
RHODESIA POLICY

2

CONFIDENTIAL

SubJect

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL NO. T79A/79
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P.O. INTERNATIONAL TELEGRAPHS
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ETAT

HER EXCELLENCY MARGARET THATCHER

PRIME MINISTER OF THE UNITED OF GREAT BRITIAN

10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1

R16/8

YOUR EXCELLENCY I HAVE BEEN GRATIFIED BY YOUR EXCELLENCY'S
RECENT LETTER CONCERNING THE LUSAKA AGREEMENT OF AUGUST 5TH
UPON WHICH YOU HAVE ACTED TO INVITE ALL PARTIES TO A
CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE IN

COL 10

P2

LONDON STOP CONSISTENT WITH MY POSITION IN THIS MATTER AS
COMMUNICATED THROUGH MY TELEGRAM OF AUGUST 8 CMA 1979 CMA
YOU CAN CERTAINLY COUNT ON MY FULL SUPPORT IN THESE EFFORTS TO
BRING A PEACEFUL AND LASTING SOLUTION TO THE
PHODESIAN PROBLEM STOP WITH RENEWED SENTIMENTS OF MY HIGHEST
CONSIDERATION AND ESTEEM SINCERELY

WR TOLBERT JR

To send Telegrams — CONSULT TELEPHONE DIRECTORY OR TELEX DIALING CARD
POST OFFICE TELEGRAPHS INTERNATIONAL
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To send Telegrams — CONSULT TELEPHONE DIRECTORY OR TELEX DIALING CARD

benefit of the regime and also to make it difficult for the regime, through the Salisbury Board, to claim any assets which the Reserve Bank might have in other countries.

(b) Fugitive Offenders

14. An Order made under the 1965 Act in 1965 prevents the transfer of fugitive offenders to Rhodesia under the Fugitive Offenders Act 1881. That Act has since been largely replaced by the Fugitive Offenders Act 1967 which, however, has not yet been extended to Rhodesia.

(c) Recognition of Rhodesian Judgements etc

15. Irrespective of sanctions, the unlawful nature of the regime in Rhodesia means that our courts do not, in general, give effect to judgements, etc of Rhodesian courts or to administrative acts of Rhodesian authorities (eg marriages). An Order made under the 1965 Act in 1972 does at present allow Rhodesian marriages, etc to be recognised here in order to prevent hardship in individual cases.

(d) Rhodesia House

16. On the basis that the regime in Salisbury is not the lawful Government of Rhodesia, we have prevented them from using Rhodesia House, the title to which is vested in "Her Majesty in right of the Government of Southern Rhodesia".

Rhodesia Department

15 August 1979



2

AUSTRALIAN HIGH COMMISSION · LONDON

THE HIGH COMMISSIONER

The Hon Sir Gordon Freeth KBE

15 August 1979

Prime Minister

Dear Prime Minister

SW
16/8

.... I have the honour to enclose the text of a letter (and its attachment) which my Prime Minister, the Rt Hon Malcolm Fraser, C.H., M.P., signed today, 15 August.

The original of Mr Fraser's letter will be forwarded as soon as it is received.

Yours sincerely
Gordon Freeth

(Gordon Freeth)

The Rt Hon Mrs Margaret Thatcher, MP
Prime Minister
10 Downing Street,
LONDON

SW

~~SECRET~~
SUBJECT

Text of letter dated 15 August 1979 from Australian
Prime Minister to British Prime Minister

T 79/79T

PRIME MINISTER'S

PERSONAL MESSAGE

SERIAL No. T79/79T

My dear Margaret,

Many thanks for your letter.

I agree with you that what was achieved at Lusaka represents a very useful step forward. The goodwill and trust that was developed will surely be an enormous help in reaching a settlement.

.... You have indeed moved very quickly and I wish you well for the constitutional conference on the 10th. I have now received your outline proposals for the constitution and accompanying explanatory documents. I have issued a statement of support, which I attach. If there is anything that I can do to help I certainly will.

There is now an opportunity for peace in a significant part of southern Africa and you have seized the opportunity boldly. My warmest congratulations.

Yours sincerely,

(Malcolm Fraser)

Attachment to letter from Australian Prime Minister
to British Prime Minister, dated 15 August 1979.

Press Statement

The Prime Minister, Mr Malcolm Fraser, today welcomed the early initiative of the British Government in calling a constitutional conference on Rhodesia to begin on 10 September. It is a most encouraging development, he said, in the long history of conflict which has brought suffering and distress to a large part of Africa, which with peace could have a promising future. Peace and prosperity could only flow from co-operation among all groups of Rhodesians on the basis of genuine majority rule. Human dignity demanded a constitutional settlement based on the framework agreed at the Commonwealth Conference in Lusaka.

Australia has been particularly concerned to see that provisions for constitutional amendment should be consistent with the general objective of providing for effective majority rule and that similar considerations should be incorporated in arrangements for administration of the defence forces, public service and the police.

The Prime Minister expressed the strong hope that the leaders of the Patriotic Front and the Salisbury Government would participate in the forthcoming discussions in the same spirit of practical good sense which the Front Line States and Britain had brought to the Lusaka conference, making it one of the most successful in the history of the Commonwealth.

We cannot ignore the difficulties which are bound to arise along the way, he said, but an important requirement now is to ensure that the process of discussions gets under way as early as possible and that the momentum developed at Lusaka is maintained.

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We cannot ignore the difficulties which are bound to arise along the way, but an important requirement now is to ensure that the process of discussions gets under way as early as possible and that the momentum developed at Lusaka is maintained.

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T79/79T

PRIME MINISTER'S



PERSONAL MESSAGE

SERIAL No. T79/79T

PRIME MINISTER

CANBERRA

15 AUG 1979

My dear Margaret

Many thanks for your letter.

I agree with you that what was achieved at Lusaka represents a very useful step forward. The goodwill and trust that was developed will surely be an enormous help in reaching a settlement.

You have indeed moved very quickly and I wish you well for the Constitutional Conference on the 10th. I have now received your outline proposals for the Constitution and accompanying explanatory documents. I have issued a statement of support, which I attach. If there is anything that I can do to help I certainly will.

There is now an opportunity for peace in a significant part of Southern Africa and you have seized the opportunity boldly. My warmest congratulations.

Yours sincerely
Malcolm Fraser

(Malcolm Fraser)

Rt Hon. Margaret Thatcher, M.P.,
10 Downing Street,
LONDON



PRIME MINISTER

FOR MEDIA

15 AUGUST, 1979

RHODESIAN CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE

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We cannot ignore the difficulties which are bound to arise along the way, but an important requirement now is to ensure that the process of discussion gets under way as early as possible and that the momentum developed at Lusaka is maintained.



22 AUG 1979

QPS 300
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FM FCO 151244Z AUG 79

TO IMMEDIATE MIRIMBA SALISBURY

TELEGRAM NUMBER 149 OF 15 AUGUST 1979

INFO WASHINGTON

YOUR TELNO 506: RHODESIAN REPRESENTATION IN LONDON

1. THE FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF PRIME MINISTER'S REPLY. ORIGINAL

FOLLOWS BY BAG. — see T 77/79T

BEGINS

DEAR BISHOP MUZOREWA

THANK YOU FOR YOUR LETTER OF 25 JULY, WHICH I HAVE RECEIVED THROUGH MR DEREK DAY AND WHICH WAS AWAITING ME IN LONDON ON MY RETURN FROM LUSAKA. IN THE MEANTIME YOU WILL HAVE RECEIVED MY MESSAGE TO YOU ABOUT THE OUTCOME OF THE COMMONWEALTH HEAD OF GOVERNMENT MEETING.

ON THE SUBJECT OF RHODESIAN REPRESENTATION IN LONDON, I QUITE UNDERSTAND THAT YOU WISH PEOPLE IN THE UNITED KINGDOM TO BE GIVEN A MORE ACCURATE VIEW OF THE CHANGES THAT HAVE TAKEN PLACE IN RHODESIA. I FULLY SUPPORT THAT OBJECTIVE AND, AS YOU KNOW, THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT ARE DOING ALL THEY CAN TO IMPRESS THE FACTS OF THE SITUATION ON THOSE WHO REMAIN SCEPTICAL ABOUT THE SUBSTANTIAL PROGRESS THAT HAS ALREADY TAKEN PLACE. I AM HAPPY TO SAY THAT WE SEE NO DIFFICULTY IN YOUR EXPANDING THE EXISTING UANC OFFICE IN LONDON, SO THAT ITS STAFF CAN UNDERTAKE INFORMATION ACTIVITIES OF THE KIND YOU HAVE IN MIND. I BELIEVE THAT THIS WOULD BE THE BEST WAY OF ACHIEVING YOUR AIMS.

YOURS SINCERELY

MARGARET THATCHER

ENDS

CARRINGTON

FILES
RHOD.D.
OADS
N AM D
NEWS D
PUSD
PLANNING STAFF
ES & SD
CCD
FRD
UND
LEGAL ADVS (MR. FREELAND)
(MR. FIFOOT)
ECON D
P & CD

DEF D
OID
PS
PS/SIR I GILMOUR
PS/MR. LUCE
PS/MR. RIDLEY
PS/MR. HURD
PS/PUS
SIR A DUFF
SIR A PARSONS
LORD N G LENNOX
MISS BROWN
MR. THOMAS
MR. WILLSON
MR. WILLIAMS

ADDITIONAL DISTN.
RHODESIA POLICY

CONFIDENTIAL

[RHODESIA: POLICY: ADVANCE COPIES]

IMMEDIATE

PS
PS/SIR I GILMOUR
PS/MR LUCE
PS/PUS
SIR A DUFF
MR WILLSON
MR WILLIAMS
LORD N G LENNOX

PS/NO 10 DOWNING STREET

MR R L WADE-GERY)
MR P M MAXEY)
COL MOIR) CABINET
MR P J FOWLER) OFFICE
DIO)
SIR J HUNT)

.....
HD/RHODESIA DEPT (3)

~~FOR ZIMBABWE DEVELOPMENTS FUND~~

HD/C AF D
HD/S AF D

~~ADD MR LYNCH ODI?~~
~~MR SLATER TREASURY~~

HD/UND
HD/NEWS DEPT
HD/WAD
MR FREELAND LEGAL ADVISER RM K200A
MR FIFOOT LEGAL ADVISER RM K164

(File)

~~RESIDENT CLERK~~

GR 340

UNCLASSIFIED

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FM MIRIMBA SALISBURY 151207Z AUG 79

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 521 OF 15 AUGUST

INFO WASHINGTON UKMIS NEW YORK PRETORIA LAGOS DAR ES SALAAM
LUSAKA LUANDA GABORONE MAPUTO CANBERRA ADDIS ABABA OTTAWA
WELLINGTON

RHODESIA: CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF STATEMENT ISSUED AFTER THIS MORNING'S
CABINET MEETING:

BEGINS

THE CABINET AT THE SPECIAL MEETING HELD THIS MORNING DECIDED TO
ACCEPT THE INVITATION WHICH THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT HAS EXTENDED TO
THE PRIME MINISTER TO ATTEND A CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE IN LONDON
ON 10 SEPTEMBER 1979. IN ACCEPTING THE INVITATION IT WAS EMPHASISED
THAT THE GOVERNMENT HOLDS OFFICE BY VIRTUE OF THE RECENT ELECTIONS
HELD IN ZIMBABWE-RHODESIA ON THE BASIS OF UNIVERSAL ADULT SUFFRAGE
AT WHICH OVER 64 PERCENT OF THE ELECTORATE VOTED SEMICOLON
WHICH ELECTIONS WERE ACCEPTED BY ALL RESPONSIBLE OBSERVERS, INCLUDU-

~~HELD IN ZIMBABWE-RHODESIA ON THE BASIS OF UNIVERSAL ADULT SUFFRAGE~~
~~AT WHICH OVER 64 PERCENT OF THE ELECTORATE VOTED SEMICOLON~~
~~WHICH ELECTIONS WERE ACCEPTED BY ALL RESPONSIBLE OBSERVERS, INCLUDING~~
~~THOSE FROM THE CONSERVATIVE PARTY, AS BEING FREE AND FAIR.~~ CONSEQUENTLY, THE GOVERNMENT REPRESENTS THE COUNTRY AND THE DELEGATION WILL THEREFORE CONSIST OF REPRESENTATIVES FROM THE GOVERNMENT OF NATIONAL UNITY. IN THE PAST, WHEN PROPOSALS FOR A CONFERENCE ON OUR CONSTITUTIONAL POSITION HAVE BEEN UNDER DISCUSSION, IT HAS ALWAYS BEEN ON THE BASIS THAT NO PRECONDITIONS ARE LAID DOWN. IT IS ON THIS BASIS THAT THE GOVERNMENT HAS ACCEPTED THE INVITATION FROM THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT.

ENDS

2. THE TWO MINISTERS FROM THE ZANU (SITHOLE) PARTY ARE BEING SWORN IN TODAY. THE PARTY THUS BECOMES PART OF THE GOVERNMENT OF NATIONAL UNITY.

3. I EXPECT TO RECEIVE A FORMAL WRITTEN ACCEPTANCE TOMORROW.
DAY

NNNN

RHODESIA: POLICY: ADVANCE COPIES]

257

PS
PS/SIR I GILMOUR
PS/MR LUCE
PS/PUS
SIR A DUFF
MR WILLSON
MR WILLIAMS
LORD N G LENNOX

PS/NO 10-DOWNING STREET
MR R. L WADE-GERY)
MR P. M MAXEY)
COL. MOIR) CABINET
MR. P J FOWLER) OFFICE
DIO)
SIR J HUNT)

.....
HD/RHODESIA DEPT (3)

~~FOR ZIMBABWE DEVELOPMENTS FUND~~

HD/C AF D
HD/S AF D

~~ADD MR LYNCH ODI~~
MR SLATER TREASURY

HD/UND
HD/NEWS DEPT
HD/WAD
MR FREELAND LEGAL ADVISER RM K200A
MR FIFOOT LEGAL ADVISER RM K164

ADVANCE COPY

RESIDENT CLERK

GR 400

CONFIDENTIAL

FM MIRIMBA SALISBURY 150700Z AUG 79

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELNO 519 OF 15 AUGUST

INFO PRIORITY PRETORIA MAPUTO DAR ES SALAAM LUANDA GABORONE

LUSAKA LAGOS WASHINGTON AND UKMIS NEW YORK

RHODESIA: MEETING WITH GENERAL WALLS

1. I SAW WALLS YESTERDAY AFTERNOON AND GAVE HIM COPIES OF OUR OUTLINE CONSTITUTION PROPOSALS AND STATEMENT. I EXPLAINED OUR PLANS FOR THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE AND WENT OVER THE ARRANGEMENTS FOR COMPOSITION OF DELEGATIONS AND OBSERVERS ETC. I ASSURED HIM THAT ATTENDANCE AT THE CONFERENCE WOULD BE CONFINED TO THE DELEGATIONS FROM SALISBURY AND THE PATRIOTIC FRONT . HE DID NOT AT THE TIME READ THE DOCUMENTS THAT I HANDED TO HIM BUT SAID HE WOULD STUDY THEM CAREFULLY.

2. I HAD NOT SEEN WALLS SINCE THE LUSAKA AGREEMENT ON RHODESIA. HE, LIKE OTHERS, HAD IMAGINED THAT THAT AGREEMENT REPRESENTED IN

SOME WAY A RETREAT BY HMG FROM THEIR EARLIER DECLARED POLICIES. I REFUTED THIS AND POINTED TO THE CONSISTENCY BETWEEN THE LUSAKA STATEMENT AND EARLIER STATEMENTS BY THE PRIME MINISTER AND YOURSELF. I ALSO DREW ATTENTION TO THE GREAT DIFFERENCE IN APPROACH BETWEEN LUSAKA AND MONROVIA. THIS REPRESENTED SIGNIFICANT MOVEMENT BY OTHERS AND NOT BY HMG. HE SEEMED TO ACCEPT THIS. NEVERTHELESS HE EXPRESSED GRAVE MISGIVINGS AT THE PROSPECT OF A FURTHER ELECTION. HE BELIEVED THAT THIS WOULD LEAD TO FURTHER BLOODSHED. THE EFFORT INVOLVED IN MOUNTING THE LAST ELECTION HAD BEEN ENORMOUS: THE COUNTRY COULDN'T GO THROUGH THAT AGAIN. I ARGUED THAT AN ELECTION WAS A NATURAL DEVELOPMENT FROM A CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE AND SUGGESTED THAT, IF THIS WERE THE PRICE FOR A FINAL AND LASTING SETTLEMENT IT WAS WORTH PAYING. THE ALTERNATIVE COULD BE EVEN MORE DISAGREEABLE. WALLS WAS NOT NECESSARILY CONVINCED BUT I THINK HIS MIND REMAINS OPEN.

3. WALLS REFERRED TO REPORTS IN THIS MORNING'S PRESS OF A STATEMENT BY CONSERVATIVE BACKBENCHERS THAT HE SHOULD REPRESENT THE WHITES AT A CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE. HE REGARDED THIS AS IRRESPONSIBLE AND UNHELPFUL. HE WAS DOING HIS BEST TO CONVINCE OPINION THAT THE SECURITY FORCES WERE NOT POLITICAL AND WERE THE SERVANT OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE DAY. HE SERVED A BLACK MINISTER OF DEFENCE AND COMBINED OPERATIONS (MUZOREWA). HE DID NOT WANT TO BE LABELLED AS A REPRESENTATIVE OF THE WHITE MINORITY.

4. WALLS SEEMED MORE TIRED AND DISPIRITED THAN ON PREVIOUS OCCASIONS. I DID WHAT I COULD TO REINFORCE HIS TRUST IN OUR INTENTIONS.

DAY

NNNN

CONFIDENTIAL

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NO 10 DOWNING ST

CONFIDENTIAL

FM FCO 141915Z AUG 79

TO IMMEDIATE LUSAKA

TELEGRAM NUMBER 710 OF 14 AUGUST

INFO IMMEDIATE MIRIMBA SALISBURY, GABORONE, DAR ES SALAAM, LUANDA, MAPUTO,

PRIORITY: WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK, PRETORIA, LAGOS, ADDIS ABABA.
INFO SAVING BUCHAREST

Prime Minister

*Gu
13/8*

YOUR TELNO 895 AND BUCHAREST TELNO 187 (NOT TO ALL):

RHODESIA: CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE

1. BYATT (AUS) SAW NKOMO AT THEATHROW THIS AFTERNOON TO DELIVER THE TEXT OF THE INVITATION AND OUTLINE OF THE INDEPENDENCE CONSTITUTION (TELS NOS 140 AND 141 TO MIRIMBA SALISBURY).

2. NKOMO, WHO WAS IN JOVIAL AND BANTERING MOOD, READ BOTH TEXTS WITH GREAT CARE SEVERAL TIMES BUT ASKED FEW QUESTIONS. HE REMARKED OF THE OUTLINE CONSTITUTION THAT QUOTE WE HAVE SEEN THIS LANGUAGE MANY TIMES BEFORE" AND OBJECTED TO THE PROVISION FOR COMMISSIONS FOR THE POLICE AND ARMED FORCES FOR WHICH HE SAID THERE WAS NO BRITISH COLONIAL PRECEDENT: QUOTE IF YOU INSIST ON INCLUDING THAT THE WHOLE THING WILL FOUNDER UNQUOTE.

3. WHEN TOLD THAT A SIMILAR INVITATION WAS BEING DELIVERED TO MUZOREWA HE ASKED QUOTE FORMALLY UNQUOTE TO KNOW IN WHAT CAPACITY THE BISHOP WAS BEING INVITED. IF HE RAISES THIS ON RETURN TO LUSAKA YOU SHOULD SAY THAT MUZOREWA IS BEING INVITED AS A MATTER OF POLITICAL REALITY (THE SAME GOES FOR THE PATRIOTIC FRONT): HE IS HEAD OF THE ADMINISTRATION IN SALISBURY. IF THERE IS A DISPOSITION TO PURSUE THE POINT YOU SHOULD AS NECESSARY MAKE CLEAR THAT WE HAVE LITTLE PATIENCE WITH QUIBBLES OF THIS SORT.

4. NKOMO'S FIRST REACTION TO THE DATE FOR THE CONFERENCE WAS THAT IT WAS QUOTE IMPOSSIBLE UNQUOTE. WHEN BYATT EXPLAINED THAT THE DATE HAD BEEN CHOSEN TO AVOID ANY CLASH WITH THE HAVANA NON-ALIGNED CONFERENCE HE DID NOT EXPLAIN HIS DIFFICULTIES WITH 10 SEPTEMBER OR PURSUE THE POINT BEYOND ASKING WHETHER THE OPENING WOULD BE AT OFFICIAL LEVEL. HE WAS TOLD THAT IT WOULD BE AT HEAD OF DELEGATION LEVEL.

/s.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

5. NKOMO SAID THAT HE WOULD HAVE TO CONSIDER WHETHER HE COULD ATTEND, AND CONSULT HIS PEOPLE, AND THAT HE WOULD BE IN TOUCH WITH YOU ON HIS RETURN TO LUSAKA.

6. HE IS STAYING OVERNIGHT IN LONDON. HE WAS EVASIVE ABOUT HIS FUTURE MOVEMENTS BUT SAID THAT HE EXPECTED TO BE IN LUSAKA IN THREE OR FOUR DAYS TIME.

CARRINGTON

FILES
RHOD.D.
CADS
N AM D
NEWS D
PUSD
PLANNING STAFF
ES & SD
CCD
FRD
UND
LEGAL ADVS (MR. FREELAND)
(MR. FIFOOT)
ECON D
P & CD

DEF D
OID
PS
PS/SIR I GILMOUR
PS/MR. LUCE
PS/MR. RIDLEY
PS/MR. HURD
PS/PUS
SIR A DUFF
SIR A PARSONS
LORD N G LENNOX
MISS BROWN
MR. THOMAS
MR. WILLSON
MR. WILLIAMS

ADDITIONAL DISTN.
RHODESIA POLICY

Copied to Master set

Rhodesia P.A
G.M.
1978

NOTE FOR THE RECORD

POINTS ARISING FROM A CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER AND
THE FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH SECRETARY ON TUESDAY 14 AUGUST 1979

Rhodesia

Lord Carrington told the Prime Minister that the FCO were considering ways in which the wording of the 1979 Rhodesian Constitution could be changed, for presentational reasons vis a vis the Africans, without affecting the substance. The Prime Minister argued strongly against meddling with the wording of the Constitution for purely presentational reasons. She thought that changes should be confined to those substantive amendments which were necessary to remedy the Constitution's defects and that the wording of the rest of the Constitution should be left alone. After some discussion, Lord Carrington accepted this.

It was agreed that Mr. Peter Blaker would accompany Sir Anthony Duff to Salisbury at the end of August; and that Lord Harlech should visit the Front Line Presidents and the Patriotic Front at the same time. Lord Carrington suggested, and the Prime Minister agreed, that Lord Harlech should also visit the United States and brief Senator Kennedy among others.

(It was clear from the discussion that the Prime Minister and Lord Carrington are approaching the forthcoming Constitutional Conference in rather different ways. The Prime Minister wishes to do everything possible to enable the Conference to succeed and to bring about agreement on the Constitution: Lord Carrington regards such agreement as virtually inconceivable and therefore tends to regard the Conference more as a means of enabling the British Government to get off the Rhodesia hook).

G.M.

15 August 1979



cc FCO

SUBJECT^{DS}

PRIME MINISTER'S

PERSONAL MESSAGE

10 DOWNING STREET

SERIAL No. T77/79T

THE PRIME MINISTER

14 August 1979

Dear Bishop Muzorewa

Thank you for your letter of 25 July, which I have received through Mr. Derek Day and which was awaiting me in London on my return from Lusaka. In the meantime, you will have received my message to you about the outcome of the Commonwealth Heads of Government meeting.

On the subject of Rhodesian representation in London, I quite understand that you wish people in the United Kingdom to be given a more accurate view of the changes that have taken place in Rhodesia. I fully support that objective and, as you know, the British Government are doing all they can to impress the facts of the situation on those who remain sceptical about the substantial progress that has already taken place. I am happy to say that we see no difficulty in your expanding the existing UANC office in London, so that its staff can undertake information activities of the kind you have in mind. I believe that this would be the best way of achieving your aims.

Yours sincerely

MT

Bishop Abel Muzorewa

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PS/MR LUCE
PS/PUS
SIR A DUFF
MR WILLSON
MR WILLIAMS
LORD N G LENNOX

IMMEDIATE

PS/NO 10 DOWNING STREET

MR R L WADE-GERY)
MR P M MAXEY)
COL MOIR) CABINET
MR P J FOWLER) OFFICE
DIO)
SIR J HUNT)

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HD/RHODESIA DEPT (3)

FOR ZIMBABWE DEVELOPMENTS FUND

HD/C AF D

ADD MR LYNCH ODI?
MR SLATER TREASURY

HD/S AF D

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HD/NEWS DEPT

HD/WAD

MR FREELAND LEGAL ADVISER RM K200A

MR FIFOOT LEGAL ADVISER RM K164

Prime Minister

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ADVANCE COPY

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FM MIRIMBA SALISBURY 141130Z AUG 79

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 516 OF 14 AUGUST

INFO IMMEDIATE PRETORIA MAPUTO LUSAKA GABORONE DAR ES SALAAM
LUANDA LAGOS WASHINGTON UKMIS NEW YORK ADDIS ABABA MONROVIA
CANNBERRA OTTAWA AND WELLINGTON

INFO PRIORITY ABIDJAN DAKAR KINSHASA KHARTOUM AND TOKYO

YOUR TELNO 139: RHODESIA CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE

1. I DELIVERED THE INVITATION, TOGETHER WITH THE TWO SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS, TO MUZOREWA AT 0930Z THIS MORNING. I INFORMED HIM THAT THE TEXTS OF ALL THREE DOCUMENTS WOULD BE RELEASED AT 1130Z TODAY. I ASKED HIM TO REGARD THESE COMMUNICATIONS AS CONFIDENTIAL UNTIL THEN.

2. I DREW ON THE POINTS IN PARAS 4-9 OF YOUR TUR, STRESSING IN PARTICULAR OUR HOPE THAT THE DELEGATION THAT MUZOREWA BROUGHT TO LONDON WOULD BE WIDELY REPRESENTATIVE OF AFRICAN OPINION AND CONTAIN A SIGNIFICANT WHITE ELEMENT. MUZOREWA PICKED ME UP ON THIS AND ASKED WHETHER I WAS SUGGESTING THAT THE WHITE REPRESENTATION SHOULD COVER ELEMENTS, SUCH AS THE NATIONAL UNIFYING FORCE, WHO DID NOT FORM PART OF THE GOVERNMENT OF NATIONAL UNITY. I SAID THAT WE WERE NOT SEEKING TO DICTATE IN ANY WAY THE COMPOSITION OF HIS DELEGATION. CLEARLY, NOT ALL POLITICAL GROUPS AND OTHER INTERESTED ELEMENTS COULD BE INCLUDED IN THE DELEGATION. I SAID THAT IT WAS HOWEVER MY OWN PERSONAL

POLITICAL GROUPS AND OTHER INTERESTED ELEMENTS COULD BE INCLUDED IN THE DELEGATION. I SAID THAT IT WAS HOWEVER MY OWN PERSONAL ASSUMPTION THAT HE WOULD WISH TO INCLUDE ONE OR MORE OF HIS WHITE COLLEAGUES FROM HIS CABINET.

3. MUZOREWA ENQUIRED WHETHER OTHER ISSUES SUCH AS TRANSITIONAL ARRANGEMENTS OR ELECTIONS WOULD BE DISCUSSED AT THE CONFERENCE. I SAID THAT IT WAS OUR INTENTION TO CONCENTRATE ON REACHING AGREEMENT ON AN INDEPENDENCE CONSTITUTION. OTHER ISSUES WOULD THEN FLOW FROM THIS. MUZOREWA UNDERSTOOD THIS BUT SAID THAT THIS WOULD CAUSE HIM SOME DIFFICULTY. IF AGREEMENT WERE REACHED ON A CONSTITUTION HE WOULD THEN BE ASKED TO RETURN AT A LATER STAGE FOR DISCUSSIONS ON TRANSITIONAL ARRANGEMENTS AND THEN ON ELECTIONS. THE WHOLE PROCEDURE WOULD THUS BE LONG DRAWN OUT. THIS WOULD NOT BE WELCOME TO THE MAJORITY OF THE PEOPLE INSIDE RHODESIA. I ASSURED HIM THAT HMG INTENDED TO PROCEED AS RAPIDLY AS POSSIBLE WITH THE PROCESS LEADING TO LEGAL INDEPENDENCE. WE HAD NO INTEREST IN DELAY. HOWEVER, UNTIL AGREEMENT HAD BEEN REACHED ON AN INDEPENDENCE CONSTITUTION THERE WOULD BE NO ADVANTAGE IN DISCUSSING THE OTHER ISSUES. FURTHERMORE, THE INTRODUCTION OF THESE OTHER ISSUES AT THIS STAGE WOULD ONLY DELAY THE PROCESS AND NOT IMPROVE THE CHANCES OF AGREEMENT.

4. AT THE CONCLUSION OF OUR CONVERSATION MUZOREWA SAID THAT I WOULD KNOW OF HIS SERIOUS MISGIVINGS ABOUT FURTHER ELECTIONS. I SAID THAT I HAD REPORTED HIS VIEWS TO LONDON AND THAT BOTH YOU AND THE PRIME MINISTER WERE FULLY AWARE OF HIS CONCERN. HOWEVER, ELECTIONS WOULD BE A NATURAL AND ESSENTIAL PART OF THE PROCESS FOLLOWING THE ADOPTION OF AN AGREED INDEPENDENCE CONSTITUTION. MUZOREWA STILL, I SUSPECT, HAS LINGERING HOPES THAT HE CAN AVOID A FURTHER ELECTION AND HE WILL CERTAINLY WISH TO PURSUE HIS ARGUMENTS WHEN HE IS IN LONDON FOR THE CONFERENCE. IN THE LAST ANALYSIS, HOWEVER, I WOULD STILL EXPECT HIM TO AGREE TO ELECTIONS, IF THAT WERE THE PRICE THAT HAD TO BE PAID FOR A FINAL SETTLEMENT.

5. I DELIVERED THE INVITATION TO MUZOREWA DURING A BREAK IN HIS WEEKLY CABINET MEETING. HE RETURNED IMMEDIATELY TO INFORM HIS COLLEAGUES OF OUR PROPOSALS. HE SAID THAT HE WOULD BE IN TOUCH WITH ME IN DUE COURSE.

DAY

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[RHODESIA: POLICY: ADVANCE COPIES]

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SIR A DUFF
MR WILLSON
MR WILLIAMS
LORD N G LENNOX

PS/NO 10 DOWNING STREET

MR R L WADE-GERY)
MR P M MAXEY)
COL MOIR) CABINET
MR P J FOWLER) OFFICE
DIO)
SIR J HUNT)

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HD/RHODESIA DEPT (3)

FOR ZIMBABWE DEVELOPMENTS FUND
ADD MR LYNCH CDF?
MR SLATER TREASURY

HD/C AF D
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HD/NEWS DEPT
HD/WAD
MR FREELAND LEGAL ADVISER RM K200A
MR FIFOOT LEGAL ADVISER RM K164
Hd ccs
PRESIDENT CLERK

Prime Minister

Yes
14/8

CONFIDENTIAL
FM GABORONE 141100Z AUG 79
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 347 OF 14/8/79

ADVANCE COPY

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INFO PRIORITY DAR ES SALAAM, LUANDA, LAGOS, WASHINGTON,
LKMIS NEW YORK, PRETORIA, MIRIMBA SALISBURY, LUSAKA

YOUR TEL 165 AND TELS 139 - 142 TO MIRIMBA SALISBURY

RHODESIA CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE

1. I HANDED OVER THE PRIME MINISTER'S PERSONAL MESSAGE TO SIR SERETSE KHAMA AND THE TEXT IN TELS 140 - 142 TO THE PRESIDENT AT 1000Z TODAY (14 AUGUST). I SPOKE AS IN TEL 139.
2. THE PRESIDENT WAS CLEARLY VERY PLEASED TO SEE THAT WE WERE PROCEEDING SO PROMPTLY. HE SAID THAT HE HOPED THAT ALL THE PARTIES WOULD ACCEPT THE INVITATION AND HE THOUGHT IT WAS THE LAST CHANCE TO REACH A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT. MRS THATCHER HAD BEEN VERY ACCOMMODATING AT LUSAKA AND HER EFFORTS HAD BEEN HIGHLY APPRECIATED. BRITAIN HAD NOW DONE WHAT BOTSWANA HOPED, WHICH WAS TO ASSERT HER AUTHORITY AS THE COLONIAL POWER, TO CALL AN ALL PARTY CONFERENCE AND TO PRESS FOR A CONSTITUTION ON THE LINE WHICH HAD BEEN ADOPTED BY OTHER COMMONWEALTH COUNTRIES

HAD BEEN VERY ACCOMMODATING AT LUSAKA AND HER EFFORTS HAD BEEN HIGHLY APPRECIATED. BRITAIN HAD NOW DONE WHAT BOTSWANA HOPED, WHICH WAS TO ASSERT HER AUTHORITY AS THE COLONIAL POWER, TO CALL AN ALL PARTY CONFERENCE AND TO PRESS FOR A CONSTITUTION ON THE LINES WHICH HAD BEEN ACCEPTED BY OTHER COMMONWEALTH COUNTRIES. IF THE PATRIOTIC FRONT DID NOT ACCEPT THE INVITATION THEY WOULD ISOLATE THEMSELVES.

3. THE PRESIDENT DID NOT READ THE TEXTS BUT LEFT IT TO ME TO EXPLAIN THE MAIN POINTS. WE MAY EXPECT FURTHER POINTS OR QUESTIONS WHEN HE AND HIS OFFICIALS HAVE HAD TIME TO STUDY THEM.

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TO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK

TELEGRAM NUMBER 412 OF 14 AUGUST
RHODESIA: CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE

Order
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1. IF YOU HAVE NOT ALREADY DONE SO, PLEASE DRAW THE ATTENTION OF DR WALDHEIM OR HIS STAFF TO THE COMMONWEALTH AGREEMENT ON RHODESIA AND TO THE TEXTS IN F C O TELEGRAMS NOS 140-142 TO MIRIMBA SALISBURY. YOU SHOULD ALSO TRANSMIT THE FOLLOWING PERSONAL MESSAGE TO DR WALDHEIM FROM THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

BEGINS:

DEAR DR WALDHEIM,

ALTHOUGH I EXPECT THE ZAMBIAN GOVERNMENT WILL BE SENDING YOU THE FULL TEXT OF THE COMMUNIQUE ISSUED BY THE COMMONWEALTH HEADS OF GOVERNMENT IN LUSAKA, I WANTED TO LET YOU KNOW PERSONALLY THAT A VERY HELPFUL AGREEMENT ON RHODESIA WAS REACHED. I BELIEVE THAT WE NOW HAVE A NEW BASIS FOR HELPING RHODESIA TO ATTAIN LEGAL INDEPENDENCE WITH WIDE INTERNATIONAL RECOGNITION. WE ARE INVITING THE PARTIES TO A CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE, TO OPEN IN LONDON ON 10 SEPTEMBER. MY PEOPLE IN NEW YORK WILL BE ABLE TO BRIEF YOU IN DETAIL. THIS IS THE FIRST STAGE IN WHAT IS BOUND TO BE A DIFFICULT PROCESS. COMPLEX NEGOTIATIONS LIE AHEAD.

I AM GRATEFUL FOR THE HELPFUL ATTITUDE YOU HAVE ALWAYS SHOWN OVER THIS PROBLEM AND I AM SURE THAT I CAN COUNT ON YOUR CONTINUED SUPPORT AS WE SEEK A SETTLEMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE TERMS OF THE COMMONWEALTH AGREEMENT.

YOURS SINCERELY

PETER CARRINGTON.

ENDS.

CARRINGTON

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SIR A PARSONS
LORD N G LENNOX
MISS BROWN
MR. THOMAS
MR. WILLSON
MR. WILLIAMS

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Rhodesia

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PRIME MINISTER'S

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FCO 131428Z AUG 79

PERSONAL MESSAGE

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TO IMMEDIATE LAGOS

TELNO 506 OF 13 AUGUST

SERIAL No. T76A/79

14/8

INFO PRIORITY LUSAKA, DAR ES SALAAM, GABORONE, PRETORIA, MIRIMBA SALISBURY, WASHINGTON, LUANDA, MAPUTO.

FCO TELNOS 139-142 TO MIRIMBA SALISBURY: RHODESIA CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE.

1. YOU SHOULD HAND OVER A COPY OF THE TEXTS IN MY TELS NOS 140-142 UNDER COVER OF THE FOLLOWING PERSONAL MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO GENERAL OBASANJO.

BEGINS:

DEAR GENERAL OBASANJO,

I AM ARRANGING FOR YOU TO RECEIVE A COPY OF THE INVITATION WHICH WE ARE SENDING TO BISHOP MUZOREWA AND THE LEADERS OF THE PATRIOTIC FRONT TO A CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE IN LONDON IN EARLY SEPTEMBER IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE AGREEMENT WE REACHED AT LUSAKA. AS I EXPLAINED IN MY RECENT MESSAGE, THIS IS THE FIRST STAGE IN WHAT IS BOUND TO BE A DELICATE PROCESS. IF WE ARE TO SUCCEED IN BRINGING GENUINE BLACK MAJORITY RULE TO RHODESIA AND RESTORING PEACE TO THAT TERRITORY THE CONTINUED SUPPORT OF THE COMMONWEALTH, AND IN PARTICULAR OF NIGERIA, WILL BE OF THE GREATEST IMPORTANCE. I AM CONFIDENT THAT I CAN COUNT ON IT. I SHALL OF COURSE BE KEEPING IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH YOU AS WE PROCEED.

YOURS SINCERELY,

MARGARET THATCHER.

ENDS:

CARRINGTON

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MR. WILLSON
MR. WILLIAMS

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FM FCO 131825Z AUG 79

TO IMMEDIATE DAR ES SALAAM

TELEGRAM NO 273 OF 13 AUGUST.

AND TO LUSAKA GABORONE MAPUTO LUANDA LAGOS

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON UKMIS NEW YORK ADDIS ABABA MONROVIA

CANBERRA OTTAWA WELLINGTON EEC POSTS PRIORITY PRETORIA

OTHER COMMONWEALTH POSTS MIRIMBA SALISBURY

SINFO SAVING TO SUVA PORT MORESBY HONIARA NUKALOFA

Prime Minister

Jan 14/8

and

10.8.79

MY TEL NO *141* TO MIRIMBA SALISBURY.

RHODESIA: OUTLINE PROPOSALS FOR INDEPENDENCE CONSTITUTION

1. THE OUTLINE MAY BE CRITICISED ON THE GROUNDS THAT IT REPRESENTS A DEPARTURE FROM THE SPIRIT OF THE RHODESIA SECTION OF THE LUSAKA COMMUNIQUE OR IS TOO CLOSE TO THE PRESENT RHODESIAN CONSTITUTION TO MEET OR HEAD OFF SUCH CRITICISM YOU SHOULD DRAW AT YOUR DISCRETION ON THE REST OF THIS TELEGRAM.

2. POINT F OF THE RHODESIA SECTION OF THE COMMUNIQUE REFERRED TO "THE ADOPTION OF A DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION INCLUDING APPROPRIATE SAFEGUARDS FOR MINORITIES". THE OUTLINE PROPOSALS ARE DESIGNED TO ACHIEVE THIS. IF IT IS SUGGESTED THAT THE OUTLINE PROPOSALS ARE INSUFFICIENTLY PRECISE OR SPECIFIC, YOU SHOULD SAY THAT THE OUTLINE IS AS PRECISE AS WE FEEL NECESSARY IN ORDER TO GIVE A BASIS FOR CONSTRUCTIVE DISCUSSION AT A CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE. PREVIOUS EXPERIENCE HAS SHOWN CLEARLY THAT EXCESSIVE DETAIL IS A RECIPE FOR CONFUSION AND DELAY. THERE WILL BE NO DIFFICULTY IN QUICKLY TRANSLATING WHAT IS AGREED AT A CONFERENCE INTO THE NECESSARY TECHNICAL LANGUAGE.

3. AS TO SUGGESTED SIMILARITIES BETWEEN THE OUTLINE AND THE 1979 RHODESIAN CONSTITUTION, YOU SHOULD POINT OUT THAT THERE IS A SIMILARITY BETWEEN MANY OF THE INDEPENDENCE CONSTITUTIONS GRANTED BY BRITAIN, OR BASED ON BRITISH MODELS. ALTHOUGH THE ORDER OF THE VARIOUS PARTS MAY BE CHANGED AND THERE MAY BE SPECIFICALLY TAILORED VARIATIONS, THERE IS MUCH THAT IS COMMON TO MANY CONSTITUTIONS AND THE REPERTOIRE OF VARIATIONS IS LIMITED. ON SPECIFIC POINTS:-
(1) THE PROPOSALS FOR A "CONSTITUTIONAL" HEAD OF STATE AND A BICAMERAL LEGISLATURE: THE TENDENCY IN AFRICA NOW IS TO OPT FOR AN EXECUTIVE HEAD OF STATE AND A UNICAMERAL LEGISLATURE.

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BUT TANGANYIKA, KENYA AND NIGERIA BECAME INDEPENDENT AS MONARCHIES WITH A PRIME MINISTER AS HEAD OF GOVERNMENT. KENYA HAD A BICAMERAL LEGISLATURE AT INDEPENDENCE. ZAMBIA HAD A HOUSE OF CHIEFS WITH POWERS TO CONSIDER BILLS INTRODUCED IN THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY. NIGERIA IS NOW ELECTING A BICAMERAL LEGISLATURE.

(II) THE PROPOSAL FOR A JUSTICIABLE DECLARATION OF RIGHTS IS, PRESUMABLY, COMMON GROUND IN ANY CASE BETWEEN THE THE SALISBURY GOVERNMENT AND THE EXTERNAL PARTIES.

(III) THERE ARE A NUMBER OF POINTS OF SUBSTANCE WHICH THE EXTERNAL PARTIES ARE LIKELY TO QUESTION BUT ON WHICH A CAREFUL READING OF OUR PROPOSALS WILL SHOW WE HAVE TAKEN FULL ACCOUNT OF COMMONWEALTH VIEWS.

THUS, THE PROPOSALS FOR REPRESENTATION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY IN PARLIAMENT SHOULD BE READ IN THE LIGHT OF PARAGRAPH F OF THE LUSAKA COMMUNIQUE. IT SHOULD ALSO BE NOTED THAT, ACCORDING TO THE PROPOSALS, PROCEDURES FOR AMENDING THE CONSTITUTION ARE TO BE ON LINES SIMILAR TO THOSE IN OTHER INDEPENDENCE CONSTITUTIONS GRANTED BY BRITAIN. THE REFERENCES TO PUBLIC SERVICE AND OTHER COMMISSIONS MAY ALSO GIVE RISE TO MISGIVINGS. BUT IT WAS COMMON FORM IN INDEPENDENCE CONSTITUTIONS GRANTED BY BRITAIN AFTER 1945 TO PROVIDE FOR JUDGES (OTHER THAN THE CHIEF JUSTICE) TO BE APPOINTED BY OR ON THE ADVICE OF JUDICIAL SERVICE COMMISSIONS AND FOR PUBLIC SERVICE AND POLICE APPOINTMENTS (BELOW THE TOP LEVEL) TO BE MADE BY PUBLIC AND POLICE SERVICE COMMISSIONS. THIS WAS THE CASE FOR ZAMBIA, TANGANYIKA AND BOTSWANA, FOR EXAMPLE. ON THE OTHER HAND, IT WAS ALSO COMMON FORM TO PROVIDE FOR APPOINTMENTS TO TOP POSTS (E.G. ATTORNEY-GENERAL, AMBASSADORS, SECRETARY TO CABINET, PERMANENT SECRETARY, COMMISSIONER OF POLICE, CHIEF JUSTICE) TO BE APPOINTED BY OR

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ON THE ADVICE OF THE PRIME MINISTER OR OTHER HOLDER OF POLITICAL OFFICE. THIS IS WHAT IS CONTEMPLATED IN THE SECOND SENTENCE OF PARAGRAPH 10 OF OUR OUTLINE. MOREOVER, THE NEED FOR AFRICANIZATION AT ALL LEVELS IS ALSO RECOGNISED IN THE REFERENCE IN THAT PARAGRAPH TO "THE LEGITIMATE CLAIMS OF THE MAJORITY OF THE POPULATION TO INCREASING REPRESENTATION IN ALL FORMS OF PUBLIC OFFICE."

4. FINALLY, YOU SHOULD POINT OUT THAT, AS THE INVITATION TO THE PARTIES MAKES CLEAR, ALTERNATIVE PROPOSALS ARE NOT EXCLUDED IF THE PARTIES THEMSELVES CAN REACH AGREEMENT ON THEM.

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SIR A PARSONS
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MISS BROWN
MR. THOMAS
MR. WILLSON
MR. WILLIAMS

ADDITIONAL DISTN.
RHODESIA POLICY

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sam
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NOTE OF A TELEPHONE CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER AND
MR. NICHOLAS ELLIOTT ON 13 AUGUST

Rhodesia

Mr. Elliott told the Prime Minister that he had seen Bishop Muzorewa, in Salisbury, very recently, in the company of General Alan Fraser. They had previously called on the South African Prime Minister, Mr. P. W. Botha, in Pretoria, and had found him friendly and very relaxed about the outcome of the Lusaka meeting. Mr. Pik Botha, however, had been in a very emotional state and had taken the line that Lusaka was a sell-out. Mr. Elliott and General Fraser had done their best to cool Pik Botha down and had told him that he was over-reacting.

In Salisbury Bishop Muzorewa had been very relaxed and had spoken very warmly of his talks with the Prime Minister in London. He had said that his strong inclination was to trust the Prime Minister not to preside over a sell-out; and Mr. Elliott had assured him that there would never be a British Government which would give the internal parties a fairer deal.

Mr. Elliott told the Prime Minister that he thought it very important that David Smith (whom he had also seen in Salisbury) should attend the Constitutional Conference. All the more intelligent whites in Salisbury had taken a relaxed view of Lusaka and so had General Walls. Only the blimps were talking about a sell-out. Mr. Trott, the Governor of the Reserve Bank in Salisbury, had told Mr. Elliott that the Rhodesian economy was in fairly good shape in the short term; but that white morale would not stand up for more than a further six months.

Mr. Elliott said that he had found great suspicion in Salisbury of Lord Carrington and of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office: a number of people had said to him that they hoped that the Prime Minister was not being unduly influenced by them. Mr. Elliott expressed the view that it was important to send a Government Minister to Salisbury very soon in order to provide the

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white Rhodesians with reassurance. The South African press was putting it about that the Prime Minister was aiming for immediate elections in Rhodesia; apart from the fact that this would obviously be impracticable, new elections would be greatly resented by the Rhodesians. Elections might, however, be acceptable if there were to be a ceasefire first.

The Prime Minister asked Mr. Elliott about President Machel's attitude to a ceasefire. Mr. Elliott said that Machel would probably like to get rid of the guerrillas if he could. 70% of Mugabe's material support now came from the Soviet Union, Cuba and the GDR, and only 30% from China.

Mr. Elliott told the Prime Minister that Bishop Muzorewa's only unsuccessful discussion during his visit to London had been with Mr. Callaghan, who had asked the Bishop to see him at the House of Commons and had then been very ill-tempered when the Bishop had asked him to call at his hotel instead.

Mr. Elliott said that David Smith had told him in Salisbury that he had recently received a visit from two elderly Americans (whose names he did not give) who claimed to be personal emissaries from Dr. Brzezinski. Their message had been that the white Rhodesians should not take any notice of Andy Young's pronouncements: they had asked David Smith to accept that the United States was fully aware of the crucial importance of Rhodesia both economically and as a bastion against the advance of Communism in Southern Africa. The emissaries had also said that if oil supplies from Saudi Arabia were to be threatened by political developments, the U.S. would not hesitate to intervene militarily in order to save the oil. David Smith had told nobody of this discussion except Mr. P. W. Botha. *hm*

15 August 1979

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10 DOWNING STREET

Prime Minister

You approved
this in draft.

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Dear Bishop Muganyizi

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FM PRETORIA 131505 Z AUG 79

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

and

Prime Minister

TELEGRAM NUMBER 451 OF 13 AUGUST

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REPEATED FOR INFORMATION PRIORITY UKMIS NEW YORK MIRIMBA SALISBURY.

RHODESIA

FOLLOWING FROM MURRAY.

1. AT OUR MEETING ON 11 AUGUST BOTHA WENT ON ABOUT RHODESIA AT CONSIDERABLE GREATER LENGTH AND MORE SHARPLY THAN I THOUGHT IT APPROPRIATE TO RECORD IN MY REPORT TO THE CONTACT GROUP (MY TELNO 6 TO UKMIS NEW YORK).
2. IN ANTICIPATION OF CRITICISM OF THE LUSAKA AGREEMENT I HAD SAID IN MY OPENING REMARKS THAT I KNEW THAT RECENT DEVELOPMENTS CONCERNING RHODESIA AT THE COMMONWEALTH CONFERENCE HAD AROUSED SOME MISGIVINGS IN SOUTH AFRICA SEMI CLN I THOUGHT THAT THESE MISGIVINGS WERE MISPLACED SINCE THEY FAILED TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF THE VERY SUBSTANTIAL AND POSITIVE FEATURES OF THE LUSAKA AGREEMENT WHICH SHOULD BUILD UP CONFIDENCE AMONGST THE RACES IN RHODESIA WHITE AND BLACK ALIKE SEMI COLON BUT IT WAS NOT PART OF MY MISSION AS ENVOY OF THE FIVE TO TALK ABOUT RHODESIA AND I KNEW THAT THE BRITISH AMBASSADOR WAS WAITING FOR AN OPPORTUNITY TO DISCUSS IT WITH HIM . CLEARLY HOWEVER , HE COULD NOT RESIST THE TEMPTATION OF A CAPTIVE BRITISH DIPLOMAT.
3. HE SAID EARLY ON IN HIS OWN STATEMENT THAT MORE THAN ONE BRITISH CONSERVATIVE PARTY LEADER HAD COME AND TALKED TO THE SOUTH AFRICANS IN THE PAST SEMI CLN WHAT THEY WERE DOING NOW WAS QUITE DIFFERENT FROM WHAT THEY HAD TOLD HIM THEN. HE WAS VERY DISAPPOINTED AT THEIR PRESENT POLICIES . THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT HAD MADE A SOMERSAULT IN LUSAKA . THEY HAD BEEN USHED BY COUNTRIES WHO COULD NOT LOOK AFTER THEMSELVES BUT WERE

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STILL SWINGING THE BIG STICK . WHEN THE WHITES STARTED RUNNING FROM RHODESIA , AND THE ECONOMY CRUMBLLED THE BRITISH WOULD NOT BE THERE TO HELP . SOUTH AFRICA HAD SPEND MONEY ON RHODESIA WHEN OTHERS HAD LEFT THE COUNTRY IN THE LURCH . NOW THE BRITISH APPARENTLY EXPECTED HIM TO PUT WITH A REPETITION OF THIS IN SOUTH WEST AFRICA .

4. AT A LATER STAGE HE REMARKED THAT IN THE PAST FEW YEARS THERE HAD BEEN NO IMPARTIALITY FROM THOSE WHO HAD TRIED TO DISCUSS MATTERS WITH THE SOUTH AFRICANS AND ALTHOUGH HE HAD THOUGHT THERE WAS GOING TO BE A NEW APPROACH AS FAR AS THE BRITISH WAS CONCERNED HE HAD BEEN PROVED WRONG .

5. AS HE ESCORTED ME TO THE DOOR AT THE END OF THE MEETING HE TOLD ME THAT HE WAS BITTERLY DISAPPOINTED WITH THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT AND WAS VERY ANGRY THAT MRS THATCHER HAD IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS CRITICISED SOUTH AFRICA'S INTERNAL POLICIES . HE HAD BEEN RELUCTANT TO SPEAK OUT PUBLICLY BUT HE WOULD IF NECESSARY. HE EXPRESSED THE HOPE THAT THERE WOULD NOT BE A REPETITION AND CONCLUDED WITH THE WORDS " AND ABOVE ALL NO THREATS " . I REPEATED MY DISAGREEMENT WITH HIS VIEW OF AFFAIRS BUT AGAIN ADDED THAT THESE WERE MATTERS FOR THE BRITISH AMBASSADOR WHO WAS LOOKING FORWARD TO AN OPPORTUNITY OF EXPLAINING OUR POLICIES IN DETAIL . HE SAID WITH RELISH THAT HE WOULD CERTAINLY REPEAT ALL THIS TO MR LEAHY.

6. HOWEVER YESTERDAY THE FOREIGN MINISTER WITH WHOM I SPENT THE AFTERNOON INFORMALLY TOLD ME THAT HE HAD BEEN IN TOUCH WITH " THE RHODESIANS " IN THE MORNING AND NOW FELT CONSIDERABLY MORE CHEERFUL . IF THE MODIFICATIONS THAT WE HAD IN MIND FOR THE CONSTITUTION WERE NOT TOO SWEEPING THEY SHOULD BE ACCEPTABLE TO MUZOREWA WITHOUT COMPLETELY UNDERMINING HIS POSITION . THE CONSTITUTION HAD PERHAPS GONE TOO FAR IN PROTECTING THE RIGHTS OF THE WHITES . HE THOUGHT THAT MUZOREWA SHOULD ATTEND THE CONFERENCE BUT ON THE BASIS THAT HE WAS NOT PREPARED TO MAKE UP HIS

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IMMEDIATE 131906Z AUG 1979
FROM CABINET OFFICE LONDON
TO WHITE HOUSE
ZEM

C O N F I D E N T I A L
MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT CARTER
DEAR MR PRESIDENT

THANK YOU SO MUCH FOR YOUR KIND MESSAGE ABOUT RHODESIA,
WHICH I RECEIVED IN LUSAKA. I AM VERY GLAD THAT YOU THINK
THE WORK WE DID THERE WAS VALUABLE. WE WERE ENCOURAGED BY THE
ATTITUDES WE ENCOUNTERED AMONGST OUR COMMONWEALTH COLLEAGUES,
AND BY THE OUTCOME WHICH WE BELIEVE DOES REPRESENT A
CONSTRUCTIVE STEP FORWARD.

WE ARE NOW GOING AHEAD, ON THE BASIS OF THE AGREEMENT
REACHED IN LUSAKA, TO INVITE THE LEADERS OF THE SALISBURY
ADMINISTRATION AND THE PATRIOTIC FRONT TO COME TO A
CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE, TO OPEN AT LANCASTER HOUSE IN LONDON
ON 10 SEPTEMBER. WE SHALL BE MAKING AN ANNOUNCEMENT AT
1230 LONDON TIME TOMORROW 14 AUGUST. I AM ARRANGING FOR FULL
DETAILS TO BE SENT TO OUR EMBASSY IN WASHINGTON SO THAT THEY
CAN BRIEF THE STATE DEPARTMENT.

THANK YOU FOR YOUR SUPPORT. THERE ARE DIFFICULT NEGOTIATIONS
AHEAD, BUT WE SHALL WORK HARD FOR SUCCESS. IF WE ARE TO ACHIEVE
IT, WE SHALL INDEED NEED THE CLOSE AND DETAILED CONSULTATION
WITH YOUR GOVERNMENT THAT YOU SUGGEST.

WARM PERSONAL REGARDS,

YOURS SINCERELY,
MARGARET THATCHER

BT

NNNN

SENT AT 1939Z/13 GCK

RGRG MATE QSL AT SAME TIME AND TKS MUCH KK

WISH YOU THAT ALL BE BIEEEEE

SUBJECT PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T63/79T

P.O.
14/8

CONFIDENTIAL

MIND ABOUT NEW ELECTIONS UNTIL HE HAD SEEN WHAT THE CONFERENCE PRODUCED (I GUESSED FROM AN ASIDE HE MADE THAT HIS INTERLOCUTOR MIGHT HAVE BEEN DAVID SMITH).

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PS/PUS
SIR A DUFF
LORD N G LENNOX
MISS BROWN
MR. WILLSON
MR. WILLIAMS

ADDITIONAL DISTN.
RHODESIA POLICY

CONFIDENTIAL



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

PRIME MINISTER
Agree to send attached
message tonight?

13 August 1979

Dear Nick,

M/P 13/ VIII.

Agreed act.

I enclose a draft telegram containing the text of a personal message which the Prime Minister may like to send to President Carter, to inform him of our plans for a conference next month.

Like the previous messages (Lusaka Telno 3 to Washington and Washington Telno 6 to Lusaka, copies attached for ease of reference), the suggested text is quite brief and promises that our Embassy will let the State Department have full details of the invitations and our plans generally.

As you will have seen (FCO Telno 1010 to Washington, copy enclosed), the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary suggested to Ambassador Brewster who called on him on 10 August, that senior State Department officials might come to London later this month to discuss Rhodesia after their return from holiday.

Our Embassy in Washington already have instructions to pass the text of the invitations to the parties and related papers to the State Department. In view of the time difference they will do so at 19.30 today Washington time (01.30 14 August our time). If the Prime Minister approves the message this evening you may wish to send it over the hot line.

Yours ever,
Stephen

(J S Wall)
Private Secretary

N J Sanders Esq
10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL

File No.
 Department RHODESIA OUTWARD
 Drafted by MISS R.J. SPENCE TELEGRAM
 (Block Capitals) 233 8149
 Tel. Extn.....

Security Classification CONFIDENTIAL
Precedence IMMEDIATE FLASH
DESKBYZ

FOR COMMS. DEPT. USE	Despatched (Date) (Time)Z	POSTBYZ
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PREAMBLE

(Time of Origin)Z(G.M.T.) (Restrictive Prefix).....
 (Security Class.) CONFIDENTIAL (Caveat/ Privacy Marking).....
 (Codeword) (Deskby).....Z

TO ~~IMMEDIATE~~ FLASH WASHINGTON Tel. No. of
 (precedence) (post)

AND TO (precedence/post).....

AND SAVING TO.....
 REPEATED TO (for info).....

SAVING TO (for info).....

- Distribution:-
 Files
 Rhodesia Dept.
 NAMD
 PS
 PS/LPS
 PS/Mr. Luce
 PS/Mr. Hurd
 PS/Mr. Blaker
 PS/PUS
 Sir A. Duff
 Mr. Williams
 Mr. Byatt

Copies to:-
 0 Downing St.

[TEXT]
 Your tel. No. 6 to Lusaka: Rhodesia.
 1. Grateful if you would pass the following message from the Prime Minister to President Carter:-
 BEGINS:
 Dear Mr. President,
 Thank you so much for your kind message about Rhodesia, which I received in Lusaka. I am very glad that you think the work we did there was valuable. We were ~~indeed much~~ encouraged by the attitudes we encountered amongst our Commonwealth colleagues, and by the outcome which we believe does represent a constructive step forward.
 We are now going ahead, on the basis of the agreement reached in Lusaka, to invite the leaders of the Salisbury Administration and the Patriotic Front to come to a constitutional conference, to open at Lancaster House in London on 10 September. We shall be making an announcement at 12.30 London time tomorrow 14 August. I am arranging for full details to be sent

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to our Embassy in Washington so that they can brief the State Department.

Thank you for your support. There are difficult negotiations ahead, but we shall work hard for success. If we are to achieve it, we shall indeed need the close and detailed consultation with your government that you suggest.

Warm personal regards,

Yours sincerely,

Margaret Thatcher.

ENDS.

CONFIDENTIAL

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

CONFIDENTIAL

FM LUSAKA 060920Z AUG

TO FLASH FCO

TELNO U/N OF 6TH AUGUST

FOLLOWING TELEGRAM IS NOW REPEATED TO YOU AT REQUEST
OF FCO

DEDIP

TO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON

TELNO 003 OF 5 AUGUST 1979

INFO FCO

MIPT: FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF PERSONAL MESSAGE FROM PRIME MINISTER
TO PRESIDENT CARTER:-

'' DEAR MR PRESIDENT,

I BELIEVE WE ARE NEAR TO SECURING AGREEMENT IN LUSAKA
TO A COMMUNIQUE IN WHICH THE COMMONWEALTH RECOGNISE THE NEW
SITUATION IN RHODESIA AND ARE WILL TO WORK WITH US TO BRING
RHODESIA TO INDEPENDENCE.

I ENCLOSE THE TEXT OF THE PASSAGE FROM THE COMMUNIQUE
WHICH HAS BEEN WORKED OUT BY A SMALL GROUP OF US INCLUDING
PRESIDENT KAUNDA, PRESIDENT NYERERE AND THE NIGERIAN
COMMISSIONER FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS. WE HOPE TO HAVE IT ENDORSED
BY OUR OTHER COLLEAGUES TOMORROW,. OF COURSE WE MAY STILL RUN
INTO DIFFICULTIES SEMI CLN AND I SHALL LET YOU KNOW AS SOON
AS THE DBATE IS OVER.

YOU WEILL SEE THAT THE TEXT PICKS UP MOST OF THE POINTS
WHICH I MADE IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS TEN DAYS AGO. I BELIEVE
THAT THE SUPPORT OF THE COMMONWEALTH FOR THIS POLICY WILL
ENABLE BISHOP MUZOREWA TO WORK WITH US FOR THE KEND OF
CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE ABOUT WHICH YOU TALKED TO HIM AT
CAMP DAVID. WE MUST CONTINUE TO GIVE HIM ALL THE
ENCOURAGEMENT WE CAN.

I SHALL BE CONSULTING MY COLLEAGUES WHEN I GET
HOME AND WILL BE IN TOUCH AGAIN THEREAFTER. BUT
YOU WILL SEE FROM THE COMMUNIQUE THE LINES ON WHICH WE ARE
THINKING AND I WANTED YOU TO HAVE ADVANCE NOTICE OF IT.

WARM PERSONAL REGARDS,

MARGARET THATCHER.''

ADVANCE COPY

3x

IMMEDIATE

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OO WASHINGTON

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FM LUSAKA 061125Z AUG 79

TO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON

TELEGRAM NUMBER 6 OF 6 AUGUST

INFO PRIORITY FCO

~~HO CCD~~

~~HO ATT'D~~

HO NAM D

McWilliams

[Fries Dm]

Xx

1332

MY TELNO 003; MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO PRESIDENT CARTER

1. THE PRIME MINISTER HAS NOW RECEIVED THE FOLLOWING REPLY FROM PRESIDENT CARTER:-

" DEAR MADAME PRIME MINISTER

I WAS PLEASED TO RECEIVE YOUR MESSAGE CONCERNING THE COMMONWEALTH AGREEMENT ON THE COMMUNIQUE DEALING WITH A SETTLEMENT IN RHODESIA.

YOU AND THE OTHER LEADERS OF THE COMMONWEALTH NATIONS IN LUSAKA HAVE TAKEN A SIGNIFICANT STEP FORWARD IN PRODUCING A DOCUMENT WHICH DOES THE PROMISE OF SERVING AS THE BASIS FOR A JUST AND LASTING SETTLEMENT.

WE LOOK FORWARD TO CONSULTING WITH YOU ON THE DETAILS OF YOUR PROGRESS DURING THE COMING DAYS. MEANWHILE YOU HAVE MY FULL SUPPORT IN THE PROCESS WHICH YOU HAVE SO WISELY SET IN MOTION.

SINCERELY, JIMMY CARTER"

ALLINSON

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FM F C O 101902Z AUG 79

TO PRIORITY WASHINGTON

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1010 OF 10 AUGUST.

RHODESIA: CALL BY U S AMBASSADOR.

KINGMAN BREWSTER CALLED ON ME AT HIS REQUEST THIS AFTERNOON TO HEAR ABOUT LUSAKA. HE SAID THE U S GOVERNMENT WAS VERY PLEASED WITH THE OUTCOME AND WOULD SUPPORT OUR EFFORTS. I TOLD HIM IN CONFIDENCE ABOUT THE PROPOSED DATE FOR THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE (ON WHICH YOU WILL BE RECEIVING SEPARATE INSTRUCTIONS). I SAID IT MIGHT BE USEFUL IF MOOSE AND LAKE CAME OVER HERE AFTER THEY GOT BACK TO WASHINGTON. BREWSTER SAID IT WOULD BE USEFUL TO HAVE QUOTE SOMEONE IN THE BUSHES UNQUOTE DURING THE CONFERENCE AND THOUGHT HE MIGHT SUGGEST TO VANCE THAT SEITZ BE SENT BACK FOR THE PURPOSE.

2. I TOLD BREWSTER THAT IF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE BROKE DOWN DUE TO PATRIOTIC FRONT INTRANSIGENCE WE WOULD LOOK TO THE AMERICANS FOR SUPPORT. BREWSTER SAID THAT THIS WAS A CONTINGENCY WHICH WOULD NEED TO BE LOOKED AT AND WE SHOULD TOGETHER PLAN HOW TO HANDLE IT.

CARRINGTON

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SIR A PARSONS
LORD N G LENNOX
MISS BROWN
MR. THOMAS
MR. WILLSON
MR. WILLIAMS

ADDITIONAL DISTN.
RHODESIA POLICY

CONFIDENTIAL

Rhodesia

file

28

BF 22/8/79



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

13 August 1979

I enclose a copy of a telegram addressed to the Prime Minister by President Tolbert of Liberia about the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting in Lusaka.

Dated
9.8.79
(T62AA/79)

I should be grateful for advice on a reply which the Prime Minister might send to President Tolbert. It would be helpful if a draft could reach me not later than Wednesday, 22 August.

B. G. CARTLEDGE

Stephen Wall, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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Ref. A0148

Prime Minister

MR. CARTLEDGE

6/13/8

I had a letter today from Lord Caccia.
Most of it dealt with a matter which is of no concern
to you, but I think you might like to see the last
paragraph, a copy of which is attached.

John

(John Hunt)

13th August, 1979

out

While I am writing, I cannot forebear to say my admiration for the role which the Prime Minister succeeded in playing in Lusaka. I know that there are plenty of hurdles yet, but that is for the future. A new start was what was needed and all that could be achieved at that Meeting was achieved. If you have a chance of passing this on with my good wishes personally to the Prime Minister, I should be most grateful. But she must have her tray full on return and please do not bother her unless you think that the chance offers.

All best wishes

Yours truly

David Cairns



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

13 August 1979

Rhodesian Representation in the UK Pt 3.

Paul Lever wrote to Mike Pattison on 30 July to convey the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary's advice on how the Prime Minister might respond to Bishop Muzorewa's message to her of 25 July about Zimbabwe-Rhodesian representation in London.

The Prime Minister has now seen this letter and is content to reply to Bishop Muzorewa in the terms proposed, subject to the amendment of the first paragraph of your draft so that it reads as follows:

"Thank you for your letter of 25 July, which I have received through Mr. Derek Day and which was awaiting me in London on my return from Lusaka. In the meantime, you will have received my message to you about the outcome of the Commonwealth Heads of Government meeting."

I should be grateful if you would arrange for the Prime Minister's reply, thus amended, to be conveyed to Bishop Muzorewa. The signed original will follow in due course.

B. G. CARTLEDGE

Stephen Wall, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

J

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*Under NA
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FROM F C O 131722Z AUGUST 79
TO FLASH LAGOS
TELEGRAM NUMBER 507 OF 13 AUGUST.

YOUR TELNO 569: PRIME MINISTER'S MESSAGE TO HEAD OF STATE.

1. YOU MAY ACT AS PROPOSED IN PARAS 3 AND 4 OF YOUR TUR. YOU SHOULD MAKE CLEAR, IF YOU DO HAVE TO GIVE A COPY OF THE P.M.'S MESSAGE TO ADEFOPE, THAT THE ORIGINAL REMAINS WITH YOU FOR DELIVERY PERSONALLY TO OBASANJO.

CARRINGTON

[COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING STREET]

F I L E S
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MR WILLIAMS

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DESKBY 131500Z

FROM LAGOS 131315Z

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 569 OF 13 AUGUST 1979.

[SIC]
MY TELNO 667.

*Endo ma
Gus
14/8*

PRIME MINISTER'S MESSAGE TO HEAD OF STATE.

I NOW HAVE AN APPOINTMENT WITH ADEFOPE FOR 0800Z TOMORROW, BUT DESPITE REPEATED APPROACHES THROUGH VARIOUS CHANNELS, AND A FURTHER NOTE STRESSING THE URGENCY, I STILL DO NOT HAVE AN APPOINTMENT WITH THE HEAD OF STATE. THERE ARE INCREASING INDICATIONS THAT HE IS DELIBERATELY STALLING, POSSIBLY BECAUSE HE SUSPECTS THAT THE MESSAGE IS MAINLY ABOUT THE BP NATIONALISATION AND HE DOES NOT WISH TO EXPOSE HIMSELF ON THIS ISSUE.

2. MEANWHILE THERE HAS BEEN LITTLE SIGN OF IMPROVEMENT IN THE GENERAL ATMOSPHERE AS A RESULT OF THE LUSAKA AGREEMENT AND THE PRESS CONTINUES TO BE HOSTILE (SEE IN PARTICULAR EDITORIAL IN NEW NIGERIAN SUMMARISED IN A SEPARATE TELEGRAM). THERE HAS BEEN VIRTUALLY NO RECOGNITION OF THE CONSTRUCTIVE BRITISH ROLE AT LUSAKA AND SUCH COMMENT AS THERE HAS BEEN HAS CLAIMED THE CREDIT FOR NIGERIA'S TOUGH LINE WITH BRITAIN. IN THIS THE PRESS WOULD APPEAR TO BE FOLLOWING THE GOVERNMENT'S, AND IN PARTICULAR, OBASANJO'S ATTITUDE. ONE REASON MAY BE DISGRUNTLEMENT BECAUSE NIGERIA COMPLETELY MISJUDGED THE ATMOSPHERE OF LUSAKA. THEY WERE TAKEN BY SURPRISE BY MRS THATCHER'S FORTHCOMING ATTITUDE AND ALLOWED THE LIMELIGHT TO BE STOLEN BY NYERERE'S STATESMANLIKE APPROACH WHILE THEY WERE LEFT MUTTERING INAPPROPRIATE THREATS ABOUT LEAVING THE COMMONWEALTH. THE SHARPNESS OF YOUR REACTION TO ADEFOPE OVER THE BP NATIONALISATION, AND IN PARTICULAR THE WAY IT WAS REPORTED HERE, COULD ALSO HAVE ADDED TO OBASANJO'S RESENTMENT.

3. AS MY APPOINTMENT WITH ADEFOPE WILL BE ONLY TWO HOURS BEFORE THE DEADLINE FOR HANDING OVER DETAILS OF OUR PLANS FOR THE RHODESIA CONFERENCE, I SHALL BE GRATEFUL FOR AUTHORITY TO INFORM HIM OF THE DETAILS ON THIS OCCASION, WITH SUITABLE RESERVATIONS ABOUT THE TIMING. I AM CONFIDENT THAT THIS WILL NOT RESULT IN ANY

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/ EMBARRASSING LEAK.

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EMBARRASSING LEAK. AT THE SAME TIME, I THINK IT SHOULD HELP TO IMPROVE THE ATMOSPHERE AND THE PROSPECTS OF AN AUDIENCE WITH OBASANJO BY DEMONSTRATING THE SPEED WITH WHICH WE ARE ACTING.

4. I SHALL OF COURSE PRESS ADEFOPE TO ARRANGE AN EARLY AUDIENCE WITH OBASANJO, SO THAT I CAN HAND OVER THE PRIME MINISTER'S MESSAGE AND MAKE THE ORAL POINTS BUT I SHOULD BE GRATEFUL FOR AUTHORITY TO HAND TO ADEFOPE A COPY OF THE PRIME MINISTER'S MESSAGE IF I JUDGE AT THE TIME THAT THIS WOULD BE APPROPRIATE. THERE IS OF COURSE A RISK THAT IF OBASANJO RECEIVES THE MESSAGE IN THIS WAY HE MAY TAKE THE LINE THAT IT IS NOT NECESSARY TO SEE ME. ON THE OTHER HAND, I HAD THE IMPRESSION FROM THE CHIEF OF STAFF THAT THE IMPORTANT THING ABOUT A MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER WOULD NOT BE ITS CONTENT BUT THE FACT THAT IT WAS BEING SENT, THUS RESUMING A CHANNEL OF COMMUNICATION BETWEEN HEADS OF GOVERNMENT. UNTIL WE CAN RESTORE TRUST AND CONFIDENCE IN OUR INTER-GOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, I FEAR THAT ARGUMENTS ON THE MERITS OF THE BP NATIONALISATION WILL HAVE LITTLE EFFECT.

BROWN

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DESKBY 131530Z

FM FCO 131455Z AUG 79

TO IMMEDIATE BONN

TELNO 250 OF 13 AUGUST

AND TO IMMEDIATE BRUSSELS, COPENHAGEN, DUBLIN, THE HAGUE
LUXEMBOURG, PARIS, ROME.

INFO IMMEDIATE UKREP BRUSSELS.

*Order via
GWS
14/8*

FCO TELNOS 139-142 TO MIRIMBA SALISBURY; RHODESIA; CONSTITUTIONAL
CONFERENCE.

1. INVITATIONS ARE TOMORROW BEING ISSUED TO BISHOP MUZOREWA AND
THE LEADERS OF THE PATRIOTIC FRONT TO ATTEND A CONSTITUTIONAL
CONFERENCE IN LONDON IN EARLY SEPTEMBER IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE
TERMS OF THE AGREEMENT REACHED AT THE COMMONWEALTH HEADS OF
GOVERNMENT MEETING IN LUSAKA.

2. PLEASE TRANSMIT FIRST THING TOMORROW, 14 AUGUST, THE FOLLOWING
PERSONAL MESSAGE FROM ME TO THE FOREIGN MINISTER OF THE COUNTRY
IN WHICH YOU ARE ACCREDITED:

BEGINS:

I WANTED TO LET YOU KNOW ABOUT THE AGREEMENT ON RHODESIA
REACHED AT THE COMMONWEALTH HEADS OF GOVERNMENT MEETING IN LUSAKA.
THE DISCUSSIONS THAT TOOK PLACE THERE MADE IT POSSIBLE TO
ESTABLISH A NEW BASIS FOR PROGRESS TOWARDS OUR OBJECTIVE OF LEGAL
INDEPENDENCE FOR RHODESIA WITH WIDE INTERNATIONAL ACCEPTANCE. IN
ACCORDANCE WITH THE TERMS OF THAT AGREEMENT, WE ARE NOW ISSUING
INVITATIONS TO LEADERS OF THE PARTIES CONCERNED TO ATTEND A
CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE IN LONDON STARTING ON 10 SEPTEMBER. THIS
WILL BE THE FIRST STAGE IN WHAT IS BOUND TO BE A DELICATE AND
DIFFICULT PROCESS. MY OFFICIALS WILL BE INFORMING YOURS FULLY
ABOUT THE LUSAKA CONFERENCE AND OUR PLANS.

I AM MOST GRATEFUL TO YOU FOR THE SUPPORT YOU HAVE GIVEN IN
THIS LONG-STANDING PROBLEM AND FOR YOUR UNDERSTANDING OF THE
DIFFICULTIES. I AM SURE YOU WILL BE PLEASED TO HEAR OF THE PROGRESS
WE HAVE MADE AND I DO HOPE THAT YOU WILL CONTINUE TO HELP US OVER
THE COMING WEEKS. I SHALL OF COURSE KEEP IN CLOSE TOUCH.

CONFIDENTIAL

| ENDS:

CONFIDENTIAL

ENDS:

3. YOU MAY DRAW ON FCO TELS NOS 139-142 TO MIRIMBA SALISBURY ABOUT OUR OUTLINE CONSTITUTIONAL PROPOSALS IN TALKING TO GOVERNMENTS TO WHICH YOU ARE ACCREDITED. YOU SHOULD ALSO MAKE FULL USE OF GUIDANCE MATERIAL. SIR A DUFF WILL GIVE A COMMUNITY BRIEFING ON 14 AUGUST ON THE LUSAKA CONFERENCE AND OUR PLANS FOR A CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE.

CARRINGTON

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PS/MR. RIDLEY
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PS/PUS
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SIR A PARSONS
LORD N G LENNOX
MISS. BROWN
MR. THOMAS
MR. WILLSON
MR. WILLIAMS

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RHODESIA POLICY

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DESKBY 140200Z
FM FCO 131442Z AUG 79
TO IMMEDIATE TOKYO
TELNO 420 OF 13 AUGUST

Antw ma
14/8

RHODESIA:

1. PLEASE TRANSMIT THE FOLLOWING PERSONAL MESSAGE FROM ME TO THE JAPANESE FOREIGN MINISTER.

BEGINS:

DEAR MR SONODA,

THANK YOU FOR YOUR KIND MESSAGE WHICH WAS FORWARDED TO ME BY YOUR EMBASSY ON 9 AUGUST. I MUCH APPRECIATE YOUR GOOD WISHES.

THE AGREEMENT REACHED AT THE COMMONWEALTH HEADS OF GOVERNMENT MEETING HAS AT LAST PROVIDED A BASIS, UNANIMOUSLY AGREED WITHIN THE COMMONWEALTH, FOR PROCEEDING TO GENUINE BLACK MAJORITY RULE AND RESTORING RHODESIA TO LEGALITY AND PEACE. WE ARE NOW SENDING INVITATIONS TO BISHOP MUZOREWA AND THE LEADERS OF THE PATRIOTIC FRONT TO A CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE IN EARLY SEPTEMBER, IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE LUSAKA AGREEMENT. WE ARE UNDER NO ILLUSIONS AS TO THE DIFFICULTIES THAT LIE AHEAD, BUT ARE DETERMINED TO SPARE NO EFFORT TO ACHIEVE A SATISFACTORY SETTLEMENT. IN THIS UNDERTAKING WE SHALL NEED THE HELP OF OUR FRIENDS AND ALLIES, AND I KNOW THAT I CAN COUNT ON YOUR SUPPORT.

I TOO FOUND OUR TALK LAST MONTH MOST USEFUL, AND I LOOK FORWARD TO A FURTHER MEETING AT AN EARLY OPPORTUNITY.

WITH KINDEST REGARDS,
YOURS SINCERELY,
CARRINGTON.

/ENDS

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

ENDS:

2. YOU MAY DRAW ON FCO TELNOS 139-142 TO MIRIMBA SALISBURY IN TALKING TO GOVERNMENT TO WHICH YOU ARE ACCREDITED. YOU SHOULD ALSO MAKE FULL USE OF GUIDANCE MATERIAL.

CARRINGTON

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MR. THOMAS
MR. WILLSON
MR. WILLIAMS

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PRIME MINISTER'S

SUBJECT

GPS 250

PERSONAL MESSAGE

SERIAL No. T76/79T

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DESKBY 131800Z

FROM F C O 131403Z AUG 79

TO IMMEDIATE KINGSTON

TELEGRAM NUMBER 115 OF 13 AUGUST.

Enter no

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RHODESIA

1. PLEASE TRANSMIT THE FOLLOWING PERSONAL MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO MR MANLEY. TO REACH HIM FIRST THING ON TUESDAY MORNING, 14 AUGUST, LOCAL TIME. NEWS OF THE INVITATION WILL BECOME PUBLIC HERE AT 1130Z ON 14 SEPTEMBER.

BEGINS:-

DEAR MICHEAL,

I SHOULD LIKE TO EXPRESS MY THANKS FOR YOUR MOST HELPFUL CONTRIBUTION TO THE SUCCESS OF THE COMMONWEALTH HEADS OF GOVERNMENT MEETING IN LUSAKA AND IN PARTICULAR TO THE AGREEMENT THAT WE REACHED ON RHODESIA. I BELIEVE THAT WE NOW HAVE THE BASIS FOR PROCEEDING TO GENUINE BLACK MAJORITY RULE AND RESTORING RHODESIA TO LEGALITY AND PEACE WITH WIDE INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT. WE ARE SENDING INVITATIONS TO BISHOP MUZOREWA AND THE LEADERS OF THE PATRIOTIC FRONT TO A CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE IN EARLY SEPTEMBER, IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE LUSAKA AGREEMENT, WE ARE UNDER NO ILLUSIONS AS TO THE DIFFICULTIES WHICH LIE AHEAD BUT ARE DETERMINED TO SPARE NO EFFORT TO ACHIEVE A SATISFACTORY OUTCOME. IN THIS UNDERTAKING WE SHALL NEED THE SUPPORT OF ALL OUR FRIENDS IN THE COMMONWEALTH AND OUTSIDE. I AM SURE THAT I CAN COUNT ON YOU. I SHALL OF COURSE BE KEEPING IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH YOU OVER THE COMING WEEKS.

YOURS SINCERELY,
MARGARET THATCHER

ENDS.

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CONFIDENTIAL

2. YOU MAY DRAW ON FCO TELEGRAMS 139-142 TO MIRIMBA SALISBURY IN TALKING TO THE JAMAICANS. YOU SHOULD MAKE FULL USE OF GUIDANCE MATERIAL.

CARRINGTON

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SIR A PARSONS

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MISS BROWN

MR. THOMAS

MR. WILLSON

MR. WILLIAMS

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RHODESIA POLICY

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CONFIDENTIAL **MINISTER'S**

SUBJECT

DESKBY 132359Z

PERSONAL MESSAGE **T75/TAT**

F C O 131405Z AUG 79

SERIAL No.

TO IMMEDIATE CANBERRA

TELEGRAM NUMBER 391 OF 13 AUGUST

Enu na

RHODESIA

*Enu
14/1*

1. PLEASE TRANSMIT THE FOLLOWING PERSONAL MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO MR FRASER:

BEGINS:

DEAR MALCOLM

I BELIEVE THAT THE AGREEMENT WHICH WE REACHED ON RHODESIA IN LUSAKA REPRESENTS A MOST CONSTRUCTIVE STEP: AND THAT WE HAVE A NEW BASIS FOR PROGRESS TOWARDS A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT. WE ARE NOW PRESSING AHEAD WITH OUR PLANS TO IMPLEMENT THE AGREEMENT, AND INVITATIONS ARE BEING ISSUED TO BISHOP MUZOREWA AND THE LEADERS OF THE PATRIOTIC FRONT TO ATTEND A CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE IN LONDON ON 10 SEPTEMBER.

THE AGREEMENT WAS OF COURSE ONLY A BEGINNING, THOUGH A PARTICULARLY AUSPICIOUS ONE. I AM UNDER NO ILLUSION ABOUT THE DIFFICULTIES THAT LIE AHEAD. WE SHALL BE NEEDING THE HELP AND GOODWILL OF ALL OUR FRIENDS AND ALLIES IN THE WEEKS THAT LIE AHEAD, AND I AM SURE THAT I CAN COUNT ON YOUR SUPPORT.

YOURS SINCERELY,
MARGARET THATCHER

ENDS.

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MISS BROWN
MR. THOMAS
MR. WILLSON
MR. WILLIAMS

ADDITIONAL DISTN.
RHODESIA POLICY

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CONFIDENTIAL PRIME MINISTER'S

SUBJECT

DESKBY 131600Z

FM F C O 131400Z AUG 79

PERSONAL MESSAGE

T74/79T

TO IMMEDIATE OTTAWA

SERIAL No.

TELEGRAM NUMBER 242 OF 13 AUGUST

Handwritten notes:
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RHODESIA

1. PLEASE TRANSMIT THE FOLLOWING PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO MR CLARK, TO REACH HIM NO EARLIER THAN 1930 LOCAL TIME TONIGHT.

BEGINS

DEAR JOE

I AM SURE YOU WERE AS HEARTENED AS I WAS BY THE AGREEMENT THAT WE REACHED AT LUSAKA OVER RHODESIA. I BELIEVE THAT THIS IS A MOST SIGNIFICANT ADVANCE; AND THAT A NEW BASIS HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED FOR PROGRESS TOWARDS A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT. IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE TERMS OF THAT AGREEMENT WE ARE NOW ISSUING INVITATIONS TO BISHOP MUZOREWA AND THE LEADERS OF THE PATRIOTIC FRONT TO ATTEND A CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE IN LONDON TO BEGIN ON 10 SEPTEMBER. THIS IS ONLY THE FIRST STAGE IN A PROCESS WHICH IS BOUND TO BE DELICATE AND DIFFICULT. THE SUPPORT OF OUR FRIENDS AND ALLIES WILL BE OF PARTICULAR HELP OVER THE COMING WEEKS AND I AM CONFIDENT THAT I CAN COUNT ON YOU.

YOUR SINCERELY

MARGARET THATCHER

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MR. WILLSON
MR. WILLIAMS

ADDITIONAL DISTN.
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CONFIDENTIAL ~~PRIME~~ MINISTER'S SUBJECT

PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T73/79T

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DESKBY 131500Z
FM FCO 131409Z AUG 79
TO IMMEDIATE KHARTOUM
TELEGRAM NUMBER 147 OF 13 AUGUST

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RHODESIA

1. PLEASE TRANSMIT THE FOLLOWING PERSONAL MESSAGE FROM THE
PRIME MINISTER TO PRESIDENT NIMEIRI FIRST THING TOMORROW 14 AUGUST.

BEGINS:

DEAR MR PRESIDENT,

YOUR CONCERN FOR THE STABILITY OF SOUTHERN AFRICA, AND YOUR DESIRE
THAT RHODESIA SHOULD PROGRESS TO GENUINE MAJORITY RULE WITHOUT
ENDANGERING THAT STABILITY ARE WELL-KNOWN TO ME. YOU WERE ALSO GOOD
ENOUGH TO GIVE US THE BENEFIT OF YOUR VIEWS ON RHODESIA DURING THE
RECENT VISIT WHICH RICHARD LUCE PAID TO YOUR COUNTRY.

I HOPE YOU WILL SHARE MY VIEW THAT THE AGREEMENT REACHED AT THE
COMMONWEALTH HEADS OF GOVERNMENT MEETING IN LUSAKA ON 5 AUGUST
PROVIDES US WITH A REAL POSSIBILITY OF REACHING AN INTERNATIONALLY
ACCEPTABLE SETTLEMENT IN RHODESIA. IN ACCORDANCE WITH THAT AGREEMENT,
WE ARE ISSUING INVITATIONS TO BISHOP MUZOREMA AND THE LEADERS OF
THE PATRIOTIC FRONT TO ATTEND A CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE.

I AM UNDER NO ILLUSIONS AS TO THE DIFFICULTIES THAT LIE AHEAD, AND WE
SHALL NEED THE HELP OF ALL WHO WISH TO SEE RHODESIA RESTORED TO PEACE
AND LEGALITY ON A BASIS OF GENUINE MAJORITY RULE. I AM SURE THAT I
CAN COUNT ON YOUR SUPPORT.

YOURS SINCERELY,

MARGARET THATCHER

ENDS.

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2. YOU MAY DRAW ON F C O TELNOS 139-142 TO MIRIMBA SALISBURY IN TALKING TO GOVERNMENTS TO WHICH YOU ARE ACCREDITED. YOU SHOULD ALSO MAKE FULL USE OF GUIDANCE MATERIAL.

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SUBJECT

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PRIME MINISTER'S

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TO IMMEDIATE DAKAR

PERSONAL MESSAGE

TELEGRAM NUMBER 96 OF 13 AUGUST

172/791

SERIAL No.

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RHODESIA

1. PLEASE TRANSMIT THE FOLLOWING PERSONAL MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO PRESIDENT SENGHOR.

BEGINS.

DEAR MR PRESIDENT,

I AM SURE THAT YOU WILL HAVE WELCOMED THE AGREEMENT ON RHODESIA WHICH WAS REACHED AT THE COMMONWEALTH HEADS OF GOVERNMENT MEETING IN LUSAKA ON 5 AUGUST. I KNOW THAT YOU HAVE ALWAYS FAVOURED A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT, AS YOU EXPLAINED TO RICHARD LUCE WHEN YOU KINDLY RECEIVED HIM IN JUNE, AND IN OUR VIEW THIS AGREEMENT PROVIDES THE MOST HOPEFUL BASIS YET FOR PROGRESS TOWARDS GENUINE MAJORITY RULE AND A RETURN TO LEGALITY AND PEACE IN RHODESIA. I AM SURE THAT I CAN COUNT ON YOUR SUPPORT IN OUR EFFORTS TO IMPLEMENT THE TERMS OF THE AGREEMENT.

YOURS SINCERELY,

MARGARET THATCHER

ENDS.

2. YOU MAY FROM TOMORROW MORNING, 14 AUGUST DRAW ON FCO TELNOS 139-142 TO MIRIMBA SALISBURY IN TALKING TO GOVERNMENTS TO WHICH YOU ARE ACCREDITED. YOU SHOULD ALSO MAKE FULL USE OF GUIDANCE MATERIAL.

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PERSONAL MESSAGE

T71/79T

Handwritten: Baku, MA, 14/Y

DESKBY 131500Z
FM FCO 131406Z AUG 8
TO IMMEDIATE ABIDJAN
TELEGRAM NUMBER 098 OF 13 AUGUST.

SERIAL No.

RHODESIA

1. PLEASE TRANSMIT THE FOLLOWING PERSONAL MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO PRESIDENT HOUPHOUET-BOIGNY FIRST THING TOMMORROW 14 AUGUST.

BEGINS:

DEAR MR PRESIDENT,

I KNOW THAT YOU HAVE ALWAYS BEEN IN FAVOUR OF A SOLUTION TO THE RHODESIAN PROBLEM BASED ON NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN ALL THE PARTIES CONCERNED, AND RICHARD LUCE TOLD ME OF YOUR GOVERNMENT'S THINKING WHEN HE RETURNED FROM HIS VISIT TO WEST AFRICA LAST JUNE. I AM SURE THAT YOU WILL SHARE MY VIEW THAT THE AGREEMENT REACHED AT THE COMMONWEALTH HEADS OF GOVERNMENT MEETING IN LUSAKA PROVIDES A REAL HOPE OF A SETTLEMENT BASED ON SUCH NEGOTIATIONS. IN ACCORDANCE WITH THAT AGREEMENT, WE ARE NOW ISSUING INVITATIONS TO BISHOP MUZOREWA AND THE LEADERS OF THE PATRIOTIC FRONT TO ATTEND A CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE IN LONDON IN EARLY SEPTEMBER. I AM UNDER NO ILLUSIONS ABOUT THE DIFFICULTIES THAT LIE AHEAD, BUT WE SHALL BE SPARING NO EFFORT TO RESOLVE THEM. WE SHALL NEED THE SUPPORT OF OUR FRIENDS IN THIS TASK, AND I TRUST THAT I CAN COUNT ON YOURS.
YOURS SINCERELY

MARGARET THATCHER

ENDS.

2. YOU MAY DRAW ON FCO TELNOS 139-142 TO MIRIMBA SALISBURY IN TALKING TO GOVERNMENTS TO WHICH YOU ARE ACCREDITED. YOU SHOULD ALSO MAKE FULL USE OF GUIDANCE MATERIAL.

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RHODESIA POLICY

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FROM F.C.O. 131425Z AUG 79

PRIME MINISTER'S

SUBJECT

IMMEDIATE MONROVIA

PERSONAL MESSAGE

TELEGRAM NUMBER 79 OF 13 AUGUST 1979

SERIAL No. T70/79T

DESKBY 131500Z

RHODESIA

1. PLEASE TRANSMIT THE FOLLOWING PERSONAL MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO PRESIDENT TOLBERT, TO REACH HIM FIRST THING TOMORROW 14 AUGUST.
BEGINS:

DEAR MR PRESIDENT, YOU WILL HAVE SEEN THE TEXT OF THE AGREEMENT ON RHODESIA WHICH WAS REACHED AT THE COMMONWEALTH HEADS OF GOVERNMENT MEETING IN LUSAKA ON 5 AUGUST. WE BELIEVE THAT THIS AGREEMENT HAS MADE IT POSSIBLE TO ESTABLISH A NEW BASIS FOR PROGRESS TOWARDS A SOLUTION TO THE RHODESIAN PROBLEM WHICH HAS POSED SUCH A THREAT TO THE STABILITY OF SOUTHERN AFRICA.

IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE TERMS OF THAT AGREEMENT WE ARE NOW ISSUING INVITATIONS TO BISHOP MUZOREWA AND THE LEADERS OF THE PATRIOTIC FRONT TO ATTEND A CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE IN LONDON. THIS WILL BE THE FIRST STEP IN A PROCESS WHICH IS BOUND TO BE DIFFICULT. I KNOW THAT YOU YOURSELF HAVE ALWAYS FAVOURED A SETTLEMENT INVOLVING NEGOTIATIONS WITH ALL THE PARTIES TO THE CONFLICT, AS YOU EXPLAINED TO RICHARD LUCE WHEN YOU KINDLY RECEIVED HIM IN JUNE. I AM THEREFORE COUNTING ON YOUR SUPPORT IN OUR EFFORTS TO BRING A LASTING SETTLEMENT BASED ON GENUINE BLACK MAJORITY RULE IN RHODESIA.
YOURS SINCERELY,

MARGARET THATCHER

ENDS:

2. YOU MAY DRAW ON FCO TELNOS 139-142 TO MIRIMBA SALISBURY IN TALKING TO GOVERNMENT TO WHICH YOU ARE ACCREDITED. YOU SHOULD ALSO MAKE FULL USE OF GUIDANCE MATERIAL.
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ESKBY 132300Z

FM F C O 131355Z AUG 79

TO IMMEDIATE WELLINGTON

TELEGRAM NUMBER 178 OF 19 AUGUST No.

PRIME MINISTER'S

PERSONAL MESSAGE

169/79T

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RHODESIA

1. PLEASE TRANSMIT THE FOLLOWING PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO MR MULDOON

BEGINS

DEAR ROB

I KNOW THAT YOU SHARE MY VIEW THAT THE AGREEMENT WE REACHED AT LISAKA OVER RHODESIA WAS A TREMENDOUS ACHIEVEMENT IN ESTABLISHING A NEW BASIS FOR PROGRESS TOWARDS A PEACEFUL SOLUTION. I AM MOST GRATEFUL TO YOU FOR YOUR CONSISTENT SUPPORT. WE ARE DETERMINED TO PRESS AHEAD, AND TO MAINTAIN THE MOMENTUM WE HAVE GAINED. IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE TERMS OF THAT AGREEMENT WE ARE NOW INVITING BISHOP MUZOREWA AND THE LEADERS OF THE PATRIOTIC FRONT TO ATTEND A CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE IN LONDON ON 10 SEPTEMBER. THIS IS ONLY THE FIRST STAGE IN A PROCESS THAT IS BOUND TO BE DIFFICULT, AND WE SHALL NEED ALL THE HELP AND SUPPORT OUR FRIENDS AND ALLIES CAN GIVE US. I AM SURE THAT I CAN COUNT ON YOURS.

WITH BEST WISHES

MARGARET THATCHER

ENDS.

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ADDITIONAL DISTN.
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PRIME MINISTER'S

PERSONAL MESSAGE

SERIAL No. T68/79T

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DESKBY 131500Z
FM F C O 131400Z AUG 79
TO IMMEDIATE LUSAKA
TELEGRAM NUMBER 705 OF 13 AUGUST

INFO PRIORITY LAGOS, DAR ES SALAAM, GABORONE, PRETORIA, MIRIMBA
SALISBURY, WASHINGTON, LUANDA, MAPUTO.

F C O TELNOS 139-142 TO MIRIMBA SALISBURY: RHODESIA CONSTITUTIONAL
CONFERENCE

1. YOU SHOULD HAND OVER A COPY OF THE TEXTS IN MY TELNOS 140-142
UNDER COVER OF THE FOLLOWING PERSONAL MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME
MINISTER TO PRESIDENT KAUNDA.

BEGINS:

QUOTE

DEAR KENNETH,

ONCE AGAIN I WANT TO EXPRESS MY DEEP APPRECIATION AND ADMIRATION
FOR YOUR CHAIRMANSHIP OF THE COMMONWEALTH HEADS OF GOVERNMENT
MEETING. IT WAS DUE IN LARGE MEASURE TO YOUR HANDLING OF THE DIS-
CUSSIONS THAT THE OUTCOME PROVED TO BE SO CONSTRUCTIVE. IT MUST NOW
BE THE HOPE OF ALL OF US THAT IT WILL POINT THE WAY TO GENUINE
BLACK MAJORITY RULE IN RHODESIA AND A RETURN TO PEACE AND LEGALITY
THERE.

A COPY OF THE INVITATION TO A CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE IN LONDON
IN EARLY SEPTEMBER WHICH WE ARE SENDING TO BISHOP MUZOREWA AND THE
LEADERS OF THE PATRIOTIC FRONT COMES WITH THIS LETTER. AS YOU KNOW,
WE ARE UNDER NO ILLUSIONS ABOUT THE DIFFICULTIES THAT LIE AHEAD.

/HOWEVER,

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HOWEVER, WE INTEND TO TACKLE THE PROBLEMS WITH DETERMINATION AND TO MAINTAIN THE MOMENTUM GENERATED AT THE CONFERENCE. YOUR CONTINUED SUPPORT WILL BE ESSENTIAL IF WE ARE TO SUCCEED, AND I AM SURE THAT I CAN COUNT ON IT. I SHALL OF COURSE BE KEEPING IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH YOU OVER THE COMING WEEKS.

YOURS SINCERELY,
MARGARET THATCHER

ENDS.

CARRINGTON

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MR. WILLSON
MR. WILLIAMS

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DE BY 131500Z

FM FCO 131507Z AUG 79

TO IMMEDIATE KINSHASA

TELNO 110 OF 13 AUGUST

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PRIME MINISTER'S

PERSONAL MESSAGE

SERIAL No. T67/79T

SUBJECT

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RHODESIA:

1. PLEASE TRANSMIT THE FOLLOWING PERSONAL MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO PRESIDENT MOBUTU, FIRST THING TOMORROW 14 AUGUST.

BEGINS:

DEAR MR PRESIDENT,

I AM FULLY AWARE OF THE CONCERN YOU FEEL FOR A PEACEFUL SOLUTION TO THE RHODESIAN PROBLEM AND I AM GRATEFUL FOR THE CONSISTENTLY HELPFUL ATTITUDE YOU HAVE TAKEN. RICHARD LUCE'S CALL ON YOU LAST JUNE WAS A MOST VALUABLE PART OF OUR PROCESS OF CONSULTATION WITH AFRICAN LEADERS AS A RESULT OF WHICH WE HAVE BEEN ABLE TO FORMULATE OUR POLICY ON RHODESIA.

THIS POLICY IS SET OUT IN THE AGREEMENT WHICH WAS REACHED AT THE COMMONWEALTH HEADS OF GOVERNMENT MEETING AT LUSAKA. I AM CONFIDENT YOU WILL SHARE MY VIEW THAT THIS AGREEMENT IS A MAJOR ACHIEVEMENT AND HOLDS OUT A REAL HOPE OF PROGRESS TOWARDS A SETTLEMENT. I AM SURE THAT YOU WILL BE WISHING US WELL IN OUR EFFORTS TO IMPLEMENT THE PROPOSALS OUTLINED IN THE AGREEMENT AND THAT I CAN COUNT ON YOUR SUPPORT IN THE PERIOD THAT LIES AHEAD. THERE ARE BOUND TO BE DIFFICULTIES, BUT WE SHALL BE SPARING NO EFFORT TO RESOLVE THEM.

YOURS SINCERELY,
MARGARET THATCHER,

ENDS:

2. YOU MAY DRAW ON FCO TELNOS 139-142 TO MIRIMBAS SALISBURY IN TALKING TO GOVERNMENTS TO WHICH YOU ARE ACCREDITED. YOU SHOULD ALSO MAKE FULL USE OF GUIDANCE MATERIAL.

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MR.WILLSON
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RHODESIA POLICY

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PRIME MINISTER'S

SUBJECT

PERSONAL MESSAGE T66/797

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DESKBY 131500Z

FM FCO 131400Z AUG 79

TO IMMEDIATE GABORONE

TELEGRAM NUMBER 165 OF 13 AUGUST

INFO PRIORITY LUSAKA DAR ES SALAAM LAGOS PRETORIA MIRIMBA SALISBURY
WASHINGTON LUANDA MAPUTO

OUR TELNO 139-142 TO MIRIMBA SALISBURY: RHODESIA CONSTITUTIONAL
CONFERENCE

1. YOU SHOULD HAND OVER A COPY OF TEXTS IN MY TELS 140-142 UNDER
COVER OF THE FOLLOWING PERSONAL MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO
SIR SERETSE KHAMA.

BEGINS:

DEAR SIR SERETSE,

THE AGREEMENT REACHED AT THE COMMONWEALTH HEADS OF GOVERNMENT
MEETING IN LUSAKA IS A TRIUMPH FOR THE COMMONWEALTH AND FOR THE
WISDOM OF THE HEADS OF STATE MOST CLOSELY INVOLVED IN THE RHODESIAN
PROBLEM AND, I AM MOST GRATEFUL FOR ALL YOU HAVE DONE TO MAKE IT
POSSIBLE I AM SURE THAT YOU WILL SHARE MY HOPE THAT IT WILL
PROVIDE THE BREAKTHROUGH WE HAVE BEEN SEEKING FOR SO LONG OVER
RHODESIA PROBLEM.

I AM DETERMINED TO MAINTAIN THE MOMENTUM GENERATED BY THE AGREEMENT
AND WE ARE NOW PRESSING ON WITH OUR PLANS FOR A CONSTITUTIONAL
CONFERENCE. INVITATIONS ARE BEING ISSUED TODAY TO BISHOP MUSOREWA AND
THE LEADERS OF THE PATRIOTIC FRONT TO ATTEND A CONSTITUTIONAL
CONFERENCE IN LONDON IN EARLY SEPTEMBER AND A COPY COMES WITH THIS
LETTER. THIS CONFERENCE WILL BE THE FIRST STAGE IN OUR PROGRESS
TOWARDS WHAT WE HOPE WILL BE A SATISFACTORY AND LASTING SETTLEMENT
FOR RHODESIA AND IT IS VITAL WE SHOULD DO EVERYTHING POSSIBLE FOR IT
TO SUCCEED. I AM SURE I CAN COUNT ON YOUR WHOLEHEARTED SUPPORT IN

/THIS

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THIS DELICATE UNDERTAKING, I SHALL OF COURSE BE KEEPING IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH YOU OVER THE COMING WEEKS.

YOURS SINCERELY,

MARGARET THATCHER

ENDS:

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SUBJECT

IMMEDIATE LIBREVILLE

TELEGRAM NUMBER 048 OF 13 AUG

PRIME MINISTER'S

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RHODESIA

PERSONAL MESSAGE

SERIAL No.

1. PLEASE TRANSMIT THE FOLLOWING PERSONAL MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO PRESIDENT BONGO.

BEGINS

DEAR MR PRESIDENT.

I AM SURE THAT AS A MEMBER OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL YOU WILL HAVE WELCOMED THE AGREEMENT ON RHODESIA WHICH WAS REACHED AT THE COMMONWEALTH HEADS OF GOVERNMENT MEETING IN LUSAKA ON 5 AUGUST. I KNOW THAT YOU HAVE ALWAYS FAVOURED A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT, AND IN OUR VIEW THIS AGREEMENT PROVIDES THE MOST HOPEFUL BASIS YET FOR PROGRESS TOWARDS GENUINE MAJORITY RULE AND A RETURN TO LEGALITY AND PEACE IN RHODESIA. I AM SURE THAT I CAN COUNT ON YOUR SUPPORT IN OUR EFFORTS TO IMPLEMENT THE TERMS OF THE AGREEMENT.

YOURS SINCERELY

MARGARET THATCHER

ENDS.

2. YOU MAY, FROM TOMORROW MORNING 14 AUGUST DRAW ON FCO TELNOS 139-142 TO MIRIMBA SALISBURY IN TALKING TO GOVERNMENTS TO WHICH YOU ARE ACCREDITED. YOU SHOULD MAKE FULL USE OF GUIDANCE MATERIAL.

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SUBJECT

FM FCO 131432Z AUG 79

PRIME MINISTER'S

TO IMMEDIATE DAR ES SALAAM

PERSONAL MESSAGE

TELNO 271 OF 13 AUGUST

T64/79T

AND TO IMMEDIATE LUANDA, MAPUTO.

SERIAL No.

Ends ma
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INFO PRIORITY LAGOS, LUSAKA, GABORONE, PRETORIA, MIRIMBA
SALISBURY, WASHINGTON.

FCO TELS NOS 139-142 TO MIRIMBA SALISBURY: RHODESIA -
CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE.

1. YOU SHOULD HAND OVER TEXTS IN OUR TELEGRAMS 140-142, UNDER
COVER OF THE FOLLOWING PERSONAL MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER
TO PRESIDENT NYERERE.

BEGINS:

DEAR JULIUS,

MAY I ONCE AGAIN EXPRESS MY THANKS FOR YOUR INVALUABLE CONTRIB-
-UTION TO THE SUCCESS OF THE COMMONWEALTH HEADS OF GOVERNMENT
MEETING IN LUSAKA. YOUR OPENING SPEECH AT THE SOUTHERN AFRICA
SESSION SET THE TONE FOR OUR CONSTRUCTIVE DISCUSSIONS THERE, AND
FOR THE VERY SATISFACTORY AGREEMENT THAT RESULTED. NONE OF US IS
UNDER ANY ILLUSIONS ABOUT THE DIFFICULTIES THAT LIE AHEAD, BUT IN
THE AGREEMENT REACHED IN LUSAKA WE HAVE AT LAST A BASIS,
UNANIMOUSLY AGREED WITHIN THE COMMONWEALTH, FOR PROCEEDING TO
GENUINE BLACK MAJORITY RULE AND RESTORING RHODESIA TO LEGALITY
AND PEACE.

IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE TERMS OF THAT AGREEMENT, INVITATIONS
ARE NOW BEING SENT TO BISHOP MUZOREWA AND THE LEADERS OF THE
PATRIOTIC FRONT TO ATTEND A CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE IN LONDON
IN EARLY SEPTEMBER. A COPY COMES WITH THIS MESSAGE. YOU WILL SEE
THAT WE ARE DOING ALL WE CAN TO MAINTAIN MOMENTUM. IF THIS
CONFERENCE IS TO SUCCEED, AND WE ARE TO ACHIEVE OUR JOINT OBJECTIVES,
YOUR PERSONAL SUPPORT WILL BE VITAL AT EVERY STAGE. I AM SURE
THAT I CAN COUNT ON IT. I SHALL OF COURSE BE KEEPING IN CLOSE
TOUCH WITH YOU OVER THE COMING WEEKS.

YOURS SINCERELY,

MARGARET THATCHER.

/ ENDS:

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

ENDS:

2. (LUANDA AND MAPUTO ONLY). THERE IS NO MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER, BUT YOU SHOULD DRAW AS APPROPRIATE ON THE SENTIMENTS EXPRESSED ABOVE WHEN HANDING OVER THE TEXT OF THE INVITATIONS.

CARRINGTON

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MISS BROWN
MR. THOMAS
MR. WILLSON
MR. WILLIAMS

ADDITIONAL DISTN.
RHODESIA POLICY

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OO FCO

Prime Minister

(2)

Ps/Noto - D.S.

RR MIRIMBA SALISBURY

San

Mr Wilson

RR LUSAKA

B/g

Mr Williams

RR DAR ES SALAAM

Handwritten scribble

Hd EAD

RR KAMPALA

Files
IMMEDIATE

Hd Rhodesia

GR 550

CONFIDENTIAL

FM NAIROBI 130934Z AUG 79

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 488 OF 13 AUGUST

INFO MIRIMBA SALIBURY, LUSAKA, DAR ES SALAAM, KAMPALA

ADVANCE COPY

Hd CCD (3)

Hd FTD

Hd Repres

Hd Pres (2)

Hd Oid (2)

Hd News

YOUR TELNO 312: CALL ON PRESIDENT MOI.

Ps
Ps/LB
Ps/Muhammad
Ps/Michael
Ps/PUS
SivADH

1. WHEN I CALLED AT THE PRESIDENTS REQUEST ON 10 AUGUST HE SAID HE GREATLY ADMIRERD MRS THATCHER'S HANDLING OF THE LUSAKA CONFERENCE, PARTICULARLY ON THE SUBJECT OF RHODESIA/ZIMBABWE. IT WAS IMPORTANT NOT TO LOSE MOMENTUM AND IF THERE WAS ANYTHING WHICH HE COULD DO TO HELP OVER THIS I SHOULD NOT HESITATE TO APPROACH HIM DIRECT. I COULD HAVE ACCESS AT ANY TIME. I THANKED HIM AND SAID THAT KENYA'S UNDERSTANDING ATTITUDE AND ASSISTANCE WERE APPRECIATED BY HMG. THE IMPORTANCE OF MAINTAINING MOMENTUM WAS WELL REALISED AND MRS THATCHER WAS IN FACT HOLDING A CABINET MEETING THAT DAY.

2. PRESIDENT MOI SAID THAT THE FIRST PROBLEM WOULD BE TO GET ALL THE PARTIES TO THE CONFERENCE TABLE AND ENQUIRED WHETHER WE HAD ANY REACTIONS. I SAID THAT IT WAS RATHER SOON, BUT WITH THE EXCEPTION OF SOUTH AFRICA AND SOME PATRIOTIC FRONT ELEMENTS IN MOZAMBIQUE, THE COMMENTS I HAD SEEN HAD BEEN GENERALLY ENCOURAGING. AFTER ALL, THE NINE POINTS ON WHICH WE WOULD NOW BE PROCEEDING HAD THE SUPPORT OF COMMONWEALTH LEADERS, ALTHOUGH THERE WAS A LOT OF WORK TO BE DONE AND DIFFICULTIES OVERCOME BEFORE A SETTLEMENT OF THE ZIMBABWE/RHODESIA PROBLEM WAS ACHIEVED. PRESIDENT MOI AGREED AND SAID THAT AN ADVERSE REACTION FROM

... HE COMMENTED THAT MANLEY CHURCH

BEFORE A SETTLEMENT OF THE ZIMBABWE/RHODESIA PROBLEM WAS ACHIEVED. PRESIDENT MOI AGREED AND SAID THAT AN ADVERSE REACTION FROM SOUTH AFRICA WAS NO BAD THING. HE COMMENTED THAT MANLEY (WHOM HE DID NOT SEEM TO CARE FOR) HAD GONE TO MOZAMBIQUE FROM LUSAKA AND HAD NO DOUBT BRIEFED MACHEL. WE HAD NYERERE'S AGREEMENT HOWEVER AND WE MUST HOLD HIM TO IT (HE REPEATED THIS THREE TIMES). ZAMBIA WAS IN SUCH A MESS THAT KAUNDA WAS DESPERATE FOR A SETTLEMENT AND NKOMO WOULD HAVE TO GO ALONG AND TEST HIS SUPPORT WITHIN RHODESIA IN AN ELECTION WHICH PRESIDENT MOI THOUGHT THAT BISHOP MUZOREWA WOULD WIN. THE NIGERIANS HAD STRONG FEELINGS AND WERE SUSPICIOUS, BUT HE THOUGHT THEY WOULD ACCEPT A SOLUTION ON THE LINES PROPOSED. THEY RESPECTED KENYA AND HE THOUGHT THAT HE COULD HELP BY TALKING TO THEM. "THE REST" EITHER WANTED A SETTLEMENT OR DID NOT MATTER.

3. THE PRESIDENT MADE NO MENTION OF ARMS CONTRACTS NOR OF AID, EXCEPT HIS KEENNESS TO GET ON WITH HIS PET PROJECT AT MUGUGA FOR WHICH WE HAVE PROMISED £50,000. (BUT SEE MY MODEV OF TODAY'S DATE). HE SAID HE HAD HAD USEFUL CONVERSTATIONS WITH PRESIDENT BINAISA WHO WAS NOT FACING THE SAME PROBLEMS AS LULE. BINAISA HAD ASKED HIM FOR THE LOAN OF TWO BATTALIONS, BUT PRESIDENT MOI TOLD HIM THAT HE WOULD NOT SEND KENYAN TROOPS TO UGANDA EXCEPT POSSIBLY AS PART OF A MULTI-NATIONAL FORCE. HE HAD, HWEVER, OFFERED TO HELP UGANDA WITH MILITARY AND POLICE TRAINING.

4. THERE WAS LITTLE NEW OR OF SUBSTANCE IN WHAT PRESIDENT MOI HAD TO SAY AND I HAVE BEEN PONDERING WHY HE SENT FOR ME AT WHAT IS FOR HIM A VERY BUSY TIME. I BELIEVE HE WANTED TO MAKE THE POINT THAT I SHOULD APPROACH HIM DIRECT ON ANY MATTER OF IMPORTANCE CONCERNING DEVELOPMENTS ON RHODESIA. THE DIFFERENCE OF VIEWS WITHIN THE KENYA GOVERNMENT, PARTICULARLY BETWEEN DR WAIYAKI AND CHARLES NJONJO IS WELL KNOWN AND SEEMS TO BE WIDENING (LETTER FOLLOWS ON THIS). THE PRESIDENT MAY THINK THAT BY TAKING ANYTHING TO DO WITH RHODESIA/ZIMBABWE INTO HIS OWN HANDS, HE REDUCES THE RISK OF A CONFRONTATION AND THE SUBJECT BECOMING AN ISSUE IN THE POLITICAL IN-FIGHTING IN THE RUN UP TO THE KENYAN GENERAL ELECTIONS.

WATTS

NNNN

PS/SIR I GILMOUR
PS/MR LUCE
PS/PUS
SIR A DUFF
MR WILLSON
MR WILLIAMS
LORD N G LENNOX

IMMEDIATE

PS/NO 10 DOWNING STREET

MR R L WADE-GERY)
MR P M MAXEY)
COL MOIR) CABINET
MR P J FOWLER) OFFICE
DIO)
SIR J HUNT)

.....
HD/RHODESIA DEPT (3)

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HD/S AF D

HD/UND
HD/NEWS DEPT
HD/WAD

MR FREELAND LEGAL ADVISER RM K200A
MR FIPOOT LEGAL ADVISER RM K164

~~FOR ZIMBABWE DEVELOPMENTS FUND~~
~~ADD MR LYNCH ODI?~~
~~MR SLATER TREASURY~~

(file)

GR 650

CONFIDENTIAL

FM MIRIMBA SALISBURY 131230Z AUG 79

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 507 OF 13 AUGUST

ms

Prime Minister

SM

13/8

RHODESIA: CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE

1. I SAW MUZOREWA THIS MORNING. GEORGE SMITH (CABINET SECRETARY) AND KAMUSIKIRI (PRIVATE SECRETARY) WERE PRESENT.

2. I DELIVERED SO MUZOREWA THE ORIGINAL OF THE PRIME MINISTER'S MESSAGE (LUSAKA TELNO 11 TO MIRIMBA). I ALSO CONVERVED MRS THATCHER'S PERSONAL GREETINGS AND ASSURANCES THAT HMG WISHED TO CONTINUE TO WORK IN CLOSE CONSULTATION WITH THE BISHOP TO ACHIEVE A FAIR AND HONOURABLE SOLUTION TO THE RHODESIA PROBLEM. MUZOREWA WAS APPRECIATIVE OF THESE REMARKS.

3. I SHOWED MUZOREWA THE TEXTS OF YOUR TELNOS 140 AND 142 WHICH HE READ CAREFULLY. THEY WERE ALSO SEEN BY SMITH AND KAMUSIKIRI. I STRESSED THAT WE WERE GIVING THE BISHOP THIS ADVANCE INFORMATION ON A STRICTLY PERSONAL AND PRIVATE BASIS. THE TEXTS WERE NOT BEING SHOWN IN ADVANCE TO THE PATRIOTIC FRONT. IT WAS THEREFORE ESSENTIAL THAT THERE SHOULD BE NO LEAK NOW OR AT ANY TIME IN THE FUTURE. MUZOREWA ACCEPTED THIS.

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4. MUZOREWA HAD NO SUBSTANTIVE COMMENT ON THE DOCUMENTS THAT I

4. MUZOREWA HAD NO SUBSTANTIVE COMMENT ON THE DOCUMENTS THAT I SHOWED TO HIM. HE SAID THAT HE WOULD NEED TO STUDY THEM WHEN THEY WERE FORMALLY PRESENTED TO HIM. HIS FIRST REACTION WAS THAT THE GOVERNMENT HERE WOULD NOT ISSUE ANY DETAILED STATEMENT. THEY WOULD MERELY CONFIRM THAT AN INVITATION TO THE CONFERENCE HAD BEEN RECEIVED AND THAT THEY WOULD NEED TO LOOK AT ANY MORE DETAILED PROPOSALS THAT WERE PUT BEFORE THEM.

5. GEORGE SMITH COMMENTED TO THE PRIME MINISTER THAT THE ONLY POINT IN THE OUTLINE OF PROPOSALS (YOUR TELNO 141) THAT WOULD CALL FOR ANY AMENDMENT TO THE EXISTING CONSTITUTION WAS POINT NUMBER 10 RELATING TO SENIOR APPOINTMENTS. IN A SUBSEQUENT DISCUSSION WITH SMITH, I SAID THAT WE DID NOT SEE IT IN QUITE THAT LIGHT. THE MATTERS RAISED IN POINTS 5 AND 6 OF THE OUTLINE WOULD ALSO REQUIRE AMENDMENTS TO THE EXISTING CONSTITUTION. WE AGREED THAT THESE WERE MATTERS WHICH COULD BEST BE PERSUED BY THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAWYERS.

N 6. I PUT TO MUZOREWA THE OFFER FOR FIFOOT TO COME TO SALISBURY FOR MORE DETAILED DISCUSSIONS. HE WELCOMED THIS. FIFOOT SHOULD THEREFORE COME AS PLANNED.

7. I EXPLAINED THAT HMG WOULD MEET THE FULL EXPENSES OF 12 DELEGATES FROM SALISBURY, MAKING IT CLEAR THAT ADDITIONAL DELEGATES COULD COME TO LONDON AT RHODESIAN EXPENSE IF THEY WISHED, BUT THAT NO MORE THAN 12 WOULD BE ADMITTED TO THE CONFERENCE ITSELF. MUZOREWA RAISED NO OBJECTION TO THIS. I HAD EARLIER MADE IT CLEAR THAT THE PATRIOTIC FRONT WOULD ALSO BE INVITED TO SEND A TOTAL DELEGATION OF 12.

8. THERE HAS BEEN ANXIETY HERE ABOUT OTHER AFRICAN STATES, EG. NIGERIA, BEING REPRESENTED AT THE CONFERENCE. I ASSURED MUZOREWA THAT THIS WAS NOT THE CASE. ONLY HMG, THE SALISBURY ADMINISTRATION AND THE PATRIOTIC FRONT WOULD BE ADMITTED TO THE CONFERENCE. IF OTHERS WISHED TO BE IN LONDON TO FOLLOW DEVELOPMENTS, WE WOULD RAISE NO OBJECTION. MUZOREWA WAS EXTREMELY PLEASED TO HAVE THIS ASSURANCE.

9. I HAVE ARRANGED TO DELIVER THE FORMAL INVITATION TO MUZOREWA AT 0930Z TOMORROW, 14 AUGUST. THIS WILL BE DURING A BREAK IN HIS NORMAL WEEKLY CABINET MEETING. IT WOULD HAVE BEEN DIFFICULT TO ARRANGE DELIVERY ANY LATER IN THE MORNING.

10. I DISCUSSED SUBSEQUENTLY WITH GEORGE SMITH THE LIKELY COMPOSITION OF THE RHODESIAN DELEGATION. HE THOUGHT THAT THE

HIS NORMAL SECRET
TO ARRANGE DELIVERY ANY LATER IN THE MORNING.

15. I DISCUSSED SUBSEQUENTLY WITH GEORGE SMITH THE LIVELY COMPOSITION OF THE RHODESIAN DELEGATION. HE THOUGHT THAT THE BISHOP WOULD WISH TO INCLUDE ALL ELEMENTS OF THE GOVERNMENT OF NATIONAL UNITY. HE SAW THE ADVANTAGE OF INCLUDING A REPRESENTATIVE OF ZANU (SITHOLE). THERE MIGHT BE SOME PROBLEM OVER THIS IF SITHOLE KEPT UP HIS CRITICISM OF THE PRESENT GOVERNMENT. I IMPRESSED UPON SMITH THE NEED TO HAVE AS REPRESENTATIVE A DELEGATION AS POSSIBLE. HE DID NOT GIVE MUCH AWAY ON THE POSITION OF IAN SMITH APART FROM VOLUNTEERING THAT THE BISHOP MIGHT WELL ASK DAVID SMITH TO ACCOMPANY HIM TO LONDON. I WILL PURSUE THIS FURTHER AS OPPORTUNITY OFFERS.

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Prime Minister

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 640 OF 11 AUG

INFO PRIORITY MAPUTO LUSAKA PRETORIA WASHINGTON

DAR EL SALAAM GABARONE

NY TELNO 637: RHODESIA

Gen
13/8

1. ADDRESSING THE PRESS, AND AFRICAN DIPLOMATS AND STUDENTS, AT AN OPEN MEETING ON 11 AUGUST JOSHUA NKOMO SPOKE CAUTIOUSLY ABOUT THE COMMONWEALTH AGREEMENT. HE HAD NOW SEEN THE FULL TEXT, BUT WAS UNABLE TO GIVE A CONSIDERED OPINION UNTIL HE HAD CONSULTED HIS OWN PARTY'S CENTRAL COMMITTEE, ZANU AND ALL THE FRONT LINE GOVERNMENTS.

2. THAT SAID NKOMO MADE WHAT HE CALLED PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS ON THE AGREEMENT. HE HAD SEEN MANY EARLIER BRITISH ATTEMPTS AT A SOLUTION. IT WAS A MYSTERY TO HIM WHY THEY THOUGHT THIS ONE WOULD HELP. HOWEVER HE TRUSTED THOSE COMMONWEALTH FRONT LINE HEADS OF GOVERNMENT WHO HAD CONTRIBUTED TO IT. IT MIGHT BE THAT MORE LAY BEHIND THESE PROPOSALS THAN MET THE EYE. ALTHOUGH, FOR THE MOST PART, HE SPOKE NON-COMMITALLY ON THE AGREEMENT, HE SAID AT ONE POINT THAT HE "WOULD GO THROUGH WITH THIS EXERCISE, DETERMINED THAT THE GAINS ACHIEVED BY THE ZIMBABWE REVOLUTION SHOULD NOT BE SACRIFICED TO BRITISH INTERESTS".

3. NKOMO STRESSED THAT THE WAR WOULD CONTINUE UNTIL IRREVERSIBLE MACHINERY FOR A TOTAL TRANSFER OF POWER WAS IN BEING. HE SEEMED RELUCTANT TO BE DRAWN ON THE SUPERVISION OF THE ELECTIONS OR ON PARTICIPATION BY BISHOP MUZOREWA IN AN ALL PARTY CONFERENCE (APART FROM A RHETORICAL ASSERTION THAT THE BISHOP WAS A NONENTITY: THE PEOPLE TO TALK TO WERE THE BRITISH, WHOSE AGENTS MUZOREWA AND SMITH WERE). HE FORESAW A SITUATION IN WHICH SOME OF THE PRESENT REGIME'S ARMED FORCES MIGHT BE INCORPORATED INTO THE PATRIOTIC FRONT FORCES; BUT OTHERS WHO HAD COMMITTED CRIMES, SUCH AS THE SELOUS SCOUTS, WOULD HAVE TO BE TRIED. HE ADDED THAT ATROCITIES MEANT THAT TEMPER WERE NOW HIGH IN RHODESIA: IT MIGHT BE NECESSARY FOR THERE TO BE A PERIOD OF PACIFICATION (BY WHICH HE SEEMED TO MEAN A COOLING-OFF PERIOD) BEFORE ELECTIONS COULD BE HELD.

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14.

4. NKOMO PRAISED EGYPT'S LONGSTANDING COMMITMENT TO THE PEOPLE OF ZIMBABWE. ASKED ABOUT EGYPTIAN MILITARY ASSISTANCE HE SAID "YOU WILL HAVE NOTICED WHOM I MET HERE (INTER ALIA HE SAW THE MINISTER OF DEFENCE); WE WERE NOT TALKING ABOUT MARBLES". QUESTIONED ON THE SAME POINT AT A PRESS CONFERENCE YESTERDAY THE MINISTER OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS SAID THAT EGYPT HAD ALWAYS GIVEN THE PATRIOTIC FRONT ALL FORMS OF AID, AND WOULD CONTINUE TO DO SO. HIS REMARK HAS NOT BEEN REPORTED IN THE EGYPTIAN PRESS.

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FM DAR ES SALAAM

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 667 OF 11 AUGUST

AND TO IMMEDIATE LUSAKA

MIRIMBA SALSBURY MAPUTO PRIORITY LUANDA PRETORIA WASHINGTON
AND UKMIS NEW YORK

PRESIDENT NYERERE AND THE PATRIOTIC FRONT.

AT A PRESS CONFERENCE 10 AUGUST AT THE END OF THE VISIT TO DAR ES SALAAM BY THE CANADIAN PRIME MINISTER PRESIDENT NYERERE WAS ASKED TO COMMENT ON MR MUGABE'S CONDITIONS FOR THE PATRIOTIC FRONT'S ATTENDANCE AT ANY CONSTITUTIONAL TALKS WITH PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO THE DISBANDMENT OF THE RHODESIAN ARMY AND ITS REPLACEMENT BY PF TROOPS. HE WAS SPECIFICALLY ASKED IF MUGABE'S CONDITIONS AMOUNTED TO A REJECTION OF THE AGREEMENT WORKED OUT AT LUSAKA. NYERERE REPLIED THAT IF THERE WERE TO BE REJECTIONS OF THE AGREEMENT WORKED OUT AT LUSAKA THEY WOULD COME FROM PRETORIA AND SALISBURY WHOSE REACTIONS HAD DEMONSTRATED THAT THEY HAD FOUND THE PROPOSALS FOR FRESH ELECTIONS PARTICULARLY UNACCEPTABLE. ALL THE PF WAS REALLY SAYING WAS THAT THERE MUST BE THE NECESSARY AUTHORITY TO ENSURE THAT THE ELECTIONS WERE PROPERLY SUPERVISED. THIS WAS PERFECTLY FAIR COMMENT. IT WAS UP TO THE BRITISH TO AGREE WITH THE RHODESIANS AND TO CONVINCING THEMSELVES AND THE COMMONWEALTH THAT THEY HAD THE AUTHORITY AND WERE SEEN CLEARLY TO HAVE THE AUTHORITY TO ENSURE THAT THE ELECTIONS WERE FREE AND FAIR. /ASKED IF

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Prime Minister

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ASKED IF WHAT MUGABE REALLY MEANT WAS THAT ONLY ZIPRA BASED
ARMY COULD ENSURE FREE AND FAIR ELECTIONS NYERERE REPLIED
THAT NO DOUBT BOTH THE FRONT AND SMITH WOULD LIKE TO
USE THEIR OWN FORCES TO SUPERVISE THE ELECTIONS BUT THE LUSAKA
AGREEMENT STATED THAT THEY WERE TO BE 'PROPERLY SUPERVISED
UNDER BRITISH GOVERNMENT AUTHORITY'. HE DID NOT KNOW WHAT
FORCES THE BRITISH WERE GOING TO USE TO ENSURE THAT THEY COULD
DISCHARGE THEIR RESPONSIBILITY.

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[PASSED AS REQUESTED]

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MR. WILLSON
MR. WILLIAMS

ADDITIONAL DISTN.
RHODESIA POLICY

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Prime Minister

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FM LUSAKA 110755Z AUG 79

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 894 OF 11 AUGUST

INFO PRIORITY DAR ES SALAAM, MAPUTO, GABORONE, LUANDA, ROUTINE LAGOS, NAIROBI, ADDIS ABABA, WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK.

mt
1978

ZAPU VIEWS ON THE COMMONWEALTH AGREEMENT

1. UNLIKE ZANU, THE ZAPU WING OF THE PATRIOTIC FRONT HAVE TO A LARGE EXTENT AVOIDED PUBLIC COMMENT ON THE COMMONWEALTH AGREEMENT ON RHODESIA. THEY ARE NO/NO DOUBT AWAITING A LEAD FROM NKOMO WHO IS ON HIS TRAVELS AGAIN.
2. HOWEVER, ZAPU VICE-PRESIDENT CHINAMANO TOLD THE EGYPTIAN COUNSELLOR YESTERDAY (9 AUGUST) THAT ZAPU WERE LIKELY TO INSIST ON THREE POINTS:-
 - A) AGREEMENT ON THE CONSTITUTION MUST BE REACHED BEFORE THERE COULD BE A CEASEFIRE SEMICOLON
 - B) THE ELECTIONS SHOULD NOT BE SUPERVISED BY BRITAIN (WE POINTED OUT TO THE EGYPTIAN THAT THE COMMONWEALTH COMMUNIQUE DID NOT/NOT SAY THIS). COMMONWEALTH SUPERVISION WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE SEMI COLON
 - C) IN RELATION TO ALL PARTY TALKS, ZAPU WOULD TALK TO THEIR ENEMIES (EG SMITH) BUT WOULD NOT/NOT SIT DOWN WITH TRAITORS (EG MUZOREWA).
3. CHINAMANO ALSO SAID THAT A FORMULA FOR ELECTIONS SHOULD BE AGREED BEFORE ANY CEASEFIRE AND SHOULD INCLUDE THE RETURN OF ALL REFUGEES SO THAT THEY COULD PARTICIPATE, THE DRAWING UP OF ELECTORAL ROLLS AND THE DELIMITATION OF CONSTITUENCIES. ZAPU WERE AGHAST AT SUGGESTIONS THAT ALL THIS COULD BE ACCOMPLISHED BY NOVEMBER.

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4. I REALISE THAT THERE IS NOTHING BASICALLY VERY NEW IN THE FOREGOING. BUT IT MAY BE USEFUL IN THE ABSENCE OF A MORE SUBSTANTIVE ZAPU REACTION AND OF INTEREST THAT ZAPU ARE APPARENTLY IN A LARGE MEASURE OF AGREEMENT WITH ZANU. CLEARLY ZAPU ARE NOT/NOT CONFIDENT OF THEIR ABILITY TO WIN AN EARLY ELECTION AND IF THERE IS AGREEMENT ON THE CONSTITUTION IN THE FIRST HALF OF SEPTEMBER, MAY TRY TO PLAY FOR TIME IN ORDER TO BUILD UP THEIR SUPPORT WITH THE INTERNAL ELECTORATE. ON THE OTHER HAND, IF OTHER PROBLEMS CAN BE SATISFACTORILY RESOLVED, (A VERY BIG "IF" OF COURSE) THE FRONT LINE STATES AND ZAMBIA IN PARTICULAR MAY TURN OUT TO BE IN MORE OF A HURRY.

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MISS BROWN
MR. THOMAS
MR. WILLSON
MR. WILLIAMS

ADDITIONAL DISTN.
RHODESIA POLICY

OTO
PERSONAL

JOHN HUTCHINSON
PROFESSOR OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS
GRADUATE SCHOOL OF MANAGEMENT
UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA AT LOS ANGELES
LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA 90024

CFP
TEL: (213) 825-3134 OFFICE
(213) 825-2503 OFFICE
(213) 476-2527 RESIDENCE

August 10, 1979

Dear Prime Minister,

For your information.

The purpose of the letter to Muzorewa is to help effect an agreement between you and him.

I have suggested a means to amend the constitution which will place the essential power in black hands while protecting White security in parliamentary representation and constitutional rights.

I don't think there's any problem about asserting Ministerial control over appointments to the public and military services. Ministerial control seems to be the issue at Lusaka. It will of course be a different matter if the Commonwealth insists on the lowering of standards for faster Africanization.

It is worth noting that White representation in the House of Assembly is proportionately less than minority representation in the Tanzanian independence constitution. The issue is power not votes.

I hope you can make a public statement of assurance to the Whites in Zimbabwe Rhodesia. Otherwise there will be queues for seats to Johannesburg.

Best wishes. That was a performance of great skill in Lusaka. I think it is quite feasible to marry your position in Lusaka to the aspirations in Salisbury, provided the Sixth Principle is not deserted.

Yours very sincerely,

John Hutchinson

JH:bs

JOHN HUTCHINSON
PROFESSOR OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS
GRADUATE SCHOOL OF MANAGEMENT
UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA AT LOS ANGELES
LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA 90024

August 9, 1979

TEL: (213) 825-3134 OFFICE
(213) 825-2503 OFFICE
(213) 476-2527 RESIDENCE

The Honorable Abel T. Muzorewa, M.P.
Milton Buildings
Jameson Avenue
Salisbury
ZIMBABWE RHODESIA

My dear Prime Minister:

I will be in Salisbury on August 26 for a week, then in Pretoria and London and Washington. I am preparing a monograph on the consequences to Lusaka. It will be published soon by the Heritage Foundation for distribution here and abroad.

I hesitate to intrude a comment at this early stage, but since the British proposals are evidently expected within the fortnight, the following might be worth putting on the table:

1. The external objection is to "excessive" White representation in the House of Assembly.

The objection seems to be symbolic rather than substantive. The proportion of White seats in your Assembly is less than the proportion of combined minority seats under the Tanzanian independence constitution. Presumably the symbolic objection could be met if necessary by a reduction of White seats in your Assembly from 28 to 20 as recommended in the Anglo-American plan, but the mind searches in vain for a non-propitiatory reason. The issue is power rather than numbers.

2. The external objection is to the White veto over constitutional amendments.

Perhaps the objection can be met by requiring:

- a. That all constitutional amendments be submitted to common roll Provincial referenda.
- b. That all constitutional amendments be approved by at least one Province in Matabeleland and in all but two Provinces in Mashonaland.
- c. That to honor the Sixth Principle and to discourage White flight the White members of the Assembly have a veto over any move to reduce their numbers or to amend (an expanded?) Declaration of Rights until after two (or more?) Parliaments or 10 (or more?) years.

August 9, 1979

The process of constitutional amendment would thus continue to be difficult -- as it should be, although it would be no more difficult than in the United States -- but except in the matter of White representation and the Declaration of Rights it would rest essentially with Black voters.

On the matter of White flight -- which is an urgent one, and which should be the subject of an early assurance of intent by Prime Minister Thatcher -- I might note that President Nyerere's emphasis on compensating those Whites who leave is precisely the way to encourage them to leave. It is also the same unfortunate emphasis struck at Zurich in 1976 by Henry Kissinger in his meeting with Prime Minister Vorster. I have attached a note I wrote to both men at the time. In any event the notion was put aside, and should not be revived except in very minor key. The overwhelming emphasis should be on making it profitable to stay in Zimbabwe Rhodesia, not to leave.

3. The external objection is to the denial of Ministerial control over appointments to the judiciary, the public service and the armed forces.

Surely that objection can be met by formally requiring Ministerial approval of all such appointments. I am aware that much of the debate is about qualifications and Africanisation, but the point made by the British Government at Lusaka was evidently about Ministerial control. Perhaps you can leave to your opponents the argument that present standards and safeguards -- designed to provide a transitional insurance for the economy and the machinery of government and the national defense -- should be lowered to please foreign opinion.

4. The bedrock objection by the Patriotic Front is of course to the professional integrity and nonpartisanship of the armed forces.

That objection can not be met without the disintegration of the state, as the Patriotic Front well knows but others might not appreciate or care about.

I hope it is true as reported that Prime Minister Thatcher defended your present defense organization in Lusaka last week. I assume that no credence will be given to Robert Mugabe's demand this week that the Patriotic Front take military control as a precondition of settlement or even negotiations.

But in view of various internal British Foreign Office recommendations in the past on this issue, it would be dangerous to assume that high consideration will not be given to the merging of the armed services and the taggle of the Patriotic Front.

August 9, 1979

That of course could easily tilt the balance of internal forces against the constitutional elements in Zimbabwe Rhodesia, warp the tradition of nonpartisanship, and destroy any hope of constitutional stability. Indeed any prospective rapprochement between your Government and the Patriotic Front should only strengthen the argument for the maintenance of the traditional character and competence of the Army and the Air Force. Otherwise you may as well make for the hills.

Something in the nature of the above arguments might be a useful response to the spirit and substance of Prime Minister Thatcher's position in Lusaka, offering both more conspicuous and substantive majority rule while preserving the foundation for minority rights and constitutional government.

There is a legitimate misgiving, however, that the price of cordiality at Lusaka might have been the Sixth Principle, without which no sustained test of the Fifth Principle will ever take place.

The American papers report this morning that the British Government said in Lusaka that whatever happens by way of constitutional change in Zimbabwe Rhodesia after legal independence is beyond British control. That is probably although not necessarily true, but the antecedents are clearly not beyond British control.

There was much talk in Lusaka about making a new or amended constitution "comparable" to those accorded to other British African possessions. Taken literally that would mean deserting the plain intent of the Sixth Principle, since none of the predecessor constitutions provided guarantees worth a farthing anyway.

Zimbabwe Rhodesia has far stronger real foundations for internal constitutional equipoise than any of its forerunners -- that has always been the great promise of your country -- but you should not be shorn of your natural strength by emulations in ornate futility.

Meantime yet another election will make nonsense of your own recent efforts and also the Boyd report unless, minimally, the April election is held to justify some early and unconditional concession by Britain, such as the ending of sanctions, in the direction of legitimacy.

The preservation of sanctions is in any case a continuous act of bias in favor of the Patriotic Front, a de facto upholding of the position of the OAU and the General Assembly that you are the sinners and that the Patriotic Front is the only legitimate representative of your people. The conditions which brought about the move for sanctions have changed fundamentally. Sanctions are now simply unilateral punishment, a bargaining bludgeon used

August 9, 1979

only against you. It is hypocritical to talk of justice for Zimbabwe Rhodesia while supporting the sanctions that debilitate you at the same time that the Soviet Union and the front-line states -- and indirectly the United Kingdom -- fortify your enemies.

The Congress of the United States, by its action last week in setting November 15 for President Carter's decision on sanctions and by retaining the right to overrule him anyway by a simple majority vote, is obviously waiting and ready for a British lead. Meantime you could ask the Russians to reduce the selling price to Americans of the Rhodesian chrome they bought under the counter in defiance of the sanctions they applaud.

But since another election must be held some day in a constitutional and legitimate Zimbabwe Rhodesia, and since the Commonwealth will show an inordinate interest in the proceedings, perhaps you should learn the rules of true freedom.

President Kaunda will show you how to cheat at elections. President Nyerere might supply you with a list of all of his political prisoners, domestic and SWAPO, during the past 10 years, and give you a few tips on the hiring and firing of foreign presidents. Prime Minister Manley will give you lessons on civic sloth and Castro-courting, while the benign Obasanjo will instruct you on sentry-posting at public meetings and university lectures.

You should, in short, keep public book on those who stand in dudgeon over you. There is iniquity in Gilead.

Best regards. Joshua 1, 9.

Yours very sincerely,

John Hatcher

JH:bs

Encl.

cc: Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher and others.

HOTEL WALDHAUS DOLDER
KURHAUSSTRASSE 20
POSTFACH 8030 ZÜRICH

TELEFON 01 32 83 80
TELEX 82277
TELEGRAMM WALDHOTEL ZÜRICH

Hotel 3
Waldhaus
Dolder
Zürich

September 4, 1976

Prime Minister B.J. Vorster
Secretary Henry Kissinger

Gentlemen:

It is disturbing to read in this morning's Herald-Tribune that financial guarantees to Rhodesia's white citizens are to be the principal issue in your joint discussions here in Zurich.

Any such priority or foundation for our policy towards Rhodesia is certain to undermine the stability of Rhodesia and the confidence of its citizens, black and white, that we are interested in enduring constitutional government for their country.

It will also increase the short and long run danger to South Africa's borders and to the general security of the Cape.

The need is for stable change to a system of representative government in Rhodesia acceptable to its citizens and friendly to ours. Our priorities should therefore be of a different order than money. They might include, seriatim:

1. An immediate assurance to both blacks and whites in Rhodesia that any ratifiable agreement will be respected abroad and at the border.
2. The unification of the African side in Rhodesia. (It is idle and dangerous to talk of a settlement when one party to the contract is as yet incapable of responsible or united bargaining and of keeping its obligations even if an agreement were reached).
3. The formulation of plans for the institutional and physical protection of the Sixth Principle. Any agreement which does not provide exceptional protection for the constitutional rights for all citizens will not be worth the ink in the pen.
4. A joint declaration by whites and blacks in Rhodesia that they will now negotiate in good faith for unobstructed progress to an African political majority and for the enduring protection of the constitutional rights of all citizens.

5. The cessation of all hostile activities on the borders of Rhodesia and of sanctuary in other countries for Rhodesian guerrillas.
6. The development of a quadripartite understanding between the United States, the United Kingdom, South Africa and Rhodesia on the quality and pace of the constitutional change in Rhodesia necessary to the mutual interests of all four countries.
7. The drafting of plans for the protection of Rhodesian pensions and legitimate property rights, for industrial recapitalization and African manpower development, and for the inclusion of Rhodesia in a program for subcontinental economic cooperation.

The proposal to provide "a financial safety net" for Rhodesian whites bears only a marginal - and out of priority a dangerous - relationship to the conditions for stable change and constitutional government in Rhodesia. It is bound to create the impression that we are not interested in full white participation over the long run in Rhodesian affairs. It is bound to increase the propensity of any black-dominated government to expropriate. It is bound to induce at least a proportion of the whites to leave when they might otherwise have stayed and contributed to their country. It is bound, above all, to undermine the notion of the inter-racial cooperation vital to a free and stable Rhodesia.

The primacy of a financial policy will give it the hallmarks of a bribe, and is almost certain to disguise or dominate any ideas you may have for a non-racial free society in Rhodesia. I hope you will put money in the background, and deal first with the political and institutional means for a free and stable Rhodesia.

Every good wish.

Sincerely yours,

John Hutchinson

John Hutchinson
Professor of Industrial Relations
Graduate School of Management
University of California at Los Angeles

cc: Prime Minister James Callaghan
Secretary Anthony Crosland
Prime Minister Ian D. Smith
Governor Jimmy Carter

NB. Ambassador Botcha and Assistant Secretary Schaufele are in possession of materials of mine dealing at greater length with the matters raised here.

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MAPUTO 100625Z AUGUST 79

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 194 OF 10 AUGUST

Prime Minister

MY TELNO 189: ZANU VIEWS

MT

*Gen
Tyr*

ZANU HAVE NOW DISTRIBUTED THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT WHICH HAS BEEN REPORTED BY VOICE OF ZIMBABWE ON 7 AUGUST.

THE POSITION OF ZANU IS WELL KNOWN. WE HAVE STATED, AND WE NOW REPEAT, THAT THERE ARE THREE PRECONDITIONS TO ANY NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT OF THE RHODESIAN PROBLEM.

A. IT MUST BE UNDERSTOOD AND ACCEPTED THAT WE REGARD IT AS A PREREQUISITE THAT THE ILLEGAL INQUITOUS AND RACIST MUZOREWA MUST BE COMPLETELY DISMANTLED AND LIQUIDATED (SIC).

B. IT MUST BE ACCEPTED THAT FULL AND UNFETTERED POLITICAL MILITARY AND ECONOMIC POWER MUST VEST IN THE PEOPLE AS A WHOLE AND THAT THEREFORE, THE CONSTITUTION MUST CONTAIN NO RACIST OR OTHER ABRIDGEMENTS ON THE POWER OF THE PEOPLE, ACTING EITHER DIRECTLY OR THROUGH THEIR REPRESENTATIVES IN PARLIAMENT, TO FREELY ALTER OR ABOLISH IT.

C. IT MUST BE ACCEPTED THAT BEFORE REACHING AND IMPLEMENTING ANY AGREEMENT THE RACIST RHODESIAN ARMY AND POLICE FORCES MUST BE DISARMED, BARRACKED AND DEMOBILIZED TO GIVE WAY TO OUR OWN FORCES WHO MUST BECOME THE NEW NATIONAL FORCES.

OUR ATTENDANCE AND/OR MEANINGFUL PARTICIPATION AT ANY FUTURE CONFERENCE MUST DEPEND ON THESE IMPORTANT FACTORS.

THERE CAN BE NO CEASEFIRE UNTIL FULL POWER HAS EFFECTIVELY BEEN TRANSFERRED TO US AND THE PEOPLE.

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 PS/MR. RIDLEY
 PS/MR. HURD
 PS/PUS
 SIR A DUFF
 SIR A PARSONS
 LORD N G LENNOX
 MISS BROWN
 MR. THOMAS
 MR. WILLISON
 MR. WILLIAMS

ADDITIONAL DISTN.
RHODESIA POLICY



BRITISH HIGH COMMISSION
P.O. BOX R.W.50
LUSAKA
ZAMBIA

10 August 1979

Mr B G Cartledge
No 10 Downing Street
London SW1

Prime Minister

!
By
17/8

Dear Sir,

You may like to know that the Dean of the Cathedral has commented to me with regard to last Sunday's service "Of course Malingo is bonkers - and probably a black racist into the bargain". Unfortunately matters were out of the Dean's hands because the service was arranged by the Christian Council.

Yours ever

!

Len

Sir Leonard Allinson

17 AUG 1970



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FM CAIRO 101135Z AUG

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

Prime Minister

TELEGRAM NR 637 OF 10 AUG 79
 INFO PRIORITY MAPUTO LUSAKA PRETORIA WASHINGTON
 DAR ES SALAAM AND GABERONE:

OK
 13/8

RHODESIA:

1. JOSHUA NKOMO HAS BEEN HERE SINCE 7 JUL. ACTING HEAD OF AFRICAN DEPT., MFA, HAS TOLD US THAT HE WAS INVITED BY PRESIDENT ADAT WHEN THEY MET DURING THE MONROVIA OAU SUMMIT. HE HAS SO FAR HAD MEETINGS WITH THE PRESIDENT, MINISTER OF DEFENCE AND MINISTER OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS.
2. YOU WILL HAVE HEARD PAUL MARTIN'S BBC RADIO INTERVIEW WITH NKOMO. IT WAS AT POINTS CONFUSED, AND PERHAPS MISLEADING. ALTHOUGH NKOMO FREELY EXPRESSED DOUBTS ABOUT BRITISH SINCERITY, HE WAS RELUCTANT TO BE DRAWN INTO FIRM POSITIONS ON THE COMMONWEALTH PROPOSALS. SEVERAL OF MARTIN'S QUESTIONS SEEMED TO US TO BE TENDENTIOUS, EG THAT CONCERNING THE NEED FOR PATRIOTIC FRONT FORCES TO BE "IN CONTROL" BEFORE ELECTIONS ARE HELD. IN A BRIEF SECTION OF THE INTERVIEW, NOT SENT TO LONDON, NKOMO SAID THAT HE HAD NOT YET SEEN THE COMMONWEALTH PROPOSALS, "APART FROM MEDIA ACCOUNTS", AND IT WAS THEREFORE DIFFICULT FOR HIM TO JUDGE THEM.
3. A BLACK RHODESIAN RESIDENT, WELL KNOWN TO US HERE, WHO HAS SEEN NKOMO DURING THE VISIT, HAS CONFIRMED THAT THIS IS THE LINE FOR PUBLIC CONSUMPTION FOR THE MOMENT. THIS CONTACT REPORTS THAT HE HEARD NKOMO SAY IN PRIVATE THAT THE COMMONWEALTH PROPOSALS MIGHT BE A GOOD THING BUT THAT HE WOULD NEED TO CONSULT COLLEAGUES IN THE ZAPU LEADERSHIP BEFORE PRONOUNCING. NKOMO CONSIDERED THAT, IF THE ALL-PARTY CONFERENCE WAS HELD, BISHOP MUZOREWA'S GOVT SHOULD BE INCLUDED IN THE BRITISH DELEGATION. NKOMO ALSO SAID THAT HE HAD REBUFFED AN OFFER OF AN ALLIANCE FROM SITHOLE, BEFORE THE LATTER HAD DECIDED TO TAKE UP HIS SEATS IN THE RHODESIAN PARLIAMENT.

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4. NKOMO'S VISIT HAS SO FAR RECEIVED RELATIVELY SPARSE PRESS COVERAGE HERE, ALTHOUGH AL AHRAM ON 9 AUG BRIEFLY QUOTED THE MINISTER OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS AS STATING THAT THE POLICIES OF EGYPT AND THE PATRIOTIC FRONT CONCERNING THE STRUGGLE WITH IMPERIALISM IN ZIMBABWE WERE IDENTICAL. BUT HE HAS RECEIVED MUCH GREATER OFFICIAL ATTENTION THAN DURING HIS LAST VISIT IN APRIL 1978. THEN HE SAW NEITHER THE PRESIDENT NOR THE MINISTER OF DEFENCE. HIS MEETING WITH THE LATTER ON THIS OCCASION PRESUMABLY CONCERNED CONTINUED EGYPTIAN MILITARY AID TO HIS FORCES. THE VISIT MAY IN FACT REFLECT SADAT'S NEED OF FRIENDS: THE KENYAN AMBASSADOR WHO WAS AT MONROVIA TELLS ME SADAT WAS DISAPPOINTED BY THE SMALL NUMBER OF HEADS OF STATE WHO CALLED ON HIM.

5. ACTING HEAD OF AFRICAN DEPT., MFA HAD AS OF YESTERDAY HEARD NOTHING ABOUT THE TALKS AND WAS RESERVED ABOUT THE COMMONWEALTH PROPOSALS. HE WELCOMED THEM AS A STEP FORWARD, BUT DESCRIBED THEM AS A COMPROMISE PAPERING OVER SUBSTANTIAL DIFFERENCES EG ON THE LIFTING OF SANCTIONS. THIS IS OF A PIECE WITH THE STAND THE EGYPTIANS TOOK AT MONROVIA. THEY ARE MOST ANXIOUS TO BE SEEN AS GOOD AFRICANS, SO AS TO RETAIN AFRICAN SUPPORT AGAINST THE ANTI-SADAT ARABS, AND WILL NOT GET OUT OF STEP WITH THE OAU MAJORITY.

6. THERE IS TO BE A MEETING OF THE GOVERNMENT-SPONSORED "AFRICAN SOCIETY" HERE TOMORROW AT WHICH NKOMO IS DUE TO SPEAK.
WEIR

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RHODESIA POLICY

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FM LUSAKA 100935Z AUG 79

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 890 OF 10 AUGUST

INFO PRIORITY DAR ES SALAAM, GABORONE, MAPUTO, LUANDA,
MIRIMBA SALISBURY, PRETORIA, LAGOS, NAIROBI

ZAMBIA/RHODESIA AND THE COMMONWEALTH PRESS UNION

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mk
1. OPENING THE COMMONWEALTH PRESS UNION CONFERENCE IN LUSAKA YESTERDAY (9 AUGUST), PRESIDENT KAUNDA SAID THAT ZAMBIA HAD ALWAYS BEEN WILLING TO COOPERATE WITH THE RHODESIANS, PROVIDED A GENUINE DEMOCRATIC REGIME WAS ESTABLISHED. HE PROMISED THAT DIPLOMATIC AND POLITICAL TIES WOULD BE ESTABLISHED BETWEEN ZAMBIA AND "THE RACIST REGIMES IN PRETORIA AND SALISBURY" IF FREE AND FAIR ELECTIONS WERE HELD THERE, IN WHICH ALL PEOPLE TOOK PART.
 2. KAUNDA WARNED THAT TIME WAS RUNNING OUT FOR THE RHODESIAN REGIME. ZAMBIA HAD ALWAYS BEEN READY TO HELP WORK OUT A SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEMS OF THE REGION, BUT THE SOUTH AFRICANS AND RHODESIANS HAD REJECTED ZAMBIA'S EFFORTS TO ESTABLISH PEACE AND COOPERATION OVER THE YEARS.
 3. KAUNDA REVEALED AN OBJECTION TO REFERENCES TO "ZIMBABWE-RHODESIA". HE SAID THAT A TRULY GENUINE AND DEMOCRATIC ZIMBABWE HAD NOT YET BEEN BORN AND "JOKINGLY" THREATENED TO BAN ANY ZAMBIAN NEWSPAPER WHICH REFERRED TO RHODESIA AS "ZIMBABWE-RHODESIA".
 4. IN AN EDITORIAL ON THE COMMONWEALTH PRESS UNION MEETING, THE TIMES OF ZAMBIA ALLEGES THAT MRS THATCHER CAME TO LUSAKA "ILL INFORMED AND POSSIBLY MISINFORMED ON THE RHODESIA PROBLEM BECAUSE NOT A SINGLE LONDON NEWSPAPER HAD SOUGHT TO GIVE A FAIR PRESENT-ATION". THIS WAS OVERCOME BY COMMON SENSE AND PERSONAL RAPPORT BETWEEN COMMONWEALTH LEADERS. THE TIMES HOPES THAT THE CPU WILL BE FOUND IN THE FOREFRONT OF THE FIGHT TO ENSURE A FREE FLOW OF INFORMATION, GOODWILL AND CHARITY.

5. THE TIMES ALSO QUOTES MR CLYDE SANGER, DIRECTOR OF INFORMATION IN THE COMMONWEALTH SECRETARIAT AS TELLING THE CUP MEETING THAT "THERE WAS A GREAT DEAL OF PREJUDICIAL REPORTING IN THE BRITISH PRESS ABOUT WHAT WAS HAPPENING (DURING CHOGM)".

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DESKBY 110730Z MIRIMBA SALISBURY LUSAKA GABORONE PRETORIA ADDIS
ABABA CANBERRA WELLINGTON DAR ES SALAAM MAPUTO LUANDA WASHINGTON
UKMIS NEW YORK OTTAWA

DESKBY 110830Z LAGOS

FM FCO 101800Z AUG 79

TO IMMEDIATE MIRIMBA SALISBURY
TELEGRAM NUMBER 142 OF 10 AUGUST
AND TO MAPUTO LUSAKA

INFO IMMEDIATE GABORONE DAR ES SALAAM LUANDA LAGOS WASHINGTON
UKMIS NEW YORK PRETORIA ADDIS ABABA MONROVIA CANBERRA OTTAWA
WELLINGTON PRIORITY ABIDJAN DAKAR KINSHASA KHARTOUM TOKYO EEC
POSTS OTHER COMMONWEALTH POSTS

INFO SAVING SUVA PORT MORESBY HONIARA NUKU'ALOFA TARAWA

MIPT: RHODESIA

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF STATEMENT:--

1. THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT HAVE MADE CLEAR FROM THE TIME THEY TOOK OFFICE THAT THEIR OBJECTIVE IS TO BRING RHODESIA TO LEGAL INDEPENDENCE IN A CONTEXT OF WIDE INTERNATIONAL ACCEPTANCE, AN END TO THE FIGHTING AND THE LIFTING OF SANCTIONS. THEY AT ONCE EMBARKED ON A PROCESS OF CONSULTATION WITH THE COUNTRIES OF THE COMMONWEALTH, THEIR PARTNERS IN THE EEC, THE UNITED STATES AND OTHERS ON THE MEANS BY WHICH THIS OBJECTIVE MIGHT BE ACHIEVED.
2. THE PROCESS OF CONSULTATION WAS COMPLETED AT THE COMMONWEALTH HEADS OF GOVERNMENT MEETING IN LUSAKA WHERE AGREEMENT WAS REACHED BETWEEN COMMONWEALTH HEADS OF GOVERNMENT ON A STATEMENT WHICH SETS OUT THE BASIS ON WHICH WE NOW INTEND TO MOVE FORWARD TO A SETTLEMENT. AS THE STATEMENT MAKES CLEAR, THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT ACCEPT WITHOUT QUESTION THEIR CONSTITUTIONAL RESPONSIBILITY IN THIS MATTER, AND GRATEFULLY ACKNOWLEDGE THAT THE COMMONWEALTH HAVE EXPRESSED THEIR CONFIDENCE IN BRITAIN TO WORK TOWARDS THE OBJECTIVE THAT ALL DESIRE.
3. THE NEXT STEP IS TO CONVENE A CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE AT LANCASTER HOUSE IN LONDON TO DISCUSS AND REACH AGREEMENT ON THE TERMS OF AN INDEPENDENCE CONSTITUTION FOR RHODESIA ON LINES WHICH WILL SECURE WIDE INTERNATIONAL ACCEPTANCE FOR THE NEW STATE AND WILL BE COMPARABLE TO THOSE ON WHICH BRITAIN HAS GRANTED INDEPENDENCE TO OTHER FORMER DEPENDENT TERRITORIES. REPRESENTATIVES OF BOTH THE SALISBURY ADMINISTRATION AND THE PATRIOTIC FRONT HAVE BEEN INVITED TO THE CONFERENCE.

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4. AT THE SAME TIME THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT HAVE PUBLISHED AN OUTLINE OF PROPOSALS FOR AN INDEPENDENCE CONSTITUTION WHICH THEY BELIEVE SHOULD BE ACCEPTABLE TO THE RHODESIAN PEOPLE, AND ON THE BASIS OF WHICH THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT WOULD BE PREPARED TO GRANT INDEPENDENCE AND LIFT SANCTIONS. OTHER POSSIBILITIES ARE, OF COURSE, NOT EXCLUDED IF THE PARTIES THEMSELVES CAN AGREE ON THEM.

5. THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT APPROACH THE CONFERENCE IN THE FIRM BELIEF THAT A SETTLEMENT IN RHODESIA CAN AND MUST BE FOUND SOON WHICH WILL OFFER RHODESIA THE PROSPECT OF AN END TO THE WAR AND A RETURN TO A NORMAL POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC RELATIONSHIP WITH THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY. THEY HAVE APPEALED TO ALL THE PARTIES TO APPROACH NEGOTIATIONS IN THE SAME SPIRIT OF URGENCY. THEY THEMSELVES ARE READY, ONCE AN ACCEPTABLE BASIS FOR INDEPENDENCE HAS BEEN AGREED, TO PLAY THEIR FULL PART AS THE CONSTITUTIONALLY RESPONSIBLE AUTHORITY IN BRINGING RHODESIA TO LEGAL INDEPENDENCE ON THAT BASIS AS SOON AS IS PRACTICABLE.

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DESKBY 110730Z - MIRIMBA SALISBURY, LUSAKA, GABORONE, PRETORIA,
ADDIS ABABA, CANBERRA, WELLINGTON, DAR ES SALAAM,
MAPUTO, LUANDA, WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK,
OTTAWA, MONROVIA

DESKBY 110830Z - LAGOS

FM F C O 101800Z AUG 79

TO IMMEDIATE MIRIMBA SALISBURY

TELEGRAM NUMBER 141 OF 10 AUGUST

AND TO IMMEDIATE MAPUTO, LUSAKA

INFO IMMEDIATE GABORONE, DAR ES SALAAM, WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK,
PRETORIA, ADDIS ABABA, MONROVIA, CANBERRA, LUANDA, LAGOS, OTTAWA,
WELLINGTON, PRIORITY ABIDJAN, DAKAR, KINSHASA, KHARTOUM, TOKYO,
EEC POSTS, OTHER COMMONWEALTH POSTS

INFO SAVING SUVA, PORT MORESBY, HONIARA, NUKUALOFA AND TARAVA.

M I P T: RHODESIA.

FOLLOWING IS OUTLINE OF PROPOSALS FOR AN INDEPENDENCE
CONSTITUTION:-

1. ZIMBABWE WILL BE AN INDEPENDENT SOVEREIGN STATE IN WHICH ALL
CITIZENS WILL ENJOY EQUAL RIGHTS UNDER THE LAW.
2. THERE WILL BE A "CONSTITUTIONAL" HEAD OF STATE.
3. THE HEAD OF GOVERNMENT WILL BE THE PRIME MINISTER, WHO WILL BE
A MEMBER OF THE HOUSE OF ASSEMBLY HAVING THE SUPPORT OF A MAJORITY
IN THAT HOUSE. POWER TO APPOINT AND DISMISS MINISTERS WILL BE
EXERCISED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE ADVICE OF THE PRIME MINISTER.
4. PARLIAMENT WILL CONSIST OF A SENATE AND A HOUSE OF ASSEMBLY.
THE SENATE WILL BE INDIRECTLY ELECTED, AND A MAJORITY OF ITS
MEMBERS WILL BE AFRICANS. IT WILL HAVE POWER TO DELAY BUT NOT
BLOCK BILLS PASSED BY THE HOUSE OF ASSEMBLY. THE HOUSE OF
ASSEMBLY WILL BE DIRECTLY ELECTED BY UNIVERSAL ADULT SUFFRAGE.

/5.

5. FOR A SPECIFIED MINIMUM PERIOD AFTER INDEPENDENCE THE HOUSE OF ASSEMBLY WILL CONTAIN A MINORITY OF SEATS RESERVED FOR REPRESENTATIVES TO BE ELECTED BY THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY. THE PROPORTION OF THESE SEATS TO THE TOTAL NUMBER OF SEATS IN THE HOUSE WILL BE A MATTER FOR DISCUSSION BETWEEN THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT AND THE RHODESIAN PARTIES.

6. PARLIAMENT WILL HAVE POWER TO AMEND THE CONSTITUTION, WHICH WILL PRESCRIBE PROCEDURES TO BE FOLLOWED FOR EFFECTING SUCH AMENDMENTS ON LINES SIMILAR TO THOSE CONTAINED IN OTHER INDEPENDENCE CONSTITUTIONS GRANTED BY BRITAIN.

7. THE CONSTITUTION WILL PROTECT THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE JUDICIARY.

8. UNDER THE LAW, PUBLIC SERVANTS WILL CARRY OUT THE INSTRUCTIONS OF MINISTERS. POWER TO APPOINT, DISMISS AND DISCIPLINE MEMBERS OF THE PUBLIC SERVICE WILL BE VESTED IN AN INDEPENDENT PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION. THE CONSTITUTION WILL PROTECT THE PENSION RIGHTS OF PUBLIC SERVANTS.

9. THE COMMANDERS OF THE POLICE FORCE AND THE DEFENCE FORCES WILL ACT IN ACCORDANCE WITH GENERAL POLICY DIRECTIVES GIVEN BY THE PRIME MINISTER OR OTHER RESPONSIBLE MINISTER. THE POLICE COMMISSIONER AND EACH DEFENCE FORCE COMMANDER WILL BE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE ADMINISTRATION AND OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF THEIR FORCES. THERE WILL BE INDEPENDENT SERVICE COMMISSIONS FOR THE RESPECTIVE FORCES WHICH WILL HAVE PRESCRIBED POWERS IN THE DISCIPLINARY AND ESTABLISHMENT FIELDS.

10. THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION, AND THE OTHER SERVICE COMMISSIONS, WILL BE APPOINTED ON A BASIS, AND WITH TERMS OF REFERENCE, WHICH WILL TAKE DUE ACCOUNT OF THE NEED TO PRESERVE A HIGH STANDARD OF EFFICIENCY AND WHICH ALSO RECOGNISE THE LEGITIMATE CLAIMS OF THE MAJORITY OF THE POPULATION TO INCREASING REPRESENTATION IN ALL FORMS OF PUBLIC OFFICE. THE POWER TO MAKE CERTAIN SENIOR APPOINTMENTS IN THE PUBLIC SERVICE AND OTHER SERVICES WILL BE VESTED IN THE PRIME MINISTER, ACTING AFTER CONSULTATION WITH THE APPROPRIATE COMMISSION.

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11. THERE WILL BE A FULLY JUSTICIABLE DECLARATION OF RIGHTS
AND AN INDEPENDENT OFFICIAL TO ASSIST IN ITS ENFORCEMENT.

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DESKBY 110730Z WASHINGTON UKMIS NEW YORK OTTAWA MONROVIA
DESKBY 110830Z LAGOS
FM FCO 101800Z AUG 79

TO IMMEDIATE MIRIMBA SALISBURY
TELEGRAM NUMBER 140 OF 10 AUGUST
AND TO MAPUTO LUSAKA

INFO IMMEDIATE GABORONE DAR ES SALAAM LUANDA LAGOS WASHINGTON
UKMIS NEW YORK PRETORIA ADDIS ABABA MONROVIA CANBERRA OTTAWA
WELLINGTON, PRIORITY ABIDJAN DAKAR KINSHASA KHARTOUM TOKYO
EEC POSTS, OTHER COMMONWEALTH POSTS
INFO SAVING SUVA PORT MORESBY HONIARA NUKUALOFA TARAWA.

MIPT: RHODESIA

1. THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT ANNOUNCED IN JULY THAT THEY INTENDED IN DUE COURSE TO PUT FORWARD FIRM PROPOSALS OF THEIR OWN FOR BRINGING RHODESIA TO LEGAL INDEPENDENCE. THEY AGREED WITH OTHER COMMONWEALTH GOVERNMENTS IN LUSAKA THAT AN APPROPRIATE PROCEDURE WOULD BE TO CALL A CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE TO WHICH ALL THE PARTIES WOULD BE INVITED.
2. THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT NOW FORMALLY INVITE BISHOP MUZOREWA/THE PATRIOTIC FRONT TO APPOINT A DELEGATION OF UP TO 12 MEMBERS TO ATTEND A CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE TO BE HELD AT LANCASTER HOUSE, LONDON, FROM 10 SEPTEMBER 1979, UNDER THE CHAIRMANSHIP OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH AFFAIRS, LORD CARRINGTON. THE PURPOSE OF THE CONFERENCE WILL BE TO DISCUSS AND REACH AGREEMENT ON THE TERMS OF AN INDEPENDENCE CONSTITUTION. AN OUTLINE OF PROPOSALS FOR AN INDEPENDENCE CONSTITUTION IS ATTACHED.
3. THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT ARE OF THE OPINION THAT THE MILITARY QUESTIONS ASSOCIATED WITH A TRANSITION TO LEGAL INDEPENDENCE SHOULD BE FOR DISCUSSION ONCE THE TERMS OF AN INDEPENDENCE CONSTITUTION HAVE BEEN AGREED. THEY BELIEVE NEVERTHELESS, AND STRONGLY URGE ON THE PARTIES, THAT THE PROSPECTS FOR A SUCCESSFUL CONFERENCE WILL BE GREATLY ENHANCED IF BOTH SIDES WILL OBSERVE A CEASEFIRE.

CONFIDENTIAL

14.

CONFIDENTIAL

4. THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROPOSALS ATTACHED REPRESENT IN OUTLINE THE KIND OF CONSTITUTION WHICH THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT BELIEVE SHOULD BE ACCEPTABLE TO THE RHODESIAN PEOPLE, AND ON THE BASIS OF WHICH THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT WOULD BE PREPARED TO GRANT INDEPENDENCE. THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT WOULD ALSO BE READY TO CONSIDER GRANTING INDEPENDENCE ON THE BASIS OF ALTERNATIVE PROPOSALS, PUT FORWARD BY ANY OF THE PARTIES, ON WHICH THE PARTIES THEMSELVES ARE ABLE TO REACH AGREEMENT. DURING THE PERIOD BETWEEN NOW AND 10 SEPTEMBER, THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT ARE READY TO TAKE PART IN CONSULTATIONS AT OFFICIAL LEVEL WITH THE PARTIES TO WHATEVER EXTENT THE PARTIES THEMSELVES THINK USEFUL IN ORDER TO PREPARE FOR THE CONFERENCE AND TO CLARIFY THEIR RESPECTIVE POSITIONS.

5. THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT BELIEVE THAT THE NEED FOR A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT AND AN END TO THE WAR IN RHODESIA IS MORE URGENT TODAY THAN IT HAS EVER BEEN. IN ADDRESSING THIS INVITATION TO THE PARTIES THEY THEREFORE ALSO APPEAL TO THEM, IN THE INTERESTS OF THE PEOPLE OF RHODESIA, TO APPROACH THESE NEGOTIATIONS, AS THEY WILL THEMSELVES, IN A CONSTRUCTIVE AND FORWARD-LOOKING SPIRIT AND TO LAY THE FOUNDATIONS FOR A FREE, INDEPENDENT AND DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY IN WHICH ALL RHODESIANS, WHATEVER THEIR RACE OR POLITICAL BELIEFS, WILL BE ABLE TO LIVE IN SECURITY AND AT PEACE WITH EACH OTHER AND THEIR NEIGHBOURS.

CARRINGTON

FILES
RHOD.D.
OADS
N AM D
NEWS D
PUSD
PLANNING STAFF
ES & SD
CCD
ERD
UND
LEGAL ADVS (MR. FREELAND)
(MR. FLFOOT)
ECON D
P & CD
SPD

DEF D
OID
PS
PS/SIR I GILMOUR
PS/MR. LUCE
PS/MR. RIDLEY
PS/MR. HURD
PS/PUS
SIR A DUFF
SIR A PARSONS
LORD N G LENNOX
MISS BROWN
MR. THOMAS
MR. WILLSON
MR. WILLIAMS

ADDITIONAL DISTN.
RHODESIA POLICY

2
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

2

Prime Minister

4 hrs. *19/8*

GRS 650A

CONFIDENTIAL

DESKBY 110730ZTO SALISBURY LUSAKA GABORONE PRETORIA ADDIS ABABA
CANBERRA WELLINGTON DAR ES SALAAM MAPUTO LUANDA WASHINGTON
UKMIS NEW YORK OTTAWA AND MONROVIA

DESKBY 110830Z LAGOS

FM FCO 101800Z AUG 79

TO IMMEDIATE MIRIMBA SALISBURY

TELEGRAM NUMBER 139 OF 10 AUGUST

AND TO IMMEDIATE MAPUTO AND LUSAKA

INFO IMMEDIATE GABORONE, DAR ES SALAAM, LUANDA, LAGOS, WASHINGTON,
UKMIS NEW YORK, PRETORIA, ADDIS ABABA, MONROVIA, CANBERRA, OTTAWA,
WELLINGTON PRIORITY ABIDJAN, DAKAR, KINSHASA, KHARTOUM, TOKYO,
EEC POSTS AND OTHER COMMONWEALTH POSTS,
AND SAVING TO SUVA, PORT MORESBY, HONIARA, NUKUALOFA AND TARAWA.

mb *P.A. -*
15/8

RHODESIA: CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE.

1. (FOR MIRIMBA AND MAPUTO AND LUSAKA). MY FIRST IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING TELEGRAM CONTAINS THE TEXT OF A WRITTEN INVITATION TO BE DELIVERED TO BISHOP MUZOREWA, MUGABE AND NKOMO AS CLOSE AS POSSIBLE TO 1000Z ON 14 AUGUST, TOGETHER WITH A COPY OF THE OUTLINE PROPOSALS FOR AN INDEPENDENCE CONSTITUTION THE TEXT OF WHICH IS IN MY SECOND IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING TELEGRAM, AND OF THE ACCOMPANYING STATEMENT IN MY THIRD IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING TELEGRAM WHICH IS TO BE RELEASED IN LONDON LATER ON 14 AUGUST.
2. (FRONT LINE, LAGOS, WASHINGTON, PRETORIA AND COMMONWEALTH POSTS). YOU SHOULD (NOT BEFORE 1000Z ON 14 AUGUST) HAND OVER COPIES OF THESE TEXTS ALSO TO THE GOVERNMENT TO WHICH YOU ARE ACCREDITED AND EXPLAIN THE ACTION BEING TAKEN VIS-A-VIS THE PARTIES. (ADDIS ABABA AND MONROVIA). YOU SHOULD TAKE SIMILAR ACTION RESPECTIVELY WITH THE OAU SECRETARIAT AND WITH THE PRESIDENT AS CURRENT CHAIRMAN OF THE OAU.
3. PARAGRAPHS 4 TO 9 BELOW SET OUT POINTS TO BE MADE ORALLY.
4. YOU SHOULD MAKE CLEAR THAT OUR INVITATION IS ADDRESSED ONLY TO BISHOP MUZOREWA AND TO THE CO-LEADERS OF THE PATRIOTIC FRONT. WE EXPECT DELEGATIONS OF 12 FROM SALISBURY AND 12 FROM THE

CONFIDENTIAL

/PATRIOTIC

CONFIDENTIAL

PATRIOTIC FRONT. WE WILL PAY ALL EXPENSES (INCLUDING FIRST CLASS FARES) FOR THESE NUMBERS. OTHERS MAY COME TO LONDON AT EXPENSE OF PARTIES, BUT WILL NOT BE ADMITTED TO THE CONFERENCE ITSELF.

5. WHO THE LEADERS CHOOSE TO BRING WITH THEM IS THEIR BUSINESS. (FOR MIRIMBA SALISBURY: PLEASE DISCUSS WITH THE BISHOP WHOM HE WILL CHOOSE. WE WANT TO ENSURE THAT HE BRINGS A DELEGATION WHICH WILL BE SEEN TO BE BROADLY REPRESENTATIVE OF THE AFRICAN SPECTRUM, AND WILL HAVE ADEQUATE WHITE REPRESENTATION. THE LATTER POINT IS PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT BECAUSE THE WHITE MEMBERS ARE GOING TO HAVE TO CARRY THE WHITE COMMUNITY WITH THEM. OUR CURRENT FEELING IS THAT THE PRESENCE OF MR IAN SMITH IN THE DELEGATION IS UNLIKELY TO ENHANCE THE PROSPECTS FOR A SUCCESSFUL CONFERENCE).

6. WE ARE PREPARED FOR THE CONFERENCE TO LAST FOR AS LONG AS PROGRESS IS BEING MADE. THERE ARE NO DEADLINES.

7. WE CANNOT AGREE THAT THE NOTICE GIVEN FOR THE CONFERENCE IS INSUFFICIENT FOR PREPARATION (INDEED WE SHOULD HAVE HOPED TO START EARLIER BUT FOR THE FACT THAT THE NON-ALIGNED SUMMIT OPENS IN HAVANA ON 4 SEPTEMBER). BOTH SIDES HAVE HAD AMPLE TIME TO CONSIDER THEIR POSITIONS. WE ARE PREPARED TO MEET DELEGATES FROM EITHER SIDE IN LONDON, OR TO SEND OFFICIALS TO MEET THEM, FOR BILATERAL PRELIMINARY WORK IN ADVANCE OF THE CONFERENCE ITSELF.

8. THE PURPOSE OF THE CONFERENCE IS AS STATED. THE FORM OF A CONSTITUTIONAL SETTLEMENT IS THE FIRST QUESTION TO BE RESOLVED. WE SHALL THEN SEEK AGREEMENT ON MEASURES FOR ITS IMPLEMENTATION. WE BELIEVE THAT IF THE PARTIES CAN AGREE ON A BASIS FOR INDEPENDENCE, THEY CAN AGREE ALSO ON THE STEPS TO BE TAKEN TOWARDS IT, INCLUDING ARRANGEMENTS FOR A CEASEFIRE, FREE AND FAIR ELECTIONS AND SO ON (THIS WAS THE ORDER OF DISCUSSION FOR WHICH MUGABE, FOR EXAMPLE, EXPRESSED A STRONG PREFERENCE IN CONVERSATION WITH LORD HARLECH ON 18 JUNE). IF AGREEMENT CAN BE REACHED ON AN INDEPENDENCE CONSTITUTION, WE WILL BE READY, AS THE CONSTITUTIONALLY RESPONSIBLE AUTHORITY, TO PLAY A FULL PART IN MAKING ARRANGEMENTS FOR ALL THE PARTIES TO PARTICIPATE IN A FAIR TEST OF OPINION ON THAT BASIS. BUT WE CANNOT ACCEPT A SERIES OF PRECONDITIONS AS TO HOW WE SHOULD CARRY OUT THAT RESPONSIBILITY.

2
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

9. ON THE QUESTION OF OBSERVERS - THE FRONT LINE, ETC, WILL BE WELCOME TO SEND REPRESENTATIVES TO LONDON, IF THEY WISH, TO KEEP IN TOUCH WITH US AND THE PARTIES, BUT WE DO NOT ENVISAGE THAT THEY WILL BE ADMITTED TO THE CONFERENCE. WE WILL IN ANY CASE BE KEEPING THEM INFORMED OF PROGRESS THROUGH THE USUAL DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS.

10. (IF NECESSARY, WITH ANY PARTIES LEFT OUT OF THE RHODESIAN DELEGATION). WE WILL SEE THAT THE LEGITIMATE INTERESTS OF MINORITY PARTIES ARE NOT OVER-LOOKED AT THE CONFERENCE. BUT IN THE INTERESTS OF RAPID PROGRESS TOWARDS A SETTLEMENT WE THINK IT BEST IF THE NEGOTIATIONS ARE CONFINED TO THE PRINCIPAL PARTIES INVOLVED IN THE WAR.

CARRINGTON

FILES
RHOD.D.
OADS
N AM D
NEWS D
PUSD
PLANNING STAFF
ES & SD
CCD
FRD
UND
LEGAL ADVS (MR. FREELAND)
(MR. FIFOOT)
ECON D
P & CD
SPD

DEF D
OID
PS
PS/SIR I GILMOUR
PS/MR. LUCE
PS/MR. RIDLEY
PS/MR. HURD
PS/PUS
SIR A DUFF
SIR A PARSONS
LORD N G LENNOX
MISS BROWN
MR. THOMAS
MR. WILLSON
MR. WILLIAMS

ADDITIONAL DISTRN.
RHODESIA POLICY



Content for attached
messages to go
in your name?

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

10 August 1979

Dear Mike,

MAP
10/11/79

Yes.

1.
FCO informed. See
13/8
P.A.
do please see and
do Surrender -
Xilian never.

RHODESIA: CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE

As agreed, instructions will shortly be sent to Posts instructing them to deliver invitations on 14 August to Bishop Muzorewa and the Patriotic Front to attend a Constitutional Conference in London on 11 September.

This will be the first step in implementing the agreement on Rhodesia reached in Lusaka. This agreement has been widely welcomed. It will be important in the coming weeks to maintain the momentum it has generated and the goodwill towards us that is widely felt as a result. For that reason, the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary thinks that it would be appropriate for the Prime Minister to send personal messages to the Heads of State or Governments of those countries which are either closely involved in the Rhodesia problem or are inclined to be sympathetic and have influence over others or which, because of their special relations with us, could feel entitled to keep in close touch with developments. In our view the Heads of Government who would particularly appreciate such messages are: the old Commonwealth, and Mr Manley as a member of the group which met in Lusaka, the three Commonwealth Front Line states and the African countries recently visited by Mr Luce, and Gabon as a Security Council Member. Lord Carrington also recommends that a message should go to General Obasanjo in Lagos; it is true that the Prime Minister has only recently sent him a message but the Nigerians are particularly appreciative of such messages and are of course well placed to damage our interests if dissatisfied with the way things were going.

Lord Carrington proposes to send messages himself to the Japanese Foreign Minister, and the EEC Foreign Ministers. In view of our recent exchanges with Pretoria we do not think a further message to the South Africans is necessary at this stage; Mr Leahy is aware that we are considering the possibility of a visit to Pretoria by a senior official or a Minister in the course of the next ten days. Lord Carrington saw Ambassador Brewster this afternoon and will be recommending a further message from the Prime Minister to President Carter in due course.

/I enclose

Mike Pattison Esq
10 Downing Street



--- I enclose draft telegrams to the Posts concerned containing possible texts. The subject matter is much the same in each case but for presentational reasons we have introduced variations in the wording. The messages would be delivered on Tuesday, 14 August at about the time when the invitations are being delivered.

*Yours ever,
Stephen*

(J S Wall)

File No.

Department RHODESIA

Drafted by
(Block Capitals) MISS R. J. SPENCER

Tel. Extn. 233-8149

OUTWARD

TELEGRAM

Security Classification
CONFIDENTIAL
Precedence
IMMEDIATE
DESKBY Z

FOR COMMS. DEPT. USE	Despatched (Date) (Time) Z	POSTBY Z
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PREAMBLE

(Time of Origin) 091530 Z (G.M.T.) (Restrictive Prefix)
 (Security Class.) CONFIDENTIAL (Caveat)
 (Codeword) (Deskby) Z

TO IMMEDIATE GABORONE (precedence) (post) Tel. No. of

AND TO (precedence/post)

AND SAVING TO

REPEATED TO (for info) PRIORITY LUSAKA, DAR ES SALAAM, LAGOS, PRETORIA,
 MIRIMBA SALISBURY, WASHINGTON, LUANDA, MAPTUA

SAVING TO (for info)

Distribution:-
 Rhodesia Policy

[TEXT]

OUR TELNO TO MIRIMBA SALISBURY: RHODESIA
 CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE

1. You should hand over a copy of the texts in my tels nos [B & C] under cover of the following personal message from the Prime Minister to Sir Seretse Khama.

BEGINS: Dear Seretse, *Sir Seretse - I decided put on = Christian name with him.*

The agreement reached at the Commonwealth Heads of Government meeting in Lusaka is a triumph for the Commonwealth and for the wisdom of the Heads of State most closely involved in the Rhodesian problem and, I am most grateful for all you have done to make it possible I am sure that you will share my hope that it will provide the breakthrough we have been seeking for so long over the Rhodesia problem.

I am determined to maintain the momentum generated by the agreement and we are now pressing on with our plans for a constitutional conference. Invitations are being /issued

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issued today to Bishop Muzorewa and the leaders of the Patriotic Front to attend a constitutional conference in London in early September and a copy comes with this letter. This conference will be the first stage in our progress towards what we hope will be a satisfactory and lasting settlement for Rhodesia and it is vital we should do everything possible for it to succeed. I am sure I can count on your wholehearted support in this delicate undertaking. I shall of course be keeping in close touch with you over the coming weeks.

Yours sincerely,
Margaret Thatcher

ENDS:

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

File No.
 Department PRIVATE OFFICE OUTWARD
 Drafted by J S WALL TELEGRAM
 (Block Capitals)
 Tel. Extn.

Security Classification	
CONFIDENTIAL	
Precedence	
IMMEDIATE	
DESKBY	Z

FOR COMMS. DEPT. USE	Despatched	(Date)	POSTBY.....	Z
		(Time)		

PREAMBLE

(Time of Origin) Z(G.M.T.) (Restrictive Prefix).....
 (Security Class.) CONFIDENTIAL (Caveat/
 Privacy Marking).....
 (Codeword) (Deskby)..... Z

TO..... IMMEDIATE LUSAKA Tel. No. of
 (precedence) (post)

AND TO (precedence/post).....

AND SAVING TO.....

REPEATED TO (for info)..... PRIORITY LAGOS, DAR ES SALAAM, GABORONE,
 PRETORIA, MIRIMBA SALISBURY, WASHINGTON, LUANDA,
 MAPUTO

SAVING TO (for info).....

Distribution:-

RHODESIA
POLICY

Copies to:-

[TEXT]

FCO TELS NOS A - C TO MIRIMBA SALISBURY: RHODESIA.
 CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE

1. You should hand over a copy of the texts in my
 tels nos B & C, under cover of the following personal
 message from the Prime Minister to President Kaunda.

Begins:

"Dear Kenneth,

Once again I want to express my deep appreciation and
 admiration for your Chairmanship of the Commonwealth
 Heads of Government Meeting. It was due in large measure
 to your handling of the discussions that the outcome
 proved to be so constructive. It must now be the hope
 of all of us that it will point the way to genuine
 black majority rule in Rhodesia and a return to peace and
 legality there.

/A

CONFIDENTIAL

A copy of the invitation to a constitutional conference in London in early September which we are sending to Bishop Muzorewa and the leaders of the Patriotic Front comes with this letter. As you know, we are under no illusions about the difficulties that lie ahead. However, we intend to tackle the problems with determination and to maintain the momentum generated at the conference. Your continued support will be essential if we are to succeed, and I am sure that I can count on it. I shall of course be keeping in close touch with you over the coming weeks.

Yours sincerely,
Margaret Thatcher

ENDS.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

File No.

Department RHODESIA

Drafted by

(Block Capitals) R. D. WILKINSON

Tel. Extn. 233 3853

OUTWARD

TELEGRAM

Security Classification CONFIDENTIAL
Precedence IMMEDIATE
DESKBYZ

FOR COMMS. DEPT. USE

Despatched (Date) (Time)Z

POSTBYZ

PREAMBLE

(Time of Origin)Z(G.M.T.)

(Restrictive Prefix).....

(Security Class.) confidential

(Caveat/ Privacy Marking).....

(Codeword)

(Deskby).....Z

TO IMMEDIATE LAGOS Tel. No. of (precedence) (post)

AND TO (precedence/post).....

AND SAVING TO.....

REPEATED TO (for info) PRIORITY: LUSAKA, DAR ES SALAAM, GABORONE, PRETORIA MIRIMBA SALISBURY, WASHINGTON, LUANDA, MAPUTO

SAVING TO (for info).....

Distribution:-

Rhodesia Policy

[TEXT]

[A-C]

FCO TELNO TO MIRIMBA SALISBURY: RHODESIA CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE

1. You should hand over a copy of the texts in my tels nos [B and C] under cover of the following personal message from the Prime Minister to General Obasanjo.

Begins.

Dear General Obasanjo

I am arranging for you to receive a copy of the invitation which we are sending to Bishop Muzorewa and the leaders of the Patriotic Front to a constitutional conference in London in early September in accordance with the agreement we reached at Lusaka. As I

/explained

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Copies to:-

CONFIDENTIAL

explained in my recent message, this is the first stage in what is bound to be a delicate process. If we are to succeed in bringing genuine black majority rule to Rhodesia and restoring peace to that territory the continued support of the Commonwealth, and in particular of Nigeria, will be of the greatest importance. I am confident that I can count on it. I shall of course be keeping in close touch with you as we proceed.

Yours Sincerely

Margaret Thatcher

ENDS

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

CONFIDENTIAL

File No.
Department RHODESIA
Drafted by MISS R J SPENCER
(Block Capitals)
Tel. Extn. 233 8149

CONFIDENTIAL

OUTWARD

TELEGRAM

Security Classification CONFIDENTIAL
Precedence IMMEDIATE
DESKBYZ

FOR
COMMS. DEPT.
USE

Despatched (Date)
(Time)Z

POSTBYZ

PREAMBLE

(Time of Origin) 091600 Z (G.M.T.) (Restrictive Prefix)
(Security Class.) CONFIDENTIAL (Caveat/
Privacy marking)
(Codeword) (Deskby) Z

TO IMMEDIATE DAR ES SALAAM Tel. No.of
(precedence) (post)

AND TO (precedence/post) IMMEDIATE, LUANDA, MAPUTO

AND SAVING TO
REPEATED TO (for info) PRIORITY LAGOS, LUSAKA, GABORONE, PRETORIA, MIRIMBA
SALISBURY, WASHINGTON

SAVING TO (for info)

Distribution:-
Rhodesia Policy

[TEXT]
FCO TELS NOS [A-5] TO MIRIMBA SALISBURY: RHODESIA -
CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE
1. You should hand over text of invitations in accordance
with the instructions in our telegram under reference,
under cover of the following personal message from the
Prime Minister to President Nyerere.

Begins:
Dear Julius, May I once again express my thanks for your
invaluable contribution to the success of the Commonwealth
Heads of Government meeting in Lusaka. Your opening speech
at the southern Africa session set the tone for our
constructive discussions there, and for the very satisfac-
tory agreement that resulted. None of us is under any
illusions about the difficulties that lie ahead, but in
the agreement reached in Lusaka we have at last a basis,
unanimously agreed within the Commonwealth, for proceeding
to genuine black majority rule and restoring Rhodesia to
legality and peace.

Copies to:-

CONFIDENTIAL

In accordance with the terms of that agreement, invitations are now being sent to Bishop Muzorewa and the leaders of the Patriotic Front to attend a constitutional conference in London in early September. A copy comes with this message. You will see that we are doing all we can to maintain momentum. If this conference is to succeed, and we are to achieve our joint objectives, your personal support will be vital at every stage. I am sure that I can count on it. I shall of course be keeping in close touch with you over the coming weeks.

Yours sincerely,
Margaret Thatcher

ENDS:

2. (Luanda and Maputo only). There is no message from the Prime Minister, but you should draw as appropriate on the sentiments expressed above when handling over the text of the invitations.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

CONFIDENTIAL

File No.

Department PRIVATE OFFICE

Drafted by
(Block Capitals) J. S. WALL

Tel. Extn.....

OUTWARD

TELEGRAM

Security Classification
CONFIDENTIAL

Precedence
IMMEDIATE

DESKBY Z

FOR
COMMS. DEPT.
USE

Despatched (Date)
(Time) Z

POSTBY Z

PREAMBLE

(Time of Origin) Z(G.M.T.)

(Restrictive Prefix).....

(Security Class.) CONFIDENTIAL

(Caveat/
Privacy Marking).....

(Codeword)

(Deskby)..... Z

TO IMMEDIATE CANBERRA Tel. No. of
(precedence) (post)

AND TO (precedence/post).....

AND SAVING TO.....

REPEATED TO (for info).....

SAVING TO (for info).....

Distribution:-

RHODESIA POLICY

SPD

[TEXT]

RHODESIA

1. Please transmit the following personal message from the Prime Minister to Mr Fraser:

Begins:

Dear Malcolm

I believe that the agreement which we reached on Rhodesia in Lusaka represents a most constructive step; and that we have a new basis for progress towards a peaceful settlement. We are now pressing ahead with our

/plans

Copies to:-

CONFIDENTIAL

plans to implement the agreement, and invitations are being issued to Bishop Muzorewa and the leaders of the Patriotic Front to attend a constitutional conference in London on 11 September.

The Agreement was of course only a beginning, though a particularly auspicious one. I am under no illusion about the difficulties that lie ahead. We shall be needing the help and goodwill of all our friends and allies in the weeks that lie ahead, and I am sure that I can count on your support.

Yours sincerely,
Margaret Thatcher

Ends.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

CONFIDENTIAL

File No.
Department Rhodesia
Drafted by
(Block Capitals) R. D. Wilkinson
Tel. Extn.....

OUTWARD
TELEGRAM

Security Classification CONFIDENTIAL
Precedence IMMEDIATE
DESKBYZ

FOR COMMS. DEPT. USE	Despatched	(Date)	POSTBY.....Z
		(Time)Z	

PREAMBLE

(Time of Origin)Z(G.M.T.) (Restrictive Prefix).....
(Security Class.) CONFIDENTIAL (Caveat/Privacy Marking).....
(Codeword) (Deskby).....Z

TO IMMEDIATE OTTAWA Tel. No. of
(precedence) (post)

AND TO (precedence/post).....

AND SAVING TO.....

REPEATED TO (for info).....

SAVING TO (for info).....

Distribution:-

Rhodesia Policy
NAD

[TEXT]

RHODESIA

1. Please transmit the following personal message from the Prime Minister to Mr Clark:

Begins

Dear Joe

I am sure you were as heartened as I was by the agreement that we reached at Lusaka over Rhodesia. I believe that this is a most significant advance; and that a new basis has been established for progress towards a peaceful settlement. In accordance with the terms of that agreement we are now issuing invitations to Bishop Muzorewa and the leaders of the Patriotic Front to attend a constitutional conference in London

Copies to:-

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to begin on 11 September. This is only the first stage in a process which is bound to be delicate and difficult. The support of our friends and allies will be of particular help over the coming weeks and I am confident that I can count on you.

Yours sincerely

Margaret Thatcher

Ends.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

CONFIDENTIAL

File No.
Department RHODESIA
Drafted by
(Block Capitals)
Tel. Extn.....

OUTWARD
TELEGRAM

Security Classification CONFIDENTIAL
Precedence IMMEDIATE
DESKBYZ

FOR COMMS. DEPT. USE	Despatched (Date) (Time)Z	POSTBY.....Z
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PREAMBLE

(Time of Origin)Z(G.M.T.) (Restrictive Prefix).....
 (Security Class.) CONFIDENTIAL (Caveat/Privacy Marking).....
 (Codeword) (Deskby).....Z

TO IMMEDIATE WELLINGTON Tel. No. of
 (precedence) (post)

AND TO (precedence/post).....

AND SAVING TO.....

REPEATED TO (for info).....

SAVING TO (for info).....

Distribution:-

Rhodesia Policy
PD

Copies to:-

[TEXT]

RHODESIA

1. Please transmit the following personal message from the Prime Minister to Mr Muldoon

Begins

Dear Robert

I know that you share my view that the agreement we reached at Lusaka over Rhodesia was a tremendous achievement in establishing a new basis for progress towards a peaceful solution. I am most grateful to you for your consistent support. We are determined to press ahead, and to maintain the momentum we have gained. In accordance with the terms of that agreement we are now inviting Bishop Muzorewa and the leaders

CONFIDENTIAL

of the Patriotic Front to attend a constitutional conference in London on 11 September. This is only the first stage in a process that is bound to be difficult, and we shall need all the help and support our friends and allies can give us. I am sure that I can count on yours.

Ends

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

File No. RHODESIA
Department
Drafted by
(Block Capitals) Miss Spencer
Tel. Extn. 233 8149

OUTWARD
TELEGRAM

Security Classification CONFIDENTIAL
Precedence IMMEDIATE
DESKBY Z

FOR COMMS. DEPT. USE	Despatched (Date) (Time) Z	POSTBY Z
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PREAMBLE

(Time of Origin) Z (G.M.T.) (Restrictive Prefix)
 (Security Class.) CONFIDENTIAL (Caveat)
 (Codeword) (Privacy marking)
 (Deskby) Z

TO IMMEDIATE KINGSTON (precedence) (post) Tel. No. of

AND TO (precedence/post)

AND SAVING TO

REPEATED TO (for info)

SAVING TO (for info)

Distribution:-
Rhodesia Policy
M & C D

[TEXT]
RHODES\$A

1. Please transmit the following personal message from the Prime Minister to Mr Manley.

BEGINS

Dear ~~Mr Manley~~ *Richard*,

I should like to express my thanks for your most helpful contribution to the success of the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting in Lusaka and in particular to the agreement that we reached on Rhodesia. I believe that we now have the basis for proceeding to genuine black majority rule and restoring Rhodesia to legality and peace with wide international support.

/we

Copies to:-

We are ~~now~~ sending invitations to Bishop Muzorewa and the leaders of the Patriotic Front to a constitutional conference in early September, in accordance with the Lusaka Agreement. We are under no illusions as to the difficulties which lie ahead but are determined to spare no effort to achieve a satisfactory outcome. In this undertaking we shall need the support of all our friends in the Commonwealth and outside. I am sure that I can count on you. I shall of course be keeping in close touch with you over the coming weeks.

Yours sincerely

Margaret Thatcher

ENDS

2. You may draw on FCO telegrams [B and C] to Mirimba Salisbury in talking to the Jamaicans. You may also draw as necessary on FCO tel no to Dar es Salaam. You should make full use of guidance material.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

File No.
Department RHODESIA
Drafted by
(Block Capitals) R. D. WILKINSON
Tel. Extn. 233 3853

OUTWARD
TELEGRAM

Security Classification CONFIDENTIAL
Precedence IMMEDIATE
DESKBYZ

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PREAMBLE

(Time of Origin) 10103G Z (G.M.T.) (Restrictive Prefix)
 (Security Class.) CONFIDENTIAL (Caveat/ Privacy marking)
 (Codeword) (Deskby) Z

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Distribution:-
Rhodesia Policy

[TEXT]

RHODESIA

1. Please transmit the following personal message from the Prime Minister to President Mobutu

Begins.

Dear President, I am fully aware of the concern you feel for a peaceful solution to the Rhodesian problem and I am grateful for the consistently helpful attitude you have taken. Richard Luce's call on you last June was a most valuable part of our process of consultation with African leaders as a result of which we have been able to formulate our policy on Rhodesia.

This policy is set out in the agreement which was reached at the Commonwealth Heads of Government meeting at Lusaka.

I am ^{confident} ~~sure~~ you will share my view that this agreement is a major achievement and holds out a real hope of progress towards a settlement. I am sure that you will be wishing us well in our efforts to implement the proposals outlined

CONFIDENTIAL

/in

Copies to:-

in the agreement and that I can count on your support in the period that lies ahead. There are bound to be difficulties, but we shall be sparing no effort to resolve them.

Yours sincerely

Margaret Thatcher
ENDS.

2. You may draw on FCO telnos B & C to Mirimba Salisbury in talking to Governments to which you are accredited. You may also draw as necessary on FCO telno to Dar es Salaam. You should also make full use of guidance material.

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File No. CONFIDENTIAL
 Department RHODESIA OUTWARD
 Drafted by MISS R J SPENCER TELEGRAM
 (Block Capitals)
 Tel. Extn. 233 8149

Security Classification CONFIDENTIAL
Precedence IMMEDIATE
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FOR COMMS. DEPT. USE	Despatched (Date) (Time)Z	POSTBYZ
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PREAMBLE

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Distribution:-

Rhodesia Policy

[TEXT]

RHODESIA

1. Please transmit the following personal message from the Prime Minister to President Houphouet-Boigny.

BEGINS:

Dear Mr President,

I know that you have always been in favour of a solution to the Rhodesian problem based on negotiations between all the parties concerned, and Richard Luce told me of your Government's thinking when he returned from his visit to West Africa last June. I am sure that you will share my view that the agreement reached at the Commonwealth Heads of Government meeting in Lusaka provides a real hope of a settlement based on such negotiations. In accordance with that agreement, we are now issuing invitations to Bishop Muzorewa and the leaders of the Patriotic Front to attend a constitutional conference in London in early September. I am under no illusions about the difficulties that lie ahead, but we shall be sparing no effort to
 /resolve

Copies to:-

resolve them. We shall need the support of our friends in this task, and I trust that I can count on yours.

Yours sincerely

Margaret Thatcher

ENDS.

2. You may draw on FCO telnos [B & C] to Mirimba Salisbury in talking to Governments to which you are accredited. You may also draw as necessary on FCO telno to Dar es Salaam. You should also make full use of guidance material.

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Distribution:-

Rhodesia Policy

NENAD

[TEXT]

RHODESIA

1. Please transmit the following personal message from the Prime Minister to President Nimeiri.

BEGINS:

Dear Mr President,

Your concern for the stability of Southern Africa, and your desire that Rhodesia should progress to genuine majority rule without endangering that stability are well-known to me. You were also good enough to give us the benefit of your views on Rhodesia during the recent visit which Richard Luce paid to your country.

I hope you will share my view that the agreement reached at the Commonwealth Heads of Government meeting in Lusaka on 5 August provides us with a real possibility of reaching an internationally acceptable settlement in Rhodesia. In accordance with that agreement, we are issuing invitations to Bishop Muzorewa and the leaders

Copies to:-

of the Patriotic Front to attend a constitutional conference.

I am under no illusions as to the difficulties that lie ahead, and we shall need the help of all who wish to see Rhodesia restored to peace and legality on a basis of genuine majority rule. I am sure that I can count on your support.

Yours sincerely,

Margaret Thatcher

ENDS.

2. You may draw on FCO telnos [B & C] to Mirimba Salisbury in talking to Governments to which you are accredited. You may also draw as necessary on FCO telno to Dar es Salaam. You should also make full use of guidance material.

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Department RHODESIA

Drafted by

(Block Capitals) R. D. WILKINSON

Tel. Extn. 233 3853

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TELEGRAM

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Distribution:-

Rhodesia Policy

Copies to:-

[TEXT]

RHODESIA

1. Please transmit the following personal message from the Prime Minister to President Tolbert. Begins.

Dear Mr President, You will have seen the text of the agreement on Rhodesia which was reached at the Commonwealth Heads of Government meeting in Lusaka on 5 August. We believe that this agreement^{has} made it possible to establish a new basis for progress towards a solution to the Rhodesian problem which has posed such a threat to the stability of Southern Africa.

In accordance with the terms of that agreement we are now issuing invitations to Bishop Muzorewa and the leaders of /the

the Patriotic Front to attend a constitutional conference in London. This will be the first step in a process which is bound to be difficult. I know that you yourself have always favoured a settlement involving negotiations with all the parties to the conflict, as you explained to Richard Luce when you kindly received him in June. I am therefore counting on your support in our efforts to bring a lasting settlement based on genuine black majority rule in Rhodesia.

Yours sincerely,
Margaret Thatcher

Ends.

2. You may draw on FCO telnos [B and C] to Mirimba Salisbury in talking to Government to which you are accredited. You may also draw as necessary on FCO telno to Dar es Salaam. You should also make full use of guidance material.

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File No.....

Department RHODESIA

Drafted by R D WILKINSON
(Block Capitals)

Tel. Extn. 233 3853

OUTWARD

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PREAMBLE

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 (Codeword) (Privacy marking)
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Distribution: -

Rhodesia Policy

[TEXT]

RHODESIA

1. Please transmit the following personal message from the Prime Minister to President Bongo.

BEGINS

Dear Mr President

I am sure that as a member of the Security Council you will have welcomed the agreement on Rhodesia which was reached at the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting in Lusaka on 5 August. I know that you have always favoured a negotiated settlement, and in our view this agreement provides the most hopeful basis yet for progress towards genuine majority rule and a return to legality and peace in Rhodesia. I am sure that I can count on your support in our efforts to implement the terms of the agreement

/Yours

Copies to: -

Yours sincerely
Margaret Thatcher

ENDS

2. You may draw on FCO telnos
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File No.
Department RHODESIA
Drafted by
(Block Capitals) R D WILKINSON
Tel. Extn. 233 3853

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PREAMBLE

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 (Codeword) (Privacy marking)
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TO IMMEDIATE DAKAR (precedence) (post) Tel. No. of

AND TO (precedence/post)

AND SAVING TO

REPEATED TO (for info)

SAVING TO (for info)

Distribution:-

Rhodesia Policy

[TEXT]

RHODESIA

1. Please transmit the following personal message from the Prime Minister to President Senghor.

Begins.

Dear ^{Mr} President, I am sure that you will have welcomed the agreement on Rhodesia which was reached at the Commonwealth Heads of Government meeting in Lusaka on 5 August. I know that you have always favoured a negotiated settlement, as you explained to Richard Luce when you kindly received him in June, and in our view this agreement provides the most hopeful basis yet for progress towards genuine majority rule and a return to legality and peace in Rhodesia. I am sure that I can count on your support in our efforts to implement the terms of the agreement.

Yours sincerely,

Margaret Thatcher

ENDS

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2. You may draw on FCO telnos [B & C] to Mirimba Salisbury in talking to Governments to which you are accredited. You may also draw as necessary on FCO telno to Dar es Salaam. You should also make full use of guidance material.

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FILE

VUS

10 August 1979

Thank you for forwarding to Mike
Pattison the signed photograph of
Bishop Muzorewa.

CAROLINE STEPHENS

Paul Lever, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

Sd-



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

8 August 1979

Dear Mike,

/ I attach a signed portrait photograph of Bishop Muzorewa for the Prime Minister, which was delivered to Rhodesia Department by a representative of the Rhodesian Pensions Office today.

Yours all

Paul Lever
Private Secretary

Mike Pattison Esq
10 Downing Street

- 8 Aug 1979

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CONFIDENTIAL

GRS 1300

CONFIDENTIAL

FM F C O 101132Z AUG 79

TO IMMEDIATE CERTAIN MISSIONS AND DEPENDENT TERRITORIES TELEGRAM
NUMBER GUIDANCE 100 OF 10 AUGUST

*Andrew
6/21
13/2*

C H G M : RHODESIA

1. F C O TELNO 231 TO OTTAWA (REPEATED TO CERTAIN POSTS) AND
RETRACT 458 OF 6 AUGUST CONTAIN TEXT OF THE COMMONWEALTH AGREEMENT
ON RHODESIA AS INCORPORATED INTO THE CHGM FINAL COMMUNIQUE (FULL
TEXT IS BEING SENT AIRMAIL VSO49/79).

2. IN DISCUSSION WITH REPRESENTATIVES OF GOVERNMENTS AND OTHERS
YOU SHOULD REPRESENT WHAT HAPPENED AT LUSAKA AS A GOOD CONSTRUCTIVE
STEP FORWARD (AND THE COMMONWEALTH AT ITS BEST); BUT YOU SHOULD NOT
BE EUPHORIC ABOUT IT, OR ATTEMPT TO MINIMISE THE DIFFICULTIES THAT
LIE AHEAD AS WE SEEK FOR A SETTLEMENT. YOU SHOULD DRAW AS APPROPRI-
ATE ON THE FOLLOWING:

POINTS TO MAKE

3. A. WE HAVE BEEN MUCH ENCOURAGED BY THE CONSTRUCTIVE DISCUSSION
AT THE MEETING, AND THE AGREEMENT THAT WAS REACHED. IT WAS
A SUCCESS FOR THE COMMONWEALTH. AS A RESULT OF THE DISCUSSION
AT CHGM, A NEW BASIS HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED FOR PROGRESS
TOWARDS A PEACEFUL SOLUTION FOR RHODESIA. WE HAVE EMPHISED
ALL ALONG THE NEED FOR RHODESIA TO ACHIEVE LEGAL INDEPEND-
ENCE WITH WIDE INTERNATIONAL ACCEPTANCE AND AN END TO THE
CONFLICT, THUS LAYING THE FOUNDATION FOR A SECURE FUTURE FOR
THE COUNTRY. THE LUSAKA AGREEMENT BRINGS THIS GOAL NEARER
AND WE ATTACH IMPORTANCE TO THE COMMONWEALTH SUPPORT WE HAVE
FOR IT.

B. THE AGREEMENT INCORPORATES A NUMBER OF ELEMENTS FORESHADOWED
IN RECENT PARLIAMENTARY SPEECHES BY THE PRIME MINISTER AND
THE SECRETARY OF STATE; EG BRITISH RESPONSIBILITY FOR A SETT-
LEMENT; HMG'S COMMITMENT TO GENUINE BLACK MAJORITY RULE; ACK-
NOWLEDGEMENT THAT, WHILE THERE HAS BEEN A SIGNIFICANT CHANGE
IN RHODESIA, ASPECTS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS ARE
OPEN TO CRITICISM; AND RECOGNITION THAT ALL THE PARTIES HAVE /TO

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TO BE INVOLVED IN THE SEARCH FOR A SETTLEMENT. THE LUSAKA AGREEMENT ENDORSES THOSE POINTS AND INTRODUCES A NUMBER OF MORE SPECIFIC ELEMENTS, NOTABLY OUR INTENTION TO PROCEED BY MEANS OF A CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE (TO WHICH ALL PARTIES WOULD BE INVITED); AND ELECTIONS SUPERVISED UNDER BRITISH GOVERNMENT AUTHORITY.

- C. WE ARE GLAD THAT THE AGREEMENT TAKES ACCOUNT OF THE REALITIES OF THE SITUATION AND THE PROGRESS THAT HAS BEEN MADE IN RHODESIA IN THE LAST FEW MONTHS, AND AVOIDS THE PARTISAN LANGUAGE OF THE OAU SUMMIT RESOLUTION ON RHODESIA. BUT IT IS NOT A QUESTION OF WHO MOVED WHOM; THE COMMONWEALTH ARE NOW AGREED ON A CONSTRUCTIVE APPROACH TO A SETTLEMENT.
- D. WE ARE ALSO GLAD THAT OUR OWN RESPONSIBILITY TO BRING RHODESIA TO LEGAL INDEPENDENCE ON A BASIS OF MAJORITY RULE IS FULLY ENDORSED.
- E. WE WELCOME THE PROMINENCE GIVEN TO THE NEED FOR HOSTILITIES TO CEASE AND SANCTIONS TO BE ENDED AS PART OF THE PROCESS OF IMPLEMENTATION OF A LASTING SETTLEMENT.
- F. THE RECOGNITION OF THE NEED FOR SAFEGUARDS FOR MINORITIES IS HELPFUL.
- G. WE INTEND TO MOVE FORWARD AS FAST AS POSSIBLE AND MAINTAIN THE MOMENTUM GENERATED AT LUSAKA. WE SHALL BE PUTTING CONSTITUTIONAL PROPOSALS TO THE PARTIES VERY SOON AND INVITING THEM TO A CONFERENCE, PROBABLY IN LONDON.
- H. WE SHALL BE KEEPING OUR FRIENDS AND ALLIES FULLY INFORMED OF PROGRESS AND HOPE THAT WE CAN COUNT ON THEIR SUPPORT IN WHAT WE RECOGNISE WILL BE A DIFFICULT TASK.

POINTS FOR DEFENSIVE USE

4. A. WHAT HAPPENS IF THE PARTIES REFUSE TO ATTEND THE CONFERENCE OR POSE UNACCEPTABLE PRECONDITIONS?

WE ARE WORKING ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT EVERYONE WHO IS INVITED WILL COME TO THE CONFERENCE TABLE. WE SEE NO REASON FOR ANY OF THE PARTIES TO SET PRE-CONDITIONS FOR THEIR ATTENDANCE.

- B. WHO WILL BE INVITED?

ALL THE PARTIES; THE SALISBURY GOVERNMENT AND THE TWO WINGS OF THE PATRIOTIC FRONT.

/C. WHAT

C. WHAT ABOUT THE TRANSITIONAL ARRANGEMENTS?

OUR FIRST TASK IS TO HOLD A CONFERENCE AND REACH AGREEMENT ON A CONSTITUTION. THE DETAILS OF TRANSITIONAL ARRANGEMENTS WILL BE FOR CONSIDERATION AFTER THAT.

D. WHAT WILL BE THE DEGREE OF BRITISH INVOLVEMENT?

WE SHALL CHAIR THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE, AND OUR ROLE IS TO TRY TO BRING THE PARTIES TO AN AGREEMENT. THEN IT IS OUR RESPONSIBILITY TO ARRANGE THE SUPERVISION OF THE ELECTIONS. HOWEVER THE PRIME MINISTER HAS MADE IT CLEAR THAT NO BRITISH TROOPS WILL BE SENT TO RHODESIA.

E. WHAT WILL BE DONE ABOUT THE SECURITY FORCES?

IT IS TOO EARLY TO COMMENT ON THE TRANSITIONAL ARRANGEMENTS.

F. WHEN WILL SANCTIONS BE LIFTED?

IT IS TOO EARLY TO SAY WHEN THAT WILL BE.

G. THE LUSAKA AGREEMENT IS A SKILLFUL SMOKE-SCREEN DESIGNED TO RENDER RESPECTABLE OUR INFLEXIBLE DETERMINATION TO LIFT SANCTIONS ON THE BASIS OF THE STATUS QUO IN RHODESIA. WE SHOULD SAY THAT WE ARE NOT STARRY-EYED; WE ARE WELL AWARE OF THE DIFFICULTIES. IT MAY NOT WORK, BUT THE PRIZE OF RECOGNISED INDEPENDENCE AND AN END TO THE WAR IS SO GREAT THAT IT IS SURELY WORTH THE EFFORT. THESE ARE GENUINE PROPOSALS DESIGNED TO ACHIEVE A FINAL SETTLEMENT. IN SPITE OF THE DIFFICULTIES, WE BELIEVE THAT WITH THE FULL SUPPORT OF THE COMMONWEALTH WE MAY YET SUCCEED.

5. YOU MAY ALSO FIND USEFUL THE FOLLOWING EXTRACTS FROM GUIDANCE BEING GIVEN TO NEWS DEPARTMENT. THE PRESS WILL BE HUNGRY FOR NEWS. THEY WILL TEND TO EXAGGERATE EACH NEW PROBLEM AS IT ARISES AND TO PURSUE EACH STARTING HARE. OUR OBJECTIVE SHOULD BE TO ACT AS A STEADYING INFLUENCE, DISCOUNTING SPECULATION AND RUMOUR, AND CONSTANTLY BRINGING CORRESPONDENTS BACK TO THE CENTRAL THEMES IN THE APPROACH TO THE CONFERENCE.

WE SHOULD DECLINE TO SPECULATE, EVEN OFF THE RECORD. WE SHOULD DRAW ON PAST PUBLIC STATEMENTS TO CORRECT WRONG INTERPRETATIONS OR DAMAGING VERSIONS PUT OUT BY OTHERS.

/IT WILL

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IT WILL NOT BE SURPRISING IF FIRST REACTIONS CONSIST OF RE-STATEMENTS OF OLD POSITIONS AND MANOEUVRING IS A NATURAL ELEMENT OF AN APPROACH TO SERIOUS NEGOTIATION. FINAL CONCLUSIONS SHOULD THEREFORE NOT BE DRAWN ON THE BASIS OF EACH PASSING STATEMENT. PARTISAN GLOSSES ON THE LUSAKA TEXT SHOULD NOT BE ACKNOWLEDGED. WE REST ON THE AGREEMENT AS IT WAS REACHED. THE IMPORTANT THING IS THAT THE PARTIES SHOULD COME TO THE CONFERENCE. GIVE THEM TIME TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF THE OPPORTUNITIES AND TO DISCUSS IT WITH THEIR FRIENDS.

6. WE SHALL BE SENDING YOU FURTHER GUIDANCE AS NECESSARY WHEN THE INVITATIONS TO THE PARTIES ARE ISSUED AND OUR PROPOSALS ARE MADE PUBLIC.

CARRINGTON

/BY TELEGRAPH

BY TELEGRAPH

BONN	DUBLIN	CG JOHANNESBURG	ACCRA
BRUSSELS	STOCKHOLM	MAPUTO	LAGOS
UKREP EEC BRUSSELS	MOSCOW	LUANDA	DAR ES SALAAM
UKDEL NATO BRUSSELS	UKHIS NEW YORK	OTTAWA	NAIROBI
COPENHAGEN	BIS NEW YORK	CANBERRA	LUSAKA
THE HAGUE	WASHINGTON	WELLINGTON	LILONGWE
LUXEMBOURG	KHARTOUM	NEW DELHI	GABORONE
OSLO	ABIDJAN	DACCA	MASERU
PARIS	KINSHASA	COLOMBO	MBABANE
ROME	MONROVIA	KUALA LUMPUR	KINGSTON
BELGRADE	PRETORIA	SINGAPORE	SALISBURY

[IMMEDIATE]

ANKARA	MEXICO CITY	DAKAR	NICOSIA
ATHENS	BRASILIA	MOGADISHU	PORT OF SPAIN
LISBON	LA PAZ	YACUNDE	GEORGETOWN
MADRID	JEDDA	LIBREVILLE	BRIDGETOWN
VIENNA	KUWAIT	JAKARTA	NASSAU
BUCHAREST	TEHRAN	ISLAMABAD	SUVA
BUDAPEST	ALGIERS	PEKING	PORT MORESBY
PRAGUE	CAIRO	TOKYO	VICTORIA
SOPIA	RABAT	BANJUL	HONIARA
WARSAW	TRIPOLI	FREETOWN	CASTRIES
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[PRIORITY]

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MR. SANDERS

cc BGC
H James



BM
10/8

10 DOWNING STREET

9th August 1979

p. 4.

Dear Julian,

You came to see me on the 24th of last month to talk about Rhodesia, and I wanted to let you know about developments since then, particularly at the Conference in Lusaka, from which Peter Carrington and I returned yesterday.

You will remember that, in our Manifesto, we said that our Government would have a duty to "do its utmost to ensure that the new independent State gains international recognition".

With that objective in mind, we held discussions earlier in the summer, with the United States Government and with our partners in the Community; we also sent David Harlech and Richard Luce to Africa, where, between them, they saw the leaders of twelve African states; soundings were also taken by our High Commissions and Embassies.

These extensive consultations showed that if we were to confer legality on the present Rhodesian Government, with its existing Constitution, we would, almost certainly, have been the only country that would have recognised the new independent State. That would not have fulfilled the objective set out in our Manifesto.

But there has been another equally serious objection. To confer legal independence on the Bishop's government, but then to find that no other countries would join us in recognising that government would have been of little, if any, real benefit to Rhodesia. It would have done nothing to stop the war. The killing and the destruction would have gone on. The white exodus would have continued. The economic prospects for Rhodesia would have remained bleak. For all our consultations had shown that neither the United States nor any European country - let alone any African country (with the possible exception of the Republic) would have gone along with us.

/Continued

That is why I said in the House on the 25th of last month that the Government had decided to try another way of achieving our objective of international recognition for an independent Rhodesia.

It is a way that we believe will be better for Rhodesia in the long run, because if our plan is successful, we will be able to bring other countries with us in accepting Rhodesia as a member of the international community. Once that acceptance has been achieved, there will be a better possibility of ending the war. Without that acceptance the war will go on.

As you know, I listened to your speech in the House on 25th July and have since read it in Hansard. You quoted Alec Home. No doubt you will have seen his article in the Sunday Express on 22nd July when he wrote:- "It would help Rhodesia in the future if she could obtain the maximum recognition internationally. This could involve changes in the Constitution as it at present stands." You also expressed the hope that I should emerge from Lusaka without having my hands tied in advance. I enclose the text of the nine points in the communique about Rhodesia. You will see that the Conference accepted that it was the responsibility of the British Government to grant legal independence to Rhodesia; that it was for the British Government to call the Constitutional Conference (as to which there are no pre-conditions); and that the elections to be held under the new Constitution should be supervised by the British Government, although with Commonwealth observers.

It will also be for the British Government alone to put forward those proposals on the Constitutional arrangements to achieve a proper basis for legal independence to which I referred in the House during the Rhodesia debate last month.

We were and we are determined that this is Britain's responsibility. There is no question at all of our hands having been tied in Lusaka. It is, however, a most significant achievement to have secured the support

/Continued

of every member of the Commonwealth for the British plan.

I know how deep is your concern - and I hope that you realise how deep is mine - for the wellbeing of Rhodesia. You would have preferred unilateral recognition by the British Government. I understand and respect that point of view. But I believe that it is the better course to try to secure international recognition, in the way that I have described and by making some changes to the present Constitution.

I believe that the better chance of securing international recognition for Rhodesia, of ending the war and of restoring peace and prosperity, lies in the Conference that we have proposed and to which invitations will be sent out very shortly.

I am under no illusion as to the difficulties which the Conference will have to face. But there is now the possibility - I put it no higher than that - that under a changed constitution, Rhodesia will gain international recognition, that the war will be stopped - or at any rate will de-escalate; that the white exodus will diminish; and that peace and progress may be restored.

I understand that you are seeing Ian Gow next week and I have asked him to report your views fully to me. If you would like to come to see me when I get back from Scotland, do please let Ian know.

Yours ever

Rogers

The Rt Hon Julian Amery MP

Extract from the Final Communique of the
Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting,
Lusaka, August 1979

Southern Africa

14. Heads of Government had a frank discussion on the current problems of Southern Africa and their implications for the Commonwealth and the wider international community. While recognising that certain developments since their Meeting in London have added new dimensions, they remained concerned by the potential dangers inherent in the existing situation. They therefore stressed the urgent need for finding satisfactory solutions to the remaining problems of this region.

15. In relation to the situation in Rhodesia, Heads of Government therefore:

- a. confirmed that they were wholly committed to genuine black majority rule for the people of Zimbabwe;
- b. recognised, in this context, that the internal settlement constitution is defective in certain important respects;
- c. fully accepted that it is the constitutional responsibility of the British Government to grant legal independence to Zimbabwe on the basis of majority rule;
- d. recognised that the search for a lasting settlement must involve all parties to the conflict;
- e. were deeply conscious of the urgent need to achieve such a settlement and bring peace to the people of Zimbabwe and their neighbours;
- f. accepted that independence on the basis of majority rule requires the adoption of a democratic constitution including appropriate safeguards for minorities;

- g. acknowledged that the government formed under such an independence constitution must be chosen through free and fair elections properly supervised under British Government authority, and with Commonwealth observers;
- h. welcomed the British Government's indication that an appropriate procedure for advancing towards these objectives would be for them to call a constitutional conference to which all the parties would be invited; and
- i. consequently, accepted that it must be a major objective to bring about a cessation of hostilities and an end to sanctions as part of the process of implementation of a lasting settlement.



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

9 August 1979

Dear Sir,

RHODESIA AND THE SECURITY COUNCIL

Sir Anthony Parsons called on the Prime Minister this morning for a short discussion before leaving to take up his new appointment as UK Permanent Representative to the United Nations.

The Prime Minister said that she was concerned about the possibility that unhelpful statements on Rhodesia might emerge from the forthcoming conference of the Non-Aligned in Havana next month. She said that everything possible should be done to ensure that the Commonwealth participants in the Non-Aligned conference stuck to their commitment to the Rhodesia section of the Lusaka communique. In particular, the Prime Minister would like the maximum advantage to be taken of such leverage as our aid programmes towards those Commonwealth countries may give us in keeping them in line. As you know, the Prime Minister has already asked that the new £10 million grant aid to Zambia for agricultural development should be kept up our sleeve for the time being: she would like the same tactic to be adopted so far as any other impending aid agreements with Non-Aligned Commonwealth members are concerned.

Sir Anthony Parsons told the Prime Minister of his views on how the issue of sanctions against Rhodesia should be handled in the Security Council if a constitutional conference were to produce proposals acceptable to all the parties, except the Patriotic Front, and to "reasonable Governments" in general. Sir Anthony Parsons said that his recommendation would be that the UK should address a letter to the Secretary General of the UN, or to the President of the Security Council, stressing the UK's status as the power responsible for ending the state of rebellion in Rhodesia and setting out the steps by which the UK had brought or proposed to bring Rhodesia to legal independence. Depending on the stage reached at the time of sending the letter (and in particular on whether elections had been held or were still in the stage of preparation), it would set out the grounds for the UK's view that the rebellion in Rhodesia was at an end: and would go on to state flatly that, in this situation, the UN resolutions on mandatory sanctions against Rhodesia had fallen away. The letter would not call for any reply. The onus would then be on the UK's adversaries in the UN Council (Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia and possibly China) to launch a counter-attack against the UK's statement of the position.

Sir Anthony Parsons said that when the counter-attack had been launched, it would be open to the UK to veto a resolution reaffirming sanctions. Much the better course, however, would be to bring about a situation in which such a resolution failed to attract a requisite number of votes in the Council. The UK could, if the

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proposed constitutional arrangements were reasonable and defensible, count on the abstentions of the five Western members of the Council. Two more would be needed: these should be available from among Kuwait, Bolivia (to whom a new offer of UK aid was in the pipeline) Gabon, Jamaica, Bangladesh or Zambia itself. Sir Anthony Parsons said that, on this basis, there should be a fair chance of ensuring that the Security Council was unable to demonstrate its capacity to reaffirm the resolutions on sanctions.

On the question of the form of a Rhodesia settlement, Sir Anthony Parsons expressed the view that transitional periods should be kept to an absolute minimum (eg 24 hours if practicable). The Prime Minister agreed and said, with reference to the FCO paper on the preparation of new elections in Rhodesia which she had read on her way back from Lusaka, that the period of 3 months envisaged in the paper for the preparation of elections was much too long and that some means would have to be found of completing all the preparations within one month.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Martin Vile (Cabinet Office).

Yours ever,

Byron Cook

J.S. Wall, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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PRIME MINISTER

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DESKBY FCO 091200Z

FM PRETORIA 090840Z AUG 79

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 438 OF 9 AUGUST .

RPTD PRIORITY LUSAKA MIRIMBA SALISBURY WASHINGTON UKMIS NEWYORK
PARIS BONN DAR ES SALAAM MAPUTO GABORONE LAGOS LUANDA.

LUSAKA TELEGRAMS NOS 11 AND 12 (NOT TO ALL) : GHGM RHODESIA.

1. I HANDED OVER YOUR MESSAGE TO PIK BOTHA YESTERDAY AFTERNOON. FOURIE WAS PRESENT . BOTHA READ THE MESSAGE CAREFULLY AND BEGAN BY SAYING THAT HE THOUGHT IT WAS " ENCOURAGING ". AT THE END OF A DISCUSSION LASTING MORE THAN AN HOUR HE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THERE WERE SOME POSITIVE ELEMENTS IN THE PASSAGE ON RHODESIA IN THE CHGM COMMUNIQUE . IN THE INTERVENING 70 MINUTES I WAS TREATED TO A LOT OF HISTORY (NOT UNLIKE HIS PERFORMANCE IN LONDON BUT IN QUIETER , LESS EMOTIONAL TONES) AND A REPETITION OF POINTS HE HAD MADE TO ME PREVIOUSLY AND WHICH I HAVE ALREADY REPORTED DURING THE LUSAKA CONFERENCE . I FOUND HIM MORE WILLING TO LISTEN THAN BEFORE , BUT HE MADE NO BONES , ABOUT SOUTH AFRICA'S " EXTREME CONCERN" OVER THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE LUSAKA COMMUNIQUE AND HE INDICATED ONCE AGAIN THE PW BOTHA WAS PRESSING HIM HARD. FOURIE CONFIRMED THIS LAST POINT TO ME WHEN I SAW HIM LATER .

2. BOTHA AGAIN EMPHASISED THAT IF MOZOREWA WAS FORCED TO MAKE CONCESSIONS OVER THE BLOCKING MECHANISM IN THE CONSTITUTION AND ON THE COMPOSITION OF PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSIONS THERE WAS A REAL DANGER OF AN EXODUS BY THE RHODESIAN WHITES . MUZOREWA WOULD FALL AND THERE WOULD BE CIVIL WAR ENDING IN A MARXIST TAKE - OVER . IT WOULD BE ANGOLA ALL OVER AGAIN. WHEN I SAID

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THAT THE INFORMATION I HAD SEEN FROM SALISBURY SO FAR SUGGESTED THAT BY AND LARGE THE WHITES IN RHODESIA , WHILE NATURALLY WORRIED, WERE TAKING THE NEWS REASONABLY CALMLY , HE BACKTRACKED A BIT AND SAID THAT HE WAS NOT SAYING IT WOULD HAPPEN IMMEDIATELY . IN ANY CASE IT WAS NOT THE REACTIONS OF RHODESIAN BUSINESSMEN THAT REALLY MATTERED , BUT RATHER THOSE OF THE " FOUR OR SO TOP PEOPLE IN CHARGE OF SECURITY " . HIS PEOPLE IN SALISBURTY WERE IN TOUCH WITH THEM AND KNEW WHAT THEY FELT. IF THEY GAVE UP AND LEFT THE SECURITY SITUATION WOULD COLLAPSE .

3. I TOLD BOTHA THAT WE WERE AS KEEN AS THEY WERE TO AVOID AN EXODUS . HENCE THE REFERENCES TO THIS IN YOUR MESSAGE AND THE INCLUSIONS IN THE COMMUNIQUE OF THE POINT ABOUT SAFEGUARDS FOR MINORITIES . WE WERE NOT THINKING OF DISMANTLING THE PRESENT CONSTITUTION BUT RATHER OF ADJUSTING WHAT WAS NOW SEEN AN OVER-CORRECTION FOR THE WHITES. BOTHA DID NOT DISPUTE THIS BUT SAID THAT MUZOREWA COULD NOT MAKE THESE CHANGES NOW WITHOUT A SERIOUS RISK OF UNDERMINING HIS OWN POSITION. IT WOULD BE A DIFFERENT THING TO DO THIS LATER AFTER SANCTIONS HAD BEEN LIFTED AND HIS POSITION WAS STRONGER. FOURIE INTERVENED TO SAY THAT IT WOULD BE POLITICAL SUICIDE FOR MUZOREWA TO HAVE TO ADMIT NOW THAT HE HAD AGREED TO A CONSTITUTION WHICH HAD NOT GIVEN THE BLACKS ALL THAT THEY SHOULD HAVE HAD. BOTHA WENT ON TO EXPLAIN IN SOME DETAIL HOW, IN VARIOUS CONVERSATIONS LAST YEAR WITH MUZOREWA AND OTHER BLACK RHODESIAN LEADERS, HE HAD BEEN ASSURED THAT HIS OWN MISGIVINGS (WHICH HE SAID NOW SEEMED IRONIC) THAT 28 SEATS MIGHT BE TOO MANY WERE MISPLACED. MOREOVER, IN TALKING TO VISITING MEMBERS OF THE CONSERVATIVE OPPOSITION HE HAD BEEN LED TO BELIEVE THAT THE REAL PROBLEM WAS NOT THE CONSTITUTION BUT THE REMOVAL OF IAN SMITH. HENCE THE STRENUOUS EFFORTS THAT HE HAD MADE TO BRING THIS ABOUT. IN THE EVENT THE FORMATION OF THE GOVERNMENT OF NATIONAL UNITY HAD BEEN SPRUNG ON THE SOUTH AFRICANS WITHOUT ANY FOREWARNING. THERE WAS MORE IN THIS VEIN WHICH I NEED NOT REPEAT: THE ESSENCE OF IT WAS THAT AFTER ALL THAT HAPPENED THE SOUTH AFRICANS HAD EXPECTED THAT FOR THE TIME BEING THE CONSTITUTION WOULD BE LEFT ALONE.

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4. BOTHA ALSO MADE GREAT PLAY WITH THE BOYD REPORT AND CLAIMED THAT THE FACT THAT THE BLACKS HAD VOTED THE WAY THEY HAD IN THE ELECTION MEANT "BY IMPLICATION" THAT THEY HAD ENDORSED THE CONSTITUTION. I DISPUTED THIS ALONG THE LINES OF THE PRIME MINISTER'S REPLY IN HER LUSAKA PRESS CONFERENCE

5. BOTHA THEN POSED A NUMBER OF QUESTIONS. SOME WERE RHETORICAL BUT TWO IN PARTICULAR CALLED FOR REPLIES. THE FIRST CONCERNED WHAT WOULD HAPPEN IF ONE OF THE PARTIES DECIDED NOT TO COME TO THE CONFERENCE AND OPPOSED THE WHOLE LUSAKA PROCESS. WHEN I REPLIED THAT NOBODY COULD HAVE A VETO, HE SMILED WEARILY AND SAID THAT DR OWEN HAD SAID THE SAME THING TO HIM IN AUGUST 1977.

6. THE SECOND QUESTION CONCERNED THE MEANING OF THE PHRASE IN POINT (G) OF THE LUSAKA COMMUNIQUE ABOUT LIFTING SANCTION AS "PART OF THE PROCESS OF SETTLEMENT". I KNEW HIS VIEWS, HE SAID, ABOUT THE VITAL IMPORTANCE OF LIFTING SANCTIONS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE AND HE HOPED THAT WE WERE NOT IN FACT THINKING OF DOING THIS AT THE END OF THE PROCESS. I SAID THAT I THOUGHT THE WORDS MEANT WHAT THEY SAID. I COULD NOT SAY HERE AND NOW WHEN IT WOULD HAPPEN BUT I ASSUMED THE WORDS WERE INTENDED TO LEAVE SOME FLEXIBILITY. FOURIE SUBSEQUENTLY CONFIRMED THAT WAS A BULL POINT FOR THE SOUTH AFRICANS.

7. WE ALSO HAD SOME DISCUSSION OF THE WILLINGNESS AND ABILITY OF KAUNDA AND NYERERE TO MAKE THE PF SEE REASON. I TRIED TO PERSUADE HIM THAT THIS WAS A NEW ELEMENT IN THE SITUATION, BUT HE REMAINED SECEPTICAL. I HAVE THE FEELING THAT OR DESPITE ALL THE EXPERIENCE HE TOLD ME HE HAD OF DEALING WITH AFRICANS, HE DOES NOT MAKE MUCH DISTINCTION BETWEEN EXTREMISTS AND MODERATES IN THE REST OF AFRICA.

8. AS I MENTIONED IN PARAGRAPH 3 OF MY TELNO 23 TO LUSAKA, THERE IS A REAL POINT OF DIFFERENCE BETWEEN US AND THE SOUTH AFRICANS IN OUR ASSESSMENTS OF WHAT EFFECT A UNILATERAL LIFTING OF SANCTIONS NOW WOULD HAVE ON THE SITUATION IN RHODESIA AND ON THE STABILITY OF THE REGION. I SAID THAT WE FIRMLY BELIEVED IT WOULD MAKE THINGS WORSE AND IN PARTICULAR WOULD MEAN THAT

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THE FLS WOULD HAVE NO OPTION BUT TO GIVE THE PF THEIR HEAD. BOTHA SAID THAT THE CUBANS MIGHT STEP THINGS UP BUT IN PRACTICE THE PF WERE NOT INHIBITED IN ANY WAY NOW AND WERE TRYING FOR ALL THEIR WORTH. I REPEATED THAT IT COULD GET MUCH WORSE. IF, AS THE SOUTH AFRICANS CLEARLY HOPE, A SENIOR PERSON COMES HERE SHORTLY FROM THE FCO TO TALK FURTHER TO THEM, HE MAY HAVE TO REVERT TO THIS POINT. FOURIE ACKNOWLEDGED LATER THAT IT NEEDED CLEARING UP.

9. BOTHA ENDED BY SAYING THAT IT HAD BEEN A USEFUL DISCUSSION. HE COULD NOT HELP FEELING, HOWEVER, THAT WHAT HE WAS WITNESSING WAS "A RUGBY MATCH PLAYED OVER AND OVER AGAIN UNTIL THE WINNERS LOSE". SWITCHING THE SPORT, HE ADDED THAT WE WERE ASKING MUZOREWA TO FIGHT IN A BOXING MATCH WITH ONE HAND TIED BEHIND HIS BACK.

10. I APOLOGISE FOR THE LENGTH OF THIS TELEGRAM, BUT I THOUGHT IT RIGHT TO GIVE YOU A FULL ACCOUNT OF OUR CONVERSATION. HOW LONG PIK BOTHA WILL REMAIN RELATIVELY CALM IS ANYBODY'S GUESS. MOREOVER, P W BOTHA IS REPORTED TO BE GOING TO SPEAK ABOUT RHODESIA AT THE NATAL CONGRESS OF THE NATIONAL PARTY NEXT WEDNESDAY.

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PS/MR. LUCE
PS/MR. RIDLEY
PS/MR. HURD
PS/PUS
SIR A DUFF
SIR A PARSONS
LORD N G LENNOX
MISS BROWN
MR. WILLSON
MR. WILLIAMS

ADDITIONAL DISTN.
RHODESIA POLICY

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[RHODESIA: POLICY: ADVANCE COPIES]

(x-24)

PS
PS/SIR I GILMOUR
PS/MR LUCE
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SIR A DUFF
MR WILLSON
MR WILLIAMS
~~LORD N G LENNOX~~

IMMEDIATE

PS/NO 10 ~~DOWNING~~ STREET

MR R L WADE-GERY)
MR P M MAXEY)
COL MOIR) CABINET
MR P J FOWLER) OFFICE
DIO)
SIR J HUNT)

.....
HD/RHODESIA DEPT (3)

~~FOR ZIMBABWE DEVELOPMENTS FUND~~

HD/C AF D
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~~ADD MR LYNCH ODI~~
~~MR SLATER TREASURY~~

HD/UND
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MR FREELAND LEGAL ADVISER RM K200A
MR FIFOOT LEGAL ADVISER RM K164

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Brian Minister

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FM MIRIMBA SALISBURY 090715Z AUG 79

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 498 OF 9 AUGUST

INFO PRIORITY PRETORIA MAPUTO LUSAKA GABORONE DAR ES SALAAM
LUANDA WASHINGTON AND UKMIS NEW YORK

9/12

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RHODESIA: CHGM STATEMENT

1. I BUMPED INTO ERNEST BULLE, MINISTER OF COMMERCE AND INDUSTRY, AT THE AIRPORT THIS MORNING. HE SAID HE WAS GOING TO PRETORIA TO "REASSURE THE SOUTH AFRICANS", WHO WERE WORRIED ABOUT THE OUTCOME OF THE COMMONWEALTH CONFERENCE. THEY BELIEVED THAT MRS THATCHER WAS RENEGING OVER HER PREVIOUSLY STATED POLICY, "AS BRITAIN HAD DONE OVER NAMIBIA". HE INTENDED TO TELL THEM THAT THE ZIMBABWE RHODESIAN GOVERNMENT WAS SATISFIED THAT THERE HAD BEEN NO CHANGE IN BRITISH POLICY. BULLE IMPLIED THAT HE MAY TRAVEL ON TO BRITAIN BUT AT THAT POINT WE WERE INTERRUPTED AND HE DID NOT CONTINUE.

2. BULLE ALSO TOLD ME, "IN STRICT CONFIDENCE" (PLEASE RESPECT), THAT THE CABINET MEETING ON TUESDAY HAD GONE WELL. THE RHODESIAN FRONT HAD BEEN "AMAZINGLY QUIET" AND IAN SMITH HIMSELF HAD RAISED NO SERIOUS OBJECTIONS TO THE LUSAKA STATEMENT.

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UNCLASSIFIED
FM LUSAKA 090915Z AUG 79
TO PRIORITY FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 886 OF 9 AUGUST
INFO PRIORITY DAR ES SALAAM, GABORONE, MAPUTO, LUANDA, MIRIMBA
SALISBURY, PRETORIA, LAGOS, NAIROBI.

amb

Bisma Minister

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BYV

MY TELNO 883: CHOGM AND RHODESIA

1. MUGABE YESTERDAY (8 AUGUST) BRIEFLY TRANSITTED LUSAKA AIRPORT ON HIS WAY TO CONGO BRAZZAVILLE. ACCORDING TO THE ZAMBIAN PRESS, HE CALLED FOR THE "TOTAL SCRAPPING" OF THE MUZOREWA REGIME AND ITS CONSTITUTION AND INSISTED THAT THE RHODESIAN SECURITY FORCES SHOULD BE DISBANDED AND REPLACED BY THE PATRIOTIC FRONT'S ARMY. HE SAID THAT A "RACIAL CONSTITUTION" IN WHICH PARLIAMENTARY SEATS WERE RESERVED FOR WHITES WOULD BE UNACCEPTABLE.

2. MUGABE ALSO CRITICISED THE PROPOSAL ATTRIBUTED TO PRESIDENT NYERERE FOR A RESETTLEMENT PROGRAMME AND FUND FOR WHITES WHO OPTED TO LEAVE RHODESIA IN THE FACE OF MAJORITY RULE, BECAUSE IN HIS VIEW THIS TOO HAD RACIAL OVERTONES.

3. IN AN EXCLUSIVE INTERVIEW WITH THE TIMES OF ZAMBIA, THE DEPARTING NIGERIAN EXTERNAL AFFAIRS COMMISSIONER, ADEFOPE, APPARENTLY INDICATED THAT NIGERIA WOULD STILL CONSIDER LEAVING THE COMMONWEALTH IF BRITAIN WENT BACK ON THE AGREEMENT ON RHODESIA REACHED DURING THE LUSAKA MEETING. HE WAS ALSO QUOTED ON THE "NECESSITY" FOR A PEACE KEEPING FORCE IN RHODESIA DURING THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD AND SUGGESTED THAT THIS WAS ONE OF THE DETAILS ON WHICH THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT WOULD WORK. !!

4. ADEFOPE SAID THAT RELATIONS WITH BRITAIN WERE NOT/NOT STRAINED OVER THE NATIONALISATION OF BP. HE EXPLAINED THE NIGERIAN ACTION BY SAYING THAT HIS GOVERNMENT FELT THAT HUMAN JUSTICE AND DIGNITY OUTWEIGHED ECONOMIC INTERESTS AND THAT THEY CONSIDERED THE SUPPLY OF NORTH SEA OIL TO SOUTH AFRICA AN ACT OF BAD FAITH.

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5. IN ITS LEADER THE TIMES OF ZAMBIA SUMS UP THE COMMONWEALTH MEETING , SAYING THAT IT ENDED IN A WAY NO ONE HAD DREAMED POSSIBLE. THE MEETING REVEALED THE INNER STRENGTH OF THE COMMONWEALTH. A SINGAPORE TYPE CONFRONTATION HAD BEEN FEARED, BUT NEVER AT ANY MOMENT WAS THERE ANY HINT OF THE TENSENESS WHICH PREVAILED IN 1971. THE TIMES NATURALLY FOCUSSES ON THE AGREEMENT ON RHODESIA, BUT NOTES THAT THERE WAS ALSO MUCH PROGRESS IN OTHER AREAS. MENTION IS MADE OF THE RAPPORT WHICH MRS THATCHER STRUCK UP WITH THE OTHER DELEGATES. THE TIMES CONCLUDES THAT FOR ZAMBIA CHOGM COMBINED WITH THE QUEEN'S VISIT WAS "A SPECTACULAR SUCCESS".

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PS/MR. RIDLEY
PS/MR. HURD
PS/PUS
SIR A DUFF
SIR A PARSONS
LORD N G LENNOX
MISS BROWN
MR. THOMAS
MR. WILLSON
MR. WILLIAMS

ADDITIONAL DISTH.
RHODESIA POLICY



Foreign and Commonwealth Office
London SW1A 2AH

9 August 1979

Mr Gifford,

*OK 27/8
JW
13/8*

RHODESIA: DEBTS TO THE UK

Thank you for your letter of 27 July to Peter Carrington, about Rhodesian debts to the UK.

We have very much in mind the question of Rhodesian debts outstanding to the UK since before UDI, and there have already been preliminary contacts between your officials and ours, and with the Bank of England. I agree that any arrangements for Rhodesia's political and constitutional future should make satisfactory provision for honouring the debt obligations of the pre-UDI government. But, as you say, any government to which we grant legal independence will almost certainly need time before they will be in a position to clear off their liabilities and, I think we may have to be ready to consider sympathetic terms.

I believe that a meeting of officials has already been suggested to discuss these issues including the co-ordination of the respective interests of private creditors and of HMG. I hope that this can take place quite soon and that we may be able to let our colleagues in OD know later this month how we plan to proceed.

In the meantime, we are considering the question, to which you drew attention in OD on 23 July, of how best to enlist the

/support

The Rt Hon Sir Geoffrey Howe QC MP
Chancellor of the Exchequer
Treasury Chambers
Parliament Street
London SW1

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
support of other potential donors for the international aid effort which Rhodesia will certainly need after independence. This will depend largely on the nature of the political settlement we are able to achieve.

I am copying this letter to the recipients of yours.

*Yours
Law.*

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10 AUG 1979



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File Tmp



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

OF 16.8.79

9 August 1979

RHODESIA

I believe the Prime Minister mentioned to the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary orally in Lusaka a conversation which she had had with Sir Seretse Khama at the reception by President Moi of Kenya on 7 August. This letter records the exchange.

Sir Seretse Khama advised the Prime Minister "not to be taken in by the politeness of the African". President Khama had gone on to urge the Prime Minister to "work on" President Kaunda. He said that President Nyerere, President Machel and he himself "wanted out" of their commitments to the Patriotic Front; but that it would be necessary for the Prime Minister to work on Kenneth Kaunda.

The Prime Minister deduced from this conversation that President Kaunda was likely to be the least reliable of the Front Line Presidents in bringing pressure to bear on the Patriotic Front to cease hostilities in the event of an agreement on a Constitution for Rhodesia. I should be grateful for any comments which you may have.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Martin Vile (Cabinet Office).

B. G. CARTLEDGE

J.S. Wall, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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29/8 SUBJECT
PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
T62AA/79T
SERIAL No.

ZCZC DLH646 LBE156 HLB5825 ROC296 IBY0057 MOI981 89 688

QBXX CO LIMV 313
MONROVIA 313 9 1020



LHS 643

ETATPRIORITE

HER EXCELLENCY MARGARET THATCHER PRIME MINISTER OF THE UNITED
KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN 10 DOWING STREET
LONDONSW1 (ENGLAND)

YOUR EXCELLENCY I HAVE FOLLOWED WITH KEEN INTEREST THE ACTIVITIES
OF THE COMMONWEALTH SUMMIT MEETING WHICH WAS HELD IN LUSAA VMA
ZAMBIA
CMA AND NOW THAT IT HAS COME TO A

LBE156 ETATPRIORITE HER PAGE 2/50

CLOSE CMA I SEIZE THIS OPPORTUNITY TO EXTEND TO YOU MY
HEARTFELT CONGRATULATIONS FOR THE OUTSTANDING SUCCESSES ACHIEVED
DURING THIS HISTORIC CONFERENCE WHICH HAS BEEN REPORTED AS THE MOST
SUCCESSFUL COMMONWEALTH SUMMIT IN RECENT YEARS STOP I WAS INDEED
GRATIFIED TO LEARN OF DECISION TAKEN REGARDING THE PEACEFUL
SETTLEMENT

LBE156 ETATPRIORITE HER PAGE 3/50

OF THE ZIMBABWEAN QUESTION AND I TRUST THAT ALL CONCERNED AND
PARTICULARLY THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY WILL GIVE EVERY
SUPPORT FOR ITS SUCCESSFUL IMPLEMENTATION TO AVOID ANY FURTHER
BLOODSHED AND THE ESCALATION OF HOSTILITY TO THE DISTRESS OF
HUMANITY STOP UPON LEARNING OF THIS IMPORTANT DECISION CMA ON MONDAY
THE SIXTH

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LBE156 ETATPRIORITE HER PAGE 4/50

CMA WHEN I HAD THE OCCASION TO RECIVE THE CREDENTIALS OF THE
AMERICAN AMBASSADOR TO LIBERIA I PUBLICLY WELCOMED THE DECISION
CMA FOR AS I UNDERSTAND CMA IT PROVIDES FOR BRITAIN TO DRAW UP
A NEW CONSTITUTION FOR THE TERRITORY AND TO SUPERVISE FEESH
ELECTIONS TO BE ATTENDED BY COMMONWEALTH

LBE156 ETATPRIORITE HER PAGE 5/50

OBSERVERS STOP I ALSO NOTED THAT IT CALLS FOR AN ALL PARTY
CONFERENCE .
INCLUDING REPRESENTATIVES OF THA PATRIOTIC FRONT TO BE ARRANGED
BY BRITAIN WHICH WOULD LEAD TO A CEASE FIRE AND THE LIFTING
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LBE156 ETATPRIORITE HER PAGE 6/50

PRESENT ZIMBABWE RHODESIA CONSTITUTION COMA RECOGNIZED
THE CON-STITUTIONAL RESPONSIBILITY OF BRITAIN TO GRANT LEGAL
INDEPENDENCE TO THAT COUNTRY ON THE BASIS OF MAJORITY RULE FOR SUCH
A
DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION WILL OF COURSE INCLUDE SAFEGUARDS FOR
THE RIGHTS OF THE MINORITY STOP IT IS THEREFORE MY FERVENT
HOPE THAT THIS MATTER

LBE156 ETATPRIORITE HER PAGE 7/28

WILL BE TIMELY RESOLVED IN THE INTEREST OF PEACE IN AFRICA
AND OUR ONE WORLD STOP WITH RENEWED SENTIMENTS OF MY HIGHEST
CONSIDERATION AND ESTEEM

WR TOLBERT JR

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
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PART 5 begins:-

C(79)33 9.8.79

PART 4 ends:-

FCO to BGC tatt 9.8.79
~~Lusaka to Pretoria 12 8.8.79~~





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Archives (TNA) in London

February 2010