

# PREM19

# 111

## RHODESIA

(Situation in)

(August 31 - September 11)

(Part 6)

PREM 19/1111





PART 6

Confidential Filing

Rhoderia Situation  
The Constitutional Conference in  
London, September 1979.

RHODESIA


Part 1: May 1979

Part 6: August 1979

Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date
<del>3-9-79</del>							
<del>6-9-79</del>							
<del>10-9-79</del>							
<del>11-9-79</del>							
<del>13-9-79</del>							
11-9-79							
-Ends-							

PREM 19/1111





PART 6 ends:-

RM to Winterton MP 11/9

PART 7 begins:-

Amey MP to <sup>FCS</sup> ~~RM~~ 11/9

~~Fro to MA + enc 12/9~~

THE PATRIOTIC FRONT OF ZIMBABWE

OPENING STATEMENT AT THE LANCASTER HOUSE CONFERENCE, LONDON

DELIVERED BY PRESIDENT J.M. NKOMO

11, SEPTEMBER, 1989

THE PATRIOTIC FRONT, DEEPLY CONSCIOUS OF THE NEED TO BRING AN END TO RACISM AND COLONIALISM WHICH CONTINUE TO PLAGUE THE PEOPLE OF ZIMBABWE, WELCOMES THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT'S STATED AIM TO ASSIST IN THIS TASK OF DECOLONIZATION. WE HAVE COME TO LONDON, TO ATTEND THIS CONFERENCE, IN RESPONSE TO THE INVITATION RECENTLY EXTENDED TO US BY THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT. FOR US, OUR PRESENCE HERE IS BY ITSELF AN ACT OF IMMENSE SACRIFICE. THE SCARCE MATERIAL RESOURCES WE HAVE HAD TO DIVERT AND THE MANPOWER WE MUST OF NECESSITY TIE DOWN IN LONDON FOR THE DURATION OF THIS CONFERENCE SHOULD BE ENOUGH EVIDENCE OF OUR SERIOUSNESS AND GOOD FAITH. WE HAVE ALWAYS SAID THAT WE WILL LEAVE NO STONE UNTURNED IN OUR STRUGGLE FOR THE TOTAL LIQUIDATION OF COLONIALISM IN ZIMBABWE.

IN PARTICULAR, WE WELCOME THE FACT THAT THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT NOW STATES THAT IT IS PREPARED TO HELP BRING GENUINE MAJORITY RULE TO ZIMBABWE; WE ARE ANXIOUS TO DISCOVER WHETHER THAT IS IN FACT THE INTENTION. EQUALLY, WE WISH TO MAKE OUR POSITION ABSOLUTELY CLEAR AND UNDERSTOOD IN ORDER TO FACILITATE FRANK AND MEANINGFUL DISCUSSION.



THE UNIQUE REALITY OF THE SITUATION IS THAT FOR MANY YEARS NOW A MAJOR WAR OF NATIONAL LIBERATION HAS BEEN RAGING IN OUR COUNTRY. THIS AROSE FROM THE SINGLE TRAGIC FACT THAT BRITAIN FAILED TO MEET HER DECOLONISING RESPONSIBILITIES EVEN IN THE FACE OF THE CONTINUING AND FLAGRANTLY ILLEGAL ACTS OF THE SETTLER MINORITY, WHICH CHALLENGED THE PEOPLE OF ZIMBABWE TO TAKE UP ARMS AND DECOLONIZE THEMSELVES. THUS WE ARE FACED WITH THE TASKS OF A PEACE CONFERENCE.

BRITISH SETTLER COLONIALISM IN ZIMBABWE PRESENTED SPECIAL PROBLEMS WHICH DID NOT DISAPPEAR BY BEING IGNORED FOR DECADES. THE WAR IS AN ADDITIONAL SPECIAL PROBLEM AND CANNOT BE IGNORED IF IT IS TO END.

TO ACHIEVE DECOLONISATION COMPARABLE TO THAT IN OTHER COMMONWEALTH STATES WE MUST FIRST ACHIEVE THE BASIC CONDITIONS FOR THE MOVEMENT TO INDEPENDENCE WHICH EXISTED IN THOSE STATES. THAT WAS PEACE? SAFETY AND SECURITY FOR ALL IN THE CONTEXT OF WHICH AN INDEPENDENT STATE WOULD BE GOVERNED ACCORDING TO AN AGREED CONSTITUTION? BY A GOVERNMENT ELECTED BY A PEOPLE WHO WERE ESSENTIALLY FREE AND SECURE WHEN THEY CHOSE THEIR GOVERNMENT. THAT ESSENTIAL PRELIMINARY SITUATION DOES NOT YET PREVAIL IN ZIMBABWE, AND EVEN A PERFECT AND AGREED INDEPENDENCE CONSTITUTION WILL NOT CREATE IT. IT IS OUR BASIC TASK HERE TO CREATE IT.



THE EXTENT AND CHARACTER OF THE WAR OF NATIONAL LIBERATION MUST BE MADE CLEAR. NINETY PERCENT OF THE COUNTRY IS COVERED BY THIS WAR; THE TOWNS AND CITIES ARE SURROUNDED BY AND OFTEN PENETRATED BY THE ARMED STRUGGLE. PARTS OF THE COUNTRY THE REGIME HAS WRITTEN OFF AND ABANDONED; THESE WE TERM THE LIBERATED AREAS. IN OTHER AREAS THE REGIME CAN ONLY ACHIEVE A TEMPORARY DAILY PRESENCE WITH PUNITIVE RAIDS ON THE VILLAGES; THESE WE TERM THE SEMI-LIBERATED AREAS. THE REMAINING? CONTESTED AREAS INCLUDE THE TOWNS AND THE CITADELS OF THE REGIME WHICH WE ARE POISED TO CONQUER. THUS THE PATRIOTIC FRONT HAS NOW RESPONSIBILITIES NOT ONLY TO FIGHT?, BUT ALSO TO ENSURE PEACE, ORDER AND GOOD GOVERNMENT - THE "PROBLEMS OF SUCCESS" -INSIDE ZIMBABWE.

CLEARLY IT IS NOT OUR PURPOSE IN COMING TO LONDON TO BETRAY OR ABANDON ANY OF THESE VICTORIES OF THE PEOPLE OF ZIMBABWE WHO HAVE PARTLY LIBERATED THEMSELVES AND ARE CONTINUING THE TASK PRECISELY BECAUSE BRITIAN FAILED TO CARRY OUT HER RESPONSIBILITIES.

THIS CONFERENCE IS NOT ONLY UNIQUE IN BRITISH COLONIAL HISTORY BECAUSE IT MUST ACHIEVE PEACE AS WELL AS A FUTURE CONSTITUTION; IT IS UNIQUE BECAUSE THIS IS THE FIRST TIME THAT TWO DECOLONISING FORCES HAVE TO CO-OPERATE IN THIS TASK. THE PATRIOTIC FRONT REPRESENTING THE PEOPLE OF ZIMBABWE ARE HERE AS THE EFFECTIVE DECOLONISING FACTOR, WHILE BRITIAN IS HERE ASSERTING HER DIMINISHED LEGAL AUTHORITY. IN THIS CONNECTION IT MUST BE POINTED OUT THAT BRITIAN, DESPITE ITS CLAIMED EXPERIENCE IN DECOLONIZATION, ? HAS HAD NO SUCCESS IN ZIMBABWE. THE TASK HAS HAD TO BE

CONT/.....4



UNDERTAIN BY THE PEOPLE. THROUGH THEIR SWEAT AND BLOOD THE PROCESS IS WELL ON ITS WAY. THE MOST POSITIVE PROOF OF THIS IS THE ADMISSION OF BRITAIN'S AGENT, IN THE FORM OF THE DECLARATION OF MARTIAL LAW IN 90% OF THE COUNTRY.

YET WE ARE MORE AWARE THAN ANY OF THE DESTRUCTION AND TRAGIC TOLL OF OUR STRUGGLE, OF THE REGIME'S CONTINUED ABILITY AND INCREASING DETERMINATION TO WREAK HAVOC AND MASS DESTRUCTION. IT IS THUS OUR VITAL RESPONSIBILITY TO ACHIEVE GENUINE INDEPENDENCE, THEREBY BRINGING ABOUT PEACE AND PUTTING AN END TO THE PREVAILING ANARCHY AND CHAOS. THIS IS NO LONGER A SOLELY BRITISH RESPONSIBILITY; WE MUST - AND OUR PRESENCE HERE DEMONSTRATES OUR WILL TO DO SO - WORK TOGETHER WITH BRITAIN.

WE HAVE STATED BEFORE AND WE REPEAT THE FACT THAT THE PATRIOTIC FRONT AND THE ACHIEVEMENTS OF THE ZIMBABWEAN PEOPLE ARE ESSENTIAL FACTORS IN THE DE-COLONISING PROCESS. WE HAVE TO DO THIS TOGETHER.

THE TASK OF THIS PEACE CONFERENCE IS TO ENSURE THROUGH AN INDIVISIBLE COMPREHENSIVE AGREEMENT, THE IRREVERSIBLE TRANSFER OF POWER TO THE PEOPLE OF ZIMBABWE. THIS IS ONE CONTINUOUS, INTERDEPENDENT PROCESS. IT IS COMPLEX BUT DOES NOT LEND ITSELF TO PIECEMEAL TREATMENT; THE CRITICAL PERIOD LEADING TO INDEPENDENCE IS AS VITAL AS THE INDEPENDENCE CONSTITUTION. IN PRACTICE THE TASK OF CREATING A SUITABLE CONSTITUTION FOR THE CRUCIAL TRANSITIONAL PERIOD WILL SERVE THE ULTIMATE TASK OF AGREEING A CONSTITUTIONAL MODEL FOR INDEPENDENCE, AND ASSIST-US ALL IN UNDER-



STANDING ONE ANOTHER'S CONSTITUTIONAL PREFERENCES. THERE MUST BE NO DOUBT ABOUT THE FREEDOM AND FAIRNESS OF THE CONTEXT OF PRE-INDEPENDENCE ELECTIONS. AS THE RECENT HISTORY OF OUR LAND SO ELOQUENTLY DEMONSTRATES, TREACHERY, TRIBALISM AND MASS MURDER IS ALL THAT CAN RESULT FROM A FALSE SOLUTION. TO ACCEPT SUCH A ZIMBABWE WOULD BE A BETRAYAL OF OUR PEOPLE, OF OUR PRINCIPLES AND QUITE SIMPLY (SINCE DEAD AND DETAINED MEN CAN NEITHER CANVAS NOR CAST VOTES) A BETRAYAL OF OURSELVES. WE MUST REMEMBER HERE THAT IT HAS ALWAYS BEEN, AND IT REMAINS, THE BASIC OBJECTIVE OF THE PATRIOTIC FRONT TO ENSURE THAT GOVERNMENT OF A GENUINE? FREE ZIMBABWE IS BASED UPON FREE AND FAIR ELECTIONS. WE WERE THE INITIATORS OF THE PRINCIPLE OF UNIVERSAL ADULT SUFFRAGE IN ZIMBABWE, IN THE FACE OF ITS CONSTANT REJECTION BY BRITAIN AND THE MINORITY OPPRESSORS.

\*ZIMBABWE MUST BE A SOVEREIGN REPUBLIC IN WHICH THE SOVEREIGN NATION PURSUES ITS OWN DESTINY, TOTALLY UNSHACKLED BY ANY FETTERS OR CONSTRAINTS.

\*THE SOVEREIGN ZIMBABWEAN PEOPLE MUST, ACTING THROUGH THEIR OWN FREELY CHOSEN REPRESENTATIVES IN PARLIAMENT? BE FREE AND FULLY VESTED WITH THE POWER TO EXERCISE COMPLETE DOMINION OVER RESOURCES FROM TIME TO TIME AS NEED ARISES THEY MUST BE FREE RE-ORDER THE SOCIAL, POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS AND STRUCTURES; AND BE FREE TO SHAPE THEIR OWN DESTINY, AS A NATION, WITHOUT HAVING TO PANDER TO ANY RACIAL, ETHNIC, TRIBAL, RELIGIOUS, SOCIAL OR OTHER INTERESTS OR DIFFERENCES.





Original - GJK  
cfo

10 DOWNING STREET

11th September 1979

Dear Nicholas,

Thank you for your letter of 15th August with which you enclosed a copy of a letter dated 9th August which you had received from your constituent Mr J G Stanley.

If Rhodesia is to have a secure future as we all wish, it is essential that there should be a settlement capable of winning wide international recognition. The agreement we reached at the Commonwealth meeting in Lusaka represents a helpful step forward. We have established a new basis for progress towards a peaceful solution for Rhodesia, and it is significant that we have the unanimous acceptance of the Commonwealth - including three of the Front Line States - that it must be a major objective to bring about a cessation of hostilities and an end to sanctions as part of the process of achieving a lasting settlement.

I do not accept that this agreement amounts to an "about face" on the part of the Government. The Conservative Party manifesto made it clear that, if elected, we would consider it our duty to make every effort to achieve international recognition for Rhodesia, while in my speech in the House on 25th July I made it clear that some constitutional change would be required. I also said that our proposals would be put to all the parties. New elections would follow naturally from agreement at the Constitutional Conference.

I believe that we now have a prospect of ending the present hostilities with the tragic loss of life they involve. The way ahead will not be easy but I am encouraged that those concerned have accepted our invitation to the Constitutional Conference which opened in London yesterday.

Yours sincerely  
Nicholas

Nicholas Winterton Esq MP

B

PS

S/SIR I GILMOUR  
PS/MR LUCE  
PS/PUS  
SIR A DUFF  
MR WILLSON  
MR BYATT  
LORD N G LENNOX

~~PS/NO 10 DOWNING STREET~~

MR R L WADE-GERY )  
MR P M MAXEY )  
COL MOIR ) CABINET  
MR P J FOWLER ) OFFICE  
DIO )

Mr Day....

HD/RHODESIA DEPT (3)

HD/C AF D  
HD/S AF D

HD/PUSD (2)

HD/NEWS DEPT

HD/WAD

MR FREELAND LEGAL ADVISER RM K200A

MR FIFOOT LEGAL ADVISER RM K164

~~RESIDENT CLERK~~

(2)

Prime Minister

12/9

ADVANCE COPY

GR 400

CONFIDENTIAL

DESKBY 112000Z

FM UKMIS NEW YORK 111915Z SEPT 79

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1012 OF 11 SEPTEMBER

INFO PRIORITY MAPUTO LUSAKA GABORONE DAR ES SALAAM

INFO SAVING LUANDA LAGOS.

DESKBY

IMMEDIATE

RHODESIA

1. MOGWE OF BOTSWANA HAS BEEN IN NEW YORK EN ROUTE FROM HAVANA. THE US MISSION HERE INFORMED US TODAY OF THE FOLLOWING ACCOUNT THEY RECEIVED FROM HIM OF A MEETING BETWEEN THE FRONT LINE STATES AND THE PATRIOTIC FRONT IN THE MARGINS OF THE NON-ALIGNED MEETING IN HAVANA.

2. MOGWE SAID THAT THIS WAS THE FIRST OCCASION THAT THE FRONT LINE HAD MET NKOMO AND MUGABE AT A JOINT MEETING SINCE BEFORE THE LUSAKA COMMONWEALTH MEETING AND THE MONROVIA OAU MEETING. THE MEETING WITH THE PATRIOTIC FRONT WAS CONVENED BY MACHEL WHO LED FOR THE FRONT LINE.

3. MACHEL ASKED WHAT THE PATRIOTIC FRONT POSITION WOULD BE AT THE LONDON CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE. MUGABE INSISTED THAT THE RHODESIAN ARMY WOULD HAVE TO BE DISMANTLED. MACHEL REACTED SHARPLY



THE LONDON CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE. MUGABE INSISTED THAT THE RHODESIAN ARMY WOULD HAVE TO BE DISMANTLED. MACHEL REACTED SHARPLY AND SAID THAT THE PATRIOTIC FRONT SHOULD GO TO THE LONDON MEETING WITH NO PRECONDITIONS. MUZOREWA WAS NOT A BLACK PUPPET WHATEVER THEY MIGHT CALL HIM IN PUBLIC. HE HAD POPULAR SUPPORT AND AN ARMY. NKOMO INTERJECTED WITH A REMINDER THAT THE OAU HAD RECOGNISED THE PATRIOTIC FRONT AS THE SOLE LEGITIMATE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE RHODESIAN PEOPLE. MACHEL REPLIED THAT THE FRONT LINE HAD SUPPORTED THIS DESIGNATION IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE OAU SUMMIT WHERE SOME AFRICAN COUNTRIES HAD BEEN WAVERING ON THE RECOGNITION OF MUZOREWA. BUT HE TOLD NKOMO THAT THIS DESIGNATION DID NOT CHANGE ANYTHING. THE PATRIOTIC FRONT LEADERS WERE NETTLED AND REFERRED TO THE FACT THAT THE REVOLUTIONARY ARMY HAD TAKEN OVER IN MOZAMBIQUE. MACHEL POINTED OUT THAT HIS ARMY HAD DEFEATED A FOREIGN ARMY IN WAR: THIS WAS NOT THE SITUATION IN ZIMBABWE. (AT NO POINT DID MACHEL MENTION THE RHODESIAN RAIDS INTO MOZAMBIQUE, ALTHOUGH THE MEETING TOOK PLACE AFTER THE RAIDS).

4. NKOMO STATED THAT HE WAS GOING TO LONDON TO GET POWER. MACHEL TOLD HIM THAT THE FRONT LINE WOULD SUPPORT THE OUTCOME OF FREE AND FAIR ELECTIONS AND THAT ONLY THE PEOPLE OF ZIMBABWE COULD GIVE NKOMO POWER. FINALLY, MACHEL URGED UNITY ON THE PATRIOTIC FRONT AND INSISTED THAT BEFORE MUGABE AND NKOMO WENT TO LONDON THAT THEY AGREE BETWEEN THEM IN THE EVENT OF THEIR WINNING FREE AND FAIR ELECTIONS, WHO WOULD BE PRESIDENT AND WHO WOULD BE VICE-PRESIDENT. IF NOT, THE FRONT LINE COULD NO LONGER REGARD THEM AS A UNITED FRONT AND THEY SHOULD SIMPLY CALL THEMSELVES ZAPU AND ZANU.

FCO PASS INFO SAVING LUANDA, LAGOS.

PARSONS

NNNN

*[Handwritten signature]*

Prime Minister

You wished to  
see these lists this  
evening

*[Handwritten initials]* 11/9

*[Handwritten signature]*

PATRIOTIC FRONT STATEMENT

CONFERENCE ON ZIMBABWE

LONDON

DELIVERED BY PRESIDENT

JOSHUA NKOMO

• • • • •



\*THE SAFETY AND SURVIVAL OF THE REPUBLIC ~~MUST~~ BE THE SACRED TRUST OF THE ZIMBABWEAN NATION, NOT THE PAWN IN THE HANDS OF MERCENARIES AND OTHER ALIEN ADVENTURERS AND AGENTS. WE ARE IRREVOCABLY COMMITTED TO THE POSITION THAT THE ZIMBABWEAN PEOPLE, BY WHOSE BLOOD AND SACRIFICE COLONIALISM WAS EXORCISED FROM THE LAND, MUST THEMSELVES BE THE PERPETUAL GUARANTORS OF SOVEREIGNTY IN THE FACE OF ALL CHALLENGES, DOMESTIC OR FOREIGN. LIBERATION AND THE PROCESS LEADING THERETO MUST ONCE AGREED, BE IRREVOCABLE AND IRREVERSIBLE. WE KNOW NO OTHER WAY OF ENSURING THIS THAN STRICT ADHERENCE TO THE PRINCIPLE THAT THE PEOPLE AND THEIR FORCES WHO HAVE TOPPLED MINORITY RULE MUST BE ENTRUSTED WITH THE TASK OF ENSURING THAT COLONIALISM, UNDER WHATEVER GUISE, WILL NOT RETURN TO PLAGUE THE NATION ONCE AGAIN.

\*JUSTICE WILL NOT OCCUR BY ACCIDENT IN A SOVEREIGN ZIMBABWE, NOR WILL ITS ADMINISTRATION AND DISPENSATION REMAIN IN THE HANDS OF PRIVILEGED MINORITY. IT MUST CONFORM TO THE SOCIAL AND CULTURAL VALUES OF ZIMBABWE.

\*THE SOCIO-ECONOMIC SYSTEM MUST CONFORM TO THE PEOPLE'S SENSE OF JUSTICE, DEMOCRACY AND FAIR-PLAY.

THESE, AND SIMILAR GOALS, CHERISHED VIGOROUSLY BY OUR PEOPLE AND FOR WHICH THOUSANDS NOW LIE IN MASS GRAVES THROUGHOUT ZIMBABWE, ZAMBIA, MOZAMBIQUE, BOTSWANA, AND ANGOLA.



MAY NOT BE BETRAYED OR COMPROMISED. IN THE PAST MAY PEOPLE PRESENT HERE IN LANCASTER HOUSE? BUT WHO ARE NOW OUR ANTAGONISTS? CHERISHED THEM TOO. IT IS PERSONAL AMBITION AND GREED THAT PROPELLED THEM INTO BETRAYAL AND TREASON WE ARE SWORN NOT TO FOLLOW THEIR EXAMPLE.

AT THIS STAGE? HAVING SEEN BOTH THE BRITISH PROPOSALS AND YESTERDAY'S STATEMENT BY LORD CARRINGTON? WE FIND THE BRITISH PROPOSALS ARE TOO VAGUE FOR US TO JUDGE WHETHER THEY ARE ADEQUATE TO OUR COMPREHENSIVE TASK. THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT MUST NOW BE PREPARED TO TAKE US INTO THEIR CONFIDENCE AND SHOW US WHAT THEIR REAL PROPOSALS ARE. THE PRESENT OUTLINE STATES NO MORE THAN SOME OF THE ELEMENTS OF ANY CONSTITUTION BUT CONTAINS ALSO CERTAIN ASPECTS WHICH ARE VERY DIFFERENT FROM THE NORMAL BRITISH PATTERN AND ARE ALSO SERIOUSLY RETROGRESSIVE AS COMPARED WITH EARLIER BRITISH PROPOSALS.

IT AVOIDS THE REAL ISSUES WHICH SHOULD BE BROUGHT BEFORE THIS CONFERENCE AND SOLVED. ONLY BY DEALING WITH THEM CAN WE HOPE TO LEAVE HERE AND RETURN TO FREEDOM AND THE PROSPECT OF PEACE IN ZIMBABWE.

THE ESSENTIAL QUESTIONS WE HAVE POSED CONSTANTLY TO OURSELVES AND WHICH WE INSIST MUST BE UNDERSTOOD BY ALL SERIOUSLY CONCERNED WITH A SOLUTION INCLUDE THE FOLLOWING:-

- I. WILL THE PEOPLE OF ZIMBABWE BE REALLY SOVERIGN AND BE ABLE TO EXERCISE THEIR SOVEREIGN AUTHORITY?

2. WHOSE ARMY SHALL DEFEND ZIMBABABWE AND ITS PEOPLE? IT MUST BE NOTED THAT 60% OF THE PRESENT WHITE ARMY ARE MERCENARIES.
3. WHOSE POLICE FORCE SHALL PROTECT THE PEOPLE OF ZIMBABWE?
4. WHOSE ADMINISTRATION AND JUDICIARY SHALL SERVE THE PEOPLE OF ZIMBABWE?
5. WILL ANY ETHNIC, RELIGIOUS, TRIBAL OR OTHER GROUP BE ABLE TO HOLD THE REST OF THE PEOPLE OF ZIMBABWE HOSTAGE?
6. HOW DO WE CREATE THE SITUATION FOR THE HOLDING OF FREE AND FAIR ELECTIONS?
7. WHOSE LAWS WILL GOVERN SUCH ELECTIONS?
8. IN PARTICULAR, APART FROM THE BRITISH SUPERVISOR'S AND THE COMMONWEALTH 'OBSERVERS' WHO WILL ADMINISTER THE ELECTIONS AND ENSURE THE SAFETY OF THE VOTERS AND CANDIDATES?
9. WHAT WILL BE THE FUTURE OF THE PEOPLE'S STOLEN LAND? ~~THE ROBBERS HAVE THEIR DAY BEFORE THE PEOPLE~~

THESE? AND SIMILAR ISSUES, ARE THOSE WHICH SHOULD BE PLACED ON THE AGENDA OF THIS CONFERENCE AND BEFORE THE WORLD IF REAL PEACE IS TO RETURN TO OUR BELOVED ZIMBABWE. THE TIME FOR EVASION IS LONG PAST AND WE INSIST THAT THE FINAL PHASE OF DECOLONISATION BE SERIOUSLY PURSUED NOW.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE

LANCASTER HOUSE

LONDON

SEPTEMBER 1979

Bishop Muzorewa's Opening Address

CHECK AGAINST DELIVERY



Mr Chairman,

It gives our delegation great pleasure to be in this historic building representing the democratically elected government of Zimbabwe Rhodesia, seeking recognition and the lifting of sanctions.

I must first, on behalf of our delegation and on my own behalf, say how grateful we all are to Her Majesty's Government for the hospitality accorded us, the spirit in which we have been received here and, above all, for the opportunity to resolve, once and for all, the constitutional problems facing our country.

I was pleased to accept the invitation to attend this Constitutional Conference and to lead the delegation of our Government of National Unity because it enables me to report officially and in person to the British Government and the British people that we have fulfilled all the requirements insisted upon by successive British administrations. This being so it is up to the British Government to recognise the new reality of the situation in our country and to act accordingly.

It is now the responsibility of your Government, Mr Chairman, to accept and acknowledge this fact. You, Mr Chairman, have referred to the laying of foundations for a

/free

free, independent and democratic society. We would suggest that those foundations have already been laid and Britain has a legal and moral duty in the name of democracy, integrity and fair play to follow its own hallowed principles and recognise the new popularly-elected government in our country which is of the people, by the people and for the people.

Let me examine, Mr Chairman, the present situation in relation to the five principles listed by the British Government in 1965 and the sixth subsequently added in 1966. I might add, at this stage, that these principles have received general approval by other countries and were even endorsed by the United Nations Organization.

Those principles were:

- (a) unimpeded progress to majority rule must be maintained and guaranteed;
- (b) there must be guarantees against retrogressive amendment to the Constitution;
- (c) there must be an immediate improvement in the political status of the black population;
- (d) there must be progress towards ending racial discrimination;
- (e) the Constitutional proposals must be acceptable to the people of Rhodesia as a whole; and
- (f) there must be no oppression of the majority by the minority or of the minority by the majority.

In connection with these 6 principles, universal adult suffrage has been accepted and introduced in our country and this change cannot be reversed. Thus, the political status of the black population has been fulfilled and majority rule is enshrined in the Constitution. No retrogressive amendments can be made without the approval of the black representatives in Parliament. Racial discrimination has been totally abolished and there is no question but that the changes which have been brought about in our country are accepted by the people as a whole. There is, in our country today, no oppression of the majority by the minority or of the

/minority



minority by the majority. I can confidently state therefore, Mr Chairman, that the requirements of previous British Governments have been fully satisfied and nothing should now stand in the way of our Government of Zimbabwe Rhodesia being granted their rightful recognition.

Let us accept one further fact. The reasons which led to the British and subsequent international action against our country were directed purely and simply against a white minority government which unilaterally declared independence in 1965. Those reasons are no longer valid. That government, which was anathema to the majority of our people, no longer exists. It has now been replaced by a government popularly elected by 64,8% of our electorate in elections which were conducted in an honest, impartial, democratic, free and fair manner. This was testified to by virtually all the observers sent to monitor our elections, including the team led by Lord Boyd which was sent by your party. You yourself, Mr Chairman, indicated in the House of Lords on May 22 that the British Government would be guided by Lord Boyd's conclusions. I fear that in some measure you may have shifted your ground in this regard and, perhaps due to the pressures exerted on your Prime Minister in Lusaka, your commitment has not been followed through. I do most sincerely hope and trust that your government has no intention of accepting a situation where Zimbabwe Rhodesia becomes the sacrificial lamb on the altar of expediency.

I would now take you back to the 15th May of this year. At the opening of the present British Parliament your Prime Minister, Mrs Thatcher, said it was the objective of your government to build on the major change that had taken place in my country to achieve a return to legality in conditions of wide international recognition. Let me emphasise the word 'major' which is of the greatest importance. This is exactly what has happened in Zimbabwe Rhodesia. There is a total new reality in our country. In Parliament, the House of Assembly consists of 72 black and 28 white Members, the Senate consists of 20 black and 10 white Senators. The Cabinet contains 19 Ministers of whom 14 are black and 5 are white. Prior to May the two highest posts in the land, that of Prime Minister and President, were held by whites. Now these posts are filled

/by



by blacks. Furthermore, as Minister of Combined Operations and Minister of Defence, I have executive control and ultimate authority over all military matters in my country. The military commanders operate under my immediate policy directives. Similarly, my black colleague, the Minister of Law and Order who is a member of my delegation, holds executive power over the police.

All racially discriminatory laws, including those relating to land tenure, have been repealed. People of all races are now permitted to live where they choose, whether in rural or urban residential areas. Our black population participates in all facets of business without any racial restrictions. Our schools and hospitals are now non-racial. All these significant developments were unheard of and thought impossible less than two years ago.

Mr Chairman, you said yesterday that in the case of Rhodesia, as in all other cases, the constitution must take account of special circumstances. That is precisely what we have done. We have a new constitution drafted by both black and white members of the four parties to the March 3rd Agreement - it was drawn up by the people of our country to meet the needs of our country. We have a new flag, one that is symbolic of our country and all its people.

We have a new non-racial nation, one that is dedicating itself to be a good example to other countries, not only on the African continent but throughout the world. The successful conclusion of our Agreement of the 3rd March, 1978, and the implementation of our new Constitution has been achieved through the tremendous courage displayed by the vast majority of our electorate during the elections. They went to the polls happily and willingly to exercise their newly-won democratic right to elect a government of their choice despite intimidation and threats of death. In doing so they clearly demonstrated their desire to determine the future course of their country and that this should be achieved through the ballot and not the bullet. The people voted because they had at last secured their inalienable right to do so, in spite of repeated threats by the Patriotic Front to disrupt our elections, to punish and



mains our citizens who dared to vote and to execute the democratically elected black leaders of their government.

There are a number of most important matters on which we require a clear, binding and unequivocal undertaking from your Government, Mr Chairman, from the very outset of this Conference. I repeat that we have met the six principles. Lord Boyd reported on the last outstanding principle and your Government has not denied his finding that the fifth principle has been met.

We require to know clearly and categorically what more your Government requires from us before you will remove sanctions and grant recognition to our Government. Thereafter, if we are able to reach agreement, we shall require a firm commitment in specific terms from your Government that it is prepared to support our Government to the fullest extent, that sanctions will be lifted and that recognition will be granted. Here I must make it absolutely clear that we are not prepared to see any negation of what has so far been achieved in our country on behalf of our people, unless it is in their interests and the interests of their country.

We require from Her Majesty's Government a guarantee made publicly to the effect that no one - I repeat no one - will have the power of veto over the stated scope and focus of this Conference and that the same will apply to any decisions that may be agreed.

Mr Chairman, yesterday you asked us to set down fully our views on the Constitutional questions and the outline proposals published by the British Government when extending the invitation to this Conference. I have already dealt with the Constitutional questions. As far as the outline proposals are concerned, the Constitutional Agreement of 3rd March, 1978, and our present Constitution substantially meets all the points that are made. We sincerely trust that you will not insist on us making changes to our Constitution, which is already working very well, merely for the sake of appeasing other countries who do not appreciate the position in Zimbabwe Rhodesia. I repeat what you yourself

/said



said yesterday, Mr Chairman - in the case of Zimbabwe Rhodesia, as in all other cases, the Constitution must take account of special circumstances. The Constitution of Zimbabwe Rhodesia was agreed in that country and for that reason it is likely to stand the test of time. History has shown that many constitutions which have been agreed in this place have not lasted for any appreciable period. We do not want the same thing to happen to us.

The British Government, in its invitation to this Conference, strongly urged both sides to observe a ceasefire. Yesterday, Mr Chairman, you said it was a matter of great regret and disappointment to you that hostilities are continuing during this Conference. My delegation would like to have it placed on record that we accepted that appeal by the British Government and, in fact, we are still prepared to co-operate fully in trying to bring about a ceasefire. However, no ceasefire can be achieved unless all the parties to the conflict agree to observe this.

Finally, Mr Chairman, in your address yesterday it was clear that you personally, and your Government, earnestly desire to see this Conference succeed and that you have the sincere determination to achieve this noble objective. You struck a chord which resounds in our own hearts when you deplored the terrible and useless loss of lives in our country. You challenged us in the name of humanity to adopt a constructive approach and contribute to the successful outcome of our deliberations.

I wish to assure you, Mr Chairman, that I and my delegation are most willing and indeed anxious to respond to your challenge in the most positive manner. We shall do so in the true spirit of the Christian and democratic principles which we have always followed. We shall do so because deep in our consciences and our souls we believe that this will lead to the salvation of our people, our country and our Nation. You will not find us lacking, Mr Chairman, in our efforts to seek a realistic solution which will enable our country to progress to peace and prosperity. In God's name I pray that goodwill may prevail and that this Conference will be blessed with success.



BF 13/9/79  
11 September 1979Message from President Tolbert

I attach a copy of a telegram to the Prime Minister received here <sup>10.9.79</sup> yesterday from President Tolbert of Liberia. President Tolbert writes not only as Head of State but also as current Chairman of the Organisation of African Unity.

I should be grateful for the text of a draft reply which the Prime Minister might send to President Tolbert. It would be helpful if the text could reach me by noon on Thursday 13 September.

H O ' D B A

R.M.J. Lyne, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

GRS250 SUBJECT

UNCLASSIFIED

T101/79

PRIME MINISTER'S

DATE BY 110900Z

FM MONROVIA 101735Z SEPT 79

PERSONAL MESSAGE

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 103 OF 10 SEPTEMBER

SERIAL No. T101/79

*Amie Amster*

*Amster 11/9*

FOREIGN MINISTER HAS ASKED FOR IMMEDIATE TRANSMISSION OF THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE.

QUOTE:

HER EXCELLENCY MARGARET THATCHER  
PRIME MINISTER OF THE UNITED KINGDOM  
LONDON ENGLAND

*Amster*

YOUR EXCELLENCY COLON AS YOUR GOVERNMENT UNDERTAKE TO CONVENE IN LONDON TODAY THE CONSTITUTIONAL TALKS ON ZIMBABWE IN IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DECISION OF THE RECENT LUSAKA COMMONWEALTH SUMMIT I SEIZE THIS OPPORTUNITY TO EXTEND TO YOU OMA THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED KINGDOM AND ALL OF THE PARTICIPANTS IN THIS IMPORTANT MEETING FELICITATIONS AND SINCERE BEST WISHES IN THE NAME OF THE GOVERNMENT AND PEOPLE OF LIBERIA AS WELL AS THE ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY STOP WE IN AFRICA BELIEVE THAT THE CONSTITUTIONAL TALKS WHICH HAVE BROUGHT TO THE CONFERENCE TABLE THE PRINCIPAL PARTIES TO THE ZIMBABWEAN PROBLEM HOLD GREAT POTENTIAL FOR EFFECTING A POSITIVE CHANGE IN ZIMBABWE IN THE INTEREST OF SELF-DETERMINATION AND PEACE FOR THE PEOPLE OF THAT TERRITORY STOP WE CONSIDER THIS EFFORT AS A STEP FORWARD IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION WHICH OMA IF SUCCESSFUL OMA WOULD MARK A SIGNIFICANT TURNING POINT FOR EVENTS IN THE ENTIRE SOUTHERN AFRICAN REGION STOP IT IS THEREFORE OUR HOPE THAT THE SPIRIT OF GOODWILL OMA OPEN-MINDEDNESS OMA CONCILIATION AND ACCOMMODATION WILL CHARACTERIZE THE ACTIONS OF ALL OF THE PARTICIPANTS TO THESE TALKS SO THAT AN INTERNATIONALLY ACCEPTABLE FORMULA MAY BE AGREED UPON WHEREBY ZIMBABWE WILL ACCEDE TO LEGAL AND GENUINE INDEPENDENCE WITH MAJORITY RULE THROUGH FREE AND FAIR ELECTIONS BASED ON A DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION FULLY GUARANTEEING THE RIGHTS OF ALL ZIMBABWEANS AND IN PARTICULAR THE OPPRESSED MAJORITY POPULATION STOP IT IS OUR FERVENT PRAYER THAT THESE CRUCIAL NEGOTIATIONS OMA WHICH WE SHALL FOLLOW WITH CONSUMING INTEREST OMA WILL BE CROWNED WITH ABUNDANT SUCCESS AND BRING FREEDOM OMA EQUALITY OMA JUSTICE AND LASTING PEACE TO ZIMBABWE STOP WITH RENEWED ASSURANCES OF MY HIGHEST CONSIDERATION AND ESTEEM  
SINCERELY

W R TOLBERT JR  
PRESIDENT OF LIBERIA AND CURRENT CHAIRMAN OF  
THE ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY

UNQUOTE  
DOUBLEDAY

FILES

- WRD
- RHO D
- OADS
- HAM D
- NEWS D
- FUSD
- PLANNING STAFF
- ES & SD
- CCD
- FRD
- UED
- LEGAL ADVISERS  
(MR FREELAND)  
(MR HFOOT)
- ROOM B

- FCD
- DEF D
- OID
- PS
- PS/SIR I GILMOUR
- PS/MR INCE
- PS/MR RIDLEY
- PS/MR HURD
- PS/FUS
- SIR A DUFF
- LORD H G LENNOX
- MISS BROWN
- MR WILSON
- MR ASPIN

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION  
RHODESIA POLICY

[COPIES SENT TO No 10  
DOWNING STREET]





Rhodesia  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

10 September 1979

Dear Michael,

RHODESIA: MESSAGES FROM PRESIDENTS BONGO  
AND SENHOR

Thank you for your letters of 31 August and 3 September. The messages from the two Presidents are indeed helpful, but we do not think the Prime Minister need reply to them. We have not recommended further messages to other African leaders who have responded to the Prime Minister's message about the Conference.

Yours ever  
Roderic Lyne

(R M J Lyne)

M O'D B Alexander Esq  
10 Downing Street

f.n.

Print  
10/9

1979  
SEP 10  
12 1

NO SEP 1979



CONFIDENTIAL

859



Free

10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

10 September 1979

RHODESIA: CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE

The Prime Minister has seen your letter to me of 7 September about the arrangements for the first week of the Constitutional Conference. She is content with the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary's proposals.

M. O'D. B. ALEXANDER

R. M. J. Lyne, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CONFIDENTIAL

TPM from Peg.

(2)



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

fs  
Pmt

10 September 1979

Prime Minister

Dear Michael

M  
Pmt

Rhodesia Conference

I enclose a copy of a letter from the New Zealand High Commission, giving the text of a message from Mr Muldoon to delegates at the Conference. The message is in most helpful terms. You may wish to bring it to the Prime Minister's attention.

The Department have sent a suitable acknowledgement to the New Zealand High Commission.

yours ever  
Roderic Lyne

(R M J Lyne)  
Private Secretary

M O'DB Alexander Esq  
10 Downing Street  
LONDON SW1



11 SEP 1979





Reference  
B69/131

New Zealand House  
Haymarket  
London SW1Y4TQ  
Telephone: 01-930 8422 Ext:  
Telex: 24368

*Ack - M. Muldoon  
to see.*

5 September 1979

Miss R.J. Spencer,  
Assistant Head,  
Rhodesia Department,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office,  
King Charles Street,  
LONDON SW1A 2AH.

*R 6/9*

*cc'd  
Mr. Byatt.  
In A Dept  
Ps Ps/LPs  
Ps/IV Luce.  
SPD  
News Dept.*

Dear Rosemary,

I mentioned on the telephone that Mr Muldoon wishes to deliver a message to each of the delegates to next week's Conference on Zimbabwe-Rhodesia. I thought you might be interested to see the text of the message. It reads:

"I write to you on the eve of what is undoubtedly the most important Conference in the history of your country. I have been encouraged to do so by the discussions that took place last month at the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting in Lusaka. That Meeting, at which differences were expected to be acute, showed what can be done when there is a will and a spirit of cooperation.

The road to a peaceful settlement is now open to you. It is for you - each and all - to make your contribution to the final stage and to lead your country into independence, peace and stability. I do not minimise the difficulties that lie ahead of you. But I hope that you will keep in mind at all times that the fate of millions of your men, women and children, now and in the future, lies in your hands - and in your hands alone. The prize of independence and of peace is great.

I look forward to the day when your country will be welcomed by the Commonwealth and the international community. I wish you all well.

Yours sincerely,

R.D. Muldoon"

We shall be delivering copies to the delegates later this week. The text of this message will not be released to the press before Saturday.

Yours sincerely,

*T.B. Caughley*  
(T.B. Caughley)



Prime Minister

(2)

THE PRIORS FARM,  
MATTINGLEY, NR. BASINGSTOKE,  
HAMPSHIRE.  
HECKFIELD 262.

Print - 13/5

9 lines

14 Print 13

ms  
pp5

Dear Mr. Thatcher,

Thank you very much

for your kind letter of 16<sup>th</sup> July about my part  
in the Royal Mission to Rhodesia.

It would be dishonest

of me not to say that I have had  
grave doubts about H.M.G.'s policy over  
the last few months. However I may well  
have been wrong! And I certainly now  
support what you are trying to achieve at  
the Conference. I will do all in my power

to help in my contacts with Rhodesia.

May I also congratulate

you on all you are doing in so many  
other fields to get our country right again.

You must know you have enormous  
support for the firm line you have taken.

Once more, many thanks for

your letter.

Yours sincerely

Niles Hudson

(NILES HUDSON)



CONFIDENTIAL

GR 1000

CONFIDENTIAL

FM F C O 091802Z SEPT 79

TO IMMEDIATE DAR ES SALAAM

TELEGRAM NUMBER 297 OF 9 SEPT

AND TO IMMEDIATE MAPUTO, GABORONE, LUSAKA, LUANDA, LAGOS,  
WASHINGTON, PRETORIA, ADDIS ABABA, MONROVIA, CANBERRA,  
OTTAWA, WELLINGTON,

PRIORITY ABIDJAN, DAKAR, KINSHASA, KHARTOUM,

TOKYO, EEC POSTS AND OTHER COMMONWEALTH POSTS, OSLO,

STOCKHOLM, LISBON, SUVA, PORT MORESBY, HONIARA, NUKUALOFA,  
AND TARAWA,

INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK.

*Handwritten:* to Rhodes - 11/5

RHODESIA: CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE

1. YOU WILL BE RECEIVING IN THE VERBATIM SERIES A COPY OF MY INITIAL STATEMENT AT THE CONFERENCE, WHICH IS BEING RELEASED TO THE PRESS. YOU SHOULD MAKE COPIES AVAILABLE TO THE GOVERNMENT TO WHICH YOU ARE ACCREDITED (ADDIS: TO OAU SECRETARIAT) AT AN APPROPRIATE SENIOR LEVEL AS SOON AS POSSIBLE BUT NOT EARLIER THAN 1500Z ON 10 SEPTEMBER. IN DOING SO YOU SHOULD, TO THE FULL EXTENT YOU THINK APPROPRIATE, MAKE THE POINTS IN PARAGRAPHS 2 TO 7 OF THIS TELEGRAM. PARAGRAPHS 8 TO 10 ARE FOR USE IN ANSWER TO QUESTIONS. PARAGRAPH 11 IS FOR USE ORALLY IN FRONT LINE POSTS.

2. I HAVE DECIDED TO PUBLISH MY OPENING SPEECH BECAUSE I WISH THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT'S POSITION TO BE FULLY UNDERSTOOD. THE LEADERS OF THE SALISBURY AND PATRIOTIC FRONT DELEGATIONS WILL NO DOUBT SIMILARLY BE PUBLISHING THEIR OWN OPENING STATEMENTS. WE SHALL BE TAKING APPROPRIATE STEPS TO BRIEF THE FRONT LINE STATES, THE COMMONWEALTH, THE NINE AND THE AMERICANS THROUGH THEIR REPRESENTATIVES HERE AS THE CONFERENCE PROCEEDS.

3. I HAVE ACKNOWLEDGED IN MY SPEECH THE CONTRIBUTION WHICH THE COMMONWEALTH IN PARTICULAR HAVE MADE TOWARDS SETTING THE SCENE FOR THIS CONFERENCE. I LOOK FORWARD TO HAVING THE CONTINUING SUPPORT OF OUR FRIENDS AND PARTNERS DURING SUBSEQUENT STAGES.

/4. WE

CONFIDENTIAL



CONFIDENTIAL

4. WE SHALL BE GUIDED BY THE CONCLUSIONS REACHED AT LUSAKA AND HAVE ALREADY PUT FORWARD OUTLINE CONSTITUTIONAL PROPOSALS TO GIVE EFFECT TO THEM. THESE ARE COMPARABLE TO THE BASIS ON WHICH WE HAVE GRANTED INDEPENDENCE TO OTHER COUNTRIES.
5. THE PRIME MINISTER MADE CLEAR AT LUSAKA THAT, ALTHOUGH THERE MUST BE ADEQUATE PROVISION FOR WHITE REPRESENTATION IN PARLIAMENT, WE DO NOT ACCEPT THAT THE WHITES SHOULD BE ABLE TO EXERCISE A BLOCKING POWER OVER A WIDE RANGE OF LEGISLATION. THE PUBLIC SERVICE AND OTHER COMMISSIONS MUST BE BROUGHT UNDER GOVERNMENT CONTROL.
6. WE SHALL AT EVERY STAGE OF THE CONFERENCE BE PREPARED TO PUT FORWARD FURTHER PROPOSALS AS NECESSARY. BUT IT IS ESSENTIAL TO THE CHANCES OF SUCCESS TO ADOPT A STEP BY STEP APPROACH. THE FIRST STAGE MUST BE TO DISCUSS THE MAIN LINES OF THE INDEPENDENCE CONSTITUTION, WHICH MUST MAKE PROVISION FOR GENUINE MAJORITY RULE. THEREAFTER WE SHALL BE READY WITH FURTHER PROPOSALS FOR THE FORM OF THE CONSTITUTION AND ITS MAIN PROVISIONS.
7. IF AGREEMENT IS REACHED ON THE MAIN PROVISIONS OF THE CONSTITUTION WE SHALL BE READY TO TACKLE THE PRE-INDEPENDENCE ARRANGEMENTS. THE KEY ELEMENT - AGREED AT LUSAKA - IS ACCEPTANCE THAT ELECTIONS MUST BE SUPERVISED UNDER THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT'S AUTHORITY. BOTH SIDES MUST HAVE A FAIR CHANCE OF WINNING THOSE ELECTIONS. IT WILL BE OUR RESPONSIBILITY TO EXERCISE THAT AUTHORITY, AND THAT OF THE COMMONWEALTH (AND ANY OTHER) OBSERVERS TO SEE HOW WE CARRY IT OUT.
8. AGREEMENT ON THE CONSTITUTION CAN OF COURSE BE CONTINGENT ON SETTLING THESE. BUT WE MUST SEEK AGREEMENT FIRST ON THE MAIN LINES OF THE CONSTITUTION BEFORE DECIDING THE ARRANGEMENTS FOR ITS IMPLEMENTATION. IF WE CANNOT AGREE ON THIS DESTINATION (WHICH IN THE LONG TERM IS WHAT MATTERS) THERE IS NO POINT IN DISCUSSING HOW TO GET THERE. BUT THE KEY ELEMENT IN THE PRE-INDEPENDENCE ARRANGEMENTS IS ACCEPTANCE THAT ELECTIONS MUST BE SUPERVISED UNDER THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT'S AUTHORITY. COMMONWEALTH OBSERVERS WILL BE PRESENT TO SEE THAT THE ELECTIONS ARE FAIR.
9. THE



CONFIDENTIAL

9. THE MILITARY ARRANGEMENTS HAVE TO BE TAKEN IN THE LAST STAGE. THIS IS ESSENTIAL TO THE PROSPECTS OF SUCCESS. THEY WILL THROW UP DIFFICULT PROBLEMS, BUT WE BELIEVE THAT IF THERE IS AGREEMENT (A) ON THE MAIN PROVISIONS OF THE CONSTITUTION (AS PROPOSED BY US) AND (B) THAT ELECTIONS ARE HELD UNDER OUR AUTHORITY, IT WILL BE POSSIBLE TO ARRANGE A CEASE-FIRE AND THE SEPARATION OF THE FORCES. WE WOULD ARRANGE NEGOTIATIONS TO THAT END.

10. WE SHALL BE READY TO DISCUSS AT A LATER STAGE THE ARRANGEMENTS FOR COMMONWEALTH OBSERVERS TO BE PRESENT DURING THE ELECTIONS.

11. THE ROLE OF THE FRONT LINE STATES WILL BE OF CRUCIAL IMPORTANCE, AND WE SHALL BE KEEPING IN PARTICULARLY CLOSE TOUCH WITH THEM THROUGHOUT THE CONFERENCE. IT WILL BE NO EASY MATTER TO GET THE SALISBURY ADMINISTRATION TO ACCEPT CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE ON THE KEY ISSUES AND NEW ELECTIONS. THERE WILL BE NO CHANCE OF A POLITICAL SOLUTION IF THE PATRIOTIC FRONT STICK TO THE STATEMENT THEY ISSUED IN DAR ES SALAAM, IN WHICH THEY REJECTED OUR CONSTITUTIONAL PROPOSALS.

12. FOR LUSAKA. FURTHER INSTRUCTIONS FOR YOU TO SPEAK TO PRESIDENT KAUNDA WILL FOLLOW.

CARRINGTON

FILES

RHOD D  
OADS  
N AM D  
NEWS D  
FUSD  
PLANNING STAFF  
ES & SD  
CCD  
FRD  
UND  
LEGAL ADVISERS  
(MR FREELAND)  
(MR FIFOOT)  
ECON D

PCD  
DEF D  
OID  
PS  
PS/SIR I GILMOUR  
PS/MR LUCE  
PS/MR RIDLEY  
PS/MR HURD  
PS/FUS  
SIR A DUFF  
LORD N G LENNOX  
MISS BROWN  
MR WILLSON  
MR BYATT  
MR ASPIN

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION  
RHODESIA POLICY

Mr Alexander  
NOTO .



*With the compliments of*

THE PRIVATE SECRETARY

GGHW .

FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE  
SW1A 2AH

10.9.79 .



The Patriotic Front of Zimbabwe,  
Royal Garden Hotel,  
London W8,  
U.K.

9th September, 1979.

Lord Carrington,  
The Secretary of State for Foreign  
and Commonwealth Affairs,  
Government Hospitality,  
2, Carlton Gardens,  
London, SW1Y 5AA.  
U.K.


*Prime Minister has  
seen.*

*Ans - 10/9*

Dear Lord Carrington,


We thank you for your invitation to us to attend a Reception at Lancaster House on Monday 10th September, 1979, from 6 p.m. to 7.30 p.m., but regret to inform you that on principle we find it impossible to be in social company with members of the illegal regime whose hands are stained with the blood of thousands of innocent victims they have murdered and continue to murder in Zimbabwe, Mocambique, Zambia and Botswana in preservation of their usurped power. We thus wish to apologise for our inability to attend. We assure you that this action is directed neither against you nor against the British Government.

Kindest regards.



J.M. Nkomo

President



R.G. Mugabe

President - ZANU



CONFIDENTIAL

GRS 523

CONFIDENTIAL

FM CANBERRA 081100Z SEP  
TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 507 OF 3 SEPTEMBER  
INFO ROUTINE DAR ES SALAAM

RHODESIA : CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE

1. PRESIDENT NYERERE AND MR FRASER HAVE EXCHANGED LETTERS ABOUT THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE. ON MR FRASER'S INSTRUCTIONS WE HAVE BEEN GIVEN A SIGHT OF THE CORRESPONDENCE BECAUSE HE IS NOT CLEAR WHETHER OR NOT ALL PRESIDENT NYERERE'S POINTS HAVE BEEN CONVEYED TO US DIRECT.

2. PRESIDENT NYERERE, IN HIS LETTER DATED 30 AUGUST INDICATES THAT HE HAS WRITTEN TO MRS THATCHER SAYING THAT THE OUTLINE PROPOSALS OF THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT SEEM TO HIM TO BE FULLY IN LINE WITH THE LUSAKA AGREEMENT. HOWEVER HE GOES ON TO SAY THAT HE HAS ONE RESERVATION OVER THE PROPOSAL THAT THE WHITE MEMBERS OF THE RHODESIAN PARLIAMENT SHOULD BE ELECTED ONLY BY WHITE CITIZENS. IF SEATS ARE RESERVED FOR WHITES AND THE CANDIDATES HAVE TO BE NOMINATED BY WHITES, NYERERE BELIEVES THAT THE CHOICE BETWEEN WHITE CANDIDATES SHOULD THEN BE MADE BY ALL VOTERS ON A COMMON ROLL. HE EXPLAINS THAT THE TANZANIAN EXPERIENCE SUGGESTS THAT THIS HELPS THE POLITICAL INTEGRATION OF THE MINORITY COMMUNITY INTO THE BODY POLITIC AND ENCOURAGES AFRICANS TO THINK OF EUROPEAN CANDIDATES AS POTENTIAL POLITICAL ALLIES. THIS HAS LED TO NON-AFRICAN MPS BEING ELECTED IN STRAIGHT COMPETITION WITH AFRICAN CANDIDATES AS THE MAJORITY OF TANZANIANS HAVE NOW LEARNED TO JUDGE INDIVIDUALS ON THEIR OWN MERITS RATHER THAN AS MEMBERS OF A PARTICULAR RACE.

3. NYERERE BELIEVES THAT BRITAIN SHOULD PLAY A LEADING ROLE DURING THE CONFERENCE AND DURING THE INTERIM WHILE ELECTIONS ARE HELD AND THAT IT WOULD BE DISASTROUS IF WE WERE TO ACT SIMPLY AS AN IMPARTIAL AND NEUTRAL CHAIRMAN. THERE IS TOO MUCH ILL-FEELING BETWEEN THE INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL PARTIES FOR SUCH A COURSE TO BE SUCCESSFUL. NYERERE BELIEVES THAT WE SHOULD SEEK AS MUCH AGREEMENT

CONFIDENTIAL

| BETWEEN



# CONFIDENTIAL

BETWEEN THE PARTIES AS POSSIBLE AND BE WILLING TO COMPROMISE ON DETAILS OF OUR OWN IDEAS. IT IS HE SAYS "VITAL THAT BRITAIN SHOULD ACT FIRMLY AS THE DECOLONISING POWER IT IS. SHE MUST SHOW THAT SHE IS DETERMINED TO TRANSFER POWER TO PEOPLE ELECTED UNDER A CONSTITUTION WHICH BRITAIN CAN DEFEND AS DEMOCRATIC, AND WHICH THE COMMONWEALTH AND THE REST OF THE WORLD WILL RECOGNISE AS SUCH".

4. NYERERE'S FINAL POINT IS THAT BRITAIN SHOULD SATISFY ITSELF AND AFRICA THAT IT HAS SUFFICIENT AUTHORITY AND POWER ON THE GROUND IN RHODESIA TO RUN THE ELECTIONS. THIS IS IMPORTANT BECAUSE AGREEMENT AT THE CONFERENCE WILL BE AFFECTED BY THE CONFIDENCE PEOPLE ARE ABLE TO FEEL IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF ANY AGREEMENT. THE PRESIDENT CONCLUDES THAT HE STILL BELIEVES THERE IS A CHANCE OF SUCCESS AND HE INTENDED TO DO WHAT HE COULD TO IMPROVE THAT CHANCE WHEN HE MET THE PATRIOTIC FRONT LEADERS IN HAVANA.

5. MR FRASER'S REPLY DATED 6 SEPTEMBER EXPRESSES A BROAD MEASURE OF AGREEMENT WITH NYERERE'S POINTS. IN PARTICULAR HE ACCEPTS THAT WE WILL NEED TO TAKE AN ACTIVE AND RESOLUTE PART IN THE PROCEEDINGS AND EXPRESSES PARTICULAR INTEREST IN THE PRESIDENT'S COMMENTS ON THE COMMON ROLL.

TEBBIT

## FILES

RHOD D  
OADS  
N AM D  
NEWS D  
PUSD  
PLANNING STAFF  
ES & SD  
CCD  
FRD  
UND  
LEGAL ADVISERS  
(MR FREELAND)  
(MR FIFCOT)  
ECON D

PCD  
DEF D  
OID  
PS  
PS/SIR I GILMOUR  
PS/MR LUCE  
PS/MR RIDLEY  
PS/MR HURD  
PS/PUS  
SIR A DUFF  
LORD N G LENNOX  
MISS BROWN  
MR WILLSON  
MR BYATT

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION  
RHODESIA POLICY



-2-  
CONFIDENTIAL



10 DOWNING STREET

Prime Minister

You may like to see the  
attached copy of the speech  
with which the Foreign &  
Commonwealth Secretary will  
open the Constitutional  
Conference on Monday.

 Smith 7/9  




RHODESIA: CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE

It gives me great pleasure to welcome you to this Conference and to open its proceedings.

When the British Government issued invitations to this Conference on 14 August, after extensive consultations, we naturally hoped for and expected a positive response. Our consultations had revealed a strong desire that the United Kingdom should take the initiative in making a further attempt to achieve a final settlement of the problem of Rhodesia, in fulfilment of its constitutional responsibilities. There was also a widespread feeling that continuation or intensification of the war was not in the best interests of any of the parties to the dispute, nor of the people of Rhodesia as a whole. Nevertheless, it is no simple matter for those who have been involved in a bitter and tragic military confrontation to sit round a conference table together. The British Government felt strongly that it had the responsibility to bring that about.

cont'd

(2)

When inviting you here, we appealed to you, in the interests of the people of Rhodesia, to approach these negotiations in a positive spirit and to seek to build up areas of agreement. We hope thereby to lay the foundations for a free, independent and democratic society in which all the people of Rhodesia, irrespective of their race or political beliefs, would be able to live in security and at peace with each other and with their neighbours. The act of coming together is important. It is now up to us to build on that.

Since 1965, and long before, many meetings have been held to try to resolve this problem. I am under no illusions about the magnitude of the task before us. The problem is one which has defeated the efforts of successive British Governments, all of whom sought to achieve the objective of a peaceful settlement in conditions which would guarantee to the people of Rhodesia the full enjoyment of their rights. But I have no intention of going back over the history of those attempts; and I hope that you will also be prepared to look to the future rather than the past.

I would like to hope that there is a difference between this meeting and those which have preceded it. This is a

7constitutional



(3)

constitutional conference, the purpose of which is to decide the proper basis for the granting of legal independence to the people of Rhodesia. Many such constitutional conferences have been held in this place before. A great many former dependent territories of the United Kingdom have successfully made the transition to independent statehood on the basis of constitutions agreed here. It is our intention to approach this Conference on the basis of the same principles and with no less strong a determination to succeed than in the case of those other conferences, which resulted in the granting of independence by this country to our former dependent territories. I believe that we can take some pride in the part we have played at conferences held at Lancaster House in the process of decolonisation. As Commonwealth leaders agreed at Lusaka, Britain has had no lack of experience as a decolonising power.

The agreement reached at Lusaka has made it possible for the British Government to convene this Conference with the very real hope that it will lead to an internationally acceptable settlement. I would like to pay tribute to the Commonwealth Heads of Government and the Commonwealth Secretary-General, who worked so hard at Lusaka to  
/establish

(4)

establish an agreed position. In summary, the Commonwealth Heads of Government at Lusaka confirmed that they were wholly committed to genuine majority rule for the people of Rhodesia, and accepted that this requires the adoption of a democratic constitution including appropriate safeguards for minorities. They reiterated that it is the responsibility of the British Government to grant legal independence to Rhodesia. They agreed that the government formed under the independence constitution must be chosen through free and fair elections, properly supervised under British Government authority, and with Commonwealth observers. They welcomed the British Government's intention to convene this Conference, and recognised that the search for a settlement must involve all parties to the conflict. We should do well to bear in mind, throughout our discussions, the framework thus set out in the Lusaka communique. Not only does it incorporate the views of the British Government, but it sets out the approach which the Commonwealth will support and which will gain international acceptance.

Against this background I approach the search for a fair, constitutional settlement in Rhodesia with the  
/conviction



(5)

conviction that it is illusory to think that any settlement can fully satisfy the requirements of either side. An agreement can only be reached if there is a willingness to compromise.

The British Government has put to you an outline of the kind of constitution on the basis of which we would be prepared to grant independence. We wish to discuss these proposals with you at this Conference, and will be prepared to elaborate on them in the light of our discussions. If we can reach agreement at this Conference, there will be an end to the war. That is an outcome which I believe will be greeted with immense relief by the people of Rhodesia and throughout Africa. Rhodesia will proceed to legal independence with a government formed by whichever party and whichever leader can show that they command the confidence of the people. I must confess that I find it difficult to see how any party, group or leader can hope to benefit from what would follow failure to reach agreement along the general lines we have put before you, and those who would suffer most would be the people of

/Rhodesia

(6)

Rhodesia, towards whom our real responsibility lies.

A quarter of the population of Rhodesia has been born since 1965. Their lives have been overshadowed, not merely by a tragic and unnecessary political dispute, but by armed conflict. Many of them have died as innocent victims of the war, or they have lost their parents, brothers or sisters. Or they have lost their homes. Many of them, black and white, face the prospect of themselves having to fight, on one side or another, or of being deprived indefinitely of peaceful residence in the land of their birth - a quarter of a million people are now in refugee camps in other countries - if we, who are assembled in this room, cannot agree on the way to end the fighting and to provide for you to settle your differences by political means.

This generation now at risk had no part in the initial causes of the conflict. It was not born when the problem of Rhodesia came to a crisis in 1965. But now there is acceptance by all the parties of a society free from racial discrimination, of universal suffrage and majority rule. We can make this objective a reality if - and only if - we are prepared to

/100K



(7)

look at the problem on the basis of principles on which both sides should be able to agree.

I believe that the people assembled in this room have it in their power to end the war and to enable the people of Rhodesia to decide their future by peaceful means. We bear a heavy responsibility and I do not believe that the people of Rhodesia will readily forgive any party which deprives them of this opportunity to settle their future by peaceful means. This is a thought which should be in our minds throughout this Conference.

It is a matter of great regret and disappointment to me and my colleagues that hostilities are continuing during this Conference. Progress towards agreement on political issues - which I hope we are all determined to achieve - will by definition mean progress towards removing the causes of the war. It must be our objective to proceed as soon as possible to a stage at which there can be agreement on a ceasefire. We shall fall short of what we ought to achieve for the people of Rhodesia if we do not give them the chance to make a fresh start, its causes and its consequences put firmly in the past.

cont'd

Britain has at times been described on one side as choosing to stand with arms folded on the touchline; and on the other as not being serious in its determination to decolonise. Let me assure you today, if anyone is in doubt, that we could not be more serious in our intention to achieve a satisfactory basis for the granting of legal independence for the people of Rhodesia and in this attempt to bring about an end to the war.

We have engaged in extensive consultations on the best way of achieving these objectives. Lord Harlech visited Africa early in the life of this Government to consult with the parties to the dispute and with the Commonwealth and other African Governments most closely concerned. He found a general conviction that a solution to the problem of bringing Rhodesia to legal independence must stem from Britain as the constitutionally responsible authority and that we must put forward proposals to achieve that objective. He also found that there was criticism of the present constitutional arrangements, in particular of the blocking power given to the white minority over a wide range of legislation, and of the character of the Public Service and other Commissions.

cont'd



in the period of consultations, we made it clear that we would  
• attach particular importance to the Commonwealth Heads  
of Government meeting at Lusaka. At Lusaka, the British  
Prime Minister said that the British Government was wholly  
committed to genuine majority rule in Rhodesia. The principle  
of majority rule has been accepted by all the delegates to  
this Conference. The Prime Minister, at Lusaka, also  
recognised the importance of encouraging the European  
minority to remain as an integral part of the community.  
The Prime Minister emphasised that Britain fully accepted  
its constitutional responsibility to bring Rhodesia to legal  
independence on a basis of Justice and democracy,  
comparable with the arrangements we have made for the  
independence of other countries.

The British Government took action immediately to give effect to the  
Lusaka agreement by convening this Conference and by putting  
forward constitutional proposals in accordance with the  
principles which were agreed at Lusaka and which have  
formed the basis for other independence constitutions in  
Africa and elsewhere.

The constitution is the fundamental problem to which we must address

ourselves

ourselves. I am well aware that there are other aspects of a settlement which must in due course be resolved. But it is essential to the prospects of success that we should first seek agreement on our destination - which is the independence constitution. If that can be achieved, I am confident that it will be possible to agree on the arrangements to give effect to that agreement and the British Government has stated clearly that it will be prepared to accept its full share of the responsibility for its implementation.

The British Government's outline proposals for an independence constitution have been before you for four weeks. I did not suggest that this Conference should be held on the basis of prior acceptance of this document. Instead, I would like to take the document as the starting point for our discussions. The British Government have been asked to put forward proposals and we have done so. Unless there is a focus for our discussion, it will be impossible to make progress.

There are certain general points which I could make in introducing them.

cont'd



First, as the constitutional authority for Southern Rhodesia, the United Kingdom intends to take direct responsibility for the independence constitution. What you have before you are the British Government's proposals, taking account of the points made to us in our consultations. They are intended to give effect to the principles which have been accepted by successive British Governments as the proper basis for independence. Those principles are that the principle of majority rule must be maintained and guaranteed; that there must be guarantees against retrogressive amendments of the constitution; that there should be immediate improvement in the political status of the African population; that racial discrimination is unacceptable; that we must ensure that, regardless of race, there is no oppression of majority by minority or of minority by majority; and that what is agreed must be shown to be acceptable to the people of Rhodesia.

Second, our proposals are comparable to the basis on which the United Kingdom has granted independence to other former dependent territories, in particular those in Africa. We have no doubt, therefore, that a solution on this basis will be accepted by the international community, as giving effect to the principles we have accepted in granting independence to our other former dependent

territories. In the case of Rhodesia, as in all other cases, a constitution must take account of special circumstances. But the broad lines of independence constitutions are clear enough; and in the precedents there are points which can help us towards a solution, for example on the representation of minorities.

Third, we have made it unequivocally clear that our constitutional proposals represent in outline the kind of constitution on the basis of which the British Government would be prepared to grant legal independence. If agreement could be reached on alternative proposals which meet the British Government's criteria, we would be ready to grant independence on that basis. But we believe that the best hope of success lies in negotiation on the lines we have proposed, in accordance with the Commonwealth agreement.

If it is possible to get agreement on the general framework for the independence constitution, the British Government will be prepared to put forward more detailed proposals to give effect to that agreement. We shall therefore have further suggestions to put before the Conference. But, before we advance to that stage, we must establish what measure of  
/agreement



agreement exists on the outline proposals, and where the major difficulties will lie. As the first step, therefore, I shall hope to hear your views on the outline proposals.

Before inviting you in our next session to state your positions on the constitutional framework for independence, I would like to speak briefly about the arrangements to give effect to an agreement on the constitution.

In other countries approaching independence, the United Kingdom's role has invariably been to establish just conditions for independence, not to encourage the aspirations of this or that party. Our role in Rhodesia will be the same as in other dependent territories. The international community is well aware of this and of our constitutional responsibility. In many countries we have handed over power to people who had previously been confirmed opponents of the policy of the United Kingdom, if they have been elected by the people of their countries. In the position which we agreed with other Commonwealth Governments at Lusaka, we stated that there must be free and fair elections, properly supervised under British Government authority and with Commonwealth observers. This has been accepted by all Commonwealth Governments.

cont'd

I turn now briefly to the way in which we might proceed at this conference. The Conference is being held under my chairmanship. I attach the highest priority to bringing it to a successful conclusion, and I intend to play the fullest part in the proceedings. At times when I am prevented from being here, I would propose to ask the Lord Privy Seal, Sir Ian Gilmour, to take the Chair.

We have made no attempt to fix the duration of the Conference. I hope that we can move forward rapidly. I trust that we can show real progress towards agreement on the constitution. We for our part are prepared to continue for as long as is necessary provided of course that progress is being made. In the opening plenary sessions I would ask you to set out fully your views on constitutional questions and on the outline proposals before the Conference, as I have done. Depending on the progress made, it might then be appropriate to consider aspects of the constitution in more detail, perhaps on the basis of further proposals tabled by the British Government. We may also wish to consider meeting in less formal groups at different levels. We shall have to decide on this as we proceed.

cont'd



The Conference Secretariat, headed by the Conference Secretary, Mr Willson, is at the service of all delegates. Any questions on administrative arrangements should be referred to Mr Willson and the Conference Officers assisting him.

The Secretariat will prepare summary records of discussions in the formal conference sessions, that is to say records which give a resume of the main points made by each speaker. They will circulate these records within 24 hours. If you wish to make corrections of substance to your own interventions, please do so within two days. These will also be circulated. The summary records will not be made available to the press.

There will be world-wide interest in the progress of the Conference. A great many journalists have been accredited to it. I shall be making public my own statement this afternoon; you may wish to do the same with your opening speeches. The press will not be admitted to Lancaster House, but there is a fully equipped press centre across the road. This is at the disposal of all delegations. Mr Fenn will act as my spokesman as Chairman of the Conference. He will also release to the press any joint statements on which we may

/from

(16)

from time to time agree. I invite each delegation to nominate a member of their staff as Press Secretary, to be in touch with Mr Fenn about these matters. They will of course be welcome to make use of the facilities at the press centre.

If there are other papers which you wish to have circulated to all participants, the Secretariat will be ready to have them reproduced and distributed as Conference documents.

In conclusion:

- a. this Conference has been convened in response to the statement agreed by the Commonwealth Heads of Government at Lusaka;
- b. we have put forward proposals designed to bring Rhodesia to legal independence;
- c. your acceptance of our invitation has given hope to the people of Rhodesia and the neighbouring countries;
- d. it is within the power of the parties represented here to bring an end to the war.

cont'd



I have deliberately avoided talking of a "last chance" of a settlement. Last chances have come and gone before. I would put it differently. Since Geneva the conflict has reached new levels. The cost of continuing it is very high. Since 1976 the number of men under arms on both sides has more than doubled. The war has spread into neighbouring states. The toll in casualties inside Rhodesia and in the neighbouring countries has continued to rise. Neither side has infinite resources. The price of failure at this Conference would be further prolonged bloodshed and further destruction of the life of whole communities. The responsibility for preventing this lies upon all those present here. The eyes of the international community will be upon us all to see that we live up to that responsibility. The British Government is determined for its part to do everything in its power to bring this Conference to a successful conclusion. It is in that spirit that I would ask you also to address the task before us.



Prime Minister

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

I think this reflects your  
 discussion with the Foreign &  
 Commonwealth Secretary 10 days ago. 7 September 1979  
 Agree general line, subject to developments?

Dear Michael,

Am: 7/9

Yes ok

Rhodesia: Constitutional Conference

You asked for Lord Carrington's advice on the Prime Minister's role in relation to the Constitutional Conference.

We understand that the Prime Minister will attend, for a short time, the reception for delegates at 18.00 on 10 September. Lord Carrington very much welcomes this. It will demonstrate her close interest in the Conference and give the participants the opportunity to meet her.

Apart from this, Lord Carrington thinks that it would be best for the Prime Minister to hold herself in reserve during the first week. Both sides are likely to appeal to her and to seek bilateral meetings. To agree to such meetings would risk running the Conference in effect at two levels. In Lord Carrington's view, it would be a mistake to agree to any bilateral meetings until it has become clear what the crucial points to be resolved are.

The Prime Minister's meeting with President Nyerere on the evening of 14 September will, however, be of particular importance as an opportunity to explain to him the proposals we shall probably by then have tabled and to persuade him to use his influence with the Patriotic Front leaders to negotiate seriously on them. We shall be submitting full briefing for this meeting in the light of progress at the Conference.

At a later stage, probably during the second week, there may well be a strong case for the Prime Minister to see the delegations separately (or possibly to give separate lunches for them). It might indeed be that a critical stage was reached during that week at which it would be advisable for the Prime Minister to intervene directly in order to emphasise that the British Government were, at the highest level, making every effort to reach an agreed solution.

Lord Carrington will not be able to make firm recommendations on these points until he has tested the temperature of the Conference next week. He would aim to let the Prime Minister have his further thoughts and firm recommendations about bilateral meetings and lunches towards the end of the week.

Yours ever  
 Roderic Lyne

M O'DB Alexander Esq  
 10 Downing Street

(R M J Lyne)  
 Private Secretary



LIBRARY  
OF THE  
BUREAU OF  
LAND MANAGEMENT  
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF  
THE INTERIOR

17 SEP 1979



00  
FCS/79/148

CHANCELLOR OF THE DUCHY OF LANCASTER

NKR17

1/2/75

Southern Rhodesia: Incependence  
Bill

1. If we succeed in reaching agreement at the forthcoming Constitutional Conference on an independence constitution for Rhodesia, we shall want to be ready to introduce a Rhodesia Independence Bill without delay.
2. I have therefore instructed my officials to put in hand inter-departmental consultation on the precise terms of instructions to Parliamentary Counsel. The position of Rhodesia, both before and after 1965, was anomalous and it will not be a case of merely following earlier independence Bills. The main provision would, however, follow the pattern. It would establish the new State and withdraw UK jurisdiction. The Constitution would be set-out in a separate Order in Council and the Bill would need to confer power to make such an Order. The Bill would also repeal the Southern Rhodesia Act 1965. Enabling powers would be taken to allow consequential amendments to United Kingdom law arising from Southern Rhodesia's changed status and the revocation of sanctions.
3. The legislation may also need to provide for a transitional period of 2 or 3 years after independence during which Rhodesians would continue to enjoy the rights and privileges of Commonwealth citizens. This will be necessary to avoid hardship for individuals if on independence Rhodesia is not accepted into the Commonwealth (which is a possibility we must reckon with). Similar provision was made for South Africa and Pakistan at the time they left the Commonwealth.
4. We shall want the Bill to provide a general amnesty and indemnity from civil action for political and sanctions offences committed during the period of illegality. We shall look to the Rhodesians to enact a similar measure. This is something which we shall need to negotiate with them once it is clear that

/ agreement





agreement on a constitution can be reached. If we are proceeding to a settlement with the internal parties alone, we should have to expect such a provision to attract criticism elsewhere in Africa. Against the background of controversy over the role of Shell and BP in supplying oil to Rhodesia, there might also be criticism in Parliament. But I believe a general amnesty to be essential if we are to wipe the slate clean and make a fresh start.

5. Geoffrey Howe has already put on record the importance of obtaining from a "legal" Rhodesian Government an acknowledgement of responsibility for Rhodesia's pre-UDI debts. We shall want to incorporate something on this into our legislation, if possible, though the principal instrument dealing with this aspect will probably have to be an Exchange of Notes with the newly independent Zimbabwe administration. This again will be a subject for negotiation once adequate constitutional arrangements are agreed.

6. A number of these issues can be settled only after the Conference and the negotiations which will follow it. But I should be grateful for your agreement to instruct Parliamentary Counsel to begin preparatory work on a draft Bill now on the lines suggested above, so that we can bring it forward quickly when the need arises.

7. I am copying this minute to the Prime Minister, the Lord President, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, the Home Secretary, the Lord Chancellor, the Attorney-General, the Chief Whip, the First Parliamentary Counsel and to Sir John Hunt.

C

(CARRINGTON)

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

7 September 1979

CONFIDENTIAL



-7 SEP 1979



4



Prime Minister:

LA Amt

(2)

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

You asked for an assessment of Mr Mugabe's character + likely role at the conference. This is attached. You may like to see the notes on the other principal participants.

*[Handwritten signature]*

Dear Michael, 6 September 1979  
LA 7/5

RHODESIA: ATTITUDES OF THE PARTIES AND OF THE "FRONT LINE" STATES

--- I attach notes on the attitudes likely to be adopted by the Salisbury and Patriotic Front delegations in the opening stages of the Constitutional Conference, with an account of the attitudes of the "front line" States. Separate personality notes on the principal participants are also attached.

--- You will have seen Mirimba Salisbury telegram no 622 (enclosed) reporting that General Walls has urged Bishop Muzorewa to take this opportunity to achieve a settlement.

Lord Carrington will be seeing the special representatives of President Kaunda (Mr Mark Chona) and President Machel (Mr Cabaco and Mr Honwana) together with the High Commissioners of Nigeria, Tanzania and Botswana and the Commonwealth Secretary-General on the morning of 10 September, before the Conference begins.

yours ever  
Rodrick Lyne

(R M J Lyne)

M O'D B Alexander Esq  
10 Downing Street

1  
2  
3  
4  
5  
6  
7  
8  
9  
10  
11  
12

-7 SEP 1979

-7 SEP 1979



RHODESIA: CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE  
ATTITUDES OF THE PARTIES

THE PATRIOTIC FRONT

A. ZANU (MUGABE)

1. The indications from intelligence and other sources are that ZANU, as expected, will not be coming to the Conference with any intention of negotiating seriously for an agreement. Mr Mugabe, influenced by the experience of FRELIMO in Mozambique, knows that to win a guerrilla war it is not necessary to defeat the Rhodesian security forces in the field (which is beyond his capacity); it is sufficient to go on fighting until the other side has had enough. He now has 11,000 men fighting inside Rhodesia with some 15,000 in reserve. It is more difficult for the Rhodesians to hit targets in Mozambique than Zambia and Mugabe's army (ZANLA) are more adept in the use of genuine guerrilla tactics, avoiding large concentrations. He has the support of the Mozambique government and also, though less unequivocally, of Nyerere. If the military pressure exerted by ZANLA can be sustained and increased, a point could come at which the white exodus would become a flood and victory would be attainable. But he is conscious that he could at that stage find himself in a military confrontation with Nkomo; and of the risk of South African intervention.

2. Mugabe is likely to adopt an intransigent attitude at the Conference. This is in his nature: he has never shown himself ready to compromise. His political strength lies partly in the fact that, alone among the nationalist leaders, he has never been caught negotiating with Mr Smith. He was able to exploit to Nkomo's disadvantage the latter's last attempt to negotiate with Mr Smith in August 1978. Mugabe believes, probably rightly, that he could win an election against Nkomo (being a Shona he has a wider tribal base) and

/that

that the longer the war goes on the stronger his position will become. Mugabe will be adamant in his insistence that the Patriotic Front should exert effective control over the administration before new elections are held and that the future army must be "based on the liberation forces". He will also seek to argue that there should be no separate white representation at all and no amnesty. He will not want any constraints of the kind we have normally written into independence constitutions. Much is sometimes made of Mugabe's Catholic education, which has certainly influenced his cast of thought. But he is a committed Marxist, though not of the pro-Soviet type. ZANLA receive no direct military support from the Soviet Union(though they do have access to older Soviet equipment supplied to them by the Mozambicans, Ethiopians and others). Mugabe dislikes and distrusts the Soviet government because of their support for Nkomo. He is intellectually in a much higher category than either Nkomo or Muzorewa. He is at present in more effective control of ZANU than in the past, though it is a collective leadership, within which he depends on Tekere (Secretary-General) and the military commander, Tongogara. Most of his senior colleagues are much less intellectually impressive than Mugabe, and even more inflexible. Mugabe is contemptuous of Nkomo whom he regards as an opportunist; but he will be concerned to maintain the semblance at least of Patriotic Front unity throughout the Conference and to drag Nkomo with him in a refusal to participate in new elections held under our authority. Mugabe would be in serious difficulty, both politically and militarily, if Nkomo agreed to participate while ZANU tried to continue fighting.



MUGABE, ROBERT GABRIEL

President ZANU (Mugabe)

Born Zuimba TTL, 1924. A Zezuru. Related to Chikerema (qv). Educated at Kutama and Empaneni Roman Catholic missions and trained as a teacher. Taught at Todd's Dadaya mission with the Rev Sithole (qv) after leaving Kutama over a pay dispute. Went to Fort Hare University, where he got a BA in 1951. Obtained two further degrees by private study. Taught in Salisbury until 1954 when he went to Northern Rhodesia. In 1956 went to Ghana, where he taught at the University College and married a Ghanaian.

Returned to Rhodesia May 1960 and joined NDP as publicity secretary and chairman of its first congress, where he made mark by his radical speeches. Also publicity secretary and later Vice President of ZAPU. In charge of the Zimbabwe Liberation Army, which was ZAPU's underground wing, carrying out sabotage. After the banning of ZAPU in 1962 opposed Nkomo. Failed to oust him and set up ZANU with the Rev Sithole. Went abroad to canvass for ZANU; and then returned to Rhodesia in December 1963, when he was arrested and sentenced for making a subversive speech. Remained in detention until December 1974, when he was released following the Lusaka agreement. Later left Rhodesia and is now based in Maputo. In 1976 ousted Rev Sithole to become leader of ZANU. In October 1976 linked with ZAPU to form an alliance known as the Patriotic Front. Attended 1976 Geneva Conference as joint leader with Nkomo of PF delegation and has been involved in subsequent settlement moves. Seen by both Dr Owen and officials in 1977 and with Nkomo met Dr Owen and Mr Young in Malta January/February and Dr Owen and Mr Vance in Dar es Salaam in April 1978 for discussions of the Anglo/US proposals. Visited China in 1977 and 1978, but has recently made frequent visits to Eastern Europe, and Cuba.

An uncompromising nationalist who is held in wide respect for his integrity even by ZAPU supporters. Some believe he is still a practising Catholic but he has strong Marxist leanings and has caused concern among Whites and moderate Blacks about the measures he would take if he came to power. Has experienced internal problems with ZANU in Mozambique, but a showdown in early 1978 in which prominent ZANU members such as Hamadziripi and Gumbo were arrested may have strengthened his position. There is some evidence that the Mozambique authorities may be cooling towards Mugabe, preferring his colleague Tongogara. Influenced by his Ghanaian experience, emphasises the "back to Africa" aspects of nationalism, especially no shoes and fur hats. Seen by the Pearce Commission to whom he presented strong anti-settlement memorandum.

Mugabe's wife, a fire-brand in her own right, lived in Ghana for some time while he was in Mozambique, but has now re-joined him.

## B. ZAFU (NKOMO)

1. The indications from intelligence and other sources are that Nkomo will be under considerable pressure from the Zambians and elements within his own party to negotiate seriously at the Conference. But he will be concerned not to appear to be being out-flanked by Mugabe or to be exposed to accusations of splitting the Patriotic Front. It is difficult to predict how he will re-act to these contradictory pressures. He may at the outset adopt a blustering and intransigent approach. But whereas Mugabe tends to take the same line in public and in private, Nkomo can be expected to give a number of private indications that he may be prepared to participate in new elections. The leading "moderate" members of his party (Chinamano and Chambati) will be urging him to do so, provided they are satisfied that the pre-independence arrangements would give ZAFU a fair chance.

2. Nkomo at present has only about 2,800 men inside Rhodesia, but over 20,000 in Zambia. His troops are better equipped (by the Soviet Union) than those of Mugabe; but various plans for a conventional offensive have come to nothing in the face of Rhodesian air attacks.

3. Nkomo's strength lies in the fact that as the traditional nationalist leader he enjoys considerably more support in the OAU than Mugabe. He also has direct Soviet support. A settlement involving Nkomo (but excluding Mugabe) would get widespread support elsewhere in Africa. Nkomo dislikes and affects to despise the doctrinaire and physically unimpressive Mugabe but, in recent years, has been steadily out-manoeuvred by him. Nkomo launched a serious attempt in December 1975 to negotiate an orderly transition to majority rule with Mr Smith and it was only after the breakdown of that attempt in March 1976 that he took up the "armed struggle", from which he had been isolated in any case during his ten years in detention (1964-74). His forces (ZIPRA) are more vulnerable to

/Rhodesian



Rhodesian attack than those of Mugabe, because some of the units are formed on "conventional" lines and it is easier for the Rhodesians to attack bases in Zambia (where they have better intelligence). ZIPRA's strategy, in the event of a collapse inside Rhodesia, would be to use their conventional units to put themselves in a position to dictate terms to ZANU.

4. There has been an erosion of Nkomo's support inside Rhodesia, as Muzorewa and Mugabe have established themselves as the Shona leaders. But Nkomo still enjoys general support among the Ndebele (20% of the population) and there could be a rapid revival in his political fortunes if he returned to Rhodesia as the "peace-maker". He also has among his lieutenants some of the ablest and - in the past - most moderate of the older nationalist leaders. Despite President Kaunda's strong personal support for Nkomo there is a good deal of discontent in both Zambia and Botswana at the ill-disciplined activities of Nkomo's forces. He will not therefore want to put himself in a position where a failure of the Conference is attributed to him, to an extent which could affect Kaunda's continuing support. He will oppose the idea that up to 20% of the Parliament should be elected by whites on a separate roll. But he is likely to attach most importance to the pre-independence arrangements (that elections should not be influenced by the present administration, Muzorewa should not be permitted to campaign as "Prime Minister" and there must be a UN or Commonwealth force).

CONFIDENTIAL

NKOMO, JOSHUA MQABUKO NYONBOLO

PRESIDENT, ZAPU

Born June 1917 in Malopa (Matabeleland) of humble Matabele (or, as some have it, Kalanga Shona) origin. Educated at Trolotto School, Adams College, Natal and the Jan Hofmeyr School of Social Work, Johannesburg. Subsequently took Social Science degree through correspondence course.

Worked as a carpenter and driver. Came to prominence initially through Trade Union movement and was General Secretary of Rhodesia Railways African Employees Association in early 1950's. In 1951 elected President-General of the first African National Congress. In April 1952 accompanied Sir Godfrey Huggins to London Conference on Federation to represent African opinion, and subsequently stood unsuccessfully for Federal Parliament. When the African National Congress was reformed in 1957, Nkomo was elected President. He subsequently occupied the same position with successor parties, the National Democratic Party and ZAPU. Both parties were banned in turn.

In 1961 Nkomo led an NDP delegation to the 1961 Constitutional Conference and initially agreed to work the 1961 Constitution. This proved to be unpopular with his followers and Nkomo reneged on his earlier agreement. He went on to urge Africans to refrain from registering as voters and to boycott elections, with disastrous results for the African Nationalist movement. In July 1963 growing dissatisfaction with Nkomo's leadership ( he had twice been out of the country when his party was banned and was suspected of personal cowardice) led to a split in the National ranks and the formation of rival parties: ZAPU led by Nkomo and ZANU led by Rev Sithole (qv). After months of inter-factional violence between these groups, both were banned and Nkomo himself was restricted to Gonakudzingwa (April 1964). He was quite unwilling to accept the Fearless terms or 1971 proposals. Seen by Sir Alec Douglas-Home in November 1971 and Pearce Commission, to whom he presented a memorandum remarkable for its lack of bitterness. Moved from Gonaku dzingwa to Buffalo Range June 1974.

Released in December 1974 to attend Lusaka talks. Remained in the background for several months after his release working at grass roots level to enlarge his personal support. Attended Kingston-Heads of Government Meeting June 1975.

Returned to Rhodesia after attending abortive Victoria Falls talks. Denounced reformed external wing (Zimbabwe Liberation Council) and called ANC National Congress in Salisbury in September 1975, at which he was elected President.

Opened constitutional discussions with Smith in December 1975 and for his pains was bitterly criticised for a "sell-out" by

/African

CONFIDENTIAL



African nationalists outside the ZAPU tradition. In fact Nkomo's approach to the negotiations was both principled and shrewd, and involved no compromise with the objective of early majority rule. Although many believed that a breakthrough was imminent just before the negotiations ended in failure in March 1976, it now seems fairly clear that there was no serious intention on Smith's part to make real concessions to nationalist aspirations. Following the breakdown of his discussions with Smith, Nkomo became progressively more extreme in his public statements and immediately before the Geneva Conference formed a loose alliance with Robert Mugabe's breakaway ZANU known as the Patriotic Front. Was again widely criticised when his secret discussions with Smith in 1977 and 1978 became public knowledge: great strain was thrown on ZAPU/ZANU relations. Now based outside Rhodesia, Nkomo devotes most of his energies to touring world capitals championing ZAPU's cause and seeking funds for his party. The Soviet Union and Cuba have been particularly forthcoming in terms of military assistance. A regular visitor to London, Nkomo has been received on several occasions by successive Secretaries of State and by Mr Callaghan as Prime Minister. With Mugabe, he had talks with Dr Owen and Mr Young in Malta in January/February and with Dr Owen and Mr Vance in Dar es Salaam in April 1978 on arrangements for the transition period under the Anglo-US proposals.

Nkomo is, of all the older generation of nationalist politicians, the one who is most congenial to President Kaunda and the only one who has shown himself capable of real statesmanship. He is first and foremost a nationalist and his pragmatism contrasts with Mugabe's ideological commitment.

Nkomo is grossly overweight ( some say deliberate over-provision of food and drink during his detention contributed to his obesity) and is now making efforts to follow an abstemious diet which excludes meat and most forms of alcohol.

He is married with children.

## THE SALISBURY DELEGATION

## A. BISHOP MUZOREWA

1. When the Prime Minister saw Bishop Muzorewa on 13 July she made clear to him that the independence Constitution would have to be comparable to the constitutions which we had given other African countries at independence; the Constitution would have to be seen to have originated with and to be approved by the United Kingdom; and there would have to be a demonstration of the acceptability by the people of Rhodesia of what had been agreed. On this basis we would not permit any other party to exercise a veto over a settlement. Muzorewa is therefore in no doubt about the basis on which we will be prepared to grant legal independence.

2. As he demonstrated in the April elections, Muzorewa has extensive political support in the Shona population (though virtually none in Matabeleland). He has a well-organised party machine, some able lieutenants and is not regarded as an opportunist like Sithole or Chikerema. He has a genuine commitment to a solution in which the white community would be able to play a full part.

3. Muzorewa and the other UANC Ministers would, for their part, have no difficulty in accepting the kind of constitutional changes we regard as indispensable. But they are concerned that if they lose the support of the defence commanders, they would no longer be able to hold off the Patriotic Front. There are signs that Muzorewa's inability since the April elections to bring about changes affecting the lives of the African population generally may be losing him some support. He is also concerned about the attitude of Sithole, Chikerema (leading a break-away faction of his own party) and Ndiweni. He realises that we have been doing what we can to bolster his authority, both in public statements and in leaving in his

/hands



hands the composition of the Salisbury delegation.

4. Muzorewa is not a decisive leader. He will be looking to us to fight his battles for him both vis-à-vis the Patriotic Front and the Rhodesia Front. He will not be able to impose his own views on the Rhodesia Front Ministers. But he will realise that it is essential to his own prospects of political survival to be seen to be making progress towards a settlement and the lifting of sanctions. He will at the outset make a strong defence of the existing Constitution, but is well aware that we will not be prepared to grant independence on that basis. We shall be impressing on him the need at every stage in the Conference for him to be seen to be adopting a reasonable attitude in the face of Patriotic Front intransigence. He will be worried about any combination involving Nkomo, which could threaten his political position. He will also show resistance to the idea of a new election, but has said publicly that he would be prepared to accept this if it would help to win international recognition and bring an end to the war. He would be well-placed to win such an election if he is able to show that he has succeeded in negotiating the arrangements for legal independence and the lifting of sanctions.

CONFIDENTIAL

MUZOREWA, BISHOP ABEL TENDEKAYI

Prime Minister in the Administration set up after the April 1979 Elections

President UANC

Born 1925 at Old Umtali with help of United (American) Methodist missionary doctors. Eldest child of a Manica peasant. Educated at Old Umtali mission and underwent theological training. Ordained deacon in the American Methodist Church in 1955 and elder in 1957. Spent 1958-68 in the USA obtaining BA in theology at Central Methodist College, Missouri, and MA at Nashville, Scarrit College. In 1968 elected first African Bishop in Rhodesia over the head of another African who was acting as Bishop after Bishop Dodge had been deported in 1964. Because he criticised the LTA he was banned in 1970 from entering Tribal Trust Lands by a restriction order which is still in force.

Approached by ZANU ex-detainees to lead the ANC in December 1971, and after 3 weeks hesitation because of his doubts about combining church and political work, became chairman of the ANC. Although seen at first as a front man, put up to make the ANC look respectable, he developed considerably in stature by his visit to the UK and USA in February 1972, during which he addressed the Security Council in strong terms. Came through London again just before Pearce report was published and was seen by Sir Alec Douglas-Home. Went abroad in July 1972 to East Africa for the All Africa Conference of Churches, of which he had been elected president in March, and on to West Africa where he was seen by General Gowon. Fell ill with a stomach ulcer on his return and spent 2 months in Nyadiri Mission Hospital. Rhodesian authorities then took away his passport to prevent him going abroad to lobby for the ANC. Re-elected (for another 4 years) UMC Bishop for Rhodesia at Methodist Conference in Malawi, September 1972. Met Lance Smith secretly in November 1972, and from July 1972 to May 1973 engaged in negotiations with Mr Smith. Although ANC Central Committee rejected Mr Smith's proposals in June 1974, Muzorewa's image was somewhat tarnished by revelations of his dealings with Smith and he was attacked by ZANU and ZAPU. Awarded UN Peace Prize 1973 but unable to go to New York to receive it.

Emerges as compromise President of post-Lusaka enlarged ANC in December 1974. Led ANC delegation to the Victoria Falls talks in August 1975. His weak leadership of the ANC contributed to the split in the leadership in September 1975. Later threw in his lot with the Sithole/Chikerema faction and, influenced by them, became increasingly militant. Repeatedly voiced his criticism of discussions held between Joshua Nkomo (qv) and Ian Smith (qv) 1975/6. Led delegation to Geneva Conference 1976. Reportedly offered a place in his delegation to Sithole (qv) who declined. Gained in popularity inside Rhodesia during 1976-1977 and by late 1977

/had

CONFIDENTIAL



had attracted Chikerema (qv) and Nyandoro to his cause. Seen by Dr Owen in both London and Salisbury 1977. With Sithole and Chief Chirau opened "internal" negotiations with Mr Smith in December 1977. Signatory with them of the internal settlement agreement on 3 March 1978 and joined with them in forming Executive Council on 21 March. Sworn in as Prime Minister of Zimbabwe Rhodesia on 29 May 1979.

A man of integrity and principle, he lacks political skill and can be indecisive. Almost invariably overshadowed in discussion by colleagues and rivals alike. Retains considerable influence as one of the traditional leaders of the Rhodesian nationalist movement. Claims support among ZANU (Mugabe) guerrillas, but despised to some extent by the Front Line Presidents and the external nationalists. Many of them recognise his following, however, and would like to see him "saved" rather than, as they forecast, sink with the internal agreement. Has marked personal antipathy for Nkomo. His critics say he is over-influenced by his kinsmen and fellow Manica tribesmen.

Married with 5 sons, whose passport problems are a thorn in the side of British officials. Wife is a capable organiser.

## B. THE WHITE COMMUNITY

1. Mr Ian Smith will come to the Conference with the intention of winning the political argument with the Patriotic Front, but also with the object of emerging with little or no change to the present Constitution. The defence commanders did not support his inclusion in the Salisbury delegation and his presence will render it <sup>more</sup> difficult for Muzorewa to present himself as the real leader of his delegation.

2. Mr Smith has brought off the extraordinary feat of defying most of the rest of the international community for fifteen years, but has only been prepared to concede majority rule at a stage at which the security situation was already almost out of control. His deferment of the elections which were due to be held in December 1978 caused serious problems for Muzorewa. It was only under strong pressure from the South Africans that he went ahead with them in April 1979. He promised the South African Prime Minister and stated publicly that he would withdraw from politics before the April elections, and subsequently gave equally firm undertakings not to participate in the government thereafter. His present stated intention is to withdraw from politics once legal independence has been achieved and sanctions are lifted. His endorsement of a settlement would, however, be an important element in the maintenance of the confidence of the white community. His withdrawal from the Government could also be a useful element in presenting a settlement to moderate international opinion.

3. Mr Smith will hope that as the November date for the renewal of Section 2 of the Southern Rhodesia Act approaches the Government will be under pressure to accept only minor changes to the Constitution (and no demonstration of its /acceptability).



acceptability). It will be essential to disabuse him of any illusions on this score. Mr David Smith, who will be accompanying him, is likely to be prepared to accept reasonable constitutional change. But it will be difficult to get him to stand up to Ian Smith on any issue of consequence.

4. General Walls has told Muzorewa that it is extremely important that this opportunity to find a solution should be seized. He does not appear himself to see serious difficulty about our proposals for constitutional change. He believes that the Rhodesian forces can contain the security situation, though Mugabe's guerrillas are exerting increasing pressure. The business and farmers' leaders are also anxious for a settlement.

5. The white officials in the Salisbury delegation will negotiate to preserve as much as possible of the existing constitution, in particular the numerous provisions which give them effective control over the administration, judiciary and the defence forces. It will be possible to reassure them that we have very much in mind the need to preserve standards of efficiency in the civil service, within which senior appointments must, however, be under ultimate governmental control. They will negotiate with considerable intransigence, but will be doing so against the background of a political and military situation which could deteriorate rapidly if no settlement is in sight; and the fact that the real pressure on the white community is exerted by the war.

SMITH, IAN DOUGLAS

Minister without Portfolio under Bishop Muzurewa in the Administration set up after the April 1979 elections; President of the Rhodesian Front.

Born 8 April 1919 at Selukwe mining camp near Gwelo, third child of an immigrant Scots miner, who later turned to farming and business, and was awarded MBE for his services to Selukwe. Educated Selukwe School; Chaplin School, Gwelo; Rhodes University, Grahamstown, South Africa. Served in RAF 1941-4 (130 Squadron RAF and 237 (Rhodesia) Squadron) and reached the rank of Flight Lieutenant. Severely injured in a take-off crash in North Africa in 1943 and shot down over enemy territory in Italy in 1944. Escaped after 6 months in hiding.

Started farming at Selukwe and elected Liberal Party MP, 1948. Elected to Federal Parliament in 1953 as member of UFP. Appointed Chief Whip by Welensky 1958. Resigned from UFP in 1961. Founder member of the RF. RF member of Southern Rhodesian Legislative Assembly for Umzingwane (Matabeleland) and Minister of the Treasury from 1962. Replaced Field as Prime Minister, and President of the RF 13 April 1964. Declared IDI 11 November 1965.

Not well known before 1964 but subsequently commanded near-worship from the majority of whites and carried all before him up to 1972. The test of acceptability, the re-emergence of the terrorist threat, the closure of the border with Zambia and the internal agreement of March 1978 have since provoked considerable criticism, but he has no obvious successor within the RF and unless there is a settlement, his opponents outside the RF will find his uncanny instinct for gauging popular feeling difficult to challenge. Won 1974 general election with ease, being returned unopposed in his own constituency. Although persuaded by the South Africans to take part in Mr Vorster's "detente" exercise and to release from detention and negotiate with the principal African leaders, he succeeded for some time in withstanding pressure to make meaningful concessions and skilfully exploited divisions in the African ranks. However, the various pressures, economic and political, eventually forced him to recognise the writing on the wall: he announced his acceptance of majority rule and initiated talks with three African leaders late 1977 which resulted in the Salisbury Constitutional Agreement of 3 March 1978, under which a transitional "Government" was set up and an independence date pledged at the end of 1978. The agreement over-insured the white position and many remain sceptical about his commitment to true majority rule. In 1978 he announced his intention of retiring from political life, but later stayed on, as he said to reassure white citizens that their interests would be protected. He may retire soon if he feels confident that he can leave behind a system which will provide whites with a secure position.

/He



CONFIDENTIAL

He has aged considerably over the past few years, but is said to be still quite fit, keeping very simple outdoor habits.

Married with 2 step-children and one son of his own, who was convicted on a drugs charge in 1971 but has now been "converted" into a staunch MRA supporter. His wife, Janet, a South African widow, is a woman of personal ambition and reactionary views, and has considerable influence on him. Mrs Smith's sister is married to Mr Owen Horwood, South African Minister of Finance.

CONFIDENTIAL

## C. OTHER PARTIES

1. Sithole will support the kind of constitutional changes we have in mind, though there is a danger that he will try to play a maverick role at the Conference. We have told him that it would be extremely unwise of him to put forward proposals (as he intended to do) for a transitional administration until agreement has been reached on the outline independence Constitution. He has been flirting, through his connection with Mr Rowland ~~of~~ Lonrho, with some kind of alliance with Nkomo, involving also Chikerema and, possibly, Ndiweni. Nkomo would only be interested in such an alliance on his own terms. Sithole detests Mugabe, who supplanted him as leader of ZANU.

2. Chief Ndiweni will try to use the Conference to put forward ideas for a Constitution giving greater representation to Matabeleland; and will be hoping to see an agreement involving Nkomo (as the real Ndebele leader).

## [Note:

It will be apparent from the above that if the Salisbury delegation find themselves in an awkward position because of the intransigence of the Rhodesia Front, this is likely to put considerable strain on the cohesion of the various elements of the governing coalition.]



SITHOLE, REVEREND NDABANINGI

President ZANU (Sithole)

Born 31 July 1920 near Shabani of Shangaan father and Matabele mother. Attended a Wesleyan school in 1932; resumed schooling at Todd's Dadaya Mission 1935. In 1939 went to Waddilove Teacher Training Institute. Became a teacher at Dadaya Mission; appointed assistant at Tegwani Training Institute 1948. Joined a newly-organised African Church 1950 and went as a teacher to Mount Selinda Mission 1953.

Went to study theology at Andover Newton Theological Seminary, Massachusetts in 1955. Returned to Rhodesia 1958 as Bachelor of Divinity. Joined Congregationalist Church and became principal of Chikore Mission in Chipinga District and President of Southern Rhodesia Teachers' Association. In 1959 his book on "African Nationalism" was published which made his reputation.

Made an official of the National Democratic Party October 1960. As a result his teaching services were terminated by Director of African Education. In December 1960 accompanied Nkomo to London to see the Commonwealth Secretary about NDP representation at Southern Rhodesia Constitutional Conference. Walked out of Conference with Nkomo in May 1961.

Appointed to National Executive of ZAPU 1961. Moved to Tanganyika when ZAPU banned in September 1962 and continued to work for the party. Returned to Salisbury and arrested July 1963 on a charge arising from a circular urging voters to boycott the December 1962 elections. On 8 August 1963 formed ZANU, but sentenced to imprisonment of one year from 1964-65 and then served with a restriction order for 5 years from May 1965. Met Mr Wilson in Salisbury in 1965. Moved to a detention camp in November 1968 and charged in January 1969 with incitement to murder Mr Smith and other Ministers on basis of a letter written to one of his associates. Sentenced to six years hard labour on 12 February 1969.

Released in December 1974 to attend Lusaka talks. Re-detained in March 1975 on charges of plotting to kill other members of the ANC leadership. Released after external pressure in April 1975 to attend OAU meeting in Dar es Salaam. Attended Commonwealth Conference in Kingston. Member of ANC delegation at Victoria Falls Talks. Was the prime mover in the re-formation of the ANC external wing (Zimbabwe Liberation Council) in September 1975, which contributed to the schism. Faded from the scene somewhat in 1976, and by September 1976 had been ousted as leader of ZANU by Robert Mugabe (qv). Omitted from original list of nationalist leaders invited to Geneva Conference but invited at the insistence of the Front Line Presidents. Returned to Rhodesia

/in



in 1977 where he formed the ANC (Sithole). Seen by Dr Owen in both London and Salisbury in 1977. With Bishop Muzorewa and Chief Chirau embarked on internal settlement talks with Mr Smith in December 1977. Signatory with them of the internal settlement agreement on 3 March 1978 and joined with them in forming Executive Council on 21 March. Did badly in the April 1979 elections which he had been sure he would win; immediately denounced as defective the new Constitution he had previously agreed to, and brought a legal action, which still drags on, alleging foul play in the elections. He and his 11 supporters who won seats in the election boycotted the Assembly and Government until August 1979; now, however, two of his supporters have taken Cabinet posts, though Sithole himself has not.

Sithole's programme and reputation are difficult to determine. At various times he has united with and later fallen out with all the main nationalist leaders. He has also frequently been at odds with one or other of the Front Line Presidents. Tribally he has, in spite of his origin become largely identified with the Shona. When led by Sithole, ZANU was under Chinese influence, and ZANU publications frequently reproduced ill-digested Maoist dogma. But Sithole himself does not give the impression of having strong Marxist convictions. Since the split in ZANU and especially during the period of his own temporary eclipse in 1976, Sithole has sought backing and material assistance from a wide variety of sources including commercial concerns.

Still commands support and respect of many "traditional" ZANU adherents. Claims also to have the support of many ZANLA guerrillas; he probably has much less support in this area than he claims and few guerrillas responded to the Executive Council's call in May 1978 for them to return. Harbours bitter feelings towards Mugabe and dislikes Nkomo. Unscrupulous but astute, he keeps his lines open to all parties and governments, and is certainly prepared to consider alternative arrangements if the "internal" agreement fails. Has proved unreliable: he has been the source of many "leaks" of meetings at which he has participated. Close to President Banda.

Alleged to have various diseases including syphilis and epilepsy. Daughter at Bishopslea (girls' school, Salisbury).



CHIKEREMA, JAMES ROBERT DAMBAZA

Leader of the Zimbabwe Democratic Party

Born 1925 at Kutama, near Salisbury. A Zezuru. Educated at the local Roman Catholic Mission School and University of South Africa where his political activities resulted in his being expelled without a degree. Also lost his first job in a factory for organising a strike.

Founder-member of African National Congress and was elected Vice-President 1957. Restricted at Gokwe February 1959-January 1963 but resumed nationalist activities on release. Remained loyal to Nkomo at time of leadership split and was appointed Secretary for Presidential Affairs in the People's Caretaker Council (continuation of ZAPU) on its formation in August 1963. Since then has spent much time abroad based in Lusaka but has also visited Moscow and Peking. Thought to be responsible for inspiring vitriolic broadcasts by Zambia radio just after IDI advocating violence in Rhodesia. In 1970-71 involved in bitter faction-fighting within ZAPU and left to help found FROLIZI in October 1971, of which he became acting Chairman. FROLIZI subsequently fell apart with several of the executive returning to the reintegrated ZANU, largely because of quarrels with Chikerema. Refused renewal of UK passport in Lusaka, October 1973.

One of the signatories of the Lusaka document forming the new ANC. Attended Commonwealth Heads of Government meeting in 1975. Member of the ANC delegation at the Victoria Falls talks in August 1975. Moved progressively closer to Bishop Muzorewa in 1976 and eventually returned to Rhodesia in mid 1977 with the approval of the regime to become Vice-President of a reconstituted UANC. A member of Bishop Muzorewa's negotiating team for the internal settlement discussions which opened in Salisbury in December 1977.

Was joint Minister of Transport and Power, Mines, and Roads and Traffic and Posts in Ministerial Council set up April 1978.

Bishop Muzorewa tried to ditch him in the run-up to the April 1979 election, but Chikerema skilfully secured a seat in the new Parliament. He then denounced the Bishop for favouring his own 'kith and kin' and broke with the UANC in June 1979, taking 7 other MPs with him. Hopes to win over more supporters and develop an anti-Muzorewa coalition.

A highly erratic individual with ambitions of his own. Regards himself as second in rank in the UANC and may well have an eye on the leadership, though his grass-roots support is lacking.

## ATTITUDES OF THE "FRONT LINE" STATES

## A. TANZANIA

1. President Nyerere has responded well to his discussions with the Prime Minister at Lusaka; and there has been a positive exchange of messages with him. The Tanzanians can see little wrong with our outline constitutional proposals, subject to one important proviso. This is that Nyerere will show a tendency to argue that the white representatives in parliament should not be elected by the white community on a separate roll (which he regards as a "racial" provision) but by the electorate as a whole. This would not be negotiable with the internal parties.

2. Nyerere will attach more importance, however, to the pre-independence arrangements. He has always said that if the Patriotic Front were offered a chance to participate in elections on fair terms, the Front Line Presidents would insist that they must do so. Nyerere will support the Lusaka agreement that elections should be held under our authority, with Commonwealth observers present. But he will also argue that it would be unfair to the Patriotic Front for those elections to be conducted with the Salisbury administration in place and Muzorewa able to campaign as "Prime Minister". He will also place emphasis on the need, during the pre-independence period, for a Commonwealth or UN force to support the police; and for the latter to be brought under our control. In short Nyerere may well find himself arguing for a temporary return to dependent status with an administration largely under British direction. It will however be hard for him to argue for any arrangements which would pre-judge the outcome of the elections in favour of the Patriotic Front. He is well aware that the present government would not agree to the concession made to him by President Carter that the future army should be "based on the liberation forces". Nyerere has sufficient influence on

/Mugabe




Mugabe (via Machel) to render it difficult for him to obstruct an agreement which Nyerere is prepared to back; and he is also concerned to play a leading role within the OAU. He could therefore see a real interest in working with us towards a settlement, but will also be liable to look for a pretext to revert to support for the Patriotic Front if the attempt fails. He will react against any manoeuvres which he interprets as being designed to split the Patriotic Front.

## B. ZAMBIA

1. President Kaunda has a strong personal commitment to Nkomo, who is a life long friend. He is conscious of the history of Nkomo's attempts to negotiate with Mr Smith and considers that he was forced into taking up arms by Smith's intransigence during the 1976 negotiations. Kaunda has an equally strong commitment to bringing about "genuine" majority rule in Rhodesia. Although the attacks on Rhodesia which have been launched by Nkomo's forces in Zambia have caused less problems for the Rhodesian security forces than Mugabe's efforts from Mozambique, the normalisation of relations with Zambia is the key to transforming the security situation in Rhodesia. Kaunda is conscious of the fact that there is a good deal of dissatisfaction in Zambia with Nkomo and his forces and a disposition to argue that the President should give priority to Zambia's interests.
  
2. Kaunda will be concerned about the extent of white representation in the Rhodesian parliament, but has so far reacted well to our constitutional proposals. As in the case of Nyerere, he will be concerned that he can assure Nkomo that, if he agrees to participate in fresh elections, he will have a fair chance of winning, ie that we will be prepared to supervise the elections (and not to leave much of this to the existing administration) and that we are not excluding the idea of a Commonwealth force. But he lacks Nyerere's intellectual subtlety and is unlikely to push the argument for British involvement in the transition as far. As in the case of Nyerere, there must be question-marks about Kaunda's ultimate determination to force Nkomo to participate in new elections; but there is sufficient war-weariness in Zambia to render that a possibility. Kaunda cares little for Mugabe and will show less concern for Patriotic Front unity than Nyerere.
  
3. Kaunda is sending his special adviser, Mr Mark Chona, to keep in touch with the delegations throughout the Conference.





## C. BOTSWANA

1. President Seretse Khama has a strong interest in a peaceful settlement. The Botswana defence forces are unable to control the activities either of Nkomo's ZIPRA or the Rhodesian forces on their territory and Botswana faces a major refugee problem. The Botswana government can therefore be expected to play a helpful role (President Khama has already reluctantly agreed, for example, not to make an issue of his sincere objections to special parliamentary representation for whites). But they do not have any capacity to exert pressure on the Patriotic Front unless Kaunda or Nyerere can be persuaded to take the lead in doing so. The Botswana Foreign Minister, Mr Mogwe, may come to London during the Conference.

## D. MOZAMBIQUE

1. The Mozambique Government have responded reasonably positively (though with less commitment than the Commonwealth African Presidents) to the Lusaka agreement. They are sending a Minister, Mr Cabaco, and President Machel's British-educated special adviser, Mr Honwana, to London during the Conference. Mr Honwana has said that we should not take too seriously the extreme line at present being put out by Mr Mugabe. The Mozambique government recognise that some safeguards for the white community would be necessary to get an agreement. The Rhodesian army was not defeated and the Patriotic Front were not united. Provided that the new government did not have to live with the Rhodesian security forces commanded by the present commanders, Mozambique would urge the Patriotic Front to participate in new elections.

2. The Mozambique government is, however, strongly committed to Mugabe and ZANU, though they are suffering heavily from the Rhodesian raids and from dissident movements helped by the Rhodesians in western Mozambique. It is unlikely that Mozambique would hold out against an agreement supported by the Commonwealth African Presidents. But they can be expected to give general support to Mugabe's negotiating demands and to give him continuing support in fighting the war if the Conference fails to produce a solution which is accepted by the Commonwealth African Presidents.





## E. ANGOLA

1. Angola is not really a front-line state. They do not at present appear to be intending to send an observer. President Neto reacted favourably to the Lusaka agreement. The Angolans support Nkomo rather than Mugabe.

[RHODESIA: POLICY: ADVANCE COPIES]

237

PS  
PS/SIR I GILMOUR  
PS/MR LUCE  
PS/PUS  
SIR A DUFF  
MR WILLSON  
MR BYATT  
~~LORD N. G. LENNOX~~

PS/NO 10 DOWNING STREET

MR R L WADE-GERY )  
MR P M MAKEY )  
COL MOIR ) CABINET  
MR P J FOWLER ) OFFICE  
DIO )  
~~SIR J HUNT~~ )

.....  
HD/RHODESIA DEPT (3)

~~FOR ZIMBABWE DEVELOPMENTS FUND~~

HD/C AF D  
HD/S AF D

~~ADD MR LYNCH ODI?  
MR SLATER TREASURY~~

HD/UND  
HD/NEWS DEPT  
HD/WAD  
MR FREELAND LEGAL ADVISER RM K200A  
MR FIFOOT LEGAL ADVISER RM K164

SECRET

FM MIRIMBA SALISBURY 040710Z SEP 79  
TO IMMEDIATE FCO  
TELNO 622 OF 4 SEPTEMBER

YOUR TELNO 193: RHODESIA CONFERENCE

1. I SAW GENERAL WALLS YESTERDAY AFTERNOON BEFORE RECEIPT OF YOUR TUR. I SPOKE ON THE LINES OF THE INTRODUCTION TO YOUR PARA 1 AND MADE THE POINTS IN YOUR PARA 1(B) (D) AND (G). OUR CONVERSATION ALSO COVERED THE GROUND IN YOUR PARA 2 AND I REFERRED TO THE EFFECT UPON THE SECURITY SITUATION OF ANY EROSION OF FRONT-LINE SUPPORT FOR THE PATRIOTIC FRONT (YOUR PARA 3).
2. I LAID PARTICULAR STRESS UPON THE CRITICAL IMPORTANCE OF THE FORTHCOMING CONFERENCE. THE LIVES AND THE FUTURE LIVELIHOOD OF ALL RHODESIANS, BLACK AND WHITE, DEPENDED UPON A SUCCESSFUL OUTCOME. I EXPRESSED MY FEAR THAT SOME OF THE BISHOP'S WHITE ADVISERS AND MINISTERIAL COLLEAGUES WOULD BE UNABLE TO SEE THE WOOD FOR THE TREES AND COULD PREJUDICE THE CHANCE OF A SETTLEMENT BY UNNECESSARY INFLEXIBILITY. I HOPED THAT WALLS WOULD BRING HIS INFLUENCE TO BEAR TO ENSURE THAT THE BISHOP WAS NOT MISLED BY SUCH ADVICE. IT WAS ALSO IMPORTANT THAT THE BISHOP SHOULD KNOW BEFORE HE LEFT FOR LONDON HOW HIS SENIOR SECURITY ADVISERS REGARDED THE SITUATION.
3. WALLS WELCOMED THE OPPORTUNITY TO DISCUSS THESE MATTERS. HE SAID THAT HE HAD, THAT MORNING, HAD A PRIVATE DISCUSSION WITH THE



3. WALLS WELCOMED THE OPPORTUNITY TO DISCUSS THESE MATTERS. HE SAID THAT HE HAD, THAT MORNING, HAD A PRIVATE DISCUSSION WITH THE BISHOP AT THE LATTERS REQUEST. MUZOREWA TOLD HIM THAT HE CONTINUED TO PUT HIS TRUST IN THE PRIME MINISTER AND WOULD BE GOING TO LONDON TO NEGOTIATE IN A CONSTRUCTIVE WAY. HE MENTIONED TO WALLS THAT HE HAD BEEN GIVEN AN INDICATION OF OUR MORE DETAILED PROPOSALS FOR CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE. HE THOUGHT THAT A FEW ITEMS MIGHT BE NEGOTIABLE. ON THE MAJORITY OF ISSUES, HOWEVER, THE BISHOP WAS ASSUMING THAT HMG WOULD STAND FIRM. WALLS HAD TOLD THE BISHOP THAT IT WAS HIGHLY DESIRABLE THAT THE PRESENT OPPORTUNITY OF FINDING A LASTING SOLUTION TO THE RHODESIAN PROBLEM SHOULD BE SEIZED. WALLS REMINDED ME THAT THE BISHOP HAD SPOKEN TO THE SECURITY FORCES ABOUT THE OUTCOME OF HIS VISIT TO LONDON IN JULY AND THAT NONE OF THE PROPOSALS MENTIONED THEN HAD RAISED SERIOUS CONCERN. WALLS SAID THAT HE HAD FOUND THE BISHOP IN A RESOLUTE FRAME OF MIND. HE DID NOT THINK THAT MUZOREWA WOULD PROVE INTRANSIGENT. HE WAS CERTAINLY NOT UNDER PRESSURE FROM THE SENIOR SECURITY COMMANDERS TO RESIST CHANGE. WALLS AGREED THAT SOME OF THOSE ACCOMPANYING THE BISHOP TO LONDON COULD GIVE UNHELPFUL ADVICE. HOWEVER, HE BELIEVED THAT DAVID SMITH AND KEN FLOWER WOULD BE A GOOD INFLUENCE AND HELP COUNTERACT ANY NEGATIVE ADVICE.

4. WALLS ASKED ABOUT SENIOR APPOINTMENTS. I TOLD HIM, FOR HIS STRICTLY PERSONAL INFORMATION, THE IDEAS THAT WE HAD IN MIND FOR THIS PARTICULAR ASPECT OF THE CONSTITUTION. WALLS COMMENTED THAT IF THIS WAS WHAT WE WANTED HE SAW NO PROBLEM.

5. WALLS ASKED WHETHER THERE WAS ANYTHING MORE HE COULD USEFULLY DO. I SUGGESTED THAT HE SHOULD MAKE SURE THAT THOSE WHO WOULD BE REPRESENTING THE WHITES IN LONDON WERE AWARE OF HIS OWN VIEWS AND THOSE OF HIS SENIOR MILITARY COLLEAGUES. IT WOULD ALSO BE HELPFUL IF HE COULD REAFFIRM TO THE BISHOP HIS BELIEF THAT CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE OF THE KIND WE HAD IN MIND WOULD NOT UNDERMINE MORALE OF THE SECURITY FORCES AND WOULD BE BROADLY ACCEPTABLE TO THE WHITE COMMUNITY. WALLS SAID HE WOULD DO WHAT HE COULD. HE BELIEVED MOST STRONGLY THAT THE LONDON CONFERENCE MUST NOT FAIL. HE COMMENTED FINALLY THAT HE DID NOT THINK THAT WE NEED NOT WORRY TOO MUCH ABOUT THE BISHOP. HE WAS STILL "ON COURSE" AND WAS GAINING IN STATURE.

6. ON THE SECURITY SITUATION, WALLS WAS MORE OPTIMISTIC THAN I WOULD HAVE EXPECTED. HE MENTIONED AGAIN THAT RHODESIAN ATTACKS ON ZIPRA HAD GREATLY WEAKENED THEIR POTENTIAL. HE ALSO CLAIMED THAT THE SECURITY FORCES HAD BEEN REASONABLY SUCCESSFUL IN THEIR

6. ON THE SECURITY SITUATION, WALLS WAS MORE OPTIMISTIC THAN I  
COULD HAVE EXPECTED. HE MENTIONED AGAIN THAT RHODESIAN ATTACKS ON  
ZIPRA HAD GREATLY WEAKENED THEIR POTENTIAL. HE ALSO CLAIMED THAT  
THE SECURITY FORCES HAD BEEN REASONABLY SUCCESSFUL IN THEIR  
OPERATIONS IN THE SOUTH AGAINST ZANLA. THERE WERE RECENT REPORTS,  
WHICH NEEDED CHECKING, THAT ZANLA FORCES IN THE FIELD WERE SHORT  
OF AMMUNITION AND EXPLOSIVES. THERE HAD ALSO BEEN MORE CLASHES  
THAN HAD AT FIRST BEEN REALISED BETWEEN ZIPRA AND ZANLA. WALLS  
SAID THAT HE WAS NOT CLAIMING THAT THE SECURITY FORCES WERE  
WINNING THE WAR. HOWEVER, THE PATRIOTIC FRONT WERE BY NO MEANS  
GETTING ON TOP.

DAY

NNNN



CONFIDENTIAL



*M<sup>1</sup>  
Rhodesia*

10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

6 September, 1979.

Rhodesia: President Kaunda

You wrote to me on 5 ~~September~~ enclosing two draft telegrams containing invitations to Presidents Kaunda and Seretse Khama to visit London in 10 days time or thereabouts.

The Prime Minister is at present in Scotland, but the suggestion that the two Presidents should come to London has been put to her. She is not enthusiastic about the proposal. Her programme for the next fortnight is already very crowded, and she is not convinced that it is yet sufficiently clear just what benefit the visits would bring.

As you know, it has been decided, in the light of the Prime Minister's reaction, not to proceed with the invitations.

M. O'D. B. ALEXANDER

R.M.J. Lyne, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CONFIDENTIAL

*6*



10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

6 September 1979

Dear Mr. Carson,

Thank you for your letter of 21 August about Mr. Ian Smith's attendance at the Constitutional Conference on Rhodesia.

As you know, Bishop Muzorewa and the leaders of the Patriotic Front were invited to bring delegations to London for the Conference. As is usual on such occasions the composition of the delegations was left to the discretion of the leaders concerned. Attempts by the Government to indicate who should or should not be included in the respective delegations would not have helped us to make progress at the Conference.

Bishop Muzorewa has now appointed a delegation which includes representatives of the various parties included in his administration. It is not surprising therefore that he should have chosen to include the leader of the Rhodesian Front.

In common with the members of both delegations, who will be staying in London as our guests, Mr. Ian Smith will benefit from immunities analogous to those enjoyed by diplomatic agents attached to foreign and Commonwealth missions in London. It was considered, when the Southern Rhodesia (Immunity for Persons attending Meetings and Consultations) Order 1979 was made last July that such a measure would be required, if both parties to the tragic conflict in Rhodesia were to feel at liberty to attend a constitutional conference in London without running the risk of arrest. Had the Order not been introduced it is likely that some of those,

/both black and white

cc FCO  
Press  
Original  
in G/Rooms  
JH

HS



both black and white, whose presence is essential if the Conference is to produce a lasting solution, would simply have stayed away. This would clearly have served the best interests neither of this country nor of Rhodesia.

*Yours sincerely*  
*Dennis Canavan*

Dennis Canavan, Esq., MP.



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

(2)

6 September 1979

Prime Minister

Dear Michael,

Rmt - 6/9

## RHODESIA: CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE

The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary has seen the Prime Minister's comments, set out in your letter of 3 September, on his minute about the Conference.

Lord Carrington agrees that there can be no question of any authority other than the British Government supervising the election. I enclose an amended version of Annex D which makes this unequivocally clear.

You will see that this version still makes no reference to the possibility of a referendum as an alternative to an election. This is because the paper takes an all-party agreement on the independence constitution as a starting-point. In this context there is no need to canvass the idea of a referendum, since an election would be inevitable. The question of a referendum would, we think, only become actual in the event of the Patriotic Front withdrawing from the negotiation. In that case a properly supervised or observed referendum, rather than an election, might, as suggested in paragraph 14 of Lord Carrington's minute, be an alternative test of the acceptability of an agreement with Bishop Muzorewa.

Yours ever

Roderic Lyne

(R M J Lyne)

M O'D B Alexander Esq  
10 Downing Street



## ANNEX D

Statement for use as necessary during the Conference

## RHODESIA: ELECTIONS

1. In the event of all-party agreement on an independence constitution for Rhodesia, it will be necessary to consider how to proceed to independence.
2. It is presumed that the independence constitution will provide in the normal way for the legislature and (directly or indirectly) the executive to derive their authority and powers from an expression of the popular will through an election. If that is to be so, a legislature and executive constituted in terms of the independence constitution cannot take office on Independence Day unless there has been an election before independence. Consideration must therefore be given to designating an authority to conduct the elections and to agreeing the conditions in which the elections and the campaign leading up to them are to be held.
3. The British Government believes that the following elements will be essential to the conduct of a free and fair election, in which all parties would be able to participate:
  - a. the administration of the election should be scrupulously impartial as between one party and another;
  - b. peaceful political activity, including pre-election campaigning, would take place freely and without intimidation of any kind;
  - c. all parties should have free and uncensored access to all the public media (press, radio and television); and
  - d. the election should be properly supervised under British Government authority.
4. The British Government will, as the constitutionally responsible authority, see that these requirements are met if the parties agree on an independence constitution.

/NOTE

/NOTE:

In addition it is likely to be necessary for HMG to make a statement about the conditions in which a ceasefire would be maintained while elections were held. This could be made at the same time as, or separately from, the above statement about elections. ]

## CEASEFIRE

5. The conduct of the elections will require the agreement of the parties on a ceasefire and the separation of the forces. In the event of agreement on the independence constitution, and acceptance that elections should be held under the British Government's authority, the British Government will arrange negotiations between the military commanders on both sides to settle the conditions in which a ceasefire shall be established and maintained and to consider proposals for the policing of the ceasefire.



11 12 1  
11 12 1  
11 12 1  
11 12 1  
11 12 1  
11 12 1  
11 12 1  
11 12 1  
11 12 1  
11 12 1

6 SEP 1979  
11 12 1

# CONFIDENTIAL

R 130

CONFIDENTIAL

FM DAR ES SALAAM 050715Z SEPTEMBER 79  
TO ROUTINE FCO

*Prime Minister*

TELNO 715 OF 5 SEPTTBER

INFO ROUTINE GABORONE, MIRIMBA SALISBURY, LUSAKA, LUANDA,  
LAGOS, MAPUTO, PRETORIA, UKMIS NEW YORK, WASHINGTON

*Ans - 6/9*

RHODESIA

*DT.*

1. THE AMERICAN CHARGE D'AFFAIRES HAS TOLD ME THAT HE WAS INSTRUCTED EARLIER THIS WEEK TO APPROACH THE TANZANIANS AT MINISTERIAL LEVEL TO ASSURE THEM OF UNITED STATES SUPPORT FOR OUR ATTEMPTS TO REACH A SETTLEMENT ON RHODEISA AND TO EXPRESS THE HOPE THAT THE TANZANIANS WOULD DO THEIR BEST TO ASSIST US PARTICULARLY WITH REGARD TO EXERTING INFLUENCE ON THE PATRIOTIC FRONT. IN THE ABSENCE OF THE FOREIGN MINISTER IN HAVANA HE SAW THE JUNIOR MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS WHO ASSURED HIM THAT THE TANZANIANS WOULD BE AS HELPFUL AS POSSIBLE. MR FOM SPOKE WARMLY OF THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT'S ATTITUDE AND SAID THAT WE, SINCE LUSAKA, HAD ADOPTED A MOST CONSTRUCTIVE POLICY. WALKER DESCRIBED FOM'S ATTITUDE AS OPTIMISTIC BORDERING ON THE EUPHORIC.

HINCHCLIFFE .

## FILES

RHOD D  
OADS  
N AM D  
NEWS D  
PUSD  
PLANNING STAFF  
ES & SD  
CCD  
FRD  
UND  
LEGAL ADVISERS  
(MR FREELAND)  
(MR FIFOOT)  
ECON D

PCD  
DEF D  
OID  
PS  
PS/SIR I GILMOUR  
PS/MR LUCE  
PS/MR RIDLEY  
PS/MR HURD  
PS/PUS  
SIR A DUFF  
LORD N G LENNOX  
MISS BROWN  
MR WILLSON  
MR BYATT

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION  
RHODESIA POLICY

# CONFIDENTIAL



07 250

CONFIDENTIAL

FM MIRIMBA SALISBURY 050845Z SEP 79

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 634 OF 5 SEPTEMBER

RHODESIA CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE

1. I SAW BULLE (MINISTER OF COMMERCE AND INDUSTRY) TODAY AND WENT OVER WITH HIM THE GROUND IN PARA 1 OF YOUR TELNO 193. I EMPHASIZED THE IMPORTANCE OF THE SALISBURY DELEGATION ADOPTING A CONSTRUCTIVE ATTITUDE IF WE WERE TO ACHIEVE THE PRIZE OF A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT ENJOYING WIDE INTERNATIONAL ACCEPTANCE. I ALSO SPELT OUT THE POSITION ON SANCTIONS.

2. BULLE SAID THAT THE BISHOP AND HIS UANC COLLEAGUES WOULD ENTER THE CONFERENCE IN A POSITIVE FRAME OF MIND. THE BISHOP HAD SAID TO THEM THAT THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROPOSALS PUT FORWARD BY HMG WERE WHAT THE BLACKS HAVE WANTED ALL ALONG. THEY SHOULD CAUSE NO PROBLEMS FOR ANY OF THE BLACK PARTIES FROM SALISBURY. AS REGARDS THE WHITES, THEY HAD NOT REACTED EITHER WAY WHEN AN ACCOUNT OF FIFOOT'S VISIT WAS GIVEN TO THE CABINET. THEIR LINE WAS TO WAIT AND SEE WHAT WAS TABLED AT THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE. HOWEVER, BULLE EXPECTED DAVID SMITH AND CRONJE TO BE CO-OPERATIVE. THEY ACCEPTED THE NEED FOR CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AS THE PRICE FOR A SETTLEMENT. IAN SMITH COULD STILL CREATE DIFFICULTIES, BUT EVEN HE WAS REPORTED TO HAVE INDICATED IN A SPEECH IN SOUTH AFRICA LAST WEEKEND THAT HE WAS PREPARED TO CONSIDER CHANGES TO THE CONSTITUTION IF, BY SO DOING, THE COUNTRY WOULD BENEFIT.

3. I ENCOURAGED BULLE TO USE ALL HIS INFLUENCE TO ENSURE THAT THE SALISBURY DELEGATION SHOWED FLEXIBILITY AND GOOD SENSE. IF THERE WAS TO BE INTRANSIGENCE, LET IT COME FROM THE OTHER SIDE.

DAY

## F I L E S

RHOD D	FCD
OADS	DEF D
N AM D	OID
NEWS D	PS
PUSD	PS/SIR I GILMOUR
PLANNING STAFF	PS/MR LUCE
ES & SD	PS/MR RIDLEY
CCD	PS/MR HURD
FRD	PS/PUS
UND	SIR A DUFF
LEGAL ADVISERS	LORD N G LENNOX
(MR FREELAND)	MISS BROWN
(MR FIFOOT)	MR WILLSON
ECON D	MR BYATE

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION  
RHODESIA POLICY

CONFIDENTIAL

[RHODESIA: POLICY: ADVANCE COPIES]

PS  
PS/SIR I GILMOUR  
PS/MR LUCE  
PS/PUS  
SIR A DUFF  
MR WILLSON  
MR BYATT  
LORD N G LENNOX

25

PS/NO 10 DOWNING STREET

MR R L WADE-GERY )  
MR P M MAXEY )  
COL MOIR ) CABINET  
MR P J FOWLER ) OFFICE  
DIO )

.....  
HD/RHODESIA DEPT (3)

HD/C AF D  
HD/S AF D

HD/PUSD (2)

HD/NEWS DEPT  
HD/WAD

MR FREELAND LEGAL ADVISER RM K200A

MR FIFOOT LEGAL ADVISER RM K164

BT 27

CONFIDENTIAL

FM MIRIMBA SALISBURY 050700Z SEPT 79

TO ROUTINE FCO

TELNO 631 OF 5 SEPTEMBER

*Handwritten initials*

*Prime Minister*

*Handwritten initials*

1. REV SITHOLE ASKED WILSON TO CALL YESTERDAY. HE WANTED TO PASS ON CERTAIN THOUGHTS. BRITAIN, HE SAID, WAS NOW IN A MORE POWERFUL POSITION THAN IT HAD EVER BEEN ON THE RHODESIAN ISSUE. THE INTERNAL PARTIES WANTED SANCTIONS LIFTED, RECOGNITION AND AN END TO THE WAR AND THE PATRIOTIC FRONT WAS AFRAID THAT THE GOVERNMENT OF NATIONAL UNITY WOULD BE RECOGNISED IF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE WAS NOT SUCCESSFUL. THUS BRITAIN WAS IN A POSITION TO "TELL US ALL WHAT TO DO".

2. SITHOLE REFERRED TO THE SECURITY FORCES. HE SAID HE INTENDED TO TELL NKOMO AND MUGABE THAT IF THERE WAS A SETTLEMENT AND IF THEY WERE LEFT ALONE ZIPRA AND ZANLA WOULD ONLY FIGHT EACH OTHER. THUS A THIRD FORCE, THE EXISTING SECURITY FORCES, WAS NECESSARY. DURING A TRANSITIONAL PERIOD OF GOVERNMENT THE THREE FORCES SHOULD BE INTEGRATED. THERE WOULD BE A PROBLEM OVER THE APPOINTMENT OF A COMMANDER AS NEITHER SIDE WOULD ACCEPT THE OTHER'S COMMANDER. A NEUTRAL PERSON MAY BE NECESSARY. HE COULD BE A BRITISH, COMMONWEALTH OR UN APPOINTEE.



3. SITHOLE THEN BROUGHT IN A YOUNG MAN WHO HE INTRODUCED AS A PERSONAL MESSENGER TO THE GUERILLAS . HE SAID THAT THE MAN, A MR SIBANDA, COULD GIVE DETAILS OF THE THINKING OF THE "BOYS IN THE BUSH". SITHOLE THEN LEFT THE ROOM TO ALLOW A PRIVATE CONVERSATION WITHOUT "MY INFLUENCE". SIBANDA SAID THAT HE WAS IN TOUCH WITH GUERILLAS IN THE CHARTER AREA. MANY OF WHOM, ALTHOUGH CLAIMING TO BE MUGABE MEN, WERE IN FACT SUPPORTERS OF REV SITHOLE. THESE GUERILLAS WANTED TO SEE THE MUGABE AND SITHOLE WINGS OF ZANU REUNITED DURING THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE. THEN A PARTY CONGRESS COULD BE HELD TO DECIDE THE LEADERSHIP. MOST OF THEM WERE FED UP WITH THE WAR AND WANTED THE CONFERENCE TO SUCCEED SO THAT THEY COULD RETURN HOME. THEY REALISED THAT THE PRESENT SECURITY FORCES COULD NOT BE TOTALLY DISBANDED AND WOULD IN FACT BE THE BASIS OF THE NEW ARMY. THOSE WHO WANTED TO REMAIN AS SOLDIERS WOULD ACCEPT INTEGRATION INTO THIS NEW ARMY.

4. SITHOLE'S INTENTION WAS PRESUMABLY TO SHOW THAT HE RETAINED THE SUPPORT OF MANY OF THE GUERILLAS. THIS IS DOUBTFUL. IT IS UNLIKELY THAT HE REALLY BELIEVES THAT ZANU CAN BE REUNITED, UNDER HIS LEADERSHIP, AT THIS STAGE.

DAY

NNNN

[RHODESIA: POLICY: ADVANCE COPIES]

24

PS  
PS/SIR I GILMOUR  
PS/MR LUCE  
PS/PUS  
SIR A DUFF  
MR WILLSON  
MR BYATT  
LORD N. G. LENNOX

PS/NO 10 DOWNING STREET

MR R L WADE-GERY )  
MR P M MAXEY )  
COL MOIR ) CABINET  
MR P J FOWLER ) OFFICE  
DIO )  
~~SIR J HUNT~~ )

.....  
HD/RHODESIA DEPT (3)

~~FOR ZIMBABWE DEVELOPMENTS FUND~~

HD/C AF D  
HD/S AF D

~~ADD MR LYNCH ODI?~~  
~~MR SLATER TREASURY~~

HD/UND  
HD/NEWS DEPT  
HD/WAD  
MR FREELAND LEGAL ADVISER RM K200A  
MR FIFOOT LEGAL ADVISER RM K164

~~RESIDENT CLERK~~

*Prime Minister*

PP FCO

PP WASHINGTON

*Ans 6/5*

GR 110

*Ans.*

CONFIDENTIAL

FM MIRIMBA SALISBURY 050710Z SEPT 79

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELNO 630 OF 5 SEPTEMBER

INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON

MY TELNO 623: RHODESIAN REPRESENTATION IN LONDON

1. KAMUSIKIRI HAS TOLD ME THAT MUZOREWA WAS GRATEFUL TO THE PRIME MINISTER FOR HER MESSAGE (YOUR TELNO 194). HE TAKES THE POINTS MADE AND WILL TAKE UP THE OFFER TO NOMINATE A PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE AFTER THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE. KAMUSIKIRI HINTED THAT THE BISHOP WOULD WISH TO MAKE SOME ANNOUNCEMENT ABOUT THIS ARRANGMENT WHEN THE DETAILS ARE FINALLY AGREED.

2. TO AVOID THE RISK OF FURTHER PREMATURE AND INACCURATE PUBLIC STATEMENTS, WE SHALL HAVE TO KEEP IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH THE BISHOP'S PARTY IN LONDON ON THIS ISSUE.





Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

*The Prime Minister*  
Does not wish to proceed  
with this idea. Reply sent.

5 September 1979

Dear Michael,

*THIS IS A COPY. THE ORIGINAL IS  
RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3 (4)  
OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT*

Rhodesia: President Kaunda

The Prime Minister will have seen the record of \* conversation with President Kaunda in Lusaka on 27 August (Stephen Wall's letter of 29 August) and President Kaunda's subsequent message to her (copy enclosed).

President Nyerere for his part has responded well to the Prime Minister's message (Dar-es-Salaam telegrams 707 and 709, also enclosed). He glosses over the likelihood of difficulty over the extent or basis of white representation in the Parliament, but takes the line that if our proposals seem fair and reasonable to the three Commonwealth "front-line" Presidents, they will not allow the Patriotic Front to have a veto. He is also encouragingly robust about the British asserting their authority. It is important that we should not only retain his support, but continue our efforts to enlist the support of the others.

As a result of her talk with President Kaunda, \* believes that he also is convinced that the Government is making a determined effort to achieve a negotiated settlement. He subsequently told the US Ambassador that we were taking the right approach in seeking to negotiate the Constitution first. It would seem from his message that he is concerned to avoid any impression that he is discussing some kind of separate deal (he burned his fingers badly in arranging the Smith-Nkomo meeting last year). We can therefore make use of the High Commissioners and Mark Chona for our contact with President Kaunda. Personal contact with him will still be very important and \* believes that President Kaunda would welcome an invitation to meet the Prime Minister during the Conference. Whether or not he is able to come to London, it seems right to offer this, particularly as the Prime Minister is seeing President Nyerere.

In that event, the Prime Minister may wish to consider sending a similar message to President Seretse Khama. His ability to influence the Patriotic Front is much less, however, and he is at present engaged in an election campaign. He is likely to respond by sending his Foreign Minister, Mr Mogwe, to London. This would be useful. Mr Mogwe has played a helpful role over Rhodesia in the past.

I attach a draft telegram with a message to President Kaunda which, if the Prime Minister agrees, HM Ambassador at Havana might

M O'DB Alexander Esq  
10 Downing Street

/be instructed

SECRET AND PERSONAL

\* ~ \* Names deleted and  
retained under section 3(4)  
C. Wayland  
5 Nov. 2009



SECRET AND PERSONAL

-2-

/ be instructed to pass to him; and a draft message to President Seretse Khama.

*yours ever*

*Roderic Lyne*

(R M J Lyne)  
Private Secretary

SECRET AND PERSONAL



HERE THIS MORNING. TEXT AS FOLLOWS: PRESIDENT KAUNDA WAS HANDED OVER

BEGINS.

29TH AUGUST 1979

DEAR MARGARET,  
I THANK YOU FOR SENDING YOUR SPECIAL ENVOY TO LUSAKA. I FOUND YOUR MESSAGE VERY USEFUL.

LAST NIGHT I SAW HER AGAIN AND TOLD HER THEN THAT I WOULD LIKE TO BE BRIEFED AS SOON AS I RETURN TO LUSAKA ROUND ABOUT SEPTEMBER 9TH, 1979. I ALSO TOLD HER TO LET YOU KNOW THAT I WOULD BE SENDING MY SPECIAL ASSISTANT (POLITICAL), MR MARK C. CHONA TO BE AROUND IN LONDON A COUPLE OF DAYS BEFORE THE CONFERENCE STARTS. IT IS A PITY THAT DUE TO PRESSURE OF WORK I AM UNABLE TO COME THROUGH LONDON AT THIS CRUCIAL TIME.

BEFORE CONCLUDING THIS LETTER, I JUST WISH TO LET YOU KNOW THAT REFLECTING OVER THE ISSUE OF YOUR SPECIAL ENVOY COMING BACK TO LUSAKA AGAIN, I HAVE A CHANGE OF MIND. 9TH SEPTEMBER WILL BE VERY CLOSE TO THE CONFERENCE ITSELF AND THEREFORE DANGERS OF LEAKAGES WILL NOT BE AN IMPORTANT FACTOR AT THAT TIME. IT IS THEREFORE IMPORTANT THAT WE RETURN TO NORMAL DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS OF COMMUNICATIONS - EITHER THROUGH MY HIGH COMMISSIONER IN LONDON OR YOUR OWN IN LUSAKA. MY CHANGE OF MIND ON THIS SUBJECT IS DUE TO THE OBVIOUS IMPORTANCE OF THE MATTER OVER WHICH WE ARE EXCHANGING VIEWS.

I WISH YOU GOD'S BLESSINGS AND GUIDANCE IN THE VERY DIFFICULT TASK YOU ARE UNDERTAKING ON BEHALF OF ALL OF US.

AS ALWAYS,  
KENNETH  
KENNETH DAVID KAUNDA  
PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF ZAMBIA.

2. ORIGINAL BY BAG.

STATHAM

NNNN

CONFIDENTIAL

GR 600

CONFIDENTIAL

DESKBY 011000Z FCO

FM DAR ES SALAAM

CONFIDENTIAL

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 707 OF 1 SEPTEMBER

RFI IMMEDIATE MIRIMBA SALISBURY MAPUTO LUSAKA GABORONE HAVANA  
PRIORITY LUANDA LAGOS WASHINGTON UKMIS NEW YORK

YOUR TELNO 287 (NOT REPEATED): RHODESIA

1. I TRANSMITTED THE PRIME MINISTERS MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT NYERERE (VIA HIS PRIVATE SECRETARY) ON THE MORNING OF 31 AUGUST. HE ASKED ME TO CALL THAT EVENING.
2. PRESIDENT NYERERE SAID THAT HE HAD JUST DRAFTED A REPLY TO THE PRIME MINISTERS MESSAGE WHICH MISS WICKEN WOULD LET ME HAVE BEFORE HIS DEPARTURE FOR HAVANA. IN THE MEANTIME HE WANTED TO TELL ME PERSONALLY HOW GRATEFUL HE WAS FOR MRS THATCHERS RESPONSE. IT HAD COVERED THE POINTS HE HAD MADE IN HIS COMMUNICATION TO HER (MY TELNO 695- NOT REPEATED) AND HE WAS VERY SATISFIED WITH HER REPLIES. HE WAS SURE THAT HIS FIRST MINOR ONEABOUT PARLIAMENTARY REPRESENTATION FOR THE WHITES WOULD BE SORTED OUT AT THE CONFERENCE BY THE RHODESIANS THEMSELVES. HE ATTACHED MORE IMPORTANCE TO THE OTHER TWO: WE MUST ACT FIRMLY AS, "DECOLONISERS". THE TIME FOR NEUTRALITY WOULD NOT BE THE CONFERENCE BUT WHEN WE WERE "HOLDING THE RING" AT THE ELECTIONS AND HE WAS PLEASED TO NOTE THAT HE AND THE PRIME MINISTER WERE APPARENTLY SEEING EYE TO EYE ON BOTH THE CONDUCT OF THE CONFERENCE AND OF THE ELECTION.
3. THINNING ALOUD PRESIDENT NYERERE SAID THAT THERE WERE A COUPLE OF PASSAGES IN THE PRIME MINISTERS MESSAGE WHICH HAD PARTICULARLY STRUCK HIM: FIRST HER REFERENCE TO A SRTEP BY STEP APPROACH- OUR BRINGING FORWARD MORE DETAILED PROPOSALS ONCE THERE WAS A MEASURE OF AGREEMENT ON THE OUTLINE. WERE THESE NEW PROPOSALS OUTSIDE THE DRAFT FRAMEWORK OR A FLESHING OUT OF THE PRESENT SKELETON? I SAID I THOUGHT THE LATTER AND

HE AGREED

CONFIDENTIAL



CONFIDENTIAL

HE AGREED THAT THIS WAS HIS INTERPRETATION AND HE ACCEPTED THE WISDOM OF THIS APPROACH. BUT ONCE WE GOT AGREEMENT ON THE BASICS WE SHOULD NOT COUNTENANCE NEW PROPOSALS.

4. HIS SECOND THOUGHT WAS ON HOW THE PRIME MINISTER HAD SUGGESSED HE COULD HELP. HE WANTED US TO BE QUITE CLEAR THAT THE PATRIOTIC FRONT WOULD NOT BE GIVEN THE RIHGT OF VETO. IF HE AND THE OTHER COMMONWEALTH FRONT LINE STATES WERE SATISFIED (AND HE EMPHASISED TWICE THAT THEY WOULD HAVE TO BE) THAT THE CONSTITUTION THAT WE WERE PUTTING FORWARD WAS A FAIR ONE AND THAT WE WERE GENUINELY INTENT IN DISCHARGING OUR RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE WHOLE PROCESS OF DECOLONISATION AND COULD BE SEEN TO ASSUME THE AUTHORITY TO DO SO WE WOULD HAVE THEIR SUPPORT. HE AND HIS COLLEAGUES WOULD TRY TO ENSURE THAT THE PARTIOTIC FRONT COULD NOT VETO BUT WE MUST, FOR OUR PART, DO OUR BEST TO PREVENT "ANYONE ELSE" FROM DOING SO.

5. THERE FOLLOWED A BRIEF DISCUSSION ON THE NON ALLIGNED CONFERENCE (NAM) IN HAVANA. IN REPLY TO MY QUESTION NYERERE SAID THAT HE DID NOT EXPECT THE REFERENCE TO RHODESIA IN THE COMMUNIQUE TO BE ISSUED AT THE NAM TO BE "STOO SIMILAR" TO THE LUSAKA DECLARATION. THIS DID NOT WORRY HIM. EACH CONFERENCE HAD ITS OWN CHARACTERISTICS AND ETHOS: AS FAR AS HE WAS CONCERNED HE WOULD ABIDE BY WHAT WAS AS AID AND AGREED AT LUSAKA. ONLY IF THE CONSTITUTIONAL APPROACH FAILED MIGHT IT BE APPROPRIATE TO FOLLOW THE LANGUAGE OF MONROVIA OR OF HAVANA. HE WAS GOING TO HAVANA TO TELL PEOPLE THAT THE LUSAKA WAS THE WAY FORWARD AND THAT HE WAS VERY HAPPY AT THE WAY MRS THATCHER WAS APPROACHING THE PROBLEM.

6. COMMENT. THAT THE PRESIDENT, ON WHAT HAD BEEN FOR HIM A FRENETIC DAY ON THE EVE OF A LENGTHY ABSENCE FROM TANZANIA SHOULD FIND THE TIME TO TALK TO ME IN ADDITION TO DRAFTING A REPLY TO THE PRIME MINISTERS MESSAGE IS I THINK A WELCOME INDICATION OF DETERMINATION TO DEMONSTRARTE HIS CONTINUED WILLINGNESS TO BE AS HELPFUL AS POSSIBLE. HIS WRITTEN MESSAGE MAY PROVE TO DIFFER IN SOME DETAILS FROM HIS SOMEWHAT RAMBLING AND DISCURSIVE ORAL PRESENTATION BUT HIS CENTRAL MESSAGE IS CLEAR ENOUGH: AS LONG AS HE CONSIDERS THAT WE ARE

/PREPARED

2

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PREPARED TO DECOLONISE FIRMLY (OUR FIRMNESS BEING PARTICULARLY, IF NOT EXCLUSIVELY DIRECTED AT BISHOP MUZOREWA AND HIS ADMINISTRATION) HE IS PREPARED TO BE EQUALLY TOUGH WITH THE PATRIOTIC FRONT. WE ARE GETTING FULL MARKS FOR EFFORT, SO FAR.

HINCHCLIFFE

FILES  
RHODESIA D  
EAD  
UND  
PS  
PS/LPS  
PS/MR LUCE  
SIR A DUFF  
MR BYATT

[COPIES SENT  
NO 10 DOWNING ST]

3

CONFIDENTIAL



CONFIDENTIAL

GRS 460

CONFIDENTIAL

DESKBY 011500Z

FM DAR ES SALAAM

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 709 OF 1 SEPTEMBER

MIPT : RHODESIA

TEXT OF PRESIDENT NYERERE'S MESSAGE TO THE PRIME MINISTER IS AS FOLLOWS:

THANK YOU FOR YOUR MESSAGE WHICH I RECEIVED TODAY AND FOUND REASSURING. I LOOK FORWARD TO DISCUSSING THESE MATTERS FURTHER WITH YOU IN LONDON ON 14TH SEPTEMBER. THERE ARE, HOWEVER, TWO IMPORTANT POINTS WHICH I WOULD LIKE TO LEAVE WITH YOU WHILE I AM IN HAVANA.

FIRST, I DO ACCEPT AND UNDERSTAND YOUR DESIRE TO GET THE MAXIMUM AMOUNT OF AGREEMENT FROM THE PARTIES. IT WILL VERY GREATLY EASE THE DECOLONISING PROCCSSS. HOWEVER, I HOPE THAT YOU WILL GO AHEAD WITH DECOLONISING ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL BASIS YOU HAVE BEEN OUTLINING ( AND WHICH WE AGREED AT LUSAKA) REGARDLESS OF DISAGREEMENT EXPRESSED BY ONE SIDE OR THE OTHER. IF IT IS PERFECTLY CLEAR THAT NO ONE WILL BE ALLOWED TO EXERCISE A VETO ON DEMOCRATIC DECOLONISATION, THAT WILL IN ITSELF ASSIST IN GETTING AGREEMENT.

SECONDLY, YOU MENTIONED THE STATEMENT ISSUED IN DAR ES SALAAM BY THE PATRIOTIC FRONT. I DO NOT MYSELF THINK IT IS THE ENTIRE REJECTION IT SEEMS TO YOU, ALTHOUGH I AGREE THAT IT WAS NOT A CONSTRUCTIVE APPROACH. HOWEVER, THIS ONLY REINFORCES WHAT I HAVE JUST SAID, FOR YOU MAY BE CONFIDENT THAT I SHALL BACK UP A BRITISH ASSERTION OF ITS AUTHORITY ALONG THE LINES WE HAVE BEEN DISCUSSING. IT IS IMPOSSIBLE FOR ANYONE TO FORCE EITHER SIDE TO AGREE TO ANYTHING: WHAT WE CAN DO IS MAKE IT VERY CLEAR TO THEM THAT THEIR FAILURE TO DO SO, AND TO COOPERATE IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF A DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTIONAL PROCESS, WILL BE- IN YOUR WORDS- VERY EXPENSIVE TO THEM.

AT HAVANA I EXPECT TO MEET THE PATRIOTIC FRONT LAEDERS. I SHALL BE MAKING THIS TANZANIAN STAND VERY CLEAR TO THEM. I SHALL BE TELLING THEM THAT WE ARE DETERMINED TO BACK UP THE TRANSFER OF POWER ON THE BASIS OF A CONSTITUTION WHICH

CONFIDENTIAL

/ IS RECOGNISABLY

CONFIDENTIAL

IS RECOGNISABLY DEMOCRATIC, AND THAT WE SHALL OPPOSE ANY ATTEMPT BY THEM OR ANYONE ELSE TO FRUSTRATE SUCH A POLITICAL SOLUTION. THEY WOULD GET NO FURTHER HELP FROM US IF THEY WERE TRYING TO UPSET SUCH DECOLONISATION.

OF COURSE I CANNOT SPEAK ON BEHALF OF MY COLLEAGUES IN THE OTHER FRONT LINE STATES. HOWEVER, PRESIDENT KAUNDA AND PRESIDENT SERETSE KHAMA WERE IN LUSAKA: I SEE NO REASON WHY THEY SHOULD TAKE A DIFFERENT LINE. NOR DO I ANTICIPATE A DIFFERENT APPROACH FROM PRESIDENT MACHEL, WITH WHOM I WILL BE DISCUSSING THESE MATTERS IN HAVANA- AS I HOPE TO DO WITH PRESIDENT NETO ALSO.

IF YOU ARE PREPARED TO ASSUME THE NECESSARY AUTHORITY TO FINALISE THE PROCESS OF DECOLONISATION ON THE BASIS OF THE LUSAKA AGREEMENT I SEE NO REASON WHY YOU SHOULD NOT EXPECT FULL SUPPORT FROM US.

I SEND MY PERSONAL GOOD WISHES TO YOU.

ENDS

HINCHCLIFFE

[COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING STREET]

FILES

RHODESIA D  
EAD  
UND  
PS  
PS/LPS  
PS/MR LUCE  
SIR A DUFF  
MR BYATT



File No. ....

Department .....

Drafted by (Block Capitals) Sir A. Duff

Tel. Extn. .... 233 5617

OUTWARD

TELEGRAM

Security Classification
CONFIDENTIAL
Precedence
IMMEDIATE
DESKBY .....

FOR COMMS. DEPT. USE	Despatched (Date) ..... (Time) .....Z	POSTBY.....
----------------------	---------------------------------------	-------------

PREAMBLE

(Time of Origin) .....Z(G.M.T.) (Restrictive Prefix).....

(Security Class.) CONFIDENTIAL (Caveat/Privacy Marking).....

(Codeword) ..... (Deskby).....Z

TO IMMEDIATE HAVANA Tel. No. .... of (precedence) (post)

AND TO (precedence/post).....

AND SAVING TO.....

REPEATED TO (for info) IMMEDIATE LUSAKA, DAR-ES-SALAAM, GABORONE WASHINGTON.

SAVING TO (for info).....

Distribution:-

Rhodesia Policy

[TEXT]

RHODESIA

1. Please convey the following message from the Prime Minister to President Kaunda:

"Thank you for your message of 29 August. I have not had a full account of your views and have found them extremely valuable in our approach to the Rhodesia Conference. We shall be glad to have Mr. Chona in London, and I will of course keep in touch with you through our High Commissioners. However, I would very much welcome an opportunity to discuss our ideas for a settlement personally with you. I am sorry you are not able to pass through London at this time, though I of course understand the reason. If there is any possibility of your coming to London at some time during the first week of the Conference or early in the following week, it would be of great benefit to our search for a settlement. Do think about it - but I know

Copies to:-

*(Handwritten mark)*

CONFIDENTIAL

/your

File No. ....

Department .....

Drafted by Sir A. Duff  
(Block Capitals) .....

Tel. Extn. 233 5617 .....

OUTWARD.

TELEGRAM

Security Classification CONFIDENTIAL
Precedence IMMEDIATE
DESKBY .....

FOR COMMS. DEPT. USE	Despatched	(Date) .....	POSTBY .....
		(Time) .....Z	

PREAMBLE

(Time of Origin) .....Z(G.M.T.) (Restrictive Prefix).....

(Security Class.) .....CONFIDENTIAL (Caveat/ Privacy Marking).....

(Codeword) ..... (Deskby).....Z

TO IMMEDIATE GABORONE Tel. No. .... of ...  
(precedence) (post)

AND TO (precedence/post).....

AND SAVING TO.....

REPEATED TO (for info)..... IMMEDIATE: LUSAKA, DAR-ES-SALAAM, Washington  
MIRIMBA SALISBURY

SAVING TO (for info).....

Distribution:-  
Rhodesia Policy

[TEXT]

RHODESIA

1. Please pass the following message from the Prime Minister to President Seretse Khama.

"Our High Commissioner will have kept you closely informed of the steps we have been taking in preparation for the Rhodesia Conference. It is our intention at the Conference to try to reach agreement first on the main lines of the independence Constitution along the lines of the proposals we have put forward. If that can be achieved we shall be ready to go on to discuss the pre-independence arrangements, in accordance with the Lusaka agreement that new elections should be held, in which all the parties could participate freely, under the British Government's authority. We shall be making the most determined effort to achieve a successful outcome, but the prospects of success will of course depend also on the attitudes of the parties.

/I ~~xxx~~ shall

Copies to:-



CONFIDENTIAL

I shall be seeing Julius Nyerere in London on 14 September and I have also written to Kenneth Kaunda. If there were any chance of your coming to London yourself in the early stages of the Conference, I should of course greatly welcome the opportunity to discuss the way forward with you and to benefit from your advice. But with your elections imminent, I suppose this is not possible, and we must simply manage to keep in contact without meeting personally."

Message ends.

2. In delivering this message you should explain that we attach importance to the influence which the Front Line Commonwealth African Governments can bring to bear on the Patriotic Front to negotiate seriously at the Conference. We would therefore welcome a visit by Mogwe (if President Khama cannot come) in the first few days of the Conference, and if you see no objection you should suggest this. We believe his presence would be helpful.

CONFIDENTIAL

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

CONFIDENTIAL

your pre-occupations, and if we cannot meet personally we shall just have to manage without.

As you know I shall be seeing Julius Nyerere on 14 September. I shall also be in touch with Sir Seretse Khama."

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN



237 Rhodesia

PS  
PS/SIR I GILMOUR  
PS/MR LUCE  
PS/PUS  
SIR A DURF  
MR WILLSON  
MR BYATT  
~~LORD N G LENNOX~~

PS/NO 10 DOWNING STREET 2  
MR R L WADE-GERY )  
MR P M MAXEY )  
COL MOIR ) CABINET  
MR P J FOWLER ) OFFICE  
DIO )  
~~SIR J HUNT~~ )

M.S.

.....  
HD/RHODESIA DEPT (3)

~~FOR ZIMBABWE DEVELOPMENTS FUND~~  
ADD MR LYNCH ODI?  
MR SLATER TREASURY

HD/C AF D  
HD/S AF D

HD/UND  
HD/NEWS DEPT  
HD/WAD

MR FREELAND LEGAL ADVISER RM K200A

MR FIFOOT LEGAL ADVISER RM K164

SECRET

(2)  
Pmic Panister

FM KIRIMBA SALISBURY 040710Z SEP 79

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

Amh 4/5

TELNO 622 OF 4 SEPTEMBER

YOUR TELNO 193: RHODESIA CONFERENCE

1. I SAW GENERAL WALLS YESTERDAY AFTERNOON BEFORE RECEIPT OF YOUR TUR. I SPOKE ON THE LINES OF THE INTRODUCTION TO YOUR PARA 1 AND MADE THE POINTS IN YOUR PARA 1(B) (D) AND (G). OUR CONVERSATION ALSO COVERED THE GROUND IN YOUR PARA 2 AND I REFERRED TO THE EFFECT UPON THE SECURITY SITUATION OF ANY EROSION OF FRONT-LINE SUPPORT FOR THE PATRIOTIC FRONT (YOUR PARA 3).

2. I LAID PARTICULAR STRESS UPON THE CRITICAL IMPORTANCE OF THE FORTHCOMING CONFERENCE. THE LIVES AND THE FUTURE LIVELIHOOD OF ALL RHODESIANS, BLACK AND WHITE, DEPENDED UPON A SUCCESSFUL OUTCOME. I EXPRESSED MY FEAR THAT SOME OF THE BISHOP'S WHITE ADVISERS AND MINISTERIAL COLLEAGUES WOULD BE UNABLE TO SEE THE WOOD FOR THE TREES AND COULD PREJUDICE THE CHANCE OF A SETTLEMENT BY UNNECESSARY INFLEXIBILITY. I HOPED THAT WALLS WOULD BRING HIS INFLUENCE TO BEAR TO ENSURE THAT THE BISHOP WAS NOT MISLED BY SUCH ADVICE. IT WAS ALSO IMPORTANT THAT THE BISHOP SHOULD KNOW BEFORE HE LEFT FOR LONDON HOW HIS SENIOR SECURITY ADVISERS REGARDED THE SITUATION.

3. WALLS WELCOMED THE OPPORTUNITY TO DISCUSS THESE MATTERS. HE SAID THAT HE HAD, THAT MORNING, HAD A PRIVATE DISCUSSION WITH THE



3. WALLS WELCOMED THE OPPORTUNITY TO DISCUSS THESE MATTERS. HE SAID THAT HE HAD, THAT MORNING, HAD A PRIVATE DISCUSSION WITH THE BISHOP AT THE LATTERS REQUEST. MUZOREWA TOLD HIM THAT HE CONTINUED TO PUT HIS TRUST IN THE PRIME MINISTER AND WOULD BE GOING TO LONDON TO NEGOTIATE IN A CONSTRUCTIVE WAY. HE MENTIONED TO WALLS THAT HE HAD BEEN GIVEN AN INDICATION OF OUR MORE DETAILED PROPOSALS FOR CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE. HE THOUGHT THAT A FEW ITEMS MIGHT BE NEGOTIABLE. ON THE MAJORITY OF ISSUES, HOWEVER, THE BISHOP WAS ASSUMING THAT HMG WOULD STAND FIRM. WALLS HAD TOLD THE BISHOP THAT IT WAS HIGHLY DESIRABLE THAT THE PRESENT OPPORTUNITY OF FINDING A LASTING SOLUTION TO THE RHODESIAN PROBLEM SHOULD BE SEIZED. WALLS REMINDED ME THAT THE BISHOP HAD SPOKEN TO THE SECURITY FORCES ABOUT THE OUTCOME OF HIS VISIT TO LONDON IN JULY AND THAT NONE OF THE PROPOSALS MENTIONED THEN HAD RAISED SERIOUS CONCERN. WALLS SAID THAT HE HAD FOUND THE BISHOP IN A RESOLUTE FRAME OF MIND. HE DID NOT THINK THAT MUZOREWA WOULD PROVE INTRANSIGENT. HE WAS CERTAINLY NOT UNDER PRESSURE FROM THE SENIOR SECURITY COMMANDERS TO RESIST CHANGE. WALLS AGREED THAT SOME OF THOSE ACCOMPANYING THE BISHOP TO LONDON COULD GIVE UNHELPFUL ADVICE. HOWEVER, HE BELIEVED THAT DAVID SMITH AND KEN FLOWER WOULD BE A GOOD INFLUENCE AND HELP COUNTERACT ANY NEGATIVE ADVICE.

4. WALLS ASKED ABOUT SENIOR APPOINTMENTS. I TOLD HIM, FOR HIS STRICTLY PERSONAL INFORMATION, THE IDEAS THAT WE HAD IN MIND FOR THIS PARTICULAR ASPECT OF THE CONSTITUTION. WALLS COMMENTED THAT IF THIS WAS WHAT WE WANTED HE SAW NO PROBLEM.

5. WALLS ASKED WHETHER THERE WAS ANYTHING MORE HE COULD USEFULLY DO. I SUGGESTED THAT HE SHOULD MAKE SURE THAT THOSE WHO WOULD BE REPRESENTING THE WHITES IN LONDON WERE AWARE OF HIS OWN VIEWS AND THOSE OF HIS SENIOR MILITARY COLLEAGUES. IT COULD ALSO BE HELPFUL IF HE COULD REAFFIRM TO THE BISHOP HIS BELIEF THAT CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE OF THE KIND WE HAD IN MIND WOULD NOT UNDERMINE MORALE OF THE SECURITY FORCES AND WOULD BE BROADLY ACCEPTABLE TO THE WHITE COMMUNITY. WALLS SAID HE WOULD DO WHAT HE COULD. HE BELIEVED MOST STRONGLY THAT THE LONDON CONFERENCE MUST NOT FAIL. HE COMMENTED FINALLY THAT HE DID NOT THINK THAT WE NEED NOT WORRY TOO MUCH ABOUT THE BISHOP. HE WAS STILL "ON COURSE" AND WAS GAINING IN STATURE.

6. ON THE SECURITY SITUATION, WALLS WAS MORE OPTIMISTIC THAN I WOULD HAVE EXPECTED. HE MENTIONED AGAIN THAT RHODESIAN ATTACKS ON ZIPRA HAD GREATLY WEAKENED THEIR POTENTIAL. HE ALSO CLAIMED THAT THE SECURITY FORCES HAD BEEN REASONABLY SUCCESSFUL IN THEIR



6. ON THE SECURITY SITUATION, WALLS WAS MORE OPTIMISTIC THAN I WOULD HAVE EXPECTED. HE MENTIONED AGAIN THAT RHODESIAN ATTACKS ON ZIPRA HAD GREATLY WEAKENED THEIR POTENTIAL. HE ALSO CLAIMED THAT THE SECURITY FORCES HAD BEEN REASONABLY SUCCESSFUL IN THEIR OPERATIONS IN THE SOUTH AGAINST ZANLA. THERE WERE RECENT REPORTS, WHICH NEEDED CHECKING, THAT ZANLA FORCES IN THE FIELD WERE SHORT OF AMMUNITION AND EXPLOSIVES. THERE HAD ALSO BEEN MORE CLASHES THAN HAD AT FIRST BEEN REALISED BETWEEN ZIPRA AND ZANLA. WALLS SAID THAT HE WAS NOT CLAIMING THAT THE SECURITY FORCES WERE WINNING THE WAR. HOWEVER, THE PATRIOTIC FRONT WERE BY NO MEANS GETTING ON TOP.

DAY

NNNN

Chiodera

JS



10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

4 September 1979

I am writing to thank you for your letter to the Prime Minister of 3 September, enclosing the original of a signed letter from Prime Minister Clark about Rhodesia.

M. O'D. B. ALEXANDER

His Excellency The Hon. Paul Martin, PC, CC, QC.

A large, stylized handwritten signature in blue ink, appearing to be 'M. O'D. B. Alexander'.



065  
●

*John Hutchinson*  
*Professor of Industrial Relations*  
*Graduate School of Management*  
*University of California at Los Angeles*  
*Los Angeles, California 90024*

*Tel: (213) 825-3134*  
*(213) 825-2506 Secretary*  
*(213) 476-2527 Residence*

MEIKLES HOTEL, SALISBURY

3 September 1979

*Dear Prime Minister,*

Please see the attached to Lord Carrington on the estimate of resignations from the Zimbabwe Rhodesian armed forces if sanctions are renewed in November.

Yours sincerely,

*John Hutchinson*

THE RT HON MARGARET THATCHER MP

*John Hutchinson*  
*Professor of Industrial Relations*  
*Graduate School of Management*  
*University of California at Los Angeles*  
*Los Angeles, California 90024*

*Tel. (213) 825-3134*  
*(213) 825-2506 Secretary*  
*(213) 476-2527 Residence*

MEIKLES HOTEL, SALISBURY

3 September 1979

*Jean Peter,*

I had intended posting an updated version of the enclosed to you in London after a visit - starting tomorrow - to South Africa; but in view of the following I thought it might be well to send it off by pouch tomorrow morning.

I was astounded to be informed today by perhaps the best qualified white public official here to make the statement that if sanctions are renewed in November perhaps 50 to 60 percent of the Europeans in the armed forces will make plans to quit or retire on April 1 next year. A comparable number will be expected to leave the public service.

If the official in question is right it must surely mean the disintegration of Zimbabwe Rhodesia at high speed. I was already convinced after a week here - as you will see - that a renewal of sanctions would be disastrous, but I had no idea the impact would be so harsh or so sudden.

I will be in South Africa for the remainder of this week with perhaps a day in Pretoria. The South African Mission here has asked Pik Botha if he will see me. I will be in London on Sunday for two weeks and reachable at the Naval Club or through the Institute of Directors if I can help at all.

Best wishes.

Yours sincerely,

*John*

TO LORD CARRINGTON

CC: PRIME MINISTER  
JULIAN AMERY



*John Hutchinson*  
*Professor of Industrial Relations*  
*Graduate School of Management*  
*University of California at Los Angeles*  
*Los Angeles, California 90024*

TENTATIVE DRAFT

*Tel. (213) 825.3134*  
*(213) 825.2506 Secretary*  
*(213) 476.2527 Residence*

September 9, 1979

c/o Institute of Directors,  
116, Pall Mall,  
LONDON S.W.1

Lord Carrington  
House of Lords,  
LONDON SW1  
ENGLAND.

Dear Foreign Secretary,

I have just spent two weeks in Zimbabwe Rhodesia and South Africa before coming to London for the Zimbabwe Rhodesia conference.

1. There is, absent a general agreement, a bedrock set of options:
  - (a) If the conference deadlocks but Her Majesty's Government concludes that Prime Minister Muzorewa has made reasonable concessions but that the Patriotic Front has not, or that the two sides are irreconcilable but that the Six Principles have been sufficiently observed, then sanctions can honourably be dropped and recognition extended to the Muzorewa Government. There is a military opinion here that such action could bring about a Government victory in the field in about eight months.
  - (b) If an arrangement is made whereafter Nkomo returns to Salisbury without Mugabe, the military opinion here seems to be that the Muzorewa Government would receive such an increment of Matabele and Karanga support that the war could be over in a few months, even if Machel continued to support Mugabe. The converse might apply, although perhaps not so appealingly or plausibly.
  - (c) If the conference deadlocks or if agreement is delayed and sanctions are not lifted in November, then Zimbabwe Rhodesia will either bleed to death or make common cause with South Africa in what could swiftly become a continental war.

The greatest of present misgivings in Salisbury seems to be that, if the conference is not successful, then HMG will either propose the extension of sanctions beyond November as part of some speculative package, or take off the Whips in some move by the Opposition to renew sanctions. There is a substantial feeling in Salisbury that you are already disposed to support either move, and a conviction that nothing would so contribute to massive white flight, and perhaps to the termination of the republic, as your confirmation of that belief.

2. It appears that Prime Minister Muzorewa will stand firm on at least two issues: The integrity of the Army, and the unavailability of early elections.

On the first, I assume it is widely known that selective recruitment from the Patriotic Front not prejudicial to military discipline is acceptable in Salisbury.

On the second, I imagine it will be argued by Salisbury that the Muzorewa Government deserves as long a test in office as the Thatcher Government, not least since proportionately it got more votes; that Nkomo himself has repeatedly insisted - seven times on one television programme in the Spring - that free and fair elections cannot be held without a registered electorate; that such registration would take at least two years; and that Nkomo should be taken at his word. There will not be anything like the same objection to the holding of a referendum on whatever constitutional amendments might be agreed to in London.

3. On the question of a special peace or prize for Nkomo:

- (a) It would be hard to exaggerate the legacy of hatred for Nkomo in the wake of the Viscounts and the steady escalation of mindless murder in the villages by the Patriotic Front. Conceivably the greatest obstacle to Nkomo's return by agreement is his apprehension that unless he first lays Zimbabwe Rhodesia in ruins he will be shot. Mugabe is hardly in better case. I doubt if the outside world has much appreciation of the lethal private mood among both blacks and whites towards these two men.



- (b) Nevertheless the notion persists that Nkomo might fruitfully be persuaded to return alone or be offered some special status, and that the Muzorewa Government might agree if the price is right and the result is recognition. Nkomo will be invited anyway with Mugabe to return to a seat in Parliament if not in the Cabinet. The offer is not expected to intrigue him. The question is raised whether he should be considered for the Presidency.

He is said to be feeling his age, and no longer privately convinced or public convincing that he can come to the chief power. On the other hand he would no doubt find it hard to succumb to pure ritual. Let me recall to you a suggestion I have made over the past five years to give the Presidency a guardian function.

- (c) The proposal is to establish a Constitutional Guard whose duty it would be to protect the parliamentary and judicial processes and persons. The Guard would be separate from the Army and directly responsible to the President who, however, could invoke its protective capacity only on the advice of a Constitutional Council that an actionable threat to the Constitution was taking place or imminent.

The Guard would not be large enough to threaten the Army but could be competent enough to deter usurpers, and perhaps conspicuous enough in panoply and distribution to give spirit to constitutional government. It would of course work best if never used, but even if abused could hardly be worse than the evil it was meant to prevent. It might, in stately and vigilant disuse, extending beyond the first incumbency, permit the constitutional equipoise that Africa has so seldom known.

In such circumstances the President could be seen to be the Guardian of the Constitution. It is not a small idea or duty-representing the great promise that Zimbabwe Rhodesia could be the constitutional exemplar of Africa, and might be presented to Nkomo as a crowning trusteeship. It would also have to be presented to the citizenry with enormous care and persuasiveness if both mayhem and exodus are not to take place.

- (d) I imagine Mugabe could simultaneously be offered a Cabinet position, although not rationally in anything to do with the Police or the Army, since he is pledged to the Marxist crucifixion of both.
- (e) If both offers are made and accepted there would be a quick end to the war. If both offers are made and only one accepted the war could be ended in a few months. If both offers are made and rejected the way would be

September 9, 1979

- 4 -

John Hutchinson

---


clear to the ending of sanctions and to recognition and peace before long in the knowledge that the British commitment to self-determination and constitutional government had been honourably served.

There is in Zimbabwe Rhodesia a great public conviction that this is the fork in the river; that Zimbabwe Rhodesia has a duty to bargain in good faith; but that if, after showing ready to listen and compromise Zimbabwe Rhodesia is kept in the chains of sanctions and illegality, Her Majesty's Government will have guaranteed the death of the republic or a wider war or both.

Sanctions will be the litmus. There is an awful foreboding, a poising for flight and genocide, a conviction that the prolongation of sanctions will bring the Soviet Union to the Limpopo. If you want to be sure about saving Zimbabwe Rhodesia for anything, you will have to end sanctions on November 15.

Best regards, I do wish you well for the coming weeks,

Yours very sincerely,

A handwritten signature in blue ink, appearing to read "John Hutchinson", with a long horizontal flourish extending to the right.

c.c. Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher and others.



11 12 1  
2  
3  
4  
5  
6  
7  
8  
9  
0

SEP 7 1979

*John [unclear]*

HAUT-COMMISSARIAT DU CANADA,  
MACDONALD HOUSE,  
1 GROSVENOR SQUARE,  
LONDON, W1X 0AB.



CANADIAN HIGH COMMISSION,  
MACDONALD HOUSE,  
1 GROSVENOR SQUARE,  
LONDON, W1X 0AB.

September 3, 1979.

Dear Prime Minister,

.....  
Following our letter of August 21, please  
find enclosed the original signed letter from <sup>20.8.79 (Sept 5)</sup>  
Prime Minister Clark of Canada on Rhodesia.

Respectfully yours,

*Paul Martin*

Paul Martin

The Rt. Hon. Margaret Thatcher, MP,  
Prime Minister,  
10 Downing Street,  
LONDON.

*Optimum*  
*100%*  
*Prof.*  
*100*



RECEIVED  
SEP 19 1979

RECEIVED  
SEP 19 1979

LA SEP 19 1979

LA 8366



Tmt  
Rhodesia

10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

3 September 1979

B/F10-9-79

Rhodesia: Message  
from President Senghor

(28/8.  
Pr.5)

I enclose a copy of a letter to the Prime Minister from President Senghor of Senegal about Rhodesia. I should be grateful for advice on the form of a reply.

M. O'D. B. ALEXANDER

R.M.J. Lyne, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.





10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

3 September 1979

*Dear Miss Breedon,*

I should be grateful if you could inform the Embassy of Senegal that President Senghor's letter of 22 August has been received and submitted for the Prime Minister's immediate consideration.

*Yours ever*

*Nicholas Alexander*

Miss E. Breedon,  
British Embassy, Paris.

*TSXP*



10 DOWNING STREET

Prime Minister .

You have seen this  
text in draft .

"Dear Julius" .

You may like to add  
"with warm personal regards"  
in manuscript . I have not  
had it typed in .

Ans.  
- 30/8

F.O. for onward  
transmission



SUBJECT  
MASTER

HS

cc F20



10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

**PRIME MINISTER'S  
PERSONAL MESSAGE  
SERIAL No. T97/79T**

3 September 1979

*Dear Julius,*

Thank you for your message about Rhodesia. I am glad to be keeping in touch and grateful to you for setting out your thoughts in advance of the Constitutional Conference. I look forward to seeing you in London on 14 September, to discuss the position then reached at the Conference.

You raised the question of the parliamentary representation of the white community. I fully understand the point you make, but we have to have regard to the reality of the situation in Rhodesia, both in historical perspective, and in the light of what is likely to be practicable. I do not in fact regard it as unreasonable that (for the first few years after independence only) there should be provision for the election of a number of representatives of the minority community by that community themselves. (Such a provision has been a common feature of all previous attempts to achieve a settlement, including the Anglo-American proposals). A provision of this sort is by its nature transitional; and it must not operate in such a way as to allow the representatives of the minority to exert a blocking power over a wide range of legislation. This would be unprecedented: I made clear at Lusaka my views on this point.

/ I much

I much agree with your second point. We do indeed intend to act at the Conference as the de-colonising power. We have convened a constitutional conference and its task will be to reach agreement on the independence constitution for Zimbabwe. We are - deliberately - adopting a step by step approach; unless we seek to build up areas of agreement before moving on to tackle other difficulties, we shall get nowhere. We have put forward outline proposals for a Constitution. If there is a measure of agreement on that outline, we shall be ready to bring forward the necessary more detailed proposals.

Once progress has been made towards agreement on the independence constitution, we can move on to discuss the manner in which it should be implemented. The first point must be acceptance by the parties that new elections will be held, properly supervised under the British Government's authority. We have exercised that authority before and Commonwealth observers would be present to see how it was exercised on this occasion. As I said in Lusaka, we are prepared to carry out our responsibility in this and in other respects. The arrangements for new elections must permit the parties to participate in them with an equal chance of success. It will be our responsibility to ensure that that is so; and the responsibility of the Commonwealth to witness the manner in which the elections are carried out.

There is one particular way in which we need your help in this venture. The success or failure of our determined effort to achieve a negotiated settlement is likely to depend on the influence you and the other Commonwealth African leaders are able to exert. It

/ will be



will be extremely difficult to get Bishop Muzorewa and his colleagues to accept different constitutional arrangements on the key issues and to agree that new elections should be held. There will be no chance of agreement if, for their part, the leaders of the Patriotic Front reject, as they have done in their statement in Dar-es-Salaam, the British Government's constitutional proposals and its authority to supervise elections. I note that Mr. Mugabe is already saying that he expects the Conference to fail.

It is our intention at the Conference to act as suggested in your message. We must seek to get as much agreement as possible from both sides. We are determined to transfer power on the basis of a Constitution which we can defend as a democratic document and which the rest of the world will recognise as such. That is exactly our approach. Both sides will I hope realise that it is likely to be costly for them if they seek to frustrate a political solution on these lines.

*With warm personal regards,*

*Yours sincerely,*

*Raymond Dubs*

His Excellency Mwalimu Dr. Julius K. Nyerere

*tw*

CONFIDENTIAL

Rhodesia



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

3 September, 1979.

Rhodesia: Constitutional Conference

The Prime Minister has seen the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary's undated minute to her about the Constitutional Conference due to open next week. She is in general content with the line set out in Lord Carrington's minute.

The Prime Minister has, however, noted that Annex D, paragraph 3, provides for an election to take place "under impartial supervision" and only adds subsequently (paragraph 4) that HMG is "prepared to assume" its responsibility to see that this requirement, inter alia, is met. In the Prime Minister's view, HMG is charged with responsibility for the election, and the election should be held under British supervision.

The Prime Minister has also noted that Annex D makes no provision for a referendum, should that be thought preferable to an election.

M. O'D. B. ALEXANDER

G.G.H. Walden, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CONFIDENTIAL

RB



CONFIDENTIAL



10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

3 September, 1979.

Rhodesian Representation in London:  
Message from Bishop Muzorewa

As I have already told Paul Lever on the telephone, the Prime Minister has approved the text of the message to Bishop Muzorewa enclosed with your letter to me of 31 August.

M. O'D. B. ALEXANDER

R.M.J. Lyne, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CONFIDENTIAL

A handwritten signature in the bottom right corner of the page.

SECRET

GR 600

SECRET

FM FCO 031045Z SEP 79

TO IMMEDIATE MIRIMBA SALISBURY

TELEGRAM NUMBER 193 OF 3 SEPTEMBER

*As per 4/5*

YOUR TELNO 609: RHODESIA CONFERENCE.

1. WHEN YOU SEE GENERAL WALLS AND DAVID SMITH THE CHIEF POINT TO RUB IN IS THAT THE PRIZE OF AN INDEPENDENT RHODESIA, ENJOYING A FEAR DEGREE OF INTERNATIONAL ACCEPTANCE AND WITH SANCTIONS LIFTED, IS WITHIN THEIR REACH. THEY SHOULD NOT THROW IT AWAY BY EXCESSIVE RIGIDITY (E.G. FIGHTING FOR EVERY CLAUSE OF THE PRESENT CONSTITUTION). THE RHODESIA FRONT AND THE CIVIL SERVANTS MUST BE PERSUADED TO BE MORE FLEXIBLE ON THIS OCCASION AND TAKE A WIDER VIEW THAN USUAL. YOU SHOULD AT YOUR DISCRETION MAKE ALSO THE FOLLOWING POINTS.
- (A) IT IS OUR INTENTION TO WORK FOR A SOLUTION BY THE END OF THE YEAR.
- (B) WE WILL NOT ALLOW THE PATRIOTIC FRONT TO EXERCISE A VETO OVER A SETTLEMENT ON TERMS WE CONSIDER REASONABLE (AND WHICH IS SHOWN TO BE ACCEPTABLE TO THE PEOPLE OF RHODESIA).
- (C) THE FINAL INDEPENDENCE CONSTITUTION WILL HAVE TO BE ENACTED BY THE BRITISH PARLIAMENT. THIS IS ESSENTIAL TO ITS BEING REGARDED AS A "LEGITIMATE" CONSTITUTION AND THEREFORE TO THE PROSPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL ACCEPTANCE. SO IS SOME TEST OF ACCEPTABILITY, WHETHER REFERENDUM OR ELECTIONS.
- (D) THERE IS NOTHING IN OUR PROPOSALS WHICH NEED CAUSE EXCESSIVE CONCERN TO THE WHITE COMMUNITY. THEY WOULD HAVE A SUBSTANTIAL PROPORTION OF THE SEATS IN PARLIAMEN TN ENTRENCHED HUMAN RIGHTS PROVISIONS AND THE MAINTENANCE OF STANDARDS IN THE CIVIL SERVICE, SUBJECT TO ULTIMATE GOVERNMENTAL CONTROL OVER SENIOR APPOINTMENTS AND SOME PROVISION FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF AFRICANS.
- (E) TOO MUCH ATTENTION SHOULD NOT BE FOCUSED ON 15 NOVEMBER. THE LIFTING OF SANCTIONS HAS TO BE A POSITIVE ACT, GOING WITH THE GRANTING OF LEGAL INDEPENDENCE. IT DOES NOT DEPEND ON LAPSING OF SECTION 2 OF 1965 ACT. BUT WE ARE DETERMINED TO BRING MATTERS TO A CONCLUSION AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.
- (F) THE US GOVERNMENT WILL SUPPORT OUR GENERAL APPROACH - BUT (C) ABOVE IS IMPORTANT TO THEM.

*/(G) IT IS*

SECRET



SECRET

(9) IT IS IMPORTANT TO OUR HANDLING OF THE CONFERENCE AND TO MUZOREWA'S PROSPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL ACCEPTANCE THAT, THROUGHOUT, HE SHOULD BE SEEN TO BE ADOPTING A REASONABLE ATTITUDE IN THE FACE OF EXPECTED PATRIOTIC FRONT INTRANSIGENCE.

2. IF WALLS RAISES QUESTIONS ABOUT THE SECURITY FORCES YOU SHOULD SAY THAT THERE IS NO QUESTION IN OUR MINDS OF "DISMANTLING" THE RHODESIAN SECURITY FORCES OR OF OUR AGREEING THAT THE FUTURE ARMY SHOULD BE "BASED ON THE LIBERATION FORCES" (THOUGH IF THE PATRIOTIC FRONT AGREED TO PARTICIPATE IN FAIR ELECTIONS AND WON, THE ELECTED GOVERNMENT WOULD HAVE TO BE ABLE TO PROVIDE FOR THE INTEGRATION OF THE FORCES AND CONTROL OVER THEM). WE ARE THINKING VERY MUCH ON THE LINES OF THE INTERVIEW WALLS GAVE TO THE DAILY TELEGRAPH ON 1 SEPTEMBER. YOU SHOULD EMPHASISE THAT IT IS ESSENTIAL TO OUR TACTICS TO TRY TO PUT MAXIMUM STRAIN ON THE SUPPORT OF COMMONWEALTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENTS FOR THE PATRIOTIC FRONT: HENCE THE NEED TO OFFER THE P.F. A FAIR CHANCE TO PARTICIPATE (BUT NOT ON TERMS WHICH WOULD GIVE THEM A POSITION OF ADVANTAGE).

3. YOU SHOULD SEEK TO EXPLORE WALLS' VIEW OF THE SECURITY SITUATION. IT IS OUR ASSESSMENT THAT NKOMO'S FORCES HAVE SUFFERED DAMAGE FROM THE RHODESIAN RAIDS BUT THAT THE RHODESIAN SECURITY FORCES ARE FINDING INCREASING DIFFICULTY IN CONTAINING THE GUERRILLAS, PARTICULARLY ZANLA. THERE HAS BEEN LITTLE RESPONSE TO THE AMNESTY AND THE RHODESIAN FORCES CANNOT HOPE TO WIN THE WAR WITHOUT A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT. WE DO NOT BELIEVE THAT THE LIFTING OF SANCTIONS BY BRITAIN ALONE WOULD HAVE ANY EFFECT ON THE GUERRILLAS IN THE FIELD: BUT THE SECURITY SITUATION COULD BE TRANSFORMED IF WE CAN WEAKEN ZAMBIAN AND BOTSWANA SUPPORT FOR THE PATRIOTIC FRONT. THERE ARE SIGNS THAT NKOMO IN PARTICULAR FEELS HIMSELF TO BE UNDER CONSIDERABLE PRESSURE FROM THE COMMONWEALTH AFRICAN PRESIDENTS FOLLOWING THE LUSAKA AGREEMENT.

CARRINGTON

FILES

RHOD D	PCD
OADS	DEF D
N AM D	OID
NEWS D	PS
FUSD	PS/SIR I GILMOUR
PLANNING STAFF	PS/MR LUCE
ES & SD	PS/MR RIDLEY
CCD	PS/MR HURD
PRD	PS/FUS
UND	SIR A DUFF
LEGAL ADVISERS	LORD N G LENNOX
(MR FREELAND)	MISS BROWN
(MR PIFOOT)	MR WILLSON
ECON D	MR BYATT

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION  
RHODESIA POLICY

CONFIDENTIAL

GR 600

CONFIDENTIAL

DESKBY 011000Z FCO

FM DAR ES SALAAM

(2)

*Prime Minister*

*(You have already seen  
the text of the message.)*

*Para 3/5*

CONFIDENTIAL

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 707 OF 1 SEPTEMBER

RFI IMMEDIATE MIRIMBA SALISBURY MAPUTO LUSAKA GABORONE HAVANA

PRIORITY LUANDA LAGOS WASHINGTON UKMIS NEW YORK

YOUR TELNO 287 (NOT REPEATED); RHODESIA

*mb*

1. I TRANSMITTED THE PRIME MINISTERS MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT NYERERE (VIA HIS PRIVATE SECRETARY) ON THE MORNING OF 31 AUGUST. HE ASKED ME TO CALL THAT EVENING.

2. PRESIDENT NYERERE SAID THAT HE HAD JUST DRAFTED A REPLY TO THE PRIME MINISTERS MESSAGE WHICH MISS WICKEN WOULD LET ME HAVE BEFORE HIS DEPARTURE FOR HAVANA. IN THE MEANTIME HE WANTED TO TELL ME PERSONALLY HOW GRATEFUL HE WAS FOR MRS THATCHERS RESPONSE. IT HAD COVERED THE POINTS HE HAD MADE IN HIS COMMUNICATION TO HER (MY TELNO 695-- NOT REPEATED) AND HE WAS VERY SATISFIED WITH HER REPLIES. HE WAS SURE THAT HIS FIRST MINOR ONEABOUT PARLIAMENTARY REPRESENTATION FOR THE WHITES WOULD BE SORTED OUT AT THE CONFERENCE BY THE RHODESIANS THEMSELVES. HE ATTACHED MORE IMPORTANCE TO THE OTHER TWO: WE MUST ACT FIRMLY AS, "DECOLONISERS". THE TIME FOR NEUTRALITY WOULD NOT BE THE CONFERENCE BUT WHEN WE WERE "HOLDING THE RING" AT THE ELECTIONS AND HE WAS PLEASED TO NOTE THAT HE AND THE PRIME MINISTER WERE APPARENTLY SEEING EYE TO EYE ON BOTH THE CONDUCT OF THE CONFERENCE AND OF THE ELECTION.

3. THINKING ALOUD PRESIDENT NYERERE SAID THAT THERE WERE A COUPLE OF PASSAGES IN THE PRIME MINISTERS MESSAGE WHICH HAD PARTICULARLY STRUCK HIM: FIRST HER REFERENCE TO A SRTEP BY STEP APPROACH-- OUR BRINGING FORWARD MORE DETAILED PROPOSALS ONCE THERE WAS A MEASURE OF AGREEMENT ON THE OUTLINE. WERE THESE NEW PROPOSALS OUTSIDE THE DRAFT FRAMEWORK OR A FLESHING OUT OF THE PRESENT SKELETON? I SAID I THOUGHT THE LATTER AND

*HE AGREED*

CONFIDENTIAL



CONFIDENTIAL

HE AGREED THAT THIS WAS HIS INTERPRETATION AND HE ACCEPTED THE WISDOM OF THIS APPROACH, BUT ONCE WE GOT AGREEMENT ON THE BASICS WE SHOULD NOT COUNTENANCE NEW PROPOSALS.

4. HIS SECOND THOUGHT WAS ON HOW THE PRIME MINISTER HAD SUGGESTED HE COULD HELP. HE WANTED US TO BE QUITE CLEAR THAT THE PATRIOTIC FRONT WOULD NOT BE GIVEN THE RIGHT OF VETO. IF HE AND THE OTHER COMMONWEALTH FRONT LINE STATES WERE SATISFIED (AND HE EMPHASISED TWICE THAT THEY WOULD HAVE TO BE) THAT THE CONSTITUTION THAT WE WERE PUTTING FORWARD WAS A FAIR ONE AND THAT WE WERE GENUINELY INTENT IN DISCHARGING OUR RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE WHOLE PROCESS OF DECOLONISATION AND COULD BE SEEN TO ASSUME THE AUTHORITY TO DO SO WE WOULD HAVE THEIR SUPPORT. HE AND HIS COLLEAGUES WOULD TRY TO ENSURE THAT THE PATRIOTIC FRONT COULD NOT VETO BUT WE MUST, FOR OUR PART, DO OUR BEST TO PREVENT "ANYONE ELSE" FROM DOING SO.

5. THERE FOLLOWED A BRIEF DISCUSSION ON THE NON ALLIGNED CONFERENCE (NAM) IN HAVANA. IN REPLY TO MY QUESTION NYERERE SAID THAT HE DID NOT EXPECT THE REFERENCE TO RHODESIA IN THE COMMUNIQUE TO BE ISSUED AT THE NAM TO BE "5 TOO SIMILAR" TO THE LUSAKA DECLARATION. THIS DID NOT WORRY HIM. EACH CONFERENCE HAD ITS OWN CHARACTERISTICS AND ETHOS: AS FAR AS HE WAS CONCERNED HE WOULD ABIDE BY WHAT WAS SAID AND AGREED AT LUSAKA. ONLY IF THE CONSTITUTIONAL APPROACH FAILED MIGHT IT BE APPROPRIATE TO FOLLOW THE LANGUAGE OF MONROVIA OR OF HAVANA. HE WAS GOING TO HAVANA TO TELL PEOPLE THAT THE LUSAKA WAS THE WAY FORWARD AND THAT HE WAS VERY HAPPY AT THE WAY MRS THATCHER WAS APPROACHING THE PROBLEM.

6. COMMENT. THAT THE PRESIDENT, ON WHAT HAD BEEN FOR HIM A FRENETIC DAY ON THE EVE OF A LENGTHY ABSENCE FROM TANZANIA SHOULD FIND THE TIME TO TALK TO ME IN ADDITION TO DRAFTING A REPLY TO THE PRIME MINISTER'S MESSAGE IS I THINK A WELCOME INDICATION OF DETERMINATION TO DEMONSTRATE HIS CONTINUED WILLINGNESS TO BE AS HELPFUL AS POSSIBLE. HIS WRITTEN MESSAGE MAY PROVE TO DIFFER IN SOME DETAILS FROM HIS SOMEWHAT RAMBLING AND DISCURSIVE ORAL PRESENTATION BUT HIS CENTRAL MESSAGE IS CLEAR ENOUGH: AS LONG AS HE CONSIDERS THAT WE ARE

/PREPARED

2

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PREPARED TO DECOLONISE FIRMLY (OUR FIRMNESS BEING PARTICULARLY, IF NOT EXCLUSIVELY DIRECTED AT BISHOP MUZOREWA AND HIS ADMINISTRATION) HE IS PREPARED TO BE EQUALLY TOUGH WITH THE PATRIOTIC FRONT. WE ARE GETTING FULL MARKS FOR EFFORT, SO FAR.

HINCHCLIFFE

FILES  
RHODESIA D  
EAD  
UND  
PS  
PS/LPS  
PS/MR LUCE  
SIR A DUFF  
MR BYATT

[COPIES SENT  
NO 10 DOWNING ST]

*ms*

3

CONFIDENTIAL



Prime Minister  
Text of a message from Pres. Senghor of  
Senegal.

(2)

UNOFFICIAL TRANSLATION

Amn.  
3/9

As you are aware, I have followed with the closest attention the work of the last Commonwealth Conference held at Lusaka. It gives me the opportunity to send you my warmest congratulations.

Without denying your own political ideas, you have accepted a balanced solution to the Rhodesian problem which goes in the direction of democracy. It is precisely this kind of pluralist democracy which Senegal is working to encourage throughout Africa.

Amn. out.

1 September 1979

RHODESIA: POLICY: ADVANCE COPIES] 25

PS  
PS/SIR I GILMOUR  
PS/MR LUCE  
PS/PUS  
SIR A DUFF  
MR WILLSON  
MR BYATT  
LORD N. G LENNOX

PS/NO 10 DOWNING STREET

MR R L WADE-GERY )  
MR P M MAXEY )  
COL MOIR ) CABINET  
MR P J FOWLER ) OFFICE  
DIO )  
~~SIR J HUNT )~~

.....  
HD/RHODESIA DEPT (3)

~~FOR ZIMBABWE DEVELOPMENTS FUND~~

HD/C AF D  
HD/S AF D

~~ADD MR LYNCH ODI?~~  
~~MR SLATER TREASURY~~

HD/UND  
HD/NEWS DEPT  
HD/WAD  
MR FREELAND LEGAL ADVISER RM K200A  
MR FIFOOT LEGAL ADVISER RM K164

*Prime Minister* (2)

RESIDENT CLERK

IMMEDIATE 3/5

00 FCO

ADVANCE COPY  
IMMEDIATE

GR 600

CONFIDENTIAL

FM MIRIMBA SALISBURY 010730Z AUG 79

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 610 OF 1 SEPTEMBER

*mt*

YOUR TELNO 185: MESSAGE FROM MUZOREWA

1. I SAW MUZOREWA YESTERDAY EVENING AND SPOKE AS INSTRUCTED IN YOUR TUR. I STRESSED THE NEED FOR THE BISHOP TO ADOPT A REASONABLE ATTITUDE AT THE CONFERENCE AND THE DANGER OF INFLEXIBILITY.

2. THE BISHOP ASKED ME TO CONVEY HIS GRATITUDE TO THE PRIME MINISTER FOR THIS RESPONSE TO HIS LETTER OF 22 AUGUST. HE COULD ASSURE US THAT HE APPROACHED THE CONFERENCE WITH AN OPEN MIND AND THAT HE WOULD ADOPT A POSITIVE AND CONSTRUCTIVE ATTITUDE. HE DID NOT SPECIFICALLY PICK UP THE POINT ABOUT CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGES BUT HE DID SAY THAT HE WAS READY TO NEGOTIATE SERIOUSLY AT THE CONFERENCE.

HE WAS PARTICULARLY GRATEFUL FOR THE DECISION TO INCREASE THE NUMBER OF DELEGATES AT THE CONFERENCE FROM 10 TO 15. THIS WOULD HELP HIS



SPECIFICALLY PICK UP THE POINT ABOUT CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGES BUT HE DID SAY THAT HE WAS READY TO NEGOTIATE SERIOUSLY AT THE CONFERENCE. HE WAS PARTICULARLY GRATEFUL FOR THE DECISION TO INCREASE THE NUMBER OF DELEGATES IN THE CONFERENCE ROOM TO 16. THIS WOULD HELP HIM GREATLY. HE DID NOT REVERT TO THE QUESTION OF EXPENSES FOR ADDITIONAL DELEGATES.

3. MUZOREWA SAID THAT HE WOULD WELCOME A CHANCE TO TALK TO THE PRIME MINISTER BEFORE THE CONFERENCE OPENED AND ASKED ME FOR MY FRANK OPINION ABOUT MAKING A REQUEST. I SAID THAT I FELT SURE MRS THATCHER WOULD BE GLAD TO HAVE FURTHER DISCUSSIONS WITH HIM AT SOME STAGE. HOWEVER, A REQUEST FOR A MEETING BEFORE THE CONFERENCE COULD CREATE PROBLEMS, I.E. A RECIPROCAL REQUEST FROM THE PF. THE BISHOP SAID HE UNDERSTOOD AND INDICATED THAT HE WOULD NOT PURSUE THIS.

4. MUZOREWA ASKED ME TO CONVEY HIS SERIOUS CONCERN ABOUT ONE ASPECT OF THE PRESENT SITUATION. THE PATRIOTIC FRONT CONTINUED TO RECEIVE MASSIVE POLITICAL, FINANCIAL AND MILITARY SUPPORT. HIS GOVERNMENT RECEIVED VIRTUALLY NOTHING. HE WAS DEEPLY WORRIED AT THIS LACK OF BALANCE. HE WANTED TO MAINTAIN DEMOCRATIC AND ORDERLY GOVERNMENT IN RHODESIA. HE REJECTED MARXISM. HE WANTED TO DRAW HIS FRIENDS FROM THE FREE WORLD. YET THOSE FRIENDS LEFT HIS MILITARILY EMPTY-HANDED. DELAY IN ACHIEVING A SETTLEMENT COULD ONLY BENEFIT THE PATRIOTIC FRONT AND FURTHER TILT THE BALANCE AGAINST HIM.

5. I SAID THAT IT WAS BECAUSE WE RECOGNISED THIS PROBLEM AND WANTED TO BRING ABOUT A DE-ESCALATION OF THE WAR THAT WE WERE PROCEEDING URGENTLY WITH OUR PLANS FOR THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE. IF ANY OF THE PARTICIPANTS AT THE CONFERENCE REMAINED TOTALLY INTRANSIGENT, IT SEEMED POSSIBLE THAT THERE COULD BE AN EROSION OF THE SUPPORT THEY RECEIVED. A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT WHICH ATTRACTED INTERNATIONAL ACCEPTANCE WAS THE BEST SOLUTION TO THIS PROBLEM.

6. MUZOREWA REAFFIRMED HIS CONTINUED TRUST IN THE PRIME MINISTER AND YOURSELF AND SAID THAT HE WOULD WORK HARD FOR A SUCCESSFUL CONFERENCE.

#### 7. COMMENT

I HAVE NO DOUBT THAT MUZOREWA IS PERSONALLY READY TO ACCEPT A CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE. HE HAS SAID, PREVIOUSLY, THAT HE REGARDS HMG'S CALL FOR CHANGE AS A "BLESSING IN DISGUISE". HE HAS, HOWEVER, TO KEEP A WARY EYE ON HIS WHITE COLLEAGUES. UNDUE READINESS ON HIS PART TO FALL IN WITH ALL OUR REQUIREMENTS COULD

7. COMMENT

I HAVE NO DOUBT THAT MUZOREWA IS PERSONALLY READY TO ACCEPT A CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE. HE HAS SAID, PREVIOUSLY, THAT HE REGARDS HMG'S CALL FOR CHANGE AS A "BLESSING IN DISGUISE". HE HAS, HOWEVER, TO KEEP A NARY EYE ON HIS WHITE COLLEAGUES. UNDUE READINESS ON HIS PART TO FALL IN WITH ALL OUR REQUIREMENTS COULD RUN HIM INTO DIFFICULTY. I DO NOT EXPECT HIM TO BE INTRANSIGENT AT THE CONFERENCE; BUT NEITHER WILL HE, INITIALLY, GO ALL THE WAY WITH US. HIS ATTITUDE WILL BE INFLUENCED TO SOME EXTENT BY THAT OF THE PATRIOTIC FRONT. HE WILL FEEL THE NEED TO FIGHT HIS CORNER AS RESOLUTELY AS THEY. HE CANNOT AFFORD TO GIVE AN APPEARANCE OF WEAKNESS. HE ALSO HAS TO KEEP A CAREFUL WATCH ON SOME OF HIS BLACK COLLEAGUES. HE IS HIGHLY SUSPICIOUS OF SITHOLE'S INTENTIONS AND HAS FEAR OF A NKOMO, CHIKEREMA, SITHOLE ALLIANCE WHICH COULD LEAVE HIM BADLY EXPOSED. ALL OF THESE FACTORS WILL BE IN HIS MIND, BUT I DO NOT CONSIDER THAT THEY WILL DETER HIM FROM ADOPTING A GENERALLY REASONABLE ATTITUDE.

DAY

IMMEDIATE

NNNN



GPS 230  
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

DESKBY 010930 Z  
FM MIRIMBA SALISBURY 010715Z AUG 79  
TO IMMEDIATE FCO  
TELNO 609 OF 1 SEPTEMBER  
INFO IMMEDIATE PRETORIA

*P.N. already informed*

*L.A.  
Rmt 3/9*

FOR RENWICK, RHODESIA DEPT

1. AS REPORTED BY TELEPHONE, I PUT TO MUZOREWA YESTERDAY EVENING THE OFFER OF A VISIT BY DUFF EARLY NEXT WEEK. I EXPLAINED THAT WE WANTED TO ENSURE THAT THERE WAS A GOOD UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN US AS WE APPROACHED THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE AND THAT DUFF WAS READY TO COME IF THE BISHOP WOULD LIKE A FIRST-HAND ACCOUNT OF OUR CURRENT ATTITUDES.
2. MUZOREWA WAS GRATEFUL FOR THIS OFFER AND FOR THIS FURTHER EVIDENCE OF OUR DESIRE TO KEEP HIM CLOSELY INFORMED OF OUR THINKING. HE DID NOT, HOWEVER, THINK IT NECESSARY TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THE OFFER. THE PRIME MINISTER'S MESSAGE (SEE MIPT) WAS MOST HELPFUL. HE THOUGHT IT WOULD BE MORE USEFUL IF WE COULD KEEP IN TOUCH WITH THE ADVANCE PARTY OF HIS DELEGATION WHICH WOULD ARRIVE IN LONDON ON 5 SEPTEMBER, PARTICULARLY THE DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER, THE FOREIGN MINISTER AND DR KAMUSIKIRI. THE LAST NAMED WILL BE IN TOUCH WITH THE DEPARTMENT ON ARRIVAL.
3. THIS DOES NOT REALLY MEET THE REQUIREMENT FOR A PERSONAL HEART-TO-HEART WITH THE BISHOP, NOR DOES IT DEAL WITH THE WHITES. I WILL HOWEVER AIM TO SEE WALLS AND DAVID SMITH EARLY NEXT WEEK AND WILL TAKE EVERY OPPORTUNITY TO IMPRESS UPON SUITABLE CONTACTS THE IMPORTANCE OF THE BISHOP'S DELEGATION ADOPTING A POSITIVE AND CONSTRUCTIVE ATTITUDE. FLOWER IS DUE IN LONDON ON 6 SEPTEMBER AND COULD BE SEEN THERE.

DAY  
FILES  
RHO D D  
PS  
PS/LPS  
PS/MRLUCE  
PS/PUS  
SIR ADUFF  
MR BYATT

CONFIDENTIAL



Subject  
T 918/79T

PRIME MINISTER'S  
PERSONAL MESSAGE  
SERIAL No. T 918/79T

THE STATE HOUSE,  
DAR ES SALAAM,  
TANZANIA.

31st August 1979

Mrs. Margaret Thatcher,  
The Prime Minister,  
10 Downing Street,  
London, S.W.1.

~~4. F.C.O.~~  
+ L.C. *Ph...* 10/9

Dear Mrs. Thatcher,

Thank you for your message which I received today and found reassuring. I look forward to discussing these matters further with you in London on 14th September. There are, however, two important points which I would like to leave with you while I am in Havana.

First, I do accept and understand your desire to get the maximum amount of agreement from the parties. It will very greatly ease the decolonising process. However, I hope that you will go ahead with decolonising on the constitutional basis you have been outlining (and which we agreed at Lusaka) regardless of disagreement expressed by one side or the other. If it is perfectly clear that no one will be allowed to exercise a veto on democratic decolonisation, that will in itself assist in getting agreement.

Secondly, you mentioned the statement issued in Dar es Salaam by the Patriotic Front. I do not myself think it is the entire rejection it seems to you, although I agree that it was not a constructive approach. However, this only reinforces what I have just said, for you may be confident that I shall back up a British assertion of its authority along the lines we have been discussing. It is impossible for anyone to force either side to agree to anything; what we can do is make it very clear to them that their failure to do so, and to cooperate in the implementation of a democratic constitutional process, will be - in your words - very expensive to them.

At Havana I expect to meet the Patriotic Front Leaders. I shall be making this Tanzanian stand very clear to them. I shall be telling them that we are determined to back up the transfer of power on the basis of a Constitution which is recognisably democratic, and that we shall oppose any attempt by them or anyone else to frustrate such a political solution.



They would get no further help from us if they were trying to upset such decolonisation.

Of course I cannot speak on behalf of my colleagues in the other Front Line States. However, President Kaunda and President Seretse Khama were in Lusaka; I see no reason why they should take a different line. Nor do I anticipate a different approach from President Machel, with whom I will be discussing these matters in Havana - as I hope to do with President Neto also.

If you are prepared to assume the necessary authority to finalise the process of decolonisation on the basis of the Lusaka Agreement I see no reason why you should not expect full support from us.

I send my personal good wishes to you.

Yours sincerely,

Julius K. Nyerere

**IMMEDIATE  
SUBJECT**

GPS 468

CONFIDENTIAL

DESKBY 011500Z

FM DAR ES SALAAM

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 709 OF 1 SEPTEMBER

**PRIME MINISTER'S**

CONFIDENTIAL

**PERSONAL MESSAGE**

**SERIAL No. T918/79T / 4/5**

*[Handwritten signature]*

4/5

MIPT : RHODESIA

TEXT OF PRESIDENT NYERERE'S MESSAGE TO THE PRIME MINISTER IS AS FOLLOWS:

THANK YOU FOR YOUR MESSAGE WHICH I RECEIVED TODAY AND FOUND REASSURING. I LOOK FORWARD TO DISCUSSING THESE MATTERS FURTHER WITH YOU IN LONDON ON 14TH SEPTEMBER. THERE ARE, HOWEVER, TWO IMPORTANT POINTS WHICH I WOULD LIKE TO LEAVE WITH YOU WHILE I AM IN HAVANA.

FIRST, I DO ACCEPT AND UNDERSTAND YOUR DESIRE TO GET THE MAXIMUM AMOUNT OF AGREEMENT FROM THE PARTIES. IT WILL VERY GREATLY EASE THE DECOLONISING PROCSSS. HOWEVER, I HOPE THAT YOU WILL GO AHEAD WITH DECOLONISING ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL BASIS YOU HAVE BEEN OUTLINING ( AND WHICH WE AGREED AT LUSAKA) REGARDLESS OF DISAGREEMENT EXPRESSED BY ONE SIDE OR THE OTHER. IF IT IS PERFECTLY CLEAR THAT NO ONE WILL BE ALLOWED TO EXERCISE A VETO ON DEMOCRATIC DECOLONISATION, THAT WILL IN ITSELF ASSIST IN GETTING AGREEMENT.

SECONDLY, YOU MENTIONED THE STATEMENT ISSUED IN DAR ES SALAAM BY THE PATRIOTIC FRONT. I DO NOT MYSELF THINK IT IS THE ENTIRE REJECTION IT SEEMS TO YOU, ALTHOUGH I AGREE THAT IT WAS NOT A CONSTRUCTIVE APPROACH. HOWEVER, THIS ONLY REINFORCES WHAT I HAVE JUST SIAD, FOR YOU MAY BE CONFIDENT THAT I SHALL BACK UP A BRITISH ASSERTION OF ITS AUTHORITY ALONG THE LINES WE HAVE BEEN DISCUSSING. IT IS IMPOSSIBLE FOR ANYONE TO FORCE EITHER SIDE TO AGREE TO ANYTHING; WHAT WE CAN DO IS MAKE IT VERY CLEAR TO THEM THAT THEIR FAILURE TO DO SO, AND TO COOPERATE IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF A DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTIONAL PROCESS, WIL BE-- IN YOUR WORDS-- VERY EXPENSIVE TO THEM.

AT HAVANA I EXPECT TO MEET THE PATRIOTIC FRONT LAEDERS. I SHALL BE MAKING THIS TANZANIAN STAND VERY CLEAR TO THEM. I SHALL BE TELLING THEM THAT WE ARE DETERMINED TO BACK UP THE TRANSFER OF POWER ON THE BASIS OF A CONSTITUTION WHICH

CONFIDENTIAL

/ IS RECOGNISABLY



CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL  
T. 31802

IS RECOGNISABLY DEMOCRATIC, AND THAT WE SHALL OPPOSE ANY ATTEMPT BY THEM OR ANYONE ELSE TO FRUSTRATE SUCH A POLITICAL SOLUTION. THEY WOULD GET NO FURTHER HELP FROM US IF THEY WERE TRYING TO UPSET SUCH DECOLONISATION.

OF COURSE I CANNOT SPEAK ON BEHALF OF MY COLLEAGUES IN THE OTHER FRONT LINE STATES. HOWEVER, PRESIDENT KAUNDA AND PRESIDENT SERETSE KHAMA WERE IN LUSAKA; I SEE NO REASON WHY THEY SHOULD TAKE A DIFFERENT LINE, NOR DO I ANTICIPATE A DIFFERENT APPROACH FROM PRESIDENT MACHEL, WITH WHOM I WILL BE DISCUSSING THESE MATTERS IN HAVANA- AS I HOPE TO DO WITH PRESIDENT NETO ALSO.

IF YOU ARE PREPARED TO ASSUME THE NECESSARY AUTHORITY TO FINALISE THE PROCESS OF DECOLONISATION ON THE BASIS OF THE LUSAKA AGREEMENT I SEE NO REASON WHY YOU SHOULD NOT EXPECT FULL SUPPORT FROM US.

I SEND MY PERSONAL GOOD WISHES TO YOU.

ENDS

HINCHCLIFFE

[COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING STREET]

F I L E S

RHODESIA D  
EAD  
UND  
PS  
PS/LPS  
PS/MR LUCE  
SIR A DUFF  
MR BYATT

- 2 -

CONFIDENTIAL

Telegram from Dar es Salaam

Text of President Nyerere's message to the Prime Minister

T91/79  
Thank you for your message which I received today and found re-assuring. I look forward to discussing these matters further with you in London on 14 September. There are, however, two important points which I would like to leave with you while I am in Havana.

First, I do accept and understand your desire to get the maximum amount of agreement from the parties. It will very greatly ease the decolonising process. However, I hope that you will go ahead with decolonising on the constitutional basis you have been outlining (and which we agreed at Lusaka) regardless of disagreement expressed by one side or the other. If it is perfectly clear that no one will be allowed to exercise a veto on democratic decolonisation, that will in itself assist in getting agreement.

Secondly, you mentioned the statement issued in Dar es Salaam by the Patriotic Front. I do not myself think it is the entire rejection it seems to you, although I agree that it was not a constructive approach. However, this only reinforces what I have just said, for you may be confident that I shall back up a British assertion of its authority along the lines we have been discussing. It is impossible for anyone to force either side to agree to anything: what we can do is make it very clear to them that their failure to do so, and to co-operate in the implementation of a democratic constitutional process, will be - in your words - very expensive to them.

At Havana I expect to meet the Patriotic Front leaders. I shall be making this Tanzanian stand very clear to them. I shall be telling them that we are determined to back up the transfer of power on the basis of a constitution which is recognisably democratic, and that we shall face any attempts by them or anyone else to frustrate such a political solution. They would get no further help from us if they were trying to upset such decolonisation. Of course I cannot speak on behalf of my colleagues in the other front line states. However, President Kaunda and President Seretse Khama were in Lusaka: I see no reason why they should take a different line. Nor do I anticipate a different approach from President Machel,  
/with



with whom I will be discussing these matters in Havana, as I hope to do with President Neto also.

If you are prepared to assume the necessary authority to finalise the process of decolonisation on the basis of the Lusaka agreement I see no reason why you should not expect full support from us.

I send my personal good wishes to you.

Hinchcliffe

1 September 1979

CONFIDENTIAL

Original filed on  
S. Africa meeting with Vander Post  
August 79

26  
get Vander Post records  
Ph... 4/5

NOTE OF A CONVERSATION (ON THE TELEPHONE) BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER  
AND MR. LAURENS VAN DER POST: 31 AUGUST 1979: 1000 P.M.

Rhodesia

Mr. Van der Post said that he had been asked to get in touch with the Prime Minister by a very old friend of his who is at present the Minister for Bantu Affairs in the South African Government. The Minister wanted Mr. Van der Post to convey a message to the Prime Minister from the South African Prime Minister, Mr. P.W. Botha.

The message was that the South African Government were gravely concerned about the deteriorating situation in Rhodesia: things were going downhill faster than they had expected. They could help to contain the situation until November but unless sanctions were lifted then they would be unable to contain it any longer. If the position had not been stabilised by that point, South Africa would be forced to intervene.

According to Mr. Van der Post, the South Africans have many people working in Mozambique's ports and towns. They have ample evidence of the scale of the Soviet build-up in the country. The main roads to the Rhodesian border from Maputo and Beira have been repaired and remodelled with Russian and Cuban help. Mozambique is swarming with "technicians" from these countries.

In the view of the South African Government, HMG was being "strung along" by the Front Line States and others. South Africa would not permit an Angola style take-over in Rhodesia. South Africans (black and white) faced a stark situation: they were not willing to allow themselves to be strangled. Mr. Van der Post added, as a personal opinion, that Mr. Mugabe was a particularly formidable opponent and that President Nyerere was not to be trusted.

Finally, Mr. Van der Post explained that the South African Prime Minister had chosen to use him as a messenger because this was the only way to avoid a leak. One result of the present crisis within the South African Government was that the diplomats were not trusted.

/ Having established


CONFIDENTIAL



CONFIDENTIAL

- 2 -

Having established that Mr. Van der Post could not come to Chequers the following day, 1 September, the Prime Minister asked him to get in touch with her when he was next in this country i.e. on about 15 September. Mr. Van der Post hoped that the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary would be able to attend any meeting that took place.

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to be 'R. van der Post', with a horizontal line underneath.

3 September 1979

CONFIDENTIAL

(1)



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

31 August 1979

*Prime Minister**Agreed M.I.?**Paul 31/8**Dear Michael,*

## RHODESIAN REPRESENTATION IN LONDON: MESSAGE FROM BISHOP MUZOREWA

In addition to his message about the Constitutional Conference (Stephen Wall's letter of 29 August), Bishop Muzorewa has sent the Prime Minister a further letter about Rhodesian representation in London. I enclose a copy of Mirimba Salisbury telegram no 579 which gives the text.

When Bishop Muzorewa asked last month to be allowed to appoint Government representatives in London to carry out information activities, the Prime Minister replied, in her letter of 14 August, that the best way of doing this would be to expand the UANC office in London. As Paul Lever explained in his letter of 30 July to Pattison, it would put us in breach of our UN Treaty obligations to permit the establishment of a Zimbabwe Rhodesia Government Office in London before Rhodesia has been brought to legal independence.

Bishop Muzorewa will be here with a large delegation for the Constitutional Conference. If, after the Conference, he prefers not to attach more senior representatives to the UANC Office in London, there would be no objection to his appointing a personal representative here, who could undertake the information activities which Bishop Muzorewa has in mind, and in practice have access to the FCO on a basis similar to diplomatic officials. If the Prime Minister agrees, we would propose to instruct Mr Day to reply verbally to the Bishop either direct or through his Private Secretary, Mr Kamusikiri, to explain the position on the Prime Minister's behalf. I enclose a draft telegram to Mirimba Salisbury.

Officials of the US State Department raised this question during talks on Rhodesia at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office on 28 August. You will be aware from Paul Lever's earlier letter that they had been in touch with us last month about Bishop Muzorewa's request to them to appoint Rhodesian representatives in Washington and New York. The Americans had not yet taken a decision and asked our advice. We explained the general lines of our approach as set out in this letter and they said that they would be replying on similar lines.

*Yours etc**Rodric Lyne*

(R M J Lyne)

M O'D B Alexander Esq  
10 Downing Street

*Agreed M.I.*



File No. ....

Department ..... RHODESIA

Drafted by ..... Miss R J Spencer  
(Block Capitals) .....

Tel. Extn .....

OUTWARD

TELEGRAM

Security Classification

CONFIDENTIAL

Precedence

IMMEDIATE

DESKBY .....Z

FOR  
COMMS. DEPT.  
USE

Despatched

(Date) .....

(Time).....Z

POSTBY .....Z

PREAMBLE

(Time of Origin).....Z(G.M.T.)

(Restrictive Prefix).....

(Caveat/

Privacy Marking).....

(Security Class.) .....CONFIDENTIAL...

(Codeword).....

(Deskby).....

To ..... IMMEDIATE ..... MIRIMBA SALISBURY ..... Tel. No. .... of.....  
(precedence) (post)

AND TO (precedence/post) ..... PRIORITY: WASHINGTON .....

AND SAVING TO .....

REPEATED TO (for info) .....

SAVING TO (for info).....

Distribution:-

Rhodesia Policy

(TEXT)

YOUR TELNO 579: RHODESIAN REPRESENTATION IN LONDON

1. The Prime Minister is content for you to speak on her behalf either to Bishop Muzorewa himself or to Kamusikiri. You should thank the Bishop for his telegram and make the following points:

Copies to:-

- a. as the Prime Minister explained in her letter of 14 August to the Bishop, she shares his desire that the facts about the Rhodesian situation should be widely known in the UK. The British Government are ready to do all they can to facilitate that task;

CONFIDENTIAL

/b.

- b. as the Bishop knows, the British Government are doing all they can to bring Rhodesia to legal independence with wide international support, as soon as possible. We are seeking to do so in cooperation with him;
- c. once legal independence has been achieved, the Rhodesian Government will be able to have diplomatic representatives in London and elsewhere;
- d. until Rhodesia has become legally independent it is not possible for us to permit the appointment of official Rhodesian Government representatives in London;
- e. Bishop Muzorewa will himself be here with a large delegation for the Constitutional Conference;
- f. if, after the Conference, Bishop Muzorewa prefers not to expand the UANC Office, he might wish to consider appointing a personal representative in London. Such a representative would have access to the FCO as necessary in carrying out his tasks, *though he could not have diplomatic status.*

FOR WASHINGTON

2. This question was raised by Moose and Lake in talks at the FCO on 28 August: the State Department

/had



had not yet decided how to respond to Bishop Muzorewa's approach to the US Administration last month. We told them of the Bishop's latest approach and the general line of our proposed response and they said they were likely to give a similar reply. You may inform the State Department of the gist of these instructions.



31 AUG 1979





31/8

Prime Minister.

(1)

Are you content with the tactics described in the Foreign & Commonwealth Secretary's minute?

PM/79/74

PRIME MINISTER

Yes - but (see Annex 1)  
(i) provide for election under "unimpaired" representation only  
And say we "are prepared" to assume that

Rhodesia: Constitutional Conference

1. In its discussion on 10 August the Cabinet endorsed the approach set out in my Memorandum of 9 August (C(79)33). *... duty: We are charged with that.*
2. Formal invitations to a Constitutional Conference at Lancaster House on 10 September were issued to Bishop Muzorewa and to the Patriotic Front on 14 August. At the same time we put forward the outline of our proposals for the Rhodesian Independence Constitution (Annex A). *... duty: election should be held under British supervision*
3. Bishop Muzorewa accepted our invitation "without pre-conditions". We made it clear that the composition of the Salisbury delegation was a matter for him to decide. The Bishop would have preferred to come without Mr Ian Smith, but Mr Smith insisted on attending. His presence offers the advantage that whatever is agreed should be acceptable to the white community - though this is more than offset by the propaganda advantage his involvement will give to the Patriotic Front. Sithole and Ndiweni have also been included: Chikerema has been excluded. The initial Rhodesian reactions in our private consultations with them about constitutional change show that there is some tough bargaining ahead. *(ii) makes no provision for a referendum should that be preferable*
4. The Patriotic Front, after some initial prevarication, also agreed to attend. It would have put them in an impossible position vis-a-vis the Commonwealth African Presidents if they had refused to do so. They issued a statement rejecting our constitutional proposals, the idea of special representation for the white minority and our responsibility to ensure that new elections are fairly conducted. In other statements they have insisted on control over the administration and that the army should be based on the "liberation forces."
5. This approach is incompatible with the Lusaka agreement. There has been a good response so far from the Commonwealth African governments to our outline constitutional proposals and

/ to





to the speed with which we have acted to give effect to the Lusaka agreement. The Patriotic Front will be nervous of coming under further pressure from the Commonwealth African Presidents.

6. Our task at the Constitutional Conference must be to demonstrate clearly that we are making a determined effort to achieve a fair settlement. The chances that the Patriotic Front will be prepared to accept reasonable constitutional proposals and agree to participate in new elections are slight (though Nkomo is under some pressure from his own supporters to negotiate; Mugabe, who believes that he is gradually winning the guerrilla war, can be expected to stick to his extreme demands). It is more probable that we shall be able to wring sufficient concessions from Bishop Muzorewa to achieve constitutional arrangements comparable to those on which we had granted independence to other Commonwealth African countries and which we would be prepared to put into effect subject to their being demonstrated to be acceptable to the people of Rhodesia.

7. We must not however so proceed as to give rise to accusations that this was our objective from the outset. We should seek to ensure that, if there is a break-down at the Conference, the responsibility for this is clearly seen to rest with the Patriotic Front and their intransigence on the basic issues - their demands in relation to the Constitution and the arrangements for elections. We should proceed in such a way as to put maximum strain on Commonwealth African governments' support for the Patriotic Front; and on the relations between Nkomo and Mugabe.

8. There is widespread support for the line we have so far adopted that we must proceed step by step and that the first task should be to secure agreement on the constitutional proposals we have put forward. We have successfully resisted demands to display more detailed proposals in advance of the Conference, thereby giving the Patriotic Front - or the Front Line States - a chance to evade the main issues, and to seek to pre-negotiate the Constitution.

9. We should persist with this approach. We have made it clear that there are large sections of the existing Constitution which

/ are





are acceptable so far as we are concerned and which we would regard as being comparable to provisions in other independence constitutions. But it would be prejudicial to the chances of agreement and give the Patriotic Front a major propaganda advantage if, from the outset, we put on the table the full text of the existing Rhodesian Constitution, with amendments to it. The Rhodesians will themselves put their constitution on the table.

10. We should allow the Conference to open with our existing proposals (Annex A) and seek to oblige parties to declare their position in relation to them. The Salisbury parties are likely to do so in much more constructive terms than the Patriotic Front. We should then be prepared, if we are asked to put forward proposals to give effect to those principles, to table a fuller outline Constitution on the lines of the draft at Annex B attached. This draft is based on the existing Rhodesian Constitution, but in such a way as to emphasise the elements of that Constitution which may be regarded as common form and to focus attention on the main questions at issue. The tabling of this draft will be seen as a further serious attempt to promote agreement at the Conference. The draft is fully compatible with the existing Rhodesian Constitution, subject only to those areas on which we have already indicated we will insist on amendment. It will be easier for the Commonwealth African Presidents and others to support this approach in the initial stages of the Conference than for them to support an amended version of the full text of the existing Constitution. Mr Vance has assured us that it will have his full support.

11. We should not however allow the Patriotic Front to engage in a protracted filibuster or to evade the main issues. In order to focus attention on these and to make clear our view on what would be acceptable on the central issues we should at the appropriate moment be prepared to make a statement on the question of white representation and the blocking mechanism and the public service commissions on the lines set out at Annex C. The proposal that 20% of the parliamentary seats should be reserved to the white electorate will be criticised in Africa, but is

/ indispensable





indispensable to retain the confidence of the white community. These proposals are likely to be rejected by the Patriotic Front (if they have not already broken off the negotiations on other issues).

12. We shall also be pressed at the beginning of the Conference to make clear how we would proceed to give effect to the commitment in the Lusaka agreement to hold new elections if agreement could be reached. The way in which we should deal with this problem is set out at Annex D. We should take the line that the purpose of the Conference is to reach agreement on the destination - the future independence Constitution. Once this has been achieved discussion should then take place of the means of implementing that agreement.

13. In order to emphasise at each stage that we are genuinely seeking agreement and to maximise the chance of weakening Commonwealth African support for the Patriotic Front, we should be prepared if the Conference appears to be reaching deadlock to urge the Commonwealth African Presidents to intervene with the Patriotic Front to persuade them to moderate their attitude. You will have an opportunity to do this with President Nyerere on 14 September. It may be necessary to arrange an adjournment of the Conference for this purpose. We should in any event seek to avoid bringing matters to a point at which we proceed with Muzorewa alone until the civilian government has been established in Lagos on 1 October.

14. We should in the meantime proceed with our bilateral negotiations with the Salisbury parties to establish the kind of Constitution we could in the end accept. We must continue to make clear, as we have done from the outset to Bishop Muzorewa, that in order to be able to proceed with the internal parties alone, we must be able to demonstrate the acceptability to the people of Rhodesia as a whole of what has been agreed. This means that there will need to be a referendum or new elections on the basis of the independence Constitution and that this test of acceptability must be supervised or at least observed by HMG.

15. I believe that this approach is the best way to build on the success achieved at Lusaka and in particular the recognition

/ that





that it is our responsibility to make the proposals for legal independence. By this approach we should be able to carry the United States government with us and to retain as long as possible the support of the Commonwealth African Presidents (though it remains to be seen if they will be prepared to put effective pressure on the Patriotic Front). If, as is to be expected, the Patriotic Front reject these proposals, we shall then be best placed to proceed with the internal parties with a chance of securing a measure of international support at any rate from our principal friends and allies.

16. We should not however suppose that, if we are left to negotiate with the Salisbury parties alone, all will be plain sailing. Their instinct at that stage will be to hold out for a settlement that will look as nearly as possible identical with their present arrangements. They will not easily comprehend the need to make changes for the sake of gaining international respectability. Specifically, they will wish to proceed by way of minimum amendment to their own constitution - rather than accepting a similar document enacted by the British Parliament; and they will refuse any form of test of acceptability. We shall have to persuade them that to obtain their legal independence, the lifting of sanctions, and recognition by a respectable number of governments, they must accept as a minimum that:

- a) whatever procedures they may go through in their own (illegal) Parliament, their independence constitution must be enacted as a whole by the British Parliament (though many of the provisions will be based on the existing Constitution);
  - b) there must be some form of test of acceptability.
- The prize will be within their reach; but they will have to be persuaded to grasp it.

(CARRINGTON)

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

RHODESIA: OUTLINE OF PROPOSALS FOR AN INDEPENDENCE CONSTITUTION  
(published by the British Government on 14 August)

Zimbabwe will be an independent sovereign state in which all citizens will enjoy equal rights under the law.

There will be a "constitutional" Head of State.

The Head of Government will be the Prime Minister, who will be a member of the House of Assembly having the support of a majority in that House. Power to appoint and dismiss Ministers will be exercised in accordance with the advice of the Prime Minister.

Parliament will consist of a Senate and a House of Assembly. The Senate will be indirectly elected, and a majority of its members will be Africans. It will have power to delay but not block bills passed by the House of Assembly. The House of Assembly will be directly elected by universal adult suffrage.

For a specified minimum period after independence the House of Assembly will contain a minority of seats reserved for representatives to be elected by the European Community. The proportion of these seats to the total number of seats in the House will be a matter for discussion between the British Government and the Rhodesian parties.

Parliament will have power to amend the constitution, which will prescribe procedures to be followed for effecting such amendments on lines similar to those contained in other independence constitutions granted by Britain.

The constitution will protect the independence of the judiciary.

Under the law, public servants will carry out the instructions of Ministers. Power to appoint, dismiss and discipline members of the public service will be vested in an independent public service commission. The constitution will protect the pension rights of public servants.

The commanders of the police force and the defence forces will act in accordance with general policy directives given by the Prime Minister or other responsible Minister. The policy commissioner and each defence force commander will be responsible for the administration and operational control of their forces. There will be independent service commissions for the respective forces which will have prescribed powers in the disciplinary and establishment fields.

The public service commission, and the other service commissions, will be appointed on a basis, and with terms of reference, which will take due



account of the need to preserve a high standard of efficiency and which also recognise the legitimate claims of the majority of the population to increasing representation in all forms of public office. The power to make certain senior appointments in the public service and other services will be vested in the Prime Minister, acting after consultation with the appropriate commission.

There will be a fully justiciable declaration of rights and an independent official to assist in its enforcement.

RHODESIA: SUMMARY OF THE INDEPENDENCE CONSTITUTION  
[Draft as of 31 August 1979]

A. THE STATE OF ZIMBABWE

1. Zimbabwe will be a sovereign State. "Zimbabwe" will be established as the official name of the country.
2. The Constitution will be the supreme law of the State and will prevail over any other law.



## B. CITIZENSHIP

1. Existing citizens:

- a. Every person who was a citizen of Rhodesia immediately before independence will automatically become a citizen of Zimbabwe on independence (by birth, descent or registration, as the case may be, according to his former status).
- b. Every person who, immediately before independence, possessed such qualifications that the relevant authority would, upon application duly made, have registered him as a citizen of Rhodesia, will be entitled to make application in the prescribed manner at any time during the first 5 years after independence and it will be open to the competent authority to grant that application and cause him to be registered as a citizen of Zimbabwe.

2. Every person who is born in Zimbabwe after independence (other than the child of a diplomat accredited to the Government of Zimbabwe or of an enemy alien) will become a citizen of Zimbabwe by birth.

3. Every person who is born outside Zimbabwe after independence but whose father (or, if he is illegitimate, whose mother) is then a citizen of Zimbabwe by birth will himself become a citizen of Zimbabwe by descent.

4. Any woman who is or has been married to a person who is or was at any time during the subsistence of the marriage a citizen of Zimbabwe (or would but for his death have automatically become a citizen of Zimbabwe at independence) will, on making application in the prescribed manner, be entitled to be registered as a citizen of Zimbabwe.

5. Any person one of whose parents is a citizen of Zimbabwe at the date of his application will be entitled, on making application in the prescribed manner, to be registered as a citizen of Zimbabwe. If the person is a minor, the application may be made on his behalf by his parent or guardian.

6. Dual citizenship will be permitted.
7. Parliament may make additional provision for citizenship.



## C. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS

1. The Constitution will set out a declaration of fundamental human rights and freedoms in the customary form, which will be fully justiciable, i.e. any person who asserts that they have been or are being infringed in his case will be able to apply to the High Court for redress. These rights will include:

- i. the right to life;
- ii. the right to personal liberty;
- iii. protection from slavery and forced labour;
- iv. protection from inhuman treatment;
- v. protection from the arbitrary deprivation of property;
- vi. protection from arbitrary search or entry;
- vii. protection of the law;
- viii. freedom of conscience;
- ix. freedom of expression;
- x. freedom of assembly and association;
- xi. freedom of movement;
- xii. freedom from discrimination.

## D. THE EXECUTIVE

i. The President

1. The President will be a "constitutional" Head of State and Commander-in-Chief of the Defence Forces. He will be elected by the members of Parliament.
2. Alternatively other arrangements could be considered for a constitutional Head of State.
3. The President will hold office until he resigns or until a period of 6 years has elapsed. Thereafter he will be eligible for re-election for one further period of office.
4. A President may be removed from office on the grounds of misconduct or inability to discharge efficiently the functions of his office. A motion for removal requires to be supported by not less than two-thirds of all the members of Parliament.
5. Provision will be made for the discharge of the functions of the office of President during the President's absence of temporary incapacity.
6. The executive power of Zimbabwe will be vested in the President acting on the advice of the Prime Minister or of a Minister acting under the authority of the Executive Council.
7. The President will exercise the Prerogative of Mercy on the advice of Ministers.
8. The President will have power, on the advice of Ministers, to declare a state of public emergency, or the existence of a situation which, if allowed to continue, may lead to a state of public emergency. Such a declaration will lapse unless it is approved within 14 days by the affirmative votes of more than one-half of the total membership of the House of Assembly. The declaration may not continue in effect for longer than 6 months unless it is renewed by a similar resolution.

/ii.



ii. Executive Council and Ministers

1. The Executive Council will consist of the Prime Minister and the other Ministers.
2. The President will appoint as Prime Minister the person who, in his opinion, is best able to command the support of a majority of the members of the House of Assembly. He will appoint and dismiss Ministers and Deputy Ministers on the advice of the Prime Minister.
3. A Minister or Deputy Minister will, as a rule, be a member of the Senate or House of Assembly.
4. The Attorney-General shall be a member of the Public Service. He shall be appointed by the President on the advice of the Prime Minister after consultation with the appropriate Commission. He shall exercise the functions of a director of public prosecutions and his tenure of office shall be protected.
5. Permanent Secretaries shall have the supervision of departments under the general direction and control of the responsible Minister. Permanent Secretaries shall be appointed by the President on the advice of the Prime Minister after consultation with the appropriate Commission.
6. Heads of Diplomatic Missions shall be appointed by the President on the advice of the Prime Minister after consultation with the appropriate Commission.

/iii.

iii. The Public Service and Police Force1. Public Service

There will be a Public Service Commission which will be responsible for regulating and controlling the organisation of the Public (i.e. Civil) Service and the Prison Service. The Commission will consist of a chairman and not less than 2 and not more than 4 other members appointed by the President on the advice of the Prime Minister. When considering candidates for appointment to a vacant post in the Public Service or Prison Service, the Commission will be required, subject to any general directions of the President (see paragraph 3 below) to give preference to the person who, in its opinion, is the most efficient and suitable for appointment.

2. Save as otherwise indicated, the Public Service Commission will have power to appoint and remove members of the Public Service.

3. The President, acting on the advice of the Prime Minister, will have power to give the Commissions such general directions with respect to the exercise of their functions as he may consider necessary. These may include directions designed to achieve a suitable representation of the various component groups of the population in the services of the State.

4. The Police Force

The Police Force will be under the command of the Commissioner of Police who will be appointed by the President on the recommendation of the Prime Minister. Before making his recommendation, the Prime Minister will consult the Police Service Commission.

5. Subject to such general directions as may be given to him by the Prime Minister, the Commissioner of Police will be responsible for the administration and operations of the Police Force. Appointments to the Police Force shall be made on the advice of or by the Commissioner of Police.

6. There will be a Police Service Commission which will consist of a chairman (who will be the Chairman of the Public Service Commission) and not less than 2 and not more than 4 other members

/appointed



appointed by the President on the advice of the Prime Minister. The composition of the Commission must take account of the need for it to receive the advice of properly qualified and experienced persons. The functions of the Police Service Commission will be to consider grievances by members of the Police Force, to consider and, if it deems fit, to confirm any proposal to dismiss a member who has had more than 2 years' service and to make regulations for the general well-being and good administration of the Police Force and the maintenance thereof in a high state of efficiency. The President, acting on the advice of the Prime Minister, may give the Commissioner and the Commission similar directions to those referred to in paragraph 3 above.

## E. PARLIAMENT

1. The legislature will consist of the President and Parliament, which will comprise a Senate and a House of Assembly.
2. All citizens who are 18 years of age or over will be eligible to be enrolled on a Common Voters Roll. As long as there is the provision for special minority representation in Parliament (described in paragraph 5 below) White citizens who have attained the age of 18 years will, as an alternative to being enrolled on the Common Voters Roll, be eligible to be enrolled on a White voters roll. Subject to the foregoing, an electoral law will provide for the election of Senators and members of the House of Assembly.
3. It is proposed that there shall be a Senate, of whom:
  - a. one-third of the members will be elected by the ordinary members of the House of Assembly;
  - b. one-third will be elected by the European members of the House of Assembly; and
  - c. the election of the remaining one-third will give due weight to regional considerations.
4. The Senate will elect a President and a Deputy President of the Senate. A Minister or Deputy Minister will not be eligible for this post.
5. The House of Assembly will consist of X members elected as follows:
  - a. Y members will be Blacks elected by voters on the Common Voters Roll for Y constituencies;
  - b. Z members will be Whites elected by voters enrolled on the White voters roll for Z White roll constituencies.
6. There will be provision for:
  - a. the establishment of a Delimitation Commission to delimit the Y Common Roll and Z White Roll constituencies for general elections;



- b. the qualifications and disqualifications of candidates for election as members of the Senate or the House of Assembly;
  - c. the establishment of an Electoral Supervisory Commission and the functions thereof in connection with the supervision of general elections.
7. The House of Assembly will elect a Speaker and a Deputy Speaker. A Minister or Deputy Minister will not be eligible for this post.
8. A Minister or Deputy Minister will have the right to sit and speak both in the Senate and in the House of Assembly but will only have the right to vote in the Senate or in the House of Assembly if he is a member of the Senate or the House, as the case may be. The President will have the right to address either House of Parliament or a joint meeting of both Houses.
9. The President will prorogue or dissolve Parliament when so advised by the Prime Minister. The President will have power to dissolve Parliament if the House of Assembly pass a resolution of no confidence in the Government or if there is no candidate for the post of Prime Minister who is able to command the support of a majority in the House of Assembly. If Parliament has not been earlier dissolved, it will stand dissolved automatically at the end of 5 years after a general election.
10. Subject to paragraph 12, Parliament will have full powers to make laws by bills passed by both Houses of Parliament and assented to by the President.
11. (1) The Senate will not be able to amend Money Bills, though it may recommend amendments.
- (2) If the Senate does not approve within 180 days a Bill which has been approved by the House of Assembly, the House of Assembly will be able to resolve that it should be presented to the President for his assent.
12. (1) The provisions of the Constitution relating to minority representation in Parliament will not be amendable for a specific period after independence. [Certain provisions of the Bill of Rights relating to basic human rights

/will

will similarly not be amendable for a specific period after independence.]

(2) Certain principal provisions of the Constitution such as those relating to the Legislature, the Judiciary, and the amendment of the Constitution will be specially entrenched. A Bill to amend the entrenched provisions of the Constitution will require the affirmative votes of at least 70 per cent of all the members of the House of Assembly. In addition, any Bill to amend the Constitution will require the affirmative votes of two-thirds of the total membership of the Senate, but if this cannot be obtained the Bill may, after a period of 180 days, be sent to the President for his assent despite the failure of the Senate to approve it.

/F.



## F. THE JUDICATURE

1. There will be a High Court of Zimbabwe, consisting of an Appellate Division and a General Division. The General Division will have unlimited original jurisdiction in both civil and criminal matters and such other jurisdiction as may be conferred on them by the Constitution or any other law. Appeals will lie from decisions of the General Division to the Appellate Division in such cases and in accordance with such procedure as may be prescribed by an Act of Parliament.
2. The Chief Justice will be appointed by the President on the advice of the Prime Minister. The other judges will be appointed by the President on the advice of the Judicial Service Commission.
3. The qualifications for appointment as a judge of the High Court are:
  - a. he has had appropriate judicial experience; or
  - b. he is, and has been for not less than [10] years, qualified to practise as an advocate in Zimbabwe, or in a court of the Commonwealth, or in a country in which the common law is Roman-Dutch, and in any such case English is the official language.
4. The tenure of High Court judges will be protected.
5. The power to appoint, exercise disciplinary control over, and remove from office the judges of the subordinate courts and certain other officers connected with the High Court (e.g. Registrar) will vest in the Judicial Service Commission.
6. The Constitution will establish an independent Judicial Service Commission, consisting of the Chief Justice, the Chairman of the Public Service Commission, a legally qualified person appointed by the President and a lay member appointed by the President in each case acting on the advice of the Prime Minister.

/G.



## G. THE DEFENCE FORCES

1. All armed forces shall be regulated by law. The Defence Forces will consist of the Army, the Air Force and any other branch established by law.
2. There will be a Commander of each branch. Each Commander will be appointed by the President, acting on the advice of the Prime Minister who will, before he makes his recommendation, consult an appropriately composed board appointed for the purpose. The power to relieve a Commander of his appointment vests in the President acting on the advice of the Prime Minister.
3. The Commander of a branch of the Defence Forces shall be responsible for that branch subject to any general directions which may be given to him by the Prime Minister (or other responsible Minister) for the operations or administration of the branch concerned. Appointments within a branch shall be made on the advice of or by the Commander.
4. There will be a Defence Forces Service Commission which will consist of a Chairman (who will be the Chairman of the Public Service Commission) and not less than 2 and not more than 4 other members appointed by the President acting on the advice of the Prime Minister. The composition of the Commission must take account of the need for it to receive the advice of properly qualified and experienced persons. The functions of the Defence Forces Service Commission will be to consider grievances by members of the Defence Forces, to consider and, if it deems fit, to confirm any proposal to dismiss a member who has had more than 2 years' service, to make regulations for the general well-being and good administration of the Defence Forces and the maintenance thereof in a high state of efficiency. The President, acting on the advice of the Prime Minister, may give the Commander and the Commission similar directions to those referred to in paragraph 3 of Head D (iii).

/H.



## H. FINANCE

1. There will be one Consolidated Revenue Fund into which all revenues shall be paid unless a law provides for the payment of any such revenues into another fund or that they be retained for the defraying of expenses. All withdrawals from the Consolidated Revenue Fund will have to be authorised by or under an Act of Parliament.

2. There will be a Controller and Auditor-General who will be appointed by the President on the recommendation of the Public Service Commission. His functions will be to audit and report on the accounts of the State and his reports will be laid before the House of Assembly. The tenure of office of the Controller and Auditor-General will be protected.

3. Pension Rights of Public Officers

The pension rights of public officers and former public officers and of their dependants will be protected under the Constitution. In addition, a scheme will be introduced to encourage officers of the Public Service and members of the Police Force, Army, Air Force or Prison Service who were in office prior to 1 October 1978 to continue to serve on and after a specified date.

/I.

## I. OMBUDSMAN

1. There will be an Ombudsman who will be appointed by the President on the advice of the Judicial Service Commission. His duty will be to investigate complaints against actions taken by employees of the Government or of a local authority or, if a law so requires, of any other authority.



## RHODESIA: PROPOSALS ON KEY ISSUES

1. It is the desire of the British Government to reach agreement with the representatives of the people of Rhodesia on an independence constitution which will be comparable with the terms on which independence was granted to other countries which were formerly British dependent territories. Special circumstances have existed in every case, and every territory has developed and agreed its own solutions to its particular problems. Almost everywhere, however, independence constitutions granted by Britain have included provision for:
  - a. an elected legislature (or, if bi-cameral, an elected lower house);
  - b. a "Westminster" model executive; that is, the Prime Minister is whoever commands a majority in the legislature (or its lower house) and chooses his administration. Where there is provision for an elected executive President, appointments to the Cabinet are made by the President from members of the legislature;
  - c. a judiciary: the Chief Justice is appointed on the advice of Prime Minister, and other judges by or on the advice of a Judicial Service Commission;
  - d. Public and Police Services: appointments are made to senior posts (e.g. Attorney-General, Ambassador, Secretary to Cabinet, those of Permanent Secretary, Commissioner of Police) on the advice of a holder of political office (usually the Prime Minister), others by the Public or Police Service Commission; Ministers have direction and control over public departments;
  - e. a Bill of Rights;
  - f. amendment of the Constitution.



2. The British Government is confident that, with goodwill on both sides, it will be possible to reach agreement on an independence constitution for Zimbabwe which, like the outline proposals, is consistent with this pattern. It is ready to give early effect to such an agreement, or to any other which may be acceptable to the parties themselves, and to play its full part as the constitutionally responsible authority in whatever arrangements are necessary for its practical implementation.

3. There are, however, three aspects of a possible independence constitution which are known to be of particular concern both to the parties themselves and to international opinion. These are:

- a. arrangements for minority representation in Parliament;
- b. arrangements for amendment of the constitution;
- c. the Public Service and other Commissions.

This paper examines each of these in detail.

#### MINORITY REPRESENTATION IN PARLIAMENT

4. The constitution must provide for a democratically chosen Government which reflects, and is responsive to the wishes of, the majority of the inhabitants of the country. The British Government are unequivocally of the opinion that this can be achieved only if the electoral system by which the Government is chosen is based firmly on the principle of universal adult suffrage. It is the British Government's view that, without detracting from the principle of one man one vote, and without creating arrangements which could undermine the verdict of the polls, it is reasonable to give the European, Coloured and Asian minorities a significant voice in Parliament as a confidence-building measure for a fixed period of time during the early years of independence. There is precedent for the inclusion of special representatives of minority communities in the legislature of Commonwealth countries in Africa at the time of their independence (eg Tanzania, Kenya and Zambia).

5. The British Government consider that any such arrangement,

/which



CONFIDENTIAL

which should be transitional, will need to avoid producing a result in Parliament whereby the European (including in this context Coloured and Asian) Members can alter in a fundamental way the preference of the electorate. At the same time, the British Government feel that, while it is important for the protection of all citizens that certain key provisions of the Constitution should be "entrenched", no minority racial group, and especially one to which special representation is to be given, should be in a position, by itself, to block amendment to the Constitution.

6. It is with these considerations in mind that the British Government propose the arrangements described in paragraphs 8 to 10 below.

7. It is proposed that there shall be a Senate, of whom:

- a. one-third of the members will be elected by the ordinary members of the House of Assembly;
- b. one-third will be elected by the European members of the House of Assembly; and
- c. the election of the remaining one-third will give due weight to regional considerations.

The Senate will have a delaying power but not a veto over Bills passed by the House of Assembly.

CONFIDENTIAL

\*8. The House of Assembly will consist of members elected as follows:

- a. 80% of the members will be elected by voters on the Common Voters Roll.
- b. 20% will be Europeans elected on a preferential voting system by voters enrolled on the European Voters Roll.

The provisions relating to the election of European members will not be amendable in any case for [five/ten] years or the life of [one/two] Parliaments, whichever is the longer.

#### CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS

- \*9. a. Any Bill to amend <sup>principal provisions of the</sup> the/Constitution will require the affirmative votes of 70% of the members of the House of Assembly.
- b. Any Bill to amend the Constitution will require the affirmative votes of two-thirds of the members of the Senate, but, if this cannot be obtained, the Bill may, after a period of 180 days, be sent to the President for his assent despite the failure of the Senate to approve it.
- c. In order to give additional protection to all minority groups as well as to all the people of Zimbabwe, certain provisions of the Bill of Rights relating to basic human rights, such as the right to life, to liberty and to freedom from discrimination, shall be unamendable for at the least [ten] years or the life of [two] Parliaments, whichever is the longer.

#### THE PUBLIC SERVICES AND DEFENCE FORCES

10. The establishment of a Public Services Commission with jurisdiction in relation to appointments, dismissals and discipline in the public service has ample precedent in other independence constitutions granted by Britain. The British Government are prepared also to see this principle extended to the prison and police services and to the defence forces. There are, however, important respects in which the British Government believe the powers and discretion of the Public Service Commission and any other Commissions to be established by the constitution should be limited.

\* Note: Paragraphs 8 and 9 are the form in which our proposals in these areas have been put to the Salisbury Administration.



11. In the first place, it is proposed that the power to appoint the Chief Justice, Ambassadors, Permanent Secretaries of Ministries, the Secretary to the Cabinet, the Attorney-General, Commissioner of Police and the Commanders of the Defence Forces should be vested in the President, acting on the advice of the Prime Minister after the latter has in appropriate cases consulted the relevant Commission.

12. In the second place, the British Government propose that the Constitution should provide for the President, acting on the advice of the Prime Minister, to give to any Commission general directions with regard to the exercise of their functions, including directions designed to achieve a suitable representation of the various component groups of the population in the services of the State.

## ANNEX D

[Statement for use as necessary during the Conference]

## RHODESIA: ELECTIONS

1. In the event of all-party agreement on an independence constitution for Rhodesia, it will be necessary to consider how to proceed to independence.
2. It is presumed that the independence constitution will provide in the normal way for the legislature and (directly or indirectly) the executive to derive their authority and powers from an expression of the popular will through an election. If that is to be so, a legislature and executive constituted in terms of the independence constitution cannot take office on Independence Day unless there has been an election before independence. Consideration must therefore be given to designating an authority to conduct the elections and to agreeing the conditions in which the elections and the campaign leading up to them are to be held.
3. The British Government believes that the following elements will be essential to the conduct of a free and fair election, in which all parties would be able to participate:
  - a. the administration of the election should be scrupulously impartial as between one party and another;
  - b. peaceful political activity, including pre-election campaigning, would take place freely and without intimidation of any kind;
  - c. all parties should have free and uncensored access to all the public media (press, radio and television); and
  - d. the election should take place under impartial supervision.
4. The British Government is prepared to assume its responsibility, as the constitutionally responsible authority, to see that these requirements are met if the parties agree on

/an



an independence constitution.

[NOTE:

In addition it is likely to be necessary for HMG to make a statement about the conditions in which a cease-fire would be maintained while elections were held. This could be made at the same time as or separately from the above statement about elections.]

CEASE-FIRE

5. The conduct of the elections will require the agreement of the parties on a cease-fire and the separation of the forces. In the event of agreement on the independence constitution, and acceptance that elections should be held under the British Government's authority, the British Government will arrange negotiations between the military commanders on both sides to settle the conditions in which a cease-fire shall be established and maintained and to consider proposals for the policing of the cease-fire.



31 AUG 1979





(2)

10 DOWNING STREET

Prime Minister - F.S.  
Rhodesia - Pmt 3/5

I understand that when, earlier  
to day, Mr Day raised with  
Bishop Rugoswa the possibility  
of a visit to Salisbury by Sir  
Amtt, the Bishop was uninterested.

He said that his advance party  
would be leaving shortly <sup>for London</sup> and  
that he saw no point in Sir  
Amtt coming out. Sir A.  
Amtt will, therefore, not be going.

Pmt 3/8

31 August 1979

Rhodesia

The enclosed note by Charles Douglas-Home on the food situation in Zimbabwe-Rhodesia and in the neighbouring countries has been seen by the Prime Minister. She has asked that the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary should be aware of it.

MO'DBA

*John*

R.M.J. Lyne, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.



Has a copy  
of this gone  
to the F.O.

Bryan; ~~Mr. Alexander~~ 25/8  
I have returned the top  
copy to Ian Gow.  
Gillian 25/8.

Ans 25/8  
Prime Minister

"Food Supplies in Zimbabwe-Rhodesia"

I thought that you might be interested  
to see the attached Note which was  
sent to me by Charles Douglas-Home.

Ian Gow  
23.8.79

Ian - may I have a

copy to keep.

More show

Bryan - and the F.O.

out.

## Facts on Food in Zimbabwe-Rhodesia

- 1) The white farmers provide 94 per cent of the grain traded through the Grain Marketing Board.
- 2) Over the past eight years <sup>(maize)</sup> food exports from Rhodesia have averaged 600,000 tons p.a. at 10 bags per ton. Of this total 200,000 tons went to Zaire, Zambia, Botswana, Mozambique and Malawi. Since 1972/3 Zambia has taken no maize; Mozambique has taken none since 1975. Both countries take seed for their planting programmes.
- 3) For 1979/80 Zimbabwe-Rhodesia is programmed to supply 160,000 tons of maize to Zaire. The whole sub-continent is short of white maize, which Africans eat, so Zimbabwe-Rhodesia is exchanging its substantial stocks of white maize for yellow maize which can be used for stock feed. This traffic will go through Zambia.
- 4) Up to 40,000 tons of maize will go to Botswana (and some elsewhere) as meal.
- 5) Thus even in drought conditions Zimbabwe white farmers are providing enormous succour for its neighbours and could increase those totals substantially if farmers' confidence was restored to the point where the reductions in land under cultivation were stopped and up to 260,000 hectares restored to cultivation.
- 6) It will be a miracle if Zambia avoids a desperate famine this year. At a recent meeting in Johannesburg the Zambian representative discussed the minimum requirements for Zambian avoidance of a famine and the transport implications of those requirements:
  - a) by January 1980 Zambia will require 300,000 tons of grain in addition to the 100,000 tons promised from Kenya. (The latter is supposed to be transported on the Tazara railway but is unlikely to get through on that scale).
  - b) The Maize Board in Pretoria has undertaken to supply all that is necessary (yellow maize only) by railway if it can be physically moved.
  - c) Zambian railways can only handle 35 wagons per day. They request a breakdown as follows:

11	maize
6	wheat
8	general goods
6	coke
4	fertilizers

totalling 1,264 tons per day.
  - d) At existing rates of movement (e.g. 35 wagons per day) and no further interruption only 100,000 tons would get through by the end of January leaving a shortfall of 200,000 tons.

continued.....



- e) The alternative road route via Chirundu is not mountable before the end of August. Moreover to transfer 200,000 tons along that road between the end of August and January would require 32 trucks per day seven days per week giving a total requirement of 270 20-ton trucks which are not known to be available in Zimbabwe-Rhodesia given the other demands of the war and the economy.
- 7) Substantial quantities of vegetable oil go to Zambia and Zaire providing the vast majority of cooking oil for food. \$1m dairy products annually go to Botswana and Zaire. Zaire in addition to maize receives 20,000 tons of wheat and 4,000 tons of beef. If the political barriers come down Zambia could receive substantial wheat supplies later this year.
- 8) Zambia, Botswana, Zaire and Mozambique will be chronic food importers for the foreseeable future. All their reasonable demands for maize, beef, wheat, dairy products and oil foods can be supplied overland by the white farmers of Zimbabwe-Rhodesia given stable political conditions without in any way affecting their capacity to continue feeding the Zimbabwe domestic population.

*Rhodesia file*  
*r/h. [Signature]*

Mr Renwick, Rhodesia Dept

Rhodesia: Constitutional Conference

The Secretary of State discussed the Rhodesian Constitutional Conference with the Prime Minister on 30 August.

The Prime Minister would like to have a chance to meet Mr Robert Mugabe, and proposes to make a brief appearance at the Secretary of State's reception for the Delegations on 10 September in order to do so. With regard to the tentative entertainment programme for the second week of the Conference, the Prime Minister expressed an interest in holding separate dinners for the ZANU and ZAPU elements in the Patriotic Front Delegation. She would like to explore the possibility of weening Mr Nkomo from Mr Mugabe.

The Secretary of State referred to the possibility that the Conference would proceed in such a way that the Government might wish to extend sanctions after 15 November. He also spoke to the Prime Minister about the proposals for a Commonwealth force (your minute of 30 August refers).

The Prime Minister agreed that Sir A Duff should visit Salisbury soon and talk to Bishop Muzorewa and others before the Conference.

It was agreed that the Secretary of State would send the Prime Minister a minute on the tactics to be adopted at the Conference. In the first instance this will not go to other Cabinet Ministers. You are amending the existing draft minute for signature by the Secretary of State today.

*RMJ Lyne*

31 August 1979

(R M J Lyne)

ccs:-

PS/LPS  
 PS/Mr Luce  
 Sir A Duff  
 Mr Byatt  
 PS



B/27.9.79

.31 August 1979

Rhodesia

I attach a message received today from President Bongo of the Gabon to the Prime Minister.

The response to the Prime Minister's message of 14 August strikes me as particularly warm. I should be grateful for your advice as to whether the Prime Minister should reply and, if so, in what terms.

MO'DBA

R.M.J. Lyne, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

PRIME MINISTER

Rhodesia: Message from President Bongo

You may be interested to see the ~~attached~~ <sup>below</sup> unofficial translation of a message to you from President Bongo that arrived today. It is a strikingly unconditional expression of support. I have sent a copy to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office for advice as to whether they would see advantage in an acknowledgement.

The unofficial translation is as follows:

"I am happy to be able to reply to your message of 14 August in which you requested the support of my country ~~in~~ <sup>for</sup> implementing the terms of the Lusaka Agreement on the Rhodesia question. I have the honour to inform you that my Government and I myself will spare no effort in encouraging the application of the Lusaka Agreement which is in perfect accord with the position which we have always taken i.e. the establishment of a genuine majority rule and a return to legality and peace in Rhodesia."

[Courtesy clause]

*Handwritten signature*

*Handwritten initials/signature*

*Handwritten signature*

31 August 1979



POST OFFICE  
TELEGRAPHS

To send Telegrams — CONSULT TELEPHONE  
DIRECTORY OR TELEX DIALLING CARD

POST OFFICE  
TELEGRAPHS

To send Telegrams — CONSULT TELEPHONE  
DIRECTORY OR TELEX DIALLING CARD

POST OFFICE  
TELEGRAPHS

To send Telegrams — CONSULT TELEPHONE  
DIRECTORY OR TELEX DIALLING CARD

*Subject*

PRIME MINISTER'S  
PERSONAL MESSAGE  
SERIAL No. T93/297

NNNN

ZCZC CLH779 LBH442 ELB3700 PLC834 COF541/009

GBLH CY GOLE 158

LIBREVILLETELEX 158/151 31 1051 PAGE1/50-49

ETAT

SON EXCELLENCE MADAME MARGARET THATCHER

PREMIER MINISTRE DU ROYAUME UNI DE GRANDEBRETAGNE

ET D IRLANDE DU NORD

LONDRESSW1

NO 50502/PR/C.- IL M EST AGREABLE DE POUVOIR DONNER SUITE

A VOTRE MESSAGE DU 14 AOUT PAR LEQUEL VOUS REQUERIEZ L APPUI  
DE MON PAYS EN VUE DE METTRE EN PRATIQUE

COL ETAT NO 50502/PR/C- 14 AOUT

LHS 885

P.O. INTERNATIONAL TELEGRAPHS  
LONDON  
31 AUG. 79  
S.N. 1 AREA OFFICE BROADWAY  
ENQUIRIES BILL TEL

LBH442 ELB3700 ETAT PAGE2/50

LES TERMES DE L ACCORD DE LUSAKA SUR LA QUESTION RHODESIENNE STOP  
J AI DONC L HONNEUR DE PORTER A VOTRE HAUTE CONNAISSANCE QUE MON  
GOUVERNEMENT ET MOIMEME NE MENAGERONS AUCUN EFFORD AFIN DE  
FAVORISER L APPLICATION DE L ACCORD DE LUSAKA QUI STOP  
PRECISEMENT ENTRE EN PARFAITE COMMUNION AVEC

COL LUSAKA

LBH442 ELB3700 ETAT PAGE3/51

LA POSITION QUE NOUS AVONS TOUJOURS PRECONISEE STOP A SAVOIR  
L ETABLISSEMENT D UN VERITABLE REGIME DE LA MAJORITE ET D UN RETOUR  
VERS LA LEGALITE ET LA PAIX EN RHODESIE STOP ET FIN VEUILLEZ AGREER  
MADAME LE PREMIER INISTRE L ASSURANCE DE MA TRES HAUTE  
CONSIDERATION  
EL HADJ OMAR BONGO

COL EL HADJ OMAR BONGO


PART 5 ends:-

Fco to Bbc 30.8.79

PART 6 begins:-

Pres Bongo to PM 31.8.79











END

Filmed at the National  
Archives (TNA) in London

February 2010