

PREM19

112

RHODESIA

(Situation in)

(Sept 11 - October 10)

(Part 7)

PREM 19 / 112

PART 7

Confidential Filing

The situation in Rhodesia  
The Constitutional Conference in  
London, September 1979.

RHODESIA

Part 1: May 1979

Part 7: September 1979

Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date
<del>15.9.79</del>							
<del>19.9.79</del>							
<del>20.9.79</del>							
<del>21.9.79</del>							
<del>25.9.79</del>							
26.9.79							
<del>27.9.79</del>							
28.9.79							
<del>3.10.79</del>							
<del>4.10.79</del>							

PREM 19/112

PART

7

ends:-

Pres of Zambia to PM 10.10.79

PART

8

begins:-

From to ~~MOBBA~~ Ch of Duchy of Lancaster 11.10.79



SUBJECT



Rhodesia  
PRIME MINISTER'S  
PERSONAL T 114/79 TIGE  
SERIAL No. T114/79 T

*State House  
Lusaka, Republic of Zambia*

10th October, 1979.

*My Dear Prime Minister,*

As you know, I continue to follow with profound interest the proceedings in the negotiations on the independence of Zimbabwe. Right from the start, I never thought these negotiations would be easy. Nevertheless, I am satisfied with the progress made so far. I have seen the document tabled by the British Government on the Independence Constitution. I regard this as a serious attempt to work out a democratic Constitution which provides a foundation for a free and independent Zimbabwe based on genuine majority rule.

I am confident that although the negotiations are tough, they are nevertheless constructive and will end in an agreement. I am in full contact with the Patriotic Front as I am with your Government. The document tabled by the Patriotic Front in reply to yours has strengthened my confidence in the successful outcome in the negotiations. I, therefore, wish to comment on some aspects of the British Government document:

(a) Presidency:

I am really concerned about the provision relating to a Constitutional President with an Executive Prime Minister. While there may be good reasons for this provision, I would urge you to re-examine it in the light of past experience.

/...

Right Honourable Margaret Thatcher,  
Prime Minister of the United Kingdom and  
Northern Ireland,  
10 Downing Street,  
LONDON.



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Zimbabwe is going through a savage war and it will take a long time before people enjoy genuine peace and stability. We should not forget what happened in Nigeria when the British Government tried to provide a similar structure as the one being proposed. Under conditions of instability where peace is threatened, you need a strong Government in which power is not diffused. A decisive Government is the best hope for Zimbabwe particularly in the great task of integrating the security forces after independence. A weak Government will not be decisive enough and will lead to failure in guaranteeing security in the country. Under these conditions the exodus of whites, whom we hope will stay on in an Independent Zimbabwe, will infact be a certainty. In the interests of stability, and in the interest of the smooth running of the new Zimbabwe Government, I urge you to seriously consider the proposal for an executive President rather than a constitutional President. If you dismiss it, then you may choose a perilous path.

(b) Declaration of Rights:

We all want human rights guaranteed under the Constitution. This is a very important provision. However, land hunger in Zimbabwe is real - considering that half the country with the best soils is under white ownership while the other half with very poor soils is reserved for Africans. This is a potential source of grave instability which will need a decisive Government to manage. In our view, it will be difficult for any independent Government in Zimbabwe to accept the entrenchment of this clause. Such Government cannot survive for long. I can assure you that the sufferers will be the whites. The provision on land is a recipe for trouble. I also propose that the issue of compensation should be dealt with by reviving the idea of a

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Zimbabwe Development Fund which was in the Kissinger Plan and also in the Anglo-American Proposals. I believe that the Carter Administration would be helpful among others including Australia, Canada and some EEC Members in contributing to this Fund.

- (c) The issue of pensions is also important. I propose that the Zimbabwe Development Fund be used also to meet the requirements under this provision.
- (d) I am also concerned about the role of white representatives in Parliament. It is our view that 20% of the seats reserved for whites should be exclusively designed to represent white interests. This is what they were specifically intended for. The 20% representing 3% of the population of Zimbabwe should, therefore, not be allowed to form a coalition with any of the black groups to form a Government in an Independent Zimbabwe for this would amount to a new blocking mechanism.
- (e) The Unanimity Rule:

I note with concern that some clauses in the Constitution will be, inter-alia, amendable only by a unanimous vote in the House of Assembly. This, I must say, is another form of blocking mechanism which I urge you to re-consider. I think that if the Patriotic Front should accept 70% provision for the amendment of the Constitution instead of two-thirds which they have demanded, this should be accepted as a reasonable compromise to cover all Clauses.
- (f) Finally, there is the question of the linkage between agreement on the Constitution and agreement on the Transitional Arrangements. I welcome this as a firm undertaking by all sides that agreement on the Constitution would be contingent upon agreement on Transitional Arrangements. This is an extremely important point.

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Looking at the outstanding points, it is clear to me that some of the issues which remain unresolved would easily fall away if agreement was reached on the Transitional Arrangements. I, therefore, want to urge you to consider carefully the proposal that if you are not at this stage able to complete the discussions on the Constitution or are unable to meet the reservations of the Patriotic Front, you move to the Transitional Arrangements where some of the fears of the Patriotic Front will be dispelled and reservations will fall away.

Let me emphasize that the areas of agreement between the British Government and the Patriotic Front are very wide indeed. Agreement that there should be a democratic Constitution and free elections before independence is vital. I am impressed by this progress. We should, therefore, look very closely at the few remaining areas of dispute. As you will recall issues like citizenship had given the Patriotic Front great cause for concern but this may no longer be a crucial issue. They are worried about the Public Service but a possible formula can be found to eliminate this area of difference. In my view, the areas which I have outlined, if met, would lead to agreement on the Constitution and would thus pave the way for the negotiations on the Transitional Arrangements. This is significant progress.

Let me also refer to the recent raids by the rebel Rhodesian forces into Mozambique. I want to emphasize how dangerous these raids are. They could easily have wrecked the London Conference and I want to assure you that credit goes to the Patriotic Front who did not walk out and to President Samora Machel who exercised the greatest restraint during one of the worst crises Mozambique has ever faced.

I had sent a message to your Government firmly stating that no one should take the co-operation of Frontline States and indeed the Patriotic Front for granted during these negotiations. The Patriotic Front will not walk out of the London Conference. They will not be the ones to break the Conference but provocation such as the recent raids on Mozambique coupled with silence from London certainly could achieve that purpose. No one wants this to happen, least of all Commonwealth countries who declared their support for the current initiative in London.

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So I urge you and your Government to order Bishop Muzorewa to end his attacks on neighbouring countries. Failure to do that will definitely jeopardize the Conference. I do not want this to happen.

Zambia remains committed to the principles enunciated in the Commonwealth declaration on Rhodesia. We agreed to find an internationally accepted solution to the Rhodesian problem. I believe that the London Conference is aimed at this objective. If there should be any change, then, of course, we can expect that the Frontline States, the O.A.U. and other members of the international community will not accept such a solution. I have told you that the Patriotic Front will not walk out of London regardless of any pressures put on them through the attacks launched against them in neighbouring countries or those applied directly to get them to accept the British document which still requires further negotiations. It is my hope, therefore, that Britain will not ignore proposals put forward by people who have been involved in negotiations over the independence of Zimbabwe for more than 20 years.

We for our part, we will continue to play our role of assisting Britain discharge her international obligation. I also pray that we build a spirit of reconciliation into the blood system of the new leadership and not resentment which will lead them to take action against those who may believe that they are being protected. Statements from some British officials do not seem to me to be helpful in making the spirit of reconciliation, the life blood of the new Zimbabwean leadership. I see a distinct possibility that in place of reconciliation, you will build a spirit of vengeance. God forbid. I pray that my advice will be taken as one from a friend trying to help another to succeed.

By the way, Mark Chona will have told you how impressed I was by Lord Carrington's address at the United Nations in reference to the Middle East and the importance of the PLO in the search for a lasting and just solution to the conflict. It is my sincere hope that we can face up to the reality of the Middle East and work towards establishing a Palestinian State so that the millions of the Palestinian refugees capable of building their own nation can have a home to return to and contribute to the establishment of peace and stability in the area.

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The statement has added my confidence that you can face up to the realities of Zimbabwe. I hope you can.

May I end by wishing you a successful Conference at Blackpool.

*As always,*

*1/0 .*

Kenneth D. Kaunda  
PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF ZAMBIA

CONFIDENTIAL

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1065 OF 10 OCTOBER 1979 FROM LUSAKA

RHODESIA

President Kaunda summoned me this evening to hand me a letter for the Prime Minister, adding that he had told her over the phone it was coming. He would like you to see it first thing in the morning.

Kaunda emphasised two points: the need for an Executive President and the need to take land out of the Bill of Rights. However, he admitted that he now understood (from your speech in today's verbatim service which I had sent to Chona this afternoon) that PF's objections on the Presidency had been modified. Nevertheless, he thought it essential for the future that there was a strong leader who did not need to look over his shoulder at another power centre. Otherwise the problem of Nigeria would be repeated.

On the Presidency I said I took his point but we were not starting from scratch and had to stick to what could be agreed. There were two sides who had to be reconciled. The President said that he thought he should make the point for the record.

On land I referred to your remarks about a fund. I also referred to the need to reassure the white community. I went on to stress the need for a speedy agreement to the Constitution. Smith could so easily make trouble. We needed to get on to the next stage.

Here the conversation which was throughout relaxed and friendly in tone except when I asked Chona when he was returning to London and he said, albeit with what passed for a smile, perhaps he would not if you broke up the Conference. I said that on the contrary we had every hope, with Zambia's help, of making progress.

/ Wisner,

CONFIDENTIAL

Wisner, the US Ambassador, has also been summoned almost certainly to receive a letter for President Carter.

Chona had called in Wisner again this afternoon to reinforce the OAED to help the PF on the lines outlined in my telegram no. 1062. He now revealed that the President, the Central Committee and the Cabinet had met on Saturday night and were very alarmed about British arrogance and intransigence. Wisner then referred him to your speech which Chona had not at that point yet read.

I believe that the calmer atmosphere this evening reflects Kaunda's realisation that Chona had been feeding him out of date information. He is clear that Kasanei, with whom I have been in close touch, had not managed to relay progress effectively to State House. The President himself has kept himself inaccessible owing to preoccupation with the Party Conference.

In view of the barriers which Kaunda has allowed to be erected round and which hinders his understanding of the progress being made, it would be helpful if your response was couched in terms requiring me to communicate them personally to him.

See MIFT.

FOLLOWING IS LETTER FROM PRESIDENT KAUNDA TO THE PRIME MINISTER

BEGINS

My dear Prime Minister,

As you know, I continue to follow with profound interest the proceedings in the negotiations on the independence of Zimbabwe. Right from the start, I never thought these negotiations would be easy. Nevertheless, I am satisfied with the progress made so far. I have seen the document tabled by the British Government on the Independence Constitution. I regard this as a serious attempt to work out a democratic constitution which provides a foundation for a free and independent Zimbabwe based on genuine majority rule.

I am confident that although the negotiations are tough, they are nevertheless constructive and will end in an agreement. I am in full contact with the Patriotic Front as I am with your Government. The document tabled by the Patriotic Front in reply to yours has strengthened my confidence in the successful outcome in the negotiations. I, therefore, wish to comment on some aspects of the British Government document.

(A) PRESIDENCY:

I am really concerned about the provision relating to a constitutional President with an executive Prime Minister. While there may be good reasons for this provision, I would urge you to re-examine it in the light of past experience. Zimbabwe is going through a savage war and it will take a long time before people enjoy genuine peace and stability. We should not forget what happened in Nigeria when the British Government tried to provide a similar structure as the one being proposed. Under conditions of instability where peace is threatened, you need a strong Government in which power is not diffused. A decisive Government is the best hope for Zimbabwe particularly in the great task of integrating the security forces after independence. A weak Government will not be decisive enough and will lead to failure in guaranteeing security in the country. Under these conditions the exodus of whites, whom we hope will stay on in an independent Zimbabwe will in fact be a certainty. In the interests of stability, and in the interest of the smooth running of the new Zimbabwe Government, I urge you to

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seriously consider the proposal for an executive President rather than a constitutional President. If you dismiss it then you may choose a perilous path.

(B) DECLARATION OF RIGHTS:

We all want human rights guaranteed under the Constitution. This is a very important provision. However, land hunger in Zimbabwe is real considering that half the country with the best soils is under white ownership while the other half with very poor soils is reserved for Africans. This is a potential source of grave instability which will need a decisive Government to manage. In our view, it will be difficult for any independent Government in Zimbabwe to accept the entrenchment of this clause. Such Government cannot survive for long. I can assure you that the sufferers will be the whites. The provision on land is a recipe for trouble. I also propose that the issue of compensation should be dealt with by reviving the idea of a Zimbabwe Development Fund which was in the Kissinger plan and also in the Anglo-American proposals. I believe that the Carter Administration would be helpful among others including Australia, Canada and some EEC members in contributing to this fund.

(C) The issue of pensions is also important. I propose that the Zimbabwe Development Fund be used also to meet the requirements under this provision.

(D) I am also concerned about the role of white representatives in Parliament. It is our view that 21 per cent of the seats reserved for whites should be exclusively designed to represent white interests. This is what they were specifically intended for. The 21 per cent representing 3 per cent of the population of Zimbabwe should, therefore, not be allowed to form a coalition with any of the black groups to form a Government in an independent Zimbabwe for this would amount to a new blocking mechanism.

(E) THE UNANIMITY RULE

I note with concern that some clauses in the Constitution will be, inter-alia, amendable only by a unanimous vote in the House of Assembly. This, I must say, is another form of blocking mechanism which I urge you to reconsider. I think that if the Patriotic Front should accept

70 per cent provision for the amendment of the Constitution instead of two-thirds which they have demanded, this should be accepted as a reasonable compromise to cover all clauses.

(F) Finally, there is the question of the linkage between agreement on the Constitution and agreement on the transitional arrangements. I welcome this as a firm undertaking by all sides that agreement on the Constitution would be contingent upon agreement on transitional arrangements. This is an extremely important point.

Looking at the outstanding points, it is clear to me that some of the issues which remain unresolved would easily fall away if agreement was reached on the transitional arrangements. I, therefore, want to urge you to consider carefully the proposal that if you are not at this stage able to complete the discussions on the Constitution or are unable to meet the reservations of the Patriotic Front, you move to the transitional arrangements where some of the fears of the Patriotic Front will be dispelled and reservations will fall away.

Let me emphasise that the areas of agreement between the British Government and the Patriotic Front are very wide indeed. Agreement that there should be a democratic constitution and free elections before independence is vital. I am impressed by this progress. We should, therefore, look very closely at the few remaining areas of dispute. As you will recall issues like citizenship had given the Patriotic Front great cause for concern but this may no longer be a crucial issue. They are worried about the public service but a possible formula can be found to eliminate this area of difference. In my view, the areas which I have outlined, if met, would lead to agreement on the constitution and would thus pave the way for the negotiations on the transitional arrangements. This is significant progress.

Let me also refer to the recent raids by the rebel Rhodesian forces in Mozambique. I want to emphasise how dangerous these raids are. They could easily have wrecked the London Conference and I want to assure you that credit goes to the Patriotic Front who did not walk out and to President Samora Machil who exercised the greatest restraint during one of the worst crises Mozambique has ever faced.



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For our part, we will continue to play our role of assisting Britain discharge her international obligation. I also pray that we build a spirit of reconciliation into the blood system of the new leadership and not resentment which will lead them to take action against those who may believe that they are being protected. Statements from some British officials do not seem to me to be helpful in making the spirit of reconciliation, the life blood of the new Zimbabwe leadership. I see a distinct possibility that in place of reconciliation, you will build a spirit of vengeance. God forbid. I pray that my advice will be taken as one from a friend trying to help another to succeed.

/ By the way,

By the way, Mark Chona will have told you how impressed I was by Lord Carrington's address at the United Nations in reference to the Middle East and the importance of the PLO in the search for a lasting and just solution to the conflict. It is my sincere hope that we can face up to the reality of the Middle East and work towards establishing a Palestinian State so that the millions of the Palestinian refugees capable of building their own nation can have a home to return to and contribute to the establishment of peace and stability in the area. The statement has added my confidence that you can face up to the realities of Zimbabwe. I hope you can.

May I end by wishing you a successful conference at Blackpool.

As always,  
Kenneth D. Kaunda  
President of the Republic of Zambia

ENDS

SPEECH BY THE RT HON LORD CARRINGTON AT THE CONSERVATIVE  
PARTY CONFERENCE, BLACKPOOL, ON 10 OCTOBER 1979

IN THE LAST 14 YEARS THERE HAS BEEN NO OCCASION WHEN RHODESIA HAS NOT BEEN DEBATED IN THIS CONFERENCE. IT WOULD BE IDLE TO DENY THAT THERE HAVE BEEN DIFFERENCES OF OPINION BETWEEN US IN THE PARTY, NOT SO MUCH OVER WHERE WE WANT TO GO, BUT HOW BEST TO ACHIEVE IT. ONE THING IS QUITE CERTAIN AND THIS WAS REFLECTED VERY CLEARLY IN GEORGE GARDNER'S SPEECH, THAT ALL OF US WISH TO SEE AN END TO THE PROBLEM, THE GRANTING OF LEGALITY AND THE CONSEQUENT LIFTING OF SANCTIONS. THERE IS NO DIFFERENCE OF OPINION BETWEEN US ABOUT THAT.

I HAVE NO INTENTION OF GOING BACK OVER THE WHOLE HISTORY OF THE LAST 14 YEARS AND THE WASTED OPPORTUNITIES AND THE SOLUTIONS WHICH WERE WITHIN REACH AND YET WHICH WE ALL OF US FAILED TO ACHIEVE. WHAT I WANT TO DO THIS AFTERNOON IS FIRST OF ALL TO TELL YOU OF THE GOVERNMENT'S THINKING WHEN WE TOOK OFFICE ON 3 MAY, OF THE CONCLUSIONS WE CAME TO AND OF THE POSITION WE NOW FIND OURSELVES IN, IN THE FIFTH WEEK OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE.

THERE HAS BEEN A DRAMATIC CHANGE IN RHODESIA OVER THE PAST YEAR RESULTING IN ONE-MAN ONE-VOTE ELECTIONS AND THE ELECTION

#OF A

OF A GOVERNMENT WITH A BLACK PRIME MINISTER, A SITUATION WHICH ONLY A SHORT TIME PREVIOUSLY WOULD HAVE BEEN IMPOSSIBLE TO VISUALISE. BUT WHEN WE CAME TO POWER WE HAD TO DEAL WITH THE SITUATION OF A COUNTRY AT WAR, WITH GUERRILLA ARMIES BASED IN THE TERRITORY OF NEIGHBOURING COUNTRIES WHO HAD BOYCOTTED THE APRIL ELECTIONS AND WERE DETERMINED TO CARRY ON THEIR STRUGGLE.

IT SEEMED TO US THAT OUR IMMEDIATE TASK WAS TO ASSESS AT FIRST HAND THE SITUATION. FIRST OF ALL TO DECIDE WHETHER THERE WAS A PROSPECT OF AN END TO THE WAR AND, SECONDLY AND JUST AS IMPORTANTLY FOR THE FUTURE, TO SOUND OUT THE PROSPECTS FOR INTERNATIONAL RECOGNITION AND GENERAL ACCEPTANCE OF THE APRIL ELECTIONS. AND SO BY CONTACTS WITH OUR FRIENDS AND ALLIES IN AFRICA AND ELSEWHERE, BY ASKING LORD HARLECH TO VISIT THE FRONT LINE STATES AND SALISBURY AND THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE PATRIOTIC FRONT, BY APPOINTING A SENIOR DIPLOMAT TO MAKE CONTACT WITH THE BISHOP'S GOVERNMENT, WE INITIATED INTENSE DIPLOMATIC CONTACTS. WE MADE IT CLEAR THAT THE EVENTS OF LAST APRIL HAD BROUGHT ABOUT AN ENTIRELY NEW SITUATION.

BUT DURING THOSE CONSULTATIONS IT BECAME CLEAR THAT THERE WAS A

#PROFOUND

PROFOUND DISTRUST IN AFRICA AND ELSEWHERE OF SOME ASPECTS OF THE CONSTITUTION ENACTED BY THE SALISBURY GOVERNMENT. MANY BELIEVED THAT IN PARTICULAR TWO OF ITS PROVISIONS, THE BLOCKING MECHANISM AND THE METHOD OF APPOINTMENT OF SENIOR MEMBERS OF THE ADMINISTRATION, WERE DESIGNED TO PREVENT GENUINE MAJORITY RULE. I PLACE A GREAT BLAME FOR THIS ON MR CALLAGHAN'S GOVERNMENT. IF IN THE MONTHS AFTER MARCH 1978 BRITAIN HAD OFFERED HELP AND ADVICE RATHER THAN CARPING CRITICISM, I BELIEVE THAT A CONSTITUTION WITHOUT THOSE DEFECTS AND ACCEPTABLE TO INTERNATIONAL OPINION MIGHT VERY WELL HAVE BEEN PRODUCED.

IF THERE HAD BEEN A REPRESENTATIVE IN SALISBURY WHO HAD THE CONFIDENCE OF THOSE WHO WERE SEEKING TO COME TOGETHER, HOW DIFFERENT THINGS MIGHT HAVE BEEN, AS IT TURNED OUT THE DEFECTS IN THE CONSTITUTION MADE THE OUTCOME OF THE ELECTIONS UNACCEPTABLE NOT ONLY TO MANY AFRICAN COUNTRIES BUT ALSO TO THE AMERICANS AND OTHERS,

HAVING MADE THIS ASSESSMENT WE HAD TWO ALTERNATIVES BEFORE US FROM WHICH WE COULD CHOOSE. WE COULD RECOGNISE THE ELECTIONS  
#WHICH WERE

WHICH WERE AGREED BY MOST OBSERVERS TO BE FREE AND FAIR AND LEGALISE THE BISHOP'S GOVERNMENT AND THE CONSTITUTION ON WHICH IT WAS BASED, AND ACCEPT THAT THE SIX PRINCIPLES HAD BEEN OBSERVED. THAT WAS THE FIRST ALTERNATIVE, BUT WE KNEW THAT NO-ONE WOULD HAVE FOLLOWED US. THERE WOULD HAVE BEEN NO INTERNATIONAL RECOGNITION,

I AM NOT TALKING HERE ABOUT DIPLOMATIC NICETIES BUT OF THE REALITIES OF RHODESIA'S POSITION IN THE HEART OF SOUTHERN AFRICA. WE MUST DO EVERYTHING TO AVOID A SITUATION WHERE RHODESIA EMERGES FROM OSTRACISM ONLY TO BE THRUST INTO ISOLATION, THAT IS WHY WE STRESSED THE NEED FOR INTERNATIONAL RECOGNITION IN OUR MANIFESTO.

MOREOVER, WITHOUT RECOGNITION FROM THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY THE CHANCES OF STOPPING THE WAR AND OF RE-BUILDING THE RHODESIAN ECONOMY WOULD BE SEVERELY REDUCED. IT IS THE CONTINUATION OF THE WAR MORE THAN ANY OTHER CAUSE WHICH IS DISCOURAGING THE WHITES FROM STAYING IN THEIR HOMELAND. AND ONE OF THE REASONS INTERNATIONAL RECOGNITION WOULD NOT HAVE MATERIALISED WAS BECAUSE OVER THE PREVIOUS TWO YEARS THE GOVERNMENT OF THE DAY HAD PAINTED A PICTURE OF THE SITUATION IN RHODESIA AND THE EFFORTS BEING MADE TO

SOLVE IT WHICH WAS PATENTLY DISTORTED. LITTLE CREDIT HAD BEEN GIVEN BY THE PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT TO THE EFFORTS OF BISHOP MUZOREWA. NOT UNNATURALLY THEREFORE AMONG SOME COUNTRIES THERE WAS SCEPTICISM AND MISUNDERSTANDING OF THE CHANGE THAT HAD BEEN MADE,

WE HAVE BEEN SEEKING IN THESE LAST FEW MONTHS TO EXPLAIN THE RADICAL CHANGES WHICH HAVE TAKEN PLACE IN RHODESIA, AND NOT I THINK WITHOUT SUCCESS.

YOU WILL SEE THEN THAT WE HAD TO CONSIDER WHETHER BY UNILATERAL ACTION ON OUR PART WE COULD BRING THE WAR TO AN END OR WHETHER THE REVERSE WOULD BE THE CASE - WITH POLARISATION AND AN INTENSIFICATION OF HOSTILITIES, WHICH WOULD BRING NEITHER PEACE NOR STABILITY TO THE GOVERNMENT OF BISHOP MUZOREWA.

THE SECOND ALTERNATIVE WAS, EVEN AT THIS LATE HOUR, TO SEEK TO BUILD UPON THE NEW SITUATION IN RHODESIA TO MAKE A LAST EFFORT TO CALL THE PARTIES TOGETHER TO ATTEMPT ONCE AGAIN TO NEGOTIATE A NEW CONSTITUTION ACCEPTABLE TO ALL PARTIES AND THUS BRING THE WAR TO AN END.

WE DECIDED ON THE SECOND COURSE. THE PRIME MINISTER AND I WENT TO LUSAKA WITH THE DETERMINATION TO SEEK SUCH A SOLUTION AND GET OUR COMMONWEALTH COLLEAGUES TO SUPPORT US IN SUCH AN UNDERTAKING. IT WAS NOT AN EASY MEETING. IT BEGAN IN AN ATMOSPHERE OF SUSPICION AND DISTRUST.

IT SAYS MUCH, IF I MAY SAY SO, FOR THE SKILLS OF THE PRIME MINISTER THAT AT THE END OF THE DAY WE CAME AWAY WITH A UNANIMOUS AGREEMENT FROM THE HEADS OF 39 GOVERNMENTS TO SUPPORT US IN CALLING A NEW CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE FROM WHICH WOULD FLOW ELECTIONS SUPERVISED BY THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT.

I THINK THAT MOST RHODESIANS WERE QUICK TO SEE THE NEW GLEAM OF HOPE ON THE HORIZON. OUR AMERICAN AND EUROPEAN PARTNERS AND OTHER FRIENDS GAVE US THEIR SOLID SUPPORT AND IN THE FIFTH MONTH OF OFFICE WE CONVENED THE CONFERENCE WHICH ALL THE PARTIES AGREED TO ATTEND AND WE GOT DOWN TO THE BUSINESS OF WORKING OUT A BROAD-BASED SETTLEMENT.

I DO NOT KNOW WHAT THE OUTCOME OF THE CONFERENCE WILL BE. WE ARE SEEKING AN AGREEMENT WHICH FULFILS THE PRINCIPLES LAID DOWN AT LUSAKA. THE ESSENCE OF THAT AGREEMENT WAS THE



RECOGNITION OF BRITISH RESPONSIBILITY TO BRING RHODESIA TO INDEPENDENCE AFTER FREE AND FAIR ELECTIONS; THAT THESE ELECTIONS SHOULD BE SUPERVISED BY US ON THE BASIS OF A CONSTITUTION WHICH WOULD GENERATE BOTH MAJORITY RULE AND PROVIDE APPROPRIATE SAFEGUARDS FOR THE EUROPEAN MINORITY; AND THAT THE CONSTITUTION SHOULD BE COMPARABLE TO THE CONSTITUTIONS WHICH WE HAVE GRANTED IN OTHER SIMILAR CASES TO AFRICAN COUNTRIES.

IT WAS ALSO ACCEPTED THAT IT MUST BE A MAJOR OBJECTIVE TO BRING ABOUT A CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES AND AN END TO SANCTIONS AS PART OF THE PROCESS OF IMPLEMENTING A LASTING SETTLEMENT. WE INTEND TO STAND BY OUR MORAL OBLIGATIONS UNDER THIS AGREEMENT AND CALL UPON OTHERS TO DO THE SAME.

THERE ARE SOME WHO SAY THAT THE CONFERENCE SO FAR HAS TAKEN A LONG TIME. IN THE CONTEXT OF 14 YEARS I DO NOT THINK WE HAVE DONE TOO BADLY. BISHOP MUZOREWA AND HIS DELEGATION HAVE AGREED TO THE PROPOSALS WHICH WE HAVE TABLED. IT HAS MEANT FOR HIS DELEGATION A DEPARTURE FROM THEIR CONSTITUTION WHICH HAS OBVIOUSLY GIVEN HIM DIFFICULTIES AND I PAY TRIBUTE TO HIM AND INDEED TO ALL HIS DELEGATION FOR THE WAY IN WHICH THEY HAVE BEEN GENUINELY SEEKING A SETTLEMENT TO THE PROBLEM.

BUT THE CONSTITUTION TO WHICH HE HAS AGREED GIVES SAFEGUARDS OF A WIDE CHARACTER TO THE EUROPEAN MINORITY, ENTRENCHED FOR A NUMBER OF YEARS AND EVEN AFTERWARDS SUBJECT TO A 70% MAJORITY TO CHANGE, ALL OF US ACKNOWLEDGE THAT THE WHITE COMMUNITY HAVE A VITAL PART TO PLAY IN THE FUTURE OF A PROSPEROUS RHODESIA.

THE PATRIOTIC FRONT HAVE NOT SO FAR ACCEPTED THE BRITISH PROPOSALS. BUT SIGNIFICANT PROGRESS HAS BEEN MADE. THEY HAVE ACCEPTED AN ASSEMBLY WITH A 20% WHITE MEMBERSHIP.

THE DAY BEFORE YESTERDAY MR NKOMO AND MR MUGABE AGREED TO A PRIME MINISTERIAL SYSTEM AND TO THE COMPOSITION AND POWERS OF THE SENATE. THE PATRIOTIC FRONT HAVE COMPROMISED TOO. BUT THEY ARE STILL RAISING POINTS OF PRINCIPLE WHICH OVER THESE LAST 4 WEEKS HAVE BEEN DISCUSSED EXHAUSTIVELY AND WHICH HAVE NOW BEEN AGREED WITH BISHOP MUZOREWA. I HAVE ASKED THEM IN THE LIGHT OF MY REPLY TO THEM ON TUESDAY, TO LET ME KNOW TOMORROW MORNING WHETHER THEY WILL ACCEPT OUR PROPOSALS OR NOT.

IN A SITUATION IN WHICH PARTIES ARE SO DEEPLY OPPOSED, NO CONSTITUTION CAN IN THE NATURE OF THINGS SATISFY EVERYBODY.

I SAY TO THOSE WHO, LIKE PETER SHORE, APPEAR TO THINK THAT WE SHOULD TALK ON AND ON AND ON ABOUT EVERYTHING WITHOUT GETTING AN AGREEMENT TO ANYTHING, THAT A TIME HAD TO COME WHEN A DECISION WOULD BE TAKEN ON THE PRINCIPLE ISSUE AT STAKE,

WE DON'T WANT A REPETITION OF WHAT HAPPENED AT GENEVA. THE CONSTITUTION OF THE NEW COUNTRY OF ZIMBABWE WILL SET OUT THE FRAMEWORK FOR ITS FUTURE DEVELOPMENT.

*We may fail.*

WE MUST NOW GET ON TO THE NEXT PHASE WHICH IS THE TRANSITIONAL ARRANGEMENTS. I DO NOT SEEK TO DISGUISE FROM YOU THAT THESE NEGOTIATIONS ARE GOING TO BE VERY DIFFICULT INDEED. WE MAY NOT SUCCEED. BUT WE MUST GENUINELY SEEK TO PROVIDE A CLIMATE IN WHICH ALL PARTIES CAN FACE A CAMPAIGN IN AN ELECTION, NONE DISADVANTAGED BUT EACH HAVING AN EQUAL CHANCE.

THERE ARE THOSE WHO ARGUE THAT A GREAT DEAL SHOULD HAPPEN BEFORE ELECTIONS ARE HELD: THAT THE SECURITY FORCES SHOULD BE INTEGRATED AND THAT OTHER RADICAL CHANGES SHOULD ALSO BE MADE. I DO NOT THINK THIS EITHER DESIRABLE OR POSSIBLE.

NOW THAT, AT LONG LAST, WE HOPE TO HAVE AN INDEPENDENCE  
CONSTITUTION ACCEPTABLE TO EVERYONE, NOTHING SHOULD  
BE DONE WHICH COULD HAVE THE EFFECT OF PRE-JUDGING OR  
PRE-EMPTING THE CHOICE OF THE PEOPLE OF RHODESIA.

I COME NOW TO THE QUESTION OF SANCTIONS. I AM HAPPY TO ACCEPT  
THE AMENDMENT MOVED BY MR TAYLOR CALLING FOR THE  
REMOVAL OF SANCTIONS AS SOON AS PRACTICALLY POSSIBLE.

I ENTIRELY AGREE THAT IN VIEW OF THE PROGRESS WHICH HAS BEEN  
MADE AT THE CONFERENCE THE TIME FOR LIFTING SANCTIONS  
CANNOT BE FAR OFF. YET WE ARE IN THE MIDDLE OF VERY  
DIFFICULT AND IMPORTANT NEGOTIATIONS: AND IT IS NOT  
POSSIBLE FOR ME TO BE MORE PRECISE UNTIL WE KNOW THE  
OUTCOME OF THE LANCASTER HOUSE CONFERENCE.

BUT I WILL SAY THIS: I RECALL AS WELL AS ANYONE HERE THAT  
SANCTIONS WERE ORIGINALLY INSTITUTED AGAINST THE  
ADVICE OF THE CONSERVATIVE PARTY, IN ORDER TO  
PERSUADE THE THEN GOVERNMENT OF RHODESIA TO ACCEPT  
MAJORITY RULE. IN MY VIEW THAT KIND OF RETRIBUTION  
MUST NOT BE ALLOWED TO CONTINUE ONCE THE MORAL BASIS  
HAS LAPSED.

THERE ARE SOME WHO WISH TO MOVE AHEAD REGARDLESS OF THE RISK OF BRINGING ABOUT THE COLLAPSE OF THE LANCASTER HOUSE CONFERENCE. TO THEM I WOULD SAY: THINK WHAT A SETTLEMENT WOULD MEAN FOR THE LIVES AND WELFARE OF ALL THE RHODESIAN PEOPLE. THINK WHAT IT WOULD MEAN IF WE THREW OVER THE CHANCE OF A SETTLEMENT AT THIS STAGE. BUT EQUALLY, TO OTHERS, LET ME SAY THIS: NO-ONE WILL BE ALLOWED TO DECIDE UNILATERALLY THAT RHODESIA MUST CONTINUE IN ILLEGALITY, IN WAR, AND IN ISOLATION,

THE PROBLEM OF RHODESIA HAS BEEN WITH US FOR TOO LONG, THE RHODESIAN PEOPLE HAVE SUFFERED THE EFFECTS OF WAR AND THE WEIGHT OF INTERNATIONAL DISAPPROVAL. THEIR NEIGHBOURS TOO HAVE SUFFERED AND THEIR COUNTRIES BEAR THE SCARS OF WAR.

VERY FEW PEOPLE IN THIS HALL, I IMAGINE, WOULD NOT ACCEPT THAT THE GOVERNMENT WERE RIGHT TO TRY TO GET A SETTLEMENT; WERE RIGHT EVEN AT THIS ELEVENTH HOUR TO SEEK TO GET THE PARTIES TOGETHER; WERE RIGHT TO GET THE BACKING OF OUR COMMONWEALTH COLLEAGUES; WERE RIGHT TO TAKE THIS CHANCE ONCE AND FOR ALL OF ENDING THE WAR.

WHAT WE ARE STRIVING TO DO IS TO SOLVE A TRAGIC PROBLEM WITH  
HONOUR, WITH DIGNITY AND WITH JUSTICE. I GIVE YOU  
MY WORD THAT IT WILL NOT BE THE FAULT OF THIS  
GOVERNMENT IF WE FAIL.

CONFIDENTIAL

GPS 450

CONFIDENTIAL

FROM FCO 102045Z

TO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1384 OF 10 OCTOBER

INFO IMMEDIATE LUSAKA, MAPUTO, GABORONE, DAR ES SALAAM, LAGOS,  
PRETORIA, UKMIS NEW YORK, LUANDA.

*Bmie Amster*  
P S TO P M  
NO 10 DOWNING ST  
*mb*

RHODESIA: CONSULTATIONS WITH THE AMERICANS

1. WHEN MOOSE CALLED TO SEE DUFF THIS MORNING HE CONFIRMED THAT THE AMERICANS HAD SENT INSTRUCTIONS TO THEIR POSTS IN THE FRONT LINE CAPITALS TO EMPHASISE THAT THE US GOVERNMENT BELIEVED THAT THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROPOSALS WE HAD PUT FORWARD WERE A FAIR AND REASONABLE COMPROMISE AND PROVIDED FOR GENUINE MAJORITY RULE; AND THAT THEY WOULD BE REGARDED AS FAIR AND DEMOCRATIC IN THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY AND BY THE US CONGRESS. IF THE CONFERENCE WERE TO BREAK DOWN DUE TO A PATRIOTIC FRONT REFUSAL TO ACCEPT THESE PROPOSALS CONGRESS WOULD MOVE TO LIFT SANCTIONS. THE AMERICANS ARE URGING THE FRONT LINE GOVERNMENTS TO PERSUADE THE PATRIOTIC FRONT TO ACCEPT OUR PROPOSALS, SUBJECT TO SUBSEQUENT AGREEMENT ON THE ARRANGEMENTS FOR IMPLEMENTING THEM.

2. DUFF EXPRESSED OUR APPRECIATION OF THE ACTION THE STATE DEPARTMENT HAD TAKEN. WE EXPLAINED THAT WE COULD NOT RE-OPEN THE CONSTITUTIONAL PACKAGE. TO DO SO WOULD PUT US IN AN IMPOSSIBLE POSITION WITH THE SALISBURY DELEGATION, AND WOULD DESTROY ANY POSSIBILITY OF AN AGREEMENT. WE BELIEVED THAT THERE WAS A REASONABLE PROSPECT THAT THE PATRIOTIC FRONT WOULD IN THE END ACCEPT THESE PROPOSALS.

3. MOOSE ALSO REFERRED TO A MESSAGE FROM THE US CHARGE IN DAR ES SALAAM WHO WAS TOLD BY MLOKA THAT THE TANZANIAN GOVERNMENT WOULD NOT ADVISE THE PATRIOTIC FRONT TO HOLD OUT AGAINST OUR PROPOSALS. WITH OUR AGREEMENT MOOSE HAS INSTRUCTED THE US CHARGE TO CONFIRM TO THE TANZANIANS.

- A. THAT AGREEMENT ON THE CONSTITUTION WOULD BE SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON THE INTERIM ARRANGEMENTS; AND
- B. THAT WE DO NOT INTEND TO PROCEED WITH LEGISLATIVE OR OTHER ACTION TO IMPLEMENT THE NEW CONSTITUTION UNTIL THERE HAS BEEN NEGOTIATION ON THE PRE-INDEPENDENCE ARRANGEMENTS;
- C. THAT THIS NEGOTIATION COULD BEGIN ON FRIDAY OR MONDAY, PROVIDED THE PATRIOTIC FRONT HAVE ACCEPTED THE CONSTITUTION.

CONFIDENTIAL

/4. DUFF

CONFIDENTIAL

4. DUFF GAVE SOME PRELIMINARY INDICATIONS OF OUR THINKING ON THE PRE-INDEPENDENCE ARRANGEMENTS. THIS IS NOT REPEAT NOT FOR USE WITH OTHERS AT THIS STAGE. HE EXPLAINED THAT WE WERE THINKING IN THE TERMS OF A SHORT TRANSITIONAL PERIOD - NOT MORE THAN ABOUT THREE MONTHS. THIS WAS BECAUSE WE DID NOT BELIEVE THAT A CEASE-FIRE WOULD BE LIKELY TO HOLD DURING A LONGER TRANSITIONAL PERIOD. OUR PURPOSE AND ROLE IN THIS PERIOD WOULD BE TO ENABLE THE PEOPLE OF RHODESIA TO CHOOSE THEIR FUTURE GOVERNMENT IN FREE ELECTIONS. WE DID NOT ENVISAGE COMPLICATED TRANSITIONAL ARRANGEMENTS (SUCH AS A TRANSITIONAL GOVERNMENT OR A TRANSITIONAL CONSTITUTION); BUT WOULD BE PREPARED TO CARRY OUT TO THE FULL EXTENT NECESSARY OUR RESPONSIBILITY TO ENSURE THAT THE ELECTION ARRANGEMENTS GAVE FULL SCOPE TO ALL THE PARTIES TO PRESENT THEIR CASE TO THE PEOPLE OF RHODESIA; AND TO ENSURE THAT THE RESULT OF THE ELECTIONS WAS NOT DISTORTED BY ADMINISTRATIVE OR OTHER PRESSURES. HE ALSO IMPLIED THAT NO FORM OF UN INVOLVEMENT ENTERED INTO OUR PLANNING, NOT LEAST BECAUSE WE WOULD NEVER OBTAIN THE AGREEMENT OF THE SALISBURY GOVERNMENT.

CARRINGTON

FILES

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PS/MR LUCE  
PS/MR RIDLEY  
PS/MR HURD  
PS/PUS  
SIR A DUFF  
LORD N G LENNOX  
MISS BROWN  
MR DAY  
MR WILLSON  
MR ASPIN

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION  
RHODESIA POLICY



S E C R E T

10

*Rennie Rumble*

*Print 11/4*

*me*

GR 350

SECRET

FM UKMIS NEW YORK 102100Z OCT 79

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1231 OF 10 OCTOBER

RHODESIA

1. AFRICAN ANXIETIES HERE ARE BEGINNING TO MOUNT. HOWEVER, THERE IS NO SIGN SO FAR OF INCIPIENT MOVES TO TAKE PRE-EMPTIVE ACTION IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL OR TO ADVANCE THE DATE OF THE RHODESIA DEBATE IN THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY.

2. WE ARE KEEPING THE LEADING AFRICANS BRIEFED ON THE CONFERENCE BY SENDING THEM COPIES OF DOCUMENTS, TEXTS OF STATEMENTS ETC. I WAS TACKLED YESTERDAY SEPARTELY BY THE REPRESENTATIVES OF ZAMBIA, NIGERIA AND TANZANIA AND AGAIN BY ZAMBIA TODAY. IN ANSWERS TO A SERIES OF QUESTIONS, I STRESSED THAT THE PATRIOTIC FRONT HAD AGREED TO THE MAIN STRUCTURE OF THE CONSTITUTION IE THE NATURE OF THE PRESIDENCY, THE COMPOSITION OF PARLIAMENT AND SO ON. THE DISAGREEMENTS WERE ON SECONDARY MATTERS AND YOU HAD AGREED TO MEET THEM OVER THE QUESTION OF A POSSIBLE COALITION BETWEEN THE WHITES AND MINORITY AFRICAN PARTIES. HENCE, THE PROSPECT DID NOT SEEM TOO BLEAK AND I FOUND IT HARD TO BELIEVE THAT THE PATRIOTIC FRONT WOULD BREAK OVER QUESTIONS WHICH THE REST OF THE WORLD WOULD REGARD AS MARGINAL RATHER THAN FUNDAMENTAL.

3. THE AFRICANS DID NOT CONTEST ANY OF THIS. THEY ALL EXPRESSED GREAT CONFIDENCE IN THE WAY YOU WERE HANDLING THE CONFERENCE AND SAID THAT YOU WERE RIGHT TO SETTLE THE CONSTITUTION BEFORE GOING ON TO THE TRANSITIONAL ARRANGEMENTS. THEY ASSURED ME THAT THE PATRIOTIC FRONT WOULD GO TO GREAT LENGTHS NOT TO BREAK UP THE CONFERENCE - LUSAKA (ZAMBIA) WAS PARTICULARLY EMPHATIC ABOUT THIS. IN SHORT THEY ALL SEEM TO BE STILL ON BOARD.

/4. INEVITABLY,

S E C R E T

S E C R E T

4. INEVITABLY, SOME SPECULATION IS BEGINNING TO DEVELOP ABOUT THE FUTURE OF SANCTIONS. WITHOUT ADDRESSING THE QUESTION DIRECTLY, MY NORWEGIAN AND PORTUGUESE COLLEAGUES BEGAN TO BRING THEIR MINDS INTO FOCUS AT LUNCH WITH ME TODAY. CLARK (NIGERIA) IS THREATENING TO CALL ON ME TO DISCUSS THE QUESTION, HIS ARGUMENT BEING THAT ONLY THE SECURITY COUNCIL CAN LIFT SANCTIONS; ANY OTHER COURSE WOULD BE INCONSISTENT WITH THE SPIRIT OF CHAPTER 7 OF THE CHARTER. SO FAR, I HAVE MANAGED TO SIDE-STEP BY BRINGING THE SUBJECT BACK TO THE PROCEEDINGS AT THE CONFERENCE.

PARSONS

F I L E S

RHOD D  
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PLANNING STAFF  
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UND  
LEGAL ADVISERS  
(MR FREELAND)  
(MR FIFOOT)  
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PS/MR LUCE  
PS/MR RIDLEY  
PS/MR HURD  
PS/PUS  
SIR A DUFF  
LORD N G LENNOX  
MISS BROWN  
MR DAY  
MR WILLSON  
MR ASPIN

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION  
RHODESIA POLICY

[RHODESIA: POLICY: ADVANCE COPIES]

721

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SIR A DUFF  
MR WILLSON  
MR BYATT  
LORD N G LENNOX

PS/NO 10 DOWNING STREET

MR R L WADE-GERY )  
MR P H MAXEY )  
COL MOIR ) CABINET  
MR P J FOWLER ) OFFICE  
DIO )

M. D. A. S. ....

HD/RHODESIA DEPT (3)

HD/C AF D

HD/S AF D

HD/PUSD (2)

HD/NEWS DEPT

HD/WAD

MR FREELAND LEGAL ADVISER RM K200A

MR FIFOOT LEGAL ADVISER RM K164

RESIDENT CLERK

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FLASH

OO DAR ES SALAAM

OO PRETORIA

OO GABORONE

OO MAPUTO

PP LUANDA

PP UKMIS NEW YORK

PP LAGOS

GRS 1600

CONFIDENTIAL

FM LUSAKA 102000Z OCT 79

TO FLASH FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1066 OF 10 OCTOBER

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, DAR ES SALAAM, PRETORIA, GABORONE,  
MAPUTO, PRIORITY LUANDA, UKMIS NEW YORK, LAGOS

MIPT: RHODESIA

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MIPT: RHODESIA

FR

ALAAAM, PRETORIA, GABORONE,  
LAGOS

FOLLOWING IS LETTER FROM PRESIDENT

BEGINS

PRIME MINISTER:

MY DEAR PRIME MINISTER,

AS YOU KNOW, I CONTINUE TO FOLLOW WITH PROFOUND INTEREST THE PROCEEDINGS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS ON THE INDEPENDENCE OF ZIMBABWE. RIGHT FROM THE START, I NEVER THOUGHT THESE NEGOTIATIONS WOULD BE EASY. NEVERTHELESS, I AM SATISFIED WITH THE PROGRESS MADE SO FAR. I HAVE SEEN THE DOCUMENT TABLED BY THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT ON THE INDEPENDENCE CONSTITUTION. I REGARD THIS AS A SERIOUS ATTEMPT TO WORK OUT A DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION WHICH PROVIDES A FOUNDATION FOR A FREE AND INDEPENDENT ZIMBABWE BASED ON GENUINE MAJORITY RULE.

I AM CONFIDENT THAT ALTHOUGH THE NEGOTIATIONS ARE TOUGH, THEY ARE NEVERTHELESS CONSTRUCTIVE AND WILL END IN AN AGREEMENT. I AM IN FULL CONTACT WITH THE PATRIOTIC FRONT AS I AM WITH YOUR GOVERNMENT. THE DOCUMENT TABLED BY THE PATRIOTIC FRONT IN REPLY TO YOURS HAS STRENGTHENED MY CONFIDENCE IN THE SUCCESSFUL OUTCOME IN THE NEGOTIATIONS. I, THEREFORE, WISH TO COMMENT ON SOME ASPECTS OF THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT DOCUMENT:

(A) PRESIDENCY:

I AM REALLY CONCERNED ABOUT THE PROVISION RELATING TO A CONSTITUTIONAL PRESIDENT WITH AN EXECUTIVE PRIME MINISTER. WHILE THERE MAY BE GOOD REASONS FOR THIS PROVISION, I WOULD URGE YOU TO RE-EXAMINE IT IN THE LIGHT OF PAST EXPERIENCE. ZIMBABWE IS GOING THROUGH A SAVAGE WAR AND IT WILL TAKE A LONG TIME BEFORE PEOPLE ENJOY GENUINE PEACE AND STABILITY. WE SHOULD NOT FORGET WHAT HAPPENED IN NIGERIA WHEN THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT TRIED TO PROVIDE A SIMILAR STRUCTURE AS THE ONE BEING PROPOSED. UNDER CONDITIONS OF INSTABILITY WHERE PEACE IS THREATENED, YOU NEED A STRONG GOVERNMENT IN WHICH POWER IS NOT DIFFUSED. A DECISIVE GOVERNMENT IS THE BEST HOPE FOR ZIMBABWE PARTICULARLY IN THE GREAT TASK OF INTEGRATING THE SECURITY FORCES AFTER INDEPENDENCE. A WEAK GOVERNMENT WILL NOT BE DECISIVE ENOUGH AND WILL LEAD TO FAILURE IN GUARANTEEING SECURITY IN THE COUNTRY. UNDER THESE CONDITIONS THE EXODUS OF WHITES, WHOM WE HOPE WILL STAY ON IN AN INDEPENDENT ZIMBABWE,

FOLLOWING IS LETTER FROM PRESIDENT KAUNDA TO THE PRIME MINISTER:

BEGINS

MY DEAR PRIME MINISTER,

AS YOU KNOW, I CONTINUE TO FOLLOW WITH PROFOUND INTEREST THE PROCEEDINGS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS ON THE INDEPENDENCE OF ZIMBABWE. RIGHT FROM THE START, I NEVER THOUGHT THESE NEGOTIATIONS WOULD BE EASY. NEVERTHELESS, I AM SATISFIED WITH THE PROGRESS MADE SO FAR. I HAVE SEEN THE DOCUMENT TABLED BY THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT ON THE INDEPENDENCE CONSTITUTION. I REGARD THIS AS A SERIOUS ATTEMPT TO WORK OUT A DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION WHICH PROVIDES A FOUNDATION FOR A FREE AND INDEPENDENT ZIMBABWE BASED ON GENUINE MAJORITY RULE.

I AM CONFIDENT THAT ALTHOUGH THE NEGOTIATIONS ARE TOUGH, THEY ARE NEVERTHELESS CONSTRUCTIVE AND<sup>D</sup> WILL END IN AN AGREEMENT. I AM IN FULL CONTACT WITH THE PATRIOTIC FRONT AS I AM WITH YOUR GOVERNMENT. THE DOCUMENT TABLED BY THE PATRIOTIC FRONT IN REPLY TO YOURS HAS STRENGTHENED MY CONFIDENCE IN THE SUCCESSFUL OUTCOME IN THE NEGOTIATIONS. I, THEREFORE, WISH TO COMMENT ON SOME ASPECTS OF THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT DOCUMENT:

(A) PRESIDENCY:

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I AM REALLY CONCERNED ABOUT THE PROVISION RELATING TO A CONSTITUTIONAL PRESIDENT WITH AN EXECUTIVE PRIME MINISTER. WHILE THERE MAY BE GOOD REASONS FOR THIS PROVISION, I WOULD URGE YOU TO RE-EXAMINE IT IN THE LIGHT OF PAST EXPERIENCE. ZIMBABWE IS GOING THROUGH A SAVAGE WAR AND IT WILL TAKE A LONG TIME BEFORE PEOPLE ENJOY GENUINE PEACE AND STABILITY. WE SHOULD NOT FORGET WHAT HAPPENED IN NIGERIA WHEN THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT TRIED TO PROVIDE A SIMILAR STRUCTURE AS THE ONE BEING PROPOSED. UNDER CONDITIONS OF INSTABILITY WHERE PEACE IS THREATENED, YOU NEED A STRONG GOVERNMENT IN WHICH POWER IS NOT DIFFUSED. A DECISIVE GOVERNMENT IS THE BEST HOPE FOR ZIMBABWE PARTICULARLY IN THE GREAT TASK OF INTEGRATING THE SECURITY FORCES AFTER INDEPENDENCE. A WEAK GOVERNMENT WILL NOT BE DECISIVE ENOUGH AND WILL LEAD TO FAILURE IN GUARANTEEING SECURITY IN THE COUNTRY. UNDER THESE CONDITIONS THE EXODUS OF WHITES, WHOM WE HOPE WILL STAY ON IN AN INDEPENDENT ZIMBABWE, WILL IN FACT BE A CERTAINTY. IN THE INTERESTS OF STABILITY,

SECURITY IN THE COUNTRY. UNDER THESE CONDITIONS THE EXODUS OF WHITES, WHOM WE HOPE WILL STAY ON IN AN INDEPENDENT ZIMBABWE, WILL IN FACT BE A CERTAINTY. IN THE INTERESTS OF STABILITY, AND IN THE INTEREST OF THE SMOOTH RUNNING OF THE NEW ZIMBABWE GOVERNMENT, I URGE YOU TO SERIOUSLY CONSIDER THE PROPOSAL FOR AN EXECUTIVE PRESIDENT RATHER THAN A CONSTITUTIONAL PRESIDENT. IF YOU DISMISS IT, THEN YOU MAY CHOOSE A PERILOUS PATH.

(B) DECLARATION OF RIGHTS:

WE ALL WANT HUMAN RIGHTS GUARANTEED UNDER THE CONSTITUTION. THIS IS A VERY IMPORTANT PROVISION. HOWEVER, LAND HUNGER IN ZIMBABWE IS REAL - CONSIDERING THAT HALF THE COUNTRY WITH THE BEST SOILS IS UNDER WHITE OWNERSHIP WHILE THE OTHER HALF WITH VERY POOR SOILS IS RESERVED FOR AFRICANS. THIS IS A POTENTIAL SOURCE OF GRAVE INSTABILITY WHICH WILL NEED A DECISIVE GOVERNMENT TO MANAGE. IN OUR VIEW, IT WILL BE DIFFICULT FOR ANY INDEPENDENT GOVERNMENT IN ZIMBABWE TO ACCEPT THE ENTRENCHMENT OF THIS CLAUSE. SUCH GOVERNMENT CANNOT SURVIVE FOR LONG. I CAN ASSURE YOU THAT THE SUFFERERS WILL BE THE WHITES. THE PROVISION ON LAND IS A RECEIPE FOR TROUBLE. I ALSO PROPOSE THAT THE ISSUE OF COMPENSATION SHOULD BE DEALT WITH BY REVIVING THE IDEA OF A ZIMBABWE DEVELOPMENT FUND WHICH WAS IN THE KISSINGER PLAN AND ALSO IN THE ANGLO-AMERICAN PROPOSALS. I BELIEVE THAT THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION WOULD BE HELPFUL AMONG OTHERS INCLUDING AUSTRALIA, CANADA AND SOME EEC MEMBERS IN CONTRIBUTING TO THIS FUND.

(C) THE ISSUE OF PENSIONS IS ALSO IMPORTANT. I PROPOSE THAT THE ZIMBABWE DEVELOPMENT FUND BE USED ALSO TO MEET THE REQUIREMENTS UNDER THIS PROVISION.

(D) I AM ALSO CONCERNED ABOUT THE ROLE OF WHITE REPRESENTATIVES IN PARLIAMENT. IT IS OUR VIEW THAT 20 PER CENT OF THE SEATS RESERVED FOR WHITES SHOULD BE EXCLUSIVELY DESIGNED TO REPRESENT WHITE INTERESTS. THIS IS WHAT THEY WERE SPECIFICALLY INTENDED FOR. THE 20 PER CENT REPRESENTING 3 PER CENT OF THE POPULATION OF ZIMBABWE SHOULD, THEREFORE, NOT BE ALLOWED TO FORM A COALITION WITH ANY OF THE BLACK GROUPS TO FORM A GOVERNMENT IN AN INDEPENDENT ZIMBABWE FOR THIS WOULD AMOUNT TO A NEW BLOCKING MECHANISM.

(E) THE UNANIMITY RULE:

I NOTE WITH CONCERN THAT SOME CLAUSES IN THE CONSTITUTION WILL BE, INTER-ALIA, AMENDABLE ONLY BY A UNANIMOUS VOTE IN THE HOUSE OF ASSEMBLY. THIS I MUST SAY IS ANOTHER FORM OF BLOCKING

I WOULD LIKE TO NOTE WITH CONCERN THAT SOME CLAUSES IN THE CONSTITUTION WILL BE, INTER-ALIA, AMENDABLE ONLY BY A UNANIMOUS VOTE IN THE HOUSE OF ASSEMBLY. THIS, I MUST SAY, IS ANOTHER FORM OF BLOCKING MECHANISM WHICH I URGE YOU TO RECONSIDER. I THINK THAT IF THE PATRIOTIC FRONT SHOULD ACCEPT 70 PER CENT PROVISION FOR THE AMENDMENT OF THE CONSTITUTION INSTEAD OF TWO-THIRDS WHICH THEY HAVE DEMANDED, THIS SHOULD BE ACCEPTED AS A REASONABLE COMPROMISE TO COVER ALL CLAUSES.

(F) FINALLY, THERE IS THE QUESTION OF THE LINKAGE BETWEEN AGREEMENT ON THE CONSTITUTION AND AGREEMENT ON THE TRANSITIONAL ARRANGEMENTS. I WELCOME THIS AS A FIRM UNDERTAKING BY ALL SIDES THAT AGREEMENT ON THE CONSTITUTION WOULD BE CONTINGENT UPON AGREEMENT ON TRANSITIONAL ARRANGEMENTS. THIS IS AN EXTREMELY IMPORTANT POINT.

LOOKING AT THE OUTSTANDING POINTS, IT IS CLEAR TO ME THAT SOME OF THE ISSUES WHICH REMAIN UNRESOLVED WOULD EASILY FALL AWAY IF AGREEMENT WAS REACHED ON THE TRANSITIONAL ARRANGEMENTS. I, THEREFORE, WANT TO URGE YOU TO CONSIDER CAREFULLY THE PROPOSAL THAT IF YOU ARE NOT AT THIS STAGE ABLE TO COMPLETE THE DISCUSSIONS ON THE CONSTITUTION OR ARE UNABLE TO MEET THE RESERVATIONS OF THE PATRIOTIC FRONT, YOU MOVE TO THE TRANSITIONAL ARRANGEMENTS WHERE SOME OF THE FEARS OF THE PATRIOTIC FRONT WILL BE DISPELLED AND RESERVATIONS WILL FALL AWAY.

LET ME EMPHASIZE THAT THE AREAS OF AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT AND THE PATRIOTIC FRONT ARE VERY WIDE INDEED. AGREEMENT THAT THERE SHOULD BE A DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION AND FREE ELECTIONS BEFORE INDEPENDENCE IS VITAL. I AM IMPRESSED BY THIS PROGRESS. WE SHOULD, THEREFORE, LOOK VERY CLOSELY AT THE FEW REMAINING AREAS OF DISPUTE. AS YOU WILL RECALL ISSUES LIKE CITIZENSHIP HAD GIVEN THE PATRIOTIC FRONT GREAT CAUSE FOR CONCERN BUT THIS MAY NO LONGER BE A CRUCIAL ISSUE. THEY ARE WORRIED ABOUT THE PUBLIC SERVICE BUT A POSSIBLE FORMULA CAN BE FOUND TO ELIMINATE THIS AREA OF DIFFERENCE. IN MY VIEW, THE AREAS WHICH I HAVE OUTLINED, IF MET, WOULD LEAD TO AGREEMENT ON THE CONSTITUTION AND WOULD THUS PAVE THE WAY FOR THE NEGOTIATIONS ON THE TRANSITIONAL ARRANGEMENTS. THIS IS SIGNIFICANT PROGRESS.

LET ME ALSO REFER TO THE RECENT RAIDS BY THE REBEL RHODESIAN FORCES INTO MOZAMBIQUE. I WANT TO EMPHASIZE HOW DANGEROUS THESE RAIDS ARE. THEY COULD EASILY HAVE WRECKED THE LONDON CONFERENCE AND I WANT TO ASSURE YOU THAT CREDIT GOES TO THE PATRIOTIC FRONT WHO DID NOT WALK OUT AND TO PRESIDENT SAMORA MACHIL WHO EXERCISED THE GREATEST RESTRAINT DURING ONE OF THE WORST CRISES MOZAMBIQUE HAS EVER FACED.

EVER FACED.

I HAD SENT A MESSAGE TO YOUR GOVERNMENT FIRMLY STATING THAT NO ONE SHOULD TAKE THE CO-OPERATION OF FRONTLINE STATES AND INDEED THE PATRIOTIC FRONT FOR GRANTED DURING THESE NEGOTIATIONS. THE PATRIOTIC FRONT WILL NOT WALK OUT OF THE LONDON CONFERENCE. THEY WILL NOT BE THE ONES TO BREAK THE CONFERENCE BUT PROVOCATION SUCH AS THE RECENT RAIDS ON MOZAMBIQUE COUPLED WITH SILENCE FROM LONDON CERTAINLY COULD ACHIEVE THAT PURPOSE. NO ONE WANTS THIS TO HAPPEN, LEAST OF ALL COMMONWEALTH COUNTRIES WHO DECLARED THEIR SUPPORT FOR THE CURRENT INITIATIVE IN LONDON.

SO I URGE YOU AND YOUR GOVERNMENT TO ORDER BISHOP MUZOREWA TO END HIS ATTACKS ON NEIGHBOURING COUNTRIES. FAILURE TO DO THAT WILL DEFINITELY JEOPARDIZE THE CONFERENCE. I DO NOT WANT THIS TO HAPPEN.

ZAMBIA REMAINS COMMITTED TO THE PRINCIPLES ENUNCIATED IN THE COMMONWEALTH DECLARATION ON RHODESIA. WE AGREED TO FIND AN INTERNATIONALLY ACCEPTED SOLUTION TO THE RHODESIAN PROBLEM. I BELIEVE THAT THE LONDON CONFERENCE IS AIMED AT THIS OBJECTIVE. IF THERE SHOULD BE ANY CHANGE, THEN, OF COURSE, WE CAN EXPECT THAT THE FRONTLINE STATES, THE O.A.U. AND OTHER MEMBERS OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY WILL NOT ACCEPT SUCH A SOLUTION. I HAVE TOLD YOU THAT THE PATRIOTIC FRONT WILL NOT WALK OUT OF LONDON REGARDLESS OF ANY PRESSURES PUT ON THEM THROUGH THE ATTACKS LAUNCHED AGAINST THEM IN NEIGHBOURING COUNTRIES OR THOSE APPLIED DIRECTLY TO GET THEM TO ACCEPT THE BRITISH DOCUMENT WHICH STILL REQUIRES FURTHER NEGOTIATIONS. IT IS MY HOPE, THEREFORE, THAT BRITAIN WILL NOT IGNORE PROPOSALS PUT FORWARD BY PEOPLE WHO HAVE BEEN INVOLVED IN NEGOTIATIONS OVER THE INDEPENDENCE OF ZIMBABWE FOR MORE THAN 20 YEARS.

FOR OUR PART, WE WILL CONTINUE TO PLAY OUR ROLE OF ASSISTING BRITAIN DISCHARGE HER INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATION. I ALSO PRAY THAT WE BUILD A SPIRIT OF RECONCILIATION INTO THE BLOOD SYSTEM OF THE NEW LEADERSHIP AND NOT RESENTMENT WHICH WILL LEAD THEM TO TAKE ACTION AGAINST THOSE WHO MAY BELIEVE THAT THEY ARE BEING PROTECTED. STATEMENTS FROM SOME BRITISH OFFICIALS DO NOT SEEM TO ME TO BE HELPFUL IN MAKING THE SPIRIT OF RECONCILIATION, THE LIFE BLOOD OF THE NEW ZIMBABWE LEADERSHIP. I SEE A DISTINCT POSSIBILITY THAT IN PLACE OF RECONCILIATION, YOU WILL BUILD A SPIRIT OF VENGEANCE. GOD FORBID. I PRAY THAT MY ADVICE WILL BE TAKEN AS ONE FROM A FRIEND TRYING TO HELP ANOTHER TO SUCCEED.



BY THE WAY, MARK CHONA WILL HAVE TOLD YOU HOW IMPRESSED I WAS BY LORD CARRINGTON'S ADDRESS AT THE UNITED NATIONS IN REFERENCE TO THE MIDDLE EAST AND THE IMPORTANCE OF THE PLO IN THE SEARCH FOR A LASTING AND JUST SOLUTION TO THE CONFLICT. IT IS MY SINCERE HOPE THAT WE CAN FACE UP TO THE REALITY OF THE MIDDLE EAST AND WORK TOWARDS ESTABLISHING A PALESTINIAN STATE SO THAT THE MILLIONS OF THE PALESTINIAN REFUGEES CAPABLE OF BUILDING THEIR OWN NATION CAN HAVE A HOME TO RETURN TO AND CONTRIBUTE TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF PEACE AND STABILITY IN THE AREA. THE STATEMENT HAS ADDED MY CONFIDENCE THAT YOU CAN FACE UP TO THE REALITIES OF ZIMBABWE. I HOPE YOU CAN.

MAY I END BY WISHING YOU A SUCCESSFUL CONFERENCE AT BLACKPOOL.

AS ALWAYS,

KENNETH D. KAUNDA  
PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF ZAMBIA

ENDS.

ALLINSON

NNNN

X-27

[RHODESIA: POLICY: ADVANCE COPIES]

PS  
PS/SIR I GILMOUR  
PS/MR LUCE  
PS/PUS  
SIR A DUFF  
MR WILLSON  
MR BYATT  
LORD N G LENNOX

PS/NO 10 DOWNING STREET

MR R L WADE-GERY )  
MR P M MAXEY )  
COL MOIR ) CABINET  
MR P J FOWLER ) OFFICE  
DIO )

*M.D.A.S.* .....

HD/RHODESIA DEPT (3)

HD/C AF D

HD/S AF D

HD/PUSD (2)

HD/NEWS DEPT

HD/WAD

MR FREELAND LEGAL ADVISER RM K200A

MR FIFOOT LEGAL ADVISER RM K164

RESIDENT CLERK

**ADVANCE COPY**

**FLASH**

FM LUSAKA 101910Z OCT 79

TO FLASH FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1065 OF 10 OCTOBER

INFOR IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, DAR ES SALAAM, PRETORIA, GABORONE,  
MAPUTO, PRIORITY LUANDA, UKMIS NEW YORK, LAGOS.

RHODESIA

PRESIDENT KAUNDA SUMMONED ME THIS EVENING TO HAND ME A LETTER FOR THE PRIME MINISTER, ADDING THAT HE HAD TOLD HER OVER THE PHONE IT WAS COMING. HE WOULD LIKE YOU TO SEE IT FIRST THING IN THE MORNING.

2. KAUNDA EMPHASISED TWO POINTS: THE NEED FOR AN EXECUTIVE PRESIDENT AND THE NEED TO TAKE LAND OUT OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS. HOWEVER HE ADMITTED THAT HE NOW UNDERSTOOD (FROM YOUR SPEECH IN TODAY'S VERBATIM SERVICE WHICH I HAD SENT TO CHONA THIS AFTERNOON) THAT PF'S OBJECTIONS ON THE PRESIDENCY HAD BEEN MODIFIED. NEVERTHELESS HE THOUGHT IT ESSENTIAL FOR THE FUTURE THAT THERE WAS A STRONG LEADER WHO DID NOT NEED TO LOOK OVER HIS SHOULDER AT ANOTHER POWER CENTRE. OTHERWISE THE PROBLEM OF NIGERIA WOULD BE REPEATED.

OF NIGERIA WOULD BE REPEATED.

3. ON THE PRESIDENCY I SAID I TOOK HIS POINT BUT WE WERE NOT STARTING FROM SCRATCH AND HAD TO STICK TO WHAT COULD BE AGREED. THERE WERE TWO SIDES WHO HAD TO BE RECONCILED. THE PRESIDENT SAID THAT HE THOUGHT HE SHOULD MAKE THE POINT FOR THE RECORD.
4. ON LAND I REFERRED TO YOUR REMARKS ABOUT A FUND. I ALSO REFERRED TO THE NEED TO REASSURE THE WHITE COMMUNITY. I WENT ON TO STRESS THE NEED FOR A SPEEDY AGREEMENT TO THE CONSTITUTION. SMITH COULD SO EASILY MAKE TROUBLE. WE NEEDED TO GET ON TO THE NEXT STAGE.
5. HERE THE CONVERSATION WHICH WAS THROUGHOUT RELAXED AND FRIENDLY IN TONE EXCEPT WHEN I ASKED CHONA WHEN HE WAS RETURNING TO LONDON AND HE SAID, ALBEIT WITH WHAT PASSED FOR A SMILE, PERHAPS HE WOULD NOT IF YOU BROKE UP THE CONFERENCE. I SAID THAT ON THE CONTRARY WE HAD EVERY HOPE, WITH ZAMBIA'S HELP, OF MAKING PROGRESS.
6. WISNER, THE US AMBASSADOR, HAS ALSO BEEN SUMMONED ALMOST CERTAINLY TO RECEIVE A LETTER FOR PRESIDENT CARTER.
7. CHONA HAD CALLED IN WISNER AGAIN THIS AFTERNOON TO REINFORCE THE OAD TO HELP THE PF ON THE LINES OUTLINED IN MY TELNO 1062. HE NOW REVEALED THAT THE PRESIDENT, THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE AND THE CABINET HAD MET ON SATURDAY NIGHT AND WERE VERY ALARMED ABOUT BRITISH ARROGANCE AND INTRANSIGENCE. WISNER THEN REFERRED HIM TO YOUR SPEECH WHICH CHONA HAD NOT AT THAT POINT YET READ.
8. I BELIEVE THAT THE CALMER ATMOSPHERE THIS EVENING REFLECTS KAUNDA'S REALISATION THAT CHONA HAD BEEN FEEDING HIM OUT OF DATE INFORMATION. HE IS CLEAR THAT KASANEI, WITH WHOM I HAVE BEEN IN CLOSE TOUCH, HAD NOT MANAGED TO RELAY PROGRESS EFFECTIVELY TO STATE HOUSE. THE PRESIDENT HIMSELF HAS KEPT HIMSELF INACCESSIBLE OWING TO PREOCCUPATION WITH THE PARTY CONFERENCE.
9. I VIEW OF THE BARRIERS WHICH KAUNDA HAS ALLOWED TO BE ERECTED ROUND AND WHICH HINDERS HIS UNDERSTANDING OF THE PROGRESS BEING MADE. IT WOULD BE HELPFUL IF YOUR RESPONSE WAS COUCHED IN TERMS REQUIRING ME TO COMMUNICATE THEM PERSONALLY TO HIM.
10. SEE MIFT.

ALLINSON

CONFIDENTIAL

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FM MIRIMBA SALISBURY 100845Z OCT 79.

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 732 OF 10 OCTOBER

INFO PRIORITY PRETORIA

*Prime Minister*

YOUR TELNO 224: RHODESIA: REACTIONS OF OFFICIALS

1. I REPORTED IN PARA 4 OF MY TELNO 731 THE VIEWS OF THE FORCE COMMANDERS. IN CALLS ON THE SECRETARIES OF THE MINISTRIES OF COMMERCE AND INDUSTRY AND FINANCE YESTERDAY I ASKED ABOUT THE REACTIONS OF THEIR STAFF TO OUR PROPOSALS AND TO SMITH'S PRESS CONFERENCE.
2. BAKER (COMMERCE AND INDUSTRY) TOLD ME THAT THERE WAS SOME DISQUIET IN THE MIDDLE AND LOWER RANKS OF HIS WHITE STAFF THAT OUR PROVISION FOR GENERAL POLICY DIRECTIONS TO THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION WOULD ADVERSELY AFFECT THEIR LONG TERM PROMOTION PROSPECTS. HE HIMSELF BELIEVED THAT CONSTITUTIONAL SAFEGUARDS IN THIS AREA WERE OF NO PARTICULAR VALUE, SINCE EVERYTHING WOULD DEPEND ON THE POLITICAL COMPLEXION OF FUTURE GOVERNMENTS, AND THAT A SUCCESSFUL SETTLEMENT WOULD WITH ANY LUCK LEAD TO AN EXPANDING ECONOMY AND A DEARTH OF QUALITY STAFF, BLACK OR WHITE, FOR SOME YEARS. HE BELIEVED HE HAD HAD SOME SUCCESS IN GETTING THIS VIEW ACROSS. CONCERN OVER THE SECURITY OF PENSIONS WAS, HOWEVER, DEEPLY INGRAINED: ANYTHING WE COULD DO TO ASSUAGE THIS CONCERN WOULD BE VALUABLE. I DREW ATTENTION TO THE RELEVANT PROVISIONS IN OUR PROPOSALS AND EXPLAINED THE DIFFICULTY ABOUT ANY GUARANTEE.
3. YOUNG (FINANCE) SAID THERE WAS NO REAL PROBLEM ABOUT MORALE IN HIS MINISTRY: THE STAFF ALL TRUSTED THEIR MINISTER - DAVID SMITH. HE WENT ON TO TELL ME THAT HE DID NOT BELIEVE THAT IAN SMITH ANY LONGER REPRESENTED THE MAJORITY OF WHITE VIEW. INDEED, HE BELIEVED THAT SUPPORT FOR THE RHODESIA FRONT WAS SLIPPING AND THAT IF THERE WERE A FURTHER ELECTION THE MODERATE OPPOSITION WOULD PICK UP SUBSTANTIALLY MORE THAN THEIR CUSTOMARY 20 TO 25 PERCENT OF THE VOTE.

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# CONFIDENTIAL

4. IN A DISCUSSION YESTERDAY AFTERNOON THE COMMISSIONER OF POLICE INDICATED THAT THERE WAS SOME CONCERN IN HIS FORCE ABOUT OUR PROVISIONS FOR DIRECTIVES TO ACHIEVE AFRICANISATION BUT THAT, AGAIN, THE MAIN SOURCE OF ANXIETY WAS PENSIONS. ALLUM SAID THAT IT WOULD BE PARTICULARLY HELPFUL TO HIM TO KNOW WHAT WE INTENDED SHOULD HAPPEN TO THE INCENTIVE SCHEME FOR SPECIAL PENSIONS CONTAINED IN THE THIRD SCHEDULE TO THE PRESENT CONSTITUTION. HE EXPECTED TO BE QUESTIONED ABOUT THIS. HE BELIEVES THAT ANY SUGGESTION THAT THE SCHEME MIGHT LAPSE COULD HAVE VERY SERIOUS CONSEQUENCES. (THE ARMY COMMANDER MADE THE SAME POINT TO ME LESS FORCEFULLY.) I REPLIED THAT WE HAD NO INTENTION OF INTERFERING WITH THE SCHEME, BUT THAT I WAS NOT SURE WHETHER IT WOULD FEATURE IN OUR NEW CONSTITUTION AND IF NOT WHAT OTHER LEGISLATIVE ARRANGEMENTS WE HAD IN MIND. IS THERE ANYTHING MORE THAT I CAN TELL THEM ON THIS POINT?

BYATT

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MR DAY  
MR WILLSON  
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ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION  
RHODESIA POLICY

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FM DAR ES SALAAM 101100Z OCTOBER 79

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 799 OF 10 OCTOBER

INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK, LUSAKA, MAPUTO,  
GABORONE, LUANDA, LAGOS, PRETORIA

*Prime Minister*

RHODESIA: CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE

1. PRESIDENT NYERERE SUMMONED ME AGAIN AT NOON TODAY 10 OCTOBER. HE Began BY SAYING THAT OF COURSE HE DID NOT EXPECT YOU TO ACCEPT THE PF PROPOSALS AS THEY STOOD, BUT HE HOPED VERY MUCH WE WOULD NOT ADOPT A "TAKE IT OR LEAVE IT" ATTITUDE. HE ADDED THAT SINCE OUR MEETING ON 4 OCTOBER (MY TELNO 786) HE HAD READ THE TEXT OF YOUR BBC TELEVISION INTERVIEW ON 3 OCTOBER, WHICH I HAD SENT TO HIM, AND WAS ENTIRELY SATISFIED THAT THAT HAD NOT BEEN YOUR ATTITUDE ON THAT OCCASION.

2. BASING HIMSELF ON THE PROPOSALS TABLED BY THE PF IN THE CONFERENCE NYERERE WENT ON TO MENTION A NUMBER OF ISSUES WHERE HE THOUGHT THAT THE PF "HAD A CASE". HE SAID THAT HE DID SO BECAUSE HE WANTED TO SEE AGREEMENT ON THE CONSTITUTION SO THAT THE CONFERENCE COULD MOVE ON TO THE MUCH MORE IMPORTANT MATTER OF IMPLEMENTATION. HE SAID THAT THE VIEWS HE WAS EXPRESSING WERE HIS OWN.

3. ON CITIZENSHIP, HE THOUGHT THAT THE PF WERE JUSTIFIED IN RESISTING AUTOMATIC CITIZENSHIP FOR THOSE WHO HAD ARRIVED IN RHODESIA AFTER UDI. MOREOVER HE THOUGHT IT WAS SOMEWHAT CONTRADICTIONARY ON OUR PART TO BE INSISTING ON AUTOMATIC CITIZENSHIP AND AT THE SAME TIME TO INSIST ON A RIGHT TO RETAIN DUAL CITIZENSHIP.

4. HE REALISED THAT THERE HAD TO BE PROVISIONS ON LAND OF THE KIND WE HAD PUT IN THE CONSTITUTION: NO CONSTITUTION WITHOUT SUCH PROVISIONS WOULD GET THROUGH THE BRITISH PARLIAMENT. WE MUST HOWEVER UNDERSTAND HOW IMPORTANT THIS ISSUE WAS TO THE PF AND WE SHOULD TRY TO HELP THEM. HE URGED AGAIN CONSIDERATION OF THE IDEA OF A LAND FUND. CONFIDENTIAL / 5. HE ALSO

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5. HE ALSO THOUGHT THAT THE PF HAD A CASE ON THE QUESTION OF AN EXECUTIVE HEAD OF STATE, AND HE THOUGHT THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT SHOULD BE ABLE TO MEET THEM ON THIS "WITHOUT RUNNING INTO TROUBLE".

6. NYERERE ENDED BY SAYING THAT HE UNDERSTOOD OUR POSITION ON THE NEED TO GET THE CONSTITUTION ACCEPTED AS A FIRST STEP. HE HOPED THAT THERE WERE AREAS WHERE WE COULD SAY "YES" TO THE PF. HE THOUGHT THAT THEY MIGHT HAVE TO ENTER RESERVATIONS AND HE DREW ATTENTION TO MUZOREWA'S STATEMENT MAKING HIS ACCEPTANCE OF THE CONSTITUTION CONDITIONAL ON THE LIFTING OF SANCTIONS. I EXPLAINED THAT YOUR POSITION WAS THAT THERE COULD NOT BE RESERVATIONS ON THE TERMS AS SUCH OF THE CONSTITUTION. (IN SPEAKING OF "RESERVATIONS" I UNDERSTAND NYERERE TO MEAN PUTTING OBJECTIONS ON THE RECORD RATHER THAN RESERVING THE RIGHT TO REOPEN CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES IN THE CONFERENCE).

7. I GAVE NYERERE THE TEXT OF YOUR STATEMENT IN THE CONFERENCE ON 9 OCTOBER (VERBATIM SERVICE 064/79). HE WAS UNDER TIME PRESSURE AND DID NOT READ THE TEXT IN FULL BUT I DREW HIS ATTENTION TO WHAT YOU HAD SAID ON THE ISSUES HE HAD RAISED AND HE WILL CERTAINLY READ THE FULL TEXT MOST CAREFULLY AS SOON AS HE HAS THE OPPORTUNITY. I POINTED OUT THAT FROM THE FINAL TWO SENTENCES OF PARA 9 OF THE TEXT I SEEMED THAT THE PF WERE SHOWING FLEXIBILITY ON THE QUESTION OF THE EXECUTIVE PRESIDENT. I ALSO DREW HIS ATTENTION TO PARA 18 STRESSING PARTICULARLY YOUR JUDGEMENT THAT THE PROPOSALS PUT FORWARD ARE "THE ONLY BASIS ON WHICH IT IS NOW POSSIBLE TO REACH FULL AGREEMENT". I REMINDED HIM AGAIN THAT OUR PROBLEM WAS THAT WE HAD TO TRY TO SATISFY AND BE FAIR TO TWO SIDES.

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8. NYERERE WAS THROUGHOUT STUDIEDLY MODERATE IN WHAT HE SAID AND GAVE THE IMPRESSION OF CONTINUING TO HAVE FULL CONFIDENCE IN OUR INTENTIONS.

9. I HAVE ONLY JUST RECEIVED YOUR TELNO 829 TO LUSAKA.

MOON

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*Rhodri*

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10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

10 October 1979

Telephone conversation between the Prime Minister and President Kaunda on 10 October

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As you know, the Prime Minister spoke to President Kaunda, at the latter's request, on the telephone this afternoon.

President Kaunda's purpose in arranging the telephone call was to tell the Prime Minister that he was anxious about the "take it or leave it" attitude that seemed to be creeping into the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary's running of the Conference. He expressed concern about the "ultimatum" that Lord Carrington had given to the leaders of the Patriotic Front. He had sent a letter to the Prime Minister which should arrive early tomorrow morning.

The Prime Minister in reply noted that the Conference had already lasted five weeks and that she and Lord Carrington had just been criticized by the speakers at the Conservative Party Conference for not keeping up the momentum. In response to a comment from President Kaunda to the effect that the spirit of co-operation should continue and should not be replaced by a spirit of confrontation, the Prime Minister said that she and Lord Carrington had kept to the letter of the Lusaka communique. The conversation ended with expressions of mutual goodwill.

I have undertaken to ensure that the text of the letter from President Kaunda is passed to Blackpool as rapidly as possible. Assuming the text arrives in the form of a telegram from Sir L. Allinson, I should be grateful if you could arrange for it to be brought over here as soon as it is received.

M. O'D. B. ALEXANDER

Roderic Lyne, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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28

PRIME MINISTER'S

PERSONAL MESSAGE

SERIAL No. T113/79T.

T113/79T  
RECORD OF A TELEPHONE CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER  
AND KENNETH KAUNDA ON 10 OCTOBER 1979

---

President Kaunda: Hello

Prime Minister: Hello Kenneth, hello, I can only just hear you.  
How are you?

President Kaunda: Very well indeed thank you. And how are you  
there.

Prime Minister: I'm fine. We've just come out of our Rhodesia  
debate and I'm afraid we had a very rough ride. But still we  
got through on the basis of Lusaka and we were told to get on  
with the job.

President Kaunda: Very good. Margaret, I have written to you  
and this letter should be reaching you I hope sometime early  
tomorrow morning.

Prime Minister: Sometime early tomorrow morning, I shall expect  
a letter from you or a communication.

President Kaunda: I am a bit anxious about what has been so far  
in my opinion a very successful beginning of the Conference.

Prime Minister: Yes, you're anxious now about what Kenneth?

President Kaunda: I'm a bit worried about the sort of take it  
or leave it attitude, Margaret. That has worried me very much  
from Peter to Joshua and Robert.

Prime Minister: Well, I think we're very nearly there Kenneth.  
It will be five weeks at the end of this week and we've really  
just been ticked off that we're letting it go on in the way Geneva  
did, and not keeping up the momentum.

/President Kaunda

President Kaunda: Well really you know you have our fullest support in terms of the <sup>Lusaka</sup> spirit and Margaret I would beg that you know, the spirit of co-operation should continue instead of confrontation.

Prime Minister: Yes, well I must say I think Peter has handled this very well. We've sort of kept to the letter of the Lusaka communique.

President Kaunda: Certainly I appreciate his handling of the Conference Margaret. I've said so in my letter. I have also said that it is what I consider to be a very good statement on the Middle East at your end for which we are most grateful indeed. But I just wanted to draw attention to my anxieties. It is more anxiety than anything else Margaret.

Prime Minister: Yes, well I think they are nearly there on the Constitution because they have been at it for five weeks, which is quite a long time. But anyway we will look out for the letter tomorrow morning. I will get it up here immediately and Lord Carrington will see it simultaneously.

President Kaunda: Thank you very much indeed.

Prime Minister: Alright.

President Kaunda: Alright, thank you Margaret.


Prime Minister: Thank you very much for phoning. Much appreciated.

President Kaunda: I appreciate it as well.

Prime Minister: Thank you. Good-bye.

President Kaunda: Good-bye now, God bless.

Prime Minister: Good-bye Kenneth.

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to be 'Rush', is located in the bottom right corner of the page.

POINTS PRESIDENT KAUNDA IS LIKELY TO RAISE WITH PRIME MINISTER

1. Executive Presidency

Kaunda may argue that a strong government is necessary, bearing in mind what happened in Nigeria and other countries, and the problem of integrating the forces, shifting coalitions, etc.

Answer: In the constitutional proposals which the Patriotic Front tabled yesterday, they accepted a "constitutional" Presidency. We welcomed the flexibility the Patriotic Front have shown on this. We believe that the system we have proposed offers the best prospect of stability and reconciliation. It is open to the people of Zimbabwe to choose a different system in due course through constitutional amendment.

2. Land

The Patriotic Front are opposed to entrenched clauses on purchase of land.

Answer: Scope in our proposals for African land settlement schemes on payment of reasonable compensation. We and almost certainly other aid donors prepared to assist projects to develop African farming, eg through an Agricultural Development Corporation.

3. Pensions

Patriotic Front also opposed to entrenched protection of public service pensions.

Answer: Essential and common element of all attempts to solve Rhodesia problem.

4. Danger of Coalition between white MPs and a <sup>minority</sup> majority African group

Answer: Dealt with yesterday. The 20 white MPs will not be able to form such a coalition to frustrate majority wishes.

5. Transitional Arrangements

It is accepted that agreement by the Patriotic Front on a Constitution is conditional on agreement on arrangements to bring it into effect.

THREE POINTS TO NOTE ON ZAMBIA

1. The Prime Minister should be aware that President Kaunda is having his own party conference. He has just made a six-hour major speech (on 8 October).
2. Kaunda may express sympathy on the death of Sir Evelyn Home - last Governor-General of Northern Rhodesia.
3. On 19 September we signed an agreement to provide 130,000 tons of maize to Zambia.

GR 500

UNCLASSIFIED

FM PRETORIA 100935Z OCT

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TEL NO 688 96 10/10/79

INFO IMMEDIATE MIRIMBA SALISBURY

MY TELS NOS 682,686 AND 687: RHODESIA

1. BEELD THIS MORNING CARRIES AN OBVIOUSLY AUTHORITATIVE LEADING ARTICLE OF WHICH THE FOLLOWING IS OUR TRANSLATION:-

US AND RHODESIA

IF THINGS GO OFF THE RAILS IN RHODESIA, THE FUTURE OF THE WHOLE OF SOUTHERN AFRICA WILL BE IRREVOCABLY CALLED IN QUESTION. SOUTH AFRICA COULD THEN FIND THAT SHE HAD NO OTHER CHOICE THAN TO INTERVENE MILITARILY IN ORDER TO SAFEGUARD HER OWN INTERESTS.

IF A MODERATE BLACK GOVERNMENT CAN STAY IN POWER THERE IS A GOOD CHANCE THAT THE COUNTRIES OF THE SUB CONTINENT CAN GROUP THEMSELVES TOGETHER AND THUS GAIN CONTROL OF THEIR OWN DEVELOPMENT AND DESTINY. LET RHODESIA FALL AND THEN ONLY SOME ENCLAVES OF WESTERN INFLUENCE WILL SURVIVE.

FOR SOUTH AFRICA THIS WILL MEAN FOR THE FIRST TIME THAT THE CONFLICT IN SOUTHERN AFRICA WILL SPILL OVER OUR OWN BORDERS, WITH CALAMITOUS CONSEQUENCES FOR OUR STABILITY AND ECONOMIC WELFARE. FOR THE AFRIKANER IT COULD WELL MEAN THE BEGINNING OF THE "THIRD FREEDOM WAR" A WAR TO DECIDE OUR VERY SURVIVAL.

AT THIS MOMENT, THERE ARE TWO DEVELOPMENTS WHICH SOUTH AFRICA CANNOT CONCEIVABLY PERMIT-

(I) THAT THE WHITE VOTERS OF RHODESIA SHOULD BE WHIPPED UP AGAINST THE LATEST SETTLEMENT PLAN, AND

/ (II) THAT

(11) THAT POLITICAL WEAKNESS ON THE BRITISH SIDE SHOULD LEAD TO THE COUNTRY BEING HANDED OVER ON A PLATTER TO THE PATRIOTIC FRONT. IF THE WHITES SHOULD LEAVE RHODESIA ON A LARGE SCALE IT WOULD MEAN THE END OF MODERATION AND STABILITY. AND IF THE PATRIOTIC FRONT SHOULD TAKE OVER, RUSSIA WOULD GET A STRONGHOLD ON ALL THE PEOPLES OF OUR PART OF THE WORLD.

IF SUCH A SITUATION SHOULD EVER ARISE, MINISTER PIK BOTHA HAS ALREADY WARNED THAT PARLIAMENT WOULD HAVE TO BE RECALLED TO CONSIDER THE SITUATION. IN BLUNT LANGUAGE THIS MEANS THAT SOUTH AFRICA WILL HAVE TO DECIDE IF SHE IS GOING TO SEND IN TROOPS TO ENSURE THAT A DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT REMAINS IN POWER.

FOR THE FUTURE OF SOUTH AFRICA A RHODESIAN CRISIS IS MUCH MORE DANGEROUS THAN THE PREVIOUS CRISIS IN ANGOLA.

LEAHY

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MR WILLSON  
MR ASPIN

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION  
RHODESIA POLICY

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FM FCO 091651Z OCT 79

TO PRIORITY CANBERRA

TELEGRAM NUMBER 480 OF 9 OCTOBER

INFO PRIORITY MIRIMBA SALISBURY, LUSAKA, DAR ES SALAAM,  
MAPUTO, LAGOS, GABORONE, PRETORIA, LUANDA, WASHINGTON, OTTAWA,  
WELLINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK.

RHODESIA.

1. COOK (AUSTRALIA HOUSE) TELEPHONED DUFF THIS AFTERNOON ABOUT  
A TELEGRAM HE HAD RECEIVED FROM CANBERRA LAST NIGHT.

CANBERRA APPEARED TO BE ALARMED ABOUT THE WAY THE  
CONFERENCE WAS GOING, PARTLY AS A RESULT OF PRESS REPORTS AND  
PARTLY (COOK BELIEVED) AS A RESULT OF THE REPORT BY THE  
AUSTRALIAN HIGH COMMISSIONER IN DAR ON HIS INTERVIEW WITH  
NYERERE (WHICH AUSTRALIA HOUSE HAD ALREADY SHOWN US).

CANBERRA ASKED FOR AN ASSESSMENT OF THE CONSTITUTION  
BEFORE THEY CONSIDERED QUOTE WHAT FURTHER ACTION  
WE MIGHT TAKE UNQUOTE:

I.E. PRESUMABLY WITH OTHER GOVERNMENTS.

2. DUFF TOLD COOK THAT HE COULD ASSURE CANBERRA THAT QUOTE  
OUR ASSESSMENT, SUPPORTED BY SOME EVIDENCE, WAS THAT THE  
PATRIOTIC FRONT WOULD FIND A WAY OF ACCEPTING THE CONSTITUTION,  
ALTHOUGH IT MIGHT TAKE THEM UNTIL MONDAY TO DO SO UNQUOTE.  
HE SAID THAT THIS ASSESSMENT APPLIED TO BOTH WINGS OF THE PF,  
ALTHOUGH WE THOUGHT THAT ZAPU WAS MORE READY TO ACCEPT THAN ZANU.

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3. COOK SAID THAT HE HAD HIMSELF BEEN REPORTING IN THE SAME SENSE. HE SPECULATED THAT PART OF CANBERRA'S ANXIETY MIGHT BE A REFLECTION OF MR. FRASER WANTING TO GET BACK IN THE ACT. FOR YOUR INFORMATION, WE HAVE ALREADY HAD SOME IDEAS ON THIS OURSELVES.

CARRINGTON

## FILES

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FM PRETORIA 091555Z OCT 79

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 687 OF 9 OCTOBER

INFO IMMEDIATE MIRIMBA SALISBURY

INFO PRIORITY LUSAKA DAR ES SALAAM MAPUTO GABORONE LUANDA LAGOS

WASHINGTON UKMIS NEW YORK.

M I P T

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT:-

BEGINS.

THE LATEST INDICATIONS ON DEVELOPMENTS AT THE LONDON CONFERENCE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL FUTURE OF ZIMBABWE RHODESIA AROUSE GREAT CONCERN. THEY THREATEN THE STABILITY AND PROGRESS OF THE COUNTRIES OF SOUTHERN AFRICA. AT THE START OF THE CONFERENCE THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT ADOPTED THE STANDPOINT THAT NONE OF THE CONTENDING PARTIES WOULD BE PERMITTED TO VETO A CONSTITUTIONAL SETTLEMENT. FROM THIS STANDPOINT IT WAS CLEAR THAT IF THE PATRIOTIC FRONT WERE NOT TO ACCEPT THE PROPOSALS, THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT WOULD BE COMMITTED TO LENDING THE NECESSARY SUPPORT TO DEMOCRATIC ORDER AS REPRESENTED BY THE GOVERNMENT OF BISHOP MUZOREWA.

AS THE CONFERENCE HAS PROGRESSED AND THE PATRIOTIC FRONT HAVE BEEN ALLOWED TO FORCE CHANGES, A DARK SHADOW HAS GROWN OVER A SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION TO THE NEGOTIATIONS.

SEVERAL COUNTRIES WITH MILLIONS OF INHABITANTS ARE MOST CLOSELY AFFECTED BY THE COURSE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS IN LONDON.

THE CONTINUATION OF SANCTIONS AGAINST THE ZAMBABWE RHODESIA GOVERNMENT HAS FOR A LONG TIME BEEN NO LONGER JUSTIFIABLE. IT IS NO LONGER A POLITICAL QUESTION BUT A MORAL NECESSITY THAT SANCTIONS BE LIFTED. THEY AFFECT EVERY MAN, WOMAN AND CHILD. THE LAND AND ITS PEOPLE ARE JUSTIFIED IN DEMANDING THAT SANCTIONS BE LIFTED IMMEDIATELY.

/IT

IT WILL BE RECALLED THAT AT THE BEGINNING OF THE CONFERENCE I SAID THAT IT APPEARED TO US LIKE A RUGBY GAME WHICH MUST BE PLAYED OVER AND OVER UNTIL THE WINNERS LOSE . IT IS STILL NOT TOO LATE TO ADOPT A FIRM STANDPOINT . ENDS

LEAHY

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RHODESIA POLICY

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FM PRETORIA 091555Z OCT 79

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 686 OF 9 OCTOBER

INFO IMMEDIATE MIRIMBA SALISBURY

INFO PRIORITY LUSAKA DAR ES SALAAM MAPUTO GABORONE LUANDA LAGOS

WASHINGTON UKMIS NEW YORK.

MY TELNO 681 : RHODESIA.

1. MIFT CONTAINS OUR UNOFFICIAL TRANSLATION OF THE FULL TEXT OF A SPECIAL STATEMENT WHICH PIK BOTHA HAS ISSUED TODAY . THE EVENING ENGLISH- LANGUAGE PRESS PRINT THE FULL CONTENT INTERSPERSED WITH SOME HIGHLY COLOURED MATERIAL FROM " PRETORIA SOURCES", WHICH IS OBVIOUSLY PIK BOTHA ON AN UNATTRIBUTABLE BASIS. APART FROM REPEATING THE POINTS MADE AT VANDERBIJLPARK (SEE MY TUR) IT INCLUDES THE FOLLOWING ADDITIONAL POINTS :-

(I) THE WORSENING ZIMBABWE RHODESIA SITUATION IS DRIVING SOUTH AFRICA TO THE CRITICAL OPTION OF FULL SCALE MILITARY ACTION IN THAT COUNTRY.

(II) START SQUARE BRACKETS IF THE MUZOREWA GOVERNMENT FELL END SQUARE BRACKETS TERRORIST FORCES WOULD BE ON THE NORTHERN TRANSVAAL BORDER AND INTO BOTSWANA TO OPEN UP A HUGE OFFENSIVE FRONT ON SOUTH AFRICA STRETCHING FROM NORTHERN SWA/NAMIBIA ALONG THE NORTHERN CAPE BORDER TO THE INDEPENDENT STATE OF VENDA IN THE EAST.

(III) THE POSSIBILITY OF ACHIEVING PEACE FOR SWA/NAMIBIA WOULD BE GREATLY REDUCED AND SOUTH AFRICA'S BORDERS WOULD BE VULNERABLE TO LARGE SCALE INFILTRATION .

(IV) IN SUCH A SITUATION SOUTH AFRICA WOULD HAVE TO HIT BACK FIRST IN CROSS BORDER OFFENSIVES TO PROTECT THE INTEGRITY OF HER OWN BORDERS .

2. VAN HEERDEN TOLD ME TODAY , BEFORE I HAD SEEN THE STATEMENT, THAT IS WAS ADDRESSED NOT TO US BUT TO THE WHITES IN RHODESIA AND WAS INTENDED TO BE HELPFUL . HE WENT OUT OF HIS WAY TO SAY

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THAT IT WAS NOT AIMED AT OUR HANDLING OF THE CONFERENCE . HAV  
NOW SEEN THIS TEXT AND ITS ACCOMPANYING COMMENTARY I TAKE HIM TO  
MEAN THAT THE SOUTH AFRICANS ARE APPEALING TO THE MODERATES  
IN RHODESIA TO STAND FIRM IN SUPPORT OF MUZOREWA BECAUSE , IF  
THEY DO NOT , THE COLLAPSE OF SECURITY COULD LEAD TO DISASTER  
IN THE REGION . MOREOVER IN THUS STANDING FIRM THE WHITES WILL  
HAVE NOTHING TO LOSE BECAUSE IN THE LAST RESORT THE SOUTH AFRICANS  
WILL ACT TO SAVE THE SITUATION . IN SPITE OF WHAT VAN HEERDEN  
SAYS THERE IS CERTAINLY A WARNING TO US NOT TO LET MUZOREWA DOWN  
BY MAKING ANY CONCESSIONS TO THE PATRIOTIC FRONT , TOGETHER WITH  
AN EXPLICIT APPEAL TO US TO LIFT SANCTIONS ( BECAUSE OF THE  
POLITICAL BENEFIT THAT WOULD THUS ACCRUE TO MUZOREWA.

3. I AM SURE THAT A FURTHER MOTIVE IN PIK BOTHA'S STATEMENT IS  
TO DEMONSTRATE IN ADVANCE OF IAN SMITH'S SPEECH IN PRETORIA ON  
SATURDAY THAT THE SOUTH AFRICANS DO NOT NEED TO BE LECTURED BY  
SMITH ABOUT THE COMMUNIST THREAT TO SOUTHERN AFRICA AND AT THE  
SAME TIME TO PREPARE THE GROUND FOR A FROSTY RECEPTION  
IN THE SOUTH AFRICAN PRESS ON THE LINES THAT THE BEST INTERESTS  
OF THE WHITES WOULD BE SERVED BY BACKING MUZOREWA AND NOT WORKING  
AGAINST HIM AS SMITH IS NOW DOING . IN OTHER WORDS SMITH MUST NOT  
BE ALLOWED TO SUGGEST THAT THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT ARE  
DESERTING THE RHODESIAN WHITES IN THEIR HOUR OF NEED .  
4. WHEN I SAW THE EVENING PRESS I TELEPHONED FOURIE TO ASK FOR  
ANY BACKGROUND . HE SAID THAT THE FIRST HE WAS AWARE OF THE  
STATEMENT WAS WHEN HE HEARD IT ON THE LUNCHTIME NEWS - AN  
INTERESTING COMMENT ON FOURIE'S PRESENT POSITION . HE HAS ,  
HOWEVER , PROMISED TO LET ME KNOW THIS EVENING IF HE CAN GIVE  
ME ANY GUIDANCE.

LEAHY

## FILES

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(MR FREELAND)  
(MR FIFOOT)  
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## ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION RHODESIA POLICY

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PS/MR RIDLEY  
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SIR A DUFF  
LORD N G LENNOX  
MISS BROWN  
MR DAY  
MR WILLSON  
MR ASPIN

[RHODESIA: POLICY: ADVANCE COPIES]

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PS/MR LUCE  
PS/PUS  
SIR A DUFF  
MR WILLSON  
MR BYATT  
LORD N G LENNOX

PS/NO 10 DOWNING STREET  
MR R L WADE-GERY )  
MR P M MAXEY )  
COL MOIR ) CABINET  
MR P J FOWLER ) OFFICE  
DIO )

*M.D.A.S.* ....

HD/RHODESIA DEPT (3)

HD/C AF D

HD/S AF D

HD/PUSD (2)

HD/NEWS DEPT

HD/WAD

MR FREELAND LEGAL ADVISER RM K200A

MR FIFOOT LEGAL ADVISER RM K164

RESIDENT CLERK

*Prime Minister*

*Paul*

IMMEDIATE

GPS 260

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FM PRETORIA 092855Z OCT 79

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 682 OF 9 OCTOBER

INFO IMMEDIATE MIRIMBA SALISBURY

INFO PRIORITY LUSAKA, DAR ES SALAAM, MAPUTO, GABORONE, LUANDA,

LAGOS, WASHINGTON AND UKMIS NEW YORK

INFO ROUTINE JOHANNESBURG

IMMEDIATE

MY TELNO. 670 (NOT TO ALL): SOUTH AFRICAN PRESS COMMENT ON RHODESIA.

1. ALTHOUGH THERE HAVE BEEN ONLY A FEW EDITORIALS ON MR SMITH'S OPPOSITION TO THE BRITISH CONSTITUTIONAL PROPOSALS, NEARLY ALL THE REPORTING CONTAINS IMPLIED CRITICISM OF HIS STAND. THE MAIN AFRIKAANS EVENING PAPER (VADERLAND) YESTERDAY REPORTED THAT IN SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT CIRCLES IT WAS THOUGHT THAT MR SMITH WAS TRYING TO WHIP UP WHITE EMOTIONS IN SOUTH AFRICA AND THAT THIS COULD BE "EXTREMELY DANGEROUS". IT IS WIDELY REPORTED FROM SALISBURY THAT SMITH NO LONGER APPEARS TO ENJOY THE UNQUESTIONING SUPPORT OF RHODESIA'S WHITES AS HE USED TO.

2. 'BEELD'S' LEAD EDITORIAL THIS MORNING IS TOUGH: "THE ROAD MR SMITH IS NOW FOLLOWING CAN ONLY LEAD TO THE DESTRUCTION OF WHAT HE IS TRYING TO ACHIEVE . . . . IF THE WHITES TURN THEIR BACKS ON MUZOREWA THEY WILL LOSE EVERYTHING THAT THEY HAVE FOR SO MANY YEARS FOUGHT FOR WITH THEIR BLOOD". THE EDITORIAL ALSO ARGUES THAT IF THE WHITES LEAVE THERE IS GREAT DANGER THAT RHODESIA WILL FALL TO THE MARXISTS, AND THAT IN THIS CASE OTHER MODERATE BLACK GOVERNMENTS IN THE REGION WOULD ALSO FALL ONE BY ONE.

3. THE ODD MAN OUT IS THE 'CITIZEN' WHICH CLAIMS THAT BY ACCEPTING THE BRITISH PROPOSALS WITHOUT GETTING ANYTHING IN RETURN, BISHOP MUZOREWA HAS FALLEN INTO A BRITISH TRAP.

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[RHODESIA: POLICY: ADVANCE COPIES]

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PS/MR LUCE  
PS/PUS  
SIR A DUFF  
MR WILLSON  
MR BYATT  
LORD N. G LENNOX

PS/NO 10 DOWNING STREET

MR R L WADE-GERY )  
MR P H MAXEY )  
COL MOIR ) CABINET  
MR P J FOWLER ) OFFICE  
DIO )

*M. D.A. ....*

HD/RHODESIA DEPT (3)

HD/C AF D  
HD/S AF D

IMMEDIATE

HD/PUSD (2)

HD/NEWS DEPT

HD/WAD

MR FREELAND LEGAL ADVISER RM K200A

*Prime Minister*

MR FIFOOT LEGAL ADVISER RM K164

*(Tells on African attitudes)*

*Print*

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IMMEDIATE

FM PRETORIA 092810Z OCT 79

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 681 OF 9 OCTOBER

INFO IMMEDIATE MIRIMBA SALISBURY

INFO PRIORITY LUSAKA, DAR ES SALAAM, MAPUTO, GABORONE, LUANDA, LAGOS, WASHINGTON AND UKMIS NEW YORK

MY TELNO. 674: RHODESIA.

1. IN A SPEECH AT VANDERBIJLPARK YESTERDAY MR PIK BOTHA REPEATED THAT IF THERE WERE A WHITE EXODUS FROM RHODESIA THE GOVERNMENT OF BISHOP MUZOREWA WOULD FALL. IF THAT HAPPENED, SOUTH AFRICA WOULD HAVE TO TAKE THE MOST PAINFUL DECISION OF ITS LIFE AND PARLIAMENT COULD BE SUMMONED TO TAKE THAT DECISION. THE NEXT FEW WEEKS WERE GOING TO BE DECISIVE FOR THE FUTURE OF SOUTHERN AFRICA. AT THE RHODESIA CONFERENCE IN LONDON THERE WERE ALREADY SIGNS THAT THE BRITISH WERE BEGINNING TO BECOME SOFT. IF THE BISHOP FELL THE TERRORISTS WOULD BE AT BEIT BRIDGE. "BOTH LORD CARRINGTON AND MRS THATCHER KNOW THAT IT IS THE FUTURE OF SOUTHERN AFRICA WHICH IS AT STAKE. WE ARE GETTING TIRED OF THE SICKLY SENTIMENTAL APPROACH OF THE WEST WHICH IS PURELY A



PROGRAMME OF ESCAPISM. THE FAULT WHICH THEY MAKE IS TO PLEAD WITH PEOPLE FOR PEACE WHEN IT WOULD ULTIMATELY ONLY BE A POSTPONEMENT FOR A FAR GREATER CATASTROPHE".

2. THE PRESS TODAY ALSO REPORT THAT IAN SMITH HAS ACCEPTED AN INVITATION TO SPEAK AT A DINNER IN PRETORIA NEXT SATURDAY WHEN HE WILL RECEIVE THE TOASTMASTERS' INTERNATIONAL COMMUNICATION AND LEADERSHIP AWARD.

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*Rhodesia* 9



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

9 October 1979

*Dear Brian,*

*Rhodesia*

Rhodesia: Constitutional Conference

Thank you for your letter of 28 September. Lord Carrington was most grateful to Mr Pym for agreeing that Brigadier Reilly should be released to undertake the visit to Rhodesia last week. The talks that Brigadier Reilly had with members of the NJOC were valuable. Sir A Duff discussed the results with the CGS on 8 October.

We are in touch with Colonel Gurden about military aspects of the pre-independence arrangements and are grateful to him for finding the time to advise us on this in the midst of his other duties.

I am copying this letter to Michael Alexander (No 10).

*Yours ever*

*R M J Lyne*

(R M J Lyne)  
Private Secretary

B M Norbury Esq  
Private Secretary  
Ministry of Defence  
Main Building  
Whitehall  
LONDON

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5-9 OCT 1979



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FM FCO 061407Z OCT 79

IMMEDIATE PRETORIA

TELEGRAM NUMBER 368 OF 8 OCTOBER

INFO IMMEDIATE MIRIMBA SALISBURY, LUFKA, LAGOS, GABORONE,  
PAR ES SALAAM, WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK.  
RHODESIA CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE.

DUFF TELEPHONED THE SOUTH AFRICAN AMBASSADOR THIS MORNING AND EXPRESSED OUR CONCERN AT THE POSSIBLE EFFECT ON WHITE OPINION OF IAN SMITH'S REMARKS YESTERDAY. DE VILLIERS SAID HE THOUGHT THE SALISBURY DELEGATION IN LONDON, EXCEPT FOR ONE MEMBER, WERE SOUND AND WOULD BACK THE BISHOP. HE WAS LESS CERTAIN ABOUT THE EFFECT IN SALISBURY, BUT THOUGHT THERE WERE CERTAIN THINGS THE SOUTH AFRICANS COULD DO TO HELP CONTAIN IT.

2. DUFF SAID THAT THERE WAS ONE THING HE WANTED TO MAKE CLEAR, AND THAT WAS THE STATUS OF THE CONSTITUTION WE HAD TABLED. AS WE HAD EXPLAINED, IT WAS THE CONSTITUTION WE WOULD ASK THE BRITISH PARLIAMENT TO ENACT. IT WAS NOT OPEN FOR AMENDMENT, PARTLY BECAUSE IT REPRESENTED THE BEST JUDGEMENT WE COULD MAKE OF WHAT OUGHT TO BE ACCEPTABLE TO ALL PARTIES AND TO THE WORLD: AND PARTLY BECAUSE THE PATRIOTIC FRONT WERE ALREADY SAYING THEY WOULD PRESS FOR AMENDMENT. WE THEREFORE INTENDED TO STAND FIRM ON THE TEXT AS TABLED. DE VILLIERS SAID THAT HE STRONGLY AGREED. DUFF POINTED OUT THAT THE FEATURE ON WHICH SMITH HAD FOCUSED (THE ABILITY OF THE PRIME MINISTER TO CONTROL SENIOR APPOINTMENTS) WAS ONE OF THE ASPECTS ON WHICH INTERNATIONAL OPINION WOULD BE ESPECIALLY SENSITIVE.

CARRINGTON

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MR DAY  
MR WILLSON  
MR ASPIN

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FM DAR ES SALAAM 080500Z OCT

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 793 OF 8.10.79.

INFO PRIORITY UKMISNEW YORK, WASHINGTON, LUSAKA, GABORONE,  
MAPUTO, LUANDA, MIRIMBA SALISBURY.

*Prime Minister*

*ant ant*

MY TELNO 792: RHODESIA: CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE.

1. PRESIDENT NYERERE ALSO CALLED IN THE AUSTRALIAN, CANADIAN, AND ZAMBIAN HIGH COMMISSIONERS ON 5 OCTOBER AND, SPEAKING TO THEM TOGETHER, EXPRESSED HIS CONCERN ARISING FROM YOUR REPORTED REMARKS IN YOUR BBC TELEVISION INTERVIEW OF 3 OCTOBER. ASKED SPECIFICALLY BY THE CANADIAN HIGH COMMISSIONER HIS PURPOSE IN SPEAKING TO THEM, NYERERE SAID HE WANTED THEIR GOVERNMENTS TO URGE THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT NOT TO BE INFLEXIBLE. HE EMPHASISED HOW CONSTRUCTIVE THE PF HAD BEEN ON THE QUESTION OF RESERVED SEATS FOR THE WHITES.
2. ACCORDING TO THE CANADIAN H.C'S ACCOUNT OF THE MEETING NYERERE SAID A NUMBER OF ENCOURAGING THINGS. ASKED IF HE THOUGHT THERE WAS A CRISIS, HE REPLIED NO. HE SAID THAT IN THE LAST RESORT HIS ADVICE TO THE PF WOULD BE TO ACCEPT THE CONSTITUTION AS IT STOOD ENTERING SUCH RESERVATIONS AS THEY THOUGHT NECESSARY. THIS WAS BECAUSE HE WAS CONFIDENT THAT THEY WOULD WIN THE SUBSEQUENT ELECTIONS AND COULD, IF NECESSARY, CHANGE THINGS LATER.
3. ON CITIZENSHIP, NYERERE SAID THAT AUTOMATIC CITIZENSHIP FOR ALL WHO HAD COME TO RHODESIA SINCE UDI WAS "TOO MUCH". SOME NO DOUBT SHOULD BE ACCEPTED, BUT IT SHOULD NOT BE AUTOMATIC. ON LAND, HE SAID THAT THE PF NEEDED SOMETHING TO ASSURE THEIR PEOPLE THAT THE LAND SITUATION WAS NOT FROZEN: "TO FREEZE LAND WAS TO FREEZE RACIAL TENSIONS". HE THOUGHT A PROPOSAL FOR A LAND FUND OF SOME KIND WAS A NECESSARY MINIMUM FOR THE PF.

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4. NYERERE REPEATED HIS SUPPORT FOR AN EXECUTIVE PRESIDENT, BUT WHEN ASKED BY THE CANADIAN HIGH COMMISSIONER WHY HE THOUGHT THIS WAS BETTER GAVE NO CLEAR ANSWER AND, IN A HUMOROUS ASIDE, REMARKED THAT MR NKOMO WAS READY-MADE FOR THE POSITION OF CONSTITUTIONAL PRESIDENT.

4. ASKED BY THE AUSTRALIAN HIGH COMMISSIONER ABOUT PENSIONS, NYERERE SEEMED TO IMPLY THAT THIS WAS AMONG THE THINGS WHICH COULD BE CHANGED LATER IF THE PF DID NOT LIKE THE PROPOSED ARRANGEMENTS.

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LORD N G LENNOX  
MISS BROWN  
MR DAY  
MR WILLSON  
MR ASPIN

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FM PRETORIA 080930Z OCT 79

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 674 OF 8 OCTOBER

INFO IMMEDIATE MIRIMBA SALISBURY

INFO PRIORITY LUSAKA, DAR ES SALAAM, MAPUTO, GABORONE, LUANDA,  
LAGOS, WASHINGTON AND UKMIS NEW YORK

*Amie Smith*

*Paul*

RHODESIA.

MY TELNO. 670 (NOT TO ALL):

1. IN A TELEVISION INTERVIEW LAST NIGHT MR PIK BOTHA REACTED TO MR IAN SMITH'S STATEMENTS ON THE BRITISH RHODESIAN CONSTITUTIONAL PROPOSALS. HE SAID HE BELIEVED THAT THE DIFFERENCES AMONG RHODESIA'S LEADERS WERE NOT SUCH THAT THEY COULD NOT BE RESOLVED QUIETLY. "WE HAVE OFFERED IN THE PAST WEEKS, AS WE AGAIN OFFER, TO ACT AS A FRIENDLY MEDIATOR IF THAT IS REQUIRED. BUT I DO NOT THINK IT IS IN ANYBODY'S INTERESTS, EITHER MR SMITH'S OR MUZOREWA'S, TO ENGAGE IN ACRIMONIOUS DEBATE WITH ONE ANOTHER. ONLY THE MARXISTS, THE ENEMIES OF ALL OF US IN SOUTHERN AFRICA, CAN GAIN FROM SUCH ACTIONS".

2. ASKED WHETHER MR SMITH'S COMMENTS HAD AGGRAVATED THE SITUATION, MR BOTHA SAID THAT HE DID NOT THINK SO, BECAUSE MR SMITH HAD NOT ADOPTED A FINAL POSITION AND THAT GAVE HOPE. MR SMITH HAD HIMSELF SAID THAT HE HOPED THE PROCESS OF NEGOTIATIONS COULD CONTINUE. SORTING OUT PRIORITIES IN SOUTHERN AFRICA WAS AN EXTREMELY SERIOUS MATTER. THE FIRST PRIORITY WAS SURVIVAL AGAINST A MARXIST ONSLAUGHT ON THE WHOLE SUB-CONTINENT. MR BOTHA ADDED "ONCE WE HAVE REACHED CONSENSUS ON THAT, THEN I HAVE NO DOUBT THAT OTHER DIFFERENCES COULD BE RESOLVED QUIETLY".

3. MR BOTHA SAID THAT IF THE PATRIOTIC FRONT ACCEPTED BRITAIN'S LATEST CONSTITUTIONAL PROPOSALS THE NEXT, MORE DIFFICULT, ROUND WOULD HAVE BEEN REACHED, THAT OF MAKING ARRANGEMENTS FOR SETTING UP AN INTERIM GOVERNMENT. IF THE PROPOSALS WERE REJECTED, THE "FIRMNESS OF HONOUR" OF THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT WOULD BE SEVERELY TESTED. "IT WOULD HAVE NO HONOURABLE CHOICE BUT TO CONTINUE TO MAKE ARRANGEMENTS WITHIN THE PARAMETERS AND TERMS OF THE PROPOSALS WHICH THE GOVERNMENT OF BISHOP MUZOREWA HAS ACCEPTED".

4. MR BOTHA SAID IF THERE WERE A LARGE WHITE EXODUS FROM ZIMBABWE RHODESIA, THE COUNTRY WOULD START DYING AND IT WOULD EVENTUALLY LEAD TO THE ELIMINATION OF BISHOP MUZOREWA. IT WOULD CREATE AN EXTREMELY CRITICAL SITUATION IN SOUTHERN AFRICA AND "VERY PAINFUL DECISIONS WOULD HAVE TO BE TAKEN BY THIS COUNTRY TO SAFEGUARD ITS INTERESTS AND SECURITY". BUT THAT STAGE HAD NOT BEEN REACHED AND HE HOPED IT WOULD NOT.

5. MODERATE LEADERS STANDING TOGETHER "COULD BIND US ALL TOGETHER INTO ACCEPTING JOINT RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE SECURITY OF THE WHOLE REGION. THAT WOULD BE ONE OF THE ELEMENTS THAT I THINK OUGHT TO BE INCORPORATED IN FUTURE IN A SOUTHERN AFRICAN CONSTELLATION OF STATES". THE OVERRIDING AIM OF THIS CONSTELLATION WAS SECURITY AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT. PEACE AND STABILITY ATTRACTED FOREIGN INVESTMENT WHICH MADE THE COUNTRY VIABLE OR CREDIBLE AND BROUGHT PROGRESS TO THE PEOPLE.

6. THERE HAS NOT YET BEEN ANY PRESS COMMENT ON MR SMITH'S STATEMENTS, ALTHOUGH PIK BOTHA'S REACTION IS GIVEN GREAT PROMINENCE.

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FM DARES SALAM 060700Z  
TO IMMEDIATE FCO  
TELNO 792 OF 6 OCTOBER 1979

*Prime Minister*

*Paul*

INFO PRIPOITY UKMIS NEW YORK WASHINGTON LUSAKA MAPUTO GABORONE

LUANDA LAGOS MARIMBA SALISBURY

*[Handwritten flourish]*

RHODESIA : CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE

1. WALKER, U.S. CHARGE D'AFFAIRES, WAS SUMMONED YESTERDAY BY  
PRESIDENT NYERERE WHO SPOKE TO HIM ON THE SAME LINES THAT HE  
HAD SPOKEN TO ME. IN PARTICULAR, NYERERE REPEATED HIS CONCERN

THAT WE SHOULD NOT BE UNCOMPROMISING ON OUR CONSTITUTIONAL

PROPOSALS. NO DOUBT A MAIN PURPOSE OF HIS SPEAKING TO WALKER

WAS TO ENCOURAGE THE AMERICANS TO PUT PRESSURES ON US TO BE

ACCOMMODATING WITH REGARD TO PF WISHES IN THE INTERESTS OF

AGREEMENT. WALKER STRESSED THAT THERE WAS FULL U.S. SUPPORT FOR THE

LINE WE WERE FOLLOWING.

2. WALKER WAS TOLD (WHICH YOU PROBABLY KNOW) THAT THE PF WERE

HAVING A MEETING WITH THE FRONT LINE STATE REPRESENTATIVES

IN LONDON YESTERDAY 5 OCTOBER. THE EGYPTIAN AMBASSADOR, WHO ALSO

SAW NYERERE YESTERDAY IN A FAREWELL CALL, TOLD ME THAT NYERERE

HAD SAID THAT MR MKAPA WAS ATTENDING THE MEETING IN LONDON.

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MR MLOKA, ON THE OTHER HAND, HAS TOLD ME THAT MKAPA IS STILL IN  
NEW YORK. BUT YOU MAY WISH TO CHECK WITH THE TANZANIAN HIGH  
COMMISSION.

FCO PLEASE PASS TO ALL

MOON

[PASSED AS REQUESTED]

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MR ASPIN

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FM FCO 061310Z OCT 79

TO IMMEDIATE LUSAKA

TELEGRAM NUMBER 821 OF 6 OCTOBER

AND TO IMMEDIATE NAIROBI MAPUTO GABORONE DAR ES SALAAM LUANDA  
LAGOS WASHINGTON PRETORIA PRIORITY ADDIS ABABA MONROVIA CANBERRA  
OTTAWA WELLINGTON PEKING MOSCOW PRAGUE ABIDJAN DAKAR KINSHASA  
KHARTOUM TOKYO EEC POSTS KINGSTON BRIDGETOWN DACCA NEW DELHI  
SINGAPORE GEORGETOWN NASSAU FREETOWN PORT LOUIS MBABANE PORT OF  
SPAIN KAMPALA LILONGWE VALLETTA COLOMBO ACCRA KUALA LUMPUR NICOSIA  
CASTRIES OSLO STOCKHOLM LISBON MADRID MANILA TEHRAN BUCHAREST  
CARACAS ATHENS UKMIS NEW YORK LA PAZ KUWAIT

INFO IMMEDIATE MIRIMBA SALISBURY

INFO SAVING SUVA PORT MORESBY HONIARA NUKUALOFA VICTORIA  
TARAWA AND BANJUL

MIPT

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE'S INTERVIEW ON  
RHODESIAN TELEVISION.

BISHOP MUZOREWA ANNOUNCED YESTERDAY THAT HIS DELEGATION ACCEPTED  
THE INDEPENDENCE CONSTITUTION WHICH THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT INTEND  
TO COMMEND TO THE BRITISH PARLIAMENT AS THE BASIS FOR LEGAL  
INDEPENDENCE FOR YOUR COUNTRY.

I WOULD LIKE TO PAY TRIBUTE TO THE DETERMINATION SHOWN BY BISHOP  
MUZOREWA AND HIS DELEGATION TO BRING ABOUT A SUCCESSFUL OUTCOME  
TO THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE. I CAN ASSURE YOU THAT THIS  
DETERMINATION IS FULLY SHARED BY THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT.

I HAVE NOT YET HAD A REPLY FROM THE PATRIOTIC FRONT. I EXPECT  
TO DO SO WHEN THE CONFERENCE RECONVENES ON MONDAY.

AT THIS MOMENT, I WOULD LIKE TO SAY SOMETHING TO ALL RHODESIANS,  
BOTH AT HOME AND ABROAD; AND TO ALL THE PEOPLE IN THE NEIGHBOURING  
COUNTRIES WHO ARE AWAITING THE OUTCOME OF THIS CONFERENCE.

THE CONFERENCE HAS NOW BEEN IN SESSION FOR FOUR WEEKS. MANY OF  
YOU MAY HAVE BEEN FRUSTRATED AT THE RATE OF PROGRESS. I MUST TELL YOU  
THAT AT TIMES I HAVE SHARED YOUR FRUSTRATION. BUT WE ARE MAKING  
PROGRESS.

THE OUTCOME OF THE CONFERENCE IS OF COURSE OF GREAT IMPORTANCE TO  
THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT AND TO MANY OTHER GOVERNMENTS. BUT A S

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THE CONFERENCE PROCEEDS, I AM ALWAYS CONSCIOUS THAT IT IS IMPORTANT MOST OF ALL TO YOU - TO ALL RHODESIANS WHO HAVE SUFFERED SO MUCH OVER THE PAST FEW YEARS FROM WAR AND FROM THE UNCERTAINTY.

I UNDERSTAND AND SHARE YOUR CONCERNS AND ANXIETIES. IT IS YOUR FUTURE WHICH IS BEING DISCUSSED HERE. I MUST EMPHASISE THAT THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT'S OBJECTIVE AT THIS CONFERENCE IS TO ACHIEVE A BETTER AND A MORE SECURE FUTURE FOR ALL OF YOU.

WE ARE LOOKING FOR A FUTURE WHICH WILL ENABLE THE FARMERS TO GO AHEAD AND PLANT THEIR CROPS. WHICH WILL ENABLE BUSINESS ONCE AGAIN TO PROSPER, WHICH WILL CREATE EMPLOYMENT. WHICH WILL ENABLE YOU TO PRESS AHEAD WITH SCHEMES TO RAISE THE LIVING STANDARDS OF ALL THE PEOPLE OF RHODESIA. WE WANT THE PEOPLE OF RHODESIA TO BE CONFIDENT THAT THEY CAN LAY DOWN THEIR ARMS: THAT THEY CAN RETURN TO THEIR HOMES: AND THAT THEY CAN ONCE MORE ENJOY A NORMAL LIFE. THIS IS WHAT WE ARE NEGOTIATING FOR.

BISHOP MUZOREWA'S ANNOUNCEMENT WAS A MAJOR STEP FORWARD. IT WAS A BREAKTHROUGH - AND I REPEAT - THIS IS THE CONSTITUTION WHICH WE WILL BE READY TO ASK THE BRITISH PARLIAMENT TO ENACT. WE HAVE ALREADY ACHIEVED MORE IN THESE NEGOTIATIONS THAN IT HAS EVER PREVIOUSLY BEEN POSSIBLE TO DO.

WE NOW HAVE TO DECIDE ON THE ARRANGEMENTS TO BRING THE CONSTITUTION INTO EFFECT. THIS WILL INVOLVE SOME FURTHER DIFFICULT NEGOTIATION.

I WOULD LIKE TO REASSURE YOU THAT IN MY JUDGMENT WE NOW STAND CLOSER THAN EVER BEFORE TO A SOLUTION WHICH WILL MEAN THE GRANTING OF INDEPENDENCE AND THE LIFTING OF SANCTIONS: AND WHICH WILL BRING RHODESIA INTO THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY AND WILL OFFER THE PROSPECT OF A BETTER FUTURE. THIS TIME WE MUST GET IT RIGHT. WITH THE SUPPORT AND THE UNDERSTANDING OF ALL THE PEOPLE OF RHODESIA - WITH YOUR HELP - THAT IS WHAT WE SHALL DO.

CARRINGTON

F I L E S

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NEWS D	PS/LPS
FUSD	PS/MR LUCE
PLANNING STAFF	PS/MR RIDLEY
ES & SD	PS/MR HURD
CCD	PS/PUS
PRD	SIR A DUFF
UND	LORD N G LENNOX
LEGAL ADVISERS	MISS BROWN
(MR FREELAND)	MR DAY
(MR FIFOOT)	MR WILLSON
ECON D	MR ASPIN
PCD	

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION

RHODESIA POLICY

Original in G/R



10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

6 October 1979

Dear Julian,

Thank you for your letter of 3 October.

The Conference is now of course very close to deciding on the constitution. Peter's impression of the attitudes of David Smith and Rowan Cronje is a little different from your own.

I recognise the need to keep the representatives in Salisbury alongside the Bishop and we are very much aware of the Security Force problem.

Yours ever

The Rt. Hon. Julian Amery, M.P.

8

PS (4)  
PS/SIR I GILMOUR  
PS/MR LUCE  
PS/PUS  
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MR WILLSON  
MR BYATT  
LORD N G LENNOX

PS/NO 10 DOWNING STREET

MR R L WADE-GERY )  
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ADVANCE COPY

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HD/RHODESIA DEPT (1/4)

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MR FREELAND LEGAL ADVISER RM K200A

MR FIFOOT LEGAL ADVISER RM K164

RESIDENT CLERK

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DESKBY 060900Z

FM UKMIS NEW YORK 052310Z OCT 79

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1203 OF 5 OCTOBER

INFO MAPUTO, MIRIMBA SALISBURY

30x

(2)

Annie Anisile

Anis

YOUR TELNO 605: MOZAMBIQUE AND THE RHODESIA CONFERENCE

1. I DISCUSSED LATEST DEVELOPMENTS AT THE CONFERENCE FOR AT LEAST HALF AN HOUR THIS EVENING WITH CHISSANO TO WHOM WE HAD EARLIER SENT PAPERS, INCLUDING AN AIDE MEMOIRE BASED ON YOUR TELNO 799 AND OUR LATEST CONSTITUTIONAL PROPOSALS.

2. CHISSANO SAID HE HAD BEEN IN TOUCH BY TELEPHONE WITH THE MOZAMBIKAN OBSERVERS AT THE CONFERENCE. THEY WERE CONCERNED THAT YOU HAD EFFECTIVELY NOW GIVEN THE PATRIOTIC FRONT AN ULTIMATUM TO AGREE TO YOUR CONSTITUTIONAL PROPOSALS. HE HAD YESTERDAY ASKED MR VANCE WHETHER THIS WAS HIS READING OF THE SITUATION. VANCE COULD NOT GIVE A FIRM REPLY BUT SAID THAT HE THOUGHT IT WAS NOT AN ULTIMATUM. THIS SITUATION WAS EMBARRASSING FOR THE PATRIOTIC FRONT AND HE WAS WORRIED THAT THE CONFERENCE MIGHT COLLAPSE AS A RESULT. MOZAMBIQUE DID NOT WANT THE PATRIOTIC FRONT TO WALK OUT ANY MORE THAN THEY WANTED THE OTHER SIDE TO BREAK OFF NEGOTIATIONS. I REPLIED THAT THE MEDIA HAD SPOKEN TOO FREELY OF AN ULTIMATUM, BUT THAT IT WAS TIME TO MOVE ON TO THE INTERIM ARRANGEMENTS AND THAT WE HAD TO ACCEPT THE FACT THAT IT WOULD NOT BE POSSIBLE TO ACHIEVE A CONSTITUTIONAL SETTLEMENT WHICH WAS 100 PER CENT SATISFACTORY

WE HAD TO ACCEPT THE FACT THAT IT WOULD NOT BE POSSIBLE TO ACHIEVE A CONSTITUTIONAL SETTLEMENT WHICH WAS 100 PER CENT SATISFACTORY TO BOTH SIDES. WE HAD ESTABLISHED THE MAIN PLANK - GENUINE MAJORITY RULE. WE COULD NOT GO ON ACCOMMODATING CONFLICTING AND DETAILED AMENDMENTS FROM BOTH SIDES. THERE WOULD HAVE TO BE A MOMENT OF DECISION.

3. CHISSANO SAID THAT THE MOZAMBICANS HAD NOT AND WOULD NOT PRESSURIZE THE PATRIOTIC FRONT ON DETAILED POINTS OF NEGOTIATION. THEY HAD HELPED TO PERSUADE THE PATRIOTIC FRONT TO ATTEND THE CONFERENCE AND HAD URGED THEM TO BE PATIENT. CHISSANO HAD BEEN ASTONISHED BY THE CONCILIATORY LINE WHICH THE PATRIOTIC FRONT HAD SO FAR TAKEN. I INTERJECTED THAT THE SALISBURY DELEGATION HAD MADE CONCESSIONS OF FUNDAMENTAL IMPORTANCE IN AGREEING TO THE REMOVAL OF THE BLOCKING POWERS OF THE WHITE MINORITY. CHISSANO ASKED WHAT HMG WOULD DO IF THE SALISBURY DELEGATION WITHDREW FROM THE TALKS AND THEN PROCEEDED TO IMPLEMENT THE CHANGES TO THE CONSTITUTION THEY HAD AGREED TO. WOULD WE CONTINUE TO TALK TO THE PATRIOTIC FRONT ALONE? I REPLIED THAT THIS WAS UNLIKELY TO HAPPEN BUT THAT THE CONSTITUTION WAS ONLY PART OF THE PACKAGE AGREED AT LUSAKA, IE WE SHOULD INSIST ON AGREEMENT ON TRANSITIONAL ARRANGEMENTS LEADING TO FREE ELECTIONS UNDER THE TERMS AGREED AT LUSAKA. CHISSANO CLAIMED THAT WHEN HIS OFFICIALS HAD ASKED THE SAME QUESTION IN LONDON THEY HAD RECEIVED NO SATISFACTORY ANSWER. THIS WAS THE SORT OF THINK THAT WORRIED THE PATRIOTIC FRONT AND CAUSED THEM "PSYCHOLOGICAL PROBLEMS".

4. CHISSANO ASKED WHAT DIFFICULTIES I FORESAW IN NEGOTIATIONS ON THE TRANSITIONAL ARRANGEMENTS. WHICH ARMED FORCES WOULD BE IN CONTROL? HE ASSUMED, SADLY, THAT THE BRITISH ARMY WOULD NOT BE SENT TO RHODESIA BUT WE MUST REMEMBER THAT CONTROL OF THE COUNTRY, EVEN IF THERE WAS A CEASEFIRE, WOULD BE VERY DIFFICULT. WE MUST FACE THE REALITY THAT THE PATRIOTIC FRONT WAS THE "MAIN FORCE". IN DEALING WITH THE RHODESIAN ARMY WE SHOULD REALISE THAT IT WAS QUITE DIFFERENT FROM TRADITIONAL BRITISH COLONIAL FORCES. I SAID THAT I DID NOT KNOW WHAT DETAILED ARRANGEMENTS WOULD BE PROPOSED. THE IMPORTANT THING WAS THAT THEY WOULD END WITH FREE AND FAIR ELECTIONS UNDER OUR AUTHORITY AND WITH COMMONWEALTH OBSERVATION AS AGREED AT LUSAKA.

5. CHISSANO AGREED, WHEN PROMPTED, THAT IN THE COURSE OF THE PRESENT NEGOTIATIONS WE HAD MADE FAR MORE PROGRESS THAN EVER BEFORE. HE ALSO SAID THAT IN HIS STATEMENT AT THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY ON MONDAY HE WOULD NOT RAISE ANY POINTS OF DETAIL IN THE PRESENT NEGOTIATIONS.

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[RHODESIA: POLICY: ADVANCE COPIES]

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PS  
PS/SIR I GILMOUR  
PS/MR LUCE  
PS/PUS  
SIR A DUFF  
MR WILLSON  
MR BYATT  
LORD N G LENNOX

PS/NO 10 DOWNING STREET

MR R L WADE-GERY )  
MR P M MAXEY )  
COL MOIR ) CABINET  
MR P J FOWLER ) OFFICE  
DIO )

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HD/RHODESIA DEPT (3)

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HD/S AF D

HD/PUSD (2)  
HD/NEWS DEPT  
HD/WAD

MR FREELAND LEGAL ADVISER RM K200A  
MR FIFOOT LEGAL ADVISER RM K164

*Rome Ruster*  
*ant* *Rust*

GR100

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FM DAR ES SALAAM 050700Z OCT  
TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 787 OF 5.10.79.

INFO PRIORITY LUSAKA, MIRIMBA SALISBURY, NAIROBI, MAPUTO, GABORONE,  
LUANDA, LAGOS, WASHINGTON, PRETORIA, ADDIS ABABA, UKMIS NEW YORK.

MIPT: RHODESIA: CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE.

1. I DO NOT THINK PRESIDENT NYERERE REQUIRES ANY FURTHER REPLY TO HIS "WORRIES" AT THIS STAGE. I THINK HE IS GENUINELY ANXIOUS THAT THERE SHOULD NOT BE SOME DEADLOCK WITH THE PF AND WILL BE READY TO HELP IF HE CAN, SUBJECT ALWAYS TO A TENDENCY TO WANT US TO MOVE TO ACCOMMODATE THE PF'S WISHES. IF WE DO BECOME BADLY STUCK ON SOME POINT ON WHICH WE WANT HIS HELP, I WOULD RECOMMEND A PERSONAL MESSAGE FROM YOU SETTING OUT VERY FRANKLY AND PRECISELY OUR REASONS FOR NOT BEING ABLE TO DO WHATEVER IT IS THE PF MAY BE DEMANDING.

MOON

NNNN



NNNN

HOLD THAT ONE A MO LAST LINE OF TEXT ODD WORD THERE .....

GOT IT ...

FOR NOT BEING ABLE TO DO WHATEVER ETC ...

IMMEDIATE

[RHODESIA: POLICY: ADVANCE COPIES]

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PS  
PS/SIR I GILMOUR  
PS/MR LUCE  
PS/PUS  
SIR A DUFF  
MR WILLSON  
MR BYATT  
LORD N G LENNOX

PS/NO 10 DOWNING STREET

MR R L WADE-GERY )  
MR P M MAXEY )  
COL MOIR ) CABINET  
MR P J FOWLER ) OFFICE  
DIO )

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HD/WAD

MR FREELAND LEGAL ADVISER RM K200A

MR FIFOOT LEGAL ADVISER RM K164

*Rennie Amster*

*Ant* *Amst*

GR500

CONFIDENTIAL

FM DAR ES SALAAM 050700Z OCT  
TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 786 OF 5.10.79.

INFO PRIORITY LUSAKA, MIRIMBA SALISBURY, NAIROBI, MAPUTO, GABORONE,  
LUANDA, LAGOS, WASHINGTON, PRETORIA, ADDIS ABABA, UKMIS NEW YORK.

MY TELNOS 782 AND 783: RHODESIA: CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE.

1. I WAS SUMMONED BY PRESIDENT NYERERE AT 5 P.M. YESTERDAY 4 OCTOBER. UNUSUALLY HE AS ALONE AND MY IMPRESSION WAS THAT HE HAD SENT FOR ME ON THE SPUR OF THE MOMENT.
2. HE BEGAN APOLOGETICALLY BY SAYING THAT HE KNEW HE WAS A "WORRIER" BUT HE HAD BEEN CONCERNED BY BBC REPORTS OF STATEMENTS MADE BY YOU. THE FIRST, AS HE HAD HEARD IT, WAS A STATEMENT TO THE EFFECT THAT THE SALISBURY GOVERNMENT HAD ACCEPTED OUR PROPOSALS IN PRINCIPLE BUT THE PATRIOTIC FRONT STILL HAD DIFFICULTIES; THE SECOND HAD BEEN ALONG THE LINE THAT IF THERE WAS NOT AGREEMENT ON THE CONSTITUTION, THERE WOULD BE A BREAKDOWN. HE HAD EXPRESSED CONFIDENCE TO ME YESTERDAY THAT THERE WOULD BE AGREEMENT ON THE CONSTITUTION BECAUSE HE COULD NOT SEE THAT THERE WERE MAJOR ISSUES OF PRINCIPLE AT ISSUE WITH THE PF. ON WHAT COULD THE CONFERENCE THEREFORE BREAK DOWN AT THIS POINT? HE AND THE OTHER FRONT LINE STATES WERE READY TO BE VERY FIRM WITH THE PF IF THEY WERE UNREASONABLE; IF, FOR EXAMPLE, THEY HAD

... BUT THIS WAS NOT

WITH THE PF IF THEY WERE UNREASONABLE: IF, FOR EXAMPLE, THEY HAD INSISTED ON NO RESERVED SEATS FOR THE WHITES. BUT THIS WAS NOT THE CASE. WITH REGARD TO THE QUESTION OF THE EXECUTIVE PRESIDENT HE ACCEPTED THE POINT I HAD MADE PREVIOUSLY THAT IF THIS WAS NOT A MAJOR ISSUE (AND HE BELIEVED IT NOT TO BE) THEN IT SHOULD NOT BE A BREAKING POINT FOR ANYONE. BUT WE SHOULD RECOGNISE THAT IT WAS MORE IMPORTANT FOR THE PF THAN FOR US. HE SAID THAT HE FULLY UNDERSTOOD OUR POSITION ON THE NEED TO OBTAIN AGREEMENT ON THE CONSTITUTION BEFORE GOING ON TO THE INTERIM ARRANGEMENTS.

3. I WENT OVER THE POINTS OF DIFFICULTY (INCLUDING THE ARGUMENTS FOR THE POSITIONS WE HAVE ADOPTED) AS SET OUT IN YOUR TELNO 799 TO LUSAKA. ON CITIZENSHIP, NYERERE SAID THAT HE THOUGHT THE PF WOULD BE TOUGH (THOUGH I THINK THIS WAS AN OFF-THE-CUFF REACTION). WITH REGARD TO LAND, HE SUGGESTED THAT A SOLUTION COULD BE FOUND BY INTRODUCING THE OLD IDEA OF A LAND FUND.

4. ON THE QUESTION OF A POSSIBLE BREAKDOWN OF THE CONFERENCE, I SAID THAT MY UNDERSTANDING WAS THAT THE REFERENCE IN THE BBC REPORT (AS I HAD MYSELF HEARD IT) WAS NOT TO A BREAK ON ANY PARTICULAR ISSUE IN THE CONSTITUTION, BUT TO FAILURE, WHICH COULD NOT YET BE ENTIRELY EXCLUDED, TO REACH OVERALL AGREEMENT ON ITS TERMS. NYERERE SAID HE HOPED NO-ONE WAS GOING TO BREAK ON SOME ISSUE WHICH WAS NOT VITAL. HE BELIEVED THAT THERE WOULD BE AGREEMENT ON THE CONSTITUTION BECAUSE HE THOUGHT EVERYONE NOW WANTED AGREEMENT (WHICH HE SAID HAD NOT ALWAYS BEEN THE CASE IN THE PAST). HE HOPED THAT WE WOULD NOT BE INFLEXIBLE WITH REGARD TO OUR PROPOSALS AND REFUSE TO CONSIDER ALTERNATIVE SUGGESTIONS. I SAID THAT I WAS SURE WE WOULD STRIVE TO THE UTMOST TO GET AGREEMENT. BUT THE PROBLEM WAS THAT THERE WERE TWO PARTIES AND ONCE YOU BEGAN CHANGING PROVISIONS TO MEET THE WISHES OF ONE PARTY, THEN THE OTHER PARTY WOULD WANT TO RE-OPEN OTHER PROVISIONS, AND THE WHOLE THING COULD COME UNDONE. NYERE SAID THAT HE UNDERSTOOD THIS. HE APOLOGISED AGAIN THAT HE MIGHT BE WORRYING UNNECESSARILY. I SAID THAT I KNEW THAT YOU ALWAYS WELCOMED HAVING HIS THOUGHTS AND WOULD WISH TO KNOW OF HIS CONCERNS.

5 I GAVE NYERERE A COPY OF OUR FULL CONSTITUTIONAL PROPOSALS AND WILL SEND HIM TODAY THE FULL TEXT OF YOUR INTERVIEW WITH JOHN HUMPHRIES AS IN VERBATIM SERVICE 061/79.

MOON

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FM DAR ES SALAAM 040500Z OCT

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

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TELEGRAM NUMBER 783 OF 4.10.79.

INFO PRIORITY LUSAKA, MIRIMBA SALISBURY, NAIROBI, MAPUTO, GABORONE,  
LUANDA, LAGOS, WASHINGTON, PRETORIA, ADDIS ABABA, UKMIS NEW  
YORK.

*mb*

*Prime Minister*

MIPT: RHODESIA: CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE.

1. PRESIDENT NYERERE WILL INEVITABLY INCLINE TO TAKE THE PATRIOTIC  
FRONT VIEWPOINT WHERE THERE IS A DIFFERENCE WITH THEM ON OUR  
CONSTITUTIONAL PROPOSALS AS NOW TABLED. IF THERE ARE PF OBJECTIONS

ON A NUMBER OF ISSUES, THE MORE THE MUZOREWA PARTY RENEW OR REPEAT  
THEIR OBJECTIONS TO THOSE OF OUR PROPOSALS WHICH DO NOT SATISFY  
THEM SO AS TO UNDERLINE THE FACT THAT WE HAVE BEEN OBLIGED TO  
OVER-RULE BOTH SIDES, THE BETTER FROM OUR POINT OF VIEW HERE.

2. WHILE MAINTAINING THE VALIDITY OF HIS ARGUMENT. NYERERE SEEMS  
TO BE GIVING UP ON HIS POINT OF UNIFICATION OF THE THREE ARMIES  
BECAUSE HE HAS FOUND THAT IT IS NOT A MATTER OF CONCERN TO THE  
PF (SEE ALSO MY TELNO 744 REPORTING MR YOUNG'S MEETING WITH  
NYERERE). I SUSPECT THAT ONE OF NYERERE'S UNDERLYING CONCERNS  
IS THAT HE IS NOT CONFIDENT THAT THE PF WILL WIN THE ELECTION  
AND IF THEY HAVE RETAINED THEIR ARMY HE MAY THEN BE FACED WITH,  
FOR HIM, THE DIFFICULT AND EVEN DANGEROUS DECISION ON WITHDRAWAL  
OF SUPPORT FROM THE PF IF THEY CONTINUE TO FIGHT.

MOON

FILES

- RHOD D
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- PLANNING STAFF
- ES & SD
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- UND
- LEGAL ADVISERS  
(MR FREELAND)  
(MR FIFOOT)
- ECON D
- PCD

- DEF D
- OID
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- PS/LPS
- PS/MR LUCE
- PS/MR RIDLEY
- PS/MR HURD
- PS/PUS
- SIR A DUFF
- LORD N G LENNOX
- MISS BROWN
- MR DAY
- MR WILLSON
- MR ASPIN
- MR BYATT

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RHODESIA POLICY

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FM MIRIMBA SALISBURY 041425Z OCT 79

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELNO 717 OF 4 OCTOBER

P S TO P M  
NO 10 DOWNING ST*Prime Minister**ms*

YOUR TELNO 799 TO LUSAKA: RHODESIA: CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE

1. I DELIVERED A COPY OF THE TEXT OF OUR FULL PROPOSALS TO HAWKINS (ACTING SECRETARY OF MFA) THIS MORNING AND WILL GIVE A COPY TO THE ACTING PRIME MINISTER WHEN I SEE HIM TOMORROW.

I HAVE ALSO GIVEN THE FULL TEXT AND YOUR TUR TO DAVIDOW (YOUR TELNO 803 TO LUSAKA REFERS).

2. HAWKINS HAD NO IMMEDIATE COMMENTS ON THE TEXT, BUT PROMISED TO STUDY IT AND EXPRESSED GRATITUDE (IT HAS NOT REACHED SALISBURY ON RHODESIAN CHANNELS). HE ASKED FOR AN ACCOUNT OF DEVELOPMENTS AT MRCNCONFERENCE, WHICH I GAVE HIM. HE WAS ANXIOUS TO TALK ABOUT PRE-INDEPENDENCE ARRANGEMENTS. I DECLINED TO BE DRAWN, BUT YOU MAY BE INTERESTED IN TWO OF HIS COMMENTS:

(A) HE ASSUMES THAT THERE WILL HAVE TO BE SOME RESUMPTION OF BRITISH "DIRECT RULE" IF PRE-INDEPENDENCE ARRANGEMENTS ARE TO BE INTERNATIONALLY CREDIBLE:

(B) HE SAID THAT THE FATAL FLAW IN THE CARVER SCHEME, FROM THE WHITE RHODESIAN POINT OF VIEW, WAS THE UNDERSTANDING THAT OUR RESIDENT COMMISSIONER WOULD "WALK AWAY" IF THE PROBLEMS GOT TOO HOT. HIS LINE WAS THAT, IF WE ASSUMED RESPONSIBILITY, WE MUST BE PREPARED TO SEE IT THROUGH.

BYATT

## FILES

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MISS BROWN  
MR DAY  
MR WILLSON  
MR ASPIN

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See 4 to PM

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FM F C O 041818Z OCT 79  
TO IMMEDIATE ROME  
TELNO 197 OF 4 OCTOBER

FOLLOWING PERSONAL FOR WALDEN FROM LYNE.

1. MR PETER SHORE TELEPHONED TO PASS THE SECRETARY OF STATE THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE ON RHODESIA (WHICH HE WILL MAKE PUBLIC):  
"I HEARD YOUR STATEMENT ON TELEVISION LAST NIGHT. WE ALL WANT THE LONDON CONFERENCE TO SUCCEED. THE CONFERENCE HAS MADE PROGRESS, WHICH WE GREATLY WELCOME, BUT I QUESTION WHETHER IT IS WISE OR RIGHT TO PUT THE CONFERENCE AT RISK BY DEMANDING AN UNEQUIVOCAL YES OR NO TO THE PROPOSED CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGES THIS MONDAY, BEFORE DISCUSSION OF THE TRANSITIONAL ARRANGEMENTS HAD EVEN BEGUN. YOU KNOW AND AGREE THAT THESE TWO ISSUES ARE INSEPARABLY LINKED AND THAT BOTH MUST BE RESOLVED. NOR DO I BELIEVE IT NECESSARY TO MAKE SUCH A DEMAND NOW, PROVIDED YOU ARE SATISFIED THERE IS AGREEMENT THAT THE CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUE WILL NOT BE REOPENED ONCE THE TRANSITIONAL ARRANGEMENTS HAVE BEEN AGREED."

CARRINGTON.

NNNN



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London S.W.1

3 October 1979

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*fr.*  
*Phut*  
*Phut*

Dear Michael,

*Phut*  
*Phut*  
I have detached the Constitution but you may like to see this letter.

Rhodesia: The Independence Constitution

I enclose a copy of the full proposals for the Independence Constitution which, subject to any final suggestions by Bishop Muzorewa, Lord Carrington proposes to table at a plenary session of the Constitutional Conference on 3 October.

The document follows closely the pattern of the proposals which we tabled early in the Conference, and represents a very wide measure of agreement with the Salisbury delegation, whom we have consulted at every stage. Its purpose is to act as a comprehensive guide from which the legal draftsmen can prepare the final text of the Constitution, basing themselves closely on the present Constitution, subject to the changes we have negotiated. It deals with the main points in dispute at the Conference in the following ways:

- a) Citizenship: We provide that all those who have citizenship immediately before Independence should be confirmed as citizens thereafter. This runs counter to the Patriotic Front's views. They contend that citizenship should not automatically be granted to those who entered Rhodesia after November 1965. The result would be that many thousands of people would find their status in doubt while investigations were conducted to determine who should and should not be granted citizenship. We have rejected these arguments. Despite Patriotic Front objections, we have retained the provision for dual citizenship (this has no implication for the position under our own law). We have agreed with the Salisbury delegation that those who have forfeited or been deprived of their citizenship since 1965 should be allowed to resume it on Independence.
- b) Declaration of Rights: We have reached a compromise with the Salisbury delegation on the question of the compulsory acquisition of agricultural land for settlement. This will be allowed where the land is not fully utilised, where a court order has been obtained and adequate compensation has been agreed. Provision for preventive detention has been taken out of the body of the Declaration of Rights and included in the savings for periods of emergency. The protective provisions of the Declaration of Rights will be amendable only by unanimous vote of the House of Assembly for ten years. This gives added protection to the Whites

/and others


M O'D B Alexander Esq  
10 Downing Street



Postage and Telecommunications Department

London S.W. 1

3 OCT 1964





and others, but it is contested by the Patriotic Front who argue that it interferes with the sovereignty of Parliament and legitimate areas of government policy such as land settlement. We shall take the line that the Declaration protects the rights of all citizens, not just the minority, and is fully justiciable.

- c) The Executive: We have not accepted the Patriotic Front argument that there should be an Executive President.
- d) Senior Appointments: The Prime Minister of independent Zimbabwe will have the final say on senior appointments. But we have agreed that, in normal circumstances, recommendations would come forward from the appropriate Commission or selection board and that, where the Prime Minister decided instead to put forward a candidate of his own choice, Parliament would be informed. This is to reassure the public services that arbitrary changes will not be made. In the case of the Chief Justice, since he would have security of tenure once appointed, we have provided that if the Prime Minister decided not to accept the candidate recommended by the appropriate Commission, then Parliament must be informed before the appointment is made. Before deciding to change a Service Commander or the Police Commissioner the Prime Minister would be required to consult the Cabinet (and the matter would subsequently be reported to Parliament).
- e) The Commissions: All appointing bodies would be required to select the most efficient and suitable candidate for a post, but would also be subject to a general direction from the President to achieve a suitable representation of different sections of the population. This would permit a policy of gradual Africanisation.
- f) Parliament: Our proposals here provide for 20% of the seats in the House of Assembly to be reserved to the white community. This would be amendable only by a unanimous vote in the House of Assembly for seven years; and would be carried forward thereafter, subject to the normal procedure for constitutional amendment. The majority required to amend any clause of the Constitution has been confirmed at 70%. The Senate has been made more representative by an increase in its size (Muzorewa attached particular importance to this); and its delaying power for ordinary legislation has been reduced.
- g) Pensions: These are protected under the Constitution by providing that any public officer has the right to a pension at the most favourable rate applying during his period of service. The right to remit pensions abroad is also guaranteed. The Patriotic Front can be expected to react strongly against this on the grounds that it is

/ unreasonable



unreasonable to expect the new State to pay the pensions of servants of the illegal regime. Both sides have, for different reasons, pressed HMG to guarantee public service pensions. We have refused on the grounds that we have never done so for a local colonial service and cannot accept expenditure on the scale involved, even on a contingency basis, as a fair charge on the British taxpayer.

These proposals are based on those which we put to the Salisbury administration in August. The Salisbury delegation have also agreed to some shortening of the Constitution. In other respects we have been able to take account of their concerns, for instance by providing that if the Prime Minister selects an outsider for a senior appointment, the matter will be reported to Parliament.

Lord Carrington intends to present the proposals to the Conference as the Constitution which the British Government is prepared to invite Parliament to enact. He will invite both sides to let him know whether they can accept the proposals by next Monday, so that the Conference can move on to the next phase of its business. The Patriotic Front are likely to protest that they are being stampeded and may produce proposals of their own. Lord Carrington proposes to take the line that we would have been willing to accept alternative proposals on which both sides could agree; but it has become clear that there is no basis for such agreement and, after a month of discussion, we must ourselves lay down what we believe to be the basis for solution.

It is not clear whether the Patriotic Front will accept a Constitution on these lines. They will strongly criticise the provisions for citizenship, pensions, land for agricultural settlement and the entrenchment of the Declaration of Rights. But they could find themselves in considerable difficulty if the Conference breaks down on their rejection of constitutional proposals which, to any reasonable observer, mark an enormous advance on any previous attempt to achieve a constitutional settlement for Rhodesia.

I am sending a copy of this letter and enclosure to the Private Secretaries of members of OD, and to the Private Secretary of the Attorney General.

*Yours sincerely*  
*Roderic Lyne*

R M J Lyne  
 Private Secretary

CONFIDENTIAL

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CONFIDENTIAL

FM FCO 031230Z OCT 79

TO FLASH LAGOS

TEL NO 734 OF 3 OCTOBER 1979

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON UKMIS NEW YORK

INFO PRIORITY DAR ES SALAAM CAPE TOWN LUSAKA GABORONE  
MAPUTO

MY TEL NO 800 TO LUSAKA: RHODESIA CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE

1. PLEASE PASS A PERSONAL MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO  
PRESIDENT SHAGARI USING THE TEXT IN PARAGRAPH 4 OF TELEGRAM UNDER  
REFERENCE WITH THE FOLLOWING MINOR ALTERATIONS:

(A) OMIT QUOTE AS YOU AND I WELL KNOW UNQUOTE FROM PENULTIMATE  
SENTENCE:

AND

(B) LAST SENTENCE TO READ QUOTE HOWEVER, WITH YOUR SUPPORT, WE  
SHALL PRESS ON IN GOOD FAITH AND RESOLVE TO IMPLEMENT TO THE FULL  
THE UNDERSTANDING SO HAPPILY REACHED AT LUSAKA. UNQUOTE.

CARRINGTON

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PS/LPS

PS/MR. LUCE

PS/PUS

SIR A DUFF

MR ASPIN

MR DAY

CONFIDENTIAL

Rhodesia

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10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

3 October 1979

Rhodesia: Message to the Front Line Presidents

I am writing to confirm that the Prime Minister was content for the text of the message from her to the Front Line Presidents, enclosed with your letter to me of 2 October, to issue. She is also content that a similar message should go to the Prime Minister of Nigeria.

M. O'D. B. ALEXANDER

R.M.J. Lyne, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

TCR

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SUBJECT

\*AMENDED COPY\*

3/10/79

GR 40

CONFIDENTIAL

FM FCO 021823Z OCT 79

TO FLASH LUSAKA

TELEGRAM NUMBER 800 OF 2 OCTOBER

AND TO FLASH DAR ES SALAAM AND GABORONE IMMEDIATE MAPUTO LAGOS  
LUANDA

PRIME MINISTER'S

PERSONAL MESSAGE

SERIAL No.

T 107A/79T

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON UKMIS NEW YORK \*PRETORIA\*

RHODESIA: CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE

1. I EXPECT TO TABLE THE GOVERNMENT'S EXPANDED CONSTITUTIONAL PROPOSALS FOR RHODESIA AT A PLENARY SESSION IN LANCASTER HOUSE ON THE AFTERNOON OF WEDNESDAY 3 OCTOBER. THESE WILL COMPRISE A FULL DESCRIPTION OF THE INDEPENDENCE CONSTITUTION FOR RHODESIA, BUT WILL NOT BE IN THEIR FINAL LEGAL FORM. FOR YOUR OWN INFORMATION AT THIS STAGE, THESE PROPOSALS WILL NOT BE OPEN FOR FURTHER AMENDMENT: I SHALL BE INVITING THE PARTIES TO SAY WHETHER OR NOT THEY ACCEPT THEM AFTER A DEFINED PERIOD OF REFLECTION.

2. IT IS IMPORTANT TO ENSURE THAT THE FRONT LINE PRESIDENTS ARE BROUGHT UP TO DATE WITH OUR VIEW OF PROGRESS AT THE CONFERENCE BEFORE THE FULL DESCRIPTION OF THE CONSTITUTION IS TABLED. LUSAKA, DAR ES SALAAM AND GABORONE SHOULD THEREFORE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING PERSONAL MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO THE FRONT LINE PRESIDENTS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

3. MAPUTO, LAGOS AND LUANDA SHOULD SEEK AN OPPORTUNITY TO SPEAK IN SIMILAR TERMS TO SENIOR REPRESENTATIVES OF THE GOVERNMENTS TO WHICH THEY ARE ACCREDITED BEFORE OUR CONSTITUTIONAL PROPOSALS ARE TABLED.

4. MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO PRESIDENTS KAUNDA, NYERERE AND KHANA:

BEGINS

QUOTE YOU WILL, I AM SURE, HAVE BEEN GETTING REPORTS FROM YOUR REPRESENTATIVES IN LONDON ABOUT THE PROGRESS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE. ALTHOUGH DISCUSSION IN THIS FIRST STAGE OF THE CONFERENCE HAS (INEVITABLY, I SUPPOSE) TAKEN LONGER THAN I FOR ONE HAD HOPED, IT HAS PRODUCED A VERY THOROUGH AND DETAILED EXAMINATION OF THE POSITIONS AND DESIRES OF BOTH SIDES TO THE CONFLICT. AS A RESULT, WE SHALL VERY SHORTLY BE IN A POSITION TO TABLE OUR OWN FULL VERSION OF THE CONSTITUTION WHICH WE SHOULD BE PREPARED TO ENACT FOR RHODESIA. GIVEN THE STRONGLY DIFFERING VIEWS BETWEEN THE PARTIES, OUR CONSTITUTION WILL NATURALLY NOT SATISFY EITHER OF THEM, BUT WE ARE HOPEFUL, INDEED VERY HOPEFUL, THAT THEY WILL BOTH ACCEPT IT.

/QUOTE WE

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QUOTE WE SHALL THEN BE ABLE TO MOVE ON TO THE SECOND PHASE. IT IS OF COURSE CLEAR TO ALL OF US THAT IF THE CONFERENCE IS TO BE SUCCESSFUL AND ACHIEVE ITS AIMS, AGREEMENT ON THE CONSTITUTION MUST BE FOLLOWED BY AGREEMENT ON THE ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE PRE-INDEPENDENCE PERIOD, BOTH CIVIL AND MILITARY. IN OTHER WORDS, ONCE WE HAVE A CONSTITUTION, WE HAVE TO AGREE HOW TO BRING IT INTO EFFECT. AS YOU AND I WELL KNOW, THIS STAGE OF OUR NEGOTIATIONS WILL THROW UP A NUMBER OF DIFFICULT PROBLEMS WHICH, THOUGH TRANSIENT, WILL IN SOME RESPECTS BE MORE DIFFICULT TO RESOLVE THAN THOSE OF THE CONSTITUTION ITSELF.

QUOTE HOWEVER, WITH YOUR SUPPORT, WE SHALL PRESS ON IN GOOD FAITH AND RESOLVE TO IMPLEMENT TO THE FULL THE UNDERSTANDING WE SO HAPPILY REACHED BETWEEN US AT LUSAKA.

MARGARET THATCHER UNQUOTE

ENDS

CARRINGTON

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[RHODESIA: POLICY: ADVANCE COPIES]

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PS/MR LUCE  
PS/PUS  
SIR A DUFF  
MR WILLSON  
MR BYATT  
LORD N G LENNOX

+27

PS/NO 10 DOWNING STREET

MR R L WADE-GERY )  
MR P M MAXEY )  
COL MOIR ) CABINET  
MR P J FOWLER ) OFFICE  
DIO )

*Mr. Day* ....

HD/RHODESIA DEPT (3)

HD/C AF D  
HD/S AF D

HD/PUSD (2)

HD/NEWS DEPT

HD/WAD

MR FREELAND LEGAL ADVISER RM K200A

MR FIFOOT LEGAL ADVISER RM K164

RESIDENT CLERK

SECRET

DESKBY 030700Z

FM NIRIMBA SALISBURY 021825Z OCT 79

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 787 OF 2 OCTOBER

~~Not received~~  
MIPT: RHODESIA: DISCUSSIONS WITH NJOC: CEAS FIRE

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF THE PAPER WHICH WE HAVE GIVEN TO THE RHODESIANS:

BEGINS

1. AN ESSENTIAL PART OF THE CEASEFIRE IS THAT THERE SHOULD BE A DESENGAGEMENT BETWEEN THE ZIMBABWE RHODESIAN SECURITY FORCES AND THE FORCES OF THE PATRIOTIC FRONT. THE MOST EFFECTIVE WAY OF ACHIEVING THIS WOULD BE FOR THE RESPECTIVE FORCES TO WITHDRAW TO THE COUNTRIES IN WHICH THEIR BASES ARE LOCATED. THIS WOULD REQUIRE THE ZIMBABWE RHODESIAN FORCES IN ZAMBIA AND MOZAMBIQUE TO BE WITHDRAWN INTO ZIMBABWE RHODESIA, AND FOR THE PATRIOTIC FRONT FORCES IN ZIMBABWE RHODESIA TO BE WITHDRAWN INTO THEIR BASES IN ZAMBIA AND MOZAMBIQUE.

2. IN ADDITION IT MAY BE FEASIBLE, SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON





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DESKBY 030700Z

[RHODESIA: POLICY: ADVANCE COPIES]

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SIR A DUFF  
MR WILLSON  
MR BYATT  
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MR R L WADE-GERY )  
MR P M MAXEY )  
COL MOIR ) CABINET  
MR P J FOWLER ) OFFICE  
DIO )

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HD/RHODESIA DEPT (3)

HD/C AF D

HD/S AF D

HD/PUSD (2)

HD/NEWS DEPT

HD/WAD

MR FREELAND LEGAL ADVISER RM K200A

MR FIFOOT LEGAL ADVISER RM K164

RESIDENT CLERK

SECRET

DESKBY 030700Z

FM NIMBA SALISBURY 021800Z OCT 70

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 706 OF 2 OCTOBER

MIPT: RHODESIA: DISCUSSIONS WITH NJOC: CEASEFIRE

1. WE HAVE SPENT A TOTAL OF MORE THAN FIVE HOURS WITH THE NATIONAL JOC TODAY, MORNING AND AFTERNOON, WITHOUT, I FEAR, MAKING MUCH PROGRESS. AT THE BEGINNING OF THIS MORN G'S MEETING THEY OFFERED TWO PROPOSALS ON THE CEASEFIRE:

(A) BOTH SIDES SHOULD RETURN TO THEIR BASE AREAS, I.E. THE SECURITY FORCES TO RHODESIA, REFRAINING FROM ATTACKS ON BASES OUTSIDE, AND THE PF FORCES TO MOZAMBIQUE AND ZAMBIA, AND SHOULD BE MONITORED BY BRITISH OR COMMONWEALTH MONITORS: OR

(B) THERE SHOULD BE NO CEASEFIRE UNTIL AFTER THE ELECTION, WHICH SHOULD BE HELD WITHIN 3 TO 4 WEEKS OF THE END OF THE CONFERENCE.

THEY HAVE NOT PURSUED (B) WITH ANY ENERGY BUT HAVE ARGUED STRONGLY FOR (A) THROUGHOUT THE DAY. THEIR CONTENTION IS THAT ANY FORM OF

DISENGAGEMENT WHICH GAVE PF FORCES A RECOGNISED STATUS WITHIN RHODESIA BEFORE THE ELECTION WOULD BE VERY DAMAGING TO THE BISHOP POLITICALLY, AND VIRTUALLY IMPOSSIBLE TO CONTROL MILITARILY. FLOWER SAYS THAT MUZOREMA TOLD HIM IN LONDON THAT DISENGAGEMENT OF FORCES WOULD BE UNACCEPTABLE. WE IMPRESSED UPON THEM THAT A PROPOSAL AT THE CONFERENCE THAT CEASEFIRE SHOULD BE ACHIEVED BY REMOVING THE PF ENTIRELY FROM THE COUNTRY WOULD NOT BE SEEN OUTSIDE RHODESIA AS EVEN REMOTELY FAIR OR REASONABLE. THEY ARGUED AT LENGTH ABOUT THE POLITICO-MILITARY DANGERS IN CURRENT CIRCUMSTANCES OF ANY OTHER COURSE.

2. SINCE THERE SEEMED NO OTHER WAY OF MAKING PROGRESS WE SUGGESTED TO THEM THAT THE AIM MIGHT BE TO DEVISE A SCHEME WHICH WAS PRESENTATIONALLY CREDIBLE BUT WHICH WOULD NOT IN PRACTICE DISADVANTAGE THEM BECAUSE IT WOULD EITHER BE REJECTED BY THE PF OR WOULD ALMOST AUTOMATICALLY BREAK DOWN GIVEN THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF WIDE DISPERSION OF PF BANDS WITHIN RHODESIAN UNDER LIMITED EXTERNAL CONTROL. WE ASKED TO MEET AGAIN TO CONSIDER ON THAT BASIS WHETHER THERE WAS NOT SOME WAY OF AVOIDING A CALL FOR TOTAL PF WITHDRAWAL.

3. IN THE AFTERNOON, EMPHASISING THAT WE WERE EXPLORING (NEXT TWO WORDS UNDERLINED) AD REFERENDUM A LINE WHICH WENT BEYOND THAT ENVISAGED IN OUR INSTRUCTIONS, WE GAVE THEM A PIECE OF PAPER ATTEMPTING TO GO AS FAR AS WE THOUGHT THEY MIGHT BE BROUGHT IN THE DIRECTION OF MARRYING THEIR IDEA OF TOTAL PF WITHDRAWAL WITH OUR PROPOSAL FOR CONCENTRATION IN SPECIFIED AREAS. THE TEXT, AS SLIGHTLY MODIFIED IN DISCUSSION WITH THEM, IS IN MIFT. YOU WILL SEE THAT THE CENTRAL IDEA, IN PARA 3 OF THE PAPER, IS THAT THE MERE PRESENCE OF ARMED PF GROUPS OUTSIDE DESIGNATED AREAS WOULD CONSTITUTE A FAILURE (RATHER THAN A BREACH) OF THE CEASEFIRE. THIS IS TO MEET THEIR ARGUMENT THAT IF THEY FAIL TO RESPOND IMMEDIATELY AND EFFECTIVELY TO REPORTS OF TERRORIST PRESENCE IN THE COUNTRYSIDE, THE CONFIDENCE UPON WHICH THEIR NETWORK OF INFORMANTS DEPENDS WILL EVAPORATE AND THE GENERAL SECURITY SITUATION WILL DETERIORATE RAPIDLY. THEY ARE INSISTENT THAT MONITORING OF BASES IN ZAMBIA AND MOZAMBIQUE SHOULD BE INCLUDED IN ANY SCHEME, ALTHOUGH THEY ACCEPT THAT IN PRACTICE IT WOULD BE NO MORE EFFECTIVE THAN WOULD ATTEMPTED BORDER PATROLLING IN PREVENTING REINFILTRATION BY THE PF, WHICH THEY REGARD AS A MAJOR DANGER. THE COMMISSIONER OF POLICE SAYS (AND WALLS AND MCINTYRE AGREE) THAT THE ROLE WHICH WE ENVISAGE FOR THE POLICE WOULD BE BEYOND THEIR CAPABILITIES. HE SAYS THAT IT WOULD BE ADMINISTRATIVELY POSSIBLE TO TRANSFER LARGE NUMBER OF MEN FROM THE ARMY TO THE POLICE (WHICH IN PRACTICE OPERATE IN PARALLEL TO A LARGE EXTENT) BEFORE

(WHICH IN PRACTICE OPERATE IN PARALLEL TO A LARGE EXTENT) BEFORE THE CEASEFIRE CAME INTO EFFECT, BUT THAT WOULD OF COURSE REDUCE THE CREDIBILITY OF THE CEASEFIRE PROPOSAL WE ENVISAGE. WALLS AND MCINTYRE ARE ADAMANT THAT, IF THE SITUATION IS NOT TO GET OUT OF HAND, THE ARMY MUST BE ABLE TO CONTINUE INVESTIGATORY PATROLS DURING A CEASEFIRE EVEN IF THEY REFRAIN FROM OFFENSIVE (EG FIRE-FORCE) OPERATIONS.

4. EVEN AS THE PAPER IN MIFT STANDS THE NJOC ARE EXTREMELY UNHAPPY ABOUT IT, AND IN PARTICULAR PARA 2. THEY HAVE NOT YET AGREED THAT THEY WOULD BE PREPARED TO PUT SUCH A SCHEME TO THEIR POLITICAL MASTERS. IF THERE WERE TO BE CONCENTRATION POINTS FOR THE PF INSIDE THE COUNTRY THEY ARGUE THAT THESE SHOULD NOT BE SUBSTANTIAL AREAS, EVEN IN SPARSELY POPULATED REGIONS, BUT SMALL AND EASILY VERIFIABLE "POINTS" SUCH AS FORMER PROTECTED VILLAGES. THEY SEEM RELUCTANT TO ABSORB THE IDEA THAT, IF A CEASEFIRE CAN BE DEFINED IN THE TERMS OF PARA 3 OF THE PAPER, MONITORING OF PF WITHDRAWAL WOULD IMMEDIATELY BECOME LESS IMPORTANT IN THE SENSE THAT IF PF PRESENCE OUTSIDE DESIGNATED AREAS WAS ESTABLISHED THE RESTRICTIONS ON SECURITY FORCE OPERATIONS (EXCEPT PERHAPS IN THE DESIGNATED AREAS THEMSELVES WOULD BE LIFTED.

5. I AM FAR FROM SURE THAT WE CAN GET THEM TO AGREE TO TALK IN DETAIL ABOUT EVEN THE SORT OF SCHEME OUTLINED IN MIFT. IF YOU CONSIDER THAT SUCH A SCHEME IS ALREADY TOO HEAVILY LOADED AGAINST THE PF TO BE WORTH PURSUING, IT WOULD BE HELPFUL TO KNOW BY TELEPHONE BEFORE OUR NEXT MEETING (0900Z TOMOROW) IF POSSIBLE.

BYATT

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CONFIDENTIAL



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London S.W.1

2 October 1979

*Dear Michael,*

Rhodesia: Messages to the Front Line  
Presidents

As you know Lord Carrington hopes to table a full description of the Independence Constitution for Rhodesia at a plenary session in Lancaster House tomorrow afternoon. He considers it important to give the Presidents of Zambia, Tanzania and Botswana (and also the Governments of Mozambique, Nigeria and Angola) advance warning of this move. Observers from the Front Line States have received regular briefing from the FCO during the Constitutional Conference, and have so far played a generally helpful role. However, at a briefing given by Derek Day on 2 October, there were signs of suspicion on the part of the observers that the British Government were not negotiating seriously with the Patriotic Front (doubtless based on prior briefing from Patriotic Front representatives). The observers were inclined to question the Government's firm adherence to their original proposals and commented on apparent British inflexibility on certain issues. Fears were also expressed that Bishop Muzorewa would pocket an agreed constitution, return to Salisbury to enact it and then call for immediate recognition, which the British Government might grant. Derek Day told the observers that the Government were not weakening in their resolve to obtain a settlement on the basis of the Lusaka Communiqué.

The Commonwealth Secretary-General has told Derek Day and Sir Antony Duff that he has had indications from Lusaka and Dar-es-Salaam that Presidents Kaunda and Nyerere are becoming restive. Whether or not this is in fact the case, Lord Carrington considers that it would help to reinforce our position with the Front Line States if the Prime Minister sent a message today to the Presidents, as a curtain raiser to the tabling of our further constitutional proposals. I enclose a draft telegram to this effect. If the proposed message has the Prime Minister's approval, we shall arrange for its immediate despatch.

*yours ever*  
*Roderic Lyne*

R M J Lyne

M O'D B Alexander Esq  
10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET and CONFIDENTIAL OFFICE  
London & World



- 2 OCT 1979

File No. ....  
Department... **Private Office**  
Drafted by **R M J Lyne**  
(Block Capitals) .....  
Tel. Extn .....

**OUTWARD**  
**TELEGRAM**

Security Classification
<b>CONFIDENTIAL</b>
Precedence
<b>FLASH</b>
DESKBY .....Z

FOR  
COMMS. DEPT.  
USE

Despatched

(Date) .....  
(Time).....Z

POSTBY .....Z

PREAMBLE

(Time of Origin) .....Z(G.M.T.) (Restrictive Prefix) .....  
(Security Class.) ..... **CONFIDENTIAL** ..... (Caveat/  
Privacy Marking) .....  
(Codeword) ..... (Deskby) .....

To ..... **FLASH** ..... **LUSAKA** ..... Tel. No. .... of .....  
(precedence) (post)

AND TO (precedence/post) ..... **FLASH DAR-ES-SALAAM AND GABORONE** .....  
... **IMMEDIATE MAPUTO, LAGOS AND LUANDA** .....

AND SAVING TO .....

REPEATED TO (for info) ..... **IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK, CAPE TOWN** .....

SAVING TO (for info) .....

Distribution:-

- Files
- Rhodesia Dept
- PS
- PS/LPS
- PS/Mr Luce
- PS/PUS
- Sir A Duff
- Mr Day
- News Dept
- CAfD
- EAD
- SAfd
- WAD

Copies to:-

(TEXT)

RHODESIA; CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE

1. I expect to table the Government's expanded constitutional proposals for Rhodesia at a Plenary session in Lancaster House on the afternoon of Wednesday 3 October. These will comprise a full description of the independence constitution for Rhodesia, but will not be in their final legal form. For your own information at this stage, these proposals will not be open for further amendment: I shall be inviting the parties to say whether or not they accept them after a defined period of reflection.
2. It is important to ensure that the Front Line Presidents are brought up to date with our view of progress at the conference before the full description

of the constitution is tabled. Lusaka, Dar-es-Salaam and Gaborone should therefore deliver the following personal message from the Prime Minister to the Front Line Presidents as soon as possible.

3. Maputo, Lagos and Luanda should seek an opportunity to speak in similar terms to senior representatives of the Governments to which they are accredited before our constitutional proposals are tabled.

4. Message from the Prime Minister to Presidents Kaunda, Nyerere and Khana:

BEGINS

"You will, I am sure, have been getting reports from your representatives in London about the progress of the Constitutional Conference. Although discussion in this first stage of the Conference has (inevitably, I suppose) taken longer than I for one had hoped, it has produced a very thorough and detailed examination of the positions and desires of both sides to the conflict. As a result, we shall very shortly be in a position to table our own full version of the Constitution which we should be prepared to enact for Rhodesia. Given the strongly differing views between the parties, our Constitution will naturally not satisfy either of them, but we are hopeful, indeed very hopeful, that they will both accept it.

"We shall then be able to move on to the second phase. It is of course clear to all of us that if the Conference is to be successful and achieve its aims, agreement on the Constitution must be followed by agreement on the arrangements for the pre-independence period, both civil and military. In

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN



other words, once we have a Constitution, we have to agree how to bring it into effect. As you and I well know, this stage of our negotiations will throw up a number of difficult problems which, although transient, will in some respects be more difficult to resolve than those of the Constitution itself.

"However, with your support, we shall press on in good faith and resolve to implement to the full the understanding we so happily reached between us at Lusaka.

Margaret Thatcher"

ENDS

[RHODESIA: POLICY:

ADVANCE COPIES]

IMMEDIATE

ADVANCE COPY

PS/SIR I GILMOUR  
PS/MR LUCE  
PS/PUS  
SIR A DUFF  
MR WILLSON  
MR BYATT  
LORD N G LENNOX

PS/NO 10 DOWNING STREET

MR R L WADE-GERY )  
MR P M MAXEY )  
COL MOIR ) CABINET  
MR P J FOWLER ) OFFICE  
DIO )

MR DAD  
..MR ASPIN....  
HD/RHODESIA DEPT (6)

HD/C AF D  
HD/S AF D

HD/PUSD (2)

HD/NEWS DEPT

HD/WAD

MR FREELAND LEGAL ADVISER RM K200A

MR FIFOOT LEGAL ADVISER RM K164

RESIDENT CLERK

Prime Minister

*[Handwritten signature]*

OO FCO DESKBY 030700Z

GPS 650

SECRET

DESKBY 030700Z

FM MIRIMBA SALISBURY 021745Z OCT 79

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 705 OF 2 OCTOBER

MY TELNO 696 AND YOUR TELS 218 AND 219: RHODESIAD: DISCUSSION WITH NATIONAL JOC: PRE-INDEPENDENCE ARRANGEMENTS.

1. WHEN WE MET THIS MORNING THE ANXIETIES OF THE RHODESIAN SIDE HAD UNFORTUNATELY INCREASED WITH FULLER CONSIDERATION. OUR DISCUSSION OF CEASEFIRE ARRANGEMENTS IS REPORTED IN MY TWO IFTS. THEY BEGAN BY QUESTIONING THE WISDOM OF OUR PROPOSALS ON THE CIVIL/CONSTITUTIONAL SIDE.

2. THEY CLEARLY BELIEVE THAT MUZOREWA WILL PUT HIMSELF AT A VERY DANGEROUS POLITICAL DISADVANTAGE QUOTE IN AFRICAN TERMS UNQUOTE IF HE GIVES UP HIS POSITION AS PRIME MINISTER: QUOTE HE MIGHT AS WELL JUST ABDICATE UNQUOTE. THEY DOUBT WHETHER HE

HE MIGHT AS WELL JUST ABDOICATE UNQUOTE. THEY DOUBT WHETHER HE COULD WIN THE ELECTION IN THAT CIRCUMSTANCE, AND WHETHER HE HAD THOUGHT THROUGH THE POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS BEFORE INDICATING TO US WILLINGNESS TO COMPLY. THEY IMPLIED STRONGLY THAT THEY WOULD BE SEEKING TO PERSUADE HIM TO CHANGE HIS MIND.

3. THEY ASKED WHETHER WE COULD NOT INSTEAD CONSIDER EITHER:

(V) LIFT SANCTIONS ON THE BASIS THAT A NEW CONSTITUTION HAD BEEN AGREED AND THAT LEGAL INDEPENDENCE WAS IMMINENT, CONFINING OUR OWN ROLE TO SUPERVISING, OR EVEN ORGANISING, THE ELECTION OR

(B) CONTINUE THE PRESENT GOVERNMENT IN OFFICE ON A CARETAKER BASIS UNDER THE RETURN TO LEGALITY, REMOVING ONLY THE PRESIDENT AND REPLACING HIM WITH A BRITISH NOMINEE, IF NECESSARY WITH THE TITLE OF GOVERNOR OR GOVERNOR GENERAL EVEN THOUGH THAT WOULD BE UNPALATEABLE TO MANY WHITES. THIS WOULD BE A RETURN TO THE PRE-UDI SITUATION. AGAIN WE WOULD SUPERVISE OR ORGANISE THE ELECTION.

4. THEY DID NOT PRESS (A), TO WHICH I HAD EXPLAINED THE OBJECTIONS YESTERDAY. I EXPLAINED THAT (B), WHILE ARGUABLY ADEQUATE AS A CONSTITUTIONAL BASIS FOR A QUOTE RETURN TO LEGALITY UNQUOTE, WOULD CARRY VERY LIMITED CONVICTION WITH INTERNATIONAL OPINION AND DO ALMOST NOTHING TO MEET PARAGRAPH 4(C) OF YOUR FIRST TUR (PRESSURE ON KAUNDA'S SUPPORT FOR THE WAR). THEY SUGGESTED THAT WE WERE BEING VER-OPTIMISTIC ABOUT THE EXTENT TO WHICH FRONT LINE GOVERNMENTS COULD BE INFLUENCED AND THAT THEIR PROPOSAL AT (B) ABOVE MIGHT BE THE BEST COURSE AVAILABLE (FROM OUR POINT OF VIEW) WHICH WAS ALSO COMPATIBLE WITH OUR OBJECTIVE OF NOT GIVING ADVANTAGE TO THE PATRIOTIC FRONT.

5. IN PUSHING THIS SUGGESTION I SUSPECT THAT THEY HAVE IN MIND NOT ONLY MUZOREWA'S POSITION, BUT ALSO THEIR OWN. IN THE DISCUSSIONS ON CEASEFIRE ARRANGEMENTS THEY PRESSED HARD AS TO WHO WOULD HAVE RESPONSIBILITY FOR DECIDING WHEN CEASEFIRE BREACHES HAD REACHED A POINT WHICH REQUIRED ACTIVE INTERVENTION BY THE SECURITY FORCES. THEY ARE CLEARLY RELUCTANT TO FIND THEMSELVES IN A POSITION WHERE THE SECURITY FORCES WERE FORBIDDEN TO INTERVENE WHEN THE NATIONAL JOC JUDGED IT OPERATIONALLY ESSENTIAL THAT THEY SHOULD DO SO. THEY ALSO ATTACH IMPORTANCE TO THE QUOTE NON-POLITICAL UNQUOTE NATURE OF THEIR RESPECTIVE SERVICES AND, ALTHOUGH THIS WAS NOT MENTIONED, I SUSPECT THAT THEY SEE THE POSSIBILITY OF A SITUATION WHERE THEY WOULD BE REGARDED BY THE WHITE COMMUNITY AS THE ONLY LEGITIMATE DEFENDERS OF RHODESIAN INTERESTS AND COULD BE UNDER PRESSURE TO

DISREGARD OR ACT WITHOUT THE BRITISH ADMINISTRATOR'S INSTRUCTIONS,  
WE TOLD THEM THAT WE ASSUME THAT THE ADMINISTRATOR WOULD TAKE  
ADVICE DIRECTLY FROM THEM AS WELL AS FROM ANY CEASEFIRE  
MONITORING OR LIAISON BODIES (PARA 15 TO 17 OF OUR BRIEF) ABOUT  
WHETHER THE SECURITY FORCES SHOULD ASSUME ACTIVE OPERATIONS BUT  
THAT NO FINAL CONCLUSIONS HAD YET BEEN REACHED IN LONDON ABOUT  
PRECISELY HOW SUCH A DECISION WOULD BE TAKEN. WE SUGGESTED THAT  
IT MIGHT BE USEFUL TO AGREE IN ADVANCE ON CRITERIA WHICH  
WOULD BE APPLIED IN JUDGING WHETHER INCIDENTS REQUIRED THE ACTIVE  
INTERVENTION OF THE SECURITY FORCES, BUT THEY DID NOT TAKE THIS  
UP.

BYATT

NNNN

IMMEDIATE

FCO stock letter



Foreign and Commonwealth Office  
London SW1A 2AH

Telephone 01-

Lg  
Purd

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Your reference

Our reference

Date

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Thank you for your letter to the Prime Minister about Rhodesia, to which I have been asked to reply.

The Government are committed to bring Rhodesia to legal independence as soon as possible; but they said in their manifesto, and have made clear all along, that they consider that they must do all they can to ensure that Rhodesia gains wide acceptance in the international community. The government are convinced that to have granted independence to Rhodesia immediately after they took office on 3 May, or at any time subsequently, would have done all Rhodesians, black and white, a considerable disservice. Our objective is to achieve a satisfactory settlement which will help bring an end to the conflict and enable us to grant legal independence to Rhodesia and to lift sanctions.

At the Conference in which we are now involved we have made considerable progress towards agreement on the constitution: Bishop Muzorewa has accepted our proposals in principle and the Patriotic Front have accepted the concept of 20 per cent. white representation in the Assembly. We will continue to do our utmost to reach a settlement based on agreement with all concerned.

Rhodesia Department

SECRET

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GR 125

SECRET

DESKBY 020730Z

FM MIRIMBA SALISBURY 011600Z OCT 79

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 698 OF 1 OCTOBER

MY TELNO 696: RHODESIA: NJOC

1. WE WERE QUESTIONED ABOUT THE EXTENT TO WHICH A BRITISH ADMINISTRATOR WOULD CONTROL OR HAVE TO AUTHORISE POLICE AND (IF A CEASEFIRE BROKE DOWN) SECURITY FORCE OPERATIONS. WE SPOKE IN TERMS OF PARA 16 OF OUR BRIEF, BUT I EXPECT THEM TO RETURN TO THIS SUBJECT WHICH TOUCHES THEM DIRECTLY. WE CAN HEDGE IF NECESSARY, BUT A CLEARER ANSWER WOULD HELP TO BUILD UP THEIR CONFIDENCE. BEARING IN MIND THAT, IN ADDITION TO NORMAL POLICING, THE POLICE HAVE VARIOUS UNITS WHICH OPERATE IN PARA-MILITARY FASHION IN RURAL AREAS, IS THERE ANY SUPPLEMENTARY GUIDANCE YOU WISH TO GIVE ON THIS?

BYATT

FILES

RHODESIA DEPT

OADS

N AM D

NEWS D

PUSD

PLANNING STAFF

ES & SD

CCD

FRD

UND

LEGAL ADVS. (MR FREELAND)  
(MR FIFOOT)

ECON D

P & CD

DEF D

OID

PS

PS/LPS

PS/MR LUCE

PS/MR RIDLEY

PS/MR HURD

PS/PUS

SIR A DUFF

LORD N G LENNOX

MISS BROWN

MR DAY

MR WILLSON

MR ASPIN

ADDITIONAL DISTN.

RHODESIA POLICY

SECRET

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FM MIRIMBA SALISBURY 011430Z OCT 79

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 696 OF 1 OCTOBER

*Prime Minister (2 tils)*

*W. A.*

RHODESIA: DISCUSSIONS WITH THE NATIONAL JOINT OPERATIONS COMMITTEE

SUMMARY

1. REILLY AND I MET THE NJOC, CHAIRED BY WALLS, THIS MORNING. THEY CLEARLY SAW MAJOR PRACTICAL DIFFICULTIES AND POLITICAL RISKS IN THE ARRANGEMENTS WHICH WE ENVISAGE. THEIR INITIAL REACTIONS WERE VERY NEGATIVE AND EVEN TOWARDS THE END OF THE MEETING WALLS SUMMED UP THAT SECTION OF THE DISCUSSION BY SAYING THAT ANY CEASEFIRE WOULD ENORMOUSLY STRENGTHEN THE PF'S ELECTORAL PROSPECTS, SO ANY SCHEME SHOULD BE SUCH THAT THE PF WERE BOUND TO REJECT IT. ON THE OTHER HAND, THE NJOC ARE CLEARLY GRATIFIED AND REASSURED BY THE FACT THAT WE ARE SEEKING THEIR VIEWS AND THEY ARE VERY ANXIOUS TO FIND A SCHEME WHICH WILL STRENGTHEN MUZOREWA'S ELECTORAL POSITION BY GETTING SANCTIONS LIFTED AT THE OUTSET. THEY ARE DISCUSSING AMONG THEMSELVES THIS AFTERNOON AND WE ARE TO MEET THEM AGAIN AT 9.00 AM TOMORROW.

DETAIL

2. ALTHOUGH FLOWER HAD PREVIOUSLY BRIEFED THEM, THE NJOC ASKED US TO SET OUT THE POSITION FULLY. I THEREFORE EXPLAINED DEVELOPMENTS SINCE MAY IN SOME DETAIL AND SPOKE FULLY ON THE LINES OF THE BRIEF (AS AMENDED BY YOUR TELNO 351 TO PRETORIA), STRESSING THAT HMG'S OBJECTIVE WAS TO SECURE RECOGNITION AND LIFTING OF SANCTIONS BY THE MAXIMUM NUMBER OF COUNTRIES, AND IF POSSIBLE TO SCALE DOWN THE WAR, BUT WITHOUT IN ANY CIRCUMSTANCES DISADVANTAGING THE SECURITY FORCES.

3. THE MEMBERS OF THE NJOC START FROM THE ASSUMPTION THAT THE PF WILL NOT PLAY FAIR. THEY ARGUE THAT THE NATURE OF THE CONFLICT

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IS SUCH THAT A CEASEFIRE WOULD AUTOMATICALLY PUT THEM AND THEIR POLITICIANS AT A DISADVANTAGE. THE PF NEED NOT FIRE A SHOT DURING THE CEASEFIRE TO ACHIEVE THEIR ELECTORAL ENDS. RELATIVELY FEW GUERRILLAS LEFT AT LARGE WITH CACHED ARMS WOULD, THROUGH THE NETWORK OF MUJIBAS (YOUNG TERRORIST INFORMERS AND AUXILIARIES), BE ABLE TO INTIMIDATE VOTERS IN THE TTLS ON A LARGE SCALE.

4. THEY ARGUED AT ONE STAGE THAT THE ONLY BASIS ON WHICH A CEASEFIRE COULD BE ACCEPTABLE WOULD BE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL PF PERSONNEL FROM THE COUNTRY. WE SAID THIS WOULD NOT BE NEGOTIABLE. THEY SAW GREAT DIFFICULTY ABOUT ANY SCHEME REQUIRING GUERRILLAS TO CONCENTRATE AT DESIGNATED AREAS, EVEN IF THE AREAS WERE ON THE BORDER. EVEN IF THE PF LEADERSHIP AGREED TO SUCH A SCHEME MANY OR MOST OF THE TERRORISTS WOULD PROBABLY DECLINE TO PUT THEMSELVES AT RHODESIAN MERCY IN THE EVENT OF RESUMED HOSTILITIES BY CONCENTRATING IN THIS WAY. HOW WOULD WE ESTABLISH THAT ALL THE TERRORISTS HAD CONCENTRATED? WHAT WOULD HAPPEN IF ONLY SOME OF THOSE IN THE COUNTRY TURNED UP AT CONCENTRATION CENTRES. (WE SAID THAT, WHILE WITHOUT INSTRUCTIONS, WE ASSUMED THAT IF CONCENTRATION WERE PART OF THE CEASEFIRE AGREEMENT AND WAS NOT EFFECTIVELY IMPLEMENTED THE CEASEFIRE COULD HARDLY BE DEEMED TO HAVE COME INTO EFFECT). IF SIGNIFICANT MEMBERS OF TERRORISTS DID CONCENTRATE, IT WAS ONLY TOO LIKELY THAT THEY WOULD BE REPLACED IN THE COUNTRYSIDE BY OTHERS BROUGHT IN FROM EXTERNAL BASES. THE NJOC DO NOT BELIEVE THAT IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO CONTROL INFILTRATION EFFECTIVELY BY BORDER PATROLLING. THEREFORE, IF A SCHEME CAN BE WORKED OUT, THEY WOULD REGARD EFFECTIVE CONTROL OF MOVEMENT FROM CAMPS IN ZAMBIA AND MOZAMBIQUE AS AN ESSENTIAL ELEMENT. GENERAL WALLS REMARKED THAT EFFECTIVE MONITORING OF PF CONCENTRATION AREAS WITHIN RHODESIA WOULD REQUIRE "THOUSANDS OF PEOPLE".

5. THEY SAW DIFFICULTIES ABOUT A CEASEFIRE SCHEME WHICH WAS TO BE MONITORED BUT NOT ENFORCED. THEIR POINT WAS THAT, IF THERE WAS NO PENALTY FOR BREACHING THE CEASEFIRE (SUCH AS DISQUALIFICATION FROM PARTICIPATION IN THE ELECTION) THERE WOULD BE LITTLE TO DISCOURAGE THE PF FROM AGREEING TO THE SCHEME AND CHEATING WIDELY. THEY DID NOT OTHERWISE COMMENT ON OUR SUGGESTIONS ABOUT A MONITORING FORCE.

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16.



6. THE COMMISSIONER OF POLICE (ALLUM) IS APPREHENSIVE THAT THE TASK OF MAINTAINING LAW AND ORDER, PREVENTING EXCESSIVE INTIMIDATION, AND MONITORING CEASEFIRE BREACHES (HE REGARDS THE THREE AS RUNNING INTO ONE ANOTHER) WOULD BE BEYOND THE CAPACITY OF THE POLICE EVEN IN CIRCUMSTANCES WHERE THE PF WERE, MORE OR LESS, COMPLYING WITH A CEASEFIRE. HE MADE THE POINT THAT, IN THE ATMOSPHERE OF AN ELECTION, IT WOULD BE NECESSARY TO KEEP A CLOSE EYE NOT ONLY ON THE ACTIVITIES OF PF AUXILIARIES BUT ALSO THOSE OF THE INTERNAL POLITICAL PARTIES ("THEIR METHODS ARE NOT YOURS OR OURS").

7. HAVING DISCUSSED THE ABOVE POINTS BACK AND FORTH, WE CAME BACK TO THE LIFTING OF SANCTIONS, THE NJOC, LIKE THE POLITICIANS, THINK IT ESSENTIAL THAT THIS SHOULD HAPPEN AS SOON AS POSSIBLE AND PREFERABLY ON MUZOREWA'S RETURN FROM LONDON. THEY CONSIDER THAT HE WILL BE RUNNING A TREMENDOUS ELECTORAL RISK IF HE AGREES TO STEP ASIDE FROM THE PRIME MINISTERSHIP, EVEN IF SANCTIONS ARE LIFTED. WITHOUT THE LIFTING OF SANCTIONS THEY BELIEVE HIS ELECTORAL POSITION WOULD BE HOPELESS. THEY GAVE THE IMPRESSION OF BEING GENUINELY CONCERNED TO DO WHATEVER THEY CAN TO ASSIST HIM. IT WAS IN THIS CONTEXT THAT THEY AGREED TO REFLECT FURTHER AMONG THEMSELVES AND TO DISCUSS WITH US TOMORROW WHETHER SOME FEASIBLE CEASEFIRE SCHEME COULD BE WORKED OUT. THEY SEE LITTLE ATTRACTION IN A GUARANTEE THAT SANCTIONS WOULD BE LIFTED ON INDEPENDENCE AFTER THE ELECTION: THEY EXPLAINED, WITH APOLOGIES, THAT THERE WOULD BE WIDESPREAD POPULAR MISTRUST OF SUCH A GUARANTEE AMONG BLACKS AS WELL AS WHITES.

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8. OUR DISCUSSIONS WERE FRIENDLY AND BUSINESSLIKE AND WALLS EXPRESSED SEVERAL TIMES HIS SATISFACTION AT OUR VISIT. HE AND HIS COLLEAGUES HAVE TAKEN WELL ON BOARD THE NEED TO KEEP OUR DISCUSSIONS AND REILLY'S PRESENCE CLOSELY GUARDED, AND I THINK THEY WILL DO SO.

BYATT

FILES  
RHODESIA DEPT  
OADS  
N AM D  
NEWS D  
PUSD  
PLANNING STAFF  
ES & SD  
CCD  
FRD  
UND  
LEGAL ADVS. (MR FREELAND)  
(MR FIFOOT)  
ECON D  
P & CD

DEF D  
OID  
PS  
PS/LPS  
PS/MR LUCE  
PS/MR RIDLEY  
PS/MR HURD  
PS/PUS  
SIR A DUFF  
LORD N G LENNOX  
MISS BROWN  
MR DAY  
MR WILLSON  
MR ASPIN

ADDITIONAL DISTN.  
RHODESIA POLICY

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*Assumed between PA & F.C.S.*

PM/79/83

PRIME MINISTER

*Ls  
P  
3/4*

Rhodesia: The Pre-Independence Arrangements

1. We are now close to agreement with Bishop Muzorewa and his delegation on a full description of the independence Constitution. I intend to table this in the Conference next week and to wind up discussion of the Constitution (apart from legal drafting) as quickly as I can.
  
2. The Patriotic Front will resist our proposals and may try to prolong the discussion. But they have accepted that 20% of the seats in the House of Assembly should be reserved to the white community. Their unaccustomed moderation up to now shows the extent of the pressure they are under from the Front Line states. The indications still are that the Zambians want a settlement. Nkomo would also like one, but will find it difficult to accept our terms and to produce plausible reasons for breaking with Mugabe.
  
3. It is probable that the Patriotic Front will come near enough to acceptance of our Constitution to enable us to go on to the next stage of the Conference in the week beginning 8 October. This must be based on our proposals for the pre-independence period. These proposals should be designed to meet a situation in which we have all-party agreement to proceed to elections and independence; but they should at the same time be adaptable for use if we are going ahead with the Salisbury government alone.
  
4. Our objective should be to devise a plan for elections which would:
  - (a) help Muzorewa as much as possible - and therefore be acceptable to him;
  - (b) win the widest possible international recognition for Rhodesia (and safeguard our position in international law);



(c) enable us to demonstrate, if the Patriotic Front refuse to participate, that they have been given a fair chance to do so.

5. Our aim when discussion of the pre-independence arrangements begin in the plenary sessions should be to get the Bishop to make a statement in the Conference on the following lines:-

(a) he had agreed the independence Constitution to be enacted by the British Parliament;

(b) the illegal declaration of independence had been nothing to do with him;

(c) he had already won elections in which 1.8 million people had participated.

But

(d) in the interests of attracting international recognition for his country, he was prepared to accept the agreement by the Commonwealth Heads of Government that new elections should be held and that these should be supervised under the British Government's authority.

6. Such a statement would put the Bishop in the best possible position vis-a-vis the international community. The only new element in it is 5 (d). In private discussion he has assured us that he can accept this.

7. We should work for an arrangement which will enable us to declare that the state of rebellion has ended and that legality has been restored before independence. If legality has not been restored by November, we shall be in great difficulty over Section 2 of the Southern Rhodesia Act. The attraction for Bishop Muzorewa in a return to legality before independence is that it would enable us to lift sanctions forthwith and thus give him considerable advantage in the elections. The lifting of sanctions would encourage the whites and help to ensure

/their



their cooperation. We must ensure that the Salisbury parties understand that, if the removal of sanctions is to be of maximum benefit to them, it must be conditional on their having accepted an independence Constitution and arrangements for the transition to independence which are internationally defensible. The legislative steps for effecting a return to legality are summarised at Annex A. The subsequent provision for elections and an independence constitution will require an Act of Parliament.

8. The basis for a return to legality before independence likely to carry most conviction with the international community and exert most pressure on the Front Line States' support for the Patriotic Front, would be to make interim "colonial" arrangements, under the authority of a British Administrator, (or "Agent" which may be a more acceptable title in Rhodesia), who would have full legislative and executive authority for the administration for a limited period (the aim would be to conduct the election and proceed to independence within at most 12 weeks). In practice the Administrator would confine his activities very largely to what was strictly necessary for the electoral process (including the supervision of the police). The present government would stand aside, with Bishop Muzorewa concentrating on the electoral campaign. The administration of the country would be carried on by Rhodesian civil servants (under the authority of the Administrator); but the formal legal position would need to be a vesting of authority in the UK or its appointee. The incentive for the Rhodesians would be:-

- (a) British economic sanctions would be removed immediately the Administrator took over;
- (b) The arrangement would put pressure on the Front Line Presidents either to push the Patriotic Front into agreeing a ceasefire and participating in elections or to diminish their support for them.

The Patriotic Front would try to negotiate with us the arrangements for control over the administration etc, but we should take firmly the line that this is our business.



9. Bishop Muzorewa is prepared to agree to a plan of  
/ this kind (you may wish to see the enclosed record of his  
talk with the Lord Privy Seal). Apart from the immediate  
lifting of sanctions, it has for him the great advantage that  
it would be the present civil service and the police force  
who would be administering the elections. The plan would  
maintain momentum towards a settlement. It would put the  
Bishop - as the man who had negotiated the basis for legal  
independence and who had already achieved the lifting of  
sanctions - in a strong electoral position.

10. The Patriotic Front would be in a difficult position.  
They would not want to participate in elections on any  
terms which did not give them a major say in their administration,  
and possibly would refuse to do so. But a return to legality  
on this basis, especially if the Patriotic Front had, even  
conditionally, accepted the independence Constitution, would  
largely under-cut their arguments about the legality of the pre-  
independence regime, even if they continued to dispute its  
impartiality. (They would continue to argue that elections  
held within the existing administration and security forces in  
place would put them at a disadvantage; and that there should  
be some neutral force.)

11. Vis-a-vis the Commonwealth, the elections would manifestly  
be held under our authority. There could be no guarantee that  
we would get full Front Line support. But the "respectable"  
international community would find it harder to see anything  
wrong with this plan - provided they could be assured of our  
involvement as impartial supervisors. If the Patriotic Front  
refused to co-operate, we could still proceed immediately with  
the return to legality, the lifting of sanctions (despite  
resisting in the Security Council) and the arrangements for  
elections in which we would keep open the offer to the Patriotic  
Front to participate. But the difficulty in that case is that  
we would be in effect responsible for the Rhodesian Army's  
actions in the continuing war. We would be able to say at every  
stage that we were acting in complete accordance with the

/Lusaka



Lusaka communique (and it is this which is worrying the Patriotic Front). With sanctions already lifted, the Bishop would have the best possible chance of achieving a high turn-out in the elections, and of winning them.

12. We have begun to prepare the ground with some of the white members of Muzorewa's delegation - in particular David Smith. We shall be in touch with General Walls, whose co-operation will be essential. We shall also have to carry the South Africans with us.

13. As part of the plan, we shall need to propose:-

- (a) a ceasefire; and
- (b) the disengagement of the forces.

Commonwealth and other observers would be invited to witness the elections.

14. What are the main disadvantages of this plan?

15. If the Patriotic Front participates, the main difficulty will be in maintaining the ceasefire. A small military "third force" might well be necessary to monitor it. Any such force would have to be acceptable in Salisbury. A small Commonwealth force composed of acceptable elements would have the effect of driving a further wedge between the Patriotic Front and the Commonwealth governments supporting them and might well prove to be a sine qua non for Kaunda's support. But we should not put forward any such ideas without Muzorewa's prior agreement. It will be very difficult in practice to devise an agreement for the separation of forces which would not put one side or the other at a disadvantage. There would be no point in putting forward proposals in this area which would be unacceptable to the Rhodesian military commanders. We are exploring the possibilities with General Walls.

16. If the Patriotic Front do not participate, we should be engaged, with the Rhodesian administration, in supervising /elections

*Am very worried about this proposal. Think it will be a disaster for Muzorewa to accept and for the Patriotic Party.*



elections with the war continuing. But Muzorewa has said that he will accept elections; and we will have to be prepared to fulfil the commitment in the Lusaka communique. We should need to show that our supervision of the elections is effective, and if the war continues our supervisors could be at some risk. The Front Line States might continue to support the Patriotic Front - though this plan would give us the basis on which to try to persuade some of them at least that they should no longer do so. We should be legally responsible for the activities of the Rhodesian administration as a whole and our responsibility under international law for the Rhodesian military would be irrefutable. We should have to get General Walls to give us a firm assurance that, for the period required to organise the elections, military activity by the Rhodesian forces vis-a-vis Zambia and Mozambique would be restricted to defence from inside Rhodesian frontiers. But our responsibility would last only for a strictly limited period (in this case less than the 12 weeks envisaged in the main plan).

17. We should have to reckon with resistance at the United Nations to the lifting of sanctions on the basis of a return to legality without the Patriotic Front. We have prepared an argument that, with a return to legality, sanctions will lapse. This is not an argument which will be generally accepted in the event, without participation of the Patriotic Front, of either a return to legality or of the granting of legal independence. In the event of a temporary return to dependent status, it may be argued by others that sanctions ought not to be lifted until after elections have been held; or that they should only be suspended pending the elections. But if we do not get rid of sanctions before an election without the Patriotic Front's participation, we may find it even more difficult to get rid of sanctions after it. There would therefore be advantage in going straight to the lifting of sanctions from the outset, provided we have a fully defensible interim arrangement. This would have most effect on the situation inside Rhodesia.

18. Sir Ian Sinclair (the FCO Legal Adviser) advises me that

*If the P.F. does not participate there is little point in further elections.*

*Not possible if the Rhodesians hold-up continues*





a full-scale return to legality would give us respectable arguments to deploy in the Security Council. The lifting of sanctions before granting legal independence can only be justified on the basis of our being seen to assume direct responsibility and authority for Rhodesia in the interim period before independence.

19. The main resistance to a return to legality on these terms is likely to come from Ian Smith, who will try to insist that the present government should remain in office. It would be very difficult to devise pre-independence arrangements on this basis which would have much chance of attracting international support, even if we appointed a British Election Commissioner to work alongside the existing government. This arrangement would carry little conviction with the Front Line States. President Kaunda would be unlikely to put any pressure on Nkomo to participate. Even if the Election Commissioner was able to claim that the police would act under his authority, it is unlikely that anyone, with the probable exception of the Americans, would follow our example in lifting sanctions in these circumstances; and we should find ourselves isolated or with very little support at the United Nations.

20. If we cannot secure the agreement of the Salisbury delegation to a return to legality on terms which offer good prospects of attracting international support, we should still want to do our best to say that we were complying with the Lusaka communique and were prepared to exercise supervision over the electoral process. But without a return to legality sanctions could not formally be lifted before independence and we should have to consider how to deal with the situation arising from the probable lapse of Section 2 of the 1965 Act before that date.

#### CONCLUSIONS

21. In relation to the pre-independence arrangements, as over the Constitution, we must retain the initiative. The

/Patriotic

*Not only  
from him  
that has all  
that who  
feel that we  
are going to  
an unstable  
situation*



Patriotic Front will be able to direct the course of discussion over the interim period towards their proposals for transitional Councils, etc unless we proceed on the basis of a firm British plan. We will gain most political advantage, and so will the Rhodesians, from a plan for the interim which involves the acceptance by the Rhodesians of a return to dependent status under British authority. This would cause the most difficulty for the Patriotic Front. Next in order of feasibility, but much less attractive to the Salisbury parties and to us, would be to proceed to independence without a preliminary return to legality.

*We should need American support before*

22. If we can get the Salisbury delegation to agree to a return to legality with a British Administrator we should work hard to get American support for this approach; a return to legality would enable them to lift sanctions too. This would do a great deal to promote stability and confidence in Rhodesia.

23. We should meanwhile press ahead with completion of the full independence Constitution, with a view to enacting it in late October/early November. The Rhodesians should begin work on plans for the elections.

24. In the Conference, if agreement has been reached on the independence Constitution (however reluctantly by the Patriotic Front) we should begin to indicate our ideas with a brief statement on the lines set out at Annex B. The objectives of such a statement would be:-

(a) to make clear we are not prepared to  accept the Patriotic Front's ideas on the pre-independence arrangements;

(b) to indicate our intention to fulfil the commitment in the Lusaka communique; - *provided there is a leave free*

(c) to open the way for Bishop Muzorewa to state that he is prepared to accept elections held under our authority. - *provided there is a leave free*

*The British Admin*



ANNEX A

*would normally have an Advisory Council. Can that be the existing 'govt' augmented by Nkomo & Mugabe & they take part in the election.*

PROCEDURE FOR BRINGING RHODESIA TO INDEPENDENCE WITH A RETURN TO LEGAL DEPENDENT STATUS

*part in the election. M.T.*

1 The Government makes an Order in Council under Section 2 of Southern Rhodesia Act 1965, appointing an Administrator with full powers and suspending or amending the 1961 Constitution.

*Can't amend by order*

2 The Administrator arrives in Rhodesia and assumes his functions. The local administration complies with his directions.

*Under what law? Surely we shall have to accept the existing state of the law there*

3 The United Kingdom's Permanent Representative informs the Security Council that legal administration has been restored in Rhodesia and rebellion has come to an end.

[We therefore regard sanctions resolutions as having lapsed.]

4 British Government makes an Order in Council revoking all sanctions orders under the 1965 Act. This requires a resolution of both Houses within twenty-eight sitting days, but may come into operation beforehand. Other sanctions enforcement measures are revoked by administrative action and/or statutory instruments under other legislation (none is subject to Parliamentary procedure except the Exchange Control orders, which are subject to negative resolution).

*Management over Rhodesian bonds?*

5 Parliament approves both Orders in Council.

6 Introduction and passing of a short enabling Act to provide for the making of Orders in Council in respect of (a) elections (b) the independence Constitution (c) transitional provisions on independence (NB this cannot be done by Orders under the 1965 Act).

*Under what law? &*



7 Orders in Council are made under the Act.

8 Elections.

9 Introduction and passing of the Independence Bill.  
(The Act at 6 could provide for independence to be granted by Order in Council on date to be fixed following elections. But it will be strongly argued that Parliament should grant independence only after the elections have taken place. An Act will in any event be required to deal with consequential matters in UK law.)

10 Rhodesia becomes independent.



CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE  
OUTLINE OF PROPOSALS FOR IMPLEMENTING THE INDEPENDENCE  
CONSTITUTION

1 The independence Constitution will give the government the power to execute its policies within the law.

*What law? What about after this the constitution has passed?*

2 The elected government will be chosen by the people of Rhodesia in fair elections, in which all parties will be free to participate.

3 Under the independence Constitution the elected government will be in a position to carry out the policies on the basis of which it has been elected.

4 The services of the State will be at its disposal in doing so. The elected government will have the power to make changes in those services, as specified in the Constitution.

*i.e. the army, police & the civil service*

5 Until the elected government takes office, nothing should be done which prejudices or pre-empts the freedom of choice of the people of Rhodesia.

6 The election of the House of Assembly, which is the first step in the implementation of the independence Constitution will take place in the following conditions:-

(a) the administration of the election will be scrupulously impartial as between one party and another;

(b) peaceful political activity will be freely conducted; and

(c) all parties will have free and uncensored access to all the public media.

7 It will be for Britain, as the constitutionally responsible authority, to ensure that these requirements are met.

*- what General Walker?*



8 In accordance with the agreement in the Lusaka communiqué, the elections will be supervised under the authority of the British Government.

9 There will be a ceasefire and a disengagement of the military forces on either side during the election campaign.

10 There will be provision for the exercise of the right of vote by citizens of Rhodesia who are absent from the country.

11 There will be provision for all those citizens of Rhodesia who wish to do so to return.

12 A British Administrator/Election Commissioner will supervise the conduct of the election.

13 Commonwealth observers will be present to witness the manner in which that authority is exercised.

*And how  
do they  
move  
citizenship.*

SUMMARY RECORD OF PRIVATE CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE LORD PRIVY  
SEAL, SIR A DUFF, BISHOP MUZOREWA AND DR S MUNDAWARARA AT  
BROWN'S HOTEL, 26 SEPTEMBER 1979

CONSTITUTION

Sir A Duff said that the talks with the Bishop's delegation were progressing but with a little difficulty at official level. There would have to be a resolution of some points at principal level and an overall look at the balance. Sir I Gilmour said he thought we had already agreed that there could not be two votes for the Whites. Parliament here would not accept it. Bishop Muzorewa initially expressed some sympathy with White arguments that they should have one vote for the government, and one for their own representatives, but eventually concurred that this was unreasonable and said that we should put our foot down. Sir A Duff gave examples of small issues which were causing problems as we got beyond major obstacles into detail, and instanced items in the Declaration of Rights, such as preventive detention even outside a state of emergency (which should anyway be subject to parliamentary approval and review), /and /excessive protection for White property owners. After some hesitation Bishop Muzorewa said that the removal of these would cause no problem for him.

SENATE

In discussion of the Senate Bishop Muzorewa said that the chiefs had always sided with the Whites against the Africans. UANC had not been able to elect their own president of the Senate. He agreed a suggested formula of one-third Whites, one-third Africans and one-sixth (eg 6 or possibly 8 out of 36) Chiefs, the remainder possibly being appointed by the president to represent minorities not otherwise represented. Sir I Gilmour said that six months delaying power on ordinary legislation was excessive. Bishop Muzorewa agreed and indicated that two-three months maximum would be proper.

No -  
we have  
that

/ENACTMENT

## ENACTMENT

Sir I Gilmour suggested that if the Rhodesian Parliament had to enact the new Constitution it could at least delay the process towards independence. Dr Mundawarara said it would be much worse. The Whites would undo all that had been agreed in London. They hoped therefore that this could be circumvented.

## FORM OF CONSTITUTION

When discussion reverted to the Constitution at a later stage Bishop Muzorewa said that the fact that the 1979 Constitution had been rejected as defective on account of what the Whites had put into it presented them with an opportunity to start afresh. There was a natural resistance from those whose creature it had been but the delegation had been prepared by Mr Fifoot's visit for the fact that the Constitution would be presented as a new document. Since that was so, there were several items in it which they would prefer to have left out in the UK Constitution. Sir I Gilmour said it would be helpful if they would let us know what these were. Bishop Muzorewa mentioned the "dreadful education act", and medical legislation as examples. Sir A Duff assured him there was no question of wholesale entrenchment of what should be ordinary laws and had no place in a constitution. Sir I Gilmour said the Constitution was much too long. Bishop Muzorewa concluded that we could assist him not only by re-arranging the Constitution, but by cutting it down to essentials. Sir A Duff commented that this would nonetheless prolong debate on the Constitution.

## THE TRANSITION

Sir A Duff said the transition, to which the Conference might come fairly soon, posed some imponderable and difficult political problems. Our thinking was yet not far advanced, but we needed to be ready to take a firm plan, however much in outline, if we were to avoid getting dragged into discussion of the Patriotic Front's proposals. He asked the Bishop to encourage his side to do some thinking. Sir I Gilmour said that we wished to remove sanctions as quickly as possible. It would be easiest to do this in the context

*If Gov  
much is  
asked - they  
will.*



of a return to legality. Sir\_A\_Duff continued that we were thinking tentatively of the possibility of appointing a British "agent" who would have, at least formally, authority over the Salisbury administration. We could approach this presentationally and legally in such a way as to minimise any diminution of the Bishop's position. The early lifting of sanctions should help to win White support and enhance the Bishop's standing. Bishop\_Muzorewa said this was not a matter of political pride for him and he would accept it for the greater good of his country. He thought most of the African members of his delegation would also go along with it. The problems would be with "the White tribe". He was attracted to the suggestion that the agent might declare the parliament inoperative until elections had been held. Dr\_Mundawarara repeated that if the parliament got at our Constitution they would break up all that had been agreed in London.

#### ELECTIONS

Bishop\_Muzorewa thought that elections should be held as quickly as possible. Dr\_Mundawarara thought it an advantage that elections had recently been held. Mr\_Pope-Simmonds (the Registrar General in charge of the previous election) was in London and might be consulted by us. Asked what he thought the minimum campaign period which could reasonably be offered to the Patriotic Front, he said three months, to which Bishop\_Muzorewa agreed. In local terms this would mean elections during the rainy season (October-March) which would create considerable difficulties especially for voting in the outlying areas. But this should not be an insuperable obstacle.

#### MILITARY ARRANGEMENTS

Bishop\_Muzorewa said that the Security Forces would not tolerate being hamstrung or confined to barracks. The Patriotic Front did not have control over all their forces in the field and we could not

/expect

expect the war to end automatically even if there was an agreed ceasefire. Many of the Patriotic Front forces were merely undisciplined bandits. Sir A Duff said we had two principles : that there should be a ceasefire, and that the existing security forces should not be disadvantaged. Beyond that we as yet had no firm plan. However we needed for our own credibility to be prepared to put one forward, if only in outline, as part of our initial statement on the transition. Sir I Gilmour commented that a stand-off, however implausible it might seem, was preferable to an attempt to integrate the forces prior to elections, which was impossible. Bishop Muzorewa said that Mr Flower and others had been thinking about these matters. Mr Flower was going back to Salisbury on 27 September. He would welcome it if we wished to send people to talk to the military in Salisbury. Sir I Gilmour said we would like to do this quickly, and if possible, discreetly. Mr Day might take out his successor Mr Byatt to introduce him. Bishop Muzorewa expressed regret that Mr Day was being replaced. He had done an enormous amount of good in rebuilding Britain's image among the Rhodesians, including many Whites.

## GENERAL

Bishop Muzorewa said he thought an all-party agreement was possible. He had repeatedly told his delegation that they could not count on the Patriotic Front walking out : powerful outside influences were helping them at the Conference table. Bishop Muzorewa did not foresee a split in the Patriotic Front during the Conference. He thought their strategy now was to go through with elections, which he thought they would contest as separate parties, and possibly reform an alliance thereafter to take power from himself. They were skilful at maintaining a superficial unity but if they achieved power would then turn to fighting each other.

Bishop Muzorewa thought that with the concession on the blocking mechanism he had passed the point of greatest danger of a split within his own delegation. He thought progress so far had been satisfactory and was optimistic about the outcome. He repeated his

/total

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total confidence in the British Government and said the Africans in his delegation did not wish the Africans to be caught up in the old battle of the Whites against the British Government.

Distribution

PS

PS/Mr Luce

PS/PUS

Sir A Duff

Mr Day

Mr Byatt

~~Mr~~ Renwick

Mr Fifoot

SECRET

*2*  
*Rhodesia*



MINISTRY OF DEFENCE  
MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1  
Telephone 01-~~XXXXXX~~ 218 2111/3

SECRET

28th September 1979

MO 5/6

*MW*  
*- 28/9*

*Dear Pym,*

RHODESIA: CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE

Mr Pym is glad to agree to Lord Carrington's request, conveyed in your letter to me of yesterday, that Brigadier Jeremy Reilly should undertake a mission to Rhodesia next week. Mr Pym recognises that it is clearly important for the Brigadier to undertake this work for the Foreign and Commonwealth Office notwithstanding his demanding responsibilities as Commander of 6th Field Force.

I assume that the Department will be consulted in good time if the requirement arises for any further military participation in missions in connection with the Conference on Rhodesia.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Michael Alexander (No 10).

*Yours and*  
*Brian Norbury*

(B M NORBURY)

R M J Lyne Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

SECRET  
SECRET

28 SEP 1979



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ef 4/10.79



File

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

27 September 1979

Dear George

Call by Mr. Chona

Mr. Chona called on the Prime Minister this morning as arranged. I enclose a copy of the record of their conversation.

It may be worth adding that I asked Mr. Chona after his talk with the Prime Minister whether the Patriotic Front had given any thought to the participation in an election of those of their forces that remained outside the country during the transitional period. Mr. Chona was inclined to dismiss this as a secondary issue: he said it ought to be possible to organise some kind of postal voting but added that the Patriotic Front might be prepared for their forces not to participate in the voting. This last observation seems to be so improbable as to cast some doubt on the degree to which the substance of the message delivered by Mr. Chona on President Kaunda's behalf has in fact been discussed with the Patriotic Front.

You will note that Mr. Chona asked whether there was any message that he could send back to President Kaunda about the Prime Minister's views on the course of the Constitutional Conference. He referred at another point in the discussion to President Kaunda's anxiety for some "feed-back". You may think therefore that the Prime Minister should at some point send President Kaunda a message in reply to that delivered by Mr. Chona.

Yours ever

Michael Alexander

George Walden, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CONFIDENTIAL

25

**CONFIDENTIAL**

*Master Set*  
cc: Master Set  
Zambia, May '79, Zambia (UK) Relation

NOTE OF A TALK BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER AND MR. MARK CHONA AT  
10 DOWNING STREET AT 0900 ON THURSDAY 27 SEPTEMBER

Present:

Prime Minister

Mr. Mark Chona

Mr. Michael Alexander

H.E. Miss L.P. Chibesakunda

\* \* \* \* \*

Mr. Chona said that he had come to deliver a personal message to the Prime Minister from President Kaunda. President Kaunda had been much encouraged by the speech that the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary had just delivered to the General Assembly. The passage on the Middle East had given President Kaunda renewed confidence in the co-operation between the United Kingdom and Zambia. Lord Carrington's references to the Palestinian problem had shown that the Conservative Party were facing up to the realities of the problem. This gave grounds for hoping that they would do the same on Zimbabwe.

Mr. Chona said that President Kaunda was greatly encouraged by the progress that had so far been made at the Constitutional Conference. Problems remained but none had come so close as the Prime Minister to achieving a solution. There was a combination of forces in favour of a peaceful outcome. The Patriotic Front recognised this and would never, in President Kaunda's view, walk out of the Conference whatever anyone else might do. President Kaunda was sure that agreement on the constitution was now within reach. He hoped that the Prime Minister would now be prepared to face the problems of the transitional period.

There was now a consensus that a transitional period was necessary. There were of course different interpretations of this: Bishop Muzorewa thought that his regime should remain in charge while the Patriotic Front were seeking a new arrangement. President Kaunda was also aware of the differing views about the length of the transitional period. In his view the requirement was that the period should be long enough to allow for the creation of an environment in which a genuinely democratic process could take place. It must be long enough to allow for the registration of voters, the

/ delimitation

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# CONFIDENTIAL

- 2 -

delimitation of constituencies and the organised return of refugees i.e. women, children and unarmed men. But the transitional period should not be so long as to risk the creation of new complications before an election was held.

President Kaunda considered that in the transitional period Britain's constitutional responsibility should be established in a way that would be unquestioned and that would permit Britain's responsibilities to be discharged without risk of failure. Success was within reach and must not be thrown away. In Angola, the Portuguese had failed to put in place machinery for the administration of the peace process. The Portuguese had turned their back on the country and left the various parties to fight it out. This must not be allowed to happen in Zimbabwe. President Kaunda accepted that both General Walls and the guerilla leaders were sincere, but he did not think too much reliance should be placed on their good will. Britain's reluctance to accept the concept of an international force in Zimbabwe was understandable, but President Kaunda wondered whether the Prime Minister should not re-examine the concept to establish whether such a force could not help Britain discharge her responsibility for separating the forces. (Mr. Chona stressed at this point that President Kaunda's confidence in the Prime Minister was complete. But he considered that Britain would need all the backing she could get in the transitional period.)

According to President Kaunda, the Patriotic Front accepted that the armies involved in the Zimbabwe conflict would not be disbanded before independence. The creation of a unified army would be a matter for the elected government of Zimbabwe. The regular forces of the Salisbury regime would remain in being as would the main forces of the guerillas outside Zimbabwe in Mozambique and Zambia. The only forces, in the view of the Patriotic Front, which would be disbanded would be the Selous Scouts and some of the auxiliary forces which had been established recently in Zimbabwe. (Mr. Chona seemed to suggest at one point that some of the guerilla forces within Zimbabwe would also be disarmed.) These units were a threat to the electoral process. There were good precedents e.g. when Mozambique, Zambia and Tanzania had become independent, for keeping trained guerillas outside the country at the time of the first election.

CONFIDENTIAL

/ The Patriotic Front



The Patriotic Front were keen to avoid a huge undisciplined influx of their people into Zimbabwe during the transitional period. They wished to see a programme for the return of the guerillas and their integration into the regular forces worked out after an elected government had taken power. They did not see the continuance in being part of the regular army, controlled by General Walls, during the transitional period, as a problem.

Mr. Chona said that President Kaunda was confident, provided Britain did not turn her back on Zimbabwe and provided there was some form of machinery to supervise the separation of forces, that the transitional period could be managed. Given that the registration of voters and the delimitation of constituencies was carried out in a way acceptable to the parties involved, the results of the election would be accepted. The most difficult problem was that related to the psychology of the white population in Zimbabwe. If they could be brought to accept that a victory for the Patriotic Front in a fair election would be a challenge for them rather than a disaster most of the other problems would disappear. Mr. Nkomo and Mr. Mugabe both wanted the whites to stay. They had both, after all, received much support from white governments such as those in Scandinavia and the Soviet Union. They recognised that the Rhodesia Front did not speak for all the whites. It was for this reason that they had been prepared to accept entrenched seats. (In this connection Mr. Chona asked whether something could be done to discourage the Daily Telegraph and other newspapers from publishing editorials such as that which had appeared in the Daily Telegraph that morning. The Prime Minister said that there was nothing that she could do.)

Mr. Chona asked whether there was any message he could send back to President Kaunda about the Prime Minister's view on the course of the Constitutional Conference. The Prime Minister said that the Conference was going steadily forward. Bearing in mind the Lusaka agreement, she was inclined to think that progress was a little slow but the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary did not altogether agree. Mr. Chona said that he thought the present rate of progress was about right. The bargaining between the parties had gone better than anyone could have expected. He said that President Kaunda was anxious about

/ what would

CONFIDENTIAL

- 4 -

what would happen if Bishop Muzorewa were to walk out. The Prime Minister said that she did not think that, provided progress continued to be made anyone, would walk out. Mr. Chona agreed.

The discussion ended at 0940.

*AmB*

27 September 1979

CONFIDENTIAL

Rhodesia 1



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

27 September 1979

*The Prime Minister is aware  
of this*

*Paul 27/9*

*Dear Brian,*

## RHODESIA: CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE

Officials of our departments have already been in touch about the need which has arisen at this stage in the Conference on Rhodesia for an early confidential meeting with the commanders of the Rhodesian security forces.

The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary believes it is essential that this mission should be carried out by a senior British officer (together with an FCO official); and that Brigadier Reilly, at present in command of 6th Field Force, is well qualified for this role in view of his previous experience of Rhodesian affairs and of the fact that he has the confidence of the Rhodesian commanders.

Lord Carrington would be grateful if Mr Pym could agree that Brigadier Reilly may be released to undertake this mission during the first week of October.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Michael Alexander at No 10 Downing Street.

*yours ever  
Roderic Lyne*

(R M J Lyne)

Brian Norbury Esq  
Private Secretary to the Secretary of State for Defence  
Ministry of Defence  
Main Building  
Whitehall  
London SW1

27 SEP 1979

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TO IMMEDIATE F.C.O.

TELEGRAM NUMBER 2838 OF 25 SEPTEMBER 1979.

INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK, MIRIMBA SALISBURY.

*Prime Minister*  
*Lord Carrington does not propose to*  
*make any statement*  
*Ant. Hunt 26/9*

MY TELEGRAM NO 2750: U.S. ACTION ON RHODESIA SANCTIONS.

1. MOOSE TOLD ROBINSON LAST NIGHT, JUST BEFORE VANCE WAS DUE TO SEE YOU, THAT VANCE WAS BEING BRIEFED TO RAISE WITH YOU THE POSSIBILITY OF A STATEMENT BY THE U.K. ON THE EFFECT ON THE LONDON CONFERENCE IF THE U.S. LIFTED SANCTIONS NOW.

2. MOOSE SAID THAT THE ADMINISTRATION HAD NOW DONE ALL THEY COULD TO STOP THE LIFTING OF SANCTIONS THROUGH THE DEFENCE BILL. CARTER HAD NOW TOLD THE CHAIRMEN OF BOTH CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES THAT HE WOULD VETO THE BILL IF IT CONTAINED THE AMENDMENT. BUT A MAJORITY ON BOTH COMMITTEES DID NOT ACCEPT THE ADMINISTRATION'S POSITION, AND THE ADMINISTRATION NOW BELIEVED THAT ONLY CLEAR EVIDENCE THAT THE LIFTING OF U.S. SANCTIONS WOULD IN THE U.K. VIEW HAVE A BAD EFFECT ON THE OUTCOME OF THE LONDON CONFERENCE COULD SWING THE CONGRESSIONAL DECISION HERE.

HENDERSON

FILES  
RHODESIA DEPT  
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(MR FIFOOT)  
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PS/MR LUCE  
PS/MR RIDLEY  
PS/MR HURD  
PS/PUS  
SIR A DUFF  
LORD N G LENNOX  
MISS BROWN  
MR DAY  
MR WILLSON  
MR ASPIN

ADDITIONAL DISTN.  
RHODESIA POLICY

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SECRETARY OF STATE AT UNGA

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Department

ACY MARKING

In Confidence

1. I now turn to the problem of Rhodesia.
2. The British Government has a responsibility to bring Rhodesia to legal independence on a basis which provides for genuine majority rule and is acceptable to the people of Rhodesia. It is now some 14 years since the British colony of Southern Rhodesia illegally declared itself independent on a basis which could not be said in any way to meet these criteria. During that time successive British Governments have wrestled with the problem of how to restore Rhodesia to legality. In this task we have requested and received abundant help from the United Nations, who have stood by us throughout. I should like to express my gratitude for this help. Many attempts have been made to solve the problem. So far all have failed, but not for lack of effort on the part of the international community.
3. Right from the start, the Rhodesia problem has faced not only Britain but other governments as well with complex difficulties which go far beyond the resolution of a colony's disputed progress to independence. The new states in the region, and especially those which are landlocked, have been faced from their very birth with obligations to maintain economic sanctions which they could ill afford and, now, are finding that their economic and social progress is increasingly hampered by a war which is not only cruel in its effects on the people of Rhodesia but which has spilled over the frontiers and left many thousands of refugees in exile from their homes. Peace and legal independence are therefore vital not only to Rhodesia itself but to all the neighbouring peoples of Central and Southern Africa who also have a right to work for a stable and prosperous future.
4. Before I deal with the stage which the Rhodesia dispute

is now reached, I think it is worth considering briefly how it began. The charter of the United Nations itself is based on "respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples". Where human rights and fundamental freedoms are respected, the Charter gives us no mandate to interfere in the exercise by free and independent nations of the right to choose their own leaders and to adopt whatever political system they wish to live under. But the issue in Rhodesia was whether it was right for us, as the colonial power, to grant independence to a territory where the majority of the people did not yet have a voice in the determination of their own affairs and where it was necessary to secure a satisfactory assurance that they would. We decided that it was not right, and the action of the United Nations followed a decision by a minority regime to take the law into its own hands.

5. But the situation inside Rhodesia itself has not remained static since that time. It has changed in many ways in response to the various pressures which have been exerted on it from outside and in response also, I believe, to changing attitudes on the part of people in Rhodesia itself. The world has changed a great deal in the last fourteen years. The ideas of racial superiority and tutelage which were then still so widespread have come to seem increasingly untenable almost everywhere, and I believe it would do us no harm to give the minority in Rhodesia some credit for seeing this for themselves.

6. By the time the Government of which I am a member took office in the United Kingdom in May, it seemed clear to us that the situation in Rhodesia had been transformed by comparison with earlier years. The elections which took place in Rhodesia in April this year have had many critics, but it could not be denied that they had led to the emergence of a Parliament and an administration, the majority of whose members belonged to the majority community and which was led by a member of that community. The elections, we believed, represented a substantial step by the white community towards the abandonment of their privileged position of exclusive power. My Government was determined to build on that step forward so as to make a further effort to bring Rhodesia to legal independence in

a context of wide international recognition and acceptance.

7. We therefore immediately decided to engage in an extensive series of consultations with all parties closely concerned with the conflict, in an attempt to identify the elements for a solution. We spoke to leaders of the Commonwealth and the Front Line States, to the Patriotic Front and to the Salisbury parties. We naturally remained in close touch with our other friends and allies and took account of their views. These consultations were invaluable, and have formed a sound basis for our present approach to a settlement. We found that certain aspects of the constitution introduced in Rhodesia before the elections were subject to widespread criticism. We also encountered a general feeling that any settlement should emanate from the UK as the responsible power, and that there should be a further attempt to involve all the parties to the conflict in an attempt to find a solution.

8. Our consultations culminated at the Commonwealth Heads of Government meeting in Lusaka. Here I should like to pay tribute to the Heads of Government present at Lusaka for the helpful and constructive attitude they all displayed during the discussions on Rhodesia. I should like to pay a special tribute to President Kaunda, himself perhaps more directly involved in the problems of Rhodesia than any other Head of State, who provided the objective and concerned Chairmanship which was indispensable for success. At Lusaka the 39 Commonwealth states unanimously endorsed the approach to a settlement which we are now following. In particular, they fully accepted the British Government's constitutional responsibility to grant legal independence to Rhodesia on the basis of genuine majority rule. The principle of including in an independence constitution appropriate safeguards for minorities was also accepted.

9. Immediately after Lusaka we pressed ahead with preparations for a Constitutional Conference. Invitations were issued to the leaders of the Patriotic Front and to Bishop Muzorewa to bring delegations. As you know, our invitations were accepted and the Conference opened in London on the 10th of September. I am glad to say that, although negotiations have been difficult, progress is being made. We have tabled




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compatible

Proposals for an independence constitution which are in full with the principle of genuine majority rule and which we believe are comparable with the constitutions which we granted at independence to other former British dependent territories. I firmly believe that, should we succeed in reaching agreement along these lines, an independent Zimbabwe with such a constitution and with a government chosen in free and fair elections, will gain general acceptance by the international community.

10. The delegations at the Conference have shown themselves willing to engage in constructive discussion of the British proposals. <sup>One ~~of the~~ delegation has already accepted them in principle.</sup> Much difficult negotiation undoubtedly lies ahead, and the final success of the Conference will depend on the willingness of the parties to compromise with us in the interests of an objective on which we can all agree - to lay the foundations for an independent and democratic society in which all the people of Rhodesia would be able to live in security and at peace with each other and with their neighbours. Britain's responsibility is to do all it can to achieve such an agreement. This we are determined to do.

11. I do not underestimate the difficulties which remain to be overcome. Only when the British Government and Parliament have been able to grant legal independence to Rhodesia on the basis of genuine majority rule will we be able to say that we have fully discharged our colonial responsibility. But I dare to hope that that moment may not be too far away. A successful end to the Rhodesian problem which has concerned so many diplomatic gatherings for so long, and has caused so much bloodshed, may be within our grasp. I sincerely hope it may be our privilege before too long to welcome an independent Zimbabwe to this Assembly as a full member of the international community, entitled to membership of the United Nations. A heavy responsibility will lie on any individual, party or movement which fails to respond to this opportunity, and I repeat through this Assembly the appeal I have already addressed to the Conference itself, at its very beginning, that we should all work together in full consciousness of that responsibility.



24 SEP 1979

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SANTA BARBARA • SANTA CRUZ

GRADUATE SCHOOL OF MANAGEMENT  
LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA 90024

September 25, 1979

*John Hutchinson*

Please see the letter I sent to British Foreign Secretary Lord Carrington in London last-week.

The point is simple. It is that the renewal of sanctions will destroy Zimbabwe Rhodesia.

Sincerely yours,

*John Hutchinson*

John Hutchinson  
Professor of Industrial Relations

cc: All members of the House-Senate Conference Committee on the FY 1980 defense authorization bill.

FROM: INSTITUTE OF DIRECTORS, 116 PALL MALL, SW1.

FAIR COPY

JOHN HUTCHINSON  
PROFESSOR OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS  
GRADUATE SCHOOL OF MANAGEMENT  
UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA AT LOS ANGELES  
LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA 90024

TEL: (213) 825-3134 OFFICE  
(213) 825-2503 OFFICE  
(213) 476-2527 RESIDENCE

Lord Carrington  
House of Lords  
London SW1

19 September 1979

*Dear Foreign Secretary,*

It is grievous to read in this morning's Financial Times that sanctions are likely to be renewed against Zimbabwe Rhodesia if the present white influence over constitutional amendments and public appointments is not surrendered.

Let me add detail to a previous point. I was informed in Salisbury earlier this month, by the public official perhaps best qualified to make the comment, that if sanctions are renewed then between 50 and 60 percent of the whites in the armed forces will leave on or before April 1 next year, and that there will be a comparable departure from the public services and private industry.

Zimbabwe Rhodesia could hardly survive such an exodus. In these circumstances the maintenance of sanctions would be an act of homicide.

Yours sincerely,

*John Hutchinson*

cc: Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher and others  
(2nd cc: Parliamentary Conservative Party)

ACU Issues Analysis Series



# **The Rhodesian Election: An Eyewitness Account**



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Special Report

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## **The Rhodesian Election: An Eyewitness Account**

Byron Engle

M. Stanton Evans

Smith Hempstone

Howard W. Pollock

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## Preface

In April of 1979, all the people of Zimbabwe-Rhodesia went to the polls for the first time in the history of their nation. Since the government of our country refused to send an official delegation to monitor the election in this African country, I authorized a team of four highly qualified Americans to go to Zimbabwe-Rhodesia and observe this momentous occasion. The American Conservative Union has long been concerned with developments in that troubled land and this delegation of observers was a natural offshoot of that concern.

The four persons on the American Conservative Union election-monitoring team to Zimbabwe-Rhodesia included: author, journalist and commentator, M. Stanton Evans, who served as Chairman of the ACU delegation; former Congressman for Alaska, Howard Pollock; journalist and columnist, Smith Hempstone; and former Director of the Office of Public Safety for the Agency for International Development, Byron Engle.

The ACU team visited 36 polling places, interviewed 156 voters and conducted more than 200 interviews with other citizens of Zimbabwe-Rhodesia.

From all of the evidence that they were able to compile, they conclude, as did nearly all of the observers from throughout the world, that the elections were fair, free and above board. The preliminary report of the ACU delegation received widespread notice in America and around the world and this served as an extremely useful catalyst for altering national perceptions of this African country. Our ACU observers' thorough and contemplative assessment of the elections makes it absolutely clear to me that Zimbabwe-Rhodesia has witnessed the birth of a new and vital democracy. We can now look forward to the establishment of a new day in relations between our two democratic nations.

Congressman Robert E. Bauman  
Chairman  
American Conservative Union



## Introduction

The one-man, one-vote election conducted in Zimbabwe-Rhodesia in the latter part of April, 1979, was an event of historic significance, not only for Africa but for the Western world in general. It has also become a matter of intense debate in the United States.

Under legislation adopted by Congress in August, 1978, the election assumed particular importance in this country. By the terms of the so-called Case-Javits amendment to the International Security Assistance Act, American economic sanctions against Rhodesia were to be removed (a) when the transitional government there expressed its willingness to participate in an "all parties conference" including external guerrilla leaders, and (b) when "a government has been installed, chosen by free elections in which all political and population groups have been allowed to participate freely, with observation by impartial, internationally recognized observers."

The transitional government headed by Prime Minister Ian Smith and three black leaders substantially complied with the first of these requirements in October, 1978, in conversations with the American State Department. This meant that, in terms of U.S. policy, the validity of the April elections to choose the 72 black members of the newly created Parliament of Zimbabwe-Rhodesia became an issue of the first importance. If the elections were free and fair, then sanctions were to be lifted. If not, then not.

Unfortunately, the Carter administration and the Congress decided not to send observers to the election, thereby preventing themselves from learning at first hand what they were obliged by law to know. Our policy was to lift sanctions if the election was free and fair, but our government declined to gather the empirical data that would have made such a determination possible.

This anomaly prompted a number of private organizations in the United States to send their own observers to Zimbabwe-Rhodesia, in order to report their findings to the Congress and the executive. The American Conservative Union was one such group. In early April, 1979, Rep. Robert Bauman (R-Md.), Chairman of ACU, appointed a four-man delegation to visit Zimbabwe-Rhodesia, observe the election, and report its findings to the board and membership of ACU, the American public, the Congress, and the executive branch of government.

The members of the delegation, in addition to myself, were Byron Engle, former Director of the Office of Public Safety of the Agency for International Development, syndicated columnist Smith Hempstone, and former Congressman Howard Pollock of Alaska. Inasmuch as I was the only ACU board member on the delegation, I was named as chairman — which, I hasten to add, was a purely nominal condition. The three


other members of our group are all experienced, knowledgeable, and highly dedicated people, and operated on their own initiative throughout our tenure in Zimbabwe-Rhodesia.

In the pages that follow, our principal observations and conclusions are set forward in some detail. Essentially, we all came to the same general findings about the election, a consensus reflected in our preliminary report, issued in Salisbury, April 22. But since we all saw different things at times, and brought to our observations different types of experience and interest, we felt it desirable to have each member contribute his own particular statement to this final document. While this leads to a certain amount of overlap in places, we believe the accumulation of detail from varied viewpoints will give the reader a comprehensive picture of what the election actually looked like on the ground.

Our preliminary findings and these four individual statements constitute the bulk of this report. To make the record as complete as possible, however, we have also included several other items as appendices: A copy of a letter from Rep. Stephen Solarz of the Africa subcommittee of the House of Representatives, inviting our testimony on the subject of the elections; a copy of a prepared statement I offered to the subcommittee; technical details concerning the conduct of the election, the state of martial law in Zimbabwe-Rhodesia, and the percentage poll both nationwide and in specific districts; a letter by former Congressman Pollock addressed to President Carter; and correspondence with the Rhodesian government concerning allegations of political repression.

Given the necessary limitations of what a four-man team can learn by examining the electoral process of a foreign country in a relatively short span of time, we believe the reader of this document will obtain an accurate, well-rounded view of the Rhodesian election and the manner in which it was conducted.

M. Stanton Evans



**The Major Tribal Groupings in Rhodesia  
With Approximate Percentage of African Population**

Ndebele Orientated Tribes		
Tribe	Percentage	No. of Chiefs
1 Ndebele	14	44
2 Kalanga	5	3
Shona Orientated Tribes		
Tribe	Percentage	No. of Chiefs
3. Rozwi	9	20
4. Korekore	12	20
5. Zezuru	18	22
6. Manyika	13	9
7. Karanga	22	35
8. Ndau	3	11
Others		
Tribe	Percentage	No. of Chiefs
9 Tonga	2	27
10 Venda	1	6
11 Shangaan	1	5

# Preliminary Report of the American Conservative Union Observer Delegation to the Rhodesian Elections

Issued at an ACU News Conference  
April 25, 1979

For the past week, members of the American Conservative Union (ACU) delegation have observed procedures in and surrounding the conduct of the popular vote for the 72 common roll seats in the new Parliament of Zimbabwe-Rhodesia.

This is a preliminary report on our observations and conclusions during the five-day period of the elections. A more fully detailed report will be issued shortly.

## **I. Procedures**

Like other observer delegations and journalists, the four members of the ACU delegation among them traveled several thousand miles back and forth across Zimbabwe-Rhodesia to observe polling techniques in widely varied settings and political/military circumstances.

The polling places visited included the Eastern territory bordering Mozambique, tribal trustlands and farming areas around Bindura, the urban townships of Salisbury, the Belingwe tribal trustlands area, Fort Victoria, and Bulawayo.

In these areas, we were able to visit 36 polling places, and interview 156 voters, nearly all of whom were black. In addition, our group conducted an aggregate of 221 interviews other than those with voters in the polling places.

The people with whom we talked included members of the government, polling officials, political spokesmen, local press personnel, supporters of external leader Joshua Nkomo, university students protesting the election, etc. Our main concern throughout, however, was to assess the attitude of voters toward the election, and to determine as best we could whether the balloting was "free and fair", as stipulated in American legislation relating to our nation's policy toward Rhodesia.

## **II. Checkpoints**

It was apparent early on to most observers that the major concern in

the election was not a matter of favoring one candidate or party over another, but the size of the total vote. Individual parties and candidates had obvious reason to want their vote totals enhanced at the expense of others, and we did make inquiries on this subject. The principal stake of the transitional government as a whole, however, was in having as large a vote as possible, to demonstrate popular support for the internal settlement, and to communicate to the world the advent of black majority rule.

If there were a dominant motive for irregularity, therefore, it would have pointed in the direction of inflated vote totals. We accordingly focused our attention as much as possible on checkpoints and methods which would cast light on this question. In general, the checkpoints and methods employed were the following:

1. Whether ineligible voters were in fact turned away by polling officials.
2. The disposition of spoiled ballots.
3. The sealing of ballot boxes.
4. The fluid used to prevent repeat voting.
5. The secrecy of the ballot.
6. The effects of martial law on the voting.
7. The spontaneity, or lack of it, of voters as reflected in interviews and other observations at polling places.
8. Visits to polling booths not on the official itinerary.
9. Talking to voters in private, away from officialdom.
10. Cross-checking with other observers for leads and observations.

In addition, our delegation was represented at the counting of ballots.

### III. Conclusions

From our observations and interviews to date, we draw the following preliminary conclusions:

1. As all commentators have noted, the turnout for the election was impressively large, and will apparently reach 65 percent of the total estimated electorate when the final tally is completed. (This was written as of 2 p.m. totals on the last day of the voting. The actual recorded percentage vote was 63.9 percent.) It should also be noted, of course, that this was a multi-party election, with four parties contesting openly for voter approval (five in one district).

2. The well-known military situation in the country obviously limited the ability of observers to move about at will in large groups. Random trips were permitted, however, to polling places and areas not on the official agenda, and members of our delegation (and others) availed themselves of this opportunity.

It was apparent to us that the prevailing security measures were necessary to the conduct of the election, and that the mission of the security forces was to protect the voters rather than to intimidate them. The voters seemed well aware of this, as exhibited by their obvious lack of

apprehension concerning the presence of security forces and several statements to the effect that they were voting because they felt it was safe to do so. The guns, that is, were pointing out, not in.

3. Ballot security procedures were observed. Secrecy of the ballot was well guarded at all polling places we visited. Voters ineligible by reason of age were in fact turned away. The fluid used to prevent repeat voting appeared to work effectively. Also, while the pace of our schedule made it difficult to check the sealing of ballot boxes on a consistent basis, we did spot-check this and conferred with local press men who monitored it constantly. On both counts, the procedures seemed to be in order. We also spot-checked (without advance notice that we wished to do so) provisions for setting aside spoiled ballots, and found that these were being followed as prescribed.

4. The voting in the areas we surveyed was not, so far as we could tell, manipulated. The government expended a great deal of effort to publicize the election, explain procedures, and urge people to vote—something that occurs in our country as well and is generally thought to be commendable. In addition, it was apparent that the political parties made every effort to turn out supporters, persuade voters, and get people to the polls. This also occurs in our country and is considered perfectly acceptable. Considering the fact that the present election was the first one-person, one-vote election in Rhodesian history, such activities would seem to have been even more necessary and desirable in Rhodesia than in the United States.

5. There have been allegations of people being forced to vote against their will, by their employers or by auxiliary forces. While we of course cannot say categorically that no such thing occurred anywhere in the country, we were unable to confirm any of these allegations in our voter interviews. The responses we received indicated that the people wanted to vote. Attitudes ranged from effusively enthusiastic in most places—a mood confirmed by huge crowds of dancing, singing and laughing demonstrators—to guardedly hopeful in some areas (such as Bulawayo) where opposition to the internal settlement is concentrated. In no case did a voter tell us he or she had been forced to vote. There were several instances, however, in which respondents said that they had been warned *not* to vote, but did so anyway. A visible manifestation of this attitude was the voting at Keyara, where we saw rural residents continue to walk to the polls despite a guerrilla attack a few kilometers distant.

6. While voters understandably did not have a sophisticated grasp of the political issues at stake in this election, our questions on this point brought one consistent answer: The belief (or hope) that it would bring an end to the fighting. Subsidiary themes included the belief or hope that the election would (a) produce a government representing all the people; (b) "make things better" in terms of jobs (including specific mention of the possible lifting of sanctions). These responses confirmed the finding

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that the enormous turnout was not coerced, and that voters were participating of their own free will.

7. In summary: In the polling places we observed, and on the evidence we were able to assemble, the Zimbabwe-Rhodesian elections of April, 1979, were conducted on a free and fair basis.

**M. Stanton Evans, Chairman**  
**Byron Engle**  
**Smith Hempstone**  
**Howard Pollock**

## 'A Unity of Purpose'

By Byron Engle

Byron Engle is an expert in international public safety. A former U.S. delegate to Interpol, he organized and trained the Japanese police force after World War II and later served as the first director of the Office of Public Safety of the Agency for International Development.

Mr. Engle is unusually knowledgeable in the area of security techniques and public safety, having served as an international consultant in organization, management and evaluation of the police systems in 45 countries.

**O**n April 11, 1979 the writer was invited to act as an international observer of the Rhodesian elections as part of a four-man team under the auspices of the American Conservative Union; other members were Howard Pollock, Stanton Evans, and Smith Hempstone.

We were briefed at the ACU offices, 316 Pennsylvania Avenue, SE, Washington, D.C. on Friday, April 13. The terms of reference for our mission were "to observe the elections in as thorough and objective manner as possible and to report your findings to the ACU upon return."

We departed Washington on Saturday, April 14 at 1500 hours and arrived in Salisbury, Rhodesia, after a one-hour stop on Isle de Sal and in Johannesburg, South Africa. We arrived at 2100 hours, Sunday, April 15, an elapsed time of 27 hours.

We travelled on a South African Airways flight from New York with other American observers from several private organizations. This gave us an opportunity to become acquainted, discuss the pending task, and a means of comparing our findings during the coming week.

After a short reception at the Salisbury airport and briefing by security officials, we were taken to the Monomatapa Hotel where observers from other countries were housed also.

The election was conducted over a period of five days from Tuesday, April 17 through Saturday, April 21. The counting of votes began on Monday, April 23. I remained in Salisbury until 1515 hours, Monday, April 23 to observe the vote counting process and arrived in Washington on Tuesday, April 24 at 1400 hours.

There were more than 70 accredited international observers and more than 200 accredited press representatives of the international news media present in Rhodesia for the elections.

We travelled thousands of miles throughout Zimbabwe-Rhodesia in various types and vintages of buses, airplanes and helicopters. None of the airplanes was less than 30 years old. But they worked. We observers and press representatives were briefed each evening on the happenings of the day by Election Directorate and security officials and were afford-

ed the opportunity to question and criticize. The major candidates also appeared and presented their views on the issues.

There were 600 static polling stations and approximately 225 mobile polling stations. The latter were portable and consisted of voting booths equipped with tables and chairs which could be set up in areas to supplement static polling stations and in other areas to accommodate voters who would have had to travel considerable distances to static voting stations. Some of the country is sparsely populated; however, careful effort was made to locate polling stations in the most convenient place for the population and in no instance would a person have to travel more than 15 miles to vote even in the most remote areas, according to the Election Directorate.

**T**he Zimbabwe-Rhodesian election was conducted under extremely adverse circumstances. It was the first election in the country in which all the population over 18 years of age with certain residence requirements were eligible to vote.

Voting eligibility requirements were simple: (1) evidence of being at least 18 years of age; (2) two years' residence in Rhodesia and (3) not having already voted in the election. Voters could cast their ballots at any polling station in the country.

As a precaution against duplicate voting, an ultra-violet light scanner which would reveal any fluorescent substance on a voter's hands was present in all voting stations and each voter was required to place his hands under the scrutiny of the scanner. If nothing was detected, before receiving his ballot, the voter was required to dip his hands in a transparent solution which would show up under a similar scanner if he attempted to vote in another polling station.

The writer placed his hands in the solution on April 15, the day preceding the commencement of voting, checked his hands in a scanner each day, and found the solution was still visible under a scanner on April 23, eight days later, despite frequent scrubbing with soap and water.

The ballot itself was simple, bearing the party symbol with the name of the party appearing with a space opposite in which the voter could place an "X" for his choice; the voter then deposited the folded ballot in a ballot box, always in full view.

Secrecy of the ballot was maintained. Partitioned booths were provided in which voters marked their ballots without disclosing who they were voting for.

All international observers were given official status under the law, had complete access to all polling stations and could ask any question they wished.

Voting procedures, which compared very favorably to similar procedures in Western democracies, are outlined in the appendix and pro-

vide details. Checks and cross-checks were part of the voting procedure. Multiple and constant observation was possible at all times.

**A**ll voting places I visited were orderly, businesslike, with friendly, helpful officials. Instructions to voters were informative and unbiased. I saw no procedural violations. Police presence in the polling stations was non-intrusive with a uniformed policeman, usually a Police Reserve, in the background to observe and prevent violations of procedures. Purses and packages carried by women were quietly inspected by Women Reserves at the entrances.

School teachers and other local residents usually comprised the officials who casually and unobtrusively observed the voters entering the polling station. Individuals who appeared to be under 18 years of age were asked to produce documentation. Most produced the requested documents and those lacking them were asked to return with appropriate papers.

Candidates and their representatives could solicit votes outside the polling stations and usually did so at a respectable distance. No indications of threats or belligerent attitude toward the voters were observed.

In most places a holiday mood prevailed with campaign workers for the various parties displaying candidates' photos on placards urging voters to vote for their candidate; this often was accompanied by dancing and singing and shouting of party slogans.

No disturbances, drunkenness or attempts to block access to polling stations were observed. Long queues were seen at many polling stations; voters in line appeared patient and orderly.

Limited numbers of voters were allowed in the polling stations at one time to avoid crowding and to permit immediate access to the individual booths where the ballot was marked and then placed into the ballot box which was displayed in full view. The voter then left the polling station; there was no loitering inside.

**T**he Rhodesian people had been told time after time that if they voted they and their families would be killed (by Communist-armed terrorists based in neighboring Mozambique and Zambia). "Radio Zimbabwe" reportedly operating from Mozambique constantly urged, "Kill the Whites. Kill the Whites!" There was plenty of reason to fear these threats, too. Thousands of Rhodesians, black and white but mostly black, have been murdered, mutilated, and beaten in the past few years by Communist-armed terrorists directed by Joshua Nkomo operating from sanctuaries in Zambia and Robert Mugabe from sanctuaries in Mozambique.

These leaders of the so-called Patriotic Front claimed they had infiltrated at least 15,000 so-called "freedom fighters" (terrorists) into the country who would disrupt the elections, destroy the polling stations, and inflict retribution on anyone who voted. Yet the threatened voters

turned out by the thousands, and the terrorists, although they tried, were unable to destroy a single polling station or stop the voting in even one of over 600 in operation throughout the country.

Asked why they voted in such large numbers, the reasons expressed by many of the voters I interviewed ranged from an old crippled man, who was a hospital patient and accompanied by an orderly, who said, "I thought it was important," to the more articulate who said they wanted a free and independent government. Another old man said he voted because he "felt safe." But mostly the voters said they wanted to stop the killing; they were "sick of terrorism," and hated its perpetrators. Some mentioned the lifting of sanctions, which they hoped the election would bring, and that this would mean more jobs.

When the election is analyzed, the factor of security is probably the key to why they were not disrupted and the reason for the large turnout of voters. As the old man said, he felt protected. How was the security possible? Much can be attributed to the Joint Operations Command concept whereby civilian, military and police authorities meet regularly at all levels to plan, develop strategy and tactics, coordinating, cooperating and carefully conserving their limited resources. It is a most effective means for dealing with a terrorist security situation.

Through such cooperative efforts Rhodesia has been able to survive externally directed terrorism and U.N. sanctions. The unified Rhodesian effort is impressive. It is not a black versus white situation but a people united against outside pressure and violence—democracy versus Marxism. For example, in both the Army and Police, blacks outnumber whites three to one.

**P**rior to the elections, Nkomo's terrorist sanctuaries in Zambia were hit repeatedly by bombing from Rhodesia. Mugabe's likewise. Guerrillas cannot operate successfully in a country (Rhodesia) without bases among the people.

Protected and consolidated villages, where the residents are safe from terrorist attacks and being robbed of food by the terrorists, denied support and re-supply to the terrorists and destroyed their ability to terrorize the population and to keep the people from voting.

The government had assured the people that the polling stations would be safe. They were. The voters had been told by the government that their ballots would be secret and that the elections would be free and fair. In my opinion—based on observation of numerous check points, dozens of interviews with voters, election officials, security personnel—the government fulfilled its promises.

Much of the success of the election can be attributed to the civil authorities. Rhodesia has long enjoyed the benefits of a professional, apolitical civil service, police and military. Organizing and conducting a free and fair election throughout the country was an enormous task and required

thorough, extensive planning and utilization of all of the country's resources. Just providing transportation to all parts of the country, housing and security for more than 200 accredited correspondents and more than 70 international election observers is a small example in comparison to the total effort, that could only have been handled efficiently by an extraordinarily competent civil and security services under a government that was dedicated and determined to make the election a success. That the Rhodesian government did, and did it well under the glaring light of world publicity.

A unity of purpose emerged, a determination to demonstrate to themselves and to the world by holding fair and free elections with secret ballot that the Zimbabwe-Rhodesians rejected Marxist totalitarianism and that they could successfully function under a democratic system.

In my view, the Rhodesian elections were fair and free and conducted in an open manner giving the Rhodesian people an opportunity to express their will by secret ballot. The new Zimbabwe-Rhodesian Government should be recognized and economic sanctions lifted immediately.

## 'They Wanted to Vote'

By M. Stanton Evans

M. Stanton Evans is a syndicated columnist for the *Los Angeles Times* syndicate and a commentator for the CBS radio network.

A former editor of the *Indianapolis News* (1960-74), he has also served as assistant editor of *The Freeman* and managing editor of *Human Events*, and is currently a contributing editor and regular columnist for that publication. He also writes regularly on legislation matters and on current books for *National Review* and is Chairman of the American Conservative Union Education and Research Institute.

Mr. Evans is the author of six books.

**B**y almost any measure, the 1979 election for the 72 black seats in the newly created Parliament of Zimbabwe-Rhodesia was a stunning success.

More than 270 members of the press and international observers were on hand to examine the election in minute detail at scores of locations across the country. The overwhelming verdict was that the balloting was conducted on an above-board basis, and that the enormous turnout (63.9 percent of the total estimated electorate) was an authentic reflection of support for the "internal settlement" arranged by outgoing Prime Minister Ian Smith and three black leaders—election-winner Bishop Abel Muzorewa, the Rev. Ndabaningi Sithole, and Sen. Chief Jeremiah Chirau.

The checkpoints and methods employed by the ACU delegation are set forth in our preliminary report from Salisbury. The major finding of our survey—confirmed by numerous other observers and journalists—was that the black people of Zimbabwe-Rhodesia wanted to vote. They did so, moreover, despite repeated violence by externally based guerrillas who had threatened to disrupt the elections in their effort to take the country by force of arms.

Extremely high vote turnouts in certain areas and the fact that votes were sometimes cast in employment settings, gave rise to suspicion in some quarters that people were being forced to vote. In no case in our voter interviews, however, did any respondent say he or she had been pressured to vote. On the other hand, there were several instances in which respondents said they had been told not to vote, but did so anyway.

Enthusiasm for the election was readily apparent from enormous crowds of dancing, singing demonstrators at the polling places. Throngs of jubilant blacks were the dominant feature of the political landscape—from the huge lines of voters who turned out on opening day to wait good-naturedly for their chance to vote, to the crowds of party supporters



who electioneered outside the polling places, laughing and singing impromptu songs.

All of this was so tangible in its meaning that no one on the scene could possibly miss it. Nearly all of the observer delegations, and most of the journalists to whom we talked, were profoundly impressed. Our group cross-checked its findings with people from Freedom House, the Institute of American Relations, the American Security Council, the Germans, the French, the British, the Australians. All had essentially the same conclusions, a unanimity that made it hard to believe the voting was anything other than an authentic expression of popular feeling.

All of this took place, it should be remembered, against a backdrop of continual warfare and violent threats to the safety of voters—facts of life in Zimbabwe-Rhodesia which make the holding of an election there distinctly different from voting in the United States.

Just how different was driven home to a group of reporters and observers, including myself, in the rural area near Belingwe. As the plane in which we were riding approached its designated landing spot, it suddenly went into a violent, twisting dive. The small Dakota (on loan from South Africa) plunged toward the ground at terrific speed, pinning its human cargo against the seats and walls.

The reason for this maneuver, we were told, was to avoid the SAM missiles used by guerrillas in the area. The missiles home in on the infrared profile of the airplane. They need three seconds to lock in to their targets, and can't follow the twists and turns of a diving object. (For the same reason, helicopters in which we rode buzzed along close to the ground, hedge-hopping over ridges, to merge their image with the surrounding landscape.)

As our plane pulled out for landing, we could hear the crackle of gunfire below us. This turned out to be the final stages of a skirmish between guerrillas and security forces which, as usual, the security forces won. The guerrillas, we were later told, had opened up on a line of people waiting to vote. As per instructions, the voters hit the ground, and the security forces returned the fire, driving the assailants off. The voters got back up and continued with the election.

This had been the second guerrilla attack in the vicinity that day. Despite that fact, our group watched rural tribesmen continue to trudge in across the fields to vote. The presiding officer told us that, as of 1 p.m., 123 people had voted at this tiny rural station. As we arrived, a young woman was casting her vote, and four others walked up as we were talking. I wondered how many Americans would bother to cast their ballots under similar conditions.

**W**e got a direct experience of the enormous crowds our second day out, this time in the urban townships outside of Salisbury. When we arrived at Kambazuma station, we were instantly surrounded by a crowd of

about 1,500 blacks, dancing, waving campaign posters, and in general enjoying themselves immensely. The crowd got even bigger a few minutes later, when it was learned that Bishop Muzorewa was going to visit this very polling spot. He arrived just as Byron Engle, Howard Pollock and I had finished up our voter interviews.

Zimbabwe-Rhodesia's new prime minister is a small, sharp-featured man of serious demeanor and quick intelligence. He was educated in the United States, and often refers to this fact in his comments about American policy toward his country. We discovered this as we talked with him at Kambazuma.

"What we are doing here to establish democratic government," the Bishop told us, "is a result of what I saw and heard in the United States when I was a student there. I would expect a democratic country like the United States to say 'you have a majority government, we will recognize you.' The causes for hostility toward us have been removed. Racism and minority government are ended.... We think it is time for the United States to recognize us."

But what, we asked, about recognition from other governments—such as the black states of the Organization of African Unity (OAU)? Can the new regime of Zimbabwe-Rhodesia expect to get recognition from Africa itself?

"Yes," said Muzorewa. "There are cracks in the OAU. There are some people, such as Kaunda of Zambia, who have commitments to individuals [meaning guerrilla leader Joshua Nkomo] who will not recognize us. But there are reasonable members of the OAU who will see that we have a majority government. There will be movement within the OAU toward recognition."

What about sanctions? Does he want them lifted? Who is actually being hurt by them?

"Sanctions hurt many black people," he said, "who have been thrown out of jobs when factories and mines were closed. I and others supported sanctions originally when it was a minority government. We were willing to pay the price to make the point. But now it is a majority government. If sanctions are maintained now, black people will be hurt."

At a general briefing for the press, Muzorewa expanded on these points—and made some others. In particular, he responded to the oft-stated view that the elections were inherently wrong because the new Rhodesian constitution reserves 28 (of 100) parliamentary seats for whites. Since whites make up only about 4 percent of the population, said a reporter, doesn't this constitute a violation of democratic principles?

In point of fact, Muzorewa said, seats reserved for whites are essential to the stability of the country. "We have seen what has happened in other nations where people have become too emotional about their independence," he said. "The whites panicked and left, and those countries have suffered as a result. People are starving in Mozambique. We

do not want that to happen here. We want our independence to be meaningful, so that the country prospers and people do not go to bed hungry."

The Bishop observed that 20 seats were proposed for whites in the Anglo-American plan being pushed by Andrew Young and others. Some whites, he said, wanted 34 seats. The principle was thus accepted by all parties to the discussion, the only question being how many seats would be reserved. The number 28 was a practical compromise.

Muzorewa concluded by noting that the whites in Rhodesia "are not visitors or tourists. Some of their families have been here for four or five generations. They are just as much citizens of Zimbabwe-Rhodesia as we are. We want them to stay."

White reporters baiting Rhodesian blacks about the alleged racism of the constitution became a kind of ritual at these briefings. The next night, another reporter addressed the identical question to Sithole, and got a quick upbraiding for his temerity.

Wasn't it anomalous, the reporter wanted to know, that the whites had 28 seats in the newly created Parliament? Wouldn't this make the new government suspect in the eyes of "the international community"?

"Perhaps if the international community did not have a double standard," Sithole shot back, "they would understand our situation here. If some outside force had killed Mr. Smith, killed Bishop Muzorewa, killed Chief Chirau and killed myself, then proclaimed themselves the government of the country, no doubt the international community would have recognized them immediately."

This was greeted by a tremendous burst of applause from the assembled press and corps of observers—in itself a significant item. Earlier in the week, the briefings had been stiff affairs, with journalists and observers alike reserved and skeptical. But as the days wore on, and all of them witnessed the reality of what was happening, skepticism had turned to admiration.

**M**uzorewa's point about sanctions was repeated by youthful blacks I interviewed in so-called "protected villages" near the small town of Bindura, northeast of Salisbury.

One of the routine questions we asked of voters was: "What do you think the elections will mean for your country?"—or words to that effect. At one of these villages a young man answered: "I hope it will mean the end of sanctions. Then I can get a job again." He explained that because of sanctions the factory where he had been working was shut down.

Thereafter I asked other young blacks about the sanctions. Those that knew of the issue clearly echoed Muzorewa's theme. One person who made the point was a teacher at the protected village of Gono. A black reporter for a Rhodesian news organization stood by to serve as an interpreter, but it turned out that the teacher spoke perfect English.

"The sanctions," the teacher said, "are very, very painful for the black people of this country. The black man is suffering terribly from the sanctions. They mean that there are no jobs."

Did he know, I asked, that in my country people said the sanctions were supposed to help the black people in Zimbabwe-Rhodesia? If that is the case, he answered, "then go back and tell your countrymen that they are wrong."

Walking back from this interview, I discovered that the black reporter accompanying me is not from Rhodesia, but from Malawi. I asked him why he had come to Rhodesia. "Because," he said, "here I can be free. I can criticize Mr. Smith, and nothing happens to me. But in Malawi, no one is allowed to criticize Dr. [Hastings] Banda."

**A** word about the "protected villages," frequently cited as examples of repressive rule exerted by the Rhodesian government: These are compounds of huts—small cities, really—containing hundreds, sometimes thousands, of residents. They are analogues of the "strategic hamlets" in Vietnam.

The protected village in which we interviewed the school teacher is part of a complex containing several thousand people. Each village is surrounded by a wire fence, equipped with lights at regular intervals and patrolled at night by guards, to keep out terrorists. At the center of the complex is a high rock formation that shelters the military garrison of the place and provides a commanding watch tower.

These compounds have been the object of much criticism as alleged concentration camps in which people are obliged by the authorities to live. (Once people were required to live in the P.V.'s, but since the internal settlement was reached, anyone who wants to leave is free to do so.)

A well-known British writer of books was traveling with us, and obviously out to prove that the P.V.'s are terrible places. While most of us were trying to gauge attitudes toward the election and the spontaneity of the turnout, he was probing for data to show the horror of life in the P.V.'s.

One thing he wanted to know was whether people weren't forced to work long hours in the fields located near the compounds. And was it true that they were deprived of food while they were working? Wouldn't they rather be outside the villages instead of being cooped up here?

The situation, it developed, was not quite so onerous as the British writer believed. Rather than heading for the fields at dawn and stumbling back exhausted after dark, the workers went out at 10 a.m. and came back at 5:30. No, they didn't take any food with them, but, as we subsequently discovered, this was for their own protection: If guerrillas knew a worker had food, they would attack to get it.

As for leaving the P.V., the most articulate of the young men being

questioned said: "As long as the fighting goes on, it is rather safer to be in here than outside." I could see that it was not the answer the British writer was looking for.

As indicated, our delegation continually cross-checked with other observers to see if they were finding leads or observations that differed from our own. Howard Penniman of Freedom House was a particularly valued resource, because of his great experience in observing and reporting elections around the world. Roscoe Drummond and Bayard Rustin, co-chairmen of the Freedom House group, have an exhaustive fund of knowledge about world affairs and civil rights, respectively, and we talked with them whenever possible.

Despite the pressures of time and a hectic traveling schedule, a number of observers made efforts to get together periodically. People with whom we talked on a regular basis included former Rep. Charles Brownson of Indiana, Dr. Richard McCormack, Elvira Orly and Belden Bell of the Institute of American Relations, Sean Randolph of the American Security Council, Leon Weaver and Rob Henderson of Freedom House, Alvis Carver and Joe Ellingwood of the American Legion, as well as numerous observers from other countries and dozens of members of the press.

From these exchanges an enormous mosaic of evidence was assembled, based on literally thousands of contacts with voters across the country. All the data pointed in the same direction—an election that was free and fair, and marvelously well conducted considering the circumstances.

Next to Bayard Rustin, the most prominent American liberal on the scene was Allard K. Lowenstein, architect of the "dump Johnson" drive in 1968. Lowenstein is inexhaustible, intelligent and audacious. Most of all, he is independent, and he had decided to come to Rhodesia to see things for himself. Like other observers, he was impressed by what he saw.

Among his other projects during election week, Lowenstein had a marathon discussion with 15 or so black students from Rhodesia University who were supporters of the Patriotic Front and opponents of the election. At about 12:30 in the morning, he called me at my room and asked if I would come down and talk with them. Since I hadn't yet interviewed any explicit Patriotic Front supporters, I seized the opportunity. It was an informative experience.

For one thing, the students did not seem especially different from many I had encountered in the United States. They were fired up with zeal for "power to the people," and complained bitterly about repression—although I later learned that they were recipients of government scholarships, and had apparently had no trouble coming and going to the headquarters hotel where we conducted our meeting. The elections, they told me, were unfair from the beginning, both because of the reserved seats

for whites and because opponents of the voting had been rounded up and jailed.

I pressed for specifics and got the names of two men assertedly detained for political reasons, rather than acts of real or threatened violence. I said I would check into the matter further (and am still doing so).<sup>\*</sup> All in all, it was a civil if somewhat restrained meeting, which permitted me to get the perspective of those who were most opposed to the internal settlement.

On the subject of repression, what looked like military intimidation to some armchair critics in the United States looked more like necessary security measures to those of us who were on the ground.

It was obvious at the polling places that the massive call-up and deployment of security forces was not intimidating to the people. The voters and demonstrators at the polling booths showed no apprehension about the presence of security forces, and in our interviews we encountered many people who said they were voting because they felt it was safe to do so. "The guns," as we put it in our preliminary report, "were pointing out, not in."

The Rhodesia security forces, indeed, are among the most impressive things about this impressive country. They are about 80 percent black; they are tough and resourceful; and they have repeatedly shown themselves to be more than a match for the terrorists as fighters.

And their inventiveness defies belief. To ward off the terrorists' favorite tactic of planting land mines, the Rhodesians have devised a series of peculiar looking vehicles, equipped with armored underplating and roll bars, that can survive the concussive impact of a direct contact explosion. For aerial combat, they have come up with such intriguing gimmicks as tiny, one-engine Cessnas—fitted out with rockets on the wings.

In one foray to the tribal trustlands, Byron Engle and Howard Pollock became instant media hits by dancing with the tribal women at a celebration of the election. They also witnessed first-hand evidence of the kind of enemy the Rhodesian security forces are facing.

In a field at one cattle farm, Engle and Pollock viewed a slaughtered herd of cattle—shot down with automatic rifle fire. Also, the mouths of the baby calves had been slit so that they could not suckle. Spent cartridge cases were all over the area—bearing the tell-tale markings of the Soviet arsenals where they had been manufactured.

At a display room in the police armory at Salisbury, we saw vast quantities of such cartridge cases, and hundreds of other items proving the massive nature of Soviet and other Communist involvement in the warfare. Here are located stacks of captured AK-47s, SAM missiles, rocket launchers, land mines, machine guns, and every other conceivable weapon.

<sup>\*</sup>See Appendix 6

These implements of warfare are marked with arsenal indicia not only from the Soviet Union, but from Communist China, Yugoslavia, Rumania, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, North Korea, and other Communist nations. I had dozens of pictures taken of these captured weapons, and planned to do an extensive layout on the subject when the photographs are ready.

**B**y week's end, the verdict of almost all the people witnessing the elections was that we had seen a rare example of democracy in action, under conditions of stress and open conflict that could well have justified a smaller turnout.

The critics, however, had not given up, and were seizing on whatever evidence they could find to discredit the voting. A flap was created when the ballots were being counted by the announcement that, in certain areas, the reported total was larger than the eligible electorate.

When this dispute arose, I recalled a little-noticed release that had been issued on Friday, April 20, when the voting was still in progress and overcounting had not become an issue. I had kept this missive and by digging back through my pile of papers was able to root it out. Its statement of the situation, before there was any serious dispute about the point, is worth quoting at length:

"The Directorate [of the Election]...draws attention to the fact that it is misleading to calculate percentage polls in individual electoral districts on the estimated voting potential in each of these districts. In the first place, these estimates were made for the purpose of calculating the number of parliamentary seats and were based on the normal estimated population of each administrative district.

"No account was taken of movement of population, particularly to the urban areas, in recent years as a result of the terrorist war, as this would have been impossible to calculate and in any event would have given a false picture on which to base parliamentary representation.

"In this particular election a voter is free to vote at any polling station in the country and is not restricted to his own district. The Directorate is aware that there has been a significant movement of people from some tribal trustlands to urban centers immediately before and during the election so that they can cast their votes free from intimidation. In many cases this movement has involved crossing electoral district boundaries." (See Appendix 4)

I had discovered the truth of this assertion earlier, when I interviewed voters in Fort Victoria, a fair-sized town in the southern portion of the country. There I talked with a man who spoke English—and therefore needed no official interpreter—who told me he had come from a considerable distance to cast his vote in this urban precinct.

Had he been told not to vote? I asked. "Yes," he said. "And I told

them that I would not vote. But in my heart I knew that I was going to vote." In Fort Victoria, he could do so without fear of discovery.

Another flap developed after the counting, when Sithole complained of "gross irregularities" in the proceedings. It was noted by several of the journalists reporting the election, however, that Sithole had been very enthusiastic about the voting until it became apparent he was going to lose. Only a few hours before he issued his statement about irregularities, indeed, he had put out a press release describing the election as "a triumph of the will of two million voters," and saying the fact that "the election was free was self-evident."

**G**iven the circumstances of the country, and the vagaries of human nature, it would be astonishing indeed if something irregular did not occur somewhere in Zimbabwe-Rhodesia in the course of this election. The incredible thing was that, under conditions of warfare, in a balloting with an unregistered electorate that had never before taken part in such a procedure, with a swarm of observers and press men combing the country for fraud, so little evidence of anything improper was uncovered. Almost any election in the United States has more to condemn it than this first-ever, one-person, one-vote election in Rhodesia.

As for other African states and the attitudes of the external leaders, the comparison is hardly worth making. Most of the African states are one-party governments or military dictatorships where no free elections are held at all. And Rhodesian guerrilla leader Robert Mugabe has openly said he aims for "a one-party Marxist state," and that "I don't think a multi-party system is necessarily democratic."

In sum: on the evidence gathered by countless observers, the parliamentary elections in Zimbabwe-Rhodesia were free and fair, and authentically democratic. It is not too much to say, indeed, that Zimbabwe-Rhodesia is the freest country on the African continent and, taking the situation all in all, probably one of the freest in the world.

A longer version of this article appeared in *Human Events* for May 5, 1979.

## 'We Have Nothing to Hide'

By Smith Hempstone

Smith Hempstone is a journalist of long standing and an expert on African affairs. His career began in 1953 as a correspondent for the Associated Press. He later worked for the *Washington Star*, *National Geographic*, and served as African correspondent for the *Chicago Daily News*.

Currently, his twice weekly column is syndicated in 89 American and Canadian newspapers. Two of his four books have dealt with Africa: *Africa, Angry Young Giant* (1961), which was a History Book-of-the-Month Club selection, and *Rebels, Mercenaries and Dividends—The Katanga Story* (1962).

The constitution under which Zimbabwe-Rhodesia has become a predominantly black-ruled state was made by men, and hence is an imperfect instrument, like its American counterpart. Critics will argue, with a degree of justification, that the 28 (of 100) seats reserved for whites in the new assembly, the inhibitions on amending the constitution for the next 10 years and the restrictions placed on altering the composition of the judiciary, security forces and civil service will have the effect of entrenching white power and privilege.

Other critics will point out that the 2.8 million black Rhodesians eligible to vote, unlike their 100,000 white countrymen, were not given the opportunity to accept or reject the constitution in a separate referendum.

But while these are matters of legitimate concern, it was not our mandate to render an opinion on them. The four members of the delegation sent by the American Conservative Union were dispatched to Zimbabwe-Rhodesia only to monitor, to the best of our ability, the freeness and fairness of the electoral process. In order to see as much as we could within the five-day span of the voting, members of the delegation frequently visited different areas and concentrated on various aspects of the electoral process.

With the Muzak playing "Red Sails in the Sunset," our blacked-out Rhodesian Air jet coasted the last 100 miles from Johannesburg into Salisbury on Easter Sunday evening, April 15, 1979 (in recent months, two Rhodesian Air Viscounts have been shot down by groundfire near Kariba with a heavy loss of life). We were met by Rhodesian officials, given a rather pessimistic security briefing and taken to our hotel, the Monomatapa (Rhodesian fears that they might "lose" an international observer had a somewhat inhibiting effect on our ability to monitor the elections, but observers were free to go off on their own at their own risk, and many did so.)

Easter Monday was given over largely to recovering from jet-lag, although there was a briefing by the Elections Directorate in the evening, followed by a reception that gave observers an opportunity to chat informally with white and black Rhodesian political figures, and members of the civil service and security forces. Earlier in the day, I lunched privately with white Rhodesian friends in an attempt to gain an insight into their attitudes. Most expressed hopes, if not expectations, that the voting would be peaceful and the turnout large. At the reception in the evening, Bishop Abel Muzorewa, leader of the United African National Congress, told me he would be happy "with a 50 percent turnout."

On Tuesday, April 17, Day 1 of the balloting, all four members of the ACU delegation flew in a South African Air Force Dakota to Fort Victoria, the largest urban center in southeastern Rhodesia. After being briefed by the military, we split into two groups.

Stanton Evans and I, escorted by Lt. Col. Terry Hammond, a fourth-generation Rhodesian and 18-year army veteran, flew to the small village of Belingwe, which is southwest of Fort Victoria and near Shabani. This is the country of the war-like Karanga tribe, which is both the largest single ethnic element within the security forces and within Robert Mugabe's faction (ZANLA) of the Patriotic Front's guerrilla forces.

About 200 women were lined up to vote, a situation which may—or may not—have been arranged for our convenience (District Commissioner David Stephenson said about 230 men had voted earlier and that, when they were finished, he "asked my staff to call up the women to vote"). The polling station was guarded by security forces, but there was a holiday air amongst the voters that was to prove typical of other polling places we visited.

Election officials seemed helpful to the voters but not obtrusive. The secrecy of the ballot appeared absolute. Of the four voters questioned (in the presence and with the help of an African interpreter attached to the civil administration), none reported either intimidation by the guerrillas not to vote or pressure by the government or security forces to do so. Asked if she feared retribution from the guerrillas, one 21-year-old woman named Margaret said she did not—"because my boyfriend is a policeman."

From Belingwe, we drove in an armed convoy a few miles to the Vanguard asbestos mine, where workers were voting on the factory premises. In an economy damaged by war and sanctions, clearly the mine's 270 workers could have been exposed to pressure from their employer to vote (a large vote obviously was desired by the government and the white community—and by moderate blacks, for that matter—as a reason why sanctions should be lifted and diplomatic recognition granted). Yet none of the workers I questioned, again with the help of an interpreter

furnished by the civil administration, said he had been subject to such pressure. About 200 of the mine's 270 employees had voted, and the rest were waiting to do so.

From the mine, we returned by road to the bush airstrip for the short flight to Keyara village in the Tribal Trustlands, the African reserves where terrorist activity has been hottest. Indeed, since there had been two attacks on voters near Keyara that morning, our Dakota descended to the landing strip in a sickening spiral designed to throw off any guerrilla-manned missiles in the area. When we landed, we could hear the faint pop of smallarms fire away to the north where the security forces were following up the terrorists.

Despite the attacks, voters were still coming in to the polling place set up under a marula tree a few hundred yards from the fortified village. That people were willing to walk several miles through country in which guerrillas were active seemed indicative of a generalized desire to exercise the franchise.

Back in Fort Victoria, we visited two urban polling stations. Both were doing a booming business, with much singing and dancing from groups of party workers from Muzorewa's UANC and the Rev. Ndabaningi Sithole's Zimbabwe African National Union much in evidence.

Perhaps a word might be said here about voting procedures. There was no voter registration for this election, the first in which the entire population has participated. Everyone over 18 years of age who had been in the country for at least two years was eligible to vote (which meant that sizable numbers of Zambian and Malawian citizens cast their ballots). Prospective voters first put their hands into a machine to detect the tell-tale liquid left if they had voted before. Having passed this test and been adjudged qualified by age and residence, they then dipped their fingers in this liquid and were handed a ballot containing the names of the four parties (five in one province) contesting the election. They then moved to a three-sided polling booth, marked their ballots, folded them, had them stamped by an election official and placed them in the ballot box. Here as elsewhere, there was no sign of anything but helpfulness on the part of election officials.

In Fort Victoria, one voter told Stanton Evans and me that terrorists had threatened him in the Tribal Trust Territories (TTLs), and that he had promised not to vote. But the man, a school teacher, added that "in my heart I knew I would vote." Many voters from the TTLs apparently preferred to cast their ballots in urban areas where they were safer from intimidation (there are no single-member constituencies; the electoral system is one of proportional representation by parties within provincial boundaries; voters may cast their ballot at any place in the country).

On day 2 (April 18), in an effort to ascertain whether we were being given Potemkin's tours of the voting places, I borrowed a car (and a pistol)

and drove the 180 miles to Inyanga, a hotspot on the Mozambique frontier.

On the way, I dropped in unannounced on one of the two polling places at Rusape, a small town that serves a racially mixed farming area. I found the polling procedures to be identical to those we had seen on the Fort Victoria tour the previous day. I declined with thanks an armed escort for the remainder of my drive up into the mountains of Inyanga (two polling stations in Rusape district had been attacked the previous night with no loss of life).

I reached the mobile polling station in Rhodes National Park shortly before noon. The station's supervisor, John Anderson, said 405 people had cast their ballots that morning, but none were waiting to do so, and none came in during my hour-long stay. Anderson advised me, as a precaution against terrorist attack, to leave Inyanga not later than 3 p.m. for the three-and-a-half hour drive back to Salisbury.

I drove another 10 miles into the mountains and lunched in solitary splendor at the Troutbeck Inn. In February, 50 of the hotel's staff of 70 were abducted by terrorists. Of the hotel's 70 rooms, only 16 are kept open, mainly for the convenience of local farmers and the security forces. But the fire that has burned (so they say) in the hotel's big stone fireplace continuously for the past 25 years has not yet been extinguished.

From the Troutbeck, I drove to the District Commissioner's office in Inyanga village. Here I was greeted with effusive cordiality by the polling supervisor, Mrs. Jean Axentowicz ("My husband was Polish," she explained somewhat unnecessarily), and by the District Commissioner, Ian Moffitt—it seemed I was the only one of some 70 foreign observers (from nine countries) to pay Inyanga a visit, and they were not expecting another.

Inyanga, being only seven miles from the Mozambique border and in an area of low population density, has been hard-hit by terrorists, and most of the voters came in groups: road-workers, forest department employees, security forces and farm workers.

None of the five people (men and women) questioned said they had been either intimidated by terrorists not to vote or told by the government to do so. I asked a young black soldier of the Rhodesia Defense Regiment if the voting had been fair and he replied: "That's for sure."

I checked the mobile station in the park once again but, once more, found it without customers. My return trip to Salisbury, like my drive up, was uneventful, a tribute to the work of the security forces.

On Day 3, the four of us flew with a mixed party of observers and journalists to Bulawayo, Rhodesia's second city and the capital of Matabeleland, the tribal homeland of Joshua Nkomo's faction of the Patriotic Front and an area hammered by his ZIPRA guerrillas based in Zambia and Botswana. There have been reports, which I believe to be true, that



Byron Engle (left) and Howard Pollock pose in front of one of the military helicopters used to transport the international observers to various polling places.



Byron Engle (right) meets Hans Germani, a correspondent for DIE WELT, at a military briefing held at Fort Victoria. In background (center) are ACU observers Stan Evans and Smith Hempstone.



M. Stanton Evans interviews Bishop Muzorewa at the Kambuzuma polling station in Salisbury.



Typical crowd scene at a polling place in Bulawayo. These young people are supporters of Bishop Muzorewa.



*Smith Hempstone (left) greets Prime Minister Ian Smith in Salisbury.*



*Howard Pollock (center) and Byron Engle (right) become media stars as they dance with tribal women celebrating the election in the tribal trustlands.*



*Byron Engle (right) and Belden Bell view cattle that were slaughtered by Soviet weapons in the tribal trustlands.*



*Howard Pollock examines an AK-47 cartridge used in the slaughter of cattle by guerrillas in the tribal trustlands area near Bindura.*



*ACU observers M. Stanton Evans and Smith Hempstone look on as a terrorist who surrendered in order to cast his vote in Bulawayo is introduced to an official of Bishop Muzorewa's party.*



*The ACU observer delegation holds a news conference on April 22 in Salisbury to issue their preliminary report on the elections. From left to right are Byron Engle, Howard Pollock, Stan Evans and Smith Hempstone.*





Upon their return to the United States, the ACU observer team held a news conference at the ACU offices. From left to right are: Byron Engle, Stan Evans, ACU Chairman Rep. Bob Bauman and Smith Hempstone.

Jim Rowland



ACU Chairman Rep. Bob Bauman (standing) introduces M. Stanton Evans to the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Africa on May 14 to present his testimony to the committee. Seated behind Evans are (left to right) Howard Pollock, Byron Engle and Smith Hempstone.

Fran Griffin



ACU delegation chairman Stan Evans (at microphone) testifies before the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Africa on May 14, 1979. Other panelists include (from left to right) Lord Chitness, Allard Lowenstein and Dr. William R. Kintner. Seated behind the panel are ACU observers Howard Pollock, Byron Engle and Smith Hempstone.

Fran Griffin

many Matabele were withholding their votes out of loyalty to Nkomo, Rhodesia's veteran African nationalist and the most prominent member of this small (16 percent of the total population) but martial tribe. In the days leading up to the election, 110 "troublemakers" were placed under preventive detention by the Bulawayo authorities.

Bulawayo is the headquarters for TANGENT, one of the five military sectors into which Rhodesia is divided. I had met its commander, Brigadier Mike Shute, two years ago, when he was commanding a battalion of the Rhodesian African Rifles in Fort Victoria, so it was decided I would spend most of the three hours allocated to the visit (plus four in the airplane) to talking to him about the military situation, while the other three members of the ACU delegation worked the polling places.

Because Nkomo had threatened to break up the elections by force, Shute had many of his troops deployed along the Zambian and Botswana borders, or pursuing terrorist gangs already within the country, leaving the protection of the polls largely to the police. Shute said the hottest day he had had was five days before the polling began. He attributed the failure of the guerrilla offensive to materialize to the unprecedented general mobilization that had put virtually every able-bodied white Rhodesian between the ages of 18 and 60 into uniform (one industrialist later told me in Salisbury that 62 of his 64 white employees had been called up). As any prudent soldier would, he was anticipating a major terrorist attack in May after the reservists have been demobilized.

While at Shute's headquarters, it was reported that a ZANLA terrorist had surrendered near the South African border, expressed the desire to vote and was being brought to Bulawayo's Tshabalala polling station to cast his ballot. So I elected to skip the military flight back to Salisbury, catching a commercial flight later after talking with the terrorist.

Shortly after the Brigadier and I arrived at Tshabalala, Stanton Evans, having heard the same report and made the same decision, showed up.

Clement Sampson, 19, told us he had been a guerrilla for two years, and his band of about 100 had been operating near the South African border for about two months, with the objective of interdicting the railroad at Plumtree. He said he had surrendered "because majority rule has been achieved."

The voting at Tshabalala was going smoothly and enthusiastically, but at a diminished pace: 3,019 people had voted there on Tuesday, 2,307 on Wednesday and 1,113 by 4:16 p.m. on Thursday. The well-sand-bagged polling station was unusual in only one respect: it was the only place where a voter declined to be interviewed; a white-haired old Matabele shook his head, saying "I am an old man and know nothing. I only wanted to vote."

On the way back to the hotel to catch the airport bus, Shute told me the vote in his five protected villages had ranged between 52 percent and 73 percent, a much more realistic figure than the reports of 99 percent

and 100 percent from the 47 protected villages in Fort Victoria province (Assistant Commissioner of Police Geoffrey Hedges later admitted to me in Salisbury that 100 percent returns—which implied there was no village idiot, nobody sick or drunk and everyone committed to the internal solution—would seem to indicate someone “might have been a trifle too enthusiastic” in those areas). In the controlled environment of a protected village—much like a Vietnamese strategic hamlet and just as controversial—voters obviously are at least exposed to pressure to vote, even if the government does not choose to exercise that pressure; by the same token, people in remote areas lightly held or seldom visited by the security forces are more exposed to intimidation by the guerrillas.

(A note on semantics: those who oppose the transitional government by force call themselves “freedom fighters” and are called by the government “terrorists.” In general, I have used the more neutral term “guerrillas,” although it must be conceded that most of the acts perpetrated by these men are of a terroristic nature and are aimed at the civilian population, not the security forces.)

Our drive to the Bulawayo airport was indicative of the extreme care the government was taking to minimize the risk to international observers. On our arrival at 11 a.m., the airport had been bristling with troops and we were escorted into town by a convoy that included armored cars. When, having separated from the official observer party, we left with two other men on the airport bus at dusk (the hour of most terrorist attacks), we did so without an escort and found an airport devoid of troops. The 6:40 p.m. Air Rhodesia Viscount flight back to Salisbury, a “businessman’s special” that normally is jammed, was virtually empty—yet another indication of the intensity of the troop call-up.

On Day 4 (April 20), I stayed behind in Salisbury to check urban polling stations and interview Prime Minister Ian Smith. Again, no irregularities of procedure were detected at the polls. The voters were uniformly cheerful, and there was much dancing and singing.

By the time I talked with Smith, well over 50 percent of those eligible to vote had done so, and the prime minister obviously was pleased. He expressed the opinion there could no longer be any logical or equitable reason for Britain or the United States to withhold diplomatic recognition or maintain economic sanctions. He said he would retire from politics when the process of normalization was complete. Smith asserted the internal settlement would work, because it had been negotiated in Rhodesia, by Rhodesians and for Rhodesians, not imposed from abroad.

On Day 5 (April 21), the last day of the balloting, I and two other members of the ACU delegation (Byron Engle and Howard Pollock) went to the Marimba home of Bishop Abel Muzorewa, who by the time these

words are set in print in all probability will have been named the first black prime minister of Zimbabwe-Rhodesia.

Muzorewa, who is as tiny as Nkomo is hulking, said his first priority would be to bring peace to his country. He said Nkomo and Mugabe were free to return any time they wanted, and to play a normal role in the political process. Asked about the entrenched clauses of the constitution that appear to some to preserve white power and privilege to an inordinate degree, Muzorewa said these were necessary for historical and political reasons, and that he intended to make the constitution work. He said the recognition and the lifting of sanctions would end the war and improve the economic situation. He admitted it would not be easy to reconcile rising black aspirations with the understandable white desire to keep things as they are. Muzorewa expressed gratitude for the role of the international observers in monitoring the elections, saying “we have nothing to hide.”

As the polling stations closed for the last time at 7 p.m. on April 21, a final check in Salisbury revealed no irregularities.

Clearly, no single person or team of four observers, no matter how energetic, unbiased and perceptive, can say definitely that any election in any country is totally without blemish. The African electorate was exposed to the possibility of pressure from the guerrillas, the security forces, the private armies, the political parties and their employers. There may have been isolated instances of undue pressure being put on Africans to vote. I can only say I saw no evidence of this and heard no complaints of it. I did see evidence of guerrilla intimidation of the electorate not to vote, in the form of broken bodies and dead men.

The secrecy of the ballot appeared good (and would have been better if curtains had been provided on the fourth side of the polling booths). Apparently under-aged people were turned away from the polls or asked to produce documentation of their age. Ballot boxes checked were properly sealed. There was no suggestion seen of the security forces’ forcing voters to the polls; the guns were pointed the other way. Double or multiple voting seemed to have been avoided by use of identification fluid. Finally, the size of the turnout—64 percent of the 2.9 million people eligible—and the spontaneity of the voters would seem to be the firmest indications of the freedom and fairness of the vote.

Zimbabwe-Rhodesia is not utopia. But under trying and dangerous circumstances its people turned out in impressive numbers to exercise the franchise. The majority rule elections of April, 1979, almost certainly were the freest and fairest held in Africa in a decade, and compare most favorably with those held in Cook County, Illinois.

## 'The Birth of a New Republic'

By Howard W. Pollock

Howard Pollock served as Congressman for the state of Alaska from 1967 to 1971, a post which he left to become Deputy Administrator of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration. A former alternate U.S. Representative to the International Law of the Sea Conference, he now is a private consultant to government and industry on marine affairs and law of the sea.

It was our privilege to observe the creation of a new democracy in southern Africa, henceforth to be known as Zimbabwe-Rhodesia. More specifically, my colleagues and I were charged with the responsibility of monitoring the national elections which would bring about a new black majority government, based upon universal suffrage involving every person 18 years of age or older who wished to vote and who was a native of the country or who had been a resident for the preceding two years or more. It was to be a one-man/one-vote election by secret ballot with no discrimination as to sex, color, tribal ancestry, national origin, religion, political philosophy, education, property ownership, or whatever. All eligible voters were invited and encouraged to participate.

Our assignment was to observe the conduct of the national elections in all aspects, and to render a completely objective, unbiased report as to whether in our opinion the secrecy of the ballot was rigorously maintained, whether the elections were free, fair, open and honest, how the integrity of the system was maintained, whether there was duress or intimidation of the electorate to make them vote, or vote for a particular candidate, or to pressure them to refrain from voting.

Our four-man team was headed by the distinguished journalist, M. Stanton Evans; and our two other colleagues were Byron Engle (now retired, but the former Police Administrator under the Supreme Commander, Allied Powers, Japan, after World War II, and subsequently Director of the Office of Public Safety for the Agency for International Development (AID), as well as a long-time member of the U.S./INTERPOL Delegation), and another well-known, highly respected and distinguished journalist, Smith Hempstone. It was a privilege to be on the team with these outstanding gentlemen.

Our delegation members criss-crossed the nation by airplane and helicopter, often on different teams, for the five days of the elections. There were also observer delegations from the Freedom House, the Institute of American Relations, the American Security Council, the American Legion, and from a number of other nations—72 of us in all. The United States Government did not choose to send any official observers.

Not only were we checking on the secrecy of the ballot, and the elec-

tion process in general, but we were also monitoring the disposition of spoiled ballots, the security, storage and sealing of ballot boxes at the end of each polling day, as well as the return of the ballot boxes to the polling places on each succeeding election day, and the removal of the seals without the opening of the ballot boxes. In addition, we carefully checked the effect of the anthracene fluid on the hands of voters (as observed by ultra-violet light) to insure that voters only exercised their franchise once. We carefully checked on the disqualification of ineligible voters, i.e., those under 18 years of age (teachers who knew the students in the local areas were used at the polling stations), or those who could not prove residence in Rhodesia for at least two years. We visited polling booths other than those on the official itinerary. We talked to voters in private, using other than official interpreters whenever possible; we checked the effects of martial law on the voting; and we closely observed the mood of the voters and the spontaneity, or lack of it, before, during, and after the voting at or near the polling places. And, finally, members of our delegation were present at the counting of the ballots, after the voting was completed.

**T**he elections took place over a five-day period (Tuesday, 17 April, through Saturday, 21 April), so that everyone would have ample opportunity to vote. In addition to the static voting places, both in the rural and the urban areas, there were "mobile" stations which moved on a schedule from one part of a community, farming area, or protected village to another, so that over the course of the week, everyone had an opportunity to vote in their area, although some determined persons walked as much as 15 kilometers (nearly 10 miles) across the countryside in hazardous areas in which the guerrilla terrorists were intimidating and slaughtering those who attempted to vote. From the air I saw as many as 100 people walking to the polling places from remote areas. The people were told by the terrorists that anyone seen voting would be shot. Some asked for military escort to the polls so they could tell the terrorists they were forced to vote. Yet, not a single voter, out of many I questioned, indicated any pressure by anyone to make them vote. At the end, an incredible 63.9 percent of the total adult population of the country voted. In at least one instance, there were three terrorist attacks on 150 voters waiting in line to vote, with one being injured, and when the terrorists were driven off the voters got back in the queue and patiently awaited their turns to exercise this coveted franchise right. We in America have never matched this percentage of voter turnout. They are a brave and determined people.

Although I arrived in Rhodesia completely impartial, objective, and unprejudiced, I was deeply impressed by the positive attitude of the people toward the elections. Not only by our own close personal observations, but by talking to other delegations of international observers

and hordes of skeptical newsmen, we became convinced that the elections were conducted in a free, fair, open, honest manner, and that the electorate were voting their honest convictions by secret ballot. We observed no irregularities such as double voting; but did observe youngsters under age being denied the right to vote and asked to leave the polling places by teachers who could identify them. We saw no evidence whatsoever of pressures exerted by the security forces on the people to vote, but, rather, quite the contrary. In those places where the people were adequately protected they voted in enormous numbers, oftentimes with 100 percent participation of the eligible voters.

Most impressive was the atmosphere of happiness, gaiety, festive dancing and singing near the polling places in the reasonably protected areas across the country where the people were not in fear of their lives for exercising their franchise.

The so-called Patriotic Front is a Marxist misnomer for the guerrilla terrorists. The terrorist leader, Joshua Nkomo, of the Matabele tribe, head of ZAPU (Zimbabwe African Peoples Union) lives in Zambia. His terrorist group is known as ZPRA (Zimbabwe Peoples Revolutionary Army). The terrorist leader, Robert Mugabe, of the Mashona tribe, a factional leader of ZANU (Zimbabwe African National Union) heads a terrorist group known as ZANLA (Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army). While the internal security forces, known as JOC, for Joint Operating Command (comprised of the Army, Air Force, Police, and Internal Affairs) are under economic sanctions and trade embargoes levied against them by the U.S., the U.K. and the U.N., the revolutionary guerrilla terrorists are given U.N. observer seats, and are freely supplied by the Soviets and other Communist nations with mortars, rockets, rifles, handguns, land mines, and other armament and ammunition, as well as with uniforms and other supplies, advisors, and encouragement. It should be understood that the guerrilla terrorist leaders were invited with their parties to participate in the national elections and to participate in an all-party conference to resolve the serious internal political issues, but they have steadfastly refused, knowing full well that they represent only a small minority of the citizens of Rhodesia and could never gain control of the government by democratic means (except as the Communists misuse that term).

**D**uring the five-day period of the elections, I visited the following polling places, some of which were also visited by my colleagues on the delegation:

**Fort Victoria**

**Mashaba** (rocketed during the elections)

**Chibi** (mortared during the elections)

**Salisbury Area:**

Kambuzuma Township (had field interview with Bishop Muzorewa there)  
 Mufakose Township  
 Department of Roads Training School

**Bulawayo**

Iminyela School  
 Mzilikazi School  
 Milton School

**Bindura****Chiweshe Tribal Trust Land:**

Gungive (Protected Village #10)  
 Chineahasha (Protected Village #5)

**Umvukwes**

Sanford Farm (workers from surrounding farms voted here)

Upon our return from Umvukwes to Bindura we dropped in by helicopter to Rumange Farm to observe valuable cattle (\$350 each), which had been shot by terrorists (estimated to be 15 in number from the sound of the shots). Result: 25 slaughtered, 13 wounded, 15 missing. Picked up empty shells from Russian 7.62 AK rifles.

Each morning in Salisbury we were awakened between 5:00 a.m. and 5:30 a.m. for the day's activities of flying out and monitoring the polling places. We returned to Salisbury in time for a 6:30 p.m. briefing each evening by government officials, at which time we were given the percentage of vote estimated to be completed in each of the areas, as well as being given a report on guerrilla terrorist activities. Also, each evening we had the opportunity to talk to one of the members of the Rhodesian Executive Council. The first was Bishop A.T. Muzorewa, leader of the UANC (United African National Council), whose party won the majority of the seats in the Parliament, and who subsequently became the new Prime Minister. The next was the Reverend N. Sithole, leader of ZANU (Zimbabwe African National Union). The third evening we met Chief J.S. Chirau, leader of ZUPO (Zimbabwe United Peoples Organization). In the evening of Day 4 we had the opportunity of meeting and questioning Prime Minister Ian Smith. Each of these leaders gave a spirited talk, and then yielded to extensive questioning by both the observers and representatives of the media who were in attendance (and not always too friendly or sympathetic).

The following are exact quotes of some significance made by members of the four-man Executive Council of the interim government pending formation of the new black majority government of Zimbabwe-Rhodesia. These remarks were made in the evening briefing sessions during the

week of the elections. The remarks of Reverend Sithole are particularly significant because of his claim of irregularities after all the votes were in, and it was certain that he and his party (ZANU) had lost the election.

**Reverend N. Sithole:**

"The 3rd March 1978 Agreement' (under which racial discrimination was completely eliminated, under which the new constitution was adopted, and under which arrangements for the national elections were formulated) is a matter of life and death. This is the correct and proper political resolution."

"Ours is a grand experiment in democracy... We are shaping our own destiny... The world should accept us."

"If a coup had been accomplished here yesterday, and all the existing leadership were liquidated, the West would immediately give official diplomatic recognition to the new revolutionary government and its leader within 48 hours; but somehow, the West dares not acknowledge or recognize a new freely elected democracy chosen by the people... The 'outside world', including the U.S., has a double standard."

"Some of the guerrillas are encouraging and helping the people to vote. They want the war to end when the black majority government takes over. They are sick and tired of the war."

"Tell the United States to support this democratic experiment by recognizing the new government of the people."

"The Parliament of Zimbabwe-Rhodesia will be the supreme organ, not the Army, or the police... The 72 black seats and 28 white seats are a transitional solution which we must honor. It was a negotiated compromise to bring about a smooth transition to black majority rule."

"The U.K. failed for 13 years to give us a black majority government, yet they cannot accept our internal resolution which has the overwhelming support of the people."

"The terrorists cannot turn their guns over to the interim government, but they can turn them over to a majority government."

**Bishop A.T. Muzorewa:**

*(the new Prime Minister)*

"One-man/one-vote is a reality after 88 years."

"The 28 white seats in the Parliament were a negotiated compromise and we will honor the commitment."

"The blacks in America are our biggest stumbling block to diplomatic recognition and lifting of the economic sanctions... yet, the sanctions hurt the blacks most in Rhodesia, for they are the vast majority of the population here."

"We have created the machinery of a democratic society."

"We have complied with all the conditions laid down [by the U.S. and the U.K.]. What else must we do? Where is the integrity? Why continue the sanctions and 'no recognition' against us? The world no longer has a case against Rhodesia."

"We will operate the government on the basis of merit, talent, and qualifications...Whites will be expected to share their expertise...It would be ridiculous not to use those most capable and experienced...From a human rights point of view, our white brothers belong here...Other nations of Africa are too emotional about race; we will be pragmatic; we will profit by the mistakes of the other African nations; we will have a stable economy...Malawi has approached its independence calmly and sensibly, and while it has been castigated by others without justification, it is supplying food to its neighbors."

"We will emphasize freedom of the press, but not where it infringes on the rights or freedoms of others."

**Chief J.S. Chirau**

*(President of the Council of Chiefs)*

"We are participating in free and fair elections."

"Why should the sanctions continue? Why should we continue to be punished for the action of our former leaders in breaking away from the U.K.? The sanctions hurt the black majority."

"We have committed no offenses against any nation."

"We must not be punished indefinitely."

**Prime Minister Ian Smith:**

"There are 48 or 49 independent governments in Africa...all but three are dictatorships or one-party states...40 successful coups d'etat in Africa...Of our five front line states [bordering nations], two have never had elections, and two are one-party dictatorships. President Kuanda, of neighboring Zambia, who opposes our elections, is head of a one-party state who simply eliminated all opposition and competition by liquidating his enemies."

"We have the sanctions imposed upon us because we had the courage to make a declaration of independence from the colonial control of the U.K. (something Americans should certainly understand)."

"Every day innocent blacks are dying (because of the encouragement the U.S. and U.K. are giving to the terrorists) and untold suffering and hardships ensue because of the sanctions and embargoes levied against Rhodesia."

"Many once-wealthy countries of Africa are now bankrupt, and have degenerated economically, morally, and every other way. Our people don't intend to have that happen here."

"It is worth noting that the sanctions are imposed upon Rhodesia, but not upon the so-called Patriotic Front [the guerrilla terrorists]. By their continued refusal to participate in an all-parties conference, they can, in fact, veto the lifting of sanctions, while Rhodesians struggle under the burden."

**U**nder the provisions of the Constitution and enabling legislation, on 7 May this year the Electoral College (composed of the 72 blacks and

20 whites elected to the House of Assembly) voted on filling the remaining eight white seats in the Assembly. Thereafter, the Speaker of the House of Assembly and the President of the Senate were to be chosen. On May 23, the 30-man Senate was to be elected—10 blacks chosen by the 72 black members of the House; 10 whites, chosen by the 28 white members of the House; and 10 black African Chiefs, chosen by the Council of Chiefs. Members of the Electoral College will appoint the President, who, in turn, will appoint the Prime Minister and subsequently (with the advice of the Prime Minister) the other Ministers and Deputy Ministers from each political party which is represented in the House of Assembly by five or more members, in the proportion of seats held by each such party. The new Government of National Unity of Zimbabwe-Rhodesia should be in place and fully operative by the end of the month (June 1979). Of course, in the new government there will be a new black Prime Minister, a black President, a substantial black majority in the Parliament, and a majority of black Ministers, presumably including a black Minister of Foreign Affairs.

**W**est German observers of the Rhodesian national elections made the following noteworthy summary statement after observing the elections for the full period:

"The members of the observers group...are of the opinion that after these general, free and democratic elections, there is no longer any reason to refuse international recognition of the future black majority government. The lifting of sanctions is necessary and justified. Any country which denies recognition to the newly elected Parliament and the future government of Zimbabwe-Rhodesia is applying double standards if, at the same time, it maintains official relations with countries whose governments are undemocratic or are insufficiently legitimized."

**I** heartily concur. Even if one accepts the view that the only purpose of sanctions was to punish a recalcitrant white government, the fact remains that with the demise of that government and the installation of a government elected on the basis of universal suffrage, the original purpose of the sanctions falls away.

Now that the national elections are over, the United States of America should exercise dynamic leadership in the free world by immediately recognizing the new Government of National Unity in Zimbabwe-Rhodesia and forthwith lifting the economic sanctions and embargoes which have wrought untold hardship and suffering on the people of that fledgling democracy, black and white alike. Under the circumstances, it would be unconscionable for the United States to do otherwise; that is, to continue appeasing the Communist world by failing to recognize the new government, by continuing the economic sanctions, and by continuing to give psychological support to the terrorist guerrilla minorities. At this juncture in history, we desperately need the moral courage to issue a

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clarion call for all the world to hear, that we will recognize and support governments the world over which are chosen by a majority of all the people by secret ballot in free, fair, open, honest elections. If the United States of America is to maintain its leadership of the free world, then its leaders must be ready to welcome and encourage those who strive to be free, no matter what the cost.

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## Appendices

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**APPENDIX 1**  
**Invitation to Testify**  
**Before the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Africa**

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May 8, 1979

Mr. M. Stanton Evans  
American Conservative Union—ERI  
600 Pennsylvania Avenue, S.E., Suite 207  
Washington, D.C. 20003

Dear Mr. Evans:

The Subcommittees on Africa and International Organizations of the House Foreign Affairs Committee are holding a series of hearings on the question of whether or not the U.S. should lift sanctions against Rhodesia.

We would like to invite you to present testimony for our hearing on May 15, 1979 at 10:00 a.m. in Room 2255 of the Rayburn House Office Building. This hearing will focus on the recent election in Rhodesia. Based on your recent visit to Rhodesia, we would appreciate your view of the extent to which this election fulfilled the Case-Javits Amendment criterion of a "free elections in which all political and population groups have been allowed to participate freely." We would like you to comment on both the actual voting and the electoral process generally including the role of the security forces and white employers, the effect of martial law, press censorship and the banning of ZAPU and ZANU, and the significance of the fact that the election was held under a constitution which was not approved by 96% of the population of the country.

Fact sheets providing details on the requirements for submitting testimony for the Subcommittees and on travel and per diem reimbursement have been enclosed. As indicated, the Rules of the Subcommittees require that written testimony be submitted 48 hours in advance of the hearing.

Due to the number of witnesses on this important issue, we must ask you to limit your oral summary of your statement to no more than ten (10) minutes.

We look forward to your testimony next week.

Sincerely,

STEPHEN J. SOLARZ  
Chairman  
Subcommittee on Africa



**APPENDIX 2**  
**Testimony of M. Stanton Evans Before the**  
**Africa Subcommittee, House Committee on Foreign Affairs**

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May 14, 1979

My name is M. Stanton Evans. I am by profession a journalist and commentator. From April 15 through 22, 1979, I was part of a four-member delegation sent to Zimbabwe-Rhodesia by the American Conservative Union to observe the elections to choose the 72 black members of the country's new Parliament. The other members of the ACU delegation were Byron Engle, former Director of the Office of Public Safety of the Agency for International Development, syndicated columnist Smith Hempstone, and Howard Pollock, former congressman from the state of Alaska.

The principal observations and conclusions of our delegation are contained in a preliminary report released in Salisbury, April 22, and issued to the American media at a press conference in Washington, April 25. I attach a copy of this report as an integral part of my remarks, and will merely summarize its contents here. In this opening statement, I will try to respond directly to the questions posed by Chairman Solarz in his letter of invitation to offer testimony.

1. As to the voting process itself and general fairness of the election, the conclusions of our delegation are essentially the same as those reached by the vast majority of international observers and members of the media who were on the scene. Our delegation visited 36 polling places in widely varied parts of the country, interviewed 156 voters, and conducted more than 200 interviews other than those with voters at the polls. We made a particular effort to talk with people away from officialdom, and to visit places not on the official agenda.

Judging by all the direct evidence we could gather, the elections were conducted on a free and fair basis. Secrecy of the ballot was observed, eligible voters had ready access to the polls, ineligible voters were turned away, steps were taken to preclude double voting, spoiled ballots were sequestered, ballot boxes were sealed at night, and so on. Details concerning the checkpoints monitored, and the methods used in observing them, are set forth in the attached report.

2. Allegations were made that security forces, so-called auxiliary forces, or white employers put pressure on voters either to make certain they voted or to favor one party over another, and the chairman makes reference to this issue in his letter. It would be astonishing under the circumstances—military conflict, an unregistered and politically unsophisticated electorate, the first ever one-person, one-vote election in the nation's history—if something irregular did not occur somewhere in the country, and there were isolated reports of such occurrences involving the auxiliaries.

In our interviews, however, we were unable to confirm any such allega-

tions. In no case did a voter tell us he or she had been forced or pressured to vote. The usual response, instead, was that the individual wanted to vote, thought the election was a great thing, and hoped it would lead to peace and better government. On the other hand, we did encounter people who told us they had been warned **not** to vote, but did so anyway. The net impression of spontaneity and enthusiasm was confirmed by the huge crowds of dancing, singing people at polling places in Salisbury, Bulawayo, Fort Victoria, and other locations.

3. This brings me to an additional point raised by the chairman in his letter—the effects of martial law. Zimbabwe-Rhodesia is of course a country at war—more particularly, a country beset by terrorists who are engaged in killing civilians, and who threatened to disrupt the elections by violence. While this circumstance limited the mobility of press and observers, those who wished to do so were permitted to visit places, at their own risk, which were not on the official itinerary.

Concerning the effects of the military/security situation on the voters themselves, it was apparent the security presence mustered during election week was there for the purpose of protecting the voters rather than intimidating them. The thousands of celebrating people we saw, and the voters with whom we talked, were obviously not afraid of the security forces—quite the contrary. Our delegation talked with people, indeed, who said they were voting because they knew they had protection.

As to the question of martial law in general, it should be pointed out that Zimbabwe-Rhodesia is firmly under civilian rule. The martial law that exists is aimed at isolating and bottling up the terrorists, and is of limited application. The ordinary procedures of civilian government, including the judicial process, go on as before. Mr. Engle of our delegation is a particular authority in these matters, and I would be happy to have him expand still further on this point if you desire.

One final observation on this subject: the Zimbabwe-Rhodesian military and security forces are approximately 80 percent black. I did a great deal of travelling in the hotter zones sitting next to a black soldier with a loaded rifle who kept a watchful eye out for terrorists.

4. On the matter of press censorship, the rules prevailing during the election were that local correspondents had to clear their copy with the government, but international correspondents and observers did not. Thus anything irregular that was discovered by the global press could be reported instantly and freely. The local clearance, as I discovered in talking with Rhodesian journalists (who didn't especially like the situation), was focused chiefly on military rather than political items. Matters of political controversy were reported rather freely in the Rhodesian papers that I saw.

5. The chairman's letter raises the question of barring ZAPU and ZANU, the forces headed by external leaders Joshua Nkomo and Robert Mugabe, respectively. As I understand it, the chronology on this subject is as follows: Both Nkomo and Mugabe were invited to participate in the constitutional settlement of March 3, 1978, but refused. Both were invited to take seats on the executive council, but

refused. Both were invited to participate in the elections, on the same basis as all other parties, but refused. The refusal of these offers is perhaps understandable in view of the fact that both these leaders feel they can gain power through military force, and that Mugabe in particular is not a fan of multi-party elections, expressing instead a preference for a "one-party Marxist state." The so-called exclusion of these two leaders, in other words, was entirely their own doing.

6. Finally, the chairman inquires about the fact that the election was held under a constitution which was not approved by 96 percent of the population. The short answer to this question is that, in a transition where power is being passed in orderly fashion from one group to another, the initial step must be to have the group possessing the power agree to hand it over. This was the practical effect of the constitutional referendum. It would perhaps have been preferable to stage a second referendum among black voters to accept the new arrangement, but considering the difficulties involved in staging even a single such nationwide balloting, I imagine the prospect of holding two elections rather than one was a bit daunting.

In any event, the concurrence of major black leaders in the arrangement, and the massive turnout of black voters, would appear to constitute an effective vote of confidence in the internal settlement.

In summary: In terms of everything we were able to observe, the Zimbabwe-Rhodesia elections were conducted on a free and fair basis, substantially fulfilling the requirements set forward in Case-Javits.

**APPENDIX 3**  
**Comments Concerning Certain Technical**  
**Aspects of the Election**  
(Byron Engle)

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**Transportation of Voters**

In the urban areas public transportation was available for voters. In the rural and Tribal Trust Lands they walked, hitchhiked to get there the best way they could, but they came defying threats of death if they voted. The Government or its police and military did not furnish transportation to the polls for voters. They did, however, have a system whereby groups making up a convoy could request and receive armed escorts. In one area (Bulawayo) the commanding officer said no escorts had been requested. In other areas we saw from the air unescorted groups walking to and from the polls, some estimated as large as one hundred.

In one farming area we visited, farmers had provided open truck beds pulled by farm tractors in which their employees rode to the polls. None we talked to said they had been told how to vote. The farmers said they had scrupulously avoided even suggesting for whom their workers should vote. One farmer said three employees he had left behind to guard the farm while the others were away voting were so disappointed that he was going to make a special trip in his auto to bring them to vote.

The practice of encouraging the populace to vote and furnishing transportation by political parties is a widely accepted practice in this and other countries as is encouraging them to vote for a particular candidate. However, when the ballot is secret as it was in Rhodesia, the voter has a free choice to vote his preference.

**Martial Law**

Martial law is a common practice in countries where organized armed violence is in progress. However, according to my understanding of how it exists in Rhodesia it could be defined as limited martial law because it does not supplant but rather supplements civil law.

In present-day Rhodesia, martial law is limited to situations and crimes involved in control of terrorism; further, courts martial try only crimes of terrorism, for example, murder, rape and maiming committed for the purpose of terrorizing the population. Similar crimes unrelated to terrorism are tried in civil courts. According to the Assistant Commissioner of Police, there are no political prisoners. All inmates of prisons were convicted under criminal procedures for such crimes as murder, robbery, assault or other violations of the criminal code.

**Countrywide Voting—High Percentage in Some Areas**

The fact that a voter could vote any place he chose contributed to the large turnout and in some instances swelled the number voting in an area beyond the estimated number of voters resident there. In two urban areas I visited, over 80% of the voters were women. Where were

the men? They were voting near the factories where they worked. Other voters told me they had walked miles to vote at a poll far distant from where they lived; they did not want to be seen voting near their homes because they had been warned not to vote.

The 2.8 million estimated eligible black voters was based on a 1969 census and projected on a normal population increase. Shifts in population due to violence and economic dislocation could easily account for the vote above population estimates in certain areas. (See next appendix.)

#### **Ballot Counting**

On Monday, April 23 I visited the ballot counting center for the Salisbury area.

All counting was done by election officials cross-checking each other and the total count against the numbers of ballots issued. Spoiled ballots were segregated.

All counting was done in full view with representatives of political parties, wearing their party badges, looking on but not interfering.

The counting process was proceeding in accordance with the election procedures previously referred to.

## **APPENDIX 4**

### **Vote Percentages Explained**

The following statement was issued today (April 20) by the Election Directorate:

As there is some confusion relating to the calculation of the percentage of votes cast in the General Election, the Election Directorate points out that for the purpose of this calculation a potential electorate of 2.9 million was used.

The Director of Census and Statistics has estimated the potential black electorate at 2.8 million as of March 31, 1979. To this must be added the potential white electorate, which is approximately 100,000.

Allowance must also be made for those eligible voters unable to vote because they are outside Rhodesia and no postal voting facilities are available for this election. In these circumstances the Directorate considers 2.9 million a reasonable estimate against which to calculate the overall percentage poll, as was explained at the Election Directorate briefing on the evening of Monday, April 16.

The Directorate also draws attention to the fact that it is misleading to calculate percentage polls in individual electoral districts on the estimated voting potential in each of these districts. In the first place these estimates were made for the purpose of calculating the number of parliamentary seats and were based on the normal estimated population of each administrative district. No account was taken of movement of population, particularly to the urban areas, in recent years as a result of the terrorist war, as this would have been impossible to calculate and in any event would have given a false picture on which to base parliamentary representation.

In this particular election a voter is free to vote at any polling station in the country and is not restricted to his own district. The Directorate is aware that there has been a significant movement of people from some Tribal Trust Lands to urban centers immediately before and during the election so that they can cast their votes free from intimidation. In many cases this movement has involved crossing electoral district boundaries.

While a comparison between the actual voters in any of the electoral districts with the estimated voting potential in that district gives an indication of the turnout of voters in the area, it cannot be taken as an accurate assessment of the percentage of the actual voters in that district during the election who have cast their votes. The only reliable calculation, therefore, is that based on the estimated potential electorate in the nation as a whole.

Department of Information,  
P.O. Box 8150,  
Causeway.

Telephone: 703891

April 20, 1979

TW/LC

**APPENDIX 5**  
**Letter from Howard W. Pollock**  
**To President Carter**

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Geneva, Switzerland  
April 25, 1979

The President  
The White House

Dear Mr. President:

Now that the national elections in Rhodesia are over, the United States of America should exercise dynamic leadership in the free world by immediately recognizing the new Government of National Unity in Zimbabwe-Rhodesia and lifting the economic sanctions which have wrought hardship on the people of that stalwart nation, black and white alike.

The elections in Rhodesia were a huge success. They were conducted by secret ballot in a free, fair, open, voluntary, and democratic manner. Notwithstanding widespread threats, intimidation, and atrocities by Marxist-supported guerrilla terrorists based outside the country to discourage voter participation, an astonishing 63.9% of the total population 18 years of age and older bravely made their way to widely-scattered polling places across the length and breadth of the land and voted their party preferences for the black leaders who will head the new government.

The black population responded enthusiastically and overwhelmingly. There was dancing and singing in the streets and villages across the land and near the polling places after the black majority voted, demonstrating their joy at being allowed to participate in the elections. Mr. President, I was there and personally witnessed this elation. Although the United States Government refused to send official observers to monitor this grand experiment in democracy in southern Africa, a number of concerned Americans saw fit to travel thousands of miles to Rhodesia to join the group of international observers. I was privileged to be one of those Americans. We crisscrossed that beautiful country by airplane and helicopter, met a gracious, gentle, but determined people, and observed the birth of a new nation.

Mr. President, I respectfully urge that you consider these relevant facts with regard to recognition and lifting of sanctions:

(a) As stated, 63.9% of the adults of the nation voted in the national elections, notwithstanding terrorist intimidation, a performance we Americans could emulate.

(b) The white minority cooperated fully in insuring the success of the elections and the formation of the new black majority Government of National Unity.

(c) As a result of the national elections, there will be a black Prime

Minister, a black President, a black majority in the Parliament, a majority of black Ministers (presumably including a black Minister of Foreign Affairs).

(d) The white minority too are Rhodesians, for many generations. At the request of the black majority of the four-man Executive Council, the former white leaders of Rhodesia, by and large, intend to stay and contribute their skills and experience, and are being encouraged to do so.

(e) By reason of the 3 March Agreement negotiated in 1978, adoption of the new Constitution, and enactment of enabling and implementing legislation, all forms of racial discrimination have been eliminated in housing, schools, transportation, restaurants, hospitals, hotels, places of entertainment, and all other public facilities; and racial relations are outstanding.

(f) Prior to the 3 March 1978 Agreement, compulsory military service was not required for blacks in Rhodesia (a reverse kind of discrimination); nevertheless, 80% of the Rhodesian Army is comprised of black volunteers who, beyond the financial considerations, clearly feel they are defending something worthwhile.

(g) The guerrilla terrorist leaders, Joshua Nkomo, of Matabele tribal ancestry, head of ZAPU (Zimbabwe African Peoples Union), and Robert Mugabe, of Mashona tribal ancestry, a factional leader of ZANU (Zimbabwe African National Union, which participated in the national elections under the leadership of Rev. Ndabaningi Sithole) were invited with their followers to participate in an all-party conference to resolve the serious internal political issues of comparative representation in the new Government of National Unity. They were invited to participate in the national elections but they have steadfastly refused, realizing full well that they lacked sufficient popular support to gain control of the government by democratic means. Accordingly, they have tried to disrupt and discredit the elections and the democratic processes of universal suffrage. Having failed in that effort of terrorist intimidation, each now seeks to mobilize an invasion force with Communist arms, supplies, equipment, military advisors, and encouragement, to gain control through the barrel of the gun. Worse still, while these renegades each wish to bring the fledgling democracy to its knees, they are tribal antagonists, and have no intention of sharing power. This is no longer a black vs. white problem, Mr. President—the guerrilla terrorist activity is a black vs. black issue, internal settlement vs. outside interference, and democracy vs. totalitarian Communism. The so-called Patriotic Front is a Marxist misnomer for the terrorists.

(h) At the outset, sanctions against Rhodesia were imposed by the U.N. at the behest of the U.K. who regarded the issue as a domestic one between the motherland and a recalcitrant colony in violation of Paragraph 7, Article 2 of Chapter 1 of the U.N. Charter, which states that:

"Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state..."

And yet the United States has consistently violated that U.N. Charter provision with reference to Rhodesia by following the dubious leadership of the U.K. and the Communist-dominated nations of the U.N. in imposing economic sanctions against that determined country, based upon an incredible finding that Rhodesia was "a threat to world peace." Yet, amazingly, we failed to arrive at such a finding as to Uganda, for instance, where for 8 long years the tyrant Idi Amin slaughtered untold thousands of his black countrymen without cause and, to his ultimate destruction, attempted to invade a neighboring country. Knowledgeable people the world over question our international diplomatic double standard. In the former Portuguese colony of Angola we announced a "hands off" attitude, although two-thirds of the citizenry wanted democracy; so the USSR and Cuba rolled in on a red carpet and set up another Marxist totalitarian regime. I could go on and on.

(i) As I understand it from Rhodesians whom I met, as a precondition to the lifting of sanctions, the United States tried to insist that Communists be taken into a coalition government for Rhodesia, that the guerrillas be integrated into the Rhodesian security forces, and that following a secret meeting between you and President Julius Nyerere, of Tanzania, a monstrous change in these unbelievable conditions emerged—a demand that the Marxist-supported terrorists take over the internal security of Rhodesia, that the army be withdrawn and confined to barracks, and that members of the police forces acceptable to the guerrilla terrorist leadership be integrated into the reorganized security forces. Mr. President, can this possibly be true? It is incredulous, unbelievable! Obviously, the Rhodesian transitional government summarily rejected this outrageous proposal.

(j) The smooth transition from minority to majority rule is a showcase for democracy, precisely what the USSR cannot tolerate in Africa. Rhodesia is an important target for Russian ambitions because of her major deposits of strategic materials such as high grade chrome, and because of Rhodesia's geographical position as the gateway to South Africa. Russia's control of the subcontinent's mineral deposits and the strategic cape sea route would pose an enormous military and economic threat to the West. With Rhodesia, and ultimately South Africa, in the Russian orbit, the Communists would have an absolute monopoly on the world's chrome supply, with concomitant control of all production of stainless steel.

Mr. President, it would be unconscionable for the United States to continue to refuse recognition of the new freely-elected black majority government of Zimbabwe-Rhodesia, or to fail to lift the economic sanctions which the United States has wrongfully imposed against Rhodesia.

All too long we have consorted with the Communist enemies of democracy and individual freedom, to the detriment of these brave and determined people. The Communists do not want a stable multiracial freely elected democracy in southern Africa, and our failure to recognize Zimbabwe-Rhodesia and lift the economic sanctions aids and abets the enemies of freedom.

I'm afraid you have been getting very bad advice from my former Congressional colleague, Ambassador to the U.N. Andrew Young, whose sympathy for Communist causes, terrorist activities, and exacerbation of human suffering is beyond my comprehension.

Why turn this peaceful, prosperous, and beautiful new democracy of Zimbabwe-Rhodesia into another bankrupt Zambia or an impoverished Marxist Mozambique or Angola? Having insisted on one-man/one-vote for Zimbabwe-Rhodesia, why do we not insist upon similar requirements for the USSR, Communist China, Cuba, Tanzania, Angola, Mozambique, and most of the other nations of the world? There are so few democracies left on earth, and we have contributed to the demise of so many by our indecisiveness and fear of confrontation. Please, let's not blow this one too.

In response to those who criticize the new constitution of Zimbabwe-Rhodesia, and who would attempt to persuade you to continue to champion the cause of the Marxist guerrilla terrorists instead of supporting those public officials chosen by the people by secret ballot in free, open, honest, and fair elections, let me remind you that in our own early American history we adopted a Constitution that was deficient and lacking in essentials, and immediately began improving it through amendments, such as the historic Bill of Rights. Why should we demand a flawless original document of the Rhodesians? Their constitution was drafted under the realities of the current stage of development in Zimbabwe-Rhodesia and in recognition of the lack of education and capacity of the village tribesmen. Again, Mr. President, this is an internal matter for the Rhodesians. The situation may be less than perfect, but it is immeasurably preferable to our support of the small minority of the population who are willing to perpetrate atrocities, commit murder on a massive scale, shoot down unprotected commercial aircraft carrying innocent men, women, and children, and instill terror in the hearts of their countrymen in order to gain personal power and install yet another Communist government in Africa. It is unbelievable that we would hesitate to embrace the new government. How un-Christian! How un-American! How very sad!

Mr. President, your bold and decisive leadership is desperately needed at this juncture in history. Rhodesians, Americans, and freedom-loving people everywhere urge you to set aside the frivolous and mischievous protestations of the left, to recognize immediately the new multiracial black majority democracy of Zimbabwe-Rhodesia, and forthwith to lift all economic sanctions presently levied against this showcase for freedom and individual dignity in southern Africa.

God love and keep you, Mr. President; and may He give you the wisdom, strength, and courage to strike a resounding blow for freedom. Let's recognize Zimbabwe-Rhodesia and lift the economic sanctions now. Cordially,

Howard W. Pollock  
The Former Congressman for Alaska

HWP:eec

Incidentally, Mr. President, the Marxist presence in Rhodesia is not just a figment of my overactive imagination. While in Rhodesia, I personally saw enormous quantities of captured Soviet and Soviet-satellite rifles, handguns, mortars, rockets, land mines, and other armament and ammunition, as well as camouflage uniforms with Communist insignias on the collars and the caps.

H.W.P.

**APPENDIX 6**  
**Correspondence Between M. Stanton Evans and**  
**Mr. L. S. Hawkins, Deputy Secretary for Foreign Affairs**  
**of Rhodesia**

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April 24, 1979

Mr. L. S. Hawkins  
Deputy Secretary for  
Foreign Affairs  
Salisbury, Rhodesia

Dear Tim:

It was good seeing you last week, and I appreciated your help on so many matters.

This message is to follow up on our discussion concerning the two detainees, George Marange (Wha Wha—Section 5) and Thompson Tiravivi (Salisbury). As I indicated previously, it is alleged that they are being held solely because of their opposition to the election, rather than for any violent behavior or conspiracy toward violence.

I of course have no independent knowledge of these cases, although in the massive effort of the government to cope with security problems it would not be astonishing if in fact some innocent people had got caught in the dragnet.

In any event, whatever information can be provided concerning these men and the nature of the evidence against them will be most appreciated, since we are planning to include some mention of the matter in the final version of our observers' report for the American Conservative Union.

Also, I talked with Allard Lowenstein on the way back to the states, and he indicated to me that he too had discussed these cases with you. Al asked that this inquiry be considered a joint request in both our behalfs, and I will share the information with him when I receive it.

Again, my thanks for all your assistance. I found my week in Zimbabwe-Rhodesia a most enjoyable and instructive experience, and hope to pay a return visit in the near future.

Best Wishes,

M. Stanton Evans  
MSE:mjw



Telephone (202) HU 3-4468  
Cable Address Rhodesians

**RHODESIAN INFORMATION OFFICE**

2852 McGill Terrace, N.W.  
Washington, D.C. 20008

April 27, 1979

Reference: P/8

Mr. M. Stanton Evans  
600 Pennsylvania Ave., Southeast,  
Suite 207,  
Washington, D.C. 20003

Dear Stan,

The following is in reply to your letter of April 24 to Tim Hawkins:—

“Both have shown themselves to be militant nationalists supporting the terrorist cause. Although neither is known to have committed a violent offence personally, there is evidence that they support the component parts of the Patriotic Front and incite and encourage others to overthrow the government and disrupt law and order by means of violence. George Marange, according to our evidence, supports that part of the Patriotic Front led by Joshua Nkomo and is known to have encouraged people to join the terrorists commanded by Nkomo. Thompson Tirivavi (please note the correct spelling of his name) is loyal to Robert Mugabe, the leader of the ZANLA terrorists. The evidence shows that they were not prepared to achieve their aims by lawful and constitutional means.”

Best wishes,

K.H. Towsey

KHT:lmf

May 15, 1979

Mr. L. S. Hawkins  
Deputy Secretary for  
Foreign Affairs  
Salisbury, Rhodesia

Dear Tim:

Thanks for your reply to my letter of April 24 concerning the cases of George Marange and Thompson Tirivavi.


I would be most interested in knowing the further disposition of these cases as they unfold, the development of any specifics concerning them, and the procedures used in handling them.


I make this request because the issue of asserted intimidation in the election, and of political prisoners in general, has played and will continue to play a prominent role in debate about American policy toward Zimbabwe-Rhodesia, and I would like to secure as much information as possible to keep myself abreast of the situation.

Best wishes,

M. Stanton Evans

MSE:ksk





[RHODESIA: POLICY: ADVANCE COPIES]

26

Rhodesia

2

PS  
PS/SIR I GILMOUR  
PS/MR LUCE  
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SIR A DUFF  
MR WILLSON  
MR BYATT  
LORD N G LENNOX

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MR R L WADE-GERY )  
MR P M MAXEY )  
COL MOIR ) CABINET  
MR P J FOWLER ) OFFICE  
DIO )

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HD/NEWS DEPT  
HD/WAD

MR FREELAND LEGAL ADVISER RM K200A  
MR FIFOOT LEGAL ADVISER RM K164

RESIDENT CLERK

*Prime Minister*  
*Mr Vance is being helpful: Mr*  
*Attorney, I would guess,*  
*rather less so.*  
*Phms*

GPS820

CONFIDENTIAL

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FROM UKMIS NEW YORK 250435Z SEP 79

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1110 OF 25 SEPTEMBER

INFO PRIORITY PRETORIA LUSAKA DAR ES SALAAM MAPUTO LUANDA AND LAGOS

FOLLOWING FROM PRIVATE SECRETARY

SECRETARY OF STATE'S MEETING WITH MR VANCE: RHODESIA

1. LORD CARRINGTON SAID THAT MUGABE APPEARED LESS INTERESTED IN A SETTLEMENT THAN NKOMO, BUT WAS BEING PUSHED BY MACHEL. THE PATRIOTIC FRONT'S OBJECTIONS TO THE CONSTITUTION WE HAD PUT DOWN WERE LOGICALLY RIGHT. BUT WE HAD TO LOOK AT THE CONSTITUTION IN ITS HISTORICAL CONTEXT. THE PATRIOTIC FRONT WERE GRUMBLING, BUT WOULD PROBABLY ACCEPT THE CONSTITUTION. IAN SMITH WAS ALSO FIGHTING A REARGUARD ACTION. WE MIGHT REACH AGREEMENT ON THE CONSTITUTION IN THE NEXT WEEK. BUT THE REAL PROBLEMS WOULD FOLLOW. THE ARMY AND THE INTERIM ARRANGEMENTS WOULD BE VERY DIFFICULT. OUR PRELIMINARY THINKING WAS THAT, THE LONGER THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD, THE MORE LIKELY THINGS WERE TO COME UNSTUCK. THE FEWER THE TRANSITIONAL ARRANGEMENTS, THE BETTER. INSOLUBLE DIFFICULTIES, EG OVER THE ARMY, WERE BEST LEFT UNTIL AFTER THE ELECTIONS.

TRANSITIONAL ARRANGEMENTS, THE BETTER. INSOLUBLE DIFFICULTIES, EG OVER THE ARMY, WERE BEST LEFT UNTIL AFTER THE ELECTIONS. INTEGRATION OF THE ARMIES, AS PROPOSED BY PRESIDENT NYERERE, WAS IMPRACTICABLE. THE NOTION THAT GENERAL WALLS AND TONGOGARA COULD JOINTLY ORGANISE AN ARMY WAS NOT SERIOUS. WE WERE THINKING IN TERMS OF A CEASEFIRE AND SEPARATION OF THE FORCES. MR VANCE SAID THAT THE AMERICANS WOULD SUPPORT US "ALL THE WAY" AND DO WHAT THEY COULD WITH PRESIDENT NYERERE.

2. LORD CARRINGTON STRESSED THAT THE MOST IMPORTANT RESULT OF THE USAKA MEETING WAS THE ACCEPTANCE OF THE UNITED KINGDOM'S RESPONSIBILITY TO SUPERVISE ELECTIONS, AND THE MOVE AWAY FROM ELABORATE AND UNWORKABLE ARRANGEMENTS. WE WOULD HAVE TO LAY DOWN, AFTER DISCUSSIONS WITH THE PARTIES, WHAT WE INTENDED TO DO. IF WHAT WE PROPOSED WAS NOT ACCEPTED, THERE WOULD BE A BREAK. HE WAS NOT ESPECIALLY OPTIMISTIC. MR VANCE SAID THAT THE AMERICANS "WERE BEHIND US WHATEVER WE DID". IT WAS EXTRAORDINARY THAT WE HAD GOT THIS FAR. WE WERE RIGHT NOT TO TACKLE THE PROBLEM OF THE ARMY, WHICH WAS INSOLUBLE AT THIS POINT. OTHER ITEMS OF THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD WOULD ALSO BE VERY DIFFICULT. HE ACCEPTED THAT, IN THE END, IT WAS OUR RESPONSIBILITY TO DECIDE WHAT WE MUST DO. LORD CARRINGTON SAID THAT BOTH SIDES WOULD NO DOUBT SAY THAT WE WERE ACTING UNFAIRLY. MR VANCE ACCEPTED THAT THE NEGOTIATIONS COULD NOT CONTINUE INDEFINITELY, AND THAT A TIME MIGHT COME WHEN WE HAD TO DECIDE THAT "THAT WAS IT". HE THOUGHT THAT THE POLICE MIGHT BE ESPECIALLY DIFFICULT. LORD CARRINGTON EXPLAINED THAT WE WERE THINKING OF MAINTAINING THE PRESENT POLICE FORCE UNDER UK SUPERVISION. MR VANCE SAID THAT THERE WAS A LOT OF BACKGROUND TO THIS QUESTION. PRESIDENT NYERERE HAD TAKEN A CONTRARY POSITION, BUT NOW RECOGNISED THAT BRITISH SUPERVISION WAS THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENT. LORD CARRINGTON EMPHASISED THAT COMMONWEALTH OBSERVERS WOULD BE A USEFUL SAFEGUARD.

3. MR MCHENRY SAID THAT THE PROBLEMS OF THE ARMY AND THE TRANSITIONAL ARRANGEMENTS WOULD BE VERY DIFFICULT. HE DID NOT THINK THAT WE WOULD GET AGREEMENT FROM THE PATRIOTIC FRONT ON THE LINES THAT LORD CARRINGTON HAD OUTLINED. MR VANCE SAID THAT PRESIDENT NYERERE WAS A THORN IN EVERYONE'S FLESH ON THE ARMY. IT WAS TIME HE STEPPED ASIDE ON THIS ISSUE. MR MCHENRY SAID THAT THE TANZANIAN FOREIGN MINISTER HAD STRESSED TO HIM THAT BRITAIN AND TANZANIA WERE ON DIFFERENT PATHS ON THE QUESTION OF THE ARMY.

4. LORD CARRINGTON SAID THAT THE PATRIOTIC FRONT HAD TOLD HIM PRIVATELY THAT THEY WERE AFRAID ABOUT THE REACTION OF THE SOUTH AFRICANS IF THEY WON THE ELECTION. IF THE SOUTH AFRICANS IGNORED

4. LORD CARRINGTON SAID THAT THE PATRIOTIC FRONT HAD TOLD HIM PRIVATELY THAT THEY WERE AFRAID ABOUT THE REACTION OF THE SOUTH AFRICANS IF THEY WON THE ELECTION. IF THE SOUTH AFRICANS IGNORED ANY AGREEMENT, THERE WAS NOT MUCH WE COULD DO ABOUT IT: WE COULD HARDLY DISBAND THE SOUTH AFRICAN ARMY.

5. MR VANCE SAID THAT THERE WAS A PROBLEM ABOUT SANCTIONS. IT LOOKED AS THOUGH THE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE OF THE HOUSE WOULD FOLLOW THE LEAD GIVEN BY THE SENATE, WHICH HAD PASSED THE BYRD AMENDMENT AGREEING TO LIFT SANCTIONS BY 1 OCTOBER. THE PRESIDENT HAD ASSURED VANCE PERSONALLY THAT HE WOULD VETO THIS. VANCE HAD INFORMED THE TWO COMMITTEE CHAIRMEN BUT THEY MIGHT STILL GO AHEAD FOR POLITICAL REASONS. THE ONLY WAY TO STOP THIS MIGHT BE FOR LORD CARRINGTON, OR HM AMBASSADOR, TO TALK TO KEY FIGURES SUCH AS SENATOR HELMS OR BYRD. IF THE CONFERENCE COMMITTEE REPORT WAS IN FAVOUR OF LIFTING SANCTIONS, THIS WOULD GO TO THE TWO HOUSES FOR A VOTE. VANCE SAID HE WOULD WORK FOR A POSTPONEMENT, BUT COULD NOT GUARANTEE ANYTHING. LORD CARRINGTON SAID HE WOULD REFLECT ON THE POSSIBILITY OF AN APPROACH. ONE DIFFICULTY WAS THAT, THERE WERE PEOPLE IN HIS OWN PARTY WHO ADOPTED THE SAME POSITION. IT WAS NOT A VERY HELPFUL STANCE AT THIS STAGE IN THE NEGOTIATIONS, WHEN THE BISHOP WAS INSISTING ON THE IMMEDIATE LIFTING OF SANCTIONS.

PARSONS

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PS/SIR I GILMOUR  
PS/MR LUCE  
PS/PUS  
SIR A DUFF  
MR WILLSON  
MR BYATT  
LORD N G LENNOX

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MR R L WADE-GERY )  
MR P M MAXEY )  
COL MOIR ) CABINET  
MR P J FOWLER ) OFFICE  
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MR FIFOOT LEGAL ADVISER RM K164

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*Prime Minister  
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FM UKMIS NEW YORK 250114Z SEP  
TO IMMEDIATE FCO  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1106 OF 24 SEPTEMBER  
INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON OTTAWA MOSCOW LUSAKA

*Prints*

FOLLOWING FROM PRIVATE SECRETARY

SECRETARY OF STATE'S MEETING WITH CANADIAN FOREIGN MINISTER

RHODESIA

1. LORD CARRINGTON OUTLINED OUR APPROACH TO THE RHODESIAN NEGOTIATIONS. MISS MACDONALD SHOWED FULL UNDERSTANDING FOR OUR POSITION AND ASKED IF THE CANADIANS COULD DO ANYTHING TO HELP, PARTICULARLY IN VIEW OF THEIR GOOD RELATIONS WITH THE ZAMBIANS. LORD CARRINGTON SAID THAT ANY PRESSURE THE CANADIANS COULD BRING ON THE PATRIOTIC FRONT THROUGH THE FRONT LINE STATES TO TAKE UP A SENSIBLE POSITION IN THE DIFFICULT NEGOTIATIONS WHICH LAY AHEAD ON THE TRANSITIONAL ARRANGEMENTS WOULD BE USEFUL. HE UNDERTOOK TO KEEP THE CANADIANS FULLY INFORMED.

HEATHROW/GATWICK

2. MISS MACDONALD ASKED WHAT THE LATEST POSITION WAS ON THE MOVE OF AIR CANADA SERVICES FROM HEATHROW TO GATWICK, WHICH WAS A SENSITIVE ISSUE IN DOMESTIC CANADIAN POLITICS. LORD CARRINGTON SAID THAT HE UNDERSTOOD THAT WE HAD PUT FORWARD A COMPROMISE, WHICH HE THOUGHT SATISFACTORY. MISS MACDONALD SEEMED TO BE UNAWARE OF OUR LATEST PROPOSALS.

SOVIET DISSIDENTS

3. MISS MACDONALD ASKED LORD CARRINGTON WHETHER HE COULD SOUND OUT MRS THATCHER ON THE POSSIBILITY OF A JOINT APPROACH BY PROMINENT FEMALE POLITICIANS, MRS THATCHER, SIMONE VEIL, MISS MACDONALD HERSELF AND POSSIBLY OTHERS, TO THE RUSSIANS ON BEHALF OF IDA NUDEL. THE REASON SHE FAVOURED THIS APPROACH WAS NOT SO MUCH THAT NUDEL WAS A WOMEN BUT BECAUSE, UNLIKE OTHERS (EG SCHARANSKY) NUDEL WAS NOT ACCUSED OF ANY POLITICAL CRIME.

PARSONS

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CONFIDENTIAL

*Prime Minister*

GR 125  
CONFIDENTIAL  
FM MIRIMBA SALISBURY 240930Z SEP 79  
TO IMMEDIATE FCO  
TELNO 681 OF 24 SEPTEMBER

*MS*  
*Print*

1. JEFFREY DAVIDOW, THE AMERICAN "REPRESENTATIVE" IN SALISBURY, HAD A MEETING WITH GENERAL WALLS ON 21 SEPTEMBER. DAVIDOW INFORMS ME THAT THE FIRST POINT WALLS MADE TO HIM WAS THAT THE UK HAS ALREADY BROKEN ITS WORD TO HIM AS GIVEN BY DEREK DAY, AND BY MRS THATCHER TO BISHOP MUZOREWA, BY AGREEING TO BROADEN THE LANCASTER HOUSE AGENDA TO INCLUDE ISSUES OTHER THAN THE CONSTITUTION. HE PERSONALLY WAS NOT OPPOSED TO DISCUSSION OF OTHER ISSUES, BUT HE VIEWED LORD CARRINGTON'S "GIVING IN" TO THE PF AS SYMPTOMATIC OF BRITISH WEAKNESS. GENERAL WALLS BELIEVED THAT A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT WAS NECESSARY AND IT MUST HAVE THE SUPPORT OF THE MAJORITY OF THE PEOPLE AND, IF POSSIBLE, THE SURROUNDING STATES.

WILSON

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PS/MR RIDLEY  
PS/MR HURD  
PS/PUS  
SIR A DUFF  
LORD N G LENNOX  
MISS BROWN  
MR DAY  
MR WILLSON  
MR ASPIN

ADDITIONAL DISTN.  
RHODESIA POLICY

CONFIDENTIAL

Subject filed on New Zealand  
May 79: Visit of Mr. Muldoon  
Rhodesia

Extract from NFR AM & Talk with PM New Zealand  
21. 9. 79

Rhodesia

On Rhodesia, Mr. Muldoon asked whether there was anything he could do to help with the Rhodesia Constitutional Conference. He would be very happy to tell Mr. Smith that the end of the road had been reached. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary took note of Mr. Muldoon's offer.

Rhodesia  
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[RHODESIA: POLICY: ADVANCE COPIES]

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MR WILLSON  
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~~PS/NO 10 DOWNING STREET~~

MR R L WADE-GERY )  
MR P M MAXEY )  
COL MOIR ) CABINET  
MR P J FOWLER ) OFFICE  
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MR FREELAND LEGAL ADVISER RM K200A  
MR FIFOOT LEGAL ADVISER RM K164

RESIDENT CLERK

J. P. Smith

CR330

UNCLASSIFIED

FM WASHINGTON 201845Z SEP

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 2770 OF 20 SEP 79.

INFORMATION IMMEDIATE UK MIS NEW YORK, MIRIMBA SALISBURY.

INFORMATION PRIORITY LUSAKA, DAR ES SALAAM, GABORONE, MAPUTO AND LUANDA.

RHODESIA : CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE.

1. THE WASHINGTON POST AND NEW YORK TIMES CARRY REPORTS TODAY (20 SEPTEMBER) THAT HMG HAS COMPLAINED TO THE US ADMINISTRATION ABOUT THE ACTIVITIES OF JOHN CARBAUGH (SENATOR HELMS' CONGRESSIONAL AIDE), WHO HAS ALLEGEDLY ENCOURAGED IAN SMITH TO TAKE AN UNYIELDING LINE DURING THE RHODESIAN NEGOTIATIONS.

2. THE POST CLAIMS THAT VANCE HAS RECEIVED A "VERY SERIOUS COMPLAINT FROM LORD CARRINGTON", WHILE THE TIMES REPORTS THAT THE COMPLAINT MAY HAVE BEEN PASSED VIA THE US EMBASSY IN LONDON OR THE BRITISH EMBASSY IN WASHINGTON.

3. VANCE IS REPORTED TO HAVE DISCUSSED THE MATTER WITH CHURCH (CHAIRMAN OF THE SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE) AND JAVITS (RANKING REPUBLICAN MEMBER OF THE COMMITTEE), BOTH OF WHOM SUBSEQUENTLY SPOKE TO HELMS ABOUT HIS ASSISTANT'S ACTIVITIES. IN COMMENTS MADE LATER, HELMS REMAINED UNREPENTANT: HE SAID THAT CARBAUGH WAS OBSERVING THE NEGOTIATIONS ON HIS BEHALF SINCE THE STATE DEPARTMENT AND ADMINISTRATION "HAD NEVER ACTED IN GOOD FAITH ON RHODESIA"; HE ADDED THAT HE WOULD NOT BE INTIMIDATED BY CHURCH AND JAVITS.

HELMS CONCEDED THAT CARBAUGH MIGHT HAVE "GIVEN A REPORT" TO SMITH ON THE STATUS OF SANCTIONS LIFTING LEGISLATION IN CONGRESS, BUT DENIED THAT HIS AIDE HAD ACTED IMPROPERLY OR HAD "LOBBIED ANYONE".

4. A STATE DEPARTMENT SPOKESMAN IS QUOTED AS SAYING THAT IT WOULD BE "UNFORTUNATE" FOR ANYONE TO GIVE AID TO THOSE SEEKING TO WRECK A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT, ALTHOUGH HE HAD NO COMMENT ON THE ACTIONS OF MEMBERS OF CONGRESS WHO TOOK AN INTEREST IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS AS LONG AS THEY OPERATED WITHIN U.S. LAW.

HENDERSON

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[RHODESIA: POLICY: ADVANCE COPIES]

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PS/MR LUCE  
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SIR A DUFF  
MR WILLSON  
MR BYATT  
LORD N G LENNOX

PS/NO 10 DOWNING STREET

MR R L WADE-GERY )  
MR P M MAXEY )  
COL MOIR ) CABINET  
MR P J FOWLER ) OFFICE  
DIO )

MR DAY  
MR ASPIN ....

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HD/NEWS DEPT  
HD/WAD

MR FREELAND LEGAL ADVISER RM K200A

MR FIFOOT LEGAL ADVISER RM K164

GR310

CONFIDENTIAL

FM DAR ES SALAAM 201115Z SEPT

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NO 744 OF 20.9.79.

INFO PRIORITY GABORONE LUSAKA MAPUTO LUANDA MIRIMBA SALISBURY  
PRETORIA LAGOS WASHINGTON UKMIS NEW YORK.

*Rhine Minister*

*Paul*

*MT.*

RHODESIA

1. MR ANDREW YOUNG WAS HERE ON 18, 19 SEPTEMBER.  
THE U.S. CHARGE D'AFFAIRES HAS TOLD ME THAT THE MAIN PURPOSE OF HIS VISIT WAS TO REASSURE PRESIDENT NYERERE THAT THERE WAS NO CHANGE IN THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION'S POLICY TOWARDS AFRICA FOLLOWING YOUNG'S RESIGNATION. YOUNG'S PARTY INCLUDED KEELEY FROM THE STATE DEPARTMENT AND FUNK FROM THE WHITE HOUSE. HE BROUGHT A PERSONAL MESSAGE FROM MR. CARTER.
2. YOUNG HAD 1 1/2 HOURS WITH PRESIDENT NYERERE ON 19 SEPTEMBER. IN DISCUSSION OF RHODESIA NYERERE SPOKE MOST OPTIMISTICALLY. HE THOUGHT BOTH THE PATRIOTIC FRONT AND THE BRITISH WANTED A SETTLEMENT AND HE SAW NO REASON WHY ONE SHOULD NOT BE ACHIEVED. HE WAS SATISFIED THAT THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT WERE BEING VERY FIRM WITH MR. SMITH. HE SAID, IN THIS CONNECTION, THAT HE WOULD NOT BE SURPRISED IF THE BRITISH HAD WARNED SMITH THAT HE SHOULD NOT COUNT ON THE REMOVAL OF SANCTIONS IN NOVEMBER. HE THOUGHT THAT THE DIFFERENCES OVER THE CONSTITUTION WERE NOT TOO SERIOUS

THE DIFFERENCES OVER THE CONSTITUTION WERE NOT TOO SERIOUS (CITING THE QUESTION OF A PRIME MINISTERIAL OR PRESIDENTIAL SYSTEM AND THE PROBLEM OF WHITE REPRESENTATION). HE SAID THAT HE HAD TOLD MRS THATCHER AT THEIR MEETING AT NO 10 THAT IT WOULD BE DANGEROUS TO ALLOW THE PARTIES TO KEEP THEIR OWN ARMIES. HOWEVER, HE WENT ON TO SAY TO MR YOUNG THAT IF MRS THATCHER WAS PREPARED TO ALLOW THIS, THEN NO DOUBT THE PATRIOTIC FRONT WOULD BE VERY HAPPY TO MAINTAIN THEIR FORCES, AND IF HE, NYERERE, WAS THE ONLY STUMBLING BLOCK MAYBE HE SHOULD STAND ASIDE.

3. FROM THE U.S. CHARGE D'AFFAIRES ACCOUNT, IT WOULD SEEM THAT NYERERE'S POSITION ON THE QUESTION OF THE ARMIES HAS SOFTENED SOMEWHAT. HE SAID NOTHING SPECIFIC ABOUT NOT BEING ABLE TO BACK A SETTLEMENT IF ZIMBABWE PROCEEDED TO INDEPENDENCE WITH THREE ARMIES.

MOON

IMMEDIATE

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[RHODESIA: POLICY: ADVANCE COPIES]

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PS/MR LUCE  
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SIR A DUFF  
MR WILLSON  
MR BYATT  
LORD N G LENNOX

~~PS/NO 10 DOWNING STREET~~

MR R L WADE--GERY )  
MR P M MAXEY )  
COL MOIR ) CABINET  
MR P J FOWLER ) OFFICE  
DIO )

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HD/NEWS DEPT

HD/WAD

MR FREELAND LEGAL ADVISER RM K200A

MR FIFOOT LEGAL ADVISER RM K164

*Pomie Amster*

*Print*

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CONFIDENTIAL

FM MAPUTO 200900Z SEP 79

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 282 OF 20 SEPTEMBER

INFO LUSAKA DAR ES SALAAM GABORONE LUANDA PRETORIA SALISBURY

UKHIS NEW YORK WASHINGTON LAGOS.

MT

NY TEL NO 281 (NOT TO ALL) : RHODESIA

1. I HAVE BEEN BRIEFING KHAN (HEAD OF EUROPE-AMERICA DEPARTMENTS IN THE MFA) ON PROGRESS. HE SAYS THAT THEIR MINISTER CABACO REPORTS EACH DAY DIRECTLY TO THE PRESIDENT (NOT THE MFA). THE MOZAMBICAN OBSERVERS ARE ENCOURAGED BY DEVELOPMENTS, PARTICULARLY IN SO FAR AS THERE HAVE BEEN NO PERSONAL FEUDS AND NO RAKING OVER THE PAST : THEY THINK THAT BOTH SIDES ARE MAKING REAL CONCESSIONS AND THAT BOTH ARE NEGOTIATING SERIOUSLY. CABACO IS EXPECTED TO STAY IN LONDON FOR AS LONG AS THE CONFERENCE LASTS.
2. I EXPLAINED THE DIFFICULTIES OVER WHITE SAFEGUARDS: KHAN WAS SURE THAT THERE SHOULD BE SAFEGUARDS, ONCE AGAIN STRESSING THE PROBLEMS WHICH HAD FACED WHITES ON INDEPENDENCE HERE. I HAVE NOT GOT INTO DISCUSSION ABOUT TRANSITIONAL ARRANGEMENTS (IN VIEW OF YOUR TELNO 1224 TO WASHINGTON): BUT I SAID THAT THE PATRIOTIC FRONT'S PROPOSALS SEEMED DESIGNED TO GIVE THEM POWER BEFORE ELECTIONS WHICH WOULD BE UNACCEPTABLE TO US. I ALSO MENTIONED THE IMPORTANCE WHICH WE ATTACHED TO THE COMMONWEALTH'S ROLE. KHAN STATED THAT HE SHOULD INVOLVE THE UN GOVERNMENT IN ANY SETTLEMENT

IMPORTANCE WHICH WE ATTACHED TO THE COMMONWEALTH'S ROLE. KHAN STRESSED THAT WE SHOULD INVOLVE THE UN SOMEHOW IN ANY SETTLEMENT E.G. AS OBSERVERS: HE AGREED THAT ANY AGREEMENT SHOULD NOT BE SUBJECTED TO TIME-CONSUMING AND POSSIBLY DISRUPTIVE UN SCRUTINY: BUT HE THOUGHT IT IMPORTANT THAT WE SHOULD NOT SEEM TO BE EXCLUDING THE UN.

DOBLE

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*Prime Minister*

FM WASHINGTON 192002Z SEP 79

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 2750 OF 19 SEPTEMBER, 1979,

INFO IMMEDIATE TO UKMIS NEW YORK AND MIRIMBA SALISBURY.

*Am*

*MT*

MY TELNO. 2629: RHODESIAN SANCTIONS.

1. THE LIFTING OF SANCTIONS AGAINST RHODESIA REMAINS A LIVE ISSUE IN CONGRESS REQUIRING THE EXECUTIVE'S CLOSEST ATTENTION. AS EXPECTED, THE HOUSE HAS NOT ATTACHED A SANCTIONS LIFTING AMENDMENT TO ITS VERSION OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENCE AUTHORIZATION BILL: INDEED THE QUESTION OF SANCTIONS WAS NOT EVEN DISCUSSED WHEN THE HOUSE CONSIDERED THE BILL LAST WEEK. HOUSE AND SENATE CONFEREES ARE DUE TO MEET TOMORROW TO HARMONIZE THE DIFFERENT VERSIONS. SENATE CONFEREES ARE EXPECTED TO HOLD OUT FOR THE INCLUSION OF SOME SANCTIONS-LIFTING AMENDMENT, ALTHOUGH THEY MAY DROP SENATOR BYRD'S ORIGINAL FORMULATION WHICH WOULD REQUIRE THE IMMEDIATE RAISING OF SANCTIONS: THE ADMINISTRATION HOPE THAT THEY MAY COMPROMISE INSTEAD ON AN AMENDMENT LIKE THE ONE ADDED TO THE STATE DEPARTMENT AUTHORIZATION ACT REQUIRING THE PRESIDENT TO LIFT SANCTIONS BY 15 NOVEMBER UNLESS HE DECIDES THAT IT WOULD BE AGAINST THE NATIONAL INTEREST TO DO SO. (THE PRESIDENT HAS ALREADY SIGNED THIS LATTER ACT, ALTHOUGH WITH A PROVISIO THAT HE CONSIDERS THE SANCTIONS AMENDMENT TO BE IN VIOLATION OF THE U S CONSTITUTION).
2. THE ADMINISTRATION ARE ANXIOUS TO AVOID BEING FACED WITH AN AGREED HOUSE/SENATE BILL REQUIRING ACTION BEFORE 15 NOVEMBER, PARTICULARLY IN VIEW OF A REPORT THEY HAVE JUST RECEIVED FROM THE U S EMBASSY IN LONDON ABOUT ALLEGATIONS THAT AMERICAN CONGRESSIONAL STAFFERS (PRESUMABLY INCLUDING CARBAUGH) ARE ENCOURAGING MEMBERS OF MUZOREWA'S DELEGATION TO BELIEVE THAT THE U S CONGRESS WILL SHORTLY LIFT SANCTIONS AND THAT THERE IS CONSEQUENTLY NO NEED FOR THE BISHOP TO MAKE SUBSTANTIAL CONCESSIONS AT THE CONFERENCE. ACCORDINGLY, WE HAVE BEEN TOLD THAT SECRETARIES VANCE AND BROWN (DEFENCE) ARE SPEAKING PERSONALLY TO EVERY MEMBER OF THE CONFERENCE COMMITTEE URGING THEM NOT TO AGREE ON ANY AMENDMENT WHICH WOULD OBLIGE THE ADMINISTRATION EITHER TO PRE-EMPT A BRITISH DECISION BY RAISING SANCTIONS NOW

*FOR TO VETO*

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OR TO VETO THE WHOLE BILL. AMBASSADOR BREWSTER HAS OFFERED TO LOBBY AS WELL (PLEASE PROTECT) SINCE HE HAS ADVISED VANCE THAT IT WOULD BE QUOTE DEEPLY RESENTED UNQUOTE BY H M G IF THE U S CONGRESS WERE TO UNDERMINE ITS EFFORTS BY PREMATURE ACTION OF ITS OWN; WE HAVE ALSO LEARNED THAT SOLARZ PROPOSES TO INFORM MUZOREWA THAT HE SHOULD NOT ASSUME THAT CONGRESS WILL INDEED VOTE IN FAVOUR OF RAISING SANCTIONS.

3. THE WASHINGTON POST CARRIES AN EDITORIAL TODAY (19 SEPTEMBER) ARGUING THAT ANY DECISION THE CONFEREES MAKE ON RHODESIAN SANCTIONS SHOULD BE CONTINGENT UPON THE OUTCOME OF THE NEGOTIATIONS IN LONDON.

HENDERSON

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PS/MR HURD

PS/PUS

SIR A DUFF

LORD N G LENNOX

MISS BROWN

MR DAY

MR WILLSON

MR ASPIN

ADDITIONAL DISTN.

RHODESIA POLICY



Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster

Rhodesian  
PRIVY COUNCIL OFFICE

WHITEHALL LONDON SW1A 2AI

19 September 1979

AmS

De Peter

SOUTHERN RHODESIA: INDEPENDENCE BILL

Thank you for your letter of 7 September.

I agree that Parliamentary Counsel should now be instructed to begin preparatory work on a draft Bill. It should be on the lines you have suggested, subject to confirmation of the policy as necessary in discussion between the Ministers concerned.

I am copying this minute to the Prime Minister, the Lord President, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, the Home Secretary, the Lord Chancellor, the Attorney General, the Chief Whip, the First Parliamentary Counsel and Sir John Hunt.

Yours  
N.C.

The Rt Hon Lord Carrington, KCMG, MC  
Secretary of State for Foreign &  
Commonwealth Affairs  
Foreign Office  
SW1

1

19 SEP 1979



Weekend Box.

(2)



# Adam Smith Institute

Prime Minister:

This adds little to what you already know but you may wish to be aware of its existence. I have ack'd.

50 Westminster Mansions,  
Little Smith Street,  
London SW1P 3DQ,  
England  
Tel: (01)-222-4995

September 19th 1979

Rt.Hon.Margaret Thatcher, MP, PC.,  
10 Downing Street,  
London SW1.

cc. FCO +

to  
Pms

Pms  
R20/9

ans

Dear Prime Minister,

I enclose a copy of the report "The Rhodesian Election: An Eyewitness Account," published by the American Conservative Union. This is a special report written by the four-person monitoring team authorised by Congressman Bauman to survey the fairness of the April elections in what is now Zimbabwe-Rhodesia. It is a useful international perspective to supplement that of our own observers.

The report may be useful when it comes to assessing the fairness of the April elections, or to determining what in the future will count as a free and fair election.

Yours sincerely,

Dr. Eamonn Butler,  
Director.

International Advisory Board of Governors:

Prof. F.A. Hayek (Chairman); Dr. Eamonn Butler; Dr. Stuart Butler; William Richmond, Esq.; Dr. Madsen Pirie;  
Dr. George C. Roche III; T. E. Utley, Esq.; Dr. Ernest van den Haag; Prof. Esmond Wright.



Rhodesia file  
+ f.c.

10 DOWNING STREET

Phms

Prime Minister.

I know the possibility is already causing you & the Foreign Secretary concern but these reports give added weight to the view that at some stage you will be faced with a choice between

(a) an agreement with Bishop Mugwena & some or all of his supporters <sup>(inc. A. Smith)</sup> that is broadly in line with Lusaka but does not enjoy substantial international support; &

(b) an agreement with the Patriotic Front (perhaps some of Bishop Mugwena's supporters) that goes beyond Lusaka <sup>, but not widely so,</sup> and is not acceptable

to the Bishop (because he would lose power) but which <sup>would</sup> enjoy the support of the Black African states and, probably, of the United States. (I would guess that the Patriotic Front have studied the Anglo-American plan very carefully.)

Unless the Patriotic Front & the Bishop move so far that a genuine agreement between all the participants is possible (which, given the calibre of the various players, would probably mean the early political demise of the Bishop) it is not at present easy to see how H.P.B. can avoid the dilemma. We have to negotiate seriously: the longer the Patriotic Front seizes, the more difficult it will be to evade the choice.

Paul 18/9

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TO IMMEDIATE LUSAKA

TELEGRAM NUMBER 776 OF 19TH SEPTEMBER 1979.

AND TO IMMEDIATE MIRIMBA SALISBURY, NAIROBI, MAPUTO, GABORONE, DAR ES SALAAM, LUANDA, LAGOS, WASHINGTON, PRETORIA, ADDIS ABABA, MONROVIA, CANBERRA, OTTAWA, WELLINGTON.

PRIORITY ABIDJAN, DAKAR, KINSHASA, KHARTOUM, TOKYO, EEC POSTS, KINGSTON, BRIDGETOWN, DACCA, NEW DELHI, SINGAPORE, GEORGETOWN, MASERU, FREETOWN, PORT LOUIS, MBABANE, PORT OF SPAIN, KAMPALA, LILONGWE, VALLETTA, BANJUL, COLOMBO, ACCRA, KUALA LUMPUR, NICOSIA, CASTRIES, OSLO, STOCKHOLM, LISBON, MADRID, MANILA, TEHRAN, BUCHAREST, CARACAS, ATHENS.

INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK.

INFO SAVING SUVA, PORT MORESBY, HONIARA, NUKUALOFA, VICTORIA, TARAWA.

## RHODESIA CONFERENCE :

1. IN BILATERAL MEETINGS TODAY WITH BOTH THE SALISBURY AND THE PATRIOTIC FRONT DELEGATIONS WE PROPOSED THAT, IN THE INTERESTS OF SECURING AGREEMENT ON AN INDEPENDENCE CONSTITUTION WHICH INDISPUTABLY WOULD PROVIDE FOR GENUINE MAJORITY RULE AND WHICH COULD ALSO AFFORD A BASIS FOR ENDING THE WAR, THE CONSTITUTION SHOULD PROVIDE THAT 80 PER CENT OF THE MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE OF ASSEMBLY SHOULD BE ELECTED BY VOTERS ON THE COMMON ROLE AND THE REMAINING 20 PER CENT BY WHITE VOTERS. THE NUMBER OF VOTES NEEDED TO AMEND THE ENTRENCHED CLAUSES OF THE CONSTITUTION WOULD BE 70 PER CENT. THE ARRANGEMENT FOR WHITE SEATS WOULD BE A TEMPORARY PROVISION BUT WOULD BE UNAMENDABLE FOR A PERIOD OF AT MOST 10 YEARS. PROVISIONS DESIGNED TO SAFEGUARD SUCH BASIC HUMAN RIGHTS AS THE RIGHT TO FREEDOM FROM DISCRIMINATION ETC WOULD ALSO BE UNAMENDABLE (OR AMENDABLE ONLY BY A UNANIMOUS VOTE OF THE HOUSE OF ASSEMBLY) FOR A SIMILAR PERIOD OF YEARS.

2. THIS PROPOSAL WILL INEVITABLY BECOME PUBLIC KNOWLEDGE. NEWS DEPARTMENT WILL CONFIRM IT UNATTRIBUTABLY. YOU SHOULD DRAW FREELY ON THE ARGUMENTS SET OUT IN MY TELEGRAM NO 769 TO LUSAKA AND ON THE REST OF THIS TELEGRAM.

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# CONFIDENTIAL

3. WE ARE ENGAGED AT PRESENT IN A MAJOR EFFORT TO PERSUADE BISHOP MUZOREWA AND HIS DELEGATION TO ACCEPT THAT THE INDEPENDENCE CONSTITUTION CANNOT ALLOW THE WHITES TO RETAIN A BLOCKING POWER OVER CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS OR OTHER LEGISLATION, AND MUST PROVIDE FOR EFFECTIVE POLITICAL CONTROL OVER THE ARMED FORCES AND PUBLIC SERVICES. OUR CONSTITUTIONAL PROPOSALS WOULD HAVE THAT EFFECT. IN ADDITION TO THE ARRANGMENTS DESCRIBED IN PARA. 1 ABOVE, THE PRIME MINISTER OF INDEPENDENT ZIMBABWE WOULD HAVE THE POWER TO MAKE OR CHANGE KEY APPOINTMENTS AND TO ISSUE GENERAL POLICY DIRECTIVES TO THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSIONS.

4. ALTHOUGH, AS YOU WILL KNOW FROM PRESS REPORTS, SOME MEMBERS OF THE SALISBURY DELEGATION HAVE ACCEPTED OUR VIEWS ON BOTH THESE MAJOR ISSUES, SOME (BUT NOT ALL) OF THE WHITE MEMBERS OF THE DELEGATION HAVE NOT AND ARE STRONGLY RESISTING OUR PROPOSALS. WE ARE DETERMINED THAT THE INDEPENDENCE CONSTITUTION MUST PROVIDE FOR GENUINE MAJORITY RULE AND HAVE NO INTENTION OF COMPROMISING ON THESE ISSUES. BUT IT IS ESSENTIAL TO THE PROSPECTS OF GETTING AN AGREEMENT WHICH COULD BRING AN END TO THE WAR TO OFFER THE MINORITY REASSURANCE THAT, WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF GENUINE MAJORITY RULE, THEIR INTERESTS WILL BE ADEQUATELY REPRESENTED IN THE LEGISLATURE FOR A LIMITED PERIOD AFTER INDEPENDENCE. BUT THEY CANNOT BE ALLOWED A BLOCKING POWER OVER THE WISHES OF THE MAJORITY.

5. SQUARE BRACKETS TO THE OBJECTION THAT THIS GIVES THE WHITES FAR MORE SEATS THAN THEIR NUMBER IN THE COUNTRY JUSTIFIES END SQUARE BRACKETS OUR PROPOSALS MUST BE REALISTIC. THEY MUST TAKE ACCOUNT OF THE HISTORY AND THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF RHODESIA, AND OF THE NEED TO GET THE WHITES TO AGREE TO WHAT WE ALL SEEK - AN END TO THE WAR AND A GENUINE MAJORITY RULE CONSTITUTION. THE WHITES ARE BEING ASKED TO GIVE UP THEIR BLOCKING POWER AND MUST HAVE THE ASSURANCE THAT THEY WILL HAVE REPRESENTATION FOR A LIMITED PERIOD. BOTH SIDES ARE GOING TO HAVE TO MAKE CONCESSIONS IF THERE IS TO BE AN AGREEMENT. A FEW YEARS OF A SPECIAL PROVISION OF THIS SORT IS WELL WORTH ACCEPTING FOR THE SAKE OF THE ULTIMATE GOAL.

6. SQUARE BRACKETS IF ASKED ABOUT THE FIGURE OF 70 PER CENT FOR CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT. END SQUARE BRACKETS MOST OTHER INDEPENDENCE CONSTITUTIONS HAVE A FIGURE BETWEEN TWO-THIRDS AND THREE-QUARTERS.

# CONFIDENTIAL

7. SQUARE BRACKETS IF IT IS CLAIMED THAT THE WHITES IN PARLIAMENT COULD FORM A GOVERNING COALITION WITH A BLACK MINORITY PARTY AND SO DEFEAT THE INTENTIONS OF THE ELECTORATE END SQUARE BRACKETS IT WOULD IF NECESSARY BE POSSIBLE TO DEVISE A CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION WHICH WOULD PREVENT THE EUROPEAN MINORITY REPRESENTATIVES IN PARLIAMENT FROM FORMING A COALITION GOVERNMENT WITH ANY AFRICAN PARTY OTHER THAN THAT WHICH HAD A MAJORITY OF THE AFRICAN SEATS.

8. SQUARE BRACKETS IF IT IS CLAIMED THAT THIS WOULD NOT PREVENT THE EUROPEANS VOTING WITH A MINORITY AFRICAN PARTY TO BLOCK CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS END SQUARE BRACKETS IT WOULD BE FOR THE ELECTORATE TO DECIDE WHETHER THEY WISHED TO VOTE FOR A SINGLE PARTY IN SUFFICIENT NUMBERS TO ENSURE THAT THIS COULD NOT HAPPEN. CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT IS INTENDED TO BE DIFFICULT. WE ARE TALKING OF A TEMPORARY PROVISION WHICH IS NECESSARY TO HELP RECONCILE THE CONFLICT OF INTERESTS (FAILING WHICH THERE WOULD BE A CONTINUATION OF THE WAR).

9. SQUARE BRACKETS IF ASKED ABOUT THE SENATE END SQUARE BRACKETS THE SENATE WOULD HAVE THE POWER ONLY TO DELAY LEGISLATION, NOT TO BLOCK IT.

CARRINGTON

## FILES

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(MR FIPOOT)

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PS/MR RIDLEY

PS/MR HURD

PS/PUS

SIR A DUFF

LORD N G LENNOX

MISS BROWN

MR DAY

MR WILLSON

MR ASPIN

ADDITIONAL DISTN.

RHODESIA POLICY

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FM FCO 181401Z SEP 79  
TO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1224 OF 13 SEPTEMBER  
AND TO IMMEDIATE DAR ES SALAAM  
INFO IMMEDIATE LUSAKA, MAPUTO, GABORONE, LUANDA, LAGOS,  
CANBERRA, OTTAWA, WELLINGTON, PRETORIA AND MIRIMBA SALISBURY.

*For Paul*

MIPT: RHODESIA.

1. WE SHALL BE POINTING OUT AS NECESSARY TO THE AMERICANS AND OTHERS THAT OUR FIRST PRIORITY IS TO REACH AGREEMENT ON THE INDEPENDENCE CONSTITUTION. WE ARE AT PRESENT ENGAGED IN AN EFFORT TO GET BISHOP MUZOREWA'S DELEGATION TO AGREE TO MAJOR CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGES AND NEW ELECTIONS. SOME MEMBERS OF HIS DELEGATION ARE CONTINUING STRONGLY TO RESIST THESE. WE ARE ALSO TRYING TO GET THE PATRIOTIC FRONT TO AGREE TO ADEQUATE WHITE REPRESENTATION (FALLING SHORT OF A BLOCKING MINORITY) WITHOUT WHICH THERE WILL BE NO POSSIBILITY OF AGREEMENT.
2. WE DO NOT REGARD THE "DIS-MANTLING" OF THE RHODESIAN SECURITY FORCES IN ADVANCE OF ELECTIONS AS NEGOTIABLE; NOR DO WE INTEND TO TRY TO NEGOTIATE IT. (NOR WOULD THE P F AGREE TO SIMULTANEOUS DISMANTLING OF THEIR OWN FORCES. THE ABSOLUTE MAXIMUM OF WHICH ONE COULD CONCEIVE WOULD BE A CEASE FIRE AND A SEPARATION OF THE OPPOSING FORCES INTO BARRACKS, CAMPS OR DEFINED AREAS). IN RELATION TO THE PRE-INDEPENDENCE ARRANGEMENTS WE SHALL BE GUIDED BY THE CONCLUSIONS REACHED AT LUSAKA, NAMELY THAT THE KEY ELEMENT IS AGREEMENT THAT ELECTIONS SHOULD BE PROPERLY SUPERVISED UNDER THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT'S AUTHORITY. ALL PARTIES SHOULD BE ABLE TO PARTICIPATE IN THOSE ELECTIONS WITH EQUAL CHANCES OF SUCCESS.

CONFIDENTIAL 13. WE DO NOT

3. WE DO NOT BELIEVE THAT A MERGER OF THE ARMIES BEFORE INDEPENDENCE IS A PRACTICAL POSSIBILITY IN PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES. THE PATRIOTIC FRONT ARE LIKELY TO DEMAND THAT THE ZIMBABWE NATIONAL ARMY SHOULD BE "BASED ON THE LIBERATION FORCES" AND TO PUT FORWARD OTHER PROPOSALS WHICH WOULD HAVE THE EFFECT OF PRE-JUDGING THE OUTCOME OF THE ELECTIONS. WE DO NOT SEE HOW EITHER SIDE COULD BE EXPECTED TO AGREE TO A MERGER ON GENUINELY EQUAL TERMS BEFORE ELECTIONS. TO DO SO WOULD PRE-SUPPOSE A COMMITMENT TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A WHOLLY NEW NATIONAL ARMY WHICH IN TURN COULD ONLY BE BASED ON A POLITICAL CONSENSUS WHICH DOES NOT EXIST AT PRESENT.

4. THE CONSEQUENCES OF INTEGRATION WOULD BE DESIGNED BY THE PATRIOTIC FRONT TO ACHIEVE A MEASURE OF CONTROL OVER THE RHODESIAN SECURITY FORCES: AND WOULD CERTAINLY NOT APPLY TO ALL THEIR FORCES. IT WOULD PRE-SUPPOSE A LONG TRANSITIONAL PERIOD IN WHICH THE EFFECTIVE EXERCISE OF POWER BY ANY "NEUTRAL" AUTHORITY WOULD BE WELL NIGH IMPOSSIBLE.

5. WE HAVE PUT FORWARD CONSTITUTIONAL PROPOSALS WHICH, IF ACCEPTED, WOULD ENSURE EFFECTIVE CONTROL BY THE ELECTED GOVERNMENT OVER THE ARMED FORCES AND THE CIVIL SERVICE. BUT THE QUESTION OF WHO IS TO EXERCISE THAT AUTHORITY IS FOR THE PEOPLE OF RHODESIA TO DECIDE. IN OUR JUDGEMENT NO TRANSITIONAL PERIOD WOULD BE WORKABLE UNLESS IT IS SHORT - THE MAIN PURPOSE BEING TO PROVIDE FOR ELECTIONS TO BE HELD UNDER OUR AUTHORITY. IF THAT IS ACCEPTED AND THE CONSTITUTION IS AGREED, IT WILL BE NECESSARY TO ENSURE THAT ALL PARTIES WILL BE ABLE TO PARTICIPATE IN THOSE ELECTIONS WITH EQUAL CHANCES OF SUCCESS. THE COMPOSITION OF THE FUTURE ARMY WOULD BE FOR THE ELECTED GOVERNMENT TO DECIDE. WE WOULD EXPECT THE RHODESIAN FORCE COMMANDERS TO AGREE TO ACCEPT IN ADVANCE THE OUTCOME OF THE ELECTIONS AND THE PATRIOTIC FRONT MILITARY COMMANDERS TO DO THE SAME.

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6. HM EMBASSY IN WASHINGTON SHOULD BE GUIDED BY THE ABOVE IN DISCUSSIONS WITH THE STATE DEPARTMENT. WE HAVE INFORMED THE US EMBASSY OF THE LINE TAKEN BY NYERERE. OTHER POSTS SHOULD BE GUIDED BY PARAGRAPHS 2-5 ABOVE FOR THEIR BACKGROUND INFORMATION ONLY AT THIS STAGE. IN DISCUSSION OF THE PRE-INDEPENDENCE ARRANGEMENTS THEY SHOULD SAY THAT THE KEY ELEMENT IS ACCEPTANCE, AS IN THE LUSAKA COMMUNIQUE, OF ELECTIONS SUPERVISED UNDER THE BRITISH GOVERNMENTS AUTHORITY; THEY SHOULD AS NECESSARY MAKE CLEAR THAT WE WILL NOT BE ABLE TO AGREE TO DEMANDS BY THE PATRIOTIC FRONT WHICH WOULD HAVE THE EFFECT OF PRE-JUDGING THE OUTCOME OF THE ELECTIONS.

CARRINGTON

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MISS BROWN  
MR DAY  
MR WILLSON  
MR ASPIN

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RHODESIA POLICY

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FM FCO 181400 Z SEP 79

TO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1223 OF 18 SEPTEMBER

AND TO IMMEDIATE DAR ES SALAAM

INFO IMMEDIATE PRETORIA MIRIMBA SALISBURY LUSAKA MAPUTO GABORONE

LUANDA LAGOS CANBERRA OTTAWA WELLINGTON

RHODESIA: NYERERE'S VIEWS.

1. AT THE PRIME MINISTER'S WORKING DINNER WITH HIM ON 14 SEPTEMBER NYERERE ARGUED THAT THE CONFERENCE WAS UNLIKELY TO BREAK DOWN ON THE QUESTION OF THE CONSTITUTION BUT THAT THE ARMIES ON BOTH SIDES WOULD HAVE TO BE MERGED BEFORE THERE COULD BE FREE AND FAIR ELECTIONS. NO STATE COULD COME TO INDEPENDENCE WITH THREE ARMIES IN EXISTENCE.

2. NYERERE BEGAN BY SAYING THAT AS FAR AS HE COULD JUDGE THE CONFERENCE HAD GONE WELL SO FAR. THE PATRIOTIC FRONT WERE LIKELY TO ACCEPT RESERVED SEATS FOR THE WHITES IN THE INTERESTS OF A SETTLEMENT. THE ORIGINAL TANZANIAN CONSTITUTION HAD NOT GIVEN THE PRESIDENT ALL THE POWERS HE NEEDED, BUT THIS HAD NOT PREVENTED HIM FROM CHANGING IT SUBSEQUENTLY (THERE WAS AN IMPLICATION THAT IN HIS VIEW THE PATRIOTIC FRONT MIGHT CHANGE THE CONSTITUTION IF THEY CAME TO POWER).

3. NYERERE WENT ON TO SUGGEST THAT THE CONFERENCE SHOULD TURN TO DISCUSSING THE PRE-INDEPENDENCE ARRANGEMENTS AT AN EARLY STAGE. THE PRIME MINISTER SAID THAT IN OUR VIEW THERE WOULD HAVE TO BE A SEPARATION OF THE ARMED FORCES FOLLOWING A CEASEFIRE: INTEGRATION OF THE ARMED FORCES WAS ONLY LIKELY TO BE POSSIBLE ONCE IT WAS CLEAR WHO WOULD FORM THE ELECTED GOVERNMENT. IT WOULD BE IMPOSSIBLE TO ACHIEVE AGREEMENT BEFORE THEN ON THE CREATION OF A SINGLE ARMY. NYERERE REJECTED THIS ARGUMENT: THE PROBLEM OF THE ARMIES HAD TO BE SOLVED NOW. IF THE PARTIES WERE NOT PREPARED TO ACCEPT THE MERGING OF THE ARMIES, IT COULD ONLY BE BECAUSE THEY WERE NOT PREPARED TO ACCEPT THE RESULTS OF THE ELECTION. THE MEN WHO CONTROLLED THE ARMIES WERE AT PRESENT IN LONDON AND THERE WAS NO NEED TO POSTPONE TACKLING THE ISSUE. IF THE BRITISH GOVT. DID NOT DO SO IT MUST BE BECAUSE THEY WERE SIMPLY EVADING THE ISSUE AND PREPARED TO CONDEMN THE COUNTRY TO CIVIL WAR. IF BRITAIN AND THE ZIMBABWEANS AGREED TO PROCEED TO INDEPENDENCE WITH THREE ARMIES IN THE FIELD, HE WOULD

*h.s. Smith - 17/9*

/NOT

CONFIDENTIAL

# CONFIDENTIAL

NOT INTERFERE. BUT NEITHER WOULD HE BACK SUCH A SETTLEMENT. IF BISHOP MUZOREWA LOST THE ELECTION, THE SOUTH AFRICANS MIGHT BACK HIM AND SMITH IN CONTINUING THE STRUGGLE. IF THE PATRIOTIC FRONT LOST, HE WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO TELL THEM TO DISBAND THEIR FORCES IF HE HAD NOT BEEN IN A POSITION TO DO SO BEFORE THE ELECTION.

4. ASKED WHETHER, IF AN ATTEMPT TO SOLVE THE MERGER OF THE ARMIES BEFORE THE ELECTION WAS MADE AND FAILED, HE WOULD BACK WHATEVER AGREEMENTS ON OTHER POINTS WERE REACHED AT THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE, NYERERE SAID THE QUESTION WOULD THEN BE WHETHER HMG WERE PREPARED TO PUT IN A BRITISH MILITARY FORCE OR TO ORGANISE A COMMONWEALTH FORCE. IF WE WERE NOT, THE CONFERENCE WAS A WASTE OF TIME.

5. THE PRIME MINISTER ASKED WHETHER, IF GENERAL WALLS WERE PREPARED TO SAY BEFORE AN ELECTION THAT HE WOULD ACCEPT THE GOVERNMENT WHICH EMERGED FROM IT WHATEVER ITS COMPLEXION, THE COMMANDERS OF ZANLA AND ZIPRA WOULD BE PREPARED TO DO THE SAME. NYERERE DID NOT REPLY DIRECTLY. IT WOULD BE IMPORTANT TO TRY TO SECURE SUCH COMMITMENTS. BUT ONCE THEY HAD BEEN OBTAINED, WE SHOULD THEN HAVE TO ASK WHY THE COMMANDERS WOULD NOT PROCEED FORTHWITH TO THE CREATION OF A SINGLE ARMY.

6. IN CONCLUSION, NYERERE SAID THAT THE ESSENTIAL NOW WAS TO KEEP UP THE MOMENTUM OF THE DISCUSSIONS. HE WAS NOT PREPARED TO DO MORE THAN TELL THE PATRIOTIC FRONT OF OUR CONCERN THAT THEY SHOULD PARTICIPATE CONSTRUCTIVELY IN THIS WEEK'S DISCUSSION OF THE CONSTITUTION. HE WOULD NOT EXERT PRESSURE ON THEM.

CARRINGTON

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PS/MR RIDLEY

PS/MR HURD

PS/PUS

SIR A DUFF

LORD N G LENNOX

MISS BROWN

MR DAY

MR WILLSON

MR ASPIN

ADDITIONAL DISTN.

RHODESIA POLICY

L.S.  
Smith - 19/5

M

Mr Renwick, Rhodesia Dept

## MEETING BETWEEN THE SECRETARY OF STATE AND MR DAVID SMITH

Mr David Smith called on the Secretary of State at 2pm today at Lord Carrington's request. Apart from myself, no-one else was present.

Mr Smith said that everyone knew that Ian Smith was a has-been. But he did not regret his part in including him in the delegation. The fact was that he could still swing white opinion in Rhodesia. He had been greatly affected by his reception in London (fan mail etc). He was alone in the Salisbury Delegation in holding out against the British proposals. Even Chief Ndiweni had now, to Ian Smith's surprise, come out against him on the grounds that the Chief could not go back to his people without an agreement.

However, there had been the first "chink of light" in Ian Smith's position at a delegation meeting this morning. Ian Smith had said that, even if they knew that they would have to give in in the end, the Salisbury Delegation should be seen to have gone down fighting. This had been the first indication that his intransigence was tactical.

David Smith himself said that he had now finally made up his mind on his own position: he trusted the British Foreign Office under a Conservative Minister and was prepared to negotiate on the three points on the Constitution, provided that recognition and the lifting of sanctions would be granted at the end of the process. Ian Smith was placing great hopes on the Americans lifting sanctions, especially following his recent meeting with Senator Helms' two representatives. He, David Smith, knew better however. White opinion in Rhodesia wanted a settlement.

David Smith expressed confidence in our joint ability to wear Ian Smith down. But it would be important to give him a chance to "empty his stomach" in a prolonged session with Lord Carrington, perhaps with Bishop Muzorewa and others present. Ian Smith kept repeating that, whatever assurances Lord Carrington was said to have given to the Bishop, he himself had not had them first hand from the Secretary of State. It would be important to hear Ian Smith out patiently, and give factual answers to his questions. Only Lord Carrington himself could do this.

Another way to encourage Ian Smith to come across would be by the promise of a development fund for Rhodesia after independence, along the lines of the Kissinger proposal. Ian Smith would need to feel that he himself had personally secured some such fund. Although the Rhodesian economy was not too bad, David Smith knew that investment from abroad would not be forthcoming until there had been a settlement; the message had come through clearly from otherwise sympathetic Swiss bankers he had talked to in Zurich on his way to London.

/David Smith



David Smith also said that it would be useful if we could make a concession to the Salisbury team on the question of unamendable aspects of the Constitution. However blinkered this view might seem, the Salisbury team's lawyers wanted the possibility of amendments by 100% votes. Lord Carrington said he thought we could do this; we had been under the impression that our present proposals were more helpful. Mr David Smith said that we should not underestimate the intelligence of Mr Andersen, though he had begun to behave oddly since he had come to London. Previously he had been a moderate.

*J. J. H. Walden*

(G G H Walden)

18 September 1979

cc: PS  
PS/LPS  
PS/Mr Luce  
PS/PUS  
Sir A Duff  
Mr Byatt  
Mr Day  
Mr Barlow  
PUSD  
Mr Fenn, News Dept

VCB.



10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

17 September 1979

*Dear Sir*

Many thanks for sending me a copy of your letter of 11 September to Peter Carrington. I have read it with interest. *as I always do. It is full of news.*

*Yours truly*

*Julian Amery*

The Rt. Hon. Julian Amery, M.P.

*4*



10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

17 September 1979

RHODESIA: BISHOP OF MASHONALAND

You wrote to me on 17 September enclosing a letter to the Prime Minister from the Bishop of Mashonaland.

I agree with the course of action proposed in your final paragraph.

M. O'D. B. ALEXANDER

R. M. J. Lyne, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

2/7



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

17 September 1979

*Dear Michael,*

Rhodesia: Letter from Bishop of Mashonaland

On 12 July the Prime Minister wrote to Paul Burroughs, the Bishop of Mashonaland, in answer to a letter he had sent her expressing his concern over the war in Rhodesia. This letter was transmitted through Derek Day in Salisbury and it suggested the Bishop might like to keep in touch with Mr Day.


I now enclose a further letter to the Prime Minister from the Bishop. Derek Day, to whom it was entrusted, comments that though there are no grounds for challenging the underlying theme of the Bishop's letter, some of his assertions are a little more doubtful. For example, Derek Day has been told by the Chairman and Vice-Chairman of the Commercial Farmers' Union that, though their members are concerned about the future, they do not believe that many would in fact fail to plant a crop for the coming season. They took the view that most people would be prepared to wait for a few more months in the hope that an acceptable solution would emerge from the current initiatives of the British Government, though the situation could change if the Constitutional Conference broke up in disarray and the only immediate prospect was an intensification of the war.

Derek Day discussed the themes of the letter with the Bishop when he came to deliver it. We therefore advise that there is no need for a further substantive reply. If you agree, we shall ask our representative in Salisbury to inform the Bishop that the letter has been transmitted to No 10 Downing Street, and to thank him on the Prime Minister's behalf.

*yours ever*  
*Roderic Lyne*

(R M J Lyne)  
Private Secretary

M O'D B Alexander Esq  
10 Downing Street  
LONDON



UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION



19 SEP 1979



BISHOP'S MOUNT  
P.O. BOX 7  
PHONE 44113

CHURCH OF THE PROVINCE OF CENTRAL AFRICA  
**The Diocese of Mashonaland**

TEL. 702253

FROM THE BISHOP OF MASHONALAND

DIOCESAN OFFICE,  
P.O. BOX UA7,  
PAGET HOUSE,  
UNION AVENUE,  
SALISBURY, RHODESIA.

The Rt; Honourable, the Prime Minister,  
10 Downing Street,  
London.

22 Aug 79

*Dear Prime Minister,*

You kindly received and replied to a letter of mine a few weeks ago. This has encouraged me to set down for you a sequence of thoughts about this country at the present time. I travel the country very widely, and have just returned from taking Services in a Protected Village close to the Mozambique border. I therefore listen to very many and varied opinions. In the light of these, I believe the following to be true:-

1. Unless strong reassurance for the future comes by next November, very many European and African farmers will not plant for the 1980 season, and, from this, grave economic collapse would begin throughout the nation.
2. An immediate consequence of this would be that very many Europeans would leave this country under their "contingency plans", and the situation would worsen rapidly.
3. Many risked their lives to produce with infinite labour a basically fair and free Election last April. They would not do this again, so that another Election would merely give power to the strongest intimidator.
4. Shona people vote for the strongest man, not the most suitable man when they are fearful. This is the sensible logic of expediency if one cannot defend oneself.
5. The present Security Forces can contain the military situation, but cannot prevent what has already largely happened - the collapse of the fabric of community living and law and order.
6. The present course of affairs and the postponement of the lifting of Sanctions would mean a continual erosion until a Marxist take-over of a totally ruined society and economy. Only recognition of the present Government can de-escalate the war. Recognition would produce not a bang, but a deflated whimper from the Front Line States.

I am, Madam, yours sincerely,

+ *Paul Mashonaland*

CHURCH OF THE PROVINCE OF CENTRAL AFRICA  
The Diocese of Mashonaland

FROM THE REGION OF MASHONALAND

PROBATION OFFICE  
100, QUEEN STREET  
HARARE



19 SEP 1979



[The following text is extremely faint and largely illegible due to the quality of the scan. It appears to be a formal document or letter, possibly containing a list of items or a report.]

[Faint handwritten signature or text at the bottom of the page.]



*ASB*

10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

17 September 1979

RHODESIA: MESSAGE FROM THE  
PRESIDENT OF LIBERIA

Your letter to me of 13 September contained the text of a draft reply from the Prime Minister to President Tolbert's message about the Constitutional Conference.

The Prime Minister has agreed the reply. I should be grateful if you would arrange for its despatch.

M. O'D. B. ALEXANDER

R M J Lyne Esq  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

0117

*KRP*



Rhodesia



F<sup>4</sup>  
Pmt  
15/5

10 DOWNING STREET

Prime Minister.

You may wish to see the Patriotic Front's constitutional proposals.

While full of hallowed language & concepts, the draft simply ignores the particular circumstances of Zimbabwe today.

Pmt 15/5

mt

PATRIOTIC FRONT

BRIEF SUMMARY OF PROPOSALS  
FOR AN INDEPENDENCE CONSTITUTION

FOR

ZIMBABWE

INTRODUCTION

The constitution of Zimbabwe will ensure the genuine transfer of effective power to the people, and will provide for all citizens of the country to have security and not privilege under the Rule of Law, equal rights without discrimination, and the right to be governed by a democratically elected government of their choice on the basis of universal adult suffrage.

THE REPUBLIC

Zimbabwe will be a sovereign republic and will have a national seal and a national emblem.

THE EXECUTIVE

The President and Vice-President

1. There will be an executive President, who will also be Head of State.
2. The President and the Vice-President will be elected as a team. The election will be by popular vote; it will proceed concurrently with the election of the members of the National Assembly and will be automatically linked with it,

so that whenever Parliament is dissolved there will be simultaneous elections for the National Assembly and the Presidential team. The successful team will be the one that has received the majority of the valid votes cast.

3. The tenure of office of the Presidential team will normally be linked with the life of Parliament. Provision will be made in the constitution for the removal from office of the President or the Vice-President for physical or mental incapacity or because of violation of the constitution or gross misconduct.

4. (1) If the office of President becomes vacant the Vice-President, provided he was elected with the President as a team, will assume the office of President and a new Vice-President will be elected by a simple majority of the members of the Senate and the National Assembly sitting together.

(2) If the office of President, having been assumed as in (1) above, becomes vacant within the first four years of the life of Parliament there will be a special "Presidential team" election within ninety days.

(3) If the office of President becomes vacant as in (2) above within the last year of the life of Parliament, Parliament will stand dissolved and there will be an ordinary Presidential and Parliamentary election.

(4) If the office of Vice-President becomes vacant a new Vice-President will be elected by a simple majority of the members of the Senate and the National Assembly sitting together; but a Vice-President so elected will not be qualified to assume the office of President if that should become vacant.

(5) If the office of President becomes vacant in circumstances where the Vice-President has been elected

as in (4) above, and the vacancy occurs in the first four years of the life of Parliament, there will be a special "Presidential team" election within ninety days.

(6) (6) If the office of President becomes vacant as in (5) above within the last year of the life of Parliament, Parliament will stand dissolved and there will be an ordinary Presidential and Parliamentary election.

(7) If the office of President becomes vacant as in (2), (3) or (5) above the Vice-President will act as President until a new President takes office, and an acting Vice-President will be elected by simple majority of the members of the Senate and the National Assembly sitting together.

5. There will be a Cabinet which will consist of the Vice-President and the Ministers.

#### Executive Functions

6. The executive power of the Republic will be vested in the President and, subject to the constitution, will be discharged by him either directly or through officers subordinate to him.

7. (1) The supreme command of the armed forces will vest in the President and he will hold the office of Commander in Chief.

(2) The powers of the President will include-

(a) the power to determine the operational use of the armed forces;

(b) the power to appoint members of the armed forces, to make appointments or promotion to any office in the armed forces and to dismiss any member of the armed forces.

(3) The President will have power to delegate any of the foregoing powers.

(4) Parliament will have power to regulate the exercise of any of the powers.

8. The Vice-President will be the principal Minister who will assist the President in the discharge of his executive functions, and leader of government business in the National Assembly.

9. The President will appoint a Cabinet from among the members of the Senate and the National Assembly comprising the Vice-President and a number of Ministers drawn from the Party which enjoys the confidence of the Assembly. The President, or in his absence the Vice-President, will preside over the Cabinet.

(10) The President may appoint junior Ministers from among the members of the Senate or the National Assembly.

#### THE LEGISLATURE

##### Composition

1. The Parliament of Zimbabwe will consist of the President, a Senate and a National Assembly.

2. The Senate will consist of forty (40) members who will be elected immediately after a general election by the members of the National Assembly sitting as an electoral college.

3. The National Assembly will consist of one hundred and twenty (120) members elected on a single member constituency basis.

4. The franchise for the election of President and the members of the National Assembly will be based

on universal adult suffrage i.e. all Zimbabwe citizens of the age of eighteen and upwards who have been registered as voters and are not specifically disqualified by law.

#### Legislation and Procedure

5. The legislative power will be exercised by bills passed by both Houses of Parliament and assented to by the President.

6. All legislation will be introduced in the National Assembly. After a bill has been passed in the National Assembly it must be debated and disposed of in the Senate within one month. If a bill is amended or rejected by the Senate it will be returned to the National Assembly. If the National Assembly re-affirms the bill or rejects the amendments proposed by the Senate without adding any fresh matter the bill will be presented directly to the President for his assent.

7. The foregoing provision will apply equally to money bills.

8. Voting on bills other than constitutional amendments will be by simple majority in each House.

9. Any bill to amend any provision of the constitution will require the affirmative votes of two-thirds of the total membership of the National Assembly and the Senate sitting separately; the Senate must debate and dispose of the bill within three months of receiving it from the National Assembly. If the bill fails to secure such majority in the Senate, it will be presented to the President for his assent despite the lack of the approval of the Senate.

#### THE JUDICATURE

1. There will be a Court of Appeal and a High Court.

2. The Chief Justice will be appointed by the President; the other judges of the Court of Appeal

and the High Court will be appointed by the President acting on the advice of the Judicial Service Commission. All judges will have security of tenure of office.

3. A person will be qualified for appointment as a judge if he has been a judge of a superior court in a country in which the common law is Roman-Dutch or English and an official language is English, or if he has practised or has been qualified to practise in such a country for not less than five years.

4. The terms of service of the judges may not be altered to their disadvantage during their tenure of office.

#### Judicial Service Commission

5. The Judicial Service Commission will comprise the Chief Justice, the Chairman of the Public Service Commission, a judge of the Court of Appeal or the High Court nominated by the Chief Justice, and two other members appointed by the President.

#### SERVICE COMMISSIONS

1. There will be the following commissions:

- (a) a Public Service Commission; and
- (b) a Police and Prison Service Commission.

2. Parliament will have power to create additional commissions.

3. A commission will comprise a chairman and not less than three nor more than six other members, who will be appointed by the President.

4. A commission will have power to retire any public officer in the public interest.

5. The following offices will not be under the

jurisdiction of any of the above commissions:

- (a) offices on the President's personal staff; these will be within the President's personal control, although he may arrange with the Public Service Commission for regular public officers to be seconded to his staff;
- (b) offices within the jurisdiction of the Judicial Service Commission;
- (c) offices on the staff of the Senate and the National Assembly;
- (d) the office of Commissioner of Police;
- (e) the office of the Secretary to the Cabinet, Permanent Secretaries and Deputy Permanent Secretaries of Departments, and Zimbabwe Ambassadors abroad. The relevant powers will be vested in the President, acting after consultation with the Public Service Commission.
- (f) The Director of Public Prosecutions and the Auditor - General will be appointed by the Public Service Commission and will then be outside its jurisdiction, enjoying constitutional protection;

The incumbents of the foregoing excluded offices will vacate their offices on the day preceding the date set for independence.

#### BILL OF RIGHTS

The constitution will contain a justiciable Bill of Rights.

#### FINANCE

There will be non-contentious provisions relating to the Consolidated Fund, withdrawals therefrom, the



Auditor-General, and so on.

### CITIZENSHIP

1. The critical date for automatic citizenship will be the 11th November 1965, the date of UDI.

2. (1) All persons who were citizens of Southern Rhodesia prior to the 11th November 1965, or were resident in Southern Rhodesia on that date and who acquired citizenship after the 11th November 1965 under the law in force at the 11th November 1965, will automatically become citizens of Zimbabwe at independence, provided that at that date they were still citizens of Southern Rhodesia.

(2) Any person who was resident in Southern Rhodesia prior to UDI and who was purportedly granted citizenship under the 1970 Act will, provided he qualified under the 1963 Act, automatically become a citizen at independence (subject to a similar proviso as in (1)).

3. There will be the widest possible provisions regarding the rights to citizenship of children of Southern Rhodesians and Zimbabweans born outside the country.

4. A person with dual citizenship will cease to be a citizen of Zimbabwe unless he renounces his other citizenship within one year after independence or after attaining the age of eighteen years, whichever is the later.

### MISCELLANEOUS

This Chapter will contain the definition section and other non-contentious provisions.

ZIMBABWE INDEPENDENCE ORDER 1979

1. Existing Laws.

We propose a general validation of existing laws, which for this purpose are pre-UDI <sup>per U.S.I.</sup> purported laws, subject to the specific repeal or amendment of offending legislation as detailed in a schedule. There will in addition be a blanket or "long-stop" invalidation of any legislation inconsistent with the constitution.

2. Existing Officers.

Existing officers in the public service may be required to take fresh oaths of allegiance. Notwithstanding, an officer's appointment may be terminated within one year of independence by three month's notice.

3. Existing Judges and Magistrates.

All judges and magistrates will cease to hold office on independence, but will be at liberty to apply for re-appointment within one month. There will be a saving to enable a judicial officer to complete civil proceedings the hearing of which commenced before independence.

4. Citizenship.

All deprivations of citizenship since UDI will be invalidated, and any grant of citizenship under the Citizenship of Rhodesia Act Cap. 23 (1970), except those which could have been made under the Citizenship of Southern Rhodesia and British Nationality Act 1963, will also be invalidated.

5. Obligations of Government of Zimbabwe.

Obligations arising out of contracts and agreements entered into in furtherance or support of the rebellion will not be accepted by the government of independent Zimbabwe.

PA Spare copy

PATRIOTIC FRONT

THE LEGISLATURE

In the light of the various discussions that have taken place the Patriotic Front presents the following amendment to its proposals.

1.

The Legislature

Composition

- (1) The National Assembly will consist of:
- (a) ninety-six (96) seats,  
elected on a common roll;
  - (b) twenty-four (24) seats reserved for white members,  
elected as follows:
    - (i) fifteen (15) elected by a reserved white roll;
    - (ii) nine (9) elected on the common roll.

If the foregoing is not acceptable then, although we are opposed to racial rolls, we have no alternative but to propose in place of sub-paragraphs (a) and (b) the following:

- (a) ninety-six (96) seats open to members of all races,  
elected by a reserved black roll;
- (b) twenty-four (24) seats reserved for white members,  
elected by a reserved white roll.

(2) The Senate will consist of sixty (60) members, of whom forty-eight (48) will be elected by the ordinary members (or the members elected under (a) in the alternative proposal) of the National Assembly and twelve (12) will be elected by the white members.

2.

Legislation

We cannot accept the powers of delay vested in the Senate, particularly in relation to ordinary day to day legislation. After independence a great deal of legislation will require expeditious amendment, and a Senate vested with such powers can frustrate good government. We maintain the position set out in our main paper,

namely that the power of delay should be three months for constitutional bills and one month for ordinary legislation including money bills.

We maintain also the position set out in our main paper that a constitutional bill may be passed in the National Assembly by a two-thirds majority.



Original  
u. G. R. 700  
VB

10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

14 September 1979

Dear Patrick,

Thank you very much for your letter from the United States about Rhodesia. I am grateful for your kind words about the Lusaka agreement, and for your frankness in setting out your anxieties.

We are now engaged in the Constitutional Conference. We have put forward proposals which I believe are fair and reasonable and fully compatible with the basis on which we have granted independence in other cases. They should be acceptable to anyone who wants a reasonable agreement. We must make a determined effort to see if it is possible to bring about an end to - or a de-escalation of - the war, which is the main factor in causing many members of the white community to leave. We must also do all we can to make sure that the newly independent country wins as much international acceptance as possible. We have made it clear that we will not allow any party to exercise a veto over what we regard as a reasonable settlement. I hope that you will feel able to support this approach.

Yours sincerely  
Margaret

Patrick Wall, Esq., M.C., V.R.D., M.P.

J.S.

Top copy on: Senator Helms,  
U.S.A.  
June 79.

EXTRACT OF A

NOTE OF A DISCUSSION WITH DR J LUCIER AND MR J CARBAUGH  
(ASSISTANTS TO SENATOR JESSE HELMS) ON 14 SEPTEMBER AT  
1100 HOURS AT NO. 10

---

I saw Messrs Lucier and Carbaugh on the Prime Minister's behalf.

Mr. Carbaugh said that he and his colleague had seen the South African Foreign Minister in Pretoria on 27 August. Mr Botha had asked them to carry a message to the Prime Minister. This was that it was essential for sanctions to be lifted in November. The South African Government was at present giving financial support to the Government in Salisbury to the tune of 40 million rand (50 million dollars) per month. They could not continue to do so. If sanctions were not lifted they would probably cut off support with the result that the economy would collapse. According to Mr Carbaugh this message had been given to Bishop Muzorewa by the South African Prime Minister at a secret meeting on the Limpopo which had taken place between 13 and 27 August.

Mr. Carbaugh said that he had seen Ian Smith and David Smith this morning and told them that he was about to convey the above message to the Prime Minister. Ian Smith had commented, wryly, that it was typical of the South Africans to be saying this to HMG while they were urging him to stand firm in the Constitutional Conference.

Having in mind the message which Mr. van der Post said he had been asked by the South African Foreign Minister to pass to the Prime Minister vis that South Africa would intervene in Rhodesia if sanctions were not lifted in November, I asked Mr Carbaugh whether Mr Botha had given any indication of South African intentions after they cut off financial support. Mr. Carbaugh said that Mr Botha had said nothing more.

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On US attitudes towards sanctions, Mr Carbaugh repeated the message in the attached letter to the Prime Minister from Senator Helms. He said that the latest Senate amendment, which had been attached to the Defence Authorisation Bill, called for sanctions to be lifted on 1 October. This amendment would be considered in the House-Senate Conference on the bill next week. Senators Tower and Stennis, who were handling the bill, intended to fight for the amendment. The only compromises they were prepared to envisage were either (a) that the date be changed from 1 October to 15 November; or (b) that the lifting of sanctions be applied to strategic materials (covering some 77 items) rather than to the whole of United States trade with Zimbabwe. Mr. Carbaugh said that it was only a matter of time before Congress lifted sanctions.

Mr. Carbaugh said that he and his colleague had been in Salisbury before coming to London. There was little new in his account of the situation there. Dr Lucier said that he had heard both from General Walls and Mr Flower that if the Constitutional Conference broke down, the white population would fight on and, specifically, would try to "get" both Mr. Nkomo and Mr Mugabe.

# UNITED NATIONAL FEDERAL PARTY

NATIONAL PRESIDENT  
Senator Chief Kayisa Ndiweni

NATIONAL CHAIRMAN  
Mr. Z. M. Bafana, M.P.

U.N.F.P.



NATIONAL HEADQUARTERS  
406 Sanlam Buildings  
10th Avenue, BULAWAYO  
Telephones 74-444/5  
P.O. Box 1589, Bulawayo

Delegation at;  
COLUMBIA HOTEL Lancaster Gate,  
London W. 2.

To  
The Prime Minister  
10. Downing Street

6th September 1979.

Dear Mrs. Thatcher,

*Annie Minister*  
*I have agreed that the F.C.O. should*  
*ack. on your behalf.* *Ans. 13/5*

The United National Federal Party is grateful for your Government's efforts in bringing about the Conference on Zimbabwe Rhodesia.

It is our earnest hope that all participants to the Conference will work with patience and determination to find a lasting solution to our problems.

We urge you Prime Minister to do your utmost to ensure that the Conference will be a success.

We, as a Party appeal to all concerned to try and look at the main problems and not to break up the Conference over minor issues which may be solved later inside the country on the lines of the major principles may be agreed upon.

The U.N.F.P. is determined to contribute to the success.

Finally we thank you for your personal efforts to bring all parties concerned to the Conference table.

Yours most respectfully

Dr. E. Gabellah

Chief Political Advisor to the UNFP.,  
Leader of the UNFP Delegation in London.

*(not the President of UNFP.)*



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FROM FCO 121800Z

TO IMMEDIATE LUSAKA

TELEGRAM NUMBER 760 OF 12 SEPTEMBER

AND TO IMMEDIATE MAPUTO, GABORONE, DAR ES SALAAM, LUANDA, LAGOS, WASHINGTON, PRETORIA, ADDIS ABABA, MONROVIA, CANBERRA, OTTAWA, WELLINGTON, PRIORITY ABIDJAN, DAKAR, KINSHASA, KHARTOUM, TOKYO, EEC POSTS AND OTHER COMMONWEALTH POSTS, OSLO, STOCKHOLM, LISBON, MADRID, MANILA, TEHRAN, BUCHAREST, CARACAS

INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK

SAVING SUVA, PORT MORESBY, HONIARA, NUKUALOFA TARAWA

RHODESIA: CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE

1. AFTER CONSIDERABLE DIFFICULTIES WITH THE PATRIOTIC FRONT, WHO SOUGHT TO INSIST THAT THE TRANSITIONAL ARRANGEMENTS SHOULD BE DISCUSSED FIRST, IT WAS AGREED THIS AFTERNOON THAT WE SHOULD PROCEED TO A DISCUSSION OF THE INDEPENDENCE CONSTITUTION, AND THAT THE PRE-INDEPENDENCE ARRANGEMENTS WOULD BE DISCUSSED LATER. THIS WAS ON THE UNDERSTANDING THAT AGREEMENT BY THE PATRIOTIC FRONT ON THE CONSTITUTION WOULD BE DEPENDENT ON AGREEMENT ON THE ARRANGEMENTS FOR IMPLEMENTING IT.

2. THE TEXTS OF A STATEMENT I MADE TODAY ABOUT THE ORGANISATION OF THE WORK OF THE CONFERENCE, AND OF SOME COMMENTS I MADE ON OUR OUTLINE CONSTITUTIONAL PROPOSALS, ARE BEING CIRCULATED IN THE VERBATIM SERIES. YOU MAY MAKE THESE AVAILABLE TO GOVERNMENTS TO WHICH YOU ARE ACCREDITED, AND DRAW ON THEM AS APPROPRIATE.

3. IN THE CONFERENCE BOTH NKOMO FOR THE PATRIOTIC FRONT AND MUZOREWA ASKED US TO PUT FORWARD MORE DETAILED PROPOSALS. MIFT CONTAINS THE TEXT OF FULLER CONSTITUTIONAL PROPOSALS WE HAVE PUT TO THE PARTIES TODAY. COPIES HAVE BEEN MADE AVAILABLE TO FRONT LINE OBSERVERS, OLD COMMONWEALTH HIGH COMMISSIONERS AND THE AMERICANS. POSTS IN THOSE COUNTRIES MAY PASS COPIES TO THEIR GOVERNMENTS. DUBLIN MAY ALSO GIVE A COPY TO NYERERE. OTHER POSTS IN THE COMMONWEALTH AND AFRICA SHOULD AWAIT FURTHER INSTRUCTION BEFORE MAKING USE OF THE TEXT WITH THEIR GOVERNMENTS.

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# CONFIDENTIAL

4. THESE PROPOSALS ARE FULLY COMPATIBLE WITH THE OUTLINE WE PRESENTED TO THE PARTIES ON 14 AUGUST. ON THE QUESTION OF EUROPEAN REPRESENTATION IN PARLIAMENT, IT WILL BE CLEAR FROM OUR PREVIOUS STATEMENTS THAT IN ANY EVENT WE ENVISAGE THAT THE PROPORTION OF EUROPEAN SEATS MUST BE SIGNIFICANTLY LESS THAN THE MINORITY REQUIRED TO BLOCK CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS. (WE WOULD, HOWEVER, BE PREPARED TO ENVISAGE THAT CERTAIN PROVISIONS OF A DECLARATION OF RIGHTS RELATING TO BASIC HUMAN RIGHTS MIGHT BE UNAMENDABLE FOR A SPECIFIED PERIOD IN ORDER TO GIVE PROTECTION TO ALL CITIZENS OF THE COUNTRY).

5. WE ARE NOW LOOKING TO BOTH SIDES IN THE CONFERENCE TO RESUME DISCUSSION WITH THE INTENTION OF MAKING REAL PROGRESS TOWARDS AGREEING THE TERMS OF THE INDEPENDENCE CONSTITUTION.

CARRINGTON

## FILES

RHOD D  
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PLANNING STAFF  
ES & SD  
CCD  
FRD  
UND  
LEGAL ADVISERS  
(MR FREELAND)  
(MR FIFCOT)  
ECON D

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PS/MR LUCE  
PS/MR RIDLEY  
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PS/PUS  
SIR A DUFF  
LORD N G LENNOX  
MISS BROWN  
MR WILLSON  
MR DAY  
MR ASPIN

## ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION RHODESIA POLICY

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FM F C O 121800Z SEP 79

TO IMMEDIATE LUSAKA

TELEGRAM NUMBER 761 OF 12 SEPTEMBER.

AND TO IMMEDIATE MAPUTO GABORONE DAR ES SALAAM LUANDA LAGOS

WASHINGTON PRETORIA ADDIS ABABA MONROVIA CANBERRA OTTAWA

WELLINGTON PRIORITY ABIDJAN DAKAR KINSHASA KHARTOUM TOKYO EEC

POSTS AND OTHER COMMONWEALTH POSTS OSLO STOCKHOLM LISBON MADRID

MANILA TEHRAN BUCHAREST CARACAS

AND TO SAVING SUVA PORT MORESBY HONIARA NUKU ALOFA TARAWA

INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK.

M I P T. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF FULLER CONSTITUTIONAL PROPOSALS.

SUMMARY OF THE INDEPENDENCE CONSTITUTION.

A. THE STATE OF ZIMBABWE.

1. ZIMBABWE WILL BE A SOVEREIGN STATE. QUOTE ZIMBABWE UNQUOTE  
WILL BE ESTABLISHED AS THE OFFICIAL NAME OF THE COUNTRY.

2. THE CONSTITUTION WILL BE THE SUPREME LAW OF THE STATE AND  
WILL PREVAIL OVER ANY OTHER LAW.

B. CITIZENSHIP.

1. EXISTING CITIZENS:

A. EVERY PERSON WHO WAS A CITIZEN OF RHODESIA IMMEDIATELY BEFORE  
INDEPENDENCE WILL AUTOMATICALLY BECOME A CITIZEN OF ZIMBABWE ON  
INDEPENDENCE (BY BIRTH, DESCENT OR REGISTRATION, AS THE CASE MAY  
BE, ACCORDING TO HIS FORMER STATUS).

B. EVERY PERSON WHO, IMMEDIATELY BEFORE INDEPENDENCE, POSSESSED  
SUCH QUALIFICATIONS THAT THE RELEVANT AUTHORITY WOULD, UPON  
APPLICATION DULY MADE, HAVE REGISTERED HIM AS A CITIZEN OF RHODESIA,  
WILL BE ENTITLED TO MAKE APPLICATION IN THE PRESCRIBED MANNER AT  
ANY TIME DURING THE FIRST 5 YEARS AFTER INDEPENDENCE AND IT WILL BE  
OPEN TO THE COMPETENT AUTHORITY TO GRANT THAT APPLICATION AND CAUSE  
HIM TO BE REGISTERED AS A CITIZEN OF ZIMBABWE.

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2. EVERY PERSON WHO IS BORN IN ZIMBABWE AFTER INDEPENDENCE (OTHER THAN THE CHILD OF A DIPLOMAT ACCREDITED TO THE GOVERNMENT OF ZIMBABWE OR OF AN ENEMY ALIEN) WILL BECOME A CITIZEN OF ZIMBABWE BY BIRTH.
  3. EVERY PERSON WHO IS BORN OUTSIDE ZIMBABWE AFTER INDEPENDENCE BUT WHOSE FATHER (OR, IF HE IS ILLEGITIMATE, WHOSE MOTHER) IS THEN A CITIZEN OF ZIMBABWE BY BIRTH WILL HIMSELF BECOME A CITIZEN OF ZIMBABWE BY DESCENT.
  4. ANY WOMAN WHO IS OR HAS BEEN MARRIED TO A PERSON WHO IS OR WAS AT ANY TIME DURING THE SUBSISTENCE OF THE MARRIAGE A CITIZEN OF ZIMBABWE (OR WOULD BUT FOR HIS DEATH HAVE AUTOMATICALLY BECOME A CITIZEN OF ZIMBABWE AT INDEPENDENCE) WILL, ON MAKING APPLICATION IN THE PRESCRIBED MANNER, BE ENTITLED TO BE REGISTERED AS A CITIZEN OF ZIMBABWE.
  5. ANY PERSON ONE OF WHOSE PARENTS IS A CITIZEN OF ZIMBABWE AT THE DATE OF HIS APPLICATION WILL BE ENTITLED, ON MAKING APPLICATION IN THE PRESCRIBED MANNER, TO BE REGISTERED AS A CITIZEN OF ZIMBABWE. IF THE PERSON IS A MINOR, THE APPLICATION MAY BE MADE ON HIS BEHALF BY HIS PARENT OR GUARDIAN.
  6. DUAL CITIZENSHIP WILL BE PERMITTED.
  7. PARLIAMENT MAY MAKE ADDITIONAL PROVISION FOR CITIZENSHIP.
- C. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS.

1. THE CONSTITUTION WILL SET OUT A DECLARATION OF FUNDAMENTAL HUMAN RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS IN THE CUSTOMARY FORM, WHICH WILL BE FULLY JUSTICIABLE, IE ANY PERSON WHO ASSERTS THAT THEY HAVE BEEN OR ARE BEING INFRINGED IN HIS CASE WILL BE ABLE TO APPLY TO THE HIGH COURT FOR REDRESS. THESE RIGHTS WILL INCLUDE :

- I. THE RIGHT TO LIFE:
- II. THE RIGHT TO PERSONAL LIBERTY:
- III. PROTECTION FROM SLAVERY AND FORCED LABOUR:
- IV. PROTECTION FROM INHUMAN TREATMENT:
- V. PROTECTION FROM THE ARBITRARY DEPRIVATION OF PROPERTY:
- VI. PROTECTION FROM ARBITRARY SEARCH OR ENTRY:

- I. PROTECTION OF THE LAW:
- VIII. FREEDOM OF CONSCIENCE:
- IX. FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION:
- X. FREEDOM OF ASSEMBLY AND ASSOCIATION:
- XI. FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT.
- XII. FREEDOM FROM DISCRIMINATION.

D. THE EXECUTIVE.

I. THE PRESIDENT.

1. THE PRESIDENT WILL BE A QUOTE CONSTITUTIONAL UNQUOTE HEAD OF STATE AND COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF THE DEFENCE FORCES. HE WILL BE ELECTED BY THE MEMBERS OF PARLIAMENT.
2. ALTERNATIVELY OTHER ARRANGEMENTS COULD BE CONSIDERED FOR A CONSTITUTIONAL HEAD OF STATE.
3. THE PRESIDENT WILL HOLD OFFICE UNTIL HE RESIGNS OR UNTIL A PERIOD OF 6 YEARS HAS ELAPSED. THEREAFTER HE WILL BE ELIGIBLE FOR RE-ELECTION FOR ONE FURTHER PERIOD OF OFFICE.
4. A PRESIDENT MAY BE REMOVED FROM OFFICE ON THE GROUNDS OF MISCONDUCT OR INABILITY TO DISCHARGE EFFICIENTLY THE FUNCTIONS OF HIS OFFICE. A MOTION FOR REMOVAL REQUIRES TO BE SUPPORTED BY NOT LESS THAN TWO-THIRDS OF ALL THE MEMBERS OF PARLIAMENT.
5. PROVISION WILL BE MADE FOR THE DISCHARGE OF THE FUNCTIONS OF THE OFFICE OF PRESIDENT DURING THE PRESIDENT'S ABSENCE OF TEMPORARY INCAPACITY.
6. THE EXECUTIVE POWER OF ZIMBABWE WILL BE VESTED IN THE PRESIDENT ACTING ON THE ADVICE OF THE PRIME MINISTER OR OF A MINISTER ACTING UNDER THE AUTHORITY OF THE EXECUTIVE COUNCIL.
7. THE PRESIDENT WILL EXERCISE THE PREROGATIVE OF MERCY ON THE ADVICE OF MINISTERS.

8. THE PRESIDENT WILL HAVE POWER, ON THE ADVICE OF MINISTERS, TO DECLARE A STATE OF PUBLIC EMERGENCY, OR THE EXISTENCE OF A SITUATION WHICH, IF ALLOWED TO CONTINUE, MAY LEAD TO A STATE OF PUBLIC EMERGENCY. SUCH A DECLARATION WILL LAPSE UNLESS IT IS APPROVED WITHIN 14 DAYS BY THE AFFIRMATIVE VOTES OF MORE THAN ONE-HALF OF THE TOTAL MEMBERSHIP OF THE HOUSE OF ASSEMBLY. THE DECLARATION MAY NOT CONTINUE IN EFFECT FOR LONGER THAN 6 MONTHS UNLESS IT IS RENEWED BY A SIMILAR RESOLUTION.

II. EXECUTIVE COUNCIL AND MINSTERS.

1. THE EXECUTIVE COUNCIL WILL CONSIST OF THE PRIME MINISTER AND THE OTHER MINISTERS.

2. THE PRESIDENT WILL APPOINT AS PRIME MINISTER THE PERSON WHO, IN HIS OPINION, IS BEST ABLE TO COMMAND THE SUPPORT OF A MAJORITY OF THE MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE OF ASSEMBLY. HE WILL APPOINT AND DISMISS MINISTERS AND DEPUTY MINISTERS ON THE ADVICE OF THE PRIME MINISTER.

3. A MINISTER OR DEPUTY MINISTER WILL, AS A RULE, BE A MEMBER OF THE SENATE OR HOUSE OF ASSEMBLY.

4. THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL SHALL BE A MEMBER OF THE PUBLIC SERVICE. HE SHALL BE APPOINTED BY THE PRESIDENT ON THE ADVICE OF THE PRIME MINISTER AFTER CONSULTATION WITH THE APPROPRIATE COMMISSION. HE SHALL EXERCISE THE FUNCTIONS OF A DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS AND HIS TENURE OF OFFICE SHALL BE PROTECTED.

5. PERMANENT SECRETARIES SHALL HAVE THE SUPERVISION OF DEPARTMENTS UNDER THE GENERAL DIRECTION AND CONTROL OF THE RESPONSIBLE MINISTER. PERMANENT SECRETARIES SHALL BE APPOINTED BY THE PRESIDENT ON THE ADVICE OF THE PRIME MINISTER AFTER CONSULTATION WITH THE APPROPRIATE COMMISSION.

6. HEADS OF DIPLOMATIC MISSIONS SHALL BE APPOINTED BY THE PRESIDENT ON THE ADVICE OF THE PRIME MINISTER AFTER CONSULTATION WITH THE APPROPRIATE COMMISSION.

III. THE PUBLIC SERVICE AND POLICE FORCE

1. PUBLIC SERVICE

THERE WILL BE A PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION WHICH WILL BE RESPONSIBLE FOR REGULATING AND CONTROLLING THE ORGANISATION OF THE PUBLIC (I.E. CIVIL) SERVICE AND THE PRISON SERVICE. THE COMMISSION WILL CONSIST OF A CHAIRMAN AND NOT LESS THAN 2 AND NOT MORE THAN 4 OTHER MEMBERS APPOINTED BY THE PRESIDENT ON THE ADVICE OF THE PRIME MINISTER. THE COMPOSITION OF THE COMMISSION MUST TAKE ACCOUNT OF THE NEED FOR IT TO RECEIVE THE ADVICE OF PROPERLY QUALIFIED AND EXPERIENCED PERSONS. WHEN CONSIDERING CANDIDATES FOR APPOINTMENT TO A VACANT POST IN THE PUBLIC SERVICE OR PRISON SERVICE, THE COMMISSION WILL BE REQUIRED, SUBJECT TO ANY GENERAL DIRECTIONS OF THE PRESIDENT (SEE PARAGRAPH 3 BELOW) TO GIVE PREFERENCE TO THE PERSON WHO, IN ITS OPINION, IS THE MOST EFFICIENT AND SUITABLE FOR APPOINTMENT.

2. SAVE AS OTHERWISE INDICATED, THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION WILL HAVE POWER TO APPOINT AND REMOVE MEMBERS OF THE PUBLIC SERVICE.

3. THE PRESIDENT, ACTING ON THE ADVICE OF THE PRIME MINISTER, WILL HAVE POWER TO GIVE THE COMMISSIONS SUCH GENERAL DIRECTIONS WITH RESPECT TO THE EXERCISE OF THEIR FUNCTIONS AS HE MAY CONSIDER NECESSARY. THESE MAY INCLUDE DIRECTIONS DESIGNED TO ACHIEVE A SUITABLE REPRESENTATION OF THE VARIOUS COMPONENT GROUPS OF THE POPULATION IN THE SERVICES OF THE STATE.

4. THE POLICE FORCE

THE POLICE FORCE WILL BE UNDER THE COMMAND OF THE COMMISSIONER OF POLICE WHO WILL BE APPOINTED BY THE PRESIDENT ON THE RECOMMENDATION OF THE PRIME MINISTER. BEFORE MAKING HIS RECOMMENDATION, THE PRIME MINISTER WILL CONSULT THE POLICE SERVICE COMMISSION.

5. SUBJECT TO SUCH GENERAL DIRECTIONS AS MAY BE GIVEN TO HIM BY THE PRIME MINISTER, THE COMMISSIONER OF POLICE WILL BE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE ADMINISTRATION AND OPERATIONS OF THE POLICE FORCE. APPOINTMENTS TO THE POLICE FORCE SHALL BE MADE ON THE ADVICE OF OR BY THE COMMISSIONER OF POLICE.

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6. THERE WILL BE A POLICE SERVICE COMMISSION WHICH WILL CONSIST A CHAIRMAN (WHO WILL BE THE CHAIRMAN OF THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION) AND NOT LESS THEN 2 AND NOT MORE THAN 4 OTHER MEMBERS APPOINTED BY THE PRESIDENT ON THE ADVICE OF THE PRIME MINISTER. THE COMPOSITION OF THE COMMISSION MUST TAKE ACCOUNT OF THE NEED FOR IT TO RECEIVE THE ADVICE OF PROPERLY QUALIFIED AND EXPERIENCED PERSONS. THE FUNCTIONS OF THE POLICE SERVICE COMMISSION WILL BE TO CONSIDER GRIEVANCE BY MEMBERS OF THE POLICE FORCE, TO CONSIDER AND, IF IT DEEMS FIT, TO CONFIRM ANY PROPOSAL TO DISMISS A MEMBER WHO HAS HAD MORE THAN 2 YEARS' SERVICE AND TO MAKE REGULATIONS FOR THE GENERAL WELL-BEING AND GOOD ADMINISTRATION OF THE POLICE FORCE AND THE MAINTENANCE THEREOF IN A HIGH STATE OF EFFICIENCY. THE PRESIDENT, ACTING ON THE ADVICE OF THE PRIME MINISTER, MAY GIVE THE COMMISSIONER AND THE COMMISSION SIMILAR DIRECTIONS TO THOSE REFERRED TO IN PARAGRAPH 3 ABOVE.

## E. PARLIAMENT

1. THE LEGISLATURE WILL CONSIST OF THE PRESIDENT AND PARLIAMENT, WHICH WILL COMPRISE A SENATE AND A HOUSE OF ASSEMBLY.

2. ALL CITIZENS WHO ARE 18 YEARS OF AGE OR OVER WILL BE ELIGIBLE TO BE ENROLLED ON A COMMON VOTERS ROLL. AS LONG AS THERE IS THE PROVISION FOR SPECIAL MINORITY REPRESENTATION IN PARLIAMENT (DESCRIBED IN PARAGRAPH 5 BELOW) WHITE CITIZENS WHO HAVE ATTAINED THE AGE OF 18 YEARS WILL, AS AN ALTERNATIVE TO BEING ENROLLED ON THE COMMON VOTERS ROLL, BE ELIGIBLE TO BE ENROLLED ON A WHITE VOTERS ROLL. SUBJECT TO THE FOREGOING, AN ELECTORAL LAW WILL PROVIDE FOR THE ELECTION OF SENATORS AND MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE OF ASSEMBLY.

3. IT IS PROPOSED THAT THERE SHALL BE A SENATE, OF WHOM:

A. ONE--THIRD OF THE MEMBERS WILL BE ELECTED BY THE ORDINARY MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE OF ASSEMBLY:

B. ONE--THIRD WILL BE ELECTED BY THE EUROPEAN MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE OF ASSEMBLY: AND

C. THE ELECTION OF THE REMAINING ONE--THIRD WILL GIVE DUE WEIGHT TO REGIONAL CONSIDERATIONS.



# CONFIDENTIAL

4. THE SENATE WILL ELECT A PRESIDENT AND A DEPUTY PRESIDENT OF THE SENATE. A MINISTER OR DEPUTY MINISTER WILL NOT BE ELIGIBLE FOR THIS POST.

5. THE HOUSE OF ASSEMBLY WILL CONSIST OF X MEMBERS ELECTED AS FOLLOWS:

- A. Y MEMBERS WILL BE BLACKS ELECTED BY VOTERS ON THE COMMON VOTERS ROLL FOR Y CONSTITUENCIES;
- B. Z MEMBERS WILL BE WHITES ELECTED BY VOTERS ENROLLED ON THE WHITE VOTERS ROLL FOR Z WHITE ROLL CONSTITUENCIES.

6. THERE WILL BE PROVISION FOR:

- A. THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A DELIMITATION COMMISSION TO DELIMIT THE Y COMMON ROLL AND Z WHITE ROLL CONSTITUENCIES FOR GENERAL ELECTIONS;
- B. THE QUALIFICATIONS AND DISQUALIFICATIONS OF CANDIDATES FOR ELECTION AS MEMBERS OF THE SENATE OR THE HOUSE OF ASSEMBLY;
- C. THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN ELECTORAL SUPERVISORY COMMISSION AND THE FUNCTIONS THEREOF IN CONNECTION WITH THE SUPERVISION OF GENERAL ELECTIONS.

7. THE HOUSE OF ASSEMBLY WILL ELECT A SPEAKER AND A DEPUTY SPEAKER. A MINISTER OR DEPUTY MINISTER WILL NOT BE ELIGIBLE FOR THIS POST.

8. A MINISTER OR DEPUTY MINISTER WILL HAVE THE RIGHT TO SIT AND SPEAK BOTH IN THE SENATE AND IN THE HOUSE OF ASSEMBLY BUT WILL ONLY HAVE THE RIGHT TO VOTE IN THE SENATE OR IN THE HOUSE OF ASSEMBLY IF HE IS A MEMBER OF THE SENATE OR THE HOUSE, AS THE CASE MAY BE. THE PRESIDENT WILL HAVE THE RIGHT TO ADDRESS EITHER HOUSE OF PARLIAMENT OR A JOINTMEETING OF BOTH HOUSES.

9. THE PRESIDENT WILL PROROGUE OR DISSOLVE PARLIAMENT WHEN SO ADVISED BY THE PRIME MINISTER. THE PRESIDENT WILL HAVE POWER TO DISSOLVE PARLIAMENT IF THE HOUSE OF ASSEMBLY PASS A RESOLUTION OF NO CONFIDENCE IN THE GOVERNMENT OR IF THERE IS NO CANDIDATE FOR

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THE POST OF PRIME MINISTER WHO IS ABLE TO COMMAND THE SUPPORT OF A MAJORITY IN THE HOUSE OF ASSEMBLY. IF PARLIAMENT HAS NOT BEEN EARLIER DISSOLVED, IT WILL STAND DISSOLVED AUTOMATICALLY AT THE END OF 5 YEARS AFTER A GENERAL ELECTION.

10. SUBJECT TO PARAGRAPH 12, PARLIAMENT WILL HAVE FULL POWERS TO MAKE LAWS BY BILLS PASSED BY BOTH HOUSES OF PARLIAMENT AND ASSENTED TO BY THE PRESIDENT.

11. (1) THE SENATE WILL NOT BE ABLE TO AMEND MONEY BILLS, THOUGH IT MAY RECOMMEND AMENDMENTS.

(2) IF THE SENATE DOES NOT APPROVE WITHIN 180 DAYS A BILL WHICH HAS BEEN APPROVED BY THE HOUSE OF ASSEMBLY, THE HOUSE OF ASSEMBLY WILL BE ABLE TO RESOLVE THAT IT SHOULD BE PRESENTED TO THE PRESIDENT FOR HIS ASSENT.

12. (1) THE PROVISIONS OF THE CONSTITUTION RELATING TO MINORITY REPRESENTATION IN PARLIAMENT WILL NOT BE AMENDABLE FOR A SPECIFIC PERIOD AFTER INDEPENDENCE. (CERTAIN PROVISIONS OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS RELATING TO BASIC HUMAN RIGHTS WILL SIMILARLY NOT BE AMENDABLE FOR A SPECIFIC PERIOD AFTER INDEPENDENCE.)

(2) CERTAIN PRINCIPAL PROVISIONS OF THE CONSTITUTION SUCH AS THOSE RELATING TO THE LEGISLATURE, THE JUDICIARY, AND THE AMENDMENT OF THE CONSTITUTION WILL BE SPECIALLY ENTRENCHED. A BILL TO AMEND THE ENTRENCHED PROVISIONS OF THE CONSTITUTION WILL REQUIRE THE AFFIRMATIVE VOTES OF (AT LEAST 70) PER CENT OF ALL THE MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE OF ASSEMBLY. IN ADDITION, ANY BILL TO AMEND THE CONSTITUTION WILL REQUIRE THE AFFIRMATIVE VOTES OF TWO-THIRDS OF THE TOTAL MEMBERSHIP OF THE SENATE, BUT IF THIS CANNOT BE OBTAINED THE BILL MAY, AFTER A PERIOD OF 180 DAYS, BE SENT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR HIS ASSENT DESPITE THE FAILURE OF THE SENATE TO APPROVE IT.

## F. THE JUDICATURE

1. THERE WILL BE A HIGH COURT OF ZIMBABWE, CONSISTING OF AN APPELLATE DIVISION AND A GENERAL DIVISION. THE GENERAL DIVISION WILL HAVE UNLIMITED ORIGINAL JURISDICTION IN BOTH CIVIL AND CRIMINAL MATTERS AND SUCH OTHER JURISDICTION AS MAY BE CONFERRED ON THEM BY THE CONSTITUTION OR ANY OTHER LAW. APPEALS WILL LIE FROM DECISIONS OF THE GENERAL DIVISION TO THE APPELLATE DIVISION IN SUCH CASES AND IN ACCORDANCE WITH SUCH PROCEDURE AS MAY BE PRESCRIBED BY AN ACT OF PARLIAMENT.

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# CONFIDENTIAL

2. THE CHIEF JUSTICE WILL BE APPOINTED BY THE PRESIDENT ON THE ADVICE OF THE PRIME MINISTER. THE OTHER JUDGES WILL BE APPOINTED BY THE PRESIDENT ON THE ADVICE OF THE JUDICIAL SERVICE COMMISSION.
3. THE QUALIFICATIONS FOR APPOINTMENT AS A JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT ARE.
  - A. HE HAS HAD APPROPRIATE JUDICIAL EXPERIENCE, OR
  - B. HE IS, AND HAS BEEN FOR NOT LESS THEN (10) YEARS, QUALIFIED TO PRACTISE AS AN ADVOCATE IN ZIMBABWE, OR IN A COURT OF THE COMMONWEALTH, OR IN A COUNTRY IN WHICH THE COMMON LAW IS ROMAN-DUTCH, AND IN ANY SUCH CASE ENGLISH IS THE OFFICIAL LANGUAGE.
4. THE TENURE OF HIGH COURT JUDGES WILL BE PROTECTED.
5. THE POWER TO APPOINT, EXERCISE DISCIPLINARY CONTROL OVER, AND REMOVE FROM OFFICE THE JUDGES OF THE SUBORDINATE COURTS AND CERTAIN OTHER OFFICERS CONNECTED WITH THE HIGH COURT (E.G. REGISTRAR) WILL VEST IN THE JUDICIAL SERVICE COMMISSION.
6. THE CONSTITUTION WILL ESTABLISH AN INDEPENDENT JUDICIAL SERVICE COMMISSION, CONSISTING OF THE CHIEF JUSTICE, THE CHAIRMAN OF THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION, A LEGALLY QUALIFIED PERSON APPOINTED BY THE PRESIDENT AND A LAY MEMBER APPOINTED BY THE PRESIDENT IN EACH CASE ACTING ON THE ADVICE OF THE PRIME MINISTER.
  - G. THE DEFENCE FORCES
    1. ALL ARMED FORECES SHALL BE REGULATED BY LAW. THE DEFENCE FORCES WILL CONSIST OF THE ARMY, THE AIR FORCE AND ANY OTHER BRANCH ESTABLISHED BY LAW.
    2. THERE WILL BE A COMMANDER OF EACH BRANCH. EACH COMMANDER WILL BE APPOINTED BY THE PRESIDENT, ACTING ON THE ADVICE OF THE PRIME MINISTER WHO WILL, BEFORE HE MAKES HIS RECOMMENDATION, CONSULT AN APPROPRIATELY COMPOSED BOARD APPOINTED FOR THE PURPOSE. THE POWER TO RELIEVE A COMMANDER OF HIS APPOINTMENT VESTS IN THE PRESIDENT ACTING ON THE ADVICE OF THE PRIME MINISTER.

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3. THE COMMANDER OF A BRANCH OF THE DEFENCE FORCES SHALL BE RESPONSIBLE FOR THAT BRANCH SUBJECT TO ANY GENERAL DIRECTIONS WHICH MAY BE GIVEN TO HIM BY THE PRIME MINISTER (OR OTHER RESPONSIBLE MINISTER) FOR THE OPERATIONS OR ADMINISTRATION OF THE BRANCH CONCERNED. APPOINTMENTS WITHIN A BRANCH SHALL BE MADE ON THE ADVICE OF OR BY THE COMMANDER.

4. THERE WILL BE A DEFENCE FORECES SERVICE COMMISSION WHICH WILL CONSIST OF A CHAIRMAN (WHO WILL BE THE CHAIRMAN OF THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION) AND NOT LESS THAN 2 AND NOT MORE THAN 4 OTHER MEMBERS APPOINTED BY THE PRESIDENT ACTING ON THE ADVICE OF THE PRIME MINISTER. THE COMPOSITION OF THE COMMISSION MUST TAKE ACCOUNT OF THE NEED FOR IT TO RECEIVE THE ADVICE OF PROPERLY QUALIFIED AND EXPERIENCED PERSONS. THE FUNCTIONS OF THE DEFENCE FORECES SERVICE COMMISSION WILL BE TO CONSIDER GRIEVANCES BY MEMBERS OF THE DEFENCE FORCES, TO CONSIDER AND, IF IT DEEMS FIT, TO CONFIRM ANY PROPOSAL TO DISMISS A MEMBER WHO HAS HAD MORE THAN 2 YEARS' SERVICE, TO MAKE REGULATIONS FOR THE GENERAL WELL-BEING AND GOOD ADMINISTRATION OF THE DEFENCE FORCES AND THE MAINTENANCE THEREOF IN A HIGH STATE OF EFFICIENCY. THE PRESIDENT, ACTING ON THE ADVICE OF THE PRIME MINISTER MAY GIVE THE COMMANDER AND THE COMMISSION SIMILAR DIRECTIONS TO THOSE REFERRED TO IN PARAGRAPH 3 OF HEAD D (III).

## H. FINANCE

1. THERE WILL BE ONE CONSOLIDATED REVENUE FUND INTO WHICH ALL REVENUES SHALL BE PAID UNLESS A LAW PROVIDES FOR THE PAYMENT OF ANY SUCH REVENUES INTO ANOTHER FUND OR THAT THEY BE RETAINED FOR THE DEFRAYING OF EXPENSES. ALL WITHDRAWALS FROM THE CONSOLIDATED REVENUE FUND WILL HAVE TO BE AUTHORISED BY OR UNDER AN ACT OF PARLIAMENT.

2. THERE WILL BE A CONTROLLER AND AUDITOR-GENERAL WHO WILL BE APPOINTED BY THE PRESIDENT ON THE RECOMMENDATION OF THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION. HIS FUNCTIONS WILL BE TO AUDIT AND REPORT ON THE ACCOUNTS OF THE STATE AND HIS REPORTS WILL BE LAID BEFORE THE HOUSE OF ASSEMBLY. THE TENURE OF OFFICE OF THE CONTROLLER AND AUDITOR-GENERAL WILL BE PROTECTED.

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## 3. PENSION RIGHTS OF PUBLIC OFFICERS

THE PENSION RIGHTS OF PUBLIC OFFICERS AND FORMER PUBLIC OFFICERS AND OF THEIR DEPENDANTS WILL BE PROTECTED UNDER THE CONSTITUTION. IN ADDITION, A SCHEME WILL BE INTRODUCED TO ENCOURAGE OFFICERS OF THE PUBLIC SERVICE AND MEMBERS OF THE POLICE FORCE, ARMY, AIR FORCE OR PRISON SERVICE WHO WERE IN OFFICE PRIOR TO 1 OCTOBER 1978 TO CONTINUE TO SERVE ON AND AFTER A SPECIFIED DATE.

## 1. OMBUDSMAN

1. THERE WILL BE AN OMBUDSMAN WHO WILL BE APPOINTED BY THE PRESIDENT ON THE ADVICE OF THE JUDICIAL SERVICE COMMISSION. HIS DUTY WILL BE TO INVESTIGATE COMPLAINTS AGAINST ACTIONS TAKEN BY EMPLOYEES OF THE GOVERNMENT OR OF A LOCAL AUTHORITY OR, IF A LAW SO REQUIRES, OF ANY OTHER AUTHORITY.

CARRINGTON

## FILES

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(MR FREELAND)  
(MR FIFOOT)  
ECON D

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PS  
PS/SIR I GILMOUR  
PS/MR LUCE  
PS/MR RIDLEY  
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MISS BROWN  
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RHODESIA POLICY

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FROM THE PRIVATE SECRETARY



HOUSE OF LORDS,  
SW1A 0PW

Your ref FCS/79/148

12 September 1979

Dear Paul,

WRAN

Paul 14/9

Southern Rhodesia : Independence Bill

The Lord Chancellor has seen the Foreign Secretary's minute of 7 September. He has commented as follows:-

"The Bill should be careful to avoid the painful anomaly of dual citizenship which landed us in such trouble with Ugandan Asians. Dual citizenship should be avoided. But subjects who wish to leave Rhodesia should have to opt within a limited period".

I am copying this minute to the Private Secretaries to the Prime Minister, the Lord President, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, the Home Secretary, the Attorney-General, the Chief Whip, the First Parliamentary Counsel and to Sir John Hunt.

Yours sincerely,  
William Arnold.

W ARNOLD

Private Secretary to the  
Secretary of State for Foreign and  
Commonwealth Affairs

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Subject file  
Nyerere Visit  
Tanzania Aug 79.

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

12 September 1979

Dear Michael,

Rhodesia: Constitutional Conference

This letter follows Lord Carrington's minute PM/79/74 in which he set out our approach to the Constitutional Conference.

Lord Carrington made clear in his opening speech that we regard it as essential in the Conference to seek a measure of agreement first on the general outline of the independence Constitution, before going on to tackle the pre-independence arrangements. In his opening statement, Bishop Muzorewa made a strong defence of the existing constitutional arrangements, but implied that he was prepared to discuss our outline proposals. The Patriotic Front, as expected, sought to evade discussion of the main elements of the constitution and to insist on prior agreement on the pre-independence arrangements.

We have now managed to get over the initial procedural hurdle and have moved to item one of our agenda: "The Independence Constitution". In an attempt to focus discussion on this item we have tabled our fuller constitutional proposals (Annex B to Lord Carrington's minute). The Prime Minister's meeting with Nyerere will therefore come at a most important stage. We have to continue to urge the Commonwealth African Presidents to persuade the Patriotic Front to negotiate seriously on the Constitution. This is a necessary preliminary to being able to demonstrate to them and to a wider audience that, if the Patriotic Front will not co-operate, the responsibility for failure to reach agreement will lie with them.

It will be important to enlist Nyerere's support for our constitutional proposals. In doing so it will be necessary to make clear to him that we regard it as indispensable to an agreement that, for a limited period, there should be a reasonable proportion of white representatives in the House of Assembly elected by the white community. The proportion should not exceed 20% and must fall short of the minority required to block constitutional amendment or a wide range of legislation. This is the point of principle at issue for us.

In order to enlist Nyerere's support - if we can obtain it - for constitutional proposals on these lines it will be important to convince him that we are prepared to deal satisfactorily with the pre-independence arrangements. In discussion with him, and in our subsequent contacts with the other African Presidents, we must make it clear that we are prepared to accept the implications of the call

/in the

M O'D B Alexander Esq  
10 Downing Street

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in the Lusaka communique for "free and fair elections properly supervised under the authority of the British Government". It will then be up to the Presidents to ascertain whether the Patriotic Front are prepared to put their political standing to the test in elections in which they would have a fair - but no more than that - chance of winning.

/ The brief which I enclose with this minute is designed to achieve that objective. The Prime Minister could start from the position that we wish to enlist Nyerere's help in ensuring that the Patriotic Front continue (if they have so started) or begin (if they have not) to engage in serious discussion of our fuller constitutional proposals. If President Nyerere attempts to defend the Patriotic Front's initial attempt to stall on the independence Constitution until the "transfer of power" had been discussed, it will be necessary to tell him that - so far as the British Government is concerned - the question of to whom power is to be transferred must be settled by the people of Rhodesia in free elections, supervised under our authority. We should obviously do so in terms designed to reassure him that we recognise that there are real issues to be settled in this connection, when the time comes to deal with them.

/ Exactly how far it would be prudent to go in discussing the pre-independence arrangements with Nyerere is a matter for careful consideration. I am enclosing, in addition to the brief for the meeting, background papers which illustrate the kind of military and administrative arrangements for the transition which might need to be discussed in the unlikely event of an agreement on an independence constitution and of an expression of willingness by the Patriotic Front to take part in elections without a dominant position in advance. As these papers show, such a situation would pose many difficult problems, of which the difficulty of making military arrangements in these circumstances would be the worst, and quite possibly insuperable. But, as preparation for a talk with Nyerere, the Prime Minister may wish to have these problems in mind because he will expect us to have thought about them, and may himself mention them. He may, for example, ask whether we are prepared to contemplate a return to legality - which could involve the appointment of a British Commissioner - and the introduction of a Commonwealth, or some other neutral, force in the period before elections are held.

We have not yet discussed any such ideas with Bishop Muzorewa. There is a risk that what is said to Nyerere in this connection will be relayed to Muzorewa and misunderstood by him. In talking to Nyerere this consideration should be balanced against the need to convince him of our readiness to accept the implications of the Lusaka agreement, and to make the Patriotic Front in due course a fair offer on the electoral process. The Prime Minister will probably not wish to go further than is suggested in paragraphs 12 and 13

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of the notes for the meeting. On one point we must stand absolutely firm with Nyerere - that in our Conference there can be no discussion with the parties of the pre-independence arrangements until agreement has been reached on the independence constitution and on the principle of free and fair elections, properly supervised under our authority.

These papers are intended to provide a basis for the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary's meeting with the Prime Minister at 5.30 pm tomorrow, to discuss the handling of the working dinner with President Nyerere. As I explained to you, the papers have been written in the light of Lord Carrington's comments on a previous draft, but have not yet been seen by him in their present form.

*yours etc*

*Roderic Lyne*

(R M J Lyne)  
Private Secretary

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CONTINGENCY PAPER

## RHODESIA : PRE-INDEPENDENCE ARRANGEMENTS

## MILITARY ASPECTS

1. The military arrangements for the transition (organisation of a ceasefire and the separation or amalgamation of the armed forces) are a matter for negotiation with the parties. We shall wish to maintain for as long as possible that this question can only be constructively discussed once there has been (a) an agreement on the main lines of the independence constitution and (b) acceptance that, as agreed at Lusaka, elections must be held under the British Government's authority. We should insist that the military problem can in our view be resolved provided the political will to reach a settlement has been demonstrated by agreement on the independence constitution and that new elections would be held under our supervision. We should indicate that we would then arrange talks between the military leaders on either side, under our chairmanship. But at some stage, as an earnest indication of our good faith and in order to keep the Patriotic Front in baulk, we may find it tactically necessary to give a fuller indication of what sort of military arrangements we believe to be practicable and desirable, in terms which will be as reassuring as possible both to the Salisbury parties and to the Commonwealth.

2. We should have to determine our position in the light of the following considerations:-

(a) The Government does not accept that the future Zimbabwe National Army should be "based on the liberation forces".

(b) No proposal involving the dismantling either of the Rhodesian security forces or of the guerrilla forces during the transition

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is going to be credible or acceptable;

(c) It is perfectly reasonable to argue that, in the context of all-party agreement on an independence constitution and on the arrangements for an election, decisions about the post-independence composition of the country's security forces can and should be left for the new government to take after independence. Even leading members of the Patriotic Front have shown themselves disposed to accept this in private discussion, and General Walls himself has spoken of the eventual integration of the forces if there is a political agreement.

(d) Credible proposals for the inception and maintenance of a ceasefire are an essential prerequisite for the holding of free and fair elections in which all parties are taking part (it is self-evident that there cannot be a "free and fair" election if the parties involved in it are still fighting each other).

3. In the circumstances prevailing in Rhodesia, the first conclusion which these considerations point to is that there must be an agreement on the separation of the forces if there is to be a chance of an effective ceasefire. This will be difficult to achieve, for the following reasons:-

(a) The armed forces of both sides are indigenous to and, wholly in the case of the security forces and partly in the case of the Patriotic Front, already established in the national territory. There is no prospect of agreement on the basis

/of



of withdrawing the Patriotic Front forces to bases outside the country during the transition.

(b) On the other hand, the armed forces on both sides are in varying degrees intermingled throughout the country and there is no obvious basis for an agreed division of territory between them (or even between the two wings of the Patriotic Front). The internal parties will be deeply suspicious of any proposals for the "concentration" of Patriotic Front forces within Rhodesia.

(c) There is a contingent need for the civil power during the transition (however it may be constituted) to be able to call on military assistance for the police in the maintenance of law and order (the Anglo-American Proposals envisaged that this would in the last resort be provided by the United Nations Zimbabwe Force). There are obvious objections to the security forces providing aid to the civil power, and there would be great reluctance on the part of any outside force to become involved in this role.

In stating our position we do not have to anticipate the full answers to these or any other problems. But we must be able to demonstrate that we have taken them into account and to indicate the broad lines on which we think solutions can be achieved, given the necessary degree of co-operation by the parties.

4. Any statement we make must also take adequate account of the position of the Rhodesian police. The Patriotic Front will argue not only that the police have become identified with the interests of the Salisbury parties in the course of the exercise of their ordinary duties in law enforcement, but that, through the Police Anti-Terrorist Units and in other ways, they have taken an active part

/in

in the war against them and must therefore be neutralised to the same degree (though not necessarily in the same way) as the rest of the security forces. This argument is largely non-negotiable. There can be no question of accepting that the existing police should be replaced or dominated by Patriotic Front "police" during the transition, nor is it realistic to think in terms of replacing the police by some force from outside. We should insist, if we are prepared to take responsibility for the administration of Rhodesia during the transition, that it will be sufficient for the police to act under British authority, with a new Police Commissioner in command. But we might concede the principle of monitoring police activities in that case by the parties (including the Patriotic Front).

5. Under the Anglo-American Proposals, the enforcement of a ceasefire would have been the responsibility of a UN force. It can reasonably be argued that, in the absence of such a force, this task could not be assumed by the police. Their impartiality is too much open to attack; and they do not have the necessary capacity. Supervision of the ceasefire must in any case start with some form of machinery for military liaison between the commanders on both sides and for settling disputes about alleged infringements. In addition, to police the agreement on the ground we may, since we have ruled out the use of British troops, have to seek support for the idea of a Commonwealth force (which could also, in the last resort, be available for "aid to the civil power" in emergency). This force would have to be modest in size, and its composition would have to be acceptable to both sides (suitable contributors might include Kenya, Australia, Canada and India). But, once again, we should not have to assume Commonwealth participation. It would be sufficient, as a first step, to announce our willingness in principle to accept it if it were feasible and acceptable to the parties.

6. Finally, it should be borne in mind that any detailed statement we make on the pre-independence military arrangements should have an essentially tactical purpose. The chances of achieving all-party agreement on an independence constitution and on the administration of the transition are remote. But as part of demonstrating the seriousness of our intention to reach such an agreement, we must be prepared eventually to show that we are ready to engage in serious discussion of the military aspects

/and



and to seek to demonstrate the intransigence of the Patriotic Front in this respect also.

7. In the light of all these considerations, it is suggested that an eventual statement on the military arrangements might include the following elements:-

(a) The British Government has stated separately its readiness to exercise its constitutional responsibility to ensure that there is a free and fair election on the basis of a new independence constitution for Rhodesia;

(b) Such an election cannot, however, take place unless there has been prior agreement between the parties on the terms of a ceasefire. The British Government will be prepared to take the lead in bringing together military representatives from both sides to discuss the terms of such an agreement and the machinery for enforcing it;

(c) The precise terms of a ceasefire agreement will be for negotiation between the parties. But the British Government believes it will be reasonable to base them on the assumption that there will be a separation between the respective forces, a cessation of hostilities on both sides, and a concentration of the forces in areas to be designated by mutual agreement;

(d) The British Government consider that decisions on the future composition of the armed forces of Zimbabwe should be a matter for the Government to be elected on the basis of the independence constitution. Unless otherwise agreed by the parties, it is therefore envisaged that no action will be taken before independence which will prejudice in this respect the freedom of action of the future government.;

(e) The means for enforcing the ceasefire and for resolving disputes about its observance will be for agreement between the parties. But the British Government consider that it would be appropriate for the two sides to establish machinery for this purpose, on which they would both be appropriately represented and which would operate under the duly constituted civil authority.

8. These elements could also be reflected in private discussions before we get to the stage of making a formal announcement. In that context only we might with suitable interlocutors indicate willingness to consider a further element:-

(f) the British Government consider that the civil police force, acting under its authority, should be responsible for the maintenance of law and order during the elections. But, if, in addition, the parties consider that it would be helpful to arrange for an external and impartial military presence to be established for the purpose of helping to supervise the maintenance of the ceasefire, the British Government would be prepared to seek the assistance of Commonwealth countries to provide such a presence.



CONTINGENCY PAPER

## PRE-INDEPENDENCE ARRANGEMENTS IN THE EVENT OF AN ALL-PARTY AGREEMENT

## ADMINISTRATIVE ASPECTS

1. At a minimum, if there is agreement on an independence constitution and the Patriotic Front have expressed willingness to participate in elections without a dominant position in advance, we shall have to offer to provide a British Election Commissioner with terms of reference, and the necessary supporting staff, to enable him to supervise the electoral process down to whatever level is necessary to satisfy the parties, and the Commonwealth, that we are carrying out faithfully the terms of the Lusaka agreement

At the same time we should have to insist that the parties should have equal access to the Rhodesia press, radio and television and to have freedom in other respects to conduct an electoral campaign on the terms which would be acceptable in a normal democratic society.

2. The Patriotic Front will, however, argue that they cannot be expected to participate in new elections with a fair chance of success - even if they are held under British supervision, with Commonwealth observers - if Bishop Muzorewa remains in charge of the administration. They will not accept that he should be able to campaign as "Prime Minister". The Front Line Presidents are also likely to argue, with wide Commonwealth and other support, that it is impossible to speak of elections "properly supervised under British Government authority" if the "authority" constituting the Government of the country is still the "illegal" regime. However meticulously we propose to supervise the electoral process itself, they may claim that this is of little significance so long as the machinery of law and order remains in the hands of what is, in effect, one side in the election. Even if we were to offer (and Salisbury were to accept) a degree of British control of the police,

/there



there would be questions about how we could effectively do this in a British colony which is technically still in a state of rebellion against the Crown, and we should be asked how we could resolve the conflict which might result between the allegiance of the police to the de facto government and the authority which we were purporting to exercise over them.

3 There are in theory several ways in which these problems might be resolved, e.g.:-

(a) the country could remain in a state of technical illegality, but the parties could detach themselves from the administration during the election. But even if this were technically feasible, it would probably satisfy no one.

The Patriotic Front would argue that the civil service were not impartial. The Salisbury parties would say that they were being asked to abandon normal political institutions. The Front Line would say that the problem of the country's legal status and of "authority" during the election had not been satisfactorily resolved;



(b) with or without a return to legality, the government could be taken over by an interim caretaker administration representing both the Salisbury parties and the Patriotic Front. But neither side has ever been prepared in the past to agree on parity in a transitional governing council, or on the allocation of responsibilities within it;

(c) The third alternative is a temporary return to dependent status under an administration established by the British Government.

4. The advantages of the third course are that:-

(a) it would enable sanctions to be suspended forthwith;

(b) existing statutory powers under the Southern Rhodesia Act 1965 could be used to legalise an interim administration by a statutory instrument modifying the 1961 constitution and providing for the appointment of a British Governor or Resident Commissioner, with the necessary supporting staff;

(c) the Commonwealth would find it difficult to argue that in these circumstances elections were not being supervised under British Government authority in the fullest sense of the words.

5. The electoral arrangements would in these circumstances be the responsibility of the Resident Commissioner.

His instructions from HMG would emphasise that his paramount task is to create and maintain the conditions for a

/free

free and fair election, that all his activities should be subordinated to this aim, and that in all other respects he should maintain the administration of the country on a caretaker basis, working as far as possible through the existing public services and police force.

6 The assumption by Britain of a direct role in the administration of Rhodesia would of course have unwelcome implications (though it would not necessarily cost more than establishing a British Election Commissioner and supporting staff). But by definition this could only happen in the context of an all-party agreement on a cease-fire (the necessary military arrangements for this are discussed in a separate paper) and with the support of neighbouring states. We should resist pressure for a prolonged transition, taking the line that our role would be confined to providing the conditions for the parties to compete in a free and fair election and that in these circumstances it need not last for more than three months at the outside. There would be Rhodesian opposition to a return to legality on these terms. But it would have the attraction for them of offering the prospect of an immediate suspension of sanctions and an end to the war, if the Patriotic Front accepted it.

7 The essential purpose of such an offer will be political. Our objective will be to draw the Patriotic Front into a reassertion of their claims to dominate the transitional administration, and, in particular, the maintenance of law and order during an election. But we shall find it difficult to detach international support from them unless they are seen to be refusing to cooperate in an offer of reasonable terms for transition to independence. Our starting point might be to say that, in the context of agreement on an independence constitution and on the holding of free and fair elections, we should be very ready to cooperate with any proposals which the parties might then be able to agree for a genuinely impartial administration during the transition to

independence. The ideal solution would no doubt be for them to agree on constituting such an administration themselves. But, we could go on to say, this seemed an unlikely prospect - and we were therefore prepared, if necessary, to assume responsibility for the administration ourselves and to leave the parties free to conduct their respective election campaigns on a footing of strict equality.

8 We should then be in a strong position to argue to our friends in the international community that we had made the fairest possible offer in the circumstances to carry out to the letter the understandings reached at Lusaka and could not be blamed if the Patriotic Front failed to accept it. Thereafter, we could regard ourselves as free to reach an agreement on the transitional arrangements with the internal parties in different terms - i e to permit them to carry on the administration, including the administration of the election or of a referendum, but to that extent and to that extent only, under the supervision of a British Election or Referendum Commission acting under the authority of the British Government.

#### CONCLUSION

9 There would be considerable political advantage if we were prepared to indicate in private discussion (and eventually to announce publicly) that we were prepared to include the following elements in the pre-independence arrangements for implementing an all-party agreement on the independence constitution and on the holding of free and fair elections:-

- (a) Provision of a British Electoral Commissioner with sufficient staff to enable him to supervise all aspects of the electoral process in detail;
- (b) An undertaking that the police would act under British supervision; and
- (c) If the parties are unable to agree on the constitution of an interim administration in which both sides will be represented, a temporary return to legal dependent status under a British Resident Commissioner.



10 DOWNING STREET

Prime Minister

I assume that you will  
wish to acknowledge receipt  
of Mr Amen's letter even  
tho' it is only a side  
copy.

Amn.  
- 14/5

and

COPY

From Julian Henry Prime Minister  
has seen (2)

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R) 11 September 1979

I am just back from Bucharest and will send you an account of our visit shortly. But you may like to know at once of what President Ceausescu had to say about Rhodesia. As you will know he was in Central Africa himself earlier in the year and received Nkomo and Mugabe in Bucharest during August. Nujoma has also been a recent visitor to Romania.

We saw the President yesterday and raised the threat which Soviet intervention in Southern Africa presented to vital British and Western and Japanese interests. This in the context of access to essential raw materials. Ceausescu replied in general terms to the effect that we had made the mistake of backing "reactionary forces" in the area which in any case were doomed and that our support of Zambia and Tanzania had been wholly inadequate. He hoped, however, that the London Conference would arrive at a settlement leading to the formulation of a government in which the Patriotic Front and Bishop Muzorewa would both take part. He recognised the contribution the Whites should make to Rhodesia but thought they should play no political role. This he believed was the view of both Patriotic Front leaders.

At the end of our general talk Ceausescu kept me back alone for a tete-a-tete with only his interpreter present. At this he reverted to Rhodesia and made the following points:

1. He claimed that Mugabe drew most of his support from Romania, Yugoslavia, and China. The Soviets were very suspicious of him because he was a genuinely independent Nationalist. By contrast Nkomo's links with the Soviets were much closer.
2. He believed that Mugabe (and perhaps Nkomo) would agree to work with Muzorewa and other Black leaders. He himself hoped that Mugabe would become the Prime Minister. He seemed not to envisage any European Ministers.
3. He thought the crucial issue would be the control of the security forces. He did not think that the Patriotic Front would demand the total disbandment of the Rhodesian Army, but thought there would have to be a fairly thorough purge by the White Officer Corps. It would also be necessary to amalgamate the existing security forces with the Patriotic Front forces. All this would be difficult but unless achieved on terms acceptable to the Patriotic Front there would be no settlement.
4. If no settlement was achieved, the fighting would undoubtedly escalate and in the process Zambia and Tanzania would turn increasingly to the Soviet Union for help. He had no doubt himself that at the end of the day the Patriotic Front would win but that it might take a long time and in the process increase the growing danger to world peace.
5. He envisaged a similar solution to the Namibia problem with SWAPO taking a leading part in the new Namibian Government. If such a settlement were reached, he was confident that President Neto would and would send the Cubans home.

I did not try to argue with him to any extent. It is clearly his thesis that the best chance of keeping Rhodesia and Namibia out of total Soviet control lies in supporting the Patriotic Front and SWAPO. Any other approach would be difficult to reconcile with his own public position and could embroil him, unnecessarily, with the Soviet Union. He also seemed to think it was the direction in which we are moving anyway!

In an earlier conversation the deputy Foreign Minister, Gliga, said that the Patriotic Front had seemed to the Romanians very divided. He personally doubted whether the problem could be settled except through fighting.

Ceausescu is not, of course, an authority on Africa but he may have the confidence of the Patriotic Front leaders, or at least Mugabe, and which he said to me probably reflects the flavour of his talks with them. On the other hand he may, simply, have been trying through me, to influence your thinking on their behalf.

I see little for our comfort in all this but said I would convey his views, and he devoted a lot of time to them, to you and to the Prime Minister to whom I am copying this letter.

The head (copy) to  
Foreign Office

11 SEP 1973

SECRET





This is a copy of the original document. The text is extremely faint and illegible. It appears to be a multi-paragraph document, possibly a report or a letter, but the specific content cannot be discerned.



11 SEP 1979

CONFIDENTIAL

Original on  
Tanzania: Aug 1979

RECORD OF THE PRIME MINISTER'S DISCUSSION WITH PRESIDENT NYERERE  
OVER A WORKING DINNER AT 10 DOWNING STREET ON 14 SEPTEMBER 1979  
AT 2030

<u>Present:</u> Prime Minister	President Nyerere
Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary	Mr. Benjamin Mkapa (Minister for Foreign Affairs)
Lord Harlech	H.E. Mr. Amon Nsekela (Tanzanian High Commissioner in London)
Sir Antony Duff	Captain Joseph Butiku (Private Secretary)
Sir Peter Preston	
H.E. Sir Peter Moon	
Mr. M.O'D.B. Alexander	

Constitutional Conference

President Nyerere said that so far as he could judge the Constitutional Conference had so far gone well. A good atmosphere had been established and this was important. It would be important not to push the participants too hard. He was confident that progress could be made. It was unlikely that the Conference would break down on the question of the constitution. In particular it would be surprising if the Patriotic Front were to try to break on this issue. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary asked whether the Patriotic Front might not find the concept of reserved seats for the white population unacceptable. President Nyerere said he did not see a major difficulty here. The Patriotic Front wanted a settlement and knew that, while they might be tempted to ignore Bishop Muzorewa, they could not ignore Mr. Smith. President Nyerere commented that the original Tanzanian constitution had not accorded the President all the powers he needed: this had not prevented him from changing the constitution subsequently. (The implication that the Patriotic Front could change the constitution if and when they came to power was clear.)

Interim Arrangements

President Nyerere said that in his judgement the Conference would have to take up the question of the interim arrangements at an early stage. If he were leading the Patriotic Front delegation he would be saying that the constitution could be discussed by

/the lawyers

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the lawyers while the main Conference got down to discussing the transitional period. He asked what Lord Carrington had in mind. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary said that he was conscious that the negotiations in Geneva had broken down on the question of transitional arrangements and that it would be important to try to keep the arrangements as simple as possible. The Prime Minister said that there would have to be a ceasefire and the armed forces in the field would have to return to their barracks. It had been agreed in Lusaka that the bullet was going to be exchanged for the ballot and that HMG should concentrate on the arrangements for the election. It would be the responsibility of the military commanders to get their soldiers into barracks before the election campaign began. It would be the responsibility of the victor in the election to weld the existing armies into a single national force.

President Nyerere rejected this approach. If HMG wanted a peaceful Zimbabwe the problem of the three armies had to be solved now. If the participants in the Conference wanted a free and fair election the armies would have to be merged before that election. This was a condition for a peaceful transition. If they were not prepared to accept the merging of the armies it could only be because they were not prepared to accept the results of the election. The men who controlled the armies were at present in London and there was no need to postpone tackling the issue. If HMG allowed the discussion to be postponed it would mean that they were only trying to get out of the situation and that they were prepared to condemn the country to civil war. If HMG and the Zimbabweans agreed to proceed to independence with three armies in the field, he would not seek to interfere. But, equally, he would not back the settlement. He would not support any arrangement that guaranteed a civil war and he had no interest in postponing the civil war. He would rather that it took place now.

Sir Antony Duff said that it would be impossible to achieve agreement now on the creation of a single army. It might be possible to move to discussion of a merger once agreement had been reached on the constitution and other aspects of the interim arrangements but the negotiation was certain to be difficult and prolonged. A lengthy pause between agreement

on the constitution and the holding of an election would be extremely dangerous. Analysing President Nyerere's fears about the implications of the continued existence of three armies after an election, Sir Antony Duff pointed out that the newly elected government would be basing the national force either on the forces at present based in Salisbury or on those at present opposing them. In the first case, the loyalty of the present defence force was assured. The Patriotic Front would have to decide to allow their forces to be merged and presumably, an election having been held and they having lost, they would be deprived of the support of the Front Line States. It would be impossible for them to continue the struggle. In the second case, the national force would be based on the Patriotic Front's own soldiers. Some of the forces of Bishop Muzorewa's administration would adhere and many would leave the country. Again, it would be impossible for them to continue fighting. President Nyerere asked about the South African reaction to the defeat of Bishop Muzorewa's administration in an election. Would they not back Bishop Muzorewa and Mr. Smith in continuing the struggle? The Prime Minister said that the South African reaction would be irrelevant because many of the whites would, in any case, leave Zimbabwe. Sir Antony Duff said that the risk of continuing civil war after an election, described by President Nyerere, existed but was not a large one. President Nyerere said that he was not prepared to accept it.

The Prime Minister asked whether it was realistic to suppose that in the aftermath of an election the losers would be able to continue the struggle. The pressure of world opinion would be intense. She asked President Nyerere whether he would continue to support the Patriotic Front, supposing they lost the election, against a democratic constitution and an elected government negotiated in accordance with the Lusaka agreement. President Nyerere said that if he was not put in a position to tell the Patriotic Front to disband/<sup>their forces</sup> before the election he would not be able to do so after an election. Sir Antony Duff asked whether, in the event that an effort was made to secure the merger of the armies before an election and failed, President Nyerere would be prepared to back whatever other agreements might be reached at the Constitutional Conference. President Nyerere said that if a serious effort to create a single army were made and failed the

question then would be whether HMG were prepared to put in a military force or to organise a Commonwealth force. If they were not prepared to do this, the Conference was a waste of time. The Prime Minister asked if President Nyerere thought it would be helpful to introduce a fourth army into Zimbabwe where it would simply become bogged down in guerilla warfare. President Nyerere did not respond. The Prime Minister asked what proportion of the Patriotic Front's forces would be prepared to go on fighting once a constitution had been agreed and the arrangements for an election were in train. Mr. Mkapa said that if no agreement on a merger had been reached, he would expect the Patriotic Front's commanders to ensure that their men remained in the field. So long as the various armies were in being a genuine election campaign would be impossible.

President Nyerere said that if his government were satisfied that HMG were implementing the Lusaka agreement in full, they would not back the Patriotic Front in rejecting it. They would if necessary ask forcefully why the Patriotic Front wished to keep their army in being. They were already telling SWAPO that they could not use their troops in Angola and Namibia to reject the results of an election in Namibia. They were telling ZANU and ZAPU the same. But who was telling Smith? If HMG were not prepared to pursue the issue, they were, he repeated, wasting their time at the Constitutional Conference. One had only to think of what Mr. Sithole would have done earlier this year if he had had an army behind him. If a civil war broke out following agreement on a constitution, the United Kingdom would not be involved but Tanzania would. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary said that President Nyerere's approach to the problem represented by the three armies was logical but, in his judgement, impracticable. He considered that HMG's approach was the right one and that the President's fears were misplaced.

The Prime Minister asked whether, if General Walls were prepared to say before an election that he would accept the government resulting from that election whatever its complexion, the military commanders of ZANLA and ZIPRA would be prepared to do the same. President Nyerere, while not replying directly to the Prime Minister's question, said that it would be important to

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FILE

VLS



10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

14 September 1979

I am writing to thank you for your letter of 3 September to the Prime Minister. She has noted the contents of the enclosure to your letter with interest.

M. O'D. B. ALEXANDER

Professor John Hutchinson

*tw*

CONFIDENTIAL



Treasury Chambers, Parliament Street, SW1P 3AG  
01-233 3000

14 September 1979

*NRPA*

*Dr Peter*

*Pauls*  
*14/9*

SOUTHERN RHODESIA : INDEPENDENCE BILL

Thank you for sending me a copy of your minute of 7th September to Norman St. John-Stevas.

I agree that we should have a draft Bill ready to bring forward quickly. I very much hope that the draft will include an obligation for an independent Zimbabwe to undertake responsibility for servicing pre-UDI debts. If, however, the negotiations develop in such a way as to prevent us from including this provision in the final Bill then - as I think you are suggesting - we should aim to secure agreement, before the Bill is enacted, on the terms of a subsequent Exchange of Notes.

I am copying this letter to the Prime Minister and the other recipients of your minute.

  
(GEOFFREY HOWE) 

The Rt. Hon. The Lord Carrington, KCMG, MC.

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14 SEP 1973



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FM PARIS 131405Z SEPTEMBER

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 580 OF 13 SEPTEMBER 1979

INFO ROUTINE PRETORIA UKMIS NEW YORK WASHINGTON UKMIS GENEVA  
LUANDA LUSAKA DAR ES SALAAM MAPUTO GABERONE BONN OTTAWA

*Prime Minister*

*ms*

*Am*  
- 15/9

MIPT

THE QUAI HAVE GIVEN US A FAIRLY FULL BRIEFING ON WHAT TRANSPIRED IN THE COURSE OF MR PIK BOTHA'S CALL ON M. FRANCOIS-PONCET ON 8 SEPTEMBER. THE TALKS LASTED TWO HOURS ; THREE QUARTERS OF THE TIME WAS DEVOTED TO DISCUSSION OF SOUTHERN AFRICAN MATTERS. (I HAVE REPORTED SEPARATELY ON THE PART OF THE TALKS WHICH WAS DEVOTED TO RUGBY).

NAMIBIA

2. M. FRANCOIS-PONCET HAD TAKEN THE INITIATIVE, SAYING THAT A POSSIBLE SOLUTION WAS EMERGING AND THAT GOODWILL WAS NEEDED FROM BOTH SIDES. HE REHEARSED THE ARGUMENTS FOR ACCEPTANCE OF A D M Z , RELATING THESE TO THE 1976 DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN THE SOUTH AFRICANS AND THE ANGOLANS. MR BOTHA RIPOSTED WITH A DIATRIBE AGAINST MR MCHENRY WHO, HE WAS CONVINCED, HAS BEEN LARGELY RESPONSIBLE FOR PARAGRAPHS 11 AND 12 OF THE U N SECRETARY GENERAL'S PROPOSALS. IF MCHENRY WERE INVOLVED IN NEGOTIATIONS, THERE WOULD BE SERIOUS DIFFICULTIES. THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT WOULD BE READY TO DISCUSS THE D M Z CONCEPT IN DETAIL, BUT ONLY WITH SOMEONE THEY COULD TRUST ; DR WALDHEIM SHOULD BE URGED TO DESPATCH GENERAL PHILIP FOR THIS PURPOSE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. SOUTH AFRICA HAD PROMISED INDEPENDENCE TO THE PEOPLE OF NAMIBIA BUT WOULD NOT BETRAY THE MODERATE PARTIES. THEY PUT THEIR STRATEGIC PREOCCUPATIONS BEFORE THE NEED FOR INTERNATIONAL ACCEPTANCE. M. FRANCOIS-PONCET REJOINED THAT THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT SEEMED TO OVER-STATE THE RISKS OF AN AGREEMENT TO WHICH S W A P O COULD SUBSCRIBE.

RHODESIA

3. MR BOTHA SAID THAT RHODESIA AND NEIGHBOURING COUNTRIES WERE ON THE POINT OF EXHAUSTION. SOUTH AFRICA HAD MADE GREAT EFFORTS TO

| MAINTAIN

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MAINTAIN THE RHODESIAN ECONOMY AND THUS TO ENCOURAGE THE WHITES TO STAY. HIS GOVERNMENT WERE FEARFUL THAT THESE EFFORTS COULD BE NULLIFIED AS A RESULT OF THE DECISIONS REACHED AT THE C H G M AT LUSAKA. HE PREDICTED THAT, IF DURING THE RHODESIA CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE BRITAIN COULD NOT BRING ABOUT A SETTLEMENT ACCEPTABLE TO THE WHITE MINORITY, THERE WOULD BE DISASTER : A WHITE EXODUS WOULD INEVITABLY BE FOLLOWED BY THE SETTING UP OF A CUBA/MARXIST DOMINATED REGIME.

4. SOUTH AFRICA'S BASIC CONDITIONS FOR A RHODESIAN SETTLEMENT WERE :

(I) THAT SANCTIONS SHOULD BE LIFTED BY NOVEMBER AT THE LATEST :

(II) THAT THERE SHOULD BE NO DILUTION OF THE EXISTING SECURITY FORCES :

(III) THAT CHANGES TO THE CONSTITUTION SHOULD NOT BE SUCH AS TO PROVOKE A WHITE EXODUS (THOUGH THE SOUTH AFRICANS WERE URGING MUZOREWA TO SHOW FLEXIBILITY IN THE MATTER OF CONSTITUTIONAAL AMENDMENT).

IF THESE CONDITIONS WERE NOT MET, SOUTH AFRICA WOULD LOOK SYMPATHETICALLY ON REQUESTS FROM MUZOREWA FOR FURTHER ASSISTANCE.

MR BOTHA STIGMATISED PRESENT BRITISH GOVERNMENT POLICY TOWARDS RHODESIA AS CONTRADICTORY.

5. M. FRANCOIS-PONCET SAID THAT RHODESIA WAS NOT A FRENCH RESPONSIBILITY. HE STRESSED HOWEVER THAT, IN HIS GOVERNMENT'S VIEW, CONDITIONS HAD NEVER BEEN MORE FAVOURABLE FOR A SETTLEMENT, GIVEN THE PRESSURES OPERATING ON THE PARTIES TO THE DISPUTE. SOUTH AFRICA SHOULD USE HER INFLUENCE WITH THE RHODESIAN REGIME IN THE DIRECTION OF CONCILIATION.

SOUTH AFRICA

6. MR BOTHA REHEARSED THE FAMILIAR THEME THAT SOUTH AFRICA WAS FACED WITH A MAJOR COMMUNIST THREAT, UNDER-ESTIMATED BY THE WESTERN POWERS. SHE WAS WORKING FOR A CONSTELLATION OF A NEO-MARXIST STATES IN THE REGION IN ORDER TO CONTAIN THIS THREAT THE SOUTH AFRICANS GOVERNMENT WERE PARTICULARLY WORRIED ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF DISINTEGRAION IN ZAMBIA.

Registry  
No.

DRAFT

Type 1 +

## SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

From

Top Secret.  
Secret.  
Confidential.  
Restricted.  
Unclassified.

To:-

Professor John Hutchinson  
c/o Institute of Directors  
Pall Mall  
London SW1Secretary of State  
Telephone No. Ext.

Department

## PRIVACY MARKING

..... In Confidence

bcc: No 10 ✓

Thank you for your recent letters, the first sending me your thoughts after your recent visit to Rhodesia and South Africa, the second some impressions you have gained from recent conversations here in London.

As I made clear in my opening address at the Constitutional Conference on 10 September, the British Government is determined to do everything in its power to bring the Conference to a successful conclusion. We are fully conscious of the difficulty of the problems involved, but our intention is to adopt a step-by-step approach. The first priority is to get agreement on the constitution. If that can be achieved, then we shall have to decide the way ahead in the light of that agreement. As I made clear in my opening statement, I am prepared that the conference should continue as long as necessary, but only provided that progress is being made, and I am conscious of the dangers that you allude to:

make an effort to secure commitments of the kind she had outlined. But once the commitments had been obtained, HMG would then have to ask why the commanders would not proceed forthwith to the creation of a single army. His test of the genuineness of any agreement would be the merger of the armies. The Prime Minister said that an undertaking from the military commanders would nonetheless be a very substantial step forward.

President Nyerere began the concluding part of the discussion by saying that he was sure that the Patriotic Front wanted a settlement. Long discussions with them in Lusaka and Havana had convinced him that they had come to London to do business. It would be essential now to maintain the momentum of the discussions and not to allow any of the participants to absent themselves from London. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary urged that President Nyerere should see the Patriotic Front while he was in London and press them to participate constructively in next week's discussion of the constitution. President Nyerere, having noted the importance of not allowing Bishop Muzorewa to get away with nothing more than agreement on the constitution, said that while he would tell the Patriotic Front of the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary's concern, he was not prepared to exert any pressure on them. The Prime Minister ended the discussion by saying that if things did not go well at the Conference she might well wish to get in touch again with the Presidents of the Front Line States.

The talk ended at 2230.

M. O'D. B. ALEXANDER

15 September 1979

500  
Private Secretary

Letter sent to

Prof Hutchinson : for  
Print

RHODESIA: LETTER FROM PROFESSOR HUTCHINSON

Professor Hutchinson has written two  
further letters to the Secretary of State,  
A the first transmitting some thoughts on the  
B Rhodesia problem, the second some impressions  
from conversations in London. I submit a  
brief, self-explanatory draft reply.

R D Wilkin

13 September 1979

R D Wilkin  
Rhodesia Department



Original in G/R

also

10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

13 September 1979

Thank you for your letter of 3 September about the case of two young Africans, Benhard and Leavit Katumba. Mr. Richard Luce is replying to the earlier letter about this to which you refer.

As a result of the Commonwealth Heads of Government meeting we now have a basis for progress towards an internationally acceptable settlement on Rhodesia. In accordance with the Lusaka understanding, we have summoned a Constitutional Conference which is being attended both by Bishop Muzorewa's administration and by the two wings of the Patriotic Front. We believe it is essential, if we are to make a success of this Conference, that we should be able to negotiate freely with all the parties to the conflict. Immunity from arrest has therefore been accorded to the principal participants on both sides, and we do not think it would be helpful in the circumstances to impose conditions on that immunity.

The only way to end the violence and suffering in Rhodesia is to bring the war there to an end. We are doing all we can to work for an internationally acceptable settlement that can restore Rhodesia to legality and peace.

(SGD) MARGARET THATCHER

Robert Hughes, Esq., MP.

3



10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

13 September 1979

Rhodesia: United National Federal  
Party

You wrote to me on 12 September enclosing the text of a letter from UNFP to the Prime Minister.

The Prime Minister agrees that the Foreign and Commonwealth Office should send Dr. Gabellah a short acknowledgement on her behalf.

M. O'D. B. ALEXANDER

R.M.J. Lyne, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

9.13



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

13 September 1979

(1)

Dear Michael,

Princ Amster

Agree text?

Amst  
13/5

Rhodesia: Constitutional Conference: Message  
from President of Liberia

In your letter of 11 September, you asked for a draft reply to a message of good wishes on the opening of the Constitutional Conference. The message is cast in general terms and raises no substantive points. I enclose a draft reply for the Prime Minister's consideration.

Yours ever


Roderic Lyne

R M J Lyne

M O'D B Alexander Esq  
10 Downing Street

Amst  
13/5





1951

File No. ....

Department RHODESIA

Drafted by (Block Capitals) C D POWELL

Tel. Extn. 233 4146

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[TEXT]

YOUR TELNO 108: MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT TOLBERT

1. Please pass the following reply from the Prime Minister to President Tolbert.

Begins. I was very glad to receive your message of good wishes, in the name of the Government and people of Liberia as well as of the OAU, for the successful outcome of the Constitutional Conference. As Lord Carrington said in his opening speech to the Conference on 10 September, the British Government is determined to do everything in its power to bring the Conference to a successful conclusion. We shall be seeking agreement on an independence constitution which provides for the full exercise of their rights by the majority, while at the same time giving the reassurance which members of the minority community need if they are to play a full and positive role in the future development of the country. It will also be our aim to bring about fair elections in which the parties can make their case to the people of Rhodesia, and the latter's verdict

Copies to:-

respected. I hope that the other participants will approach the Conference in the same spirit and with a genuine desire to achieve a fair and peaceful solution and that the Organisation of African Unity will lend its support to a settlement on this basis.

I take this opportunity to send you my warmest regards. Ends.

*A. J. ...*

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

● PART 6 ends:-

PM to Winton MP 11/9.

PART 7 begins:-

Amery MP to FCS 11/9

~~Ho to MA + end 12/9.~~

END

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February 2010