

PREM19

113

RHODESIA

(Situation in)

(October 11 - 31)

(Part 8)

PREM 19/113

PART 8 ends:-

F20 to Mod 31.10.79

PART 9 begins:-

Dar Es Salaam 856 1.11.79

Published Papers

The following published paper(s) enclosed on this file have been removed and destroyed. Copies may be found elsewhere in The National Archives.

1. House of Commons Hansard,

24 October 1979, columns 420-434

"Rhodesia"

2. Draft Bill: Southern Rhodesia

(constitution for Zimbabwe)

Published 26 October 1979

Signed AWayland Date 29 October 2009

PREM Records Team



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

Prime Minister

Lg. *Handwritten initials* 2/x

31 October 1979

Dear Brian,

Rhodesia: Constitutional Conference

As you will know, we have now reached a stage in the Rhodesia Constitutional Conference at which we have put forward a full description of the independence constitution which has been accepted by Bishop Muzorewa's delegation and by the Patriotic Front, subject to a satisfactory agreement on the arrangements for bringing it into effect.

Our objective now is to get both delegations to agree, in accordance with the declaration of the Commonwealth Heads of Government in Lusaka, that elections should be supervised under our authority. We have indicated that we envisage a brief return to legal dependent status for Rhodesia for the period of the elections. During this period legislative and executive authority would be vested in a British Governor, who would however operate to a very large extent through the existing authorities. I enclose a copy of the paper on the pre-independence arrangements which was circulated to the Conference on 22 October. Bishop Muzorewa indicated acceptance of these proposals on 27 October; the Patriotic Front are still questioning them.

Planning for the appointment of a British Governor is now being carried forward on a contingency basis. The Governor would be assisted by a small British staff, including a Political Adviser and a Police Adviser, candidates for which posts have now been identified and designated.

We have proposed that the Rhodesian security forces will be responsible to the Governor during the interim period. It will be an essential feature of this arrangement to make provision for the Governor to have a British Military Adviser for purposes of liaison with the Rhodesian forces, for the limited period necessary to enable an election campaign to be conducted. (We envisage that this would be no more than two months.) Our provisional conclusions are that a senior officer would be required for the post of Military Adviser. (The Rhodesian commanders, who are of Lieutenant-General rank, will attach importance to his not being senior to them.) The Adviser would need a supporting staff to assist him in carrying out his role; another senior officer would be required to act as Liaison Officer with the Rhodesian National Joint Operations Command (NJOC) and additional officers, perhaps a further 15 to 20, would have to act as liaison officers with the JOCs at local level in Rhodesia. In addition the Military Adviser would require some secretarial and clerical support.

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The general object of these arrangements would not be to interfere with or direct the operations of the Rhodesian security forces, who would be operating within whatever arrangements had been agreed for a ceasefire and who would in any case have agreed to cease to conduct operations outside Rhodesia for the duration of the interim period. But it will be desirable to demonstrate that the Governor has a means of exercising effective liaison with the security forces through his Military Adviser, in the event of a ceasefire and if the Patriotic Front agree to participate in elections under our supervision. In these circumstances, the Military Adviser would also need to maintain contact with the commanders of the Patriotic Front forces in relation to the ceasefire.

We shall be taking the line in the Conference that negotiations on military aspects of the interim cannot usefully start until there is agreement on the political aspects. But if the Patriotic Front continue in the negotiations, we shall need to be ready to demonstrate that we are prepared to make proposals for the inception and maintenance of a ceasefire which, whether or not they satisfy the Patriotic Front, will carry some conviction with wider international opinion and thus help to carry international support with us if we are obliged to bring Rhodesia to independence without Patriotic Front participation. Our consideration of this question so far suggests that some provision, however modest, for impartial monitoring of the ceasefire will be an essential feature of such a plan. I enclose a copy of a paper prepared in this Department which sets out the background to this question in more detail.

As you will see from this paper, General Walls, the Rhodesian Combined Operations Commander, is himself convinced that some provision for a monitoring group (ie in addition to the British Military Adviser and his assistants) will be a necessary feature of credible proposals for a ceasefire. Independently of this, the Australian Prime Minister has also indicated that his government 'would be ready to consider Australian involvement in tasks additional to election observation as part of a joint Commonwealth effort', and we should like to pursue this offer with him. But General Walls would prefer any monitoring group to be under British auspices. The role of such a group would be essentially to observe the way in which the ceasefire was maintained and to report to the Ceasefire Commission. In no circumstances would it conduct peace-keeping operations or intervene between the opposing forces.

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In the light of all these considerations, Lord Carrington would be grateful if Mr Pym would be prepared to authorise the Ministry of Defence to take the following action:-

- (a) to make proposals for the appointment of a Military Adviser and supporting military staff to assist the Governor of Rhodesia during the pre-independence period; and
- (b) to undertake a study of what would be required in order to establish a Monitoring Group, on the lines suggested in the enclosed papers, on the assumption that the Australians and possibly a few other Commonwealth countries not committed to support the Patriotic Front might participate in it.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Michael Alexander (No 10).

yours ever
Roderic Lyne

(R M J Lyne)
Private Secretary

B M Norbury Esq
Private Secretary
Ministry of Defence
Main Building
Whitehall
LONDON

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ARRANGEMENTS FOR IMPLEMENTING THE INDEPENDENCE CONSTITUTION

1. The British Government puts forward the following proposals for implementing the Independence Constitution.
2. The Independence Constitution ensures that the future government will have the power to carry out the policies on the basis of which it is elected, and that the services of the State will be at its disposal in doing so.
3. The elected government will be chosen by the people in fair elections, in which all the parties will be free to participate. Until it takes office, nothing should be done which prejudices or pre-empts the freedom of choice of the people of Zimbabwe.
4. The election of the House of Assembly, which is the first step in the implementation of the Independence Constitution, will take place under the following conditions:
 - a. the administration of the election will be scrupulously fair and impartial as between all the political parties;
 - b. peaceful political activity will be freely conducted by all the parties to the election; and
 - c. all the parties will have free and uncensored access to all the public media.
5. It will be the constitutional responsibility of the British Government, as recognised in the Lusaka communiqué, to ensure that these requirements are met.
6. To fulfil this responsibility the British Government are prepared to appoint a Governor, who will be British. The Governor would have executive and legislative authority. All political leaders will commit themselves to the election campaign.

7. To supervise the elections, there will be an Election Commissioner, with supporting staff, appointed by the British Government. His task will be to supervise all aspects of the organisation and conduct of the elections.
8. Commonwealth observers will be present to witness the elections.
9. To enable the parties to satisfy themselves that the elections are fair and impartial, there will be an Election Council. The Council will be chaired by the Election Commissioner and parties taking part in the election will be represented on it. The Council and its individual members will be able to make representations to the Commissioner and to the Governor on any matter concerning the elections.
10. The Governor's instructions will require him to do all things necessary to secure compliance with the conditions for free and fair elections. The Commanders of the security forces will be responsible to him.
11. The Governor will assume authority over the civil police. They will be responsible, under his supervision, for the maintenance of law and order.
12. There will be agreement between the opposing forces regarding a ceasefire and disengagement of their respective forces.
13. As soon as the election results have been declared and a Government has been formed, Zimbabwe will become independent.

RHODESIA: CEASE-FIRE ARRANGEMENTS

1. The proposals for implementing the Independence Constitution which we have circulated to the Conference envisage that there will be "agreement between the opposing forces regarding a cease-fire and disengagement of their respective forces". We have made clear that the introduction of a United Nations peace-keeping force during the pre-independence period is unacceptable to us. The only peace-keeping force the Rhodesians would be prepared to accept is a British force and this is not acceptable to us. There will, however, be further pressure for a "Commonwealth force" and this could be turned to our disadvantage.

2. Our intention in the Conference is to defer discussion of the cease-fire arrangements until agreement has been reached on our general proposals for the interim arrangements. Thereafter we will deploy the argument that the essential element in an effective cease-fire is the political will of the parties themselves to maintain it and to stand by the result of the elections. The security forces and the Patriotic Front would be represented on a cease-fire commission, responsible to the British Governor, which would monitor the observance of the cease-fire. Offensive operations by either side would cease. But it will be a sine qua non for the Rhodesian military authorities that routine patrolling by the security forces would continue and that they would be authorised to take appropriate measures to deal with breaches of the cease-fire by Patriotic Front forces as and when they occurred.

3. We have discussed these ideas informally with General Walls and the other Rhodesian commanders in Salisbury and in London. The attached paper sets out, without commitment on either side, a basis for the cease-fire which reflects the outcome of these discussions. General Walls has accepted that the Chairman of the Cease-fire Commission described in this

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paper would be the Governor's Military Adviser.

4. General Walls himself considers that our proposals will lack credibility unless we are prepared also to envisage arrangements for monitoring the cease-fire. He believes it would be politically and presentationally useful if we could make provision for monitoring. He is ready to accept that British liaison officers should be attached to the National Joint Operations Command and his regional commands for this purpose. He envisages that the functions of the monitoring element should also include the supervision of movement in and out of any re-grouping areas allocated to Patriotic Front forces and entry points for the return of refugees etc. He would also wish to press for some monitoring of Patriotic Front camps in Zambia and Mozambique. General Walls realises that he cannot expect to achieve this unless he accepts a quid pro quo on monitoring inside Rhodesia.

5. General Walls would not be prepared to accept a large monitoring group in Rhodesia. But our consideration of this question does not suggest that such a group need number more than, at most, 2-300 persons. In no circumstances would such a group intervene between the opposing forces. Its functions would be to observe and report to the Cease-fire Commission.

6. General Walls would prefer such a group to be wholly British. But he would be prepared to see it include elements from other Commonwealth countries, so long as their Governments have not already shown by the attitudes they have adopted that they are committed against Bishop Muzorewa and in favour of the Patriotic Front. He would be prepared to accept representation in such a monitoring group from Australia, New Zealand and Fiji.

7. There would be considerable political advantage in associating other Commonwealth countries with a monitoring

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group. Apart from sharing the responsibility this would help to reinforce and maintain the support we hope to get from them for our handling of the Conference and of the process leading to independence. It will help greatly to convince the Americans and others of the seriousness of our approach if we are prepared to indicate that we do have in mind arrangements to monitor a cease-fire.

PRE-INDEPENDENCE CEASEFIRE ARRANGEMENTS

1. An essential part of the ceasefire is that there should be a disengagement between the Rhodesian security forces and the forces of the Patriotic Front. The most effective way of achieving this would be for the respective forces to withdraw to the countries in which their bases are located. The Rhodesian forces would discontinue operations in Zambia and Mozambique; and the Patriotic Front forces in Rhodesia would be withdrawn into their bases in Zambia and Mozambique.
2. An alternative or supplementary way, subject to agreement on important details between those responsible for the forces involved, would be for units of the Patriotic Front, together with their weapons, to be concentrated in predetermined places within Rhodesia to which access by Rhodesian forces would be prohibited. However, this alternative would not be feasible unless accompanied by specific practical arrangements which would provide an adequate assurance that the ceasefire would not be prejudiced by the resultant close proximity of Rhodesian and Patriotic Front forces.
3. It is estimated that the period allowed for disengagement would be not more than 10 days. Failure to observe agreed arrangements for disengagement would constitute a de facto failure of the ceasefire with the inevitable consequences in political terms.
4. During and following the period of disengagement the Rhodesian forces would discontinue external offensive land and air operations and would co-operate with the agreed arrangements for the safe withdrawal of personnel from existing operational areas. Similarly, during the same period, the Patriotic Front forces would not carry out any illegal acts in Rhodesia.
5. A Ceasefire Commission would be established at Salisbury under British arrangements to provide monitoring control of the army and air force of Rhodesia and units of the Patriotic Front. The Chairman of the Commission would be answerable to the (British Administrator) and would carry out his function by means of liaison officers and supervising elements attached to the forces involved, and through a Ceasefire Review Committee whose members would include representatives of the Rhodesian security forces and of the Patriotic Front. The Commission would also be responsible for the security and supervision of any Patriotic Front concentrations within Rhodesia: for the necessary monitoring of disengagement movement through safe-routes and entry points: and for the co-ordination of logistic support

for disengagement plans when appropriate.

6. The effective supervision of externally based forces of the Patriotic Front is another essential ingredient of the ceasefire. The governments of Zambia and Mozambique would be invited to agree upon arrangements, to be established in conjunction with the ceasefire arrangements, for the monitoring by the Commission of externally based forces and for the control of cross-border movement.

7. The (British Administrator) should be responsible, making use of the best advice available to him, for deciding when or if security violations or infringements of law and order constituted a de facto breakdown of the ceasefire. When he makes the decision he will bear in mind the security requirements necessary for the conduct of elections.

8. Responsibility for law and order in Rhodesia, apart from any designated places necessary for the concentration of Patriotic Front units would rest with the police and civil authorities of Rhodesia. Offensive operations by the Rhodesian army and air force would be discontinued for the duration of the ceasefire.

8 October 1979

Rhodesia Department

31 OCT 1979



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GR 557

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FM LISBON 311500Z OCT

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELNO 322 OF 31 OCTOBER

INFO PRIORITY UKMIS NEW YORK AND WASHINGTON

YOUR TELNO 190; RHODESIA.

1. I SAW PRESIDENT EANES LAST NIGHT AND GAVE HIM A TRANSLATION OF YOUR PERSONAL MESSAGE (YOUR TELEGRAM NO 191). I THEN SPOKE AS INSTRUCTED IN YOUR TELEGRAM. I STRESSED THE CENTRAL IMPORTANCE HMG ATTACHED TO ACHIEVING A SOLUTION OF THIS PROBLEM, THE PRODIGIOUS EFFORTS THAT HAD BEEN MADE SO FAR, THE REMARKABLE PROGRESS THAT YOU HAD BEEN ABLE TO ACHIEVE AT THE LONDON CONFERENCE, CONTRARY TO ALL EXPECTATION, AND THE CONTINUING EFFORTS WHICH ARE BEING MADE TO PERSUADE THE PATRIOTIC FRONT TO FALL IN WITH OUR PROPOSALS.

2. I SAID THAT NEVERTHELESS THE POSSIBILITY REMAINED THAT THE PATRIOTIC FRONT WOULD NOT AGREE, IN ^{WHICH} CASE HMG WOULD BE COMPELLED TO PROCEED WITH THE BISHOP ALONE AND I DESCRIBED, IN CONFIDENCE, THE POSSIBLE COURSE OF EVENTS AS YOU HAD OUTLINED THEM TO THE NORWEGIAN FOREIGN MINISTER (OSLO TELNO 167). I SAID THAT IF WE WERE COMPELLED TO PROCEED WITH THE BISHOP ALONE, WE EXPECTED STRONG OPPOSITION FROM THE NON-ALIGNED AT THE UNITED NATIONS AND, AS INSTRUCTED, I SAID THAT IN THOSE CIRCUMSTANCES WE WOULD LOOK FOR SUPPORT FROM OUR FRIENDS IN GENERAL AND IN PARTICULAR FOR PORTUGUESE SUPPORT IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL, NOT LEAST BECAUSE OF OUR STRONG SUPPORT FOR PORTUGUESE MEMBERSHIP OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY.

3. PRESIDENT EANES LISTENED CAREFULLY TO WHAT I SAID AND HIS SUBSEQUENT QUESTIONS REVEALED THAT HE IS FOLLOWING EVENTS CLOSELY AND FULLY SUPPORTS OUR OBJECTIVES. HE ASKED WHAT WOULD HAPPEN ABOUT THE CONTROL OF THE ARMED FORCES IN RHODESIA DURING THE INTERIM PERIOD. I SAID THAT THEY WOULD COME UNDER THE GOVERNOR, AS WOULD THE POLICE, BUT THAT THE PATRIOTIC FRONT WERE MAKING DIFFICULTIES ABOUT THIS. HE CLEARLY REGARDED THIS AS

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/A CENTRAL

A CENTRAL AND JBST DIFFICULT QUESTION, HE SAID HIS IMPRESSION WAS THAT NKOMO WAS MORE REASONABLE AND FLEXIBLE THAN MUGABE AND THAT THE RUSSIANS WERE PUTTING THEIR MONEY ON MUGABE. HE ASKED WHAT WAS THE CURRENT POSITION OF THE FRONT LINE PRESIDENTS AND OF PRESIDENT NYERERE IN PARTICULAR. I SAID THAT WE WERE IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH THEM AND THAT THEY HAD UP TILL NOW BEEN EXERCISING HELPFUL PRESSURE ON THE PATRIOTIC FRONT, BUT THAT IT WAS HARD TO TELL WHETHER THIS PRESSURE WOULD BE EFFECTIVE IN PERSUADING THE FRONT TO AGREE TO OUR PROPOSALS FOR THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD. HE ASKED ABOUT THE AMERICANS AND I SAID THAT THEY WERE WHOLEHEARTEDLY SUPPORTING OUR PROPOSALS AND HAD SENT INSTRUCTIONS TO THIS EFFECT TO ALL THEIR POSTS. HE SAID THAT HE THOUGHT THE INFLUENCE OF THE AMERICAN AMBASSADOR IN MAPUTO MIGHT BE ESPECIALLY HELPFUL.

4. I SAID THAT I PROPOSED, IF HE AGREED, TO DISCUSS THIS QUESTION IN MORE DETAIL WITH THE MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS. HE WELCOMED THIS. I THINK IT IMPORTANT THAT I SHOULD DO THIS, ESPECIALLY IF THE SANCTIONS ISSUE IS GOING TO COME BEFORE THE SECURITY COUNCIL SOON. IT IS THE MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS WHO WILL SEND INSTRUCTIONS TO THE PORTUGUESE DELEGATION. I SHALL THEREFORE TRY TO SEE HIM IN THE NEXT FEW DAYS. I THINK I SHOULD MAKE IT CLEAR TO HIM AS WELL THE GREAT IMPORTANCE YOU AND YOUR COLLEAGUES ATTACH TO THIS ISSUE. AS HE IS AMBASSADOR DESIGNATE IN LONDON HE HAS A PERSONAL INTEREST IN THE MATTER WHICH MAY BE HELPFUL.

5. I AM SURE THAT THE PORTUGUESE SYMPATHISE WITH OUR DIFFICULTIES, BUT IF IT COMES TO THE CRUNCH, IT MAY NOT BE EASY TO PERSUADE THEM TO VOTE WITH US IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL IN VIEW OF THE GREAT IMPORTANCE THEY ATTACH TO IMPROVING RELATIONS WITH ANGOLA AND MOZAMBIQUE. THEY WILL BE RELUCTANT TO LINE UP AGAINST THOSE COUNTRIES IN NEW YORK, AND IT IS NOT, I THINK, MUCH USE APPEALING TO SENTIMENT SINCE THEY WILL OF COURSE REMEMBER THAT WE GAVE THEM LITTLE HELP IN NEW YORK WHEN THE

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dg. Smith

GR 150
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FM FCO 311102Z OCT 79
TO FLASH LUSAKA
TELEGRAM NUMBER 895 OF 31 OCTOBER
INFO FLASH BONN (FOR WALDEN)

MY TELNO 88: RHODESIA

1. WE HAVE HEARD FROM RAMPHAL AND OTHER SOURCES THAT PRESIDENT KAUNDA MAY BE INTENDING TO COME TO LONDON IN THE NEXT DAY OR TWO TO DISCUSS RHODESIA.

2. WE HAVE NOT YET BEEN ABLE TO CONSULT THE PRIME MINISTER (WHO IS IN BONN) BUT IN TERMS BOTH OF THE TIMING OF THE CONFERENCE AND OF HER ENGAGEMENTS (INCLUDING THE PROGRAMME FOR CHAIRMAN HUA) IT WOULD BE GREATLY PREFERABLE IF SUCH A VISIT DID NOT REPEAT NOT TAKE PLACE BEFORE THIS WEEKEND. IF KAUNDA THEREFORE RAISES THIS WITH YOU, YOU SHOULD TRY TO STEER HIM AWAY FROM A VISIT HERE ON 1 OR 2 NOVEMBER. SUBJECT TO CONFIRMATION FROM BONN YOU SHOULD MAKE CLEAR THAT A VISIT ANY TIME FROM 3 NOVEMBER ONWARDS WOULD BE MORE OPPORTUNE.

CARRINGTON

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RHODESIA-D
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SIR J. GRAHAM
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6. I THEN DELIBERATELY RAISED THE QUESTION OF THE LENGTH OF THE INTERIM PERIOD, QUOTING THE PF PAPER WHICH INDICATED THAT ONE MONTH WOULD BE ENOUGH FOR CAMPAIGNING AND REITERATING THE REASONS WHY THE INTERIM PERIOD SHOULD BE SHORT. THE PRESIDENT SAID THAT HE AGREED THAT DELIMITATION OF CONSTITUENCIES AND REGISTRATION WAS IMPRACTICABLE IN THE CONDITIONS OF RHODESIA BUT HE THOUGHT THAT IT WOULD NOT BE POSSIBLE TO GET REFUGEES SETTLED BACK INTO RHODESIA IN A SHORT TIME. THE 20,000 REFUGEES IN BOTSWANA WERE A COMPARATIVELY SIMPLE PROBLEM SINCE THEY WERE UNARMED AND WELL CONTROLLED BY THE BOTSWANA GOVERNMENT IN ONLY THREE CAMPS, BUT EVEN THEY COULD NOT SIMPLY BE PUSHED OVER THE BORDER BECAUSE MANY OF THEM HAD NO HOMES TO RETURN TO. THE PROBLEM OF THOSE IN ZAMBIA AND MOZAMBIQUE WAS INFINITELY GREATER. THERE WOULD HAVE TO BE WELL-ORGANISED RECEPTION CENTRES IN RHODESIA AND THESE WOULD TAKE SOME TIME TO SET UP. AT MY SUGGESTION THE PRESIDENT AGREED THAT STEENKAMP AND I SHOULD LATER THIS WEEK DISCUSS THE PRACTICAL ISSUES IN RETURNING BOTSWANA'S REFUGEES.

COMMENT

7. THIS WAS A FRIENDLY DISCUSSION. PRESIDENT KHAMA FULLY SUPPORTS YOUR MOTIVATION IN THE INTERIM PERIOD PROPOSALS AND ADMIRES THE WAY IN WHICH YOU HAVE SOUGHT PRACTICABLE SOLUTIONS. I BELIEVE THAT HE RECOGNISES THAT THE ONLY WAY OF MAINTAINING ORDER DURING THE INTERIM PERIOD IS BY USING THE EXISTING FORCES AND I THINK THAT HE ACCEPTS THAT THE GOVERNOR COULD KEEP THEM NEUTRAL. HOWEVER, HE ALSO THINKS THAT THE PF HAVE AN UNANSWERABLE POINT IN THE VIEW OF AFRICAN AND FRONT LINE STATES WHEN THEY CLAIM THAT SUCH A SYSTEM WOULD BE UNFAIR TO THEM. HE ADMITS THAT HE CANNOT THINK OF A PRACTICABLE ALTERNATIVE EXCEPT THE USE OF BRITISH TROOPS, WHICH I THINK HE ACCEPTS IS OUT OF THE QUESTION. I BELIEVE THAT HE WILL SUPPORT YOU ON ALL OTHER ISSUES BUT ON THIS ONE WILL REFUSE TO GO OUT ON A LIMB IN RELATION TO THE OTHER FRONT LINE PRESIDENTS. IT WAS ALSO NOTICEABLE THAT THE VICE-PRESIDENT IN HIS INTERVENTIONS WAS CONSIDERABLY MORE HAWKISH. THE PRESIDENT MIGHT HAVE SOME

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DIFFICULTY WITH HIM IN CABINET. IT WOULD BE HELPFUL IF I COULD GIVE THE PRESIDENT MORE DETAILS OF HOW WE ENVISAGE CONTROLLING THE POLICE AND FORCES TO ENSURE FAIRNESS.

TURNER

F I L E S

RHOD D
OADS
N AM D
NEWS D
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PLANNING STAFF
ES & SD
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LEGAL ADVISERS
(MR FREELAND)
(MR FIFOOT)
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PS/LPS
PS/MR LUCE
PS/MR RIDLEY
PS/MR HURD
PS/PUS
SIR J GRAHAM
LORD N G LENNOX
MISS BROWN
MR DAY
MR WILLSON
MR ASPIN

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION
RHODESIA POLICY

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C O N F I D E N T I A L

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GR 1000

DESKBY FCO 010900Z

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FM GABORONE 311920Z OCT
TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 443 OF 31 OCTOBER 1979

INFO IMMEDIATE LUSAKA, DAR ES SALAAM,

INFO PRIORITY MAPUTO, LUANDA, LAGOS ..

INFO ROUTINE MONROVIA, UKMIS NEW YORK, WASHINGTON AND CANBERRA.

P S TO P M
NO 10 DOWNING ST

Patricia Miller

Pat

YOUR TELNO 351 TO DAR ES SALAAM : RHODESIA.

1. THE PRESIDENT IS RESTING AT HIS FARM ON THE LIMPOPO UNTIL 4 NOVEMBER BUT AGREED TO RECEIVE ME THERE THIS AFTERNOON (31 OCTOBER). I FLEW THERE WITH THE VICE-PRESIDENT, STEENKAMP AND MPOTOKWANE. I GAVE THE PRESIDENT THE PRIME MINISTER'S MESSAGE AND YOUR SPEAKING NOTES OF 29 OCTOBER (YOUR TELNO 885 TO LUSAKA). AT THE SAME TIME STEENKAMP DELIVERED A LONG TELEGRAPHIC REPORT FROM LEGWAILA IN LONDON ABOUT THE PROGRESS OF THE CONFERENCE. AFTER THE PRESIDENT HAD COMPLETED HIS READING I SPOKE AS IN TUR.
2. MY DELIVERY WAS INTERSPERSED BY FRIENDLY INTERVENTIONS BY THE PRESIDENT IN WHICH ALL OTHERS PRESENT FREELY JOINED IN. IN SUMMARY THE PRESIDENT SAID THAT HE WAS CONVINCED THAT IT WAS RIGHT THAT RHODESIA SHOULD RETURN TO BRITISH COLONIAL STATUS FOR THE INTERIM PERIOD AND THAT ELECTIONS SHOULD BE HELD UNDER BRITISH AUTHORITY. THERE WAS ALSO NO DOUBT IN HIS MIND OF THE SINCERITY OF BRITAIN'S DETERMINATION TO SEE THAT THE ELECTIONS WERE FREE AND FAIR. AT THIS POINT HE WENT ON TO SAY THAT HE WONDERED HOWEVER IF IT WERE PRACTICALLY POSSIBLE FOR BRITAIN TO ACHIEVE OUR ASPIRATIONS FOR THE ELECTIONS. I RE-EMPHASISED THE POINT IN THE SPEAKING NOTES IN TUR THAT WE WERE CONVINCED THAT OUR PLAN WOULD WORK.
3. THE PRESIDENT THEN SAID THAT HE DID NOT SEE HOW WE COULD CONVINCING THE PATRIOTIC FRONT THAT ELECTIONS WOULD BE FAIR AS LONG AS THE ONLY INSTRUMENTS FOR LAW AND ORDER WERE THOSE NOW SERVING THE MUZOREWA REGIME. I POINTED OUT THAT WHEN THE GOVERNOR ASSUMED CONTROL THE POLICE AND SECURITY FORCES WOULD BE UNDER HIS COMMAND. THE ONLY ACTIVE INSTRUMENT FOR LAW AND ORDER WOULD

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NORMALLY BE THE POLICE. THE REGIME'S FORCES NO LONGER WOULD HAVE AN ENEMY AND THEREFORE WOULD NOT NEED TO BE ACTIVE, EXCEPT IF CIRCUMSTANCES CALLED FOR THEM TO COME TO THE AID OF THE CIVIL POWER, WHEN THEY WOULD BE UNDER THE CLOSE DIRECTION OF THE GOVERNOR. I SAID THAT AS THE RHODESIAN ARMY WAS A DISCIPLINED FORCE WITH A WELL-ESTABLISHED HEIRARCHY IT WOULD BE FEASIBLE FOR THE GOVERNOR AND HIS ADVISERS TO ESTABLISH CONTROL OVER THEM. I THEN QUOTED SIR IAN GILMOUR'S STATEMENT ON 27 OCTOBER (YOUR TELNO 881 TO LUSAKA, PARA 6) THAT OUR PROPOSALS DO NOT EXCLUDE THE PATRIOTIC FRONT FORCES.

4. THE PRESIDENT SAID HE SAW THE PRACTICAL ADVANTAGES OF USING THE EXISTING STRUCTURE IN RHODESIA AND HE ACCEPTED OUR DETERMINATION TO CONTROL THEM UNDER THE GOVERNOR BUT HE DOUBTED IF EITHER THE FORCES OR THE POLICE COULD BE REGARDED AS FULLY DISCIPLINED - BOTSWANA HAD SOME EXPERIENCE TO THE CONTRARY. HOWEVER, HIS MAIN OBJECTION WAS THAT HE COULD NOT SEE HOW THE PATRIOTIC FRONT COULD ACCEPT THAT ELECTIONS WERE FAIR IF THE ONLY FORCES IN CONTROL OF THE COUNTRY WERE THOSE OF THE SALISBURY REGIME. HE REJECTED THE IDEA OF A UN OR COMMONWEALTH PEACEKEEPING FORCE BUT THERE HAD TO BE A NEUTRAL FORCE AND THE ONLY ONE WAS THE BRITISH ARMY. I SAID THAT THIS WAS NEITHER POLITICALLY NOR PRACTICALLY POSSIBLE. THE GOVERNOR'S RESPONSIBILITY FOR MAINTAINING LAW AND ORDER THROUGH A MACHINE WHICH ALREADY EXISTED BUT UNDER HIS CONTROL WOULD ACHIEVE THE SAME EFFECT. THE PRESIDENT SAID SOMEWHAT DESPAIRINGLY THAT HE SAW THESE PRACTICAL PROBLEMS, BUT THEN WENT ON TO QUOTE THE PASSAGE IN THE PRIME MINISTER'S MESSAGE "WE ARE READY TO CARRY OUT TO THE FULL (THE PRESIDENT EMPHASISED THIS WORD) OUR RESPONSIBILITY AS THE DECOLONISING POWER". IN HIS VIEW THIS MEANT BRITISH FORCES.

5. I PROMISED TO REPORT THESE VIEWS TO YOU BUT THEN WENT ON TO SAY THAT THERE WAS NO POSSIBILITY OF YOU MAKING THE FUNDAMENTAL CHANGES IN THE PROPOSALS WHICH HIS VIEWS IMPLIED AND THAT IT WOULD BE DAMAGING TO THE CHANCES OF AGREEMENT IF THE PF WERE LED TO BELIEVE THAT A SOLUTION WAS POSSIBLE ON QUITE DIFFERENT TERMS (PARA 2(F) OF TUR). THE PRESIDENT SMILED IN UNDERSTANDING OF THIS MESSAGE.

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PORTUGUESE AFRICAN TERRITORIES WERE UNDER DISCUSSION AND WERE INDEED FREQUENTLY VERY CRITICAL FOR THEM. I HOPE WE CAN KEEP IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH THE PORTUGUESE HERE AND IN NEW YORK, BUT I SUSPECT THAT THE BEST WE CAN HOPE FOR IS THAT THEY WILL TAKE A NEUTRAL ATTITUDE AND ABSTAIN. IF THERE IS ANY MORE AMMUNITION YOU CAN GIVE ME FOR USE WITH THE FOREIGN MINISTER, THIS WOULD BE HELPFUL.

MORAN

FILES
RHODESIA D
SED

OADS
N AM D
NEWS D
PUSD
PLANNING STAFF
ES & SD
CCD
FRD
UND

LEGAL ADVISERS
(MR FREELAND)
(MR FIFOOT)

ECON D
PCD

DEF D
OID
PS
PS/LPS
PS/MR LUCE
PS/MR RIDLEY
PS/MR HURD
PS/PUS
SIR A DUFF
LORD N G LENNOX
MISS BROWN
MR DAY
MR WILLSON
MR ASPIN

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION
RHODESIA POLICY

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Original filed on
Germany June 79
PM's meetings with
Chancellor Schmidt
Germany.

Excerpt from

RECORD OF A DISCUSSION BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER AND CHANCELLOR HELMUT SCHMIDT AT THE CHANCELLERY IN BONNIE

ON 31 OCTOBER 1979 AT 1530

PRESENT

The Prime Minister

The Federal Chancellor

Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary

Herr Genscher

Mr. M. O'D. B. Alexander

Dr. von der Gablenz

* * * * *

Rhodesia

The Prime Minister said that the Rhodesia talks in London had reached a critical stage. Agreement had been reached on a Constitution and on the installation of the Governor. It would be ridiculous and absurd if the talks were to break down on the problems of the interim period. It would mean that those responsible for the break-down are not genuinely interested in democracy. Britain intended to go ahead with the internal elections. If the Patriotic Front decided not to participate that would be their decision and theirs alone. That the talks had got as far as they had was due largely to the superb way the talks had been handled by the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary. Chancellor Schmidt said that he shared the Prime Minister's admiration for the way Lord Carrington had handled the negotiation.

The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary said that there was a feeling abroad that HMG only needed to negotiate with the Patriotic Front. The Chancellor said that he recognised that Britain was dealing with three parties or even, if one included Mr. Smith, with four. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary said that Bishop Muzorewa had been given no credit for accepting a British Governor with executive powers or for accepting that the Governor would in fact run the country while the Bishop was fighting the election. For a man who had recently won the support of 64 per cent of the electorate to make these concessions, and to agree to submit himself to another election, was remarkable. The Patriotic Front had themselves made concessions on the Constitution. They would now have to trust Britain over the appointment of the Governor and the handling of the interim period. The Chancellor agreed.

Extract from Record of Discussion between PM and Chancellor Schmidt
Bonn 31 Oct 79

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Original filed on
Germany June '79
PM's meetings with
Chancellor Schmidt in
Germany.

Rhodesia

The Prime Minister said that she had had a long talk with Premier Hua about Rhodesia but she had found it difficult to get him to understand the basic concept of our approach to the problem. He had told her that the Front Line States would not accept Bishop Muzorewa as the leader of an independent Rhodesia. China had of course an interest in a Patriotic Front victory in Rhodesia, even though Mr. Nkomo was receiving Soviet help. She had told him that the battle was no longer one between black and white but between black and black. Our objective now was to see that the Rhodesian people could make a choice in free and fair elections, and if the Patriotic Front lost, they must accept the verdict of the ballot box and stop fighting. The concept of the ballot box was a difficult one to get over to Premier Hua, but she would return to this subject with him in their further talks the following day. She would also point out to him again that a stable Rhodesia would be a check on the expansionism of the Soviet Union in Southern Africa. If Rhodesia drifted into chaos, it would make the eventual loss of South Africa that much more likely, and this in turn would weaken the West as a whole since they relied on South Africa for certain vital raw materials.

Chancellor Schmidt said that the fundamentals of the British approach to Rhodesia appeared to him to be clear and simple and he would have expected Premier Hua to understand them. He had told him when he was in Bonn that he thought that the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary was handling the Lancaster House negotiations extremely well. He would, however, be grateful for the Prime Minister's assessment of the chances of bringing the talks to a successful conclusion.

/ The Prime Minister

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The Prime Minister said that successive British Governments had stipulated that six conditions should be fulfilled before Rhodesia could be restored to legality and given independence. The Rhodesian election of last April had returned a black majority Government with a 64 per cent turnout, and there were many people in the United Kingdom who thought that Bishop Muzorewa's Government had met all six conditions. There were, on the other hand, those who argued that there was some doubt about whether the fifth principle, which was that any settlement should be acceptable to the people of Rhodesia as a whole, had been adequately satisfied. It was also argued that the constitution on which his Government had been elected was deficient in two respects. It would have been possible to ask him to put right these two defects and then to recognise his Government as a legal and independent one. If the British Government had followed this course, however, we should almost certainly have not gained the support of the international community and this would not have been helpful to Rhodesia. We had therefore decided to take the route which we were now following, and our main purpose at the Lusaka Conference had been to carry other countries along with us. As a result of the Lancaster House negotiations so far we had obtained the agreement of the participants to a constitution which not only got rid of ^{the} two deficiencies in the existing Rhodesian constitution but was also comparable to the constitutions which we had granted in the past to former British colonies. We were now trying to negotiate the pre-independence arrangements, and this was the most difficult stage so far. The British Government were proposing that a British governor should be installed in Rhodesia during the transitional period in whom legislative and executive authority would be vested. It was envisaged that Bishop Muzorewa and his Ministers would devote themselves to contesting the elections. The present security forces would be answerable to the governor. Although we were expecting there to be a ceasefire, we wanted to keep the pre-independence period to no longer than two months.

/ The longer it lasted

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The longer it lasted the more likely it was that guerrilla activity would increase and if events took a serious turn, the Governor would be helpless. There was no intention to support him with British troops. It would be for him to supervise the elections, thus fulfilling the undertaking which the British Government had given at Lusaka, and to ensure that they were free and fair. Bishop Muzorewa was prepared to go along with these pre-independence arrangements. Given the nature of the election which he had won in April, this was a big step for him to take and few people realised how far he was prepared to come. But it was by no means certain that the Patriotic Front would also agree to the British Government's transitional proposals. They were arguing that the pre-independence period should be longer than two months: they claimed that they needed more time to establish themselves inside Rhodesia. Britain could not accept this, since the Patriotic Front had been active for a long time and Mr. Nkomo and Mr. Mugabe were as well known in Rhodesia as Bishop Muzorewa.

Chancellor Schmidt said that President Kaunda had asked him to try and persuade the Prime Minister to lengthen the transitional period and to remove the army and police commanders during the pre-independence stage. He was simply reporting this approach from President Kaunda and was not offering any comment on it, though it did seem to him that Britain needed to carry with her the Front Line Presidents as well as those actually participating in the talks at Lancaster House. He also wondered whether the Prime Minister felt that she was getting enough support from the United States, Canada, France and the Federal Republic.

The Prime Minister reiterated the importance of keeping the transitional period as short as possible. The guerrillas were not a disciplined force in the way the Rhodesian Army was and they might cause trouble at any time. The British Government was

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confident that the Army Commander, with whom we were in direct touch, would serve the Governor loyally once he was installed. She agreed on the importance of carrying the Front Line Presidents with us. We had succeeded in doing this in Lusaka, but both President Kaunda and President Nyerere were now worried that if the Patriotic Front lost the election, they would still have the guerrilla forces based in their territories. On the other hand, they should see that it was in their own interests to have a stable, independent Rhodesia. Zambia in particular, which already relied for vital supplies on the railway that ran through Rhodesia and which was heavily dependent on South Africa for foodstuffs, would benefit. But if Rhodesia was to remain a stable and prosperous society, it was imperative to retain the confidence of the white population there in the future of the country. All Britain could do was to restore Rhodesia to legality, at which point the sanctions would fall away, and to see that free and fair elections were held on the basis of the Constitution already agreed at Lancaster House. Once we had done that, the future of Rhodesia was in the hands of its own people. We were now within an ace of this goal and we were in particular need of our friends' support. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary had been very pleased with the response he had had from our European partners at Ashford Castle, and Mr. Vance was supporting us, though there were other members of the United States administration who were less helpful, even though Rhodesia was already, under its existing Constitution, a far more democratic state than many other African countries.



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SECRET
FM FCO 311102Z OCT 79
TO FLASH LUSAKA
TELEGRAM NUMBER 895 OF 31 OCTOBER
INFO FLASH BONN (FOR WALDEN)

*Mr Walden 2 copies
Mr Alexander 2 copies*

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MY TELNO 88: RHODESIA

1. WE HAVE HEARD FROM RAMPHAL AND OTHER SOURCES THAT PRESIDENT KAUNDA MAY BE INTENDING TO COME TO LONDON IN THE NEXT DAY OR TWO TO DISCUSS RHODESIA.
2. WE HAVE NOT YET BEEN ABLE TO CONSULT THE PRIME MINISTER (WHO IS IN BONN) BUT IN TERMS BOTH OF THE TIMING OF THE CONFERENCE AND OF HER ENGAGEMENTS (INCLUDING THE PROGRAMME FOR CHAIRMAN HUA) IT WOULD BE GREATLY PREFERABLE IF SUCH A VISIT DID NOT REPEAT NOT TAKE PLACE BEFORE THIS WEEKEND. IF KAUNDA THEREFORE RAISES THIS WITH YOU, YOU SHOULD TRY TO STEER HIM AWAY FROM A VISIT HERE ON 1 OR 2 NOVEMBER. SUBJECT TO CONFIRMATION FROM BONN YOU SHOULD MAKE CLEAR THAT A VISIT ANY TIME FROM 3 NOVEMBER ONWARDS WOULD BE MORE OPPORTUNE.

CARRINGTON

NNNN

31 October 1979

Rhodesia

Thank you for your letter of today's date, in which you asked whether a message could be sent to the Canadian Prime Minister on behalf of the Prime Minister in the same terms as the one approved yesterday for the New Zealand Prime Minister.

As I told you by telephone, this has now been agreed.

MAP

R.M.J. Lyne, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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MAP has seen

3/10/79



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London S.W.1

31 October 1979

Dear Nick,

Rhodesia: Message to the Canadian Prime Minister

After consulting Michael Alexander by telephone yesterday, I despatched a message about Rhodesia from the Prime Minister to the New Zealand Prime Minister. The text is enclosed. The message was to be delivered last night by the British High Commissioner at Wellington, who had an appointment to see Mr Muldoon. The message to Mr Muldoon followed closely the lines of the message to the Australian Prime Minister, which Mrs Thatcher approved yesterday.

Lord Carrington recommends that a similar message should also be sent to the Canadian Prime Minister. The text would be identical to that of the message to Mr Muldoon. I should be grateful if you could let me know whether we have authority to despatch such a message.

yours ever

Roderic Lyne

R M J Lyne

N Sanders Esq
10 Downing Street

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UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Washington, D.C. 20535



31 OCT 1979
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FM MAPUTO 301200Z OCTOBER 79

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 361 OF 30 OCTOBER

INFO IMMEDIATE LUSAKA LAGOS LUANDA DAR ES SALAAM GABORONE WASHINGTON
UKMIS NEW YORK MIRIMBA SALISBURY

YOUR TELNO 876 TO LUSAKA: RHODESIA CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE

1. I CALLED ON THE SECRETARY-GENERAL AT THE MFA THIS MORNING AND TOOK HIM THROUGH THE LUSAKA AGREEMENT EMPHASISING THAT IT IS COMPLETELY OUT OF THE QUESTION FOR US TO ALLOW IT TO BE QUOTE ENHANCED UNQUOTE, RE-WRITTEN OR MISINTERPRETED. I SAID THAT I PERSONALLY FOUND IT PUZZLING THAT, AFTER WE HAD AGREED TO EXERCISE OUR AUTHORITY WE SHOULD NOW BE CRITICISED BY THE PF FOR GIVING THE GOVERNOR, THROUGH WHOM WE WILL BE EXERCISING THAT AUTHORITY, TOO MUCH POWER. I ALSO FOUND IT STRANGE THAT THE PF SHOULD BE PLEADING FOR SEVERAL MONTHS' TIME IN WHICH TO CONDUCT THEIR ELECTORAL CAMPAIGN WHEN, OVER THE YEARS, THEY HAVE BEEN TELLING US AND INDEED THE WORLD THAT THEY ARE THE ONLY ORGANISATION WHICH TRULY REPRESENTS AND IS WHOLE-HEARTEDLY SUPPORTED BY AN OVERWHELMING MAJORITY OF RHODESIANS.

2. FERRAO SAID THAT ONE OF THE PF'S MAIN CONCERNS IS THAT, DURING THE INTERIM PERIOD, THE VERY SAME SECURITY FORCES WHICH HAVE BEEN RESPONSIBLE FOR MASSACRES, BRUTALITIES AND OPPRESSION OF THE PEOPLE WOULD REMAIN IN THEIR POSITIONS INTACT UNDER THE MUZOREWA GOVERNMENT. I EMPHASISED THAT THE GOVERNOR, WHO WOULD BE WELL SUPPORTED BY SENIOR ADVISERS AND EXPERTS, WOULD HAVE SUPREME EXECUTIVE AS WELL AS LEGISLATIVE AUTHORITY AND THAT MUZOREWA AND HIS MINISTERS WOULD STEP ASIDE TO DEVOTE THEMSELVES TO THE ELECTORAL CAMPAIGN. I HOPED THAT THE PF COULD BE PERSUADED NOT TO DOUBT OUR SINCERITY AND TO WORK WITH US FOR A QUICK AGREEMENT. AT THE END OF THE DAY A GOOD AGREEMENT IN LONDON WOULD OF ITSELF MINIMISE IF NOT ELIMINATE PROBLEMS ON THE GROUND.

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3. FERRAO GAVE ME AS HIS PERSONAL BUT VERY FIRM CONVICTION THAT THERE IS NO PROSPECT OF THE PEOPLE OF ZIMBABWE ELECTING A MARXIST/LENINIST GOVERNMENT SEMICLN AND IT WAS CERTAINLY NO PART OF THE MOZAMBICAN POLICY TO WORK FOR THE ELECTION OF MARXISTS IN ZIMBABWE.

4. AT ABOUT THE SAME TIME THE US AMBASSADOR WAS MEETING FOREIGN MINISTER CHISSANO WHO HAD SENT FOR DE PREE ON ANOTHER MATTER. THEY DID HOWEVER TOUCH ON RHODESIA. CHISSANO INDICATED THAT HE WAS QUOTE VERY CONCERNED UNQUOTE ABOUT THE TURN OF EVENTS IN LONDON. HE SAID, THAT HE WOULD EXPLAIN HIS CONCERN TO ME AND THAT HE WOULD BE SENDING FOR ME EITHER THIS AFTERNOON OR TOMORROW. HE DID HOWEVER TELL DE PREE THAT THERE WAS A LOT OF FORCE IN THE PF'S ARGUMENTS AGAINST OUR PROPOSALS, ESPECIALLY IN RELATION TO THE ROLE OF THE SALISBURY ADMINISTRATION AND THEIR SECURITY FORCES AND OF THOSE OF THE PF. CHISSANO ADDED THAT HE UNDERSTOOD THAT THE JAMACIAN PRIME MINISTER, WHO HAD A LOT TO DO WITH THE LUSAKA AGREEMENT, IS NOW IN LONDON AND THAT HE HAS ALREADY DISAGREED WITH OUR INTERPRETATION OF PARTS OF THE LUSAKA DOCUMENT. I SHOULD BE GRATEFUL FOR GUIDANCE ON THIS POINT SOONEST.

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FM UKMIS NEW YORK 310010Z OCT 79

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1381 OF 30 OCTOBER

INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON DAR ES SALAAM LUSAKA MAPUTO MIRIMBA

SALISBURY LAGOS LUANDA PRETORIA

RHODESIA

1. I HAVE OF COURSE BEEN BOMBARDED WITH QUESTIONS AND ARGUMENT OVER THE PAST FEW DAYS. YOU MAY FIND THE FOLLOWING SUMMARY HELPFUL.

2. THE GENERAL MOOD IS UNCHANGED. EVERYONE, INCLUDING THE AFRICANS, IS FULL OF HOPE FOR AN OVERALL SETTLEMENT. THERE IS NO DISPOSITION TO REGARD THE PRESENT CHECK OVER THE TRANSITIONAL ARRANGEMENTS WITH DESPONDENCY OR TO INDULGE IN RECRIMINATION AGAINST US. I HAVE SPOKEN FIRMLY TO THE LEADING AFRICANS AND OTHERS IN SUPPORT OF OUR CASE OVER THE POWERS OF THE GOVERNOR, THE NON-ACCEPTABILITY OF A UN PRESENCE AND THE PROBLEM OF THE ARMED FORCES. AT NO POINT HAS OUR SINCERITY BEEN QUESTIONED. OUR DETERMINATION TO EXERCISE OUR CONSTITUTIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES (AS WE HAVE SO OFTEN BEEN URGED TO DO BY THE UN) IS WIDELY WELCOMED. IN BRIEF THE OVERALL MOOD IS THAT A PRIZE IS STILL WITHIN OUR GRASP WHICH WOULD ENABLE THE UN TO CLOSE THE BOOK ON A PROBLEM WHICH HAS IHERTO SEEMED ALMOST AS INSOLUBLE AS THE MIDDLE EAST. THERE IS NO DOUBT TOO THAT IF WE WERE TO SUCEED IT WOULD BE REGARDED AS A VERY REMARKABLE TRIUMPH WHICH WOULD, AS ONE BENEFIT, BOOST OUR OWN STANDING IN THE UN TO UNPRECEDENTED HEIGHTS.

3. THE MAIN PROBING I HAVE ENCOUNTERED HAS BEEN ON THE FOLLOWING THREE TOPICS:

- (I) THE LENGTH OF THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD. NO-ONE HAS ARGUED THAT THIS PERIOD SHOULD BE PROTRACTED BUT THE CONSENSUS IS THAT TWO MONTHS IS TOO SHORT:
- (II) WILL THE GOVERNOR HAVE ENOUGH PHYSICAL SUPPORT ON THE GROUND TO MAKE SURE THAT THE TRANSITIONAL MACHINERY IS WORKING FAIRLY? WILL HE HAVE SUFFICIENT STAFF TO BE DEPLOYED THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY? WILL WE BE ABLE TO ENSURE BY DIRECT MONITORING

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THAT THE POLICE/SPECIAL BRANCH/DISTRICT COMMISSIONERS ARE NOT CHEATING? WILL THE COMMONWEALTH OBSERVERS BE PRESENT FROM THE OUTSET AND IN WHAT NUMBERS? THESE ARE THE MAIN QUESTIONS.

(III) ALTHOUGH THE DIFFICULTY OF INTEGRATING THE VARIOUS ARMIES IS RECOGNISED, HOW CAN WE ENSURE THAT THERE IS PARITY OF TREATMENT OF THEM? HERE I THINK THEIR ARGUMENT IS THAT THE GUERRILLAS SHOULD BE ACCORDED SOME STATUS EVEN IF THEY ARE NOT TO HAVE ANY FUNCTION IN THE INTERIM PERIOD; THAT THEIR PRIDE SHOULD NOT BE OFFENDED AND THAT THEY SHOULD BE CONVINCED THAT SOMETHING IS BEING DONE TO MONITOR THE ACTIVITIES OF THE OFFICIAL ARMED FORCES AS WELL AS THEIR OWN; EG I AM ASKED WHETHER THERE WILL BE BRITISH OR COMMONWEALTH MILITARY OBSERVERS WITH EACH ARMY SO THAT NONE CAN CLAIM THAT THE OTHERS ARE GETTING MORE FAVOURABLE TREATMENT?

4. I AM OF COURSE DRAWING ON THE GUIDANCE YOU HAVE SENT IN ORDER TO ANSWER AS MANY OF THESE QUESTIONS AS POSSIBLE AT THIS STAGE. I AM NOT ASKING FOR FURTHER GUIDANCE. THE PURPOSE OF THIS TELEGRAM IS SIMPLY TO GIVE AN IMPRESSION OF THE UN ATMOSPHERE AT THIS STAGE.

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GRS 880

Subject

CONFIDENTIAL

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T130 F / 79 T

CONFIDENTIAL

FM F.C.O. 301105Z OCT 79

TO IMMEDIATE DAR ES SALAAM

TELEGRAM NUMBER 352 OF 30 OCTOBER

INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK, WASHINGTON AND CANBERRA

MY TEL NO : 351 RHODESIA

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT NYERERE:-

DEAR JULIUS

RICHARD LUCE HAS GIVEN ME AN ACCOUNT OF HIS DISCUSSION WITH YOU ON 23 OCTOBER ABOUT RHODESIA AND OUR PROPOSALS FOR THE PRE-INDEPENDENCE PERIOD. I AM GRATEFUL FOR THE APPRECIATION YOU EXPRESSED OF OUR EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE A SETTLEMENT. I HAVE ALSO SEEN AN ACCOUNT OF YOUR CONVERSATION ON 28 OCTOBER WITH SIR PETER MOON.

TO AVOID ANY RISK OF MISUNDERSTANDING BETWEEN US, PERHAPS I COULD EXPLAIN MORE FULLY OUR APPROACH AND THE WAY IN WHICH WE NOW INTEND TO PROCEED.

TO BEGIN WITH, I CAN ASSURE YOU THAT THERE WILL BE NO LACK OF DETERMINATION ON OUR PART IN SEEKING TO ACHIEVE A SATISFACTORY OUTCOME IN THIS STAGE OF THE CONFERENCE. AS YOU KNOW, MY GOVERNMENT REGARD IT AS BRITAIN'S RESPONSIBILITY TO BRING RHODESIA TO LEGAL INDEPENDENCE, TO SUPERVISE THE ELECTIONS AND TO ENSURE THAT THE ARRANGEMENTS ARE FAIR AS BETWEEN THE PARTIES.

IN OUR EARLIER EXCHANGE OF MESSAGES IN AUGUST, YOU URGED BRITAIN TO ACT AS THE DECOLONISING POWER. THAT IS PRECISELY WHAT MY GOVERNMENT INTENDS TO DO AND HAS BEEN DOING.

WE HAVE BEEN TAKING ACTION TO GIVE EFFECT STEP BY STEP TO THE LUSAKA AGREEMENT. WE ARE READY TO CARRY OUT TO THE FULL OUR RESPONSIBILITIES. BUT WE SHALL NOT BE PREPARED TO AGREE TO ARRANGEMENTS WHICH GO WELL BEYOND THE LUSAKA AGREEMENT OR WHICH WOULD MAKE IT IMPOSSIBLE FOR US TO EXERCISE OUR AUTHORITY. IT IS THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT WHICH WILL HAVE TO ASSUME DIRECT RESPONSIBILITY FOR RHODESIA IN THE PRE-INDEPENDENCE PERIOD. WE WILL ONLY BE PREPARED TO DO SO UNDER CONDITIONS AND FOR A PERIOD IN WHICH WE CAN BE CONFIDENT THAT WE WILL BE ABLE TO CARRY OUT THAT RESPONSIBILITY. WHAT IS REQUIRED IS NOT A COMPLICATED

TRANSITIONAL STRUCTURE, WHICH WOULD RENDER IT IMPOSSIBLE FOR US TO CARRY OUT OUR RESPONSIBILITY, BUT FOR THE PEOPLE OF RHODESIA TO BE ENABLED TO DECIDE FOR THEMSELVES WHAT GOVERNMENT THEY WANT IN FAIR ELECTIONS. THE LONGER THE INTERIM PERIOD LASTS BEFORE THE PEOPLE OF RHODESIA HAVE BEEN GIVEN THE CHANCE TO DECIDE THEIR POLITICAL FUTURE FOR THEMSELVES, THE GREATER WILL BE THE RISK OF A BREAKDOWN IN THE CEASE-FIRE. IT IS VERY MUCH IN THE RHODESIAN PEOPLE'S INTERESTS THAT THEY SHOULD BE GIVEN THAT OPPORTUNITY AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. WE SHALL NOT BE PREPARED TO TRANSFER POWER TO ANY PARTY WHICH HAS NOT WON IT THROUGH FAIR ELECTIONS.

WHAT WE MUST SEEK IN THE NEXT PHASE OF THE CONFERENCE IS THE AGREEMENT OF BOTH SIDES ON A GENERAL STRUCTURE OF THE INTERIM PERIOD - NAMELY THE REASSERTION OF BRITISH AUTHORITY, A GOVERNOR WITH EXECUTIVE AND LEGISLATIVE AUTHORITY EXERCISING DIRECT CONTROL OVER THE ADMINISTRATION, AND THE ARRANGEMENTS FOR ELECTIONS. THE PROPOSALS WE HAVE PUT FORWARD INVOLVE BISHOP MUZOREWA AND HIS MINISTERS RELINQUISHING POWER TO ENABLE NEW ELECTIONS TO BE HELD UNDER OUR AUTHORITY. BISHOP MUZOREWA HAS SAID THAT HE IS PREPARED TO ACCEPT THOSE PROPOSALS, WHICH INVOLVE VERY DIFFICULT DECISIONS FOR HIM, IN THE INTERESTS OF ACHIEVING INTERNATIONAL RECOGNITION AND THE PROSPECT OF A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT. I SHALL NOT BE PREPARED TO ASK A GREAT DEAL MORE OF HIM, SIMPLY BECAUSE THE OTHER DELEGATION HAVE FAILED TO AGREE.

YOU HAVE RAISED POINTS ABOUT THE COMMAND OF THE ARMED FORCES AND THE ROLE OF THE PATRIOTIC FRONT'S FORCES. THE RHODESIAN ARMED FORCES WILL BE UNDER THE COMMAND OF THE GOVERNOR AND WILL HAVE TO ACCEPT HIS AUTHORITY. THE PATRIOTIC FRONT'S FORCES WILL ALSO BE RESPONSIBLE TO THE GOVERNOR, IN RELATION TO THE CEASE-FIRE. THERE WILL BE A CEASE-FIRE COMMISSION, UNDER THE CHAIRMANSHIP OF THE GOVERNOR'S MILITARY ADVISER, ON WHICH THE COMMANDERS OF THE FORCES ON BOTH SIDES WILL BE REPRESENTED. THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR OBSERVANCE OF THE CEASE-FIRE WILL FALL IN THE FIRST INSTANCE ON THE COMMANDERS OF THE FORCES. THE INDEPENDENCE CONSTITUTION ENABLES THE DULY ELECTED GOVERNMENT TO EXERT FULL CONTROL OVER THE ARMED FORCES. IT WILL BE FOR THE PEOPLE OF RHODESIA TO DECIDE WHO THEY WISH TO DO SO.

AT LUSAKA WE AGREED THAT THE GOVERNMENT FORMED UNDER THE INDEPENDENCE CONSTITUTION MUST BE CHOSEN THROUGH FREE AND FAIR ELECTIONS, PROPERLY SUPERVISED UNDER BRITISH GOVERNMENT AUTHORITY AND WITH COMMONWEALTH OBSERVERS. I INTEND TO CARRY

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OUT THAT COMMITMENT IN FULL. THERE IS ONE VERY IMPORTANT DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE PRESENT ATTEMPT TO REACH A SETTLEMENT AND THE ATTEMPTS WHICH HAVE PRECEDED IT: WE ARE IN A POSITION TO PUT THESE PLANS INTO EFFECT. IF THEY ARE ACCEPTED BY BOTH SIDES, IT WILL BE POSSIBLE TO PROCEED TO THE FINAL PHASE OF THE CONFERENCE, WHICH MUST CONCERN ITSELF WITH THE NEGOTIATIONS FOR A CEASE-FIRE AND ITS OBSERVANCE. I HAVE NO DOUBT THAT IT WILL BE VERY MUCH EASIER TO RESOLVE THE DIFFICULTIES THAT ARE LIKELY TO ARISE IN THAT PHASE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS ON THE BASIS OF PRIOR AGREEMENT BY BOTH SIDES ON THE ACCEPTANCE OF BRITISH AUTHORITY AND OUR GENERAL PROPOSALS FOR THE INTERIM PERIOD.

I HOPE THAT THE PATRIOTIC FRONT WILL ACCEPT THE SINCERITY OF OUR INTENTIONS AND OUR DETERMINATION TO ENSURE THE IMPARTIALITY OF THE ELECTION PROCESS, AND THAT THEY WILL BE PREPARED TO PARTICIPATE IN THE ELECTIONS. IN THAT EVENT, FOR THE FIRST TIME IN THE LONG HISTORY OF THESE NEGOTIATIONS, A SOLUTION WILL BE WITHIN OUR GRASP. I CONSIDER, IF I MAY SAY SO, THAT THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT IS PLAYING ITS PART IN FULFILMENT OF THE LUSAKA AGREEMENT, AND I HOPE THAT I CAN COUNT ON YOUR SUPPORT.

CARRINGTON

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ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION
 RHODESIA POLICY

GRS 740

Subject

CONFIDENTIAL

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. *T 130E/141*

CONFIDENTIAL

FM F.C.O. 301105Z OCT 79

TO IMMEDIATE LUSAKA

TELEGRAM NUMBER 888 OF 30 OCTOBER

INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK, WASHINGTON AND CANBERRA.

MY TEL NO 351 TO DAR ES SALAAM: RHODESIA

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT KAUNDA:-

DEAR KENNETH,

THANK YOU FOR TALKING SO FULLY TO RICHARD LUCE ON 20 OCTOBER AND FOR YOUR SUBSEQUENT LETTER ABOUT THE RHODESIA CONFERENCE WHICH REACHED ME ON 27 OCTOBER.

2. I AGREE WITH MOST OF THE POINTS YOU MAKE IN YOUR LETTER AND IN PARTICULAR THAT WE ARE CLOSER NOW TO A SOLUTION THAN WE HAVE EVER BEEN BEFORE. THERE ARE ONE OR TWO POINTS ON WHICH WE TAKE A DIFFERENT VIEW. THESE MAY NOT BE IMPORTANT IN RELATION TO THE AREA OF AGREEMENT BETWEEN US, BUT I WOULD LIKE TO EXPLAIN WHY.

3. YOU ARE CONCERNED THAT TWO MONTHS MAY NOT BE LONG ENOUGH TO ARRANGE FOR THE HOLDING OF ELECTIONS. I CANNOT BELIEVE THAT ANY OF THE PARTIES WILL NEED MORE THAN TWO MONTHS TO STATE THEIR CASE TO THE ELECTORATE, AND THIS IS WHAT IS ESSENTIAL. IT IS BRITAIN WHICH WILL HAVE TO TAKE DIRECT RESPONSIBILITY FOR RHODESIA IN THIS PERIOD. WE WILL ONLY BE PREPARED TO DO SO UNDER CONDITIONS AND FOR A PERIOD IN WHICH WE CAN BE CONFIDENT THAT WE WILL BE ABLE TO CARRY OUT THAT RESPONSIBILITY. WHAT IS REQUIRED IS NOT A COMPLICATED TRANSITIONAL STRUCTURE, WHICH WOULD RENDER IT IMPOSSIBLE FOR US TO CARRY OUT OUR RESPONSIBILITY, BUT FOR THE PEOPLE OF RHODESIA TO BE ENABLED TO DECIDE FOR THEMSELVES, WHAT GOVERNMENT THEY WANT IN FAIR ELECTIONS. THE LONGER THE INTERIM PERIOD LASTS BEFORE THE PEOPLE OF RHODESIA HAVE BEEN GIVEN THE CHANCE TO DECIDE THEIR POLITICAL FUTURE FOR THEMSELVES, THE GREATER WILL BE THE RISK OF A BREAK-DOWN OF THE CEASE-FIRE. IT IS VERY MUCH IN THE RHODESIAN PEOPLE'S INTERESTS AND IN THOSE OF THE PEOPLE OF THE NEIGHBOURING COUNTRIES THAT THEY SHOULD BE GIVEN THAT OPPORTUNITY AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. WE SHALL NOT BE PREPARED TO TRANSFER POWER TO ANY PARTY WHICH HAS NOT WON IT THROUGH FAIR ELECTIONS.

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4. THE REGISTRATION OF VOTERS WOULD BE LIKELY TO TAKE MUCH LONGER THAN THE SIX MONTHS YOU ENVISAGE. THIS WOULD BE TOO LONG TO WAIT TO RESOLVE A PROBLEM WHICH IS OF EXTREME AND GROWING URGENCY. WE HAVE NO DOUBT THAT IT WILL BE POSSIBLE, AS IT HAS BEEN IN OTHER COUNTRIES, TO CARRY OUT A FAIR ELECTION WITHOUT PRIOR REGISTRATION, PROVIDED THERE ARE ADEQUATE SAFEGUARDS AGAINST DOUBLE VOTING AND OTHER MAL-PRACTICES.

5. I ENTIRELY AGREE THAT AN EFFECTIVE CEASE-FIRE MUST BE AN ESSENTIAL PART OF ANY AGREEMENT ON THE ARRANGEMENTS LEADING TO INDEPENDENCE. THE ESSENTIAL INGREDIENT IN THIS WILL BE THE POLITICAL WILL OF THE PARTIES THEMSELVES TO OBSERVE THE CEASE-FIRE AND TO STAND BY THE RESULT OF THE ELECTIONS, WHATEVER IT MAY BE. I DO NOT SHARE YOUR INTERPRETATION THAT AT LUSAKA THERE WAS AGREEMENT TO AN INTERNATIONAL FORCE. BUT WHEN WE REACH THAT STAGE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS WE SHALL BE READY TO ARRANGE DISCUSSIONS ABOUT A CEASE-FIRE BETWEEN THE MILITARY COMMANDERS ON BOTH SIDES: AND THIS MUST INCLUDE EFFECTIVE ARRANGEMENTS FOR ITS OBSERVANCE.

6. WHAT WE MUST SEEK IN THE NEXT PHASE OF THE CONFERENCE IS THE AGREEMENT OF BOTH SIDES OF THE GENERAL STRUCTURE OF THE INTERIM PERIOD - NAMELY THE RE-ASSERTION OF BRITISH AUTHORITY, A GOVERNOR WILL FULL EXECUTIVE AND LEGISLATIVE AUTHORITY EXERTING DIRECT CONTROL OVER THE ADMINISTRATION, AND THE ARRANGEMENTS FOR ELECTIONS. THE PROPOSALS WE HAVE PUT FORWARD INVOLVE MAJOR CONCESSIONS BY BISHOP MUZOREWA. HE AND HIS COLLEAGUES HAVE AGREED TO RELINQUISH POWER TO ENABLE NEW ELECTIONS TO BE HELD UNDER OUR AUTHORITY. THIS HAS INVOLVED VERY DIFFICULT DECISIONS FOR HIM, IN THE INTERESTS OF ACHIEVING INTERNATIONAL RECOGNITION AND THE PROSPECT OF A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT. THERE IS NO DOUBT, THEREFORE, THAT UNLIKE SOME PREVIOUS EFFORTS TO REACH A SETTLEMENT, WE ARE IN A POSITION TO PUT THESE PLANS INTO EFFECT. IF THEY ARE ACCEPTED BY BOTH SIDES, IT WILL BE POSSIBLE TO PROCEED TO THE FINAL PHASE OF THE CONFERENCE, WHICH MUST CONCERN ITSELF WITH THE NEGOTIATIONS FOR A CEASE-FIRE. I HAVE NO DOUBT THAT IT WILL BE VERY MUCH EASIER TO RESOLVE THE DIFFICULTIES WHICH ARE LIKELY TO ARISE IN THAT PHASE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS ON THE BASIS OF PRIOR AGREEMENT BY BOTH SIDES ON THE ACCEPTANCE OF BRITISH AUTHORITY AND OUR GENERAL PROPOSALS FOR THE INTERIM PERIOD.

7. I VERY MUCH HOPE THAT THE PATRIOTIC FRONT WILL ACCEPT THE SINCERITY OF OUR INTENTIONS AND OUR DETERMINATION TO ENSURE THE IMPARTIALITY OF THE ELECTION PROCESS. IN THAT EVENT A SOLUTION WILL BE WITHIN OUR GRASP. IN VIEW OF ALL THIS WOULD MEAN FOR THE PEOPLE OF RHODESIA AND FOR ZAMBIA, I HOPE THAT YOU WILL BE PREPARED TO USE YOUR INFLUENCE TO PERSUADE THE PATRIOTIC FRONT TOO OF THE NEED FOR COMPROMISE.

CARRINGTON.

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 LORD N G LENNOX
 MISS BROWN
 MR DAY
 MR WILLSON
 MR ASPIN

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION
 RHODESIA POLICY

CONFIDENTIAL

Subject

PRIME MINISTER'S

PERSONAL MESSAGE

SERIAL No. T 1300/R.T.

GR 650

CONFIDENTIAL

FM F C O 301105Z OCT 79

TO IMMEDIATE LAGOS

TELEGRAM NUMBER 818 OF 30 OCTOBER

INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK AND WASHINGTON

MY TELNO 351 TO DAR ES SALAAM: RHODESIA

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT SHAGARI:-

1. RICHARD LUCE HAS GIVEN ME AN ACCOUNT OF HIS DISCUSSION WITH YOU ON 24 OCTOBER ABOUT RHODESIA AND OUR PROPOSALS FOR THE PRE-INDEPENDENCE PERIOD. I AM GRATEFUL FOR THE APPRECIATION YOU EXPRESSED OF OUR EFFORTS TO KEEP YOU IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH THE PROGRESS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE. I CAN ASSURE YOU THAT THERE WILL BE NO LACK OF DETERMINATION ON OUR PART IN SEEKING TO ACHIEVE A SATISFACTORY OUTCOME IN THE SECOND STAGE OF THE CONFERENCE.
2. WE NOW HAVE THE PATRIOTIC FRONT'S RESPONSE TO OUR PROPOSALS. THEY QUESTION THE BASIC PREMISE OF THE PLAN WE HAVE PUT FORWARD, NAMELY THAT, IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE AGREEMENT AT LUSAKA, ELECTIONS SHOULD BE SUPERVISED UNDER BRITISH AUTHORITY, WITH COMMONWEALTH OBSERVERS PRESENT.
3. AS YOU KNOW, MY GOVERNMENT REGARD IT AS BRITAIN'S RESPONSIBILITY TO BRING RHODESIA TO LEGAL INDEPENDENCE, TO SUPERVISE THE ELECTIONS AND TO ENSURE THAT THE ARRANGEMENTS ARE FAIR AS BETWEEN THE PARTIES. WE ARE TAKING ACTION TO GIVE EFFECT TO THE LUSAKA AGREEMENT. WE ARE READY TO CARRY OUT TO THE FULL OUR RESPONSIBILITIES AS THE DÉ-COLONISING POWER. BUT WE SHALL NOT BE PREPARED TO AGREE TO ARRANGEMENTS WHICH GO WELL BEYOND THAT AGREEMENT OR WHICH WOULD MAKE IT IMPOSSIBLE FOR US TO EXERCISE OUR AUTHORITY. IT IS THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT WHICH WILL HAVE TO ASSUME DIRECT RESPONSIBILITY FOR RHODESIA IN THIS PERIOD.

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4. WE WILL ONLY BE PREPARED TO DO SO UNDER CONDITIONS AND FOR A PERIOD IN WHICH WE CAN BE CONFIDENT THAT WE WILL BE ABLE TO CARRY OUT THAT RESPONSIBILITY. WHAT IS REQUIRED IS NOT A COMPLICATED TRANSITIONAL STRUCTURE, WHICH WOULD RENDER IT IMPOSSIBLE FOR US TO CARRY OUT OUR RESPONSIBILITY, BUT FOR THE PEOPLE OF RHODESIA TO BE ENABLED TO DECIDE FOR THEMSELVES WHAT GOVERNMENT THEY WANT IN FAIR ELECTIONS. THE LONGER THE INTERIM PERIOD LASTS BEFORE THE PEOPLE OF RHODESIA HAVE BEEN GIVEN THE CHANCE TO DECIDE THEIR POLITICAL FUTURE FOR THEMSELVES THE GREATER WILL BE THE RISK OF A BREAK-DOWN OF THE CEASE-FIRE. IT IS VERY MUCH IN THE RHODESIAN PEOPLE'S INTERESTS AND IN THOSE OF THE PEOPLE OF THE NEIGHBOURING COUNTRIES THAT THEY SHOULD BE GIVEN THAT OPPORTUNITY AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. WE SHALL NOT BE PREPARED TO TRANSFER POWER TO ANY PARTY WHICH HAS NOT WON IT THROUGH ELECTIONS. BUT THE PARTIES MUST BE PREPARED TO STAND BY THE RESULT OF THE ELECTION, WHATEVER IT MAY BE.

5. WHAT WE MUST SEEK IN THE NEXT PHASE OF THE CONFERENCE IS THE AGREEMENT OF BOTH SIDES ON THE GENERAL STRUCTURE OF THE INTEREIM PERIOD - NAMELY THE RE-ASSERTION OF BRITISH AUTHORITY, A GOVERNOR WITH EXECUTIVE AND LEGISLATIVE AUTHORITY EXERTING DIRECT CONTROL OVER THE ADMINISTRATION, AND THE ARRANGEMENTS FOR ELECTIONS. THE PROPOSALS WE HAVE PUT FORWARD INVOLVE BISHOP MUZOREWA AND HIS MINISTERS RELINQUISHING POWER TO ENABLE NEW ELECTIONS TO BE HELD UNDER OUR AUTHORITY. BISHOP MUZOREWA HAS SAID THAT HE IS PREPARED TO ACCEPT THESE PROPOSALS, WHICH INVOLVE VERY DIFFICULT DECISIONS FOR HIM, IN THE INTERESTS OF ACHIEVING INTERNATIONAL RECOGNITION AND THE PROSPECT OF A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT. THERE IS NO DOUBT, THEREFORE, THAT UNLIKE SOME PREVIOUS EFFORTS TO REACH A SETTLEMENT, WE ARE IN A POSITION TO PUT THESE PLANS INTO EFFECT. IF THEY ARE ACCEPTED BY BOTH SIDES, IT WILL BE POSSIBLE TO PROCEED TO THE FINAL PHASE OF THE CONFERENCE, WHICH MUST CONCERN ITSELF WITH THE NEGOTIATIONS FOR A CEASE-FIRE. I HAVE NO DOUBT THAT IT WILL BE VERY MUCH EASIER TO RESOLVE THE DIFFICULTIES WHICH ARE LIKELY TO ARISE IN THAT PHASE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS ON THE BASIS OF PRIOR AGREEMENT BY BOTH SIDES ON THE ACCEPTANCE OF BRITISH AUTHORITY AND OUR GENERAL PROPOSALS FOR THE INTERIM PERIOD.

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6. I HOPE THAT THE PATRIOTIC FRONT, WILL ACCEPT THE SINCERITY OF OUR INTENTIONS AND OUR DETERMINATION TO ENSURE THE IMPARTIALITY OF THE ELECTION PROCESS. IN THAT EVENT A SOLUTION WILL BE WITHIN OUR GRASP.

7. I KNOW HOW IMPORTANT IT IS TO NIGERIA THAT THIS PROBLEM SHOULD BE SOLVED PEACEFULLY AND WITH JUSTICE. THIS WE ARE TRYING EARNESTLY TO ACHIEVE. I SHALL BE GRATEFUL FOR ALL THE SUPPORT YOU CAN GIVE US IN THIS ENDEAVOUR.

CARRINGTON

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MISS BROWN
MR DAY
MR WILLSON
MR ASPIN

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION
RHODESIA POLICY

00 WELLINGTON DESKBY 302200Z

GRS 930

subject

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T130c/791

CONFIDENTIAL

DESKBY 302200Z

FM F.C.O. 302006Z OCT 79

TO IMMEDIATE WELLINGTON

TELEGRAM NUMBER 254 OF 30 OCTOBER.

MIPT: RHODESIA

TEXT OF MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO MR MULDOON IS AS FOLLOWS:

I KNOW THAT YOU WILL HAVE BEEN FOLLOWING CLOSELY THE PROGRESS OF THE RHODESIA CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE. I WOULD LIKE TO GIVE YOU MY IMPRESSION OF HOW MATTERS NOW STAND.

WE HAVE NOW REACHED AGREEMENT WITH BOTH BISHOP MUZOREWA AND THE PATRIOTIC FRONT ON AN INDEPENDENCE CONSTITUTION WHICH PROVIDES FOR GENUINE MAJORITY RULE, WITH ADEQUATE SAFEGUARDS FOR MINORITIES.

AS YOU WILL KNOW, WE FOLLOWED THIS BY PUTTING FORWARD OUR PROPOSALS FOR THE PRE-INDEPENDENCE ARRANGEMENTS ON 22 OCTOBER. THESE INVOLVE THE ASSUMPTION BY BRITAIN OF DIRECT RESPONSIBILITY FOR RHODESIA IN THE PERIOD LEADING TO INDEPENDENCE. WE ARE CONTINUING TO TAKE ACTION TO GIVE EFFECT STEP BY STEP TO THE AGREEMENT WE ALL REACHED AT LUSAKA IN AUGUST. BUT WE WILL ONLY BE PREPARED TO DO SO UNDER CONDITIONS AND FOR A PERIOD IN WHICH WE CAN BE CONFIDENT THAT WE WILL BE ABLE TO CARRY OUT THAT RESPONSIBILITY. WE WILL NOT BE ABLE TO AGREE TO ARRANGEMENTS WHICH GO WELL BEYOND WHAT WAS AGREED AT LUSAKA - STILL LESS TO ANY ATTEMPTS TO RE-INTERPRET OR RE-FORMULATE THAT AGREEMENT - OR WHICH WOULD RENDER THE TASK OF SUPERVISING THE ADMINISTRATION IMPOSSIBLE FOR US.

IT IS CENTRAL TO OUR CONCEPTION THAT, IN THE INTERIM PERIOD, THE GOVERNOR SHOULD BE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE DAY-TO-DAY ADMINISTRATION. THE ROLE OF THE POLITICAL LEADERS IN THIS PERIOD WILL BE TO COMMIT THEMSELVES TO THE ELECTION CAMPAIGN AND NOT TO SEEK TO SET UP PARALLEL ADMINISTRATIONS OF THEIR OWN OR TO IMPEDE THE GOVERNOR IN HIS TASK. THERE WILL BE AN ELECTION COUNCIL ON WHICH ALL PARTIES WILL BE REPRESENTED. THE LONGER THE INTERIM PERIOD LASTS BEFORE

PEOPLE OF RHODESIA ARE GIVEN THE CHANCE TO DECIDE THEIR POLITICAL FUTURE FOR THEMSELVES, THE GREATER WILL BE THE RISK OF A BREAK-DOWN OF THE CEASE-FIRE. WE WILL NOT BE PREPARED TO ASSUME RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE ADMINISTRATION OF RHODESIA FOR LONGER THAN IS NECESSARY TO ENABLE ELECTIONS TO BE HELD IN WHICH ALL THE PARTIES WILL BE ABLE TO PARTICIPATE WITH EQUAL CHANCES OF SUCCESS.

BISHOP MUZOREWA HAS ANNOUNCED HIS ACCEPTANCE OF OUR PROPOSALS. I AM SURE YOU WILL REALISE THAT THIS WAS A DIFFICULT DECISION FOR HIM. HE IS BEING ASKED TO RELINQUISH POWER, TO ENTRUST BOTH EXECUTIVE AND LEGISLATIVE AUTHORITY TO A BRITISH GOVERNOR, AND TO GO THROUGH ELECTIONS FOR THE SECOND TIME IN 9 MONTHS THIS TIME WITH PATRIOTIC FRONT PARTICIPATION, AND HE HAS AGREED TO DO SO. THERE IS A TENDENCY TO IMAGINE THAT WE ARE ENGAGED IN NEGOTIATIONS ONLY WITH THE PATRIOTIC FRONT, AND THAT THERE IS NO NEED TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF THE VIEWS OF THE SALISBURY DELEGATION. THIS IS NOT THE CASE. BISHOP MUZOREWA HAS NOW BEEN PUSHED AS FAR AS IS POSSIBLE IN THIS NEGOTIATION. WE SHALL NOT BE ABLE TO REQUIRE HIM TO DO MORE.

IT IS ESSENTIAL TO OUR STRATEGY IN THIS PHASE OF THE CONFERENCE THAT WE SHOULD FIRST SEEK AGREEMENT ON THE GENERAL PROPOSALS WE HAVE PUT FORWARD FOR THE INTERIM PERIOD. IF THESE ARE ACCEPTED, WE WILL BE ABLE TO PROCEED TO THE FINAL PHASE OF THE CONFERENCE. THIS WILL INVOLVE NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE COMMANDERS ON BOTH SIDES, UNDER OUR CHAIRMANSHIP ON A CEASE-FIRE AND ITS OBSERVANCE. THE RHODESIAN SECURITY FORCES IN THIS PERIOD WILL BE UNDER THE AUTHORITY OF THE GOVERNOR ASSISTED BY A BRITISH MILITARY ADVISER. THE POLICE WILL BE SUPERVISED BY THE GOVERNOR, WHO WILL HAVE A POLICE ADVISER AND SUPPORTING STAFF. THE COMMANDERS OF THE PATRIOTIC FRONT WILL BE RESPONSIBLE TO THE GOVERNOR, IN RELATION TO THE MAINTENANCE OF THE CEASE-FIRE. THERE WILL BE A CEASE-FIRE COMMISSION, UNDER THE CHAIRMANSHIP OF THE GOVERNOR'S MILITARY ADVISER, ON WHICH THE COMMANDERS OF BOTH SIDES WILL BE REPRESENTED. THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR DEALING WITH BREACHES OF THE CEASE-FIRE WILL IN THE FIRST INSTANCE REST WITH THEM. THERE WILL ALSO NEED TO BE ARRANGEMENTS FOR MONITORING THE CEASE-FIRE.

AS WE HAVE MADE CLEAR, OBSERVERS FROM ANY COMMONWEALTH COUNTRIES WHO WISH TO SEND THEM WILL BE INVITED TO OBSERVE THE ELECTIONS AND TO WITNESS THE WAY IN WHICH WE CARRY OUT OUR RESPONSIBILITY. BISHOP MUZOREWA WILL NOT, HOWEVER, BE

RED TO ACCEPT ANY ROLE IN RELATION TO SUPERVISION OF THE
.SE-FIRE FOR GOVERNMENTS WHICH ARE ALREADY COMMITTED TO
SUPPORT THE PATRIOTIC FRONT.

WE ARE CLOSER TO A SOLUTION THAN WE HAVE EVER BEEN BEFORE.
THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE PLAN WE HAVE PUT FORWARD AND PREVIOUS
PROPOSALS WHICH HAVE BEEN MADE FOR A SETTLEMENT IS THE
VERY IMPORTANT ONE THAT WE ARE IN A POSITION TO PUT THIS PLAN INTO
EFFECT. WE HOPE THAT THE PATRIOTIC FRONT WILL AGREE TO
PARTICIPATE AND WE SHALL BE INTENSIFYING OUR EFFORTS TO GET
THEM TO DO SO. IT WILL NOT, HOWEVER, BE POSSIBLE
TO PUT INTO EFFECT SOME OTHER PLAN, AND IT WOULD BE FATAL TO THE
CHANCES OF SUCCESS IF THE PATRIOTIC FRONT WERE LED TO BELIEVE
THAT IT MAY BE.

I WOULD LIKE TO MAKE ONE FINAL POINT. BISHOP MUZOREWA HAS
ACCEPTED THE INDEPENDENCE CONSTITUTION. HE IS PREPARED TO HAND
OVER POWER TO A BRITISH GOVERNOR, AND HE IS READY TO FACE
NEW ELECTIONS. IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES I WOULD BE MISLEADING YOU
IF I LED YOU TO BELIEVE THAT THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT WOULD CONSIDER
IT REASONABLE THAT RHODESIA SHOULD REMAIN IN A STATE OF ILLEGALITY
IF THE PATRIOTIC FRONT ARE NOT PREPARED TO PUT THEIR POLITICAL
SUPPORT TO THE TEST IN ELECTIONS UNDER OUR AUTHORITY.

I HOPE THAT THE PATRIOTIC FRONT WILL ACCEPT THE SINCERITY
OF OUR INTENTIONS AND OUR DETERMINATION TO ENSURE THE IMPARTIALITY
OF THE ELECTION PROCESS, AND THAT THEY WILL BE PREPARED TO
PARTICIPATE IN THE ELECTIONS. IN THAT EVENT, FOR THE FIRST
TIME IN THE LONG HISTORY OF THESE NEGOTIATIONS, A SOLUTION WILL BE
WITHIN OUR GRASP. THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT IS DOING ALL IT CAN
TO FULFIL ITS PART OF THE LUSAKA AGREEMENT, AND I HOPE THAT I CAN
COUNT ON YOUR CONTINUED SUPPORT.

CARRINGTON

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FM F C O 301105Z OCT 79

TO IMMEDIATE MAPUTO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 134 OF 30 OCTOBER 1979.

INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK, WASHINGTON AND LUANDA.

PRIME MINISTER'S

PERSONAL MESSAGE

SERIAL No. T.130B/RT

MY TELNO 351 TO DAR ES SALAAM : RHODESIA

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT MACHEL:-

1. RICHARD LUCE HAS GIVEN ME AN ACCOUNT OF HIS DISCUSSIONS WITH MR CHISSANO ON 22 OCTOBER ABOUT RHODESIA AND OUR PROPOSALS FOR THE PRE-INDEPENDENCE PERIOD.
2. WE NOW HAVE THE PATRIOTIC FRONT'S RESPONSE TO OUR PROPOSALS. THEY QUESTION THE BASIC PREMISE OF THE PLAN WE HAVE PUT FORWARD, NAMELY THAT, IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE AGREEMENT AT LUSAKS, ELECTIONS SHOULD BE SUPERVISED UNDER BRITISH AUTHORITY, WITH COMMONWEALTH OBSERVERS PRESENT.
3. I VERY MUCH AGREE WITH THE VIEW MR CHISSANO PUT TO MR LUCE THAT CONDITIONS SHOULD BE CREATED WHICH WILL ENABLE ALL THOSE COMPETING FOR POWER TO HAVE A FAIR OPPORTUNITY OF SECURING IT THROUGH FREE AND DEMOCRATIC ELECTIONS. THAT IS PRECISELY WHAT THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT IS OFFERING TO ARRANGE. MY GOVERNMENT REGARD IT AS BRITAIN'S RESPONSIBILITY TO BRING RHODESIA TO LEGAL INDEPENDENCE, TO SUPERVISE THE ELECTIONS AND TO ENSURE THAT THE ARRANGEMENTS ARE FAIR AS BETWEEN THE PARTIES. WE ARE READY TO CARRY OUT TO THE FULL OUR RESPONSIBILITIES AS THE DE-COLONISING POWER, AS THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY HAS SO OFTEN URGED US TO DO. BUT WE SHALL NOT BE PREPARED TO AGREE TO ARRANGEMENTS WHICH GO WELL BEYOND THAT AGREEMENT OR WHICH WOULD MAKE IT IMPOSSIBLE FOR US TO EXERCISE OUR AUTHORITY. IT IS THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT WHICH WILL HAVE TO ASSUME DIRECT RESPONSIBILITY FOR RHODESIA IN THIS PERIOD.
4. AS TO THE LENGTH OF THIS PERIOD, I KNOW THAT YOU YOURSELF HAVE SAID TO MR PAPADOPOULOS THAT IT SHOULD BE AS SHORT AS POSSIBLE. I AGREE. THE LONGER THE INTERIM PERIOD LASTS, THE GREATER THE RISKS OF A BREAKDOWN OF THE CEASE-FIRE. OUR CONCERN IS THAT THE

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PEOPLE OF RHODESIA MUST BE GIVEN THE OPPORTUNITY TO DECIDE THEIR POLITICAL FUTURE FOR THEMSELVES. WE SHALL NOT BE PREPARED TO TRANSFER POWER TO ANY PARTY WHICH HAS NOT WON IT THROUGH ELECTIONS.

5. WHAT WE MUST SEEK IN THE NEXT PHASE OF THE CONFERENCE IS THE AGREEMENT OF BOTH SIDES OF THE GENERAL STRUCTURE OF THE INTERIM PERIOD - NAMELY THE RE-ASSERTION OF BRITISH AUTHORITY, A GOVERNOR WITH FULL EXECUTIVE AND LEGISLATIVE AUTHORITY EXERTING DIRECT CONTROL OVER THE ADMINISTRATION, AND THE ARRANGEMENTS FOR ELECTIONS. THE PROPOSALS WE HAVE PUT FORWARD INVOLVE BISHOP MUZOREWA AND HIS MINISTERS RELINQUISHING POWER TO ENABLE NEW ELECTIONS TO BE HELD UNDER OUR AUTHORITY. BISHOP MUZOREWA HAS SAID THAT HE IS PREPARED TO ACCEPT THESE PROPOSALS, WHICH INVOLVE VERY DIFFICULT DECISIONS FOR HIM, IN THE INTERESTS OF ACHIEVING INTERNATIONAL RECOGNITION AND THE PROSPECT OF A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT. THERE IS NO DOUBT, THEREFORE, THAT UNLIKE SOME PREVIOUS EFFORTS TO REACH A SETTLEMENT, WE ARE IN A POSITION TO PUT THESE PLANS INTO EFFECT. IF THEY ARE ACCEPTED BY BOTH SIDES, IT WILL BE POSSIBLE TO PROCEED TO THE FINAL PHASE OF THE CONFERENCE, WHICH MUST CONCERN ITSELF WITH THE NEGOTIATIONS FOR A CEASE-FIRE. I HAVE NO DOUBT THAT IT WILL BE VERY MUCH EASIER TO RESOLVE THE DIFFICULTIES WHICH ARE LIKELY TO ARISE IN THAT PHASE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS ON THE BASIS OF PRIOR AGREEMENT BY BOTH SIDES ON THE ACCEPTANCE OF BRITISH AUTHORITY AND OUR GENERAL PROPOSALS FOR THE INTERIM PERIOD.

6. I VERY MUCH HOPE THAT THE PATRIOTIC FRONT WILL ACCEPT THE SINCERITY OF OUR INTENTIONS AND OUR DETERMINATION TO ENSURE THE IMPARTIALITY OF THE ELECTION PROCESS. IN THAT EVENT WE SHALL HAVE WITHIN OUR GRASP A SOLUTION WHICH WILL BRING PEACE TO RHODESIA AND TO MOZAMBIQUE.

CARRINGTON

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SIR A DUFF
LORD N G LENNOX
MISS BROWN
MR DAY
MR WILLSON
MR ASPIN

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION
RHODESIA POLICY

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Subject

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GRS 750

PRIME MINISTER'S

PERSONAL MESSAGE

SERIAL No. T130A/79T

CONFIDENTIAL

FM F.C.O. 301105Z OCT 79

TO IMMEDIATE GABORONE

TELEGRAM NUMBER 204 OF 30 OCTOBER

INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK AND WASHINGTON.

MY TEL NO 351 TO DAR ES SALAAM: RHODESIA

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT KHAMA:-

1. RICHARD LUCE EXPLAINED TO MR MOGWE ON 21 OCTOBER THE PROPOSALS WE ARE PUTTING FORWARD TO ENABLE ELECTIONS TO BE HELD UNDER OUR AUTHORITY TO BRING THE INDEPENDENCE CONSTITUTION FOR RHODESIA INTO EFFECT. I WAS GREATLY ENCOURAGED BY MR TURNER'S ACCOUNT OF HIS CONVERSATION WITH YOU ON 3 OCTOBER. I AM MOST GRATEFUL FOR THE APPRECIATION YOU EXPRESSED OF OUR EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE A SETTLEMENT. I CAN ASSURE YOU THAT THERE WILL BE NO LACK OF DETERMINATION ON OUR PART IN SEEKING TO ACHIEVE A SATISFACTORY OUTCOME IN THE NEXT STAGE OF THE CONFERENCE.
2. WE NOW HAVE THE PATRIOTIC FRONT'S RESPONSE TO OUR PROPOSALS. THEY QUESTION THE BASIC PREMISE OF THE PLAN WE HAVE PUT FORWARD, NAMELY THAT, IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE AGREEMENT AT LUSAKA, ELECTIONS SHOULD BE SUPERVISED UNDER BRITISH AUTHORITY, WITH COMMONWEALTH OBSERVERS PRESENT.
3. AS YOU KNOW, MY GOVERNMENT REGARD IT AS BRITAIN'S RESPONSIBILITY TO BRING RHODESIA TO LEGAL INDEPENDENCE TO SUPERVISE THE ELECTIONS AND TO ENSURE THAT THE ARRANGEMENTS ARE FAIR AS BETWEEN THE PARTIES. WE ARE TAKING ACTION TO GIVE EFFECT TO THE LUSAKA AGREEMENT. AS I ASSURED YOU BEFORE THE CONFERENCE BEGAN, WE ARE READY TO CARRY OUT TO THE FULL OUR RESPONSIBILITIES AS THE DE-COLONISING POWER. BUT WE SHALL NOT BE PREPARED TO AGREE TO ARRANGEMENTS WHICH GO WELL BEYOND THAT AGREEMENT OR WHICH WOULD MAKE IT IMPOSSIBLE FOR US TO EXERCISE OUR AUTHORITY. IT IS THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT WHICH WILL HAVE TO ASSUME DIRECT RESPONSIBILITY FOR RHODESIA IN THIS PERIOD. WE WILL ONLY BE PREPARED TO DO SO UNDER CONDITIONS AND FOR A PERIOD IN WHICH WE CAN BE CONFIDENT THAT WE WILL BE ABLE TO CARRY OUT THAT RESPONSIBILITY. WHAT IS REQUIRED IS NOT A COMPLICATED

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TRANSITIONAL STRUCTURE, WHICH WOULD RENDER IT IMPOSSIBLE FOR US TO CARRY OUT OUR RESPONSIBILITY, BUT FOR THE PEOPLE OF RHODESIA TO BE ENABLED TO DECIDE FOR THEMSELVES WHAT GOVERNMENT THEY WANT IN FAIR ELECTIONS. THE LONGER THE INTERIM PERIOD LASTS BEFORE THE PEOPLE OF RHODESIA HAVE BEEN GIVEN THE CHANCE TO DECIDE THEIR POLITICAL FUTURE FOR THEMSELVES, THE GREATER WILL BE THE RISK OF A BREAK-DOWN OF THE CEASE-FIRE. IT IS VERY MUCH IN THE RHODESIAN PEOPLE'S INTERESTS AND IN THOSE OF THE PEOPLE OF THE NEIGHBOURING COUNTRIES THAT THEY SHOULD BE GIVEN THAT OPPORTUNITY AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. WE SHALL NOT BE PREPARED TO TRANSFER POWER TO ANY PARTY WHICH HAS NOT WON IT THROUGH ELECTIONS.

4. WHAT WE MUST SEEK IN THE NEXT PHASE OF THE CONFERENCE IS THE AGREEMENT OF BOTH SIDES OF THE GENERAL STRUCTURE OF THE INTERIM PERIOD - NAMELY THE RE-ASSERTION OF BRITISH AUTHORITY, A GOVERNOR WITH FULL EXECUTIVE AND LEGISLATIVE AUTHORITY EXERTING DIRECT CONTROL OVER THE ADMINISTRATION, AND THE ARRANGEMENTS FOR ELECTIONS. THE PROPOSALS WE HAVE PUT FORWARD INVOLVE BISHOP MUZOREWA AND HIS MINISTERS RELINQUISHING POWER TO ENABLE NEW ELECTIONS TO BE HELD UNDER OUR AUTHORITY. BISHOP MUZOREWA HAS SAID THAT HE IS PREPARED TO ACCEPT THESE PROPOSALS, WHICH INVOLVE VERY DIFFICULT DECISIONS FOR HIM, IN THE INTERESTS OF ACHIEVING INTERNATIONAL RECOGNITION AND THE PROSPECT OF A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT. THERE IS NO DOUBT, THEREFORE, THAT UNLIKE SOME PREVIOUS EFFORTS TO REACH A SETTLEMENT, WE ARE IN A POSITION TO PUT THESE PLANS INTO EFFECT. IF THEY ARE ACCEPTED BY BOTH SIDES, IT WILL BE POSSIBLE TO PROCEED TO THE FINAL PHASE OF THE CONFERENCE, WHICH MUST CONCERN ITSELF WITH THE NEGOTIATIONS FOR A CEASE-FIRE. I HAVE NO DOUBT THAT IT WILL BE VERY MUCH EASIER TO RESOLVE THE DIFFICULTIES WHICH ARE LIKELY TO ARISE IN THAT PHASE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS ON THE BASIS OF PRIOR AGREEMENT BY BOTH SIDES ON THE ACCEPTANCE OF BRITISH AUTHORITY AND OUR GENERAL PROPOSALS FOR THE INTERIM PERIOD.

5. I HOPE THAT THE PATRIOTIC FRONT WILL ACCEPT THE SINCERITY OF OUR INTENTIONS AND OUR DETERMINATION TO ENSURE THE IMPARTIALITY OF THE ELECTIONS PROCESS. IN THAT EVENT A SOLUTION WILL BE WITHIN OUR GRASP. IT WILL BE A TRAGEDY FOR RHODESIA AND FOR HER NEIGHBOURS IF, NOW THAT GENUINE MAJORITY RULE HAS BEEN ACHIEVED UNDER THE NEW CONSTITUTION, ANY OF THE PARTIES WILL NOT BE PREPARED TO PUT THEIR POLITICAL SUPPORT TO THE TEST IN ELECTIONS UNDER OUR AUTHORITY.

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6. I VERY MUCH HOPE THAT WE CAN COUNT ON YOUR SUPPORT. THIS COULD BE DECISIVE TO THE CHANCES OF SUCCESS. WE ARE LOOKING FOR A SOLUTION WHICH WILL BRING PEACE TO RHODESIA AND TO BOTSWANA AND ENABLE THE REFUGEES TO RETURN AS SOON AS POSSIBLE TO THEIR HOMES AND WE SHALL OF COURSE BE PREPARED TO DO ALL WE CAN TO ASSIST WITH THIS.

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ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION
RHODESIA POLICY

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PRIME MINISTER'S

PERSONAL MESSAGE

SERIAL No. T130/79T

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PS / ~~NO 10 DS~~

PS

PS / M Luce

Sir J Graham

Mr Daryl

Mr Byatt

263555 PRORME G

OCTOBER 30, 1979

ETATPRIORITE

THE RIGHT HONOURABLE MARGARET THATCHER
PRIME MINISTER OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND
10DOMINING STREET
LONDON

MADAM PRIME MINISTER COLON LET ME THANK YOUR GOVERNMENT FOR SENDING
THE HONOURABLE RICHARD LUCE CMA PARLIAMENTARY UNDER SECRETARY OF
YOUR MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AND COMMONWELATH AFFAIRS CMA TO BRIEF US
ON DEVELOPMENTS AT THE CONSTITUTIONAL TALKS IN LONDON STOP IN HIS
CONVERSATION WITH MY MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS CMA WE EXPRESSED
CONCERN OVER SEVERAL ASPECTS OF THE TRANSITIONAL ARRANGEMENTS AS
PROPOSED BY YOUR GOVERNMENT AND WE TRUST THAT HE HAS CONVEYED OUR
VIEWS TO YOUR FOREIGN SECRETARY STOP IT WAS OUR HOPE HOWEVER THAT IN
THE SPIRIT OF ACCOMODATION AND FLEXIBILITY CMA AN ATTITUDE OF GIVE
AND TAKE CMA NEGOTIATIONS AMONG THE PARTIES WOULD PROGRESS UNTIL AN
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A SETTLEMENT OF COMPLEXED ISSUES SUCH AS THOSE INHERENT IN THE ZIMBABWEAN PROBLEM CANNOT BE EXPECTED TO BE RESOLVED IF TOLERANCE AND FLEXIBILITY ARE NOT ALLOWED TO BE MADE MANIFEST IN THE NEGOTIATIONS STOP YOUR GOVERNMENT HAS SET FORTH TO THE PARTIES WHAT IT WOULD LIKE TO SEE AS THE PROCESS FOR IMPLEMENTING THE INDEPENDENCE CONSTITUTION CMA AND SHOULD YOUR PROPOSALS BE ACCEPTED AS BEING MADE IN GOOD FAITH CMA THEN A TAKE IT OR LEAVE IT ATTITUDE WOULD NOT BE CONSISTANT WITH THE TRUE SPIRIT WHICH SHOULD CHARACTERIZE THE TALKS STOP THAT IS WHY WE FEEL SERIOUS CONSIDERATION SHOULD ALSO BE GIVEN TO THE PROPOSALS AS ADVANCED BY THE PATRIOTIC FRONT SO THAT THROUGH THE PROCESS OF NEGOTIATIONS AN ACCEPTABLE AGREEMENT TO ALL PARTIES CONCERNED MIGHT BE REACHED STOP SITUATION BEING WHAT THEY ARE IN ZIMBABWE CMA IT CANNOT BE CONSIDERED UNREASONABLE TO EXPECT THAT A FAIR AND JUST TRANSITIONAL ARRANGEMENT MIGHT TAKE INTO ACCOUNT AN IMPARTIAL ADMINISTRATIVE MACHINERY WHICH WOULD EQUALLY INVOLVE THE PARTIES STOP SOME MECHANISM WHICH WOULD AFFORD EQUAL CONDITONS FOR AND EQUAL PARTICIPATION BY THE RESPECTIVE MILITARY AND POLICE FORCES OF THE PARTIES CANNOT IN OUR VIEW BE SUMMARILY DISMISSED AS UNJUSTIFIABLE STOP YOUR GOVERNEMNT HAS PROPOSED TWO MONTHS FOR THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD AND THE PATRIOTIC FRONT HAS PROPOSED SIX MONTHS STOP WE SINCERELY FEEL THAT THE PERIOD OF SIX MONTHS IS NOT TOO LONG STOP WE FURTHER FEEL THAT THE INVOLVEMENT OF ANY INTERNATIONAL TEAM MUST ENVISAGE SOME FORM OF ACTION IN SUPERVISING THE ELECTIONS AND NO

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OF ZIMBABWE AND THEN TO THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY TO CONDUCT CMA
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APPREHENSIONS OF THE PATRIOTIC FRONT SHOULD BE APPRECIATED AND

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BRITAIN BY THE COMMONWEALTH CMA AFRICA AND THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY
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INTERNATIONALLY ACCEPTABLE FORMULA FOR THE TRANSITION TO GENUINE
INDEEPEENCE WITH MAJORITY RULE IN ZIMBABWE STOP WITH RENEWED
ASSURANCES OF MY HIGHEST ESTEEM SINCERELY

W R TOLBERT JR
PRESIDENT OF LIBERIA AND CURRENT CHAIRMAN OF
THE ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY

253565 PRDRME G
4501 FORMIN LI
HOW WELL RECVD?+

OK TKS
IS THIS THE FOREIGN OFFICE PSE?
YES
TKS AND BIBIBI

*Pils sent .**L. J. P. W.*

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London S.W.1

30 October 1979

Dear Michael,

RHODESIA: MESSAGE FROM MR MALCOLM FRASER

You asked for a draft reply to the message received on 29 October from Mr Malcolm Fraser about Rhodesia.

Lord Carrington spoke to Mr Peacock last night to explain fully to him the position now reached in the Conference. He emphasised the extent of the concessions made by Muzorewa; and the fact that it is Britain's responsibility to conduct the negotiations. I enclose a note on their conversation.

Mr Peacock implied that Mr Fraser's message may have been triggered by approaches from President Nyerere and Mr Manley. Mr Fraser obviously wishes to continue to play a role in relation to Rhodesia, as he did at Lusaka. His message contains an offer of possible Australian participation in the eventual arrangements for observance of the ceasefire. General Walls has said that he would be prepared to accept some Australian involvement. An indication that we may wish to invite the Australians to participate in a group intended to help monitor the ceasefire will be helpful in dealing with demands for a Commonwealth peace-keeping force, as well as in seeking to secure Australian support for the policy we are pursuing. Mr Peacock indicated to Lord Carrington that the Australians would be prepared to help with monitoring. Sir Donald Tebbit might be asked to pursue this in due course with the Australians. He has already been instructed to make clear that we would not be prepared to agree to a new Commonwealth meeting to re-interpret or re-formulate the Lusaka agreement.

I attach a draft reply in the form of a telegram to Canberra, which the Prime Minister may wish to send to Mr Fraser.

yours ever
Roderic Lyne

(R M J Lyne)


M O' D B Alexander Esq
10 Downing Street

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London S.W.1



30 OCT 1979



Mr. Penwick (Rhodesia Dept)

Conversation between the Secretary of State and the
Australian Foreign Minister

Lord Carrington spoke to Mr Andrew Peacock for twenty minutes on the telephone this evening.

Lord Carrington explained the position reached in the Constitutional Conference and emphasised that Bishop Muzorewa had made major concessions, for which he had not been given due recognition. People had the impression that the British Government were having to deal only with the Patriotic Front. They did not appreciate what it meant for Muzorewa to give up a position based on a 64% electoral turnout. We had pushed Bishop Muzorewa as far as he could go: there was nothing else we could ask him to do.

Lord Carrington said that the Patriotic Front were challenging every aspect of the proposed interim arrangements, and to support their position were seeking to have the Lusaka Agreement reinterpreted. The PF would like the small Commonwealth group responsible for drafting the Lusaka Agreement to say that the British Government was not doing what the CHGM had asked it to do. Lord Carrington said that we should not continue to conduct negotiations if people tried to change the ground rules in the middle. We had kept Presidents Kaunda, Nyerere, Machel and Khama closely informed. When Mr Luce had met them last week, none of the Presidents had queried the UK's supervision of the elections or suggested UN supervision. But the Patriotic Front were trying to change the basis of the negotiations by lobbying the Commonwealth, including the Jamaican Prime Minister who would be meeting Mrs Thatcher and Lord Carrington later in the day.

Mr Peacock said that the Australians had had a number of phone calls recently from Mr Manley, Mr Ramphal and others. Mr Manley had told Mr Fraser that there were only four problems for the PF in the pre-independence arrangements. The PF needed an interim period of six months. There should be an advisory council. There should be "equality" between the military forces of the two sides. (Mr Peacock had forgotten Mr Manley's fourth point).

Lord Carrington said that we could not accept a six month interim period. The ceasefire would not last this long. The delay would give rise to intrigue and tremendous internal problems. The positions of the parties were well known and two months was long enough to hold an election. Lord Carrington said that we could not fetter the Governor with an advisory council. He would have to be responsible for the administration during this short period. We had not yet discussed in the Conference matters relating to the ceasefire but we would have to try to separate the armies.

/ In

In relation to the ceasefire, Lord Carrington said that we were likely to need some monitoring, and might wish to ask the Australians to help with this. Mr Peacock assured him that the Australians would be prepared to help. In reply to a question from him, Lord Carrington said that the monitors would not be armed except for their own self-defence, and therefore need not necessarily be soldiers.

Mr Peacock said that Mr Fraser thought that each of Mr Manley's four points, taken separately, was reasonable. However it was clear from what Lord Carrington had said that they were unlikely to be agreed as a package, even if for example some compromise was possible on the length of the interim period.

Lord Carrington said that he did not think the three points mentioned by Mr Peacock were reasonable. Bishop Muzorewa had moved a very long way. The British Government had stuck their necks out in taking on responsibility for the interim period. Responsibility had to be left with the UK.

Mr Peacock said that any realist should see that a time had to come when authority needed to be exerted. He had taken careful note of what Lord Carrington had said and would report fully to Mr Fraser. In so doing, he might have to offset his advice to take account of the fact that Mr Fraser was being pushed the other way by those who had telephoned him recently. (Mr Peacock implied that he thought Mr Fraser had gone too far in sympathising with arguments put to him on behalf of the PF. Mr Peacock clearly welcomed the fact that Lord Carrington's call had given him some counter-arguments to put across).

In conclusion Lord Carrington emphasised that the British Government would regard it as intolerable if their friends took the side of the Patriotic Front after the progress which we had achieved at considerable effort over the past eight weeks. The head of steam building up within the UK on this issue should not be under-estimated. Mr Peacock indicated that he sympathised with Lord Carrington's view, and said that we should not underestimate the head of steam which would build up in Australia if the British Government put forward a solution and the Australian Government paused for one moment before supporting it.

I spoke to Sir Donald Tebbit earlier in the day about the points we wanted to put across to the Australians. He in turn has received calls from Mr Fraser, which he will be reporting by telegram. May I leave it to you to telegraph as much of the above as you think necessary to Sir Donald on a personal basis?

R M J Lyne

(R M J Lyne)

29 October 1979

cc: PS ✓ PS/LPS
Sir J Graham

PS/Mr Luce
Mr Day

PS/PUS
Mr Snodgrass (SPD)

File No.
Department PRIVATE OFFICE
Drafted by R M J LYNE
(Block Capitals)
Tel. Extn.

OUTWARD
TELEGRAM

Security Classification CONFIDENTIAL
Precedence IMMEDIATE
DESKBYZ

FOR COMMS. DEPT. USE	Despatched (Date) (Time)Z	POSTBYZ
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PREAMBLE

(Time of Origin) Z (G.M.T.) (Restrictive Prefix)
(Security Class.) CONFIDENTIAL (Caveat/ Privacy marking)
(Codeword) (Deskby)Z

TO IMMEDIATE CANBERRA Tel. No.of
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REPEATED TO (for info)

SAVING TO (for info)

Distribution: -

[TEXT]

PERSONAL FOR HIGH COMMISSIONER

1. Following is the text of a message from the Prime Minister to Mr Fraser which should be delivered as soon as possible:

Begins:

"Dear Prime Minister,

Thank you for your message about Rhodesia. I am grateful for what you say about the extent of what has been achieved so far in the talks at Lancaster House. We really have made progress and I only hope we can keep it up. I am also grateful for your suggestion that you are prepared to do whatever you can to help.

/As you

Copies to: -

As you will know, we put forward our proposals for the pre-independence arrangements on 22. October. These involve the assumption by Britain of direct responsibility for Rhodesia in this period. We are taking action to give effect step by step to the agreement we reached at Lusaka. But we will only be prepared to do so under conditions and for a period in which we can be confident that we will be able to carry out that responsibility. We will not be able to agree to arrangements which go well beyond what was agreed at Lusaka - still less to any attempts to re-interpret or re-formulate that agreement - or which would render the task of supervising the administration impossible for us.

NP

// It is central to our conception that in the interim period, the Governor should be responsible for the day to day administration. The role of the political leaders in this period will be to commit themselves to the election campaign and not to seek to set up parallel administrations of their own or to impede the Governor in his task. There will be an Election Council on which all parties will be represented. The longer the interim period lasts before

the people of Rhodesia are given the chance to decide their political future for themselves, the greater will be the risk of a break-down of the cease-fire. We will not be prepared to assume responsibility for the administration of Rhodesia for longer than is necessary to enable elections to be held in which all the parties will be able to participate with equal chances of success.

/Bishop

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TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

Bishop Muzorewa has announced his acceptance of our proposals. I am sure you will realise that this was a very difficult and painful decision for him. He is being asked to relinquish power, to entrust both executive and legislative authority to a British Governor, and to go through elections for this time with Patriotic Front participation; and the second time in 9 months, he has agreed to do so. There is a tendency to imagine that we are engaged in negotiations only with the Patriotic Front; and that there is no need to take account of the views of the Salisbury delegation. This is not the case. Bishop Muzorewa has now been pushed as far as is possible in this negotiation. We shall not be able to/ require him to do more.

It is essential to our strategy in this phase of the Conference that we should first seek agreement on the general proposals we have put forward for the interim period. If these are accepted, we will be able to proceed to the final phase of the Conference. This will involve negotiations between the commanders on both sides, under our chairmanship, on a cease-fire and its observance.

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/You raise

You raise the question of the status of the Rhodesian armed forces and of the forces controlled by the Patriotic Front. The Rhodesian security forces in this period will be under the authority of the Governor who will have a senior British officer as his Military Adviser. The police will be supervised by the Governor, who will have a Police Adviser and supporting staff. The commanders of the Patriotic Front will also be responsible to the Governor, in relation to the maintenance of the cease-fire. There will be a Cease-fire Commission, under the chairmanship of the Governor's Military Adviser, on which the commanders of both sides will be represented. The responsibility for dealing with breaches of the ceasefire^{will} in the first instance rest with them.

There will also need to be arrangements for monitoring the ceasefire. Some Commonwealth participation in this could be valuable and I am grateful to you for your readiness to help. We shall be asking Sir Donald Tebbit to pursue this with you. Bishop Muzorewa will not, however, be prepared to accept any role in relation to supervision of the ceasefire for governments which are already committed to support the Patriotic Front.

As regards the electoral process, we agreed at Lusaka to accept Commonwealth observers and will, of course, make arrangements for them to be able to witness the elections.

I agree with you that we are closer now to a break-through than ever before. The difference between the plan we have put forward and previous proposals which had been made for a settlement is the very important

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one that we are in a position to put this plan into effect. We hope that the Patriotic Front will agree to participate and we shall be intensifying our efforts to get them to do so. It will not, however, be possible to put into effect some other plan; and it would be fatal to the chances of success if the Patriotic Front were led to believe that it may be.

I would like to make one final point. ^{Bishop} / Muzorewa has accepted the independence Constitution. He is prepared to hand over power to a British Governor, and he is ready to face new elections. In these circumstances I would be misleading you if I led you to believe that the British Government would consider it reasonable for Rhodesia to remain in a state of illegality if the Patriotic Front were not prepared to put their political support to the test in elections under our authority. I hope very much that they will participate. We shall be continuing our efforts to get them to do so.

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Subject filed on
Jamaica: June 79: Visit
by Michael Manley.

RECORD OF A MEETING BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER AND THE PRIME
MINISTER OF JAMAICA, MR. MICHAEL MANLEY, ON 29 OCTOBER AT
2200 HOURS IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS

Present

The Prime Minister

Mr. Michael Manley

The Foreign and Commonwealth
Secretary

Mr. M. O'D. B. Alexander

* * * * *

After some discussion of Premier Hua's visit, Mr. Manley asked about progress at Lancaster House. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary described recent developments. The counter-proposal for the pre-Independence arrangements put in by the Patriotic Front contradicted the philosophy which had underlain HMG's approach to the problem ever since Lusaka. At Lusaka HMG had been urged to assume responsibility for the problem. Their decision to accept that responsibility had been courageous. The Constitution which had been negotiated was a very reasonable one: in agreeing to it both Bishop Muzorewa and the Patriotic Front had moved a long way from their earlier positions. Britain's interim proposals would, in effect, give the Governor power to do what he liked. Acceptance of the proposals would, again, take both sides on to new ground. The Bishop would have to agree to an Executive Governor in Rhodesia. There had never been an Executive Governor in Rhodesia before. The Patriotic Front would have to accept that a British Governor would be fair and neutral.

The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary stressed that it had been extremely difficult to bring Bishop Muzorewa as far as he had come. After all, he had been elected by 64 per cent of the people of Rhodesia and had, as a result, a genuine democratic right to be where he was. He was now being asked to surrender power to a Governor. It was not easy for the

/Bishop

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Bishop and would not be easy for Mr. Manley in similar circumstances. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary said that Mr. Manley, President Kaunda, President Nyerere and others seemed to have difficulty in accepting that Britain was negotiating with two sides. The Lancaster House Conference was not a case of HMG versus the Patriotic Front. A group of people who were in charge of the country and had been elected to their office were also involved. The Bishop had in fact accepted the Constitution and the pre-Independence proposals. This was a considerable achievement. Mr. Manley agreed.

The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary said that the task now was to persuade the Patriotic Front to accept the pre-Independence proposals. At present things were not going too well. But the appointment of a Governor was the only way to make people believe that the settlement was fair. No-one would accept as fair a situation in which Bishop Muzorewa was left in charge. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary said that he accepted there was a sense in which the appointment of a Governor was unfair to both sides. But people would have to trust Britain. The Prime Minister said that the negotiations had made a great deal of progress. The gains must not now be allowed to slip away. Mr. Manley and President Kaunda had been right to say that agreement on a Constitution could be secured but it had been extremely difficult to get Bishop Muzorewa to accept the new Constitution and elections. The problem had to be resolved, and soon. The Conference had been going on for a long time and occasionally had looked like running into the sand. Bishop Muzorewa had been away from his country for a long time, certainly longer than the Prime Minister would have been prepared to absent herself. Moreover, the negotiations were taking up too much of the time of the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary and his staff. She therefore felt a considerable sense of urgency.

/Mr. Manley

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Mr. Manley said that his only objective was to be helpful. He had no status in the matter other than that which stemmed from his participation in the Lusaka talks. He had just had a long session with the Patriotic Front. He had the impression that the Prime Minister and the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary were close to pulling off a fantastic achievement. He was speaking not just in narrow political terms but in terms of a benefit to the world as a whole. Precisely because achieving an agreement was so close, he wanted to ask whether HMG's position was still flexible or whether it was now hard and final. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary said that he had pushed Bishop Muzorewa just about as far as was possible. Politics was the art of the possible. The Bishop had already agreed to give up control of his Government. If he conceded any more he would be regarded as a failure by his electorate. In an ideal situation, further concessions might be made to the position of the Patriotic Front, e.g. the offer of a longer interim period. But if this were agreed, the results would be (a) that the ceasefire would break down and (b) that the jockeying and intrigue among the various political parties would be so prolonged and intense that the election might never take place.

Mr. Manley said that he understood the difficulties of Bishop Muzorewa's position. But he did not think that it would be possible to organise a fair election in two months. The sheer logistical difficulties of getting the refugees back and preparing for the elections would be insurmountable. The interim period might not need to be as long as six months but there was what Mr. Manley described as a genuine feeling in many quarters that two months was too short. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary repeated that of course in an ideal world one might have an interim longer than two months, but it should be borne in mind that:

/(a)

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(a) The two months would start from the onset of the ceasefire.

(b) Full registration would take far longer than six months. It had taken a year in Botswana. With anti-fraud devices and regional lists, a fair, if not ideal, election could be held.

(c) The refugees would have two full months in which to return. Failing this, they could vote where they were. Mr. Nkomo, after all, wanted ^{his army} to stay where it was.

The Prime Minister noted that President Machel favoured an interim period of two or three months. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary said that if the interim period was more than two or three months there would be no election.

Mr. Manley repeated that if the interim was compressed too much the negotiations would collapse. The Patriotic Front were not being intransigent. There was a negotiating element in their present posture. He would be willing to speak strongly to them about the need for speed in the interim and about the need for them to get on with the negotiations. The Prime Minister said this would be very helpful.

Mr. Manley said that it would greatly assist matters if there could be agreement that the Commonwealth Group of Observers could enter Rhodesia as early as possible. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary said he was prepared to be flexible on this but that Mr. Ramphal's recent statement had caused a great deal of difficulty. Bishop Muzorewa had regarded it as very unfair and he himself had been much put out. He offered to send Mr. Manley the text of the statement.

/Reverting

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Reverting to the length of the interim period, the Prime Minister repeated that one could not have a Governor with full executive and legislative powers in Rhodesia for very long. If things went wrong as a result of a prolonged interim, the Governor might, for instance, be driven to ask for troops from Britain. This could not be allowed to happen.

Mr. Manley asked about the military position. There were two armies in Rhodesia, neither of which had been defeated. Would it be possible to get a settlement without acknowledging that the two armies had equal status and a similar role in the interim? The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary said that the idea would be to separate the two armies and bring them under the authority of the Governor. A monitoring unit would be established, including the commanders of the armies. It would report to the Governor's military adviser who would be British. The monitoring unit would be responsible for identifying and dealing with breaches of the ceasefire. Mr. Manley asked whether this meant that Britain would recognise that both armies were military realities, were in the country, and had equal status. Britain would not be saying that Bishop Muzorewa's army was the only force they recognised? The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary repeated that the intention would be to separate the armies and recognise the presence of both. Mr. Manley repeated that this was a critical issue. Britain did not, as he now understood it, envisage "Smith's army" charging up and down the country in jeeps with the Patriotic Front backed up in one corner. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary said that the negotiations had not got that far. The ceasefire and separation were clearly essential. If they could be achieved, then General Walls and General Tongogara would have to get together under the chairmanship of a British General and talk about the modalities. Both armies would have to come under the Governor's authority. If problems arose,

/the Governor

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the Governor would be responsible for the necessary decisions. Whether the thing would work would depend on the will of both sides to observe a ceasefire.

Mr. Manley asked whether Britain had a rooted objection to a Commonwealth force. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary replied in the affirmative. A Commonwealth force would be like a UN force and would be unable to do anything. There would be no problem about the monitors being drawn from Commonwealth countries. Mr. Manley said that he was much encouraged by what was being said about the position of the two armies. It had been widely believed that "Smith's army" would be the only one recognised by the Governor. But as he now understood it the Governor would acknowledge two armies, there would be a monitoring commission and the Governor might call on elements of one or other of the armies to assist him. There would be no problem about such an arrangement. (Indeed, Mr. Manley described what the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary had been saying as "terrific".) The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary said that he did not want to deceive Mr. Manley. On the one hand, there would be a formed army, on the other hand a guerrilla army. The difference between them would have to be taken into account. But the principle would be that both were under the command of the Governor. There would be occasions when the Governor would wish to use an element of one or the other or both. But the fact was that while General Walls could control his forces it was much more doubtful whether the Patriotic Front commanders could do so. This was not for reasons of ill-will but because the Patriotic Front's forces were guerrillas. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary stressed that what he had been saying had been the subject of negotiation with no-one. Mr. Manley said that none the less he was feeling much more hopeful.

/Mr. Manley

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Mr. Manley asked whether Britain would have any objection to the establishment of an advisory group under the authority of the Governor to which he could refer and from which he could receive advice. The council would be under the chairmanship of the Governor and might have four representatives of the Patriotic Front and four of the Salisbury regime. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary said that an advisory council discussing administrative matters would only cause trouble. These would be the responsibility of the Governor. On the other hand, there would be an Electoral Council to supervise the fairness of the elections. The Prime Minister said that the difficulties that would be encountered by anything like an advisory council underlined the need for brevity in the interim. The administration of the country would be on a razor's edge. One could not sit there for long.

Mr. Manley said that what he had heard on the military position and on the Electoral Council seemed to him unlikely to give rise to problems. He liked the way the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary had formulated the position on the two armies. The length of the interim period, however, was likely to prove crucial. The Prime Minister said that two months seemed to her a long time. The Governor would not be able to control the situation for much longer than that. Nor would HMG be prepared to put in troops. As the Viscount incident had shown, there were considerable doubts as to whether the Patriotic Front had adequate control of their forces. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary said that the issues in the election were already well known: the short period would not prevent any of the participants making their position clear. Mr. Manley repeated that agreement was very close. Six months was no doubt too long, but two months was too short. A compromise on this point might make the difference between triumph and tragedy. The Prime Minister said that if HMG were to show too much flexibility, the negotiations would collapse. The Patriotic Front and the Front Line States should not try to push Britain too far. However, she noted what Mr. Manley had said and undertook to consider the position.

The discussion ended at 2300 hours.
30 October 1979

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FM DAR ES SALAAM 290900Z OCTOBER 79

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELNO 848 OF 29 OCTOBER

INFO PRIORITY LUSAKA, MAPUTO, GABORONE, LAGOS, LUANDA,
MONROVIA, ADDIS ABABA, WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK

MY TELNO 846 AND 847: RHODESIA

1. THE US AMBASSADOR ALSO WAS SUMMONED BY PRESIDENT NYERERE ON 28 OCTOBER. NYERERE SPOKE ON THE SAME LINES AS HE HAD SPOKEN TO ME. IN REPLY TO A DIRECT QUESTION FROM MR VIETS AS TO WHETHER HE REGARDED SIX MONTHS AS A MINIMUM FOR THE PRE-INDEPENDENCE PERIOD NYERERE SAID THAT IN HIS VIEW IT WAS A MINIMUM. HOWEVER, AFTER SOME FURTHER DISCUSSION, HE INDICATED THAT HE COULD NOT IMAGINE THE CONFERENCE BREAKING DOWN ON THIS POINT.
2. NYERERE STRESSED TO VIETS THE IMPORTANCE OF THE ROLE OF THE COMMONWEALTH OBSERVERS AND SAID THAT HE WOULD BE TALKING TO COMMONWEALTH HIGH COMMISSIONERS IN DAR ES SALAAM. HE TOLD VIETS THAT HE WISHED TO AVOID THIS QUESTION BECOMING A MAJOR ISSUE OF CONFLICT. I SUGGESTED TO VIETS THAT WE SHOULD BOTH MAKE CLEAR TO OUR COMMONWEALTH COLLEAGUES HERE THAT WE SEE THE ROLE OF THE COMMONWEALTH OBSERVERS AS TO OBSERVE THE ELECTIONS AND NOT IN ANY WAY AS A PEACEKEEPING FORCE.
3. VIETS SAID THAT NYERERE HAD BEEN COMPLIMENTARY OF YOUR RUNNING OF THE CONFERENCE AND HAD BEEN CRITICAL OF THE PATRIOTIC FRONT FOR DRAGGING THEIR FEET AT THE FINAL STAGES OF THE DISCUSSION OF THE CONSTITUTION. HE HAD SAID THAT HE WAS PREPARED TO "LEAN ON THE PATRIOTIC FRONT" (NYERERE'S OWN PHRASE) BUT MUST HAVE SOME HELP FROM US.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

4. VIETS SAID THAT MR MKAPA, WHOM HE HAD SEEN ON 27 OCTOBER, HAD SPOKEN ON MUCH THE SAME LINES AS NYERERE BUT HIS TONE HAD BEEN SOMEWHAT HARsher, AND HE HAD BEEN INCLINED TO BE CRITICAL OF OUR CONDUCT OF THE NEGOTIATIONS AS TOO "SCHOOLMASTERLY".

MOON

FILES

RHOD DEPT
OADS
NAD
PUSD
PLANNING STAFF
ES & SD
CCD
FRD
UND

LEGAL ADVISERS (MR FREELAND)
(MR FIFOOT)

ECON DEPT
PCD
DEF DEPT
OID
NEWS DEPT

PS

PS/SIR I GILMOUR
PS/MR LUCE
PS/MR RIDLEY
PS/MR HURD
PS/PUS
SIR J GRAHAM
LORD N G LENNOX
MISS BROWN
MR DAY
MR WILLSON
MR ASPIN

ADDITIONAL DIST.
RHODESIA POLICY



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London S.W.1

29 October 1979

*P.A. has approved
texts for despatch. F.C.O. informed*

Dear Michael,

*for
Rhodesia 30/10*

Rhodesia

Bishop Muzorewa has said that he is prepared to accept our proposals for the pre-independence period in Rhodesia. This has involved difficult decisions for him. The Patriotic Front are seeking to insist on a United Nations presence and UN supervision of the elections. They will be appealing to some Commonwealth governments to "re-interpret" the Lusaka agreement.

Mr Luce visited the Front Line States and Nigeria last week to explain our approach in this phase of the Conference. Lord Carrington believes that it would be helpful at this stage if the Prime Minister were to send messages to the Presidents of the Front Line States and Nigeria to thank them for seeing Mr Luce, and to point out that we are seeking to give effect to the Lusaka agreement, but will not be ready to accept arrangements which were never envisaged at Lusaka. President Kaunda has already written to the Prime Minister following Mr Luce's visit to Lusaka (Lusaka telno 1154); and President Nyerere has raised a number of points with Sir Peter Moon (Dar-es-Salaam telnos 846 and 847).

I enclose draft messages to Presidents Kaunda, Nyerere, Khama, Machel and Shagari, together with copies of the telegrams* reporting Mr Luce's discussions with them or their Foreign Ministers. We propose to despatch these by telegram as soon as we have your approval.

Yours sincerely,

Ray Lunn

PP. R M J Lyne

M O'D B Alexander Esq
10 Downing Street

* Telegrams for follow attached.
30.10.79

29 OCT 1979

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DRAFT MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT KAUNDA

Dear Kenneth,

Thank you for talking so fully to Richard Luce on 20 October and for your subsequent letter about the Rhodesia Conference which reached me on 27 October.

2. I agree with most of the points you make in your letter and in particular that we are closer now to a solution than we have ever been before. There are one or two points on which we take a different view. These may not be important in relation to the area of agreement between us; but I would like to explain why.

3. You are concerned that two months may not be long enough to arrange for the holding of elections. I cannot believe that any of the parties will need more than two months to state their case to the electorate, and this is what is essential. It is Britain which will have to take direct responsibility for Rhodesia in this period. We will only be prepared to do so under conditions and for a period in which we can be confident that we will be able to carry out that responsibility. What is required is not a complicated transitional structure, which would render it impossible for us to carry out our responsibility, but for the people of Rhodesia to be enabled to decide for themselves what government they want in fair elections. The longer the interim period lasts before the people of Rhodesia have been given the chance to decide their political future for themselves, the greater will be the risk of a break-down of the cease-fire. It is very much in the Rhodesian people's interests and in those of the people of the neighbouring countries that they should be given that opportunity as soon as possible. We shall not be prepared to transfer power to

any party which has not won^{it} through fair elections.

4. The registration of voters would be likely to take much longer than the six months you envisage. This would be too long to wait to resolve a problem which is of extreme and growing urgency. We have no doubt that it will be possible, as it has been in other countries, to carry out a fair election without prior registration, provided there are adequate safeguards against double voting and other mal-practices.

5. I entirely agree that an effective cease-fire must be an essential part of any agreement on the arrangements leading to independence. The essential ingredient in this will be the political will of the parties themselves to observe the cease-fire and to stand by the results of the elections, whatever it may be. I do not share your interpretation that at Lusaka there was agreement to an international force. But when we reach that stage of the negotiations we shall be ready to arrange discussions about a cease-fire between the military commanders on both sides; and this must include ~~the~~ effective arrangements for its observance.

6. What we must seek in the next phase of the Conference is the agreement of both sides on the general structure of the interim period - namely the re-assertion of British authority, a Governor with full executive and legislative authority exerting direct control over the administration, and the arrangements for elections. The proposals we have

put forward involve ^{He and his colleagues have agreed to} Bishop Muzorewa ~~and his Ministers~~ relinquishing power to enable new elections to be held under our authority. ~~Bishop Muzorewa has said that he is prepared to accept these proposals,~~ ^{They has} which involved very difficult decisions for him, in the interests of achieving international recognition and the prospect of a peaceful settlement. There is no doubt, therefore, that unlike some previous efforts to reach a settlement, we are in a position to put these plans into effect. If they are accepted by both sides, it will be possible to proceed to the final phase of the Conference, which must concern itself with the negotiations for a cease-fire. I have no doubt that it will be very much easier to resolve the difficulties which are likely to arise in that phase of the negotiations on the basis of prior agreement by both sides on the acceptance of British authority and our general proposals for the interim period.

7. I very much hope that the Patriotic Front will accept the sincerity of our intentions and our determination to ensure the impartiality of the election process. In that event a solution will be within our grasp. In view of all this would mean for the people of Rhodesia and for Zambia, I hope that you will be prepared to use your influence to persuade the Patriotic Front too of the need for compromise.

Major
concessions
by

Registry
No.

DRAFT MESSAGE

Type 1 +

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

Top Secret.
Secret.
Confidential.
Restricted.
Unclassified.

To:-

PRESIDENT NYERERE

From

Telephone No. Ext.

Department

PRIVACY MARKING

..... In Confidence

Dear Julius

Richard Luce has given me an account of his discussion with you on 23 October about Rhodesia and our proposals for the pre-Independence period. I am grateful for the appreciation you expressed of our efforts to achieve a settlement. I have also seen an account of your conversation on 28 October with Sir Peter Moon.

To avoid any risk of misunderstanding between us, perhaps I could explain more fully our approach and the way in which we now intend to proceed.

To begin with, I can assure you that there will be no lack of determination on our part in seeking to achieve a satisfactory outcome in this stage of the Conference. As you know, my Government regard it as Britain's responsibility to bring Rhodesia to legal independence, to supervise the elections and to ensure that the arrangements are fair as
/between

between the parties. In our earlier exchange of messages in August, you urged Britain to act as the decolonising power. That is precisely what my Government intends to do and has been doing.

We have been taking action to give effect step by step to the Lusaka agreement. We are ready to carry out to the full our responsibilities. But we shall not be prepared to agree to arrangements which go well beyond the Lusaka agreement or which would make it impossible for us to exercise our authority. It is the British Government which will have to assume direct responsibility for Rhodesia in the pre-independence period. We will only be prepared to do so under conditions and for a period in which we can be confident that we will be able to carry out that responsibility. The longer the interim period lasts before the people of Rhodesia have been given the chance to decide their political future for themselves, the greater will be the risk of a breakdown in the ceasefire. It is very much in the Rhodesian people's interests and in those of the people of the neighbouring countries that they should be given that opportunity as soon as possible. We shall not be prepared to transfer power to /any

What is required is not a complicated transitional structure, which would render it impossible for us to carry out our responsibility, but for the people of Rhodesia to be enabled to decide for themselves what government they want in fair elections.

any party which has not won it through fair elections.

What we must seek in the next phase of the Conference is the agreement of both sides on a general structure of the interim period - namely the reassertion of British authority, a Governor with executive and legislative authority exercising direct control over the administration, and the arrangements for elections. The proposals we have put forward involve Bishop Muzorewa and his Ministers relinquishing power to enable new elections to be held under our authority. Bishop Muzorewa has said that he is prepared to accept those proposals, which involve very difficult decisions for him, in the interests of achieving international recognition and the prospect of a peaceful settlement. I shall not be prepared to ask a great deal more of him, simply because the other delegation have failed to agree.

You have raised points about the command of the armed forces and the role of the Patriotic Front's forces. The Rhodesian armed forces will be under the command of the Governor and will have to accept his authority. The

/Patriotic

Patriotic Front's forces will also be responsible to the Governor, ~~[in particular]~~ in relation to the cease-fire.

There will be a Cease-fire Commission, under the chairmanship of the Governor's military adviser, on which the Commanders of the forces on both sides will be represented. The responsibility for observance of the cease-fire will fall in the first instance on the Commanders of the forces. ~~[What is at issue is not the command structure of the forces, but whether they accept the Governor's authority.]~~ The Independence Constitution enables the duly elected government to exert full control over the armed forces. It will be for the people of Rhodesia to decide who they wish to do so.

At Lusaka we agreed that the government formed under the Independence Constitution must be chosen through free and fair elections, properly supervised under British Government authority and with Commonwealth observers. I intend to carry out that commitment in full. ~~But my Government will not be prepared to agree to arrangements which go well beyond that agreement.~~

There is one very important difference between the

/present

present attempt to reach a settlement and the attempts which have preceded it: we are in a position to put these plans into effect. If they are accepted by both sides, it will be possible to proceed to the final phase of the Conference, which must concern itself with the negotiations for a ceasefire and its observance. I have no doubt that it will be very much easier to resolve the difficulties that are likely to arise in that phase of the negotiations on the basis of prior agreement by both sides on the acceptance of British authority and our general proposals for the interim period.

I hope that the Patriotic Front will accept the sincerity of our intentions and our determination to ensure the impartiality of the election process; and that they will be prepared to participate in the elections. In that event, for the first time in the long history of these negotiations, a solution will be within our grasp. I consider, if I may say so, that the British Government is playing its part in fulfilment of the Lusaka agreement; and I hope that I can count on your support.

DRAFT MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT SERETSE KHAMA

1. Richard Luce explained to Mr Mogwe on 21 October the proposals we are putting forward to enable elections to be held under our authority to bring the independence Constitution for Rhodesia into effect. I was greatly encouraged by Mr Turner's account of his conversation with you on 3 October. I am most grateful for the appreciation you expressed of our efforts to achieve a settlement. I can assure you that there will be no lack of determination on our part in seeking to achieve a satisfactory outcome in the next stage of the Conference.
2. We now have the Patriotic Front's response to our proposals. They question the basic premise of the plan we have put forward, namely that, in accordance with the agreement at Lusaka, elections should be supervised under British authority, with Commonwealth observers present.
3. As you know, my Government regard it as Britain's responsibility to bring Rhodesia to legal independence to supervise the elections and to ensure that the arrangements are fair as between the parties. We are taking action to give effect to the Lusaka agreement. As I assured you before the Conference began, we are ready to carry out to the full our responsibilities as the de-colonising power. But we shall not be prepared to agree to arrangements which go well beyond that agreement or which would make it impossible for us to exercise our authority. It is the British Government which will have to assume direct
/responsibility.

responsibility for Rhodesia in this period. We will only be prepared to do so under conditions and for a period in which we can be confident that we will be able to carry out that responsibility. What is required is not a complicated transitional structure, which would render it impossible for us to carry out our responsibility, but for the people of Rhodesia to be enabled to decide for themselves what government they want in fair elections. The longer the interim period lasts before the people of Rhodesia have been given the chance to decide their political future for themselves, the greater will be the risk of a break-down of the cease-fire. It is very much in the Rhodesian people's interests and in those of the people of the neighbouring countries that they should be given that opportunity as soon as possible. We shall not be prepared to transfer power to any party which has not won it through elections.

4. What we must seek in the next phase of the Conference is the agreement of both sides of the general structure of the interim period - namely the re-assertion of British authority, a Governor with full executive and legislative authority exerting direct control over the administration, and the arrangements for elections. The proposals we have put forward involve Bishop Muzorewa and his Ministers relinquishing power to enable new elections to be held under our authority. Bishop Muzorewa has said that he is prepared to accept these proposals, which involve very difficult decisions for him, in the interests of achieving international recognition and the prospect of a peaceful settlement. There is no doubt, therefore, that unlike some previous efforts to reach a settlement, we are in a position to put these plans into effect. If they are accepted by both sides, it will be possible to proceed

to the final phase of the Conference, which must
itself with the negotiations for a cease-fire. I have no
doubt that it will be very much easier to resolve the
difficulties which are likely to arise in that phase of the
negotiations on the basis of prior agreement by both
sides on the acceptance of British authority and our general
proposals for the interim period.

5. I hope that the Patriotic Front will accept the
sincerity of our intentions and our determination to
ensure the impartiality of the elections process. In
that event a solution will be within our grasp. It
will be a tragedy for Rhodesia and for her neighbours
if, now that genuine majority rule has been achieved
under the new Constitution, any of the parties will
not be prepared to put their political support to the
test in elections under our authority.

6. I very much hope that we can count on your support.
This could be decisive to the chances of success. We
are looking for a solution which will bring peace to
Rhodesia and to Botswana and enable the refugees to return
as soon as possible to their homes and we shall of course
be prepared to do all we can to assist with this.

DRAFT MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT MACHEL

1. Richard Luce has given me an account of his discussions with Mr Chissano on 22 October about Rhodesia and our proposals for the pre-independence period.
2. We now have the Patriotic Front's response to our proposals. They question the basic premise of the plan we have put forward, namely that, in accordance with the agreement at Lusaka, elections should be supervised under British authority, with Commonwealth observers present.
3. I very much agree with the view Mr Chissano put to Mr Luce that conditions should be created which will enable all those competing for power to have a fair opportunity of securing it through free and democratic elections. That is precisely what the British Government is offering to arrange. My Government regard it as Britain's responsibility to bring Rhodesia to legal independence, to supervise the elections and to ensure that the arrangements are fair as between the parties. We are ready to carry out to the full our responsibilities as the de-colonising power, as the international community has so often urged us to do. But we shall not be prepared to agree to arrangements which go well beyond that agreement or which would make it impossible for us to exercise our authority. It is the British Government which will have to assume direct responsibility for Rhodesia in this period.
4. As to the length of this period, I know that you yourself

have said to Mr Papadopoulos that it should be as short as possible. I agree. The longer the interim period lasts, the greater the risks of a breakdown of the cease-fire. Our concern is that the people of Rhodesia must be given the opportunity to decide their political future for themselves. We shall not be prepared to transfer power to any party which has not won it through elections.

5. What we must seek in the next phase of the Conference is the agreement of both sides of the general structure of the interim period - namely the re-assertion of British authority, a Governor with full executive and legislative authority exerting direct control over the administration, and the arrangements for elections. The proposals we have put forward involve Bishop Muzorewa and his Ministers relinquishing power to enable new elections to be held under our authority. Bishop Muzorewa has said that he is prepared to accept these proposals, which involve very difficult decisions for him, in the interests of achieving international recognition and the prospect of a peaceful settlement. There is no doubt, therefore, that unlike some previous efforts to reach a settlement, we are in a position to put these plans into effect. If they are accepted by both sides, it will be possible to proceed to the final phase of the Conference, which must concern itself with the negotiations for a cease-fire. I have no doubt that it will be very much easier to resolve the difficulties which are likely to arise in that phase of the negotiations on the basis of prior agreement by both sides on the acceptance of British authority and our general proposals for the interim period.

6. I very much hope that the Patriotic Front will accept the sincerity of our intentions and our determination to ensure the impartiality of the election process. In that event we shall have within our grasp a solution which will bring peace to Rhodesia and to Mozambique.

Draft Message to President Shagari

1. Richard Luce has given me an account of his discussion with you on 24 October about Rhodesia and our proposals for the pre-independence period. I am grateful for the appreciation you expressed of our efforts to keep you in close touch with the progress of the Constitutional Conference. I can assure you that there will be no lack of determination on our part in seeking to achieve a satisfactory outcome in the second stage of the Conference.

2. We now have the Patriotic Front's response to our proposals. They question the basic premise of the plan we have put forward, namely that, in accordance with the agreement at Lusaka, elections should be supervised under British authority, with Commonwealth observers present.

3. As you know, my Government regard it as Britain's responsibility to bring Rhodesia to legal independence, to supervise the elections and to ensure that the arrangements are fair as between the parties. We are taking action to give effect to the Lusaka agreement. We are ready to carry out to the full our responsibilities as the decolonising power. But we shall not be prepared to agree to arrangements which go well beyond that agreement or which would make it impossible for us to exercise our authority. It is the British Government which will have to assume direct responsibility for Rhodesia in this period.

We will only be prepared to do so under conditions and for a period in which we can be confident that we will be able to carry out that responsibility. What is required is not a

complicated transitional structure, which would render it impossible for us to carry out our responsibility, but for the people of Rhodesia to be enabled to decide for themselves what government they want in fair elections. The longer the interim period lasts before the people of Rhodesia have been given the chance to decide their political future for themselves the greater will be the risk of a break-down of the cease-fire. It is very much in the Rhodesian people's interests and in those of the people of the neighbouring countries that they should be given that opportunity as soon as possible. We shall not be prepared to transfer power to any party which has not won it through elections. But the parties must be prepared to stand by the result of the election, whatever it may be.

5. What we must seek in the next phase of the Conference is the agreement of both sides on the general structure of the interim period - namely the re-assertion of British authority, a Governor with executive and legislative authority exerting direct control over the administration, and the arrangements for elections. The proposals we have put forward involve Bishop Muzorewa and his Ministers relinquishing power to enable new elections to be held under our authority. Bishop Muzorewa has said that he is prepared to accept these proposals, which involve very difficult decisions for him, in the interests of achieving international recognition and the prospect of a peaceful settlement. There is no doubt, therefore, that unlike some previous efforts to reach a settlement, we are in a position to put these plans into effect. If they are accepted by both sides, it will be possible to proceed to the final phase of the Conference, which must concern itself with the negotiations for a cease-fire. I have no doubt that it will be very much easier to resolve the difficulties which are

likely to arise in that phase of the negotiations on the basis of prior agreement by both sides on the acceptance of British authority and our general proposals for the interim period.

6. I hope that the Patriotic Front will accept the sincerity of our intentions and our determination to ensure the impartiality of the election process. In that event a solution will be within our grasp.

7. I know how important it is to Nigeria that this problem should be solved peacefully and with justice. This we are trying earnestly to achieve. I shall be grateful for ^{the} all/support you can give us in this endeavour.

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DESKBY 250930Z FCO

FM LAGOS 250745Z OCT 79

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 897 OF 25 OCTOBER

RPD INFO IMMEDIATE LUSAKA GABERONE MAPUTO DAR ES SALAAM LUANDA
SALISBURY MONROVIA PARIS BONN UKMIS NEW YORK WASHINGTON
AND ADDIS ABABA.

FROM MR LUCE.

1. I HAD A FORTY MINUTE TALK WITH PRESIDENT SHAGARI THIS AFTERNOON. ACTING FOREIGN MINISTER IAY ABUBAKAR WAS ALSO PRESENT BUT SILENT. I BRIEFED THE PRESIDENT ON THE PRESENT POSITION AT THE CONFERENCE AND ON OUR PROPOSALS FOR THE INTERIM PERIOD ON THE LINES OF PARAGRAPHS 2-4 OF MAPUTO TELNO 341 TO FCO.

2. THE PRESIDENT THANKED ME FOR THIS ACCOUNT. HE SAID HE VERY MUCH APPRECIATED OUR EFFORTS TO MAINTAIN CONSULTATION WITH HIM SINCE HE TOOK OFFICE AND INDEED BEFORE. HE WAS GRATEFUL FOR THE ALMOST DAILY BRIEFINGS GIVEN TO HIM BY THE HIGH COMMISSION IN LAGOS. HE AGREED THAT THE INTERIM ARRANGEMENTS WERE OF THE UTMOST IMPORTANCE AND WAS GLAD THAT BOTH SIDES SEEMED READY TO COMPROMISE. NIGERIA HAD URGED THE PATRIOTIC FRONT TO BE FLEXIBLE AND TO ACCEPT THAT THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR DECOLONISING RHODESIA LAY WITH BRITAIN.

3. THE PRESIDENT EXPRESSED CONCERN THAT THE ELECTIONS MUST BE DEMONSTRABLY FAIR. TO THIS END THE INTERIM PERIOD SHOULD NOT BE UNDULY SHORT. IT TOOK A LONG TIME TO ARRANGE ELECTIONS PROPERLY. IN NIGERIA IT HAD TAKEN A FULL YEAR AND IN RHODESIA THE SITUATION WAS COMPLICATED BY THE FACT THAT ONE OF THE PARTIES INVOLVED WAS NOT YET ESTABLISHED WITHIN RHODESIA. TWO MONTHS WAS TOO SHORT.

4. THE PRESIDENT ALSO SAID THAT HE DID NOT FULLY UNDERSTAND HOW A DEMOCRATIC ELECTION COULD BE CARRIED OUT WITHOUT THE DELIMITATION OF CONSTITUENCIES OR REGISTRATION, BOTH OF WHICH HAD BEEN CONSIDERED ESSENTIAL IN NIGERIA. HOWEVER, IF ALL SIDES AT THE CONFERENCE WERE PREPARED TO ACCEPT THIS, THEN THERE WAS NO REASON WHY NIGERIA SHOULD NOT DO SO.

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5 THE PRESIDENT WENT ON TO SAY THAT HE THOUGHT SOME KIND OF PEACEKEEPING FORCE WOULD BE NECESSARY DURING THE INTERIM PERIOD, OTHERWISE EITHER SIDE MIGHT BUILD ON A MINOR INCIDENT TO UNDERMINE THE SETTLEMENT. HE APPRECIATED THAT MONITORING WAS USEFUL UP TO A POINT BUT THOUGHT THAT TO BE REALISTIC THE PRESENCE OF SOME BODY TO ENFORCE THE CEASEFIRE WAS ESSENTIAL.

6 IN REPLYING I USED THE FAMILIAR ARGUMENTS ON THE NEED FOR A SHORT INTERIM PERIOD AND FOR THE UNACCEPTABLE DELAY INVOLVED IN CARRYING OUT REGISTRATION. I ARGUED THAT THE NEED FOR A PEACEKEEPING FORCE WOULD BE OBIATED BY THE POLITICAL WILL OF THE PARTIES TO MAKE THE SETTLEMENT AND A CEASE-FIRE WORK. I STRESSED THAT WE INTENDED TO MAINTAIN CLOSE CONTACT WITH THE NIGERIAN GOVERNMENT ON THE SUBJECT OF RHODESIA, BOTH HERE IN LAGOS AND THROUGH THEIR HIGH COMMISSION AND OBSERVER IN LONDON. THE PRESIDENT REPEATED HIS BELIEF THAT A PEACEKEEPING FORCE WOULD BE NEEDED AND URGED US TO BE FLEXIBLE ON THE DURATION OF THE INTERIM PERIOD.

7. PRESIDENT SHAGARI WAS CLEARLY WELL BRIEFED ON RHODESIA. HE SPOKE CALMLY AND THOUGHTFULLY. HIS TONE WAS FRIENDLY THROUGHOUT. CLEARLY IF THE PATRIOTIC FRONT IS PREPARED TO ACCEPT A SHORT INTERIM PERIOD HE WILL BE PREPARED TO GO ALONG WITH THIS. BUT IF THE PATRIOTIC FRONT MAKE A MAJOR ISSUE OF THIS POINT WE SHALL NOT HAVE NIGERIAN SUPPORT IN ARGUING AGAINST THEM. ON THE QUESTION OF ENFORCING A CEASEFIRE, I BELIEVE THAT THE PRESIDENT'S DOUBTS CAN ONLY BE RESOLVED IF HE SEES AN EFFECTIVE CEASEFIRE IN ACTION.

BROWN

FILES

RHOD D
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 UND
 LEGAL ADVISERS
 (MR FREELAND)
 (MR FIFOOT)
 ECON D
 FCD

DEF D
 OI D
 PS
 PS/LPS
 PS/MR LUCE
 PS/MR RIDLEY
 PS/MR HURD
 PS/ PUS
 SIR J GRAHAM
 LORD N G LENNOX
 MISS BROWN
 MR DAY
 MR WILLSON
 MR ASPIN

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION
 RHODESIA POLICY

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GRS 600A

CONFIDENTIAL

FM LUANDA 231635Z

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 447 OF 23 OCTOBER

INFO PRIORITY GABORONE LUSAKA MAPUTO LAGOS MONROVIA MIRIMBA
SALISBURY PARIS BONN WASHINGTON UKMIS NEW YORK AND ADDIS
ABABA

FROM MR LUCE

1. I SAW PRESIDENT NYERERE FOR 45 MINUTES THIS MORNING. I SPOKE ON THE LINES OF PARAS 2 TO 4 OF MAPUTO TELNO 341 TO FCO ADDING THAT OUR OUTLINE PROPOSALS FOR THE PRE-INDEPENDENCE PERIOD HAD BEEN TABLED AT LANCASTER HOUSE YESTERDAY. I GAVE NYERERE THE TEXT OF OUR PROPOSALS AND OF YOUR STATEMENT (FCO TEL NOS 259 AND 262 TO LUSAKA).
2. THE PRESIDENT SAID HE WAS GRATEFUL FOR MY VISIT. HE WAS PLEASED THAT STAGE ONE OF THE CONFERENCE HAD BEEN ACCOMPLISHED. HE HAD NEVER BELIEVED THAT IT WAS GOING TO CAUSE SERIOUS PROBLEMS. STAGE TWO WOULD BE MORE DIFFICULT. HE HOPED THAT YOU WOULD PROVE AS DETERMINED IN YOUR HANDLING OF THE SECOND STAGE AS YOU HAD BEEN DURING THE FIRST. BRITAIN NEEDED TO BE BOLD IN ITS APPROACH TO THE ADMINISTRATIVE ARRANGEMENTS DURING THE PRE-ELECTION PERIOD.
3. THE PRESIDENT SAID THAT HE WOULD CONCENTRATE ON IDENTIFYING THE PROBLEMS WHICH HE THOUGHT LAY AHEAD RATHER THAN PRESCRIBING ANSWERS TO THEM. HE WAS ESPECIALLY CONCERNED THAT WE SHOULD GENUINELY ASSERT OUR AUTHORITY IN RHODESIA DURING THE INTERIM. HE SAID WE WERE RIGHT TO APPOINT A GOVERNOR AND STRESSED THAT THE GOVERNOR MUST NOT ONLY HAVE LEGAL AUTHORITY BUT MUST BE SEEN TO HAVE THE POWER TO BACK IT UP. IN THE SAME WAY HE STRESSED HIS CONCERN OVER THE POWERS OF THE ELECTION, MILITARY AND POLICE ADVISERS. WOULD THEY MERELY ADVISE OR WOULD THEY BE ABLE TO ACT? LIKE CHISSANO HE STRESSED THE NEED TO CONVINCE THE PATRIOTIC FRONT AND THE FRONT LINE STATES THAT THE GOVERNOR REALLY WOULD BE ABLE TO COMMAND THE SUPPORT OF THE MACHINERY OF GOVERNMENT (THE

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/ SECURITY FORCES



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SECURITY FORCES AND CIVIL SERVICE) CREATED BY SAITH. IT MIGHT BE DIFFICULT TO CONVINCE THE PF THAT THEY WOULD HAVE AN EQUAL CHANCE IN ELECTIONS IF, FOR EXAMPLE, GENERAL WALLS APPEARED TO BE IN COMMAND OF THE SECURITY FORCES DURING THE INTERIM PERIOD.

4. THE PRESIDENT REFERRED TO HIS EARLIER CONCERN THAT THE ARMIES IN RHODESIA SHOULD BE INTEGRATED BEFORE THE ELECTIONS. HE SAID HE DID NOT DISPUTE THAT THE EVENTUAL FUTURE OF THE SECURITY FORCES COULD ONLY BE DECIDED AFTER THE ELECTIONS. HE DOUBTED WHETHER OTHERS NOW SHARED HIS CONCERN ABOUT THE POSITION DURING THE INTERIM AND HE CONCEDED THAT A MILITARY COUNCIL ON WHICH PF FORCE COMMANDERS WOULD BE REPRESENTED MIGHT GO SOME WAY TOWARDS OVERCOMING THE PROBLEM. HIS MAIN CONCERN WAS THAT DURING THIS PERIOD THE PF FORCES SHOULD HAVE A CLEAR POSITION WHICH WAS NOT MARKEDLY INFERIOR TO THAT OF THE SALISBURY FORCES. OTHERWISE THE PSYCHOLOGICAL EFFECT ON THE PATRIOTIC FRONT WOULD SERIOUSLY AFFECT PROSPECTS FOR A CEASEFIRE. I POINTED OUT THAT, IF WE COULD GET AGREEMENT ON THE PROCEDURE FOR ELECTIONS AND THE ASSERTION OF BRITISH AUTHORITY, THIS COULD CREATE A POLITICAL CLIMATE IN WHICH IT MIGHT BE EASIER TO AGREE ON MILITARY ARRANGEMENTS. NYERERE SAW THIS, BUT SUGGESTED THAT SATISFACTORY MILITARY ARRANGEMENTS WOULD, IN THEMSELVES, HELP TO IMPROVE THE POLITICAL ATMOSPHERE. IT WAS A CHICKEN AND EGG SITUATION.

5. ON THE DURATION OF THE INTERIM PERIOD PRESIDENT NYERERE STRESSED THAT, IF HE WAS IN THE POSITION OF THE PF; HE WOULD WANT A PERIOD SUFFICIENT FOR BUILDING UP A PARTY ORGANISATION. WE WOULD HAVE TO DISCUSS THIS WITH THE PF. THE CASE FOR A VERY SHORT PERIOD WOULD NOT BE STRONG IF THERE WAS AN EFFECTIVE CEASEFIRE.

6. THE PRESIDENT MADE THE POINT THAT HE HAD HAD NO DIFFICULTY IN RECOMMENDING TO THE PF THAT THEY SHOULD ACCEPT OUR PROPOSALS FOR A CONSTITUTION. HE RESERVED JUDGEMENT ON OUR PROPOSALS FOR THE INTERIM. OF COURSE, IF AGREEMENT WAS REACHED AT LANCASTER HOUSE HE WOULD BE PERFECTLY HAPPY. BUT IF THE PF ASKED HIM WHETHER HE WOULD AGREE TO OUR PROPOSALS HE DID NOT AS YET KNOW WHAT ANSWER HE WOULD BE ABLE TO GIVE.

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7. I IMPRESSED ON NYERERE OUR DETERMINATION TO SEE MATTERS THROUGH AND TO EXERCISE THE NECESSARY AUTHORITY TO ENSURE THAT FAIR ELECTIONS WILL BE HELD. THE PROPOSALS WE HAD NOW TABLED WOULD, IN A NUMBER OF RESPECTS, BE UNWELCOME TO THE BISHOP'S DELEGATION, AS WELL AS TO THE PATRIOTIC FRONT. AS WITH THE CONSTITUTION, WE WOULD TRY TO FIND COMMON GROUND. BUT THE ULTIMATE RESPONSIBILITY RESTED WITH US, AS COMMONWEALTH LEADERS HAD ACKNOWLEDGED AT LUSAKA, AND WE MIGHT HAVE TO TAKE DIFFICULT AND BOLD DECISIONS.

8. IT WILL BE IMPORTANT TO CONVINCED PRESIDENT NYERERE THAT WE INTEND TO EXERCISE BRITISH AUTHORITY IN RHODESIA IN THE FULLEST SENSE. THIS I TRIED TO DO DURING OUR DISCUSSION. THE ATTITUDE OF NYERERE, AND OTHERS, WILL BE INFLUENCED BY THE STANDING OF THE PERSON NOMINATED AS GOVERNOR. IF THEY HAVE CONFIDENCE IN THE INDIVIDUAL, THEY WILL BE LESS CONCERNED ABOUT THE DETAILS OF THE MACHINERY. THERE COULD THEREFORE BE A CASE FOR MAKING KNOWN, DURING THE COURSE OF THE DISCUSSIONS OF THE PRE-INDEPENDENCE ARRANGEMENTS, WHO WE HAVE IN MIND FOR THIS TASK.

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TO IMMEDIATE FCC

TELEGRAM NUMBER 346 OF 22 OCTOBER

AND TO IMMEDIATE GABORONE LUSAKA DAR ES SALAAM LUANDA LAGOS

MONROVIA UKMIS NEW YORK PARIS BOEN WASHINGTON MIRIMBA SALISBURY

ADDIS ABABA

FOLLOWING FROM MR LUCE

1. I HAD AN HOUR AND A HALF'S CONVERSATION THIS MORNING WITH THE MOZAMBIQUE FOREIGN MINISTER, CHISSANO. HE WAS ACCOMPANIED BY HONWANA (DIRECTOR OF THE PRESIDENT'S OFFICE), AND FERRAO (SECRETARY-GENERAL FOREIGN MINISTRY). CHISSANO EXPRESSED REGRET THAT MACHEL WAS NOT ABLE TO RECEIVE ME PERSONALLY. HE WAS VISITING THE NORTH OF THE COUNTRY AND AN APPOINTMENT COULD NOT BE ARRANGED IN THE SHORT PERIOD AT MY DISPOSAL. CHISSANO SAID THAT HE HAD, HOWEVER, BEEN INSTRUCTED BY THE PRESIDENT TO RECEIVE ME AND TO REVIEW THE SITUATION REACHED IN THE LANCASTER HOUSE CONFERENCE.
2. I EXPLAINED OUR POSITION ON THE LINES OF PARA 2 TO 4 OF MAPUTO TELNO 341.
3. CHISSANO SAID THAT THE MOZAMBIQUE GOVERNMENT WERE HAPPY THAT ALL PARTIES CONCERNED HAD NOW ACCEPTED THE INDEPENDENCE CONSTITUTION. HE SAID THAT HE DID NOT FEEL COMPETENT TO COMMENT IN DETAIL ON THE POINTS THAT I HAD PUT TO HIM ON THE ELECTION AND THE REASSERTION OF BRITISH AUTHORITY ETC. THIS WOULD BE A MATTER FOR THE PATRIOTIC FRONT (PF) . HE DID HOWEVER WISH TO MAKE CERTAIN REMARKS ABOUT THE PRINCIPLES INVOLVED.
4. THE MOZAMBIQUE GOVERNMENT REGARDED THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD AS ONE IN WHICH ARRANGEMENTS SHOULD BE MADE FOR THE TRANSFER OF POWER. IN SOME CASES (EG MOZAMBIQUE) THIS WAS RELATIVELY SIMPLE, SINCE IT WAS CLEAR TO WHOM POWER WAS BEING TRANSFERRED. THE SITUATION WAS DIFFERENT IN RHODESIA WHERE IT WAS NOT YET DECIDED WHO SHOULD ASSUME POWER ON INDEPENDENCE. THE MOZAMBIQUE GOVERNMENT THEREFORE CONSIDERED IT OF PRIME IMPORTANCE THAT CONDITIONS SHOULD BE CREATED DURING THAT PERIOD WHICH WOULD ENABLE ALL THOSE CHALLENGING FOR POWER TO HAVE AN EQUAL OPPORTUNITY OF SECURING IT IN FREE AND DEMOCRATIC ELECTIONS.

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REFERRING TO MY STATEMENT THAT A BRITISH GOVERNOR WOULD, DURING THE INTERIM PERIOD, WORK THROUGH THE EXISTING MACHINERY OF GOVERNMENT, CHISSANO ACCEPTED THAT THERE WAS NO NEED TO CHANGE EVERYTHING. HE SPECIFICALLY SAID THAT HE WAS NOT SUGGESTING THAT THE JUDICIARY AND THE POLICE SHOULD BE CHANGED. ON THE OTHER HAND THERE MIGHT BE REASONABLE GROUNDS FOR QUESTIONING WHETHER THE EXISTING PUBLIC SERVICE AND SECURITY FORCES WOULD NOT SEEK TO SABOTAGE THE ELECTION PROCESS OR AT LEAST SEEK TO EXERT INFLUENCE TO ACHIEVE A RESULT MORE ACCEPTABLE TO THEM. THERE WAS BOUND TO BE SOME RESISTANCE TO CHANGE. THIS WAS A PROBLEM THAT THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT MUST RECOGNISE AND SEEK TO SOLVE. WE SHOULD ALSO REALISE THE DISQUIET THAT THIS CONSIDERATION WAS LIKELY TO CAUSE THE GRASS-ROOTS OF THE PF. IT WAS IMPORTANT THAT THE PF LEADERSHIP SHOULD RETAIN THE CONFIDENCE OF THEIR MEMBERS DURING THE NEGOTIATIONS.

6. CHISSANO ALSO SAID THAT IT WAS QUOTE NOT FIT UNQUOTE TO DISMANTLE THE SECURITY FORCES. THE OUTSIDE WORLD WOULD, HOWEVER, WANT TO KNOW WHICH FORCES THE BRITISH WOULD USE TO ASSERT THEIR AUTHORITY DURING THE INTERIM PERIOD. I EXPLAINED THAT OUR THINKING WAS THAT THERE SHOULD BE A CEASE-FIRE AND A DISENGAGEMENT OF OPPOSING FORCES AND THAT THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR LAW AND ORDER SHOULD REST WITH THE GOVERNOR OPERATING THROUGH THE EXISTING POLICE FORCE WHICH WOULD BE UNDER THE SUPERVISION OF A BRITISH POLICE ADVISER.

7. CHISSANO SPECIFICALLY ASKED WHAT WE WOULD DO IF EITHER MUZOREWA OR THE PF REJECTED OUR PROPOSALS FOR THE INTERIM PERIOD. I EXPLAINED THAT OUR FIRM OBJECTIVE WAS TO REACH A SETTLEMENT WITH ALL THE PARTIES CONCERNED, IN THE SPIRIT OF THE LUSAKA DECLARATION. IF ANY PARTY REJECTED PROPOSALS, WHICH WE AND INTERNATIONAL OPINION REGARDED AS REASONABLE, THEY WOULD BEAR A HEAVY RESPONSIBILITY. I TOOK THIS OPPORTUNITY TO MAKE THE POINT THAT NO-ONE WOULD BE ALLOWED TO EXERCISE A VETO (PARA 5 OF YOUR TEL NO 128 TO MAPUTO). CHISSANO DID NOT DEMUR.

8. ON THE DURATION OF THE INTERIM PERIOD CHISSANO CONFIRMED THAT THE MOZAMBIQUE GOVERNMENT AGREED THAT THIS SHOULD BE AS SHORT AS POSSIBLE. WE RECALLED THAT MAGHEL HAD HIMSELF SPOKEN IN TERMS OF THREE MONTHS. THIS WAS GENERALLY IN LINE WITH OUR OWN THINKING. CHISSANO DID NOT GO BACK ON THIS, ALTHOUGH HE HOPED THAT ADEQUATE TIME WOULD BE ALLOWED FOR ALL PARTIES TO HAVE A FAIR CHANCE IN THE ELECTION. WE COULD NOT EXPECT THE PF TO AGREE TO PEACE AT ANY PRICE. WE POINTED OUT TO HIM THAT THIS APPLIED EQUALLY TO THE OTHER DELEGATION WITH WHOM WE WERE IN NEGOTIATION.

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CHISSANO PRESSED QUITE STRONGLY ON THE QUESTION OF THE STATUS OF MUZOREWA AND HIS MINISTERS DURING THE PRE-INDEPENDENCE PERIOD. WOULD THEY REMAIN IN AUTHORITY UNDER THE GOVERNOR? I EXPLAINED THAT UNDER OUR PROPOSALS THE GOVERNOR WOULD ASSUME FULL EXECUTIVE AND LEGISLATIVE AUTHORITY. CHISSANO PRESSED THIS POINT ON THE BASIS OF A LOCAL PRESS REPORT THAT THE SALISBURY DELEGATION WERE ARGUING THAT THE BISHOP SHOULD REMAIN PRIME MINISTER UP TO THE ELECTION. I SAID THAT THIS WAS AN EXAMPLE OF THE WAY IN WHICH OUR PROPOSALS MIGHT CAUSE DIFFICULTY FOR BOTH SIDES. THIS PARTICULAR MATTER WAS ONE THAT WE CLEARLY HAD TO APPROACH WITH CARE.

10. AT THE END OF OUR CONVERSATION CHISSANO INDICATED THAT IT WAS NOT HELPFUL IF THE IMPRESSION WAS GIVEN, AT ANY STAGE, THAT WE WERE URGING THE FRONT LINE STATES TO BRING PRESSURE UPON THE PF. (CLEARLY THE FRONT LINE EXPECT TO BE ASKED TO DO SO, BUT THEY DO NOT WELCOME TOO MUCH PUBLIC ATTENTION BEING DRAWN TO THEIR ROLE IN THIS RESPECT).

11. IT IS UNFORTUNATE THAT I AM NOT ABLE TO SEE MACHEL PERSONALLY. I DO NOT THINK THAT THIS IS A DELIBERATE GESTURE. MACHEL IS CURRENTLY TOURING THE NORTH OF THE COUNTRY AND IS IN AREAS WHICH ARE NOT EASILY ACCESSIBLE. CHISSANO UNDERTOOK TO REPORT OUR CONVERSATION FULLY TO HIM. THE PRESENCE OF HONWANA AT OUR MEETING SHOULD HELP TO ENSURE THAT A FULL ACCOUNT GETS THROUGH.

12. CHISSANO ADOPTED A GENERALLY UNDERSTANDING APPROACH. HE APPEARED RE-ASSURED ABOUT THE READINESS OF HMG TO ASSUME RESPONSIBILITY FOR ELECTIONS AND TO ASSERT AUTHORITY DURING THE PRE-INDEPENDENCE PERIOD. HE CONFIRMED THAT THE MOZAMBIQUE GOVERNMENT WERE MOST ANXIOUS TO FIND A SOLUTION TO THE RHODESIA PROBLEM WHICH WOULD BRING AN END TO THE WAR AND ALLOW MORE NORMAL CONDITIONS TO RETURN.

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TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 341 OF 22 OCTOBER

INFO PRIORITY GABORONE LUSAKA DAR ES SALAAM LUANDA LAGOS MONROVIA
UKMIS NEW YORK WASHINGTON PARIS BONN SALISBURY ADDIS ABABA

FROM ME LUCE

1. I HAD AN HOUR WITH THE BOTSWANA FOREIGN MINISTER, MOGWE, YESTERDAY.
2. I WENT OVER, BRIEFLY THE NATURE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS ON THE CONSTITUTION AND EXPLAINED OUR VIEW THAT THE DOCUMENT FINALLY ACCEPTED BY BOTH DELEGATIONS PROVIDED FOR GENUINE MAJORITY RULE AND REMOVED THE DEFECTS IDENTIFIED BY THE COMMONWEALTH LEADERS AT LUSAKA. WE WELCOMED THE HELP GIVEN BY THE FRONT LINE STATES IN REACHING THIS STAGE. MOGWE HAD NO COMMENTS ON THE CONSTITUTION.
3. I THEN OUTLINED OUR PLANS FOR THE PRE-INDEPENDENCE PERIOD LAYING EMPHASIS ON THE ELECTIONS. THESE WOULD BE THE KEY ELEMENT IN THE TRANSITION TO INDEPENDENCE, AS AFFIRMED AT LUSAKA. I REFERRED TO OUR INTENTIONS IN RESPECT OF THE ELECTION COMMISSIONER, THE ELECTION COUNCIL AND TO HMG'S ACCEPTANCE OF THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR ENSURING THAT ALL PARTIES WERE ABLE TO COMPETE IN THE ELECTIONS ON AN EQUAL FOOTING AND WITH EQUAL ACCESS TO THE MEDIA ETC. DURING THE PERIOD UP TO THE ELECTION, THERE WOULD BE A RETURN TO LEGAL DEPENDENCE WITH AUTHORITY BEING EXERCISED BY A BRITISH GOVERNOR. THE GOVERNOR WOULD WORK THROUGH THE EXISTING MACHINERY OF GOVERNMENT, AND WOULD HAVE MILITARY AND POLICE ADVISERS ON HIS STAFF. WE DID NOT THINK IT DESIRABLE OR PRACTICAL TO DISMANTLE THE EXISTING PUBLIC SERVICE, JUDICIARY, POLICE OR SECURITY FORCES DURING THIS PERIOD.
4. I EXPLAINED OUR STRONG BELIEF THAT THE PRE-INDEPENDENCE PERIOD SHOULD NOT EXTEND BEYOND 2(TWO) TO 3(THREE) MONTHS. APPROPRIATE CEASE-FIRE AND DISENGAGEMENT ARRANGEMENTS WOULD HAVE TO BE MADE, WHICH WOULD INVOLVE DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN THE VARIOUS COMMANDERS.

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5. MOGWE SAID THAT THE FRONT LINE WERE EXTREMELY SATISFIED AT THE PROGRESS MADE AT LANCASTER HOUSE. COMPARED TO GENEVA, IT ALMOST SEEMED PLAIN-SAILING. (I DISABUSED HIM.). HIS ONLY CRITICISM WAS THAT HMG HAD PROCEEDED TO SEPARATE TALKS WITH THE BISHOP ON PRE-INDEPENDENCE ARRANGEMENTS WITHOUT CONSULTING, OR AT LEAST INFORMING, THE FRONT LINE PRESIDENTS. THEY WOULD BE PREFERRED TO LEARN OF OUR INTENTIONS FROM US, RATHER THAN THE BBC. IT WOULD HELP IF WE COULD LET THE FRONT LINE KNOW WHEN WE SAW AN OBSTACLE AHEAD TO GIVE THEM AN OPPORTUNITY OF BRINGING INFLUENCE TO BEAR ON THE PF. WE WOULD EARN GOODWILL FROM SUCH COOPERATION. HOWEVER, HE DID NOT LABOUR THE POINT.

6. LIKE KAUNDA, MOGWE QUESTIONED WHETHER 2-3 MONTHS WAS A REASONABLE PERIOD FOR THE RUN UP TO THE ELECTION. HE SEEMED TO ACCEPT THE NEED TO MOVE QUICKLY, BUT THOUGHT WE SHOULD BE SYMPATHETIC IF THE PF WANTED RATHER LONGER. WE TOUCHED ON REGISTRATION AND DELIMITATION. MOGWE SHOWED SOME UNDERSTANDING OF OUR DIFFICULTIES OVER TIMING.

7. ON THE ARMIES, MOGWE SAID THAT AT HAVANA THE FRONT LINE HAD TOLD THE PF THAT THE FUTURE ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE SECURITY FORCES COULD NOT BE WRITTEN INTO THE CONSTITUTION BUT MUST BE DECIDED BY THE ELECTED GOVERNMENT. HE VOLUNTEERED THAT IT WOULD NOT BE POSSIBLE TO PROVIDE FOR INTEGRATION IN THE INTERIM PERIOD. THE FRONT LINE HAD BEEN TRYING FOR A LONG TIME, WITHOUT SUCCESS, TO INTEGRATE ZANLA AND ZIPRA. THERE WAS NO HOPE OF ACHIEVING AN INTEGRATION INVOLVING ALSO THE RHODESIAN FORCES. THIS WHOLE AREA WOULD HOWEVER BE A DIFFICULT ONE AND THE FRONT LINE WOULD WANT TO CONSIDER OUR PROPOSALS CAREFULLY.

8. ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS, MOGWE REFERRED TO THE CONSIDERABLE IMPORTANCE OF MACHEL. HE HAD PLAYED A SIGNIFICANT ROLE IN HAVANA IN ENSURING THAT THE PF CAME TO LONDON PREPARED TO NEGOTIATE SERIOUSLY. MACHEL HAD ALSO BEEN MUCH IMPRESSED BY THE OUTCOME OF LUSAKA AND BY THE READINESS OF HMG TO ACCEPT THEIR RESPONSIBILITY FOR BRINGING RHODESIA TO LEGAL INDEPENDENCE. MOGWE COMPARED MACHEL'S REALISTIC ATTITUDE MOST FAVOURABLY WITH THAT OF ANOTHER CHIEF OF THE COMMONWEALTH LEADER (CLEARLY KAUNDA). HE URGED UPON ME THE IMPORTANCE OF SEEING MACHEL PERSONALLY DURING MY CURRENT TOUR.

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9. MORGUE POINTED OUT THAT IT WAS THE PF WHO WERE PRESSING AT GENEVA FOR AN ASSERTION OF BRITISH AUTHORITY, HMG WHO FAVOURED UN INVOLVEMENT. THE ROLES NOW SEEMED TO HAVE BEEN REVERSED.

HE HIMSELF INDICATED NO ENTHUSIASM FOR A UN PRESENCE WHICH I SAID, IN ANY EVENT, WAS RULED OUT.

10. ALTHOUGH MORGUE DID NOT SAY SO, SPECIFICALLY, I HAVE LITTLE DOUBT THAT HIS GOVERNMENT WOULD BE PREPARED TO GO ALONG WITH OUR IDEAS FOR THE INTERIM AND WILL USE SUCH INFLUENCE AS THEY HAVE IN THE FRONT LINE IN THIS DIRECTION. THEY WILL NOT, HOWEVER, SWIM TOO HARD AGAINST THE TIDE. MORGUE'S REPEATED REFERENCES TO RACHEL SUGGEST THAT HE COULD BE AN INCREASINGLY IMPORTANT FIGURE IN THIS NEXT STAGE.

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TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1120 OF 20 OCTOBER

INFO PRIORITY. MIRIMBA SALISBURY, GABORONE, MAPUTO, DAR ES SALAAM, LUANDA, LAGOS, MONROVIA, UKMIS NEW YORK, WASHINGTON, PARIS, BONN.

FROM MR LUCE

TOUR OF FRONT LINE STATES

1. I HAD AN HOUR AND A QUARTER'S DISCUSSION WITH PRESIDENT KAUNDA TODAY. THE PRESIDENT WAS ACCOMPANIED BY MAINZA CHONA (SECRETARY GENERAL OF UNIP), CHAKULYA (FOREIGN MINISTER) AND PHIRI (HOME AFFAIRS). THE PRESIDENT WAS CLEARLY PLEASED TO RECEIVE A FIRST HAND ACCOUNT OF THE PROCEEDINGS AT LANCASTER HOUSE. HE ASKED ME TO CONVEY HIS PERSONAL GREETINGS TO YOU AND THE PRIME MINISTER. I DESCRIBED THE STAGE REACHED AT THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE AND DESCRIBED OUR GENERAL PROPOSALS FOR THE PRE-ELECTION PERIOD AND THE RETURN TO INDEPENDENCE, INCLUDING THE ROLE OF THE GOVERNOR, THE ELECTION COMMISSIONER, AND THE MILITARY AND POLICE ADVISERS.

2. PRESIDENT KAUNDA EXPRESSED CONCERN OVER THREE POINTS: REGISTRATION, THE TIMESCALE FOR ELECTIONS AND A CEASE-FIRE. ON REGISTRATION THE PRESIDENT INSISTED THAT IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO CARRY OUT REGISTRATION IN MUCH LESS THAN NINE MONTHS. IN ZAMBIA IT HAD BEEN DONE IN THREE MONTHS AND HE BELIEVED THAT IN RHODESIA WITH ITS BETTER COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM IT SHOULD BE POSSIBLE TO DO THE SAME. ZAMBIA ATTACHED GREAT IMPORTANCE TO REGISTRATION AS A MEANS OF DEMONSTRATING OUR SINCERITY IN SEEKING GENUINELY FAIR ELECTIONS.

3. THE PRESIDENT, BACKED BY MR CHONA, WAS VERY INSISTENT THAT ADEQUATE TIME MUST BE ALLOWED FOR THE PATRIOTIC FRONT TO CAMPAIGN BEFORE AN ELECTION. TO ALLOW ONLY TWO OR THREE MONTHS COULD ONLY BE CONSIDERED A TRICK. A REAL SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM OF RHODESIA REQUIRED A DEMONSTRABLY FAIR ELECTION, NOT ONE WHICH FAVOURED THE PARTY WHICH WAS ALREADY PRESENT AND ORGANISED IN THE COUNTRY WHILE DISCRIMINATING AGAINST THE PATRIOTIC FRONT. SIX MONTHS WOULD BE A FAIRER PERIOD TO GIVE THE PATRIOTIC FRONT AN EQUAL CHANCE.

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4. THE PRESIDENT ARGUED THAT STEPS TOWARD A CEASEFIRE SHOULD NOT BE DELAYED UNTIL NEGOTIATIONS WERE CONCLUDED ON THE POLITICAL OUTLINE FOR A SETTLEMENT. HE THOUGHT IT IMPORTANT THAT THE MILITARY COMMANDERS FROM SALISBURY AND THE PATRIOTIC FRONT SHOULD GET TOGETHER AS SOON AS POSSIBLE TO WRK OUT CEASE-FIRE ARRANGEMENTS. THIS WOULD ITSELF HELP TO PROMOTE AGREEMENT ON POLITICAL ISSUES. AT THE SAME TIME IT WOULD HELP CREATE AN ATMOSPHERE OF CONFIDENCE WHICH WOULD ENCOURAGE THE REFUGEES TO RETURN TO RHODESIA TO TAKE PART IN THE ELECTION.

5. I EXPLAINED AT SOME LENGTH OUR VIEWS ON REGISTRATION AND THE TIME-SCALE. I CONFIRMED THAT WE WERE DETERMINED TO ENSURE THAT ALL PARTIES HAD A FAIR CHANCE IN THE ELECTION. THE QUESTION OF THE PERIOD ALLOWED WAS A MATTER OF JUDGMENT.

6. THE ATMOSPHERE OF THE MEETING WAS CORDIAL THROUGHOUT. KAUNDA DID NOT REACT IN ANY PARTICULAR WAY TO MY REMARKS ON THE ROLE OF THE GOVERNOR, ELECTORAL COMMISSIONER ETC. OR OVER RETAINING THE EXISTING CIVIL SERVICE. NO MENTION WAS MADE OF SANCTIONS. CHONA PRESSED US OVER WHETHER THE MUZOREWA GOVERNMENT WOULD CONTINUE TO FUNCTION DURING THE PRE-ELECTION PERIOD, BUT ACCEPTED THE REPLY THAT FULL EXECUTIVE AND LEGISLATIVE POWERS WOULD BE VESTED IN THE GOVERNOR WHO WOULD WORK THROUGH THE EXISTING PUBLIC SERVICE.

7. THIS OPPORTUNITY TO GO OVER THE GROUND WITH KAUNDA HAS BEEN WELL WORTH-WHILE. HE OBVIOUSLY WELCOMED THIS INSIGHT INTO OUR THINKING. HIS REACTION TO OUR GENERAL PLANS FOR THE RETURN TO LEGALITY WAS ENCOURAGING ; HOWEVER IT WOULD NOT SURPRISE ME IF WE DID NOT GET A MORE CRITICAL RESPONSE WHEN HE HAS HAD TIME TO DIGEST FURTHER OUR INTENTION TO LEAVE THE EXISTING ADMINISTRATIVE AND SECURITY STRUCTURE IN PLACE DURING THE INTERIM PERIOD. THE GERMAN AMBASSADOR, WHO SAW KAUNDA LAST NIGHT, TOLD ME THAT THE PRESIDENT MADE A SPECIAL POINT OF SAYING THAT BOTH GENERAL WALLS AND COMMISSIONER OF POLICE ALLUM WOULD HAVE TO GO.

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ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION RHODESIA POLICY



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

29 October 1979

BF 31.10.79

n I enclose a copy of a letter to the Prime Minister from the Prime Minister of Australia. I should be grateful for the text of a reply which might be sent to Mr. Fraser as soon as possible.

M. O'D. B. ALEXANDER

R.M.J. Lyne, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

SB



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

29 October 1979

I am writing to thank you for your letter to me of 29 October covering a letter to the Prime Minister from the Prime Minister of Australia.

I have, of course, arranged for Mr. Fraser's letter to be brought to the Prime Minister's immediate attention. I am sure that she will wish to reply shortly.

His Excellency The Honourable
Sir Gordon Freeth, K.B.E.



AUSTRALIAN HIGH COMMISSION · LONDON

THE HIGH COMMISSIONER
The Hon. Sir Gordon Freeth, KBE

29 October 1979

Dear Mr Alexander,

I have been asked by my Prime Minister, the Rt. Hon. Malcolm Fraser, to convey the attached text of a letter from him to your Prime Minister, the Rt. Hon. Mrs Margaret Thatcher.

I would be grateful if you could bring this letter to Mrs Thatcher's attention as soon as possible.

Yours sincerely,

(Gordon Freeth)

Mr Michael Alexander,
Private Secretary (Overseas Affairs)
to the Prime Minister,
Prime Minister's Office,
10 Downing Street,
LONDON. SW1.

SUBJECT

PRIME MINISTER'S

PERSONAL MESSAGE

Text of a Letter from the Prime Minister
of Australia, the Rt. Hon. Malcolm Fraser,
to the Rt. Hon. Mrs Margaret Thatcher,
Prime Minister

SERIAL No. T129/79T

T129/79T

My dear Prime Minister,

What has been achieved so far at Lancaster House in the talks chaired by Peter Carrington will go down in history as a magnificent achievement. So many past efforts to settle the Rhodesia problem have - tragically - ended in failure, but the present talks hold out much more hope of success than any of the earlier ones. You and your Government have gone far indeed to bring to fruition the promise of Lusaka, and in this you know that you have our full support.

I made clear in a message passed to your officials through Australia House two weeks ago that we would gladly do anything we could to help the talks progress to an acceptable settlement. That message was prompted by concern that there was some risk of a failure on constitutional issues. Happily, those aspects are now resolved and there is agreement on what is clearly a fair and genuine black majority constitution.

Your Government's fundamental strategy in the talks - namely, to achieve agreement first on a Constitution in order to create an atmosphere which would facilitate subsequent accommodations on the more difficult questions of pre-independence arrangements - has been outstandingly successful.

As the conference now tackles these more difficult issues, and as a result of reports we have had from our High Commissioner in London, I thought it might be useful if I set out the feeling we have about them and their relation to the agreement we reached at Lusaka.

The first point I wish to make concerns the pace of the conference. There has been an initial exchange of views on arrangements. I know you will have in mind that it is most important that there should be ample opportunity now for the fullest elaboration of the views of all parties and for exploration through all possible means of ways in which they might be developed and, where necessary, modified. Andrew Peacock has already told your High Commission of the difficulties for us and others if you were to decide after a comparatively short discussion of pre-independence arrangements that agreement could not be reached on them with the Patriotic Front delegation and to implement them without that agreement.

As to the actual arrangements proposed so far I should like to make a number of points. In making them I am very conscious of two fundamental points agreed on at Lusaka:

- . that the search for a settlement must involve all parties to the conflict: and
- . that the government to be formed must be chosen through free and fair elections properly supervised under British Government authority and with Commonwealth observers.

As I see it there are many ways in which "British Government authority" can be manifest: I can understand some of the concerns which have been expressed about the need to involve all parties to the conflict, and I believe it should be possible to find ways of accommodating them without any challenge to that authority.

Central to this is the question of security, and the role and status of the Rhodesian armed forces and the forces controlled by the Patriotic Front. I believe that the idea of a United Nations supervisory force does not come reasonably within the framework agreed on at Lusaka and that, on the basis of discussions there, ought to be ruled out. However, if the question of supervisory and security arrangements became the sticking points on which final agreement depended, then would it be worth considering a joint Commonwealth group under your Government's authority and direction as a possible way around this problem? My Government would be ready to consider Australian involvement in tasks additional to election observation as part of a joint Commonwealth effort. The possible use of a Commonwealth force has a long history going back at least, I think, to the "Tiger" talks in 1966. Comments by certain of your spokesmen indicate that you do not rule this out. If you do decide on this course of action, we will certainly study sympathetically any proposals you might put forward, which might include involvement in such a force and observation of the whole transitional process, if this would be helpful.

Other points at present at issue should, I believe, be capable of resolution through patient discussion. These include the length of the transition period, which should clearly not be a sticking point in negotiations.

Proposals for a share of authority during this period would again seem to me to be quite outside the Lusaka Agreement, which accepted without any question that the arrangements must be under British authority. But I would have thought that a consultative or advisory group composed of the parties principally concerned, but without any executive powers, might be worthy of consideration.

Concerning sanctions, it seems to me that if, following on agreement about the Constitution, agreement is also reached on pre-independence arrangements, then what you propose is quite reasonable.

I said at the beginning of this letter that the progress that has already been made is magnificent. You are moving closer to a breakthrough in a problem which has bedevilled the world and brought tragedy and suffering to countless thousands, most of all to the black and white people of Zimbabwe, for long years. If you can achieve this, your Government and the other parties to the talks will have gained a victory which will have enormous significance for the cause of peace and racial harmony in all of southern Africa and in the world as a whole.

Yours sincerely,

Malcolm Fraser

29 October 1979.



PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T129/79T

PRIME MINISTER

CANBERRA

29 OCT 1973

My dear Prime Minister,

What has been achieved so far at Lancaster House in the talks chaired by Peter Carrington will go down in history as a magnificent achievement. So many past efforts to settle the Rhodesia problem have - tragically - ended in failure, but the present talks hold out much more hope of success than any of the earlier ones. You and your Government have gone far indeed to bring to fruition the promise of Lusaka, and in this you know that you have our full support.

I made clear in a message passed to your officials through Australia House two weeks ago that we would gladly do anything we could to help the talks progress to an acceptable settlement. That message was prompted by concern that there was some risk of a failure on constitutional issues. Happily, those aspects are now resolved and there is agreement on what is clearly a fair and genuine black majority constitution.

Your Government's fundamental strategy in the talks - namely, to achieve agreement first on a constitution in order to create an atmosphere which would facilitate subsequent accommodations on the more difficult questions of pre-independence arrangements - has been outstandingly successful.

As the conference now tackles these more difficult issues, and as a result of reports we have had from our High Commissioner in London, I thought it might be useful if I set out the feeling we have about them and their relation to the agreement we reached at Lusaka.

The first point I wish to make concerns the pace of the conference. There has been an initial exchange of views on arrangements. I know you will have in mind that it is most important that there should be ample opportunity now for the fullest elaboration of the views of all parties and for exploration through all possible means of ways in which they might be developed and, where necessary, modified. Andrew Peacock has already told your High Commission of the difficulties for us and others if you were to decide after a comparatively short discussion of pre-independence arrangements that agreement could not be reached on them with the Patriotic Front delegation and to implement them without that agreement.

As to the actual arrangements proposed so far I should like to make a number of points. In making them I am very conscious of two fundamental points agreed on at Lusaka:

- . that the search for a settlement must involve all parties to the conflict; and
- . that the Government to be formed must be chosen through free and fair elections properly supervised under British Government authority and with Commonwealth observers.

As I see it there are many ways in which "British Government authority" can be manifest; I can understand some of the concerns which have been expressed about the need to involve all parties to the conflict, and I believe it should be possible to find ways of accommodating them without any challenge to that authority.

Central to this is the question of security, and the role and status of the Rhodesian armed forces and the forces controlled by the Patriotic Front. I believe that the idea of a United Nations Supervisory Force does not come reasonably within the framework agreed on at Lusaka and that, on the basis of discussions there, ought to be ruled out. However, if the question of supervisory and security arrangements became the sticking points on which final agreement depended, then would it be worth considering a joint Commonwealth group under your Government's authority and direction as a possible way around this problem? My Government would be ready to consider Australian involvement in tasks additional to election observation as part of a joint Commonwealth effort. The possible use of a Commonwealth force has a long history going back at least, I think, to the "Tiger" Talks in 1966. Comments by certain of your spokesmen indicate that you do not rule this out. If you do decide on this course of action, we will certainly study sympathetically any proposals you might put forward, which might include involvement in such a force and observation of the whole transitional process, if this would be helpful.


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Concerning sanctions, it seems to me that if, following on agreement about the constitution, agreement is also reached on pre-independence arrangements, then what you propose is quite reasonable.

I said at the beginning of this letter that the progress that has already been made is magnificent. You are moving closer to a breakthrough in a problem which has bedevilled the world and brought tragedy and suffering to countless thousands, most of all to the black and white people of Zimbabwe, for long years. If you can achieve this, your Government and the other parties to the talks will have gained a victory which will have enormous significance for the cause of peace and racial harmony in all of Southern Africa and in the world as a whole.

Yours sincerely,

A handwritten signature in blue ink, appearing to read 'Malcolm Fraser', with a horizontal line underneath.

(Malcolm Fraser)

The Rt. Hon. Margaret Thatcher, M.P.,
Prime Minister of Great Britain,
10 Downing Street,
LONDON.
UK.

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GRS 200

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DESKBY 281300Z

FM DAR ES SALAAM 281255Z OCT 79

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 847 OF 28 OCTOBER

RFI IMMEDIATE DESKBY 290700Z LUSAKA, MAPUTO, GABORONE,
MIRIMBA SALISBURY, IMMEDIATE DESKBY 290900Z LAGOS, LUANDA,

IMMEDIATE DESKBY 291400Z WASHINGTON, PRIORITY MONROVIA,

UKMISS NEW YORK, ADDIS ABABA

MY I.P.T.

RHODESIA:

1. FROM THIS DISCUSSION IT IS MY IMPRESSION THAT: -----

(I) WE WILL NOT OBTAIN PRESIDENT NYERERE'S SUPPORT FOR A TWO MONTH PRE-INDEPENDENCE PERIOD. HE SIMPLY DOES NOT ACCEPT OUR ARGUMENTS AS SUFFICIENT JUSTIFICATION. AT THE SAME TIME, I NOTED THAT HE DID NOT GIVE 6 MONTHS AS HIS OWN MINIMUM PERIOD, BUT MERELY QUOTED IT AS THE PF DEMAND. HE MAY THEREFORE BE PREPARED TO SHOW SOME FLEXIBILITY AS BETWEEN THE TWO FIGURES.

(II) NYERERE IS PREPARED TO ACCEPT OUR INTENTION TO USE THE EXISTING CIVIL AUTHORITY AS THE MACHINERY FOR ORGANISING AND RUNNING THE ELECTIONS PROVIDING THE GOVERNOR REALLY IS IN COMMAND AND IS SEEN TO BE SO. BUT WE MUST, IF HE IS TO SUPPORT OUR PROPOSALS WITH THE PF, FIND SOME WAY OF GIVING STATUS TO THE PF FORCES. AND THIS MUST BE DONE IN THE CONTEXT OF THE PRE-INDEPENDENCE ARRANGEMENTS: IT CANNOT BE LEFT TO THE STAGE OF DISCUSSION OF THE CEASE-FIRE.

(III) WHILE HE MAY NOT ALWAYS BE AS FORTHRIGHT ON THE POINT WITH THE PF AS WE WOULD WISH, NYERERE ACCEPTS THAT WE HAVE EXCLUDED UN PARTICIPATION, AND UNDER THE LUSAKA AGREEMENT ARE FULLY ENTITLED TO DO SO.

12. I HAD

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2. I HAD EXPECTED NYERERE TO RAISE THE QUESTION OF THE LIFTING OF SANCTIONS AT THE MOMENT OF THE INSTALLATION OF OUR GOVERNOR. I REGARD IT AS MILDLY ENCOURAGING THAT HE DID NOT DO SO.

MOON

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(MR FIFOOT)
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PS/MR LUCE
PS/MR RIDLEY
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SIR J GRAHAM
LORD N G LENNOX
MISS BROWN
MR DAY
MR WILLSON
MR ASPIN

ADDITIONAL DIST.
RHODESIA POLICY

GRS 600

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DESBY 281300Z

FM DAR ES SALAAM 281215Z OCT 79

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 846 OF 28 OCTOBER

RFI IMMEDIATE DESBY 290700Z LUSAKA, MAPUTO, GABORONE,
MIRIMBA SALISBURY, IMMEDIATE DESBY 290900Z LAGOS, LUANDA,
IMMEDIATE DESBY 291400Z WASHINGTON, PRIORITY MONROVIA,
UKMISS NEW YORK, ADDIS ABABA

Prime Minister

Ant

WV

RHODESIA:

1. PRESIDENT NYERERE CALLED ME TO SEE HIM THIS MORNING 28 OCTOBER. HE SAID HE HAD RECEIVED A REPORT YESTERDAY FROM LONDON ON THE CONFERENCE. THE PF HAD NOW MADE THEIR VIEWS KNOWN ON OUR PREINDEPENDENCE PROPOSALS AND HE REMAINED OPTIMISTIC. BUT TWO POINTS WERE TROUBLING HIM, AND HE WANTED TO MAKE HIS VIEWS KNOWN BEFORE ANYONE GOT "HOOKED" ON PARTICULAR POSITIONS.
2. THE FIRST POINT WAS THE QUESTION OF THE TIME OF THE PRE-INDEPENDENCE PERIOD. HE UNDERSTOOD OUR ARGUMENTS (WHICH HE REHEARSED TO ME) FOR A SHORT PERIOD. BUT TWO MONTHS WAS NOT ENOUGH AND HE COULD NOT RECOMMEND THE PF TO ACCEPT IT. THE PF WERE ASKING FOR SIX MONTHS. THEY NEEDED TIME TO "GO HOME" AND ESTABLISH THEMSELVES BEFORE THE ELECTIONS.
3. NYERERE'S SECOND POINT RELATED TO THE STATUS OF THE PF ARMIES. HE REPEATED THAT HE NOW ACCEPTED THAT THE ARMIES WERE NOT GOING TO BE UNIFIED BEFORE INDEPENDENCE: NO ONE WANTED IT. BUT NEVERTHELESS THE STATUS OF THE PF ARMIES IN THE PREINDEPENDENCE PERIOD HAD TO BE ESTABLISHED. HE DID NOT CONSIDER WHAT WE NOW WERE PROPOSING TO BE "REASONABLE". THE PREINDEPENDENCE ARRANGEMENTS TO WHICH BISHOP MUZOREWA HAD, IT SEEMED, AGREED, ESTABLISHED THE STATUS OF THE SMITH/MUZOREWA FORCES: THEY BECAME THE FORCES UNDER THE COMMAND OF THE GOVERNOR I.E. THE LEGAL FORCES. BUT THE PF FORCES HAD NO RECOGNITION AND WOULD APPEAR TO MANY TO BE ILLEGAL: "THE REBEL FORCES BECAME LEGAL AND THE PF FORCES BECAME THE REBELS". THE RELATIONSHIP OF THE PF FORCES WITH THE GOVERNOR MUST BE ESTABLISHED.
4. I SAID THAT THE SALISBURY FORCES WOULD BE UNDER THE FULL CONTROL OF THE GOVERNOR AND HIS STAFF. IN CONNECTION WITH THE CEASE FIRE THERE WOULD HAVE TO BE DISCUSSIONS WITH THE COMMANDERS OF ALL THE FORCES, AND THERE WOULD HAVE TO BE MACHINERY FOR ESTABLISHING AND MAINTAINING THE CEASE-FIRE, AND THIS WOULD INVOLVE RECOGNITION OF THE STATUS OF THE PF FORCES. OTHER THAN WITH REGARD TO THE CEASE-FIRE, HE DID NOT SEE ANY

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OF THE FORCES HAVING A MAJOR ROLE IN CONNECTION WITH THE ELECTIONS WHICH WERE ESSENTIALLY A MATTER FOR THE CIVIL POWERS.
5. NYERERE WAS NOT SATISFIED. HIS POINT (AND IT IS ONE HE MADE IN SOMEWHAT DIFFERENT TERMS TO MR LUCE) IS THAT IT IS PSYCHOLOGICALLY IMPORTANT FOR THE PF FORCES TO BE SEEN, IN THE PRE-INDEPENDENCE PERIOD, TO BE ON THE SAME FOOTING AS THE SALISBURY FORCES. (THE LOGIC OF THIS, THOUGH I DID NOT PUT THE POINT TO NYERERE, WOULD SEEM TO BE THAT THEY ALSO SHOULD FALL UNDER THE COMMAND OF THE GOVERNOR)

6. I ASKED NYERERE TO CONFIRM THAT HIS POINT RELATED ONLY TO THE FORCES, AND THAT HE AGREED THAT THERE WAS NO ALTERNATIVE BUT FOR THE GOVERNOR TO USE THE EXISTING POLICE IN THE PRE-INDEPENDENCE PERIOD. HE ANSWERED SOMEWHAT EVASIVELY, BUT HE DID SAY THAT HE ACCEPTED THAT THERE WERE NO OTHER POLICE WHOM THE GOVERNOR COULD USE. HE ADDED, HOWEVER, THAT THE ORGANISATION OF COMMAND BOTH FOR THE POLICE AND THE ARMED FORCES WOULD BE VITAL. THE GOVERNOR MUST NOT ONLY BE IN FULL COMMAND, BUT BE SEEN TO BE IN FULL COMMAND: "THE SENIOR COMMAND WOULD BE VERY IMPORTANT".

7. NYERERE ENDED BY RAISING ONE FURTHER POINT. HE SAID THAT HE REALISED THAT WE COULD NOT ACCEPT UN INVOLVEMENT: "I KNOW YOU WILL SAY 'NO' TO THE UN". BUT THE QUESTION OF WHO MONITORS THE CEASE FIRE WAS BOUND TO BE RAISED. I SAID THAT I KNEW THAT AS SOON AS THERE WAS AGREEMENT ON THE PRE-INDEPENDENCE ARRANGEMENTS, YOU WERE PLANNING FULL DISCUSSION OF THE CEASE-FIRE WHICH WOULD INEVITABLY INCLUDE ARRANGEMENTS NOT ONLY FOR BRINGING IT INTO EFFECT, BUT ALSO FOR ITS MAINTENANCE, FOR EXAMPLE INVESTIGATION OF ALLEGATIONS OF BREACHES.

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MR ASPIN

ADDITIONAL DIST.
RHODESIA POLICY

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FM OSLO 271705Z OCT 79

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 167 OF 27 OCTOBER 1979

FOLLOWING FROM PRIVATE SECRETARY

*Prime Minister.**The Foreign & Commonwealth**Secretary spoke well!**MS**Am*

1. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAW THE NORWEGIAN FOREIGN MINISTER PRIVATELY THIS MORNING. LORD CARRINGTON EXPLAINED THAT HE WISHED TO MAKE CLEAR TO MR FRYDENLUND THE POSSIBLE COURSE WHICH EVENTS IN RHODESIA MIGHT TAKE. HE NATURALLY HOPED THAT THE LANCASTER HOUSE CONFERENCE WOULD REACH AGREEMENT ON THE INTERIM ARRANGEMENTS AS WELL AS ON THE CONSTITUTION, THAT A CEASEFIRE WOULD BE ACHIEVED AND THAT ELECTIONS WOULD BE HELD IN WHICH ALL THE PARTIES WOULD PARTICIPATE. NONETHELESS IT HAD TO BE RECOGNISED THAT THIS MIGHT NOT BE POSSIBLE. BRITAIN HAD ADVANCED PROPOSALS ON THE INTERIM ARRANGEMENTS WHICH HE BELIEVED WERE FAIR AND REASONABLE AND WHICH THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY OUGHT TO RECOGNISE AS SUCH. BUT THOUGH BISHOP MUZOREWA'S DELEGATION SEEMED LIKELY TO ACCEPT THEM, IT WAS QUESTIONABLE WHETHER THE PATRIOTIC FRONT WOULD DO SO. IT WAS HARD TO ENVISAGE MUGABE TAKING PART IN AN ELECTION UNLESS HE FELT CERTAIN OF VICTORY, AND, INsofar AS IT WAS POSSIBLE TO FORECAST THE RESULT OF A NEW ELECTION IN RHODESIA, IT SEEMED UNLIKELY THAT HE WOULD WIN.
2. THE PATRIOTIC FRONT WERE THEREFORE PUTTING FORWARD DEMANDS ON THE INTERIM ARRANGEMENTS WHICH THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT COULD SIMPLY NOT ACCEPT. THEY WERE INSISTING ON A LONG TRANSITIONAL PERIOD, OF AT LEAST SIX MONTHS, WHEREAS IT WAS CLEAR THAT NO CEASEFIRE ARRANGEMENTS COULD POSSIBLY HOLD FOR AS LONG AS THIS. AND THEY WERE DEMANDING UNITED NATIONS SUPERVISION OF THE ELECTIONS, SOMETHING WHICH WAS WHOLLY UNACCEPTABLE TO THE SALISBURY DELEGATION WHO REGARDED (WITH SOME JUSTIFICATION) THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE COMMONWEALTH AS ORGANISATIONS WHOLLY OPPOSED TO THEM. IT WAS POSSIBLE THEREFORE THAT A SITUATION MIGHT ARISE IN WHICH ONLY THE SALISBURY DELEGATION ACCEPTED THE BRITISH PROPOSALS FOR THE HOLDING OF NEW ELECTIONS. IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT WOULD HAVE NO OPTION BUT TO LET THE ELECTIONS TAKE PLACE AND RECOGNISE WHATEVER RHODESIAN GOVERNMENT EMERGED FROM THEM.

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3. LORD CARRINGTON ADDED THAT BRITAIN HAD SHOWN POLITICAL COURAGE IN ACCEPTING THE RESPONSIBILITY IN RHODESIA WHICH THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY HAD BEEN PRESSING ON HER FOR YEARS. IT HAD BEEN AGREED AT LUSAKA THAT SUPERVISION OF THE ELECTIONS WAS A BRITISH RESPONSIBILITY AND THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT WAS PREPARED TO APPOINT A GOVERNOR AND SUPPORTING STAFF TO CARRY THIS OUT. BUT IN RETURN, BRITAIN EXPECTED THE CLEAR SUPPORT OF HER FRIENDS AND ALLIES. RHODESIA WAS AN IMPORTANT AND EMOTIONAL ISSUE IN BRITAIN. IT HAD NOT BEEN EASY FOR THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT TO FOLLOW ITS PRESENT COURSE AND TO INSIST THAT BISHOP MUZOREWA SHOULD MAKE THE CONCESSIONS AND COMPROMISES WHICH HE HAD DONE NOW. THERE WOULD BE A FEELING OF VERY CONSIDERABLE RESENTMENT IF, HAVING DONE EVERYTHING WHICH THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY HAD ASKED, BRITAIN WAS DESERTED BY HER FRIENDS. HE MUST THEREFORE WARN MR FRYDENLUND OF THE SERIOUSNESS OF THE DECISION WHICH NORWAY, AS A MEMBER OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL, MIGHT HAVE TO TAKE.

4. MR FRYDENLUND SAID THAT HE WAS GRATEFUL TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR SPEAKING SO FRANKLY. HE REALISED THAT THIS WAS AN ISSUE OF GREAT POLITICAL SENSITIVITY IN BRITAIN. BUT IN NORWAY TOO THERE WERE DOMESTIC POLITICAL PROBLEMS. THE NORWEGIAN LABOUR PARTY HAD BEEN ACCUSTOMED TO SUPPORTING THE PATRIOTIC FRONT AS THE NATURAL LIBERATION MOVEMENT IN RHODESIA. HE HIMSELF HAD REALISED THAT THE ELECTIONS IN APRIL HAD MARKED A RADICAL CHANGE IN THE SITUATION AND THAT IT WAS NOT POSSIBLE TO IGNORE A REGIME WHICH HAD WON THE SUPPORT OF 64% OF THE POPULATION. NONETHELESS, IT WOULD NOT BE EASY TO JUSTIFY TO THE NORWEGIAN LABOUR PARTY A SHIFT OF SUPPORT AWAY FROM THE PATRIOTIC FRONT. THE ISSUE COULD BE VERY POLITICALLY DEVISIVE IN NORWAY. HIS GUESS WAS THAT IN PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES THERE WOULD BE A NARROW MAJORITY IN THE NORWEGIAN PARLIAMENT AGAINST RECOGNISING BISHOP MUZOREWA'S REGIME. MUCH WOULD DEPEND HOWEVER ON THE CIRCUMSTANCES IN WHICH ANY EVENTUAL BREAKDOWN TOOK PLACE. IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT TO EXPLAIN TO NORWEGIAN PUBLIC OPINION THAT A TRANSITIONAL PERIOD OF LONGER THAN TWO MONTHS WAS UNTHINKABLE AND THERE WOULD BE PSYCHOLOGICAL PROBLEMS IN JUSTIFYING THE IMPRACTICABILITY OF A UNITED NATIONS FORCE.

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5. LORD CARRINGTON EMPHASISED THE FRAGILITY OF ANY CEASEFIRE. IT COULD NOT POSSIBLY LAST SIX MONTHS. MOREOVER, THE WAR HAD BEEN GOING ON FOR MANY YEARS AND EVERYONE IN RHODESIA KNEW THE ISSUES AND PERSONALITIES INVOLVED. THE PATRIOTIC FRONT WOULD HAVE TWO MONTHS OF OPEN CAMPAIGNING AND THIS SHOULD GIVE THEM AMPLE OPPORTUNITY TO PRESENT THEIR CASE. UNITED NATIONS SUPERVISION WAS SIMPLY NOT PRACTICAL EITHER. THE UNITED NATIONS HAD OVER THE YEARS CONSISTENTLY GIVEN ITS SUPPORT TO THE PATRIOTIC FRONT AS THE SOLE LEGITIMATE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE RHODESIAN PEOPLE., BISHOP MUZOREWA WHO HAD, UNLIKE THE LEADERS OF THE COUNTRIES IMMEDIATELY AROUND HIM, ACTUALLY SUBMITTED HIMSELF TO AN ELECTION WHICH, WHATEVER THE FAULTS OF THE CONSTITUTION UNDER WHICH IT WAS HELD, HAD BEEN FREE AND FAIR, REGARDED THE UNITED NATIONS AS PREJUDICED AND HOSTILE. IN ANY CASE IT HAD BEEN AGREED IN LUSAKA THAT BRITAIN SHOULD ASSUME RESPONSIBILITY. BUT THERE COULD BE A COMMONWEALTH OBSERVERS, OR OBSERVERS FROM ANYWHERE ELSE, AND THE WORLD'S PRESS WOULD BE THERE TO SEE THAT THE BRITISH GOVERNOR DID NOT CHEAT AND THAT THE ELECTIONS WERE FAIR.

6. MR FRYDENLUND ASKED ABOUT THE PROSPECTS FOR A RHODESIAN GOVERNMENT IN CIRCUMSTANCES WHERE THE PATRIOTIC FRONT HAD BOYCOTTED THE ELECTIONS. LORD CARRINGTON SAID THAT IF THIS HAPPENED, THE WAR WOULD DOUBTLESS FIRST CONTINUE. BUT THE MODERATE COUNTRIES IN THE THIRD WORLD, PROVIDED THEY WERE SATISFIED THAT BRITAIN HAD DISCHARGED HER RESPONSIBILITIES FAIRLY, WOULD PROBABLY ADOPT A LOW PROFILE. THE CUBANS AND OTHERS WOULD NO DOUBT TRY TO FOMENT TROUBLE. BUT GIVEN WESTERN SUPPORT AND ECONOMIC AID, THERE WAS NO REASON WHY A NEW ZIMBABWE GOVERNMENT COULD NOT PROSPER. THE PROBLEMS FOR PRESIDENT KAUNDA AND PRESIDENT MACHEL WOULD BE APPALLING AND THERE WAS A GOOD CHANCE THAT IN TIME THE LEVEL OF MILITARY ACTIVITY BY THE PATRIOTIC FRONT FORCES WOULD DIE AWAY.

7. MR FRYDENLUND SAID THAT HE WOULD REFLECT CAREFULLY ON WHAT LORD CARRINGTON HAD SAID. THE DILEMA FOR THE NORWEGIAN GOVERNMENT IN DOMESTIC POLITICAL TERMS WAS WHETHER TO TAKE THE STRAIN IN PARLIAMENT WITH THE OPPOSITION, OR INTERNALLY WITHIN THE NORWEGIAN LABOUR PARTY. LORD CARRINGTON REITERATED THE SERIOUSNESS OF A BREACH BY NORWAY WITH BRITAIN ON THIS ISSUE. THE FRONT LINE STATES, ALTHOUGH THEY WERE PUTTING PRESSURE ON THE PATRIOTIC FRONT, WOULD BE RELUCTANT TO BREAK WITH IT. THERE WAS A TENDANCY AMONG SOME WESTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES TO AVOID A QUARREL WITH THE FRONT

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LINE STATES BUT TO FEEL THAT A DISAGREEMENT WITH BRITAIN ON RHODESIA DID NOT MATTER OR THAT THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT WOULD NOT MIND. HE WISHED TO MAKE QUITE CLEAR THAT ON THIS OCCASION THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT DID MIND AND THAT IT WOULD MATTER. IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT, IF THE NORWEGIAN GOVERNMENT LET BRITAIN DOWN, FOR ANGLO-NORWEGIAN RELATIONS TO RETAIN THEIR PRESENT DEGREE OF CLOSENESS.

3. MR FRYDENLUND ASKED WHETHER THERE WAS ANYTHING WHICH NORWAY COULD DO TO HELP IN THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE. THEY HAD GOOD CONTACTS WITH PRESIDENT NYERERE AND SOME OF THE OTHER FRONT LINE STATES AND WOULD BE WILLING TO USE SUCH INFLUENCE AS THEY HAD WITH THEM TO TRY TO MAINTAIN THE PRESSURE ON THE PATRIOTIC FRONT. LORD CARRINGTON SAID THAT THIS WOULD BE HELPFUL. IF SUCH PRESSURE WAS TO BE EFFECTIVE HOWEVER, IT WOULD HAVE TO BE APPLIED WITHIN THE NEXT WEEK OR SO.

9. RHODESIAN DEPT PLEASE COPY FURTHER AS NECESSARY.

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(MR FIFOOT)
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FM MIRIMBA SALISBURY 271000Z OCT 79

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 829 OF 27 OCTOBER

INFO PRIORITY PRETORIA

Pamie Hunter
PH

1. SINCE IT WAS AGREED THAT I SHOULD NOT RETURN TO LONDON AT THIS STAGE, YOU MAY FIND THE FOLLOWING RANDOM OBSERVATIONS AND COMMENTS USEFUL.

2. THE WAR SITUATION IS SERIOUS AND AT THE TOP OF EVERYONES' MIND, BLACK AND WHITE. EXCEPT FOR CENTRAL SALISBURY, THE COUNTRY LARGELY CLOSED DOWN AT SUNSET EACH DAY. THE SECURITY FORCES CAN OFFER LITTLE PROTECTION TO THE BLACK INHABITANTS OF THE COUNTRYSIDE. THEY CAN MAINTAIN CONTROL ONLY WHEN AND WHERE THEY ARE PRESENT. EVEN TO DO THAT THEY ARE REDUCED TO HARSH TACTICS WHICH DO NOT WIN HEARTS AND MINDS.

3. ELLMAN OF THE GUARDIAN BELIEVES THAT LARGE TRACTS OF TRIBAL TRUST LAND IN CENTRAL MATABELELAND AND FROM UMTALI AND WEDZA TO THE SOUTH-EASTERN BORDER HAVE BEEN MORE OR LESS WRITTEN-OFF BY THE SECURITY FORCES FOR PURPOSES OF ROUTINE PATROLLING. HE MAINTAINS THAT ALMOST NO GOVERNMENT SERVICES OPERATE IN THESE AREAS. BUT THEY ARE NOT, OF COURSE, "LIBERATED ZONES" IN THE SENSE THAT ZANLA AND ZIPRA CANNOT PREVENT THE SECURITY FORCES FROM ENTERING AND PATROLLING.

4. ALTHOUGH LIFE IN SALISBURY IS OUTWARDLY PRETTY NORMAL, THE MASSIVE DRIFT OF REFUGEES TO THE TOWNS IS PUTTING A STRAIN ON HOUSING AND SCHOOL FACILITIES. SQUATTERS ARE BEGINNING TO CAMP ON THE RUBBISH DUMP NEXT TO MIRIMBA HOUSE. AFRICAN SCHOOLS IN SALISBURY ARE RUNNING CLASSES FOR TWO SETS OF PUPILS A DAY AND A NEW LOW COST HOUSING SCHEME IS SCHEDULED TO START NEXT MONTH. SUCH MEASURES MAY ASSUAGE, BUT NOT SOLVE, THE PROBLEM. THERE IS A LARGE AND GROWING UNEMPLOYED POPULATION IN AND AROUND THE CITY. OTHER TOWNS ARE PRESUMABLY SIMILARLY PLACED.

5. ALTHOUGH THE EUROPEAN FARMING SECTOR IS SAID TO BE OPERATING SATISFACTORILY, AGRICULTURE IN THE AFRICAN FARMING

CONFIDENTIAL

/ AREAS AND

AREAS AND TRIBAL TRUST LANDS HAS BEEN BADLY DISRUPTED, AND THERE IS TALK OF A SERIOUS FOOD SHORTAGE BEFORE THE MAIN (EUROPEAN) MAIZE HARVEST COMES IN NEXT MARCH OR APRIL.

6. EVERYONE (INCLUDING MANY OF THE GUERILLAS) IS TIRED OF THE WAR. BUT THE RURAL BLACKS ARE DESPERATE: THEY WILL SUPPORT AND VOTE FOR ANYTHING OR ANYONE WHOM THEY THINK WILL BRING PEACE.

7. THERE ARE THOUGHT TO BE AT LEAST 15,000 GUERILLAS IN THE COUNTRY, SEVERAL HUNDREDS HAVING BEEN INFILTRATED RECENTLY. ALTHOUGH THE REPORTED LEVEL OF INCIDENTS HAS BEEN HIGHER IN RECENT MONTHS THAN FORMERLY, IT STILL SUGGESTS THAT MANY OF THE GUERILLAS ARE MORE OR LESS INACTIVE. WHY? BECAUSE THEIR HEARTS ARE NOT IN THE FIGHT AND THEY ARE OUT OF CONTACT WITH AND CONTROL BY THEIR LEADERS? OR BECAUSE THEY ARE POSITIONED AWAITING ORDERS? INsofar AS THE LATTER EXPLANATION IS TRUE (I INCLINE, WITHOUT ANY REAL EVIDENCE, TO SUSPECT THAT THE FORMER IS MORE OFTEN THE CASE) THE PF WOULD BE WELL PLACED FOR AN ELECTION CAMPAIGN: EITHER TO CONTEST OR TO DISRUPT IT.

8. THERE SEEMS TO BE A FAIRLY GENERAL ASSUMPTION AMONG EDUCATED BLACKS AND THE MORE LIBERAL WHITE LIBERALS THAT AFRICANS SUPPORT IS SHIFTING STEADILY FROM THE BISHOP TO NKOMO AND MUGABE, PARTICULARLY THE LATTER. I HAVE NO MEANS OF JUDGING THIS. BUT IT IS MY HUNCH THAT THE BISHOP WOULD STILL DO BETTER IN AN ELECTION THAT SUCH PEOPLE EXPECT (SOME GO SO FAR AS TO SAY THAT HE IS "FINISHED"). IF MICHAEL MAWEMA DECIDED TO SET UP A KARANGA POLITICAL PARTY (LARGEST SINGLE SHONA GROUP) THAT WOULD COMPLICATE THE PICTURE STILL FURTHER. IT CERTAINLY SEEMS THAT AFRICAN POLITICAL PARTIES, EVEN AMONG THE SHONA, ARE BECOMING INCREASINGLY TRIBAL IN ORIENTATION.

9. MOST WHITES ARE TERRIFIED AT THE THOUGHT OF A PF ELECTORAL VICTORY: "I WILL PACK AND LEAVE WITHOUT WAITING TO SEE WHAT HAPPENS". FOR THOSE WHO HAVE NO MAJOR STAKE HERE, OR CAN GET IT OUT OF THE COUNTRY, THAT MAY WELL BE TRUE. BUT I SUSPECT THAT MANY, PARTICULARLY IN THE FARMING AND BUSINESS COMMUNITIES, WOULD WAIT TO SEE WHAT HAPPENED. THERE COULD BE A RUSH AMONG THE ARTISANS AND JUNIOR RANKS OF THE CIVIL AND SECURITY FORCES WITH ADVERSE CONSEQUENCES ON THE FUNCTIONING OF THE SYSTEM.

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FOR THE PRESENT WHITES MOSTLY STILL THINK THAT MUZOREWA WILL WIN THE NEXT ELECTION. SO LONG AS THAT EXPECTATION HOLDS I DO NOT FORSEE SERIOUS DIFFICULTIES FROM THE WHITES OVER OUR PROPOSALS FOR THE CONSTITUTION OR THE PRE-INDEPENDENCE PERIOD. IF THE EXPECTATION CHANGES WE MAY FACE DIFFICULTIES.

THERE WOULD BE A TENDENCY TO ACCUSE US OF SABOTAGING THE INTERNAL SETTLEMENT AND IMPOSING 'MARXISM'; WE MIGHT FIND DIFFICULTIES OVER COOPERATION BETWEEN THE GOVERNOR AND THE PUBLIC AND SECURITY SERVICES DURING THE INTERIM. THE PROPOSAL THAT THE MUZOREWA GOVERNMENT SHOULD STAND DOWN IS SENSITIVE BECAUSE IT SCRATCHES AT THE EXPECTATION THAT HE WILL WIN.

11. I WAS TACKLED RECENTLY BY AN AFRICAN UNIVERSITY LECTURER, WHO APPEARED TO BE A PF SUPPORTER ALTHOUGH BITTERLY OPPOSED TO THE WAR. WITHOUT HAVING SOLUTIONS TO SUGGEST (HE ACCEPTED THAT A CEASEFIRE COULD NOT BE IMPOSED) HE WAS WORRIED ABOUT SECURITY DURING THE INTERIM. HE DID NOT BELIEVE THAT A VOLUNTARY CEASEFIRE COULD WORK. MINOR INCIDENTS MIGHT BE CONTAINED BY THE POLICE OR A CEASEFIRE SUPERVISORY TEAM, BUT HE THOUGHT A MAJOR BREAKDOWN HIGHLY PROBABLE. TO WHOM WOULD OUR GOVERNOR TURN? WHAT WOULD HAPPEN TO THE ELECTION ARRANGEMENTS AND THE LANCASTER HOUSE AGREEMENT? I SUSPECT THAT WE SHALL FIND INCREASING CONCERN ON THIS SCORE AMONG BLACKS AND WHITES IF THE CONFERENCE MOVES TOWARDS DISCUSSION OF MILITARY ARRANGEMENTS.

12. A WHITE WHO HAS GOOD CONTACTS WITH ZAPU TELLS ME THEY ARE BEGINNING TO CANVASS IN AND AROUND SALISBURY FOR VOTES AT THE NEXT ELECTION. THIS MAY BE A REFLECTION OF NKONO'S INTENTIONS.

13. PLEASE REPEAT ELSEWHERE IF NECESSARY.

BYATT

FILES

RHOD D
OADS
N AM D
NEWS D
PUSD
PLANNING STAFF
ES & SD
CCD
FRD
UND
LEGAL ADVISERS
(MR FREELAND)
(MR FIFCOT)
ECON D
PCD

DEF D
OID
PS
PS/LPS
PS/MR LUCE
PS/MR RIDLEY
PS/MR HURD
PS/PUS
SIR J GRAHAM
LORD N G LENNOX
MISS BROWN
MR DAY
MR WILLSON
MR ASPIN

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION
RHODESIA POLICY

SUBJECT

CONFIDENTIAL

PRIME MINISTER'S

PERSONAL MESSAGE

Serial No. T127A/79T

*Reply is in
Information. Pmt*

*cc ops set
Master Set*

GRS 1000

CONFIDENTIAL

DESKBY 262230Z

FM LUSAKA 262105Z OCT 79

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1154 OF 26 OCTOBER

AND TO IMMEDIATE DAR ES SALAAM, WASHINGTON, MAPUTO, MIRIMBA
SALISBURY, LAGOS, PRIORITY GABORONE, LUANDA, MONROVIA, UKMIS
NEW YORK, JEDDA, BONN, PRETORIA AND PARIS

MY I.P.T.: RHODESIAN CONFERENCE

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF LETTER FROM PRESIDENT KAUNDA TO PRIME
MINISTER:

BEGINS

ms

MY DEAR MARGARET,

I THANK YOU FOR SENDING YOUR PARLIAMENTARY UNDER SECRETARY
IN THE COMMONWEALTH AND FOREIGN OFFICE, MR. RICHARD LUCE, TO
SHARE WITH US YOUR IDEAS ON THE NEXT STAGE IN THE NEGOTIATIONS
AT LANCASTER HOUSE. I APPRECIATE YOUR THOUGHTFULNESS IN THIS.

WE WERE NATURALLY HAPPY THAT FOLLOWING ASSURANCES BY THE
BRITISH GOVERNMENT AND THAT OF THE UNITED STATES ON THE VITAL
QUESTION OF LAND, COMMON GROUND WAS FOUND WHICH ENABLED THE
PATRIOTIC FRONT TO CONTINUE WITH THE TALKS. THIS IS A FURTHER
AND CONTINUING SIGN OF THE WILLINGNESS ON ALL SIDES TO FIND A
PERMANENT SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM AT HAND.

MR. LUCE WILL HAVE REPORTED TO YOU ON OUR DISCUSSIONS BUT
I THOUGHT I SHOULD CONFIRM IN WRITING SOME OF THE POINTS WHICH
FORMED PART OF OUR CONVERSATION.

ELECTIONS

CONFIDENTIAL

/ I FULLY

CONFIDENTIAL

I FULLY APPRECIATE AND SHARE YOUR CONCERN FOR IMPARTIAL, FAIR AND FREE ELECTIONS BEFORE ZIMBABWE COULD BE BROUGHT TO LEGAL INDEPENDENCE. I BELIEVE, HOWEVER, THAT THE TIME YOU PROPOSE FOR CONDUCTING SUCH ELECTIONS IS RATHER TOO SHORT TO ACHIEVE THE OBJECTIVES WHICH WE ALL DESIRE. AS YOU KNOW, THERE ARE HUNDREDS OF THOUSANDS OF REFUGEES NOW LIVING OUTSIDE ZIMBABWE AND WHO WILL NEED TO RETURN HOME TO PARTICIPATE IN THE ELECTIONS. NEEDLESS TO SAY THAT THE ORGANISATION FOR THE RETURN OF THESE REFUGEES WOULD TAKE TIME. THE PATRIOTIC FRONT ITSELF WOULD IN ALL FAIRNESS, NEED TIME TO ORGANISE THEMSELVES PROPERLY. THEY HAVE BEEN OUTSIDE AND THEIR POLITICAL MACHINERY HAS NOT BEEN ALLOWED TO OPERATE INSIDE ZIMBABWE BY THE PRESENT REGIME. A REASONABLE PERIOD IN WHICH ALL THE PARTIES CAN CAMPAIGN IS, THEREFORE, NECESSARY. ARISING OUT OF OUR OWN EXPERIENCE HERE IN ZAMBIA, WE KNOW THAT THE AWAKENING OF THE CONSCIOUSNESS OF THE PEOPLE AND THEIR PREPARATION FOR IMPENDING POLITICAL CHANGES ARE A NECESSARY PRE-REQUISITE OF THE PROCESS OF FOSTERING UNITY AND RECONCILIATION IN A NEW AND EMERGING COUNTRY.

THE OTHER MAJOR FACTOR IN THE CONDUCT OF ELECTIONS IN MY VIEW IS THE REGISTRATION OF VOTERS. I NOTED FROM THE REPORT WHICH MR. LUCE GAVE TO ME VERBALLY THAT YOU DO NOT INTEND TO PROCEED WITH THIS NORMAL PROCESS BEFORE ELECTIONS ARE HELD IN ZIMBABWE. IN MY VIEW, THE REGISTRATION OF VOTERS IS AN EXERCISE THAT CAN BE ACCOMPLISHED IN A MUCH SHORTER PERIOD OF SAY THREE MONTHS. YOU WILL NOTE THAT NOT ONLY DO WE NEED TO ASSURE OUR COMMONWEALTH FRIENDS BUT THE ENTIRE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY WANT TO BE SATISFIED THAT THE ELECTIONS ARE BEING CONDUCTED IN A FAIR AND DEMONSTRABLY DEMOCRATIC MANNER. TO EXCLUDE REGISTRATION AND THOSE ASPECTS THAT GO WITH IT WOULD BE TO RUN THE RISK OF THE ELECTIONS NOT BEING SEEN AS FAIR, FREE AND IMPARTIAL TO ALL CONCERNED. IT IS MY BELIEF, THEREFORE, THAT YOU SHOULD GIVE SERIOUS ATTENTION TO THIS IMPORTANT PILLAR OF ANY DEMOCRATIC PROCESS.

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I BELIEVE FRANKLY THAT THESE PROCESSES WHICH ARE VITAL TO THE NEED TO FOSTER UNITY AND RECONCILIATION AMONG THE PEOPLE OF ZIMBABWE ARE ABSOLUTELY NECESSARY IF WE ARE TO ARRIVE AT THE OBJECTIVE OF FINDING A PEACEFUL AND PERMANENT SOLUTION TO THE CONFLICT. IT IS IN THIS CONTEXT THAT I BELIEVE THAT A PERIOD OF SIX MONTHS IN WHICH TO COMPLETE THE WORK IS ADEQUATE.

THE CEASEFIRE AND ITS SUPERVISION:

IN MY DISCUSSIONS WITH MR. LUCE, HE INFORMED ME THAT IT WAS THE INTENTION OF THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT TO ESTABLISH A MILITARY COMMISSION OF BOTH SIDES TO DISCUSS THE MATTERS RELATING TO THE CEASEFIRE. I PROPOSED THAT SUCH A JOINT COMMISSION NEEDED TO MEET ALMOST IMMEDIATELY IF POSSIBLE SIMULTANEOUSLY WITH THE POLITICAL DISCUSSIONS. I SAID THIS WOULD BE IMPORTANT IN TERMS OF DIFFUSING TENSION AMONG THE PARTIES. I MUST ADMIT MR. LUCE WAS NOT VERY SPECIFIC ON THIS MATTER AND I ACCEPT THAT YOU HAD PROBABLY NOT DEVELOPED YOUR IDEAS MUCH FURTHER THAN THIS OR AT LEAST YOU HAD NOT BY THAT TIME REACHED A STAGE WHEN YOU WOULD FEEL FREE TO INFORM US ABOUT YOUR DETAILED PROPOSALS. HOWEVER, I GOT THE IMPRESSION WHICH IS NOW CONFIRMED BY YOUR OWN PROPOSALS TABLED ON MONDAY THAT YOU ANTICIPATE AN AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE OPPOSING ARMIES AND SUBSEQUENT DISENGAGEMENT OF FORCES.

THE IDEA OF A CEASEFIRE THAT CAN HOLD IS CENTRAL TO THE RESOLUTION OF THE CONFLICT. DURING OUR DISCUSSIONS IN LUSAKA, IT WAS QUITE CLEAR, AS YOU WILL AGREE, THAT THE IDEA FOR THE PRESENCE OF AN INTERNATIONAL FORCE WAS VERY MUCH PREFERABLE. YOU HAD EXPLAINED TO YOUR COMMONWEALTH COLLEAGUES THE PROBLEMS WHICH YOU WOULD HAVE IF SUCH TERMINOLOGY WERE TO APPEAR IN THE FINAL COMMUNIQUE. HOWEVER, THE TIME FOR A DECISION ON JUST HOW THE CEASEFIRE IS TO BE SUPERVISED AND POLICED HAS NOW COME. AN INTERNATIONAL PRESENCE IN ONE FORM OR THE OTHER TO OVERSEE THE OBSERVANCE OF THE CEASEFIRE IS ABSOLUTELY NECESSARY IF WE ARE TO ACHIEVE THE DESIRED RESULTS. I HAVE NO DOUBT IN MY OWN MIND THAT THE FINANCING OF THE EXERCISE IS NOT AN INSURMOUNTABLE

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PROBLEM. THE UNITED STATES AND SELECTED EUROPEAN POWERS WOULD, IN FACT, BE MORE THAN WILLING TO MAKE THEIR CONTRIBUTION IN THIS RESPECT. MARK CHONA WHO HAS BEEN ACTING ON MY INSTRUCTIONS, HAS DISCUSSED MY ANXIETIES ON THIS MATTER WITH YOU ALREADY. I HOPE AND TRUST THAT YOUR GOVERNMENT WILL CONTINUE TO APPROACH THIS ISSUE WITH THE SERIOUSNESS AND IMPORTANCE THAT IT DESERVES.

FINALLY, I WOULD LIKE TO REITERATE MY SUSTAINED INTEREST IN ADHERING STRICTLY TO THE PRINCIPLES THAT GUIDED US DURING THE LUSAKA CONFERENCE. AT NO OTHER TIME HAVE WE GOT SO CLOSE TO A SOLUTION OF THE CONFLICT. WE CANNOT AFFORD TO LOSE THIS OPPORTUNITY AS THE CONSEQUENCES FOR SECURITY AND PEACE IN THE AREA ARE GRAVE. IT IS FOR THIS REASON, MARGARET, THAT I FIRMLY BELIEVE THAT YOU SHOULD REVISE YOUR PRESENT IDEAS ABOUT THE ARRANGEMENTS WHICH YOU NOW PROPOSE FOR THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD.

I REMAIN AVAILABLE FOR FURTHER CONSULTATIONS IN THESE MATTERS.
AS ALWAYS,
KENNETH.

KENNETH D. KAUNDA

PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF ZAMBIA.

ENDS

ALLINSON

FILES

RHOD D
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NEWS D
PUSD
PLANNING STAFF
ES & SD
CCD
FRD
UND
LEGAL ADVISERS
(MR FREELAND)
(MR FIFOOT)
ECON D
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PS/MR LUCE
PS/MR RIDLEY
PS/MR HURD
PS/PUS
SIR A DUFF
LORD N G LENNOX
MISS BROWN
MR DAY
MR WILLSON
MR ASPIN

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION
RHODESIA POLICY

- 4 -
CONFIDENTIAL



PRIME MINISTER'S

PERSONAL MESSAGE

SERIAL No. T127^A/79T

State House

Lusaka, Republic of Zambia

Rec'd & answered by
for telegrams

Am

25th October, 1979.

My dear Margaret,

I thank you for sending your Parliamentary Under Secretary in the Commonwealth and Foreign Office, Mr. Richard Luce, to share with us your ideas on the next stage in the negotiations at Lancaster House. I appreciate your thoughtfulness in this.

We were naturally happy that following assurances by the British Government and that of the United States on the vital question of land, common ground was found which enabled the Patriotic Front to continue with the talks. This is a further and continuing sign of the willingness on all sides to find a permanent solution to the problem at hand.

Mr. Luce will have reported to you on our discussions but I thought I should confirm in writing some of the points which formed part of our conversation.

ELECTIONS:

I fully appreciate and share your concern for impartial, fair and free elections before Zimbabwe could be brought to legal independence. I believe, however, that the time you propose for conducting such elections is rather too short to achieve the objectives which we all desire. As you know, there are hundreds of thousands of refugees now living outside Zimbabwe and who will need to return home to participate in the elections. Needless to say that the organisation for the return of these refugees would take time. The Patriotic Front itself would in all fairness, need time to organise themselves properly.

/...

Rt. Hon. Margaret Thatcher,
10 Downing Street,
LONDON.



- 2 -

They have been outside and their political machinery has not been allowed to operate inside Zimbabwe by the present regime. A reasonable period in which all the parties can campaign is, therefore, necessary. Arising out of our own experience here in Zambia, we know that the awakening of the consciousness of the people and their preparation for impending political changes are a necessary pre-requisite of the process of fostering unity and reconciliation in a new and emerging country.

The other major factor in the conduct of elections in my view is the registration of voters. I noted from the report which Mr. Luce gave to me verbally that you do not intend to proceed with this normal process before elections are held in Zimbabwe. In my view, the registration of voters is an exercise that can be accomplished in a much shorter period of say three months. You will note that not only do we need to assure our Commonwealth friends but the entire international community want to be satisfied that the elections are being conducted in a fair and demonstrably democratic manner. To exclude registration and those aspects that go with it would be to run the risk of the elections not being seen as fair, free and impartial by all concerned. It is my belief, therefore, that you should give serious attention to this important pillar of any democratic process.

I believe frankly that these processes which are vital to the need to foster unity and reconciliation among the people of Zimbabwe are absolutely necessary if we are to arrive at the objective of finding a peaceful and permanent solution to the conflict. It is in this context that I believe that a period of six months in which to complete the work is adequate.

THE CEASEFIRE AND ITS SUPERVISION:

In my discussions with Mr. Luce, he informed me that it was the intention of the British Government to establish a Military Commission of both sides to discuss the matters relating to the ceasefire. I proposed that such a joint commission needed to meet almost immediately if possible simultaneously with the political discussions. I said this would be important in terms of diffusing tension among the parties. I must admit Mr. Luce was not very specific on this matter and I accept that you had probably not developed your ideas much further than this or at least you had not by that time reached a stage when you would feel free to inform us about your detailed proposals. However, I got the impression which is now confirmed by your own proposals tabled on Monday that you anticipate an agreement between the opposing armies and subsequent disengagement of forces.

/...



- 3 -

The idea of a ceasefire that can hold is central to the resolution of the conflict. During our discussions in Lusaka, it was quite clear, as you will agree, that the idea for the presence of an international force was very much preferable. You had explained to your Commonwealth colleagues the problems which you would have if such terminology were to appear in the final communique. However, the time for a decision on just how the ceasefire is to be supervised and policed has now come. An international presence in one form or the other to oversee the observance of the ceasefire is absolutely necessary if we are to achieve the desired results. I have no doubt in my own mind that the financing of the exercise is not an insurmountable problem. The United States and selected European powers would, in fact, be more than willing to make their contribution in this respect. Mark Chona who has been acting on my instructions, has discussed my anxieties on this matter with you already. I hope and trust that your Government will continue to approach this issue with the seriousness and importance that it deserves.

Finally, I would like to reiterate my sustained interest in adhering strictly to the principles that guided us during the Lusaka Conference. At no other time have we got so close to a solution of the conflict. We cannot afford to lose this opportunity as the consequences for security and peace in the area are grave. It is for this reason, Margaret, that I firmly believe that you should revive your present ideas about the arrangements which you now propose for the Transitional Period.

I remain available for further consultations in these matters.

As always,

Kaunda

Kenneth D. Kaunda
PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF ZAMBIA

CONFIDENTIAL

GRS 380
CONFIDENTIAL

FM WASHINGTON 252030 Z OCT
TO IMMEDIATE F C O
TELEGRAM NUMBER 3370 OF 25 OCTOBER.

Prime Minister
[Signature]

INFO UKMIS NEW YORK, LUSAKA, DAR ES SALAAM, GABORONE, LAGOS.

YOUR TELNO 865 TO LUSAKA: RHODESIA: RE INDEPENDENCE ARRANGEMENTS.

1. HEAD OF CHANCERY CALLED ON FUNK, WHO DEALS WITH RHODESIA IN THE NSC, AND SPOKE ON THE LINES OF YOUR TELEGRAM UNDER REFERENCE, LEAVING HIM A COPY OF OUR PROPOSALS FOR PRE-INDEPENDENCE ARRANGEMENTS (YOUR TELNO 859 TO LUSAKA) WE ARE TAKING PARALLEL ACTION WITH STATE DEPARTMENT TODAY.

2. FUNK DID NOT QUESTION THEIR LOGIC. HE PERSONALLY WOULD HAVE LIKED TO SEE SOME SORT OF COMMONWEALTH FORCE, BUT ACCEPTED THE DIFFICULTIES. FAILING THAT HE ARGUED FOR AS WIDESPREAD A VISIBLE BRITISH PRESENCE AS POSSIBLE. THERE WAS STILL GREAT RESPECT FOR THE BRITISH IN RHODESIA AND WE WERE ADEPT AT EXERTING AUTHORITY WITH THE MINIMUM OF FORCE.

3. FUNK SAID WITH ADMIRATION THAT HE COULD NOT HAVE IMAGINED AN OUTCOME OF LUSAKA WHICH GENERATED MORE PRESSURE ON ALL PARTIES TO GET A SETTLEMENT. IF THE PATRIOTIC FRONT WERE TO BREAK AWAY NOW, THE PRESIDENT'S REACTION WOULD NATURALLY DEPEND ON THE TIMING AND CIRCUMSTANCES. MORLAND RECALLED THE PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT IN JUNE WHERE HE HAD IN EFFECT SAID THAT EVEN IF CONGRESS FORCED THE LIFTING OF SANCTIONS, THE PRESIDENT BELIEVED IT WOULD BE MORALLY WRONG TO DO SO. (OUR TELNO 1396) FUNK SAID THAT HE DID NOT BELIEVE THE PRESIDENT WOULD TAKE SUCH A LINE NOW. HE WOULD HAVE TWO MAIN CONCERNS FIRST, HE WOULD NOT NOW WANT TO RISK A VISIBLE DEFEAT BY CONGRESS. ON THE OTHER HAND HE WOULD NOT WANT TO RETREAT FROM A MORAL POSITION.

BUT IN THE DISCUSSIONS WITH THE PRESIDENT IN JUNE ABOUT WHAT LINE TO TAKE ON THE RHODESIAN ELECTIONS, AN ARGUMENT WHICH FUNK (WHO WAS PRESENT) THOUGHT WEIGHED MOST WITH THE PRESIDENT WAS THAT THE OLD SALISBURY PARTY CONSTITUTION DID NOT PROVIDE FOR GENUINE TRANSFER

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OF POWER TO THE BLACK MAJORITY. FUNK SAID HE CONSIDERED THE NEW CONSTITUTION DID PROVIDE FOR MAJORITY RULE, AND HIS VIEWS, AS ONE OFFICIAL CONCERNED WAS THAT THE PRESIDENT WOULD NOT THEREFORE BE FACED WITH RETREATING FROM A MORAL POSITION IN BACKING THE LIFTING OF SANTIONS, EVEN IF THE PATRIOTIC FRONT HAD BROKEN AWAY.

HENDERSON

FILES

RHOD DEPT
OADS
NAD
PUSD
PLANNING STAFF
ES & SD
CCD
FRD
UND
LEGAL ADVISERS (MR FREELAND)
(MR FIFOOT)
ECON DEPT
PCD
DEF DEPT
OID
NEWS DEPT

PS
PS/SIR I GILMOUR
PS/MR LUCE
PS/MR RIDLEY
PS/MR HURD
PS/PUS
SIR J GRAHAM
LORD N G LENNOX
MISS BROWN
MR DAY
MR WILLSON
MR ASPIN

ADDITIONAL DIST.
RHODESIA POLICY

Old T.M.D.
from P.E.S.

Print



Print

Foreign and Commonwealth Office
London SW1A 2AH

25 October 1979

Print *Print* ②

Dear Michael,

Rhodesia Conference

Print 26/10

Mr Muldoon is sending a further message to delegates to the Conference, congratulating them on progress so far. I enclose a letter from the New Zealand High Commission giving the text, which you may wish to bring to the attention of the Prime Minister. Mr Muldoon sent an earlier message before the Congerence began, which I passed to you under cover of my letter of 10 September.

The Department have sent a suitable acknowledgement to the New Zealand High Commission.

Yours etc

R M J Lyne

(R M J Lyne)
Private Secretary

M O'D B Alexander Esq
10 Downing Street
LONDON



cc Mr Day

New Zealand High Commission

Sir J. Graham

PS/LPS

New Zealand House

Haymarket

Reference

B69/131

PS/Mr Luce

London SW1Y4TQ

19 October 1979

SPD

Telephone: 01-930 8422 Ext:

Telex: 24368

New Dept

[Handwritten signature]

Miss R.J. Spencer,
Assistant Head,
Rhodesia Department,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office,
King Charles Street,
LONDON SW1A 2AH.

*Mr Bennett read the letter
over to me before sending
our copies. I said I thought
it was helpful,
he said he would submit
(as per earlier message).*

Dear Rosemary,

You will recall that on 5 September we sent to you the text of a message from our Prime Minister to each of the delegates to the Conference on Zimbabwe Rhodesia. Mr Muldoon has decided to send a second message congratulating the participants on their achievements so far. The text is as follows:

PS 19/10

"You will recall that I sent a message to all delegates on the eve of the opening of your Conference in London.

I write now to congratulate all of you for having overcome by your combined efforts the first and very important obstacle by having reached agreement on a new constitution. You have shown the same determination and spirit of cooperation that I witnessed at the Lusaka Meeting of Commonwealth Heads of Government to bring about by peaceful means the independence of your country under genuine majority rule.

My good wishes, those of my Government and, I am sure, those of the whole Commonwealth are with you in your discussions of the next and final stage of the Conference: the interim arrangements for the pre-independence period.

The prize of independence and peace, to which I alluded in my first message to you, is now within your grasp. I am sure you will continue to display the determination and the qualities of statesmanship that will ensure for all your people a secure and happy future.

Yours sincerely,
R.D. Muldoon"

Yours sincerely,

P.R. Bennett

(P.R. Bennett)



26 OCT 1979

[RHODESIA: POLICY: ADVANCE COPIES]

x 27

PS
PS/SIR I GILMOUR
PS/MR LUCE
PS/PUS
SIR J GRAHAM
MR WILLSON
MR DAY
LORD N G LENNOX
MR ASPIN

PS/NO 10 DOWNING STREET

MR R L WADE-GERY)
MR P M MAXEY) CABINET
COL MOIR) OFFICE
MR P J FOWLER)
DIO)

.....

HD/RHOD DEPT (4)

HD/C AF D
HD/S AF D

HD/PUSD (2)

HD/NEWS DEPT

HD/WAD

MR FREELAND LEGAL ADVISER RM K200A

MR FITFOOT LEGAL ADVISER RM K164
G'S 100

ADVANCE COPY

UNCLASSIFIED

FM WASHINGTON 252220Z OCT 79

TO PRIORITY F.C.O.

TELEGRAM NUMBER 3376 OF 25 OCTOBER.

INFO MIRIMBA SALISBURY, UKMIS NEW YORK.

MY TELNO 3348: U.S. SANCTIONS AGAINST RHODESIA.

1. THE SENATE YESTERDAY APPROVED THE REVISED CONFERENCE COMMITTEE REPORT ON THE DEFENCE DEPARTMENT AUTHORIZATION BILL: THIS INCLUDED THE COMPROMISE WORDING CONTAINED IN PARA 2 OF T.U.R. ONCE THE REPORT HAS BEEN APPROVED BY THE HOUSE (WHERE IT IS EXPECTED TO PASS EASILY) THE FINAL BILL WILL BE SENT FOR PRESIDENTIAL SIGNATURE.

HENDERSON

NNNN

[RHODESIA: POLICY: ADVANCE COPIES]

027

PS
PS/SIR I GILMOUR
PS/MR LUCE
PS/PUS
SIR J GRAHAM
MR WILLSON
MR DAY
LORD N G LENNOX
MR ASPIN

~~PS/NO 10 DOWNING STREET~~

MR R L WADE-GERY)
MR P M MAXEY) CABINET
COL MOIR) OFFICE
MR P J FOWLER)
DIO)

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HD/RHOD DEPT (4)

HD/C AF D
HD/S AF D

HD/PUSD (2)

HD/NEWS DEPT
HD/WAD

MR FREELAND LEGAL ADVISER RM K200A

MR FI FOOT LEGAL ADVISER RM K164

~~RESIDENT CLERK~~

ADVANCE COPY

GRS 100

CONFIDENTIAL

FM LUSAKA 250840Z OCT 79


TO PRIORITY FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1134 OF 25 OCTOBER

INFO PRIORITY GABORONE, MIRIMBA SALISBURY, MAPUTO, DAR ES SALAAM,
LUANDA, PRETORIA AND LAGOS

Prime Minister ②

Sub. Duty Clerk
M M D G A
25.10.



GABORONE TELNO 431 TO FCO: RHODESIA

PRESIDENT KHAMA'S CRITICAL COMMENTS ABOUT KAUNDA IN PARA 2 OF
GABORONE'S TUR FIT IN WITH A COMMENT BY A SENIOR ZAMBIAN OFFICIAL
TO ONE OF MY COLLEAGUES. THE OFFICIAL, WHO HAD ATTENDED THE
DAR FLS CONFERENCE, SAID THAT HE BELIEVED THAT WHEN THE HEADS
OF STATE WERE ALONE THERE HAD BEEN A CONSIDERABLE ROW ALTHOUGH
UNITY HAD BEEN PRESERVED IN PUBLIC. HE WAS NOT ABLE OR WILLING
TO GIVE ANY OTHER DETAILS.

ALLINSON

NNNN

IMMEDIATE

[RHODESIA: POLICY: ADVANCE COPIES]

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PS
PS/SIR I GILMOUR
PS/MR LUCE
PS/PUS
SIR J GRAHAM
MR WILLSON
MR DAY
LORD N G LENNOX
MR ASPIN

PS/NO 10 DOWNING STREET
MR R L WADE-GERY)
MR P M MAXEY) CABINET
COL MOIR) OFFICE
MR P J FOWLER)
DIO)

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HD/RHOD DEPT (4)

HD/C AF D
HD/S AF D

HD/PUSD (2)

HD/NEWS DEPT

HD/WAD

MR FREELAND LEGAL ADVISER RM K200A

MR FIFOOT LEGAL ADVISER RM K164

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DESKBY 250930Z FCO

FM LAGOS 250745Z OCT 79

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 897 OF 25 OCTOBER

RPD INFO IMMEDIATE LUSAKA GABERONE MAPUTO DAR ES SALAAM LUANDA

SALISBURY MONROVIA PARIS BONN UKMIS NEW YORK WASHINGTON

AND ADDIS ABABA.

FROM MR LUCE.

Prime Minister

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Sp. Duty Clerk
M MORA
2510.

1. I HAD A FORTY MINUTE TALK WITH PRESIDENT SHAGARI THIS AFTERNOON. ACTING FOREIGN MINISTER IAY ABUBAKAR WAS ALSO PRESENT BUT SILENT. I BRIEFED THE PRESIDENT ON THE PRESENT POSITION AT THE CONFERENCE AND ON OUR PROPOSALS FOR THE INTERIM PERIOD ON THE LINES OF PARAGRAPHS 2-4 OF MAPUTO TELNO 341 TO FCO.

2. THE PRESIDENT THANKED ME FOR THIS ACCOUNT. HE SAID HE VERY MUCH APPRECIATED OUR EFFORTS TO MAINTAIN CONSULTATION WITH HIM SINCE HE TOOK OFFICE AND INDEED BEFORE. HE WAS GRATEFUL FOR THE ALMOST DAILY BRIEFINGS GIVEN TO HIM BY THE HIGH COMMISSION IN LAGOS. HE AGREED THAT THE INTERIM ARRANGEMENTS WERE OF THE UTMOST

LAGOS. HE AGREED THAT THE INTERIM ARRANGEMENTS WERE OF THE UTMOST IMPORTANCE AND WAS GLAD THAT BOTH SIDES SEEMED READY TO COMPROMISE. NIGERIA HAD URGED THE PATRIOTIC FRONT TO BE FLEXIBLE AND TO ACCEPT THAT THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR DECOLONISING RHODESIA LAY WITH BRITAIN.

3. THE PRESIDENT EXPRESSED CONCERN THAT THE ELECTIONS MUST BE DEMONSTRABLY FAIR. TO THIS END THE INTERIM PERIOD SHOULD NOT BE UNDULY SHORT. IT TOOK A LONG TIME TO ARRANGE ELECTIONS PROPERLY. IN NIGERIA IT HAD TAKEN A FULL YEAR AND IN RHODESIA THE SITUATION WAS COMPLICATED BY THE FACT THAT ONE OF THE PARTIES INVOLVED WAS NOT YET ESTABLISHED WITHIN RHODESIA. TWO MONTHS WAS TOO SHORT.

4. THE PRESIDENT ALSO SAID THAT HE DID NOT FULLY UNDERSTAND HOW A DEMOCRATIC ELECTION COULD BE CARRIED OUT WITHOUT THE DELIMITATION OF CONSTITUENCIES OR REGISTRATION, BOTH OF WHICH HAD BEEN CONSIDERED ESSENTIAL IN NIGERIA. HOWEVER, IF ALL SIDES AT THE CONFERENCE WERE PREPARED TO ACCEPT THIS, THEN THERE WAS NO REASON WHY NIGERIA SHOULD NOT DO SO.

5. THE PRESIDENT WENT ON TO SAY THAT HE THOUGHT SOME KIND OF PEACEKEEPING FORCE WOULD BE NECESSARY DURING THE INTERIM PERIOD, OTHERWISE EITHER SIDE MIGHT BUILD ON A MINOR INCIDENT TO UNDERMINE THE SETTLEMENT. HE APPRECIATED THAT MONITORING WAS USEFUL UP TO A POINT BUT THOUGHT THAT TO BE REALISTIC THE PRESENCE OF SOME BODY TO ENFORCE THE CEASEFIRE WAS ESSENTIAL.

6. IN REPLYING I USED THE FAMILIAR ARGUMENTS ON THE NEED FOR A SHORT INTERIM PERIOD AND FOR THE UNACCEPTABLE DELAY INVOLVED IN CARRYING OUT REGISTRATION. I ARGUED THAT THE NEED FOR A PEACEKEEPING FORCE WOULD BE OBIATED BY THE POLITICAL WILL OF THE PARTIES TO MAKE THE SETTLEMENT AND A CEASE-FIRE WORK. I STRESSED THAT WE INTENDED TO MAINTAIN CLOSE CONTACT WITH THE NIGERIAN GOVERNMENT ON THE SUBJECT OF RHODESIA, BOTH HERE IN LAGOS AND THROUGH THEIR HIGH COMMISSION AND OBSERVER IN LONDON. THE PRESIDENT REPEATED HIS BELIEF THAT A PEACEKEEPING FORCE WOULD BE NEEDED AND URGED US TO BE FLEXIBLE ON THE DURATION OF THE INTERIM PERIOD.

7. PRESIDENT SHAGARI WAS CLEARLY WELL BRIEFED ON RHODESIA. HE SPOKE CALMLY AND THOUGHTFULLY. HIS TONE WAS FRIENDLY THROUGHOUT. CLEARLY IF THE PATRIOTIC FRONT IS PREPARED TO ACCEPT A SHORT INTERIM PERIOD HE WILL BE PREPARED TO GO ALONG WITH THIS. BUT IF THE PATRIOTIC FRONT MAKE A MAJOR ISSUE OF THIS POINT WE SHALL NOT HAVE NIGERIAN SUPPORT IN ARGUING AGAINST THEM. ON THE QUESTION OF ENFORCING A CEASEFIRE. I BELIEVE THAT THE

7. PRESIDENT SHAGARI WAS CLEARLY WELL BRIEFED ON RHODESIA. HE SPOKE CALMLY AND THOUGHTFULLY. HIS TONE WAS FRIENDLY THROUGHOUT. CLEARLY IF THE PATRIOTIC FRONT IS PREPARED TO ACCEPT A SHORT INTERIM PERIOD HE WILL BE PREPARED TO GO ALONG WITH THIS. BUT IF THE PATRIOTIC FRONT MAKE A MAJOR ISSUE OF THIS POINT WE SHALL NOT HAVE NIGERIAN SUPPORT IN ARGUING AGAINST THEM. ON THE QUESTION OF ENFORCING A CEASEFIRE, I BELIEVE THAT THE PRESIDENT'S DOUBTS CAN ONLY BE RESOLVED IF HE SEES AN EFFECTIVE CEASEFIRE IN ACTION.

BROWN

IMMEDIATE

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FM UKMIS NEW YORK 242152Z OCT 79

TO PRIORITY F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1327 OF 24 OCTOBER

INFO LUSAKA DAR ES SALAAM GABORONE LAGOS WASHINGTON

YOUR TELNO 865 TO LUSAKA: RHODESIA

1. WE HAVE BEEN KEEPING THE COMMONWEALTH FRONT LINE REPRESENTATIVES HERE PARTICULARLY CLOSELY INFORMED OF DEVELOPMENTS AT LANCASTER HOUSE. I ARRANGED A LUNCH FOR LORD HARLECH TO TALK TO THEM TODAY.

2. IN THE COURSE OF A WIDE-RANGING DISCUSSION WHICH LORD HARLECH OPENED WITH A MOST CONVINCING PRESENTATION ON OUR OBJECTIVES, THE AFRICANS EXPRESSED THEIR MAIN CONCERNS ABOUT THE PRE-INDEPENDENCE ARRANGEMENTS. THESE WERE THE NEED FOR THE GOVERNOR TO BE SEEN TO EXERCISE HIS AUTHORITY EFFECTIVELY AND THE STRONG FEELING THAT TWO MONTHS WAS TOO SHORT TO ENABLE THE PATRIOTIC FRONT TO SET UP A COUNTRY-WIDE ORGANISATION TO COMPETE ON EQUAL TERMS IN THE ELECTION. THERE WAS ALSO THE PROBLEM OF THE VERY LARGE NUMBERS OF ZIMBABWEANS LIVING IN NEIGHBOURING COUNTRIES WHO WOULD HAVE TO RETURN HOME FOR THE ELECTION. LORD HARLECH ARGUED THAT, ALTHOUGH THE GOVERNOR WOULD HAVE LEGISLATIVE POWERS, HE COULD NOT POSSIBLY TACKLE ANY OF THE COUNTRY'S ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL PROBLEMS: THIS WOULD BE FOR THE ELECTED GOVERNMENT OF ZIMBABWE. BUT HE WOULD BE IN A POSITION TO ENSURE THAT NO PART OF THE EXISTING ADMINISTRATION ACTED IN A WAY THAT FAVOURED ONE PARTY AGAINST ANOTHER. ALTHOUGH LORD HARLECH POINTED OUT THAT THE PATRIOTIC FRONT CLAIMED TO CONTROL LARGE PARTS OF RHODESIA AND THUS SHOULD HAVE NO DIFFICULTY IN SETTING UP AN ELECTORAL ORGANISATION QUICKLY AND EMPHASISED THE REAL DANGERS OF A PROTRACTED TRANSITIONAL PERIOD, THE AFRICANS CLEARLY BELIEVED THAT THERE IS SOME FLEXIBILITY OVER THE PROPOSED TWO MONTHS.

3. SURPRISINGLY THERE WAS NO REFERENCE TO A UN OR COMMONWEALTH FORCE, BUT DOUBTS WERE RAISED ABOUT HOW THE POLICE WOULD BEHAVE. QUESTIONS ABOUT THE TIMING OF THE ARRIVAL OF THE COMMONWEALTH OBSERVERS SHOWED THAT THERE WAS RELUCTANCE TO RELY SOLELY ON BRITISH SUPERVISION FROM THE START OF THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD AND CONCERN THAT THE GOVERNOR SHOULD HAVE ENOUGH STAFF TO BE AWARE OF WHAT WAS HAPPENING ON THE GROUND.

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4. WHEN CLARK (NIGERIA) RAISED THE QUESTION OF SANCTIONS LORD HARLECH DESCRIBED THE POLITICAL REALITIES IN THE UK AND ASKED HOW ANYONE WOULD BE ABLE TO JUSTIFY THE CONTINUATION OF SANCTIONS AGAINST THE PEOPLE OF ZIMBABWE WHEN ALL THE DEMANDS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL HAD BEEN MET. I EMPHASISED THE IMPORTANCE OF NOT BRINGING THE SANCTIONS QUESTION INTO THE ARENA NOW WHEN IT WOULD COMPLICATE THE ALREADY DIFFICULT PROCESS AT LANCASTER HOUSE.

5. THE MEETING WAS USEFUL IN HELPING TO CONVINCING THE AFRICANS THAT WE ARE STILL IN FULL ACCORD WITH THE LETTER AND THE SPIRIT OF THE LUSAKA AGREEMENT. THERE WAS NO ATTEMPT TO QUESTION THIS. ALTHOUGH WE COULD NOT CONVINCING CLARK THAT THE SECURITY COUNCIL WOULD NOT BE LEGALLY REQUIRED TO LIFT SANCTIONS I BELIEVE WE HAVE DONE SOMETHING TO RESTRAIN HIM FROM PREMATURE PRE-EMPTIVE ACTION ON THIS FRONT.

PARSONS

FILES

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LEGAL ADVISERS
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(MR FIFOOT)
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SIR A DUFF
LORD N G LENNOX
MISS BROWN
MR DAY
MR WILLSON
MR ASPIN

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION
RHODESIA POLICY

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CONFIDENTIAL

IMMEDIATE

PS
PS/SIR I GILMOUR
~~PS/MR LUCE~~
PS/PUS
SIR ~~W. DUFF~~ *J. Graham.*
MR WILLSON
MR BYATT
LORD N. G. LENNOX

PS/NO 10 DOWNING STREET

MR R L WADE-GERY)
MR P M MAXEY)
COL MOIR) CABINET
MR P J FOWLER) OFFICE
DIO)

Mr. D.A.I. ... 4
HD/RHODESIA DEPT (3)

HD/C AF D
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HD/PUSD (2)

HD/NEWS DEPT

HD/WAD

MR FREELAND LEGAL ADVISER RM K200A

MR FIFOOT LEGAL ADVISER RM K164

CONFIDENTIAL

DESKBY 241700Z FCO

FM LAGOS 241500Z OCT 79

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 895 OF 24 OCTOBER

RPTD INFO IMMEDIATE LUSAKA GABORONE MAPUTO DAR-ES-SALAAM

LUANDA MONROVIA PARIS BONN WASHINGTON UKMIS NEW YORK SALISBURY
AND ADDIS ABABA.

Prime Minister

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*ST P. Duty Desk
PP MOORA*

25.10.

FROM MR LUCE.

1. I HAD NEARLY TWO HOURS WITH PAULO JORGE (ANGOLAN FOREIGN MINISTER) LAST NIGHT. THE VICE MINISTER (DE MOURA) WAS ALSO PRESENT. I BRIEFED HIM ON THE LINES OF PARA 2-4 OF MAPUTO TELEGRAM NO 341 TO FCO.

2. JORGE THANKED ME FOR MY EXPLANATION OF THE POSITION REACHED AT LANCASTER HOUSE AND OF OUR PROPOSALS FOR THE INTERIM PERIOD. HE RECOGNISED THAT WE WERE MAKING A SERIOUS EFFORT TO RESOLVE THE RHODESIAN PROBLEM AND REALISED THAT WE WERE FACED WITH A DELICATE AND DIFFICULT SITUATION. HE MADE IT CLEAR THAT THE ANGOLAN GOVERNMENT GAVE FULL SUPPORT TO THE PATRIOTIC FRONT BECAUSE IT WAS FIGHTING FOR THE LEGITIMATE ASPIRATIONS OF THE PEOPLE OF RHODESIA. IN HIS VIEW THE CONFERENCE WAS TAKING PLACE FIRSTLY BECAUSE OF THE ARMED STRUGGLE CARRIED OUT BY THE PATRIOTIC FRONT AND SECONDLY BECAUSE THE OAU HAD DECIDED IN MONROVIA TO RECOGNISE THE PATRIOTIC FRONT AS THE LEGITIMATE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE PEOPLE OF RHODESIA.

AND SECONDLY BECAUSE THE OAU HAD DECIDED IN MONROVIA TO RECOGNISE THE PATRIOTIC FRONT AS THE LEGITIMATE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE PEOPLE OF RHODESIA. THESE TWO FACTORS HAD FORCED BRITAIN TO TAKE ANOTHER LOOK AT THE PROBLEM AND, FINALLY AFTER 14 YEARS, TO ACCEPT HER RESPONSIBILITIES IN THE SITUATION.

3. JORGE EXPRESSED CONCERN AT OUR PROPOSAL THAT THE INTERIM PERIOD SHOULD BE AS SHORT AS 2/3 MONTHS. IT WOULD BE IMPOSSIBLE TO ORGANISE THE ELECTION IN THIS TIME. NOT ONLY WOULD REGISTRATION BE IMPOSSIBLE BUT THE PARTIES WOULD NOT HAVE TIME TO EXPLAIN THEIR POLICIES TO THE PEOPLE, THE MAJORITY OF WHOM WERE ILLITERATE. IT WOULD BE HARD FOR H.M.G. TO SUPERVISE FREE AND FAIR ELECTIONS, THOUGH HE WAS ENCOURAGED TO HEAR THAT THERE WOULD BE COMMONWEALTH OBSERVERS. NOR COULD HE SEE HOW BRITAIN COULD ASSERT ITS AUTHORITY IN RHODESIA WITHOUT SENDING TROOPS. IT WOULD HARDLY BE POSSIBLE TO RELY, DURING THE INTERIM, ON THE SECURITY FORCES AND POLICE WHO HAD ASSURED THE EXISTENCE OF THE REBEL REGIME. HOW WOULD CLASHES BETWEEN PATRIOTIC FRONT FORCES AND QUOTE SMITH/MUZOREWA UNQUOTE FORCES BE PREVENTED AND THE CEASEFIRE GUARANTEED WITHOUT USING BRITISH TROOPS?

4. JORGE ALSO RAISED THE QUESTION OF REFUGEES. HE ASKED WHAT I MEANT BY THE PEACEFUL RETURN OF REFUGEES TO RHODESIA. WHAT ABOUT THE 'FREEDOM FIGHTERS'. THEY COULD NOT BE EXPECTED SIMPLY TO LAY DOWN THEIR ARMS AND RETURN TO RHODESIA.


5. JORGE CONCLUDED BY SAYING THAT THE ANGOLAN GOVERNMENT WAS READY TO DO ITS BEST FOR A JUST SOLUTION OF THE RHODESIAN PROBLEM. THEY WOULD CO-OPERATE WITH BOTH THE PATRIOTIC FRONT AND H.M.G. THEY WANTED TO SEE AN END TO THE WAR AND WISHED US SUCCESS.

6. I EXPLAINED OUR VIEWS ON THE DURATION OF THE INTERIM PERIOD AND ON REGISTRATION, EMPHASISING THAT THE PATRIOTIC FRONT THEMSELVES HAD SUGGESTED A PERIOD NOT EXCEEDING SIX MONTHS. I SAID THAT OUR PROPOSALS FOR THE INTERIM WERE BASED ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT ALL PARTIES WOULD HAVE AGREED THE TERMS OF A SETTLEMENT AND WERE COMMITTED TO A CEASEFIRE. IT WOULD BE IDLE TO SUGGEST THAT THERE WOULD NOT BE PROBLEMS ASSOCIATED WITH THE ELECTIONS AND THE CEASE-FIRE. BUT WE BELIEVED THAT THE PROPOSALS WE HAD TABLED WERE A PRACTICAL WAY OF DEALING WITH A DIFFICULT SITUATION AND THAT THEY WERE WORKABLE PROVIDED THE PARTIES CONCERNED HAD THE WILL TO PUT THEMSELVES TO A POLITICAL TEST BEFORE THE PEOPLE OF RHODESIA AS A WHOLE. JORGE SAID THAT HE DID NOT DOUBT OUR DETERMINATION TO ORGANISE FREE AND FAIR ELECTIONS. HE HAD BEEN HOWEVER CONCERNED TO HEAR THAT AFTER HIS VISIT TO LONDON P.M. BOTHA HAD SAID THAT HE WAS HAPPY WITH THE WAY

BEFORE THE PEOPLE OF RHODESIA AS A MINUTE. DONALD SMITH
DID NOT DOUBT OUR DETERMINATION TO ORGANISE FREE AND FAIR
ELECTIONS. HE HAD BEEN HOWEVER CONCERNED TO HEAR THAT AFTER HIS
VISIT TO LONDON PIK BOTHA HAD SAID THAT HE WAS HAPPY WITH THE WAY
THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE WAS GOING, BECAUSE SOUTH AFRICAN
INTERESTS WERE GOING TO BE SAFEGUARDED. ANGOLA FEARED THAT
SOUTH AFRICA MIGHT INTERVENE TO HELP THE SMITH/MUZOREWA GROUP.

7. IT WAS CLEAR FROM THIS DISCUSSION THAT THE ANGOLANS REMAIN
UNCERTAIN OF OUR COMMITMENT TO ARRANGEMENTS WHICH WILL GIVE THE
PATRIOTIC FRONT AN EQUAL CHANCE IN DEMOCRATIC ELECTIONS. THEIR
SUPPORT FOR THE PATRIOTIC FRONT AND FOR THE CONCEPT OF ARMED
STURGGLE APPEARS DEEPER THAN THAT IN LUSAKA OR DAR-ES-SALAAM THOUGH
THEY STILL HOPE THAT THE PROBLEMS OF SOUTHERN AFRICA CAN BE SOLVED
BY PEACEFUL MEANS. I THINK THAT I WAS ABLE TO GO SOME WAY
TOWARDS REASSURING JORGE OVER OUR DETERMINATION TO ACHIEVE A JUST
SETTLEMENT AND HE WAS CLEARLY PLEASED TO HAVE THE OPPORTUNITY OF
EXCHANGING VIEWS WITH A MINISTER. HOWEVER IN THE FINAL
ANALYSIS THE ANGOLAN GOVERNMENT WILL BE GUIDED PRIMARILY BY WHAT
IS ACCEPTABLE TO THE PATRIOTIC FRONT.

BROWN



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IMMEDIATE

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[RHODESIA: POLICY: ADVANCE COPIES]

PS
PS/SIR I GILMOUR
PS/MR LUCE
PS/PUS
SIR J GRAHAM
MR WILLSON
MR DAY
LORD N G LENNOX
MR ASPIN

PS/NO 10 DOWNING STREET

MR R L WADE-GERY)
MR P M MAXEY) CABINET
COL MOIR) OFFICE
MR P J FOWLER)
DIO)

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HD/RHOD DEPT (4)

HD/C AF D

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HD/PUSD (2)

HD/NEWS DEPT

HD/WAD

MR FREELAND LEGAL ADVISER RM K200A

MR FIFOOT LEGAL ADVISER RM K164

RESIDENT CLERK

Prime Minister

(2)

RESTRICTED

FM WASHINGTON 241725Z OCT 79

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 3348 OF 24 OCTOBER

INFO UKMIS NEW YORK MIRIMBA

STP. Duty Clerk
pp MOD RA
25.10

ant

MY TELNO 2936:

US SANCTIONS AGAINST RHODESIA

1. IN THE SENATE YESTERDAY (23 OCTOBER) SENATOR HELMS SUCCESSFULLY MOVED THAT THE HOUSE/SENATE CONFERENCE REPORT ON THE DEFENCE DEPARTMENT AUTHORIZATION BILL BE REFERRED BACK TO THE CONFEREES. HELMS ARGUED THAT SENATE CONFEREES HAD EXCEEDED THEIR INSTRUCTIONS BY AGREEING TO A HOUSE PROPOSAL THAT THE BYRD AMENDMENT CALLING FOR THE IMMEDIATE LIFTING OF SANCTIONS SHOULD BE REPLACED BY A NON-BINDING SENSE OF CONGRESS RESOLUTION.
2. AT THE HOUSE/SENATE CONFERENCE, RECONVENED SHORTLY AFTERWARDS, THE FOLLOWING COMPROMISE WAS FINALLY AGREED: QUOTE IT IS THE SENSE OF THE CONGRESS THAT THE UNITED STATES SHOULD HAVE UNLIMITED ACCESS TO STRATEGIC AND CRITICAL MATERIALS WHICH ARE VITAL TO THE DEFENCE AND SECURITY OF THE UNITED STATES AND THAT EVERY EFFORT SHOULD BE MADE TO REMOVE ARTIFICIAL IMPEDIMENTS AGAINST THE IMPORTATION OF SUCH MATERIALS INTO THE UNITED STATES FROM ZIMBABWE - RHODESIA.


AND SECURITY OF THE UNITED STATES AND THAT EVERY EFFORT SHOULD BE MADE TO REMOVE ARTIFICIAL IMPEDIMENTS AGAINST THE IMPORTATION OF SUCH MATERIALS INTO THE UNITED STATES FROM ZIMBABWE - RHODESIA. UNQUOTE APART FROM THE ADDITION OF THE LAST THREE WORDS, THIS WORDING DUPLICATES THE CONFERENCE'S ORIGINAL FORMULATION (SEE TELEGRAM UNDER REFERENCE).

3. LAST NIGHT THE AMENDED VERSION WAS RE-SUBMITTED TO THE HOUSE AND SENATE FOR FINAL APPROVAL. OUR SOURCES IN CONGRESS SUGGEST THAT HELMS WILL PROBABLY ACCEPT IT.

4. THE PRINCIPAL PIECE OF LEGISLATION CONCERNING US SANCTIONS POLICY WILL THEREFORE REMAIN THE STATE DEPARTMENT AUTHORIZATION ACT WHICH IS ALREADY IN FORCE: THIS REQUIRES THE LIFTING OF SANCTIONS BY 15 NOVEMBER UNLESS THE PRESIDENT DETERMINES THAT IT WOULD BE AGAINST THE NATIONAL INTEREST TO DO SO.

5. THE SENATE WILL BE IN RECESS FROM 21 TO 26 NOVEMBER, THE HOUSE FROM 19 TO 26 NOVEMBER.

HENDERSON



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[RHODESIA: POLICY: ADVANCE COPIES]

PS
PS/SIR I GILMOUR
PS/MR LUCE
PS/PUS
SIR J GRAHAM
MR WILLSON
MR DAY
LORD N G LENNOX
MR ASPIN

PS/NO 10 DOWNING STREET

MR R L WADE-GERY)
MR P M MAXEY) CABINET
COL MOIR) OFFICE
MR P J FOWLER)
DIO)

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HD/RHOD DEPT (4)

HD/C AF D

HD/S AF D

HD/PUSD (2)

HD/NEWS DEPT

HD/WAD

MR FREELAND LEGAL ADVISER RM K200A

MR FIFOOT LEGAL ADVISER RM K164

~~RESIDENT CLERK~~

(Dept.)

Prime Minister

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GPS 373

CONFIDENTIAL

FM MAPUTO 241225Z OCT 79

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 351 OF 24 OCTOBER

INFO DAR ES SALAAM LUSAKA LILONGWE MIRIMBA SALISBURY PRETORIA

MOZAMBIQUE INTERNAL

SJP Duty Act
MURRA
2510.


1. DEEP CONCERN ABOUT INTERNAL SECURITY, AS WELL AS RHODESIAN ATTACKS ON MOZAMBIKAN INFRASTRUCTURE TARGETS AND THE SERIOUS ECONOMIC SITUATION, IS PROBABLY BEHIND MACHEL'S APPARENTLY GENUINE DESIRE FOR A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT ON RHODESIA.
2. THE RHODESIAN BACKED NATIONAL MOZAMBIKAN RESISTANCE IS GRADUALLY EXTENDING ITS OPERATIONS. THE AREA AROUND THE GORONGOSA GAME RESERVE, PARTS OF SOFALA, TETE AND MANICA PROVINCES ARE NOW SAID TO BE INCREASINGLY INFILTRATED BY THE RESISTANCE. SEIRA ITSELF HAS SEEN TERRORIST ACTIVITY, MOST RECENTLY IN THE FORM OF THE SINKING OF TWO DREDGERS INSIDE THE HARBOUR. SOME EMBASSIES, INCLUDING OURSELVES, HAVE RECEIVED TWO COMMUNIQUES (COPIES BY BAG) FROM THE RESISTANCE, POSTED IN JOHANNESBURG; ON THEIR RECENT OPERATIONS. THEY CLAIM THAT THE SINKING OF THE DREDGERS WAS DESIGNED TO PREVENT THE DISCHARGE OF SOVIET WAR MATERIALS AND TO DENY FACILITIES TO SOVIET TRAWLERS

IN JOHANNESBURG, ON THEIR RECENT OPERATIONS. THEY CLAIM THAT THE SINKING OF THE DREDGERS WAS DESIGNED TO PREVENT THE DISCHARGE OF SOVIET WAR MATERIALS AND TO DENY FACILITIES TO SOVIET TRAWLERS. THEY ALSO CLAIM THAT THE AREAS OF CATANDICA, MAVITA, DONDO AND INHAMINGA ARE NOW QUOTE LIBERATED ZONES UNQUOTE: THAT CUBAN AND SOVIET OFFICERS HAVE BEEN KILLED: AND THAT CAPTURED EQUIPMENT INCLUDES SAM 7 MISSILES WHICH WILL BE USED AGAINST GOVERNMENT AIRCRAFT. THE SWEDES HAVE RECENTLY FORBIDDEN THEIR AID PEOPLE TO TRAVEL NORTH OF VILANCULOS (22 DEGREES SOUTH 35 DEGREES AND 30 MINUTES EAST) WITHOUT SPECIAL PERMISSION.

3. MUCH OF THIS CAN BE DISCOUNTED (THE ABOVE MENTIONED COMMUNIQUEES GIVE THE IMPRESSION OF AN EFFICIENT SOUTH AFRICAN/RHODESIAN INFORMATION EFFORT) AND I HOPE THAT THE BBC WILL TREAT WITH CAUTION ALL REPORTS BY SOUTH AFRICAN NEWS AGENCIES OF MILITARY SUCCESSES BY THE RESISTANCE. NEVERTHELESS ITS ACTIVITIES DO POSE AN INCREASING PROBLEM TO THE AUTHORITIES. MACHEL HAS SPENT AN UNPRECEDENTED 16 DAYS SO FAR TOURING THE NIASSA PROVINCE, APPARENTLY BECAUSE OF MUCH DISAFFECTION IN THAT NEGLECTED REMOTE AREA. THERE HAVE BEEN RUMOURS OF FOOD RIOTS IN VILLAGES THERE AND IN MAPUTO ITSELF THERE HAVE BEEN SQUABBLES IN FOOD QUEUES WHICH OFTEN FORM OVERNIGHT.

4. DESPITE ALL THIS I DO NOT THINK THAT FRELIMO'S OVERALL CONTROL OF THE COUNTRY IS SERIOUSLY THREATENED: AND IT WOULD BE A MISTAKE TO ASSUME THAT THE MOZAMBICANS WOULD ACCEPT A RHODESIAN SETTLEMENT AT ANY PRICE.

PAPADOPOULOS



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es FCo

HP

Rhodesia

10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

24 October, 1979.

Your Excellency,

Thank you for your letter about the Constitutional Conference, brought by the hand of Dr. Chinebuah. You will have heard by now that the Patriotic Front delegation have accepted our constitutional proposals, subject to agreement on arrangements for putting them into effect. We are now discussing with both delegations the arrangements for elections, supervised under our authority - as agreed at Lusaka - and the other steps necessary to put the Constitution into effect.

I am grateful for your support in these very delicate and difficult negotiations; I hope I can continue to count on it in the future.

Yours sincerely,

(SGD) MT

His Excellency Dr. Hilla Limann



fg. *Paul*

STATEMENT ON RHODESIA TO BE MADE BY THE RIGHT HON THE LORD CARRINGTON, SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH AFFAIRS, IN THE HOUSE OF LORDS ON WEDNESDAY 24 OCTOBER

My Lords, with the leave of the House, I will make a statement on Rhodesia.

When the House rose, the Government were close to completing their consultations on the way to build on the progress made inside Rhodesia so as to bring the country to independence with wide international recognition.

My Right Honourable Friend, the Prime Minister, and I went to the Meeting of Commonwealth Heads of Government at Lusaka with the objective of securing their support for a renewed effort to find a settlement and end the war.

The agreement reached there paved the way for the present Constitutional Conference at Lancaster House.

It was agreed that, in the event of agreement on a new Constitution, there should be fresh elections in which all the parties would be able to participate, properly supervised under the British Government's authority and with Commonwealth observers present.



Such an election, if all agreed to stand by its result, would offer the prospect of an end to the war.

In the last six weeks we have achieved agreement on a Constitution which, indisputably, provides for genuine majority rule, while including appropriate safeguards for minorities.

Both Bishop Muzorewa's delegation and that of the Patriotic Front have made substantial concessions from their opening positions to reach agreement with us on the Independence Constitution, which we believe will provide a sound, just and democratic basis for the future of an independent Zimbabwe.

The task before us in the Conference now is to reach agreement on the arrangements for implementing that Constitution.

The key element in those arrangements will be, as agreed at Lusaka, "free and fair elections, properly supervised under British Government authority, and with Commonwealth observers." Bishop Muzorewa's delegation has already declared its willingness to participate in such elections in order to bring the new Constitution into effect.



Her Majesty's Government are willing to discharge in full their constitutional responsibility to see that elections are held on a basis which will give every party a fair chance to state its case to the people of Rhodesia.

We have made proposals to the Conference about the arrangements to bring the independence constitution into effect, and we are now engaged in discussing them with the delegations.

It is in the interests of all the people of Rhodesia and of the neighbouring countries that elections should take place as soon as possible to implement the Constitution and allow Rhodesia to proceed to legal independence. Our proposals provide for the appointment of a British Governor, with executive and legislative authority during the brief interim.

No official legislative or constitutional authority. -
You've got to have one (according to lawyers). -

para on legislative provisions

Under the Governor, an Election Commissioner will have the task of supervising the conduct of the elections.

Commonwealth observers would be invited to witness them.

I would not under-estimate the difficulties which lie ahead of us.

/But



But we have reached a wider measure of agreement on the Constitution than has hitherto been possible and the British Government have accepted their responsibility to supervise the process of putting it into effect.

What we have proposed is fully within the letter and the spirit of the Lusaka declaration.

We see no need for elaborate administrative and constitutional structures during the interim period, or for a lengthy interim period with all the unrest and uncertainty that would bring.

Any restructuring that may be necessary will be for the elected government to undertake within the constitutional framework.

If our proposals are accepted as I hope they will be, and a ceasefire is agreed, the way will be open for an end to the war and for Zimbabwe to take its place in the international community as a free and independent nation in the very near future.

I hope that the House will support the Government in their efforts to bring this about.

CONFIDENTIAL

GRS 600A

CONFIDENTIAL

FM LUANDA 231635Z

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 447 OF 23 OCTOBER

INFO PRIORITY GABORONE LUSAKA MAPUTO LAGOS MONROVIA KIRIMBA
SALISBURY PARIS BONN WASHINGTON UKMIS NEW YORK AND ADDIS
ABABA

FROM MR LUCE

- Prin Prisker*
Prisker
and
1. I SAW PRESIDENT NYERERE FOR 45 MINUTES THIS MORNING. I SPOKE ON THE LINES OF PARAS 2 TO 4 OF MAPUTO TELNO 341 TO FCO ADDING THAT OUR OUTLINE PROPOSALS FOR THE PRE-INDEPENDENCE PERIOD HAD BEEN TABLED AT LANCASTER HOUSE YESTERDAY. I GAVE NYERERE THE TEXT OF OUR PROPOSALS AND OF YOUR STATEMENT (FCO TEL NOS 859 AND 869 TO LUSAKA).
 2. THE PRESIDENT SAID HE WAS GRATEFUL FOR MY VISIT. HE WAS PLEASED THAT STAGE ONE OF THE CONFERENCE HAD BEEN ACCOMPLISHED. HE HAD NEVER BELIEVED THAT IT WAS GOING TO CAUSE SERIOUS PROBLEMS. STAGE TWO WOULD BE MORE DIFFICULT. HE HOPED THAT YOU WOULD PROVE AS DETERMINED IN YOUR HANDLING OF THE SECOND STAGE AS YOU HAD BEEN DURING THE FIRST. BRITAIN NEEDED TO BE BOLD IN ITS APPROACH TO THE ADMINISTRATIVE ARRANGEMENTS DURING THE PRE-ELECTION PERIOD.
 3. THE PRESIDENT SAID THAT HE WOULD CONCENTRATE ON IDENTIFYING THE PROBLEMS WHICH HE THOUGHT LAY AHEAD RATHER THAN PRESCRIBING ANSWERS TO THEM. HE WAS ESPECIALLY CONCERNED THAT WE SHOULD GENUINELY ASSERT OUR AUTHORITY IN RHODESIA DURING THE INTERIM. HE SAID WE WERE RIGHT TO APPOINT A GOVERNOR AND STRESSED THAT THE GOVERNOR MUST NOT ONLY HAVE LEGAL AUTHORITY BUT MUST BE SEEN TO HAVE THE POWER TO BACK IT UP. IN THE SAME WAY HE STRESSED HIS CONCERN OVER THE POWERS OF THE ELECTION, MILITARY AND POLICE ADVISERS. WOULD THEY MERELY ADVISE OR WOULD THEY BE ABLE TO ACT? LIKE CHISSANO HE STRESSED THE NEED TO CONVINCE THE PATRIOTIC FRONT AND THE FRONT LINE STATES THAT THE GOVERNOR REALLY WOULD BE ABLE TO COMMAND THE SUPPORT OF THE MACHINERY OF GOVERNMENT (THE

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/ SECURITY FORCES

SECURITY FORCES AND CIVIL SERVICE) CREATED BY SMITH. IT MIGHT BE DIFFICULT TO CONVINCED THE PF THAT THEY WOULD HAVE AN EQUAL CHANCE IN ELECTIONS IF, FOR EXAMPLE, GENERAL WALLS APPEARED TO BE IN COMMAND OF THE SECURITY FORCES DURING THE INTERIM PERIOD.

4. THE PRESIDENT REFERRED TO HIS EARLIER CONCERN THAT THE ARMIES IN RHODESIA SHOULD BE INTEGRATED BEFORE THE ELECTIONS. HE SAID HE DID NOT DISPUTE THAT THE EVENTUAL FUTURE OF THE SECURITY FORCES COULD ONLY BE DECIDED AFTER THE ELECTIONS. HE DOUBTED WHETHER OTHERS NOW SHARED HIS CONCERN ABOUT THE POSITION DURING THE INTERIM AND HE CONCEDED THAT A MILITARY COUNCIL ON WHICH PF FORCE COMMANDERS WOULD BE REPRESENTED MIGHT GO SOME WAY TOWARDS OVERCOMING THE PROBLEM. HIS MAIN CONCERN WAS THAT DURING THIS PERIOD THE PF FORCES SHOULD HAVE A CLEAR POSITION WHICH WAS NOT MARKEDLY INFERIOR TO THAT OF THE SALISBURY FORCES. OTHERWISE THE PSYCHOLOGICAL EFFECT ON THE PATRIOTIC FRONT WOULD SERIOUSLY AFFECT PROSPECTS FOR A CEASEFIRE. I POINTED OUT THAT, IF WE COULD GET AGREEMENT ON THE PROCEDURE FOR ELECTIONS AND THE ASSERTION OF BRITISH AUTHORITY, THIS COULD CREATE A POLITICAL CLIMATE IN WHICH IT MIGHT BE EASIER TO AGREE ON MILITARY ARRANGEMENTS. NYERERE SAW THIS, BUT SUGGESTED THAT SATISFACTORY MILITARY ARRANGEMENTS WOULD, IN THEMSELVES, HELP TO IMPROVE THE POLITICAL ATMOSPHERE. IT WAS A CHICKEN AND EGG SITUATION.

5. ON THE DURATION OF THE INTERIM PERIOD PRESIDENT NYERERE STRESSED THAT, IF HE WAS IN THE POSITION OF THE PF, HE WOULD WANT A PERIOD SUFFICIENT FOR BUILDING UP A PARTY ORGANISATION. WE WOULD HAVE TO DISCUSS THIS WITH THE PF. THE CASE FOR A VERY SHORT PERIOD WOULD NOT BE STRONG IF THERE WAS AN EFFECTIVE CEASEFIRE.

6. THE PRESIDENT MADE THE POINT THAT HE HAD HAD NO DIFFICULTY IN RECOMMENDING TO THE PF THAT THEY SHOULD ACCEPT OUR PROPOSALS FOR A CONSTITUTION. HE RESERVED JUDGEMENT ON OUR PROPOSALS FOR THE INTERIM. OF COURSE, IF AGREEMENT WAS REACHED AT LANCASTER HOUSE HE WOULD BE PERFECTLY HAPPY. BUT IF THE PF ASKED HIM WHETHER HE WOULD AGREE TO OUR PROPOSALS HE DID NOT AS YET KNOW WHAT ANSWER HE WOULD BE ABLE TO GIVE.

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7. I IMPRESSED ON NYERERE OUR DETERMINATION TO SEE MATTERS THROUGH AND TO EXERCISE THE NECESSARY AUTHORITY TO ENSURE THAT FAIR ELECTIONS WILL BE HELD. THE PROPOSALS WE HAD NOW TABLED WOULD, IN A NUMBER OF RESPECTS, BE UNWELCOME TO THE BISHOP'S DELEGATION, AS WELL AS TO THE PATRIOTIC FRONT. AS WITH THE CONSTITUTION, WE WOULD TRY TO FIND COMMON GROUND. BUT THE ULTIMATE RESPONSIBILITY RESTED WITH US, AS COMMONWEALTH LEADERS HAD ACKNOWLEDGED AT LUSAKA, AND WE MIGHT HAVE TO TAKE DIFFICULT AND BOLD DECISIONS.

8. IT WILL BE IMPORTANT TO CONVINCING PRESIDENT NYERERE THAT WE INTEND TO EXERCISE BRITISH AUTHORITY IN RHODESIA IN THE FULLEST SENSE. THIS I TRIED TO DO DURING OUR DISCUSSION. THE ATTITUDE OF NYERERE, AND OTHERS, WILL BE INFLUENCED BY THE STANDING OF THE PERSON NOMINATED AS GOVERNOR. IF THEY HAVE CONFIDENCE IN THE INDIVIDUAL, THEY WILL BE LESS CONCERNED ABOUT THE DETAILS OF THE MACHINERY. THERE COULD THEREFORE BE A CASE FOR MAKING KNOWN, DURING THE COURSE OF THE DISCUSSIONS OF THE PRE-INDEPENDENCE ARRANGEMENTS, WHO WE HAVE IN MIND FOR THIS TASK.

BYATT

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

23 October 1979

Dear Michael,

Rhodesia: Message to the Prime Minister from the
President of Ghana

The Ghanaian Foreign Minister handed to the Lord Privy Seal at the end of last week a message from his President about the Constitutional Conference. The message has been overtaken by the Patriotic Front's announcement that they now accept our constitutional proposals.

As a matter of courtesy, however, and to keep President Limann favourably disposed towards our approach at the Conference, we think it would be useful for the Prime Minister to reply along the lines of the enclosed draft letter.

*Yours ever
Roderic Lyne*

(R M J Lyne)
Private Secretary

M O'D B Alexander Esq
10 Downing Street

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Regist
 No.

DRAFT Letter

Type 1 +

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

 Top Secret,
 Secret.
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 Unclassified.

 To:- Dr Hilla Limann
 President of the Republic of Ghana

 From
 Prime Minister

Telephone No. Ext.

Department


PRIVACY MARKING

..... In Confidence

Thank you for your letter about the Constitutional Conference, brought by the hand of Dr Chinebuah. You will have heard by now that the Patriotic Front delegation have accepted our constitutional proposals, subject to agreement on arrangements for putting them into effect. We are now discussing with both delegations the arrangements for elections, supervised under our authority - as agreed at Lusaka - and the other steps necessary to put the Constitution into effect.

I am grateful for your support in these very delicate and difficult negotiations; I hope I can continue to count on it in the future.

*Copy for
Signature*



23 OCT 1979

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(2)



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

23 October 1979

Ly *Prime Minister*

Dear Michael,

and *23/10*

Rhodesia: Legislation

I enclose, for background information, a short note setting out the legislation likely to be needed on Rhodesia. Instructions are issuing, with the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster's agreement, to Parliamentary Counsel to draft the Enabling Bill and the Independence Bill. But the dates of their introduction must remain uncertain until the outcome of the Constitutional Conference is known.

I am sending copies of this letter to Murdo Maclean in the Chief Whip's Office and to John Stevens in the office of the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster.

yours ever
Roderic Lyne

(R M J Lyne)
Private Secretary

M O'D B Alexander Esq
10 Downing Street

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23 OCT 1979



RHODESIA: TIMETABLE FOR LEGISLATION

1. All timings are tentative and depend on the date on which the Constitutional Conference ends.
2. At the close of the Conference we would make two Orders in Council under Section 2 of the Southern Rhodesia Act 1965:
 - a. to appoint a Governor and bring about a return to legality;
 - b. to lift sanctions and grant a partial amnesty and indemnity.
3. Section 2 lapses on 15 November. There may be a race between our revoking Sanctions Orders and their lapsing. If Section 2 lapses before new legislation is in force, there would be no legislative authority for any Orders we need to preserve, e.g. the Governor's Order.
4. Whether or not the steps in paragraphs 2 and 3 above have been taken, there will need to be an Enabling Bill. Its purposes will be:
 - a. to preserve after 15 November Orders (other than Sanctions Orders) made under Section 2;
 - b. to allow Orders in Council to be made for an Independence Constitution and new elections. (The electoral provision of the Independence Constitution will be needed for the elections.)

The Bill must be law by 15 November.
5. Thereafter an Independence Bill will be required to confer independence on Rhodesia and make consequential provisions in UK law. The Bill will allow the Government to set the date of independence by Order in Council after the elections. The Bill will probably be introduced in mid-November and should be enacted by mid-December.
6. In theory the Bills in 4 and 5 above could be combined. In practice the Enabling Bill will be required very quickly, and we should not want to burden it with matters of substance requiring full debate.

[RHODESIA: POLICY: ADVANCE COPIES]

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PS/NO 10 DOWNING STREET

MR R L WADE-GERY)
MR P M MAXEY)
COL MOIR) CABINET
MR P J FOWLER) OFFICE
DIO)

M. D.A.H.
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HD/C AF D

HD/S AF D

HD/PUSD (2)

HD/NEWS DEPT

HD/WAD

MR FREELAND LEGAL ADVISER RM K200A

MR FIFOOT LEGAL ADVISER RM K164

RESIDENT CLERK

Prime Minister

[Signature]
23/4

SECRET

FM LUSAKA 231450Z OCT 79

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1130 OF 23 OCTOBER

INFO IMMEDIATE MIRIMBA SALISBURY

INFO ROUTINE GABORONE, PRETORIA, DAR ES SALAAM, LUANDA, MAPUTO,
UKMIS NEW YORK, WASHINGTON.

RHODESIAN INCURSIONS:

1. WE HAVE LEARNED FROM SECRET AND OTHER SOURCES THAT A MAJOR RHODESIAN INCURSION INTO THE AREA BETWEEN CHIRUNDU AND FEIRA BEGAN ABOUT FOUR DAYS AGO. KAUNDA WITHOUT REFERRING TO THE INCURSION AS SUCH CLAIMED IN A SPEECH ON 22 OCTOBER THAT THERE WERE 400 RHODESIAN SOLDIERS INSIDE ZAMBIA AT PRESENT. WE BELIEVE THAT THE TARGET WAS A CONCENTRATION OF ZIPRA FORCES BEING PREPARED FOR INFILTRATION. A PRESS SOURCE HAS TOLD US THAT A NUMBER OF ZAMBIAN MILITARY ARE AMONG THE CASUALTIES. OUR SOURCES SUGGEST THAT THE RHODESIANS MAY WITHDRAW TONIGHT.

2. IF INDEED THERE ARE HEAVY ZAMBIAN CASUALTIES, THIS COMING ON TOP OF THE ATTACK ON THE TAZARA WILL PROVE DIFFICUT FOR KAUNDA AND CAN HARDLY BE EXPECTED TO PUT HIM IN THE MOST CO-OPERATIVE OF MOODS.

ALLINSON

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FM MIRIMBA SALISBURY 221430Z OCT 79

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 786 OF 22 OCTOBER

INFO ROUTINE PRETORIA MAPUTO LUSAKA DAR ES SALAAM GABORONE NAD
LUANDA

RHODESIA: THE MUZOREWA GOVERNMENT

1. THERE IS INCREASING SPECULATION IN THE PRESS, BASED ON REPORTS FROM LONDON (MUKOME WAS QUOTED ON 19 AND 21 OCTOBER) THAT WE SHALL BE ASKING THE MUZOREWA GOVERNMENT TO STAND DOWN DURING THE INTERIM PERIOD. MANY WHITES HAVE EXPRESSED CONCERN TO ME ABOUT THIS.
2. AT A LUNCH YESTERDAY I HAD A LONG TALK WITH MISS BARBARA TREADGOLD, A RETIRED MISSIONARY AND SISTER OF THE FORMER SOUTHERN RHODESIAN GOVERNOR, WHO APPEARS TO KNOW MOST OF THE AFRICAN POLITICAL LEADERS WELL (INCLUDING MUGABE) AND IS REPORTEDLY WIDELY RESPECTED IN AFRICAN CIRCLES. SHE WAS PLEASED WITH THE WAY THE CONFERENCE IS GOING, BUT VERY WORRIED THAT THE MUZOREWA GOVERNMENT MIGHT BE REMOVED FROM OFFICE, FEARING THE CONSEQUENCES ON AFRICAN POLITICAL ALIGNMENTS WITHIN THE COUNTRY. SHE PRESSED ON ME EARNESTLY THAT WE MUST NOT APPEAR TO TREAT THE GOVERNMENT OF NATIONAL UNITY AS THE DIRECT SUCCESSORS OF UDI, RATHER THAN AS A DEMOCRATICALLY ELECTED GOVERNMENT. WE SHOULD ALLOW THEM TO CONTINUE ON A CARETAKER BASIS UP TO THE ELECTION IN THE NORMAL WAY. THE LAST POINT HAS BEEN MADE TO ME BY NUMEROUS PEOPLE AND IS FEATURED IN PRESS ARTICLES.
3. I HAVE DISCUSSED AFRICAN POLITICAL REACTIONS TODAY WITH O'CONNELL, FORMER RED CROSS CHAIRMAN AND A WHITE WITH GOOD CONTACTS, ESPECIALLY NKOMO SUPPORTERS, AND WITH MADZIMA, PRESIDENT OF THE FOOTBALL ASSOCIATION, WHO ALSO HAS WIDE POLITICAL CONTACTS, AND IS HIMSELF AN NKOMO SUPPORTER. GIVEN THE ANGLE OF APPROACH, THERE MAY BE AN ELEMENT OF SELF DECEPTION IN BOTH ASSESSMENTS, BUT I DO NOT THINK THAT THEY SHOULD BE DISMISSED. BOTH DETECT A MAJOR SWING AWAY FROM THE BISHOP, BECAUSE HE HAS NOT ENDED THE WAR, HAS ACHIEVED VERY LITTLE IN HIS SHORT TERM IN OFFICE, HAS APPOINTED TOO MANY OF HIS OWN RELATIVES AND, UNLIKE THE PATRIOTIC FRONT,

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/SEEMS TO

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SEEMS TO HAVE GIVEN IN TO THE BRITISH WITHOUT A FIGHT. BOTH BELIEVE THAT THE PF HAVE DONE VERY WELL OUT OF THE LAND ISSUE, MAKING IT APPEAR THAT THEY ALONE ARE CONCERNED ABOUT AND HAVE ENSURED LAND REDISTRIBUTION. MADZIMA THINKS MUZOREWA WILL STILL GET SIGNIFICANT URBAN BLACK SUPPORT, BUT ALMOST NONE IN THE COUNTRYSIDE. O'CONNELL SIMPLY WRITES HIM OFF. MADZIMA SAYS (WITH REGRET) THAT MOST SUPPORT IS GOING TO MUGABE AS THE ONLY "UNCORRUPTIBLE" NATIONALIST LEADER. BOTH AGREE THAT, IN BROAD TERMS, THE UNDER 30S ARE ATTRACTED BY MUGABE AND THE OLDER PEOPLE BY NKOMO.

4. O'CONNELL URGED THAT WE SHOULD NOT SEEK TO HUMILIATE THE BISHOP TOO FAR OR HE, RATHER THAN SMITH OR THE PF, MIGHT FRUSTRATE AN ARGEEMENT. COULD WE NOT LET HIM CONTINUE AS CARETAKER PRIME MINISTER?

BYATT

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OFFICE

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HD/S AF D

HD/PUSD (2)

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MR FREELAND LEGAL ADVISER RM K200A

MR FIFOOT LEGAL ADVISER RM K164

~~RESIDENT CLERK~~

CC ADDIS ABABA

GPS 320

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FM MAPUTO 221322Z

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 346 OF 7 OCTOBER

AND TO IMMEDIATE GABORONE LUSAKA DAR ES SALAAM LUANDA LAGOS

MONROVIA UKMIS NEW YORK PARIS BONN WASHINGTON MIRIMBA SALISBURY

ADDIS ABABA

FOLLOWING FROM MR LUCE

1. I HAD AN HOUR AND A HALF'S CONVERSATION THIS MORNING WITH THE MOZAMBIQUE FOREIGN MINISTER, CHISSANO. HE WAS ACCOMPANIED BY HONWANA (DIRECTOR OF THE PRESIDENT'S OFFICE), AND FERRAO (SECRETARY-GENERAL FOREIGN MINISTRY). CHISSANO EXPRESSED REGRET THAT MACHEL WAS NOT ABLE TO RECEIVE ME PERSONALLY. HE WAS VISITING THE NORTH OF THE COUNTRY AND AN APPOINTMENT COULD NOT BE ARRANGED IN THE SHORT PERIOD AT MY DISPOSAL. CHISSANO SAID THAT HE HAD, HOWEVER, BEEN INSTRUCTED BY THE PRESIDENT TO RECEIVE ME AND TO REVIEW THE SITUATION REACHED IN THE LANCASTER HOUSE CONFERENCE.
2. I EXPLAINED OUR POSITION ON THE LINES OF PARA 2 TO 4 OF MAPUTO TEL 341.

3. CHISSANO SAID THAT THE MOZAMBIQUE GOVERNMENT WERE HAPPY THAT ALL PARTIES CONCERNED HAD NOW ACCEPTED THE INDEPENDENCE CONSTITUTION. HE SAID THAT HE DID NOT FEEL COMPETENT TO COMMENT IN DETAIL ON THE POINTS THAT I HAD PUT TO HIM ON THE ELECTION AND THE REASSERTION OF BRITISH AUTHORITY ETC. THIS WOULD BE A MATTER FOR THE PATRIOTIC FRONT (PF). HE DID HOWEVER WISH TO MAKE CERTAIN REMARKS ABOUT THE PRINCIPLES INVOLVED.

4. THE MOZAMBIQUE GOVERNMENT REGARDED THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD AS ONE IN WHICH ARRANGEMENTS SHOULD BE MADE FOR THE TRANSFER OF POWER. IN SOME CASES (EG MOZAMBIQUE) THIS WAS RELATIVELY SIMPLE, SINCE IT WAS CLEAR TO WHOM POWER WAS BEING TRANSFERRED. THE SITUATION WAS DIFFERENT IN RHODESIA WHERE IT WAS NOT YET DECIDED WHO SHOULD ASSUME POWER ON INDEPENDENCE. THE MOZAMBIQUE GOVERNMENT THEREFORE CONSIDERED IT OF PRIME IMPORTANCE THAT CONDITIONS SHOULD BE CREATED DURING THAT PERIOD WHICH WOULD ENABLE ALL THOSE CHALLENGING FOR POWER TO HAVE AN EQUAL OPPORTUNITY OF SECURING IT IN FREE AND DEMOCRATIC ELECTIONS.

5. REFERRING TO MY STATEMENT THAT A BRITISH GOVERNOR WOULD, DURING THE INTERIM PERIOD, WORK THROUGH THE EXISTING MACHINERY OF GOVERNMENT, CHISSANO ACCEPTED THAT THERE WAS NO NEED TO CHANGE EVERYTHING. HE SPECIFICALLY SAID THAT HE WAS NOT SUGGESTING THAT THE JUDICIARY AND THE POLICE SHOULD BE CHANGED. ON THE OTHER HAND THERE MIGHT BE REASONABLE GROUNDS FOR QUESTIONING WHETHER THE EXISTING PUBLIC SERVICE AND SECURITY FORCES WOULD NOT SEEK TO SABOTAGE THE ELECTION PROCESS OR AT LEAST SEEK TO EXERT INFLUENCE TO ACHIEVE A RESULT MORE ACCEPTABLE TO THEM. THERE WAS BOUND TO BE SOME RESISTANCE TO CHANGE. THIS WAS A PROBLEM THAT THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT MUST RECOGNISE AND SEEK TO SOLVE. WE SHOULD ALSO REALISE THE DISQUIET THAT THIS CONSIDERATION WAS LIKELY TO CAUSE THE GRASS-ROOTS OF THE PF. IT WAS IMPORTANT THAT THE PF LEADERSHIP SHOULD RETAIN THE CONFIDENCE OF THEIR MEMBERS DURING THE NEGOTIATIONS.

6. CHISSANO ALSO SAID THAT IT WAS QUOTE NOT FIT UNQUOTE TO DISMANTLE THE SECURITY FORCES. THE OUTSIDE WORLD WOULD, HOWEVER, WANT TO KNOW WHICH FORCES THE BRITISH WOULD USE TO ASSERT THEIR AUTHORITY DURING THE INTERIM PERIOD. I EXPLAINED THAT OUR THINKING WAS THAT THERE SHOULD BE A CEASE-FIRE AND A DISENGAGEMENT OF OPPOSING FORCES AND THAT THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR LAW AND ORDER SHOULD REST WITH THE GOVERNOR OPERATING THROUGH THE EXISTING POLICE FORCE WHICH WOULD BE UNDER THE SUPERVISION OF A BRITISH POLICE ADVISER.

7. CHISSANO SPECIFICALLY ASKED WHAT WE WOULD DO IF EITHER MUZOREWA OR THE PF REJECTED OUR PROPOSALS FOR THE INTERIM PERIOD. I EXPLAINED THAT OUR FIRM OBJECTIVE WAS TO REACH A SETTLEMENT WITH ALL THE PARTIES CONCERNED, IN THE SPIRIT OF THE LUSAKA DECLARATION. IF ANY PARTY REJECTED PROPOSALS WHICH WE AND INTERNATIONAL OPINION

ADVISED.

7. CHISSANO SPECIFICALLY ASKED WHAT WE WOULD DO IF EITHER MUZOREWA OR THE PF REJECTED OUR PROPOSALS FOR THE INTERIM PERIOD. I EXPLAINED THAT OUR FIRM OBJECTIVE WAS TO REACH A SETTLEMENT WITH ALL THE PARTIES CONCERNED, IN THE SPIRIT OF THE LUSAKA DECLARATION. IF ANY PARTY REJECTED PROPOSALS, WHICH WE AND INTERNATIONAL OPINION REGARDED AS REASONABLE, THEY WOULD BEAR A HEAVY RESPONSIBILITY. I TOOK THIS OPPORTUNITY TO MAKE THE POINT THAT NO-ONE WOULD BE ALLOWED TO EXERCISE A VETO (PARA 5 OF YOUR TEL NO 128 TO MAPUTO). CHISSANO DID NOT DEMUR.
8. ON THE DURATION OF THE INTERIM PERIOD CHISSANO CONFIRMED THAT THE MOZAMBIQUE GOVERNMENT AGREED THAT THIS SHOULD BE AS SHORT AS POSSIBLE. WE RECALLED THAT MACHEL HAD HIMSELF SPOKEN IN TERMS OF THREE MONTHS. THIS WAS GENERALLY IN LINE WITH OUR OWN THINKING. CHISSANO DID NOT GO BACK ON THIS, ALTHOUGH HE HOPED THAT ADEQUATE TIME WOULD BE ALLOWED FOR ALL PARTIES TO HAVE A FAIR CHANCE IN THE ELECTION. WE COULD NOT EXPECT THE PF TO AGREE TO PEACE AT ANY PRICE. WE POINTED OUT TO HIM THAT THIS APPLIED EQUALLY TO THE OTHER DELEGATION WITH WHOM WE WERE IN NEGOTIATION.
9. CHISSANO PRESSED QUITE STRONGLY ON THE QUESTION OF THE STATUS OF MUZOREWA AND HIS MINISTERS DURING THE PRE-INDEPENDENCE PERIOD. WOULD THEY REMAIN IN AUTHORITY UNDER THE GOVERNOR? I EXPLAINED THAT UNDER OUR PROPOSALS THE GOVERNOR WOULD ASSUME FULL EXECUTIVE AND LEGISLATIVE AUTHORITY. CHISSANO PRESSED THIS POINT ON THE BASIS OF A LOCAL PRESS REPORT THAT THE SALISBURY DELEGATION WERE ARGUING THAT THE BISHOP SHOULD REMAIN PRIME MINISTER UP TO THE ELECTION. I SAID THAT THIS WAS AN EXAMPLE OF THE WAY IN WHICH OUR PROPOSALS MIGHT CAUSE DIFFICULTY FOR BOTH SIDES. THIS PARTICULAR MATTER WAS ONE THAT WE CLEARLY HAD TO APPROACH WITH CARE.
10. AT THE END OF OUR CONVERSATION CHISSANO INDICATED THAT IT WAS NOT HELPFUL IF THE IMPRESSION WAS GIVEN, AT ANY STAGE, THAT WE WERE URGING THE FRONT LINE STATES TO BRING PRESSURE UPON THE PF. (CLEARLY THE FRONT LINE EXPECT TO BE ASKED TO DO SO, BUT THEY DO NOT WELCOME TOO MUCH PUBLIC ATTENTION BEING DRAWN TO THEIR ROLE IN THIS RESPECT).
11. IT IS UNFORTUNATE THAT I AM NOT ABLE TO SEE MACHEL PERSONALLY. I DO NOT THINK THAT THIS IS A DELIBERATE GESTURE. MACHEL IS CURRENTLY TOURING THE NORTH OF THE COUNTRY AND IS IN AREAS WHICH ARE NOT EASILY ACCESSIBLE. CHISSANO UNDERTOOK TO REPORT OUR CONVERSATION FULLY TO HIM. THE PRESENCE OF HONWANA AT OUR MEETING SHOULD HELP TO ENSURE THAT A FULL ACCOUNT GETS THROUGH.
12. CHISSANO ADOPTED A GENERALLY UNDERSTANDING APPROACH. HE APPEARED RE-ASSURED ABOUT THE READINESS OF HMG TO ASSUME RESPONSIBILITY FOR ELECTIONS AND TO ASSERT AUTHORITY DURING THE PRE-INDEPENDENCE PERIOD. HE CONFIRMED THAT THE MOZAMBIQUE GOVERNMENT WAS MOST ANXIOUS TO FIND A SOLUTION TO THE RHODESIA PROBLEM WHICH

URGING THE FRONT LINE STATES TO BRING PRESSURE UPON THE FF.
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WERE MOST ANXIOUS TO FIND A SOLUTION TO THE RHODESIA PROBLEM WHICH
WOULD BRING AN END TO THE WAR AND ALLOW MORE NORMAL CONDITIONS TO
RETURN.

PAPADOPOULOS

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SENT/RECD AT 221622Z AP/K

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SPS 670

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DESKBY 220900Z

FM MAPUTO 220545Z OCT 79

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 341 OF 22 OCTOBER

INFO PRIORITY GABORONE LUSAKA DAR ES SALAAM LUANDA LAGOS MONROVIA
UKMIS NEW YORK WASHINGTON PARIS BONN SALISBURY ADDIS ABABA

FROM ME LUCE

1. I HAD AN HOUR WITH THE BOTSWANA FOREIGN MINISTER, MOGWE, YESTERDAY.
2. I WENT OVER, BRIEFLY THE NATURE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS ON THE CONSTITUTION AND EXPLAINED OUR VIEW THAT THE DOCUMENT FINALLY ACCEPTED BY BOTH DELEGATIONS PROVIDED FOR GENUINE MAJORITY RULE AND REMOVED THE DEFECTS IDENTIFIED BY THE COMMONWEALTH LEADERS AT LUSAKA. WE WELCOMED THE HELP GIVEN BY THE FRONT LINE STATES IN REACHING THIS STAGE. MOGWE HAD NO COMMENTS ON THE CONSTITUTION.
3. I THEN OUTLINED OUR PLANS FOR THE PRE-INDEPENDENCE PERIOD LAYING EMPHASIS ON THE ELECTIONS. THESE WOULD BE THE KEY ELEMENT IN THE TRANSITION TO INDEPENDENCE, AS AFFIRMED AT LUSAKA. I REFERRED TO OUR INTENTIONS IN RESPECT OF THE ELECTION: COMMISSIONER, THE ELECTION COUNCIL AND TO HMG'S ACCEPTANCE OF THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR ENSURING THAT ALL PARTIES WERE ABLE TO COMPETE IN THE ELECTIONS ON AN EQUAL FOOTING AND WITH EQUAL ACCESS TO THE MEDIA ETC. DURING THE PERIOD UP TO THE ELECTION, THERE WOULD BE A RETURN TO LEGAL DEPENDENCE WITH AUTHORITY BEING EXERCISED BY A BRITISH GOVERNOR. THE GOVERNOR WOULD WORK THROUGH THE EXISTING MACHINERY OF GOVERNMENT, AND WOULD HAVE MILITARY AND POLICE ADVISERS ON HIS STAFF. WE DID NOT THINK IT DESIRABLE OR PRACTICAL TO DISMANTLE THE EXISTING PUBLIC SERVICE, JUDICIARY, POLICE OR SECURITY FORCES DURING THIS PERIOD.
4. I EXPLAINED OUR STRONG BELIEF THAT THE PRE-INDEPENDENCE PERIOD SHOULD NOT EXTEND BEYOND 2(TWO) TO 3(THREE) MONTHS. APPROPRIATE CEASE-FIRE AND DISENGAGEMENT ARRANGEMENTS WOULD HAVE TO BE MADE, WHICH WOULD INVOLVE DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN THE VARIOUS COMMANDERS.

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5. MOGWE SAID THAT THE FRONT LINE WERE EXTREMELY SATISFIED AT THE PROGRESS MADE AT LANCASTER HOUSE. COMPARED TO GENEVA, IT ALMOST SEEMED PLAIN-SAILING. (I DISABUSED HIM.). HIS ONLY CRITICISM WAS THAT HMG HAD PROCEEDED TO SEPARATE TALKS WITH THE BISHOP ON PRE-INDEPENDENCE ARRANGEMENTS WITHOUT CONSULTING, OR AT LEAST INFORMING, THE FRONT LINE PRESIDENTS. THEY WOULD BE PREFERRED TO LEARN OF OUR INTENTIONS FROM US, RATHER THAN THE BBC. IT WOULD HELP IF WE COULD LET THE FRONT LINE KNOW WHEN WE SAW AN OBSTACLE AHEAD TO GIVE THEM AN OPPORTUNITY OF BRINGING INFLUENCE TO BEAR ON THE PF. WE WOULD EARN GOODWILL FROM SUCH COOPERATION. HOWEVER, HE DID NOT LABOUR THE POINT.

6. LIKE KAUNDA, MOGWE QUESTIONED WHETHER 2-3 MONTHS WAS A REASONABLE PERIOD FOR THE RUN UP TO THE ELECTION. HE SEEMED TO ACCEPT THE NEED TO MOVE QUICKLY, BUT THOUGHT WE SHOULD BE SYMPATHETIC IF THE PF WANTED RATHER LONGER. WE TOUCHED ON REGISTRATION AND DELIMITATION. MOGWE SHOWED SOME UNDERSTANDING OF OUR DIFFICULTIES OVER TIMING.

7. ON THE ARMIES, MOGWE SAID THAT AT HAVANA THE FRONT LINE HAD TOLD THE PF THAT THE FUTURE ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE SECURITY FORCES COULD NOT BE WRITTEN INTO THE CONSTITUTION BUT MUST BE DECIDED BY THE ELECTED GOVERNMENT. HE VOLUNTEERED THAT IT WOULD NOT BE POSSIBLE TO PROVIDE FOR INTEGRATION IN THE INTERIM PERIOD. THE FRONT LINE HAD BEEN TRYING FOR A LONG TIME, WITHOUT SUCCESS, TO INTEGRATE ZANLA AND ZIPRA. THERE WAS NO HOPE OF ACHIEVING AN INTEGRATION INVOLVING ALSO THE RHODESIAN FORCES. THIS WHOLE AREA WOULD HOWEVER BE A DIFFICULT ONE AND THE FRONT LINE WOULD WANT TO CONSIDER OUR PROPOSALS CAREFULLY.

8. ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS, MOGWE REFERRED TO THE CONSIDERABLE IMPORTANCE OF MACHEL. HE HAD PLAYED A SIGNIFICANT ROLE IN HAVANA IN ENSURING THAT THE PF CAME TO LONDON PREPARED TO NEGOTIATE SERIOUSLY. MACHEL HAD ALSO BEEN MUCH IMPRESSED BY THE OUTCOME OF LUSAKA AND BY THE READINESS OF HMG TO ACCEPT THEIR RESPONSIBILITY FOR BRINGING RHODESIA TO LEGAL INDEPENDENCE. MOGWE COMPARED MACHEL'S REALISTIC ATTITUDE MOST FAVOURABLY WITH THAT OF ANOTHER UNNAMED COMMONWEALTH LEADER (CLEARLY KAUNDA). HE URGED UPON ME THE IMPORTANCE OF SEEING MACHEL PERSONALLY DURING MY CURRENT TOUR.

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9. MOGWE POINTED OUT THAT IT WAS THE PF WHO WERE PRESSING AT GENEVA FOR AN ASSERTION OF BRITISH AUTHORITY, HMG WHO FAVOURED UN INVOLVEMENT. THE ROLES NOW SEEMED TO HAVE BEEN REVERSED.

HE HIMSELF INDICATED NO ENTHUSIASM FOR A UN PRESENCE WHICH I SAID, IN ANY EVENT, WAS RULED OUT.

10. ALTHOUGH MOGWE DID NOT SAY SO, SPECIFICALLY, I HAVE LITTLE DOUBT THAT HIS GOVERNMENT WOULD BE PREPARED TO GO ALONG WITH OUR IDEAS FOR THE INTERIM AND WILL USE SUCH INFLUENCE AS THEY HAVE IN THE FRONT LINE IN THIS DIRECTION. THEY WILL NOT, HOWEVER, SWIM TOO HARD AGAINST THE TIDE. MOGWE'S REPEATED REFERENCES TO MACHEL SUGGEST THAT HE COULD BE AN INCREASINGLY IMPORTANT FIGURE IN THIS NEXT STAGE.

PAPADOPOULOS

FILES

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LEGAL ADVISERS
(MR FREELAND)
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MISS BROWN
MR DAY
MR WILLSON
MR ASPIN

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION
RHODESIA POLICY

CF to note
PPS in GR



Rhodesia D
cc FCO
FRODS

10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

22 October 1979

Dear Sir,

Thank you for your letter of 1 October about your recent visit to South Africa and your contacts with Rhodesians there. I am grateful to you for letting me know your impressions.

I know that it came as a disappointment to many Rhodesians that we did not at once proceed to grant legal independence to the government established by Bishop Muzorewa following the April elections, and to lift sanctions. But, as we had said in our manifesto, we believed that it was of crucial importance to Rhodesia to gain international acceptance. It would have been of little help to Rhodesia if we had recognised and lifted sanctions on our own: it was quite clear from our consultations that no other government would have followed suit. Rhodesia, though legally independent, would have remained isolated and the conflict might well have intensified. If we had gone down this road we should not have fulfilled our responsibilities to the people of Rhodesia. The understanding we reached at the Commonwealth Heads of Government meeting in Lusaka provided a new basis for an internationally acceptable settlement. It was significant that all concerned acknowledged Britain's responsibility

/and

and there was agreement that there should be an end to hostilities and the lifting of sanctions as part of the process of reaching a settlement.

Bishop Muzorewa's acceptance of our constitutional proposals is a major step forward and I hope the Patriotic Front, too, will accept. We have now reached the stage where we must move on to deal with arrangements for implementing the Constitution. We must do all we can to keep the support of Rhodesia's neighbours if we are to end the war - but I can assure you that there will be no question of allowing anyone to exercise a veto or to block progress on the basis of our proposals.

*Y
Muzorewa*

Rapera

Mrs. Jill Knight, M.B.E., M.P.

Rhodesia

Reference.....

Copy on: S. Africa,
Visit of Foreign Minister,
25.79.

Mr. Alexander

[Handwritten signature]

It was given copies
of both messages at
Chequers.

STP.

21. 10. 79

Mr Renwick, Rhodesia Department

1. The attached notes from the South African Embassy containing messages from the South African Prime Minister to Mrs Thatcher, and the South African Prime Minister to Lord Carrington, were received in the FCO at 2.45 this afternoon (Sunday).

2. I informed Sir A Duff (who was lunching with the Lord Privy Seal and Bishop Muzorewa) and (with the agreement of the Number 10 duty clerk) passed copies by telephone to Chequers for transmission to the Prime Minister and the Secretary of State. I also informed the News Department duty officer.

21 October 1979

Mrs S Wiseman
Resident Clerk

cc: ✓ Duty Clerk, Number 10	(with enclosures)
PS	{ " " }
PS/LPS	{ " " }
PS/Mr Luce	{ " " }
PS/PUS	{ " " }
Mr Duff	{ " " }
Mr Barder	{ " " }

(and copies to Sir M Palliser
Mr Walden
Mr Lyne
Mr Lever, in Sunday boxes)

Subject



South African Embassy

T 124/79T

Rhodesia

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T 124/79T

The Ambassador of the Republic of South Africa presents his compliments to Her Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs and, at the request of the Honourable the South African Prime Minister, would greatly appreciate it if the following message could be conveyed to The Right Honourable the Prime Minister, Mrs Margaret Thatcher.

"Foreign Minister Botha has reported to me on his discussions with you and with Lord Carrington, and I would like to thank you for receiving him at such short notice. I was particularly glad to receive your assurances on those issues regarding Rhodesia that are of great concern to me and my Government. We now have a clearer picture of the position. I value your understanding of our efforts and initiatives in South and Southern Africa, and I hope there will be other opportunities to exchange views on these matters of common interest. Please accept my best wishes."

The Ambassador of the Republic of South Africa avails himself of this opportunity to renew to Her Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs the assurances of his highest consideration.

LONDON

21 October 1979



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FM FCO 201520Z OCT 79

TO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1467 OF 20 OCTOBER 1979

INFO UKMIS NEW YORK PRETORIA LUSAKA MAPUTO DAR ES SALAAM
GABORONE LUANDA LAGOS OTTAWA CANBERRA WELLINGTON PARIS

RHODESIA

1. DUFF, DAY AND FIFOOT WENT OVER THE GROUND COMPREHENSIVELY
YESTERDAY WITH US AMBASSADOR, LAKE, MISS SPIEGEL AND LAMPHER.

2. LAKE CONFIRMED THAT THE US REGARDED THE CONSTITUTION THAT WE HAD
ENDED UP WITH AS EMINENTLY REASONABLE AND THAT IT HAD THEIR FULL
SUPPORT. THE US GOVERNMENT WERE ANXIOUS TO CONTINUE TO GIVE US THEIR
FULL BACKING. IT WAS HOWEVER IMPORTANT FOR THEM THAT ANY PROPOSALS
THAT WE PUT FORWARD FOR THE PRE-INDEPENDENCE PERIOD SHOULD BE AS
REASONABLE, FAIR AND SATISFACTORY AS WERE OUR PROPOSALS FOR THE
CONSTITUTION. THE US ADMINISTRATION WERE CONCERNED AT THE LIKELY
REACTIONS, NOT ONLY OF THE CONGRESS BUT ALSO, IN THE PRE-
PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION PERIOD, OF IMPORTANT DOMESTIC CONSTITUENCIES
SUCH AS THE BLACK VOTE. THE ADMINISTRATION'S ATTITUDE WOULD NOT BE
WHOLLY OR EVEN PRIMARILY INFLUENCED BY THE ATTITUDE OF THE SENATE.
FURTHERMORE THE ADMINISTRATION WOULD NEED TO CONSIDER THE
IMPLICATIONS FOR US FOREIGN POLICY AS A WHOLE OF THE ATTITUDE THAT
THEY ADOPTED TOWARDS OUR PROPOSALS FOR THE PRE-INDEPENDENCE PERIOD.
WE DREW ATTENTION TO THE OFTEN OVERLOOKED FACT THAT WE WERE
NEGOTIATING WITH TWO TOTALLY OPPOSED SIDES, ONE OF WHICH WAS IN
POSSESSION. THE AGREEMENT OF THE LATTER HAD THEREFORE TO BE OBTAINED
BUT WE HAD PUSHED THEM A LONG WAY. MUCH OF THE WORLD APPEARED TO
CONSIDER ONLY THE PATRIOTIC FRONT.

3. IN A DISCUSSION ON THE PRE-INDEPENDENCE ARRANGEMENTS WE GAVE LAKE
A FULL ACCOUNT OF OUR VIEWS ON THE PROCEDURE FOR THE ELECTIONS.
IT WAS OUR INTENTION THAT, IN ACCORDANCE WITH LUSAKA, THESE WOULD
BE SUPERVISED UNDER BRITISH GOVERNMENT AUTHORITY WITH COMMONWEALTH
OBSERVERS. WE WOULD PROPOSE TO APPOINT A BRITISH ELECTION
COMMISSIONER WHO WOULD BE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE SUPERVISION OF ALL
ELECTION ARRANGEMENTS FROM THE PRINTING OF THE BALLOT PAPERS TO

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THE ACTUAL POLLING, THE ORGANISATIONAL ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE ELECTION WOULD HAVE TO BE IN THE HANDS OF THE RHODESIAN ADMINISTRATION. THIS WOULD IN PRACTICE MEAN THE ELECTION DIRECTORATE WHICH HAD BEEN RESPONSIBLE FOR THE APRIL ELECTIONS. WE ALSO ENVISAGED THE CREATION OF AN ELECTORAL COUNCIL ON WHICH ALL THE PARTIES TAKING PART IN THE ELECTIONS WOULD PROBABLY NEED TO BE REPRESENTED. THIS WOULD PROVIDE A STATUS FOR THE PATRIOTIC FRONT. THE PRECISE COMPOSITION OF THIS COUNCIL WOULD BE A MATTER FOR THE ELECTION COMMISSIONER HIMSELF TO DECIDE. THE COMMISSIONER WOULD BE RESPONSIBLE FOR ENSURING THAT ALL POLITICAL PARTIES PARTICIPATING IN THE ELECTION WERE ABLE TO CONDUCT THEIR CAMPAIGN WITHOUT INTIMIDATION OR HARRASSMENT. THEY WOULD HAVE TO BE GIVEN FREE ACCESS TO THE MEDIA. IT WOULD BE UP TO THE ELECTION COMMISSIONER TO ENSURE FAIR PLAY.

4. IN REPLY TO QUESTIONS WE EXPLAINED THAT WE WOULD NOT NECESSARILY ENVISAGE BRITISH ELECTION STAFF BEING PRESENT AT ALL POLLING BOOTHS ON ELECTION DAY OR DAYS. WE WOULD HOWEVER NEED TO PUT A CONSIDERABLE NUMBER OF STAFF ON THE GROUND DURING THE ACTUAL PERIOD OF THE ELECTIONS. TO SOME EXTENT THE PROCESS WOULD BE SELF-POLICING IN THAT THE PARTIES WOULD THEMSELVES BE KEEPING A CAREFUL WATCH ON EACH OTHER AND WOULD KNOW THAT THEY HAD, IN THE ELECTORAL COUNCIL, A BODY TO WHICH THEY COULD TAKE COMPLAINTS. THE COUNCIL WOULD NOT HOWEVER HAVE ANY EXECUTIVE ROLE. DECISION AND ACTION WOULD REST WITH THE ELECTION COMMISSIONER.

5. WE CONFIRMED THAT WE WOULD EXPECT COMMONWEALTH OBSERVERS TO BE PRESENT DURING THE ELECTORAL PROCESS. THEY WOULD NO DOUBT WISH TO BE IN THE COUNTRY DURING THE IMMEDIATE RUN-UP TO THE ELECTION AS WELL AS THE ELECTION ITSELF. THE PRECISE ARRANGEMENTS FOR THIS AND THE COMPOSITION OF THE COMMONWEALTH OBSERVER GROUP WERE MATTERS FOR FURTHER DISCUSSION.

6. GIVEN THE DISTRUST AND SUSPICION OF EACH SIDE FOR THE OTHER, THERE WAS NO HOPE OF ANY JOINT POLITICAL ARRANGEMENTS BEING AGREED FOR THE PRE-INDEPENDENCE PERIOD. LET ALONE THE COMPLICATIONS OF A TRANSITIONAL CONSTITUTION AND TRANSITIONAL GOVERNMENT SUCH AS THE PATRIOTIC FRONT ENVISAGED. IN OUR VIEW, THE ONLY SENSIBLE THING, UNWELCOME AS IT WAS TO US, WAS TO BRING RHODESIA UNDER BRITISH AUTHORITY AND LEAVE IT TO THE BRITISH TO SEE FAIR PLAY. BRITISH AUTHORITY DURING THE PERIOD UP TO INDEPENDENCE WOULD BE ASSERTED BY THE APPOINTMENT

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OF A GOVERNOR WITH FULL EXECUTIVE AND LEGISLATIVE AUTHORITY. THE EXISTING PUBLIC SERVICE WOULD REMAIN IN BEING AND THE GOVERNOR WOULD ASSUME RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE DAY TO DAY ADMINISTRATION OF THE COUNTRY USING THE EXISTING ADMINISTRATIVE MACHINERY. ONCE THE GOVERNOR HAD ARRIVED HE WOULD CONDUCT THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE COUNTRY THROUGH THE SECRETARIES OF THE MINISTRIES, AND THE DEFENCE FORCE COMMANDERS AND THE COMMISSIONER OF POLICE WOULD REPORT DIRECT TO HIM. MUZOREWA AND HIS MINISTERS WOULD CONCENTRATE ON THE ELECTION CAMPAIGN. THE US AMBASSADOR AND LAKE WERE INSISTENT THAT, IF OUR ARRANGEMENTS WERE TO BE REGARDED AS FAIR TO BOTH SIDES, MUZOREWA AND THE MINISTERS MUST PLAY NO PART IN THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE COUNTRY. LAKE SUGGESTED THAT IT MIGHT MAKE THE RE-ASSERTION OF BRITISH AUTHORITY MORE EVIDENT IF BRITISH PERSONNEL WERE ATTACHED TO ALL MINISTRIES. WE SAID THAT WE HAD NOT OURSELVES BEEN THINKING ON THESE LINES. IN PRACTICE (ALTHOUGH WE DID NOT SAY SO TO LAKE) THIS IS UNLIKELY TO BE A STARTER. WE EXPLAINED HOWEVER THAT THERE WOULD BE BRITISH SUPERVISION OF THE POLICE FORCE, WHICH WOULD MEAN THE APPOINTMENT OF A NUMBER OF BRITISH POLICE LIAISON OFFICERS AT VARIOUS LEVELS.

7. WE EXPLAINED THAT OUR PRESENT THINKING WAS THAT THE ELECTIONS SHOULD BE HELD ON A PARTY LIST SYSTEM BASED, AS THE APRIL ELECTIONS, ON REGIONAL LISTS. SINCE WE WERE THINKING OF AN ELECTION TAKING PLACE WITHIN 2-3 MONTHS OF THE END OF THE CONFERENCE (NOT 3-4 MONTHS AS LAKE HAD IMAGINED)

THERE WOULD BE NO TIME FOR A REGISTRATION OF VOTERS AND A DELIMITATION OF CONSTITUENCIES. WE REALISED THAT THIS CREATED PROBLEMS EG WHAT ARRANGEMENTS SHOULD BE MADE FOR THOSE IN ZANLA AND ZIPPA CAMPS OUTSIDE RHODESIA TO VOTE? HOW COULD WE DECIDE FOR WHICH OF THE REGIONAL LISTS THEY SHOULD CAST THEIR VOTE? HOWEVER WE WOULD HAVE TO ACCEPT A NUMBER OF INCONSISTENCIES AND DIFFICULTIES FOR THE SAKE OF A SHORT ELECTION CAMPAIGN, AND IN WHAT WAS ESSENTIALLY A ROUGH AND READY SOLUTION TO A DIFFICULT PROBLEM.

8. WE MADE IT CLEAR THAT WE WERE NOT THINKING OF ANY KIND OF UNPEACEKEEPING FORCE. THIS WOULD BE TOTALLY UNACCEPTABLE TO MUZOREWA. THE PRESENT COMMONWEALTH ATTITUDE OF IMPLACABLE HOSTILITY TO MUZOREWA, RECENTLY REINFORCED BY THE COMMONWEALTH SECRETARY-GENERAL'S STATEMENT OF 15 OCTOBER, MADE IT UNLIKELY THAT EVEN A COMMONWEALTH

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FORCE WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE. THE AMERICANS PRESSED US ON SOME FORM OF OBSERVATION, SUPERVISION OR MONITORING OF THE CEASE FIRE. IF A COMMONWEALTH FORCE WERE RULED OUT COULD THERE NOT PERHAPS BE A GROUP OF OBSERVERS OR MONITORS DRAWN FROM SELECTED COMMONWEALTH COUNTRIES? WE SAID THAT, IF IT WERE NECESSARY TO INTRODUCE ANY KIND OF MONITORING ARRANGEMENTS IN THE CONTEXT OF THE CEASEFIRE, THIS WOULD HAVE TO BE A FAIRLY MODEST ARRANGEMENT. IN REPLY TO A QUESTION FROM BREWSTER, WE MADE IT CLEAR THAT THE COMMONWEALTH OBSERVERS WOULD BE CONCERNED ONLY WITH THE ELECTION PROCESS AND NOT WITH THE CEASE-FIRE.

9. LAKE RAISED A NUMBER OF DETAILED QUESTIONS ABOUT THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CEASE-FIRE, DEALING WITH SUCH MATTERS AS THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR INVESTIGATING BREACHES, WHAT WOULD HAPPEN IF THERE WERE A MAJOR INFRINGEMENT OF THE CEASE-FIRE PROVISIONS, WHETHER ZANLA AND ZIPRA UNITS WOULD BE ALLOWED BACK INTO RHODESIA WITH THEIR WEAPONS ETC. WE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THESE WERE IMPORTANT AND DIFFICULT ISSUES TO WHICH WE AS YET HAD NO PRECISE ANSWERS. THEY WERE MATTERS THAT WOULD HAVE TO BE DISCUSSED AT THE APPROPRIATE STAGE BETWEEN THE MILITARY AUTHORITIES ON BOTH SIDES. THERE WERE A NUMBER OF OPTIONS THAT COULD BE CONSIDERED RANGING FROM THE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL EXISTING FORCES TO THEIR PRESENT BASES (IE ZANLA AND ZIPRA TO RETURN TO MOZAMBIQUE AND ZAMBIA AND THE RHODESIANS TO WITHDRAW INTO RHODESIA), TO THE ALLOCATION OF CERTAIN AREAS WITHIN RHODESIA TO THE FORCES OF THE TWO SIDES. WE MADE IT CLEAR THAT THERE WAS NO POSSIBILITY OF OUR GETTING THE RHODESIAN SECURITY FORCES TO ACCEPT RESTRICTIONS ON INVESTIGATIVE PATROLLING IN AREAS ALLOCATED TO THEM.

10 BREWSTER REVERTED TO THE MONITORING ISSUE ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS. THIS IS CLEARLY A MATTER TO WHICH THE AMERICANS ATTACH CONSIDERABLE IMPORTANCE. WE WERE ALSO ASKED WHETHER WE SAW A CONTINUING ROLE FOR ANY MONITORING GROUP AFTER INDEPENDENCE TO ENSURE THAT WHATEVER GOVERNMENT EMERGED DID NOT ACT IN AN ARBITRARY WAY AGAINST ITS FORMER OPPONENTS. WE SAID THAT WE SAW LITTLE IF ANY PROSPECT OF ANY SUCH RESIDUAL PRESENCE.

11. LAKE ASKED HOW WE WERE DEALING WITH QUESTIONS ABOUT AID, AND IN PARTICULAR OUR ATTITUDE TOWARDS THE ZIMBABWE DEVELOPMENT FUND. WE EXPLAINED THAT WE NO LONGER REGARDED THE ZIMBABWE DEVELOPMENT FUND AS AN ACTIVE ISSUE. IF ASKED, WE WERE

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SAYING THAT, WHEN THE IDEA WAS ORIGINALLY LAUNCHED, WE FOUND REMARKABLY LITTLE ENTHUSIASM FOR IT AMONGST OTHER GOVERNMENTS AND WOULD NOT EXPECT ANY MORE FAVOURABLE REACTION NOW. WE HAD INDICATED THAT WE WERE READY TO HELP WITH ASSISTANCE TO ECONOMIC AND AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT (THE SECRETARY OF STATE'S STATEMENT OF 11 OCTOBER) AND THAT WE WOULD DO OUR BEST TO ENCOURAGE OTHER GOVERNMENT TO ASSIST THE NEW GOVERNMENT OF ZIMBABWE IN THIS WAY. LAKE EXPLAINED THAT US ASSISTANCE WOULD PROBABLY BE UNDER THE UMBRELLA OF AN EXISTING US FUND FOR REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT IN SOUTHERN AFRICA. WE MADE IT CLEAR THAT WE WERE NOT THINKING IN TERMS OF A REGIONAL FUND AS SUCH. OUR ASSISTANCE WOULD TAKE THE FORM OF BILATERAL AID PLUS INVOLVEMENT IN ANY MULTILATERAL ASSISTANCE THROUGH EG THE WORLD BANK OR THE EEC.

12. LAKE WAS UNDERSTANDABLY INTERESTED IN THE PRESENT POSITION ON SANCTIONS. WE EXPLAINED THAT, ALTHOUGH CERTAIN SANCTIONS WOULD LAPSE IF SECTION 2 OF THE 1965 SOUTHERN RHODESIA ACT WERE NOT RENEWED IN MID-NOVEMBER, OTHER SANCTIONS LEGISLATION WOULD REQUIRE FORMAL GOVERNMENT ACTION BEFORE IT COULD BE REPEALED. THERE WAS A POSSIBILITY THAT SECTION 2 MIGHT LAPSE WHILST THE OTHER SANCTIONS REMAINED IN FORCE. THIS MIGHT GIVE US AT LEAST SOME PARTIAL AND TEMPORARY COVER IN THE UNITED NATIONS. HOWEVER POLITICAL PRESSURE FOR THE TOTAL LIFTING OF SANCTIONS WAS CONSIDERABLE, IF NOT IRRESISTIBLE, AND WE WERE FAST APPROACHING A SITUATION IN WHICH ALL SANCTIONS WERE LIKELY TO BE LIFTED.

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PS/PUS
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LORD H G LENNOX
MISS BROWN
MR DAY
MR WILLSON
MR ASPIN

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MR BYATT
LORD N-G LENNOX

~~PS/NO 10 DOWNING STREET~~

MR R L WADE-GERY)
MR P M MAXEY)
COL MOIR) CABINET
MR P J FOWLER) OFFICE
DIO)

M. D.A. 4
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HD/PUSD (2)
HD/NEWS DEPT
HD/WAD
MR FREELAND LEGAL ADVISER RM K200A
MR FIFOOT LEGAL ADVISER RM K164

RESIDENT CLERK

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DESKBY 200700Z

FM DAR ES SALAAM 200550Z OCT 79

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 826 OF 20 OCTOBER

RFI IMMEDIATE DESKBY 200700Z LUSAKA, GABORONE, MAPUTO

IMMEDIATE LUANDA, LAGOS, MONROVIA

PRIORITY WASHINGTON, UKMISS NEW YORK

YOUR TELNO 343.

RHODESIA:

1. MR MARTIN CONVEYED YOUR MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT NYERERE WHEN HE SAW HIM ON 19 OCT. NYERERE EXPRESSED HIS OWN GRATITUDE, IN THE WARMEST TERMS, IN RETURN: "YOU WERE IMPLEMENTING STEP BY STEP WHAT HAD BEEN AGREED IN LUSAKA". WHEN HE HAD SEEN YOUR PROPOSALS FOR THE CONSTITUTION HE HAD FOUND LITTLE WRONG WITH THEM. AT THE NEXT STAGE "HIS EMPHASIS" WOULD BE ON THE BRITISH AUTHORITY TO SUPERVISE THE ELECTIONS: "IF YOU MADE HIS TASK WITH THE PF AS EASY AT THE NEXT STAGE AS IT HAD BEEN ON THE FIRST, HE WOULD HAVE NO COMPLAINT". HE REMAINED READY TO GO ON HELPING AS NEED AROSE.
2. MR MARTIN TOLD THE PRESIDENT OF MR LUCE'S PLANS AND NYERERE WELCOMED THE VISIT. HE WILL BE AVAILABLE FOR A MEETING ON MONDAY, 22 OCTOBER. ASKED BY MR MARTIN WHAT HE THOUGHT WOULD BE THE MAIN ISSUES IN THE NEXT STAGE OF THE CONFERENCE, NYERERE SAID THAT THE PF WOULD WANT TO KNOW WHAT HE WERE GOING

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NYERERE WELCOMED THE VISIT. HE WILL BE AVAILABLE FOR A MEETING ON MONDAY, 22 OCTOBER. ASKED BY MR MARTIN WHAT HE THOUGHT WOULD BE THE MAIN ISSUES IN THE NEXT STAGE OF THE CONFERENCE, NYERERE SAID THAT THE PF WOULD WANT TO KNOW WHAT WE WERE GOING TO PROPOSE AS MACHINERY FOR EXERCISING OUR AUTHORITY. THIS HAD ALWAYS BEEN A MAJOR ISSUE IN THE DISCUSSIONS OF THE ANGLO-AMERICAN PROPOSALS: "WERE WE GOING TO USE THE 'SMITH' MACHINERY?" IT WAS ON THIS POINT OF MACHINERY FOR EXERCISING OUR AUTHORITY THAT HE THOUGHT WE WOULD BE BOUND TO HAVE "A LITTLE DEBATE". HE WOULD LOOK FORWARD TO HEARING OUR IDEAS FROM MR LUCE. HE WOULD NOT WISH TO TAKE POSITIONS AT THIS STAGE (THE TIME FOR THAT, HE IMPLIED, WAS WHEN IT CAME TO HELPING TO RESOLVE SOME DIFFICULTY WITH THE PF). BUT HE MIGHT BE ABLE TO GIVE MR LUCE SOME HELP ON WHERE HE FORESAW THE POSSIBILITY OF PROBLEMS ARISING.

3. NYERERE WAS CLEARLY DELIGHTED AT THE RESUMPTION OF THE CONFERENCE WITH THE PF PRESENT, AND FULL OF PRAISE FOR YOUR HANDLING OF THE DISCUSSIONS. BUT EQUALLY CLEARLY HE IS UNDER NO ILLUSIONS ABOUT THE DIFFICULTIES AHEAD.

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FM LUSAKA 191330Z OCT 79

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1114 OF 19 OCTOBER

AND TO PRIORITY ECGD, DOT, BANK OF ENGLAND

INFO PRIORITY DAR ES SALAAM.

RHODESIAN RAID: CHISAMBA BRIDGE

1. THE CHINESE AMBASSADOR TOLD ME TODAY IN STRICT CONFIDENCE THE FOLLOWING DETAILS ABOUT THE DAMAGE TO THE RAILWAY BRIDGE AT CHISAMBA, WHICH IS STILL BEING EXAMINED BY CHINESE EXPERTS:-

(I) TRAFFIC HAS COME TO A STANDSTILL ON THE RAILWAY CAUSING A DIRECT LOSS OF BETWEEN K80,000 AND K90,000 A DAY TO THE TAZARA RAILWAY AUTHORITY.

(II) THE TANZANIA AND ZAMBIAN GOVERNMENTS HAVE ASKED FOR CHINESE ASSISTANCE.

(III) THE EXACT EXTENT OF THE DAMAGE IS BEING ASSESSED. IT IS STILL TOO EARLY TO GIVE A CONSIDERED JUDGMENT BUT THE NON-AVAILABILITY LOCALLY OF MATERIAL, ESPECIALLY STEEL, SUGGESTS THAT THE ZAMBIAN MINISTER OF COMMUNICATIONS ASSERTION THAT THE BRIDGE WOULD BE REPAIRED IN TWO MONTHS IS ABSURDLY OVER OPTIMISTIC. IN FACT THE EXPERTS HAVE NOT YET DECIDED WHETHER THE BEST COURSE WOULD BE TO PUT UP A MAKESHIFT BRIDGE OR GO STRAIGHT FOR A PERMANENT SOLUTION. ONLY WHEN THEY HAVE DECIDED WHICH COURSE TO ADOPT CAN THEY DECIDE PRECISELY WHAT MATERIALS AND WHAT MANPOWER THEY WILL NEED.

(IV) THE RAILWAYS BRIDGE IS IN FIVE SECTIONS, EACH 48 METRES IN LENGTH. THREE OUT OF THE FIVE SECTIONS HAVE BEEN DESTROYED AND THE NUMBER TWO PILLAR SUPPORTING THE BRIDGE HAS BEEN COMPLETELY BLOWN UP.

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(V) THE WEIGHT OF EACH SECTION IS 100 TONS. SOME OF THE STEEL BEAMS HAVE BEEN DESTROYED COMPLETELY, OTHERS HAVE SUBMERGED IN THE RIVER. TAZARA RAILWAY HAVE NO CRANES CAPABLE OF LIFTING THE BEAMS AND IT IS DOUBTFUL WHETHER THERE ARE ANY AVAILABLE IN ZAMBIA. BEFORE THE DESTROYED PILLAR CAN BE REBUILT CRANES WILL HAVE TO BE FOUND TO LIFT THE SUBMERGED BEAMS FROM THE RIVER.

(VI) THE ZAMBIAN AUTHORITIES HAVE TOLD THE CHINES THEY BELIEVE THIS RAID WAS CONDUCTED BY THE RHODESIANS WITH THE COLLABORATION OF SOME LOCAL ELEMENTS AND WHITE FARMERS, ONE OF WHOM WAS QUICKLY DETAINED (MR SHONE, A ZAMBIAN CITIZEN).

ALLINSON

(ADVANCED AS REQUESTED)

FILES

RHOD D
OADS
N AM D
NEWS D
PUSD
PLANNING STAFF
ES & SD
CCD
FRD
UND
LEGAL ADVISERS
(MR FREELAND)
(MR FIFOOT)
ECON D
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MR DAY
MR WILLSON
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ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION
RHODESIA POLICY

2
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T230/79T

SUBJECT

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T1230/79T

ADVANCE COP

PS (4)
PS/LPS
PS/Mr huce
PS/POS
Sir A Duff
Mr Byatt
Mr Day
Mr Aspin
~~PS/No 10, Downing~~
Hd of WA
Hd Rhod

X13

OCTOBER 19 1979

ETATPRIORITE
THE RIGHT HONOURABLE MARGARET THATCHER
PRIME MINISTER OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND
10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON

MADAM PRIME MINISTER COLON I AM PLEASSED TO COME TO KNOW THAT
THE CONSTITUTIONAL TALKS IN LONDON HAVE RESUMED WITH THE PARTICI-
PATION OF THE PATRIOTIC FRONT STOP THIS DEVELOPMENT IS INDEED
HEARTENING AND HOLDS OUT HOPE THAT IF THE TALKS SHOULD CONTINUE IN
AN ATMOSPHERE OF UNDERSTANDING A SOLUTION ACCEPTABLE TO ALL PARTIES
CONCERNED CAN BE FOUND WHICH WOULD LEAD TO GENUINE INDEPENDENCE
WITH MAJORITY RULE FOR ZIMBABWE STOP WITH RENEWED ASSURANCES OF MY
HIGHEST CONSIDERATION AND ESTEEM SINCERELY

W R TOLBERT JR
PRESIDENT OF LIBERIA AND CURRENT CHAIRMAN OF
THE ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY

for
Wm

263564 PRDRME G
4224 FORMIN LI
HOW WELL RECEIVED PSE?

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Subject

T123/79T

Oct 18 13 03

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GBXX CO LIMV 412
MONROVIA 412 1 9 1205
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**PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T123/79T**

TELEGRAPHS LONDON
18 OCT 1979
EC3/791 AREA OFFICE
ST BOTOLPHS
ENQUIRIES: 0446 21442
1222 EXT 2085

ETATPRIORITE
THE RT HONOURABLE MARGARET THATCHER
PRIME MINISTER OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND
10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON

*FLO advise no
reply reg'n's from P.A.*

LFS 934

Phnt 19/10

DEAR MADAM PRIME MINISTER COLON HER MAJESTYS AMBASSADOR TO
LIBERIA HIS EXCELLENCY JOHN DOUBLEDAY INFORMED MY MINISTER OF
FOREIGN AFFAIRS ON TUESDAY OF THE SUBSTANCE OF THE PRESS
CONFERENCE YOUR SECRETARY OF

PAGE 2/50 WRDS

STATE FOR FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH AFFAIRS CMA LORD CARRINGTON
CMA HELD IN LONDON ON MONDAY CMA THE FIFTEENTH INSTANT CMA ON THE
CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE STOP HE INDICATED THAT FOLLOWING A
MEETING WHICH LORD CARRINGTON HELD WITH THE CO-LEADERS OF THE
PATRIOTIC FRONT CMA MESSRS NKOMO AND MUGABE CMA THEY REITERATED

PAGE 3/50 WRDS

THAT THEY COULD NOT ACCEPT THE INDEPENDENCE CONSTITUTION AS
PROPOSED WITH PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO THE LAND ISSUE SEMICOLON
THAT LORD CARRINGTON HAD PLANNED TO BEGIN DISCUSSIONS OF THE
IMPLEMENTATION ARRANGEMENTS WITH THE SALISBURY DELEGATION ON
YESTERDAY CMA LEAVING OF COURSE THE DOOR OPEN TO THE PATRIOTIC
FRONT TO JOIN IN

PAGE 4/50 WRDS

THE NEGOTIATIONS AT SUCH TIME WHEN THEY HAD INDICATED THEIR
ACCEPTANCE OF THE INDEPENDENCE CONSTITUTION AS PROPOSED STOP I
UNDERSTAND THAT THE NEGOTIATIONS WHICH WERE BEGUN WITH THE
SALISBURY DELEGATION ALONE RESUMES TODAY STOP IT IS MOST
REGRETTABLE THAT MORE TIME AND PATIENCE COULD NOT HAVE BEEN
EMPLOYED TO AFFORD

PAGE 5/50 WRDS

THE CO-LEADERS OF THE PATRIOTIC FRONT CMA WHO IN OUR JUDGMENT
ARE INDISPENSABLE TO ANY SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION OF THE TALKS CMA
ALL POSSIBILITIES FOR REFLECTION CMA CONSULTATION AND CLARIFICATION
ON THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE LAND ISSUE STOP IT IS MY CONSIDERED
OPINION THAT TO CONTINUE THE TALKS WITH THE SALISBURY

DELEGATION ALONE AND WITHOUT THE PARTICIPATION OF THE PATRIOTIC
FRONT DOES NOT ONLY CONTRAVENE THE SPIRIT OF THE LUSAKA
UNDERSTANDING BUT WOULD MAKE MORE DIFFICULT THE PROCESS OF
ARRIVING AT THE ACCEPTANCE OF AN INDEPENDENCE CONSTITUTION AND
SUCH OTHER MEASURES AS WOULD LEAD TO ENDING THE WAR IN
ZIMBABWE STOP I

PAGE 7/50 WRDS

SINCERELY HOPE THAT A WAY COULD BE FOUND WHERE THE TALKS WOULD
NOT CONTINUE WITH THE PARTICIPATION OF ONLY THE SALISBURY
DELEGATION STOP I ACCORDINGLY APPEAL TO YOU TO EXERCISE EVERY
EFFORT TO BRING ALL THE PARTIES BACK TO THE CONFERENCE TABLE
IN THE SPIRIT OF THE LUSAKA ACCORD STOP

PAGE 8/50 WRDS

AS I HAVE INDICATED IN MY EARLIER MESSAGES TO YOU CMA I SHALL CONTINUINGLY PRAY AND WORK SO THAT THIS OPPORTUNITY TO END SUFFERING AND INJUSTICE CMA AND TO USHER IN INDEPENDENCE WITH MAJORITY RULE IN ZIMBABWE WILL NOT BE LOST STOP WITH RENEWED ASSURANCES OF MY HIGHEST ESTEEM SINCERELY

PAGE 9/12 WRDS

WR TOLBERT JR
PRESIDENT OF LIBERIA AND
CURRENT CHAIRMAN OF THE OAU



Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster

PRIVY COUNCIL OFFICE
WHITEHALL, LONDON SW1A 2AT

18 October 1979

My dear Peter

*Lg
Paul*

SOUTHERN RHODESIA: LEGISLATION

Thank you for your minute of 11 October about further contingent legislation on Southern Rhodesia.

I agree that Parliamentary Counsel should be instructed to begin preparatory work on a draft bill on the lines set out in your minute. I have noted that you would seek the approval of Ministerial colleagues to what you propose before seeking introduction of the bill.

I am copying this to the Prime Minister, the Lord President, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, the Home Secretary, the Lord Chancellor, the Attorney General, the Chief Whip, and to First Parliamentary Counsel and Sir John Hunt.

Yours sincerely
John Carrington

The Rt Hon the Lord Carrington KCMG MC
Secretary of State for Foreign and
Commonwealth Affairs
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
Whitehall

18 OCT 1979



SECRET



File 26
Rhodesia

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

18 October 1979

RHODESIA: PRE-INDEPENDENCE PERIOD

The Prime Minister has seen the paper, enclosed with your letter to me of 17 October, setting out the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary's proposals for the pre-Independence period in Rhodesia. The Prime Minister is content with those proposals.

M. O'D. B. ALEXANDER

R. M. J. Lyne, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

SECRET

SLM

[RHODESIA: POLICY: ADVANCE COPIES]

(X27)

PS
PS/SIR I GILMOUR
PS/MR LUCE
PS/PUS
SIR A DUFF
MR WILLSON
MR BYATT
LORD N G LENNOX

PS/NO 10 DOWNING STREET

MR R L WADE-GERY)
MR P M MAXEY)
COL MOIR) CABINET
MR P J FOWLER) OFFICE
DIO)

Mr. D.A.H.

HD/RHODESIA DEPT (3)

HD/C AF D

HD/S AF D

HD/PUSD (2)

HD/NEWS DEPT

HD/WAD

MR FREELAND LEGAL ADVISER RM K200A

MR FIFOOT LEGAL ADVISER RM K164

RESIDENT CLERK

GR 650

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Mr. [Files]

fs. Prime Minister

CONFIDENTIAL

DESKBY 180800Z

FM WASHINGTON 172337Z OCT 79

TO IMMEDIATE FCC

TELEGRAM NUMBER 3234 OF 17 OCTOBER

Paul (9.10)

CUR TELEGRAM NO 3215: RHODESIA.

1. LAKE ASKED TO SEE ME THIS AFTERNOON. I REPEATED WHAT SIR H HENDERSON HAD BEGUN TELLING VANCE THIS MORNING, THAT WE REGARDED IT AS MOST IMPORTANT THAT WE AND THEY SHOULD NOT GET OUT OF STEP, I HAD THE IMPRESSION THE STATE DEPARTMENT MIGHT HAVE SOME CONCERNS ABOUT THE NEXT STEPS. LAKE WOULD WANT TO DISCUSS THESE WITH SIR A DUFF, AND OUR DISCUSSION WAS SIMPLY A PRELIMINARY TO THIS. BUT IT WOULD BE HELPFUL TO BE ABLE TO REPORT THE POINTS LAKE WANTED TO COVER.
2. LAKE SAID THAT THE POINTS HE WANTED TO COVER ON FRIDAY WERE:

- (I) PEACEKEEPING AND THE QUESTION OF EXTERNAL FORCES.
- (II) THE ADMINISTRATION OF ELECTIONS AND THE QUESTION OF OBSERVERS.
- (III) THE MECHANISM OF INTERIM GOVERNMENT.
- (IV) THE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE EXISTING FORCES INSIDE AND OUTSIDE

(IV) THE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE EXISTING FORCES INSIDE AND OUTSIDE RHODESIA.

(V) THE LENGTH OF TRANSITIONAL PERIOD (WHICH HE ADMITTED SEEMED TO THE AMERICANS NOW LESS IMPORTANT).

(VI) THE PRECISE POSITION ON BRITISH SANCTIONS.

3. HE REFERRED TO THESE POINTS AS NOT SO MUCH WORRIES AS POINTS OF INTENSE US INTEREST. THE ADMINISTRATION HAD NOTHING BUT ADMIRATION FOR THE WAY IN WHICH WE HAD HANDLED MATTERS TO DATE. BUT THEY WERE CONCERNED THAT, AS OUR AND THEIR NOVEMBER DEADLINE ON SANCTIONS APPROACHED, WE SHOULD FACE IT IN CIRCUMSTANCES WHERE OUR POSITION COULD BE DEFENDED AS WHOLLY REASONABLE VIS-A-VIS THE PATRIOTIC FRONT, AS WELL AS VIS-A-VIS SALISBURY. THE AMERICANS WERE ON THE SAME TRAIN WITH US, BUT THEY WERE INEVITABLY INTERESTED IN WHERE IT WAS GOING FROM HERE.

4. ON SANCTIONS, THE AMERICANS ARE PUZZLED BY OUR PRECISE LEGAL POSITION. I SAID THAT SIR A DUFF WOULD BE ABLE TO EXPLAIN THIS IN DETAIL, BUT THAT THE IMPORTANT THING WAS THE POLITICAL POSITION RATHER THAN THE LEGAL ONE. IT WOULD BE IDLE TO SUPPOSE THAT, BARRING SOMETHING QUITE UNFORESEEN AND UNLIKELY, PARLIAMENT WOULD AGREE TO RENEW SANCTIONS AFTER THE MIDDLE OF NOVEMBER. WE REALISED THE LIKELY CONGRESSIONAL REACTION TO THIS, WHICH VANCE HAD REPEATED THIS MORNING TO SIR N. HENDERSON.

5. AS REGARDS PEACEKEEPING AND SECURITY DURING THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD IT IS CLEAR THAT THE ADMINISTRATION ARE NOT LOOKING FOR ANYTHING LIKE A UN FORCE. BUT LAKE APPEARED SURPRISED THAT WE MIGHT REGARD A COMMONWEALTH FORCE AS ALSO UNREALISTIC. I TOLD HIM, BUT HE MAY NEED TO BE TOLD AGAIN, THAT AGENCY REPORTS THAT WE MIGHT BE PREPARED TO SEND IN MILITARY ADVISERS DO NOT MEAN THAT WE WILL BE PREPARED TO SEND IN TROOPS. THIS CLEARLY LEFT IN HIS MIND THE QUESTION, INTO WHICH I DID NOT GO, OF THE POSITION OF GENERAL WALLS' FORCES AND WHO WOULD MAINTAIN SECURITY DURING THE TRANSITION.

6. IN A REFERENCE TO THE EXCHANGE YESTERDAY ON A LAND FUND LAKE SAID THAT THE ADMINISTRATION WERE VERY CONSCIOUS OF THE NEED TO AVOID GIVING THE IMPRESSION THAT ITS PURPOSE WAS TO BUY OUT WHITES, OR THAT IT WOULD COMPARE IN SIZE TO THE OLD 1977 ZIMBABWE DEVELOPMENT FUND. THE SORT OF THING THAT THEY HAD IN MIND WOULD BE FOR THE WHOLE REGION, PERHAPS WITH A FIGURE NEARER TO THE BOTTOM END OF THE ZIMBABWE DEVELOPMENT FUND THAN TO THE 55 MILLION POUNDS ATTRIBUTED TO NKOMO IN A SPEECH IN OXFORD AND FOR DEVELOPMENT PURPOSES GENERALLY. IT WOULD BE EASIER TO GET MONEY FROM CONGRESS FOR A REGIONAL FUND, AND IT WOULD CERTAINLY BE DIFFICULT TO GET MONEY TO BUY OUT WHITES.

7. I MADE THE POINT THAT NOTHING SHOULD BE DONE TO GIVE EITHER RHODESIAN PARTY THE EXPECTATION THAT BY FURTHER DELAYING DECISIONS AND OBSTRUCTING AGREEMENT THEY MIGHT DO BETTER. LAKE SAID HE TOOK THIS POINT. IN THE OTHER HAND THE AMERICANS COULD NOT AFFORD TO BACK PROPOSALS THEY COULD NOT DEFEND TO CONGRESS AND BLACK AFRICA

RHODESIAN PARTY THE EXPECTATION THAT BY FURTHER DELAYING DECISIONS
AND OBSTRUCTING AGREEMENT THEY MIGHT DO BETTER. LAKE SAID HE TOOK
THIS POINT. IN THE OTHER HAND THE AMERICANS COULD NOT AFFORD TO
●CK PROPOSALS THEY COULD NOT DEFEND TO CONGRESS AND BLACK AFRICA.

ROBINSON

NNN

45 ①



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

Prime Minister,

I think this paper takes account
of most of the points you made
at Chequers + yesterday. Agree?

17 October 1979

Dear Michael,

RML:17/x

Yes OK

Rhodesia: Pre-Independence Period

I enclose a paper describing our proposals for the pre-independence period in Rhodesia.

Lord Carrington proposes to carry forward our discussions with the Salisbury Delegation on the basis of this paper, and to seek Bishop Muzorewa's agreement to it.

yours ever

Roderic Lyne

(R M J Lyne)
Private Secretary

M O'D B Alexander Esq
10 Downing Street
LONDON

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17 OCT 1979

Rhodesia: The Pre-Independence Period

1. On a date to be agreed, by an Order in Council of the Southern Rhodesia Act of 1965, executive authority in Rhodesia will be vested in a Governor who will be British.
2. There will be no Parliament in Rhodesia in the pre-election period to act as the legislative authority. This authority will therefore have to be vested formally in the Governor.
3. The Governor will be appointed by the British Government. He will have a small British staff, an Election Commissioner, a military adviser and a police adviser.
4. At the end of the Conference and before the Governor arrives, Bishop Muzorewa would return to Rhodesia and resume control of the Government. He would if necessary arrange for the new Constitution to be approved by the Rhodesian Parliament by a rapid procedure; and in any case for Parliament to be dissolved to enable new elections to be held. He would invite us to appoint a British Governor to enable elections to be held under our authority.
5. The Governor would then proceed to Rhodesia. From his arrival, he would be formally responsible for the administration of the country. (For a short period after his arrival, Bishop Muzorewa and his principal Ministers would deal with day to day business in matters which did not relate to the holding of elections and a ceasefire.) From this point Rhodesia would have returned to legality as a British dependent territory and sanctions would be lifted.
6. Bishop Muzorewa and his Ministers, and all other political leaders, would thereafter commit themselves to the election campaign. Bishop Muzorewa would not be asked to resign. The Governor would not take action to divest him of his office. But the Governor would become directly responsible for the day to day administration of the country, acting through the Permanent

/Secretaries

Secretaries, for such time as was necessary to enable elections to be held.

6. The Governor's instructions would require him to do all things necessary to secure compliance with the conditions for free elections. In particular, he would ensure that during the election campaign:-

- a) the administration of the election is scrupulously impartial as between all the political parties;
- b) peaceful political activity is freely conducted;
- c) all parties will have free and uncensored access to all the public media.

7. The Governor's Election Commissioner and supporting staff would assist him in carrying out these functions. Commonwealth observers would be present during the election.

8. The Governor would appoint an Election Council, under the chairmanship of his Election Commissioner, on which parties taking part in the election would be represented. The Council and its individual members would be able to offer advice and make representations to the Governor on any matter concerning the elections.

9. The existing civil police would be responsible for the maintenance of law and order, under the authority and supervision of the Governor and his police adviser and supporting staff.

10. There would be agreement between the opposing forces regarding a ceasefire and disengagement of their respective forces. A Ceasefire Commission under the chairmanship of the British military adviser would be established to assist with the oversight of the ceasefire on which the commanders of the opposing forces will be represented and would be answerable to the Governor.

11. The elections would be held on a date to be decided by the Governor, after consultation with the parties participating in them. Immediately thereafter the independence government would be established and Zimbabwe would become independent.

Top Copy

cc Master set
Rhodesia sitⁿ

S Africa, Oct 79, visit by
S Africa Foreign Minister Mr. P. Botha

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RECORD OF A DISCUSSION BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER AND THE
FOREIGN MINISTER OF SOUTH AFRICA, MR PIK BOTHA, AT
10 DOWNING STREET ON 17 OCTOBER AT 1800

Present: Prime Minister
Foreign and Commonwealth
Secretary
Mr. M. O'D B. Alexander

Mr Pik Botha
H.E. Dr. Dawid de Villiers

After an exchange of courtesies, Mr. Botha said that he had been asked by his Prime Minister to say that he very much hoped it might be possible to arrange a meeting between himself and the Prime Minister at an opportune moment. Mr. P.W. Botha considered that it would be extremely useful for the two Prime Ministers to be able to discuss their common problems and to get to know each other better. The Prime Minister recalled that she had met Mr. P.W. Botha when he was the South African Defence Minister. She said that it would be virtually impossible for her to meet Mr. P.W. Botha in the months immediately ahead. Her diary was already overcrowded. Mr. Botha made it clear that his Prime Minister was thinking of a visit to London rather than of a visit by Mrs. Thatcher to South Africa. He did not attempt to pursue the matter further.

Mr. Botha said that his Prime Minister had asked him to make clear how grateful he was for the Prime Minister's response to his initiatives in South Africa. Mr. P.W. Botha's ambition was to bring the leaders of the black and the Asian communities to share his vision of Southern Africa. This was based on a belief that South Africa could and should play a bigger role in the social and economic development of the entire region. The region contained 40 million people. It possessed a good infrastructure and a large internal market. It was in every sense the most highly developed region in Africa. It had enormous resources of gold and other minerals, of the various metals and of water. South Africa's knowledge and

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/expertise

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expertise e.g. in the areas of agriculture, treatment of disease, and industry was tailored to the African situation. The region was one of great importance. Given the chance, the present South African Government aimed to show the other African countries that co-operation with them would be worth seeking. Within South Africa the Government's objective was to convince the whites that the blacks were their natural partners. If Mr. P.W. Botha's policies succeeded, the result would be a solid and stable region in Southern Africa which it would be easier for the West to support.

The Prime Minister said that she needed no convincing about the importance of South Africa. She considered that Mr. P.W. Botha's efforts had not received enough recognition in the West. His recent initiatives were part of a continuing process. The setbacks he had encountered in the recent by-elections had underlined how courageous his policies were. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary said that he agreed with the Prime Minister. Mr. Botha's point about making it easier for Western Governments to support Southern Africa was of particular importance. The greater the movement to which they could point within South Africa, the better.

Mr. Botha said that despite the difficulties, the South African Government had the will to complete their programme. But they would be unable to do so if the Marxists won in Zimbabwe/Rhodesia. The Prime Minister said that everyone would be lost if the Marxists won. It was essential to have moderate Governments, supported by the white population, in both Zimbabwe/Rhodesia and in Namibia. Britain's objective was to achieve a lasting solution in Zimbabwe/Rhodesia of the type secured in Kenya. This would allow the country to flourish, would give the neighbouring countries a better chance and would make co-operation with South Africa easier. We would try to get others to share our view of the situation in the region as a whole. A constitutional settlement supported only by South Africa and

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/the United Kingdom

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-3-

the United Kingdom would leave Zimbabwe/Rhodesia isolated. There had been two aspects of Bishop Muzorewa's Constitution which had had to be rectified because they had no parallel in any other Constitution granted by Britain. Both points had been put right. There was now a Constitution which was in all respects similar to those we had granted to many other countries on gaining independence. Britain recognised that what Rhodesians wanted was an end to the war: we intended to offer the ballot in exchange for the bullet. Great difficulties remained and progress at the Conference had been too slow. Bishop Muzorewa had been away from Salisbury too long. None the less we were on course. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary added that it was essential that Britain should be seen to be being reasonable in the conduct of the negotiations. As it was he had already been accused by many of attempting to wreck the Conference.

Mr. Botha said that it was important that Bishop Muzorewa's position should not be weakened. There was no-one in Rhodesia who would look after his interests. His power base lay in his link with the Security Forces. If this were to be severed, the Bishop would be a laughing stock in the country. Access to the levers of power/^{was what} mattered in African politics. Looking further ahead, Mr. Botha said that he was concerned about the possibility that Mr. Nkomo would be allowed to participate in the elections even though he had not accepted any agreement in London. If this happened, Mr. Nkomo would have a platform that would enable him to destroy Bishop Muzorewa. He would say that he had sought a better agreement in London but that the Bishop had sold out to the British. The Prime Minister said that there was force in Mr. Botha's point but that in our view Mr. Nkomo should not be allowed to participate in the election unless he accepted the Constitution. As regards Bishop Muzorewa's position, the aim would be for him to return to Salisbury with definite achievements e.g. the lifting of sanctions and the return to legality, to his credit.

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/Mr. Botha

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-4-

Mr. Botha said that South Africa had a military presence in Rhodesia at the Bishop's request. This consisted of equipment rather than men. South Africa was also giving financial support to the tune of some 40 million rand per month. If they were to decide to end their presence, they would wish to do so soon. South Africa could not afford a repetition of what had happened in Angola where they had appeared to capitulate under external pressure. (It had evidently been Mr. Botha's intention at this point to describe the alternative course of action which South Africa might pursue if the situation deteriorated and they decided not to withdraw. However, in the event the conversation took a different direction and he never returned to the point.)

The Prime Minister expressed the hope that South Africa would not decide to pull out of Rhodesia. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary said that it was entirely reasonable for Bishop Muzorewa to have purchased the South African equipment. If there were a British presence in Zimbabwe/Rhodesia during the interim period, no questions would be asked about the equipment.

Mr. Botha said he was concerned that the United States Government might try to exert pressure on the British Government. The Prime Minister said he need have no concern on that score. We would do our best to bring the Americans along and would remind them of our extensive experience in the problems of the region. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary said that he did not believe the American Government could afford not to follow HMG's line. Mr. Botha referred to intercepts available to the South African Government of President Nyerere's conversations with colleagues. President Nyerere's interpretation of what he had been told by the Americans did not altogether square with the Prime Minister's view. It was of course possible that President Nyerere had misunderstood what the Americans were saying. The Secretary of State said that he thought President Nyerere was probably wide of the mark. The only

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/worry

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worry was that the Americans might not regard the interim arrangements as fair. But they could probably be brought round.

At the end of the conversation Mr. Botha reverted to his Prime Minister's vision of the development of Southern Africa as a whole. He said that Mr. P.W. Botha intended to have a meeting with South African industrialists and financiers on 22 November at which he would be seeking financial support for his grand design. The meeting ended at 1835.

Phub

17 October 1979

SECRET

[RHODESIA: POLICY: ADVANCE COPIES]

IMMEDIATE

PS
PS/SIR I GILMOUR
PS/MR LUCE
PS/PUS
SIR A DUFF
MR WILLSON
~~MR BYATT~~
LORD N. G. LENNOX

PS/NO 10 DOWNING STREET

MR R L WADE-GERY)
MR P M MAXEY)
COL MOIR) CABINET
MR P J FOWLER) OFFICE
DIO)

M. D. A. S.

HD/RHODESIA DEPT (3)

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HD/PUSD (2)

HD/NEWS DEPT

HD/WAD

MR FREELAND LEGAL ADVISER RM K200A

MR FIFOOT LEGAL ADVISER RM K164

CONFIDENTIAL

FM DAR ES SALAAM 161100Z OCTOBER 79

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 812 OF 16 OCTOBER

INFO PRIORITY MAPUTO, GABORONE, LUSAKA, LAGOS, WASHINGTON,
UKMIS NEW YORK

MY TELNO 811: RHODESIA CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE

1. PRESIDENT NYERERE BEGAN THE MEETING REPORTED IN MY TUR BY ASKING ME IF I HAD ANYTHING MORE I COULD TELL HIM. (I HAD EARLIER SENT HIM THE TEXTS OF VS070 AND 071). I SPOKE FROM PARAS 2 AND 3 OF YOUR TELNO 838 TO LUSAKA.5
2. NYERERE RESPONDED BY SAYING THAT HE WAS NOT WORRIED ABOUT THE SUBSTANCE, BUT BY THE UNNECESSARY CRISIS POSITION WHICH, AS HE SAW IT, HAD ARISEN AND WHICH SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN ALLOWED TO ARISE. AFTER RECEIVING THE PRIME MINISTER'S MESSAGE ON 14 OCTOBER HE HAD WORKED VERY HARD. HE HAD SPOKEN TO LUSAKA SEVERAL TIMES TO LONDON AND HE HAD SEEN ME AND THE AMERICAN CHARGE D'AFFAIRES. YESTERDAY 15 OCTOBER HE HAD MOVED HIS MEETING WITH THE VICE PRESIDENTS OF THE PF FROM THE AFTERNOON TO THE MORNING IN ORDER TO SEE THEM AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. THEN AT 4.00 PM IN THE AFTERNOON HE HAD HEARD THE BBC NEWS (AND HE INDICATED WITH A GESTURE THAT THIS HAD UPSET EVERYTHING). HE FEARED THAT THE CRISIS ATMOSPHERE WHICH HAD BEEN CREATED COULD ITSELF BECOME A PROBLEM. HE BELIEVED THE GUARDIAN WAS ALREADY TALKING OF POSSIBLE FAILURE OF THE CONFERENCE

CRISIS ATMOSPHERE WHICH HAD BEEN CREATED COULD ITSELF BECOME A PROBLEM. HE BELIEVED THE GUARDIAN WAS ALREADY TALKING OF POSSIBLE FAILURE OF THE CONFERENCE.

3. NYERERE THEN TURNED TO YOUR PRESS STATEMENTS ON 15 OCTOBER (WHICH HE HAD CLEARLY READ WITH GREAT CARE). HE SAID HE DID NOT QUARREL WITH THE SUBSTANCE OF WHAT YOU HAD SAID, BUT SOME OF THE PRESENTATION WAS DIFFICULT. THE IMPRESSION WAS CONSTANTLY GIVEN THAT THE PF HAD NOT ACCEPTED THE CONSTITUTION. THIS WAS ONLY TRUE IN A "VERY SEMANTIC WAY". WE ALL KNEW THAT THEY HAD REALLY ACCEPTED: IT WAS ONLY A QUESTION OF CHANGING "MAY" INTO "WILL". THE ONLY DIFFERENCE BETWEEN US AND THE PF WAS NOW ON THE QUESTION OF COMPENSATION FOR LAND. THE BRITISH WERE SAYING THAT THERE COULD BE NO LAND SEIZURE WITHOUT COMPENSATION AND THE PF WERE SAYING THAT IF YOU WANT COMPENSATION YOU MUST GIVE US THE MONEY. NYERERE THEN WENT ON TO SPEAK AS IN MY TUR MAINTAINING THAT WE HAD NOT BEEN SUFFICIENTLY CLEAR WITH THE PF. THUS WE HAVE TALKED WITH THEM ABOUT DEVELOPMENT BUT NOT ABOUT COMPENSATION. MOREOVER THERE HAD TO BE AGREEMENT HERE AND NOW IN LONDON AND NOT WITH SOME FUTURE ZIMBABWE GOVERNMENT. HE ADDED IN A HALF HUMOROUS ASIDE THAT HE HIMSELF WAS PREPARED TO ACCEPT "VAGUENESS" BUT THE PF COULD NOT.

4. THE PRESIDENT WAS FRIENDLY THROUGHOUT AND HIS CRITICISM WAS CONFINED TO OUR TACTICAL HANDLING OF THE SITUATION. MOKA, WHOM I HAD SEEN EARLIER IN THE DAY, HAD TAKEN THE SAME LINE.

5. I HAVE JUST LEARNED THAT THE REUTERS REPRESENTATIVE HAS NOW BEEN SUMMONED BY PRESIDENT NYERERE NO DOUBT TO PUT HIS VIEWS ON PUBLIC RECORD.

MOON

NNNN

26

PS
PS/SIR I GILMOUR
PS/MR LUCE
PS/PUS
SIR A DUFF
MR WILSON
MR BYATT
LORD N G LENNOX

PS/NO 10 DOWNING STREET

MR R L WADE-GERY)
MR P M MAXEY)
COL MOIR) CABINET
MR P J FOWLER) OFFICE
DIO)

M. J.A.F.

HD/RHODESIA DEPT (3)

HD/C AF D
HD/S AF D

HD/PUSD (2)

HD/NEWS DEPT

HD/WAD

MR FREELAND LEGAL ADVISER RM K200A

MR FIFOOT LEGAL ADVISER RM K164

ms

RESIDENT CLERK

FM GABORONE 161510Z OCT 79

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 425 OF 16 OCTOBER

INFO IMMEDIATE LUSAKA, DAR ES SALAAM, MAPUTO, LUANDA, WASHINGTON,
PRETORIA, LAGOS

MY TEL NO 424; RHODESIA

1. MOGWE CALLED ME IN THIS AFTERNOON (16 OCTOBER). IT NOW APPEARS UNLIKELY THAT THE PRESIDENT WILL HAVE TIME TO SEE ME. HE WILL RELY UPON MOGWE'S BRIEFING.

2. I WENT OVER THE POINTS IN YOUR TELNO 838 TO LUSAKA, EMPHASISING THAT THE DOOR WAS BEING KEPT OPEN FOR PF PARTICIPATION AND THAT IN OUR VIEW THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROPOSALS, TOGETHER WITH YOUR OFFER ON LAND, REPRESENTED THE FAIREST WHICH COULD BE DEvised. I QUOTED THE LUSAKA STATEMENT ON BRITISH CONSTITUTIONAL RESPONSIBILITY AND SAID THAT THIS WAS WHAT YOU WERE EXERCISING. MOGWE SAID THAT HE ACCEPTED THIS. HE RECOGNISED THAT WE WERE DOING WHAT WE THOUGHT WAS RIGHT FOR THE PEOPLE OF ZIMBABWE. HOWEVER THE FRONT-LINE STATES HAD A VITAL INTEREST. BOTSWANA FOR INSTANCE HAD SUFFERED INCURSIONS FROM ALL PARTIES. MOST OF THE FRONT-LINE STATES HAD TRIED TO BE HELPFUL IN MAKING THE PF SEE SENSE. IN PARTICULAR MACHEL HAD BEEN ANXIOUS THAT THE PF SHOULD NOT BE OBDURATE. HE THEREFORE THOUGHT THAT BEFORE TAKING THE DECISIVE STEP OF MOVING TO DISCUSSION OF THE PRE-INDEPENDENCE ARRANGEMENTS YOU SHOULD TO HAVE CONSULTED THE FRONT-LINE PRESIDENTS ON WHAT WAS

MOVING TO DISCUSSION OF THE PRE-INDEPENDENCE ARRANGEMENTS YOU OUGHT TO HAVE CONSULTED THE FRONT-LINE PRESIDENTS ON WHAT WAS NEEDED TO REMOVE THE FINAL OBJECTION OF THE PF TO THE CONSTITUTION. YOU OUGHT TO HAVE SENT AN EMISSARY TO DISCUSS THE POSITION WITH EACH OF THE PRESIDENTS. HE THOUGH THAT YOU HAD BEEN IMPOLITE TO THE FRONT-LINE PRESIDENTS AND THEY WOULD TAKE IT AMISS. IT WOULD NOW BE MORE DIFFICULT FOR YOU TO GET THEIR SUPPORT.

3. I POINTED OUT THAT YOU AND THE PRIME MINISTER HAD TAKEN THE GREATEST CARE IN KEEPING THE FRONT LINE INFORMED ON THE PROGRESS OF THE NEGOTIATIONS. IT WAS NEARLY TWO WEEKS SINCE YOU HAD TABLED THE DETAILED CONSTITUTIONAL PROPOSALS. THE FRONT LINE HAD BEEN MADE WELL AWARE BOTH BY YOU AND THE PF OF THE DIFFICULTIES FACING THE PF. YOU HAD BEEN GRATEFUL FOR THE HELP GIVEN BY THE FRONT LINE BUT THE TIME HAD TO COME WHEN YOU HAD TO DECIDE THAT THE CONFERENCE HAD TO MOVE ON. I SAID THAT IT WOULD HAVE BEEN HELPFUL IF THE FRONT LINE PRESIDENTS HAD BEEN ABLE TO TAKE YOU INTO THEIR CONFIDENCE AND REVEAL EARLIER THAT THEY HAD IN MIND TO HAVE A MEETING. (MOGWE AGREED).

4. I SAID THAT I HOPED THAT THE FRONT-LINE PRESIDENTS WOULD BE ABLE TO SUPPRESS ANY (UNJUSTIFIABLE) RESENTMENT ABOUT YOUR MANNER OF PROCEEDING AND GET DOWN TO THE FUNDAMENTAL QUESTION OF WHAT WAS THE BEST FOR THE PEOPLE OF ZIMBABWE. WE THOUGHT THAT OUR PROPOSALS WERE THE FAIREST THAT WE COULD DEVISE AND I THOUGHT THAT BOTSWANA SUPPORTED US IN THIS. (MOGWE NODDED AGREEMENT). I HOPED THAT YOU COULD RELY UPON THE BOTSWANA DELEGATION INFLUENCING THE FRONT-LINE PRESIDENTS TO GET DOWN TO ESSENTIALS. IN PARTICULAR I HOPED THAT IT WOULD BE APPRECIATED THAT, WHETHER OR NOT THE PF RETURNED TO THE NEGOTIATIONS, YOUR AIM REMAINED TO ACHIEVE PROCEDURES WHICH WOULD ENABLE ALL PARTIES TO PARTICIPATE FREELY AND FAIRLY IN ELECTIONS.

5. MOGWE SAID THAT HE TOOK MY POINTS. THE BOTSWANA DELEGATION WOULD APPROACH THE FRONT-LINE MEETING WITH A COMPLETELY OPEN MIND. HE REVEALED THAT AS WELL AS MOGWE AND MPOTOKWANE, THE ATTORNEY GENERAL WILL BE ACCOMPANYING THE PRESIDENT TO DAR ES SALAAM.

6. AT THE CONSLUSION OF OUR DISCUSSION I GAVE MOGWE A COPY OF THE PF STATEMENT OF 8 OCTOBER SENT TO ME IN YOUR TELNO 197 AND THE EXPLANATION OF SECTION C(43-)3 IN YOU TEL 196. MOGWE READ THE STATEMENT QUICKLY AND ASKED ME ITS PRESENT STATUS. I SAID THAT MY IMPRESSION WAS THAT THE PF HAD TACITLY DROPPED MOST OF THEIR POINTS EXCEPT THOSE ON LAND.

GR 359

CONFIDENTIAL

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FM DAR ES SALAAM 161010Z OCTOBER 79

TO FLASH FCO

TELNO 811 OF 16 OCTOBER

INFO IMMEDIATE MAPUTO, GABORONE, LUSAKA, LAGOS, WASHINGTON
LUANDA,

INFO PRIORITY UKMIS NEW YORK

MY TELNO 809: RHODESIA CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE

1. PRESIDENT NYERERE SUMMONED THE US CHARGE D'AFFAIRES AND MYSELF AT 12 NOON LOCAL TIME TODAY 16 OCTOBER. HE EXPLAINED THAT HE WAS SEEING US TOGETHER BECAUSE HE STILL BELIEVED THAT THE "CRISIS" WHICH HAD ARISEN WITH THE PF COULD BE RESOLVED BY OUR MAKING CLEAR TO THE PF OUR POSITION ON COMPENSATION FOR LAND, PREFERABLY WITH FULL US SUPPORT.
2. NYERERE SAID THAT WHAT THE PF NEEDED TO ENABLE THEM TO CONFIRM THEIR ACCEPTANCE OF THE CONSTITUTION (TO CHANGE THEIR "MAY ACCEPT" INTO "WILL ACCEPT") WAS AN UNEQUIVOCAL ASSURANCE THAT THERE WOULD BE MONEY FOR LAND COMPENSATION (AND NYERERE UNDERLINED THE WORD COMPENSATION, NOT DEVELOPMENT OR RESETTLEMENT OR OTHER SUCH TERMS) AND THAT THE SUM WOULD BE "ADEQUATE". NYERERE SPECIFICALLY SAID THAT IT WAS NOT NECESSARY TO PUT A FIGURE ON THE SUM: IN ANY CASE NO-ONE COULD SAY AT THIS STAGE WHAT WOULD BE NEEDED. BUT WE SHOULD STATE THAT IT WOULD BE ADEQUATE.
3. NYERERE COMMENTED THAT YOU HAD IN FACT ALREADY SAID IN PUBLIC ALL THAT WAS REQUIRED, AND CITED THE FIRST TWO SENTENCES OF YOUR ANSWER TO THE QUESTION AT YOUR PRESS CONFERENCE ON 15 OCTOBER WHICH READ "IF MUGABE NOW SAID HE WOULD ACCEPT THE CONSTITUTION PROVIDED SOMEBODY ELSE PAID FOR THE COMPENSATION FOR LAND, WOULD YOU ACCEPT THAT?". HOWEVER, WHILE YOU HAD SAID THIS IN PUBLIC, ACCORDING TO THE PF VICE PRESIDENTS, YOU HAD NEVER SAID THIS TO THEM IN SO MANY WORDS. NYERERE HOPED THAT YOU WOULD NOW DO SO

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AT ONCE AND HE SUGGESTED THAT YOU SHOULD HAVE THE US AMBASSADOR WITH YOU WHEN YOU DID SO. HE HAD BEEN IN TOUCH WITH THE PF LEADERS IN LONDON THROUGH THEIR VICE PRESIDENTS, AND HE BELIEVED THAT IF THEY HAD CLARITY ON THIS MATTER THEY WOULD ACCEPT THE CONSTITUTION.

4. NYERERE RENEWED HIS APPEAL THAT THE MEETING PLANNED FOR TODAY SHOULD BE POSTPONED AT LEAST UNTIL YOU HAD HAD AN OPPORTUNITY TO SPEAK AGAIN TO THE PF LEADERS.

5. I AM REPORTING IN A FOLLOWING TEL OTHER MATTER WHICH AROSE IN THIS DISCUSSION.

NOON

F I L E S

RHOD D
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PLANNING STAFF
ES & SD
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FRD
UND
LEGAL ADVISERS
(MR FREELAND)
(MR FIFOOT)
ECON D
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PS
PS/LPS
PS/MR LUCE
PS/MR RIDLEY
PS/MR HURD
PS/FUS
SIR A DUFF
LORD N G LENNOX
MISS BROWN
MR DAY
MR WILLSON
MR ASPIN

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION
RHODESIA POLICY

[RHODESIA: POLICY: ADVANCE COPIES]

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PS/SIR I GILMOUR
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SIR A DUFF
MR WILLSON
MR ~~DEATT~~
LORD N G LENNOX

PS/NO 10 DOWNING STREET

MR R L WADE-GERY)
MR P M MAXEY)
COL MOIR) CABINET
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DIO)

M. D. A. S.

HD/RHODESIA DEPT (3)

HD/C AF D
HD/S AF D

HD/PUSD (2)

HD/NEWS DEPT

HD/WAD

MR FREELAND LEGAL ADVISER RM K200A

MR FIFOOT LEGAL ADVISER RM K164

UNCLASSIFIED

DESKBY 161300Z

FM PRETORIA 161035Z OCT 79

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 714 OF 16 OCTOBER 1979.

MIPT

1. FOLLOWING IS OFFICIAL TEXT OF PIK BOTHA'S COMMENTS AS ISSUED BY THE DFA AT NOON TODAY (LOCAL) UNDER THE HEADING "STATEMENT BY THE MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS ON THE DECISION BY LORD CARRINGTON TO PROCEED WITH THE LONDON CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE WITHOUT THE PATRIOTIC FRONT: 15 OCTOBER 1979"

BEGINS

"ASKED TO COMMENT ON THE DECISION BY LORD CARRINGTON TO CONTINUE THE DISCUSSIONS AT THE LANCASTER HOUSE CONFERENCE ON ZIMBABWE-RHODESIA WITHOUT THE PARTICIPATION OF THE PATRIOTIC FRONT, THE MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OBSERVED THAT THE PROPOSED CONSTITUTION HAD NOT BEEN EASIER FOR BISHOP MUZOREWA TO ACCEPT THAN IT WAS FOR ANY OTHER PARTY. ON THE CONTRARY ITS ACCEPTANCE BY THE BISHOP AROUSED SERIOUS DISAGREEMENT AND ALMOST GAVE RISE TO A SPLIT IN HIS DELEGATION RANKS. YET, IN THE INTEREST OF A PEACEFUL FUTURE FOR RHODESIA, BISHOP MUZOREWA HAD ACCEPTED, IN A COURAGEOUS ACT,

ASKED TO COMMENT ON THE LIKELIHOOD OF SANCTIONS NOW BEING

COURAGEOUS ACT.

ASKED TO COMMENT ON THE LIKELIHOOD OF SANCTIONS NOW BEING LIFTED, THE MINISTER SAID:-

"THE LIFTING OF SANCTIONS IS AN URGENT NECESSITY. IT IS CLEAR THAT ALL ZIMBADWE-RHODESIANS WOULD BE STRENGTHENED IN THEIR RESOLVE TO CONTINUE DEFENDING THEIR COUNTRY AGAINST THE AGRESSION AND CONTINUE LIVING OUT THEIR LIVES THERE IF SANCTIONS WERE REMOVED. IT IS ALSO CLEAR THAT BISHOP MUZOREWA AND HIS SUPPORTERS FEEL THAT THEY HAVE DONE EVERYTHING THAT COULD POSSIBLY HAVE BEEN EXPECTED OF THEM TO SETTLE THE LONG-STANDING DISPUTE AND THAT NOTHING SHOULD NOW STAND IN THE WAY OF LIFTING SANCTIONS."

IN GENERAL, THE MINISTER SAID THAT THE PEOPLE WANTED TO CONCENTRATE ON REBUILDING THEIR COUNTRY AND MAKING IT PROSPEROUS. HE APPEALED TO THOSE WHO HAVE INFLUENCE WITH THE PATRIOTIC FRONT TO PERSUADE THEM TO ABANDON THE WAR WHICH COULD ONLY BRING MORE TRAGEDY IN ITS WAKE."

ENDS

2. P W BOTHA IS ALSO QUOTED IN TODAY'S 'BEELD' AS SAYING THAT HE WOULD BE GLAD TO SEE BRITAIN LIFTING SANCTIONS AGAINST RHODESIA.

LEAHY

NNNN

BF 23/10/79

Overtaken
(no spelle to MODBA)



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

16 October 1979

Message from President Tolbert

We spoke last night about the latest message to the Prime Minister from President Tolbert about the Constitutional Conference. I enclose a copy of the text and would be grateful for advice as to the reply which the Prime Minister should send.

M. O'D. B. ALEXANDER

R.M.J. Lyne, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

MB



10 DOWNING STREET

Prime Minister.

MS

The Foreign & Commonwealth
 wishes to reconsider the position
 paper on the arrangements for the
 interim period in Rhodesia in the
 light of your comments this afternoon.
 He has therefore not been able to get it
 ready in time for this evening's box.
 He will submit it to-morrow.

Lord Carrington plans to bring
 Mr Botha over to see you at 18.00
 to-morrow: he will be seeing Mr
 Botha himself at 15.30.

You may like to glance through
 the attached background papers (message to
 Mr Vance & records of talks with Dennis Brewster
 & Ramphal.)

Andrew 16/1x

Mr Renwick

CALL BY THE COMMONWEALTH SECRETARY GENERAL ON LORD CARRINGTON

Mr Ramphal said that he had just seen the Patriotic Front, who were in a state of surprise and bemusement. They were hoping to meet the Americans on the question of land, and he was trying to encourage them to continue working for a settlement on this issue. As we knew, the Front Line States were also urging the Patriotic Front to move. But Mr Ramphal was worried lest the Patriotic Front should be too humiliated. This was the basic reason for his press statement. Meanwhile he was continuing to urge them to devise a form of words (he himself had produced a draft) designed to register their unhappiness about aspects of the Constitution, but to accept it all the same. It was vital that this should be done without too much loss of face.

Lord Carrington said that there was no reason for the Patriotic Front to feel surprised. It had been clear from the beginning of the conference that discussions could not start on the second phase until the first had been agreed. The Bishop had accepted the Constitution; and the Patriotic Front were prevaricating. We had deliberately moved the deadline several times to give the Patriotic Front a chance to catch up. If we had not moved ahead yesterday, the Bishop might simply have gone home. When he had seen the Patriotic Front yesterday they had simply asked what we were intending to do. Yet they had known that it was not possible for us to move any further on land.

The interim arrangements were going to be difficult if not impossible. Mr Ramphal's statement had made a Commonwealth force impossible. How could the Salisbury parties be expected to accept a Commonwealth force after such a statement? Mr Ramphal said that it had seemed from the press that the UK was about to accept the "second option" [a settlement with Salisbury]. Lord Carrington said that, whatever Mr Ramphal's motives, he had in effect given the Patriotic Front a veto. Mr Ramphal said that the Lusaka Agreement had never envisaged moving forward with one side only. We were putting Nyerere and Kaunda in a terrible position. He had just received a message from Kaunda expressing gratitude for his statement.

Lord Carrington said that Mr Ramphal had simply come out in support of one side. Mr Ramphal said that there could be no question of getting a Commonwealth force in the event of an agreement with the Salisbury parties alone. Lord Carrington explained that that was not the issue; Mr Ramphal's statement would confirm the fear of the Salisbury parties that the Commonwealth was hostile to them. Whatever Mr Ramphal's motives for issuing his statement, he must accept the consequences.

Mr Ramphal asked whether there was any chance of postponing today's meeting with the Salisbury parties. Lord Carrington said this was not possible. Mr Ramphal said he was trying to persuade the Patriotic Front to separate procedure from substance and to continue to talk about land. The Patriotic Front were saying that we intended to leave the establishment of a fund until after the

/elections.

elections. Lord Carrington confirmed that this was our view. Sir A Duff said that the Patriotic Front were once more acting as if they were in power. Lord Carrington said he wished people (including the Americans) would realise that we were not simply negotiating with the Patriotic Front; but that we were dealing with people who were in charge and in possession in Salisbury. Where was our leverage on these people? The assumption was that we only had problems with the Patriotic Front. People should realise that the others were just as difficult.

Mr Ramphal said that the Front Line States were keen that there should be more plenary sessions at the conference. Lord Carrington said that he hoped that they realised why we had moved to bilaterals: the reason being that the Patriotic Front had refused to discuss in plenary with the Salisbury parties or to acknowledge their presence. It was a bit unfair to blame the UK for stopping plenaries after this. He hoped Mr Ramphal would make this point to Kaunda. Mr Ramphal said that his main aim was to get the Patriotic Front back without making them grovel. Lord Carrington said that the Patriotic Front must accept the Constitution, on the understanding that it was contingent on satisfactory arrangements for the interim. This had been the position from the start. It was not the UK who had boxed the Patriotic Front in.

Mr Ramphal said that we were all stuck in different corners, and we must all move out. One problem was that the Russians were telling the Patriotic Front that Lusaka was all a trick. But we should remember that Mugabe and Nkomo were still united. Lord Carrington noted however that Tekere had talked very toughly at yesterday's meeting with the Patriotic Front; in Tekere's view no compensation should be given for land, and the Constitution as a whole was bad. Mr Ramphal said that he had told the Patriotic Front that very few Commonwealth countries were granted Constitutions which they found entirely to their taste.

Lord Carrington repeated that Mr Ramphal's statement would make things more difficult with the Salisbury parties. Mr Ramphal said that he had his troubles with the Patriotic Front too. Nkomo kept complaining to him about Lusaka, and thought that the Commonwealth was sold out to the UK. Lord Carrington was not alone in being caught in the middle. Perhaps more dinners with both sides were needed? He had tried talking to Sithole but he was only interested in intrigues. Lord Carrington suggested that Mr Ramphal should talk to Mr David Smith. The Salisbury parties were under the impression that, despite the election they had held, they were being cold-shouldered. Mr Ramphal indicated (with apparent reluctance) that he might try.

Mr Ramphal again urged Lord Carrington not to spank the Patriotic Front too publicly. Lord Carrington said that he had deliberately avoided doing so at his press conference yesterday, though the longer the Patriotic Front stayed out, the more difficult it would be to catch up. Mr Ramphal said that the Commonwealth would not accept a "second-class solution".

/Lord Carrington

Lord Carrington said that it would be most unreasonable of the Commonwealth if it refused to accept a solution in which a fair constitution and reasonable interim arrangements were accepted by one side and refused by the other, leaving us with no alternative but to go ahead with the side who had accepted. It would be taken very amiss here if the Commonwealth refused to endorse this. Mr Ramphal said that such a settlement would not end the war. Lord Carrington said that the war would end if the Front Line States wanted it to. It would be very nasty indeed if the Commonwealth ratted on us after we had done our best. This would be tantamount to allowing the Patriotic Front a veto. Mr Ramphal said that it was not a question of a veto; there could be no lasting settlement without the Patriotic Front. In a sense both sides had a veto. Sir A Duff acknowledged this, but asked what the position would be if one side had done everything asked of it, and the other refused. Mr Ramphal said that much would depend on the reasonableness of the interim arrangements. If we could persuade the Front Line States to accept our arrangements, they would put pressure on the Patriotic Front.

Lord Carrington said that our arrangements would be based on what was reasonable and practicable. The Patriotic Front's paper was both impracticable and unfair. It amounted to a Patriotic Front takeover before any elections. Mr Ramphal said that this was the Patriotic Front's opening bid; he imagined that the Bishop's first position would be to insist on the status quo. We would need to chart a course between them. The main thing was that the Patriotic Front had a fair crack of the electoral whip. They would accept the situation if they lost the elections. Lord Carrington said that provided somebody held the ring during the interim period, the rest was not very important.

Mr Ramphal said that he hoped that Nyerere could be brought round on the integration of the armies; he did not anticipate any problem with the Zambians. The main problem was that of the Bishop. If the army stood down, the Bishop would have to as well. The Bishop would have to dissolve Parliament, and there would have to be something like an interim council in which no one figure would be the leader, although the Bishop would no doubt call himself Prime Minister. Lord Carrington commented that the ceasefire would be difficult. Mr Ramphal doubted this, provided the political framework were right.

(G G H Walden)

16 October 1979

cc:- PS
 PS/LPS
 PS/Mr Luce
 PS/PUS
 Sir A Duff
 Mr Day
 Mr Fenn
 Mr Powell

Mr Renwick

CALL BY THE AMERICAN AMBASSADOR

Mr Brewster discussed Rhodesia with Lord Carrington this afternoon. The Secretary of State described the current background. We were about to lose Salisbury if we were not careful. The Patriotic Front had seen him today, but had prevaricated. Nkomo might accept the Constitution, but he was not sure about Mugabe. If we began discussing the interim with the Salisbury parties alone, it would still be open to the Patriotic Front to join in. We could hardly be accused of rushing them after six weeks.

Lord Carrington said he would like to comment candidly on Mr Vance's message. Reading between the lines, his impression was that the Americans thought that he had only one customer to satisfy: the Patriotic Front. In fact he had two customers: one already in possession with an election and a 64% turnout behind it, and with a certain political support in this country; and the Patriotic Front. On the pre-election arrangements, we had decided that brevity and simplicity were essential, not least to maintain the ceasefire. The AAP was unworkable, and there was no question of a UN force. Moreover, the Commonwealth were loaded against the Bishop, and a Commonwealth force would not be possible either.


Mr Brewster said that he did not think that the length of the interim period was a very strong point, and he understood Lord Carrington's argument. The important thing was that neutral countries should not say that the arrangements were unfair. This was the only motive behind American recommendations. He himself was relaxed about the disappearance of the UN force. But he hoped there would be no problem about Commonwealth observers, as distinct from a Commonwealth force. Lord Carrington said that the UK could not of course be involved militarily, but he thought that we could possibly work out arrangements in which we could help. Mr Brewster asked about Muzorewa's role during the run-up period. Would we have a sort of British regent like Lord Carver? Lord Carrington indicated that our minds were moving in that direction. Mr Brewster said that the main concern of the Americans was that the arrangements should not appear to have been rigged up for the Bishop. Lord Carrington said that we were not thinking of rigging anything but commented that the Bishop had won elections. Mr Brewster said that a lot of people, including some members of the White Commonwealth, would be unhappy if the Bishop were to be treated as an incumbent during the election period, rather than simply as a candidate.

Lord Carrington said that we had not recognised the Bishop's government but there would be no chance of success in the conference at all if we rubbed his nose in this too much. We would not recognise him as an office holder, but

/could

could not stop him calling himself whatever he wanted. Our main concern was that the elections should be free and fair. There could be some sort of electoral commission on which all parties could be represented. Mr Brewster reiterated that it was important that the Bishop should be seen as no more than an electoral candidate. He should not for example sit in his Prime Ministerial office during the campaign.

Summing up, Mr Brewster said that the main points of concern for the Americans were the Bishop's status during the pre-election period, and the question of observers or an international force. The length of the interim period was a secondary issue.



(G G H Walden)

15 October 1979

cc:- PS
PS/LPS
PS/Mr Luce
PS/PUS
Sir A Duff
Mr Day

Mr Alexander, No 10

16 OCT 1979



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P S TO P M
NO 10 DOWNING ST

FROM LAGOS 151230Z OCTOBER 1979
TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 859 OF 15 OCTOBER

RFI PRIORITY WASHINGTON, LUSAKA, DAR ES SALAAM, MAPUTO, LUANDA,
GABORONE, UKMIS NEW YORK.

YOUR TEL NO 950

RHODESIA CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE

1. ON RECEIPT OF TUR WE DELIVERED A NOTE TO MEA ASKING FOR AN APPOINTMENT WITH PRESIDENT SHAGARI. THIS MORNING WE WERE TOLD THAT, WHILE THE PRESIDENT HOPED TO SEE ME SOON, HE WAS TOO BUSY AT THE PRESENT TIME (IN FACT AFTER TWO WEEKS IN OFFICE HE IS STILL ENGAGED IN WHAT IS OBVIOUSLY A DIFFICULT TASK OF CABINET-MAKING). I WAS THEREFORE ASKED TO CONVEY THE MESSAGE THROUGH THE PERMANENT SECRETARY AT THE MINISTRY OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, WHO IS ACTING AS FOREIGN MINISTER UNTIL THE NEW GOVERNMENT IS FORMED.

2. I ACCORDINGLY SAW UKEGBU LATER THIS MORNING. IN HANDING OVER THE PRIME MINISTER'S MESSAGE I EXPRESSED GRATITUDE FOR PRESIDENT SHAGARI'S MESSAGE WHICH WE HAD INTERPRETED AS BEING INTENDED TO PERSUADE THE PATRIOTIC FRONT TO ACCEPT THE CONSTITUTION AS IT NOW STOOD AND TO PROCEED TO DISCUSSION OF THE TRANSITIONAL ARRANGEMENTS. UKEGBU CONFIRMED THAT THIS WAS SO, AND THAT THEY COULD NOT BE HELD RESPONSIBLE FOR THE GLOSS PUT ON IT BY THE DAILY TIMES. I COMMENTED THAT NEVERTHELESS IT COULD ONLY WEAKEN THE EFFECT OF THE MESSAGE IF A NEWSPAPER OWNED BY THE NIGERIAN GOVERNMENT PRESENTED IT AS SUPPORT FOR THE PATRIOTIC FRONT AND PRESSURE ON THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT.

3. I ALSO HANDED OVER A COPY OF YOUR STATEMENT AT LANWSTER HOUSE ON 9 OCTOBER AND YOUR STATEMENT OF 11 OCTOBER CONCERNING LAND RESETTLEMENT. I RECOGNISED THAT THE PATRIOTIC FRONT HAD WITHDRAWN A NUMBER OF THEIR OBJECTIONS TO THE CONSTITUTION. BUT THEIR REMAINING POINTS, RELATING TO LAND AND PENSIONS, COULD NOT BE ACCEPTED BY HMG. IAN SMITH WAS STILL A PROBLEM AND HE HAD JUST

/Blen

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BEEN IN RHODESIA TRYING TO RALLY WHITE OPPOSITION TO THE CONSTITUTION. IF WE WERE NOW TO GIVE WAY ON THE QUESTION OF PENSIONS OR OF EXPROPRIATION OF LAND WITHOUT COMPENSATION, THIS WOULD RALLY VIRTUALLY THE WHOLE OF WHITE OPINION BEHIND SMITH AND DESTROY ANY HOPE OF AGREEMENT ON THE CONSTITUTION. UKEGBU EXPRESSED AGREEMENT AND SAID THAT NIGERIAN INFLUENCE WOULD CONTINUE TO BE EXERTED IN FAVOUR OF ACCEPTANCE OF THE PRESENT CONSTITUTION TO ENABLE DISCUSSIONS ON THE TRANSITIONAL ARRANGEMENTS TO BE NEGOTIATED. HE SAID THAT HE HAD ORIGINALLY SENT OBA (NIGERIAN HIGH COMMISSIONER AT LUSAKA) TO LONDON FOR A LIMITED PERIOD BUT HAD NOW INSTRUCTED HIM TO STAY THERE UNTIL FURTHER NOTICE.

BROWN

F I L E S

RHOD D
OADS
N AM D
NEWS D
FUSD
PLANNING STAFF
ES & SD
CCD
FRD
UND
LEGAL ADVISERS
(MR FREELAND)
(MR FIFOOT)
ECON D
PCD

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION RHODESIA POLICY

DEF D
OID
PS
PS/LPS
PS/MR LUCE
PS/MR RIDLEY
PS/MR HURD
PS/PUS
SIR A DUFF
LORD N G LENNOX
MISS BROWN
MR DAY
MR WILLSON
MR ASPIN

2

CONFIDENTIAL

GRS 470

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DESKBY 152230Z

FM LUSAKA 152210Z OCT 79

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1088 OF 15 OCTOBER

AND TO IMMEDIATE DAR ES SALAAM, WASHINGTON, MIRIMBA SALISBURY,
PRETORIA, MAPUTO, LAGOS, GABORONE.

YOUR TELNO 838 : RHODESIA

PRESIDENT KAUNDA SUMMONED ME THIS EVENING AND I GAVE HIM THE MESSAGE IN YOUR TUR. HE SAID THAT HE WAS GOING TO ATTEND A MEETING OF THE FRONT LINE STATES ON 17TH (RETURNING THE SAME DAY) WHEN THEY HOPED TO CELEBRATE PROGRESS. BUT IF HE WAS TO USE HIS INFLUENCE WITH THE PATRIOTIC FRONT WE MUST BE MORE SPECIFIC OVER LAND AND MAKE A DEFINITE STATEMENT, PREFERABLY FORMING PART OF THE AGREEMENT. I WENT OVER WITH HIM THE TALKING POINTS ABOUT YOUR OFFER ON LAND. HE WAS VEHEMENT THAT IT WAS NOT SUFFICIENTLY CONCRETE. THE US STATEMENT WAS MORE HELPFUL (BUT HE COULD NOT EXPLAIN HOW). LAND WAS THE STICKING POINT SEMI COLON KR PLEADED WITH US FOR A DEFINITE AND SPECIFIC UNDERTAKING WHICH HE COULD USE TO LEVER THE PF TO AGREE THE CONSTITUTION. (BY IMPLICATION HE WAS DROPPING ALL THE OTHER POINTS WHICH HE RAISED AND HE ADMITTED IN AN ASIDE THAT FROM A TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH MARK CHONA THIS EVENING HE FOUND THAT HE SEEMED TO BE OUT OF STEP WITH MOST OF HIS COLLEAGUES.

2. KAUNDA SPOKE WITH WHAT SEEMED TO ME AFTER SOME EXPERIENCE OF HIS PERFORMANCES WITH REAL EARNESTNESS. HE SAID THAT HE GENUINELY FEARED WHAT SUCH RAIDS AS THE RECENT ONE ON TAZARA AND A ROAD BRIDGE WERE DOING TO RACE RELATIONS IN ZAMBIA. THREE WHITE MEN WITH UNLICENSED WEAPONS HAD BEEN FOUND WHERE THE ZAMBIANS THOUGHT THE SELOUS SCOUTS WHO HAD DESTROYED THE BRIDGES WERE GOING TO BE PICKED UP, IN CIRCUMSTANCES AS YET UNEXPLAINED. ONE HAD A BRITISH NAME, ONE ITALIAN, ONE GERMAN, ALL LIVED IN NDOLA. ANOTHER WHITE MAN SHONE, OF WHOSE NATIONALITY KAUNDA WAS NOT SURE BUT WHO WAS THOUGHT TO BE UNFRIENDLY TO ZAMBIA AND WHO LIVED IN KASAMA OWNED THE FERTILISER LORRIES USED IN THE RAID, WAS LUCKY HE HAD NOT BEEN LYNCHED. HE FELT HIS PEOPLE WERE BEGINNING TO SEE AN ENEMY WHEN THEY SAW A WHITE MAN. SO ZAMBIA NEEDED PEACE AND TO GET THE PF TO MOVE HE NEEDED A STRONG AND DEFINITE PLEDGE OF HELP FOR LAND PURCHASE AND DEVELOPMENT TO MAKE THE PF COME BACK TO THE TABLE.

CONFIDENTIAL

/3.

CONFIDENTIAL

3. THE PRESIDENT AGAIN ASSURED YOU AND THE PRIME MINISTER THAT HE GENUINELY AND SINCERELY WANTS TO HELP AND HE WANTS YOU TO HELP HIM ON THIS ONE POINT SO THAT HE IN TURN CAN HELP YOU.
4. WITH THIS DRAMATIC WHITTILING DOWN OF HIS DIFFICULTIES, AS SEEN FROM HERE, PERHAPS THE POINT HAS COME TO FIND A FORMULA ON THIS ONE REQUEST, EG A LETTER OF UNDERSTANDING SLIGHTLY FORMALISING YOUR OFFER. THERE IS NO DOUBT THAT RHODESIAN RAIDS DO RAISE THE TEMPERATURE OF RACE RELATIONS IN THE AFFECTED AREAS, AND THE RISK WILL INEVITABLY INCREASE IF ZAMBIAN TARGETS ARE HIT AGAIN.
5. WISNER THE US AMBASSADOR WAS CALLED IN SUBSEQUENTLY AND WAS ASKED TO REQUEST WASHINGTON TO URGE YOU TO PRODUCE A FORMULA ON LAND. WISNER'S ATTEMPTS TO POINT OUT THAT THE US FORMULA WAS VERY SIMILAR TO OURS FELL ON DEAF EARS.

ALLINSON

FILES

RHOD D
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NEWS D
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PLANNING STAFF
ES & SD
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FRD
UND
LEGAL ADVISERS
(MR FREELAND)
(MR FIFOOT)
ECON D
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PS/MR LUCE
PS/MR RIDLEY
PS/MR HURD
PS/PUS
SIR A DUFF
LORD N G LENNOX
MISS BROWN
MR DAY
MR WILLSON
MR ASPIN

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION
RHODESIA POLICY

CONFIDENTIAL

3

Nº 10 DOWNING STREET

NO DISTRIBUTION

DFT HQ/RHODESIA PEPT

PS
PS/LPS
PS/PUS
SIR A. DUFF

VGRGRG KK

JNT ZNB MIKE HOTEL K

FOWON 078/15

OO WASHINGTON
GPS 600
SECRET
DEDIP

fa. (3 Hrs)

Ants - 17/x

FM FCO 151600Z OCT 79
TO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON
TEL NUMBER 1411 OF 15 OCTOBER 1979

MY TELNO 1406: RHODESIA

1. PLEASE PASS THE FOLLOWING REPLY FROM ME TO MR VANCE:
BEGINS.

THANK YOU FOR YOUR MESSAGE WHICH WAS PASSED TO ME BY KINGMAN BREWSTER ON 14 OCTOBER. I AM MOST GRATEFUL FOR THE ACTION YOU HAVE TAKEN WITH THE FRONT LINE STATES IN SUPPORT OF OUR PROPOSALS FOR THE INDEPENDENCE CONSTITUTION: AND FOR THE INDICATIONS YOU ARE GIVING TO THE FRONT LINE GOVERNMENTS THAT YOU WOULD BE PREPARED TO COOPERATE IN INTERNATIONAL ASSISTANCE FOR AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT. I HOPE THAT THIS, TOGETHER WITH MY STATEMENT OF 11 OCTOBER, WILL HELP THE PATRIOTIC FRONT TO ACCEPT THE INDEPENDENCE CONSTITUTION AND ENABLE US TO CARRY FORWARD THE DISCUSSIONS ABOUT THE ARRANGEMENTS FOR IMPLEMENTING IT WITH BOTH DELEGATIONS.

I AM GLAD THAT TONY LAKE WILL BE COMING TO LONDON FOR DISCUSSIONS ON THE INTERIM ARRANGEMENTS, BUT ON THE POINTS YOU RAISED IN YOUR MESSAGE I THOUGHT IT WOULD BE USEFUL TO LET YOU KNOW MY VIEWS.

IT IS NOW CLEAR THAT, HOWEVER THE DISCUSSION OF THE INTERIM ARRANGEMENTS COMES OUT, THE ONLY BASIS ON WHICH WE SHALL BE ABLE TO GET THE PARTIES TO AGREE IS LIKELY TO BE ONE THAT INVOLVES THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT IN ASSUMING A VERY LARGE MEASURE OF RESPONSIBILITY FOR THAT PERIOD: AND THE LONGER THE PERIOD, THE LESS LIKELY IT IS THAT A CEASE-FIRE WILL HOLD. A PERIOD OF 4-6 MONTHS IS IN MY VIEW TOO LONG. I DO NOT ENVISAGE OUR ASSUMING RESPONSIBILITY FOR A PERIOD OF MORE THAN, AT MOST, THREE MONTHS. THIS WOULD BE ADEQUATE FOR THE EXTERNAL PARTIES, WHO ALREADY HAVE A VERY CONSIDERABLE PRESENCE IN THE COUNTRY, TO PREPARE FOR THE ELECTIONS. (AS YOU MAY HAVE SEEN, PRESIDENT MACHEL APPEARS TO SHARE THESE VIEWS).

I VERY MUCH DOUBT IF A COMMONWEALTH FORCE WILL BE ACCEPTABLE TO THE PARTIES. ONE OF THE UNFORTUNATE ELEMENTS IN THE WHOLE SITUATION IS THE EXTREME HOSTILITY MANIFESTED BY MANY COMMONWEALTH GOVERNMENTS TOWARDS MUZOREWA. THE SALISBURY DELEGATION CONSIDER THAT MOST COMMONWEALTH GOVERNMENTS ARE ALREADY POLITICALLY COMMITTED AGAINST THEM AND COULD NOT BE BROUGHT TO AGREE TO A COMMONWEALTH FORCE.

OUR OBJECTIVE IS TO ACHIEVE A SETTLEMENT WHICH WILL ENABLE THE PATRIOTIC FRONT TO PARTICIPATE IN ELECTIONS SUPERVISED BY US AND WILL THEREBY BRING AN END TO THE WAR. BUT THE POSITION AT PRESENT REACHED IN THE CONFERENCE IS THAT BISHOP MUZOREWA AND HIS DELEGATION HAVE ACCEPTED THE INDEPENDENCE CONSTITUTION, AND HAVE ALSO ACCEPTED THAT ELECTIONS SHOULD BE HELD UNDER OUR AUTHORITY. I WOULD BE MISLEADING YOU IF I LED YOU TO BELIEVE THAT, IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, THERE IS ANY PROSPECT OF PARLIAMENT RETAINING SANCTIONS AGAINST RHODESIA AFTER MID-NOVEMBER. I SAW NKOMO AND MUGABE AGAIN THIS MORNING. THEY WERE STILL NOT ABLE TO SAY THAT THEY ACCEPTED THE INDEPENDENCE CONSTITUTION, SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON THE INTERIM ARRANGEMENTS. I CANNOT HOLD UP ANY LONGER DISCUSSIONS WITH THE SALISBURY DELEGATION, WHO HAVE NOW BEEN WAITING A WEEK. I SHALL, THEREFORE, HAVE TO CONTINUE THE DISCUSSION OF THE PRE-INDEPENDENCE ARRANGEMENTS WITH THEM, HOPING THAT THE PF WILL SHORTLY JOIN IN. IN ANY EVENT IT WILL BE MY OBJECTIVE TO WORK OUT PRE-INDEPENDENCE ARRANGEMENTS WHICH WOULD ENABLE THE PATRIOTIC FRONT TO PARTICIPATE IN FREE ELECTIONS ON THE BASIS OF THAT CONSTITUTION: AND THAT THESE WOULD BE SUPREVISED UNDER THE BRITISH GOVERNMENTS AUTHORITY, AS WAS AGREED AT LUSAKA. WE SHALL THEREFORE BE CONTINUING OUR EFFORTS TO REACH AN AGREEMENT IN WHICH THE PATRIOTIC FRONT WILL BE ABLE TO PARTICIPATE.
ENDS.

2. AS YOU WILL REALISE, THE CONTENT OF THIS MESSAGE IS PARTICULARLY SENSITIVE. IT IS INTENDED FOR MR VANCE PERSONALLY. I SHOULD BE GRATEFUL IF YOU WOULD ENSURE THAT THIS IS MADE CLEAR IN DELIVERING IT TO HIM.

CARRINGTON

NNNN

RHODESIA PLANNING: ADVANCE COPIES

(29)

PS
 PS/SIR I GILMOUR
 PS/MR LUCE
 PS/PUS
 SIR A DUFF
 MR ~~WILLIAMS~~
 LORD NICHOLAS GORDON-LENNOX
 HD/RHOD DEPT (4)
 HD/S AF D
 HD/C AF D
 HD/UND
 HD/PUSD (2)
 HD/IPD
 HD/OID
 HD/NEWS DEPT
 HD/WAD
 MR FIFOOT LEGAL ADVISER RMK190
 MR FREELAND LEGAL ADVISER RM K200A

PS/NO 10 DOWNING STREET
 SIR J HUNT)
 MR P M MAXEY)
 COL MOIR) CABINET OFFICE
 MR P J FOWLER)
 DIO)

Day

Rennie Amster

IMMEDIATE

IMMEDIATE

ADVANCE COPY

047

CONFIDENTIAL

FM MIRIMBA SALISBURY 150730Z OCT 79

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 750 OF 15 OCTOBER

INFO PRIORITY PRETORIA

INFO ROUTINE MAPUTO LUSAKA DAR ES SALAAM GABORONE LUANDA LAGOS
 WASHINGTON AND UKHIS NEW YORK

RHODESIA: WHITE ATTITUDES

1. IN THE TWO WEEKS SINCE MY ARRIVAL HERE I HAVE, BECAUSE OF IAN SMITH'S INTERVENTION, CONCENTRATED ALMOST ENTIRELY ON CONTACTS WITH THE WHITE COMMUNITY. I HAVE NOT HAD ACCESS TO RHODESIA FRONT STALWARTS. WITH THE PROVISIO, MY GENERAL IMPRESSIONS ARE AS FOLLOWS:

(A) THE TOP CONCERN IN ALL MINDS (OF BLACKS AS WELL AS WHITES) IS TO SEE AN END TO, OR AT LEAST EARLY DIMINUTION OF, THE WAR. THERO IS GENERAL SAR WEARINESS AND A FEELING THAT THINGS CANNOT GO ON MUCH LONGER AS THEY ARE. THERE IS NO PRESENT SIGN OF ANY I'MINENT COLLAPSE OF MORALE. BUT THE OUTCOME OF THE CONFERENCE IS AWAITED WITH GREAT ANXIETY.

(B) UNHESITATING TRUST IN AND ALLIGIENCE TO IAN SMITH HAS GREATLY DECLINED. MANY RESENT HIS CCURRENT CLAIM TO SPEAK FOR THE WHITE COMMUNITY. I DETECT AN UNSPOKEN FEAR THAT HE WILL LOOSE THEM YET ANOTHER, AND PERHAPS THE LAST, CHANCE OF A SETTLEMENT.

WHITE COMMUNITY. I DETECT AN UNSPOKEN FEAR THAT HE WILL LOOSE THEM YET ANOTHER, AND PERHAPS THE LAST, CHANCE OF A SETTLEMENT. YESTERDAY'S SUNDAY MAIL EDITORIAL COMMENTED AS FOLLOWS ON HIS REMARKS THAT OUR PROPOSALS ARE THE WORST OFFERED SINCE UDI: "THAT MAY BE SO, BUT WHO BEARS THE ULTIMATE RESPONSIBILITY FOR REJECTING EARLIER AND MORE ACCEPTABLE TERMS? IAN DOUGLAS SMITH. THE WRITING WAS NOT ONLY ON THE WALL WHEN HE ACCEPTED THE KISSINGER PROPOSALS AND MAJORITY RULE - IT WAS UP IN LIGHTS".

(C) PARTICULAR GROUPS HAVE PARTICULAR CONCERNS: LAND FOR THE FARMERS, PENSIONS FOR GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES (SAID TO BE 40 PERCENT OF WORKING WHITES) AND SANCTIONS FOR EVERYONE BUT ESPECIALLY BUSINESSMEN. BEYOND THAT THERE SEEMS TO BE LITTLE CONCERN ABOUT OUR CONSTITUTIONAL PROPOSALS. FOR EXAMPLE, NO ONE HAS EVEN MENTIONED TO ME THE DISAPPEARANCE OF THE PARLIAMENTARY BLOCKING POWER, OR QUERIED OUR PROPOSALS ON COMMISSIONS OTHER THAN THE PROVISION FOR DIRECTIVES ABOUT AFRICANIZATION.

(D) ON THE OTHER HAND, THERE IS CONSIDERABLE ANXIETY AS TO THE POSSIBLE OUTCOME OF AN ELECTION IN WHICH THE PF TAKE PART, AND THE REALIGNMENTS OF AFRICAN POLITICAL GROUPINGS WHICH MIGHT OCCUR. MOST PROBABLY REGARD THE PF AS MARXIST AND IMPLACABLY HOSTILE THROUGHOUT. THE MEDIA DO NOT HELP TOWARDS AN APPRECIATION OF THE GRADATIONS WITHIN AND BETWEEN ZAPU AND ZANU, THOUGH THE BETTER INFORMED WHITES KNOW THEM WELL ENOUGH. EVEN IF THE PF DO NOT CONTEST AN ELECTION, MOST WHITES THINK THAT MUZOREWA WILL DO MUCH LESS WELL THAN IN APRIL BECAUSE HIS PROMISES IN THAT CAMPAIGN HAVE NOT BEEN FULFILLED (PARTICULARLY THE PROMISE OF AN END TO THE WAR). THEY ALSO EXPECT A VERY MUCH LOWER PERCENTAGE POLL OVERALL.

(E) THERE IS STILL A RIDICULOUS DEGREE OF MISTRUST OF OUR MOTIVES AND INTENTIONS: THE PRODUCT OF 14 YEARS OF RF PROPAGANDA. EVEN SOME WHO SHOULD KNOW BETTER HAVE VOICED THIS TO ME. IT HAS BEEN EVIDENT IN SOMEWHAT HYSTERICAL COMMENTARIES ON OUR HANDLING OF THE PF'S RELUCTANCE, DURING THE PAST WEEK, TO ACCEPT OUR CONSTITUTION (GENEVA, BRITISH INDECISION, WEAKNESS ETC). IT COMES UP MOST OFTEN WITH THE QUESTION WHETHER, IF WE SAY WE ARE GOING TO LIFT SANCTIONS, WE WILL IN FACT DO SO ON WHATEVER TIMESCALE WE PROMISE.

(F) HOWEVER, THERE ARE SIGNS OF GROWING CONFIDENCE IN US AND IN YOU PERSONALLY (VIDE THE VERY FAVOURABLE COMMENTARY ON YOUR HANDLING OF SETTLEMENT POLICY IN THE HERALD OF 12 OCTOBER - PARA 2 OF MY TELNO 742).

(G) FURTHER, I BELIEVE THAT MOST WHITES REALIZE THAT THEY HAVE NO WHERE ELSE TO TURN. ONLY ONE HAS INDICATED TO ME A BELIEF THAT

(G) FURTHER, I BELIEVE THAT MOST WHITES REALIZE THAT THEY HAVE NOWHERE ELSE TO TURN. ONLY ONE HAS INDICATED TO ME A BELIEF THAT SOUTH AFRICA WILL BE READY TO PROVIDE ENOUGH MILITARY SUPPORT TO "ENABLE US TO TAKE THE WAR INTO MOZAMBIQUE, ZAMBIA AND TANZANIA AND KILL ENOUGH THOUSANDS TO FINISH IT".

(H) FINALLY, THERE SEEMS TO BE A WIDESPREAD DESIRE TO TRY TO MAKE A GO OF MAJORITY RULE GIVEN (OVRT THE WHITES WOULD REGARD AS) HALF A CHANCE. THE MUZOREWA GOVERNMENT HAS WON A SURPRISING DEGREE OF CONFIDENCE, AND PERHAPS EVEN SOME TRACES OF RESPECT. //

BYATT

NNNN



SECRET

2

Prime Minister
Amul

GRS 650

SECRET

DESKBY 141400Z ALL ADDRESSEES EXCEPT WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK
FM FCO 141235Z OCT 79

TO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON

TELNO 1406 OF 14 OCTOBER

INFO IMMEDIATE LUSAKA, DAR ES SALAAM, GABORONE, MAPUTO, LUANDA,
LAGOS, PRIORITY UKMIS NEW YORK.

RHODESIA.

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF MESSAGE FROM SECRETARY VANCE CONVEYED TO
ME THIS MORNING BY US AMBASSADOR:

BEGINS:

I HOPE YOU WILL LET US KNOW IF THERE IS ANYTHING ELSE WE CAN DO
TO HELP GAIN AGREEMENT ON CONSTITUTIONAL PROPOSALS. I HAVE REQUESTED
AMBASSADOR BREWSTER TO BACK UP YOUR OCTOBER 11 STATEMENT BY INDIC-
ATING PRIVATELY TO FRONT LINE REPRESENTATIVES THAT WE BELIEVE A
MULTIDONOR EFFORT WOULD BE APPROPRIATE TO ASSIST IN THE AGRICULT-
URAL AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF AN INDEPENDENT ZIMBABWE WITHIN THE
FRAMEWORK OF A WIDER DEVELOPMENT CONCEPT FOR SOUTHERN AFRICA AS A
WHOLE AND WE WOULD BE PREPARED TO COOPERATE IN SUCH AN EFFORT. WE
CANNOT OF COURSE MAKE A SPECIFIC COMMITMENT AND WILL POINT OUT
THAT THIS EFFORT WOULD BE CONTINGENT BOTH ON REACH A SUCCESSFUL
OUTCOME AT LANCASTER HOUSE AND ON GAINING CONGRESSIONAL SUPPORT FOR
THE CONCEPT AT A TIME OF SEVERE BUDGETARY CONSTRAINT.

WE ALSO WANT TO BE HELPFUL NOW IN LOOKING AHEAD AT TRANSITION
ARRANGEMENTS. WE UNDERSTAND HOW THORNY THEY WILL BE, SINCE IT WILL
BE VERY IMPORTANT THAT THEY STRIKE A BALANCE BETWEEN WORKABLE
SIMPLICITY AND YET SUFFICIENT GUARANTEES THAT EACH OF THE PARTIES
CAN COMPETE FAIRLY IN THE ELECTIONS. WITHOUT THE LATTER, WESTERN
INTERESTS IN AFRICA COULD BE SERIOUSLY DAMAGED.

I UNDERSTAND THAT TONY LAKE WILL BE GOING TO LONDON AT
SOME POINT IN THE COMING DAYS TO DISCUSS TRANSITION
ISSUES. THIS WOULD BE USEFUL TO US, ALTHOUGH WE WOULD
WANT IT TO BE AT A TIME WHEN SUCH MEETINGS WOULD NOT
INTERFERE WITH YOUR OFFICIALS' WORK AT LANCASTER HOUSE.
IN PARTICULAR, IT WOULD BE USEFUL TO GET THE FCO'S THINK-
ING ON THREE ISSUES:

SECRET

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SECRET

A. WHILE WE UNDERSTAND AND SYMPATHISE WITH THE NEED TO HAVE A SHORT AND UNCOMPLICATED TRANSITION PERIOD, WE BELIEVE IT SHOULD BE SUFFICIENTLY LONG TO GIVE A FAIR OPPORTUNITY FOR THE EXTERNAL PARTIES TO BECOME ENGAGED. WE HAVE NO PRECISE TIMETABLES IN MIND, BUT BELIEVE A PERIOD IN THE RANGE OF FOUR TO SIX MONTHS MIGHT BE ACCEPTABLE TO THE PARTIES AND YET SHORT ENOUGH TO BE MANAGEABLE.

B. IT WILL BE IMPORTANT TO PROVIDE ADEQUATE ASSURANCES THAT LAW AND ORDER WILL BE FAIRLY MAINTAINED DURING THE TRANSITION. AN OUTSIDE COMMONWEALTH FORCE MIGHT BE ACCEPTABLE TO THE PARTIES, IN ADDITION TO COMMONWEALTH OBSERVERS.

C. WE SHALL ALSO HAVE TO STAY IN CLOSE TOUCH ON OUR RESPECTIVE POSITIONS ON SANCTIONS. IF THE ORDERS IN COUNCIL ARE ALLOWED TO EXPIRE IN MID-NOVEMBER BEFORE A SETTLEMENT IS ACHIEVED, THERE WOULD BE IMPORTANT IMPLICATIONS FOR OUR POSITION.

YOU CONTINUE TO HAVE OUR SUPPORT AND ADMIRATION. CY.
ENDS

2. U.S. AMBASSADOR HAS BEEN AUTHORISED TO DRAW ON ABOVE IN QUOTE BRIEFING PRIVATELY UNQUOTE ZAMBIAN AND TANZANIAN HIGH COMMISSIONERS, AND OTHER FRONT LINE REPRESENTATIVES AS CONSIDERED APPROPRIATE.

CARRINGTON

FILES

RHOD D
OADS
N AM D
NEWS D
PUSD
PLANNING STAFF
ES & SD
CCD
FRD
UND
LEGAL ADVISERS
(MR FREELAND)
(MR FIFOOT)
ECON D
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PS/MR LUCE
PS/MR RIDLEY
PS/MR HURD
PS/FUS
SIR A DUFF
LORD N G LENNOX
MISS BROWN
MR DAY
MR WILLSON
MR ASPIN

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION
RHODESIA POLICY

SECRET

FLASH

FLASH

FLASH

[RHODESIA: POLICY: ADVANCE COPIES]

26

PS
PS/SIR I GILMOUR
PS/MR LUCE
PS/PUS
SIR A DUFF
MR WILLSON
MR BYATT
LORD N.G LENNOX

PS/NO 10 DOWNING STREET

MR R L WADE-GERY)
MR P M MAXEY)
COL MOIR) CABINET
MR P J FOWLER) OFFICE
DIO)

M. D.A.H

(2)

HD/RHODESIA DEPT (3)

Prime Minister
Am

HD/C AF D
HD/S AF D

15.10.79

HD/PUSD (2)

FLASH

HD/NEWS DEPT
HD/WAD

MR FREELAND LEGAL ADVISER RM K200A

MR FIFOOT LEGAL ADVISER RM K164

RESIDENT CLERK

CONFIDENTIAL

FM DAR ES SALAAM

TO FLASH FCO 141130Z OCT 79

FLASH

TELEGRAM NUMBER 804 OF 14 OCTOBER

INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK, LUSAKA, LUANDA,
GABORONE, MAPUTO.

YOUR TELNO 332

RHODESIA: CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE

1. I DELIVERED THE PRIME MINISTER'S MESSAGE THROUGH PRESIDENT NYERERE'S PRIVATE SECRETARY THIS MORNING AND WAS SUBSEQUENTLY CALLED TO SEE THE PRESIDENT.
2. NYERERE WAS GRATEFUL FOR THE MESSAGE. HE REALLY DID NOT BELIEVE THAT THERE WAS NOW ANY MAJOR ISSUE BETWEEN US AND THE PF, AND HE WAS SEEKING TO PERSUADE THE PF OF THIS. HE WELCOMED THE FACT THAT IT HAD COME DOWN TO THE LAND QUESTION AND COMPENSATION, BECAUSE HE THOUGHT THIS WAS SOLABLEEEEE SOLUBLE 'IT WAS NOT A CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUE AT ALL'.
3. NYERERE NOTED THAT ACCORDING TO A BBC REPORT THIS MORNING MR. NKOMO HAD NOW PUT A FIGURE (£55 MILLION) ON THE SUM REQUIRED FOR DEALING WITH THE LAND QUESTION. HE CONSIDERED THIS WAS VERY REASONABLE: IN FACT RATHER SMALL. HE DID NOT KNOW, BUT HE THOUGHT THAT NKOMO, WHO WAS VERY SHREWED, MIGHT DELIBERATELY HAVE NAMED A FIGURE AT THIS JUNCTURE WITH THE

QUIRED FOR DEALING WITH THE LAND QUESTION. HE CONSIDERED THIS WAS VERY REASONABLE: IN FACT RATHER SMALL. HE DID NOT KNOW, BUT HE THOUGHT THAT NKOMO, WHO WAS VERY SHREWED, MIGHT DELIBERATELY HAVE NAMED A FIGURE AT THIS JUNCTURE WITH THE NEGOTIATIONS IN MIND. HE WANTED TO SUGGEST THAT WE SHOULD TAKE NKOMO UP ON HIS FIGURE. HE WAS GOING TO SAY TO THE PF THAT THEY ' SHOULD BE ABLE TO GET THE KIND OF MONEY NKOMO WAS SPEAKING OF', AND SHOULD SETTLE WITH US ON THAT BASIS.

4. I ASKED NYERERE ABOUT PRESIDENT MACHEL'S VIEWS(THEY HAD MET YESTERDAY IN MTWARA). HE SAID THAT MACHEL WAS OF THE SAME VIEW AS HIMSELF: HE ADDED THAT MACHEL HAD EXPLAINED HIS POSITION TO OUR AMBASSADOR IN MAPUTO. (HE WAS NOT TO BE DRAWN FURTHER AND I WOULD NOT EXCLUDREEE EXCLUDE FROM THIS THAT MACHEL IS TAKING A RATHER HARDER LINE). NYERERE ALSO SAID THAT HE HAD SPOKEN TO PRESIDENT KAUNDA EXPLAINING THAT HE THOUGHT THE PF SHOULD NOW ACCEPT THE CONSTITUTION CONDITIONAL UPON SUBSEQUENT AGREEMENT ON THE IMPLEMENTATION ARRANGEMENTS.

5. NYERERE DID NOT YET KNOW WHETHER MZENDA AND CHINAMANU WOULD BE COMING TO DAR ES SALAAM AS REPORTED IN TODAY'S DAILY NEWS. HE SAID HE THOUGHT THEY WERE AT PRESENT IN MAPUTO.

MOON

FLASH

NNNN

SUBJECT

(27)

IMMEDIATE

[RHODESIA: POLICY: ADVANCE COPIES]

PS
PS/SIR I GILMOUR
PS/MR LUCE
PS/PUS
SIR A DUFF
MR WILLSON
MR BYATT
LORD N. G. LENNOX

**PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE**
SERIAL No. T 118 8/79

PS/NO 10 DOWNING STREET

MR R L WADE-GERY)
MR P M MAXEY)
COL MOIR)
MR P J FOWLER)
DIO)
CABINET
OFFICE

M.D.A.S.

HD/RHODESIA DEPT (3)

HD/C AF D
HD/S AF D

HD/PUSD (2)

HD/NEWS DEPT

HD/WAD

MR FREELAND LEGAL ADVISER RM K200A

MR FIFOOT LEGAL ADVISER RM K164

Prime Minister

Paul

UNCLASSIFIED

DESKBY 150900Z
FM MONROVIA 142130Z OCT 79
TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 124 OF 14 OCTOBER.

FOLLOWING SENT AT REQUEST OF PRESIDENT TOLBERT.

SEE MIPT.

BEGINS:

THE RT. HONOURABLE MARGARET THATCHER
PRIME MINISTER OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND
10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON, ENGLAND.

YOUR KIND MESSAGE CONCERNING THE CONSTITUTIONAL TALKS WAS
DELIVERED TO ME TODAY BY THE HAND OF AMBASSADOR DOUBLEDAY AND
I THANK YOU FOR PROVIDING ME WITH AN ASSESSMENT OF THE POSITION
NOW REACHED STOP YOUR ASSERTION THAT IN THE NEGOTIATIONS BOTH
SIDES HAVE SHOWN A WILLINGNESS TO COMPROMISE IS INDEED HEARTENING
FOR AS I URGED IN MY RECENT CABLE TO YOU CMA ONLY IN AN ATMOSPHERE
OF ACCOMMODATION CMA FLEXIBILITY AND CONCILIATION WILL A JUST AND
ACCEPTABLE RESULT BE ACHIEVED FROM THE CONFERENCE STOP WE THEREFORE
ASK THAT YOU CONTINUE YOUR BEST EFFORTS TO THIS END STOP WE HAVE
NOTED YOUR COMMENT REGARDING THE QUESTION OF LAND AND PARTICULARLY
YOUR RECOGNITION OF THE IMPORTANCE OF THIS PROBLEM TO THE PARTIES
CONCERNED STOP WHILE THE PROPOSED CONSTITUTION MAKES PROVISION FOR
THE GOVERNMENT OF ZIMBABWE TO ACQUIRE LAND FOR SETTLEMENT CMA WE
SHARE THE VIEW THAT AT

YOUR RECOGNITION OF THE IMPORTANCE OF THIS PROBLEM TO THE PARTIES
CONCERNED STOP WHILE THE PROPOSED CONSTITUTION MAKES PROVISION FOR
THE GOVERNMENT OF ZIMBABWE TO ACQUIRE LAND FOR SETTLEMENT CMA WE
SHARE THE VIEW THAT IT WOULD BE JUST TO ALSO INCLUDE PROVISION FOR
ADEQUATE COMPENSATION FOR LAND EXPROPRIATED STOP IN THIS CONNECTION
WE COMMEND YOUR GOVERNMENTS WILLINGNESS TO ASSIST WITH TECHNICAL
ASSISTANCE FOR LAND SETTLEMENT SCHEMES AND CAPITAL AID FOR AGRICULT-
URAL DEVELOPMENT STOP WE HAVE ALSO NOTED YOUR WILLINGNESS TO ASSIST
THE NEW GOVERNMENT TO OBTAIN INTERNATIONAL ASSISTANCE FOR THESE AND
OTHER PURPOSES STOP BECAUSE OF THE IMPORTANCE THAT WE ATTACH TO
THESE NEGOTIATIONS CMA I AM TODAY SENDING MESSAGES TO OUR
BROTHERS JOSHUA NKOMO AND ROBERT MUGABE CMA CO-LEADERS OF THE
PATRIOTIC FRONT CMA IMPLORING THAT IN THE CAUSE OF GENUINE
INDEPENDENCE WITH MAJORITY RULE FOR THE PEOPLE OF ZIMBABWE AND TO
BRING AN END TO SUFFERING AND INJUSTICE IN THAT TERRITORY CMA
AND IN THE SPIRIT OF GIVE AND TAKE CMA EVERY EFFORT SHOULD BE MADE
AT REACHING AND AGREEABLE SOLUTION ON THE LAND QUESTION SO THAT AN
INDEPENDENCE CONSTITUTION WOULD BE AGREED TO AND THUS ENABLE
THE CONFERENCE TO MOVE ON TO THE OTHER IMPORTANT MATTERS THAT MUST BE
RESOLVED STOP IN THE INTEREST OF AFRICAN LIBERATION CMA PEACE AND
HUMAN DIGNITY WE SHALL CONTINUE TO PRAY FOR A SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION
OF THESE TALKS STOP WITH RENEWED ASSURANCES OF MY HIGHEST CONSIDER-
ATION AND ESTEEM SINCERELY

W R TOLBERT JR
PRESIDENT OF LIBERIA AND CURRENT CHAIRMAN
OF THE ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY.

ENDS

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OK THAT MY LOT KKK

RGRGRG PAL TKS AND GOOD BYE KKKKK

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[RHODESIA: POLICY: ADVANCE COPIES]

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MR WILLSON
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+32

MR R L WADE-GERY)
MR P M MAXEY)
COL KOIR)
MR P J FOWLER)
DIO)

CABINET
OFFICE

M. Day...

HD/RHODESIA DEPT (W)

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HD/S AF D

HD/PUSD (2)

HD/NEWS DEPT

HD/WAD

MR FREELAND LEGAL ADVISER RM K200A

MR FIFOOT LEGAL ADVISER RM K164

RESIDENT CLERK

ASB

Prime Minister

CONFIDENTIAL

DESKBY 140800Z

FM LUSAKA 130800Z OCT 79

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1083 OF 13 OCTOBER

AND TO IMMEDIATE DAR ES SALAAM, MAPUTO, VINDHVA SALISBURY,
WASHINGTON, GABORONE, PRETORIA, UMNIS NEW YORK, LAGOS

YOUR TELNO 235: RHODESIA

1. I HAD NEARLY AN HOUR AND A HALF WITH KAUNDA THIS EVENING (13 OCTOBER). HE WAS IN FRIENDLY AND PHILOSOPHICAL MOOD. MARK CHONA HOWEVER MADE SOME SHARP INTERVENTIONS ARGUING THE PATRIOTIC FRONT CASE UNCRITICALLY. KASANDA, PERMANENT SECRETARY MFA, WAS ALSO PRESENT.

2. KAUNDA READ THE PRIME MINISTER'S LETTER CAREFULLY AND LISTENED TO THE ADDITIONAL POINTS WHICH YOU INSTRUCTED ME TO MAKE. HE BEGAN HIS REPLY WITH A DISCUSSION ON THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT AND THE WEST AND HOW THE SOVIETS DID WRONG THINGS THROUGH FEAR AND INEXPERIENCE. BOTH EMOTIONS HAD HAMPERED PREVIOUS RHODESIAN NEGOTIATIONS TOO. HE REPEATED AT THE BEGINNING AND THE END OF HIS REMARKS THAT HE BELIEVED

Y II AND THE PRIME MINISTER HAD TAKEN...

YOU AND THE PRIME MINISTER HAD TAKEN UP A CORRECT POSITION ON RHODESIA. UNFORTUNATELY WHAT HE SAID ON THE PF'S DEMANDS TOTALLY BELIED THIS.

3. ON THE QUESTION OF THE PRESIDENCY HE SAID THAT EVEN THOUGH THE PF HAD AGREED WITH US HE STILL WANTED THE PRIME MINISTER TO THINK AGAIN ABOUT THE NEED FOR STRONG GOVERNMENT. TO HAVE TWO POWER CENTRES WAS A RECIPE FOR DISASTER. CHONA ADDED THAT THE SUGGESTION THAT THE ARRANGEMENT COULD BE CHANGED LATER WAS CYNICAL AND HINTED AT A MUNICH TYPE PIECE OF PAPER. THE PF WANTED A CONSTITUTION THEY COULD RESPECT AND ADHERE TO, NOT SOMETHING TO BE CHANGED WITHIN FIVE MINUTES. I REPEATED THAT THIS WAS AGREED AND REFERRED TO THE NEED TO CARRY EVERY ONE ALONG BUT WITH LITTLE EFFECT ON MY AUDIENCE.

4. KAUNDA FOUND THE DETAILS OF WHAT COULD BE DONE TO HELP OVER LAND USEFUL. BUT ASKED IF WE COULD NOT COME A LITTLE FURTHER TO HELP THE PF? I WENT OVER THE NEED TO ACCEPT THE PROPOSALS AND PRESS ON TO OTHER THINGS. CHONA ASKED IF WE WERE ALREADY IN TOUCH WITH OTHER COUNTRIES ABOUT HELP; ~~SEVEN~~ TIME WAS SHORT. BUT IN FURTHER DISCUSSION KAUNDA SAID FLATLY THAT HE SUPPORTED THE PF POSITION OVER LAND. IT WOULD BE A GREAT PROBLEM; ~~SEVEN~~ EVEN ZAMBIA HAD HAD DIFFICULTIES IN SOUTHERN PROVINCE. I TRIED TO SPELL OUT SLOWLY AND CLEARLY HOW WHAT WAS PROPOSED WOULD BE VERY IMPORTANT FOR SMOOTH TRANSFER AND IN CREATING CONFIDENCE, DRAWING ON MY KENYAN EXPERIENCE. BUT ANYTHING CONTRARY TO THE WISHES OF THE PF FALLS ON DEAF EARS AT STATE HOUSE. KAUNDA SAID HE ATTACHED SO MUCH IMPORTANCE TO THE QUESTION OF THE PRESIDENCY AND OF LAND THAT HE WOULD ASK CHONA WHO RETURNS TO LONDON TOMORROW TO SEE THE PRIME MINISTER OR YOU PERSONALLY TO REINFORCE WHAT HE HAD SAID TO ME (ADDING THAT HE HAD EVERY CONFIDENCE IN MY REPORTING HIM CORRECTLY).

5. CHONA WENT ON TO SPELL OUT THE PF CASE OVER LAND. THE BRITISH HAD TAKEN LAND BY FORCE. THE PF HAD NOW LIBERATED AREAS, INCLUDING FARMS FROM WHICH THE FARMERS HAD FLED. WHY SHOULD THEY PAY COMPENSATION TO DEPARTED OWNERS? THE PF WERE VERY FIRM ABOUT THIS AND ZAMBIA AGREED. I ARGUED THE POINT AND EVENTUALLY KAUNDA SAID THAT MRS THATCHER NEEDED AND DESERVED SUPPORT AND IT WAS BETTER FOR HIM TO TELL HER PRIVATELY WHAT HE THOUGHT WERE IMPORTANT POINTS BUT HE WOULD NOT TOUCH ON THEM IN PUBLIC AS THAT WOULD ROCK THE BOAT.

6. WE CAME THEN TO THE QUESTION OF ACCEPTING THE CONSTITUTION ON A CONTINGENT BASIS. KAUNDA ARGUED THAT BY INSISTING UPON NO

A CONTINGENT BASIS. KAUNDA ARGUED THAT BY INSISTING UPON NO RESERVATIONS WE WERE INCREASING PF SUSPICION AND WOULD MAKE DISCUSSION OF THE TRANSITIONAL ARRANGEMENTS MUCH MORE DIFFICULT. IF WE AGREED TO GO ON AS THE PF WISHED HE WOULD FIND THEM FAR MORE ACCOMMODATING. IN FACT HE AND CHONA FORECAST THAT THAT STAGE OF THE DISCUSSIONS WOULD TAKE ONLY TWO OR THREE WEEKS. CHONA ADDED THAT IT WAS NOT ONLY THE PF WHO WERE SUSPICIOUS ABOUT OUR RIGIDITY, "WE" WERE BECOMING SO TOO. KAUNDA HASTENED TO SAY THAT THERE WAS NOW AN EXCEPTIONAL CHANCE TO SOLVE THE RHODESIAN PROBLEM AND IT WOULD BE A GREAT PITY IF WE FAILED THROUGH TOO GREAT RIGIDITY OR PUSHED WRONG SOLUTIONS WHICH WOULD ONLY HAVE TO BE REINFORCED LATER. CHONA ADDED A LITANY ABOUT HOW THE PF HAD MADE ALL THE CONCESSIONS ALL THE WAY WHICH I SOUGHT TO BALANCE.

7. KAUNDA SAID HE WOULD NOT COMMENT THIS EVENING ON THE QUESTION OF RAIDS IN VIEW OF THE DAMAGE ZAMBIA HAD SUFFERED YESTERDAY ("VERY ANNOYING") BUT WOULD WRITE TO MRS THATCHER ON ALL POINTS. HE ASKED ME TO THANK HER FOR HER LETTER.

8. AFTERWARDS KASANDA UNDERLINED THE POINT ABOUT SUSPICION WHICH HE SAID EXTENDED TO WHAT WE WERE GOING TO SPRING AT THE NEXT STAGE. THERE WAS SUSPICION TOO OF WHAT WOULD HAPPEN IF THE PF AGREED THE CONSTITUTION SUBJECT TO THE NEXT STAGE BUT FOUND THAT STAGE UNACCEPTABLE. IS THERE A FORMULA WHICH I MIGHT USE HERE ON THAT POINT TO BUDGE THE ZAMBIAANS OFF THEIR PRESENT UNCRITICAL PF STAND? YOU MAY LIKE TO CONSIDER USING A MESSAGE OR EVEN A VISIT FROM SOMEONE LIKE RAMPHAL TO BRING KAUNDA FORWARD A BIT BECAUSE CLEARLY HE DOES NOT AT PRESENT INTEND TO EXERT ANY PRESSURE ON THE PF AT ALL AND YESTERDAY'S DESTRUCTION OF ROAD AND RAIL BRIDGES WILL INTENSIFY HIS UNWILLINGNESS TO GIVE GROUND REGARDLESS OF ECONOMICS.

ALLISON

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**PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE**
SERIAL No. 117E/79T

CONFIDENTIAL

FM FCO 131629Z OCT 79

TO FLASH MAPUTO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 120 OF 13 OCTOBER

RHODESIA CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE

1. PLEASE PASS THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT MACHEL FROM THE PRIME MINISTER.

BEGINS

I HAVE HAD AN ACCOUNT FROM MR PAPADOPOULOS OF HIS MEETING WITH YOU ON 12 OCTOBER. I FOUND THIS VERY ENCOURAGING. WE HAVE KEPT IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH YOUR SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE IN LONDON. I SHOULD LIKE TO SHARE WITH YOU MY PERSONAL ASSESSMENT OF THE POSITION WE HAVE NOW REACHED.

THE INDEPENDENCE CONSTITUTION WHICH WE HAVE PUT FORWARD HAS IN OUR VIEW GONE A VERY LONG WAY TO MEET THE PATRIOTIC FRONT'S REQUIREMENTS. IT HAS THEREFORE BEEN NO EASY TASK TO SECURE THE SALISBURY DELEGATION'S ACCEPTANCE OF IT. THAT CONSTITUTION PROVIDES, INDISPUTABLY, FOR GENUINE MAJORITY RULE.

IN THESE NEGOTIATIONS, BOTH SIDES HAVE SHOWN A WILLINGNESS TO COMPROMISE, AND WE ARE APPRECIATIVE OF THAT. BUT WE HAVE NOW BEEN ENGAGED IN FIVE WEEKS OF INTENSIVE NEGOTIATION ON THE CONSTITUTION. WE HAVE THOROUGHLY EXAMINED ALL THE ISSUES AND WE HAVE NO DOUBT THAT THE CONSTITUTION WE HAVE PUT FORWARD IS THE ONLY BASIS ON WHICH AGREEMENT IS POSSIBLE. WE CANNOT MAKE FURTHER CHANGES AT THIS STAGE.

WE HAVE TRIED TO HELP THE PATRIOTIC FRONT OVER THE QUESTION OF LAND. WE RECOGNISE THE VERY GREAT IMPORTANCE OF THIS PROBLEM TO BOTH SIDES. THE INDEPENDENCE CONSTITUTION DOES MAKE FULLY ADEQUATE PROVISION FOR THE GOVERNMENT TO ACQUIRE LAND FOR SETTLEMENT, BUT THERE MUST ALSO BE PROVISION FOR ADEQUATE COMPENSATION. LORD CARRINGTON MADE A STATEMENT IN THE CONFERENCE ON 11 OCTOBER PROMISING THAT WE WOULD HELP, WITHIN THE LIMITS OF OUR FINANCIAL RESOURCES, WITH TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE AND CAPITAL AID FOR LAND SETTLEMENT PROJECTS AND AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT. WE SHALL ALSO BE READY TO HELP THE NEW GOVERNMENT OBTAIN INTERNATIONAL ASSISTANCE FOR THESE AND OTHER PURPOSES.

IF THERE IS AGREEMENT ON THE INDEPENDENCE CONSTITUTION, WE SHALL BE ABLE TO MOVE ON TO DISCUSS WITH BOTH DELEGATIONS THE ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE INTERIM PERIOD BEFORE INDEPENDENCE, INCLUDING ELECTIONS

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SUPERVISED UNDER OUR AUTHORITY, AND THE ARRANGEMENTS FOR A CEASE-FIRE. THIS WILL OFFER FURTHER HOPE TO THE PEOPLE OF RHODESIA AND OF THE NEIGHBOURING COUNTRIES THAT THE NEGOTIATIONS ARE MAKING PROGRESS, THAT RHODESIA WILL COME TO INDEPENDENCE ON THE BASIS OF GENUINE MAJORITY RULE AND THAT THE PARTIES WILL BE PREPARED TO COMPETE FOR POWER BY POLITICAL MEANS. I WOULD LIKE YOU TO KNOW THAT I AGREE VERY STRONGLY WITH YOUR VIEW THAT IT IS ESSENTIAL TO KEEP THE INTERIM PERIOD BEFORE ELECTIONS ARE HELD AS SHORT AS POSSIBLE. THE SALISBURY DELEGATION HAVE AS YOU KNOW ACCEPTED THE CONSTITUTION. THEY HAVE ALSO STATED THEIR READINESS TO ACCEPT ELECTIONS UNDER OUR AUTHORITY. WE ARE STILL WAITING FOR THE PATRIOTIC FRONT'S ACCEPTANCE. I VERY MUCH HOPE THAT WE CAN COUNT ON YOUR SUPPORT AND INFLUENCE IN BRINGING THESE NEGOTIATIONS TO A SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION.

ENDS.

2. YOU SHOULD INFORM YOUR AMERICAN COLLEAGUE OF THE ACTION WHICH YOU HAVE TAKEN. SIMILAR, THOUGH NOT IDENTICAL, MESSAGES ARE BEING SENT TO NYERERE, SERETSE KHAMA, TOLBERT AND SHAGARI. LUANDA IS BEING INSTRUCTED TO SPEAK ON THESE LINES.

CARRINGTON

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PS/MR HURD
PS/PUS
SIR A DUFF
LORD N G LENNOX
MISS BROWN
MR DAY
MR WILLSON
MR ASPIN

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION
RHODESIA POLICY

SUBJECT

GR 600

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CONFIDENTIAL

FM F C O 131634Z OCT 79

TO FLASH LAGOS

TELEGRAM NUMBER 777 OF 13 OCTOBER

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, PRIORITY UKMIS NEW YORK.

PRIME MINISTER'S

PERSONAL MESSAGE

SERIAL No. T117D/79^r

MY TELEGRAM NO. 767: RHODESIA CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE.

1. PLEASE PASS THE FOLLOWING REPLY TO PRESIDENT SHAGARI FROM THE PRIME MINISTER AS SOON AS POSSIBLE:

BEGINS.

I WAS VERY GRATEFUL FOR YOUR HELPFUL MESSAGE WHICH I RECEIVED LAST NIGHT.

BOTH SIDES HAVE HAD DIFFICULTY IN ACCEPTING THE PROPOSALS WE HAVE TABLED IN THE RHODESIA CONFERENCE. THE INDEPENDENCE CONSTITUTION WHICH WE HAVE PUT FORWARD HAS IN OUR VIEW GONE A VERY LONG WAY TO MEETING THE PATRIOTIC FRONT'S REQUIREMENTS. IT HAS THEREFORE BEEN NO EASY TASK TO SECURE THE SALISBURY DELEGATION'S ACCEPTANCE OF IT. THAT CONSTITUTION PROVIDES, INDISPUTABLY, FOR GENUINE MAJORITY RULE. IN FIVE WEEKS OF INTENSIVE NEGOTIATIONS WE HAVE THOROUGHLY EXAMINED ALL THE ISSUES. I HAVE NO DOUBT THAT THE CONSTITUTION WE HAVE PUT FORWARD IS THE ONLY BASIS ON WHICH AGREEMENT IS POSSIBLE. WE CANNOT MAKE FURTHER CHANGES AT THIS STAGE.

WE HAVE TRIED TO HELP THE PATRIOTIC FRONT OVER THE QUESTION OF LAND. WE RECOGNISE THE VERY GREAT IMPORTANCE OF THIS PROBLEM TO BOTH SIDES. THE INDEPENDENCE CONSTITUTION MAKES FULLY ADEQUATE PROVISION FOR THE GOVERNMENT TO ACQUIRE LAND FOR SETTLEMENT. BUT, THERE MUST ALSO BE PROVISION FOR ADEQUATE COMPENSATION. LORD CARRINGTON MADE A STATEMENT IN THE CONFERENCE ON 11 OCTOBER PROMISING THAT WE WOULD HELP, WITHIN THE LIMITS OF OUR FINANCIAL RESOURCES, WITH TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE FOR LAND SETTLEMENT PROJECTS AND AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT. WE SHALL ALSO BE READY TO HELP THE NEW GOVERNMENT OBTAIN INTERNATIONAL ASSISTANCE FOR THESE AND OTHER PURPOSES.

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IF THERE IS AGREEMENT ON THE INDEPENDENCE CONSTITUTION, WE SHALL BE ABLE TO MOVE ON TO DISCUSS WITH BOTH DELEGATIONS THE ARRANGEMENTS FOR ELECTIONS SUPERVISED UNDER OUR AUTHORITY - AS WE AGREED AT LUSAKA - AND THE ARRANGEMENTS FOR A CEASE-FIRE. THIS WILL OFFER FURTHER HOPE TO THE PEOPLE OF RHODESIA AND OF THE NEIGHBOURING COUNTRIES THAT THE NEGOTIATIONS ARE MAKING PROGRESS, THAT RHODESIA WILL COME TO INDEPENDENCE ON THE BASIS OF GENUINE MAJORITY RULE AND THAT THE PARTIES WILL BE PREPARED TO COMPETE FOR POWER BY POLITICAL MEANS.

WE HAVE MADE CLEAR FROM THE BEGINNING OF THIS CONFERENCE THAT IN OUR VIEW AGREEMENT BY BOTH SIDES TO THE INDEPENDENCE CONSTITUTION IS CONDITIONAL ON AGREEMENT ALSO ON THE PRE-INDEPENDENCE ARRANGEMENTS. BISHOP MUZOREWA HAS ACCEPTED THE INDEPENDENCE CONSTITUTION, SUBJECT TO THAT RESERVATION; AND IT IS OPEN TO THE PATRIOTIC FRONT TO DO EXACTLY THE SAME.

I VERY MUCH HOPE THAT WE CAN COUNT ON YOUR SUPPORT IN BRINGING THESE NEGOTIATIONS TO A SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION.

AS THIS IS THE FIRST MESSAGE WHICH I HAVE ADDRESSED TO YOU SINCE YOUR ASSUMPTION OF OFFICE I SHOULD LIKE TO END BY SENDING YOU MY WARM CONGRATULATIONS, AND MY BEST WISHES FOR THE SUCCESS OF YOUR ADMINISTRATION IN THE YEARS AHEAD. I AND MY COLLEAGUES LOOK FORWARD TO WORKING WITH YOUR GOVERNMENT ON INTERNATIONAL PROBLEMS OF COMMON CONCERN TO US. IT IS OUR FIRM DESIRE TO STRENGTHEN THE RELATIONS BETWEEN NIGERIA AND BRITAIN WHICH WE BELIEVE ARE MUTUALLY BENEFICIAL. THERE IS A WHOLE NETWORK OF CLOSE LINKS BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES ON WHICH WE MUST CONTINUE TO BUILD.

ENDS

CONFIDENTIAL

2. YOU SHOULD INFORM YOUR AMERICAN COLLEAGUE OF THE ACTION WHICH YOU HAVE TAKEN. MESSAGES ON SOMEWHAT THE SAME LINES ARE BEING SENT TO NYERERE, MACHEL, SERETSE KHAMA AND TOLBERT. LUANDA IS BEING INSTRUCTED TO SPEAK TO THE ANGOLAN GOVERNMENT.

CARRINGTON

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MISS BROWN
MR DAY
MR WILLSON
MR ASPIN

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION
RHODESIA POLICY

CONFIDENTIAL

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Subject

CONFIDENTIAL

FM FCO 131632Z OCT 79

TO FLASH DAR ES SALAAM

TELEGRAM NUMBER 332 OF 13 OCTOBER

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, LUSAKA, LUANDA PRIORITY UKMIS NEW YORK, RHODESIA CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE.

1. PLEASE PASS THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE TO PRESIDENT NYERERE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER.

BEGINS

DEAR JULIUS

I HAVE SEEN SIR PETER MOON'S ACCOUNT OF HIS TALK WITH YOU ON 10 OCTOBER AND I AM REALLY MOST GRATEFUL TO YOU FOR FINDING TIME TO DISCUSS THESE MATTERS WITH HIM. I WOULD LIKE TO SHARE WITH YOU MY ASSESSMENT OF THE POSITION WE HAVE NOW REACHED IN THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE.

THE INDEPENDENCE CONSTITUTION WHICH WE HAVE PUT FORWARD HAS IN OUR VIEW GONE A VERY LONG WAY TO MEET THE PATRIOTIC FRONT'S REQUIREMENTS. IT HAS THEREFORE BEEN NO EASY TASK TO SECURE THE SALISBURY DELEGATION'S ACCEPTANCE OF IT. YOU WILL HAVE SEEN THE REACTIONS OF MR IAN SMITH. THAT CONSTITUTION PROVIDES, INDISPUTABLY, FOR GENUINE MAJORITY RULE.

IN THESE NEGOTIATIONS, BOTH SIDES HAVE SHOWN A WILLINGNESS TO COMPROMISE, AND WE ARE APPRECIATIVE OF THAT. BUT WE HAVE NOW BEEN ENGAGED IN FIVE WEEKS OF INTENSIVE NEGOTIATION. WE HAVE THOROUGHLY EXAMINED ALL THE ISSUES AND WE HAVE NO DOUBT THAT THE CONSTITUTION WE HAVE PUT FORWARD IS THE ONLY BASIS ON WHICH AGREEMENT IS POSSIBLE. WE CANNOT MAKE FURTHER CHANGES AT THIS STAGE. AND WE HAVE MADE CLEAR FROM THE BEGINNING OF THE CONFERENCE IT IS OPEN TO BOTH DELEGATIONS TO MAKE THEIR AGREEMENT TO THE INDEPENDENCE CONSTITUTION CONDITIONAL ON AGREEMENT ON THE PRE-INDEPENDENCE ARRANGEMENTS.

AS YOU SUGGESTED, WE HAVE TRIED TO HELP THE PATRIOTIC FRONT OVER THE QUESTION OF LAND. WE RECOGNISE THE VERY GREAT IMPORTANCE OF THIS PROBLEM TO BOTH SIDES. BUT THE INDEPENDENCE CONSTITUTION DOES MAKE FULLY ADEQUATE PROVISION FOR THE GOVERNMENT TO ACQUIRE LAND FOR SETTLEMENT. WHAT IT ALSO DOES IS TO PROVIDE FOR ADEQUATE COMPENSATION, AND THAT IS WHAT THE PATRIOTIC FRONT ARE AT PRESENT UNABLE TO ACCEPT. PETER CARRINGTON MADE A STATEMENT IN THE CONFERENCE ON 11 OCTOBER WHICH WAS DESIGNED TO HELP THEM EVEN OVER

PRIME MINISTER'S

PERSONAL MESSAGE

SERIAL No. TUTC/79

CONFIDENTIAL

/ THIS HURDLE.

CONFIDENTIAL

THIS HURDLE. HE PROMISED THAT WE WOULD HELP, WITHIN THE LIMITS OF OUR FINANCIAL RESOURCES, WITH TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE FOR LAND SETTLEMENT SCHEMES AND CAPITAL AID FOR AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS AND INFRASTRUCTURE. WE SHALL ALSO BE READY TO HELP THE NEW GOVERNMENT OBTAIN INTERNATIONAL ASSISTANCE FOR THESE AND OTHER PURPOSES.

IF THERE IS AGREEMENT ON THE INDEPENDENCE CONSTITUTION, WE SHALL BE ABLE TO MOVE ON TO DISCUSS WITH BOTH DELEGATIONS THE ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE INTERIM PERIOD BEFORE INDEPENDENCE, INCLUDING ESPECIALLY ELECTIONS SUPERVISED UNDER OUR AUTHORITY - AS WE AGREED AT LUSAKA - AND THE ARRANGEMENTS FOR A CEASEFIRE. THIS WILL OFFER FURTHER HOPE TO THE PEOPLE OF RHODESIA AND OF THE NEIGHBOURING COUNTRIES THAT THE NEGOTIATIONS ARE MAKING PROGRESS, THAT RHODESIA WILL COME TO INDEPENDENCE ON THE BASIS OF GENUINE MAJORITY RULE AND THAT THE PARTIES WILL BE PREPARED TO COMPETE FOR POWER BY POLITICAL MEANS.

THE SALISBURY DELEGATION HAVE, AS YOU KNOW, ACCEPTED THE CONSTITUTION. THEY HAVE ALSO STATED THEIR READINESS TO ACCEPT ELECTIONS SUPERVISED UNDER OUR AUTHORITY. WE ARE STILL WAITING FOR THE PATRIOTIC FRONT'S ACCEPTANCE. I HOPE VERY MUCH THAT WE CAN COUNT ON YOUR SUPPORT AND INFLUENCE TO BRING THESE NEGOTIATIONS TO A SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION.

ENDS

2. YOU SHOULD INFORM YOUR AMERICAN COLLEAGUE OF THE ACTION WHICH YOU HAVE TAKEN. SIMILAR, THOUGH NOT IDENTICAL MESSAGES, ARE BEING SENT TO MACHEL, TOLBERT, SERETSE KHAMA AND SHAGARI. LUANDA IS BEING INSTRUCTED TO SPEAK ON THESE LINES TO THE ANGOLAN GOVERNMENT.

CARRINGTON

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MISS BROWN
MR DAY
MR WILLSON
MR ASPIN

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION
RHODESIA POLICY

SUBJECT

CONFIDENTIAL

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PP LAGOS

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CONFIDENTIAL

FM F C C 131630Z OCT

TO FLASH CAPOFONE

TELECFAM NUMBER 195 OF 13 OCTOBER

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, PRIORITY UKMIS NEW YORK, LUSAKA, MAPUTO,
LUANDA, LAGOS.

PRIME MINISTER'S

PERSONAL MESSAGE

SERIAL No. T1178/79^r

RHODESIA CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE.

1. PLEASE PASS THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT SEPETSE KHAMA
FROM THE PRIME MINISTER.

BEGINS.

I WAS VERY GLAD TO SEE MR TURNER'S ACCOUNT OF HIS DISCUSSION WITH
YOU ON 3 OCTOBER ABOUT RHODESIA. I WOULD LIKE TO SHARE WITH YOU THE
ASSESSMENT OF THE POSITION WE HAVE NOW REACHED IN THE CONSTITUTIONAL
CONFERENCE.

THE INDEPENDENCE CONSTITUTION WHICH WE HAVE PUT FORWARD HAS IN OUR
VIEW COME A VERY LONG WAY TO MEET THE PATRIOTIC FRONT'S REQUIRE-
MENTS. IT HAS THEREFORE BEEN NO EASY TASK TO SECURE THE SALISEUBY
DELEGATION'S ACCEPTANCE OF IT. THAT CONSTITUTION PROVIDES,
INDISPUTABLY, FOR GENUINE MAJORITY RULE.

IN THESE NEGOTIATIONS, BOTH SIDES HAVE SHOWN A WILLINGNESS TO
COMPROMISE, AND WE ARE APPRECIATIVE OF THAT. BUT WE HAVE NOW BEEN
ENGAGED IN FIVE WEEKS OF INTENSIVE NEGOTIATION ON THE CONSTITUTION.
WE HAVE THOROUGHLY EXAMINED ALL THE ISSUES AND WE HAVE NO DOUBT THAT
THE CONSTITUTION WE HAVE PUT FORWARD IS THE ONLY BASIS ON WHICH
AGREEMENT IS POSSIBLE. WE CANNOT MAKE FURTHER CHANCES AT THIS STAGE.

WE HAVE TRIED TO HELP THE PATRIOTIC FRONT OVER THE QUESTION OF
LAND. WE RECOGNISE THE VERY GREAT IMPORTANCE OF THIS PROBLEM TO
BOTH SIDES. THE INDEPENDENCE CONSTITUTION MAKES FULLY ADEQUATE
PROVISION FOR THE GOVERNMENT TO ACQUIRE LAND FOR SETTLEMENT. BUT

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CONFIDENTIAL

/ THERE MUST

THERE MUST ALSO BE PROVISION FOR ADEQUATE COMPENSATION. PETER CARRINGTON MADE A STATEMENT IN THE CONFERENCE ON 11 OCTOBER PROMISING THAT WE WOULD HELP, WITHIN THE LIMITS OF OUR FINANCIAL RESOURCES, WITH TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE FOR LAND SETTLEMENT SCHEMES AND CAPITAL AID FOR AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT. WE SHALL ALSO BE READY TO HELP THE NEW GOVERNMENT OBTAIN INTERNATIONAL ASSISTANCE FOR THESE AND OTHER PURPOSES.

IF THERE IS AGREEMENT ON THE INDEPENDENCE CONSTITUTION, WE SHALL BE ABLE TO MOVE ON TO DISCUSS WITH BOTH DELEGATIONS THE ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE INTERIM PERIOD BEFORE INDEPENDENCE, INCLUDING ELECTIONS SUPERVISED UNDER OUR AUTHORITY, AND THE ARRANGEMENTS FOR A CEASE-FIRE. THIS WILL OFFER FURTHER HOPE TO THE PEOPLE OF RHODESIA AND OF THE NEIGHBOURING COUNTRIES THAT THE NEGOTIATIONS ARE MAKING PROGRESS THAT RHODESIA WILL COME TO INDEPENDENCE ON THE BASIS OF GENUINE MAJORITY RULE AND THAT THE PARTIES WILL BE PREPARED TO COMPETE FOR POWER BY POLITICAL MEANS. THE SALISBURY DELEGATION HAVE AS YOU KNOW ACCEPTED THE CONSTITUTION. THEY HAVE ALSO STATED THEIR READINESS TO ACCEPT ELECTIONS UNDER OUR AUTHORITY. WE ARE STILL WAITING FOR THE PATRIOTIC FRONT'S ACCEPTANCE. I VERY MUCH HOPE THAT WE CAN COUNT ON YOUR SUPPORT AND INFLUENCE IN BRINGING THESE NEGOTIATIONS TO A SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION.

ENDS.

2. YOU SHOULD INFORM YOUR AMERICAN COLLEAGUE OF THE ACTION WHICH YOU HAVE TAKEN. SIMILAR, THOUGH NOT IDENTICAL, MESSAGES ARE BEING SENT TO NYEHEPE, MACHEL, TOLEBERT AND SPACAFI. LUANDA IS BEING INSTRUCTED TO SPEAK ON THESE LINES.

CARRINGTON

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MISS BROWN
MR DAY
MR WILLSON
MR ASPIN

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION
RHODESIA POLICY

CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT

CONFIDENTIAL
FM FCO 131633Z OCT 79
TO FLASH MONROVIA
TELNO 115 OF 13 OCT 79.

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T117A/79

RHODESIA CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE

1. PLEASE PASS THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER
TO PRESIDENT TOLBERT.

BEGINS

I KNOW HOW CLOSELY YOU ARE FOLLOWING DEVELOPMENTS AT THE RHODESIA
CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE. I HAVE SEEN MR DOUBLEDAY'S ACCOUNT OF
YOUR TALKS WITH HIM ON 11 OCTOBER. I WOULD THEREFORE LIKE YOU
TO KNOW MY ASSESSMENT OF THE POSITION WE HAVE NOW REACHED.

THE INDEPENDENCE CONSTITUTION WHICH WE HAVE PUT FORWARD HAS IN OUR
VIEW GONE A VERY LONG WAY TO MEET THE PATRIOTIC FRONT'S
REQUIREMENTS. IT HAS THEREFORE BEEN NO EASY TASK TO SECURE THE
SALISBURY DELEGATION'S ACCEPTANCE OF IT. THAT CONSTITUTION PROVIDES,
INDISPUTABLY, FOR GENUINE MAJORITY RULE.

IN THESE NEGOTIATIONS, BOTH SIDES HAVE SHOWN A WILLINGNESS TO
COMPROMISE, AND WE ARE APPRECIATIVE OF THAT. BUT WE HAVE NOW BEEN
ENGAGED IN FIVE WEEKS OF INTENSIVE NEGOTIATION ON THE CONSTITUTION.
WE HAVE THOROUGHLY EXAMINED ALL THE ISSUES AND WE HAVE NO DOUBT
THAT THE CONSTITUTION WE HAVE PUT FORWARD IS THE ONLY BASIS ON WHICH
AGREEMENT IS POSSIBLE. WE CANNOT MAKE FURTHER CHANGES AT THIS STAGE.

WE HAVE TRIED TO HELP THE PATRIOTIC FRONT OVER THE QUESTION OF
LAND. WE RECOGNISE THE VERY GREAT IMPORTANCE OF THIS PROBLEM TO
BOTH SIDES. THE INDEPENDENCE CONSTITUTION MAKES FULLY ADEQUATE
PROVISION FOR THE GOVERNMENT TO ACQUIRE LAND FOR SETTLEMENT. BUT,
AS YOU RECOGNISE, THERE MUST ALSO BE PROVISION FOR ADEQUATE
COMPENSATION. LORD CARRINGTON MADE A STATEMENT IN THE CONFERENCE
ON 11 OCTOBER PROMISING THAT WE WOULD HELP, WITHIN THE LIMITS OF
OUR FINANCIAL RESOURCES, WITH TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE FOR LAND
SETTLEMENT SCHEMES AND CAPITAL AID FOR AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT.
WE SHALL ALSO BE READY TO HELP THE NEW GOVERNMENT OBTAIN INTER-
NATIONAL ASSISTANCE FOR THESE AND OTHER PURPOSES.

CONFIDENTIAL

/ IF THERE IS

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IF THERE IS AGREEMENT ON THE INDEPENDENCE CONSTITUTION, WE SHALL BE ABLE TO MOVE ON TO DISCUSS WITH BOTH DELEGATIONS THE ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE INTERIM PERIOD BEFORE INDEPENDENCE, INCLUDING ELECTIONS SUPERVISED UNDER OUR AUTHORITY - AS WAS AGREED AT LUSAKA - AND THE ARRANGEMENTS FOR A CEASE-FIRE. THIS WILL OFFER FURTHER HOPE TO THE PEOPLE OF RHODESIA AND OF THE NEIGHBOURING COUNTRIES THAT THE NEGOTIATIONS ARE MAKING PROGRESS, THAT RHODESIA WILL COME TO INDEPENDENCE ON THE BASIS OF GENUINE MAJORITY RULE AND THAT THE PARTIES WILL BE PREPARED TO COMPETE FOR POWER BY POLITICAL MEANS. THE SALISBURY DELEGATION HAVE AS YOU KNOW ACCEPTED THE CONSTITUTION. THEY HAVE ALSO STATED THEIR READINESS TO ACCEPT ELECTIONS SUPERVISED UNDER OUR AUTHORITY. (BISHOP MUZOREWA ALSO MADE CLEAR AT THE BEGINNING OF THE CONFERENCE HIS READINESS TO AGREE TO A CEASE-FIRE). WE STILL AWAIT THE PATRIOTIC FRONT'S ACCEPTANCE.

I VERY MUCH HOPE THAT WE CAN COUNT ON YOUR SUPPORT IN BRINGING THESE NEGOTIATIONS TO A SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION.
ENDS

2. YOU SHOULD INFORM YOUR AMERICAN COLLEAGUE OF THE ACTION WHICH YOU HAVE TAKEN. SIMILAR, THOUGH NOT IDENTICAL, MESSAGES ARE BEING SENT TO NYERERE, MACHEL, SERETSE KHAMA AND SHAGARI.

CARRINGTON

F I L E S

RHOD D
OADS
N AM D
NEWS D
PUSD
PLANNING STAFF
ES & SD
CCD
FRD
UND.
LEGAL ADVISERS
(MR FREELAND)
(MR FIFOOT)
ECON D
PCD

DEF D
OID
PS
PS/IPS
PS/MR LUCE
PS/MR RIDLEY
PS/MR HURD
PS/PJS
SIR A DUFF
JOED N G LENNOX
MISS BROWN
MR DAY
MR WILLSON
MR ASPIN

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION
RHODESIA POLICY

FILE

VLS

12 October 1979

Message from President Kaunda

I enclose, for your records, a copy of the signed version of the message from President Kaunda to the Prime Minister contained in Lusaka telegram 1066 of 10 October.

M. O'D. B. ALEXANDER

R. M. J. Lyne, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

9B



(2)

10 DOWNING STREET

Prime Minister

I asked for a paper summarising the broad background to the Lancaster House talks. The Foreign & Commonwealth Secretary has seen this.

It does not say anything very startling but you may find it useful. The figures at Annex A will be familiar to you but you may like to glance at them again. The disparity in the scale of our trade with S. Africa as against that with the rest of Africa is striking.

Reeds

RHODESIA: THE PRE-INDEPENDENCE PERIOD

1. On a date to be agreed, the British Government will, by Order in Council under the Southern Rhodesia Act 1965, provide that executive and legislative authority in Rhodesia shall be vested in a Governor, who will be British. The Governor will be appointed by, and will receive instructions from, the British Government. He will have a British staff, including an Election Commissioner and military and police advisers, to assist him in carrying out his functions.
2. The Governor and his staff will proceed immediately to Rhodesia and, on his arrival, he will be responsible for the administration of the country. From this point Rhodesia will have returned to legality as a British dependent territory.
3. In the first stage of the interim period, the Governor will ask Bishop Muzorewa and his principal Ministers to act as a caretaker government to deal with the day to day administration of the country in matters which do not relate to the holding of the elections and the cease-fire, and until such time as the necessary preparations have been made to move to the second stage of the interim period.
4. The Governor's instructions will direct him to do all things necessary to secure compliance with the conditions for free elections. In particular, he will ensure that during the election campaign:

/a.

- a. the administration of the election is scrupulously impartial as between all the political parties;
- b. peaceful political activity is freely conducted;
- c. all parties will have free and uncensored access to all the public media.

5. The Governor's Election Commissioner and supporting staff will assist him in carrying out these functions. Commonwealth observers will be present during the election. On all matters not connected with the holding of the election and the maintenance of a cease-fire, the administration of the country will be conducted on a caretaker basis.

6. The Governor will appoint an Election Council, under the chairmanship of his Election Commissioner, on which all parties taking part in the election will be represented. The Council and its individual members will be able to offer advice or make representations to the Governor on any matter concerning the elections.

7. There will be agreement between the opposing forces regarding a cease-fire and disengagement of their respective forces. A Cease-fire Commission under the chairmanship of the British military adviser will be established to assist with the monitoring of the cease-fire on which the commanders of the opposing forces will be represented and will be answerable to the Governor. The British Government will be ready to play its part in monitoring the cease-fire.

8. During the second stage of the interim period, all the political leaders will commit themselves to the election campaign. The Governor will be directly responsible for the day to day administration of the country.

9. During the interim period the existing civil police will be responsible for the maintenance of law and order, under the authority of the Governor and the supervision of his police Adviser and supporting staff.

/10.

10. The elections will be held on a date to be decided by the Governor, after consultation with the parties participating in them. Immediately thereafter the independence government will be established, as provided for in the Constitution, and a Zimbabwe Independence Bill will be introduced in the British Parliament. When the Bill has been passed, Zimbabwe will become independent.

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to. Rumb

Rhodesia: Wider Implications

1. Given that no basis exists for a comprehensive settlement involving the Salisbury parties and both wings of the Patriotic Front, there appear to be three ways in which the situation in and around Rhodesia might develop following the Constitutional Conference:-

A. If Bishop Muzorewa continues in Government without a broad measure of international support the war will continue unabated. The Front Line States will continue to support the Patriotic Front and to provide them with bases. The more radical non-front line OAU States will encourage them in this. Moderate members of the OAU will be unable to resist this trend, because they will see no advantage for themselves in backing the side which appears to rely largely on South African support for its survival. Rhodesian raids into Zambia and Mozambique will continue. The Soviet Union and its allies will respond to requests for further military assistance to resist these raids and will provide the Patriotic Front with more weapons and equipment. It is unlikely that Cuban or other non-African surrogate troops will be involved, but the possibility of Ethiopian involvement cannot be ruled out. Although Congress might force the US Administration to follow us in lifting sanctions, Rhodesia would be unlikely to attract foreign investment and credit on favourable terms.

In these circumstances, a severe decline in white morale would be likely by mid-1980 (the Rhodesians already fear that many middle-ranking officers and public servants may take their accrued pension rights and leave in April unless there is a marked improvement in the situation by then). This in turn would generate a failure of black confidence in the Bishop's government, with the risk that Sithole, Chikerema and others might begin to think again of allying themselves with one wing or the other of the Patriotic Front.

This could face the South African government with a choice between direct intervention in the war in support of the Rhodesian government, or allowing it to disintegrate and making the best of the resulting debacle by evacuating the remaining white population.

/B. ..

B. If Bishop Muzorewa establishes a government with broad Western support, there will, however, be a good prospect of Rhodesia attracting enough international aid and commercial credit and investment to enable the government to restore the economy and reinforce both white and black morale. In that case, the security forces should remain in a high state of efficiency. There may be defections from the Patriotic Front, and they will find recruitment more difficult. ZAPU's military capability is already smaller than ZANU's and Kaunda may feel emboldened to restrict the facilities he offers them if they appear to be losing ground. There will be some prospect of encouraging the more moderate OAU States to move towards establishing relations with the Muzorewa government.

C. If the Patriotic Front splits, and ZAPU agrees to a separate ceasefire and to take part in elections, ZANU will continue fighting after independence, with Mozambican support. In this case, the restoration of normal relations with Zambia and Botswana will put the new government in a good position to contain ZANU activities at a tolerable level. The Soviet Union might try to switch its support to ZANU in these circumstances. But it would be on very weak ground in doing so. In other respects the situation would develop very much as in case B above, but more rapidly and more favourably for Rhodesia.

2. South Africa's role in any of these situations will be of crucial importance, especially in Case A. Mr P W Botha's present policy is to remove the more offensive features of apartheid at home, while also trying to establish a 'constellation' of friendly States in Southern Africa, to include not only the 'independent' homelands, but also Rhodesia and Namibia and even Botswana, Malawi and Zambia. There are already indications that his government is considering, both privately and publicly, the possibility of direct intervention in Rhodesia in order to forestall the establishment of a Patriotic Front government there. Whether they would actually do so is uncertain. If they did, there would be strong and probably irresistible international pressure for mandatory UN action against South Africa

(which would cause severe damage to British economic interests there). This consideration might lead them to decide against such a course. But if Bishop Muzorewa's government collapsed, they might well feel that they should cut their losses in the region. They would probably decide also to impose an internal settlement in Namibia and perhaps to accelerate their nuclear programme. They would end their present economic co-operation with Zambia and Mozambique. There would be no prospect of a rapprochement with Angola. Zaire would be left exposed and vulnerable. The net result would be further international isolation of South Africa and its immediate neighbours and, probably, encouragement for the emergence of more radical regimes further north.

3. Developments of this kind would be of great concern to the Americans. They will see them as likely to create openings for the Soviet Union to entrench and expand its political and military position not only amongst its present clients in Africa but in countries, like Zambia and Nigeria, which up to now have not been particularly receptive to Soviet advances. They will be very reluctant, therefore, to support any moves which they see as tending to increase these risks. Similar considerations are likely to influence our other NATO and EEC partners. They will be reluctant to follow any policies in Southern Africa which they will see as providing the Soviet Union and its allies with opportunities to strengthen their position not only in Africa but elsewhere in the Third World.

4. In relation to Rhodesia, we ourselves share the South Africans' wish to see the emergence there of a moderate government, since this offers the best prospect of avoiding an exodus of the white population, re-activating British economic interests there, and staving off the creation of another focus of radical pressure on our African policies. But it is important that such a government should have a good chance of long term survival and that we should try to avoid or minimise a sharp polarisation in Southern Africa which could do severe damage to British and Western interests. The economic interests which might be at risk are listed in an Annex. First among these is of course our trade with Nigeria.

SECRET

5. Our best chance of pursuing and achieving all these objectives will be in continuing to work for an outcome to the Constitutional Conference which will as far as possible undercut international and especially Front Line support for the Patriotic Front and offer hope of de-escalating the war in either of the ways suggested at B or C above. The prospects both for us and for Rhodesia will, however, be much poorer if the Conference ends and independence is granted in circumstances which do not attract Western support for Bishop Muzorewa's government and the situation develops as in A.

SECRET

UNITED KINGDOM ECONOMIC INTERESTS IN AFRICA: SELECTED ITEMS

£,million

Country	Visible trade (1978)			UK net invisible receipts (1978) (1)	UK direct investment (end 1977 est) (3)	UK gross banking claims (end 1978) (4)	ECGD commitment (goods and services) (end 1978)	UK aid (end 1978) (3)
	UK Exports	UK Imports	Balance					
1 <u>South Africa</u> (inc Namibia)	<u>669.3</u> (2.2)	<u>732.6</u> (14.8)	<u>-113.3</u> (-12.6)	<u>426.0</u>	<u>1200-1400</u>	<u>1250.0</u>	<u>763.0</u> (0.1)	
2 <u>Other African countries</u> comprising:	<u>3464.2</u>	<u>2325.4</u>	<u>1138.8</u>	<u>708.0</u>	<u>c. 1000</u>	<u>2586.0</u>	<u>2653.0</u>	<u>195.5</u>
A <u>Black Africa</u> (of which	<u>2211.3</u>	<u>2012.0</u>	<u>699.3</u>	<u>538.0</u>	(7)	<u>1333.0</u>	<u>1825.0</u>	<u>194.8</u>
<u>Nigeria</u>	1133.4	286.2	847.2	108.8(2) (1977)			753.0	39.6
<u>Kenya</u>	195.7	114.6	81.1				277.0	(6)
<u>Ghana</u>	119.0	110.1	8.9				52.0	33.2
<u>Zambia</u>	69.8	68.0	1.8				201.0	49.3
B <u>North Africa</u>	<u>752.9</u>	<u>313.4</u>	<u>439.5</u>	<u>170.0</u>		<u>1253.0</u>	<u>828.0</u>	<u>0.7</u>
ie								
<u>Morocco</u>	76.5	44.1	32.4				33.0	
<u>Tunisia</u>	21.4	12.0	9.4				11.0	
<u>Libya</u>	214.7	98.2	116.5		2.0		112.0	
<u>Egypt</u>	205.6	101.7	103.9				213.0	(6)
<u>Sudan</u>	114.1	19.5	94.6				83.0	(6)
<u>Algeria</u>	120.6	37.9	82.7				379.0	

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NOTES

- (1) These figures indicate a broad magnitude only; they exclude UK oil industry earnings.
- (2) UK net earnings from direct investment only.
- (3) Book values; excludes oil, banking and insurance. Firm figures later than end-1974 do not exist. They are derived from a periodic enquiry and although a new enquiry is in progress, its results will not be available until 1980. Figures given are, therefore, very approximate projections of end-1974 figures.
- (4) UK gross banking claims are deposits with, and advances to non-residents; commercial bills and other negotiable paper drawn on non-residents; lending under special schemes for exports.
- (5) Official loans disbursed and still outstanding, including arrears of principal and interest.
- (6) The totals for Black Africa and North Africa have excluded £127.4m "written off" under the retrospective terms adjustment exercise in 1978. The £127.4m includes £55.6m for Kenya, £14.7m for Egypt, and £9.6m for the Sudan.
- (7) No breakdown for individual countries is available.



12 OCT 1979

Mr Renwick, Rhodesia Department

CONVERSATION WITH REV SITHOLE

- 1 The Rev Sithole called on me this morning. He was accompanied by Mr Nyemba, the First Vice President of his party.
- 2 After some introductory remarks about Britain's role as a decolonising power Mr Sithole said that he considered the constitution that we had tabled to be reasonable and he hoped that HMG would stand firm on this basis. Rev Sithole said it was important to demonstrate that the constitution was acceptable to the people of Rhodesia as a whole and he therefore argued for a referendum on the constitution. He pointed out that this procedure had been followed on a number of occasions in Rhodesia in the past. He thought, incidentally, that this might also help the Patriotic Front to get over their hesitations about the constitution.
- 3 It emerged later in our conversation that Sithole's enthusiasm for a referendum was inspired by a desire to frustrate Ian Smith's attempts to have our constitution amended or voted down in the Rhodesian Parliament. He thought it vital to frustrate Smith over this and saw a referendum as an effective way of bypassing the Rhodesian Parliament.
- 4 Sithole's second main point related to land. He indicated that he had spoken to Nkomo on the phone on this matter. He hoped we recognised that this was a serious issue for Nkomo who needed help on this point. Nkomo had told Sithole that all the other unresolved issues were of minor importance. If HMG would be prepared to commit themselves to a specific figure which they would contribute towards a resettlement programme this would probably get Nkomo over this hurdle.
- 5 Sithole said that Mugabe's approach to the land question was totally different from that of Nkomo. Mugabe was looking for retribution rather than anything else.
- 6 Thirdly Sithole questioned the desirability of pressing the Patriotic Front too hard over a reply on the constitution. He thought that this might be counter-productive.
- 7 Finally Sithole discussed Nkomo's own position. He believed that Nkomo genuinely wanted a settlement and that he would be

/prepared

prepared to accept the constitution as it stood. This had become clear in various contacts that had taken place between members of ZAPU and members of the Salisbury delegation. Both Sithole and Nyemba referred on several occasions to the desirability of some kind of private contact between HMG and Nkomo. Without saying so in specific terms they were urging us to do our best to split Nkomo from Mugabe.

8 I told Sithole that it was extremely valuable to us to have his views on these matters. As far as a referendum was concerned I thought that this could unnecessarily delay and complicate the procedure leading to legal independence. We wanted this process to be as short as possible (Sithole indicated that he agreed). If we had to fit in a referendum and elections this would take far too long. We were concentrating on elections. If all Rhodesian political leaders attending the conference agreed to the constitution this in itself would be something of a referendum. Furthermore, the elections themselves would give the people an opportunity to express their views on the new constitution.

9 As far as frustrating Smith's efforts and bypassing the Rhodesian Parliament was concerned we too had been giving this some thought. We believed that this could be achieved without involving a referendum. I did not refer to the need for the Rhodesian Parliament to be dissolved at the beginning of the pre-independence period.

10 On land I took Rev Sithole through the Secretary of State's statement to the conference yesterday and emphasised the significance of the offer that we had made. This statement had been intended to help Mr Nkomo. It gave him a great deal that he wanted on the land issue. HMG could not commit themselves at this stage to a precise figure. Apart from our own financial constraints we would need to discuss with the new Government of Zimbabwe precisely what kind of resettlement programme they had in mind. Until we had done this we could not start talking about precise figures.

11 I pointed out that we were not pressing any unreasonable ultimatum upon the Patriotic Front. Our constitution was tabled on 3 October after nearly four weeks discussion. We had already given them more than another week to make up their minds. We could not delay indefinitely. I reminded Mr Sithole that we were under strong pressure from his own delegation, apart from others, to get a move on.

12 As far as Nkomo's position is concerned I said that we were aware of his anxiety to come to a satisfactory agreement on the constitution. We were doing what we could to assist him (on land). The door was open if Mr Nkomo wished at any time to discuss matters further with us. We were available and there would be no difficulty in arranging a meeting if that is what he wished.

J. M. Day.

12 October 1979

D M Day

Copied to:
Private Secretary
PS/LPS
PS/Mr Luce
Sir A Duff

P.S. 45 minutes after Rev Sithole left me I had a phone call from Mr Rowland. He said that Sithole had told him that we thought a meeting with Mr Nkomo would be helpful and that I would be pleased to see him. I explained that this was not quite what I had discussed with Mr Sithole. I had merely said in response to remarks by Mr Sithole that we were of course ready to have a meeting with Mr Nkomo if he thought at any time that this would be helpful. Mr Rowland said that he would be seeing Mr Nkomo this evening and would be happy to pass on any message about a meeting.

2 After consulting Sir A Duff I have spoken again to Mr Rowland and said that we are in direct touch with Mr Nkomo and would not therefore wish to take up Mr Rowland's suggestion that he should discuss the possibility of a meeting.

J. M. Day.

12 October 1979

D M Day

SUBJECT

CRS 800

CONFIDENTIAL

FM FCO 121146Z OCT 79

TO FLASH LUSAKA

TELNO 834 OF 12 OCTOBER

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, DAR ES SALAAM, PRETORIA, GABORONE, MAPUTO, UKMIS NEW YORK, LAGOS.

CONFIDENTIAL

PRIME MINISTER'S

PERSONAL MESSAGE

SERIAL No. 1117/79

MIPT: RHODESIA.

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF REPLY FROM PRIME MINISTER TO PRESIDENT KAUNDA.

BEGINS:

DEAR KENNETH,

THANK YOU FOR YOUR HELPFUL AND CONSTRUCTIVE MESSAGE. I WAS PARTICULARLY GRATEFUL FOR YOUR ASSURANCE OF CONTINUING SUPPORT IN THE DIFFICULT TASK AHEAD. I CAN ASSURE YOU THAT OUR AIM IS A SETTLEMENT INVOLVING ALL THE PARTIES, WHICH WILL BRING PEACE TO RHODESIA AND TO ZAMBIA, IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PRINCIPLES WE AGREED ON AT LUSAKA.

I WAS HEARTENED BY YOUR WELCOME FOR THE INDEPENDENCE CONSTITUTION WHICH WE HAVE TABLED. IT HAS GONE A LONG WAY TO MEET THE PATRIOTIC FRONT'S REQUIREMENTS AND IT HAS THEREFORE BEEN NO EASY TASK TO SECURE THE SALISBURY DELEGATION'S ACCEPTANCE OF IT. BOTH SIDES HAVE BEEN WILLING TO COMPROMISE AND WE ARE APPRECIATIVE OF THAT. BUT THERE CAN BE NO FURTHER CHANGES. IN THESE WEEKS OF INTENSIVE NEGOTIATIONS WE HAVE THOROUGHLY EXAMINED ALL THESE ISSUES AND ARE QUITE CONFIDENT THAT OUR CONSTITUTION REPRESENTS THE ONLY BASIS ON WHICH AGREEMENT IS POSSIBLE.

AT THE SESSION OF THE CONFERENCE ON 11 OCTOBER THE PATRIOTIC FRONT RESERVED THEIR POSITION ON MAJOR ISSUES AND KEPT OPEN THE POSSIBILITY OF REVERTING TO THEM AT A LATER STAGE. THIS IS NOT COMPATIBLE WITH OUR AGREEMENT AT THE BEGINNING OF THE CONFERENCE THAT, BEFORE MOVING ON TO DISCUSS THE INTERIM ARRANGEMENTS, WE WOULD NEED TO HAVE AGREEMENT ON THE CONSTITUTION ITSELF, CONTINGENT OF COURSE TO SUBSEQUENT AGREEMENT ON THE INTERIM ARRANGEMENTS. WE HAVE MADE CLEAR THAT THE NEXT MEETING OF THE CONFERENCE WILL BE TO DISCUSS THE INTERIM ARRANGEMENTS AND WE HOPE THAT THEY WILL LET US KNOW IN THE VERY NEAR FUTURE THAT THEY CAN ACCEPT THE CONSTITUTION, SUBJECT TO SATISFACTORY INTERIM ARRANGEMENTS.

I AM ASKING MY HIGH COMMISSIONER TO EXPLAIN TO YOU THE POSITION ON THE SPECIFIC POINTS WHICH YOU RAISE ON THE CONSTITUTION. IN

PARTICULAR, WE HERE ARE DEEPLY CONSCIOUS OF THE IMMENSE IMPORTANCE OF THE QUESTION OF LAND. BUT THE POINT IS, AS I AM SURE YOU YOURSELF UNDERSTAND, THAT IT IS OF REAL SIGNIFICANCE TO BOTH SIDES. IT IS NATURAL THAT THE SUBJECT SHOULD AROUSE STRONG EMOTIONS ON BOTH SIDES. WE ARE ALL CONSCIOUS OF THAT. BUT WHAT WE HAVE DONE, IN OUR CONSTITUTION, IS TO MAKE IT POSSIBLE FOR THE NEW GOVERNMENT TO ACQUIRE UNDERUTILISED LAND COMPULSORILY -- AS WELL OF COURSE AS BEING ABLE TO BUY LAND FROM FARMERS WHO WANT TO LEAVE. WHAT WE HAVE UNDERLINE NEXT WORD NOT BEEN ABLE TO DO IS TO AGREE THAT COMPENSATION SHOULD NOT NECESSARILY BE PAYABLE. I AM SURE YOU UNDERSTAND THAT. ONCE RHODESIA IS INDEPENDENT, INVESTMENT FUNDS, AND AID MONEY TOO, WILL BEGIN COMING IN AND I AM SURE IN MY OWN MIND THAT FINDING THE MONEY FOR A SENSIBLE SCHEME OF LAND REDISTRIBUTION WILL NOT BE A REAL PROBLEM. WE WOULD HELP WITH THIS -- WITHIN THE LIMITS OF OUR FINANCIAL RESOURCES.

YOU RAISE THE QUESTION OF RHODESIAN RAIDS INTO NEIGHBOURING COUNTRIES. SINCE ISSUING INVITATIONS TO THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE, WE HAVE PRESSED BOTH SIDES TO ACCEPT A CEASE-FIRE. BISHOP MUZOREWA HAS EXPRESSED A READINESS TO AGREE TO THIS. I THINK IT A TRAGEDY THAT THE FIGHTING HAS CONTINUED DURING THE CONFERENCE. ONCE WE HAVE AGREEMENT ON THE CONSTITUTION, WE SHALL BE RENEWING OUR EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE A CEASEFIRE AND ELECTIONS IN WHICH ALL THE PARTIES CAN PARTICIPATE. I HOPE THAT YOU WILL SUPPORT US IN THIS.

LET ME REPEAT IN CONCLUSION HOW GRATEFUL I AM FOR YOUR ADVICE AND SUPPORT. I KNOW THAT YOU ARE AS ANXIOUS AS I AM TO SEE THE CONFLICT ENDED. YOU HAVE PERSONALLY MADE GREAT EFFORTS, AT THE HEADS OF GOVERNMENT MEETING AND SINCE, TO MAKE A SETTLEMENT POSSIBLE. THE CONFERENCE HAS REACHED A DIFFICULT POINT, BUT I CAN ASSURE YOU THAT WE ARE DOING ALL WE CAN TO REACH A LASTING SETTLEMENT AND TO BRING ABOUT RECONCILIATION.

2. PLEASE SEE MIPT.

CARRINGTON

F I L E S

RHOD D
OADS
H AM D
NEWS D
FUSD
PLANNING STAFF
ES & SD
CCD
FRD
UND
LEGAL ADVISERS
(MR FREELAND)
(MR FIFOOT)
ECON D
PCD

DEF D
OID
PS
PS/LFS
PS/MR LUCE
PS/MR RIDLEY
PS/MR HURD
PS/FUS
SIR A DUFF
LORD N G LENNOX
MISS BROWN
MR DAY
MR WILLSON
MR ASPIN

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION
RHODESIA POLICY

CONFIDENTIAL

FM FCO 121145Z OCT 79

TO FLASH LUSAKA

TELEGRAM NUMBER 833 OF 12 OCTOBER

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON DAR ES SALAAM, PRETORIA, GABORONE,
MAPUTO, UKMIS NEW YORK, LAGOS*Lg. Mind*

RHODESIA: PRESIDENT KAUNDA'S MESSAGE

1. LIKE YOU WE ARE CONCERNED THAT CHONA IS SERIOUSLY MIS-REPRESENTING TO PRESIDENT KAUNDA THE COURSE OF DISCUSSIONS AT THE CONFERENCE. THE PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE INDICATES THAT CHONA IS STILL FIGHTING OVER POINTS WHICH THE PATRIOTIC FRONT (PARTICULARLY ZAPU) HAVE ALREADY CONCEDED.

2. YOU SHOULD THEREFORE ARRANGE TO DELIVER THE MESSAGE IN MIPT TO KAUNDA PERSONALLY. IN DOING SO YOU SHOULD ADD THE FOLLOWING COMMENTS ON THE DETAILED POINTS IN KAUNDA'S MESSAGE.

A. PRESIDENCY. IT WILL BE OPEN TO THE PEOPLE OF RHODESIA TO MOVE TO AN EXECUTIVE PRESIDENCY IF THEY WISH TO DO SO. IN THE PROPOSALS THEY PUT FORWARD ON 8 OCTOBER THE PATRIOTIC FRONT ACCEPTED A QUOTE CONSTITUTIONAL UNQUOTE PRESIDENCY.

B. AND C. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS. WE SHALL BE READY TO PROVIDE TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE FOR LAND SETTLEMENT SCHEMES AND CAPITAL AID FOR AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS AND INFRASTRUCTURE. IF AN AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT BANK OR SOME EQUIVALENT INSTITUTION WERE SET UP TO PROMOTE AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT INCLUDING LAND SETTLEMENT SCHEMES, WE SHOULD BE PREPARED TO CONTRIBUTE TO THE INITIAL CAPITAL (THOUGH THE COSTS WOULD BE BEYOND THE CAPACITY OF ANY INDIVIDUAL DONOR COUNTRY AND WE CANNOT COMMIT OURSELVES TO A SPECIFIC SHARE AT THIS STAGE). WE SHOULD BE READY TO HELP INDEPENDENT ZIMBABWE TO OBTAIN INTERNATIONAL ASSISTANCE IN THIS AS IN OTHER AREAS. THERE IS HOWEVER, NO POSSIBILITY OF ESTABLISHING AN INTERNATIONAL FUND TO UNDERWRITE THE PENSIONS OF RHODESIAN PUBLIC SERVANTS.

D. COALITION. WE HAVE MADE PROVISION THAT THE PARTY REPRESENTING THE MAJORITY OF WHITES SHOULD NOT BE ABLE TO FORM A COALITION WITH ANY SINGLE PARTY EXCEPT THAT WHICH HAS THE LARGEST NUMBER OF SEATS ELECTED ON THE COMMON ROLL. THE PRESIDENT WOULD BE EXPECTED TO CALL ON THE LEADER OF THE LARGEST AFRICAN PARTY TO TRY TO FORM A GOVERNMENT. BUT IT WILL BE NECESSARY FOR ANY PARTY WHICH SEEKS TO FORM

A GOVERNMENT EITHER TO WIN A MAJORITY OF SEATS IN THE HOUSE OF ASSEMBLY OR TO FORM A COALITION.

E. THE UNANIMITY RULE. MAKING THE MAIN PROTECTIVE PROVISIONS OF THE DECLARATION OF RIGHTS (AND THOSE CONCERNING WHITE REPRESENTATION) AMENDABLE ONLY BY UNANIMOUS VOTE BY THE HOUSE OF ASSEMBLY IN A NUMBER OF AREAS WAS ESSENTIAL, IN VIEW OF THE HISTORY OF CONFLICT IN RHODESIA, TO GIVE ADEQUATE PROTECTION TO ALL THE PEOPLE OF RHODESIA AGAINST THE ARBITRARY EXERCISE OF POWER. IT IS A TEMPORARY PROVISION TO ALLOW CONFIDENCE TO BE RE-ESTABLISHED AND TO PROTECT THE RIGHTS OF ALL THE CITIZENS OF ZIMBABWE, BLACK AND WHITE.

F. LINKAGE. WE HAVE MADE CLEAR FROM THE BEGINNING OF THE CONFERENCE THAT EACH DELEGATION'S ACCEPTANCE OF THE CONSTITUTION WILL BE CONTINGENT ON AGREEMENT ON THE ARRANGEMENTS FOR IMPLEMENTING IT. BISHOP MUZOREWA HAS MADE HIS ACCEPTANCE OF THE INDEPENDENCE CONSTITUTION CONTINGENT ON THAT POINT AND IT IS OPEN TO THE PATRIOTIC FRONT TO DO EXACTLY THE SAME. WHAT WE CANNOT ACCEPT IS THAT EITHER SIDE SHOULD RESERVE THE RIGHT TO REOPEN NEGOTIATION ON THE CONSTITUTION AFTER WE HAVE MOVED ON TO DISCUSS THE PRE-INDEPENDENCE ARRANGEMENTS. OTHERWISE WE SHOULD BE IN DANGER OF LOSING ALL THE GAINS WHICH HAVE BEEN ACHIEVED IN FIVE WEEKS OF DIFFICULT NEGOTIATION. WE WERE UNABLE TO ACCEPT THE STATEMENT MADE BY THE PATRIOTIC FRONT AT THE PLENARY SESSION ON 11 OCTOBER PRECISELY BECAUSE IT ENTERED RESERVATIONS ON MAJOR ISSUES ON THE CONSTITUTION AND KEPT OPEN THE POSSIBILITY OF RE-OPENING THEM AT A LATER STAGE.

3. YOU WILL BE RECEIVING FURTHER GUIDANCE BY IMMEDIATE TELEGRAM ON THE POINT NOW REACHED IN THE CONFERENCE.

CARRINGTON

F I L E S

RHOD D
OADS
N AM D
NEWS D
FUSD
PLANNING STAFF
ES & SD
CCD
FRD
UND
LEGAL ADVISERS
(MR FREELAND)
(MR FIFOOT)
ECON D
PCD

DEF D
OID
PS
PS/LPS
PS/MR LUCE
PS/MR RIDLEY
PS/MR HURD
PS/PUS
SIR A DUFF
LORD N G LENNOX
MISS BROWN
MR DAY
MR WILLSON
MR ASPIN

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION
RHODESIA POLICY

SECRET



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

12 October 1979

submitted to P.A.

to P.A. 12/10

Dear Michael,

I enclose a paper which examines the possible consequences of events in Rhodesia following the Constitutional Conference; and their implications for British policy. Lord Carrington has seen and approved an earlier draft of this paper (to which minor amendments have since been made).

yours ever

Roderic Lyne

(R M J Lyne)
Private Secretary

M O'D B Alexander Esq
10 Downing Street

SECRET

File No.
Department ... Rhodesia
Drafted by
(Block Capitals)
Tel. Extn. 233-5698

OUTWARD
TELEGRAM

Security Classification
CONFIDENTIAL
Precedence
IMMEDIATE
DESKBY Z

FOR
COMMS. DEPT.
USE

Despatched

(Date)
(Time) Z

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PREAMBLE

(Time of Origin) Z (G.M.T.)
(Security Class.) CONFIDENTIAL
(Codeword)
(Restrictive Prefix)
(Caveat/
Privacy marking)
(Deskby) Z

TO IMMEDIATE DAR ES SALAAM
(precedence) (post) Tel. No. of

AND TO (precedence/post)

AND SAVING TO

REPEATED TO (for info) IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, LUSAKA, LUANDA
PRIORITY UKMIS NEW YORK

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Distribution:-

Rhodesia Policy

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[TEXT]

AL
RHODESIA CONSTITUTION CONFERENCE

1. Please pass the following message as soon as possible to President Nyerere from the Prime Minister.

BEGINS

Dear Julius

I have seen Sir Peter Moon's account of his talk with you on 10 October and I am really most grateful to you for finding time to discuss these matters with him.

I would like to share with you my assessment of the position we have now reached in the constitutional conference.

/..

The independence Constitution which we have put forward has in our view gone a very long way to meet the Patriotic Front's requirements. It has therefore been no easy task to secure the Salisbury delegation's acceptance of it. You will have seen the reactions of Mr Ian Smith. That Constitution provides, indisputably, for genuine majority rule.

In these negotiations, both sides have shown a willingness to compromise, and we are appreciative of that. But we have now been engaged in five weeks of intensive negotiation. We have thoroughly examined all the issues and we have no doubt that the Constitution we have put forward is the only basis on which agreement is possible. We cannot make further changes at this stage. And we have made clear from the beginning of the Conference, it is open to both delegations to make their agreement to the independence Constitution conditional on agreement on the pre-independence arrangements.

As you suggested, we have tried to help the Patriotic Front over the question of land. We recognise the very great importance of this problem to both sides. But the independence Constitution does make fully adequate provision for the government to acquire land for settlement. What it also does is to provide for adequate compensation, and that is what the Patriotic Front are at present unable to accept. Peter Carrington made a statement in the Conference on 11 October which was designed to help them even over this hurdle. He promised that

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

we would help, within the limits of our financial resources, with technical assistance for land settlement schemes and capital aid for agricultural development projects and infrastructure. We shall also be ready to help the new government obtain international assistance for these and other purposes.

If there is agreement on the independence Constitution, we shall be able to move on to discuss with both delegations the arrangements for the interim period before independence, including especially elections supervised under our authority - as we agreed at Lusaka - and the arrangements for a ceasefire. This will offer further hope to the people of Rhodesia and of the neighbouring countries that the negotiations are making progress, that Rhodesia will come to independence on the basis of genuine majority rule and that the parties will be prepared to compete for power by political means.

The Salisbury delegation have, as you know, accepted the Constitution. They have also stated their readiness to accept elections supervised under our authority. We are still waiting for the Patriotic Front's acceptance. I hope very much that we can count on your support and influence to bring these negotiations to a successful conclusion.

ENDS

2. You should inform your American colleague ^{of} the action which you have taken. Similar, though not identical messages, are being sent to Machel, Tolbert, Seretse Khama and Shagari. Luanda is being instructed to speak on these lines to the Angolan Government.

File No.
 Department RHODESIA
 Drafted by
 (Block Capitals)
 Tel. Extn ~~257 14214~~

OUTWARD
 TELEGRAM

Security Classification CONFIDENTIAL
Precedence IMMEDIATE
DESKBYZ

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PREAMBLE

(Time of Origin)Z(G.M.T.) (Restrictive Prefix).....
 (Security Class.) CONFIDENTIAL (Caveat/ Privacy Marking).....
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To IMMEDIATE MAPUTO Tel. No. of.....
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AND TO (precedence/post)

AND SAVING TO

REPEATED TO (for info) ... IMMEDIATE ... ~~WAGHIA ... TO NEW YORK, SAKA~~
~~LUANDA, MONROVIA, LAGOS, DAR ES SALAAM~~

SAVING TO (for info).....

Distribution:-

Rhodesia Policy

Copies to:-

(TEXT)

RHODESIA CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE

1. Please pass the following message to President Machel from the Prime Minister.

Begins.

I know how closely you have been following the progress of the Constitutional Conference. We have found it very helpful to be able to keep in touch with your special representative in London. I should like to share with you my personal assessment of the position we have now reached.

/The

CONFIDENTIAL

The independence Constitution which we have put forward has in our view gone a very long way to meet the Patriotic Front's requirements. It has therefore been no easy task to secure the Salisbury delegation's acceptance of it. ~~You will have seen the reactions of Mr Ian Smith.~~ That Constitution provides, indisputably, for genuine majority rule.

In these negotiations, both sides have shown a willingness to compromise, and we are appreciative of that. But we have now been engaged in five weeks of intensive negotiation on the Constitution. We have thoroughly examined all the issues and we have no doubt that the Constitution we have put forward is the only basis on which agreement is possible. We cannot make further changes at this stage.

~~As suggested,~~ We have tried to help the Patriotic Front over the question of land. We recognise the very great importance of this problem to both sides. ⁴ The independence Constitution ^{does} make fully adequate provision for the government to acquire land for settlement. But, ~~however,~~ there must also be provision for adequate compensation. Lord Carrington made a statement in the Conference on 11 October promising that we would help, within the limits of our financial resources, with

/technical

CONFIDENTIAL

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

assistance and capital aid for land settlement projects and agricultural development. We shall also be ready to help the new government obtain international assistance for these and other purposes.

If there is agreement on the independence Constitution, we shall be able to move on to discuss with both delegations the arrangements for the interim period before independence, including elections supervised under our authority, and the arrangements for a cease-fire. This will offer further hope to the people of Rhodesia and of the neighbouring countries that the negotiations are making progress, that Rhodesia will come to independence on the basis of genuine majority rule and that the parties will be prepared to compete for power by political means. The Salisbury delegation have as you know accepted the Constitution. They have also stated their readiness to accept elections under our authority. We are still waiting for the Patriotic Front's acceptance. I very much hope that we can count on your support and influence in bringing these negotiations to a successful conclusion.

Ends.

2. You should inform your American colleague of the action which you have taken. Similar, though not identical, messages are being sent to Nyerere, Seretse Khama, Tolbert and Shagari. Luanda is being instructed to speak on these lines.

File No.
Department
Drafted by
(Block Capitals)
Tel. Extn

OUTWARD
TELEGRAM

Security Classification CONFIDENTIAL
Precedence IMMEDIATE
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PREAMBLE

(Time of Origin)Z(G.M.T.) (Restrictive Prefix).....
(Security Class.)...CONFIDENTIAL..... (Caveat/
Privacy Marking).....
(Codeword)..... (Deskby)

To IMMEDIATE GABORONE Tel. No.....of.....
(precedence) (post)

AND TO (precedence/post)
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AND SAVING TO

REPEATED TO (for info) IMMEDIATE: WASHINGTON
PRIORITY: UKMIS NEW YORK, LUSAKA, MAPUTO,
LUANDA, LAGOS

SAVING TO (for info).....

Distribution:-

RHODESIA POLICY

Despatched

Copies to:-

(TEXT)

RHODESIA CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE

1. Please pass the following message to President Seretse Khama from the Prime Minister.

Begins.

I was very glad to see Mr Turner's account of his discussion with you on 3 October about Rhodesia. I would like to share with you the assessment of the position we have now reached in the Constitutional Conference.

The independence Constitution which we have put

CONFIDENTIAL

/forward

forward has in our view gone a very long way to meet the Patriotic Front's requirements. It has therefore been no easy task to secure the Salisbury delegation's acceptance of it.

That Constitution provides, indisputably, for genuine majority rule.

In these negotiations, both sides have shown a willingness to compromise, and we are appreciative of that. But we have now been engaged in five weeks of intensive negotiation on the Constitution. We have thoroughly examined all the issues and we have no doubt that the Constitution we have put forward is the only basis on which agreement is possible. We cannot make further changes at this stage.

We have tried to help the Patriotic Front over the question of land. We recognise the very great importance of this problem to both sides. The independence Constitution makes fully adequate provision for the government to acquire land for settlement. But there must also be provision for adequate compensation. Peter Carrington made a statement in the Conference on 11 October promising that we would help, within the limits of our financial resources, with technical assistance for land settlement schemes and capital aid for agricultural development -

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

~~assistance and capital aid for land settlement projects and agricultural development.~~ We shall also be ready to help the new government obtain international assistance for these and other purposes.

If there is agreement on the independence Constitution, we shall be able to move on to discuss with both delegations the arrangements for the interim period before independence, including elections supervised under our authority, and the arrangements for a cease-fire. This will offer further hope to the people of Rhodesia and of the neighbouring countries that the negotiations are making progress, that Rhodesia will come to independence on the basis of genuine majority rule and that the parties will be prepared to compete for power by political means. The Salisbury delegation have as you know accepted the Constitution. They have also stated their readiness to accept elections under our authority. We are still waiting for the Patriotic Front's acceptance. I very much hope that we can count on your support and influence in bringing these negotiations to a successful conclusion.

Ends.

2. You should inform your American colleague of the action which you have taken. Similar, though not identical, messages are being sent to Nyerere, ^{Machel} ~~Seretse~~ Khama, Tolbert and Shagari. Luanda is being instructed to speak on these lines.

File No.
Department RHODESIA
Drafted by
(Block Capitals)
Tel. Extn.....

OUTWARD
TELEGRAM

Security Classification CONFIDENTIAL
Precedence IMMEDIATE
DESKBYZ

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(Time of Origin)Z(G.M.T.) (Restrictive Prefix).....
(Security Class.) CONFIDENTIAL (Caveat/
Privacy Marking).....
(Codeword) (Deskby).....Z

TO IMMEDIATE LAGOS Tel. No. of
(precedence) (post)

AND TO (precedence/post).....
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AND SAVING TO.....
REPEATED TO (for info)..... PRIORITY
IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, / UKMIS NEW YORK, DAR ES SALAAM,
LUSAKA, MAPUTO, LUANDA, MONROVIA

SAVING TO (for info).....

Distribution:-
Rhodesia Policy

[TEXT]
RHODESIA CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE

1. Following is text of a message from President Shagari to the Prime Minister, delivered to the Permanent Under-Secretary by the Nigerian High Commissioner yesterday.

Begins

My dear Prime Minister,

We have as you know followed with the keenest interest the progress so far made in the ongoing Constitutional Conference on Zimbabwe. We appreciate that the negotiations at Lancaster House have reached a critical stage and that the Conference is now very delicately poised.

We believe that the proposals which the British Government have advanced may not fully satisfy all the parties to the negotiations, but we consider it essential that the Conference should reach an early agreement on the Constitution, conditional upon agreement

Copies to:-

being reached on the transitional arrangements. We would therefore urge that unless agreement was reached on the transitional arrangements no agreement should be deemed to have been reached on the Constitution.

Trusting that this proposal will assist in preventing a breakdown of the Conference, I avail myself of this opportunity to convey to your excellency the assurances of my great esteem and highest consideration.

Yours sincerely, Shehu Shagari.

Ends.

2. Please pass the following reply to President Shagari from the Prime Minister as soon as possible:

Begins.

I was very grateful for your helpful message which I received last night.

Both sides have had difficulty in accepting the proposals we have tabled in the Rhodesia Conference. The independence Constitution which we have put forward has in our view gone a very long way to meeting the Patriotic Front's requirements. It has therefore been no easy task to secure the Salisbury delegation's acceptance of it. That Constitution provides, indisputably, for genuine majority rule. In five weeks of intensive negotiations

/we

we have thoroughly examined all the issues. I have no doubt that the Constitution we have put forward is the only basis on which agreement is possible. We cannot make further changes at this stage.

We have tried to help the Patriotic Front over the question of land. We recognise the very great importance of this problem to both sides. The independence Constitution makes fully adequate provision for the government to acquire land for settlement. But, ~~as you recognise~~, there must also be provision for adequate compensation. Lord Carrington made a statement in the Conference on 11 October promising that we would help, within the limits of our financial resources, with technical assistance for land settlement projects and ^{agricultural development} ~~infrastructure~~. We shall also be ready to help the new government obtain international assistance for these and other purposes.

If there is agreement on the independence Constitution, we shall be able to move on to discuss with both delegations the arrangements for elections supervised under our authority - as we agreed at Lusaka - and the arrangements for a cease-fire. This will offer further hope to the people of Rhodesia and of the neighbouring countries that the negotiations are making progress, that Rhodesia will come to independence on the basis of genuine majority rule and that the parties will be prepared to compete for power by political means. ~~The Salisbury delegation have stated their readiness to accept elections supervised under our authority. Bishop Muzorewa also made clear at the~~

/beginning

89280 Dd 532113 200M 2/79 StS

beginning of the Conference his readiness to agree to a
cease-fire.

We have made clear from the beginning of this Conference that in our view agreement by both sides to the independence Constitution is conditional on agreement also on the pre-independence arrangements. Bishop Muzorewa has accepted the independence Constitution, subject to that reservation; and it is open to the Patriotic Front to do exactly the same.

I very much hope that we can count on your support in bringing these negotiations to a successful conclusion.

Please insert "A" below.

Ends.

3. You should inform your American colleague of the action which you have taken. Messages on somewhat the same lines are being sent to Nyerere, Machel, Seretse Khama and Tolbert. Luanda is being instructed to speak to the Angolan Government.

"A"

As this is the first message which I have addressed to you since your assumption of office, I should like to end by sending you my warm congratulations and my best wishes for the success of your administration in the years ahead. I and my colleagues look forward to working with your Government on international problems of common concern to us. It is our firm desire to strengthen the relations between Nigeria and Britain which we believe are mutually beneficial. It is a whole network of close links between our two countries on which we must continue to build.

File No.
Department RHODESIA
Drafted by
(Block Capitals)
Tel. Extn

OUTWARD
TELEGRAM

Security Classification CONFIDENTIAL
Precedence IMMEDIATE
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(Time of Origin).....Z(G.M.T.) (Restrictive Prefix).....
 (Security Class.) CONFIDENTIAL (Caveat/ Privacy Marking).....
 (Codeword)..... (Deskby).....

To IMMEDIATE MONROVIA Tel. No.....of.....
 (precedence) (post)

AND TO (precedence/post)

AND SAVING TO PRIORITY:
 REPEATED TO (for info) ~~(IMMEDIATE: WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK, DAR ES SALAAM
 BUSAKA, MAPUTO, LUANDA, LAGOS)~~

SAVING TO (for info).....

Distribution:-

(TEXT)

Rhodesia Policy

RHODESIA CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE

1. Please pass the following message from the Prime Minister to President Tolbert.

Begins.

I know how closely you are following developments at the Rhodesia Constitutional Conference. I have seen Mr Doubleday's account of your talks with him on 11 October. I would therefore like/you to know my assessment of the position we have now reached.

The independence Constitution which we have put forward /has

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Copies to:-

has in our view gone a very long way to meet the Patriotic Front's requirements. It has therefore been no easy task to secure the Salisbury delegation's acceptance of it. ~~You will have~~

~~some difficulties in this regard.~~ That Constitution provides, indisputably, for genuine majority rule.

In these negotiations, both sides have shown a willingness to compromise, and we are appreciative of that. But we have now been engaged in five weeks of intensive negotiation on the Constitution. We have thoroughly examined all the issues and we have no doubt that the Constitution we have put forward is the only basis on which agreement is possible. We cannot make further changes at this stage.

We have tried to help the Patriotic Front over the question of land. We recognise the very great importance of this problem to both sides. The independence Constitution makes fully adequate provision for the government to acquire land for settlement. But, as you recognise, there must also be provision for adequate compensation. Lord Carrington made a statement in the Conference on 11 October promising that we would help, within the limits of our financial resources, with technical assistance for land settlement schemes and capital aid for agricultural ^{development.} ~~land settlement~~

/projects

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

We shall also be ready to help the new government obtain international assistance for these and other purposes.

If there is agreement on the independence Constitution, we shall be able to move on to discuss with both delegations the arrangements for the interim period before independence, including elections supervised under our authority - as was agreed at Lusaka - and the arrangements for a cease-fire. This will offer further hope to the people of Rhodesia and of the neighbouring countries that the negotiations are making progress, that Rhodesia will come to independence on the basis of genuine majority rule and that the parties will be prepared to compete for power by political means. The Salisbury delegation have as you know accepted the Constitution. They have also stated their readiness to accept elections supervised under our authority. (Bishop Muzorewa also made clear at the beginning of the Conference his readiness to agree to a cease-fire.) We still await the Patriotic Front's acceptance.

I very much hope that we can count on your support in bringing these negotiations to a successful conclusion.
Ends.

2. You should inform your American colleague of the action which you have taken. Similar, though not identical, messages are being sent to Nyerere, Machel, Seretse Khama and Shagari.

CONFIDENTIAL



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

12 October 1979

Dear Michael,

For [unclear]

Rhodesia Constitutional Conference: Messages from
the Prime Minister to the Presidents of the
Front Line States, Nigeria and Liberia

Lord Carrington recommends that the Prime Minister should send messages to President Nyerere, President Machel, President Seretse Khama, President Shagari and President Tolbert (as Chairman of the OAU) describing the position reached at the Constitutional Conference. I enclose drafts. We should like to telegraph these messages as soon as possible. The Resident Clerk will hold copies of them ready for despatch.

*yours ever
Roderic Lyne*

(R M J Lyne)
Private Secretary

M O'D B Alexander Esq
10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL



(2)

10 DOWNING STREET

Prime Minister -

These two texts (from the S.A. Govt & from Bp Angewand) were delivered to-day. The Foreign Secretary is not taking them too tragically. He has spoken to the Bishop & told him he understands & sympathises with the Bishop's position.

The S. African message is not v. surprising. Col van der Post spoke to Mr P.W. Botha last night: Mr Botha was 'reassuring' & said that he would keep Mr Smith 'under control'.

(1) again - the Prime Minister is dropping 3/4 too long. Mr.



UK.8/3/1/1/7

South African Embassy (Rhodesia)

fy. [Signature]

The Ambassador of the Republic of South Africa presents his compliments to Her Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs and has the honour to convey the following message from the South African Government:

"The South African Government is profoundly disturbed at the latest turn of events at the Lancaster House Constitutional Conference on Zimbabwe/Rhodesia. The conference, originally scheduled to last two weeks, has now dragged on for five, and the delay is due to the publicly proclaimed intransigence of one of the parties, the Patriotic Front. The momentum gained by the tabling of the constitutional proposals of the United Kingdom and their subsequent acceptance by Bishop Muzorewa has been dissipated by failure to deal decisively with the refusal of the Patriotic Front to give an unqualified acceptance of the proposed constitution. Despite the clear prior statement by the United Kingdom Government that the constitution as tabled was not negotiable and was presented on a take-it or leave-it basis, the Patriotic Front have repeatedly been afforded additional time to reconsider their rejection of the constitution as it stands. This has had no

2/...

effect on their position, as was confirmed yesterday, but the reaction of the United Kingdom Government has been to announce another postponement, despite the statement at the Conservative Party Conference on the previous day by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and Commonwealth Affairs that:-

'I say to those who ... appear to think that we should talk on and on and on about everything, without getting agreement to anything, that a time had to come when a decision would be taken on the principal issues at stake.'

The South African Government believes the following facts to be relevant and important at this juncture:

Firstly, agreement to the United Kingdom draft constitution was a courageous act by the delegation of Bishop Muzorewa. There is no doubt that it was a controversial decision not lightly taken, which could have caused the disintegration of his delegation. Deep-seated differences of opinion could easily have frustrated acceptance.

Secondly, that Bishop Muzorewa's acceptance was predicated upon the assumption that the same rules would apply to the Patriotic Front delegation and that, having accepted the Constitution, he was entitled to believe that his Government had done all, if not more, that could be expected of it. Therefore there was no justification for the continued imposition of sanctions.

Thirdly, that the malaise surrounding developments concerning the attitude of the Patriotic Front is leading to a climate of cynicism, uncertainty, frustration and distrust in Zimbabwe/Rhodesia itself.

Decisiveness, particularly as regards the lifting of sanctions is of vital importance at this crucial period, when many white Rhodesians, whose experience and technological proficiency is so urgently required in Zimbabwe/Rhodesia, are making up their minds either to stay or leave.

Fourthly, that every moment of delay encourages the armed conflict in Zimbabwe/Rhodesia, jeopardising the eventual recovery and reconstruction of the country. The toll of human life is appalling.

Fifthly, that the absence of the Prime Minister from his country for five weeks contributes to the confusion and the feeling of insecurity in the country, and is having a negative effect on orderly administration. Bishop Muzorewa stands in a special relationship to his people and they require his leadership.

Finally, that the present uncertainty is playing into the hands of the enemies of peace, stability and orderly progress in the region and is being exploited by them. The consequences for the whole southern African region could be catastrophic, with violence spreading like cancer from one country to the next, and with incalculable danger to the survival of democracy in the region and harm to the strategic interests of the West and the democratic leaders of Africa.

The South African Government therefore urgently requests the Government of the United Kingdom to take the steps necessary to remove the uncertainty from the present situation. In particular the South African Government urges the Government of the United Kingdom to remove sanctions without delay as

the minimum step required to restore essential confidence in the future of Zimbabwe/Rhodesia and avoid further deterioration in the situation.

The Ambassador of the Republic of South Africa avails himself of this opportunity to renew to Her Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs the assurance of his highest consideration.

LONDON WC2N 5DP
12 October 1979





ZIMBABWE RHODESIA

PRIME MINISTER
SALISBURY

12 October 1979

Lord Carrington
Secretary for Foreign & Commonwealth Affairs
LONDON

My dear Lord Carrington,

Five weeks have elapsed since I and my delegation left our country to attend this Conference. After full and exhaustive discussion on the issues involved in the Constitutional proposals, both in plenary and in bilateral meetings, the British Government tabled its proposals for the independence constitution on 3 October 1979. On 5th October I announced that, on behalf of the Government of Zimbabwe Rhodesia, I accepted the proposals - subject to agreement on matters relating to the implementation of the proposals and I called for the immediate lifting of sanctions. This acceptance of the proposals was formally conveyed to you, Sir, at the plenary meeting on Monday, 8th October.

The Patriotic Front, on the other hand, despite the fact that exhaustive discussions had taken place and you had made it clear that the proposals you had tabled were for acceptance or rejection but not for re-negotiation, came up with counter proposals, the effect of which would be to negate the work already done. At the plenary meeting held on 11th October the Patriotic Front was again equivocal in its reply to your proposals and now a further adjournment of the Conference has been granted for an indefinite period.

I must protest most strongly at this further delay in the business of the Conference. This last week has been completely unproductive. As I made clear when I accepted the invitation to attend the Conference, I am responsible for the government of my country and this is affected, to some extent, by the fact that I and many of my Ministers have been away from our country for so long. There are still very complex matters to be discussed and, in the meantime, people in my country are being killed or wounded and sanctions continue to be maintained. I must advise you that I and my Ministers cannot stay in London indefinitely. In the interests of good government, we will soon have to return to Salisbury. I trust that you will ensure that the business of the Conference proceeds expeditiously without any further delays.

Yours sincerely,

Bishop Abel T. Muzorewa

POST OFFICE TELEGRAPHS INTERNATIONAL TELEGRAPHS

Send Telegrams — CONSULT TELEPHONE DIRECTORY OR TELEX DIALLING CARD POST OFFICE TELEGRAPHS INTERNATIONAL TELEPHONE DIRECTORY OR TELEX DIALLING CARD

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. 116/79T

070
SUBJECT

Oct 12 22 41 '79

NNNN
ZCZC CLH600 LBG642 ELB5088 ROC189 MO1841 1011-921
GBXX CO LIMV 244
EM/NR137 MONROVIA LIBERIA 244/232 10 1600G

LHS 804

THE RT HONOURABLE MARGARET THATCHER PRIME MINSTER OF
GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRLEAND 10 DOWNING STREET
LONDONS W1

P.O. INTERNATIONAL TELEGRAPHS
LONDON
12 OCT. 79
S.W.1 AREA OFFICE BROADWAY
ENQUIRIES DIAL 168

R131

AS WE CONTINUE TO FOLLOW WITH UNDERSTANDABLE INTEREST AND CONCERN
THE CURRENT CONSTITUTIONAL TALKS ON THE FUTURE OF ZIMBABWE CAM
IT HAS COME TO OUR ATTENTION THAT CERTAIN DIFFICULTIES HAVE
DEVELOPED WHICH REPRESENT A DEPARTURE FROM THE SPIRT OF THE LUSAKA
COMMONWEALTH SUMMIT STOP SHOULD THIS INDEED BE THE CASE I WOULD
URGE AND IMPLORE YOU CMA MADAM PRIME MINISTER CMA TO MAKE EVERY
EFFORT TO ENSURE THAT THE TALKE CONTINUE JTO BE HELD IN AN
ATMOSPHERE OF ACCOMMODATION CMAA FLEXIBILITY AND CONCILIATION CMAA
AND THAT THERE REMAINS A WILLINGNESS TO CONTINUINGLY LOOK AT
THE VARIOUS ISSUES IN ALL THEIR RAIFICATIONS SO AS TO ALLAY THE
FEARS AND MSUSPICIONS OF ALL CONCERNED PARTIES INCLUSIVE OF THE
PATRIOTIC FRONT STOP I AM SURE YOU WILL AGREE CMA MADAM PRIME
MINISTER CMA THAT WE
MUST ALL CONTINUE TO PRAY AND ACT SO AS TO AVERY A BREAKDOWN IN
THE TALKS CMA FOR THIS MAY VERY WELL BE THE LAST CHANCE TO STAVE
OFF CATASTROPHE IN THE REGIOND AND END THE DEATH AND DESTRUCTION
THAT ILLEGALITY AND ILLEGITIMACY HAVE CASUED THE PEOPLE OF
ZIMBABWE TO SUFFER FOR SO LONG STOP WITH RENEWED ASSURANCES OF
MY HIGHEST CONSIDERATION AND ESTEEM SINCERELY

WR TOLBERT JR.++
PRESIDENT OF LIBERIA AND CURRENT CHAIRMAN OF THE
ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY

COL PATRIOTIC FRONT STOP I AM SURE



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

12 October 1979

Dear Michael,

*dictated to chequers.
12/10.*

Messages on Rhodesia

/ I enclose the paragraph which, as I told
you on the telephone, we propose should be added
/ at the end of the message from the Prime Minister
to President Shagari of Nigeria. I also enclose
an advance copy of the telegram from Maputo
which I mentioned to you.

*Yours ever
Roderic Lyne*

(R M J Lyne)
Private Secretary

M O'D B Alexander Esq
10 Downing Street

Paragraph to be added to the end of the message
from the Prime Minister to President Shagari of Nigeria

"As this is the first message which I have addressed to you since your assumption of office I should like to end by sending you my warm congratulations, and my best wishes for the success of your administration in the years ahead. I and my colleagues look forward to working with your government on international problems of common concern to us. It is our firm desire to strengthen the relations between Nigeria and Britain which we believe are mutually beneficial. There is a whole network of close links between our two countries on which we must continue to build." ~~This is an~~

IMMEDIATE

PS
PS/SIR I GILMOUR
PS/MR LUCE
PS/PUS
SIR A DUFF
MR WILLSON
MR BYATT
LORD N.G LENNOX

PS/NO 10 DOWNING STREET

MR R L WADE-GERY)
MR P M MAXEY)
COL MOIR) CABINET
MR P J FOWLER) OFFICE
DIO)

M. D. A. S.

HD/RHODESIA DEPT (3)

HD/C AF D
HD/S AF D

HD/PUSD (2)

HD/NEWS DEPT

HD/WAD

MR FREELAND LEGAL ADVISER RM K200A

MR FIFOOT LEGAL ADVISER RM K164

GPS 550

CONFIDENTIAL

FM MAPUTO 121312 Z OCT 79

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 315 OF 12 OCTOBER

INFO LUSAKA DAR ES SALAAM LAGOS GABORONE MIRIMBA SALISBURY WASHINGTON
PRETORIA LUANDA UKMIS NEW YORK

RHODESIA CONFERENCE

1. I PRESENTED CREDENTIALS TODAY. AFTER THE TRADITIONAL WARM WORDS OF WELCOME PRESIDENT MACHEL LAUNCHED STRAIGHT INTO THE PROBLEMS OF CENTRAL AND SOUTHERN AFRICA. HE STRESSED THAT MOZAMBIQUE FULLY SUPPORTS THE EFFORTS NOW BEING MADE TO SECURE A JUST AND PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT RESULTING IN A STABLE, UNITED, NON-RACIAL, RECONCILED, FULLY DEMOCRATIC ZIMBABWE. HE WAS WORKING WITH US TOWARDS THIS END. HE MUCH ADMIRERD THE BRITISH WAY OF DEALING WITH NATIONALIST LEADERS OF FORMERLY DEPENDENT TERRITORIES AND CITED THE EXAMPLES OF KAUNDA, BANDA AND OTHERS WHO WERE RECOGNISED AND GIVEN THEIR DUE RESPECT BY THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT AND INDIVIDUAL BRITISH OFFICIALS THE MOMENT THEY WERE DEMOCRATICALLY ELECTED TO OFFICE. THIS ADMIRABLE TRAIT HOWEVER WAS ABSENT FROM THE WHITE LEADERSHIP IN SALISBURY AND HE FEARED THAT IAN SMITH AND THE SOUTH AFRICANS WERE INTENT ON SABOTAGING THE CONFERENCE.

2. HE PAID TRIBUTE TO YOUR EFFORTS AND WAS GLAD THAT THOSE WHO WANTED THE IMMEDIATE LIFTING OF SANCTIONS WERE ROUNDLY DEFEATED AT TLOE POL. HE RECALLED THE PATRIOTIC FRONT FOR ENTERING UPON THE

BLAC POOL. HE PRAISED THE PATRIOTIC FRONT FOR ENTERING UPON THE NEGOTIATIONS IN A SERIOUS AND CONSTRUCTIVE FRAME OF MIND. HE WISHED TO URGE YOU STRONGLY TO KEEP THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD AS SHORT AS POSSIBLE. THE LONGER IT WAS, THE MORE ROOM THERE WOULD BE FOR MISCHIEF-MAKERS TO SABOTAGE ANY AGREEMENT AND DESTROY THE COUNTRY'S ECONOMY. HE MENTIONED MR PIK BOTHA'S STATEMENT (PRETORIA TELEGRAM, NO 697) AS AN INDICATION THAT SOUTH AFRICA WAS CAPABLE OF CAUSING SERIOUS TROUBLE - HENCE, HE EMPHASISED AGAIN, THE NEED FOR AS BRIEF A TRANSITION PERIOD AS POSSIBLE. HE HIMSELF THOUGHT THAT THREE MONTHS WOULD BE ENOUGH. HE DID NOT THINK IT WOULD BE NECESSARY FOR US TO INTRODUCE SECURITY FORCES FROM BRITAIN. HE FELT THAT WE COULD QUOTE USE WHAT IS ALREADY THERE UNQUOTE BY QUOTE EXERCISING OUR AUTHORITY UNQUOTE. HE DID NOT ELABORATE.

3. I ACKNOWLEDGED THE HELPFUL ATTITUDE OF MOZAMBIQUE AND THE OTHER FRONT-LINE STATES AND ASSURED THE PRESIDENT THAT WE ARE INDEED WORKING FOR A FULLY INDEPENDENT, FULLY DEMOCRATIC ZIMBABWE UNDER A CONSTITUTION WHICH WE WERE CONFIDENT WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE INTERNATIONALLY. THE PRESIDENT INTERCEDED TO SAY THAT HE HAD BEEN INFORMED OF THE POINTS WE HAD BEEN MAKING - HE MENTIONED SPECIFICALLY THOSE MADE BY DOBLE YESTERDAY (MY TELNO 314) - AND HE HAD HAD OUR VIEWS CONVEYED TO THE PF IN LONDON THROUGH HIS OBSERVERS THERE - WHO INCIDENTALLY HAVE KEPT HIM WELL INFORMED. WHEN I INDICATED THAT I HAD MORE RECENT INFORMATION TO CONVEY, THE PRESIDENT, WHO CLEARLY DID NOT WISH ON THIS OCCASION TO BECOME INVOLVED IN DETAILS, INVITED ME TO HAVE A GOOD TALK WITH THE ACTING MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS OR A SENIOR OFFICIAL (I AM AWAITING AN APPOINTMENT).

4. THE PRESIDENT SEIZED ON A POINT WHICH I MADE ABOUT THE CONTINUING LOSS OF LIFE TO EXPRESS THE STRONG VIEW THAT A MILITARY VICTORY WOULD NOT BE THE ANSWER. MOZAMBIQUE HAD DISCOVERED THIS: DESPITE GAINING INDEPENDENCE AS A RESULT OF A MILITARY VICTORY, NINE MONTHS OF ARGUMENTS AND NEGOTIATIONS LEFT THEM WITH MANY PROBLEMS.

5. HE MADE A BRIEF BUT SPIRITED CONDEMNATION OF APARTHEID AS A DEGRADING PRACTICE, STRESSING HOWEVER THAT THIS DID NOT PREVENT MOZAMBIQUE FROM RECOGNISING SOUTH AFRICA AS A SOVEREIGN STATE.

6. HIS FINAL PERORATION WAS A VISION OF PEACE AND STABILITY WITH MOZAMBIQUE PLAYING AN IMPORTANT ROLE IN THE DEVELOPEMENT OF THE AREA QUOTE YOU HAVE MOZAMBIQUE, WITH ITS COMMUNICATIONS AND ITS PORTS, SPECIALLY BEIRA UNQUOTE HE ADDED.

7. HE MADE NO MENTION OF THE ZIMBABWE/RHODESIA RAIDS INTO MOZAMBIQUE.



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

12 October 1979

Message sent as amended

Dear Michael

RML

MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT KAUNDA

--- I enclose the amended version of the message to
President Kaunda which I mentioned to you on the telephone.
We would like to send this version instead of that which
--- was approved by the Prime Minister last night (a copy of
which is also enclosed for ease of reference). We shall
be seeking separately approval for messages to the other
Front Line Presidents and the Presidents of Nigeria and
Liberia.

*yours ever
Roderic Lyne*

(R M J Lyne)

M O'D B Alexander Esq
10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL

DSR 11

Registry No.

DRAFT

LETTER

Type 1 +

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

Top Secret,
Secret.
Confidential.
Restricted.
Unclassified.

To:-

Private Secretary
10 Downing Street

From

Private Secretary

Telephone No. Ext.


Department

PRIVACY MARKING

..... In Confidence

RHODESIA: MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT KAUNDA

1. I enclose a draft reply from the Prime Minister to the message from President Kaunda in Lusaka telno 1066 (copy enclosed for ease of reference). Sir L Allinson has suggested that the reply be cast in such a way to allow him to communicate it to Kaunda personally. Lord Carrington attaches importance to ensuring that Kaunda should hear our views direct, rather than hearing them at second-hand through Chona and others. The reply therefore leaves a number of points in Kaunda's message to be answered orally.



CONFIDENTIAL

File No.
 Department RHODESIA
 Drafted by R W RENWICK
 (Block Capitals)
 Tel. Extn 233 5698

OUTWARD
 TELEGRAM

Security Classification CONFIDENTIAL
Precedence IMMEDIATE
DESKBYZ

FOR COMMS. DEPT. USE	Despatched (Date) (Time)Z	POSTBYZ
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PREAMBLE

(Time of Origin)Z(G.M.T.) (Restrictive Prefix).....
 (Security Class.) CONFIDENTIAL (Caveat/ Privacy Marking).....
 (Codeword)..... (Deskby)

To IMMEDIATE LUSAKA Tel. No. of.....
 (precedence) (post)

AND TO (precedence/post)

AND SAVING TO

REPEATED TO (for info) IMMEDIATE: WASHINGTON, DAR ES SALAAM, PRETORIA
 GABORONE, MAPUTO, UKMIS NEW YORK, LAGOS

SAVING TO (for info).....

Distribution:-

Rhodesia Policy

Despatched

0100, 12.X.79

Lg.

Phnd

Copies to:-

(TEXT)

RHODESIA: PRESIDENT KAUNDA'S MESSAGE

1. Like you we are concerned that Chona is seriously mis-representing to President Kaunda the course of discussions at the Conference. The President's message indicates that Chona is still fighting over points on which the Patriotic Front (particularly ZAPU) have already ~~agreed~~ *conceded*.

2. You should therefore arrange to deliver the message in MIPT to Kaunda personally. In doing so you should add the following comments on the detailed points in Kaunda's message.

/A. PRESIDENCY

CONFIDENTIAL

A. PRESIDENCY. It will be open to the people of Rhodesia to move to an Executive Presidency if they wish to do so. In the proposals they put forward on 8 October the Patriotic Front accepted ~~the~~ "constitutional Presidency".

B. AND C. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS. We shall be ready to provide technical assistance for land settlement schemes and capital aid for agricultural development projects and infrastructure. If an Agricultural Development Bank or some equivalent institution were set up to promote agricultural development including land settlement schemes, we should be prepared to contribute to the initial capital (though the costs would be beyond the capacity of any individual donor country and we cannot commit ourselves to a specific share at this stage). We should be ready to help independent Zimbabwe to obtain international assistance IN THIS AS IN OTHER AREAS THERE IS, HOWEVER, ~~There is~~ no possibility of establishing an international fund to underwrite the pensions of Rhodesian public servants.

D. COALITION. We have made ~~temporary~~ provision that the party representing the majority of Whites should not be able to form a coalition with any single party except that which ^{has} ~~is~~ the largest number of seats elected on the Common Roll. The President would be expected to call on the leader of the largest African party to try to form a government.

/But

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

File No.

OUTWARD

Security Classification

Department

TELEGRAM

Precedence

Drafted by
(Block Capitals)

Tel. Extn.

DESKBY Z

FOR
COMMS. DEPT.
USE

Despatched

(Date)

POSTBY Z

(Time) Z

PREAMBLE

(Time of Origin) Z(G.M.T.)

(Restrictive Prefix)

(Security Class.)

(Caveat/
Privacy Marking)

(Codeword)

(Deskby) Z

TO Tel. No. of
(precedence) (post)

AND TO (precedence/post)

AND SAVING TO

REPEATED TO (for info)

SAVING TO (for info)

Distribution:-

[TEXT]

Copies to:-

It will be necessary for any party which seeks to form a government either to win a majority of seats in the House of Assembly or to form a coalition.

E. THE UNANIMITY RULE. Making the main protective provisions of the Declaration of Rights (and those concerning White representation) amendable only by unanimous vote by the House of Assembly in a number of areas was essential, in view of the history of conflict in Rhodesia, to give adequate protection to all the people of Rhodesia against the arbitrary exercise of power. It is a temporary provision to allow confidence to be re-established and to protect the rights of all the citizens of Zimbabwe, black or white.

F. LINKAGE. We have made clear from the beginning of the Conference that each delegation's acceptance of the Constitution will be contingent on agreement on the arrangements for implementing it. Bishop Muzorewa has made his acceptance of the Independence Constitution contingent on that point and it is open to the Patriotic Front to do exactly the same. What we cannot accept is that either side should reserve the right to re-open negotiation on the Constitution after we have moved on to discuss the pre-independence arrangements. Otherwise we should be in danger of losing all the gains which have been achieved in five weeks of difficult negotiation. We were unable to accept the Statement made by the Patriotic Front at the plenary session on 11 October precisely because it entered reservations on major issues on the Constitution and kept open the possibility of re-opening them at a later stage. ^{N.P.3.} You will be receiving further guidance by immediate telegram on the point now reached in the Conference.

File No.
Rhodesia
Department
Drafted by ~~XXXX~~ C D Powell
(Block Capitals)
Tel. Extn 233 4146

OUTWARD
TELEGRAM

Security Classification CONFIDENTIAL
Precedence IMMEDIATE
DESKBYZ

FOR COMMS. DEPT. USE	Despatched (Date) (Time).....Z	POSTBYZ
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PREAMBLE

(Time of Origin)Z(G.M.T.) (Restrictive Prefix).....
(Security Class.) CONFIDENTIAL (Caveat/Privacy Marking).....
(Codeword)..... (Deskby).....

To IMMEDIATE LUSAKA Tel. No. of.
(precedence) (post)

AND TO (precedence/post)
.....

AND SAVING TO

REPEATED TO (for info) IMMEDIATE: WASHINGTON, DAR ES SALAAM, PRETORIA
GABORONE, MAPUTO, UKMIS NEW YORK, LAGOS

SAVING TO (for info).....

Distribution:-

Rhodesia Policy

Despatched
0100, 12.X.79.
K.S.
Ph...

Copies to:-

(TEXT)

MIPT: RHODESIA

1. Following is text of reply from Prime Minister to President Kaunda.

Begins
Dear Kenneth, Thank you for your helpful and constructive message. I was particularly grateful for your assurance of continuing support in the difficult task ahead. I ^{CAN} assure you that our aim ¹⁵ remains a settlement involving all the parties, which will bring peace to Rhodesia and to Zambia, in accordance with the principles we agreed on at Lusaka.

/I

CONFIDENTIAL

I was heartened by your welcome for the Independence Constitution which we have tabled. In our judgement, based on weeks of intensive negotiation, it represents the only basis for an agreement. It has been no easy task to secure the Salisbury delegation's acceptance of it. Ian Smith and others are still opposing it but I am confident that we will be able to proceed on this basis. Acceptance by the Patriotic Front will require them to compromise. They have already shown willingness to do so on various points and we are now very near agreement. But we cannot move on to discuss the interim arrangements without agreement on the Constitution. This would mean that our discussions over nearly five weeks had been inconclusive and the future of the Conference would be thrown into doubt.

At the session of the Conference on 11 October the Patriotic Front reserved their position on major issues and kept open the possibility of reverting to them at a later stage. This is not compatible with the agreement that discussion of the Constitution should be completed before we moved on to the interim arrangements. We have ~~therefore~~ made clear that the next meeting of the Conference will be to discuss the interim arrangements and we hope that they will let us know in the ^{very} near future that they can accept the Constitution, subject to satisfactory interim arrangements.

I am asking my High Commissioner to explain to you the position on the specific points which you raise on the Constitution. In particular I recognise the importance of the issue of land. The British Government will be ready to provide help, within the limits of our financial resources, for agricultural development in independent Zimbabwe and support efforts to obtain international assistance for land settlement.

You raise the question of Rhodesian raids into neighbouring countries. Since issuing invitations to the Constitutional Conference, we have pressed both sides to accept a cease-fire. Bishop Muzorewa has expressed a readiness to agree to this. I think it a tragedy that the fighting has continued during the Conference. Once we have agreement on the Constitution, we shall be renewing

/our

CONFIDENTIAL

our efforts to achieve a cease-fire and elections in which all the parties can participate. I hope that you will support us in this.

Let me repeat in conclusion how grateful I am for your advice and support. I know that you are as anxious as I am to see the conflict ended. You have personally made great efforts, at the Heads of Government meeting and since, to make a settlement possible. The Conference has reached a difficult point, but I can assure you that we are doing all we can to reach a lasting settlement and to bring about reconciliation.

2. Please see MIPT.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

CONFIDENTIAL

File No.

OUTWARD

Security Classification

Department

TELEGRAM

Precedence

Drafted by
(Block Capitals)

Tel. Extn.

DESKBY Z

FOR
COMMS. DEPT.
USE

Despatched

(Date)

(Time) Z

POSTBY Z

PREAMBLE

(Time of Origin) Z(G.M.T.) (Restrictive Prefix)

(Security Class.) (Caveat/Privacy Marking)

(Codeword) (Deskby) Z

TO Tel. No. of
(precedence) (post)

AND TO (precedence/post)

AND SAVING TO

REPEATED TO (for info)

SAVING TO (for info)

Distribution:-

[TEXT]

Copies to:-



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

12 October 1979

Dear Michael,

fs. *Ph...* 15/11

Lancaster House Constitutional Conference

/ I enclose a message to the Prime Minister
/ from President Shehu Shagari which was delivered
/ to the PUS yesterday by the Nigerian High
/ Commissioner under cover of the attached Note
Verbale. I have sent you separately a draft
telegram which replies to this message.

Yours ever
Robert Lyne

(R M J Lyne)
Private Secretary

M O'D B Alexander Esq
10 Downing Street

12 OCT 1979



A circular red stamp containing the numbers 1 through 9 arranged in a circle. A central arrow points from the center towards the number 2.



The High Commissioner of the Federal Republic of Nigeria presents his compliments to the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs and has the honour to state as follows:-

His Excellency, the President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria has instructed the High Commissioner to convey a message to Her Majesty's Government on the subject of the Constitutional Conference on Zimbabwe currently taking place in Lancaster House in London. The message is that His Excellency, the President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria urges Her Majesty's Government to do everything possible to avoid a deadlock and a breakdown of the said Conference.

--- The telegram from His Excellency, the President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria to the Right Honourable Prime Minister is enclosed herewith for transmission to its high destination.

The High Commissioner has the further honour to inform the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs that a separate message of similar appeal to the Patriotic Front from His Excellency, the President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria has also been conveyed to the Joint Leaders of the Patriotic Front in London.

The High Commissioner of the Federal Republic of Nigeria avails himself of this opportunity to express to the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs the assurances of his highest consideration.

LONDON, 11th October, 1979.

Foreign and Commonwealth Office,
King Charles Street,
London W.1.



SUBJECTS

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL NO.

T 115/79

11TH OCTOBER, 1979.

MY DEAR PRIME MINISTER,

WE HAVE AS YOU KNOW FOLLOWED WITH THE KEENEST INTEREST THE PROGRESS SO FAR MADE IN THE ONGOING CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE ON ZIMBABWE. WE APPRECIATE THAT THE NEGOTIATIONS AT LANCASTER HOUSE HAVE REACHED A CRITICAL STAGE AND THAT THE CONFERENCE IS NOW VERY DELICATELY POISED.

WE BELIEVE THAT THE PROPOSALS WHICH THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT HAVE ADVANCED MAY NOT FULLY SATISFY ALL THE PARTIES TO THE NEGOTIATIONS, BUT WE CONSIDER IT ESSENTIAL THAT THE CONFERENCE SHOULD REACH AN EARLY AGREEMENT ON THE CONSTITUTION, CONDITIONAL UPON AGREEMENT BEING REACHED ON THE TRANSITIONAL ARRANGEMENTS. WE WOULD THEREFORE URGE THAT UNLESS AGREEMENT WAS REACHED ON THE TRANSITIONAL ARRANGEMENTS NO AGREEMENT SHOULD BE DEEMED TO HAVE BEEN REACHED ON THE CONSTITUTION.

TRUSTING THAT THIS PROPOSAL WILL ASSIST IN PREVENTING A BREAKDOWN OF THE CONFERENCE, I AVAIL MYSELF OF THIS OPPORTUNITY TO CONVEY TO YOUR EXCELLENCY THE ASSURANCES OF MY GREAT ESTEEM AND HIGHEST CONSIDERATION.

YOURS SINCERELY,

(SHEHU SHAGARI)
PRESIDENT OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC
OF NIGERIA.

THE RT. HON. MRS. MARGARET THATCHER,
PRIME MINISTER,
10 DOWNING STREET,
LONDON.

IMMEDIATE

PS
 PS/SIR I GILMOUR
 PS/MR LUCE
 PS/PUS
 SIR A DUFF
 MR WILLSON
 MR BYATT
 LORD N. G. LENNOX

PS/NO 10 DOWNING STREET

MR R L WADE-GERY)
 MR P M MAXEY)
 COL MOIR) CABINET
 MR P J FOWLER) OFFICE
 DIO)

M. D. A. I.

HD/RHODESIA DEPT (3)

HD/C AF D
 HD/S AF D

HD/PUSD (2)

HD/NEWS DEPT

HD/WAD

MR FREELAND LEGAL ADVISER RM K200A

MR FIFOOT LEGAL ADVISER RM K164

GPS 558

CONFIDENTIAL

FM MAPUTO 121312 Z OCT 79

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 315 OF 12 OCTOBER

INFO LUSAKA DAR ES SALAAM LAGOS GABORONE MIRIMBA SALISBURY WASHINGTON
 PRETORIA LUANDA UKMIS NEW YORK

RHODESIA CONFERENCE

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2. HE PAID TRIBUTE TO YOUR EFFORTS AND WAS GLAD THAT THOSE WHO WANTED THE IMMEDIATE LIFTING OF SANCTIONS WERE ROUNDLY DEFEATED AT BLAC POOL. HE PRAISED THE PATRIOTIC FRONT FOR ENTERING UPON THE

Prime Minister (2)

*A rather remarkable
 statement by Pres. Machel. It
 tends to confirm that the Govt of
 Mozambique are very anxious
 for a peaceful settlement.*

Paul

BLACKPOOL. HE PRAISED THE PATRIOTIC FRONT FOR ENTERING UPON THE NEGOTIATIONS IN A SERIOUS AND CONSTRUCTIVE FRAME OF MIND. HE WISHED TO URGE YOU STRONGLY TO KEEP THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD AS SHORT AS POSSIBLE. THE LONGER IT WAS, THE MORE ROOM THERE WOULD BE FOR MISCHIEF-MAKERS TO SABOTAGE ANY AGREEMENT AND DESTROY THE COUNTRY'S ECONOMY. HE MENTIONED MR PIK BOTHA'S STATEMENT (PRETORIA TELEGRAM, NO 687) AS AN INDICATION THAT SOUTH AFRICA WAS CAPABLE OF CAUSING SERIOUS TROUBLE - HENCE, HE EMPHASISED AGAIN, THE NEED FOR AS BRIEF A TRANSITION PERIOD AS POSSIBLE. HE HIMSELF THOUGHT THAT THREE MONTHS WOULD BE ENOUGH. HE DID NOT THINK IT WOULD BE NECESSARY FOR US TO INTRODUCE SECURITY FORCES FROM BRITAIN. HE FELT THAT WE COULD QUOTE USE WHAT IS ALREADY THERE UNQUOTE BY QUOTE EXERCISING OUR AUTHORITY UNQUOTE. HE DID NOT ELABORATE.

3. I ACKNOWLEDGED THE HELPFUL ATTITUDE OF MOZAMBIQUE AND THE OTHER FRONT-LINE STATES AND ASSURED THE PRESIDENT THAT WE ARE INDEED WORKING FOR A FULLY INDEPENDENT, FULLY DEMOCRATIC ZIMBABWE UNDER A CONSTITUTION WHICH WE WERE CONFIDENT WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE INTERNATIONALLY. THE PRESIDENT INTERCEDED TO SAY THAT HE HAD BEEN INFORMED OF THE POINTS WE HAD BEEN MAKING - HE MENTIONED SPECIFICALLY THOSE MADE BY DOBLE YESTERDAY (MY TELNO 314) - AND HE HAD HAD OUR VIEWS CONVEYED TO THE PF IN LONDON THROUGH HIS OBSERVERS THERE - WHO INCIDENTALLY HAVE KEPT HIM WELL INFORMED. WHEN I INDICATED THAT I HAD MORE RECENT INFORMATION TO CONVEY, THE PRESIDENT, WHO CLEARLY DID NOT WISH ON THIS OCCASION TO BECOME INVOLVED IN DETAILS, INVITED ME TO HAVE A GOOD TALK WITH THE ACTING MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS OR A SENIOR OFFICIAL (I AM AWAITING AN APPOINTMENT).

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5. HE MADE A BRIEF BUT SPIRITED CONDEMNATION OF APARTHEID AS A DEGRADING PRACTICE, STRESSING HOWEVER THAT THIS DID NOT PREVENT MOZAMBIQUE FROM RECOGNISING SOUTH AFRICA AS A SOVEREIGN STATE.

6. HIS FINAL PERORATION WAS A VISION OF PEACE AND STABILITY WITH MOZAMBIQUE PLAYING AN IMPORTANT ROLE IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE AREA QUOTE YOU HAVE MOZAMBIQUE, WITH ITS COMMUNICATIONS AND ITS PORTS, SPECIALLY BEIRA UNQUOTE HE ADDED.

7. HE MADE NO MENTION OF THE ZIMBABWE/RHODESIA RAIDS INTO MOZAMBIQUE.

[RHODESIA: POLICY: ADVANCE COPIES]

25

PS
PS/SIR I GILMOUR
PS/MR LUCE
PS/PUS
SIR A DUFF
MR WILLSON
MR BYATT
LORD N-G LENNOX

PS/NO 10 DOWNING STREET

MR R L WADE-GERY)
MR P M MAXEY)
COL MOIR) CABINET
MR P J FOWLER) OFFICE
DIO)

N.D.A.S.

Prime Minister (2)

HD/RHODESIA DEPT (3)

HD/C AF D

HD/S AF D

HD/PUSD (2)

HD/NEWS DEPT

HD/WAD

MR FREELAND LEGAL ADVISER RM K200A

MR FIFOOT LEGAL ADVISER RM K164

IMMEDIATE

~~RESIDENT CLERK~~

GRS 332

UNCLASSIFIED

DESKBY 121631Z

FM LUSAKA 121555Z OCT 79

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1080 OF 12 OCTOBER

AND TO IMMEDIATE NIRIMBA SALISBURY, DAR ES SALAAM, PRETORIA,
GABORONE, MAPUTO, UKMIS NEW YORK, LAGOS

IMMEDIATE

M.I.P.T.: RHODESIA/ZAMBIA

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF ZAMBIA GOVERNMENT SPOKESMAN'S STATEMENT
ISSUED THIS AFTERNOON (12 OCTOBER):

BEGINS

A GOVERNMENT SPOKESMAN ANNOUNCED THAT THE TAZARA RAIL AND GREAT
NORTH ROAD BRIDGES AT CHAMBESHI WERE DAMAGED BY EXPLOSIVES EARLY
THIS MORNING.

THE SPOKESMAN SAID BOTH BRIDGES WERE DAMAGED BY EXPLOSIVES PLANTED
BY ZAMBIA'S ENEMIES AT ABOUT 0230 HOURS. THE EXTENT OF THE DAMAGE
IS BEING ASSESSED BUT BOTH RAIL AND ROAD TRAFFIC HAVE BEEN STOPPED

THE SPOKESMAN SAID BOTH BRIDGES WERE DAMAGED BY EXPLOSIVES PLANTED BY ZAMBIA'S ENEMIES AT ABOUT 0230 HOURS. THE EXTENT OF THE DAMAGE IS BEING ASSESSED BUT BOTH RAIL AND ROAD TRAFFIC HAVE COME TO A STANDSTILL.

GIVING THE SEQUENCE OF EVENTS AS REPORTED FROM THE SCENE OF INCIDENT THE SPOKESMAN EXPLAINED THAT PRIOR TO THE BLOWING UP OF THE BRIDGE A SPEED BOAT CARRYING FOUR PEOPLE WAS SEEN UNLOADING BOXES CONTAINING EXPLOSIVES NEAR THE RAIL BRIDGE, WHILE A SPOTTER PLANE CIRCLED THE AREA. SOON AFTER UNLOADING THE BOXES IT SPED AWAY FROM THE SCENE. LATER A REPORT WAS RECEIVED THAT TWO FISHERMEN WERE SHOT AT FROM THE SPEED BOAT KILLING ONE AND CRITICALLY INJURING THE OTHER.

BETWEEN 21 AND 22 HOURS TWO TRUCKS LOADED WITH FERTILIZER STOPPED NEAR THE ROAD BRIDGE AND A NUMBER OF PERSONS ARMED WITH FIRE-ARMS JUMPED OUT OF THE VEHICLES AND TOOK POSITIONS AT THE BRIDGES. A FEW MINUTES LATER TWO CARS APPROACHED FROM MPIKA DIRECTION AND PICKED THE RACIST SOLDIERS AND SPED AWAY TOWARDS THE SOUTH.

THE SPOKESMAN ADDED THAT THIS ACT OF SABOTAGE BY THE RACIST REGIMES IS AIMED AT WEAKENING ZAMBIA'S ECONOMY AND DISCOURAGING HER SUPPORT FOR THE LIBERATION MOVEMENTS.

THE SPOKESMAN CONDEMNED THIS WANTON AGRESSION AND WARNED THE NATION TO BE ON THE ALERT FOR FURTHER POSSIBLE ATTACKS ON THE ECONOMIC TARGETS THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY AND TO REPORT ANY SUSPICIOUS CHARACTERS TO THE NEAREST SECURITY FORCES.

ENDS

ALLINSON

NNNN

IMMEDIATE



(5)

10 DOWNING STREET

Prime Minister (Ed. M. S. C.).

I have passed on to the Foreign Secretary's Office a message from the South Africans, received by Col van der Post, to the effect that we should not take Mr Smith's statements too seriously. They believe that they can 'contain' him.

Since Col. van der Post had begun to feel a little out of touch the Foreign Secretary has kindly agreed to give him a briefing on his return from Blackpool on Thursday.

Am. A. 11/x

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DESKBY 112100Z LUSAKA

DESKBY 112100Z GABORONE

DESKBY 112100Z DAR ES SALAAM

DESKBY 112100Z LAGOS

FDESKBY 112100Z MAPUTO

DESKBY 112100Z MONROVIA

FM FCO 111820Z OCT 79

TO IMMEDIATE LUSAKA

TELEGRAM NUMBER 831 OF 11 OCTOBER

AND TO IMMEDIATE (DESKBY 112100Z) MAPUTO, GABORONE, DAR ES SALAAM,
LAGOS, MONROVIA

AND TO IMMEDIATE MIRIMBA SALISBURY, NAIROBI, LUANDA, WASHINGTON,
PRETORIA, ADDIS ABABA, MONROVIA, CANBERRA, OTTAWA, WELLINGTON,
PEKING, MOSCOW, PRAGUE, PRIORITY ABIDJAN, DAKAR, KINSHASA, KHARTOUM,
TOKYO, EEC POSTS, KUWAIT, KINGSTON, BRIDGETOWN, DACCA, NEW DELHI,
SINGAPORE, GEORGETOWN, LA PAZ, NASSAU, FREETOWN, PORT LOUIS, MBABANE
PORT OF SPAIN, KAMPALA, LILONGWE, VALLETTA, DANJUL, COLOMBO, ACCRA,
KUALA LUMPUR, NICOSIA, CASTRIES, OSLO, STOCKHOLM, LISBON, MADRID,
MANILA, TEHRAN, BUCHAREST, ATHENS

INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK

INFO SAVING SUVA, PORT MORESBY, HONIARA, NUKUALOFA, VICTORIA, TARAWA,
UKDEL NATO

RHODESIA: CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE

1. WHEN THE CONFERENCE RESUMED IN PLENARY SESSION THIS
AFTERNOON I ASKED THE PATRIOTIC FRONT DELEGATION WHETHER THEY COULD
NOW ACCEPT OUR CONSTITUTIONAL PROPOSALS. THEY MADE A STATEMENT
THAT A WIDE MEASURE OF AGREEMENT ON THE INDEPENDENCE CONSTITUTION
HAD BEEN REACHED BUT SAYING THAT THEY HAD TO RESERVE THEIR POSITION
ON "SUCH MAJOR ISSUES AS LAND, THE INALTERABILITY OF THE DECLARAT-
ION OF RIGHTS INsofar AS IT AFFECTS LAND AND PENSIONS AND THE PROV-
ISIONS RELATING TO THE FOUR PRINCIPAL INSTITUTIONS OF GOVERNMENT
(THE ARMY, THE POLICE, THE PUBLIC SERVICE AND THE JUDICIARY)" THEY
URGED THE CONFERENCE TO PROCEED WITHOUT DELAY TO DISCUSS ALL THE
ISSUES UNDER THE TRANSITIONAL ARRANGEMENTS AND SAID: "IF WE ARE
SATISFIED BEYOND DOUBT AS TO THE VITAL ISSUES RELATING TO TRANSIT-
IONAL ARRANGEMENTS, THERE MAY (SIC) NOT BE NEED TO REVERT TO
DISCUSSION ON THE ISSUES WE HAVE RAISED UNDER THE CONSTITUTION".

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2. I SOUGHT TO GIVE THEM REASSURANCE ON THE QUESTION OF LAND BY MAKING A STATEMENT, THE TEXT OF WHICH YOU WILL BE RECEIVING IN THE VERBATIM SERIES (067/79) AND ON WHICH YOU SHOULD DRAW FREELY (INSTRUCTIONS AND GUIDANCE ON THIS ARE GOING TO FRONT LINE POSTS). MUGABE, WHO HAS BEEN TAKING A MUCH HARDER LINE THAN NKOMO CONFIRMED THAT THE PATRIOTIC FRONT RESERVED THEIR POSITION ON ALL THE ISSUES IN PARAGRAPH ONE ABOVE. I POINTED OUT THAT SEVERAL OF THESE HAD NOTHING WHATEVER TO DO WITH THE INTERIM ARRANGEMENTS.

3. THERE WAS THEN AN ADJOURNMENT DURING WHICH I DISCUSSED THE PRECISE MEANING OF THEIR STATEMENT IN PRIVATE WITH MR NKOMO AND MR MUGABE. WHEN THE SESSION RESUMED I EXPLAINED THAT FOLLOWING MY CONVERSATION WITH MR MUGABE AND MR NKOMO IT WAS CLEAR THAT THE PATRIOTIC FRONT WERE MAKING RESERVATIONS ON A NUMBER OF ISSUES WHICH AS THEY STATED, WERE OF MAJOR IMPORTANCE. I HAD TRIED TO BE OF ASSISTANCE ON THE QUESTION OF LAND AND HOPED THAT MR MUGABE AND MR NKOMO WOULD READ MY STATEMENT CAREFULLY. IT WAS NECESSARY TO REITERATE WHAT HAD BEEN SAID AT THE BEGINNING OF THE CONFERENCE. DISCUSSION SHOULD PROCEED ON A STEP BY STEP BASIS TO AVOID A REPETITION OF WHAT HAD HAPPENED AT GENEVA. IT HAD BEEN AGREED TO DEAL WITH THE CONSTITUTION FIRST, AND TO REACH AGREEMENT ON IT SUBJECT TO THE SATISFACTORY INTERIM ARRANGEMENTS. CONSEQUENTLY IT WAS NOT POSSIBLE TO ACCEPT THE RESERVATIONS CONTAINED IN MR NKOMO'S STATEMENT. THIS WOULD MEAN THAT MAJOR QUESTIONS WOULD REMAIN ON THE TABLE AFTER DISCUSSION OF THE INTERIM ARRANGEMENTS. THERE WAS THEREFORE NOW NO ALTERNATIVE BUT TO ADJOURN THE CONFERENCE. WHEN THE CONFERENCE MET AGAIN IT WOULD DISCUSS THE INTERIM ARRANGEMENTS. IN THE MEANTIME I NEEDED TO KNOW WHETHER MR MUGABE AND MR NKOMO WOULD ACCEPT THE BRITISH PROPOSALS, AND HOPED TO RECEIVE A RESPONSE IN THE NEAR FUTURE.

4. MUGABE SAID THAT THERE WOULD BE NO CHANGE IN THE PATRIOTIC FRONT'S POSITION. NKOMO HOWEVER, MAY STILL BE LOOKING FOR A COMPROMISE. THE CONFERENCE HAS NOT AT THIS STAGE "BROKEN DOWN", THOUGH THERE WILL BE NO MORE PLENARY SESSIONS UNTIL MONDAY. BEFORE THEN WE HOPE TO HAVE A POSITIVE RESPONSE FROM THE PATRIOTIC FRONT ON

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THE CONSTITUTION. WE ARE NOT PREPARED TO OPEN DISCUSSION WITH THE PATRIOTIC FRONT OF THE ARRANGEMENTS FOR IMPLEMENTING THE CONSTITUTION UNTIL WE HAVE THAT AGREEMENT.

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LEGAL ADVISERS
(MR FREELAND)
(MR FIFOOT)
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PS/MR HURD
PS/PUS
SIR A DUFF
LORD N G LENNOX
MISS BROWN
MR DAY
MR WILLSON
MR ASPIN

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FM MIRIMBA SALISBURY 111500Z OCT 79

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 739 OF 11 OCTOBER

INFO IMMEDIATE PRETORIA

Prime Minister

YOUR TELNO 233: IAN SMITH'S PRESS CONFERENCE

1. IT IS MY IMPRESSION (BASED, ADMITTEDLY ON VERY LITTLE EVIDENCE) THAT SMITH'S REMARKS HAVE NOT FOUND MUCH FAVOUR BEYOND THE RIGHT-WING OF THE RF. FOR EXAMPLE, THE WOMAN WHO SUPPLIES OUR NEWSPAPERS IS NORMALLY A SMITH SUPPORTER BUT COMMENTED TO WILSON "WELL, HE HAS CERTAINLY MADE A FOOL OF HIMSELF THIS TIME". AS YOU WILL SEE FROM PARA 2 OF MY TELNO 734, THERE IS CONCERN AMONG SOME MODERATES OVER HIS THREAT TO BLOCK AGREEMENT IN THE PRESENT PARLIAMENT. TUESDAY'S HERALD EDITORIAL DEALT WITH THAT REASONABLY SATISFACTORILY (PARA 5 OF MY TELNO 736), APART FROM THE REFERENCE TO CHANGING THE PACKAGE TO AVOID THE DANGER.

2. ANYTHING WHICH LOOKS LIKE A PUBLIC BRITISH RETORT TO SMITH COULD HAVE QUITE THE WRONG EFFECT ON THOSE WHO MAY BE OPEN TO HIS INFLUENCE. I THINK IT BETTER THEREFORE NOT TO MAKE ANY DETAILED STATEMENT ON THE RECORD IN SALISBURY.

3. I HAVE ARRANGED TO SEE THE EDITORS OF THE HERALD AND SUNDAY MAIL AT 0815Z TOMORROW AND TO GIVE AN OFF THE RECORD BACKGROUND BRIEFING ON THE CONSTITUTION TO THEM AND THEIR EDITORIAL STAFF. THIS WILL, OF COURSE, MAKE PUBLIC MY PRESENCE HERE, BUT IT HAS ALREADY BEEN REPORTED TODAY IN AN AFRICAN WEEKLY.

4. I HAVE SUFFICIENT MATERIAL HERE. HOWEVER, IF THERE IS ANYTHING FURTHER I CAN SAY ON THE SPECIAL PENSION SCHEME (PARA 4 OF MY TELNO 732) IT WOULD BE USEFUL TO HAVE THAT OVERNIGHT IN CASE THEY RAISE THE SUBJECT.

BYATT

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FM PRETORIA 110735Z OCT 79

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 689 OF 11 OCTOBER 1979.

INFO IMMEDIATE MIRIMBA, SALISBURY.

Prime Minister

MY TELNO 686: RHODESIA

Am
11/x
[Signature]

1. FOURIE DID NOT COME BACK TO ME ON TUESDAY EVENING AND YESTERDAY WAS A PUBLIC HOLIDAY HERE. BUT I HAVE THIS MORNING SPOKEN TO HIM ON THE TELEPHONE. HE SAYS THAT HIS MINISTER IS CONCERNED ESSENTIALLY ON TWO ISSUES:-

(I) THAT THERE SHOULD BE NO DELAY IN BRINGING MATTERS TO A HEAD IN LONDON BECAUSE OF THE CONSEQUENCES THIS WOULD HAVE FOR THE SITUATION INSIDE RHODESIA. FOURIE SAID NOTHING TO DISTURB VAN HEERDEN'S ASSURANCE TO ME (PARA 2 OF TUR) THAT PIK BOTHA'S STATEMENT WAS NOT AIMED AT OUR HANDLING OF THE CONFERENCE, BUT HE WAS CLEARLY GIVING ME THE MESSAGE THAT IF WE WERE TO PERMIT ANY FURTHER DELAY TODAY AS A RESULT OF THE PF INTRANSIGENCE IT WOULD MAKE A BAD IMPRESSION HERE SEMICOLON

(II) THAT WE SHOULD LIFT SANCTIONS SOON. FOURIE STRESSED THAT THE SOUTH AFRICAN APPRECIATION WAS THAT THE SITUATION ON THE GROUND INSIDE RHODESIA WAS CRITICAL AND COULD ONLY BE RETRIEVED BY LIFTING SANCTIONS.

2. I TOLD FOURIE THAT I WAS AT THE MINISTER'S DISPOSAL IF HE WISHED TO SEE ME. FOURIE THOUGHT A MEETING COULD BE HELPFUL BUT SHOULD BE KEPT IN RESERVE FOR THE MOMENT.

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PS/MR HURD
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SIR A DUFF
LORD N G LENNOX
MISS BROWN
MR DAY
MR WILLSON
MR ASPIN

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See by the
17. KAU
Prime Minister

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

I also attach the statement
made by Lord Carrington on the
land question.

11 October 1979

Dear Michael,

Andy 11/10

Rhodesian Constitutional Conference

At this afternoon's session of the Conference, the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary asked the Patriotic Front whether they were now in a position to accept the Constitution, subject to agreement on the interim arrangements. In a prepared statement (copy enclosed) Nkomo replied that the Patriotic Front reserved their position on major issues and wanted to keep open the possibility of reverting to them.

Lord Carrington then saw Nkomo and Mugabe privately, but they declined to lift their reservations. When the Conference resumed, Lord Carrington therefore said that the British Government could not accept the Patriotic Front's reply as a sufficient basis to allow discussion to move on to the next item: and that he had no alternative but to adjourn the session. When the Conference met again, it would be to discuss the interim arrangements. The Patriotic Front should let him know before then whether they could accept the Constitution.

Although Lord Carrington set no date for the next meeting, he made it clear that it would be in the near future (we have in mind Monday)

There were clear signs of strain between ZAPU and ZANU at today's session. Nkomo appears to be looking for a way out, while Mugabe seems determined not to accept the points in the Constitution covering land and pensions, as well as maintaining general reservations about the Army, Police and Public Service.

There is a possibility that ZAPU will look for a way out of the dilemma. But, if we have to face a breakdown of the Conference, we will, in Lord Carrington's view, have a fully defensible position, and we would lose the support of Bishop Muzorewa and his delegation if we give way on this issue.

Yours ever
Roderic Lyne

M O'D B Alexander Esq
10 Downing Street
LONDON

(R M J Lyne)

CONFIDENTIAL

PATRIOTIC FRONT

REPLY TO CHAIRMAN'S STATEMENT OF

11th OCTOBER, 1979.

When this Conference opened, we made it very clear that we had come to participate in a serious effort to bring about a complete solution of all aspects of the Rhodesian problem through a single comprehensive agreement as opposed to fragmented or separate and private agreements between any parties to this Conference.

Any concessions we have made, and may make, on various aspects of the problem in the spirit of negotiation should not be interpreted as agreement on the whole or as an endorsement of any party to this Conference venturing separate or unilateral application of piecemeal arrangements. We also made it very clear, from the start, that we had come in a serious spirit to negotiate and not to be subjected to brinkmanship. This remains our position.

The issue before us is not just the 14 year-old problem of UDI, but the 80 year colonial problem of Rhodesia. For all that time our people have had to wait in subjugation while the "spirit of decision" failed to descend on successive British Governments; and yet after a mere four weeks we are being rushed into making decisions which could prove disastrous.

We have *carefully* considered your *statement* on Tuesday. We note and welcome the fact that you accepted in principle our proposal put forward in the papers we tabled on Monday, namely that the members

elected on the white roll should not be able to form a coalition government; we note also your acknowledgement of differences between us in some areas of the constitution. Except for such major issues as land, the unalterability of the Declaration of Rights in so far as it affects land and pensions, and the provisions relating to the four principal institutions of government (the Army, the Police, the Public Service and the Judiciary), over which we cannot but reserve our position because they have a vital connection with transitional arrangements, we are now satisfied that the conference has reached a sufficiently wide measure of agreement on the independence constitution to enable it to proceed to the next item on the agenda. If we are satisfied beyond doubt as to the vital issues relating to transitional arrangements, there may not be need to revert to discussion on the issues we have raised under the constitution.

We therefore urge, once again, that the Conference proceed without delay to discuss all the issues under the transitional arrangements.

/t.c.

(Delivered verbatim by SOSFA, Jan.
October 11.)

STATEMENT ON LAND (FOR USE IF NECESSARY IN REPLY TO THE PATRIOTIC FRONT)

We recognise that the future Government of Zimbabwe, whatever its political complexion, will wish to extend land ownership. The Government can of course purchase land for agricultural settlement, and the Independence Constitution will make it possible to acquire under-utilised land compulsorily provided that adequate compensation is paid. Any resettlement scheme would clearly have to be carefully prepared and implemented to avoid adverse effects on production. The Zimbabwe Government might well wish to draw in outside donors such as the World Bank in preparing and implementing a full-scale agricultural development plan. The British Government recognise the importance of this issue to a future Zimbabwe Government and will be prepared, within the limits imposed by our financial resources, to help. We should for instance be ready to provide technical assistance for settlement schemes and capital aid for agricultural development projects and infrastructure. If an Agricultural Development Bank or some equivalent institution were set up to promote agricultural development including land settlement schemes, we would be prepared to contribute to the initial capital. The costs would be very substantial indeed, well beyond the capacity of any individual donor country, and the British Government cannot commit itself at this stage to a specific share in them. We should however, be ready to support the efforts of the Government of independent Zimbabwe to obtain international assistance for these purposes.

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

Prime Minister
I also attach the statement
made by Lord Carrington on the
land question.

L.S., 12/14

11 October 1979

Dear Michael,

11/14

*Mufared to
Blackpool 11/10/79.*

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*Yours ever
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M O'D B Alexander Esq
10 Downing Street
LONDON

(R M J Lyne)

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/t.c.

(Delivered verbally by SOSFA, 1st Min.
October 11.)

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Rennie Smith

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h.s. Smith

FCS/79/160

CHANCELLOR OF THE DUCHY OF LANCASTER

Southern Rhodesia: Legislation

1. My minute of 7 September ^{PKG.} sought your agreement to instructions to Parliamentary Counsel to prepare a Southern Rhodesia Independence Bill.
2. I am at present considering various options for the interim period between agreement on the Constitution and the grant of independence. There is a possibility that we shall want to grant the new Constitution in advance of Independence. There may also be circumstances in which we shall wish to make provision for new elections in Rhodesia. The Attorney General's advice is that we could not make provision for either of these eventualities under the 1965 Southern Rhodesia Act. A short Enabling Act would be required to allow the Government to make the necessary Orders in Council.
3. The need for such a Bill could arise at very short notice so as to come into force before 15 November (in the event that Section 2 of the 1965 Act lapses). I should therefore be grateful for your agreement on a contingency basis to the issue of further instructions to Parliamentary Counsel for the drafting of a Bill on the lines which I have described. This will, of course, be subject to agreement on the policy.
4. I am sending copies of this minute to recipients of my minute of 7 September.

(CARRINGTON)

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

11 October 1979

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PART 7 ends:-

Pres of Zambia do PM 10.10.79

PART 8 begins:-

FW to ~~Hoover~~ Ch of Dirty of Forecast 11.10.79

END

Filmed at the National
Archives (TNA) in London

February 2010