

PREM19

114

RHODESIA

(Situation in)

(November 1 - 18)

(Part 9)

PREM 19/114



PH 9.
SECRET

MT

Confidential Filing

The situation in Zimbabwe Rhodesia.
The Constitutional Conference in London.


RHODESIA

Part 1 : May 1979

Part 9 : Nov 1979

Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date
7.11.79							
12.11.79							
14.11.79							
16.11.79							
19.11.79							
18.11.79							
and							

PREM 19/114



● PART 9 ends:-

FLO to Dar Es Salaam 389 18/11/79

PART 10 begins:-

MOZBAATO FLO 19/11/79

TO BE RETAINED AS TOP ENCLOSURE

Cabinet / Cabinet Committee Documents

Reference	Date
CC(79) 19 th Conclusions, Minute 2 (<i>Limited Circulation Annex</i>)	01/11/79
OD(79) 38	02/11/79
OD(79) 12 th Meeting, Minute 1	05/11/79
CC(79) 20 th Conclusions, Minutes 1&2 (Extracts)	08/11/79
CC(79) 21 st Conclusions, Minute 2 (Extract)	15/11/79

The documents listed above, which were enclosed on this file, have been removed and destroyed. Such documents are the responsibility of the Cabinet Office. When released they are available in the appropriate CAB (CABINET OFFICE) CLASSES

Signed *A Wayland*

Date *5 November 2009*

PREM Records Team

Published Papers

The following published paper(s) enclosed on this file have been removed and destroyed. Copies may be found elsewhere in The National Archives.

Southern Rhodesia Bill	07/11/79
House of Commons Hansard Columns 406-423	07/11/79 Rhodesia
House of Lords Hansard Columns 828-838	07/11/09 Rhodesia: Constitutional Conference

Signed Wayland Date 5 November 2009

PREM Records Team

SUBJECT

350

CONFIDENTIAL

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. *Lg* T145AAA/797

CONFIDENTIAL

FM FCO 181944Z NOV 79

TO IMMEDIATE DAR ES SALAAM

TELNO 389 OF 18 NOVEMBER

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON LAGOS UKMIS NEW YORK LUSAKA GABORONE
MAPUTO LUANDA

YOUR TELNO 903 : RHODESIA

1. PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER
TO PRESIDENT NYERERE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE:

"DEAR JULIUS,

THANK YOU FOR YOUR MESSAGE OF 14 NOVEMBER ABOUT RHODESIA.
THE POINTS WHICH YOU RAISED WERE VERY MUCH ON OUR MINDS
AT THE TIME. I AM SURE THAT YOU WILL BE AS DELIGHTED
AS I AM THAT WE HAVE REACHED AGREEMENT WITH THE
PATRIOTIC FRONT ON THE PRE INDEPENDENCE ARRANGEMENTS,
SUBJECT TO A SUCCESSFUL OUTCOME OF THE NEGOTIATIONS
ON THE CEASEFIRE. THIS IS A GREAT STEP FORWARD AND
A TRIBUTE TO BOTH THE DELEGATIONS AT THE CONFERENCE.
WE HAVE NOW PUT FORWARD OUR PROPOSALS FOR THE
CEASEFIRE. THE PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITY FOR
MAINTENANCE OF THE CEASEFIRE WILL REST WITH
THE RESPECTIVE FORCES AND THEIR COMMANDERS. THE
MAIN ELEMENTS IN OUR PROPOSALS ARE THE ESTABLISHMENT
OF A CEASEFIRE COMMISSION UNDER THE GOVERNOR'S
MILITARY ADVISER, WITH REPRESENTATIVES OF THE
MILITARY COMMANDERS ON BOTH SIDES. IN ADDITION
WE ARE PROPOSING THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A MONITORING
FORCE, UNDER UNITED KINGDOM AUSPICES.

WE HAVE ALREADY STARTED, THEREFORE, ON THIS
FINAL PHASE OF THE CONFERENCE. WITH THE CONSTITUTION
AND THE PRE INDEPENDENCE ARRANGEMENTS AGREED,
THE CASE FOR A CEASEFIRE AND AN END TO THE WAR
IS IRRESISTIBLE. I KNOW I CAN COUNT ON YOUR SUPPORT
IN BRINGING THE WHOLE PROCESS TO A SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION.
WITH GOOD WISHES,
YOURS SINCERELY,
MARGARET THATCHER. "

CONFIDENTIAL

/2. IN

CONFIDENTIAL

2. IN ANY DISCUSSION ARISING FROM THIS MESSAGE YOU SHOULD MAKE IT CLEAR THAT ALL COMMONWEALTH COUNTRIES WILL BE INVITED TO SEND OBSERVERS TO THE ELECTIONS. WE SHALL NOT, HOWEVER, BE INVITING ANY COMMONWEALTH GOVERNMENTS WHICH ARE FORMALLY COMMITTED TO SUPPORT ONE SIDE OR THE OTHER IN THE NEGOTIATIONS TO CONTRIBUTE TO THE MONITORING FORCE, WHICH WILL BE UNDER UK AUSPICES.

3. NYERERE'S EFFORTS OVER THE LAST FEW DAYS TO MOBILISE COMMONWEALTH, SCANDINAVIAN AND EUROPEAN PRESSURE ON US TO INDUCE US TO MODIFY OUR POSITION ON THE PRE INDEPENDENCE ARRANGEMENTS HAVE BEEN UNHELPFUL. HE HAS FURTHERMORE BEEN LEFT OUT ON A LIMB BY THE PATRIOTIC FRONT'S ACCEPTANCE OF OUR PROPOSALS. BUT WE DO WISH TO TRY TO RETAIN A MEASURE OF SUPPORT FROM HIM FOR THE NEGOTIATIONS ON A CEASEFIRE. IF THESE ARE TO BE BROUGHT TO A SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION, IT IS ESSENTIAL TO BE ABLE TO DO SO QUICKLY.

CARRINGTON

FILES

RHOD D
OADS
NAD
MED
PUSD
PLANNING STAFF
ES & SD
NENAD
CCD
FRD
EID (E)
UND
LEGAL ADVISERS
(SIR I SINCLAIR)
(MR FIFOOT)
EGON D
PCD

DEF D
OID
NEWS D
PS
PS/SIR I GILMOUR
PS/MR LUCE
PS/MR RIDLEY
PS/MR HURD
PS/PUS
SIR A DUFF
MR BULLARD
MR FRETWELL
LORD N G LENNOX
MISS BROWN
MR DAY
MR WILLSON
MR ASPIN

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION
RHODESIA POLICY

GRS 400

CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT

CONFIDENTIAL

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE

FM FCO 181944Z NOV 79

TO IMMEDIATE LUSAKA

TELEGRAM NUMBER 950 OF 18 NOVEMBER

Serial No. T145^{AA}/79^T

INFO PRIORITY TO WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK, DAR ES SALAAM, MAPUTO,
GABORONE, LUANDA, PRETORIA, MIRIMBA SALISBURY

RHODESIA

1. PLEASE PASS THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME
MINISTER TO PRESIDENT KAUNDA AS SOON AS POSSIBLE:-

QUOTE

DEAR KENNETH,

AS YOU WILL KNOW, WE HAVE NOW REACHED AGREEMENT
WITH THE PATRIOTIC FRONT DELEGATION AT THE RHODESIA
CONFERENCE ON THE PRE-INDEPENDENCE ARRANGEMENTS,
SUBJECT TO A SUCCESSFUL OUTCOME OF THE NEGOTIATIONS
ON THE CEASE-FIRE. THIS WAS IN VERY GREAT PART
A RESULT OF THE PERSONAL CONTRIBUTION YOU HAVE MADE
TO THE SUCCESS OF THE NEGOTIATIONS. I SHOULD
LIKE TO THANK YOU WARMLY FOR THE INDISPENSABLE
PART YOU PLAYED IN EXPLAINING THE REAL
SIGNIFICANCE OF OUR PROPOSALS TO THE PATRIOTIC
FRONT LEADERS.

WE ARE NOW MOVING ON TO THE THIRD AND FINAL PHASE
OF THE CONFERENCE. WE HAVE PUT FORWARD OUR

PROPOSALS FOR A CEASE-FIRE: SIR LEONARD ALLINSON
WILL BE MAKING THESE AVAILABLE TO YOU. IF WE
ARE TO BRING THE NEGOTIATIONS TO A SUCCESSFUL
CONCLUSION IT WILL BE ESSENTIAL TO USE THE
MOMENTUM WHICH HAS NOW BEEN ACHIEVED TO REACH
AGREEMENT VERY QUICKLY ON THE TERMS OF A CEASE-
FIRE. AFTER OUR TALKS TOGETHER, I KNOW HOW MUCH
THIS MEANS FOR YOU AND FOR ZAMBIA. AS I EXPLAINED
TO YOU IN LONDON IT IS ESSENTIAL IF THERE IS TO
BE AN EFFECTIVE CEASE-FIRE AND ADEQUATE PROVISION
FOR THE WELFARE AND SECURITY OF THE PATRIOTIC FRONT
THAT THOSE WHO ARE IN RHODESIA SHOULD AGREE TO
ASSEMBLE AT PRE-DETERMINED PLACES AT THE TIME A
CEASE-FIRE COMES INTO EFFECT. FULLY ADEQUATE
ARRANGEMENTS MUST BE MADE FOR THE PATRIOTIC FRONT
FORCES: AND IT GOES WITHOUT SAYING THAT THEY MUST
BE TREATED HONOURABLY.

fa
Pms

CONFIDENTIAL

/IT WILL

CONFIDENTIAL

IT WILL ALSO BE ESSENTIAL TO ENSURE THAT CROSS-BORDER MILITARY ACTIVITY BY EITHER SIDE CEASES FROM THE START AND THROUGHOUT THE INTERIM PERIOD. THIS WILL REQUIRE FIRM ASSURANCES ABOUT THE POSITION OF THE FORCES OUTSIDE AS WELL AS INSIDE RHODESIA. WE SHALL THEREFORE BE IN TOUCH WITH YOU URGENTLY ABOUT THE ARRANGEMENTS TO ENSURE EFFECTIVE MILITARY LIAISON BETWEEN YOUR GOVERNMENT, THE CEASE-FIRE COMMISSION IN RHODESIA AND PATRIOTIC FRONT FORCES IN ZAMBIA IN ORDER TO ENSURE THAT NO ACTIVITY TAKES PLACE WHICH COULD LEAD TO A RESUMPTION OF HOSTILITIES. WE SHALL BE AIMING TO REACH AGREEMENT NEXT WEEK ON THE FRAMEWORK FOR A CEASE-FIRE. IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT WE SHOULD DO SO IF WE ARE TO ACHIEVE WHAT MATTERS MOST TO THE PEOPLE OF RHODESIA AND OF ZAMBIA - THE CHANCE TO LIVE IN PEACE AND SECURITY.

I REALLY BELIEVE THAT PRIZE IS WITHIN OUR GRASP IF WE CAN NOW WORK TOGETHER TO ACHIEVE IT.

WITH MY WARMEST PERSONAL REGARDS.

MARGARET

UNQUOTE

CARRINGTON

F I L E S

RHOD D
OADS
NAD
MED
PUSD
PLANNING STAFF
ES & SD
NENAD
CCD
FRD
EID (E)
UND
LEGAL ADVISERS
(SIR I SINCLAIR)
(MR FIFOOT)
ECON D
PCD

DEF D
OID
NEWS D
PS
PS/SIR I GILMOUR
PS/MR LUCE
PS/MR RIDLEY
PS/MR HURD
PS/PUS
SIR A DUFF
MR BULLARD
MR FRETWELL
LORD N G LENNOX
MISS BROWN
MR DAY
MR WILLSON
MR ASPIN

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION
RHODESIA POLICY



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

Prime Minister

16 November 1979

Apartheid?

Ans Yes and

Dear Michael,

FCO Resident Clerk
informed. 19.30 18/11
G. BaldwinRhodesia: Messages to Kaunda and Nyerere

/ President Nyerere sent a message to the Prime Minister on
/ 14 November about Rhodesia (Dar es Salaam telno 903). This has
/ been overtaken by the Patriotic Front's agreement to our proposals
/ for the interim arrangements. I attach a draft reply, approved
/ by Lord Carrington, which the Prime Minister may wish to send
/ President Nyerere, together with instructions to Sir Peter Moon.
/ Despite the unhelpful tone of Nyerere's message, Lord Carrington
/ recommends that the Prime Minister should reply in a conciliatory
/ vein. You may also wish to see the High Commissioner's comments
/ in Dar telegram No 907 (enclosed).

/ Lord Carrington thinks that the Prime Minister may wish also
/ to send a message to President Kaunda to thank him for the role
/ he has played in helping to achieve this measure of agreement and
/ to enlist his support for our ceasefire proposals. I attach a
/ draft telegram to Lusaka.

The Resident Clerk will hold copies of both telegrams, in
case you wish to authorise their despatch over the weekend.

yours ever
Rodric Lyne

(R M J Lyne)
Private Secretary

M O'D B Alexander Esq
10 Downing Street

File No.....

Department Rhodesia

Drafted by

(Block Capitals) R. Renwick

Tel. Extn. 233-5698

OUTWARD

TELEGRAM

Security Classification
CONFIDENTIAL
Precedence
IMMEDIATE
DESKBYZ

FOR COMMS. DEPT. USE	Despatched (Date) (Time)Z	POSTBYZ
----------------------	---------------------------------------	---------------

PREAMBLE

(Time of Origin) Z (G.M.T.) (Restrictive Prefix).....

(Security Class.) CONFIDENTIAL (Caveat/ Privacy marking)

(Codeword) (Deskby)..... Z

TO IMMEDIATE DAR ES SALAAM Tel. No.of (precedence) (post)

AND TO (precedence/post)

AND SAVING TO

REPEATED TO (for info) IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, LAGOS, UKMIS NEW YORK, LUSAKA, GABORONE, MAPUTO, LUANDA

SAVING TO (for info)

Distribution:-
Rhodesia Policy

[TEXT]

YOUR TELNO 903: RHODESIA

1. Please deliver the following message from the Prime Minister to President Nyerere as soon as possible:

"Dear Julius,

Thank you for your message of 14 November about Rhodesia.

The points which you raised were very much on our minds at the time. I am sure that you will be as delighted

as I am that we have ~~now~~ reached agreement with the Patriotic Front on the pre-independence arrangements, subject to a successful outcome of the negotiations on the ceasefire. This is a great step forward and a tribute to both the delegations at the Conference.

Copies to:-

We have now put forward our proposals for the ceasefire. The primary responsibility for maintenance of the ceasefire will rest with the respective forces and their commanders. The main elements in our proposals are the establishment of a ceasefire commission under the Governor's military adviser, with representatives of the military commanders on both sides. In addition we are proposing the establishment of a monitoring force, under United Kingdom auspices.

We have already started, therefore, on this final phase of the Conference. With the Constitution and the pre-independence arrangements agreed, the case for a ceasefire and an end to the war is irresistible. I know I can count on your support in bringing the whole process to a successful conclusion.

With good wishes,

Yours sincerely,

Margaret Thatcher."

*Amud
ano*

2. In any discussion arising from this message you should make it clear that all Commonwealth countries will be invited to send observers to the elections. We shall not, however, be inviting any Commonwealth governments which are formally committed to support one side or the other in the negotiations to contribute to the monitoring force, which will be under UK auspices.

/3.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

3. Nyerere's efforts over the last few days to mobilise Commonwealth, Scandinavian and European pressure on us to induce us to modify our position on the pre-independence arrangements have been unhelpful. He has furthermore been left out on a limb by the Patriotic Front's acceptance of our proposals. But we do wish to try to retain a measure of support from him for the negotiations on a ceasefire. If these are to be brought to a successful conclusion, it is essential to be able to do so quickly.

File No.

Department RHODESIA

OUTWARD

Drafted by (Block Capitals) P J BARLOW

TELEGRAM

Tel. Extn. 233 5725

Security Classification CONFIDENTIAL
Precedence IMMEDIATE
DESKBYZ

FOR COMMS. DEPT. USE	Despatched (Date) (Time)Z	POSTBYZ
----------------------	---------------------------------------	---------------

PREAMBLE

(Time of Origin) Z (G.M.T.) (Restrictive Prefix)
 (Security Class.) CONFIDENTIAL (Caveat)
 (Codeword) (Deskby) Z
 (Privacy marking)

TO IMMEDIATE LUSAKA (precedence) (post) Tel. No. of

AND TO (precedence/post)

AND SAVING TO
 REPEATED TO (for info) PRIORITY WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK, DAR ES SALAAM
 MAPUTO, GABORONE, LUANDA, PRETORIA
 MIRIMBA SALISBURY.

SAVING TO (for info)

tribution:-

hodesia Policy

[TEXT]

RHODESIA

1. Please pass the following message from the Prime Minister to President Kaunda as soon as possible:-

"Dear Kenneth,

As you will know, we have now reached agreement with the Patriotic Front delegation at the Rhodesia Conference on the pre-independence arrangements, subject to a successful outcome of the negotiations

/on

CONFIDENTIAL

ies to:-

on the cease-fire. This was in very great part a result of the personal contribution you have made to the success of the negotiations. I should like to thank you warmly for the indispensable part you ~~have~~ played in explaining the real significance of our proposals to the Patriotic Front leaders.

We are now moving on to the third and final phase of the Conference. We have put forward our proposals for a cease-fire: Sir Leonard Allinson will be making these available to you. If we are to bring the negotiations to a successful conclusion, it will be essential to use the momentum which has now been achieved to reach agreement very quickly on the terms of a cease-fire. After our talks together, I know how much this means for you and for Zambia. As I explained to you in London it is essential if there is to be an effective cease-fire and adequate provision for the welfare and security of the Patriotic Front that those who are in Rhodesia should agree to assemble at pre-determined places at the time a cease-fire comes into effect. Fully adequate arrangements must be made for the Patriotic Front forces; and it goes without saying that they must be treated honourably.

It will also be essential to ensure that cross-border military activity by either side ceases from the


/start

start and throughout the interim period. This will require firm assurances about the position of the forces outside as well as inside Rhodesia. We shall therefore be in touch with you urgently about the arrangements to ensure effective military liaison between your government, the Cease-fire Commission in Rhodesia and Patriotic Front forces in Zambia in order to ensure that no activity takes place which could lead to a resumption of hostilities. We shall be aiming to reach _____ agreement next week on the framework for a cease-fire. It is essential that we should do so if we are to achieve what matters most to the people of Rhodesia and of Zambia - the chance to live in peace and security.

I really believe that _____ prize is within our grasp if we can now work together to achieve it.

With my warmest personal regards.

Margaret."



GR 190

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FM DAR ES SALAAM 160630Z NOVEMBER 79
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELNO 907 OF 16 NOVEMBER

RHODESIA

1. IN THE LIGHT OF THE AGREEMENT NOW REACHED, PRESIDENT NYERERE'S MESSAGE (MY TELNO 903) AND INITIATIVE FOR A COMMONWEALTH MEETING ARE SEEN TO HAVE BEEN HUMILIATINGLY ILL-TIMED. HE MUST FEEL THAT HE HAS BEEN BADLY MISLED ABOUT THEIR NEGOTIATING TACTICS BY THE PF (AS I WOULD HAVE THOUGHT ALSO WOULD THE OAU HAVING REGARD TO THEIR PROPOSAL FOR A MEETING FOLLOWING MR MUGABE'S VISIT TO ADDIS ABABA). THIS IS NOT NECESSARILY A BAD THING.
2. NYERERE'S RECENT LOBBYING OF WHAT HE THOUGHT TO BE THE PF CASE, AND HIS EFFORTS TO HAVE DECISIONS PUT OFF THROUGH THE DEVICE OF FURTHER COMMONWEALTH CONSULTATION HAVE BEEN EXTREMELY UNHELPFUL. I REMAIN OF THE VIEW, HOWEVER, THAT HIS BEHAVIOUR STEMS ESSENTIALLY NOT FROM ANY HOSTILITY TO WHAT YOU ARE TRYING TO DO, BUT FROM HIS FEAR (IT IS NOT TOO STRONG A WORD) OF THE POSSIBLE CONSEQUENCES OF DEAD-LOCK AND A BREAK. I AM AFRAID THEREFORE THAT, UNLESS HE HAS LEARNT A LESSON FROM THIS LAST EXPERIENCE, WE SHALL ALWAYS BE LIKELY TO HAVE SERIOUS DIFFICULTY WITH HIM EACH TIME WE COME TO A MOMENT OF DECISION: HE WILL ALWAYS BE INCLINED TO LOOK FOR SOME WAY TO PUT IT OFF.
3. I HOPE NONETHELESS THAT THE PRIME MINISTER'S REPLY TO NYERERE'S MESSAGE OF 14 NOVEMBER CAN BE A PERSONAL MESSAGE AND COUCHED IN GENEROUS TERMS TO SAVE AS MUCH FACE AS POSSIBLE. WE MAY YET NEED TO TRY TO OBTAIN HIS SUPPORT ON FUTURE ISSUES. HE HAS INFLUENCE WITH PRESIDENT MACHEL, THERE ARE TANZANIAN TROOPS IN MOZAMBIQUE AND ZANU TRAINING CAMPS IN TANZANIA.

MDON

FILES
RHODESIA D
EAD
PS
PS/LPS

PS/MR LUCE
PS/PUS
SIR A DUFF
MR DAY
MR ASPIN

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

GR 950

CONFIDENTIAL

DESKBY 142030Z

FM DAR ES SALAAM 141930Z NOVEMBER 79

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 903 OF 14 NOVEMBER

RHODESIA:

1. FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF AN UNSIGNED COPY OF A PERSONAL MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT NYERERE TO THE PRIME MINISTER. IT WAS DELIVERED TO ME THIS EVENING, 14 NOV BY MISS WICKEN. SHE TOLD ME A MESSAGE WAS ALSO BEING DELIVERED TO THE US AMBASSADOR. MESSAGE BEGINS:

DEAR MRS THATCHER,

I AM VERY WORRIED INDEED ABOUT WHAT I SEE AS A VERY REAL POSSIBILITY - ALMOST A PROBABILITY - OF THE RHODESIAN TALKS COLLAPSING. I AM APPEALING TO YOU TO HELP REMOVE THIS THREAT. SUCH A COLLAPSE WOULD BE DISASTROUS TO THE HOPES WHICH WE ENTERTAINED AFTER OUR WORK AT LUSAKA SINCE EVEN WORSE, IT WOULD THRUST SOUTHERN AFRICA INTO YEARS OF INTENSIFIED AND EXTENDED WAR.

IN MY CORRESPONDENCE WITH YOU SINCE LUSAKA I HAVE EMPHASISED MY WORRY ABOUT THE CONDITIONS DURING THE INTERIM UNDER WHICH THE ELECTIONS WOULD BE HELD. I HAVE STRESSED ALL THE TIME THE NEED FOR BRITISH AUTHORITY TO BE BOTH EFFECTIVE AND SEEN AS EFFECTIVE. UNTIL NOW I HAVE TAKEN FOR GRANTED THAT THE BRITISH AUTHORITY WOULD BE EXERCISED OVER A SUFFICIENT PERIOD TO ENSURE AN EQUAL OPPORTUNITY FOR ALL PARTIES, BECAUSE I HAVE ASSUMED, I THINK UNDERSTANDABLY, THAT THIS IS IMPLICIT WHERE IT IS NOT EXPLICIT IN THE LUSAKA AGREEMENT.

WE HAVE ACHIEVED CONDITIONAL AGREEMENT ON A NEW CONSTITUTION - THE CONDITION IS ONLY THAT THE INTERIM ARRANGEMENTS SHOULD ALSO BE AGREED. FRANKLY THERE IS MUCH IN THAT CONSTITUTION WHICH I DO NOT LIKE AT ALL, BUT I HAVE DONE WHAT I COULD TO GET THE PATRIOTIC FRONT TO ACCEPT IT BECAUSE IT DOES, I BELIEVE, DO THE ESSENTIAL THING - WHICH IS TRANSFER EFFECTIVE POWER TO THE MAJORITY.

CONFIDENTIAL

/BUT I HAVE

CONFIDENTIAL

BUT I HAVE ONLY BEEN ABLE TO HELP IN URGING DISTASTEFUL DECISIONS ON THE PATRIOTIC FRONT, AND I WILL ONLY BE ABLE TO DO SIMILAR THINGS IN THE FUTURE, WHILE I REMAIN CONVINCED THAT THE ELECTIONS THEMSELVES WILL BE CARRIED OUT UNDER CONDITIONS WHICH ARE REALLY FAIR AND GIVE AN EQUAL CHANCE TO ALL THE PARTICIPANTS. I CANNOT URGE THE PATRIOTIC FRONT TO TAKE PART IN ELECTIONS WHEN THE CARDS ARE STACKED AGAINST THEM BEFORE THEY START, ANY MORE THAN YOU COULD URGE SUCH ACTION UPON THE BISHOP IF THE CIRCUMSTANCES WERE REVERSED. FOR WE HAVE BEEN URGING THE PATRIOTIC FRONT TO GIVE UP ARMS AND TURN TO THE BALLOT SINCE THEY ARE READY TO DO THAT. WE FOR OUR PART ARE NOW DUTY BOUND TO GIVE THEM A FAIR CHANCE IN THE POLLING BOOTHS.

BUT AS FAR AS I CAN SEE THAT WOULD NOT HAPPEN WITH A TWO MONTHS INTERIM BEFORE ELECTIONS. THE BISHOP AND HIS ALLIES HAVE BEEN LEGALLY IN RHODESIA FOR YEARS, AND HAVE BEEN ORGANISING POLITICALLY WITH THE BACKING OF THE SALISBURY ARMED FORCES SINCE THEY HAVE KNOWN CANDIDATES - OR CAN HAVE WHERE THEY DO NOT ALREADY HAVE THEM SINCE THEY HAVE A POLITICAL ORGANISATION IN BEING. THE PATRIOTIC FRONT, ON THE OTHER HAND, IS COMPOSED OF PARTIES WHICH ARE NOW ILLEGAL INSIDE RHODESIA, AND WHICH HAVE OF NECESSITY ORGANISED THEMSELVES FOR WAR, NOT FOR POLITICAL CAMPAIGNING SINCE MOST OF THEIR LEADERS AND ACTIVISTS ARE AT LEAST PART OF THE TIME OUT OF THE COUNTRY AND CERTAINLY HAVE TO MOVE IN SECRECY WHEN INSIDE IT. THE PATRIOTIC FRONT PARTIES HAVE THEREFORE NO EXISTING POLITICAL ORGANISATION, NO CANDIDATES READY, NO MEANS OF MOVING THEIR PEOPLE ABOUT THE COUNTRY EXCEPT ON FOOT, AND SO ON.

THERE IS ANOTHER ASPECT TO THIS PROPOSED TWO MONTHS INTERIM. IT WILL BE INSUFFICIENT - THIS IS ACKNOWLEDGED - TO COMPILE A VOTERS' REGISTER OR TO DEMARCATe CONSTITUENCIES. THE ABSENCE OF A REGISTER IS A HANDICAP TO FAIRNESS SINCE BUT I COULD SWALLOW THAT AS THE ELECTIONS ARE ON A ONE-PERSON, ONE-VOTE BASIS AND INDELIBLE MARKINGS CAN BE MADE ON THE HANDS OF VOTERS. I DO NOT, HOWEVER, SEE HOW WE IN THE BRITISH TRADITION CAN RUN, SUPERVISE, OR JUDGE AS FAIR, AN ELECTION ON A MULTI-MEMBER, PARTY-LIST, SYSTEM. BOTH MAJOR PARTIES IN BRITAIN HAVE REJECTED SUCH A SYSTEM - INDEED I BELIEVE EVEN THE LIBERALS FAVOUR A SINGLE-MEMBER TRANSFERABLE VOTE PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION SYSTEM.

IN AFRICA THERE ARE EVEN MORE ARGUMENTS AGAINST SUCH A SYSTEM AS THAT NOW BEING PROPOSED. IN PARTICULAR, IT ENCOURAGES

CONFIDENTIAL

TRIBALISM IN STATES WHICH ARE STILL BUILDING THEIR NATIONAL CONSCIOUSNESS. AND IN RHODESIA IT HAS THE STILL FURTHER DISADVANTAGE AT THIS JUNCTURE OF BEING IDENTIFIED WITH THE SMITH REGIME.

FRANKLY I DO NOT UNDERSTAND WHY THIS TWO MONTHS PERIOD IS PROVING SUCH A STICKING POINT IXR YOU, AND STILL LESS WHY YOU ARE JEOPARDISING EVERYTHING WHICH YOU - AND WE ALL - HAVE WON OVER THE PAST WEEKS OF HARD WORK. THE ARGUMENTS FOR SIX MONTHS HAVE BEEN PUT FORWARD SEMICLN THEY HAVE NOT BEEN ANSWERED. WE ARE ONLY TOLD THERE IS A DANGER THAT THE CEASE FIRE WILL NOT LAST MORE THAN TWO MONTHS. YET THERE WILL NOT BE A CEASE FIRE AT ALL IF TWO MONTHS IS INSISTED UPON EXCLAMATION MARK AND THE WHOLE COMMONWEALTH, AS WELL AS THE FRONT LINE STATES, HAVE AGREED TO BACK UP A C ASE FIRE FOR AS LONG AS NECESSARY AND THEN TO BACK UP THE ELECTED GOVERNMENT - PROVIDED AGREEMENT IS REACHED.

CAN WE NOT EVEN NOW, SAVE THE CONFERENCE? I HAVE SUGGESTED THAT ONE WAY FORWARD WOULD BE FOR AN EMERGENCY COMMONWEALTH MEETING, OR A MEETING OF OUR LUSAKA WORKING PARTY GROUP OF SIX NATIONS, TO DISCUSS THIS ISSUE. SUCH A MEETING COULD BE HELD IN LONDON IF YOU WISH. BUT FOR EITHER OF THESE IDEAS TO HAVE A CHANCE WE NEED TO BE RELEIVED OF THIS ATMOSPHERE OF CRISIS SEMICLN A DECISION IS NOT POSSIBLE WITHIN ONE OR TWO DAYS UNLESS IT IS A DECISION TO BREAK UP THE CONFERENCE.

THIS LETTER COMES TO YOU WITH MY PERSONAL GOOD WISHES AS ALWAYS.
YOURS SINCER LY.

ENDS
MOON

F I L E S


RHODESIA D
OADS
NAD
PUSD
PLANNING STAFF
ES & SD
CCD
FRD
UND
LEGAL ADVISERS
(SIR I. SINCLAIR)
(MR FIFOOT)
ECON D MED
PCD NENAD
DEF D EID (E)
OID

NEWS D
PS
PS/SIR I GILMOUR
PS/MR LUCE
PS/MR RIDLEY
PS/MR HURD
PS/PUS

SIR A DUFF
LORD N G LENNOX
MISS BROWN
MR DAY
MR WILLSON
MR ASPIN
MR BULLARD
MR FRETWELL

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION
RHODESIA POLICY

16 NOV 1979



RHODESIA POLICY ADVANCE COPIES - 28

DE/FR I GILMOUR
DE/FR LUCE
DE/FUS

MR WILSON
MR DAY
LORD H G LENNOX
MR ASPEN

DE/NO 10 DOWNING STREET

MR R J WADDE-GERY
MR P H MAXEY
~~MR DEVERALL~~
MR P J FOWLER
DIO
MR GORELTY

CABINET
OFFICE

ADVANCE COPY

IMMEDIATE

HD/BIOD DEPT (4)

HD/C AF D

HD/S AF D

HD/PUSD (2)

HD/NEWS DEPT

HD/WAD

SIC I. S. S. C. L. A. M. I. N. G. A. D. V. I. S. E. R. M. K. 174

MR PIPCOOT LEGAL ADVISER M K 164

~~RESIDENT CLERK~~

Pamie Rowley

And

GRS 230

CONFIDENTIAL

DESKBY 191430Z

FM LUSAKA 191200Z NOV 79

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1254 OF 19 NOVEMBER

INFO PRIORITY MIRIMBA SALISBURY, DAR ES SALAAM, MAPUTO, LUANDA,
GABORONE AND PRETORIA

RHODESIAN INCURSIONS

1. THERE HAVE BEEN FURTHER INCURSIONS INTO ZAMBIA OVER THE PAST WEEKEND. ATTACKS HAVE BEEN CONCENTRATED ON ROAD BRIDGES IN SOUTHERN AND EASTERN PROVINCES. THE ROAD BRIDGE AT KALEYA (20 KMS SOUTH-WEST OF MAZABUKA) HAS BEEN DAMAGED AS HAS THE GREAT EAST ROAD AT TWO BRIDGING POINTS SOME 50 AND 70 KMS EAST OF RUFUNSA. WE HAVE JUST LEARNT IN CONFIDENCE FROM SENIOR ZAMBIAN MINISTER THAT THIS MORNING THE GREAT NORTH ROAD WAS ATTACKED AND A MAJOR BRIDGE SOME 70 KMS SOUTH-WEST OF MKUSHI DAMAGED BY AERIAL BOMBING. MINISTER HAS PARTICULARLY ASKED THAT WE DO NOT (REPEAT NOT) MENTION THIS LAST INCIDENT TO ZAMBIAN OFFICIALS OR THOSE LIKELY TO REVEAL SUCH INFORMATION TO ZAMBIAN OFFICIALS UNTIL THE ZAMBIANS THEMSELVES ANNOUNCE IT LATER TODAY. THE EFFECT OF CUTTING THE GREAT NORTH ROAD AT

THAT WE DO NOT (REPEAT NOT) MENTION THIS LAST INCIDENT TO ZAMBIAN OFFICIALS OR THOSE LIKELY TO REVEAL SUCH INFORMATION TO ZAMBIAN OFFICIALS UNTIL THE ZAMBIANS THEMSELVES ANNOUNCE IT LATER TODAY. THE EFFECT OF CUTTING THE GREAT NORTH ROAD AT THIS POINT WOULD BE TO REINFORCE THE DIFFICULTIES OCCASIONED BY THE DESTRUCTION OF THE BRIDGES AT CHAMBESHI AND REPAIRS TO THE CHAMBESHI BRIDGE COULD BE RENDERED MORE DIFFICULT IF IT PROVES IMPOSSIBLE TO MOVE HEAVY MACHINERY ETC TO SITE.

2. ZAMBIAN MINISTER CATEGORICALLY DENIED TO US THIS MORNING THAT RAIL LINK BETWEEN LUSAKA AND LIVINGSTONE HAD ALSO BEEN ATTACKED ALTHOUGH RUMOURS PERSIST TO THIS EFFECT AND WE SHALL REPORT LATER.

ALLINSON

1247

NNN

RECEIVED SALISBURY

[RHODESIA: POLICY: ADVANCE COPIES]

X-26

PS
PS/SIR I GILMOUR
PS/MR LUCE
PS/PUS
SIR J GRAHAM
MR WILLSON
MR DAY
LORD N G LENNOX
MR ASPIN

PS/NO 10 DOWNING STREET

MR R L WADE-GERY)
MR P M MAXEY)
~~COL MOIR~~)
MR P J FOWLER)
DIO)

CABINET
OFFICE

Spencerall

.....

HD/RHOD DEPT (4)

HD/C AF D

HD/S AF D

HD/PUSD (2)

HD/NEWS DEPT

HD/WAD

~~MR FREELAND~~ LEGAL ADVISER RM K2002

Sir I Sinclair

174/

(2lls)

MR FIFOOT LEGAL ADVISER RM K164

~~RESIDENT CLERK~~

GR 300

UNCLASSIFIED

FM LUSAKA 161212Z

TO PRIORITY FCO

TEL NO. 1249 OF 16 NOVEMBER 1979.

REPEATED TO ROUTINE GABORONE, PRETORIA, MIRIMBA SALISBURY,
DAR ES SALAAM, MAPUTO, UKMIS NEW YORK.

RHODESIA.

1. THE MOOD IN LUSAKA FOLLOWING THE PATRIOTIC FRONT'S ACCEPTANCE OF THE INTERIM PROPOSALS IS OF JOY AND RELIEF.
2. BOTH ZAMBIAN DAILY NEWSPAPERS LEAD WITH THE "BREAK THROUGH" AT LANCASTER HOUSE STATING THAT "THE MOMENT OF TRUTH CAME WHEN BRITAIN AGREED THAT FREEDOM FIGHTERS WOULD BE GIVEN EQUAL STATUS WITH THE REBEL RHODESIAN FORCE DURING THE PERIOD BEFORE FRESH ELECTIONS". THE TIMES OF ZAMBIA REPORTS PATRIOTIC FRONT SPOKESMAN WILLIE MUSARURWA AS SAYING THAT TECHNICAL NEGOTIATIONS IN A CEASEFIRE ARE NOT EXPECTED TO BE A STUMBLING BLOCK.

... OF PRAISE FOR MRS THATCHER AND

ELECTIONS. THE TIMES OF ZAMBIA REPORTS PATRIOTIC FRONT
SPOKESMAN WILLIE MUSARURWA AS SAYING THAT TECHNICAL NEGOTIATIONS
IN A CEASEFIRE ARE NOT EXPECTED TO BE A STUMBLING BLOCK.

3. BOTH EDITORIALS ARE FULL OF PRAISE FOR MRS THATCHER AND
YOURSELF SEMI COLON THE MAIL SAYS "WE CAN SAFELY ADMIT THAT THE
ELECTION OF MRS MARGARET THATCHER AS BRITISH PRIME MINISTER WAS
A GREAT BLESSING IN DISGUISE. SHE WILL GO DOWN IN HISTORY NOT
ONLY AS THE FIRST WOMAN PRIME MINISTER OF BRITAIN, BUT ALSO AS A
WOMAN WHO SUCCEEDED WHERE MEN FAILED". THE TIMES WHICH HAS
BEEN EXTREMELY CRITICAL OF YOUR HANDLING OF THE CONFERENCE
COMMENTS ON THE QUESTION OF EQUAL STATUS OF TROOPS "THIS IS A
GREAT CONCESSION AND LORD CARRINGTON, WHOSE INITIAL HANDLING
OF THE TALKS HAS BEEN ANYTHING BUT EVENHANDED, IS TO BE
CONGRATULATED FOR SEEING THE LIGHT AT LAST".

4. THE UNDERLYING TREND IN ALL COMMENT IS THAT ZAMBIA HAS
SUFFERED CONSIDERABLY DURING THE PAST 14 YEARS, THE TIMES SAYS
"ZAMBIA HAS SACRIFICED LIVES AND PROPERTY IN THIS ENDEAVOUR
SEMI COLON SHE HAS SUFFERED CRIPPLING ECONOMIC REPERCUSSIONS"
BUT THAT ALTHOUGH WILLING TO CONTINUE TO SUFFER FOR PRINCIPLE
WITH A SETTLEMENT IN SIGHT THE MAIL SAYS "WE CAN SEE THE
BEGINNING OF OUR PEACE AND INDEPENDENCE".

ALLINSON.

NNNN

1345

[RHODESIA: POLICY: ADVANCE COPIES]

28

PS
PS/SIR I GILMOUR
PS/MR LUCE
PS/PUS
~~SIR J GRAHAM~~
MR WILLSON
MR DAY
LORD N G LENNOX
MR ASPIN

PS/NO 10 DOWNING STREET

MR R L WADE-GERY)
MR P M MAXEY)
COL MOIR)
MR P J FOWLER)
DIO)

CABINET
OFFICE

.....
HD/RHOD DEPT (4)

HD/C AF D
HD/S AF D

HD/PUSD (2)

HD/NEWS DEPT

HD/WAD

~~MR FRASER~~ LEGAL ADVISER RM K200A

Sir I Sinclair

K174

MR FIFOOT LEGAL ADVISER RM K164

~~RESIDENT CLERK~~

Prime Minister

GRS 200

UNCLASSIFIED

FM CANBERRA 160510Z NOV 79

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 626 OF 16 NOVEMBER

REPEATED INFO WELLINGTON, WASHINGTON, UKMIS YEW YORK,

MIRIMBA SALISBURY

Ant

Ant

RHODESIA: CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE

1. AUSTRALIAN PRIME MINISTER, WHO IS STILL CONVALESCING AT HIS PROPERTY IN VICTORIA, TODAY ISSUED A PRESS RELEASE WARMLY WELCOMING THE AGREEMENT ON ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD. THAT THE CONFERENCE HAD COME SO FAR, HE SAID, REFLECTED THE SKILL OF YOUR CHAIRMANSHIP AND THE WILLINGNESS OF ALL PARTIES AT THE CONFERENCE TO COMPROMISE. IN A RADIO CURRENT AFFAIRS INTERVIEW THIS MORNING (AT THE PRIME MINISTER'S INITIATIVE), MR FRASER DESCRIBED THE AGREEMENT AS A "TREMENDOUS ACHIEVEMENT AND A GREAT DEAL OF CREDIT CERTAINLY NEEDS TO GO TO PRIME MINISTER THATCHER, LORD CARRINGTON AND TO ALL THE PARTICIPANTS". HE ADDED THAT THE AGREEMENT SO FAR WAS A "TREMENDOUS AND HISTORIC ADVANCE".
2. ON AUSTRALIAN PARTICIPATION IN CEASEFIRE MONITORING, HE SAID THAT "AUSTRALIAN PARTICIPATION WAS DEPENDENT UPON GETTING

2. ON AUSTRALIAN PARTICIPATION IN CEASEFIRE MONITORING, HE SAID THAT "AUSTRALIAN PARTICIPATION WAS DEPENDENT UPON GETTING AGREEMENT OF ALL THE PARTIES BECAUSE WE STILL BELIEVED THAT WITHOUT THAT AGREEMENT IT WOULD NOT REALLY BE A SETTLEMENT. WELL, THOSE STEPS HAVE BEEN TAKEN. THEY HAVE BEEN TAKEN SUCCESSFULLY, SO, WITH OTHER COMMONWEALTH NATIONS, WE CAN EXPECT TO BE PARTICIPATING . . ."

TEBBIT

NNNN

IMMEDIATE

PS
PS/DEPT I GLENCOUR
PS/MR LUCE
PS/PUS

MR WILLSON
MR DAY
LORD R G LENNOX
MR ASPIN

PS/NO 10 DOWNING STREET

MR R J WADD-GERY)
MR P M MAXBY)
MR DEVERALL)
MR P J FOWLER)
DIO)

CABINET
OFFICE

.....

HD/BIOD DEPT (4)
HD/C AF D
HD/S AF D
HD/PUSD (2)
HD/NEWS DEPT
HD/WAD
SIR I SINCLAIR LEGAL ADVISER RM K174
MR PIFCOT LEGAL ADVISER RM K164
RESIDENT CLERK

GR 250

CONFIDENTIAL

FM GABORONE 161510Z NOV

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 468 OF 16 NOVEMBER 1979

INFO IMMEDIATE PRETORIA

INFO PRIORITY MIRIMBA SALISBURY, LAGOS, DAR ES SALAAM, MAPUTO,
LUANDA, WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK AND LUSAKA.

PRETORIA TELNO 856 : RHODESIA.

1. THERE IS A REFLECTION IN BOTSWANA OF PIK BOTHA'S FEELINGS REPORTED IN TUR. AS A SETTLEMENT HAS APPROACHED THERE HAS BEEN GROWING CONCERN AMONGST MINISTERS AND OFFICIALS ABOUT THE SITUATION AFTER ELECTIONS IN RHODESIA. THERE WAS NO EUPHORIA OVER THE AGREEMENT ON THE INTERIM ARRANGEMENTS AND INDEED AN INCREASE IN APPREHENSION. GIN THE PRESIDENT'S OFFIC THERE IS A STRONG BELIEF THAT WHOEVER WINS THE ELECTIONS CIVIL WAR WILL FOLLOW SHORTLY AFTER. ALTHOUGH THIS HAS NOT BEEN EXPLICIT I SUSPECT THAT THEY WOULD PR FER A VICTORY BY BISHOP MUZOREWA, WHOM THEY ASSUME WOULD HAVE THE SUPPORT OF THE EXISTING SECURITY FORCES. THEY DO NOT BELIEVE THAT THE PATRIOTIC FRONT WOULD QUIETLY ACCEDE TO A LOSS OF THE ELECTION AND IF THEY WON A STRUGGLE WOULD BREAK OUT

WOULD PREFER A VICTORY BY BISHOP MUZOREWA, WHOM THEY ASSUME WOULD HAVE THE SUPPORT OF THE EXISTING SECURITY FORCES. THEY DO NOT BELIEVE THAT THE PATRIOTIC FRONT WOULD QUIETLY ACCEDE TO A LOSS OF THE ELECTION AND IF THEY WON A STRUGGLE WOULD BREAK OUT AMONGST THE FACTIONS. THE BATSWANA FEAR THAT WHAT THEY CALL A MOZAMBIQUE SITUATION WOULD SPILL OVER INTO BOTSWANA. IDEALLY WHAT THEY WOULD LIKE IS THE CONTINUANCE OF BRITISH PRESENCE TO ENSURE THE ORDERLY EMERGENCY OF RESPONSIBLE SECURITY FORCES UNDER THE NEW GOVERNMENT. OFFICIALS HAVE SUGGESTED TO ME A PERIOD OF ABOUT TWELVE MONTHS. I HAVE EXPLAINED THAT THIS IS COMPLETELY OUT OF THE QUESTION BUT NEVERTHELESS THEY INSIST THAT IT WOULD BE DISASTEROUS IF THE BRITISH GOVERNOR LEFT ON THE DAY AFTER THE ELECTIONS.

TURNER

NNNN



He Lb

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

16 November 1979

BF 23.11.79

I enclose a copy of a message the Prime Minister has received from President Tolbert of Liberia.

The message has been somewhat overtaken by events but I should be grateful for advice as to whether the Prime Minister should send a reply and, if so, in what terms.

M. O'D. B. ALEXANDER

R. M. J. Lyne, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

MOB BA says this is now dead
SP 3.12.79

GO

Sublet

PRIME MINISTER'S

PERSONAL MESSAGE

SERIAL No. 1144/79T

Nov 16 0544

NNNN

ZCZC CLF741 LBE998 FLB5525 ROC296 IBY0043 MOI339 1115-1071

G8LH CO LIMV 381

EM/NR46 MOJNROVIA LIBERIA 381/352 15 6:42G

LFS0988

(PRIOR.)

ETATPRIORITE

THE RIGHT HONORABLE MARGARET THATCHER

PRIME MINISTER OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND

10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1

MADAM PRIME MINISTER COLON THANK YOU FOR YOUR LETTER OF 2ND NOVEMBER ELABORATING ON THE ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE TRANSITIONAL OR PRE-INDEPENDENCE PERIOD IN ZIMBABWE AS PROPOSED BY YOUR GOVERNMENT AT THE CONSTITUTIONAL TALKS STOP WE ARE HOWEVER GRAVELY CONCERNED THAT THE INSISTENCE OF YOUR GOVERNMENT ON FULL ACCEPTANCE OF THE PROPOSALS AS ADVANCED MIGHT JEOPARDIZE WHAT IS PERHAPS THE LAST OPPORTUNITY FOR A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT OF THE ZIMBABWE PROBLEM STOP I AM INFORMED THAT IN THE SPIRIT OF COMPROMISE AND ACCOMMODATION CMA THE COLEADERS OF THE PATRIOTIC FRONT ARE NOW PROPOSING A TRANSITIONAL PERIOD OF FOUR MONTHS CMA THE INCLUSION OF THE ELECTION COUNCIL OF REPRESENTATIVE OF THE COMMONWEALTH CMA THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A CEASEFIRE COMMISSION CONSISTING OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE PATRIOTIC FRONT CMA THE INTERNAL REGIME AND THE COMMONWEALTH CMA A VOTING PERIOD OF TWO DAYS AND EQUAL TREATMENT AND STATUS FOR ALL CONTENDING LEADERS STOP AS THE PROPSAL FOR A BRITISH GOVERNOR WITH EXECUTIVE AND LEGISLATIVE POWERS HAS NOW BEEN ACCEPTED CMA IT IS MY UNDERSTANDING THAT THE ELECTION COUNCIL AND CEASEFIRE COMMISSION WOULD GENERALLY FALL UNDER THE GOVERNORS JURISDICTION THUS ENSURING BRITAINS FULL AUTHORITY OVER THE TERRITORY UNTIL THE ATTAINMENT OF INDEPENDENCE STOP AS THESE PROPOSALS IN MY VIEW DO NOT SEEM INCONSISTENT AND UNREASONABLE CMA I AGAIN URGE YOUR GOVERNMENT TO DEMONSTRATE FLEXIBILITY AND AN ATTITUDE OF ACCOMMODATION BY GIVING SERIOUS CONSIDERATION TO THESE NEW PROPOSALS SO THAT AGREEMENT MAY BE REACHED ON THE CRUCIAL ISSUES RELATING TO THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD STOP I DO TRUST THAT I CAN REPLY ON THE ASSURANCE THAT YOUR GOVERNMENT WILL DO ALL WITHIN ITS POWER TO ENSURE THAT THE CONSTITUTIONAL TALKS LEAD TO AN INTERNATIONALLY ACCEPTABLE FORMULA FOR THE INDEPENDENCE OF ZIMBABWE CMA A FORMULA WHICH SERVES THE SUPREME INTEREST OF THE ZIMBABWEAN PEOPLE AND CONTRIBUTES TO THE PROMOTION OF PEACE AND PROGRESS ON THE CONTINENT OF AFRICA STOP WITH RENEWED ASSUANCES OF MY HIGHEST CONSIDERATION AND ESTEEM SINCERELY

W R TOLBERT JR+

PRESIDENT OF LIBERIA AND CURRENT CHAIRMAN OF THE ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY

To send Telegrams — CONSULT TELEPHONE DIRECTORY OR TELEX DIALLING CARD

POST OFFICE INTERNATIONAL TELEGRAPHS

To send Telegrams — CONSULT TELEPHONE DIRECTORY OR TELEX DIALLING CARD

POST OFFICE INTERNATIONAL TELEGRAPHS

To send Telegrams — CONSULT TELEPHONE DIRECTORY OR TELEX DIALLING CARD

POST OFFICE INTERNATIONAL TELEGRAPHS



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

cc Master Set
Toward
Pit Trips Everywhere
(Hag 1979)
April

16 November 1979

Call by Bishop Muzorewa

Your letter to me of 15 November enclosed briefing for the above meeting and a draft line which, you suggested, the Bishop might take in explaining his decision to return home.

In the event the conversation when the Bishop called yesterday afternoon was confined to generalities. The question of explaining his decision to return was not touched on. The Bishop expressed his gratitude to the Prime Minister and to the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary for making good on the commitment they had given him in July. He paid tribute to their determination and sincerity. Although the ceasefire had still to be worked out, the most important things had already been accomplished. He would therefore be leaving for Salisbury the following day. This would enable him to arrive on Sunday which should ensure that he was greeted by a considerable number of his supporters.

The Prime Minister paid tribute to the determination which the Bishop had shown in pursuit of a settlement. The length of time he had spent in London and the sacrifices he had made for the sake of a settlement were remarkable. She did not believe the conference could fail now provided momentum was maintained.

There was a brief discussion about the timing of the election. Bishop Muzorewa said that the Patriotic Front were taking every opportunity to infiltrate their men into Rhodesia while the negotiations continued. He believed that six or seven thousand guerrillas, mostly Zipra, had entered Rhodesia since the negotiations had begun. It was therefore important to press ahead and hold the election as early as possible. The weather provided an additional reason for speed. The rainy season officially started on 15 November and lasted to mid March. The heaviest rains fell in January: from mid January onwards the roads would be impassable and the rivers overflowing. Finally the schools would reopen in the third week of January and it was essential to have the school teachers to help with running the

/election.

MBO

election. All this pointed to holding the elections no later than mid January. Dr. Mundawarara who was accompanying Bishop Muzorewa underlined the importance of the mid January deadline. The Prime Minister agreed with this analysis.

The discussion ended with expressions of mutual goodwill. Bishop Muzorewa said that he hoped one day to welcome the Prime Minister in an independent Zimbabwe. The Prime Minister said she looked forward to making such a visit.

M. Q. B. ALEXANDER

R.M.J. Lyne, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

NORTHERN IRELAND: ADVANCE COPIES 2)

N IRELAND OFFICE - PS TO SEC OF STATE
RM 66 A/2 GGS

PS

N IRELAND OFFICE [4 copies]

PS/SIR I GILMOUR

MR K STOWE

PS/PUS

MR MARSHALL

MR FERGUSSON

MR P W J BUXTON

LORD N GORDON LENNOX

HD/RID

CABINET OFFICE - SIR ^{R. ARISTOTEL} J HUNT

FUSD (2)

HD/IPD

MR R WADE-GERY

HD/OID (2)

DIO

NEWS DEPT

~~NO~~ 10 DOWNING STREET

.....

.....

~~RESIDENT CLERK~~

Prime Minister
[Signature]

GR 400

UNCLASSIFIED

FM WASHINGTON 152345Z NOV 79

TO PRIORITY F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 3750 OF 15 NOVEMBER 1979.

INFO ROUTINE N I O BELFAST, DUBLIN, BIS NEW YORK.

M I P T: NORTHERN IRELAND

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF STATEMENT BY SENATOR EDWARD KENNEDY (D-MASS.) AFTER HIS TALK WITH MY LYNCH.

I HAVE SPOKEN WITH PRIME MINISTER LYNCH TODAY AND WE DISCUSSED IN PARTICULAR THE MAJOR POLITICAL PROBLEMS IN NORTHERN IRELAND.

WE AGREED IT IS TIME TO MOVE BOLDLY AND CREATIVELY TOWARDS A POLITICAL SOLUTION SO NECESSARY TO PREVENT THE CONTINUATION OF THE TERRIBLE VIOLENCE WHICH HAS AFFLICTED THE IRISH PEOPLE FOR SO LONG. OUR NATIONS MUST UNDERSTAND THE IMPORTANCE AND THE URGENCY OF BRINGING AN END TO TERRORIST ACTS, WHETHER THESE OCCUR IN IRELAND OR IN IRAN OR ANY OTHER COUNTRY.

WE MUST ALSO MOVE TO SOLVE THE ROOT CAUSE OF THE TERRORISM AND THE VIOLENCE. THAT IS WHY IT IS SO IMPORTANT FOR AMERICANS TO IDENTIFY WITH AND SUPPORT THE FREELY ELECTED REPRESENTATIVES OF THE PEOPLE OF IRELAND WHO ARE TRYING TO HARD TO REACH POLITICAL AGREEMENT. AT A DINNER GIVEN IN HIS HONOUR BY MAYOR BYRNE LAST TUESDAY IN CHICAGO, THE PRIME MINISTER SAID THAT "WE WANT A RECONCILIATION OF MINDS AND HEARTS - NOT SIMPLY THE AMALGAMATION OF

[Handwritten squiggly mark]

... THAT IS AN AMALGAMATION OF THE GREATEST SIGNIFICANCE

IN PARTICULAR THE MAJOR POLITICAL PROBLEMS IN NORTHERN IRELAND.

WE AGREED IT IS TIME TO MOVE BOLDLY AND CREATIVELY TOWARDS A POLITICAL SOLUTION SO NECESSARY TO PREVENT THE CONTINUATION OF THE TERRIBLE VIOLENCE WHICH HAS AFFLICTED THE IRISH PEOPLE FOR SO LONG. OUR NATIONS MUST UNDERSTAND THE IMPORTANCE AND THE URGENCY OF BRINGING AN END TO TERRORIST ACTS, WHETHER THESE OCCUR IN IRELAND OR IN IRAN OR ANY OTHER COUNTRY.

WE MUST ALSO MOVE TO SOLVE THE ROOT CAUSE OF THE TERRORISM AND THE VIOLENCE. THAT IS WHY IT IS SO IMPORTANT FOR AMERICANS TO IDENTIFY WITH AND SUPPORT THE FREELY ELECTED REPRESENTATIVES OF THE PEOPLE OF IRELAND WHO ARE TRYING TO HARD TO REACH POLITICAL AGREEMENT. AT A DINNER GIVEN IN HIS HONOUR BY MAYOR BYRNE LAST TUESDAY IN CHICAGO, THE PRIME MINISTER SAID THAT "WE WANT A RECONCILIATION OF MINDS AND HEARTS - NOT SIMPLY THE AMALGAMATION OF TERRITORIES". THAT IS AN ASPIRATION OF THE GREATEST SIGNIFICANCE TO WHICH ALL AMERICANS AND IRISH MEN AND WOMEN SHOULD SUBSCRIBE FOR THE BENEFIT OF THE IRISH PEOPLE, ESPECIALLY FOR BOTH SECTIONS OF THE COMMUNITY IN NORTHERN IRELAND.

BEYOND THE IMMEDIATE POLITICAL MOVES THAT ARE NEEDED I SHARE MR LYNCH'S VIEW THAT THE BEST INTERESTS OF ALL THE PEOPLE IN IRELAND, OF WHATEVER TRADITION, AND ANGLO-IRISH RELATIONS WOULD BE SERVED BY A CLEAR INDICATION FROM THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT OF ITS INTEREST IN SEEING A PEACEFUL COMING TOGETHER OF THE IRISH PEOPLE UPON AGREED POLITICAL TERMS.

I CONGRATULATE MR LYNCH ON HIS EXTREMELY SUCCESSFUL TOUR OF THE UNITED STATES. I REGRET VERY MUCH THAT OUR SCHEDULES DID NOT PERMIT US TO MEET DIRECTLY DURING THIS VISIT, BUT I JOIN WITH ALL AMERICANS IN APPLAUDING THE MESSAGE OF HOPE, PEACE AND RECONCILIATION HE BROUGHT TO THIS COUNTRY AS A PRIME MINISTER WHO IS A GOOD AND TRUE FRIEND OF THE UNITED STATES.

HENDERSON.

NNNN



CONFIDENTIAL

FCS/79/180

CHANCELLOR OF THE DUCHY OF LANCASTER

Southern Rhodesia: Independence Bill

1. Now that the Enabling Bill and the Constitutional Conference on Rhodesia has moved into its final phase, we need to consider the likely timing of the Southern Rhodesia Independence Bill which will soon be needed.

2. We envisage that the Bill will give the Government power to set the date of independence by Order in Council. The earliest practicable date for Rhodesia to achieve independence is the end of December, and our contingency planning should take this as a target. This would mean that the Independence Bill would need to receive the Royal Assent before the Christmas recess. If the ceasefire negotiations succeed, it is unlikely that Rhodesia will become independent until the end of January; but we cannot count on success in these negotiations, or await their outcome before commencing work on the Bill. It would in any case be prudent to have the Independence Bill enacted well before the end of January, in case of a breakdown in the ceasefire or some other contingency which required us to bring forward the date of independence.

3. We wish at all costs to avoid the disruption caused by the introduction at short notice of the Enabling Bill, and should give Parliament adequate time to consider the Independence Bill. But if we are to be sure of having it through by the Christmas recess we ought, I suggest, to aim to introduce it not later than 26 November.

4. Your minute of 19 September gave authority for the issue of instructions to Parliamentary Counsel to draft the Bill. With some issues already dealt with in the Enabling Bill and others likely to be settled by Orders in Council made under it, the Independence Bill itself should be a less formidable piece of legislation than

/at one

CONFIDENTIAL

②

Ry

Prime Minister

Planning is going ahead
on the basis of getting
the Bill through by Christmas

16/11
Ry



CONFIDENTIAL

at one time seemed likely. I have no doubt that Parliamentary Counsel have a great deal of pressing business. But if the Bill is to be tabled by 26 November - which I think essential to avoid further inconvenience to Parliament - its drafting will obviously have to be treated as a priority. I should be grateful for your agreement to this.

A handwritten signature consisting of a large, stylized letter 'C' with a diagonal line extending downwards and to the right from its base.

(CARRINGTON)

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

15 November 1979

This minute is copied to:
Prime Minister
Lord Chancellor
Chief Whip
Members of L Committee
Sir R Armstrong

CONFIDENTIAL

76
8
6
4
11
7

15 NOV 1971

X-28

[RHODESIA: POLICY: ADVANCE COPIES]

PS
PS/SIR I GILMOUR
PS/MR LUCE
PS/PUS
~~SIR J GRAHAM~~
MR WILLSON
MR DAY
LORD N G LENNOX
MR ASPIN

PS/NO 10 DOWNING STREET

MR R L WADE-GERY)
MR P M MAXEY) CABINET
COL MOIR) OFFICE
MR P J FOWLER)
DIO)

IMMEDIATE

.....
HD/RHOD DEPT (4)

HD/C AF D
HD/S AF D

HD/PUSD (2)

HD/NEWS DEPT

HD/WAD

~~MR PEARLAND~~ *Sir I Sinclair* LEGAL ADVISER RM ~~K164~~ K174

MR FIFCOF LEGAL ADVISER RM K164

RESIDENT CLERK

Prime Minister

[Handwritten signature]

GR1000

CONFIDENTIAL

FM PRETORIA 151530Z NOV

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TEL NO 856 OF 15/11/79

INFO PRIORITY MIRIMBA SALISBURY LUSAKA DAR ES SALAAM MAPUTO

GABORONE LUANDA WASHINGTON UKMIS NEW YORK LAGOS

MY TELNO 852:RHODESIA

1. PIK BOTHA SUMMONED ME FOR ANOTHER SESSION OF DOOM AND GLOOM THIS AFTERNOON. EVEN THE NEWS WHICH WAS TELEPHONED THROUGH TO ME DURING OUR MEETING THAT THE PATRIOTIC FRONT HAD THIS MORNING AGREED TO OUR PROPOSALS FOR THE INTERIM ARRANGEMENTS AND THAT THE CEASEFIRE DISCUSSIONS WOULD BE STARTING IMMEDIATELY FAILED TO LIGHTEN HIS MOOD.

2. AS FORESHADOWED IN MY TUR, THE BURDEN OF MR BOTHA'S REMARKS WAS THAT , ACCORDING TO RELIABLE INFORMATION AVAILABLE TO THE SOUTH AFRICANS, BISHOP MUZOREWA NOW ONLY ENJOYED THE SUPPORT OF BETWEEN 35% AND 40% OF THE ELECTORATE AND EVERY WEEK THAT WENT BY HE LOST ANOTHER 2%-3%. FROM WHAT HE (BOTHA) HAD HEARD

WENT BY HE LOST ANOTHER 25-35. FROM WHAT HE (BOTHAS) HAD HEARD FROM LONDON IT MIGHT TAKE AS MUCH AS TWO WEEKS BEFORE THE CEASEFIRE WAS NEGOTIATED; THIS IN TURN WOULD DELAY THE ARRIVAL OF THE GOVERNOR AND ALSO THE DATE OF THE ELECTIONS. THE WAY THINGS WERE GOING HE WOULD TAKE A BET WITH ME THAT THE ELECTIONS WOULD NOT IN FACT TAKE PLACE UNTIL APRIL. IT WAS EASY FOR ME TO SAY THAT WE INTENDED TO GET THE CEASEFIRE DISCUSSIONS OVER QUICKLY SEMICLN WE HAD SAID THE SAME THING ABOUT THE CONFERENCE ITSELF AND IT HAD NOW DRAGGED ON FOR WELL OVER TWO MONTHS.

3. MR BOTHAS WENT ON TO SAY THAT WE PERHAPS HAD A DIFFERENT ASSESSMENT OF MUZOREWA'S CHANCES. IN GENERAL HE COULD NOT HELP WONDERING WHETHER WE WERE STILL "ON THE SAME WAVE-LENGTH". HE DID NOT WISH TO SUGGEST THAT WE HAD BEEN GUILTY OF BAD FAITH, BUT WHEN HE WAS IN LONDON HE HAD UNDERSTOOD THAT WE INTENDED TO GET THE GOVERNOR TO SALISBURY BY THE MIDDLE OF NOVEMBER. THE REPEATED DELAYS AT LANCASTER HOUSE MEANT THAT NKOMO WAS NOW WINNING ALL ALONG THE LINE. HE WAS OPENING OFFICES "EVERYWHERE" AND HAD "ENORMOUS" SUMS OF MONEY AT HIS DISPOSAL. HE HAD COMPLETELY OUT-PLAYED MUZOREWA, WHO HAD STAYED ON IN LONDON FAR LONGER THAN HE SHOULD HAVE DONE AGAINST HIS (BOTHAS) ADVICE. EVEN NOW IT WAS NOT KNOWN WHEN MUZOREWA WOULD RETURN.

4. MR BOTHAS SAID HE DID NOT DOUBT OUR GOOD INTENTIONS, BUT UNFORTUNATELY INTENTIONS DID NOT WIN ELECTIONS. IT WAS ORGANISATION THAT WON ELECTIONS AND THE MAN WHO HAD THE ORGANISATION WAS NKOMO. SOUTH AFRICA COULD NOT AFFORD TO GO ON BACKING A LOSING HORSE AND PAYING OUT RANDBS 40 MILLION A MONTH FOR THIS PURPOSE. THERE WAS NO POINT IN GOING ON SUPPORTING THE BISHOP AND INCURRING THE WRATH OF NKOMO AT THE SAME TIME. HIS (BOTHAS) POSITION IN THE CABINET WAS BECOMING "EMBARRASSING". HE INTENDED, THEREFORE, TO PUT THESE VIEWS TO THE CABINET NEXT TUESDAY AND TO SUGGEST THAT THE TIME HAD COME FOR SAG TO RECONSIDER THEIR ATTITUDE. IF BETWEEN NOW AND THEN I WOULD LIKE TO GIVE HIM OUR CONSIDERED REACTIONS TO WHAT HE HAD SAID HE WOULD BE GLAD TO HAVE THEM.

5. I TOLD MR BOTHAS THAT I WOULD REPORT WHAT HE HAD SAID. I HAD HOPED THAT THE NEWS THAT I HAD JUST GIVEN HIM WOULD BE ENCOURAGING AND WAS SORRY TO SEE THAT IT WAS NOT. I SAW NO REASON WHY THE CEASEFIRE DISCUSSIONS SHOULD GO ON FOR ANOTHER TWO WEEKS OR WHY THE GOVERNOR'S ARRIVAL IN SALISBURY SHOULD BE LONG DELAYED. WE MIGHT WELL HAVE A DIFFERENT ASSESSMENT FROM HIM OF MUZOREWA'S ELECTORAL CHANCES. NOR WAS IT FAIR TO SUGGEST, AS HE HAD DONE EARLIER, THAT THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT, UNLIKE THE SAG,

HE HAD DONE EARLIER, THAT THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT, UNLIKE THE SAG, DID NOT MIND TOO MUCH WHAT HAPPENED IN RHODESIA AS LONG AS THEY GOT THE PROBLEM OFF THEIR HANDS. MR BOTHA INTERVENED TO SAY THAT HE DID NOT MEAN TO PUT IT AS STRONGLY AS THAT, BUT IT WAS ONLY NATURAL THAT SOUTH AFRICA SHOULD BE MORE CONCERNED WITH A COUNTRY ON ITS DOORSTEP THAN WAS THE UNITED KINGDOM AT A DISTANCE OF 6000 MILES. I SAID WE HAD DEMONSTRATED AT LANCASTER HOUSE THAT WE WERE CONCERNED WITH THE QUALITY OF THE AGREEMENT WE GOT ON RHODESIA, AS WELL AS WITH ITS TIMING. MR BOTHA REPLIED THAT THE UPSHOT OF WHAT WAS NOW HAPPENING WAS THAT ALTHOUGH WE DID NOT INTEND IT WE WOULD BE CREATING IN RHODESIA NOT PEACE BUT RATHER THE BEGINNING OF A LARGE -SCALE CONFLICT IN SOUTHERN AFRICA.

6. I AM SORRY ONCE AGAIN TO BE BURDENING YOU WITH PIK BOTHA'S MODDY PROGNOSTICATIONS. I DO NOT EXACTLY ENJOY THEM MYSELF, BUT IT IS, I THINK, IMPORTANT TO GO ON TRYING TO CALM HIM DOWN AND REASSURE HIM. THE PERSONAL MESSAGE WHICH YOU SENT HIM ON NAMIBIA HAD A GOOD EFFECT, AND IF YOU COULD SEE YOUR WAY TO DOING THE SAME THING NOW ON RHODESIA IT WOULD HELP HIM IF, AS HE SAYS, HE FEELS OBLIGED TO RAISE THE MATTER IN CABINET NEXT TUESDAY. THE TWO IMPORTANT POINTS TO COVER IN SUCH A MESSAGE WOULD BE OUR LATEST FORECAST OF THE TIMING OF THE GOVERNOR'S ARRIVAL IN SALISBURY AND OUR ASSESSMENT (WHICH MR BYATT MAY BE ABLE TO PROVIDE) OF MUZOREWA'S ELECTORAL STANDING. IF IN THIS CONTEXT YOU COULD ADD ANYTHING ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF THE LIKELY COHESION OR LACK OF COHESION BETWEEN MUGABE AND NKOMO DURING THE ELECTION CAMPAIGN, SO MUCH THE BETTER, BUT THIS MAY BE EITHER TOO SPECULATIVE OR TOO DELICATE.

7. AT ONE POINT MR BOTHA ASKED ME WHETHER THE BRITISH GOVERNOR WOULD "RECOGNIZE" THE LOANS SOUTH AFRICA HAD MADE TO RHODESIA: I TREATED THIS AS A RHETORICAL QUESTION, BUT IT IS INTERESTING THAT HE SPOKE OF LOANS RATHER THAN GRANTS.

LEAHY

NNNN

[RHODESIA: POLICY: ADVANCE COPIES]

IMMEDIATE

PS
PS/SIR I GILMOUR
PS/MR LUCE
PS/PUS
~~SIR J GRAHAM~~
MR WILLSON
MR DAY
LORD N G LENNOX
MR ASPIN

PS/NO 10 DOWNING STREET

MR R L WADE-GERY)
MR P M MAXEY) CABINET
COL MOIR) OFFICE
MR P J FOWLER)
DIO)

.....

HD/RHOD DEPT (4)

HD/C AF D
HD/S AF D

HD/PUSD (2)

HD/NEWS DEPT
HD/WAD

~~MR FERRIS~~ LEGAL ADVISER RM ~~1200A~~ K174

MR FITZPATRICK LEGAL ADVISER RM K164

RESIDENT CLERK

Sir I Sinclair

and

Prime Minister

GPS 400

CONFIDENTIAL

FM MAPUTO 151500Z NOVEMBER 79

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 402 OF 15 NOVEMBER

INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON UKMIS NEW YORK PRETORIA MIRIMBA SALISBURY
LUSAKA DAR ES SALAAM CANBERRA LUANDA LAGOS WELLINGTON GABORONE SUVA

YOUR TELNO 1645 TO WASHINGTON: RHODESIA

1. I HAD NEARLY AN HOUR'S TALK WITH CHISSANO THIS AFTERNOON AND GAVE HIM THE GIST OF OUR PAPER ON THE CEASE-FIRE. I ALSO DREW ON YOUR HELPFUL TELEGRAM 153 (NOT TO ALL) AND LEFT A PIECE OF PAPER.

2. CHISSANO TOOK CAREFUL NOTE AND PROMISED TO CONVEY THE INFORMATION TO THE PRESIDENT. THERE WAS LITTLE THAT HE COULD SAY AT THE MOMENT BUT HE LOOKED FORWARD TO FULLER DETAILS OF OUR PROPOSALS IN DUE COURSE. HE COULD, HOWEVER, ASSURE ME OF HIS GOVERNMENT'S COOPERATION IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF AGREED CEASE-FIRE ARRANGEMENTS AND HE SAW NO PROBLEMS OF COMMUNICATION WITH PF FORCES IN MOZAMBIQUE. BUT HE REPEATED HIS EARLIER WARNINGS ABOUT ENSURING THAT THE DIRECTIVES OF THE PF LEADERS REACH THEIR MEN IN THE FIELD INSIDE RHODESIA.

THE PF LEADERS REACH THEIR MEN IN THE FIELD INSIDE RHODESIA.

3. HE ENVISAGED NO PROBLEMS IN STOPPING RAIDS ACROSS THE BORDER INTO RHODESIA BUT HE WAS CONCERNED LEST, BETWEEN NOW AND THE COMING INTO FORCE OF THE CEASE-FIRE, MERCENARIES ESPECIALLY MOZAMBICANS RECRUITED BY PORTUGUESE WHO HAD LEFT THE COUNTRY MIGHT TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THE SITUATION TO INFILTRATE MOZAMBIQUE AND ESTABLISH CELLS OF DISSIDENT ACTIVITY THIS SIDE OF THE BORDER. THIS COULD "CAUSE MANY PROBLEMS". I COMMENTED THAT IF THERE WERE SUCH DANGER IT WAS ALL THE MORE IMPORTANT THAT WE SHOULD MOVE FAST.

4. CHISSANO WANTED MORE INFORMATION ABOUT THE COUNTRIES WHICH ARE TO PROVIDE THE MONITORING FORCE. HE WONDERED WHETHER, INSTEAD OF US MAKING THE CHOICE EG AUSTRALIA, NEW ZEALAND AND FIJI, WE SHOULD NOT HAVE MOVED WITH THE AGREEMENT WITH THE PARTIES AT THE CONFERENCE. HE TOOK THE POINT ABOUT THE UNACCEPTABILITY OF COUNTRIES WHICH WERE COMMITTED TO SUPPORT ONE SIDE OR THE OTHER BUT HE THOUGHT THAT THERE WERE PLENTY OF THIRD WORLD COUNTRIES WHOSE CREDENTIALS OF IMPARTIALITY COULD NOT BE CHALLENGED. I SAID THAT I HAD NO REASON TO BELIEVE THAT OUR CHOICE OF COUNTRIES WOULD BE CONTENTIOUS AND THAT TO HAVE ADDED YET ANOTHER ISSUE TO THE AGENDA WOULD HAVE COMPLICATED MATTERS FURTHER AND POSTPONED THE DAY OF FINAL AGREEMENT ON VITAL ISSUES. IN ANY CASE, THE PRINCIPLE THAT WE WOULD EXERCISE SOLE AUTHORITY HAVING NOW BEEN UNIVERSALLY ACCEPTED, IT WAS SURELY FOR US TO DECIDE WHOM TO INVITE TO WORK UNDER OUR AUTHORITY. HE DID NOT PRESS THE POINT FURTHER.

5. AS REGARDS PARA 3 OF YOUR TUR, AN INDIRECT QUESTION BY ME ABOUT ANY SPECIAL PROBLEMS CONCERNING POSSIBLE BORDER INCIDENTS FAILED TO DRAW HIM, BUT I WOULD NOT EXPECT THE MOZAMBICANS TO BE TOO FUSSY ABOUT THE PROXIMITY TO THEIR BORDERS OF NEUTRAL MONITORING UNITS.

PAPADOPOULOS

NNNN

CONFIDENTIAL



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

15 November 1979

Dear Michael,

F.S. V. 16/41

Call by Bishop Muzorewa on the Prime Minister

Bishop Muzorewa asked to call on the Prime Minister this afternoon in the expectation that he will be returning to Salisbury tomorrow or on Saturday. Muzorewa will be seeing Lord Carrington at 4pm. Lord Carrington intends to discuss with him the exact timing of his return to Salisbury. In terms of the Constitutional Conference, there would be advantages in the Bishop staying until the ceasefire negotiations have come to a conclusion. The Front Line Presidents may react adversely to his early departure. He will also not be able to present his supporters with a settlement and a date for the return to legality if he goes to Salisbury this weekend. However, Muzorewa and his advisers are very anxious about the effect which his continued absence from Rhodesia may be having on the Bishop's political following in Rhodesia. We therefore think it likely that the Bishop will decide to return to Salisbury in the next day or two, and do not think that we should press him strongly to stay here against his wishes. We would suggest that the Bishop might explain his decision to return on the lines of the enclosed draft.

I enclose copies of Lord Carrington's exchange in the Conference this morning with Robert Mugabe, on the basis of which agreement was reached on the pre-independence arrangements, and of the paper circulated at Lancaster House yesterday based on proposals put by the Prime Minister to President Kaunda last weekend.

The Salisbury delegation are concerned that the understanding reached this morning with the Patriotic Front and a possible slight slippage in the period allowed to bring the ceasefire into effect represent a move by HMG towards the Patriotic Front. We are assuring Bishop Muzorewa that this is not the case.

The Prime Minister can assure the Bishop that we have not departed in any way from the proposals for the pre-independence period that we tabled and which were accepted by him. We have refused to accord equality of status to the forces of the Patriotic Front, for which they were pressing strongly. We have held firm to our proposal for a two month election period after the date on which the ceasefire comes into effect. The Patriotic Front have accepted our

/proposals

M O'D B Alexander Esq
10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL



CONFIDENTIAL

proposals; we have not accepted theirs. We shall now proceed with the utmost urgency to conclude discussions on the ceasefire. We have no interest whatever in delay.

The Prime Minister might take this opportunity to thank Bishop Muzorewa for the courageous stand that he and his delegation have taken throughout the Conference, without which we could not possibly have achieved so much.

Yours ever

Roderic Lyne

(R M J Lyne)
Private Secretary

POINTS FOR BISHOP MUZOREWA

1. I am returning to Rhodesia because political agreement has now been reached in the discussions at Lancaster House. I have negotiated the Independence Constitution for Zimbabwe. My delegation have accepted the British Government's full proposals for the period before independence involving a return to legality and new elections. The British Government has not renewed Section 2 of the Southern Rhodesia Act. All remaining sanctions will be removed as soon as the British Governor arrives in Salisbury.

2. I am looking forward to the elections and am confident of winning them. I expect the Patriotic Front to participate in the elections. I have left behind a team under the Deputy Prime Minister, Dr Mundawarara, to conduct the negotiations on a cease-fire. My Government is prepared to play its part in bringing an end to the war; but that depends on the Patriotic Front also agreeing to stop fighting. We consider that the proposals the British Government have put forward are fair and will bring an end to the war.



MR MUGABE

In the light of the discussion we have had as a result of President Kaunda's proposals to the Prime Minister, if you are prepared to include the Patriotic Front forces in paragraph 13 of the British paper, we are able to agree the interim proposals, conditional on the successful outcome of the negotiations on the ceasefire.

LORD CARRINGTON

I can confirm that your forces and the Rhodesian security forces will be under the authority of the Governor. The Patriotic

Front forces will be required to comply with the directions of the Governor. I am prepared to add such a provision to paragraph 13 of the paper we have circulated on the understanding which you have just given me that you will be able to agree the interim proposals, subject to a successful outcome of the negotiations on the ceasefire.

LORD CARRINGTON:

I would now like to clarify further a number of aspects of our proposals.

The British Government fully recognises that all parties must be able to take part on equal terms in genuinely free and fair elections. It is for this reason that they decided, after the Lancaster House Conference had reached agreement on the Independence Constitution, to offer to appoint a British Governor with executive and legislative authority to take charge of the administration of Rhodesia during the election period. This was not an easy decision. Britain has never before been directly responsible in this way for the administration of Rhodesia. But the Government took this step because it had become convinced that only in this way could all the parties feel confidence in the impartiality of the administration during the interim.

The British Government has always taken the view that the Independence Constitution should be implemented as soon as is consistent with the holding of free and fair elections. Their starting point was that the election period need not last more than four to six weeks. But they have taken account of the strongly held views that it should be longer, in eventually deciding that it should run for two months from the date when a cease-fire becomes effective. It will take up to two weeks to bring the cease-fire into effect. The election will be held eight or nine weeks after the cease-fire comes into effect.

The British Government fully accepts that the electoral

/ arrangements

arrangements themselves must be seen to be scrupulously fair to all parties who must have an equal opportunity to conduct their election campaign. They therefore decided to appoint a very senior and experienced British official as Election Commissioner, with a very substantial supporting British staff which will total over 100. They will impartially supervise every aspect of the electoral process. The staff will include officials with wide experience of the holding of elections both in Britain and in developing countries. Every precaution will be taken to guard against electoral fraud and malpractice.

The British Government took full account of the Patriotic Front's proposals for an Election Commission in making their proposals for an Election Council. All parties will have equal status on the Council. Any of its members will be free to make representations to the Election Commissioner on any matter relating to the elections, ie organisation, administration, access to the media, public meetings etc. This is a very wide mandate indeed. The Council will have no connection with the existing machinery of government. It will meet as frequently as the members wish and the parties will be free to decide the level at which they wish to be represented on it.

The practical arrangements for a cease-fire and the associated military questions will be for discussion in the third and final phase of the Conference - the negotiations on the cease-fire. But the British Government recognises that they must take full and fair account of the concerns of all parties to the election. It is for this reason that we propose the establishment of a Cease-fire Commission on which the military commanders on both sides will be represented. The role of the military forces on both sides

/ will

will be to maintain the cease-fire, for which they will be equally responsible to the Governor. Arrangements will be made to see that the Patriotic Front forces who may be assembled in Rhodesia during the cease-fire are properly housed and fed.

To meet some of the concerns expressed by the Front Line Presidents and the Patriotic Front, the British Government is taking steps to set up a monitoring force, with the participation of certain other Commonwealth governments, to monitor the cease-fire. With the agreement of the parties and of the contributing countries, this could play a stabilising role in resolving military questions which could arise after elections and before independence.

Britain recognises that the resettlement of refugees will be a major pre-occupation of the first government of Zimbabwe. A start must be made on the return of refugees as soon as Rhodesia returns to legality. The British Government is ready to do everything possible to help in this matter, in conjunction with host governments, the international organisations and other governments which are prepared to offer aid for this purpose.

The Governor will be prepared to meet any political leader should matters arise which cannot be resolved by their respective advisers.

ST. LOUIS
MO.
NOV 15 1972

NOV 15 1972

Mr Alexander

- Personal



With the compliments of

THE PRIVATE SECRETARY

Outline paper on the
Ceasefire to be tabled at
the Conference -

Roderic Lyne

FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
SW1A 2AH

15/11/79

A

RHODESIA: CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE

The Ceasefire

1. A comprehensive ceasefire agreement will be necessary in order to ensure a cessation of all offensive military activities by the Rhodesian security forces and the forces of the Patriotic Front. To achieve this the British Government puts forward the following proposals for discussion.

The Time-scale

2. A fully effective ceasefire cannot come into operation immediately. Time will be required for the transmission of orders to all subordinate commanders in the field and for the implementation of whatever arrangements are agreed for the separation of the opposing forces. In the view of the British Government, this time should be kept as short as possible and need not be more than ten days.

3. During this time, the leaders on each side will ensure that clear and precise instructions are issued to all units and ~~individuals~~ ^{personnel} under their command to comply scrupulously with the agreed arrangements for bringing the ceasefire into effect. The political and military leaders concerned will be provided with facilities to make regular and repeated announcements, by all available means and through all appropriate channels, to assist in ensuring that instructions to observe the ceasefire reach all the forces under their command.

4. During this period, all movement by units of the security forces into neighbouring countries and by units of the Patriotic Front forces into Rhodesia will cease; both sides will desist from offensive activities and will carry out military operations only in self-defence. Machinery will be established for the assessment and maintenance of the ceasefire and will be in ~~full~~ operation by ceasefire day.

/Observance

Observance and Supervision

5. The commanders of the forces involved will be responsible to the Governor for the observance of the ceasefire by the forces under their command.
6. The Governor will be assisted in this task by a British Military Adviser and a team of British military liaison officers. Arrangements will be made for liaison officers to be assigned as necessary to maintain contact with the forces concerned.
7. A Ceasefire Commission will be established in Salisbury to assess and supervise the observance of the ceasefire. The Commission will consist of the Governor's Military Adviser, as Chairman, and military representatives of the Rhodesian security forces and of the Patriotic Front. The Commission's functions will include:-
- (a) ensuring compliance with agreed arrangements for the security and activities of the forces inside Rhodesia; and
 - (b) the investigation of actual or threatened breaches of the ceasefire.

Cross-border Activity

8. Subject to agreement on monitoring arrangements, provision will be made to permit the return of unarmed persons to Rhodesia between ceasefire day and the date of the election to vote or engage in other peaceful political activity. There will be no cross-border military activity by either side. The governments of Zambia, Botswana and Mozambique will be invited to agree on arrangements, to be established in conjunction with the ceasefire, to ensure compliance with this requirement by forces based outside Rhodesia and to control cross-border movements by such forces. The Governor will be responsible for ensuring compliance with this requirement by forces inside Rhodesia.

/Monitoring

Monitoring

9. Britain will take responsibility for the establishment of a Ceasefire Monitoring Group, and has invited certain other Commonwealth Governments to contribute to it. The group will operate under the authority of the Governor and his Military Adviser. The function of the group will be to assess and monitor impartially the observance of the ceasefire by the forces and to assist the Ceasefire Commission in its tasks. The commanders of the forces will undertake to co-operate fully with the Monitoring Group and to provide it with whatever facilities are necessary to assist it to discharge its functions.

Disposition of the Forces

10. If agreement can be reached on the foregoing elements, it will be essential to proceed to the practical arrangements which will be necessary to avoid the risk of clashes between the existing forces, whether these are accidental or the result of failures of communication. Adequate arrangements will be required, taking into account the present dispositions of the forces, to ensure that the ceasefire is not prejudiced by close proximity of units of the security forces and the Patriotic Front forces. It would not otherwise be possible to deploy the Monitoring Group. Arrangements will be made to ensure that proper provision is made for the security, accommodation and other agreed requirements of the Patriotic Front forces ~~accumulated~~ ^{assembled} in Rhodesia during the ceasefire.

B



file

BK

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

15 November 1979

I enclose a copy of the text of a message to the Prime Minister from the Prime Minister of Canada.

This is a reply to the Prime Minister's message of 31 October. It would not appear to require a further reaction at the moment.

M. O'D. B. ALEXANDER

Roderic Lyne, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

6



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

15 November 1979

I am writing to thank you for your letter of 14 November to Clive Whitmore enclosing a letter from Prime Minister Clark to the Prime Minister.

I have of course brought Mr. Clark's letter to the Prime Minister's immediate attention.

M. O'D. B. ALEXANDER

Christian Hardy, Esq.,

CONFIDENTIAL

Rhodesia



MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1

Telephone 01-~~230 722~~ 218 2111/3

CONFIDENTIAL

15 November 1979

MO 35/5

NBPA

Dear Rhodesia

Paul 15/11

will request if required

Thank you for your letter of 7th November asking if the Ministry of Defence could provide an RAF aircraft for the British Governor in Salisbury during the transitional period.

It would be operationally possible to provide an RAF Andover, which is the only RAF communications aircraft suitable for the task, and my Secretary of State agrees that the RAF should, but we have no spare aircraft available so that to provide one will inevitably have an adverse effect on the communications flying service which MOD provides for Government Departments. The Queen's Flight has one aircraft in major servicing until February, and we will have no alternative but to withdraw one of the Andovers from 32 Squadron. This will considerably reduce this squadron's available effort, and - because of servicing schedules and some unavoidable commitments - this effect will be particularly severe up to early December. We shall have to ask our users to restrict their demands on 32 Squadron to the minimum, particularly up to the first week in December, by using civil means of executive air travel whenever possible, and to accept that if aircraft become unserviceable cancellation of 32 Squadron Andover tasks may be unavoidable. We would hope to meet essential tasks by making maximum use of our resources, including the Queen's Flight when appropriate, although we may need to resort to charter occasionally to do so.

You undertook to meet our extra costs. The weekly charge for the aircraft plus air and groundcrew would be £5,500. Positioning costs for the outward and return journeys would be about £25,000 by the most direct route.

One of the reasons you mention for using an aircraft for the Governor to travel in Rhodesia is safety. The Andover would be much safer than any form of land transport but it is of course vulnerable to missile attack from the ground during take off and landing.

/ We ...

R M J Lyne Esq

CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL



2

We can have the Andover ready to leave the UK by next Sunday as I believe you wish. Journey time to Salisbury by the most direct route is three days from the time when the necessary diplomatic clearances have been obtained. There is no route which the Andover could fly to Salisbury which would not involve overflight of Zambia and/or Angola. If these countries refuse permission the only aircraft for in-country use which we could provide which could reach Salisbury would be a Hercules. This could be fitted with a "VIP caravan" but would cost over twice as much as the Andover.

I am copying this letter to Michael Alexander (No 10).

*Yours most
B M Norbury*

B M NORBURY
Private Secretary

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

R. PREMADASA, M.P.

Prime Minister



DEMOCRATIC SOCIALIST REPUBLIC
OF
SRI LANKA

November 15th, 1979

The Rt.Hon.Mrs Margaret Thatcher, M.P.
Prime Minister of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland
No. 10, Downing Street, LONDON.

Dear Mrs Thatcher,

I thank you very much for your message of the 9th November on the progress that has been made at the Rhodesia Conference at Lancaster House.

We in Sri Lanka have been following with great interest, the proceedings at the Conference on the basis of our agreement in Lusaka.

I am indeed grateful for the full and frank exposition of your Government's position at the current stage of the negotiations.

With warm regards and good wishes,

Yours sincerely,

R. Premadasa



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

15 November 1979

I enclose a copy of a letter to the Prime Minister from the President of the Republic of The Gambia.

The letter is a reply to the message sent by the Prime Minister to the President last week. It would not seem to require any further acknowledgement at present.

M. O'D. B. ALEXANDER

Roderic Lyne, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

RLB

010
Recall with 2 telegrams -
29 Nov 21/4

THE STATE HOUSE,
DAR ES SALAAM,
TANZANIA.

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T143B/79T

15th November, 1979.

Mrs. Margaret Thatcher, M.P.,
The Prime Minister,
10 Downing Street,
London, S.W.1.

Dear Mrs. Thatcher,

I am very worried indeed about what I see as a very real possibility - almost a probability - of the Rhodesian talks collapsing. I am appealing to you to help remove this threat. Such a collapse would be disastrous to the hopes which we entertained after our work at Lusaka; even worse, it would thrust Southern Africa into years of intensified and extended war.

In my correspondence with you since Lusaka I have emphasized my worry about the conditions during the Interim under which the elections would be held. I have stressed all the time the need for British authority to be both effective and seen as effective. Until now I have taken for granted that the British authority would be exercised over a sufficient period to ensure an equal opportunity for all Parties, because I have assumed, I think understandably, that this is implicit where it is not explicit in the Lusaka Agreement.

We have achieved conditional agreement on a new constitution - the condition is only that the Interim arrangements should also be agreed. Frankly there is much in that constitution which I do not like at all, but I have done what I could to get the Patriotic Front to accept it because it does, I believe, do the essential thing - which is transfer effective power to the majority.

But I have only been able to help in urging distasteful decisions on the Patriotic Front, and I will only be able to do similar things in the future, while I remain convinced that the elections themselves will be carried out under conditions which are really fair and give an equal chance to all the participants. I cannot urge the Patriotic Front to take part in elections when the cards are stacked against them before they start, any more than you could urge such action upon the

.../2

Bishop if the circumstances were reversed. For we have been urging the Patriotic Front to give up arms and turn to the ballot; they are ready to do that. We for our part are now duty bound to give them a fair chance in the polling booths.

But as far as I can see that would not happen with a two months Interim before elections. The Bishop and his allies have been legally in Rhodesia for years, and have been organising politically with the backing of the Salisbury Armed Forces; they have known candidates - or can have where they do not already have them; they have a political organisation in being. The Patriotic Front, on the other hand, is composed of Parties which are now illegal inside Rhodesia, and which have of necessity organised themselves for war, not for political campaigning; most of their leaders and activists are at least part of the time out of the country and certainly have to move in secrecy when inside it. The Patriotic Front Parties have therefore no existing political organisation, no candidates ready, no means of moving their people about the country except on foot, and so on.

There is another aspect to this proposed two months interim. It will be insufficient - this is acknowledged - to compile a Voters' Register or to demarcate constituencies. The absence of a Register is a handicap to fairness; but I could swallow that as the elections are on a one-person, one-vote basis and indelible markings can be made on the hands of voters. I do not, however, see how we in the British tradition can run, supervise, or judge as fair, an election on a multi-member, Party-list, system. Both major Parties in Britain have rejected such a system - indeed I believe even the Liberals favour a single-member transferable vote Proportional Representation system.

In Africa there are even more arguments against such a system as that now being proposed. In particular, it encourages tribalism in states which are still building their national consciousness. And in Rhodesia it has the still further disadvantage at this juncture of being identified with the Smith Regime.


Frankly I do not understand why this two months period is proving such a sticking point for you, and still less why you are jeopardising everything which you - and we all - have won over the past weeks of hard work. The arguments

for six months have been put forward; they have not been answered. We are only told there is a danger that the Cease Fire will not last more than two months. Yet there will not be a Cease Fire at all if two months is insisted upon! And the whole Commonwealth, as well as the Front Line States, have agreed to back up a Cease Fire for as long as necessary and then to back up the elected Government - provided agreement is reached.

Can we not, even now, save the Conference? I have suggested that one way forward would be for an emergency Commonwealth meeting, or a meeting of our Lusaka Working Party Group of six nations, to discuss this issue. Such a meeting could be held in London if you wish. But for either of these ideas to have a chance we need to be relieved of this atmosphere of crisis; a decision is not possible within one or two days unless it is a decision to break up the Conference.

This letter comes to you with my personal good wishes as always.

Yours sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, reading "Julius K. Nyerere", is written above a horizontal line. The line extends across the width of the signature.

21 NOV 1979



PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T143B/79T

(referred to PS for decision on distribution)

DWF G 287/14

IMMEDIATE

ADVANCE COPY

LTX226/14

PS No 10 Downing St

OO FCO DESKBY 142030Z

R.C.

GR 950

CONFIDENTIAL

DESKBY 142030Z

FM DAR ES SALAAM 141930Z NOVEMBER 79

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 903 OF 14 NOVEMBER

RHODESIA:

Prime Minister
(written because)
(Although overlooked, you
may enjoy this!)

K.S.
Shu

Paul

1. FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF AN UNSIGNED COPY OF A PERSONAL MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT NYERERE TO THE PRIME MINISTER. IT WAS DELIVERED TO ME THIS EVENING, 14 NOV BY MISS WICKEN. SHE TOLD ME A MESSAGE WAS ALSO BEING DELIVERED TO THE US AMBASSADOR. MESSAGE BEGINS:

DEAR MRS THATCHER,

I AM VERY WORRIED INDEED ABOUT WHAT I SEE AS A VERY REAL POSSIBILITY - ALMOST A PROBABILITY - OF THE RHODESIAN TALKS COLLAPSING. I AM APPEALING TO YOU TO HELP REMOVE THIS THREAT. SUCH A COLLAPSE WOULD BE DISASTROUS TO THE HOPES WHICH WE ENTERTAINED AFTER OUR WORK AT LUSAKA SEMICLN EVEN WORSE, IT WOULD THRUST SOUTHERN AFRICA INTO YEARS OF INTENSIFIED AND EXTENDED WAR.

IN MY CORRESPONDENCE WITH YOU SINCE LUSAKA I HAVE EMPHASISED MY WORRY ABOUT THE CONDITIONS DURING THE INTERIM UNDER WHICH THE ELECTIONS WOULD BE HELD. I HAVE STRESSED ALL THE TIME THE NEED FOR BRITISH AUTHORITY TO BE BOTH EFFECTIVE AND SEEN AS EFFECTIVE. UNTIL NOW I HAVE TAKEN FOR GRANTED THAT THE BRITISH AUTHORITY WOULD BE EXERCISED OVER A SUFFICIENT PERIOD TO ENSURE AN EQUAL OPPORTUNITY FOR ALL PARTIES, BECAUSE I HAVE ASSUMED, I THINK UNDERSTANDABLY, THAT THIS IS IMPLICIT WHERE IT IS NOT EXPLICIT IN THE LUSAKA AGREEMENT

THAT THIS IS IMPLICIT WHERE IT IS NOT EXPLICIT IN THE LUSAKA AGREEMENT.

WE HAVE ACHIEVED CONDITIONAL AGREEMENT ON A NEW CONSTITUTION - THE CONDITION IS ONLY THAT THE INTERIM ARRANGEMENTS SHOULD ALSO BE AGREED. FRANKLY THERE IS MUCH IN THAT CONSTITUTION WHICH I DO NOT LIKE AT ALL, BUT I HAVE DONE WHAT I COULD TO GET THE PATRIOTIC FRONT TO ACCEPT IT BECAUSE IT DOES, I BELIEVE, DO THE ESSENTIAL THING - WHICH IS TRANSFER EFFECTIVE POWER TO THE MAJORITY.

BUT I HAVE ONLY BEEN ABLE TO HELP IN URGING DISTASTEFUL DECISIONS ON THE PATRIOTIC FRONT, AND I WILL ONLY BE ABLE TO DO SIMILAR THINGS IN THE FUTURE, WHILE I REMAIN CONVINCED THAT THE ELECTIONS THEMSELVES WILL BE CARRIED OUT UNDER CONDITIONS WHICH ARE REALLY FAIR AND GIVE AN EQUAL CHANCE TO ALL THE PARTICIPANTS. I CANNOT URGE THE PATRIOTIC FRONT TO TAKE PART IN ELECTIONS WHEN THE CARDS ARE STACKED AGAINST THEM BEFORE THEY START, ANY MORE THAN YOU COULD URGE SUCH ACTION UPON THE BISHOP IF THE CIRCUMSTANCES WERE REVERSED. FOR WE HAVE BEEN URGING THE PATRIOTIC FRONT TO GIVE UP ARMS AND TURN TO THE BALLOT SINCE THEY ARE READY TO DO THAT. WE FOR OUR PART ARE NOW DUTY BOUND TO GIVE THEM A FAIR CHANCE IN THE POLLING BOOTHS.

BUT AS FAR AS I CAN SEE THAT WOULD NOT HAPPEN WITH A TWO MONTHS INTERIM BEFORE ELECTIONS. THE BISHOP AND HIS ALLIES HAVE BEEN LEGALLY IN RHODESIA FOR YEARS, AND HAVE BEEN ORGANISING POLITICALLY WITH THE BACKING OF THE SALISBURY ARMED FORCES SINCE THEY HAVE KNOWN CANDIDATES - OR CAN HAVE WHERE THEY DO NOT ALREADY HAVE THEM SINCE THEY HAVE A POLITICAL ORGANISATION IN BEING. THE PATRIOTIC FRONT, ON THE OTHER HAND, IS COMPOSED OF PARTIES WHICH ARE NOW ILLEGAL INSIDE RHODESIA, AND WHICH HAVE OF NECESSITY ORGANISED THEMSELVES FOR WAR, NOT FOR POLITICAL CAMPAIGNING SINCE MOST OF THEIR LEADERS AND ACTIVISTS ARE AT LEAST PART OF THE TIME OUT OF THE COUNTRY AND CERTAINLY HAVE TO MOVE IN SECRECY WHEN INSIDE IT. THE PATRIOTIC FRONT PARTIES HAVE THEREFORE NO EXISTING POLITICAL ORGANISATION, NO CANDIDATES READY, NO MEANS OF MOVING THEIR PEOPLE ABOUT THE COUNTRY EXCEPT ON FOOT, AND SO ON.

THERE IS ANOTHER ASPECT TO THIS PROPOSED TWO MONTHS INTERIM. IT WILL BE INSUFFICIENT - THIS IS ACKNOWLEDGED - TO COMPILE A VOTERS' REGISTER OR TO DEMARCATe CONSTITUENCIES. THE ABSENCE OF A REGISTER IS A HANDICAP TO FAIRNESS SINCE BUT I COULD SAY THAT AS THE ELECTIONS ARE ON A ONE-PERSON, ONE-VOTE BASIS AND INDELIBLE MARKINGS CAN BE MADE ON THE HANDS OF VOTERS. I DO NOT, HOWEVER, SEE HOW WE IN THE BRITISH TRADITION CAN RUN, SUPERVISE, OR JUDGE AS FAIR AN ELECTION ON A MULTI-MEMBER

SWALLOW THAT AS THE ELECTIONS ARE ON A ONE-PERSON, ONE-VOTE BASIS AND INDELIBLE MARKINGS CAN BE MADE ON THE HANDS OF VOTERS. I DO NOT, HOWEVER, SEE HOW WE IN THE BRITISH TRADITION CAN RUN, SUPERVISE, OR JUDGE AS FAIR, AN ELECTION ON A MULTI-MEMBER, PARTY-LIST, SYSTEM. BOTH MAJOR PARTIES IN BRITAIN HAVE REJECTED SUCH A SYSTEM -- INDEED I BELIEVE EVEN THE LIBERALS FAVOUR A SINGLE-MEMBER TRANSFERABLE VOTE PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION SYSTEM.

IN AFRICA THERE ARE EVEN MORE ARGUMENTS AGAINST SUCH A SYSTEM AS THAT NOW BEING PROPOSED. IN PARTICULAR, IT ENCOURAGES TRIBALISM IN STATES WHICH ARE STILL BUILDING THEIR NATIONAL CONSCIOUSNESS. AND IN RHODESIA IT HAS THE STILL FURTHER DISADVANTAGE AT THIS JUNCTURE OF BEING IDENTIFIED WITH THE SMITH REGIME.

FRANKLY I DO NOT UNDERSTAND WHY THIS TWO MONTHS PERIOD IS PROVING SUCH A STICKING POINT FOR YOU, AND STILL LESS WHY YOU ARE JEOPARDISING EVERYTHING WHICH YOU -- AND WE ALL -- HAVE WON OVER THE PAST WEEKS OF HARD WORK. THE ARGUMENTS FOR SIX MONTHS HAVE BEEN PUT FORWARD SINCE THEY HAVE NOT BEEN ANSWERED. WE ARE ONLY TOLD THERE IS A DANGER THAT THE CEASE FIRE WILL NOT LAST MORE THAN TWO MONTHS. YET THERE WILL NOT BE A CEASE FIRE AT ALL IF TWO MONTHS IS INSISTED UPON EXCLAMATION MARK AND THE WHOLE COMMONWEALTH, AS WELL AS THE FRONT LINE STATES, HAVE AGREED TO BACK UP A CEASE FIRE FOR AS LONG AS NECESSARY AND THEN TO BACK UP THE ELECTED GOVERNMENT -- PROVIDED AGREEMENT IS REACHED.

CAN WE NOT EVEN NOW, SAVE THE CONFERENCE? I HAVE SUGGESTED THAT ONE WAY FORWARD WOULD BE FOR AN EMERGENCY COMMONWEALTH MEETING, OR A MEETING OF OUR LUSAKA WORKING PARTY GROUP OF SIX NATIONS, TO DISCUSS THIS ISSUE. SUCH A MEETING COULD BE HELD IN LONDON IF YOU WISH. BUT FOR EITHER OF THESE IDEAS TO HAVE A CHANCE WE NEED TO BE RELIEVED OF THIS ATMOSPHERE OF CRISIS SINCE A DECISION IS NOT POSSIBLE WITHIN ONE OR TWO DAYS UNLESS IT IS A DECISION TO BREAK UP THE CONFERENCE.

THIS LETTER COMES TO YOU WITH MY PERSONAL GOOD WISHES AS ALWAYS.
YOURS SINCERELY.

ENDS.

MOON



Tel. 01-584 1242/3
Cables: Gamext London SW7
Telex: 23229

CONFIDENTIAL

The Gambia High Commission,
60 Ennismore Gardens,
London SW7 1NH

YOUR REF.

OUR REF. **GHC/L540/(23j)**

The Honourable Mrs. Margaret Thatcher
Prime Minister
10 Downing Street
London SW1

Dear Honourable Prime Minister,

Just few minutes ago I received an urgent Telex Message from His Excellency Sir Dawda Kairaba Jawara, President of the Republic of The Gambia, directing me to deliver an urgent Telex Message addressed to you which I reproduced on our official letter head and attached herewith.

With renewed interest, humble Prime Minister.

Dated 14th November, 1979

B.O. Semega-Janneh
High Commissioner of The Gambia in London



Tel. 01-584 1242/3
Cables: Gamext London SW7
Telex: 23229

YOUR REF.
OUR REF. GHC/L540/(22j)

CONFIDENTIAL

The Gambia High Commission,
60 Ennismore Gardens,
London SW7 1NH

PRIME MINISTER'S

PERSONAL MESSAGE

SERIAL No. T143A/79T

14th November 1979

TEXT OF MESSAGE FROM HIS EXCELLENCY THE PRESIDENT
OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE GAMBIA TO THE BRITISH
PRIME MINISTER

Dear Prime Minister,

I had the pleasure last Friday morning of receiving your High Commissioner, His Excellency Mr. Eric Norman Smith, when he delivered to me your message on the progress of the Rhodesia Conference.

Indeed, I have been following the deliberations of the Conference over the past nine weeks with keen interest and I wish to congratulate you and your Government for the effective and constructive manner in which the discussions have been conducted thus far. I have been particularly encouraged by the considerable amount of good will and spirit of compromise which have been displayed by all the parties participating in the Conference. It is thus my ardent wish and prayer that, at this crucial stage in the talks, everything possible should continue to be done to ensure that the Conference is brought to a satisfactory conclusion. It is for this reason that I am inclined to believe, with regard to the present contention over the preindependence interim arrangements, that all the parties would require an equal opportunity and adequate time to contest the elections. Thus, in my view and from my own experience, a period of two months does not seem sufficient time for the necessary preparation to be made by the parties within and outside Phodesia for fresh national elections; in addition some time will be needed for the effective realisation of a cease-fire.

CONFIDENTIAL

Therefore, while undertaking to appeal to the Leaders of the Patriotic Front to continue to co-operate with you in the spirit of the Lusaka declaration, especially on the issue of ultimate constitutional responsibility until Independence, I would also like to seize this opportunity to appeal to you and your Government, in view of the substantial progress that has been made so far, to consider extending the period of two months which it is proposed to allow the parties concerned to prepare for the elections. Mutual accommodation on this matter which is more of a practical administrative measure rather than one of principle would constitute a dynamic and constructive compromise.

We have come a long way since the Lusaka declaration which came about through the acceptance by all of us of the need for co-operation to bring this long standing Rhodesian problem to a speedy and positive conclusion. Indeed, the tenacity of purpose with which your Government has set about grappling with this extremely difficult and delicate matter since our meeting in Lusaka is highly commendable, and I feel that we must continue in the same spirit to endeavour to find amicable solutions to issues which might arise at this stage. I therefore hope and pray that in the next few days the Conference will come to a fruitful and definitive conclusion.

DAWDA KAIRABA JAWARA
PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE GAMBIA.

HAUT-COMMISSARIAT DU CANADA,
MACDONALD HOUSE,
1 GROSVENOR SQUARE,
LONDON, W1X 0AB.



CANADIAN HIGH COMMISSION,
MACDONALD HOUSE,
1 GROSVENOR SQUARE,
LONDON, W1X 0AB.


CONFIDENTIAL

December 4, 1979

Dear Mr. Whitmore

I enclose the original copy of the November 14 letter
from Prime Minister Clark to Prime Minister Thatcher.

Cordially yours


Christian Hardy,
Acting High Commissioner

Mr. C.A. Whitmore,
Principal Private Secretary
to the Prime Minister,
Prime Minister's Office,
10 Downing Street,
London SW1

HAUT-COMMISSARIAT DU CANADA,
MACDONALD HOUSE,
1 GROSVENOR SQUARE,
LONDON, W1X 0AB.



CANADIAN HIGH COMMISSION,
MACDONALD HOUSE,
1 GROSVENOR SQUARE,
LONDON, W1X 0AB.

CONFIDENTIAL.

November 14, 1979

Dear Mr Whitmore

Enclosed please find the text of a letter
from Prime Minister Clark to Prime Minister Thatcher.

Respectfully yours

Christian Hardy
Christian Hardy,
Acting High Commissioner

Mr. C.A. Whitmore,
Principal Private Secretary
to the Prime Minister,
Prime Minister's Office,
10 Downing Street,
London, SW 1.

T14 179T
SUBJECT

CONFIDENTIAL

TEXT OF A LETTER
FROM PRIME MINISTER CLARK TO PRIME MINISTER THATCHER

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE

SERIAL No. T141/79T

"
Dear Prime Minister Thatcher:

Thank you very much for your message of October 31. The progress which has been achieved at the conference is most encouraging. Thanks to your own personal contribution, and the positive and constructive approach of others involved, Rhodesia has come closer to a solution than ever before. I have been particularly struck by the generally helpful role of the Front Line States and would hope that all the parties will continue to display patience and a spirit of accommodation.

I agree fully that the Lusaka Agreement must remain the guiding formula for a settlement. Attempts to reinterpret the Agreement will not be helpful. At the same time, I have been made aware of the concerns of some of our Commonwealth colleagues about certain aspects of the proposed transitional arrangements. I know these have been conveyed to you directly. Some of the difficulties seem susceptible to solution, including the issue of the length of the transition period. As you point out, the longer this period the greater the risk of a breakdown of ceasefire. Nevertheless, it might be worthwhile to consider providing for a transition of somewhat more than two months so that it is clear to all that the Front, as well as the Salisbury parties, will have adequate time to conduct a political campaign. Although the underlying situations are far different, I am mindful of the much more extensive transitional and election campaign periods envisaged in our joint western proposal for Namibia.

I remain hopeful that, under your leadership, we shall soon see a peaceful settlement in Rhodesia. Canada remains prepared to do what it can to assist in the achievement of such a settlement and I am sure that I can count on you to let us know if there is some particular way in which we can be helpful.

Yours sincerely,

Joe Clark

"

14 NOV 1979





PRIME MINISTER · PREMIER MINISTRE

T141/79T

OTTAWA, K1A 0A2
November 14, 1979

Dear Prime Minister Thatcher,

Thank you very much for your message of October 31.

The progress which has been achieved at the Conference is most encouraging. Thanks to your own personal contribution, and the positive and constructive approach of others involved, Rhodesia has come closer to a solution than ever before. I have been particularly struck by the generally helpful role of the Front Line States and would hope that all the parties will continue to display patience and a spirit of accommodation.

I agree fully that the Lusaka Agreement must remain the guiding formula for a settlement. Attempts to reinterpret the Agreement will not be helpful. At the same time, I have been made aware of the concerns of some of our commonwealth colleagues about certain aspects of the proposed transitional arrangements. I know these have been conveyed to


.../2

The Right Honourable Margaret Thatcher,
Prime Minister of Great Britain,
London, England.

you directly. Some of the difficulties seem susceptible to solution, including the issue of the length of the transition period. As you point out, the longer this period the greater the risk of a breakdown of ceasefire. Nevertheless, it might be worthwhile to consider providing for a transition of somewhat more than two months so that it is clear to all that the Front, as well as the Salisbury parties, will have adequate time to conduct a political campaign. Although the underlying situations are far different, I am mindful of the much more extensive transitional and election campaign periods envisaged in our joint western proposal for Namibia.

I remain hopeful that, under your leadership, we shall soon see a peaceful settlement in Rhodesia. Canada remains prepared to do what it can to assist in the achievement of such a settlement and I am sure that I can count on you to let us know if there is some particular way in which we can be helpful.

Yours sincerely,

A handwritten signature in blue ink, appearing to be "J. M. Smith", written in a cursive style.



F-5 DEC 1979

SUBJECT

cc Master set
Ops set



10 DOWNING STREET

ufo
PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T143/79T

THE PRIME MINISTER

14 November 1979

Dear Mr President

Many thanks for your message of 5 November, which has encouraged me to feel that there is a great deal of common ground between us in our approach to the Rhodesia problem. I note that you still feel that the period we envisage for the electoral process is too short. The British Government has always taken the view that the independence constitution should be implemented as soon as is consistent with the holding of free and fair elections. Their starting point was that the election period need not last more than four to six weeks. But they have taken account of the strongly held views that it should be longer, in eventually deciding that it should run for two months from the date when a cease-fire becomes effective. It will take up to two weeks to bring the cease-fire into effect. The election will be held eight or nine weeks after the cease-fire comes into effect.

I entirely agree with you that provisions should be made against possible breaches of the cease-fire. For this reason, we shall be putting forward proposals in the Conference for a Commonwealth monitoring force, to which a number of other Commonwealth countries have now agreed in principle to contribute. This will provide all parties with reassurance that the maintenance of the cease-fire will be impartially observed and controlled. With the agreement of the parties and of the contributing countries, this force could play a stabilising role in resolving military questions which could arise after elections and before independence.

/Following

Following intensive discussions with President Kaunda, I gave him a paper which sets out fully our views on the way ahead. I am asking our High Commissioner to give you a copy of this paper for your strictly personal information.

I am convinced that we now have a set of proposals for the interim period which will be fair to all parties. I very much hope that the Patriotic Front will agree to participate in the elections.

With best wishes,

Signed

MT

His Excellency Alhaji Shehu Shagari.



10 DOWNING STREET

jo is
Subject file
Nigeria - Call by
Mr Sule - Nov 79

From the Private Secretary

14 November 1979

Call by Mr. Sule

As you know, the special representative of the President of Nigeria, Mr. Sule, called on the Prime Minister this afternoon. The letter he bore, of which I enclose a copy, was, as in the case of Mr. Nguza, simply a letter of introduction. The Prime Minister handed over the signed copy of the draft enclosed with George Walden's letter to me of 13 November.

I do not think there is any need to record the conversation between Mr. Sule and the Prime Minister: it has in any case largely been overtaken by events. The Prime Minister told Mr. Sule where matters stood, Mr. Sule told the Prime Minister about the immense importance of a successful outcome to the Conference and of his determination to do everything he could to bring the parties together.

It may, however, be worth noting that Mr. Sule laid a great deal of stress on relations between Nigeria and Great Britain and upon the potential significance for them of a breakdown in the Rhodesia talks. He said that Britain was a country that the Nigerians held particularly dear. Moreover, the two countries had many mutual interests. It was essential that the outcome of the Lancaster House Conference should not tarnish Britain's reputation. There was a danger that failure of the Conference would affect Britain's relations with Nigeria. This would be against the wishes of the Nigerian Government but might be inevitable. Therefore the Conference must not fail. Mr. Sule made it clear that for Nigerian purposes, an agreement with one party to the Conference would constitute a failure. There must be no bilateral deal.

As I was taking Mr. Sule to the door, I told him of the critical point reached in the Conference and of the fact that developments this evening were likely to be crucial. Mr. Sule said that he hoped there was no question of HMG issuing an ultimatum. I said that HMG, of course, did not issue ultimata in negotiations of this kind. Mr. Sule said that he was glad to hear this. He then volunteered that he would try to see the Patriotic Front this evening to urge them to be reasonable.

M. O'D. B. ALEXANDER

R.M.J. Lyne, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

28



Rhodesia B
cc 720

C.F.
To note

10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

original in G.R.

14 November 1979

Dear Mr. Southall,

Thank you for your letter of 2 November in which you were kind enough to express your general appreciation of our efforts to reach a settlement over Rhodesia and made some suggestions concerning the arrangements for holding elections and bringing Rhodesia to independence.

In proposing that Rhodesia should return to legality as part of Her Majesty's dominions for the period leading up to the elections, we believe we have taken a step that required some courage. The whole basis of our approach has been that the Government is prepared to accept that it is Britain's responsibility, and Britain's alone, to bring Rhodesia to independence on the basis of genuine majority rule.

In carrying out this responsibility, I think it essential that we should try to make arrangements for putting it into effect which are simple, feasible and rapid. I see the attractions of integration of the forces, and of assembling a military force to police the ceasefire: but if we could find a basis for agreement at Lancaster House on these elements (and I do not think we could), putting them into effect would be a long and extraordinarily difficult process. Just how difficult was shown by the problems which the Anglo-American proposals encountered.

/However,

However, when we come to discuss the ceasefire arrangements, we may be able to propose that there should be a small commission at the disposal of the Governor to monitor breaches of the ceasefire. If such a proposal proved acceptable, we would ask a number of Commonwealth countries if they could make contingents available for this purpose.

Yours sincerely

Ragant Deltic

Donald Southall, Esq.

[RHODESIA: POLICY: ADVANCE COPIES]

IMMEDIATE

X-28

PS
PS/SIR I GILMOUR
PS/MR LUCE
PS/PUS
~~SIR J GRAHAM~~
MR WILLSON
MR DAY
LORD N G LENNOX
MR ASPIN

PS/NO 10 DOWNING STREET

MR R L WADE-GERY)
MR P M MAXEY)
COL MOIR)
MR P J FOWLER)
DIO)

CABINET
OFFICE

.....

HD/RHOD DEPT (4)

HD/C AF D
HD/S AF D

HD/PUSD (2)

HD/NEWS DEPT
HD/WAD

Sgt. Sinclair

~~MR FIFCOOT~~ LEGAL ADVISER RM ~~K164~~

K174

MR FIFCOOT LEGAL ADVISER RM K164.

GRS 300

Bennie Austin

CONFIDENTIAL

X DESKBY 131700Z X

FM DAR ES SALAAM 131520Z NOV 79

TO IMMEDIATE DESKBY FCO

TELNO 900 OF 13 NOVEMBER

INFO PRIORITY LUSAKA LAGOS LUANDA MAPUTO GABORONE MIRIMBA

SALISBURY PRETORIA WASHINGTON CANBERRA OTTAWA

M.I.P.T. RHODESIA.

1. NYERERE MADE CLEAR THAT IN PROPOSING A COMMONWEALTH MEETING HE WAS ACTING ON HIS OWN INITIATIVE, NOT FOR THE FLS. HE ALSO SAID THAT HE HAD MADE NO SUGGESTIONS FOR TIMING AND PLACE: HE LEFT THAT TO RAMPHAL.

2. IN ADDITION TO THIS INITIATIVE PRESIDENT NYERERE HAS HAD MEETINGS YESTERDAY AND TODAY WITH THE CW GROUP (WITHOUT ME) AND THE SCANDINAVIAN AND EEC AMBASSADORS TO SPEAK TO THEM ON THE LINES HE SPOKE TO ME YESTERDAY (MY TELNO 890).

3. AFTER THE MEETING REPORTED IN MY I.P.T. I SPOKE ALONE TO NYERERE TO REPEAT THAT HE WAS QUITE WRONG IN WHAT HE WAS SAYING ABOUT SOUTH AFRICAN INFLUENCE (MY TELNO 893). HE AGAIN SAID THAT HE DID NOT QUESTION YOUR SINCERITY (AND I DETECT NO

3. AFTER THE MEETING REPORTED IN MY I.P.T. I SPOKE ALONE TO NYERERE TO REPEAT THAT HE WAS QUITE WRONG IN WHAT HE WAS SAYING ABOUT SOUTH AFRICAN INFLUENCE (MY TELNO 393). HE AGAIN SAID THAT HE DID NOT QUESTION YOUR SINCERITY (AND I DETECT NO CHANGE IN HIS PERSONAL FEELINGS IN THE MATTER), BUT HE SAID HE SIMPLY COULD NOT UNDERSTAND OUR POSITION -- BY IMPLICATION HE IS SAYING THAT THERE MUST BE SOME REASON WE HAVE NOT REVEALED.

MDON

NNNN

[RHODESIA: POLICY: ADVANCE COPIES]

X-218

PS
PS/SIR I GILMOUR
PS/MR LUCE
PS/PUS
~~SIR J GRAHAM~~
MR WILLSON
MR DAY
LORD N G LENNOX
MR ASPIN

PS/NO 10 DOWNING STREET

MR R L WADE-GERY)
MR P M MAXBY)
COL MOIR)
MR P J FOWLER)
DIO)

CABINET
OFFICE

.....
HD/RHOD DEPT (4)

HD/C AF D
HD/S AF D

HD/PUSD (2)

HD/NEWS DEPT
HD/WAD

~~MR PEREIRA~~ LEGAL ADVISER RM K164

MR FITOFT LEGAL ADVISER RM K164

RESIDENT CLERK

IMMEDIATE

Sir I Sinclair
K174

Eric Rintse

GR

CONFIDENTIAL

DESKBY 131700Z

FM DAR ES SALAAM 131515Z NOV 79

TO IMMEDIATE DESKBY FCO

TELNO 899 OF 13 NOVEMBER

INFO PRIORITY LUSAKA LAGOS LUANDA MAPUTO GABORONE MIRIMBA
SALISBURY PRETORIA WASHINGTON CANBERRA OTTAWA

MY TELNO 890

RHODESIA

1. PRESIDENT NYERERE SUMMONED THE COMMONWEALTH REPRESENTATIVES
(AUSTRALIA, CANADA, INDIA, NIGERIA, ZAMBIA AND MYSELF) THIS
AFTERNOON 13 NOVEMBER.

2. HE REPEATED HIS DEEP CONCERN ABOUT THE DIFFERENCE OVER
THE LENGTH OF THE ELECTION PERIOD. THERE WAS NOW A GROWING
FEELING THAT LORD CARRINGTON WAS PRESENTING HIS PROPOSALS ON A
"TAKE IT OR LEAVE IT" BASIS. HE WAS SURE THAT THE P.F. WOULD
NOT "TAKE IT". NOR COULD THE FRONT LINE STATES BE EXPECTED
TO ENCOURAGE THEM TO DO SO. HE HAD NOT IN THE PAST HESITATED
TO ASK THE P.F. TO ACCEPT SOMETHING WHICH THEY DID NOT LIKE

ant

TO ASK THE P.F. TO ACCEPT SOMETHING WHICH THEY DID NOT LIKE WHEN IT HAD BEEN REASONABLE. BUT THIS WAS A MATTER OF FAIRNESS. YOU COULD NOT HAVE FAIRNESS IN ELECTIONS OF 2 MONTHS OR ELEVEN WEEKS.

3. NYERERE WENT ON TO SAY THAT HE HAD SUGGESTED TO THE COMMONWEALTH SECRETARY GENERAL THAT IF THERE CONTINUED TO BE A DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE P.F. AND BRITAIN ON THIS MATTER, BRITAIN SHOULD NOT TRY TO IMPOSE ITS POSITION. THE COMMONWEALTH HAD PLAYED A PART IN MAKING THE RHODESIA CONFERENCE POSSIBLE. THEY WERE ALSO GOING TO BE INVOLVED IN THE ARRANGEMENTS FOR IMPLEMENTING A SETTLEMENT (THOUGH NOBODY WAS CHALLENGING BRITAIN'S AUTHORITY IN THIS RESPECT). THEREFORE BRITAIN SHOULD EXPLAIN ITS POSITION TO THE COMMONWEALTH. IT SHOULD BE EXPLAINED WHY THE COMMONWEALTH WAS BEING ASKED TO OBSERVE ELECTIONS TO BE HELD IN A TWO MONTH PERIOD AND WITHOUT REGISTRATION AND CONSTITUENCIES. HE HAD ACCORDINGLY PROPOSED TO MR RAMPHAL THAT THERE SHOULD BE AN EMERGENCY MEETING OF THE COMMONWEALTH OR OF THE LUSAKA 'SIX' FOR THIS PURPOSE: "LET US ALSO BE CONVINCED". NYERERE SAID THAT THE IMPRESSION WAS BEING GIVEN IN LONDON THAT AN ANSWER WAS AWAITED FROM THE P.F. "BUT WE (PRESUMABLY HE MEANT THE COMMONWEALTH) WERE AWAITING AN ANSWER FROM LORD CARRINGTON".

4. THE AUSTRALIAN HIGH COMMISSIONER ASKED IF NYERERE COULD GUARANTEE A CEASE FIRE DURING A LONGER ELECTION PERIOD. NYERERE DECLINED TO GIVE A GUARANTEE BUT SAID HE WOULD DO ALL HE COULD: WITH A TWO MONTH PERIOD THERE WOULD BE NO CEASE-FIRE. THE INDIAN HIGH COMMISSIONER SUGGESTED UNHELPFULLY THAT THERE WERE STILL OTHER DIFFERENCES WITH THE PF BESIDES THE ELECTION PERIOD, FOR EXAMPLE WITH REGARD TO THE ROLE OF THE CEASE-FIRE OBSERVERS. NYERERE BRUSHED THIS ASIDE SAYING THAT IT WAS HIS VIEW THAT THIS WAS A MATTER MORE BETWEEN BRITAIN AND THE COMMONWEALTH THAN BETWEEN BRITAIN AND THE PF. THE NIGERIAN ACTING HIGH COMMISSIONER MENTIONED THAT HE HAD SEEN A LAGOS PRESS REPORT SUGGESTING THAT HIS PRESIDENT HAD PROPOSED A FOUR-MONTH ELECTION PERIOD AS A COMPROMISE/PRESUMABLY A REFERENCE TO PRESIDENT SHAGANIS MESSAGE IN LAGOS TELNO 954).

MOON

NNN

[RHODESIA: POLICY: ADVANCE COPIES]

IMMEDIATE

PS
PS/SIR I GILMOUR
PS/MR LUCE
PS/PUS
~~SIR J GRAHAM~~
MR WILLSON
MR DAY
LORD N G LENNOX
MR ASPIN

PS/NO 10 DOWNING STREET

MR R L WADE-GERY)
MR P M MAXEY)
COL MOIR)
MR P J FOWLER)
DIO)

CABINET
OFFICE

.....

HD/RHOD DEPT (4)

HD/C AF D

HD/S AF D

HD/PUSD (2)

HD/NEWS DEPT

HD/WAD

~~MR FIFCOFF~~ LEGAL ADVISER RM K164

MR FIFCOFF LEGAL ADVISER RM K164

+26

Sgt. Sinclair
K174

Prime Minister

CONFIDENTIAL

FM DAR ES SALAAM 130700Z NOV 79

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 894 OF 13 NOVEMBER

INFO PRIORITY LUANDA LUSAKA GABORONE MAPUTO LAGOS MIRIMBA
SALISBURY WASHINGTON CANBERRA OTTAWA PRETORIA

[Handwritten signature]

MIPT : RPPDESIA

1. BY PUBLICLY ATTRIBUTING OUR POSITION ON THE ELECTION ARRANGEMENTS TO SOUTH AFRICAN INDLUENCE AT HIS MEETING WITH THE PRESS, NYERERE WOULD SEEM TO HAVE VIRTUALLY CUT HIMSELF OFF FROM ANY RETREAT ON THIS QUESTION. WHETHER THIS IS A LAST ILL-DIRECTED ATTEMPT TO TRY TO INFLUENCE US OR WHETHER HE IS NOW BEGINNING TO PREPARE HIS GROUND FOR JUSTIFYING A BREAK IT IS DIFFICULT TO SAY. BUT HIS CHOICE OF THE EMOTIONAL SOUTH AFRICAN ARGUMENT AS THE PEG ON WHICH TO HANG HIS PUBLIC STATEMENT OF THE CASE DOES NOT BODE WELL FOR THE FUTURE.

MOON

NNNN

[RHODESIA: POLICY: ADVANCE COPIES]

26x

PS
PS/SIR I GILMOUR
PS/MR LUCE
PS/PUS
~~SIR J GRAHAM~~
MR WILLSON
MR DAY
LORD N G LENNOX
MR ASPIN

PS/NO 10 DOWNING STREET

MR R L WADE-GERY
MR P M MAXEY
COL MOIR
MR P J FOWLER
DIO

CABINET
OFFICE

.....
HD/RHOD DEPT (4)

HD/C AF D
HD/S AF D

HD/PUSD (2)

HD/NEWS DEPT

HD/WAD

~~MR PERCY AND~~

MR PEECOT LEGAL ADVISER FM K164

~~RESIDENT CLERK~~

Sir I Sinclair


LEGAL ADVISER FM K164

ADVANCE COPY
IMMEDIATE

K174

ADVANCE COPY

Prime Minister



UNCLASSIFIED

FM DAR ES SALAAM 130700Z NOV 79

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 893 OF 13 NOVEMBER

INFO PRIORITY LUANDA, LUSAKA, GABORONE, MAPUTO, LAGOS,
MIRIMBA SALISBURY, WASHINGTON, CANBERRA, OTTAWA, PRETORIA

MY TELNO 893 : RHODESIA

1. TODAY'S NEWSPAPERS CARRY A REPORT OF A PRESS INTERVIEW WHICH PRESIDENT NYERERE GAVE TO LOCAL NEWSMEN YESTERDAY EVENING 12 NOV IN DAR ES SALAAM. NYERERE IS REPORTED TO HAVE REITERATED TANZANIA'S FULL BACKING FOR THE PF CONTENTION THAT THERE SHOULD BE A LONGER PRE-INDEPENDENCE PERIOD BECAUSE THE BRITISH PROPOSAL FOR A TWO MONTH PERIOD CLEARLY FAVOURED THE "MUZOREWA-SMITH" REGIME IN SALISBURY. NYERERE WENT ON TO DESCRIBE THE SOUTH AFRICAN POSITION IN TERMS SIMILAR TO THOSE REPORTED IN PARA 1 OF MY TUR AND IS QUOTED AS CONCLUDING: "SO I SUPPOSE THE SOUTH AFRICANS ARE SAYING IN FACT THAT AGREEMENT MUST MAKE IT DIFFICULT FOR THE PF TO WIN ANY ELECTIONS. HENCE THIS STRANGE BRITISH INDEPENDENCE PACKAGE". HE IS ALSO QUOTED AS SAYING "TO THINK THAT WE COULD URGE THE PF TO ACCEPT PROPOSALS THAT ARE CLEARLY UNFAIR IN ORDER TO SUIT SOUTH AFRICA IS ABSURD. WE

CANNOT ACCEPT THIS". NYERERE ALSO CALLED FOR A "VOTERS' ROLL AND CONSTITUENCIES. WHEN ASKED ABOUT PRESIDENT KAUNDA'S OPTIMISM ON THE TALKS NYERERE IS REPORTED TO HAVE REPLIED "THIS WAS BECAUSE HE KNOWS THE BRITISH ARE NOT MAD". THE DAILY NEWS REPORT HAS NYERERE CONCLUDING BY SAYING THAT THE TALKS COULD BREAK DOWN OVER THIS ISSUE AND ASKING RHETORICALLY "WHAT IS THERE IN THE SIX MONTHS THAT IS SO OBJECTIONABLE TO THE BRITISH".

2. REPORTING ON THE CONFERENCE IN LONDON THE DAILY NEWS DESCRIBES BRITAIN AS HAVING GIVEN THE PF YESTERDAY "A VIRTUAL ULTIMATUM" TO ACCEPT ITS PROPOSALS FOR MOVING THE TERRITORY TO LEGAL INDEPENDENCE.

MOON

NNNN

Rhodesia distribution

+ Michael Alexander
No 10

EMBASSY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

LONDON

November 13, 1979

Check
cc B
E B/LB
P/She-wid
P/plus
Mc-Day
WAD

Prime Minister

(2)

A satisfactory letter, on balance.

F. G.
Pm

Hand - 13/11

Dear Mr. Nkomo:

First, let me thank you for the privilege of our conversation this morning.

Second, I talked to Secretary of State Cyrus Vance this noon and told him of your desire to have President Carter intervene on the matters you raised concerning the Lancaster House negotiations. Secretary Vance said there was no possibility whatsoever of President Carter's intervention.

Third, I notified Secretary Vance of the possibility of a desire on your part to visit Washington in the near future. He instructed me to tell you that in his view this would not be a constructive thing to do. He feels that at this time it is essential to get on with the Lancaster negotiations without delay or interruption.

I shall attempt to communicate this message in person, but if that should fail I want to be sure you receive this report as soon as possible.

There is one matter which we did not touch on this morning. That is the matter of refugees and the repatriation of citizens of Zimbabwe who have been expatriated during the struggle. You can be assured that after a settlement and ceasefire the United States would be prepared to join other governments and international agencies in an effort to facilitate their early return to Zimbabwe.

Please be assured that I would be glad to meet with you or anyone you might designate at any time if you think it would be useful. Mr. Lanpher is also available to you or your people at any time.

Respectfully,

Kingman Brewster
Ambassador

His Excellency
Joshua Nkomo
London



STATE HOUSE
RIBADU ROAD
LAGOS, NIGERIA

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T140^A/79T

Ref. No. SH. 1882/S.70

13th November, 1979.

My dear Prime Minister,

*Subject file - Nigeria
Nov 79 - Call by Mr
Sule.*

May I crave your indulgence to write to you so soon after my letter No. SH. 1882/S.70 of 6th November, 1979 on the on-going Constitutional Conference on Zimbabwe in London which must have been delivered to you through diplomatic channels by now. I know how deeply concerned you are with the successful out-come of this Conference. It is just as true to say that the question of Zimbabwe has received my considerable attention, and I am willing to do anything to supplement your efforts in reaching an amicable resolution of this problem.

It is for this reason that I have decided to send my trusted Special Envoy in the person of Alhaji Yusuf Maitama Sule, who has been instructed to express on behalf of myself and the entire people of Nigeria our warm fraternal greetings, and to discuss with you matters of mutual interest affecting Africa so that we can benefit from your usual clear understanding of such issues.

In particular, he has my instructions to discuss with you matters relating to the successful out-come of the current Constitutional Conference on Zimbabwe.

I, therefore, request you to give entire credence to whatever Alhaji Yusuf Maitama Sule shall say to you in my name, especially when he shall convey to you our deep abiding interest in your personal good health and in the peace and prosperity of your people.

... /Please accept ...

*The Rt. Hon. Mrs. Margaret Thatcher, M.P.,
Prime Minister,
10 Downing Street,
LONDON.*



- 2 -

*Please accept the assurances of my fraternal esteem
and highest consideration.*

Yours very sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read 'Shehu Shagari'.

(ALHAJI SHEHU SHAGARI)
PRESIDENT OF THE FEDERAL
REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA.

CONFIDENTIAL



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

13 November 1979

Prime Minister

Alice text?

Yes out

Paul

Dear Michael,

RHODESIA

President Shagari's message of 5 November to the Prime Minister (Lagos telegram no 954) was in encouragingly moderate terms. Lord Carrington believes it would be appropriate for the Prime Minister to reply, taking up President Shagari's points on the length of the interim and on a peacekeeping force. I --- enclose a draft message.

(G G H Walden)

M O'D B Alexander Esq
10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL

File No.

Department RHODESIA

Drafted by (Block Capitals) R.W. RENWICK

Tel. Extn. 233 5698

OUTWARD

TELEGRAM

Security Classification CONFIDENTIAL
Precedence PRECEDENCE IMMEDIATE
DESKBYZ

FOR COMMS. DEPT. USE	Despatched (Date) (Time)Z	POSTBYZ
----------------------	---------------------------------------	---------------

PREAMBLE

(Time of Origin)Z(G.M.T.) (Restrictive Prefix).....
 (Security Class.) CONFIDENTIAL (Caveat/Privacy Marking).....
 (Codeword) (Deskby).....Z

TO IMMEDIATE LAGOS Tel. No. of
 (precedence) (post)

AND TO (precedence/post).....

AND SAVING TO.....
 REPEATED TO (for info) ROUTINE: UKMIS NEW YORK, WASHINGTON

SAVING TO (for info).....

Distribution:-

Rhodesia Policy

[TEXT]

YOUR TELNO 954: RHODESIA

1. Unless you see objection, please pass the following message from the Prime Minister to President Shagari. In doing so you should hand over a copy of the paper in my telno to Washington. You may at your discretion point out that the over-all length of the interim period (see below) will be near to three months.

Begins

"Dear Mr President

Many thanks for your message of 5 November, which has encouraged me to feel that there is a great deal of

/common

CONFIDENTIAL

Copies to:-

common ground between us in our approach to the Rhodesia problem. I note that you still feel that the period we envisage for the electoral process is too short. The British Government has always taken the view that the independence constitution should be implemented as soon as is consistent with the holding of free and fair elections. Their starting point was that the election period need not last more than four to six weeks. But they have taken account of the strongly held views that it should be longer, in eventually deciding that it should run for two months from the date when a cease-fire becomes effective. It will take up to two weeks to bring the cease-fire into effect. The election will be held eight or nine weeks after the cease-fire comes into effect.

I entirely agree with you that provision should be made against possible breaches of the cease-fire. For this reason, we shall be putting forward proposals in the Conference for a Commonwealth monitoring force, to which a number of other Commonwealth countries have now agreed in principle to contribute. This will provide all parties with reassurance that the maintenance of the cease-fire will be impartially observed and controlled. With the agreement of the parties and of the contributing countries, this force could play a stabilising role in resolving military questions which could arise after elections and before independence.

/Following

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

Following intensive discussions with President Kaunda, I gave him a paper which sets out fully our views on the way ahead. I am asking our High Commissioner to give you a copy of this paper for your strictly personal information.


I am convinced that we now have a set of proposals for the interim period which will be fair to all parties. I very much hope that the Patriotic Front will agree to participate in the elections.

With best wishes

Your sincerely

Margaret Thatcher "

Ends.



CONFIDENTIAL

Subject filed as Zaire:
Nov 79 Visit of Foreign Minister

RECORD OF A TALK BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER AND THE FOREIGN MINISTER
OF THE REPUBLIC OF ZAIRE, MR. NGUZA KARL-I-BOND, AT 10 DOWNING STREET
ON 13 NOVEMBER, 1979, AT 1800

Present:

Prime Minister	Mr. Nguza
Mr. M.O'D.B. Alexander	H.E. M. Matungulu N'Kuman Tavun

The Prime Minister thanked Mr. Nguza for taking the trouble to come to London, and asked him to convey to President Mobutu her gratitude for the positive interest he was taking in the problems of Rhodesia. Mr. Nguza said that the Government of Zaire felt closely involved in the Rhodesian problem in both a physical and moral sense. They were close in a physical sense because of the obvious facts of geography. They were close in a moral sense because they themselves had suffered too much at the time of gaining independence, and did not wish to see others going down the same path. The Prime Minister could feel assured of the friendship and support of the Zaire Government in her efforts to find a solution in Rhodesia.

The Prime Minister said that she was hopeful that decisions might be taken in the next day or two. Mr. Nguza said that he had seen both Bishop Muzorewa and Mr. Nkomo in the course of the day. He had given them President Mobutu's message which was that they should take care not to let the conference fail. The people of Rhodesia would never forgive them if the present opportunity was missed. Bishop Muzorewa had replied that he had agreed to everything that had been asked of him. He had gone on to say that if Lord Carrington so wished, he remained willing to make further concessions. The Prime Minister commented that Bishop Muzorewa had already made great concessions. The problem lay with the unwillingness of the other side to allow progress to be made. Could Mr. Nguza do anything to help with Mr. Nkomo and Mr. Mugabe.

/ Mr. Nguza

CONFIDENTIAL

Mr. Nguza said that he had been into considerable detail with Mr. Nkomo about the various outstanding problems. Mr. Nkomo had left him with the impression that none of the problems were likely to prove insurmountable. Although he would not take a final decision until he was sure that nothing more could be extracted from the situation, he intended to accept the British Government's proposals. He asked Mr. Nguza to pass this message to President Mobutu.

Mr. Nguza said that Mr. Nkomo attached importance to having some of "his boys" inside Rhodesia. They should be there not as a guerrilla or rebel army, but on the same basis as the other forces. He was thinking in terms of bringing in two or three brigades from Zambia. The Prime Minister said that Mr. Nkomo already had a considerable number of his men inside Rhodesia. If there were a ceasefire, they would have to be assembled at a specific point. Once they were assembled, Britain would be responsible for housing and feeding them. Subsequently, we would help with rehabilitation and resettlement. We assumed that most of the men would go home. Some would no doubt wish to become full-time soldiers: it would be for the new Government to deal with the amalgamation of the three armies. Mr. Nguza strongly agreed that the three armies could not continue in being after independence.

The Prime Minister said that she was hoping the discussion on the interim could come to an end on the following day. Bishop Muzorewa had been away from Salisbury too long, and would probably wish to return at the end of the week. Satisfactory arrangements could be made if the will was there. The length of the transition should not be a problem; the proposed period was very close to three months.

Mr. Nguza repeated that Mr. Nkomo had asked him to tell President Mobutu that he would be back in Salisbury. Mr. Nkomo still had some "psychological problems" with his people. He

/ was

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

- 3 -

was worried about the return of the refugees and their registration for the elections. Mr. Nguza had told him this was no problem. Mr. Nguza had also told him that two to three months gave ample time in which to prepare for the elections. He had the impression that this was not a big problem for Mr. Nkomo. The Prime Minister commented that Mr. Nkomo was very well known in Rhodesia.

Mr. Nguza said that he had not seen Mr. Mugabe in London on this visit, but that he had seen him in the Netherlands two weeks previously. He had told Mr. Mugabe that if he were to cause a breakdown of the Conference by adopting an excessively hard policy, many African leaders, including President Mobutu, would blame him. Mr. Mobutu had denied that he was causing problems and had undertaken to be more flexible. Mr. Nguza said that if Mr. Nkomo were to settle, Mr. Mugabe would, however reluctantly, follow him. He had no choice.

Mr. Nguza said that, in the course of his talks during the day, he had tried to bring Bishop Muzorewa and Mr. Nkomo together. Bishop Muzorewa had said that he was willing to talk to Mr. Nkomo. If Mr. Nkomo wanted to go with him, he was "my brother". Mr. Nkomo had said that the past was the past and might perhaps be forgotten. He would talk to his "boys". Mr. Nguza said that when he had last seen Lord Carrington he had told him that he thought there would be an agreement on the constitution within two or three days, and there had been. His feeling now was that the Patriotic Front would accept Britain's proposals with only very minor changes. For example, acceptance of a three-month interim and some stepping up of the Commonwealth monitoring force. Acceptance would not necessarily come within two or three days, but it would come. The Prime Minister said that if this result were achieved, most of the credit would go to the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary and to his helpers in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. Despite the length of the negotiations and

/ the

CONFIDENTIAL

- 4 -

the large number of people involved, she had never heard a word of criticism about the way things had been done. Mr. Nguza agreed.

The Prime Minister then asked about the attitude of the neighbouring countries. Mr. Nguza said that President Kaunda wanted the problem resolved as rapidly as possible. President Nyerere was also very positive; more so than President Machel. There were differences between President Nyerere and Mr. Mugabe. President Nyerere did not regard the Patriotic Front as the sole representative of the people of Zimbabwe, and was in favour of elections whatever their outcome. He had told President Mobutu during a recent meeting, attended by Mr. Nguza, that if Ian Smith were elected Prime Minister in a free and fair election, he would be received in Tanzania.

In the course of a brief discussion about Zaire Mr. Nguza said that there would be an important meeting in Brussels next month to discuss Zaire's economic problems and to try to agree on aid to enable the Zairean economy to take off. There was a need to restore confidence in Zaire. In this context Mr. Nguza said that recent talk about massacres in Zaire was proving very damaging. President Mobutu denied that any massacre had taken place, and had made it clear that he would welcome any international commission which wished to come to investigate the situation. Mr. Nguza would be meeting Mr. Ennals on the following day to invite Amnesty to send a team to Zaire.

The meeting ended at 1835.

AmA

13 November, 1979.

CONFIDENTIAL

20



With the compliments of

THE PRIVATE SECRETARY

Assured with P.A.

Her

Am

13/7/71

FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
SW1A 2AH

Rhodesia 3 XV42

File No.
 Department RHODESIA
 Drafted by R W RENWICK
 (Block Capitals)
 Tel. Extn. 233 5698

OUTWARD
 TELEGRAM

Security Classification	<u>SECRET</u>
Precedence	<u>FLASH IMMEDIATE</u>
DESKBY	<u>131270 JOONES.T.Z</u>

FOR COMMS. DEPT. USE	Despatched	(Date)	POSTBY.....Z
		(Time)Z	

PREAMBLE

(Time of Origin)Z(G.M.T.)
 (Security Class.) SECRET
 (Codeword)
 (Restrictive Prefix).....
 (Caveat/
 Privacy Marking).....
 (Deskby).....Z

TO FLASH IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON Tel. No. of

AND TO (precedence/post).....

AND SAVING TO.....
 REPEATED TO (for info) IMMEDIATE: UKMIS NEW YORK, LUSAKA

SAVING TO (for info).....

Distribution:-
 Rhodesia
 Policy

[TEXT]

RHODESIA

1. Nkomo asked the US Ambassador to call on him this morning. Nkomo said that the Conference was now at a crucial point. He wanted to go to Washington to see President Carter.

2. We explained in advance of this meeting to the US Ambassador that Nkomo has been trying to negotiate with us ^{AN ADDITION} adding to paragraph 13 of our paper on the interim arrangements which, by linking it to paragraph 21, would enable him to accept them, conditional on the negotiations for a cease-fire.

Copies to:-

3. Brewster does not appear to have given Nkomo sufficiently clearly the message that if he goes to Washington at this stage the Conference will break up. It will not be possible to keep the Salisbury delegation here any longer. We must have a reply tomorrow (and were on the verge of getting one). Furthermore we suspect the result of a visit by Nkomo to Washington would be attempts by Moose and Lake to find some sort of "compromise" which would be non-negotiable.

4. Unless you see objection please explain to Vance as quickly as possible the consequences of Nkomo going to Washington at this point and ask him to let Nkomo know today that the Americans hope that he can accept our interim proposals and move on to discuss the cease-fire. The ideal would be a message from Carter himself to Nkomo saying he is too busy to see him, and strongly urging him to accept a settlement. (Obviously any additional hint of financial support, eg over the re-settlement of refugees from Zambia, would be useful.) But the important thing is that constant pressure to come to terms should not be relaxed.

5. If the Americans take this action and are sufficiently firm about it, this will help them and us to avoid having to face some very unpleasant decisions in the next few days.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

though we would not wish consideration of this point to delay a prompt American reply to Nkomo).

12/11

(7.6)
[RHODESIA: POLICY:

ADVANCE COPIES] **IMMEDIATE**

28

PS
PS/SIR I GILMOUR
PS/MR LUCE
PS/PUS
~~SIR J GRANT~~
MR WILLSON
MR DAY
LORD N G LENNOX
MR ASPIN

~~PS/NO 10. DOWNING STREET~~

MR R L WADE-GERY)
MR P M MAXEY)
COL MOIR) CABINET
MR P J FOWLER) OFFICE
DIO)

.....
HD/RHOD DEPT (4)
HD/C AF D
HD/S AF D
HD/PUSD (2)
HD/NEWS DEPT
HD/WAD
~~MR FIFCOT~~
MR FIFCOT LEGAL ADVISER RM K16A
RESIDENT CLERK

ADVANCE COPY

Sir I Sinclair
LEGAL ADVISER RM K174

GRS 250

Amie Amster (2)

CONFIDENTIAL

12.11

DESKBY 120900Z
FM KINSHASA 120755Z NOV 79
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 257 OF 12 NOVEMBER
INFO PRIORITY BRUSSELS, DAR ES SALAAM AND LUSAKA.

ms

MY TELEGRAM NUMBER 256 OF 9 NOVEMBER: RHODESIA,
1. STATE COMMISSIONER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS, NGUZA KARL I BOND,
WILL ARRIVE IN LONDON EARLY ON TUESDAY, 13 NOVEMBER, FOR TWO-DAY
VISIT.
2. CHIEF OF PROTOCOL HAS TOLD ME THAT PURPOSE OF VISIT IS TO
DELIVER A WRITTEN MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT MOBUTU TO MRS THATCHER IN
ANSWER TO HER PERSONAL MESSAGE ON RHODESIA. HE ADDED THAT SINCE
MOBUTU ATTACHES SUCH IMPORTANCE TO THE PROBLEM, HE WISHES HIS
FOREIGN MINISTER TO FLY URGENTLY TO LONDON TO DELIVER IT PERSONALLY.
3. NGUZA HAS, THEREFORE, ASKED FOR AN AUDIENCE WITH MRS THATCHER

2. CHIEF OF PROTOCOL HAS TOLD ME THAT PURPOSE OF VISIT IS TO DELIVER A WRITTEN MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT MOBUTU TO MRS THATCHER IN ANSWER TO HER PERSONAL MESSAGE ON RHODESIA. HE ADDED THAT SINCE MOBUTU ATTACHES SUCH IMPORTANCE TO THE PROBLEM, HE WISHES HIS FOREIGN MINISTER TO FLY URGENTLY TO LONDON TO DELIVER IT PERSONALLY.

3. NGUZA HAS, THEREFORE, ASKED FOR AN AUDIENCE WITH MRS THATCHER ON THE AFTERNOON OF 13 NOVEMBER IF AT ALL POSSIBLE, AS WELL AS A MEETING WITH YOU. HE ALSO PROPOSES TO SEE BOTH NKOMO AND MUGABE.

4. I HAVE WARNED CHIEF OF PROTOCOL THAT WITH SUCH SHORT NOTICE IT MIGHT BE IMPRACTICABLE TO EXPECT THAT MRS THATCHER COULD EASILY FIT NGUZA IN, BUT I WOULD CONVEY THE REQUEST.

5. ALTHOUGH I SAW NGUZA ON SATURDAY, 10 NOVEMBER, HE MADE NO MENTION OF THIS VISIT AND IT PRESUMABLY RESULTS FROM INSTRUCTIONS HE RECEIVED YESTERDAY.

6. NGUZA LEAVES KINSHASA TO-NIGHT BY SWISS AIR, ARRIVING HEATHROW VIA ZURICH ON SR 800 AT 08.20 HOURS ON 13 NOVEMBER. HE PLANS TO DEPART FOR BRUSSELS ON THURSDAY 15TH. AMBASSADOR MATUNGULU HAS OTHER DETAILS AND WILL NO DOUBT BE RESPONSIBLE FOR ARRANGING ACCOMMODATION.

DONALD

NNNN

IMMEDIATE

[RHODESIA: POLICY: ADVANCE COPIES]

IMMEDIATE

PS
PS/SIR I GILMOUR
PS/MR LUCE
PS/PUS
~~SIR J GILMOUR~~
MR WILLSON
MR DAY
LORD N G LENNOX
MR ASPIN

+26

PS/NO 10 DOWNING STREET

MR R L WADE-GERY)
MR P M MAXEY) CABINET
COL MOIR) OFFICE
MR P J FOWLER)
DIO)

.....
HD/RHOD DEPT (4)

HD/C AF D
HD/S AF D

HD/PUSD (2)

HD/NEWS DEPT
HD/WAD

~~MR P J FOWLER~~ LEGAL ADVISER RM K174

MR FIFCOT LEGAL ADVISER RM K164

Prime Minister (2)

12.11.

fa
Prime
K174

GR 550

CONFIDENTIAL

FM DAR ES SALAAM 121300Z NOV 79

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 890 OF 12 NOVEMBER

INFO PRIORITY LUSAKA, MAPUTO, LUANDA, GABORONE, LAGOS, MIRIMBA,
SALISBURY, WASHINGTON, CANBERRA, OTTAWA, PRETORIA.

arb

MY TELNO 898 : RHODESIA

1. PRESIDENT NYERERE SUMMONED ME AGAIN THIS MORNING, 12 NOVEMBER.
HIS PURPOSE WAS TO REINFORCE WHAT HE HAD SAID TO ME YESTERDAY.

2. HE BEGAN BY SAYING THAT HE WAS WORRIED BY WHAT HE WAS HEARING
FROM LONDON ABOUT THE SOUTH AFRICAN ATTITUDE. WHEN MR PIK BOTHA
HAD VISITED LONDON IN OCTOBER IT HAD BEEN WIDELY UNDERSTOOD THAT
THE SOUTH AFRICANS WANTED A SETTLEMENT AND THEREFORE WANTED THE
CONFERENCE TO SUCCEED BECAUSE A FAILURE OF THE CONFERENCE AND
CONTINUATION OF THE WAR WOULD, IN THEIR VIEW, LEAD TO WHITE PANIC
I N RHODESIA AND A MASS EXODUS TO SOUTH AFRICA WHICH WOULD
CAUSE THEM POLITICAL TROUBLE AND THUS POSSIBLY REQUIRE THEIR
INTERVENTION. NOW IT WAS BEING SAID THAT THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERN-
MENT BELIEVED THAT THERE WOULD BE A SIMILAR PANIC AND EXODUS IF
THE CONFERENCE SUCCEEDED AND THE PF SUBSEQUENTLY WON THE ELECTIONS,
AND THAT IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES ALSO SOUTH AFRICA MIGHT HAVE TO

AND THAT IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES ALSO SOUTH AFRICA MIGHT HAVE TO INTERVENE.

3. NYERERE SAID HE WAS STILL TRYING TO UNDERSTAND WHY WE WERE INSISTING IN OUR PROPOSALS FOR THE ELECTIONS WHICH WERE SO PATENTLY UNFAIR TO THE PF, AND THERE WAS A CLEAR IMPLICATION IN WHAT HE SAID THAT HE THOUGH THAT THE SOUGH AFRICAN ATTITUDE MIGHT BE A FACTOR INFLUENCING US. I SAID THAT OUR ARGUMENTS FOR OUR PROPOSALS HAD BEEN REPEATEDLY SET OUT BY YOU VERY CLEARLY IN STATEMENTS IN THE CONFERENCE AND OUTSIDE AND THAT THEY HAD BEEN EXPLAINED TO HIM, NYERERE, BY MR LUCE AND MYSELF. WHILE RECOGNISING THAT NYERERE DID NOT ACCEPT THESE ARGUMENTS, I SAID THAT IT WOULD BE A MATTER OF GREAT CONCERN TO YOU IF YOU THOUGH THAT HE DID NOT BELIEVE THAT THEY WERE YOUR REAL GROUNDS FOR THE POSITION YOU HAD TAKEN AND THAT YOU HAD OTHER FACTORS IN MIND. NYERERE QUICKLY SAID THAT HE DID NOT QUESTION YOUR SINCERITY AND DID NOT MAKE ANY FURTHER REFERENCE TO SOUTH AFRICA.

4. HE WENT ON TO REPEAT THAT HE WANTED TO BE ABLE TO SUPPORT OUR PROPOSALS WITH THE PF. BUT HE JUST COULD NOT ACCEPT WHAT WE WERE PROPOSING ON THS ELECTIONS. THERE HAD TO BE THREE THINGS: A SIX MONTH PERIOD, CONSTITUENCIES AND A VOTERS' ROLL (THIS TIME HE PUT THEM ALL ON THE SAME FOOTING). OTHERWISE THE ELECTIONS WERE WEIGHTED AGAINST THE PF AND WOULD NOT BE SEEN TO BE FAIR AND FREE.

5. WHEN I REPEATED AGAIN THE PROBLEMS AND, PARTICULARLY THE DANGERS OF A LONG PERIOD, HE SAID THAT IF THERE WAS A SETTLEMENT HE AND HIS FRONT LINE COLLEAGUES WOULD PUT ALL THEIR WEIGHT BEHIND THE CEASEFIRE. HE PERSONALLY WOULD USE HIS GOOD OFFICES WITH PRESIDENTS KAUNDA AND MACHEL TO ENSURE THAT THEY WERE COMMITTED TO SEEING THAT THE CEASEFIRE HELD SO FAR AS THE PF WAS CONCERNED: "HE PROMISED THIS TO MRS THATCHER". HE BELIEVED THAT THEY COULD HOLD THE CEASEFIRE IF THERE WAS AGREEMENT: AND IT WOULD BE EASIER TO HOLD A CEASEFIRE FOR SIX MONTHS ON WHICH THERE WAS AGREEMENT, THAN FOR A SHORTER PERIOD ON WHICH THERE WAS NOT.

6. NYERERE'S OVERALL ATTITUDE REMAINS ONE OF DESPERATE ANXIETY TO OBTAIN A SETTLEMENT AND, PERHAPS MORE PARTICULARLY, TO AVOID A SHOW-DOWN, THE POSSIBILITY OF WHICH HE NOW SEES LOOMING UP.

7. I GAVE NYERERE A COPY OF VERBATIM SERVICE 087/79.

MOON



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

12 November 1979

BF 19. 11. 79

I enclose a copy of a message to the Prime Minister from the President of Nigeria. This was handed to me by the Nigerian High Commissioner last Friday. You have, I think, received this text by telegram.

11 I should be grateful in due course to receive the text of a draft reply which the Prime Minister might send to President Shagari.

M. O'D. B. ALEXANDER

R.M.J. Lyne, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

GB

Rhodesia

File

DS



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

12 November 1979

Rhodesia

As I have informed George Walden on the telephone, the Prime Minister has agreed the texts of the messages to Mr. Lee Kwan Yew and Datuk Hussein Onn enclosed with your letter to me of 9 November.

M. O'D. B. ALEXANDER

R.M.J. Lyne, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

GB

[RHODESIA: POLICY: ADVANCE COPIES]

33
IMMEDIATE

4 PS

PS/SIR I GILMOUR
PS/MR LUCE
PS/PUS
SIR J GRAHAM
MR WILLSON
MR DAY
LORD N G LENNOX
MR ASPIN

PS/NO 10 DOWNING STREET

MR R L WADE-GERY)
MR P M MAXEY)
COL MOIR)
MR P J FOWLER)
DIO)

CABINET
OFFICE

.....

HD/RHOD DEPT (4)

HD/C AF D
HD/S AF D

HD/PUSD (2)

~~HD/WAD~~
HD/NEWS DEPT

HD/WAD

~~MR FIFOOT~~

Sir I Sinclair
LEGAL ADVISER RM K164

RESIDENT CLERK

Roger Ruster
[Signature]

②

12.11.

K174

CONFIDENTIAL

DESKBY 111000Z

FM WASHINGTON 110135Z NOV 79

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NO 3665 OF 10 NOVEMBER

INFO DAR ES SALAAM, MAPUTO, LUSAKA, GABORONE, LUANDA, LAGOS,
PRETORIA, UKMIS NEW YORK, PARIS, OSLO, LISBON.

TALK WITH SECRETARY OF STATE VANCE ABOUT THE LIFTING OF RHODESIAN
SANCTIONS: PLEASE SEE MIPT

1. DURING MY TALK TODAY WITH VANCE I SAID I WANTED TO EXPLAIN OUR
INTENTIONS ABOUT SANCTIONS AND TO WHY WE DID NOT CONSIDER POSITIVE
ACTION BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL NECESSARY TO BRING TO AN END THE
SITUATION THAT LED TO THE IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS. THIS SUBJECT
WOULD COME EASILY TO HIM WITH HIS LEGAL TRAINING. THERE WAS NOT
ONLY THE QUESTION OF PRECEDENT, (AND I DESCRIBED WHAT HAD HAPPENED
OVER THE PALESTINE AND KOREAN RESOLUTIONS OF 1948 AND 1950, AS WELL
AS SUBSEQUENT RHODESIAN RESOLUTIONS) BUT THERE WAS ALSO THE VERY
IMPORTANT PRACTICAL POINT THAT IF YOU TOOK THE LINE THAT THE
SECURITY COUNCIL ITSELF MUST DECIDE WHETHER A SITUATION THAT GAVE
RISE TO SOME ACTION WAS OVER OR NOT THIS WOULD MEAN THAT ONE
PERMANENT MEMBER, BY USE OF THE VETO, COULD CLAIM THAT SOME ACTION
MUST BE CONTINUED IN PERPETUITY. ONE OF THE STATE DEPARTMENT

MUST BE CONTINUED IN PERPETUITY. ONE OF THE STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIALS SAID THAT THE RHODESIA CASE WAS THE ONLY ONE IN WHICH SANCTIONS HAD BEEN APPLIED UNDER CHAPTER VII AND HE SUGGESTED THEREFORE THAT THERE COULD NOT BE A PRECEDENT FOR IT. I ASKED VANCE WHETHER HE KNEW OF ANY EXAMPLE IN WHICH A RESOLUTION BASED ON A THREAT TO OR A BREACH OF PEACE UNDER CHAPTER VII HAD BEEN POSITIVELY BROUGHT TO AN END BY A SECURITY COUNCIL DECISION SAYING THAT IMPAIRMENT TO PEACE NO LONGER EXISTED. HE SAID HE COULD NOT.

2. BUT OFFICIALS WENT ON TO ASK WHETHER, EVEN IF A TERMINATING RESOLUTION MIGHT NOT BE LEGALLY REQUIRED, THERE MIGHT NOT BE SOMETHING TO BE SAID FOR HAVING ONE IF ALL PARTIES TO THE LONDON CONFERENCE REACHED AGREEMENT ABOUT THE CONSTITUTION, ELECTIONS, ETC.

I SAID THAT I WAS NOT AN EXPERT ON THIS MATTER BUT I REALLY DID NOT THINK THAT WE WOULD WANT TO GET INVOLVED IN THE RIGMAROLE OF A PROTRACTED SECURITY COUNCIL DEBATE ABOUT THE SITUATION IN RHODESIA. THERE MIGHT WELL BE A LOT OF RAKING UP OF THE PAST AND SUGGESTED BREACHES OF SANCTIONS BY ONE OR OTHER PARTY SINCE THE ORIGINAL SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION. WHEN LEGALITY WAS RESTORED WE WOULD LIFT SANCTIONS AND WOULD EXPECT OTHERS TO FOLLOW SUIT IMMEDIATELY. THIS WAS ESSENTIAL BECAUSE OTHERWISE PEOPLE WOULD BE APPLYING SANCTIONS AGAINST US. VANCE'S RESPONSE ON THIS WAS THAT HE WAS STILL WRESTLING WITH THE PROBLEM. HIS ADVISORS HAD TOLD HIM THAT THE LEGAL ARGUMENT WAS SPLIT FIFTY-FIFTY.

3. WE THEN CAME ON THE DISCUSS THE RATHER DIFFERENT QUESTION OF WHAT THE ADMINISTRATION WAS GOING TO DO ABOUT US SANCTIONS. HE SAID THAT THE ADMINISTRATION WOULD HAVE TWO CHOICES ON 15 NOVEMBER, WHEN THE PRESIDENT IS REQUIRED TO MAKE A DETERMINATION. THESE WERE:

- A. TO CONTINUE US SANCTIONS WHILE THE NEGOTIATIONS IN LONDON WERE GOING ON; AND
- B. TO CONTINUE US SANCTIONS UNTIL LEGALITY WAS RESTORED TO RHODESIA.

I SAID THAT IT WOULD BE UNACCEPTABLE TO THE U.K. FOR THE UNITED STATES TO MAINTAIN SANCTIONS AGAINST RHODESIA ONCE THE GOVERNOR WAS THERE BECAUSE IF THEY DID THAT THEY WOULD BE MAINTAINING SANCTIONS AGAINST THE UK.

4. ON THE SUBJECT OF THE PRESIDENTIAL DETERMINATION ON 15 NOVEMBER, I REFERRED TO THE LANGUAGE USED IN THE DETERMINATION IN JUNE WHICH RAISED CERTAIN DIFFICULTIES FOR US AND ASKED VANCE WHETHER HE WOULD GIVE US ADVANCE NOTICE ON WHAT THEY INTENDED TO DO AND LET US SEE THE TEXT OF WHAT THE PRESIDENT WAS GOING TO SAY. VANCE UNDERTOOK TO DO SO.

HENDERSON

33

[RHODESIA: POLICY: ADVANCE COPIES]

IMMEDIATE

PS
PS/SIR I GILMOUR
PS/MR LUCE
PS/PUS
SER J GRAHAM
MR WILLSON
MR DAY
LORD N G LENNOX
MR ASPIN

PS/NO 10 DOWNING STREET
MR R L WADE-GERY)
MR P M MAXEY) CABINET
COL MOIR) OFFICE
MR P J FOWLER)
DIO)

.....
HD/RHOD DEPT (4)
HD/C AF D
HD/S AF D
HD/PUSD (2)
HD/NEWS DEPT
HD/WAD
MR ~~PIFCOT~~ LEGAL ADVISER RM K204
MR PIFCOT LEGAL ADVISER RM K164
RESIDENT CLERK

Sgt. Sinclair
LEGAL ADVISER RM K204 K174

Prime Minister

CONFIDENTIAL

DESKBY 111000Z

FM WASHINGTON 110130Z NOV 79

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 3664 OF 10 NOVEMBER 1979

INFO DAR ES SALAAM MAPUTO LUSAKA GABERONE LUANDA LAGOS PRETORIA
UKMIS NEW YORK PARIS OSLO LISBON

MEETING WITH SECRETARY OF STATE VANCE ABOUT RHODESIA

1. ON MY RETURN FROM LONDON TODAY I SAW VANCE TO GIVE HIM YOUR MIND ON HOW THE CONFERENCE IS GOING AND ON HOW THE U S GOVERNMENT MIGHT HELP AT THIS DIFFICULT JUNCTURE. VANCE, WHO IS VERY PREOCCUPIED AT THE MOMENT WITH THE IRANIAN HOSTAGE PROBLEM, SAID THAT HE WAS EAGER TO KNOW EACTLY WHAT YOU FELT ON RHODESIA.
2. GIVING A GENERAL ACCOUNT OF WHERE THE CONFERENCE STANDS AT THE MOMENT AND THE IMPASSE THAT HAS BEEN REACHED BECAUSE OF THE PATRIOTIC FRONT'S PREVARICATIONS, I SAID THAT YOUR UNDERLYING PROBLEM LAY IN MAINTAINING SUFFICIENT MOMENTUM AND IN KEEPING UP THE PRESSURE ON THE PATRIOTIC FRONT WITHOUT GIVING GROUNDS FOR PEOPLE TO SAY, SHOULD THE CONFERENCE BREAK DOWN, THAT HIS HAD BEEN DUE TO LACK OF PATIENCE AT A LATE STAGE WHEN SO MUCH HAD ALREADY BEEN ACHIEVED. ALTHOUGH THE PATRIOTIC FRONT WERE BEING VERY NEGATIVE AS I HAD BEEN ABLE TO WITNESS MYSELF AT THE MEETING YESTERDAY,

... TO EACH OF PATIENCE AS A LAST STRIKE WHEN SO MUCH HAD ALREADY BEEN ACHIEVED. ALTHOUGH THE PATRIOTIC FRONT WERE BEING VERY NEGATIVE, AS I HAD BEEN ABLE TO WITNESS MYSELF AT THE MEETING YESTERDAY, IT WAS NECESSARY TO BEAR IN MIND THAT THEY HAD SHOWN SIMILAR PROLONGED INTRANSIGENCE OVER THE FIRST PART OF THE CONFERENCE ONLY TO TURN ROUND SUDDENLY AND ACCEPT THE PROPOSED CONSTITUTION. IT COULD NOT THEREFORE BE RULED OUT THAT THEY WOULD COME ROUND OVER THE TRANSITION ARRANGEMENTS. BUT THERE WAS NO DOUBT THAT AT THE MOMENT YOU SAW GREAT DIFFICULTIES. MOREOVER THE CONFERENCE JUST COULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO DRAG ON INDEFINITELY. APART FROM THE NEED FOR US TO HOLD THE INITIATIVE THERE WAS A DANGER THAT IF IT WENT ON INTERMINABLY YOU WOULD LOSE MUZOREWA AND THE SALISBURY DELEGATION. I HAD JUST HEARD THAT SOME OF THE DELEGATION WERE BEING SENT HOME. I STRESSED TO VANCE WHAT A VERY LONG WAY WE HAD TRAVELLED SINCE THE SPRING. IT WAS QUITE UNTRUE TO SUGGEST, AS THE PATRIOTIC FRONT WERE NOW TRYING TO DO, THAT EVERYTHING HAD BEEN COOKED UP WITH SALISBURY WHO HAD MADE NO CONCESSIONS AND THAT IT WAS ONLY THEY, THE PATRIOTIC FRONT, WHO WERE BEING FORCED TO YIELD. THE PROPOSED CONSTITUTION WOULD PROVIDE FOR MAJORITY RULE, NO WHITE BLOCKING VOTE, AND FOR THE POLICE AND ARMY UNDER BLACK RULE. IAN SMITH HAD BEEN SMASHED. MUZOREWA HAD HAD TO ACCEPT HANDING OVER POWER TO A GOVERNOR, NOTWITHSTANDING THE FACT THAT HE HAD BEEN ELECTED BY 64 PER CENT OF THE ELECTORATE AND THE RHODESIAN PARLIAMENT, ELECTED IN MAY, WOULD BE ABOLISHED. (I POINTED OUT THAT MUGABE HAD BEEN ELECTED BY THREE PEOPLE NOT 1.8 MILLION).

3. THE QUESTION IN YOUR MIND NOW WAS WHETHER THE PATRIOTIC FRONT WANTED ELECTIONS OR NOT. THERE WAS A DIFFERENCE BETWEEN MUGABE AND NKOMO. THE LATTER MUST HAVE DIFFICULTY IN DECIDING. HE MIGHT WELL DO BADLY IN THE ELECTIONS; BUT HIS POSITION WOULD ALSO BE DIFFICULT IF THE WAR WENT ON AND IF HE HAD NO CHANCE OF GETTING INTO POWER BY PEACEFUL MEANS. ON THE BASIS OF THE EVIDENCE SO FAR IT WAS DIFFICULT TO SAY THAT KAUNDA'S PRESENCE IN LONDON HAD HAD A BENEFICIAL EFFECT UPON NKOMO. THE IMMEDIATE ISSUE WAS WHAT FURTHER PRESSURE COULD BE EXERCISED NOW QUICKLY TO INDUCE NKOMO AT LEAST TO AGREE TO SOMETHING REASONABLE ON THE TRANSITION. VANCE SAID THAT HE APPRECIATED THE REASONS AGAINST A LONG TRANSITION BUT COMMENTED THAT TWO MONTHS SEEMED QUOTE A SHORT TIME UNQUOTE. IT WOULD BE A PITY IF THE CONFERENCE WERE TO BREAK DOWN OVER WHAT APPEARED TO BE SIMPLY A QUESTION OF TIMING. I DESCRIBED OUR VIEWS ON THE LENGTH OF THE TRANSITION PERIOD AND SAID THAT THE BASIC QUESTION REMAINED WHETHER THE PATRIOTIC FRONT'S VIEW ON THIS SUBJECT WAS A FUNDAMENTAL OBJECTION OR SIMPLY PART OF THEIR POLICY TO SPIN OUT THE CONFERENCE FOR AS LONG AS POSSIBLE.

4. VANCE ASKED ABOUT THE PRESENCE OF SOUTH AFRICAN TROOPS IN RHODESIA. HE SAID THAT A U S MERCENARY HAD REPORTED IN DETAIL ON THEIR PRESENCE AND THAT AN ARTICLE WOULD BE APPEARING IN THE WASHINGTON POST ON 13 NOVEMBER DESCRIBING THIS. VANCE SUGGESTED

WASHINGTON POST ON 13 NOVEMBER DESCRIBING THIS. VANCE SUGGESTED THAT IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT IF WE WERE TO COUNTENANCE THE PRESENCE OF SUCH TROOPS DURING THE TRANSITION.

5. I SAID THAT I COULD TELL HIM FOR HIS OWN INFORMATION THAT YOU HAD HAD A DISCUSSION ABOUT THIS WITH GENERAL WALLS. YOUR VIEW WAS THAT THERE SHOULD NOT BE SOUTH AFRICAN UNITS OPERATING IN RHODESIA BUT THAT THIS WAS DIFFERENT FROM SOUTH AFRICANS VOLUNTEERING THEMSELVES TO SERVE WITH RHODESIAN UNITS. VANCE SAID THAT ACCORDING TO AMERICAN INFORMATION THERE WERE FOUR COMPANIES OF SOUTH AFRICANS IN RHODESIA.

6. WE THEN HAD A GENERAL DISCUSSION IN WHICH OTHERS WHO WERE PRESENT, (VEST, MOOSE, LAKE AND HARE), TOOK PART, ABOUT YOUR INTENTIONS REGARDING THE ARRIVAL OF THE GOVERNOR IN SALISBURY, WHAT HIS POWERS WOULD BE AND WHAT WOULD HAPPEN TO THE FORCES OF THE TWO SIDES DURING THE TRANSITION PERIOD. OBVIOUSLY THE QUESTION OF THE POSITIONING OF THE TROOPS WORRIED THEM AND I SAID THAT MY UNDERSTANDING WAS THAT THE TROOPS ON BOTH SIDES WOULD COME UNDER THE GOVERNOR AND THAT THEY WOULD HAVE TO STAY PUT.

7. THEY ALSO EXPRESSED GREAT INTEREST IN THE PROPOSALS FOR A CEASE-FIRE MONITORING FORCE COMPOSED OF CONTINGENTS FROM COMMONWEALTH COUNTRIES, AND THEY SEEMED FAVOURABLY IMPRESSED BY WHAT I WAS ABLE TO TELL THEM. I TOOK THE OPPORTUNITY OF EXPLAINING WHAT WE WERE THINKING OF AS REGARDS THIS AND THE CEASE-FIRE COMMISSION THOUGH THESE WERE SUBJECTS OF COURSE FOR THE THIRD STAGE OF THE CONFERENCE.

8. REVERTING TO THE PRESENT IMPASSE IN THE CONFERENCE AND THE VARIOUS OBJECTIONS RAISED BY THE PATRIOTIC FRONT REGARDING TIMING, REGISTRATION ETC, MOOSE AND LAKE, WITH VANCE'S ENCOURAGEMENT, CAME FORWARD WITH A NUMBER OF SUGGESTIONS. THE FIRST WAS BASED ON THEIR BELIEF THAT THERE WAS LITTLE TO BE DONE AT THIS STAGE BY HAMMERING ON AT NKOMO AND MUGABE. THE ONLY WAY TO GET THEM TO MOVE WAS TO EXERT PRESSURE ON THE FRONT LINE STATES AND GET THEM, PARTICULARLY MACHEL AND NYERERE, TO LEAN ON THE PATRIOTIC FRONT LEADERS AS THEY HAD DONE AT THE CRITICAL STAGE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS ON THE PROPOSED CONSTITUTION. BUT IF WE WERE TO DO THIS SUCCESSFULLY WE WOULD HAVE TO DRESS IT UP AS A NEW PACKAGE. THIS WAS IMPORTANT PSYCHOLOGICALLY AT THIS MOMENT OF THE CONFERENCE. WOULD IT NOT BE POSSIBLE FOR US TO SHOW SOME READINESS TO BE FLEXIBLE ON TIMING AND TO REVEAL OUR HAND A BIT MORE TO THE FRONT LINE PRESIDENTS ABOUT OUR INTENTION TO KEEP TROOPS CONCENTRATED AND TO MAKE PROVISION FOR A COMMONWEALTH CEASE-FIRE MONITORING FORCE? AS AN EXTENSION OF THIS IDEA THE SUGGESTION WAS ALSO MADE THAT WE SHOULD DELIBERATELY MERGE STAGES TWO AND THREE OF THE CONFERENCE. WE WERE STUCK ON STAGE TWO: WHY NOT THEREFORE GO ON TO STAGE THREE? OUR FLEXIBILITY ON THAT MIGHT HELP TO UNBLOCK THE PROBLEMS ON THE TRANSITION STAGE.

9. I SAID THAT I THOUGHT THAT YOUR REACTION TO THESE IDEAS WOULD

9. I SAID THAT I THOUGHT THAT YOUR REACTION TO THESE IDEAS WOULD BE AS FOLLOWS. FIRSTLY THAT YOU HAD DELIBERATELY DECIDED TO HANDLE THE CONFERENCE STEP BY STEP, EVEN THOUGH FINAL AGREEMENT TO ONE STAGE COULD BE CONDITIONAL UPON AGREEMENT ON THE SUBSEQUENT STAGE. THIS PROCEDURE HAD WORKED WELL AS REGARDS THE CONSTITUTION. (VANCE INTERJECTED TO SAY THAT IT HAD WORKED BRILLIANTLY). THE IDEA OF AN IMPROVED PACKAGE SEEMED TO ME TO LEAVE OUT OF ACCOUNT THE VERY CONSIDERABLE MOVES TOWARDS THE IDEAS OF THE PATRIOTIC FRONT THAT HAD ALREADY BEEN MADE BY YOU. THERE WAS NOT REALLY A GREAT DEAL MORE ROOM FOR FURTHER PACKAGES. IN ANY CASE IT WAS EXTREMELY INEXPEDIENT TO GIVE ANY ENCOURAGEMENT TO THE IDEA THAT WHOLE AREAS OF THE SUBJECT COULD NOW, AFTER NINE WEEKS OF THE CONFERENCE, BE OPENED UP AS A RESULT OF PRESSURE BY ONE SIDE. IT WAS AN ARTICLE OF YOUR FAITH THAT THE MOMENTUM MUST BE MAINTAINED AND THAT NO ENCOURAGEMENT COULD BE GIVEN TO THE PATRIOTIC FRONT TO THINK THAT THE CONFERENCE COULD BE ENDLESSLY DRAWN OUT BY DISCUSSION OF THIS OR THAT POINT. ON THE ISSUE OF THE LENGTH OF THE TRANSITION TIME WE WERE NOT PREPARED TO START NEGOTIATING ABOUT THIS, PARTLY BECAUSE THIS WOULD LEAD TO PROLONGED AND FRUITLESS ARGUMENT BUT ALSO BECAUSE IT WAS POINTLESS. THE TIME THAT WE WERE ENVISAGING, WHICH WAS TWO MONTHS PLUS, WAS PLENTY OF TIME FOR THE PEOPLE OF RHODESIA TO KNOW WHO THE PARTIES AND CANDIDATES WERE. IT WAS ABSURD FOR NKOMO TO PRETEND THAT HE NEEDED A LOT MORE TIME TO BECOME KNOWN TO THE ELECTORATE. HE WAS ALREADY WELL KNOWN TO EVERYBODY IN RHODESIA.

10. THE STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIALS INSISTED THAT WE SHOULD REALLY GIVE THOUGHT TO A FRESH APPROACH TO MACHEL AND NYERERE. THEY THOUGHT THAT THEY MIGHT WELL HOLD THE KEY.

11. I SAID I WOULD OF COURSE REPORT WHAT I HAD HEARD, BUT I MUST MAKE ONE FINAL AND IMPORTANT OBSERVATION REGARDING THE U S ATTITUDE. YOU WERE GRATEFUL FOR THE SUPPORT THAT VANCE HAD GIVEN. SOLIDARITY WAS ESSENTIAL. BUT THE ONE THING THAT COULD MAKE THE NEGOTIATION HARDER AND MORE PROLONGED WOULD BE IF COUNTENANCE WERE GIVEN TO THE IDEA THAT THE U S FAVOURED SOME OF THE POINTS SUCH AS TIMING THAT THE PATRIOTIC FRONT WERE INSISTING UPON. I KNEW THE U S GOVERNMENT HAD BEEN EXTREMELY CAREFUL NOT TO GIVE ANY FALSE IMPRESSION ON THIS BUT I DID WANT TO EMPHASISE THE POINT. THERE WAS ANOTHER ASPECT TO THIS. WHAT WOULD ALSO UNDERMINE YOUR NEGOTIATING POSITION WOULD BE IF THE FRONT LINE STATES OR PATRIOTIC FRONT BELIEVED THAT IN THE EVENT OF THE CONFERENCE FAILING, OF THE APPOINTMENT OF A GOVERNOR AND OF ELECTIONS BEING HELD WITHOUT THE PATRIOTIC FRONT AND WITH THE GUERRILLA WAR CONTINUING, THE U S GOVERNMENT MIGHT NOT BE PREPARED TO RECOGNISE THE NEW GOVERNMENT THAT WAS ELECTED BY THOSE ELECTIONS ON THE BASIS OF THE PROPOSED NEW CONSTITUTION. IF THE AFRICAN LEADERS THOUGHT THAT THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT MIGHT HESITATE IN THIS WAY THIS WOULD GIVE THEM ENORMOUS ENCOURAGEMENT TO HOLD OUT AGAINST COMING TO TERMS. VANCE'S REACTION TO THIS

MIGHT HESITATE IN THIS WAY THIS WOULD GIVE THEM ENORMOUS ENCOURAGEMENT TO HOLD OUT AGAINST COMING TO TERMS. VANCE'S REACTION TO THIS WAS TO SAY THAT HE DID NOT WISH OR INTEND TO DO ANYTHING THAT MIGHT IMPEDE THE PROGRESS OF THE CONFERENCE. I THOUGHT HE WAS CAREFUL HOWEVER TO AVOID SAYING WHAT HE WOULD DO IN THE HYPOTHETICAL CASE I HAVE JUST DESCRIBED. I LEFT VANCE IN NO DOUBT THAT WE WOULD BE LOOKING TO OUR FRIENDS FOR SUPPORT IN SUCH CIRCUMSTANCES: THE GOVERNOR WOULD MEAN LEGALITY. I MUST REITERATE THAT VANCE IS UNHESITATING IN HIS ADMIRATION FOR WHAT YOU HAVE ACHIEVED AND HIS BACKING FOR YOUR ATTEMPTS TO REACH A FAIR AGREEMENT.
12 PLEASE SEE MIFT.

HENDERSON

NNNN

IMMEDIATE

République du Zaïre



Le Président

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T/39A/79T

Subject filed on Zaïre
Nov 79: Unit of Foreign
Minister, Nguzi

Kinshasa, le 11 novembre 1979.

A Son Excellence
Madame Margaret THATCHER M.P.
Premier Ministre Britannique

L O N D R E S

Madame le Premier Ministre,

C'est avec un bien réel plaisir que J'ai reçu et lu Votre dernière lettre, dans laquelle Vous avez eu l'extrême amabilité d'évoquer le problème du règlement politique au Zimbabwe.


J'ai toujours apprécié, à leur juste valeur, les efforts considérables que Votre Gouvernement ne cesse de déployer pour dénouer cette délicate question.

Et, comme Vous l'avez indiqué Vous-même, J'accorde aussi personnellement toute l'importance voulue à ce problème.

Voilà pourquoi J'ai estimé nécessaire de dépêcher auprès de Votre Excellence, Mon Commissaire d'Etat aux Affaires Etrangères, le Citoyen NGUZA KARL-i-BOND, que J'ai chargé de Vous transmettre, de vive voix, Mes avis et suggestions sur cette question.

En Vous renouvelant tous Mes vœux de succès et, dans l'espoir que nos relations bilatérales vont se renforcer davantage, Je Vous prie de croire, Madame le Premier Ministre, à l'expression de Ma très haute considération.

LE PRESIDENT-FONDATEUR DU MOUVEMENT POPULAIRE
DE LA REVOLUTION, PRESIDENT DE LA REPUBLIQUE,


MOBUTU SESE SEKO KUKU NGBENDU WA ZA BANGA,
Général de Corps d'Armée.

Private Secretary

RHODESIA CONFERENCE: 10 NOVEMBER

1. I submit a statement for the Secretary of State's use at this morning's session.
2. The Patriotic Front's statement yesterday represented in virtually all important respects a re-statement of the paper they put forward on 18 September. The only differences are:
 - a. the proposal that the Governor should be chairman of the Governing Council, with equal representation on the Council for the Salisbury delegation and the Patriotic Front;
 - b. acceptance of the party list system.
3. I also attach a supplementary note for use as necessary.

R. W. Renwick

R W Renwick
Rhodesia Department

10 November 1979

cc: PS/LPS
PS/Mr Luce
PS/PUS
Mr Day
Mr Fifoot
Mr Fenn
Mr Empson
Mr Powell
Mr Barlow

RHODESIA CONFERENCE

STATEMENT BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE: 10 NOVEMBER

1. I have studied very carefully the statement which Mr Nkomo made yesterday in response to the full proposals which the British Government put forward on 2 November for the pre-independence period.
2. We agree that a basic objective of this Conference is the achievement of independence on the basis of genuine majority rule. All parties to the Conference have given their conditional agreement to an independence Constitution which, indisputably, provides for genuine majority rule.
3. It is also our objective to achieve peace. The only way to do so is to offer the parties to this Conference a chance to settle their differences by political means in fair elections held under the British Government's authority.
4. We also agree that the function of the interim administration is to prepare for and conduct fair elections. We do not agree that our proposals do not provide arrangements which will enable the parties to contest the elections on equal terms. The whole purpose of our proposals is to enable them to do so.
5. We are prepared to assert British authority during the interim and to make ourselves fully responsible for seeing that
/free and

free and fair elections are held in order to implement the independence Constitution which has been agreed in this Conference. We would not be prepared to do so under conditions or for a period which would make it impossible for us to carry out that responsibility. Once we have asserted our authority, it will be exerted impartially.

6. The Patriotic Front object to the use of "existing institutions". There is no practical alternative to Britain asserting its authority over the existing civil service and other services of the state. All the parties will be represented on the Election Council. None of the parties will have any role in running the administration during the interim period. Bishop Muzorewa and his delegation have accepted this; and we hope that it will also be accepted by the Patriotic Front.

7. We have already discussed at length the Patriotic Front's proposals for a governing council. We have explained that it will be for the Governor to conduct the administration in the interim period, and to ensure that it is impartial. The role of the Patriotic Front leaders in this period, as of the other political leaders, will be to put their case to the people of Rhodesia.

8. The Governor's function will be to ensure that they are able to do so freely and fairly. All the party leaders will be able to make representations to the Governor directly or

/through

through the machinery of the Election Council.

9. The Governor will not be a "titular head". He will have executive and legislative authority. He will be supported by a British staff to assist him in carrying out his responsibilities.

10. Mr Nkomo pointed out that the Lusaka communiqué stated that the future government would be chosen through free and fair elections "properly supervised under British Government authority and with Commonwealth observers". We cannot see how it can conceivably be argued that by using the expression "under British Government authority" the Commonwealth leaders really meant the participation of "some other agency". If they had meant that, they would have said so. The elections will be supervised by the British Government, with Commonwealth observers present.

11. We agree that Commonwealth observers should be present during the election campaign and not just for polling. The British Government will be inviting all Commonwealth countries who wish to do so to send observers to the elections. We do not envisage that they will confine their attention to what happens on the days when polling takes place. We assume that

/they will

they will want to observe the electoral process as a whole and this is what our paper was intended to convey. I hope there is a measure of understanding between us and the Patriotic Front on this point. The parties will be represented on the Election Council and through the machinery will be able to raise any matters concerning the elections.

12. The responsibility for supervising the elections will rest with the British Election Commissioner. He will have a substantial and experienced British staff to assist him in supervising the elections to the full extent necessary to ensure that they are fairly conducted. We do not accept that he will not be impartial, and if in any respect the parties can show that the administration of the election is not in fact impartial the Election Commissioner and the Governor will have a duty to see that appropriate action is taken.

13. We have already explained that a full registration of voters would take many months. But there must be fully adequate safeguards against fraudulent or multiple voting.

/These will

These will be a matter for the Election Commissioner, in consultation with the parties. Representatives of all the parties will be present at the polling stations and will be able to satisfy themselves about the fairness of the voting. I note that the Patriotic Front's statement expresses a willingness, in principle at least, to consider a party list system. This will avoid the need for the de-limitation of constituencies, which would involve long delays before the independence elections can be held.

14. We have already explained that the police will act under the authority and supervision of the Governor and of his police adviser. British police officers will be attached to the police in the districts.

15. We agree that as soon as there is an effective cease-fire there will no longer be a need for martial law. The emergency provisions will be reviewed by the Governor.

16. We are not clear why the Patriotic Front object so strongly to an election period lasting two months. The Patriotic Front have often stated that they enjoy the support of the majority of the people of Zimbabwe. The British Government is offering them ^{the} / chance to put their electoral support to the test. Their policies are well known to the people of Rhodesia. The period of two months is fully adequate for all the party leaders to be able to explain their position and policies and

/to enable

to enable the people of Rhodesia to choose their future leaders.

17. On the question of the cease-fire, we have already stated that we do not consider that a period of anything like two months, as proposed in the Patriotic Front's earlier paper, will be necessary to bring a cease-fire into effect.

18. The Patriotic Front have said that the fact that many members of the Salisbury delegation had nothing to do with the illegal declaration of independence "does not save them". The purpose of this Conference is to bring the rebellion and the state of illegality to an end. It is clear that the Salisbury delegation share that objective. We are anxious to find a settlement in which both sides will be able to participate. This can only be based on a willingness by both sides to put their political support to the test in fair elections held under our authority.

19. It is not the British Government's intention, as the Patriotic Front suggested in their statement yesterday, to wash our hands of the Rhodesia problem. If that had been our intention, we need never have embarked on this Conference or on the consultations which led up to it. Nor would we have continued it for so long. We continue to hope that this Conference will lead to a solution which will bring peace and a more secure future to the people of Rhodesia. But that does depend on a willingness of all the parties to settle

/their

their differences by political means.

20. I hope that the Patriotic Front will now feel able to agree to our general proposals for the pre-independence period, subject to the subsequent negotiations on the cease-fire and the arrangements for monitoring it.

SUPPLEMENTARY NOTE

[For use as Necessary]

Three weeks ago in this Conference, on 22 October, the British Government put forward proposals for elections to bring the independence Constitution into effect and to enable the people of Rhodesia freely to choose their future leaders. Those proposals required Bishop Muzorewa and his colleagues to hand over power to a British Governor with executive and legislative authority, so that you would be able to participate in the elections and the people of Rhodesia would be offered the prospect of an end to the war. They agreed to hand over their power to enable that to happen.

It is therefore a matter of great disappointment to the British Government that, in response, after three weeks of intensive discussion, the Patriotic Front should reply with what is in most respects a re-statement of the position they put forward over seven weeks ago on 18 September.



NOV 11 1941

[RHODESIA: POLICY: ADVANCE COPIES]

PS
PS/SIR I GILMOUR
PS/MR LUCE
PS/PUS
~~SIR J GRAHAM~~
MR WILLSON
MR DAY
LORD N G LENNOX
MR ASPIN

PS/NO 10 DOWNING STREET

MR R L WADE-GERY)
MR P M MAXEY) CABINET
COL MOIR) OFFICE
MR P J FOWLER)
DIO)

.....
HD/RHOD DEPT (4)

HD/C AF D
HD/S AF D

HD/PUSD (2)

HD/NEWS DEPT
HD/WAD

~~MR FREELAND~~ LEGAL ADVISER RM ~~U204~~ ki74

MR FITFOOT LEGAL ADVISER RM K164

~~RESIDENT CLERK~~

Prime Minister

PRIME MINISTER'S

PERSONAL MESSAGE

SERIAL No. T134A/79T

SIR I SINCLAIR

aw

GRS 500

CONFIDENTIAL

DESKBY 181200Z

FM LAGOS 100930Z NOV 79

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 954 OF 10 NOVEMBER

RPTD INFO PRIORITY DAR ES SALAAM, LUSAKA, MAPUTO, GABORONE,
LUANDA, UKMIS NEW YORK, WASHINGTON, PRETORIA AND MIRIMBA SALISBURY.

YOUR TELNO 850: RHODESIA (NOT TO ALL)

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF PRESIDENT SHAGARI'S MESSAGE TO THE
PRIME MINISTER.

BEGINS...

5TH NOVEMBER 1979.

DEAR PRIME MINDTER,

I THANK YOU FOR WRITING TO ME SO SOON AFTER THE RETURN
TO LONDON OF THE HONOURABLE RICHARD LUCE TO LET ME KNOW THAT
HE HAS GIVEN YOU AN ACCOUNT OF HIS DISCUSSION WITH ME ON 24
OCTOBER.

IMMEDIATE

OCTOBER.

I AM GRATEFUL FOR THE ASSURANCES YOU EXPRESSED OF YOUR DETERMINATION IN SEEKING TO ACHIEVE A SATISFACTORY OUTCOME IN THE SECOND STAGE OF THE CONFERENCE.

MR LUCE MAY HAVE INFORMED YOU THAT I DID FEEL, AND STILL DO, THAT GIVEN THE PRESENT DIFFICULT SITUATION IN ZIMBABWE THE TWO MONTHS PERIOD INTENDED FOR THE PARTIES TO PREPARE FOR ELECTIONS COULD BE EXTENDED TO AT LEAST FOUR MONTHS.

I WAS ALSO MADE TO UNDERSTAND THAT IT WAS NOT INTENDED TO PROVIDE FOR VOTER'S REGISTRATION OR TO ARRANGE FOR A DELIMITATION OF CONSTITUENCIES. INSTEAD, THERE WOULD BE PROVISION FOR PARTY LISTS. I KNOW THAT THE PARTY LISTS SYSTEM IS NOT ONE WHICH HER MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT AND THE NIGERIAN GOVERNMENT ARE FAMILIAR WITH ALTHOUGH IT IS SAID TO BE EXTENSIVELY USED ON THE EUROPEAN CONTINENT. NEVERTHELESS, I AM NOT UNHAPPY ABOUT THE INTENDED USE OF THIS INNOVATION SINCE I UNDERSTAND THAT BOTH SIDES, NAMELY THE MUZOREWA GROUP AND THE PATRIOTIC FRONT, HAVE FOUND IT ACCEPTABLE.

FURTHERMORE, IT IS MY FEELING THAT IT WOULD BE ESSENTIAL FOR PEACE TO BE ACHIEVED AND MAINTAINED BEFORE EMBARKING UPON ELECTIONS. I THEREFORE URGE THAT A CEASEFIRE SHOULD BE FIRST ATTAINED. IN MY VIEW, IT WOULD BE EQUALLY ESSENTIAL FOR PROVISION TO BE MADE AGAINST POSSIBLE BREACHES OF THE CEASEFIRE AS I AM NOT SURE THAT EVEN IN THE BEST SPIRIT OF COMPROMISE MILITARY COMMANDERS ON BOTH SIDES WOULD FIND IT EASY TO MEET AND WORK OR FIGHT TOGETHER FOR PEACE.

IT IS STILL NOT SUFFICIENTLY CLEAR TO ME WHAT YOUR INTENTIONS ARE WITH REGARD TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A PEACE-KEEPING FORCE. WHILE I APPRECIATE THAT WE ARE EXPECTING A POLITICAL AGREEMENT, TOGETHER WITH THE WILL TO FULFIL THAT AGREEMENT, I MUST EXPRESS RESERVATIONS ABOUT THE ADEQUACY OF THE POLICE FORCE, EVEN IF ASSISTED BY BRITISH POLICE ADVISERS.

TAKING INTO ACCOUNT ALL THE CIRCUMSTANCES, WE IN NIGERIA FEEL REASONABLY SATISFIED WITH THE SPIRIT OF COMPROMISE WHICH IS SO FAR EMERGING. ACCORDINGLY, WE ARE LOOKING FORWARD TO A SUCCESSFUL CONFERENCE TO A MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE, GENUINELY FREE AND INDEPENDENT ZIMBABWE.

ON BILATERAL RELATIONS, PLEASE PERMIT ME TO AVAIL MYSELF OF THIS OPPORTUNITY TO THANK YOU FOR YOUR CONGRATULATORY

ON BILATERAL RELATIONS, PLEASE PERMIT ME TO AVAIL MYSELF OF THIS OPPORTUNITY TO THANK YOU FOR YOUR CONGRATULATORY MESSAGE OF BEST WISHES FOR THE SUCCESS OF MY ADMINISTRATION IN THE YEARS AHEAD. I AND MY ADMINISTRATION SHARE YOUR EXPRESSED INTENTION FOR US TO WORK TOGETHER ON INTERNATIONAL PROBLEMS OF COMMON CONCERN. IT IS INDEED OUR RECIPROCAL DESIRE TO STRENGTHEN ANGLO-NIGERIAN RELATIONS AND I FEEL THAT EVERYTHING SHOULD BE DONE TO SUSTAIN THE CO-OPERATION AND UNDERSTANDING THAT HAVE LONG EXISTED BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES AND PEOPLES.

YOURS VERY SINCERELY,
(SGD.) ALHAJI SHEHU SHAGARI,
PRESIDENT OF THE FEDERAL
REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA.

IMMEDIATE

ENDS...

BROWN

NNNN

CONFIDENTIAL

File VB

*Top Copy of Zambia,
Visit of
Kaunda,
Nov 79.*



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

10 November 1979

Dear George,

President Kaunda's Call

As you know, the Prime Minister had a tête-à-tête discussion with President Kaunda at No. 10 this afternoon. No-one else was present at the meeting. You attended the Prime Minister's debriefing but you may nonetheless like to have this letter for the record.

The Prime Minister and President Kaunda exchanged papers at the beginning of their talk. You already have the top copy of the document left by President Kaunda. I enclose, for convenience, a copy of the paper given to him by the Prime Minister together with a copy of the points which the Prime Minister was briefed to raise orally.

The Prime Minister pointed out to President Kaunda that the two papers had some points in common but there were other points on which they were some way apart. President Kaunda made it clear to the Prime Minister that his document reflected the views of Mr. Nkomo. He did not make any serious attempt to defend the paper. The Prime Minister, on the other hand, was left with the strong impression that President Kaunda was pleased by the content of the paper she had given him.

President Kaunda spent most of the talk, which lasted about 45 minutes, discussing the personalities involved in the Lancaster House Conference. He took the line that Bishop Muzorewa was not a strong man and that he would be unable to hold the situation in Zimbabwe together after an election. Mr. Nkomo, on the other hand, was a leader. A number of Mr. Mugabe's cadres had acquired considerable respect for Mr. Nkomo in the course of the Conference. So had General Tongogara. The General had been to Nkomo and told him that he hoped to see him appointed sole leader of the Patriotic Front. In President Kaunda's view it was likely that quite a number of Mr. Mugabe's followers would be prepared to accept Mr. Nkomo's leadership.

In handing over her paper, the Prime Minister stressed the second of the points which it had been suggested she should make orally. She did not raise the other two points. She tried to bring it home to President Kaunda that the week ahead was a critical, and indeed an historic, one. The negotiations could not

CONFIDENTIAL

/ continue much

CONFIDENTIAL

- 2 -

continue much longer. Some of Bishop Muzorewa's delegation had already begun to drift away. Decisions had to be taken soon.

President Kaunda left the impression with the Prime Minister that he thought Mr. Nkomo genuinely wanted a settlement. The Prime Minister herself tried to leave the President with the impression that HMG did not look with disfavour on Mr. Nkomo.

Yours ever

Michael Alexander

G.G.H. Walden, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CONFIDENTIAL

Top Copy on: Zambia,
Visit of Kaunda,
Nov 79

CONFIDENTIAL

Rhodesia, Sir

RECORD OF A CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER AND PRESIDENT KAUNDA
OF ZAMBIA AT 10 DOWNING STREET ON 9 NOVEMBER AT 1030

Present:

Prime Minister	His Excellency Dr. Kenneth Kaunda
Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary	His Excellency Mr. W. Chakulya, Foreign Minister
His Excellency Sir Len Allinson	His Excellency Mr. R. Kamanga, Member of the Central Committee
Mr. D.M. Day	Her Excellency the Zambian High Commissioner
Mr. C.A. Whitmore	
Mr. M.O!D!B. Alexander	Mr. Mark Chona

Having expressed his gratitude for the hospitality he had received during his visit, President Kaunda said that he was encouraged by the talks he had had so far. He would not have come to London if he had not been convinced of the sincerity and good faith of the British Government. He wanted to assist the Prime Minister in finding a solution that would stick. The Prime Minister and the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary deserved to succeed.

President Kaunda said that he wished to touch on a number of areas where, he thought, new proposals might be made. He recognised that some of the matters he was going to raise had not yet been the subject of negotiation.

President Kaunda said that he had been encouraged by what the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary had said at dinner the previous evening about the according of equal status to the participants in a Rhodesian election. He had noted the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary's statement that the leaders of the various parties would have the use of Government aircraft. He was wondering whether the same principle could be applied elsewhere e.g. in the treatment of the armed forces. President Kaunda took the point that Bishop Muzorewa could not be expected to concede anything more. The vital point would be to succeed in making the members of the Patriotic Front feel that they were fully accepted and would receive the same treatment as the members of the Salisbury regime. The way to do this might be for a number of senior members of the Patriotic Front, perhaps ten or twelve, to be

CONFIDENTIAL

/ taken

taken on to the Government payroll and to be given the same facilities as Bishop Muzorewa's team. This would help to ensure that they were seen by the Rhodesian electorate as a whole to have assumed a leading position in the Rhodesian community.

President Kaunda said that the same argument should apply to the members of the Patriotic Front armies. They would of course come under the direct authority of the Governor. But it would help to establish both their equal status and the Governor's control if they could be paid by the Governor. As regards the police, President Kaunda said that they could be left in being provided some of the more unacceptable elements, particularly those, like the Selos Scouts, ^{combined operations, were removed,} who had been involved in/ The police should be placed under British command. It would help if some British trained police from other Commonwealth countries, e.g. Tanzania and Zambia, could be introduced.

President Kaunda said that the Governor must, of course, have full control of the country. If a system could be established whereby both Bishop Muzorewa's colleagues and forces and those of the Patriotic Front were being paid by the Governor, there should be no problem in setting up an Electoral Council. The routine administration of the country would be the responsibility of the Governor, the Electoral Council would help him to run the elections. But the Electoral Council should have an active role. It should meet at regular intervals and should be seen to involve the participation of all the main political leaders. It would be an important means of building confidence.

Once the machinery had been set up, President Kaunda thought that the main problems left would be the return of the refugees and registration. The refugees to be considered were not only those in the neighbouring countries, but also those at present in Bulawayo and Salisbury who would have to return to their own villages. However, if free movement of the leaders of the various parties was ensured, the movement of refugees should not present insurmountable problems. HMG had suggested that two months might suffice; the Patriotic Front were arguing for six months. Four months might be a good compromise. As regards registration, HMG had claimed that it would take a long time. But in Zambia, which was a larger country, three weeks had proved sufficient.

/ If properly

If properly organised, it should prove possible to arrange registration of voters in Rhodesia within the sort of timescale now under discussion. As regards the voting process itself, President Kaunda recalled that Bishop Muzorewa favoured a five-day election, HMG one taking three days and the Patriotic Front one taking a single day. Perhaps two days would suffice.

The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary said that in considering his approach to the problems of the pre-independence period, he had been very conscious of the mistakes made in the past. One had been to attempt to do too much. The Anglo-American plan for instance had been much too complicated. A lot of what President Kaunda had said had been logical but was not negotiable. There was too much jealousy and suspicion. The only conceivable way of getting an acceptable, if not an ideal, interim agreement followed by a free and fair election was to be simple and quick. Power-sharing, which was what some of President Kaunda's ideas would seem to involve, was not negotiable because the Salisbury regime would not accept it. His way out of this dilemma had been to propose that there should be no power to be shared among the competing parties. The Governor, together with his Electoral Commissioner and staff and his Military Adviser and staff, would be responsible for everything. This had not been an easy decision to take.

The three armies would have nothing to do with the election. Assuming that there was a ceasefire, a Ceasefire Commission would be set up with the British Military Adviser in the chair. The army commanders would be represented on the Commission and responsible through the Military Adviser to the Governor. There would be absolute equality of status between each adviser.

The difficulty about paying the leaders of the Patriotic Front was that it would raise the question of power-sharing. This in turn would be bound to give rise to a great deal of trouble. It had already been agreed that Bishop Muzorewa should not participate in the administration of the country during the interim. This was the single most important concession made by any party to the negotiations. There was a limit beyond which one could not go in humiliating the Salisbury regime.

/ As regards

As regards the election, the Governor, through the Electoral Commissioner, would have to be in charge. The responsibility would be his although he would of course take action in consultation with the Electoral Council. All the parties would be represented on it and would be able to make representations to the Governor whenever they wished. Here again, the essence of the situation was that responsibility lay with Britain. Power-sharing would not be negotiable.

The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary agreed with President Kaunda about the need to get the refugees back to their homes as quickly as possible. He expected that the United States would be prepared to help. But it would be misleading to suggest that it would be possible to get all the refugees back before the election took place.

The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary said that he envisaged that the elections would be observed by a large number of British electoral commissioners, of Commonwealth observers and of members of the world Press. Moreover, each party would have a representative at each polling station. The ceasefire similarly would be supervised by monitors from outside. It would not be easy to find people who were acceptable to both sides. Bishop Muzorewa was suspicious of many members of the Commonwealth, the more so since Mr. Ramphal had adopted a partisan attitude throughout the Conference. However, we had a number of countries in mind who would be willing to offer monitors. The monitors would not, of course, be responsible for enforcing the ceasefire. They would report breaches to the Ceasefire Commission. It would then be for the commanders of the forces responsible for the breaches to deal with offenders. There would be a considerable number of monitors, probably several hundreds. In response to a question from President Kaunda, the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary said that the number could not run into thousands, if only because of the difficulties of housing them and moving them around the country. The Prime Minister stressed that the arrangements we had proposed were as fair as could be envisaged in the circumstances. Moreover, the pressure on the Governor from the large numbers of observers, monitors, journalists, etc., to ensure that the interim was fairly administered and the election fairly run would be overwhelming.

/ President Kaunda

CONFIDENTIAL

- 5 -

President Kaunda said that no-one questioned the importance of giving the Governor full powers. The problem was to devise a mechanism that would make his work easier and would solve the problem of giving equal status to the various participants in the election. It was not his intention to introduce power-sharing. The Governor would be a "father figure" and in full control of the situation.

Repeating that he was not talking about power-sharing, President Kaunda said that the arrangements must be fair and be seen to be fair. Everyone accepted that Muzorewa had given up a great deal. But he had retained his salary, his car, his house and his status. The Patriotic Front leaders would not have titles or powers, but they should be offered equal treatment. It would give them a sense of confidence and belonging.

President Kaunda agreed that the armies should have nothing to do with the elections. But it was necessary to have peace, not only at the time of the ceasefire, but throughout the interim and thereafter. The unification of the guerrilla army and the army of the Salisbury regime would be a major problem for the post-independence government. If in the interim period the ^{guerrillas} could be given, through their own channels, pay or allowances, they would acquire a sense of responsibility. It would begin the process of re-adjustment that would be so important for the future. It would ease the process of drawing together acceptable elements from both armies. Similarly, with the army commanders. All would be responsible to the Governor but there would remain a difference if one was being paid by the State and the others were not. Britain had a moral responsibility to see that peace was maintained after the election as well as before it; the suggestions that President Kaunda had made would assist in converting fear and suspicion into confidence.

The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary said that he agreed that the real problem was what happened after the election. He thought that the Ceasefire Commission might have a confidence-building rôle. The army commanders, who would be members of it, could start discussing the post-election period under the Chairmanship of the British military adviser. The point about the status of the various forces was a real one. But there was a major difference between continuing to

CONFIDENTIAL

/pay an

pay an army and starting to pay a new one. The Prime Minister noted that there would be a problem of distinguishing between the permanent and the temporary fighting men. There ought to be a role for rehabilitation and resettlement payments. It would be essential to find some way of giving the political leaders equal status. Assistance in setting up party political headquarters might be one possibility. They would of course have equal time on television. (It was pointed out that this was a limited asset in Rhodesia.)

President Kaunda re-iterated that actions taken now would have a considerable effect on the post-election situation. Britain should not concentrate on getting out as quickly as possible. When tempted to do so, she should think of the reputation the Belgians now enjoyed in Africa. Rhodesia was the last and most difficult of Britain's colonial problems but "the last born is the dearest child". A lot of money was being spent already. If some of it could be diverted to buying uniforms for guerrillas and regularising them, it would help greatly with their psychological re-orientation. It would be a good investment. All this applied to those guerrillas already in Rhodesia. His government and that of President Machel in Mozambique would hold back the armed forces now in their countries until things had been sorted out. After the election, their return would be the responsibility of the new government in Zimbabwe. Surely the money could be found during a three- or four-month interim period to put some of these things in hand. The Prime Minister said that the interim period could not go on for four months. Things would start to fall apart if it was that long. It would not be possible to pay everyone in each army. Every penny spent by HMG on the sort of points President Kaunda had been raising would have to come out of money that would otherwise have gone on resettlement and rehabilitation. But the need to do something about the status of the various parties and about rehabilitation was understood.

The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary said that most of the points raised by President Kaunda had been thought about and discussed. He realised that there were points in the British proposals which both sides found unacceptable. But there was no proposal which would be wholly acceptable to everyone. The question of the status of the parties would be looked at again but he could not risk losing the Salisbury regime.

President Kaunda asked about the length of the interim period. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary said that the whole period from the signing of the agreement to the assumption of power by the new Government would be 11 or 12 weeks. In the course of the ensuing discussion about the likelihood of a breakdown during the interim period, Mr. Chakulya asked about violations of the ceasefire by the Salisbury regime's forces. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary said that if General Walls ordered his troops to cease fire, they would do so. Moreover, General Walls himself was a soldier and would certainly take orders from whoever was in power in Salisbury. Miss Chibesakunda commented that some elements of the Rhodesian forces were ill-disciplined. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary repeated that he was sure that General Walls could exert his authority if he wished to do so.

President Kaunda asked whether the replies he had been given earlier meant that Britain would give no consideration to providing money for clothing, feeding and medical treatment for the guerrillas inside Rhodesia. Mr. Day said that these points would be covered when the conference began to discuss the problems of the ceasefire. The Prime Minister said however that it was clear that something would have to be done to ensure that those in the field were properly cared for. Commenting on the question of pay for the guerrillas, Mr. Chona said that Bishop Muzorewa's auxiliaries were at present receiving \$90 a month from state funds. The Prime Minister repeated that Britain could not undertake to pay the guerrilla armies. Resettlement and rehabilitation was of course a different question.

The discussion ended at 1205.

And
:-

9 November 1979

PS (4)
PS/SIR I GILMOUR
PS/MR LUCE
PS/PUS
~~SIR J. GILMOUR~~
MR WILLSON
MR DAY
LORD N G LENNOX
MR ASPIN

PS/NO 10 DOWNING STREET
MR R L WADE-GERY)
MR P M MAXEY) CABINET
COL MOIR) OFFICE
MR P J FOWLER)
DIO)

.....

HD/RHOD DEPT (4)

HD/C AF D
HD/S AF D

HD/PUSD (2)

HD/NEWS DEPT
HD/WAD

~~MR FREEMAN~~ LEGAL ADVISER RM K164A 174
MR FIFOOT LEGAL ADVISER RM K164
RESIDENT CLERK

ADVANCE COPY

IMMEDIATE

31X

Sir Sinclair

[Handwritten signature]

GR 300
CONFIDENTIAL
DESKBY 100900Z

Prime Minister

FM UKMTS NEW YORK 1090117Z NOV 79
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1512 OF 9 NOVEMBER
INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON ROUTINE LUSAKA DAR ES SALAAM
LAGOS PRETORIA PARIS OSLO LISBON BONN

MY 2 IPTS: RHODESIA SANCTIONS

1. THIS IS PROBABLY AS GOOD A RESULT AS WE COULD HAVE EXPECTED. THE STATEMENT CONTAINS UNWELCOME CRITICISM OF HMG AND REPEATS THE UNFORTUNATE ASSERTION IN THE JULY 1978 STATEMENT THAT ONLY THE SECURITY COUNCIL HAS THE RIGHT TO LIFT SANCTIONS. THIS SORT OF LANGUAGE WAS UNAVOIDABLE BUT THE IMPORTANT THING IS THAT THE FIVE WESTERN POWERS ALL DISASSOCIATED THEMSELVES FROM IT. IT WAS NOT TO BE EXPECTED AT THIS STAGE THAT THE TERMS OF THEIR RESERVATIONS WOULD HAVE ENTAILED A DIRECT REFUTATION OF THE ROLE OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL IN THE LIFTING OF SANCTIONS, BUT THEIR POSITIONS ARE AT LEAST RESERVED. (WE HAD OF COURSE POINTED OUT TO THE OTHER FOUR BEFORE THE MEETING THE SERIOUS IMPLICATIONS OF THEIR PREJUDICING THEIR GOVERNMENTS' POSITIONS ON THIS VITAL POINT).

IMPLICATIONS OF THEIR PREJUDICING THEIR GOVERNMENTS' POSITIONS
ON THIS VITAL POINT).

2. THE AFRICANS ARE STILL DEEPLY CONCERNED TO MAINTAIN THE POSITION
THAT THERE SHOULD BE NO UNILATERAL FLOUTING OF MANDATORY RESOLUTION
OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL. BUT THEY SHOWED SIGNS OF BEING
RECEPTIVE TO OUR ARGUMENTS IN PRIVATE THAT TO FORCE US TOO FAR AT
THIS STAGE COULD DAMAGE THE PROSPECTS FOR A SETTLEMENT. I HOPE
THEREFORE THAT THEY WILL NOT RESORT IN THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE TO THE
SECURITY COUNCIL. BUT AS 15 NOVEMBER APPROACHES AND IT BECOMES
CLEAR THAT WE ARE NOT GOING TO EXERCISE POWER IN THE ENABLING BILL
TO KEEP ON THE SECTIONS 2 SANCTIONS, PRESSURES WILL MOUNT FOR THEM TO
GO TO THE COUNCIL OR AT LEAST REVERT TO THE SANCTIONS
COMMITTEE. THESE PRESSURES WILL COME FROM THE RUSSIANS AND THE
MORE RADICAL AFRICANS.

PARSONS

NNNN

PS (e)
PS/SIR I GILMOUR
PS/MR LUCE
PS/PUS
~~SIR J GILMOUR~~
MR WILLSON
MR DAY
LORD N G LENNOX
MR ASPIN

PS/NO 10 DOWNING STREET

MR R L WADE-GERY)
MR P M MAXEY) CABINET
COL MOIR) OFFICE
MR P J FOWLER)
DIO)

ADVANCE COPY

IMMEDIATE

31x

.....
HD/RHOD DEPT (4)
HD/C AF D
HD/S AF D
HD/PUSD (2)
HD/NEWS DEPT
HD/VAD
~~MR FERRELL~~ LEGAL ADVISER RM K200A 174
MR FIFOOT LEGAL ADVISER RM K164
RESIDENT CLERK

Sir I Sinclair

Prime Minister

GRS 660

ant

UNCLASSIFIED
DESKBY 100900Z
FM UKMIS NEW YORK 100116Z NOV 79
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1511 OF 9 NOVEMBER
INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON
ROUTINE LUSAKA DAR ES SALAAM LAGOS PRETORIA PARIS OSLO
LISBON BONN

MIPT: RHODESIA SANCTIONS.

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF STATEMENT:-

1. THE SECURITY COUNCIL COMMITTEE ESTABLISHED IN PURSUANCE OF RESOLUTION 253 (1968) CONCERNING THE QUESTIONS OF SOUTHERN RHODESIA HELD AN URGENT MEETING ON 8 NOVEMBER 1979 FOR THE PURPOSE OF CONSIDERING THE QUESTION OF THE MAINTENANCE OF SECURITY COUNCIL SANCTIONS AGAINST THE ILLEGAL REGIME IN SOUTHERN RHODESIA. THE COMMITTEE HAD LEARNED WITH DISTRESS THAT THE UNITED KINGDOM GOVERNMENT CONTEMPLATED THE NON-RENEWAL

THE COMMITTEE HAD LEARNED WITH DISTRESS THAT THE UNITED KINGDOM GOVERNMENT CONTEMPLATED THE NON-RENEWAL OF SOME SANCTIONS (SECTION 2 OF THE UNITED KINGDOM SOUTHERN RHODESIA ACT, 1965) AND THE LIFTING OF THE REST ((AS SOON AS RHODESIA RETURNS TO LEGALITY WITH THE APPOINTMENT OF A BRITISH GOVERNOR AND HIS ARRIVAL IN SALISBURY,)) ((SEE FOOTNOTE +1+)) SOUTHERN RHODESIA. THE COMMITTEE EXPRESSED GRAVE CONCERN THAT THE MEASURES CONTEMPLATED BY THE UNITED KINGDOM GOVERNMENT WOULD AMOUNT TO UNILATERAL ACTION BY THAT GOVERNMENT WITH REGARD TO THE SANCTIONS ESTABLISHED BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL AGAINST THE ILLEGAL REGIME IN SOUTHERN RHODESIA. THE COMMITTEE EMPHASIZED THAT ONLY THE SECURITY COUNCIL, WHICH HAD INSTITUTED THE SANCTIONS IN THE FIRST PLACE, HAD A RIGHT TO LIFT THEM. ALL MEMBER STATES SHOULD THEREFORE CONTINUE TO RESPECT AND APPLY STRICTLY THE PROVISIONS OF ALL THE RELEVANT SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS ON SOUTHERN RHODESIA, UNTIL ALL THE AIMS AND OBJECTIVES SET OUT IN RESOLUTION 253(1968) HAVE BEEN COMPLETELY ACHIEVED. ((SEE FOOTNOTE +2+)).

2. THE COMMITTEE FELT THAT IT WOULD BE FAILING IN ITS DUTY IF IT DID NOT PRONOUNCE ITSELF ON THE DECLARED INTENTION OF A MEMBER STATE TO VIOLATE THE SANCTIONS BY DISCONTINUING THEIR APPLICATION. ITS CONCERN WAS ALL THE GREATER BECAUSE THE MEMBER STATE INVOLVED, THE UNITED KINGDOM, CARRIES THE DUAL RESPONSIBILITY OF THE ADMINISTERING POWER OF THE REBEL TERRITORY AND OF A PERMANENT MEMBER OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL PRIMARILY RESPONSIBLE FOR THE MAINTENANCE OF INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY. THE COMMITTEE NOTED FURTHER THAT THE SECURITY COUNCIL SANCTIONS SYSTEM AGAINST SOUTHERN RHODESIA WAS ESTABLISHED IN THE FIRST INSTANCE AT THE REQUEST OF THE UNITED KINGDOM GOVERNMENT.

3. THEREFORE, THE COMMITTEE DECIDED TO ISSUE THIS STATEMENT. IT ALSO DECIDED TO APPEAL TO ALL MEMBER STATES AND IN PARTICULAR TO THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED KINGDOM THROUGH ITS REPRESENTATIVE IN THE COMMITTEE TO CONTINUE TO OBSERVE SCRUPULOUSLY ALL THE PROVISIONS OF THE SANCTIONS ESTABLISHED BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL. FURTHERMORE, THE COMMITTEE DECIDED TO TRANSMIT A COPY OF THIS STATEMENT TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL FOR THE ATTENTION OF ITS MEMBERS.

4. THE REPRESENTATIVES OF FRANCE AND PORTUGAL EXPRESSED THEIR DELEGATIONS' RESERVATIONS ON BOTH THE PRINCIPLE AND THE TEXT OF THE PROPOSED STATEMENT BY THE COMMITTEE IN THE ABSENCE OF SUFFICIENT TIME TO GET INSTRUCTIONS FROM THEIR GOVERNMENTS. THE NORWEGIAN DELEGATION STATED THAT IT WAS NOT IN A POSITION TO PRONOUNCE ITSELF ON THE SUBSTANCE OF THE STATEMENT OWING TO THE LACK OF TIME.

TO PRONOUNCE ITSELF ON THE SUBSTANCE OF THE STATEMENT OWING TO THE LACK OF TIME FOR ITS DELEGATION TO OBTAIN INSTRUCTIONS FROM ITS GOVERNMENT. THE UNITED KINGDOM DELEGATION DISSOCIATED ITSELF FROM THE PROPOSED STATEMENT, THE ISSUE OF WHICH IT REGARDED AS WHOLLY INAPPROPRIATE AND THE TERMS OF WHICH IT CONSIDERED INACCURATE AND UNJUSTIFIED. THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNITED STATES STATED THAT, BEARING IN MIND THE SENSITIVITY OF THE NEGOTIATIONS CURRENTLY TAKING PLACE IN LONDON, HIS DELEGATION WAS UNABLE TO PARTICIPATE IN THE CONSIDERATION OF THE PROPOSED STATEMENT BY THE COMMITTEE.

FOOTNOTE +1+ FROM STATEMENT BY THE UNITED KINGDOM SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH AFFAIRS IN PARLIAMENT ON : NOVEMBER 1979.

FOOTNOTE +2+ SEE RESOLUTIONS: 253 (1968), PREAMBULAR PARAGRAPH 4: 277 (1970), PREAMBULAR PARAGRAPH 2: 288 (1970), OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH 3: 314 (1972), OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH 1: 318 (1972), PREAMBULAR PARAGRAPH 4: AND 323 (1972), OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH 1.

PARSONS

NNNN

PS (4)
PS/SIR I GILMOUR
PS/MR LUCE
PS/PUS
~~SIR J GILMOUR~~
MR WILLSON
MR DAY
LORD N G LENNOX
MR ASPIN

PS/NO 10 DOWNING STREET

MR R L WADE-GERY
MR P M MAXEY
COL MOIR
MR P J FOWLER
DIO

CABINET
OFFICE

ADVANCE COPY

314

.....
HD/RHOD DEPT (4)
HD/C AF D
HD/S AF D
HD/PUSD (2)
HD/NEWS DEPT
HD/WAD
MR ~~BREEDLAND~~ LEGAL ADVISER RM K204 174
MR FIFOOT LEGAL ADVISER RM K164
RESIDENT CLERK

IMMEDIATE

Sir I Sinclair

Prime Minister

GR 400
CONFIDENTIAL

amb

DESK BY 1009007
FM UKMIS NEW YORK 090115Z NOV 79
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1510 OF 9 NOVEMBER
INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON ROUTINE LUSAKA DAR ES SALAAM LAGOS
PRETORIA PARIS OSLO LISBON BONN

YOUR TELNO 783: RHODESIA SANCTIONS

1. AT THE BEGINNING OF THIS MORNING'S MEETING WE ONCE AGAIN STATED OUR OPPOSITION TO THE ISSUE OF ANY STATEMENT BY THE COMMITTEE ON THE GROUNDS THAT IT COULD DAMAGE PROSPECTS FOR A SETTLEMENT AT LANCASTER HOUSE. WE RECEIVED USEFUL SUPPORT FROM PORTUGAL, FRANCE AND THE U.S. BUT NIGERIA, KUWAIT AND THE SOVIET UNION INSISTED (WITH GENERAL SUPPORT FROM NON-WESTERN DELEGATIONS) THAT THE COUNCIL WOULD BE FAILING IN ITS OBLIGATIONS IF IT DID NOT ISSUE A STATEMENT.

2. WHEN, AFTER A LENGTHY DISCUSSION, IT BECAME CLEAR THAT THE COMMITTEE COULD NOT BE PREVENTED FROM DISCUSSING A DRAFT STATEMENT WHICH HAD BEEN TABLED OVERNIGHT, NORWAY SUGGESTED THAT THIS SHOULD ISSUE AS A STATEMENT BY THE CHAIRMAN IN HIS PERSONAL CAPACITY. THIS WAS REJECTED BY THE AFRICANS AND EAST EUROPEANS. ALL FIVE WESTERN DELEGATIONS THEN SAID THEY WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO

ALL FIVE WESTERN DELEGATIONS THEN SAID THEY WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO AGREE TO ANY COMMUNIQUE WITHOUT THEIR RESERVATIONS BEING RECORDED IN IT. SINCE ONE OF THE MAIN PLANKS OF THE ARGUMENTS PUT FORWARD BY THE NORWEGIANS AND PORTUGUESE WAS THAT THEY HAD NOT HAD TIME TO CONSULT CAPITALS, WE JUDGED IT TACTICALLY WISE NOT TO WORK FOR A DELAY IN THE ISSUE OF THE STATEMENT SINCE THIS WOULD PUT THEM ON THE SPOT ON THE SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES. WE THEREFORE SAID THAT WE WOULD NOT IMPEDE DISCUSSION OF THE DRAFT STATEMENT BUT THAT WE WOULD NOT PARTICIPATE IN IT. THE AMERICANS TOOK THE SAME LINE, AS, IMPLICITY, DID HE THREE OTHER WESTERN DELEGATIONS.

3. THE REST OF THE COMMITTEE THEN AGREED THE DRAFT WITH THE MINIMUM OF DISCUSSION AND AMENDMENT. THERE WAS THEN A ROW BETWEEN THE RUSSIANS AND THE CHAIRMAN (BLANKSON OF NIGERIA) ON THE EXTENT TO WHICH THE FIVE WESTERN DELEGATIONS EXPRESSING RESERVATIONS SHOULD BE ALLOWED TO EXPLAIN THEIR CASE IN AN ADDITIONAL PARAGRAPH OF THE COMMUNIQUE. AFTER THIS HAD CONTINUED FOR SOME TIME BLANKSON GAVELLED THROUGH THE DECISION THAT ALL FIVE SHOULD BE ALLOWED TO NEGOTIATE THE TEXT OF THEIR OWN RESERVATIONS WITH THE SECRETARIAT. THE ROW CONTINUED AFTER THE MEETING AND BECAME HEATED. ONLY IN MID-AFTERNOON DID THE RUSSIANS FINALLY AGREE WITH THE CHAIRMAN THAT HE COULD ISSUE THE STATEMENT.

4. EXTRACTS FROM THE STATEMENT HAVE ALREADY BEEN CARRIED ON REUTER'S HERE

5. TEXT OF STATEMENT IS IN MIFT AND COMMENT IN MY SECOND MIFT.

PARSONS

NNNN

PS
PS/SIR I GILMOUR
PS/MR LUCE
PS/PUS
~~SIR J GRAHAM~~
MR WILLSON
MR DAY
LORD N G LENNOX
MR ASPIN

PS/NO 10 DOWNING STREET
MR R L WADE-GERY)
MR P M MAXEY) CABINET
COL MOIR) OFFICE
MR P J FOWLER)
DIO)

Prime Minister

.....
HD/RHOD DEPT (4)
HD/C AF D
HD/S AF D
HD/PUSD (2)
HD/NEWS DEPT
HD/WAD
MR FREBLAND
MR FIFOOT
~~RESIDENT CLERK~~

Sir Ian Sinclair
LEGAL ADVISER RM K200A

amb

CONFIDENTIAL

FM CAIRO 091205Z NOV

IMMEDIATE

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NR 820 OF 09 NOV 79
YOUR TELNO 461: RHODESIA

1. I DELIVERED THE PRIME MINISTER'S MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT SADAT'S CHEF DE CABINET, HASSAN KAMEL, THIS MORNING. I STRESSED OUR HOPE THAT PRESIDENT SADAT WOULD USE HIS INFLUENCE WITH THE PATRIOTIC FRONT TO URGE THEM TO ACCEPT OUR PROPOSALS. HASSAN KAMEL UNDERTOOK TO TRANSMIT THE MESSAGE IMMEDIATELY, AND SAID HE WAS SURE PRESIDENT SADAT WOULD BE PREPARED TO ACT AS REQUESTED. AS EVERYONE KNEW, HE BELIEVED PASSIONATELY IN SETTLING PROBLEMS BY PEACEFUL MEANS AND DEMOCRATIC METHODS, AND HE MIGHT SEE A COMPARISON BETWEEN THE RHODESIA CONFERENCE AND HIS OWN EFFORTS TO DRAW THE PALESTINIANS INTO THE PEACE PROCESS. I SAID THAT JUST AS THE ARAB/ISRAEL PEACE PROCESS WAS PRESIDENT SADAT'S HIGHEST PRIORITY IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS, A SETTLEMENT OF THE RHODESIA PROBLEM WAS AT THIS MOMENT A TOP PRIORITY FOR THE BRITISH GOVT., AND WE WOULD HOPE FOR AN

PRESIDENT SADAT'S HIGHEST PRIORITY IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS, A SETTLEMENT OF THE RHODESIA PROBLEM WAS AT THIS MOMENT A TOP PRIORITY FOR THE BRITISH GOVT., AND WE WOULD HOPE FOR AN EQUAL UNDERSTANDING FROM THE EGYPTIAN GOVT., OF OUR PREOCCUPATIONS AS WE HAD SHOWN FOR THEIRS.

2. BEFORE RECEIVING YOUR TUR, I HAD THOUGHT IT TIMELY TO EXPLAIN THE PRESENT SITUATION TO THE MFA, AND IN THE ABSENCE OF BUTROS GHALI ON HIS AFRICAN TOUR I CALLED YESTERDAY ON THE NEW SENIOR UNDER-SECRETARY, SAMIR AHMED. I SPOKE ON THE LINES OF YOUR TELEGRAM NO 1534 TO WASHINGTON, AND LEFT WITH HIM THE FULL TEXT OF OUR PROPOSALS. I SAID THAT WE HAD BEEN DISAPPOINTED ON RECENT OCCASIONS BY THE STRENGTH OF EGYPT'S VOCAL SUPPORT FOR THE PATRIOTIC FRONT, DENUNCIATION OF THE MUZOREWA GOVERNMENT AND EXCLUSIVE RECOGNITION OF THE PATRIOTIC FRONT. I PUT IT TO HIM BLUNTLY THAT WE WERE ENTITLED TO A MORE UNDERSTANDING RESPONSE TO OUR POSITIVE ATTITUDE TO CAMP DAVID, AND THAT ALTHOUGH WE APPRECIATED EGYPT'S NEED FOR AFRICAN SUPPORT IN THE LATTER CONTEXT THEY COULD SURELY AVOID APPEARING MORE AFRICAN THAN THE AFRICANS. SAMIR AHMED SAID HE FULLY UNDERSTOOD, AND AGREED THAT THE PATRIOTIC FRONT OUGHT TO BE PREPARED TO PUT THEIR CLAIMS TO THE TEST IN FREE ELECTIONS. I MENTIONED SADAT'S CURIOUS REMARK TO MR JULIAN AMERY THAT HE HAD SUPPOSED IT WAS THE PATRIOTIC FRONT WHOM WE WISHED HIM TO SUPPORT, AND HE SAID THIS COULD BE DISREGARDED AS AN OFF-THE-CUFF REACTION ON AN UNFAMILIAR SUBJECT.

3. SAMIR AHMED, UNTIL RECENTLY AMBASSADOR IN ROME AND FORMERLY MINISTER IN LONDON AND NEW YORK, IS VERY WELL DISPOSED AND I AM SURE WILL DO HIS BEST TO INTRODUCE SOME MODERATION INTO THE EGYPTIAN POSITION. BUT IF THE PATRIOTIC FRONT STAY OUT I FEAR THE EGYPTIANS WILL FEEL OBLIGED TO CONTINUE TO SUPPORT THEM AND TO JOIN IN CRITICISING OUR PROPOSALS, SO DESPERATE IS THEIR ANXIETY NOT TO ALIENATE THE FEW REMAINING FRIENDS THEY HAVE IN AFRICA.

4. PLEASE REPEAT AS NECESSARY.

WEIR.

NNNN

IMMEDIATE

Private Secretary

Despatched
Michael Alexander *Am*

Via the Duty Clerk
I have asked if we
can send repetitions of
this message from the
PM to the heads of
Government in:

Saudi Arabia

Kuwait

India

Sri Lanka

The Resident Clerk
here is standing by
to despatch on a
word from you.

Roderic Lyne

9/xi



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

①

9 November 1979

Dear Michael,

Rhodesia

Prime Minister

Africa West

Yes

I enclosed with my letter of 7 November a draft personal message to certain African Heads of State which was subsequently approved by the Prime Minister. Lord Carrington believes it would be useful for the Prime Minister to send messages to Mr Lee Kwan Yew and Datuk Hussein Onn in similar terms, omitting the specific African references and concluding with a request for general support rather than for pressure on the Patriotic Front.

/ I enclose draft messages in the form of telegrams to Singapore and Kuala Lumpur.

yours ever

Roderic Lyne

(R M J Lyne)
Private Secretary

M O'D B Alexander Esq
10 Downing Street
LONDON

File No.
Department
Drafted by
(Block Capitals)
Tel. Extn

OUTWARD
TELEGRAM

Security Classification CONFIDENTIAL
Precedence IMMEDIATE
DESKBYZ

FOR COMMS. DEPT. USE	Despatched (Date) (Time).....Z	POSTBYZ
----------------------------	--	---------------

PREAMBLE

(Time of Origin)Z(G.M.T.) (Restrictive Prefix).....
 (Security Class.) CONFIDENTIAL (Caveat/
 Privacy Marking).....
 (Codeword)..... (Deskby)

To IMMEDIATE SINGAPORE Tel. No. of
(precedence) (post)

AND TO (precedence/post) IMMEDIATE: KUALA LUMPUR

AND SAVING TO

REPEATED TO (for info)

SAVING TO (for info)

Distribution:-

Rhodesia Policy

(TEXT)

1. Unless you see objection please pass the following personal message from the Prime Minister to Mr Lee Kwan Yew/Datuk Hussein Onn as soon as possible:

Begins

I know that you will have been following closely the progress of the Rhodesia Conference at Lancaster House. As we agreed at Lusaka the purpose of the Conference is to bring Rhodesia to independence on the basis of genuine majority rule. We have also been making a determined effort to see if it is possible to bring an end to the war by offering the parties in conflict a chance to resolve their differences by political means.

Copies to:-

CONFIDENTIAL

/The

CONFIDENTIAL

The question of majority rule, which was the cause of the war, has been resolved by the agreement we have reached with the parties on the Independence Constitution. The question now at issue is who is to exercise power under ~~the Independence~~ ^{new} Constitution. Our position is that the choice of their future leaders must be left to the people of Rhodesia, in free elections supervised by the British Government and held under our authority. Bishop Muzorewa and his colleagues have agreed to hand over power to a British Governor with legislative and executive authority to enable new elections to be held. This was not an easy decision for them to take. Nor is it politically easy for us to take direct responsibility for Rhodesia while elections are held. But we are ready to carry out in full our responsibility to bring Rhodesia to legal independence.

The Patriotic Front have not yet agreed to our proposals. They too are being asked to put their political support to the test in elections held under our authority. Our concern in bringing all our other former dependent territories to independence has always been to create the conditions for independence and not to favour the claims of one party of the other. The present British Government is determined to discharge its constitutional responsibility to bring Rhodesia to legal independence; and we are in a position to /do so.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

CONFIDENTIAL

do so.

If the Patriotic Front agree to the general proposals we have put forward for the pre-independence period, we will be able to move on to arrange negotiations on a cease-fire between the military commanders on both sides. We will propose that there should be a cease-fire commission under the chairmanship of the Governor's military adviser with representatives of the military commanders on both sides. We will also propose arrangements to monitor the cease-fire under United Kingdom auspices, with the participation of some other Commonwealth governments.

If the Patriotic Front agree to take part in the elections, they will be given every opportunity to present their case to the people of Rhodesia. We shall grant independence to whatever government emerges from the elections. But we shall not be prepared to transfer power to any party which is not ready to win it in elections; and we shall not be prepared to delay granting legal independence to Rhodesia because of the refusal of any party to put its political claims to the test in elections held under our authority.

I thought that I should explain to you fully and frankly the position we have now reached in the Conference. It remains my hope that the Patriotic Front will agree to participate in the elections.

Ends.

NOV 1979



to Zambia, Nov 79
 Visit by Kaunda.



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

9 November 1979

Dear Michael,

Prime Minister's Meeting with President
 Kaunda: 10 November

L.S.
 Smith
 12/10

I have sent you the reply given today by the Patriotic Front to our proposals for the pre-independence arrangements. This takes us no further forward. It consists to a large extent of a re-statement of their opening position. It will not be possible to reach agreement on this basis.

On the points we can "offer" President Kaunda, the Prime Minister may wish to emphasise that, if the Patriotic Front leaders can agree to our general proposals:

- (a) we envisage a Ceasefire Commission on which the Commanders of the forces on both sides would be represented. The Patriotic Front forces would have "status" (arrangements would need to be made for their housing, food, etc) and would be responsible to the Governor for the maintenance of the cease-fire.
- (b) to meet some of the concerns expressed by the Front Line Presidents, we envisage a monitoring force under United Kingdom auspices, to which certain other Commonwealth Governments have already offered to contribute (Australia, New Zealand and Fiji; we have also approached Kenya and may approach Malaysia). This will not be an intervention force (which could easily find itself involved in clashes with the Patriotic Front). Its purpose will be to monitor and control the cease-fire and to help to exercise a stabilising influence when the result of the election is known.
- (c) with regard to the status of the parties and their leaders during the election campaign (about which Kaunda has expressed great concern), we should emphasise that they will all be represented on the Election Council and will all campaign on the same basis.

This really is as much as we can offer the Patriotic Front or President Kaunda. The Prime Minister will wish to emphasise once again to President Kaunda that the key to peace is in his hands. (On behalf of Lord Carrington, Mr Luce sent him an oral message this evening to this effect). We are doing everything we can to give effect to the Lusaka agreement. A settlement

/ is

M O'D B Alexander Esq
 10 Downing Street



is obtainable on this basis; but not on some other basis. We are in a position to put these plans into effect. We are closer to a solution than ever before; but we can only succeed if President Kaunda decides to support us. The Prime Minister may also wish to indicate that we believe that Mr Nkomo is showing considerably more interest in a settlement than Mr Mugabe; and that it would be a tragedy if the latter's intransigence caused the chance of a settlement to be lost.

yours ever

Roderic Lyne

R M J Lyne

6181 NOV 6-79

9
11
12
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8



With the compliments of

THE PRIVATE SECRETARY

Mr Alexander

R M S Lyne

FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
SW1A 2AH

PATRIOTIC FRONT

RESPONSE TO BRITISH GOVERNMENT'S DETAILED

PROPOSALS

FOR IMPLEMENTING THE INDEPENDENCE CONSTITUTION

I. Introduction.

- 1.1. At the conclusion of the discussions on the Independence Constitution we reserved our position on several aspects but agreed not to re-open discussion on them provided we were satisfied as to the transitional arrangements. The British proposals do not satisfy our essential requirements for the interim period.
- 1.2. All parties agree that the basic objectives of this conference are:-
- (a) the achievement of lasting peace in Zimbabwe, and
 - (b) the achievement of independence on the basis of genuine majority rule.
- 1.3. The major function of the interim administration is to prepare for and conduct free and fair elections. We have stressed in our previous papers, as the British Government agrees, that the primary condition for free and fair elections is peace and security in the country. As we show below, the British proposals will not achieve peace and security, nor do they provide the machinery which will ensure that all parties can contest the elections on equal terms.

2. The Interim Administration.

2.1. The British proposal to govern through the existing institutions is partial and a negation of the principle of free and fair elections for the following reasons:-

(a) the Governor will in reality be simply the titular head of the existing power structure, which remains in the hands of the regime; this favours the regime and prejudices the Patriotic Front;

(b) the Patriotic Front has no channel for influencing the decision-making process, whereas the regime has the channel of the existing machinery of the Public Service; this is particularly prejudicial in the areas affecting the elections;

(c) the fact that the existing institutions of power remain unchanged will have a serious intimidatory impact on the electorate prejudicial to the Patriotic Front.

2.2. Our proposal for a Governing Council composed of equal numbers from the Patriotic Front and the regime and with the Governor as Chairman has the following advantages:-

(a) both parties will have direct contact with the whole administrative process leading to elections, and will therefore be able to satisfy themselves that the elections are free and fair;

(b) executive and legislative action will be

taken after consultation between the Governor and both parties, and not, as under the British proposal, after consultation with only existing public officers.

The British assumption that the representatives of the parties serving on the Governing Council will be unable to work together has no basis, and is a contradiction of the principle of reconciliation which Britain has repeatedly advanced.

3. Elections

3.1. The Commonwealth Heads of Government said, in paragraph (g) of the Lusaka communique, that the government of Zimbabwe must be chosen through free and fair elections "properly supervised under British Government authority, and with Commonwealth observers."

3.2. We are satisfied that if the Heads of Government had intended the supervision to be by Britain alone they would have said so in those terms, which would have been simple and permitting of no other interpretation. By using the expression "under British Government authority" they clearly intended the participation of some other agency. Our proposals for an Electoral Commission and supervision by an international agency fall squarely within the Lusaka communique.

3.3 In their final paper the British government states that the role of the Commonwealth observers will be "to observe that the elections are genuinely free and fair" and that "no restrictions will be placed upon their movements, and every effort will be made to facilitate their task". We understand this to mean that the observers will participate fully in the whole electoral process. This is the position we have consistently maintained.

3.4. Britain criticises our proposal for an Electoral Commission on the grounds that there cannot be two parallel bodies performing the same functions. We have not proposed parallel bodies; on the contrary, the British proposal for an Election Commissioner and a separate Election Council creates two bodies to perform the functions which would be performed by our Electoral Commission, under British authority.

3.5. The British proposal for an Election Commissioner suffers from the same fundamental defect as the whole British approach to the interim administration; since he has to rely on the existing Public Service to the exclusion of the Patriotic Front the Election Commissioner's administration of the electoral process cannot be impartial.

3.6. Our proposal for an Electoral Commission has the following advantages:-

- (a) it ensures direct contact by both parties with the electoral process, thereby ensuring

impartiality;

- (b) it would reduce administrative difficulties in such areas as the provision of interpreters.

3.7.1. We maintain that a proper registration of voters is absolutely essential. Without a proper registration of voters elections cannot be free and fair; there would be endless opportunity for fraud, such as:-

- (a) voting by non-residents, such as tourists and people coming from across the borders;
- (b) voting by people under age;
- (c) voting more than once;
- (d) fraudulent voting cards, i.e. the introduction into ballot boxes of voting cards completed fraudulently in advance;
- (e) if the party list system is used on a district basis, voting in a district other than that of one's residence.

3.7.2. There is another serious consequence of non-registration if the party list system is used on a district basis. Without registration it will be impossible to determine the voting population with any degree of accuracy for the purpose of apportioning seats in respect of each district.

3.7.3. We do not accept Britain's assertion that registration would take a very long time. The time would depend entirely on the size of the staff; with an adequate staff registration could be completed comfortably in three months. In Zambia prior to

independence, voters were registered at the rate of 700 per day per constituency; this rate would enable 3,000,000 voters to be registered in Zimbabwe in sixty working days.

- 3.7.4. We stress that a register of voters is essential whether the elections are conducted on a constituency or a party list basis. We would have no objection to the party list system provided (a) there is proper registration of voters, and (b) the same system is used for the election for the reserved white seats.

4. Security Arrangements

- 4.1 Peace and security are vital to free and fair elections. The British proposals do not provide security and will not achieve peace, because:

- (a) The people cannot feel secure when the only forces maintaining law and order are those of the regime;
- (b) a cease-fire cannot possibly hold without an international peace-keeping force.

- 4.2 Our position is that there should be a Transitional Police Committee, composed of representatives of the Patriotic Front and the regime whose principal functions will be to supervise the maintenance of public order, to provide liaison between the civil administration and an international police force, and to commence the process of building the new Zimbabwe Police Force. The international force will be combined with Patriotic Front and Rhodesian elements, under British authority.

4.3 Immediately on the coming into force of the Transitional Order in Council martial law and the state of emergency must be brought to an end. The British Government has remained silent on the question of the state of emergency.

4.5 The constant reference by the British to a cease-fire and the responsibilities of the parties in relation there, to reveal an understanding of a cease-fire to which we cannot subscribe. We understand by a cease-fire that the parties maintain their positions and stop shooting; the British proposals entail policing by the regime's police, which is para-military force, of areas occupied by us. This is unacceptable. The only solution is an international police force, combined with Patriotic Front and Rhodesian elements, to maintain law and order over the whole country.

5. Length of Interim Period

5.1 The British proposal to limit the election period to two months is totally unacceptable. We are on record as saying that the whole interim period must not be unduly long. However, it must not be so short as to negate the principle of free and fair elections. The length of the period must not be fixed arbitrarily, but

it must allow the completion of the necessary processes preparatory to an election and must give both delegations a fair chance to get back to the country, organise themselves for elections and to explain their policies to the electorate.

5.2 In paragraph 10, the British document makes the startling suggestion that a cease-fire can hold for two months but not for six months. This argument is totally unfounded. The effectiveness of the cease-fire depends on the agreement, the will to observe it, and the adequacy of the machinery for policing it. Military experience suggests that it is in fact more difficult to maintain a cease-fire in the first two to three months rather than in later periods.

5.3 The periods which the British delegation proposes have the effect of:

- (a) putting the Patriotic Front at an electoral disadvantage and
- (b) enabling the British Government to wash their hands of the Rhodesian problem quickly and to get out before a predictable civil war has flared up.

The Patriotic Front, is at present banned; we have to get back into the country, assist in the return of refugees, set up an electoral machinery and compete for the support of the electorate. It is plain that the British proposal that all this should be done in two months is highly prejudicial to the Patriotic Front and is intended to favour the Salisbury regime.

6. The process of decolonisation envisaged by this conference will require two Orders-in-Council i.e. the Interim Order-in-Council providing for the Interim Constitutional Arrangements and the Transitional Order-in-Council introducing the Independence Constitution. The provisions of both orders are of crucial importance and must be agreed on at this conference.

7. The British delegation constantly refers to the Salisbury delegation having made "considerable sacrifices" by agreeing to hand over executive and legislative power to the Governor. We must remind the British government that the Salisbury delegation are members of an illegal regime, and that the fact that many of them had nothing to do with UDI in November 1965 does not save them; they chose to join the rebellion, and are now as much a part of it as any of the original perpetrators. One of the objects of this conference is to end the illegality. It is outrageous for the British government, which has always regarded the regime as illegal and which says that it does not recognise it, now to commend them for agreeing to relinquish the spoils of their illegal conduct.

One of the objects of this conference is to end the illegality. It is outrageous for the British Government, which has always regarded the regime as illegal and which says that it does not recognise it, now to commend them for agreeing to relinquish the spoils of their illegal conduct.

8. We draw attention to the agenda, drawn by the British delegation and agreed by the conference. It contains only two items, the Independence Constitution and the Pre-Independence Arrangements. It was agreed also that agreement on the former was contingent on agreement on the latter, which includes the cease-fire. The British Government cannot now demand that there be agreement piecemeal on individual items falling under the heading of Pre-Independence Arrangements before passing on to other items.

9. There is clearly a gap between our position and that of the British government as to the essential requirements of the interim arrangements. A determined effort must be made by all parties to bridge that gap; it will not be bridged by pressure tactics or by issuing ultimata.

✓

THE PATRIOTIC FRONT

STATEMENT ON THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT'S INTRODUCTION OF THE SOUTHERN RHODESIA BILL 1979 IN THE BRITISH PARLIAMENT.

It was agreed at the outset of the Lancaster House Conference that no final settlement would be regarded as concluded unless and until all issues and matters before the Conference had been fully discussed and agreed upon.

The action of the British Government in introducing the Southern Rhodesia Bill 1979, in Parliament on the 8th November, in the middle of the crucial Lancaster House Negotiations is in breach of this undertaking.

The British Government say that they propose to appoint a governor under clause 3 of the Bill who "will have political, military, police and legal advisers and subordinate staff as well as an Election Commissioner with a team of officials to enable the governor to carry-out the function of supervising the election."

These are all matters which are at issue before the Lancaster House Conference and on which there has yet been no final agreement. We conclude that this is an attempt by Lord Carrington to substitute his own Parliament for the Conference. The consequence of this deplorable approach is to undermine and wreck the conference.

The Patriotic Front notes with surprise and alarm that one of the purposes of this enabling Bill is to enable the British Government to unilaterally breach International sanctions against the rebel colony on November 15th, 1979.

This is a breach of the undertaking which the British Government gave to the Commonwealth Conference at Lusaka, namely, that they would not lift sanctions until a settlement, involving all parties, had been concluded.

It is also a breach of the undertaking which Lord Carrington gave to the Lancaster House Conference to wit, that the sanctions would only be lifted after a settlement involving all parties had been concluded and a governor had been appointed and arrived in Salisbury.

This undertaking was made in reply to Bishop Muzorewa's question (see C.C (79) 37, copy number 2I of the Lancaster House Conference - 16th Plenary session

dated 25th October, 1979 at page 4). Lord Carrington said:-

"Finally, Bishop Muzorewa asked when sanctions would be lifted. The British Government will lift sanctions as soon as there is a return to legality in Rhodesia. Our aim is to reach agreement in this conference which will allow this to happen as soon as possible."

To lift sanctions on the 15th November is to betray these assurances.

The wide and unlimited powers which the British Government seeks to acquire under the enabling bill is sufficiently indicative of the fact that the British Government is now on a course of concluding a bilateral agreement with Bishop Muzorewa in order to impose that regime on the people of Zimbabwe.

Resorting to the tactics of taking decisions alone on issues before the conference and announcing them, confirms our long standing observation that the British Government never had any intentions to negotiate at this conference save to use it as a platform to announce its policies and to defy international opinion on the question of Southern Rhodesia.

We call upon the British Government to come back to the Conference table and negotiate a peaceful settlement for our embattled country.

9th November, 1979

t.s.



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

9 November 1979

Dear Brian

R M J Lyne

The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary would be most grateful for your help in providing our Governor in Salisbury during the transitional period with an RAF aircraft for his own official use and use by his Military Adviser and other senior members of his staff, eg the Election Commissioner, in carrying out their duties.

FCO officials understand from yours that it might be possible to make available one of the RAF's VIP Andovers generally used by Ministers and senior British military personnel. Lord Carrington very much hopes that one could be released for the Governor's use. He believes it is essential that the Governor, whoever he may be, should be able to travel quickly and safely around the country. We understand from General Walls that it would be very difficult to spare Rhodesian aircraft for the Governor's use. The Rhodesian Security Forces are short of aircraft and are likely themselves to be relying on the South Africans to a considerable extent to provide logistic support for the elections. Moreover, presentationally, it would be more appropriate for the Governor to travel by British Service aircraft than by Rhodesian aircraft. Since the Governor may have to travel out to Salisbury as early as 14 November, we should be grateful to have your reply as soon as possible.

We shall, of course, be ready to reimburse the additional costs of using an aircraft and crew, from FCO funds being set aside for the Rhodesian transitional administration.

I am copying this letter to Michael Alexander (No 10).

yours ever
Roderic Lyne
 (R M J Lyne)

Brian Norbury Esq
 PS/Secretary of State for Defence
 Ministry of Defence
 Main Building
 Whitehall
 London SW1

11-12-79
11-12-79
11-12-79

9 NOV 1979

CONFIDENTIAL

Top copy on: Zambia
Visit of Kaunda,
Nov 79.



Rhod...
11

JS
cc CO

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

8 November 1979

Dear George

PRESIDENT KAUNDA'S VISIT

As you know, President Kaunda has had a tête-à-tête meeting with the Prime Minister, followed by a working dinner here this evening. I shall not be doing a formal record of the discussions since no-one sat in on the tête-à-tête and since the Prime Minister decided against having a note taken during the meal.

In fact, there was little detailed discussion during either part of the talks with President Kaunda. President Kaunda said that he had come to listen. Apart from efforts to create a favourable atmosphere, the Prime Minister and the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary both concentrated on getting across to President Kaunda and his colleagues that the Lancaster House Conference had arrived at the moment of decision. They said that much progress had been made at the Conference and that agreement was now within reach. The Conference could not be allowed to drag on much longer: further delay would only result in Bishop Muzorewa's delegation being lost. HMG had made proposals which seemed to it to lie between the positions of the two parties. It might be that the proposals would seem unfair to both sides but this was inevitable in the circumstances. Bishop Muzorewa's delegation had accepted the proposals. We now awaited the verdict of the Patriotic Front. We hoped that they would say 'yes' and that they would do so soon. We very much hoped that President Kaunda would bring his influence to bear on the Patriotic Front to reach an early and favourable decision.

The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary stressed that he recognised that it would not be easy for Mr. Nkomo to reach such a decision. In order for him to do so it would be necessary for him to trust the United Kingdom. HMG had throughout the Conference attempted to be fair and were determined to be equally fair during any interim period. At one stage President Kaunda said, in response to the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary, that it was because he trusted HMG that he had come to London to try to help to secure an agreement.

/It was striking

CONFIDENTIAL

JS

It was striking throughout the evening's discussions how little attention was focussed by President Kaunda and his delegation on the problems we had been led to expect them to raise, e.g. the length of the interim period and the question of a Commonwealth force. Instead, they seemed to be principally preoccupied with the question of the status of Bishop Muzorewa and of the Patriotic Front leaders during the interim period and the election campaign. They were concerned about the advantage Bishop Muzorewa would derive from appearing to be Prime Minister, even if he were not in fact carrying out the duties of the office. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary promised that all the political leaders participating in the election would enjoy equal status. He said that they would, for instance, certainly have the use of government aircraft. One of the Governor's principal functions would be to ensure that all the participants in an election were treated similarly.

There was some discussion of the kind of result from an election which would be most likely to lead to stability in the early stages of Independence. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary said that it might be no bad thing if the result was that no-one won a majority. The resulting need for accommodation between the various parties might make a reconciliation between the warring factions easier. President Kaunda dissented strongly from this view. He considered that the best, and indeed the only, hope for the country was that an outright victor would emerge. A coalition government would be extremely weak. Only a government with a clear majority would be able to give the direction required. There was general agreement in this context that Mr. Nkomo was the most charismatic figure among the various political leaders at present on the scene.

In the course of discussion on subjects other than Rhodesia, President Kaunda expressed considerable concern about the developing situation in Zaire. He thought President Mobutu's situation was not strong and that the insurgents who had previously tried to overthrow his regime from outside were now infiltrating into the country. President Kaunda expected that when the next upheaval came it would be very serious. He evidently regarded with a good deal of dismay the prospect of being bordered to both north and south by unstable regimes. He spoke favourably, however, of President Santos of Angola. He expected President Santos to continue President Neto's policy.

At the end of the discussion it was agreed that President Kaunda and his party would call again at 1030 tomorrow. The Prime Minister expressed the hope that an answer from the Patriotic Front might be forthcoming in the course of the day. She said that the decision for the Patriotic Front would not get any easier by being delayed.

/I am sending

CONFIDENTIAL

- 3 -

. I am sending a copy of this letter to Martin Vile in the Cabinet Office.

Yours ever

Richard Alexander

G.G.H. Walden, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CONFIDENTIAL

[RHODESIA: POLICY: ADVANCE COPIES]

IMMEDIATE

PS
PS/SIR I GILMOUR
PS/MR LUCE
PS/PUS
SIR J GRAHAM
MR WILLSON
MR DAY
LORD N G LENNOX
MR ASPIN

PS/NO 10 DOWNING STREET

MR R L WADE-GERY)
MR P M MAXEY) CABINET
COL MOIR) OFFICE
MR P J FOWLER)
DIO)

Amie Amie

.....
HD/RHOD DEPT (4)

HD/C AF D
HD/S AF D

HD/PUSD (2)

HD/NEWS DEPT

HD/WAD

MR FREEMAN LEGAL ADVISER RM K200A

MR FIFOOT LEGAL ADVISER RM K164

RESIDENT CLERK

CONFIDENTIAL

DESKBY 081630Z

FM DAR ES SALAAM 081430Z NOVEMBER 79

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 883 OF 8 NOVEMBER

INFO PRIORITY LUSAKA, MAPUTO, GABORONE, LUANDA, LAGOS,
MIRIMBA SALISBURY, ADDIS ABABA, MONROVIA, WASHINGTON, CANBERRA,
OTTAWA, UKMIS NEW YORK

YOUR TELNO 1587 TO WASHINGTON: RHODESIA:

1. I WAS CALLED THIS AFTERNOON 8 NOVEMBER TO SEE MR MKAPA TO
BRING HIM UP TO DATE ON RHODESIA (HE HAD JUST RETURNED FROM TWO
DAYS AT HIS HOME OUT OF DAR ES SALAAM). I GAVE HIM COPIES OF
VERBATIM SERVICE 083/79 AND 084/79.

2. MKAPA EXPRESSED CONCERN THAT OUR RAPID ACTION WOULD INCREASE
PF SUSPICION THAT WE WERE WORKING IN COLLUSION WITH MUZOREWA
TO RUSH THINGS THROUGH AND TO LIFT SANCTIONS. I SAID THIS WAS
QUITE WRONG. WE HOPED WE WERE NOW VERY CLOSE TO A SETTLEMENT
AND WE SSSIMPLY HAD TO BE READY.

3. MKAPA ASKED WHAT HAD BEEN HAPPENING IN THE TALKS THEMSELVES

AND WE S.SSSTIMPLY HAD TO BE READY.

3. MKAPA ASKED WHAT HAD BEEN HAPPENING IN THE TALKS THEMSELVES. I SAID THAT THE PF HAD BEEN RAISING NUMBERS OF QUESTION WHICH WE HAD SOUGHT TO ANSWER. I ADDED THAT WHILE THERE HAD BEEN SOME ISSUES OF DISAGREEMENT OF WHICH WE WERE ALL AWARE FROM AN EARLY STAGE, SUCH AS THE LENGTH OF THE INTERIM PERIOD, WHICH NO DOUBT WERE BEING DISCUSSED FULLY WITH PRESIDENT KAUNDA, IT WAS VERY WORRYING IF THE PF WERE NOW GOING TO RAISE ALL KINDS OF NEW POINTS. THE TIME REALLY HAD COME FOR DECISIONS. IT SHOULD NOT BE LOST SIGHT OF THAT ALL AGREED THAT THE NEW CONSTITUTION PROVIDED FOR AFRICAN MAJORITY RULE WHICHEVER OF THE COMPETING PARTIES WON THE ELECTION, AND THAT WAS THE GOAL WHICH WAS NOW IN SIGHT OF ACHIEVEMENT. I UNDERLINED THE DIFFICULTY OF CONTINUING SANCTION MEASURES AGAINST A PARTY WHICH HAD ACCEPTED BOTH THE CONSTITUTION AND OUR PROPOSALS FOR THE ELECTION PERIOD.

4. MKAPA DID NOT DISSENT BUT WAS VERY UNHAPPY. THEIR DESPERATE ANXIETY NOT TO SPLIT WITH THE PF IS PAINFULLY OBVIOUS. ON THE OTHER HAND THEY ARE FINDING IT LOGICALLY VERY DIFFICULT TO STAND AGAINST OUR PROPOSALS, OTHER THAN ON THE GROUND OF THE INADEQUACY OF THE LENGTH OF THE INTERIM PERIOD WHERE THEY ARE SINCERELY CONVINCED THAT WE ARE BEING UNREASONABLE.

5. PRESIDENT NYERERE IS TOURING THE COUNTRY AT THE MOMENT AND IS DUE BACK ON SATURDAY, THOUGH HE WOULD NO DOUBT RETURN EARLIER IN THE EVENT OF A CRISIS.

MOON

NNNN

DESKBY 080900Z

IMMEDIATE

[RHODESIA: POLICY: ADVANCE COPIES]

PS
PS/SIR I GILMOUR
PS/MR LUCE
PS/PUS
SIR J GRAHAM
MR WILLSON
MR DAY
LORD N G LENNOX
MR ASPIN

~~PS/NO 10 DOWNING STREET~~

MR R L WADE-GERY)
MR P M MAXEY) CABINET
COL MOIR) OFFICE
MR P J FOWLER)
DIO)

.....

HD/RHOD DEPT (4)

HD/C AF D

HD/S AF D

HD/PUSD (2)

HD/NEWS DEPT

HD/WAD

MR FREELAND LEGAL ADVISER RM K200A

MR FIFCOOT LEGAL ADVISER RM K164

~~RESIDENT CLERK~~

+27

RM
Bennie Minister

CONFIDENTIAL

DESKBY 080900Z

FM LUSAKA 082650Z NOV 79

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1216 OF 8 NOVEMBER

INFO PRIORITY MIRIMBA SALISBURY, DAR ES SALAAM, GABORONE AND
NARUTO

RHODESIAN CONFERENCE

1. I SPOKE LAST NIGHT TO MAINZA CHONA (SECRETARY GENERAL OF UNIP WHO WILL ACT AS PRESIDENT IN KAUNDA'S ABSENCE) AT KAUNDA'S AIRPORT DEPARTURE FOR LONDON.
2. CHONA SAID "WE WERE CLOSE TO A SETTLEMENT" AND ADDED "ALL YOU HAVE TO REALISE IS THAT WE MUST NOT, (REPEAT NOT), GIVE THE PATRIOTIC FRONT A CHANCE TO CALL "FOUL" WHEN THEY LOSE THE ELECTION. IF THEY CAN CALL "FOUL" WE SHALL HAVE TO STICK WITH THEM. IF NOT, SO BE IT". IN CONTEXT IT WAS CLEAR THAT CHONA REGARDED THE QUESTION OF TIMING AS MUCH THE

MOST IMPORTANT LITMUS TEST OF A SATISFACTORY SETTLEMENT. WE HAVE HEARD SAME FROM PHIRI (MINISTER OF HOME AFFAIRS). TO TEST CHONA A LITTLE FURTHER I SAID THAT BISHOP MUZOREWA MUST ALSO BE CONVINCED THAT THERE WERE NO GROUNDS FOR CALLING "FOUL". TO THIS CHONA REPLIED "YES BUT WE ARE REALLY TALKING ABOUT THE PATRIOTIC FRONT LOSING".

3. THESE COMMENTS FROM THE BLUFF CHONA MAY CARRY SOME EXTRA WEIGHT COMING AS THEY DO AFTER CONCENTRATED PARTY/CABINET MEETINGS PRECEDING KAUNDA'S DEPARTURE. HOWEVER, EARLIER IN THE EVENING MUNDIA (MEMBER OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE) SPEAKING (POSSIBLY IN PART AT LEAST TO THE GALLERY) AT SOVIET NATIONAL DAY, STRESSED ZAMBIAN FIRM OPPOSITION TO THE TWO MONTH INTERIM PERIOD - WHICH HE DESCRIBED AS BIZARRE - AND ADDED THAT IT WAS NOT FOR BRITAIN ALONE TO INTERPRET THE LUSAKA ACCORD AS THIS HAD BEEN ONE MADE BY THE COMMONWEALTH AS A WHOLE.

NEILSON

NNNN

CONFIDENTIAL

GR 750

CONFIDENTIAL

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T138/79T

Handwritten initials/signature

DESKBY CAIRO 081500Z

FM F C O 081117Z NOV 79

TO IMMEDIATE CAIRO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 461 OF 8 NOVEMBER

AND TO IMMEDIATE TUNIS RABAT DAKAR LILONGWE YAOUNDE KINSHASA

LIBREVILLE ABIDJAN MASERU KHARTOUM BANJUL

INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON PARIS UKMIS NEW YORK ADDIS ABABA

LAGOS LUSAKA DAR ES SALAAM MAPUTO PRETORIA.

RHODESIA.

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF PERSONAL MESSAGE FROM PRIME MINISTER TO PRESIDENT (RABAT : KING HASSAN) WHICH ACTION ADDRESSEES SHOULD ARRANGE TO DELIVER AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. IN ANY DISCUSSION ARISING FROM THIS MESSAGE YOU SHOULD DRAW ON MY TELEGRAM NO 1584 TO WASHINGTON. YOU MAY AT YOUR DISCRETION MAKE IT CLEAR THAT IF THE PATRIOTIC FRONT ARE UNWILLING TO PUT THEIR POLITICAL SUPPORT TO THE TEST IN ELECTIONS HELD UNDER THE AUTHORITY OF A BRITISH GOVERNOR, THEY CAN NOT BE PERMITTED UNILATERALLY TO DECIDE THAT RHODESIA SHOULD REMAIN IN A STATE OF ILLEGALITY, THAT THE PEOPLE OF RHODESIA SHOULD BE FURTHER PUNISHED FOR THE ILLEGAL INDEPENDENCE OR THAT THEY SHOULD BE DEPRIVED OF THE OPPORTUNITY OF BEING BROUGHT TO LEGAL INDEPENDENCE UNDER OUR AUTHORITY.

2. MESSAGE BEGINS.

I KNOW THAT YOU WILL HAVE BEEN FOLLOWING CLOSELY THE PROGRESS OF THE RHODESIA CONFERENCE AT LANCASTER HOUSE. THE PUROPOSE OF THAT CONFERENCE IS TO BRING RHODESIA TO INDEPENDENCE ON THE BASIS OF GENUINE MAJORITY RULE. WE ARE ALSO ENGAGED IN A DETERMINED EFFORT TO SEE IF IT IS POSSIBLE TO BRING AN END TO THE WAR AND IN CONSEQUENCE TO ENABLE US AND OTHER COUNTRIES TO CONTRIBUTE TO A JOINT EFFORT TO SOLVE THE REFUGEE PROBLEM WHICH HAS BEEN CREATED BY IT.

CONFIDENTIAL

/WE HAVE

CONFIDENTIAL

WE HAVE REACHED AGREEMENT WITH ALL THE PARTIES AT THE CONFERENCE ON THE THE INDEPENDENCE CONSTITUTION, WHICH INDISPUTABLY PROVIDES FOR GENUINE MAJORITY RULE, WITH APPROPRIATE SAFEGUARDS FOR THE RIGHTS OF INDIVIDUALS AND MINORITIES. IT IS A CONSTITUTION WHICH, WHEN IT IS IMPLEMENTED, WILL FULFIL THE ASPIRATIONS FOR WHICH NATIONALIST LEADERS IN RHODESIA HAVE BEEN STRIVING FOR MANY YEARS.

THE QUESTION OF MAJORITY RULE, WHICH WAS THE CAUSE OF THE WAR, HAS THEREFORE BEEN RESOLVED. THE QUESTION NOW AT ISSUE IS WHO IS TO EXERCISE POWER UNDER THE INDEPENDENCE CONSTITUTION. THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT BELIEVE THAT THE CHOICE OF THEIR FUTURE GOVERNMENT MUST BE LEFT TO THE PEOPLE OF RHODESIA TO DECIDE IN FREE ELECTIONS SUPERVISED BY THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT AND HELD UNDER OUR AUTHORITY. WE HAVE MADE PROPOSALS TO ENABLE SUCH ELECTIONS TO BE HELD. THE KEY ELEMENT IN THEM IS THE APPOINTMENT OF A BRITISH GOVERNOR IN WHOM EXECUTIVE AND LEGISLATIVE AUTHORITY WILL BE VESTED UNTIL INDEPENDENCE. BISHOP MUZOREWA AND HIS COLLEAGUES HAVE DECLARED THEIR READINESS TO HAND OVER THEIR MINISTERIAL POWERS TO THE GOVERNOR AND TO PUT THEIR POLITICAL STANDING TO THE TEST IN ELECTIONS HELD UNDER HIS AUTHORITY. THIS WAS A DIFFICULT DECISION FOR THEM TO TAKE. BUT THEY HAVE DONE IT IN THE INTERESTSS OF PEACE AND THE WELFARE OF THEIR COUNTRYMEN AND OF ENABLING RHODESIA TO BE BROUGHT TO INDEPENDENCE WITH WIDE INTERNATIONAL ACCEPTANCE.

THE PATRIOTIC FRONT HAVE NOT YET AGREED TO OUR PROPOSALS : WITH YOUR HELP, WE HOPE THAT THEY WILL DO SO. THEY ARE BEING ASKED, ON A STRICTLY EQUAL BASIS, TO PUT THEIR POLITICAL SUPPORT TO THE TEST IN ELECTIONS HELD UNDER OUR AUTHORITY. OUR CONCERN IN BRINGING ALL OUR OTHER FORMER DEPENDENT TERRITORIES TO INDEPENDENCE HAS ALWAYS EBEN TO CREATE THE CONDITIONS FOR INDEPENDENCE AND NOT TO FAVOUR THE CLAIMS OF ONE PARTY OR THE OTHER. THE PRESENT BRITISH GOVERNMENT IS DETERMINED TO DISCHARGE ITS CONSTITUTIONAL RESPONSIBILITY TO BRING RHODESIA TO LEGAL INDEPENDENCE : AND WE ARE IN A POSITION TO DO SO.

CONFIDENTIAL

7
IF THE PATRIOTIC FRONT AGREE TO THE PROPOSALS WE HAVE PUT FORWARD THE PRE-INDEPENDENCE PERIOD, WE WILL ARRANGE NEGOTIATIONS ON A CEASE-FIRE INCLUDING THE MILITARY COMMANDERS ON BOTH SIDES. WE ENVISAGE THAT THERE WILL BE A CEASE-FIRE COMMISSION, UNDER THE GOVERNOR, WITH REPRESENTATIVES OF THE MILITARY COMMANDERS OF THE RHODESIAN SECURITY FORCES AND THE PATRIOTIC FRONT. THERE WILL BE ARRANGEMENTS TO MONITOR THE CEASE-FIRE, UNDER BRITISH AUSPICES, WITH THE PARTICIPATION OF SOME OTHER COMMONWEALTH GOVERNMENTS.

IT IS MY HOPE THAT THE PATRIOTIC FRONT WILL AGREE TO TAKE PART IN THE ELECTIONS. THEY WILL BE GIVEN EVERY OPPORTUNITY TO PRESENT THEIR CASE TO THE PEOPLE OF RHODESIA. WE SHALL GRANT INDEPENDENCE TO WHATEVER GOVERNMENT EMERGES FROM THE ELECTIONS: BUT WE SHALL NOT BE PREPARED TO TRANSFER POWER TO ANY PARTY WHICH IS NOT READY TO WIN IT IN ELECTIONS.

I KNOW THAT THIS IS A SUBJECT OF GREAT CONCERN TO ALL AFRICAN LEADERS. IF OUR PROPOSALS ARE REJECTED, I DO NOT BELIEVE THAT IT WILL BE POSSIBLE TO REACH AGREEMENT ON ANY OTHER BASIS. I HOPE THAT YOU WILL JOIN ME IN URGING THE PATRIOTIC FRONT TO TAKE THIS OPPORTUNITY TO REACH A FAIR AND HONOURABLE SOLUTION TO THE RHODESIA PROBLEM.

MESSAGE ENDS.

CARRINGTON

FILES

RHODESIA D
OADS
NAD
PUSD
PLANNING STAFF
ES & SD
CCD
FRD
UND
LEGAL ADVISERS
(MR FREELAND)
(MR FIFOOT)
ECON D
PCD
DEF D
OID

NEWS D
PS
PS/SIR I GILMOUR
PS/MR LUCE
PS/MR RIDLEY
PS/MR HURD
PS/PUS

SIR J GRAHAM
LORD N G LENNOX
MISS BROWN
MR DAY
MR WILLSON
MR ASPIN

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION
RHODESIA POLICY

CONFIDENTIAL

HS

8 November 1979

Rhodesia

The Prime Minister has seen the text of a personal message from her to selected African Presidents and to King Hassan of Morocco enclosed with your letter to me of 7 November. She is content that the message should issue.

MICHAEL ALEXANDER

R.M.J. Lyne, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CONFIDENTIAL

93

CONFIDENTIAL

GR1350

CONFIDENTIAL

FROM LAGOS 071045Z NOVEMBER 1979

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 944 OF 7 NOVEMBER

RFI IMMEDIATE DAR ES SALAAM, LUSAKA, MAPUTO, GABORONE, LUANDA, UKMIS NEW YORK, WASHINGTON, PRETORIA, MARIMBA SALISBURY.

P S TO P M
NO 10 DOWNING ST

Prime Minister
And

MY TEL NO 937 : NIGERIAN ATTITUDE TO RHODESIA CONFERENCE

1. LAST NIGHT PRESIDENT SHAGARI HELD A RECEPTION TO MEET THE DIPLOMATIC CORPS. THE CIRCUMSTANCES PERMITTED ONLY A BRIEF CONVERSATION WITH HIM DURING WHICH HE SAID THAT HE HAD THAT DAY REPLIED TO THE PRIME MINISTER'S LATEST MESSAGE. I HAVE NOT YET SEEN THIS REPLY BUT FROM CONVERSATIONS WITH THE PRESIDENT'S ADVISERS I WOULD GUESS THAT IT WILL REPEAT THE CALL FOR A LONGER INTERIM PERIOD AND PROBABLY ALSO ARGUE FOR SOME KIND OF COMMONWEALTH PEACE-KEEPING FORCE I UNDERSTAND THAT YOU MAY BE CONTEMPLATING SOME CONCESSION ON THE INTERIM PERIOD. THIS TELEGRAM IS CONCERNED MAINLY WITH THE CEASE-FIRE ARRANGEMENT.

2. AT THE RECEPTION I HAD A FAIRLY LONG TALK WITH DR AKINYEMI, THE HAWKISH DIRECTOR OF THE NIGERIAN INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, WHO WAS AN IMPORTANT FOREIGN AFFAIRS ADVISER TO GENERAL OBASANJO AND WHOSE PRESENCE AT THE FUNCTION LAST NIGHT INDICATED THAT HE IS STILL INFLUENTIAL. HE ARGUED STRONGLY THE CASE FOR A COMMONWEALTH PEACE-KEEPING FORCE TO BACK UP THE GOVERNOR. I REPLIED THAT SUCH A FORCE WOULD BE UNPRECEDENTED IN A DECOLONISING SITUATION AND WOULD BE INAPPROPRIATE. INTERNATIONAL FORCES MIGHT BE NECESSARY IN EG CYPRUS AND LEBANON WHERE THERE WAS CONTINUING CONFRONTATION AND NO POLITICAL SETTLEMENT : WHEREAS IN ZIMBABWE WE WERE ASSUMING THAT ALL PARTIES WOULD HAVE AGREED TO A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT. HE THEN SAID THAT A BRITISH FORCE WOULD BE REGARDED BY THE AFRICANS AS IMPARTIAL AND IF NECESSARY PERHAPS THE COMMONWEALTH WOULD PAY FOR IT. AFTER I HAD DEALT WITH THIS ON OBVIOUS LINES HE THEN PUT FORWARD A NEW IDEA. HE SAID THAT IT WOULD BE IMPORTANT FOR US TO HAVE NIGERIAN BACKING FOR THE SETTLEMENT AND THIS MIGHT BE ACHIEVED IF WE COULD ACCEPT A NIGERIAN AS POLITICAL ADVISER TO THE GOVERNOR. I NATURALLY SHOT DOWN THIS RATHER ABSURD IDEA. NEVERTHELESS THE FUNDAMENTAL IDEA

CONFIDENTIAL

1 OF

CONFIDENTIAL

OF INVOLVING NIGERIA A LITTLE MORE IN THE OPERATION IN ORDER TO OBTAIN THEIR SUPPORT SEEMS TO ME WELL WORTH PURSUING. AKINYEMI INDICATED THAT THE ROLE OF OBSERVER WOULD NOT BE SUFFICIENT, BUT IT SEEMS TO ME THAT WE SHOULD GIVE SERIOUS CONSIDERATION TO THE POSSIBILITY OF INCLUDING NIGERIA IN THE SMALL MILITARY GROUP TO MONITOR THE CEASE-FIRE.

3. I MUST SAY I HAVE FOUND IT DIFFICULT TO ACCEPT THE VIEW THAT MUZOREWA SHOULD HAVE A VETO ON THE COMPOSITION OF THE MONITORING GROUP, TO THE EXTENT OF EXCLUDING ANY COUNTRIES WHICH HE REGARDS AS SUPPORTERS OF THE PATRIOTIC FRONT (THIS WOULD INCLUDE VIRTUALLY ALL THE THIRD WORLD, NEARLY ALL OF WHOM, INCLUDING I IMAGINE KENYA, HAVE VOTED FOR RESOLUTIONS CONDEMNING MUZOREWA'S INTERNAL SETTLEMENT). I FEAR THAT THE FOUR NATION COMPOSITION AT PRESENT PROPOSED IS SO "RIGHT-WING" IN APPEARANCE THAT IT WOULD BE REGARDED IN NIGERIA AND AFRICA AS PRO-MUZOREWA AND ANTI-PATRIOTIC FRONT AND WOULD THEREFORE LACK CREDIBILITY. IN MY TUR I SUGGESTED THE INCLUSION OF INDIA WHICH HAS RESPECTABLE NON-ALIGNED CREDENTIALS. INDIA HAS NO DOUBT SUPPORTED THE PATRIOTIC FRONT AT THE UN BUT EXPERIENCE OF SENIOR INDIAN ARMY OFFICERS IS THAT THEY ARE ANYTHING BUT RADICAL (GENERAL PREM CHAND IS PERHAPS AN EXTREME CASE BUT HE IS NOT ALTOGETHER UNTYPICAL AND MY GUESS IS THAT THEY WOULD BE MORE AT EASE WITH AND SYMPATHETIC TO THE WHITE RHODESIAN OFFICERS THAN THE PATRIOTIC FRONT GUERRILLA COMMANDERS.

4. AS FOR NIGERIA I REALISE THAT IN THE LIGHT OF OBASANJO'S UNREMITTING HOSTILITY DURING THE SUMMER AND THE ANTICS OF CLARK AT THE UN, NIGERIA IS REGARDED AS A LEADING RADICAL COUNTRY. NIGERIA HAS ALSO GIVEN DIRECT MILITARY SUPPORT TO THEBNF BY SUPPLYING EQUIPMENT AND THE USE OF TRANSPORT AIRCRAFT. BUT THIS WAS UNDER THE MILITARY GOVERNMENT. I WOULD LIKE TO PUT TO YOU THE THOUGHT THAT THE RETURN TO CIVILIAN RULE HAS PRODUCED A GOVERNMENT OF A VERY DIFFERENT COMPLEXION. THOSE WHO ARE NOW IN CHARGE ARE ESSENTIALLY THE SAME GROUP OF PEOPLE WHO DOMINATED THE GOVERNMENT IN THE EARLY 1960S WHEN SIR ABUBAKAR BALEWA WAS REGARDED AS THE LEADING MODERATE STATESMAN IN AFRICA. PRESIDENT SHAGARI WAS BALEWA'S PROTEGE AND A LEADING MINISTER IN HIS

2
CONFIDENTIAL

GOVERNMENT

CONFIDENTIAL

GOVERNMENT. HIS OWN GOVERNMENT WILL BE CONSERVATIVE, CAPITALIST AND ANTI-COMMUNIST. ALTHOUGH FULLY COMMITTED TO OPPOSING COLONIALISM, RACIALISM AND APARTHEID, ALL THE INDICATIONS ARE THAT HIS METHOD OF APPROACH WILL BE MUCH MORE CAUTIOUS. AS I HAVE ALREADY REPORTED THERE HAS BEEN A REMARKABLE MODERATION OF TONE IN THE PRESS, WHICH MUST REFLECT A LEAD FROM THE GOVERNMENT. MOREOVER CLARK'S AGGRESSIVE BEHAVIOUR AT THE UN IS UNLIKELY TO HAVE BEEN ON MINISTERIAL INSTRUCTIONS, SINCE THERE HAS SO FAR BEEN NO MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

5. IT IS ALSO WORTH POINTING OUR THAT EVEN IN OBASANJO'S TIME NIGERIA WAS NOT COMMITTED TO THE SUPPORT OF THE PATRIOTIC FRONT AS SUCH, AS SHOWN BY THE GARBA INITIATIVE FOR A SMITH/NKOMO ALLIANCE, WHICH WOULD IN EFFECT HAVE SPLIT THE FRONT LEAVING MUGABE OUTSIDE. THERE IS NOT MUCH SYMPATHY FOR MUGABE HERE AND MY GUESS IS THAT THE PRESENT GOVERNMENT, WHILE NATURALLY PREFERRING A SETTLEMENT INCLUDING THE WHOLE OF THE PATRIOTIC FRONT, WOULD EQUALLY NOT BE TOO UPSET IF NMMCAME IN AND MUGABE WERE LEFT OUT. MOST SENIOR NIGERIAN OFFICERS ARE BRITISH-TRAINED AND I THINK THAT NIGERIAN REPRESENTATIVES ON A MONITORING BODY, IF CAREFULLY CHOSEN WOULD DO A STRAIGHTFORWARD MILITARY JOB.

6. ACCORDING TO MY DEFENCE ADVISER THE CHOICE OF OFFICERS FOR THIS TASK WOULD BE IN THE HANDS OF THE NEW CHIEF OF STAFF, WHO IS STAUNCHLY ANTI-COMMUNIST AND WOULD PROBABLY BE RECEPTIVE TO ADVICE FROM US TO CHOOSE NON-POLITICAL OFFICERS. I THEREFORE URGE THAT CONSIDERATION BE GIVEN TO TRY TO PERSUADE MUZOREWA THAT THERE HAS BEEN A MAJOR CHANGE IN NIGERIA AND THAT NIGERIAN REPRESENTATIVES ON A MILITARY MONITORING BODY WOULD NOT WORK TO HIS OWN DISADVANTAGE. IT SEEMS TO ME THAT THE POTENTIAL ADVANTAGES ARE VERY GREAT. IT COULD WIN NIGERIAN SUPPORT FOR OUR PROPOSALS AND THEREFORE IMPROVE THE CHANCES OF A SETTLEMENT ; AND IT COULD ALSO REDUCE CRITICISM OF US (AND THE THREAT OF DAMAGING ECONOMIC ACTION AGAINST US) IF IN THE END WE HAD TO GO AHEAD WITHOUT THE PATRIOTIC FRONT . IT WOULD GIVE MUCH GREATER CREDIBILITY TO THE MONITORING GROUP ; IT WOULD THEREBY CONSIDERABLY WEAKEN SOME OF THE PRESENT FRONT-LINEOBJECTIONS TO OUR PROPOSALS . AND WOULD MAKE IT MORE DIFFICULT FOR NKOMO, AND EVEN PERHAPS MUGABE NOT TO ACCEPT THEM.

CONFIDENTIAL

7. I APOLOGISE FOR TROUBLING YOU WITH MY VIEWS AT SUCH LENGTH. BUT WE ARE VERY CLOSE TO SUCCESS AND AS SEEN FROM HERE NIGERIAN SUPPORT, WITH ALL THE ADVANTAGES THAT COULD BRING, MIGHT WELL BE OBTAINED BY SOME LENGTHENING OF THE INTERIM PERIOD AND THE INCLUSION OF NIGERIA (AND PREFERABLY ALSO INDIA) IN THE CEASE-FIRE MONITORING GROUP.

BROWN

FILES

RHODESIA D
OADS
NAD
FUSD
PLANNING STAFF
ES & SD
CCD
FRD
UND
LEGAL ADVISERS
(MR FREELAND)
(MR FIFOOT)
ECON D
PCD
DEF D
OID

NEWS D
PS
PS/SIR I GILMOUR
PS/MR LUCE
PS/MR RIDLEY
PS/MR HURD
PS/PUS

LORD N G LENNOX
MISS BROWN
MR DAY
MR WILLSON
MR ASPIN

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION

RHODESIA POLICY

4

CONFIDENTIAL

Over-taken - PA 2
MS
PRIME MINISTER



Here is the text of the
agreed Business Statement this
afternoon. Mr. Lynn Kees undertook

Very happy to be able to report to the House an arrangement ^{in response to meet the timetable} at X.
which I believe will do justice to the different views held by MS
Members on the Rhodesia issue.

It will meet the needs of Government and Opposition and will
be in accord with the dignity of this House.

The House will be asked to approve the business motion forthwith:
the Second Reading debate will commence straight away and be
concluded between 10 and 11 tonight. The money resolution
will then be taken.

The House will then be requested to resolve into a committee
and we shall immediately report progress.

X | Remaining stages of the Bill will be taken on Monday 12 November
and will be concluded at a reasonable hour, that is to say
in the words of the Rt Hon Gentleman, the Leader of the Opposition,
late Monday night or early Tuesday morning.

has
The Opposition/undertaken to facilitate progress of the Bill
to achieve the Government's date for completion in order to
obtain Royal Assent on Wednesday 14 November.

I believe this agreement is honorable and
honorable and will ensure that the proceedings
of the House in no way justify a successful
move to the House of Commons.

BUSINESS STATEMENT

THURSDAY, 8TH NOVEMBER, 1979

LEADER OF THE HOUSE

~~With permission, Mr Speaker, I should like to make a revised Business Statement.~~

The Business for next week has been re-arranged as follows:-

Monday
12th November

Completion of the remaining stages of the
Southern Rhodesia Bill.

The Business on Thursday 15th November will now be -

Second Reading of the Protection of Trading Interests Bill,
and of the Papua New Guinea, Western Samoa and Nauru
(Miscellaneous Provisions) Bill.

Proceedings on the Isle of Man Bill.

STATEMENT ON RHODESIA TO BE
MADE BY THE RIGHT HON
SIR IAN GILMOUR, LORD PRIVY
SEAL, IN THE HOUSE OF
COMMONS ON WEDNESDAY
7 NOVEMBER

With your permission, Mr Speaker, I will make a statement on Rhodesia.

In my statement of the 24th of October I described the proposals which the Government had put to the Constitutional Conference for the holding of elections in Southern Rhodesia and the administration of the country in the pre-independence period.

The full proposals which the Government tabled on the 2nd of November have been placed in the Library of the House. We have also published today as a White Paper the summary of the Independence Constitution accepted by the parties at Lancaster House.

At Lancaster House we have now achieved provisional agreement on a Constitution, and have made considerable progress towards agreement on the interim period. I hope that we shall soon be able to proceed to negotiations for a ceasefire and the arrangements for monitoring it. The Conference is therefore moving towards a conclusion. We must be able to act without delay to implement the final agreement for which we are working with all parties. Any delay in putting a settlement into effect would cost further lives and could place the settlement itself at risk.

/The

The purpose of the Enabling Bill which the Government is introducing later today is to enable us to implement the interim arrangements without delay. It will enable the Government to make the Independence Constitution, to introduce parts of it before Independence to allow elections to be held, and to provide for the appointment of a Governor with full powers. Existing legislation is not adequate for these purposes.

The Salisbury delegation have accepted the proposals which the Government have put to them as a basis for a settlement. The Patriotic Front have also accepted the principles of a British Governor and new elections. We are therefore very close to a settlement which is fully consistent with the communique of the Meeting of Heads of Commonwealth Governments in Lusaka. In these circumstances the Government believes that it would be wrong now to take the positive action of renewing Section 2 of the Southern Rhodesia Act 1965. But as the House will be aware, the great bulk of sanctions - those relating to direct trade and the transfer of funds - do not depend on Section 2 but on Orders made under other Acts and they will continue until they are revoked. These sanctions will be lifted as soon as Rhodesia returns to legality with the appointment of a Governor and his arrival in Salisbury. The Bill which will be placed before the House enables the Government to take whatever action is necessary in relation to Rhodesia, depending on the state of progress at the Conference. This

/includes

includes the power to continue those sanctions at present imposed under Section 2. But given the position now reached the Government find it difficult to envisage circumstances in which this would be necessary.

While the Government would have preferred to give both Houses more time to consider the Bill, the timing of the introduction of the Bill has been related to the progress of the Conference. It is essential that the Governor should be in a position when, as we hope, agreement is reached to give effect to a settlement without delay and for elections to be held as soon as possible. A great deal of progress has been made in the talks. We were glad to hear this morning that President Kaunda will be coming to London tomorrow. This will be a most timely visit. His presence will I am sure assist our progress towards a peaceful settlement.

Prime Minister

ha
Shunt
cc Michael Alexander

Note of meeting held at the Residence of the Zambian High Commissioner, 17 Courtney Avenue, London N6, at 11.30 p.m. on Wednesday 7th November 1979

Present: High Commissioner
Mr Mark Chona
Permanent Secretary at the Zambian
Ministry of Foreign Affairs

1. Mr Chona did most of the talking.
2. He enquired about the Parliamentary time-table for the new Southern Rhodesia Bill, and I told him that it was the Government's intention that the Bill should complete its passage through the House of Commons before the weekend and that it would go to the House of Lords early next week.
3. Chona said that there were four areas of special concern to the Zambian Government:-
 - (a) That the proposed period of two months between the implementation of the ceasefire and the holding of a General Election, was much too short. Chona said that time would be needed for refugees to return from Zambia and Mozambique and for those who had sought refuge in towns and cities to return to the rural areas. Chona suggested a period of six months.

.....continued

- (b) That there should be a Commonwealth military presence as well as the Commonwealth observers envisaged at Lusaka. Chona said that it would be wrong for the Governor to have to rely for his own protection and as an instrument for enforcing law and order during the interim period either on what he described as "Smith's Forces" or the Patriotic Front. He said that he foresaw the real possibility of conflict between "Smith's forces" and the "Guerillas" if either of their two armies were called on to enforce law and order prior to elections. He said it was essential that both armies should be "confined to barracks" during the pre-election period.
- (c) That he was much concerned that the status of what he described as "Smith/Muzorewa Administration" would appear to remain in tact prior to the Election and that the existing Ministers would retain their houses, official cars, etc. Chona said that this would give them unfair prestige and preference.
- (d) That Smith and Muzorewa would continue to control the media during the pre-election period.
4. All these points are very well known to you. However it was clearly the wish of Chona that I should report this conversation to you.
5. I handed to Chona a copy of the Southern Rhodesia Bill.

8th November 1979

Ian Gow

SUBJECT



**PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T135/79T**

*State House
Lusaka, Republic of Zambia*

*for
Mum
12/11*

7th November, 1979.

My Dear Margaret,

Clearly the Conference is reaching a most delicate moment and I thought I should write to urge you not only to give but to be seen to give the parties adequate time to negotiate to reach reasonable compromises on points where differences still exist. This process is crucial whatever will be the final outcome of the talks and regardless of the seemingly long time the Conference has already taken and notwithstanding any important deadlines and pressures that you might have. Please, allow me, Margaret, to say what I know you know already that the situation is grave and it is far better to be late by one day but achieve a workable solution than to be too early by weeks but solve nothing.

As far as Zambia is concerned, my candid view is that we are in full agreement with your proposal for the constitution and will stand by you on this. But I have three really serious problems on your proposal for the pre-independence arrangements.

I am concerned that what you achieve for the people of Rhodesia on Independence Day is not destroyed by what you do for them in the interim period. You have done enough already to deserve an arrangement that can hold outright in Rhodesia. I know you can reach it and I am praying daily for you.

- (a) I know you can get a constitution for Rhodesia and you have already got it;
- (b) I know you can put together the interim arrangements and you are busy doing so now;

/...

The Right Honourable Margaret Thatcher,
Prime Minister of United Kingdom of Great
Britain and Northern Ireland,
10 Downing Street,
LONDON.



- 2 -

- (c) I know you can get the ceasefire and you are fighting to get this shortly;
- (d) I know you can organise the power transfer election;
- (e) I know you are committed and determined to be fair in all the handling and management of these matters and I trust you.

But, please Margaret, be fair to yourself and give yourself for the transition

- (a) the time in which to undo and do these great things for Rhodesia;
- (b) the mechanism to contain honourably the inevitable public violence while you undo and do these great things for Rhodesia.

These two are my basic serious concerns and real worry in your proposal for the pre-independence arrangements. In my view it is in these two important regards that you are being so unfair to yourself and to your own great efforts. I have to be open and honest to you because I am convinced that you mean well, you are committed and honest in what you are doing to effect the vital change in Rhodesia.

It is, Margaret, not a logical position to take to assume that you can effect the necessary change in no time at all. And equally, it is not a logical position to take to assume that in effecting the necessary change in the present political situation in Rhodesia there will be no occurrence of public violence at all, no matter what promises you may get from anybody.

Everything you are engaging in at the moment is in fact to reduce and finally eliminate violence and war in Rhodesia but it would be naive and dangerous to your own cause and effort to proceed on a firm assumption that violence - not war - will be reduced in the twinkle of an eye to absolute zero in the transition. The practical thing is to prepare to cope with violence effectively even if it costs a little more time and money. In the end this will prove many times less costly than chaos.

/...



- 3 -

You need a ceasefire and you need an election in order to transfer power. I agree with you and support you to the fullest. But in terms of Party violence in elections in the situation in Rhodesia, ceasefire and election are conflicting processes. The people who will lay down their arms will not go to the barracks but will rush to their different leaders to organise their rival political parties. Therefore instead of these people meeting with guns on the battle field, they will meet one another in the political arena fighting with political programmes all over the country.

The Rhodesian policeman, like his close brother the soldier in Rhodesia, cannot be immune from this political process which will pervade the entire population. In fact in terms of the need to stand and fight, the Rhodesian policeman is indistinguishable from the Rhodesian soldier and both have received identical indoctrination. And there will be no time to re-orientate or debrief them sufficiently.

The police officer in charge of the station in the township and countryside and the constable out on beat will be in an impossible situation trying to decide impartially which one among political rivals sparked the trouble. For 15 years this same policeman has arrested as a matter of routine and duty members of some of the rival political parties and has been commended and perhaps decorated for this. And some of the most active political groups have been banned for many years.

In these circumstances while it may appear very practical it will not fail to detract on the Governor's position and impartiality if he relied entirely, except for a few British police advisors, on the existing one-sided police force for maintaining public order and managing the inevitable election factional strife and violence. The Governor here does need an additional mechanism for monitoring public order especially the turbulent election campaigns during which inevitably violence will erupt.

There is certainly a case here for an effective Commonwealth police auxilliary force which will not merely observe elections but police the election jointly with policemen from the existing regular establishment on the basis of either one for one or some formula giving adequate numbers. The Governor's Commonwealth

/...



- 4 -

auxilliary force for public order can be drawn from the seasoned police forces of the Commonwealth - white, African and other areas.

Before the Governor hands over power to the elected new administration there must be a reasonably neutral public police force upon which he can rely to lock up and guard the armouries throughout the country to ensure that there is no easy run on the guns by any section of the population after the announcement of the election results or when the going is not as good for anyone as was expected during the election campaign. This is a distinct possibility because there are deep divisions and far too many guns and ammunitions surrounding the whole process of the transition. Mere trust by all in the Governor and the responsibility of the British Government are not enough.

A little time spent in sorting out this aspect of the transition could mean the difference between final success and final wrecking of the entire effort of the Conference and the precipitation of a situation many times more complex and dangerous than the one we now face.

I would certainly appeal to you, Margaret, to consider most seriously the strengthening of the hand of the Governor in the neutral maintenance of public order. Otherwise I can see unmistakable threats from all sides.

This brings me to my second concern of time. I accept your proposal that two months of electioneering is ample. But I do not accept what appears to be your proposal that the two months of electioneering should be the limits of the transition. Until now I was under the mistaken impression that once ceasefire has been agreed and the Governor moves into Rhodesia, you were going to give him a minimum of two to three months for him

- (a) to settle in;
- (b) to ensure for himself on the spot that everything about the ceasefire can hold;
- (c) to debrief the services and create an actual atmosphere of a return to legality among the population and
- (d) for him to know the trouble spots and where they are in the country in order to understand and appreciate the volume of advice he will be getting from everywhere and to pass correct judgement and

/...



- 5 -

- (e) he and his senior officials will have certainly to visit a number of places;
- (f) he will have to acquaint himself with the problem and the process he has come to sort out. He cannot blindly plunge into the election.

Now I am being given the impression that you think all this can be done in a fortnight. It is crazy! The above points don't even include:

- (a) the movements of tens of thousands of Rhodesian refugees from neighbouring countries into Rhodesia to vote. It would be the poorest of strategy to have these vote where they are outside Rhodesia.
- (b) Thousands of these will be carrying arms and will have to disarm some where inside Rhodesia.
- (c) As much as possible weapons throughout the country will have to be secured otherwise the ceasefire will be meaningless.
- (d) Leaders of the Liberation Movement will have to sell the agreement and ceasefire to their commanders and field armies in the most inaccessible areas of the country and travel outside Rhodesia.
- (e) All units of the Rhodesian army will have to be debriefed.
- (f) So will the services and determination made which prisoners will be released, when and where.
- (g) These and other physical preparations of the population for election cannot be carried out instantly or in a matter of hours in the prevailing situation.

/...



- 6 -

On top of this you will have to add registration of voting adults even if there may be no delimitation of constituencies and the election is based on Party lists. If you do not register those eligible to vote you will find

- (a) thousands of people below voting age casting votes. How does one distinguish a person who is 17, 16 and even 15 from one who is 18 years old?
- (b) thousands of people from adjacent territories will pour into Rhodesia to vote. Don't forget there will be thousands of people returning home from neighbouring territories and it will be necessary to screen these.
- (c) from our experience you will find it difficult to stop thousands of people repeating voting many times in the same station and in different localities. Remember you are not dealing with Britain but with a country in a developing social and political situation. What is more there is a war on!

In my view, five to six months allowing three to four of these months for preparation is about the barest workable and worthwhile minimum for the entire process of the power transfer arrangement. Anything less than that is certain to create more problems than it is designed to solve.

I sincerely think, Margaret, you do have a chance to solve this problem of Rhodesia once and for all provided you do not allow anyone to stampede you into spoiling your own solution. As I see it this danger is real.

Please allow yourself to effect an arrangement that will bring peace to Rhodesia

- (a) during the period building up to the power transfer election;
- (b) during the transfer election itself;
and
- (c) after the election and handover of power.

/...



- 7 -

The Governor you send to Rhodesia should be able to depart Rhodesia in peace and dignity because the final arrangement is able to hold. He should not be forced out of Rhodesia again.

Thirdly and finally, I consider equally important that political groups competing in the election should have equality of political status. This will not be the case if candidates of some parties will carry Government or official titles such as Prime Minister, Minister and so on, be housed, transported and paid salaries out of public funds. And certainly the personal safety of all candidates especially the leaders of Parties must be guaranteed. And the safety of leaders must be one of the responsibilities the Governor will hand over to the elected new administration.

I have written in this manner because I believe sincerely in what you are doing and I am ready to help in whatever way I can to see you through. I wanted you to see clearly why I think the way I do.

I wish you God's blessings and pray for you daily.

A always,

Kenneth

Kenneth D. Kaunda
PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF ZAMBIA

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
CONFIDENTIAL

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE

SERIAL No. T135/79T

GRS 1958A

CONFIDENTIAL

X DESKBY FCO 071230Z

FM LUSAKA 071030Z

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TEL NO. 1211 OF 7 NOVEMBER 1979

AND TO IMMEDIATE DAR ES SALAAM, GABORONE, MAPUTO, MIRIMBA
SALISBURY, WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK, PRETORIA
PRIORITY LUANDA, NAIROBI, LAGOS, CANBERRA.

MY IPT.

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF PRESIDENT KAUNDA'S LETTER TO THE
PRIME MINISTER:

CLEARLY THE CONFERENCE IS REACHING A MOST DELICATE
MOMENT AND I THOUGHT I SHOULD WRITE TO URGE YOU NOT ONLY
TO GIVE BUT TO BE SEEN TO GIVE THE PARTIES ADEQUATE TIME
TO NEGOTIATE TO REACH REASONABLE COMPROMISES ON POINTS
WHERE DIFFERENCES STILL EXIST. THIS PROCESS IS CRUCIAL
WHATEVER WILL BE THE FINAL OUTCOME OF THE TALKS AND
REGARDLESS OF THE SEEMINGLY LONG TIME THE CONFERENCE
HAS ALREADY TAKEN AND NOTWITHSTANDING ANY IMPORTANT
DEADLINES AND PRESSURES THAT YOU MIGHT HAVE. PLEASE,
ALLOW ME, MARGARET, TO SAY WHAT I KNOW YOU KNOW ALREADY
THAT THE SITUATION IS GRAVE AND IT IS FAR BETTER TO BE
LATE BY ONE DAY BUT ACHIEVE A WORKABLE SOLUTION THAN TO
BE TOO EARLY BY WEEKS BUT SOLVE NOTHING.

AS FAR AS ZAMBIA IS CONCERNED, MY CANDID VIEW IS
THAT WE ARE IN FULL AGREEMENT WITH YOUR PROPOSAL FOR THE
CONSTITUTION AND WILL STAND BY YOU ON THIS. BUT I HAVE
THREE REALLY SERIOUS PROBLEMS ON YOUR PROPOSAL FOR THE
PRE-INDEPENDENCE ARRANGEMENTS.

/I AM

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

I AM CONCERNED THAT WHAT YOU ACHIEVE FOR THE PEOPLE OF RHODESIA ON INDEPENDENCE DAY IS NOT DESTROYED BY WHAT YOU DO FOR THEM IN THE INTERIM PERIOD. YOU HAVE DONE ENOUGH ALREADY TO DESERVE AN ARRANGEMENT THAT CAN HOLD OUTRIGHT IN RHODESIA. I KNOW YOU CAN REACH IT AND I AM PRAYING DAILY FOR YOU.

- (A) I KNOW YOU CAN GET A CONSTITUTION FOR RHODESIA AND YOU HAVE ALREADY GOT IT SEMI COLON
- (B) I KNOW YOU CAN PUT TOGETHER THE INTERIM ARRANGEMENTS AND YOU ARE BUSY DOING SO NOW SEMI COLON
- (C) I KNOW YOU CAN GET THE CEASEFIRE AND YOU ARE FIGHTING TO GET THIS SHORTLY SEMI COLON
- (D) I KNOW YOU CAN ORGANISE THE POWER TRANSFER ELECTION SEMI COLON
- (E) I KNOW YOU ARE COMMITTED AND DETERMINED TO BE FAIR IN ALL THE HANDLING AND MANAGEMENT OF THESE MATTERS AND I TRUST YOU.

BUT, PLEASE MARGARET, BE FAIR TO YOURSELF AND GIVE YOURSELF FOR THE TRANSITION

- (A) THE TIME IN WHICH TO UNDO AND DO THESE GREAT THINGS FOR RHODESIA SEMI COLON
- (B) THE MECHANISM TO CONTAIN HONOURABLY THE INEVITABLE PUBLIC VIOLENCE WHILE YOU UNDO AND DO THESE GREAT THINGS FOR RHODESIA.

THESE TWO ARE MY BASIC SERIOUS CONCERNS AND REAL WORRY ON YOUR PROPOSAL FOR THE PRE-INDEPENDENCE ARRANGEMENTS. IN MY VIEW IT IS IN THESE TWO IMPORTANT REGARDS THAT YOU ARE BEING SO UNFAIR TO YOURSELF AND TO YOUR OWN GREAT EFFORTS. I HAVE TO BE OPEN AND HONEST TO YOU BECAUSE I AM CONVENCED THAT YOU MEAN WELL, YOU ARE COMMITTED AND HONEST IN WHAT YOU ARE DOING TO EFFECT THE VITAL CHANGE IN RHODESIA.

CONFIDENTIAL

IT IS, MARGARET, NOT A LOGICAL POSITION TO TAKE TO ASSUME THAT YOU CAN EFFECT THE NECESSARY CHANGE IN NO TIME AT ALL. AND EQUALLY, IT IS NOT A LOGICAL POSITION TO TAKE TO ASSUME THAT IN EFFECTING THE NECESSARY CHANGE IN THE PRESENT POLITICAL SITUATION IN RHODESIA THERE WILL BE NO OCCURRENCE OF PUBLIC VIOLENCE AT ALL, NO MATTER WHAT PROMISES YOU MAY GET FROM ANYBODY.

EVERYTHING YOU ARE ENGAGING IN AT THE MOMENT IS IN FACT TO REDUCE AND FINALLY ELIMINATE VIOLENCE AND WAR IN RHODESIA BUT IT WOULD BE NAIVE AND DANGEROUS TO YOUR OWN CAUSE AND EFFORT TO PROCEED ON A FIRM ASSUMPTION THAT VIOLENCE - NOT WAR - WILL BE REDUCED IN THE TWINKLE OF AN EYE TO ABSOLUTE ZERO IN THE TRANSITION. THE PRACTICAL THING IS TO PREPARE TO COPE WITH VIOLENCE EFFECTIVELY EVEN IF IT COSTS A LITTLE MORE TIME AND MONEY. IN THE END THIS WILL PROVE MANY TIMES LESS COSTLY THAN CHAOS.

YOU NEED A CEASEFIRE AND YOU NEED AN ELECTION IN ORDER TO TRANSFER POWER. I AGREE WITH YOU AND SUPPORT YOU TO THE FULLEST. BUT INTERMS OF PARTY VIOLENCE IN ELECTIONS IN THE SITUATION IN RHODESIA, CEASEFIRE AND ELECTIONS ARE CONFLICTING PROCESSES. THE PEOPLE WHO WILL LAY DOWN THEIR ARMS WILL NOT GO TO THE BARRACKS BUT WILL RUSH TO THEIR DIFFERENT LEADERS TO ORGANISE THEIR RIVAL POLITICAL PARTIES. THEREFORE INSTEAD OF THESE PEOPLE MEETING WITH GUNS ON THE BATTLE FIELD, THEY WILL MEET ONE ANOTHER IN THE POLITICAL ARENA FIGHTING WITH POLITICAL PROGRAMMES ALL OVER THE COUNTRY.

THE RHODESIAN POLICEMEN, LIKE HIS CLOSE BROTHER THE SOLDIER IN RHODESIA, CANNOT BE IMMUNE FROM THIS POLITICAL PROCESS WHICH WILL PERVADE THE ENTIRE POPULATION. IN FACT IN TERMS OF THE NEED TO STAND AND FIGHT, THE RHODESIAN POLICEMAN IS INDISTINGUISHABLE FROM THE RHODESIAN SOLDIER AND BOTH HAVE RECEIVED IDENTICAL INDOCTRINATION. AND THERE WILL BE NO TIME TO RE-ORIENTATE OR DEBRIEF THEM SUFFICIENTLY.

/THE POLICE OFFICER

THE POLICE OFFICER IN CHARGE OF THE STATION IN THE TOWNSHIP AND COUNTRYSIDE AND THE CONSTABLE OUT ON BEAT WILL BE IN AN IMPOSSIBLE SITUATION TRYING TO DECIDE IMPARTIALLY WHICH ONE AMONG POLITICAL RIVALS SPARKED THE TROUBLE. FOR 15 YEARS THIS SAME POLICEMAN HAS ARRESTED AS A MATTER OF ROUTINE AND DUTY MEMBERS OF SOME OF THE RIVAL POLITICAL PARTIES AND HAS BEEN COMMENDED AND PERHAPS DECORATED FOR THIS. AND SOME OF THE MOST ACTIVE POLITICAL GROUPS HAVE BEEN BANNED FOR MANY YEARS.

IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES WHILE IT MAY APPEAR VERY PRACTICAL IT WILL NOT FAIL TO DETRACT ON THE GOVERNOR'S POSITION AND IMPARTIALITY IF HE RELIED ENTIRELY, EXCEPT FOR A FEW BRITISH POLICE ADVISORS, ON THE EXISTING ONE-SIDED POLICE FORCE FOR MAINTAINING PUBLIC ORDER AND MANAGING THE INEVITABLE ELECTION FACTIONAL STRIFE AND VIOLENCE. THE GOVERNOR HERE DOES NEED AN ADDITIONAL MECHANISM FOR MONITORING PUBLIC ORDER ESPECIALLY THE TURBULENT ELECTION CAMPAIGNS DURING WHICH INEVITABLY VIOLENCE WILL ERUPT.

THERE IS CERTAINLY A CASE HERE FOR AN EFFECTIVE COMMONWEALTH POLICE AUXILLIARY FORCE WHICH WILL NOT MERELY OBSERVE ELECTIONS BUT POLICE THE ELECTION JOINTLY WITH POLICEMEN FROM THE EXISTING REGULAR ESTABLISHMENT ON THE BASIS OF EITHER ONE FOR ONE OR SOME FORMULA GIVING ADEQUATE NUMBERS. THE GOVERNOR'S COMMONWEALTH AUXILLIARY FORCE FOR PUBLIC ORDER CAN BE DRAWN FROM THE SEASONED POLICE FORCES OF THE COMMONWEALTH - WHITE, AFRICAN AND OTHER AREAS.

BEFORE THE GOVERNOR HANDS OVER POWER TO THE ELECTED NEW ADMINISTRATION THERE MUST BE A REASONABLY NEUTRAL PUBLIC POLICE FORCE UPON WHICH HE CAN RELY TO LOCK UP AND GUARD THE ARMOURIES THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY TO ENSURE THAT THERE IS NO EASY RUN ON THE GUNS BY ANY SECTION OF THE POPULATION AFTER THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE ELECTION RESULTS OR WHEN THE GOING IS NOT AS GOOD FOR ANYONE AS WAS EXPECTED DURING THE ELECTION CAMPAIGN. THIS IS A DISTINCT POSSIBILITY BECAUSE THERE ARE DEEP DIVISIONS AND FAR TOO MANY GUNS AND AMMUNITION SURROUNDING THE WHOLE PROCESS OF THE TRANSITION. MERE TRUST BY ALL IN THE GOVERNOR AND THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT ARE NOT ENOUGH.

CONFIDENTIAL

A LITTLE TIME SPENT IN SORTING OUT THIS ASPECT OF THE TRANSITION COULD MEAN THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN FINAL SUCCESS AND FINAL WRECKING OF THE ENTIRE EFFORT OF THE CONFERENCE AND THE PRECIPITATION OF A SITUATION MANY TIMES MORE COMPLEX AND DANGEROUS THAN THE ONE WE NOW FACE.

I WOULD CERTAINLY APPEAL TO YOU, MARGARET, TO CONSIDER MOST SERIOUSLY THE STRENGTHENING OF THE HAND OF THE GOVERNOR IN THE NEUTRAL MAINTENANCE OF PUBLIC ORDER. OTHERWISE I CAN SEE UNMISTAKABLE THREATS FROM ALL SIDES.

THIS BRINGS ME TO MY SECOND CONCERN OF TIME. I ACCEPT YOUR PROPOSAL THAT TWO MONTHS OF ELECTIONEERING IS AMPLE. BUT I DO NOT ACCEPT WHAT APPEARS TO BE YOUR PROPOSAL THAT THE TWO MONTHS OF ELECTIONEERING SHOULD BE THE LIMITS OF THE TRANSITION. UNTIL NOW I WAS UNDER THE MISTAKEN IMPRESSION THAT ONCE CEASEFIRE HAS BEEN AGREED AND THE GOVERNOR MOVES INTO RHODESIA, YOU WERE GOING TO GIVE HIM A MINIMUM OF TWO TO THREE MONTHS FOR HIM

- (A) TO SETTLE IN SEMI COLON
- (B) TO ENSURE FOR HIMSELF ON THE SPOT THAT EVERYTHING ABOUT THE CEASEFIRE CAN HOLD SEMI COLON
- (C) TO DEBRIEF THE SERVICES AND CREATE AN ACTUAL ATMOSPHERE OF A RETURN TO LEGALITY AMONG THE POPULATION AND
- (D) FOR HIM TO KNOW THE TROUBLE SPOTS AND WHERE THEY ARE IN THE COUNTRY IN ORDER TO UNDERSTAND AND APPRECIATE THE VOLUME OF ADVICE HE WILL BE GETTING FROM EVERYWHERE AND TO PASS CORRECT JUDGEMENT AND
- (E) HE AND HIS SENIOR OFFICIALS WILL HAVE CERTAINLY TO VISIT A NUMBER OF PLACES SEMI COLON
- (F) HE WILL HAVE TO ACQUAINT HIMSELF WITH THE PROBLEM AND THE PROCESS HE HAS COME TO SORT OUT. HE CANNOT BLINDLY PLUNGE INTO THE ELECTION.

/NOW I AM

NOW I AM BEING GIVEN THE IMPRESSION THAT YOU THINK ALL THIS CAN BE DONE IN A FORTNIGHT. IT IS CRAZY EXCLAMATION MARK THE ABOVE POINTS DON'T EVEN INCLUDE:

- (A) THE MOVEMENTS OF TENS OF THOUSANDS OF RHODESIAN REFUGEES FROM NEIGHBOURING COUNTRIES INTO RHODESIA TO VOTE. IT WOULD BE THE POOREST STRATEGY TO HAVE THESE VOTE WHERE THEY ARE OUTSIDE RHODESIA.
- (B) THOUSAND OF THESE WILL BE CARRYING ARMS AND WILL HAVE TO DISARM SOME WHERE INSIDE RHODESIA.
- (C) AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE WEAPONS THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY WILL HAVE TO BE SECURED OTHERWISE THE CEASEFIRE WILL BE MEANINGLESS.
- (D) LEADERS OF THE LIBERATION MOVEMENT WILL HAVE TO SELL THE AGREEMENT AND CEASEFIRE TO THEIR COMMANDERS AND FIELD ARMIES IN THE MOST INACCESSIBLE AREAS OF THE COUNTRY AND TRAVEL OUTSIDE RHODESIA.
- (E) ALL UNITS OF THE RHODESIAN ARMY WILL HAVE TO BE DEBRIEFED.
- (F) SO WILL THE SERVICES AND DETERMINATION MADE WHICH PRISONERS WILL BE RELEASED, WHEN AND WHERE.
- (G) THESE AND OTHER PHYSICAL PREPARATIONS OF THE POPULATION FOR ELECTION CANNOT BE CARRIED OUT INSTANTLY OR IN A MATTER OF HOURS IN THE PREVAILING SITUATION.

ON TOP OF THIS YOU WILL HAVE TO ADD REGISTRATION OF VOTING ADULTS EVEN IF THERE MAY BE NO DELIMITATION OF CONSTITUENCIES AND THE ELECTION IS BASED ON PARTY LISTS. IF YOU DO NOT REGISTER THOSE ELIGIBLE TO VOTE YOU WILL FIND

- (A) THOUSANDS OF PEOPLE BELOW VOTING AGE CASTING VOTES. HOW DOES ONE DISTINGUISH A PERSON WHO IS 17, 16 OR EVEN 15 FROM ONE WHO IS 18 YEARS OLD?

/(B) THOUSANDS OF

CONFIDENTIAL

- (B) THOUSANDS OF PEOPLE FROM ADJACENT TERRITORIES WILL PIR INTO RHODESIA TO VOTE. DON'T FORGET THERE WILL BE THOUSANDS OF PEOPLE RETURNING HOME FROM NEIGHBOURING TERRITORIES AND IT WILL BE NECESSARY TO SCREEN THESE.

- (C) FROM OUR EXPERIENCE YOU WILL FIND IT DIFFICULT TO STOP THOUSANDS OF PEOPLE REPEATING VOTING MANY TIMES IN THE SAME STATION AND IN DIFFERENT LOCALITIES. REMEMBER YOU ARE NOT DEALING WITH BRITAIN BUT WITH A COUNTRY IN A DEVELOPING SOCIAL AND POLITICAL SITUATION. WHAT IS MORE THERE IS A WAR ON EXCLAMATION MARK.

IN MY VIEW, FIVE TO SIX MONTHS ALLOWING THREE TO FOUR OF THESE MONTHS FOR PREPARATION IS ABOUT THE BAREST WORKABLE AND WORTHWHILE MINIMUM FOR THE ENTIRE PROCESS OF THE POWER TRANSFER ARRANGEMENT. ANYTHING LESS THAN THAT IS CERTAIN TO CREATE MORE PROBLEMS THAN IT IS DESIGNED TO SOLVE.

I SINCERELY THINK, MARGARET, YOU DO HAVE A CHANCE TO SOLVE THIS PROBLEM OF RHODESIA ONCE AND FOR ALL PROVIDED YOU DO NOT ALLOW ANYONE TO STAMPEDE YOU INTO SPOILING YOUR OWN SOLUTION. AS I SEE IT THE DANGER IS REAL.

PLEASE ALLOW YOURSELF TO EFFECT AN ARRANGEMENT THAT WILL BRING PEACE TO RHODESIA

- (A) DURING THE PERIOD BUILDING UP TO THE POWER TRANSFER ELECTION SEMI COLON

- (B) DURING THE TRANSFER ELECTION ITSELF SEMI COLON AND

- (C) AFTER THE ELECTION AND HANDOVER OF POWER.

THE GOVERNOR YOU SEND TO RHODESIA SHOULD BE ABLE TO DEPART RHODESIA IN PEACE AND DIGNITY BECAUSE THE FINAL ARRANGEMENT IS ABLE TO HOLD. HE SHOULD NOT BE FORCED OUT OF RHODESIA AGAIN.

/THIRDLY AND

CONFIDENTIAL

THIRDLY AND FINALLY, I CONSIDER EQUALLY IMPORTANT THAT POLITICAL GROUPS COMPETING IN THE ELECTION SHOULD HAVE EQUALITY OF POLITICAL STATUS. THIS WILL NOT BE THE CASE IF CANDIDATES OF SOME PARTIES WILL CARRY GOVERNMENT OR OFFICIAL TITLES, SUCH AS PRIME MINISTER, MINISTER AND SO ON, BE HOUSED, TRANSPORTED AND PAID SALARIES OUT OF PUBLIC FUNDS. AND CERTAINLY THE PERSONAL SAFETY OF ALL CANDIDATES ESPECIALLY THE LEADERS OF PARTIES MUST BE GUARANTEED. AND THE SAFETY OF LEADERS MUST BE ONE OF THE RESPONSIBILITIES THE GOVERNOR WILL HAND OVER TO THE ELECTED NEW ADMINISTRATION.

I HAVE WRITTEN IN THIS MANNER BECAUSE I BELIEVE SINCERELY IN WHAT YOU ARE DOING AND I AM READY TO HELP IN WHATEVER WAY I CAN TO SEE YOU THROUGH. I WANTED YOU TO SEE CLEARLY WHY I THINK THE WAY I DO.

I WISH YOU GOD'S BLESSINGS AND PRAY FOR YOU DAILY.

ALLINGSON

[COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING STREET]

F I L E S

PS

PS/LPS

PS/MR LUCE

PS/PUS

MR DAY

HD/RHOD D

HD/C AF D

HD/NEWS D

CONFIDENTIAL



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

7 November 1979

①

Dear Michael,

Prime Minister

Agree with?

Yes

Ans - 7/x1

Rhodesia

If the Constitutional Conference breaks within the next week, as a result of the Patriotic Front's failure to accept our proposals for the pre-independence arrangements, it will be important to have demonstrated to the leaders of moderate African opinion that we have done our utmost to reach a settlement on terms which are fair to the Patriotic Front. If they are themselves prepared to associate themselves with our approach in the Conference, this may also encourage them subsequently to support, or at least not to dissent publicly from, a subsequent decision by us to go ahead without the Patriotic Front.

It would help to achieve these objectives if the Prime Minister sent a personal message to selected African Presidents and to King Hassan of Morocco in terms of the enclosed draft. If the Prime Minister agrees, we will arrange to have this sent by telegram to the posts indicated.

yours ever
Roderic Lyne

(R M J Lyne)
Private Secretary

M O'D B Alexander Esq
10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL



Rhodesia

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Principal Private Secretary

7 November 1979

Dear Michael,

RHODESIA

I attach a copy of the record of a meeting which the Prime Minister and the Lord Privy Seal had last night with the Leader of the Opposition, Mr. Peter Shore and Mr. John Morris to discuss the Rhodesia Enabling Bill.

I am sending copies of this letter and of the record to George Walden (FCO), John Stevens (Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster), Murdo MacLean (Chief Whip's Office) and Bill Beckett (Law Officers' Department).

Yours sincerely,

Alan Williams

M.J. Richardson, Esq.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

cc Master set

NOTE OF A MEETING HELD IN THE PRIME MINISTER'S ROOM
IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS AT 2130 ON TUESDAY, 6 NOVEMBER 1979

Present: Prime Minister The Rt. Hon. James Callaghan, MP
 Lord Privy Seal The Rt. Hon. Peter Shore, MP
 Mr. C.A. Whitmore The Rt. Hon. John Morris, QC MP

* * * * *

Mr. Callaghan said that he and his colleagues were grateful to the Prime Minister for being ready to see them to discuss the draft Enabling Bill on Rhodesia which she had sent him earlier in the day. He was bound to tell the Prime Minister that he saw no prospect of the Government proceeding on the bill in the way they were proposing. He said this not because he wished to oppose what the Government wanted to do just for the sake of opposition: on the contrary, he wished to be helpful in what he knew were difficult circumstances and to see the bill go through quickly. But he thought that the Government's judgement was wrong on both procedural and political grounds. It was a procedural mistake to ask the House of Commons to consider the Enabling Bill when it had had no report on the progress of the Lancaster House conference presented to it. In similar circumstances in the past it had been the practice for the Government to publish a White Paper setting out the proposed constitution for the territory that was about to become independent before the House was asked to pass the necessary legislation. The Government was now asking the House to pass a bill which would subsequently allow the Government to make a constitution by Order in Council, but the House had no knowledge of the provisions of the constitution. He urged the Government to publish a White Paper on the draft constitution in the form in which it had been agreed so far at the Lancaster House conference. Members of the House should then be allowed to reflect and to consult before they were asked to pass the Enabling Bill. He had to warn the Government that the Labour Party would take it very amiss if the Government went ahead with its plans to make a statement the following day/^{and} to pass the bill through all its stages on Thursday.

/The Prime Minister

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

- 2 -

The Prime Minister said that it should be borne in mind that the way in which the new constitution for an independent Rhodesia had been drawn up was very different from the circumstances in which constitutions for other dependent territories had been arrived at. The Lord Privy Seal said that he understood the procedural point which the Leader of the Opposition was making but the fact was that the constitution was no longer controversial. It had now been agreed with both Bishop Muzorewa's delegation and the Patriotic Front, subject to agreement being reached on the pre-independence arrangements, and our allies and the Front Line states had had nothing but good to say about it. Moreover, its provisions had been widely known for some time. The constitution was not yet cast in legal terms but he was ready to arrange for it to be published, as it stood at present, the following afternoon.

Mr. Callaghan said that he believed that the bill was also premature in political terms. The House was bound to ask why the bill was needed now when the detailed transitional arrangements for Rhodesia had still to be agreed at Lancaster House. He thought that by proceeding with the bill at this stage the Government might find that the effect on the conference was adverse. If the Government tried to take the bill on Thursday, as they were planning to, and there was an enormous row in the House, what impact would this have on Lancaster House? He believed that the Government would have a much better chance of getting the bill through with less difficulty if it was taken on Monday of the following week and not Thursday.

The Prime Minister said that the bill was needed on Thursday because the proceedings at Lancaster House were on a razor's edge. The Government had delayed introducing the bill to the last possible moment in order to get as much agreement as possible at the conference but they had to move now. The bill did two things. First, it would give the Government powers, which it did not have under the 1965 Act, to make a new constitution, to arrange

/elections and to

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

- 3 -

elections and to appoint a governor with legislative and executive powers. These provisions were constructive and forward looking. Second, the 1965 Act would expire on 15 November, and the new bill would carry forward those Orders which needed to be continued but which would otherwise lapse. This meant that the Government had to have the new bill enacted by midnight on Wednesday 14 November. If there was a gap between the expiry of the 1965 Act and the coming into force of the new bill, unforeseeable legal difficulties might arise. If the Government had a guarantee that the Commons would complete all stages of the bill by Monday so that the bill could go to the Lords on Tuesday, it could accept that timetable. But nobody could in practice give such a guarantee. It was for these reasons that the Government proposed to take the bill through all its stages in the Commons this week.

Mr. Shore said that the only constraint on the Government at present was the imminent expiry of the 1965 Act. It did not seem to him that there was any hurry about giving the Government the powers it needed for other purposes such as the appointment of the governor and the holding of elections. The House would want a major debate on the constitution and the transitional arrangements in due course, and there was no need to face it with the abrupt timetable the Government was seeking to follow. The reaction of the House was bound to be strong. Mr. Callaghan added that the Lord Privy Seal was bound to be asked during his statement the following day what the Government proposed to do about sanctions, and his answer would largely determine how easily the bill got through the Commons.

The Prime Minister said that she wished to emphasise that the bill was only an enabling one. It did not of itself make provision for the constitution. That would require an Order subsequently and there would no doubt be a debate on it. Given

/that the bill

CONFIDENTIAL

H. D. 11

CONFIDENTIAL

- 4 -

that the bill did no more than carry forward certain existing powers and give the Government new powers which were needed to implement pre-independence arrangements which had been agreed at the conference, it was difficult to see why the Opposition should object to it. She urged them to think of the consequences for the conference if the Government did not get the bill. The overriding objective was to keep both sides at Lancaster House and to try to bring them to an agreement. With this in mind the Government was obliged to stick to its plan to take the bill through all its stages in the Commons on Thursday.

CAW

7 November 1979

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

GRS 480

CONFIDENTIAL

FM LUSAKA 061355Z NOV 79

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1205 OF 6 NOVEMBER

AND TO IMMEDIATE MIRIMBA SALISBURY

AND TO PRIORITY DAR ES SALAAM, PRETORIA, MAPUTO, GABORONE, WASHINGTON
, UKMIS NEW YORK, LAGOS.

Pamie Wisner (2)

RHODESIA/ZAMBIA

[Handwritten signature]

1. US AMBASSADOR WISNER WAS TOLD YESTERDAY BY ZAMBIAN HOME MINISTER PHIRI THAT IN THE LAST FORTNIGHT IN A RECTANGLE ABOUT SIXTY KILOMETRES DEEP STRETCHING IN FROM CHIRUNDU TO LUANGWA ALONG THE ZAMBIAN/RHODESIA BORDER THERE HAS BEEN AN INTENSIFICATION OF BOMBING AND SHORT IN AND OUT RAIDS BY THE RHODESIANS. WHAT PARTICULARLY WORRIES THE ZAMBIANS IS THAT THE RAIDS HAVE BEEN TO SNATCH THREE OR FOUR ZAMBIANS WHO ARE TAKEN TO RHODESIA, INTERROGATED AND RETURNED. THE ZAMBIANS ARE ALL BEING TAKEN FROM ROUND ABOUT THE KAFUE AREA AND THE QUESTIONING IS DIRECTED TO THE USE AND PROTECTION OF THE BRIDGE.

2. PHIRI SAYS THIS IS ZAMBIA'S VITAL LINK TO THE SOUTH AND IF THE RHODESIANS WERE TO GO FOR THE BRIDGE THAT WOULD BE AN UNDOUBTED ACT OF WAR. WISNER POINTED OUT THAT THE QUICKEST WAY TO REMOVE THE DANGER WAS TO SUPPORT OUR EFFORTS AT THE LANCASTER HOUSE CONFERENCE AND GET A BRITISH GOVERNOR INSTALLED IN SALISBURY.

3. WE HAVE HEARD TODAY ALSO THAT THE GOVERNMENT HAS COMMANDEERED THE OUTPUT OF THE LAND ROVER ASSEMBLY PLANT AT NDOLA AND THAT OTHER CIVIL GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENT VEHICLES AND SOME BUSES HAVE ALSO BEEN PRESSED INTO DEFENCE SERVICE. THIS SEEMS TO BE EITHER COUPLED WITH THE RELOCATION OF ZAPU NEAR THE BORDER OR A REQUIREMENT FOR INCREASED ZNDF PATROLLING.

4. THE ANNOUNCEMENT IN SALISBURY OF A "MAIZE SQUEEZE" AGAINST ZAMBIA (MIRIMBA TELNO 842) WILL INEVITABLY CAUSE THE ZAMBIANS TO REVIEW COUNTER MEASURES AVAILABLE TO THEM. WE HAVE HAD AN INTIMATION THAT THEIR MINDS MAY BE TURNING TOWARDS A RESTRICTION OF THE ELECTRIC POWER CURRENTLY EXPORTED FROM ZAMBIA TO RHODESIA. WE HAVE NOT,

CONFIDENTIAL

(REPEAT NOT

CONFIDENTIAL

REPEAT NOT, YET BEEN ABLE TO ESTABLISH THE ZAMBIAN VIEW AS TO WHETHER THE HIGHER AUTHORITY FOR POWER (HAP) COULD ACT IN THE ABSENCE OF A FOURTH MEMBER (BROAD'S LETTER OF 12 OCTOBER TO NEILSON). BUT IF THE ZAMBIANS WERE TO CONSIDER SUCH A COUNTER MEASURE AND SUMMON A MEETING OF THE HAP, MISS EMERY AS YOUR NOMINEE WOULD BE IN DIFFICULTIES UNLESS ABLE TO SUPPORT THE DECISIONS OF THE ZAMBIAN NOMINEES.

5. AS THE ZAMBIAN MAIZE HARVEST HAS JUST BEEN COMPLETED THE MAIZE SQUEEZE IS UNLIKELY TO HAVE AN IMMEDIATE EFFECT ON THE ZAMBIAN'S SUPPLY POSITION BUT ANY SUSTAINED DELAYS WILL BE BOUND TO HAVE A VERY SERIOUS EFFECT IN THAT REGULAR SHIPMENTS ON THE SOUTHERN ROUTE WILL BE NECESSARY TO AVOID SIGNIFICANT SHORTFALLS IN THE NEW YEAR.

6. SHOULD YOU INTEND TO ISSUE ANY STATEMENT ON THE RHODESIAN MOVE I SHOULD WELCOME A COPY BY FLASH TELEGRAM.

ALLINSON

FILES

RHODESIA D
OADS
NAD
PUSD
PLANNING STAFF
ES & SD
CCD
FRD
UND
LEGAL ADVISERS
(MR FREELAND)
(MR FIFOOT)
ECON D
PCD
DEF D
OID

NEWS D
PS
PS/SIR I GILMOUR
PS/MR LUCE
PS/MR RIDLEY
PS/MR HURD
PS/PUS

SIR J GRAHAM
LORD N G LENNOX
MISS BROWN
MR DAY
MR WILLSON
MR ASPIN

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION
RHODESIA POLICY

PS
PS/SIR I GILMOUR
PS/MR LUCE
S/PUS
SIR J GRAHAM
MR WILLSON
MR DAY
LORD N G LENNOX
MR ASPIN

PS/NO 10 DOWNING STREET

MR R L WADE-GERY)
MR P M MAXEY) CABINET
COL MOIR) OFFICE
MR P J FOWLER)
DIO)

.....
HD/RHOD DEPT (4)

HD/C AF D
HD/S AF D

HD/PUSD (2)

HD/NEWS DEPT
HD/WAD

MR FREELAND LEGAL ADVISER RM K200A

MR FIFOOT LEGAL ADVISER RM K164

RESIDENT CLERK

99X

IMMEDIATE

ADVANCE COPY

②
P. Minter

and

GR 450

CONFIDENTIAL

FM UKMIS NEW YORK 070021Z NOV 79

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1457 OF 6 NOVEMBER

INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON

MY TELNO 1421 AND TELECONS WITH MISS SPENCER AND RENWICK: RHODESIA
IN THE FOURTH COMMITTEE

1. IT NOW APPEARS THAT, DESPITE OUR BEST EFFORTS, THE CHAIRMAN
OF THE FOURTH COMMITTEE IS PLANNING TO START A DEBATE ON
RHODESIA ON THURSDAY.

2. THIS IS A PERFECT NUISANCE TO SAY THE LEAST, BUT TO BE HONEST,
I AM SURPRISED THAT THE AFRICANS HAVE HELD OFF FOR SO LONG. I
SPOKE THIS EVENING TO SALIM (TANZANIA) AND ASKED HIM IF THERE WAS
ANY HOPE OF POSTPONING THE DEBATE IN VIEW OF THE STATE OF PLAY AT
LANCASTER HOUSE. HE SAID THAT HE AND, BY IMPLICATION, THE FRONT
LINE STATES, HAD BEEN AGAINST THE DEBATE. HE HAD SAID AS MUCH AT
THE AFRICAN GROUP, POINTING OUT THAT THERE WAS NOTHING OF
SUBSTANCE TO BE SAID WHILE LANCASTER HOUSE CONTINUED. HOWEVER, THERE
WAS STRONG PRESSURE FROM THE PATRIOTIC FRONT FOR A DEBATE AND
THEY HAD SUPPORT FROM OTHER AFRICAN DELEGATIONS (WE BELIEVE THESE
TO INCLUDE BENIN AND LIBYA). HE FELT THAT IT WOULD NOW BE IMPOSSIBLE
TO DIVIDE OFF THE AFRICAN GROUP.

D INCLUDE BENIN AND LIBYA). HE FELT THAT IT WOULD NOW BE IMPOSSIBLE
TO DRIVE OFF THE AFRICAN GROUP.

3. SALIM WENT ON TO SAY THAT HE HAD SPOKEN TODAY TO THE PATRIOTIC FRONT AND TO OTHER AFRICANS. HE THOUGHT HE HAD PERSUADED THEM TO ACCEPT A MIDWAY COURSE IE THAT THE PATRIOTIC FRONT SHOULD ADDRESS THE FOURTH COMMITTEE FOLLOWED BY ONE OR TWO DELEGATES WHO WISHED TO EXPRESS THEIR VIEWS. THE DEBATE SHOULD THEN BE DEFERRED PENDING THE OUTCOME OF LANCASTER HOUSE.

4. I THANKED SALIM FOR HIS HELPFULNESS THROUGHOUT. I MADE THE POINT THAT IT WOULD BE EXTREMELY DIFFICULT FOR ME TO CONTEMPLATE A MAJOR STATEMENT OF SUBSTANCE IN THE DEBATE. THIS WOULD BE TANTAMOUNT TO OPENING UP A SECOND LANCASTER HOUSE CONFERENCE. SALIM AGREED WITHOUT HESITATION AND WAS OBVIOUSLY NOT EXPECTING ME TO PARTICIPATE.

5. I THINK THAT SALIM'S SCENARIO IS THE BEST THAT WE CAN HOPE FOR. I PROPOSE TO KEEP A LOW PROFILE AND NOT TO PARTICIPATE IN THE DEBATE UNLESS I NEED TO REFUTE ALLEGATIONS OF BAD FAITH OR SOMETHING OF THAT KIND IN RIGHT OF REPLY.

6. IT IS GRATIFYING THAT SALIM IS STILL PLAYING A RESTRAINING ROLE. MANSFIELD GATHERED FROM A SECRETARAIT CONTACT THAT THE PATRIOTIC FRONT HERE CONSIDER THAT THE FLS ARE BEING TOO MODERATE AND ARE BRINGING THEM UNDER PRESSURE. THEY ARE THEREFORE TRYING TO DRUM UP PUBLIC SUPPORT FROM SOME OF THE WILDER AFRICANS OUTSIDE THE COMMONWEALTH/FLS GROUP.

PARSONS

NNNN

7/20/55



a FW
CWO
COJ
LPSO.

10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

6 November 1979

Dear Sir,

I thought that you would find it helpful to have, on Privy Counsellor terms, the attached copy of the draft of the Enabling Bill on Rhodesia which we plan to publish tomorrow afternoon. An additional copy is enclosed for you to give to Peter Shore if you wish, also on Privy Counsellor terms.

We have not been able to introduce the Bill any earlier because it was necessary to table our detailed proposals for the pre-Independence arrangements, which we did last Friday, and to allow the other parties time to respond to them. We had hoped to have a reply yesterday or today.

The Bill and the Explanatory Memorandum will, I believe, answer most of your questions. If, however, you would like to see me, perhaps you would kindly let my office know.

Yours sincerely,

The Rt. Hon. James Callaghan, MP.

~~SECRET~~

(Secret tells on
Rhodesia Conf.).



10 DOWNING STREET

Prime Minister

There are a number of
interesting reports here -
particularly about Nkombo's
attitudes. I am told - though
there is no evidence in these
papers - that there are further
signs of strain within Purgab's
team.

As to Sany's planing the P.F.
prevarication - as these papers would
have led me to expect.

~~SECRET~~

Smith

5.11.79

.GRPS 800

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

DESKBY 052000Z

FM COPENHAGEN 051715Z NOV 79

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 222 OF 5 NOVEMBER

INFO PRIORITY ALL EEC POSTS, OSLO, STOCKHOLM, UKMIS NEW YORK,
WASHINGTON, LAGOS, DAR-ES-SALAAM, MAPUTO, GABORONE, LUANDA,
LUSAKA, UKDEL NATO

Prime Minister ②

srp. Duty Clerk
11 MODRA
6.11.79

[Handwritten signature]

FROM MR LUCE

1. I HAD A 45 MINUTE DISCUSSION ON RHODESIA WITH FOREIGN MINISTER OLESEN THIS AFTERNOON AFTER GOING OVER THE GROUND IN DETAIL WITH HIS PERMANENT SECRETARY AND OTHER SENIOR OFFICIALS DURING LUNCH. I BRIEFED MR OLESEN ON THE BACKGROUND TO THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE, ON THE POSITION NOW REACHED AT LANCASTER HOUSE AND ON THE WAY WE SEE THE TALKS DEVELOPING IN THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE.
2. THROUGHOUT I EMPHASISED OUR EVEN-HANDED APPROACH TO THE SALISBURY DELEGATION AND THE PATRIOTIC FRONT AND THE EXTENT TO WHICH BOTH SIDES HAD BEEN REQUIRED TO MAKE CONCESSIONS. I SAID THAT WE VERY MUCH HOPED THAT THE PATRIOTIC FRONT WOULD AGREE TO OUR PROPOSALS FOR THE INTERIM SO THAT WE COULD THEN PROCEED WITH THE DISCUSSION OF CEASEFIRE ARRANGEMENTS. AT THE SAME TIME I ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THERE WAS A REAL POSSIBILITY THAT ALL OR AT LEAST PART OF THE PATRIOTIC FRONT WOULD REFUSE. IN THAT CASE WE WOULD HAVE NO ALTERNATIVE BUT TO PROCEED WITH THE SALISBURY DELEGATION ALONE.
3. I TOLD MR OLESEN THAT, SHOULD WE BE FACED WITH A SETTLEMENT IN WHICH THE PATRIOTIC FRONT WAS NOT INVOLVED, WE WOULD NEVERTHELESS FEEL CONFIDENT THAT WE HAD DONE EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO ACHIEVE A FAIR SETTLEMENT INVOLVING ALL THE PARTIES. WE WOULD THEREFORE EXPECT THE SUPPORT OF OUR FRIENDS AND ALLIES. SO FAR AS SANCTIONS WERE CONCERNED WE BELIEVED THAT WITH A RETURN TO LEGALITY THE UN RESOLUTION ON SANCTIONS WOULD EFFECTIVELY LAPSE. IT WOULD BE A SERIOUS MATTER IF ANY OF OUR FRIENDS AND PARTNERS WERE TO MAINTAIN SANCTIONS AGAINST A COUNTRY IN A POSITION OF LEGAL DEPENDENCE ON BRITAIN.

CONFIDENTIAL

14

CONFIDENTIAL

4. I EXPLAINED THAT WE HAD MODIFIED OUR POSITION ON THE TIMING OF EVENTS, SO THAT THE TWO MONTH PERIOD WOULD COMMENCE FROM THE CEASEFIRE. THE DANES NOTED THIS.

5. MR OLESEN SAID HE WAS VERY GRATEFUL FOR THIS BRIEFING. HE CONGRATULATED YOU ON WHAT HAD BEEN ACHIEVED AT LANCASTER HOUSE. HE HAD BEEN IN OSLO LAST WEEK (IT WAS EVIDENT THAT YOUR TALK WITH THE NORWEGIAN HAD HAD A HEALTHY EFFECT). HIS NORWEGIAN COLLEAGUE HAD SAID THAT YOU HAD GIVEN HIM A PESSIMISTIC ASSESSMENT OF THE LIKELY OUTCOME OF THE CONFERENCE. MR OLESEN SAID THAT HE WAS SURPRISED BY THIS. THE CONFERENCE HAD COME SO CLOSE TO SUCCESS THAT IT COULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO BREAK DOWN. HE BELIEVED A SETTLEMENT WAS POSSIBLE IF WE SHOWED FLEXIBILITY. THE FRONT LINE STATES WERE THE KEY ELEMENT. HE THOUGHT THEY WOULD BE PREPARED TO PRESS THE PATRIOTIC FRONT SUFFICIENTLY TO BRING ABOUT A SETTLEMENT. THE DANISH GOVERNMENT'S MAIN CONCERN WAS TO SEE PEACE RESTORED BUT THEIR VIEW WAS GREATLY INFLUENCED BY THAT OF THE FRONT LINE STATES WHOSE APPROVAL WOULD BE NEEDED FOR A SETTLEMENT.

6. MR OLESEN ASKED WHAT WOULD HAPPEN TO THE VARIOUS FORCES DURING THE INTERIM PERIOD. HE THOUGHT PERHAPS THERE SHOULD BE PROVISION FOR A COMMONWEALTH MILITARY CONTINGENT TO SUPERVISE THE CEASEFIRE OR EVEN THAT THE FRONT LINE STATES SHOULD TAKE SOME RESPONSIBILITY FOR THIS. I EXPLAINED THAT IF THE POLITICAL WILL EXISTED THERE SHOULD BE NO REQUIREMENT FOR AN INDEPENDENT FORCE TO POLICE THE CEASEFIRE. IN ANY CASE A COMMONWEALTH CONTINGENT WOULD NOT BE ACCEPTABLE TO MUZOREWA, THOUGH IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE TO CONSIDER A TOKEN COMMONWEALTH MONITORING FORCE.

7. MR EIGIL JOERGENSEN (PERMANENT SECRETARY, MFA) SAID THAT ON SANCTIONS THE DANISH GOVERNMENT'S LEGAL VIEW WAS THAT A SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION COULD ONLY BE REVOKED BY A SPECIFIC RESOLUTION. BUT HE REALISED THAT THIS MIGHT PUT THE SOVIET UNION IN A POSITION TO EXERCISE A VETO. IN THIS CASE, THE DANES WOULD HAVE NO PROBLEM IN SUPPORTING US. BUT IF THE ISSUE WAS NOT SO CLEAR CUT, THE DANISH ATTITUDE WOULD DEPEND TO A LARGE DEGREE ON THEIR POLITICAL ASSESSMENT WHETHER EVERYTHING REASONABLE HAD BEEN DONE TO REACH A FAIR SETTLEMENT.

2
CONFIDENTIAL

| MR OLESEN

CONFIDENTIAL

MR OLESEN AGREED, BUT ADDED THAT HE PREFERRED NOT TO BE SO PESSIMISTIC ABOUT THE OUTCOME OF THE CONFERENCE. I REPLIED DEPLOYING THE ARGUMENTS SET OUT IN THE LEGAL ADVISERS' PAPER "ENDING OF OBLIGATIONS TO APPLY SANCTIONS AGAINST SOUTHERN RHODESIA", A COPY OF WHICH I HAD GIVEN TO JOERGENSEN AT LUNCH.

8. COMMENT: MR OLESEN WAS RELUCTANT TO BE DRAWN INTO DETAILED DISCUSSION OF THE SITUATION WHICH COULD ARISE IF WE REACHED A SETTLEMENT WITHOUT THE PATRIOTIC FRONT. HE MAY HAVE PREFERRED TO AVOID DIFFICULT GROUND ON WHICH HE WOULD HAVE HAD TO EXPRESS OPINIONS WHICH WE WOULD FIND UNPALATABLE. EQUALLY, GIVEN THE SHORT PERIOD FOR WHICH HE HAS BEEN FOREIGN MINISTER, HE MAY HAVE FELT INSECURE IN DETAILED DISCUSSION. IN SPITE OF THIS AND ALTHOUGH HE GAVE NO COMMITMENT TO SUPPORT US IF WE WENT AHEAD WITHOUT THE PATRIOTIC FRONT, I THINK IT WAS USEFUL TO PUT OUR ARGUMENTS TO MR OLESEN AND HIS OFFICIALS AT FIRST HAND. IT IS HELPFUL THAT YOU WILL HAVE A CHANCE TO FOLLOW THEM UP WHEN YOU SEE HIM NEXT WEEK.

WARBURTON

FILES

RHODESIA D
OADS
NAD
PUSD
PLANNING STAFF
ES & SD
CCD
FRD
UND
LEGAL ADVISERS
(MR FREELAND)
(MR FIFOOT)
ECON D
PCD
DEF D
OID

NEWS D
PS
PS/SIR I GILMOUR
PS/MR LUCE
PS/MR RIDLEY
PS/MR HURD
PS/PUS

SIR J GRAHAM
LORD N G LENNOX
MISS BROWN
MR DAY
MR WILLSON
MR ASPIN

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION RHODESIA POLICY

CONFIDENTIAL

cc Mr. Whitmore
Mr. Alexander

PRIME MINISTER

Timetable for the Rhodesia Bill

The business managers have been giving some further thought to the timetable for the first Rhodesia Bill. What they are now likely to suggest at this afternoon's meeting of OD is the following sequence of events:

Tuesday 6 November

Notice of introduction will be given very late in the day, in the hope that the news will not get out on Tuesday night — but in fact it is bound to do so because backbenches will soon spot the motions necessary to change the business.

Wednesday 7 November

There will be a short business statement by the Leader of the House and a somewhat fuller statement by the Lord Privy Seal about the Government's intentions. The Bill will be introduced and receive a first reading.

Thursday 8 November

Second reading in the Commons.

Friday 9 November

All remaining stages in the Commons

Monday 12 November/Tuesday 13 November

All stages in the Lords.

This timetable is for discussion at OD this afternoon. If agreed there, then there will have to be negotiations with the Opposition. If they are fully co-operative, it would be possible to take all stages in the Commons on Thursday; but if there is any risk of obstruction, the Chief Whip and the Leader of the House would prefer to allow two days for the Commons discussion. Friday is a Private Members' Day in the Commons, so that if it has to be taken over for the Rhodesia Bill there would have to be a day of "injury time" for Private Members next week.

MS

5 November 1979

CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT



STATE HOUSE
RIBADU ROAD
LAGOS, NIGERIA

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No.

T134a/79T

Ref. No. SH 1882/S. 70

5th November, 1979.

Dear Prime Minister,

I thank you for writing to me so soon after the return to London of the Honourable Richard Luce to let me know that he has given you an account of his discussion with me on 24 October.

I am grateful of the assurances you expressed of your determination in seeking to achieve a satisfactory outcome in the Second Stage of the Conference.

Mr. Luce may have informed you that I did feel, and still do, that given the present difficult situation in Zimbabwe the two months period intended for the Parties to prepare for elections could be extended to at least four months.

I was also made to understand that it was not intended to provide for Voter's Registration or to arrange for a delimitation of Constituencies. Instead, there would be provision for Party Lists. I know that the Party Lists system is not one which Her Majesty's Government and the Nigerian Government are familiar with although it is said to be extensively used on the European Continent. Nevertheless, I am not unhappy about the intended use of this innovation since I understand that both sides, namely the Muzorewa Group and the Patriotic Front, have found it acceptable.

Furthermore, it is my feeling that it would be essential for peace to be achieved and maintained before embarking upon elections. I therefore urge that a ceasefire should be first attained. In my view, it would be equally essential for provision to be made

... /against possible breaches

*The Rt. Hon. Mrs. Margaret Thatcher, M.P.,
Prime Minister,
10 Downing Street,
LONDON.*



- 2 -


against possible breaches of the ceasefire as I am not sure that even in the best spirit of compromise military commanders on both sides would find it easy to meet and work or fight together for peace.

It is still not sufficiently clear to me what your intentions are with regard to the establishment of a peace-keeping force. While I appreciate that we are expecting a political agreement, together with the will to fulfil that agreement, I must express reservations about the adequacy of the Police Force, even if assisted by British Police Advisers.

Taking into account all the circumstances, we in Nigeria feel reasonably satisfied with the spirit of compromise which is so far emerging. Accordingly, we are looking forward to a successful conference to a mutually acceptable, genuinely free and independent Zimbabwe.

On bilateral relations, please permit me to avail myself of this opportunity to thank you for your congratulatory message of best wishes for the success of my Administration in the years ahead. I and my Administration share your expressed intention for us to work together on international problems of common concern. It is indeed our reciprocal desire to strengthen Anglo-Nigerian relations and I feel that everything should be done to sustain the co-operation and understanding that have long existed between our two countries and peoples.

Yours Very Sincerely,


(ALHAJI SHEHU SHAGARI)
PRESIDENT OF THE FEDERAL
REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA

CONFIDENTIAL



MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1
Telephone 01-933X02X 218 2111/3

CONFIDENTIAL

5th November 1979

(3)

MO 5/6

Dear Rhodesia,

Bennie Punter
[Signature] *[Signature]* *[Signature]*

Thank you for your letter of 31st October about the Rhodesian Constitutional Conference. I am sorry that this reply must be lengthy.

On the basis of the papers you have forwarded, and MOD studies already undertaken, my Secretary of State is content that proposals should now be made for the appointment of a Military Adviser to the Governor in Rhodesia, and for supporting military staff to assist him during the pre-independence period. (The question of secretarial and clerical support to which you refer in your fourth paragraph can no doubt be addressed later). We believe that it should be feasible to provide from the British Army the officers required.

If, however, specific proposals for appointments are now to be made, it will be necessary to clarify the numbers involved and to agree on appropriate ranks. We believe that the Military Adviser should be a Major General and that he should be supported by a Brigadier, who would act as Liaison Officer with the Rhodesian National Joint Operations Centre, as you propose. You go on to propose "additional officers, perhaps a further 15 or 20" to "act as liaison officers with the JOCs at local level in Rhodesia". We had envisaged a need to man six area JOCs, perhaps with a Lieutenant Colonel supported by a Captain. This would amount to 12 officers.

As to the establishment of a monitoring group, our studies have assumed the need to cover, in addition to the JOCs, 18 military assembly areas, two air bases and six designated crossing points, with teams made up of one officer plus 10 NCOs.

/ This would ...

R M J Lyne Esq
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

2.

This would mean a requirement for 26 teams, but we think it would be prudent to assume a requirement for 30, ie 30 officers plus 300 NCOs. All these teams could be found from the British Armed Forces at reasonably short notice (something like 16 days) but with some penalty to operational efficiency. They would be drawn from a number of units and we suggest they should be deployed wearing the scarlet berets of the Royal Military Police to distinguish them from the Rhodesian security forces. If other Commonwealth nations contributed to the monitoring group, we would hope they would be prepared to make their contribution in the form of similar teams, which would operate under the command of the British Major General. We accept that they might also wish to attach a senior officer to the General's Headquarters. We note the FCO view (in paragraph 5 of the paper "Rhodesia: Ceasefire Arrangements") that the monitoring group need number no more than 200 - 300 Servicemen; but this estimate turns on an assessment of the number of areas to be monitored; we could only confirm an initial military assessment after discussion with the senior officers of the Rhodesian Armed Forces who are attending the Lancaster House Conference. A reconnaissance on the ground in Rhodesia would be essential before a monitoring group was deployed. It is also likely that some support from the Air Transport Force would be required, which could be made available at the expense of their other commitments.

You will gather from the above that a good deal of the study for which Lord Carrington asked has already been done. We have concluded that the monitoring concept discussed with General Walls could be effective in circumstances of a complete ceasefire which we had good reason to think would hold, and of a complete withdrawal of both Patriotic Front and Zimbabwe-Rhodesian forces to designated Assembly areas. We have, however, noted a number of difficulties about the concept which would need to be fully considered. Mr Pym thinks it important that these difficulties should be spelt out.

Since the "monitors" would not have an intervention or peace-keeping capability, they would be armed only for personal protection. Their only role would be observation and reporting. They would therefore have to be withdrawn if the ceasefire broke down. The Governor would have to define clearly in advance the

/ circumstances ...

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL



CONFIDENTIAL

3.

circumstances in which the ceasefire would have been deemed to have broken down, and to consider the political implications of withdrawing the monitors (but presumably leaving the Military Adviser and supporting staff). The Rhodesian Armed Forces would not, in our view, be able to undertake routine patrols if they were to be monitored along with the Patriotic Front (pace paragraph 2 of "Ceasefire Arrangements"). Our understanding is that the security forces would only be called in to support the police, who would, as you say, have responsibility for maintaining law and order, on the authority of the Governor.

Your proposals appear to assume that military monitors would monitor only the activities of the Rhodesian Armed Forces and the Patriotic Front. Separate provisions might be required for monitoring the auxiliary forces. Does Lord Carrington envisage this? Finally, the extent to which monitoring teams would have to rely on the local security forces for essential logistic, administrative and communications support could cast doubt on their neutrality.

Whether or not these points are likely to become important issues in the later stages of the negotiations at Lancaster House is, of course, for the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary to judge. Mr Pym is concerned that, having identified them in the course of our work, we should register them now so that further work can be set in hand by our two Departments, if necessary, in order to develop the ceasefire proposals in whatever way may be required to render them both operationally viable and presentationally sufficient.

We assume that any extra cost arising to Defence Votes should be met by FCO.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Michael Alexander (No 10).

Yours ever
Brian Norbury

(B M NORBURY)

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

5 NOV 1979

9 10 11 12 1 2 3 4
8 7 6 5

[RHODESIA: POLICY: ADVANCE COPIES]

33

IMMEDIATE

PS (4)
PS/SIR I GILMOUR
PS/MR LUCE
PS/PUS
SIR J GRAHAM
MR WILLSON
MR DAY
LORD N G LENNOX
MR ASPIN

PS/NO 10 DOWNING STREET

MR R L WADE-GERY)
MR P M MAXEY) CABINET
COL MOIR) OFFICE
MR P J FOWLER)
DIO)

.....
HD/RHOD DEPT (4)

HD/C AF D
HD/S AF D

HD/PUSD (2)

HD/NEWS DEPT
HD/WAD

MR FREELAND LEGAL ADVISER RM K200A

MR FIFOOT LEGAL ADVISER RM K164

RESIDENT CLERK

ADVANCE COPIES

Prime Minister

CONFIDENTIAL

FM MAPUTO 031820Z NOV 79

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 373 OF 3 NOV

INFO MIRIMBA SALISBURY UKMIS NEW YORK WASHINGTON DAR ES SALAAM
GABORONE LUSAKA LUANDA LAGOS PRETORIA

RHODESIA AND MOZAMBIQUE

1. AQUINO DE BRAGANCA (NO 2 IN LEADING PERSONALITIES REPORT), WHO IS CLOSE TO THE PRESIDENT, TOLD ME AT A SOCIAL FUNCTION LAST NIGHT THAT FAILING AGREEMENT IN LONDON THE WAR WOULD CONTINUE. MOZAMBIQUE WOULD THEN BE INCREASINGLY AFFECTED AND THERE WOULD BE IRRESISTIBLE PRESSURES ON THE PRESIDENT TO BRING IN MODERN MILITARY EQUIPMENT TO DEAL WITH THE THREAT. THIS WOULD INEVITABLY INVOLVE THE ARRIVAL OF LARGE NUMBERS OF EXPERTS MILITARY PERSONNEL FROM A NUMBER OF COUNTRIES - HE DID NOT NAME THEM- AND THIS IN TURN WOULD VERY SERIOUSLY CURTAIL MOZAMBIQUE'S ABILITY TO CONDUCT AN INDEPENDENT FOREIGN POLICY-AS SHE IS DOING NOW.

2. YOU WILL RECALL THAT PRESIDENT MACHEL TALKED ABOUT THE DANGERS OF INTERNATIONALISATION IN HIS MESSAGE OF 1 OCTOBER (OUR TELNO 297

.....) AND ALSO WHAT THE CUBAN AMBASSADOR TOLD

AN INDEPENDENT FOREIGN POLICY-AS SHE IS DOING NOW.

2. YOU WILL RECALL THAT PRESIDENT MACHEL TALKED ABOUT THE DANGERS OF INTERNATIONALISATION IN HIS MESSAGE OF 1 OCTOBER (OUR TELNO 227 OF 1 OCTOBER) SEMI COLON AND ALSO WHAT THE CUBAN AMBASSADOR TOLD ME ON 29 OCTOBER ABOUT COMING TO THE HELP OF THEIR FRIENDS AND ALLIES (MY TELNO 359).

PAPADOPOULOS

NNNN

SENT AT

032030ZMEC

RECD 032030Z RM

IMMEDIATE

15

[RHODESIA: POLICY: ADVANCE COPIES]

33

IMMEDIATE

PS
PS/SIR I GILMOUR
PS/MR LUCE
PS/PUS
SIR J GRAHAM
MR WILLSON
MR DAY
LORD N G LENNOX
MR ASPIN

PS/NO 10 DOWNING STREET

MR R L WADE-GERY
MR P M MAXEY
COL MOIR
MR P J FOWLER
DIO

CABINET
OFFICE

.....
HD/RHOD DEPT (4)

Ha N. Amet D

HD/C AF D

HD/S AF D

HD/PUSD (2)

HD/NEWS DEPT

HD/WAD

MR FREELAND LEGAL ADVISER RM K200A

MR FIFOOT LEGAL ADVISER RM K164

RESIDENT CLERK

Bennie Hunter

[Handwritten signature]

~~IMMEDIATE~~
ADVANCE COPY

GR 683

CONFIDENTIAL

FM WASHINGTON 031610Z NOVEMBER 79

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 3529 OF 3 NOVEMBER 1979

INFO PRIORITY MIRIMBA SALISBURY DAR ES SALAAM MAPUTO LUSAKA

LUANDA GABORONE UKMIS NEW YORK

RHODESIA: CONGRESSIONAL SENTIMENT

1. THERE IS WIDESPREAD ADMIRATION ON THE HILL FOR YOUR HANDLING OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE. NOTWITHSTANDING SOME RESERVATIONS ABOUT THE SHORTNESS OF THE INTERIM PERIOD, THE GENERAL FEELING IN BOTH HOUSES IS THAT OUR PROPOSALS FOR A CONSTITUTION AND THE TRANSITIONAL ARRANGEMENTS PROVIDE A BASIS FOR FAIR ELECTIONS AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF GENUINE MAJORITY RULE IN RHODESIA.

2. KISSINGER, WITH WHOM I HAVE HAD A LONG DISCUSSION ON THE SUBJECT, SAID THAT HE WAS FOUR-SQUARE BEHIND YOU. HE WOULD DO ANYTHING TO HELP. HE HAS SUBSEQUENTLY HAD A MEETING WITH 20 REPUBLICAN SENATORS AND TELLS ME THAT THEY ARE UNANIMOUS IN THEIR SUPPORT. OTHER CONTACTS INDICATE THAT MOST DEMOCRAT SENATORS ALSO SUPPORT OUR ENDEAVOURS. IN THE HOUSE, WHICH HAS TENDED TO BE LESS SYMPATHETIC TO MUZOREMA, LIBERAL DEMOCRATS SUCH AS SOLARZ NOW CONCEDE THAT EVEN IF THE PATRIOTIC FRONT EXCLUDES THEMSELVES

HOW CONCEDE THAT EVEN IF THE PATRIOTIC FRONT EXCLUDE THEMSELVES FROM THE SETTLEMENT PROPOSALS, IT WILL BE IMPOSSIBLE TO PREVENT THE LIFTING OF SANCTIONS BY CONGRESS ONCE HMG DECIDE TO DO SO.

3. IN THE EVENT OF THE PATRIOTIC FRONT'S REFUSAL TO PARTICIPATE, THERE MAY BE THOSE IN CONGRESS (PARTICULARLY THE BLACK CAUCUS IN THE HOUSE) WHO WILL ARGUE THAT THE SETTLEMENT IS INVALID SINCE IT HAS FAILED TO BRING ABOUT PEACE AND THAT HMG SHOULD HAVE BEEN MORE FLEXIBLE IN NEGOTIATION WITH THE PATRIOTIC FRONT. OTHERS MAY SUGGEST THAT THE LIFTING OF U S SANCTIONS IN SUCH CIRCUMSTANCES WOULD CAUSE UNACCEPTABLE DAMAGE TO AMERICAN POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC TIES WITH BLACK AFRICA AND WOULD ONLY ENCOURAGE SOVIET AND CUBAN INVOLVEMENT ON THE SIDE OF THE PATRIOTIC FRONT. HOWEVER, IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT FOR EITHER GROUP TO APPEAR TO BE ENDORSING THE PATRIOTIC FRONT'S REJECTION OF MANIFESTLY REASONABLE BRITISH PROPOSALS. THOSE MEMBERS OF CONGRESS WHO MIGHT OBJECT TO THE LIFTING OF U S SANCTIONS WOULD ALMOST CERTAINLY BE OUTNUMBERED BY THOSE WHO CONSIDERED THAT THERE WAS NO LONGER A VALID REASON FOR FURTHER DELAY.

4. IN FORMULATING ITS OWN POLICY, THE ADMINISTRATION WILL BE INFLUENCED BY THE ATTITUDES OF BLACK AMERICAN POLITICAL LEADERS. BUT IT WILL NOT BE ABLE TO IGNORE THE LIKELY WEIGHT OF CONGRESSIONAL SENTIMENT IN FAVOUR OF LIFTING SANCTIONS. ALTHOUGH IT HAS NARROWLY MAINTAINED SUPPORT FOR ITS SANCTIONS POLICY SO FAR, ANY MOVE BY THE ADMINISTRATION TO KEEP U S SANCTIONS IN OPERATION IN FACE OF A DECISION BY HMG TO LIFT BRITISH SANCTIONS WOULD RISK A HUMILIATING DEFEAT IN CONGRESS. IT IS UNLIKELY THAT CARTER WOULD SEEK SUCH A CONFRONTATION ON THIS ISSUE, EVEN IF HE WERE SO MINDED.

HENDERSON

NNNN

CONFIDENTIAL

GRS 500

CONFIDENTIAL

DESKBY FCO 032237Z

FM LUSAKA 032140Z NOV 79

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1190 OF 3 NOVEMBER

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, DAR ES SALAAM, MAPUTO, GABORONE,
PRIORITY LAGOS, MONROVIA, PRETORIA, MIRIMBA SALISBURY, UKMIS NEW
YORK, LUANDA, CANBERRA, NAIROBI

YOUR TELNO 909: RHODESIA

US AMBASSADOR WISNER TO-NIGHT DELIVERED PRESIDENT CARTER'S BRIEF BUT STRONG MESSAGE IN SUPPORT OF OUR EFFORTS. WISNER TELLS ME THAT THE PRESIDENT WAS STILL IN SESSION WITH HIS FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE AND WAS LOOKING WORN DOWN AND SUBDUED, EYES BLOOD SHOT AND GENERALLY SHOWING SIGNS OF GREAT TENSION.

2. KAUNDA SAID THAT HE WAS PREPARING A MEMORANDUM FOR YOU WHICH I WILL PRESUMABLY BE GIVEN TO-MORROW. HE FULLY AGREED THAT THE CONFERENCE HAD REACHED A CRITICAL STAGE AND THAT THERE WAS HOPE STILL. HOWEVER HE SAID THAT HE WAS WORRIED BY TWO FACTORS IN PARTICULAR. AFTER THIS HE SIDE TRACKED HIMSELF SO WISNER HAS TO ASSUME THAT HE GOT THE SECOND POINT RIGHT SINCE KAUNDA BLURRED THINGS.
3. THE FIRST POINT WAS MOST DEFINITELY TIMING. THE DURATION OF THE INTERIM PERIOD WAS ALL IMPORTANT AND THE BRITISH PROPOSAL WAS DEFINITELY TOO SHORT. HOW COULD THE PF WHOSE LEADERS HAD BEEN ABROAD SO LONG RETURN AND SET UP OFFICES AND AN ELECTION ORGANISATION IN THE TIME SCALE PROPOSED? MORE TIME WAS NEEDED FOR THIS AND FOR PEOPLE TO SETTLE DOWN AND FOR RECONCILIATION.
4. THE SECOND POINT SEEMED TO BE REFUGEES. KAUNDA SAID THAT THERE WERE 200,000 OUTSIDE RHODESIA: 50 TO 60,000 IN ZAMBIA, 20 TO 30,000 IN BOTSWANA, 8 TO 10 IN ANGOLA AND THE BALANCE IN MOZAMBIQUE. THEY HAD TO BE GOT BACK AND THAT TOO WOULD TAKE TIME.

/5. KAUNDA

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

5. KAUNDA EMPHASISED THAT HE RETAINED HIS TRUST IN THE PRIME MINISTER AND SINCERELY BELIEVED SHE INTENDED TO DO THE RIGHT THING. INDEED HE PRAYED THAT BRITAIN WOULD SEE IT THROUGH TO FREE AND FAIR ELECTIONS. IF THE ELECTIONS WERE NOT SEEN TO BE FREE THE OAU WOULD CALL FOR THE ARMED STRUGGLE TO CONTINUE AND HOW COULD ZAMBIA STAND OUT ALONE? THE PRIME MINISTER DID NOT HAVE SUFFICIENT PERSPECTIVE ON THE PROBLEMS OF LIFE IN AFRICA. THERE WERE CARDINAL ERRORS IN OUR PROPOSALS APART FROM THE TIME SCALE. FOR EXAMPLE THE PF HAD SAID THAT POLICE AND SOLDIERS WHO HAD BEHAVED BADLY WOULD BE PUNISHED. HOW COULD THESE SAME POLICEMEN BE TRUSTED TO BEHAVE IMPARTIALLY AGAINST THAT THREAT?

6. AS I DID LAST NIGHT WISNER GOT THE FIRM IMPRESSION KAUNDA IS BEGGING FOR HELP. KAUNDA SAID IN EMOTIONAL TERMS THAT HE NEEDED HELP IN PUTTING MATTERS TO THE OAU. HE WAS WILLING TO GO TO LONDON. IT HAD BEEN SUGGESTED THAT HE SHOULD GO AS CHAIRMAN OF THE CHGM BUT HE DID NOT WANT TO DO THIS AND DID NOT FEEL HE COULD GO WITHOUT A SPECIFIC INVITATION.

7. IN THE LIGHT OF WISNER'S CONVERSATION IT WOULD BE MOST HELPFUL IF BEFORE I SEE KAUNDA AT 0930 HOURS GMT I COULD BE AUTHORISED FORMALLY TO INVITE HIM TO LONDON. IT IS CLEAR HE IS TRULY SEEKING A WAY OUT OF HIS DILEMMA. KAUNDA FEELS HE IS IN A CORNER AND BOTH WISNER AND I ARE SURE HE IS SEEKING HELP TO GET OUT OF IT. I BELIEVE IT WOULD BE USEFUL IF I COULD ALSO BE AUTHORISED EITHER TO MAKE A SPECIFIC OFFER OF HELP IN SHIFTING REFUGEES E.G. BE ABLE TO SAY WE WOULD PUT X NUMBER OF HERCULES ASIDE FOR AN AIR LIFT OR AT LEAST ENQUIRE WHAT SORT OF HELP WOULD BE MOST USEFUL IN THAT CONTEXT.

ALLINSON

[COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING STREET]

FILES

RHODESIA D
OADS
NAD
PUSD
PLANNING STAFF
ES & SD
CCD
FRD
UND
LEGAL ADVISERS
(MR FREELAND)
(MR FIFOOT)
ECON D
PCD
DEF D
OID

NEWS D
PS
PS/SIR I GILMOUR
PS/MR LUCE
PS/MR RIDLEY
PS/MR HURD
PS/PUS
SIR A DUFF
SIR J GRAHAM
LORD N G LENNOX
MISS BROWN
MR DAY
MR WILLSON
MR ASPIN

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION
RHODESIA POLICY

CONFIDENTIAL

GRS 1200

CONFIDENTIAL

DESKBY 031430Z

FM PRETORIA 031230Z NOV 79

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 801 OF 03 NOVEMBER 1979.

INFO IMMEDIATE MIRIMBA SALISBURY AND WASHINGTON.

YOUR TELNO 443: RHODESIA: SOUTH AFRICAN APPROACH

1. ON RECEIPT OF VERBATIMS 080, 081 AND 082/79 THIS MORNING I ASKED PIK BOTHA'S PRIVATE SECRETARY WHETHER HE WOULD LIKE COPIES IMMEDIATELY. THIS RESULTED IN A REQUEST TO DELIVER THEM TO PIK BOTHA IN PERSON. OUR TALK LASTED AN HOUR AND A HALF. REID WAS PRESENT.
2. WHEN I SAW PIK BOTHA HE THANKED ME FOR THE FULL TEXTS OF THE VERBATIMS BUT DID NOT READ THEM. HE WAS ONLY INTERESTED TO PURSUE THE SUBJECT OF HIS APPROACH THROUGH HIS AMBASSADOR IN LONDON YESTERDAY AS REPORTED IN THE TUR. TO ENCOURAGE CONFIDENCE I LET HIM READ THE TELEGRAM AND AT HIS REQUEST LEFT A COPY WITH HIM FOR HIS PERSONAL USE.
3. HAVING STUDIED THE TELEGRAM CAREFULLY, HE SAID THAT IF MUZOREWA AND WALLS WANTED TO GO ALONG WITH THE PROCESS IT WAS NOT FOR THE SOUTH AFRICANS TO INTERFERE. "WE JUST WANT TO GET OUT, CLOSE THE BORDER AND FORGET ABOUT RHODESIA AS A COMPONENT OF SOUTHERN AFRICA". ANOTHER ANGOLA WAS NOW INEVITABLE. PIK BOTHA SAID THAT "THE FOOLISH LITTLE BISHOP" HAD NOW BEEN AWAY FOR TWO MONTHS AND HAD FALLEN INTO THE TRAP SO CAREFULLY LAID FOR HIM BY NKOMO AT RUSSIAN INSTIGATION. NKOMO WAS WORKING IN CLOSE CAHOOTS WITH THE RUSSIANS AND WOULD NOW WIN. HE WOULD GO INTO THE ELECTIONS REPRESENTING HIMSELF AS HAVING BEEN FORCED TO ACCEPT THE CONSTITUTION AND HE WOULD TEAR IT UP AS SOON AS HE WAS IN POWER. HE WOULD PORTRAY MUZOREWA AS A PUPPET AND WOULD PROMISE RADICAL CHANGE. NKOMO WAS A RUTHLESS EVIL MAN, A TRUE DESCENDANT OF DINGAAN.
4. PIK BOTHA WENT ON TO SAY THAT HE MADE NO ACCUSATIONS OF

CONFIDENTIAL

/BAD

CONFIDENTIAL

BAD FAITH BUT HE HAD COME AWAY FROM LONDON WITH THE CLEAR IMPRESSION THAT ELECTIONS WOULD BE HELD BY THE END OF THE YEAR. HE HAD INFORMED HIS CABINET COLLEAGUES ACCORDINGLY AND THE OPPOSITION. HE HAD THUS EXPOSED HIMSELF TO AN ACCUSATION OF BAD JUDGEMENT. THE GOVERNMENT WOULD NOW BE FORCED TO PUT THE RECORD STRAIGHT. BOTH HE AND THE PRIME MINISTER WERE MAKING SPEECHES ON MONDAY EVENING. HE HIMSELF WOULD BE SPEAKING IN DURBANVILLE (NEAR CAPE TOWN), AND WOULD HAVE TO LEAVE FOR THERE BY MIDDAY ON MONDAY. UNLESS THEY MADE THE GOVERNMENT'S POSITION QUITE CLEAR, IT COULD HAVE A TERRIBLE EFFECT ON THE BY-ELECTIONS. MEANWHILE SMITH, WHO WAS BY NO MEANS A SPENT FORCE, WOULD SOON COME OUT AND ACCUSE THE SOUTH AFRICANS OF HAVING BEEN FOOLED.

5. PIK BOTHA SAID THAT THE PF TACTICS WERE TO DELAY, AND THEY WERE SUCCEEDING. THERE HAD BEEN A DECISIVE TURN FOR THE WORSE IN THE LAST WEEK OR SO WHEN "WE HAVE MOVED FROM A WINNING TO A LOSING POSITION". MUZOREWA LOOKED MORE AND MORE LIKE A PATIENT WITH A TERMINAL ILLNESS AND IT WAS PURELY A QUESTION OF TIME. MEANWHILE THE SOUTH AFRICANS HAD POURED ANOTHER 200 MILLION RAND DOWN THE DRAIN (THE IMPLICATION WAS THAT THIS WAS ANOTHER MONTH OR TWO MONTHS SUBSIDY TO THE MUZOREWA GOVERNMENT.) IT COULD NOT GO ON LIKE THIS. IF THE BRITISH THOUGHT THEY WERE ON THE VERGE OF A BREAKTHROUGH IN THE NEGOTIATIONS, HE ASSUMED WE WOULD NOW TAKE OVER SOUTH AFRICA'S FINANCIAL COMMITMENT TO UNDER-PIN MUZOREWA WITHOUT WHICH HE WOULD BE LOST.

6. I LET BOTHA PUR IT ALL OUT, INTERPOSING ONLY AN OCCASIONAL RESTRAINING COMMENT OR QUESTION. WHEN HE HAD FINISHED, A DISCUSSION DEVELOPED IN WHICH HIS DOMESDAY MOOD LIGHTENED CONSIDERABLY. WHEN PRESSED, HE ADMITTED THAT HE COULD NOT BE CERTAIN OF WHAT WAS GOING TO HAPPEN IN RHODESIA: IT WAS HIS OWN BEST ESTIMATE, SUBJECT TO A 50% ERROR. WHEN FURTHER QUESTIONED, HE FAILED TO GIVE A CONVINCING EXPLANATION OF WHY HE THOUGHT MATTERS HAD SO SUDDENLY TAKEN SUCH A DISASTROUS TURN FOR THE WORSE SEMICOLON IT WAS NOT BECAUSE OF ANY SPECIFIC INFORMATION HE HAD RECEIVED RECENTLY. HE DID NOT, HOWEVER, ACCEPT THE ARGUMENT THAT YOU HAD ALREADY SUCCEEDED IN PUTTING THE PF UNDER EFFECTIVE PRESSURE TO CURB THEIR DELAYING TACTICS.

2
CONFIDENTIAL

/HE

CONFIDENTIAL

HE TALKED AT LENGTH AND WITH OBVIOUS WARMTH AND RESPECT OF HIS TALKS WITH YOU AND THE PRIME MINISTER IN LONDON. THE PRESENT UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE TWO GOVERNMENTS HAD NO PARALLEL SINCE THE DAYS OF CHURCHILL. THERE WAS "A UNIQUE SITUATION OF AGREEMENT". THE ONLY POINT ON WHICH THERE WAS NOT PERHAPS COMPLETE UNDERSTANDING - AND HE SAID THAT HE WAS PERHAPS AT FAULT FOR NOT HAVING EXPRESSED HIMSELF MORE CLEARLY ON THIS - WAS ON THE REALITIES OF THE AFRICAN DIMENSION. THE BRITISH POSITION WAS FAIR AND LOGICAL BY WESTERN STANDARDS BUT NKOMO WAS PLAYING IT IN THE AFRICAN WAY AND TAKING US FOR A RIDE BY SPINNING THINGS OUT IN A WAY WHICH WOULD DEFEAT US ALL. HIS FINAL WORDS WERE "DON'T, PLEASE DON'T, UNDER-ESTIMATE THIS CRITICAL DIMENSION".

7. PIK BOTHA WAS COURTEOUS BUT TENSE. THERE WERE THE USUAL CHARACTERISTIC APOCALYPTIC TOUCHES BUT THERE WAS NO MISTAKING HIS SINCERITY. I SAID THAT I WOULD REPORT AT ONCE WHAT HE HAD TOLD ME AND WOULD LET HIM KNOW AS SOON AS POSSIBLE WHAT YOUR REACTIONS WERE. I MADE IT CLEAR THAT AN UNHELPFUL PUBLIC STATEMENT EARLY NEXT WEEK WOULD BE MOST UNWELCOME.

8. I APOLOGISE FOR THE EXTREMELY INCONVENIENT TIMING BUT I STRONGLY RECOMMEND THAT YOU SHOULD SEND A MESSAGE AND I SHOULD NEED TO HAVE IT HERE DESKBY 0700Z ON MONDAY.

9. POINTS WHICH MIGHT BE INCLUDED IN THE MESSAGE ARE:

- (A) I UNDERSTAND YOUR ANXIETY ABOUT THE PASSAGE OF TIME AND ITS EFFECTS ON MUZOREWA'S CHANCES OF WINNING THE ELECTION. THERE ARE INDEED DANGERS IN FURTHER DELAY. THE PATRIOTIC FRONT WILL NOT BE ALLOWED TO SPIN THINGS OUT ANY LONGER.
- (B) I HAVE EVERY INTENTION OF BRINGING THE CONFERENCE TO A CONCLUSION BY AND GETTING THE GOVERNOR TO SALISBURY IMMEDIATELY THEREAFTER.
- (C) AT THAT STAGE THERE WILL BE A RETURN TO LEGALITY AND THE LIFTING OF SANCTIONS. YOU TOLD ME IN LONDON HOW MUCH IMPORTANCE YOU ATTACHED TO THIS. MUZOREWA WILL BE ABLE TO REPRESENT IT AS A FEATHER IN HIS CAP.

3
CONFIDENTIAL

/ (D)

CONFIDENTIAL

- (D) FROM THE TIME OF THE GOVERNOR'S ARRIVAL WE ENVISAGE A PERIOD OF NOT MORE THAN 14 DAYS TO BRING THE CEASE-FIRE INTO EFFECT. THEREAFTER WE WOULD ALLOW NINE WEEKS (ONE WEEK MORE THAN WE ORIGINALLY CONTEMPLATED) FOR THE ELECTION CAMPAIGN. THIS TAKES US TO WHILE IT WOULD HAVE BEEN BETTER TO HOLD THE ELECTIONS IN THE DRY SEASON WE OBVIOUSLY CANNOT WAIT FOR THAT.
- (E) THE TIMING IS, THEREFORE, CLEAR AND FINITE AND I AM NOT ASKING THE SAG TO COMMIT THEMSELVES TO GOING ALONG WITH AN OPEN-ENDED ARRANGEMENT. IF YOU CAN MAINTAIN YOUR SUPPORT FOR MUZOREWA DURING THIS PERIOD I BELIEVE HE WILL STAND A GOOD CHANCE OF WINNING THROUGH. WITHOUT IT HE WILL CERTAINLY LOSE.

LEAHY

FILES

RHODESIA D
OADS
NAD
PUSD
PLANNING STAFF
ES & SD
CCD
FRD
UND
LEGAL ADVISERS
(MR FREELAND)
(MR FIFOOT)
ECON D
PCD
DEF D
OID

NEWS D
PS
PS/SIR I GILMOUR
PS/MR LUCE
PS/MR RIDLEY
PS/MR HURD
PS/PUS
SIR A DUFF
SIR J GRAHAM
LORD N G LENNOX
MISS BROWN
MR DAY
MR WILLSON
MR ASPIN

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION
RHODESIA POLICY

4

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

00350

CONFIDENTIAL

FM MAPUTO 021100Z NOVEMBER 79

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 368 OF 2 NOVEMBER

mt *Prime Minister*

mt 3/4

1. IN MY TELNO 361 OF 30 OCTOBER I REPORTED THAT THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE MFA HAD TOLD ME THAT HE IS FIRMLY CONVINCED THAT NO MARXIST GOVERNMENT WOULD EMERGE FROM THE RHODESIAN ELECTIONS: AND THAT IT WAS NO PART OF HIS GOVERNMENT'S POLICY TO WORK FOR A MARXIST ELECTION VICTORY.
2. DURING MY INTRODUCTORY CALLS I HAVE BEEN GETTING THE SAME SORT OF UNSOLICITED MESSAGE FROM SOME AMBASSADORS, NOTABLY THE GUINEAN, HUNGARIAN AND THE EAST GERMAN (HOLLENDER). THE LATTER, WHO CLAIMS TO HAVE SPECIALISED IN EAST AND CENTRAL AFRICAN AFFAIRS THROUGHOUT HIS 20 YEARS IN THE FOREIGN SERVICE, YESTERDAY WENT A LITTLE FURTHER: HE MAINTAINED THAT NEITHER NKOMO OR MUGABE ARE MARXISTS: THAT THEY HAVE NOTHING APPROACHING A SOCIALIST NUCLEUS INSIDE ZIMBABWE ON WHICH A MARXIST PARTY COULD BE BUILT: AND THAT THERE IS NO PROSPECT OF THE TWO PF LEADERS EVER COMING TOGETHER IN A FREE ZIMBABWE. HOLLENDER BELIEVES THAT NOTHING HAS CHANGED FUNDAMENTALLY BETWEEN THE TWO LEADERS SINCE HIS FIRST MEETING WITH THEM IN 1966 WHEN HE TRIED TO PERSUADE THEM TO BURY THEIR PERSONAL DIFFERENCES. HE ADDED THAT QUOTE EVERYBODY, BUT EVERYBODY UNQUOTE IS FED UP WITH THE RHODESIA PROBLEM AND IS FERVENTLY HOPING FOR A SOLUTION.
3. IT MAY BE FORTUITIOUS THAT THIS IDENTICAL MESSAGE SHOULD HAVE REACHED ME FROM THE ABOVE SOURCES DURING THE LAST FEW DAYS. IF THERE IS A PLAN AND A PURPOSE BEHIND IT, THERE COULD BE ONE OF TWO REASONS: EITHER THE MOZAMBICANS AND THE OTHER SOCIALIST COUNTRIES ARE TRYING TO ALLAY ANY FEARS THAT WE MAY HAVE ABOUT THE PF, SO THAT WE CAN MAKE CONCESSIONS TO THEM THUS IMPROVING THEIR CHANCES OF WINNING THE ELECTIONS SEMICLN OR THEY GENUINELY WANT A SETTLEMENT - ANY SETTLEMENT - BUT FEAR THAT, IF WE BELIEVE THAT THE PF ARE, OR WILL SOON TURN INTO, A MARXIST ORGANISATION WE WILL REMAIN FIRM AND MAKE IT IMPOSSIBLE FOR THE PF TO SAVE ENOUGH FACE TO SUBSCRIBE TO A LONDON AGREEMENT. THE LATTER MOTIVE SOUNDS MORE LIKELY.

mt

1/4.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

4. I SHOULD ADD THAT ALL THE AMBASSADORS CONCERNED, AND ESPECIALLY THE HUNGARIAN AND EAST GERMAN, ARE OF A HIGH CALIBRE AND APPEAR TO BE WELL INFORMED.

5. MAY I LEAVE YOU TO DECIDE ON WHAT IF ANY DISTRIBUTION THIS TELEGRAM SHOULD RECEIVE?

PAPADOPOULOS

[COPIES SENT TO
NO 10 DOWNING ST]

FILES

RHOD. D

PUSD

PS

PS/LPS

PS/MR LUCE

PS/PUS

SIR J GRAHAM

MR DAY

MR ASPIN

CABINET OFFICE

2

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PRIME MINISTER

Rhodesia
(OD(79)38)

BACKGROUND

The background to the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary's paper was fully discussed at Cabinet on 1st November. There was general support for both his strategy and his tactics. He was asked to provide a list of key Questions and Answers; these are in his present Annex B. The main purpose of the OD meeting on 5th November is to establish that OD members are fully aware of the difficulties which will be involved both with international opinion (e.g. because we are taking off sanctions on indirect trade) and with domestic opinion (e.g. because we are temporarily keeping on sanctions on direct trade); and are fully briefed on how to deal with likely lines of criticism of the Government in various public fora.

HANDLING

2. You will wish to ask the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary and the Lord Privy Seal to introduce the paper and to report on the latest state of the negotiations. You will yourself wish to report on the talks which you and they had with the Leader of the Opposition and the Shadow Foreign Secretary.

3. You could then ask if members of the Committee are satisfied with the answers to questions listed in Lord Carrington's Annex B; and whether they have any further such questions. Lord Carrington and Mr. Gilmour should be asked to supply any answers required.

4. The rest of the discussion could be grouped as follows:-

- (a) Parliament: The First Bill. The Chancellor of the Duchy should be asked to run through the timetable and say if he is content. The Lord Chancellor and others will no doubt wish to comment.

CONFIDENTIAL

- (b) Parliament: The Second Bill. Lord Carrington proposes to introduce this in the second half of November. It needs to have been passed before the earliest envisaged date for independence, i.e. mid-December. Parliamentary Counsel do not think it could in fact be drafted before early December, if as expected they only receive instructions from the Foreign and Commonwealth Office in mid-November. Could the instructions be accelerated? And how long will the Government's business managers need to get the Bill through both Houses?
- (c) International Opinion. Assuming that we have to proceed without the Patriotic Front, what could be done -
- (i) to maximise support from our allies (particularly the Americans)?
 - (ii) to mitigate damage to our economic and other interests in Third World countries (especially Zambia and Nigeria)?
 - (iii) to contain the situation at the United Nations?
 - (iv) to inhibit support for the Patriotic Front from the Front Line States and from Communist countries?
- (d) British and Rhodesian Opinion
- (i) What will be the Opposition's line and how should it be countered?
 - (ii) Which aspects of our policy will most worry the Government's supporters?
 - (iii) What are the dangers of the Muzorewa Government losing majority support in Rhodesia?
 - (iv) What are the prospects for White Rhodesia opposition and/or emigration?
 - (v) Are new elections essential (or even possible) if there is no Patriotic Front participation and no cease-fire? Would a referendum be a better way of having a Test of Acceptability?
- (e) The Situation on the Ground. If there is no cease-fire, can Salisbury's security forces hold the position (i) until independence at the end of the year? (ii) thereafter?

CONFIDENTIAL


CONCLUSION

5. Subject to the discussion you may wish to guide the Committee to agree that, despite the difficulties, there is no acceptable alternative to proceeding as proposed in Lord Carrington's paper.

RA

(Robert Armstrong)

2nd November 1979



SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

The following information was obtained from a confidential source who has provided reliable information in the past.



23 NOV 1979

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL



Kie

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Principal Private Secretary

2 November 1979

Dear George,

Rhodesia

I attach a note of the meeting which the Prime Minister, the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary and the Lord Privy Seal had this morning with the Leader of the Opposition and Mr. Shore to discuss the Enabling Bill on Rhodesia.

I am sending copies of this letter and of the record to John Stevens (Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster's office), Murdo Maclean (Chief Whip's Office) and Charles Cumming-Bruce (Chief Whip's Office, H/L). A copy also goes to Martin Vile (Cabinet Office).

Yours sincerely,

Heri Whitmore.

G.G.H. Walden, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CONFIDENTIAL

A. C. R.

CONFIDENTIAL

eg Master set

NOTE OF A MEETING WITH THE LEADER OF THE OPPOSITION HELD IN
THE PRIME MINISTER'S ROOM IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS AT 1130 ON
FRIDAY 2 NOVEMBER 1979

<u>Present:</u> Prime Minister	The Rt. Hon.
Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary	James Callaghan MP
Lord Privy Seal	The Rt. Hon.
Mr C.A. Whitmore	Peter Shore MP

Rhodesia

The Prime Minister said that what she had to say about Rhodesia would be on Privy Counsellor terms. She did not want Mr. Callaghan and Mr. Shore to be taken by surprise by the Parliamentary steps which the Government would need to take on Rhodesia the following week. Existing legislation did not enable the Government to take the action that would be necessary if the Lancaster House Conference reached a successful conclusion. The Government therefore proposed to introduce an interim Enabling Bill the following week under which they would be able, by Order, to promulgate the new constitution for Rhodesia, to appoint a Governor with executive and legislative powers and to hold elections on the basis of the new constitution. As regards sanctions, the moment the Governor took over, the rebellion would be finished, Rhodesia would become a British colony again and sanctions would fall. Section 2 of the Southern Rhodesia Act 1965 provided for sanctions on indirect trade with Rhodesia and this would lapse on 15 November. The Government did not propose to renew this section in view of the likelihood that Rhodesia would soon be granted legal independence. Sanctions on direct trade with Rhodesia, however, were provided for by other acts and the Enabling Bill would maintain these sanctions until legality was restored following the Governor's arrival. The Lord Privy Seal

CONFIDENTIAL

/added

CONFIDENTIAL

-2-

added that indirect trade was that undertaken by British firms operating outside the United Kingdom and not by firms operating from within the country. It might be suggested that firms that would normally wish to engage in direct trade would now, with the lapse of Section 2 of the 1965 Act, switch to indirect trade, but the Government thought that the interval between 15 November and the abolition of sanctions on direct trade would be so short as not to make this a worthwhile change. The Enabling Bill would not provide for the grant of independence itself and for this another Bill would be needed in due course.

The Prime Minister said that the Bill might be published on Monday of next week, with the Second Reading on Wednesday or Thursday. The Opposition might prefer Thursday, since she understood that Wednesday was a supply day. If Thursday was preferable, it might be possible for the Commons to take all stages of the Bill that day.

Mr. Callaghan said that he thought that the Opposition would be able to be helpful over an Enabling Bill for the purposes which the Prime Minister had described. He would prefer to have the Second Reading on Thursday of next week. There would be strong feeling amongst Opposition Members if the steel debate planned for Wednesday did not take place. Much was, however, contingent on what happened at the Conference between now and the middle of next week. If there was a breakdown, the Opposition would have to consider its position over support for the Enabling Bill. But his advice to the Government in the meantime was to negotiate up to the hilt. He thought that the Government had done very well in the negotiations so far. But he knew that Mr. Nkomo and Mr. Mugabe were concerned about their personal safety if they entered Rhodesia to fight an election: they would in effect be putting themselves into the hands of the present state apparatus of Rhodesia including the army and police against which the Patriotic Front had been fighting. Mr. Shore added that the Governor would not, in practice, be in control of the machinery of Government in Rhodesia. He would have paper powers and not real ones in this respect.

CONFIDENTIAL

/The Prime Minister

CONFIDENTIAL

-3-

The Prime Minister said that we had achieved as much agreement in the negotiations as we needed to launch Rhodesia into legal independence based on genuine majority rule and with a constitution which was comparable to those we had granted to former British colonies. The Lancaster House Conference had agreed upon the constitution and had accepted that there should be elections with British supervision. Having achieved this measure of progress, we could not now withhold independence. Mr. Callaghan commented that he did not think that the situation in Rhodesia could be compared with most former British colonies immediately before they had been granted independence. In the case of Rhodesia there was a strong military force based outside the country. It seemed to him that it was essential to have a ceasefire and to have agreement on how the ceasefire would operate if the elections were to be secure and free.

The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary said that the Government had approached the Lancaster House Conference in three stages. The first was to obtain agreement on the constitution, subject to the interim arrangements; and this had been achieved. Second, they had sought agreement on the interim arrangements, subject to agreement on a ceasefire. The Government was in the process of trying to bring this stage to a successful conclusion and we were about to table our detailed proposals for the pre-independence period. The third stage was to reach agreement on the ceasefire itself. It was essential to adopt this kind of sequential approach. It would be fatal to try to discuss all the issues simultaneously. He understood the concern of the leaders of the Patriotic Front for their personal safety, but there was no alternative but to make use of the existing Rhodesian security forces. There were no other forces to put in their place. But there would be teams of Commonwealth observers in the country during the period of the election. It should not, however, be forgotten that the negotiations at Lancaster House were being conducted not only with the Patriotic Front but also with Bishop Muzorewa's delegation and because of the bias which Mr. Ramphal was showing towards the Patriotic Front, they were finding it increasingly difficult to accept the notion of Commonwealth involvement.

CONFIDENTIAL

/Mr Callaghan

CONFIDENTIAL

-4-

Mr. Callaghan suggested that the Government might consider an Electoral Commission and making use of United Kingdom Returning Officers for the election in Rhodesia. He also thought that there would be advantage in bringing together General Walls and Mr. Mugabe. It would be helpful if, in the debate next Thursday, the Government could say something precise about how the ceasefire would operate and about how it intended to ensure that the elections were free and fair. These were the issues on which the House would focus. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary said General Walls and the Patriotic Front Military Commander were ready to discuss the ceasefire at the appropriate moment.

2 November 1979

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

2 November 1979

Rhodesia Conference: Messages

The Prime Minister has seen the texts of the messages to President Moi, Ratu Sir Kamisese Mara and President Tolbert enclosed with your letter to me of 1 November. As I have told you on the telephone, she is content that the messages should be despatched.

M. O'D. B. ALEXANDER

R.M.J. Lyne, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT

PRIME MINISTER'S

CONFIDENTIAL

FM FCO 021220Z NOV 79

TO IMMEDIATE MONROVIA

TELEGRAM NO 138 OF 2 NOVEMBER

PERSONAL MESSAGE

SERIAL No. T.132A/79T

INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON UKMIS NEW YORK CANBERRA WELLINGTON MIRIMBA
SALISBURY MAPUTO DAR ES SALAAM LUANDA LUSAKA GABORONE

MIPT: RHODESIA

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT TOLBERT:-

BEGINS

DEAR MR PRESIDENT,

RICHARD LUCE HAS TOLD ME OF THE USEFUL TALKS THAT HE HAD WITH YOUR
FOREIGN MINISTER, MR DENNIS, ON 25 OCTOBER, AND I AM GRATEFUL
TO YOU FOR YOUR CLOSE INTEREST IN RHODESIA OVER THE PAST WEEKS,
MOST RECENTLY YOUR MESSAGE OF 30 OCTOBER.

AS RICHARD LUCE EXPLAINED, THE LANCASTER HOUSE CONFERENCE
IS NOW DISCUSSING THE PRE-INDEPENDENCE ARRANGEMENTS. AS YOU KNOW,
AND AS WAS STATED IN THE COMMONWEALTH DECLARATION AT LUSAKA,
IT IS BRITAIN'S RESPONSIBILITY TO BRING RHODESIA TO LEGAL
INDEPENDENCE, TO SUPERVISE THE ELECTIONS AND TO ENSURE THAT
THE ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE ELECTIONS ARE FAIR AS BETWEEN ALL THE
PARTIES. WE ARE READY TO CARRY OUT OUR RESPONSIBILITIES TO THE
FULL, BUT WE SHALL NOT BE PREPARED TO AGREE TO ARRANGEMENTS WHICH
GO WELL BEYOND THE LUSAKA AGREEMENT OR WHICH WOULD MAKE IT IMPOSSIBLE
FOR US TO EXERCISE OUR AUTHORITY. IT IS THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT
WHICH WILL HAVE TO ASSUME DIRECT RESPONSIBILITY FOR RHODESIA IN
THE PRE-INDEPENDENCE PERIOD AND WE NATURALLY NEED TO BE CONFIDENT
THAT WE HAVE THE AUTHORITY TO CARRY OUT THE RESPONSIBILITY.

WHAT IS REQUIRED IS NOT A COMPLICATED TRANSITIONAL STRUCTURE,
BUT FOR THE PEOPLE OF RHODESIA TO BE ALLOWED WITH MINIMUM DELAY, TO
DECIDE FOR THEMSELVES WHAT GOVERNMENT THEY WANT. IN YOUR MOST
RECENT MESSAGE YOU EXPRESSED CONCERN OVER THE LENGTH OF THE INTERIM
PERIOD WE ARE PROPOSING. OUR VIEW IS THAT THE LONGER THE PERIOD
BEFORE THE ELECTIONS, THE GREATER WILL BE THE RISK OF THE SETTLEMENT
BREAKING DOWN. IN PARTICULAR, I DO NOT BELIEVE THAT THE
PATRIOTIC FRONT'S PROPOSALS FOR A TWO-MONTH PERIOD TO ORGANISE THE
CEASEFIRE IS EITHER WORKABLE OR CONDUCIVE TO THE MAINTENANCE OF
SECURITY ON WHICH THEY ALSO LAY STRESS. IT IS UNTHINKABLE THAT
THE INTERIM PERIOD SHOULD BEGIN IN CONDITIONS WHERE THE CEASEFIRE

CONFIDENTIAL

/was

CONFIDENTIAL

WAS NOT EFFECTIVE. A PERIOD LONGER THAN TWO MONTHS WOULD ONLY LEAD TO UNCERTAINTY AND COMPLICATE OUR TASK OF CONDUCTING THE COUNTRY'S ADMINISTRATION ON A CARETAKER BASIS UNTIL THE ELECTIONS. WE SHALL NOT OF COURSE BE PREPARED TO TRANSFER POWER TO ANY PARTY WHICH HAS NOT WON IT THROUGH FAIR ELECTIONS.

IN THE CURRENT PHASE OF THE CONFERENCE WE ARE SEEKING THE AGREEMENT OF BOTH SIDES ON THE STRUCTURE FOR THE INTERIM PERIOD, NAMELY THE RE-ASSERTION OF BRITISH AUTHORITY, A GOVERNOR WITH EXECUTIVE AND LEGISLATIVE AUTHORITY EXERCISING DIRECT CONTROL OVER THE ADMINISTRATION, AND ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE ELECTIONS. OUR PROPOSALS INVOLVE BISHOP MUZOREWA AND HIS MINISTERS RELINQUISHING POWER TO ENABLE NEW ELECTIONS TO BE HELD UNDER OUR AUTHORITY. BISHOP MUZOREWA ANNOUNCED ON 27 OCTOBER THAT HE WAS PREPARED TO ACCEPT THOSE PROPOSALS IN PRINCIPLE. THIS WAS A DIFFICULT DECISION FOR HIM AND HIS DELEGATION TO MAKE, AND WE SHALL NOT BE ABLE TO ASK A GREAT DEAL MORE OF HIM. AS REGARDS THE PATRIOTIC FRONT'S PROPOSAL THAT THEY SHOULD PARTICIPATE IN THE ADMINISTRATION IN THE INTERIM PERIOD, OUR PROPOSALS PROVIDE FOR ALL PARTIES TO BE REPRESENTED ON THE ELECTION COUNCIL. WE, THROUGH THE GOVERNOR, MUST BE LEFT TO RUN THE COUNTRY.

MR DENNIS DISCUSSED WITH MR LUCE THE NATURE OF THE GOVERNOR'S AUTHORITY, ESPECIALLY IN RELATION TO THE SECURITY FORCES. YOU ALSO REFERRED TO THE MILITARY ARRANGEMENTS IN YOUR LAST MESSAGE. ONCE THE POLITICAL ASPECTS OF THE INTERIM STRUCTURE HAVE BEEN AGREED UPON, THE CONFERENCE WILL DISCUSS THE CEASEFIRE, WE PROPOSE TO ARRANGE DISCUSSIONS, UNDER OUR CHAIRMANSHIP, BETWEEN THE MILITARY EXPERTS OF BOTH SIDES. WE HAVE MADE IT CLEAR THAT THE RHODESIAN ARMED FORCES WILL BE UNDER THE COMMAND OF THE GOVERNOR AND WILL HAVE TO ACCEPT HIS AUTHORITY. THE PATRIOTIC FRONT'S FORCES WILL ALSO BE RESPONSIBLE TO THE GOVERNOR, IN RELATION TO THE CEASEFIRE. WE ENVISAGE A CEASEFIRE COMMISSION, UNDER CHAIRMANSHIP OF THE GOVERNOR'S MILITARY ADVISER, ON WHICH THE COMMANDERS OF BOTH SIDES' FORCES WILL BE REPRESENTED. IN THESE CONDITIONS THERE WOULD BE NO ROLE FOR A PEACEKEEPING FORCE. SUCH A FORCE WAS NOT ENVISAGED IN THE LUSAKA DECLARATION. AFTER THE ELECTIONS, IT WILL BE FOR THE NEWLY ELECTED GOVERNMENT TO DECIDE HOW IT WISHES TO ORGANISE THE SERVICES OF THE STATE.

THE PATRIOTIC FRONT ARE STILL CONSIDERING OUR PROPOSALS. I HOPE THAT THEY WILL ACCEPT THE SINCERITY OF OUR INTENTIONS AND OUR DETERMINATION TO ENSURE THE IMPARTIALITY OF THE ELECTION PROCESS

CONFIDENTIAL

/AND

CONFIDENTIAL

AND OF THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE COUNTRY DURING THE INTERIM PERIOD. I HOPE ALSO THAT THEY WILL BE PREPARED TO PARTICIPATE IN THE ELECTIONS. OUR ROLE IN OTHER DEPENDENT TERRITORIES HAS BEEN TO ESTABLISH CONDITIONS FOR INDEPENDENCE, NOT TO ENCOURAGE THE ASPIRATIONS OF ONE PARTY OR ANOTHER. IN A NUMBER OF COUNTRIES WE HAVE HANDED OVER POWER TO THOSE WHO HAD PREVIOUSLY BEEN CONFIRMED OPPONENTS OF THE UNITED KINGDOM. WE WILL NOT SACRIFICE THESE PRINCIPLES OF IMPARTIALITY IN THE CASE OF RHODESIA.

FOR THE FIRST TIME IN THE LONG HISTORY OF THESE NEGOTIATIONS, A SOLUTION IS WITHIN OUR GRASP. YOU WERE KIND ENOUGH TO REFER TO THE CONFIDENCE REPOSED IN MY GOVERNMENT IN OUR SEARCH FOR A SOLUTION. WE ARE FULLY AWARE OF OUR RESPONSIBILITIES AND WILL CARRY THEM OUT. WE ARE DOING EVERYTHING IN OUR POWER TO GET BOTH SIDES WITH US ON THE ROAD TO A SETTLEMENT, AND I HOPE THAT I CAN COUNT ON YOUR SUPPORT AND INFLUENCE AS THE NEGOTIATIONS CONTINUE.

YOURS SINCERELY
MARGARET THATCHER

ENDS

CARRINGTON

FILES

RHODESIA D
OADS
NAD
PUSD
PLANNING STAFF
ES & SD
CCD
FRD
UND
LEGAL ADVISERS
(MR FREELAND)
(MR FIFOOT)
ECON D
PCD
DEF D
OID

NEWS D
PS
PS/SIR I GILMOUR
PS/MR LUCE
PS/MR RIDLEY
PS/MR HURD
PS/PUS
SIR A DUFF
SIR J GRAHAM
LORD N G LENNOX
MISS BROWN
MR DAY
MR WILLSON
MR ASPIN

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION
RHODESIA POLICY

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

M FCO 021130Z NOV 79

TO IMMEDIATE MONROVIA

TELEGRAM NO 137 OF 2 NOVEMBER

INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON UKMIS NEW YORK CANBERRA WELLINGTON MIRIMBA
SALISBURY MAPUTO DAR ES SALAAM LUANDA LUSAKA GABORONE

Handwritten signature

MY TELNO 351 TO DAR ES SALAAM: RHODESIA

1. MIFT CONTAINS THE TEXT OF A MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO PRESIDENT TOLBERT, WHICH IN THE PRESIDENT'S ABSENCE YOU SHOULD DELIVER TO THE FOREIGN MINISTER AS SOON AS POSSIBLE, DRAWING ON MY TUR AS NECESSARY. YOU MIGHT ADD THAT WE FIND IT SURPRISING, FOLLOWING MR LUCE'S CONVERSATION WITH DENNIS, THAT THE PRESIDENT'S VIEWS SEEM SO FIRMLY BASED UPON THE POSITION OF THE PATRIOTIC FRONT ALONE.
2. THE PRESIDENT SHOULD BE AWARE THAT THEY ARE NOT THE ONLY PARTY TO THE CONFERENCE, AND IT IS OUR TASK TO FIND COMMON GROUND BETWEEN THE VERY DIFFERENT APPROACHES OF THE PF AND SALISBURY DELEGATIONS. BISHOP MUZOREWA HAS ALREADY MADE MAJOR CONCESSIONS IN ACCEPTING OUR PROPOSALS FOR THE INTERIM PERIOD. HIS AGREEMENT WAS BY NO MEANS A FOREGONE CONCLUSION. IF THE PF CANNOT ALSO ACCEPT THAT THE ELECTIONS SHOULD BE HELD UNDER BRITISH GOVERNMENT AUTHORITY, THE CONFERENCE WILL FACE GRAVE DIFFICULTIES. FINALLY, IN ORDER TO MEET THE POINT ABOUT FLEXIBILITY MADE IN TOLBERT'S MESSAGE OF 30 OCTOBER, YOU MIGHT REFER TO THE EFFORTS WE HAVE MADE TO ANSWER EXHAUSTIVELY QUESTIONS PUT BY THE PF AND TO EXPLORE IN DEPTH THE POINTS WHICH CAUSE THEM DIFFICULTY.
3. YOU SHOULD ALSO SAY THAT THE PRIME MINISTER HAS GONE INTO THE QUESTIONS RAISED BY PRESIDENT TOLBERT IN SOME DETAIL, AND THAT WE HOPE THE EXCHANGE CAN BE KEPT CONFIDENTIAL.

CARRINGTON

F I L E S

RHODESIA D
OADS
NAD
FUSD
PLANNING STAFF
ES & SD
CCD
FRD
UND
LEGAL ADVISERS
(MR FREELAND)
(MR FIFOOT)
ECON D
PCD
DEF D
OID

NEWS D
PS
PS/SIR I GILMOUR
PS/MR LUCE
PS/MR RIDLEY
PS/MR HURD
PS/PUS
SIR A DUFF
SIR J GRAHAM
LORD N G LENNOX
MISS BROWN
MR DAY
MR WILLSON
MR ASPIN

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION

RHODESIA POLICY

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT

PRIME MINISTER'S

PERSONAL MESSAGE

SERIAL No. T131/79T

RS 800

CONFIDENTIAL

DESKBY 011100Z FCO

FM LUSAKA 011015Z NOV 79

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1177 OF 1 NOVEMBER

INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON.

Prime Minister

M.I.P.T.

DUE TO CLERICAL ERROR BY KAUNDA'S OFFICE WE HAVE RECEIVED TEXT OF LETTER WHICH PRIOR TO OUR MEETING HE HAD INTENDED TO SEND TO PRIME MINISTER. IT READS AS FOLLOWS:

I AM MOST GRATEFUL TO YOU FOR YOUR LETTER OF 31ST OCTOBER WHICH I HAVE RECEIVED TODAY THROUGH YOUR HIGH COMMISSIONER HERE, SIR ALLINSON.

I THOUGHT I SHOULD REPLY TO YOU IMMEDIATELY BECAUSE YOUR TALKS ARE REACHING A REALLY DELICATE STAGE REQUIRING ALL OF US TO PUT OUR HEADS TOGETHER TO MAKE CERTAIN THAT WE DO NOT AGAIN MISS THE CHANCE FOR A SETTLEMENT. AS YOU POINT OUT IN YOUR LETTER THIS IS THE FIRST TIME WE HAVE COME SO CLOSE TO AN AGREEMENT.

I WANT TO URGE YOU, AS CHAIRMAN, TO GIVE THE PARTIES TO THE CONFERENCE TIME TO NEGOTIATE AND REACH REASONABLE COMPROMISE ON POINTS WHERE DIFFERENCES STILL EXIST. THIS PHASE OF THE CONFERENCE IS SO CRUCIAL THAT WE, YOUR COLLEAGUES, CERTAINLY EXPECT YOU TO ALLOW TIME FOR REASONABLE NEGOTIATION.

I MUST BE VERY FRANK WITH YOU. ONE BASIC ELEMENT OF THE TRANSITION CONTINUES TO WORRY ME VERY MUCH AND YOUR LETTER TO ME HAS NOT BEEN ABLE TO EASE MY EXTREME CONCERN. THIS IS YOUR PROPOSAL AND INSISTENCE TO PUT THE GOVERNOR INTO RHODESIA FOR A PERIOD OF TWO MONTHS ONLY. I AM FULLY CONVINCED THAT YOU ARE IN VERY SERIOUS ERROR IN THIS REGARD. IT CAN BE TRAGIC, MARGARET. YOU ARE EXCEEDINGLY UNDERESTIMATING NOT JUST THE FORCES AT PLAY BUT BOTH THE SIZE OF THE TASK AND THE COMPLEXITY OF THE SITUATION FOR WHICH YOU ARE TAKING RESPONSIBILITY AND ARE SENDING A GOVERNOR TO SORT OUT. WE ARE ALL AGREED AND COMMITTED TO HAVING AN ELECTION - A FAIR AND FREE ELECTION - BUT PLEASE DO NOT ALLOW ELECTION TO OBSCURE THE SIZE OF THE PROBLEM AND THE COMPLEXITY OF THE SITUATION. IF IN FACT THE MAIN TASK AND PROBLEM WAS A MERE ELECTION UNDOUBTEDLY SMITH AND MUZOREWA WOULD HAVE SOLVED THE ISSUE.

CONFIDENTIAL

/ I HAVE TO

CONFIDENTIAL

I HAVE TO POINT OUT THAT EVEN IF THE CONFERENCE FINALLY AGREES TO BASE THIS HAND-OVER ELECTION ON MERE PARTY LISTS AND THEREFORE REQUIRE NO REGISTRATION OF VOTERS AND NO DELIMITATION OF CONSTITUENCIES, YOU MUST, MARGARET, GIVE YOURSELF TIME TO MAKE THE CEASEFIRE SENSIBLE AND TO RE-ESTABLISH FREE MOVEMENT AND AS NEAR NORMAL SOCIAL INTERCOURSE AS POSSIBLE AMONG THE RACIALLY MIXED AND ERSTWHILE WARRING COMMUNITIES. IT IS UPON THIS LIMITED PRACTICAL CONDITION OF PEACE THAT THE GOVERNOR CAN BUILD A MEANINGFUL POLITICAL PROGRAMME FOR AN ALL-PARTY ELECTION. WITHOUT THIS THE GOVERNOR AND BRITISH RESPONSIBILITY AND PRESENCE IN RHODESIA MAY FAIL EVEN TO APPEAR AS A SYMBOL OF PEACE LET ALONE AN AUTHORITY AND INSTRUMENT OF PEACE.

PLEASE, DO NOT FORGET THAT ONCE YOU ANNOUNCE:

(A) CEASEFIRE

(B) THE ARRIVAL OF THE GOVERNOR IN RHODESIA AND

(C) AN ALL-PARTY GENERAL ELECTION

THERE WILL BE AN INFLUX OF RHODESIANS BACK TO RHODESIA AND A GREAT MOVEMENT OF THE WAR-DISPLACED PEOPLE INSIDE RHODESIA ITSELF. THE GOVERNOR WILL NOT COPE WITH THIS AND OTHER CONTINGENT PROBLEMS IN ONE MONTH.

THEREFORE WHILE YOU GIVE YOURSELF TWO MONTHS SPECIFICALLY FOR ELECTION (THE EASIEST PART OF THE WHOLE EXERCISE OF THE TRANSITION), YOU MUST, AND I SAY THIS MOST EMPHATICALLY, GIVE YOURSELF NOT A COUPLE OF WEEKS BUT ADDITIONAL MONTHS TO PREPARE FOR THE TWO MONTHS OF ELECTIONS. IN MY VIEW YOU NEED A MINIMUM OF AT LEAST THREE MONTHS TO BRING REASONABLY PEACEFUL AND FREE CONDITIONS TO RHODESIA BEFORE EMBARKING ON YOUR TWO MONTHS OF ELECTIONS UNDER ANY FORM THE CONFERENCE MAY CHOOSE.

IN MY VIEW THE INTERVAL OF THE TRANSITION IS CARDINAL TO THE WHOLE PROCESS BECAUSE IT WILL DETERMINE WHAT ADMINISTRATIVE ARRANGEMENTS YOU WILL NEED, WHERE AND WHEN. OBVIOUSLY IF YOU PRETEND THAT THE WHOLE THING CAN BE DONE IN ONE AFTERNOON THEN YOU WILL DECEIVE YOURSELF THAT YOU DO NOT NEED MANY THINGS WHICH YOU IN FACT DO. YOU MUST WORK IN A LOGICAL TIME SCALE. TO PROPOSE TWO MONTHS FOR EVERYTHING IS ILLOGICAL.

OTHERWISE QUITE HONESTLY I DO NOT SEE HOW ONE CAN PERSUADE THE PATRIOTIC FRONT OR INDEED ANYONE WHO KNOWS THE SIZE AND NATURE OF THE PROBLEM AND WHAT HE MUST DO, TO ACCEPT THAT THE WHOLE THING CAN

CONFIDENTIAL

BE DONE IN NO TIME AT ALL. THE TRANSITION COMPRISES ROUGH REALITIES FOR WHICH THERE CAN BE NO MAIC WAND. SUFFICIENT TIME, CERTAINLY NOT LESS THAN FIVE MONTHS MUST BE ALLOWED FOR A PROPER MANAGEMENT OF THIS PERIOD.

CERTAINLY IT WILL BE AT LEAST ONE STEP FORWARD IF YOU CAN ALLOW ADEQUATE TIME FOR THE MANAGEMENT OF THE TRANSITION. TWO MONTHS IS AS ILLOGICAL AS TEN YEARS IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES. IT WILL DESTROY WHATEVER YOU MAY ACHIEVE AT THE CONFERENCE TABLE.

I REMAIN READY FOR ANY FURTHER CONSULTATIONS YOU MAY WISH TO MAKE. AND I WISH YOU ALL THE BEST IN YOUR EFFORTS.
GOD BLESS.

KENNETH DAVID KAUNDA
PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF ZAMBIA

ALLINSON

F I L E S

RHOD D
OADS
N AM D
NEWS D
PUSD
PLANNING STAFF
ES & SD
CCD
FRD
UND
LEGAL ADVISERS
(MR FREELAND)
(MR FIFOOT)
ECON D
PCD

DEF D
OID
PS
PS/LPS
PS/MR LUCE
PS/MR RIDLEY
PS/MR HURD
PS/PUS
SIR J GRAHAM
LORD N G LENNOX
MISS BROWN
MR DAY
MR WILLSON
MR ASPIN

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION
RHODESIA POLICY

X-27

[RHODESIA: POLICY: ADVANCE COPIES]

IMMEDIATE

PS
PS/SIR I GILMOUR
PS/MR LUCE
PS/PUS
SIR J GRAHAM
MR WILLSON
MR DAY
LORD N G LENNOX
MR ASPIN

PS/NO 10 DOWNING STREET

MR R L WADE-GERY)
MR P M MAXEY) CABINET
COL MOIR) OFFICE
MR P J FOWLER)
DIO)

.....
HD/RHOD DEPT (4)
HD/C AF D
HD/S AF D
HD/PUSD (2)
HD/NEWS DEPT
HD/WAD
MR FREELAND LEGAL ADVISER RM K200A
MR FIFOOT LEGAL ADVISER RM K164

MAT

Rome Carter

GRS 1720
CONFIDENTIAL

DESKBY 011100Z FCO
FM LUSAKA 010923Z NOV79
TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1176 OF 1 NOVEMBER

INFO IMMEDIATE DAR ES SALAAM, MAPUTO, LAGOS, PRETORIA, MIRIMBA
SALISBURY, GABORONE, MONROVIA, LUANDA, UKMIS NEW YORK, WASHINGTON.

YOUR TELNO 895: RHODESIAN NEGOTIATIONS

1. I SAW THE PRESIDENT THIS MORNING. HE DID NOT MENTION THE POSSIBILITY OF VISITING LONDON TO ME BUT SEE PARA 5 BELOW. FROM WHAT FOLLOWS YOU MAY AFTER ALL CONSIDER IT DESIRABLE TO INVITE HIM TO COMBINE HIS VISIT TO ROME WITH TALKS IN LONDON TO HELP KEEP HIM ON THE RIGHT LINES.
2. FOLLOWING MY CONVERSATION WITH CHAKULYA THE FOREIGN MINISTER YESTERDAY MORNING (MY TELNO 1173) I WAS TOLD TO EXPECT A CALL TO SEE THE PRESIDENT LATE YESTERDAY EVENING. INSTEAD HE SAW THE US AMBASSADOR, WISNER AND THE CANADIAN HIGH COMMISSIONER, BACON.
3. HE ASKED WISNER TO GET PRESIDENT CARTER TO INTERCEDE URGENTLY WITH THE PRIME MINISTER AND YOURSELF OVER PARAGRAPH 5 IN THE SECTION

WITH THE PRIME MINISTER AND YOURSELF OVER PARAGRAPH 5 IN THE SECTION ON ADMINISTRATION IN THE INTERIM PERIOD OF THE TEXT OF YOUR TELETYPE 885, ALSO CIRCULATED AS A CONFERENCE DOCUMENT. KAUNDA TOLD WISNER THAT THE BASIC POINT WAS THAT IF HE WAS TO PERSUADE THE PATRIOTIC FRONT TO PARTICIPATE IN THE ELECTIONS HE NEEDED TO BE ASSURED THAT THEY REALLY WOULD BE FREE AND FAIR. IT WAS IMPORTANT THEREFORE THAT BOTH SIDES SHOULD HAVE EQUAL OPPORTUNITIES WHICH WOULD NOT BE THE CASE IF MUZOREWA AND HIS COLLEAGUES RETURNED TO SALISBURY STILL HOLDING MINISTERIAL OFFICE AND TITLES. TO THIS END HE WANTED PRESIDENT CARTER TO URGE THE PRIME MINISTER TO APPOINT THE BRITISH GOVERNOR NOW (IN DISCUSSION WITH ME LATER KAUNDA MODIFIED THIS TO APPOINT THE GOVERNOR WHEN THE CEASE-FIRE NEGOTIATIONS STAGE BEGAN). THE GOVERNOR SHOULD ARRIVE IN SALISBURY BEFORE THE CONFERENCE FINALLY BROKE UP AND BEFORE THE SALISBURY MINISTERS RETURNED. THE SALISBURY MINISTERS SHOULD RETURN WITHOUT OFFICE OR TITLE. CONSEQUENTLY THERE SHOULD BE NO MINISTERIAL HANDOVER PERIOD IN SALISBURY. THE HANDOVER SHOULD BE BY THE CABINET SECRETARY AND OTHER OFFICIALS. THE FORMER MINISTERS SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO RECEIVE THE GOVERNOR ON HIS ARRIVAL IN SALISBURY, HENCE THE IMPORTANCE OF HIM GETTING THERE BEFORE THEY RETURNED. KAUNDA URGED THAT MUZOREWA SHOULD RETURN TO RHODESIA ONLY TO ELECTIONEER. ELECTIONEERING COULD BEGIN IN LONDON AND MUZOREWA SHOULD BE ASKED POSITIVELY TO UNDERTAKE NOT TO ASSUME ANY MINISTERIAL FUNCTIONS. KAUNDA WAS ALSO CONCERNED BY THE PHRASE "DEVOTE THEMSELVES FULLY TO THE TASK OF EXPLAINING THE CONSTITUTION TO THE PEOPLE". THIS KAUNDA ARGUED GAVE MUZOREWA PREFERENTIAL TREATMENT. TO WISNER'S AMAZEMENT KAUNDA EVEN QUIBBLED ABOUT THE EXPRESSION "CARETAKER BASIS" IN THE LAST SENTENCE OF THE PARAGRAPH WHICH HE CLAIMED VIOLATED AND CONTRADICTED EARLIER REFERENCES TO THE GOVERNOR ASSUMING FULL EXECUTIVE POWERS.

3. KAUNDA ARGUED TO WISNER THAT THE PHRASEOLOGY SUGGESTED THE BRITISH WERE CHEATING AND BEING DISHONEST. THEY WERE TRYING TO HELP MUZOREWA WITHOUT APPEARING TO DO SO.

4. WISNER, WHO FOUND THE PRESIDENT'S ARGUMENTS LESS THAN WORTHY OF PRESIDENT CARTER'S ATTENTION, AS A MATTER OF URGENCY PRESSED THE PRESIDENT ON WHETHER THESE WERE THE ONLY OBJECTIONS HE HAD TO THE INTERIM ARRANGEMENTS. KAUNDA SAID THAT HE HAD COMMENTED TO THE PRIME MINISTER ON OTHER POINTS AND IT WAS ONLY ON THE MATTERS HE HAD MENTIONED TO WISNER THAT HE WISHED PRESIDENT CARTER TO INTERVENE.

5. KAUNDA ADDED THAT THE PATRIOTIC FRONT HAD ASKED HIM TO GO TO LONDON BUT HE KNEW HE WOULD NOT BE WELCOMED BY THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT AND HE HAD NOT MADE UP HIS MIND. HE WAS AT PRESENT CONSULTING

ENT AND HE HAD NOT MADE UP HIS MIND. HE WAS AT PRESENT CONSULTING HIS COLLEAGUES ABOUT THE MATTER. HIS PRESENT FEELING WAS THAT IF HE DID GO IT WOULD BE IN HIS CAPACITY AS CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMONWEALTH HEADS OF GOVERNMENT MEETING.

6. JUST BEFORE I WAS DUE TO GO TO STATE HOUSE THIS MORNING TO SEE THE PRESIDENT I WAS INFORMED THAT I WOULD BE RECEIVING A LETTER INSTEAD. THE PRESEIDENT WAS TRAVELLING TO SOUTHERN PROVINCE AND WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO SEE ME. I POINTED OUT THAT I HAD SOMETHING TO SAY TO HIM AND THAT IT WOULD BE UNFORTUNATE IF THE MEETING FELL THROUGH. I WAS THEN INVITED TO STATE HOUSE WHERE I WENT THROUGH THE POINTS IN YOUR TELNO 351 TO DAR ES SALAAM WITH THE PRESIDENT WHO FORTUNATELY WAS ONLY ACCOMPANIED BY HIS PRESS ADVISER, PUNABANTU, SO THAT THERE WERE NO UNHELPFUL INTERVENTIONS.

7. I REFERRED TO MY CONVERSATION WITH THE FOREIGN MINISTER YESTERDAY MORNING AND SAID THAT I HAD BEEN DISTRESSED TO FIND HE HAD SO LITTLE CONFIDENCE IN BRITISH TRUSTWORTHINESS IN THIS MATTER. IN THE COURSE OF OUR CONVERSATION IT RAPIDLY BECAME APPARENT THAT ALL I HAD EXPLAINED TO CHAKULYA ABOUT THE TIME PROBLEM AND THAT OUR TWO MONTHS SHOULD BE COMPARED TO THE PATRIOTIC FRONT'S FOUR MONTHS HAD NOT BEEN RELATED TO KAUNDA. IN FACT KAUNDA, WHO HAD A LETTER READY FOR ME TO TRANSMIT TO YOU, DECIDED TO RE-EXAMINE HIS LETTER IN THE LIGHT OF WHAT I HAD SAID TO HIM SO THAT HE AND I COULD HAVE ANOTHER DISCUSSION WHEN HE RETURNS FROM SOUTHERN PROVINCE TOMORROW (EVENING) AT WHICH TIME HE HOPES I SHOULD BE ABLE TO GIVE HIM A LITTLE MORE INFORMATION ON TWO POINTS.

(A) ON THE QUESTION OF TIME HE SAID THAT THIS WAS EXTREMELY IMPORTANT AND HE WOULD LIKE TO BE ABSOLUTELY CLEAR ABOUT WHAT WE PROPOSED. HIS CONCERN WAS THAT MANY OF THE PATRIOTIC FRONT HAD BEEN SO LONG OUTSIDE RHODESIA THAT IT WOULD TAKE TIME FOR THEM TO GET ADJUSTED. IN ADDITION THERE WAS THE PHYSICAL PROBLEM OF RETURNING REFUGEES AND HE WOULD LIKE TO SEE AS MANY AS POSSIBLE LEAVE ZAMBIA TO GO BACK FOR THE ELECTIONS. HE REALISED IT WOULD NOT PERHAPS BE PHYSICALLY POSSIBLE FOR ALL TO GO AT ONCE AND SOME WOULD DEFINITELY NEED A LOT OF PERSUASION BEFORE THEY TRUSTED THEMSELVES BACK IN RHODESIA. IT WAS THEREFORE TO HAVE TIME TO CREATE A GOOD ATMOSPHERE AND GET USED TO AS HE PUT IT "GENTLY SHOULDER RUBBING" IN AN ATMOSPHERE OF NEW CONFIDENCE. I WOULD BE GRATEFUL THEREFORE IF YOU COULD SPELL OUT VERY PRECISELY FOR HIS BENEFIT TOMORROW EVENING EXACTLY HOW WE SEE THE TIMING OF I) PHASING THE CEASE-FIRE II) THE RETURN OF THE GOVERNOR III) THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE TWO MONTHS PERIOD FOR ELECTIONEERING. I AM CERTAIN THAT ONE OF KAUNDA'S

11) THE RETURN OF THE GOVERNOR 111) THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE TWO MONTHS' PERIOD FOR ELECTIONEERING. I AM CERTAIN THAT ONE OF KAUNDA'S MAIN DESIRES IS TO GET THE RHODESIAN REFUGEES OUT OF ZAMBIA.

(B) KAUNDA TOLD ME THAT HE HAD ONE OTHER CONCERN. THIS PROVED TO BE WHAT HE HAD DISCUSSED WITH WISNER LAST NIGHT. HE DID NOT GO INTO SO MUCH DETAIL WITH ME BUT HE SAID THAT MUZOREWA AND HIS COLLEAGUES WERE STILL CONSIDERED BY THE FRONT LINE STATES AS A GOVERNMENT OF REBELS. IT WAS UNFORTUNATE THAT THE SALISBURY GOVERNMENT TROOPS HAD TO BE ALLOWED TO REMAIN IN BEING. BUT HE HAD BEEN ENCOURAGED BY WHAT WAS SAID IN PARA 5 OF THE PRIME MINISTER'S LETTER (YOUR TELNO 888) AND BY WHAT I HAD SAID; FROM WHICH IT APPEARED THAT BOTH SYSTEMS WOULD BE IN EFFECT RECOGNISED BY THE GOVERNMENT, WHICH WOULD BE A SATISFACTORY COMPROMISE. HOWEVER, TO ALLOW MUZOREWA AND HIS COLLEAGUES TO GO BACK AS MINISTERS WOULD GIVE THEM AN UNFAIR ADVANTAGE. THERE WERE POLITICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL ADVANTAGES IN HOLDING MINISTERIAL OFFICE WHEN IT CAME TO FACING ELECTIONS AND THEREFORE THE GOVERNOR SHOULD BE APPOINTED AS SOON AS THE CONFERENCE MOVED TO TALKING ABOUT THE CEASE-FIRE AND TAKE UP HIS POSITION AND AUTHORITY BEFORE THE SALISBURY DELEGATION RETURNED. IT WOULD BE USEFUL IN THE INTERIM ON THE CONFERENCE FOR ALL THE LEADERS TO GET TO KNOW HIM AND RESPECT HIM

8. KAUNDA CONCLUDED BY ASKING ME TO ASSURE YOU AND THE PRIME MINISTER THAT HE WAS DETERMINED TO SEE "THIS THING WORK". HE WAS DETERMINED TO HELP TO GET THE PATRIOTIC FRONT TO FACE THE ELECTORATE. EVERYTHING HE HAD SAID AND WRITTEN WAS INTENDED TO BRING BOTH SIDES TOGETHER WITH EQUAL OPPORTUNITIES. HE GENUINELY WANTED TO HELP AND HE ADMIRERD YOUR AND THE PRIME MINISTER'S ACHIEVEMENTS: "YOU HAD MOVED MOUNTAINS".

9. THE TONE OF MY MEETING WITH KAUNDA WAS GOOD AND I WOULD BE GRATEFUL IF I COULD BE GIVEN SOME AMMUNITION TO GO BACK TO HIM TOMORROW EVENING WHICH WOULD HELP TO KEEP HIM ON LINE. HIS FEARS ABOUT PARAGRAPH 5 OF YOUR SPEAKING NOTES (YOUR TELNO 885) SEEM EXTREMELY EXAGGERATED AND I HOPE IT WILL NOT BE TOO DIFFICULT TO FIND A DIFFERENT FORM OF WORDS TO MEET HIM HALFWAY. I EMPHASISED REPEATEDLY HOW FAR WE HAD GOT BISHOP MUZOREWA TO MOVE AND HOW IMPOSSIBLE IT WAS TO ASK HIM FOR MORE CONCESSIONS.

10 I UNDERSTAND KAUNDA SPOKE TO THE CANADIAN HIGH COMMISSIONER AS TO WISNER BUT ALSO ABOUT THE NEED FOR A COMMONWEALTH PEACE-KEEPING FORCE. KAUNDA FORGOT TO MENTION THIS TO WISNER WHO WAS CALLED IN BY CHAKULYA THIS MORNING TO SAY THAT THIS ALSO WAS A

• CALLED IN BY CHAKULYA THIS MORNING TO SAY THAT THIS ALSO WAS A MATTER OF CONCERN TO THE PRESIDENT. THE ZAMBIANS UNDERSTOOD FROM A HIGH COMMONWEALTH PERSONAGE THAT SHOULD TROUBLE BREAK OUT REQUIRING THE USE OF ARMED FORCE THE BRITISH INTENDED THE GOVERNOR TO CALL UPON THE ZIMBABWE/RHODESIAN REGULAR FORCES. IF THEY WERE EMPLOYED THE PATRIOTIC FRONT FORCES WERE BOUND TO RESPOND AND CHAOS WOULD FOLLOW. THE PRESIDENT THEREFORE CONSIDERED IT ESSENTIAL THAT THERE SHOULD BE A COMMONWEALTH PEACE-KEEPING FORCE AND FROM HIS ENQUIRIES UNDERSTOOD THAT INDIA, CANADA, AUSTRALIA, AND NIGERIA WOULD BE PREPARED TO PARTICIPATE. IF ADDITIONAL FUNDS COULD BE FOUND FOR THE COMMONWEALTH SECRETARIAT IT WOULD BE DESIRABLE TO ADD TROOPS FROM GHANA AND BANGLADESH. M CHAKULYA ADDED THAT IT SEEMED MUZOREWA KNEW OF THE BRITISH INTENTIONS AND THAT THE BRITISH WERE BEING MORE FRANK WITH MUZOREWA THAN THEY WERE WITH THE PATRIOTIC FRONT. WISNER REMINDED THE FOREIGN MINISTER THAT IN NEGOTIATIONS NOT ALL THE CARDS ARE DISPLAYED AT ONCE THOUGH HE COULD NOT COMMENT ON THE SUBSTANCE OF WHAT CHAKULYA HAD SAID.

11 . SEE MY MIFT (TO FCO AND WASHINGTON ONLY).

ALLINSON

A PARA 7.)

COULD HAVE ANOTHER

DISCUSSION WHEN HE RETURNS FROM SOTHERN PROVINCE TOMORROW

EVENING (2 NOVEMBER) AT WHICH TIME HE HOPES I SHOULD BE ABLE TO

GIVE HIM A LITTLE MORE INFORMATION.....

CONFIDENTIAL



Prime Minister

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

After texts at

London SW1A 2AH

A+B

1 November 1979

Ph...

Yes one

Dear Michael,

Rhodesia Conference: Messages

President Moi and Ratu Sir Kamisesa Mara

In the event of agreement in the Rhodesia Conference, on the pre-independence arrangements, both the Australian and New Zealand Prime Ministers have said that their countries would be prepared to participate in arrangements under United Kingdom auspices for the monitoring of the ceasefire. To complete our preparations for this stage of the Conference, we should approach the other Commonwealth governments we have in mind (and whose participation would be acceptable to Bishop Muzorewa and General Walls).

Lord Carrington thinks that it would be helpful if the Prime Minister were prepared to send messages to the Kenyan President and the Fijian Prime Minister about this. Whether or not such arrangements will need to be brought into effect, it is essential to demonstrate in the Conference and outside that we will be prepared to make arrangements for the monitoring of a ceasefire if one is agreed.

Flag/A

I attach a draft message accordingly.

President Tolbert

President Tolbert of Liberia, the current OAU Chairman, sent a further message (enclosed) to the Prime Minister on 30 October following up Mr Luce's conversation with his Foreign Minister on the Lancaster House talks.

Although there have been several recent exchanges between President Tolbert and the Prime Minister (the last on 19 October), Lord Carrington believes that it would be helpful for the Prime Minister to send him a message in terms similar to those she has sent to the Front Line Presidents in the last day or so. A particular objective is to get President Tolbert to accept the realities of negotiating with two parties and to adopt a more balanced approach. Therefore a separate message to President Tolbert is also enclosed.

Flag/B

*yours ever
Rodric Lyne*

M O'D B Alexander Esq
10 Downing Street

(R M J Lyne)
Private Secretary

11-12-11
6 11 12 1
3 2
4 5 6 7 8 9
11 - NOV 1979

File No.
 Department RHODESIA ...
 Drafted by R W RENWICK
 (Block Capitals)
 Tel. Extn 233 5698

OUTWARD
 TELEGRAM

Security Classification CONFIDENTIAL
Precedence IMMEDIATE
DESKBYZ

FOR COMMS. DEPT. USE	Despatched (Date)..... (Time).....Z	POSTBYZ
----------------------------	--	---------------

PREAMBLE

(Time of Origin)Z(G.M.T.) (Restrictive Prefix).....
 (Security Class.) CONFIDENTIAL (Caveat/
 Privacy Marking).....
 (Codeword)..... (Deskby).....

To IMMEDIATE NAIROBI Tel. No.....of.....
 (precedence) (post)

AND TO (precedence/post) IMMEDIATE: SUVA

AND SAVING TO

REPEATED TO (for info) IMMEDIATE: WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK, CANBERRA,
 WELLINGTON, MIRIMBA SALISBURY, MAPUTO
 DAR ES SALAAM, LUANDA, LUSAKA, GABORONE

SAVING TO (for info).....

Distribution:-

RHODESIA
POLIC7

(TEXT)

RHODESIA: THE PRE-INDEPENDENCE ARRANGEMENTS

1. Please arrange to deliver to President ~~Moi~~/Ratu Sir
~~Kamisese~~ Mara as soon as possible the following message from the
 Prime Minister.

Begins

I know that you will have been following closely develop-
 ments in the Rhodesia Conference at Lancaster House.
 We have made ~~remarkable~~ ^{considerable} progress. Agreement has been
 reached on an independence Constitution which provides,
 /indisputably

Copies to:-

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

indisputably, for genuine majority rule. We have put forward proposals for the arrangements to enable elections to be held in order to bring the independence Constitution into effect and the people of Rhodesia ~~xxx~~ to choose their future leaders as soon as possible. The details will be available to you. ~~But~~ the essential point is that we are prepared to appoint a British Governor who would have executive and legislative authority in the period before the elections are held. Bishop Muzorewa and his Ministers have agreed to relinquish power in this period to enable new elections to be held in which the Patriotic Front will be able to participate. ^{N.P.} These elections will be supervised by the British Government and held under our authority. All Commonwealth countries will be invited to send observers to the elections. We shall not be prepared to assume direct responsibility for Rhodesia for a longer period than is necessary to enable all the political leaders to put their case to the people of Rhodesia and for the people themselves to decide who they want to represent them. A more extended interim period than the two months we have proposed would be likely to increase problems in relation to the maintenance of a cease-fire. It would also lead to the political leaders seeking to interfere in the administration of the country, rather than committing themselves to the election campaign.

CONFIDENTIAL

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

N.P

If, as we hope, we can get the agreement of both the other delegations to the general proposals we have put forward for the interim period, it will be necessary to proceed to the third and final phase of the Conference - the negotiations on a ceasefire and its observance. We shall be ready to arrange negotiations between the military commanders on both sides. The arrangements we envisage are that the commanders on both sides should be represented on a Ceasefire Commission under the chairmanship of the Governor's military adviser. The responsibility for observance of the ceasefire would in the first instance fall to the respective commanders. We do not believe that it would be practicable to envisage a large intervention force which might find itself in conflict with one side or the other. But it would undoubtedly help to create more confidence in the ceasefire arrangements and minimise the risk of ceasefire violations if there were an arrangement, under UK auspices, to monitor the ceasefire. Bishop Muzorewa and his delegation will not be prepared to accept the involvement in such a monitoring group of countries which are already fully committed to support the Patriotic Front. I should be grateful if you would consider whether, in the interests of contributing to a peaceful solution to the Rhodesian problem, you would be prepared to consider some Kenyan/Fijian involvement in such a monitoring group. I am also in touch with the Australian and New Zealand Prime Ministers about the matter. If you are able to agree in principle to this, we should

/wish

CONFIDENTIAL

wish to pursue our ideas with you in more detail. The numbers involved need not be very large. (SUVA ONLY: and I recognise the invaluable contribution your contingent is already making to UNIFIL.) But I am convinced that a monitoring arrangement of this kind could increase significantly the prospects of achieving a peaceful solution.

Ends.

2. In passing on this message or in any discussion arising from it you will at your discretion need to emphasise that Bishop Muzorewa and his delegation have agreed to transfer their powers to a British Governor and to participate in new elections, in which the Patriotic Front will be able to take part, under our authority. If the Patriotic Front are not prepared to participate in elections supervised by the British Government and held under our authority (with Commonwealth observers present), we shall not be able to hold up the de-colonising process on that account. You should emphasise strongly, however, that it remains our objective to achieve a settlement involving both sides. This is why we are making this approach about possible Kenyan/Fijian involvement in a monitoring group. We believe this could be a very important element in a peaceful solution. The question of course would only arise if the Patriotic Front agreed to participate. We have not yet discussed these ideas in the Conference and therefore hope that the confidentiality of this message will be respected.

/3.

CONFIDENTIAL

3. You should also emphasise that there would be no question of the monitoring group intervening between opposing forces. Its functions would be to observe and report to the Ceasefire Commission. Even token contributions from Fiji and/or Kenya could be very helpful.

10x

HD WAD
HD RHO D x 4
PS / No 10 DS
PS
PS / M Luce
Sir J Graham
M. Day
M. Byatt

ADVANCE COPY

253535 PRORME G

OCTOBER 30, 1979

ETATPRIORITE

THE RIGHT HONOURABLE MARGARET THATCHER
PRIME MINISTER OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND
10DOWNING STREET
LONDON

MADAM PRIME MINISTER COLON LET ME THANK YOUR GOVERNMENT FOR SENDING
THE HONOURABLE RICHARD LUCE CMA PARLIAMENTARY UNDER SECRETARY OF
YOUR MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH AFFAIRS CMA TO BRIEF US
ON DEVELOPMENTS AT THE CONSTITUTIONAL TALKS IN LONDON STOP IN HIS
CONVERSATION WITH MY MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS CMA WE EXPRESSED
CONCERN OVER SEVERAL ASPECTS OF THE TRANSITIONAL ARRANGEMENTS AS
PROPOSED BY YOUR GOVERNMENT AND WE TRUST THAT HE HAS CONVEYED OUR
VIEWS TO YOUR FOREIGN SECRETARY STOP IT WAS OUR HOPE HOWEVER THAT IN
THE SPIRIT OF ACCOMMODATION AND FLEXIBILITY CMA AN ATTITUDE OF GIVE
AND TAKE CMA NEGOTIATIONS AMONG THE PARTIES WOULD PROGRESS UNTIL AN
AGREEMENT BASED ON FAIR ACCOMMODATIONS AND MUTUAL TRUST WOULD BE
REACHED STOP WE WILL ALL AGREE CMA MADAM PRIME MINISTER CMA THAT

A SETTLEMENT OF COMPLEX ISSUES SUCH AS THESE IS FREQUENT IN THE

A SETTLEMENT OF COMPLEXED ISSUES SUCH AS THOSE INHERENT IN THE ZIMBABWEAN PROBLEM CANNOT BE EXPECTED TO BE RESOLVED IF TOLERANCE AND FLEXIBILITY ARE NOT ALLOWED TO BE MADE MANIFEST IN THE NEGOTIATIONS STOP YOUR GOVERNMENT HAS SET FORTH TO THE PARTIES WHAT IT WOULD LIKE TO SEE AS THE PROCESS FOR IMPLEMENTING THE INDEPENDENCE CONSTITUTION CMA AND SHOULD YOUR PROPOSALS BE ACCEPTED AS BEING MADE IN GOOD FAITH CMA THEN A TAKE IT OR LEAVE IT ATTITUDE WOULD NOT BE CONSISTANT WITH THE TRUE SPIRIT WHICH SHOULD CHARACTERIZE THE TALKS STOP THAT IS WHY WE FEEL SERIOUS CONSIDERATION SHOULD ALSO BE GIVEN TO THE PROPOSALS AS ADVANCED BY THE PATRIOTIC FRONT SO THAT THROUGH THE PROCESS OF NEGOTIATIONS AN ACCEPTABLE AGREEMENT TO ALL PARTIES CONCERNED MIGHT BE REACHED STOP SITUATION BEING WHAT THEY ARE IN ZIMBABWE CMA IT CANNOT BE CONSIDERED UNREASONABLE TO EXPECT THAT A FAIR AND JUST TRANSITIONAL ARRANGEMENT MIGHT TAKE INTO ACCOUNT AN IMPARTIAL ADMINISTRATIVE MACHINERY WHICH WOULD EQUALLY INVOLVE THE PARTIES STOP SOME MECHANISM WHICH WOULD AFFORD EQUAL CONDITONS FOR AND EQUAL PARTICIPATION BY THE RESPECTIVE MILITARY AND POLICE FORCES OF THE PARTIES CANNOT IN OUR VIEW BE SUMMARILY DISMISSED AS UNJUSTIFIABLE STOP YOUR GOVERNEMNT HAS PROPOSED TWO MONTHS FOR THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD AND THE PATRIOTIC FRONT HAS PROPOSED SIX MONTHS STOP WE SINCERELY FEEL THAT THE PERIOD OF SIX MONTHS IS NOT TOO LONG STOP WE FURTHER FEEL THAT THE INVOLVEMENT OF ANY INTERNATIONAL TEAM MUST ENVISAGE SOME FORM OF ACTION IN SUPERVISING THE ELECTIONS AND NOT

MUST ENVIAGE SOME FORM OF ACTION IN SUPERVISING THE ELECTIONS AND NOT
MERELY SERVING AS WINTNESSES STOP THIS IN OUR JUDGEMENT IS NO MORE
THAN FAIR AND JUST STOP IF IT IS FELT BY THE PATRIOTIC FRONT THAT
UNITED NATIONS FORCES MIGHT BE UTILIZED TO SUPERVISE THE CEASEFIRE
AND THE MILITARY SITUATION DURING THE TRANSITION PERIOD CMA ASSIST
WITH THE MAINTENANCE OF LAW AND ORDER AND HELP WITH THE SUPERVISION
OF ELECTIONS CMA THEN THE PROPOSAL SHOULD BE DISCUSSED AND GIVEN
TIMELY CONSIDERATION STOP WE MUST AGREE THAT INSISTING ON SOME MEANS
WHEREBY AN IMPARTIAL PUBLIC SERVICE AND JUDICIAL SERVICE DURING THE
INTERIM PERIOD MIGHT BE ENSURED CANN OT BE CONSIDERED ASKING TOO
MUCH STOP WE ARE CONVINCED THAT THUS FAR IN THE CONSTITUTIONAL TALKS
THE PATRIOTIC FRONT HAS DEMONSTRATED A SPIRIT OF GOODWILL AND A
PREPAREDNESS TO MAKE CONCESSIONS IN THE INTEREST OF A JUST SETTLE-
MENT OF THE ZIMBABWEAN PROBLEM STOP BEING INVITED CMA THEY CANNOT
BE EXPECTED TO ATTEND NEGOTIATIONS AND IN THE PROCESS NOT ADVANCE
PROPOSALS WHICH THEY FEEL WOULD BE IN THE BEST INTEREST OF THOSE
THEY REPRESENT STOP AT THIS CEIEEEE CRITICAL JUNCTURE IN THE TALKS
CMA WE URGE CMA MADAM PRIME MINISTER CMA THAT YOUR GOVERNMENT
REMAIN KEENLY AWARE OF ITS HIGH RESPONSIBILITY FIRST TO THE PEOPLE
OF ZIMBABWE AND THEN TO THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY TO CONDUCT CMA
IN A FAIR AND IMPARTIAL MANNER CMA NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE PARTIES
CONCERNED STOP IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT THE LEGITIMATE FEARS AND
APPREHENSIONS OF THE PATRIOTIC FRONT SHOULD BE APPRECIATED AND

APPREHENSIONS OF THE PATRIOTIC FRONT SHOULD BE APPRECIATED AND
GIVEN DUE CONSIDERATION FOR THEY EMINATE FROM REPEATED MANUEVERS
AND SCHEMES OF THE RACIST MINORITY REGIME OF ZIMBABWE DESIGNED TO
PERPETUATE THEIR DOMINANCE STOP MUCH CONFIDENCE IS NOW IMPOSED IN
BRITAIN BY THE COMMONWEALTH CMA AFRICA AND THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNIT
IN THE SEARCH FOR A SOLUTION TO THE ZIMBABWEAN PROBLEM STOP ACCORDING
LY CMA I ASSURE YOU MADAM PRIME MINISTER CMA THE EXPECTATIONS OF
AFRICAN NATIONS ARE HIGH THAT THAT CONFIDENCE WILL BE JUSTIFIED AND
OUR OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL TALKS WILL EMERGE A FAIR CMA JUST AND
INTERNATIONALLY ACCEPTABLE FORMULA FOR THE TRANSITION TO GENUINE
INDEPENDENCE WITH MAJORITY RULE IN ZIMBABWE STOP WITH RENEWED
ASSURANCES OF MY HIGHEST ESTEEM SINCERELY

W R TOLBERT JR
PRESIDENT OF LIBERIA AND CURRENT CHAIRMAN OF
THE ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY

263555 PRDRME G
4501 FORMIN LI
HOW WELL RECVD?+

OK TKS
IS THIS THE FOREIGN OFFICE PSE?
YES
TKS AND 818181

File No.

Department RHODESIA

Drafted by N E SHEINWALD
(Block Capitals)

Tel. Extn. 233 5853

OUTWARD

TELEGRAM

Security Classification
CONFIDENTIAL
Precedence
IMMEDIATE
DESKBYZ

FOR COMMS. DEPT. USE	Despatched (Date) (Time)Z	POSTBYZ
----------------------	--	---------------

PREAMBLE

(Time of Origin) Z (G.M.T.) (Restrictive Prefix)

(Security Class.) CONFIDENTIAL (Caveat/ Privacy marking)

(Codeword) (Deskby) Z

TO IMMEDIATE MONROVIA Tel. No. of
(precedence) (post)

AND TO (precedence/post)

AND SAVING TO

REPEATED TO (for info) PRIORITY WASHINGTON, Wkms New York, Canberra, Wellington, Mzimba Salisbury, Maputo, Dar Es Salaam, Luanda, Lusaka, Gaborone.

SAVING TO (for info)

Distribution:-

Rhodesia Policy

[TEXT]

MY TEL NO 351 TO DAR ES SALAAM: RHODESIA

1. MIFT contains the text of a message from the Prime Minister to President Tolbert, which in the President's absence you should deliver to the Foreign Minister as soon as possible, drawing on my TUR as necessary. You ^{my et} should in addition say that we find it surprising, following Mr Luce's conversation with Dennis, that the President's views seem so firmly based upon the position of the Patriotic Front

/alone.

Copies to:-

alone. *B2.* The President should be aware that they are not the only party to the Conference, and it is our task to find common ground between the very different approaches of the PF and Salisbury delegations. Bishop Muzorewa has already made major concessions in accepting our proposals for the interim period. His agreement was by no means a foregone conclusion. If the PF cannot also accept that the elections should be held under British Government authority, the Conference will face grave difficulties. Finally, in order to meet the point about flexibility made in Tolbert's message of 30 October, you might refer to the efforts we have made to answer exhaustively questions put by the PF and to ~~develop~~ *explore in* ~~discussion with them~~ *depth* on the points which cause them difficulty.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

3. You should also say that the Prime Minister has gone into the questions raised by President Tolbert in some detail, and that we hope the exchange can be kept confidential.

File No.....

Department RHODESIA

OUTWARD

Drafted by N E SHEINWALD
(Block Capitals)

TELEGRAM

Tel. Extn. 233 3853

Security Classification CONFIDENTIAL
Precedence IMMEDIATE
DESKBYZ

FOR COMMS. DEPT. USE	Despatched (Date) (Time)Z	POSTBYZ
----------------------------	--	---------------

PREAMBLE

(Time of Origin) Z (G.M.T.) (Restrictive Prefix)

(Security Class.) CONFIDENTIAL (Caveat/ Privacy marking)

(Codeword) (Deskby) Z

TO IMMEDIATE MONROVIA (precedence) (post) Tel. No. of

AND TO (precedence/post)

AND SAVING TO

REPEATED TO (for info) PRIORITY Washington, Ulm's New York, Canberra, Wellington, Mirimba Salisbury, Maputo, Dar es Salaam, Luanda, Lusaka, Gaborone

SAVING TO (for info)

Distribution:-

[TEXT]

MIPT: RHODESIA

1. Following is text of message to President

Tolbert:-

BEGINS

Dear Mr President,

Richard Luce has told me of the useful talks that he had with your Foreign Minister, Mr Dennis, on 25 October, and I am grateful to you for your close interest in Rhodesia over the past weeks, most recently your message of 30 October.

As Richard Luce explained, the Lancaster House

/Conference

CONFIDENTIAL

Copies to:-

CONFIDENTIAL

Conference is now discussing the pre-independence arrangements. As you know, and as was stated in the Commonwealth declaration at Lusaka, it is Britain's responsibility to bring Rhodesia to legal independence, to supervise the elections and to ensure that the arrangements for the elections are fair as between all the parties. We are ready to carry out our responsibilities to the full, but we shall not be prepared to agree to arrangements which go well beyond the Lusaka agreement or which would make it impossible for us to exercise our authority. It is the British Government which will have to assume direct responsibility for Rhodesia in the pre-independence period and we naturally need to be confident that we have the authority to carry out that responsibility. ^{N.P.} What is required is not a complicated transitional structure, but for the people of Rhodesia to be allowed, with the minimum delay, to decide for themselves what Government they want. In your most recent message you expressed concern over the length of the interim period we are proposing. Our view is that the longer the period before the elections, the greater will be the risk of the settlement breaking down. In particular, I do not believe that the Patriotic Front's proposals for a two-month period to organise

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

/the

CONFIDENTIAL

the ceasefire is either workable or conducive to the maintenance of security on which they also lay stress. It is unthinkable that the interim period should begin in conditions where the ceasefire was not effective. A period longer than two months would only lead to uncertainty and complicate our task of conducting the country's administration on a caretaker basis until the elections. We shall not of course be prepared to transfer power to any party which has not won it through fair elections.

In the current phase of the Conference we are seeking the agreement of both sides on the structure for the interim period, namely the re-assertion of British authority, a Governor with executive and legislative authority exercising direct control over the administration, and arrangements for the elections. Our proposals involve Bishop Muzorewa and his Ministers relinquishing power to enable new elections to be held under our authority. Bishop Muzorewa announced on 27 October that he was prepared to accept those proposals in principle. This was a difficult decision for him and his delegation to make, and ^{we} shall not be able to ask a great deal more of him. As regards the Patriotic Front's proposal that they should participate in the administration in the interim period, our proposals provide for all parties to be represented on the Election Council. We, through the Governor, must be left to run the country.

Mr Dennis discussed with Mr Luce the nature of

CONFIDENTIAL

the Governor's authority, especially in relation to the security forces. You also referred to the military arrangements in your last message. Once the political aspects of the interim structure have been agreed upon, the Conference will discuss the ceasefire; we propose to arrange discussions, under our chairmanship, between the military experts of both sides. We have made it clear that the Rhodesian armed forces will be under the command of the Governor and will have to accept his authority. The Patriotic Front's forces will also be responsible to the Governor, in relation to the ceasefire. We envisage a Ceasefire Commission, under the chairmanship of the Governor's Military Adviser, on which the commanders of both sides' forces will be represented. In these conditions there would be no role for ~~the~~ a peacekeeping force. Such a force was not envisaged in the Lusaka Declaration. After the elections, it will be for the newly elected Government to decide how it wishes to organise the services of the State.

The Patriotic Front are still considering our proposals. I hope that they will accept the sincerity of our intentions and our determination to ensure the impartiality of the election process and of the administration of the country during the interim period. I hope also that they will be prepared to participate in the elections. Our role in other dependent territories has been to establish conditions ^{for independence}, not

CONFIDENTIAL

/to

to encourage the aspirations of one party or another. In a number of countries we have handed over power to those who had previously been ~~confined~~ opponents of the United Kingdom. We will not sacrifice these principles of impartiality in the case of Rhodesia.

For the first time in the long history of these negotiations, a solution is within our grasp. You were kind enough to refer to the confidence reposed in my Government in our search for a ~~settlement~~ ^{solution.} We are fully aware of our responsibilities and will carry them out. We are doing everything in our power to get both sides with us on the road to a settlement, and I hope that I can count on your support and influence as the negotiations continue.

Yours sincerely

Margaret Thatcher

ENDS

CONFIDENTIAL

GPS 1200A

CONFIDENTIAL

DESKBY 010930Z

M.T.

Prime Minister

FM DAR ES SALAAM TO IMMEDIATE DESKBY FCO TEL NO 856 OF 1 NOVEMBER
INFO PRIORITY LUSAKA, GABORONE, MAPUTO, LUANDA, LAGOS, MONROVIA,
WASHINGTON, CANBERRA, UKMIS NEW YORK.

YOUR TELEGRAM NO 351: RHODESIA

1. I DELIVERED THE PRIME MINISTERS MESSAGE MTHROUGH PRESIDENT NYERERE'S PRIVATE SECRETARY YESTERDAY MORNING, 31 OCTOBER, AND WAS CALLED TO SEE THE PRESIDENT IN THE EVENING. HE HAD STUDIED CAREFULLY BOTH THE MESSAGE AND THE SPEAKING NOTES IN YOUR TELNO 885 TO LUSAKA WHICH I HAD ALSO SENT TO HIM. HE HAD MR MKAPA WITH HIM.
2. I SPOKE FROM THE GUIDANCE IN YOUR TELNO 351 INCLUDING THE POINT IN YOUR PARA 3.
3. NYERERE REPLIED IN A SOMEWHAT DISJOINTED WAY MAKING FREQUENT REFERENCE TO THE PRIME MINISTER'S MESSAGE AND YOUR SPEAKING NOTES WHICH HE HAD IN HIS HAND. HIS MAIN POINTS WERE:-
 - (1) HE STILL THOUGHT THINGS WERE QUOTE MOVING QUITE WELL UNQUOTE.
 - (2) HE ACCEPTED THAT FOR BISHOP MUZOREWA TO RELINQUISH OFFICE WAS NOT A SMALL THING.
 - (3) ON THE TIME OF THE PRE-INDEPENDENCE PERIOD, TWO MONTHS WAS MUCH TOO SHORT. IT COULD NOT BE DONE FAIRLY IN THAT TIME. (HE WAS CLEARLY NOT IMPRESSED BY THE EXTENSION INVOLVED IN THE PERIOD NOT BEGINNING UNTIL THE CEASE-FIRE WAS ESTABLISHED).
 - (4) LOOKING AT PARAS 9 AND 10 OF YOUR SPEAKING NOTES, HE SUGGESTED THE PF'S VIEWS WERE BRUSHED ASIDE TOO EASILY. IT WHAT WERE OBVIOUSLY NOT CONSIDERED COMMENTS HE SAID QUOTE PERHAPS WE CAN LEAVE OUT REGISTRATION OF VOTERS, BUT WE CANNOT LEAVE OUT EVERYTHING UNQUOTE.

CONFIDENTIAL

/HE EXPRESSED

HE EXPRESSED DISLIKE OF A REGIONAL SYSTEM WHICH COULD ENCOURAGE TRIBALISM AND ARGUED FOR DELIMITATION OF CONSTITUENCIES SAYING THAT WHAT WE WERE PROPOSING WAS QUITE ALIEN TO OUR OWN SYSTEM. (I DID NOT HOWEVER HAVE AT ALL THE IMPRESSION THAT THESE WERE VITAL ISSUES FOR HIM).

(5) GOING BACK TO HIS POINT ABOUT THAT STATUS OF THE PF ARMIES AFTER REFERRING TO THE RELEVANT PARAGRAPH IN THE PRIME MINISTER'S LETTER, NYERERE SAID THAT HE THOUGHT QUOTE YOU WERE MAKING SOME MOVEMENT THERE UNQUOTE. THE IMPLICATION WAS THAT HE WAS ENCOURAGED BUT, IN HIS VIEW, THERE WAS STILL SOME WAY TO GO. IN AN ASIDE, HE AGREED THAT THE ARMIES SHOULD HAVE NO PART IN THE ELECTIONS QUOTE I HOPE THEY WILL BE LOCKED UP UNQUOTE.

(6) NYERERE RAISED AGAIN (BUT WITHOUT MUCH CONVICTION) THE QUESTION OF A POLITICAL BODY PREVIOUSLY RAISED WITH ME BY MISS WICKEN (MY TELNO 851). HE WONDERED IF OUR PROPOSALS FOR DIRECT RULE BY THE GOVERNOR WERE QUOTE FEASIBLE UNQUOTE: HE THOUGHT THE GOVERNOR WOULD NEED SOME KIND OF QUOTE POLITICAL VEHICLE UNQUOTE TO LINK HIM WITH THE MACHINERY HE WOULD BE USING FOR GOVERNMENT. I RE-EMPHASISED THE POINT IN PARA 2C OF YOUR TELNO 351 AND I THINK NYERERE SAW THE FORCE OF THIS.

(7) NYERERE QUESTIONED THE FORMULA QUOTE UNDERTAKE NOT TO EXERCISE MINISTERIAL FUNCTIONS UNQUOTE IN PARA 5 OF THE SECTION OF YOUR SPEAKING NOTES ON THE ADMINISTRATION IN THE INTERIM PERIOD. HE SAID IT WAS NOT A QUESTION OF ANY QUOTE UNDERTAKING UNQUOTE BY MUZOREWA, BUT WHEN I SAID THE MEANING AND INTENTION WAS QUITE CLEAR, HE ACCEPTED THIS.

(8) NYERERE ALSO GRUMBLED A LITTLE ABOUT THE PHRASE IN THE PRIME MINISTER'S LETTER READING QUOTE I SHALL NOT BE PREPARED TO ASK A GREAT DEAL MORE OF HIM (MUZOREWA) ... UNQUOTE (BUT SEE ALSO (3) ABOVE). HE LINKED THIS WITH THE TIME OF THE PRE-INDEPENDENCE PERIOD AND SOUGHT TO ARGUE THAT EXTENDING THE PERIOD WAS NOT INFACT ASKING ANYTHING MORE OF MUZOREWA.

CONFIDENTIAL

(9)

NYERERE SPOKE IN A RATHER CONFUSED MANNER OF COMMONWEALTH QUOTE TROOPS UNQUOTE, SAYING HE WAS NOT RAISING THIS BUT MR FRASER HAD SPOKEN TO HIM OF IT SAYING QUOTE IF THIS WOULD BE A HELPN WE SHOULD BE PREPARED TO COME IN UNQUOTE. NYERERE COMMENTED THAT QUOTE IF THE VISIBILITY OF SOME AUSTRALIAN SOLDIERS WOULD HELP WE SURELY SHOULD NOT BREAK ON THIS UNQUOTE. BUT HE REPEATED THAT HE WAS NOT MAKING A ISSUE OF IT. FOR HIS PART THE VITAL THING WAS EFFECTIVE COMPLIANCE WITH THE CEASE-FIRE BY THE PARTIES (I AM IN NO DOUBT THAT HE WELL UNDERSTANDS ALL THE OBJECTIONS TO ANY KIND OF PEACE-KEEPING FORCE).

(10) AT ONE POINT NYERERE COMMENTED THAT HE THOUGHT THE QUOTE ATMOSPHERE UNQUOTE IN THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE WAS NOW NOT TOO GOOD. HE ASKED ME IF THE PRIME MINISTER HAD MET BISHOP MUZOREWA. I SAID I HAD SEEN NO REPORTS OF ANY SUCH MEETING. I HAD THE IMPRESSION THAT HE MIGHT HAVE BEEN TOLD BY SOME SOURCE THAT THERE HAD BEEN A PRIVATE BEHIND THE SCENED MEETING AND WAS SUSPICIOUS OF THIS.

2. THIS MEETING WAS LONGER THAN USUAL AND NYERERE RAISED MORE MATTERS OF DETAIL THAN IS HIS USUAL PRACTICE. I SUSPECT IT MAY HAVE BEEN BECAUSE MR MKAPA WAS PRESENT. MR MKAPA DID NOT HIMSELF TAKE ANY PART IN THE DISCUSSION.

NOON

F I L E S

RHOD D
OADS
N AM D
NEWS D
PUSD
PLANNING STAFF
ES & SD
CCD
FRD
UND
LEGAL ADVISERS
(MR FREELAND)
(MR FIFCOT)
ECON D
PCD

DEF D
OID
PS
PS/LPS
PS/MR LUCE
PS/MR RIDLEY
PS/MR HURD
PS/PUS
SIR A DUFF
LORD N G LENNOX
MISS BROWN
MR DAY
MR WILLSON
MR ASPIN 3

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION
RHODESIA POLICY

CONFIDENTIAL

PART 8 ends:-

Fro to Mon 31.10.79

PART 9 begins:-

Dar Es Salaam 856 1.11.79





END

Filmed at the National
Archives (TNA) in London

February 2010