

PREM19

115

RHODESIA


(Situation in)

(November 19 - 30)

(Part 10)

PREM

19 / 115



PART 10

MT

Confidential Filing

The situation in Zimbabwe Rhodesia
The Constitutional Conference in London

RHODESIA

Part 1 = May 1979

Part 10 = Nov 1979

Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date
21.11.79							
22.11.79							
23.11.79							
26.11.79							
28.11.79							
PREM 19/1/85							



PART 10 ends:-

Ho to Fco 30-11-79

PART 11 begins:-

Fm Dar 959 2.12.79

Published Papers

The following published paper(s) enclosed on this file have been removed and destroyed. Copies may be found elsewhere in The National Archives.

House of Commons Hansard.

21 November 1979, columns 384-387

"Zambia"

Signed Wayland Date 5 November 2009

PREM Records Team

Rhodesia

From: THE PRIVATE SECRETARY



HOME OFFICE
QUEEN ANNE'S GATE
LONDON SW1H 9AT

30 November 1979

And

Dear George

SOUTHERN RHODESIA: ZIMBABWE INDEPENDENCE
BILL - OD(79)40

The Home Secretary has seen the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary's memorandum OD(79)40 and is content with the policy proposals it contains.

Copies of this letter go to the Private Secretaries to other members of OD and to Martin Vile.

Yours sincerely
Tim Butler

(A J BUTLER)

G G H Walden Esq

3 - DEC 1979



351a
 Mr Renwick

MEETING BETWEEN THE SECRETARY OF STATE AND THE PATRIOTIC FRONT

Messrs Nkomo and Mugabe called again on the Secretary of State this evening, accompanied by Mr Chambati and Mr Kamba. The LPS, you and I were also present.

Mr Mugabe began by distributing and reading out a paper, which he described as the PF's reply to Lord Carrington. He said he would have preferred to do this at a full-scale bilateral meeting. Lord Carrington said that he found this reply most disappointing. It was not an answer, but an interpretative statement. The other side would also wish to make such statements if the PF did. In other respects, the paper was merely a reiteration of the PF's position. We had already taken account of the PF's problems, eg on monitoring where we were now thinking in terms of 1,200, thus trebling our initial figure. This was as far as we could go. As for the PF's concern about the Rhodesian Air Force, he could give a categorical undertaking that the airports would be adequately monitored. On the disposition of the forces, Lord Carrington then read out points (a)-(h) in your brief for the meeting.

The Secretary of State stressed that there was no other way of reaching a ceasefire agreement, and no more negotiating fat on our position. It was for this reason that he had asked in good faith whether the Patriotic Front could accept our proposals or not. No more discussion was possible. Mr Mugabe said that there had been no discussion at all about disengagement on an equal basis. The PF were prepared to move to company bases if the Rhodesian forces were too. Mr Renwick said that we did not understand the proposals for a two-stage disengagement in the PF's document. Above all, the proposal in para 2(d) of that document (which suggests that movement into the second phase positions might be unnecessary) was not acceptable. Our own proposals were less complex. We were prepared to accept the monitoring of Rhodesian forces down to company level. Assembly was crucial. There could not be an adequate ceasefire with large numbers of PF forces scattered across the country. The Rhodesians would fall back towards their bases as the PF assembled. Everyone would have to be satisfied, including the Governor, that the PF had assembled in sufficient numbers with their arms.


Mr Mugabe said that they accepted reciprocity, but our definition was not clear. Lord Carrington said that the details could be discussed in the talks on implementation. The point was that all the forces would be under the Governor, and would be monitored. Once they were separated there would be no more fighting. Mr Mugabe said that it was wrong to suppose that the PF forces could not be identified; they had provincial structures and commands. Mr Renwick said that if large numbers of the PF turned up, then the ceasefire would be successfully implemented. Mr Mugabe asked why the PF should be concentrated in fewer areas than the Rhodesian forces. The ZRFS were not to be trusted. They were "ferocious creatures". In the final analysis, the PF would have to defend themselves since the Governor had no army and the monitors could only pray. Discussion of the problem would be much easier if the

/Rhodesians

Rhodesians themselves were present.

Lord Carrington said that the main objective was to stop the war. He wanted to make it clear that there was nothing more he could say to the PF: they must decide whether or not they could accept our ceasefire paper, together with his statement at Lancaster House on 28 November which had been circulated as a conference document. Mr Mugabe said that the PF had given its answer in their paper; there must be equality: if the Rhodesian forces withdrew to their batallion bases, the PF would too. Mr Nkomo became indignant, and asked what the PF were supposed to be accepting. Lord Carrington said that we could not accept the PF's interpretative paper. We had already rejected many of its arguments. He was not prepared to go through the whole business again. We were now at the end of the week, and he had a meeting with his senior colleagues on Monday. They knew that he had asked for a definitive answer. Decisions had to be taken on Monday about the next steps the Government would have to take. He would however be available to see the PF at 11 o'clock tomorrow morning if they wished.

Mr Nkomo, in a noisy and heated intervention, said that Lord Carrington was making difficulties for himself; that the PF were not his students; and were not prepared to sing his song. Lord Carrington said that we had been discussing the ceasefire arrangements for over two weeks and had gone out of our way to allay the PF's fears. We had to have an answer. Mr Nkomo said that the PF were ready to agree on a ceasefire and wanted to go straight on to discuss the details. Lord Carrington said that the details could not be discussed until the PF had accepted our proposals.



(G G H Walden)

30 November 1979

cc:- PS
 PS/LPS
 PS/Mr Luce
 PS/PUS
 Sir A Duff
 Mr Day
 Mr Fifoot, Legal Advisers
 Mr Powell
 News Dept

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Mr Day

Private Secretary

RHODESIA: MEETING WITH MR NKOMO AND MR MUGABE: 30 NOVEMBER

1. We know from various sources that the Patriotic Front are not very far from accepting our proposals. They will, however, try to gain time and re-open various issues. They may alternatively try to accept with an "interpretation" of our proposals. This would not be acceptable. What we could accept, however, is that they could put forward their proposals on implementation in the next phase. It would then be open to them to accept our cease-fire proposals in the light of the Secretary of State's statement of 28 November, provided there was agreement on the practical arrangements.

2. Mr Nkomo this morning raised again the question of the composition of the monitoring force. We do not believe that this is a breaking point for the Patriotic Front and should resist any attempts to re-open this. The Secretary of State will wish to emphasize, however, that we have taken account of the Patriotic Front's concern about the size of the force. We now envisage that the numbers will be more than double those originally contemplated (we are now close to 1,200 men).

3. If the Patriotic Front raise again the question of the grounding of the Rhodesian air force, we should say again that the air force will be monitored. We do not accept that there is any danger of attack on Patriotic Front forces which have assembled and accepted the Governor's authority.

4. The difficult area will be that of the disposition of the forces. The Secretary of State may wish to take the line that:

a. at present the forces of both sides are deployed and interlocked throughout Rhodesia;

b.

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- b. our proposals are designed to bring about a reciprocal dis-engagement of forces which will not place either side at a dis-advantage;
 - c. the Rhodesian armed forces will be obliged to take the first step by dis-engaging under the authority of their own Commanders and under the supervision of the monitoring force;
 - d. it will be for the Patriotic Front to take the next step by assembling their forces;
 - e. a number of assembly places and an additional number of rendez-vous points will be established for this purpose. These will be related to the areas in which Patriotic Front forces have been operating;
 - [f. there will be monitoring arrangements throughout the command structure of the Rhodesian armed forces, who will be monitored from their existing head-quarters bases;]
 - g. provided the Patriotic Front forces assemble with their arms as required by the cease-fire agreement, the dis-engagement will be complete and reciprocal and neither side will present a threat to the other;
 - h. the forces of both sides will be under the authority of the Governor and will be required to comply with his directions; those forces who assemble and accept his authority will be lawful;
5. In further discussion if Mr Mugabe raises again the question of the Rhodesian forces "returning to barracks", the Secretary of State may wish to say that the assembly process will be crucial. There are deep-rooted suspicions on the Rhodesian side as well as on the Patriotic Front side. They do not know whether the

/Patriotic Front

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Patriotic Front will be prepared to assemble their forces. The dis-engagement which takes place will be reciprocal.

The disposition of the Rhodesian forces, under the directions of the Governor, will be related to the final position of the Patriotic Front forces. (There is no question therefore of confining the Rhodesian forces to barracks from the outset of the assembly process.)

6. It is open to the Patriotic Front to accept the cease-fire proposals in the light of the Secretary of State's statement in response to their expressions of concern on 28 November, and on the basis that it remains to work out the practical details of the implementation. But if they do not accept the proposals it will not be possible to proceed to discussions of implementation because there will be no arrangements to implement. The Patriotic Front have been offered a cease-fire agreement on the basis of reciprocal dis-engagement. If they are not prepared to accept it, it will not be possible to advance the work of the Conference or to keep the other delegation at the Conference any longer.

7. If, however, the Patriotic Front are able to respond positively, it will be open to them to put forward their proposals as soon as the discussions begin on implementation. We will consider those proposals together with any proposals put forward by the Rhodesian delegation; but we do not believe that it will be possible to get agreement on any basis which departs significantly from the proposals we have put forward.


8. If the Patriotic Front say that they are unable to reply, the Secretary of State may wish to say that in that event it is difficult to see how the Conference can make further progress. We hope that the Patriotic Front leaders will reflect on what he has said. If they will let us have their reply tomorrow

/morning

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morning we will then be able to tell the Salisbury delegation whether they should stay to discuss the implementation or not. The British Government will have to decide its future course of action in the light of the Patriotic Front's response. We can see no way of proceeding if it is negative.



R W Renwick
Rhodesia Department

cc: PS/LPS
PS/Mr Luce
PS/PUS
Sir A Duff

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f.a.
Renwick

Mr Renwick

MEETING BETWEEN THE SECRETARY OF STATE AND THE PATRIOTIC FRONT

At this morning's meeting with the Patriotic Front (at which the LPS, you and I were also present on our side) Nkomo began by acknowledging that Lord Carrington's statement yesterday was evidence that the British had moved on a number of points. Lord Carrington seemed to wish to reach agreement by movement on both sides, and this was a good thing. But it would be wrong to leave things undone (he mentioned the Rhodesian Air Force) and said that our proposals still needed to be "knocked into shape". The only way this could be done would be by sitting down with the Rhodesian side and getting down to details on maps.

Lord Carrington said that he knew that the Patriotic Front had difficulties, and we had tried to meet these. We could, for example, accept 1,000 monitors. He mentioned other concessions we had made. Assembly of the Patriotic Front forces was however crucial, as the start of a two-way traffic. He recognised that there was distrust on both sides, but reciprocal disengagement depended on the success of the assembly of the Patriotic Front forces. The Salisbury forces would be monitored from their bases. Nkomo said that he hoped that we were not talking about the Rhodesians' operational bases. Mugabe asked why the Rhodesians should not withdraw to barracks - that was the only possible meaning of movement on both sides. If the Rhodesian forces stayed in their operational areas, so would the Patriotic Front. Lord Carrington clearly had no notion about how the Patriotic Front forces were organised. Mr Nkomo said that all this needed to be discussed between them and the Salisbury people.

Lord Carrington said that as far as we were concerned, there was nothing more to discuss. Our wording had been carefully chosen. He hoped that the Patriotic Front could tell him tomorrow whether they could accept our proposals or not. In the meantime, we could give them any clarification they needed. We were now at the end of the road. Nkomo asked Lord Carrington not to talk about final discussions; the Patriotic Front were still a long way from the end of the road. Mugabe asked whether what we were saying was that the Rhodesians had refused to withdraw to their barracks. He was not going to stand by while his forces were pushed into "slaughter points". Mr Renwick explained that the Rhodesian forces, who would disengage to allow assembly, were hardly likely to slaughter the Patriotic Front forces before the eyes of the monitors. Mugabe argued that the Rhodesians were rebels, capable of anything, and that the monitors were inadequate. Nkomo said that we needed to establish where the Patriotic Front and Rhodesian operational bases were. If the Rhodesian forces stayed in theirs, so would the Patriotic Front.

/Lord Carrington

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Lord Carrington insisted that the Patriotic Front should tell him tomorrow night whether they accepted our proposals or not. Both Nkomo and Mugabe said that they would not reply tomorrow, but would re-pose their questions about assembly points and barracks.

(G G H Walden)

29 November 1979

cc:- PS
PS/LPS
PS/Mr Luce
PS/PUS
Mr Day
Mr Barder
PUSD
News Dept

Mr Fifoot, Legal Advisers
No 10 Downing Street

29 NOV 1979

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no

COMMONWEALTH SECRETARIAT

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MARLBOROUGH HOUSE,
PALL MALL,
LONDON, SW1Y 5HX

Your ref:

Our ref:

C.151/4/2

29 November 1979

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Commonwealth Committee on Southern Africa

Attached is a copy of the minutes of the Committee's meeting on 23 November 1979.

M. Malhoutra

Copies To:

PS | No 10 ✓

Mr. Fowler, Cabinet office

PS

PS | LPS

PS | Mr. Blaker

PS | Mr. Luce

PS | PUS

Sir. A. Duff

Mr. Stratton

Mr. Day

Mr. N. Aspin

Mr. Barber

Mr. Kenwick

M. Malhoutra
Secretary
Commonwealth Committee on
Southern Africa

Mr. J.M. Wilson

Mr. J.V. Kerby

Mr. I.A. Roberts, Canberra

M+C.D

EAD

Mr. Sankey

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CSA(79) Seventh Meeting

COMMONWEALTH COMMITTEE ON SOUTHERN AFRICA

MINUTES of the Meeting of the Committee on Southern Africa held at Marlborough House on Friday, 23 November 1979, at 4.00 p.m.

Present:

H.E. Mr Arthur J. Scerri
High Commissioner for Malta
(in the chair)

Australia

H.E. Sir Gordon Freeth
High Commissioner

Mr R.R. Fernandez
Deputy High Commissioner

Mr R.A. Burns
Counsellor

Barbados

Mr C.W. Hinkson
Counsellor

Britain

Mr D.M. Day
Assistant Under Secretary

Mr J.R. Paterson
Acting Head
Commonwealth Coordination
Department

Cyprus

H.E. Mr T. Panayides
High Commissioner

Fiji

Mr Prabodh Mishra
Second Secretary

The Bahamas

H.E. Mr R.F. Anthony Roberts
High Commissioner

Bangladesh

H.E. Mr A.R. Shams-ud Doha
High Commissioner

Botswana

Mr M.L. Selepeng
Acting High Commissioner

Canada

Mr C. Hardy
Acting High Commissioner

Mr A.N. Robinson
First Secretary

Dominica

H.E. Mr A. Shillingford
High Commissioner

The Gambia

H.E. Mr B. O. Semega-Janeh
High Commissioner

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Ghana

H.E. Mr E.M. Debrah
High Commissioner

Mr I.K. Davies
Counsellor

Guyana

H.E. Dr C.H. Grant
High Commissioner

Mr C.J.E. Barker
Deputy High Commissioner

Jamaica

H.E. Mr E.G. Peart
High Commissioner

Mrs Audrey M. Thompson
Counsellor

Lesotho

Mr M. Mathibeli
Counsellor

Mauritius

H.E. Sir L. Teelock
High Commissioner

Nigeria

H.E. Mr S.Y. Yolah
High Commissioner

H.E. Mr E. Oba
High Commissioner (Zambia)

Mr. J.K. Shinkaiye
Counsellor

Seychelles

Mr M.H. Delcy
Acting High Commissioner

Sri Lanka

H.E. Mr N. Wimalasena
High Commissioner

Grenada

H.E. Mr F. Augustine
High Commissioner

India

Mr I.P. Singh
Acting High Commissioner

Mr Arif Quamarain
Counsellor

Kenya

H.E. Mr. S.K. Kimalel
High Commissioner

Malawi

Mr B.J.W. Sani
First Secretary

Malaysia

Mr Looi Cheok Hun
Deputy High Commissioner

New Zealand

H.E. The Hon. L.W. Gandar
High Commissioner

Mr. B.J. Lynch
Deputy High Commissioner

Mr P.R. Bennett
Counsellor

Papua New Guinea

H.E. Mr F.B.C. Reiher
High Commissioner

Sierra Leone

Mr C.B. Aubee
Deputy High Commissioner

Mr A. Wilson
Information Attache

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St. Lucia

H.E. Dr C.C. Thomas
High Commissioner

Tanzania

Mrs L. Howell
Counsellor

Trinidad and Tobago

Mr H. Broomes
Acting High Commissioner

Swaziland

H.E. Mr G.M. Mamba
High Commissioner

Tonga

H.E. Mr I.F. Faletau
High Commissioner

Zambia

Mr E.N. Nyirenda
Deputy High Commissioner

H.E. Mr Shridath S. Ramphal
Commonwealth Secretary-General

Commonwealth Secretariat

Mr E.C. Anyaoku
Mr D. Anderson
Prof. K.S. Murshid
Mr M. Malhoutra (Secretary)
Mr C. Gunawardena
Mrs P.B. Robertson
Dr. A.C. Bundu
Mr C. Laidlaw
Mr. A.V. Hayday
Mr H. Craft
Mr M. Robinson
Miss A. Cassam
Miss A.R. Horwich
Mr M. Anafu
Miss S. Hyne
Miss R.M. Gould

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MINUTES

The Chairman welcomed representatives to the meeting and expressed his appreciation for the honour they had done him by asking him to act as Chairman in the absence of Mr Seignoret.

2. He pointed out that, as had been agreed earlier, the present meeting would begin with a briefing by the British representative about the developments at Lancaster House. He requested representatives to make their comments or questions as brief as possible in order to ensure that there was adequate time for the substantive business of the day relating to observers.

3. After drawing attention to the documents from the Lancaster House Conference which had been laid on the table, he invited the British representative to brief the meeting.

I Briefing by the British Representative

4. The Representative of Britain said that since the last Briefing Meeting there had been two bilateral meetings, one in the morning of the previous day with the Salisbury delegation and another in the afternoon with the Patriotic Front. The discussions had been based on the British proposals for a ceasefire. Certain aspects of the proposals relating to the Ceasefire Monitoring Group and the disposition of the forces during the ceasefire period had been further clarified at the request of the Salisbury delegation, whereas the meeting with the Patriotic Front had discussed certain procedural problems, and in particular, their request to have detailed direct discussions with the Salisbury delegation. There had been some discussion also on the proposals put forward by the Patriotic Front.

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5. At a plenary meeting on 22 November, Lord Carrington had tabled an amplified version of his earlier proposals for a ceasefire. He had stressed his strongly held view that, having reached agreement on the basic political issues, the Conference should move rapidly to conclude the discussion on the ceasefire so that the process leading to a cessation of hostilities, elections and independence could commence. He had asked the delegations to consider these proposals and give their reactions after the week-end.

6. Lord Carrington had then sought agreement from both delegations to an immediate cessation of cross-border activities in order to avoid any further increase in tension between Rhodesia and Zambia. He had pointed out that the British Prime Minister had been in touch with President Kaunda during the day and urged both sides to earnestly consider the proposal he had made.

7. Mr Nkomo had agreed that it was important to have an early decision on a ceasefire, but this should not be at the expense of detailed and thorough discussions; detailed discussions with the Salisbury delegation were particularly necessary. Regarding Lord Carrington's proposal for a moratorium on cross-border activity, Mr Nkomo had suggested that this should be addressed to the Rhodesian authorities rather than the Patriotic Front. Mr Mugabe had spoken on similar lines. Lord Carrington had pointed out that his proposal regarding cross-border activities was made in a sincere and genuine effort to relieve a difficult situation; it would be a pity if it was rejected out of hand.

8. Regarding the amplified proposals, the Patriotic Front suggested that it was difficult to reach any decision until there had been further discussion of the basic principles involved and a clear indication of the Salisbury delegation's attitude. Lord Carrington had replied that he hoped both

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delegations would examine them carefully over the week-end and indicate whether the proposals were acceptable. The meeting had then adjourned and would resume on Monday, 26 November, to consider the reactions of both delegations.

9. The Representative of The Bahamas thought that the understanding had been that the ceasefire negotiations would be held in plenary sessions but it now appeared that the British Government had once again returned to bilateral negotiations. He asked what the objective of this was.

10. The Representative of Britain explained that there had clearly been differences between the British and Patriotic Front proposals and it was thought that it might be possible that these differences could be narrowed in bilateral discussions with the Patriotic Front.

11. In reply to a question by the representative of Jamaica, the Representative of Britain said that the Salisbury delegation had not tabled any proposals but had indicated their readiness to discuss the ceasefire proposals tabled by the British delegation.

12. The Representative of Jamaica asked whether this meant that the Salisbury delegation accepted the British proposals.

13. The Representative of Britain replied that this was not the case but they had said that they would examine the amplified British proposals and give their reactions to them at the next meeting.

14. The Representative of Tanzania understood that Lord Carrington expected to have the Patriotic Front's reactions on Monday. According to the Press, however, the impression was given that Lord Carrington required a 'Yes' or 'No' answer by Monday.

15. The Representative of Britain referred to the text of Lord Carrington's statement on 22 November, where he stated "I would ask both delegations to let me know whether or not they can accept our proposals by Monday, 26 November".

II Commonwealth Observers

16. The Chairman said that as representatives already knew, the main purpose of the meeting was to consider the question of Commonwealth observers, in the context of the elections that would be held in Zimbabwe if the Lancaster House Conference succeeded. The meeting had before it, as a basis for discussion, two Circular Letters (Nos.75/79 and 76/79 of 19 November 1979) which the Secretary-General had addressed to Commonwealth Governments. He expected that representatives would have acquainted their capitals with the contents of these letters and that their remarks would therefore reflect the thinking of their respective Governments on this vital issue.

17. If he correctly interpreted the mood of the preliminary discussion of this question on Tuesday last, it had been clear that Commonwealth Governments attached the highest importance to the matter as well as to the urgent need for decisions to be taken in good time. The Australian representative had reminded the meeting of the need for full consultation with the British Government. The Secretary-General had informed them that he had conveyed his ideas to Lord Carrington on 1 November and it would be helpful to the present meeting to know the British Government's thinking on the matter, so that their discussion could take account of its views. He therefore proposed to first invite the Secretary-General to introduce the papers he had circulated to them and immediately thereafter to invite the British representative to inform them about his Government's approach to the question.

18. The Secretary-General said that in all that representatives had been doing in the past weeks in their informal consultations

and in meetings of the Southern Africa Committee they had been working collectively as the Commonwealth; and they had been doing so in support of the lasting settlement in Rhodesia which Commonwealth action in Lusaka made possible. The Commonwealth role, as their involvement testified and as 14 years of Commonwealth pre-occupation attested, was not a marginal one. Major burdens were borne by the British Government and by Commonwealth African Frontline States; but many other Commonwealth Governments had played immensely helpful roles as well. The Commonwealth, as this week's developments confirmed, would need to continue these contributions if the promise of a lasting settlement which the Commonwealth had made to the world in Lusaka was to be brought nearer to fulfilment.

19. But apart from general support for the post-Lusaka procedures which Commonwealth Governments accepted as natural responsibilities, there was one particular Commonwealth role for which the Lusaka Agreement provided specifically. It was about that role that they were meeting today in this Committee. It was, he was sure, no secret from any of the representatives that of all the important elements of the nine-point plan which Heads of Government had agreed on, and which they had been calling the 'Lusaka Accord', none was more important than point seven in which Heads of Government:

'acknowledged that the government formed under such an independence constitution must be chosen through free and fair elections properly supervised under British Government authority, and with Commonwealth observers'.

20. He did not need to stress the importance which Heads of Government had attached to this Commonwealth observer role in relation to the elections. It was quite clear that it was of immense importance as confidence building machinery in relation to the parties to the elections. But it was also of

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major importance to Commonwealth Governments generally who had made a major political investment in the procedures for achieving and implementing a lasting settlement. He ventured to think it was of much significance to the wider international community.

21. The second point he should make was that this was a Commonwealth role that everyone should be encouraged to see in wholly helpful and constructive terms. The elections should mark the real end of the Rhodesian problem that had bedevilled African, Commonwealth and international affairs for so long. They should be the prelude to Zimbabwe's independence and the assumption of its long deferred place as a member of the Commonwealth and of the international community. A Commonwealth observer role which assisted in confirming the validity of those elections would be a seal of assurance of great importance to Zimbabwe's future.

22. The third point was that the Committee should not be confused over the questions to be settled. There was, for example, no significant (if any) disagreement over the essential elements of paragraphs 1 to 3 of the Outline for the Commonwealth observer role that he had circulated as the Secretariat's preliminary ideas. He believed the British Government accepted that Commonwealth observers must be in a position to satisfy the Commonwealth as a whole that the election was free and fair and that the British Government had effectively carried out its responsibility in relation to them. There was no disagreement that there should be no restrictions on the movement of the observers and that every effort should be made by all concerned to facilitate their tasks. There was no disagreement that the observers should not limit their activities merely to the events during the days on which polling took place but must be able to observe the election campaign as a whole. There was no disagreement that the responsibility for the organisation and conduct of the election would rest with the Governor and his staff who would have the responsibility for ensuring, with the assistance of the Election Council, that the elections had been free and fair

and that allegations of unfair practice had been properly investigated and remedied. Moreover there was no doubt whatever that the Governor and his staff would wish to co-operate in full with the Commonwealth observers. None of these, he believed, certainly he hoped, were matters of any controversy or difference within this Committee or between Commonwealth Governments.

23. Nor did he believe that in the spirit that had always inspired Commonwealth arrangements, there should be any problem over formalities, or, speaking for the Secretariat, any institutional amour-propre inhibiting its working out practicable arrangements for the establishment of the group of Commonwealth observers or their functioning. Certainly, the Secretariat was not seeking a role in this matter for its own sake.

24. But there was an important matter of principle for Commonwealth Governments to determine and, therefore, for this Committee to make recommendations on to them. In some respects it was not an issue of any great complexity; and, indeed, it had never been one on which he entertained any doubt or expected any difference of view. It was simply this: when Commonwealth leaders in Lusaka agreed to give their support to the plan leading to free and fair elections 'with Commonwealth observers', did they envisage anything other than a collective observer role for the Commonwealth? As he had indicated in his message to Commonwealth Heads of Government on 19 November, it was his understanding that what was envisaged at Lusaka was a collective role for 'Commonwealth observers' rather than separate roles for 'observers from Commonwealth countries'.

25. He had said in that message that this understanding was 'in line with normal practice'. There were not many occasions on which there had been Commonwealth observer roles for elections or for referenda; but there had been a few. The last one - a Commonwealth observer role at the referendum on the future of

Gibraltar - was in 1967, and it was one of some international significance. Before Gibraltar, there were Commonwealth roles in relation to elections in Guyana (1964) and in Mauritius (1966-1967). On all these occasions the observers were organised as a team: a group of observers reporting as a group - sometimes with reservations on the part of one or more member - but always on the basis of a collective role.

26. There were many occasions on which elections or plebiscites or referenda had been conducted around the world with United Nations observers : in Togoland, in the Cameroons, in Western Samoa, in Ruanda Burundi, in Sabah and Sarawak, in Equatorial Guinea, in West Irian, in Papua New Guinea, in Djibouti and, only this month, in the New Hebrides. On all of those occasions, United Nations observers had been not merely observers coming from countries who were members of the United Nations but a collective United Nations team organised at the request of member countries by the United Nations and reporting to member countries through the United Nations. To the Secretariat's knowledge - which might not, admittedly, be complete - if some comparable procedure were not followed in Rhodesia this would be the first occasion on which a Commonwealth or United Nations observer role was not discharged in a collective manner by an observer team established on what had now come to be standard lines.

27. That was essentially the question: was the Commonwealth role in observing the elections in Rhodesia prior to Zimbabwe's independence to be a normal collective role or an abnormal non-collective one? Of course, if it was not to be a collective role it would not be a Commonwealth role in the true sense of the word.

28. The British Government had already indicated an intention to invite all Commonwealth countries to send observers at their own expense to the elections; and it may be that some Commonwealth countries would wish to avail themselves of this separate opportunity to observe the elections in a purely national context.

That would not, of course, exclude the collective role of Commonwealth observers which he believed had been generally envisaged at Lusaka, or even preclude the participation in that collective group of countries availing themselves separately of the British invitation.

29. He would not conceal from representatives, however, the implications of dealing with this matter otherwise than in a collective manner. The Commonwealth, as the meeting testified, had 42 members; it was, he thought, wholly unrealistic to expect all 42 countries to participate in the process of observing the elections. For one thing the overwhelming majority of Commonwealth member states would find it an immense financial burden to send personnel to Rhodesia for what could be as long as eight weeks or more; and yet, in the absence of a collective Commonwealth role or the separate acceptance of those financial burdens, most member countries would be excluded altogether from the process. Those countries which could easily afford to send observers and were prepared to do so on a separate national basis would go on their own behalf to advise their own governments. They would not go as Commonwealth observers and they would not become Commonwealth observers merely because they were joined in Rhodesia by three or four - or six or seven - other sets of observers, each of them observing the elections on behalf of their own governments.

30. At the end of the day what would result was not a collective view of Commonwealth observers, with or without reservation or dissent, but so many separate reports to separate capitals. In the place of a single collective assertion that (as they all must hope would be the case) the elections were freely and fairly conducted and the new Government of whatever Party, validly elected to take the country to independence - and Commonwealth membership; instead of that collective authentication which would be the consummation of Commonwealth efforts in Lusaka, there would be a series of different reports to different Governments - quot homines, tot sententiae. The invitation to

divisiveness could not be clearer. Yet it would be a time when the Commonwealth would need most to maximise its unity. He did not believe that this was what Commonwealth leaders in general envisaged at Lusaka.

31. But, quite apart from the basic issue of principle, there were a number of operational reasons which suggested that individual observer teams would not be able to function in as comprehensive and effective a manner as a collective group, and, therefore, not be able to contribute as fully to the process of confidence building which was so vital:

- A collective group would establish a presence within the country as soon as practicable after the ceasefire came into effect; individual teams would go to Zimbabwe in a more haphazard manner.
- A collective group would be able to establish its presence not only in Salisbury but also in each of the provincial or district headquarters; individual teams would not be able to do so.
- A collective group, with adequate and specialised supporting staff, would be able to observe whether the various instrumentalities of Government - including the media, the police and relevant Departments of the Government - both in Salisbury and in the provinces had maintained strict impartiality during the whole process of the election campaign. Individual teams with limited numbers would hardly be able to do so.

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- A collective group, whose presence and personnel would be widely advertised through the media would be able to play a constructive role in a manner that individual teams would not.
- A collective group would be in a far better position to receive complaints from parties and individuals about all aspects of the electoral process, to look into these complaints and, where necessary, bring them to the notice of the Election Council or the Governor - than individual teams would be able to do.
- A collective group would be able to maintain close liaison with the Governor, the Election Council, the Ceasefire Commission and the Ceasefire Monitoring Force and all the political parties; individual teams would not.
- As the elections would be held without registration of voters, critical questions of eligibility would arise on polling day at hundreds of polling stations throughout the country. A collective group backed by substantial supporting staff would be able to observe, in a manner that individual teams would simply find impossible, how polling officers discharged their responsibilities.
- Last but not least, a collective group, without derogating in any way from the executive authority of the administering power, would be able to use its good offices

and offer judicious advice to smooth out difficulties as and when they occurred in a manner that individual teams would not.

32. For all these reasons, the observer role of a collective group was bound to be immeasurably more effective and their report was bound to carry incomparably greater weight with the people of Zimbabwe, Commonwealth Governments as a whole, and the wider international community.

33. He was stating all this at some length because it was important that the Commonwealth did not falter at this stage. In his message to Commonwealth leaders he had referred to President Kaunda's proposals for the Commonwealth observer team which reflected his own understandings. In response to that message, he had since heard from a number of Heads of Government, all of whom, with the exception of the Prime Minister of New Zealand, had indicated that that had been their understanding also. In the end, it was a matter for Commonwealth Governments collectively to decide.

34. One final matter. For his own part, he and his colleagues in the Secretariat had not been immune from sniping by certain sections of the press in this country with charges of partisanship whenever it had become necessary to take a stand on principle. It had been so from the first days of this Committee when, as the Sanctions Committee in the early days of UDI, his predecessor faced the same wrath. It had been so on sanctions breaking, on the deficiencies of the internal settlement constitution and the elections that had followed or, more recently, on the 'second class option'. History had already vindicated some of those stands. The immediate knocks were unwarranted; but they were an occupational hazard they must accept. What would be wrong would be to be deflected from principle because of them. The Commonwealth collectively had played an honourable role throughout the chequered history of the Rhodesia problem. It was

essential that it should sustain that record now.

35. It was in that spirit that he had put forward for the consideration of Governments the proposals that were before the Committee, and invited its particular consideration of the essential issue of a collective Commonwealth observer role at the elections - quite apart from any other roles that Governments may wish to play.

36. The Representative of Mauritius thanked the Secretary-General for his lucid and admirable statement. It was his understanding too that Commonwealth Heads of Government at Lusaka had envisaged Commonwealth observers acting collectively as a group with a Chairman and a Secretary. The Secretary-General had mentioned the Commonwealth's previous role in Gibraltar, Guyana and Mauritius. He could elaborate on what had happened in Mauritius. There, the Commonwealth observers had acted as a group, with a Chairman, to observe both the registration of voters and the organisation and conduct of the elections, and had reported as a group. He agreed with the Secretary-General that a group approach would be a more effective means of carrying out the tasks assigned to the Commonwealth as it would have greater authority and more resources and staff to observe exactly what was happening. Moreover, a group report would be more readily accepted by the international community as being unbiased.

37. The Representative of Britain said that, like the Secretary-General, the British Government had made the Lusaka Agreement its starting point and like all Commonwealth Governments, it attached the highest importance to the role of Commonwealth observers at the elections. At the preliminary discussion of this matter last Tuesday, he had made it clear that the British Government recognised that the observers must be in a position to satisfy themselves, their Governments and the Commonwealth as a whole that the elections in Rhodesia were free and fair and conducted under conditions of impartiality. It was equally

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important that the observers satisfied themselves that the British Governor was carrying out his responsibilities in supervising the elections properly. Britain expected the observers to be concerned with the entire electoral process and not just with what happened on polling day. The Governor and his staff would facilitate the tasks of the observers and co-operate with them.

38. The Secretary-General had recognised that the responsibility for the organisation, conduct and overall supervision must rest with the Governor and his staff; it was one responsibility that could not be shared. Clear and precise instructions would be given to the Governor to create conditions for free and fair elections to be held and accept the duty to investigate complaints against the Election Commissioner and to rectify any defects brought to his attention.

39. During the discussions the Secretary-General had had with the British Secretary of State the previous week, it had been agreed that the British Government would invite Commonwealth Governments to indicate whether they wished to send observers to Rhodesia during the elections. When Government reactions had been received, further detailed discussions would be held with the Secretary-General regarding appropriate arrangements. Responses had been received from a number of Commonwealth Governments. Some had indicated that they preferred their observers to report directly to them; others supported a collective Commonwealth observer group.

40. It was not the British Government's understanding that there would be a collective Commonwealth team; nor would it accept that invitations to individual Commonwealth Governments was an invitation to divisiveness. It was for Commonwealth Governments individually to make their own arrangements for observation. Individual teams of observers would no doubt report to their own Governments whether the British Government had fulfilled its obligations and whether the parties concerned had

acted in a lawful and responsible manner.

41. In reference to the Secretary-General's remark that if Commonwealth observers did not form part of a collective group they could not be considered as fulfilling a Commonwealth role, he said he believed Commonwealth Governments were Commonwealth Governments whether they took part in a group or made their own arrangements for observing the elections. He affirmed Britain's determination to ensure that the elections in Rhodesia were conducted in a way that gave all citizens of the country the right to decide for themselves who their political leaders should be. His Government was committed to free and fair elections, would welcome the presence of Commonwealth observers throughout the electoral process and would give them every assistance to facilitate their tasks.

42. The Chairman asked whether the British representative could confirm that the collective approach had always been the normal practice and also whether the British Government envisaged a limit to the number of observers each country could send.

43. The Representative of Britain replied that he did not wish to dispute the facts regarding earlier precedents. However, as Rhodesia had no exact analogy, this was a matter for consultation with Commonwealth Governments, followed by discussion between the British Government and the Secretary-General on appropriate arrangements. Britain wished to hear the views of other Governments before reaching any conclusions.

44. The Representative of Ghana said that the debates of the Committee, even though they might from time to time reflect divergent views, were intended not to weaken but to strengthen Commonwealth links and deepen mutual confidence. Since the Lusaka Meeting, the meetings of Commonwealth representatives in London had in their own way helped many of those who were formulating policies on Rhodesia to avoid the pit-falls to which they were being driven by certain vested interests.

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45. He paid tribute to the Secretary-General for working closely and in harmony with all representatives. He thought he should do this for the record, because it appeared that certain elements were deliberately sowing seeds of discord about his impartiality in Rhodesian matters. The Secretary-General was not hostile to the Salisbury regime or well-disposed towards the Patriotic Front as the Daily Telegraph would want the world to believe. He was anxious to see illegality ended so that the people of Zimbabwe themselves, irrespective of race, could determine their own future freely, fairly and justly without intimidation or fear. He thought the meeting should go on record as expressing full confidence in the Secretary-General at this time.

46. Since the meetings of the Committee had been a help rather than an hindrance to the discussions at Lancaster House, his Government would like these meetings to continue and warmly supported the holding of this meeting to discuss aspects of the Lusaka Accord, in particular the question of Commonwealth observers.

47. His Government wished to place on record that it was the Commonwealth's collective effort which had made possible the Lusaka Agreement and had placed Zimbabwe on the high road to ending a war which neither the British nor any country by itself could have brought to an end. If there was any role for the Commonwealth as such in ensuring free and fair elections in Zimbabwe, it was his Government's view that that role should be decided upon and played collectively by the Commonwealth acting as a group. There should be a Commonwealth position; Governments should avoid going it alone or acting in an unco-ordinated fashion to the detriment of the Commonwealth. It was also the view of his Government that the nature of the role of Commonwealth observers should be decided upon by the Commonwealth itself and that the Commonwealth Secretariat should be called upon to service that role. It did not mean that the Commonwealth's role would be carried out without consultations with the British Government whose authority in Rhodesia the Commonwealth had helped to reassert; but for

Commonwealth observers to have any credibility, to be able to behave and to be seen to behave impartially, they must act independently of British authority in deciding their programme, where they went, whom they talked to, how they talked to them, whom they reported to, how they reported to them, when they arrived in the country and how they arrived there.

48. There were many sceptics in the world who doubted the good faith of all those who were involved in one way or another in the Rhodesian issue. In fact, the credibility of Commonwealth countries who had helped to draft the Lusaka Accord was in the melting pot. He recalled his own statement at an earlier meeting where he had said that the Commonwealth should be careful not to be accused of making it possible for illegality finally to triumph.

49. The OAU had passed a resolution clearly stating that it recognised the Patriotic Front as the only true and genuine voice of Zimbabwe, and this for good reason. Smith's regime was illegal and whoever entered into an agreement with it was equally tainted with illegality. Africans in the Commonwealth owed it as a duty to the OAU to pronounce on the fairness or otherwise of the proposed elections in Zimbabwe. To be able to do this, they must be seen to be acting independently.

50. What was more, Non-aligned Nations which recognised the Patriotic Front would also have to be convinced about the fairness of the elections. This obligation was no less vis-a-vis the United Nations. This could not be done if Commonwealth observers were to be left to limp, hop and crawl in Zimbabwe, fully dependent on the administering Power. Hence the only Commonwealth observer team which Ghana would recognise was an observer team organised under the auspices of the Commonwealth Secretariat, and reporting through the Secretary-General to Commonwealth Heads of Governments.

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51. He urged representatives not to accept any other meaning or interpretation of Commonwealth observers . As to how the observer team should be constituted, Ghana believed that the Secretary-General, in consultation with Commonwealth Governments, should decide on the number and identify the persons to be appointed. There should be an equitable geographical spread, but no country should be compelled to serve against its will. In this regard Ghana would accept a group of nine or ten persons as proposed by the Secretary-General. The observer group should be emplaced in Zimbabwe not later than a week after the Governor had taken up residence there; in other words, they should be there for the whole transitional period. They would thus be able to see how the elections were organised; what facilities were made available to the parties; how the civil service helped, hindered or ignored any parties; and how the election campaign was conducted by the parties. They would also monitor how the police force was carrying out its duties in connection with the elections. On polling day they would observe whether the electoral rules were obeyed, whether those eligible to vote were enabled to do so without let or hindrance; and whether there was any rigging whatsoever of the elections. Ghana accepted the Secretary-General's comments that the success of the mission would depend on its establishing confidence with and receiving the full co-operation of the Governor and his staff, the local administration, and the parties involved in the elections. If the group was to be independent of British authority, they should have their own supporting staff and logistical back-up. Commonwealth Governments should be prepared to shoulder the extra burden this involved. He agreed that the terms of reference for the observer group would need to be clearly defined, but they should be given the flexibility necessary to fully execute their responsibilities. The Secretary-General once again, in consultation with Governments, should prepare proposals for their consideration

52. In conclusion, he reiterated Ghana's support for the Secretary-General's approach and expressed its full confidence in

him at this time. It was said that neither the Secretary-General nor anybody organised by him would be welcomed in Salisbury as impartial observers. He hoped this was and would remain the exclusive view of the Daily Telegraph.

53. The Representative of Bangladesh said that at Lusaka his Government had had no doubt regarding the role of Commonwealth observers as being a collective one. He was authorised to say this his Government fully supported a collective Commonwealth observer team and commended the consultations which the Secretary-General was holding with the British Foreign Secretary. He hoped that the composition of the team would be mutually agreed by all the parties concerned.

54. The Representative of Grenada said that it appeared that a strange interpretation of a part of the Lusaka accord had again entered the discussion. The British representative had indicated that the definition of Commonwealth observers remained the prerogative of the British Government. It would be strange indeed if, on the basis of the discussions and the agreement endorsed by the Commonwealth as a body, they were told that the Secretariat (the administrative arm of the Commonwealth) would be consulted only after the British Government had done certain things or obtained agreement from individual Governments. In the nature of things, Commonwealth Governments had bilateral arrangements on a number of different matters but these could hardly be considered as a Commonwealth activity. Historically, it was a fact that Commonwealth activities were either organised, initiated, or conducted through the Commonwealth Secretariat, and he therefore hoped that when the observer group was agreed upon, the Secretariat would be the organising, initiating and co-ordinating body as it had always been.

55. Reservations had been expressed about whether the situation in Zimbabwe was abnormal. He believed that the abnormality existed not in the situation, but in the handling of it.

56. The Representative of Barbados said that he wholeheartedly agreed with the views expressed. His Government fully supported the Secretary-General's proposals for a collective Commonwealth observer team rather than individual groups, not only for reasons of economy but also because there would be more confidence in a report by a collective team.

57. The Representative of The Bahamas asked the British representative whether his Government objected to a collective Commonwealth observer team.

58. The Representative of Britain replied that his Government was not seeking the prerogative of defining the Lusaka Agreement. He was only putting forward the understanding of his Secretary of State, that was, that it was a matter for individual Commonwealth Governments to decide how they wished to participate in the election process in Rhodesia. When their wishes became known Lord Carrington would hold discussions with the Secretary-General about practical arrangements which would need to be made.

59. The Representative of The Bahamas said that he had attended the Lusaka Meeting and that it had never been the view of his Government that the Commonwealth role would be relegated to representatives of individual countries acting on their own. It was difficult to see how individual countries could attend as observers and be regarded as acting in a Commonwealth role. He believed that Heads of Government at Lusaka had wished to see a group of observers organised through the Secretariat and reporting through the Secretary-General to Heads of Government. He would be remiss in his duties not to stress this point.

60. Alluding to Press charges of partiality on the part of the Secretary-General, he said that blame was being laid on the wrong person as the Secretary-General in his News Releases was merely presenting the collective views of Commonwealth countries.

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61. He was surprised that the British Government, in its efforts to rid itself of responsibility for Rhodesia, should appear reluctant to let the Commonwealth play the role it should; if scape-goats were needed they should be looked for in places other than the Commonwealth.

62. He confirmed his Government's commitment to the Lusaka Agreement and support for a collective Commonwealth observer group.

63. The Representative of Guyana gave the understanding his Government had of the words 'Commonwealth observers'.

64. Guyana's status as a Commonwealth Country, he said, derived from the fact that Guyana acted in association with other countries belonging to the Commonwealth, just as it did in the Non-Aligned group and the Commonwealth Caribbean. Inherent in the phrase 'Commonwealth' was the notion of collectivity and of acting in concert with other Commonwealth countries. His instructions from his Government were to remind the meeting that the British Government had accepted full responsibility for Rhodesia until independence, and in keeping with that, Britain had the sovereign right to invite whom it wished as observers. It need not confine its invitation to members of the Commonwealth, it could invite other groups as well, for example, Amnesty International; or it might be approached by such groups for invitations. However, this sovereign right of Britain should in no way derogate from the right of the Secretary-General to establish a team of Commonwealth observers as envisaged in the Lusaka accord. The two positions were not mutually exclusive or antagonistic. Therefore while paying due regard to the British position and authority, Guyana urged the Commonwealth to proceed within the framework of the Secretary-General's proposals.

65. His Government had been asked through the British High Commission in Georgetown whether it would accept an invitation if offered. Guyana did not wish to answer this as yet, in case it prejudiced the principle of a collective Commonwealth observer group. They therefore wanted this principle to be established first of all before reacting to any proposal.

66. The Representative of Australia endorsed the point made by the representative of Guyana and said that the two views were not mutually exclusive. Australia had agreed to send its own observers who would report to the Australian Government, and it did not see any reason why a collective Commonwealth team of observers should not also be sent who would report to the Commonwealth as a whole; it was therefore not necessary to argue about the meaning of the words 'Commonwealth observers' as set out in the Lusaka Agreement. Australia did not understand the words to mean only a collective team, and would be ready to participate in the team if it were satisfied with the mode of its selection.

67. If the Committee decided that a collective team assembled by the Secretariat should be sent, great care should be taken to ensure that it functioned as a team and had the full confidence of the Governor. If the members of the team were located in different parts of the country their impartiality and effectiveness would be enhanced. However, he wondered how some countries around the table who had expressed support for the Patriotic Front could still claim to be capable of impartiality. The thought strained his credulity and he was sure it strained Bishop Muzorewa's even more. Australia, too, wanted to see an end to the war and had therefore genuinely adopted no partisanship between the parties contesting the elections.

68. The question of the observers was really a side-issue and should be kept separate from the delicate negotiations in progress at Lancaster House. There was no need to quibble about the interpretation of Commonwealth observers nor did he feel there was a problem which could not be resolved by consultations between the British Government and the Secretary-General.

69. The Representative of Grenada asked the Australian representative whether his Government saw its observer team as going to Zimbabwe solely on its own behalf or as part of the

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collective Commonwealth team and he also wanted to know whether the Australian Government had received any indication from Britain as to the kind of functions it expected Australian observers to perform.

70. The Representative of Australia replied that most Commonwealth countries at Lusaka had made a substantial political investment in the outcome of the Rhodesian issue. Australia had its own political considerations to take into account. It was from a natural wish to satisfy these considerations that it had accepted the invitation from the British Government to send observers. However, Australia did not cease to be a member of the Commonwealth simply because it had accepted the invitation and its observers would be acting both in a national capacity and as Commonwealth observers.

71. The Representative of Jamaica recalled that at its last meeting the Committee had spent a considerable amount of time on the interpretation of words in the Lusaka accord, and it seemed that it was about to do the same thing again. As far as Jamaica was concerned, Commonwealth observers could only mean a team which was selected by the Secretary-General. He had the impression that the British Government considered its interpretation of the Lusaka accord as being the only valid one. But the Secretary-General's statement exactly expressed Jamaica's understanding of the agreement. Jamaica was not prepared to send observers on its own behalf but would be prepared to send observers as part of a Commonwealth team.

72. He assured representatives that his Government was not taking sides between the parties in Rhodesia, but only wanted to see peace. It was the clear right of the Zimbabwean people to choose their own leaders, and all Jamaica sought to do was to help bring about the conditions for achievement of this objective. The British Government should appreciate that representatives wanted to help not hinder its efforts to bring about peace. He hoped therefore that the meeting would adjourn with the clear understanding that the ideas outlined by the Secretary-General would form the basis for future action.

73. The Representative of Zambia said that he too was worried that the Committee was once again locked into a discussion about interpretation when in fact the meaning of the Lusaka accord was perfectly clear. At the Committee's last meeting the problem of interpretation had centred on the scope of the observer role. Today, the problem appeared to relate to the nature of that role. If the Lusaka accord had been intended to mean that individual Commonwealth countries should send observers, the wording would surely have made this explicit. In his view there was no problem of interpretation: it was quite clear that Commonwealth observers meant that a collective team was to be sent to Zimbabwe in order collectively to observe and report on whether the elections were free and fair.

74. The Australian representative had argued that a collective Commonwealth team and individual national teams were both permissible. While he appreciated the point his Australian colleague had made, he wished to stress that the primary emphasis should be on the despatch of a collective Commonwealth team. The representative of Australia had also implied that there was some bias in the Committee in favour of the Patriotic Front which cast a doubt on the impartiality of the members concerned. However, the question of impartiality was not really at issue, since all members were against the illegal regime as such and therefore, he believed, supported the Patriotic Front in its efforts to assist the British Government to reassert its authority in Rhodesia. He was sure that the Australian Government also supported the Patriotic Front in this regard.

75. The Committee should not waste any further time on the question of interpretation. It was the understanding of his Government that Commonwealth observers would work as a collective entity and therefore fully supported the proposals that had been outlined by the Secretary-General.

76. The Representative of New Zealand said that the words 'Commonwealth observers' were not restrictive; therefore each

member country had two responsibilities, an initial one to send observers on behalf of its own Government and a responsibility to the Commonwealth as collective participants. He had been authorised to say that New Zealand was in full agreement with the Secretary-General's view that Commonwealth observers had a critical role to play in creating the appropriate climate in which free and fair elections could take place, and that they could effectively do this only if they were in Rhodesia to monitor the entire electoral process from beginning to end and were able to move about freely in the country. He appreciated that it would not be easy for some Commonwealth countries to send observers and this was where the Secretariat could play a particularly valuable role in providing the necessary supporting staff to co-ordinate the work of the observer teams.

77. It would be wrong to restrict the number to a small group of nine or ten observers. This was definitely not authorised in the Lusaka Accord. His Government believed that all member countries should be interested in participating if they could and it understood that Britain had in fact extended invitations to all countries. New Zealand, for its part, had indicated its willingness to accept. There was no reason why the Commonwealth should not send a collective observer group, but his Government felt it would not detract from New Zealand's status as a Commonwealth member if it also despatched its own observer team. The report of the Commonwealth observers should cover not only the form and content of the elections but also the degree of freedom in which they were held.

78. The Representative of Guyana said that the Australian representative had suggested that his views were very similar to those which he, himself, had expressed earlier. There was, however, an important conceptual divide between their two positions. He had acknowledged that Britain was within its right, as the administering Power in Rhodesia, to invite individual Commonwealth countries to send their own observers. This right did not stem from the Lusaka accord, but rather from its inherent sovereign

authority in Rhodesia. The Lusaka accord, on the other hand, was a product of the Commonwealth as an association which had its own identity, independent of that of any one constituent member country. It was in this context that his Government unequivocally supported sending a Commonwealth observer team through the Secretariat. His Government had not yet accepted Britain's invitation to send its own observers because to do so might have implied that it would be unwilling to endorse the idea of a Commonwealth team.

79. The Representative of Australia said that the Committee could obviously go on discussing the precise meaning of the phrase Commonwealth observers for a long time. The real point he had been trying to make was that there was no practical reason why this wording should be interpreted to mean only a collective Commonwealth observer team. Individual countries should be free to send their own teams if they wished.

80. The Representative of Canada said that the Lancaster House Conference had been in session for some ten weeks and representatives had been meeting at Marlborough House for briefing twice a week on the average. The Canadian representative at these briefings had not always intervened in the discussions as often as other representatives, but this was not due to lack of interest in the Rhodesian problem. Canada had condemned UDI and had supported the Frontline States materially. It had also upheld the principle that only the people of Zimbabwe themselves could decide who their future leaders should be; it certainly had no preference among the parties and hoped that this was the case with all other Commonwealth countries.

81. His Government had considered the views put forward by the Secretary-General, the British Government and other Commonwealth countries on the interpretation of the Lusaka Agreement. It noted that the Secretary-General had held discussions with Lord Carrington on the issue of observers and it was a matter of regret that no agreement had been reached between them before the meeting. The Lusaka Agreement itself did not specify how the observer role

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was to be fulfilled and could therefore be open to more than one valid interpretation. Canada would opt for the interpretation that would work best and accordingly would prefer to send its own team of observers who would report directly to Ottawa.

82. It had been said in some quarters that observers sent independently by Governments could not be regarded as specifically Commonwealth observers. However, it was not Canada's understanding that there was to be only one interpretation of the phrase Commonwealth observers. On the other hand, his Government also felt that a totally unco-ordinated observation would be unsatisfactory and that was why he had been attracted by the reference made by the Nigerian representative during the last briefing session to the procedure that had been adopted for the international observation of the civil war in Nigeria. Canada considered that the national observer teams should act independently but could hold frequent liaison meetings in order to exchange information and compare notes. He therefore supported the idea of a co-ordinating role to be performed by the Secretariat. In these hard economic times the cost of sending a collective observer team was an important factor that also had to be taken into consideration, and as far as Canada was concerned the least expensive plan of observation would be preferred.

83. The precise number of Commonwealth observers had yet to be determined. Each national team should work closely with those of other Commonwealth countries but should send its report direct to its own Government which would then circulate it to all other member Governments. Canada did not envisage that a common report would be issued but this did not rule out the publication of joint statements at critical moments. A particular responsibility fell to the British Government to take the necessary action to ensure that the observer teams would be able to perform their tasks satisfactorily.

84. Referring to the point made by the Zambian representative on support for the Patriotic Front in its struggle against

the illegal regime, he stressed the importance of the observer teams maintaining strict impartiality as regards the various parties contesting the elections.

85. The Representative of Fiji said that his Government had declined an invitation from the British Government to send observers in a national capacity and unreservedly agreed in principle with the sending of a collective Commonwealth team as proposed by the Secretary-General.

86. The Representative of Tanzania said that he was happy to hear that the interpretation offered by the British representative was simply one view. It would be sad indeed if after the Commonwealth had reached agreement on the substantive issues on the Rhodesian problem, it fell apart on the lesser issue of observers. He therefore hoped that at the end of its deliberations the Committee would emerge with a consensus.

87. Even if different interpretations to the Lusaka Agreement were accepted, it would still be necessary to co-ordinate Commonwealth views on the election process but this need not preclude minority reports or observers sending separate reports to their Governments. He appealed to the members of the Committee in their capacity as advisers to their Governments to reach a consensus on the need for a collective Commonwealth observer role.

88. The Representative of Sierra Leone said that his Government was dismayed that there could be any doubt on the meaning of the words 'Commonwealth observers' and he had accordingly been instructed to endorse wholeheartedly the Secretary-General's message which had been circulated to all Heads of Government.

89. The process of confidence-building was vital for peace and only a collective role would engender this much-needed confidence. A separate observer role for each country was not

only unprecedented. it was also reckless. The Government of Sierra Leone wanted the Commonwealth observer team to go to Zimbabwe as a cohesive unit and felt that the Secretary-General's proposals along these lines were in keeping with international practice.

90. The Representative of Ghana said that while there was no doubt that each country had its individual preference among the parties, only the people of Zimbabwe could in the last resort decide who their rulers would be. The Commonwealth should not be concerned about whether its observers would have the requisite credibility in the eyes of Bishop Muzorewa at a time when the Patriotic Front was being asked to accept policemen who had been shooting at them and judges who had been hanging them

91. The Representative of Nigeria said he wished to clarify that during the Nigerian Civil War the international observers, who included a Canadian General, had reported to the Nigerian Government as well as to their own Governments. But the present case was entirely different. On the nature of Commonwealth observers for Rhodesia, the Nigerian Government clearly and unambiguously understood their role to be a collective one as outlined in the Secretary-General's message to Heads of Government.

92. The Representative of Trinidad and Tobago said that in the course of the Committee's discussion an identity of views among the 'old Commonwealth' had emerged. But he was pleased to hear the British representative say that the British Government's interpretation of the Lusaka Agreement was merely one interpretation. He was of the view that the most competent people to interpret the words of the Communique were Commonwealth leaders themselves.

93. Differing interpretations often arose after an agreement had been written and in such cases the meaning usually accepted was the one attributed to it by the majority at the time the agreement was formulated. In this instance the majority interpretation of the Lusaka accord seemed clear enough: Commonwealth observers should be selected by the usual Commonwealth machinery.

94. He noted that the representative of Australia had stressed that the observers would need to have the confidence of the Governor. But the Governor would be there to carry out one function and the observers another. He was also disturbed by the reference to cost made by the Canadian representative. He had understood him to be saying that if a Commonwealth observer group were sent by the Secretariat, the Canadian Government might not be interested in contributing to the cost of the assignment. He considered this a somewhat unfortunate remark.

95. The Representative of Tanzania felt that the meeting should be addressing itself to the proposals which it had specifically asked the Secretary-General to prepare. The overwhelming majority of representatives seemed to be of the view that the Commonwealth observer group should play a collective role. He, too, sensed a division between the old and new Commonwealth, a development he regretted. Nevertheless, there was an overwhelming majority in favour of the view that justice must not only be done but be seen to be done and this would be achieved only if Commonwealth observers acted in a collective capacity.

96. The Representative of India was grateful to the Secretary-General for setting out all the implications involved in the concept of a Commonwealth observer role so succinctly. However, his Government felt that the matter was of such importance that it should be given more thought and, if necessary, more time. For this reason it had not yet reached a final view.

97. It seemed that Britain had already invited certain countries to send observers to Rhodesia and he hoped that due weight would be given to the views expressed in the Committee. India would go along with the consensus.

98. The Representative of Zambia, clarifying his earlier remark, said that the Zambian Government supported the principle which the Patriotic Front stood for, namely, the dislodgement of

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the illegal regime. But when it came to elections it would be for the people of Zimbabwe to decide for themselves who should govern them. As regards the Commonwealth observer role, there was everything to be gained from a collective rather than a fragmented approach.

99. The Representative of Canada hoped there was no misunderstanding of the Canadian Government's attitude to the Salisbury regime. He reiterated that since UDI Canada had opposed the Salisbury regime and had supported the Frontline States.

100. On the question of observers, Canada's main concern was that whoever ultimately went to observe the elections in Rhodesia, as national representatives or as participants in a collective Commonwealth team, should ensure that the people had the right to elect whichever party they liked. Some representatives had indicated that they were distressed by his reference earlier to financial considerations, but these were nevertheless important and had to be taken into account. He would therefore like to make clear Canada's view that the Commonwealth should try to agree on the least expensive approach compatible with agreed objectives.

101. The Representative of St. Lucia declared that as his Government would not be able to send observers to Rhodesia, it would not wish to rely exclusively on the reports of individual observer teams who might be partisan. It would, however, be prepared to rely on the report submitted by a collective Commonwealth observer team.

102. The Representative of The Gambia said that his Government was also in favour of a collective Commonwealth observer group. Its findings would be essential in order to provide independent confirmation that the elections had been fairly conducted in case the Patriotic Front failed to win them and as a safeguard against a hostile reaction in that event from the OAU which had explicitly recognised the Patriotic Front as the sole and authentic representatives of the Zimbabwean people.

103. The Representative of Dominica stated that his Government could not accept Britain's invitation to send independent observers and fully supported the Secretary-General's proposals for Commonwealth observers to be sent by the Commonwealth acting collectively.

104. The Representative of Swaziland endorsed the proposal for a collective Commonwealth observer role in order to provide a report on which everyone could rely.

105. The Representative of Sri Lanka said that most countries would not be able to send individual observer teams. If one or two individual teams were sent, it would be futile to pretend that they could report comprehensively on the way in which the elections were conducted throughout the country; they would inevitably be forced to rely on rumours and information whose authenticity they, themselves, could not vouchsafe. Most member countries clearly felt that it would be practical and realistic to participate in a collective group so as to ensure that their verdict would be accorded due weight by the international community as a whole. His Government therefore supported the proposals that were so lucidly set out in the Secretary-General's message to Heads of Government.

106. The Representative of Lesotho said that his Government had at no stage envisaged sending a national observer team to Rhodesia. In its view a collective team would go a long way to build confidence among all the parties to the conflict. Although all the parties had accepted the role of the British Government as an impartial administration, there was need for an additional back-up support which only a collective observer group could provide.

107. The Representative of Nigeria said that although various speakers had already pointed out the merits of a collective approach, he wished to make two further observations. First, at Lusaka, Heads of Government had indicated that at their next Summit Meeting they expected a report on what had happened in

Zimbabwe during the intervening period. It could be that Zimbabwe's membership of the Commonwealth would be an issue at that meeting and Heads of Government would require a report on the elections before reaching a decision; only a collective report submitted together with the appropriate recommendation of the Secretary-General could be accepted as a basis for such a decision. Second, individual observer teams would only report those aspects of the election they had seen in the particular parts of the country that they visited and their reports would be considered incomprehensive and insufficient by his Government as a basis for assessing whether the elections had been free and fair.

108. The Representative of Cyprus commented that the fact that the Commonwealth had managed to reach the present stage of negotiations was due to a collective endeavour by all members. The report on the elections submitted by national observer teams would bind only their own Governments whereas a collective Commonwealth report would bind all member Governments. Moreover, a collective report by the observer team would provide an excellent opportunity for enhancing the Commonwealth's international role, and this was an additional reason why his Government endorsed the proposals outlined by the Secretary-General.

109. The Representative of Malawi wished to put on record that he had not yet received clear instructions from his Government in response to the Secretary-General's proposals. However, Malawi's traditional stand had been that no internal settlement could achieve lasting peace without the involvement of all parties, including the Patriotic Front, and that what was required therefore was a viable solution reflecting the agreement of all the parties concerned.

110. The Representative of Tanzania formally proposed that the meeting adopt the Secretary-General's proposals outlined in Circular Letter No. 76/79 of 19 November for sending a collective Commonwealth observer team on the understanding that any

Commonwealth countries wishing to send separate and independent teams of observers should be free to do so.

111. The Representative of Zambia supported the proposal of the Tanzanian representative. He wished, however, to emphasise that there should be an understanding that only the report produced by the collective team would be submitted to Commonwealth Governments.

112. There being no dissent, the Chairman said that there was a clear consensus in favour of the proposal by the Tanzanian representative to adopt the Secretary-General's proposals. The Committee so agreed.

113. The Secretary-General pointed out that his proposals were as yet only in outline form. Further consultations with the British Government and other Commonwealth Governments would be necessary in order to give them greater specificity, for example, on the composition of the team. He expected to be able to put forward more detailed proposals after he had completed these consultations.

114. The Representative of Britain said that his Government would not of course be sending observers to observe itself supervising the elections but, as the Secretary-General had made clear, it would be engaging in further consultations on the arrangements for Commonwealth observers.

115. The Representative of New Zealand said that it was good that the Committee had reached a consensus but he wanted an assurance that the independent observers would be accorded all the necessary facilities for carrying out their work.

116. The Secretary-General pointed out that this question would have to be addressed to the British Government.

117. The Representative of Canada said he wished to reserve his Government's position on the issue of finance, since the full financial implications of the exercise were as yet unclear.

118. The Secretary-General commented that there were a variety of options on how to meet the cost. The financial aspect would certainly be one of the issues to be settled by further consultations. However, he hoped that the decision would not turn only on the question of finance. In any case the total cost of the exercise would to some extent depend on the facilities made available locally in Rhodesia. He would be consulting with member countries and would be particularly interested to hear the views of those Governments which had expressed their intention of sending their own independent observer teams and had therefore presumably already done some analysis of the cost involved.

119. It was agreed that the next informal briefing meeting would be held on Tuesday, 27 November, at 6.30 p.m.

120. The meeting adjourned at 7.30 p.m.

International Affairs Division
Commonwealth Secretariat
Marlborough House
Pall Mall
London SW1Y 5HX

29 November 1979



Pmme Minister

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RECORD OF CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE SECRETARY OF STATE AND THE SOUTH AFRICAN FOREIGN MINISTER AT 3 PM ON 28 NOVEMBER 1979

mb

Those Present:

The Rt Hon The Lord Carrington	Mr P F Botha
Mr J Leahy	His Excellency Dr D de Villiers
Mr G G H Walden	Mr R Killen

1. Lord Carrington thanked Mr Botha for his helpfulness in recent weeks. We had just overcome a difficult hiccup following the Rhodesian raids in Zambia. He quite understood that infiltration from Zambia to Rhodesia was at a high level. But politically the timing of the raids had made it harder for us to bring the Patriotic Front to the boil in the negotiations. If we had done so prematurely, the blame for a breakdown would have fallen on Salisbury. Now however we had succeeded in getting back to the ceasefire, and had just had a long bilateral meeting with the Patriotic Front. That afternoon he intended to give the PF the definitive UK position. This would attempt to reassure them on some points, but we would make it clear that we were looking for a swift response. He would see them before going to Dublin on 29 November, and again if necessary on his return, making it clear that there was no more negotiating fat on our position. We would then go ahead and appoint a Governor, make the Constitution, and begin putting through an Independence Bill. We would not however break the Conference, and make it clear that the PF were still free to join in if they wished. On Monday 3 December we would have to go ahead on that basis. The negotiations simply could not continue any longer, especially in view of the infiltration which was going on. The Salisbury parties were also fed up, though they themselves had lengthened the negotiations by one week. It was important that we should be in the best international position possible if there were a breakdown. He was grateful for South African forbearance.

2. Mr Botha said he was grateful for Lord Carrington's help over arranging this meeting. He had been worried about the press treatment of his visit, but the Ambassador had rectified this in 20 minutes. Lord Carrington said we had been concerned about charges of collusion, given the timing of Mr Botha's visit. Mr Botha said that he saw the difficulty. On Zambia, General Walls had told him that the Secretary of State had expressed understanding of the reasons for the Rhodesian attacks on Zambian bridges. It was important to realize how "bloody terrible" the position on the ground was, where the guerillas were crossing the border into Rhodesia to murder and rape. In his view, Kaunda was finished (Mr Botha later alleged that Kapepwe was recruiting Katangese, but seemed unsure of his facts.) In Angola Dos Santos was also fighting for his life. South African monitoring of signals in Southern Angola showed that Government forces there, which numbered 13,000, including a Cuban element, had been cornered by Savimbi, and were refusing to obey their commanders

/until



until they were properly fed. Machel was also in trouble, and a new opposition movement (the MRN?) was now active. Nyerere had also got into a mess in Uganda. The whole of Southern Africa was unstable, and South Africa faced very difficult decisions. In Botswana, Russian activity was now very dangerous. The Russians had offered to identify British and American agents there in exchange for closer co-operation. Chief Jonathan was also likely to be toppled within a month in Swaziland. He had asked Mr Botha personally to improve his security, eg by providing him with better personal communications.

3. Against this background, delay at the Rhodesian Conference was unfortunate, though he recognized that this had largely been beyond Lord Carrington's control. He would be grateful if the Conference could be concluded as soon as possible. An ideal solution may not be possible. But a "second-class solution" could bring about stability in time. A number of African countries would come to recognize Muzorewa: eg Senegal, Kenya, Swaziland, Botswana and Zaire. Lord Carrington said that this would only happen as a result of our going through the Lancaster House exercise. Mr Botha said he saw that, and agreed that the acceptance by the Patriotic Front of the Constitution had been an important achievement. But he was still afraid of a general flare-up in the region.

as 4. Lord Carrington said he was well aware of the problems, and again stressed that the Conference could not continue for much longer. But we would need/much international support as possible if we were to go ahead with a second-class solution. The Front Line States would continue to support the Patriotic Front in those circumstances, though with varying degrees of enthusiasm. We were also worried about British citizens in Zambia; Iran was a bad example. We would have economic difficulties with Nigeria. Nor could we expect much support from OAU members at the outset. However we would be able to demonstrate that we had spent 11 weeks trying to get a full settlement. Some Europeans were feebler than others (Mr Botha said that his list might be longer than Lord Carrington's) but we thought that others would come with us in the row over sanctions and the recognition of the Bishop. Even if we achieved the first-class solution, the ceasefire could be messy. The PF were unlikely to assemble their forces properly. If there were a breakdown of the ceasefire, we would also be accused of responsibility for it. But we still thought that we would be in a stronger position by attempting to achieve a ceasefire. Muzorewa had a good chance of getting a majority of seats, together with the Whites. (Mr Botha was clearly not familiar with the important provision in the draft Constitution whereby the Whites could only form a government with the largest political party. It was explained to him that Muzorewa would only need to gain a few seats more than his nearest rival to gain the support of the 20 White seats). Lord Carrington did not think that Mugabe would win the elections, particularly in view of the activities of Mawema. Mr Botha said he was not certain how important Mawema would be, but said that South Africa was helping him, and would help all anti-Marxist parties. He had just had a good talk with Sithole.



5. Mr Botha said that General Walls was nervous. His main fear was that some of our more junior officials (Walls had specifically exempted the Secretary of State and Mr Renwick) tended to give interpretations of our positions favourable to the Patriotic Front. Walls also feared that the Governor might interpret the provisions of any agreement in a sense favourable to the Patriotic Front. If there was no agreement he was afraid that the Governor might go out of his way to get the Patriotic Front in. Lord Carrington said that General Walls had clearly not understood the position. If the Patriotic Front did not answer our latest move, we would not break up the Conference. We would simply go ahead with the Governor, the Constitution and the Independence Bill, explaining that the Patriotic Front could come in within a period of x days, provided they accepted our ceasefire proposals. If they did not, the Government would fix the date of elections at the end of that period. Mr Botha said that it would be useful if Lord Carrington could explain this to General Walls, who felt that he had been left out of things recently. Lord Carrington said he would probably see the General on Saturday morning.

6. Mr Botha said that Ian Smith was already making overtures to Nkomo. Lord Carrington pointed out that he would only be able to make a coalition of the largest party. Mr Botha commented that many Rhodesians had no idea what was going on in London. In his view the situation still looked quite good, providing we could conclude the negotiations early. Lord Carrington said that he agreed with Mr Botha on time, but hoped no more bridges would be bombed. We had to understand President Kaunda's position to some extent. He had returned from London a hero, and had then been humiliated by Rhodesian attack. Mr Botha said that Kaunda was emotional and histrionic. A number of members of the Zambian Government were in touch with the South Africans. Some of them favoured the Bishop, but Kaunda was personally committed to Nkomo, whom he wanted to see enthroned. The South Africans too had favoured Nkomo in 1974, but Smith had turned down Nkomo's terms. He thought that Nkomo would get more than 20% of the vote. There was a danger of splitting all the parties, and of gangsterism. There were also problems in Malawi. As for Mozambique, he intended to stop helping Machel in Beira if the war in Rhodesia continued. If we could conclude the Conference soon, he knew from personal contact that there would be massive investment from the private sector for Muzorewa. The economic benefits would begin to flow in a matter of months. In a year, Lord Carrington would be seen as the man who had achieved a turn-around in the area. Lord Carrington said that we must achieve either a first or second class solution soon. In the latter case, we would appoint a different Governor and go for very quick elections. Mr Botha stressed that the South Africans wanted sanctions lifted very quickly.

7. Lord Carrington said that the Patriotic Front constantly alleged that the South Africans would invade Rhodesia if the Front won the elections. He had been taking the line that the South Africans would not interfere in an Administration run by a British Governor. Mr Botha said that this was an important issue which he wanted to get clear. The South Africans already had a presence in Rhodesia. He wanted to be frank. They had to help Muzorewa, otherwise there was no hope. The South Africans had to ensure the security of trains passing through their

/Rhodesia



Rhodesia in remote areas. They also protected the Rhodesian end of the Beit bridge, which would otherwise be blown. Lord Carrington emphasised that he was not talking about South African equipment in Rhodesia, or about volunteers. But there must be no formed South African units which would attract the attention of observers and the press. If there were, this would put us in an impossible position. The South Africans must remember that we were talking about a cease-fire. If they had personnel in Rhodesia, they must be dressed in Rhodesian uniforms, and not come to notice in formations. He urged Mr Botha to discuss this with General Walls.

Distribution:

PS
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PS/PUS
Mr Day
Mr Aspin
Mr Fifoot
Mr Barder)
Mr Renwick) Personal for
Mr Fenn)
Mr Powell)
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Private Secretary, 10 Downing St.

29 NOV 1979



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J.G. Punt (1)

Ref. A0779

PRIME MINISTER

These files give the answer to your query about the Amnesty provisions. Agree following L OAS (79) 40? Punt - 28/11

Southern Rhodesia: Zimbabwe Independence Bill

(OD(79) 40)

This memorandum by the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary deals with the policy issues raised by the Zimbabwe Independence Bill which may be required very shortly. Cabinet on 1st November and OD on 5th November have already touched on the need for an Independence Bill to follow the interim Enabling Bill already passed. This is the first full exposition of the Independence Bill, including its potentially controversial provisions on citizenship and amnesty. The Bill cannot be introduced until the Lancaster House conference has concluded, e.g. in the weeks beginning 3rd or 10th December, but will then be very urgent. Legislation Committee agreed on 27th November that it should be given full priority once approved by OD, but unless the conference has secured agreement with the Patriotic Front the Opposition may make it difficult to secure the Bill before the Christmas Recess.

2. The Bill has been fully discussed at official level between Departments and in view of the urgency it is hoped that it can be agreed by Ministers out of Committee in the course of this week.


This will be very controversial

3. Of the potentially controversial aspects the extension by one year of the right of some Rhodesians to register as citizens of the United Kingdom and Colonies should be readily defensible. The amnesty in United Kingdom law for "political offences" (paragraph 8) and the amnesty in Southern Rhodesian law to be granted by the Governor (paragraph 9) are logical consequences of a settlement and are necessary for elections in Rhodesia. They should only be controversial if the settlement has not included the Patriotic Front but would then only be facets of the larger row over proceeding with independence in this situation, which OD has already accepted. (OD(79) 12th Meeting, 5th November.) The amnesty for sanctions offences (paragraph 10) could be controversial since it cannot equally be seen as necessary to promote reconciliation within Rhodesia. But it will have been preceded by an announcement of the finding by the Director of Public Prosecutions

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that there is no case to be brought against those oil executives pinpointed in the Bingham Inquiry and it is generally expected in the context of a settlement. If the settlement does not include the Patriotic Front, it will be an added strand in tense relations with President Kaunda in view of his demands for compensation for the damage done to Zimbabwe by sanctions and for the legal punishment of those responsible for breaches of sanctions. But this tension would exist in any case and does not seem a sufficient reason to hesitate over this amnesty. There would also be time for any second thoughts on this before the Order in Council is made at about the time the Independence Bill becomes law.

4. In view of the urgency you may wish to give early approval to the policy set out in OD(79) 40, subject to the views of other colleagues.



ROBERT ARMSTRONG

28th November, 1979

PATRIOTIC FRONT

DISPOSITION OF THE FORCES AND THE COMMONWEALTH FORCE.

1. Lord Carrington's statement of November 28th, provides a more or less comprehensive summary of the British proposals for the ceasefire. This is a statement of the Patriotic Front's interpretation of the critical issues raised therein, and an elaboration of its position on these critical issues. The Patriotic Front considers the resolution of the fundamental problems of Disposition and Disengagement of the forces, and the Commonwealth Force to be indispensable to the achievement of a ceasefire.

2. Disposition and Disengagement.
 - 2.1. Paragraphs 4, 8 and 9 of Lord Carrington's statement are those most relevant to this issue. The Patriotic Front's understanding of these paragraphs is:-
 - (i) There will be two distinct phases to the ceasefire. In order to ensure that there is no question of inferior status or surrender by one party to another the two phases will be as follows:-
 - A. The first phase will involve the following action by both forces:
 - (1) Rhodesian Forces: On ceasefire day the Rhodesian forces will disengage. This means that the combatants in the field will discontinue patrols and withdraw to company level bases.
 - (2) Patriotic Front: The disengagement of Rhodesian forces will enable the Patriotic Front forces to assemble in secure conditions. This means that immediately the Rhodesian Forces have retired to company level bases, the field commanders of the Patriotic Front will deploy throughout the country and order their combatants to assemble at company level bases as determined by the commanders. This first process of assembly will be under Patriotic Front command.

- B. The second Phase will involve the following action by both forces:-
- (1) Rhodesian Forces will retire from company bases to their normal peacetime locations at battalion level.
 - (2) Patriotic Front Forces will retire from company bases to the agreed Assembly areas on a comparable basis.
- (ii) The completion of these two phases will open the country up for electoral campaigning. If it is decided that movement into the second phase positions is unnecessary then both forces must remain in phase one deployment.
 - (iii) The Commonwealth Force will be deployed from the beginning of phase one, throughout the country.
- 2.2. The Rhodesian Air Force (which is not mentioned in Lord Carrington's statement) will be equally required to disengage. We understand this to mean that all combat aircraft will be grounded.
- 2.3. It must be made clear that the ceasefire applies to all armed elements in the Rhodesian Military system, including the Auxiliaries, Pfumo re Vanhu, the Private Armies and the Police (including the Police Anti-Terrorist Unit and the Ziso re Vanhu).
- 2.4. The considerable mercenary element in the Rhodesian Forces must be dealt with in the ceasefire. The raison d'etre of the mercenary is to perpetuate fighting and not to stop it, they must therefore be dismissed and repatriated.
- 2.5. Disengagement will apply equally to all South African Forces and personnel in the country, all of whom will be required to withdraw to South Africa.

3. The Commonwealth Force

- 3.1 We agree that a ceasefire in our situation can only be effective if the parties are firmly resolved to make it work. This firm resolve and commitment is itself dependent upon the mutual confidence of the combatants in the Commonwealth Force involved in the preservation and operation of the ceasefire and in ensuring their security.
- 3.2 The Patriotic Front believes the force must inspire confidence and that its composition is the first component in ensuring this. In addition to the countries already invited by Britain we have proposed that a properly balanced force will be achieved by the participation of Nigeria, India, Ghana, Sierra Leone, Guyana and Jamaica. The basic principle is that the parties involved in the conflict must be satisfied on this issue.
- 3.3 The structure of the force is also important. The Patriotic Front believes it should be a Commonwealth Force under a Commonwealth Commander with experience in such operations. It should report not only to the governor but also to the Commonwealth, through the Commonwealth Secretariat.
- 3.4 The role of the Force is to ensure effective preservation and operation of the ceasefire. The British misunderstanding of the term "enforce" has led them to imply that the Patriotic Front is asking for an interventionary force which will impose the ceasefire upon one party which may not be prepared to comply with it. This is not the position of the Patriotic Front. What we require of this force is no more than has been required of other forces carrying out a similar role: an interpositional capacity combined with an ability to defend itself when dealing with a localised breach, and thus a credibility and deterrent character which the present British proposals appear to deny it. This force should make unnecessary the dangerous implication contained in the British proposals

that the Governor will use one of the forces against the other to enforce the ceasefire.

- 3.5. The tasks the force must undertake will define its size and its capability. There has been a constant underestimation of these tasks by Britain. The tasks include: monitoring and guarding of all military airfields, armouries, border-posts; the surveillance of the borders - including an ability to warn against aerial intrusion.
- 3.6. The monitoring and liason capacity of the Force must be up to the task of effectively and authoritatively dealing with the forces involved. The Commander of the Force must be senior, or at least equal in rank to the commanders of either army. The same principle must apply to the rank of the heads of the teams attached to the forces at all levels. The arrangement for the disposition of the two forces in the first phase of the ceasefire indicates that a large number of teams will be required.

Agreement on these two matters, the Disposition of the Forces and the Commonwealth Force, is fundamental.

4. Ceasefire: Time Scale
- 4.1. To impose an unrealistic time scale for the achievement of the ceasefire is to invite unnecessary breaches which will create an atmosphere of cynicism and disbelief among the forces calculated to destroy any possibility of achieving a ceasefire at all.
- 4.2. The Patriotic Front is anxious to undertake a serious obligation to ceasefire and must re-emphasize the need for a realistic time scale. There are two reasons which make it impossible for the Patriotic Front to promise to establish an effective ceasefire within a few days. The communication of orders to combatants in the field by radio is not enough because of repeated fraudulent "ceasefires" in the past. Communication of the ceasefire order must

therefore be direct, by the Patriotic Front commanders. Time must be allowed to enable our commanders to be briefed and then to reach their men in the field.

- 4.3. It must be noted that the achievement of the 'opening up' of the country for free movement and political campaigning will only be possible at phase two of the ceasefire.

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Rhodesia

S
PS/SIR I GILMOUR
PS/MR LUCE
PS/PUS

MR WILLSON
MR DAY
LORD N G LENNOX
MR ASPIN

PS/HO 10 DOWNING STREET

MR R L WADE-GERY)
MR P M MAXEY)
MR GOULTY)
MR P J FOWLER)
DIO)
Sn & *Armstrong*)

CABINET
OFFICE

.....
HD/RHOD DEPT (4)

HD/C AF D
HD/S AF D

HD/PUSD (2)

HD/NEWS DEPT
HD/WAD

MR STEEL LEGAL ADVISER RM K188

Sn I Sinclair
~~MR WILSON~~ LEGAL ADVISER RM K164

~~RESIDENT CLERK~~

Prime Minister

[Signature]

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FM LUSAKA 270820Z

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TEL NO. 1311 OF 27 NOVEMBER 1979

REPEATED TO ROUTINE MIRIMBA SALISBURY, DAR ES SALAAM, GABORONE,
LUANDA, MAPUTO, WASHINGTON, LAGOS, NAIROBI, PRETORIA, UKMIS
NEW YORK.

MY TEL NO. 1301. ZAMBIA/RHODESIA.

1. IT IS NO DOUBT PRESUMPTUOUS FOR ME TO ATTEMPT TO ASSESS OUR SITUATION IN ZAMBIA WHEN SIR L ALLINSON HAS RECENTLY RETURNED FOR CONSULTATIONS. BUT IT IS A FAST MOVING SITUATION AND EVEN SOME MEN OF STRAW MIGHT PROVE USEFUL.
2. THE RHODESIAN RAIDS FOLLOWED SO CLOSELY ON THE HEELS OF HIS TRIUMPHAL RETURN FROM EUROPE AND IRAQ WHEN HE WAS HAILED AS THE "MOSES OF AFRICA" ANGERED AND HUMILIATED KAUNDA. THERE HAD BEEN RUMBLINGS ABOUT THE INEPTITUDE OF GOVERNMENT ECONOMIC POLICIES AND MILITARY POLICIES (WITH SOME JUNIOR OFFICERS REPORTEDLY WISHING TO TAKE A MORE AGGRESSIVE STANCE VIS-A-VIS RHODESIA WHILST MANY OTHERS WERE CRITICAL OF CONTINUED SUPPORT FOR ZAPU SEEING THEM AS THE SOURCE OF ZAMBIA'S PROBLEMS. I SUSPECT THAT FEARING THAT THESE RUMBLINGS WOULD INCREASE KAUNDA

FOR ZAPU SEEING THEM AS THE SOURCE OF ZAMBIA'S PROBLEMS. I SUSPECT THAT FEARING THAT THESE RUMBLINGS WOULD INCREASE KAUNDA FELT IT ESSENTIAL TO REASSERT HIS AUTHORITY IN A DRAMATIC FASHION. WE HAVE TO REMEMBER THAT NORMAL OPPOSITION OR DEBATE IS RARELY ALLOWED TO SURFACE AND KAUNDA'S POSITION IS NOT ONE OF PRIMA INTER PARES BUT OF UNDISPUTED LEADERSHIP. HAVING ONLY

LIMITED MEANS TO REACT AGAINST RHODESIA GIVEN THEIR STRANGLEHOLD ON HIS COMMUNICATIONS AND BELIEVING THAT BRITAIN MUST HAVE HAD NOTICE OF RHODESIAN INTENTIONS HE DIRECTED HIS FIRE AT US, FEELING THAT THE ANTI-COLONIALIST SENTIMENT, STILL WIDESPREAD IN ZAMBIA, WOULD GIVE HIM THE NATIONAL UNITY HE REQUIRED. HE MAY ALSO HAVE CALCULATED THAT INSPIRING THE VICIOUS PERSONAL ATTACKS AGAINST THE HIGH COMMISSIONER WOULD PROVIDE HIM WITH SOME SORT OF VICTORY EVEN IF ONLY IN THE SHAPE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER'S TEMPORARY RECALL FOR CONSULTATIONS. THIS HE PROBABLY CALCULATED WAS SOMETHING ACHIEVABLE. THE HIGH COMMISSION STATEMENT OFFERED A READY PRETEXT BUT OTHERS COULD HAVE BEEN FOUND.

3. BUT EVEN BY 24 NOVEMBER HIS SPEECH TO THE STUDENTS SUGGESTED THAT HE WAS CONCERNED THAT THEIR IDEAS AND DEMANDS WERE GOING FURTHER THAN HE HAD ANTICIPATED AND CERTAINLY IN HIS SPEECH ON 25 NOVEMBER HE SEEMED INTENT ON DRAWING FIRE AWAY FROM BRITAIN TO SOME EXTENT AND EMPHASISING THE ECONOMIC AS OPPOSED TO RACIAL BACKGROUND TO SOUTHERN AFRICA'S PROBLEMS. PLANS FOR A THIRD DEMONSTRATION AGAINST US WERE SHELVED. INTERESTINGLY ZAPU OR NKOMO WERE RARELY IF EVER MENTIONED IN HIS SPEECHES - PRESUMABLY THEY ARE NOT SEEN AS VOTE CATCHERS.

4. ALTHOUGH THERE HAS BEEN A STEADY SHIFT TOWARDS MARXIST IDEOLOGICAL LANGUAGE IN KAUNDA'S RECENT SPEECHES I DO NOT THINK WE CAN YET CONCLUDE THAT KAUNDA WISHES TO ALTER ZAMBIA'S POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC ORIENTATION IN THE WAY WHICH WOULD BE INVOLVED BY INVITING SOVIET AND CUBAN ASSISTANCE. IN FACT HIS WORDS ON 25 NOVEMBER TO THE ZAMBIAN ENTREPRENEUR WERE MEANT TO BE ENCOURAGING. HE DISTINGUISHED CLEARLY BETWEEN THE INDIGENOUS AND INDEED FOREIGN ENTREPRENEUR AND THE FORCES OF "INTERNATIONAL EXPLOITATIVE CAPITALISM" BY WHICH HE SEEMED TO MEAN THE MULTI-NATIONALS.

5. FOR SOME DAYS KAUNDA SUBORDINATED THE SEARCH FOR A SOLUTION IN RHODESIA TO ASSURING HIS HOME BASE. BUT I SUSPECT HE STILL HAD SUFFICIENT OF AN EYE ON THE BALL TO MAKE A DELIBERATE DECISION NOT TO ATTEND THE FLS MEETING AT DAR ES SALAAM WHERE HE FEARED THAT HIS ROOM FOR MANOEUVRE MIGHT BE REDUCED BY THE NEED TO SHOW SUPPORT FOR IDEAS PRINCIPALLY EMANATING FROM

DECISION NOT TO ATTEND THE FLS MEETING AT DAR ES SALAAM WHERE HE FEARED THAT HIS ROOM FOR MANOEUVRE MIGHT BE REDUCED BY THE NEED TO SHOW SUPPORT FOR IDEAS PRINCIPALLY EMANATING FROM MUGABE AND NYERERE. HE STILL HAS A STRONG INTERES SIN SEEING A SETTLEMENT COME ABOUT.

6. THERE SEEMS LITTLE DOUBT THAT AT LEAST IN THE SHORT TERM KAUNDA'S POLITICAL POSITION WITHIN ZAMBIA HAS BEEN RE-ESTABLISHED. ANY WHO FELT THE URGE TO SPEAK OUT HOWEVER MUTEDLY AGAINST HIM WILL THINK TWICE IN THE CURRENT ATMOSPHERE WHERE "VIGILANCE" AND "NATIONAL UNITY" ARE THE WATCHWORDS.

NEILSON.

NNNN

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL



Civil Service Department
Whitehall London SW1A 2AZ
01-273 4400

26 November 1979

Roderic Lyne Esq
Private Secretary
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
LONDON SW1A 2AH

Dear Roderic,

RHODESIA

Many thanks for your letter of 20 November with the draft announcement.

The Lord President has looked at this and suggests the attached for his part.

Yours sincerely,
Jim Buckley.

J BUCKLEY
Private Secretary

Enc

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

Phnt
Michael Alexander - Note.

Apologies! Here's the version which has the Lord President's approval — the previous one arose from my wording, not Lord Soames'.
Jim Buckley.
26/11

PRESS RELEASE

VERSION 1 - LORD SOAMES

RHODESIA: APPOINTMENT OF A BRITISH GOVERNOR

L? Her

HM The Queen has been pleased to approve the appointment of the Rt Hon Lord Soames GCMG GCVO CBE as Governor in Rhodesia during the interim period. In recommending for this post a senior member of the Cabinet with wide ministerial experience, the Prime Minister is demonstrating the great importance she and her Government attach to the fulfilment of their responsibility to bring Rhodesia to independence on the basis of genuine majority rule. On the Governor's arrival in Salisbury, Rhodesia will be restored to legality. His prime task will be to ensure that conditions in Rhodesia are such that elections can be held which will be fair as between all the participating parties. He will have full executive and legislative responsibility until the granting of independence.

~~? Here of an election leading to~~

Lord Soames is Lord President of the Council and Leader of the House of Lords. He was born in 1920 and served in the Army during the war. He was elected to Parliament in 1950. He held ministerial office in the Air Ministry, and the Admiralty. He was later Secretary of State for War from 1958-60, and Minister of Agriculture from 1960-64. He was Ambassador to France from 1968-72 when he played a notable part in Britain's negotiations to join the European Community and subsequently Vice-President of the Commission to the European Communities from 1973-77, with responsibility for external relations.

FILE

VLS

Rhodesia

Overtaken by
events?

26 November 1979

(23/11/79)

I enclose yet a further message from President Tolbert of Liberia. As with so many of his messages, it has been overtaken by events before it arrived. Nonetheless, you will no doubt wish to consider whether the Prime Minister should, in due course, send an acknowledgement.

M. O'D. B. ALEXANDER

R. M. J. Lyne, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

[Handwritten signature]

IMMEDIATE

[RHODESIA: POLICY. ADVANCE COPIES] 29

PS
PS/SIR I GILMOUR
PS/MR LUCE
PS/PUS

MR WILLSON
MR DAY
LORD N G LENNOX
MR ASPIN

PS/NO 10 DOWNING STREET

MR R L WADE-GERY
MR P M MAXEY
MR GOULTY
MR P J FOWLER
DIO

CABINET
OFFICE

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HD/RHOD DEPT (4)

HD/C AF D
HD/S AF D

HD/PUSD (2)

HD/NEWS DEPT
HD/WAD

MR STEEL LEGAL ADVISER RM K188

MR FIFCOF LEGAL ADVISER RM K16A

DESKBY 261130Z FCO

CONFIDENTIAL

FM MAPUTO 261325Z NOVEMBER 79

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 431 OF 26 NOVEMBER

INFO IMMEDIATE DAR ES SALAAM LUSAKA LUANDA GABORONE LAGOS WASHINGTON
PRETORIA UKMIS NEW YORK MIRIMBA SALISBURY

RHODESIA: FLS MEETING

1. THE PRESIDENT SENT FOR ME THIS MORNING. WE TALKED FOR ONE HOUR.
CHISSANO WAS PRESENT BUT SPOKE VERY LITTLE.

2. THE PRESIDENT OPENED BY RECONFIRMING HIS OPTIMISM FOR A SUCCESSFUL
CONCLUSION OF THE LANCASTER HOUSE CONFERENCE. A VERY GREAT DEAL HAD
BEEN ACHIEVED BUT THE PRACTICAL ARRANGEMENTS WHICH REMAIN WERE VERY
IMPORTANT. HE AND HIS COLLEAGUES HAD LISTENED TO THE PF FOR LONG
HOURS IN DAR ES SALAAM AND THEY HAD ALSO STUDIED CAREFULLY OUR
DETAILED PROPOSALS FOR THE CEASE-FIRE ARRANGEMENTS. THE PF FELT VERY
STRONGLY ON A NUMBER OF POINTS. THE FLS LEADERS REJECTED A GREAT MANY
PF PROPOSALS BUT THEY FOUND MERIT IN OTHERS. THESE WERE:

(A) NOTHING SHOULD BE DONE TO DIMINISH THE STATUS OF THE PF FORCES.
THEY SHOULD, AND BE SEEN TO, BE TREATED ON A BASIS OF EQUALITY
WITH THE RHODESIAN SECURITY FORCES. OUR EXISTING PROGRAMME FOR

(A) NOTHING SHOULD BE DONE TO DIMINISH THE STATUS OF THE PF FORCES. THEY SHOULD, AND BE SEEN TO, BE TREATED ON A BASIS OF EQUALITY WITH THE RHODESIAN SECURITY FORCES. OUR EXISTING PROPOSALS FOR INTERMEDIATE AND FINAL ASSEMBLY POINTS FOR THE PF AT LOCATIONS CLEARLY DEFINED WOULD RENDER THEM VULNERABLE AND INFERIOR TO THE SECURITY FORCES. IT WAS IMPORTANT THAT THE POSITIONS OF ALL FORCES, INCLUDING THE SECURITY FORCES SHOULD BE CLEARLY DEFINED AND MADE KNOWN TO ALL SIDES.

(B) THE SUPERVISION OF THESE ARRANGEMENTS REQUIRED A PEACE-KEEPING FORCE. THE PF HAD ALREADY ACCEPTED A COMMONWEALTH ROLE IN THIS - BUT THE FORCE MUST HAVE PEACE-KEEPING FUNCTIONS.

(C) SOMEONE SHOULD BE ABLE TO PREVENT EFFECTIVELY ATTEMPTS TO BREAK THE PEACE BY ELEMENTS OTHER THAN THE SECURITY FORCES AND THE PF, EG SOUTH AFRICA.

3. THE PRESIDENT STRESSED THAT WE WOULD NOT HAVE BEEN AT A POINT SO CLOSE TO A SOLUTION OF THIS PROBLEM HAD IT NOT BEEN FOR THE PF. IT WAS MOST IMPORTANT THAT WE SHOULD NOT MAKE ENEMIES OF THE PF. IF WE DID AND DID NOT ACCEPT THEIR REASONABLE PROPOSALS AND APPEARED TO BE WORKING MORE CLOSELY WITH THE ILLEGAL REGIME WE WOULD BE MAKING ENEMIES ALL OVER AFRICA. THE PF HAD MADE ENORMOUS CONCESSIONS. AN IMPORTANT ONE WAS THEIR AGREEMENT TO, IN EFFECT, PLACE THEIR FIGHTING FORCES UNDER THE COMMAND OF THE BRITISH GOVERNOR. THE FLS LEADERS HAD BEEN EXTREMELY CAREFUL NOT TO TELL THE PF OF THE POSSIBLE IMPLICATIONS OF THIS DECISION - IF THEY REALISED WHAT THEY HAD DONE THEY WOULD ALMOST CERTAINLY GO BACK ON IT. IT WOULD HAVE BEEN UNTHINKABLE FOR HIM TO HAVE PLACED FRELIMO UNDER THE COMMAND OF THE COLONIAL POWER DURING THE TRANSITION PERIOD IN MOZAMBIQUE'S RECENT HISTORY.

4. THIS AND OTHER FREQUENT COMPARISONS WITH THE SITUATION IN MOZAMBIQUE IN 1974 GAVE ME AN OPENING TO STRESS ONCE AGAIN THE FUNDAMENTAL DIFFERENCES BETWEEN RHODESIA AND THE EX-PORTUGUESE COLONIES, AND BETWEEN OUR RECORD AND THAT OF THE PORTUGUESE. IT WAS SIMPLY NOT TRUE THAT WE WERE MAKING ANY SECRET DEALS WITH THE MUZOREWA SIDE BUT WE HAD TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE FACT THAT HE IS IN POSSESSION OF THE GROUND AND THAT, WHATEVER SMITH'S MOTIVES IN THE INTERNAL SETTLEMENT NEGOTIATIONS MUZOREWA DID AT LEAST HELP BRING ABOUT, FOR THE FIRST TIME, A MAJORITY BLACK GOVERNMENT AFTER UNIVERSAL SUFFRAGE ELECTIONS. WE WERE NOT HAPPY WITH HIS CONSTITUTION AND WE WITHHELD OUR RECOGNITION. THE PRESIDENT SAID AT THIS POINT ~~THAT~~ ^{THAT}, IN DAR ES SALAAM, HE AND HIS COLLEAGUES GOT THE PF TO RE-CONFIRM THAT WE NOW HAVE AN ACCEPTABLE CONSTITUTION AND ACCEPTABLE TRANSITIONAL ARRANGEMENTS.

PF TO RE-CONFIRM THAT WE NOW HAVE AN ACCEPTABLE CONSTITUTION AND
ACCEPTABLE TRANSITIONAL ARRANGEMENTS.

5. I DID MY BEST TO ASSURE THE PRESIDENT THAT IT WAS NOT OUR INTENT-
ION TO HUMILIATE OR IN ANY WAY DIMINISH THE PF. OUR PROPOSALS MADE
IT CLEAR THAT, SO LONG AS THEY ACCEPTED THE GOVERNOR'S AUTHORITY AND
COMPLIED WITH HIS DIRECTIONS THE PF FORCES WOULD BE DEEMED TO BE
ACTING LAWFULLY. IN A NUTSHELL, OUR PROPOSALS ALSO ENVISAGED THE
RHODESIAN SECURITY FORCES WOULD BE 'CONFINED TO BARRACKS'.
MANY OF THE POINTS RAISED BY THE PF COULD BE LEFT TO THE EXPERTS
AND THE CEASE-FIRE COMMISSION. THE PRESIDENT SEEMED TO AGREE
THAT MUCH COULD BE ACHIEVED IN THIS WAY BUT IT WAS ESSENTIAL
TO SATISFY THE PF BY AGREEING ON CERTAIN PRINCIPLES, ESPECIALLY
THOSE IN PARAGRAPH 2 ABOVE, AT LANCASTER HOUSE ITSELF.

6. ON 2(B) ABOVE I RECALLED OBLIQUELY THAT WE HAD AGREED AT OUR LAST
CONVERSATION THAT THERE IS NO SUBSTITUTE FOR AGREEMENT TO KEEP
THE PEACE: AND ON 2(C) I READ PRETORIA TEL NO 895 TO YOU AND,
AT HIS REQUEST, GAVE HIM A COPY. HE COMMENTED THAT NEVERTHELESS A
PEACE-KEEPING FORCE COULD FILL A VACUUM. HE LAUGHED AT THE NOTION
THAT ZIMBABWE WOULD ELECT A MARXIST GOVERNMENT. NEITHER OF THE
LEADERS WAS A MARXIST.

7. THE PRESIDENT'S MANNER WAS FRIENDLY THROUGHOUT AND HE CONCLUDED
THAT ENORMOUS PROGRESS HAS BEEN MADE AND HE REMAINED AN OPTIMIST.
ALL THAT REMAINED WAS TO GET THE CEASE-FIRE ARRANGEMENTS
RIGHT ACTING IMPARTIALLY AND
LISTENING TO THE LEGITIMATE COMPLAINTS OF THE PF. MY CONCLUSION
IS THAT THE PF HAVE AT LEAST SUCCEEDED IN PERSUADING THE FLS TO
PUT PRESSURE ON US. BUT ALTHOUGH THEY WILL HAVE MADE SOME IMPACT
ON MACHEL HE CLEARLY REMAINS AS ANXIOUS AS EVER FOR A VERY QUICK
SETTLEMENT.

8. MY US COLLEAGUE WAS SUMMONED AFTER ME AND WAS SPOKEN TO MORE
OR LESS ON THE SAME LINES.

PAPADUPOULOS

NNNN

IMMEDIATE

[RHODESIA: POLICY: ADVANCE COPIES]

26

PS
PS/SIR I GILMOUR
PS/MR LUCE
PS/PUS

MR WILLSON
MR DAY
LORD N G LENNOX
MR ASPIN

PS/NO 10 DOWNING STREET

MR R L WADE-GERY
MR P M MAXEY
MR GOULTY
MR P J FOWLER
DIO

CABINET
OFFICE

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HD/RHOD DEPT (4)

HD/C AF D
HD/S AF D

HD/PUSD (2)

HD/NEWS DEPT
HD/WAD

MR STEEL LEGAL ADVISER RM K188

MR FIFCOF LEGAL ADVISER RM K164

~~RESIDENT CLERK~~

GR 830

CONFIDENTIAL

DESKBY 260945Z (FCO)

FM GABORONE 260800Z NOV 79

TO IMMEDIATE F C F S

IMMEDIATE

TELEGRAM NUMBER 484 OF 26 NOVEMBER

INFO IMMEDIATE LUSAKA, DAR ES SALAAM, MAPUTO, LUANDA, MIRIMBA
SALISBURY, PRETORIA, UKMIS NEW YORK, WASHINGTON, LAGOS.

MY TEL 483 (NOT TO MIRIMBA) : RHODESIA: FRONT LINE MEETING

1. ACTING PRESIDENT MASIRE, ACCOMPANIED BY KWELAGOBE AND
MOTOKWANE, BRIEFED ME THIS MORNING 26 NOVEMBER ON THE FRONT LINE
PRESIDENTS MEETING. MOGWE, WHO ALSO HAD BEEN TO DAR ES SALAAM,
WAS NOT PRESENT.

2. MASIRE SAID THAT THE MEETING HAD BEEN HELD AT THE REQUEST OF THE
PATRIOTIC FRONT. THE PF HAD EXPLAINED TO THE THREE DELEGATIONS
THAT THE ONE POINT IN THE CEASEFIRE PROPOSALS ON WHICH THEY FELT
STRONGLY WAS THAT THEIR ARMY SHOULD BE GIVEN EQUAL STATUS TO THE
RHODESIAN ARMY. THE PATRIOTIC FRONT HAD AGREED TO THE CONCEPT OF
ASSEMBLY BUT THE PROPOSALS ENVISAGED THAT THE PF WOULD BE AT ONLY
15 POINTS WHILST THE RHODESIAN ARMY WOULD BE AT THEIR PRESENT BASES.
THE RHODESIAN ARMY HAD A LARGE NUMBER OF BASES IN THE OPERATIONAL

15 POINTS WHILST THE RHODESIAN ARMY WOULD BE AT THEIR PRESENT BASES. THE RHODESIAN ARMY HAD A LARGE NUMBER OF BASES IN THE OPERATIONAL AREAS AND THIS WOULD GIVE THEM POLITICAL ADVANTAGE. THE PF WOULD ACCEPT THE CONCENTRATION OF THE RHODESIAN FORCES IN BARRACKS BUT NOT AT BASES. AS THE PF SAW IT, THE RHODESIAN ARMY WOULD BE LEFT WITH EFFECTIVE CONTROL UNDER THE GOVERNOR. THEY WOULD BE DEPLOYED IN THEIR EXISTING AREAS TO CARRY OUR NORMAL DUTIES. THIS WOULD PUT THE PF AT A DISADVANTAGE. THE PF WERE NOT SURE WHAT "SAFE PASSAGE" TO ASSEMBLY POINTS MEANT AND THEY ENVISAGED THAT THE PF FORCES WOULD BE MARCHED THERE BY SMITH'S ARMY. IF THAT WAS THE CASE IT WOULD HAVE A BAD PSYCHOLOGICAL EFFECT. THE PF TROOPS WOULD FEEL THAT THEY HAD BEEN BETRAYED AND WERE BEING TREATED LIKE PRISONERS OF WAR BEING PUT INTO CONCENTRATION CAMPS. THE PF DID NOT KNOW IF THEIR TROOPS WOULD BE DISARMED. IF THEY WERE, THIS WOULD BE DANGEROUS FOR THEIR MEN. IF THE PATRIOTIC FRONT WON THE ELECTION THE RHODESIAN ARMY WOULD WIPE THEM OUT IN THE ASSEMBLY AREAS AND THE REST OF THE WORLD WOULD JUST ASSUME THAT THIS WAS ANOTHER AFRICAN COUP. EQUALLY IF MUZOREWA WON THEY WOULD FEEL UNSAFE. THE PF SAID THAT IF THEY HAD KNOWN THAT THIS WAS THE INTERPRETATION TO BE GIVEN TO THE CEASEFIRE THEY WOULD NEVER HAVE AGREED TO THE INTERIM ARRANGEMENTS.

3. THE PF TOLD THE THREE DELEGATIONS THAT THEY WOULD PREFER TO HAVE THE BRITISH GOVERNOR BUILD UP A "SMALL ARMY" OF TWO OR THREE BRIGADES FORMED OUT OF THE TWO OPPOSING ARMIES. THEY SAID THAT IF THIS COULD HAPPEN THERE WOULD BE A BETTER CHANCE OF THE TWO OPPOSING FORCES GETTING TO KNOW EACH OTHER AS COMRADES DURING THE INTERIM PERIOD THAN THERE EVER WOULD BE AFTER ONE SIDE OF THE OTHER HAD WON THE ELECTION. AS A FIRST STEP THEY THOUGHT THAT THERE SHOULD BE A "NEUTRAL ARMY" FROM THE COMMONWEALTH WHICH WOULD KEEP THE PEACE WHILE THIS NUCLEUS ARMY WAS BEING SET UP. THIS COMMONWEALTH FORCE SHOULD BE LARGE ENOUGH TO BE MEANINGFUL AND SHOULD BE WELL-EQUIPPED.

4. ALTHOUGH THE PATRIOTIC FRONT DID NOT MAKE AN ISSUE OF IT THEY SAID THAT THEY WOULD PREFER COMMONWEALTH OBSERVERS TO BE IN THE FORM OF ONE TEAM RATHER THAN 49 GROUPS OPERATING SEPARATELY.

5. ON THE POLICE FORCE TO BE MAINTAINED DURING THE INTERIM PERIOD THE PATRIOTIC FRONT FELT STRONGLY THAT SOME ELEMENTS WHICH THEY HAD NAMED SHOULD BE EXCLUDED.

6. THE VICE-PRESIDENT SUMMED UP BY SAYING THAT THE MAIN QUESTION WAS EQUALITY OF TREATMENT OF THE FORCES. THE FRONT LINE HAD AGREED THAT IF THE PF WAS TO BE LIMITED TO 15 ASSEMBLY POINTS WHILST THE RHODESIAN FORCES WERE LEFT IN THEIR NORMAL BASES THERE WOULD BE

WAS EQUALITY OF TREATMENT OF THE FORCES. THE FRONT LINE HAD AGREED THAT IF THE PF WAS TO BE LIMITED TO 15 ASSEMBLY POINTS WHILST THE RHODESIAN FORCES WERE LEFT IN THEIR NORMAL BASES THERE WOULD BE UNFAIRNESS. THEY HAD NOTED THAT THE PATRIOTIC FRONT WAS NOT OPPOSED TO THE PRINCIPLE OF CONFINEMENT BUT THEY MUST NOT BE PUT IN THE POSITION OF APPEARING TO HAVE SURRENDERED. THE CONCEPT OF A NEUTRAL COMMONWEALTH FORCE HAD ALWAYS APPEALED TO THE FRONT LINE AND THEY ENDORSED IT. MPOTOKWANE ADDED THAT IT WAS QUITE OBVIOUS THAT THE PATRIOTIC FRONT WERE DETERMINED TO HAVE A SETTLEMENT. HE COMPARED THIS TO THE ATMOSPHERE AT OTHER MEETINGS WITH THE PF WHICH HE HAD ATTENDED, WHEN THERE WAS VERY SERIOUS DOUBT AS TO WHETHER THE PF WANTED A SETTLEMENT.

7. I TOLD MASIRE THAT I WAS SURE THAT YOU WOULD BE MOST GRATEFUL FOR THIS INFORMATION ABOUT THE MEETING. I SAID THAT IT SEEMED TO ME THAT SOME OF THE STATEMENTS MADE BY THE PF SEEMED TO BE A MISINTERPRETATION OF THE CEASEFIRE ARRANGEMENTS WHICH YOU HAD TABLED, AND I COMMENTED BRIEFLY THAT WHILST THE IDEA OF THE OPPOSING FORCES GETTING TO KNOW EACH OTHER WAS ADMIRABLE, IT WAS IMPRACTICABLE IN THE NECESSARILY BRIEF PERIOD OF THE INTERIM. I REMINDED KWELAGOBE OF HOW LONG IT HAD TAKEN HIM TO BUILD UP THE BOTSWANA DEFENCE FORCE EVEN IN THE ATMOSPHERE OF PEACE INSIDE BOTSWANA. KWELAGOBE TOOK THE POINT. I SAID THAT THE IDEA OF A COMMONWEALTH PEACE-KEEPING FORCE WAS ALSO UNPRACTICABLE FOR A NUMBER OF REASONS WHICH YOU HAD ALREADY EXPLAINED TO THE PF.

TURNER.

IMMEDIATE

NNNN

[RHODESIA: POLICY: ADVANCE COPIES]

32

PS
PS/SIR I GILMOUR
PS/MR LUCE
PS/PUS

MR WILLSON
MR DAY
LORD N G LENNOX
MR ASPIN

PS/NO 10 DOWNING STREET

MR R L WADE-GERY
MR P M MAXEY
MR GOULTY
MR P J FOWLER
DIO

CABINET
OFFICE

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HD/RHOD DEPT (4)

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HD/PUSD (2)

HD/NEWS DEPT
HD/WAD

MR STEEL LEGAL ADVISER RM K188
MR FIFCOOT LEGAL ADVISER RM K164

amb

CONFIDENTIAL

DESKBY 261200Z

IMMEDIATE

FM DAR ES SALAAM 261130Z NOV 79

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 942 OF 26 NOVEMBER

INFO IMMEDIATE LUSAKA, LUANDA, MAPUTO, GABORONE, LAGOS,
ADDIS ABABA, WASHINGTON, CANBERRA, OTTAWA, PRETORIA, MIRIMBA
SALISBURY, UKMIS NEW YORK

RHODESIA:

1. PRESIDENT NYERERE BRIEFED THE COMMONWEALTH REPRESENTATIVES, INCLUDING MYSELF, THIS AFTERNOON ON THE OUTCOME OF SATURDAY'S FLS MEETING WITH THE PF.
2. NYERERE SAID THERE WERE A NUMBER OF PROBLEMS. FIRST THE PF WERE VERY IRRITATED WITH THE ATMOSPHERE AT THE CONFERENCE. THEY HAD TWO COMPLAINTS. THEY WERE "FED UP WITH ULTIMATUMS"; AND THERE WAS A PROBLEM OF TRUST - "THEY WERE FINDING IT DIFFICULT TO HAVE COMPLETE TRUST IN LORD CARRINGTON". A MAJOR CAUSE OF THIS LOSS OF TRUST WAS THAT DURING THE DISCUSSION OF THE PRE-INDEPENDENCE ARRANGEMENTS THE P F HAD MADE CLEAR THAT THE QUESTION OF THE ROLE AND STATUS OF THEIR ARMIES WAS VITAL TO THEM. THEY THOUGHT THAT THEY HAD SECURED AGREEMENT THAT THE PF AND THE SMITH/MUZOREWA

ARRANGEMENTS THE P F HAD MADE CLEAR THAT THE QUESTION OF THE ROLE AND STATUS OF THEIR ARMIES WAS VITAL TO THEM. THEY THOUGHT THAT THEY HAD SECURED AGREEMENT THAT THE PF AND THE SMITH/MUZOREWA FORCES WOULD BE TREATED ON AN EQUAL BASIS. IT WAS TOTALLY UNACCEPTABLE TO THEM THAT THEIR FORCES SHOULD CONTINUE TO BE REGARDED AS TERRORISTS WHILE THE REBEL FORCES BECAME THE LEGAL FORCES OF THE COUNTRY. BUT IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE PRE-INDEPENDENCE ARRANGEMENTS HAD BEEN AGREED YOU HAD "MADE A CLARIFICATION OR IMPLIED" THAT YOU HAD NOT AGREED TO EQUALITY OF STATUS.

3. TURNING TO QUESTIONS OF SUBSTANCE WITH REGARD TO THE BRITISH PROPOSALS FOR A CEASEFIRE, NYERERE REFERRED TO THE PROPOSAL FOR THE ASSEMBLY OF THE PF FORCES IN PRE-DETERMINED PLACES. THE PF DID NOT REGARD THIS AS OBJECTIONABLE AS A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE. INDEED THEIR OWN PROPOSALS INVOLVED THEIR FORCES MOVING INTO SPECIFIED AREAS. BUT THERE WAS NO MENTION IN THE BRITISH PROPOSALS OF WHAT WAS GOING TO HAPPEN TO THE SMITH/MUZOREWA FORCES. DID THE PROPOSALS MEAN THAT ALL THE PF FORCES WOULD MOVE FROM THEIR OPERATIONAL AREAS WHILE THE SMITH/MUZOREWA FORCES WOULD REMAIN IN THEIR OPERATIONAL AREAS, INCLUDING KEEPING CONTROL OF AIRFIELDS. IF SO THIS WAS NOT ACCEPTABLE. THERE HAD TO BE CLEAR RECIPROCITY. IN NYERERE'S VIEW OUR PROPOSALS COULD ONLY MEAN THAT THE SMITH/MUZOREWA FORCES WOULD GO BACK TO THEIR BARRACKS AS THE PF FORCES WENT TO THEIR ASSEMBLY AREAS: "LORD CARRINGTON CANNOT MEAN ANYTHING ELSE". IF SO, THIS WAS FINE.

4. NYERERE SAID THE SECOND POINT OF SUBSTANCE RELATED TO THE COMMONWEALTH FORCE. THERE MUST BE A FORCE CAPABLE OF "ENFORCING" THE AGREED ARRANGEMENTS AND OF MAKING QUITE SURE, FOR EXAMPLE, THAT THE SMITH/MUZOREWA FORCES COULD NOT SUDDENLY MAKE USE OF THEIR AIRFIELDS. NYERERE THEN REPEATED THIS THOUGHT IN SIMILAR WORDS BUT OMITTING THE WORD "ENFORCING" AND USING ONLY THE EXPRESSION "MAKING QUITE SURE". HE ENDED BY SAYING THAT THE FORCE MUST BE SUFFICIENT "TO DO THIS JOB", AND EXPRESSING THE VIEW THAT HE FOUND THE PF POSITION REASONABLE.

5. I SAID THAT WE UNDERSTOOD THE FEELING THAT WE WERE PUTTING GREAT PRESSURE ON THE PF TO REACH RAPID DECISIONS BUT OUR REASON WAS SIMPLY THE VERY GRAVE DANGER WE SAW IN ANY DELAY, PARTICULARLY AT THIS FINAL STAGE. I SAID THAT THE AGREEMENT FOR THE PRE-INDEPENDENCE ARRANGEMENTS PROVIDED FOR THE FORCES OF ALL THE PARTIES TO BE EQUALLY RESPONSIBLE TO THE GOVERNOR. I HAD TAKEN CAREFUL NOTE OF WHAT HE HAD SAID ABOUT THE NEED FOR THE SALISBURY FORCES TO BE IN THEIR BARRACKS MATCHING THE ASSEMBLY OF THE PF

PARTIES TO BE EQUALLY RESPONSIBLE TO THE GOVERNOR. I HAD TAKEN CAREFUL NOTE OF WHAT HE HAD SAID ABOUT THE NEED FOR THE SALISBURY FORCES TO BE IN THEIR BARRACKS MATCHING THE ASSEMBLY OF THE PF FORCES IN THEIR ASSEMBLY AREAS, AND I WOULD REPORT TO YOU THE PF STRONG FEELING ON THIS POINT. WITH REGARD TO THE COMMONWEALTH FORCE, I SAID THAT AN "ENFORCEMENT" FORCE WAS IMPOSSIBLE, BUT I NOTED THAT HE HAD ALSO SPOKEN OF A FORCE SUFFICIENT TO MAKE QUITE SURE THAT THE ARRANGEMENTS WERE OBSERVED. THIS SEEMED TO ME NOT FAR FROM OUR OWN POSITION. NYERERE THEN SAID THAT IT WAS INDEED HIS OWN VIEW THAT WE MUST WORK FOR A CEASEFIRE WHICH WILL REALLY HOLD AND BE OBSERVED BY ALL THE PARTIES. HE HIMSELF DID NOT BELIEVE THAT IT WAS POSSIBLE TO PROVIDE A FORCE WITH THE TASK OF STANDING BETWEEN TWO FIGHTING FORCES. WHAT WAS NEEDED WAS A COMMONWEALTH FORCE WHICH WAS CREDIBLE: "IT WAS NOT TO FIGHT BUT IT MUST BE THERE CREDIBLY".

6. THE INDIAN HIGH COMMISSIONER ASKED WHETHER THERE WAS NOT ALSO A PROBLEM ABOUT DISARMING THE PF FORCES. NYERERE SAID THERE WAS NO QUESTION OF ANY FORCES BEING DISARMED. NO-ONE ELSE RAISED ANY POINTS.

IMMEDIATE

MOON

NNNN

f. s. / Peter 26/11

TELEPHONE CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER AND THE FOREIGN
AND COMMONWEALTH SECRETARY IN THE EARLY EVENING ON SUNDAY, 25
NOVEMBER 1979

PM: Hullo

FCS: Hullo Margaret

PM: Peter. I just 'phoned up to ask if you had any thoughts about the news from Dar Es Salaam that they are not going to co-operate on the ceasefire and they are going to call your bluff, etc.

FCS: Well I don't think we really know what happened. They didn't actually produce a communique .

PM: But Mugabe was on the news.

FCS: Tonight?

PM: Yes.

FCS: This Evening?

PM: Yes. On the radio

FCS: We have heard nothing at the Foreign Office about that. What they will certainly do is not to answer tomorrow. But I don't think it necessarily follows that they won't go on talking. I think that they will say, you know, we haven't had the talks, and this that and the other. I hope Salisbury will say they accept the ceasefire tomorrow and then we shall try and play them along.

PM: Certainly. Though on the news tonight the BBC
that I have heard
radio was one of four accounts/and it was very much that the Rhodesians say that Nkomo has been infiltrating people into us. But the Dar Es Salaam people absolutely refuse to congregate in groups inside Rhodesia, because that would be unfair.

FCS: They won't congregate in groups?

PM: Yes.

FCS: Well in which case there can be no ceasefire.

PM: Well, and they are not going to co-operate and they are going to call your bluff, etc. The typical posturing stuff you would expect. In a way I was not displeased because it puts them back into the wrong. So it pleased me quite a lot from the viewpoint of public opinion it looks to ^{me} as if they have gone absolutely into the wrong.

FCS: Yes. I think/good. You know they have done another raid.

PM: Oh no. On Zipra?

/FCS: On Zipra, yes.

FCS: On Zipra, yes. And it is said to be a camp about 25 miles from Lusaka.

PM: Oh Lord it is right inside.

FCS: Well, you know one despairs of them doesn't one.

PM: Yes.

FCS: But some body said they heard it on the news. Did it not appear on the six o'clock news?

PM: I didn't hear that on the six o'clock news, no.

FCS: Well may be it is a false report.

PM: They might have listened to television news you see.

FCS; No. This was earlier on at one o'clock.

PM: Oh. Well most certainly I don't think it was on the six o'clock.

FCS: Oh it may have passed off rather better than you might think. But so far as we can judge I have been in touch all day with all this, what's happened is that there has been no communique issued by the Front Line Presidents. But Mugabe gave a press conference in which he said he was going to call my bluff but....

PM: Yes well that must have been what we heard.

FCS: But nothing about not concentrating or anything. That may have come later. In which case I agree with you. It puts them in the wrong.

PM: Yes. We were just talking Europe here. I can't see Peter that you are going to be able to come unless the thing breaks up before.

FCS: No, nor do I. It would come at this moment wouldn't it.

PM: I know. But if, they are coming back what, tonight or tomorrow morning?

FCS: They are coming back tonight.

PM: To arrive tomorrow morning?

FCS: Yes well they may turn up or they may not turn up in order to defy me because I asked them to give me an answer on Monday. But we shall be in a better position because if the Salisbury delegation agree to our ceasefire proposals, say that they won't hit Zipra, say they won't infiltrate, and also they will talk to them as soon as they have agreed. We are in a much better position.

PM: Much better. The blame is attached to the other side.

FCS: Well that's right and we are now getting the thing back on the ceasefire rather than on the Zambian thing. But I am afraid they have done themselves a lot of damage with all the people we want to support them. That is the problem. However, we have just

/got

to play this by ear really. I will give a ring Margaret and find out ... I haven't been in touch with them for three or four hours.

PM: No. I am still at Chequers and will be here for another two and a half hours.

FCS: Well if I find out anything else I will give you a ring.

PM: All right.

FCS: But I haven't heard that bit and I will see if they can confirm it.

PM: All right.

FCS: Thanks so much.

PM: Good bye.

* * * * *

FCS: Hullo Margaret.

PM: Yes Ieter.

FCS: The report is inaccurate. What they said was that they were not going to have an ultimatum. They would go on negotiating in their own time. But our proposals did not give equality of status to the forces and that if they were required to assemble then the Salisbury forces would have to assemble too.

PM: Oh. I see. Well that can't happen can it?

FCS: No. But it puts us of course in a more difficult position.

PM: In that case it would be far better if their forces got out, wouldn't it? But we can't ask that either.

FCS: But they won't do that. But they say because they hold more territory than the Salisbury forces.

PM: I see. So a ceasefire is going to be just about impossible to monitor.

FCS: It will be impossible to monitor because, I mean it is quite clear they won't assemble and you will have to use the other people to do it.

PM: To round them up?

FCS: Yes. But it will break down on that.

PM: Oh Lord.

FCS: I mean I would think that is what would happen, wouldn't you?

PM: I wonder if it is impossible for everyone to go back to barracks.

FCS: No because W won't. Because he said they won't assemble and there would be intimidation.

/PM:

PM: He's right.

FCS: And he couldn't put the thing at risk.

PM: If they assembled you could use them for patrolling couldn't you? But you would have nowhere to go to

FCS: But he won't accept that either.

PM: Oh well, we'll have to think about it Peter.

FCS: Yes. But one thing is quite certain. After what he has done there is no paper.

PM: I entirely agree.

FCS: We will just have to think.

PM: Yes. Good bye.

S E C R E T

GRS 906

SECRET

FM LUSAKA 241850Z NOV 79

TO FLASH FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1378 OF 24 NOVEMBER

INFO PRIORITY MIRIMBA SALISBURY, WASHINGTON, ROUTINE GABORONE,
MAPUTO, LUANDA, DAR ES SALAAM, LAGOS

MY TELNO 1299: RHODESIA/ZAMBIA

1. I SAW WISNER BEFORE AND AFTER HIS MEETING WITH KAUNDA. AT FIRST MEETING I EMPHASISED APPARENT ZRSF INTENTION TO PRESS FOR MILITARY ADVANTAGE IN ABSENCE OF ZAMBIAN/PATRIOTIC FRONT GUARANTEES AND THE LIMITED SCOPE OF RECENT RAIDS. WISNER TOOK CAREFUL NOTE.
2. AT HIS MEETING THIS EVENING WISNER FOUND THAT MARK CHONA HAD RETURNED UNEXPECTEDLY FOR A FAMILY FUNERAL AND WAS PRESENT. IN THE ANTE-ROOM CHONA EMPHASISED HIS VIEW THAT A SOLUTION WAS AT HAND AND MUST BE FOUND SOON.
3. WISNER DELIVERED PRESIDENT CARTER'S MESSAGE AND SPOKE ON THE LINES OF MY TUR GOING INTO CONSIDERABLE DETAIL. KAUNDA THANKED HIM AND SAID THAT THE PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE HELPED HIM CONSIDERABLY.
4. KAUNDA SAID THAT HE HAD SPOKEN TO MRS THATCHER EARLIER IN THE WEEK BUT THAT "UNFORTUNATELY SHE CHOSE TO MAKE MY CALL PUBLIC" - PRESUMABLY A REFERENCE TO THE PNO. THIS HAD CAUSED HIM SOME DIFFICULTIES AND HE HAD NOT BEEN AVAILABLE TO SPEAK TO HER YESTERDAY BUT WANTED TO DO SO EARLY NEXT WEEK IN ORDER TO RE-ASSUME A HAPPIER TONE IN OUR RELATIONS. IT HAD BEEN UNFORTUNATE THAT SIR L ALLINSON HAD ENTERED INTO "A HOT POLITICAL SITUATION". HE SHOULD HAVE CONTENTED HIMSELF IN REPORTING THE PRESIDENT'S COMMENTS. KAUNDA SAID THAT IF HE HAD SPOKEN TO MRS THATCHER YESTERDAY HE WOULD HAVE EMPHASISED THE IMPORTANCE OF GENERAL WALLS AND THE PATRIOTIC FRONT SPEAKING TO EACH OTHER IN PUBLIC AS WELL AS IN PRIVATE AND TRILATERALLY RATHER THAN BILATERALLY WHICH WAS BY PROXY. HE KNEW THAT WALLS

S E C R E T

/AND NKOMO

AND NKOMO HAD SPOKEN PRIVATELY AND BROKEN THE ICE. HE THOUGHT IT REALLY IMPORTANT THAT THEY SHOULD NOW COME TOGETHER IN PUBLIC. I INTERVENED ON WISNER'S NARRATIVE TO SAY THAT WALLS AND THE PATRIOTIC FRONT HAD HAD DIRECT MEETINGS AND WISNER ADMITTED THAT HE HAD FAILED TO TAKE THIS POINT UP IN CONVERSATION.

5. KAUNDA SAID "WE IN ZAMBIA WILL DO NOTHING TO DESTROY AN AGREEMENT". THIS WAS NOT BECAUSE OF PRESSURE BUT BECAUSE OF PRINCIPLE. THEY WOULD STAND BY THOSE PRINCIPLES. GOING FURTHER HE ASKED WISNER TO ASSURE PRESIDENT CARTER THAT HE WOULD DO EVERYTHING TO SEE THAT THERE WAS AN AGREEMENT.

6. CHONA EMPHASISED THE NEED FOR WALLS AND THE PATRIOTIC FRONT MILITARY LEADERS TO BE SEEN TO MEET IN PUBLIC. HE WENT ON TO SAY THAT THE ZAMBIAN OBSERVERS HAD OBTAINED A NOTE OF A MEETING ON 19 NOVEMBER BETWEEN THE BRITISH DELEGATION AND MUZOREWA WHICH OTHER MEMBERS OF MUZOREWA'S DELEGATION HAD FOUND ASTOUNDING. HE OPINED THAT THE MUZOREWA DELEGATION WAS FALLING APART.

7. CHONA CONTINZD BY QUESTIONING THE SIZE AND MEMBERSHIP OF THE MONITORING FORCE AND SAID THAT THE PATRIOTIC FRONT FOUND THAT DESPITE YOUR CLAIMS OF EQUITABLE TREATMENT, YOU STILL TENDED TO SPEAK OF ONE FORCE AS ORGANISED AND ANOTHER AS DISORGANISED RABBLE SO THAT THEY DOUBTED YOUR GENUINE EVEN HANDEDNESS.

8. KAUNDA SAID THAT HE HAD ORGINALLY THOUGHT OF AUSTRALIA, CANADA, GHANA, BANGLADESH AND NIGERIA AS BEING SUITABLE COUNTRIES FOR THE MONITORING FORCE AND EMPHASISED THE IMPORTANCE OF NIGERIA IN SELLING THE IDEA TO AFRICAN OPINION AS WELL AS IMPORTANT IN IMPROVING ANGLO/NIGERIAN BILATERAL RELATIONS. KAUNDA ADDED THAT NEW ZEALAND WAS TARRD WITH THE SOUTH AFRICAN BRUSH AS A RESULT OF THE MONTREAL OLYMPICS SQUABBLE AND WISNER TOLD ME THAT HE REACTED STRONGLY IN FAVOUR OF NEW ZEALAND AS AN UNCOMMITTED POWER. HE (WISNER) ALSO SPOKE STRONGLY IN FAVOUR OF FIJI ON THE BASIS OF THEIR ROLE IN THE LEBANON PEACE-KEEPING FORCE.

9. CHONA SAID THAT THE PATRIOTIC FRONT WERE HOPING FOR SOME AGREEMENT "THIS WEEK" BUT FELT IT NECESSARY TO BEGIN THE PROCESS OF THE INTEGRATION OF THE RESPECTIVE FORCES AT AN EARLY

S E C R E T

STAGE IF CONFIDENCE WAS TO BE BUILT. KAUNDA AGREED AND SAID THAT THE SOONER THIS WAS DONE THE BETTER. I QUESTIONED WISNER ABOUT THE IMPORTANCE OF 'INTEGRATION' BUT WISNER FELT IT MEANT NO MORE THAN STAFF TALKS ABOUT POST ELECTION ARRANGEMENTS AND NOT, REPEAT NOT, ARRANGEMENTS IN THE INTERIM PHASE.

10. WISNER TOLD ME THAT IN HIS VIEW THE MEETING HAD SHOWN KAUNDA TO BE BASICALLY BACK ON AN EVEN KEEL EVEN IF TIRED. HE FELT THE WORST WAS OVER. HE DID NOT, REPEAT NOT, THINK THAT KAUNDA WAS LIKELY TO MAKE TOO MUCH OF HIS DETAILED POINTS ABOUT THE NATURE AND SIZE OF THE MONITORING FORCE BUT THAT KAUNDA HAD GOT IT INTO HIS HEAD THAT THERE WAS SOME IMPORTANCE TO BE ATTACHED TO THE PUBLIC MEETINGS BETWEEN WALLS AND THE PATRIOTIC FRONT. HE FORESAW SOME SQUABBLING BUT NO MAJOR HURDLES ON THE ZAMBIAN SIDE. HE SUGGESTED TO ME THAT THE WAY WAS NOW OPEN FOR ME TO RESUME NORMAL BUSINESS WITH THE ZAMBIAN AUTHORITIES AND I PROPOSE TO TEST THE WATER AT AN EARLY OPPORTUNITY NEXT WEEK.

11. IF WISNER'S ASSESSMENT IS ACCURATE, I WOULD SUGGEST THAT THE PRIME MINISTER WHEN SPEAKING TO KAUNDA NEXT WEEK, MIGHT KICK OFF BY EMPHASISING HER SATISFACTION AT THE DEGREE OF CONTACT ALREADY ESTABLISHED BETWEEN WALLS AND THE PATRIOTIC FRONT MILITARY LEADERS. THIS MAY NOT HAVE GOT THROUGH THE CHONA FILTER. I SUGGEST THE PRIME MINISTER HAVE DATES AND TIMES TO HAND.

ALLINSON

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PS/PUS
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MR BULLARD
MR FRETWELL
LORD N G LENNOX
MISS BROWN
MR DAY
MR WILLSON
MR ASPIN
PS/MR MARTEN

ADDITIONAL DISTN.
RHODESIA POLICY

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S E C R E T

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DESK BY FCO 240900Z
 DESK BY DAR ES SALAAM 240700Z
 DESK BY PRETORIA 240700Z
 DESK BY LUSAKA 240700Z
 DESK BY SALISBURY 240700Z

Prime Minister (2)

Ant

26.11.79

FROM UKMIS NEW YORK 240540Z NOVEMBER
 TO IMMEDIATE FCO
 TELEGRAM NUMBER 1615 OF 24 NOVEMBER 1979
 INFO IMMEDIATE LUSAKA DAR ES SALAAM MIRIMBA SALISBURY
 AND PRETORIA
 INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON PARIS LAGOS MAPUTO LUANDA GABERONE
 OSLO AND LISBON.

MY TEL NO. 1610 (NOT TO ALL): RHODESIA/ZAMBIA.

1. THE SECURITY COUNCIL ADJOURNED AT 11.15P.M. LOCAL TIME AFTER ADOPTING A CONSENSUS RESOLUTION (TEXT IN MY TELEGRAM UNDER REFERENCE AS AMENDED BY M I F T). I SPOKE IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE CONSENSUS WAS ADOPTED (TEXT IN MY SECOND I F T).

2. IT WAS A VERY LONG DAY AND I APOLOGISE FOR DISTURBING MINISTERS AND OFFICIALS IN THE SMALL HOURS. BUT, GIVEN ALL THE IMPERFECTIONS OF THE U N, WE CAME OUT WITH A BETTER RESULT THAN I HAD ANTICIPATED. I AM THINKING IN TERMS OF OUR RELATIONS WITH ZAMBIA, INCLUDING THE SAFETY OF OUR HIGH COMMISSION AND COMMUNITY, AND OF THE FORTHCOMING EXERCISE IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL WHEN WE RESTORE LEGALITY AND LIFT SANCTIONS. IF THE DEBATE HAD BEEN PROLONGED AND ACRIMONIOUS, ENDING IN A RESOLUTION ON WHICH WE HAD EITHER ABSTAINED ALONE OR VETOED ALONE, ALL THESE SITUATIONS COULD HAVE BEEN WORSE AND THIS MIGHT HAVE ADVERSELY AFFECTED LANCASTER HOUSE.

3. AT THE BEGINNING OF THE DAY I REALISED THAT I WAS NOT GOING TO BE ABLE TO PLAY FOR ENOUGH TIME FOR AGREEMENT TO BE ACHIEVED AT LANCASTER HOUSE BEFORE THE COUNCIL HAD DONE ITS WORST. I ACCORDINGLY DECIDED THAT THE BEST TACTICS WERE TO GO FOR A QUICK RESULT

WITH THE LEAST DAMAGE. WE SPENT THE MORNING LOBBYING THE WESTERN MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND MODERATE AFRICANS. WE GOT A LOT OF SUPPORT FOR THE PROPOSITION THAT THE COUNCIL SHOULD DO NOTHING WHICH MIGHT DAMAGE LANCASTER HOUSE. FUTSCHER PEREIRA (PORTUGAL) AND B A CLARK (NIGERIA) WERE PARTICULARLY HELPFUL ALL DAY.

4. IN THE AFTERNOON, PEREIRA AND CLARK BROUGHT LUSAKA (ZAMBIA) AND ME TOGETHER. THE ATMOSPHERE QUICKLY THAWED AND WE HAD A SENSIBLE CONVERSATION. LUSAKA MADE CLEAR THAT HE WAS UNDER STRICT INSTRUCTIONS FROM KAUNDA TO HAVE A FORMAL MEETING OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL AS SOON AS POSSIBLE AND TO GET A QUICK RESOLUTION. BUT HE HAD CALMED DOWN AND TOOK THE POINT THAT WE MUST AVOID DAMAGING LANCASTER HOUSE.

5. WHEN THE FIRST DRAFT OF THE RESOLUTION EMERGED, I TOLD THE AFRICANS THAT THE ORIGINAL PARAGRAPH 5 ON COMPENSATION WAS TOTALLY UNACCEPTABLE TO US. THEY ASKED FOR FRESH WORDING AND ACCEPTED MY PROPOSED AMENDMENT WITH LITTLE DIFFICULTY. TO BEGIN WITH THEY WERE RECONCILED TO OUR ABSTAINING WITH A SUITABLE EXPLANATION OF VOTE WHICH I OUTLINED TO THEM.

6. SHORTLY AFTERWARDS, THE AFRICANS BROACHED THE SUBJECT OF CONSENSUS. THEY URGED US STRONGLY, AND I BELIEVED GENUINELY, TO JOIN A CONSENSUS FOR THE SAKE OF OUR RELATIONS WITH ZAMBIA. LUSAKA SUPPORTED BY CLARK AND MEMBERS OF THE ZAMBIAN DELEGATION, SAID THAT KAUNDA AND THE ZAMBIAN PRESS WOULD IMMEDIATELY SPOT US AS THE ODD MAN OUT IF WE ABSTAINED AND WE MIGHT BE IN FOR MORE TROUBLE. IF WE COULD GO ALONG WITH A CONSENSUS PLUS AN EXPLANATORY STATEMENT, HE WAS SURE THAT THIS WOULD CLOSE THE CHAPTER WITH KAUNDA AND LEAD TO A FULL RECONCILIATION. MOREOVER, HE WOULD THEN BE ABLE TO RESTRICT THE LIST OF SPEAKERS, FINISH THE WHOLE AFFAIR TONIGHT AND AVOID THE PROLONGATION OF THE DEBATE WHICH MIGHT HAVE THE CONSEQUENCES WE FEARED.

7. LUSAKA AND CLARK WERE AS GOOD AS THEIR WORD. THERE WERE VERY FEW SPEAKERS IN THE DEBATE AND MOST OF THE SPEECHES WERE SHORT AND RELATIVELY RESTRAINED. THE AFRICANS WERE SUSPICIOUS AND ON OCCASIONS A LITTLE HOSTILE BUT NOT OUTRAGEOUS OR HYSTERICAL. THE LIBYANS (CHAIRMAN OF THE AFRICAN GROUP THIS MONTH) CONCLUDED WITH SOME MALICIOUS NONSENSE, WHICH, AS YOU WILL SEE, I REJECTED VERY FIRMLY. THE FRENCH AND AMERICANS BOTH SPOKE ADMIRABLY ABOUT LANCASTER HOUSE, BUT CONDEMNED THE RHODESIAN RAIDS UNEQUIVOCALLY. THE RUSSIAN AND CHINESE SPEECHES WERE BRIEF AND FAIRLY MUTED.

8. YOUR AGREEMENT TO OUR ACCEPTANCE OF THE CONSENSUS WAS GREETED WITH IMMENSE SATISFACTION BY THE NON-ALIGNED AND WESTERN MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL. IN FACT, THE CONSENSUS ITSELF, ALTHOUGH HIGHLY DISAGREEABLE TO ANY REASONABLE PERSON, WAS NOT TOO BAD BY AFRICAN SECURITY COUNCIL PRECEDENT. THE AFRICANS DID NOT REACT TO MY STATEMENT WHICH WAS, AS YOU WISHED, VERY TOUGH BY RECENT WESTERN STANDARDS IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL. THE CLOSING ATMOSPHERE WAS GOOD, WHICH SHOULD BE HELPFUL WHEN WE GO INTO BATTLE OVER THE LIFTING OF SANCTIONS.

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MR FREELAND
MR FIFOOT
ECON DEPT
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PS/MR RIDLEY
PS/MR HURD
PS/PUS
SIR A DUFF
MR BULLARD
MR FRETWELL
LORD N G LENNOX
MISS BROWN
MR DAY
MR WILLSON
MR ASPIN
PS/MR MARTEN

ADDITIONAL DISTN.
RHODESIA POLICY



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

23 November 1979

Statement drafted

Dear Michael,

RMJ

Statement on Rhodesia

- 23/11

We discussed the possibility of issuing from No 10 Downing Street a statement on Rhodesia on the eve of the meeting of Front Line Presidents at Dar es Salaam tomorrow.

I enclose a draft statement which sets out the Government's position fully. Lord Carrington recommends that this should be issued today. As soon as the statement is approved, we would wish to telegraph the text widely to posts overseas.

*yours
Roderic Lyne*

(R M J Lyne)
Private Secretary

M O'D B Alexander Esq
10 Downing Street

~~DRAFT STATEMENT~~

L.S. *Punt* 26/XI

Prime Minister: This is the text as issued at 20.20 this evening. The reference to the ceasefire commission has been slightly expanded & that to cross border operations shortened.

Punt 23/XI

The Lancaster House Conference has reached a critical point. I want everyone to be clear about the position of the British Government.

We are within an ace of success. The Conference has already agreed a Constitution which, for the first time, guarantees genuine majority rule. It has agreed arrangements for a transitional period before independence. Only the cease-fire remains to be negotiated.

All the parties have contributed towards these achievements. Everyone has made concessions. The United Kingdom does not wish that which has been achieved to be jeopardised by ill-judged actions or decisions; or by delaying the final phase of the Conference to the point where previous decisions are imperilled. Now is the time to bring the Conference to a successful close.

The British Government has put forward full proposals to bring a cease-fire into effect. These include a Cease-fire Commission with military commanders from both sides; a monitoring force with Commonwealth participation; and disengagement of the opposing forces. If these proposals are accepted we envisage a cessation of hostilities within the next few days. This would bring immense benefits to the people of Rhodesia and of Zambia, Botswana and Mozambique, who have suffered so much in the course of the conflict. The British Government would help to bring about the return of refugees.

/ Pending

Pending the implementation of a cease-fire, Lord Carrington has proposed that the Rhodesian authorities and the Patriotic Front leaders, with the cooperation of the Zambian authorities, should give undertakings about a cessation of all cross-border activities between Zambia and Rhodesia.

We hope that the representatives of the Patriotic Front and of the Salisbury regime will now take the decisions which will make it possible to put all these plans into effect. Britain is prepared to take the steps and assume the responsibility necessary to help bring an end to the conflict. There would be serious dangers in any further delay. Given the necessary resolve we can bring peace to Rhodesia and the neighbouring countries.

Secretary of State

To be used by News Dept.

later today, if you agree

Thurley
23/11/78

DRAFT STATEMENT BY NEWS DEPARTMENT

ZAMBIA/RHODESIA

The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary has asked the British High Commissioner to Zambia, Sir Leonard Allinson, to return to London for consultations, so that he can review with him recent developments affecting Anglo/Zambian relations.

1. When will Sir L Allinson be returning to Lusaka?

We should expect him to return to Lusaka when his consultations here are completed.

2. How long has he been in Zambia?

Sir Leonard Allinson has been in Lusaka since February 1978. [He has already returned for consultations earlier this year, most recently on the occasion of President Kaunda's visit at the beginning of November].

3. Who will be in charge in Lusaka?

In the absence of Sir Leonard Allinson in London, his deputy, Mr Richard Neilson, will be Acting High Commissioner.

4. Have the High Commissioner or his staff been attacked?

Demonstrations have taken place outside the British High Commission offices in Lusaka on 22 and 23 November. The crowds were controlled by the Zambian police and no injuries were caused to members of the High Commission staff. On the second occasion, some damage was done to High Commission ^{property} ~~staff~~. We have made it clear to the Zambian authorities, both in Lusaka and through their

.... /High

2.

High Commissioner in London, that we hold the Zambian Government fully responsible for the protection and safety of British lives and property both in the High Commission and throughout Zambia.

5. Have any members of the British community been attacked?

We have no reports of any attacks on individual members of the British community. As I have said: We hold the Zambian Government fully responsible for the protection and safety of British citizens throughout Zambia.

SUBJECT

PRIME MINISTER'S

PERSONAL MESSAGE

SERIAL No. 7151/79T Nov 23 22 56

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MONROVIA 431/408 23 2045

(24/11)
LFS1092

THE RIGHT HONOURABLE MARGARET THATCHER

PRIME MINISTER OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND

10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1

MADAM PRIME MINISTER COLON ALLOW ME CMA AT THE OUTSET CMA TO
COMMEND THE EFFORTS MARSHALLED BY YOUR GOVERNMENT WHICH HAVE
CONTRIBUTED TO THE SUCCESS SO FAR ACHIEVE IN THE NEGOTIATIONS
ON ARRANGEMENTS

COL 10

PAGE 2

FOR THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD LEADING TO THE INDEPENDENCE OF ZIMBABWE STOP THE CEASEFIRE ARRANGEMENT WITH WHICH THE TALKS ARE NOW CONCERNED ARE DESERVANT OF THE MOST CAREFUL CONSIDERATION OF ALL THE PARTIES INVOLVED IN ORDER THAT AN ACCEPTABLE AGREEMENT ON THIS ISSUE SO CRUCIAL TO THE ULTIMATE SUCCESS OF THE

PAGE 3

TALKS MIGHT BE ACHIEVED STOP ARE HOWEVER DISTRESSFULLY CONCERNED ABOUT THE SERIES OF UNPROVOKED ATTACKS BEING LAUNCHED AGAINST THE REPUBLIC OF ZAMBIA BY SECURITY FORCES OF RHODESIA STOP YOU WILL AGREE THAT SUCH BLATANY AND FLAGRANT TRANSGRESSIONS UPON THE TERRITORIAL INTERGRITY OF THE SOVEREIGN STATE OF ZAMBIA CONSTITUTE A

PAGE 4

SERIOUS THREAT TO INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY AND GREATLY ENDANGER FURTHER PROGRESS IN THE ZIMBABWE CONSTITUTIONAL TALKS BEING HELD UNDER THE AUSPICES OF YOUR GOVERNMENT STOP IN THE CONTEXT OF SOUTHERN AFRICA CMA A CONTINUATION OF THESE WANTON ACTS OF AGRSSION COULD LEAD TO A CONFLAGRATION OF THE CONFLICT PORTENDING

PAGE 5

GRAVE CONSEQUENCES NOT FOR THAT REGION ALONE BUT FOR AFRICA AS A WHOLE AND THE WORLD AS WELL STOP WE HAVE ALWAYS DEPLOYED MOST VEHEMENTLY THESE DIABOLICAL ATTACKS PERPETRATED BY THE RHODESIAN AND SOUTH AFRICAN REGIMES AGAINST THE FRONTLINE STATES IN SOUTHERN AFRICA STOP AND IT IS MOST DISTRESSING CMA

To send Telegrams — CONSULT TELEPHONE DIRECTORY OR TELEX DIALLING CARD
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PAGE 6

MADAM PRIME MINISTER CMA THAT SUCH HEINOUS ACTS SHOULD BE COMMITTED AT THIS TIME WHEN GENUINE EFFORTS SUPPORTED BY THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY ARE BEING MADE TO REACH A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT OF THE ZIMBABWE PROBLEM STOP THAT THESE ATTACKS WOULD BE DIRECTED AGAINST ZAMBIA WHOSE PRESIDENT HAS PLAYED A PIVOTAL ROLE

PAGE 7

BOTH IN THE FORGING OF THE LUSAKA AGREEMENT ON ZIMBABWE AND IN BREAKING THE RECENT STALEMATE IN NEGOTIATIONS ON THE TRANSITIONAL ARRANGEMENTS IS MOST SURPRISING TO SAY THE LEAST, AND COULD SERIOUSLY IMPAIR AND JEOPARDIZE THE TALKS WHICH HAVE NOW REACHED A DELICATE AND DECISIVE STAGE STOP IN THE INTEREST

PAGE 8

OF PEACE AND SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL TALKS CMA I URGE THAT YOU DO ALL IN YOUR POWER TO CAUSE THE RHODESIAN REGIME TO FORTHWITH DESIST FROM FURTHER ACTS OF AGRSSION AGINST ZAMBIA AND OTHER FRONTLINE STATES STOP PLEASE ACCEPT CMA MADAM PRIME MINISTER CMA RENEWED ASSURANCES OF

PAGE 9

HIGHEST CONSIDERATION AND ESTEEM ^{SINCERELY} ~~SI-24326~~

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~~24 599 345 4~~

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Prime Minister: This may come to a vote in the middle of the night. Sir A. Parsons is working to secure a text on which we could abstain. But he is under instructions to veto if the reference to the responsibility of the administering power remains in.

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

23 November 1979

Dear Michael,

RMJ 23/11

UN Security Council

We discussed the line which the Prime Minister might take on the Security Council debate if President Kaunda comes through on the telephone later today. The Zambians have tabled a Resolution which would condemn acts of aggression against them, hold the administering power responsible, and set up a fact finding mission to report. If we are unable to secure amendments, we shall have to veto this Resolution: otherwise we could be held legally responsible for the damage caused in Zambia and face claims for reparations. The Resolution may come to a vote tonight.

The Prime Minister could say to President Kaunda that we hope our two permanent representatives in the Security Council can concert their position in New York so that the Security Council debate does not make it harder to achieve a settlement. The Prime Minister might also wish to warn President Kaunda that the British Government would not be able to accept a Resolution purporting to hold the administering power responsible for the Rhodesian raids. She could remind the President that we cannot be responsible for Rhodesian actions until a British Governor arrives in Salisbury.

If the Zambian proposal leads to a prolonged debate, continuing next week, the debate is likely to range widely over matters concerned with a Rhodesian settlement: and there may be attempts to take pre-emptive action to our disadvantage on the lifting of sanctions. Our present intention therefore is to try to ensure that the debate comes to a conclusion rapidly.

*yours ever
Roderic Lyne*

(R M J Lyne)
Private Secretary

M O'D B Alexander Esq
10 Downing Street
LONDON

[RHODESIA: POLICY: ADVANCE COPIES]

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PS/SIR I GILMOUR
PS/MR LUCE
PS/PUS

MR WILLSON
MR DAY
LORD N G LENNOX
MR ASPIN

PS/HO 10 DOWNING STREET

MR R L WADE-GERY)
MR P M MAXEY)
MR GOULTY)
MR P J FOWLER)
DIO)

CABINET
OFFICE

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HD/RHOD DEPT (4)

HD/C AF D

HD/S AF D

HD/PUSD (2)

HD/NEWS DEPT

HD/WAD

MR STEEL LEGAL ADVISER RM K188

MR FIFOOT, LEGAL ADVISER RM K164

RESIDENT CLERK

CONFIDENTIAL

FM MAPUTO 231515Z NOV 79

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 427 OF 23 NOVEMBER

INFO GABORONE DAR ES SALAAM LUANDA LUSAKA LAGOS WASHINGTON

MIRIMBA SALISBURY UKHIS NEW YORK PRETORIA

ADVANCE COPY

IMMEDIATE

Prime Minister

art

MY TELNO 424: RHODESIA CEASE-FIRE ARRANGEMENTS

1. I HAVE JUST SEEN CHISSANO. HE APOLOGISED FOR SOME CONFUSION IN THEIR WORKING SCHEDULES, AS THE RESULT OF WHICH HE COULD NOT YET GIVE ME DETAILED COMMENTS ON OUR CEASE-FIRE AND LIAISON PROPOSALS. HE WOULD HOWEVER BE SEEING THE PRESIDENT IMMEDIATELY AFTER OUR MEETING BUT HE COULD NOT SAY WHEN THEIR COMMENTS WOULD BE READY. EXPERTS WERE STILL WORKING ON THE DETAILS AND HIS GOVERNMENT WERE STILL IN CONSULTATION WITH THE OTHER FRONT LINE STATES. (HE REFUSED TO BE DRAWN ON THE LEVEL OF ANY FLS MEETING - OR IF ONE WOULD TAKE PLACE - IN DAR ES SALAAM TOMORROW).

2. CHISSANO SAID HOWEVER THAT HIS GOVERNMENT AGREED IN PRINCIPLE TO OUR PROPOSALS FOR A BRITISH MILITARY LIAISON OFFICER IN MAPUTO, PROVIDED WE COULD ACCEPT A MOZAMBICAN LIAISON OFFICER IN SALISBURY. UNLIKE THE BRITISH LIAISON OFFICER WHO WOULD HAVE OUR FACILITIES AT HIS DISPOSAL, THE MOZAMBICAN WOULD NEED SOME FACILITIES AND TO TAKE WITH HIM SOME SUPPORTING STAFF. ASKED IF HE HAD ANY COMMENTS ON

WITH HIM SOME SUPPORTING STAFF. ASKED IF HE HAD ANY COMMENTS ON MY PROPOSAL TO KHAN (MY TELNO 412) FOR ADDITIONAL, PERHAPS MOBILE, LIAISON OFFICERS OUTSIDE MAPUTO, CHISSANO WAS NON-COMMITAL, BUT PROMISED THAT THIS WOULD BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN THEIR DETAILED CONSIDERATION OF THE PROBLEM.

3. THIS PROVISIONAL AGREEMENT IS ENCOURAGING AND I HOPE THAT, EVEN BEFORE WE RECEIVE THAT PROMISED DETAILED COMMENTS, I CAN BE AUTHORISED TO CONFIRM THE ACCEPTABILITY OF A MOZAMBICAN LIAISON UNIT IN SALISBURY. IF WE ARE ALL CORRECT IN OUR ASSESSMENT THAT MACHEL HAS INDEED BEEN TAKING THE MOST ROBUST ATTITUDE TOWARDS THE PF OF ALL THE FLS LEADERS SUCH A PRESENCE COULD BE VERY MUCH TO OUR ADVANTAGE.

V4. CHISSANO'S ONLY COMMENT ON THE ZAMBIAN SITUATION WAS THAT IT WAS TACTICALLY ILL-TIMED FOR YOU TO LINK A CESSATION OF CROSS-BORDER OPERATIONS INTO ZAMBIA WITH A CESSATION OF PF MOVEMENTS OUT OF ZAMBIA. THE PF WOULD FEEL THAT THEY WERE BEING ASKED TO OBSERVE A PREMATURE UNILATERAL PARTIAL CEASE-FIRE. IT WOULD HAVE BEEN TACTICALLY BETTER FOR YOU TO HAVE COME OUT FIRST WITH AN EXPLICIT CONDEMNATION OF THE SABOTAGE RAIDS OF WHICH THE ZAMBIANS ARE SO BITTERLY COMPLAINING AND THEN TRY AND GET BOTH SIDES TO AGREE TO ARRANGEMENTS TO AVOID THEM. I POINTED OUT THAT THE TWO-WAY CROSS-BORDER ACTIVITY WAS LINKED AND THAT BY RESPONDING TO YOUR APPEAL (I READ TO HIM PARA 2(A) AND (B) OF YOUR TELNO 971 TO LUSAKA) THE PF WOULD NOT BE GIVING AWAY ANYTHING INSIDE RHODESIA WHICH THEY DID NOT ALREADY HAVE. IN ANY CASE, I STRESSED THAT ALVES GOMES' REPORT IN TODAY'S NOTICIAS (MY TELNO 423) WAS MISLEADING IN PUTTING YOUR PROPOSALS FOR DEALING WITH IMMEDIATE CRISES IN ZAMBIA THE WRONG WAY ROUND. (GOMES QUOTED YOU AS SAYING "IF THE PF WERE DISPOSED TO CEASE ITS ACTIVITIES AND LEAVE ZAMBIA, THE SALISBURY REGIME WILL CEASE ITS AGRESSION"). CHISSANO TOOK THE POINT THOUGH HE STILL FELT THAT YOU SHOULD HAVE LED OFF WITH A CONDEMNATION OF THE RAIDS. HE ALSO ACCEPTED THAT THE FACT THAT YOU DID NOT MENTION MOZAMBIQUE IN THIS WHOLE CONTEXT WAS NO INDICATION, AS GOMES HAD HINTED, THAT WE WOULD REGARD WITH EQUANIMITY ANY INCURSIONS AGAINST MOZAMBIQUE. HE ASSURED ME THAT ALTHOUGH GOMES HAS FULL EDITORIAL FREEDOM HIS WRITINGS DO NOT INFLUENCE GOVERNMENT POLICY. THEY RELY ON THE INFORMATION SUPPLIED BY US AND BY THEIR OWN OBSERVERS IN LONDON. HE WAS STUDYING PARTICULARLY CAREFULLY OUR FULLER PROPOSALS AND YOUR INTRODUCTORY STATEMENT.

5. I THINK IT WOULD BE PREMATURE FOR US TO MAKE USE OF THE FACT THAT THE MOZAMBICANS HAVE AGREED IN PRINCIPLE TO A LIAISON OFFICER AS THEY

THE MOZAMBICANS HAVE AGREED IN PRINCIPLE TO A LIAISON OFFICER AS THEY
WILL ALMOST CERTAINLY WISH TO INFORM THE OTHER FLS FIRST PROBABLY IN
DAR ES SALAAM TOMORROW.

6. YOUR TELNO 219 TO GABORONE CROSSED MY TELNO 424 TO YOU. GIVEN
CURRENT INTENSIVE CONSULTATION AMONG THE FRONT LINE STATES I WOULD
HOPE THAT HM AMBASSADOR IN GABORONE WILL BE CONTENT TO CONFINE
HIMSELF TO THE LINE SUGGESTED IN MY TELNO 424.

PAPADOPOULOS

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SENT/RECD AT 231620Z AR/GCD

[RHODESIA: POLICY: ADVANCE COPIES]

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IMMEDIATE

PS
PS/SIR I GILMOUR
PS/MR LUCE
PS/PUS

PS/NO 10 DOWNING STREET

MR WILLSON
MR DAY
LORD N G LENNOX
MR ASPIN

MR R L WADE-GERY)
MR P M MAXEY)
MR GOULTY)
MR P J FOWLER)
DIO)

CABINET
OFFICE

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HD/RHOD DEPT (4)

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HD/S AF D

HD/PUSD (2)

HD/NEWS DEPT
HD/WAD

MR STEEL LEGAL ADVISER RM K188

MR FIFCOOT LEGAL ADVISER RM K164

~~RESIDENT CLERK~~

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PP LUANDA

PP LAGOS

PP MIRIMBA SALISBURY

PP PRETORIA

PP WASHINGTON

PP OTTAWA

PP CANBERRA

PP ADDIS ABABA

GR 227

CONFIDENTIAL

FM DAR ES SALAAM 230730Z NOVEMBER 79

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 931 OF 23 NOVEMBER

INFO PRIORITY MAPUTO, GABORONE, LUSAKA, LUANDA,
LAGOS, MIRIMBA SALISBURY, PRETORIA, WASHINGTON,

Pennie Blunt

Ans

INFO PRIORITY MAPUTO, GABORONE, LUSAKA, LUANDA,
LAGOS, MIRIMBA SALISBURY, PRETORIA, WASHINGTON,
OTTAWA, CANBERRA, ADDIS ABABA

RHODESIA CONFERENCE

1. THE US AMBASSADOR SAW PRESIDENT NYERERE YESTERDAY AFTERNOON 22 NOVEMBER, WHEN ACCOMPANYING A GROUP OF US CONGRESSMEN. MR VIETS DESCRIBED THE PRESIDENT AS COMPARATIVELY OPTIMISTIC WHEN SPEAKING TO THE CONGRESSMEN ABOUT RHODESIA AND THAT IS REFLECTED IN TODAY'S TANZANIAN PRESS. BUT WHEN MR VIETS HAD A WORD PRIVATELY WITH HIM AFTERWARDS HE FOUND HIM "RATHER BLEAK", THOUGH WHAT NYERERE SAID WAS NOT ENTIRELY UNHELPFUL.
2. NYERERE GAVE THE BRITISH FULL MARKS FOR GETTING AWAY WITH THE AGREEMENTS SO FAR ACHIEVED IN THE CONFERENCE. HE HIMSELF WOULD NEVER HAVE ADVISED THE PF TO ACCEPT THE PROPOSALS FOR THE PRE-INDEPENDENCE ARRANGEMENTS. BUT HE WOULD NOT TRY TO UNDO WHAT HAD BEEN DONE. HE WARNED HOWEVER THAT HE THOUGHT THAT YOU WERE PUSHING TOO HARD AND TOO FAST AND THAT YOU SHOULD SLOW DOWN. THE PF COULD NOT ABSORB THE PRESSURE WHICH WAS BEING PUT UPON THEM TO BRING THE CONFERENCE TO A RAPID CONCLUSION. NYERERE SUGGESTED THAT THE RELATIVE EASE WITH WHICH WE HAD FORCED THROUGH AGREEMENT IN THE FIRST TWO STAGES OF THE CONFERENCE MIGHT BE GOING TO OUR HEADS.
3. MR VIETS REPLIED FIRMLY STRESSING THE GREAT DANGERS OF DELAY. HE ALSO TOLD NYERERE THAT HIS GOVERNMENT WAS LOOKING TO NYERERE TO HOLD HIS FRONT LINE COLLEAGUES ON THE RIGHT PATH AT THIS WEEKEND'S FRONT LINE STATES MEETING. NYERERE RESPONDED BY SAYING THAT THE WAR HAD TO BE ENDED AND HE WOULD BE DOING HIS VERY BEST.

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DESKBY 240900Z (FCO)

DESKBY 240700Z (LUSAKA)

DESKBY 240700Z (PRETORIA)

DESKBY 240700Z (MIRIMBA SALISBURY)

DESKBY 240700Z (D.E.S.)

FM UKMIS NEW YORK 240507Z NOV 79

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1617 OF 23 NOVEMBER

INFO IMMEDIATE LUSAKA, PRETORIA, MIRIMBA SALISBURY, DAR ES SALAAM,
INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON, PARIS, LAGOS, MAPUTO, LUANDA, GABORONE,
OSLO, LISBON.

MIPT: RHODESIA/ZAMBIA

1. FOLLOWING IS ADVANCE TEXT OF STATEMENT I MADE AFTER SECURITY
COUNCIL RESOLUTION 455/79 HAD BEEN ADOPTED BY CONSENSUS THIS EVENING.
BEGINS

1. MR PRESIDENT

I BEGIN BY EXPRESSING THE DEEPEST AND MOST SINCERE SYMPATHY OF MY
DELEGATION AND OF THE PEOPLE OF MY COUNTRY FOR THE SUFFERING AND
DESTRUCTION INFLICTED ON ZAMBIA. IN SO SAYING, I REITERATE SIMILAR
EXPRESSIONS ALREADY MADE BY BRITISH MINISTERS IN PARLIAMENT AND
DIRECTLY TO PRESIDENT KAUNDA. WE DEPLORE ANY ESCALATION OF THE
FIGHTING ANYWHERE AND IN PARTICULAR CONDEMN ATTACKS ON CIVILIAN
TARGETS.

2. WE STAND AT WHAT MAY BE A UNIQUE POINT IN THE HISTORY OF AFRICA.
THE KEY TO UNLOCK THE DOOR TO PEACE AND STABILITY IN ZIMBABWE IS
IN OUR HANDS. THEY KEY FINALLY TO LOCK THE DOOR ON THE BITTER
CYCLE OF VIOLENCE, DEATH AND DESTRUCTION IS IN OUR HANDS TOO. WE
HAVE REACHED THIS POSITION THROUGH THE WILL OF ALL PARTIES TO ACHIEVE
A SETTLEMENT, THROUGH THE EFFORTS OF THE FRONT LINE STATES AND THRO-
UGH THE EFFORTS OF THE WHOLE COMMONWEALTH AS EMBODIED IN THE
AGREEMENT REACHED AT THE LUSAKA CONFERENCE LAST SUMMER.

13. ALL THESE

3. ALL THESE ENDEAVOURS CULMINATED IN THE LANCASTER HOUSE CONFERENCE UNDER THE CHAIRMANSHIP OF MY FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH SECRETARY - A CONFERENCE WHICH HAS NOW BEEN IN SESSION FOR TEN WEEKS. I NOTE AT THIS POINT THAT THE CHAIRMAN OF THE LUSAKA CONFERENCE WAS PRESIDENT KAUNDA OF ZAMBIA WHO ALSO MADE THE JOURNEY TO LONDON VERY RECENTLY IN ORDER TO PLAY A MOST HELPFUL ROLE AT A PARTICULARLY DIFFICULT POINT IN THE NEGOTIATIONS.

4. THE LANCASTER HOUSE CONFERENCE IS IN ITS FINAL STAGES. A CONSTITUTION GRANTING GENUINE MAJORITY RULE TO THE PEOPLE OF ZIMBABWE HAS BEEN AGREED BY ALL PARTIES. TRANSITIONAL ARRANGEMENTS UNDER THE AUTHORITY OF BRITAIN AND WITH THE OBSERVATION AND ACTIVE SUPPORT OF THE COMMONWEALTH HAVE ALSO BEEN FULLY AGREED. WE ARE NOW ON THE LAST YARDS OF THE LAST LAP. THIS LAP IS THE ALL IMPORTANT QUESTION OF A CEASEFIRE WHICH IS THE ONE THING WHICH WILL BRING ABOUT A CESSATION OF THE ACTS OF VIOLENCE WHICH HAVE PLAGUED RHODESIA ITSELF AND ITS NEIGHBOURING COUNTRIES, PARTICULARLY ZAMBIA AND MOZAMBIQUE. WE EARNESTLY HOPE THAT THE PRIZE OF A FULL AGREEMENT WHICH WILL BE IMMEDIATELY IMPLEMENTED IN ALL ITS PARTS IS ONLY A FEW DAYS AWAY FROM US. THE FULL EFFORT OF MY GOVERNMENT IS CONCENTRATED ON TRYING TO ENSURE THAT NOTHING DEFLECTS US FROM THIS GOAL IN THESE FINAL MOMENTS.

5. MY DELEGATION HAS ASSOCIATED ITSELF WITH THE CONSENSUS REACHED BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL. WE DID SO SIMPLY AND ONLY BECAUSE WE DO NOT WISH TO DO ANYTHING - ANYTHING, MR PRESIDENT - WHICH MIGHT DAMAGE THE PROSPECTS FOR AN EARLY AND SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION OF THE LANCASTER HOUSE NEGOTIATIONS.

THERE IS A GREAT DEAL OF LANGUAGE IN THE DRAFT CONSENSUS WITH WHICH WE TAKE ISSUE. IT IS ONE-SIDED. IT IS NOT EVEN HANDED. IT CONTAINS INTEMPERATE PHRASEOLOGY. IT TAKES NO ACCOUNT OF THE FACT THAT, FOR MANY YEARS, FIGHTING BY THE PATRIOTIC FRONT AND RHODESIAN FORCES HAS ERUPTED ON ALL SIDES AND FROM ALL SIDES.

6. MR PRESIDENT, I REITERATE THIS WITH ALL THE PASSION AT MY COMMAND. WE CAN ONLY BRING AN END TO THE FIGHTING BOTH WITHIN THE COUNTRY AND ACROSS THE BORDERS WHEN WE GET AGREEMENT ON A CEASEFIRE, WHEN WE CAN IMPLEMENT THE WHOLE ACCORD, WHEN ALL PARTIES RESPECT

IT, WHEN WE, THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT ARE IN CONTROL. AT PRESENT, WE ARE NOT, I REPEAT NOT, MR PRESIDENT, IN CONTROL AND WE CANNOT GUARANTEE A CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES. I SAY AGAIN, MR PRESIDENT, NOTHING MUST BE ALLOWED TO DEFLECT US FROM THE ACHIEVEMENT OF THE AGREEMENT WHICH ALONE WILL REMEDY THIS DESPERATE STATE OF AFFAIRS.

7. MR PRESIDENT, IN OUR VIEW, THE WORDING OF THIS CONSENSUS DOES NOT IMPLY THAT A FRESH DETERMINATION HAS BEEN MADE UNDER ARTICLE 39 OF THE CHARTER. MOREOVER, AS REGARDS OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH 5 OF THE CONSENSUS, I REPEAT WHAT MY LORD PRIVY SEAL, SIR IAN GILMOUR, STATED IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS ON THE 21ST OF NOVEMBER, NAMELY THAT THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT DO NOT ACCEPT ANY RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE DAMAGE INFLICTED IN ZAMBIA BY THE RHODESIAN RAIDS NOR FOR THE PAYMENT OF COMPENSATION. BUT THIS DISCLAIMER OF RESPONSIBILITY DOES NOT MEAN THAT WE ARE HARD HEARTED OR UNMOVED BY THE SUFFERING OF ZAMBIA. THE LORD PRIVY SEAL WENT ON TO SAY, ON THE SAME OCCASION THAT, AS A FRIEND OF ZAMBIA, AND ONCE THE CEASE-FIRE HAS BEEN AGREED, WE SHALL WISH TO PLAY OUR PART IN ASSISTING ZAMBIA TO RESTORE HER INFRASTRUCTURE. ANYONE WHO KNOWS THE HISTORY OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN BRITAIN AND ZAMBIA SINCE THE INDEPENDENCE OF THAT COUNTRY WILL KNOW THAT THESE ARE NOT EMPTY WORDS.

8. BEFORE I CONCLUDE I FEEL OBLIGED TO REPLY TO ONE OR TWO POINTS RAISED IN THE DEBATE. THE REPRESENTATIVE OF LIBYA SUGGESTED THAT WE WERE IN SOME WAY ENCOURAGING THE RAIDS ON ZAMBIA AND THAT WE WANTED THE LANCASTER HOUSE CONFERENCE TO FAIL. THIS IS AN ABSOLUTELY MONSTROUS ALLEGATION. WORDS FAIL ME AND I WISH THAT THOSE WORDS HAD FAILED HIM. I VIGOROUSLY, UTTERLY AND TOTALLY REJECT THESE CHARGES. THE RECORD OF OUR ACHIEVEMENT SO FAR AT LANCASTER IS ELOQUENT REBUTTAL IN ITSELF.

9. THE DISTINGUISHED DELEGATE OF NIGERIA ACCUSED MY GOVERNMENT OF AIDING AND ABETTING BREACHES OF SANCTIONS. I CANNOT ALLOW THIS TO PASS. AS THIS COUNCIL KNOWS MY GOVERNMENT HAS ALWAYS COOPERATED CLOSELY WITH THE RHODESIA SANCTIONS COMMITTEE AND WHEREVER EVIDENCE HAS COME TO LIGHT BRITISH FIRMS THAT HAVE BREACHED SANCTIONS HAVE BEEN PROSECUTED. AS FOR THE BINGHAM REPORT, MENTIONED BY THE DISTINGUISHED DELEGATE IT WAS COMMISSIONED BY MY GOVERNMENT, SUBSEQUENTLY PUBLISHED AND PASSED TO THE DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS IN LONDON TO SEE WHETHER IT CONTAINED EVIDENCE THAT WOULD JUSTIFY A PROSECUTION UNDER ENGLISH LAW.

10. IN CONCLUSION, MR PRESIDENT, I AM NOT ASHAMED TO REITERATE MY APPEAL. LET NOTHING HAPPEN, NOTHING, MR PRESIDENT, WHICH MIGHT IN ANYWAY PUT AT RISK THE PRIZE WHICH IS SO NEARLY IN OUR GRASP.

PARSONS

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LEGAL ADVISERS
MR STEEL
MR FREELAND
MR FIFOOT
ECON DEPT
P & CD
DEF DEPT

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PS/LPS
PS/MR LUCE
PS/MR RIDLEY
PS/MR HURD
PS/PUS
SIR A DUFF
MR BULLARD
MR PRETWELL
LORD N G LEMNOX
MISS BROWN
MR DAY
MR WILLSON
MR ASPIN
PS/MR MARTEN

ADDITIONAL DISTN.
RHODESIA POLICY

GR 700

UNCLASSIFIED

DESKBY 240600Z (DES)

DESKBY 240700Z (LUSAKA)

DESKBY 240800Z (OSLO)

DESKBY 240800Z (PARIS)

DESKBY 240900Z (LAGOS)

DESKBY 240900Z (LISBON)

DESKBY 241300Z (WTON)

FM UKMIS NEW YORK 232133Z NOV 79

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1610 OF 23 NOVEMBER

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, PARIS, LUSAKA, LAGOS, DAR ES SALAAM, OSLO,
LISBON.

YOUR TELNO 857 AND TELE CONVS GOULDING/MISS SPENCER:

RHODESIA/ZAMBIA

1. FOLLOWING IS DRAFT RESOLUTION PREPARED BY THE NON-ALIGNED GROUP AND CIRCULATED AFTER THIS AFTERNOON'S INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL:

TAKING NOTE OF THE LETTER FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE REPUBLIC OF ZAMBIA CONTAINED IN DOKUMENT S/13636,

HAVING CONSIDERED THE STATEMENT OF THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE REPUBLIC OF ZAMBIA,

GRAVELY CONCERNED AT THE NUMEROUS HOSTILE AND UNPROVOKED ACTS OF AGGRESSION BY THE ILLEGAL MINORITY REGIME IN SOUTHERN RHODESIA VIOLATING THE SOVEREIGNTY, AIR SPACE AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF THE REPUBLIC OF ZAMBIA,

GRAVELY CONCERNED ALSO AT THE CONTINUING COLLUSION BY SOUTH AFRICA IN THE REPEATED ACTS OF AGGRESSION LAUNCHED AGAINST THE REPUBLIC OF ZAMBIA BY THE REBEL FORCES OF THE ILLEGAL MINORITY REGIME OF SOUTHERN RHODESIA,

GRIEVED AT THE TRAGIC LOSS OF HUMAN LIFE AND CONCERNED ABOUT THE DAMAGE AND DESTRUCTION OF PROPERTY RESULTING FROM THE REPEATED ACTS OF AGGRESSION COMMITTEED BY THE ILLEGAL MINORITY REGIME OF SOUTHERN RHODESIA AGAINST THE REPUBLIC OF ZAMBIA,

/CONVINCED

CONVINCED THAT THESE WANTON ACTS OF AGGRESSION BY THE ILLEGAL MINORITY OF SOUTHERN RHODESIA FORM A CONSISTENT AND SUSTAINED PATTERN OF VIOLATIONS AIMED AT DESTROYING THE ECONOMIC INFRASTRUCTURE OF THE REPUBLIC OF ZAMBIA AND WEAKENING ITS SUPPORT OF THE STRUGGLE OF THE PEOPLE OF ZIMBABWE FOR FREEDOM AND NATIONAL LIBERATION,

RECALLING ITS RESOLUTION 424 (1978) OF 17TH MARCH, 1978, IN WHICH INTER ALIA, IT STRONGLY CONDEMNED THE ARMED INVASION PERPETUATED BY THE ILLEGAL MINORITY REGIME IN THE BRITISH COLONY OF SOUTHERN RHODESIA, WHICH CONSTITUTES A FLAGRANT VIOLATION OF THE SOVEREIGNTY AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF ZAMBIA:

REAFFIRMING THAT THE EXISTENCE OF THE MINORITY RACIST REGIME IN SOUTHERN RHODESIA AND THE CONTINUANCE OF ITS ACTS OF AGGRESSION AGAINST ZAMBIA AND OTHER NEIGHBOURING STATES CONSTITUTE A THREAT TO INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY

CONSCIOUS OF THE NEED TO TAKE IMMEDIATE AND EFFECTIVE STEPS FOR THE PREVENTION AND REMOVAL OF ALL THREATS TO INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY,

(1) STRONGLY CONDEMNS THE ILLEGAL REGIME IN THE BRITISH COLONY OF SOUTHERN RHODESIA FOR ITS CONTINUED, INTENSIFIED AND UNPROVOKED ACTS OF AGGRESSION AGAINST THE REPUBLIC OF ZAMBIA, WHICH CONSTITUTE A FLAGRANT VIOLATION OF THE SOVEREIGNTY AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF ZAMBIA:

(2) STRONGLY CONDEMNS ALSO THE CONTINUED COLLUSION BY SOUTH AFRICA IN REPEATED ACTS OF AGGRESSION LAUNCHED AGAINST THE REPUBLIC OF ZAMBIA:

(3) COMMENDS THE REPUBLIC OF ZAMBIA AND OTHER FRONT LINE STATES FOR THEIR CONTINUED SUPPORT OF THE PEOPLE OF ZIMBABWE IN THEIR JUST AND LEGITIMATE STRUGGLE FOR THE ATTAINMENT OF FREEDOM AND INDEPENDENCE AND FOR THEIR SCRUPULOUS RESTRAINT IN THE FACE OF UNWARRENTED ARMED PROVOCATIONS BY THE RODESIAN REBELS IN COLLUSION WITH SOUTH AFRICAN ARMED FORCES:

(4) CALLS UPON THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND AS THE ADMINISTERING AUTHORITY TO TAKE PROMPT AND EFFECTIVE MEASURES TO ENSURE THAT THE ILLEGAL RACIST MINORITY REGIME IN SOUTHERN RHODESIA DESIST FROM COMMITTING REPEATED ACTS OF AGGRESSION AND PROVOKATION AGAINST THE REPUBLIC OF ZAMBIA:

(5) FURTHER KALLS UPON THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED KINGDOM AS THE ADMINISTERING AUTHORITY AND IN THE EXERCISE OF ITS FULL RESPONSIBILITY TO FULLY AND ADEQUATELY COMPENSATE THE REPUBLIC OF ZAMBIA FOR THE EXTENSIVE DAMA3 59)8%3 -,# 04903456 43'7)58,@ %49. 5£3 ACTS OF AGGRESSION:

(6) APPEALS TO ALL MEMBER STATES TO URGENTLY EXTEND MATERIAL AND OTHER FORMS OF ASSISTANCE TO THE REPUBLIC OF ZAMBIA IN ORDER TO FACILITATE THE IMMEDIATE REKONSTRUKTION OF ITS ECONOMIC INFRASTRUCTURE.

(7) DECIDES TO ESTABLISH A SPECIAL MISSION COMPOSED OF FOUR MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL, TO BE APPOINTED BY THE PRESIDENT, AFTER CONSULTATIONS WITH MEMBERS, TO PROCEED TO ZAMBIA IN ORDER TO ACQUAINT THEMSELVES WITH THE CURRENT GRAVE SITUATION, AND REPORT TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL BY DECEMBER 15, 1979:

(8) DECIDES TO REMAIN SEIZED OF THE MATTER.

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MR FREELAND
MR FIFOOT
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PS/MR RIDLEY
PS/MR HURD
PS/PUS
SIR A DUFF
MR BULLARD
MR FRETWELL
LORD N G LENNOX
MISS BROWN
MR DAY
MR WILLSON
MR ASPIN
AS/MR MARMEN

ADDITIONAL DISTN.
RHODESIA POLICY

CONFIDENTIAL

GR 580

CONFIDENTIAL

FM F C O 231040Z NOV 79

TO IMMEDIATE MIRIMBA SALISBURY

TELEGRAM NUMBER 336 OF 23 NOVEMBER

INFO MODUK (FOR HD DS11)

Psmie Rumsler

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YOUR TELNO 931: CEASE-FIRE ARRANGEMENTS

1. WE HAVE NOW REACHED AGREEMENT IN PRINCIPLE WITH MOD AND WITH THE RHODESIANS THAT:-

- (A) MONITORING TEAMS AND PATRIOTIC FRONT REPRESENTATIVES WILL BE IN POSITION AT COLLECTING POINTS FROM CEASE-FIRE DAY:
- (B) POLICE AND SECURITY FORCES WILL NOT BE PRESENT AT COLLECTION POINTS AND WILL PROVIDE SAFE ROUTES WHILE PATRIOTIC FRONT PERSONNEL ARE IN TRANSIT TO ASSEMBLY PLACES:
- (C) P F, ACCOMPANIED BY MONITORS, WILL BE TRANSPORTED BY BUS OR TRUCK FROM COLLECTION POINTS TO ASSEMBLY PLACES AS SOON AS POSSIBLE AFTER THEIR ARRIVAL AND ASSEMBLY WILL BE COMPLETED WITHIN 7 DAYS FROM CEASE-FIRE DAY.

2. THE RHODESIANS HAVE ALSO MADE CLEAR THAT, WHILE THEY ARE PREPARED TO PROVIDE LOGISTIC SUPPLY OF FOOD FOR GUERRILLAS AT ASSEMBLY PLACES, THEY WILL NOT BE PREPARED TO TAKE IT INTO THE CAMPS. IT IS CENTRAL TO THE CEASE-FIRE AGREEMENT THAT CONTACT BETWEEN THE FORCES SHOULD BE AVOIDED.

TRANSPORT BETWEEN COLLECTION AND ASSEMBLY POINTS

3. THE RHODESIANS CLAIM THAT THEY CANNOT PROVIDE VEHICLES (AND THEY COULD NOT IN ANY CASE BE DRIVEN BY SECURITY FORCES PERSONNEL). THEY BELIEVE THAT THE ONLY FEASIBLE PROCEDURE WILL BE TO REQUISITION CIVILIAN BUSES (SAY, THREE AT EACH OF 30 COLLECTION POINTS) FOR THE 7 DAYS. WE ASSUME THAT POWERS EXIST WHICH COULD BE USED FOR THIS PURPOSE BUT SHOULD BE GRATEFUL FOR YOUR AND THE RECCE TEAM'S VIEWS ON FEASIBILITY. EVEN IF SUFFICIENT VEHICLES CAN BE REQUISITIONED, IT SEEMS QUESTIONABLE WHETHER THEIR DRIVERS COULD

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CONFIDENTIAL

BE REQUIRED TO OPERATE THEM IN CONDITIONS WHICH MIGHT WELL BE HAZARDOUS (EVEN THOUGH SECURITY FORCES WILL GUARANTEE SAFE PASSAGE FOR GUERRILLAS IN TRANSIT TO ASSEMBLY PLACES). WOULD YOU SEE ANY PROSPECT OF ICRC/LOCAL RED CROSS/CHURCH ORGANISATIONS PROVIDING DRIVERS?

DELIVERY OF FOOD

4. WE SHOULD BE GRATEFUL IF YOU AND RECCE TEAM WOULD OPEN THIS UP FURTHER WITH RHODESIANS AND (AT YOUR DISCRETION) WITH SUITABLE VOLUNTARY ORGANISATIONS. THERE WILL BE A NEED FOR SOME LINK BETWEEN ASSEMBLY PLACES AND NEAREST POINTS TO WHICH RHODESIANS ARE PREPARED TO DELIVER SUPPLIES. MONITORS WILL BE UNABLE TO PROVIDE THIS, AND THERE CAN BE NO QUESTION OF ALLOWING PF COLLECTION PARTIES OUT FOR THIS PURPOSE.

5. WE STILL AWAIT FURTHER RHODESIAN PROPOSALS ON SITING OF COLLECTION POINTS AND ASSEMBLY PLACES. AS YOU WILL HAVE NOTED, OUR AMPLIFIED CEASE-FIRE PROPOSALS ENVISAGE THAT THE CEASE-FIRE WILL COME INTO EFFECT IN TWO PHASES - IE THE CEASE-FIRE AGREEMENT WOULD NAME A SUBSEQUENT CEASE-FIRE DAY, ON WHICH ALL HOSTILITIES WOULD CEASE. STARTING FROM AGREEMENT DAY, CROSS-BORDER ACTIVITY WOULD CEASE AND INSTRUCTIONS WOULD BE BROADCAST TO THE FORCES REGARDING THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CEASE-FIRE. ON CEASE-FIRE DAY, MONITORS WOULD BE DEPLOYED AT COLLECTION POINTS AND COLLECTION AND ASSEMBLY WOULD BEGIN AT ONCE.

6. WE HAVE IMPRESSED ON THE RHODESIANS THE NEED TO IDENTIFY COLLECTION PLACES WHICH WILL BE EASILY ACCESSIBLE TO GUERRILLAS WHEREVER THEY MAY BE LOCATED IN THE COUNTRY, AND TO ESTABLISH SOME 5 OR 6 OF THE FINAL ASSEMBLY PLACES AT POINTS WHICH WILL NOT REPEAT NOT BE IMMEDIATELY ON OR CLOSE TO THE BORDERS. GRATEFUL IF YOU AND RECCE TEAM WOULD TAKE THIS UP WITH BRIGADIER-GENERAL BARNARD,

2

| EMPHASISING

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EMPHASISING THAT IN IDENTIFYING BOTH COLLECTION AND (ESPECIALLY) ASSEMBLY POINTS WE SHALL EXPECT THEM TO TAKE PROPER ACCOUNT OF THE SECURITY OF MONITORS. IT WILL NOT BE ACCEPTABLE TO LOCATE ASSEMBLY PLACES IN ISOLATED QUOTE NO-GO UNQUOTE AREAS.

CARRINGTON

FILES
RHODESIA D
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PLANNING STAFF
ES & SD
NENAD
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EID (E)
UND
LEGAL ADVISERS
MR STEEL
MR FREELAND
MR FIFOOT
ECON DEPT
P & CD
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PS
PS/LPS
PS/MR LUCE
PS/MR RIDLEY
PS/MR HURD
PS/PUS
SIR A DUFF
MR BULLARD
MR FRETWELL
LORD N G LENNOX
MISS BROWN
MR DAY
MR WILLSON
MR ASPIN
PS/MR MARTEN

ADDITIONAL DISTN.
RHODESIA POLICY

CONFIDENTIAL



2

10 DOWNING STREET

PRIME MINISTER

You might like to see
this paper on the Zimbabwe
Bill at this stage; the
Bill itself will be
circulated after the weekend.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to be 'MJS'.

MJS

23 November 1979

ACTION:

COPY NO

2

✓
MS

LEGISLATION COMMITTEE

The attached Bill should be linked to Memorandum L(79) 87

~~a. which will be circulated as soon as possible~~

b. already circulated

2

Committee Section
Cabinet Office

Deal with

~~PRIME MINISTER~~

To see

MS

26.11.

~~I am not sure - 28/11
about the Ministry's intention.
It looks like a 'blacked'
convention.~~

ms.



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

23 November 1979

Dear Sir,

SOUTHERN RHODESIA : LEGISLATION
ZIMBABWE INDEPENDENCE BILL

The draft Zimbabwe Independence Bill will be taken by Legislation Committee on 27 November. A separate memorandum on the Bill is being circulated to OD.

As you know, the Bill cannot be introduced until the Constitutional Conference has ended. This now looks increasingly unlikely to be before the end of next week, ie before 30 November or 1 December. There will need to be time before its introduction for the Attorney-General to announce the DPP's findings on the Bingham Report. It is unlikely therefore that the Bill can be introduced before 5 or 6 December.

The purpose of the Bill is to discharge our obligation to bring Rhodesia to independence. Depending on the outcome of the Conference we may need to be in a position to grant independence by mid-January, and there can therefore be no guarantee that there would be time to complete the Parliamentary procedure after the Christmas recess. It is essential therefore that the Bill should become law before the recess. The best scenario from our point of view would be to hold the Second Reading debate in the week beginning 10 December (which would mean lifting the two-weekend rule) and take the subsequent stages in the Commons and the Lords in the same or the following week. It is unfortunate to have to compress the time-scale for Parliament's consideration of the Bill; but the longer the Conference goes on, the more we are pushed up against the deadline of the Christmas recess. If there are further developments which affect this prediction, I will let you know.

Murdo McLean Esq
Chief Whip's Office
12 Downing Street

/ORDERS

CONFIDENTIAL



ORDERS IN COUNCIL

As we also discussed, the Sanctions Expiry Order, made on 14 November, had to be debated no later than 11 December. We would wish to take in the same debate all other Orders, including that making the Governor, made and considered by the Joint Committee by then. The debate on any outstanding Orders at that stage should if possible be combined with the Second Reading of the Independence Bill.

I am sending copies of this letter to the Private Secretaries to the Prime Minister, Lord President of the Council, Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster and the Attorney General.

S J Gomerall
S J Gomerall
Private Secretary to the
Lord Privy Seal

23 NOV 1979

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Mr Sankey, Central African Department

ZAMBIA: ATTACKS ON HIGH COMMISSION

1 I spoke to the Zambian High Commissioner this morning and told her of the reports we had received from Sir L Allinson about a further demonstration this morning at the High Commission. I explained that damage had been caused to the High Commission building. I referred also to the personal attacks being made in the press against Sir L Allinson which could whip up feeling against him and put him at considerable personal risk. I told the High Commissioner that the Prime Minister was hoping to speak to President Kaunda this morning about our relations with Zambia. The Secretary of State had, however, asked me to speak to her to impress upon her the need for the Zambian authorities to provide adequate protection for the High Commission premises and also for the High Commissioner's Residence. The latter had not as far as we were aware been given adequate protection. I also said that the type of press campaign being whipped up could put Sir Leonard himself at some risk and we would therefore welcome an assurance that proper protection would be given to him.

2 The High Commissioner said that she had been in touch with Lusaka this morning. She said she could give me an assurance that strictly peaceful demonstrations were taking place. I commented that I had just spoken to Sir L Allinson who told me that some 20-30 windows in his High Commission had been broken with stones and rocks and that part of the perimeter wall had been broken down. This hardly seemed to me a peaceful demonstration. I therefore felt that I must repeat our request for proper protection.

3 Miss Chibesakunda said that the demonstrations and the articles in the press were an indication of the strong feelings of the people. We should not however have any fear for the security of the High Commissioner or the High Commission. However, she indicated that she would convey my request to Lusaka.

23 November 1979

D. M. Day
D M Day

Copied to:

Private Secretary —

PS/LPS

PS/Mr Luce

PS/PUS

Chief Clerk

Mr Aspin

Mr Renwick, Rhodesia Department

Mr Fenn, News Department



23 NOV 1979

Paul Lusaka,
Tony Pearson,

Not used.

for
Amul

POINTS FOR PRESIDENT KAUNDA

- 1 Continuing concern at the way the situation is developing. Distressed at the effect this is having on Anglo-Zambian relations. We remain determined to obtain a solution to the Rhodesian problem. We are anxious to do everything possible to relieve the tension.
- 2 We have asked Sir Leonard Allinson to return to London for consultations. We want an opportunity to discuss matters personally with him.
- 3 We proposed at the Lancaster House Conference yesterday that the Rhodesians and the Patriotic Front should give immediate undertakings not to engage in any cross border movement or activity. [Details of proposal attached] This is a sincere and genuine attempt to reduce the tension between Rhodesia and Zambia. We are putting strong pressure on the Rhodesians. We hope that Zambia would co-operate in bringing the agreement into effect. Could we say so to the parties?
- 4 Zambia has called for a meeting of the Security Council to discuss Rhodesian attacks. We must avoid a Security Council meeting degenerating into a general argument about the Rhodesia settlement. This could set back the chances of getting an agreement at Lancaster House. We might lose all that we have so far achieved.
- 5 We are close to an agreement on a ceasefire with all that this would mean for Southern Africa as a whole. The Conference could break down if the Patriotic Front leaders returned from Dar es Salaam with new and non-negotiable demands. We must get a British Governor to Salisbury and his authority accepted in the very near future.
- 6 Further demonstrations against the High Commission in Lusaka this morning and some damage. Sure that the police will give adequate protection to the High Commissioner and his staff.


PROPOSALS ON CROSS BORDER ACTIVITY

The Rhodesian authorities will give an undertaking that no cross broder operations will be carried out by Rhodesia into Zambia.

Leaders of the Patriotic Front will give an undertaking that, with immediate effect, no further movement of armed Patriotic Front personnel will take place from Zambia into Rhodesia. →

The co-operation of the Zambian authorities will be essential to bring the agreement into effect.

23 NOV 1979



CONFIDENTIAL

GR 200

CONFIDENTIAL

FM F C O 231050Z NOV 79

TO FLASH LUSAKA

TELEGRAM NUMBER 972 OF 23 NOVEMBER

INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK, WASHINGTON, SALISBURY, DAR ES SALAAM
PRETORIA, GABORONE, LUANDA, MAPUTO, LAGOS

*Lewis from Gamm
in B. Cal.*

YOUR TELNOS 1284-1287

FOLLOWING PERSONAL FOR HIGH COMMISSIONER FROM PERMANENT UNDER-
SECRETARY

1. THE SECRETARY OF STATE HAS DECIDED THAT HE WOULD LIKE YOU TO RETURN TO LONDON FOR CONSULTATIONS. THE PRIME MINISTER IS HOPING TO SPEAK TO KAUNDA AT LUNCHTIME AND HER PRIVATE SECRETARY IS TRYING TO CONTACT KAUNDA'S OFFICE IN ADVANCE TO TELL THEM OF THIS DECISION. YOU SHOULD MAKE ARRANGEMENTS TO COME BACK TO LONDON AS SOON AS CONVENIENT. YOUR WIFE SHOULD RETURN WITH YOU.
2. WE ARE VERY CONSCIOUS OF THE PERSONAL RISK TO YOU IN LUSAKA AND THINK IT IS SENSIBLE FOR YOU TO GET AWAY FOR A WHILE. THIS MIGHT ALSO HELP TO REDUCE THE IMMEDIATE TENSION.
3. THE SECRETARY OF STATE IS NOT QUESTIONING IN ANY WAY HOW YOU HAVE HANDLED MATTERS OVER THE LAST FEW DIFFICULT DAYS: QUITE THE CONTRARY. AND HE REGARDS THE PERSONAL AND PUBLIC ATTACKS MADE UPON YOU AS WHOLLY UNJUSTIFIED. HOWEVER, IT DOES SEEM SENSIBLE, TAKING INTO ACCOUNT ALL ELEMENTS OF THE PRESENT DIFFICULT SITUATION, FOR YOU TO COME AWAY UNTIL THE DUST HAS SETTLED. PLEASE LET US KNOW YOUR TRAVEL PLANS. DO LET ME KNOW IF THERE IS ANYTHING THAT WE CAN DO TO HELP YOU AND YOUR STAFF AT THIS DIFFICULT TIME.

CARRINGTON

[COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING ST]

FILES

CAFD
R HODESIA D
NEWS D
POD
PS D
PU S D
SECURITY D
O I D
PS
PS/LPS

PS/MRLUCE
PS/PUS
CHIEF CLERK
MR DAY
MR ASPIN
MR FIGG

CONFIDENTIAL

Rhodena

PS
PS/DIR I GLEICOUR
PS/DIR LUCE
PS/PUB
MR WILLSON
MR DAY
LORD N G LENNOX
MR ASPER

MR FLAG
MR RUSSELL
MR MURPHY

HD/BIOD DEPT (4)
HD/C AF D
HD/S AF D
HD/PUSD (2)
HD/NEWS DEPT
HD/VAL
SIR I. SINCLAIR LEGAL ADVISER RM K174
MR FITCOFF LEGAL ADVISER RM K164
RESIDENCE CLERK

Account

FLASH

PS/NO 10 DOWNING STREET
MR R D WADD-GERY)
MR P M MAXEY) CABINET
~~MR DEVERALL~~) OFFICE
MR P J FOWLER)
DIO)

HD COM D
CONS. Em Unit
HD POD
HD PSD
HD PPD
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HD. COD

(File)

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UNCLASSIFIED
FM LUSAKA 230900Z
TO FLASH FCO
TEL NO. 1288 OF 23 NOVEMBER 1979.

MY TEL NO. 1287: DEMONSTRATION.

MOB HAS NOW LEFT. DANISH CHARGE, MY NEAR NEIGHBOUR SAYS THEY BY PASSED RESIDENCE AND ARE PROBABLY HEADING FOR STATE HOUSE TO GREET KAUNDA.

2. ALL STAFF ARE SAFE.
3. I AM NOT YET PREPARED TO OPEN GRILLES TO LOWER FLOORS SO FULL DAMAGE ASSESMENT IMPOSSIBLE. MEANWHILE WE ARE SPRING CLEANING ON TOP FLOOR WHERE ELEVEN WINDOWS HAVE BEEN BROKEN.
4. THERE WAS NO (RPT NO) SECURITY BREACH.
5. TWO POLICEMENT HAVE BEEN PLACED ON GUARD AT RESIDENCE.

ALLINSON.

(38)

PB/NO 10 DOWNING STREET
 MR R D WIDEL-GERRY
 MR P M MAYBY
~~MR D EVERALL~~
 MR P J FOWLER
 DIO

MR WILLSON
 MR DAY
 LORD N G LENNOX
 MR ASPIN
 MR ~~SPICG~~
 MR RUTHER
 MR ~~MILLS~~

HD/ENOD DEPT (4)
 HD/C AF D
 HD/S AF D
 HD/PUSD (2)
 HD/NEWS DEPT
 HD/ENL
 SIA I. SINDLA, LEGAL ADVISER RM K174
 MR PINCOF LEGAL ADVISER RM K164
 RESIDENT CLERK

to Goulty

CABINET OFFICE

FLASH

HD COMS D
 COMS En Unit
 HD POD
 HD PFD
 HD PPD
 HD SRED
 HD COD

(Jes.)

GR 84
 UNCLASSIFIED
 FM LUSAKA 230814Z
 TO FLASH FCO
 TEL NO. 1285 OF 23 NOVEMBER 1979

MY TEL NO. 1285.

1. DEMONSTRATORS HAVE ARRIVED AT THE HIGH COMMISSION. THEY NUMBER ABOUT 1,000. MAIN GATE OF THE HIGH COMMISSION PERIMETER HAS BEEN FORCED AND THE POLICE AND PARAMILITARY ARE NOT (REPEAT NOT) CURRENTLY ABLE TO CONTROL THE CROWD.
2. DEMONSTRATION WHICH IS BEING ATTENDED BY FINES BULAWAYO, MEMBER OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE, HAS TAKEN UP YESTERDAY'S STATE HOUSE CHANT "WE WANT WAR".

ALLINSON.

38

PS

DE/DIR I GILMOUR

PS/KE LUCE

PS/PUS

CAMEL CURAN

MR WILLSON

MR DAY

LORD R G LENNOX

MR ASPER

MR. PEGG

MR. RUSSELL

MRS. TAYLOR

DD/EMOD DEPT (4)

DD/C AF D

DD/S AF D

DD/PUSD (2)

DD/NEWS DEPT

DD/WAD

SIR I. SINDIGA LEGAL ADVISER RM K174

MR PITCOFF LEGAL ADVISER RM K164

RESIDENT CLERK

PS/NO 10 BOWEN STREET

MR R D WADD-GERY

MR P M MAXBY

~~MR D EVERETT~~

MR P J FOWLER

DIO

CABINET OFFICE

to Goulty

FLASH

HD COMD
Comm. Unit

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~~HD~~

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Print

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FM LUSAKA 230740Z

TO FLASH FCO

TEL NO1285 OF 23 NOVEMBER 1979

REPEATED TO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK, WASHINGTON,
PRIORITY MIRIMBA SALISBURY, DAR ES SALAAM, PRETORIA,
ROUTINE GABORONE, LUANDA, MAPUTO, LAGOS.

THE ZAMBIAN DAIL MAIL EDITORIAL QUOTED IN MIPT COUPLED WITH
THE VERY UN-REASSURING REMARK BY PRESIDENT KAUNDA IN PARA 3
OF YOUR TEL NO. 968 GIVES CAUSE FOR SERIOUS CONCERN.

2. THE VICE CHANCELLOR TOLD ME LAST NIGHT THAT HIS STUDENTS
WILL DEMONSTRATE TODAY. ZAMBIAN AUTHORITIES HAVE BASED A LARGE
POLICE GUARD AT THE HIGH COMMISSION THIS MORNING AND CROWD
IS REPORTED TO BE ON ITS WAY. THE POLICE EXPECT ROCKS TO BE
THROWN TODAY.

3. IN VIEW OF THE INTENSE PERSONAL ATTACK ON ME I AM TAKING
UP KIND OFFER OF THE MANAGING DIRECTOR OF AMAX AND SHIFTING
MY RESIDENTIAL QUARTERS TEMPORARILY TO HORIZON HOUSE

3. IN VIEW OF THE INTENSE PERSONAL ATTACK ON ME I AM TAKING UP KIND OFFER OF THE MANAGING DIRECTOR OF AMAX AND SHIFTING MY RESIDENTIAL QUARTERS TEMPORARILY TO HORIZON HOUSE (TEL NO. 51142/53926) SO AS TO BE LESS READILY AVAILABLE FOR STUDENT OR OTHER DEMONSTRATORS. AS YESTERDAY THERE IS NO POLICE PROTECTION FOR MY RESIDENCE.

4. I HOPE YOU WILL DRAW THE DAILY MAIL EDITORIAL TO THE ZAMBIAN HIGH COMMISSIONER'S ATTENTION.

ALLINSON.

NNNN

MR
MR/ADR I GLENCOUR
MR/ADR LUCE
MR/PUB

Miss Clark

MR WILSON
MR DAY

LORD H G LENNOX
MR ASPEN

Mr. ...
and ...
...

DD/EMOD DEPT (4)

DD/C AF D

DD/S AF D

DD/PUSD (2)

DD/NEWS DEPT

DD/WD

SIR I. SHELTON LEGAL ADVISER RM K174

MR FITCOFF LEGAL ADVISER RM K164

RESIDENT CLERK

13/NO 10 BOWEN STREET

to Goulty

MR R D WADDEBERRY)
MR P M BAXBY)
~~MR D EVERETT L~~)
MR P J FOWLER)
DIO)

CABINET
OFFICE

FLASH

HD CONS D
CONS Em Unit
HD POD
HD PSD
HD PPD
HD SEC D
HD COD

(File)

[Signature]

GR 620

UNCLASSIFIED

FM LUSAKA 230707Z

TO FLASH FCO

TEL NO. 1284 OF 23 NOVEMBER 1979

REPEATED TO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK, WASHINGTON,
PRIORITY MIRIMBA SALISBURY, DAR ES SALAAM, PRETORIA,
ROUTINE GABORONE, LUANDA, MAPUTO, LAGOS.

Brian Amster

[Signature]

RHODESIA/ZAMBIA.

1. A VISCIOUS EDITORIAL IN THE DAILY MAIL DEVOTED ENTIRELY TO A PERSONAL ATTACK ON ME WAS ALSO REPORTED EXTENSIVELY ON THE ZAMBIAN NEWS THIS MORNING IN THE PRESS SUMMARY. IT RAN AS FOLLOWS:

BRITISH HIGH COMMISSIONER TO ZAMBIA, SIR LEONARD ALLINSON WAS GIVEN A DIPLOMATIC DRESSING YESTERDAY BY ZAMBIA'S FOREIGN MINISTER, MR WILSON CHAKULYA, OVER HIS INSOLENT OUTBURSTS TO THE PRESIDENT'S DEMAND FOR COMPENSATION FROM THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT FOR THE REBEL ATTACKS ON ZAMBIA.

BY HIS UNDIPLOMATIC MISCONDUCT AND LACK OF RESPECT FOR PRESIDENT

BY HIS UNDIPLOMATIC MISCONDUCT AND LACK OF RESPECT FOR PRESIDENT KAUNDA AS A HEAD OF STATE, ALLINSON HAS TRIGGERED OFF A SERIOUS DIPLOMATIC ROW WHICH COULD RESULT IN THE RUPTURE OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS BETWEEN HIS COUNTRY AND ZAMBIA.

THE PEOPLE OF ZAMBIA TAKE A VERY SERIOUS VIEW OF HIS REACTION WHICH IGNORES EVERY DIPLOMATIC ETIQUETTE. WITHIN A FEW MONTHS OF HIS STAY HERE, ALLINSON HAS PROVED TO BE THE MOST IRRESPONSIBLE AND UNRULY BRITISH DIPLOMAT ZAMBIA HAS RECEIVED SINCE INDEPENDENCE.

HE HAS NO RESPECT FOR PREISDENT KAUNDA AND THERE IS NO MORAL REASON WHY THE PEOPLE OF ZAMBIA SHOULD ACCOMMODATE HIM. THE WHOLE NATION AGREES WITH THE SENTIMENTS EXPRESSED BY THE YOUTHS DURING THEIR DEMONSTRATION AT STATE HOUSE YESTERDAY.

IN FACT, WE DEMAND AN APOLOGY FROM HIS GOVERNMENT, AND AFTER THAT, HE SHOULD BE WITHDRAWN BECAUSE ZAMBIA CANNOT TOLERATE HIM.

WHEN THE QUEEN KNIGHTED HIM A FEW MONTHS AGO, IT WAS NOT A LICENCE FOR HIM TO COME AND INSULT US ON OUR SOIL. WE CANNOT SPARE HIM EVEN IN LONDON IF HE DISPLAYED SUCH PUTRID MANNERS.

IT IS TRUE THAT WHITE PEOPLE OF SUCH CHARACTER WILL ALWAYS FIND ZAMBIA TO BE A "CHEEKY LITTLE NATION", AND THE REASON IS SIMPLY THAT WE HAVE PLEDGED TO REMAIN TRULY FREE AND INDEPENDENT IN THOUGHT AND ACTION. WE SHALL NOT BE PUPPETS OF THE BRITISH OR ANYBODY.

FOR THIS REASON, WE SHALL FIGHT TOOTH AND NAIL TO RETAIN OUR INDEPENDENCE AND DIGNITY, AND EJECT FROM OUR MIDST ILL-MANNERED ELEMENTS LIKE ALLINSON.

IF ALLINSON WAS NOT PROPERLY BRIEFED BY MARGARET THATCHER BEFORE SHE SENT HIM TO ZAMBIA, WE WOULD REMIND HIM THAT HE IS JUST A COURIER FOR HIS GOVERNMENT AND HE HAS NO DIPLOMATIC RIGHT TO ANSWER BACK WHEN THE HEAD OF STATE SPEAKS. THAT IS THE DUTY OF HIS PRIME MINISTER.

AFTER MARGARET THATCHER HAS REACTED TO THE PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT, ALLINSON'S TASK IS AGAIN MERELY TO DELIVER THE MESSAGE TO THE ZAMBIAN GOVERNMENT. HE HAS NO OTHER AUTHORITY, AND HIS GOVERNMENT HAS GOT TO TAME HIM.

FOR ALLINSON TO SAY "THE ACTS THAT HAVE BEEN DIRECTED AGSINST ZAMBIA OVER THE PAST FEW MONTHS CLEARLY EMPHASISE THE VITAL

FOR ALLINSON TO SAY "THE ACTS THAT HAVE BEEN DIRECTED AGAINST ZAMBIA OVER THE PAST FEW MONTHS CLEARLY EMPHASISE THE VITAL IMPORTANCE OF A SUCCESSFUL OUTCOME TO THE PEACE TALKS THAT BRITAIN IS CURRENTLY CONDUCTING, WHICH WOULD BRING AN END TO THESE ATTACKS", SHOWS BRITISH COLLUSION WITH THE REBELS. IT IS FOR THIS REASON THAT WE ARE HOLDING THEM RESPONSIBLE.

ALLINSON'S DIRECT REACTION TO THE PRESIDENT'S DEMAND FOR COMPENSATION IS THE WORST INSULT TO THE HEAD OF STATE AND THE ZAMBIAN PEOPLE. WE WANT TO STATE THAT ALTHOUGH WE MAY BE A SMALL NATION, WE WANT TO REMAIN DECENT.


UNFORTUNATELY, ALLINSON HAS JUST COME TO ZAMBIA A LITTLE TOO LATE WHEN WE CANNOT BROOK SUCH CHEEK AND OBSTINACY FROM HIM OR ANY MAN WITH A WHITE SKIN. WITH MEN LIKE ALLINSON AND CARRINGTON IN THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT, WE CANNOT EXPECT THE REBELS TO BEHAVE OR REASON BETTER.

WE KNOW THAT THESE ARE PEOPLE WITH VESTED INTERESTS IN THE PROBLEM OF RHODESIA AND ARE ENCOURAGING THE REBELS TO ATTACKS US. ALLINSON IS SPEAKING WITH THE VOICE OF A REBEL COMMANDER BASED IN ZAMBIA, AND HE IS DETRIMENTAL TO THE WELFARE OF THE WHITE MAN IN THIS COUNTRY. HE MUST GO.

ZAMBIANS ARE DETERMINED TO CONTINUE WITH THEIR REVOLUTION IN THE DIRECTION OF PERFECTION. THEY WILL REMAIN VIGILANT AND TETHLESSLY REMOVE IMPEDIMENTS LIKE ALLINSON, AND NO AMOUNT OF KILLING OR DESTRUCTION WILL DAUNT THE PEOPLE OF ZAMBIA. THEY WILL FIGHT THE ALLINSONS AND WIN.

2. SEE MY IFT.

ALLINSON.



NNNN

CONFIDENTIAL

Rhodesia



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

22 November 1979

President Kaunda

As you know the Prime Minister spoke to President Kaunda early this afternoon on the telephone. The call had been placed earlier in the morning when the High Commission in Lusaka was surrounded by demonstrators. After the Prime Minister had expressed concern about misunderstandings which seemed to have arisen between the two Governments, President Kaunda said that on his return to Lusaka from Europe, he had found a very volatile situation awaiting him. He did not understand what had been happening. He had therefore spoken strongly at a press conference in condemnation of the destruction of Zambian bridges and the murder of Zambians. Following his speech the British High Commissioner had issued a very unfortunate statement indeed. This had greatly annoyed the Zambian people.

The Prime Minister told the President that she was grateful for everything the police and the army had done to protect the High Commission earlier in the day. She went on to say that Britain would have no powers over Salisbury or General Walls until a ceasefire had been signed and a Governor had arrived in Rhodesia. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary would be tabling the British proposals for a ceasefire later this afternoon and would be appealing to both sides to come to an immediate agreement to prevent any further damage to Zambia. We would be asking for undertakings from one side that no further cross-border operations should be carried out into Zambia and from the other side that no further movement of Patriotic Front personnel from Zambia into Rhodesia should take place. Everything that was happening underlined the vital importance of an early ceasefire agreement.

President Kaunda replied that he was only speaking to the Prime Minister because of his deep personal respect for her. He did not expect to be paying any more attention at present to what was taking place in London. His time would be spent on mobilising his nation for self-defence. He doubted whether anything he could do to help the Prime Minister bring about an early ceasefire would be effective under present circumstances.

CONFIDENTIAL

/The Prime Minister

GB

CONFIDENTIAL

-2-

The Prime Minister repeatedly urged on President Kaunda the need for an early ceasefire and for his representatives to do what they could to encourage the Patriotic Front to reach agreement. Success was very close. President Kaunda had played an important role in bringing success within reach. It was now a question of holding on until the settlement, which would be an end to Zambia's troubles and to Zimbabwe's, was achieved. She said that she would get in touch again on the telephone if there were any further troubles. In the meantime she hoped that the President would ensure the safety of British diplomats in Zambia. The President replied that he had issued an instruction to his countrymen not to give way to anti-British feelings. The High Commission would be protected.

E. D. B. ALEXANDER

R.M.J. Lyne, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT

h. Pmt

TRANSCRIPT OF A TELEPHONE CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER AND PRESIDENT KAUNDA ON THURSDAY 22 NOVEMBER 1979

PRIME MINISTER'S

PERSONAL MESSAGE

SERIAL No. T150/79T

Prime Minister: Is that Kenneth? This is Margaret.

President Kaunda: Good afternoon, Margaret.

PM: Oh, Kenneth, I'm so glad to have the chance to talk to you, because I think some very bad misunderstandings have arisen. Would you just like to say one or two things to me first?

President: Really, Margaret, things here, on my return from there, after I had gone through Rome and Baghdad, I found a very volatile situation here: the ways in which our bridges have been destroyed; continuous attacks on our people, resulting in murders and I just don't understand it at all. I have just come from London where after you received me so well didn't want to find this position here at all. I called a press conference the day before yesterday at which I spoke very strongly. I was surprised of course by the silence of Western countries except for America which condemned the attacks on us, and I said at this press conference that Britain had the responsibility for this British colony - it's always been as far as I'm concerned - and then from there your British High Commissioner issued a very unfortunate statement indeed and this annoyed people here very much indeed.

PM: Well, I heard that and I thought I would like to have one or two words with you. First, can I just say that I understand now that our British High Commission is all right and that the police and the army kept off the demonstration, and we're very grateful that they did and they acted to protect our people in the High Commission. Now secondly, Kenneth, what I'm very worried about is the misunderstanding that seems to have arisen about the powers we have at the moment. We don't have powers over Salisbury or General Walls until we can get a ceasefire

/actually

actually signed and the Governor over there. Only then do we have the powers. Now Peter Carrington has been urging both sides to show complete restraint in particular during the ceasefire talks, and I am just as concerned as you are because I think that when you were here we were on the point of achieving success. Now let me tell you what is going to happen now. We're going to have a full plenary session at 4 o'clock this afternoon. Peter Carrington having talked with both sides will be laying detailed proposals for a ceasefire for them to consider. The moment he lays those proposals he will ask both sides to come to an immediate agreement to prevent any further damage to Zambia. We shall ask for undertakings to come into effect simultaneously that no cross-border operations will be carried out by Rhodesia into Zambia and that no further movement of Patriotic Front personnel will take place from Zambia into Rhodesia. And we think it is vitally important that we secure those undertakings and will do all we can to persuade the parties to give them. Can I stress one thing. We made those undertakings, we made the ceasefire agreement. It is vital to get it urgently because until we get that ceasefire agreement we are in a difficulty with no power over Rhodesia until we get a Governor in position. And that is what Peter was trying to say. We also are concerned, we have talked and tried to urge constraint and we will have another go this afternoon in the terms which I have indicated. But the vital thing, Kenneth, is to get that ceasefire agreement because the longer it takes now the more we are concerned that troubles of this kind - and we know how difficult they are and particularly for you - and that is why I have been worried that the talks were going on for such a long time. We'll do that at 4 o'clock this afternoon. Would that help?

President: Well I want you to know that really I am only speaking to you out of very personal respect and feelings for you.

/PM:

PM: Well this is why I wanted to get on to you, Kenneth, because I thought if you and I talked about it it might help. I feel that only you can help to get us the ceasefire arrangements now and we do want them quickly if we are to get a Governor in position quickly and then deal with these matters. But in the meantime we will try to get undertakings from both sides, one, not to have any cross-border operations into Zambia and the Patriotic Front to agree that no further movement of their personnel will take place from Zambia into Rhodesia. And if we can get that, and the ceasefire agreement, then I believe we're on the verge of success.

President: Well, I wish you the best of luck, Margaret, but honestly my time now is being spent on mobilising the small Zambian nation to self-defence and I cannot kid you that I will be paying any more attention to what is taking place in London. I just have no time at all for that now.

PM: I just hope that your people in London will urge the Patriotic Front to come to agreement on the ceasefire - and urgently. Because I feel, Kenneth, that it is urgent for your people as well as for the whole future of Rhodesia. If we get a ceasefire agreement then we can act very quickly. Without it, it is difficult. You see, I can act within days of a ceasefire agreement, and we've got orders and governors and everything else ready to come over. But we do need it and we need it quickly, and you need it, too, because it will.....if we get the undertaking on the ceasefire then the things which have caused you such grievous trouble will, I believe, stop.

President: Look, Margaret. I don't think anybody has worked more for peace than I have done I've done all these things. I responded to you.... I came over.... and I really must now organise my people ^{for whatever happens.} /.... If we're going to be demolished because of ^{the scale of} /power from the South - very well, but Margaret I keep saying to you, I'm talking to you only out of personal respect.

/PM:

PM: I know that, I know that. But we very nearly got an agreement when you were here Kenneth and we just have to complete it now because if we do then the troubles that are causing you such grievous harm will, I believe, stop. We'll have a plenary at 4 o'clock; we'll ask both sides to come to an immediate agreement to prevent further damage to Zambia: one, to have no cross-border operations and the other to stop the movement of Patriotic Front personnel into Rhodesia and then go ahead and have the ceasefire quickly and I do beg of you to do anything you can to do that because I'm sure that's a quick way forward. Are you still there?

President: I'm listening, Margaret I have to think as quickly as possible. I'm not sure it would be right for me to make promises which I can't fulfil. Really, nothing has disturbed me more these past few days. I don't know whether I would be effective in this shape or form in any of the things we would be trying to do together.

PM: I think we can still get through, Kenneth, if General Walls stops the attacks in return for Mr. Nkomo stopping infiltration. Then we can go ahead with the ceasefire - and quickly. I know that you are having consultations in Dar es Salaam over the weekend and I hope everything will be done there to urge them to come to a ceasefire agreement quickly. Because we'll do our part here and we're constantly urging constraint because we're not going to put the whole of an agreement and a solution in jeopardy. We're just doing everything we can to stop the attacks and to have constraint on both sides. So we'll do what we can, Kenneth, and I'm sure you'll do what you can because I think we are close to success and I think the worst is coming - the worst has come - just before success. Kenneth, you know I do personally wish you every success and I do thank you for what you did in coming over here and I just think we've got to hold on to the objectives now to get the settlement, because that will be an end to your troubles and to Zimbabwe's.

/President:

President: Thank you for the messages, Margaret.

PM: If there are any further troubles, Kenneth, I will probably try to get on the telephone to you because I think you and I can perhaps try to deal with it more quickly than any other way. In the meantime, I know you'll look after all diplomatic people in Zambia.

President: Well I've made, not really an appeal, but an instruction to my countrymen of not acting anti-British at all. a lot of support from white subjects here we have to protect the High Commission nothing to do with ordinary British citizens here at all, nothing.

PM: Well, Kenneth. We'll do our best to stop both further attacks and infiltration and to get a ceasefire and I hope that if the other two come to Dar es Salaam they'll come back absolutely ready to take part in the ceasefire talks with a view to coming to a rapid conclusion.

President: All right, Margaret. Thank you very much indeed.

PM: Thank you. My personal very best wishes, Kenneth.

President: Thank you, Margaret. Thank you.

PM: Goodbye.

President: Goodbye now. God bless.

GRS 700

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DESKBY MIRIMBA SALISBURY 222030Z

DESKBY UKMIS NEW YORK 222030Z

FM F C O 221910Z NOVEMBER 79

TO FLASH LUSAKA

TELNO 968 OF 22 NOVEMBER

AND TO IMMEDIATE MIRIMBA SALISBURY, UKMIS NEW YORK,
WASHINGTON AND PRETORIA.

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Rms*

RHODESIA: CROSS-BORDER RAIDS.

1. THE PRIME MINISTER SPOKE TO PRESIDENT KAUNDA ON THE TELEPHONE THIS MORNING. SHE SAID THAT WE APPRECIATED HOW DIFFICULT HIS SITUATION WAS AND WERE VERY CONCERNED ABOUT THE TIME IT WAS TAKING TO GET A CEASEFIRE. SHE STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF ACHIEVING A CEASEFIRE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE, AND THE HOPE THAT KAUNDA WOULD HELP TO BRING THIS ABOUT. IN THE MEANTIME, THE PRIME MINISTER SAID THAT WE WERE TRYING TO GET UNDERTAKINGS FROM BOTH SIDES TO BRING AN IMMEDIATE END TO CROSS-BORDER MILITARY ACTIVITY BETWEEN RHODESIA AND ZAMBIA. WE WOULD BE PROPOSING AN AGREEMENT TO THIS EFFECT (DETAILS BELOW) IN THE CONFERENCE THIS AFTERNOON. WE WERE ON THE VERGE OF SUCCESS, AND COULD GET A CEASEFIRE QUICKLY IF THE ATTACKS AND INFILTRATION STOPPED.

2. KAUNDA EMPHASISED HIS PERSONAL RESPECT FOR THE PRIME MINISTER, AND WISHED HER THE BEST OF LUCK IN HER EFFORTS. HE SAID THAT HIS TIME WAS NOW BEING SPENT ENTIRELY IN MOBILISING THE ZAMBIAN NATION FOR SELF-DEFENCE. HE HAD DONE ALL HE COULD TO BRING ABOUT PEACE (HE MENTIONED HIS MEETING WITH VORSTER) BUT, IF HIS COUNTRY WAS NOW GOING TO BE DEMOLISHED, HE HAD TO ORGANISE HIS PEOPLE. HE WAS NOT SURE THAT HE COULD ANY LONGER PLAY AN EFFECTIVE ROLE IN THE THINGS HE HAD BEEN TRYING TO ACHIEVE WITH US, AND DID NOT WISH TO MAKE PROMISES HE COULD NOT FULFIL.

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3. THE PRIME MINISTER THANKED KAUNDA FOR ALL HE HAD DONE TO TRY TO ACHIEVE A SETTLEMENT AND SAID THAT IF THERE WERE FURTHER DIFFICULTIES SHE WOULD TELEPHONE HIM AGAIN. SHE KNEW HE WOULD LOOK AFTER DIPLOMATIC REPRESENTATIVES IN ZAMBIA. KAUNDA SAID THAT THIS WAS NOT A RACIAL MATTER BUT (REFERRING TO THE PROTECTION OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER) EMOTIONS WERE RUNNING HIGH.

4. FOLLOWING THIS CONVERSATION, I HAVE PROPOSED IN THE CONFERENCE THIS AFTERNOON AN AGREEMENT INVOLVING THE FOLLOWING ELEMENTS:-

A. THE RHODESIAN AUTHORITIES WILL GIVE AN UNDERTAKING THAT NO CROSS-BORDER OPERATIONS WILL BE CARRIED OUT BY RHODESIA INTO ZAMBIA:

B. THE LEADERS OF THE PATRIOTIC FRONT WILL GIVE AN UNDERTAKING THAT, WITH IMMEDIATE EFFECT, NO FURTHER MOVEMENT OF PATRIOTIC FRONT PERSONNEL WILL TAKE PLACE FROM ZAMBIA INTO RHODESIA:

C. THE CO-OPERATION OF THE ZAMBIAN AUTHORITIES WILL BE ESSENTIAL TO BRING THE AGREEMENT INTO EFFECT.

5. FOLLOWING UP THE PRIME MINISTER'S TALK WITH KAUNDA, THE PUS HAS BRIEFED MISS CHIBESAKUNDA ON THE ABOVE PROPOSALS. HE SAID THAT WE HOPED THAT THE SALISBURY DELEGATION WOULD AGREE ON THIS BASIS TO CEASE ALL CROSS-BORDER MILITARY ACTIVITY. HOWEVER, THEY WOULD PROBABLY AGREE TO DO SO, ONLY IF THE ZAMBIAN AUTHORITIES (AND NOT JUST THE PATRIOTIC FRONT) WOULD CONFIRM THAT THEY WOULD ENSURE THAT THIS AGREEMENT WAS COMPLIED WITH.

6. MISS CHIBESAKUNDA SAID THAT SHE SAW DIFFICULTY OVER 4(B) ABOVE. AS MARK CHONA HAD EXPLAINED TO ME YESTERDAY, THE PATRIOTIC FRONT SAID THAT NONE OF THEIR PERSONNEL WAS MOVING INTO RHODESIA: AND THE ZAMBIAN GOVERNMENT BELIEVED THIS. BRITAIN WANTED TO BE TRUSTED BY ZAMBIA, AND ZAMBIA EXPECTED HER ASSURANCES TO BE TRUSTED BY BRITAIN, AND NOT ASKED FOR IN WRITING. THE PUS SAID THAT HE WAS NOT SEEKING A FORMAL COMMUNICATION IN WRITING, BUT SIMPLY AN ASSURANCE THAT IF THE PATRIOTIC FRONT GAVE THE UNDERTAKING

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PROPOSED, ZAMBIA WOULD COOPERATE IN BRINGING THE AGREEMENT INTO EFFECT. IF CHONA WAS RIGHT, AND THERE WAS NO MOVEMENT OF PATRIOTIC FRONT PERSONNEL INTO RHODESIA, THEN IT WOULD SURELY BE POSSIBLE FOR THE PATRIOTIC FRONT TO GIVE THE NECESSARY UNDERTAKING AND FOR ZAMBIA TO BACK THIS.

7. I APPRECIATE THAT IT WILL NOT BE EASY FOR YOU TO TAKE ACTION TO REINFORCE THE REQUEST WE HAVE PUT TO MISS CHIBESAKUNDA. BUT I HOPE YOU CAN FIND A SUITABLE CHANNEL (PERHAPS PUNABANTU) THROUGH WHICH TO INFORM THE ZAMBIAN GOVERNMENT OF THE ACTION WE HAVE TAKEN, AND TO EMPHASISE THAT WE THINK THERE IS A GOOD CHANCE OF SECURING AN AGREEMENT ON THE CESSATION OF CROSS-BORDER MILITARY ACTIVITY IF THEY ARE ABLE TO GIVE SUCH AN ASSURANCE. IT IS OF VERY GREAT IMPORTANCE TO THE FUTURE OF RHODESIA AND ZAMBIA AND TO THE PROSPECTS FOR A SUCCESSFUL OUTCOME TO THE LANCASTER HOUSE NEGOTIATIONS THAT THEY SHOULD BE READY TO DO SO. WE ARE DOING ALL WE CAN TO HELP: BUT THIS DOES REQUIRE A POSITIVE RESPONSE FROM THE ZAMBIAN GOVERNMENT.

8. THIS TELEGRAM IS BEING REPEATED TO CERTAIN POSTS FOR THERE BACKGROUND INFORMATION. THE INFORMATION IN PARAGRAPHS 1-3 SHOULD NOT (RPT NOT) BE QUOTED TO OTHERS, BUT POSTS MAY DRAW IN CONFIDENCE ON PARA 4 ONWARDS.

CARRINGTON

[COPIES SENT TO NO.10 DOWNING ST]

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RHODESIA D
PS
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PS/MR LUCE
PS/PUS

MR DAY
MR ASPIN
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- 3 -

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PB/NO TO DOWNING STREET

MR WILLSON
MR DAY
LORD N G LENNOX
MR ASPIN

Mr Goulet
MR R D WIDE-GERY
MR P M MAXBY
MR DEVERALL
MR P J FOWLER
DIO

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MR FITCOFF LEGAL ADVISER RM K164
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Mr Mills

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FM LUSAKA 221232Z NOV 79

TO FLASH FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1282 OF 22 NOVEMBER

MY TELNO 1281: RHODESIA

1. THE CROWD HAS NOW DISPERSED PEACEFULLY. THERE SEEMS TO BE NO FURTHER IMMEDIATE RISK TO THE HIGH COMMISSION.
2. MINIMISE PROCEDURE MAY NOW BE SUSPENDED.

ALLINSON

36

PS
MR/STY I GLENDON
MR/STY LUCE
MR/FUS

MR/NO TO DOWNING STREET

MR WILLSON
MR DAY
LORD N G LENNOX
MR ASPER

to Goulty

MR R D WADE-SEERY)
MR P H MAYBY)
~~MR D EVERALL~~)
MR P J FOWLER)
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MR PINCOFF LEGAL ADVISER IM K161
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- cons. Pen Unit
- chief clerk
- Mr. Pugh.

to Paul

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FM LUSAKA 221215Z NOV 79
TO FLASH FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1281 OF 22 NOVEMBER
INFO IMMEDIATE MIRIMBA SALISBURY, PRETORIA, PRIORITY GABORONE,
MAPUTO, LUANDA AND WASHINGTON

MIPT: RHODESIA/ZAMBIA

KAUNDA'S SPEECH DID NOT ADVANCE THE SITUATION ALTHOUGH IT WAS PERHAPS LESS INFLAMMATORY THAN THE EXCITED BUILD UP MAY HAVE LED SOME TO ANTICIPATE. DESPITE STUDENTS CHANTS OF 'WE WANT WAR' THEY WERE TOLD ONLY TO ORGANISE THEMSELVES AND REMAIN VIGILANT. MARXIST JARGON WAS MORE IN EVIDENCE THAN EVER.

2. AS THE DESIGNATED SCAPE GOAT FOR KAUNDA I MUST LEAVE IT TO YOU TO JUDGE WHETHER YOU WISH ME TO RIDE OUT THE STORM AT LEAST FOR A WHILE. HOWEVER I WOULD APPRECIATE IT IF YOU WOULD REMIND MISS CHIBESAKUNDA OF THE ZAMBIAN GOVERNMENT'S DUTY TO PROTECT ME SINCE THE PUBLIC HAVE SO CLEARLY BEEN INCITED AGAINST ME. PLEASE ALSO GO OVER WITH HERE OUR VIEW OF THE ROLE OF A REPRESENTATIVE I.E. THAT MY TASK IS NOT JUST TO REPORT (AS

PROTECT ME SINCE THE PUBLIC HAVE SO CLEARLY BEEN INCITED AGAINST ME. PLEASE ALSO GO OVER WITH HERE OUR VIEW OF THE ROLE OF A REPRESENTATIVE I.E. THAT MY TASK IS NOT JUST TO REPORT (AS CHAKULYA THINKS).

3. I WAS NOT, REPEAT NOT, MUCH COMFORTED BY KAUNDA'S FAILURE TO COMMENT ON THE REQUEST OF A STUDENT SPOKESMAN THAT THE STUDENTS SHOULD BE FORGIVEN IF THEY USED UNCONVENTIONAL METHODS IN "DEALING" WITH ME, ALTHOUGH THE CROWD WAS ASKED TO GO HOME PEACEFULLY AND IN A DISCIPLINED MANNER.

4. THE POLICE INCIDENTALLY HAVE NOT PUT A GUARD ON MY HOUSE DESPITE REPEATED REQUESTS AND MY WIFE HAS MOVED TEMPORARILY TO ANOTHER STAFF HOUSE UNTIL THE DEMONSTRATORS DISPERSE. SIMILARLY WE WILL REMAIN AT THE HIGH COMMISSION UNTIL THE CROWD HAS CLEARED.

ALLINSON

NNNN

(X-27)

MR I GILMOUR
MR R LUCE
MR PUS

MR/NO 10 JOHNSON STREET

MR WILLSON
MR DAY
LORD H G LENNOX
MR ASPER

to Gaulty

MR R D WARD-GERY
MR P H MAXBY
~~MR D EVERETT L~~
MR P J FOWLER
DIO

CABINET
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HD/WID

SIR I. SINDIGA LEGAL ADVISER RM K174

MR FITCOFF LEGAL ADVISER RM K164

~~RESIDENT CLERK~~

GRS 700

CONFIDENTIAL

FM LUSAKA 221158Z NOV 79

TO FLASH FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1280 OF 22 NOVEMBER

INFO IMMEDIATE MIRIMBA SALISBURY, PRETORIA, PRIORITY GABORONE,
MAPUTO, LUANDA AND WASHINGTON

RHODESIA/ZAMBIA

1. PRESIDENT KAUNDA ADDRESSED A CROWD ESTIMATED BY ZAMBIA RADIO TO NUMBER UP TO TWENTY THOUSAND AT STATE HOUSE FOR FORTY MINUTES TODAY. THE CROWD WAS MADE UP OF STUDENTS AND 'PARTY MILITANTS'.
2. HE SAID THAT THE RESPONSE OF THE ZAMBIAN YOUTH TO THIS CALL FOR SOLIDARITY MADE HIM HAPPY AND PROUD. THEY WERE ALL COMRADES IN THE STRUGGLE AGAINST EXPLOITATIVE CAPITALISM. HE WISHED TO BE KNOWN AS COMRADE PRESIDENT HENCEFORTH RATHER THAN YOUR EXCELLENCY.
3. IT WAS ZAMBIA'S STRUGGLE AGAINST CAPITALISM, COLONIALISM ETC. WHICH THE RACISTS FEARED. ZAMBIA WAS TOO CIVILISED TO BE

3. IT WAS ZAMBIA'S STRUGGLE AGAINST CAPITALISM, COLONIALISM ETC. WHICH THE RACISTS FEARED. ZAMBIANS WERE TOO CIVILISED TO BE RACISTS "UNLIKE THE PRIMITIVE APES TO THE SOUTH".

4. ZAMBIA HAD BEEN CHEATED BY SUCCESSIVE BRITISH GOVERNMENTS SINCE 1965 WHEN HE HAD URGED FIRM ACTION ON MR WILSON. HE SNEERED AT MR WILSON'S REMARKS ABOUT A SOLUTION TO THE RHODESIAN PROBLEM BEING FOUND IN "WEEKS NOT MONTHS". BRITAIN HAD QUALIFIED AND SUPPORTED THE RHODESIAN REBELLION AND OIL SUPPLIED BY BRITISH GOVERNMENT CONTROLLED OIL COMPANIES FROM THE VERY OIL THAT FUELED THE AIRCRAFT THAT KILLED ZAMBIANS, ANGOLANS AND MOZAMBIANS. HE ASKED HOW HE COULD CONTINUE TO TRUST US. HE HAD GONE TO LONDON RECENTLY TO SUPPORT THE POLICIES OF THE OAU OF WHICH "THE FRONTLINE STATES WERE A SUB-COMMITTEE". HE HAD TRIED TO BE HELPFUL AND IN RETURN GOT BOMBS ON HIS BRIDGES. ZAMBIA WOULD STAND FIRM AS THEIR STRUGGLE WAS A JUST ONE AND THEY WERE GOING TO WIN. ZAMBIA WAS COMMITTED TO THE LIBERATION STRUGGLE OF AFRICA AND NO AMOUNT OF KILLING OR DESTRUCTION COULD DAUNT THEM. THE WEST WAS WASTING ITS TIME IF THEY THOUGHT ZAMBIA WOULD GIVE UP SUPPORT OF THE PATRIOTIC FRONT.

5. HE CALLED UPON THE YOUNG PEOPLE OF ZAMBIA TO ENROL IN THE STRUGGLE AND SAID THAT AS GUNS BECAME AVAILABLE THEY WOULD BE PASSED ON TO THE ORGANISED YOUTH. SEVERAL OF HIS OWN CHILDREN HAD ALREADY REPORTED FOR DUTY. SMALL ARMS FACTORIES WERE BEING ESTABLISHED IN ZAMBIA AND WOULD BE OPERATING "SOME TIME NEXT YEAR". COLLEGES AND FACTORIES WOULD HAVE THEIR OWN WEAPONS. THE YOUNG PEOPLE WERE CALLED UPON TO BE VIGILANT AND DUTIFUL.

6. HE AGAIN REFERRED TO MY STATEMENT FOLLOWING HIS MULUNGUSHI HALL PRESS CONFERENCE IN WHICH I HAD DENIED BRITISH RESPONSIBILITY FOR DAMAGE DONE TO ZAMBIA BY RHODESIAN ATTACKS. HE DESCRIBED THE STATEMENT AS INCREDIBLE. IT WAS CHEEK AND INSOLENCE FOR ME TO HAVE COMMENTED ON THE STATEMENT OF A PRESIDENT. HE HAD BEEN SPEAKING AS ZAMBIA AND NOT AS KAUNDA. ZAMBIA COULD NOT HAVE THAT. THEY WERE PROUD PEOPLE. HE THEN SAID "UNTIL THEY PUT THIS THING RIGHT I DO NOT THINK THAT ZAMBIA'S RELATIONS WITH BRITAIN WILL BE HAPPY".

7. FOLLOWING THE ATTACKS BRITAIN HAD SIMPLY SAID THAT THEY POINTED TO THE NEED FOR AN URGENT CEASEFIRE. THERE HAD BEEN NO APOLOGY. BRITAIN SIMPLY WANTED TO PUT PRESSURE ON THE PATRIOTIC FRONT AND THAT KAUNDA REFUSED TO DO.

8. TURNING TO BRITISH ECONOMIC INTERESTS KAUNDA SAID THAT THEY HAD A CONTROLLING INTEREST IN SHELL/BP ZAMBIA AND HAD

8. TURNING TO BRITISH ECONOMIC INTERESTS KAUNDA SAID THAT THEY ALREADY HAD A CONTROLLING INTEREST IN SHELL/BP ZAMBIA AND HAD MADE IT CLEAR TO LONRHO THAT THEY WOULD WISH TO ESTABLISH A MAJORITY HOLDING IN THEIR ZAMBIAN OPERATION. IT WAS NOW UP TO THE YOUNG PEOPLE TO COME THROUGH AS MANAGERS. MANY OF THE MANAGERS IN THE PARASTATAL FIELD HAD GROWN UP WITH THE HABITS OF CAPITALISM. IT WAS NOW TIME TO PUT NEW WINE IN OLD BOTTLES, PEOPLE IMBUED WITH CORRECT SOCIALIST PHILOSOPHIES.

9. AT ONE POINT IN HIS SPEECH KAUNDA REFERRED TO MR THATCHER'S PREVIOUS CONNECTION WITH BURMA OIL AND CLAIMED THAT YOU OWNED RIO TINTO AND HENCE NAMIBIA. IT WAS THIS KIND OF THING THAT MADE IT IMPOSSIBLE FOR THE PATRIOTIC FRONT TO ACCEPT THAT THERE WAS FAIR DEALING IN THE LONDON CONFERENCE.

ALLINSON

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OO MIRIMBA SALISBURY

OO PRETORIA

OO DAR ES SALAAM

PP MAPUTO

PP LUANDA

PP WASHINGTON

GRS 150

CONFIDENTIAL

FM LUSAKA 220920Z NOV 79

TO FLASH FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1279 OF 22 NOVEMBER

INFO IMMEDIATE MIRIMBA SALISBURY, PRETORIA, DAR ES SALAAM,
PRIORITY MAPUTO LUANDA AND WASHINGTON

RHODESIA

1. I HAVE NOW RETURNED TO THE HIGH COMMISSION. THE DEMONSTRATORS, WHO IN FACT NUMBER THREE OR FOUR THOUSAND, HAVE MOVED OFF TO STATE HOUSE. POLICE AND PARA MILITARY ARE IN ATTENDANCE ON THE MARCH.
2. AFTER THEIR INITIAL DISARRAY THE POLICE GUARD AT THE HIGH COMMISSION PERFORMED SATISFACTORILY, SUPPORTED BY PARA MILITARY, IN CLEARING DEMONSTRATORS. SENIOR POLICEMAN PRESENT CONSIDERS THAT AFTER THE RALLY AT STATE HOUSE THE CROWD WILL DISPERSE BUT THIS OBVIOUSLY DEPENDS ON WHAT HAPPENS AT STATE HOUSE. MEANWHILE POLICE AND PARA MILITARY ARE PATROLLING GROUNDS OF HIGH COMMISSION. I HAVE ASKED FOR PROTECTION FOR MY HOUSE WHICH IS CLOSE TO STATE HOUSE BUT THIS IS NOT YET IN POSITION.
3. ALL STAFF WELL.

ALLINSON

PS
PS/STN I GILMOUR
PS/STN LUCE
PS/PUB

~~PS/NO 10 DOWNING STREET~~

MR WILLSON
MR DAY
LORD N G LENNOX
MR ASPER

to Goulty

MR R J WADDY-GERY)
MR P H MAXBY)
MR D EVERALL)
MR P J FOWLER)
DIO)

CABINET
OFFICE

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DD/NEWS DEPT

DD/EMD

SIR I. S. SHELTON, LEGAL ADVISER RM K174

MR FITCOCK, LEGAL ADVISER RM K164

RESIDENT CLERK

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FM UKMIS NEW YORK 230010Z NOV 79

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1605 OF 22 NOVEMBER

INFO IMMEDIATE LUSAKA, LAGOS, DAR ES SALAAM, MIRIMBA SALISBURY,
INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON, MAPUTO, LUANDA, GABORONE, OSLO, PARIS,
LISBON.

Prime Minister
[Signature] *[Signature]*

MY TELNO 1603 AND TELECON RENWICK/GOULDING: RHODESIA/ZAMBIA

1. I SPOKE TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL THIS AFTERNOON. I WENT OVER ALL THE GROUND AT LANCASTER HOUSE AND MADE VERY STRONGLY THE POINT THAT WE WERE CLOSE TO THE END OF THE LAST LAP. WE MIGHT HAVE A FULL AGREEMENT IN THE FIRST HALF OF NEXT WEEK WHICH WOULD ENABLE US TO TAKE CONTROL AND ENSURE THAT SUCH INCIDENTS DID NOT RECUR. IF THERE WAS AN ACRIMONIOUS CONFRONTATION IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL AT THIS STAGE, THIS COULD PUT THE WHOLE PROCEEDING AT RISK AND DELAY THE CEASEFIRE. I URGED HIM TO USE HIS INFLUENCE TO POSTPONE THE MEETING OR AT WORST TO FINISH UP WITH A PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENT WITHOUT A FORMAL MEETING. I PRESSED MY POINTS HARD AND THE

MENT WITHOUT A FORMAL MEETING. I PRESSED MY POINTS HARD AND THE PRESIDENT TOOK THEM WELL. I ALSO GAVE HIM WITH SUITABLE EXPLANATIONS THE TEXT OF THE INTERIM CEASEFIRE PROPOSAL WHICH YOU TABLED TODAY.

2. ON MY WAY OUT I RAN INTO BA CLARK (NIGERIA) WHO WAS ARRIVING FOR THE NON-ALIGNED CONSULTATIONS WITH THE PRESIDENT. I WENT OVER ALL THE GROUND WITH HIM AND URGED HIM IN THE STRONGEST TERMS TO PERSUADE LUSAKA (ZAMBIA) TO HOLD OFF FOR THE SAKE OF AN EARLY CEASEFIRE AND THE SUCCESS OF LANCASTER HOUSE. HE DID NOT SEEM WHOLLY UNSYMPATHETIC. HE WAS HOWEVER DISPOSED TO ARGUE THAT THE SECURITY COUNCIL SHOULD TAKE ACTION BECAUSE THE RHODESIAN RAIDS ON ZAMBIAN INFRASTRUCTURE WERE TOTALLY UNJUSTIFIED. WE MADE SURE BEFORE THE NON-ALIGNED CONSULTATIONS THAT LUSAKA HAD THE TEXT OF THE INTERIM CEASEFIRE PROPOSAL.

3. I SUBSEQUENTLY SPOKE IN SIMILAR TERMS TO WALDHEIM WHO I WAS SEEING ABOUT OTHER MATTERS. I AM CONFIDENT THAT HE WILL SPEAK IN THE RIGHT SENSE TO THE ZAMBIAIS IF HE GETS A CHANCE.

4. THE PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL TELEPHONED ME THIS EVENING. FROM WHAT HE SAID, IT IS EVIDENT THAT LUSAKA HAS STILL GOT THE BIT BETWEEN HIS TEETH. LUSAKA HAD ARGUED THAT THE AIM OF THE 'ACTS OF AGGRESSION' WAS TO DESTROY THE ZAMBIAN ECONOMY, TO INTERNATIONALISE THE WAR, TO FORCE ZAMBIA INTO CONCESSIONS AND PERHAPS TO BREAK UP LANCASTER HOUSE. HE INSISTED ON A FORMAL MEETING OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL TOMORROW AFTERNOON. MEANWHILE THE NON-ALIGNED WOULD WORK ON A RESOLUTION WHICH WOULD CONDEMN THE ACTS OF AGGRESSION, HOLD THE ADMINISTERING POWER RESPONSIBLE, AND SET UP A FACT-FINDING MISSION OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL TO INVESTIGATE DAMAGE ON THE SPOT AND REPORT. THE PRESIDENT HAD TRID TO PERSUADE THE NON-ALIGNED TO DRAFT A NON-CONTROVERSIAL RESOLUTION IN CONJUNCTION WITH OTHER GROUPS, BUT THEY HAD REFUSED. HE WOULD CONSULT THE WESTERN MEMBERS AT 1030 LOCAL TIME TOMORROW (FRIDAY).

5. I SHALL TALK TO SALIM TOMORROW MORNING AND WILL TRY TO GET SOME OF THE WESTERN MEMBERS TO WORK ON LUSAKA. BUT I DOUBT VERY MUCH WHETHER ANYTHING WILL BE EFFECTIVE EXCEPT DIRECT INSTRUCTIONS FROM PRESIDENT KAUNDA. LUSAKA IS EMOTIONAL AND DIFFICULT AT THE BEST OF TIMES, AND HE CLEARLY FEELS THAT HIS ACTIVITIES ARE REFLECTING HIS PRESIDENT'S WISHES. HE HAS BEEN ON THE TELEPHONE TO LUSAKA THIS AFTERNOON.

6. UNLESS YOU CAN MOBILISE EFFECTIVE PRESSURE ON KAUNDA WITHIN THE NEXT TWENTY-FOUR HOURS@?17 1? (@@.-#94 5497?)3. UNLESS - WHICH SEEMS UNLIKELY - WE CAN SOMEHOW SECURE AMENDMENTS WHICH WOULD ALLOW US TO ARSTAIN THE MOST PROBABLE OUTCOME WILL BE AN AGGONIZING OUB-

6. UNLESS YOU CAN MOBILISE EFFECTIVE PRESSURE ON KAUNDA WITHIN THE
NE TWENTY-FOUR HOURS 1? (00.-94 5497?)3. UNLESS - WHICH
SEEMS UNLIKELY - WE CAN SOMEHOW SECURE AMENDMENTS WHICH WOULD ALLOW
US TO ABSTAIN, THE MOST PROBABLE OUTCOME WILL BE AN ACRIMONIOUS PUB-
LIC DEBATE AND A VOTE ON AN UNACCEPTABLE RESOLUTION EITHER TOMORROW
OR SATURDAY.

7. IN UN TERMS, IF LUSAKA CANNOT BE DRIVEN OFF, IT IS ARGUABLE
THAT IT WOULD BE BEST TO GET IT OVER QUICKLY AND VETO ANY UNACCEPT-
ABLE DRAFT AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. THE LONGER THE DEBATE GOES ON, THE
MORE LIKELY IT IS TO RAMIFY ACROSS THE BOARD OF THE LANCASTER HOUSE
AGREEMENT, SANCTIONS AND SO ON. I SEE TWO ARGUMENTS AGAINST THIS
COURSE, ONE OF WHICH IS NOT MINE TO MAKE. FIRST, IF WE HAVE TO CAST
A VETO A FEW DAYS BEFORE CONCLUDING THE AGREEMENT, WE ARE GOING TO
HAVE A MORE DIFFICULT TIME THAN I AT PRESENT ANTICIPATE IN THE
COUNCIL OVER THE LIFTING OF SANCTIONS. SECONDLY, COULD NOT THE EFFECT
ON KAUNDA OF A BRITISH VETO AT THIS JUNCTURE BE REALLY SERIOUS?
IF YOU BELIEVE, MAINLY FOR THE LATTER REASON, THAT THE 'QUICK VETO'
TACTIC IS UNDESIRABLE, MY ONLY CHANCE MAY BE TO PLAY FOR TIME. I
WOULD ARGUE THAT, IN THE LIGHT OF THE PRESENT STAGE OF THE LANCASTER
HOUSE NEGOTIATIONS, IT WOULD BE WHOLLY INAPPROPRIATE TO EXPECT HMG
TO PRONOUNCE ON A FAR REACHING RESOLUTION IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL
AT TWENTY-FOUR HOURS OR LESS NOTICE AT A WEEKEND. I DOUBT IF I
COULD MOBILISE THE NECESSARY SEVEN ABSTENTIONS TO DEFEAT A PROCEDURAL
MOTION IN FAVOUR OF AN EARLY VOTE. BUT I MIGHT BE ABLE TO MOBILISE
A FAIR AMOUNT OF SUPPORT, PARTICULARLY FROM THE WESTERN MEMBERS,
TO TRY AND PERSUADE LUSAKA NOT TO DEMAND A VOTE OVER THE WEEKEND.
IF I COULD SPIN IT OUT UNTIL MONDAY EVENING OR, PREFERABLY TUESDAY,
AGREEMENT MIGHT HAVE BEEN REACHED AT LANCASTER HOUSE. WE MIGHT THEN
BE ABLE TO CHANGE THE SCENARIO HERE IE TO GO BACK TO THE IDEA OF A
PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENT OR TO GET MODIFICATIONS TO THE RESOLUTION
WHICH WOULD ENABLE US TO ABSTAIN.

PARSONS

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DESKBY 221200Z

FROM FCO 220954Z NOV

TO IMMEDIATE MAPUTO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 159 OF 22 NOVEMBER

*for
Rund*

YOUR TELNO 418: RHODESIA CONFERENCE PATRIOTIC FRONT: PROPOSALS ON
BASIC PRINCIPLES FOR A CEASEFIRE

INTRODUCTION

1. THE CEASEFIRE AGREEMENT, MADE BETWEEN THE NATIONAL LIBERATION ARMIES OF THE PATRIOTIC FRONT AND THE RHODESIAN ARMY AS EQUAL ENTITIES, MARKS THE FINAL STAGE IN THE PROCESS OF ZIMBABWEAN SELF-DETERMINATION. IT WILL PUT THE SEAL ON THE EFFORT TO REPLACE A PURELY MILITARY SOLUTION WITH ONE WHICH IS PEACEFUL AND POLITICAL, WHEREBY THE PARTIES TO THE CONFLICT WILL MAKE A SOLEMN, AUTONOMOUS AGREEMENT TO CEASE HOSTILITIES IN RETURN FOR AN INDEPENDENCE CONSTITUTION AND SATISFACTORY INTERIM ARRANGEMENTS LEADING TO FREE AND FAIR ELECTIONS.

2. THE NATURE OF THE CEASEFIRE.

2.1 THERE WILL BE A DECLARATION BY BOTH PARTIES OF A GENERAL CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES IN RESPECT OF ALL THEIR MILITARY AND PARA-MILITARY FORCES.

2.2 THE CEASEFIRE AGREEMENT MUST PROVIDE PROPER MACHINERY TO ENSURE ITS OBSERVANCE AND ENFORCEMENT, AND MUST ESTABLISH PROGRESSIVELY A STATE OF PEACE IN WHICH ELECTIONS CAN BE HELD AND THEIR RESULTS RESPECTED.

3. THE CRUCIAL ROLE OF A COMMONWEALTH PEACE-KEEPING FORCE.

3.1 A SUBSTANTIAL COMMONWEALTH PEACE-KEEPING FORCE (ARMY AND POLICE), CAPABLE OF ENFORCING THE CEASEFIRE, IS A FUNDAMENTAL REQUIREMENT TO ACHIEVING THE CONFIDENCE AND SENSE OF SECURITY OF THE PARTIES. THIS WOULD ENCOURAGE THE OBSERVANCE OF THE CEASEFIRE.

3.2 THE CHOICE OF THE COMMONWEALTH STATES CONTRIBUTING TO THE PEACE-KEEPING FORCE WILL BE CRITICAL TO INSPIRE MUTUAL CONFIDENCE, AND IT MUST BE AGREED UPON BY THE CONFERENCE.

4. THE EFFECTIVE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE CEASEFIRE — A PROCESS.

THE PURPOSE OF THE CEASEFIRE IS TO ACHIEVE AN END TO FIGHTING AND ULTIMATELY TO ENSURE CONDITIONS OF POLITICAL FREEDOM FOR ELECTIONS. THE TEST BY WHICH TO DETERMINE WHETHER OR NOT THE CEASEFIRE HAS TAKEN EFFECT, IS WHETHER THE PROCESSES WHICH ENABLE FIGHTING TO STOP AND FREE POLITICAL ACTIVITY TO TAKE PLACE, HAVE OCCURED.

THE DECISION ON THE COMPLETION OF THESE PROCESSES MUST NOT BE ARBITRARY BUT MUST BE TAKEN BY AN EXPERT AUTHORITY — THE PROPOSED COMMONWEALTH CEASEFIRE SUPERVISORY COMMISSION—IN CONSULTATION WITH THE BELLIGERENTS AND THE GOVERNOR.

5. DEMARCATION OF CEASEFIRE LINES AND AREAS.

5.1 THE EXTENT OF MARTIAL LAW INDICATES THE DEGREE TO WHICH THE RHODESIAN REGIME'S CIVIL ADMINISTRATION HAS BEEN DISPLACED BY THE PATRIOTIC FRONT FORCES. THE PATRIOTIC FRONT IS NOT PREPARED TO SURRENDER ITS AREAS UNDER THE GUISE OF AGREEING TO A CEASEFIRE.

5.2 THE COMPLEXITY OF THE SITUATION DEMANDS THAT THE SEPARATION OF FORCES BE DEALT WITH IN TWO STAGES:— FIRST, THE BASIC DEMARCATION OF AREAS DOMINATED BY ONE SIDE OR THE OTHER AND THE DRAWING OF CEASEFIRE LINES: SECOND, IN ORDER TO PROVIDE THE NECESSARY POLITICAL FREEDOM FOR ELECTIONS, THE RE-GROUPING OF BOTH FORCES.

5.3 IT MUST BE PROVIDED THAT RE-GROUPING WILL TAKE PLACE IMMEDIATELY THE CEASEFIRE IS DECLARED TO BE EFFECTIVE. THIS WILL REDUCE THE POTENTIAL FOR BREACHES OF THE CEASEFIRE AND CONFLICT, AND ENHANCE THE COMMITMENT ON BOTH SIDES TO THE POLITICAL PROCESS.

6. THE REMOVAL OF STRUCTURAL OBSTACLES TO THE CEASEFIRE.

6.1 THERE ARE SERIOUS STRUCTURAL THREATS TO THE ESTABLISHMENT AND MAINTENANCE OF BOTH THE CEASEFIRE AND THE POLITICAL FREEDOM NECESSARY FOR FREE AND FAIR ELECTIONS IN THE RHODESIAN SYSTEM. THESE INCLUDE MILITARY

AND PARA-MILITARY UNITS, WHOSE SPECIALITY HAS BEEN THE COMMISSION OF ACTS INTENDED TO INCRIMINATE AND LIQUIDATE THE PATRIOTIC FRONT AND ITS SUPPORTERS. UNLESS THESE UNITS ARE DISBANDED THERE WILL BE A GRAVE RISK OF LARGE SCALE SUBVERSION OF THE CEASEFIRE.

6.2 A SEPARATE THREAT IS POSED BY THE EXISTENCE OF A VAST PRIVATE ARMOURY OF AUTOMATIC AND OTHER ARMS (CURRENTLY ESTIMATED AT 155,000 WEAPONS) IN THE HANDS OF RHODESIAN CIVILIANS.

6.3 THE CEASEFIRE AGREEMENT MUST PROVIDE THAT THESE UNITS ARE DISBANDED AND THE CIVIL POPULATION DISARMED.

7. SUPERVISION AND OBSERVATION OF THE CEASEFIRE.

7.1 THE PARTIES WILL BE RESPONSIBLE TO THE GOVERNOR FOR THE OBSERVANCE OF THE CEASEFIRE, SUBJECT TO THE MANDATE OF THE COMMONWEALTH PEACE-KEEPING FORCE TO SUPERVISE, MONITOR AND ENFORCE IT. THE GOVERNOR MAY GIVE DIRECTIONS TO BOTH FORCES TO OBSERVE THE RIGHTS AND DUTIES ESTABLISHED BY THE CEASEFIRE AGREEMENT.

7.2 THERE WILL BE A JOINT CEASEFIRE SUPERVISORY COMMISSION MADE UP OF REPRESENTATIVES OF BOTH FORCES WITH A BRITISH CHAIRMAN, TO ENSURE CO-OPERATION IN THE ESTABLISHMENT AND MAINTENANCE OF THE CEASEFIRE.

7.3 A COMMONWEALTH CEASEFIRE SUPERVISORY COMMISSION WILL BE ESTABLISHED, MADE UP OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE STATES PARTICIPATING IN THE COMMONWEALTH PEACE KEEPING FORCE, TO ASSIST IN THE ESTABLISHMENT AND MAINTENANCE OF THE CEASEFIRE.

8. LAW AND ORDER DURING THE CEASEFIRE.

8.1 THE POLICE FORCE IN RHODESIA IS A PART OF THE MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT AND UNDER MILITARY COMMAND. LAW AND ORDER DURING THE CEASEFIRE PERIOD, IT HAS BEEN AGREED, MUST BE MAINTAINED BY THE CIVIL POLICE. IT IS ESSENTIAL FOR THE CEASEFIRE AGREEMENT TO SET UP A CRITERIA AND MACHINERY FOR THE DETERMINATION AND ESTABLISHMENT OF THE CIVIL POLICE.

8.2 AGREEMENT MUST ALSO BE REACHED TO FACILITATE THE MOVEMENT AND USE OF CIVIL POLICE DURING THE CEASEFIRE.

9. THE EXCHANGE OF PRISONERS OF WAR.

9.1 PROVISION MUST BE MADE FOR THE EXCHANGE OF PRISONERS OF WAR IN THE CEASEFIRE AGREEMENT.

10. INTERNATIONAL CO-OPERATION IN RESPECT OF THE CEASEFIRE.

10.1 INTERNATIONAL INVOLVEMENT HAS BEEN AN INTEGRAL PART OF THE ARMED CONFLICT BETWEEN THE PATRIOTIC FRONT AND THE RHODESIAN REGIME. THE SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION OF THE FINAL PHASE OF THE STRUGGLE WILL LIKEWISE REQUIRE SIGNIFICANT INTERNATIONAL CO-OPERATION.

10.2 THIS WILL ENTAIL CO-OPERATION TO SUPPORT, AND TO ASSIST IN THE ORDERLY RETURN OF, ZIMBABWEAN REFUGEES AND OTHERS; IN THE REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL BORDERS, AND IN GENERAL TO RESPECT THE OUTCOME OF THE CONFERENCE.

10.3 SOUTH AFRICAN FORCES AND OTHER FOREIGN MILITARY PERSONNEL PRESENTLY IN THE COUNTRY MUST BE WITHDRAWN, AND UNDERTAKINGS GIVEN TO REFRAIN FROM INTERVENTION AND TO RESPECT THE SOVEREIGNTY AND THE RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION OF THE PEOPLE OF ZIMBABWE.

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PS/MR RIDLEY
PS/MR HURD
PS/PUS
SIR A DUFF
MR BULLARD
MR FRETWELL
LORD N G LENNOX
MISS BROWN
MR DAY
MR WILLSON
MR ASPIN
LORD BRIDGES

ADDITIONAL DISTN.
RHODESIA POLICY

Department AUSS
Drafted by
(Block Capitals) D M DAY
Tel. Extn. 233 6119

OUTWARD
TELEGRAM

Security Classification CONFIDENTIAL
Precedence FLASH
DESKBY

FOR COMMS. DEPT. USE	Despatched (Date) (Time)Z	POSTBY
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PREAMBLE

(Time of Origin) Z (G.M.T.) (Restrictive Prefix)
(Security Class.) CONFIDENTIAL (Caveat/ Privacy marking)
(Codeword) (Deskby) Z

TO FLASH LUSAKA Tel. No. of
(precedence) (post)

AND TO (precedence/post)

AND SAVING TO

REPEATED TO (for info) IMMEDIATE SALISBURY, PRETORIA, DAR ES SALAAM
PRIORITY MAPUTO, LUANDA, WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK, GABORONE

SAVING TO (for info)

Distribution: -

[TEXT]

Your telsnos 1278 and 1278...

1 On receipt of your telegrams under reference I immediately summoned the Zambian High Commissioner. Your telno 1729 arrived shortly before I saw the High Commissioner, who was accompanied by Mark Chona.

2 I informed the High Commissioner and Chona of the reports contained in your telegrams under reference. I pointed out that I had explained to both of them yesterday (my telno 965) that HMG had no responsibility for or authority over the Rhodesians. We had nothing to do with the recent attacks on Zambia. I had stressed repeatedly over the last ten weeks the need to reach an early agreement in the Lancaster House Conference as the longer it dragged on the more danger there was that the fighting would escalate. The sooner we could achieve a /ceasefire

Copies to: -

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ceasefire the better for all concerned. I added that, since both the High Commissioner and Chona had been informed of my views yesterday, it was all the more regrettable that our High Commission should be threatened in this way today. I added that HMG would hold the Zambian Government responsible for any harm to life or property in Lusaka or elsewhere in Zambia.

3 As regards President Kaunda's refusal to receive the Prime Minister's messages I found this incomprehensible and deeply distressing. It was particularly regrettable following the valuable discussions that had taken place between the President and the Prime Minister in London some ten days ago. The Prime Minister would be seeking to speak to President Kaunda on the telephone.

4 I added that I would, at a plenary session of the Conference this afternoon, urge the parties concerned ~~once again to refrain from~~ ^{agree immediately to stop} all cross border activity. I would appeal to General Walls to stop the attacks and to Nkomo to stop the infiltration.

5 I left the High Commissioner and Chona in no doubt of the seriousness with which HMG viewed the situation that had developed.

6 Chona made two points:

(a) he recalled that he had informed me yesterday (my telno 965) that President Kaunda would not read the Prime Minister's message unless Rhodesian attacks on Zambia stopped;

(b) Kaunda was under very great pressure from his people following the Rhodesian attacks and the killing of Zambian servicemen. It was impossible for him to restrain the Zambians from peaceful /demonstrations.

demonstrations. He ^{Chona} noted with satisfaction our latest report that the demonstrators had moved away from the High Commission. He added that Kaunda did not believe in violent demonstrations.

7 Chona implied that HMG must have had some prior information through ~~secret sources~~ of the planned Rhodesian raids on Zambia. I firmly denied that we had any such information and regretted that this accusation should be made. Chona said that if there were further Rhodesian attacks today this would further gravely impair the confidence between President Kaunda and HMG. I explained again to Chona that we were doing our very best to restrain the Rhodesians but he must realise that we did not exercise control over them.

J. C. J.
22/11

CONFIDENTIAL

GRS 500
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FM FCO 222118Z NOV 79

TO IMMEDIATE LUSAKA

TELEGRAM NUMBER 971 OF 22 NOVEMBER

AND TO IMMEDIATE MIRIMBA SALISBURY, NAIROBI, MAPUTO, GABORONE,
DAR ES SALAAM, LUANDA, LAGOS, WASHINGTON, PRETORIA, ADDIS ABABA,
MONROVIA, CANBERRA, OTTAWA, WELLINGTON, PRIORITY PEKING, MOSCOW,
PRAGUE, DAKAR, KINSHASA, KHARTOUM, TOKYO, EEC POSTS, KUWAIT,
KINGSTON, BRIDGETOWN, DACCA, NEW DELHI, SINGAPORE, GEORGETOWN,
FREETOWN, PORT LOUIS, PORT OF SPAIN, LILONGWE, VALLETTA, BANJUL,
COLOMBO, ACCRA, KUALA LUMPUR, NICOSIA, OSLO, STOCKHOLM, LISBON,
MADRID, ATHENS, MBABANE, ABIDJAN,

INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK

INFO SAVING NASSAU, MASERU, CASTRIES, SUVA, PORT MORESBY, HONIARA,
NUKUALOFA, VICTORIA, TARAWA, UKDEL NATO, SOFIA, BUDAPEST,
BUCHAREST, EAST BERLIN, BELGRADE, CAIRO, ALGIERS, TUNIS, TRIPOLI,
RABAT, TEHRAN.

RHODESIA: CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE

1. AT A PLENARY SESSION ON 22 NOVEMBER, I TABLED A PAPER
SETTING OUT OUR FULL PROPOSALS FOR A CEASE-FIRE AGREEMENT.
I ASKED FOR A REPLY FROM BOTH THE OTHER DELEGATIONS TO
OUR PROPOSALS BY 26 NOVEMBER. TEXTS OF MY STATEMENT AND
OF THE PAPER ARE BEING TELEGRAPHED IN VS . (POSTS IN FRONT LINE
CAPITALS PLEASE PASS TO YOUR U.S. COLLEAGUE).

2. TO DEAL WITH THE INCREASE IN TENSION BETWEEN ZAMBIA AND
RHODESIA I PROPOSED AN IMMEDIATE AGREEMENT WHICH WOULD
HAVE THE FOLLOWING ELEMENTS :

(A) THE RHODESIAN AUTHORITIES WOULD GIVE AN UNDERTAKING
THAT NO CROSS-BORDER OPERATIONS WOULD BE CARRIED OUT BY RHODESIA
INTO ZAMBIA :

(B) THE LEADERS OF THE PATRIOTIC FRONT WOULD GIVE AN UNDERTAKING
THAT, WITH IMMEDIATE EFFECT, NO FURTHER MOVEMENTS OF ARMED
PATRIOTIC FRONT PERSONNEL WOULD TAKE PLACE FROM ZAMBIA INTO
RHODESIA:

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(C) THE CO- OPERATION OF THE ZAMBIA AUTHORITIES WOULD BE ESSENTIAL TO BRING THE AGREEMENT INTO EFFECT.

I ADDED THAT THE PRIME MINISTER HAD BEEN IN TOUCH WITH PRESIDENT KAUNDA ABOUT THIS MATTER.

THE ELEMENTS OF THIS AGREEMENT WOULD TAKE EFFECT SIMULTANEOUSLY. I ASKED BOTH THE OTHER DELEGATIONS TO LET ME KNOW THEIR REACTIONS TO THIS PROPOSAL ON 23 NOVEMBER.

3. THE PATRIOTIC FRONT APPEARED TO REJECT THIS PROPOSAL. THEY SAID THE SALISBURY AUTHORITIES WERE THE AGGRESSORS: MY APPROACH SHOULD BE ADDRESSED EXCLUSIVELY TO THEM. MR NKOMO APPEARED AT ONE POINT TO CLAIM THAT NO GUERRILLAS WERE IN FACT BEING INFILTRATED FROM ZAMBIA INTO RHODESIA.

I REPLIED THAT IT WOULD BE TRAGIC IF THIS SERIOUS ATTEMPT TO REDUCE TENSION WERE REJECTED, AND ASKED THE PATRIOTIC FRONT TO RECONSIDER THEIR POSITION.

4. ON THE GENERAL CEASE-FIRE PROPOSALS THE PATRIOTIC FRONT ARGUED THAT THE CONFERENCE WAS NOT FOLLOWING THE CORRECT PROCEDURE. THERE MUST BE FURTHER DISCUSSION OF THEIR PAPERS AND OF THE VIEWS OF THE SALISBURY DELEGATION.

I SAID THAT I WAS MORE CONCERNED WITH SUBSTANCE THAN WITH PROCEDURE. THE SALISBURY DELEGATION HAD INDICATED THAT THEY WERE PREPARED TO NEGOTIATE ON THE BASIS OF THE PROPOSALS I HAD TABLED ON 16 NOVEMBER. I HAD STILL HAD NO RESPONSE FROM THE PATRIOTIC FRONT DELEGATION. AS CHAIRMAN , I HAD THEREFORE HAD TO LOOK FOR THE BEST METHOD OF ENABLING THE PARTIES TO REACH AGREEMENT. I WAS NOW ASKING BOTH SIDES TO LOOK CAREFULLY AT OUR FULL PROPOSALS AND RESPOND TO THEM ON 26 NOVEMBER. IF AGREEMENT COULD BE REACHED ON THESE, WE COULD PROCEED RAPIDLY TO FINALISE THE CEASE-FIRE ARRANGEMENTS.

5. THE PATRIOTIC FRONT'S REACTION TO MY TABLING FULL PROPOSALS ON THE CEASE-FIRE WAS ESSENTIALLY A DELAYING TACTIC IN VIEW OF THE FRONT LINE STATES' MEETING IN DAR ES SALAAM ON 24 AND 25 NOVEMBER.

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ON THE SUBSTANCE, THEY ARE FINDING IT DIFFICULT TO ARGUE AGAINST OUR CEASE-FIRE PROPOSALS.

IN PRIVATE THEY HAVE INDICATED THAT THEY APPROVE OF SOME ELEMENTS OF THEM: AND THE MOZAMBIQUE GOVERNMENT HAVE RESPONDED POSITIVELY. KNOMO'S REACTION TO MY PROPOSAL TO REDUCE TENSION BETWEEN RHODESIA AND ZAMBIA REFLECTS HIS CONCERN TO INFILTRATE AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE OF ZIPRA INTO RHODESIA BEFORE A CEASE-FIRE.

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SIR A DUFF
MR BULLARD
MR PRETWELL
LORD N G LENNOX
MISS BROWN
MR DAY
MR WILLSON
MR ASPIN

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RHODESIA POLICY

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MR WILLSON
MR DAY
LORD E G LENNOX
MR ASPIN

McGrouchy

MR R D WEDD-GERY
MR P M MAXBY
MR ~~D~~ EVERALL
MR P J FOWLER
DIO

CABINET
OFFICE

HD/RHOD DEPT (4)

HD/C AF D

HD/S AF D

HD/PUSD (2)

HD/NEWS DEPT

HD/END

SIR I. SINGCLAIR LEGAL ADVISER RM K174

MR PITCHER LEGAL ADVISER RM K161

~~RESIDENT CLERK~~

GRS 55

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FM LUSAKA 220830Z NOV 79

TO FLASH FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1279 OF 22 NOVEMBER

FROM NEILSON.

DEMONSTRATORS NUMBERING 1500 - 2000 CURRENTLY RINGING OFFICE
BOUNDARY FENCE WITH SOME 200 INSIDE PERIMETER. POLICE AND ARMY
PRESENT AND CURRENTLY HOLDING POSITION.

2. HIGH COMMISSIONER MAROONED AT U.S. EMBASSY.

3. WE ARE BATTENED DOWN AND WELL.

4. PLEASE MINIMISE TELEGRAPHIC TRAFFIC.

ALLINSON

FLASH

FLASH

TO
MR I GILMOUR
PB/EE LUCE
PB/FUB

PB/NO TO DOWNING STREET

MR WILLSON
MR DAY
LORD N G LENNOX
MR ASPIN

Mr Goulet
MR R D WADD-GERY
MR P H MAXBY
MR ~~D~~ EVERALL
MR P J FOWLER
DIO

CABINET
OFFICE

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DD/RHOD DEPT (4)
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SIR I. SINDIGA, LEGAL ADVISER RM K174
MR PIFCOF, LEGAL ADVISER RM K164
~~RESIDENT CLERK~~

PP LUANDA

PP WASHINGTON

GTS 230

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FM LUSAKA 220812Z NOV 79

TO FLASH FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1277 OF 22 NOVEMBER

INFO IMMEDIATE MIRIMBA SALISBURY, PRETORIA, DAR ES SALAAM,
PRIORITY MAPUTO, LUANDA AND WASHINGTON

RHODESIA

1. I WAS CALLED IN BY CHAKULYA AT 9.30 THIS MORNING. HE TOLD ME THAT HIS PURPOSE IN INVITING ME WAS TWOFOLD. HE WISHED TO RETURN THE LETTERS FROM MRS THATCHER THAT HAD BEEN SENT TO KAUNDA THROUGH THE CHIEF OF PROTOCOL SEMICLN KAUNDA HAD REFUSED TO SEE THIS MAIL AND HAD GIVEN NOTICE THAT HE WOULD NOT RECEIVE ANY MAIL FROM ANY PERSON IN THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT UNTIL FURTHER NOTICE. SECONDLY, THE GOVERNMENT OF ZAMBIA WAS EXTREMELY SHOCKED BY MY BEHAVIOUR IN CHALLENGING ANY PRESS STATEMENT MADE BY PRESIDENT KAUNDA. THE GOVERNMENT OF ZAMBIA BELIEVED THAT NO HIGH COMMISSIONER OR AMBASSADOR COULD CHALLENGE THE STATEMENT

BY MY BEHAVIOUR IN CHALLENGING ANY PRESS STATEMENT MADE BY
PRESIDENT KAUNDA. THE GOVERNMENT OF ZAMBIA BELIEVED THAT NO
HIGH COMMISSIONER OR AMBASSADOR COULD CHALLENGE THE STATEMENT
OF A HEAD OF STATE SINCE THE JOB OF AN AMBASSADOR OR HIGH
COMMISSIONER WAS MERELY TO REPORT TO HIS GOVERNMENT, AND IN
CONSEQUENCE THEY REGARDED MY STATEMENT AS A BREACH OF DIPLOMATIC
ETIQUETTE.

2. CHAKULYA REFUSED ALL FURTHER DISCUSSION. I TOLD HIM THAT I
HAD SEVERAL THINGS TO TELL HIM BUT I WOULD NOT NOW DO SO IN VIEW
OF HIS REFUSAL TO TALK.

3. FOREGOING FROM NEILSON. HIGH COMMISSIONER CURRENTLY UNABLE
TO ENTER OFFICE DUE TO DEMONSTRATION.

ALLINSON

NNNN



L. Carrington

Miss Chibesakunda

RECORD OF A CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH AFFAIRS AND THE ZAMBIAN HIGH COMMISSIONER AND MR MARK CHONA ON 22 NOVEMBER AT 10.10AM IN THE FCO.

Those present:

The Rt Hon The Lord Carrington KCMG MC	Her Excellency Miss L P Chibesakunda
Mr D M Day CMG	
Mr G G H Walden	Mr Mark Chona

1. Lord Carrington said that he had received two very serious pieces of news that morning. The first was that the Zambian Foreign Minister had returned to Sir Leonard Allinson the Prime Minister's letter to President Kaunda. The second was that there were 4,000 demonstrators surrounding the British High Commission in Lusaka and 2,000 were inside the perimeter [the figures should have been 2,000 and 200, and we are correcting this with the Zambian High Commission]. We had no firm reports yet about what damage had been done. The High Commissioner himself had not been able to return to the building after seeing the Foreign Minister this morning. We had however just received a telegram saying that the demonstrators had moved away from the Mission, which was protected by the police.
2. Lord Carrington said that he took a grave view of these two events. He had spoken to Mr Chona yesterday about accusations of British responsibility for Salisbury's actions against Zambia, and had made it clear that these activities were nothing to do with us, and that we neither condoned them nor had any responsibility for them. He had asked Mr Chona to pass this on immediately to the President. He had also stressed that the sooner a ceasefire were arranged and a Governor arrived in Salisbury, the sooner all this could be stopped. Since both Miss Chibesakunda and Mr Chona knew this and had presumably communicated this to their government and to the President, he greatly regretted what was happening, especially in the light of the useful talks which the President had had with the Prime Minister two weeks ago. He could not understand why President Kaunda was now refusing to communicate with us. The British Government would hold the Zambian Government fully responsible for British lives and property in Zambia. Zambia's actions were incomprehensible and deeply distressing. The Prime Minister was trying to reach the President on the telephone, but he was apparently not available at the moment.
3. There would be a plenary session of the Lancaster House Conference later today. He had stressed as long as ten weeks ago, when the Conference began, that undue delay in concluding the Conference could lead to the escalation of the war. We should try to achieve a ceasefire as quickly as possible. This afternoon he intended to appeal once again to General Walls to refrain from action against Zambia, and to Nkomo to refrain from movements across the border. He hoped that Miss Chibesakunda and Mr Chona would be good enough to report this to Lusaka.
4. Mr Chona recalled the two points he had made to Lord Carrington yesterday. Firstly, he had told him that the President had said he



would not read Mrs Thatcher's letters until he had seen that the attacks on the Zambian people had stopped. The President had told Mr Chona to remain composed in dealing with the British, since he himself was very angry. Mr Chona had worked for 12 years with the President, and knew exactly the kind of mood he was in. One of the bridges that had been destroyed had been rebuilt at a cost of £6,000,000, having already been destroyed by the Portuguese. We must realise that the President was under extreme pressure from the people, especially from the relatives of those who had been killed in Rhodesian attacks. These had included some young boys. It was impossible for the President to restrain the anger of the people. He had spoken to him late last night, and it was clear that the President was not in control of peaceful demonstrations. In Zambia, such demonstrations were legal, just as they were in the United Kingdom. He hoped that Lord Carrington had noted that the High Commission had benefitted from police assistance. Lord Carrington said that he had indeed noted this. Mr Chona said that if the President had condoned these demonstrations, it would have been another Tehran and Islamabad. But the President did not believe in this sort of thing.

5. As regards the Prime Minister's letter, Mr Chona said that he was authorised to re-state that the President wanted to wait and see whether further attacks were to be launched on Zambia, despite the help President Kaunda had given us in the negotiations.

6. Lord Carrington said that it was strange that two Commonwealth leaders who got on so well should not be able to communicate with each other. Mr Chona recalled that in 1968 the President had spoken to the press about breaking oil sanctions against Rhodesia. At that time the Zambians had been asked to have confidence in the British Government, but it had been revealed in the end that successive British Governments had broken the sanctions. All that remained of Zambian relations with Britain was the personal link between the President and Mrs Thatcher. Lord Carrington said that, if this was so, it was a pity the President refused to communicate with the Prime Minister.

7. At this point, Lord Carrington said that he had to leave to attend a Cabinet meeting. Mr Chona expressed surprise, denied that he had been late for the interview, and was restrained by Lord Carrington from walking out. He explained that the President's view was still that if there were further attacks on Zambia today that would be the last straw. Lord Carrington emphasised once more that we were doing our best to restrain Salisbury, but that we did not control them.

8. Mr Chona said that he would tell the press everything about his conversations with the Secretary of State, which were supposed to be confidential, if we said that he had been "summoned" to see the Foreign Secretary. (Mr Chona had in fact been invited to accompany Miss Chibesakunda if he wished.)

Rhodesia Dept

cc: PS/LPS CAfD
PS/Mr Luce News Dept
PS/PIUS

CONFIDENTIAL

DESKBY 220500Z

FM FCO 220005Z NOV 79

TO IMMEDIATE LUSAKA

TELEGRAM NUMBER 967 OF 22 NOVEMBER

INFO IMMEDIATE MIRIMBA SALISBURY, WASHINGTON, PRETORIA,
DAR ES SALAAM, GABORONE, LAGOS, LUANDA, MONROVIA, UKMIS NEW YORK.
YOUR TELNO 1275: RHODESIA

1. THE TWO BASIC POINTS YOU SHOULD TRY TO GET ACROSS TO
CHAKULYA ARE:

(1) THE ACCUSATIONS OF BRITISH COLLUSION OVER THESE RAIDS ARE
WHOLLY UNTRUE AND DEEPLY RESENTED HERE, PARTICULARLY AFTER THE
HIGHLY CONSTRUCTIVE ATMOSPHERE OF THE TALKS PRESIDENT KAUNDA
HAD WITH THE PRIME MINISTER AND ME

(2) UNLESS AND UNTIL THERE IS A BRITISH GOVERNOR IN SALISBURY
WE HAVE NO CONTROL OVER RHODESIAN ACTIONS.

2. YOU CAN TELL CHAKULYA THAT I SPOKE TO WALLS TODAY AND TOLD
HIM OF THE EFFECT OF THE RAIDS ON THE PROSPECTS OF A SETTLEMENT.
WALLS SAID THAT HE HAS SENT INSTRUCTIONS TO SALISBURY THAT NO
ATTACKS SHOULD BE MADE ON ZAMBIAN (AS OPPOSED TO ZIPRA) TARGETS.

3. FOR YOUR OWN INFORMATION THE RHODESIANS ARE LIKELY TO TAKE
FURTHER ACTION AGAINST ZIPRA CONTINGENTS IN ZAMBIA CLOSE TO
KARIBA IN THE IMMEDIATE VICINITY OF THE FRONTIER.

4. THE PRIME MINISTER DECIDED NOT TO TELEPHONE KAUNDA TODAY
BECAUSE I WAS DUE TO SPEAK TO THE ZAMBIAN HIGH COMMISSIONER
AND CHONA. (A RECORD OF MY CONVERSATION HAS ALREADY BEEN
TELEGRAPHED TO YOU) I ASKED CHONA TO REPORT TO PRESIDENT
KAUNDA MY ASSURANCES THAT THE UK GOVERNMENT WAS NOT INVOLVED
IN THE RHODESIAN ACTION IN ANY WAY, THAT WE HAD NO PRIOR
KNOWLEDGE, AND THAT THE THREAT TO THE SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION
OF THE NEGOTIATIONS POSED BY RECENT EVENTS RAN DIRECTLY COUNTER
TO WHAT WE HAD BEEN WORKING FOR DURING THE LAST TEN WEEKS.

5. I HOPE THAT CHONA WILL HAVE GOT THIS MESSAGE THROUGH TO
PRESIDENT KAUNDA AND THAT IT WILL HELP TO CALM HIM DOWN. WE
CAN CERTAINLY CONSIDER RECOMMENDING A TELEPHONE CALL FROM THE
PRIME MINISTER IF YOU THINK THIS ADVISABLE FOLLOWING YOUR
MEETING WITH CHAKULYA, AND PROVIDED YOU ARE REASONABLY CONFIDENT
THAT KAUNDA WILL NOT REFUSE TO TAKE THE CALL.

CARRINGTON

NNNN

110 / T148/79T

PRIME MINISTER'S

PERSONAL MESSAGE

SERIAL No. T148/79T

B/F 28/X1

(1)

RG MATE WILL DO KK!

cc ops +
Master

Prime Minister

A courteous, if not very
prompt, message. Reply in a
few days when the ^{final} outcome is
more predictable?

Handwritten initials and date: 21/X1

VZCZCWAG027

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DE WTE £9491 3251652

O 211700Z NOV 79

FM PRESIDENT CARTER

TO PRIME MINISTER THATCHER

ZEM

C O N F I D E N T I A L VIA CABINET OFFICE CHANNELS WH92181

NOVEMBER 21, 1979

DEAR MADAME PRIME MINISTER

YOU HAVE MY DEEPEST ADMIRATION ON THE BREAK-
THROUGH WHICH YOU ACHIEVED AT THE LANCASTER HOUSE
CONFERENCE ON THURSDAY. THERE IS NO QUESTION THAT
THE SKILL AND DIPLOMACY OF YOUR GOVERNMENT WERE
RESPONSIBLE FOR THIS RESULT. AS YOU ADDRESS THE
REMAINING ISSUES AT THE CONFERENCE, YOU MAY COUNT
ON MY CONTINUING SUPPORT.

CONGRATULATIONS AND BEST WISHES,

JIMMY CARTER

THE RIGHT HONORABLE
MARGARET THATCHER, M.P.
PRIME MINISTER
LONDON

0134
£9491

Handwritten initials: JWC

File No.
Department CAfD
Drafted by SANKEY
(Block Capitals)
Tel. Extn 233 4176

OUTWARD
TELEGRAM

21117

Security Classification
UNCLASSIFIED
Precedence IMMEDIATE
DESKBY 211900.....Z

FOR COMMS. DEPT. USE	Despatched (Date)..... (Time).....Z	POSTBYZ
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PREAMBLE

(Time of Origin).....Z(G.M.T.) (Restrictive Prefix).....
(Security Class.)... UNCLASSIFIED..... (Caveat/
Privacy Marking).....
(Codeword)..... (Deskby) 211900.....

To IMMEDIATE LUSAKA Tel. No..... of.....
(precedence) (post)

AND TO (precedence/post)
.....
.....

AND SAVING TO

REPEATED TO (for info) IMMEDIATE MIRIMBA, SALISBURY
PRIORITY TO WASHINGTON, DAR ES SALAAM, MAPUTO, GABORONE, LUANDA,
PRETORIA; LAGOS; UKMTS NEW YORK

SAVING TO (for info).....

Distribution:-
Rhodesian policy

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(TEXT)

RHODESIA/ZAMBIA : Your File no 1270

1. In reply to a Private Notice Question, the Lord Privy Seal made the following statement in the House of Commons this afternoon:

QUOTE
On 20 November President Kaunda announced the full mobilisation of his country's resources as a result of recent Rhodesian raids on bridges in Zambia. My Rt Hon Friend the Prime Minister sent a personal message to President Kaunda on 20 November expressing her concern and the Government's determination to bring all such incidents to a speedy end. My Rt Hon and Noble Friend is seeing the Zambian High Commissioner this afternoon.

.. /As

UNCLASSIFIED

As the House is aware, the persistent tension between Rhodesia and Zambia, of which this is the latest manifestation, is caused by the conflict in Rhodesia which we are trying to resolve through the Lancaster House Conference. We have come closer to a settlement than ever before. Any intensification of violence by either side at this stage is clearly contrary to the spirit of reconciliation which we are trying to create.

There is a heavy responsibility on all parties to the Conference to end the war quickly now that agreement on the political issues has been reached. And we call upon both sides to reach early agreement on the ceasefire on the basis of the proposals we have put forward'. UN QUOTE

2. Mr Peter Shore (Opposition Foreign Affairs Spokesman) referred to the contribution which President Kaunda made to the Lancaster House Conference and asked that representations should be made to the Rhodesian authorities to stop the raids. The Lord Privy Seal said that President Kaunda was a close friend of Britain ~~who~~ ^{and} had played an important part in the progress which had been achieved at Lancaster House. The British government had conveyed their views on the recent raids to the Salisbury

.../delegation

UNCLASSIFIED

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

UNCLASSIFIED

2.

delegation *and had used restraint.*

3. In reply to questions about compensation to Zambia for destruction caused by the raids, and the possibility of British technical assistance to help repair the damage, the Lord Privy Seal said that while HMG could accept no responsibility for damage caused by the Rhodesians, ^{we} ~~they~~ ^{wish to} play _{our} ~~their~~ part in assisting Zambia to restore her infrastructure once the ceasefire had been agreed.

Smy
26/11

UNCLASSIFIED

21 November 1979

BY PRIVATE NOTICE

*C Mr William Shelton (Lambeth, Streatham): To ask the Lord Privy Seal, if he will make a statement on the mobilization of Zambian Military forces against Zimbabwe-Rhodesia.

SIR IAN GILMOUR

On the 20th of November President Kaunda announced that Zambia had been placed on full alert and that the country's resources would be mobilised to meet the situation resulting from the Rhodesian raids on bridges in Zambia. My right honourable Friend the Prime Minister sent a personal message to President Kaunda on the 20th of November expressing her regret at the loss of human life and the disruption of Zambia's economy as a result of the Rhodesian conflict. My right honourable and noble Friend will be seeing the Zambian High Commissioner this afternoon.

These developments underline the urgent need for the earliest possible agreement on a ceasefire on the proposals we have tabled at Lancaster House.

RHODESIA POLICY ADVANCED COPIES #28

PS

PS/OFR I GLENDON

PS/NE LUCE

PS/FOS

MR WILLSON

MR DAY

LORD N G LENNOX

MR ASPIN

PS/NO 10 DOWNING STREET

MR R D WADE-GERY

MR P M MAXBY

McGowry MR ~~D~~EVERALL

MR P J FOWLER

DIO

CABINET
OFFICE

HD/BIOD DEPT (4)

HD/C AF D

HD/S AF D

HD/PUSD (2)

HD/NEWS DEPT

HD/WAD

SIR I SINCLAIR LEGAL ADVISER RM K174

MR FITCOFF LEGAL ADVISER RM K161

RESIDENT CLERK

Annie Smith (2)

Paul

20.11.79

GPS 670

CONFIDENTIAL

DESKBY 220800Z

FN MAPUTO 211640Z NOV 79

TO IMMEDIATE FCC

TELEGRAM NUMBER 419 OF 21 NOVEMBER

INFO LUSAKA GABORONE DAR ES SALAAM MIRIMBA SALISBURY UKMIS NEW YORK
WASHINGTON LUANDA LAGOS

MIPT AND YR TELNO 157: RHODESIA

IMMEDIATE

1. I DELIVERED THE PRIME MINISTER'S MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT MACHEL. HE READ IT CAREFULLY NODDING AGREEMENT SEVERAL TIMES. HE SAID THAT AS FAR AS HE WAS CONCERNED THERE WAS HARDLY ANY REASON FOR FURTHER NEGOTIATIONS, THE REAL OBJECTIVES OF THE 'STRUGGLE' AND THE LONDON CONFERENCE HAVING ALREADY BEEN ACHIEVED THROUGH AGREEMENT BOTH ON A CONSTITUTION AND ON THE INTERIM AND ELECTORAL ARRANGEMENTS. THE WAR SHOULD THEREFORE HAVE BEEN OVER BY NOW. IT IS IMMORAL FOR PEOPLE STILL TO BE DYING WHEN ALL THAT REMAINS TO BE DONE IS SOME INTENSIVE 'PSYCHOLOGICAL' WORK ON THE FF AND THE SALISBURY FORCES WHO HAD BEEN AT EACH OTHER'S THROATS FOR SO LONG.

FOR SO LONG.

2. HE HAD HEARD THAT WE EXPECTED TO REACH AGREEMENT ON A CEASE-FIRE WITHIN 7-10 DAYS. WAS THIS INDEED OUR TIME-SCALE? I SAID THAT WE WOULD BE DELIGHTED FOR AGREEMENT TO BE REACHED THIS VERY DAY. THE 7-10 DAY PERIOD MENTIONED BY US WAS WHAT WE BELIEVED WOULD BE NECESSARY FOR THE CEASE-FIRE TO BECOME FULLY EFFECTIVE. UNLIKE CHISSANO AND VIEIRA (MY TELNO 416) HE DID NOT DEMUR. HE SAID THAT WHAT WAS NOW REQUIRED WAS GOOD ORGANISATION TO ENSURE THE MAINTENANCE OF THE CEASE-FIRE, THE AVOIDANCE OF CROSS-BORDER INCIDENTS (HE DID NOT MENTION THE ZAMBIA RAIDS) AND THE RETURN TO THEIR HOMES OF THE REFUGEES. THERE WERE 150,000 OF THEM IN MOZAMBIQUE ALONE BUT FORTUNATELY THEY CAME FROM AREAS CLOSE TO THE BORDER. WITH THE HELP OF OURSELVES AND THE UNITED NATIONS, AND WITH THE USE OF RAILWAYS AND TRUCKS THE JOB OF REPATRIATION WAS MANAGEABLE. I CONFIRMED THAT IT WAS INDEED OUR CONCERN THAT THE REFUGEES SHOULD BE REPATRIATED AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. GIVEN WHAT THE PRESIDENT SAID ABOUT THE PROXIMITY OF THEIR TRIBAL AREAS, THERE WAS NO REASON WHY MANY OF THEM SHOULD NOT BE BACK IN TIME TO VOTE IN THE ELECTIONS.

3. HE INDICATED THAT HE HAD BEEN IN TOUCH WITH OTHER FRONT LINE LEADERS, ESPECIALLY AS ZAMBIA, AND TO A LESSER EXTENT BOTSWANA, WOULD BE AFFECTED BY ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE CEASE-FIRE AND THE REFUGEES. HE HAD HAD A MEETING WITH HIS CABINET AND MILITARY ADVISERS SHORTLY BEFORE HE SAW ME AND I WOULD BE RECEIVING THEIR IDEAS IN WRITING SOON. IN THE MEANTIME HE ASKED IF I COULD LET HIM HAVE THE FULL TEXT OF THE PF COUNTER-PROPOSALS FOR THE CEASE-FIRE. I PROMISED TO TRY AND GET THEM FROM YOU QUICKLY (SEE MIPT). FROM THE LITTLE THAT I HAD HEARD ABOUT THEM, THEY HAD MUCH COMMON GROUND WITH OURS; BUT A MAJOR DIVERGENCE OF VIEWS WAS OVER A PF SUGGESTION THAT AREAS OF CONTROL SHOULD BE DEMARCATED AND ASSIGNED TO EACH OF THE TWO SIDES. WE FOUND THIS UTTERLY IMPRACTICABLE AND UNACCEPTABLE. IT WAS ESSENTIAL FOR THE BRITISH GOVERNOR TO BE IN CONTROL OF THE WHOLE TERRITORY, THE COMMANDERS OF THE OPPOSING FORCES BEING ONLY RESPONSIBLE TO HIM FOR THE MAINTENANCE OF THE CEASE-FIRE. THE PRESIDENT AGREED EMPHATICALLY. WHILE A DEMARCATION WAS FEASIBLE IN THE CASE OF MOZAMBIQUE IT WAS QUITE OUT OF THE QUESTION IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF RHODESIA. AT THE TIME WHEN FRELIMO WAS DISCUSSING CEASE-FIRE AND PEACE-KEEPING WITH THE PORTUGUESE FRELIMO COULD DEMONSTRATE THAT IT HAD ABSOLUTE TERRITORIAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROL OF A LARGE SECTION OF THE COUNTRY WITH SCHOOLS, HOSPITALS AND OTHER SOCIAL SERVICES. THIS WAS PATENTLY

SCHOOLS, HOSPITALS AND OTHER SOCIAL SERVICES. THIS WAS PATENTLY NOT THE CASE IN RHODESIA. NOR WOULD A PEACE-KEEPING FORCE, WHATEVER ITS SIZE, BE THE ANSWER. UNLESS THERE WAS A GENERAL WILLINGNESS TO ABIDE BY CEASE-FIRE ARRANGEMENTS NO FORCE COULD PREVENT PEOPLE FROM SHOOTING AT EACH OTHER. HE REPEATED WHAT HE HAD SAID AT MY CREDENTIALS CEREMONY ABOUT THE NEED FOR REPLACING SHOOTING, REVENGE AND ANIMOSITY WITH UNITY, HARMONY AND CO-OPERATION.

4. ALTHOUGH HE DID NOT SPECIFICALLY SAY SO THE PRESIDENT WAS CLEARLY SPEAKING OFF THE CUFF AND CONFIDENTIALLY. (HE SAID ALMOST IN AS MANY WORDS THAT THEIR STATEMENT OF 3 NOVEMBER WAS JUST FOR PUBLIC CONSUMPTION.) PLEASE SEE PARA 8 OF MYTEL NO 371 OF 3 NOVEMBER ABOUT THE MOZAMBICANS' SENSITIVITY REGARDING BILATERAL EXCHANGES.

PAPADOPOULOS

IMMEDIATE

NNN

SENT AT 211806ZMEC/DGB



Commonwealth Information

NEWS RELEASE
79/33

21 November 1979

BOMBING RAIDS ON ZAMBIA

Statement by Commonwealth High Commissioners

Following consultations in London yesterday Commonwealth High Commissioners unanimously expressed a sense of outrage over recent bombing raids on Zambian bridges and other vital economic installations, and their resulting loss of life.

Whatever their motivation, these attacks they felt do not assist the process of negotiation at Lancaster House or the wider cause of peace in Southern Africa. They dangerously escalate the conflict at a moment of great delicacy in the negotiations and could imperil the very ceasefire that the Commonwealth's enlightened political efforts at Lusaka have brought so near. The Commonwealth as a whole has a deep concern for ensuring that these negotiating efforts should not be prejudiced.

President Kaunda's heroic contributions to the cause of peace in Southern Africa commands the respect of the entire Commonwealth. High Commissioners expressed their Governments solidarity with him and the people of Zambia and their condemnation of these acts of wanton destruction.

Copies To:

PS / No 10 ✓

Mr. Fowler, Cabinet office

PS

PS / LPS

PS / Mr. Blaker

PS / Mr. Huce

PS / PUS

Mr. Stratton

Mr. Day

Mr. N. Aspin

Mr. Bardsley SAF-D

Mr. Kenwick, Rhod Dpt

Mr. J.M. Wilson

Mr. P.S. McLean, ODA

Mr. I.A. Roberts, Canberra

M+C/D

EA/D

Mr. Sarkey CAF-D

COMMONWEALTH
SECRETARIAT
Marlborough House
London SW1Y 5HX
01-839 3411

COMMONWEALTH SECRETARIAT

CABLES: COMSECGEN LONDON SW1
TELEX: 27678
TELEPHONE: 01-839 3411 Ext:

MARLBOROUGH HOUSE,
PALL MALL,
LONDON, SW1Y 5HX

Your ref:

Our ref: C.151/4/2

21 November 1979

Commonwealth Committee on Southern Africa

Notice of Meeting

As agreed by High Commissioners at the Briefing Meeting on Tuesday, 21 November, a meeting of the Commonwealth Committee on Southern Africa will be held at Marlborough House on Friday, 23 November at 4.00 p.m.

The purpose of the meeting will be to discuss the question of Commonwealth observers in the elections to be held in Zimbabwe pursuant to a successful conclusion of the Lancaster House Conference.

The relevant papers for the meeting are:

- 1) Circular Letter No.75/79 dated 19 November 1979
- 2) Circular Letter No.76/79 dated 19 November 1979

Copies To:

PS / No 10 ✓

MR. FOWLER, CABINET OFFICE

PS

PS / LPS

PS / Mr. Blaker

PS / Mr. Huce

PS / PUS

Mr. Stratton

Mr. Day

Mr. N. Aspin.

Mr. Barder SAFD

Yours sincerely

M. Malhoutra

M. Malhoutra
Committee Secretary

Mr. Rennie } Rhod
Miss. Spencer } Dept

Mr. J. M. Wilson

Mr. P. S. Mclean ODA

Mr. I. A. Roberts, Canberra

M + C D

EAD

Mr. Sankey CDFD

COMMONWEALTH SECRETARIAT

CABLES: COMSECGEN LONDON SW1
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TELEPHONE: 01-839 3411 Ext:

MARLBOROUGH HOUSE,
PALL MALL,
LONDON, SW1Y 5HX

Your ref:
Our ref:

C. 151/4/2

16 November 1979

CONFIDENTIAL

Commonwealth Committee on Southern Africa

Attached is a copy of the minutes of the Committee's meeting on 8 November 1979.

M. Malhoutra

M Malhoutra
Secretary
Commonwealth Committee on
Southern Africa

Encl.

CONFIDENTIAL

CSA(79) Sixth Meeting

COMMONWEALTH COMMITTEE ON SOUTHERN AFRICA

MINUTES of the Meeting of the Committee on
Southern Africa held at Marlborough House on Thursday,
8 November 1979 at 6.00 pm.

Present:

H.E. Mr Eustace Seignoret
High Commissioner for Trinidad and Tobago
(in the Chair)

Australia

H.E. Sir Gordon Freeth
High Commissioner

Mr M. Curtin
Minister (Political)

Mr R. Burns
Counsellor

Botswana

Mr M.L. Selepeng
Acting High Commissioner

Mr I.J. Legwaila
Senior Private Secretary
to President

Canada

Mr A. N. Robinson
First Secretary

The Gambia

H.E. Mr B.O. Semega-Janneh
High Commissioner

Grenada

H.E. Mr Fennis Augustine
High Commissioner

India

Mr Arif Qamarain
Counsellor

The Bahamas

H.E. Mr R.F. Anthony Roberts
High Commissioner

Bangladesh

H.E. Mr A.R.S. Doha
High Commissioner

Britain

Mr N. Aspin
Under Secretary, FCO

Mr R. Baltrop
Head of CCD, FCO

Mr D. Moore
Rhodesia Dept., FCO

Cyprus

Mr D. Papasavvas
First Counsellor

Ghana

H.E. Mr E.M. Debrah
High Commissioner

Guyana

H.E. Dr C.H. Grant
High Commissioner

Mr C.J.E. Barker
Deputy High Commissioner

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Jamaica

H.E. Mr Ernest G. Peart
High Commissioner

Mr A. M. Thompson
Counsellor

Malaysia

Mr A. Hasmy
Counsellor

Mauritius

H.E. Sir L. Teelock
High Commissioner

Nigeria

H.E. Mr S.U. Yolah
High Commissioner

H.E. Mr E. Oba
High Commissioner to Zambia

Mr J.K. Shinkaiye
Counsellor (Political)

Singapore

H.E. Mr Jek Yeun Thong
High Commissioner

Mr Low Choon Ming
Minister-Counsellor

St. Lucia

H.E. Dr Claudius C. Thomas
High Commissioner

Tanzania

H.E. Mr A.J. Nsekela
High Commissioner

Mr L. Howell
Counsellor

Kenya

Mr J.K. Kimani
Counsellor

Malawi

Mr Ben J.W. Sani
First Secretary

Malta

Mr Richard Lapira
First Secretary

New Zealand

Mr B.J. Lynch
Deputy High Commissioner

Mr P.R. Bennett
Counsellor

Seychelles

H.E. Mr B. Loustau-Lalanne
High Commissioner

Sierra Leone

Dr S.T. Matturi
High Commissioner

Sri Lanka

Mr Y.L.M. Zawahir
First Secretary

Swaziland

Mr E.M. Nhlabathi
Counsellor

Uganda

H.E. Eng. J.M.N. Zikusoka
High Commissioner

Zambia

Mr E.N. Nyirenda
Deputy High Commissioner

Mr L.K. Mtesa
Director, African Affairs, M/D & FA

H.E. Mr Shridath S. Ramphal
Commonwealth Secretary-General

CONFIDENTIAL

Commonwealth Secretariat

Mr E.C. Anyaoku
Mr D. Anderson
Mr R. Brown
Mr J.R. Syson
Mrs P.B. Robertson
Dr A.C. Bundu
Mr C. Laidlaw
Mr H. Craft
Mr Mark Robinson
Miss A. Cassam
Miss A.R. Horwich
Mr D. Sankey

MINUTES

1. The Chairman welcomed representatives to the meeting and said that he knew they would be surprised at the convening of the Committee at such short notice. Earlier in the day he had received requests from a number of representatives to convert the informal briefing session scheduled for that evening into a formal meeting of the Committee because of developments in connection with the Lancaster House Conference on Rhodesia since the last briefing session. Some representatives had described these developments as "dramatic" and he was sure that the Committee would wish to review and exchange views on the rapidly moving events that had taken place. There was no specific agenda but he believed that representatives might wish to make statements. However, he invited representatives to decide first of all whether a formal meeting of the Southern Africa Committee should be convened.

2. The Representative of Canada said that he had been asked by his Acting High Commissioner to express the view that the essential difference between the formal meetings of the Committee on Southern Africa and the informal briefing sessions, apart from their chairmanship, was that for the meetings of the Committee an agenda was circulated and all the representatives spoke explicitly on behalf of their Governments, acting on their instructions. Canada's Acting High Commissioner had not been able to receive instructions precisely because there had not been sufficient time to do so; nor had any agenda been circulated. It would be impossible therefore for his delegation to participate at the meeting in a constructive manner, or perhaps even to lend its support to any consensus that might emerge.

3. The Chairman said that he had spoken with the Acting Canadian High Commissioner at 11.35 that morning about the possibility of convening a meeting of the Committee but had not had an opportunity to contact him again to convey the widespread support that had been expressed in favour of holding a meeting.

However, even at this stage if there was an overwhelming feeling against holding a meeting then the Committee would not of course meet.

4. The Representative of Australia said his views were similar to those expressed by his Canadian colleague and he also had had no time to receive instructions.

5. The British Representative said he had some difficulty in participating in a substantial manner as his colleagues who were more intimately involved with the Lancaster House negotiations and who normally attended the briefing sessions and meetings of the Committee were either engaged in the talks between Mrs Thatcher and President Kaunda at 10 Downing Street or were in the House of Commons for the debate on the Southern Rhodesia Bill.

6. The Representative of Nigeria suggested that the purpose of requesting a meeting of the Committee that evening was to provide an opportunity for representatives to exchange views on the rapidly unfolding events in connection with the Lancaster House Conference in order to assist the parties thereto. Although the procedural points raised by the Canadian representative were of importance, they should not necessarily be regarded as barriers to a productive discussion. There were occasions when specific developments occurred which did not require the circulation of an agenda but on which the Chairman's consultations revealed the necessity of convening a special meeting. He had himself endorsed the idea of a Committee meeting because he knew the topic for discussion would be the Lancaster House Conference and there was therefore no need for any agenda since all representatives were thoroughly familiar with the issues. He appealed to those members who had expressed reservations on procedural grounds not to take too strict a stand. Everyone had a clear desire to assist the negotiations and the attempt to convene a formal meeting of the Committee should be seen as a constructive move, given the fact that these negotiations stemmed from the Lusaka accord. Moreover, all representatives had a duty to ensure that the Lusaka

Communique was kept constantly in mind and put in proper perspective.

7. The Representative of Tanzania said that he had agreed on the need to convene a meeting of the Committee because matters were moving swiftly and as representatives of the Commonwealth they had an obligation to constantly consult with each other on developments at Lancaster House, a matter that had been fully reaffirmed in the minutes of the last Committee meeting. There was a need to keep reminding those at Lancaster House of the Committee's understanding of the Lusaka accord and to reassure them of the Commonwealth's readiness to assist in every way possible. In his view representatives had a duty to advise their Governments on developments. A Bill had been placed before Parliament, a matter on which representatives might not necessarily take a position but about which they might wish to exchange views as to whether it was in harmony with what had been agreed to at Lusaka. He urged the need for a re-commitment to the Lusaka spirit and expressed concern about reports that the British Government might be preparing for a "second best solution" emerging from Lancaster House. However, it had to be borne in mind that the Lusaka Communique had explicitly affirmed that Commonwealth recognition could only be accorded on the basis of an agreement between all the parties to the conflict. Referring representatives to paragraph 15(i) of the Communique, he pointed out that at Lusaka it had been agreed that sanctions would only be lifted after a settlement had been reached which involved all the parties to the conflict. An atmosphere of uncertainty now surrounded the Lancaster House talks and it was therefore desirable for representatives to rededicate themselves again to what their Governments had undertaken at Lusaka and give encouragement to those negotiating at Lancaster House. It had been agreed at Lusaka that there would be a Commonwealth role in the interim arrangements in the form of Commonwealth observers and it would similarly be useful for the Committee to explore and develop that role. The Committee should reaffirm the Lusaka accord and ensure that no party was attempting to act in variance with it.

8. The Representative of Sierra Leone acknowledged that some representatives may not have received instructions from their Governments regarding the meeting but felt that the Chairman must have had good reason for summoning representatives. He supported the convening of the Committee in the light of recent developments. However, he would first of all wish to be briefed on the latest developments.
9. The Representative of The Bahamas supported the view expressed by the representative of Sierra Leone.
10. The Representative of Canada explained that he did not in any way question the importance of holding a meeting to make possible an exchange of views but felt he should reiterate that his delegation would not be able to participate constructively and this probably included its not being able to subscribe to any consensus that might emerge since it had not received any instructions from its Government.
11. The Chairman said he had called the meeting at the request of certain members and he did not feel that they should belabour the procedural point. Summing up the position, he said that some representatives had questioned the holding of a formal meeting on procedural grounds while others had indicated that these grounds were not a real issue. His impression was however, that no one had explicitly objected to the meeting taking place.
12. The Representative of Tanzania said it would be important for representatives to have a common understanding on the role of Commonwealth observers in the transitional period. Although the reference to Commonwealth observers in the Lusaka accord represented a compromise, there was a general understanding that Commonwealth observers would have a substantive role and not merely serve as witnesses. This understanding needed to be spelt out so that everyone could know "the rules of the game".

13. The Representative of Nigeria felt there was great value in exchanging views about recent developments at Lancaster House as well as the speeches in Parliament in the context of the Lusaka accord. The Nigerian Government had a clear understanding of the Lusaka accord. It understood that the Lancaster House agreement would involve all the parties to the conflict and that it did not expect the British Government to reach an agreement with only one of the parties. If such a possibility had been discussed in Lusaka, the Nigerian Government would not have accepted the accord and it was disturbed by the new idea of a "second-best solution". The present meeting provided an opportunity for representatives to state their understanding of the Lusaka accord. He pointed out that it had been understood in Lusaka that both sanctions and the cease-fire were linked to the achievement of a lasting settlement to the Rhodesia problem, referring in this connexion to paragraph 15(i) of the Lusaka accord. His Government's understanding was that sanctions would only be lifted in the context of the implementation of such a settlement. It also expected that representatives of the Commonwealth would be involved in an observer role which would find fuller expression in the interim arrangements making it clear that that role would not be superficial. At an earlier meeting he had proposed, with the subsequent support of the Canadian representative, a substantial and substantive role for Commonwealth observers and that the Secretariat should have responsibility for co-ordinating it. He wished this understanding to be expressed in a statement which he hoped the Committee could agree on at the end of the meeting.

The Representative of Tanzania said he would like to seek clarification from the meeting as to whether there was a shared understanding on the following four points:

- (i) that whatever solution emerged from Lancaster House must have the agreement of all the parties to the conflict;
- (ii) that the lifting of sanctions as envisaged in paragraph 15(i) of the Lusaka accord would be conditional on agreement being reached by all the parties to the Lancaster House Conference;

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- (iii) that Commonwealth countries continued to have faith and confidence that such an agreement could be reached at the Conference; and
- (iv) that the Commonwealth should have a substantive observer role in the transitional period.

He would like an exchange of views on all four points and also on the nature and scope of the Commonwealth observer role and the machinery for putting it into effect.

15. The Representative of Ghana said that the previous deliberations of the Committee had always had as their objective the achievement of peace in Rhodesia and he believed that the Commonwealth had a valuable role to play in pursuit of this objective. However, the Commonwealth was worried by the character of recent speeches in the British Parliament. According to the Lord Privy Seal the Southern Rhodesia Bill was being put through to enable interim arrangements to be implemented. Reading the Lord Carrington's statement of 7 November, one would gain the impression that there had been agreement both on the constitution and the interim arrangements and that furthermore the powers of the Governor had also been agreed by all the parties: "The Salisbury delegation have accepted the proposals which the Government have put to them as a basis for a settlement. The Patriotic Front have also accepted the principles of a British Governor and new elections. We are therefore very close to a settlement which is fully consistent with the Communique of the Meeting of Heads of Government in Lusaka". This statement did not appear to be in accordance with the briefings that had been given so far. At an earlier briefing session, representatives had been told that the Patriotic Front had not yet given a response to the British proposals on the interim arrangements and this was in fact reflected in the statement by Sir Ian Gilmour to the House of Commons on 7 November, in which he also conceded that the matter of the cease-fire was still outstanding. But if this most important question was indeed still outstanding, how could it be maintained

that the Conference was close to a settlement? How could such a claim be reconciled with the stipulation in the Lusaka accord that both the cease-fire and the interim arrangements must be accepted by all the parties?

16. The Committee should bear in mind that in the case of Rhodesia there had been a rebellion against the Crown, which the metropolitan Power had been unable or unwilling to quell; a war of national liberation had therefore been launched and a situation had developed in which the British Government did not have the ability to impose a solution. Failure to reach agreement with the Patriotic Front at Lancaster House could intensify the war in Rhodesia, and it was only with their agreement that a genuine settlement could be achieved. The point had recently been made in Parliament with regard to the need to reach agreement by all parties, that a veto should not be placed in the hands of the Patriotic Front. But the Patriotic Front was not in fact exercising a veto. It had made a proposal for a six-month transitional period before the elections and this proposal, which seemed perfectly reasonable to many Commonwealth members, had been turned down. Who then was exercising a veto?

17. The Ghanaian representative said he had been very much disturbed by the recent exchange in Parliament between Mr Silkin and Sir Ian Gilmour. Replying to Mr Silkin's request for an assurance that there would be no implementation of the enabling legislation until there was agreement by all the parties, Sir Ian Gilmour had suggested that such a procedure would be tantamount to giving a veto to one of the parties and that this would be contrary to the Lusaka accord. In this connection, he drew attention to The Guardian editorial that morning which he read out as follows :

"In the absence of convincing and worthy reasons for such haste, less worthy suspicions inevitably bubble up. Those suspicions take two forms. First, there is the question of internal Conserv-

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ative discipline. Sanctions - at least those sanctions imposed under the 1965 Southern Rhodesia Act - lapse on November 14. If the planned legislation is on the statute book by then, sanctions will stay lapsed (although the Government would retain the theoretical right to reimpose them) and an embarrassing Conservative revolt would be avoided.

Then there is the possibility of the enabling legislation being used to put pressure on the Patriotic Front. All the indications are that the Government is less confident than it sometimes pretends of gaining the endorsement of the Patriotic Front, particularly for the terms and conditions of a ceasefire. Enabling legislation - coupled with the proposition, repeated several times yesterday by Sir Ian, that no party can expect a veto over the final agreement - would allow Lord Carrington to threaten the Patriotic Front with an imposed solution. Such an exercise in realpolitik might, just about, be justified by success. But the price, and the implication, of failure are large indeed."

These words very much expressed his own fears, and for this reason he was anxious that the meeting should be fully briefed on recent developments at Lancaster House.

18. The Representative of The Gambia strongly questioned the value of holding the meeting at the very time that the Chairman of the Lusaka Meeting, President Kaunda of Zambia, was discussing the questions involved with the British Prime Minister. He proposed that the Committee should invite President Kaunda to address it so that it could be informed about their discussions. Armed with such information, representatives would be better able to make constructive suggestions to their own Governments.

19. The Representative of Tanzania informed the meeting that the representatives of the Frontline States had earlier in the day met with President Kaunda and had informed him that a meeting of the Committee was likely to be held later that day. He did not therefore think it was proper to invite President Kaunda to address the Committee.

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20. The Representative of Canada said he wished to clarify the statement he had made in the briefing session on 6 November in which he had referred to earlier remarks on the Commonwealth observer role by the representative of Nigeria. The essence of his statement on 6 November was that the Canadian Government was considering the role of Commonwealth observers but had not yet come to any conclusions with regard to the commitments that it had made on this subject at Lusaka. Therefore his observation on 6 November that all delegations should be working on this issue had been intended to convey the point that his own Government had not yet reached definite conclusions and should not necessarily be interpreted as supporting the particular views put forward by the Nigerian representative.

21. The Representative of Guyana said the earlier procedural discussion could have been avoided if representatives had been fully briefed, in the spirit of Commonwealth solidarity, and had been told that the British Government was about to resort to the action taken in Parliament on 7 November. He himself was in the enviable position of having a clear-cut brief from his Government to emphasise that Sir Ian Gilmour's statement that the British Government would lift sanctions by not renewing Section 2 of the Southern Rhodesia Act 1965 was contrary to the expectations of the Lusaka accord. He recalled that at a briefing session two weeks earlier Sir John Graham had made the point that it would not be logical for the British Government to continue sanctions after a Governor had been installed. However, he also recalled the intervention made by the Ghanaian representative at an earlier meeting on this particular point, that sanctions must not be related only to constitutional matters but also to issues such as the cease-fire. Now a situation had emerged in which the British Government proposed that part of its sanctions legislation would be lifted even before a Governor had been appointed. It appeared that the British Government was not following the Lusaka accord as closely as the situation warranted but was moving farther away from it. In the view of his own Government any attempt by the British Government to reach a unilateral agreement with one party or

another would not receive the support of the Commonwealth. His Government also held the view that the role, function and status of Commonwealth observers were issues which should be determined by the Commonwealth as a whole and it was appropriate for the Committee to begin an in-depth exchange of views on this matter rather than await further briefings from the British Government.

22. The Representative of Mauritius observed that events have been moving very fast and the Chairman would have been failing in his duty had he not called this emergency meeting. Most representatives were not quite satisfied about the way in which the enabling Bill was being rushed through Parliament. He wondered whether the session of the Lancaster House Conference scheduled for 9 November would not be the final one, in view of the proceedings that were currently taking place in Parliament.

23. The Representative of Jamaica agreed with the representative of Guyana that the British Government had not kept them fully apprised of developments at the briefing sessions for he had in fact learnt more from the newspapers. He gathered that no negotiations were actually going on at Lancaster House at the present time, as one party had apparently been told to "take-it-or-leave-it", which was not the approach envisaged in the Lusaka accord. He had specific instructions to say that his Government was not satisfied with the way the Conference was being conducted; he hoped it was not "indecent haste". He said he felt most distressed by the statements made by British Ministers in Parliament; he could not see any reason for rushing the Bill through Parliament especially since no agreement had been reached at Lancaster House. If the conduct of the negotiations continued in this way, he doubted whether his Government would wish to play any role at all in the elections. The period allowed for holding the elections was quite insufficient for arranging the necessary machinery. Various questions were still unresolved: what would happen to the armed forces during the interim period and would both forces receive official recognition in the interim period? These were only some of the matters his Government was deeply

unhappy about and he felt they deserved further consideration at the Conference.

24. The Representative of Britain said it was impossible to deal with all the points that had been raised and that in any case he was not qualified to speak on them. However, he would like to brief representatives about the current state of affairs at Lancaster House. A plenary meeting had been held on 7 November with Lord Carrington in the Chair. Mr Mugabe had promised to give the Patriotic Front's reply to the British proposals the following day at a plenary meeting scheduled at 3.00 pm. and had asked to be given an advance copy of the Bill the British Government proposed to introduce in Parliament. On the morning of 8 November, the Patriotic Front had requested that this meeting be postponed, but the British Government had felt unable to accede to this request and accordingly both its own delegation and the Salisbury delegation had gone to Lancaster House. However, since the Patriotic Front did not turn up, the meeting had had to be postponed to the next day, 9 November. Regarding the general question of the interpretation of the Lusaka accord, he did not feel that the Committee had authority to rewrite or reinterpret the agreement that had been drawn up with great care and after much deliberation by Heads of Government.

25. The Representative of Jamaica said he wished to register strong objections to the remarks made by the British representative. Nobody was either rewriting or reinterpreting the Lusaka accord and he requested that the British representative withdrew these remarks.

26. The Representative of Britain said he would rephrase his comments. He did not believe that any member of the Committee was empowered to reinterpret the agreement. He had noticed that there had been some departures from the text of the Communique in the statements made by representatives but he wished now to separate this observation from his comment about reinterpreting

the Lusaka accord. Referring to remarks made by representatives about his Government's statements in Parliament, he observed that it was easy to select phrases in order to make a given point, but the balance and thrust of the statements could only be appreciated by reading the texts as a whole.

27. The Representative of The Bahamas recalled that several weeks ago he had expressed the opinion that the British Government was trying to support the position of the minority in preference to that of the majority. He had also commented at that time that the Salisbury delegation had been putting forward no proposals of its own but was merely accepting those put forward by Britain and that this had placed the Patriotic Front in a very difficult situation. It appeared that the British Government was now trying to arrange matters in such a way that the final outcome of the Lancaster House Conference would be in line with the wishes of the Salisbury delegation. Accordingly it was dangerous for Commonwealth High Commissioners to allow themselves to be briefed by British Government spokesmen, since this might convey an erroneous impression to the outside world that the Commonwealth was supporting the British Government. He would like it to be made public that High Commissioners were not participating in the negotiations and furthermore that there was widespread unease amongst them over the conduct of the negotiations.

28. The Representative of Guyana stressed the appositeness of the proverb "more haste less speed". Like his Jamaican colleague he was extremely distressed by the imputation that the Committee's representatives were reinterpreting or rewriting the Lusaka accord. What the British representative should in fact have said was that there were differing interpretations of the Lusaka accord. If he had reinterpreted the Lusaka agreement, it had been at the direct behest of his own Government, which was the only source of authority that he recognised.

29. The Representative of Zambia asked whether the British representative was aware that the Patriotic Front had said that

their delegation would not be able to attend the plenary meeting at 3.30 pm. on 8 November because of their appointment with President Kaunda. Concerning the problem of achieving agreement of all the parties, he expected to be briefed on how the British Government was trying to resolve the difficulties it had referred to in the statements it made in Parliament. There was no point in the Committee merely being told what Britain's own position was; it should also be informed about the Government's ideas on how to reach agreement between all the parties.

30. On the question of Commonwealth observers, he saw their role as providing an answer to the problems which might be expected to arise from Britain's interim arrangements by serving as a third force that could neutralise the situation.

31. The Representative of Tanzania said that he too had been dismayed by the language the British representative had used. He felt he had the right to say in the Committee what his Government had entrusted him to say. He himself had been at the Lusaka Meeting and he had been one of the representatives of the Frontline States who had had the opportunity to consult earlier in November with some of the Heads of Government who had actually drafted the text of the Lusaka agreement. He therefore felt insulted to hear representatives on the Committee being told that they were reinterpreting this text. After reiterating the four points on which he had indicated at the beginning of the meeting that he was seeking an understanding, he circulated a draft statement embodying these points which he hoped the Committee would feel able to issue to the press at the conclusion of its deliberations.

The draft text was as follows:

"At a special meeting of the Commonwealth Southern Africa Committee today, Commonwealth representatives, after re-

viewing developments in relation to the future of Zimbabwe, agreed to recommend to their Governments as follows:

1. That it be made clear in all appropriate ways that the Lusaka agreement:
 - (a) envisaged a lasting settlement in Zimbabwe only through agreement between all the parties to the conflict;
 - (b) specifically envisaged the lifting of sanctions only in the context of the implementation of such a settlement;
2. That there is every reason to believe that the Lancaster House Conference can produce agreement by all the parties to a lasting settlement provided there is flexibility by all concerned in the final stages of the Conference.
3. That in the pursuit of such an agreement, Commonwealth Governments should remain ready to assist in all practicable ways, including in particular the independent Commonwealth observer role agreed to in Lusaka. The Committee requested the Secretary-General to put forward for the consideration of Commonwealth Governments proposals for the organisation and functioning of that role. "

32. The Representative of Grenada said that he, like the other members of the Committee, had the right to put an interpretation on the Lusaka accord. If the agreed objective was indeed to end the conflict in Rhodesia then there must logically be agreement by all the parties to that conflict. With regard to paragraph 15(i) of the Lusaka accord, it would also appear logical that an end to sanctions must be part of the process of implementing a lasting settlement; and if there was no lasting settlement, an end to any part of sanctions would be in breach of that paragraph. His second point was a procedural one. Bearing in mind the rapidity of developments and the fact that the British Government did not think it necessary to brief representatives frankly about its intentions, particularly with respect to the lifting of sanctions which had only been revealed to them through Parliament,

he would like to suggest that their future meetings should be convened at Committee level. Moreover, since matters were developing so swiftly he thought it might be advisable for representatives of the OAU to be invited to such meetings.

33. The Representative of Uganda said that it would be improper to misinterpret the Lusaka agreement. He too had been at Lusaka and reports had accurately described the Meeting as the most successful of all Heads of Government Meetings because of the spirit of "give and take" that characterised it. The British Government had then seemed eager to achieve a solution of the Rhodesia issue through consultation. However, unless care was exercised in resolving that issue, the next Heads of Government Meeting might be fraught with grave difficulties. It would be wrong to pretend that the legislation being rushed through Parliament could produce a lasting settlement. The situation was much too serious for a solution to be reached by this means, yet it appeared that representatives were being told that it was best to rush if a solution were to be achieved.

34. He endorsed the views expressed in the draft statement circulated by the Tanzanian representative and wished to propose formally that it be adopted as reflecting the consensus of the meeting. It made it clear that representatives had not taken sides with any party to the conflict, recognised that one party was having difficulty with the British proposals on interim arrangements and that the negotiations could be advanced if certain understandings were accepted by all concerned. He said the language used by the British representative was unfortunate and was not conducive to the good spirit that everyone expected. No one was rewriting the Lusaka accord as the text was crystal clear, nevertheless he feared that it might be misinterpreted.

35. The Representative of St. Lucia said he had heard Sir Ian Gilmour's statement on the radio on 7 November, in which he had expressed the hope that an agreement involving all the

parties to the conflict could be reached at Lancaster House but that if this were not possible there would have to be a fall-back position. He wanted to know whether this was truly the intention of the British Government and whether it corresponded with the expectations of Lusaka.

36. The Representative of Britain said that he could only go as far as the statements made by Ministers in Parliament the previous day which had made it clear that it remained their objective to secure agreement by all the parties. He could not support the proposal to invite non-Commonwealth representatives to the Committee's meetings; for to do so would run counter to established precedents as well as undermine the frankness of exchanges which had always characterised the Committee's deliberations.

37. The Representative of The Gambia expressed approval for the draft statement but felt however that the Committee ought first to find out what had transpired in the talks then going on between President Kaunda and Mrs Thatcher. The Committee should fully inform itself about these discussions lest it found itself at variance with what those leaders might agree upon.

38. The Representative of Britain said that he had no authority to support any statement to the Press.

39. The Representative of Australia felt that the Committee should not intrude too far on the delicate process of negotiations. He drew attention to certain differences of wording between paragraph 1(a) of the Tanzanian statement and the corresponding paragraph 15(d) of the Lusaka Communique; in his view these amounted to a rewording and arguably a reinterpretation. Moreover, his delegation had neither the wish nor the need to associate itself with the statement as the Australian Government had made its views known privately to Britain on the transitional arrangements as well as on the consequences that would flow if Britain were to conclude a separate agreement with the Salisbury delegation. He would however have no objection to the Chairman informing the

British Government of the discussions that had taken place in the Committee, though it would naturally be aware of these from its own representative.

40. The Representative of New Zealand said his Government greatly valued the discussions both at the level of the Committee and in the briefing sessions. His instructions from his Government were that their representative in London should always proceed on the basis of explicit and firm instructions from Wellington and no other. It might be the case that the Tanzanian statement accorded with the understandings of the New Zealand delegation in Lusaka but he could not at this stage give a firm assurance that this was in fact the case.

41. The Representative of Zambia thanked the representative of The Gambia for expressing his trust in the leadership of President Kaunda. President Kaunda was aware that a meeting of the Committee was being convened and as the Chairman of the Lusaka HGM he felt that the representatives of the Commonwealth had a useful role to play. The recommendations of the Committee could be helpful to his President and he would therefore urge that the Committee adopt the text as it stood.

42. The Representative of Grenada said that after examining the Tanzanian text he felt sure that it was not in any way contrary to any agreement President Kaunda had reached or may be able to reach in London. If anything the Tanzanian statement reinforced the attempts being made by President Kaunda to advance the negotiations at Lancaster House. He noted that it had been suggested that paragraph 1(a) of the Tanzanian text was contrary to the Lusaka accord. The Tanzanian statement did not repeat word-for-word the Lusaka accord but gave an interpretation of the spirit of that accord. As to whether the Southern Africa Committee should interfere, his Government believed that from the very first week of the Lancaster House Conference the question of what the Lusaka agreement meant had been highlighted, though the Committee itself had

remained quiescent even when it felt that the accord was being misinterpreted. The time had now been reached for the Committee to make an authoritative statement as to what it believed the accord to entail. It was true that the Committee should strive for consensus but there were times when there would be disagreements and representatives should not feel afraid to admit this.

43. The Representative of Guyana referring to the role of the Committee which had been brought up the Australian representative, said that this was not the first time its role or function had been questioned. It had been suggested that the Committee should be more circumspect but in fact the Committee was not overreaching itself. He felt it should not take too legalistic an approach in dealing with what were after all essentially political questions. He could recall a number of other occasions when the Committee had met in emergency session to discuss serious events and had issued statements to the press. The depth of Commonwealth involvement with the present phase of the situation had in fact been reflected in the regular attendance of High Commissioners, as distinct from their deputies, since May. He concluded by recalling the words of a well-known Guyanese poet, Martin Carter, where he had said "either we are all involved or we shall all become consumed".

44. The Representative of Nigeria expressed appreciation to his Tanzanian colleague for the very excellent draft he had put forward which underscored all the operative concepts in the Lusaka agreement. The principle that sanctions could only be removed in the context of the implementation of a lasting settlement had been very clearly brought out and it was not necessary to use identical phraseology in the Lusaka Communique. The third paragraph expressed the Commonwealth's readiness to assist in all practical ways, in particular by assuming the observer role that had been agreed to at Lusaka. Furthermore, the statement expressed confidence in a successful outcome of the Conference; all this made the draft a singularly responsible one. It would of course be desirable

that it be adopted by consensus but if that were not possible he would support the insertion of a paragraph indicating the reservations made. The Committee was perfectly competent within its terms of reference to issue such a constructive and helpful statement. He pointed out that from the very beginning all the parties had found it necessary to brief Commonwealth representatives and to exchange views with them. The Committee could therefore not be seen as intruding on the negotiating process but rather as assisting it. At its last meeting the Committee had issued a statement which, from the way it had been presented in the press, had seemed to be helpful to the British Government. In the same token he felt the British Government should be happy with a statement now which expressed the Commonwealth's confidence in the negotiations as well as its readiness to assist.

45. The Representative of Australia said he would be happier if the Committee were able to adopt a consensus statement. To facilitate this he **proposed** that the introductory paragraph be amended to read:"Commonwealth representatives agreed to report to their Governments for further consideration the views expressed by a number of delegates as follows:"

46. After some discussion the Committee decided to accept a modified version of the amendment proposed by the Australian representative. The final wording of the amended paragraph read: "At a special meeting of the Commonwealth Southern Africa Committee today, Commonwealth representatives, after reviewing developments in relation to the future of Zimbabwe, agreed to report to their Governments the views expressed by representatives including, in particular, the following:" No other amendments were made to the text.

47. The meeting adjourned at 9.30 pm.

International Affairs Division
Commonwealth Secretariat
Marlborough House
London

15 November 1979



With the compliments of

THE PRIVATE SECRETARY

RMT Lythe

AK2 sent.

Phut

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Distribution:-

hodesia policy

(TEXT)

RHODESIA/ZAMBIA

1. Following is the text of message from Prime Minister to President Kaunda:

'Dear Kenneth,

I am saddened and distressed at recent developments. Relations between our two countries have reached a low point, at a time when we need more than ever to work together to reach a final settlement at the Lancaster House Conference. This is the sure, ~~and indeed only~~, way to bring an immediate end to the loss of life and economic disruption which Zambia is suffering.

I am sure that in your heart you cannot believe that the British government have any responsibility for the recent attacks on your territory and people, which
 CONFIDENTIAL .../we

Copies to:-

CONFIDENTIAL

we cannot and do not condone. On the contrary, we are bending every nerve to achieve rapid agreement on a ceasefire.

We have repeatedly urged both the Salisbury side and the Patriotic Front to show restraint and avoid any action which could prejudice our hopes for an early peace. At this afternoon's meeting of the Lancaster House Conference, we

shall ask both sides to come to an immediate agreement to prevent any further damage to Zambia. We shall ask for undertakings to come into effect simultaneously that no cross-border operations will be carried out by Rhodesia into Zambia, and that no further movement of Patriotic Front personnel will take place from Zambia into Rhodesia. I think it vitally important that we should secure these undertakings, and we shall ~~today~~ do all we can to persuade the parties to give them, ~~today~~.

Meanwhile, I am deeply distressed to hear that you have not received my most recent personal messages, ~~to you~~. I trust that, whatever differences there may be between us, the traditional and most valuable custom of such messages between us as friends and fellow members of the Commonwealth will not be interrupted. I was also concerned at reports of demonstrations against our High Commission offices in Lusaka, but I am relieved to know that these dispersed peacefully.

You must believe how worried and concerned we are about your difficulties and how much we want to help. The effective way to do so is by getting agreement at Lancaster House.

You have made a tremendous contribution to the progress we have made so far. Your chairmanship of the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting was a key element in getting the Conference started, and your personal efforts on your recent mission to London led to an agreement on the pre-independence arrangements. I think it essential that we should keep very closely in touch to help the Conference move rapidly to a successful end. I hope that we can do this. I am convinced that, with your help, we can get agreement in the next few days.



file BK
Rhodesia

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

21 November 1979

I am writing to thank you for your letter to me of 20 November containing a message from the Prime Minister of Singapore to the Prime Minister.

I have of course arranged for Mr. Lee Kuan Yew's message to be brought to the Prime Minister's immediate attention.

M. O'D. B. ALEXANDER

His Excellency Mr. Jek Yeun Thong

SA



file BK

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

21 November 1979

I enclose a copy of a message to the Prime Minister from Mr. Lee Kuan Yew about Rhodesia. No further action is called for.

M. O'D. B. ALEXANDER

Roderic Lyne, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

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10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

21 November 1979

I am writing to thank you for your letter of 20 November enclosing the signed text of a letter from the Prime Minister of Australia to the Prime Minister. The text has been placed on our files.

M. O'D. B. ALEXANDER

His Excellency
The Honourable Sir Gordon Freeth, K.B.E.

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DSG
✓

fine

21 November 1979

RHODESIA

As you know, the Prime Minister has approved the draft telegram to Maputo enclosed with your letter to me of 19 November.

M. O'D. B. ALEXANDER

SM

R. M. J. Lyne, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CONFIDENTIAL

PRIME MINISTER'S

CONFIDENTIAL

PERSONAL MESSAGE

SERIAL No. T147c/179T

PRIME MINISTER'S

PERSONAL MESSAGE

GR 400

CONFIDENTIAL

DESKBY GABORONE 201600Z

FM FCO 211426Z NOV 79

TO FLASH LUSAKA

TELEGRAM NUMBER 958 OF 20 NOVEMBER

INFO IMMEDIATE UKREP BRUSSELS (FOR PS TO S OF S) WASHINGTON
DAR ES SALAAM MAPUTO GABORONE PRIORITY LUANDA UKMIS NEW YORK
PRETORIA LAGOS MIRIMBA SALISBURY

MJPT: RHODESIA.

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF MESSAGE FROM PRIME MINISTER:

'DEAR KENNETH

AS YOU KNOW, I HAD ALREADY ADDRESSED A MESSAGE TO YOU ABOUT THE PROGRESS OF THE RHODESIA CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE BEFORE NEWS REACHED ME ABOUT THE RECENT EVENTS. THESE I KNOW HAVE CAUSED YOU MUCH DISTRESS.

I CAN WELL UNDERSTAND THE CONCERN WHICH YOU FEEL AT THE ATTACKS WHICH HAVE TAKEN PLACE ON YOUR TERRITORY AND THE EXTREMELY DIFFICULT SITUATION IN WHICH THEY HAVE PLACED YOU AND YOUR PEOPLE. AS I MADE CLEAR TO YOU WHEN YOU WERE IN LONDON, IT IS MY EARNEST DESIRE TO SEE THAT ALL SUCH INCIDENTS COME TO AN END AND THAT NORMAL RELATIONS CAN BE RESTORED BETWEEN RHODESIA AND ZAMBIA AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. LET ME ASSURE YOU, KENNETH, THAT WE ARE DOING ALL WE CAN TO SEE THAT THIS HAPPENS AND THAT WE HAVE BEEN URGING BOTH SIDES TO SHOW RESTRAINT. BUT THE ONLY WAY WE CAN BE SURE OF ACHIEVING OUR AIM IS TO BRING THE WAR ITSELF TO AN END. THIS IS PRECISELY WHAT WE ARE STRIVING TO DO IN THIS FINAL PHASE OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE. PETER CARRINGTON AND IAIN GILMOUR HAVE BEEN DOING THEIR UTMOST TO IMPRESS ON BOTH THE OTHER DELEGATIONS AT LANCASTER HOUSE THE URGENT NEED TO MAKE PROGRESS QUICKLY. ONE OF THE CONSIDERATIONS WHICH IS UPPERMOST IN ALL OUR MINDS IN THIS IS THE NEED TO PUT AN END TO THE LOSS OF HUMAN LIFE AND THE DISRUPTION OF YOUR ECONOMY WHICH YOU ARE SUFFERING AS A RESULT OF THE CONFLICT IN RHODESIA. TO DO THIS, WE MUST GET AN AGREEMENT ON A CEASE-FIRE HERE IN LONDON WHICH WILL ENABLE US TO SEND OUR GOVERNOR OUT TO SALISBURY AT ONCE SO THAT HE CAN EXERT HIS AUTHORITY OVER ALL THE FORCES. WITHOUT A GOVERNOR WE HAVE NO AUTHORITY. HAVING GOT AGREEMENT ON THE POLITICAL BASIS FOR A SETTLEMENT, IT WOULD BE A TRAGEDY IF WE NOW FAILED TO GET AGREEMENT ON AN END TO THE WAR, IN THE INTERESTS NOT ONLY OF THE PEOPLE OF RHODESIA BUT OF ZAMBIA AS WELL.

CONFIDENTIAL

/I DO URGE

I DO URGE YOU TO UNDERSTAND, KENNETH, THAT WE ARE TAKING THE SITUATION VERY SERIOUSLY INDEED. AT THIS VITAL MOMENT, WE MUST ENSURE THAT ALL THE PARTICIPANTS HERE CONCENTRATE ON WORKING WITHOUT ANY FURTHER DELAY OR INTERRUPTION TO REACH AGREEMENT ON A CEASEFIRE AT THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE DATE. WE MUST MAINTAIN THE MOMENTUM OF THE TALKS AT LANCASTER HOUSE. WE MUST GET AGREEMENT WITHIN THE NEXT FEW DAYS IF THE CHANCE IS NOT TO SLIP FROM OUR GRASP. I AM SURE THAT I CAN COUNT ON YOU FOR ALL POSSIBLE HELP IN THIS. IF YOU THINK IT WOULD BE HELPFUL TO HAVE A WORD WITH ME ON THE TELEPHONE TO DISCUSS THIS FURTHER, PLEASE DO NOT HESITATE TO CALL ME AT ONCE.

WITH WARMEST REGARDS. MARGARET.'

CARRINGTON

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 LEGAL ADVISERS
 (SIR I. SINCLAIR)
 (MR FIFOOT)
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 PS/SIR I GILMOUR
 PS/MR LUCE
 PS/MR RIDLEY
 PS/MR HURD
 PS/PUS
 SIR A DUFF
 LORD N G LENNOX
 MISS BROWN
 MR DAY
 MR WILLSON
 MR ASPIN

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION

RHODESIA POLICY

Subject

CONFIDENTIAL
PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE

SERIAL No. T 147B/71T L4
Wm

GR 300
CONFIDENTIAL
FM FCO 201500Z NOV 79
TO IMMEDIATE MAPUTO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 157 OF 20 NOVEMBER
INFO PRIORITY DAR ES SALAAM GABORONE LUSAKA LAGOS WASHINGTON
UKMIS NEW YORK LUANDA.
RHODESIA.

1. UNLESS YOU SEE OBJECTION PLEASE PASS THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO PRESIDENT MACHEL AS SOON AS POSSIBLE:

'DEAR MR PRESIDENT,
THE RHODESIA CONFERENCE HAS NOW REACHED AGREEMENT ON THE INDEPENDENCE CONSTITUTION AND ON THE ARRANGEMENTS FOR BRINGING IT INTO EFFECT THROUGH FREE ELECTIONS SUPERVISED UNDER THE AUTHORITY OF A BRITISH GOVERNOR. THIS OPENS THE WAY TO A PEACEFUL SOLUTION OF THE PROBLEM. IT NOW REMAINS TO AGREE ON THE FINAL STEP - THE ARRANGEMENTS FOR A CEASE-FIRE. IF THERE IS AN EFFECTIVE CEASE-FIRE DURING THE INTERIM PERIOD, AND IF ALL THE PARTIES COMMIT THEMSELVES TO ABIDE BY THE OUTCOME OF THE ELECTION, THE RESULT WILL BE A LASTING PEACE FOR THE PEOPLE OF RHODESIA AND FOR MOZAMBIQUE.

MR PAPADOPOULOS HAS GIVEN MR CHISSANO A FULL ACCOUNT OF OUR PROPOSALS FOR THE CEASE-FIRE. WE ARE READY TO PUT THESE INTO EFFECT VERY RAPIDLY. I KNOW THAT YOU WILL BE NO LESS CONCERNED THAN WE ARE TO ACHIEVE AN END TO THE WAR WITHIN THE NEXT FEW DAYS.

IT WILL BE ESSENTIAL TO THE MAINTENANCE OF AN EFFECTIVE CEASE-FIRE TO ENSURE THAT CROSS-BORDER ACTIVITY BY EITHER SIDE CEASES FROM THE START AND THROUGHOUT THE INTERIM PERIOD. WE SHALL THEREFORE WANT TO DISCUSS WITH YOU ARRANGEMENTS FOR MILITARY LIAISON BETWEEN OUR TWO GOVERNMENTS AND THE CEASE-FIRE COMMISSION IN RHODESIA TO ENSURE THAT NO ACTIVITY TAKES PLACE WHICH COULD LEAD TO A RESUMPTION

/OF.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

OF HOSTILITIES. WITH YOUR COOPERATION I AM CONVINCED THAT A PEACEFUL AND HONOURABLE SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM IS WITHIN OUR GRASP, AND WE MUST NOW MOVE TO GET FINAL AGREEMENT WITHOUT DELAY.

YOURS SINCERELY

MARGARET THATCHER.'

CARRINGTON

F I L E S

RHODESIA D
OADS
NAD
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PLANNING STAFF
ES & SD
CCD
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LEGAL ADVISERS
(SIR I. SINCLAIR)
(MR FIFOOT)
ECON D
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NEWS D
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PS/SIR I GILMOUR
PS/MR LUCE
PS/MR RIDLEY
PS/MR HURD
PS/PUS
SIR A DUFF
LORD N G LENNOX
MISS BROWN
MR DAY
MR WILLSON
MR ASPIN

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION
RHODESIA POLICY

2

CONFIDENTIAL

J. N. Smith

STATEMENT BY THE BRITISH HIGH COMMISSIONER
(LUSAKA) SIR LEONARD ALLISON, KCVO, CMG

" WHILE WE SYMPATHISE WITH ZAMBIA OVER THE LOSS OF LIFE AND PROPERTY IN THE RECENT RAIDS WE WOULD STRESS THAT, AS STATED TO THE ZAMBIAN MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS LAST YEAR, THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT CANNOT ACCEPT ANY RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE ACTS OF THE ILLEGAL REGIME IN ZIMBABWE RHODESIA.

THE ACTS THAT HAVE BEEN DIRECTED AGAINST ZAMBIA OVER THE PAST FEW MONTHS CLEARLY EMPHASISE THE VITAL IMPORTANCE OF A SUCCESSFUL OUTCOME TO THE PEACE TALKS THAT BRITAIN IS CURRENTLY CONTINUING, WHICH WOULD BRING AN END TO THESE ATTACKS.

British High Commission
LUSAKA - Nov. 20/79



AUSTRALIAN HIGH COMMISSION · LONDON

THE HIGH COMMISSIONER

The Hon. Sir Gordon Freeth, KBE

20 November 1979

Dear Mr Alexander,

I refer to my letter of 29 October 1979 which enclosed the text of a letter from my Prime Minister, the Rt. Hon. Malcolm Fraser, to your Prime Minister, the Rt. Hon. Mrs Margaret Thatcher.

I now enclose the original of Mr Fraser's letter.

Yours sincerely,

(Gordon Freeth)

Mr Michael Alexander,
Private Secretary (Overseas Affairs)
to the Prime Minister,
Prime Minister's Office,
10 Downing Street,
LONDON, SW1.



THE HIGH COMMISSIONER

21 NOV 1979



PRIME MINISTER'S

PERSONAL MESSAGE



SERIAL No. T129/79T

Original on Part 8.

PRIME MINISTER

CANBERRA

29 OCT 1979

My dear Prime Minister,

What has been achieved so far at Lancaster House in the talks chaired by Peter Carrington will go down in history as a magnificent achievement. So many past efforts to settle the Rhodesia problem have - tragically - ended in failure, but the present talks hold out much more hope of success than any of the earlier ones. You and your Government have gone far indeed to bring to fruition the promise of Lusaka, and in this you know that you have our full support.

I made clear in a message passed to your officials through Australia House two weeks ago that we would gladly do anything we could to help the talks progress to an acceptable settlement. That message was prompted by concern that there was some risk of a failure on constitutional issues. Happily, those aspects are now resolved and there is agreement on what is clearly a fair and genuine black majority constitution.

Your Government's fundamental strategy in the talks - namely, to achieve agreement first on a constitution in order to create an atmosphere which would facilitate subsequent accommodations on the more difficult questions of pre-independence arrangements - has been outstandingly successful.

As the conference now tackles these more difficult issues, and as a result of reports we have had from our High Commissioner in London, I thought it might be useful if I set out the feeling we have about them and their relation to the agreement we reached at Lusaka.

The first point I wish to make concerns the pace of the conference. There has been an initial exchange of views on arrangements. I know you will have in mind that it is most important that there should be ample opportunity now for the fullest elaboration of the views of all parties and for exploration through all possible means of ways in which they might be developed and, where necessary, modified. Andrew Peacock has already told your High Commission of the difficulties for us and others if you were to decide after a comparatively short discussion of pre-independence arrangements that agreement could not be reached on them with the Patriotic Front delegation and to implement them without that agreement.

As to the actual arrangements proposed so far I should like to make a number of points. In making them I am very conscious of two fundamental points agreed on at Lusaka:

- . that the search for a settlement must involve all parties to the conflict; and
- . that the Government to be formed must be chosen through free and fair elections properly supervised under British Government authority and with Commonwealth observers.

As I see it there are many ways in which "British Government authority" can be manifest; I can understand some of the concerns which have been expressed about the need to involve all parties to the conflict, and I believe it should be possible to find ways of accommodating them without any challenge to that authority.

Central to this is the question of security, and the role and status of the Rhodesian armed forces and the forces controlled by the Patriotic Front. I believe that the idea of a United Nations Supervisory Force does not come reasonably within the framework agreed on at Lusaka and that, on the basis of discussions there, ought to be ruled out. However, if the question of supervisory and security arrangements became the sticking points on which final agreement depended, then would it be worth considering a joint Commonwealth group under your Government's authority and direction as a possible way around this problem? My Government would be ready to consider Australian involvement in tasks additional to election observation as part of a joint Commonwealth effort. The possible use of a Commonwealth force has a long history going back at least, I think, to the "Tiger" Talks in 1966. Comments by certain of your spokesmen indicate that you do not rule this out. If you do decide on this course of action, we will certainly study sympathetically any proposals you might put forward, which might include involvement in such a force and observation of the whole transitional process, if this would be helpful.

Other points at present at issue should, I believe, be capable of resolution through patient discussion. These include the length of the transition period, which should clearly not be a sticking point in negotiations.

Proposals for a sharing of authority during this period would again seem to me to be quite outside the Lusaka Agreement, which accepted without any question that the arrangements must be under British authority. But I would have thought that a consultative or advisory group composed of the parties principally concerned, but without any executive powers, might be worthy of consideration.

Concerning sanctions, it seems to me that if, following on agreement about the constitution, agreement is also reached on pre-independence arrangements, then what you propose is quite reasonable.

I said at the beginning of this letter that the progress that has already been made is magnificent. You are moving closer to a breakthrough in a problem which has bedevilled the world and brought tragedy and suffering to countless thousands, most of all to the black and white people of Zimbabwe, for long years. If you can achieve this, your Government and the other parties to the talks will have gained a victory which will have enormous significance for the cause of peace and racial harmony in all of Southern Africa and in the world as a whole.

Yours sincerely,

(Malcolm Fraser)

The Rt. Hon. Margaret Thatcher, M.P.,
Prime Minister of Great Britain,
10 Downing Street,
LONDON.
UK.

RHODESIA POLICY ADVANCE COPIES - 20

(X-27)

PS
MR I GILMOUR
MR LUCE
MR PUS

PS/NO 10 DOWNING STREET

MR WILSON
MR DAY
LORD E G LENNOX
MR ASPEN

Mr GOULTY

MR R L WADD-GERY
MR P H MAXBY
MR ~~DEVERALL~~
MR P J FOWLER
DIO

CABINET
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FLASH

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HD/NEWS DEPT
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SIR I. SUTCLIFFE LEGAL ADVISER RM K174

MR PIPCOOT LEGAL ADVISER RM K164

~~REPRESENTATIVE~~

Prime Minister

GR 1350
UNCLASSIFIED
FM LUSAKA 201240Z

TO FLASH FCO
TEL NO. 1262 OF 20 NOVEMBER 1979.
REPEATED TO IMMEDIATE MIRIMBA SALISBURY, PRETORIA,
PRIORITY DAR ES SALAAM, MAPUTO, WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK,
UJANDA
ROUTINE LAGOS, GABORONE, MONROVIA.

RHODESIA.

1. PRESIDENT KAUNDA GAVE A PRESS CONFERENCE THIS MORNING. THE DIPLOMATIC CORPS WAS ALSO INVITED.
2. HE SAID THAT ZAMBIA STOOD FOR PEACE AND HAD ALWAYS WORKED FOR IT AS A MATTER OF DEEP ROOTED PRINCIPLE. IN CONSEQUENCE THEY HAD SUFFERED ATTACKS BY THE RACISTS WHO WERE THE RUNNING DOGS OF THEIR IMPERIALIST MASTERS WITH VETETED INTERESTS IN SOUTHERN AFRICA. DURING THE ATTACKS IN SEPTEMBER BOTH BY SOUTH AFRICAN AND RHODESIAN FORCES LEAFLETS

SEPTEMBER BOTH BY SOUTH AFRICAN AND RHODESIAN FORCES COMPLETELY
HAD BEEN LEFT STATING THAT THE ATTACKS WERE NOT AGAINST
ZAMBIA. HOWEVER, ZAMBIAN LIFE AND PROPERTY HAD BEEN
LOST. THE MORE RECENT ATTACKS HAD PROVED THAT ZAMBIA
ITSELF WAS THE RACIST TARGET SEMI COLON HER ECONOMIC INFRA-
STRUCTURE HAD BEEN DAMAGED. SINCE 12 OCTOBER, ON WHICH DAY
CHAMBESHI ROAD AND RAIL BRIDGES WERE DESTROYED SOME TEN
ADDITIONAL ROAD AND RAIL BRIDGES HAD BEEN DESTROYED AND A
ZAMBIAN NATIONAL SERVICE CAMP HAD BEEN ATTACKED AT CHONGWE.

3. THE AIM OF THE ATTACKS WAS TO DESTROY ZAMBIA'S
ECONOMY AND MAKE HER WEAK SEMI COLON TO ESCALATE AND INTER-
NATIONALISE THE WAR SEMI COLON TO FORCE ZAMBIA TO PUT PRESSURE
ON THE PATRIOTIC FRONT TO GIVE MORE CONCESSIONS SEMI COLON AND
TO WRECK THE TALKS AT LANCASTER HOUSE.

4. THE PRESIDENT SAID EMPHATICALLY THAT RHODESIA WAS
A BRITISH RESPONSIBILITY AND HAD ALWAYS BEEN SO. THE
ZAMBIAN GOVERNMENT PLACED FULL RESPONSIBILITY FOR
THE ATTACKS ON THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT AND COMPENSATION
MUST BE GIVEN BY BRITAIN FOR THE LOSS SUFFERED.

5. HE SAID THAT THE ZAMBIAN RESPONSE TO THE "WANTON AND
SAVAGE ATTACKS" WAS:

- (I) THE CAUSE OF THE ZOMBABWE PEOPLE WAS RIGHT, ZAMBIAN
SUPPORT FOR THEI CAUSE WAS JUST.
- (II) ZAMBIA HAD ALWAYS REFUSED TO BE INTIMIDATED AND STILL DID.
- (III) ZAMBIA REFUSED TO INTERNATIONALISE THE WAR BUT RESERVED
THE RIGHT TO TAKE ALL MEASURES TO DEFEND HERSELF.

6. THE PRESIDENT ANNOUNCED THE FOLLOWING DECISIONS:

- (I) ALL FORM V ZAMBIAN NATIONAL SERVICE MALE GRADUATES ARE TO
BE IMMEDIATELY MOBILISED. ALL RESIGNED OR RETIRED FORMER OFFICERS
OR MEN IN ARMY AIR FORCE OR ZAMBIA NATIONAL SERVICE WERE RECALLED.
- (II) ALL LEAVE IN THE SECURITY FORCES WAS CANCELLED. THOSE ON
LEAVE ARE TO RETURN TO DUTY.
- (III) ALL NECESSARY MEASURES WILL BE TAKEN TO MOBILISE THE
RESOURCES OF THE COUNTRY FOR WAR.

7. THE PRESIDENT APPEALED TO ZAMBIANS AND TO ALL
RESIDENTS TO APPRECIATE THAT ZAMBIA WAS NOW IN A FULLSCALE
WAR SITUATION. EVERYBODY MUST BE READY TO RESPOND WHENEVER
CALLED UPON TO ASSIST. PARTY MILITANTS MUST BE EXTRA VIGILANT
TO ENSURE THAT "THE MASSES" REPORT ALL SUSPICIOUS CHARACTERS
TO SECURITY FORCES. HOWEVER NOBODY SHOULD TAKE THE LAW INTO
HIS OWN HANDS. ZAMBIA WAS UP AGAINST A FORMIDABLE ENEMY

HIS OWN HANDS. ZAMBIA WAS UP AGAINST A FORMIDABLE ENEMY SUPPORTED BY WESTERN IMPERIALIST FORCES. ZAMBIA RESERVED THE RIGHT TO CALL UPON ANY FRIENDLY COUNTRY TO COME TO ITS AID IN DEFENDING ITSELF.

8. THE PRESIDENT, TURNING DIRECTLY TO THE DIPLOMATIC CORPS, APPEALED FOR HELP FROM THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY FOR MATERIAL AND OTHER FORMS OF ASSISTANCE BOTH FOR ZAMBIA AND FOR THE PATRIOTIC FRONT "TO FIGHT THIS JUST WAS TO ITS LOGICAL CONCLUSION".

9. THE WEST, THE PRESIDENT SAID, "MUST NOW COME INTO THE OPEN AND CONDEMN THESE WANTON ATTACKS IN THE SAME WAY THEY REACT WHEN ONE OR TWO WHITES ARE ARRESTED". THE SILENCE OF THE WEST HAD BEEN CONSPICUOUS.

10. THE PRESIDENT SAID THAT IN THE FIGHTING AT THE ZAMBIAN NATIONAL SERVICE CAMP AT CHONGWE BRIDGE THE ZAMBIANS HAD LOST SEVEN NATIONAL SERVICE MEN, ONE SMALL BOY AND A POLICE OFFICER. THE RHODESIANS ADMITTED LOSING TEN "WHITES" BUT ZAMBIA KNEW THAT 21 HAD BEEN KILLED. ONE BODY HAD BEEN LEFT BEHIND (THE PRESIDENT SHOWED HIS IDENTITY DISC - ONE ZIHLER MAX).

11. THE PRESIDENT SAID THAT HE DID NOT WISH ZAMBIANS TO COLLAPSE MORALLY AND BECOME WHITE HATERS. HE HAD TO ADMIT THAT HE WAS UNDER GREAT TEMPTATION TO SAY "I HATE THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT". BUT HE WAS STILL PRAYING AND HE ASKED THE NATION TO PRAY FOR HIM TO OVERCOME THIS TEMPTATION. HE FELT UNDER GREAT PRESSURE TO HATE THE BRITISH.

12. IN RESPONSE TO A QUESTION FROM JOHN OSMANN, BBC, KAUNDA SAID HE DID NOT KNOW IF THERE WAS ANY HOPE FOR THE CEASE-FIRE TALKS. HE HAD RESPONDED TO BRITISH PRIME MINISTER'S REQUEST TO HELP AND WITHOUT ANY SENSE OF FALSE PRIDE BELIEVED HE HAD HELPED. BUT PRIDE HAD GONE BEFORE A FALL. THE SAME BRITISH GOVERNMENT WHICH HE HAD HELPED WAS ALLOWING SAVAGES TO ATTACK ZAMBIA. IN THE PAST THEY HAD GIVEN THEM OIL AND BROKEN SANCTIONS. HE HOPED THAT EARLY NEXT YEAR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL WOULD INSTRUCT THE LAWYERS TO IMPLEMENT THE OIL CASE AGAINST BRITISH COMPANIES. THE BINGHAM REPORT HAD REVEALED THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT'S FALSITY UNDER BOTH LABOUR AND CONSERVATIVE.

13. ON MONITORING HE SAID THAT ZAMBIA EMPHATICALLY SUPPORTED THE AGREEMENT AT LUSAKA AND THE PROPOSALS OF MR RAMPHAL. THE ELECTION SHOULD BE OBSERVED BY TEN LEADING COMMONWEALTH CITIZENS SUPPORTED BY A HUNDRED SENIOR PEOPLE FORMING AN

13. ON MONITORING HE SAID THAT ZAMBIA EMPHATICALLY SUPPORTED THE AGREEMENT AT LUSAKA AND THE PROPOSALS OF MR RAMPHAL. THE ELECTION SHOULD BE OBSERVED BY TEN LEADING COMMONWEALTH CITIZENS SUPPORTED BY A HUNDRED SENIOR PEOPLE FORMING AN INDEPENDENT UNIT REPORTING DIRECTLY TO THE COMMONWEALTH HEADS OF GOVERNMENT. IF HE COULD NOT TRUST THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT ON OIL HOW COULD HE TRUST THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT TO MONITOR ELECTIONS. THE STORY WAS ONE OF CHEATING AND SINFULNESS.

14. THE PATRIOTIC FRONT HAD ASKED FOR SOMETHING TO BE DONE ABOUT SOUTH AFRICAN THREATS TO MARCH INTO RHODESIA AFTER THE ELECTION BUT JUDGING BY THE BBC THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT WAS SILENT. THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT WAS CONSPIRING WITH SOUTH AFRICA TO ALLOW SOUTH AFRICA TO MOVE IN IF THE PATRIOTIC FRONT WON THE ELECTION. MUZOREWA WAS GETTING SOUTH AFRICAN HELP. HOW COULD HE KAUNDA FEEL THE ELECTIONS WOULD BE FREE AND FAIR WITHOUT AN INDEPENDENT MONITORING UNIT?

15. THE PRESIDENT SPOKE FIERCELY AGAINST FARMERS OR OTHER RESIDENTS WHO FELT INCLINED TOWARDS SMITH AND DID NOT WISH TO HELP ZAMBIA. HE APPEALED TO THEM TO LEAVE ZAMBIA IF THEY DID NOT WANT TO LIVE HERE. THERE HAD BEEN AN OUTCRY WHEN A WHITE FARMER'S WIFE HAD BEEN MURDERED RECENTLY AND HER DEATH WAS INDEED SAD BUT IN LONDON HE READ OF MURDERS EVERY DAY AND OF ACTIONS BY THE IRA. THEY HAD MURDERED THE MOST SENIOR PEOPLE (HE MENTIONED MR AIREY NEAVE) DESPITE ALL THE SECURITY PROVIDED: "IF YOU DO NOT HAVE PARADISE WHERE YOU COME FROM DON'T EXPECT IT HERE". AS FOR THOSE WHO CONSPIRE AGAINST ZAMBIA HE FEARED THAT ONE DAY HE WOULD BE TEMPTED TO DO SOMETHING ILLEGAL. HE WOULD TIRE OF IDIOCY. "WE MAY BECOME AS SAVAGE AS THEY ARE". BNM DECENT WHITES WERE MOST WELCOME.

16. QUESTIONED ABOUT THE EFFECT ON IMPORTS AND EXPORTS THE PRESIDENT SAID THAT THE ATTACKS ON ZAMBIA'S ECONOMIC STRUCTURES WERE PARALLELED BY SIMILAR ATTACKS FOR SIMILAR REASONS ON MOZAMBIQUE AND ANGOLA. ZAMBIA HAD SURVIVED EQUALLY BAD THINGS IN THE PAST AND WOULD SURVIVE AGAIN.

ALLINSON.

FLASH

PS
DE/DIR I GLENDON
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PB/PUB

DE/NO TO ~~DOUGLAS STREET~~

MR WILSON
MR DAY
LORD N G LENNOX
MR ASPIN

B Goulty

MR R J WIDE-GERY
MR P H MAXBY
~~MR DEVERALL~~
MR P J FOWLER
DIO

CABINET
OFFICE

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HD/EMOD DEPT (4)
HD/C AF D
HD/S AF D
HD/PUSD (2)
HD/NEWS DEPT
HD/EMD

FLASH

SIR I. SUTCLIFFE, ADVISER RM K174

MR PEECOT LEGAL ADVISER RM K164

GR 500
CONFIDENTIAL

P. M. Muntz
ant

FM LUSAKA 201316Z

TO FLASH FCO

TEL NO. 1263 OF 20 NOVEMBER 1979.

REPEATED TO FLASH PRETORIA

IMMEDIATE MIRIMBA SALISBURY,

PRIORITY DAR ES SALAAM, MAPUTO, WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK,
LUANDA

ROUTINE LAGOS, GABORONE, MONROVIA.

MIPT: RHODESIA AND YOUR TEL NO. 956
KAUNDA'S PRESS CONFERENCE.

1. KAUNDA WAS LESS THEATRICAL THAN I HAD EXPECTED AND I JUDGE THAT HIS SOMBRE TONE INDICATES HOW DEEPLY HUMILIATED, AND BETRAYED HE FEELS. HE MUST ALSO FEEL HIS OWN POSITION IS AT SOME RISK FROM MILITARY HAWKS. HOWEVER ALTHOUGH HE SAID ZAMBIA WAS ON A WAR FOOTING IT WAS CLEAR FROM WHAT HE SAID THAT HE WAS SPEAKING IN DEFENSIVE NOT OFFENSIVE TERMS. HE DID NOT, REPEAT NOT, DECLARE WAR ON RHODESIA.

2. MOST OF THE MEASURES HE INDICATED SEEM TO BE FACE-SAVING DEVICES UNLESS HE IS REALLY IN CONTACT WITH THE EAST EUROPEANS OR CUBANS FOR MORE SPECIFIC MILITARY HELP

2. MOST OF THE MEASURES HE INDICATED SEEM TO BE FACE-SAVING DEVICES UNLESS HE IS REALLY IN CONTACT WITH THE EAST EUROPEANS OR CUBANS FOR MORE SPECIFIC MILITARY HELP OF WHICH THERE IS SO FAR NO INDICATION.

3. HIS THREATNING REMARKS ABOUT FARMERS AND SUPPORTERS OF IAN SMITH ADD TO THE THREAT TO THE BRITISH COMMUNITY TO WHICH I REFERRED IN MY TEL NO 1260 EARLIER TODAY.

4. HIS SUPPORT FOR RAMPHAL'S VIEWS ON THE COMPOSITION OF THE COMMONWEALTH OBSERVERS AT THE ELECTION SUGGEST HE WILL ALSO BE UNHELPFUL ABOUT LIAISON ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE CEASEFIRE UNLESS WE CAN BE SEEN TO RESPOND TO HIS DISTRESS CALL VERY POSITIVELY AND PUBLICLY. ANGLO-ZAMBIAN RELATIONS ARE AT RISK.

5. I WONDER IF THERE IS ALSO ANY POSSIBILITY OF US WORKING ON THE SOUTH AFRICANS (AND FOR GOOD MEASURE THE SOVIET UNION - WITH THE HELP OF THE US) TO MAKE A STATEMENT SAYING THAT THEY WILL ACCEPT THE RESULT OF FREE AND FAIR ELECTIONS.

6. IT WOULD BE VALUABLE, IF WE COULD OFFER SOME MATERIAL SUPPORT TO HELP MAKE GOOD THE DAMAGE TO ZAMBIA'S COMMUNICATIONS. I UNDERSTAND FROM THE PERMANENT SECRETARY IN THE MINISTRY OF WORKS THAT THEY ESTIMATE AT LEAST 10 ROAD AND RAIL BRIDGES HAVE BEEN DESTROYED. THERE IS VERY LITTLE SUITABLE STEEL IN THE COUNTRY, A SHORTAGE OF CEMENT AND NOT NEARLY ENOUGH QUALIFIED ENGINEERS AT TECHNICAL LEVEL TO COPE WITH THE TASK OF RECONSTRUCTION.

7. MY CANADIAN COLLEAGUE TELLS ME THAT CANADIANS HELPING THE ZAMBIAN RAILWAY REPORT THE SOUTHERN ROUTE IS WORKING WELL AND THAT WHEAT, FERTILISER AND GENERAL GOODS ARE COMING UP REGULARLY. THEY HAVE SEEN A RHODESIAN RAILWAYS NOTICE AT KABWE (ZAMBIA RAILWAYS HEADQUARTERS) INDICATING THAT THE BAN ON THE TRANSPORT OF MAIZE WILL BE LIFTED NEXT WEEK. THIS SEEMS STRANGE IN ALL THE CIRCUMSTANCES.

8. LAND COMMUNICATIONS WITH EASTERN PROVINCE, NORTHERN PROVINCE AND TO THE RHODESIAN BORDER AT CHIRUNDU ARE ALL CUT AND THE ZAMBIAN FEELING OF BEING BESEIGED IS VERY STRONG. IT IS COUPLED WITH A

8. LAND COMMUNICATIONS WITH EASTERN PROVINCE,
NORTHERN PROVINCE AND TO THE RHODESIAN BORDER AT
CHIRUNDU ARE ALL CUT AND THE ZAMBIAN FEELING OF BEING
BESEIGED IS VERY STRONG. IT IS COUPLED WITH A
REALISATION OF HELPLESSNESS WHICH BEHOVES FOREIGN
RESIDENTS TO MOVE ABOUT AS LITTLE AS POSSIBLE AND
KEEP A LOW PROFILE AS INEVITABLY A SEARCH BEGINS FOR
SCAPEGOATS.

ALLINSON.

FLASH

NNN

Rhodesia



Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster

PRIVY COUNCIL OFFICE
WHITEHALL LONDON SW1A 2AT

20 November 1979

De Peter

To Peter

SOUTHERN RHODESIA INDEPENDENCE BILL

Thank you for your minute of ~~15~~ November.

I understand that work on drafting the main Independence Bill is well in hand and Parliamentary Counsel expect to have it ready in time for it to be considered at Legislation Committee on 27 November. The Bill could then be published on 28 November, and the Chief Whip and I will arrange for Second Reading and, if possible, the remaining stages to be taken in the Commons before Christmas.

I am copying this letter to the Prime Minister, the Chairman and members of Legislation Committee and Sir Robert Armstrong.

John Carrington

The Rt Hon Lord Carrington, KCMG, MC
Secretary of State for Foreign &
Commonwealth Affairs
Foreign & Commonwealth Office
SW1

20 NOV 1979



RHODESIA, POLICY ADVANCE COPIES #29

FLASH

PS
PS/DIR I GLENCOUR
PS/SEC
PS/FUS

PS/NO TO ~~BRUSSELS STREET~~

MR WILLSON
MR DAY
LORD H G LENNOX
MR ASPIN

GOULTY

MR R D WIDE-GERY
MR P M MAXBY
~~MR D EVERALL~~
MR P J FOWLER
DIO

CABINET
OFFICE

DD/RIOD DEPT (4)

DD/C AF D
DD/S AF D

DD/PUSD (2)

DD/NEWS DEPT
DD/WID

SIR I. SUTCLIFFE LEGAL ADVISER RM K174

MR FITCOFF LEGAL ADVISER RM K164

RESIDENT CLERK

W/REDE 2

Pinne Hunter

GPS 300

RESTRICTED

FM UKREP BRUSSELS 201650Z NOV 79

TO FLASH FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 6191 OF 20 NOV

AND TO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON

INFO IMMEDIATE BRUSSELS, COPENHAGEN, THE HAGUE, ROME, LUXEMBOURG,
DUBLIN, PARIS, BONN, UKMIS NEW YORK, UKDEL NATO, UKDEL STRASBOURG,
MADRID, LISBON, ATHENS, PRETORIA, MIRIMBA (SALSIBUPY), LUANDA,
LUSAKA, MAPUTO, NAIROBI, LAGOS, DAR ES SALAAM.

EUROPEAN POLITICAL COOPERATION.

MEETING OF MINISTERS.

BRUSSELS 20 NOVEMBER.

RHODESIA.

1. THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT WAS AGREED BY FOREIGN
MINISTERS FOR ISSUE FOLLOWING TODAY'S MEETING:

1. THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT WAS AGREED BY FOREIGN
MINISTERS FOR ISSUE FOLLOWING TODAY'S MEETING:

BEGINS.

THE FOREIGN MINISTERS OF THE NINE WARMLY WELCOME THE PROGRESS
MADE AT THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE AT LANCASTER HOUSE.
THEY COMMEND THE PARTIES TO THE NEGOTIATIONS FOR THE SPIRIT
OF COMPROMISE THEY HAVE SHOWN AND THEY RECOGNISE THE ROLE
PLAYED BY OTHER AFRICAN LEADERS WHO HAVE ENCOURAGED THE EFFORTS
TO ACHIEVE A SETTLEMENT.

THE MINISTERS NOTE THE AGREEMENT REACHED ON AN INDEPENDENCE
CONSTITUTION PROVIDING FOR GENUINE MAJORITY RULE, AND ON
ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE HOLDING OF FREE AND FAIR ELECTIONS AND
FOR THE ADMINISTRATION OF RHODESIA UNTIL THESE TAKE PLACE.

THE CONFERENCE HAS NOW MOVED TO ITS FINAL STAGE - THE EFFORT
TO AGREE ON PROPOSALS FOR A CEASEFIRE. THE FOREIGN MINISTERS
OF THE NINE NOTE THAT THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT HAS PUT FORWARD
PROPOSALS TO THIS END. THEY HOPE THAT AGREEMENT WILL QUICKLY
BE NEGOTIATED ON THE BASIS OF THESE PROPOSALS SO THAT THE
PRESENT DESTRUCTIVE CONFLICT WILL BE BROUGHT TO A SPEEDY END.
THIS WOULD CLEAR THE WAY FOR ELECTIONS AND BRING ABOUT THE
EMERGENCE OF A FREE AND INDEPENDENT ZIMBABWE TO TAKE ITS
RIGHTFUL PLACE AS AN ACCEPTED MEMBER OF THE WORLD COMMUNITY.

ENDS.

BUTLER.

FLASH

NNNN

RHODESIA POLICY ADVANCED COPIES #28

1/1/79 I GILMOUR
PB/ME LUCE
PB/PBS

MR WILLSON
MR DAY
LORD R G LENNOX
MR ASPER

Gooldy

PB/NO 10 ~~LEWINS~~ STREET

MR R D WADD-GERY)
MR P M MAXEY)
MR ~~DEVEREAUX~~)
MR P J FOWLER)
DIO)

CABINET
OFFICE

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DD/S AF D

DD/PUSD (2)

DD/NEWS DEPT
DD/WID

SIR I. SUTCLIFFE, ADVISER RM K174

MR FITCOFF LEGAL ADVISER RM K164

RESIDENT CLERK

Rome ...

GRS 460
CONFIDENTIAL
FM BONN 201540Z NOV 79
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 699 OF 20 NOVEMBER
INFO EEC POSTS UKMIS NEW YORK WASHINGTON

IMMEDIATE

arb

RHODESIA: FRG ATTITUDES

1. AS A COMPLEMENT TO GENSCHER'S CONGRATULATORY MESSAGE TO YOU, THE AUSWARTIGES AMT ISSUED A STATEMENT ON 18 NOVEMBER WELCOMING THE LANCASTER HOUSE AGREEMENT ON THE ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD AS A FURTHER IMPORTANT STEP ON THE WAY TOWARDS INDEPENDENCE FOR RHODESIA. THE RESULTS OF THE CONFERENCE SO FAR WERE AN ENCOURAGING SIGN THAT PATIENT NEGOTIATION AND READINESS TO COMPROMISE ON THE PART OF ALL CONCERNED COULD LEAD TO A PEACEFUL AND INTERNATIONALLY ACCEPTABLE SOLUTION TO ONE OF THE MOST DIFFICULT PROBLEMS OF SOUTHERN AFRICA. THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT HOPED THAT THE WAY WAS NOW OPEN FOR AN EARLY CEASE-FIRE, FOR FREE AND FAIR ELECTIONS IN WHICH ALL POLITICAL FORCES COULD TAKE PART AND FOR THE PEACEFUL CO-EXISTENCE OF ALL RHODESIANS IN AN INDEPENDENT AND DEMOCRATIC ZIMBABWE.

AND DEMOCRATIC ZIMBABWE.

2. THE GERMANS ARE FULL OF ADMIRATION FOR THE WAY IN WHICH YOU HAVE CONDUCTED THE LANCASTER HOUSE NEGOTIATIONS. VAN WELL, THE STATE SECRETARY (PUS EQUIVALENT) IN THE AUSWARTIGES AMT, TOLD ME ON 16 NOVEMBER THAT THIS WAS AN EXAMPLE OF WHAT BRITISH DETERMINATION COULD ACHIEVE (WHETHER THE GERMANS WOULD BE SO SANGUINE ABOUT THIS IN THE CONTEXT OF THE COMMUNITY BUDGET IS ANOTHER MATTER EXCLAMATION MARK). THE AUSWARTIGES AMT ARE ALSO PROBABLY MORE THAN A LITTLE RELIEVED THAT THEY HAVE NOT BEEN FACED WITH THE CONSEQUENCES OF A BREAKDOWN OF THE CONFERENCE. THEY HAVE TRIED TO BE HELPFULL IN THEIR OWN CONTACTS WITH FRONT LINE STATES (MY TELNO 658 (NOT TO ALL)). DESPITE THE OBVIOUS DIFFICULTY OF THE CEASEFIRE NEGOTIATIONS, THERE IS NOW A FEELING IN THE AUSWARTIGES AMT THAT, HAVING GONE SO FAR, IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT FOR THE PATRIOTIC FRONT TO PIN THE BLAME FOR A BREAKDOWN OF THE CONFERENCE ON ANYONE ELSE AND THAT THE FRONT LINE STATES WILL PUSH HARD TO KEEP THEM AT THE CONFERENCE TABLE.

3. OFFICIALS IN THE AUSWARTIGES AMT HAVE TOLD US INFORMALLY THAT WE CAN COUNT ON THE FRG'S SUPPORT FOR OUR EFFORTS TO COMPLETE THE SETTLEMENT. SCHMIDT HAS APPARENTLY BEEN BRIEFED TO REFER IN HIS TALKS WITH GROMYKO THIS WEEK TO THE ACHIEVEMENT SO FAR AS A SUPREME ACT OF BRITISH STATESMANSHIP AND TO CALL FOR RECOGNITION OF THIS. THE FRG COULD ALSO BE A USEFUL SOURCE OF SUPPORT OVER THE NEXT FEW DAYS PARTICULARLY IN OUR EFFORTS TO PERSUADE THE BOTSWANA, ZAMBIA AND MOZAMBIQUE GOVERNMENTS TO HELP IN RESOLVING THE PROBLEMS OF THE CEASE-FIRE.

4. ON SANCTIONS THE GERMANS HAVE RECENTLY TOLD US THAT FOLLOWING SIR IAN SINCLAIR'S VISIT ON 6 NOVEMBER, THEY SEE NO DIFFICULTY IN ACCEPTING OUR LEGAL ARGUMENTS AND WILL NOT HESITATE TO USE THEM TO JUSTIFY A POLITICAL DECISION TO LIFT SANCTIONS. THEY HAVE ALSO TAKEN CAREFUL NOTE OF PRESIDENT CARTER'S STATEMENT THAT THE UNITED STATES WOULD BE PREPARED TO LIFT SANCTIONS ONCE A BRITISH GOVERNOR HAD BEEN INSTALLED IN SALISBURY (YOUR TELNO 550 TO CANBERRA).

WRIGHT

IMMEDIATE

NNNN

SENT AT 20/8743Z AJC

SUBJECT

F A 100—W 5699



HIGH COMMISSIONER
OF THE
REPUBLIC OF SINGAPORE

LONDON

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T147/79T

20 November 1979

Mr Michael Alexander
Private Secretary to Prime Minister
Prime Minister's Office
10 Downing Street
London SW1.

Dear Mr Alexander,

I have been asked by my Prime Minister to
transmit the following message to Mrs Margaret Thatcher:

Message begins:

" THANK YOU FOR YOUR MESSAGE (.) YOUR POSITION
ON ZIMBABWE-RHODESIA HAS BEEN CONSISTENT AND
CLEAR CUT (.) I HAVE FOLLOWED THE PROGRESS OF
THE RHODESIAN CONFERENCE AT LANCASTER HOUSE,
AND AM HEARTENED TO LEARN THAT THE RHODESIAN
CONFERENCE HAS REACHED AN ALL-PARTY AGREEMENT
ON THE BRITISH PROPOSALS FOR A TRANSITIONAL PERIOD
LEADING TO INDEPENDENCE (.)

IT IS MY HOPE THAT THERE WILL BE A PEACEFUL
SETTLEMENT TO THE RHODESIAN PROBLEM (.) "

Message ends.

I shall be grateful if you will convey the message
to your Prime Minister.


Yours sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to be 'Jek Yeun Thong'.

JEK YEUN THONG



20 NOV 1979



RHODESIA POLICY ADVANCE COPIES #28

PS
PS/DIR I GILGOUR
PS/DIR LUCE
PS/PUS

MR WILLSON
MR DAY
LORD N G LENNOX
MR ASPIN

PS/NO 10 DOWNING STREET

B Goulty

MR R D WILDER-GERY)
MR P M MAXEY)
MR D EVERALL)
MR P J FOWLER)
DIO)

CABINET
OFFICE

DD/EMOD DEPT (4)

DD/C AF D

DD/S AF D

DD/PUSD (2)

DD/NEWS DEPT

DD/EMD

SIR I. SUTCLIFFE LEGAL ADVISER RM K174

MR PITCOCK LEGAL ADVISER RM K164

RESIDENT CLERK

Prime Minister

OO FCO (DESKBY 291830Z)

CONFIDENTIAL

DESKBY FCO 201830Z

FM PRETORIA 201730Z NOV 79
TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 876 OF 20 NOV
INFO IMMEDIATE NIRMBA SALISBURY LUSAKA WASHINGTON UKMIS NEW YORK
DAR ES SALAAM MAPUTO.

MY TELNO 874 (NOT TO ALL) AND LUSAKA TELNO 1262 : FAUNDA'S
PRESS CONFERENCE.

1. IN VIEW OF MY TALK WITH PIK BOTHA EARLIER IN THE DAY (MY
FIRST TUR), I ARRANGED TO HAVE DELIVERED TO HIM PROMPTLY A
COPY OF THE SECOND TUR. THIS REACHED HIM AS HE WAS ABOUT TO
LEAVE TO DISCUSS THE MATTER WITH THE PRIME MINISTER.

2. PIK BOTHA HAS NOW TELEPHONED TO SAY THAT THE SOUTH AFRICANS

art

2. PIK BOTHA HAS NOW TELEPHONED TO SAY THAT THE SOUTH AFRICANS HAVE BEEN IN TOUCH WITH SALISBURY AND HAVE COUNSELLED CAUTION. HE SAID THAT THE RHODESIANS AGREED WITH THE SOUTH AFRICANS THAT KAUNDA'S STATEMENT DID NOT AMOUNT TO A DECLARATION OF WAR: TOO SERIOUS A VIEW SHOULD NOT BE TAKEN OF IT. PIK BOTHA SAID HE UNDERSTOOD THAT THE RHODESIANS WOULD BE PUTTING OUT A STATEMENT IN RESPONSE MAKING THREE POINTS:

(A) THAT KAUNDA MIGHT MERELY BE LOOKING FOR A SCAPEGOAT TO DISTRACT ATTENTION FROM HIS OWN SHORTCOMINGS SEMICOLON

(B) THAT THE BRIDGES MIGHT HAVE BEEN FLOWN UP BY KAUNDA'S INTERNAL OPPONENTS SEMICOLON AND

(C) THAT THE RHODESIAN GOVERNMENT WERE NOT AFRAID OF ZAMBIA OR THE PATRIOTIC FRONT AND WOULD HIT BACK AS NECESSARY.

3.. PIK BOTHA THEN SAID HE WAS SORRY TO PRESS YOU AGAIN BUT THE SOUTH AFRICANS STILL REGARDED THE TIME FACT WITH GREAT CONCERN. HE REALISED THE DIFFICULTIES WHICH YOU FACED AT LANCASTER HOUSE AND HIS AMBASSADOR HAD TOLD HIM OF THE VERY FIRM LINE YOU WERE TAKING ON THE CEASEFIRE ARRANGEMENTS . THE SOUTH AFRICANS WERE VERY GRATEFUL . BUT KAUNDA'S REACTION SHOWED JUST HOW THE POSITION COULD DETERIORATE AND WHAT POTENTIAL IT HAD TO BLOW UP SUDDENLY INTO A LARGER CONFLICT . HE HOPED YOU WOULD BE FIRM AND " GET IT OVER AND DONE WITH AT LANCASTER HOUSE " AS SOON AS POSSIBLE EVEN IF THAT MEANT TAKING SOME PAINFUL DECISIONS.

' = , 5333333

" IF YOU CONFRONT THE AFRICAN COUNTRIES WITH A FAIT ACCOMPLI YOU WOULD BE SURPRISED HOW READILY IT WOULD BE ACCEPTED.

4. PIK BOTHA WAS CALM AND FRIENDLY AND SAID HE WAS GRATEFUL TO HAVE BEEN KEPT INFORMED .

LEAHY

IMMEDIATE

NNNN

RHODESIA POLICY ADVANCE COPIES - 28

PS
PC/DIR I GILMOUR
PS/MR LUCE
PS/PUS

PS/NO TO DOCKING STREET

MR WILLSON
MR DAY
LORD N G LENNOX
MR ASPIN

Ap County

MR R L WADDE-GERY
MR P H MAXBY
~~MR P J FOWLER~~
MR P J FOWLER
DIO

CABINET
OFFICE

HD/EMOD DEPT (4)
HD/C AF D
HD/S AF D
HD/PUSD (2)
HD/NEWS DEPT
HD/EMD

SIC I. S. S. C. L. A. S. I. C. O. N. E. A. D. V. I. S. E. R. IM K174
MR PIPCOE LEGAL ADVISER IM K164

Prime Minister

~~SECRETARY GENERAL~~

CONFIDENTIAL

FROM PRETORIA 201255Z NOV 79

TO FLASH FCO *if*

TELEGRAM NUMBER 878 OF 20 NOV

INFO FLASH LUSAKA UKREP BRUSSELS (FOR SECRETARY OF STATE'S PARTY)
AND SALISBURY

RHODESIA/ZAMBIA

1. AS REPORTED IN MY TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH WALDEN, PIK BOTH TELEPHONED ME URGENTLY IN BETWEEN SESSIONS OF A CABINET MEETING THIS MORNING TO ASK WHETHER I COULD ESTABLISH LORD CARRINGTON'S WHEREABOUTS SO THAT HE COULD TALK WITH HIM ON THE TELEPHONE RIGHT AWAY. HE SAID THAT THEY HAD JUST HEARD ON THE RADIO THAT PRESIDENT KAUNDA HAD "DECLARED WAR AGAINST RHODESIA" AND HE WANTED TO FIND OUT FROM LORD CARRINGTON WHETHER WE HAD CONFIRMATION OF THIS AND IF SO WHAT WE THOUGHT IT REALLY MEANT. AFTER TALKING WITH WALDEN AND ESTABLISHING THAT BOTH THE SECRETARY OF STATE AND THE LORD PRIVY SEAL WERE ON THEIR WAY TO BRUSSELS, AND AFTER HEARING FROM WALDEN SUCH DETAILS AS WERE AVAILABLE IN LONDON, I RANG BACK MR BOTHA AND TOLD HIM THE FOLLOWING :-

OF STATE AND THE LORD PRIVY SEAL WERE ON THEIR WAY TO BRUSSELS, AND AFTER HEARING FROM WALDEN SUCH DETAILS AS WERE AVAILABLE IN LONDON, I RANG BACK MR BOTHA AND TOLD HIM THE FOLLOWING :-

(A) WE UNDERSTOOD THAT KAUNDA HAD NOT (NOT) "DECLARED WAR" BUT HAD ANNOUNCED IN A RADIO BROADCAST THE CALLING UP OF ZAMBIA'S RESERVISTS TO MEET "A FULL-SCALE WAR SITUATION".

(B) THE CALLING UP OF RESERVISTS WAS LIKELY TO ADD SOME 15,000-20,000 TO THE STANDING FORCE OF 12,000.


(C) KAUNDA WAS IN A BITTER MOOD AND WAS UNDER PRESSURE IN ZAMBIA TO REACT PUBLICLY TO THE LATEST ATTACKS.

2. PIK BOTHA TOOK CAREFUL NOTE OF THIS INFORMATION AND SAID THAT HE WOULD BE GRATEFUL FOR ANY FURTHER CLARIFICATIONS WE COULD GIVE HIM. HE WENT ON TO SAY THAT HE UNDERSTOOD THE RHODESIAN CABINET WERE MEETING THIS AFTERNOON TO CONSIDER THEIR REACTION TO THE NEWS AND HE WAS GETTING THROUGH TO MUZOREWA SUGGESTING THAT THEY SHOULD NOT SAY ANYTHING PUBLICLY BEFORE DISCUSSING IT WITH THE SOUTH AFRICANS. HE ALSO MENTIONED A RUMOUR TO THE EFFECT THAT MUGABE HAD DECLARED THAT THE P F WOULD FIGHT ALONGSIDE ZAMBIA. I TOLD HIM THAT THERE HAD BEEN A LIVELY SESSION AT LANCASTER HOUSE THIS MORNING, BUT THAT THERE HAD BEEN NO REFLECTION OF THIS.

3. I HOPE THAT WHAT I HAVE ALREADY TOLD BOTHA WILL BE SUFFICIENT TO CALM THINGS DOWN HERE. BUT ANY FURTHER INFORMATION THAT I CAN GIVE HIM, PARTICULARLY ABOUT THE INTENDED SCOPE OF KAUNDA'S ANNOUNCEMENT, WOULD PAY DIVIDENDS.

LEAHY

NNNN



CONFIDENTIAL



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

20 November 1979

Dear Michael

As. Hunt

Zambia/Rhodesia

/
/
The Prime Minister may be questioned in the House this afternoon on the tension between Zambia and Rhodesia. We are submitting advice separately. It would be useful for the Prime Minister to be able to say that she had sent a message to President Kaunda. The text of a message which she may wish to authorize us to convey rapidly is in the first enclosed draft telegram. Background is given in the second enclosed draft telegram, and in a separate note. The purpose of the message is both to mollify President Kaunda and to try to persuade him that a meeting of the Front Line Presidents this week-end (plans for which have come to us from secret sources) would interrupt progress towards a ceasefire.

I discussed the possibility of sending a message to President Kaunda with Lord Carrington before his departure for Brussels this morning, but in the time available we have not been able to clear the text with him. I am passing the gist of the draft message to Lord Carrington in Brussels, and I think that he would be content with it.

yours ever
Roderic Lyne

(R M J Lyne)
Private Secretary

M O'D B Alexander Esq
10 Downing Street



20 MAY 1970

File No.
 Department RHODESIA
 Drafted by P J BARLOW
 (Block Capitals)
 Tel. Extn. 233 5725

OUTWARD
 TELEGRAM

Security Classification CONFIDENTIAL	
Precedence FLASH	
DESKBY	Z

FOR COMMS. DEPT. USE	Despatched (Date)	POSTBY
	(Time) Z Z

PREAMBLE

(Time of Origin) Z (G.M.T.) (Restrictive Prefix)
 (Security Class.) CONFIDENTIAL (Caveat/ Privacy marking)
 (Codeword) (Deskby) Z

TO FLASH LUSAKA Tel. No. of
 (precedence) (post)

AND TO (precedence/post)

AND SAVING TO
 REPEATED TO (for info) IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, DAR ES SALAAM, MAPUTO,
 GABORONE

PRIORITY LUANDA, UKMIS NEW YORK, PRETORIA, LAGOS, MIRIMBA SALISBURY
 SAVING TO (for info)

Distribution: -
 Rhodesia Policy

Copies to: -

and that we have been urging both sides to show restraint.

[TEXT]
 MIPT: RHODESIA

1. Following is text of message from Prime Minister:
 'Dear Kenneth
 As you know, I had already addressed a message to you about the progress of the Rhodesia Constitutional Conference before news reached me about the recent events, ^{there} which, I know, have caused you ⁱⁿ such distress.

I can well understand the concern which you feel at the attacks which have taken place on your territory and the extremely difficult situation in which they have placed you and your people. As I made clear to you when you were in London, it is my earnest desire to see that all such incidents come to an end and that normal relations can be restored between Rhodesia and Zambia as soon as possible. Let me assure you, Kenneth, that we are doing all we can to see that this happens. But the only way we can be sure of achieving ^{an aim} this is to bring the war ^{itself} to an end, ^{that} which is precisely what we are striving to do in

this final phase of the of the Constitutional Conference. Peter Carrington and Ian Gilmour have been doing their utmost to impress on both the other delegations at Lancaster House the urgent need to make progress quickly.

One of the considerations which is uppermost in all our minds in this is the need to put an end to the loss of human life and the disruption of your economy which you are suffering as a result of the conflict in Rhodesia. To do this, we must get an agreement on a cease-fire here in London which will enable us to send our Governor out to Salisbury at once so that he can exert his authority over all the forces. Having got agreement on the political basis for a settlement, it ^{will} be a tragedy if we now fail to get agreement on an end to the war, in the interests not only of the people of Rhodesia but of Zambia as well.

*Without a
few more, we
have no
authority.*

*At present, as you
know, we do not
have that
authority.*

I do urge you to ^{understand} believe, Kenneth, that we ^{are taking the} ~~take this~~ situation very seriously indeed. At this vital moment, we must ensure that all ^{the} participants ^{here} concentrate on working without ~~any~~ further delay or interruptions to reach agreement on a ceasefire at the earliest possible date. We must maintain the momentum of the talks at Lancaster House. I am sure that I can count on you for all possible help in this. If you think it would be helpful to have a word with me on the telephone to discuss this further, please do not hesitate to call me at once.

With warmest regards. Margaret.'

*We ~~really~~ must
get agreement
within the next few
days if the chance
is not to slip from
our grasp.*

File No.

OUTWARD

Security Classification
CONFIDENTIAL

Department..... RHODESIA.....

TELEGRAM

FLASH Precedence

Drafted by (Block Capitals) C D POWELL.....

Tel. Extn 233 4146.....

DESKBY Z

FOR COMMS. DEPT. USE

Despatched (Date)..... (Time)..... Z

POSTBY Z

PREAMBLE

(Time of Origin)..... Z(G.M.T.)

(Restrictive Prefix).....

(Security Class.)..... CONFIDENTIAL.....

(Caveat/ Privacy Marking).....

(Codeword).....

(Deskby).....

To..... FLASH LUSAKA (precedence) (post)

Tel. No..... of.....

AND TO (precedence/post)

AND SAVING TO

REPEATED TO (for info) IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON: PRIORITY UKMIS NEW YORK, DAR ES SALAAM, MAPUTO, GABORONE, LUANDA, PRETORIA, MIRIMBA SALISBURY, LAGOS UKMIS NY

SAVING TO (for info).....

Distribution:-
Rhodesia Policy

(TEXT)

YOUR TELNO 1259: RHODESIA

1. The line taken by Wisner, as reported in para 4 of TUR, is right. So long as the Zambians allow ZIPRA to step up its infiltration, no action which we take will persuade the Rhodesians to desist from counter-measures. The only way to break the cycle is to bring the cease-fire negotiations to the earliest possible conclusion, so that the Governor can go to Salisbury. Walls will accept instructions from us only when the Governor arrives. We are doing all we can to impart urgency to the cease-fire talks and have also urged both sides to show restraint in the negotiations. The Patriotic Front, however, seem intent on stringing things out and there are now reports that Nkomo and Mugabe will fly off at the weekend to attend a meeting of Front-Line Presidents. This can only delay the process of reaching agreement, and we hope that Kaunda will not be party to any proposal which will have the effect of undermining our efforts to ensure early agreement on a cease-fire.

Copies to:-

2. Kaunda can hardly claim convincingly that he has no word from the British, when he is refusing to accept delivery from you of the Prime Minister's message of 18 November. MIFT contains the text of a further message from the Prime Minister which you should make every effort to deliver personally or, failing that, through Chakulya. As you will see, it ends with the suggestion that Kaunda should telephone the Prime Minister. We prefer ^{not} ~~this~~ to initiating the telephone call from here, since we want Kaunda to grasp ^{just} the main point that we cannot hold back the Rhodesians while the Patriotic Front continue to step up infiltration, until we are in a position to exert direct authority over Rhodesia. We shall only be able to do so when there is agreement on a cease-fire.

3. Please see MIFT.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

Confidential.
Restricted.
Unclassified.

PRIVACY MARKING

In Confidence

Telephone No. Ext.

Department

BACKGROUND NOTE

RHODESIAN RAIDS ON ZAMBIA

1. Lusaka telno 1259 (copy enclosed for ease of reference) reports the US Ambassador's account of President Kaunda's reactions to the latest Rhodesian raids which have resulted in the destruction of a number of bridges. Kaunda is reported to be depressed at the lack of action by the British Government to restrain the Rhodesians and asked for American help (the US Ambassador has subsequently been in touch to express the US Government's concern). He added that he would not see Sir L. Allinson to receive the Prime Minister's latest message. Sir L. Allinson believes that unless we ^{persuade the Rhodesians to show restraint} ~~take action with Salisbury~~ we shall ^{not} ~~be~~ able to count on Kaunda's help with Nkomo. He suggests that the Prime Minister might telephone President Kaunda.

2. At the same time we have reports that President Nyerere is planning to hold a meeting of Front-Line Presidents this weekend, which Nkomo and Mugabe will attend. This would seriously delay the cease-fire negotiations and reduce the pressure on the Patriotic Front to reach agreement.

3. There has been a substantial increase in the infiltration of Patriotic Front forces from Zambia in the past few days, which is causing the Rhodesians serious concern. No action which we can take will deter them from interdicting of the infiltration routes. The only way to bring an end to the cycle of infiltration and retaliation is to reach the earliest possible agreement on a ceasefire after which the Governor can proceed to Salisbury and establish his authority over

Dd 0532000 800M 5/78 HMSO Bracknell

CONFIDENTIAL

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the Rhodesian forces. The US Ambassador in Lusaka has made this point to Kaunda, but it is important that the point should be reinforced. We shall at the same time be taking action to urge restraint on the Rhodesians, and can tell Kaunda this.

9PS550
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FM LUSAKA 192315Z NOV 7

TO FLASH FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1259 OF 19 NOVEMBER

AND TO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, PRIORITY MIRIMBA SALISBURY ,
PRETORIA, UKMIS NEW YORK, DAR EL SALAAM, GABORONE, MAPUTO, LUANDA ,
LAGOS AND TEHERAN.

MYTEL NO 1256: RHODESIA

PR SIDENT KAUNDA RECEIVED THE U S AMBASSADOR, WISNER, LATE THIS
EVENING TO HEAR A MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT CARTER ABOUT THE
HOSTAGES IN TEHERAN TO WHICH KAUNDA RESPONDED VERY HELPFULLY WITH
A PERSONAL LETTER TO THE AYATOLLAH. HOWEVER HE TOLD WISNER
THAT HIS OTHER PURPOSE WAS TO EXPRESS HIS GREAT DISMAY AT THE J
ATTACKS ON ZAMBIA BY THE RHODESIANS WHICH HAVE CONTINUED TO-DAY
WITH MORE ROAD BRIDGES DESTROYED.

2. KAUNDA WHO WAS LOOKING GREY AND DESPONDENT SAID THAT HE WAS
EXTR MELY UPSET. HE WAS PRAYING THAT HE COULD CONTROL HIMSELF.
IT HAD ALL STARTED WITH SANCTIONS INTO WHICH BRITAIN HAD DRAGGED
ZAMBIA WITH THE FIRST ZAMBIAN DEATH RESULTING IN 1965. THERE HAD
BEEN THE BRITISH BETRAYAL OVER OIL. NOW THIS. THE BRITISH
GOVERNEMENT HAD SAID NOTHING. THEY MUST EXPLAIN WHAT WAS HAPPENING
AND PUT A STOP TO IT. HE , KAUNDA , WAS ON TRIAL. HE HAD NEVER
BEEN UNDER SUCH PR SSURE. YET THERE WAS NO WORD FROM BRITAIN.
HE WOULD NOT REPEAT NOT SEE THE BRITISH HIGH COMMISSIONER TO
R CEIVE THE PRIME MINISTER'S LETTER. THE FOREIGN MINISTER WOULD
SEE HIM. THE AMERICANS MUST CONVINCEN THE BRITISH THAT THEY
MUST TAKE ACTION. MR VANCE MUST SPEAK TO THEM.

3. KAUNDA SAID THAT HE HAD NEVER BEEN SO NEAR BITTERNESS. HE
HAD SUFFERED MUCH IN HIS LFE . HE HAD BEEN BEATEN IN PRISON.
BUT UNTIL NOW HE HAD ALWAYS MAINTINED HIS SELF-CONTROL.

4. WISNER SUGGESTED THAT THE BEST ANSWER WAS SURELY TO SPEED
UP THE CEASE-FIRE NEGOTIATIONS AND GET A BRITISH GOVERNOR IN
CONTROL IN SALISBURY. KAUNDA HOWEVER SAID THAT THE BRITISH WERE
NOT POWERLESS. SMITH AND MUZOREWA WERE NOTHING. HMG HAD THE
POWER. YOU HAD TOLD HIM ON THE DRIVE FROM HEATHROW ON HIS RECENT
VISIT THAT WALLS WAS A PROFESSIONAL SOLDIER WHO WOULD OBEY ORDERS
AND WOULD WORK WITH ANYONE. LET THE BRITISH EXERCISE CONTROL.

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/5.

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5. KAUNDA TERMINATED THE CONVERSATION WITH LESS THAN HIS USUAL COURTESY. CHAKULYA WAS PRESENT THROUGHOUT BUT SAID NOTHING. WISNER COMMENTED TO ME THAT SECURITY AT STATE HOUSE HAD BEEN INCREASED GREATLY WITH MANY MORE ARMED MEN IN EVIDENCE OUTSIDE AND INSIDE .

6. THERE CAN BE NO DOUBT THAT THESE RAIDS FOLLOWING IMMEDIATELY AFTER HIS HEROS WELCOME ON SATURDAY AND CAUSING SUCH GREAT HARM TO ZAMBIAN ROUTES TO TANZIANA AND TO MALAWI AS WELL AS THE ROAD SOUTH HAVE CAUSED A TREMENDOUS LOSS OF FACE FOR KAUNDA. THE FULL FACTS MUST SOON APPEAR AND HE DOES NOT KNOW WHAT ELSE THE RHODEISANS MAY ATTEMPT. THESE ATTACKS MOR OVER ARE DIRECT STRIKES AT ZAMBIA ITSELF NOT AT THE PATROTIC FRONT. THE SUPPLY ROUTE FOR IMPORTED MAIZE IS NOW EVFECTIVELY STOPPED IN ALL DIRECTIONS FOR THE TIME BEING.

7. IN KAUNDA'S PRESENT EMOTIONAL MOOD REMINDING KAUNDA THAT IT WAS THE PATRIOTIC FRONT WHO TURNED DOWN A CEASE- FIRE AT THE BEGINNING OF THE TALKS WILL NOT HELP. UNLESS YOU ARE ABLE TO LET IT BE KNOWN THAT WE WILL TRY TO INFLUENCE SALISBURY TO STOP THESE ATTACKS WE CAN NOT COUNT ON KAUNDA FOR ANY HELP NOW WITH NKOMO.

8. IF THERE IS SOMETHING WHICH COULD USEFULLY BE SAID TO KAUNDA AT THIS JUNCTURE A DIRECT TELEPHONE CALL FROM THE PRIME MINISTER MIGHT BE BEST IF CHAKULYA IS TO BE MY CHANNEL OF COMMUNICATION FOR THE TIME BEING.

ALLINSON

FILES
RHODESIA D
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PLANNING STAFF
ES & SD
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UND
LEGAL ADVISERS
(SIR I SINCLAIR)
(MR FIFOOT)
ECON D
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PS/LPS
PS/MR LUCE
PS/MR RIDLEY
PS/MR HURD
PS/PUS
SIR A DUFF
MR BULLARD
LORD BAIDGES
LORD N G LENNOX
MISS BROWN
MR DAY
MR WILLSON
MR ASPIN

ADDITIONAL DISTN.
RHODESIA POLICY



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

① I thought - there was a change in Dept. Gov. Lord Soames H.C. with a note out like 2 more months into November 1979 - heavy involvement in the process. really ~~not~~ out 27/11

②

Dear Jim,

Rhodesia

As you know, we have been preparing draft announcements of the appointment of the Governor, his Deputy, and key members of his team who are likely to be in the public eye. I enclose a draft with which the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary is content. We should be grateful to know as soon as possible if the Lord President approves it. The timing of the announcement of course will have to be decided in the light of progress at Lancaster House.

As you will see, we have taken into account Lord Soames's wish that his role in Europe should be properly covered and the form of words you suggested has been included in paragraph 3. We have not felt able to include a specific reference to logistics and transport since to do so would overburden the announcement with detail. However, I can assure you that we and the Ministry of Defence are fully aware of the importance of adequate logistic support for all those who are in Rhodesia in connection with the elections or the monitoring of the ceasefire. We shall be working jointly to ensure that all the necessary arrangements have been made.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Michael Alexander at No 10 Downing Street.

yours ever
 Roderic Lyne

(R M J Lyne)
Private Secretary

J Buckley Esq
 Private Secretary
 to the Lord President
 Civil Service Department
 Whitehall
 London SW1

CONFIDENTIAL

DSR 11

Registry No.

DRAFT Press statement

Type 1 +

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

Top Secret.
Secret.
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Unclassified.

To:-

From

Telephone No. Ext.

Department

PRIVACY MARKING

..... In Confidence

PRESS RELEASE

VERSION 1 - LORD SOAMES

RHODESIA: APPOINTMENT OF A BRITISH GOVERNOR

HM The Queen has been pleased to approve the appointment of the Rt Hon Lord Soames GCMG GCVO CBE as Governor in Rhodesia during the interim period. In appointing to this post a senior member of the Cabinet with wide ministerial experience, the Government are demonstrating the great importance they attach to the fulfilment of their responsibility to bring Rhodesia to independence on the basis of genuine majority rule. His prime task will be to ensure that conditions in Rhodesia are such that elections can be held which will be fair as between all the parties participating in them. On the Governor's arrival in Salisbury, Rhodesia will be restored to legality. The Governor will have full executive and legislative responsibility.

Lord Soames, as Lord President of the Council, has been much involved since the May election with the UK approach to our European partners and would have been heavily involved with the next stages of our discussions on the EEC Budget and the various aspects of the Common Agricultural Policy. He was born in 1920 and served in the Army before being elected to Parliament in 1950. He has held ministerial office in the Air Ministry, Admiralty and War Office and

/was

2 hrs?

*This person is solely in relation to the...
No - he wouldn't*

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was Secretary of State for War from 1958-60, and Minister of Agriculture from 1960-64. He was Ambassador in Paris from 1968-72 and subsequently Vice-President of the Commission to the European Communities from 1973-77.

The Deputy Governor will be Mr Richard Luce MP (for Shoreham), Parliamentary Under Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, who has special responsibility for Africa. He has been one of the Ministers in the British delegation at the Lancaster House Conference on Rhodesia. Mr Luce, who was born in 1936, was in the Overseas Civil Service as a District Officer in Kenya. He was elected to the House of Commons in 1971, and was subsequently Parliamentary Private Secretary to Sir Geoffrey Howe when he was Minister for Trade and Consumer Affairs (1972-74), an Opposition Whip 1974-75, and an Opposition Spokesman for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs 1977-79.

Sir John Boynton MC LLB PPRTPI has been appointed Election Commissioner under the Governor to supervise the holding of elections in Rhodesia. He will be assisted as Deputy Commissioner by Mr John Cumber CMG MBE TD. Sir J Boynton, who was born in 1918, was the Chief Executive of Cheshire County Council from 1974-78. He is also a former President of the Society of Local Government Chief Executives. He has extensive experience of administering elections. In July he was appointed by the Secretary of State for Social Services as Chairman of the Team to review the organisation and management of Rampton Special Hospital. After consulting Sir John, the Secretary of State for Social Services is

/satisfied

I thought
there was
a change?



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satisfied that there is no reason to believe that the Review will be in any way prejudiced by Sir John's new appointment.

Mr John Cumber, currently Director-General of the Save the Children Fund, served in Kenya as a member of the Overseas Civil Service and was subsequently Administrator of the Cayman Islands and Commissioner in Anguilla.

The Governor will also have military and police advisers. His Military Adviser, Major-General J H B Acland CBE, has been GOC South West District since 1978. He will command the British and Commonwealth troops who will be committed to Rhodesia to monitor the ceasefire. His Police Adviser, Sir James Haughton CBE QPM, was HM Chief Inspector of Constabulary from 1976-77.

20 JUN 1979





Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

19 November 1979

Dear Michael,

Rhodesia


As you know, we shall meet resistance to the idea of monitoring Patriotic Front activities in Mozambique (as well as in Zambia) during the ceasefire. Lord Carrington believes it would be helpful for the Prime Minister to send a message to President Machel, stressing the importance which we attach to adequate liaison arrangements with the Mozambique authorities. I enclose a draft telegram to Maputo.

yours ever
Roderic Lyne

(R M J Lyne)
Private Secretary

M O'D B Alexander Esq
10 Downing Street
LONDON

19 NOV 1979



File No.

Department RHODESIA
 Drafted by
 (Block Capitals)

OUTWARD
 TELEGRAM

Security Classification CONFIDENTIAL
Precedence IMMEDIATE
DESKBYZ

Tel. Extn.

FOR
 COMMS. DEPT.
 USE

Despatched (Date)
 (Time)Z

POSTBYZ

PREAMBLE

(Time of Origin)Z(G.M.T.) (Restrictive Prefix).....
 (Security Class.) CONFIDENTIAL (Caveat/Privacy Marking).....
 (Codeword) (Deskby).....Z

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AND TO (precedence/post).....

AND SAVING TO.....

REPEATED TO (for info) PRIORITY: DAR ES SALAAM, GABORONE, LUSAKA, LAGOS
WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK, LUANDA

SAVING TO (for info).....

Distribution:-

Rhodesia Policy

[TEXT]

RHODESIA

1. Unless you see objection please pass the following message from the Prime Minister to President Machel as soon as possible:

"Dear Mr President,

The Rhodesia Conference has now reached agreement on the independence constitution and on the arrangements for bringing it into effect through free elections supervised under the authority of a British Governor.

This opens the way to a peaceful solution of the problem. It now remains to agree on the final step - the arrangements for a cease-fire. If there is an

/effective

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Copies to:-

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effective cease-fire during the interim period,
and if all the parties commit themselves;

to abide by the outcome of the election, the
result will be a lasting peace for the people of
Rhodesia and for Mozambique.

Mr Papadopoulos^o has given Mr Chissano a full
account of our proposals for the cease-fire.

We are ready to put these into effect very
rapidly. I know that you will be no less
concerned than we are to achieve an end to the
war within the next few days.

It will be essential to the maintenance of an
effective cease-fire to ensure that cross-border
activity by either side ceases from the start and
throughout the interim period. We shall
therefore want to discuss with you arrangements
for military liaison between our two governments
and the Cease-fire Commission in Rhodesia to
ensure that no activity takes place which could
lead to a resumption of hostilities. With your
cooperation I am convinced that a peaceful and
honourable solution to the problem is within
our grasp, and we must now move to get final agreement
without delay.

Yours sincerely

Margaret Thatcher."

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

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RHODESIA, POLICY ADVANCES COPIES - 26

PS

PS/DIR I GLEBOUR

PS/DIR LUCE

PS/PUS

MR WILLSON

MR DAY

LORD N G LENNOX

MR ASPIN

PS/NO 10 DOWNING STREET

MR R D WADD-GERY

MR P H MAYHEW

MR ~~WADD-GERY~~

MR P J FOWLER

DIO

CABINET
OFFICE

HD/EMOD DEPT (4)

HD/C AF D

HD/S AF D

HD/PUSD (2)

HD/NEWS DEPT

HD/WAD

SIR I. SHELTON LEGAL ADVISER RM K174

MR FITCOCK LEGAL ADVISER RM K164

~~RESERVE OFFICER~~

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SIC

GR 900

Pamie Hunter
[Signature]

CONFIDENTIAL

FM GABORONE 191700Z NOV 79

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 473 OF 19 NOVEMBER

INFO IMMEDIATE LUSAKA, MAPUTO, DAR ES SALAAM, LUANDA

INFO PRIORITY PR TORIA, LAGOS, WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK,

MODUK (HEAD DS 11)

YOUR TEL 949 TO LUSAKA AND MY TEL 472 (NOT TO ALL)

RHODESIA: CEASEFIRE ARRANGEMENTS

1. I HAD AN HOUR-LONG MEETING WITH THE ACTING PRESIDENT MASIRE, MOGWE AND KWELAGOBE. I GAVE THE VICE-PRESIDENT A COPY OF THE CEASEFIRE PROPOSALS IN VERBATIM 097 AND WENT OVER THE MAIN POINTS WITH HIM. I THEN DEPLOYED THE ARGUMENTS ON THE NEED FOR CROSS-BORDER LIAISON, DRAWING ON TUR.

2. THE FIRST POINT MADE BY THE MINISTERS WAS THAT THERE WAS NO

2. THE FIRST POINT MADE BY THE MINISTERS WAS THAT THERE WAS NO NEED FOR LIAISON ACROSS THE BOTSWANA BORDER. THERE WERE NO PATRIOTIC FRONT BASES IN BOTSWANA AND ANY GUERRILLAS WHO WERE PICKED UP AND DISARMED COULD BE SENT TO REFUGEE CAMPS FOR RETURN WITH THE REST UNDER CONTROLLED ARRANGEMENTS. I POINTED TO BOTSWANA'S LONG BORDER AND SAID THAT ONE COULD ENVISAGE SITUATIONS IN WHICH UNARMED BODIES OF MEN INSISTED ON CROSSING INTO ZIMBABWE AT POINTS NEAR THEIR HOMES. IN SUCH CIRCUMSTANCES THE BOTSWANA AUTHORITIES MIGHT WANT THE BRITISH AUTHORITIES IN RHODESIA QUICKLY TIPPED OFF TO AVOID A CLASH. I SAID THAT IT WAS IMPOSSIBLE TO PREDICT ALL THE CIRCUMSTANCES ON THE BORDER DURING THE CEASE-FIRE AND THEREFORE YOU WISHED TO ENSURE THAT THERE WERE ADEQUATE ARRANGEMENTS TO AVOID A BREACH OF THE CEASEFIRE EVEN IF THEY NEVER HAD TO BE USED.

3. MOGWE SAID THE FACT THAT WE WERE MAKING AN APPROACH ABOUT LIAISON OFFICERS MADE HIM SUSPICIOUS. HE COULD UNDERSTAND THAT MY OFFICE MIGHT NEED A LITTLE STRENGTHENING TO DEAL WITH THE PROBLEMS WHICH AROSE ON RETURN OF REFUGEES AND SO ON, AND HE WOULD HAVE NO DIFFICULTY IN AGREEING TO THIS. WHAT WAS BEHIND MY SPECIAL APPROACH? I SAID THAT WHILST IN BOTSWANA A SMALL ADDITION TO THE HIGH COMMISSION MIGHT BE ADEQUATE THIS WOULD PROBABLY NOT BE THE CASE IN ZAMBIA AND MOZAMBIQUE. THE PRINCIPLE WAS HOWEVER THE SAME AND SINCE THE ISSUE OF CROSS BORDER LIAISON ARRANGEMENTS WOULD BE RAISED AT THE LONDON TALKS IT WAS ONLY PROPER THAT THE BOTSWANA GOVERNMENT SHOULD BE INFORMED IN ADVANCE ABOUT WHAT WE HAD IN MIND. I THEN WENT ON TO SUGGEST THAT SINCE BOTSWANA WAS NOT SO TIGHTLY ENMESHED IN THE CONFLICT AS WERE ZAMBIA AND MOZAMBIQUE IT WAS PERHAPS EASIER FOR THE BOTSWANA TO LOOK AT THE ISSUE OBJECTIVELY. IF THEY COULD STATE NOW THAT THEY ACCEPTED THE PRINCIPLE OF THE ARRANGEMENT CONDITIONAL UPON THE AGREEMENT OF THE OTHER INVOLVED FRONT LINE STATES IT WOULD HELP A GREAT DEAL IN SECURING GENERAL ACCEPTANCE OF CEASEFIRE PROPOSALS.

4. THE VICE-PRESIDENT, WHO APPEARED VERY TIRED, MADE FEW COMMENTS, BUT THEY EMPHASISED HIS SUSPICION OF OUR MOTIVATIONS. I THEREFORE STRESSED THAT THE OBJECT OF LIAISON WAS NOT TO MONITOR THE COOPERATION OF THE BOTSWANA DEFENCE FORCE AND OTHER BOTSWANA AUTHORITIES BUT TO MAKE IT EASIER FOR THEM TO BRING TO OUR ATTENTION ANY MATTERS WHICH REQUIRED ACTION BY THE BRITISH AUTHORITIES IN ZIMBABWE TO PREVENT A BREAKDOWN OF THE CEASEFIRE.

5. MOGWE THEN SAID THAT WHILST THE ARRANGEMENTS WE PROPOSED MIGHT BE ACCEPTABLE TO BOTSWANA HE THOUGHT THAT IT WOULD BE COUNTER-PRODUCTIVE TO YOUR EFFORTS IF BOTSWANA'S AGREEMENT WERE QUOTED

5. MOGWE THEN SAID THAT WHILST THE ARRANGEMENTS WE PROPOSED MIGHT BE ACCEPTABLE TO BOTSWANA HE THOUGHT THAT IT WOULD BE COUNTER-PRODUCTIVE TO YOUR EFFORTS IF BOTSWANA'S AGREEMENT WERE QUOTED TO THE OTHER FRONT LINE STATES. THE REACTION IN MOZAMBIQUE AND ZAMBIA WOULD BE THAT SINCE BOTSWANA HAD NO CROSS-BORDER PROBLEM IT WAS ONLY TOO EASY FOR THE BOTSWANA GOVERNMENT TO ACCEPT OUR LIAISON PROPOSALS. HE THOUGHT THAT IT WOULD BE BETTER IF WE LEFT IT TO THE BATSWANA TO EXERT THEIR INFLUENCE IN PRIVATE WITH THE OTHER FRONT LINE STATES. I POINTED OUT THAT THE TIMESCALE WAS SHORT AND THAT WHILST YOU WOULD APPRECIATE SUCH HELP IT MIGHT NOT IN THIS INSTANCE BE QUICK ENOUGH TO BE EFFECTIVE.

6. AFTER FURTHER DISCUSSION, MAINLY ON HYPOTHETICAL SITUATIONS ON THE BORDER, THE VICE-PRESIDENT SUMMED UP THE BATSWANA ATTITUDE BY SAYING THAT THER WOULD BE NO OBJECTION TO MY STAFF BEING INCREASED FOR THE PURPOSE OF EASING COMMUNICATIONS ON PROBLEMS ARISING ON THE BORDER. HOWEVER, THESE PROBLEMS SHOULD BE DEALT WITH THROUGH THE NORMAL CHANNELS, THAT IS FROM AUTHORITIES IN THE FIELD THROUGH THE PRESIDENT'S OFFICE TO MY OFFICE, UNLESS THE BOTSWANA GOVERNMENT SPECIALLY DELEGATED RESPONSIBILITY FOR COMMUNICATION WITH MY OFFICE BY AN OFFICIAL IN THE FIELD. THE VICE-PRESIDENT SAID THAT THIS UNDERSTANDING SHOULD NOT BE USED AT LANCASTER HOUSE TO INDICATE THAT BOTSWANA HAD AGREED TO CROSS-BORDER LIAISON. MOGWE INTERVENED TO SAY THAT THIS LIMITED AGREEMENT SHOULD MAKE IT CLEAR THAT BOTSWANA HAD NOT, REPEAT NOT, ACCEPTED THE PRINCIPLE OF LIAISON OFFICERS AS SUCH. MASIRE AGREED.

COMMENT.

7. I AM QUITE SUR THAT ALL THREE MINISTERS SAW THE NEED FOR CROSS-BORDER LIAISON IN THE CASE OF THE ZAMBIA AND MOZAMBIQUE. THEY DID NOT HOWEVER WANT TO AGR E TO ANY ARRANGEMENT IN BOTSWANA WHICH APPEARED TO ISOLATE THEM FROM THE OTHER FRONT LINE STATES. THEY WERE NOT WILLING TO APPEAR TO BE TAKING THE LEAD EVEN CONDITIONALLY. IT WAS QUITE CLEAR THAT THEY HAD IN MIND THE CRITICISM DIR CTED AT BOTSWANA IN THE PAST FOR NOT THROWING THEIR WEIGHT BEHIND THE "FREEDOM STRUGGLE". I THINK THAT MOGWE WAS GENUINELY TRYING TO BE HELPFUL WHEN HE SAID THAT TO USE ACCEPTANCE BY BOTSWANA OF THE ARRANGEMENTS WOULD IRRITATE THE PF AND THE OTHER TWO INVOLVED STATES RATHER THAN ENCOURAGE THEM TO FALL IN LINE.

TURNER.
BT

FS
FD/DEPT I GILMOUR
FD/DEPT LUGOZ
FD/PUS

MR WILLSON
MR DAY
LORD E G LENNOX
MR ASPEN

FB/NO TO ~~LEWIS STREET~~

MR R J WADE-GERY
MR P M MAXBY
~~MR DEVERALL~~
MR P J FOWLER
DIO
MR. GOULTY

CABINET
OFFICE

.....
HD/RHOD DEPT (4)
HD/C AF D
HD/S AF D
HD/PUSD (2)
HD/NEWS DEPT
HD/WAD
SIR I. SINDIGA LEGAL ADVISER RM K174
MR FITCOT LEGAL ADVISER RM K161
~~RESIDENT CLERK~~

Prime Minister

GRS 700

CONFIDENTIAL

DESKBY 191530Z

FM LUSAKA 191415Z NOV 79

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1256 OF 19 NOVEMBER

INFO IMMEDIATE MIRIMBA SALISBURY, WASHINGTON, PRETORIA,
DAR ES SALAAM, UKMIS NEW YORK, ROUTINE LAGOS, LUANDA, MAPUTO,
GABORONE AND MONROVIA

RHODESIA

Ans

IMMEDIATE

1. CHAKULYA, FOREIGN MINISTER, ASKED ME TO SEE HIM THIS AFTERNOON. HE WANTED TO KNOW WHAT WAS IN THE MESSAGE I HAD TO DELIVER TO THE PRESIDENT (YOUR TEL NO 950). I EXPLAINED THAT IT REFERRED TO THE CEASE-FIRE AND TO THE MONITORING ARRANGEMENTS. I ALSO TOOK THE OPPORTUNITY TO INVITE THE MINISTER TO SAY IF THE ZAMBIANS WISHED TO NOMINATE OBSERVERS FOR THE ELECTION PROCESS.
2. ON MONITORING CHAKULYA ASKED (IN THE OFFENSIVE MOOD IN WHICH THE WHOLE INTERVIEW WAS CONDUCTED) WHETHER THE BRITISH LIAISON OFFICERS WOULD RUN AWAY INTO RHODESIA AT CROSSING

LIAISON OFFICERS WOULD RUN AWAY INTO RHODESIA AT CROSSING POINTS WVS THE RAF OFFICERS HAD DONE IN 1965. HE WAS IN AN IMMENSELY AGGRESSIVE MOOD, PARTLY NO DOUBT AS THE RESULT OF THE RHODESIAN RAIDS YESTERDAY AND AGAIN THIS MORNING. BUT AS YOU KNOW FROM PREVIOUS REPORTS HE IS NOT AT ALL WELL DISPOSED TOWARDS BRITAIN IN ANY CASE.

3. ON OBSERVERS HE EXPRESSED DISAPPOINTMENT THAT WE WERE NOT PROCEEDING ON THE LINES RAMPHAL HAD IN MIND EG FOR A CO-ORDINATED TEAM WITH A CHAIRMAN WHICH HE ALLEGED HAD BEEN ENVISAGED AT THE COMMONWEALTH CONFERENCE. I TOLD HIM THAT THIS WAS NOT THE PROPOSAL AND ASKED HIM TO LET ME KNOW HOW MANY PEOPLE THEY WOULD WISH TO NOMINATE, BEARING IN MIND THAT IF THE NUMBERS PROVED TO BE TOO MANY TO BE HANDLED WE MIGHT HAVE TO ASK SOME COUNTRIES TO REDUCE THE NUMBERS.

4. CHAKULYA THEN, SPEAKING OFFICIALLY AS HE MADE IT QUITE CLEAR, ASKED ME TO REPORT TO YOU THAT THE ZAMBIAN GOVERNMENT HELD BRITAIN RESPONSIBLE FOR THE DAMAGE CAUSED BY THE RHODESIANS AND WOULD SHORTLY BE DEMANDING COMPENSATION. I SAID THAT I REGRETTED VERY MUCH THE DAMAGE WHICH HAD BEEN DONE BUT THAT WHEN A SIMILAR CLAIM HAD BEEN PUT FORWARD LAST YEAR I HAD HAD TO ADVISE THE ZAMBIAN GOVERNMENT THAT WE DID NOT ACCEPT RESPONSIBILITY FOR REBEL ACTION. CHAKULYA ASKED IF HE SHOULD TELL THE PRESIDENT THAT WAS THE POSITION. I SAID THAT THE PRESIDENT WOULD BE WELL AWARE OF THE STAND WE HAD TAKEN LAST YEAR AND PROBABLY ON PREVIOUS OCCASIONS. CHAKULYA THEN SAID THAT HE WOULD HAVE TO INFORM THE ZAMBIAN PEOPLE OF THE POSITION. I ASKED HIM WHAT OBJECTIVE HE HAD IN MIND IN TAKING THIS ACTION BEFORE I HAD REPORTED TO YOU. HE SAID THAT THE ZAMBIAN PEOPLE COULD NOT BELIEVE THAT BRITAIN WAS UNAWARE OF THE RHODESIANS' ACTIONS IN ADVANCE. AT THIS POINT I TOOK HIM UP EXTREMELY STRONGLY AND SAID THAT YOU WOULD BE VERY SHOCKED IF I REPORTED THIS AS HIS OFFICIAL OPINION. HE IMMEDIATELY BACKTRACKED AND SAID THAT IT WAS HIS PERSONAL OPINION AND THAT OF MANY ZAMBIANS WHO COULD DRAW THEIR OWN CONCLUSIONS. I SAID THAT HE AND THEY WERE IN THAT CASE DRAWING VERY WRONG CONCLUSIONS AND OUR ACTIONS SURELY GAVE THE LIE TO WHAT HE SUGGESTED.

5. IT IS UNDERSTANDABLE THAT ZAMBIAN FEELINGS SHOULD BE RUNNING FAIRLY HIGH AFTER THE RHODESIAN ATTACKS ON THEIR COMMUNICATIONS AT THIS VERY LATE STAGE OF THE HOSTILITIES, BUT CHAKULYA'S PERSONAL ANIMOSITY TOWARDS BRITAIN UNDOUBTEDLY MADE HIM SPEAK MUCH MORE HARSHLY THAN MOST OTHER MINISTERS WOULD HAVE DONE. MY REPEATED PRESSURE TO KNOW WHAT WAS OFFICIAL AND WHAT WAS PERSONAL IN HIS COMMENTS CAUSED HIM TO ADD THAT ZAMBIA WANTED TO BE FRIENDS WITH

COMMENTS CAUSED HIM TO ADD THAT ZAMBIA WANTED TO BE FRIENDS WITH BRITAIN AND INDEED TO STRENGTHEN THEIR FRIENDSHIP. IT WAS IN THAT SPIRIT (HE CLAIMED) THAT THE REQUEST FOR COMPENSATION HAD BEEN PUT FORWARD. HOWEVER HE ADDED THE CLAIM WOULD BE PRESSED STRONGLY AND FAR IN LONDON AND IF NECESSARY IN ZAMBIA. THIS LAST REMARK SUGGESTS THAT THE MORE HOT-HEADED ELEMENTS HERE MAY BE THINKING OF NIGERIAN PARALLELS.

6. I DO NOT YET HAVE AN APPOINTMENT WITH THE PRESIDENT BUT MAY SEE HIM TO-NIGHT IN WHICH CASE A PRELIMINARY RESPONSE FROM YOU WOULD BE USEFUL.

ALLINSON

IMMEDIATE

NNNN



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

19 November, 1979.

Rhodesia: Messages to Presidents
Kaunda and Nyerere

As you already know, the Prime Minister has seen and approved the texts of the messages enclosed with your letter to me of 16 November.

M. O'D. B. ALEXANDER


R.M.J. Lyne, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

PART 9 ends:-

FLO to Dar Es Salaam 389 18/11/79

PART 10 begins:-

MoDBA to FLO 19/11/79





END

Filmed at the National
Archives (TNA) in London

February 2010