

PREM19

116

RHODESIA

(Situation in)

(December 2 - 21)

(Part 11)

PART II

mt

5B
830

Confidential Filing

The Situation in Zimbabwe Rhodesia.
The Constitutional Conference in London.
The Appointment of Lord Soames as
Governor.

RHODESIA.

Part I: May 1979

Part II: Dec 1979

Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date
S. 12 79							
6-12-79							
K-12-79							
13-12-79							
21-12-79							
Closed							

PREM 19/116

PART 11 ends:-

PM to FCS M19/79T, 21.12.79

PART 12. begins:-

MVDBA to F10 21.12.79

Published Papers

The following published paper(s) enclosed on this file have been removed and destroyed. Copies may be found elsewhere in The National Archives.

House of Commons Hansard
Columns 775-779

07/12/79
Rhodesia

Signed AWayland Date 5 November 2009

PREM Records Team

S/ane

PM has copies of Resolutions.

STP 22.12.79

RESOLUTION 253 (1968)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 1428th meeting on 29 May 1968

The Security Council

Recalling and reaffirming its resolutions 216 (1965) of 12 November 1965, 217 (1965) of 20 November 1965, 221 (1966) of 9 April 1966, and 232 (1966) of 16 December 1966,

Taking note of resolution 2262 (XXII) adopted by the General Assembly on 3 November 1967,

Noting with great concern that the measures taken so far have failed to bring the rebellion in Southern Rhodesia to an end,

Reaffirming that, to the extent not superseded in this resolution, the measures provided for in resolution 217 (1965) of 20 November 1965, and 232 (1966) of 16 December 1966, as well as those initiated by Member States in implementation of those resolutions, shall continue in effect,

Gravely concerned that the measures taken by the Security Council have not been complied with by all States and that some States, contrary to resolution 232 (1966) of the Security Council and to their obligations under Article 25 of the Charter, have failed to prevent trade with the illegal regime in Southern Rhodesia,

Condemning the recent inhuman executions carried out by the illegal regime in Southern Rhodesia which have flagrantly affronted the conscience of mankind and have been universally condemned,

Affirming the primary responsibility of the Government of the United Kingdom to enable the people of Southern Rhodesia to achieve self-determination and independence, and in particular their responsibility for dealing with the prevailing situation,

Recognizing the legitimacy of the struggle of the people of Southern Rhodesia to secure the enjoyment of their rights as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations and in conformity with the objectives of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV),

Reaffirming its determination that the present situation in Southern Rhodesia constitutes a threat to international peace and security,

Acting under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter,

1. Condemns all measures of political repression, including

/arrests

arrests, detentions, trials and executions which violate fundamental freedoms and rights of the people of Southern Rhodesia, and calls upon the Government of the United Kingdom to take all possible measures to put an end to such actions;

2. Calls upon the United Kingdom as the administering Power in the discharge of its responsibility to take urgently all effective measures to bring to an end the rebellion in Southern Rhodesia, and enable the people to secure the enjoyment of their rights as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations and in conformity with the objectives of General Assembly Resolution 1514 (XV);

3. Decides that, in furtherance of the objective of ending the rebellion, all States Members of the United Nations shall prevent:

(a) The import into their territories of all commodities and products originating in Southern Rhodesia and exported therefrom after the date of this resolution (whether or not the commodities or products are for consumption or processing in their territories, whether or not they are imported in bond and whether or not any special legal status with respect to the import of goods is enjoyed by the port or other place where they are imported or stored);

(b) Any activities by their nationals or in their territories which would promote or are calculated to promote the export of any commodities or products from Southern Rhodesia; and any dealings by their nationals or in their territories in any commodities or products from Southern Rhodesia; and any dealings by their nationals or in their territories in any commodities or products originating in Southern Rhodesia and exported therefrom after the date of this resolution, including in particular any transfer of funds to Southern Rhodesia for the purposes of such activities or dealings;

(c) The shipment in vessels or aircraft of their registration or under charter to their nationals, or the carriage (whether or not in bond) by land transport facilities across their territories of any commodities or products originating in Southern Rhodesia and exported therefrom after the date of this resolution;

(d) The sale or supply by their nationals or from their territories of any commodities or products (whether or not originating in their territories, but not including supplies

intended strictly for medical purposes, educational equipment and material for use in schools and other educational institutions, publications, news material and, in special humanitarian circumstances, food-stuffs) to any person or body in Southern Rhodesia or to any other person or body for the purposes of any business carried on in or operated from Southern Rhodesia, and any activities by their nationals or in their territories which promote or are calculated to promote such sale or supply;

(e) The shipment in vessels or aircraft of their registration, or under charter to their nationals, or the carriage (whether or not in bond) by land transport facilities across their territories of any such commodities or products which are consigned to any person or body in Southern Rhodesia, or to any other person or body for the purposes of any business carried on in or operated from Southern Rhodesia;

4. Decides that all States Members of the United Nations shall not make available to the illegal regime in Southern Rhodesia or to any commercial, industrial or public utility undertaking, including tourist enterprises, in Southern Rhodesia any funds for investment or any other financial or economic resources and shall prevent their nationals and any persons within their territories from making available to the regime or to any such undertaking any such funds or resources and from remitting any other funds to persons or bodies within Southern Rhodesia except payments exclusively for pensions or for strictly medical, humanitarian or educational purposes or for the provision of news material and in special humanitarian circumstances, food-stuffs;

5. Decides that all State Members of the United Nations shall

(a) Prevent the entry into their territories, save on exceptional humanitarian grounds, of any person travelling on a Southern Rhodesian passport, regardless of its date of issue, or on a purported passport issued by or on behalf of the illegal regime in Southern Rhodesia; and

(b) Take all possible measures to prevent the entry into their territories of persons whom they have reason to believe to be

/ordinarily

ordinarily resident in Southern Rhodesia and whom they have reason to believe to have furthered or encouraged, or to be likely to further or encourage, the unlawful actions of the illegal regime in Southern Rhodesia or any activities which re-calculated to evade any measure decided upon in this resolution or resolution 232 (1966) of 16 December 1966;

6. Decides that States Members of the United Nations shall prevent airline companies constituted in their territories and aircraft of their registration or under charter to their nationals from operating to or from Southern Rhodesia and from linking up with any airline company constituted or aircraft registered in Southern Rhodesia;

7. Decides that all States Members of the United Nations shall give effect to the decisions set out in operative paragraphs 3, 4, 5 and 6 of this resolution notwithstanding any contract entered into or licence granted before the date of this resolution;

8. Calls upon all States Members of the United Nations or of the specialised agencies to take all possible measures to prevent activities by their nationals and persons in their territories promoting, assisting or encouraging emigration to Southern Rhodesia, with a view to stopping such emigration;

9. Requests all States Members of the United Nations or of the specialized agencies to take all possible further action under Article 41 of the Charter to deal with the situation in Southern Rhodesia, not excluding any of the measures provided in that Article;

10. Emphasizes the need for the withdrawal of all consular and trade representation in Southern Rhodesia, in addition to the provisions of operative paragraph 6 of resolution 217 (1965);

11. Calls upon all States Members of the United Nations to carry out these decisions of the Security Council in accordance with Article 25 of the United Nations Charter and reminds them that failure or refusal by any one of them to do so would constitute a violation of that Article;

12. Deplores the attitude of States that have not complied with their obligations under Article 25 of the Charter, and censures in particular those states which have persisted in trading with the illegal regime in defiance of the resolutions of the Security Council, and which have given active assistance to the regime.
13. Urges all States Members of the United Nations to render moral and material assistance to the people of Southern Rhodesia in their struggle to achieve their freedom and independence;
14. Urges, having regard to the principles stated in Article 2 of the United Nations Charter, States not Members of the United Nations to act in accordance with the provisions of the present resolution;
15. Requests States Members of the United Nations, the United Nations Organization, the specialized agencies, and other international organisations in the United Nations system to extend assistance to Zambia as a matter of priority with a view to helping her solve such special economic problems as she may be confronted with arising from the carrying out of these decisions of the Security Council;
16. Calls upon all States Members of the United Nations, and in particular those with primary responsibility under the Charter for the maintenance of international peace and security, to assist effectively in the implementation of the measures called for by the present resolution;
17. Considers that the United Kingdom as the administering Power should ensure that no settlement is reached without taking into account the views of the people of Southern Rhodesia, and in particular the political parties favouring majority rule, and that it is acceptable to the people of Southern Rhodesia as a whole;
18. Calls upon all States Members of the United Nations or of the specialized agencies to report to the Secretary-General by 1 August 1968 on measures taken to implement the present resolution;
19. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council

on the progress of the implementation of this resolution, the first report to be made not later than 1 September 1968;

20. Decides to establish, in accordance with rule 28 of the provisional rules of procedure of the Security Council, a committee of the Security Council to undertake the following tasks and to report to it with its observations:

- (a) To examine such reports on the implementation of the present resolution as are submitted by the Secretary-General;
- (b) To seek from any States Members of the United Nations or of the specialized agencies such further information regarding the trade of that State (including information regarding the commodities and products exempted from the prohibition contained in operative paragraph 3 (d) above) or regarding any activities by any nationals of that State or in its territories that may constitute an evasion of the measures decided upon in this resolution as it may consider necessary for the proper discharge of its duty to report to the Security Council;

21. Requests the United Kingdom, as the administering Power, to give maximum assistance to the committee, and to provide the committee with any information which it may receive in order that the measures envisaged in this resolution and resolution 232 (1966) may be rendered fully effective;

22. Calls upon all States Members of the United Nations, or of the specialized agencies, as well as the specialized agencies themselves, to supply such further information as may be sought by the Committee in pursuance of this resolution;

23. Decides to maintain this item on its agenda for further action as appropriate in the light of developments.

Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/7610)".¹²

Resolution 232 (1966)
of 16 December 1966

Mandatory

The Security Council,

Reaffirming its resolutions 216 (1965) of 12 November 1965, 217 (1965) of 20 November 1965 and 221 (1966) of 9 April 1966, and in particular its appeal to all States to do their utmost to break off economic relations with Southern Rhodesia,

Deeply concerned that the Council's efforts so far and the measures taken by the administering Power have failed to bring the rebellion in Southern Rhodesia to an end,

Reaffirming that, to the extent not superseded in the present resolution, the measures provided for in resolution 217 (1965), as well as those initiated by Member States in implementation of that resolution, shall continue in effect,

Acting in accordance with Articles 39 and 41 of the United Nations Charter,

1. *Determines* that the present situation in Southern Rhodesia constitutes a threat to international peace and security;

2. *Decides* that all States Members of the United Nations shall prevent:

- (a) The import into their territories of asbestos, iron ore, chrome, pig-iron, sugar, tobacco, copper, meat and meat products and hides, skins and leather originating in Southern Rhodesia and exported therefrom after the date of the present resolution;
- (b) Any activities by their nationals or in their territories which promote or are calculated to promote the export of these commodities from Southern Rhodesia and any dealings by their nationals or in their territories in any of these commodities originating in Southern Rhodesia and exported therefrom after the date of the present resolution, including in particular any transfer of funds to Southern Rhodesia for the purposes of such activities or dealings;
- (c) Shipment in vessels or aircraft of their registration of any of these commodities originating in Southern Rhodesia and exported therefrom after the date of the present resolution;
- (d) Any activities by their nationals or in their territories which promote or are calculated to promote the sale or shipment to Southern Rhodesia of arms,

¹² *Ibid.*, Twenty-first Year, Supplement for October, November and December 1966.

permanent du Royaume-Uni de Grande-Bretagne et d'Irlande du Nord auprès de l'Organisation des Nations Unies (S/7610)¹² ».

Résolution 232 (1966)
du 16 décembre 1966

Le Conseil de sécurité,

Réaffirmant ses résolutions 216 (1965) du 12 novembre 1965, 217 (1965) du 20 novembre 1965 et 221 (1966) du 9 avril 1966 et, en particulier, l'appel qu'il a adressé à tous les Etats pour qu'ils s'efforcent de rompre les relations économiques avec la Rhodésie du Sud,

Profondément préoccupé par le fait que les efforts du Conseil jusqu'ici et les mesures prises par la Puissance administrante n'ont pas réussi à mettre un terme à la rébellion en Rhodésie du Sud,

Réaffirmant que, pour autant qu'elles ne sont pas remplacées dans la présente résolution, les mesures prévues dans la résolution 217 (1965) aussi bien que celles prises par les Etats Membres en application de ladite résolution doivent demeurer en vigueur,

Agissant conformément aux Articles 39 et 41 de la Charte des Nations Unies,

1. *Constate* que la situation actuelle en Rhodésie du Sud constitue une menace contre la paix et la sécurité internationales;

2. *Décide* que tous les Etats Membres de l'Organisation des Nations Unies empêcheront:

- a) L'importation sur leurs territoires d'amianté, de minerai de fer, de chrome, de fonte, de sucre, de tabac, de cuivre, de viande et produits carnés et de cuirs et peaux en provenance de Rhodésie du Sud et exportés de Rhodésie du Sud après la date de la présente résolution;
- b) Toutes activités de leurs ressortissants ou sur leurs territoires qui favorisent ou ont pour objet de favoriser l'exportation de ces produits par la Rhodésie du Sud, ainsi que toutes transactions de leurs ressortissants ou sur leurs territoires concernant l'un quelconque de ces produits en provenance de Rhodésie du Sud et exportés de Rhodésie du Sud après la date de la présente résolution, y compris, en particulier, tout transfert de fonds à la Rhodésie du Sud aux fins d'activités ou de transactions de cette nature;
- c) L'expédition par navires ou aéronefs immatriculés chez eux de l'un quelconque de ces produits en provenance de Rhodésie du Sud et exportés de Rhodésie du Sud après la date de la présente résolution;
- d) Toutes activités de leurs ressortissants ou sur leurs territoires qui favorisent ou ont pour objet de favoriser la vente ou l'expédition à destination de la

¹² *Ibid.*, vingt et unième année, Supplément d'octobre, novembre et décembre 1966.

ammunition of all types, military aircraft, military vehicles, and equipment and materials for the manufacture and maintenance of arms and ammunition in Southern Rhodesia;

- (e) Any activities by their nationals or in their territories which promote or are calculated to promote the supply to Southern Rhodesia of all other aircraft and motor vehicles and of equipment and materials for the manufacture, assembly, or maintenance of aircraft and motor vehicles in Southern Rhodesia; the shipment in vessels and aircraft of their registration of any such goods destined for Southern Rhodesia; and any activities by their nationals or in their territories which promote or are calculated to promote the manufacture or assembly of aircraft or motor vehicles in Southern Rhodesia;
- (f) Participation in their territories or territories under their administration or in land or air transport facilities or by their nationals or vessels of their registration in the supply of oil or oil products to Southern Rhodesia;

notwithstanding any contracts entered into or licences granted before the date of the present resolution;

3. *Reminds* Member States that the failure or refusal by any of them to implement the present resolution shall constitute a violation of Article 25 of the United Nations Charter;

4. *Reaffirms* the inalienable rights of the people of Southern Rhodesia to freedom and independence in accordance with the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples contained in General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960, and recognizes the legitimacy of their struggle to secure the enjoyment of their rights as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations;

5. *Calls upon* all States not to render financial or other economic aid to the illegal racist régime in Southern Rhodesia;

6. *Calls upon* all States Members of the United Nations to carry out this decision of the Security Council in accordance with Article 25 of the United Nations Charter;

7. *Urges*, having regard to the principles stated in Article 2 of the United Nations Charter, States not Members of the United Nations to act in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 2 of the present resolution;

8. *Calls upon* States Members of the United Nations or members of the specialized agencies to report to the Secretary-General the measures which each has taken in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 2 of the present resolution;

9. *Requests* the Secretary-General to report to the Council on the progress of the implementation of the

Rhodésie du Sud d'armes, de munitions de tous types, d'aéronefs militaires, de véhicules militaires, et d'équipement et de matériels pour la fabrication et l'entretien d'armes et de munitions en Rhodésie du Sud;

- e) Toutes activités de leurs ressortissants ou sur leurs territoires qui favorisent ou ont pour objet de favoriser la livraison à la Rhodésie du Sud de tous autres aéronefs et véhicules à moteur et d'équipement et de matériels pour la fabrication, le montage ou l'entretien d'aéronefs et de véhicules à moteur en Rhodésie du Sud; l'expédition par navires ou aéronefs immatriculés chez eux de tous biens de cette nature destinés à la Rhodésie du Sud; et toutes activités de leurs ressortissants ou sur leurs territoires qui favorisent ou ont pour objet de favoriser la fabrication ou le montage d'aéronefs ou de véhicules à moteur en Rhodésie du Sud;
- f) La participation sur leurs territoires ou territoires placés sous leur administration ou de moyens de transport terrestres ou aériens ou de leurs ressortissants ou de navires immatriculés chez eux à la fourniture de pétrole ou de produits pétroliers à la Rhodésie du Sud;

nonobstant tous contrats conclus ou toutes licences accordées avant la date de la présente résolution;

3. *Rappelle* aux Etats Membres que le fait pour l'un quelconque d'entre eux de ne pas appliquer ou de refuser d'appliquer la présente résolution constituera une violation de l'Article 25 de la Charte des Nations Unies;

4. *Réaffirme* les droits inaliénables du peuple de la Rhodésie du Sud à la liberté et à l'indépendance, conformément à la Déclaration sur l'octroi de l'indépendance aux pays et aux peuples coloniaux figurant dans la résolution 1514 (XV) de l'Assemblée générale, en date du 14 décembre 1960, et reconnaît la légitimité de sa lutte pour s'assurer l'exercice de ses droits, tels qu'ils sont énoncés dans la Charte des Nations Unies;

5. *Requiert* tous les Etats de ne fournir aucune aide financière ni aucune autre aide économique au régime raciste illégal en Rhodésie du Sud;

6. *Requiert* tous les Etats Membres de l'Organisation des Nations Unies d'appliquer la présente décision du Conseil de sécurité conformément à l'Article 25 de la Charte des Nations Unies;

7. *Demande instamment*, compte tenu des principes énoncés à l'Article 2 de la Charte des Nations Unies, aux Etats qui ne sont pas membres de l'Organisation des Nations Unies de se conformer aux dispositions du paragraphe 2 de la présente résolution;

8. *Requiert* les Etats Membres de l'Organisation des Nations Unies et les Etats membres des institutions spécialisées de porter à la connaissance du Secrétaire général les mesures que chacun d'eux aura prises conformément aux dispositions du paragraphe 2 de la présente résolution;

9. *Prie* le Secrétaire général de rendre compte au Conseil du progrès de l'application de la présente réso-

present resolution, the first report to be submitted not later than 1 March 1967;

10. *Decides* to keep this item on its agenda for further action as appropriate in the light of developments.

Adopted at the 1340th meeting by 11 votes to none, with 4 abstentions (Bulgaria, France, Mali, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics).

lution, le premier rapport devant être soumis le 1^{er} mars 1967 au plus tard;

10. *Décide* de garder cette question à son ordre du jour pour y donner la suite nouvelle appropriée eu égard à l'évolution de la situation.

Adoptée à la 1340^e séance par 11 voix contre zéro, avec 4 abstentions (Bulgarie, France, Mali, Union des Républiques socialistes soviétiques).

THE PALESTINE QUESTION ¹³

Decisions

At its 1288th meeting, on 25 July 1966, the Council decided to invite the representatives of Syria, Israel and Iraq to participate, without vote, in the discussion of the item entitled "The Palestine Question: (a) Letter dated 21 July 1966 from the Permanent Representative of Syria to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/7419);¹⁴ (b) Letter dated 22 July 1966 from the Permanent Representative of Israel to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/7423)".¹⁴

At the same meeting the Council decided to request the Secretary-General to submit two reports based on information supplied by the Chief of Staff of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization in Palestine: one covering sub-item (a) and the other sub-item (b) of the item on the agenda (see above).

At the same meeting the Council decided to begin the discussion of the question as it had been included in the agenda (see above), and to consider sub-item (a) first.

¹³ Resolutions or decisions on this question were also adopted by the Council in 1947, 1948, 1949, 1950, 1951, 1953, 1954, 1955, 1956, 1957, 1958, 1959, 1961, 1962, 1963 and 1964.

¹⁴ See *Official Records of the Security Council, Twenty-first Year, Supplement for July, August and September 1966.*

LA QUESTION DE PALESTINE ¹³

Décisions

A sa 1288^e séance, le 25 juillet 1966, le Conseil a décidé d'inviter les représentants de la Syrie, d'Israël et de l'Irak à participer, sans droit de vote, à la discussion de la question intitulée « Question de Palestine: a) Lettre, en date du 21 juillet 1966, adressée au Président du Conseil de sécurité par le représentant permanent de la République arabe syrienne auprès de l'Organisation des Nations Unies (S/7419¹⁴); b) Lettre, en date du 22 juillet 1966, adressée au Président du Conseil de sécurité par le représentant permanent d'Israël auprès de l'Organisation des Nations Unies (S/7423¹⁴) ».

A la même séance, le Conseil a décidé d'inviter le Secrétaire général à présenter deux rapports établis d'après les renseignements communiqués par le Chef d'état-major de l'Organisme des Nations Unies chargé de la surveillance de la trêve en Palestine: l'un concernant la partie a et l'autre la partie b de la question à l'ordre du jour (voir ci-dessus).

A la même séance, le Conseil a décidé d'aborder la discussion de la question telle qu'elle avait été inscrite à l'ordre du jour (voir ci-dessus) et d'examiner en premier lieu la partie a.

¹³ Question ayant fait l'objet de résolutions ou décisions de la part du Conseil en 1947, 1948, 1949, 1950, 1951, 1953, 1954, 1955, 1956, 1957, 1958, 1959, 1961, 1962, 1963 et 1964.

¹⁴ Voir *Documents officiels du Conseil de sécurité, vingt et unième année, Supplément de juillet, août et septembre 1966.*

Subject



Rhodesia

10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

Personal Minute

No. M19/79T

FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH SECRETARY

THE RHODESIA CONFERENCE

Today sees the successful conclusion of an extraordinary piece of diplomacy. The period ahead in Rhodesia is not going to be easy but the signature of the Agreement at the end of the Lancaster House Conference later this morning will nonetheless be a milestone of major significance.

The effort to secure an agreement between the various parties to the conflict in Rhodesia began not long after the present Government took office and has continued almost without pause ever since. It has been an exercise not only in negotiation, at Lusaka and Lancaster House, but also in international persuasion and has involved Embassies and High Commissions all over the world. It must have tested the resources of the Diplomatic Service to the full. Clearly the Service has been equal to the task.

You are well aware of my admiration for the way you and the Lord Privy Seal have conducted the negotiation as a whole and the Conference at Lancaster House in particular. But I should be grateful if you could arrange for my gratitude to be conveyed to everyone else who has played a part in the enterprise. They all have reason to be proud of what has been achieved.

Margaret Thatcher

21 December 1979

Handwritten initials

DRAFT STATEMENT BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE

1. I would like to congratulate the leaders of both the other delegations to the Conference on the conclusion of this agreement which is of the greatest importance for the people of your country. The agreement offers new hope to all the people of Rhodesia. It offers the prospect of an end to the war and the possibility of deciding their future by peaceful means. As Lord Soames has said, for a war-weary country the prize is great. It has been your readiness to negotiate which has made this possible.
2. By signing these documents today we have pledged ourselves to certain solemn undertakings.
3. The British Government for our part intend faithfully to discharge the heavy responsibilities we have undertaken during the period leading to elections and the transfer of sovereignty to the new Government of Zimbabwe. We have already taken the legislative action which is necessary to bring your country to legal independence following the holding of elections. We have no wish to prolong our role. Our task is to give the people of your country the chance to decide for themselves their own future and to establish a new relationship between Rhodesia and the rest of the world. I am glad to say that this process has already started, so that you will be able to take your rightful place in the international community.

4. The British Government is prepared to help Rhodesia to overcome the difficulties of the past; to carry out its responsibilities; and to do its utmost to offer you the prospect of a more peaceful future. The rest depends on your cooperation. It is essential to the success of the enterprise on which we are now engaged that all the parties should realise that what have been signed at the conclusion of this Conference are not pieces of paper but solemn and binding agreements.

5. In signing these agreements you have undertaken, as is stated in the Conference Report, to accept the authority of the Governor; to abide by the independence Constitution; to comply with the pre-independence arrangements; to abide by the cease-fire agreement; to campaign peacefully and without intimidation; to renounce the use of force for political ends; and to accept the outcome of the elections and to instruct any forces under your authority to do the same. It will be for the Governor to see that the parties act in accordance with these commitments.

6. For the people of Rhodesia and of the neighbouring States today's signature heralds the end of a war which has caused immense hardship and suffering. From midnight tonight the first phase of the ceasefire will come into operation. The parties have pledged to cease any cross-border movement by their forces. It is essential to the preservation of the cease-fire that this agreement should be complied with.

7. This moment, however, for which the people of Rhodesia have been waiting will come at midnight on Friday 28 December. At that time all hostilities within Rhodesia must cease and the process of dis-engagement and assembly will begin. This will be a difficult period. It is essential that the forces on both sides should comply scrupulously, under the direction of their Commanders, with the requirements of the cease-fire agreement. This provides that the forces must dis-engage, must move rapidly to the nearest rendez-vous point, and must thereafter move on to the assembly places designated in the cease-fire agreement. The successful accomplishment of the dis-engagement and assembly process will be of crucial importance to the future effectiveness of the cease-fire.

8. The subsequent commitments concerning the observance of the cease-fire and the pursuit of the political campaign by peaceful means are of no less importance. The Governor could not undertake his task without the powers and authority which are necessary to enable him to accomplish it. These include the power to take whatever action is necessary to ensure compliance with the agreements entered into today. Our commitment is to fair elections. Having committed themselves to campaign peacefully and to comply with the cease-fire agreement, no party or group could expect to take part in elections if it continued the war or systematically to break the cease-fire and to practise widespread intimidation.

9. I have thought it right to emphasize on this occasion the obligations which you and we have accepted. I have done so because I feel strongly the sense of hope which goes with having achieved so much; for in accepting them, you have given the people of Rhodesia and of the neighbouring countries new hope for the future. The British Government has sought to create the conditions in which you can settle your differences by peaceful means. The agreements which you have signed give you the opportunity to do so; and will create among the people of Rhodesia the hope that at the end of a bitter conflict lies the prospect of national reconciliation. We have negotiated together for fourteen weeks. It has proved possible in the end to reconcile the differences. This experience has made a deep impression on all of us, and holds an encouraging message for the future. We have a shared responsibility now to do our utmost to ensure that Zimbabwe comes to independence in conditions of peace. With your cooperation and that of the neighbouring countries, we can hope together to achieve that objective.



With the compliments of
THE PRIVATE SECRETARY

FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
SW1A 2AH

21 DECEMBER 1979

RHODESIA CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE: ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE SIGNING CEREMONY IN THE LONG GALLERY, LANCASTER HOUSE AT 1200 HOURS ON FRIDAY 21 DECEMBER 1979



TIME	EVENT	OFFICIALS
0900 hours	Installation of TV lighting, cabling etc to be completed.	
1000 hours	TV and cines to be in position in the Long Gallery.	
1000 - 1100 hours	Press representatives to be escorted in groups to the Long Gallery and still cameramen to the Music Room; all go via the left-hand side of the staircase and the North Door to the Long Gallery.	See Press plan
	NB: RMP will be positioned on the staircase, the east and west sides of the first floor gallery and at the North and South doors to the Long Gallery: and will control access to the State Drawing Room and Chairman's Office.	
1030 hours	Coffee served in the State Drawing Room.	
1050 hours	Secretariat and PCD ushers take up their stations.	Front Hall - Mr Sheinwald & Mr Berry Top of the stairs - Mr Ralph
1055 hours	UK Delegation officials and some members of the Salisbury and Patriotic Front Delegations arrive.	
1100 - 1120 hours	Invited guests arrive and are escorted to the State Drawing Room, to the right-hand side of the staircase (hats and coats may be left in the cloakroom/on the ground floor). (Room 3)	Front Hall - Mr R W du Boule Ushers: Mr Martin Hon D Makgill Miss Pecover Miss Gale Miss Edwards
	MR LUCE will greet the guests in the West Ante Room (1st floor).	

TIME	EVENT	OFFICIALS
1100 - 1130 hours	Salisbury principals arrive from No. 10 Downing Street and proceed to the State Drawing Room.	Mr Day to greet in Front Hall
1125 hours	Members of Delegations, excluding Alcove parties and principals, take their seats in the Long Gallery (total 34).	Rhodesia Department to usher.
1130 - 1140 hours	Invited guests take their seats, in the south block (total 62).	PCD Ushers: for HCs/Ambassador Rhodesia Department to usher Observers.
1140 approx	Lady Carrington and Lady Caroline Gilmour arrive.	Hon D Makgill
1140 hours approx	Patriotic Front principals arrive from No. 10 Downing Street and proceed to the State Drawing Room.	Mr Day to greet in Front Hall
1145 hours	Defence Secretary will arrive.	
1150 hours	Alcove parties take their seats (total 12).	Escorted by Mr Renwick and Mr Powell
1150 hours	VIPs (Row 1) take their seats.	Mr Martin Hon D Makgill
1150 hours	Arrival of the Prime Minister. (? To be greeted in the front hall by the Secretary of State) She will proceed to the State Drawing Room or direct to the Long Gallery, according to her time of arrival.	Secretary-General and Mr du Boulay
1155 hours approx	Prime Minister takes her seat in the Long Gallery.	
1158 hours approx	When all are seated the Secretary-General will inform the Secretary of State, who will invite the principals to take their seats. They will enter the Long Gallery in the order of seating ie Mr Mugabe, Mr Nkomo. Secretary of State, Lord Privy Seal, Bishop Muzorewa, and A N Other (see seating plan issued separately).	Secretary-General to lead the party to the dais
Then	First rota of cameramen enter (from the North Door).	

TIME	EVENT	OFFICIALS
1200 hours	<p>Secretary of State to make opening statement or a few words of welcome. He will invite the others to sign. Documents bearers, who will have been waiting in the East Ante Room, will take their places behind the principals on the dais and will place a copy in front of each of the four principals.</p> <p>Documents will be passed between the bearers after each signing to fit in with the change over of the still cameramen (3 rotas of 1 1/2 minutes each with TV coverage of the final set of signatures).</p> <p>When signing has been completed bearers will exit with the documents via the South Door.</p> <p>Rota cameramen will exit via the North Door and will wait in the Music Room until they can be escorted from the building.</p>	<p>Mr Ralph, Mr Sheinwald, Mr Berry Mr. Crees.....</p>
1210 hours approx	? Address by the Secretary of State.	
1220 hours approx	<p>At the conclusion of the ceremony the S of S and principals will lead invited guests and members of the Delegations to the State Dining Room (ground floor) for a reception.</p> <p>Press representatives will be escorted from the building under arrangements made by the Press Centre Manager.</p>	
1230 hours	Arrival of guests attending the reception.	

DISTRIBUTION

PS/LPS	PS/Mr Luce	PS/PUS	Mr Day	Mr R Renwick
Mr Powell	Mr Sheinwald	(2 Copies)		
Secretariat (10 copies)	Lancaster House			
PCD Usher (10 copies)	Lancaster House			
Spares (3)				





DOYEN
LORD TREPPANNE
MR. LUCE
LADY C. GILMOUR
SIS DEFENCE
LORD HARLECH
PM
LADY CARRINGTON
ATTORNEY-GENERAL

9											
8	OFFICIAL										
7	CONFERENCE										
6	DELEGATES										
5											
4											
3	PS										
2	PS										
1	PS										
		1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10

High Commissioner
Ambassadors,
Commonwealth Secretary General,
& Observers.

MR. LUCE
SIS DEFENCE
LADY C. GILMOUR



MR MUGABE
MR NKOMO
LORD CARRINGTON
SIR I GILMOUR
BISHOP MUZOREMA

Mr Day
Mr Powell

Mr Renwick
Mr Fifoot

Del. of Mr Nkomo, Mr Mugabe

Del. of Bishop Muzorewa

To East Annex & State Drawing Room (formerly Conference Room)

To Veronese Room & Music Room (formerly Delegates Lounge)

SEATING PLAN FOR LONG GALLERY.
(20 DEL. 1730 HOURS)



REPUBLIC OF GHANA

Hand.
SUBJECT
PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T172B/79T
THE CASTLE
OSU, ACCRA


221
20th December, 1979.

Dear Prime Minister,

On the occasion of the signing of the Agreement for a settlement on Rhodesia, I should like to convey to you my warmest congratulations on the successful conclusion of the Lancaster House Talks. Britain, under your leadership, deserves sincere commendation for the forbearance and statesmanship shown at the Conference as well as for the assumption of its responsibilities.

We pray that an atmosphere of peace and justice will now prevail in which Rhodesia will soon be brought to independence in a new Zimbabwe.

Best wishes,


HILLA LIMANN
PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF GHANA

HON. MRS. MARGARET THATCHER,
PRIME MINISTER OF GREAT BRITAIN
AND NORTHERN IRELAND.

MR R L WADE-GERY
CABINET OFFICE

~~PS~~
PS/SIR I GILMOUR

PS/MR LUCE

PS/PUS

~~SIR A DUFF~~

NO 10 DOWNING STREET (1)

~~MR BYATT~~

IMMEDIATE

LORD N G LENNOX

... ..

... ..

HD/S AF D

HD/C AF D

HD/UND

HD/DEFENCE D

MR FREELAND LEGAL ADVISER RM K200A

HD/NEWS D

GR 350

UNCLASSIFIED

FROM PRETORIA 201120Z DEC 79

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1018 OF 20 DEC

INFO ROUTINE WASHINGTON UKMIS NEW YORK

THE PRIME MINISTER'S COMMENTS IN NEW YORK ON SOUTH AFRICA

1. IN A STATEMENT YESTERDAY MR PIK BOTHA WELCOMED THE PRIME MINISTER'S REFERENCE TO SOUTH AFRICA DURING HER SPEECH TO THE FOREIGN POLICY ASSOCIATION IN THE U S. HE SAID THAT " MRS THATCHER'S POSITIVE STATEMENT ON THE PROSPECTS FOR PEACE IN SOUTHERN AFRICA AND SOUTH AFRICA'S CONSTRUCTIVE ROLE IN THIS RESPECT IS ENCOURAGING. IT CONTRASTS SHARPLY WITH THE RECENT SPATE OF U N CONDEMNATIONS IN SCORES OF RESOLUTIONS PASSED AGAINST SOUTH AFRICA. IN HER PUBLIC STATEMENT IN NEW YORK SHE CONFIRMED WHAT SHE TOLD ME WHEN I MET HER IN LONDON TWO MONTHS AGO. SHE IS NOT THE ONLY WORLD LEADER WHO HOLDS THESE VIEWS, BUT SHE CERTAINLY HAS THE COURAGE TO SAY SO OPENLY."

2. EDITORIALS IN THE AFRIKAANS PRESS ALSO PRAISE THE PRIME MINISTER'S COURAGE AND NOTE THAT SHE IS THE FIRST WESTERN LEADER TO ACKNOWLEDGE RECENT CHANGES IN SOUTH AFRICA. THE OPPOSITION PRESS HAS ALSO REACTED FAVOURABLY. AN EDITORIAL IN OGGENBLAD NOTES THAT THE PRIME MINISTER'S COMMENTS DO NOT CONSTITUTE INTERFERENCE IN SOUTH AFRICA'S DOMESTIC AFFAIRS

CVNSTITUTE INTERFERENCE IN SOUTH AFRICA'S DOMESTIC AFFAIRS
SEMICOLON THEY UNDERLINE THE WISH IN WESTERN COUNTRIES THAT
SOUTH AFRICANS SHOULD CONDUCT THEMSELVES IN SUCH A WAY THAT THEY
WILL BE ON FIRM GROUND WHEN DEFENDING SOUTH AFRICA. THE
EDITORIAL SAYS THAT IT IS UP TO SOUTH AFRICA TO PURSUE
CHANGE, BUT SUGGESTS THAT THERE CAN NOW BE MORE RAPID PROGRESS
TOWARDS IMPLEMENTING THE POLICY OF SEPARATE FREEDOMS, BECAUSE
IF RESPONSIBLE WESTERN LEADERS WILL LISTEN, UNDERSTANDING
MAY FOLLOW. BEELD'S EDITORIAL ATTRIBUTES MRS THATCHER'S
WORDS TO REALISM AND BRITAIN'S TRADING INTERESTS. IT PRAISES
MR P W BOTHA FOR CREATING THE CIRCUMSTANCES THAT HAVE ELICITED
FAVOURABLE COMMENT ABOUT SOUTH AFRICA BY A WESTERN LEADER.

LEAHY

NNNN

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London S.W.1

20 December 1979

Dear Michael,

Rhodesia: The Prime Minister's Meeting with
Mr Nkomo and Mr Mugabe: Friday 21 December: 11.15

The Prime Minister will wish to congratulate Mr Nkomo and Mr Mugabe on the successful conclusion of the Conference. It has been our purpose to achieve a solution which will not just bring Rhodesia to legal independence, but will offer it the prospect of a more secure and peaceful future. It has therefore been our objective to ensure that the Patriotic Front should be given the opportunity to participate in new elections held under our authority. We are very glad that they have agreed to do so. The negotiations have not been easy for anyone. We have all had to take difficult decisions. Britain is assuming a heavy responsibility. We are determined to discharge it to the best of our ability. In doing so, it will be essential to have the co-operation of the Patriotic Front leaders. It is important that everyone should realise, as Lord Carrington will be saying at the signature ceremony, that the agreements which have been entered into are binding. The successful accomplishment of the first phase of the ceasefire (the disengagement of the Rhodesian forces and the assembly of the Patriotic Front forces) will be crucial to the preservation of an effective ceasefire.

If Mr Mugabe mentions the time-scale for the ceasefire the Prime Minister could make it clear that the ceasefire agreement allows seven days for preparation and seven days to assemble the Patriotic Front forces. If the greater part of their forces are assembled within that time it will of course be necessary, through the mechanism of the ceasefire commission, for their commanders to make contact with any isolated groups which are "outstanding". A much more difficult situation would arise if their forces did not assemble and remained in the field with their arms.

If the Patriotic Front leaders talk about additional assembly places, the Prime Minister will wish to say that they are being allocated a further assembly place in the west central area. Further assembly places would be considered only if the existing capacity in the designated assembly places was exhausted. We do not think this contingency is likely to arise.

/The Prime

M O'D B Alexander Esq
10 Downing Street

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The Prime Minister could conclude by congratulating Mr Nkomo and Mr Mugabe on their decision to participate in the elections. This will give new hope to the people of Rhodesia and to those of the neighbouring countries who have suffered on their behalf. We are very glad that the sad history of the last fourteen years has ended and that Rhodesia is now set on the road to legal independence.

yours ever
Roderic Lyne

(R M J Lyne)
Private Secretary

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20 DEC 1979



Register
No: 10

DRAFT

Type 1 +

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

- Top Secret.
- Secret.
- Confidential.
- Restricted.
- Unclassified.

PRIVACY MARKING

..... In Confidence

From

Telephone No. Ext.

Department

To:-

DRAFT STATEMENT BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE

As Chairman of the Lancaster House Conference I would like to make a few concluding remarks.

With the signature of this Final Report we complete together 16 weeks of concerted and concentrated effort. I would like to take this opportunity to congratulate all the participants in this Conference, and in particular the leaders of the delegations who sit beside me on the successful outcome of our endeavours. The documents that we have just signed are of the greatest significance to the people of Rhodesia and of the neighbouring States.

In opening this Conference I expressed the hope that we would be able to lay the foundations for a free, independent and democratic society in which all the people of Rhodesia irrespective of their race or political beliefs would be able to live in security and at peace with each other and with their neighbours. That hope has now been realised. The people of Rhodesia will now be able to settle their future by peaceful means.

As Lord Soames said on his arrival in Salisbury last week, for a war weary country the prize is great.

What is that prize? It is the end of war and enmity. It is the opportunity for all Rhodesians to devote their energies to peaceful activities rather than to strife. It is a chance for the country to renew and strengthen its

/relations

relations with its neighbours and with the wider international community. It is, in brief, the opportunity for a normal and settled existence. That is what I believe the people of Rhodesia sought from this Conference; and that is what we can now offer them.

However, in providing these opportunities, the participants in this Conference have also entered into certain solemn undertakings.

For our part, the British Government intend faithfully to discharge the heavy responsibilities we have undertaken during the period leading up to elections and the transfer of sovereignty to the new Government of Zimbabwe. We have already taken the necessary legislative action to bring your country to legal independence as soon as the elections have been held. All our efforts will be devoted to enabling the people of your country to decide for themselves their own future, to rebuild harmonious relations between Zimbabwe, its neighbours, and the international community. I am glad to say that this process has already started and that you will now be able to take your rightful place in the international community.

The rest depends on your cooperation. It is essential to the success of our common task that all the parties should accept as solemn and binding the agreements which you have undertaken, as is stated in the Conference Report, to accept the authority of the Governor; to abide by the independence Constitution; to comply with the pre-independence arrangements; to abide by the ceasefire agreement; to campaign peacefully and without intimidation; to renounce the use of force for political ends; and to accept the outcome of the elections and to instruct any forces under your authority to do the same. These are binding commitments and it will be for the Governor to ensure that the parties act in accordance with them.

For the people of Rhodesia and of the neighbouring States today's signature heralds the end of a war which has caused immense hardship and suffering. From midnight tonight the first phase of the ceasefire will come into operation. The parties have pledged to cease any cross border movement by their forces. It is essential to the later stages of the ceasefire that this initial stage should be complied with.

The moment, however, for which the people of Rhodesia have been waiting will come at midnight on Friday, 28 December. At that time hostilities within Rhodesia must cease and the process of disengagement and assembly will begin. This will be a difficult period. The forces of both sides will undoubtedly be suspicious and nervous. It is therefore all the more essential that all the forces comply scrupulously, under the direction of their Commanders, with the requirements of the ceasefire agreement that we have drawn up. This provides that the forces must disengage; must move rapidly to the nearest rendezvous point; and must thereafter move to the assembly places designated in the ceasefire agreement. There must of course be no movement of forces during the dis-engagement process from one region of the country to another. Failure to observe these provisions would constitute a breach of the agreement. The successful accomplishment of both disengagement and the assembly process will be the key to the future effectiveness of the ceasefire and to the creation of conditions for free and fair elections.

The subsequent maintenance of the ceasefire and the pursuit of the political campaign by peaceful means are equally crucial commitments. The political parties must comply with these agreements. I am confident that they will do so. If any individuals or parties should be responsible for systematic breaches of any aspect of the ceasefire agreement, or fail to comply with the undertakings they have entered into to campaign peacefully and without intimidation, they would not be able to enjoy the benefits which these agreements confer upon all those who are prepared to live up to their undertakings.

/Such

ch a contingency, we hope and believe, will not arise. But the Governor could not undertake his task without the powers and authority which are necessary to enable him to accomplish it. He therefore has the power to take whatever action is necessary in relation to any individuals or party which does not fulfil its obligations under the agreements entered into today.

I make no apology for emphasising the importance of our commitments in the period ahead. We must recognise the commitments which we have all accepted today. If I have spoken somewhat sternly, it is because as your Chairman I feel so deeply the sense of hope which goes with having got so far - and the anxiety that - whether deliberately or not - some careless or selfish action by any of us could betray the trust and high hopes of the people of Zimbabwe and of Southern African.

We stand at the end of a sombre decade in the history of central and southern Africa. A decade marred by conflict in many countries of the region. A decade in which the problems of southern Africa have at times seemed utterly intractable.

With the conclusion today of a negotiated settlement for Rhodesia, the prospects for the next decade are immeasurably improved. We can now look forward to the emergence early in 1980 of an independent and internationally recognised Republic of Zimbabwe. This, in itself, is a tremendous step forward.

But the significance of today's signature goes far wider than that. The progress of the Lancaster House Conference has been watched with keen attention from many countries. If, as a result of a negotiated settlement, wounds so deep can be healed in Rhodesia - as I pray they shall be during the months ahead - then the people of that country will have set an example and given hope to others throughout the world.

In particular, they will have given new heart to those who have been patiently working for a peaceful settlement in Namibia. And they will have encouraged those who wish to resolve the issues which now divide South Africa from the other countries of the Continent.

We have succeeded - not always easily - in maintaining over weeks the spirit of compromise and determination that was born at the Lusaka Conference. ↑ We

have a political basis for the reconciliation of all Rhodesians. I am sure that this experience has made a deep impression on all of us, and holds the most encouraging message for the future.

As I formally bring the Constitutional Conference to a close, therefore, I would thank both delegations for reminding the world, at a time when it is very much in need of it, that there is a genuine alternative to conflict. You have earned our deep and sincere gratitude. In the testing days ahead we shall give you all possible support in developing a spirit of reconciliation throughout Zimbabwe and Southern Africa, and in ensuring that the next decade there will be one of peace and prosperity.

We have done so with the help and support of the Commonwealth, of the ~~the~~ Front Line and other African States, and of many other Governments.

Registry
No:

DRAFT

Type 1 +

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

Top Secret.
Secret.
Confidential.
Restricted.
Unclassified.

To:-

From

Telephone No. Ext.

Department

PRIVACY MARKING

..... In Confidence

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/relations

COMMONWEALTH SECRETARIAT

CABLES: COMSECGEN LONDON SW1
TELEX: 27678
TELEPHONE: 01-839 3411 Ext:

MARLBOROUGH HOUSE,
PALL MALL,
LONDON, SW1Y 5HX

Your ref:
Our ref:

C151/4/5

20 December 1979

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Commonwealth Committee on Southern Africa

Attached is a copy of the Minutes of the Committee's meeting on 14 December 1979.

Distribution as before

M Malhoutra

M. Malhoutra
Secretary
Commonwealth Committee on
Southern Africa

Encl.

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CSA(79) Ninth Meeting

COMMONWEALTH COMMITTEE ON SOUTHERN AFRICA

MINUTES of the Meeting of the Committee on Southern Africa
held at Marlborough House on Friday, 14 December 1979, at
10.30 am.

Present:

H.E. Mr Arthur J. Scerri
High Commissioner for Malta
(in the chair)

Australia

Mr R.R. Fernandez
Deputy High Commissioner

Mr R. Burns
Counsellor

Barbados

Mr C.W. Hinkson
Counsellor

Miss C. Mahon
Second Secretary

Britain

Miss Rosemary Spencer, FCO
Mr J.R. Paterson, FCO

Cyprus

Mr D. Papasavvas
First Counsellor

The Gambia

H.E. Mr B.O. Semega-Janeh
High Commissioner

Guyana

H.E. Mr C.H. Grant
High Commissioner

Mr C.E. Barker
Deputy High Commissioner

The Bahamas

H.E. Mr R.F. Anthony Roberts
High Commissioner

Bangladesh

H.E. Mr A.R. Shams-ud Doha
High Commissioner

Mr K.M. Shehabuddin
Deputy High Commissioner

Botswana

H.E. Mr A.W. Kgarebe
High Commissioner

Mr L.M. Selepeng
Counsellor

Canada

Mr N.A. Robinson
First Secretary

Fiji

Mr N. M. Uluiviti
Counsellor

Ghana

H.E. Mr E.M. Debrah
High Commissioner

Mr I.K. Davies
Counsellor

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India

Mr I.P. Singh
Acting High Commissioner

Mr Arif Quamarain
Counsellor

Kenya

Mr P.M. Nyamweya
First Secretary

Malawi

Mr Beni Sani
First Secretary

Mauritius

H.E. Sir L. Teelock
High Commissioner

Nigeria

H.E. Mr S.U. Yolah
High Commissioner

H.E. Mr E.N. Oba
High Commissioner to Zambia

Singapore

Mr Lim Chin Leong
First Secretary

St. Lucia & St. Vincent

Mr C.O. Samuel
Administration Officer

Tanzania

Mrs L. Howell
Counsellor

Uganda

H.E. Eng. J.M.N. Zikusoka
High Commissioner

Jamaica

H.E. Mr E.G. Peart
High Commissioner

Mrs Audrey M. Thompson
Counsellor

Lesotho

H.E. Mr M.M. Molapo
High Commissioner

Malaysia

Mr Looi Cheok Hun
Deputy High Commissioner

New Zealand

Mr P.R. Bennett
Counsellor

Papua New Guinea

H.E. Mr F.B.C. Reiher
High Commissioner

Sierra Leone

Mr Alpha Wilson
Press Counsellor

Sri Lanka

Mr J.C. Rajepakse
Counsellor

Swaziland

H.E. Mr G.M. Mamba
High Commissioner

Trinidad & Tobago

Mr H. Broomes
Acting High Commissioner

Zambia

H.E. Miss L.P. Chibesakunda
High Commissioner

Mr L.K. M'tesa
Director, African Affairs,
Ministry of Foreign Affairs

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H.E. Mr Shridath S. Ramphal
Commonwealth Secretary-General

Commonwealth Secretariat

Mr E.C. Anyaoku
Mr D. Anderson
Mr M. Malhoutra (Secretary)
Mr A.V. Hayday
Dr A.C. Bundu
Mrs P.B. Robertson
Mr C. Laidlaw
Miss A. Cassam

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MINUTES

The Chairman welcomed representatives and invited the representative of Ghana, Chairman of the Sub-Committee which had been formed the previous day to revise the Secretariat memorandum CSA(79)3, to introduce the report of the Sub-Committee.

2. The Representative of Ghana said he would present his report in three parts. First a general comment on their work; secondly, a consideration paragraph by paragraph of the revised document which they had prepared; and thirdly, they had requested the Secretariat to undertake further details on costings which he would table.

3. The Sub-Committee had met in a marathon session of almost six hours and had considered document CSA(79)3 paragraph by paragraph. He emphasized that the principle of sending a collective Commonwealth Observer Group as such was not questioned because that had already been decided by a previous meeting of the Committee. He then went through the amendments made by the Sub-Committee.

4. The Sub-Committee had sought to arrive at a text which would make it clear that the role of the observers was to observe and report on all aspects of the organisation and conduct of the elections in Southern Rhodesia, and that it would have no executive role of any kind nor intended to duplicate or interfere with the functions of the administering authority. Thus whereas the original text had proposed the making of "recommendations" to the appropriate authority on behalf of petitioners in paragraph 9(c) headed "Procedures", this was amended to read "to bring any such relevant matter to the attention of the appropriate authorities". The second sentence of paragraph 5 of the original text was also amended to read "Their duty will be to form a judgement within their terms of reference".

5. Paragraph 7 of the original text - headed "Operational Structure" - was removed to a later part of the memorandum immediately after paragraph 13. The final clause which read "with sub-units headed by individual observers in other electoral districts" was amended to read "with, if necessary, sub-units in other electoral districts" in order to give the Group some measure of flexibility in deciding how best to approach their task.

6. The Sub-Committee had felt that complete immunity from civil and criminal process as well as inviolability for their premises and archives was necessary if they were to carry out their work effectively. He appealed to the British Government to grant this.

7. One question on which the Sub-Committee had spent considerable time was the size of the Group. Having taken note of the British representative's statement that polling would be spread over three consecutive days instead of two, the Sub-Committee revised the original text of paragraph 16 to read "It is expected that the staff in each of the electoral districts will need to be augmented by an average of 8, if polling is to be observed effectively". This necessitated the consequential reduction of the arithmetic in paragraph 17, resulting in an overall total of 109 instead of the 145 given in the original text.

8. On the important question of costs, the Sub-Committee agreed to recommend that the final costing of the exercise could not be undertaken until it was known what services and support the local authorities in Southern Rhodesia were able to provide, including those indicated in paragraph 20(a) of the original text. In keeping with this broad conclusion, the Sub-Committee had therefore amended paragraph 21 of the original text to read "Estimation of costs will have to await an indication by the British Government of the extent of local facilities and logistical support that will be made available, and the assessment of the Secretariat team that is shortly proceeding to Salisbury".

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9. On further reflection, however, he had felt that it would be more useful if the Secretariat prepared some detailed costing of those matters which did not depend on the information being sought from the administering authority, as time was of the essence. He had therefore requested the Secretariat to do this.

10. Copies of the Financial Estimates were distributed to representatives at the meeting. In summary, they were as follows:

Travel	-	121,440
Subsistence	-	166,287
Other expenses (excluding Insurance)	-	24,180
Total	-	<u>£311,907</u>

11. He emphasized that the above estimates did not make any provision for transport within Rhodesia whether by land or air, nor for radio communication, office accommodation and equipment, or ancillary local staff including interpreters. In the light of the response of the administering authority and the assessment of the Secretariat reconnaissance team which would shortly be leaving for Rhodesia, a supplementary estimate might need to be presented.

12. The other amendments the Sub-Committee had made were insubstantial and designed essentially to improve the text.

13. The Chairman thanked the Committee for the diligent manner in which they had carried out their task and the Secretariat who had helped them prepare the revised texts and costings.

14. The Secretary-General added his commendation to the Sub-Committee for the improvements it had made to the document and for the spirit of accommodation which had made this possible. He exhorted the Committee in view of the urgency of embarking upon

CONFIDENTIAL

the preparatory arrangements for the Observer Group, to reach decisions which would permit action to be taken immediately.

15. The Representative of Mauritius noted that in paragraph 20(a) of the revised document, the local authority would be required to provide free office and residential accommodation, all transportation requirements within Rhodesia as well as communication facilities and ancillary local staff and pointed out that unless the Observer Group obtained these facilities they would be unable to carry out their work properly. He felt it was an obligation which properly fell on the British Government and he hoped that it would be discharged.

16. The Representative of The Gambia enquired whether the reduced number of 109 members of the Observer team would be adequate to cover all polling stations. He believed if the Commonwealth were to take the trouble to assemble an Observer Group they should be able to carry out their task fully.

17. The Representative of Ghana replied that it would be impossible, politically and financially, to cover all polling stations. However the Sub-Committee had felt this to be the minimum number needed to be able to observe in such a way that its report would be considered credible.

18. The Representative of Britain, in reply to the question asked by the representative of Mauritius, said that her Government had cabled the request to Salisbury the previous day, and had asked to be informed urgently what could be done. As soon as a reply was received her Government would convey this to the Secretariat. However, for the time being, Britain would reserve its position on the whole question of costs.

19. The Representative of The Gambia reiterated his concern whether the revised number of observers would be adequate to fully observe the elections.

20. The Representative of Ghana said that the 145 proposed in the original text of paragraph 17 had been reduced to 109 primarily because the elections would be held over three instead of two days. Consequently less staff would be required as there was greater time in which they could be moved about from area to area.

21. The Representative of Jamaica did not believe this to be an adequate explanation as the vigilance required for three days was not lesser than for two. The observers still had to cover all areas and the polling stations would remain continuously open over the three consecutive days proposed for the elections.

22. The Representative of Ghana felt that further clarification was needed as it had been his understanding that polling would be held in different areas of the country on different days.

23. The Representative of Britain explained that the elections were a matter for the decision of the Election Commissioner acting under the authority of the Governor. It had been agreed that the polling would last for three days and her understanding was that this would mean a full three days in the heavily populated areas, but that in the less densely populated areas where polling would have to be brought to the people, the full three days would not be required as mobile polling stations would be used in order to get full results. These procedures would take full account of all relevant elements such as population density, distance etc; all would have the opportunity to vote.

24. The Representative of Ghana said that the Sub-Committee had been working on a rather different assumption, namely that polling stations in some areas would be open for a day or two, after which polling would take place in other areas. If, on the other hand, polling stations were open in most places for the full three days, this would call for an upward revision of the number of observers required and it might be necessary to go back to the original calculation of 145 persons.

25. The Representative of Jamaica stressed the importance of the difference between polling areas, some of them were small and some densely populated. Moreover, it should be remembered that if it were announced that three days were available for polling, some people might choose for various personal reasons to vote on the last possible day. In any case it was his understanding that the law in all countries required all polling stations to stay open for the entire election period, even if it was felt that everyone in a particular area had cast their vote.

26. The Representative of The Bahamas, agreeing with the representatives of Jamaica and The Gambia, said he too had difficulty with the judgement of the Sub-Committee. In the experience of most countries there was usually an established pattern of voting; people would come and go as they wished and it was therefore necessary for polling stations to remain open for the whole period. Unless some unusual arrangements were contemplated, this would presumably be the case in Southern Rhodesia.

27. The Representative of Bangladesh, explained that the original estimate of 145 had been directly related to time and space; the assumption being that the elections would take place over two days but in different parts of the country, and that this number of supporting staff had been the minimum possible. Had the period of the election been condensed to one day it would have been necessary to increase the observers and the number of supporting staff to about 200. But the Committee had been informed that the election period would be three days with continuous polling over that period. This meant that the same number of observers would now have a longer period to cover the ground; hence the reduction of the number from 145 to 109. If it turned out when the Observer Group got to Rhodesia that it had been decided to spread the elections over an extended period of, say four days, he wondered what the reaction would be.

28. The Representative of Guyana said that he accepted the Bangladesh representative's explanation - namely, that the more days allowed for elections the fewer the number of supporting staff required. But this line of reasoning had been based on the assumption that in no one area would polling be held for the full three days. However, the British representative had just informed the Committee that in some densely populated areas polling would in fact be held over all three days, while in some of the more remote and less densely populated areas mobile polling stations would move from one area to another and would be only open for one day in each of these places. On the basis of this information and pending further clarification by the British Government, he felt the Committee should revert to the original estimate of 145 persons and make adjustments later if necessary.

29. The Representative of Jamaica pointed out that in some of the more remote rural areas it might take the people a full day to reach a polling station. The exact condition in such areas was not known and he would therefore agree with the Guyana representative that further clarification was required from the British Government.

30. The Deputy Secretary-General said that to the extent the Secretariat had done the original calculations it was only right for him to mention that the assumptions on which it had been working had been significantly modified by this morning's discussion. It would now be necessary to change the estimates as it had not been originally understood that in some cases polling stations would be open for the full three days. He would suggest that the Committee go back to the original estimate, using the figure of 145 as maximum subject to modification later on the basis of recommendations made by the Observer Group after they had had an opportunity to assess the situation on the ground.

31. The Representative of Australia agreed that the Committee should revert to the original estimate pending further clarification from the British Government on the polling procedures to be employed.

32. The Representative of Sri Lanka referred to three amendments made by the Sub-Committee: the deletion of the word "unrestricted" in paragraph 9(a) of the Secretariat's paper; the deletion of the last part of paragraph 9(c); the reduction of the number of supporting staff from "a minimum of 12" to "an average of 8" in paragraph 16 as well as the deletion of the second sentence of that paragraph. His apprehension was whether these changes did not add up to an overall diminution of the capacity of the Observer Group to carry out its work.

33. The Representative of Ghana confirmed that the revisions that had been made would not diminish the capacity of the Observer Group. The deletion of the word "unrestricted" had been done in order to improve the text as it did not add very much to the substance.

34. The Representative of Uganda questioned whether three polling days would in fact be sufficient. He pointed out that conditions in Southern Rhodesia were far from normal, as had been found by Bishop Muzorewa himself last April. It had been found that some voters could not get to the polling stations; how much more difficult might it be now for some voters at present outside the country who had to be persuaded to return in order to cast their vote. The proper conduct of the elections was even more likely to be frustrated with polling limited in some areas to only two days or even one day, especially in view of the transport difficulties in the rural areas. Ideally there should be uniformity throughout the country, but if this was not possible the Election Commissioner should indicate in advance the polling stations that would be open only for restricted periods.

35. The Representative of Canada agreed with the suggestion by the Deputy Secretary-General on giving observers themselves the right to indicate the numbers they required and felt that a wording to this effect should be inserted in the paper. It was necessary to know what would be the final number of supporting staff needed. It would not be necessary to visit every polling

station and the credibility of the Observers' report would rest on the intensity of the samples taken. He had no objection to the original figure of 145 being used as a ceiling, leaving it to the Observer Group to decide how many supporting staff would be needed from outside Rhodesia and on this requirement would depend the final estimates of the cost of the exercise.

36. The Deputy Secretary-General, in response to the request by the Canadian representative, suggested adding the following phrase to paragraph 16 of the revised paper after the word "effectively": " - the Observer Group, having the right to request a lower number of supporting staff in the light of the final electoral arrangements" following an amendment of the words "an average of 8" to "an average of 12" in that paragraph. If this was accepted by the Committee, it would necessitate consequential amendments in paragraph 17(b) by altering the figures "8 x 8" to "8 x 12" to give a sub-total of 96 instead of 64 and an overall total of 141 instead of 109.

37. The Representative of Guyana thought it would bring the wording closer to the point made by the representative of Canada about the need to allow the Observer Group flexibility of operation if they used the words "to vary" instead of "to request". He felt this would reflect the open-endedness of the idea put forward by the representative of Canada.

38. The Deputy Secretary-General pointed out that in accordance with their terms of reference the Observer Group would not have power to make such decisions; they could only request that certain things be done. Moreover, to accept the Guyana representative's amendment would be to leave the question of cost open-ended. His own formulation, on the other hand, would provide for flexibility downwards which in his understanding had been the intent of the Canadian intervention.

39. Following an intervention by the Indian representative, the Committee agreed to amend paragraph 16 to read as follows: "It is expected that the staff in each of the electoral districts will need to be augmented by an average of 12, if polling is to be observed effectively - unless the Observer Group itself requests a lower number of supporting staff in the light of the final electoral arrangements". The consequential amendments in paragraph 17 were also agreed.

40. The Chairman then asked whether the Committee was prepared to accept the paper in its entirety as amended.

41. The Representative of Canada said that before proceeding further he wished to point out that he had served on the Sub-Committee which had examined the original Secretariat paper in detail in a positive and constructive way. Those members of the Committee who had heard the news from Canada that morning would know that he was not in a position to say specifically what his Government may or may not accept. However, subject to certain reservations and understandings, he believed his Government might be prepared to accept the paper as revised by the Sub-Committee.

42. He then proceeded to specify the reservations and understandings on which the paper might be accepted. With regard to paragraph 6, he said that his Government understood this to mean that the Observer Group's report would be forwarded by the Secretary-General to Commonwealth Heads of Government through the High Commissions in London.

43. The Secretary-General confirmed this interpretation.

44. The Representative of Canada then went on and said that with regard to paragraph 7(b), while his Government had no objection to the Observer Group being given a "right of access to all polling stations" its understanding was that the Group would not visit all polling stations but would confine themselves to taking a balanced sample of the poll on the days in which it was held. Moreover his Government's understanding with regard to questions

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of eligibility of voters was that the Group would satisfy themselves in a general sense and not necessarily confine their attention to particular cases. With regard to paragraph 18 his Government's understanding was that the supporting staff mentioned therein were encompassed in the total of Headquarters staff mentioned in paragraph 17(a) and were not an additional group. He also pointed out that the financial estimates which had been submitted by the Secretariat were now no longer accurate.

45. The Representative of Ghana said the Secretariat paper should be understood as subject to further amendments when more precise information became available.

46. The Secretary-General added that as the amendments advanced by his Deputy to paragraphs 16 and 17 had been approved, the paper stood as amended by the Committee.

47. The Representative of Canada said that he hoped his Government would be able to agree to the method of financing proposed in paragraph 22 but was unable to do so now until more detailed costing, which took into account any facilities the administering authority was able to offer, had been prepared. Only when such detailed costing was made would his Government be prepared to accept the estimates as reasonable and as setting an upper limit of expenditure, but at this stage it could not accept a budget which was not final but rather subject to further supplementary estimates. His Government's agreement to the method of financing proposed was also subject to the British Government paying its assessed contribution to the Secretariat special budget in cash.

48. The Representative of Britain confirmed that urgent consultations were being held with the Governor in Salisbury with regard to the matters pertaining to the Observer Group and the outcome of these consultations would be conveyed to the Secretariat as soon as possible. The British Government had reservations about the numbers put forward in the Secretariat

paper and about the precise operation of the Observer Group on the ground, subject to consultations with the Governor in Salisbury. There were similar reservations with regard to costs till an assessment of the position in Southern Rhodesia could be taken. She added that it was the responsibility of the Governor in Salisbury to ensure that arrangements were made that would enable free and fair elections to be held.

49. The Secretary-General asked for clarification of the point made in regard to the consultation with the Governor about the operation of the Observer Group in Southern Rhodesia. Did this, for example, refer to their movement within the country?

50. The Representative of Britain replied that the consultations with the Governor were wider than that and involved also the question of the numbers that could be coped with, logistical matters, and facilities etc.

51. The Secretary-General observed that the nature of the work of the Observer Group was not contingent on the approval of the Governor in Salisbury.

52. The Representative of Britain confirmed that the Governor wanted to assure the Observer Group as broad an access as possible and this consideration was being taken into account in Salisbury.

53. The Representative of Canada, referring to the earlier reservation by the British representative on costs, asked whether this reservation referred specifically to the cost of services in Southern Rhodesia or whether it related to the method of financing the Observer exercise as specified in paragraph 22.

54. The Representative of Britain said her Government had a general reservation on finance till the position on the ground

was known and reaffirmed that her Government's position would be made clear as soon as possible.

55. The Representative of New Zealand, referring to the suggestion he had made the previous day in regard to paragraph 20(b), namely that consideration be given to the possibility of contributing Governments paying international air fares, accommodation and subsistence of the observers they send, asked whether this had been considered by the Sub-Committee. On the method of payment of costs he reserved his Government's position as he had not yet received any instructions from his Government.

56. The Deputy Secretary-General said that the suggestion by the New Zealand representative had not featured in the Sub-Committee's report because it had been felt that a distinction must be drawn between the collective Commonwealth Observer Group and individual national teams of observers. However, this did not mean that countries wishing to do so, could not make contributions in kind as envisaged in paragraph 22, in the form suggested by the New Zealand representative.

57. The Secretary-General reminded the Committee that as had been indicated the previous day the Secretariat proposed sending a small reconnaissance team to Salisbury at the earliest opportunity as part of its effort to obtain precise information relevant to the preparation of a full estimate of the Observer operation. Given the imponderables indicated in the Secretariat's memorandum, it was not possible at this time to set a final upper limit; nevertheless these imponderables had to be married to the realities of the situation, and in so doing it was possible to prepare a provisional estimate based on items the calculation of which was independent of the facilities being sought from the administering authority. He stressed the importance of the Secretariat being in a position to proceed immediately with the preparatory work that needed to be undertaken for assembling the Observer Group, including consultation with Governments to nominate candidates.

Once the report before the Committee was approved, he would take this to mean that he had full authority from the Committee to embark at once, within its framework, upon the arrangements that were necessary to make the Observer Group a reality.

58. The Representative of Britain, referring to the Deputy Secretary-General's distinction between national observers and the collective Commonwealth Observer Group, said that her Government would regard the individual members of the Commonwealth Observer Group as no more than the representatives of the States which were represented on it.

59. The Representative of Jamaica moved that the Sub-Committee's report as amended be adopted by the Committee and was seconded by the Representative of Uganda.

60. The Representative of Canada while appreciating the urgency of the matter, reiterated that formal acceptance of the report, and paragraph 22 in particular, could not be given since final estimates were not available to establish an upper limit of the budget proposed. In his view, since the Committee was proposing to set up "a special Secretariat budget" to be funded by the usual rate of assessment it was essential that this should be approved by unanimity rather than by consensus which was the accepted procedure only for such matters as were essentially political in nature. It seemed to him that there was no unanimity, in the light of the reservation by the representative of Britain which also implied that the financing of the exercise should be done on a voluntary basis.

61. The Secretary-General clarified that the report did not provide a voluntary basis for contributions. On the contrary it proposed that contributions would be assessed on the usual basis of member Governments' contributions to the Secretariat budget. If any Governments then wished to make additional voluntary contributions, this would be welcome. The fact that one Government

expressed a reservation on a particular proposal had never had the effect of altering the character of the proposal.

62. The Representative of Canada emphasised that in his understanding the reservation by the British Government implied a voluntary basis for contributions to the budget of the Observer exercise.

63. The Representative of Malawi expressed reservation on paragraph 22, stating that he had not been authorised by his Government to make a commitment of that kind on its behalf. He would seek appropriate instructions from his Government and would convey these to the Secretary-General as soon as they were received.

64. The Representative of India noted the comments of the Canadian representative and sought clarification from the Secretary-General as to the rules which applied to Commonwealth meetings regarding which matters could be carried by consensus and which required unanimity, thus giving any Commonwealth member a right of veto.

65. The Secretary-General stated that the concept of veto within the Commonwealth was a contradiction in terms. It was not unusual for governments to attach different orders of priority to different issues but this did not preclude governments from agreeing on matters on a consensus basis. On the question of payments by member governments of contributions to the budget for Commonwealth programmes, generally the Commonwealth could do very little if a member government did not pay its contribution. He would be very surprised if on this most critical matter in which the Commonwealth had such an important role to play and which the whole international community was following with more than ordinary interest, any country tried to delay or frustrate the present proceedings. Protraction of this matter was equivalent to frustration. It had even been suggested that this matter be referred to the Finance Sub-Committee which should then report to the Finance Committee. The election would be over by the

time such a process was completed. He had an over-riding responsibility to carry out the mandate given to the Secretariat at Lusaka last August. Therefore despite reservations and procedural problems raised by some representatives, once approval was given the Secretariat would move forward in the direction outlined in the report.

66. The Representative of Nigeria suggested that the representative of Canada should obtain appropriate instructions from his Government on its participation in this Commonwealth effort. If it was not willing to participate it could opt out, but this question should not be allowed to delay the work of the Committee.

67. The Representative of Jamaica hoped that Canada was not hiding behind the remark made by the British representative and asked for further clarification of the British position. As he understood it, the British reservation on costs was in respect only to paragraph 20(a), which called on it to provide certain facilities to the Observer Group, and not to the method of financing outlined in paragraph 22. He therefore found it difficult to see how the reservation of the Canadian representative could be based on that of the British.

68. The Representative of Britain explained that their reservation on costs was much more general than had been interpreted by the representative of Jamaica. As Mr Day had pointed out the previous day, the British Government was already meeting the immense costs involved in the resumption of their authority in Southern Rhodesia and until more specific information was available from Salisbury they were unable to give any additional financial commitment.

69. The Representative of Papua New Guinea pointed out that in his view the Lancaster House negotiations were a direct result of the Lusaka Meeting of Commonwealth Heads of Government and not of any high-handed diplomacy on the part of the British Government. From what had been said it seemed that certain

representatives had not taken seriously the decisions of the Committee's meetings over the last two months on the subject under discussion. The question of the nature and status of the Commonwealth Observer Group had been decided previously by the Committee and its decision should have been communicated to all Heads of Government. In his case this had involved expensive phone calls to Papua New Guinea. He therefore could not see how any Commonwealth Government could now resile on the question of financing the Observer operation, and suggested that the Secretary-General should circulate immediately to all member Governments the provisional estimates prepared by the Secretariat so that the necessary funds could be made available as soon as possible. Accordingly he supported the idea of the present meeting approving in principle the Sub-Committee's report as amended, and did not agree that a further meeting was necessary for this.

70. The Representative of Uganda expressed his appreciation for the timeliness of the Secretary-General's explanation of the value of moving forward in the direction proposed in the report without further delay. A motion was before the meeting and this should now either be approved or rejected. The financial costs involved were insignificant when compared to the lives being lost daily as a result of the war and the longer the Observer exercise was delayed the greater the number of lives that would be lost. The Committee should therefore go ahead and approve the report without any further discussion, and mandate the Secretary-General to proceed as planned.

71. The Representatives of the Bahamas and Tanzania expressed agreement, emphasizing that when Commonwealth Governments agreed to a Commonwealth Observer Group at Lusaka they must implicitly have committed themselves to the expenditure involved. Representatives at this Committee might not have specific instructions on the question of expenditure but they should realise that their Governments had already committed themselves in principle.

72. The Representative of Guyana sought clarification from the British representative about what she meant when she spoke

of a general reservation about the cost of the Observer Group. In his view there were two related but quite separate issues involved: there was the question of quantum on which many representatives might indeed wish to reserve the position of their Governments until this was further clarified; but this was different from the question how the exercise was to be financed which involved a question of principle. He wanted to know whether the British reservation related to the first or the second of these issues.

73. The Representative of Britain replied that for the time being the British Government had reservations on both issues. However, they hoped these would be sorted out very quickly on the basis of the information expected from the Governor in Salisbury.

74. The Representative of Guyana said he found it incredible that the British Government should have any reservation on the question of financing the Observer Group. In effect the British stand re-opened a principle that had already been settled in Lusaka. Did the British Government still believe, he asked, that the Observers appointed by the Secretary-General would be acting as the representatives of their individual Governments? To proceed in this way could only lead to frustration of what had already been agreed.

75. He sympathised with the Canadian position that Canada wished to reserve its position until more detailed information about cost was provided. However, in putting forward the idea of unanimity because a special budget had been proposed, Canada was in effect introducing the notion of veto which was quite alien in the Commonwealth. He appealed to the Canadian representative to pay greater heed to what the overwhelming majority of Commonwealth Governments were saying than to what the British representative had said.

76. The Representative of The Gambia believed that Britain had a very substantial interest in what happened in Rhodesia and

that therefore Britain would itself feel compelled to make a contribution towards the cost of the Observer Group. He hoped the British Government would not continue to delay a decision, bearing in mind that not too long ago they had accused the Patriotic Front of adopting delaying tactics at the Lancaster House Conference. He proposed that the Committee should proceed as proposed in the report because he was confident that the British Government would be reasonable enough to accept their share of the cost of the Observer Group.

77. The Secretary-General said he had been startled by the British representative's remarks about the nature of the Commonwealth Observer Group. During his lengthy consultations with the British Government at the highest levels over the past six weeks, this was the first occasion on which there had been any such questioning of the nature of the Commonwealth Observer Group. The distinction had always been quite clear between representation of national Governments and non-national representation through a collective group. In all his consultations with Commonwealth Governments he had stressed the collective character of the Commonwealth Observer Group. Many Commonwealth leaders had emphasized to him how much they welcomed this collective approach and how much they preferred this to sending their own national observers. Moreover, the explicit language of paragraph 2 of the report made it clear that members of the Observer Group would not be representatives of their Governments but would be serving in their individual capacity as Commonwealth citizens, performing a task on behalf of the Commonwealth collectively and reporting to Commonwealth Heads of Government collectively. He wished to make it clear that all his actions in fulfilling the mandate of the Committee had been guided by this belief, and that he intended to proceed on this basis.

78. The Representative of Canada reiterated that he hoped to be able to agree to the method of financing proposed. However, he thought it would be ultra vires for the Committee to approve the report by consensus at this meeting and therefore suggested

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that the Committee should meet again the following week when it might be possible to set an upper limit of expenditure.

79. The Chairman formally asked for the Sub-Committee's report as amended to be approved by the Committee. The Committee so agreed. The British representative drew attention to her reservations.


80. The Secretary-General reminded High Commissioners that they had had no opportunity for consideration of the final stages of the Lancaster House Conference and suggested that they meet informally for a briefing session on Monday, 17 December, at 6.00 p.m.

81. The Representative of Ghana thanked his colleagues on the Committee for accepting the Sub-Committee's report. He suggested that if there was any shortfall in contributions, those representatives who were in a position to urge their Governments to make up the difference should do so. He pleaded with all representatives that despite the difficult economic situation in many Commonwealth countries, every effort should be made to resolve this matter once and for all; they should not be deterred by shortage of funds in bringing to fulfilment this important role of the Commonwealth in the impending elections that would take Southern Rhodesia to full statehood under genuine majority rule.

82. The meeting adjourned at 1.00 p.m.

International Affairs Division,
Commonwealth Secretariat,
Marlborough House,
London SW1Y 5HX.

17 December 1979





Commonwealth Information

NEWS RELEASE
79/37

20 December 1979

ZIMBABWE - THE LANCASTER HOUSE AGREEMENT

Ramphal

The following statement was issued today by the Commonwealth Secretary-General, Mr Shridath S. Ramphal:

"Thirty-eight Commonwealth leaders at Lusaka last August committed themselves to the end of UDI and the war it spawned, to genuine majority rule elections under a democratic constitution and to the birth of a free Zimbabwe thereafter. The agreement at Lancaster House on the terms of a lasting settlement derive from that commitment.

*Copies as per
previous corresp*

I salute all those who have made this agreement possible: our Commonwealth leaders collectively in Lusaka; the British Prime Minister and her Foreign Secretary who carried special responsibilities; the Presidents of the Frontline States, including the President of Mozambique; all those who made possible the particular contributions of Nigeria and, at a critical stage in the discussions, of the United States; and, not least, the representatives of Commonwealth governments in London who held some 30 meetings in Marlborough House during the last three months. But there could have been no achievement without the will and determination to reach it on the part of the parties to the negotiations - the Leaders of the Patriotic Front and of the Salisbury delegations.

Together, Lusaka and Lancaster House constitute a Commonwealth service to Africa and the world community of immense proportions and of great significance for the 80's. But it is a service not yet complete. We must secure what has been achieved and ensure effective implementation

COMMONWEALTH
SECRETARIAT
Marlborough House
London SW1Y 5HX
01-839 3411

...../more

in spirit no less than in letter. Not everyone will view the successes of Lancaster House alike; but the only judgement that must now prevail is that of the people of Zimbabwe expressed through free and fair elections. The Commonwealth is in many ways a trustee of that process: Britain under whose authority the elections will be supervised, the Commonwealth collectively through its Elections Observer Group and, of course, the contributions of individual Commonwealth countries to the Ceasefire Monitoring Force.

I am sure it is a trust that will be faithfully discharged at all levels. But we shall also need the same unity of purpose among Commonwealth countries in the period of implementation as was evident in the period of negotiation. The spirit of Lusaka that in the end prevailed at Lancaster House must now condition the transition from Southern Rhodesia to Zimbabwe."

Ends

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London S.W.1

20 December 1979

Dear Michael,

J. Hunt
21/12

Rhodesia: The Prime Minister's Meeting
with Bishop Muzorewa: Friday 21 December: 10.30

Bishop Muzorewa will be accompanied by one or two of the leading members of his delegation (possibly including General Walls). They are due to meet Lord Carrington before calling on the Prime Minister.

The Prime Minister will be aware of the very serious last minute difficulties which arose with the Salisbury delegation over signature of the agreement. These arose in large part from the statements made to the press by Mr Mugabe on 17 December, which threw doubt on his intentions to comply with the requirements of the ceasefire agreement. Mr Mugabe suggested that additional assembly places would be allocated to the Patriotic Front in the central areas of Rhodesia; and that it would take six to eight weeks for the Patriotic Front to comply with the agreement. We have assured Bishop Muzorewa and his delegation that the only addition which has been made is that of a sixteenth assembly place for the Patriotic Front. We do not envisage that additional assembly places will be necessary. If there was any practical requirement, the Governor would first seek the agreement of Bishop Muzorewa and General Walls.

The Salisbury delegation are concerned about cross-border movement. The ceasefire requires that all cross-border movement should cease from midnight on 21 December. We will be looking to the Zambian and Mozambique governments to play an active part in ensuring compliance with this requirement. The full ceasefire comes into effect at midnight on 28 December and the process of disengagement and the assembly of Patriotic Front forces must be carried out over the next seven days. The efforts made by the Patriotic Front commanders to assemble their forces will be a very important test of the seriousness of the Patriotic Front's intentions to comply with the ceasefire. We are concerned about Mr Mugabe's remarks and have made clear in public, as well as to the Patriotic Front commanders, that such an interpretation would be totally unacceptable.

/The Salisbury

M O'D B Alexander Esq
10 Downing Street

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The Salisbury delegation are looking for an assurance that, if the Patriotic Front do not assemble their forces, they will be banned from participating in the elections. Lord Carrington will be making at the signature ceremony a very firm speech about compliance with the agreement. The Governor has the authority to take whatever action is necessary in relation to any individuals or party guilty of systematic breaches of the ceasefire. A failure by the Patriotic Front to make a serious effort to assemble their forces would create a serious situation. If they then continued to break the ceasefire and practised widespread intimidation, very firm action would have to be taken. (We of course cannot commit ourselves to proscribing the Patriotic Front as a whole from participating in the elections if they make a serious effort, but fail to achieve a complete assembly of their forces. It may, for instance, be necessary to distinguish the action taken vis-a-vis various sections of the Patriotic Front. We shall naturally make it clear that we cannot allow any party to win the elections by cheating).

yours man

Roderic Lyne

(R M J Lyne)
Private Secretary

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20 DEC 1979



[RHODESIA: POLICY: ADVANCE COPIES]

X-27

PS
PS/SIR I GILMOUR
PS/MR LUCE
PS/PUS

PS/NO 10 DOWNING STREET

MR R L WADE-GERY)
MR P M MAXEY)
MR GOULTY)
MR P J FOWLER)
DIO)

CABINET
OFFICE

MR WILLSON
MR DAY
LORD N G LENNOX
MR ASPIN

IMMEDIATE

.....
HD/RHOD DEPT (4)

HD/C AF D
HD/S AF D

HD/PUSD (2)

HD/NEWS DEPT
HD/WAD

to Ireland K200h.
MR FIFCOF LEGAL ADVISER RM K164

(File)

mf

GRS 200

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DESKBY F C O 201730Z

FROM PARIS 201640Z DEC 79

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1003 OF 20 DECEMBER 1979

INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK, BONN, BRUSSELS, COPENHAGEN, DUBLIN,
LUXEMBOURG, ROME, THE HAGUE, UKREP BRUSSELS, LUSAKA,
MIRIMBA-SALISBURY, MAPUTO, GABORONE, DAR-ES-SALAAM,
WASHINGTON AND MOSCOW.

MY TELNO 1002 : RHODESIA SANCTIONS

1. THE ELYSEE ISSUED THIS AFTERNOON THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT
(OUR TRANSLATION) :

"THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS ON 19 DECEMBER CONSIDERED THAT
IT WAS APPROPRIATE TO LIFT THE ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AGAINST
RHODESIA WHICH HAD BEEN ADOPTED IN 1968. THE PROVISIONAL
RE-ESTABLISHMENT OF BRITISH AUTHORITY IN RHODESIA HAS
BROUGHT TO AN END THE SITUATION OF ILLEGALITY CREATED BY
THE UNILATERAL DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE BY THE AUTHOR-
ITIES IN SALISBURY IN 1965. A CEASE-FIRE IS SOON TO BE
BROUGHT INTO FORCE WITH THE AGREEMENT OF ALL PARTIES
CONCERNED. FREE AND DEMOCRATIC ELECTIONS WILL BE ORGANISED

BROUGHT INTO FORCE WITH THE AGREEMENT OF ALL PARTIES CONCERNED. FREE AND DEMOCRATIC ELECTIONS WILL BE ORGANISED ON THE BASIS OF MAJORITY RULE, THE APPLICATION OF WHICH HAS BEEN ADVOCATED BY FRANCE. ALL THE INTERESTED PARTIES HAVE ACCEPTED THE TERMS OF THIS SOLUTION WHICH SHOULD PERMIT THE FUTURE REPUBLIC OF ZIMBABWE TO ACHIEVE SWIFT AND INTERNATIONALLY RECOGNISED INDEPENDENCE. IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, THE GOVERNMENT CONSIDERS THAT THE CONDITIONS WHICH HAD JUSTIFIED THE ADOPTION OF SANCTIONS AGAINST RHODESIA NO LONGER EXIST. ''

HIBBERT

NNNN

SENT/RECD 201704Z BXC/JJ

[RHODESIA: POLICY: ADVANCE COPIES]

267

FC
PS/SIR I GILMOUR
PS/MR LUCE
PS/PUS

PS/NO 10 DOWNING STREET

~~MR WILLSON~~
MR DAY
LORD N G LENNOX
MR ASPIN

MR R L WADE-GERY)
MR P M MAXEY)
MR GOULTY)
MR P J FOWLER)
DIO)

CABINET
OFFICE

.....
HD/RHOD DEPT (4)

HD/C AF D
HD/S AF D

HD/PUSD (2)

HD/NEWS DEPT
HD/WAD

Mr. Ireland K200h.
MR FIFCOF LEGAL ADVISER RM K16A

~~RESIDENT CLERK~~

IMMEDIATE

ADVANCE COPY

RR CANBERRA

GRS 850

CONFIDENTIAL

FROM PARIS 201340Z DEC 79

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1002 OF 20 DECEMBER 1979

INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK, WASHINGTON, BONN AND MIRIMBA-SALISBURY

INFO PRIORITY BRUSSELS, COPENHAGEN, DUBLIN, LUXEMBOURG, ROME,
THE HAGUE, UKREP BRUSSELS, LUSAKA, DAR ES SALAAM,
MAPUTO AND PRETORIA.

INFO ROUTINE CANBERRA

MY TEL NO 1000 AND MY TELECON WITH RENWICK THIS MORNING.

RHODESIA : FRENCH DECISION ON SANCTIONS.

1. WHEN I ASKED TO SEE WAHL THIS MORNING I WAS TOLD THAT I COULD NOT HAVE AN APPOINTMENT UNTIL TOMORROW. I THEREFORE ASKED TO SEE THE SECRETARY GENERAL AT THE QUAI D'ORSAY. I TOLD HIM THAT I WANTED TO COMPARE NOTES ON THE SEQUENCE OF EVENTS IN NEW YORK WHICH APPEARED TO HAVE CAUSED THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT TO REFRAIN FROM TAKING THE EXPECTED DECISION TO LIFT SANCTIONS YESTERDAY. MOST OF BRITAIN'S PRINCIPAL PARTNERS HAD ANNOUNCED DECISIONS TO

MOST OF BRITAIN'S PRINCIPAL PARTNERS HAD ANNOUNCED DECISIONS TO LIFT SANCTIONS AND IT SEEMED STRANGE THAT FRANCE WAS NOT AMONG THEM. IT SEEMED TO ME THAT THERE MUST HAVE BEEN SOME MISUNDERSTANDING TO CAUSE SUCH AN ABSENCE.

2. M DE LEUSSE SAID THAT THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT HAD FAILED TO ACT YESTERDAY BECAUSE IMMEDIATELY BEFORE THE CABINET MEETING A TELEGRAM HAD BEEN RECEIVED GIVING THE TEXT OF SIR ANTHONY PARSONS SECOND LETTER TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL (UKMIS NEW YORK TELEGRAM NUMBER 1927). THE SENDING OF THIS LETTER SEEMED TO HAVE TAKEN THE FRENCH REPRESENTATIVE IN NEW YORK BY SURPRISE AND IT HAD TAKEN THE FRENCH COUNCIL OF MINISTERS BY SURPRISE ALSO. IT HAD BEEN SEEN AS AN UNEXPLAINED CHANGE OF TACTICS BY THE UNITED KINGDOM.

3. I TOOK THE SECRETARY GENERAL THROUGH THE CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS IN NEW YORK STARTING FROM 12 DECEMBER. I SAID THAT, ACCORDING TO THE TELEGRAMS WHICH I HAD SEEN (PARA 2 OF UKMIS NEW YORK TEL NO 1898), THE INTENTIONS OF THE BRITISH REPRESENTATIVE HAD BEEN EXPLAINED TO THE FRENCH REPRESENTATIVE ON 17 DECEMBER. IT WAS DIFFICULT TO ACCOUNT FOR THE FAILURE OF ANY EXPLANATION TO REACH PARIS BY THE MORNING OF 19 DECEMBER. I EXPLAINED THAT THE SECOND BRITISH LETTER WAS SIMPLY AN ATTEMPT TO PRE-EMPT ANY INITIATIVE WHICH UNFRIENDLY ELEMENTS MIGHT TAKE TO INITIATE DISCUSSION IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL ON THE BASIS OF THE UNSATISFACTORY LETTER FROM THE MALAGASY REPRESENTATIVE. THE SOUNDINGS BY THE PORTUGUESE AND NORWEGIAN REPRESENTATIVES (WHICH M DE LEUSSE HAD WRONGLY DESCRIBED AS THE TABLING OF A RESOLUTION) WAS AN INITIATIVE BY COUNTRIES WHICH FELT THAT THE SECURITY COUNCIL MUST DO SOMETHING BEFORE THEY THEMSELVES COULD LIFT SANCTIONS. THE BRITISH DELEGATION HAD BEEN CONSULTED ABOUT WHAT THEY WERE DOING AND HAD INDICATED TO THEM WHAT THE UK COULD LIVE WITH. THE BRITISH AIM, NOW AS PREVIOUSLY, WAS TO AVOID ANY DECISION OF SUBSTANCE ON SANCTIONS BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL. THERE WAS NOW AN AFRICAN COUNTER-DRAFT BEING PEDDLED IN NEW YORK (UKMIS NEW YORK TEL NO 1924) AND THIS CONTAINED UNDESIRABLE FEATURES. THE AIM WAS TO ENSURE THAT IF THE SECURITY COUNCIL HAD TO DO SOMETHING IT DID SOMETHING WITH AS LITTLE CONTENT AS POSSIBLE AND AS NEAR AS POSSIBLE SIMPLY TO TAKING NOTE ON WHAT HAD ALREADY BEEN DONE BY OTHERS. THE UK LOOKED FOR FRANCE'S HELP IN CREATING A CONSENSUS IN PRACTICE BY LIFTING SANCTIONS OR DECLARING FIRMLY AN INTENTION TO LIFT SANCTIONS. ONLY THIS WOULD CONTRIBUTE TO THE MAINTENANCE OF PRESSURE ON THE PATRIOTIC FRONT AND AGAINST THE WEST'S ILL-WISHERS SO AS TO KEEP EVERYONE ON THE RIGHT ROAD.

4. M DE LEUSSE PICKED ON THE POINT ABOUT A DECLARATION AND ASKED

4. M DE LEUSSE PICKED ON THE POINT ABOUT A DECLARATION AND ASKED IF ~~HE~~ THAT BRITAIN WAS NOW ASKING WAS THAT FRANCE SHOULD DECLARE AN INTENTION TO LIFT SANCTIONS. I REPLIED THAT THE UK WOULD HAVE LIKED FRANCE TO ISSUE A DECREE LIFTING SANCTIONS YESTERDAY. THE SECOND BEST WOULD BE A DECREE LIFTING SANCTIONS TODAY. THE THIRD BEST WOULD BE A DECLARATION TODAY OF INTENTION TO LIFT SANCTIONS. LEUSSE SMILED AND SAID HE THOUGHT HE MIGHT HELP US TO GET THE THIRD. I READ OUT APPROPRIATE PASSAGES FROM THE ITALIAN AND AUSTRALIAN STATEMENTS (ROME TEL NO 610 AND CANBERRA TEL NO 719), WITH PARTICULAR EMPHASIS ON HOW MUCH BETTER ITALY HAD DONE THAN FRANCE.

5. LEUSSE SAID THAT HE FULLY ACCEPTED THAT BRITISH TACTICS HAD NOT CHANGED, BUT IT REMAINED THE CASE THAT DISCUSSION OF THE MATTER WAS NOW GOING TO TAKE PLACE IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND THIS FITTED IN WITH WHAT HAD ALWAYS BEEN THE FRENCH VIEW OF FRANCE'S OWN LEGAL REQUIREMENTS. I RETURNED TO THE CHARGE ABOUT THE IMPORTANCE OF FRANCE BEING SEEN TO BE WITH THE UK AND NOT ABSENT FROM THE BAND OF PARTNERS WHICH HAD ACTED SOLIDLY WITH THE UK. I EXPRESSED GRATITUDE FOR THE MANY MESSAGES OF CONGRATULATIONS WHICH HAD BEEN RECEIVED FROM OR PUBLISHED IN FRANCE, BUT I SAID WE SHOULD BE EVEN MORE GRATEFUL IF THIS WAS REINFORCED BY ACTION. I REMINDED LEUSSE THAT FRANCE, WITH BRITAIN, WAS ONE OF THE ONLY TWO EUROPEAN COUNTRIES WITH A MAJOR VOCATION IN AFRICA. M FRANCOIS-PONCET HAD BEEN SPEAKING TO THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY ABOUT IT ONLY YESTERDAY. IT WOULD BE A GREAT PITY IF THESE TWO COUNTRIES WERE SEEN NOT TO BE FULLY UNITED ON THE PRESENT ISSUE, AS SO MANY OTHER COUNTRIES WERE MANAGING TO BE UNITED WITH THE UK ON IT.

6. LEUSSE ENDED THE CONVERSATION BY BEING VERY ENCOURAGING AND REASSURING, SAYING THAT HE WOULD SPEAK AT ONCE TO THE FOREIGN MINISTER WHO WOULD UNDOUBTEDLY SPEAK IMMEDIATELY TO THE ELYSEE, AND HE WOULD KEEP IN TOUCH WITH ME IN THE COURSE OF THE AFTERNOON. HE NEVERTHELESS SHRUGGED HIS SHOULDERS TO INDICATE THAT HE COULD NOT ANSWER FOR THE ELYSEE'S DECISION.

7. THE MINISTER WILL PURSUE THE MATTER WITH THE DIPLOMATIC COUNSELLOR AT THE ELYSEE THIS AFTERNOON AND I SHALL SEE WAHL AT 1000 HOURS TOMORROW MORNING.

HIBBERT

NNNN

This Copy to Mr Alexander
(No 10)

Mr Lyne (2 copies)

For
Pants

Prime Minister .

①

Pants

Yes and

You would probably prefer to aim for an
11.50 arrival to avoid cutting things
too fine?

RHODESIA CONFERENCE: SIGNING CEREMONY/RECEPTION

Pants

Signing Ceremony

1. Here is the third draft of the programme for the signing ceremony: as you know we are aiming to have a rehearsal at Lancaster House at 4 pm this afternoon, so we should aim to have the plan in final form by that time.

2. Please could you let me know what time the Secretary of State is likely to arrive at Lancaster House. If he is likely to be in No. 10 Downing Street perhaps the Lord Privy Seal or Mr Luce could greet the invited guests, who are due to arrive between 11 and 11.20 am. This greeting will have to take place in the West Ante Room on the first floor as the Main Hall will have to be used for hats and coats.

3. We also need to know when the Prime Minister will arrive. If she wishes to go straight to the Long Gallery on arrival I suggest that she should arrive at four minutes to 12 so that she can be in her seat by two minutes to 12, when the Secretary of State is due to lead the platform party to their seats.

4. You will see from the attached plan that VIPs and members of delegations will be seated in the south block. Row 1 will be the tribune of honour so to speak, for the Prime Minister, British Ministers, the Doyen (Mauritius High Commissioner) and the PUS. Rows 2-5 will be for members of the delegations and rows 6-13 for the invited guests. We shall not attempt to allocate seats for the invited guests but will simply usher them into the rows as they arrive.

Reception

5. Miss Gale and Miss Edwards (extensions 3113 and 7820) are now dealing with the invitation lists for the reception and I should be grateful if all questions about the guest list could be referred to them.

E B. Chaplin.

E B Chaplin (Miss)
Conference and Visits Section
Protocol and Conference Department
(258-5087)

20 December 1979

cc: PS/LPS PS/Mr Luce PS/PUS Mr Day Mr R Renwick
 Mr Powell Mr Sheinwald (2 copies) Mr du Boulay
 Mr Martin Miss Pecover Secretariat (10 copies)

19 December

RHODESIA CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE: ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE SIGNING
CEREMONY IN THE LONG GALLERY, LANCASTER HOUSE AT 1200 HOURS ON
FRIDAY 21 DECEMBER 1979

TIME	EVENT	OFFICIALS
0900 hours	Installation of TV lighting, cabling etc to be completed.	
1000 hours	TV and cines to be in position in the Long Gallery.	
1000 - 1100 hours	Press representatives to be escorted in groups to the Long Gallery and still cameramen to the Music Room; all go via the left-hand side of the staircase and the North Door to the Long Gallery.	See Press plan
	NB: RMP will be positioned on staircase, the east and west sides of the first floor gallery and at the north and south doors to the Long Gallery: and will control access to the State Drawing Room and Chairman's Office.	
1030 hours	Coffee served in the State Drawing Room.	
1050 hours	Secretariat and PCD ushers take up their stations.	Foot of the stairs - Mr Berry Top of the stairs - Mr Ralph
1055 hours	UK Delegation officials and some members of the Salisbury and Patriotic Front Delegations arrive.	State Drawing Room - Mr Sheinwald
1100 - 1120 hours	Invited guests arrive and are escorted to the State Drawing Room, to the right-hand side of the staircase (hats and coats may be left in the cloakroom on the ground floor).	Front Hall - Mr R W du Boulay Ushers: Mr Martin Miss Pecover Miss Gale Miss Edwards

TIME	EVENT	OFFICIALS
1100 hours approx	Salisbury principals arrive from No. 10 Downing Street and proceed to the State Drawing Room.	[? Mr Day to greet]
1125 hours	Members of Delegations, excluding Alcove parties and principals, take their seats in the Long Gallery (total 34).	
1130 - 1140 hours	Invited guests take their seats, in the south block (total 62).	PCD Ushers:
1140 hours approx	Patriotic Front principals arrive from No. 10 Downing Street and proceed to the State Drawing Room.	
1150 hours	Alcove parties take their seats (total 12).	
?1150 hours	Arrival of the Prime Minister. (? To be greeted in the front hall by the Secretary of State) She will proceed to the State Drawing Room [or directed to the Long Gallery].	
?1155 hours approx	Prime Minister takes her seat in the Long Gallery.	
1158 hours approx	When all are seated the Secretary-General will inform the Secretary of State, who will invite the principals to take their seats. They will enter the Long Gallery in the order of seating ie Mr Mugabe, Mr Nkomo, Secretary of State, Bishop Muzorewa, A N Other and the Lord Privy Seal (see seating plan attached).	
Then	First rota of cameramen enter.	

TIME

EVENT

OFFICIALS

1200 hours

Secretary of State to make opening statement or a few words of welcome. He will invite the others to sign. Documents bearers, who will have been waiting in the East Ante Room, will take their places behind the four principals on the dais and will place a copy in front of each of the four principals. [Amend to include Lord Privy Seal].

Documents will be passed between the bearers after each signing to fit in with the change over of the still cameramen (3 rotas of 1 1/2 minutes each with TV coverage of the final set of signatures).
When

Mr Ralph,
Mr Sheinwald,
Mr Berry
.....

When signing has been completed bearers will exit with the documents via the South Door.

Rota cameramen will exit via the North Door and will wait in the Music Room until they can be escorted from the building.

1210 hours approx

? Address by the Secretary of State.

1220 hours approx

At the conclusion of the ceremony the S of S and principals will lead invited guests and members of the Delegations to the State Dining Room (ground floor) for a reception.

Press representatives will be escorted from the building under arrangements made by the Press Centre Manager.

1230 hours



Arrival of guests attending the reception.

VERBATIM WRITERS

ENGINEERS

300 seats


10 rows



TVs

13 rows

17 Seats = 85




Press

(enter via North Door)

5 rows

Doyen



Press/Others

(enter via North Door)

S/S Defence


PM

A/Gen


(Plc No 10)

Other VIPs

(High Commissioners, Ambassadors and Observers)




9 7 8 9
seats
= 84




Renwick

PF



Luce

SG




PF

S/S


SD

LPS



SD

Power




SD

Fifoot

9 seats per row
= 117

TO VERONESE ROOM AND MUSIC ROOM

LONG GALLERY SEATING PLAN



TO EAST ANNEX AND DELS LOUNGE

DATE: 12/20/79

NAME: [Faint]

20 DEC 1979



ADDRESS: [Faint]

1000 1/2
[Faint]



ENCLOSURE

December 19, 1979

Dear Prime Minister, *Prime Minister: Delay
reply until after the signing ceremony
on Friday? Yes not sure*

As the Lancaster House Conference formally concludes, I write to acknowledge the deep sense of gratification which I know is widely felt throughout the Commonwealth at its outcome and over the major personal contributions that you and Peter Carrington have made to that result.

I was confident, as you know, that success would come; but it was a confidence born not of unawareness of the difficulties but of certainty in overcoming them given continuing Commonwealth commitment to the objectives of Lusaka. We shall of course need to sustain that unity of purpose in the even more testing periods of implementation that lies ahead. I am sure you can count upon its being forthcoming from your Commonwealth colleagues - as it goes without saying you can from me and my colleagues at the Secretariat.

A surprised, and still largely disbelieving, world waits to see whether the Commonwealth can indeed make it all happen. I am sure we can. If and when we do, its achievement will in great measure be your own.

Shridath S. Ramphal

Shridath S. Ramphal

The Rt. Hon. Mrs Margaret Thatcher
Prime Minister
10 Downing Street
LONDON SW1

19 DEC 1979



[RHODESIA: POLICY: ADVANCE COPIES]

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PS
PS/SIR I GILMOUR
PS/MR LUCE
PS/PUS

PS/NO 10 DOWNING STREET

MR R L WADE-GERY
MR P M MAXEY
MR GOULTY
MR P J FOWLER
DIO

CABINET
OFFICE

~~MR WILSON~~
MR DAY
LORD N G LENNOX
MR ASPIN

.....
HD/RHOD DEPT (4)

HD/C AF D
HD/S AF D

HD/PUSD (2)

HD/NEWS DEPT
HD/WAD

to Ireland & 2000
MR FIFCOT LEGAL ADVISER FM K164

~~RESIDENT CLERK~~

Prime Minister
[Signature]

GRS 160A

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FM BONN 191220Z DEC 79

TO FLASH FCO

FLASH

TELEGRAM NUMBER 798 OF 19 DECEMBER

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, SALISBURY EEC POSTS VIENNA TOKYO

CANBERRA MADRID LISBON BERNE OTTAWA UKMIS NEW YORK ATHENS

PRIORITY LUSAKA DAR-ES-SALAAM MAPUTO LUANDA GABORONE

BONN TELNO 790: RHODESIA SANCTIONS

1. THE AUSWAERTIGES AMT INFORM US THAT AS A RESULT OF TODAY'S CABINET MEETING, THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT WILL ANNOUNCE AT THIS AFTERNOON'S FEDERAL PRESS CONFERENCE THAT THEY TAKE THE SAME VIEW OF THE LEGALITY OF SANCTIONS AS THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT, THAT SANCTIONS NOW AUTOMATICALLY FALL AND THAT THE NECESSARY DOMESTIC ACTION IS BEING PUT IN HAND IMMEDIATELY. WE SHALL TELEGRAPH THE TEXT OF THE ANNOUNCEMENT AS SOON AS IT IS AVAILABLE.

WRIGHT

FLASH

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1000 APPROX

CONFIDENTIAL

FM PARIS 191906Z DEC 79

TO FLASH FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1000 OF 19 DECEMBER 1979.

INFO FLASH UKMIS NEW YORK

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, BONN, MIRIMBA SALISBURY,

INFO PRIORITY OTHER EEC POSTS, LUSAKA, DAR ES SALAAM, MAPUTO,
PRETORIA.

MY TEL NO 998: RHODESIA

FRENCH DECISION ON SANCTIONS

1. AFTER MEMBERS OF MY STAFF HAD PURSUED THE QUAI D'ORSAY AT VARIOUS LEVELS ON THIS QUESTION DURING THE AFTERNOON, I WAS FINALLY TELEPHONED THIS EVENING BY THE SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE ELYSEE. HE TOLD ME THAT HE HAD TELEPHONED YESTERDAY TO NO 10 DOWNING STREET AND IN THE ABSENCE OF WHITMORE HAD SPOKEN TO LANCASTER AND HAD TOLD HIM, FOR COMMUNICATION TO THE PRIME MINISTER, THAT THE FRENCH COUNCIL OF MINISTERS WOULD TAKE A DECISION TODAY TO LIFT SANCTIONS.
2. WHAT HAD ACTUALLY HAPPENED AT THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS TODAY WAS A LITTLE DIFFERENT. THE GOVERNMENT HAD INDEED TAKEN A DECISION TO ISSUE A DECREE TO LIFT SANCTIONS BUT THE DECREE HAD NOT BEEN PUBLISHED AND WAS NOT YET PROMULGATED.
3. WHEN I POINTED OUT THAT A DECREE WHICH WAS NOT PUBLISHED WOULD NOT BE SATISFACTORY TO THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT WHICH WAS LOOKING FOR THE POSITIVE SUPPORT OF ITS PARTNERS, WAHL SAID THAT THE REASON FOR THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT'S ATTITUDE WAS THAT TELEGRAMS HAD BEEN RECEIVED IN THE NIGHT FROM NEW YORK REPORTING THE DELIVERY OF A SECOND LETTER FROM THE BRITISH REPRESENTATIVE TO THE CHINESE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL (THIS APPEARS TO BE A REFERENCE TO THE LETTER REPORTED IN PARA 1 OF UKMIS NEW YORK TEL NO 1911). READING FROM A FRENCH TRANSLATION OF THE TEXT OF THIS LETTER WAHL SAID THAT IT APPEARED TO ASK THAT THE SECURITY COUNCIL SHOULD BE QUOTE SAISI DE CETTE MATIERE UNQUOTE. THIS APPEARED TO BE A CHANGE OF LINE BY THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT

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AS IT HAD BEEN UNDERSTOOD IN PARIS THAT BRITAIN WISHED TO AVOID DISCUSSION IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL. WAHL ALSO REFERRED TO THE SOUNDINGS WHICH ARE BEING TAKEN BY THE NORWEGIAN AND PORTUGUESE DELEGATIONS AT NEW YORK AND SAID THAT THESE TOO SEEMED TO BE AIMED AT EVOLVING A TEXT SUITABLE FOR A SECURITY COUNCIL DECISION, AND THAT THE ACTIVITY OF NORWAY AND PORTUGAL WAS UNDERSTOOD TO HAVE BRITISH ENCOURAGEMENT.

4. I TOLD WAHL THAT I THOUGHT THERE HAD BEEN A MISUNDERSTANDING. AS FAR AS I KNEW THE LETTER OF 18 DECEMBER TO WHICH HE REFERRED WAS A LETTER BRINGING THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL UP TO DATE WITH DEVELOPMENTS IN THE RHODESIAN QUESTION SINCE 12 DECEMBER AND THAT ALL THE UK WOULD BE DOING WAS ASKING THAT THE SECURITY COUNCIL SHOULD TAKE NOTE OF THE INFORMATION. THE UK LOOKED TO ITS CLOSE PARTNERS TO TAKE POSITIVE ACTION TO LIFT SANCTIONS. THE US HAD ALREADY DONE SO AND I UNDERSTOOD THAT THE GERMAN GOVERNMENT HAD DECIDED TO DO SO TODAY. SPEAKING PERSONALLY, I THOUGHT THAT THE FRENCH ATTITUDE WOULD BE ILL-RECEIVED IN LONDON.

5. I ADDED THAT AS FAR AS I KNEW THE ACTIVITY OF PORTUGAL AND NORWAY WAS ACTIVITY PROMOTED BY MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL WHO THOUGHT THAT THE SECURITY COUNCIL OUGHT TO DO SOMETHING, AND THE MOST THAT WAS ENVISAGED WAS THAT THE SECURITY COUNCIL MIGHT EVENTUALLY ACKNOWLEDGE WHAT HAD OCCURED.

6. WAHL SAID THAT THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT HAD UNDERSTOOD THAT THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT HOPED THAT A TACIT CONSENSUS FOR THE LIFTING OF SANCTIONS WOULD OCCUR. I SAID THAT THIS WAS SO AND THAT THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT HAD EXPECTED FRANCE TO CONTRIBUTE TO THE FORMATION OF THIS TACIT CONSENSUS. WAHL THEN REFERRED TO THE ACTIVITY WHICH WAS TAKING PLACE UNDER US INSPIRATION AIMING AT A POSSIBLE CHAPTER 7 RESOLUTION AGAINST IRAN IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL. BEFORE ANYTHING LIKE THAT OCCURED FRANCE WOULD WISH TO KNOW EXACTLY WHAT THE POSITION WAS AS REGARDS THE VALIDITY AND DURATION OF RESOLUTIONS IMPOSING SANCTIONS. I TOLD HIM THAT I COULD SEE NO CONNECTION BETWEEN THE TWO CASES. WHAT BRITAIN WAS LOOKING FOR WAS EARLY ACTION BY ITS PARTNERS TO HELP MAINTAIN PRESSURE ON THE PATRIOTIC FRONT TO KEEP THEM ON THE RIGHT ROAD.

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CONFIDENTIAL

17.

CONFIDENTIAL

7. WAHL MADE IT CLEAR THAT THE FRENCH DECREE NEEDS ONLY THE PRESIDENT'S SIGNATURE IN ORDER TO BE PROMULGATED, SO THAT PROMULGATION COULD IN FACT NOW TAKE PLACE AT ANY TIME. BUT HE ALSO MADE IT CLEAR THAT THE EXACT SIGNIFICANCE OF THE LATEST DEVELOPMENTS IN NEW YORK WOULD HAVE TO BE MOST CAREFULLY EXAMINED BY THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT BEFORE THE PRESIDENT'S SIGNATURE WOULD BE APPENDED. HE SAID THAT HE WOULD BE OUT OF TOUCH FOR THE REST OF THIS EVENING BUT WOULD BE AVAILABLE TOMORROW MORNING. ANY FURTHER COMMUNICATION TODAY WOULD THEREFORE HAVE TO BE THROUGH OTHER CHANNELS.

8. I DO NOT HAVE THE TEXT OF THE LETTER OF 18 DECEMBER ON WHICH THE FRENCH ARE PINNING THEIR CASE. I AM ALSO NOT SURE HOW FULL OR EXACT LEPRETTE'S INFORMATION IN NEW YORK IS ABOUT THE SOUNDINGS BEING TAKEN BY NORWAY AND PORTUGAL. IT LOOKS AS THOUGH IT IS URGENTLY NECESSARY TO CLARIFY THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THESE TWO THINGS TO THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT. I CANNOT SAY WITH CERTAINTY HOWEVER THAT THE FRENCH ARGUMENT DOES NOT CONTAIN ELEMENTS OF ARTIFICIALITY. MEMBERS OF THIS EMBASSY HAVE BEEN IN TOUCH WITH THE QUAI D'ORSAY ALL DAY AND HAVE BEEN GIVEN NO INKLING OF THE PROBLEM WHICH WE ARE NOW TOLD HAD ARISEN ON THE FRENCH SIDE. IT IS UNUSUAL FOR WAHL TO BE A MOUTH-PIECE FOR A COMMUNICATION OF THIS SORT AND IT ARGUES A CERTAIN UNEASINESS ON THE FRENCH SIDE.

9. AS A FINAL POINT I SHOULD ADD THAT I SENT THE FOREIGN MINISTER A LETTER YESTERDAY EVENING CONVEYING THE LATEST INFORMATION ABOUT THE CEASE-FIRE ARRANGEMENTS IN PREPARATION, I EXPLAINED, FOR TODAY'S DISCUSSION OF THE RAISING OF SANCTIONS.

HIBBERT

FILES

RHOD D	DEF D
OADS	OID
NAD	NEWS D
MED	PS
PUSD	PS/LPS
PLANNING STAFF	PS/MR LUCE
ES & SD	PS/MR RIDLEY
NENAD	PS/MR HURD
CCD	PS/MR MARTEN
FRD	PS/PUS
EID (E)	SIR A DUFF
UND	MR BULLARD
LEGAL ADVISERS	MR HANNAY
(MR FREELAND)	LORD N G LENNOX
(MR FIFOOT)	MISS BROWN
ECON D	MR DAY
FGD	MR ASPIN
	MR MILLS

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION
RHODESIA POLICY

3
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FM SALISBURY 191535Z DEC 79
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1210 OF 19 DECEMBER
RHODESIA CEASEFIRE AGREEMENT.

PRIME MINISTER'S MESSAGE DELIVERED TO MUZOREWA EARLY THIS MORNING. I SUGGESTED IN MY COVERING LETTER THAT HE MIGHT WISH TO DISCUSS THE MATTER DURING THE MORNING, BUT I HAD EVENTUALLY TO SEND FOR HIM. HE CAME WITH MUNDAWARARA AT 1230. HE THANKED ME FOR PRIME MINISTER'S MESSAGE AND MY LETTER BUT SAID THAT POINT D IN HIS OWN LETTER HAD NOT BEEN ADEQUATELY ANSWERED.

2. I TOLD MUZOREWA THAT I MOST DEFINITELY COULD NOT (NOT) ACCEPT HIS THESIS THAT A FAILURE TO ASSEMBLE WOULD LEAD INEVITABLY AND OF ITSELF ALONE, TO THE PROSCRIPTION OF THE POLITICAL PARTIES CONCERNED. IN RESPONSE TO A QUESTION FROM MUNDAWARARA, I SAID THAT I DID INDEED RECALL OUR CONVERSATION WITH YOU ABOUT THE NEED FOR THE GOVERNOR TO HAVE THE POWER TO BAN A POLITICAL PARTY. I HAD WELCOMED THIS, INDEED IT WAS OBVIOUSLY AN ESSENTIAL PART OF MY ARMOURY, BUT ON THAT OCCASION WE HAD BEEN DISCUSSING THE POSSIBLE USE OF THIS WEAPON IN THE CONTEXT OF A BREAKDOWN OF THE CEASEFIRE, RATHER THAN SIMPLY THE FAILURE OF THE P F FORCES TO ASSEMBLE.

3. IN THE COURSE OF THE ENSUING DISCUSSION I MADE IT CLEAR THAT BREACHES OF THE AGREEMENT (INCLUDING THE SOLEMN UNDERTAKINGS IN PARAGRAPH 4 OF THE CONFERENCE REPORT) BY ANY PARTICULAR PARTY WERE LIKELY TO BE CUMULATIVE AND WOULD THEREFORE ATTRACT GRADUATED RESPONSES FROM ME. I GAVE EXAMPLES OF THE SORT OF ACTION OPEN TO ME IN SPECIFIC CIRCUMSTANCES. RETURNING TO THE QUESTION OF ASSEMBLY, I SAID THAT OF COURSE IF THE FIGURE TURNED OUT TO BE REDICULOUSLY LOW THAT WOULD BE A VERY SERIOUS MATTER AND WOULD OBVIOUSLY TAKE US A LONG WAY DOWN THE ROAD TOWARDS THE ULTIMATE SANCTION, BUT EVEN SO WOULD NOT OF ITSELF BRING ABOUT A BAN. I EXPLAINED THE INTERNATIONAL CONSEQUENCES, AND SUGGESTED THAT THEY MIGHT BE LESS DISADVANTAGEOUS IN THE CASE OF ONE PARTY THAN OF THE OTHER.

4. MUNDAWARARA THEN BROUGHT US TO THE POINT BY SAYING THAT WHAT WAS NEEDED WAS SOME PUBLIC REFERENCE TO THE GOVERNOR'S POWER TO PROSCRIBE, WHICH WOULD BOTH REASSURE THE PUBLIC AND CONSTITUTE A DETERRENT TO THE P F. COULD NOT SUCH A REFERENCE BE INCLUDED IN THE SPEECH YOU ALREADY INTENDED TO MAKE AT THE SIGNING CEREMONY ABOUT COMVLIANCE? I SAID IT SEEMED TO ME THAT SOMETHING HELPFUL (FORM THEIR POINT OF VIEW) COULD PROBABLY BE WORKED OUT AND I WOULD ASK YOU TO DO THIS. ON THIS BASIS THEY AGREED TO GO TO LONDON FOR THE SIGNATURE: BUT I FAILED TO PERSUADE THEM TO CATCH THIS AFTERNOON'S AIRCRAFT AND THEY WILL THEREFORE NOT BE AVAILABLE UNTIL FRIDAY MORNING.

5. MUZOREWA LEFT IT TO MUNDAWARARA TO MAKE THE RUNNING, INTERVENING HIMSELF ONLY TO COMPLAIN THAT HIS PEOPLE IN SALISBURY (WHO HAD HAD IT THEIR OWN WAY IN RECENT YEARS) WERE BEING MOLESTED BY THE P F. I SAID THAT AS SOON AS ANYONE WOULD SIGN THE AGREEMENT I SHOULD BE APPEALING TO THE PUBLIC TO COMPLY WITH ALL ITS TERMS. (ALL PARTY LEADERS ARE OF COURSE ALREADY COMPLAINING TO ME ABOUT THE MONSTROUS BEHAVIOUR OF THEIR OPPONENTS).

16.

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6. THE EXPERIENCE OF TONY DUFF WITH THESE PEOPLE LEADS US TO BELIEVE THAT WHAT WE HAVE JUST BEEN THROUGH IS TO BE ACCOUNTED FOR PARTLY BE A TYPICAL EMOTIONAL CRISIS AMONGST THE WHITE MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT, SELF-ENGENDERED, BUT FUELLED BY A LONG POST MORTEM ON THE CONDUCT OF THE DELEGATION IN LONDON AND BY RECENT INACCURATE PRESS REPORTING:

PARTLY BY A FEELING THAT IT WAS THE RHODESIANS TURN TO MAKE A SHOW OF NOT BEING PUSHED AROUND. IT HAS TAKEN THEM A DAY OR TWO TO GET OVER THIS AND THE REFUSAL TO LEAVE FOR LONDON THIS AFTERNOON WAS A REJECTION (I HOPE THE LAST) OF THEIR ILL HUMOUR.

7. SUGGESTIONS FOR A FORM OF WORDS FOR YOUR SPEECH WILL FOLLOW.

SOAMES

FILES

RKOD D
OADS
NAM D
MED
FUSD
PLANNING STAFF
ES & SD
NEMAD
CCD
FRD
EID (E)
UID
LEGAL ADVISERS
(MR FERRELAND)
(MR FITFOOT)
ECON D

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PS/IPS
PS/MR LUCE
PS/MR RUDNEY
PS/MR HURD
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SIR A DUFE
MR BILLARD
MR HANWAY
LORD H G LENNOX
MISS BROWN
MR DAY

MR ASPIN
MR MILLS

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION

RHODESIA POLICY



PRIME MINISTER'S OFFICE,
BARBADOS.

December 19, 1979

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE

SERIAL NO. T172^{AAAA} / 797

Dear Prime Minister,

I write to thank you for bringing me up to date on the Rhodesia Conference at Lancaster House.

I welcome the progress that has been made so far in meeting the agreements reached at the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting in Lusaka, and I hope that the remaining details will be agreed upon without further delay. Britain is to be commended on its chairmanship of the Conference and its commitment to discharge its responsibility to bring Rhodesia to legal Independence on the basis of genuine majority rule. You can count on Barbados' continued support to accomplish this task.

It is important that the views of all parties, including the Patriotic Front, continue to be taken into account. I myself am prepared to use whatever influence I may have to persuade the Patriotic Front to accept the cease-fire proposals and to agree that they be brought into effect immediately.

With best regards.

Yours sincerely,

J.M.G. ADAMS
Prime Minister

The Rt. Hon. Mrs. Margaret Thatcher, M.P.
Prime Minister
BRITAIN

-7 JAN 1980



SUBJECT

RÉPUBLIQUE TUNISIENNE

Le Président

Rhodésien Dwt
de p. 11/11 PS
Mr J. Mchul
NENAD



Mr Godson,

R 22/12

5 19/12

PRIME MINISTER'S

PERSONAL MESSAGE

SERIAL No. T 172 AAA/79T

Madame le Premier Ministre,

J'ai reçu avec plaisir la lettre que vous avez bien voulu m'adresser par l'intermédiaire de votre Ambassadeur à TUNIS, le 9 Novembre 1979, pour me faire part de la position du gouvernement britannique sur le conflit rhodésien ainsi que sur l'évolution des pourparlers de LANCASTER HOUSE.

Permettez-moi tout d'abord de vous exprimer mes sincères remerciements pour l'attention aimable que vous avez montrée à l'égard de la Tunisie en l'informant de l'action diplomatique importante entreprise par votre pays en vue de parvenir à un règlement pacifique au douloureux problème de la Rhodésie.

Je tiens également à vous renouveler la satisfaction de la Tunisie pour les efforts que vous avez personnellement déployés pour amener toutes les parties intéressées à une plus grande concertation dans la recherche d'une solution négociée à ce grave conflit qui menace, depuis de trop longues années, la paix et la sécurité de notre continent africain.

Le principe d'une Conférence groupant toutes les parties au conflit bénéficie de notre approbation et de notre adhésion, car il correspond à nos conceptions en matière de décolonisation.

./..

En effet, vous n'êtes pas sans savoir que dès le commencement de ma lutte pour l'indépendance de la Tunisie, j'ai toujours prôné le dialogue et la concertation comme instrument pacifique et efficace pour le règlement des différends, aussi complexes et ardu soient-ils.

Pour cette raison et m'inspirant du succès de mes propres expériences, j'ai toujours encouragé les initiatives sérieuses tendant à la recherche de solutions négociées, justes et durables des conflits qui, malheureusement, sévissent encore en Afrique Australe.

A cet égard, j'ai appris avec plaisir que les pourparlers de LANCASTER HOUSE connaissent une évolution positive marquée par la volonté sincère d'aboutir à un accord sur l'indépendance authentique du Zimbabwe, conformément aux aspirations légitimes de son peuple.

Il me plaît de relever que les dirigeants du Front Patriotique, attentifs aux conseils que le gouvernement tunisien a cru utile de leur prodiguer, lors de la visite en Tunisie d'une délégation du ZAPU en Octobre 1979, ont accepté le projet de constitution ainsi que les arrangements relatifs à la période intérimaire.


C'est là une étape importante que les dirigeants du Front Patriotique ont accepté de franchir dans l'intérêt de la paix et du bien-être du peuple de Zimbabwe. Il reste maintenant à leur permettre, dans le cadre d'un cessez-le-feu équitable, de réintégrer leur pays et d'organiser, en toute liberté et dans un délai raisonnable, leur campagne électorale. Les militants du Front Patriotique, qui ont souffert de l'exploitation et de l'oppression du régime de Salisbury, sont en droit d'exiger des garanties sérieuses pour leur sécurité.

Je suis convaincu que votre gouvernement ne ménagera aucun effort pour éviter que cette question de procédure, élément déterminant dans l'application effective de tout accord de paix, ne compromette le consensus déjà réalisé sur le fond du problème.

Je forme l'espoir que la patience et la sagesse politique que vous avez démontrées au cours de ces négociations soient couronnées de succès et qu'un Accord final soit conclu le plus tôt possible. Le succès de votre entreprise aura sans aucun doute une portée historique d'autant plus qu'il ne manquera pas, j'en suis convaincu, d'influer sur le cours des événements dans le reste de l'Afrique Australe, particulièrement en Namibie et en Afrique du Sud.

En vous assurant de ma réelle sympathie, je vous prie de croire, Madame, en l'expression de ma haute considération,

et de ma vive sympathie.



Habib BOURGUIBA

Son Excellence Madame Margaret THATCHER,
Premier Ministre du Royaume-Uni

PRIME MINISTER'S

PERSONAL MESSAGE

THE EXECUTIVE MANSION
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
MONROVIA, LIBERIA
AM-APJ/688/R.T.VII

SERIAL No. T172 AA/79 + f.s

December 19, 1979

Subject file
Monrovia set file (2)
Prime Minister Liberia - Tolber
visit - June 79.
Ph...

Dear Madam Prime Minister:

Having safely returned to Liberia, we recall with deep appreciation, the very warm, cordial and kind hospitality which Her Britannic Majesty's Government has bestowed upon us during our recent visit to your great country and industrious nation.

We were indeed gratified by the opportunity afforded us to meet and form new friendships, while strengthening existing ties and to exchange views on issues of the moment in Africa and our One World.

Indeed, as I am writing you this letter, I have been informed of the concurrence of the Leaders of the Patriotic Front to an immediate ceasefire. These are glad tidings which finally announce the advent of peace in Zimbabwe.

Allow me to again express heartiest congratulations for this great achievement of your Government.

We therefore hail the dawn of a new day in the relations between the United Kingdom and Africa and for our part, we will endeavour to build solid bridges

The Right Honourable Margaret Thatcher
Prime Minister of Great Britain &
Northern Ireland
10 Downing Street
London - ENGLAND

THE EXECUTIVE MANSION
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
MONROVIA, LIBERIA


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
of genuine friendship with your great Country for a rewarding and productive partnership in progress and development for the mutual benefit of our peoples and Governments.

Mrs. Tolbert, our Suite and indeed the Government and all the people of Liberia, enthusiastically join me in sentiments of gratitude to you and all the friendly people of the United Kingdom.

With kindest personal regards, appreciation and best wishes for a Merry Christmas and a Happy and Prosperous New Year.

Faithfully yours
IN THE CAUSE OF THE PEOPLE


W. R. Tolbert, Jr.



PS
PS/SIR I GILMOUR
PS/MR LUCE
PS/PUS

MR WILLSON
MR DAY
LORD N G LENNOX
MR ASPIN

PS/NO 10 DOWNING STREET

MR R L WADE-GERY
MR P M MAXEY
MR GOULTY
MR P J FOWLER
DIO

CABINET
OFFICE

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HD/PUSD (2)

HD/NEWS DEPT

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to Ireland K200.

MR FIFCOE LEGAL ADVISER RM K164

RESIDENT CLERK

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FM SALISBURY 181900Z DEC 79

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1193 OF 18 DECEMBER

Prime Minister

[Handwritten signature]

HAND-OVER CALL BY MR IAN SMITH

1. YOU MAY LIKE TO KNOW OF MY MEETING THIS MORNING WITH IAN SMITH. I SAW HIM ALONE FOR HIS HAND-OVER CALL, WHEREAS OTHER MINISTERS HAVE COME IN GROUPS. HE WAS POLITE, COOPERATIVE AND ALMOST FRIENDLY.

2. HE SAID THAT, AS I WOULD KNOW, HE HAD HAD RESERVATIONS ABOUT PARTS OF THE LANCASTER HOUSE AGREEMENT "BUT THERE IS NO GOING BACK NOW. WE ARE LOCKED IN AND WE MUST DO OUR BEST TO MAKE IT WORK". HE EXPRESSED HIMSELF AS REASONABLY OPTIMISTIC ABOUT THE WAY THINGS WOULD GO. OF COURSE THE CEASE-FIRE WOULD NOT BE FULLY EFFECTIVE BUT HIS HUNCH WAS THAT THE SECURITY SITUATION WOULD IMPROVE RATHER THAN DETERIORATE FROM NOW ON. IT WAS ALSO HIS HUNCH THAT THE PROBLEM OF VIOLENCE AND INTIMIDATION WOULD NOT BE NOTABLY WORSE AT THIS ELECTION THAN IT HAD BEEN IN APRIL, DESPITE THE INCLUSION OF THE PATRIOTIC FRONT. AND HE WAS OPTIMISTIC THAT AFTER THE ELECTION, THANKS TO KAUNDA AND MACHEL HAVING HAD ENOUGH,

THE ELECTION, THANKS TO KAUNDA AND MACHEL HAVING HAD ENOUGH,
COMPARATIVE PEACE COULD BE AROUND THE CORNER.

3. HE SAID THAT HE WAS READY AT ANY TIME TO SEE ME SHOULD I WANT
INFORMATION FROM HIM.

4. HE WANTED TO RAISE TWO PARTICULAR POINTS WHICH HE IMPLIED
HAD BEEN PRESSED ON HIM BY RF COLLEAGUES:

(A) THERE WAS WORRY ABOUT THE LIFTING OF THE MAIZE BAN:
WAS THERE ANY GUARANTEE THAT THE ZAMBIANS WOULD CONTROL
INFILTRATION? I DISCUSSED THE PROBLEM WITH HIM AND TOLD HIM IN
CONFIDENCE THAT I HAD CONSULTED BEFORE TAKING THE DECISION WITH
THE APPROPRIATE SECURITY SERVICE AND PUBLIC SERVICE OFFICIALS.

(B) THE FACT THAT OUR AMNESTY ORDINANCE WOULD ONLY COVER ACTS
COMMITTED "IN GOOD FAITH" IN CONNECTION WITH THE WAR, WHEREAS
THE PREVIOUS RHODESIAN AMNESTY OFFER HAD BEEN ABSOLUTE. THE
RESERVATION IN OUR AMNESTY COULD ATTRACT CRITICISM AND MIGHT
ALSO BE USED, IN THE EVENT OF A PF GOVERNMENT, TO JUSTIFY
PROSECUTION OF WHITE FARMERS AND OTHERS WHO MIGHT HAVE GONE TOO
FAR. I EXPLAINED THE DISCUSSIONS WHICH HAD TAKEN PLACE IN LONDON
ON THIS AND THE REASON FOR THE PHRASE "IN GOOD FAITH".

I POINTED OUT THAT NO WORDING WHICH COULD BE DEVISED WOULD BE
WATERPROOF AGAINST A POST-INDEPENDENCE GOVERNMENT WHICH WAS
DETERMINED TO GET ROUND THE AMNESTY.

MR SMITH SAID THAT HE ACCEPTED WHAT I SAID ON BOTH POINTS.

5. IN ALL, THE MEETING WAS SOMETHING OF A SURPRISE: MUCH BETTER
THAN A BILIOUS SESSION WITH VAN DER BYL THIS AFTERNOON, WHICH
WAS IN CHARACTER AND NOT WORTH REPORTING.

SOAMES

NNNN

SENT/RECD 182245Z MSJ/MBI

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Subject filed in
USA: Nov 79: Visit
to US PM

Extract from Record of Meeting between
PM and President of the U.N. General Assembly,
New York 18.12.79.

RHODESIA

Ambassador Salim offered his profound congratulations to the Prime Minister and the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary on the successful conclusion of the Lancaster House conference. In the light of this achievement he regretted that the Prime Minister's visit had not been ^{at} a time when she could speak to the General Assembly. The Prime Minister warned against excessive jubilation, but said that the satisfactory conclusion of the conference was a firm move in the right direction. Mr. Salim said that the United Nations had followed the Lancaster House conference very closely. He had made it clear that they were ready to be helpful in any way. Lord Carrington confirmed that his help had been much appreciated. Mr. Salim mentioned the spontaneous applause in the General Assembly when the initialling of the ceasefire had been announced the previous day. This was a rare accolade.

The Prime Minister commented that the Rhodesian question seemed to be moving in a positive direction just as Iranian events had taken a negative course. Mr. Salim said that he knew from his personal experience the complexities of the

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/Rhodesian

Rhodesian problem. There was overwhelming mutual suspicion and a lack of homogeneity. The Governor now had a major responsibility. He had to create confidence in the settlement. Britain would have the support of the international community, and the confidence of the United Nations, in the transitional period. But an ultimate judgment would have to await the conclusion of the process. Lord Carrington commented that a great deal of luck would be an essential ingredient. The Prime Minister said that she was still concerned about events once the election had taken place. Mr. Salim said that there would always be concern but if a peaceful transition managed to create confidence, then there was hope for the future. Lord Carrington said that mutual suspicion could not disappear overnight at present; factions were jockeying for top positions. But, with the agreement established, none of them would have an external base from which to carry on a war after the elections. Mr. Salim felt that there was hope if conditions were created for fair elections, and if all that was humanly possible were done to ensure this. The Prime Minister commented that elections never looked fair to losers. The Reverend Sithole's attitude to the last election in Rhodesia illustrated this. He had been quite happy with the process until the results emerged.

Lord Carrington stressed that it would be very difficult to stamp out all intimidation. There would be problems on both sides, leading to incidents despite the ceasefire. The difficulties were undeniable. It was necessary to have a steady nerve, and to take all opportunities to reinforce the settlement arrangements. With the right will there was a chance of success. Mr. Salim said that a success in Rhodesia would matter to the whole of Southern Africa. The Prime Minister commented that Lord Carrington always took a less optimistic view than his colleagues. But for Rhodesia the time had been ripe. The surrounding states and the Commonwealth as a whole had had enough of the situation. Against this background, no-one was in a position to reject reasonable proposals. Mr. Salim agreed that all parties had had enough, and neither side in the battle had been winning. This had created conditions for a settlement. Lord Carrington foresaw the possibility that no overall majority would emerge from the election. This could be a helpful result, requiring a coalition

of some of the groups to form a Government.

SANCTIONS

Mr. Salim raised the question of sanctions, which he had previously discussed with Sir Anthony Parsons. Throughout the negotiations there had been tremendous goodwill in the United Nations. This had to be sustained. He therefore judged it extremely important that the Security Council should be asked to take a decision on sanctions, and should not merely be informed. There would be resentment of unilateral action. If the United Kingdom now asked the Security Council to lift sanctions, it would be very difficult for people to obstruct this. Even the USSR could hardly veto against overwhelming African opinion - even if they wished to take an extreme position, which he doubted. A veto in these circumstances would be a new departure for the Russians. Mr. Salim said that the General Assembly could be a helpful institution, but it had its extremist tendencies. He had worked to prevent the General Assembly discussing Rhodesia in a damaging way. Lord Carrington complimented Mr. Salim on his successful efforts.

Sir Anthony Parsons said that he would be writing to the President of the Security Council today. He hoped that the United Kingdom could produce a consensus by the end of the current week. Mr. Salim said that it would be helpful if the letter could be despatched before the General Assembly took up Rhodesia that afternoon. To be frank, there had been problems in holding back the Assembly. Sir Anthony Parsons said that, subject to developments in his absence that morning, a letter to the President would be despatched at 3 p.m. seeking consultations the next day, after the signing in London of the conference documents. Things would then be moving.

Mr. Salim said that the Rhodesian solution would be helpful for the Namibia problem. The Prime Minister suggested that Namibia should be left on one side until Rhodesia was finally settled. Mr. Salim said that action was already in hand in the United Nations. The pressure was on for results. It was ironic that previous analyses of Southern African problems had concluded

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that a Namibia solution was necessary to create movement on Rhodesia. Lord Carrington stressed the timing would have to be right. Namibia could go wrong if moves were now mistimed. Sir Anthony Parsons suggested that the elections and independence of Zimbabwe should be completed before Namibia was allowed to come to a head. This meant that current moves on Namibia should not be hurried. Lord Carrington commented that South Africa would want to have a chance to judge the results in Rhodesia before settling its view of Namibia. Mr. Salim said that the UN could continue its activity on Namibia, whilst privately recognising that South Africa could be expected to hold back on final decisions for the present. This was not an impossible way forward.

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[RHODESIA: POLICY: ADVANCE COPIES]

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PS/SIR I GILMOUR
PS/MR LUCE
PS/PUS

MR WILLSON
MR DAY
LORD N G LENNOX
MR ASPIN

PS/NO 10 DOWNING STREET

MR R L WADE-GERY)
MR P M MAXEY)
MR GOULTY)
MR P J FOWLER)
DIO)

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FM SALISBURY 181600Z DEC 79

Pamie Anstie

TO FLASH FCO

TELNO 1191 OF 18/12/79

no

MY TELEGRAM NO 1183 : CEASEFIRE AGREEMENT

1. THE MOST DIFFICULT POINT TO DEAL WITH AT THIS TIME IS THE RHODESIAN WISH FOR AN UNDERTAKING THAT WE WOULD BAN EITHER ZANU OR ZAPU OR BOTH FROM PARTICIPATION IN THE ELECTIONS IN THE EVENT OF THEIR MISCONDUCT: AND THAT SPECIFICALLY WE WOULD DO THIS IN THE EVENT OF PF FAILURE TO ASSEMBLE IN THE NUMBERS DECLARED (C.F. D OF MUZOREWA'S LETTER).

2. ONCE THE ELECTION CAMPAIGN HAS BEGUN, THE AMOUNT OF INTIMIDATION AND GENERAL SKULDUGGERY WILL NO DOUBT INCREASE ON BOTH SIDES. BUT UNLESS THERE IS AN OUTBREAK OF FIGHTING CLEARLY AMOUNTING TO A BREAKDOWN OF THE CEASEFIRE, I FCND IT HARD TO CONCEIVE OF CIRCUMSTANCES IN WHICH IT WOULD BE POLITIC TO BAN ANY PARTICULAR PARTY FROM FURTHER PARTICIPATION. IT MIGHT JUST HAPPEN, AND I MUST KEEP THE OPTION OPEN: BUT IT WOULD BE THE LAST THING I WOULD WISH TO DO FOR OBVIOUS REASONS.

3. THE CASE OF FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH THE CEASEFIRE BY NOT ASSEMBLING IS EVEN MORE DIFFICULT. IT SEEMS UNLIKELY THAT THE PF

3. THE CASE OF FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH THE CEASEFIRE BY NOT ASSEMBLING IS EVEN MORE DIFFICULT. IT SEEMS UNLIKELY THAT THE PF WILL PRODUCE LUDICROUSLY LOW FIGURES. BUT EVEN IF THEY DID, I WOULD BE MOST HESITANT TO BAN A PARTY MERELY ON THOSE GROUNDS. I SHOULD HAVE TO LOOK AT THE TOTAL PICTURE, IN PARTICULAR THE ATTITUDES AND BEHAVIOUR OF THOSE WHO HAD NOT COME IN. I HOPE THIS COINCIDES BOTH WITH YOUR THINKING AND WITH WHAT YOU TOLD WALLS AND CO. EARLIER.

4. MY TASK THEREFORE IS TO CONVINCING THE BISHOP AND NJCC THAT I WOULD BE PREPARED TO IMPOSE A BAN IN CERTAIN CIRCUMSTANCES, BUT THAT THOSE CIRCUMSTANCES CERTAINLY CANNOT BE LAID DOWN IN ADVANCE IN ANY PRECISE TERMS: AND THAT IN ANY CASE I SHOULD BE VERY RELUCTANT TO ACT IN THIS WAY.

5. IF YOU AGREE, HOWEVER, I MIGHT INDICATE THAT I THINK THERE IS A GREATER POSSIBILITY OF HAVING TO PROCEED AGAINST MUGABE THAN NKOMO (WHICH WOULD SUIT RHODESIANS BETTER) IF ONLY BECAUSE I EXPECTED HIS PEOPLE TO CAUSE MORE TROUBLE AND BE MORE INTRANSIGENT.

SCAMES

NNNN

SENT/RECD AT 181710Z JW/JMS

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Subject filed in USA
Nov 79: Visit to US Policy

Extract from Record of Meeting between
PM and U.N. Secretary-General, New York,

18.12.79

Rhodesia

Dr. Waldheim offered warm congratulations on the success of the Lancaster House conference on Rhodesia. The United Nations had been delighted by the news, and he had cabled a message of congratulation to the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary. Lord Carrington said that there was still an outstanding difficulty. Bishop Muzorewa had now asked for clarification of news media reports of British concessions to the Patriotic Front. He believed this would prove to be last minute nerves. Dr. Waldheim said that the United Nations had received the news of a ceasefire agreement with great enthusiasm. Rhodesia had been a difficult subject for the General Assembly, but the announcement at the President of the General Assembly's lunch of the initialling had been greeted by applause from even the most radical of representatives. The Prime Minister commented that this wholehearted support from all sides had been characteristic since the negotiating process had been set in hand at Lusaka. Everybody wanted success. The right moment had come. This did not mean the problems were over. Battles were never finally won.

Dr. Waldheim said that he hoped the achievement over Rhodesia would have an impact on the Namibian negotiations. The Prime Minister foresaw an impact on the whole of South Africa, and especially on the Front Line States. Dr. Waldheim

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/ said

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said that the Front Line states seemed to have been helpful. The Prime Minister said that they no longer wished to play host to the problems of Rhodesia. The success of the Conference was a blow for democracy in the heart of Africa, where democracy was not always in the ascendant. Dr. Waldheim recalled a discussion with President Nyerere in Monrovia in the summer, where the President had assured him that he would press the Patriotic Front if the British were ready to set in hand the negotiating process. The Prime Minister commented that all the Commonwealth leaders had been very helpful at Lusaka. They had even been prepared to respond to her opening statement by redrafting their own prepared speeches to pick up her theme. Work had then gone into a small group, once again proving that plenaries were always too big for worthwhile negotiations. Since then, a great deal of time had been spent on the negotiations. Ultimately, the strategy had proved effective. It was a tribute to the genius of the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary and his staff. She recalled the decision to insist on negotiating an agreement on a constitution before allowing discussion of transitional arrangements. Lord Carrington commented that the agreement was still fragile, as that day's pronouncement from Bishop Muzorewa had demonstrated. All parties had been very nervous in the final days of discussion. The Prime Minister added that all the parties had concerns about their own security.

Dr. Waldheim asked how the issue of bases had been solved at the final stage. Lord Carrington said that the Patriotic Front were all gathered on the Mozambique and Zambian borders. He had said that they should be assembled in those areas. The Patriotic Front claimed also to have significant concentrations of men in the centre of Rhodesia. The British Government were aware of only a few there, but had finally offered one additional base, in that area, with an understanding that the Governor would re-assess the situation if it proved that there were greater numbers of Patriotic Front forces in the central area. The Patriotic Front had declared 35,000 men, much more than the

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- 3 -

British Government's own information suggested. The United Kingdom estimated the Patriotic Front forces as in the region of 16,000, compared with Bishop Muzorewa's Government forces of about 45,000. Dr. Waldheim said, that for presentational reasons the Patriotic Front may have wanted to claim a figure in that region.

Dr. Waldheim characterised progress on Rhodesia as one positive development in a period of troubles.

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[RHODESIA: POLICY: ADVANCE COPIES]

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PS
PS/SER I GILMOUR
PS/MR LUCE
PS/PUS

PS/NO 10 DOWNING STREET

~~MR WILSON~~
MR DAY
LORD N G LENNOX
MR ASPIN

MR R L WADE-GERY)
MR P M MAXEY)
MR GOULTY)
MR P J FOWLER)
DIO)

CABINET
OFFICE

.....
HD/RHOD DEPT (4)

HD/C AF D
HD/S AF D

HD/PUSD (2)

HD/NEWS DEPT
HD/WAD

Ir. Ireland K200A
MR FIFCOF LEGAL ADVISER RM K164

~~RESIDENT CLERK~~

IMMEDIATE

ADVANCE COPY

CONFIDENTIAL
DESKBY 181130Z

DESKBY

Pamie Austin

FM LUSAKA 180948Z DEC 79

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1419 OF 18 DECEMBER

INFO IMMEDIATE SALISBURY, DAR ES SALAAM, MAPUTO, PRIORITY
GABORONE, LUANDA, LAGOS, UKMIS NEW YORK, WASHINGTON

[Handwritten signature]

RHODESIA

1. I WAS TOLD THIS MORNING THAT PRESIDENT KAUNDA WISHED TO
SEE ME AT 0700Z. IN THE EVENT, AT THE LAST MOMENT THE MEETING
WAS CHANGED TO ONE WITH CHAKULYA.

2. HIS PURPOSE WAS TO INFORM ME OF YESTERDAY'S MEETING AT
NAMPULA BETWEEN KAUNDA, NYERERE AND MACHEL. THE PRESIDENTS
HAD EXPRESSED SURPRISE AND DISAPPOINTMENT THAT BRITAIN HAD
NOT SEEN FIT TO GO TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL TO ASK FORMALLY
FOR SANCTIONS TO BE REMOVED. THEY HAD ALSO EXPRESSED SURPRISE
AT THE SENDING TO SALISBURY OF LORD SOAMES PRIOR TO FINAL
AGREEMENT BEING REACHED.

AGREEMENT BEING REACHED.

3. CHAKULYA WHO WAS IN A QUIET AND SURPRISINGLY FRIENDLY MOOD, SAID THAT THE MAIN POINT WHICH THE FRONT LINE PRESIDENTS WISHED TO CONVEY TO BRITAIN WAS THAT THEY BE ASKED AND INDEED ADVISED IN THEIR OWN INTERESTS, TO GO FORMALLY TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL TO OBTAIN THE NECESSARY WORLDWIDE SUPPORT FOR THE LIFTING OF SANCTIONS. NOW THAT AGREEMENT HAD BEEN REACHED (AND OF COURSE THE PRESIDENTS HAD MET BEFORE THIS NEWS WAS AVAILABLE) THE CASE FOR BRITAIN ACTING IN THIS WAY WAS STRENGTHENED. WHATEVER FEARS BRITAIN MIGHT HAVE HAD ABOUT THEIR RECEPTION IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL WERE NOW SURELY BASELESS. WE WOULD HAVE THE SUPPORT OF THE FRONT LINE STATES AND INDEED OF THE PATRIOTIC FRONT. IT WAS IMPORTANT THAT THE ROLE OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL BE MAINTAINED AS OTHERWISE A DANGEROUS PRECEDENT WOULD HAVE BEEN ESTABLISHED WHICH MIGHT ALLOW OTHERS TO FLOUT ITS DETERMINATIONS IN THE FUTURE. IF THE SECURITY COUNCIL WERE FORMALLY ASKED TO APPROVE THE LIFTING OF SANCTIONS BRITAIN WOULD BE HELPING NOT ONLY ITSELF BUT ITS FRIENDS AND ALLIES WHO CURRENTLY WERE PLACED IN DIFFICULTY WITH AFRICAN OPINION WHEN SUPPORTING US. HE INSISTED THAT THE MESSAGE OF THE PRESIDENTS WAS OFFERED IN ALL SINCERITY AS A MEANS OF ASSISTING THE ACHIEVEMENT OF A FORMAL AND PROPERLY RECOGNISED END TO SANCTIONS.

4. IT WAS CLEAR THAT CHAKULYA WAS RELAYING THE AGREED POSITION OF THE PRESIDENTS AS PASSED TO HIM BY KAUNDA AND HE DID NOT WISH TO ENTER INTO SUBSTANTIVE DISCUSSION OF THE MESSAGE. I THEREFORE CONTENTED MYSELF BY SAYING THAT HE WOULD BE AWARE OF SIR A PARSONS' LETTER TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL WHICH SET OUT THE REASONING BEHIND OUR POSITION WHICH I THEN REHEARSED ALONG WITH OUR REASONS FOR SENDING LORD SOAMES IN ADVANCE OF AGREEMENT. CHAKULYA SAID THAT HE WAS INDEED WELL AWARE OF THE ARGUMENTS WE HAD ADVANCED BUT HE BELIEVED NEVERTHELESS THAT THE PROPOSAL OF THE PRESIDENTS WAS A MUCH MORE SATISFACTORY WAY OF ACHIEVING WIDE INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT FOR THE LIFTING OF SANCTIONS.

5. THE U S AMBASSADOR HAD EARLIER IN THE MORNING BEEN RECEIVED BY PRESIDENT KAUNDA AND GIVEN A SIMILAR ACCOUNT OF THE NAMPULA MEETING AND HAD BEEN URGED TO SEEK WASHINGTON'S SUPPORT IN PERSUADING HMG OF THE RIGHTNESS OF THE FRONT LINE PRESIDENTS' APPROACH. WISNER TOLD ME THAT HE FOUND KAUNDA IN A DOUR MOOD BUT THAT HE TOO HAD INSISTED THAT THE ADVICE OFFERED WAS IN ALL SINCERITY TO SEE THE SANCTIONS STORY ENDED IN 'A PROPER WAY'. KAUNDA HAD SAID THAT THE THREE PRESIDENTS HAD GIVEN THOUGHT TO BRITISH FEARS ABOUT A SOVIET VETO WHEN THEY HAD MET IN NAMPULA BUT

BRITISH FEARS ABOUT A SOVIET VETO WHEN THEY HAD MET IN NAMPULA BUT THEY HAD CONCLUDED THAT THESE FEARS WERE GROUNDLESS. HE EXPECTED THE SOVIET UNION AT MOST TO ABSTAIN AND ZAMBIA WOULD BE USING ITS INFLUENCE WITH THE AFRICAN GROUP IN ORDER TO ATTAIN A FAVOURABLE OUTCOME TO SECURITY COUNCIL DELIBERATIONS.

6. SEE MIFT (NOT TO ALL).

NEILSON

NNNN

SUBJECT

T 172A/79T



MINISTER-PRESIDENT

Prime Minister

292033

The Prime Minister of the United Kingdom

Mrs. Margaret Thatcher,

10 Downingstreet,

LONDON.

The Hague, December 18th 1979

PRIME MINISTER'S

PERSONAL MESSAGE

SERIAL No. T172A/79T

Dear Mrs. Prime Minister,

I would like to extend to you my congratulations on achieving a final and complete agreement in the Lancaster House Conference.

I hope you will accept this letter as a token of admiration for the patience, perseverance and imagination you and Lord Carrington have shown.

Sincerely yours,

(A.A.M. van Agt).

vA/Ip

POST OFFICE INTERNATIONAL TELEGRAPHS DIRECTORY OR TELEX DIALLING CARD CONSULT TELEPHONE INTERNATIONAL POST OFFICE TELEGRAPHS DIRECTORY OR TELEX DIALLING CARD CONSULT TELEPHONE INTERNATIONAL POST OFFICE TELEGRAPHS DIRECTORY OR TELEX DIALLING CARD CONSULT TELEPHONE INTERNATIONAL

SUBJECT

PRIME MINISTER
PERSONAL TELEGRAM
SERIAL No. T172/79T

Dec 18 18 49 '79

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(2)

ETAT

THE RIGHT HONOURABLE MRS. MARGARET THATCHER,
PRIME MINISTER,
10 DOWNING STREET,
LONDON SW1

Mrs Thatcher

Paul

[Handwritten signature]

LFS0453

ON MY OWN BEHALF AND ON BEHALF OF MY GOVERNMENT, IT GIVES
ME GREAT PLEASURE TO EXTEND TO YOU HEARTFELT CONGRATULATIONS
UPON THE SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION OF THE RHODESIA CONSTITUTIONAL
CONFERENCE STOP WE EXTEND ALSO SINCERE CONGRATULATIONS TO THE
LEADERS OF THE PARTIES TO THE CONFERENCE FOR THE SPIRIT OF
COMPROMISE
WHICH LED TO THE SUCCESS OF THE VERY DIFFICULT NEGOTIATIONS STOP
THE BITTER WAR OF THE PAST SEVEN YEARS HAS BEEN MORE THAN
COSTLY, PARTICULARLY IN TERMS OF LIVE LOST STOP IT IS THEREFORE
OUR EARNEST HOPE THAT AS, WITH THE SIGNATURE OF THE AGREEMENT
TOMORROW, A NEW CHAPTER IN THE HISTORY OF THEIR COUNTRY
IS OPENED, THE PEOPLE OF RHODESIA CAN TAKE CONFORT IN THE
REALIZATION THAT THE UTIMATE SACRIFICE MADE BY THOSE WHO LAST
THEIR LIVES IN THE CAUSE OF THE LIBERATION OF THEIR CORNTY
DID NOT DO SO IN VAIN.
WE WISH YOUR GOVERNMENT AND THE PEOPLE OF RHODESIA EQUAL SUCCESS
IN THE NEXT TWO MONTHS AS, TOGETHER, YOU PREPARE FOR
THE BIRTH OF THE LONG AWAITED INDEPENDENT STATE OF SIMBABWE
STOP

H. KAMUZU BANDA
LIFE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF MALAWI.

COL ETAT 10 H.

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FBI DEC 11 1964

RESTRICTED



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London S.W.1

18 December 1979

PM
Prime Minister (2)

Dear Michael,

H. P. P.

P. P.

Rhodesia : Arrangements for Implementation of Settlement

You asked recently about the arrangements we are making both for the monitoring force and for supervising the elections.

The monitoring force will number some 1,200 men, of whom 800 will be British and the remainder from Australia, New Zealand, Kenya and Fiji. 450 will be actual monitors; the remainder will provide administrative and logistic support. They will be deployed at border crossing points, assembly points for Patriotic Front forces and at the bases of the Rhodesian defence force, down to company level. Major items of equipment that are being flown out, partly in US aircraft, are 136 Landrovers (many of them steel-plated for protection against mines), 6 Puma helicopters, 6 Gazelle helicopters and a large number of radios.

The ceasefire monitoring group is under the overall command of the Governor's Military Adviser, Major-General Acland. Its headquarters will be in Salisbury. The first trooping and transport flights will arrive in Salisbury approximately a week after agreement is reached, with a further day or two for deployment in the country.

The Election Commissioner, Sir John Boynton, flew to Salisbury with the Governor. His Deputy Commissioner and two Assistant Commissioners (all three senior men with experience in the Overseas Civil Service) have already been in Salisbury for several weeks to start advance preparations with the Rhodesians. For the six week period leading up to the elections and the elections themselves, there will be a team of two senior officials (one with relevant experience in the former British Colonial administration and the other with relevant experience in local government at a senior level) in each of the eight electoral regions. They will be followed about two weeks later by a further 64 supervisors to give us a presence in each of the 54 electoral districts, with an extra ten to cover areas where additional UK representation is required. In the last ten days

/or so

M O'D B Alexander Esq
10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL



or so before the elections and during the poll, there will be a further ten supervisors to help the teams in the larger urban areas. Finally, there will be a group of 25 or 30 distinguished former Colonial Governors, retired senior Ambassadors and others with relevant experience who will be present for the last two weeks or so of the campaign and during the elections. They will be largely independent of Sir John Boynton but will contribute to his report.

Some of them may accompany groups of Commonwealth or other observers in the country for the elections.

yours etc
Roderic Lyne

(R M J Lyne)
Private Secretary



21 DEC 1979



Rhodesia

PA
MS

STATEMENT IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS BY THE LORD PRIVY SEAL
ON TUESDAY 18 DECEMBER

WITH PERMISSION, MR SPEAKER, I SHALL MAKE A STATEMENT
ON RHODESIA.

ALL PARTIES AT THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE HAVE NOW
INITIALLED THE FINAL CONFERENCE REPORT. FORMAL SIGNATURE
OF THE REPORT AND OF THE CEASE-FIRE AGREEMENT WILL TAKE
PLACE WITHIN THE NEXT TWO DAYS.

THE CONFERENCE HAS THUS REACHED FINAL AGREEMENT.
THE GOVERNMENT WELCOME THE SPIRIT OF COMPROMISE SHOWN BY
ALL THE PARTIES AND ARE GRATEFUL TO THE OTHER GOVERNMENTS
INVOLVED FOR THEIR CONTRIBUTION TOWARDS A SETTLEMENT.

IN THE INTERESTS OF RECONCILIATION FOLLOWING A
SETTLEMENT, THE GOVERNMENT INTEND TO INSTRUCT THE GOVERNOR
TO CONFER AN AMNESTY IN THE LAW OF SOUTHERN RHODESIA WHICH
WILL APPLY TO ACTS COMMITTED IN GOOD FAITH BY BOTH SIDES.

THE HOUSE WILL WISH TO KNOW THAT IN THE LIGHT OF THE
REQUIREMENT FOR A MONITORING PRESENCE AND ITS NEED FOR SELF-
SUFFICIENCY OF ROAD AND AIR TRANSPORT WITHIN RHODESIA, THE
LATEST ESTIMATE FOR THE COST OF THE PRE-INDEPENDENCE ARRANGE-
MENTS IS £27 MILLION.

SUPPLEMENTARIES

A. AMNESTY

1. What offences will the amnesty cover?

I shall arrange for a copy of the Governor's Ordinance setting out the terms of the amnesty to be placed in the Library of the House in due course. It will apply to acts done in good faith by both sides in furtherance of, or in resistance to UDI.

2. Does the amnesty cover sanctions offences?

The amnesty is in the terms I have described, and applies to political offences. Sanctions offences are not covered.

[If pressed on the Government's intentions] The Government will make its intentions known in due course.

3. Why amnesty for terrorists?

Without amnesty, it would not be possible for members of the Patriotic Front to return to Rhodesia to campaign peacefully and free from the threat of prosecution for their past activities. But I emphasise that the amnesty will cover [only] acts done in good faith - on both sides.

4. Will it cover all terrorist offences?

It will cover all acts done in good faith in furtherance of the purpose of resisting and frustrating the illegal administration. It will not apply to acts not done in good faith for that purpose - for example, where the real motive was personal gain or private vengeance.

5. Will it cover the shooting down of the Viscount?

I can only repeat the terms of the amnesty: it will apply to acts done in good faith including acts of resistance to UKI. It will be for the prosecuting authorities and ultimately for the courts to form a judgement on specific cases.

6. Does it apply to those who have committed judicial murder/treason?

The terms of the amnesty are as described in my statement. Acts done in connection with UDI or carried out under the authority of any administration in Rhodesia since 11 November 1965 or under the authority of a law created by such an administration, will be covered.

7. Will there be a review of those convicted?

There will be a review of the sentences of those convicted for offences to which the amnesty would have applied had it been in force at the relevant time. The review will be conducted under the Governor's authority. It will be for him to decide in which cases release is justified.

8. What about an amnesty for those who have contravened Rhodesian legislation aimed at evading our sanctions? Will Mr Mackintosh be released?

The present amnesty is conferred for political offences. It does not deal with sanctions-related offences on either side. I have said that we will make known our intentions on sanctions offences in due course. I cannot comment on what may be the position in individual cases.

LORD SOAMES' ACHIEVEMENTS

Maize

Martial Law Courts suspended. Martial law will be terminated when it has been established that the ceasefire is fully effective.

Detainees

Governor is instituting a review of all cases of detention in Rhodesia. We shall also be looking for the release of persons in detention outside Rhodesia.

SUPPLEMENTARIES

B. CEASE-FIRE

How many assembly places will the Patriotic Front have?

Sixteen. We believe that there will be fully adequate capacity at these for the Patriotic Front forces.

[If pressed] The question of additional places will arise only if Patriotic Front forces assemble with their arms and equipment in numbers greater than can be dealt with at all the assembly places designated in the cease-fire agreement. We do not expect this situation to arise.

When will the cease-fire come into effect?

The first phase of the cease-fire, which involves the immediate cessation of all cross-border movement, will come into effect at midnight on the day of signature. All shooting will cease 7 days after the cease-fire agreement is signed; and the Patriotic Front's forces should complete their assembly 7 days after that. The cease-fire should thus be effective within two weeks of signature.

14 days
from
signature .

B. CEASEFIRE

Length of time allowed is inadequate

We believe 14 days is adequate. Patriotic Front leaders have had several weeks to issue contingency orders and prepare their forces.

Depends largely on political will of the parties to make it succeed.

What happens to 'unlawful' guerrillas

All Patriotic Front forces are expected to assemble. Those who do not will be unlawful. That has been made quite clear. All forces are committed to abide by the terms agreed for the ceasefire.

Locations 'in heartland'

There have been some inaccurate reports of what has been agreed. We have agreed that an additional assembly place in the west central area will be designated for the Patriotic Front, making a total of sixteen.

SUPPLEMENTARIES: RHODESIA

Why has the Governor not announced a resumption of maize shipments to Zambia?

Governor has only been there for six days, can't expect miracles.....

Restrictions on the shipment of maize have been lifted and shipments will resume.

[If pressed on how long it will take] A day or two at most.

When will elections be held?

It is for the Governor to set the date, which is likely to be at the end of February.

Detainees

The Governor will institute a review of the cases of all detainees. We shall be looking to the release of persons detained by or at the request of the Patriotic Front outside Rhodesia.

Broadcasting

The agreements reached at the Conference provide for free access to the media, and freedom to publish and advertise political reviews. It will be important to ensure that the Zimbabwe Rhodesia Broadcasting Corporation is impartial in its coverage of political activities, and the Governor's instructions cover this point. ZRBC have already agreed in principle to take the BBC World Service News for its early news broadcast. [If pressed on whether BBC staff will be sent to advise] The Governor will look into the need for this.

POWELL

Always made it clear that a settlement could only be reached with the will of the parties themselves. The parties have demonstrated this will at Lancaster House. We have never shirked our duty to do all within our power to bring an end to the war, and it ill becomes the Hon Gentleman to be cynical.

[There is no question of a British military presence intervening in a war in Rhodesia]

BLOCKED ACCOUNTS

Welcome relaxation in remittances to individuals. Will be for incoming government to assess the position and decide its policies. Climate of international acceptance will greatly help.

WHY WAS THE ZAPU OFFICE IN SALISBURY CLOSED DOWN?

ZAPU officials in Rhodesia were aware that ZAPU would remain a banned organisation until a ceasefire agreement was concluded at the Lancaster House talks. The ban on ZAPU and ZANU will be lifted on the signing of the ceasefire agreement.

COSTS

Where will the £27 million come from?

A substantial portion will come from savings on the FCO
PESC. The remainder will be a charge on the Central Contingency
Reserve.

Why was this estimate not made earlier?

At the time the Enabling Bill was put through Parliament
we did not envisage a monitoring presence on this scale.

WHAT DOES THE GOVERNMENT INTEND TO DO ABOUT SOUTH AFRICAN FORCES IN RHODESIA?

There have been reports that the forces of various other countries have been involved in Rhodesia. The Government has said on several occasions and I said in the House in the debate last week that there could be no question of external intervention in Rhodesia under a British Governor. [The position has been made clear to all the governments concerned.]

DID NOT THE GOVERNOR'S MILITARY ADVISER, GENERAL ACLAND, SAY ON ARRIVAL IN SALISBURY THAT THERE WERE SOUTH AFRICAN TROOPS IN RHODESIA?

General Acland was speaking on his arrival in Salisbury. His remarks have been widely mis-quoted. [There is no question of the presence of foreign units in Rhodesia under the Governor; there are individuals of various nationalities serving in the Rhodesian Armed Forces.]

ARE INDIVIDUAL SOUTH AFRICANS SERVING IN RHODESIA?

There are individuals of various nationalities serving in the Rhodesian Armed Forces. The only forces in Rhodesia in this period will be the Rhodesian forces and the Patriotic Front forces. We made it very clear in the Conference and elsewhere that we did not contemplate any kind of 'purge' of the personnel of the forces of either side.

WILL SOUTH AFRICAN FORCES BE WITHDRAWN?

It is for the Governor to establish the position. This is only one part of the problem. We are equally concerned about the possible continuance of cross-border movement. We are in touch with the governments of all the neighbouring countries about this.

PS

PS/MR I GILMOUR

PS/MR LUCE

PS/PUS

MR WILLSON

MR DAY

LORD N G LENNOX

MR ASPIN

PS/NO 10 DOWNING STREET

MR R L WADE-GERY

MR P M MAXEY

MR GOULTY

MR P J FOWLER

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MR FIFCOF LEGAL ADVISER RM K16A

RESIDENT CLERK

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UNCLASSIFIED

FM SALISBURY 151136Z DEC 79

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 1146 OF 15/12/79

INFO IMMEDIATE PRETORIA

MY TELNO 1145 : RHODESIA

FOLLOWING IS TRANSCRIPT:-

Q. JOURNALISTS HAVE SEEN S.A. TRUCKS BEING SEEN OFFLOADED AT SALISBURY RAILWAY STATION.

A. YOU HAVE RECEIVED INFORMATION THAT HASN'T COME MY WAY

Q. WHAT IS THE STRENGTH OF SA FORCES INSIDE THIS COUNTRY AT THE MOMENT.

A. AS I UNDERSTAND IT THERE ARE A CERTAIN NUMBER OF INDIVIDUALS FROM ALL OVER THE WORLD WHO HAVE ACTUALLY ENLISTED IN THE RHODESIAN ARMY AND IN OTHER AREAS AS I UNDERSTAND IT AT THE MOMENT THERE IS A SMALL S A PRESENCE BEYOND THAT I CAN SAY NOTHING.

Q. DID YOU SAY A SMALL S A PRESENCE.

A. A SMALL.

Q. CAN YOU GIVE US SOME IDEA OF WHAT YOU MEAN BY 'SMALL'?

A FEW THOUSAND MEN, TWO BATTALIONS OR WHAT.

A. I THINK LESS THAN A THOUSAND MEN.

Q. ARE THEY MERCENARIES.

A. I DON'T THINK YOU CAN DESCRIBE A MAN AS A MERCENARY WHO HAS ACTUALLY ENLISTED IN THE ARMED FORCES. I KNOW NOTHING ABOUT MERCENARIES.

Q. HAVEN'T NEGOTIATIONS GONE ON WITH THE S A GOVERNMENT WITH THE INTENTION OF DEPLOYING THEM.

A. THAT'S NOT A MATTER FOR ME I'M A SOLDIER.

Q. INDISTINGUISHABLE.

A. THAT'S GONE THROUGH THE SLIPS FOR A FOUR TOO.

Q. DOES THE ORDER THAT THEY MUST WITHDRAW APPLY TO OTHER

UNIT UNITS WITH THE S A GOVERNMENT

Q. HAVEN'T NEGOTIATIONS GONE ON WITH THE S A GOVERNMENT WITH THE INTENTION OF DEPLOYING THEM.

A. THAT'S NOT A MATTER FOR ME I'M A SOLDIER.

Q. INDISTINGUISHABLE.

A. THAT'S GONE THROUGH THE SLIPS FOR A FOUR TOO.

Q. DOES THE ORDER THAT THEY MUST WITHDRAW APPLY TO OTHER NATIONALITIES WITHIN THE RHODESIAN FORCES.

A. I'M NOT QUITE CLEAR ON THE WORD 'WITHDRAW', THE WORD 'WITHDRAW' IS A MILITARY WORD IN MY UNDERSTANDING, WITHDRAW FROM WHERE TO WHERE.

Q. THERE ARE DIFFERENT NATIONALITIES ATTESTED IN THIS ARMY. WITH THE NEW RULES DOES IT MEAN THAT THEY HAVE TO LEAVE OR BE DISCHARGED.

A. IN THE FIRST PLACE I'M NOT AWARE OF ANY NEW RULES AND SECONDLY AS FAR AS I KNOW, THIS IS MERELY MY OWN PERSONAL VIEW, IF THEY HAVE ATTESTED LEGALLY IN THE RHODESIAN ARMY THEY ARE PART OF THE RHODESIAN ARMY, SO THEY ARE NO LONGER FOREIGN TROOPS. IN THE BRITISH ARMY WE HAVE ALL SORTS OF NATIONALITIES SERVING, INCLUDING NO DOUBT SOME RHODESIANS.

SOAMES

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CONFIDENTIAL

Rhodesia

OR 400

CONFIDENTIAL

FM SALISBURY 182259Z DEC 79

TO FLASH UKMIS NEW YORK

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1 OF 18 DECEMBER

INFO FLASH FCO

PERSONAL FOR SECRETARY OF STATE:

RHODESIA CEASEFIRE AGREEMENT.

1. PRIME MINISTER'S MESSAGE ARRIVED TOO LATE FOR DELIVERY DURING THE EVENING. I SHALL THEREFORE SEND IT ROUND AT 0500 GMT 19 DECEMBER. I THINK IT WORTH MAKING SOME ADDITIONAL POINTS AND PROPOSE, UNLESS YOU DISAGREE, TO ENCLOSE THE PRIME MINISTER'S MESSAGE IN A LETTER FROM ME AS FOLLOWS:

QUOTE

I ENCLOSE A MESSAGE TO YOU FROM MRS THATCHER, WHICH UNFORTUNATELY ARRIVED TOO LATE FOR ME TO DELIVER TO YOU LAST NIGHT. YOU WILL WISH TO KNOW THAT I ALSO HAD A TELEPHONE CALL FROM LORD CARRINGTON IN NEW YORK, AND I KNOW THAT MRS THATCHER AND HE DO INDEED HOPE THAT YOU WILL FEEL ABLE TO LEAVE FOR LONDON TODAY. I AM SURE THAT, IF YOU WISHED IT, MRS THATCHER WOULD BE VERY GLAD TO HAVE A TALK WITH YOU AND YOUR DELEGATION BEFORE THE SIGNING CEREMONY.

I THINK IT MIGHT BE HELPFUL IF I ADDED ONE OR TWO POINTS OF MY OWN TO WHAT MY PRIME MINISTER HAS TOLD YOU. FIRST, IN CONNECTION WITH PARAGRAPH 2 OF HER LETTER, I CAN ASSURE YOU THAT, IN THE UNLIKELY EVENT OF THERE ARISING A MANIFEST NEED FOR ADDITIONAL ASSEMBLY PLACES, I WOULD OF COURSE CONSULT YOU ABOUT THEIR LOCATION.

SECOND, THE PATRIOTIC FRONT HAVE, AS YOU KNOW, INFORMED US OF THE TOTAL NUMBER OF THEIR ARMED FORCES IN RHODESIA AND THIS IS THE FIGURE WE WOULD NEED TO HAVE IN MIND WHEN JUDGING THE EXTENT OF THEIR CONCENTRATION. THIS ASSEMBLY PROCESS, UNDER THE TERMS OF THE CEASEFIRE AGREEMENT, IS TO BE COMPLETED WITHIN 7 DAYS FROM THE DAY NAMED IN THE AGREEMENT FOR THE CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES. THE DOCUMENT HAS BEEN MADE PUBLIC, AND THE COMMITMENT IS THEREFORE CLEARLY AND PUBLICLY ON THE RECORD. MR MUGABE WAS TOLD IN LONDON THAT WE DO NOT ACCEPT HIS REPORTED ASSESSMENT OF THE TIME IT WOULD TAKE HIS MEN TO ASSEMBLE.

CONFIDENTIAL

THIRD

CONFIDENTIAL

THIRD, IT IS STATED IN THE CEASEFIRE AGREEMENT THAT ANY FORCES WHICH FAIL TO COMPLY WITH THE CEASEFIRE OR THE DIRECTIONS OF THE GOVERNOR WILL BE DEEMED TO BE ACTING UNLAWFULLY. THIS CLEARLY APPLIES TO MEMBERS OF THE PATRIOTIC FRONT FORCES WHO FAIL TO ASSEMBLE WITHIN THE PRESCRIBED 7 DAYS. WHAT ACTION I WOULD TAKE IN THOSE CIRCUMSTANCES WOULD DEPEND ON MY JUDGMENT OF THE TOTAL SITUATION AT THAT TIME, INCLUDING THE NUMBERS WHO HAD NOT REPORTED AND THEIR BEHAVIOUR. THE SUBJECT IS NOT ONE WHICH IS SUSCEPTIBLE TO MATHEMATICAL CALCULATION IN ADVANCE, AND I CANNOT GIVE ANY PRECISE UNDERTAKING AS TO WHAT I MIGHT THINK IT NECESSARY TO DO IN ANY GIVEN CIRCUMSTANCES. I WOULD HOWEVER REMIND YOU THAT I HAVE PLENARY POWERS AND SHOULD CERTAINLY HAVE TO TAKE ACTION AGAINST ANY POLITICAL PARTY WHICH SYSTEMATICALLY BROKE THE CEASEFIRE AND ITS CONNECTED COMMITMENTS TO CAMPAIGN PEACEFULLY AND WITHOUT INTIMIDATION. IN THIS CONTEXT, I SHOULD REGARD VERY SERIOUSLY A FAILURE TO MAKE ANY REAL ATTEMPT TO COMPLY WITH THE ASSEMBLY PROCESS.

UNQUOTE

SOAMES

FILES

RHOD D
OADS
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UND
LEGAL ADVISERS
(MR FREELAND)
(MR FIFOOT)
ECON D
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PS/LPS
PS/MR LUCE
PS/MR RIDLEY
PS/MR HURD
PS/MR MARTEN
PS/PUS
SIR A DUFF
MR BULLARD
MR HANNAY
LORD N G LENNOX
MISS BROWN
MR DAY
MR ASPIN
MR MILLS

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION
RHODESIA POLICY

CONFIDENTIAL

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R. 1910 18 DECEMBER 79

FM FCO 181745Z DEC 79

TO FLASH SALISBURY

TELEGRAM NUMBER 553 OF 18 DECEMBER

AND TO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK

MIPT : MESSAGE FROM PRIME MINISTER TO BISHOP MUZOREWA

1. BEGINS. DEAR BISHOP MUZOREWA, LORD SOAMES HAS INFORMED ME OF YOUR LETTER TO HIM TODAY SEEKING CLARIFICATION OF PRESS REPORTS ABOUT THE AGREEMENTS REACHED AT LANCASTER HOUSE. I AM SORRY THAT THESE SHOULD HAVE CAUSED YOU CONCERN, WHICH I CAN ASSURE YOU IS NOT JUSTIFIED. YOU HAVE MADE A DECISIVE CONTRIBUTION AT THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE TO SECURING A SETTLEMENT AND THE PROSPECT OF PEACE FOR YOUR COUNTRY. WE MUST NOW COMPLETE THE AGREEMENT WHICH YOU HAVE DONE SO MUCH TO ACHIEVE.

2. I CAN ASSURE YOU THAT THE ONLY DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE AGREEMENT INITIALLED BY DR MUNDAWARARA ON 15 DECEMBER AND THAT INITIALLED BY THE PATRIOTIC FRONT YESTERDAY IS THE ADDITION OF ONE EXTRA ASSEMBLY POINT FOR THE PATRIOTIC FRONT'S FORCES. THIS WAS AGREED WITH YOUR MILITARY ADVISERS. THE PATRIOTIC FRONT WILL NOW HAVE 16 (16) ASSEMBLY PLACES AND WE ARE CONFIDENT THAT THESE WILL BE FULLY ADEQUATE FOR THE PATRIOTIC FRONT FORCES WHICH ASSEMBLE. THE QUESTION OF ADDITIONAL PLACES WILL ARISE ONLY IF PATRIOTIC FRONT FORCES ASSEMBLE WITH THEIR ARMS AND EQUIPMENT IN NUMBERS GREATER THAN CAN BE DEALT WITH AT ALL THE ASSEMBLY PLACES IN THE CEASE-FIRE AGREEMENT. BUT WE DO NOT EXPECT SUCH A SITUATION TO ARISE. THE REPORT TO WHICH YOU REFER IN POINT A OF YOUR LETTER IS THUS WITHOUT FOUNDATION AND AN OFFICIAL STATEMENT HAS BEEN ISSUED TO THE PRESS TODAY SETTING OUT THE CORRECT POSITION.

3. AS REGARDS POINT B OF YOUR LETTER, THE CEASE-FIRE AGREEMENT REQUIRES THE CESSATION OF ALL CROSS-BORDER MOVEMENT FROM MIDNIGHT ON THE DAY OF SIGNATURE. IT IS THUS A MATTER OF PUBLIC RECORD. THE FINAL CONFERENCE REPORT REQUIRES ALL PARTIES TO ABIDE BY THE TERMS OF THE CEASE-FIRE AGREEMENT.

4. YOU ALSO EXPRESSED CONCERN ABOUT THE TIMING OF THE ENTRY INTO FORCE OF A CEASE-FIRE AND I CAN WELL UNDERSTAND THIS, GIVEN SOME OF THE STATEMENTS REPORTED AFTER THE INITIALLING OF THE AGREEMENT. I CONFIRM TO YOU THAT CEASE-FIRE DAY WILL BE 7 (7) DAYS AFTER SIGNATURE OF THE AGREEMENTS, AND THAT THE PATRIOTIC FRONT WILL BE EXPECTED TO COMPLETE THE ASSEMBLY OF THEIR FORCES WITHIN 7 (7) DAYS AFTER THAT. ANY FORCES WHICH ARE NOT ASSEMBLED AFTER THAT DATE WILL BE UNLAWFUL AND IN BREACH OF THE CEASE-FIRE AGREEMENT. THE POSITION HAS BEEN MADE CLEAR TO ALL CONCERNED.

/5.

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5. I FULLY UNDERSTAND YOUR CONCERN - AND WE ARE NO LESS CONCERNED THAN YOU ARE - ABOUT THE NECESSITY FOR COMPLIANCE WITH THE AGREEMENT. THE AGREED CONFERENCE REPORT FOR SIGNATURE REQUIRES THE PARTIES TO UNDERTAKE:

- A. TO ACCEPT THE AUTHORITY OF THE GOVERNOR
- B. TO ABIDE BY THE INDEPENDENCE CONSTITUTION
- C. TO COMPLY WITH THE PRE-INDEPENDENCE ARRANGEMENTS
- D. TO ABIDE BY THE CEASE-FIRE AGREEMENT
- E. TO CAMPAIGN PEACEFULLY AND WITHOUT INTIMIDATION
- F. TO RENOUNCE THE USE OF FORCE FOR POLITICAL ENDS
- G. TO ACCEPT THE OUTCOME OF THE ELECTIONS AND INSTRUCT ANY FORCES UNDER THEIR AUTHORITY TO DO THE SAME.

THESE ARE BINDING COMMITMENTS. WE SHALL EMPHASIZE THEM AGAIN AT THE SIGNATURE CEREMONY. THE GOVERNOR WOULD HAVE TO TAKE WHATEVER ACTION WAS NECESSARY TO DEAL WITH A SITUATION IN WHICH ANY PARTY FAILED TO COMPLY WITH ITS OBLIGATIONS TO CAMPAIGN PEACEFULLY AND WITH THE CEASE-FIRE.

6. I TRUST THAT WITH THESE ASSURANCES YOU WILL FEEL ABLE TO LEAVE FOR LONDON TOMORROW SO THAT WE CAN SIGN THE AGREEMENT. I SHALL ASK THE GOVERNOR TO SET THE DATE OF THE ELECTIONS IMMEDIATELY THE AGREEMENT HAS BEEN SIGNED. I BELIEVE THAT THE SETTLEMENT WHICH YOU HAVE DONE SO MUCH TO MAKE POSSIBLE WILL ALLOW THE IDEALS WHICH YOU REPRESENT TO BE REALISED AND PROVIDE A SECURE AND PEACEFUL FUTURE FOR YOUR COUNTRY. I TRUST THAT THESE ASSURANCES, WHICH CARRY THE FULL AUTHORITY OF THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT, ALLAY YOUR CONCERNS.

7. I LOOK FORWARD VERY MUCH TO SEEING YOU ON THURSDAY WHEN WE CAN DISCUSS THESE AND ANY OTHER CONCERNS. WITH MY BEST WISHES MARGARET THATCHER. ENDS.

DISTRIBUTION
P3 TO PM,
PS TO S OF S
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CARRINGTON

Circular Letter No. 83/79

18 December 1979

Dr. Ramphal

Dear High Commissioner,

I know you would wish to share with me the sentiments which have been expressed in the following message which I have received from the United Nations' Secretary-General, Dr. Kurt Waldheim.

"I have followed the progress of the Lancaster House talks with the greatest care and interest. May I express to you my warmest congratulations for all you have done both personally, and on behalf of the Commonwealth Governments, to help achieve a remarkable outcome. I do hope that the coming weeks will witness a smooth transition to independence and I wish you the very best in your continuing efforts. Warm regards (Kurt Waldheim).


Copies as per prec. letter

Shridath S. Ramphal

Shridath S. Ramphal

UNIT OF THE GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
1979-1980

19 DEC 1979



Rhodesia X-27

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MR FIFCOF LEGAL ADVISER RM K164

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FM SALISBURY 181445Z DEC 79

TO FLASH FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1189 OF 18 DECEMBER

MY TELEGRAM NO 1183: CEASEFIRE AGREEMENT.

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF LETTER FROM BISHOP MUZOREWA TO ME DELIVERED AT 1415Z THIS AFTERNOON.

BEGINS

YOUR EXCELLENCY,

I WISH TO INFORM YOU THAT BEFORE I CAN MAKE MYSELF AVAILABLE TO COMPLETE THE FORMALITY OF SIGNING THE FINAL CEASEFIRE DOCUMENT I WOULD NEED TO HAVE SIGHT IN ADVANCE OF THE PRECISE WORDING OF THE ADDITIONS AND CHANGES THAT HAVE REPORTEDLY BEEN MADE TO THE AGREEMENT INITIALED BY MY DEPUTY. IN PARTICULAR THE PRECISE LOCATION OF THE 16TH ASSEMBLY PLACE AND THE PRINCIPLES SURROUNDING THE REQUIREMENT FOR ANY ADDITIONAL ASSEMBLY PLACES NEEDS TO BE CLARIFIED.

FURTHERMORE, I WOULD LIKE TO POINT OUT THE FOLLOWING AREAS OF MAJOR CONCERN:

A. THE REPORT IN TODAY'S PAPER ATTRIBUTED TO BRITISH OFFICIALS AND A PATRIOTIC FRONT SPOKESMAN THAT QUOTE THE BRITISH ADDITIONALLY AGREED TO INSTRUCT LORD SOAMES TO OPEN UP NEW ASSEMBLY AREAS WHEREVER THE PATRIOTIC FRONT COULD PRODUCE 1000 OR MORE FIGHTERS UNQUOTE. AS THIS REPORT CLEARLY GOES BEYOND THE AGREEMENT INITIALED BY MY DEPUTY AND THEREFORE MUST BE ASSUMED TO BE INCORRECT I MUST ASK FOR AN IMMEDIATE PUBLIC CORRECTION OF THIS APPARENT ERROR IN

ASK FOR AN IMMEDIATE PUBLIC CORRECTION OF THIS APPARENT ERROR IN REPORTING.

B. I AM CONFIDENT IT MUST BE COMMON CAUSE THAT A PUBLIC CONFIRMATION IS REQUIRED THAT ALL CROSS-BORDER MOVEMENTS WILL CEASE IMMEDIATELY WITH EFFECT FROM THE SIGNING OF THE FULL CEASEFIRE AGREEMENT.

C. A BILATERAL ASSURANCE IS ALSO REQUIRED WITH REGARD TO THE NUMBER OF ARMED MEN FROM THE PATRIOTIC FRONT WHO WILL BE EXPECTED TO CONCENTRATE IN ASSEMBLY POINTS WITHIN OUR COUNTRY AND THE PRECISE TIME LIMITS FOR THIS CONCENTRATION. A PUBLIC RE-ASSURANCE OF THIS TIME FACTOR IS ESSENTIAL IN VIEW OF MR MUGABE'S REPORTED ASSESSMENT OF THE TIME HE HAS IN MIND FOR HIS MEN TO GROUP.

D. WE ARE ALSO, I AM SURE, IN AGREEMENT ON THE NEED FOR A PUBLIC CONFIRMATION, AS WAS PROMISED BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS, TO YOU IN THE PRESENCE OF OFFICIALS OF MY DELEGATION, THAT ONCE THE SIGNING OF THE CEASEFIRE AGREEMENT IS COMPLETED ANY FAILURE TO CONCENTRATE THE ARMED FOLLOWERS OF THE PATRIOTIC FRONT IN THE STRENGTHS AND TIME AS SPECIFIED IN THE AGREEMENT, WOULD IN ITSELF BE A BREACH OF THE CEASEFIRE AND WOULD CONSEQUENTLY RESULT IN THE PROSCRIPTION FROM THE ELECTION OF THE POLITICAL PARTIES CONCERNED. SIMILARLY, ACCUMULATIVE BREACHES OF THE CEASEFIRE BY ANY POLITICAL PARTY WILL HAVE THE SAME RESULT.

IN VIEW OF MY OWN AND THE PUBLIC'S ANXIETY WHICH HAS ARISEN FROM THE MEDIA REPORTS OF THIS MORNING RELATING TO THE ALLEGED MAJOR CONCESSIONS THAT HAVE BEEN MADE, APPARENTLY TO SATISFY THE PATRIOTIC FRONT, I HAVE HAD NO ALTERNATIVE BUT TO ISSUE THE ATTACHED STATEMENT TO THE INFORMATION MEDIA.

ENDS

2. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF STATEMENT ENCLOSED WITH THE LETTER, WHICH IS APPARENTLY BEING RELEASED TO THE PRESS.

BEGINS

STATEMENT

WHILE I WELCOME THE REPORTED PROGRESS THAT HAS BEEN MADE IN SECURING A CEASEFIRE, I HAVE FOUND IT NECESSARY TO INFORM HIS EXCELLENCY THE GOVERNOR THAT I HAVE DELAYED MY RETURN TO LONDON TO SIGN THE CEASEFIRE AGREEMENT UNTIL I HAVE RECEIVED CLARIFICATION ON SOME OF THE NEWS MEDIA REPORTS REGARDING THE CONCESSIONS ALLEGEDLY MADE BY THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT.

IT IS STILL MY EARNEST DESIRE TO CONCLUDE AN HONOURABLE AGREEMENT AS SOON AS POSSIBLE AND SECURE A LASTING PEACE FOR THE PEOPLE OF THIS COUNTRY.

ENDS



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

18 December 1979

Dear Michael,

f. v. Hunt - 15/12/79

Message from President Senghor to the Prime Minister


I attach a personal message to the Prime Minister from President Senghor of Senegal. This is in reply to the message which the Prime Minister sent to the President in November, and does not call for a response. It is, however, a further indication of the reasonably helpful attitude which the Government of Senegal have adopted during the Lancaster House Conference.

*yours ever
Roderic Lyne*

(R M J Lyne)
Private Secretary

M O D B Alexander Esq
10 Downing Street
LONDON

18 DEC 1979



SUBJECT

Le Président de la République N° 2095/PR/SP.

Dakar, le 29 novembre 1979.

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T157c/179T

Madame le Premier Ministre,

Veillez m'excuser de n'avoir pas répondu plus tôt à votre lettre du 9 novembre 1979.

Comme j'ai eu l'occasion de le dire à M. Luce, sous-secrétaire d'Etat aux Affaires étrangères, le Gouvernement sénégalais a soutenu, en son temps, le Plan anglo-américain sur le Zimbabwe-Rhodésie. C'est la raison pour laquelle nous suivons, avec attention, la Conférence de Lancaster House.

Bien qu'ayant soutenu le Front patriotique contre le Gouvernement de M. Ian Smith, nous n'avons jamais caché à MM. Joshua Nkomo et Robert Mugabé que, parce que socialistes, nous étions, avant tout, des démocrates et que, partant, nous avions

toujours soutenu le principe d'une constitution démocratique et d'élections libres, ouvertes à tous les partis.

En souhaitant, au Gouvernement de Sa Majesté britannique, le plus grand succès pour la Conférence de Lancaster House, je vous prie d'agréer, Madame le Premier Ministre, l'hommage de mes pensées respectueuses.



Léopold Sédar SENGHOR

Madame Margaret THATCHER
Premier Ministre de Grande Bretagne

- L O N D R E S -

COMMONWEALTH SECRETARIAT

CABLES: COMSEC GEN LONDON SW1
TELEX: 27678
TELEPHONE: 01-839 3411 Ext:

MARLBOROUGH HOUSE,
PALL MALL,
LONDON, SW1Y 5HX

Your ref:
Our ref: C.151/4/5

17 December 1979

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Commonwealth Committee on Southern Africa

Attached is a copy of the minutes of the Committee's meeting on 13 December 1979.

Copies as per prec letter

M. Malhoutra

M. Malhoutra
Secretary
Commonwealth Committee on
Southern Africa

Encl.

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CSA(79) Eighth Meeting

COMMONWEALTH COMMITTEE ON SOUTHERN AFRICA

MINUTES of the Meeting of the Committee on Southern Africa
held at Marlborough House on Thursday, 13 December 1979,
at 10.30 am.

Present:

H.E. Mr Arthur J. Scerri
High Commissioner for Malta
(in the chair)

Australia

Mr R.R. Fernandez
Deputy High Commissioner
Mr R. Burns
Counsellor

Barbados

Mr C.W. Hinkson
Counsellor
Miss C. Mahon
Second Secretary

Britain

Mr D.M. Day
Assistant Under Secretary
Miss P. Spencer, FCO
Mr J.R. Paterson, FCO

Cyprus

Mr A. Vakis
Deputy High Commissioner

The Gambia

H.E. Mr B.O. Semega-Janeh
High Commissioner

Guyana

H.E. Dr C.H. Grant
High Commissioner
Mr C.J.E. Barker
Deputy High Commissioner

The Bahamas

H.E. Mr R.F. Anthony Roberts
High Commissioner

Bangladesh

H.E. Mr A.R. Shams-ud Doha
High Commissioner
Mr A.M. Choudhury
Counsellor

Botswana

H.E. Mr A.W. Kgarebe
High Commissioner

Canada

Mr C. Hardy
Acting High Commissioner
Mr N.A. Robinson
First Secretary

Fiji

H.E. Mr J.D. Gibson
High Commissioner
Mr J.T. Tevita
Second Secretary

Ghana

H.E. Mr E.M. Debrah
High Commissioner
Mr I.K. Davies
Counsellor

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India

Mr I.P. Singh
Acting High Commissioner

Mr Arif Quamarain
Counsellor

Kenya

Mr P.M. Nyamweya
First Secretary

Malaysia

H.E. Mr R.T.S. Aznam
High Commissioner

Mr A. Hasmy
Counsellor

Nigeria

H.E. Mr S.U. Yolah
High Commissioner

H.E. Mr E.N. Oba
High Commissioner to Zambia

Seychelles

Mr S.V.S. Rouillon
Second Secretary

Singapore

Mr Lim Chin Leong
First Secretary

St. Lucia & St. Vincent

Mr C.O. Samuel
Administration Officer

Trinidad & Tobago

Mr H. Broomes
Acting High Commissioner

Jamaica

H.E. Mr E.G. Peart
High Commissioner

Mrs Audrey M. Thompson
Counsellor

Lesotho

H.E. Mr M.M. Molapo
High Commissioner

Mauritius

H.E. Sir L. Teelock
High Commissioner

New Zealand

Mr P.R. Bennett
Counsellor

Papua New Guinea

H.E. Mr F.B.C. Reiher
High Commissioner

Sierra Leone

H.E. Dr S.T. Matturi
High Commissioner

Sri Lanka

H.E. Mr N. Wimalasena
High Commissioner

Swaziland

H.E. Mr G.M. Mamba
High Commissioner

Tanzania

Mrs L. Howell
Counsellor

Uganda

H.E. Eng. J.M.N. Zikusoka
High Commissioner

H.E. Mr Shridath S. Ramphal
Commonwealth Secretary-General

Commonwealth Secretariat

Mr E.C. Anyaoku
Mr D. Anderson
Mr M. Malhoutra (Secretary)
Mrs P.B. Robertson
Dr A.C. Bundu
Mr C. Laidlaw
Mr A.V. Hayday
Mr M. Robinson
Miss A. Cassam
Miss A.R. Horwich
Mr D. Sankey
Mr M. Anafu
Miss S. Hyne
Mr M.B. Rodgers
Miss E.R. Minto
Miss J.E. Drake-Brockman
Mr M. Rahim
Mr I.R. Thomas
Miss J.S. Morrill

MINUTES

The Chairman welcomed representatives to the meeting and recalled that at the Committee's meeting of 23 November a basic question of principle had been considered relating to the nature and role of Commonwealth observers for the Zimbabwe elections to be held pursuant to the agreement reached at the Lancaster House Conference. They had concluded their deliberations on the matter with an agreement to adopt the Secretary-General's outline proposals for sending a collective Commonwealth Observer Group for the Zimbabwe elections, on the understanding that any Commonwealth country which wished to send its own national observers should be free to do so. The meeting had then asked the Secretary-General to consult with the British Government further with a view to giving his proposals greater specificity before forwarding them to Commonwealth Governments.

2. That had now been done and the main business of the meeting was to give further consideration to this question in the light of the detailed proposals that had been circulated by the Secretariat in Memorandum CSA(79)3 entitled "Commonwealth Observers : Operational Requirements".
3. With events moving so rapidly, and the fact that Lord Soames had already arrived in Salisbury, he was sure that representatives would be conscious of the need to make recommendations to their Governments with a sense of great urgency. He then invited the Secretary-General to introduce the paper he had circulated.
4. The Secretary-General pointed out although it was Malta's National Day, the Chairman had foregone his holiday and curtailed a number of engagements in order to chair the meeting. He had done so in deference to the importance and urgency attached to the subject before the Committee. He was sure that representatives would wish him to say a word of appreciation and thanks to the Chairman.

5. In the covering note to the paper that had been circulated, it had been explained that the British Government did not necessarily concur in all aspects of the paper. In fact, the area of non-concurrence was not a wide one; it related primarily to the overall size of the Observer Group and their supporting staff and the ability of the local authorities to provide the logistical support that would be entailed.

6. Although the Chairman had referred to Lord Soames' arrival in Salisbury, he wished to underscore that time was not on their side. The Lancaster House Conference was in its final phase, and was nearing the end of its discussion on the modalities of implementing the ceasefire. If all went well, ceasefire day was not far off. The Governor and his senior advisers were already in Salisbury, the Ceasefire Monitoring Force was standing-by ready to be air-lifted at any moment, and all the necessary legislative powers had either been enacted or were in the course of becoming law.

7. Against this background, one would also have expected that the Commonwealth Observer Group, which had been envisaged would be in Salisbury on or as soon as practicable after ceasefire day, would already have been identified and ready to move at short notice and that the necessary logistical arrangements both for their travel to Salisbury and their work within Zimbabwe would have been completed. So far from this being the case, the Committee had only just settled one important point of principle, namely that there should be a collective Commonwealth Group. They were about to embark on a discussion of the detailed operational requirements that would be entailed. Once these had been settled there was an immense amount of detailed preparatory work to be undertaken by the Secretariat, including consultations with Governments, identification of observers and their supporting staff, arrangements for their movement and reception etc. The longer decisions were delayed the more difficult it would be for the Secretariat, for all Commonwealth Governments and not least for the individuals who would be directly involved. Indeed, delay could be fatal to the objective they had in mind.

8. Having stressed the need for urgency, the Secretary-General offered the following points by way of elaboration of the Secretariat's proposals.

9. In formulating its proposals the Secretariat had been acutely conscious of two factors: the need to mount an operation that was both effective and credible and financial costs. It had tried to strike the best possible balance.

10. Regarding the appointment of members of the team, he assured representatives that this would be preceded by the fullest possible consultation and agreement with the Governments concerned. He would, of course, urge Heads of Government to nominate persons of high standing, since the credibility of the Group would largely depend on the quality of its members.

11. In relation to the selection of countries the criteria by which he assumed Commonwealth Governments would wish him to be guided would be the need to assemble a group with equitable geographical representation and one which would bring together all the most relevant strands of Commonwealth electoral experience.

12. The draft terms of reference had been the subject of consultation with the British Government, and he hoped representatives could endorse them. They had been deliberately kept as broad and flexible as possible.

13. The procedural details in the Secretariat's paper had also been the subject of consultation with the British. They were incorporated in the paper in order to avoid any possible misunderstandings later. They would thus serve as guidelines, though naturally the Group would be free to discharge their terms of reference in the manner which they themselves considered most appropriate and suitable in the circumstances.

14. On the question of numbers, he stressed that the overall figure was no more than would have been the case if 12 to 15 Governments had sent individual national teams. Indeed, for the bulk of the period in question, it was envisaged that there would be only about 50 people present - considerably less than would have been the case if there had been 12 to 15 national teams.

15. In justification of the second phase of 96 supporting staff, it had since been confirmed by the British Government that there would be 8 electoral districts. Each of these would thus encompass a very large area. It was not yet known how many polling stations there would be, but it was understood that in the poll held in April 1979 there were 441 static and 244 mobile polling stations altogether with about 2,000 polling places. The Secretariat and the Group itself would naturally be in touch with the British Election Commissioner to ascertain the details of the polling arrangements; having regard, however, to the factors of geographical area and scattered population, especially in the rural areas, it did not seem to the Secretariat that polling could be effectively monitored with figures below those set out in its paper.

16. These rather modest figures were predicated on one basic assumption: that the Group and their supporting staff would be highly mobile, and would have at their disposal adequate land and air transport. If this was not forthcoming, the only alternative would be to significantly increase the numbers. The Secretariat had deliberately avoided this for financial reasons, as well as the added strain that would be placed on local accommodation and other facilities.

17. The costing, subject to accommodation and logistical requirements being met by the administering authority, were at this stage only an indicative figure. The Secretariat envisaged that those deputed by Governments from posts held within their own administrative structures would continue to receive their

basic remuneration: the Secretariat would pay their travel costs and a per diem allowance. If however there were any nominated outside this category, and it was hoped that there would not be more than a handful, some payment of remuneration might be involved.

18. As soon as agreement was reached at Lancaster House, he intended to send out a Secretariat team to Salisbury for technical and other discussions with the administering authority, preceded by appropriate consultation with the British Foreign Office. He hoped the administering authority in Rhodesia would find it possible to receive the Secretariat officials at the earliest opportunity and extend them the fullest co-operation in making the necessary arrangements.

19. The Secretariat's paper had proposed that £75,000 might be used from the Mozambique Fund. The Secretary-General apologised that this was an error as he had just been informed by the Secretariat's accountants that the balance of convertible funds was considerably lower, and on account of earlier commitments and certain other requirements, no usable funds would be available from this source. He appealed to all Commonwealth Governments to contribute as generously as possible to the voluntary fund the Secretariat had proposed should be established. While pledges could be communicated later, support in principle at this stage would be most helpful.

20. The Secretary-General concluded his remarks by stressing that in the context of time and particularly the interposition of the Christmas season - which was not itself deducted from the transition period - representatives must endeavour to reach broad agreement on as wide an area as possible.

21. The Representative of Britain said he wished to make a few comments on the Secretariat's proposals. As the Secretary-General had indicated, when he had called on the Lord Privy Seal earlier in the week for consultations, the British

Government had indicated that they had one or two reservations about the proposals. These related to certain practical problems in servicing the Observer Group, and in particular the numbers involved and the cost of the exercise. He pointed out that the elections would be spread over 3 consecutive days, not 2 as indicated in paragraph 15 of the paper.

22. There were serious practical limitations on the resources available in Rhodesia in regard to office and residential accommodation and transport and communications. These were extremely limited and already fully stretched and even for the purposes of the Governor, the Election Commissioner and their staff, the British Government had had to arrange for additional transport and aircraft to be taken to Rhodesia for the transition period. The proposal suggested that some 50 persons would be sent to Rhodesia initially, followed by another group of about 100 to observe the actual poll. Because of the practical problems he had mentioned it would be impossible to provide the facilities outlined in paragraph 20(a) of the Secretariat's paper. This was not due to lack of will, but to the practical problems of finding and providing facilities on the scale required by the numbers involved. In earlier discussions, the British Government had indicated its willingness to co-operate with and assist the Observer Group; but at each stage of the consultation with the Secretary-General they had stressed the serious practical problems that could arise.

23. Referring to the costs involved, he noted the suggestion was that local authorities would be expected to provide office and residential accommodation, transport and communication facilities and ancillary local staff. He said that he could not give any undertaking at this time as this would depend on consultation with the Governor.

24. He reminded the meeting that the election would be held in the aftermath of armed conflict and that there would be difficulty and dangers in travelling around the country. Efforts would be made to remove mines but there would be areas in which it would not be safe to travel in normal transport.

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25. He believed it would not be possible for the administering authority to meet costs on the scale implied in paragraph 20(a) of the paper. In fact the British Government was meeting most of the substantial costs involved in implementing the final agreement reached at Lancaster House, such as the costs related to resuming their authority and in providing for the Ceasefire Monitoring Force. These would place a considerable financial burden on the British Government and although they were ready to help with the administrative arrangements, he stressed that these problems should be borne in mind by the Committee in reaching a decision on the size of the Observer Group. It might be necessary for participating Governments or the Commonwealth collectively to meet the primary costs of the operation.

26. He noted that the suggestion had been made in paragraph 9(b) that the Group and its supporting staff would need to have complete immunity from civil and criminal process. He could see some difficulty about this as such immunity was not being accorded even to the Election Commissioner and his staff. It was a matter on which they would need to consult with the Governor.

27. With regard to the functions of the Observer Group, the British Government accepted that subject to constraints of security, the observers would have complete freedom to move about the country, and to inquire into the electoral process as it evolved. However, it was important to ensure that any collective group or individual group of observers should not duplicate the executive role of the administering authority. It had already been agreed that the ultimate responsibility for the supervision of the election, and for ensuring that it was held fairly and impartially must rest with the Governor and his staff. In the proposals for the interim administration, the Election Council had been established specifically to enable parties to bring to the attention of the Governor any issues which might prejudice the fairness or impartiality of the election. He hoped that the Secretariat's proposals did not imply any kind of executive role or duplication.

28. The Committee had discussed at its last meeting the nature and role of Commonwealth observers for the elections and had agreed that some Governments might wish to send national teams and others participate in a collective group. The British Government believed it was up to individual Governments themselves to decide what arrangements they wished to make. However, no single or collective group would be regarded as exclusive. Each would arrive at its own conclusions regarding the impartiality and fairness of the elections and their conclusions would be considered as equally authoritative and valid.

29. The Representative of The Bahamas considered it unfortunate that everything the British representative had said would seem to discourage the sending of an effective Commonwealth observer team. The Commonwealth was trying to help the British Government in its task. It would be necessary for mutually acceptable provisions to be worked out and he hoped that the British Government would be willing to make some concessions. If the Commonwealth observer role were stifled then it would be difficult for the international community to conclude that the election had been free and fair.

30. The Representative of Bangladesh said he had come to the meeting assuming that the British Government would extend an invitation to Commonwealth observers to assist them in the transitional process in accordance with the Lusaka Agreement. He felt that the British representative should explain in more detail the number of observers his Government felt would be practicable and the costing could then be worked out on this basis. He therefore suggested that the meeting should examine in detail the proposals prepared by the Secretariat as regards the numbers of observers and supporting staff required both at the district level and in Salisbury, together with the necessary logistical support.

31. The Representative of Australia confirmed that his Government was very much in support of the idea of a collective

Commonwealth team even though it intended to send a separate team of its own. As regards the cost of the collective team he felt that as the Commonwealth observer role would be of importance to all member Governments it should be financed in accordance with the assessment rates applicable to the Secretariat budget rather than by voluntary contributions whether or not they were asked to nominate observers to serve on the team. While he agreed with the Secretary-General's point about the need for a sufficient number to cover the extensive area involved, he felt he should point out that the Australian Government's own preliminary survey, which it had carried out in connection with its role as a participant in the Ceasefire Monitoring Force, had indicated that the basic resources available on the ground would be limited. He therefore had some doubts about the numbers contemplated in the Secretariat's paper. It had been agreed that the role of the Observer Group would be essentially to observe and that it should not assume or interfere with the executive functions performed by the administering authority. For this reason he considered that it would be more appropriate if the Group were authorised to draw matters to the attention of the appropriate authorities rather than to make recommendations as such, as was contemplated in paragraph 9(c) of the Secretariat's paper.

32. The Representative of Bangladesh reiterated that the meeting needed information about the available resources in the country to enable it to reach firm decisions. If, for example, there were sufficient accommodation for only 30 persons, some other means of providing accommodation for the rest of the observers would have to be found and the same would apply with regard to transport facilities.

33. The Chairman suggested that the right approach would be to decide initially upon the required number of observers and supporting staff and, from that, work out the costing of what was needed.

34. The Representative of Barbados agreed with the representative of The Bahamas about the reservations expressed by the British

representative on the size of the team. As he understood it the British Government had invited several countries to send their own observers. He did not know how many countries Britain had invited to send observers and the number of observers each individual team was expected to comprise. The Secretary-General had implied in his opening remarks that the numbers envisaged in the Secretariat's paper for the collective team were not very different from what might have been expected if 15 countries or so had acceded to the British Government's invitation. If that were the case, transport and accommodation, etc. should present little problem.

35. The Secretary-General explained that Britain had invited all Commonwealth countries to send observers if they so wished. He had calculated that if, say, only 15 countries were to send 8 or 10 observers each, a total of 150 persons would require accommodation and other facilities.

36. The Representative of Jamaica asked if any limit had been put on the size of observer teams from countries like Australia. If not, he wondered why, in view of the shortage of accommodation. It would seem that to allow individual teams would be to burden the limited resources available and yet the British Government had apparently encouraged certain countries to send their own teams.

37. The Representative of Britain said during the earlier discussion the Secretary-General had had with his Secretary of State it had been agreed that if the response to the invitation to send observers had been, so to speak, excessive it would be necessary to consult with the countries concerned in order to decide how the problem should be dealt with. He hoped it had not been felt, as a result of his previous remarks, that Britain wished to stifle the role of the Commonwealth Observer Group. He also hoped that this interpretation would not be given to his attempt to draw attention to the practical problems involved.

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There would be great pressure on accommodation in Salisbury, not only from Commonwealth representatives but from representatives of other countries and of the media, etc. There was no intention to diminish the role of the Commonwealth Observer Group or of using logistic difficulties as an excuse to place obstacles in its way.

38. The Representative of Jamaica hoped that some attempt would be made to clear the area of mines. He pointed out that a difficulty might arise if it were suspected that the authorities had not cleared certain areas of mines because they did not wish observers to enter those areas.

39. The Representative of Britain replied that the clearing of mines was already in hand. He noted however that as active mines were still being found in the United Kingdom 40 years after World War II, it would be difficult to give a guarantee that all mines had been cleared from Rhodesian territory.

40. The Representative of Jamaica said that he wished to revert to the approach earlier recommended by the representative of Bangladesh. In particular, he wished to know whether the observer teams being sent by individual countries would be accorded priority over the collective Commonwealth Observer Group. This question of priority would have to be considered carefully because of the limited resources available.

41. The Representative of Britain said that his Government hoped to provide the best possible facilities for all the observers who went to Rhodesia in whatever capacity.

42. The Representative of Jamaica stressed that the British Government was now the Government of Rhodesia and it was therefore up to that Government to state clearly its own priorities on the matter.

43. The Representative of Sierra Leone said that there was a general wish to avoid polarization and confrontation but that the agreement to send Commonwealth observers had put the Commonwealth into two camps. It was clear that the richer Commonwealth countries were in a different category from the poorer ones, since it was they who were inclined to send individual observers. He added however that time was not on the Commonwealth's side, as the Secretary-General had pointed out. The satisfactory resolution of Zimbabwe elections was not an issue for the Commonwealth alone; it was also an African issue and indeed one for the entire Third World. In his view it would be necessary to revise the costing in the light of the points made by the representative of Britain. His assurance of providing the "best possible facilities for all observers", might turn out to be "no facilities" at all. It was thus essential for the meeting to consider how the Commonwealth as a whole could support its collective observer role.

44. The Representative of Tanzania apologised for the absence of her High Commissioner. She stressed that her Government was adamant that the Commonwealth representatives in their consideration of the Observer Group should not trim their requirements to what facilities the Rhodesian Government could provide. The numbers suggested in the Secretariat's paper were an absolute minimum and indeed the reaction of Tanzania had been that there should be more. In any event the number suggested should not be reduced. Furthermore representatives in considering the Observer Group should not be inhibited by what the British Government said it would be able to afford. The Observer Group was of vital importance and she agreed with the proposal made by the Australian representative that its financing should be provided on the usual basis for financing the Secretariat.

45. She noted that the Observer Group would have no executive role to play but the details concerning its role were important. She drew attention to paragraph 8(a) (i) of the Secretariat paper and stressed that it would be very important for observers to assess the "practical effects of existing laws" in Rhodesia; for example, she recalled that during the last elections there had been restrictions on financial expenditure by candidates.

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Please make the following correction to the above minutes:

In para 45 delete the second sentence and substitute the following:

"She drew attention to paragraph 8(a)(i) of the Secretariat paper and stressed that it would be very important for observers also to assess the 'practical effects of existing laws' in Rhodesia; for example, she recalled that during the last elections the regulations placing limits on financial expenditure by candidates had been lifted".

46. Referring to paragraph 8(a) (ii) about the special consideration that might have to be given to the position of political prisoners, she asked what political prisoners the Secretariat envisaged would still remain in Rhodesia at the time of elections. Her Government believed that by that time all existing political prisoners in Rhodesia would have been released.

47. Referring to paragraph 8(b), she stressed that it would be necessary for the Group to satisfy themselves about relevant matters before as well as after polling. In this connection she recalled that during the last election there had been reports that some of the ballot boxes had not been properly sealed. She also observed that during the last election some polling stations had allowed friends of illiterate voters to mark the voting papers for them. Bearing in mind that some 70 per cent of the population were illiterate there was a need for some national norm on this matter.

48. She drew attention to the reference in paragraph 14 to the need for interpreters to assist the Observer Group and stressed that they should not be provided by the authorities in Rhodesia but independently, suggesting as sources of recruitment institutions such as Universities or missionary organisations, in order to ensure impartiality. She also proposed that transport utilized by the Group should be clearly identifiable.

49. The Representative of Ghana stressed that the Commonwealth Observer Group was of essential importance and representatives should seek to overcome the many problems raised. There were certain commitments that some Commonwealth countries had relating to Lusaka, to the OAU, for example, or to the Non-Aligned Group - responsibilities which had to be fulfilled - and therefore the Committee should not be deterred in its consideration of the Observer Group. It was he felt right for the British representative to draw attention to the problems and he felt it would serve to strengthen the Committee's determination to fulfil its

role in regard to the Observer Group. It would be a mistake for the Committee to await proposals from the Governor as they should not expect him to make the Observer Group his first priority; but it was the Committee's priority.

50. The Committee should determine what the Observer Group would actually require in Rhodesia and work out how to provide it. For example if no hotel facilities were available then the Observer Group would have to consider mobile homes or tents. He appealed to those Commonwealth countries who had accepted individual invitations to consider combining this function with participation in the Commonwealth Group as this would reduce pressure on available facilities. He agreed with the proposal that the Group might be financed on the normal basis but with voluntary contributions also being sought, for example in the area of communications. Certain countries might be able to make aircraft and land rovers available and other countries could provide specialist teams. He suggested that the British should say what was available so that the Secretariat could undertake detailed costings on the basis of which countries would decide what further assistance could be provided.

51. On the question of immunity he emphasised that it was essential for Commonwealth observers to have both civil and criminal immunity and pointed out that only responsible people would be selected as members of the Group. As the Secretariat paper had pointed out there was no duplication of roles, but the Group would need to have the ability to do its work properly and thereby maintain credibility.

52. The Representative of Britain, in reply to an earlier point by the Jamaican representative, observed that there would be enormous demands on facilities in Rhodesia but that the authorities would do their best to help the Commonwealth Observer Group and individual observers sent by Commonwealth countries. He then apologised for leaving the meeting in order to attend a plenary session at Lancaster House.

53. The Representative of Guyana, referring to the Ghanaian representative's point about immunity, said that the question of immunity was a matter of international law and he was concerned about the British representative's statement that this was an issue for discussion with the Governor in Salisbury. The issue of immunity was a matter of principle of international law concerning the High Contracting Parties and consequently should be settled with the FCO in London. The fundamental constitutional fact was that Rhodesia was a British Crown Colony and as such the Governor in Salisbury was in no position to decide on the question of immunity. Without commenting on the merit of the proposal it was necessary that the Committee should direct its approach on the question of immunity to the British Government.

54. The Representative of Canada said that his Government had no objection to a Commonwealth Group. However, his Government had not yet reached a political decision as to whether Canada should participate in the Commonwealth Group or send an individual team or both. If Canada were to participate in the Commonwealth Group it would do so on the basis that the Observer Group should both be effective and undertake its work at reasonable cost. He felt that the Secretariat document was a good starting point but that it required inputs from Commonwealth Governments. There were three questions he wished to raise; the overall size of the Group, its method of operation, and the method of financing. The Canadian Government was not prepared to give a blank cheque. Furthermore, he was concerned by some of the wording of the Secretariat document which seemed to suggest a confusion between observing and monitoring; it also seemed at times that the duties of the Observer Group verged on those of a Commission of Enquiry. In the interest of speed he suggested that the Chairman should establish a Sub-Committee of seven or eight members to give immediate detailed consideration to the proposals for the Observer Group. Canada would be willing to serve on the Sub-Committee.

55. The Representative of India said he was in full agreement with the Secretariat paper. There were some small problems, but

these could easily be ironed out. He noted that the British representative's statement at the very outset had raised the conceptual issue that the British Government would be primarily responsible for elections in Rhodesia. He felt that the Committee entirely agreed with this for Commonwealth Heads of Government at Lusaka had made a distinction between the Commonwealth observer role and the British Government's responsibility for holding the elections. The size of the teams suggested by the Secretariat was the minimum strength needed for effective observation of an election which involved so many polling stations and polling booths. In his view it was important to avoid a situation where the Commonwealth Group would be merely observing other people's observations. He insisted that the role of observing could not be satisfactorily fulfilled unless there were enough observers and he endorsed once again the number suggested in the Secretariat paper. In considering the numbers necessary it must be borne in mind that the bulk of the team would be sent to Rhodesia for only a short period of time. He noted that it had been said that it would be very difficult to provide the facilities in paragraph 20(a). Only the authorities in Rhodesia could provide these facilities; all that Commonwealth Governments could do, if these facilities were not provided free, was to meet the costs involved.

56. He agreed with the representative of Ghana that the issue of immunities was very important if the Group was to operate effectively. Recalling the British representative's statement that the British Election Commissioner and his staff would not be given immunity, he pointed out that in any case it was not normal for Governments to give immunity to their own citizens. Finally, referring to the report to be made by Commonwealth observers, he believed that at a recent Committee meeting a decision had been taken on the basis of a very wide consensus that the Commonwealth Group would be responsible for reporting to Commonwealth Heads of Government through the Secretary-General. However, he was surprised by the British representative's observation that the reports of individual observer teams and the collective Commonwealth team would have the same status. If this were the case, then the basic issue was still open but he stressed that his Government understood that the Commonwealth Observer Group would alone be responsible to all Commonwealth Heads of

Government. Individual Governments could if they wished make independent reports for their own individual benefit.

57. The Representative of Mauritius referred to paragraph 3 of the Secretariat paper on the mode of appointment of the Group and said if facilities such as transport, accommodation, communication etc. were scarce the Commonwealth Group should have priority claim to these facilities as against the independent observers. The Group should not be relegated to second class status. He agreed with the comments made by the representatives of Ghana and India on immunity and requested the British Government to re-examine this matter.

58. The Representative of Nigeria thanked the Secretary-General for the concise, helpful and complete document before the meeting. He supported in particular the views expressed by the representatives of Jamaica, Ghana and Tanzania. He found it surprising that despite already lengthy discussion on this subject, the British Government did not appear to have fully briefed the Governor on the role and needs of the Commonwealth Observer Group before, during and after the election and that the Governor would have to be consulted on these matters before final decisions were made. He requested the British Government to ensure that the Governor was adequately briefed. As regards the financial aspects, he felt that the Secretariat's paper had outlined the proposals in sufficient detail to enable the Committee to make a decision and that further details could be provided later. He considered it vital that the Commonwealth team be as financially independent as possible and volunteered to serve on a Sub-Committee to consider the financial aspects. He also noted that it would be necessary for the Secretary-General to send an advance party within the next few days to make contact with the Governor's administration and to establish in greater detail the various requirements of the team. He suggested that the Secretary-General approach some of the Commonwealth Governments on his provisional list in order to enable some Commonwealth personnel to be on the ground in Rhodesia early in the following week. This would facilitate the provision of better information on logistics, mobility and costs. He agreed with the representative of Ghana that the

cost estimated should be included in the information to be sent to Governments for consideration, and that member Governments should be invited to give material assistance by way of supply of equipment such as radios, vehicles, and tents in addition to contributions towards the cost of the Group. He suggested that these matters be taken account of in the implementation of the Secretariat's proposals.

59. The Representative of Lesotho thanked the Secretary-General for the paper before the Committee which he considered very realistic especially with respect to the number of countries to be included in the team and with respect to costs. He noted that one reason for the Governor having been sent in such a hurry was the hope that he could put an immediate stop to the raids by Rhodesian forces into neighbouring countries. As the local Rhodesian authorities were capable of meeting the expenses of such raids, he considered that they would also be capable of contributing a small amount towards a lasting settlement. In his view the Rhodesian authorities had ample resources and the British Government now had the power to require them to pay part of the cost of the election as Rhodesia's status had now reverted to that of a British colony. One of the reasons why the election previously held in Rhodesia had not gained international recognition was that it was seen to be manifestly unfair and partial. It was very important therefore that the election was seen to be fair and impartial. The British representative had assured the meeting that the Governor had adequate power to ensure a fair and impartial election but it would surely be of further assistance to the Governor if a Commonwealth Observer Group was witness to that election and therefore able to facilitate international recognition of the new Government. Britain should clearly understand the importance of international acceptability of the outcome of the election. One contributing factor to this acceptability would be additional evidence that the elections had been fair and impartial. If there were claims later that the election was not fair and impartial the war would in all probability recur.

60. The Representative of Tanzania supported the suggestion made by the representative of Nigeria for a Sub-Committee to consider the financial questions in depth. As the matter was urgent, the sub-committee should meet that afternoon. Its members should be appointed immediately at the meeting and be convened under the chairmanship of the Secretary-General.

61. The Representative of New Zealand supported the representative from Tanzania and suggested that the Sub-Committee should meet to consider not only the costs of sending the Commonwealth team but also the likely resources, in terms of accommodation and transport which could be made available by Britain. He suggested that governments providing observers and supporting staff to the joint Commonwealth team should be invited to bear the costs of accommodation and external airfares in addition to salaries and other subsistence costs.

62. The Representative of Britain stated, with respect to the point made by the representative of Lesotho, that the Government was firmly committed to fair and impartial elections and to the need for international acceptability. This was why it had arranged and participated in the negotiations at Lancaster House. All efforts would be made to provide adequate facilities for both the members of the Commonwealth Observer Group and other observers. She pointed out that the Governor would be responsible for arranging the election and that this would be the beginning of an irreversible process towards majority rule in Rhodesia to which the British Government very much looked forward. With regard to the point made by the representative of Nigeria she said that the Governor had in fact been briefed on the role and needs of the Commonwealth Observer team. She emphasized however that the Governor required a few days on the ground in Rhodesia in order to assess the prevailing situation. Turning to the suggestion for a Sub-Committee she suggested that the first priority should be to seek an assessment from the Governor as to what facilities could in fact be made available to the Commonwealth team.

She explained that while the British Government was aware that facilities, especially for accommodation were limited, it did not have precise information. With regard to the suggestion made by the representative of Lesotho, she did not believe it was realistic to look to the local Rhodesian authorities to assist in meeting the financial costs of the Commonwealth team. The budget of these authorities was already very stretched and the British Government had been asked for assistance on many aspects of the election process.

63. The Representative of The Gambia noted that throughout the negotiations at Lancaster House the Patriotic Front had been made to rush its decision-making on the grounds that there was little time and it surprised him therefore that the British representative was now telling the meeting that Britain needed more time to provide facilities for the Commonwealth Observer Group. In his view if the Rhodesian authorities did not have sufficient resources by way of accommodation, transport, etc. the British Government should investigate the options available to deal with this problem. It could, for example, commandeer army vehicles and other facilities to meet the needs of the Group. Where hotels were full tourists could be asked to vacate rooms to make them available to Commonwealth Observers. After the previous election the observers sent to Rhodesia had held conflicting views as to its fairness. He urged that the Commonwealth Observer Group be given sufficient facilities to carry out its work effectively and enable it to submit an authoritative report. He hoped that the Commonwealth would be able to add weight to the British Government's conduct of the election. He agreed with the suggestions in the Commonwealth Secretariat document and stressed that these proposals should be implemented with urgency. Solutions should be found as soon as possible to the problem of land mines and decisions taken quickly on accommodation, tents and other facilities. Various options for the utilisation of army facilities should also be discussed as soon as possible.

64. Noting that many relevant and important points had been raised by the Committee, the Chairman asked the Secretary-General if he wished to say anything further.

65. The Secretary-General said that the Committee's discussions had been very helpful. He felt that there was a substantial element of consensus to point the way forward. The mood of the Committee had been that a Commonwealth Observer Group was essential but it needed to be credible and effective. The costs of sending the Group should be borne by member countries on the same basis as the normal budget of the Secretariat. He added however that there was room for voluntary contributions in the form of cash or kind.

66. Some very interesting suggestions had been made as to ways of minimizing the burden placed on local resources in Rhodesia and restricting the numbers involved in national observer teams. Many Commonwealth Governments had contacted him and expressed themselves in favour of a Commonwealth Observer Group instead of national teams, and were seeking urgent confirmation that a Commonwealth Group was being assembled. The mood of the Committee that Commonwealth resources should be placed behind the team to help meet problems that might otherwise arise was most helpful.

67. He had, however, been deeply surprised that anyone would even contemplate that the report of the collective Commonwealth Group might not be accorded a very high measure of importance. Without wishing to speak in terms of relative priorities, he stressed that a Commonwealth observer role was an essential part of the Lusaka accord and that Commonwealth Governments saw it as an integral element of the final settlement.

68. Referring to the need for speed, of which the Secretariat was acutely conscious, he said that arrangements were already in hand for a small team to go to Salisbury within the next few days.

69. He then referred to the Canadian proposal that a small Sub-Committee of about eight persons should be constituted. He suggested that the Sub-Committee, which might consist of the representatives of Ghana, (in the Chair), Australia, Canada, Guyana, India, Nigeria, Tanzania and UK, should meet that afternoon at 3.00 p.m. He felt that it would be unwise to postpone further consultations pending further information from the authorities in

Salisbury. He noted that his initial proposals had been sent to Lord Carrington on 1st November, that it was now 13th December and that there was great urgency to proceed. A settlement on Rhodesia was imminent and he would therefore suggest that the Committee reconvene the following morning at 10.30 a.m. to consider the report of the Sub-Committee, which would be circulated to High Commissioners that evening.

70. The Representative of Ghana agreed to serve as Chairman and suggested that the High Commissioner for Bangladesh, as a military man, should also be included as a member of the Sub-Committee because of his familiarity with the logistical aspects involved.

71. The Committee concluded by agreeing that the Sub-Committee should meet that afternoon at 3.00 p.m. and that it would itself reconvene at 10.30 the following morning.

72. The meeting adjourned at 12.45 p.m.

International Affairs Division
Commonwealth Secretariat
Marlborough House
London SW1

13 December 1979

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GR 450

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DESKBY FCO 172000Z

FM DAR ES SALAAM 171900Z DECEMBER 79

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 1002 OF 17 DECEMBER

INFO PRIORITY SALISBURY, LUSAKA, MAPTUA, LUANDA, GABORONES,
LAGOS, ADDIS ABABA, PRETORIA, WASHINGTON, OTTAWA, CANBERRA,
WELLINGTON, UKMIS NEWYORK

MIPT: RHODESIA

1. PRESIDENT NYERERE (WHO TRAVELS TO IRAQ TOMORROW) SUMMONED
THE US AMBASSADOR AND MYSELF THIS EVENING 17 DECEMBER.

2. HE SAID HE HAD JUST RETURNED FROM A MEETING IN NAMPULA
WITH PRESIDENTS KAUNDA AND MACHEL AND HE WAS NOW REPORTING
TO US AS CHAIRMAN OF THE FLS. THE MEETING HAD BEEN CALLED BY
MACHEL.

3. THE THREE PRESIDENTS FELT THAT A GREAT DEAL HAD BEEN ACHIEVED
IN THE LANCASTER HOUSE CONFERENCE AND THE REMAINING DIFFERENCES
BETWEEN BRITAIN AND THE PF SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO CAUSE FAILURE.
THE DIFFERENCES WERE NOT FUNDAMENTAL HOWEVER MUCH EACH SIDE MIGHT
THINK THEY WERE. THE FLS WERE THEREFORE APPEALING TO THE PF TO
BE FLEXIBLE AND NOT TO INSIST ON THEIR DEMANDS (AT A LATER
POINT, HE SPOKE OF THEIR "SENDING A VERY CLEAR MESSAGE TO
THE PF"). THEY WERE ALSO APPEALING TO THE BRITISH TO BE
FLEXIBLE AND NOT TO REGARD THE FIGURE OF 15 ASSEMBLY POINTS AS
IMMUTABLE. THE FLS BELIEVED THAT COMPROMISE SHOULD BE POSSIBLE,
AND WE SHOULD NOW AGREE AND MOVE ON TO THE NEXT STAGE NAMELY
THE ELECTIONS.

4. NYERERE WENT ON TO ADDRESS WHAT HE DESCRIBED AS A COMPLAINT
TO THE BRITISH. HE BELIEVED THAT WE SHOULD NOT HAVE SENT IN
THE GOVERNOR BEFORE AGREEMENT IN THE CONFERENCE. AFTER GOING
INTO PAST HISTORY OF HOW WE HAD FAILED TO ACT AGAINST UDI, HE SAID
OUR MOVING IN WITH ALACRITY NOW BEFORE AGREEMENT IN THE CONFERENCE
HAD THE IMPLICATION OF OUR TAKING OVER THE WAR AGAINST THE PF.
HE ENDED RATHER LAMELY BY SAYING THAT IT WAS WRONG.

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5. HE CONTINUED BY COMPLAINING THAT BOTH WE AND THE AMERICANS SHOULD NOT HAVE LIFTED SANCTIONS IN THE WAY WE HAD DONE. THEY ACCEPTED THAT ONCE THERE WAS A LEGAL GOVERNMENT IN SALISBURY SANCTIONS SHOULD BE ENDED. BUT WE SHOULD HAVE WAITED FOR AGREEMENT IN THE CONFERENCE AND WE SHOULD HAVE GONE TO THE UN. IF AFTER AGREEMENT WE WENT AND ASKED THE UN FOR THE LIFTING OF SANCTIONS THEY WOULD SUPPORT US PUBLICLY. "WE MUST NOT TRAMPLE ON THE UN". HE UNDERSTOOD OUR FEARS THAT SOME COUNTRIES MIGHT OPPOSE THE LIFTING OF SANCTIONS, BUT HE DID NOT THINK THEY COULD STOP IT. IT WAS A QUESTION OF RESPECT FOR THE UN.

6. I SAID THAT WE HAD NO INTENTION OF TRAMPLING ON THE UN. IT WAS SIMPLY THAT OUR VIEW WAS THAT FORMAL ACTION BY THE UN WAS NOT REQUIRED, THAT ALL THE PRECEDENTS WERE AGAINST IT, AND THAT TO CREATE A NEW PRECEDENT NOW COULD EVEN HAVE UNFORTUNATE IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FUTURE QUITE UNCONNECTED WITH RHODESIA OR AFRICA. MR VIETS SPOKE SIMILARLY ADDING THAT THERE WERE "POLITICAL ELEMENTS" ALSO, AND THAT THERE MIGHT WELL BE COUNTRIES WHO, FOR THEIR OWN PURPOSES, MIGHT TRY TO MAINTAIN SANCTIONS. NYERERE CONTINUED TO PRESS AND SPOKE OF THE "NEED TO REPORT TO THE UN" THAT THE CIRCUMSTANCES HAD CHANGED AND THE REASONS FOR SANCTIONS WERE NOW OVER. HOWEVER, WHEN ASKED WHETHER HE THOUGHT A REPORT ALONE WOULD BE ENOUGH HE REFUSED TO BE TIED DOWN TO THIS.

7. NYERERE ENDED BY GOING OVER ALL THE ARGUMENTS WHY HE THOUGHT WE SHOULD OFFER THE PF MORE ASSEMBLY POINTS. I TOLD HIM THAT I REGRETTED THAT I COULD HOLD OUT NO PROSPECT AT ALL OF OUR BEING ABLE TO GO ANY FURTHER THAN OUR PRESENT OFFER (HE WAS UNIMPRESSED BY OUR OFFER OF ONE ADDITIONAL ASSEMBLY POINT)

MOON

FILES

RHOD D
OADS
N AM D
MED
FUSD
PLANNING STAFF
ES & SD
NENAD
CCD
FRD
EID (E)
UND
LEGAL ADVISERS
(MR FERRELAND)
(MR FIFOOT)
ECON D

PCD
DEF D
OJD
NEWS D
PS
PS/LPS
PS/MR LUCE
PS/MR RIDLEY
PS/MR HURD
PS/MR MARTEN
PS/FUS

MR BULLARD
MR HANNAY
LORD R G LENNOX
MISS BROWN
MR DAY

MR ASPIN
MR MILLS

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MR DAY
LORD N G LENNOX
MR ASPIN

MR R L WADE-GERY
MR P M MAXEY
MR GOULTY
MR P J FOWLER
DIO

CABINET
OFFICE

Sir R Armstrong

DESKBY 172000Z

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HD/RHOD DEPT (4)

HD/C AF D
HD/S AF D

HD/PUSD (2)

HD/NEWS DEPT
HD/WAD

Irishland K 200A

MR FIFCOF LEGAL ADVISER RM K164

RESIDENT CLERK

GR 110

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DESKBY FCO 172000Z

FM DAR ES SALAAM 171900Z DECEMBER 79

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 1001 OF 17 DECEMBER

INFO PRIORITY SALISBURY, LUSAKA, MAPUTO, LUANDA, GABORONES,
LAGOS, ADDISIABABA, PRETORIA, WASHINGTON, OTTAWA, CANBERRA,
WELLINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK

RHODESIA

1. PRESIDENT NYERERE TOLD THE US AMBASSADOR AND MYSELF THIS EVENING THAT AFTER MEETING WITH PRESIDENTS KAUNDA AND MACHEL TODAY IN NORTHERN MOZAMBIQUE THEY WERE APPEALING TO THE PF TO BE FLEXIBLE AND TO REACH AGREEMENT WITH US IN THE CONFERENCE (A FULL REPORT IS IN MY IFT).

2. IT WAS THE IMPRESSION OF BOTH MR VIETS AND MYSELF THAT THE BALANCING APPEAL TO OURSELVES TO BE FLEXIBLE WAS VERY MUCH PRO-FORMA AND PROBABLY NYERERE'S OWN IDEA. IT IS SIGNIFICANT THAT THIS MEETING WAS CALLED BY MACHEL.

NOON

CONFIDENTIAL



MODBA(oe)

Treasury Chambers, Parliament Street, SW1P 3AG
01-233 3000

17 December 1979

John Peel

[Handwritten signature]

Ronnie Rutherford

(2)

[Handwritten signature]

IMPLEMENTATION OF A RHODESIAN SETTLEMENT

Thank you for your minute of 10 December.

I note that the estimated costs of the Governor, supervision of the election, and monitoring the ceasefire, have increased to a figure of £24 million, and that the actual cost may turn out to be even higher when the situation has been assessed on the ground. The large increase over the previous estimate of £3.5 million is of course due to the much greater scale of the operation now envisaged and also to a more detailed analysis of requirements.

I agree that you will need additional provision from the contingency reserve to the extent that offsetting savings cannot be found from within your approved public expenditure allocation for 1979-80. As you say, our officials have been in touch about this, and I understand they have so far identified savings of £16 million - including £10 million which had been provisionally set aside against the possibility of a UN Peacekeeping Force in Namibia. We shall clearly need to watch this very closely, and I shall be glad if your officials will continue to advise mine of changes in the cost estimates. No doubt you will inform me at once if there seems any possibility of expenditure slipping into 1980-81.

I note that you expect to limit our contribution to refugee relief to £1 million, which can be accommodated within the approved Aid Programme. I understand the UNHCR has adequate funds available to meet the likely costs of repatriation. But emergency food or relief aid, if that proved necessary, could be very expensive. I should be glad if you would consult me before committing any Aid Programme money for such work.

/ I agree

The Rt. Hon. The Lord Carrington, KCMG, MC.

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I agree that Parliament should be informed of the latest cost estimates as soon as possible.

I am copying this letter to the Prime Minister, and to Sir Robert Armstrong.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Geoffrey Howe".

GEOFFREY HOWE

CONFIDENTIAL



177 DEC 1979

B

BF 29/12/79

~~18~~

file



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

17 December 1971

I attach a copy of a message from the Prime Minister of Fiji, the text of which was included in SUVA telegram 367 of 14 December.

I should be glad to have advice on whether any form of reply is needed. We shall of course acknowledge the High Commissioner's letter in the usual way.

N. J. SANDERS

Roderic Lyne, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

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Subject filed on USA: Nov 79
Visit to US Policy

Extract from Record of Meeting between P.M. and
President Carter, Washington 17. 12. 79 (Pt II)

Rhodesia

The Prime Minister asked the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary to explain to the President the position reached in the Lancaster House Conference. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary said that the Conference had cleared all the major hurdles. But the final hurdle was proving the most difficult. The conference was sticking on the question of assembly areas between the time the ceasefire was declared and the holding of the election. Broadly speaking the areas controlled by the Patriotic Front, and consequently their assembly areas, were around the outside edge of the country. The Patriotic Front wanted assembly areas nearer the centre. Also they were anxious not to be surrounded by the Rhodesian Security Forces. We had thought it right to locate the Patriotic Front assembly areas in areas where they were already. The British assessment that there were

/17/18,000

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17/18,000 members of the Patriotic Front in Rhodesia. This suggested that 15 assembly areas was about right. Moreover since the British Government would be responsible for feeding and housing them, it would be difficult to take on a greater number.

The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary said that he had been surprised at the Patriotic Front's unwillingness to accept. The reason probably was that they saw political advantage in moving closer to the centre. The British compromise proposal consisted:-

- (a) of offering the Patriotic Front one additional assembly area nearer the centre of the country; and
- (b) taking advantage of the fact that the Patriotic Front's claim to have 35,000 guerrillas in the country was clearly unrealistic, of saying that if our assessment of the numbers was wrong, the Governor would reconsider the number of assembly areas.

There was a good chance that these offers would do the trick. President Michael had been extremely helpful and had told Mr. Mugabe that he could not continue the struggle from Mozambique territory. President Kaunda had told Mr Nkomo to sign and Mr. Nkomo clearly wished to do so. President Nyerere had been more equivocal. Mr. Mugabe did not wish to sign but was under great pressure. The situation looked promising but throughout the negotiations it had proved difficult to bring the Patriotic Front to the point of decision. It had frequently been necessary to issue ultimata while denying it. The sending of Lord Soames to Salisbury had been the final ultimatum: the Patriotic Front knew that they risked getting left behind in the preparations for the election. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary said that he would be misleading the President if he gave the impression that even after a ceasefire the situation would be other than very uneasy. There was a strong risk that the Patriotic Front in the event would not assemble in their assigned areas. If so the

/Rhodesian

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Rhodesian Security Forces could not be expected to ignore the situation. It was for these reasons that it was so urgent to hold the election. The President asked whether Bishop Muzorewa was genuinely opposed to any extension in the number of assembly areas or whether he regarded that as bargaining cards. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary said that it was a bit of both. On the whole he thought that the amended British position was fair. The Prime Minister commented that Bishop Muzorewa and his colleagues had throughout the negotiations done whatever had been asked of them. He had given up the post of Prime Minister and agreed to hold a new election a few months after having won one. Mr. Vance asked whether there would be a problem over the infiltration of Patriotic Front guerrillas during the period between the ceasefire and the election. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary said that he hoped that it would be possible to persuade President Michel and Kaunda to stop it. It was true that even if they agreed to do so a good deal of infiltration would continue. None the less there was no case for an expansion of the number of areas at present.

The President asked whether the British Government had ever approached the Soviet Government for help. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary said that the Soviet Union had throughout been very unhelpful. He had discussed the problem with Gromyko whose attitude had been hostile. The Russians and the Romanians were both supplying arms to the Patriotic Front. Trouble in the area suited them very well. Mr. Brzezinski queried the reference to the Romanians. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary confirmed it. (News of the Romanian involvement clearly came as a surprise to Mr. Brzezinski.)

The Prime Minister said that throughout the conference the tension in the relation^{ship} between Mr Nkomo and Mr. Mugabe had been obvious. They had however decided not to break up the Patriotic Front at least while they were in London. It was difficult to predict what would happen when they returned to Rhodesia. In any case the British Government intended to go

/ahead

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-4-

ahead. She believed that they would get through. Lord Soames' task would not be easy. It had been essential to send someone with a powerful personality. The Governor would have little material support to fall back on.

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File

215

17 December 1979

I am writing on behalf of the Prime Minister, who is at present in the United States, to thank you for your letter of 14 December, with which you enclosed a message from your Prime Minister. I will of course place your letter before the Prime Minister at the earliest opportunity.

NJS

His Excellency Mr. J. D. Gibson, CBE.

KRR

GRS 300A

UNCLASSIFIED

DESKBY 151900Z (CAIRO)

FROM FCO 151800Z DEC 79

TO IMMEDIATE LUSAKA

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1041 OF 15 DECEMBER

AND TO IMMEDIATE CAIRO SALISBURY NAIROBI MAPUTO GABORONE DAR ES
SALAAM LUANDA LAGOS WASHINGTON PRETORIA ADDIS ABABA MONROVIA CANBERRA
OTTAWA WELLINGTON PRIORITY PEKING MOSCOW PRAGUE DAKAR KINSHASA
KHARTOUM TOKYO EEC POSTS KUWAIT KINGSTON BRIDGETOWN DACCA NEW DELHI
SINGAPORE GEORGETOWN FREETOWN PORT LOUIS PORT OF SPAIN LILONGWE
VALETTA BANJUL COLOMBO ACCRA KUALA LUMPUR NICOSIA OSLO STOCKHOLM
LISBON MADRID ATHENS MBABANE ABIDJAN
INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK

INFO SAVING NASSAU MASERU CASTRIES SUVA PORT MORESBY HONIARA
NUKUALOFA VICTORIA TARAWA UKDEL NATO SOFIA BUDAPEST BUCHAREST
EAST BERLIN BELGRADE ALGIERS TUNIS TRIPOLI RABAT TEHRAN

FCO TELNOS 1039 AND 1040.

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF FINAL DOCUMENT INTIALLED TODAY BY SECRETARY
OF STATE AND MUNDAWARARA (IT HAS BEEN RELEASED TO THE PRESS).
BEGINS:-

SOUTHERN RHODESIA

CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE HELD AT LANCASTER HOUSE, LONDON
SEPTEMBER-DECEMBER 1979

REPORT

1. FOLLOWING THE MEETING OF COMMONWEALTH HEADS OF GOVERNMENT
HELD IN LUSAKA FROM 1 TO 7 AUGUST, HER MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT ISSUED
INVITATIONS TO BISHOP MUZOREWA AND THE LEADERS OF THE PATRIOTIC
FRONT TO PARTICIPATE IN A CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE AT
LANCASTER HOUSE. THE PURPOSE OF THE CONFERENCE WAS TO DISCUSS
AND REACH AGREEMENT ON THE TERMS OF AN INDEPENDENCE CONSTITUTION,
AND THAT ELECTIONS SHOULD BE SUPERVISED UNDER BRITISH AUTHORITY
TO ENABLE RHODESIA TO PROCEED TO LEGAL INDEPENDENCE AND THE PARTIES
TO SETTLE THEIR DIFFERENCES BY POLITICAL MEANS.

12. THE CONFERENCE

2. THE CONFERENCE OPENED ON 10 SEPTEMBER UNDER THE CHAIRMANSHIP OF LORD CARRINGTON, SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH AFFAIRS. THE CONFERENCE CONCLUDED ON DECEMBER, AFTER PLENARY SESSIONS. A LIST OF THE OFFICIAL DELEGATES TO THE CONFERENCE IS AT ANNEX A. THE TEXT OF LORD CARRINGTON'S OPENING ADDRESS IS AT ANNEX B, TOGETHER WITH STATEMENTS MADE BY MR NKOMO ON BEHALF OF HIS AND MR MUGABE'S DELEGATION AND BY BISHOP MUZOREWA ON BEHALF OF HIS DELEGATION.

3. IN THE COURSE OF ITS PROCEEDINGS THE CONFERENCE REACHED AGREEMENT ON THE FOLLOWING ISSUES:

- A SUMMARY OF THE INDEPENDENCE CONSTITUTION (ATTACHED AS ANNEX C TO THIS REPORT) FOOTNOTE: (THE CONSTITUTION, WHICH WAS ENACTED BY ORDER IN COUNCIL ON 6 DECEMBER 1979, GIVES FULL EFFECT TO THIS SUMMARY.)

- ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE PRE-INDEPENDENCE PERIOD (ANNEX D)

- A CEASE-FIRE AGREEMENT SIGNED BY THE PARTIES (ANNEX E)

4. IN CONCLUDING THIS AGREEMENT AND SIGNING THIS REPORT THE PARTIES UNDERTAKE:

2.

/A. TO ACCEPT

- A. TO ACCEPT THE AUTHORITY OF THE GOVERNOR:
- B. TO ABIDE BY THE INDEPENDENCE CONSTITUTION:
- C. TO COMPLY WITH THE PRE-INDEPENDENCE ARRANGEMENTS:
- D. TO ABIDE BY THE CEASE-FIRE AGREEMENT:
- E. TO CAMPAIGN PEACEFULLY AND WITHOUT INTIMIDATION:
- F. TO RENOUNCE THE USE OF FORCE FOR POLITICAL ENDS:
- G. TO ACCEPT THE OUTCOME OF THE ELECTIONS AND INSTRUCT ANY FORCES UNDER THEIR AUTHORITY TO DO THE SAME.

ENDS

CARRINGTON

FILES

RHOD D
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 PLANNING STAFF
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 FRD
 EID (E)
 UND
 LEGAL ADVISERS
 (MR STEEL)
 (MR FREELAND)
 (MR FIFOOT)
 ECON D

PCD
 DEF D
 OI D
 NEWS D
 PS
 PS/LFS
 PS/MR LUCE
 PS/MR RIDLEY
 PS/MR HURD
 PS/MR MARTEN
 PS/PUS
 SIR A DUFF
 MR BULLARD
 MR FRETWELL
 LORD N G LENNOX
 MISS BROWN
 MR DAY
 MR WILLSON
 MR ASPIN
 MR CORTAZZI

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION

RHODESIA POLICY

UNCLASSIFIED

FM WASHINGTON 152035Z DEC 79

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 4232 OF 15 DECEMBER

INFO IMMEDIATE SALISBURY NAIROBI MAPUTO GARBORONE DAR ES SALAAM

LUANDA LAGOS PRETORIA ADDIS ABABA MONROVIA CANBERRA OTTAWA

WELLINGTON LUSAKA UKMIS NEW YORK

PRIORITY PEKING MOSCOW PRAGUE DAKAR KINSHASA KHARTOUM TOKYO

EEC POSTS KUWAIT BRIDGETOWN DACCA NEW DELHI SINGAPORE GEORGETOWN

FREETOWN PORT LOUIS PORT OF SPAIN LILONGWE VALETTA BANJUL COLOMBO

ACCRA KUALA LUMPUR NICOSIA OSLO STOCKHOLM LISBON MADRID ATHENS

MBABANE ABIDJAN CAIRO UKDEL NATO SOFIA BUDAPEST BUCHAREST

EAST BERLIN BELGRADE ALGIERS TUNIS TRIPOLI AND RABAT.

RHODESIA SANCTIONS.

1. THE FOLLOWING ANNOUNCEMENT WAS MADE AT 151945Z.

QUOTE

WITH THE ARRIVAL OF THE BRITISH GOVERNOR IN SALISBURY ON WEDNESDAY, THE UNITED KINGDOM HAS ASSUMED LEGAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY IN RHODESIA AND A PROCESS LEADING TO IMPARTIAL ELECTIONS AND INDEPENDENCE HAS BEGUN. THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT HAS TAKEN THIS ACTION ON THE BASIS OF PROPOSALS DEVELOPED BY THE PARTIES AT THE LANCASTER HOUSE CONFERENCE.

ON THE GOVERNOR'S ARRIVAL, ORDINANCES HAVE COME INTO EFFECT WHICH ESTABLISH THE POWERS OF THE ELECTION COMMISSIONER AND MAKE PROVISION FOR THE ELECTION COUNCIL. ALL PARTIES WHICH AGREE TO CAMPAIGN PEACEFULLY WILL BE ABLE TO DO SO FREELY. ALL PARTIES WHICH WISH TO PARTICIPATE IN THE ELECTIONS HAVE BEEN INVITED TO REGISTER. THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT IS TAKING THE LEGISLATIVE ACTION NECESSARY TO BRING INTO FORCE THOSE PARTS OF THE INDEPENDENCE CONSTITUTION REQUIRED FOR ELECTIONS TO BE HELD.

IT HAS BEEN HEARTENING THAT THE TWO DELEGATIONS LED BY BISHOP MUZOREWA AND MESSRS. NKOMO AND MUGABE HAVE ACCEPTED THE BASIC PRINCIPLES OF ALL THE PROPOSALS ELABORATED BY THE BRITISH DELEGATION IN THE LANCASTER HOUSE NEGOTIATIONS. THE REMAINING ISSUES RELATE TO SOME ASPECTS OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE

CEASE-FIRE

CEASE-FIRE. ON TUESDAY, LORD CARRINGTON PRESENTED DETAILED CEASE-FIRE PROPOSALS WHICH WE BELIEVE PROVIDE THE ASSURANCES NECESSARY FOR THE PATRIOTIC FRONT TO HAVE CONFIDENCE IN THE CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH THE ELECTIONS WILL TAKE PLACE.

HAVING STUDIED ALL THE BRITISH PROPOSALS PRESENTED AT LANCASTER HOUSE FOR THE CONSTITUTION, THE TRANSITIONAL ARRANGEMENTS AND THE CEASE-FIRE, IT IS OUR JUDGEMENT THAT THEY ARE FAIR AND MAKE POSSIBLE AN IMPARTIAL ELECTION LEADING TO A JUST SETTLEMENT OF THE RHODESIAN CONFLICT.

IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, IT SEEMS CLEAR THAT THE AIMS AND OBJECTIVES OF THE UN SANCTIONS AS SET FORTH IN THE RELEVANT RESOLUTIONS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL, HAVE, IN FACT, BEEN ACHIEVED.

PRESIDENT CARTER, IN EXPLAINING HIS NOVEMBER 14 DECISION TO MAINTAIN SANCTIONS AGAINST RHODESIA, STATED THAT HE WOULD BE PREPARED TO LIFT SANCTIONS WHEN A BRITISH GOVERNOR ASSUMES AUTHORITY IN SALISBURY AND A PROCESS LEADING TO IMPARTIAL ELECTIONS HAS BEGUN. THESE CONDITIONS HAVE NOW BEEN MET AND THE PRESIDENT HAS ORDERED, EFFECTIVE MID-NIGHT THE SIXTEENTH OF DECEMBER, THAT UNITED STATES SANCTIONS AGAINST RHODESIA BE LIFTED.
UNQUOTE.

2. U.S. SANCTIONS WILL THEREFORE BE LIFTED AT 170500Z.

HENDERSON

FCO/WHITEHALL DISTN.

RHODESIA. D.

[RHODESIA: POLICY: ADVANCE COPIES]

IMMEDIATE

PS
PS/SIR I GILMOUR
PS/MR LUCE
PS/PUS

MR WILLSON
MR DAY
LORD N G LENNOX
MR ASPIN

PS/NO 10 DOWNING STREET

MR R L WADE-GERY
MR P M MAXEY
MR GOULTY
MR P J FOWLER
DIO

CABINET
OFFICE

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HD/PUSD (2)

HD/NEWS DEPT
HD/WAD

to Ireland K200A.
MR FIFCOT LEGAL ADVISER RM K164
RESIDENT CLERK

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OO WASHINGTON

OO UKMIS NEW YORK

GPS 200

CONFIDENTIAL

FM MAPUTO 151730Z DEC 79

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 477 OF 15 DECEMBER

INFO TO IMMEDIATE DAR ES SALAAM LUSAKA GABORONE LUANDA MIRIMBA
SALISBURY PRETORIA WASHINGTON UKMIS NEW YORK

RHODESIA

1. THE US AMBASSADOR SAW PRESIDENT MACHEL AT 1115Z TODAY AND DELIVERED A PERSONAL MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT CARTER URGING MACHEL TO URGE THE PF TO SIGN NOW SEMICLN AND ADVISING HIM THAT THE US CRITERIA FOR LIFTING SANCTIONS HAVE NOW BEEN MET.
2. MACHEL SAID THAT HE HAD SPOKEN BOTH TO NKOMO AND TO MUGABE YESTERDAY EVENING (PRESUMABLY AFTER MY TALK WITH CHISSANO). HE THOUGHT THAT THERE WERE NOW NO GROUNDS FOR HOLDING UP A FINAL AGREEMENT AND HE PROMISED TO CONTACT THE PF LEADERS AGAIN TODAY. MOZAMBIQUE WANTED A SETTLEMENT QUICKLY AND AFTER FREE AND FAIR

HE THOUGHT THAT THERE WERE NOW NO GROUNDS FOR HOLDING UP A FINAL AGREEMENT AND HE PROMISED TO CONTACT THE PF LEADERS AGAIN TODAY. MOZAMBIQUE WANTED A SETTLEMENT QUICKLY AND AFTER FREE AND FAIR ELECTIONS IN ZIMBABWE HE WOULD ACCEPT THE PEOPLE'S VERDICT AND WORK WITH WHOEVER WON - EVEN IF IT WAS MUZOREWA.

3. ON SANCTIONS MACHEL SAID THAT MONTEIRO IS IN NEW YORK READY TO ASK THE SECURITY COUNCIL TO LIFT SANCTIONS THE MOMENT AGREEMENT IS REACHED IN LONDON. THE MOZAMBICANS WERE WORKING TO ENSURE THAT NEITHER OF THE TWO PERMANENT MEMBERS WHO MIGHT CAST A VETO WOULD IN FACT DO SO. MACHEL THEREFORE WOULD ASK PRESIDENT CARTER TO POSTPONE LIFTING SANCTIONS BY A WEEK. HE FELT SURE THAT FULL AGREEMENT WILL HAVE BEEN REACHED BY THEN.

4. COMMENT: THE PF LEADERS MUST REALISE THAT IT IS VIRUTALLY IMPOSSIBLE FOR MACHEL TO DISOWN THEM SEMICLN BUT THEY MUST ALSO KNOW THAT HE COULD MAKE LIFE EXTREMELY DIFFICULT FOR THEM IF THEY FRUSTRATE THE GENERAL DESIRE FOR A SETTLEMENT. I HAVE NO INDICATION AT THIS END WHETHER MACHEL HAS COME TO THE POINT OF WARNING MUGABE THAT, UNLESS HE SETTLES, HE CAN NO LONGER COUNT ON MOZAMBIKAN CO-OPERATION, WHATEVER THEY SAY IN PUBLIC.

5. MACHEL ALSO DESPERATELY WANTS SANCTIONS LIFTED SEMICLN BUT HE FEELS THAT IS POLITICALLY OUT OF THE QUESTION FOR MOZAMBIQUE TO DO SO MERELY ON A CUE FROM BRITAIN.

PAPADOPOULOS

NNNN

SENT / RECD AT 151750Z SMAP/JB

PRIORITY

PS

PS/SIR I GILMOUR
PS/MR LUCE
PS/PUS

MR WILLSON
MR DAY
LORD N G LENNOX
MR ASPIN

PS/NO 10 DOWNING STREET -

MR R L WADE-GERY)
MR P M MAXEY)
MR GOULTY)
MR P J FOWLER)
DIO)

CABINET
OFFICE

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Sp Freeland K200

MR FIFCOF LEGAL ADVISER RM K164

~~RESIDENT CLERK~~

CONFIDENTIAL

FM UKMIS NEW YORK 151655Z DEC 79
TO PRIORITY FCO
TEL NUMBER 1886 OF 15 DECEMBER

INFO PRIORITY ATHENS

MY TELNO 1847 (PARA 6) AND ATHENS TELNO 416:
RHODESIA: UN LEGAL COUNSEL'S VIEW ON SANCTIONS.

1. WE GATHERED YESTERDAY EVENING IN CONFIDENCE FROM A MEMBER OF
SUY'S OFFICE THAT SUY HAS NOW ADVISED WALDHEIM ALONG THE FOLLOWING
LINES. IT IS FOR THE UK TO DETERMINE THAT THE REBELLION IS OVER.
THE UK IS IN A SPECIAL POSITION BECAUSE IT CANNOT APPLY SANCTIONS
AGAINST ITSELF. ONLY THE SECURITY COUNCIL CAN DETERMINE THAT THERE
IS NO LONGER A THREAT TO THE PEACE. THE DETERMINATION IN SCR
232 REFERRED TO 'THE PRESENT SITUATION'. IN DECEMBER 1966 THE
SITUATION INCLUDED THE REBELLION BUT ALSO ADDITIONAL ELEMENTS.
ALTHOUGH THE UK HAS DETERMINED THAT THE REBELLION IS OVER, THESE
ADDITIONAL ELEMENTS REMAIN. THE COUNCIL NEED NOT ADOPT A RESOLUTION
IN ORDER TO DETERMINE THAT THE THREAT TO THE PEACE HAS ENDED. IT
WOULD BE ENOUGH FOR MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL TO EXPRESS THEIR CONSENT,
EVEN TACITLY (AS IN THE CASE OF OUR LETTER ABOUT THE BEIRA PATROL).
AT THIS STAGE, SHARES SUY'S VIEWS

IN ORDER TO DETERMINE THAT THE THREAT TO THE PEACE HAS ENDED. IT WOULD BE ENOUGH FOR MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL TO EXPRESS THEIR CONSENT, EVEN TACITLY (AS IN THE CASE OF OUR LETTER ABOUT THE BEIRA PATROL). OUR INFORMATION IS THAT WALDHEIM, AT THIS STAGE, SHARES SUY'S VIEWS.

2. MY LEGAL ADVISER WELCOMED ACCEPTANCE OF THE ARGUMENT THAT THE UK COULD NOT APPLY SANCTIONS AGAINST ITSELF AND POINTED OUT THAT THE LOGICAL NEXT STEP IN THE ARGUMENT WAS TO SAY THAT OTHER MEMBER STATES COULD NOT APPLY SANCTIONS AGAINST THE UK IN RIGHT OF RHODESIA. WE DID NOT ACCEPT THE VIEW THAT SCR 232 INCLUDED ELEMENTS OTHER THAN THE REBELLION IN THE DETERMINATION OF THE THREAT TO THE PEACE.

PARSONS

NNNN

[RHODESIA: POLICY: ADVANCE COPIES]

PS
PS/SIR I GILMOUR
PS/MR LUCE
PS/PUS

MR WILLSON
MR DAY
LORD N G LENNOX
MR ASPIN

PS/NO 10 DOWNING STREET

MR R L WADE-GERY
MR P M MAXEY
MR GOULTY
MR P J FOWLER
DIO

CABINET
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Mr Fifeoff
MR FIFCOFF LEGAL ADVISER RM K16A

RESIDENT CLERK

(+27)

UNCLASSIFIED
FROM SALISBURY 151545Z DEC 79
TO PRIORITY FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1150 OF 15 DECEMBER 1979

INFO PRIORITY PRETORIA, LUSAKA, DAR ES SALAAM, MAPUTO,
GABORONE, LUANDA, WASHINGTON AND UKMIS NEW YORK.

GOVERNOR'S FIRST DAYS IN SALISBURY.

1. IN THE RUSH OF THE FIRST FEW DAYS, WE HAVE REPORTED ONLY SCANTILY ON LORD SOAMES' RECEPTION.
2. THE ARRIVAL CEREMONY AT THE AIRPORT WAS WELL ORGANISED BY THE RHODESIANS. AS WE REPORTED BY TELEPHONE, THE SECURITY FORCE COMMANDERS THEMSELVES DECIDED THAT IT WOULD BE BETTER, IN THE CONTEXT OF THE CEASEFIRE DISCUSSIONS, IF THEY WERE NOT THERE. IAN SMITH PLEADED A PRIOR ENGAGEMENT. D YOUNG WAS UNAVOIDABLY OUT OF SALISBURY AND G SMITH WAS GENUINELY SICK. THE WELCOMING PARTY THEREFORE COMPRISED 3 MEMBERS OF THE SALISBURY 12 PLUS ANDERSEN, WHO ARRIVED UNVITED, THAT ACTING CHIEF JUSTICE, COMMISSIONER OF POLICE, 2 FOREIGN MINISTRY OFFICIALS AND AN AFRICAN ACTING CHIEF OF PROTOCOL (APPOINTED FOR THE OCCASION). SIR H GIBBS WATCHED FROM THE TERMINAL BALCONY AND CALLED ON LORD SOAMES THAT EVENING FOR A DRINK.
3. A FAIR NUMBER OF PEOPLE LINED THE ROUTE TO GOVERNMENT HOUSE, A FEW LOOKED HOSTILE, SEVERAL IMPASSIVE, BUT MOST WERE WELCOMING.
4. ALL REPORTS WHICH WE HAVE RECEIVED SUGGEST THAT THE BROADCAST TO THE NATION ON THE FIRST EVENING MADE THE RIGHT IMPACT AND WAS WELL RECEIVED.
5. MIZOREWA, GEORGE SMITH (CABINET SECRETARY) AND ALLUM (COMMISSIONER OF POLICE) MADE INITIAL CALLS ON 13 DECEMBER TO HAND OVER ALL AND ESTABLISH CONTACT AS APPROPRIATE. THE ATTYCHERE AT

5. MUZOREWA, GEORGE SMITH (CABINET SECRETARY) AND ALLUM (COMMISSIONER OF POLICE) MADE INITIAL CALLS ON 13 DECEMBER TO "HAND OVER" AND "ESTABLISH CONTACT" AS APPROPRIATE. THE ATMOSPHERE AT THESE MEETINGS WAS CORDIAL. MUZOREWA EXPRESSED READINESS TO HELP WHEREVER POSSIBLE. ALLUM NOW SEEMS KEEN TO ESTABLISH THE APPROPRIATE WORKING RELATIONSHIP AND TO MAKE THE ADJUSTMENTS NECESSARY FOR POLICE OPERATION UNDER THE GOVERNOR'S RULE. DURING A CALL BY AIR MARSHAL MACLAREN THAT DAY IT EMERGED AS UNDERSTOOD THAT THERE WOULD BE NO CROSS BORDER RAIDS.

6. ON 14 DECEMBER THERE WERE HANDOVER CALLS BY GROUPS OF MINISTERS (D SMITH, BULLE AND NYEMBA; MAZAIWANA, MUTITI AND ANDERSEN; NYANDORO, IRVINE, ZIMUTO AND MTIMKHULU). IRVINE WAS FRIENDLY (FOR HIM) THOUGH A LITTLE CARPING. ALL THE OTHERS WELCOMED THE GOVERNOR AND OFFERED TO ASSIST WHEREVER THEY COULD. BULLE AND NYEMBA MADE A POINT OF SAYING THAT THEIR IMPRESSION OF THE GENERAL AFRICAN REACTION WAS OF PLEASURE AND SOME EXCITEMENT OVER THE GOVERNOR'S ARRIVAL. VAN DER BYL'S OFFICE HAVE MADE CLEAR THAT HE WOULD PREFER NOT TO CALL. IAN SMITH HAD "ENGAGEMENTS" THIS WEEK BUT IS CALLING ON 18 DECEMBER. THE REMAINING MINISTERS, WHO WERE OUT OF TOWN, WILL ALSO CALL EARLY NEXT WEEK.

7. ESTABLISHING CONTACT WITH PERMANENT SECRETARIES WAS BEGUN THIS MORNING WITH CALLS BY TWO GROUPS OF FIVE. THESE MEETINGS ALSO WENT WELL AND THE SECRETARIES ARE CLEARLY READY TO CO-OPERATE. THEIR MAIN CONCERN IS HOW WE AND THEY JOINTLY KEEP BUSINESS MOVING. WE ARE WORKING ON THIS WITH G SMITH.

SOAMES

NNNN

IMMEDIATE

PS
PS/SIR I GILMOUR
PS/MR LUCE
PS/PUS

PS/NO 10 DOWNING STREET

MR WILLSON
MR DAY
LORD N G LENNOX
MR ASPIN

MR R L WADE-GERY
MR P M MAXEY
MR GOULTY
MR P J FOWLER
DIO

CABINET
OFFICE

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to Ireland K 2000

MR FIFCOE LEGAL ADVISER RM K164

~~RESIDENT CLERK~~

CONFIDENTIAL

FM SALISBURY 150930Z DEC 79

TO PRIORITY FOO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1139 OF 15 DECEMBER

YOUR TELNO 501 AND TELECON BARLOW/MISS SPENCER

RHODESIA: CLOSURE OF ZAPU SALISBURY OFFICE

FOLLOWING IS VERSION OF EVENTS GIVEN TO US BY B S A P, WHICH WE HAVE NO REASON TO DOUBT.

1. AT MIDDAY ON THURSDAY 13 DECEMBER CEPHAS MSIPA, Z A P U'S LOCAL UNOFFICIAL REPRESENTATIVE, HAVING WARNED THE PRESS IN ADVANCE, WENT WITH SUPPORTERS TO THE FORMER Z A P U OFFICE AT 75 MOFFAT STREET, AND APPEARED ON THE BALCONY WITH 15 COMPANIONS, PROCEEDING TO BURN A SYMBOLIC U D I COFFIN.
2. A CROWD OF SOME 500 PEOPLE, MANY OF THEM PASSERS-BY, GATHERED ON THE PAVEMENT. AN ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER OF POLICE WITH A SMALL DETACHMENT ENTERED THE OFFICE SHORTLY AFTERWARDS AND TOLD MSIPA THAT SINCE Z A P U REMAINS A BANNED ORGANISATION UNDER THE UNLAWFUL ORGANISATIONS ACT HIS ACTION WAS ILLEGAL AND HE SHOULD LEAVE THE OFFICE.
3. MSIPA ACCEPTED THIS AND WITH HIS SUPPORTERS PROCEEDED ON FOOT TO HARARE WHERE AN ESTIMATED CROWD OF 1500 GATHERED AT THE FOOTBALL STADIUM AND COMPLETED BURNING THEIR SYMBOLIC U D I COFFIN. THEY DISPERSED PEACEFULLY SHORTLY AFTERWARDS.
4. ON FRIDAY 14 DECEMBER THE POLICE REVISITED THE Z A P U OFFICE,

LEAVE THE OFFICE.

3. MCHIPA ACCEPTED THIS AND WITH HIS SUPPORTERS PROCEEDED ON FOOT TO HARARE WHERE AN ESTIMATED CROWD OF 1500 GATHERED AT THE FOOTBALL STADIUM AND COMPLETED BURNING THEIR SYMBOLIC U D I COFFIN. THEY DISPERSED PEACEFULLY SHORTLY AFTERNWARDS.

4. ON FRIDAY 14 DECEMBER THE POLICE REVISITED THE Z A P U OFFICE, REMOVING PLACARDS AND A Z A P U SIGN, AND WARNED THE OWNER OF THE BUILDING THAT IF HE ALLOWED Z A P U TO USE THE PREMISES HE WOULD BE IN CONTRAVENTION OF THE UNLAWFUL ORGANISATIONS ACT.

5. THE POLICE HAVE PREPARED A PROSECUTION DOCKET ON MCHIPA'S ACTION WHICH HAS BEEN SUBMITTED TO THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL TO DECIDE WHETHER TO PROSECUTE.

SOAMES

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PS
PS/SIR I GILMOUR
PS/MR LUCE
PS/PUS

PS/NO 10 DOWNING STREET

MR WILLSON
MR DAY
LORD N G LENNOX
MR ASPIN

MR R L WADE-GERY
MR P M MAXEY
MR GOULTY
MR P J FOWLER
DIO

CABINET
OFFICE

+24

HD/RHOD DEPT (2)

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HD/PUSD (2)

HD/NEWS DEPT
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MR FICOT LEGAL ADVISER RM K164
RESIDENT CLERK

SECRET

FM SALISBURY 151135Z DEC 79

TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELNO 1145 OF 15/12/79
INFO IMMEDIATE PRETORIA

RHODESIA: SOUTH AFRICAN TROOPS

1. I AM TELEGRAPHING SEPARATELY A TRANSCRIPT OF ON THE RECORD EXCHANGES WITH GENERAL ACLAND AT PRESS CONFERENCE YESTERDAY. THESE WE UNDERSTAND HAVE BEEN WIDELY MISINTERPRETED. WALLS AND MACLAREN HAVE BOTH EXPRESSED THEIR CONCERN THAT THE SUBJECT HAS BEEN BROUGHT UP IN THIS WAY, AND TELL US THAT THE SOUTH AFRICANS ARE VERY DISTURBED.

2. IN CONVERSATION WITH VAN VUREN (SOUTH AFRICAN REPRESENTATIVE IN SALISBURY) TODAY, DUFF EXPLAINED THE BACKGROUND AND SAID THAT FCO SPOKESMAN IN LONDON WOULD CONTINUE TO TAKE THE LINE THAT WE EXPECTED NO INTERVENTION BY EXTERNAL FORCES IN RHODESIA DURING THIS PERIOD. IF ASKED ABOUT GENERAL ACKLAND'S REMARKS, HE WAS SAYING THAT THEY WERE MADE OFF THE CUFF ON THE BASIS OF CNADEQUATE INFORMATION. WE WOULD BE DOING OUR BEST TO VLAY THE WHOLE SUBJECT DOWN FROM NOW ON AND WOULD REFUSE ALL FURTHER COMMENT.

3. DUFF ADDED THAT WE WERE SORRY THAT GENERAL ACLAND HAD BEEN SO WIDELY MISQUOTED AND THAT THIS HAD CAUSED EMBARRASSMENT TO THE

SUBJECT DOWN FROM NOW ON AND WOULD REFUSE ALL FURTHER COMMENT.
3. DUFF ADDED THAT WE WERE SORRY THAT GENERAL ACLAND HAD BEEN SO
WIDELY MISQUOTED AND THAT THIS HAD CAUSED EMBARRASSMENT TO THE
SOUTH AFRICANS. MEANWHILE WE WERE LOOKING FORWARD TO DISCUSSING
WITH WALLS ON MONDAY THE PRACTICAL ARRANGEMENTS NECESSARY TO
GIVE EFFECT TO THE UNDERSTANDING WE HAD ALL REACHED, AND THE LINE
WHICH WE WOULD TAKE ON THEM IN PUBLIC.

FCO PASS PRETORIA

SOAMES

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PS
PS/SIR I GILMOUR
PS/MR LUCE
PS/PUS

MR WILLSON
MR DAY
LORD N G LENNOX
MR ASPIN

PS/NO 10 DOWNING STREET

MR R L WADE-GERY
MR P M MAXEY
MR GOULTY
MR P J FOWLER
DIO

CABINET
OFFICE

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Is Ireland K 200A
MR FIFCOF LEGAL ADVISER RM K16A
RESIDENT CLERK

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UNCLASSIFIED
FM SALISBURY 151138Z DEC 79

TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELNO 1148 OF 15/12/79
INFO IMMEDIATE PRETORIA
MY TELNO 1145 : RHODESIA
FOLLOWING IS TRANSCRIPT:-

Q. JOURNALISTS HAVE SEEN S.A. TRUCKS BEING SEEN OFFLOADED AT SALISBURY RAILWAY STATION.

A. YOU HAVE RECEIVED INFORMATION THAT HASN'T COME MY WAY

Q. WHAT IS THE STRENGTH OF SA FORCES INSIDE THIS COUNTRY AT THE MOMENT.

A. AS I UNDERSTAND IT THERE ARE A CERTAIN NUMBER OF INDIVIDUALS FROM ALL OVER THE WORLD WHO HAVE ACTUALLY ATTESTED IN THE RHODESIAN ARMY AND IN OTHER AREAS AS I UNDERSTAND IT AT THE MOMENT THERE IS A SMALL S A PRESENCE BEYOND THAT I CAN SAY NOTHING.

Q. DID YOU SAY A SMALL S A PRESENCE.

A. A SMALL.

Q. CAN YOU GIVE US SOME IDEA OF WHAT YOU MEAN BY 'SMALL'?
A FEW THOUSAND MEN, TWO BATTALIONS OR WHAT.

A. I THINK LESS THAN A THOUSAND MEN.

Q. ARE THEY MERCENARIES.

A. I DON'TO THINK YOU CAN DESCRIBE A MAN AS A MERCENARY WHO HAS ACTUALLY ENLISTED IN THE ARMED FORCES. I KNOW NOTHING ABOUT MERCENARIES.

Q. HAVEN'T NEGOTIATIONS GONE ON WITH THE S A GOVERNMENT WITH THE INTENTION OF DEPLOYING THEM.

A. THAT'S NOT A MATTER FOR ME I'M A SOLDIER.

Q. INDISTINGUISHABLE.

A. THAT'S GONE THROUGH THE SLIPS FOR A FOUR TOO.

Q. DOES THE ORDER THAT THEY MUST WITHDRAW APPLY TO OTHER NATIONALITIES WITHIN THE RHODESIAN FORCES

Q. HAVEN'T NEGOTIATIONS GONE ON WITH THE S A GOVERNMENT WITH THE INTENTION OF DEPLOYING THEM.

A. THAT'S NOT A MATTER FOR ME I'M A SOLDIER.

Q. INDISTINGUISHABLE.

A. THAT'S GONE THROUGH THE SLIPS FOR A FOUR TOO.

Q. DOES THE ORDER THAT THEY MUST WITHDRAW APPLY TO OTHER NATIONALITIES WITHIN THE RHODESIAN FORCES.

A. I'M NOT QUITE CLEAR ON THE WORD 'WITHDRAW', THE WORD 'WITHDRAW' IS A MILITARY WORD IN MY UNDERSTANDING, WITHDRAW FROM WHERE TO WHERE.

Q. THERE ARE DIFFERENT NATIONALITIES ATTESTED IN THIS ARMY. WITH THE NEW RULES DOES IT MEAN THAT THEY HAVE TO LEAVE OR BE DISCHARGED.

A. IN THE FIRST PLACE I'M NOT AWARE OF ANY NEW RULES AND SECONDLY AS FAR AS I KNOW, THIS IS MERELY MY OWN PERSONAL VIEW, IF THEY HAVE ATTESTED LEGALLY IN THE RHODESIAN ARMY THEY ARE PART OF THE RHODESIAN ARMY, SO THEY ARE NO LONGER FOREIGN TROOPS. IN THE BRITISH ARMY WE HAVE ALL SORTS OF NATIONALITIES SERVING, INCLUDING NO DOUBT SOME RHODESIANS.

SOAMES

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[RHODESIA: POLICY: ADVANCE COPIES]

IMMEDIATE

PS

PS/SIR I GILMOUR

PS/MR LUCE

PS/PUS

MR WILLSON

MR DAY

LORD N G LENNOX

MR ASPIN

PS/NO 10 DOWNING STREET -

MR R L WADE-GERY

MR P M MAXEY

MR GOULTY

MR P J FOWLER

DIO

CABINET
OFFICE

+27

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HD/RHOD DEPT (A)

HD/C AF D

HD/S AF D

HD/PUSD (2)

HD/NEWS DEPT

HD/WAD

Ir. Ireland K200A

MR FIFCOF LEGAL ADVISER RM K16A

RESIDENT CLERK

CONFIDENTIAL

FM SALISBURY 151110Z DEC 79

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 1144 OF 15/12/79

FROM ALLAN

ZRBC

1. ACCOMPANIED BY PAUNCEFORT AND HALL I SPENT THE MORNING OF 13 DECEMBER WITH THE CHAIRMAN AND VICE CHAIRMAN OF THE ZRBC AND THE DIRECTOR-GENERAL AND HIS SENIOR MEMBERS OF STAFF. I WAS ASSURED THAT THE ZRBC WISHED TO REPORT IMPARTIALLY AND WE HAVE SUBSEQUENTLY DISCUSSED WHAT ROLE WE MIGHT PLAY IN ENSURING THIS.
2. MEANWHILE, THE BOARD HAVE AGREED THAT ANY MEMBER RUNNING IN THE ELECTIONS SHOULD STAND DOWN (THE BOARD AT PRESENT CONSISTS OF 5 WHITES AND 4 BLACKS). THE BOARD HAVE ALSO INDICATED THAT THEY WOULD BE HAPPY TO BROADCAST THE BBC WORLD SERVICE NEWS AT 0400 HOURS GMT (THE 6.00 AM NEWS HERE IS PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT IN A COUNTRY WHERE PEOPLE, AND PARTICULARLY AFRICANS, GET UP EARLY). WE HAVE NOT PRESSED FOR THE DISCONTINUATION OF THE ONE SABC NEWS BROADCAST WHICH IS AT 9.00 AM (WHICH HAS A SMALLER LISTENERSHIP THAN THE EARLIER BROADCASTS). I AM SUGGESTING TO THE ZRBC THAT THEY GET IN TOUCH WITH THE BBC DIRECT ABOUT STARTING UP THIS

HOURS GMT (THE 6.00 AM NEWS HERE IS PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT IN A COUNTRY WHERE PEOPLE, AND PARTICULARLY AFRICANS, GET UP EARLY). WE HAVE NOT PRESSED FOR THE DISCONTINUATION OF THE ONE SABC NEWS BROADCAST WHICH IS AT 8.00 AM (WHICH HAS A SMALLER LISTENERSHIP THAN THE EARLIER BROADCASTS). I AM SUGGESTING TO THE ZRBC THAT THEY GET IN TOUCH WITH THE BBC DIRECT ABOUT STARTING UP THIS REBROADCAST, BUT IPD MAY ALSO WISH TO PASS THIS ON.

3. IN REPLY TO PRESS ENQUIRIES (THIS IS NOT A QUESTION WHICH IS AROUSING MUCH LOCAL INTEREST AT PRESENT) WE ARE SIMPLY SAYING WE ARE IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH THE ZRBC AND OUR DISCUSSIONS ARE CONTINUING.

SOANES

NNNN

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T169AA/79T

December 15, 1979

Translation

From Jaber Al-Ahmed Al-Sabah

To The Rt. Hon. Margaret Thatcher, MP,
Prime Minister of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.

Your Excellency,

It gave me pleasure to receive Your Excellency's kind message regarding the latest developments of the Rhodesian issue envisaged to culminate in free elections and the granting of independence on the basis of genuine majority rule with the surrender of power to the winning side.

I have noted the contents of this message with due attention as I have also followed in its time the progress of the Rhodesia Conference held at Lancaster House.

I am glad to inform you that we have already made required contacts in this respect and do hope that they will be fruitful. Anyhow, we trust that, with the well-known wisdom and sagacity which characterize both Your Excellency and Government, you will eventually be able to surmount all difficulties, and thus pave the way for the realization of the hopes and aspirations of parties concerned.

With my most cordial greetings and best wishes.
May your good endeavours be crowned with success.

Please accept, Your Excellency, my highest regard.

Jaber Al-Ahmed Al-Sabah
Amir of Kuwait.

[RHODESIA: POLICY: ADVANCE COPIES]

128

PS
PS/SIR I GILMOUR
PS/MR LUCE
PS/PUS

PS/NO 10 DOWNING STREET

MR R L WADE-GERY
MR P M MAXEY
MR GOULTY
MR P J FOWLER
DIO

CABINET
OFFICE

MR WILLSON
MR DAY
LORD N G LENNOX
MR ASPIN

... HD/UMD ...

HD/RHOD DEPT (4)

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Mr. Ireland K 200A
MR FIFCOF LEGAL ADVISER RM K16A
RESIDENT CLERK

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FM UKMTS NEW YORK 142140Z DEC 79

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1883 OF 14 DECEMBER

INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON MIRIMBA SALISBURY LUSAKA LAGOS LISBON
OSLO PARIS

MY TELNO 1882: RHODESIA.

1. IN THE EVENT THE AFRICANS AGREED A TEXT AND HANDED IN THE LETTER TONIGHT, THE TEXT IS IN MIFT. SINCE WE ACQUIRED IT BY DUBIOUS MEANS PLEASE DO NOT MAKE PUBLIC REFERENCE TO IT UNTIL WE CONFIRM IT HAS BEEN CIRCULATED.
2. THE TEXT IS MUCH AS FORETOLD BY CLARK. THE LIKELY TIMING IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL REMAINS AS IN MY TELEGRAM UNDER REFERENCE

PARSONS

[RHODESIA: POLICY: ADVANCE COPIES]

X28

PS

PS/NO 10 DOWNING STREET

PS/SIR I GILMOUR

PS/MR LUCE

PS/PUS

MR R L WADE-GERY

MR P M MAXEY

MR GOULTY

MR P J FOWLER

DIO

CABINET
OFFICE

MR WILLSON

MR DAY

LORD N G LENNOX

MR ASPIN

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ADVANCE COPY

Mr Ireland K 200A

MR FIFCOE LEGAL ADVISER RM K164

RESIDENT CLERK

CONFIDENTIAL

FM UKMIS NEW YORK 150122Z DEC 79

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1882 OF 14 DECEMBER

INFO WASHINGTON, EEC POSTS, OSLO, LISBON, LUSAKA, LAGOS, DAR ES
SALAAM, GABORONE, SALISBURY, KINGSTON, DACCA, KUWAIT, LIBREVILLE,
CANBERRA, WELLINGTON, OTTAWA, TOKYO, PEKING.

MY TELNO 1864: RHODESIA

1. CLARK (NIGERIA) TOLD ME THIS AFTERNOON THAT THE AFRICAN GROUP WERE HAVING SOME DIFFICULTY IN DRAFTING THEIR LETTER TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL (PARA 2 OF MY TELEGRAM UNDER REFERENCE). THE MALAGASY CHAIRMAN HAD WANTED THE LETTER TO COMMENT ON VARIOUS ASPECTS OF THE LANCASTER HOUSE AGREEMENTS, BUT WAS DISSUADED. THE LETTER IS LIKELY TO ACCEPT THAT THERE HAS BEEN A RETURN TO LEGALITY IN RHODESIA, BUT THAT BEING STILL A COLONY IT IS SUBJECT TO GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION 1514. IT WILL GO ON TO REJECT THE UNILATERAL LIFTING OF SANCTIONS AND TO ACCUSE US OF BEING IN BREACH OF ARTICLE 25 OF THE CHARTER. IT WILL NOT, HOWEVER, CALL FOR A MEETING OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL.

2. CLARK EXPECTS THE LETTER TO BE AGREED BY THE AFRICAN GROUP

SANCTIONS AND TO ACCUSE US OF BEING IN BREACH OF ARTICLES 23 OF THE CHARTER. IT WILL NOT, HOWEVER, CALL FOR A MEETING OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL.

2. CLARK EXPECTS THE LETTER TO BE AGREED BY THE AFRICAN GROUP TOMORROW AND TO ISSUE OVER THE WEEKEND. IT WILL BE DISTRIBUTED BY THE PRESIDENT. THIS MEANS THAT, BY THE BEGINNING OF NEXT WEEK, THE COUNCIL WILL BE FACED WITH TWO OPPOSING VIEWS ON THE LIFTING OF SANCTIONS. ALTHOUGH CLARK ASSURED ME THAT THE FRONT LINE STATES WANTED TO AVOID ANY ACTION HERE THAT COULD AFFECT LANCASTER HOUSE, THE PRESIDENT WILL PROBABLY FEEL CONSTRAINED BEFORE LONG I.E. PERHAPS BY THE MIDDLE OF NEXT WEEK TO HOLD INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS OF SOME KIND.

3. IN THE LIGHT OF THE STRONGLY HELD VIEWS OF MANY OF THE LEADING MEMBERS OF THE AFRICAN GROUP HERE ABOUT THE NEED FOR THE COUNCIL TO PLAY A POSITIVE ROLE IN THE LIFTING OF SANCTIONS, I DO NOT BELIEVE WE WILL BE ABLE TO PERSUADE THE PRESIDENT SIMPLY TO LEAVE THE TWO LETTERS UNACKNOWLEDGED; INDEED THIS WOULD LEAVE THE SITUATION VERY UNCLEAR IF THE AFRICAN LETTER IS SENT AS DRAFTED. EQUALLY A SIMPLE ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF OUR LETTER WOULD NOT BE ENOUGH IN THE LIGHT OF THE AFRICAN LETTER.

4. IF A COUNCIL MEETING LOOKS IMMINENT EARLY NEXT WEEK, I AM INCLINED TO CALL FOR INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS MYSELF BEFORE THE PRESIDENT OR SOMEONE ELSE DOES SO. I WOULD AIM TO PERSUADE MY NORWEGIAN AND/OR PORTUGUESE COLLEAGUES TO PUT FORWARD A DRAFT PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENT CONTAINING THE MAIN ELEMENTS WE CONSIDER ESSENTIAL. BUT I DO NOT WANT TO DISCUSS THIS WITH THEM UNTIL WE KNOW THE OUTCOME OF LANCASTER HOUSE.

PARSONS

NNNN

MOODBA
OR



PRIME MINISTER
SUVA, FIJI

14th December, 1979.

Ln. Pmt

Rt. Hon. Mrs. Margaret Thatcher, MP,
Prime Minister,
LONDON,
United Kingdom.

T/67/79T

Dear Prime Minister,

Thank you for your message on the outcome of the Zimbabwe Rhodesia Conference.

The resolute and constructive manner in which you and your Government have discharged your responsibility in giving effect to the agreements reached at the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting at Lusaka deserve the warmest praise and congratulations of everyone, including the Government and people of Fiji.

We in Fiji have felt it as a great honour to be invited to assist in monitoring the ceasefire arrangements accepted by all the parties concerned. We shall continue to give you all the support within our resources in achieving the objective of bringing about genuine majority rule in Zimbabwe Rhodesia.

Yours sincerely,

K. K. T. Mara

(K.K.T. Mara)
Prime Minister

RECORD OF A MEETING BETWEEN THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH AFFAIRS AND LEADERS OF THE PATRIOTIC FRONT ON FRIDAY, 14 DECEMBER AT THE FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

Those Present:

The Rt Hon The Lord Carrington
 Sir Ian Gilmour
 Mr G G H Walden
 Mr R W Renwick

Mr Joshua Nkomo
 Mr Robert Mugabe
 Mr Chambati

1. Lord Carrington said that since we were at the end of the Conference, it was time to look at what had been achieved. We now had genuine majority rule. The Patriotic Front had made concessions, eg over the 20 white seats; but the whites had too. During the transitional period, it would be a British Governor, and not the Bishop, who would rule the country, in an attempt to get really fair elections. He had known Lord Soames all his life. He was a fair-minded man, with great personality and presence. He hoped that the position on the ceasefire, which he had outlined three days ago, was satisfactory. It had been a serious attempt to allay the PF's fears about reciprocal withdrawal. He recognised that the outcome was not ideal for the PF, for Salisbury, or for us. Nobody should forget that we too had our problems. We were responsible for making the agreement work. But it could not work if the PF and Salisbury did not help us.

2. He knew that there were also fears about personal security, and he understood these. It was our job to ensure personal security, and he would personally make this clear to the Governor. The PF leaders could also bring some of the people protecting them in London to Rhodesia if they wished. On the assembly areas, he wished to make it clear that, if the PF forces assembled with their arms in numbers which posed difficulty in relation to the number and capacity of the assembly places allocated to PF forces, the Governor would have to make the necessary dispositions. We were now at the point of final agreement, and we must all decide whether or not to accept. We should not allow the killing to go on. He had noted incidentally that the Salisbury people were still talking of "terrorists". Now that the Governor was there he would ensure that this stopped. With the Governor's presence, an irreversible process had begun. We were worried by the prospect of further delay. The PF must make a decision one way or the other. He was therefore calling a meeting at Lancaster House tomorrow morning. They had all had 14 difficult weeks of negotiation. But we had come a long way. He had not expected to get so far when the negotiations had begun. There was only one final small jump to be taken. But there was a risk that, if it were not taken, everything could be lost. More people would then be killed.

3. The UK had shown great courage. The cowardly way out would have been to say on 3 May that there had already been elections, the five principles had been satisfied, and that Rhodesia could be given independence, even though the war might have continued and the

South Africans might have been drawn in. The position he had taken up had not been very popular in his own party. We had shown our courage in accepting responsibility for what happened in the interim period. If it went badly, everyone would turn against us, even our own friends.

4. Mr Nkomo asked whether we had already drawn up the list of election results? That seemed to be our manner of proceeding. Mr Mugabe said he hoped that Lord Carrington was aware of the PF's objections to our proposals on the disposition of the forces, and of the PF's own suggestions. Our positioning of the forces would not work, and was not acceptable. It would put the PF in an invidious position, in which the military balance would be tipped against them. The PF would have to defend itself in the last analysis, if the rebels attacked them again. Monitors would be no help; nor would the British, who were powerless. Why were the PF being moved from their operational areas to remote areas on the periphery of the country? They were being pushed away from the urban and industrial heartland of the country, leaving the field open to Rhodesian forces and Muzorewa's auxiliaries, who were already deployed amongst the people.

5. Mr Mugabe asked why we did not move Salisbury away from their operational areas. We had clearly agreed with Salisbury to concentrate the PF forces in 15 places. This was a non-starter. We clearly wanted to give maximum advantage to Muzorewa, and maximum disadvantage to the PF. Lord Carrington said that a ceasefire was to everyone's advantage. Mr Nkomo said that the PF completely accepted the principle of a ceasefire, and the idea of assembly. If the PF could not initial agreement tomorrow, they would explain the reasons to the world. They simply would not be placed where we and the Rhodesians wanted to put them. They had been told that they themselves had asked to be on the periphery of the country. He wanted to make it clear that this was not so.

6. Mr Renwick explained that our military reconnaissance teams had been concerned to achieve an effective separation of the forces. In choosing the places in question, they had taken account of the PF's operational areas and their concern not to be encircled. We were talking about an election campaign, and not a military one. The whole point was to enable the PF leaders to go to Salisbury and fight elections. Mr Nkomo said that the PF forces were being sent to forest areas and game reserves. Lord Carrington stressed that the PF's military commanders would be in Salisbury. Mr Mugabe said that the places we proposed suggested a surrender by the PF. Mr Mugabe asked why we did not say openly that we wanted the PF suppressed. Lord Carrington said that it would be misleading if he were to suggest that we could alter our proposals. Mr Mugabe said that this was because we had fixed things with Salisbury.

7. Mr Renwick said that both sides had difficulties. The Rhodesians were not keen on the PF being installed in Salisbury. Mr Mugabe said that we should monitor the PF in their bases, as with the Rhodesians. Lord Carrington said that the negotiations were over.

/There

There was nothing more to be said. We were at the end of the road. Mr Mugabe said that the PF were not at the end of their road. Lord Carrington said that the PF could do what they wished, but they must decide whether or not to initial the agreement tomorrow. There was no point in delay, and nothing more to be said.

8. Mr Mugabe said that he would never put his fighters in danger. Our Governor would be in charge of the Salisbury forces, and there would be war. Lord Carrington insisted that our proposals were fair. Mr Renwick said that the PF were not being asked to retreat, but to concentrate. In return they would get political advancement. Mr Nkomo said that he did not wish to be lectured about politics. The Lord Privy Seal stressed that the PF would be involved in a political campaign. Lord Carrington said he did not understand the PF's position, which seemed to assume that hostilities would erupt before or after the elections.

9. Mr Nkomo appealed to Lord Carrington not to call a meeting tomorrow. Lord Carrington said that if the PF did not come, that would amount to a rejection of the agreement. They should note that our proposals were considered fair, in New York and elsewhere. The PF should think deeply before rejecting them. The Lord Privy Seal said that rejection would be a tragedy. Mr Mugabe said that Lord Carrington had proceeded unfairly throughout the conference, and particularly by sending a Governor to Salisbury before agreement was reached. Lord Carrington said he was deeply disappointed with the PF's reply, which could lead to tragic consequences.

Distribution:

PS/LPS ✓
PS/Mr Luce
PS/PUS
Sir A Duff
Mr Day
Mr Fifoot, Legal Advisers
Mr Renwick
Mr Powell
PUSD
News Dept



REPUBLIC OF GHANA

SUBJECT
PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T167A/79T
THE CASTLE
OSU, ACCRA

14th December, 1979.

T167A/79T

Dear Prime Minister,

Thank you for your message on the Rhodesia Conference and your proposals for a cease-fire.

I would like to express my appreciation for your leadership in carrying the Conference through to its present stage. The issues involved have been difficult and delicate and could not have been resolved without the spirit of understanding and give-and-take on all sides. And if the same spirit persists I believe that it is possible to achieve final agreement on the cease-fire proposals.

We have been rather concerned about the frequent and unrestrained attacks on Zambia by the Rhodesia Armed Forces, and would urge that steps be taken to halt these attacks immediately. Unless this is done, the fears of the Patriotic Front, Zambia and the neighbouring countries about the genuineness of the cease-fire proposals will persist and make it difficult to reach a final agreement.

You can count on my continued support in all your efforts to bring Rhodesia back to legality, and, more importantly, to ensure that when independence is finally achieved, there will be no return to the tragic waste of human lives and material resources of the past fourteen years.

We look forward to welcoming an independent Zimbabwe into the Commonwealth in the very near future.

HILLA LIMANN

PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF GHANA

HON. MRS. MARGARET THATCHER,
PRIME MINISTER OF GREAT BRITAIN AND
NORTHERN IRELAND.

THE OFFICE
OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

19 DEC 1979



Dear Mr. Secretary,

Thank you for your message on the Rhodesia Conference and your proposals for a cease-fire.

I would like to express my appreciation for your leadership in carrying the Conference through to its present state. The issues involved have been difficult and complex and it has not been easy to reach the point of understanding that we have reached on all sides. And if the same spirit persists I believe that it is possible to achieve that agreement on the cease-fire proposals.

We have been most concerned about the frequent and unprovoked attacks on Zambia by the Rhodesia Armed Forces and your role in this regard has been to help these attacks to cease. Unless this is done, the fate of the people of Zambia and the neighboring countries will be in jeopardy. I believe that the cease-fire proposals will persist and make it possible to reach a final agreement.

You can count on my continued support in all your efforts to bring Rhodesia back to legality, and, more importantly, to ensure that when independence is finally achieved, there will be no return to the rule of white or black, lives and material resources of the past fourteen years.

The look forward to welcoming an independent Zimbabwe into the Commonwealth in the very near future.

PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF ZIMBABWE

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D.C.

COMMONWEALTH COMMITTEE ON SOUTHERN AFRICA
MEETING AT MARLBOROUGH HOUSE, FRIDAY, 14 DECEMBER 1979

Amf

1. This meeting was to consider the Secretariat paper on operational requirements of the Commonwealth Observer team, which had been looked at in detail by a sub-committee on the afternoon of 13 December. The Commonwealth Secretariat will issue a detailed record in due course. The following are highlights.
2. Mauritius, referring to paragraph 20(a), said there was an obligation on the British Government to see that the services and facilities requested were provided. In reply the UK Representative (Miss Spencer) said that a telegram had gone to the British Governor in Salisbury asking him to examine urgently what could be done on the ground for the Observer team. In the meantime, the UK Government would have to reserve their position on the whole question of costs.
3. There followed discussion of whether the election would be for two or three days, and whether polling stations would be open continuously. In the sub-committee the previous day the Secretariat Representative (Mr Anyaoku), having heard from Mr Day that morning that the elections would be spread over three days, had assumed that polling stations would not be open continuously and that Observers would therefore be able to cover a larger number of stations. On this basis the Secretariat had revised the suggested total of Observers from 145 to 109. However information provided by the British Representative at the present meeting indicated that in the heavily populated areas polling stations would be open for three days continuously, while in the remote areas there would be at least some mobile polling stations going from place to place. (Jamaica felt strongly that all polling stations should stay open throughout the polling period.) The British Representative said, however, that she did not have complete information about the procedures to be used, and that it would be for the Election Commissioner to decide finally on these. In the light of this information the consensus of the meeting was that the estimated number of Observers should revert to a maximum of 141.
4. Canada had no objection to reverting to the higher figure for purposes of estimation of the budget, but wanted to see something in the paper giving Observers the option of making do with a lesser number if they saw fit. As a result of this, the words "unless the Observer group itself requests a lower number of supporting staff in the light of the final electoral arrangements" were added to paragraph 16 of the paper.
5. The Chairman (Malta) then asked the meeting if the paper with the new amendments could be accepted. Canada said they were prepared to accept the paper with some qualifications:-
 - (a) that the team's final report would go in the usual way to Heads of Government through High Commissioners in London;

- (b) that the "right of access" mentioned in paragraph 7(b) of the paper did not mean that Observers would cover every polling station, but merely take a sample;
- (c) that the Secretariat support group mentioned in paragraph 18 of the paper would be within the total of 141 and not additional to it;
- (d) referring to the preliminary financial estimates which the Secretariat had provided (attached) Canada said they would agree to the method of finance ie costs assessed on the usual basis, shown in paragraph 22, but that they could not give their agreement to the actual payment of an assessed contribution pending more detailed costing, including a response on provision of facilities from the Rhodesian authorities, and an assurance that the British would pay their normal percentage share in cash.

6. The UK Representative said that her Government's reservations about the proposed numbers of the team were well known and that the British position about the precise operations of the group on the ground also had to be reserved pending advice from the Governor. She had already said that Britain was reserving its position on costs generally until an assessment of what could be provided had been received from Salisbury. Finally, it was the responsibility of the British Government that elections would be free and fair and this was very much in the Government's mind. The Secretary-General asked for clarification to the reference about the operation of the Observer group on the ground - was this pending a response on logistic resources from Salisbury? The UK Representative said that her Government would wish to ensure access on as broad a basis as possible, and that clarification of what would be feasible was being sought from Salisbury.

7. New Zealand made the same point they had made on 13 December, suggesting that the countries making up the Commonwealth team should, as well as paying normal remuneration of their countries' participants, also pay for external air fares, accommodation and meals. New Zealand also wished to reserve its position on the method of payment referred to in paragraph 22, pending instructions from the New Zealand Government. In response Mr Anyaoku (Deputy Secretary-General) said that since the countries providing Observers would be part of a collective Commonwealth force all their costs, apart from personal remuneration, should be met by the Commonwealth as a whole.

8. The Secretary-General, referring to remarks by the Canadian Representative about the need to have an upper limit to the total budget, said that he hoped this would be known as soon as possible, but that meanwhile action had to proceed - he was for instance about to despatch a small reconnaissance team to Salisbury, and he hoped Representatives were in agreement with him on this.

9. The UK Representative, referring to what Mr Anyaoku had said about the collectivity of the group, said that the UK Government

/regarded

regarded the Commonwealth Observer group as a group which represented the countries sending Observers and the countries who had associated themselves with the group. This statement caused some criticism from several Representatives who asserted that this was the representative Commonwealth group and was in fact the "Commonwealth Observer" element referred to in the Lusaka agreement. Speaking a few minutes later, the Secretary-General said he was startled by the UK Representative's understanding of the nature of the Observer group; this was the first time, having had discussions with the British at the very highest level, that he had heard this interpretation from the British. He said that some weeks ago the Commonwealth Representatives had endorsed the outline plan for the Observer group and that in all his consultations since then with High Commissioners, he had been assured that they welcomed a collective role for the group rather than the individual role that had originally been suggested by the British.

10. Jamaica proposed that the Secretariat paper be accepted, and the proposal was seconded. A consensus of voices supported this proposal. Canada reiterated their reservations previously stated, and said that final acceptance of the paper could not be given at this time. They also pointed out that a decision as this, which involved a budget and assessed contributions, required not just consensus but unanimity; this was the difference between assessed and voluntary contributions.

11. Malawi also said that they were not authorised to commit their government to paying an assessed contribution, and reserved their position on finance.

12. There were some acrimonious references from the floor to the stands taken by Canada and Britain: the Nigerian Representative was extremely blunt in his observations on the Canadian position.

13. The UK, mentioning reservations already expressed, also reserved its position on the paper as a whole.

14. The Papua New Guinea Representative made a strong plea for support for the Commonwealth team, saying that Representatives should, without further ado, approve the Secretariat's proposals and commit their governments to finance the operation. After some further discussion, including some disobliging remarks by the Guyanese Representative, who claimed that the British position was only aimed at frustrating the plans of the Commonwealth Observer team, the Chairman, in the face of the reservations that had been expressed by Britain, Canada, New Zealand and Malawi, said that planning should proceed on the basis of the Secretariat's paper.

Commonwealth Co-ordination Department

19 December 1979

/Distribution:

Distribution:

PS/No 10 ✓

Mr Fowler, Cabinet Office

PS

PS/Mr Blaker

PS/Mr Luce

PS/LPS

PS/PUS

Mr Stratton

Mr Day

Mr Renwick, Rhodesia Department

Mr Barltrop, CCD

Mr Perris, Finance Department

Chancery, Salisbury

FINANCIAL ESTIMATES

It is possible to quantify the following costs with some accuracy:

<u>TRAVEL</u> (Average figures have been used)	£
a) Observers - 11 First Class	13,200
b) Assistants - 22 Economy Class	19,800
c) Headquarters Unit - 12 Economy Class	10,800
d) Poll supporting staff - 96 Economy Class	86,400
e) Secretariat reconnaissance and other planning visits	6,000
f) Chairman's visits to London - 2 First Class	3,000
	<hr/>
	139,200
Add 10% contingencies	13,920
	<hr/>
	£153,120
	=====

SUBSISTENCE

a) Observers - 11 x 70 days x £50	38,500
b) Assistants - 22 x 70 days x £30	46,200
c) Headquarters Unit - 12 x 70 days x £30	25,200
d) Poll supporting staff - 96 x 15 days x £30	43,200
e) Secretariat reconnaissance and planning visits - 5 x 7 days x £30	1,050
f) Chairman's visits to London 6 days x £70	420
g) Transit halts, inward and outward	14,200
	<hr/>
	168,770
Add 10% contingencies	16,877
	<hr/>
	£185,647
	=====

	£
<u>INSURANCE</u>	<u>20,000</u>
 <u>OTHER EXPENSES</u>	
a) Local office staff - 6 x £30 p.w.* x 10 weeks	1,800
b) Interpreters - 10 x £30 p.w.* x 10 weeks	3,000
c) Supplies:	
12 flags x £15	180
150 pennants x £3	450
150 armbands x £5	750
Office supplies	<u>2,000</u>
	3,380
d) Air freight for (c) above	3,000
e) Overseas telephones, telegrams	5,000
f) Remuneration, if necessary, of non-governmental staff	12,000
g) Sundry expenses	4,000
h) Contingencies	<u>5,000</u>
	£37,180
	=====

*Precise local rates are not yet known.

<u>T O T A L</u>	
Travel	153,120
Subsistence	185,647
Insurance	20,000
Other expenses	37,180
	<u>£395,947</u>
	=====

The above estimate does not make any provision for transport within Rhodesia whether by land or air, radio communications, office accommodation and equipment, ancillary local staff excluding interpreters or medical costs. In the light of the response of the administering authority and the assessment of the Secretariat team which will shortly be leaving for Salisbury, a supplementary estimate may need to be presented.

T169/79T

SUBJECT

pm

P. Prime Minister

*ABS
Duty Clerk
14 Dec 79*

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OO WTE24N
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O 142225Z DEC 79
FM PRESIDENT CARTER
TO PRIME MINISTER THATCHER
ZEM

PRIME MINISTER'S

PERSONAL MESSAGE

SERIAL No. T169/79T

C O N F I D E N T I A L VIA CABINET OFFICE CHANNELS EYES ONLY WH92255

VIA CABINET LINE

C O N F I D E N T I A L

DECEMBER 14, 1979

FOR: PRIME MINISTER THATCHER

FROM: PRESIDENT CARTER

THANK YOU FOR YOUR LETTER ON THE LANCASTER HOUSE NEGOTIATION. YOU PROBABLY ALREADY WILL HAVE HEARD FROM AMBASSADOR HENDERSON OF MY DECISION TO LIFT SANCTIONS. OUR ANNOUNCEMENT IS PLANNED FOR TOMORROW. I AM COMMUNICATING THIS TO THE FRONT LINE LEADERS ALONG WITH A STRONG PLEA FOR SUPPORT TO CONCLUDE THE NEGOTIATIONS TOMORROW. AS YOU SUGGESTED, I HAVE ALSO INSTRUCTED OUR EMBASSY TO MAKE THE SAME POINT TO NKOMO AND MUGABE.

YOU AND YOUR GOVERNMENT HAVE DONE AN OUTSTANDING JOB IN THIS NEGOTIATION. I LOOK FORWARD TO SEEING YOU SOON.

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00082

NNNN

RECD 14/2257Z GMH TKS



34, HYDE PARK GATE,
LONDON, SW7 5BN.
01-584 3661.

FIJI HIGH COMMISSION

Our Ref: CLM 6/4/10

14 December, 1979.

I have been asked by my Government to pass on the following message from my Prime Minister.

Begins

The Rt. Hon. Mrs. Margaret Thatcher, M.P.,
Prime Minister,
London,
United Kingdom.

Dear Prime Minister,

Thank you for your message on the outcome of the Zimbabwe Rhodesia Conference.


The resolute and constructive manner in which you and your Government have discharged your responsibility in giving effect to the agreements reached at the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting at Lusaka deserve the warmest praise and congratulations of everyone, including the Government and people of Fiji.

We in Fiji have felt it as a great honour to be invited to assist in monitoring the ceasefire arrangements accepted by all the parties concerned. We shall continue to give you all the support within our resources in achieving the objective of bringing about genuine majority rule in Zimbabwe Rhodesia.

Yours sincerely,


(K. K. T. Mara)
Prime Minister

..... ends


J. D. Gibson
High Commissioner for Fiji

The Rt. Hon. Mrs. Margaret Thatcher, M.P.,
Prime Minister,
10 Downing Street,
London.

STANLEY WALKER
LONDON W1A 1AA
01-234 5678



THE HOUSE OF COMMONS



CONFIDENTIAL

114 DEC 1979



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TO WHITEHOUSE WASHINGTON
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C O N F I D E N T I A L
FOR PRESIDENT CARTER
FROM PRIME MINISTER THATCHER
DEAR MR PRESIDENT

I AM SORRY TO HAVE TO RAISE RHODESIA WITH YOU WHEN THE VERY WORRYING SITUATION IN IRAN IS TAKING UP SO MUCH OF YOUR TIME. I LOOK FORWARD TO DISCUSSING BOTH SUBJECTS WITH YOU ON MONDAY. BUT THERE IS ONE IMPORTANT POINT ON RHODESIA ON WHICH I HOPE WE CAN MAKE PROGRESS BEFORE THEN.

WE HAVE NOW TO BRING THE LANCASTER HOUSE CONFERENCE TO A CONCLUSION. THE PATRIOTIC FRONT ARE STILL TRYING TO SPIN OUT THE TALKING AND TO AVOID COMING TO A DECISION (AND MEANWHILE ARE INFILTRATING MORE OF THEIR FORCES INTO RHODESIA). BUT WE HAVE COMPLETED THE NEGOTIATIONS. WE CANNOT HOLD UP THE IMPLEMENTATION OF A SETTLEMENT MUCH LONGER.

OUR EXPERIENCES AT LANCASTER HOUSE HAVE SHOWN THAT THE PATRIOTIC FRONT WILL NOT MAKE UP THEIR MINDS UNLESS AND UNTIL THEY ARE BROUGHT UP CLEARLY AGAINST THE NEED TO DO SO.

PETER CARRINGTON HAS THEREFORE CALLED A FINAL SESSION OF THE CONFERENCE FOR TOMORROW. THERE IS A FAIR CHANCE THAT THE PATRIOTIC FRONT WILL INITIAL THE AGREEMENT THEN IF IT IS MADE ABSOLUTELY CLEAR TO THEM THAT THEY WILL GET NO SUPPORT FOR STAYING OUT.

WE HAVE DONE EVERYTHING WE CAN TO CREATE THE CONDITIONS FOR THE PATRIOTIC FRONT TO PARTICIPATE IN ELECTIONS UNDER THE GOVERNOR'S AUTHORITY. WE HAVE PRESENTED DETAILED CEASEFIRE PROPOSALS THAT CY VANCE WAS GOOD ENOUGH TO DESCRIBE TO PETER CARRINGTON IN BRUSSELS AS EMINENTLY FAIR. I AM VERY CONCERNED ABOUT THE DANGERS OF FURTHER DELAY IN REACHING AGREEMENT. THIS COULD RESULT IN A BREAKDOWN OF THE SETTLEMENT AS A WHOLE.

THE SUPPORT OF THE UNITED STATES, AND THE ACTION YOU HAVE TAKEN WITH THE PARTIES AND AFRICAN GOVERNMENTS HAVE BEEN A MAJOR FACTOR IN HELPING US TO GET THIS FAR. I HOPE THAT NOW YOU CAN HELP US TO BRING HOME TO THE PATRIOTIC FRONT THE NEED TO AGREE TO A CEASEFIRE AND PARTICIPATE IN THE ELECTIONS. THIS MIGHT BE DONE BY A STATEMENT THAT THE UNITED STATES WILL NOT CONTINUE SANCTIONS AGAINST RHODESIA UNDER A BRITISH GOVERNOR. THAT WOULD BE THE MOST EFFECTIVE APPROACH, BUT IN ANY CASE IT WOULD BE VERY HELPFUL IF KINGMAN BREWSTER COULD SPEAK IN THIS SENSE DIRECTLY TO THE PATRIOTIC FRONT TODAY. ACTION ON THESE LINES COULD HELP US TO CLINCH THE FINAL AGREEMENT. I FEAR THAT IF IT IS DELAYED, YOUR DECISION WOULD NOT HAVE THE SAME EFFECT ON THE NEGOTIATIONS.

I HATE TROUBLING YOU AT A TIME WHEN YOU HAVE SUCH APPALLING TROUBLES OF YOUR OWN. BUT I BELIEVE THAT ACTION BY YOU ON THE LINES I HAVE SUGGESTED WOULD GREATLY INCREASE THE CHANCES OF A SUCCESSFUL OUTCOME. IF YOU WOULD LIKE TO DISCUSS THIS I AM AVAILABLE HERE ALL THIS EVENING.

WITH WARM REGARDS,
MARGARET THATCHER.
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QSL 1912Z KKKKK
THANKS

CONFIDENTIAL MINISTER'S

SUBJECT



PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T168/79T

10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

14 December 1979

Dear Mr. President

I am sorry to have to raise Rhodesia with you when the very worrying situation in Iran is taking up so much of your time. I look forward to discussing both subjects with you on Monday. But there is one important point on Rhodesia on which I hope we can make progress before then.

We have now to bring the Lancaster House Conference to a conclusion. The Patriotic Front are still trying to spin out the talking and to avoid coming to a decision (and meanwhile are infiltrating more of their forces into Rhodesia). But we have completed the negotiations. We cannot hold up the implementation of a settlement much longer.

Our experiences at Lancaster House have shown that the Patriotic Front will not make up their minds unless and until they are brought up clearly against the need to do so.

Peter Carrington has therefore called a final session of the Conference for tomorrow. There is a fair chance that the Patriotic Front will initial the agreement then if it is made absolutely clear to them that they will get no support for staying out.

We have done everything we can to create the conditions for the Patriotic Front to participate in elections under the Governor's authority. We have presented detailed ceasefire proposals that Cy Vance was good enough to describe to Peter

/Carrington

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

- 2 -

Carrington in Brussels as eminently fair. I am very concerned about the dangers of further delay in reaching agreement. This could result in a breakdown of the settlement as a whole.

The support of the United States, and the action you have taken with the parties and African governments have been a major factor in helping us to get this far. I hope that now you can help us to bring home to the Patriotic Front the need to agree to a ceasefire and participate in the elections. This might be done by a statement that the United States will not continue sanctions against Rhodesia under a British Governor. That would be the most effective approach, but in any case it would be very helpful if Kingman Brewster could speak in this sense directly to the Patriotic Front today. Action on these lines could help us to clinch the final agreement. I fear that if it is delayed, your decision would not have the same effect on the negotiations.

I hate troubling you at a time when you have such appalling troubles of your own. But I believe that action by you on the lines I have suggested would greatly increase the chances of a successful outcome. If you would like to discuss this I am available here all this evening.

With warm regards,

Margaret Thatcher

The President of the United States of America.

CONFIDENTIAL

Dear Mr President

I am sorry to have to raise Rhodesia with you when the very worrying situation in Iran is taking up so much of your time. I look forward to discussing both subjects with you on Monday. But there is one important point on Rhodesia on which I hope we can make progress before then.

We have now to bring the Lancaster House Conference to a conclusion. The Patriotic Front are still trying to spin out the talking and to avoid coming to a decision (and meanwhile are infiltrating more of their forces into Rhodesia). But we have completed the negotiations. We cannot hold up the implementation of a settlement much longer.

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We have done everything we can to create the conditions for the Patriotic Front to participate in elections under the Governor's authority. We have presented detailed ceasefire proposals that Cy Vance was good enough to describe to Peter Carrington in Brussels as eminently fair. I am very concerned about the dangers of further delay in reaching agreement. This could result in a breakdown of the settlement as a whole.

/The support

The support of the United States, and the action you have taken with the parties and African governments have been a major factor in helping us to get this far. I hope that you ^{now} ~~may be able~~ ^{can help} to ^{in to} ~~consider~~ bringing ~~ing~~ home to the Patriotic Front the need to agree to a ceasefire and participate in the elections, ^{This might be done by} ~~by~~ a statement that the United States will not ^{be the most effective.} continue sanctions against Rhodesia under a British Governor. ^{& that would send a message} ~~If you could do this today,~~ ^{But if this is not possible, would you expect} ~~it~~ ^{to ask Kinnaman Aswell to speak in this sense to the Patriotic Front to say. Action on} could help us to clinch the final agreement. I fear that if it is delayed, ^{your} ~~such a~~ decision would not have the same effect on the negotiations.

I hate troubling you at a time when you have such appalling troubles of your own. But I believe that action by you on the lines I have suggested would greatly increase the chances of a successful outcome. If you would like to discuss this I am available here all this evening.

With ~~my~~ warmest regards

Margaret Thatcher

SUBJECT

GRS 175A

UNCLASSIFIED

FM SUVA 140425Z DEC 79

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 367 OF 14 DECEMBER 79

YOUR TELNO 834 TO NEW DELHI

I HAVE BEEN ASKED TO PASS THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO MRS THATCHER FROM THE PRIME MINISTER OF FIJI.

BEGINS

THANK YOU FOR YOUR MESSAGE ON THE OUTCOME OF THE ZIMBABWE RHODESIA CONFERENCE.

THE RESOLUTE AND CONSTRUCTIVE MANNER IN WHICH YOU AND YOUR GOVERNMENT HAVE DISCHARGED YOUR RESPONSIBILITY IN GIVING EFFECT TO THE AGREEMENTS REACHED AT THE COMMONWEALTH HEADS OF GOVERNMENT MEETING AT LUSAKA DESERVE THE WARMEST PRAISE AND CONGRATULATIONS OF EVERYONE, INCLUDING THE GOVERNMENT AND PEOPLE OF FIJI.

WE IN FIJI HAVE FELT IT AS A GREAT HONOUR TO BE INVITED TO ASSIST IN MONITORING THE CEASEFIRE ARRANGEMENTS ACCEPTED BY ALL THE PARTIES CONCERNED. WE SHALL CONTINUE TO GIVE ALL THE SUPPORT WITHIN OUR RESOURCES IN ACHIEVING THE OBJECTIVE OF BRINGING ABOUT GENUINE MAJORITY RULE IN ZIMBABWE RHODESIA.

YOURS SINCERELY

(K.K.T. MARA)

PRIME MINISTER

ENDS

2. ORIGINAL MESSAGE FOLLOWS BY BAG

DUNROSSIL

PRIME MINISTER'S

PERSONAL MESSAGE

T167/79T

SERIAL No.

F I L E S

- RHOD D
- OADS
- N AM D
- MED
- FUSD
- PLANNING STAFF
- ES & SD
- NENAD
- CCD
- FRD
- EID (E)
- UND
- LEGAL ADVISERS
- SPD
- (MR FREELAND)
- (MR FI FOOT)
- ECON D

- PCD
- DEF D
- OID
- NEWS D
- PS
- PS/LPS
- PS/MR LUCE
- PS/MR RIDLEY
- PS/MR HURD
- PS/MR MARTEN
- PS/FUS
- SIR A DUFF
- MR BULLARD
- MR FRETWELL
- LORD N G LENNOX
- MISS BROWN
- MR DAY
- MR WILLSON
- MR ASPIN

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION

RHODESIA POLICY

COMMONWEALTH SECRETARIAT

CABLES: COMSEGEN LONDON SW1
TELEX: 27678
TELEPHONE: 01-839 3411 Ext:

MARLBOROUGH HOUSE,
PALL MALL,
LONDON, SW1Y 5HX

njs

Your ref:

Our ref:

C. 151/4/5

14 December 1979

Commonwealth Committee on Southern Africa

Southern Rhodesia Elections - Commonwealth Observer Group

Attached is a copy of the Report of the Sub-Committee as revised by the Commonwealth Committee on Southern Africa at its meeting this morning and then adopted after noting the reservations by two representatives.

Also attached is a copy of the revised Financial Estimates excluding those elements of local facilities on which advice is awaited from the British Government.

As agreed by the Committee, the Secretariat is now taking action on the basis of the report.

M. Malhoutra

M. Malhoutra
Secretary
Commonwealth Committee
on Southern Africa

Encs.

CSA(79)5

COMMONWEALTH SECRETARIAT

COMMONWEALTH COMMITTEE ON SOUTHERN AFRICA

SOUTHERN RHODESIA ELECTIONS

COMMONWEALTH OBSERVERS : OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS

Membership of the Group

1. Drawn from eleven countries.
2. Members of the Group will serve in their individual capacity, not as representatives of their Governments. The Group will have a Chairman, as well as its own Secretary.

Mode of Appointment

3. The Group will be appointed by the Commonwealth Secretary-General after the necessary consultations with Commonwealth Governments.

Terms of Reference

4. In accordance with earlier precedents, the Group will be given terms of reference. The following is suggested:

"The Observer Group will observe and report to Commonwealth Heads of Government on all relevant aspects of the organisation and conduct of the elections in Southern Rhodesia held pursuant to the agreement at the Lancaster House Conference. Their function will be to ascertain in their impartial judgement, whether, in the context of the Lusaka accord and the Lancaster House Conference, the elections were free and fair. In furtherance of this objective, it will be competent for the Group to bring to the attention of the administering authorities from time to time such matters as they consider pertinent."

5. In discharging these terms of reference the observers will have no executive role. Their duty will be to form a judgement within their terms of reference.

Reporting

6. The Group will report to Commonwealth Heads of Government through the Commonwealth Secretary-General.

Functions

7. (a) Prior to Polling Day

(i) The Group will observe every aspect of the electoral campaign. They will have a duty to examine the process within the terms of the agreement reached at Lancaster House and to assess how the electoral laws and regulations are being implemented.

(ii) They will need to consider such important issues as freedom of expression, assembly, association and movement (consistent with the terms of ceasefire agreed by the parties) with a view to ascertaining whether parties and individuals contesting the elections are unfettered in their ability to do so. This may involve special consideration being given to the position of political prisoners and refugees.

(iii) It will be their duty to take note of the general administration of government in so far as it bears on the elections and to keep under scrutiny particular areas of governmental activity such as the functioning of the police and the Department of Home Affairs, the governmental information services including broadcasting and television and

government publications generally. Similarly, the Group will need to keep a watchful eye on the conduct of all those who may be in a position to exercise undue influence on voters.

(b) Functions During and After Polling

The Group will observe the conduct of the poll in all its aspects with right of access to all polling stations and supervising officers. In the absence of registration, critical questions of eligibility (determination of age, citizenship or residence as the case may be) will necessarily arise at polling stations throughout the country. The Observer Group must be able to satisfy themselves that these matters are fairly dealt with. The Group will also need to satisfy themselves about other relevant matters, such as the handling of ballot boxes and the counting of the votes after polling.

Procedures

8. (a) In order to carry out their functions, the Observer Group will have complete freedom of movement and access to all parts of the country and the right of inquiry into every aspect of the electoral process.
- (b) The Group and supporting staff will need to have complete immunity from civil and criminal process and inviolability for their premises and archives.
- (c) The Group should be free to receive representations from individuals, political parties and organisations about the electoral process and to bring any relevant matter to the attention of the appropriate authorities. This will necessitate adequate publicity so that the public is aware of the presence of the Observer Group and their functions.

- (d) The Group will need to maintain close liaison with the Governor, the Election Commissioner, the Election Council, the Ceasefire Commission and the Ceasefire Monitoring Force as well as with all the political parties.
- (e) It is expected that the Governor and his administration will wish to co-operate to the full with the Group.

Phasing

9. It will be the aim that the Observer Group should be in position as soon as practicable after ceasefire day, along with their immediate staff.

10. A larger number of staff would be required to observe the actual poll. It is envisaged that they will need to be in Salisbury at least 10 days before polling in order to permit time for briefing, familiarization and travel to their allocated destinations within the country.

11. If the Group feels that some of the supporting staff should arrive earlier, their judgement in the matter will be accepted. The organisational structure will be flexible to permit deployment or redeployment to meet the needs of the situation as it evolves.

12. Having regard to the wide-ranging nature of the work of the Group prior to polling day as indicated in para 7(a), each observer will be invited to bring with him two assistants.

Operational Structure

13. While it will be for the Group to decide how it will organise its work, provision will be made for a Headquarters Unit in Salisbury under the direct authority of the Chairman with, if necessary, sub-units in other electoral districts.

Headquarters Unit

14. The Headquarters Unit will include specialist and administrative staff and will be co-ordinated by one of their members provided by the Commonwealth Secretariat who will serve as Secretary to the Group. Specialist staff will include a legal, an electoral, a media and a security adviser. Administrative staff will handle transportation, accommodation, travel and communication needs of the Group in liaison with the local authorities. The Group will require the services of secretarial and other staff including interpreters, who will, where appropriate, be locally engaged. It will be the intention to organise the Headquarters Unit as well as field units of the Observer Group as far as practicable on a pan-Commonwealth basis.

Supporting Staff

15. To discharge its functions the Group will require adequate supporting staff and, in particular, a sufficient number of suitably qualified persons to observe effectively the conduct of the poll through the country. It is difficult to estimate the number of supporting staff with any precision. Even after allowing for the fact that polling will be spread over 3 consecutive days and that it should be possible, especially in the urban areas, for one person to cover several polling stations, the needs of a country the size of Southern Rhodesia will impose their own demands. Its total area is 150,000 square miles; which would give, if there are eight electoral districts, an average size of 18,750 square miles, i.e. two-fifths the area of England for each district.

16. It is expected that the staff in each of the electoral districts will need to be augmented by an average of 12, if polling is to be observed effectively - unless the Observer Group itself requests a lower number of supporting staff in the light of the final electoral arrangements.

Summary of Time-Table

17. In summary, this memorandum envisages the observers and their staff arriving in two groups, as follows:

(a)	Soon after ceasefire day - 11 observers each with 2 staff	= 33
	Additional Headquarters staff (4 advisers as enumerated in para 14 + an administra- tive unit of about 8)	= 12
		—
		45
(b)	10 days before polling remaining supporting staff (8 x 12), unless some are required earlier by the Observer Group	= 96
		—
		141
		===

Secretariat Support

18. Apart from the Secretary to the Group and a small number of Secretariat officials to assist in the planning, co-ordination, and ground arrangements for the whole exercise, and to render such other substantive assistance as the Chairman and observers may from time to time require, it is envisaged that supporting staff, like the Observer Group itself, will be drawn from member countries.

Logistical Support

19. Effective logistical support will be essential if the Group and its support staff are to carry out their functions effectively. This includes:

- Suitable ground and air transport
- Radios for two-way communication
- Accommodation facilities
- Office equipment

Costs

20. It would facilitate the costing of the exercise to have confirmation of the following:

- (a) That the services or support to be provided by the local authorities will as a minimum, include provision of free office and residential accommodation, all transportation requirements within the country whether by land or air, and provision of communication facilities and ancillary local staff other than interpreters.
- (b) That Governments providing observers and supporting staff will bear the costs of their basic remuneration.

21. Estimation of costs will have to await an indication by the British Government of the extent of local facilities and logistical support that will be made available, and the assessment of the Secretariat team that is shortly proceeding to Salisbury.

22. The costs to be borne centrally should be met from a special Secretariat budget assessed on the usual basis. Voluntary contributions in kind would also be welcome.

International Affairs Division
Commonwealth Secretariat
Marlborough House
Pall Mall
London SW1

14 December 1979

FINANCIAL ESTIMATES

It is possible to quantify the following costs with some accuracy:

<u>TRAVEL</u> (Average figures have been used)	£
a) Observers - 11 First Class	13,200
b) Assistants - 22 Economy Class	19,800
c) Headquarters Unit - 12 Economy Class	10,800
d) Poll supporting staff - 96 Economy Class	86,400
e) Secretariat reconnaissance and other planning visits	6,000
f) Chairman's visits to London - 2 First Class	3,000

	139,200
Add 10% contingencies	13,920,

	£153,120
	=====

SUBSISTENCE

a) Observers - 11 x 70 days x £50	38,500
b) Assistants - 22 x 70 days x £30	46,200
c) Headquarters Unit - 12 x 70 days x £30	25,200
d) Poll supporting staff - 96 x 15 days x £30	43,200
e) Secretariat reconnaissance and planning visits - 5 x 7 days x £30	1,050
f) Chairman's visits to London 6 days x £70	420
g) Transit halts, inward and outward	14,200

	168,770
Add 10% contingencies	16,877

	£185,647
	=====

INSURANCE

£
20,000

OTHER EXPENSES

a) Local office staff - 6 x £30 p.w.* x 10 weeks	1,800
b) Interpreters - 10 x £30 p.w.* x 10 weeks	3,000
c) Supplies:	
12 flags x £15	180
150 pennants x £3	450
150 armbands x £5	750
Office supplies	2,000
	<u>3,380</u>
d) Air freight for (c) above	3,000
e) Overseas telephones, telegrams	5,000
f) Remuneration, if necessary, of non-governmental staff	12,000
g) Sundry expenses	4,000
h) Contingencies	5,000
	<u>£37,180</u>
	=====

*Precise local rates are not yet known.

T O T A L


Travel	153,120
Subsistence	185,647
Insurance	20,000
Other expenses	37,180
	<u>£395,947</u>
	=====

The above estimate does not make any provision for transport within Rhodesia whether by land or air, radio communications, office accommodation and equipment, ancillary local staff excluding interpreters or medical costs. In the light of the response of the administering authority and the assessment of the Secretariat team which will shortly be leaving for Salisbury, a supplementary estimate may need to be presented.

COMMONWEALTH SECRETARIAT

CABLES: COMSEGEN LONDON SW1
TELEX: 27678
TELEPHONE: 01-839 3411 Ext:

MARLBOROUGH HOUSE,
PALL MALL,
LONDON, SW1Y 5HX



Your ref:

Our ref:

C151/4/5


13 December 1979

Commonwealth Committee on Southern Africa

Report of the Sub-Committee

Attached is a copy of the report of the Sub-Committee appointed by the Commonwealth Committee on Southern Africa at its meeting this morning to revise the Secretariat memorandum CSA(79)3 entitled "Commonwealth Observers : Operational Requirements" in the light of its discussions.

The Sub-Committee's Report will be considered by the Committee at its next meeting at Marlborough House on Friday, 14 December at 10.30 a.m.



M. Malhoutra
Secretary
Commonwealth Committee on
Southern Africa

Encl.

In discharging these terms of reference the observers will have no executive role. Their duty will be to form a judgement within their terms of reference.

Reporting

6. The Group will report to Commonwealth Heads of Government through the Commonwealth Secretary-General.

Functions

7. (a) Prior to Polling Day

- (i) The Group will observe every aspect of the electoral campaign. They will have a duty to examine the process within the terms of the agreement reached at Lancaster House and to assess how the electoral laws and regulations are being implemented.
- (ii) They will need to consider such important issues as freedom of expression, assembly, association and movement (consistent with the terms of ceasefire agreed by the parties) with a view to ascertaining whether parties and individuals contesting the elections are unfettered in their ability to do so. This may involve special consideration being given to the position of political prisoners and refugees.
- (iii) It will be their duty to take note of the general administration of government in so far as it bears on the elections and to keep under scrutiny particular areas of governmental activity such as the functioning of the police and the Department of Home Affairs, the governmental information services including broadcasting and television and

government publications generally. Similarly, the Group will need to keep a watchful eye on the conduct of all those who may be in a position to exercise undue influence on voters.

(b) Functions During and After Polling

The Group will observe the conduct of the poll in all its aspects with right of access to all polling stations and supervising officers. In the absence of registration, critical questions of eligibility (determination of age, citizenship or residence as the case may be) will necessarily arise at polling stations throughout the country. The Observer Group must be able to satisfy themselves that these matters are fairly dealt with. The Group will also need to satisfy themselves about other relevant matters, such as the handling of ballot boxes and the counting of the votes after polling.

Procedures

8. (a) In order to carry out their functions, the Observer Group will have complete freedom of movement and access to all parts of the country and the right of inquiry into every aspect of the electoral process.
- (b) The Group and supporting staff will need to have complete immunity from civil and criminal process and inviolability for their premises and archives.
- (c) The Group should be free to receive representations from individuals, political parties and organisations about the electoral process and to bring any relevant matter to the attention of the appropriate authorities. This will necessitate adequate publicity so that the public is aware of the presence of the Observer Group and their functions.

- (d) The Group will need to maintain close liaison with the Governor, the Election Commissioner, the Election Council, the Ceasefire Commission and the Ceasefire Monitoring Force as well as with all the political parties.
- (e) It is expected that the Governor and his administration will wish to co-operate to the full with the Group.

Phasing

9. It will be the aim that the Observer Group should be in position as soon as practicable after ceasefire day, along with their immediate staff.

10. A larger number of staff would be required to observe the actual poll. It is envisaged that they will need to be in Salisbury at least 10 days before polling in order to permit time for briefing, familiarization and travel to their allocated destinations within the country.

11. If the Group feels that some of the supporting staff should arrive earlier, their judgement in the matter will be accepted. The organisational structure will be flexible to permit deployment or redeployment to meet the needs of the situation as it evolves.

12. Having regard to the wide-ranging nature of the work of the Group prior to polling day as indicated in para 7(a), each observer will be invited to bring with him two assistants.

Operational Structure

13. While it will be for the Group to decide how it will organise its work, provision will be made for a Headquarters Unit in Salisbury under the direct authority of the Chairman with, if necessary, sub-units in other electoral districts.

Headquarters Unit

14. The Headquarters Unit will include specialist and administrative staff and will be co-ordinated by one of their members provided by the Commonwealth Secretariat who will serve as Secretary to the Group. Specialist staff will include a legal, an electoral, a media and a security adviser. Administrative staff will handle transportation, accommodation, travel and communication needs of the Group in liaison with the local authorities. The Group will require the services of secretarial and other staff including interpreters, who will, where appropriate, be locally engaged. It will be the intention to organise the Headquarters Unit as well as field units of the Observer Group as far as practicable on a pan-Commonwealth basis.

Supporting Staff

15. To discharge its functions the Group will require adequate supporting staff and, in particular, a sufficient number of suitably qualified persons to observe effectively the conduct of the poll throughout the country. It is difficult to estimate the number of supporting staff with any precision. Even after allowing for the fact that polling will be spread over 3 consecutive days and that it should be possible, especially in the urban areas, for one person to cover several polling stations, the needs of a country the size of Southern Rhodesia will impose their own demands. Its total area is 150,000 square miles; which would give, if there are eight electoral districts, an average size of 18,750 square miles, i.e. two-fifths the area of England for each district.

16. It is expected that the staff in each of the electoral districts will need to be augmented by an average of 8, if polling is to be observed effectively.

Summary of Time-Table

17. In summary, this memorandum envisages the observers and their staff arriving in two groups, as follows:

(a)	Soon after ceasefire day - 11 observers each with 2 staff	= 33
	· Additional Headquarters staff (4 advisers as enumerated in para 14 + an administra- tive unit of about 8)	= 12
		—
		45
(b)	10 days before polling remaining supporting staff (8 x 8), unless some are required earlier by the Observer Group	= 64
		—
		109
		===

Secretariat Support

18. Apart from the Secretary to the Group and a small number of Secretariat officials to assist in the planning, co-ordination, and ground arrangements for the whole exercise, and to render such other substantive assistance as the Chairman and observers may from time to time require, it is envisaged that supporting staff, like the Observer Group itself, will be drawn from member countries.

Logistical Support

19. Effective logistical support will be essential if the Group and its support staff are to carry out their functions effectively. This includes:

- Suitable ground and air transport
- Radios for two-way communication
- Accommodation facilities
- Office equipment

Costs

20. It would facilitate the costing of the exercise to have confirmation of the following:

- (a) That the services or support to be provided by the local authorities will as a minimum, include provision of free office and residential accommodation, all transportation requirements within the country whether by land or air, and provision of communication facilities and ancillary local staff other than interpreters.
- (b) That Governments providing observers and supporting staff will bear the costs of their basic remuneration.

21. Estimation of costs will have to await an indication by the British Government of the extent of local facilities and logistical support that will be made available, and the assessment of the Secretariat team that is shortly proceeding to Salisbury.

22. The costs to be borne centrally should be met from a special Secretariat budget assessed on the usual basis. Voluntary contributions in kind would also be welcome.

International Affairs Division
Commonwealth Secretariat
Marlborough House
Pall Mall
London SW1

13 December 1979

fg. [Signature]

Copies to:

PS/No 10
 Mr Fowler (Cabinet Office)
 Private Secretary
 PS/LPS
 PS/Mr Blaker
 PS/Mr Luce
 PS/PUS
 Mr Stratton
 Mr Day
 Mr Aspin

Mr Willson
 Mr Barder
 Mr Renwick
 Mr Sankey
 Mr Barltrop
 Mr J V Kerby (ODA)
 Mr I A Roberts, Canberra
 M & CD
 EAD
 Government House, Salisbury

COMMONWEALTH COMMITTEE ON SOUTHERN AFRICA

COMMONWEALTH OBSERVERS SUB-COMMITTEE MEETING, 13 DECEMBER 1979,
 MARLBOROUGH HOUSE

1. Representatives were:-

Ghana (in the chair)	India
Australia	Nigeria
Bangladesh	Tanzania
Canada	UK (Mr J R Paterson, CCD)
Guyana	

Mr Anyaoku and other Secretariat staff also attended.

2. The meeting lasted from 3 pm to 8.55 pm. It concentrated solely on the Commonwealth Secretariat paper of 7 December "Zimbabwe Elections, Commonwealth Observers: Operational Requirements" (circulated previously). The amendments shown in the attached paper were agreed. Most of those aimed at limiting the size and/or scope of the team were suggested initially by the Canadian representative.

3. In discussion I reiterated our view that no observer group should have exclusive status or be considered more authoritative than others. This attitude received considerable criticism on the lines that the Commonwealth team was the one which followed on from the Lusaka Agreement, that it had been accepted by the Commonwealth representatives in the Committee on Southern Africa of 23 November, and should therefore be regarded by Commonwealth governments as the principal observer team.

4. I repeated the line taken in the morning meeting by Mr Day about immunity (para 8b) for the team, saying we had not envisaged immunity for anyone; that we would have to discuss the matter with the Governor, and that we foresaw difficulties. Mr Anyaoku said he assumed that all those members of the Commonwealth Secretariat and High Commissions who enjoyed immunity in Britain would also enjoy it in Rhodesia, a British dependency. Other representatives stressed the need for such immunity in order to carry out their job properly; some claimed it was a matter of

/international

international law. I said we would look further into the matter, particularly the legal aspects.

5. I reiterated our fears (para 8c) that the team would duplicate the consultative function of the Election Council. The paragraph was somewhat watered down.

6. There was considerable discussion of the role of the two staff who were to accompany each of the 11 observers. Suggestions were made that their function might be administrative, advisory, dealing with security, secretarial or even as personal servants. The Canadians felt that they should include amongst them people to serve as, or back up, the "specialist staff" in the HQ Unit. Unless their function was properly useful he suggested they be cut out from the team, or at least their numbers diminished. I supported him on this, stressing, as I did at other points, the need, from the practical point of view, of keeping the team to manageable numbers.

7. Mr Anyaoku said that, as they had now been told that the elections were to be held on 3 consecutive days rather than 2, the estimated size of the team could be reduced to 109 (this calculation was however later found to be based on false premises, and at the meeting on 14 December the proposed total strength reverted to 141).

8. The "supporting staff", to arrive some 10 days before the elections, would come, where possible, from the country of the observer, but, where not, from the same region.

9. On logistical support and costs, I reiterated our belief that the local Rhodesian authorities would not be able to provide the resources required for such a large team, and that what they could provide was unlikely to be free of charge. I said however that we were, that day, consulting the Governor by telegram as to what could be provided; asked how long the reply would take, I replied that some fairly detailed logistic enquiries would be required and I thought we might not have an answer for several days. The Chairman asked if we could say how many mine-proofed vehicles could be provided, if any. I undertook to enquire. Mr Anyaoku expressed the hope that if the Rhodesian authorities could not provide the resources required the British Government could (he implied free of charge); I took note of his comment.

10. There were detailed discussions about costs and payment. It was realised by the sub-Committee that if the facilities mentioned in para 20(a) of the paper were not provided free, the total costs would be considerably increased. The Canadians were worried about committing themselves to agree with any plan before the full costs were known - for this reason they felt it important to know what the Rhodesian/

/British

British authorities could provide, and whether free or not, as soon as possible.

11. In discussion of para 22 - payment - it became apparent that services in kind would not be offset against normally assessed cash contributions. I spoke of the very large amounts we were already having to find in bringing Rhodesia to independence, and said that I wished to reserve our position on the payment of a contribution to the costs of the Commonwealth team. This evoked some slightly sour remarks, particularly from the Guyanese, about the costs other countries, eg Zambia, had incurred, and how the expenses we faced arose only from our inaction 15 years ago.

J R Paterson

J R Paterson
Commonwealth Co-ordination Department

17 December 1979

CSA(79)3

COMMONWEALTH SECRETARIAT

COMMONWEALTH COMMITTEE ON SOUTHERN AFRICA

ZIMBABWE ELECTIONS

COMMONWEALTH OBSERVERS : OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS

(As Amended by Sub Committee of 13/12/79.)

Membership of the Group

1. Drawn from eleven countries.
2. Members of the Group will serve in their individual capacity, not as representatives of their Governments. The Group will have a Chairman, as well as its own Secretary.

Mode of Appointment

3. The Group will be appointed by the Commonwealth Secretary-General after the necessary consultations with Commonwealth Governments.

Terms of Reference

4. In accordance with earlier precedents, the Group will be given terms of reference. The following is suggested:

"The Observer Group will observe and report to Commonwealth Heads of Government on all relevant aspects of the organisation and conduct of the elections in Zimbabwe held pursuant to the agreement at the Lancaster House Conference. Their function will be to ascertain in their impartial judgement, whether, in the context of the Lusaka accord and the Lancaster House Conference, the elections were free and fair. In furtherance of this objective, it will be competent for the Group to bring to the attention of the administering authorities from time to time such matters as they consider pertinent."

5. In discharging these terms of reference the Observers will have no executive role. Their duty will be to form a judgement ~~on~~ ^{within their terms of reference} the conduct of the elections and the manner in which they have been supervised under British Government authority in accordance with the agreement reached at the Lancaster House Conference.

Reporting

6. The Group will report to Commonwealth Heads of Government through the Commonwealth Secretary-General.

Operational Structure

7. While it will be for the Group to decide how it will organise its work, provision will be made for a Headquarters Unit in Salisbury under the direct authority of the Chairman, with ^{if necessary} sub-units headed by individual observers in other electoral districts.

Functions

7.8. (a) Prior to Polling Day

- (i) The Group will observe every aspect of the conduct of the ~~electoral~~ ^{elections} campaign. They will have a duty to examine the process within the ~~electoral~~ ^{electoral campaign} terms of the agreement reached at Lancaster House and to assess how the electoral laws and regulations are being implemented.
- (ii) They will need to consider such important issues as freedom of expression, assembly, association and movement (consistent with the terms of the ceasefire agreed by the parties) with a view to

Moves to para 13

ascertaining whether parties and individuals contesting the elections are unfettered in their ability to do so. This may involve special consideration being given to the position of political prisoners and refugees.

(iii) It will be their duty to take note of the general administration of government in so far as it bears on the elections and to keep under scrutiny particular areas of governmental activity such as the functioning of the police and the Department of ^{Home} Internal Affairs, the governmental information services including broadcasting and television and government publications generally. Similarly, the Group will need to keep a watchful eye on the conduct of all those who may be in a position to exercise undue influence on voters.

(b) Functions During and After Polling

The Group will be ~~required~~ to observe the conduct of the poll in all its aspects with right of access to all polling stations and supervising officers. In the absence of registration, critical questions of eligibility (determination of age, citizenship or residence as the case may be) will necessarily arise at polling stations throughout the country. The Observer Group must be able to satisfy themselves that these ^{matters} are being fairly dealt with. The Group will also need to satisfy themselves about ^{other} relevant matters, ~~after~~ polling such as the handling of ballot boxes and the counting of the votes. ^{after polling.}

Procedures

- § 9. (a) In order to carry out their functions, the Observer Group will have complete freedom of movement and access to all parts of the country and the right of unrestricted inquiry into every aspect of the electoral process.
- (b) The Group and supporting staff will need to have complete immunity from civil and criminal process and inviolability for their premises and archives.
- (c) The Group should be free to receive representations from individuals, political parties and organisations about the electoral process and to ^{bring any relevant} ~~make~~ ^{in view} ~~recommendations~~ ^(the attention of) to the appropriate authorities. This will necessitate adequate publicity so that the public is aware of the presence of the Observer Group ^{and} their functions and their right to receive representations. Such publicity should, wherever possible, include local publications within electoral districts.
- (d) The Group will need to maintain close liaison with the Governor, the Election Commissioner, the Election Council, the Ceasefire Commission and the Ceasefire Monitoring Force as well as with all the political parties.
- (e) It is expected that the Governor and his administration will wish to co-operate to the full with the Group.

Phasing

- 9 10. It will be the aim that the Observer Group should be in position as soon as practicable after ceasefire day, along with their immediate staff.
- 10 11. A larger number of staff would be required to ^{observe} monitor the actual poll. It is envisaged that they will need to be in Salisbury at least 10 days before polling in order to permit time for briefing, familiarization and travel to their allocated destinations within the country.
- 11 12. If the Group feels that some of their supporting staff should arrive earlier, their judgement in the matter will be accepted. The organisational structure will be flexible to permit deployment or redeployment to meet the needs of the situation as it evolves.
- 12 13. Having regard to the wide-ranging nature of the work of the Group prior to polling day as indicated in para 8(a), each Observer will be invited to bring with him a ^{two} special assistant and at least one other assistant or adviser.

Headquarters Unit

14. ~~To assist the Observer Group, a small Headquarters Unit will be established in Salisbury. It will come under the direct authority of the Chairman of the Group and be responsible to the Group.~~ ^{The H-Q Unit} It will include specialist and administrative staff and will be co-ordinated by one of their members provided by the Commonwealth Secretariat who will serve as Secretary to the Group. Specialist staff will include a legal, an electoral, a media and a security adviser. Administrative staff will handle transportation, accommodation, travel and communication needs of the Group in liaison with the local authorities. The Group will require the services of secretarial and other staff including interpreters, who will, where appropriate, be locally engaged. It will be the intention to organise the Headquarters Unit as well as field units of the Observer Group as far as practicable on a pan-Commonwealth basis.

Supporting Staff

15. To discharge its functions the Group will require adequate supporting staff and, in particular, a sufficient number of suitably qualified persons to provide ^{observe efficiently} effective monitoring of the conduct of the poll throughout the country. It is difficult to estimate the number of supporting staff with any precision. Even after allowing for the fact that polling will be spread over ^{3 consecutive} 2 days and that it should be possible, especially in the urban areas, for one person to cover several polling stations, the needs of a country the size of Zimbabwe will impose their own demands. Its total area is 150,000 square miles; which would give, if there are eight electoral districts, an average size of 18,750 square miles, i.e. two-fifths the area of England for each district.

16. It is expected that the staff in each of the electoral districts will need to be augmented by an ^{average} minimum of 12, if polling is to be effectively monitored. Within these limits, the final figure ^{observed efficiently unless the Observer group itself requests a lower number of supporting staff in its light of the final electoral arrangements.} should depend on the judgement of the Observer Group itself, after they have had an opportunity to assess the situation on the ground, the proposed electoral schedule and other relevant circumstances.

Summary of Time-Table

17. In summary, this memorandum envisages the observers and their staff arriving in two groups, as follows:

(a)	Soon after ceasefire day - 11 observers each with 2 staff	= 33
	Additional Headquarters staff (4 advisers as enumerated in para 14 + an administrative unit of about 12)	= 16 12
		49 45
(b)	10 days before polling remaining supporting staff (8 x 12), unless some are required earlier by the observer group	= 96 64
	TOTAL	145 109

Secretariat Support

18. Apart from the Secretary to the Group and a small number of Secretariat officials to assist in the planning, co-ordination, and ground arrangements for the whole exercise, and to render such other substantive assistance as the Chairman and observers may from time to time require, it is envisaged that supporting staff, like the Observer Group itself, will be drawn from member countries.

Logistical Support

19. Effective logistical support will be essential if the Group and its support staff are to carry out their functions effectively. This includes:

- Suitable ground and air transport
- Radios for two-way communication
- Accommodation facilities
- Office equipment

Costs

20. It would facilitate the costing of the exercise to have confirmation of the following:

- (a) That the services or support to be provided by the local authorities will as a minimum, include provision of free office and residential accommodation, all transportation requirements within the country whether by land or air, and provision of communication facilities and ancillary local staff, *Other than interpreters.*
- (b) That Governments providing Observers and supporting staff will bear the costs of their basic remuneration.

21. ~~On the assumption that the services and costs mentioned in the preceding paragraph will be provided an attempt has been made to work out a financial estimate. In the absence of precise information~~
Estimation of costs will have to await an indication by the British Government of the extent of local facilities & logistical support that will be made available, and the assessment of the Secretariat team that is shortly proceeding to Salisbury.

about local conditions and costs it is not possible however to give more than an indicative figure. At this stage this would appear to be about £375,000 - £400,000. This figure will be revised as soon as more specific information becomes available.

22. The costs to be borne centrally might be met in the following ways:
Secretariat budget assessed on the usual basis. Voluntary contributions in kind would also be welcome.
- (a) ~~From the funds remaining unutilised at 1 December 1979 in the Mozambique Fund (approximately £75,000).~~
- (b) From voluntary contributions from individual Governments.
- (c) The remainder, if any, from a special Secretariat budget, against which voluntary contributions might be offset.

International Affairs Division,
 Commonwealth Secretariat,
 Marlborough House,
 Pall Mall,
 London SW1.

7 December 1979

17 36 1979



X-27

PS
PS/SIR I GILMOUR
PS/MR LUCE
PS/PUS

MR WILLSON
MR DAY
LORD N G LENNOX
MR ASPIN

~~PS/NO 10 DOWNING STREET~~

MR R L WADE-GERY)
MR P M MAXEY)
MR GOULTY)
MR P J FOWLER)
DIO)

CABINET
OFFICE

IMMEDIATE

.....

HD/RHOD DEPT (4)

HD/C AF D
HD/S AF D

HD/PUSD (2)

HD/NEWS DEPT
HD/WAD

(Handwritten initials)

MR FIFCOF LEGAL ADVISER RM K164
RESIDENT CLERK

CONFIDENTIAL

FROM UKMIS NEW YORK 131540Z DEC 79
TO IMMEDIATE F C O
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1853 OF 13 DECEMBER
INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON SALISBURY

(Handwritten squiggle)

WASHINGTON TELS NOS 4175 AND 4176: RHODESIA

1. MCHENRY TOOK A LOT OF TROUBLE TO TRACK ME DOWN YESTERDAY MORNING TO TELL ME ABOUT THIS LEAK - WHICH I HAD NOT AT THE TIME SEEN. HE SAID THAT THE MEMORANDUM WHICH HAD BEEN LEAKED CONTAINED A REPORT OF A CONVERSATION IN WHICH HE HAD TAKEN PART. WHAT HAD NOT BEEN LEAKED WAS A LATER MEMORANDUM IN WHICH HE WAS ON RECORD AS SAYING THAT, WHATEVER THE LEGAL POSITION, THE POLITICAL REALITY WAS THAT HMG MUST BE FULLY SUPPORTED IN THEIR EFFORTS TO GET A SETTLEMENT. HE WAS PARTICULARLY ANXIOUS THAT I SHOULD BE UNDER NO MISUNDERSTANDING ON THE STRENGTH OF A SELECTIVE AND MALICIOUS LEAK.

PARSONS

[RHODESIA: POLICY: ADVANCE COPIES]

+ 26

PS
PS/SIR I GILMOUR
PS/MR LUCE
PS/PUS

MR WILLSON
MR DAY
LORD N G LENNOK
MR ASPIN

HD/EA D

HD/RHOD DEPT (4)

HD/C AF D
HD/S AF D

HD/PUSD (2)

HD/NEWS DEPT
HD/WAD

~~MR STREET LEGAL ADVISER RM K188~~

MR FIFCOFF LEGAL ADVISER RM K16A

~~RESIDENT CLERK~~

PS/NO 10 DOWNING STREET

MR R L WADE-GERY
MR P M MAXEY
MR GOULTRY
MR P J FOWLER
DIO

CABINET
OFFICE

ADVANCE COPY

IMMEDIATE

GR 200

CONFIDENTIAL

FM DAR ES SALAAM 131100Z DEC 79

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TEL NO 996 OF 13 DECEMBER

INFO PRIORITY SALISBURY, MAPUTO, GABORONE, LUSAKA, LUANDA,
LAGOS, PRETORIA, ADDIS ABABA, WASHINGTON, CANBERRA, OTTAWA,
WELLINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK.

RHODESIA

1. THE DUTCH AMBASSADOR TODAY CALLED ON PRESIDENT NYERERE ON INSTRUCTIONS FROM HIS GOVERNMENT TO APPEAL TO NYERERE TO USE HIS GOOD OFFICES TO EXPEDITE FINAL AGREEMENT IN THE LANCASTER HOUSE CONFERENCE.

2. NYERERE TOLD THE AMBASSADOR THAT HE HAD RECOMMENDED TO "HIS FRIENDS IN LONDON" (THE AMBASSADOR UNDERSTOOD HIM TO MEAN THE PF) THAT THEY SHOULD TURN THE NEW SITUATION TO BEST ADVANTAGE. THERE WERE NOW NO LONGER ANY REBELS, AND THE PF WAS NEGOTIATING DIRECTLY WITH THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT. NYERERE TOLD

1. THE DUTCH AMBASSADOR TODAY CALLED ON PRESIDENT NYERERE ON INSTRUCTIONS FROM HIS GOVERNMENT TO APPEAL TO NYERERE TO USE HIS GOOD OFFICES TO EXPEDITE FINAL AGREEMENT IN THE LANCASTER HOUSE CONFERENCE.

2. NYERERE TOLD THE AMBASSADOR THAT HE HAD RECOMMENDED TO "HIS FRIENDS IN LONDON" (THE AMBASSADOR UNDERSTOOD HIM TO MEAN THE PF) THAT THEY SHOULD TURN THE NEW SITUATION TO BEST ADVANTAGE. THERE WERE NOW NO LONGER ANY REBELS, AND THE PF WAS NEGOTIATING DIRECTLY WITH THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT. NYERERE TOLD THE AMBASSADOR THAT HE WAS NOT GREATLY AFRAID THAT THE RESULTS OF THE CONFERENCE MIGHT BE PUT IN JEOPARDY. HE WENT ON TO SAY THAT HE WAS CONFIDENT THAT EVERYONE WOULD SEE THE REASONABLENESS OF FAIRER DISENGAGEMENT ARRANGEMENTS. THE AMBASSADOR TOLD ME THAT NYERERE DID NOT SPEAK WITH PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO ANY SPECIFIC PROPOSALS OF OURS, IE THOSE OF 11 DECEMBER, AND WHAT HE SAID WAS NOT INCOMPATIBLE WITH HIS SUBSEQUENTLY TREATING THOSE PROPOSALS AS A SIGNIFICANT IMPROVEMENT.

3. THE AMBASSADOR'S GENERAL IMPRESSION WAS THAT NYERERE WAS NOT SERIOUSLY WORRIED, AND I TAKE THIS AS A GOOD SIGN.

MOON

NNNN

REPORT

125-

[RHODESIA: POLICY: ADVANCE COPIES]

29 Prime Minister
~~IMMEDIATE~~

PS
PS/SIR I GILMOUR
PS/MR LUCE
PS/PUS

PS/HO TO DOWNING STREET

MR WILLSON
MR DAY
LORD N G LENNOX
MR ASPIN

MR R L WADE-GERY
MR P M MAXEY
MR GOULTY
MR P J FOWLER
DIO

CABINET
OFFICE

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HD/RHOD DEPT (4)

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HD/PUSD (2)

HD/NEWS DEPT
HD/WAD

MR STEEL LEGAL ADVISER RM K188

MR FIFCOF LEGAL ADVISER RM K16L

arb

GR 450

CONFIDENTIAL

FM BAGHDAD 121353Z DEC

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 499 OF 12/12/79

INFO IMMEDIATE MAPUTO, MIRIMBA SALISBURY, DAR ES SALAAM, GABORONE,
LAGOS, UKMIS NEW YORK, WASHINGTON, PRETORIA, LUANDA AND LUSAKA

DESKBY 121500Z

RHODESIA.

1. I HANDED THE PRIME MINISTER'S MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT MACHEL IMMEDIATELY ON HIS RETURN TO BAGHDAD THIS AFTERNOON (DECEMBER 12).

2. HE WENT THROUGH THE MESSAGE CAREFULLY AND COMMENTED THAT HE HAD TOLD HMA MAPUTO THAT ONCE AGREEMENT HAD BEEN REACHED ON THE CONSTITUTION, THE CEASEFIRE FOLLOWED DE JURE. THREE ELEMENTS WERE NEEDED FOR THE CEASEFIRE TO BE EFFECTIVE: TROOP MOVEMENTS TO BE FROZEN ON BOTH SIDES, EQUAL STATUS FOR THE TROOPS OF BOTH SIDES AND EACH SIDE TO KNOW THE TROOP POSITIONS OF THE OTHER. THESE SEEMED TO BE SATISFACTORILY COVERED IN MRS THATCHER'S LETTER.

3. MACHEL ASKED WHETHER THE REFERENCE TO FINAL AGREEMENT ON THE CEASEFIRE BEING REACHED IN THE NEXT ONE OR TWO DAYS MEANT THAT

3. MACHEL ASKED WHETHER THE REFERENCE TO FINAL AGREEMENT ON THE CEASEFIRE BEING REACHED IN THE NEXT ONE OR TWO DAYS MEANT THAT WE EXPECTED AGREEMENT BY FRIDAY AT THE LATEST. I SAID THAT WE EARNESTLY HOPED THAT THE AGREEMENT WOULD BE CONCLUDED THIS WEEK AND THAT WE LOOKED TO HIM TO EXERT HIS CONSIDERABLE INFLUENCE TO ENSURE THAT THERE WERE NO LAST MINUTE HITCHES.

4. MACHEL SAID THAT I COULD INFORM THE PRIME MINISTER OF HIS WISH TO CO-OPERATE CLOSELY IN ASSURING A SETTLEMENT AND OF HIS INTENTION TO DO EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO ENSURE THAT THERE WAS NO BREACH OF THE CEASEFIRE FROM MOZAMBIQUE. HE SAID THAT THE BRITISH LIAISON UNIT IN MAPUTO COULD COUNT ON THE FULL COOPERATION OF THE MOZAMBIKAN GOVERNMENT AND HE TRUSTED THAT THE MOZAMBIKAN UNIT IN SALISBURY (I TOLD HIM THAT THIS HAD BEEN ACCEPTED) WOULD BE TREATED SIMILARLY. I SAID I WAS SURE OF IT.

5. MACHEL SAID THAT HE WOULD NOW CONSIDER THE PRIME MINISTER'S LETTER AT GREATER LENGTH WITH HIS FOREIGN MINISTER (WHO WAS NOT PRESENT AT OUR MEETING). HE WOULD BE SENDING ONE OF HIS STAFF TO LONDON TODAY OR TOMORROW TO FOLLOW THE FINAL STAGES OF THE RHODESIA TALKS.

6. MACHEL SPOKE OF THE PROBLEMS CAUSED BY THE REFUGEES IN MOZAMBIQUE AND BY THE PRESENCE THERE OF THE LARGEST PART OF THE PATRIOTIC FRONT FORCES. HE SAID, IN TERMS PROBABLY FAMILIAR TO HMA MAPUTO, THAT THE PATRIOTIC FRONT WERE HMG'S BEST ALLIES IN ENDING THE RHODESIAN REBELLION AND THAT MOZAMBIQUE HAD FULLY PLAYED ITS PART BY SEALING THE BORDER AND -- HE ADDED POINTEDLY -- BY EFFECTIVELY APPLYING SANCTIONS.

7. HE ASKED ME TO CONVEY HIS WARM REGARDS TO THE PRIME MINISTER AND HIS DEEP GRATITUDE FOR HAVING KEPT HIM SO PROMPTLY AND FULLY INFORMED.

8. MACHEL IS DUE TO RETURN TO MAPUTO ON 13 DECEMBER.

STIRLING

NNNN

IMMEDIATE

[RHODESIA: POLICY: ADVANCE COPIES]

Prime Minister 5-26

PS
PS/SIR I GILMOUR
PS/MR LUCE
PS/PUS

MR WILLSON
MR DAY
LORD N G LENNOX
MR ASPIN

PS/NO 10 DOWNING STREET

MR R L WADE-GERY
MR P M MAXEY
MR GOULTY
MR P J FOWLER
DIO

CABINET
OFFICE

IMMEDIATE

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~~MR STEEL LEGAL ADVISER RM K188~~

MR FIFCOE LEGAL ADVISER RM K162

~~RESIDENT CLERK~~

(Jill)

mf

GRS 267

CONFIDENTIAL

FM LUSAKA 120902Z DEC 79

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1399 OF 12 DECEMBER

MY TELNO 1386: RHODESIA

1. WHILST KASANDA'S FIRST AND PERSONAL REACTION WAS GUARDED AND SUSPICIOUS AND WHILST IT IS ONLY KAUNDA'S REACTION THAT IS ANY REAL SIGNIFICANCE AS FAR AS ZAMBIAN OPINION IS CONCERNED, WE HAVE HAD CERTAIN INDICATIONS THAT ZAMBIAN REACTION MAY NOT BE TOTALLY NEGATIVE EVEN THOUGH WE CAN EXPECT IT TO BE NOISY.

2. AT A SOCIAL OCCASION LAST NIGHT, KASANDA HAD A LONG TALK WITH U S AMBASSADOR WISNER AND REHEARSED HIS SUSPICIONS AND FEARS BUT IN THE FACE OF STANCH SUPPORT FROM WISNER, KASANDA'S FINAL COMMENT WAS "YOU KNOW THAT IN THE FINAL ANALYSIS IT IS CLINCHED".

2. MY INFORMATION OFFICER ALSO SPOKE LAST NIGHT TO PUNABANTU, PRESS ADVISER TO THE PRESIDENT, WHOSE INITIAL REACTION TO THE DECISION TO SEND LORD SOAMES WAS TO DESCRIBE IT AS "TERRIFIC NEWS, AND A BRAVE ACT". HE WAS DISPOSED PERSONALLY TO DISTINGUISH

2. AT A SOCIAL OCCASION LAST NIGHT, KASANDA HAD A LONG TALK WITH U S AMBASSADOR WISNER AND REHEARSED HIS SUSPICIONS AND FEARS BUT IN THE FACE OF STANCH SUPPORT FROM WISNER, KASANDA'S FINAL COMMENT WAS "YOU KNOW THAT IN THE FINAL ANALYSIS IT IS CLINCHED".

2. MY INFORMATION OFFICER ALSO SPOKE LAST NIGHT TO PUNABANTU, PRESS ADVISER TO THE PRESIDENT, WHOSE INITIAL REACTION TO THE DECISION TO SEND LORD SOAMES WAS TO DESCRIBE IT AS "TERRIFIC NEWS, AND A BRAVE ACT". HE WAS DISPOSED PERSONALLY TO DISTINGUISH CLEARLY BETWEEN THE RETURN TO LEGALITY AND THE SIGNATURE OF A CEASEFIRE AGREEMENT AND FELT THAT THE FORMER WOULD HAVE A POSITIVE EFFECT ON THE LATTER. PUNABANTU WENT ON TO ADMIT CURRENT ZAMBIAN CONCERN AT WHAT THEY SEE AS DELIBERATE PROCRASTINATION BY THE PATRIOTIC FRONT.

3. LOCAL ZAPU OFFICIALS (ADMITTEDLY OF THE THIRD ELEVEN VARIETY) WERE ALSO DISPOSED NOT (REPEAT NOT) TO BE UNDULY CRITICAL OF THE DECISION AND IF THIS IS MAINTAINED THE RISK TO OUR COMMUNITY SHOULD BE MINIMAL.

NEILSON

ZKNNM

X28

PS
PS/SIR I GILMOUR
PS/MR LUCE
PS/PUS

PS/HO 10 DOWNING STREET

MR R L WADE-GERY
MR P M MAXBY
MR GOULTY
MR P J FOWLER
DIO

CABINET
OFFICE

MR WILLSON
MR DAY
LORD N G LENNOX
MR ASPIN

45/1111

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MR STEEL LEGAL ADVISER RM K188

MR FIFCOF LEGAL ADVISER RM K164

RESIDENT CLERK

IMMEDIATE

ADVANCE COPY

Desk By 130900Z

CONFIDENTIAL

DESKBY 130900Z

FM UKMIS NEW YORK 130051Z DEC 79

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1847 OF 12 DECEMBER

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, EEC POSTS, OSLO, LISBON, LUSAKA, LAGOS,
DAR ES SALAAM, GABORONE, MIRIMBA SALISBURY, KINGSTON

INFO PRIORITY DACCA, KUWAIT, LIBREVILLE, CANBERRA, WELLINGTON, OTTAWA
TOKYO, PEKING, LA PAZ.

MIPT RHODESIA

1. FINALLY, I SAW SALIM (THE TANZANIAN PRESIDENT OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY) THIS EVENING. HE TOOK BROADLY THE SAME LINE AS LUSAKA ALTHOUGH FAR MORE RATIONALLY AND WITHOUT EMOTION. HE CONCLUDED THAT OUR ACTION WOULD AROUSE SUSPICION AMONGST THOSE WHO WERE ONLY TOO READY TO SUSPECT US, AND DIMINISH THE CREDIBILITY OF THE FRONT LINE STATES WHO HAD BEEN CO-OPERATING WITH US. COULD WE NOT HAVE NEGOTIATED HERE IN ADVANCE OR, ALTERNATIVELY, LIFTED SANCTIONS - HE REALISED THAT WE HAD TO DO THIS AS SOON AS THE GOVERNOR ARRIVED - WITHOUT ADDRESSING OURSELVES FORMALLY TO THE COUNCIL?

2. I SAID THAT WE COULD NOT POSSIBLY HAVE NEGOTIATED IN ADVANCE. YOU HAD TO BE IN A POSITION TO MAKE YOUR DECISIONS IN THE BEST INTER-

ADDRESSING HIMSELVES FORMALLY TO THE COUNCIL

2. I SAID THAT WE COULD NOT POSSIBLY HAVE NEGOTIATED IN ADVANCE. YOU HAD TO BE IN A POSITION TO MAKE YOUR DECISIONS IN THE BEST INTERESTS OF A SETTLEMENT. YOU COULD NOT HAVE AFFORDED THE RISK OF DELAY, VETOS ETC WHICH RECOURSE TO THE COUNCIL WOULD HAVE INVOLVED BEFORE SENDING THE GOVERNOR AND REACHING FINAL AGREEMENT IN LONDON. EQUALLY, WE COULD NOT HAVE CONTEMPLATED LIFTING SANCTIONS WITHOUT INFORMING THE COUNCIL. WE WOULD NOT HAVE REGARDED THIS AS ACTING IN GOOD FAITH.

3. I WENT ON TO REPEAT WHAT I HAD SAID EARLIER TO CLARK. I SAID THAT I REALISED THAT NOT EVERYONE SHARED OUR LEGAL VIEWS. I REALISED THAT WE MIGHT HAVE DIFFICULTIES. I MIGHT BE SUBJECTED TO A FAIR AMOUNT OF FLAK. BUT OUR EARNEST DESIRE WAS TO REACH AN EARLY SETTLEMENT AND FOR NOTHING TO HAPPEN IN THE UN WHICH MIGHT DISTURB THIS. EQUALLY, WE WANTED TO COME OUT OF THE WHOLE BUSINESS HERE CLEANLY AND IN AN AMICABLE ATMOSPHERE. IN PARTICULAR, I HOPED THAT NO-ONE WOULD CALL THE COUNCIL BEFORE A FULL AGREEMENT WAS SIGNED IN LONDON.

4. SALIM THEN BECAME MORE SYMPATHETIC. HE SAID THAT, TO STATE THE OBVIOUS, EVERYTHING DEPENDED ON A FULL SETTLEMENT BEING REACHED IN LONDON QUICKLY. THE LONGER THE DELAY, THE MORE PRESSURE WOULD BUILD UP HERE. IF THERE WAS AN AGREEMENT WITHIN THE NEXT FEW DAYS, HE THOUGHT THAT THE WHOLE UN ATMOSPHERE WOULD CHANGE. HE DID NOT ANTICIPATE AN EARLY MOVE TO THE COUNCIL.

5. I ASKED HIM ABOUT THE PLENARY DEBATE ON RHODESIA. I HOPED THERE WOULD NOT BE HOSTILE STATEMENTS TO WHICH I WOULD BE OBLIGED TO REPLY. SALIM SAID THAT HE WAS AIMING TO HAVE NO MORE SPEECHES. HE HOPED THAT THERE WOULD BE A DECISION OF THE ASSEMBLY TOMORROW TO POSTPONE RESOLUTIONS UNTIL MONDAY.

PARSONS

NNNN

PS
PS/SIR I GILMOUR
PS/MR LUCE
PS/PUS

MR WILLSON
MR DAY
LORD N G LENNOX
MR ASPIN

PS/NO 10 DOWNING STREET

MR R L WADE-GERY
MR P M MAXEY
MR GOULTY
MR P J FOWLER
DIO

CABINET
OFFICE

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MR STEEL LEGAL ADVISER RM K188

MR FIFCOF LEGAL ADVISER RM K164

RESIDENT CLERK

ADVANCE COPY

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FM WASHINGTON 130025Z DEC 79
TO IMMEDIATE FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
TELEGRAM NUMBER 4175 OF 12 DECEMBER 1979
AND TO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK
INFO IMMEDIATE SALISBURY.

RHODESIA:

1. MIFT CONTAINS THE MAIN POINTS OF AN ARTICLE IN TODAY'S WASHINGTON POST WHICH APPEARED UNDER THE HEADING QUOTE MCHENRY WARNS AGAINST LIFTING RHODESIAN CURBS UNQUOTE.

2. THE ADMINISTRATION ARE EMBARRASSED BY THIS ARTICLE: MOOSE HAS TOLD US THAT THE MEMORANDUM REFERRED TO IN THE ARTICLE HAD BEEN WRITTEN ON 10 DECEMBER AND HAD MERELY DISCUSSED THE TACTICAL HANDLING IN THE UNITED NATIONS OF THE SANCTIONS QUESTION. MOOSE CONFIRMED THAT MCHENRY HAD INDEED USED THE WORDS QUOTE WE SHOULD ARGUE FORCEFULLY WITH THE BRITISH TO SAVE THEM - AND US - FROM THEMSELVES UNQUOTE, BUT MAINTAINED THAT THE ARTICLE MISREPRESENTED MCHENRY'S ARGUMENTS BY SELECTIVE QUOTATION.

CONFIRMED THAT MCHENRY HAD INDEED USED THE WORDS QUOTE WE SHOULD ARGUE FORCEFULLY WITH THE BRITISH TO SAVE THEM - AND US - FROM THEMSELVES UNQUOTE, BUT MAINTAINED THAT THE ARTICLE MISREPRESENTED MCHENRY'S ARGUMENTS BY SELECTIVE QUOTATION.

3. STATE DEPARTMENT SPOKESMAN SAID TODAY THAT THE ARTICLE MISLEADINGLY FOCUSED ON ONLY ONE ASPECT OF THE PROBLEM (THE DESIRABILITY OF AN INTERNATIONAL CONSENSUS) AND THAT A FINAL JUDGEMENT DEPENDED ON A NUMBER OF OTHER FACTORS AS WELL.

4. I DO NOT THINK WE SHOULD MAKE TOO MUCH OF WHAT APPEARS TO BE A MALICIOUS LEAK OF SOME INTERNAL MINUTING WITHIN THE ADMINISTRATION. MOOSE TOLD US THIS MORNING THAT A RECOMMENDATION ON U S SANCTIONS POLICY IS ON THE PRESIDENT'S DESK AND THAT IT GAVE DUE WEIGHT TO THE FORTHCOMING VISIT OF THE PRIME MINISTER AND THE SERIOUS DIFFICULTY WHICH WOULD BE CAUSED IF THE U S WERE TO BE UNHELPFUL.

HENDERSON

NNNN

SUBJECT

THE STATE HOUSE,
DAR ES SALAAM,
TANZANIA.

11th December, 1979.

19/12/79

Mrs. Margaret Thatcher, M.P.,
The Prime Minister,
10 Downing Street,
London, S.W.1.
U.K.

PRIME MINISTER'S

PERSONAL MESSAGE

SERIAL No. T165/79T

Dear Mrs. Thatcher,

Neither of us assumed that the Constitutional and Peace Conference now being held at Lancaster House would be easy or smooth running! Yet it seems to me that we are now struggling with the very last obstacle before a Cease Fire is agreed - albeit still one which has to be overcome.

As I understand it, the problem is that of the disposition of Forces for the Cease Fire period. Both the Patriotic Front and the Salisbury group are worried that they should not appear to be surrendering to the other side, or to be laying themselves open for extermination if anything goes wrong. This mutual distrust is something we have always recognised as a problem needing to be dealt with in the Conference decisions. It was this recognition which caused Britain to state clearly that both Armies had to be given equal status during the Interim, with the Governor relying upon neither for his own administration.

I therefore find it difficult to understand the British Proposals about the disposition of Forces. As I understand it these are that the Salisbury Forces should be monitored where they are at their existing Company Bases. The Patriotic Front Forces, on the other hand, should be assembled in 15 places - which in effect means something like 2,000 men at each of their bases in contrast to approximately 150 men in the Salisbury bases. Without being a military man, this looks as if the Salisbury Forces will simply sit in their existing operational base ready (if they so decide) to go into operation at any moment, and the Patriotic Front Forces will have left their operation bases and gathered in very large groups out in the open.

.../2


Surely this is not treating the Armies equally? I would have thought that reciprocity demanded one of three things. (a) That both sides should gather in groups of about Company size, at declared spots; as proposed for the Salisbury Forces. Or; (b) That both sides should gather their Forces in 15 separate designated places; as proposed for the Patriotic Front Forces. Or (c) That both sides should observe a Cease Fire from where they are, with the Monitoring Forces being given the necessary information by the Commanders. What does not seem to me to be equality of treatment is that the more mobile Force should be collected in groups of 150 men, and the Force which moves on its feet should be required to assemble in larger groupings, away from their bases of operation, and vulnerable to the air attacks they have always greatly feared.

Although I realise the many other demands on your time, I would still appeal to you to consider this question and make the adjustments necessary to meet what seems to me to be a legitimate objection from the Patriotic Front.

As I am writing, I would like to raise one other question with you, about which I am not clear. Does Britain really propose to send the Governor to Rhodesia before the Cease Fire has been agreed? It seems to me that it would be highly dangerous, both politically and militarily, for the Governor to go to Salisbury in advance of an Agreement.

This letter comes to you with my warm personal good wishes. I look forward to writing a problem-less letter to you in the near future if we can overcome this last hurdle!

Yours sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, reading "Julius K. Nyerere", is written above a horizontal line.

19 DEC 1979



[RHODESIA: POLICY: ADVANCE COPIES]

128

PS
PS/SIR I GILMOUR
PS/MR LUCE
PS/PUS

PS/NO 10 DOWNING STREET

MR WILLSON
MR DAY
LORD N G LENNOX
MR ASPIN

MR R L WADE-GERY
MR P M MAXEY
MR GOULTY
MR P J FOWLER
DIO

CABINET
OFFICE

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MR STEEL LEGAL ADVISER RM K188

MR FIFCOFF LEGAL ADVISER RM K164

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T165/79T

CONFIDENTIAL

DESKBY FCO 111933

FM DAR ES SALAAM 111830Z DECEMBER 79

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 986 OF 11 DECEMBER

INFO PRIORITY LUSAKA, LUANDA, MAPUTO, GABORONE, LAGOS,
MIRIMBA SALISBURY, PRETORIA, WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEWYORK

MIPT RHODESIA:

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF PRESIDENT NYERERE'S PERSONAL
MESSAGE TO THE PRIME MINISTER: BEGINS

DEAR MRS THATCHER

NEITHER OF US ASSUMED THAT THE CONSTITUTIONAL AND PEACE
CONFERENCE NOW BEING HELD AT LANCASTER HOUSE WOULD BE EASY
OR SMOOTH RUNNING EXCLAMATION YET IT SEEMS TO ME THAT WE ARE
NOW STRUGGLING WITH THE VERY LAST OBSTACLE BEFORE A CEASE FIRE
IS AGREED - ALBEIT STILL ONE WHICH HAS TO BE OVERCOME.

AS I UNDERSTAND IT, THE PROBLEM IS THAT OF THE DISPOSITION OF
FORCES FOR THE CEASE FIRE PERIOD. BOT THE PATRIOTIC FRONT AND
THE SALISBURY GROUP ARE WORRIED THAT THEY SHOULD NOT APPEAR TO

FORCES FOR THE CEASE FIRE PERIOD. BUT THE PATRIOTIC FRONT AND THE SALISBURY GROUP ARE WORRIED THAT THEY SHOULD NOT APPEAR TO BE SURRENDERING TO THE OTHER SIDE, OR TO BE LAYING THEMSELVES OPEN FOR EXTERMINATION IF ANYTHING GOES WRONG. THIS MUTUAL DISTRUST IS SOMETHING WE HAVE ALWAYS RECOGNISED AS A PROBLEM NEEDING TO BE DEALT WITH IN THE CONFERENCE DECISIONS. IT WAS THIS RECOGNITION WHICH CAUSED BRITAIN TO STATE CLEARLY THAT BOTH ARMIES HAD TO BE GIVEN EQUAL STATUS DURING THE INTERIM, WITH THE GOVERNOR RELYING UPON NEITHER FOR HIS OWN ADMINISTRATION.

I THEREFORE FIND IT DIFFICULT TO UNDERSTAND THE BRITISH PROPOSALS ABOUT THE DISPOSITION OF FORCES. AS I UNDERSTAND IT THESE ARE THAT THE SALISBURY FORCES SHOULD BE MONITORED WHERE THEY ARE AT THEIR EXISTING COMPANY BASES. THE PATRIOTIC FRONT FORCES, ON THE OTHER HAND, SHOULD BE ASSEMBLED IN 15 PLACES - WHICH IN EFFECT MEANS SOMETHING LIKE 2,000 MEN AT EACH OF THEIR BASES IN CONTRAST TO APPROXIMATELY 150 MEN IN THE SALISBURY BASES. WITHOUT BEING A MILITARY MAN, THIS LOOKS AS IF THE SALISBURY FORCES WILL SIMPLY SIT IN THEIR EXISTING OPERATIONAL BASE READY (IF THEY SO DECIDE) TO GO INTO OPERATION AT ANY MOMENT, AND THE PATRIOTIC FRONT FORCES WILL HAVE LEFT THEIR OPERATION BASES AND GATHERED IN VERY LARGE GROUPS OUT IN THE OPEN.

SURELY THIS IS NOT TREATING THE ARMIES EQUALLY? I WOULD HAVE THOUGHT THAT RECIPROCITY DEMANDED ONE OF THREE THINGS.

(A) THAT BOTH SIDES SHOULD GATHER IN GROUPS OF ABOUT COMPANY SIZE, AT DECLARED SPOTS SEMICLNNAS PROPOSED FOR THE SALISBURY FORCES.

OR SEMICLN (B) THAT BOTH SIDES SHOULD GATHER THEIR FORCES IN 15 SEPARATE DESIGNATED PLACES SEMICLN AS PROPOSED FOR THE PATRIOTIC FRONT FORCES.

OR (C) THAT BOTH SIDES SHOULD OBSERVE A CEASE FIRE FROM WHERE THEY ARE, WITH THE MONITORING FORCES BEING GIVEN THE NECESSARY INFORMATION BY THE COMMANDERS. WHAT DOES NOT SEEM TO ME TO BE EQUALITY OF TREATMENT IS THAT THE MORE MOBILE FORCE SHOULD BE COLLECTED IN GROUPS OF 150 MEN, AND THE FORCE WHICH MOVES ON ITS FEET SHOULD BE REQUIRED TO ASSEMBLE IN LARGER GROUPINGS, AWAY FROM THEIR BASES OF OPERATION, AND VULNERABLE TO AIR ATTACKS THEY HAVE ALWAYS GREATLY FEARED.

ALTHOUGH I REALISE THE MANY OTHER DEMANDS ON YOUR TIME, I WOULD STILL APPEAL TO YOU TO CONSIDER THIS QUESTION AND MAKE THE ADJUSTMENTS NECESSARY TO MEET WHAT SEEMS TO ME TO BE A LEGITIMATE OBJECTION FROM THE PATRIOTIC FRONT. AS I AM WRITING, I WOULD LIKE TO RAISE ONE OTHER QUESTION WITH YOU, ABOUT WHICH I AM NOT

PLEASE APPEAR TO YOU TO CONSIDER THIS QUESTION AND MAKE THE
ADJUSTMENTS NECESSARY TO MEET WHAT SEEMS TO ME TO BE A LEGITIMATE
OBJECTION FROM THE PATRIOTIC FRONT. AS I AM WRITING, I WOULD
LIKE TO RAISE ONE OTHER QUESTION WITH YOU, ABOUT WHICH I AM NOT
CLEAR. DOES BRITAIN REALLY PROPOSE TO SEND THE GOVERNOR TO
RHODESIA BEFORE THE CEASE FIRE HAS BEEN AGREED? IT SEEMS TO ME
THAT IT WOULD BE HIGHLY DANGEROUS, BOTH POLITICALLY AND
MILITARILY, FOR THE GOVERNOR TO GO TO SALISBURY IN ADVANCE OF
AN AGREEMENT.

THIS LETTER COMES TO YOU WITH MY WARM PERSONAL GOOD WISHES.
I LOOK FORWARD TO WRITING A PROBLEM-LESS LETTER TO YOU IN
THE NEAR FUTURE IF WE CAN OVERCOME THIS LAST HURDLE EXCLAMATION

YOURS SINCERELY, JULIUS K NYERERE.

ENDS

MOON

NNNN

[RHODESIA: POLICY: ADVANCE COPIES]

Prime Minister X27

PS
PS/SIR I GILMOUR
PS/MR LUCE
PS/PUS

MR WILLSON
MR DAY
LORD N G LENNOX
MR ASPIN

PS/NO 10 DOWNING STREET

MR R L WADE-GERY
MR P M MAXEY
MR GOULTY
MR P J FOWLER
DIO

CABINET OFFICE

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MR STEEL LEGAL ADVISER RM K188
MR FIFCOF LEGAL ADVISER RM K164
RESIDENT CLERK

IMMEDIATE

ADVANCE COPY

[Handwritten signature]

CONFIDENTIAL

FM WASHINGTON 112245Z DEC 79

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 4149 OF 11 DECEMBER, 1979,
INFO UKMIS NEW YORK AND MIRIMBA (SALISBURY).

YOUR TELNO 1945: RHODESIA SANCTIONS.

1. SOLARZ, CHAIRMAN OF THE AFRICA SUB-COMMITTEE OF THE HOUSE FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE HAD A PARTY LAST NIGHT TO CELEBRATE THE AGREEMENT REACHED AT LANCASTER HOUSE LAST WEEK. I EXPLAINED TO HIM THE POSITION REACHED AND THE ARGUMENTS FOR SENDING THE GOVERNOR IN AS PART OF THE FINAL DRIVE TO ACHIEVE SIGNATURE AT LANCASTER HOUSE AND THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CEASE-FIRE. SOLARZ EXPLAINED THE DIFFICULTIES THE BLACK CAUCUS AND OTHERS HAVE ABOUT THE LIFTING OF U S SANCTIONS BEFORE FINAL AGREEMENT.

2. ON THE SAME OCCASION FUNK, WHO DEALS WITH AFRICA IN THE H S C, SAID THAT HE WAS WORRIED THAT WE DID NOT UNDERSTAND THE ACUTE POLITICAL SENSITIVITY OF THIS ISSUE FOR THE PRESIDENT. THERE WERE ONLY TWO NARROW SEGMENTS OF OPINION THAT CARED PASSIONATELY ABOUT RHODESIA - SENATOR HELMS AND CO. ON THE RIGHT AND THE BLACK CAUCUS ETC ON THE LEFT. THIS WAS ELECTION YEAR. THE BLACK CAUCUS HAD LONG MEMORIES. FOR HIS POLITICAL SURVIVAL IN A CLOSE ELECTION THE

ETC ON THE LEFT. THIS WAS ELECTION YEAR. THE BLACK CAUCUS HAD LONG MEMORIES. FOR HIS POLITICAL SURVIVAL IN A CLOSE ELECTION THE PRESIDENT NEEDED TO AVOID OFFENDING THEM, AND BELIEVED THAT PRECIPITATE LIFTING OF U S SANCTIONS WOULD OFFEND THEM. FUNK THOUGHT IT SIMPLY WOULD NOT BE POSSIBLE TO LIFT U S SANCTIONS ON 12 DECEMBER. THE PRESIDENT AT THE VERY LEAST WOULD NEED A FEW DAYS TO GET THE MESSAGE TO THE BLACK CAUCUS ETC THAT HE HAD NO OPTION BUT TO LIFT. FUNK SAID THAT PERSONALLY HE HOPED VERY MUCH THAT THEY COULD LIFT BY THE WEEKEND IN VIEW OF THE PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT.

3. MORLAND WENT OVER THE GROUND THIS MORNING WITH MOOSE. MOOSE SAID THAT VANCE HAD SENT THE PRESIDENT A MESSAGE AND CONFIRMED THAT THE STATE DEPARTMENT UNDERSTOOD THE REASONS FOR OUR ACTION AND THE NEED FOR FULL SUPPORT FROM THE U S. HE TOOK THE POINT THAT THEY SHOULD NOT LINK LIFTING OF U S SANCTIONS TO SETTLEMENT OF THE FINAL DETAILS AT LANCASTER HOUSE, SINCE THAT COULD SIMPLY ENCOURAGE THE PATRIOTIC FRONT TO DRAW THINGS OUT.

4. WE HAVE LEFT THE AMERICANS IN NO DOUBT THAT WE NEED THEIR STRONG SUPPORT FOR THE FINAL CEASEFIRE PROPOSALS, AND A DECISION BY THEM TO LIFT SANCTIONS VERY SOON INDEED.

5. FUNK, NSC, HAS JUST TOLD US THAT THINGS ARE MOVING RAPIDLY AND REASONABLY FAVOURABLY.

HENDERSON

NNNN



FCS/79/189

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR DEFENCERhodesia

1. You have already agreed to the appointment of a Military Adviser to the Governor in Rhodesia, and that supporting military staff should assist him during the pre-independence period.
2. Since then, FCO and MOD officials have examined the complement and terms of reference of the Military Adviser and his staff, and of the British contingent to the Ceasefire Monitoring Force.
3. As you know, the Lancaster House talks are now nearing a conclusion, and Lord Soames is due to arrive in Salisbury on Wednesday 12 December. With his arrival, Rhodesia will return to legality. We would wish him to be accompanied by the Military Adviser and supporting military staff. We hope that the British Commonwealth contingents to the Monitoring Force would follow after the arrangements for a ceasefire are finally agreed in London.
4. I should be grateful for confirmation that you are now content to authorise the planned deployment of British military personnel to Rhodesia in accordance with the arrangements outlined above and agreed in detail by officials.
5. I am sending a copy of this minute to the Prime Minister.

C
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(CARRINGTON)

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[RHODESIA: POLICY: ADVANCE COPIES]

ADVANCE COPY

PS
PS/SIR I GILMOUR
PS/MR LUCE
PS/PUS

MR WILLSON
MR DAY
LORD N G LENNOX
MR ASPIN

~~PS/NO~~ 10 DOWNING STREET

MR R L WADE-GERY)
MR P M MAXEY) CABINET
MR GOULTY) OFFICE
MR P J FOWLER)
DIO)

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HD/RHOD DEPT (4)

HD/C AF D
HD/S AF D

HD/PUSD (2)

HD/NEWS DEPT
HD/WAD

MR STEEL LEGAL ADVISER RM K188
MR FIFCOOT LEGAL ADVISER RM K164
RESIDENT CLERK

Prime Minister

11-12

mg

CONFIDENTIAL

FM GABORONE 111700Z DEC 79

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 504 OF 11 DECEMBER

INFO IMMEDIATE LUSAKA DAR ES SALAAM MAPUTO LAGOS BAGHDAD

WASHINGTON UKMIS NEW YORK PRETORIA MIRIMBA SALISBURY LUANDA

YOUR TEL TO LUSAKA 1025: RHODESIA

1. I WAS ADVISED BY MOGWE THAT PRESIDENT KHAMA WAS STILL NOT WELL ENOUGH TO RECEIVE A VISIT FROM ME. THEREFORE AFTER DISCUSSION WITH BARLOW I DELIVERED THE PRIME MINISTER'S MESSAGE TO VICE-PRESIDENT MASIRE THIS AFTERNOON. MASIRE WAS ACCOMPANIED BY EXTERNAL AFFAIRS MINISTER MOGWE AND THE PRESIDENT'S PRIVATE SECRETARY LEGWAILA. AFTER MASIRE HAD READ THE LETTER I SPOKE AS IN PARAS 2 AND 3 OF TUR.

2. MOGWE SAID THAT HE APPRECIATED THE REASONS FOR SENDING THE GOVERNOR TO RHODESIA AND AGREED THAT BRITAIN WAS AT LAST ASSERTING ITS AUTHORITY. HE HOPED THAT THE ACTION WOULD BE SUCCESSFUL BUT HE FEARED THAT IT WOULD MAKE MATTERS WORSE. HE SAID THAT ONCE AGAIN BRITAIN WAS TAKING ACTION WITHOUT GIVING THE FRONT LINE

BUT HE FEARED THAT IT WOULD MAKE MATTERS WORSE. HE SAID THAT ONCE AGAIN BRITAIN WAS TAKING ACTION WITHOUT GIVING THE FRONT LINE STATES THE OPPORTUNITY TO INFLUENCE THE PATRIOTIC FRONT. BECAUSE OF THIS IT WAS FUTILE TO EXPECT THE FRONT LINE NOW TO USE ITS INFLUENCE. IF THEY DID IT WOULD JUST APPEAR TO THE PATRIOTIC FRONT AND THE REST OF AFRICA THAT THE FRONT LINE WERE BEING MANIPULATED BY BRITAIN. IN ANY CASE, HOW COULD THE FRONT LINE INFLUENCE THE PF AS REQUESTED BY THE PRIME MINISTER IF THEY DID NOT HAVE FULL DETAILS OF OUR CEASEFIRE PROPOSALS, THAT IS ON DISPOSITION OF FORCES? LEGWAILA ADDED THAT HE COULD NOT UNDERSTAND WHY THERE HAD NOT BEEN MORE NEGOTIATION WITH THE PATRIOTIC FRONT OVER THE PRECISE ASSEMBLY POINTS. WHEN HE LEFT LONDON LAST WEEK IT WAS WELL KNOWN THAT A BRITISH RECONNAISSANCE TEAM WAS TOURING RHODESIA CHOOSING THE ASSEMBLY POINTS WITH THE HELP OF RHODESIAN FORCES. THE PATRIOTIC FRONT HAD NOT HAD A LOOK-IN.

3. I SAID THAT THE CEASEFIRE PROPOSALS HAD BEEN KNOWN SINCE THE MIDDLE OF LAST WEEK AND THE PRINCIPLES ACCEPTED BY THE PF. ALL THAT HAD REMAINED TO BE AGREED WITH THE PATRIOTIC FRONT HAD BEEN THE DETAILS OF THE ASSEMBLY POINTS AND THE CEASEFIRE DATE. THE PATRIOTIC FRONT HAD NOT BEEN COOPERATIVE IN REACHING AGREEMENT ON THESE MATTERS. I WENT ON TO SAY THAT THE DISPOSITION OF FORCES WAS NOT AIMED AT DRAWING UP BATTLE LINES FOR THE FUTURE BUT IN DISENGAGING THE TWO FIGHTING FORCES IN A WAY THAT LEFT THE PATRIOTIC FRONT SECURE AND CAPABLE OF BEING PROVISIONED.

4. THE VICE-PRESIDENT, WHO HAD LISTENED TO MY EXCHANGES WITH LEGWAILA AND MOGWE WITH GREAT ATTENTION, SUMMED UP BY SAYING THAT THE PATRIOTIC FRONT HAD NEVER WANTED A SETTLEMENT. THEY HAD BEEN FORCED INTO NEGOTIATIONS AND INTO THE AGREEMENTS ALREADY CONCLUDED ONLY BY PRESSURE FROM THE FRONT LINE. THE FRONT LINE HAD HAD ENOUGH OF THE RHODESIAN CONFLICT AND THE PATRIOTIC FRONT KNEW IT. HOWEVER, HE FEARED THAT WHAT HE REGARDED AS PRECIPITATE ACTION IN SENDING THE GOVERNOR WOULD GIVE THE PATRIOTIC FRONT REASONS TO HOLD OUT LONGER WITH THE SUPPORT OF AFRICA, EVEN IF THE FRONT LINE DID NOT SUPPORT THEM. HE HOPED AGAINST HOPE THAT THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT'S GAMBLE WOULD SUCCEED BUT HE BELIEVED THAT ALL THAT WOULD HAPPEN WOULD BE THE PROLONGATION OF THE NEGOTIATIONS AND THE CONFLICT. WHY HAD YOUR PATIENCE RUN OUT?

5. I SAID THAT IT WAS NOT A QUESTION OF YOUR PATIENCE RUNNING OUT, AS YOU HAD DEMONSTRATED IN THE LAST 14 WEEKS. IT WAS THAT THE SITUATION WAS BECOMING SO DANGEROUS THAT YOU COULD NOT WAIT UPON THE DELAYING TACTICS OF THE PATRIOTIC FRONT BEFORE APPOINTING A GOVERNOR. THE PATRIOTIC FRONT WERE NOT THE ONLY PARTIES TO THE CONFLICT AND THE RHODESIANS WERE DANGEROUS. AS RECENT EVENTS HAD

SITUATION WAS BECOMING SO DANGEROUS THAT YOU COULD NOT WAIT UPON THE DELAYING TACTICS OF THE PATRIOTIC FRONT BEFORE APPOINTING A GOVERNOR. THE PATRIOTIC FRONT WERE NOT THE ONLY PARTIES TO THE CONFLICT AND THE RHODESIANS WERE DANGEROUS, AS RECENT EVENTS HAD SHOWN. THE ASSUMPTION OF BRITISH AUTHORITY OVER RHODESIA WAS NECESSARY TO BRING THE ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE CEASEFIRE INTO EFFECT.

6. ALL THREE THEN SAID THAT THEIR ONLY HOPE WAS THAT YOUR MEETING WITH THE PATRIOTIC FRONT TODAY WOULD BE SUCCESSFUL AND THAT THEIR FEARS ABOUT THE EFFECTS OF THE APPOINTMENT OF A GOVERNOR WOULD BE UNJUSTIFIED. MOGWE ADDED THAT IF NOT, THE SIGNIFICANCE OF 12 DECEMBER WOULD NOT BE THAT IT WAS THE END OF THE RHODESIA REBELLION BUT WAS THE DAY THAT BRITAIN DECLARED WAR ON THE PATRIOTIC FRONT.

TURNER.

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IMMEDIATE

CONFIDENTIAL

Prime Minister

GRS 607

CONFIDENTIAL

DESKBY 111800Z

FM LUSAKA 111535Z DEC 79

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1386 OF 11 DECEMBER

INFO IMMEDIATE MIRIMBA SALISBURY, PRIORITY GABORONE, MAPUTO,
LUANDA, DAR ES SALAAM, PRETORIA, LAGOS, NAIROBI, LILONGWE

YOUR TELS NOS 1022 AND 1295 AND YOUR TEL NO 230 TO GABORONE:
RHODESIA: MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER

1. I SOUGHT A MEETING WITH PRESIDENT KAUNDA TO DELIVER THE PRIME MINISTER'S MESSAGE BUT HAVING BEEN STALLED ALL DAY I WAS TOLD WITH HALF AN HOUR TO SPARE THAT I SHOULD DELIVER IT TO KASANDA, PERMANENT SECRETARY, MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS. I DO NOT KNOW WHETHER THIS REPRESENTED A GENUINE DIFFICULTY WITH THE PRESIDENT'S TIMETABLE OR NOT.
2. HAVING HANDED OVER THE MESSAGE I SPOKE AS INSTRUCTED IN YOUR TEL NO 1025.
3. KASANDA LISTENED ATTENTIVELY AND THEN SAID THAT HIS FIRST AND PERSONAL REACTION WAS THAT THIS WAS A DISTURBING MESSAGE WHICH RAISED A NUMBER OF QUESTIONS. HE THOUGHT OUR ACTION WOULD STRENGTHEN SUSPICION THAT WE WERE COMMITTED TO A BILATERAL DEAL WITH MUZOREWA, LEAVING THE PATRIOTIC FRONT THE OPTION OF STAYING OUT OR COMING IN ONLY AS SECOND CLASS CITIZENS. I EMPHASISED THAT IT WAS OUR WISH AND HOPE AS IT HAD ALWAYS BEEN THAT THE PATRIOTIC FRONT WOULD PLAY A FULL PART IN THE SETTLEMENT.
4. KASANDA THEN ASKED WHY IF WE BELIEVED THAT A SETTLEMENT WAS SO CLOSE DID WE CHOOSE TO SEND THE GOVERNOR TO RHODESIA BEFORE SIGNATURE. I SAID THAT WE WERE VERY CONCERNED THAT ANY DELAY MIGHT CAUSE A FURTHER ESCALATION OF THE CONFLICT AND THAT WE BELIEVED THAT THE GOVERNOR'S PRESENCE IN SALISBURY WAS AN INDISPENSABLE FACTOR IN BRINGING INTO EFFECT THE FINAL CEASEFIRE ARRANGEMENTS. HIS AUTHORITY OVER THE RHODESIAN FORCES SHOULD FURTHER ASSUAGE PATRIOTIC FRONT FEARS.

CONFIDENTIAL

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5. KASANDA THEN ASKED AT WHAT STAGE RHODESIA WOULD BE HELD BY US TO HAVE RETURNED TO LEGALITY AND I REPLIED ON STANDARD LINES. HE THEN SAID "AND I SUPPOSE THE REST FLOWS - SANCTIONS LIFTED AND SO ON". I SAID THAT IT WAS OUR INTENTION TO LIFT SANCTIONS ON THE RETURN TO LEGALITY AS THE VERY FACTORS WHICH HAD CALLED FORTH THOSE SANCTIONS WOULD HAVE BEEN REMOVED. HIS FINAL QUESTION CONCERNED THE GOVERNOR'S ROUTE TO RHODESIA. WOULD HE OVERFLY ZAMBIA? I SAID THAT I HAD REPORTED THE ZAMBIAN GOVERNMENT'S VIEWS ON OVERFLYING BEFORE SIGNATURE OF AN AGREEMENT AND ALTHOUGH M HAD NO SPECIFIC INFORMATION I COULD ONLY ASSUME THAT THE GOVERNOR WOULD BE TAKING AN ALTERNATIVE ROUTE.

6. I THEN ASKED KASANDA IF HE WOULD ENSURE THAT THE PRIME MINISTER'S MESSAGE WAS PASSED URGENTLY TO THE PRESIDENT SAYING THAT IT WAS THE PRIME MINISTER'S WISH THAT HE SHOULD HAVE ADVANCE NOTICE OF THE STATEMENT. KASANDA SAID THAT IT WAS DISTURBING THAT WE HAD NOT FELT ABLE TO GIVE THE ZAMBIANS MORE ADVANCE NOTICE THAN WE HAD. HAD THE P.F. BEEN FOREWARNED? I EXPLAINED THAT WHILST WE INTENDED EVERY COURTESY TO PRESIDENT KAUNDA AND WERE GRATEFUL FOR HIS HELP THROUGHOUT THE NEGOTIATIONS THERE HAD OF COURSE ALWAYS BEEN THE POSSIBILITY THAT THE SITUATION MIGHT CHANGE DURING THE DAY AND I BELIEVED THAT IT WAS FOR THIS REASON THAT IT HAD BEEN JUDGED UNWISE FOR ME TO SPEAK EARLIER IN THE DAY. AS TO THE P.F. I FELT SURE THEY WOULD BE TOLD IN ADVANCE OF THE STATEMENT.

7. KASANDA REMAINED CLEARLY WORRIED BY THE POSSIBLE REACTION TO THE MESSAGE AND I CONCLUDED THE MEETING WHICH HAD BEEN CORDIAL THROUGHOUT BY SAYING THAT I WAS OF COURSE AT THE PRESIDENT'S DISPOSAL SHOULD HE WISH TO DISCUSS ANY ASPECT OF THE MESSAGE OR TO FORWARD A REPLY.

NEILSON

FILES

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LEGAL ADVISERS
(MR STEEL)
(MR FREELAND)
(MR FIFOOT)
ECON D

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NEWS D
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PS/LPS
PS/MR LUCE
PS/MR RIDLEY
PS/MR HURD
PS/MR MARTEN
PS/PUS
SIR A DUFF
MR BULLARD
MR FRETWELL
LORD N G LENNOX
MISS BROWN
MR DAY
MR WILLSON
MR ASPIN

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION

RHODESIA POLICY

X-27

PS
PS/SIR I GILMOUR
PS/MR LUCE
PS/PUS
MR WILLSON
MR DAY
LORD N G LENNOX
MR ASPIR

PS/NO 10 DOWNING STREET

MR R L WADE-GERY
MR P M MAXEY
MR GOULTY
MR P J FOWLER
DIO

CABINET
OFFICE

HSV7J

FLASH

HD/RHOD DEPT (4)

HD/C AF D

HD/S AF D

HD/PUSD (2)

HD/NEWS DEPT

HD/WAD

MR STEEL LEGAL ADVISER RM K188

MR FIFCOF LEGAL ADVISER RM K164

~~RESIDENT CLERK~~

Prime Minister

11.12.

MT

CRS 350

SECRET

FM PRETORIA 111030 Z DEC 79

TO FLASH FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 986 OF 11 DEC.

MY TELNO 990 : S A FORCES IN RHODESIA.

PIK BOTHA HAS JUST TELEPHONED ME (I AM IN CAPE TOWN) WITH AN URGENT MESSAGE FOR YOU . IT READS AS FOLLOWS :

'' WE HAVE TAKEN NOTE OF YOUR MISGIVINGS AS REGARDS THE PRESENCE OF OUR TROOPS AND EQUIPMENT IN ZIMBABWE - RHODESIA . WE ON OUR PART NOW HAVE MISGIVINGS ABOUT THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT ATTITUDE TO THIS MATTER . IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES , COULD YOU PLEASE LET ME KNOW TODAY WHETHER IT IS YOUR WISH THAT WE SHOULD WITHDRAW OUR PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT BEFORE THE GOVERNOR'S ARRIVAL ''.

2. PIK BOTHA WAS NOT ABLE TO TELL ME MUCH ON THE TELEPHONE ABOUT THE REASONS FOR THIS MESSAGE , EXCEPT THAT HE HAD NOW CONSULTED THE PRIME MINISTER AND IT REPRESENTED THE VIEWS OF THE GOVERNMENT. AS REPORTED IN MY TUP HIS OWN SUGGESTION YESTERDAY WAS THAT

2. PIK BOTHA WAS NOT ABLE TO TELL ME MUCH ON THE TELEPHONE ABOUT THE REASONS FOR THIS MESSAGE , EXCEPT THAT HE HAD NOW CONSULTED THE PRIME MINISTER AND IT REPRESENTED THE VIEWS OF THE GOVERNMENT. AS REPORTED IN MY TUR , HIS OWN SUGGESTION YESTERDAY WAS THAT THIS MATTER SHOULD BE SETTLED DIRECT ON THE MILITARY NET . WHAT NOW APPEARS TO BE SUGGESTED IS THAT THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT REQUIRES A MORE EXPLICIT REQUEST FROM US. WHEN I ASKED HIM WHY IT WAS THAT THEY " NOW HAVE MISGIVINGS ABOUT THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT ATTITUDE " , HE MERELY SAID THAT AFTER ALL THE HELP THEY HAD GIVEN IN RHODESIA , THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT WERE NOW BEING MADE TO FEEL OBSOLETE AND SUPERFLOUS. HE ALSO SUGGESTED THAT THE RHODESIANS MIGHT NOT LIKE WHAT WE WERE PROPOSING , IE THE WITHDRAWAL OF SOUTH AFRICAN TROOPS .

3. IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES , I SUGGEST THAT IN YOUR REPLY YOU SHOULD CONFIRM WHAT YOU HAVE ALREADY SAID PUBLICLY AND SHOULD MAKE IT CLEAR THAT WE DO EXPECT THAT SOUTH AFRICAN FORMED UNITS SHOULD WITHDRAW AS SOON AS POSSIBLE, EVEN IF IT IS NOT FEASIBLE BY THE TIME OF THE GOVERNOR'S ARRIVAL. IN PASSING ON THIS REPLY, I COULD MAKE IT CLEAR ORALLY THAT THE POSITION ABOUT VOLUNTEERS AND EQUIPMENT REMAINS AS I HAVE TOLD HIM BEFORE.

C

LEAHY

NNNN

[RHODESIA: POLICY: ADVANCE COPIES]

IMMEDIATE

PS
PS/SIR I GILMOUR
PS/MR LUCE
PS/PUS
MR WILLSON
MR DAY
LORD N G LENNOX
MR ASPIN

PS/NO 10 DOWNING STREET

MR R L WADE-GERY)
MR P M MAXEY)
MR GOULTY)
MR P J FOWLER)
DIO)
Mr R Armstrong)

CABINET OFFICE

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HD/RHOD DEPT (4)

HD/C AF D

HD/S AF D

HD/PUSD (2)

HD/NEWS DEPT

HD/WAD

MR STEEL LEGAL ADVISER RM K188

MR FIFCOF LEGAL ADVISER RM K164

~~RESIDENT CLERK~~

Prime Minister

11-12

GPS 100

CONFIDENTIAL

FM MAPUTO 111615Z DEC 79

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 467 OF 11 DECEMBER

UNFO TO DAR ES SALAAM GABORONE LAGOS BAGHDAD CANBERRA UKMIS NEW YORK WASHINGTON PRETORIA LUANDA MIRIMBA SALISBURY LUSAKA

MY TELNO 466: RHODESIA

1. I DELIVERED THE PRIME MINISTER'S MESSAGE TO FERRAO AT 5 P.M. LOCAL TIME AND REHEARSED ALL THE ARGUMENTS IN FAVOUR OF QUICK ACTION TO PERSUADE THE PF TO ACCEPT OUR DETAILED PLAN. I SAID THAT ALTHOUGH THE MESSAGE MIGHT ALSO REACH PRESIDENT MACHEL IN BAGHDAD I HOPED THAT IT WOULD BE CONVEYED TO HIM ON THEIR CHANNELS FROM HERE TO MAKE DOUBLY SURE.
2. FERRAO PROMISED TO DO HIS BEST. HE WAS QUITE DELIGHTED TO HEAR THAT WE WOULD ACCEPT A SMALL LIAISON UNIT IN SALISBURY.
3. LIKE DOS SANTOS, HE WAS NOT CRITICAL OF OUR DECISION TO HAVE THE GOVERNOR ARRIVE IN SALISBURY AHEAD OF THE FINAL AGREEMENT SEMICOLON AND HE TOOK IT FOR GRANTED THAT ANY REMAINING PROBLEMS WOULD BE RESOLVED BEFORE THE END OF THIS WEEK.

PARADOROULOS

mg
IMMEDIATE
ADVANCE COPY

[RHODESIA: POLICY: ADVANCE COPIES]

IMMEDIATE

PS
PS/SIR I GILMOUR
PS/MR LUCE
PS/PUS

MR WILLSON
MR DAY
LORD N G LENNOX
MR ASPIN

PS/NO 10 DOWNING STREET

MR R L WADE-GERY
MR P M MAXEY
MR GOULTY
MR P J FOWLER
DIO

CABINET
OFFICE

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HD/RHOD DEPT (4)

HD/C AF D
HD/S AF D

HD/PUSD (2)

HD/NEWS DEPT
HD/WAD

MR STEEL LEGAL ADVISER RM K188

MR FIFCOFF LEGAL ADVISER RM K161

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am

Prime Minister

11.12

CONFIDENTIAL

FM MAPUTO 111115Z DEC 79

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TEL NO 466 OF 11 DECEMBER

INFO IMMEDIATE DAR ES SALAAM GABORONE LAGOS BAGHDAD CANBERRA
UKMIS NEW YORK WASHINGTON PRETORIA LUANDA MIRIMBA SALISBURY
LUSAKA.

YOUR TEL NO 174: RHODESIA

1. I HAD AN HOUR'S TALK WITH DOS SANTOS THIS MORNING. ALTHOUGH HE SEEMED WELL BRIEFED, I WENT OVER THE WHOLE GROUND AND EXPLAINED THE POSITION WE HAD NOW REACHED IN DETAIL. I INFORMED HIM OF THE GOVERNOR'S ARRIVAL IN SALISBURY TOMORROW, STRESSING THAT HIS PRESENCE THERE WITHOUT ANY FURTHER DELAY WAS ESSENTIAL IF THE CEASE-FIRE ARRANGEMENTS WERE TO BE IMPLEMENTED SATISFACTORILY ON THE GROUND. WE WOULD ACCEPT A SMALL MOZAMBICAN LIAISON UNIT IN SALISBURY SEMICOLON I HOPED THAT WE COULD COUNT ON MOZAMBICAN COOPERATION FOR STOPPING ARMED ACTIVITY ACROSS THE BORDER AS SOON AS THE GOVERNOR ASSUMED CHARGE SEMICOLON AND THAT THE PRESIDENT'S INFLUENCE WOULD AGAIN BE USED TO ENSURE THAT THE PATRIOTIC FRONT ACCEPTED OUR FINAL PRESENTATION WITHOUT DELAY. I TOLD HIM THAT I WOULD BE DELIVERING A MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO HIS PRESIDENT LATER TODAY.

2. DOS SANTOS SAID THAT HE WAS COMPLETELY CONFIDENT THAT THE PF WILL SIGN AND HE REPEATED HIS GOVERNMENT'S ASSURANCES THAT, ON THEIR SIDE,

2. DOS SANTOS SAID THAT HE WAS COMPLETELY CONFIDENT THAT THE PF WILL SIGN AND HE REPEATED HIS GOVERNMENT'S ASSURANCES THAT, ON THEIR SIDE, THEY WOULD ENSURE THAT THERE WAS NO CROSS-BORDER ACTIVITY AND WOULD CO-OPERATE WITH US FULLY. HE TOOK NOTE OF OUR READINESS TO ACCEPT A SMALL MOZAMBIKAN LIAISON UNIT IN SALISBURY. HOWEVER, IT WAS POLITICALLY IMPOSSIBLE FOR HIS GOVERNMENT TO TAKE ANY ACTION OR TO SET IN MOTION THE MACHINERY FOR COOPERATION BEFORE THE PF FINALLY SIGN. HE WAS UNMOVED WHEN I ARGUED THAT EVEN A 2 OR 3 DAY DELAY (BETWEEN THE GOVERNOR'S ARRIVAL AND THE PF BEING PERSUADED TO SIGN) WOULD BE FRAUGHT WITH DANGER.

3. AT HIS REQUEST I EXPLAINED OUR POSITION OVER SANCTIONS. HE REPEATED THE POINTS MADE TO ME BY CHISSANO (MY TEL NO 453) ADDING THAT, WHATEVER OUR LEGAL INTERPRETATION, IT WAS "ETHICALLY" RIGHT FOR THE UNITED NATIONS TO BE SOMEHOW INVOLVED IN THE ENDING OF SANCTIONS. HE WONDERED IF WE ENVISAGED A MEETING OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL TAKING PLACE FOLLOWING SIR A PARSON'S COMMUNICATION TO ITS PRESIDENT. I SAID THAT THIS WAS A MATTER FOR THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL; BUT AS FAR AS WE WERE CONCERNED WE COULD NOT AGREE TO THE LIFTING OF SANCTIONS BEING MADE THE SUBJECT OF AN AFFIRMATIVE SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION. DOS SANTOS DID NOT PRESS THE POINT AND I GOT THE IMPRESSION THAT, SO LONG AS THE UNITED NATIONS WERE INVOLVED IN SOME WAY, THE PRECISE MECHANICS WOULD NOT WORRY THE MOZAMBIKANS. HE REVEALED THAT OSCAR MONTEIRO, MINISTER AT THE PRESIDENCY, WAS ON HIS WAY TO NEW YORK WITH A FULL BRIEF FROM HIS GOVERNMENT ON THE QUESTION OF SANCTIONS. HE WILL, AMONG OTHER THINGS, BE RAISING SUCH PRACTICAL PROBLEMS AS THE RESTORATION OF RAIL COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN MOZAMBIQUE AND RHODESIA. BOTH THE LINES, FROM BEIRA AND MAPUTO BUT ESPECIALLY THE LATTER, HAD BEEN REPEATEDLY BOMBED AND DAMAGED BY THE RHODESIANS AND MOZAMBIQUE WOULD NEED "OUT-SIDE HELP" TO REPAIR THEM.

4. LOOKING BEYOND THE SETTLEMENT, DOS SANTOS HOPED THAT WE WOULD BE PREPARED TO RE-OPEN THE DIALOGUE, INTERRUPTED IN MARCH OF THIS YEAR, ABOUT ECONOMIC COOPERATION ESPECIALLY AS ONE OF THE REASONS THEN GIVEN BY MY PREDECESSOR WAS MOZAMBIQUE'S "CRITICAL" ATTITUDE TOWARDS US IN THE RHODESIA CONTEXT. ALTHOUGH THEIR'S IS A STATE CONTROLLED ECONOMY, THEY WOULD WELCOME COOPERATION AND INVESTMENT, FOR EXAMPLE IN JOINT VENTURES, WITH PRIVATE FIRMS FROM ABROAD. I TOOK NOTE OF HIS REMARKS, BUT EXPLAINED THAT, SO FAR AS THEY REFERRED TO FURTHER TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE, NO DECISIONS COULD BE TAKEN WHILE THE PROBLEM OF RHODESIA, EFFECTING AS IT DOES THE WHOLE REGION, REMAINED UNSOLVED SEMICOLON AND IT WAS ONLY FAIR TO WARN HIM THAT FOREIGN AID HAS HAD TO TAKE ITS SHARE OF THE CUTS ON GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURE.

[RHODESIA: POLICY: ADVANCE COPIES]

PS/SIR I GILMOUR
PS/MR LUCE
PS/PUS

MR WILLSON
MR DAY
LORD N G LENNOX
MR ASPIN

PS/NO 10 DOWNING STREET

MR R L WADE-GERY
MR P M MAXEY
MR GOULTY
MR P J FOWLER
DIO

CABINET
OFFICE

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HD/RHOD DEPT (4)

HD/C AF D
HD/S AF D

HD/PUSD (2)

HD/NEWS DEPT
HD/WAD

MR STEEL LEGAL ADVISER RM K188

MR FIFCOF LEGAL ADVISER RM K164

RESIDENT CLERK

Prime Minister

[Signature]

11/12/79

IMMEDIATE

GRPS

CONFIDENTIAL

FM DUBLIN 11 1715 Z DECEMBER

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 503 OF 11 DECEMBER 1979

AND TO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON UKMIS NEW YORK

INFO PRIORITY ALL EEC POSTS UKDEL NATO UKDEL STRASBOURG MADRID

LISBON ATHENS PRETORIA MIRIMBA (SALISBURY) LUANDA LUSAKA MAPUTO

NAIROBI LAGOS DAR ES SALAAM

EUROPEAN POLITICAL COOPERATION: POLITICAL COMMITTEEDR DUBLIN:

11 DECEMBER 1979

RHODESIA

SUMMARY

1. THE UNITED KINGDOM BRIEFED PARTNERS ON THE LATEST SITUATION AND ON THE NEXT BRITISH MOVES. ON THE SANCTIONS ASPECT, THE FRG SUPPORTED THE UK ARGUMENTATION AND SAID THEY WOULD FOLLOW IT: LUXEMBURG KEPT SILENT: THE REMAINDER SAID THEY CONTINUED TO BELIEVE THAT IT WOULD BE NECESSARY FOR THE SECURITY COUNCIL TO TAKE SOME ACTION FOR SANCTIONS TO LIFTED: THE FRENCH SUGGESTED THAT THIS ACTION COULD TAKE THE FORM OF ABSENCE OF COMMENT ON THE LETTER TO BE SENT BY SIR A PARSONS TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL. THE COMMISSION HELD OUT THE PROSPECT OF COMMUNITY FUNDS BOTH TO ASSIST IN REPATRIATION OF REFUGEES AND TO RELIEVE FOOD SHORTAGES.

2. DETAIL

BULLARD SAID THAT THE NINE STILL HAD A ROLE TO PLAY WITH THE PATRIOTIC FRONT (PF) AND THE FRONT LINE STATES (FLS) TO PERSUADE THE PF TO CONCLUDE THE LAST DETAILS OF THE NEGOTIATIONS. THE GOVERNOR WOULD ARRIVE IN RHODESIA TOMORROW. WHEN HIS AUTHORITY HAD BEEN ACCEPTED RHODESIA WOULD HAVE RETURNED TO LEGALITY. THE UK WOULD THEN LIFT SANCTIONS AND HOPED THAT PARTENERS WOULD INITIATE ACTION TO DO LIKEWISE. IN THE UN THE UK WOULD PROCEED AS FORECAST EARLIER BY MEANS OF A LETTER TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL. THE NINE WERE BEING INVITED TO SEND OBSERVERS TO THE ELECTIONS.

3. DISCUSSION ON SANCTIONS FOLLOWED AS RECORDED IN PARA 1 ABOVE

4. DORR (PRESIDENCY) SUGGESTED THAT AT A LATER STAGE THE POLITICAL COMMITTEE SHOULD CONSIDER MAKING RECOMMENDATIONS ON POLITICAL ASPECTS OF AID TO RHODESIA. AUDLAND (COMMISSION) SAID THAT 3 AND M 1/2 MUAS COULD BE MADE AVAILABLE IMMEDIATELY TO HELP REPATRIATION OF RHODESIAN N REFUGEES. FURTHER FUNDS MIGHT BE FOUND IF THEY PROVED INADEQUATE. THE COMMISSION MIGHT ALSO BE ABLE TO FIND FUNDS FOR FOOD AID FOR RHODESIA THOUGH IT WOULD HAVE TO DISTRIBUTE THESE THROUGH INTERNATIONAL AGENCIES SUCH AS THE UNHCR AND ICRC. THE UK SHOULD CONTACT THE COMMISSION (FOLEY) ABOUT DETAILED ARRANGEMENTS. AFTER THE MEETING AUDLAND SUGGESTED PRIVATELY THAT THE UK MIGHT CONSIDER INVITING THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT TO SEND OBSERVERS TO THE ELECTIONS .

HAYDON

IMMEDIATE

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With the compliments of

THE PRIVATE SECRETARY

FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
SW1A 2AH

CONFIDENTIAL



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH.

11 December 1979

Governor of Southern Rhodesia
The Rt Hon Lord Soames GCMG, GCVO, CBE
etc etc etc

La
Smith

My Lord

1. I have it in command from Her Majesty to convey to you instructions for the discharge of the functions vested in you as Governor of Southern Rhodesia.
2. It is the firm resolve of Her Majesty's Government to bring Southern Rhodesia to independence as the independent Republic of Zimbabwe within a period of three months from the date of your taking up your appointment, having enabled the people of the territory through elections to make a free choice of their future government. Your task in this period will be to maintain orderly government and efficient administration of the affairs of the territory and to organise and conduct elections. The powers which will enable you to carry out this task are conferred by the Southern Rhodesia Constitution (Interim Provisions) Order 1979 (the "Constitution Order"). All legislative and executive authority in Southern Rhodesia will be vested in you. All public officers in Rhodesia including the civil service, the police and the defence forces will be required to comply with your directions; so also, in the event of a cease-fire, will the military forces of the Patriotic Front.
3. It is not the wish of Her Majesty's Government that you should initiate fundamental changes of policy in Southern Rhodesia during the period of your government. Existing laws will be continued in force with such modifications as are necessary to take account of the "Constitution Order" and as may be required for the organisation and conduct of free and

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CONFIDENTIAL



fair elections. It will be your responsibility to ensure that the discretionary powers granted by such laws to public officers in Southern Rhodesia are not used in a manner likely to prejudice the conditions for free and fair elections or otherwise exercised in an oppressive or arbitrary manner. Except as regards the organisation of elections your administration of the country should be conducted on a caretaker basis. Matters of policy should, so far as is possible, be left for the decision of the government which will take office after the elections have been held.

4. You should ensure that no body purporting to be the legislature of the territory assemble or pass laws. Under the powers conferred on you by the Constitution Order you should provide by law that all functions at present vested by Rhodesian law in the President, Prime Minister or other Ministers will from the date of your arrival be vested in you. You will convey your directions for the government of the territory either in person or through members of your staff to the Secretaries of Ministries, the Commanders of the Defence Forces, the Commissioner of Police, and other appropriate public officers. There will be a handover period of 3 or 4 days following your arrival but thereafter you should ensure that any persons holding the office of Minister do not undertake the administration of their departments or otherwise exercise Ministerial functions. All matters which, under the laws at present in force, are expressed to require the authority of the President should be dealt with only on your authority. You should, however, grant access to any political leader should matters arise which cannot be resolved with your advisers. All matters concerning the external relations of Southern Rhodesia will be reserved to you and you should exercise a close supervision over all matters concerning the organisation and conduct of elections, the maintenance of law and order and the protection of human rights. In other respects your

/authority



authority may be delegated by written instruments, as you think fit.

5. It is envisaged that a cease-fire between the Rhodesian Security Forces and the military forces of the Patriotic Front will come into force shortly after your arrival in Salisbury. You should direct your Military Adviser to concern himself immediately with the preparations for this, on the basis of the draft cease-fire agreement under negotiation at the Constitutional Conference at Lancaster House. As soon as agreement on the implementation of a cease-fire is reached you should constitute a Cease-Fire Commission under the Chairmanship of your Military Adviser, on which should be represented the military commanders of both sides or their representatives. The task of the Commission will be to ensure compliance with the terms of the cease-fire, and the military commanders of both forces will be responsible to you for this. The Commission will investigate breaches, will endeavour to establish responsibility for them and will make recommendations to prevent their recurrence. The military forces of the Patriotic Front which assemble at pre-determined places will be regarded as lawful forces. Forces which do not assemble will be in breach of the terms of the cease-fire. Provided that all Patriotic Front forces assemble and all cross-border infiltration ceases, there should be no need for you to order the Rhodesian Security Forces forward from their company bases.

6. A Monitoring Force under United Kingdom auspices and comprising units from the forces of a number of Commonwealth countries will start to deploy in Southern Rhodesia as soon as agreement on the implementation of the cease-fire has been reached. Under your authority, the Force will be responsible for monitoring the cease-fire and reporting breaches of it to the Cease-Fire Commission. You should require breaches to be thoroughly investigated and appropriate action to be taken. In

/the event



the event of a major breakdown of the cease-fire, you have discretion to use the military forces under your authority as necessary, having regard to the responsibility for the breakdown. Once the cease-fire is effective, you should give encouragement to the military representatives of both sides on the Cease-Fire Commission to initiate joint planning on the future military forces of Rhodesia after the elections.

7. You will exercise responsibility for the maintenance of law and order through the civil police who will act under your supervision. A Police Adviser with such supporting staff as is judged necessary will assist you in the exercise of this supervision. You should cause special arrangements to be made for the physical protection of the political leaders of all parties during the election campaign.

8. An Order-in-Council will be made shortly to bring into effect such provisions of the Independence Constitution for Zimbabwe as will be required for the conduct of elections to a legislature to be composed as provided in that Constitution. You should put in hand immediately upon taking up your office such legislative and administrative measures as are necessary in the territory for the holding of elections on a date to be fixed, not more than two months after the entry into force of a cease-fire, and for the constitution of an Election Council. You will have the assistance of an Election Commissioner who will, under your authority, be responsible for supervising the detailed arrangements for such elections. Through your administration you should seek to ensure an atmosphere of tranquillity and order in which peaceful political activity by all political parties can take place freely and without intimidation. There should be provisions for freedom of movement, assembly and expression during the campaign. All political parties will be required to pledge themselves to

/campaign



campaign peacefully and lawfully. Any allegation of improper activity by any public authority or political party or its representatives in the election campaign which is brought to your attention should be thoroughly and urgently investigated and appropriate action taken. The ultimate sanction against any political party which consistently practices intimidation or incites violence or otherwise fails to abide by the undertaking given at the Constitutional Conference to campaign peacefully will be exclusion from participation in the election campaign. All orders in force in the territory which ban political parties should be lifted as soon as final agreement is reached on a cease-fire. Any Orders which place restrictions on the freedom to publish political views should also be lifted. Existing regulations concerning public meetings should be amended to reduce the period of notice required to 48 hours. The prohibition on public meetings on holidays should be lifted, with the exception of Christmas Day. You should, through your Election Commissioner, ensure that appropriate arrangements are made to facilitate the task of representatives of Commonwealth Governments who will be present to observe the elections.

9. Particular attention should be given by your Election Commissioner to ensuring that all political parties contesting the election have a fair opportunity to obtain access to the media, and are free to advertise and to publish their political views. Your advisers should be instructed to monitor the political reporting and commentary of the Zimbabwe-Rhodesia Broadcasting Corporation and to enjoin on the Corporation the need to maintain editorial balance in the coverage of political parties and their activities.

10. You should, at an early date after your arrival, enact an Ordinance granting an amnesty both for all acts committed in good faith in pursuance of the illegal declaration of independence and actions taken in good faith in resistance to it. In the

/event



event that agreement has not been reached on a cease-fire at the date on which you enact that Ordinance, it should be expressed to withhold the benefits of the amnesty from persons who continue to resist your authority unless they follow prescribed procedures for repudiating force and submitting themselves to your authority. In both cases you should institute a review of the sentences of all persons convicted for or detained on suspicion of offences of the kind to which the amnesty would have applied had it been in force at the time of their trial or detention.

11. You should issue instructions after your arrival for a review of the cases of persons detained under martial law and emergency powers, with the object of securing early release of those who can be set at liberty without causing a serious threat to public safety or public order. Where the grounds for detaining any person are, in essence, political grounds he should be released immediately. Martial law courts will be suspended from the date of your arrival. When a cease-fire becomes fully effective, martial law should be lifted. If there is no cease-fire, it should be lifted for the final stages of the election campaign. You should give early consideration to reduction of the areas to which curfew at present applies, with a view to achieving extensive relaxation once a cease-fire is effective. The requirement imposed upon certain persons to reside in protected villages should also be lifted when the cease-fire is fully effective. You should issue instructions that all persons currently listed as prohibited immigrants should be free to apply for entry to Southern Rhodesia and their applications given sympathetic consideration.

12. You should instruct the appropriate authorities to put in hand arrangements necessary for reception and resettlement of refugees who wish to return to Rhodesia, using the good offices of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and the International Committee of the Red Cross.



13. Following the conduct of elections, it is intended that you should appoint to be Prime Minister under the Independence Constitution the person who, in your judgement, is the most likely to command the support of a majority in the House of Assembly; and that you should arrange for the election of a Senate and a President-designate in the manner prescribed in the Independence Constitution. It is the intention of Her Majesty's Government that independence be granted to Southern Rhodesia some two weeks after elections have been held.

14. You should not absent yourself from Southern Rhodesia without having first obtained leave of Her Majesty signified through a Secretary of State.

15. These instructions, so far as they are applicable to any functions to be performed by the Deputy Governor, either in the capacity of Acting Governor or otherwise, should be regarded as addressed to, and are to be observed by, the Deputy Governor.

I have the honour to be

My Lord

Your most obedient, humble Servant

SECRET

JS



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10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

11 December 1979

RHODESIA

As you know, the Prime Minister agreed with the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary and with Lord Soames that she would write to Lord Soames on the question of General Walls' access to him while he is Governor in Salisbury. I now enclose the necessary letter. I should be grateful if you could arrange for it to be handed to Lord Soames before his departure for Rhodesia this afternoon.

MA

G.G.H. Walden, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

SB

SECRET



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10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

11 December 1979

Dear Christopher,

When we discussed on 7 November your responsibilities as Governor in Salisbury, I said that I would confirm one point in writing. This related to General Walls' access to you.

I said that I wished General Walls to have direct access to you just as the Chiefs of Staff have to me in this country. It would not be necessary for him to go through others to obtain that access. General Walls will also of course on occasion be present when you are seeing Bishop Muzorewa.

You said that you saw no difficulty in the above.

Yours ever

Robert

The Rt. Hon. Lord Soames, G.C.M.G., G.C.V.O., C.B.E.

SECRET

MOUVEMENT POPULAIRE

DE LA REVOLUTION

AMBASSADE DE LA REPUBLIQUE DU ZAIRE AU ROYAUME-UNI

Theresa Dept

26 CHESHAM PLACE,
LONDON SW1X 8HH

05846/01/652/79

for draft reply

for Mr Alexander

TÉLÉPHONE: 01-235 6137

LONDRES, Le

To await draft

P/LP

CAG D

P/ Mr Luk

Transl. P. 211

Mr Anpin

reply

L'Ambassade de la République du Zaïre à Londres

présente ses compliments au Secrétaire d'Etat au Foreign et Commonwealth Office et a l'honneur de lui transmettre le texte d'un message que le Citoyen MOBUTU SESE SEKO KUKU NGBENDU WA ZABANGA, Président-Fondateur du Mouvement Populaire de la Révolution et Président de la République destine à Madame THATCHER, Premier Ministre, relatif aux travaux de la Conférence de Londres sur le Zimbabwe.

L'Ambassade de la République du Zaïre à Londres saisit cette occasion pour renouveler au Secrétaire d'Etat au Foreign et Commonwealth Office l'assurance de sa haute considération.

Fait à Londres, le 10/12/79.

Le Secrétaire d'Etat au
Foreign et Commonwealth Office
Great George Street
London SW1



AMBASSADE DE LA REPUBLIQUE DU ZAIRE AU ROYAUME-UNI

26 CHESHAM PLACE,
LONDON SW1X 8HH

TÉLÉPHONE: 01-235 6137
LONDRES, Le

A Madame MARGARET THATCHER
PREMIER MINISTRE
GOUVERNEMENT DE SA MAJESTE BRITANNIQUE
10, DOWNING STREET
LONDRES

LA REPUBLIQUE DU ZAIRE FORTE DE SA VOCATION AFRICAINE S'ETAIT SENTIE DIRECTEMENT CONCERNEE DES LE DEPART PAR LE PROCESSUS DE DECOLONISATION ENGAGE PAR VOTRE PAYS AU ZIMBABWE RHODESIE STOP AUSSI EST CE AVEC UN INTERET CONSTAMMENT SOUTENU QUE NOUS AVONS PERSONNELLEMENT SUIVI LE DEROULEMENT DES NEGOCIATIONS A LA CONFERENCE DE LANCASTER HOUSE STOP A CHAQUE PHASE DIFFICILE QU'A CONNUE CETTE CONFERENCE NOUS N'AVONS PAS HESITE A DEPECHER NOTRE COMMISSAIRE D'ETAT AUX AFFAIRES ETRANGERES EN VUE DE VOUS EPAULER DANS VOS EFFORTS STOP L'ISSUE HEUREUSE DE LA CONFERENCE CONSTITUE POUR NOUS NON SEULEMENT UNE OCCASION DE REJOUISSANCE MAIS AUSSI UN MOTIF DE LEGITIME FIERTE EN TANT QU'AFRICAINS ET EN TANT QUE CHEF D'ETAT D'UN PAYS AMI STOP A CETTE HEURE DECISIVE POUR L'HISTOIRE DU ZIMBABWE NOUS TENONS A VOUS FELICITER POUR LE SENS ELEVE DE RESPONSABILITE DONT VOUS AVEZ FAIT PREUVE ET A VOUS ASSURER DE NOTRE DISPONIBILITE A L'AVENIR FULLSTOP.

LUBUMBASHI, le 7 Décembre 1979.

SE/MOBUTU SESE SEKO KUKU NGBENDU WA ZABANGA
GENERAL DE CORPS D'ARMEE
PRESIDENT DE LA REPUBLIQUE DU ZAIRE

CONFIDENTIAL Rhodesia Subject file
Liberia - Tolbert Visit
June 79

RECORD OF A CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER AND THE PRESIDENT
OF THE REPUBLIC OF LIBERIA AT NO 10 DOWNING STREET AT 12.15 PM ON
MONDAY, 10 DECEMBER 1979

Present:-

The Prime Minister	President Tolbert
Lord Carrington	Mrs E Johnson-Sirleaf
Mr N Aspin CMG	Mr D Franklin Neal
Mr R Williams	Mr J McClain
Mr J Doubleday OBE	Mr T Siafa Sherman
Mr J R Johnson	HE Mr F A Dennis
Mr M Pattison	Mr S B Cole Jr

The Prime Minister welcomed President Tolbert and expressed appreciation of his close interest in and messages about the Rhodesia Conference. Settlement was near and she hoped it might be reached quickly. President Tolbert said that he was grateful for the invitation to visit at such a significant juncture. He had talked to the Patriotic Front leaders that morning and was confident that the Rhodesia problem which was of great concern to Africa and to the world could be successfully resolved.

At the Prime Minister's request, Lord Carrington outlined the current position. It was essential to allay the suspicions on both sides which had led to the continuing cross-border infiltration and the retaliatory attacks at the weekend. He intended to provide a paper the next day which should reassure Patriotic Front fears. The conference had come so far that it could not be allowed to founder on the assembly of forces. The aims now were to have the cease-fire arrangements agreed and to send the Governor out. He hoped that President Tolbert would use his influence to convince the Patriotic Front leaders of the fairness of the British measures and of the need to reach a decision quickly.

President Tolbert congratulated the British Government on behalf of Liberia and of the OAU on their courage and resolve over Rhodesia. A Liberian proverb seemed appropriate: 'If you eat the rat you must be prepared to eat the tail'. He had been impressed by the determination of the Patriotic Front leaders to end the war. They were not opposed to assembling their forces or to the number of points, but they

/needed to be

needed to be reassured that the Rhodesia forces would be treated and monitored in the same way. Their fears about the reliability of the Rhodesian forces were shared by Presidents Nyerere and Shagari who had been in Monrovia last week. Lord Carrington said that these fears were exaggerated, but the arrangements had to be fair. The observers, the monitoring forces, the Governor and the world press would ensure this.

President Tolbert said that it took time to create the right psychological conditions but he would do what he could to help. He would speak to the Patriotic Front leaders again as soon as possible. Lord Carrington undertook to give the President a copy of his paper and advised waiting until he had read it before seeing the Patriotic Front leaders again. He stressed the need for the information on force numbers and for a reciprocal withdrawal to allay fears on both sides. The Conference had made great progress and could not be allowed to fail now. President Tolbert said that it would not fail.

President Tolbert spoke of the distress Africa felt at the Rhodesian raids and the problems in particular caused for Zambia. The Prime Minister said that Britain had tried to get mutual agreement on stopping cross-border infiltration and raids but the Patriotic Front spokesman had called for an intensification of the war. Lord Carrington pointed out that the raids would stop when the British Governor was in charge, and maize would flow to Zambia again. (Lord Carrington then left to fulfil another engagement).

The Prime Minister stressed that she had been instructed at the CHGM in Lusaka to act with urgency on Rhodesia. The conference had now lasted for 15 weeks. A most powerful Governor had been carefully chosen to build confidence in Salisbury. It would be most appropriate for final agreement to be reached during the President's visit. President Tolbert agreed that they must work to this end.

The Prime Minister asked about current issues facing the President as Chairman of the Organisation of African Unity. President Tolbert said that Western Sahara was important. The OAU had resolved that the Saharan people were entitled to self-determination. He had just held a meeting of

/the ad hoc

the ad hoc committee which had successfully broached consideration of the problem. Other preoccupations were the Ethiopia/Somalia and Benin/Gabon disputes and reconciliation in Chad. Peace had to be achieved in African trouble spots and then the OAU would devote attention to economic development. He hoped an economic meeting would be held in Lagos in April/May 1980. The Prime Minister wished him well in these endeavours.

The Prime Minister asked about the President's plans for Liberia. President Tolbert said that the emphasis was on an integrated development programme for the rural areas concentrating on schools, roads and agricultural projects. The standard of living of the masses would be improved. But world problems had made it difficult for Liberia to rely solely on its own resources, so it was necessary to look to friendly countries. He wanted particularly to expand the long-standing relationship with the United Kingdom by seeking co-operation in education, especially manpower training and technical knowhow. He handed over to the Prime Minister documents on:

'UK and Liberia: Technical and Economic Co-operation'; and
'Selected Priority Planned Public Investment Projects of Liberia's Socio-Economic Development 1980-84'.

The Prime Minister expressed her interest and undertook to study the documents. The meeting closed at 1300 hours.

11 December 1979.

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COMMONWEALTH SECRETARIAT


CABLES: COMSEGEN LONDON SW1
TELEX: 27678
TELEPHONE: 01-839 3411 Ext:

MARLBOROUGH HOUSE,
PALL MALL,
LONDON, SW1Y 5HX

Your ref:

Our ref: C.151/4/5

10 December 1979



Commonwealth Committee on Southern Africa


Notice of Meeting

A meeting of the Commonwealth Committee on Southern Africa will be held on Thursday, 13 December, at 10.30 a.m. Coffee will be served in the Bar from 10.00 a.m.

The purpose of the meeting will be to give further consideration to the question of Commonwealth observers for the Zimbabwe elections to be held pursuant to agreement at the Lancaster House Conference.

A memorandum by the Secretariat "Commonwealth Observers : Operational Requirements" is attached as a basis for discussion. As envisaged by the Committee, this is being issued after consultation with the British Government, but does not necessarily imply their concurrence in all its aspects.

Yours sincerely,



M. Malhoutra
Committee Secretary

CSA(79)3

COMMONWEALTH SECRETARIAT

COMMONWEALTH COMMITTEE ON SOUTHERN AFRICA

ZIMBABWE ELECTIONS

COMMONWEALTH OBSERVERS : OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS

Membership of the Group

1. Drawn from eleven countries.
2. Members of the Group will serve in their individual capacity, not as representatives of their Governments. The Group will have a Chairman, as well as its own Secretary.

Mode of Appointment

3. The Group will be appointed by the Commonwealth Secretary-General after the necessary consultations with Commonwealth Governments.

Terms of Reference

4. In accordance with earlier precedents, the Group will be given terms of reference. The following is suggested:

"The Observer Group will observe and report to Commonwealth Heads of Government on all relevant aspects of the organisation and conduct of the elections in Zimbabwe held pursuant to the agreement at the Lancaster House Conference. Their function will be to ascertain in their impartial judgement, whether, in the context of the Lusaka accord and the Lancaster House Conference, the elections were free and fair. In furtherance of this objective, it will be competent for the Group to bring to the attention of the administering authorities from time to time such matters as they consider pertinent."

5. In discharging these terms of reference the Observers will have no executive role. Their duty will be to form a judgement on the conduct of the elections and the manner in which they have been supervised under British Government authority in accordance with the agreement reached at the Lancaster House Conference.

Reporting

6. The Group will report to Commonwealth Heads of Government through the Commonwealth Secretary-General.

Operational Structure

7. While it will be for the Group to decide how it will organise its work, provision will be made for a Headquarters Unit in Salisbury under the direct authority of the Chairman, with sub-units headed by individual observers in other electoral districts.

Functions

8. (a) Prior to Polling Day

(i) The Group will observe every aspect of the conduct of the electoral campaign. They will have a duty to examine the process within the terms of the agreement reached at Lancaster House and to assess how the electoral laws and regulations are being implemented.

(ii) They will need to consider such important issues as freedom of expression, assembly, association and movement (consistent with the terms of the ceasefire agreed by the parties) with a view to

ascertaining whether parties and individuals contesting the elections are unfettered in their ability to do so. This may involve special consideration being given to the position of political prisoners and refugees.

(iii) It will be their duty to take note of the general administration of government in so far as it bears on the elections and to keep under scrutiny particular areas of governmental activity such as the functioning of the police and the Department of Internal Affairs, the governmental information services including broadcasting and television and government publications generally. Similarly, the Group will need to keep a watchful eye on the conduct of all those who may be in a position to exercise undue influence on voters.

(b) Functions During and After Polling

The Group will be required to observe the conduct of the poll in all its aspects with right of access to all polling stations and supervising officers. In the absence of registration, critical questions of eligibility (determination of age, citizenship or residence as the case may be) will necessarily arise at polling stations throughout the country. The Observer Group must be able to satisfy themselves that these are being fairly dealt with. The Group will also need to satisfy themselves about relevant matters after polling such as the handling of ballot boxes and the counting of the votes.

Procedures

9. (a) In order to carry out their functions, the Observer Group will have complete freedom of movement and access to all parts of the country and the right of unrestricted inquiry into every aspect of the electoral process.
- (b) The Group and supporting staff will need to have complete immunity from civil and criminal process and inviolability for their premises and archives.
- (c) The Group should be free to receive representations from individuals, political parties and organisations about the electoral process and to make recommendations to the appropriate authorities. This will necessitate adequate publicity so that the public is aware of the presence of the Observer Group, their functions and their right to receive representations. Such publicity should, wherever possible, include local publications within electoral districts.
- (d) The Group will need to maintain close liaison with the Governor, the Election Commissioner, the Election Council, the Ceasefire Commission and the Ceasefire Monitoring Force as well as with all the political parties.
- (e) It is expected that the Governor and his administration will wish to co-operate to the full with the Group.

Phasing

10. It will be the aim that the Observer Group should be in position as soon as practicable after ceasefire day, along with their immediate staff.

11. A larger number of staff would be required to monitor the actual poll. It is envisaged that they will need to be in Salisbury at least 10 days before polling in order to permit time for briefing, familiarization and travel to their allocated destinations within the country.

12. If the Group feels that some of their supporting staff should arrive earlier, their judgement in the matter will be accepted. The organisational structure will be flexible to permit deployment or redeployment to meet the needs of the situation as it evolves.

13. Having regard to the wide-ranging nature of the work of the Group prior to polling day as indicated in para 8(a), each Observer will be invited to bring with him a special assistant and at least one other assistant or adviser.

Headquarters Unit

14. To assist the Observer Group, a small Headquarters Unit will be established in Salisbury. It will come under the direct authority of the Chairman of the Group and be responsible to the Group. It will include specialist and administrative staff and will be co-ordinated by one of their members provided by the Commonwealth Secretariat who will serve as Secretary to the Group. Specialist staff will include a legal, an electoral, a media and a security adviser. Administrative staff will handle transportation, accommodation, travel and communication needs of the Group in liaison with the local authorities. The Group will require the services of secretarial and other staff including interpreters, who will, where appropriate, be locally engaged. It will be the intention to organise the Headquarters Unit as well as field units of the Observer Group as far as practicable on a pan-Commonwealth basis.

Supporting Staff

15. To discharge its functions the Group will require adequate supporting staff and, in particular, a sufficient number of suitably qualified persons to provide effective monitoring of the conduct of the poll throughout the country. It is difficult to estimate the number of supporting staff with any precision. Even after allowing for the fact that polling will be spread over 2 days and that it should be possible, especially in the urban areas, for one person to cover several polling stations, the needs of a country the size of Zimbabwe will impose their own demands. Its total area is 150,000 square miles; which would give, if there are eight electoral districts, an average size of 18,750 square miles, i.e. two-fifths the area of England for each district.

16. It is expected that the staff in each of the electoral districts will need to be augmented by a minimum of 12, if polling is to be effectively monitored. Within these limits, the final figure should depend on the judgement of the Observer Group itself, after they have had an opportunity to assess the situation on the ground, the proposed electoral schedule and other relevant circumstances.

Summary of Time-Table

17. In summary, this memorandum envisages the observers and their staff arriving in two groups, as follows:

(a)	Soon after ceasefire day - 11 observers each with 2 staff	=	33
	Additional Headquarters staff(4 advisers as enumerated in para 14 + an administrative unit of about 12)	=	16
			<hr/> 49
(b)	10 days before polling remaining supporting staff (8 x 12), unless some are required earlier by the observer group	=	96
	TOTAL		<hr/> 145

Secretariat Support

18. Apart from the Secretary to the Group and a small number of Secretariat officials to assist in the planning, co-ordination, and ground arrangements for the whole exercise, and to render such other substantive assistance as the Chairman and observers may from time to time require, it is envisaged that supporting staff, like the Observer Group itself, will be drawn from member countries.

Logistical Support

19. Effective logistical support will be essential if the Group and its support staff are to carry out their functions effectively. This includes:

Suitable ground and air transport
Radios for two-way communication
Accommodation facilities
Office equipment

Costs

20. It would facilitate the costing of the exercise to have confirmation of the following:

- (a) That the services or support to be provided by the local authorities will as a minimum, include provision of free office and residential accommodation, all transportation requirements within the country whether by land or air, and provision of communication facilities and ancillary local staff.
- (b) That Governments providing Observers and supporting staff will bear the costs of their basic remuneration.

21. On the assumption that the services and costs mentioned in the preceding paragraph will be provided an attempt has been made to work out a financial estimate. In the absence of precise information

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about local conditions and costs it is not possible however to give more than an indicative figure. At this stage this would appear to be about £375,000 - £400,000. This figure will be revised as soon as more specific information becomes available.

22. The costs to be borne centrally might be met in the following ways:

- (a) From the funds remaining unutilised at 1 December 1979 in the Mozambique Fund (approximately £75,000).
- (b) From voluntary contributions from individual Governments.
- (c) The remainder, if any, from a special Secretariat budget, against which voluntary contributions might be offset.

International Affairs Division,
Commonwealth Secretariat,
Marlborough House,
Pall Mall,
London SW1.

7 December 1979

11 DEC 1979



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Extract from a record of a discussion PM/Vance (US Secretary of State)

10. 12. 79.

Top copy filed on Iran (May 79) Internal Situation

SECRET

- 5 -

Rhodesia

The Prime Minister told Mr. Vance that it would be very awkward for her if when she arrived in Washington there was a British Governor in Salisbury but US sanctions against Rhodesia were still in operation. Mr. Vance indicated that he understood the point.

SECRET

Subject

CONFIDENTIAL

PRIME MINISTER'S

PERSONAL MESSAGE

SERIAL No. T164F/79T

La. Ann

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FDESKBY 110100Z

FM F C O 102135Z DEC 79

TO IMMEDIATE NEW DELHI

TELEGRAM NUMBER 834 OF 10 DECEMBER

AND TO IMMEDIATE DACCA ISLAMABAD COLOMBO SINGAPORE KUALA LUMPUR

CAIRO KHARTOUM RABAT LIBREVILLE KINSHASA NAIROBI DAKAR ACCRA

KINGSTON LILONGWE BANJUL SUVA BRIDGETOWN

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON UKMIS NEW YORK PRETORIA LUANDA

MIRIMBA SALISBURY OTTAWA WELLINGTON MASSAU NICOSIA DAR ES SALAAM

GEORGETOWN LUSAKA PORT LOUIS PORT OF SPAIN FREETOWN GABORONE

PORT MORESBY MASERU LAGOS MBABANE.

RHODESIA : MIPT (NOT TO ALL).

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF MESSAGE :

DEAR (INSERT SUITABLE STYLE OF ADDRESS)

THE OUTCOME OF THE RHODESIA CONFERENCE AT LANCASTER HOUSE IS OF GREAT CONCERN TO AFRICA AND TO THE COMMONWEALTH. I WOULD LIKE TO LET YOU KNOW HOW MATTERS STAND AND TO ASK FOR YOUR CONTINUED SUPPORT FOR OUR EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE A SETTLEMENT.

THIS MORNING IN THE RHODESIA CONFERENCE LORD CARRINGTON MADE A FINAL PRESENTATION OF OUR DETAILED PROPOSALS FOR A CEASE-FIRE.

AS YOU KNOW, WE ARE PROPOSING A CEASE-FIRE COMMISSION ON WHICH THE MILITARY COMMANDERS OF BOTH SIDES WILL BE REPRESENTED AND WHICH WILL HAVE THE PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITY FOR SUPERVISING THE CEASE-FIRE. THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR ENSURING THE COMPLIANCE OF THEIR FORCES WITH THE CEASE-FIRE WILL REST WITH THE COMMANDERS ON BOTH SIDES. WE ARE PROPOSING THAT THE PATRIOTIC FRONT FORCES SHOULD ASSEMBLE AT PLACES IN THEIR OPERATIONAL AREAS, WHERE THEIR SECURITY, ACCOMMODATION AND OTHER REQUIREMENTS CAN BE PROVIDED FOR. THEY WILL ASSEMBLE WITH THEIR ARMS UNDER THE AUTHORITY OF THEIR OWN COMMANDERS. THE PROCESS OF DISENGAGEMENT WILL BE RECIPROCAL. PROVIDED THAT THE ASSEMBLY OF PATRIOTIC FRONT FORCES IS COMPLETE AND THAT THERE IS A CESSATION OF THE MOVEMENT OF ARMED PATRIOTIC FRONT PERSONNEL FROM NEIGHBOURING COUNTRIES INTO RHODESIA, A SUCCESSFUL DISENGAGEMENT WILL TAKE PLACE, THE FORCES WILL NOT BE IN CONTACT, AND THE RHODESIAN FORCES WILL NOT NEED TO DEPLOY

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FROM THEIR COMPANY BASES. WE ARE ALSO PROPOSING A SUBSTANTIAL MONITORING FORCE TO ASSIST WITH THE OBSERVATION AND MAINTENANCE OF THE CEASE-FIRE. THE FORCE IS AT PRESENT STANDING BY AND IS READY TO REACH RHODESIA WITHIN THE NEXT FEW DAYS.

WE HAVE ALREADY ENACTED THE INDEPENDENCE CONSTITUTION ON THE BASIS OF GENUINE MAJORITY RULE ; AND THERE IS AGREEMENT IN THE CONFERENCE THAT ELECTIONS IN WHICH ALL PARTIES CAN PARTICIPATE SHOULD BE HELD UNDER THE AUTHORITY OF A BRITISH GOVERNOR WITH FULL EXECUTIVE AND LEGISLATIVE POWERS. THE APPOINTMENT AS GOVERNOR OF LORD SOAMES, A VERY SENIOR CABINET MINISTER, DEMONSTRATES THE IMPORTANCE WHICH MY GOVERNMENT ATTACHES TO THE TASK OF BRINGING THE STATE OF REBELLION IN RHODESIA TO AN END AND ENABLING THE COUNTRY TO BE BROUGHT TO LEGAL INDEPENDENCE. CHRISTOPHER SOAMES WILL BE LEAVING LONDON TODAY TO TAKE UP HIS APPOINTMENT IN SALISBURY. WHEN HE ARRIVES THERE TOMORROW AND HIS AUTHORITY IS ACCEPTED, THE STATE OF REBELLION IN RHODESIA WILL HAVE BEEN BROUGHT TO AN END. THE GOVERNOR WILL SET IN HAND IMMEDIATELY THE ARRANGEMENTS FOR ELECTIONS IN WHICH ALL PARTIES CAN PARTICIPATE, WITH AN EQUAL CHANCE OF SUCCESS. HE WILL ALSO SET IN HAND WHATEVER ACTION IS NECESSARY TO NORMALISE RELATIONS BETWEEN RHODESIA AND ZAMBIA. RHODESIA WILL HAVE RETURNED TO LAWFUL GOVERNMENT AS PART OF HER MAJESTY'S DOMINIONS. A BRITISH AUTHORITY IN SALISBURY IS ESSENTIAL TO THE PROCESS OF FINALISING THE DETAILED ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE CEASE-FIRE. IT IS INDISPENSABLE THAT, FOR THIS PURPOSE, WE SHOULD HAVE CONTROL OVER THE RHODESIAN ARMED FORCES, POLICE, ETC, SO THAT THE LOGISTIC OAND OTHER ARRANGEMENTS MAY BE MADE FOR THE CEASE-FIRE AND FOR THE SECURITY, ACCOMMODATION AND OTHER AGREED REQUIREMENTS OF THE PATRIOTIC FRONT FORCES.

BRITAIN HAS BEEN URGED FOR MANY YEARS TO ASSERT ITS AUTHORITY AND TO CARRY OUT ITS RESPONSIBILITY TO DECOLONISE RHODESIA. THIS WE ARE NOW DOING. IT IS OF COURSE ONE OF OUR ESSENTIAL OBJECTIVES THAT ALL PARTIES SHOULD PARTICIPATE IN THE SETTLEMENT, PROVIDED THEY ARE PREPARED TO PUT THEIR POLITICAL SUPPORT TO THE TEST IN FREE ELECTIONS UNDER OUR AUTHORITY AND COMMIT THEMSELVES TO CAMPAIGN PEACEFULLY. I HAVE NO DOUBT THAT, WITH GOODWILL, FINAL AGREEMENT ON THE DETAILS OF THE CEASE-FIRE CAN BE REACHED IN LONDON IN THE NEXT ONE OR TWO DAYS. WE WOULD WISH TO SEE THE CEASE-FIRE COME INTO EFFECT IMMEDIATELY, THEREBY SPARING THE PEOPLE OF RHODESIA AND OF THE NEIGHBOURING COUNTRIES ANY FURTHER SUFFERING OF THE KIND THEY HAVE HAD TO DEAR FOR THE LAST FOURTEEN YEARS.

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I AM THEREFORE TAKING ACTION TO GIVE EFFECT TO THE AGREEMENTS REACHED AT THE COMMONWEALTH HEADS OF GOVERNMENT MEETING AT LUSAKA AND TO DISCHARGE OUR RESPONSIBILITY TO BRING RHODESIA TO LEGAL INDEPENDENCE ON THE BASIS OF GENUINE MAJORITY RULE AND OF ELECTIONS HELD UNDER OUR AUTHORITY. I HOPE THAT YOU WILL BE PREPARED TO EXERT YOUR INFLUENCE WITH THE PATRIOTIC FRONT TO PERSUADE THEM TO ACCEPT THE CEASE-FIRE PROPOSALS AND TO AGREE THAT THEY SHOULD BE BROUGHT INTO EFFECT IMMEDIATELY.

A SETTLEMENT IS NOW WITHIN OUR GRASP. WE ARE IN A POSITION TO CARRY OUT OUR RESPONSIBILITIES AND FULLY INTEND TO DO SO. I HOPE I CAN COUNT ON YOUR CONTINUED SUPPORT.

WITH BEST WISHES
MARGARET THATCHER.

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PS/MR MARTEN
PS/FUS
SIR A DUFF
MR BULLARD
MR BRETWELL
LORD N G LENNOX
MISS BROWN
MR DAY
MR WILLSON
MR ASPIN

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION
RHODESIA POLICY

10 December 1979

I am writing on the Prime Minister's behalf to thank you for your letter to her of 7 December containing a message of congratulations from Mr. Manley. I have of course arranged for Mr. Manley's message to be placed before the Prime Minister without delay.

MICHAEL ALEXANDER

His Excellency Mr. Ernest G. Peart, C.D.

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SUBJECT

CR 800

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DESKBY 110730Z GABORONE
FM FCO 102135Z DEC 79
TO IMMEDIATE GABORONE
TELEGRAM NUMBER 230 OF 10 DECEMBER 79
AND TO IMMEDIATE LUSAKA
INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK

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PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T164E/79T

NIFT: RHODESIA

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF MESSAGE

DRAFT MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO PRESIDENTS KAUNDA/
SERETSE KHAMA

~~DEAR KENNETH~~/SIR SERETSE,

THIS MORNING IN THE RHODESIA CONFERENCE PETER CARRINGTON
MADE A FINAL PRESENTATION OF OUR DETAILED PROPOSALS FOR A
CEASEFIRE.

AS YOU KNOW, WE ARE PROPOSING A CEASEFIRE COMMISSION
ON WHICH THE MILITARY COMMANDERS OF BOTH SIDES WILL BE REPRESENTED
AND WHICH WILL HAVE THE PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITY FOR SUPERVISING
THE CEASEFIRE. THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR ENSURING THE COMPLIANCE
OF THEIR FORCES WITH THE CEASEFIRE WILL REST WITH THE COMMANDERS
ON BOTH SIDES. WE ARE PROPOSING THAT THE PATRIOTIC FRONT
FORCES SHOULD ASSEMBLE AT PLACES IN THEIR OPERATIONAL AREAS,
WHERE THEIR SECURITY, ACCOMMODATION AND OTHER REQUIREMENTS CAN
BE PROVIDED FOR. THEY WILL ASSEMBLE WITH THEIR ARMS UNDER THE
AUTHORITY OF THEIR OWN COMMANDERS. THE PROCESS OF DISENGAGEMENT
WILL BE RECIPROCAL. PROVIDED THAT THE ASSEMBLY OF PATRIOTIC FRONT
FORCES IS COMPLETE AND THAT THERE IS A CESSATION
OF THE MOVEMENT OF ARMED PATRIOTIC FRONT PERSONNEL FROM
NEIGHBOURING COUNTRIES INTO RHODESIA, THE PROCESS
OF DISENGAGEMENT WILL BE COMPLETE AND THE FORCES WILL NOT BE
IN CONTACT AND THE RHODESIAN FORCES WILL NOT NEED TO
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MONITORING FORCE TO ASSIST WITH THE OBSERVATION AND
MAINTENANCE OF THE CEASEFIRE. THE FORCE IS AT PRESENT STANDING
BY AND IS READY TO REACH RHODESIA WITHIN THE NEXT FEW DAYS.

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WE HAVE ALREADY ENACTED THE INDEPENDENCE CONSTITUTION ON THE BASIS OF GENUINE MAJORITY RULE: AND THERE IS AGREEMENT IN THE CONFERENCE THAT ELECTIONS IN WHICH ALL PARTIES CAN PARTICIPATE SHOULD BE HELD UNDER THE AUTHORITY OF A BRITISH GOVERNOR WITH FULL EXECUTIVE AND LEGISLATIVE POWERS.

THE APPOINTMENT AS GOVERNOR OF CHRISTOPHER SOAMES, A VERY SENIOR CABINET MINISTER, DEMONSTRATES THE IMPORTANCE WHICH MY GOVERNMENT ATTACHES TO THE TASK OF BRINGING THE STATE OF REBELLION IN RHODESIA TO AN END AND ENABLING THE COUNTRY TO BE BROUGHT TO LEGAL INDEPENDENCE. CHRISTOPHER SOAMES WILL BE LEAVING LONDON TODAY TO TAKE UP HIS APPOINTMENT IN SALISBURY.

WHEN HE ARRIVES THERE TOMORROW AND HIS AUTHORITY IS ACCEPTED, THE STATE OF REBELLION IN RHODESIA WILL HAVE BEEN BROUGHT TO AN END. THE GOVERNOR WILL SET IN HAND IMMEDIATELY THE ARRANGEMENTS FOR ELECTIONS IN WHICH ALL PARTIES CAN PARTICIPATE WITH AN EQUAL CHANCE OF SUCCESS. HE WILL ALSO SET IN HAND WHATEVER ACTION IS NECESSARY TO NORMALISE RELATIONS BETWEEN RHODESIA AND ZAMBIA. RHODESIA WILL HAVE RETURNED TO LAWFUL GOVERNMENT AS PART OF HER MAJESTY'S DOMINIONS. A BRITISH AUTHORITY IN SALISBURY IS ESSENTIAL TO THE PROCESS OF

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BRITAIN HAS BEEN URGED FOR MANY YEARS TO ASSERT ITS AUTHORITY AND TO CARRY OUT ITS RESPONSIBILITY TO DECOLONISE RHODESIA. THIS WE ARE NOW DOING. IT IS OF COURSE ONE OF OUR ESSENTIAL OBJECTIVES THAT ALL PARTIES SHOULD PARTICIPATE IN THE SETTLEMENT, PROVIDED THEY ARE PREPARED TO PUT THEIR POLITICAL SUPPORT TO THE TEST IN FREE ELECTIONS UNDER OUR AUTHORITY AND COMMIT THEMSELVES TO CAMPAIGN PEACEFULLY.

I HAVE NO DOUBT THAT, WITH GOODWILL, FINAL AGREEMENT ON THE DETAILS OF THE CEASEFIRE CAN BE REACHED IN LONDON IN THE NEXT ONE OR TWO DAYS. WE WOULD WISH TO SEE THE CEASEFIRE COME INTO EFFECT IMMEDIATELY, THEREBY SPARING THE PEOPLE OF YOUR COUNTRY AS WELL AS THE PEOPLE OF RHODESIA ANY FURTHER SUFFERING OF THE KIND THEY HAVE HAD TO BEAR FOR THE LAST FOURTEEN YEARS.

CONFIDENTIAL

OUR SUPPORT HAS BEEN OF DECISIVE IMPORTANCE IN EARLIER PHASES OF THESE NEGOTIATIONS, AS IT WAS AT THE COMMONWEALTH HEADS OF GOVERNMENT MEETING AT LUSAKA. I HOPE THAT YOU WILL BE PREPARED TO EXERT YOUR INFLUENCE TO PERSUADE THE PATRIOTIC FRONT TO ACCEPT THE CEASEFIRE PROPOSALS AND TO AGREE THAT THEY SHOULD BE BROUGHT INTO EFFECT IMMEDIATELY. WE STAND READY, AS YOU KNOW, TO ASSIST WITH THE PROCESS OF BRINGING ABOUT THE RETURN OF REFUGEES TO RHODESIA. WE SHALL COUNT ON YOUR COOPERATION IN ENSURING A CESSATION OF CROSS-BORDER MILITARY ACTIVITY BY THE MOVEMENT OF RHODESIAN FORCES INTO ZAMBIA OR BY THE MOVEMENT OF PATRIOTIC FRONT FORCES INTO RHODESIA. A SETTLEMENT IS NOW WITHIN OUR GRASP. WE ARE IN A POSITION TO CARRY OUT OUR RESPONSIBILITIES AND FULLY INTEND TO DO SO. I HOPE THAT YOU WILL HELP TO ENSURE THAT ALL PARTIES PARTICIPATE IN THE ELECTIONS.

WITH BEST WISHES. MARGARET.

GARRINGTON

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PS/MR RIDLEY
PS/MR HURD
PS/MR MARTEN
PS/FUS
SIR A DUFF
MR BULLARD
MR FRETWELL
LORD N G LENNOX
MISS BROWN
MR DAY
MR WILLSON
MR ASPIN

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION
RHODESIA POLICY

CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT

CR 800

cc Master/ Ops set

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DESKBY 110730Z GABORONE
FM FCO 102135Z DEC 79
TO IMMEDIATE GABORONE
TELEGRAM NUMBER 230 OF 10 DECEMBER 79
AND TO IMMEDIATE LUSAKA
INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK

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HIFT: RHODESIA

PRIME MINISTER'S

PERSONAL MESSAGE

SERIAL No. T164D/79T

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF MESSAGE

DRAFT MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO PRESIDENTS KAUNDA/
SERETSE KHAMA

DEAR KENNETH/~~SIR SERETSE,~~

THIS MORNING IN THE RHODESIA CONFERENCE PETER CARRINGTON
MADE A FINAL PRESENTATION OF OUR DETAILED PROPOSALS FOR A
CEASEFIRE.

AS YOU KNOW, WE ARE PROPOSING A CEASEFIRE COMMISSION
ON WHICH THE MILITARY COMMANDERS OF BOTH SIDES WILL BE REPRESENTED
AND WHICH WILL HAVE THE PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITY FOR SUPERVISING
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THE APPOINTMENT AS GOVERNOR OF CHRISTOPHER SOAMES, A VERY SENIOR CABINET MINISTER, DEMONSTRATES THE IMPORTANCE WHICH MY GOVERNMENT ATTACHES TO THE TASK OF BRINGING THE STATE OF REBELLION IN RHODESIA TO AN END AND ENABLING THE COUNTRY TO BE BROUGHT TO LEGAL INDEPENDENCE. CHRISTOPHER SOAMES WILL BE LEAVING LONDON TODAY TO TAKE UP HIS APPOINTMENT IN SALISBURY. WHEN HE ARRIVES THERE TOMORROW AND HIS AUTHORITY IS ACCEPTED, THE STATE OF REBELLION IN RHODESIA WILL HAVE BEEN BROUGHT TO AN END. THE GOVERNOR WILL SET IN HAND IMMEDIATELY THE ARRANGEMENTS FOR ELECTIONS IN WHICH ALL PARTIES CAN PARTICIPATE WITH AN EQUAL CHANCE OF SUCCESS. HE WILL ALSO SET IN HAND WHATEVER ACTION IS NECESSARY TO NORMALISE RELATIONS BETWEEN RHODESIA AND ZAMBIA. RHODESIA WILL HAVE RETURNED TO LAWFUL GOVERNMENT AS PART OF HER MAJESTY'S DOMINIONS. A BRITISH AUTHORITY

IN SALISBURY IS ESSENTIAL TO THE PROCESS OF FINALISING THE DETAILED ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE CEASEFIRE. IT IS INDISPENSABLE THAT FOR THIS PURPOSE, WE SHOULD HAVE CONTROL OVER THE RHODESIAN ARMED FORCES, POLICE ETC SO THAT THE LOGISTIC AND OTHER ARRANGEMENTS MAY BE MADE FOR THE CEASEFIRE AND FOR THE SECURITY AND ACCOMMODATION AND OTHER AGREED REQUIREMENTS OF THE PATRIOTIC FRONT FORCES.

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I HAVE NO DOUBT THAT, WITH GOODWILL, FINAL AGREEMENT ON THE DETAILS OF THE CEASEFIRE CAN BE REACHED IN LONDON IN THE NEXT ONE OR TWO DAYS. WE WOULD WISH TO SEE THE CEASEFIRE COME INTO EFFECT IMMEDIATELY, THEREBY SPARING THE PEOPLE OF YOUR COUNTRY AS WELL AS THE PEOPLE OF RHODESIA ANY FURTHER SUFFERING OF THE KIND THEY HAVE HAD TO BEAR FOR THE LAST FOURTEEN YEARS.

CONFIDENTIAL

OUR SUPPORT HAS BEEN OF DECISIVE IMPORTANCE IN EARLIER PHASES OF THESE NEGOTIATIONS, AS IT WAS AT THE COMMONWEALTH HEADS OF GOVERNMENT MEETING AT LUSAKA. I HOPE THAT YOU WILL BE PREPARED TO EXERT YOUR INFLUENCE TO PERSUADE THE PATRIOTIC FRONT TO ACCEPT THE CEASEFIRE PROPOSALS AND TO AGREE THAT THEY SHOULD BE BROUGHT INTO EFFECT IMMEDIATELY. WE STAND READY, AS YOU KNOW, TO ASSIST WITH THE PROCESS OF BRINGING ABOUT THE RETURN OF REFUGEES TO RHODESIA. WE SHALL COUNT ON YOUR COOPERATION IN ENSURING A CESSATION OF CROSS-BORDER MILITARY ACTIVITY BY THE MOVEMENT OF RHODESIAN FORCES INTO ZAMBIA OR BY THE MOVEMENT OF PATRIOTIC FRONT FORCES INTO RHODESIA. A SETTLEMENT IS NOW WITHIN OUR GRASP. WE ARE IN A POSITION TO CARRY OUT OUR RESPONSIBILITIES AND FULLY INTEND TO DO SO. I HOPE THAT YOU WILL HELP TO ENSURE THAT ALL PARTIES PARTICIPATE IN THE ELECTIONS.

WITH BEST WISHES.

MARGARET.

GARRINGTON

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MR FRETWELL
LORD N G LENNOX
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MR WILLSON
MR ASPIN

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION
RHODESIA POLICY

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DESKBY 110730Z

FM FCO 102135Z DEC 79

TO IMMEDIATE MAPUTO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 173 OF 10 DEKEMBER

AND TO BAGHDAD

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON UKMIS NEW YORK

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PRIME MINISTER'S

PERSONAL MESSAGE

SERIAL No. T764c/79T

MIPT RHODESIA

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF MESSAGE (TO BE DELIVERED IF NECESSARY
IN BAGHDAD)

DRAFT MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO PRESIDENT MACHEL
DEAR PRESIDENT,

THIS MORNING IN THE RHODESIA CONFERENCE PETER CARRINGTON MADE A FINAL PRESENTATION OF OUR DETAILED PROPOSALS FOR A CEASEFIRE. AS YOU KNOW, WE ARE PROPOSING A CEASEFIRE COMMISSION ON WHICH THE MILITARY COMMANDERS OF BOTH SIDES WILL BE REPRESENTED AND WHICH WILL HAVE THE PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITY FOR SUPERVISING THE CEASEFIRE. THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR ENSURING THE COMPLIANCE OF THEIR FORCES WITH THE CEASEFIRE WILL REST WITH THE COMMANDERS ON BOTH SIDES. WE ARE PROPOSING THAT THE PATRIOTIC FRONT FORCES SHOULD ASSEMBLE AT PLACES IN THEIR OPERATIONAL AREAS, WHERE THEIR SECURITY, ACCOMMODATION AND OTHER REQUIREMENTS CAN BE PROVIDED FOR. THEY WILL ASSEMBLE WITH THEIR ARMS UNDER THE AUTHORITY OF THEIR OWN COMMANDERS. THE PROCESS OF DISENGAGEMENT WILL BE RECIPROCAL. PROVIDED THAT THE ASSEMBLY OF PATRIOTIC FRONT FORCES IS COMPLETE AND THAT THERE IS A CESSATION OF THE MOVEMENT OF ARMED PATRIOTIC FRONT PERSONNEL FROM NEIGHBOURING COUNTRIES INTO RHODESIA, THE PROCESS OF DISENGAGEMENT WILL BE COMPLETE THE FORCES WILL NO LONGER BE IN CONTACT AND THE RHODESIAN FORCES WILL NOT NEED TO DEPLOY FROM THEIR COMPANY BASES. WE ARE ALSO PROPOSING A SUBSTANTIAL MONITORING FORCE TO ASSIST WITH THE OBSERVATION AND MAINTENANCE OF THE CEASEFIRE. THE FORCE, WHICH WILL INCLUDE CONTINGENTS FROM SOME OTHER COMMONWEALTH COUNTRIES, IS STANDING BY AND IS READY TO REACH RHODESIA WITHIN THE NEXT FEW DAYS.

WE HAVE ALREADY ENACTED THE INDEPENDENCE CONSTITUTION ON THE BASIS OF GENUINE MAJORITY RULE: AND THERE IS AGREEMENT

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IN THE CONFERENCE THAT ELECTIONS IN WHICH ALL PARTIES CAN PARTICIPATE SHOULD BE HELD UNDER THE AUTHORITY OF A BRITISH GOVERNOR WITH FULL EXECUTIVE AND LEGISLATIVE POWERS.

THE APPOINTMENT AS GOVERNOR OF RHODESIA OF LORD SOAMES, A VERY SENIOR CABINET MINISTER, DEMONSTRATES THE IMPORTANCE WHICH MY GOVERNMENT ATTACHES TO THE TASK OF BRINGING THE STATE OF REBELLION IN RHODESIA TO AN END AND ENABLING THE COUNTRY TO BE BROUGHT TO LEGAL INDEPENDENCE. LORD SOAMES WILL BE LEAVING LONDON TODAY TO TAKE UP HIS APPOINTMENT IN SALISBURY. WHEN HE ARRIVES THERE TOMORROW AND HIS AUTHORITY IS ACCEPTED, THE STATE OF REBELLION IN RHODESIA WILL HAVE BEEN BROUGHT TO AN END. THE GOVERNOR WILL SET IN HAND IMMEDIATELY THE ARRANGEMENTS FOR ELECTIONS IN WHICH ALL PARTIES CAN PARTICIPATE WITH AN EQUAL CHANCE OF SUCCESS. HE WILL ALSO SET IN HAND WHATEVER ACTION IS NECESSARY TO NORMALISE RELATIONS BETWEEN RHODESIA AND MOZAMBIQUE. RHODESIA WILL HAVE RETURNED TO LAWFUL GOVERNMENT AS PART OF HER MAJESTY'S DOMINIONS. A BRITISH AUTHORITY IN SALISBURY IS ESSENTIAL TO THE PROCESS OF FINALISING THE DETAILED ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE CEASEFIRE. IT IS INDISPENSABLE THAT, FOR THIS PURPOSE, WE SHOULD HAVE CONTROL OVER THE RHODESIAN ARMED FORCES, POLICE ETC SO THAT THE LOGISTIC AND OTHER ARRANGEMENTS MAY BE MADE FOR THE CEASFIRE AND FOR THE SECURITY AND ACCOMMODATION AND OTHER AGREED REQUIREMENTS OF THE PATRIOTIC FRONT FORCES.

BRITAIN HAS BEEN URGED FOR MANY YEARS TO ASSERT ITS AUTHORITY AND TO CARRY OUT IS RESPONSIBILITY TO DECOLONISE RHODESIA. THIS WE ARE NOW DOING. IT IS OF COURSE ONE OF OUR ESSENTIAL OBJECTIVES THAT ALL PARTIES SHOULD PARTICIPATE IN THE SETTLEMENT, PROVIDED THEY ARE PREPARED TO PUT THEIR POLITICAL SUPPORT TO THE TEST IN FREE ELECTIONS UNDER OUR AUTHORITY AND COMMIT THEMSELVES TO CAMPAIGN PEACEFULLY. I HAVE NO DOUBT THAT, WITH GOODWILL, FINAL AGREEMENT ON THE DETAILS OF THE CEASEFIRE CAN BE REACHED IN LONDON IN THE NEXT ONE OR TWO DAYS. WE WOULD WISH TO SEE THE CEASEFIRE COME INTO EFFECT IMMEDIATELY, THEREBY SPARING THE PEOPLE OF YOUR COUNTRY AS WELL AS THE PEOPLE OF RHODESIA ANY FURTHER SUFFERING OF THE KIND THEY HAVE HAD TO BEAR FOR THE LAST FOURTEEN YEARS.

CONFIDENTIAL

YOUR SUPPORT HAS BEEN OF GREAT IMPORTANCE IN EARLIER PHASES OF THESE NEGOTIATIONS. I HOPE THAT YOU WILL NOW EXERT YOUR INFLUENCE TO PERSUADE THE PATRIOTIC FRONT TO ACCEPT THE CEASEFIRE PROPOSALS AND TO AGREE THAT THEY SHOULD BE BROUGHT INTO EFFECT IMMEDIATELY. WE STAND READY TO ASSIST WITH THE PROCESS OF BRINGING ABOUT THE RETURN OF REFUGEES TO RHODESIA. WE SHALL COUNT ON YOUR COOPERATION IN ENSURING A CESSATION OF CROSS-BORDER MILITARY ACTIVITY BY THE MOVEMENT OF RHODESIAN FORCES INTO MOZAMBIQUE OR BY THE MOVEMENT OF PATRIOTIC FRONT FORCES INTO RHODESIA. WE ARE READY TO ESTABLISH MILITARY LIAISON ARRANGEMENTS FOR THIS PURPOSE.

A SETTLEMENT IS NOW WITHIN OUR GRASP. WE ARE IN A POSITION TO CARRY OUT OUR RESPONSIBILITIES AND FULLY INTEND TO DO SO. I HOPE THAT YOU WILL HELP TO ENSURE THAT ALL PARTIES PARTICIPATE IN THE ELECTIONS.

WITH BEST WISHES.

MARAGARET THATCHER

CARRINGTON

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PS/MR RIDLEY
PS/MR HURD
PS/MR MARTEN
PS/PUS
SIR A DUFF
MR BULLARD
MR FRETWELL
LORD N G LENNOX
MISS BROWN
MR DAY
MR WILLSON
MR ASPIN

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION

RHODESIA POLICY

CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT

AS 900
CONFIDENTIAL

cc Master)
Ops Jct
/s

DESKBY 110730Z

FM FCO 102135Z DEC 79

TO IMMEDIATE LAGOS

TELEGRAM NUMBER 933 OF 10 DECEMBER

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON UKMIS NEW YORK

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T164B/79T

NIPT: RHODESIA

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF MESSAGE.

BEGINS:

DEAR MR PRESIDENT

THIS MORNING IN THE RHODESIA CONFERENCE LORD CARRINGTON MADE A FINAL PRESENTATION OF OUR DETAINED PROPOSALS FOR A CEASE-FIRE.

AS YOU KNOW, WE ARE PROPOSING A CEASE-FIRE COMMISSION ON WHICH THE MILITARY COMMANDERS OF BOTH SIDES WILL BE REPRESENTED AND WHICH WILL HAVE THE PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITY FOR SUPERVISING THE CEASE-FIRE. THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR ENSURING THE COMPLIANCE OF THEIR FORCES WITH THE CEASE-FIRE WILL REST WITH THE COMMANDERS ON BOTH SIDES.

WE ARE PROPOSING THAT THE PATRIOTIC FRONT FORCES SHOULD ASSEMBLE AT PLACES IN THEIR OPERATIONAL AREAS, WHERE THEIR SECURITY, ACCOMMODATION AND OTHER REQUIREMENTS CAN BE PROVIDED FOR. THEY WILL ASSEMBLE WITH THEIR ARMS UNDER THE AUTHORITY OF THEIR OWN COMMANDER. THE PROCESS OF DISENGAGEMENT WILL BE RECIPROCAL. PROVIDE THAT THE ASSEMBLY OF PATRIOTIC FRONT FORCES IS COMPLETE AND THAT THERE IS A CESSATION OF THE MOVEMENT OF ARMED PATRIOTIC FRONT PERSONNEL FROM NEIGHBOURING COUNTRIES INTO RHODESIA, THE PROCESS OF DISENGAGEMENT WILL BE COMPLETE AND THE FORCES WILL NOT BE IN CONTACT AND THE RHODESIAN FORCES WILL NOT NEED TO DEPLOY FROM THEIR COMPANY BASES. WE ARE ALSO PROPOSING A SUBSTANTIAL MONITORING FORCE TO ASSIST WITH THE OBSERVATION AND MAINTENANCE OF THE CEASE-FIRE. THE FORCE IS AT PRESENT STANDING BY AND IS READY TO REACH RHODESIA WITHIN THE NEXT FEW DAYS.

WE HAVE ALREADY ENACTED THE INDEPENDENCE CONSTITUTION ON THE BASIS OF GENUINE MAJORITY RULE: AND THERE IS AGREEMENT IN THE CONFERENCE THAT ELECTIONS IN WHICH

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/ALL PARTIES

CONFIDENTIAL

ALL PARTIES CAN PARTICIPATE SHOULD BE HELD UNDER THE AUTHORITY OF A BRITISH GOVERNOR WILL FULL EXECUTIVE AND LEGISLATIVE POWERS.

THE APPOINTMENT AS GOVERNOR OF LORD SOAMES, A VERY SENIOR CABINET MINISTER, DEMONSTRATES THE IMPORTANCE WHICH MY GOVERNMENT ATTACHES TO THE TASK OF BRINGING THE STATE OF REBELLION IN RHODESIA TO AN END AND ENABLING THE COUNTRY TO BE BROUGHT TO LEGAL INDEPENDENCE. LORD SOAMES WILL BE LEAVING LONDON TODAY TO TAKE UP HIS APPOINTMENT IN SALISBURY. WHEN HE ARRIVES THERE TOMORROW AND HIS AUTHORITY IS ACCEPTED, THE STATE OF REBELLION IN RHODESIA WILL HAVE BEEN BROUGHT TO AN END. THE GOVERNOR WILL SET IN HAND IMMEDIATELY THE ARRANGEMENTS FOR ELECTIONS IN WHICH ALL PARTIES CAN PARTICIPATE WITH AN EQUAL CHANCE OF SUCCESS. HE WILL ALSO SET IN HAND WHATEVER ACTION IS NECESSARY TO NORMALISE RELATIONS BETWEEN RHODESIA AND THE NEIGHBOURING FRONT LINE STATES. RHODESIA WILL HAVE RETURNED TO LAWFUL GOVERNMENT AS PART OF HER MAJESTY'S DOMINIONS. A BRITISH AUTHORITY IN SALISBURY IS ESSENTIAL TO THE PROCESS OF FINALISING THE DETAILED ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE CEASE-FIRE. IT IS INDISPENSABLE THAT, FOR THIS PURPOSE, WE SHOULD HAVE CONTROL OVER THE RHODESIAN ARMED FORCES, POLICE, ETC. SO THAT THE LOGISTIC AND OTHER ARRANGEMENTS MAY BE MADE FOR THE CEASE-FIRE AND FOR THE SECURITY AND ACCOMMODATION AND OTHER AGREED REQUIREMENTS OF THE PATRIOTIC FRONT FORCES.

BRITAIN HAS BEEN URGED FOR MANY YEARS TO ASSERT ITS AUTHORITY AND TO CARRY OUT ITS RESPONSIBILITY TO RECOLONISE RHODESIA. THIS WE ARE NOW DOING. IT IS OF COURSE ONE OF OUR ESSENTIAL OBJECTIVES THAT ALL PARTIES SHOULD PARTICIPATE IN THE SETTLEMENT, PROVIDED THEY ARE PREPARED TO PUT THEIR POLITICAL SUPPORT TO THE TEST IN FREE ELECTIONS UNDER OUR AUTHORITY AND COMMIT THEMSELVES TO CAMPAIGN PEACEFULLY. I HAVE NO DOUBT THAT, WITH GOODWILL, FINAL AGREEMENT ON THE DETAILS OF THE CEASE-FIRE CAN BE REACHED IN LONDON IN THE NEXT ONE OR TWO DAYS. WE WOULD WISH TO SEE THE CEASE-FIRE COME INTO EFFECT IMMEDIATELY, THEREBY SPARING THE PEOPLE OF RHODESIA AND OF THE NEIGHBOURING COUNTRIES ANY FURTHER

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SUFFERING OF THE KIND THEY HAVE HAD TO BEAR FOR THE LAST FOURTEEN YEARS.

I AM THEREFORE TAKING ACTION TO GIVE EFFECT TO THE AGREEMENTS REACHED AT THE COMMONWEALTH HEADS OF GOVERNMENT MEETING AT LUSAKA AND TO DISCHARGE OUR RESPONSIBILITY TO BRING RHODESIA TO LEGAL INDEPENDENCE ON THE BASIS OF GENUINE MAJORITY RULE AND OF ELECTIONS HELD UNDER OUR AUTHORITY. I HOPE THAT YOU WILL BE PREPARED TO EXERT YOUR INFLUENCE TO PERSUADE THE PATRIOTIC FRONT TO ACCEPT THE CEASE-FIRE PROPOSALS AND TO AGREE THAT THEY SHOULD BE BROUGHT IN TO EFFECT IMMEDIATELY. IF WE CAN ACHIEVE THIS, WE SHALL HAVE ACCOMPLISHED SOMETHING WHICH IS OF THE GREATEST SIGNIFICANCE NOT ONLY FOR RHODESIA BUT FOR ALL OF AFRICA.

A SETTLEMENT IS NOW WITHIN OUR GRASP. WE ARE IN A POSITION TO CARRY OUR OUR RESPONSIBILITIES AND FULLY INTEND TO DO SO. I HOPE THAT YOU WILL HELP TO ENSURE THAT ALL PARTIES PARTICIPATE IN THE ELECTIONS.

YOURS SINCERELY,
MARGARET THATCHER.
ENDS.

CARRINGTON

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SIR A DUFF
MR BULLARD
MR FRETWELL
LORD N G LENNOX
MISS BROWN
MR DAY
MR WILLSON
MR ASPIN 3

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION
RHODESIA POLICY

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cc Master/ST
Ops J

DESKBY 110600Z

FM FCO 102135Z DEC 79

TO IMMEDIATE DAR ES SALAAM

TELEGRAM NUMBER 413 OF 10 DECEMBER

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON UKMIS NEW YORK

Ac

MIPT: RHODESIA

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF MESSAGE:

PRIME MINISTER'S

PERSONAL MESSAGE

SERIAL No. T16A/79T

DEAR JULIUS,

THIS MORNING IN THE LANCASTER HOUSE CONFERENCE PETER CARRINGTON MADE A FINAL PRESENTATION OF OUR DETAILED PLANS FOR A CEASEFIRE. I AM ASKING OUR HIGH COMMISSIONER TO MAKE A COPY AVAILABLE TO YOU, SINCE IT WILL I AM SURE CLARIFY CERTAIN POINTS THAT MAY HAVE BEEN IN DOUBT WHEN OUR PROPOSALS WERE ACCEPTED LAST WEEK.

AS YOU KNOW, THE BASIS OF OUR PLAN IS THAT THE PATRIOTIC FRONT FORCES SHOULD ASSEMBLE AT PLACES IN THEIR OPERATIONAL AREAS, WHERE THEIR SECURITY, ACCOMMODATION AND OTHER REQUIREMENTS CAN BE PROVIDED FOR. THEY WILL ASSEMBLE WITH THEIR ARMS, UNDER THE AUTHORITY OF THEIR OWN COMMANDERS. DURING THIS PERIOD OF ASSEMBLY THERE WILL BE RECIPROCAL DISENGAGEMENT BY THE RHODESIAN ARMED FORCES. IN A CEASEFIRE AFTER A WAR OF THIS NATURE IT IS OBVIOUSLY NECESSARY THAT THE GUERRILLA SIDE SHOULD BECOME IDENTIFIABLE IN THIS WAY.

ON THE RHODESIAN SIDE, THEIR FORCES ARE ALREADY IDENTIFIED IN AN EXISTING STRUCTURE. THEY WILL BE MONITORED THROUGHOUT THIS STRUCTURE, AND THE MONITORS WILL BE IN PLACE BY THE TIME THE PATRIOTIC FRONT ARE ASKED TO BEGIN THE PROCESS OF ASSEMBLY.

PROVIDED THAT ASSEMBLY OF THE PATRIOTIC FRONT FORCES WITH THEIR ARMS IS COMPLETE, AND THAT THERE IS A CESSATION OF THE MOVEMENT OF ARMED PATRIOTIC FRONT PERSONNEL FROM NEIGHBOURING COUNTRIES INTO RHODESIA, THE PROCESS OF DISENGAGEMENT WILL BE COMPLETE, THE FORCES WILL NOT BE IN CONTACT AND THERE WILL BE NO NEED TO DEPLOY THE RHODESIAN FORCES FROM THEIR COMPANY BASES.

THE SUBSTANTIAL MONITORING FORCE WE HAVE ORGANISED IS AT PRESENT STANDING BY AND IS READY TO REACH RHODESIA WITHIN THE NEXT FEW DAYS. WE HAVE ALREADY ALREADY ENACTED THE INDEPENDENCE CONSTITUTION ON THE BASIS OF GENUINE MAJORITY RULE; AND THERE IS AGREEMENT IN THE CONFERENCE THAT ELECTIONS IN WHICH ALL PARTIES CAN PARTICIPATE SHOULD BE HELD UNDER THE AUTHORITY OF A BRITISH GOVERNOR WITH FULL EXECUTIVE AND LEGISLATIVE POWERS. THE APPOINTMENT AS

/GOVERNOR OF

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

GOVERNOR OF CHRISTOPHER SOAMES, A VERY SENIOR CABINET MINISTER, DEMONSTRATES THE IMPORTANCE WHICH MY GOVERNMENT ATTACHES TO THE TASK OF BRINGING THE STATE OF REBELLION IN RHODESIA TO AN END AND ENABLING THE COUNTRY TO BE BROUGHT TO LEGAL INDEPENDENCE.

WE AWAIT ONLY THE FINAL AGREEMENT OF THE PARTIES TO THE DETAILS OF THE CEASEFIRE PLAN. I AM CONFIDENT THAT, WITH GOODWILL, THIS WILL BE ACHIEVED WITHIN THE NEXT DAY OR TWO. WE WOULD WISH TO SEE THE CEASEFIRE COME INTO EFFECT IMMEDIATELY, THEREBY SPARING THE PEOPLE OF RHODESIA AND OF THE NEIGHBOURING COUNTRIES ANY FURTHER SUFFERING SUCH AS THEY HAVE HAD TO BEAR FOR SO LONG.

MEANWHILE, IT IS VERY IMPORTANT TO GET AHEAD WITH THE PRACTICAL ARRANGEMENTS. A BRITISH AUTHORITY IN SALISBURY IS ESSENTIAL TO THE PROCESS OF FINALISING THE DETAILED ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE CEASEFIRE. IT IS INDISPENSABLE THAT FOR THIS PURPOSE, WE SHOULD HAVE CONTROL OVER THE RHODESIAN ARMED FORCES, POLICE ETC SO THAT THE LOGISTIC AND OTHER ARRANGEMENTS MAY BE MADE FOR THE CEASEFIRE AND FOR THE SECURITY AND ACCOMMODATION AND OTHER AGREED REQUIREMENTS OF THE PATRIOTIC FRONT FORCES. LORD SOAMES WILL THEREFORE BE LEAVING LONDON TODAY TO TAKE UP HIS APPOINTMENT IN SALISBURY. WHEN HE ARRIVES THERE TOMORROW AND HIS AUTHORITY IS ACCEPTED, THE STATE OF REBELLION IN RHODESIA WILL HAVE BEEN BROUGHT TO AN END. THE GOVERNOR WILL SET IN HAND IMMEDIATELY THE ARRANGEMENTS FOR ELECTIONS IN WHICH ALL PARTIES CAN PARTICIPATE WITH AN EQUAL CHANCE OF SUCCESS. HE WILL ALSO SET IN HAND WHATEVER ACTION IS NECESSARY TO NORMALISE RELATIONS BETWEEN RHODESIA AND ZAMBIA. RHODESIA WILL HAVE RETURNED TO LAWFUL GOVERNMENT AS PART OF HER MAJESTY'S DOMINIONS.

BRITAIN HAS BEEN URGED FOR MANY YEARS TO ASSERT ITS AUTHORITY AND TO CARRY OUT ITS RESPONSIBILITY TO DECOLONISE RHODESIA. THIS WE ARE NOW DOING, AND THUS GIVING EFFECT TO THE AGREEMENTS REACHED AT OUR LUSAKA MEETING. IT IS, OF COURSE, ONE OF OUR ESSENTIAL OBJECTIVES THAT ALL PARTIES SHOULD PARTICIPATE IN THE SETTLEMENT, PROVIDED THEY ARE PREPARED TO PUT THEIR POLITICAL SUPPORT TO THE TEST IN FREE ELECTIONS UNDER OUR AUTHORITY AND TO COMMIT THEMSELVES TO CAMPAIGN PEACEFULLY. A SETTLEMENT IS NOW WITHIN OUR GRASP. WE ARE IN A POSITION TO CARRY OUT OUR RESPONSIBILITIES AND FULLY INTEND

CONFIDENTIAL

TO DO SO. I HOPE THAT YOU, FOR YOUR PART, WILL BE PREPARED TO EXERT YOUR INFLUENCE TO PERSUADE THE PATRIOTIC FRONT TO ACCEPT THE DETAILED CEASEFIRE PLAN AND TO AGREE THAT IT SHOULD BE BROUGHT INTO EFFECT IMMEDIATELY - AND I HOPE THAT YOU WILL ALSO HELP TO PERSUADE ALL PARTIES TO PARTICIPATE IN THE ELECTIONS.

WITH BEST WISHES
MARGARET

CARRINGTON

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LEGAL ADVISERS
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 (MR FREELAND)
 (MR FIFOOT)
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PS/MR LUCE
PS/MR RIDLEY
PS/MR HURD
PS/MR MARTEN
PS/PUS
SIR A DUFF
MR BULLARD
MR FRETWELL
LORD N G LENNOX
MISS BROWN
MR DAY
MR WILLSON
MR ASPIN

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION

RHODESIA POLICY



FCS/79/188

CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUERImplementation of a Rhodesian Settlement

1. In the Explanatory and Financial Memorandum covering the Rhodesia Bill which was presented to Parliament on 8 November, the costs of the arrangements leading to independence were estimated at £3.5 million. £3 million of this was to cover expenditure on the Governor, his Election Commissioner and staff, and his political, military, police and legal advisers; the remaining £0.5 million was for monitoring the ceasefire. On the assumption of an agreement including the Patriotic Front, the latest indications are that the cost of the Governor and his staff and of the entire election exercise, excluding military costs, is likely to be closer to £9 million. The cost of the monitoring force including the expenses we may have to bear for accommodating the Patriotic Front at their assembly places has increased to about £15 million and may rise further.

2. This is unavoidable. Detailed study of what is needed for the organisation of an election has shown that it will require extensive logistic support. The Rhodesians could not provide sufficient aircraft and Land Rovers etc themselves for our own election teams, Commonwealth election observers and others, and journalists in Rhodesia for the elections. We shall have to provide logistic support on this occasion, with the help of the Canadians and others, but mainly at our expense. The holding of the April elections placed a considerable burden on the Rhodesian exchequer and, in response to Rhodesian requests, we have indicated that we would be prepared on this occasion to meet a proportion of the additional costs. These might include the movement of election personnel, the provision of polling booths and the printing of ballot papers. All this means that the Foreign and Commonwealth Office will exceed its public expenditure allocation for 1979/80, and recourse to the

/Contingency



Contingency Reserve will be inevitable. I know that our officials have been in touch and are in broad agreement. If you too agree I propose that our officials should now discuss the details further.

3. There will also be a requirement for overseas aid funds to facilitate the return of Rhodesian refugees from neighbouring countries. We hope that UNHCR and ICRC will play a leading role in what could be a very large operation. We shall need to contribute to their additional costs. We have made preliminary contact with some other potential donors with encouraging responses, particularly from the EEC Commission. We would expect ourselves to offer not more than £1 million and this sum could be found by switching funds within the ODA vote, if you agree. However, if there is a need for aid expenditure beyond this amount in this financial year eg for emergency food or relief aid, the ODA may well have to seek recourse to the Contingency reserve.

4. In view of the extent of these increases, I am sure that the earliest possible opportunity should be taken to inform Parliament of this development. I imagine that you would wish me to arrange this, and I would of course point out that the benefits accruing from the settlement of the Rhodesian problem are likely to outweigh the immediate financial costs.

5. I am copying this minute to the Prime Minister and Sir Robert Armstrong.

A handwritten signature in dark ink, consisting of a large, stylized 'C' followed by a horizontal line.

(CARRINGTON)

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

10 December 1979



110 DEC 1979



'T' an
receipt of tels.

10 DOWNING STREET

~~Michael~~ Telegrams authorized
for despatch. FCO
informed.

FCO would also like
to send similar messages
from PM to Heads of
Govt of following:—

Pakistan

Bangladesh

Sri Lanka

Singapore

Malaysia Morocco

Jamaica Zaire

Ghana Kenya

Egypt Gabon

Sudan Senegal

CONFIDENTIAL



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

10 December 1979

Dear Michael,

Rhodesia

/ I attach the draft messages which I mentioned to you. If the Prime Minister agrees, Lord Carrington would like to send them to the front line Presidents and to President Shagari to inform them of Lord Soames's departure for Salisbury and to seek to enlist their support in putting pressure on the Patriotic Front to accept our final cease-fire proposals. These messages would be delivered shortly before the parliamentary statement is made tomorrow: we would therefore hope to despatch them overnight.

*yours ever
Rodrick Lyne*

(R M J Lyne)
Private Secretary

M O'D B Alexander Esq
10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL

File No.
Department RHODESIA
Drafted by
(Block Capitals)
Tel. Extn

OUTWARD
TELEGRAM

Security Classification CONFIDENTIAL
Precedence IMMEDIATE
DESKBY FIRST CONTACT

FOR
COMMS. DEPT.
USE

Despatched (Date)
(Time) Z

POSTBY Z

PREAMBLE

(Time of Origin) Z(G.M.T.) (Restrictive Prefix)
(Security Class.) CONFIDENTIAL (Caveat/ Privacy Marking)
(Codeword) (Deskby)

To IMMEDIATE LUSAKA (precedence) (post) Tel. No. of
AND TO (precedence/post) IMMEDIATE DAR ES SALAAM, MAPUTO, GABORONE, LAGOS
(ALL DESK BY)

AND SAVING TO
REPEATED TO (for info) IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK, PRETORIA
MIRIMBA SALISBURY, LUANDA

SAVING TO (for info)

Distribution:-

(TEXT)

RHODESIA

Rhodesia Policy

Copies to:-

- Following a final presentation of our cease-fire proposals in the Conference on the morning of Tuesday 11 December I shall be announcing in Parliament at 15.30 hrs GMT the Governor's departure for Salisbury. Lord Soames will arrive in Salisbury on 12 December. As soon as his authority has been accepted, Rhodesia will have returned to legality.
- Please ensure that the following message from the Prime Minister in MIFT is delivered to President

/at

at 15.00 hrs GMT on 11 December. In delivering the message ^{OR} ~~of~~ in any discussion arising from it you should emphasise ~~that~~:

- a. the agreement at Lancaster House must be completed this week;
- b. in order to bring the final arrangements for a cease-fire into effect, it is indispensable to have a British authority in Salisbury;
- c. my statement in the Conference is designed to meet the Patriotic Front's concerns about the security of their forces, ^{AND THE} ~~the present~~ disposition of the Rhodesian forces ~~and the final disposition of the Rhodesian forces~~. On the latter point, if the Patriotic Front forces assemble with their arms and cease cross-border movement, the Rhodesian forces will not be deployed from their company bases. You will be receiving further separate guidance on this point.

3. In the light of these assurances there can be no reason for the Patriotic Front not to complete the cease-fire agreement. It is our objective to bring the cease-fire into effect within the next few days. The monitoring force is standing by and can be deployed to Rhodesia within seven days; a settlement is within our grasp; but the chance

of completing it depends on front line and Nigerian ~~support~~.
ENCOURAGEMENT TO ACCEPT OUR PROPOSALS.

4. For your own information we shall not be able to
"improve" further on our final cease-fire proposals.

In particular, any attempt to argue that since the
Patriotic Front are being required to assemble in fifteen
places the ^{MUCH LARGER} Rhodesian forces should be limited to fifteen
~~assembly places should be dealt with firmly. WOULD?~~
NOT BE ACCEPTABLE.

File No.
 Department RHODESIA
 Drafted by
 (Block Capitals)
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OUTWARD
 TELEGRAM

Security Classification CONFIDENTIAL
Precedence IMMEDIATE
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 Privacy Marking)

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To IMMEDIATE DAR ES SALAAM
 (precedence) (post)

Tel. No.....of.....

AND TO (precedence/post)

AND SAVING TO

REPEATED TO (for info) IMMEDIATE: WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK

SAVING TO (for info)

Distribution:-

(TEXT)

Rhodesia Policy

MIPT: RHODESIA

Following is text of message:

[insert A to B attached]

Copies to:-

CONFIDENTIAL

Registry
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Message

Type 1 +

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

Top Secret,
Secret,
Confidential,
Restricted,
Unclassified.

To:- President Nyerere

From
Prime Minister

Telephone No. Ext.

Department

PRIVACY MARKING

..... In Confidence

Dear Julius,

This morning in the Lancaster House Conference Peter Carrington made a final presentation of our detailed plans for a ceasefire. I am asking our High Commissioner to make a copy available to you, since it will I am sure clarify certain points that may have been in doubt when our proposals were accepted last week.

As you know, the basis of our plan is that the Patriotic Front forces should assemble at places in their operational areas, where their security, accommodation and other requirements can be provided for. They will assemble with their arms, under the authority of their own commanders. During this period of assembly there will be reciprocal disengagement by the Rhodesian Armed Forces. In a ceasefire after a war of this nature it is obviously necessary that the guerrilla side should become identifiable in this way.

On the Rhodesian side, their forces are already identified in an existing structure. They will be monitored throughout this structure, and the monitors will be in place by the time the Patriotic Front are asked to begin the process of assembly.

Provided that assembly of the Patriotic Front forces with their arms is complete, and that there is a cessation of the movement of armed Patriotic Front personnel from neighbouring countries into Rhodesia, the process of disengagement will be complete, the forces will not be in contact and there will be no need to deploy the Rhodesian forces from their company bases.

The substantial monitoring force we have organised is at present standing by and is ready to reach Rhodesia within the next few days. We have

CONFIDENTIAL

/already

CONFIDENTIAL

already enacted the independence constitution on the basis of genuine majority rule; and there is agreement in the Conference that elections in which all parties can participate should be held under the authority of a British Governor with full executive and legislative powers. The appointment as Governor of Christopher Soames, a very senior Cabinet Minister, demonstrates the importance which my Government attaches to the task of bringing the state of rebellion in Rhodesia to an end and enabling the country to be brought to legal independence.

We await only the final agreement of the parties to the details of the ceasefire plan. I am confident that, with goodwill, this will be achieved within the next day or two. We would wish to see the ceasefire come into effect immediately, thereby sparing the people of Rhodesia and of the neighbouring countries any further suffering such as they have had to bear for so long.

Meanwhile, it is very important to get ahead with the practical arrangements. A British authority in Salisbury is essential to the process of finalising the detailed arrangements for the ceasefire. It is indispensable that for this purpose, we should have control over the Rhodesian armed forces, police etc so that the logistic and other arrangements may be made for the ceasefire and for the security and accommodation and other agreed requirements of the Patriotic Front forces. Lord Soames will therefore be leaving London today to take up his appointment in Salisbury. When he arrives there tomorrow and his authority is accepted, the state of rebellion in Rhodesia will have been brought to an end. The Governor will set in hand immediately the arrangements for elections in which all parties can participate with an equal chance of success. He will also set in hand whatever action is necessary to normalise relations between Rhodesia and Zambia. Rhodesia will have returned to lawful government as part of Her Majesty's dominions.

Britain has been urged for many years to assert its authority and to carry out its responsibility to decolonise Rhodesia. This we are now doing, and thus giving effect to the agreements reached at our Lusaka meeting. It is a matter of very great importance to us, as to you,

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/and

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and it is one of our essential objectives that all parties should participate in the settlement, provided they are prepared to put their political support to the test in free elections under our authority and to commit themselves to campaign peacefully. A settlement is now within our grasp. We are in a position to carry out our responsibilities and fully intend to do so. I hope that you, for your part, will be prepared to exert your influence to persuade the Patriotic Front to accept the detailed ceasefire plan and to agree that it should be brought into effect immediately - and I hope that you will also help to persuade all parties to participate in the elections.

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File No.
 Department RHODESIA ...
 Drafted by
 (Block Capitals)
 Tel. Extn

OUTWARD
 TELEGRAM

Security Classification
CONFIDENTIAL
Precedence
IMMEDIATE
DESKBY 11th. 1st. contact...Z

FOR COMMS. DEPT. USE	Despatched	(Date)	POSTBY
		(Time).....ZZ

PREAMBLE

(Time of Origin)Z(G.M.T.) (Restrictive Prefix)
 (Security Class.) CONFIDENTIAL (Caveat/
 Privacy Marking)
 (Codeword)..... (Deskby)

To IMMEDIATE GABORONE Tel. No. of
 (precedence) (post)

AND TO (precedence/post) IMMEDIATE: LUSAKA

AND SAVING TO

REPEATED TO (for info) IMMEDIATE: WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK

SAVING TO (for info)

Distribution:-

Rhodesia Policy

(TEXT)

MIPT: RHODESIA

Following is text of message.

[insert A to B attached]

Copies to:-

CONFIDENTIAL

DRAFT MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO PRESIDENTS KAUNDA/
SERETSE KHAMA

Dear Kenneth/Sir Seretse,

This morning in the Rhodesia Conference Peter Carrington made a final presentation of our detailed proposal for a ceasefire.

As you know, we are proposing a Ceasefire Commission on which the military commanders of both sides will be represented and which will have the primary responsibility for supervising the ceasefire. The responsibility for ensuring the compliance of their forces with the ceasefire will rest with the Commanders on both sides. We are proposing that the Patriotic Front forces should assemble at places in their operational areas, where their security, accommodation and other requirements can be provided for.

They will assemble with their arms under the authority of their own commanders. Provided that the assembly of Patriotic Front forces is complete and that there is a cessation of the movement of armed Patriotic Front personnel from neighbouring countries into Rhodesia, the process of disengagement will be complete and the forces will not be in contact and the We are also proposing a substantial monitoring force to assist with the observation and maintenance of the ceasefire. The force is at present standing by and is ready to reach Rhodesia within the next few days.

We have already enacted the independence constitution on the basis of genuine majority rule; and there is agreement in the Conference that elections in which all parties can participate should be held under the

The process of disengagement will be reciprocal.

Rhodesian forces will not need to deploy from their company bases.

authority of a British Governor with full executive and legislative powers.

The appointment as Governor of Christopher Soames, a very senior Cabinet Minister, demonstrates the importance which my Government attaches to the task of bringing the state of rebellion in Rhodesia to an end and enabling the country to be brought to legal independence. Christopher Soames will be leaving London today to take up his appointment in Salisbury. When he arrives there tomorrow and his authority is accepted, the state of rebellion in Rhodesia will have been brought to an end. The Governor will set in hand immediately the arrangements for elections in which all parties can participate with an equal chance of success. He will also set in hand whatever action is necessary to normalise relations between Rhodesia and Zambia. Rhodesia will have returned to lawful government as part of Her Majesty's dominions. A British authority in Salisbury is essential to the process of finalising the detailed arrangements for the ceasefire. It is indispensable that for this purpose, we should have control over the Rhodesian armed forces, police etc so that the logistic and other arrangements may be made for the ceasefire and for the security and accommodation and other agreed requirements of the Patriotic Front forces.

Britain has been urged for many years to assert its authority and to carry out its responsibility to decolonise Rhodesia. This we are now doing. It is a matter of very great importance to us and it is indeed one of our essential objectives that all parties should participate in the settlement, provided they are prepared to put their political support to the test in free elections under our authority and commit themselves to campaign peacefully. I have no doubt that, with goodwill, final agreement on the details of the ceasefire can be reached in

London in the next one or two days. We would wish to see the ceasefire come into effect immediately, thereby sparing the people of your country as well as the people of Rhodesia any further suffering of the kind they have had to bear for the last fourteen years.

Your support has been of decisive importance in earlier phases of these negotiations, as it was at the Commonwealth Heads of Government meeting at Lusaka. I hope that you will be prepared to exert your influence to persuade the Patriotic Front to accept the ceasefire proposals and to agree that they should be brought into effect immediately. We stand ready, as you know, to assist with the process of bringing about the return of refugees to Rhodesia. We shall count on your cooperation in ensuring a cessation of cross-border military activity by the movement of Rhodesian forces into Zambia or by the movement of Patriotic Front forces into Rhodesia.

A settlement is now within our grasp. We are in a position to carry out our responsibilities and fully intend to do so. I hope that you will help to ensure that all parties participate in the elections.

With best wishes.

Margaret

File No.
Department RHODESIA
Drafted by
(Block Capitals)
Tel. Extn

OUTWARD
TELEGRAM

Security Classification CONFIDENTIAL
Precedence IMMEDIATE
DESKBY 11th. 1st. contact..Z

FOR COMMS. DEPT. USE	Despatched	(Date)	POSTBY
		(Time).....ZZ

PREAMBLE

(Time of Origin).....Z(G.M.T.) (Restrictive Prefix).....
 (Security Class.)..... CONFIDENTIAL (Caveat/
 Privacy Marking).....
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REPEATED TO (for info) IMMEDIATE: WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK

SAVING TO (for info).....

Distribution:-

Rhodesia Policy

Copies to:-

(TEXT)

MIPT: RHODESIA

Following is text of message:

[insert A to B attached]

CONFIDENTIAL

DRAFT MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO PRESIDENT MACHEL

Dear President,

This morning in the Rhodesia Conference Peter Carrington made a final presentation of our detailed proposals for a ceasefire. As you know, we are proposing a ceasefire Commission on which the military commanders of both sides will be represented and which will have the primary responsibility for supervising the ceasefire. The responsibility for ensuring the compliance of their forces with the ceasefire will rest with the Commanders on both sides. We are proposing that the Patriotic Front forces should assemble at places in their operational areas, where their security, accommodation and other requirements can be provided for. They will assemble with their arms under the authority of their own commanders. Provided that the assembly of Patriotic Front forces is complete and that there is a cessation of the movement of armed Patriotic Front personnel from neighbouring countries into Rhodesia, the process of disengagement will be complete and the Rhodesian forces will no longer be in contact and the Rhodesian forces will not ~~will not deploy from their company bases.~~ We are also proposing a substantial monitoring force to assist with the observation and maintenance of the ceasefire. The force, which will include contingents from some other Commonwealth countries, is standing by and is ready to reach Rhodesia within the next few days.

The process of disengagement will be reciprocal

need to deploy from their company bases.

We have already enacted the independence constitution on the basis of genuine majority rule; and there is agreement in the Conference that elections in which all parties can participate should be held under

the authority of a British Governor with full executive and legislative powers.

The appointment as Governor of Rhodesia of Lord Soames, a very senior Cabinet Minister, demonstrates the importance which my Government attaches to the task of bringing the state of rebellion in Rhodesia to an end and enabling the country to be brought to legal independence. Lord Soames will be leaving London today to take up his appointment in Salisbury. When he arrives there tomorrow and his authority is accepted, the state of rebellion in Rhodesia will have been brought to an end. The Governor will set in hand immediately the arrangements for elections in which all parties can participate with an equal chance of success. He will also set in hand whatever action is necessary to normalise relations between Rhodesia and Mozambique. Rhodesia will have returned to lawful government as part of Her Majesty's dominions. A British authority in Salisbury is essential to the process of finalising the detailed arrangements for the ceasefire. It is indispensable that, for this purpose, we should have control over the Rhodesian armed forces, police etc so that the logistic and other arrangements may be made for the ceasefire and for the security and accommodation and other agreed requirements of the Patriotic Front forces.

Britain has been urged for many years to assert its authority and to carry out its responsibility to decolonise Rhodesia. This we are now doing. It is a matter of very great importance to us and it is indeed one of our essential objectives that all parties should participate in the settlement, provided they are prepared to put their political support to the test in free elections under our authority and commit themselves to campaign peacefully. I have no doubt that, with goodwill, final agreement on the details of the ceasefire can be reached in London in

in the next one or two days. We would wish to see the ceasefire come into effect immediately, thereby sparing the people of your country as well as the people of Rhodesia any further suffering of the kind they have had to bear for the last fourteen years.

Your support has been of great importance in earlier phases of these negotiations. I hope that you will now exert your influence to persuade the Patriotic Front to accept the ceasefire proposals and to agree that they should be brought into effect immediately. We stand ready to assist with the process of bringing about the return of refugees to Rhodesia. We shall count on your cooperation in ensuring a cessation of cross-border military activity by the movement of Rhodesian forces into Mozambique or by the movement of Patriotic Front forces into Rhodesia. We are ready to establish military liaison arrangements for this purpose.

A settlement is now within our grasp. We are in a position to carry out our responsibilities and fully intend to do so. I hope that you will help to ensure that all parties participate in the elections.

With best wishes.

Margaret Thatcher

File No.
Department RHODESIA
Drafted by
(Block Capitals)
Tel. Extn

OUTWARD
TELEGRAM

Security Classification CONFIDENTIAL
Precedence IMMEDIATE
DESKBY .11th.first.contact

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Rhodesia Policy

MIPT: RHODESIA

Following is text of message

[insert A to B attached]

Copies to:-

CONFIDENTIAL

DRAFT MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO PRESIDENT
SHAGARIA/
Dear Mr President

This morning in the Rhodesia Conference Lord Carrington made a final presentation of our detained proposals for a cease-fire.

As you know, we are proposing a Cease-fire Commission on which the military Commanders of both sides will be represented and which will have the primary responsibility for supervising the cease-fire. The responsibility for ensuring the compliance of their forces with the cease-fire will rest with the Commanders on both sides.

We are proposing that the Patriotic Front forces should assemble at places in their operational areas, where their security, accommodation and other requirements can be provided for. They will assemble with their arms under the authority of their own Commanders. The process of disengagement will be reciprocal. Provided that the assembly of Patriotic Front forces is complete and that there is a cessation of the movement of armed Patriotic Front personnel from neighbouring countries into Rhodesia, the process of disengagement will be complete and the forces will not be in contact and the Rhodesian forces will not need to deploy from their company bases. We are also proposing a substantial monitoring force to assist with the observation

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and maintenance of the cease-fire. The force is at present standing by and is ready to reach Rhodesia within the next few days.

We have already enacted the independence constitution on the basis of genuine majority rule; and there is agreement in the Conference that elections in which all parties can participate should be held under the authority of a British Governor with full executive and legislative powers.

The appointment as Governor of Lord Soames, a very senior Cabinet Minister, demonstrates the importance which my Government attaches to the task of bringing the state of rebellion in Rhodesia to an end and enabling the country to be brought to legal independence. Lord Soames will be leaving London today to take up his appointment in Salisbury. When he arrives there tomorrow and his authority is accepted, the state of rebellion in Rhodesia will have been brought to an end. The Governor will set in hand immediately the arrangements for elections in which all parties can participate with an equal chance of success. He will also set in hand whatever action is necessary to normalise relations between Rhodesia and the neighbouring front line states. Rhodesia will have returned to lawful government as part of Her Majesty's dominions. A British authority in Salisbury is essential to the process of finalising the detailed arrangements for the cease-fire. It is indispensable that, for this

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Purpose, we should have control over the Rhodesian armed forces, police, etc. so that the logistic and other arrangements may be made for the cease-fire and for the security and accommodation and other agreed requirements of the Patriotic Front forces.

Britain has been urged for many years to assert its authority and to carry out its responsibility to decolonise Rhodesia. This we are now doing. It is a matter of very great importance to us and it is indeed one of our essential objectives that all parties should participate in the settlement, provided they are prepared to put their political support to the test in free elections under our authority and commit themselves to campaign peacefully. I have no doubt that, with goodwill, final agreement on the details of the cease-fire can be reached in London in the next one or two days. We would wish to see the cease-fire come into effect immediately, thereby sparing the people of Rhodesia and of the neighbouring countries any further suffering of the kind they have had to bear for the last fourteen years.

I am therefore taking action to give effect to the agreements reached at the Commonwealth Heads of Government meeting at Lusaka and to discharge our responsibility to bring Rhodesia to legal independence on the basis of genuine majority rule and of elections held under our authority. I hope that you will be

/prepared

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prepared to exert your influence to persuade the Patriotic Front to accept the cease-fire proposals and to agree that they should be brought in to effect immediately. If we can achieve this, we shall have accomplished something which is of the greatest significance not only for Rhodesia but for all of Africa.

A settlement is now within our grasp. We are in a position to carry out our responsibilities and fully intend to do so. I hope that you will help to ensure that all parties participate in the elections.

Yours sincerely,

Margarat Thatcher / B

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FM FCO 092005Z DEC 79

TO IMMEDIATE CANBERRA

TELEGRAM NUMBER 609 OF 9 DECEMBER 1979

AND TO IMMEDIATE EEC POSTS VIENNA OTTAWA MADRID ATHENS TOKYO

ANKARA OSLO WELLINGTON LISBON BERNE

INFO IMMEDIATE LUSAKA MIRIMBA SALISBURY NAIROBI MAPUTO GABORONE

DAR ES SALAAM LUANDA LAGOS WASHINGTON PRETORIA ADDIS ABABA

MONROVIA PEKING MOSCOW PRAGUE DAKAR KINSHASA KHARTOUM TOKYO

KUWAIT KINGSTON BRIDGETOWN DACCA NEW DELHI SINGAPORE GEORGETOWN

FREETOWN PORT LOUIS PORT OF SPAIN LILONGWE VALLETTA BANJUL COLOMBO

ACCRA KUALA LUMPUR NICOSIA STOCKHOLM MBABANE ABIDJAN UKMIS

NEW YORK UKDEL NATO CAIRO ALGIERS TUNIS TRIPOLI RABAT HELSINKI

LIBREVILLE LA PAZ

RHODESIA

1. WE ARE VERY CLOSE TO A SUCCESSFUL OUTCOME TO THE CONFERENCE. BUT THE PATRIOTIC FRONT ARE ENGAGED IN ANOTHER FILIBUSTER AND SHOW EVERY INTENTION OF SEEKING TO PROLONG THE NEGOTIATIONS WHILE THEY INFILTRATE MORE OF THEIR FORCES INTO RHODESIA. THERE HAS RECENTLY BEEN A MAJOR MOVEMENT OF ZANLA (MUGABE) FORCES FROM TANZANIA TO MOZAMBIQUE; AND ZIPRA (NKOMO) ARE MAKING REPEATED ATTEMPTS TO INFILTRATE LARGE UNITS ACROSS THE RHODESIA-ZAMBIA BORDER.

2. AGAINST THIS BACKGROUND, UNLESS AGREEMENT ON A CEASE -FIRE IS REACHED IN THE NEXT FEW DAYS IT IS UNLIKELY TO BE ACHIEVED AT ALL; AND THERE WILL BE A REAL RISK OF A FURTHER ESCALATION OF THE CONFLICT. THE DANGERS OF DELAY WERE HIGH-LIGHTED BY THE RHODESIAN ATTACKS ON BRIDGES IN ZAMBIA AT THE END OF NOVEMBER AND BY THE RECENT RAIDS ON ZIPRA TARGETS IN ZAMBIA. IF WE DO NOT GET THE GOVERNOR TO SALISBURY, THE RHODESIANS WILL LAUNCH FURTHER STRIKES INTO ZAMBIA AND MOZAMBIQUE. THERE WILL ALSO BE A GREATER

DANGER OF INCREASED SOUTH AFRICAN INVOLVEMENT.

3. THE PURPOSE OF SENDING A GOVERNOR TO SALISBURY WILL BE TO ASSERT OUR AUTHORITY AND LIMIT THESE DANGERS. THE GOVERNOR WILL IMMEDIATELY ORDER THE RESUMPTION OF MAIZE SHIPMENTS TO ZAMBIA. A BRITISH AUTHORITY IN SALISBURY IS ALSO ESSENTIAL FOR MAKING OFFICIAL ARRANGEMENTS FOR IMPLEMENTING THE CEASE-FIRE. IT IS NOT POSSIBLE TO DO THIS FROM A DISTANCE. WE NEED CONTROL OVER THE RHODESIAN FORCES, POLICE ETC, TO ENSURE INTER ALIA THAT ADEQUATE ARRANGEMENTS ARE MADE FOR THE ASSEMBLY OF THE PATRIOTIC FRONT FORCES.

4. TO THOSE NOT INVOLVED IN THE NEGOTIATIONS IT MIGHT APPEAR POSSIBLE TO AGREE THE FINAL DETAILS IN THE CONFERENCE AND ARRANGE FOR THE GOVERNOR TO GO ONCE THE FINAL AGREEMENT HAS BEEN SIGNED. NO-ONE WHO HAS NEGOTIATED WITH THE PATRIOTIC FRONT OVER THE LAST TWELVE WEEKS WILL BELIEVE THIS TO BE FEASIBLE. THEIR NEGOTIATING TACTICS THROUGHOUT THE CONFERENCE HAVE BEEN BASED ON A REFUSAL TO SAY EITHER QUOTE YES UNQUOTE OR QUOTE NO UNQUOTE. ON THIS OCCASION THEY ARE BEING ASKED TO TAKE THE FINAL DECISION. IT HAS ONLY BEEN POSSIBLE TO BRING THEM TO THE POINT OF DECISION ON THE THREE PREVIOUS OCCASIONS BY VERY STRONG PRESSURE. IT WILL NOT BE POSSIBLE TO DO SO ON THIS OCCASION WITHOUT ACTION BY US. UNLESS AND UNTIL THE PATRIOTIC FRONT ARE AWARE THAT THE RETURN TO LEGALITY AND THE LIFTING OF SANCTIONS ARE ACTUALLY UNDER WAY, THEY WILL HAVE NO INCENTIVE TO REACH FINAL AGREEMENT ON OUR PROPOSALS. THEY WILL BE BOUND INSTEAD TO CONTINUE TO FILIBUSTER - BECAUSE THEY BELIEVE THAT IT IS IN THEIR POLITICAL AND MILITARY INTERESTS TO DO SO.

5. IF, HOWEVER, THEY ARE GIVEN A STRONG ENOUGH PUSH, WE BELIEVE THAT IT SHOULD BE POSSIBLE TO BRING THEM INTO THE SETTLEMENT. THIS WE INTEND TO DO BY MAKING A FINAL PRESENTATION OF OUR CEASE-FIRE PROPOSALS TO THE CONFERENCE ON TUESDAY 11 DECEMBER. IN DOING SO, WE WILL SEEK TO MEET THE PATRIOTIC FRONT'S MAIN CONCERN BY MAKING IT CLEAR THAT IF THE PATRIOTIC FRONT ASSEMBLE THEIR FORCES

AND CEASE ALL CROSS-BORDER MOVEMENT, THE RHODESIAN FORCES WILL NOT NEED TO DEPLOY FROM THEIR COMPANY BASES. AT THE SAME TIME WE WILL DISTRIBUTE A MAP INDICATING THE PATRIOTIC FRONT ASSEMBLY PLACES. THESE HAVE BEEN CHOSEN IN RELATION TO THEIR EXISTING OPERATIONAL AREAS AND IN A MANNER WHICH TAKES ACCOUNT OF TONGOGARA'S CONCERN THAT THEY SHOULD NOT BE QUOTE ENCIRCLED UNQUOTE BY RHODESIAN BASES.

6. THE RETURN TO LEGALITY WILL BE EFFECTED WITH THE ARRIVAL OF THE GOVERNOR IN SALISBURY AND THE ACCEPTANCE OF HIS AUTHORITY ON WEDNESDAY 12 DECEMBER. THERE CAN BE NO QUESTION OF OUR CONTINUING TO APPLY SANCTIONS AGAINST A BRITISH GOVERNOR: THESE WILL BE LIFTED IMMEDIATELY, AND WE SHALL LOOK TO OUR FRIENDS AND ALLIES TO FOLLOW SUIT. SIR A PARSONS WILL BE INSTRUCTED TO ADDRESS THE LETTER IN MIFT TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL.

7. YOU WILL RECEIVE INSTRUCTIONS TO SPEAK ON THESE LINES TO THE GOVERNMENTS TO WHICH YOU ARE ACCREDITED, ON THE MORNING OF TUESDAY 11 DECEMBER, TOGETHER WITH THE FINAL TEXT OF OUR PRESENTATION IN THE CONFERENCE. IN DOING SO YOU SHOULD SAY :

A. WE ARE GRATEFUL FOR THE SUPPORT OUR FRIENDS AND ALLIES HAVE GIVEN US IN EARLIER CRUCIAL PHASES OF THE CONFERENCE:

B. WE ARE AIMING FOR A SETTLEMENT INVOLVING THE PATRIOTIC FRONT, AND BELIEVE THERE IS A GOOD CHANCE OF SECURING THEIR FINAL ACCEPTANCE: BUT

C. THIS WILL DEPEND CRUCIALLY ON THE EXTENT OF THE SUPPORT WE GET IN THIS FINAL, DECISIVE STAGE OF THE CONFERENCE:

D. WE HOPE THEREFORE THAT OUR FRIENDS AND ALLIES WILL GIVE STRONG SUPPORT TO THE ACTION WE ARE TAKING AND TO OUR CEASE-FIRE PROPOSALS:

E. IF WE GET SOLID INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT, THE PRESSURES ON THE PATRIOTIC FRONT TO PARTICIPATE WILL BE IRRESISTIBLE:

F. DESPITE THEIR TENDENCY AUTOMATICALLY TO SUPPORT PATRIOTIC FRONT NEGOTIATING DEMANDS, THE FRONT LINE STATES ARE VERY CONCERNED THAT A SETTLEMENT SHOULD BE REACHED THIS WEEK:

G. IT WILL BE VERY IMPORTANT THAT THE INTERPRETATION OF SIR A PARSONS' LETTER TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL SHOULD NOT BE CONTESTED BY OTHER WESTERN MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL:

H. WE HOPE THERE WILL BE NO QUESTION OF THEIR CONTINUING SANCTIONS AGAINST RHODESIA UNDER A BRITISH GOVERNOR:

I. (AS NECESSARY) IF OUR ACTION IS NOT SUPPORTED, THE PATRIOTIC FRONT WILL BE ENCOURAGED TO HOLD OUT AND MAKE FURTHER DEMANDS WHICH WILL BE NON-NEGOTIABLE. THERE WILL THEN BE A MUCH GREATER DANGER OF OUR FRIENDS HAVING TO MAKE A CHOICE BETWEEN SUPPORT FOR OUR POSITION AND (IN EFFECT) THAT OF THE PATRIOTIC FRONT.

J. THE CEASE-FIRE PROPOSALS ARE DESIGNED TO MEET THE CONCERNS OF BOTH SIDES. THE PATRIOTIC FRONT ARE CONCERNED ABOUT THE SECURITY OF THEIR FORCES, AND WE HAVE MOVED TO MEET THEM ON THIS. THERE IS EQUALLY SERIOUS CONCERN ON THE RHODESIAN SIDE THAT THE PATRIOTIC FRONT WILL NOT ASSEMBLE THEIR FORCES (OR MORE THAN A FRACTION OF THEM) AND THAT CROSS-BORDER INFILTRATION BY PATRIOTIC FRONT FORCES WILL CONTINUE:

K. WE SHOULD NOT BE ABLE TO ENDORSE THE CONTINUANCE OF SANCTIONS EVEN FOR A LIMITED PERIOD AGAINST RHODESIA UNDER A BRITISH GOVERNOR:

L. IT IS NOT POSSIBLE TO AWAIT THE OUTCOME OF THE CONFERENCE BEFORE SENDING A GOVERNOR. IF WE ADOPTED THAT APPROACH, THE CONFERENCE WOULD NEVER COME TO A CONCLUSION, AND WOULD BE LIKELY TO COLLAPSE.

CARRINGTON

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 (MR FREELAND)
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PS/MR LUCE
PS/MR RIDLEY
PS/MR HURD
PS/MR MARTEN
PS/PUS
SIR A DUFF
MR BULLARD
MR FRETWELL
LORD N G LENNOX
MISS BROWN
MR DAY
MR WILLSON
MR ASPIN

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FM DAR ES SALAAM 081040Z DEC 79

TO IMMIDIAZE FCO

TELNO 981'OF 8 DECEMBER

INFO PRIORITY LUSAKA, LUANDA, MAPUTO, GABORONE, LAGOS,
MIRIMBA SALISBURY, PRETORIA, WASHINGTON, OTTAWA, CANBERRA,
WELLINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK

M.I.P.T. RHODESIA

Prime Minister

11.12.

ms

1. I SAW PRESIDENT NYERERE THIS MORNING 8 DECEMBER TO TAKE UP WITH HIM THE QUESTION OF NACHINGWEA. I DESCRIBED THE VARIOUS STEPS WE HAD TAKEN (ENABLING MEASURES AND THE APPOINTMENT OF A GOVERNOR) TO BE READY TO IMPLEMENT AN AGREEMENT AT LANCASTER HOUSE WITHOUT DELAY. WE WERE DOING ALL THIS BECAUSE WE HOPED THAT THE FINAL DETAILS OF THE CEASE FIRE AGREEMENT COULD BE WORKED OUT VERY QUICKLY. IN THE DISCUSSION OF THESE DETAILS, CONFIDENCE ON BOTH SIDES WAS OF THE GREATEST IMPORTANCE. THE MUZOREWA SIDE WERE DEEPLY CONCERNED ABOUT POSSIBLE MOVEMENT OF PF FORCES FROM OUTSIDE RHODESIA AFTER THE CEASE FIRE AND, IN THIS CONTEXT, HAD RAISED THE QUESTION OF NACHINGWEA. IT WOULD GREATLY HELP TOWARDS AGREEMENT IF WE WERE ABLE TO GIVE THEM ASSURANCES ABOUT THE ZANLA FORCES AT NACHINGWEA SO AS TO SATISFY THEM THAT ARMED PERSONNEL FROM NACHINGWEA WOULD NOT SEEK TO ENTER RHODESIA AFTER THE CEASE FIRE.

2. NYERERE AVOIDED MY QUESTION ALTOGETHER AND SAID HE HAD A QUESTION TO PUT TO ME: WHY WERE WE NOT BEING FAIR IN OUR PROPOSALS FOR THE DISENGAGEMENT OF THE FORCES OF THE TWO SIDES? WHY WERE WE ALLOWING THE SALISBURY FORCES TO REMAIN IN THEIR OPERATIONAL AREAS WHILE ASSEMBLING THE PF FORCES AT 15 ASSEMBLY POINTS? WE MUST KNOW THAT AS A GUERRILLA FORCE, DISPERSAL WAS THE STRENGTH TO THE PF FORCES. THEY SHOULD BE ALLOWED AT LEAST THE SAME NUMBER OF BASES AS THE SALISBURY FORCES.

3. I REPLIED POINTING TO THE LACK OF SYMMETRY BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES AND THE PROBLEMS THIS PRESENTED: ALSO THE LOGISTICAL DIFFICULTIES. I ALSO STRESSED THAT THE SALISBURY FORCES WOULD BE THE ONES TO MAKE THE INITIAL MOVE ON DISENGAGEMENT. I SAID THAT

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WHILE THE CONCERNS OF THE PF WERE UNDERSTANDABLE IT HAD TO BE REALISED THAT THE SALISBURY SIDE HAD SERIOUS CONCERNS ALSO: THAT FOR EXAMPLE, NOT ALL THE PF FORCES INSIDE RHODESIA WOULD DECLARE THEMSELVES AND THAT THERE WOULD CONTINUE TO BE MOVEMENT OVER THE BORDER AFTER THE CEASE FIRE. NYERERE WAS NOT TO BE SHIFTED AND CONTINUALLY REPEATED THAT THE ONLY FAIR ARRANGEMENT WAS ONE IN WHICH THE ARRANGEMENTS ON THE PF SIDE WERE THE SAME AS FOR THE SALISBURY FORCES. HE ALSO URGED THAT THE DISCUSSIONS SHOULD BE LEFT TO THE MILITARY ON EACH SIDE AND THAT WE SHOULD NOT BE PLAYING SUCH A PROMINENT ROLE IN BRINGING PRESSURE ON THE PF: "WHY DID WE NOT SOMETIMES APPLY PRESSURE TO MUZOREWA?". I SAID THAT THE MILITARY WERE NOW ENGAGED IN DISCUSSIONS. HAD IN THE COURSE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS APPLIED A GREAT DEAL OF PRESSURE ON MUZOREWA, BUT THERE WAS NO CALL FOR PRESSURE WHEN HE ACCEPTED OUR PROPOSALS. WITH REGARD TO LEAVING THE DISCUSSIONS TO THE TWO SIDES, WE COULD NOT ESCAPE OUR RESPONSIBILITIES BECAUSE IT WAS THE BRITISH GOVERNOR WHO HAD TO IMPLEMENT THE AGREEMENTS.

4. I AGAIN RAISED THE QUESTION OF NACHINGWEA REPEATING THAT ASSURANCES WOULD HELP CONFIDENCE AND THEREBY CONTRIBUTE TO AGREEMENT IN THE DISCUSSIONS. NYERERE WAS UNWILLING TO BE DRAWN INTO SPECIFIC ASSURANCES. HE SAID THAT IF THERE WAS A CEASE-FIRE THERE WOULD BE NO PROBLEM. I ASKED IF THIS MEANT THAT IF THERE WAS A CEASE FIRE HE WOULD BE READY TO TAKE STEPS TO SEE THAT ARMED PEOPLE FROM NACHINGWEA DID NOT TRY TO GO TO RHODESIA. HE REPLIED TO THE EFFECT THAT IF THERE WAS A CEASE FIRE WE COULD COUNT ON HIM TO DO ALL HE COULD TO SEE THAT IT WAS OBSERVED. HE THEN WENT ON TO SAY (THOUGH, I THINK, AS A DEBATING POINT ONLY) THAT IF PEOPLE HAD TO STAY IN NACHINGWEA DURING THE CEASE FIRE PERIOD HE WOULD EXPECT BRITAIN TO PAY FOR THEIR MAINTENANCE.

5. I RAISED THE QUESTION OF COMMONWEALTH OBSERVERS AND EXPLAINED OUR POSITION (YOUR TELNO 604 TO CANBERRA). NYERERE REPEATED HIS SUPPORT FOR A JOINT TEAM AND INDICATED THAT HE DID NOT AT ALL LIKE THE IDEA OF INDIVIDUAL GROUPS GOING IN ADDITION. I SAID THAT THE MORE OBSERVERS THERE WERE, THE MORE ELECTORAL MALPRACTICE WOULD

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BE DISCOURAGED. NYERERE MENTIONED THAT HE DID NOT THINK THAT TANZANIA WOULD BE CONTRIBUTING TO THE JOINT OBSERVER TEAM. I ALSO TOOK THE OPPORTUNITY TO STRESS THE NEED FOR RAPID CLEARANCE OF THE FLIGHTS COVERING THE GOVERNOR AND HIS PEOPLE AND THE MONITORING FORCE (THE AMERICANS HAD BEEN TOLD THAT DIPLOMATIC CLEARANCE MIGHT TAKE 48 HOURS). NYERERE SAID THAT WE COULD CONT ON THEIR FULL COOPERATION IN THE EVENT OF THERE BEING AN AGREED SETTLEMENT. MR MKAPA GAVE ME A SIMILAR ASSURANCE YESTERDAY EVENING. (I DO NOT THINK THEY WILL AGREE TO OVERFLIGHTS UNTIL THERE IS FINAL AGREEMENT).

6. AS I WAS LEAVING, NYERERE CALLED ME BACK TO REPEAT HOW STRONGLY HE FELT ON THE DISENGAGEMENT QUESTION. HE ASKED WHAT WE WOULD DO IF THE PF SIMPLY SAID THEY WOULD OBSERVE THE CEASE FIRE AND BE RESPONSIBLE FOR IT THEMSELVES. I SAID THAT CLEARLY WHATEVER ARRANGEMENTS WERE MADE WOULD HAVE TO BE SUSCEPTIBLE TO EFFECTIVE MONITORING. I EXPRESSED THE HOPE THAT ONCE INFORMATION HAD BEEN SUPPLIED ABOUT THE NUMBERS AND DISPOSITIONS OF THE FORCES OF THE TWO SIDES THIS WOULD ENABLE MATTERS TO GO FORWARD. NYERERE RECOGNISED THE NEED FOR THIS INFORMATION.

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MR BULLARD
MR FRETWELL
LORD N G LENNOX
MISS BROWN
MR DAY
MR WILLSON
MR ASPIN

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Pm

STATEMENT BY LORD PRIVY SEAL IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS ON
FRIDAY 7 DECEMBER

RHODESIA: APPOINTMENT OF A BRITISH GOVERNOR

WITH PERMISSION, MR SPEAKER, I SHALL MAKE A STATEMENT ON
RHODESIA.

I TOLD THE HOUSE ON 5 DECEMBER THAT WE WERE MAKING PLANS TO
SEND A GOVERNOR TO SALISBURY IN THE NEXT FEW DAYS. I CAN NOW
INFORM THE HOUSE THAT HM THE QUEEN HAS BEEN PLEASED TO APPROVE
THE APPOINTMENT OF MY RT HON AND NOBLE FRIEND LORD SOAMES AS
HER GOVERNOR OF RHODESIA DURING THE INTERIM PERIOD. LORD SOAMES
WILL ARRIVE IN SALISBURY IN THE COURSE OF NEXT WEEK. IN VIEW OF
THE EXACTING NATURE OF THE TASKS WHICH THE GOVERNOR WILL HAVE TO
FULFIL DURING THIS PERIOD, THE GOVERNMENT THOUGHT IT RIGHT TO
RECOMMEND THE APPOINTMENT OF A SENIOR MEMBER OF THE CABINET WITH
WIDE MINISTERIAL EXPERIENCE.

THE DEPUTY GOVERNOR WILL BE SIR ANTONY DUFF, DEPUTY *TO THE*
PERMANENT UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE AT THE FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH
OFFICE.

THE GOVERNMENT ARE THUS DEMONSTRATING THE GREAT IMPORTANCE
THAT THEY ATTACH TO THE FULFILMENT OF THEIR RESPONSIBILITY TO
PROVIDE THE CONDITIONS IN WHICH FREE AND FAIR ELECTIONS CAN BE
HELD, AS THE MEANS OF BRINGING RHODESIA TO INDEPENDENCE ON THE
BASIS OF GENUINE MAJORITY RULE. WHEN THE GOVERNOR ARRIVES IN
SALISBURY AND HIS AUTHORITY IS ACCEPTED, RHODESIA WILL RETURN TO
LEGALITY.



7 DEC 1979



Telephone
01-499 8600
Cables
JAMHICOM, LONDON, S.W.1.

JAMAICAN HIGH COMMISSION,
50, ST. JAMES'S STREET,
LONDON, SW1A 1JS.

M. T. G.

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T164/79T

305.1

7 December 1979

Dear Prime Minister,

I have today received the following message by telex from my Prime Minister with a request that it be forwarded to you:

" Please accept warm congratulations. It was a long road to Lusaka and a difficult one since. We are very happy that it has been settled and hope all goes well from now on. Best wishes to Lord Carrington who must have done a remarkable job. "

Yours sincerely,

Ernest G Peart
High Commissioner

The Rt. Hon. Margaret Thatcher, MP
Prime Minister
10 Downing Street
London SW1

PRIME MINISTER

Statement on Rhodesia

The Lord Privy Seal's statement on the appointment of Lord Soames (copy attached) went off very quietly this morning. Mr. Shore pressed about whether a ceasefire would have been agreed before Lord Soames' departure for Salisbury. The Lord Privy Seal said that only the details remained to be settled; ~~that~~ that could be done quickly; but that the process of finalising the ceasefire arrangements would require a British presence on the spot.

In answer to subsequent questions from Alex Lyon and Willie Hamilton, the Lord Privy Seal said that the Governor would be going well before the armed forces had returned to barracks or safe areas, and that the monitoring force would not be used as a military force.

Mr. Shore asked finally whether there would be a formal ceasefire declaration before the Governor departed. The Lord Privy Seal said that he could give no firm undertaking about that, since progress would depend on how the Lancaster House talks went over the next few days.

There was general support from all sides of the House for Lord Soames himself.

ys

7 December 1979

STATEMENT BY LORD PRIVY SEAL IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS ON
FRIDAY 7 DECEMBER

RHODESIA: APPOINTMENT OF A BRITISH GOVERNOR

WITH PERMISSION, MR SPEAKER, I SHALL MAKE A STATEMENT ON
RHODESIA.

I TOLD THE HOUSE ON 5 DECEMBER THAT WE WERE MAKING PLANS TO
SEND A GOVERNOR TO SALISBURY IN THE NEXT FEW DAYS. I CAN NOW
INFORM THE HOUSE THAT HM THE QUEEN HAS BEEN PLEASED TO APPROVE
THE APPOINTMENT OF MY RT HON AND NOBLE FRIEND LORD SOAMES AS
HER GOVERNOR OF RHODESIA DURING THE INTERIM PERIOD. LORD SOAMES
WILL ARRIVE IN SALISBURY IN THE COURSE OF NEXT WEEK. IN VIEW OF
THE EXACTING NATURE OF THE TASKS WHICH THE GOVERNOR WILL HAVE TO
FULFIL DURING THIS PERIOD, THE GOVERNMENT THOUGHT IT RIGHT TO
RECOMMEND THE APPOINTMENT OF A SENIOR MEMBER OF THE CABINET WITH
WIDE MINISTERIAL EXPERIENCE.

THE DEPUTY GOVERNOR WILL BE SIR ANTONY DUFF, DEPUTY ^{to The}
PERMANENT UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE AT THE FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH
OFFICE.

THE GOVERNMENT ARE THUS DEMONSTRATING THE GREAT IMPORTANCE
THAT THEY ATTACH TO THE FULFILLMENT OF THEIR RESPONSIBILITY TO
PROVIDE THE CONDITIONS IN WHICH FREE AND FAIR ELECTIONS CAN BE
HELD, AS THE MEANS OF BRINGING RHODESIA TO INDEPENDENCE ON THE
BASIS OF GENUINE MAJORITY RULE. WHEN THE GOVERNOR ARRIVES IN
SALISBURY AND HIS AUTHORITY IS ACCEPTED, RHODESIA WILL RETURN TO
LEGALITY.

SPEAKING NOTE FOR MINISTERS: RHODESIA

The Governor

The appointment of Lord Soames as Governor was announced on 7 December. The appointment of a senior member of the Cabinet with wide ministerial experience is right in view of the exacting nature of the task. The Governor will enjoy the fullest confidence of HMG. Demonstrates the great importance the Government attach to the fulfilment of their responsibility to provide the conditions in which the people of Rhodesia can decide their own future in free and fair elections on the basis of genuine majority rule.

Lord Soames will arrive in Salisbury in the course of next week. When he arrives and his authority is accepted, Rhodesia will return to legality.

The Conference

The crucial breakthrough at the Conference for which we have been working was achieved on 5 December when the Patriotic Front accepted the British ceasefire proposals of 22 November in the light of the assurances Lord Carrington was able to give them. The Salisbury Delegation had already accepted.

We now have agreement on the independence constitution, on the transitional arrangements and on the ceasefire principles. What remains is discussion of the details for implementing the ceasefire which need not take more than two or three days.

You will have seen reports of new difficulties over the details. It is natural that the deep anxieties should come to the surface now that we are discussing practical details. Accept that there are difficulties for both sides. But, in the light of all that we have so far achieved, we have no doubt at all

that success is within our grasp.

Parliament

This confidence is reflected in the measures taken this week:

- Monday. Order in Council creating the Governor's office.
- Tuesday. Full text of the Independence Constitution laid before the House.
- Wednesday. Statement to both Houses. Breakthrough in the Conference.
- Thursday. Introduction of the Zimbabwe Bill (for Rhodesian independence after the elections).
- Friday. The announcement of Lord Soames' appointment.

None of these measures pre-empts the Conference since all leave the timing in the hands of the Government. But they demonstrate our confidence that the end is in sight and with it peace, legality and independence for the people of Rhodesia.

Paymaster General's Office
Privy Council Office
68 Whitehall
SW1

7 December 1979

CONFIDENTIAL

10.18
P.A. J.M. 7:10
PRIME MINISTER ✓

Rhodesia

Lord Carrington is almost certain to find an opportunity this evening to let you know the latest state of play on Rhodesia. But in case he does not do so, you will wish to know that he saw Dr. Mundawarara this evening and left him in no doubt that the proposal that the present Parliament in Salisbury should not be dissolved before midnight on Wednesday of next week would put in jeopardy all the progress which we have made in the Lancaster House negotiations so far. Lord Carrington explained to him the importance of getting Lord Soames in place as Governor on Tuesday: if there was any delay, we should be prevented from sending a Governor until complete agreement had been reached with both sides on all the details of the cease-fire and its implementation, and there was no knowing when this would be.

He then sent Dr. Mundawarara away to try to solve the problem in the course of the night. He told him that he wanted a satisfactory answer in time for a meeting he was having with Lord Soames at 9.00 tomorrow morning.

J.M.

6 December 1979

CONFIDENTIAL



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London S.W.1

Prime Minister
has seen & approved. Tels
sent for despatch.

6 December 1979

Dear Michael,

L². Pms 6/11

Rhodesia: Messages to the South African Government

As you know, we have had a number of exchanges this week with the South African Government over the role of their forces in Rhodesia following the arrival of a British Governor.

Mr Laurens van der Post has helped us to explain to the South Africans the reasons why we would not wish any identifiable units of the South African forces to remain in Rhodesia following the arrival of the British Governor. Mr van der Post called privately on Lord Carrington today. He said that the position over South African forces and equipment was now clearly understood in Pretoria. Mr van der Post strongly recommended that the Prime Minister and Lord Carrington should send private messages to Mr P W Botha and Mr Pik Botha as soon as possible, thanking the South Africans for their help and restraint. There was no need for the messages to deal with the details of military support for Rhodesia.

Mr van der Post said that such messages would have a very useful psychological effect, as the statements which we had been obliged to make in public about South African forces had left South African Ministers feeling that their positive efforts were going unrecognised. He was certain that the South Africans would be discreet about private messages from Mrs Thatcher and Lord Carrington.

Lord Carrington thinks this is a very helpful and sound suggestion, and recommends that the Prime Minister should send a short personal message of appreciation to Mr P W Botha as soon as possible. Such a message would help to balance the representations we have had to make about the need for the South Africans to remove identifiable military units from Rhodesia; and the public statements we have been obliged to make in response to Mr P W Botha's recent oblique reference to the presence of South African forces there. Although at times during the Lancaster House Conference the South Africans have had an unhelpful influence on its proceedings and on the Salisbury delegation, and continue to have doubts about whether we are pursuing the right course, in the past few weeks they have exercised considerable restraint and have taken a generally

/constructive

M O'D B Alexander Esq
10 Downing Street



SECRET

constructive line. We hope that sympathetic messages will encourage them to continue to do so. The South African Government are also said by Mr van der Post to have done all they can to contain and isolate Mr Ian Smith.

/ I enclose the texts of draft telegrams of instruction to HM Ambassador at Pretoria which, if the Prime Minister agreed, we would hope to despatch early tomorrow.

yours ever
Roderic Lyne

(R M J Lyne)
Private Secretary

SECRET

-6 DEC 1979



File No.

Department

Drafted by

(Block Capitals)

Tel. Extn.

OUTWARD

PRIVATE SECRETARY TELEGRAM

233 4641

Security Classification CONFIDENTIAL
Precedence IMMEDIATE
DESKBY ...7...DECEMBER.....1000.Z

FOR
COMMS. DEPT.
USE

Despatched

(Date)
(Time)Z

POSTBYZ

PREAMBLE

(Time of Origin) Z (G.M.T.)

(Restrictive Prefix)

(Security Class.) CONFIDENTIAL

(Caveat/
Privacy marking)

(Codeword)

(Deskby)..... Z

TO IMMEDIATE
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PRETORIA
(post)

Tel. No.of

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AND SAVING TO

REPEATED TO (for info)

SAVING TO (for info)

Distribution: -

- PS
- PS/LPS
- PS/Mr Luce
- PS/PUS
- Sir A Duff
- Mr Day
- Mr Aspin
- Head, Rhodesia Dept
- Head, Southern Africa Dept
- Head, News Dept

Copies to: -

[TEXT]

PERSONAL FOR HM AMBASSADOR

RHODESIA

1. My two immediately following telegrams contain the texts of personal messages from the Prime Minister to the South African Prime Minister and from me to Mr Pik Botha. The recent public controversy here over the future role of South African forces in Rhodesia has, I appreciate, given rise to some anxiety and strain within the South African Government. We have dealt with the substance of this matter in separate telegrams. However, I think it would be helpful now to express appreciation privately of the generally constructive and restrained role played by the South Africans during the Lancaster House Conference. It will of course be particularly important to retain their support during the period leading up to independence.

CONFIDENTIAL

2

2. We understand that Mr P W Botha may be feeling slightly hurt that we have not been able to make any public acknowledgment of South Africa's contribution, though he should appreciate the reasons for this. It would certainly be our intention to make such an acknowledgment at an appropriate time, but this will obviously not be in the very near future. I hope that you will be able to deliver these messages soon. In doing so, you should explain that they are intended as private and personal messages, which we shall not refer to in public. You should stress that we wish to continue to work very closely with the South African Government in bringing Rhodesia to independence, and thereafter.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

CONFIDENTIAL

File No.....
Department
Drafted by
(Block Capitals)
Tel. Extn.....

OUTWARD
TELEGRAM

Security Classification CONFIDENTIAL
Precedence IMMEDIATE
DESKBY 071000 Z

FOR COMMS. DEPT. USE	Despatched (Date) (Time) Z	POSTBY Z
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PREAMBLE

(Time of Origin) Z (G.M.T.) (Restrictive Prefix)
 (Security Class.) ...CONFIDENTIAL... (Caveat/ Privacy marking)
 (Codeword) (Deskby)..... 071000 Z

TO IMMEDIATE PRETORIA Tel. No. of
 (precedence) (post)

AND TO (precedence/post)

AND SAVING TO

REPEATED TO (for info)

SAVING TO (for info)

Distribution:-

- PS
- PS/LPS
- PS/Mr Luce
- PS/PUS
- Sir A Duff
- Mr Day
- Mr Aspin
- Head, Rhodesia Dept
- Head, S. Af. Dept
- Head, News Dept

[TEXT]

PERSONAL FOR HM AMBASSADOR

MY TWO IPTs

Text of message from me to Mr Pik Botha is as follows:

Dear Pik

John Leahy has been in touch with you very recently about the question of South African forces in Rhodesia. I am very grateful for the understanding which you have shown.

The Prime Minister is sending a personal message to Mr P W Botha to express our appreciation of your Government's help over Rhodesia. I would like to add

Copies to:-

a personal word of thanks to you. Your two recent visits to London have, I feel, helped us to develop a much clearer perspective; and you have done much to steady the Rhodesians at what, understandably, is a tense and uncertain time for them

You do not need me to tell you that we are not yet out of the wood, so far as Rhodesia is concerned. We still have to wind up the Conference. And the weeks ahead leading up to independence will be no easier than the past three months. But I am sure you will have been heartened to hear that the Governor is ~~now about to travel~~ *in the next few days.* ~~go~~ out to Salisbury. We have come a long way; and your help, as ever, will be vital to us in going further.

With warm regards

Peter

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

File No.
 Department
 Drafted by
 (Block Capitals)
 Tel. Extn

OUTWARD
 TELEGRAM

Security Classification	
CONFIDENTIAL	
Precedence	
IMMEDIATE	
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Despatched (Date)
 (Time).....Z

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PREAMBLE

(Time of Origin).....Z(G.M.T.) (Restrictive Prefix).....
 (Security Class.).....CONFIDENTIAL (Caveat/
 Privacy Marking).....
 (Codeword)..... (Deskby)

To.....IMMEDIATE.....PRETORIA.....Tel. No.....of.....
 (precedence) (post)

AND TO (precedence/post)

AND SAVING TO

REPEATED TO (for info)

SAVING TO (for info)

Distribution:-

- PS
- PS/LPS
- PS/Mr Luce
- PS/PUS
- Sir A Duff
- Mr Day
- Mr Aspin
- Hd Rhod Dept
- Hd SAf Dept
- Hd News Dept

Copies to:-

(TEXT)

PERSONAL FOR HM AMBASSADOR

MIPT: RHODESIA

1. Text of message from the Prime Minister to Mr

P W Botha is as follows:

Dear Prime Minister

As you will know, Peter Carrington has announced that we shall be sending a Governor to Rhodesia in the next few days. This will enable us to restore normal relations between Britain and Rhodesia and to lift sanctions; and we hope that other countries will follow suit. Our intention is that the Governor should arrive in Salisbury next week.

/In helping

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CONFIDENTIAL

In helping us to get to this point, I would like to express my personal appreciation of the support which you and your government have given in helping us to work towards a settlement. We have throughout been conscious of the fact that the future of Rhodesia is of no less vital concern to you than to us. South African will have a crucial part to play in helping Rhodesia to develop as a stable and prosperous country after independence. We look forward to continuing to work with you to make this a reality.

I look forward to the time when I can pay^a/more public tribute to your assistance. In the meantime I am most anxious that you should know how much I have valued it.

With best wishes

Margaret Thatcher

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London S.W.1

6 December 1979

Secretary of State

for Print 7/14

Dear Michael,

Rhodesia

The Prime Minister has agreed to see General Walls and Mr Flower of the Rhodesian Central Intelligence Organisation at 12.30 pm. Sir A Duff will attend and will be available to give an oral briefing from 12.15 pm.

The meeting with the Prime Minister will be of very great importance in securing the continuing support of General Walls for a settlement on the lines we are proposing. General Walls regards himself, with some justification, as having been largely responsible for bringing the white community along so far - and of course the members of the security forces in particular. But the whites are getting edgy, and General Walls is at present under pressure both within Rhodesia (where he is being attacked by Mr Ian Smith and others for going along with our proposals), and from the South Africans. He is worried, and needs reassurance that he has done the right thing and has not misled his compatriots. He needs in particular reassurance on the following points:

- a. that the process leading to independence will be irreversible. He will be looking for an assurance from the Prime Minister that once authority has been handed over to a British Governor and the process of elections has been set in train, there will be no question of Britain reimposing sanctions if actions by the Patriotic Front render it impossible for an election with their participation to be held. The Prime Minister will wish to assure General Walls that sanctions will be lifted on the Governor's arrival and that we have no intention of re-imposing them. Nor would we withhold independence if - for example because of intimidation - there was a low turn-out in the elections. Independence will be granted as soon as the elections have been held.
- b. The Rhodesian security forces will not be disadvantaged. General Walls has made it clear throughout his negotiations with us that he is extremely concerned about the extent of intimidation by the Patriotic

/Front

M O'D B Alexander Esq
10 Downing Street



Front during the election campaign. He does not believe that a ceasefire will be observed by the Patriotic Front forces generally. He regards it as essential, therefore, that the Rhodesian forces should be able to carry out a normal pattern of activity, including patrolling, under the authority of the Governor. The Prime Minister will wish to reassure him that his forces will not be required to stop patrolling. But, in the Rhodesian interest in terms of attracting international recognition, as well as in our joint interest, it will be important that military activity should be carried out with all possible circumspection and full regard for the political consequences. No cross-border operations should be carried out in this period unless it is clear to both the Governor and General Walls that a limited operation is essential.

- c. South African Assistance. All the equipment and supplies of the Rhodesian armed forces are drawn from South Africa. A significant number of South African personnel are serving in the Rhodesian forces. In addition Mr P W Botha has recently revealed the presence of South African units in Rhodesia. Our position is that we shall not be asking the South Africans to withdraw (or cease supplying) equipment or personnel within the Rhodesian armed forces. But Lord Carrington has explained to Mr Pik Botha that it will be essential that no identifiable South African army units should be in Rhodesia under a British Governor. We do not think there is any need for the Prime Minister to raise this subject, but General Walls may mention it himself.

yours ever
Roderic Lyne

(R M J Lyne)
Private Secretary

PS
PS/SIR I GILMOUR
PS/MR LUCE
PS/PUS

MR WILLSON
MR DAY
LORD N G LENNOX
MR ASPIN

PS/HO 10 DOWNING STREET

MR R L WADE-GERY)
MR P M MAXEY)
MR GOULTY)
MR P J FOWLER)
DIO)

CABINET
OFFICE

ADVANCE COPY

121

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HD/RHOD DEPT (4)

HD/C AF D
HD/S AF D

HD/PUSD (2)

HD/NEWS DEPT
HD/WAD

MR STEEL LEGAL ADVISER RM K188

MR FIFOOT LEGAL ADVISER RM K164

RESIDENT CLERK

ms.

[Handwritten signature]

GR 450

CONFIDENTIAL

DESKBY 070930Z

FM WASHINGTON 070130Z DEC 79

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 4089 OF 6 DECEMBER 1979

INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK

Prime Minister

RHODESIA SANCTIONS

1. WHEN I WENT TO SEE VANCE THIS MORNING HE BEGAN BY REFERRING TO THE CONGRATULATIONS HE HAD SENT YOU ON THE SUCCESS AT LANCASTER HOUSE. I TOOK THE OPPORTUNITY OF DRAWING HIS ATTENTION TO THE SEVERAL MATTERS THAT STILL HAD TO BE SETTLED.
2. VANCE SAID THAT ON SANCTIONS THE U S ADMINISTRATION WAS STILL BOUND BY THE REFERENCE IN THE PRESIDENT'S DETERMINATION OF 14 NOVEMBER (MY TELNO 3704) TO LIFT SANCTIONS WHEN THE GOVERNMENT HAD BEEN APPOINTED AND WHEN THE ELECTORAL PROCESS HAD BEGUN. IT WOULD BE A GREAT HELP IF YOU COULD NOTIFY THEM ON THE LATTER. I ASKED HOW LONG AFTER SUCH A NOTIFICATION THE U S COULD LIFT SANCTIONS. VANCE SAID THAT THE AMERICANS WOULD BE ABLE TO DO SO WITHIN QUOTE 24 OR 48 HOURS UNQUOTE.
3. WE EXPLAINED TO LAKE (WHO WAS PRESENT WITH VANCE) SEPARATELY THAT IT COULD FAIRLY BE SAID THAT THE ELECTORAL PROCESS HAD ALREADY BEGUN SINCE A DEPUTY ELECTION COMMISSIONER HAD BEEN IN RHODESIA FOR A COUPLE OF WEEKS MAKING INITIAL PREPARATIONS AND SINCE

THAT IT COULD FAIRLY BE SAID THAT THE ELECTORAL PROCESS HAD ALREADY
BEGUN SINCE A DEPUTY ELECTION COMMISSIONER HAD BEEN IN RHODESIA
FOR A COUPLE OF WEEKS MAKING INITIAL PREPARATIONS AND SINCE
CAMPAIGNING BY THE PARTIES HAD CERTAINLY BEGUN. LAKE SAID THAT HE
DID NOT THINK THAT THIS WOULD GET THEM OUT OF THEIR DIFFICULTY.
THIS AROSE FROM THE PRESIDENT'S EXPRESS COMMITMENT NOT TO ACT UNTIL
THE ELECTORAL PROCESS HAD BEGUN. WE EXPLAINED THAT WE HAD A DEFINITE
COMMITMENT TO AN ELECTION CAMPAIGN OF TWO MONTHS. THERE MIGHT BE
SOME CONFUSION IF WE WERE TO DECLARE PUBLICLY THAT THE ELECTORAL
PROCESS BEGAN WHEN THE GOVERNOR ARRIVED, SINCE WE SHOULD NOT START
COUNTING THE WEEKS OF THE FORMAL CAMPAIGN UNTIL A LITTLE LATER.

4. I DOUBT WHETHER IN PRACTICE WE ARE GOING TO BE CAUSED MUCH
EMBARRASSMENT BY THIS, PARTICULARLY IF YOU COULD SEND ME A MESSAGE
FOR VANCE ON THE GOVERNOR'S ARRIVAL, REFERRING TO THAT FACT, TO
OUR SIMULTANEOUS LIFTING OF SANCTIONS AND TO THE START OF THE
ELECTORAL PROCESS. I REALISE THAT THE QUOTE ELECTORAL CAMPAIGN
UNQUOTE MAY NOT IN FACT GET UNDER ^{WAY} ~~WEIGH~~ UNTIL A LITTLE AFTER THE
GOVERNOR'S ARRIVAL, BUT I SEE NO HARM IN SAYING TO THE AMERICANS
THAT THE QUOTE ELECTORAL PROCESS UNQUOTE HAS BEGUN.

5. THE ADMINISTRATION WILL NOT REGARD THIS PROBLEM AS RESOLVED BY
THE PASSAGE THROUGH THE SENATE OF THE BILL DESCRIBED IN MY TELNO
4080, SINCE EVEN IF THAT BILL PASSED THE HOUSE, THE ADMINISTRATION
REGARD THEMSELVES AS BOUND BY THE FORMULA IN VANCE'S LETTER TO
HELMS WHICH (LIKE THE PRESIDENT'S EARLIER COMMITMENT) MAKES THE
BEGINNING OF THE ELECTORAL PROCESS A REQUIREMENT FOR THE LIFTING
OF AMERICAN SANCTIONS.

HENDERSON

NNNN

[RHODESIA: POLICY: ADVANCE COPIES]

PS
IR I GILMOUR
PS/MR LUCE
PS/PUS

MR WILLSON
MR DAY
LORD N G LENNOX
MR ASPIN

PS/NO 10 DOWNING STREET

MR R L WADE-GERY
MR P M MAXEY
MR GOULTY
MR P J FOWLER
DIO

CABINET
OFFICE

127

ADVANCE COPY

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HD/RHOD DEPT (4)

HD/C AF D
HD/S AF D

HD/PUSD (2)

HD/NEWS DEPT
HD/WAD

MR STEEL LEGAL ADVISER RM K188

MR FIFCOOT LEGAL ADVISER RM K164

RESIDENT CLERK

[files]

GRS140

RESTRICTED

FM WASHINGTON 062148Z DEC 79

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NO 4080 OF 6 DECEMBER

INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK PRIORITY DAR ES SALAAM LUSAKA MAPUTO
LUANDA GABORONE PRETORIA LAGOS

MY TEL NO 4028-4029 (NOT TO ALL)

RHODESIA: SANCTIONS

1. SENATE VOTED 90-0 TODAY IN FAVOUR OF A BILL WHICH WOULD REQUIRE THE PRESIDENT TO TERMINATE US SANCTIONS AGAINST RHODESIA AS SOON AS A BRITISH GOVERNOR ARRIVES AND ASSUMES HIS DUTIES IN SALISBURY OR BY 31 JANUARY, WHICHEVER IS SOONER (TEXT IN PARA 2 OF MY TEL NO 4029). THE BILL WOULD STILL ALLOW THE PRESIDENT TO MAINTAIN SANCTIONS IN THE NATIONAL INTEREST, ALTHOUGH IT CONFERS ON CONGRESS THE RIGHT TO OVER-RULE SUCH A DECISION BY CONCURRENT RESOLUTION.
2. THE BILL SHOULD NOW GO TO THE HOUSE, ALTHOUGH IT IS GENERALLY EXPECTED IN CONGRESS THAT FURTHER ACTION ON IT WILL BE OUTPACED BY THE ARRIVAL IN SALISBURY OF A BRITISH GOVERNOR AND THE RAPID LIFTING OF US SANCTIONS.

2248

SECRET



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

6 December, 1979.

41
2
additional copy

Sent to FCO

personal to R. Lyne
12.8.80

Dear Genfr,

Call by General Walls

I enclose the record of the Prime Minister's talk with General Walls earlier today. I need hardly stress that this record should be given minimal distribution. You may think it better if no copies at all are made of it.

Yours ever

Richard Alexander

G.G.H. Walden, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

SECRET

(No carbon)
[Signature]

SECRET

cc master

RECORD OF A CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER AND GENERAL WALLS
AT NO.10 DOWNING STREET ON 6 DECEMBER, AT 1230

Present:

Prime Minister

General Walls

Sir Antony Duff

Mr. M.O'D.B. Alexander

After an exchange of courtesies, General Walls said that he expected the Patriotic Front would try to blame the Salisbury delegation for any difficulties which arose in the discussions of the implementation of the ceasefire. The Prime Minister said that in her view the Patriotic Front, in agreeing to the ceasefire, had crossed the Rubicon. It would be impossible for the Patriotic Front now to go back. For them to agree on the main issue and quarrel on detail would cast doubt on their good faith. She had been struck by the evident sense of relief all over the world at the agreement reached the previous day. Everyone considered that final agreement was now a fait accompli. The Prime Minister stressed that it was now the intention of the British Government to go "all the way through to independence".

General Walls said that he knew that the Prime Minister welcomed straight talking. He had a number of problems. The first was that under the British proposals he was divorced from political guidance. If he obeyed the British Governor, he could not consult Bishop Muzorewa who had agreed to stand aside during the interim. He had welcomed ^{"under the counter"} the scheme for the Governor, the Prime Minister, and the present military Commanders to consult together during the interim. He envisaged this as a means of ensuring that their actions would be consistent with the policies of any incoming Government - always assuming that that Government was a moderate one. Even so, two months was a long time for him to be without direct political guidance. Even one month would be a long time. He

/ was

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- 2 -

was very conscious of the responsibility which rested on his shoulders to ensure that the future of Rhodesia was protected. Many people had told him that he was being duped by the Prime Minister and the British Government. The Rhodesian people had put their faith in the military Commanders, and in him, and he had to be certain that what he was doing was in the country's interest. He had to be sure therefore of his access to the Governor.

The Prime Minister said that it was her understanding that the Governor would be entitled to summon anyone to see him at any time. This included, of course, both Bishop Muzorewa and General Walls. It was no part of the British Government's intention to reduce the Governor's capability to keep law and order in Rhodesia. The Governor had to be in a position to create the right conditions for the elections. Sir Antony Duff said that he saw no difficulty in principle about access by General Walls to the Governor. Of course, some of the meetings would be informal.

General Walls said that what mattered was that there was no question of his being denied access to the Governor, and no question of his having to go through others to obtain that access. The Prime Minister confirmed that this was so. She said she would make it clear to Lord Soames both orally and in writing that he must have direct access to the Governor just as the Chiefs of Staff had direct access to her in this country. Moreover, General Walls should on occasion be present when the Governor was seeing Bishop Muzorewa. As far as Rhodesia was concerned, the British Government had but one objective: to bring Rhodesia to independence. It was clear that the country's capability to maintain law and order, exercised through the Governor, had to be maintained.

/ General Walls

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- 3 -

General Walls said that he had taken the easiest of his problems first. He had often been told that previous Rhodesian leaders, like Sir Roy Welensky and Sir Edgar Whitehead, had been duped by Britain's methods of leading them on. He was concerned that a British Governor, under domestic and international pressure, might start wavering when it came to acting in the interests of Zimbabwe-Rhodesia. In reply to the Prime Minister's request for an example of what he had in mind, General Walls referred to the possibility of a build-up of guerilla forces in one of the neighbouring countries. If such a build-up reached the point where the future of Zimbabwe-Rhodesia appeared to be threatened, General Walls said that he would hope that the Governor would agree that something had to be done. No doubt the Governor would hope to secure results by the exercise of diplomatic pressure. If he failed, he might be reluctant to envisage a cross-border operation while the military Commanders might want to take pre-emptive action. General Walls said that his critics were taking the line that once the Governor's authority had been accepted, the military Commanders would be prevented from taking such action.

The Prime Minister said she could not say how Lord Soames would react in these circumstances. She had given Rhodesia one of the ablest and strongest people in the British Government. He was not the sort of man who was likely to be intimidated or pressured. Everything would depend on the relationship between him and General Walls. There would have to be a determination on both sides to keep things straight. She could give no further undertakings. But she stressed the degree of her own commitment and the fact that she herself was unlikely to be intimidated. The Government's objective was to carry through the elections, and to bring Rhodesia to independence. They would not hesitate now.

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Turning to the situation inside Rhodesia, which he said was the most difficult problem of all, General Walls said that he knew for a fact that the Patriotic Front did not intend to implement the ceasefire. They would continue to intimidate and threaten wherever they could. He believed that the British Government agreed that this was the case. He had to be in a position to assure people in Zimbabwe-Rhodesia that the armed forces would be able to counter intimidation. The British proposals allowed for a working arrangement whereby the present armed forces could provide protection and make possible the election of a responsible Government. The Governor must be ready to interpret these proposals in the same way as Lord Carrington had done in private conversations with General Walls. If the Governor were to waver on this, and to try to reduce the ability of the armed forces to deal with the terrorists, General Walls would have forfeited the country's chance of survival. It was against this background that Lord Carrington had offered him a piece of paper. Perhaps Lord Carrington should not have offered the piece of paper, but its existence had enabled General Walls to reassure Bishop Muzorewa and the South African Government. The South African Government had been threatening to remove their men from Rhodesia which would, of course, be fatal to the country's chance of survival.

Lord Carrington had subsequently said that the piece of paper could not be given to General Walls and was now saying that there could be no piece of paper at all. He had also changed his position on the question of South African assistance to Rhodesia. Originally, he had said that he would encourage the South Africans to support Bishop Muzorewa's Government. Now he was saying that there must be no identifiable South African units in the country. If, as a result of Lord Carrington's new position on the question of a South African presence, the Governor were to give instructions for the withdrawal of the South Africans or to lay down conditions on their employment, then "we'd be finished". If it was no longer

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
possible for him to have the piece of paper, General Walls said that he had to be 100% sure that the contents of the paper nonetheless represented the intentions of the British Government.

The Prime Minister said that the future of Zimbabwe-Rhodesia was at stake. So was the reputation of Lord Soames. So was her own reputation. Lord Soames had made a considerable gesture in agreeing to put his reputation at issue. She did not put her faith in pieces of paper. She put her faith in people. She shared with General Walls an immediate interest in the future of Zimbabwe-Rhodesia, since members of her own family lived there. She shared a larger interest in that she regarded the future of democracy in Southern Africa as being at stake. Her commitment was total. It was no part of her intention to reduce the capability of the only disciplined force in the country to maintain law and order there. General Walls and Lord Soames would, she was confident, be able to work out how to ensure that law and order was kept. General Walls, she repeated, should be in no doubt about her commitment. She regarded Zimbabwe-Rhodesia as being in the front line of the defence of the Western way of life. It was ^{this} on/commitment, rather than in a piece of paper, that General Walls would have to put his faith. He could be assured of her continuing close interest in what was happening. Lord Soames and Sir Antony Duff, and through them General Walls, would be able to get in touch with her whenever they wished to do so.

General Walls said that he also did not put his faith in bits of paper. What the Prime Minister had said was good enough for him. It was fine.

The discussion ended at 1300 hours.

6 December, 1979.



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10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

5 December 1979

New Rhodesia,

CALL BY THE U.S. AMBASSADOR

The U.S. Ambassador, Mr. Kingman Brewster, called on the Prime Minister this morning to discuss her forthcoming visit to Washington and New York. A number of issues were touched on briefly.

Rhodesia

The Prime Minister commented that it would be very awkward for her if the United States was still applying sanctions against Rhodesia at the time of her arrival and if there were by then a British Governor in Salisbury. Mr. Brewster said that he was conscious of the problem and would make sure it was understood in Washington when he returned there early next week. However, he could give no undertakings about the reaction of the Administration. He assumed the wording used in recent statements, and in particular the reference to a thirty day period, reflected an effort to bridge the positions of those who wanted no procrastination in the lifting of sanctions and those who wanted no automaticity.

Defence

In the course of some rather random remarks about defence matters, Mr. Brewster said that the wish of the U.S. Administration to separate the timing of the decision on theatre nuclear force modernisation and on the Polaris succession should not be read as having any implications for the attitude of the Administration on the second issue.

Iran

Mr. Brewster said that the President was, inevitably, pre-occupied with the Iranian situation. It would be very useful for him to be able to discuss with another Head of Government the implications of the crisis and to hear the views of an outsider on what might be done. The President had been receiving advice from a very limited number of advisers. These advisers

/ were themselves

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were themselves disinclined, for obvious reasons, to discuss the problem, particularly the question of contingency plans, with a wider circle. Mr. Brewster said that he hoped that if the Prime Minister had ideas of her own she would spell them out. The President would very probably keep his own ideas to himself, but a discussion would nonetheless, in Mr. Brewster's view, be useful.

Mr. Brewster said that two members of the U.S. Treasury, Messrs. Carswell and Mundheim (?) would be coming to London tomorrow to talk to the Treasury and the Bank of England about the freezing of Iranian assets. They would be bearing a letter to the Prime Minister from President Carter on the question.

Ulster

Mr. Brewster said that the question of arms sales to the RUC was tied up with the primaries rather than with the national elections. As a result it was likely to be very difficult for the President to move in the immediate future. The Prime Minister said that she would have to raise the question nonetheless. Mr. Brewster said that he understood this.

Oil Sales

Mr. Brewster referred briefly to American unhappiness at the impact of the BNOC decision to charge in advance for future oil sales. The American authorities were taking the line that this made it harder to keep the Saudi Arabians, Kuwaitis and others in line in resisting further price increases. BNOC's position had symbolic significance. The Prime Minister made it clear that she did not share this analysis.

I am sending copies of this letter to Martin Hall (HM Treasury), Bill Burroughs (Department of Energy), Brian Norbury (Ministry of Defence) and Martin Vile (Cabinet Office).

Yours ever

Michael Alexander

R. M. J. Lyne, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

1. With your permission, Mr Speaker, I shall make a statement on Rhodesia.
2. In the Conference on 22 November, the Government put forward full proposals for a ceasefire, on which there have since been intensive discussions. The Salisbury delegation accepted these proposals on 26 November. ^{My Ex. Hon. & Noble Friends and I are} ~~in~~ ^{at} this moment in touch with the Patriotic Front leaders and ^{we} ~~I~~ hope that they will shortly be able to agree. Only the detailed implementation will then remain to be discussed. ^{we} ~~I~~ do not envisage that these discussions need take more than two or three days.
3. Both sides have now agreed on a Constitution which guarantees genuine majority rule, on the pre-independence arrangements and on the ceasefire proposals. There can be no reason for delay in setting in train the arrangements for the ceasefire and for elections under our authority. An Order in Council has been made and was laid before the House yesterday which provides for the appointment of a Governor

/with full

with full executive and legislative powers. The full text of the Independence Constitution has been given to both delegations. I have arranged for copies to be placed in the Library of the House. It is intended that an Order providing for the Constitution will be laid before Her Majesty in Council later this week.

4. The Government will also introduce into the House tomorrow the Zimbabwe Bill which will allow Rhodesia to be brought to independence at the appropriate moment. The process of finalising the arrangements for a ceasefire will require a British authority in Rhodesia. We are therefore making plans to send a Governor to Salisbury in the next few days.

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

5 December 1979

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Primo Minister

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Jean Jaide

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Before you went to the United States, and at a time when we had just passed the two thirds mark at Lancaster House, you wrote me a very charitable letter. I had hoped that by the time you returned we would have reached the end of the Conference. Though I am not yet sure what the final outcome will be, we are very nearly at the end, and I think I can now safely release you from your obligations as a member of the British delegation!

I can also thank you for your kind words - though in truth far the hardest part is what now lies ahead of us. Perhaps I can utter a few words of my own, while reserving absolutely my right to ask for your help again. Before Lancaster House, before Lusaka, you were saddled with the unenviable and enormously difficult task of breaking the ice and of starting the process which has led us very close to an agreement. You had to overcome an apparently solid barrier of suspicion and start a dialogue. Many people would have balked at taking on such an assignment and, in so doing, putting their own reputations on the line. You not only took on the job, but did it marvellously well. And instead of then bowing out with honour, you have gone on helping us since. In particular, I feel sure that your visit to the United States in October made an invaluable contribution towards steadying American opinion on Rhodesia.

I am enormously grateful for all you have done, for the time you have given to Rhodesia, and above all for the

/quality of

The Rt Hon Lord Harlech KCMG



PERSONAL

quality of your advice. You have made a vital contribution. I hope that you will forgive me if I have to turn to you again. I know that the Prime Minister (to whom I am sending a copy of this letter) would wish to be associated with these sentiments.

You were splendid.

J *Pdz*

(CARRINGTON)

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5 DEC 1979



[RHODESIA: POLICY: ADVANCE COPIES] *LD*

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PS
PS/SIR I GILMOUR
PS/MR LUCE
PS/PUS
SRA DUFF
MR WILLSON
MR DAY
LORD N G LENNOX
MR ASPIN

~~PS/NO~~ 10 DOWNING STREET

MR R L WADE-GERY)
MR P M MAXEY) CABINET
MR GOULTY) OFFICE
MR P J FOWLER)
DIO)

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HD/PUSD (2)

HD/NEWS DEPT
HD/WAD

MR STEEL LEGAL ADVISER RM K188

MR FIFCOFF LEGAL ADVISER RM K164

~~RESIDENT CLERK~~

Prime Minister

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TO PRIORITY FCO

TEL NO. 1360 OF 5 DECEMBER 1979

REPEATED TO PRIORITY GABORONE, MAPUTO, DAR ES SALAAM, LUANDA,
MIRIMBA SALISBURY, NAIROBI, LAGOS, UKMIS NEW YORK, WASHINGTON.

MY TEL NO. 1360 (NOT TO ALL) - RHODESIA.

1. AS FORESHADOWED IN PARA 2 OF MY TUR THE EDITORIALS IN TODAY'S
TIMES OF ZAMBIA IS GENERALLY POSITIVE AT LEAST BY LOCAL
STANDARDS IN ITS APPROACH TO THE CEASEFIRE NEGOTIATIONS AT
LANCASTER HOUSE. ALTHOUGH INEVITABLY WE ARE CRITICISED, THE
TIMES APPORTIONS BLAME BY SAYING "FINAL AGREEMENT HINGES ON
ARRANGEMENTS FOR A CEASEFIRE. BUT BOTH THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT
AND THE PATRIOTIC FRONT ARE NOW SHADOW-BOXING OVER THE ISSUE.
YET THE PLUNGE MUST BE TAKEN".

2. THE TIMES ASSERTS IN ITS LEADER THAT THERE ARE FOUR POINTS AT ISSUE BEFORE A SETTLEMENT CAN BE REACHED:--

- (1) THE PATRIOTIC FRONT WANT A FURTHER DEFINITION ON DISENGAGEMENT. THE TIMES CONTINUES THAT "THE BRITISH SAY THIS MUST BE RECIPROCAL ALTHOUGH THEY ADMIT THAT REBEL RHODESIAN FORCES MUST DISENGAGE FIRST. THEIR ONLY CONTENTION IS THAT THE PROCESS OF ASSEMBLY OF PATRIOTIC FRONT FORCES IS THE KEY TO ANY MEANINGFUL DISENGAGEMENT.
- (2) THE PATRIOTIC FRONT DEMAND THE GROUNDING OF ALL RHODESIAN COMBAT AIRCRAFT DURING THE CEASEFIRE WHICH THE BRITISH, ACCORDING TO THE TIMES, SAY IS NOT POSSIBLE AS "WE NEED IT FOR LOGISTIC PURPOSE. AFTER ALL A MONITOR FORCE WILL BE THERE". "WHAT CHEEK" COMMENTS THE TIMES.
- (3) THE PATRIOTIC FRONT DEMAND THE INCLUSION OF SIX OTHER COUNTRIES TO JOIN THE PROPOSED COMMONWEALTH MONITORING FORCE, GHANA, NIGERIA, SIERRA LEONE, INDIA, GUYANA AND JAMAICA. THE BRITISH REPLY, THE TIMES SAYS, IS THAT "IT HAS ALREADY RESPONDED A GREAT DEAL TO THIS BY ITS OWN INCLUSION OF KENYA".
- (4) "THE LEGITIMATE WORRY BY THE PATRIOTIC FRONT FOR THE PRESENCE OF SOUTH AFRICAN TROOPS IN RHODESIA DURING THE CEASEFIRE". OUR RESPONSE TO THIS POINT IS CONSIDERED "LAME".

3. BUT THE TIMES CONCLUDES BY SAYING THAT "WE STRONGLY FEEL THERE IS NO NEED FOR THIS LAST MINUTE CRISIS AT ALL. IT IS EVIDENT THAT AGREEMENT IN PRINCIPLE IS THERE. THE PATRIOTIC FRONT SAID LAST WEEKEND THAT THEY "CAN ALMOST AGREE. WHY ARE THEY THEN QUIBBLING AND BILLY-DALLYING OVER MINOR DETAIL? THEY HAD THE INITIATIVE AND NOW SEEM TO HAVE LOST IT AGAIN TO CARRINGTON'S SCHOOLMASTER TACTICS OF DEADLINES".

4. INTERESTINGLY THE LEADING NEWS STORY CLAIMS THE PATRIOTIC FRONT AS DEMANDING TWO FURTHER CLARIFICATIONS - A) EXCLUSION OF SOUTH AFRICAN FORCES; B) EQUALITY OF TREATMENT FOR FORCES.

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FM MIRIMBA SALISBURY 051530Z DEC 79
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELNO 1036 OF 5 DECEMBER

FROM ELECTION COMMISSION

OUR TELNO 352: RHODESIA: ELECTIONS

1. VISITS WHICH CARRUTHERS HAS NOW PAID TO SOME DISTRICTS HAVE HIGHLIGHTED THE EXTENT TO WHICH BALLOT SECRECY IS VITAL IN CONTAINING INTIMIDATION. THE MOST COMMON THREAT ALREADY BEING MADE BY INTIMIDATORS IS THAT THEY WILL ESTABLISH HOW PEOPLE VOTED AFTER THE ELECTION AND EXACT RETRIBUTION (OFTEN HORRIFYINGLY EXPLICIT) FROM THEIR OPPONENTS. THE EXPERIENCE OF THE LAST ELECTION HAS GONE SOME WAY TOWARDS ALLAYING THE FEARS OF THE MORE EDUCATED VOTERS, BUT PF PARTICIPATION THIS TIME ADDS A NEW DIMENSION TO THE PROBLEM, PARTICULARLY FOR THE MORE NAIVE RURAL VOTER. EXTENSIVE PUBLICITY ABOUT THE SECRECY OF THE BALLOT WILL NOT TOTALLY REMOVE THE FEAR THAT WHOEVER WINS WILL SCRUTINISE THE BALLOT PAPERS AFTER THE GOVERNOR DEPARTS. THE ABSENCE OF ANY LINK BETWEEN A VOTER AND THE SERIAL NUMBER ON A BALLOT PAPER IS NOT CONVINCING TO THE UNINITIATED. WE BELIEVE THAT AN UNDERTAKING BY HMG TO REMOVE ALL BALLOT PAPERS TO THE UK FOR THE STATUTORY PERIOD BEFORE THEIR DESTRUCTION BEFORE POWER IS TRANSFERRED TO THE INCOMING GOVERNMENT WOULD HAVE AN ENORMOUS IMPACT ON VOTER'S CONFIDENCE IN THE IMPARTIALITY AND SECRECY OF THE ELECTORAL PROCESS. WE THINK THIS COULD BE JUSTIFIED ON THE GROUNDS THAT THE ELECTIONS ARE BEING HELD UNDER OUR CONSTITUTIONAL PROPOSALS AND OUR SUPERVISION. SUBJECT TO YOUR AGREEMENT WE SEE MERIT IN SUCH

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AN UNDERTAKING BEING INCLUDED IN ELECTION PUBLICITY MATERIAL.
RHODESIAN OFFICIALS, WITH WHOM THIS IDEA HAS BEEN TENTATIVELY
FLOATED, BELIEVE THIS SUGGESTION WILL HELP BUILD CONFIDENCE AND
COUNTER INTIMIDATION. GRATEFUL FOR YOUR VIEWS.

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PS/MR MARTEN
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MR DAY
MR WILLISON
MR ASPIN

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RHODESIA POLICY



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

ce Master set JFH
Rhodesia 7/8/79
Original on
Commonwealth: May 79
Ramphal mtgs
4 December 1979

Near Rhodesia,

Call by Mr. Ramphal

As you know, Mr. Ramphal, the Commonwealth Secretary-General, called on the Prime Minister yesterday evening to discuss the present situation in the Lancaster House Conference. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary was present.

Mr. Ramphal raised four issues.

The Conference

Mr. Ramphal passed on to the Prime Minister a message from Mr. Nkomo to the effect that Mr. Nkomo recognised that "the bus was on the move" and that he intended to be on it. Of the other members of the Patriotic Front, Mr. Ramphal said that Mr. Tongogara wanted a settlement and that Mr. Mugabe probably did too although he was still "in a dialectic". The real difficulty lay with Mr. Tekere who was still resisting agreement. However Mr. Ramphal was confident that the Patriotic Front would come up to the mark, probably on the following day. He himself would be seeing both Mr. Nkomo and Mr. Mugabe later in the evening and would be telling them that the time for delay was past. Mr. Sule, the Nigerian observer, would be doing the same. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary stressed that the Conference would have to be completed by the end of this week. He hoped that the Patriotic Front were clear about this and that they recognised that the discussions on implementation could only take a few days. Mr. Ramphal thought there would be no difficulty about this. Mr. Nkomo, at least, was desperate to get back to Rhodesia.

South African Involvement

Mr. Ramphal said that the revelation that South African troops were present in Rhodesia had been very damaging. It had caused real concern within the Patriotic Front. They seemed to be alarmed lest the South Africans should remain in the country and should subsequently get hold of planes and bomb them or take hostile action in some other form. Mr. Ramphal said that he had told the Patriotic Front that they had no cause for alarm. A British Governor would not allow the South Africans to remain in the country. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary made it clear that he agreed with this. He had told Mr. Pik Botha that, while

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/he had no

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he had no wish to be informed officially about whether or not there were South Africans in Rhodesia, any troops there should be removed as soon as possible. He was more worried about what would happen if the talks broke down. There was a real possibility that in those circumstances the South Africans would go into Rhodesia.

The Interim Period

Mr. Ramphal said that the Patriotic Front were worried about the role of the Rhodesian Air Force, and in particular of their combat planes, during the interim period. Could the combat planes not be grounded? The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary said that Rhodesian Air Force planes would have to be used during the interim period for communications and monitoring purposes. It was absurd to suppose that the planes would be used to shoot up the Patriotic Front in their assembly areas. The Prime Minister pointed out that there would in any case be monitors in the assembly areas and that it was unlikely that anyone would take the risk of attacking them.

The Commonwealth Observers

Mr. Ramphal said that he had not come to talk in detail about the Commonwealth observers but he had been in touch with the Canadian and Australian Governments and he thought they would agree to participate both in the national and in the collective Commonwealth effort to observe the elections. He thought that the views of a credible Commonwealth group would carry a great deal of weight with the world at large. The present mood of the Commonwealth was in any case helpful and constructive. The group would make it easier to control the views of potentially difficult countries like Nigeria. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary commented that the composition of the group proposed by the Secretary General seemed reasonable.

Mr. Ramphal said as he left the meeting that Mr. Nkomo had asked him to convey to the Prime Minister and the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary his deep sense of appreciation of what they had done in trying to resolve the Rhodesia problem in recent months.

Yours ever

Richard Alexander

R.M.J. Lyne, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

4 December 1979

kg, [Signature] - 5/11

Dear Michael,

Rhodesia: Ceasefire negotiations

If by tomorrow morning the Patriotic Front have still not accepted our ceasefire proposals, Lord Carrington thinks that it would be useful for the Prime Minister to send messages to some of the moderate African and Commonwealth Heads of Government with whom she has been in contact about Rhodesia. I attach a draft telegram of instructions. The purpose of the messages would be both to exert further pressure on the Patriotic Front to join in an agreed settlement and to demonstrate that we are doing our utmost to bring them in.

*yours ever
Roderic Lyne*

(R M J Lyne)
Private Secretary

M O'D B Alexander Esq
10 Downing Street

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File No. RHODESIA
 Department OUTWARD
 Drafted by TELEGRAM
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a Policy

RHODESIA: CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE

1. Unless you see objection, please pass the following personal message from the Prime Minister to Head of Government as soon as possible:

Begins

The negotiations in the Rhodesia Conference have reached their final stage. Agreement has been reached on the independence Constitution and on pre-independence arrangements which will enable all the parties to take part on an equal footing in fair elections under a British Governor with full executive and legislative authority.

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The success of the Conference now depends on reaching final agreement on a comprehensive cease-fire. If we can achieve this the result will be a lasting peace for Rhodesia and for the neighbouring countries which have suffered so much from the war.

We have made detailed proposals to the Conference for the implementation of a cease-fire. They include provision for a cease-fire commission, with *including* the military commanders on both sides, which will be responsible for the maintenance of the cease-fire; and a ^{substantial} monitoring force under British auspices with the participation of other Commonwealth ~~governments~~ COUNTRIES.

The Patriotic Front have not yet accepted our proposals. We are continuing to do our utmost to persuade them to do so. If they can, it should be possible to finalise the details of implementation of a cease-fire and to bring a cease-fire into effect in a matter of days.

It would be a grave disappointment if, after all that has been achieved, the Conference failed to reach agreement on a cease-fire. I have been very grateful for the extent of international support we have received throughout the negotiation, the successful conclusion of which is a matter of concern to the entire international community. I hope that in this final phase of the negotiations,

CONFIDENTIAL

/you

you may be prepared to assist our efforts to achieve a peaceful settlement by exerting your influence with the Patriotic Front to accept a cease-fire and agree to participate in elections under a British Governor.

[For Nairobi and Suva only]

I have been most grateful for your willingness to consider Kenyan/Fijian participation in the monitoring force. This has been a most constructive contribution to our efforts to achieve a settlement.

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FROM F C O 042130Z DEC 79

TO IMMEDIATE PRETORIA

TELEGRAM NUMBER 529 OF 4 DECEMBER

AND TO IMMEDIATE MIRIMBA SALISBURY.

INFO PRIORITY LAGOS, DAR ES SALAAM, MAPUTO, LUSAKA, GABORONE,
LUANDA, UKMIS NEW YORK, WASHINGTON.

SOUTH AFRICAN FORCES IN RHODESIA.

1. THE BBC WORLD SERVICE NEWS AT 2000Z TODAY REPORTED CONFERENCE SPOKESMAN AS SAYING THAT THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT WOULD NOT PERMIT SOUTH AFRICAN MILITARY PERSONNEL (RPT PERSONNEL) TO OPERATE IN RHODESIA UNDER THE GOVERNOR.

2. YOU SHOULD KNOW THAT SPOKESMAN DID NOT SAY THAT. WE HAVE SPOKEN TO THE BBC AND HOPE THAT THEY WILL WITHDRAW THIS REPORT.

3. WHAT SPOKESMAN SAID, IN REPLY TO A SERIES OF QUESTIONS, WAS AS FOLLOWS:

A) THERE IS NO QUESTION OR EXTERNAL MILITARY INVOLVEMENT IN RHODESIA UNDER THE BRITISH GOVERNOR. THIS POSITION HAS BEEN MADE CLEAR TO ALL THE GOVERNMENTS CONCERNED.

B) THERE IS NO QUESTION OF FOREIGN UNITS (RPT UNITS) OPERATING IN RHODESIA UNDER A BRITISH GOVERNOR. THE ONLY FORCES IN RHODESIA WILL BE THE RHODESIAN FORCES AND THE PATRIOTIC FRONT, BOTH RESPONSIBLE TO THE GOVERNOR FOR MAINTENANCE OF THE CEASEFIRE AND BOTH EFFECTIVELY MONITORED.

C) THE SUGGESTION (WHICH HAD BEEN ADVANCED BY THE PATRIOTIC FRONT SPOKESMAN) THAT THE BRITISH POSITION HAD HARDENED AFTER THE VISIT OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN FOREIGN MINISTER IS ABSURD.

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THE FIRST BRITISH MOVE THEREAFTER WAS LORD CARRINGTON'S STATEMENT TO THE CONFERENCE ON 28 NOVEMBER, WHICH WAS UNIVERSALLY SEEN TO HAVE BEEN CONCILIATORY.

D) THERE IS NO QUESTION OF A PURGE OF THE FORCES EITHER OF THE PATRIOTIC FRONT OR OF THE RHODESIAN AUTHORITIES.

CARRINGTON

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MR BULLARD
MR FRETWELL
LORD N G LENNOX
MISS BROWN
MR DAY
MR WILLSON
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FM MIRIMBA SALISBURY 041002Z DEC 79
TO PRIORITY FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1027 OF 4 DECEMBER 1979.

RHODESIA: LANCASTER HOUSE CONFERENCE: FINAL AGREEMENT.

1. AS YOU WILL KNOW, MUZOREWA HAS FROM TIME TO TIME SINCE HIS RETURN HERE SAID THAT HE IS READY TO GO TO LONDON IF NECESSARY TO "SIGN THE FINAL AGREEMENT".
2. IN CONNECTION WITH THE PROGRAMME HERE FOR PASSING A CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT BILL THROUGH THE RHODESIAN PARLIAMENT AND THEN DISSOLVING IT, GEORGE SMITH ASKED ME YESTERDAY WHETHER, IN THE EVENT OF FINAL AGREEMENT AT THE CONFERENCE, WE ENVISAGE ANY FORMAL SIGNING CEREMONY FOR WHICH HEADS OF DELEGATION SHOULD BE PRESENT, AND IF SO AT WHAT STAGE THIS WOULD HAPPEN: AFTER AGREEMENT ON THE CEASE-FIRE PROPOSALS NOW UNDER DISCUSSION OR ONLY AFTER FINAL AGREEMENT BETWEEN MILITARY LEADERS ON THE DETAILS OF IMPLEMENTATION.
3. WHAT ANSWER SHOULD I GIVE HIM?

BYATT

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MR FRETWELL
LORD N G LENNOX
MISS BROWN
MR DAY
MR WILLSON
MR ASPIN

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FM LUSAKA 041221Z

TO ROUTINE FCO

TEL NO. 1359 OF 4 DECEMBER 1979

REPEATED TO ROUTINE PEKING.

RHODESIA: A CHINESE COMMENT.

1. YOU MAY FIND SOME INTEREST IN THE GIST OF A CONVERSATION ON RHODESIA WHICH THE US AMBASSADOR (WISNER) HAD YESTERDAY WITH THE CHINESE AMBASSADOR (KE PU-HAI).
2. WISNER ASKED WHAT WAS THE CHINESE VIEW OF THE BRITISH PROPOSALS AND WHAT STEPS HAD THE CHINESE IN MIND IF A SETTLEMENT WAS ACHIEVED. KE PU-HAI REPLIED THAT PEKING VERY MUCH HOPED THAT A SETTLEMENT EMBRACING ALL PARTIES WOULD BE REACHED AND HAD BEEN ENCOURAGING ZANU AS FAR AS THEY WERE ABLE TO AGREE TO A SETTLEMENT ON THE LINES OF OUR PROPOSALS. HE IMPLIED THAT ONE FACTOR ENCOURAGING THE CHINESE TO ADOPT THIS POLICY WAS THE FEAR THAT IN THE ABSENCE OF A SETTLEMENT, THE RUSSIANS WOULD FIND FURTHER ROOM FOR EXPANSION OF THEIR INFLUENCE.
3. KE PU-HAI SAID THAT IF A SETTLEMENT WAS REACHED IT WOULD BE THE INTENTION OF HIS GOVERNMENT TO DRAW ATTENTION PUBLICLY TO THOSE ASPECTS OF THE SETTLEMENT WHICH THEY REGARDED AS POSITIVE WHILST AVOIDING CRITICISM OF SECTIONS ABOUT WHICH THEY HAD RESERVATIONS. KE PU-HAI DID NOT GO BEYOND THIS.

NEILSON.

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T158A/79T

FM F.C.O. 041131Z DEC 79
TO PRIORITY WELLINGTON
TELEGRAM NUMBER 320 OF 4 DECEMBER.

hs Paul

YOUR TEL NO 401: RHODESIA

1. GRATEFUL IF YOU WOULD PASS TO MR MULDOON THE FOLLOWING
PERSONAL MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER

**PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T158A/79T**

BEGINS

DEAR ROB

I HAVE SEEN YOUR STATEMENT OF 22 NOVEMBER ABOUT RHODESIA AND THE
LIFTING OF SANCTIONS. IT IS MOST HELPFUL TO HAVE YOUR SUPPORT
FOR OUR POSITION CLEARLY ON THE RECORD AT THIS STAGE. I ALSO
WANTED TO LET YOU KNOW HOW GRATEFUL WE ARE FOR YOUR GOVERNMENT'S
AGREEMENT TO PROVIDE A CONTINGENT FOR THE CEASEFIRE MONITORING
GROUP. I WAS VERY PLEASED TO LEARN THAT NEW ZEALAND WILL BE
SENDING ITS OWN OBSERVER GROUP TO RHODESIA FOR THE ELECTIONS.

YOUR CONSISTENT SUPPORT FOR OUR EFFORTS TO BRING RHODESIA TO
PEACEFUL INDEPENDENCE IS GREATLY APPRECIATED. WE ARE IN THE LAST
CRUCIAL STAGE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS. DESPITE CURRENT DIFFICULTIES,
I HOPE WE MAY BE ABLE TO BRING THE CONFERENCE TO A SATISFACTORY
CONCLUSION WITHIN THE NEXT FEW DAYS.

WITH WARM REGARDS
YOURS SINCERELY
MARGARET THATCHER
GARRINGTON

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20064 PRDRME G
FROM FORMIN LI

MONROVIA, LIBERIA

DECEMBER 4, 1979

TELEX 4224

TO

HER EXCELLENCY MARGARET THATCHER
PRIME MINISTER OF GREAT BRITAIN AND
NORTHERN IRELAND
NO. 10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON

PRIME MINISTER'S

PERSONAL MESSAGE

SERIAL No. T158/79T

UNCLASSIFIED

MADAM PRIME MINISTER COLON AS THE OAU AD HOC COMMITTEE ON WESTERN SAHARA CONVENES TODAY IN MONROVIA CMA DEEP AND GRAVE CONCERNS HAVE BEEN AROUSED BY NEWS REPORTS OF STATEMENTS MADE BY YOUR FOREIGN SECRETARY LORD CARRINGTON INDICATING THAT YOUR GOVERNMENT INTENDS TO PROCEED WITH THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE INDEPENDENCE PLAN FOR ZIMBABWE WITH OR WITHOUT THE PARTICIPATION OF THE PATRIOTIC FRONT STOP HENCE OUR COLLEAGUES CMA PRESIDENTS JULIUS NYERERE OF TANZANIA CMA PRESIDENT SHEHU SHAGARI OF NIGERIA AND MYSELF WERE IMPELLED TO CALL IN YOUR CHARGE D'AFFAIRES IN THE ABSENCE OF AMBASSADOR DOUBLEDAY AND EXPRESS OUR CANDID VIEWS ON THESE DEVELOPMENTS STOP THESE VIEWS CMA AS WE TRUST WILL BE FAITHFULLY REPORTED TO YOU BY YOUR CHARGE CMA RELATE TO THE QUESTION OF RECIPROCAL GROUPING OF FORCES OF THE PATRIOTIC FRONT AND THE RHODESIAN REGIME CMA CONTROL OF THE AIRFIELDS AND MILITARY AIRCRAFT AND THE REVELATION OF THE PRESENCE OF SOUTH AFRICAN TROOPS IN RHODESIA STOP WE HAVE BEEN MADE TO UNDERSTAND THAT CLARIFICATIONS SOUGHT BY THE PATRIOTIC FRONT ON THESE POINTS HAVE NOT BEEN FORTHCOMING FROM YOUR GOVERNMENT STOP ANOTHER CONCERN OF OURS RELATES TO THE DISPOSITION OF THE PRIVATE ARMY OF BISHOP MUZOREWA OR FOR THAT MATTER OF ANY OTHER POLITICAL FACTION IN ZIMBABWE STOP YOU WILL AGREE CMA MADAM PRIME MINISTER CMA THAT IN THE CEASEFIRE ARRANGEMENT THESE ARE FUNDAMENTAL POINTS WHICH MUST BE CLARIFIED AND RESOLVED IN A MANNER THAT WOULD BE SATISFACTORY TO THE PARTIES CONCERNED STOP THEREFORE THE POSITION OF YOUR GOVERNMENT AS ANNOUNCED BY LORD CARRINGTON CMA IF MAINTAINED CMA WILL RENDER

RENDER COMPLETELY FRUITLESS ALL EFFORTS AND ACHIEVEMENTS MADE THIS FAR TOWARDS A JUST AND PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF THE ZIMBABWE QUESTION STOP WHILE WE APPRECIATE YOUR CONCERN TO REACH AN EARLY AGREEMENT CMA WE ARE STRONGLY OF THE OPINION THAT THIS CONSIDERATION SHOULD NOT BECOME SO FLEXIBLE IN APPLICATION AS TO LEAD TO THE COLLAPSE OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL TALKS WHICH HAVE ENSUED FOR THREE MONTHS NOW CMA ARISING FROM A PROBLEM WHICH HAS DEFIED SOLUTION AND PLAGUED AFRICA FOR FIFTEEN YEARS STOP WE AGAIN APPEAL TO YOU CMA MADAM PRIME MINISTER CMA TO EXERCISE PATIENCE AND AVOID THE IMPRESSION THAT THE TALKS ARE BEING CONDUCTED UNDER CIRCUMSTANCES WHEREIN THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT APPEARS TO BE GIVING ORDERS AND NOT GENUINELY NEGOTIATING THE POINTS OF CONTENTION STOP WE FURTHER URGE YOU PERSONALLY CMA MADAM PRIME MINISTER CMA ON BEHALF OF MY COLLEAGUES CMA PRESIDENT NYERERE CMA PRESIDENT SHAGARI AND MYSELF AND IN THE NAME OF AFRICA CMA TO DO ALL THAT IS WITHIN YOUR POWER TO ALLOW THE NEGOTIATIONS CMA WHICH HAVE BROUGHT A RAY OF HOPE FOR PEACE IN ZIMBABWE CMA TO CONTINUE UNTIL AN ACCEPTABLE AND LASTING SETTLEMENT FOR GENUINE INDEPENDENCE WITH MAJORITY RULE BECOMES A REALITY IN ZIMBABWE STOP WITH RENEWED ASSURANCES OF MY HIGHEST CONSIDERATION AND ESTEEM

SINCERELY

W R TOLBERT JR
PRESIDENT OF LIBERIA AND CURRENT CHAIRMAN OF THE
ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY

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Sir A Duff
MR WILLSON
MR DAY
LORD N G LENNOX
MR ASPIN

~~PS/NO~~ 10 DOWNING STREET

MR R L WADE-GERY)
MR P M MAXEY) CABINET
MR GOULTY) OFFICE
MR P J FOWLER)
DIO)

IMMEDIATE

~~HD/RHOD DEPT (4)~~

HD/C AF D
HD/S AF D

HD/PUSD (2)

HD/NEWS DEPT
HD/WAD

MR STEEL LEGAL ADVISER RM K188

MR FITCOFF LEGAL ADVISER RM K162

RESIDENT CLERK

DESKBY 041600Z
[Received in Rm K131 041910Z]

Prime Minister

[Signature]

CONFIDENTIAL

DESKBY 041600Z

FM MONROVIA 041510Z DEC 79

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TEL NO 188 OF 4 DEC

AND TO IMMEDIATE LUSAKA MIRIMBA SALISBURY DAR ES SALAAM LAGOS
NAIROBI MAPUTO GABORONE LUANDA PRETORIA WASHINGTON AND ADDIS
ABABA.

RHODESIA.

1. I WAS CALLED TO THE PRESIDENT'S VILLA AT THE OAU CONFERENCE
CENTRE AT 12.45 THIS AFTERNOON AND WAS REDIRECTED TO THE
PRESIDENT'S OFFICE IN THE AFRICAN UNITY CENTRE WHERE PRESIDENT
TOLBERT ARRIVED ACCOMPANIED BY PRESIDENT'S NYERERE AND
AL HAJI SHEHU SHAGARI, FOREIGN MINISTER DENNIS AND TWO UNNAMED
AIDES NEITHER I THINK LIBERIAN.

2. PRESIDENT TOLBERT OPENED BY SAYING THAT HE HAD LEARNED THIS
MORNING FROM HIS REPRESENTATIVE IN LONDON AND PRESIDENT
NYERERE THROUGH HIS OWN CHANNELS NEWS OF THE TALKS ON ZIMBASWE
WHICH OCCASIONED ALL OF THEM DEEP CONCERN. IT WAS THEIR
WISH THAT I SHOULD BRING TO THE NOTICE OF MY GOVERNMENT THE

WISH THAT I SHOULD BRING TO THE NOTICE OF MY GOVERNMENT THE CAUSES OF THIS CONCERN.

3. PRESIDENT NYERERE THEN ITEMISED AS FOLLOWS:

A) THE PF HAD BEEN TOLD THEIR FORCES WOULD BE GROUPED IN 15 SELECTED AREAS. WHAT IS TO BE DONE WITH THE SALISBURY FORCES? ARE THEY ALSO TO BE GROUPED? TO THIS QUESTION WAS LATER ADDED A REQUEST FOR CLARIFICATION REGARDING THE PRIVATE ARMIES DEPLOYED BY BISHOP MUZOREWA AND OTHERS OF THE SALISBURY GROUP.

B) WHAT WOULD BE THE SITUATION REGARDING THE AIR FORCE. WILL THE GOVERNOR'S AIR TRANSPORT REQUIREMENT BE THE ONLY MILITARY USAGE OR WILL MILITARY AIRCRAFT CONTINUE TO BE AVAILABLE FOR MILITARY PURPOSES? DISCUSSION BETWEEN THEMSELVES INDICATED SCEPTICISM ABOUT THE GOVERNOR'S POWER TO PREVENT MILITARY FLYING AGAINST PF TARGETS.

C) WHAT WAS THE STRENGTH OF INFORMATION RECEIVED BY ALL THREE OF THE PRESENCE OF SOUTH AFRICAN FORCES IN ZIMBABWE? IF THEY WERE THERE DID THE BRITISH PROPOSALS INCLUDE THEM? WOULD THEY REMAIN?

D) LATER AT THE SUGGESTION OF ONE OF THE AIDES IT WAS DECIDED TO SEEK INFORMATION REGARDING THE STATUS OF THE TALKS TODAY. THIS MIGHT BE FOUND TO ANSWER MOST OF A - C

4. I WAS ASKED TO COMMUNICATE THESE CONCERNS AND SEEK REPLIES TO THEIR QUESTIONS BUT NOT ASKED FOR MY VIEWS. I SAID VERY LITTLE THEREFORE SINCE POINTS MADE IN YOUR TELNO 1004 TO LUSAKA ETC WILL ADD WEIGHT TO ANY REPLY I CAN BE AUTHORISED TO GIVE IN RESPONSE TO THESE DIRECT QUESTIONS BUT IN ANSWER TO REMARK ABOUT QUOTE WHY SUCH HURRY UNQUOTE I SPOKE ON LINES OF SECOND ANSWER IN VS109/79 OF 3 DEEC. EMPHATIC RESPONSE FROM PRESIDENT NYERERE THAT UNRAVELLING CERTAIN IF AN ATTEMPT IS MADE TO PROCEED WITHTUT THE PF. PRESIDENT TOLBERT QUOTED LIBERIAN PROVERB QUOTE IF YOU EXPECT TO EAT THE WHOLE RAT YOU MUST NOT STOP AT THE TAIL UNQUOTE AND URGED ME WITH GREAT EMPHASIS TO SEEK PATIENCE AND IN HIS WORDS QUOTE ACCOMMODATION AND FLEXIBILTY UNQUOTE HE SAID IT WOULD BE DISASTROUS TO CARRY ON NOW WITHOUT THE PF.

5. THERE WERE EXPRESSIONS ON THESE LINES FROM ALL OF THEM AND MUCH EMPHASIS ON GRAVITY AND URGENCY OF THE POSITION. PRESIDENT TOLBERT, PROBABLY IN VIEW OF FORTHCOMING VISIT TO LONDON, WAS ESPECIALLY CONCERNED NOT TO SEE TALKS ENDED WITHOUT FULL

AGREEMENT OF ALL SIDES AND INDICATED THAT PRESENCE OF TWO
COMMONWEALTH PRESIDENTS AND CHAIRMAN OAU AT THIS MEETING SHOWED
BREADTH OF AFRICAN INVOLVEMENT. I PROMISED IMMEDIATE TELEGRAM AND
HOPE IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO REPLY TONIGHT. PLEASE TELEGRAPH
IF NOT WHEN REPLY CAN BE EXPECTED.

6. AFTER THE MEETING DENNIS RAN AFTER ME TO REPEAT CONCERN
SAYING THAT NEWS ON BBC THIS MORNING THAT YOU WOULD PROCEED
WITHOUT PF HAD OCCASIONED DEEP SHOCK.

7. GRATEFUL FOR IMMEDIATE REPLY.

TRAVIS

FCO PSE PASS ALL

NNNN

[RHODESIA: POLICY: ADVANCE COPIES] 27

PS
PS/SIR I GILMOUR
PS/MR LUCE
PS/PUS

MR WILLSON
MR DAY
LORD N G LENNOX
MR ASPIN

~~PS/NO~~ 10 DOWNING STREET

MR R L WADE-GERY
MR P M MAXEY
MR GOULTY
MR P J FOWLER
DIO

CABINET
OFFICE

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HD/RHOD DEPT (4)

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HD/S AF D

HD/PUSD (2)

HD/NAMD

HD/NEWS DEPT

HD/WAD

MR STEEL LEGAL ADVISER RM K188

MR NICOT LEGAL ADVISER RM K164

~~RESIDENT CLERK~~

GRS 250

SECRET

FM OTTAWA 041925Z DEC 79

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 612 OF 4 DECEMBER

YOUR TELNO 1004 TO LUSAKA: RHODESIA

1. ALL THAT SHE HAS SAID TO ME SO FAR AND WHAT I HAVE HEARD ABOUT HER SUGGESTS THAT MISS MACDONALD IS FULL OF ADMIRATION FOR THE WAY IN WHICH YOU HAVE CONDUCTED THE NEGOTIATIONS ON RHODESIA. WHEN I SAW HER LAST NIGHT AND WISHED HER BON VOYAGE FOR HER TRIP TO EUROPE I UNDERLINED THE IMPORTANCE OF THE DEFENCE OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC, THE COCKPIT OF DEMOCRACY, AS BY FAR AND AWAY THE TOPMOST PRIORITY FOR US ALL. SHE AGREED: AND I WOULD EXPECT HER TO STAND BY US IF WE ARE OBLIGED TO PROCEED WITHOUT THE PATRIOTIC FRONT.

2. NEVERTHELESS THE CANADIANS HAVE A BAD RECORD OF TRYING TO GET THE BEST OF BOTH WORLDS AND PREVARICATING IN THEIR SUPPORT OF US ON ISSUES WHERE THEIR REPUTATION WITH THE THIRD WORLD IS AT STAKE: AND

THERE ARE PLENTY OF OFFICIALS IN OTTAWA WHO REGARD THE COMMONWEALTH AS OF THE SAME IMPORTANCE AS NATO AND WHO WILL BE PRESSING FOR CAUTION IF THE PATRIOTIC FRONT IN THE END REFUSE AGREEMENT TO YOUR PROPOSALS. WE KNOW (UKMIS TELNO 1571) THAT SOME CANADIANS ARE INCLINED TO TAKE AN UNDULY LEGALISTIC VIEW ABOUT SANCTIONS.

3. IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES MISS MACDONALD'S ATTENDANCE AT THE NATO MEETING WILL PROVIDE A GOOD OPPORTUNITY TO GET A COMMITMENT OF SUPPORT FROM HER WHILE SHE IS AWAY FROM INFLUENCE OF HER DEPARTMENT. IF, HOWEVER, MATTERS COME TO AHEAD BEFORE THEN, A PERSONAL TELEPHONE CALL FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO MR CLARK AND FROM YOURSELF TO MISS MACDONALD COULD WELL BE CRUCIAL IN SECURING CANADIAN BACKING PARTICULARLY IF IT APPEARS THAT NYERERE AND OTHERS OF HIS ILK ARE LIKELY TO RAT ON US AND HELP IN PILLORYING US AT THE U.N.

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[RHODESIA: POLICY: ADVANCE COPIES]

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HD/WAD

MR STEEL LEGAL ADVISER RM K188

MR FIFCOO LEGAL ADVISER RM K164

RESIDENT CLERK

PS/NO 10 DOWNING STREET

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MR P J FOWLER)

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FM WASHINGTON 050105Z DEC 79

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 4047 OF 4 DECEMBER

INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK

P.A. has seen.

Paul

RHODESIA SANCTIONS: YOUR TELNO 1783

1. MORLAND TOOK ACTION WITH RAY SEITZ, FORMERLY DEALING WITH RHODESIA IN THE EMBASSY IN LONDON AND NOW IN MR VANCE'S OFFICE. SEITZ SAID THAT THE TWO PHRASES IN VANCE'S LETTER WHICH CONCERN YOU HAD BEEN ARGUED INTENSELY WITHIN THE ADMINISTRATION. IT HAD BEEN POINTED OUT TO THE PRESIDENT AND VANCE THAT DELAY IN LIFTING SANCTIONS AFTER WE HAD LIFTED THEM RAISED SEVERAL LEGAL PROBLEMS: THAT IT WOULD LOOK CRAZY IF THE AMERICANS MAINTAINED SANCTIONS WHILE THEY WERE LETTING US USE THEIR MILITARY AIRCRAFT TO FLY STUFF INTO RHODESIA; THAT IT WOULD IMPLY DOUBT ABOUT THE WAY WE WERE IMPLEMENTING A SETTLEMENT SINCE THE AMERICANS HAD ACCEPTED THE FAIRNESS OF OUR CONSTITUTION. IT HAD ALSO BEEN POINTED OUT THAT MAINTAINING AMERICAN SANCTIONS WOULD STRAIN BILATERAL RELATIONS ON OTHER FRONTS JUST WHEN THE AMERICANS NEEDED FRIENDS. SEITZ SAID THAT VANCE WAS FULLY AWARE AND INDEED CONVINCED BY THESE ARGUMENTS.

2. SEITZ SAID THAT THE REASON FOR INCLUDING THE WORDS QUOTE NOT LATER THAN ONE MONTH UNQUOTE WAS THAT THE PRESIDENT BELIEVED HE HAD COMMITTED HIMSELF TO THIS WORDING TALKING TO A SIGNIFICANT POLITICAL

LATER THAN ONE MONTH UNQUOTE WAS THAT THE PRESIDENT BELIEVED HE HAD COMMITTED HIMSELF TO THIS WORDING TALKING TO A SIGNIFICANT POLITICAL GROUP (OUR GUESS IS THAT THIS IS THE BLACK CAUCUS IN CONGRESS). THE PRESIDENT DID NOT FEEL ABLE TO ABANDON IT BEFORE THE GOVERNOR ARRIVED. BUT ONCE HE HAD ARRIVED FOLLOWING AN AGREED SETTLEMENT SEITZ SAID THAT HE KNEW THAT VANCE, AND HE BELIEVED THE PRESIDENT, WOULD ACCEPT THAT THE ARGUMENTS FOR THE AMERICANS IMMEDIATELY LIFTING SANCTIONS WERE OVERWHELMING. THIS TIES IN WITH WHAT LAKE TOLD ROBINSON (PARAGRAPH 4 OF MY TELEGRAM NUMBER 4028)

3. ON THE COMMITMENT TO CONSULT CONGRESS QUOTE IF AN AGREED SETTLEMENT IS NOT REACHED AT THE CONFERENCE UNQUOTE SEITZ SAID THAT AGAIN THERE HAD BEEN MUCH ARGUMENT WITHIN THE ADMINISTRATION. SEITZ HIMSELF HAD ARGUED STRONGLY AGAINST IT. THE OBJECTIVE WAS TO SHOW THAT CONGRESS WAS FULLY INVOLVED IN DECISIONS ABOUT SANCTIONS - SOMETHING THAT THE ADMINISTRATION NEEDED TO DEMONSTRATE.

SEITZ SAID THAT THE WORDS QUOTE AGREED SETTLEMENT UNQUOTE DID NOT MEAN THAT ALL PARTIES HAD TO AGREE IT. FOR EXAMPLE HE PERSONALLY BELIEVED THAT IF MUGABE BROKE AWAY, THE AMERICANS WOULD CERTAINLY REGARD THAT AS AN AGREED SETTLEMENT. UNLIKE THE REFERENCE TO ONE MONTH, THIS PASSAGE DID NOT REFLECT ANY SPECIFIC PLEDGE BY THE PRESIDENT OR THE ADMINISTRATION TO CONGRESS.

4. MORLAND REITERATED THE ARGUMENTS IN PARAGRAPH 3 OF YOUR TELEGRAM UNDER REFERENCE AND SAID THAT WHAT MATTERED TO US WAS THAT THE AMERICANS SHOULD NOT UNDER ANY CIRCUMSTANCES MAINTAIN SANCTIONS FOR MORE THAN A DAY OR TWO AFTER THE ARRIVAL OF THE GOVERNOR. COULD SEITZ GIVE AN ASSURANCE THAT THERE WAS NO LIKELIHOOD OF THIS? SEITZ SAID THAT HE SIMPLY DID NOT HAVE THE AUTHORITY TO GIVE SUCH A FLAT ASSURANCE IN THE LIGHT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMMITMENT WHICH HE HAD EXPLAINED IN CONFIDENCE AND THE WORDING OF VANCE'S LETTER WHICH HAD BEEN DRAFTED ONLY AFTER INTENSE DISCUSSION.

HENDERSON

NNNN

CONFIDENTIAL



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

Prime Minister

I attach the programme as
it now stands & a recent
telegram which we should discuss. *h*

4 December 1979

Dear Michael,

RMJ 4/11

Call by the US Ambassador, 5 December: Rhodesia

When announcing his determination on sanctions in mid-November President Carter stated that the US Administration "would be prepared to lift sanctions when a British Governor assumes authority in Salisbury and the process leading to impartial elections has begun. Our policy will continue to be that no party should have a veto over fair settlement proposals."

HM Ambassador at Washington has reported that Mr Vance has now written to Senator Helms to say that the President will take action to lift sanctions "no later than one month after the Governor's arrival", or by 31 January, whichever is the sooner (Washington telegrams 4028 and 4029 attached).

The Prime Minister may wish to remind Mr Brewster that we have made and are continuing to make every effort to achieve a settlement involving the Patriotic Front. As he knows, Mr Mugabe is making great difficulty about accepting our cease-fire proposals. We hope these difficulties will be overcome, but it is in any event likely that a return to legality will be effected within the next few days.

It would obviously be highly unsatisfactory to have sanctions maintained for a month by the US Administration against Rhodesia under a British Governor. Lord Carrington has therefore instructed Sir N Henderson to make clear to Mr Vance's office that this would cause us serious concern. Lord Carrington recommends that the Prime Minister should point out to Mr Brewster that it would cause potentially serious political embarrassment between us, particularly in view of the timing of the Prime Minister's visit to Washington, if the US Administration were to continue to apply sanctions after the Governor's arrival in Salisbury.

yours etc
Roderic Lyne

(R M J Lyne)
Private Secretary

M O'D B Alexander Esq
10 Downing Street

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FM WASHINGTON 040210Z DEC 79
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NO 4028 OF 3 DECEMBER
INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK

RHODESIA: SANCTIONS

1. KEELEY, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY, STATE DEPARTMENT, ASKED MORLAND TO CALL TODAY TO BE GIVEN A COPY OF A COMPROMISE DRAFT BILL DRAFTED BY SENATORS CHURCH AND JAVITS, WHICH WOULD REQUIRE THE PRESIDENT TO TERMINATE SANCTIONS WHEN A GOVERNOR HAD ASSUMED HIS DUTIES IN RHODESIA, OR BY 31 JANUARY 1980, WHICHEVER CAME EARLIER, SUBJECT TO A PRESIDENTIAL DETERMINATION THAT IT WAS NOT IN THE NATIONAL INTEREST TO LIFT SANCTIONS, TOGETHER WITH A LETTER FROM VANCE TO SENATOR HELMS DELIVERED THIS MORNING, SETTING OUT THE ADMINISTRATION'S INTERPRETATION OF THE DRAFT. TEXT OF BOTH IN MY IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING TELEGRAM. US EMBASSY WERE BEING SENT INSTRUCTIONS IN PARALLEL.
2. KEELEY TOOK THE LINE THAT THE REFERENCE IN VANCE'S LETTER TO A POSSIBLE DELAY OF ONE MONTH IN LIFTING SANCTIONS AFTER AN AGREED SETTLEMENT, THE GOVERNOR'S ARRIVAL AND THE BEGINNING OF THE ELECTORAL PROCESS WAS SIMPLY TO ALLOW THE NECESSARY ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION TO BE COMPLETED - THEY EXPECTED THAT THIS WOULD IN FACT TAKE A GOOD DEAL LESS THAN A MONTH. IN THIS SCENARIO THE ADMINISTRATION WOULD MAKE PUBLIC VERY SOON AFTER THE GOVERNOR'S ARRIVAL THEIR INTENTION TO LIFT SANCTIONS AT AN EARLY DATE. THIS WOULD BE WHAT MATTERED.
3. MORLAND POINTED OUT THAT AT THE END OF THE SAME PARAGRAPH THE COMMITMENT TO DO NO MORE THAN CONSULT CONGRESS IF AN AGREED SETTLEMENT IS NOT REACHED LOOKED A BIT DIFFERENT FROM THE PRESIDENT'S EARLIER FORMULATION. (MY TELS NO 3704 AND 3705) WHICH HAD SAID THAT THE U.S. ADMINISTRATION QUOTE WOULD BE PREPARED TO LIFT SANCTIONS WHEN A BRITISH GOVERNOR ASSUMES AUTHORITY IN SALISBURY AND A PROCESS LEADING TO IMPARTIAL ELECTIONS HAS BEGUN. OUR POLICY WILL CONTINUE TO BE THAT NO PARTY SHOULD HAVE A VETO OVER FAIR SETTLEMENT PROPOSALS UNQUOTE KEELEY ARGUED FIRST, (AND UNCONVINCINGLY)

CONFIDENTIAL

/THAT

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THAT THE EARLIER WORDING HAD ASSUMED A SUCCESSFUL OUTCOME TO THE CONFERENCE AND SECOND, THAT THE COMMITMENT TO CONSULT CONGRESS IN VANCE'S LETTER WAS MEANT TO HELP SMOOTH RELATIONS WITH CONGRESS AND UNDERLINE THE ADMINISTRATION'S INTENTION TO WORK IN PARTNERSHIP WITH THEM ON THIS ISSUE.

4. LAKE (PLEASE PROTECT) SUBSEQUENTLY TOLD ROBINSON THAT THE WORDS QUOTE NO LATER THAN ONE MONTH UNQUOTE IN VANCE'S LETTER HAD BEEN PUT IN AS PART OF A MANOEUVRE TO GAIN SUPPORT FROM LEFT-WINGERS IN CONGRESS. BOTH LAKE AND MOOSE BELIEVED THAT IN FACT ANY DELAY WOULD BE MORE LIKE ONE DAY THAN ONE MONTH.

5. WE HAVE NOW HEARD THAT THE DRAFT BILL HAS BEEN PASSED BY THE SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE AND SHOULD COME TO THE FLOOR OF THE SENATE LATER THIS WEEK FOR A FINAL VOTE. THE HOUSE FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE BEGINS ITS HEARINGS ON 5 DECEMBER.

6. KEELEY ALSO ASKED FOR OUR COMMENTS ON A NEW AMERICAN IDEA FOR HANDLING SANCTIONS IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL. THEY DID NOT QUESTION THE NEED FOR THE UK AND THE US TO LIFT SANCTIONS WITHOUT WAITING FOR A SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION. BUT COULD WE (THE UK) NOT GO TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL SOON AFTER LIFTING, AND SEEK A CONFIRMATORY RESOLUTION? THE AMERICANS WERE INCLINED TO THINK THAT AFTER A SETTLEMENT THE RUSSIANS WOULD NOT VETO, AND THAT A SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION WOULD HELP INDEPENDENT ZIMBABWE. KEELEY ARGUED THAT THIS NEED NOT UNDERMINE OUR CASE THAT A RETURN TO LEGALITY REMOVED THE BASIS ON WHICH SANCTIONS WERE IMPOSED. MORLAND SAID THAT HE DID NOT SEE HOW ONE COULD BE SURE OF AVOIDING A RUSSIAN VETO, AND THAT KEELEY'S LINE OF ARGUMENT WAS UNLIKELY TO GO DOWN WELL IN LONDON, FOR A NUMBER OF REASONS, BUT PROMISED TO SEEK INSTRUCTIONS

7. KEELEY SAID IF IT COULD BE AVOIDED THE AMERICANS DID NOT WANT TO UNDERMINE THE AUTHORITY OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL WHEN THEY MIGHT NEED TO BACK IT UP FOR ALL IT WAS WORTH IN THE IRAN CONTEXT. BUT HE ACCEPTED THAT SECURITY COUNCIL ENDORSEMENT FOR LIFTING SANCTIONS WOULD BE A LUXURY WHICH DEPENDED ON AN AGREED SETTLEMENT, SINCE ONLY THEN COULD ONE HOPE FOR GENERAL SUPPORT IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL. THE US WOULD NOT THINK OF TRYING THIS TACTIC IF THERE HAD BEEN NO AGREED SETTLEMENT.

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8. LAKE (AGAIN PLEASE PROTECT) LATER TOLD ROBINSON THAT HE DID NOT AT ALL LIKE THIS IDEA, AND THOUGHT THAT IT COULD BE KILLED IF WE LET THE AMERICANS HAVE A QUICK NEGATIVE REACTION. GRATEFUL FOR INSTRUCTIONS.

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LORD N G LENNOX
MISS BROWN
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MR WILLSON
MR ASPIN

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION

RHODESIA POLICY

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FM WASHINGTON 040215Z DEC 79

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NO 4029 OF 3 DECEMBER

INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK

M.I.P.T. RHODESIA SANCTIONS

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF LETTER FROM VANCE TO SENATOR HELMS
DEAR SENATOR HELMS:

DURING THE HEARINGS BEFORE THE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE THIS WEEK, I UNDERSTAND THAT YOU REITERATED YOUR DESIRE, EXPRESSED TO ME EARLIER IN THE WEEK, FOR AN EXPLICIT STATEMENT OF THE PRESIDENT'S POSITION WITH RESPECT TO WHEN HE WOULD LIFT SANCTIONS AGAINST ZIMBABWE-RHODESIA. ASSISTANT SECRETARY MOOSE HAS REPORTED TO ME THAT A CLARIFICATION OF THIS POINT WOULD MAKE POSSIBLE A CONSENSUS WITHIN THE COMMITTEE IN SUPPORT OF THE PENDING LEGISLATIVE PROPOSAL, A COPY OF WHICH IS ENCLOSED.

I HAVE DISCUSSED THIS MATTER WITH THE PRESIDENT AND WISH TO ASSURE YOU, ON HIS BEHALF, THAT WHEN THE BRITISH GOVERNOR ARRIVES IN SALISBURY TO IMPLEMENT AN AGREED LANCASTER HOUSE SETTLEMENT AND THE ELECTORAL PROCESS BEGINS, THE PRESIDENT WILL TAKE PROMPT ACTION TO LIFT SANCTIONS. THIS WILL BE DONE NO LATER THAN ONE MONTH AFTER THE GOVERNOR'S ARRIVAL. IF AN AGREED SETTLEMENT IS NOT REACHED AT THE CONFERENCE, WE WILL CONSULT WITH THE RESPECTIVE COMMITTEES OF THE SENATE AND THE HOUSE REGARDING THE COURSE OF ACTION WHICH BEST SERVES THE NATIONAL INTEREST.

THE PENDING LEGISLATIVE PROPOSAL WOULD REQUIRE THE PRESIDENT TO TERMINATE SANCTIONS EITHER A) AFTER THE ARRIVAL OF A BRITISH GOVERNOR, OR B) ON JANUARY 31, 1980, WHICHEVER IS EARLIER, UNLESS THE PRESIDENT WERE TO DETERMINE THAT IT WOULD NOT BE IN OUR NATIONAL INTEREST TO DO SO. ANY SUCH DETERMINATION BY THE PRESIDENT WOULD BE SUBJECT TO REVIEW BY THE CONGRESS WHICH COULD REJECT THE DETERMINATION WITHIN THIRTY DAYS AFTER IT IS REPORTED TO THE CONGRESS, THEREBY TERMINATING SANCTIONS.

THUS, THE PENDING LEGISLATIVE PROPOSAL WOULD BE COMPATIBLE WITH THE PRESIDENT'S POSITION ON THE LIFTING OF SANCTIONS AS SET FORTH ABOVE. ACCORDINGLY, AS MR. MOOSE TESTIFIED ON NOVEMBER 30, THIS PROPOSAL WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE TO THE ADMINISTRATION.

SINCERELY,

CYRUS VANCE

CONFIDENTIAL

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2. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF DRAFT BILL

A BILL

TO REQUIRE THE PRESIDENT TO TERMINATE SANCTIONS AGAINST ZIMBABWE-RHODESIA UNDER CERTAIN CIRCUMSTANCES.

1 BE IT ENACTED BY THE SENATE AND HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
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3 (A) THE PRESIDENT SHALL TERMINATE SANCTIONS OF THE UNITED
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5 (1) A DATE BY WHICH A BRITISH GOVERNOR HAS BEEN
6 APPOINTED, HAS ARRIVED IN ZIMBABWE-RHODESIA, AND HAS
7 ASSUMED HIS DUTIES, OR

8 (2) JANUARY 31, 1980,
9 UNLESS THE PRESIDENT DETERMINES IT WOULD NOT BE IN THE
10 NATIONAL INTEREST OF THE UNITED STATES TO DO SO AND SO
11 REPORTS TO THE CONGRESS.

12 (B) IF THE PRESIDENT SO REPORTS TO THE CONGRESS, THEN
13 SANCTIONS SHALL BE TERMINATED IF THE CONGRESS, WITHIN 30
14 CALENDAR DAYS AFTER RECEIVING THE REPORT UNDER SUBSECTION
15 (A), ADOPTS A CONCURRENT RESOLUTION STATING IN SUBSTANCE THAT
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17 RESOLUTION UNDER THE PRECEDING SENTENCE SHALL BE CONSIDERED
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19 601 (B) OF THE INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ASSISTANCE AND ARMS
1 EXPORT CONTROL ACT OF 1976.

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ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION
RHODESIA POLICY



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FM F C O 041352 Z DEC 79
TO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1783 OF 4 DECEMBER
INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK.

Prime Minister

YOUR TELNOS 4028 AND 4029 : RHODESIA SANCTIONS.

1. UNLESS YOU SEE OBJECTION PLEASE TELL MR VANCE'S OFFICE THAT I AM CONCERNED ABOUT THE STATEMENT IN HIS LETTER TO SENATOR HELMS THAT ACTION WILL BE TAKEN TO LIFT SANCTIONS QUOTE NO LATER THAT ONE MONTH UNQUOTE AFTER THE GOVERNOR'S ARRIVAL IN SALISBURY : AND THAT IF AN AGREED SETTLEMENT IS NOT REACHED AT THE CONFERENCE, THE ADMINISTRATION WILL CONSULT WITH THE RESPECTIVE COMMITTEES OF THE SENATE AND THE HOUSE CONCERNING THE COURSE OF ACTION WHICH BEST SERVES THE NATIONAL INTEREST.
2. AS MORLAND POINTED OUT, THERE IS A VERY CONSIDERABLE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THIS STATEMENT AND THE PRESIDENT'S EARLIER STATEMENT (YOUR TELNOS 3704 AND 3705) THAT THE U S ADMINISTRATION WOULD BE QUOTE PREPARED TO LIFT SANCTIONS WHEN A BRITISH GOVERNOR ASSUMES AUTHORITY IN SALISBURY AND THE PROCESS LEADING TO IMPARTIAL ELECTIONS HAS BEGUN UNQUOTE.
3. WE HAVE POINTED OUT TO THE U S AMBASSADOR THAT BOTH THE U S ADMINISTRATION AND THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT COULD FIND THEMSELVES IN UNNECESSARY POLITICAL DIFFICULTY IF WE FALL OUT OF STEP IN RELATION TO SANCTIONS. WE WOULD BE BOUND TO DEPLORE THE CONTINUANCE OF SANCTIONS AGAINST RHODESIA UNDER A BRITISH GOVERNOR (AND THIS COULD CAUSE POTENTIALLY SERIOUS EMBARRASSMENT IN RELATION TO THE PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT TO WASHINGTON ON 16 DECEMBER). THIS IS NOT A POSITION IN WHICH WE WOULD WISH TO PLACE OURSELVES OR THE U S ADMINISTRATION. WE HAVE EMPHASISED TO THE U S AMBASSADOR THAT IT REMAINS OUR OBJECTIVE TO ACHIEVE A SETTLEMENT INCLUDING THE PATRIOTIC FRONT. AS THE AMERICANS ARE AWARE PRESENT DIFFICULTIES IN THE NEGOTIATIONS ARISE FROM THE ATTITUDE OF MUGABE.

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4. AS WE HAVE ALREADY EXPLAINED, WE DO NOT INTEND TO GO TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL AFTER LIFTING SANCTIONS IN ORDER TO SEEK AN AFFIRMATIVE RESOLUTION. THIS WOULD UNDERMINE THE BASIS OF OUR LEGAL ARGUMENT, WHICH IS THAT THE LIFTING OF SANCTIONS DOES NOT REQUIRE SUCH A RESOLUTION. IN THE EVENT OF A COMPREHENSIVE AGREEMENT, WE WOULD HOPE THAT NONE OF THE MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL WOULD CHALLENGE A LETTER FROM SIR A PARSONS REPORTING THAT AGREEMENT HAD BEEN REACHED, LEGALITY WAS BEING RESTORED AND THAT IN CONSEQUENCE SANCTIONS WERE BEING LIFTED. BUT YOU SHOULD MAKE CLEAR TO THE AMERICANS THAT THERE IS NO QUESTION OF OUR SEEKING AN AFFIRMATIVE RESOLUTION.

5. IF IN THE LIGHT OF THESE EXCHANGES THERE IS ANY LIKLIHOOD OF THE AMERICANS MAINTAINING SANCTIONS FOR MORE THAN A DAY OR TWO AFTER THE ARRIVAL OF THE GOVERNOR, I WILL WISH TO TAKE THIS UP MYSELF WITH MR VANCE.

CARRINGTON

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MR DAY
MR WILLSON
MR ASPIN

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RHODESIA POLICY

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MR R L WADE-GERY)
MR P M MAXEY)
MR GOULTY)
MR P J FOWLER)
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MR STEEL LEGAL ADVISER RM K188

MR FIFOOT LEGAL ADVISER RM K164

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FM WASHINGTON 040215Z DEC 79
TO IMMEDIATE F C O
TELEGRAM NO 4029 OF 3 DECEMBER
INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK

M.I.P.T. RHODESIA SANCTIONS

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I HAVE DISCUSSED THIS MATTER WITH THE PRESIDENT AND WISH TO ASSURE YOU, ON HIS BEHALF, THAT WHEN THE BRITISH GOVERNOR ARRIVES IN SALISBURY TO IMPLEMENT AN AGREED LANCASTER HOUSE SETTLEMENT AND THE ELECTORAL PROCESS BEGINS, THE PRESIDENT WILL TAKE PROMPT ACTION TO LIFT SANCTIONS. THIS WILL BE DONE NO LATER THAN ONE MONTH AFTER THE GOVERNOR'S ARRIVAL. IF AN AGREED SETTLEMENT IS NOT REACHED AT THE CONFERENCE, WE WILL CONSULT WITH THE RESPECTIVE COMMITTEES OF THE SENATE AND THE HOUSE REGARDING THE COURSE OF ACTION WHICH BEST

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PS/MR LUCE
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MR WILLSON
MR DAY
LORD N G LENNOX
MR ASPIN

MR R L WADE-GERY)
MR P M MAXEY)
MR GOULTY)
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MR STEEL LEGAL ADVISER RM K188

MR FIFCOF LEGAL ADVISER RM K164

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TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NO 4028 OF 3 DECEMBER

INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK

RHODESIA: SANCTIONS

1. KEELEY, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY, STATE DEPARTMENT, ASKED MORLAND TO CALL TODAY TO BE GIVEN A COPY OF A COMPROMISE DRAFT BILL DRAFTED BY SENATORS CHURCH AND JAVITS, WHICH WOULD REQUIRE THE PRESIDENT TO TERMINATE SANCTIONS WHEN A GOVERNOR HAD ASSUMED HIS DUTIES IN RHODESIA, OR BY 31 JANUARY 1980, WHICHEVER CAME EARLIER, SUBJECT TO A PRESIDENTIAL DETERMINATION THAT IT WAS NOT IN THE NATIONAL INTEREST TO LIFT SANCTIONS, TOGETHER WITH A LETTER FROM VANCE TO SENATOR HELMS DELIVERED THIS MORNING, SETTING OUT THE ADMINISTRATION'S INTERPRETATION OF THE DRAFT. TEXT OF BOTH IN MY IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING TELEGRAM. US EMBASSY WERE BEING SENT INSTRUCTIONS IN PARALLEL.

2. KEELEY TOOK THE LINE THAT THE REFERENCE IN VANCE'S LETTER TO A POSSIBLE DELAY OF ONE MONTH IN LIFTING SANCTIONS AFTER AN AGREED SETTLEMENT, THE GOVERNOR'S ARRIVAL AND THE BEGINNING OF THE ELECTORAL PROCESS WAS SIMPLY TO ALLOW THE NECESSARY ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION TO BE COMPLETED - THEY EXPECTED THAT THIS WOULD IN FACT TAKE A GOOD DEAL LESS THAN A MONTH. IN THIS SCENARIO THE ADMINISTRATION WOULD MAKE PUBLIC VERY SOON AFTER THE GOVERNOR'S ARRIVAL THEIR INTENTION TO LIFT SANCTIONS AT AN EARLY DATE. THIS WOULD BE WHAT MATTERED.

INTENTION TO LIFT SANCTIONS AT AN EARLY DATE. THIS WOULD BE WHAT MATTERED.

3. MORLAND POINTED OUT THAT AT THE END OF THE SAME PARAGRAPH THE COMMITMENT TO DO NO MORE THAN CONSULT CONGRESS IF AN AGREED SETTLEMENT IS NOT REACHED LOOKED A BIT DIFFERENT FROM THE PRESIDENT'S EARLIER FORMULATION. (MY TELS NO 3704 AND 3705) WHICH HAD SAID THAT THE U.S. ADMINISTRATION WOULD BE PREPARED TO LIFT SANCTIONS WHEN A BRITISH GOVERNOR ASSUMES AUTHORITY IN SALISBURY AND A PROCESS LEADING TO IMPARTIAL ELECTIONS HAS BEGUN. OUR POLICY WILL CONTINUE TO BE THAT NO PARTY SHOULD HAVE A VETO OVER FAIR SETTLEMENT PROPOSALS UNQUOTE KEELEY ARGUED FIRST, (AND UNCONVINCINGLY) THAT THE EARLIER WORDING HAD ASSUMED A SUCCESSFUL OUTCOME TO THE CONFERENCE AND SECOND, THAT THE COMMITMENT TO CONSULT CONGRESS IN VANCE'S LETTER WAS MEANT TO HELP SMOOTH RELATIONS WITH CONGRESS AND UNDERLINE THE ADMINISTRATION'S INTENTION TO WORK IN PARTNERSHIP WITH THEM ON THIS ISSUE.

4. LAKE (PLEASE PROTECT) SUBSEQUENTLY TOLD ROBINSON THAT THE WORDS QUOTE NO LATER THAN ONE MONTH UNQUOTE IN VANCE'S LETTER HAD BEEN PUT IN AS PART OF A MANOEUVRE TO GAIN SUPPORT FROM LEFT-WINGERS IN CONGRESS. BOTH LAKE AND MOOSE BELIEVED THAT IN FACT ANY DELAY WOULD BE MORE LIKE ONE DAY THAN ONE MONTH.

5. WE HAVE NOW HEARD THAT THE DRAFT BILL HAS BEEN PASSED BY THE SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE AND SHOULD COME TO THE FLOOR OF THE SENATE LATER THIS WEEK FOR A FINAL VOTE. THE HOUSE FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE BEGINS ITS HEARINGS ON 5 DECEMBER.

6. KEELEY ALSO ASKED FOR OUR COMMENTS ON A NEW AMERICAN IDEA FOR HANDLING SANCTIONS IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL. THEY DID NOT QUESTION THE NEED FOR THE UK AND THE US TO LIFT SANCTIONS WITHOUT WAITING FOR A SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION. BUT COULD WE (THE UK) NOT GO TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL SOON AFTER LIFTING, AND SEEK A CONFIRMATORY RESOLUTION? THE AMERICANS WERE INCLINED TO THINK THAT AFTER A SETTLEMENT THE RUSSIANS WOULD NOT VETO, AND THAT A SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION WOULD HELP INDEPENDENT ZIMBABWE. KEELEY ARGUED THAT THIS NEED NOT UNDERMINE OUR CASE THAT A RETURN TO LEGALITY REMOVED THE BASIS ON WHICH SANCTIONS WERE IMPOSED. MORLAND SAID THAT HE DID NOT SEE HOW ONE COULD BE SURE OF AVOIDING A RUSSIAN VETO, AND THAT KEELEY'S LINE OF ARGUMENT WAS UNLIKELY TO GO DOWN WELL IN LONDON, FOR A NUMBER OF REASONS, BUT PROMISED TO SEEK INSTRUCTIONS

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HAD BEEN NO AGREED SETTLEMENT.

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

3 December 1979

Dear Michael,

The Prime Minister's Meeting with the Commonwealth Secretary-
General: Rhodesia

When the Prime Minister sees Mr Ramphal this evening he is likely to wish to discuss Rhodesia.

The Prime Minister could explain that Lord Carrington's statement of 28 November was designed to deal with most of the concerns raised by the Patriotic Front and that we are very disappointed that, despite this, the Front have not so far accepted the ceasefire proposals.

Mr Ramphal may raise:-

(a) South African forces in Rhodesia: It has been made clear to everyone concerned that we do not envisage external intervention in Rhodesia under a British Governor.

(b) The Rhodesian Air Force: This will be effectively monitored.

(c) The Disposition of the Forces: There will be reciprocal disengagement. It will be for the Rhodesian forces to make the first move by disengaging to enable the Patriotic Front forces to assemble. What happens thereafter will depend on the success of the assembly process. It will not be possible to achieve an effective ceasefire and the deployment of the monitoring force if a significant proportion of the Patriotic Front forces remain in the field with their arms. If the assembly process is successfully completed we envisage

/that

M O' D B Alexander Esq
10 Downing Street
LONDON

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that the dis-engagement will be complete and the ceasefire fully effective.

Mr Ramphal is also likely to raise with the Prime Minister his strongly held view, for which he has some support from other Commonwealth Governments, that the Lusaka agreement implied that the Commonwealth observers of the Rhodesian elections should be formed as a single team organised by the Commonwealth Secretariat and reporting through it to Commonwealth Governments. Mr Ramphal has proposed to us that a Commonwealth observer group should be formed, perhaps under the leadership of B K Nehru (former Indian High Commissioner in London) with representatives of some of the following countries: Australia, Barbados, Canada, Jamaica, Cyprus, Sri Lanka or Malaysia, Papua New Guinea or another Pacific country, Sierra Leone, Kenya, Mauritius and Nigeria. He would like to attach a back-up staff of 150. On the face of it, Mr Ramphal's proposed group appears to be about as moderate a line-up as one could reasonably expect. However, there is a danger that operating as a group it would arrive at a consensus view harmful to our position: the moderate, non-aligned members of the group would not wish to stand out against the strongly held views of, for example, Jamaica and Nigeria; and Canada and Australia would be loath to divide the group by producing a minority report representing only the "old" and white Commonwealth. We cannot stop Mr Ramphal from sending his team (though we can perhaps persuade him that the figure for back-up staff is wildly inflated); but if we stand firm in treating Mr Ramphal's team as only one among several groups of Commonwealth observers, reporting independently and with equal status, we should be able to persuade Australia, New Zealand, and possibly Canada and one or two others to stand out from the Ramphal exercise.

We have therefore made it clear that we cannot accept an exclusive team or that any team organised by Mr Ramphal can be regarded as producing the sole authoritative Commonwealth view. The Prime Minister may wish to reiterate to Mr Ramphal that we are inviting all Commonwealth countries which wish to do so to send observers to the elections and the election campaign. We understand that some Commonwealth countries are likely to send separate teams. If other Commonwealth countries wish to join together to send a single team, that is for them to decide; but it is unfortunately the case that the Commonwealth Secretariat cannot be regarded as impartial as between the internal African leaders and the Patriotic Front (whom they have been advising throughout the Conference). Furthermore any joint team will have to be kept to manageable proportions: and will have to be

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treated on the same basis as groups of observers from individual Commonwealth countries. It cannot have a special status. The numbers that the Governor will be able to cope with are limited, and he will have to decide what will be possible in practice.

yours ever
Roderic Lyne

(R M J Lyne)
Private Secretary

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187 DEC 1979



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

*Can be despatched,
R. Lyne informed.*

3 December 1979

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Dear Michael,

Rhodesia: Message to New Zealand Prime Minister

The New Zealand High Commission recently sent us a copy of a statement by Mr Muldoon about sanctions, a copy of which is enclosed. This is a further example of the helpful line which Mr Muldoon has taken throughout the Lancaster House Conference. (You will recall that he sent two messages to delegates to the Conference, which were copied to you under cover of my letters of 10 September and 25 October.)

New Zealand, together with Australia, Kenya and Fiji, has already agreed to contribute to the ceasefire monitoring force. She has also agreed with our proposals that Commonwealth countries should send independent teams to observe the Rhodesian elections (although the Commonwealth Secretary-General is still pressing for a composite observer team).

Lord Carrington thinks that it would be much appreciated if the Prime Minister sent a message of thanks to Mr Muldoon. I enclose a draft message in the form of a telegram to Wellington.

Yours ever

Roderic Lyne

(R M J Lyne)
Private Secretary

M O'D B Alexander Esq
10 Downing Street
LONDON

ZIMBABWE-RHODESIA

Press Statement issued by the New Zealand Prime Minister,
Rt Hon. R.D. Muldoon, on 22 November 1979

The New Zealand Government has all along held the view that Britain alone has the constitutional authority to approve the independence of Rhodesia. The London Conference has not yet reached final agreement. If it does, the British Government will appoint a Governor for Zimbabwe and announce that Rhodesia has returned to legality. It is expected that at this point the British Government will also announce the lifting of sanctions. When the British Government has made these announcements and Rhodesia returns to legality the New Zealand Government will make a similar announcement.

* * *

File No.

Department RHODESIA

Drafted by (Block Capitals) MISS SPENCER

Tel. Extn. 233 8149

OUTWARD
TELEGRAM

Security Classification
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Precedence
PRIORITY
DESKBYZ

FOR COMMS. DEPT. USE	Despatched (Date) (Time)Z	POSTBYZ
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PREAMBLE

(Time of Origin) Z (G.M.T.) (Restrictive Prefix)
 (Security Class.) ...CONFIDENTIAL... (Caveat/ Privacy marking)
 (Codeword) (Deskby) Z

TO PRIORITY WELLINGTON Tel. No. of
 (precedence) (post)

AND TO (precedence/post)

AND SAVING TO

REPEATED TO (for info)

SAVING TO (for info)

Distribution:-

Rhodesia Policy
SPD

Copies to:-

[TEXT]

YOUR TEL NO 401: RHODESIA

1. Grateful if you would pass to Mr Muldoon the following personal message from the Prime Minister

Begins

Dear Rob

I have seen your statement of 22 November about Rhodesia and the lifting of sanctions. It is most helpful to have your support for our position clearly on the record at this stage. I also wanted to let you know how grateful we are for your Government's agreement to provide a contingent for the ceasefire monitoring group. I was

/very

very pleased to learn that New Zealand will be sending its own observer group to Rhodesia for the elections.

Your consistent support for our efforts to bring Rhodesia to peaceful independence is greatly appreciated. We are in the last crucial stage of the negotiations, ^{Despite current} ~~and very close to~~ ^{difficulties,} ~~success.~~ I hope we may be able to bring the Conference to a satisfactory conclusion within the next few days.

With warm regards

Yours sincerely

Margaret Thatcher

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

[RHODESIA: POLICY: ADVANCE COPIES] x31

PS ↑
PS/SIR I GILMOUR
PS/MR LUCE
PS/PUS

MR WILLSON
MR DAY
LORD N G LENNOX
MR ASPIN

PS/NO 10 DOWNING STREET

MR R L WADE-GERY)
MR P M MAXBY) CABINET
MR GOULTY) OFFICE
MR P J FOWLER)
DIO)

.....
HD/RHOD DEPT (4)

HD/C AF D
HD/S AF D

HD/PUSD (2)

HD/NEWS DEPT
HD/WAD

MR STEEL LEGAL ADVISER RM K188

MR FIFCOT LEGAL ADVISER RM K164

RESIDENT CLERK

GR 250

CONFIDENTIAL

FM DAR ES SALAAM 021330Z DEC 79

TO IMMEDIATE DESKBY 1500Z FCO

IMMEDIATE

ADVANCE COPY

DESKBY

TELNO 959 OF 2 DECEMBER

AND TO PRIORITY LUSAKA, LUANDA, MAPUTO, GABORONE, LAGOS,
MIRIMBA SALISBURY, PRETORIA, WASHINGTON, OTTAWA, CANBERRA,
7 UKMIS NEW YORK.

RHODESIA CONFERENCE:

1. PRESIDENT NYERERE SUMMONED ME THIS AFTERNOON 2 DECEMBER
HE WISHED TO ASK ME ABOUT THE PRESENCE OF SOUTH AFRICAN TROOPS
IN RHODESIA. HE HAD CLEARLY HEARD REPORTS OF MR. NKOMO'S
MOST RECENT STATEMENTS ON THE SUBJECT.
2. I SAID THAT I HAD NO INFORMATION ON THE PRESENCE OF SOUTH
AFRICAN FORCES. NYERERE SAID THAT THEY KNEW THAT THEY WERE
THERE, BUT HAD ASSUMED THAT THEY WOULD BE QUIETLY LEAVING
BEFORE THE ARRIVAL OF A BRITISH GOVERNOR. HE HAD NOT HOWEVER
YET HEARD ANY STATEMENT FROM YOU, AND WOULD BE REASSURED
TO DO SO.

TO DO SO.

3. I ASKED IF NYERERE THOUGHT THAT THIS WAS NOW THE FINAL OUT-
STANDING POINT IN THE NEGOTIATIONS. HE INDICATED THAT HE THOUGHT
IT WAS AS HE UNDERSTOOD THAT WE HAD NOW ACCEPTED A LARGER
MONITORING FORCE AND THE PRINCIPLE OF RECIPROcity IN REGARD
TO THE DISENGAGEMENT OF FORCES. IT WAS NOT, HOWEVER, ENTIRELY
CLEAR TO ME WHETHER HE WAS SPEAKING ON THE BASIS OF UP-
TO-DATE CONTACT WITH THE PF.

4. I SHOULD BE GRATEFUL FOR IMMEDIATE GUIDANCE ON WHAT I MAY
SAY ABOUT SOUTH AFRICAN FORCES. IT IS CLEAR THAT NYERERE IS
NOT CONCERNED WITH THEIR PRESENCE NOW OR IN THE PAST: IT WILL
SATISFY HIM IF IT IS POSSIBLE TO SAY THAT UNDER THE BRITISH
GOVERNOR THE PRESENCE OF ANY SOUTH AFRICAN UNITS IN RHODESIA
WOULD BE UNACCEPTABLE. IT WOULD HELP TO BE ABLE TO REPLY AS
QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE.

MOON .

NNNN

PART 10 ends:-

HO to FCO

30. 11. 79

PART 11 begins:-

Fin Dev 959

2. 12. 79

END

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February 2010