

PREM19

123

SOUTH KOREA

(Call on MT by special
envoy of South Korean
President)

Confidential Filing

Call on the PM by the South Korean
President's special envoy, Mr Kim Jong Pil.

S. KOREA

MAY

June 1979

Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date
25.6.79							
26.6.79							
28.6.79							
<p>PREM 19/123</p>							

S. Korea
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EMBASSY OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA
4, PALACE GATE,
LONDON, W8 5NF


28th June, 1979

Dear Mr. Cartledge,

I am writing to acknowledge receipt of your letter of 25th June, with its enclosure of a letter from the Prime Minister to the Special Presidential Envoy, Mr. Kim Jong-Pil.

The letter from the Prime Minister is today being conveyed to Mr. Kim.

Yours sincerely,



Pyo-Wook Han
Ambassador

Mr. Bryan G. Cartledge,
Private Secretary
Office of the Prime Minister
10 Downing Street, London SW 1

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
A LARGE GATE
LORDS WHEEL



28 JUN 1951



S Korea.

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10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

26 June 1979

Dear Mr Kim,

I am most grateful for the magnificent gift of an embroidered screen which you so kindly gave me to remind me of your call at 10 Downing Street today as the Special Envoy of your President. The screen will have a place of honour in my house: thank you for your kind thought.

I very much enjoyed our discussion and wish you every success in your important mission for your country.

With every best wish,

Yours sincerely
Margaret Thatcher

Mr. Kim Jong-pil

✓



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

25 June 1979

The Prime Minister would be very grateful if you would be good enough to convey the enclosed letter from her to the Special Envoy of your President, Mr. Kim Jong-pil. The letter thanks Mr. Kim for his kind gift of the magnificent silk screen which was delivered to 10 Downing Street today.

His Excellency Dr. Pyo-Wook Han

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10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

25 June 1979

Dear Stephen,

CALL ON THE PRIME MINISTER BY MR. KIM JONG PIL, SOUTH KOREAN
PRESIDENTIAL ENVOY, AT 10 DOWNING STREET ON 25 JUNE 1979

The special envoy of the President of South Korea, Mr. Kim Jong Pil, called on the Prime Minister at 1630 today, accompanied by three members of the South Korean Parliament, the Ambassador of South Korea and an interpreter. At the end of half an hour's discussion, of which the following is a summary of the main points, Mr. Kim handed the Prime Minister a letter from President Park of which I enclose a copy.

After thanking the Prime Minister for her kindness in receiving him and congratulating her on her election victory, Mr. Kim said that President Park had instructed him to convey his own warm greetings and his congratulations. The President noted with pleasure the excellent state of relations between the United Kingdom and South Korea and much appreciated the co-operation extended to his country by the British people. Mr. Kim went on to say that the South Korean Government wished to achieve a state of peaceful co-existence between South Korea and her neighbour to the north and to avoid a further war on the Korean peninsula by pursuing a peaceful dialogue. Mr. Kim recalled that initial contacts between South and North Korea had taken place in 1972, on President Park's initiative, but had lapsed after a year. South Korea had repeatedly urged their resumption and in January this year President Park had again proposed a dialogue without pre-conditions. North Korea claimed to have the only lawful Korean Government and refused to recognise South Korea's existence: in fact, however, 108 countries had recognised South Korea and only 97 North Korea.

Mr. Kim explained that South Korea recognised that two Governments existed and hoped that, in due course, they could both enter the United Nations simultaneously. A major difficulty confronting South Korea, however, was the fact that during the past ten years a number of western countries had recognised North Korea, while no Communist country had yet recognised South Korea. South Korea hoped, therefore, to promote in future the principle of reciprocal recognition for each Government. They would like to see a similar situation to that which prevailed

/in Germany,

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in Germany, where the Governments of the FRG and the GDR enjoyed an equal degree of recognition. The North Koreans, who had been encouraged to regard themselves as superior to South Koreans, believed that time was on their side and that for so long as they refused to come to the conference table South Korea would become increasingly isolated.

Mr. Kim said that South Korea hoped that the UK, before recognising North Korea, would persuade some Communist countries to recognise South Korea. He had been very glad to hear Lord Carrington say that, even if the UK were to decide that North Korea satisfied the British criteria for recognition, the present policy of non-recognition would nevertheless be maintained; he and his colleagues were very grateful for this. In 1973, Mr. Kim said, he had met the Belgian and Italian Heads of Government who had at that time been persuaded by the Poles and the Romanians to recognise North Korea, and had persuaded them not to do so unless these Communist Governments recognised South Korea at the same time. The Government of South Korea believed that this was the best way to create the conditions of peace and stability which Korea needed. North Korea was endeavouring to deal directly with the United States; but the US Government's basic principle was to avoid direct dealings with North Korea and to avoid doing anything which would be unwelcome to South Korea or affect South Korea adversely. The Japanese Government, Mr. Kim said, worked on the same principle.

Summing up, Mr. Kim said that President Park wished to request the British Government, as a friend of long standing and a world power, to do two things: firstly, to assist in creating favourable conditions for a dialogue between North and South Korea and, secondly, to influence Communist Governments in the direction of recognising South Korea. Mr. Kim said that South Korea understood that the achievement of re-unification would require a great deal of time; but, until that point was reached, peace and stability had to be preserved.

Replying to Mr. Kim, the Prime Minister asked him to convey her warm greetings to President Park and to thank him for sending Mr. Kim to see her as his envoy. The Prime Minister said that the British Government fully agreed with the aim of solving Korea's problems through a peaceful dialogue and hoped that this aim would one day be achieved. The British Government had not yet reconsidered the question of the possible recognition of North Korea. If they were to reconsider, they would of course take South Korea's views, and the views of others including the United States, fully into account. The Prime Minister said that, for this reason, she was particularly grateful to Mr. Kim for explaining the South Korean position so clearly. There could, in any case, be no question of the United Kingdom acting with undue haste in this matter. The Prime Minister said that she fully recognised the importance of maintaining stability on the Korean peninsula and of working to secure a peaceful settlement.

/The Prime Minister

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The Prime Minister also expressed to Mr. Kim the British Government's thanks for the help which the Government of South Korea had given in acting as intermediaries with the Taiwanese over the problem of the Vietnamese refugees on the MV Roachbank; she said that she was very grateful for the help which the South Korean authorities had been able to give.

Yours ever,
Gyan Comden.

Stephen Wall, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

22 June 1979

Dear Sir,

*B.A. G.W.
21st*

Gift for the Prime Minister from the South Korean
President's Special Envoy

We are sending across separately a gift for Mrs Thatcher from the South Korean President's Special Envoy, Mr Kim Jong-pil, who will call on the Prime Minister at 4.30 pm on 25 June. Lord Carrington, Mr Pym and Sir Ian Gilmour have also received presents.

*Yours ever,
Stephen*

J S Wall

B G Cartledge Esq
10 Downing Street

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32 JUN 1979



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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

22 June 1979

Dear Bryan,

Agree to "X"? Prime Minister
by [initials]

Call by the South Korean Presidential Envoy on
the Prime Minister, 25 June

Thank you for your letter of 20 June. I enclose points to make, factual background, a personality note and statistical background on South Korea for Mr Kim's call on the Prime Minister on 25 June.

[A]

My letter of 18 June (copy enclosed) contained some of the background information on Mr Kim's visit to Britain. The purpose of Mr Kim's call on the Prime Minister is to deliver a message to her from President Park about South Korea's relations with North Korea. Seoul is concerned that Western governments may be prepared to take at face value North Korea's claims to be seeking a solution to the problem of a divided Korea through peaceful, mutually acceptable means. All the indications are in fact that the North Koreans have not abandoned their objective of forcibly reuniting the country under a communist regime. The South Koreans are also trying to develop their foreign policy in the Third World (especially in the non-aligned movement) and wish to seek the advice and assistance of European governments.

X //

3. The South Koreans will hope the Prime Minister will show understanding for South Korea's position, and offer sympathetic support for their efforts to resolve the Korean problem peaceably and broaden their links with the Third World. They attach considerable importance to the presentational aspects of the visit, and it would be helpful if the Prime Minister could agree to a photographer taking pictures for the Korean press, and to receive Mr Kim together with his three principal advisers, the Ambassador and interpreter.

① *Relates with Korea*

*Yours ever,
Stephen*

J S Wall
Private Secretary

Bryan Cartledge Esq
10 Downing Street

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CALL BY THE SOUTH KOREAN PRESIDENTIAL ENVOY ON THE PRIME MINISTER, 25 JUNE

POINTS TO MAKE

Relations between North and South Korea

1. Take delivery of President Park's message. Welcome his explanation of the current position.
2. Agree on importance of maintaining stability in North East Asia.
3. We support South Korea's attempts to solve the Korean problem by peaceful means. Disappointed that the recently resumed dialogue between North and South broke down.

Anglo-Korean Relations

4. Britain wishes to develop further our bilateral relations with Korea. Trade especially important.

Refugees

5. Grateful for the prompt assistance which the Korean Government gave in acting as intermediaries with Taiwan over the case of the "Roachbank".

British non-recognition of North Korea (Defensive)

6. The Government have not examined the question of recognition of North Korea since the election. When we do, we shall take serious account of the views of friendly countries, including South Korea, and not move with undue haste.

CONFIDENTIAL

CALL BY THE SOUTH KOREAN PRESIDENTIAL ENVOY ON THE PRIME MINISTER
25 JUNE 1979

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Anglo-Korean Relations

1. Britain recognised South Korea in January 1948. Since then our relations have been consistently good largely because of the 22,500 troops which we sent to defend South Korea during the Korean War. The support which we have given them at the UN to defeat communist manoeuvres has been another factor. These relations have become increasingly substantial as a result of the rapid growth in bilateral trade: in 1978, exports to Korea increased by 70% to reach £130 million. A significant improvement in the human rights situation in South Korea has also helped.

Relations between North and South Korea

2. North Korea's standing army of 600,000 men is the 5th largest in the world. The serious military threat which the North poses to the South was underlined in the autumn of 1978 when a third invasion tunnel under the DMZ was discovered. The two countries are still technically at war with each other: the 1953 Armistice Agreement was not followed by a Peace Treaty. There has been little contact between North and South Korea since the war. In August 1971, direct political talks were established when the North responded to an initiative from the South. After six sessions North Korea broke off the talks in August 1973. In January of this year, President Park proposed a resumption of the talks and the North accepted. Three direct meetings were held before the dialogue was broken off because of differences over procedural matters.

Refugees

3. The "Roachbank" anchored off the Taiwanese port of Kiaoshung (its first port of call) on 27 May, carrying 296 Vietnamese refugees. At the request of the British Government, Seoul instructed the

/Korean

Korean Ambassador in Taipei to ask Taiwan to accept the refugees. This failed, but the Koreans have continued to be helpful as intermediaries in discussing arrangements for the refugees' departure for Britain.

British Non-recognition of North Korea

4. Britain does not recognise North Korea, mainly because the Americans, Japanese, and South Koreans have asked us not to extend recognition until such time as the USSR and China recognise South Korea. This policy is shared by all the members of the EEC (save Denmark) who have agreed to consult each other before any member recognises North Korea.

Foreign and Commonwealth Office
21 June 1979

PERSONALITY NOTE

MR KIM JONG-PIL

1. Mr Kim was born in 1926, and educated at Seoul National University. He joined the Korean Army shortly after its formation, in 1948. During the Korean War (1950-53) Mr Kim worked in military intelligence, and by 1957 he had risen to the rank of Lieutenant-Colonel. In May 1961 he was one of the leading figures behind the military coup in which Major-General Park Chung-hee overthrew the democratically elected government of Mr John Chang, Dr Syngman Rhee's successor. The same year he became director of the newly established Korean Central Intelligence Agency. In 1963 he resigned his post and retired from the army with the rank of Brigadier General in order to establish the Democratic Republican Party (DRP), which was to be the basis of President Park's political support. He became a member of the Korean National Assembly in 1963 and served as Chairman of the DRP from 1963-1968. In 1968 he resigned his seat and party post after a disagreement with President Park. (He expressed open opposition to a proposal for a constitutional amendment that would allow the President to stand for a third term of office.) However, he regained his position of influence in 1970 when he was appointed Senior Political Adviser to the President. From 1971-1975 Mr Kim was Prime Minister of South Korea. Since then he has again served as Senior Political Adviser to the President, and is looked upon as a leading contender to succeed him.

2. Mr Kim is married to President Park's niece and has one daughter. He speaks a little English.

June 1979
FED, FCO

SOUTH KOREA - STATISTICAL BACKGROUND

Area 38,000 square miles, population (1978) 37.019 million (Seoul 7.52 million, Pusan 2.57 million). Average life expectancy (1975) 68.1 years.

Economy

GNP (1978) \$45.98 billion.

Growth rate of GNP (1978) 12.5%

GNP per capita (1978) \$1,242.

Composition of industrial structure (1978):

Agriculture, forestry, fisheries 21.2%; mining and manufacturing 28.2%; social infrastructure and other services 50.6%.

Foreign exchange reserves (1978) \$4.93 billion.

Unemployment (1978, estimated) 3%.

Inflation (1978, estimated) 15-20%.

Trade

	<u>1978</u> \$million	<u>1977</u> % change
Total Exports	12,711	+ 26.6
Total Imports	14,452	+ 38
Current account balance	-1,085	-
Trade balance	-1,813	

Main export markets (1978); USA 31.9%, Japan 26.6% (Britain 3%).

UK/South Korean Trade (1978)

Exports to South Korea \$258.2 million.

Imports from South Korea \$428.8 million.

Trade balance -\$170.6 million.

National Assembly

Unicameral 214 seats. Party strengths; Democratic Republican Party 68 seats (Government); Yujeong-Hoe 77 seats (supports Government); New Democratic Party 61 seats (Opposition); Democratic Unification Party 3 seats (Opposition).

RESTRICTED

S. Korea.

vLB



FILE

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

20 June 1979

B/K 22.6.79

Mr. Kim Jong-pil

Thank you for your letter of 18 June about the forthcoming visit to London of the South Korean President's Special Envoy, Mr. Kim Jong-pil.

The Prime Minister has agreed, despite her very crowded diary during the period of Mr. Kim's visit, to receive him briefly on Monday, 25 June at 1630. In agreeing to see Mr. Kim, the Prime Minister has commented that it is now clear that she will have to make a substantial reduction in her commitments to receive overseas visitors; I should be grateful if this could be borne in mind.

I should be grateful if briefing for Mr. Kim's call on the Prime Minister could reach me by noon on Friday, 22 June.

B. G. CARTLEDGE

J. S. Wall, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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MSD



Prime Minister

In terms of substance, this would not qualify for twenty minutes of your time: but in view of X I think it is difficult to refuse.

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

18 June 1979

Dear Bryan,

Mr. Kim at 1630 on 25 June? Would you agree to the

Possible Call on the Prime Minister by the South Korean President's Special Envoy

The South Korean President has asked Mr Kim Jong-pil, a former Prime Minister of South Korea (1971-75) and currently senior Political Adviser to the President, to visit a number of European countries in June. The Korean Ambassador has asked FCO Ministers whether the Prime Minister would consider receiving Mr Kim during his visit to Britain (22-26 June). The chief purpose of Mr Kim's visit is to deliver a message to the Prime Minister from President Park about the state of South Korea's relations with North Korea.

Mr Kim is one of the most influential political figures in South Korea and is perhaps the leading contender to become the next President. The Koreans attach very considerable importance to the visit.

Other European countries have decided to respond at the very highest level; Mr Kim will meet the Belgian King and Foreign Minister; the Norwegian King, Prime Minister and Foreign Minister; the French President, Prime Minister and Foreign Minister; the Dutch Queen and Prime Minister; and the German President, Chancellor and Foreign Minister.

Lord Carrington and Mr Pym have already agreed to see Mr Kim. But Lord Carrington believes that we shall be very conspicuous if neither our Head of State nor our Head of Government receives Mr Kim. Moreover, the Korean Peninsula is strategically important and the South Koreans continue to face a real military threat from North Korea which has the fifth largest army in the world. British trade with South Korea is expanding fast. In terms of volume, British exports to Korea have risen by 100% over the past five years. The value for 1978 was £130 million. With the Korean economy continuing to grow at 10% per annum the future prospects are excellent. The trade prospects have undoubtedly influenced the other European Governments in according Mr Kim such high level treatment.

The Koreans recently acted very promptly when we asked them to take up the question of the "Roachbank" with the Taiwanese authorities, and have shown themselves ready to accept voluntary restraint in their exports where these have threatened sensitive areas of British industry.

Will see him - but shall soon have to cut down Foreign Office commitments

/ Lord



Lord Carrington realises that the Prime Minister's schedule is a very full one for the period 22-26 June and that she will be in Strasbourg for part of that time. He nevertheless hopes that the Prime Minister will be able to receive Mr Kim for no more than 20 minutes so as to take delivery of his message.

Yours ever,
Stephen

J S Wall

B G Cartledge Esq
10 Downing Street



18 JUN 1979

Subject



PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T16B/79T

대한민국 대통령

1979년 5월 28일

각 하,

금번 본인의 특사 자격으로 귀국을 방문하게 되는 김 종필 의원을 통하여 각하와 귀국국민에게 정중한 인사와 평안을 비는 본인의 뜻을 전하게 된 것을 기쁘게 생각합니다. 김 종필 특사는 동료 국회의원을 포함한 수명의 수행원을 동반하게 될 것입니다.

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이 기획을 빌어 본인은 양국간의 우의증대를 위하여 귀하와 함께
계속 협조해 나갈 것임을 다짐드리는 바입니다.

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복리를 위하여 계속 매진하게 될 것이라고 확신합니다.

귀하께 최대의 경의를 표합니다.

박

정
희

대영 왕국

마가렛 힐더 대처 수상 귀하



President of the Republic of Korea

(Translation)

May 28, 1979

Excellency:

It is with great pleasure that I convey my cordial greetings and good wishes to Your Excellency and the people of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland through Mr. Jong Pil Kim, member of our National Assembly, who is visiting your great country as my special envoy, accompanied by several fellow Assemblymen.

Assemblyman Kim is a distinguished political leader who, in the past, served as my Prime Minister and Chairman of the Democratic Republican Party, and is presently serving as my special advisor at the said ruling party. It is my sincere wish that his visit to your country and his exchange of views with Your Excellency and other leaders of your Government on matters of common interest will contribute to further strengthening the ties of friendship and cooperation happily existing between our two countries.

It is gratifying to note that in recent years the relations between the Republic of Korea and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland have continued to develop to our mutual satisfaction. I firmly believe that occasional high level consultations between our governmental leaders can serve to further strengthen the good relations and to ensure still greater extent of cooperation between us. Accordingly, I am dispatching my special envoy to your country with the expectation that he will meet with Your Excellency to evaluate the current world situations, including the recent developments in and around Korea, and to discuss ways to further strengthen our bilateral relations. I take this opportunity to assure Your Excellency of my intention to continue working with you for the cause of further enhancing our friendship.

I am confident that the people of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland under your outstanding leadership will continue to forge ahead toward greater prosperity and well-being

Accept, Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration.

/s/ Park Chung Hee

The Right Honourable
Margaret Hilda Thatcher, M. P.
Prime Minister of the United Kingdom
of Great Britain and Northern Ireland

END

Filmed at the National
Archives (TNA) in London

February 2010