

PREM19

130

VIETNAM

(Vietnamese refugees in
Hong Kong - resettlement
in UK)

(Part 2)

SECRET

Confidential Filing

Vietnamese Refugees in Hong Kong, etc.
Possibility of resettlement in the U.K.


VIETNAM

PART 1: May 1979

PART 2: June 1979

Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date
16.6.79							
18.6.79							
19-6-79							
20.6.79							
27.7.79							
5.7.79							
9.7.79							
10.7.79							
12.7.79							
14.7.79							
18.7.79							
ENDS							

PREM 19/130



PART 3 begins:-

Fro to Bbc 17/7/79

PART 2 ends:-

Note by Malay Minister Home Affairs 14/7/79
19

Vietnam

THE VIETNAMESE "BOAT PEOPLE" - AN
OUTLINE OF MALAYSIA'S PROPOSAL TO
RESOLVE THE PROBLEM

*Original
1977*

The exodus of hundreds of thousands of Vietnamese "Boat People" in ever accelerating numbers is a human tragedy of almost unparalleled dimensions which demands urgent action from the international community. It has also created serious political, economic and social and security problems for the governments in the region which are engaged in the difficult and often delicate task of ensuring the unity, stability and prosperity of their respective societies.

UN PROCESSING CENTRES FOR VIETNAMESE "BOAT PEOPLE"

2. MALAYSIA proposes that a VIETNAM refugee centre or centres for boat people fleeing VIETNAM should be established in the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA or in a UNITED STATES OF AMERICA controlled territory with conditions and undertakings as outlined hereinafter. In addition or alternatively, with the same conditions and undertakings, the UNITED NATIONS Processing Centre or Centres may be established in other countries e.g. HAINAN (CHINA), OKINAWA (JAPAN), DARWIN (AUSTRALIA) and NEW CALEDONIA (FRANCE). The list is not exclusive or exhaustive. Others and ASEAN too may participate in this UN project of setting up UN Processing Centre for refugees. The Centre or centres would serve the following purposes:-

- (a) To facilitate the orderly processing of refugees by countries or organisations which wish to participate in solving the refugee problem;
- (b) To provide havens for refugees who have been processed and selected but awaiting resettlement in third countries;
- (c) To provide proper care for health and welfare particularly the education of the young so that any length of stay in the centre or centres would not in any way have any psychological ill-effect on the refugees.

3. After the establishment of the UN processing centre or centres the refugees under the category of boat people now in camps in HONG KONG, THAILAND, MALAYSIA, SINGAPORE, INDONESIA and the PHILIPPINES should be transferred to such centre or centres.

FUNDING AND ADMINISTERING

4. The centre or centres should be funded and administered by the UNHCR and should be known as the UNITED NATIONS PROCESSING CENTRE FOR VIETNAMESE REFUGEES. Security and other matters affecting sovereignty and ownership of the land should be determined by the Government of the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA and other Governments which offered to establish UN processing centres but ways must be found to overcome difficulties in the municipal law e.g. writ of Habeas Corpus either through legislation or administrative arrangement or an agreement with the UN in order that these UN processing centres are immune from the process of local laws.

5. The International Red Cross should play an effective role in this project. Other International Organisations such as the World Food Programme of FAO and humanitarian and religious groups could also contribute in terms of manpower and financial resources thus placing minimal burden on the Government of the UNITED STATES of AMERICA and those that are similarly committed to this project.

6. There must be a firm understanding given by the UNHCR to the Government of the UNITED STATES of AMERICA and other Governments with UN processing centres in their countries that it would vigorously give its best endeavours not merely to get an increase in the number of countries as well as each country expanding its responsibility towards this project but that eventually no refugee would be left unwanted in any of the proposed camp. The free nations of the world must respond to this move not orally but positively by deeds.

ROLE OF TRANSIT COUNTRIES

7. Countries where the refugees land should lift their cordon and provide centres to serve no more than staging posts from which refugees would be moved to the proposed UNITED NATIONS processing centre or centres. It would be a matter for consideration as to who should bear

the cost but the principle must be maintained that this is an international responsibility and those countries concerned with the staging posts should not unduly suffer financially.

RESPONSIBILITY AND ROLE OF VIETNAM

8. Together with the other members of ASEAN, MALAYSIA urges the international community to give greater recognition to the fact that the solution to the problem should be found also at source where it all began. VIETNAM being the source of the problem has the primary responsibility and a decisive role to play towards its solution. VIETNAM should be impressed upon that she should adhere to the norms of practice and behaviour in the comity of nations.

9. The UNHCR must step up its efforts to broaden the scope of the Agreement it had entered into with VIETNAM.

10. As VIETNAM had entered into an Agreement with UNHCR on the orderly departure of persons wishing to leave, VIETNAM and UNCHR must now be made responsible for all refugees leaving the country. In the broadening of the scope of the Agreement between UNHCR and VIETNAM UNHCR should interalia be provided with a mandate by the proper authority to establish refugee centre or centres in Vietnam with the agreement of the Vietnamese Government for people who are prepared to be classified as refugees and processed for resettlement in other countries. All departures must go through this authorised channel and anyone leaving outside this channel must continue to be VIETNAM's responsibility whom VIETNAM must receive back, in accordance with normal international practice.

11. By the same token, transit countries have the right to take whatever measures to prevent the inflow of Vietnamese boat people to their shores and to return these illegal immigrants to VIETNAM. The latter would then be put in UNHCR-organised camps in VIETNAM pending their departure to resettlement countries.

12. To ensure the success of this programme, resettlement countries are not obliged to accept, much less welcome, illegal immigrants.

13. The acceptance of refugees from VIETNAM through the official channel by third countries should in no way affect the existing resettlement programme and commitments for Vietnamese boat people already in ASEAN countries of first transit and in HONG KONG.

INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON VIETNAMESE "BOAT PEOPLE"

14. MALAYSIA welcomes an international conference on the problem of the Vietnamese boat people. The problem has reached desperate proportions, and, together with the rest of the ASEAN nations, MALAYSIA has sounded alarms, but both world attention and rescue efforts have been minimal and inadequate.

15. The conference must include VIETNAM, being the source of the problem, the UNHCR, transit countries and recipient countries who are principally the developed countries where the refugees want to go to and those other countries that are able to receive them. MALAYSIA does not want to see the conference be used for or turn itself into a forum for countries to throw mud at one another instead of tackling directly the desperate problem of the illegal immigrants and refugees.

SPECIAL FUND

16. The UNHCR together with donor countries should provide a programme of action and a special fund for countries that are willing to resettle refugees in their countries but are unable to do so for lack of financial and other material resources.

MALAYSIA AND THE PROBLEM OF RESIDUES

17. The solution to the problem is not a pledge to increase the intake but that the selection of people should not be based on immigration regulations ^{but} that these people should be treated as refugees and the pledge required is that there should be no refugee left unwanted in MALAYSIA. The crux of the matter is the avoidance of the problem of the residues.

18. Since 1975 MALAYSIA has provided for the UNHCR four processing centres and one transit centre. Should the UNHCR and the free world feel


unable to accept the Malaysian proposal and at the same time fail to give the pledge to the Government of MALAYSIA which provided the centres that no refugee would be required to stay in any centre for more than a specific period say three years, then MALAYSIA reserve the right to continue to combat the arrival of Vietnamese illegal immigrants by every means at their disposal. Any boat carrying illegal immigrants that tries to enter MALAYSIAN waters would be turned away and those that attempt to land will be towed away after being given assistance to proceed on its journey.

19. If the required pledge is not forthcoming for the time being those already in camps administered by UNITED NATIONS in MALAYSIA would continue to await processing and transportation to third countries. MALAYSIA urges third countries that the procedure for processing and transportation be expedited. Those already selected should be removed from these camps to camps of their own in respective countries while awaiting sponsors or employment. It is indeed inhumane to allow unnecessary suffering in these camps for those people already selected simply for reason of lack of sponsorship and finance. This is one of the reasons for the overcrowding in the present UNITED NATIONS camps such as PULAU BEDONG.

20. Should the programme and progress of resettlement in third countries appear to MALAYSIA as unsatisfactory, with the prospect of saddling her with the residues since they are not accepted by third countries or their country of origin, then MALAYSIA would decide at the appropriate time to resort to whatever measures necessary in order to rid these UN centres of the illegal immigrants which is the only alternative to their being left to rot. Malaysian Prime Minister's message to UNITED NATIONS Secretary-General on 18th June, 1979 has reference.

14th JULY, 1979

KUALA LUMPUR,
MALAYSIA.


TAN SRI GHAZALI SHAFIE
MINISTER OF HOME AFFAIRS

Vietnam

CONFIDENTIAL

GR

CONFIDENTIAL

*Butler NA
Gus
16/7*

DESKBY 141430Z UKMIS GENEVA AND HONG KONG
FM FCO 141203Z JUL 79
TO IMMEDIATE UKMIS GENEVA
TELEGRAM NUMBER 153 OF 14 JULY
AND TO IMMEDIATE HONG KONG
INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON UKMIS NEW YORK CANBERRA OTTAWA KUALA
LUMPUR JAKARTA BANGKOK MANILA SINGAPORE TOKYO HANOI PARIS
VIETNAMESE REFUGEES

1. THERE HAS BEEN PRESS SPECULATION THAT A NEW UK QUOTA OF
10,000 REFUGEES WILL BE PHASED OVER THREE YEARS. THERE HAS
BEEN NO OFFICIAL STATEMENT TO THIS EFFECT. YOU SHOULD AVOID
COMMENT ON THE SCOPE OR TIMING OF ANY NEW BRITISH QUOTA UNTIL
AFTER A STATEMENT HAS BEEN MADE, PROBABLY ON TUESDAY, 17 JULY.

CARRINGTON

FILES
SEAD
HK & GD
UND
FED
EESD
N AM D
SAD
EID
PUSD
OId
IPD

NEWS D
M & VD
PS
PS/LPS
PS/MR HURD
PS/MR BLAKER
PS/PUS
SIR A DUFF
SIR A PARSONS
MR CORTAZZI
MR MURRAY
MR STRATTON
LORD N G LENNOX
MR BULLARD

MR FERGUSSON
MR FRETWELL

ADDITIONAL DISTN
BOAT PEOPLE

CONFIDENTIAL

Vietnam

1

NO DISTRIBUTION

End

The Murray
The Cowley

R129

V
ZZ HONG KONG

GRS 200A
SECRET
FROM FCO 141055Z JUL 79
TO FLASH HONG KONG
TELEGRAM NUMBER 540 OF 14 JULY

STRICTLY PERSONAL FOR GOVERNOR FROM MURRAY
YOUR TELNO.999

- 1. YOUR POINTS ARE WELL TAKEN. FOR REASONS WHICH YOU WILL UNDERSTAND, WE CANNOT DENY THE 3-YEAR PHASING. ON THE OTHER HAND, PRESENT PLANS, SUBJECT TO FINAL SCRUTINY BY MINISTERS, ARE FOR THE STATEMENT ITSELF WHICH WILL PROBABLY BE MADE ON TUESDAY NOT REPEAT NOT TO REFER TO PHASING THOUGH IT MAY REPEAT MAY REFER TO RESCUES AT SEA. MINISTERS' INTENTIONS AT PRESENT ARE THAT PHASING SHOULD BE MENTIONED IN AN INSPIRED SUPPLEMENTARY QUESTION, BUT THIS WOULD SAY ONLY THAT ALL REFUGEES CANNOT OBVIOUSLY ARRIVE AT ONCE WITH NO MENTION OF 3-YEAR PHASING.
- 2. WE SHALL TELEGRAPH LATER, STRICTLY FOR YOUR PERSONAL INFORMATION, THE DRAFT TEXT AS IT STANDS NOW.
- 3. I REALISE THAT YOU WILL STILL BE IN DIFFICULTIES UNTIL THE STATEMENT IS MADE AND YOU CAN SEE EXACTLY HOW THE PHASING AND SEA RESCUES ARE TREATED. WE CAN EXPLAIN BACKGROUND WHEN WE SEE YOU. BUT I FEAR THAT YOU CANNOT DISCLOSE THE INFORMATION IN THIS TELEGRAM TO ANYONE ELSE.

CARRINGTON

NNNN

CONFIDENTIAL

GRS 450

CONFIDENTIAL

DESKBY 140950Z F C O

FM HONG KONG 140755Z JUL 79

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 999 OF 14 JULY

INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS GENEVA, WASHINGTON.

Handwritten notes:
top no.
John M. ...
6/1
16/7

GENEVA CONFERENCE ON INDO-CHINESE REFUGEES: U K PLEDGE.

PERSONAL FROM GOVERNOR.

1. A REUTERS LONDON STORY REPORTS A DECISION THAT THE UK PLEDGE WILL BE 10,000 SPREAD OVER 3 YEARS, AND NOT, AS I HAD SUPPOSED, MERELY SUBJECT TO SOME PHASING. IF TRUE, AND COUPLED WITH DEDUCTIONS FOR SEA RESCUE, IT COULD NOT BE CLAIMED TO APPROXIMATE TO THE UNHCR'S SUGGESTION OF 10,000 IN A YEAR, BUT WOULD AMOUNT TO LESS THAN 3,330 A YEAR.
2. MEMBERS OF EXECUTIVE COUNCIL AND MORE OMINOUSLY THE US CONSUL-GENERAL HAVE SAID THEY HOPE THE REPORT UNFOUNDED.
3. IF IT CAN BE DENIED, THE SOONER IT IS THE BETTER, AND PLEASE DISREGARD THE REST OF THIS TELEGRAM.
4. IF THIS WERE HMG'S DECISION IT COULD NOT BE CONCEALED FOR LONG BY VAGUE WORDING IN THE ANNOUNCEMENT, PARTICULARLY SINCE THE REUTERS REPORT WILL PROVOKE CLOSE QUESTIONING. THE AMERICANS AND OTHER POTENTIAL HOST COUNTRIES WOULD BE UPSET, THE PRACTICAL CONSEQUENCES FOR HONG KONG AT LEAST WOULD BE SERIOUS. I WOULD PROBABLY HAVE TO EXPRESS PUBLICLY THIS GOVERNMENT'S DISAPPOINTMENT WHEN THE DECISION WAS ANNOUNCED. IT WOULD ALL BE MOST DISTASTEFUL AND DISAPPOINTING AFTER THE INITIATIVE OF CALLING FOR THE CONFERENCE AND THE WIDE INTEREST IN A SOLUTION IT HAS GENERATED.
5. SO COULD YOU NOT SIMPLY MAKE HMG'S PLEDGE 10,000 WITHOUT REFERRING TO TIMING ? IN ANSWER TO QUESTIONS THE REUTERS REPORT COULD BE DENIED, BUT IT COULD BE SAID THAT THE TIME FOR RESETTLEMENT COULD NOT BE FORESEEN SINCE IT WOULD NEED CAREFUL HANDLING IN THE UK'S CIRCUMSTANCES, WOULD DEPEND ON THE NUMBER OF REFUGEES OPTING FOR THE UK AND THEIR SUITABILITY, AND ON

CONFIDENTIAL

WHAT

CONFIDENTIAL

WHAT ADMINISTRATION PROBLEMS INDIVIDUAL CASES PRESENTED. IT COULD WELL TAKE MORE THAN A YEAR, BUT HMG WOULD ACT AS QUICKLY AS WAS PRACTICABLE.

6. I DO NOT THINK IT WOULD AFFECT THE ATTITUDE OF OTHER POTENTIAL HOST COUNTRIES, AND PARTICULARLY THE US, IF THE PROCESS STRETCHED TO 18 MONTHS OR A LITTLE MORE. THEY TOO WILL HAVE THEIR PROBLEMS. BUT INEVITABLY THE RATE OF OFF-TAKE WILL BE WATCHED AND IF THE UK APPEARS TO BE DELIBERATELY LAGGING THE US WILL COMPLAIN AND CUT ITS OFF-TAKE ACCORDINGLY. BUT EVEN SUCH A POSSIBILITY WOULD BE PREFERABLE TO A PUBLIC ROW AND DISILLUSIONMENT NOW.

7. I HOPE THE QUESTION OF PRINCIPLE CAN BE LEFT OPEN IN ANY PUBLIC STATEMENT UNTIL I HAVE AN OPPORTUNITY TO DISCUSS IN LONDON ON TUESDAY.

MACLEHOSE

FILES
SEAD
HK & GD
UND
FED
EESD
N AM D
SAD
EID
PUSD
OID
IPD

NEWS D
M & VD
PS
PS/LPS
PS/MR HURD
PS/MR BLAKER
PS/PUS
SIR A DUFF
SIR A PARSONS
MR CORTAZZI
MR MURRAY
MR STRATTON
LORD N G LENNOX
MR BULLARD

MR FERGUSSON
MR FRETWELL

ADDITIONAL DISTN
BOAT PEOPLE

-2-
CONFIDENTIAL

EPS 300

RESTRICTED

DESKBY 160830Z

CHIEF PRESS SECRETARY
10 DOWNING ST

FM UKMS GENEVA 131800Z JULY

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 318 OF 13 JULY 1979

INFO PRIORITY HONG KONG AND UKMIS NEW YORK.

Prime MinisterBm
16/7

UN MEETING ON INDICHINESE REFUGEES. PLEDGES.

1. FOLLOWING IS OUR BEST ESTIMATE OF PLEDGES OF PLACES AND CASH SO FAR IN 1979. OFFERS OF PLACES PRIOR TO UNHCR'S JUNE APPEAL ARE IN BRACKETS:

	PLACES	CASH(1,000 DOLLARS)
ARGENTINA	933	
AUSTRALIA	14,000 (10,500) (NOT YET ANNOUNCED - CANBERRA TELNO 401)	2465 (+277 FOR GALANG) <i>mt</i>
AUSTRIA	400	
BELGIUM	1760 (300)	
BELIZE	1000	
BRAZIL	26 (RESCUED AT SEA)	
CANADA	11000 (8000)	603
DENMARK	590 (250)	3698
FINLAND	100	
FRANCE	17000 (12000) (ASSUMING 1000 A MONTH) +1500 (CITY OF PARIS)	
FRG	10000 (5000) (NOT YET ANNOUNCED - UKMIS GENEVA TELNO 205)	2844
GREECE	150	
ISRAEL	200 (100)	
ITALY	900 (100) EXPECTED FROM ITALIAN NAVY	783
JAPAN	1000 (500) (JAKARTA TELNO 207)	11500 (+6500 FOR GALANG)
MONACO	25	
NETHERLANDS	1000	1737 /NEW ZEALAND

RESTRICTED

NEW ZEALAND	SOME	239
NORWAY	SOME RESCUED AT SEA	1961
PHILIPPINES		10
SWEDEN	1533 (253)	2544
SWITZERLAND	2000 (979 + 980)	93
UK	(2753)(INCLUDING RESCUED AT SEA)	
US	168000 (84000)	7533
	AS FROM 1 OCT 1979	
EEC		7534
O'FAM		253
OTHER NGO'S		5728
<hr/>		<hr/>
TOTAL	235,831	49,927

2. CASH CONTRIBUTIONS ARE THOSE EARMARKED FOR UNHCR'S PROGRAMME FOR INDOCHINA REFUGEES. WE HAVE TOLD UNHCR THAT THIS REFLECTS UNFAIRLY ON THOSE LIKE THE UK WHO HAVE AT UNHCR'S REQUEST REFRAINED FROM EARMARKING THEIR CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE GENERAL PROGRAMME FROM WHICH (SINCE 1 MARCH 1979) THE S E ASIA PROGRAMME HAS BEEN FINANCED.

MACINNES

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

CCD	SED
C AF D	SPD
PCD	WAD
EAD	WIAD
M & CD	CRD
NAD	EID (E)
SAD	RHOD D
SEAD	SEC D
S AF D	TRED

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION

C H G M

Top Copy - Indonesia
- visit by Pres. Suharto - June 79

CONFIDENTIAL



Prime Minister

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

Gives his background, London SW1A 2AH

Do you agree that Lord 13 July 1979

Carvington may now advise
in favour of this West Visit?

Dan Bryan,

Yes or no

6/11
13/7

Possible State Visit by President Suharto of Indonesia

Thank you for your letter of 28 June, in which you asked whether the invitation to President Suharto could be deferred until after the UN Special Conference later this month, so that Indonesia's reaction to the possible wish of the UN to purchase from her an island which would be used as a staging post for Vietnamese refugees could be taken into account.

We have consulted our Ambassador in Jakarta about the possible purchase of an Indonesian island, in addition to the processing centre for 10,000 refugees that Indonesia has already agreed can be set up on Galang Island. Mr O'Brien advised that the Indonesian authorities would react strongly against the idea (he has subsequently reported that the Indonesian Foreign Minister has denied American reports of Indonesia's agreement to the suggestion). In the Indonesian view, the Galang proposals had already contributed to the accelerated outflow of refugees from Vietnam, and proposals for an island with a capacity of up to 200,000 would prompt an even faster rate. Moreover, the Indonesians would not welcome the prospect of so large a concentration of Indo-Chinese in their midst for whom no permanent resettlement elsewhere might ever be arranged. Security considerations, Mr O'Brien said, were uppermost in Indonesian minds at present.

For these reasons the Indonesians seem unlikely to agree to any expansion of the limited facilities they are already providing on Galang. (The Prime Minister may have noticed a report in the Observer of 8 July which suggested that the Americans were prepared to allow Guam to be used.)

The Conference in Geneva on 20-21 July will certainly address the need for large-scale processing centres. But Indonesia's objections to the use of her territory are not unreasonable and are very similar to those of Malaysia and other countries in the region who face the prospect of accommodating large numbers of refugees. Indonesia's behaviour towards the refugees, despite strong statements by her Defence Minister and the 47,000 refugees she now claims to have, has been described by UNHCR as surprisingly good. The Foreign Minister has told our Ambassador that Indonesia will not tow landed refugees out to sea.

/In

Bryan Cartledge Esq
10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL



In a wider context it should be recalled that the Indonesians have been owed a return visit since 1974, when The Queen made a State Visit to Indonesia, and are aware of the possibility that an invitation may be extended soon.

In these circumstances, and given the political and economic reasons for inviting President Suharto set out in my letter of 13 June, Lord Carrington doubts whether it would be justifiable to make an invitation dependent on Indonesian reactions at the UN meeting.

There is also a time factor to be borne in mind. We have asked our Ambassador in Jakarta what would be the latest date on which an invitation for November 1979 could be issued with any chance of the President's being able to accept; he considers that mid-July would be the latest possible time. The UN conference has now, as you know, been convened for 20-21 July. Lord Carrington therefore recommends that the Prime Minister agree that the proposal to invite President Suharto in November be put to Buckingham Palace.

I am copying this letter to Martin Vile, Cabinet Office.

For ever
Stephen

J S Wall
Private Secretary

CONFIDENTIAL

Vietnam -
Refugees.

CONFIDENTIAL

Subject Copy: United Nations
Visit of UN Sec-General

NOTE OF THE PRIME MINISTER'S DISCUSSION WITH THE UNITED NATIONS
SECRETARY GENERAL, DR. KURT WALDHEIM, AT 10 DOWNING STREET, ON
THURSDAY 12 JULY 1979 AT 1700 HOURS

Present:

The Prime Minister	Dr. Kurt Waldheim
The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary	Mr. Brian Urquhart (Under-Secretary General for Special Political Affairs)
Sir Anthony Parsons	Mr. W.B. Buffum (Under-Secretary General for Political and General Assembly Affairs)
Mr. B.G. Cartledge	Mr. A. Rohan (Deputy Executive Assistant to the Secretary General)

* * * * *

Refugees from Indochina

After welcoming Dr. Waldheim, the Prime Minister raised the problem of Vietnamese refugees and stressed that the British Government's objective was not only to achieve progress over their resettlement but also to put a stop to the enforced exodus at its source. The Prime Minister said that the United States had succeeded in holding communism at bay in Vietnam over a long period, for which she had received scant thanks: the exodus from communism was now beginning. The only source of effective pressure on Vietnam was the Soviet Union but, the Prime Minister said, her conversation with Mr. Kosygin in Moscow had shown not only that the Russians had no intention of exerting pressure on the Vietnamese but that, on the contrary, they supported the Vietnamese policy. A major operation was in progress in South East Asia designed to destabilise the region. The Chinese were already unpopular in the area, because they were successful; this was being deliberately exploited. For these reasons, the British Government had not hesitated to pillory Vietnam in Parliament. Lord Carrington told the Prime Minister that he had already warned Dr. Waldheim that he would have some unpleasant things to say about Vietnam at the forthcoming Geneva meeting; he knew that Dr. Waldheim did not altogether approve but he did not think that he would stand in the way. The Prime Minister said that it was essential that the West should demonstrate that it stood for certain values.

CONFIDENTIAL/ Dr. Waldheim

Dr. Waldheim told the Prime Minister that he was very well aware of her preoccupation with the refugee problem and shared her deep concern. He had deliberately stressed the humanitarian aspect of the problem for consideration in Geneva, since if the argument became too political before the meeting took place Vietnam might refuse to attend it and the meeting would degenerate into a shouting match instead of doing anything to help the refugees themselves. A political debate on the refugee problem would simply lead to sterile confrontation. Dr. Waldheim said that there could be no doubt that the Vietnamese Government was deliberately forcing the refugees to leave: he had raised the matter repeatedly, both with Mr. Pham Van Dong and with the Vietnamese Ambassador at the United Nations. The Vietnamese argued that the refugees were leaving voluntarily and retorted with counter-accusations that a propaganda campaign was being waged against them. He had suggested to Mr. Pham Van Dong that Vietnam should arrange for a phased and orderly departure of the refugees, in cooperation with the United Nations High Commissioner. Despite his representations, the Vietnamese were continuing to behave exactly as before. The Vietnamese Ambassador was now pleading that his Government could not completely control the long Vietnamese coastline and that the Chinese were deliberately exacerbating the problem. Dr. Waldheim said that he had pointed out to the Vietnamese that they were rapidly losing the widespread international sympathy, for example in Scandinavia, which their country had previously enjoyed.

The Prime Minister commented that, meanwhile, Vietnam was continuing to confiscate the wealth and possessions of those whom they were throwing out and was shooting^{at} them as they left. This was a question not of a shouting match but of sheer barbarism. It should be pilloried publicly: this could produce an effect, as the Belgrade meeting to review the CSCE had produced an effect on the East Europeans, who witnessed the pillorying of the Soviet Union in that forum. It was essential that the United Nations should be seen to stand for something and to condemn barbarism.

Dr. Waldheim explained that, under the United Nations Charter, the Secretary General had no authority to convene a conference such as that which was about to take place in Geneva. He had nevertheless

CONFIDENTIAL

- 3 -

gone ahead out of respect for the Prime Minister and in the belief that her objective was to promote a humanitarian solution of the refugee problem. He had decided to break the United Nations rules of procedure, since he knew that if he had adhered to them by taking the matter first to the Security Council, the discussion would have been long and contentious. For the reasons he had explained to the Prime Minister, he had throughout stressed the humanitarian aspect of the meeting and had done his best to invite a representative selection of countries. Despite all his efforts, he was already coming under fire, for example, from the Chinese for not inviting Kampuchea. The Prime Minister said that attacks should not concern one if the policies were right. The fact was that Vietnam was pursuing a policy of barbarism, under the protection of the Soviet veto in the Security Council. Under the same protection, a number of developments which the UN had been established to prevent were gathering momentum, such as the spread of Soviet subversion through the use of proxies. The Prime Minister told Dr. Waldheim that she was very grateful to him for convening the Geneva meeting and congratulated him on his decision to bypass the rules of procedure. She was nevertheless very concerned by a number of current trends affecting the UN, such as the growing number of small islands, especially in the Caribbean, which were being taken over by Cuban or other communist influence and, despite their small size, commanded a vote in the General Assembly. Although the UN had been designed to protect freedom, it was becoming increasingly difficult for the organisation to fulfil this objective.

Dr. Waldheim said that the UN was indeed handicapped by some of the shortcomings in its Charter and also by the behaviour of some Western Governments, who, for example, voted for political reasons in favour of help for the third world but then voted against providing money for it. Too many UN members were ambiguous in their approach to the world's problems: they were keen to win political credit but reluctant to pay the price. Mr. Gromyko had told him that the Soviet Union was just as concerned as the West about the problems of the UN, but the Soviet Union nevertheless continued to vote against the UN budget.

/ Dr. Waldheim

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

- 4 -

Dr. Waldheim told the Prime Minister that he would do everything possible to make the Geneva meeting on refugees a success and hoped that positive results could be achieved; his concern was to avoid a political conference, which could not produce results. He was certain that many delegates would nevertheless speak their mind about Vietnam and he himself proposed to include a reference to Vietnam's responsibility for the situation in his opening statement to the meeting. The Prime Minister, referring to the United Nations as a whole, said that every procedural device should be employed in order to put the Western point of view across and the Western objective should be to perpetuate the values which the West stood for, rather than tolerating perpetual retreat in the face of barbarism and tyranny. Referring to the problems which the refugee situation had created for Hong Kong, the Prime Minister said that Hong Kong constituted a remarkable tribute to the free world and to what the Chinese could achieve when they were free.

Dr. Waldheim gave the Prime Minister an account of the separate but related problem of the 160,000 refugees from Kampuchea who had crossed the border into Thailand and whom the Thais, despite an undertaking to the contrary which General Kriangsak had given him, were forcibly repatriating into Kampuchea. This policy had resulted in a very large number of deaths. The Thais had now said that they would suspend their repatriation policy provided the international community would assist them, with money, in housing and caring for the Kampuchean refugees. Dr. Waldheim mentioned the two islands, in Indonesia and the Philippines, which were being used as processing centres, but agreed with Lord Carrington that these were being used only for refugees who already had a new destination to go to.

The Prime Minister expressed the view that the OPEC countries, with their great financial resources which would now be further increased by the rise in oil prices, should be persuaded to make a direct contribution to solving the refugee problem. Dr. Waldheim told the Prime Minister that OPEC would be represented at the Geneva meeting, as would be Latin America.

/ Tokyo Economic Summit

CONFIDENTIAL

Tokyo Economic Summit

Dr. Waldheim asked the Prime Minister if she had derived any encouragement from the Economic Summit Meeting in Tokyo. The Prime Minister said that the meeting had simply re-affirmed the basic truth that if demand and supply were out of balance the price mechanism had to be adjusted so that balance could be restored. The European participants had already agreed that the demand for oil had to be depressed, but that this could not be done by Europe alone. It was agreed at Tokyo that if it could be demonstrated to Saudi Arabia that, by depressing demand, the shortfall in the supply of oil to the West was only, say, 5 per cent, Saudi Arabia might agree to increase her output sufficiently to fill that gap. As Sheikh Khalifa had told her in Bahrain on her way back to London, the Arabs had no desire to hurt the West since this hurt their own interests as well.

Lord Carrington commented that all the Tokyo participants had chosen the base line for their restriction of demand which happened to suit them best.

The Prime Minister went on to say that most economic problems had their origin in political problems. The Middle East was a prime example of this: the first great oil shortage had sprung from the conflict between Israel and Egypt and the new shortage had resulted from the internal political problems of Iran. A major success in Tokyo had been agreement on the importance of developing new sources of energy supply, especially nuclear power. There had also been agreement on the need to improve communication with the OPEC countries and to make them feel that they were being included in the political dialogue. In the last resort, however, the problem of oil could only be solved through a solution to the political problems of the Middle East. The West was at present witnessing the creation by the Soviet Union of a belt of instability across Africa and Asia. A settlement which could restore stability to the Middle East would be a great prize.

Middle East

/ Lord Carrington

Middle East

Lord Carrington asked Dr. Waldheim whether he had it in mind to take any new initiative on the Middle East. Dr. Waldheim said that he fully shared the Prime Minister's view of the situation: without a comprehensive settlement in the Middle East, there could be no solution to the West's economic problems. For this reason, he had proposed that a preparatory conference should be held, under UN auspices, one purpose of which would be to re-involve the Arab states and the Soviet Union in the negotiating process. He had recently discussed this question with President Ceausescu of Romania, who agreed with him that a new international conference offered the only hope of progress. The first step would be to take soundings among the Arabs and then to organise a conference in which both they and the PLO could take part. There would be little hope of progress, however, if the Israelis maintained their present policy on new settlements on the West Bank. To his surprise, Mr. Gromyko had told him recently that the Soviet Union no longer wished to return to Geneva; this had indeed been a Soviet objective before the Camp David Agreement, but to go back to Geneva now would, in the Soviet view, imply approval, or at least recognition, of the bilateral treaties. Dr. Waldheim commented that the Russians were very adept at hiding behind the positions of the Arab extremists.

Lord Carrington asked Dr. Waldheim whether he would wait for the Camp David process to run into the sand before launching his own initiative, or whether he set a time limit to it. Dr. Waldheim said that he proposed to make it clear, when he spoke at the Conference of the OAU, that it was important to begin consultations with the Arabs on how to move forward.

Sir Anthony Parsons expressed the view that Geneva was now tainted by history, as well as bedevilled by the problem of Palæstinian representation. What was now needed was a fresh resolution in the Security Council which would formally establish the rights of the Palestinians but not in terms which would inevitably attract a United States veto. The Camp David process could then be allowed to continue until Mr. Strauss was obliged to admit that no further progress could be made. The problem

/ could then

could then go back to the Security Council so that the Secretary General could be given a new mandate. Dr. Waldheim said that he agreed with Sir Anthony Parsons' comments about Geneva: if he waited too long to launch his initiative, however, President Sadat would find himself in serious difficulties. He remained convinced, that an international conference offered the only way forward. The Prime Minister said that a new Security Council resolution could perhaps go a bit further than Resolution 242 on the question of the national identity of the Palestinians; but the difficulty lay in securing the cooperation of Mr. Begin.

Southern Africa

Dr. Waldheim asked the Prime Minister for her view of the situation in South Africa. The Prime Minister expressed the view that if they were not constantly being put in the public stocks, the South Africans might move faster than anybody expected. South African industry was a dynamo in promoting Africanisation. The Nationalist Party had recently been defeated in a by-election. The Prime Minister said that the best catalyst for further progress in Southern Africa would be a settlement in Rhodesia. The West should constantly bear in mind the strategic position which South Africa occupied, across the West's life-lines for oil and raw materials.

Dr. Waldheim said that negotiations with South Africa over Namibia had been very difficult, despite the help which the Group of Five had given. He thought that the British Government might now be in the best position of the Five to resume the effort; it was important to pick up the loose ends and try to put a settlement package together again.

Turning to Rhodesia, Dr. Waldheim said that President Kaunda had kept him informed of his contacts with the Prime Minister. Dr. Waldheim expressed the view that Bishop Muzorewa's Government should be regarded as a transitional stage towards a final settlement in Rhodesia.

/ The Prime Minister

CONFIDENTIAL

- 8 -

The Prime Minister said that it should be constantly borne in mind that Rhodesia had recently conducted elections on the basis of one person, one vote in which the people had been able to choose between four different political parties. The elections had produced a black president, a black Prime Minister, a black majority in the Cabinet and a black majority in the Parliament. This was a colossal advance. The situation in Rhodesia now was infinitely closer to democracy than the situation which existed in many of the countries most critical of Bishop Muzorewa's regime. If the UK were now to go too far in pressing for changes in the constitution, this might upset the white population and the Rhodesian economy could collapse. President Kaunda, for example, had turned out too many whites and the result was that he was now unable to feed his people. Rhodesia could be self-sufficient in food and could also help her neighbours. Bishop Muzorewa had expressed the view that it was essential to encourage the whites to remain so that the economy could be efficiently run in the interests of the black population. The Prime Minister said that Bishop Muzorewa had done everything which had been asked of him: he had been advised to work for a substantial turn out in the elections and he had achieved this. The present constitutional position was not perfect, but few constitutions were.

Dr. Waldheim said that it would be possible to help Bishop Muzorewa by means of new elections to be held under international supervision. He thought that Rhodesia's problems could be solved if the Muzorewa Government were regarded as transitional. The Prime Minister recalled that Rhodesia's last elections had been assessed by observers both from the UK and Australia. The many representatives of the media who had been in Rhodesia at the time had found no defects in the electoral procedures. The conflict in Rhodesia now was not between black and white but between black and black. It was essential that the internal settlement should not be upset: it should be built upon. Joshua Nkomo had made it very clear to Mr. Callaghan's envoy, Mr. Cledwyn Hughes, that he intended to achieve his aims by force.

/Dr. Waldheim

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

- 9 -

Dr. Waldheim said that he feared that if no solution could be found soon, there would simply be an endless guerilla war. The Prime Minister said that the British Government would do everything possible to achieve an acceptable settlement: but the UK would have to take others along with her. Lord Carrington agreed and said that recognition by the UK alone would not be much help to Rhodesia. It was essential to chart a middle course between changes which would be acceptable to international opinion and changes which could be accepted by the white population. It was certainly necessary to give Bishop Muzorewa reassurance: but it was also important to convince him of the necessity for changes to the constitution. The Prime Minister said that too radical changes might bring the whole structure down. One way of achieving a better Parliamentary balance would be to add more black members instead of reducing the number of white members.

Concluding the discussion, the Prime Minister said that she greatly looked forward to Dr. Waldheim's official visit to the UK later in the year. The meeting ended at 1810.

Gen.

12 July 1979

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

2

GRS 420

[Handwritten signature]

Prime Minister

CONFIDENTIAL

FM PARIS 121728Z JULY 79

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 422 OF 12 JULY 1979

INFO PRIORITY KUALA LUMPUR DINGAPORE BANGKOK HONG KONG (PERSONAL FOR GOVERNOR) CANBERRA WASHINGTON MOSCOW OTTAWA UKMIS GENEVA

[Handwritten initials]
13/7

INDO-CHINA REFUGEES: FRENCH ATTITUDES

1. THERE ARE SIGNS THAT AS FRENCH VIEWS ARE DEVELOPING ON THE OBJECTIVES OF THE FORTHCOMING GENEVA CONFERENCE THEY ARE DIVERGING SOMEWHAT FROM THOSE OF THE UK ON THE EXTENT TO WHICH VIETNAM SHOULD BE CALLED TO ACCOUNT POLITICALLY OVER THE REFUGEE PROBLEM (CF. PARA 2(A) OF FCO TELNO 313 TO CANBERRA).
2. THE FRENCH HAVE MADE CLEAR TO THE EMBASSY AT VARIOUS LEVELS THE IMPORTANCE THEY ATTACH TO THE HUMANITARIAN ASPECT OF THE REFUGEE PROBLEM AND THEIR DESIRE TO SEE THE CONFERENCE CONCENTRATE ON THIS. THE LATEST INDICATION OF FRENCH PRIORITIES IS A COMMENT BY M STIRN (MINISTER OF STATE AT THE QUAI) BEFORE HIS VISIT IN THE LAST FEW DAYS TO HANOI THAT VIETNAM SHOULD BE BROUGHT TO ARRANGE FOR THE REFUGEES TO LEAVE IN SUCH A WAY THAT THEIR RECEPTION IN OTHER COUNTRIES COULD BE PROPERLY ORGANISED. HE MADE NO MENTION OF THE ROOT CAUSE OF THE PROBLEM. IN ADDITION, CURRENT FRENCH HESITATION OVER TAKING AN EARLY DECISION TO TRANSFER EEC FOOD AID FROM VIETNAM TO THE REFUGEES REFLECTS A DESIRE TO AVOID PUTTING VIETNAM IN THE DOCK BEFORE GENEVA.
3. THERE ARE A NUMBER OF REASONS WHY THE FRENCH ARE DISINCLINED TO LEND THEIR NAME TO PUBLIC CONDEMNATION OF VIETNAM. FIRST, THEY CONTINUE TO BELIEVE IN THE POSSIBILITY OF A SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP WITH VIETNAM, IN SPITE OF LITTLE PROGRESS IN THIS DIRECTION SINCE 1975. SECOND, THE FRENCH PEOPLE PRIDE THEMSELVES ON THEIR RECORD OF PROVIDING A HAVEN FOR REFUGEES. IT IS A SUBJECT WHERE PUBLIC OPINION IS IMPORTANT AND CAN EXERT INFLUENCE ON THE GOVERNMENT. THE GOVERNMENT'S INCLINATION IS TO SAY NOTHING THAT WOULD IMPLY THAT THEY ARE TAKING REFUGEES RELUCTANTLY. CONVERSELY.

CONFIDENTIAL

/ THEIR POLICY

CONFIDENTIAL

THEIR POLICY OF TAKING SUBSTANTIAL NUMBERS OF REFUGEES WILL GIVE THEM A STRONG BASIS ON WHICH TO TRY TO SHAPE THE WORK OF THE CONFERENCE. THIRD, BY PRESENTING THEIR APPROACH AS BEING MOTIVATED SOLELY BY HUMANITARIAN CONSIDERATIONS, THE GOVERNMENT AVOID EXPOSING THEMSELVES TO CRITICISM FROM THE LEFT, AS WOULD HAPPEN IF THEY CONDEMNED VIETNAM.

4. ALTHOUGH THERE IS WIDESPREAD SCEPTICISM IN THE ADMINISTRATION HERE THAT VIETNAM WILL IN FACT TAKE SERIOUS STEPS TO HALT THE EMIGRATION OUTFLOW, IT LOOKS AS THOUGH THE FRENCH WILL WANT VIETNAM TO BE GIVEN A CHANCE AT GENEVA. THEY ARE LIKELY TO ARGUE THAT PUBLIC ACCUSATIONS WILL SIMPLY MAKE THE VIETNAMESE MORE STUBBORN AND LESS INCLINED TO COOPERATE. THEIR ATTITUDE IS THUS A MIXTURE OF HUMANITARIAN CONSIDERATION, TACTICAL JUDGEMENT OF THE MOST EFFECTIVE WAY TO APPROACH THE VIETNAMESE, AND SELF-INTEREST, WITH THE EMPHASIS PROBABLY ON THE LAST.

HIBBERT

FILES

SEAD
HK & GD
UND
FED
EESD
N AM D
SAD
EID
PUSD
OId
IPD

NEWS D
M & VD
PS
PS/LPS
PS/MR HURD
PS/MR BLAKER
PS/PUS
SIR A DUFF
SIR A PARSONS
MR CORTAZZI
MR MURRAY
MR STRATTON
LORD N G LENNOX

ADDITIONAL DISTN
BOAT PEOPLE



Original info/Kec - fcs
Ho
LOD
JS

10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

12 July 1979

Dear Lord Shawcross,

Thank you for your letter of 27 June, and its enclosures, about refugees in Indo-China. I gather you have written in similar terms to Peter Carrington.

I am keenly aware of the appalling conditions in which many of the refugees survive, and of the dangers they run to escape from the Community tyrannies in Indo-China. That was why I first proposed that the international community should consult together, with a view to agreeing on practical measures for the refugees' welfare. We shall play a full part in the meeting Dr. Waldheim has called in Geneva on 20/21 July. I shall be seeing Dr. Waldheim in London on 12 July.

By the special statement on Indo-Chinese refugees issued at the Tokyo Summit, we are committed significantly to increase our contribution to Indo-China refugee relief and resettlement - by making more funds available and by admitting more people, while taking into account social and economic circumstances in our country. We stand by this undertaking.

In the last ten years over 730,000 immigrants have come here. None the less, we have continued to honour the special quota of 1,500 Indo-Chinese refugees set by the previous Government, 250 of whom were to come from Thailand. More

/ recently

recently we have agreed to take refugees saved by the British ships Sibonga and Roachbank and those from the Norse Viking who wish to come here. We have also contributed over 8 per cent towards the budget of the United Nations' High Commissioner for Refugees. In all, since 1975 we have agreed to take over 4,500 Indo-Chinese.

Our record has been good, therefore. The prime call on our resources must be Hong Kong, where the problem posed by the 60,000 boat people is compounded by the number of legal and illegal immigrants from China.

We are now considering how best we can help at the Geneva Conference. Thailand, like all the other countries of first resort, will benefit if, as we fully intend, the Geneva meeting is successful in working out an overall for coping with the current problem and if the Vietnamese can be shamed into abandoning the policies towards their own people which have met with world-wide censure.

Yours sincerely
Margaret Thatcher

The Rt. Hon. The Lord Shawcross, GBE, QC.

lw

CONFIDENTIAL

Vietnam



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

12 July 1979

Dear Bryan,

BF 16.7.79

The PM has asked
that this should be
postponed until
next week.

Indo-China Refugees

I enclose a draft of the statement on refugees which, subject to discussion this morning, Lord Carrington hopes to make in the House of Lords this afternoon.

6/7
16/7

I am copying this letter and enclosure to the Private Secretaries to the Chancellor of the Exchequer, the Home Secretary, the Lord President of the Council and Sir John Hunt.

Yours ever,
Stephen

J S Wall

B G Cartledge Esq
10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

DRAFT STATEMENT ON INDO-CHINESE REFUGEES TO BE MADE BY THE RT
HON THE LORD CARRINGTON, SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AND
COMMONWEALTH AFFAIRS, IN THE HOUSE OF LORDS ON THURSDAY 12 JULY

With the leave of the House, I will make a statement on the Indo-China refugee problem. Noble Lords will be aware of the deep concern with which the Government has viewed the rapid deterioration of the refugee situation in South East Asia over recent weeks. The Secretary-General of the United Nations, Dr Waldheim, has now convened a special international meeting in Geneva on 20 and 21 July to deal with the problem. The Government welcome this move, which was originally proposed by My Rt Hon Friend the Prime Minister.

There can be no doubt that it is the callous and inhuman policies of the Vietnamese Government which are the root cause of the problem and it is imperative that the Vietnamese Government change those policies. Meanwhile, the burden which the flood of refugees is imposing on others in the region can be relieved only by a major and genuinely international effort.

The Government have given very careful consideration to the extent of the humanitarian problems, and in particular to the appalling burden which is being placed on the resources of the Government of Hong Kong. The United Kingdom is prepared to accept a further 10,000 refugees from Indo-China for settlement here. Because of our direct concern for the situation in Hong Kong, these extra refugees will be taken, over a period to be agreed with the Governor, from the 64,000 who are presently awaiting resettlement in Hong Kong. My Rt Hon Friend the Home Secretary is getting in touch with the voluntary agencies who have played such a commendable role in helping with the resettlement of the refugees who have already arrived in the United Kingdom. I would like to take this opportunity of recording again the Government's gratitude to the voluntary agencies for the splendid work which they are doing in this field.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

The Government have also decided to make a further contribution of £5 million to the funds of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees specifically earmarked for use in his South East Asian operations over the next 12 months.

I shall myself attend the opening session of the Secretary General's meeting in Geneva on 20 July. I can assure Noble Lords that we shall play a full and constructive role in Geneva.

CONFIDENTIAL

22 JUN 1973



GPS 100

CONFIDENTIAL

FROM FCO 111509Z

TO IMMEDIATE CANBERRA

TELEGRAM NUMBER 319 OF 11 JULY

INFO WASHINGTON, PARIS, OTTAWA, UKMIS NEW YORK, UKMIS GENEVA.

Enter no - 621 177

YOUR TELNO 398: INDO-CHINA REFUGEES

1. IN THE PRIME MINISTER'S ABSENCE, MALCOLM FRASER TELEPHONED ME THIS MORNING AND SPOKE ON THE LINES OF YOUR TUR.

2. I SAID THAT OFFICIALS WOULD BE MEETING IN LONDON TODAY AND WE HOPED THAT LIKE-MINDED MINISTERS MIGHT GET TOGETHER IN GENEVA JUST BEFORE THE CONFERENCE. I SHARED MR FRASER'S WISH TO HIGHLIGHT VIETNAMESE RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE REFUGEE PROBLEM AND THIS WOULD DOUBTLESS EMERGE IN SPEECHES AND DISCUSSION. BUT DR WALDHEIM WAS ANXIOUS TO PRESERVE THE ESSENTIALLY HUMANITARIAN NATURE OF THE CONFERENCE AND I DOUBTED IF WE COULD GET OUTRIGHT CONDEMNATION OF THE VIETNAMESE. MR FRASER SEEMED TO ACCEPT THIS.

CARRINGTON

FILES

SEAD
HK & GD
UND
FED
EESD
N AM D
SAD
EID
PUSD
OID
IPD

NEWS D
M & VD
PS
PS/LPS
PS/MR HURD
PS/MR BLAKER
PS/PUS
SIR A DUFF
SIR A PARSONS
MR CORTAZZI
MR MURRAY
MR STRATTON

ADDITIONAL DISTN
BOAT PEOPLE

1. Mr. Sanders
2. PRIME MINISTER

PA

VIETNAMESE REFUGEES

You agreed in OD that Lord Carrington should make a statement, before the Geneva Conference on Vietnamese Refugees, announcing the UK's acceptance of the Hartling quota of 10,000 refugees and the conditions on which we are doing so.

In view of the front page story in today's Guardian and given the possibility of further leaks about the UK position, Lord Carrington now wishes to make his statement in the Lords tomorrow, 12 July and the Lord Privy Seal would repeat it in the Commons. This timing would have the advantage of pre-empting further press speculation, which would reduce the impact of our announcement if it were to be made next week; and it would give you and other Ministers a solid basis on which to rest in answering Questions in the House about refugees between now and the opening of the Conference.

However, the proposed timing of the statement is rather earlier than that envisaged in ~~OD~~ and I understand that the Home Secretary has some reservations about bringing the statement forward in this way. You may like to deal with the point when the refugee question comes up at Cabinet tomorrow.

DM

*No - !
have to make
a brief statement
in Commons and
it will done
later to have
public in
view of the
people number
before it is
announced*

11 July 1979

CONFIDENTIAL

P S TO P M No10 DOWNING ST

IS 360

CONFIDENTIAL

FM CANBERRA 110610Z JUL 79

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 398 OF 11 JULY

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, PARIS, OTTAWA,
PRIORITY UKMIS NEW YORK, UKMIS GENEVA.

*Enter via
GM
14*

YOUR TELEGRAM NUMBER 313: INDO/CHINA REFUGEES

1. MR FRASER HAS JUST TELEPHONED ME TO SAY THAT AUSTRALIAN HIGH COMMISSION IN LONDON HAVE REPORTED THAT WE HAVE DECIDED NOT AFTER ALL TO PROCEED WITH A PRE-CONFERENCE MEETING OF MINISTERS OF LIKE-MINDED COUNTRIES. HE SAID THAT AUSTRALIA ATTACHED THE HIGHEST IMPORTANCE TO SUCH A MEETING SINCE POLITICAL ISSUES MUST BE RAISED AT THE WALDHEIM CONFERENCE AND IT WAS ESSENTIAL THAT WE SHOULD CONCERT OUR POSITIONS IN ADVANCE. HE SAID THAT HE KNEW THAT THIS WAS NOT THE "VANCE LINE", BUT HE FELT VERY STRONGLY THAT IF ONLY HUMANITARIAN ASPECTS WERE COVERED THE VIETNAMESE WOULD CONCLUDE THAT THE REST OF THE WORLD WAS GOING TO BE PREPARED TO ABSORB MORE REFUGEES AND THAT THEY COULD THEREFORE CONTINUE TO PURSUE THEIR POLICIES OF INTIMIDATION AND EXPULSION. HE SAID THAT HE HAD IT IN MIND TO TELEPHONE THE PRIME MINISTER ON THESE LINES AS SOON AS IT WAS A RESPECTABLE HOUR IN LONDON.

2. DRAWING (FROM MEMORY) ON PARAGRAPH 4 ONWARDS OF TUR I ASSURED MR FRASER THAT WE WERE VERY FAR FROM HAVING RULED OUT THE OPTION OF A PRE-CONFERENCE MEETING OF LIKE-MINDED MINISTERS AND SPECIFICALLY MENTIONED THAT WE WERE CONSIDERING WHETHER THIS MIGHT TAKE PLACE IN GENEVA. I ADDED THAT ALL POSSIBILITIES WOULD BE CONSIDERED BY A MEETING OF OFFICIALS TAKING PLACE IN LONDON LATER TODAY. MR FRASER SEEMED CONSIDERABLY REASSURED BY THIS BUT ASKED WHETHER THE PRE-CONFERENCE MEETING COULD NOT TAKE PLACE IN LONDON (I IMAGINE BECAUSE HE THOUGHT THAT VENUE WOULD BE LESS CONSPICUOUS).

CONFIDENTIAL

/ 3. AT THE END

CONFIDENTIAL

3. AT THE END OF OUR CONVERSATION MR FRASER INDICATED THAT IN VIEW OF WHAT I HAD TOLD HIM HE MIGHT NOT THINK IT NECESSARY TO TELEPHONE THE PRIME MINISTER AFTER ALL, BUT HE ASKED ME MOST INSISTENTLY TO REPORT WHAT HE HAD SAID AND TO ADD THAT HE HELD THESE VIEWS VERY STRONGLY.

4. HEAD OF CHANCERY IS EVEN NOW ATTENDING A MEETING WITH AUSTRALIAN OFFICIALS ON THIS AND I SHALL NO DOUBT NEED TO TELEGRAPH FURTHER DETAILS AS A RESULT.

DUDGEON

F I L E S

SEAD

HK & GD

UND

FED

EESD

N AM D

SAD

EID

PUSD

OID

IPD

NEWS D

M & VD

PS

PS/LPS

PS/MR HURD

PS/MR BLAKER

PS/PUS

SIR A DUFF

SIR A PARSONS

MR CORTAZZI

MR MURRAY

MR STRATTON

ADDITIONAL DISTN

BOAT PEOPLE

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

2

FROM BELMOPAN 101930Z

PRIORITY FCO TELNO 94 OF 10 JULY,
INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON.
MIPT NO 93: VIETNAMESE REFUGEES.

Prime Minister

2 hrs. *gh*
"17

1. FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF A LETTER FROM PREMIER PRICE TO MRS THATCHER:

QUOTE

DEAR MADAM PRIME MINISTER,

ON BEHALF OF THE BELIZE GOVERNMENT I WRITE TO EXPRESS OUR SYMPATHY FOR THE PLIGHT OF THE REFUGEES IN HONG KONG, AND AS POSITIVE EVIDENCE OF THIS SYMPATHY, I WISH TO SAY THAT THE BELIZE GOVERNMENT IS WILLING TO ACCEPT A LIMITED NUMBER OF THESE REFUGEES.

IN ORDER TO PROTECT THE INTEREST OF OUR BELIZEAN PEOPLE, THE GOVERNMENT WOULD ACCEPT THESE PEOPLE ON THE BASIS THAT THEY DO NOT BECOME A BURDEN AND IMPOSE ANY HARDSHIPS ON OUR OWN PEOPLE.

A NECESSARY CONDITION WILL BE TO ENSURE THAT THE FUNDS PROVIDED FOR THE SETTLEMENT OF THESE REFUGEES, AS PROVIDED BY THE AGENCIES WHO ARE ASSISTING IN THIS EXERCISE, ARE SUFFICIENT TO SETTLE THE REFUGEES WITH DUE PROVISION BEING MADE FOR THEIR MAINTENANCE AND SOCIAL WELFARE, IE HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE OF THE REFUGEES.

I HOPE THAT MY GOVERNMENT'S OFFER IS GIVEN SERIOUS CONSIDERATION AND ENOUGH NOTICE IS GIVEN SO THAT ARRANGEMENTS CAN BE MADE FOR SMOOTH SETTLEMENT OF THE REFUGEES.

SINCERELY
(GEORGE PRICE)
PREMIER

ans

UNQUOTE

FCO PLEASE PASS TO WASHINGTON.

MCENTEE

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

FILES
SEAD
HK & GD
UND
FED
EESD
N AM D
SAD
EID
PUSD
OID
IPD

NEWS D
M & VD
PS
PS/LPS
PS/MR HURD
PS/MR BLAKER
PS/PUS
SIR A DUFF
SIR A PARSONS
MR CORTAZZI
MR MURRAY
MR STRATION

ADDITIONAL DISTN
BOAT PEOPLE

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FM BELMOPAN 101800Z JULY

TO PRIORITY FCO TELNO 93 OF 10 JULY,
INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON.

YOUR TEL PERSONAL 15 OF 28 JUNE: VIETNAMESE REFUGEES.

1. REGRET DELAY IN REPLYING TO YOUR TUR BUT PRICE HAS BEEN UNAVAILABLE ELECTIONEERING IN THE COUNTRY DISTRICTS. WHEN I SAW HIM ON FRIDAY, 6TH HE WAS RECEPTIVE AND SAID THAT HE WOULD BE LETTING ME HAVE A PERSONAL LETTER TO MRS THATCHER AFTER THE WEEKEND. (TEXT IN MIFT).
2. PRICE TOLD ME THAT THE BELIZE GOVERNMENT IS PREPARED TO ACCEPY UP TO 1,000 REFUGEES (SAY, 100 FAMILIES) WHICH HE SEES AS MAKING UP TWO VILLAGES. BELIZE GOVERNMENT ARE STILL AT PRESENT WORKING THROUGH QUOTE INTERNATIONAL REFUGEE RESETTLEMENT INCORPORATED UNQUOTE OF TORONTO (MY TELNO 1 OF 29 JUNE TO TOROMTO) NOTWITHSTANDING MY ADVICE NOT TO COMMIT THEMSELVES FINALLY TO USING THIS AGENCY UNTIL THEY HAVE THE FURTHER ADVICE OFFERED IN TORONTO TELEGRAM U/N OF 6 JULY.
3. I SEE PARAGRAPH 3 OF PREMIER PRICE'S LETTER TO MRS THATCHER AS NO MORE THAN COVERING HIMSELF. HEALTH SERVICES AND PRIMARY EDUCATION ARE FREE TO ALL IN BELIZE BUT FUNDS WOULD BE REQUIRED TO COVER THE MAINTENANCE OF REFUGEES UNTIL THEIR FIRST CROPS ARE REAPED. I THINK PRICE ALSO FEARS THE POSSIBILITY OF IMPORTING DISEASE WITH THE REFUGEES, IE CHOLERA, WHICH MIGHT INVOLVE OUR HEALTH AUTHORITIES IN AN EXPENSIVE UMMUNISATION CAMPAIGN. HOWEVER GIVEN SUFFICIENT NOTICE AND FINANCIAL HELP I BELIEVE THAT THE BELIZE GOVERNMENT IS DISPOSED TO BE AS HELPFUL AS POSSIBLE.

FCO PLEASE PASS TO WASHINGTON.

MCENTEE

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

FILES

SEAD

HK & GD

UND

FED

EESD

N AM D

SAD

EID

PUSD

OID

IPD

NEWS D

M & VD

PS

PS/LPS

PS/MR HURD

PS/MR BLAKER

PS/PUS

SIR A DUFF

SIR A PARSONS

MR CORTAZZI

MR MURRAY

MR STRATTON

ADDITIONAL DISTN
BOAT PEOPLE

CONFIDENTIAL



Original in C/R.

cc : Mr. Wolfson

R. G. BRADMAN

10 DOWNING STREET

CF
TO note

From the Private Secretary

10 July 1979

Vietnamese Refugees

I enclose a copy of correspondence from a Mr. Godfrey Bradman which has been sent to David Wolfson at No.10 for information. I assume that the top copy of Mr. Bradman's memorandum may have already reached the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary.

David Wolfson tells me that Mr. Bradman disposes of ample funds and can be expected to pursue his project with energy and determination, regardless of any view which the Government may form of it. I should be grateful if you would let me know in due course what response is made to Mr. Bradman. Although the Government are proposing to deduct from the UK's increased intake quota of Vietnamese refugees from Hong Kong any boat people who may be picked up by UK registered ships, our willingness to take any refugees other than those who have found a first refuge in Hong Kong does not, presumably, extend to boat people which UK registered ships have deliberately sought out.

I am sending copies of this letter and enclosures to Tom Harris (Department of Trade) and Tony Butler (Home Office).

B. G. CARTLEDGE

Stephen Wall, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

25

Vietnam
Original in
AM

FILE

85

✓ CF
TO note



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

10 July 1979

Indo-Chinese Refugees

I enclose a copy of a letter addressed to the Prime Minister by Sir Laurence Hartnett, C.B.E., together with its enclosures, about a possible approach to the problem of the Indo-Chinese refugees.

I should be grateful if you would arrange for a suitable reply to be sent to Sir Laurence Hartnett on the Prime Minister's behalf and for a copy of the reply to be sent to me in due course for our records here at No.10.

B. G. CARTLEDGE

Stephen Wall, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

VB

Vietnam

RESTRICTED

DS



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

10 July 1979

Geneva meeting on refugees from Indo-China

Thank you for your letter of 9 July about the arrangements for the meeting in Geneva on 20/21 July on the problem of Indo-Chinese refugees, in which you conveyed the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary's proposals for the composition of the UK delegation.

The Prime Minister has seen your letter and acquiesces in the composition of the UK team which Lord Carrington has suggested.

B. G. CARTLEDGE

Stephen Wall, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

RESTRICTED

scrm

GR 530A

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FM FCO 091800Z JUL

TO IMMEDIATE CANBERRA

Edw
SW
11/7
P S TO P M No10 DOWNING ST

TELEGRAM NUMBER 313 OF 9TH JULY 1979.

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, PARIS AND OTTAWA.

PRIORITY UKMIS NEW YORK, UKMIS GENEVA.

YOUR TELNOS 371 AND 381: INDO-CHINA REFUGEES (NOT TO ALL)

1. BEFORE RECEIPT OF YOUR FIRST TUR, THE PRIME MINISTER HAD ALREADY INSTRUCTED, AS A RESULT OF HER TALKS IN CANBERRA, FOR CONSULTATIONS TO BE PUT IN HAND IMMEDIATELY WITH AUSTRALIA, THE US, CANADA AND PERHAPS FRANCE, WITH A VIEW TO ARRIVING AT A COMMON APPROACH TO THE CONFERENCE. WE HAVE THEREFORE CALLED A MEETING OF OFFICIALS FROM THESE MISSIONS IN LONDON ON WEDNESDAY, 11 JULY AND HAVE ASKED MISSIONS TO SEEK FULL INSTRUCTIONS BY THEN. WE KNOW THE AUSTRALIANS REPORTED THIS PROPOSAL ON 3 JULY.

2. IN PRELIMINARY CONSULTATIONS WITH MISSIONS IN LONDON TO ARRANGE THIS MEETING, MURRAY STRESSED THE PRIME MINISTER'S CLOSE INTEREST IN THE CONFERENCE AND THE IMPORTANCE FOR LIKE-MINDED COUNTRIES OF POOLING INFORMATION AND VIEWS. THE SORT OF ISSUES ON WHICH A COMMON LINE WOULD BE VALUABLE WERE:

A) HOW SHOULD WE ENSURE THAT VIETNAM'S RESPONSIBILITY FOR CAUSING THE CRISIS IS ADEQUATELY REVEALED WITHOUT RISKING BEING RULED OUT OF ORDER BY WALDHEIM OR ENCOURAGING THE HARD-LINERS. E.G. THE CHINESE AND POSSIBLY THE SINGAPOREANS, TO LAY INTO THE VIETNAMESE SO HARD AS TO RISK DISRUPTING THE MEETING?

B) WHAT DO WE SEE AS OUR OBJECTIVES FOR THE CONFERENCE IN TERMS OF A FINAL DECLARATION, OR RESOLUTIONS, OR OTHER ACTIONS, SO AS TO ESTABLISH THAT THIS IS SOMETHING MORE THAN SIMPLY A PLEDGING CONFERENCE?

C) HOW DO WE ENSURE THAT COUNTRIES WHO FAIL TO ATTEND, OR OFFER VERY LITTLE AT THE CONFERENCE, ARE INDUCED TO HELP THE INTERNATIONAL EFFORT PROPERLY?

3. MURRAY SAID THAT THIS LIST WAS NOT EXHAUSTIVE AND WE WOULD WELCOME A WIDE DISCUSSION. ON (C), HE HAD IN MIND PARTICULARLY THE SOUTH AMERICANS WHO MIGHT FEAR PRESSURE ON THEMSELVES. THE US EMBASSY'S FIRST COMMENT ON THIS WAS THAT THE AMERICANS COULD PROBABLY LEAN ON THEM.

CONFIDENTIAL

| H.

CONFIDENTIAL

4. ON THE AUSTRALIAN PROPOSAL FOR A MEETING OF MINISTERS, WE HAD THOUGHT IT IMPORTANT FOR THE MIND-CLEARING MEETING OF OFFICIALS WITH LIMITED PARTICIPATION TO GO AHEAD FIRST. WE HAVE INVITED THE FRENCH BECAUSE OF THEIR INDO-CHINA CONNECTIONS AND THEIR LARGE INTAKE OF REFUGEES. WE ARE INCLINED NOT TO INCLUDE THE NEW ZEALANDERS OR JAPANESE AT THIS STAGE.
5. WE NOTE THAT THE AUSTRALIANS ARE NOW PROPOSING ONLY A BILATERAL AT MINISTERIAL LEVEL. IT MAY, HOWEVER, BE USEFUL FOR MINISTERS CONCERNED (I.E. US, CANADA, FRANCE,) TO ARRIVE IN GENEVA HALF A DAY EARLIER AND TO MEET INFORMALLY THERE. WE SEE SOME ADVANTAGE IN BROADENING THESE PRIOR DISCUSSIONS IN GENEVA TO INCLUDE NEW ZEALAND, JAPAN AND PERHAPS GERMANY - AS WELL AS PERHAPS ASEAN COUNTRIES AT A SECOND STAGE.
6. IF THE AUSTRALIANS AGREE WITH THIS PROCEDURE, WE MIGHT AGREE IN THE NEXT FEW DAYS ON A LIST OF COUNTRIES WHO COULD BE ENCOURAGED TO ARRANGE FOR THEIR MINISTERS TO ARRIVE IN GENEVA IN TIME FOR PRIOR CONSULTATIONS THERE. WASHINGTON, PARIS AND OTTAWA SHOULD DISCUSS THIS WITH FOREIGN MINISTRIES WHEN STRESSING TO THEM THE IMPORTANCE OF AN EFFECTIVE OFFICIALS' MEETING NEXT WEEK. WE ARE REPEATING YOUR TUR'S TO THESE POSTS AND GENEVA.
7. OFFICIALS COULD PROFITABLY DISCUSS THE QUESTIONS IN YOUR PARA 7 WHEN THEY MEET NEXT WEEK. WE AGREE THAT POLITICAL QUESTIONS WILL INEVITABLY BE RAISED AT WALDHEIM'S CONFERENCE THOUGH WALDHEIM'S INTENTION IS CLEARLY MAINLY HUMANITARIAN. IT IS NOT YET CERTAIN THAT WALDHEIM WILL CHAIR THROUGHOUT (UKMIS GENEVA TELNO 254).

CARRINGTON

FILES

SEAD

HK & GD

UND

FED

EESD

N AM D

SAD

EID

PUSD

OID

IPD

SPD

NEWS D

M & VD

PS

PS/LPS

PS/MR HURD

PS/MR BLAKER

PS/PUS

SIR A DUFF

SIR A PARSONS

MR CORTAZZI

MR MURRAY

MR STRATTON

ADDITIONAL DISTN

BOAT PEOPLE

- 2 -
CONFIDENTIAL



Prime Minister

*Are you content
with these arrangements?*

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

9 July 1979

Dear Bryan,

*BU
9/7*

Agreement!
ms

DELEGATION FOR THE GENEVA MEETING ON INDO-CHINA REFUGEES

1. Dr Waldheim's agenda for the Geneva meeting on 20/21 July is contained in UKMIS New York telegram no. 693. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary thinks it is looking increasingly like a pledging meeting, though we shall try to expand its scope or at least get the political aspects aired in the margins.

2. Lord Carrington will consider with the Prime Minister whether he should attend personally for part of the meeting. However, he proposes that Mr Blaker should attend throughout and should go to Geneva with officials at least a day in advance for consultations with friendly and like-minded delegations.

3. Lord Carrington thinks the delegation should consist of:

- | | |
|--|---|
| 1. Mr Peter Blaker MP | Minister of State |
| 2. Mr C A Munro | Private Secretary |
| 3. Mr D F Murray | Assistant Under-Secretary
of State, FCO |
| 4. Mr T C S Stitt | First Secretary, South East
Asia Department, FCO |
| 5. A member of News Department | FCO |
| 6. Miss S Holt | Secretary |
| 7. Mr S Maideen | Adviser |
| 8. One representative of the
Standing Conference on
Refugees | Observer |

Home Office

- | | |
|---------------------|------------------------------------|
| 9. Mr P J Woodfield | Deputy Under-Secretary of
State |
|---------------------|------------------------------------|

Hong Kong

- | | |
|-------------------|------------------------|
| 10. Mr L M Davies | Secretary for Security |
| 11. Mr D C Wilson | Political Adviser |

/4.

B G Cartledge Esq
10 Downing Street



4. No 5, the member of News Department, is important. The Conference will attract the maximum of world interest and we can expect the media to concentrate on Geneva and to show particular interest in the activities of the British delegation, given our original call for a conference.

5. No 7, Mr S Maideen (a British subject) has just left Ho Chi Minh City where he was the British Embassy's unofficial representative for some years and was accepted as such by the Vietnamese Government. He knows more than anyone else about the behaviour of the Vietnamese authorities and their organisation of the refugee traffic and his presence will be valuable. Though he is not a UK official, Lord Carrington thinks he can be regarded as one for this meeting and that his travel and expenses should be met from public funds.

6. No 8, a representative from the Standing Conference on Refugees, has been included because Lord Carrington thinks it would be valuable for the voluntary organisations to get an impression at first hand of the complexities of this whole problem. Sir L Kirkley, the Chairman of the Standing Conference on Refugees, suggested a week or two ago that someone should be included. The voluntary organisations would, however, bear the whole cost of his travel and expenses in Geneva.

7. Nos 10 and 11 have been proposed by the Governor of Hong Kong, and their expenses will be borne by Hong Kong. Sir M MacLehose has stressed the importance for public relations purposes in Hong Kong, as well as for the substance of the problem, of having a strong Hong Kong team. Given the weight we shall be attaching to the refugee problem in Hong Kong, Lord Carrington agrees with the Governor.

8. I should be grateful if you would confirm that the Prime Minister agrees with this composition.

Yes even,
Stephen
 (J S Wall)

B G Cartledge Esq
 10 Downing Street



19 JUL 1979



CONFIDENTIAL



PRIME MINISTER

Following our discussion this morning about Vietnamese refugees, I have reviewed where we stand now and what would be involved in taking more. It is difficult at very short notice to give a complete and accurate account but the following are the facts that I have. We have taken, or are in the process of taking, about 2,000 who have been picked up at sea by British captains, some 1,300 since the election, most of them from the Sibonga and the Roach Bank. We are committed by a decision of the previous Government, at the request of the UNHCR, to taking 1,500 from camps, allocated as follows:-

1,000 from Hong Kong

250 from Malaysia

250 from Thailand

Of these, about 300 have arrived so far.

There are no insuperable practical reception problems in taking larger numbers - e.g. the overall total of 10,000 suggested by UNHCR - provided we can control the rate of arrivals, as I have no doubt we could do with the co-operation of the Governor of Hong Kong. Of the refugees who arrived around October, about half have since been resettled in long-term housing. On their experience so far, the voluntary refugee organisations think that, on average, the refugees ought not to have to spend longer than six months in a reception centre before being rehoused. On this basis, it would be possible to receive about 3,000-4,000 refugees a year in the accommodation now available.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

It would be difficult to say how easy it would be to get larger numbers out of the camps and settled into housing and work, but there have been many offers of local authority housing for the refugees. Most recently the GLC has offered 400 housing units (enough for about 2,000 people). Other offers total about 250 units. The language difficulty means that it is likely to take up to a year or so before most of them are employable. Those who have come here so far, however, appear to be mostly young, skilled and professional people. The morale of the refugees in the centres is reported to be high and they have a strong will to make a success of their life in this country. From all we know these people are more than eager to stand on their own feet.

Of course a decision to accept more Vietnamese refugees has to be seen against the background of immigration policy generally. But as I said at our meeting, I do not believe it is in the interests of the Government to encourage a link between the two subjects. Each stands in its own right. It is necessary to tighten our immigration controls: it is also necessary that we should have a positive and defensible policy towards refugees from a brutal Communist tyranny. To make the one dependent on the other weakens the force of our case for each.

Of course if we are to take more Vietnamese refugees we must be especially vigorous in controlling immigration generally, and it may be helpful to you and to our colleagues to know what progress I have made on this front.


It is now clear to me that there is a good deal more scope for tightening the Rules than we could have known about when we wrote the Manifesto. Instead of making amendments to the Rules confined to our Manifesto commitments, I intend to lay a completely new set after the recess. They will cover our Manifesto commitments and other matters besides. I intend to announce before the Party Conference what the changes will be.

CONFIDENTIAL

3.

If we rush this we are likely to get it wrong, especially on the very important matter of male fiances and husbands. I am in no doubt that the acceptance of male fiances and husbands from India and Pakistan (it has hardly caught on yet in Bangladesh but will do so if we leave things as they are) is being used as a means of primary immigration. But it would be unfortunate, to say the least, if a general ban meant that a British girl who married, for example, an American or an Australian man had to leave the country in order to live with her husband. So I am looking for ways of drafting rules that would enable us to make a distinction between a marriage entered into for the purpose of achieving settlement here for the man and one which was a genuine match - and a distinction which would also have the best chance of standing up to a challenge in the European Court.

I am sending copies of this minute to our colleagues on the OD Committee, and to Sir John Hunt.



9 July 1979



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

9 July 1979

I now enclose the signed original of the Prime Minister's reply to Mr. Menachem Begin's letter to her of 19 June, about Vietnamese refugees, and should be grateful if you would arrange for it to be forwarded to Tel Aviv for delivery to Mr. Begin's office by our Embassy.

B. G. CARTLEDGE

Paul Lever, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

9B

CONFIDENTIAL



Vietnam
file 26

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

B/C 9-7-79

9 July 1979

Dear Sir,

VIETNAMESE REFUGEES

At an informal meeting with the Prime Minister this morning, at which the Home Secretary was also present, the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary gave an account of the plight, which he had seen at first hand, of the Vietnamese refugees in Hong Kong and expressed the view that the UK should accept, at the outset of the forthcoming Geneva Conference on Refugees, the target quota of a further intake of 10,000 Vietnamese refugees which had been identified for the UK by the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, Mr. Hartling.

Lord Carrington suggested that, in accepting Mr. Hartling's target, the UK should stipulate that these 10,000 additional refugees should be taken from Hong Kong only; that it should be spread over a period of 2 years; and that any Vietnamese boat people rescued on the high seas by UK registered ships should be subtracted from the overall total.

The Home Secretary indicated that 3,000 additional Vietnamese refugees could be admitted annually on the basis of existing reception facilities and without opening new camps or reception centres. The Prime Minister made it clear that she wished the Government's approach to this matter to be considered against the background of immigration policy as a whole. It was later agreed that the matter should be discussed in OD tomorrow, 10 July: Lord Carrington would introduce the subject orally and Mr. Whitelaw would circulate a paper on the arrangements made for the reception of the Vietnamese refugees already admitted to the UK, giving an indication of what had happened to them, and on the facilities which existed for the reception of an increased quota.

/I am sending

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

- 2 -

I am sending copies of this letter to John Chilcot (Home Office) and to the Private Secretaries to the other members of OD; and to Martin Vile (Cabinet Office).

Yours etc,

Bryan Cardew.

J. S. Wall, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CONFIDENTIAL

2/6

CONFIDENTIAL

cc Master set

Enlu na
GWA
9/7

NOTE FOR THE RECORD

VIETNAMESE REFUGEES

The Prime Minister had an informal meeting with the Home Secretary and the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary in the Cabinet Room on 9 July at 1230 to discuss the Government's approach to the continuing problem of Vietnamese refugees.

Lord Carrington gave a vivid account of the plight, which he had witnessed at first hand, of the Vietnamese refugees in Hong Kong. He said that the approach which other countries, such as the United States, were likely to adopt towards the problem of Vietnamese refugees in general was likely to be conditioned in part by the UK's own policy to the refugees in Hong Kong. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Mr. Hartling, had suggested that the UK should accept 10,000 refugees as its contribution towards the international effort which the United Kingdom, together with other countries, had sought to stimulate. Lord Carrington said he was very concerned that if the UK did not come forward with a significant offer, there would be a damaging reaction both internationally and in the British Press.

The Prime Minister said that, in that case, the UK would have to cut down on the level of immigration into the UK, and in particular on the admission of dependants. The Home Secretary pointed out that in this area the UK was bound by the terms of the 1971 Immigration Act; no reductions were feasible. Lord Carrington suggested that the British Government should offer to take 10,000 refugees from Hong Kong alone, and that this intake should be spread over a period of 2 years. The UK should also make it clear that any refugees picked up on the high seas by UK registered ships would be subtracted from this total of 10,000. He thought that any lesser offer would be difficult to sustain internationally. The Prime Minister said that, on humanitarian grounds, she would much rather see the UK take in refugees than immigrants. With some exceptions there had been no humanitarian case for accepting 1½ million immigrants from South Asia and elsewhere. It was essential to draw a line somewhere.

CONFIDENTIAL /Mr. Whitelaw

CONFIDENTIAL

- 2 -

Mr. Whitelaw expressed the view that the British Press was now coming round towards the view that the UK should take more refugees; Mr. William Deedes felt passionately and the Economist, the Observer and the Guardian were taking a similar line. A recent meeting of the Party's Home Affairs Committee, which he had chaired, had shown that there was a considerable body of opinion in the Party which favoured increasing the UK's intake. A substantial number of members agreed with Reg Prentice's views, as indeed did all his Junior Ministers in the Home Office. Mr. Whitelaw said that if the Home Office were asked to accept 3,000 more refugees annually, this could be done on the basis of existing resources without opening up any additional camps or other facilities.

Mr. Whitelaw went on to say that the refugees and the immigrants were different kinds of people; his own preference would be not to mix the two categories in the same public presentation of the Government's case. He was at the moment endeavouring to find a means of tackling the problem of immigrant male fiancés: his objective would be to stop abuse of the law without frustrating genuine individual wishes. The procedures which he had in mind were a kind of steeple-chase, designed to weed out South Asians in particular. It would in principle be possible to introduce the necessary legislation by late July. He would prefer to do so at a later stage but it would be feasible to bring the legislation forward if this was essential. He had looked at the question of a register of dependents, which had been advocated in the Party's Election Manifesto, but had concluded that this would cost millions of pounds and would employ thousands of Civil Servants. A reduction in the inward flow of immigrants might compensate for a higher intake of Vietnamese refugees.

The Prime Minister said that in her view the 1,500 Vietnamese refugees whom the UK had already accepted recently should be subtracted from the 10,000 quota, if the Government decided to agree to this. Lord Carrington expressed reservations. The Home Secretary said that his own correspondence indicated a shift of opinion... in favour of accepting more refugees. The Prime Minister said that in her view all those who wrote letters in this sense should be invited to accept one into their homes. She thought it quite wrong that immigrants should be given council housing whereas white

/citizens

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

- 3 -

citizens were not.

The Prime Minister asked whether a new influx of Vietnamese refugees could be resettled? It might be a matter simply of shifting them from one warehouse in Hong Kong to another in the UK. Mr. Whitelaw undertook to produce a detailed report on how the Vietnamese refugees admitted so far had been processed and on what had happened to them since their arrival. He would put a paper to Cabinet, in consultation with the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary. Lord Carrington said that this would have to be done quickly, since the UN Conference was due to meet on 20 July. It was agreed that the paper would come before Cabinet on 12 July.

Lord Carrington said that the UK would also have to offer some money at the forthcoming Conference. The Prime Minister said that if money was to be offered, it would have to come out of the FCO Vote.

The Prime Minister pointed out that throughout the weekend the No. 10 Press Office had been denying Press reports to the effect that the UK was about to agree to accept 10,000 more Vietnamese refugees. The Home Secretary asked whether the UK could not go for 6,000, or perhaps 9,000 spread over a period of three years. Lord Carrington said that in his view the UK would have to accept the target set for it by Mr. Hartling in order to get the Conference, for which the UK had itself called, off to a good start. The Prime Minister mentioned the problem which would face the UK over the refugees from Rhodesia, following Independence, but said that she had less objection to refugees such as Rhodesians, Poles and Hungarians since they could more easily be assimilated into British society.

In a subsequent conversation between the Prime Minister and Lord Carrington alone, it was agreed that the question of the UK approach to the forthcoming Geneva Conference on Refugees should be discussed, not in Cabinet on 12 July, but in OD on 10 July. Lord Carrington would introduce the subject orally and the Home Secretary would circulate his paper. *B.W.*

9 July 1979

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

DSG



FUE

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

9 July 1979

VIETNAMESE REFUGEES

Thank you for your letter of 5 July about consultations with other Governments in advance of the Conference on Refugees from Indo-China which is to meet in Geneva on 20/21 July.

The Prime Minister has seen your letter and was glad to be informed of the action which is being taken.

I am sending copies of this letter to Tony Butler (Home Office), Tom Harris (Department of Trade) and Martin Vile (Cabinet Office).

B. G. CARTLEDGE

J. S. Wall, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CONFIDENTIAL

SKM

PRIME MINISTER

Has seen.

*p.a.
Ryd*

I understand that tomorrow's Sunday Telegraph carries a report that a Cabinet meeting on Friday decided that the UK would accept a further 10,000 Vietnamese refugees.

Neither the Home Office nor the Foreign Office have any idea about the source of the story. The reference to a Cabinet meeting obviously shows that the story is ill-informed. The figure of 10,000 may have come from United Nations sources: this is the figure which has been privately and informally suggested to the UK by the office of the UN High Commissioner for refugees, in the course of preparations for the UN conference on refugees. I expect that this figure will be mentioned when you discuss refugees with the Foreign Secretary and the Home Secretary on Monday, but neither of them is in any way committed to it.

This will obviously generate Press enquiries. I am in touch with Henry James about this. I expect that the line will be that there has been no recent meeting of Ministers on the subject. Ministers will shortly be considering the British position for the conference. There are great difficulties in any further significant intake of refugees into the UK, as you made clear in Tokyo.

M.A.P.

7 July 1979

SUBJECT



Please Quote

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T 398/79T

OFFICE OF THE PREMIER

Belmopan,
Cayo District, Belize
Central America.

6 July 1979

Rt. Hon. Mrs. Margaret Thatcher, PC, MP
Prime Minister of Great Britain
No. 10 Downing Street
London, ENGLAND

peb

Dear Madam Prime Minister,

On behalf of the Belize Government I write to express our sympathy for the plight of the refugees in Hong Kong, and as positive evidence of this sympathy, I wish to say that the Belize Government is willing to accept a limited number of these refugees.

In order to protect the interest of our Belizean people, the Government would accept these people on the basis that they do not become a burden and impose any hardships on our own people.

A necessary condition will be to ensure that the funds provided for the settlement of these refugees, as provided by the agencies who are assisting in this exercise, are sufficient to settle the refugees with due provision being made for their maintenance and social welfare, i.e. health, education and welfare of the refugees.

(Cont'd)



Please Quote

OFFICE OF THE PREMIER

Belmopan,
Cayo District, Belize
Central America.

- 2 -

I hope that my Government's offer is given serious consideration and enough notice is given so that arrangements can be made for smooth settlement of the refugees.

Sincerely

A handwritten signature in blue ink, reading "George Price". The signature is written in a cursive style with a long horizontal stroke at the end.

(GEORGE PRICE)
Premier



10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

SUBJECT

cc: Lord Privy Seal. *ajc*

PRIME MINISTER'S

PERSONAL MESSAGE

SERIAL No. T41/79T

6 July 1979

Thank you for writing to me on 19 June, of your concern for Vietnamese refugees now in Malaysia. This is indeed a tragic aspect of the problem created by the expulsion of refugees from Indochina. I agree that a major international effort is needed, to relieve the problems of the refugees and of recipient countries in South East Asia and - somehow - to convince the Vietnamese to moderate their inhumane policies.

I proposed that a conference should be held under UN auspices because I thought this would be the best way to arouse the conscience of the civilised world and to involve the international community as a whole in practical measures for the refugees' benefit.

Dr. Waldheim has now called a conference in Geneva, and I assure you that we shall play our full part. I hope that it will lead to effective action to solve this appalling human predicament. Meanwhile, I have no doubt that the volume of international disgust at Vietnamese policies will grow: and it is my hope, as it must be yours, that this will cause the Vietnamese to think again.

(SGD) MARGARET THATCHER

His Excellency Mr. Menachem Begin

vb

Heene Rectory,
4, Lansdowne Road,
Worthing.

5 July 1979

From: The Reverend J. H. Money and others.

Dear Mr. Higgins,

We, the Rector, Churchwardens, and members of the Parochial Church Council of St Botolph's Church, Heene, Worthing, wish to tell you of our whole-hearted agreement with Mrs. Thatcher's humane decision to allow the 1,000 Vietnamese refugees picked up by the "Sibonga" to settle in Britain, and we ask you to convey to her our support for her action in this matter.

We very much hope, in the name of mercy and compassion, that she will authorize a larger number of Vietnamese refugees to come into this country than the present quota, which we understand to be only 1,500 persons per year. In so doing, she would not only help to end the sufferings of these unhappy people themselves, but would relieve the pressing problems of our Crown Colony, Hong Kong.

Such humane and Christian action would be a noble example of the application of moral principles in political decisions.

Your sincerely,

J. H. Money (Rector)
Henry Ingram (Churchwarden)
Marjorie Allen (Churchwarden)
Grant (Reader)

B. Ingram.

Tom Lye.

Greene Saxby.

Tom Smedley.

Sreender Phillips

Jaqueline Simpson

Ann G. Hawley/William

Margaret Knill-Jones.

R. L. Burrows

~~John Burrows~~

Kevin E. Harris

2

GPS 110
RESTRICTED
FM UKMIS GENEVA 050925Z JULY
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELNO 268 OF 5 JULY 1979
INFO ROUTINE UKMIS NEW YORK

RESTRICTED

Prime Minister

SW
77

MIPT: MR HURD'S CALL ON UN SECRETARY GENERAL

1. WALDHEIM SAID THAT HE LOOKED FORWARD TO HIS VISIT TO LONDON AND MEETING MRS THATCHER AGAIN. HE WAS CONTENT WITH THE PROGRAMME PROPOSED. MR HURD SAID THAT IT WAS BEING RECOMMENDED TO THE PRIME MINISTER THAT SHE MIGHT CONCENTRATE ON REFUGEES, RHODESIA AND THE MIDDLE EAST, WHILE YOU DEALT SEPARATELY WITH CYPRUS AND NAMIBIA. WALDHEIM CONCURRED AND SAID THAT HE ATTACHED GREAT IMPORTANCE TO CLOSE RELATIONS WITH THE UK BECAUSE OF THE IMPLICATIONS AT THE UN OF OUR POLICY ON PROBLEMS LIKE RHODESIA AND NAMIBIA. HE PARTICULARLY LOOKED FORWARD TO HEARING THE OUTCOME OF MR PIK BOTHA'S RECENT VISIT TO LONDON.

2. MIPT RECORDS WALDHEIM'S COMMENTS ON THE MIDDLE EAST.

MURRAY
DEPTL DISTN.
UND
SEAD
NENAD
MED
RHOD D.
OADS
SED
OJD
NEWS D
CABINET OFFICE

[COPIES SENT TO NO10 DOWNING ST.]

RESTRICTED.

RESTRICTED

2

GR 300

RESTRICTED

FM UKMIS NEW YORK 051430Z JULY 79

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 693 OF 5 JULY

INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS GENEVA, PRIORITY WASHINGTON, HONG KONG, TOKYO, MANILA, KUALA LUMPUR, SINGAPORE, BANGKOK, JAKARTA, OTTAWA, PEKING, MOSCOW, PARIS, BONN.

Prime Minister
If there are to be no
resolutions or voting, it
is difficult to see what the
meeting can achieve
GHS
6/7

MY TELNO 692: INDO-CHINESE REFUGEES

1. WE HAVE THIS MORNING RECEIVED FROM THE SECRETARY-GENERAL A THIRD PERSON NOTE SETTING OUT PRACTICAL ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE GENEVA MEETING AND ASKING THAT THEY BE TELEGRAPHED TO YOU. THE RELEVANT PART OF THE TEXT READS AS FOLLOWS:-

1. THE MEETING WILL BE HELD AT PALAIS DES NATIONS, GENEVA.
2. THE MEETING WILL OPEN 10:00 A.M., FRIDAY 20 JULY AND CONCLUDE SATURDAY EVENING 21 JULY.
3. THE MEETING IS TO DEAL WITH ALL HUMANITARIAN ASPECTS OF THE REFUGEE PROBLEM, INCLUDING ASYLUM AND THE RELATED QUESTION OF RESCUE AT SEA, SAFE AND ORDERLY DEPARTURE AND DURABLE SOLUTIONS. IT IS THE HOPE THAT GOVERNMENTS WILL BE PREPARED TO ANNOUNCE AT THE MEETING SPECIFIC CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE UNHCR PROGRAMME, INCLUDING SIGNIFICANT INCREASES IN RESETTLEMENT OPPORTUNITIES AND FUNDS.
4. THE MEETING WILL BE CHAIRED BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL WITH THE ASSISTANCE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES.
5. A BACKGROUND PAPER IS BEING PREPARED BY UNHCR AND WILL BE DISTRIBUTED IN THE NEXT FEW DAYS.
6. INTERPRETATION FACILITIES WILL BE AVAILABLE IN THE OFFICIAL LANGUAGES OF THE UNITED NATIONS.
7. IN VIEW BREVITY OF MEETING (TWO DAYS) AND EXPECTED NUMBER OF PARTICIPANTS (ABOUT SIXTY), DELEGATIONS ARE KINDLY REQUESTED TO LIMIT THEIR STATEMENTS TO APPROXIMATELY TEN MINUTES.

RESTRICTED

| 8.

RESTRICTED

8. THE MEETING WILL BE CONCLUDED BY SUMMING-UP STATEMENT BY SECRETARY-GENERAL.

(9. NO RESOLUTIONS OR VOTING ENVISAGED.

ENDS

RICHARD

F I L E S
SEAD
HK & GD
UND
FED
EESD
N AM D
SAD
EID
PUSD
OId
IPD
PCD

NEWS D
M & VD
PS
PS/LPS
PS/MR HURD
PS/MR BLAKER
PS/PUS
SIR A DUFF
SIR A PARSONS
MR CORTAZZI
MR MURRAY
MR STRATTON

ADDITIONAL DISTN
BOAT PEOPLE

- 2 -
RESTRICTED

CONFIDENTIAL

GR 250

CONFIDENTIAL

DELHI 050640Z JULY

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 513 OF 05 JULY 1979

2

Press Minute

SECRETARY OF STATE'S VISIT TO DELHI: 2 - 3 JULY

MY TELNO 510: VIETNAMESE REFUGEES.

del
67

1. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SPOKE VIVIDLY ON THIS SUBJECT TO DESAI, WHO WAS CLEARLY IMPRESSED. HE HAD ASSUMED THAT THE REFUGEES WERE MAINLY PEOPLE WHO HAD SUPPORTED THE US DURING THE WAR AND TO THAT EXTENT HAD BROUGHT THEIR TROUBLES UPON THEMSELVES. BUT IN THE LIGHT OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE'S ACCOUNT OF THE SITUATION DESAI UNDERTOOK TO WRITE AS FORCEFULLY AS WAS CONSISTENT WITH POLITE PRACTICE TO THE VIETNAMESE LEADERS.

2. THE SECRETARY OF STATE ALSO SPOKE STRONGLY ON THE MATTER TO VAJPAYEE. WHEN I SAID TO THE LATTER THAT I ASSUMED INDIA WOULD ATTEND THE CONFERENCE CALLED BY MR WALDHEIM, HE REPLIED THAT INDIA HAD NOT RECEIVED AN INVITATION AND IT WAS PREMATURE TO SAY WHAT THEY WOULD DO. IN FURTHER EXCHANGES HE ADMITTED THAT IT WOULD BE WRONG TO TALK ABOUT HUMAN RIGHTS AND TO NEGLECT WHAT THE VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT WAS DOING. THERE SHOULD NOT BE A DOUBLE STANDARD IN SUCH MATTERS.

3. THE SECRETARY OF STATE DREW ATTENTION TO THE SUBJECT IN HIS PRESS CONFERENCE. AS A RESULT OF HIS VISIT THERE HAD BEEN CONSIDERABLE COVERAGE WITH PICTURES IN THE INDIAN PRESS OF THE PLIGHT OF THE REFUGEES.

THOMSON

FILES
SEAD
HK & GD
UND
FED
EESD
N AM D
SAD
EID
PUSD
OID
IPD

NEWS D
M & VD
PS
PS/LPS
PS/MR. HURD
PS/MR. BLAKER
PS/PUS
SIR A DUFF
SIR A PARSONS
MR. CORTAZZI
MR. MURRAY
MR. STRATTON

ADDITIONAL DISTN.
BOAT PEOPLE

CONFIDENTIAL

GPS 430

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED

2

FM UKMIS GENEVA 050910Z JUL 79

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 259 OF 05 JULY 1979

INFO PRIORITY UKMIS NEW YORK, INFO ROUTINE HONG KONG, CANBERRA. *BM*
INFO SAVING WASHINGTON, HANOI, PEKING. *47*

YOUR TELNO 131: INDO-CHINESE REFUGEES: MR HURD'S CALL ON
DR WALDHEIM

1. MR HURD CALLED ON WALDHEIM ON 4 JULY AND HANDED OVER THE
TEXTS OF THE PRIME MINISTER'S TWO MESSAGES (YOUR TELNOS
129 AND 130).

2. WALDHEIM SAID THAT HE HAD TRIED VERY HARD TO RESPOND TO THE
PRIME MINISTER'S WISH FOR AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE. AS
SECRETARY GENERAL HE DID NOT HAVE THE CONSTITUTIONAL
AUTHORITY TO ACT ON HIS OWN TO CONVENE A CONFERENCE.
BUT OUT OF A DESIRE TO BE HELPFUL HE HAD TAKEN THE
UNPRECEDENTED STEP OF CALLING A MEETING ON THE BASIS OF HIS
PERSONAL INVITATION AND OUTSIDE NORMAL UN PROCEDURES TO
DISCUSS THE HUMANITARIAN ASPECTS. HE HOPED THAT DISCUSSION AT THE
MEETING COULD BE CONFINED AS FAR AS POSSIBLE TO THE HUMANITARIAN
ASPECTS. HE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THERE WOULD INEVITABLY BE
SOME REFERENCE TO VIETNAM'S ROLE BUT HE WANTED TO AVOID THE
THE CONFERENCE DETERIORATING INTO A POLITICAL CONFRONTATION WHICH
COULD INVOLVE HIM IN CONTROVERSY AND BE COUNTERPRODUCTIVE. HE
HOPED GOVERNMENTS WOULD BEAR HIS PERSONAL POSITION IN MIND.

3. HE PROPOSED TO MAKE AN OPENING STATEMENT EXPLAINING THE
PURPOSE OF THE CONFERENCE AND THEN INVITE STATEMENTS FROM
GOVERNMENTS (NO MORE THAN 10 MINUTES EACH) WHICH IT WAS HOPED
WOULD INCLUDE NEW OFFERS OF ASSISTANCE. MR HURD STRESSED THE
IMPORTANCE OF WALDHEIM TAKING THE CHAIR AND WALDHEIM SAID THAT HE
WOULD DO SO FOR THE MORNING SESSION OF THE FIRST DAY AND THEN
HAND OVER TO HARTLING FOR THE AFTERNOON SESSION IN ORDER TO
DEMONSTRATE THE UNHCR'S INVOLVEMENT. HE WOULD RETURN TO THE
CHAIR THE FOLLOWING MORNING. WHEN NOT IN THE CHAIR HE WOULD BE
ON HAND IF ANY DISPUTE AROSE. AT THE CLOSE HE WOULD SUM UP.
(SINCE IT WAS NOT A PROPER UN CONFERENCE THERE COULD BE NO
RESOLUTIONS). THE MEETING WOULD BE IN PUBLIC.

RESTRICTED

14.

RESTRICTED

4. MR HURD SAID THAT WE HOPED THE SOVIET UNION WOULD ATTEND. THEY SHOULD BE EDGED INTO TAKING SOME RESPONSIBILITY. WALDHEIM SAID THAT THE RUSSIANS HAD BEEN APPROACHED THROUGH UNDER SECRETARY-GENERAL SYTENKO IN NEW YORK TO SEE WHETHER THEY WOULD ACCEPT IF INVITED. THEY HAD SUPPORTED THE VIETNAMESE VIEW THAT THE CONFERENCE SHOULD BE SOLELY CONCERNED WITH HUMANITARIAN ASPECTS, BUT HAD SO FAR GIVEN NO CLEAR-CUT ANSWERS. THE CHINESE, WHO UNLIKE THE RUSSIANS WERE MEMBERS OF THE EXECUTIVE BOARD OF UNHCR, HAD ALREADY BEEN INVITED. THEY HAD NOT YET ANSWERED BUT IT HAD SAID THAT THE PRIMARY PURPOSE OF THE MEETING MUST BE TO CONDEMN VIETNAM.

5. MR HURD SAID THAT WE WERE NOW CONSIDERING WHOM WE WOULD SEND TO THE MEETING AND HOW TO RESPOND TO MR HARTLING'S QUESTIONNAIRE.

6. ON ATTENDANCE WALDHEIM SAID THAT THE JAPANESE, THAIS AND MALAYSIANS WERE SENDING CABINET MINISTERS AND THERE WAS TALK OF THE US SENDING MONDALE OR VANCE.

FCO PLEASE PASS SAVING ADDRESSEES

MURRAY

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

FILES
SEAD
HK & GD
UND
FED
EESD
N AM D
SAD
EID
PUSD
OJD
IPD

NEWS D
M & VD
PS
PS/LPS
PS/MR HURD
PS/MR BLAKER
PS/PUS
SIR A DUFF
SIR A PARSONS
MR CORTAZZI
MR MURRAY
MR STRATTON

ADDITIONAL DISTN
BOAT PEOPLE

2
RESTRICTED

2



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

5 July 1979

Dear Bryan

*Phanuyon
nis*

Prime Minister

Vietnamese Refugees

*You will wish
to know that action is
in hand -
SWS
4*

Thank you for your letter of 2 July about the Prime Minister's instructions that consultations with Australia, the United States, Canada and perhaps France, with a view to arriving at a common approach to the conference in Geneva on 20/21 July, should be put in hand as a matter of urgency.

Missions in London were consulted on 3 July and we have convened an officials' meeting for 11 July. This will give time for governments to send full instructions to London.

[A] /
[A] /

After the FCO had taken action, we received Canberra telegram No 371, expanding on the Prime Minister's discussion with Mr Fraser and Mr MacKellar in Canberra. We have now had a further telegram (No 381, which I also enclose.) We have taken this into account in the enclosed draft telegram of instruction to Canberra.

I am sending copies of this letter and enclosure to Tony Butler (Home Office), Tom Harris (Department of Trade) and Martin Vile (Cabinet Office).

Yours ever,

Stephen

J S Wall

B G Cartledge Esq
10 Downing Street

F-5 JUL 1979



ADVANCES: BOAT PEOPLE

22

IMMEDIATE
PS/NO 10 DOWNING STREET

A

PS
PS/IPS
PS/MR HURD
PS/MR BLAKER
PS/PUS
SIR A DUFF
SIR A PARSONS
~~MR CORTAZZI~~
MR MURRAY
MR STRATTON
HD/UND
HD/HK & GD
HD/MVD
HD/NEWS D
HD/SEAD
HD/N AM D
HD/EESD
HD/OID

RESIDENT CLERK

W. J. S. P. D.

GRS 488

CONFIDENTIAL

FM CANBERRA 030655Z JUL 73

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 371 OF 03 JULY 1973

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON AND UKMIS NEW YORK

IMMEDIATE

REFUGEES

1. DURING HER TALKS ON 1 JULY IN CANBERRA, THE PRIME MINISTER AGREED WITH MR FRASER THAT IT WOULD BE A GOOD IDEA IF BRITAIN AND AUSTRALIA, BEFORE THE CONFERENCE CALLED BY DR WALDHEIM FOR 20/21 JULY, COULD GET TOGETHER WITH LIKE-MINDED COUNTRIES TO TRY TO AGREE A CONCERTED PLAN ON REFUGEES.

2. THE AUSTRALIANS WOULD BE GRATEFUL FOR OUR URGENT OBSERVATIONS ON THE FOLLOWING:

3. THE AUSTRALIAN MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION, WHO IS LEAVING CANBERRA ON 14 JULY, WILL BE IN LONDON FROM 16 TO 18 JULY AND WOULD LIKE TO TALK TO YOU. PERHAPS THESE BILATERAL TALKS COULD TAKE PLACE ON 16 JULY, FOLLOWED ON 18 JULY BY TALKS IN WHICH OTHERS COULD JOIN. AT THE PRIME MINISTERIAL MEETING IN CANBERRA, THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA HAD BEEN MENTIONED. THE AUSTRALIANS WOULD WELCOME OUR VIEWS ON WHETHER FRENCH, NEW ZEALAND AND JAPANESE MINISTERS MIGHT ALSO BE INVITED.

ON WHETHER FRENCH, NEW ZEALAND AND JAPANESE MINISTERS MIGHT ALSO BE INVITED.

4. IF THE ABOVE SEEMS A STARTER TO US, THE AUSTRALIANS WOULD WELCOME OUR REACTION BY THURSDAY SO THAT THEY COULD RAISE THE QUESTION WITH MR DICK CLARK (US AMBASSADOR AT LARGE), WHO ARRIVES IN CANBERRA ON THAT DAY.

5. IF THE UNITED STATES IN TURN SUPPORTED THE IDEA, THE AUSTRALIANS WOULD THEN CALL IN HEADS OF MISSION OF LIKE-MINDED COUNTRIES ON MONDAY 9 JULY (IE, BUT SUBJECT TO YOUR VIEWS, CANADA, FRANCE, NEW ZEALAND, JAPAN) AND SUGGEST THAT THEIR MINISTERS MIGHT MEET IN LONDON AS PROPOSED ABOVE.

6. THE AUSTRALIANS THEN FEEL IT WOULD BE USEFUL TO CALL IN HEADS OF MISSION FROM ASEAN COUNTRIES, GERMANY AND LATIN AMERICA ON THE AFTERNOON OF 9 JULY TO GIVE THEM AN INDICATION OF AUSTRALIA'S LATEST THINKING ON THE CONFERENCE AND OF HER UNDERSTANDING OF THE VIEWS OF OTHERS. THE AUSTRALIANS WOULD NOT, OF COURSE, INDICATE TO THIS AFTERNOON GROUP THAT A LIMITED MINISTERIAL MEETING IN LONDON WAS IN PROSPECT. THEY WOULD SIMPLY SEEK TO ELICIT THE VIEWS OF THOSE WHOM THEY WERE BRIEFING.

7. IN ADDITION TO AN EARLY REACTION FROM YOU ON THE ABOVE PROPOSAL, AUSTRALIANS WOULD ALSO WELCOME YOUR VIEW ON:

- A) WHAT SORT OF CONFERENCE WE EXPECT ON 20 JULY. SINCE DR WALDHEIM WILL BE IN THE CHAIR, THE AUSTRALIANS EXPECT THE CONFERENCE TO COVER BOTH HUMANITARIAN AND POLITICAL QUESTIONS.
- B) WOULD WE SEE VALUE IN THE AUSTRALIANS PREPARING A DRAFT RESOLUTION FOR CONSIDERATION AT LONDON. AN AGREED RESOLUTION COULD THEN PERHAPS BE TABLED AT THE CONFERENCE EITHER BY AUSTRALIA OR JOINTLY SPONSORED.

TEBBIT

IMMEDIATE

NN

X-19

B

ADVANCES: BOAT PEOPLE

IMMEDIATE

PS
 PS/LPS
 PS/MR HURD
 PS/MR BLAKER
 PS/PUS
 SIR A DUFF
 SIR A PARSONS
 MR CORTAZZI
 MR MURRAY
 MR STRATTON
 HD/UND
 HD/HK & GD
 HD/MVD
 HD/NEWS D
 HD/SEAD
 HD/N AM D
 HD/EESD
 HD/OID
 RESIDENT CLERK

PS/NO 10 DOWNING STREET

Talk to D. Murray

GRS 65

CONFIDENTIAL

FM CANBERRA 050605Z JUL 79

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 381 OF 05 JULY 1979

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON AND URMIS NEW YORK

MY TELNO 371 AND YOUR TELNO 297: REFUGEES
FOR MURRAY

1. SENIOR OFFICIAL IN THE DEPARTMENT OF IMMIGRATION HAS TOLD US THAT, IN THE LIGHT OF DISCUSSIONS IN CANBERRA YESTERDAY WITH MR VANCE THE AUSTRALIANS THEMSELVES NOW DOUBT THE WISDOM OF A LIMITED MINISTERIAL MEETING IN LONDON, AS PROPOSED IN MY TUR. THEY WOULD, HOWEVER, STILL WELCOME A BILATERAL MINISTERIAL EXCHANGE.

TEBBIT

NNNN

File No.
Department
Drafted by
(Block Capitals) D F MURRAY
Tel. Extn. 233 3566

OUTWARD
TELEGRAM

Security Classification CONFIDENTIAL
Precedence IMMEDIATE
DESKBYZ

FOR
COMMS. DEPT.
USE

Despatched (Date)
(Time)Z POSTBYZ

PREAMBLE

(Time of Origin) Z (G.M.T.) (Restrictive Prefix)
(Security Class.) CONFIDENTIAL (Caveat/
Privacy marking)
(Codeword) (Deskby) Z

TO IMMEDIATE CANBERRA Tel. No. of
(precedence) (post)

AND TO (precedence/post)

AND SAVING TO

REPEATED TO (for info) IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON PARIS AND OTTAWA
PRIORITY UKMIS NEW YORK, UKMIS GENEVA

SAVING TO (for info)

Distribution:-

BOAT PEOPLE
PLUS SPD

Copies to:-

[TEXT]

Your telnos 371 & 381: INDO-CHINA REFUGEES (NOT TO ALL)

1. Before receipt of your/^{first}TUR, the Prime Minister had already instructed, as a result of her talks in Canberra, for consultations to be put in hand immediately with Australia, the US, Canada and perhaps France, with a view to arriving at a common approach to the conference. We have therefore called a meeting of officials from these missions in London on Wednesday, 11 July and have asked missions to seek full instructions by then. We know the Australians reported this proposal on 3 July.

2. In preliminary consultations with missions in London to arrange this meeting, Murray stressed the Prime Minister's close interest in the conference and the importance for like-minded countries of pooling

information and views. The sort of issues on which a common line would be valuable were:

- a). how should we ensure that Vietnam's responsibility for causing the crisis is adequately revealed without risking being ruled out of order by Waldheim or encouraging the hard-liners, e.g. the Chinese and possibly the Singaporeans, to lay into the Vietnamese so hard as to risk disrupting the meeting?;
- b). What do we see as our objectives for the conference in terms of a final declaration, or resolutions, or other actions, so as to establish that this is something more than simply a pledging conference?;
- c). How do we ensure that countries who fail to attend, or offer very little at the conference, are induced to help the international effort properly?

3. Murray said that this list was not exhaustive and we would welcome a wide discussion. On (c), he had in mind particularly the South Americans who might fear pressure on themselves. The US Embassy's first comment on this was that the Americans could probably lean on them.

4. On the Australian proposal for a meeting of Ministers, we had thought it important for the mind-clearing meeting of officials with limited participation to go ahead first. We have invited the French because of their Indo-China connections and their large intake /of

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

of refugees. We are inclined not to include the New Zealanders or Japanese at this stage.

5. We note that the Australians are now proposing only a bilateral at Ministerial level. It may, however, be useful for Ministers concerned ^(ie W, Canada France) to arrive in Geneva half a day earlier and to meet informally there. We see some advantage in broadening these prior discussions in Geneva to include New Zealand, Japan and perhaps Germany - as well as perhaps ASEAN countries at a second stage.

6. If the Australians agree with this procedure, we might agree in the next few days on a list of countries who could be encouraged to arrange for their Ministers to arrive in Geneva in time for prior consultations there. Washington, Paris and Ottawa should discuss this with Foreign Ministries when stressing to them the importance of an effective officials' meeting next week. We are repeating your TURs to these posts and Geneva.

7. Officials could profitably discuss the questions in your para 7 when they meet next week. We agree that political questions will inevitably be raised at Waldheim's conference though Waldheim's intention is clearly mainly humanitarian. It is not yet certain that Waldheim will chair throughout (UKMIS Geneva telno 254).

CONFIDENTIAL

GRS 65

CONFIDENTIAL

FM CANBERRA 050605Z JUL 79

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 381 OF 05 JULY 1979

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON AND UXMIS NEW YORK

*Endw na
b/w
sy*

MY TELNO 371 AND YOUR TELNO 297; REFUGEES
FOR MURRAY

1. SENIOR OFFICIAL IN THE DEPARTMENT OF IMMIGRATION HAS TOLD US
THAT, IN THE LIGHT OF DISCUSSIONS IN CANBERRA YESTERDAY WITH MR VANCE
THE AUSTRALIANS THEMSELVES NOW DOUBT THE WISDOM OF A LIMITED
MINISTERIAL MEETING IN LONDON, AS PROPOSED IN MY TUR. THEY WOULD,
HOWEVER, STILL WELCOME A BILATERAL MINISTERIAL EXCHANGE.

TEBBIT

F I L E S

SEAD

HK & GD

UND

FED

EESD

N AM D

SAD

EID

PUSD

OID

IPD

NEWS D

M & VD

PS

PS/LPS

PS/MR HURD

PS/MR BLAKER

PS/PUS

SIR A DUFF

SIR A PARSONS

MR CORTAZZI

MR MURRAY

MR STRATTON

ADDITIONAL DISTN

BOAT PEOPLE

CONFIDENTIAL

GR 200

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED

FM F 00 041003Z JUL 79

TO IMMEDIATE UKMIS GENEVA

TELEGRAM NUMBER 130 OF 4 JULY

INFO UKMIS NEW YORK WASHINGTON ALL EEC POSTS GOV HONG KONG KUALA LUMPUR BANGKOK SINGAPORE JAKARTA MANILA HANOI PEKING CANBERRA WELLINGTON OTTAWA AND TOKYO.

*Enter via
BYW
177*

INDO-CHINESE REFUGEES

M-I-P-T

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF DRAFT MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO DR WALDHEIM IN RESPONSE TO HIS PERSONAL MESSAGE BEGINS:

THANK YOU FOR YOUR MESSAGE OF 1 JULY, IN WHICH YOU REPLIED TO MY LETTER OF 17 JUNE ABOUT THE INDO-CHINESE REFUGEE PROBLEM. I HAVE REPLIED SEPARATELY TO YOUR INVITATION FOR THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT TO BE REPRESENTED AT THE MEETING IN GENEVA ON 20 JULY. WE SHALL OF COURSE ATTEND AND PLAY A CONSTRUCTIVE ROLE.

I AGREE THAT THERE IS AN URGENT NEED TO FIND SOLUTIONS OF A HUMANITARIAN NATURE FOR THE REFUGEES' PLIGHT. BUT LIKE YOU, I CONSIDER THAT THE ROOT CAUSE OF THE PROBLEM MUST ALSO BE DEALT WITH. THE VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT HAS A RESPONSIBILITY TO CONDUCT ITS AFFAIRS IN A WAY THAT DOES NOT CONDEMN PART OF ITS OWN POPULATION TO SUCH SUFFERING AS THE WORLD NOW WITNESSES.

I WAS GLAD TO SEE THAT YOU HAD BEEN IN TOUCH WITH REPRESENTATIVES OF THE GOVERNMENTS MOST DIRECTLY CONCERNED. I AM WELL AWARE OF THE DIFFICULTIES.

I GREATLY LOOK FORWARD TO DISCUSSING THIS AND OTHER MATTERS WITH YOU IN LONDON ON 12 JULY.

ENDS

CARRINGTON

FILES
SEAD
HK & GD
UND
FED
EESD
N AM D
SAD
EID
PUSD
OID
IPD

NEWS D
M & VD
PS
PS/LPS
PS/MR. HURD
PS/MR. BLAKER
PS/PUS
SIR A DUFF
SIR A PARSONS
MR. CORTAZZI
MR. MURRAY
MR. STRATTON

ADDITIONAL DISTN.
BOAT PEOPLE

RESTRICTED

QPS100
RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED

F0FCO 041000Z JUL

TO IMMEDIATE UKMIS GENEVA

TELNO 129 OF 4 JULY

INFO UKMIS NEWYORK WASHINGTON ALL EEC POSTS GOV HONG KONG
KUALA LUMPUR BANGKOK SINGAPORE JAKARTA MANILA HANOI PEKING
CANBERRA WELLINGTON OTTAWA TOKYO.

NIPT

INDO-CHINESE REFUGEES.

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF DRAFT REPLY FROM THE PRIME MINISTER
TO DR WALDHEIM'S INVITATION.

BEGINS

YOUR EXCELLENCY,

I ACCEPT YOUR INVITATION FOR THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT TO BE
REPRESENTED AT THE MEETING AT GENEVA ON 20 JULY. THE BRITISH
REPRESENTATION WILL BE AT MINISTERIAL LEVEL.

LIKE YOU , I CONSIDER IT ESSENTIAL FOR THE MEETING TO PRODUCE
CONCRETE RESULTS AND FOR THIS TO BE DONE BY MEANS OF CAREFUL
ADVANCE PREPARATION.

THE BRITISH REPRESENTATIVE WILL TAKE A CONSTRUCTIVE PART IN THE
DISCUSSIONS.

YOURS **S**INCERELY

MARGARET THATCHER.

ENDS

2. PLEASE SEE MIFT.

CARRINGTON

FILES
SEAD
HK & GD
UND
FED
EESD
N AM D
SAD
EID
PUSD
OID
IPD

NEWS D
M & VD
PS
PS/LPS
PS/MR. HURD
PS/MR. BLAKER
PS/PUS
SIR A DUFF
SIR A PARSONS
MR. CORTAZZI
MR. MURRAY
MR. STRATTON

ADDITIONAL DISTN.
BOAT PEOPLE

RESTRICTED

*Enter in
6/24
17*

RESTRICTED

P S TO P M No10 DOWNING ST

GR 100

RESTRICTED

FM SINGAPORE 040827Z JUL

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELNO 231 OF 4 JUL 79

BAHRAIN TEL TO FCO NO 137: VIETNAMESE REFUGEES: MV ASHFORD.

1. ANTICIPATING THAT YOU WOULD BE SENDING INSTRUCTIONS ON THESE LINES (AND IN VIEW OF PRESSURE FROM THE SHIPS AGENTS WHO HAD HEARD FROM LONDON THAT UK HAD AGREED TO ACCEPT THE REFUGEES), WE ISSUED USUAL GUARANTEE ON 3 JULY. THE 41 ARE NOW ASHORE IN UNHCR CARE. THIS HAS BEEN REPORTED BRIEFLY IN LOCAL PRESS.
2. UNHCR NOW SAY THAT THERE IS POSSIBILITY THAT THREE MAY BE ELIGIBLE FOR RESETTLEMENT IN USA, AND TWO IN CANADA. I ASSUME YOU WILL BE EXPLORING WITH DUTCH POSSIBILITY OF THEIR ACCEPTING SOME.

HENNINGS

Enzo na
by
by

FILES
SEAD
HK & GD
UND
FED
EESD
N AM D
SAD
EID
PUSD
OID
IPD

NEWS D
M & VD
PS
PS/LPS
PS/MR. HURD
PS/MR. BLAKER
PS/PUS.
SIR A DUFF
SIR A PARSONS
MR. CORTAZZI
MR. MURRAY
MR. STRATTON

ADDITIONAL DISTN.
BOAT PEOPLE

RESTRICTED



10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

Original in Col Rogers files

*Vietnam
cc files.
LPS
100.*

4 July 1979

Mrs M.B.L.S. de Roland-Peel

Thank you for your further letter of 10 June about Vietnamese refugees. I have read with interest your latest suggestions for dealing with the boat people. I agree that these unfortunate human beings would probably settle best in an Asian environment, but the plain fact is that the Asian countries of first refuge - and I count Hong Kong in these - can no longer cope with the waves of refugees that have arrived in their territories.

This is why international action is essential and I am glad to have your support. You will have seen that the United Nations Secretary-General has convened a conference for 20-21 July to consider the whole matter. We shall play a full part in this and I can assure you that we shall not relax our search for ways of influencing the Vietnamese Government to stop its inhumane policies.

Yours sincerely

Margaret Thatcher

Mrs M.B.L.S. de Roland-Peel

[Handwritten mark]

From REF PRENTICE.



DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH & SOCIAL SECURITY
Alexander Fleming House, Elephant & Castle, London SE1 6BY
Telephone 01-407 5522
From the Minister of State

Prime Minister

Do you wish to
reply (perhaps
by a phone call)?

4th July 1979. 4/7

Dear Margaret,

I promise not to make a habit of writing letters to you on matters outside my department. However, the "boat people" issue is unique and I feel compelled to put on record my agreement with ^{the} view of today's Telegraph.

Of course I accept that this is a world problem and that it was absolutely right to call for a U.N. Conference. I can appreciate that there may be tactical reasons for not committing ourselves to a large intake in advance of that conference, although this means that some (not all) of our Western allies are now doing much more than we are.

My plea is that we should call for an adequate global response at the conference and make a substantial offer to do more ourselves. I feel we should do this now, but if the tactical argument still prevails, we should surely do it at the outset of the conference - otherwise we cannot appeal to others with any credibility.

PTA

Three issues are surely at stake:

- A. The sheer inhumanity of abandoning these people.
- B. Britain's reputation.
- C. The factual necessity for the West to underwrite our condemnation of Communist inhumanity by a practical demonstration of our own values.

Yours,

Reag.

P.S.

I am copying this to Willie Whitelew, Pete Bonington and Patrick Jenkin. Otherwise I am keeping this approach entirely confidential - hence the handwriting, for which I apologise. I do not ask for a reply. I just had to get this off my chest.

OUT OF THE WATER

FACED WITH A HARSH AND difficult problem, Mrs THATCHER announces her inability to make a commitment on the taking in of the boat people. Nevertheless she should respond. Once in a generation something occurs which stinks to history. The Somme informed our grandparents in this way. (County regiments and Pals' brigades went to extinction by dereliction of intellect in high places). STALIN's archipelago of camps and the monstrous Jew-killing undertaking of HITLER came next. We should not pretend that what now happens in the South China Sea is anything better.

The German word for a place such as Sobibor, Treblinka or Auschwitz was *Vernichtungslager*. Is not the South China Sea upon which little overcrowded boats bob and sink, a *vernichtungslager*, a sea of extermination? Is it not the intention of the Vietnamese régime (with Russia's guilty knowledge and involvement) to send the ethnic Chinese and the Vietnamese middle class to the bottom of the sea? There are at least a million people involved. Not less than half a million are expected to drown—with less record of a great crime than the finger scratchings on the cemented ceiling of the Auschwitz gas chamber.

The Vietnamese rulers and their Soviet partners have told us what sort of people they are, promiscuous killers. But what sort of people are we and what are we going to do? Quite simply we must take—take refugees until it hurts! Scores of thousands of German and Austrian refugees were taken into Britain and we are the richer for it. Let us not insult our ingenuity and humanity by supposing that 50,000 Chinese and Vietnamese cannot be drawn into this country as good citizens. Don't raise abstract moral questions. Trust the morality of a turning stomach, and ask, if we could have reached into the other places of death, would not we have done so? Shall we then not take people out of the sea?

FILE

88



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

4 July 1979

Indo-Chinese Refugees

Thank you for your letter of 4 July, with which you enclosed draft replies which the Prime Minister might send to Dr. Waldheim's two telegrams to her about the conference on refugees which Dr. Waldheim is convening in Geneva on 20 July.

As I told your office on the telephone this afternoon, the Prime Minister is content with these replies which may be telegraphed to Geneva so that Mr. Douglas Hurd may deliver them personally to Dr. Waldheim this evening.

I am sending copies of this letter to Tony Butler (Home Office), Tom Harris (Department of Trade), Bill Beckett (Attorney-General's Office) and Martin Vile (Cabinet Office).

B. G. CARTLEDGE

S. J. Gomersall, Esq.,
Lord Privy Seal's Office.

Handwritten initials or signature in the bottom right corner.

010
RESTRICTED



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

4 July 1979

Dear Bryan

INDO-CHINESE REFUGEES

On 2 July you asked for advice for the Prime Minister in replying to two telegrams from Dr Waldheim:

- i) inviting the Government to be represented at the meeting on 20 July in Geneva, and
- ii) replying to the Prime Minister's message to Dr Waldheim of 17 June.

I enclose drafts. Mr Hurd will be seeing Dr Waldheim in Geneva at 1800^{*} hours this evening. If the Prime Minister agrees the drafts, these could be telegraphed in time for him to hand the replies to Dr Waldheim at that meeting.

There will be an opportunity to discuss the political aspects of the problem when Dr Waldheim is here for consultations on 12 July.

I am sending copies of this letter and enclosures as well as the texts of Dr Waldheim's messages to Tony Butler (Home Office), Tony Harris (DOT), Bill Beckett (Attorney-General's Office), and Martin Vile (Cabinet Office).

Yours ever
Stephen Gomersall.

S J Gomersall
Private Secretary to the
Lord Privy Seal
(Sir Ian Gilmour)

B G Cartledge Esq
10 Downing Street
London SW1

* 1700 London time

RESTRICTED



- 4 JUL 1979

File No.
Department SEAD
Drafted by A M SIMONS
(Block Capitals)
Tel. Extn. 233 3078

OUTWARD
TELEGRAM

Security Classification RESTRICTED
Precedence
DESKBYZ

FOR
COMMS. DEPT.
USE

Despatched (Date) POSTBYZ
(Time)Z

PREAMBLE

(Time of Origin) Z (G.M.T.) (Restrictive Prefix)
(Security Class.) RESTRICTED (Caveat/
Privacy marking)
(Codeword) (Deskby) Z

TO UKMIS GENEVA Tel. No. of
(precedence) (post)

AND TO (precedence/post)

AND SAVING TO

REPEATED TO (for info) AS IPT

SAVING TO (for info)

Distribution:-

Four pages.

[TEXT]

INDO-CHINESE REFUGEES

MIPT

1. Please pass the following message from the Prime Minister to Dr Waldheim in response to his personal message.

Begins:

"Thank you for your message of 1 July, in which you replied to my letter of 17 June about the Indo-Chinese refugee problem. I have replied separately to your invitation for the British Government to be represented at the meeting in Geneva on 20 July. We shall of course attend and ~~hope to~~ play a constructive rôle.

"I agree that there is an urgent need to find solutions of a humanitarian nature for the

RESTRICTED

/refugees'

Copies to:-

B

RESTRICTED

refugees' plight. But like you, I consider that the root cause of the problem must also be dealt with. The Vietnamese Government has a responsibility to conduct its affairs in a way that does not condemn part of its own population to such suffering as the world now witnesses.

"I was glad to see that you had been in touch with representatives of the governments most directly concerned. I am well aware of the difficulties.

"I greatly look forward to discussing this and other matters with you in London on 12 July."

[Ends]

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

RESTRICTED

File No. FA 243/1
Department SEAD
Drafted by A M Simons
(Block Capitals)
Tel. Extn. 233 3078

OUTWARD
TELEGRAM

Security Classification RESTRICTED
Precedence
DESKBYZ

FOR
COMMS. DEPT.
USE

Despatched (Date) Z
(Time) Z POSTBYZ

PREAMBLE

(Time of Origin) Z (G.M.T.) (Restrictive Prefix)
(Security Class.) RESTRICTED (Caveat/
Privacy marking)
(Codeword) (Deskby) Z

TO UKMIS GENEVA Tel. No. of
(precedence) (post)

AND TO (precedence/post)

AND SAVING TO

REPEATED TO (for info) Routine UKMIS New York, Washington Au EEC press Gov Hong Kong
Kuala Lumpur Bangkok Singapore Jakarta Manila Seoul Peking Tokyo
Canberra Washington

SAVING TO (for info)

Distribution: -

Bow rope

[TEXT]

Indo-Chinese Refugees

1. Please pass the following message from the
Prime Minister to Dr Waldheim.

[Begins]


"Your Excellency,

"I accept your invitation for the British
Government to be represented at the meeting at
Geneva on 20 July, and can let you know that The British
representation will be at Ministerial level.

"Like you, I consider it essential for the
meeting to produce concrete results and for this to
be done by means of careful advance preparation.

"The British representative will take a
constructive part in the discussions".

Copies to: -



Yours sincerely.

"Margaret Thatcher"

[Ends]

2. Please see MIFT.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

CONFIDENTIAL

2

AR 860A
CONFIDENTIAL

FM UKMIS NEWYORK 032344Z JULY 79
TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 692 OF 3 JULY 79

INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS GENEVA PRIORITY WASHINGTON HONG KONG
TOKYO MANILA KUALA LUMPUR SINGAPORE BANGKOK JAKARTA
OTTAWA PEKING MOSCOW PARIS BONN

Prime Minister

*YW
4/7*

UKMIS GENEVA TELS NOS 250 AND 254: UN CONFERENCE ON INDO-CHINESE
REFUGEES.

1. THE SECRETARIAT HAVE GIVEN US IN CONFIDENCE THE UNPUBLISHED
LIST OF GOVERNMENTS WHICH THE SECRETARY-GENERAL HAS INVITED TO
THE GENEVA MEETING (COPY BY BAG TO SIMONS IN SEAD). 72 GOVERNMENTS
ARE LISTED, PRINCIPALLY FROM WESTERN EUROPE, LATIN AMERICA AND ASIA.
THE ONLY AFRICANS ARE ALGERIA TUNISIA, LIBYA LIBERIA MADAGASCAR
NIGERIA UGANDA AND TANZANIA. THE LIST INCLUDES ISRAEL AND A
NUMBER OF ARAB GOVERNMENTS, BUT NOT EGYPT. ALL COUNTRIES IN THE
AREA ARE INCLUDED EXCEPT LAOS AND CAMBODIA.

2. THE MOST STRIKING OMISSION IS THE SOVIET UNION AND THE WHOLE
OF EASTERN EUROPE EXCEPT YUGOSLAVIA. THE SECRETARY-GENERAL, ASKED
ABOUT SOVIET PARTICIPATION AT HIS PRESS CONFERENCE IN GENEVA,
APPARENTLY SAID THAT IF ANY COUNTRY WISHED TO PARTICIPATE AND
WAS READY TO MAKE A CONTRIBUTION, IT WOULD BE INVITED. THE
SECRETARIAT TELL US THAT THERE HAS BEEN NO INDICATION OF INTEREST
(LET ALONE READINESS TO HELP) FROM THE RUSSIANS SO FAR. HOWEVER
THEY HAVE ASKED THE SOVIET MISSION PRIVATELY TO FIND OUT WHETHER
THE SOVIET UNION WOULD BE READY TO TAKE PART AND THE MISSION
UNDERTOOK TO CONSULT MOSCOW.

RICHARD

FILES -
SEAD
HK & GD
UND
FED
EESD
N AM D
SAD
EID
PUSD
OID
IPD

NEWS D
M & VD
PS
PS/LPS
PS/MR. HURD
PS/MR. BLAKER
PS/PUS
SIR A DUFF
SIR A PARSONS
MR. CORTAZZI
MR. MURRAY
MR. STRATTON

ADDITIONAL DISTN.
BOAT PEOPLE

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

2

GPS 260

CONFIDENTIAL

FM UKMIS GENEVA 030845Z JULY 79

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 254 OF 03/7/79

AND TO PRIORITY UKMIS NEW YORK WASHINGTON HONG KONG

UN CONFERENCE ON INDO-CHINESE REFUGEES

Prime Minister

SM
4/1

1. MR HURD SAW HARTLING ON 2 JULY. HARTLING EXPLAINED THAT WALDHEIM HAD STRESSED THAT THE 20/21 JULY MEETING SHOULD CONCERN ITSELF WITH HUMANITARIAN ASPECTS. WALDHEIM WOULD INVITE THOSE GOVERNMENTS WHICH COULD CONTRIBUTE TO A SOLUTION TO THE REFUGEE PROBLEM. THESE WOULD INCLUDE THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE, THE COUNTRIES OF THE REGION AND POTENTIAL RESETTLEMENT COUNTRIES. IF ANY COUNTRY INSISTED ON BEING INVITED, IT WOULD BE. HE INTENDED TO LEAVE SHORTLY AFTER OPENING THE MEETING AND HARTLING (RATHER THAN ANY OTHER UN OFFICIAL SUCH AS BUFFUM) WOULD CONTINUE IN THE CHAIR. HARTLING READILY ACCEPTED MR HURD'S SUGGESTION THAT WALDHEIM MIGHT BE PRESSED TO CHAIR THE MEETING THROUGHOUT, BUT IN THAT CASE BECAUSE OF WALDHEIM'S OTHER COMMITMENTS THE MEETING WOULD HAVE TO BE LIMITED TO THE TWO DAYS NOW PLANNED. IT COULD GO ON LATE INTO THE NIGHT IF NECESSARY.
2. HARTLING SAID THAT CHINA'S ATTENDANCE AT THE MEETING WAS UNCERTAIN BUT HE BELIEVED THAT THE VIETNAMESE WOULD BE THERE.
3. HARTLING PRESSED FOR THREE THINGS. FIRST THAT WESTERN COUNTRIES, INCLUDING THE UK, SHOULD PROMISE- PREFERABLY BEFORE THE MEETING - TO TAKE A TOTAL OF 200,000 REFUGEES AWAY FROM THE ASEAN AREA. THIS WAS A MANAGEABLE FIGURE. SECOND, FOLLOWING FROM SUCH A COMMITMENT- THAT ASEAN COUNTRIES SHOULD BE PRESSED OPENLY TO AGREE TO GIVE UNLIMITED FIRST ASYLUM TO REFUGEES AND ALSO TO ACCEPT A SIZEABLE SHARE OF THEM FOR PERMANENT RESETTLEMENT. UNHCR CONSIDERED THAT THE ASEAN COUNTRIES WERE AT PRESENT BEING UNREASONABLY ONE-SIDED IN THEIR DEMANDS. THIRD, THAT THE UK AND OTHERS SHOULD PRESS THE LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES TO ACCEPT SIGNIFICANT NUMBERS. UNHCR HAD RECENTLY HELPED RESETTLE OVER 40,000 LATIN AMERICANS OUTSIDE THAT CONTINENT AND SOME RECIPROCAL RESPONSE WAS THEREFORE IN ORDER. WE SHOULD NOT ACCEPT LATIN AMERICAN EXCUSES ABOUT THEIR SPECIAL DIFFICULTIES.

CONFIDENTIAL

1/4

CONFIDENTIAL

4. MR HURD SAID THAT THE UK WOULD BE CONSIDERING ITS RESPONSE IN THE LIGHT OF THE TOKYO SUMMIT, BUT WE HAD VERY REAL POLITICAL PROBLEMS IN ACCEPTING FURTHER IMMIGRATION. WE FELT THAT POLITICAL PRESSURE WAS NEEDED TO STOP THE PROBLEM AT SOURCE. WE HAD TO STRIKE THE RIGHT BALANCE BETWEEN POLITICAL AND HUMANITARIAN ACTION. HARTLING SAID THAT THE 20/21 JULY MEETING WOULD NOT PROVIDE SUCH POLITICAL SOLUTIONS, BUT HE RELUCTANTLY ACKNOWLEDGED THAT, DESPITE UNHCR'S WISHES, CRITICISM OF VIETNAM AT THE MEETING WAS INEVITABLE.
5. HARTLING WAS OPPOSED TO ANY SUBSEQUENT DISCUSSION OF THE CONFERENCE IN ECOSOC (4 JULY-3 AUGUST) WHEN HIS ANNUAL REPORT TO THAT BODY IS TAKEN. THIS IS USUALLY ADOPTED WITHOUT MUCH DISCUSSION AND HE DID NOT WANT A PRECEDENT SET FOR POLITICAL DEBATE. IF THERE HAD TO BE ANY POLITICAL FOLLOW-UP HE WOULD PREFER THIS IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL.
6. UNHCR OFFICIALS HAVE TOLD US THAT NO AGENDA HAS YET BEEN SETTLED AND THAT THERE MIGHT BE ADVANTAGE IN NOT HAVING A FORMAL AGENDA. AS FOR DOCUMENTATION, THE HIGH COMMISSIONER IS EXPECTED TO PRODUCE A BASIC FACTUAL NOTE WHICH WILL BE ATTACHED TO A FORMAL COVERING NOTE FROM THE SECRETARY GENERAL.
7. MR HURD IS SEEING THE SECRETARY- GENERAL TOMORROW JULY 4 AND WILL PRESS HIM TO REMAIN IN THE CHAIR THROUGHOUT THE MEETING, USING THE ARGUMENT THAT THE SUMMING - UP AT THE END OWILL BE A CRUCIAL OCCASION. PLEASE LET ME KNOW IF THERE ARE FURTHER POINTS YOU WOULD WISH HIM TO PUT.

MURRAY

FILES
SEAD
HK & GD
UND
FED
EESD
N AM D
SAD
EID
PUSD
CID
IPD

NEWS D
M & VD
PS
PS/LPS
PS/MR.HURD
PS/MR.BLAKER
PS/PUG
SIR A DUFF
SIR A PARSONS
MR.CORTAZZI
MR.MURRAY
MR.STRATTON

ADDITIONAL DESTN.
BOAT PEOPLE

- 2 -
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

Z

005 485

CONFIDENTIAL

FM HONG KONG 030730Z JUL 79

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 910 OF 3 JULY

INFO IMMEDIATE BAGHDAD (FOR SECRETARY OF STATE)

INFO PRIORITY UKMIS GENEVA

Prime Minister

GA
4/1

PERSONAL FROM GOVERNOR.

UN CONFERENCE ON INDO-CHINESE REFUGEES.

1. I AM WORRIED ABOUT HMG'S POSITION, AND ITS EFFECT ON HONG KONG.

2. UNHCR HAS ASKED FOR PLEDGES FOR PERMANENT RESETTLEMENT FOR 10,000 IN UK AND 10,000 IN HONG KONG OVER THE PERIOD JULY 1979 TO JULY 1980 (EXCLUSIVE OF REFUGEES RESCUED BY BRITISH FLAG SHIPS).

3. IN HONG KONG'S SITUATION, WE CAN RUN NO RISK OF JEOPARDISING OFFERS OF RESETTLEMENT PLACES FROM POTENTIAL HOST COUNTRIES. THEREFORE WE MUST MAINTAIN AN IMPECCABLE POSITION VIS-A-VIS UNHCR. CONSEQUENTLY, I WILL RECOMMEND TO EXCO ACCEPTANCE OF THE PLEDGE (PERHAPS AS A FINAL AND COMPLETE CONTRIBUTION, CONSIDERING THE EXTENT OF THE FINANCIAL SUPPORT THAT IS ALSO BEING GIVEN BY HONG KONG).

4. THIS WILL FOCUS ATTENTION ON THE UK'S PLEDGE. THE LATTER WILL EFFECT THE NUMBER OF PLACES OFFERED TO HONG KONG, FIRSTLY DIRECTLY, BUT ALSO INDIRECTLY SINCE THE US (WITH MUCH THE LARGEST RESETTLEMENT PROGRAMME) WILL BE INFLUENCED BY WHAT IT CONSIDERS, HOWEVER UNREASONABLY, TO BE THE ADEQUACY OF THE UK EFFORT (SEE HONG KONG TELNO 890). OTHER COUNTRIES MAY TAKE THE SAME LINE (SEE FCO-PARIS TELNO 204).

5. I FEAR THIS LINE HAS A SUPERFICIAL ATTRACTION WHICH WILL BE HARD TO SHAKE BY OUR COUNTER ARGUMENTS. JUDGING BY THE REMARKS OF THE PRESS ACCOMPANYING YOU THE ADEQUACY OF THE UK'S CONTRIBUTION IS LIKELY TO BE WIDELY AIREO.

CONFIDENTIAL

16

CONFIDENTIAL

6. TO ACCEPT UNHCR'S SUGGESTED TARGETS FOR BOTH THE UK AND HK WOULD BE A COMPLETE ANSWER TO THIS LINE OF CRITICISM WITH ALL ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR HONG KONG.

7. I ALSO WONDER WHETHER FAILURE TO DO SO AFTER INITIATING THE CONFERENCE MIGHT NOT GIVE A PARTICULARLY UNPLEASANT TWIST TO CRITICISM.

8. FOR BOTH THESE POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE REASONS I THEREFORE RECOMMEND ACCEPTANCE OF THE UNHCR'S TARGETS. WOULD IT HELP IF THE UK AND HK PLEDGES WERE MERGED INTO A SINGLE BRITISH PLEDGE OF 20,000 ? THIS WOULD LEAVE ROOM FOR HONG KONG TO TAKE RATHER MORE THAN HALF IF YOU RAN INTO DOMESTIC DIFFICULTIES. I HAVE SOUNDED THE SENIOR MEMBER WHO THINKS WE COULD GET THIS THROUGH EXCO. OUR PROBLEM IS SO VAST THAT TO ACCEPT ONE OR TWO THOUSAND MORE WOULD BE A REASONABLE PRICE TO ENSURE THE UK'S POSITION REMAINED UNASSAILABLE, AND THUS ASSISTED THE SUCCESS OF THE CONFERENCE, AND THE REMOVAL OF THE BULK OF THE REFUGEES FROM US.

10. MY ONLY OTHER SUGGESTION IS THAT THE BRITISH PLEDGE MIGHT BE MADE SEPEARTELY BUT INCLUDE REFUGEES PICKED UP BY BRITISH SHIPS (MADE WITH GREAT RELUCTANCE BECAUSE IT WOULD DETRACT FROM THE POSITION IN PARA 6).

MACLEHOSE

FILES
SEAD
HK & GD
UND
FED
EESD
N AM D
SAD
EID
PUSD
OID
IPD

NEWS D
M & VD
PS
PS/LPS
PS/MR. HURD
PS/MR. BLAKER
PS/PUS
SIR A DUFF
SIR A PARSONS
MR. CORTAZZI
MR. MURRAY
MR. STRATTON

ADDITIONAL DISTN.
BOAT PEOPLE

CONFIDENTIAL

Handwritten: Eto ma
JUL 79

GRS 400

P S TO P M No 10 DOWNING ST

CONFIDENTIAL

FM CANBERRA 030655Z JUL 79

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 371 OF 03 JULY 1979

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON AND UKMIS NEW YORK

REFUGEES

1. DURING HER TALKS ON 1 JULY IN CANBERRA, THE PRIME MINISTER AGREED WITH MR FRASER THAT IT WOULD BE A GOOD IDEA IF BRITAIN AND AUSTRALIA, BEFORE THE CONFERENCE CALLED BY DR WALDHEIM FOR 20/21 JULY, COULD GET TOGETHER WITH LIKE-MINDED COUNTRIES TO TRY TO AGREE A CONCERTED PLAN ON REFUGEES.
2. THE AUSTRALIANS WOULD BE GRATEFUL FOR OUR URGENT OBSERVATIONS ON THE FOLLOWING:
3. THE AUSTRALIAN MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION, WHO IS LEAVING CANBERRA ON 14 JULY, WILL BE IN LONDON FROM 16 TO 18 JULY AND WOULD LIKE TO TALK TO YOU. PERHAPS THESE BILATERAL TALKS COULD TAKE PLACE ON 16 JULY, FOLLOWED ON 18 JULY BY TALKS IN WHICH OTHERS COULD JOIN. AT THE PRIME MINISTERIAL MEETING IN CANBERRA, THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA HAD BEEN MENTIONED. THE AUSTRALIANS WOULD WELCOME OUR VIEWS ON WHETHER FRENCH, NEW ZEALAND AND JAPANESE MINISTERS MIGHT ALSO BE INVITED.
4. IF THE ABOVE SEEMS A STARTER TO US, THE AUSTRALIANS WOULD WELCOME OUR REACTION BY THURSDAY SO THAT THEY COULD RAISE THE QUESTION WITH MR DICK CLARK (US AMBASSADOR AT LARGE), WHO ARRIVES IN CANBERRA ON THAT DAY.
5. IF THE UNITED STATES IN TURN SUPPORTED THE IDEA, THE AUSTRALIANS WOULD THEN CALL IN HEADS OF MISSION OF LIKE-MINDED COUNTRIES. ON MONDAY 9 JULY (IE, BUT SUBJECT TO YOUR VIEWS, CANADA, FRANCE, NEW ZEALAND, JAPAN) AND SUGGEST THAT THEIR MINISTERS MIGHT MEET IN LONDON AS PROPOSED ABOVE.

Handwritten: 16. THE

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

6. THE AUSTRALIANS THEN FEEL IT WOULD BE USEFUL TO CALL IN HEADS OF MISSION FROM ASEAN COUNTRIES, GERMANY AND LATIN AMERICA ON THE AFTERNOON OF 9 JULY TO GIVE THEM AN INDICATION OF AUSTRALIA'S LATEST THINKING ON THE CONFERENCE AND OF HER UNDERSTANDING OF THE VIEWS OF OTHERS. THE AUSTRALIANS WOULD NOT, OF COURSE, INDICATE TO THIS AFTERNOON GROUP THAT A LIMITED MINISTERIAL MEETING IN LONDON WAS IN PROSPECT. THEY WOULD SIMPLY SEEK TO ELICIT THE VIEWS OF THOSE WHOM THEY WERE BRIEFING.

7. IN ADDITION TO AN EARLY REACTION FROM YOU ON THE ABOVE PROPOSAL, AUSTRALIANS WOULD ALSO WELCOME YOUR VIEW ON:

- A) WHAT SORT OF CONFERENCE WE EXPECT ON 20 JULY. SINCE DR WALDHEIM WILL BE IN THE CHAIR, THE AUSTRALIANS EXPECT THE CONFERENCE TO COVER BOTH HUMANITARIAN AND POLITICAL QUESTIONS.
- B) WOULD WE SEE VALUE IN THE AUSTRALIANS PREPARING A DRAFT RESOLUTION FOR CONSIDERATION AT LONDON. AN AGREED RESOLUTION COULD THEN PERHAPS BE TABLED AT THE CONFERENCE EITHER BY AUSTRALIA OR JOINTLY SPONSORED.

TEBBIT

FILES
SEAD
HK & GD
UND
FED
EESD
N AM D
SAD
EID
PUSD
OID
IPD
SAD

NEWS D
M & VD
PS
PS/LPS
PS/MR. HURD
PS/MR. BLAKER
PS/PUS
SIR A DUFF
SIR A PARSONS
MR. CORTAZZI
MR. MURRAY
MR. STRATTON

ADDITIONAL DISTN.
BOAT PEOPLE

2
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

GRS 390

CONFIDENTIAL

FM F.C.O. 031755Z JUL 79

TO IMMEDIATE UKMIS GENEVA

TELEGRAM NUMBER 127 OF 3 JULY

INFO PRIORITY HONG KONG, BANGKOK, SINGAPORE, MANILA, JAKARTA, KUALA LUMPUR, PARIS, BONN, LUXEMBOURG, BRUSSELS, COPENHAGEN, DUBLIN, THE HAGUE, ROME, WASHINGTON, CANBERRA, TOKYO, HANOI.

Ente ma
SM
JH

MIPT: INDO-CHINA REFUGEES: UN CONFERENCE

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF DR WALDHEIM'S LETTER OF 1 JULY TO THE PRIME MINISTER INVITING THE UK TO ATTEND THE UN MEETING ON REFUGEES:-

BEGINS

YOUR EXCELLENCY, THANK YOU FOR YOUR POSITIVE RESPONSE TO MY APPEAL OF 24 MAY CONCERNING THE URGENT QUESTION OF REFUGEES AND DISPLACED PERSONS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA. ALTHOUGH THERE ARE VERY MANY SERIOUS REFUGEE PROBLEMS IN OTHER PARTS OF THE WORLD, THE ALARMING PROPORTIONS OF THE CRISIS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA REQUIRE IMMEDIATE AND SPECIAL ATTENTION. I BELIEVE THAT MEMBERS OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY, COLLECTIVELY AND INDIVIDUALLY, MUST NOW MAKE A RENEWED AND DETERMINED EFFORT TO FIND AN URGENT SOLUTION TO THIS PROBLEM. AFTER HAVING REVIEWED THE RESPONSES TO MY APPEAL AND AFTER INTENSIVE CONSULTATIONS, I HAVE CONCLUDED THAT IT WOULD BE USEFUL FOR ALL CONCERNED GOVERNMENTS TO MEET JOINTLY WITH THE PURPOSE OF OBTAINING MAXIMUM INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT FOR CONCRETE MEASURES DESIGNED TO AMELIORATE THIS TRAGIC SITUATION. THE MEETING, WHICH I ENVISAGE WOULD LAST TWO DAYS, SHOULD BE OF A HUMANITARIAN CHARACTER, DESIGNED TO PRODUCE ADDITIONAL SUPPORT WHICH WOULD ENABLE THE UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES TO ENLARGE THE ALREADY SUBSTANTIAL EFFORTS HE HAS BEEN MAKING TO DEAL WITH THIS TRAGIC PROBLEM. ACCORDINGLY, I WILL CONVENE SUCH A MEETING AT THE PALAIS DES NATIONS IN GENEVA ON 20 JULY. I WOULD GREATLY APPRECIATE THE PARTICIPATION OF YOUR GOVERNMENT. IN ORDER TO ASSURE THE SUCCESS OF THIS EFFORT,

| I BELIEVE

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

I BELIEVE GOVERNMENTS SHOULD BE REPRESENTED AT THE MINISTERIAL LEVEL. IF THE SITUATION IS NOT TO BE EXACERBATED, IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT THIS MEETING PRODUCE CONCRETE RESULTS. THIS CAN BE ACHIEVED ONLY THROUGH CAREFUL ADVANCE PREPARATION BY GOVERNMENTS AND ASSURANCES CONCERNING ASYLUM, SAFE AND ORDERLY DEPARTURE AS WELL AS COMMITMENTS TOWARD DURABLE SOLUTIONS OF THE PROBLEM, INCLUDING SIGNIFICANTLY INCREASED RESETTLEMENT OPPORTUNITIES AND FINANCIAL SUPPORT. I LOOK FORWARD TO YOUR EARLY RESPONSE TO THIS INVITATION. PLEASE ACCEPT, YOUR EXCELLENCY, THE ASSURANCES OF MY HIGHEST CONSIDERATION.
KURT WALDHEIM SECRETARY-GENERAL UNITED NATIONS.

ENDS

CARRINGTON

FILES
SEAD
HK & GD
UND
FED
EESD
N AM D
SAD
EID
PUSD
OID
IPD

NEWS D
M & VD
PS
PS/LPS
PS/MR. HURD
PS/MR. BLAKER
PS/PUS
SIR A DUFF
SIR A PARSONS
MR. CORTAZZI
MR. MURRAY
MR. STRATTON

ADDITIONAL DISTN.
BOAT PEOPLE

CONFIDENTIAL

81 R 300

P S TO P M No 10 DOWNING SZ

CONFIDENTIAL

FM F.C.O. 031750Z JUL 79

TO IMMEDIATE UKMIS GENEVA

TELEGRAM NUMBER 126 OF 3 JULY

INFO PRIORITY HONG KONG, BANGKOK, SINGAPORE, MANILA, JAKARTA,
KUALA LUMPUR, PARIS, BONN, LUXEMBOURG, BRUSSELS, COPENHAGEN,
DUBLIN, THE HAGUE, ROME, WASHINGTON, CANBERRA, TOKYO, HANOI.

*Enter na
bu
1/7*

M.I.P.T.: INDO-CHINA REFUGEES: U.N. CONFERENCE

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF DR WALDHEIM'S REPLY, DATED 1 JULY, TO THE
PRIME MINISTER'S LETTER OF 17 JUNE:

BEGINS.

DEAR MADAME PRIME MINISTER,

THANK YOU FOR YOUR LETTER OF 17 JUNE 1979 CONVEYING YOUR FURTHER
VIEWS ABOUT THE INDO-CHINESE REFUGEE PROBLEM. AS YOU KNOW FROM MY
LETTER OF 4 JUNE, I APPRECIATED YOUR THOUGHTFUL SUGGESTION, IN
RESPONSE TO MY APPEAL ON THIS SUBJECT, THAT A FURTHER CONFERENCE OF
MEMBER STATES OF THE UNITED NATIONS BE CALLED TO DEAL WITH THIS
MATTER. FROM THE SUBSEQUENT DISCUSSIONS I HAVE HELD WITH YOUR
MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS, I AM GLAD TO LEARN THAT YOU SUPPORT
MY CONCEPT THAT SUCH A MEETING SHOULD BE OF A HUMANITARIAN
CHARACTER.

I WISH TO ASSURE YOU I AM FULLY SENSITIVE TO THE INCREASINGLY
CRITICAL NATURE OF THIS PROBLEM. AFTER INTENSIVE CONSULTATIONS WITH
NUMEROUS GOVERNMENTS CONCERNED, I DECIDED TO CONVENE SUCH A MEETING
IN GENEVA ON 20 JULY. AN INVITATION TO YOUR GOVERNMENT TO ATTEND WILL
BE TRANSMITTED SEPARATELY.

NEEDLESS TO SAY, I AM VERY MUCH AWARE OF THE FACT THAT ONE MUST
DEAL WITH THE ROOT CAUSE AS WELL AS THE SYMPTOMS OF THE PROBLEM. I
WILL CONTINUE TO DO EVERYTHING I CAN TO BE HELPFUL IN THIS REGARD
THROUGH THE EXERCISE OF MY GOOD OFFICES, AND HAVE HELD SEVERAL
CONVERSATIONS WITHIN THE LAST FEW WEEKS WITH REPRESENTATIVES OF THE
GOVERNMENTS MOST DIRECTLY CONCERNED.

CONFIDENTIAL

/ 1 VERY

CONFIDENTIAL

I VERY MUCH LOOK FORWARD TO THE PROSPECT OF DISCUSSING THE DRAGIC SITUATION OF THE INDO-CHINESE REFUGEES AS WELL AS OTHER MATTERS WITH YOU PERSONALLY DURING MY FORTHCOMING VISIT TO LONDON.

SINCERELY YOURS,
KURT WALDHEIM SECRETARY-GENERAL.

ENDS.

CARRINGTON

FILES
SEAD
HK & GD
UND
FED
EESD
N AM D
SAD
EID
PUSD
OID
IPD

NEWS D
M & VD
PS
PS/LPS
PS/MR. HURD
PS/MR. BLAKER
PS/PUS
SIR A DUFF
SIR A PARSONS
MR. CORTAZZI
MR. MURRAY
MR. STRATTON

ADDITIONAL DISTN.
BOAT PEOPLE

2
CONFIDENTIAL

RESTRICTED

GR 220

RESTRICTED

FM SINGAPORE 020802Z JULY

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TEL NO. 226 OF 2 JULY 1979

REPEATED IMMEDIATE TO THE HAGUE, DELHI (FOR PS FOREIGN SECRETARY).

pa.
6/24
4/7

MY TEL NO. 224 (NOT TO THE HAGUE): VIETNAMESE REFUGEES: MV ASHFORD.

1. THERE HAS BEEN A NEW DEVELOPMENT. THE DUTCH EMBASSY HAVE DECIDED TO INTERVENE BECAUSE THE SALVAGE COMPANY OWNING THE "ASHFORD" IS DUTCH (THOUGH THE VESSEL IS BRITISH REGISTERED). THE DUTCH COMPANY CLAIM TO HAVE LOST ONE MILLION DOLLARS SO FAR THROUGH THE DELAY IN SINGAPORE (FOR THE HAGUE: THE ASHFORD, ENGAGED IN TIN SALVAGE OPERATIONS IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA, ARRIVED IN SINGAPORE ON 22 JUNE WITH 41 REFUGEES. MINISTERS IN THE UK HAVE NOT YET DECIDED WHETHER TO GIVE A GUARANTEE OF RESETTLEMENT IN ORDER TO MEET SINGAPORE GOVERNMENT CONDITIONS TO ALLOW THE REFUGEES TO BE DISEMBARKED).

2. THE DUTCH EMBASSY ARE NOW RECOMMENDING TO THEIR GOVERNMENT THAT THEY SHOULD GIVE THE NECESSARY GUARANTEE, OR PERHAPS AGREE TO SHARE THE 41 REFUGEES BETWEEN THE UK AND THE NETHERLANDS. I RECOMMEND THAT YOU SHOULD NOW LIAISE URGENTLY WITH THE DUTCH GOVERNMENT TO SEE IF THIS IS A STARTER.

HENNINGS.

FILES
SEAD
HK & GD
UND
FED
EESD
N AM D
SAD
EID
PUSD
OID
IPD

NEWS D
M & VD
PS
PS/LPS
PS/MR. HURD
PS/MR. BLAKER
PS/PUS
SIR A DUFF
SIR A PARSONS
MR. CORTAZZI
MR. MURRAY
MR. STRATTON

ADDITIONAL DISTN.
BOAT PEOPLE

RESTRICTED

CONFIDENTIAL

GRS 90

CONFIDENTIAL

DESKBY 020900Z

FM BAHRAIN 020800Z JUL 79

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 137 OF 02 JULY

INFO IMMEDIATE SINGAPORE HONG KONG

*But no
6/17*

FOLLOWING FOR WALL FROM CARTLEDGE (WITH PM'S PARTY)
SINGAPORE TEL³³³ (NOT RECEIVED IN BAHRAIN): VIETNAMESE REFUGEES;
MV ASHFORD

1. THE PRIME MINISTER HAS AGREED THAT, SINCE IT IS NOW DEFINITE THAT THE SINGAPORE AUTHORITIES WILL NOT ALLOW THE ASHFORD REFUGEES TO LAND WITHOUT A UK GUARANTEE, THIS GUARANTEE MAY BE GIVEN FORTHWITH. GRATEFUL IF YOU WOULD ARRANGE FOR HIGH COMMISSIONER TO BE INSTRUCTED ACCORDINGLY.
2. THE PRIME MINISTER DOES NOT REPEAT NOT WISH PUBLICITY TO BE STIMULATED FOR THIS DECISION ALTHOUGH IT MAY OF COURSE BE CONFIRMED IN ANSWER TO QUESTIONS.

WALKER

FILES
SEAD
HK & GD
UND
FED
EESD
N AM D
SAD
EID
PUSD
OID
IPD

NEWS D
M & VD
PS
PS/LPS
PS/MR. HURD
PS/MR. BLAKER
PS/PUS.
SIR A DUFF
SIR A PARSONS
MR. CORTAZZI
MR. MURRAY
MR. STRATTON

ADDITIONAL DISTN.
BOAT PEOPLE

CONFIDENTIAL



CC HO
DIT
ATT Gen
CC

HO

BGC to see
D.C.

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

2 July 1979

BF 4.7.79

I enclose copies of two telegrams addressed to the Prime Minister by Dr. Waldheim about the proposed meeting on Vietnamese refugees in Geneva on 20 July.

I would be grateful for advice on replies to these by 4 July.

I am sending copies of this letter and enclosures to Tony Butler (Home Office), Tom Harris (Department of Trade), Bill Beckett (Attorney General's Office) and Martin Vile (Cabinet Office).

M. A. PATTISON

Paul Lever, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CONFIDENTIAL



pre 5
Vietnam:

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

B/F 6.7.79.

2 July 1979

Dear Stephen,

Vietnamese Refugees

I shall be sending you as soon as possible the full record of the Prime Minister's discussions in Canberra on 30 June and 1 July with Mr. Malcolm Fraser. There was, however, one point arising from them which requires urgent action and I enclose, in advance, the text of the relevant extract on Vietnamese refugees, from the record of the plenary session of talks which took place in Parliament House on 1 July.

You will see that, after an extended discussion between the Prime Minister, Mr. Fraser and the Australian Minister in Charge of Immigration, Mr. MacKellar, it was agreed that the UK and Australia, possibly in association with the United States and Canada, and perhaps France, should consult with a view to arriving at a common approach to the UN sponsored conference on refugees which is now being convened on 20/21 July. I should be grateful if you would arrange for these consultations to be put in hand as a matter of urgency and if you would let me know, not later than 1600 on Friday 6 July, what action has been taken and how much progress has been made.

I am sending copies of this letter and enclosure to Tony Butler (Home Office), Tom Harris (Department of Trade) and Martin Vile (Cabinet Office).

Yours etc,

Bryan Cardew

J.S. Wall, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

TRP
J
5

CONFIDENTIAL

EXTRACT FROM A RECORD OF THE PRIME MINISTER'S DISCUSSIONS WITH
THE PRIME MINISTER OF AUSTRALIA, THE RT. HON. MALCOLM FRASER,
IN CANBERRA ON 1 JULY 1979

Mr. Fraser suggested that Britain and Australia should, together with like-minded countries, try to agree a concerted plan on refugees. The Prime Minister agreed. Australia was Britain's link with this part of the world. Mr. MacKellar hoped Britain and Australia could seek to arrive at a common approach before the conference called for 20/21 July. The Prime Minister said there was not much time but she would ask the Foreign Secretary to consider the question urgently. Mr. MacKellar suggested that the United States and Canada might also be associated with a joint approach to the problem. He wondered whether France should be asked to participate?

Mr. Fraser, reverting to the question of ^acutting of aid to Vietnam, said the question could be argued two ways. Some felt that if the West cut off aid, Vietnam would become the more dependent on Russian aid. On the other hand, Vietnam perhaps would not wish to become totally dependent on Russian aid and therefore a total cut in Western aid might have a real effect.

The Prime Minister commented that the whole issue of refugees seemed to revolve round three points - condemnation of Vietnam; switching aid from Vietnam to refugees; and resettling refugees.



10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

2 July, 1979.

Dear Lord Inverforth,

Thank you for your letter of 6 June. I am of course conscious of the frustrations which faced your Company and the Master and Crew of the Roachbank in the past few weeks. You will be aware from your knowledge of the region that it is not easy to establish a line of communication between ourselves and the Taiwanese Authorities, thus efforts to persuade them to give at least temporary asylum to the refugees on the Roachbank have been fraught with difficulty.

I can assure you, however, that every endeavour was made to persuade the Taiwanese to accept their responsibilities, or to allow transit facilities, and it now appears that most of our difficulties have been overcome. As you will know arrangements are now in hand for the refugees to be flown to the United Kingdom.

Yours sincerely,

(SGD) MT

The Lord Inverforth

4

CONFIDENTIAL



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

2 July 1979

Dear Bryan

VIETNAMESE REFUGEES

In your letter of 20 June you asked how the Prime Minister should reply to a proposal by Mr Begin that all governments should offer to accept a number of Vietnamese refugees from Malaysia relative to the size of their territory and population. He has suggested that Mrs Thatcher should forward the proposal to the UNHCR.

Mr Begin's letter was evidently prompted by the Malaysian Deputy Prime Minister's statement that refugees in his country would be expelled and that newcomers would be shot. However, the Malaysian Prime Minister has confirmed that this is not his government's policy. Furthermore, the Malaysian angle is only one aspect of the overall problem created by the expulsion of refugees from Vietnam. I therefore attach a draft reply in suitably general terms.

I am sending copies of this letter and enclosure to Tony Butler (Home Office) and Martin Vile (Cabinet Office).

*Yours ever,
Stephen Gomersall*

S J Gomersall
Private Secretary to the
Lord Privy Seal

B G Cartledge Esq CMG
No 10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL

Registry
No.

DRAFT

Letter

Type 1 +

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

Top Secret,
Secret.
Confidential.
Restricted.
Unclassified.

To:-

His Excellency
Mr Menahem Begin
Prime Minister of IsraelFrom
Prime Minister

Telephone No. Ext.

Department

PRIVACY MARKING

..... In Confidence

Thank you for writing to me on 19 June, of your concern for Vietnamese refugees now in Malaysia. This is indeed a tragic aspect of the problem created by the expulsion of refugees from Indochina. I agree that a major international effort is needed, to relieve the problems of the refugees and of recipient countries in South East Asia and - somehow - to convince the Vietnamese to moderate their inhumane policies.

I proposed that a conference should be held under UN auspices because I thought this would be the best way to arouse the conscience of the civilised world and to involve the international community as a whole in practical measures for the refugees' benefit.

Dr Waldheim has now called a conference in Geneva, and I assure you that we shall play our full part. I hope that it will lead to effective action to solve this appalling human predicament. Meanwhile I have no doubt that the volume of international disgust at Vietnamese policies will grow: and it is my hope, as it must be yours, that this will cause the Vietnamese to think again.

POST OFFICE TELEGRAMS — CONSULT TELEPHONE DIRECTORY OR TELEX DIALLING CARD INTERNATIONAL TELEGRAMS — CONSULT TELEPHONE DIRECTORY OR TELEX DIALLING CARD INTERNATIONAL

POST OFFICE TELEGRAMS — CONSULT TELEPHONE DIRECTORY OR TELEX DIALLING CARD INTERNATIONAL TELEGRAMS — CONSULT TELEPHONE DIRECTORY OR TELEX DIALLING CARD INTERNATIONAL

NNNN

JUL 1 13 28 '79

ZCZC CLH257 LBH756 FLB4140 GWB559 RMP3474 QAL1096 CRB000206

QBXX CY URSS 336

NEWYORK 336/308 30 2149 PAGE 1/50

LHS1072

ETAT
HER EXCELLENCY
THE RT. HON. MARGARET THATCHER, M.P.
PRIME MINISTER
LONDONSW1

P.O. INTERNATIONAL TELEGRAMS
LONDON
- 1 JUL. 79
S.W.1 AREA OFFICE BROADWAY
ENQUIRIES DIAL 188

STRO280-06 YOUR EXCELLENCY, THANK YOU FOR YOUR POSITIVE RESPONSE TO MY APPEAL OF 24 MAY CONCERNING THE URGENT QUESTION OF REFUGEES AND DISPLACED PERSONS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA. ALTHOUGH THERE ARE VERY MANY SERIOUS REFUGEE PROBLEMS ON OTHER PARTS

CRB000206 PAGE 2/50

OF THE WORLD, THE ALARMING PROPORTIONS OF THE CRISIS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA REQUIRE IMMEDIATE AND SPECIAL ATTENTION. I BELIEVE THAT MEMBERS OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY, COLLECTIVELY AND INDIVIDUALLY, MUST NOW MAKE A RENEWED AND DETERMINED EFFORT TO FIND AN URGENT SOLUTION TO THIS PROBLEM. AFTER HAVING REVIEWED THE RESPONSES TO

POST OFFICE
TELEGRAPHS
INTERNATIONAL

To send Telegrams — CONSULT TELEPHONE
DIRECTORY OR TELEX DIALING CARD

TELEGRAPHS

ONLY THROUGH CAREFUL ADVANCE PREPARATION BY GOVERNMENTS AND
ASSURANCES CONCERNING ASYLUM, SAFE AND ORDERLY DEPARTURE AS WELL AS
COMMITMENTS TOWARD DURABLE SOLUTIONS OF THE PROBLEM, INCLUDING
SIGNIFICANTLY INCREASED RESETTLEMENT OPPORTUNITIES AND FINANCIAL
SUPPORT. I LOOK FORWARD TO YOUR EARLY RESPONSE TO THIS INVITATION.
PLEASE ACCEPT, YOUR EXCELLENCY, THE ASSURANCES OF MY HIGHEST
CONSIDERATION. KURT WALDHEIM SECRETARY-GENERAL UNITED NATIONS

COL ETAT RT. HON. THATCHER, M.P. STRO280-06 EXCELLENCY, 24 ASIA.
WORLD, ATTENTION. COMMUNITY, INDIVIDUALLY, PROBLEM. CONSULTATIONS,
SITUATION. MEETING, DAYS, CHARACTER, PROBLEM. ACCORDINGLY, 20 JULY.
GOVERNMENT. EFFORT, LEVEL. EXACERBATED, RESULTS. ASYLUM, PROBLEM,
SUPPORT. INVITATION. ACCEPT, EXCELLENCY, CONSIDERATION.
SECRETARY-GENERAL

To send Telegrams — CONSULT TELEPHONE
DIRECTORY OR TELEX DIALING CARD

INTERNATIONAL

POST OFFICE

TELEGRAPHS

To send Telegrams
DIRECTORY OR

NNNN

JUL 1 0 1 16 '79

ZCZC CLH154 LBF448 FLB3440 GMB449 RMN3764 QAL0755 CRB152000

GBXX BY URSS 271

NEWYORK 271255 30 1757 AMPLIATION

P.O. INTERNATIONAL TELEGRAPHS
LONDON
- 1 JUL. 79
S.W.1 AREA OFFICE BROADWAY
ENQUIRIES DIAL 163

ETATPRIORITE

HER EXCELLENCY

MRS. MARGARET THATCHER

PRIME MINISTER

LONDONSW1

LHS1025

RMB

MCP2325-06 DEAR MADAME PRIME MINISTER,

THANK YOU FOR YOUR LETTER OF 17 JUNE 1979 CONVEYING YOUR FURTHER VIEWS ABOUT THE INDO-CHINESE REFUGEE PROBLEM. AS YOU KNOW FROM MY

LETTER OF 4 JUNE, I APPRECIATED YOUR THOUGHTFUL SUGGESTION, IN RESPONSE TO MY APPEAL ON THIS SUBJECT, THAT A FURTHER CONFERENCE OF MEMBER STATES OF THE UNITED NATIONS BE CALLED TO DEAL WITH THIS MATTER. FROM THE SUBSEQUENT DISCUSSIONS I HAVE HELD WITH YOUR MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS, I AM GLAD TO LEARN THAT YOU SUPPORT MY CONCEPT THAT SUCH A MEETING SHOULD BE OF A HUMANITARIAN CHARACTER.

I WISH TO ASSURE YOU I AM FULLY SENSITIVE TO THE INCREASINGLY CRITICAL NATURE OF THIS PROBLEM. AFTER INTENSIVE CONSULTATIONS WITH NUMEROUS GOVERNMENTS CONCERNED, I DECIDED TO CONVENE SUCH A MEETING IN GENEVA ON 20 JULY. AN INVITATION TO YOU GOVERNMENT TO ATTEND WILL BE TRANSMITTED SEPARATELY.

NEEDLESS TO SAY, I AM VERY MUCH AWARE OF THE FACT THAT ONE MUST DEAL WITH THE ROOT CAUSE AS WELL AS THE SYMPTOMS OF THE PROBLEM. I WILL CONTINUE TO DO EVERYTHING I CAN TO BE HELPFUL IN THIS REGARD THROUGH THE EXERCISE OF MY GOOD OFFICES, AND HAVE HELD SEVERAL CONVERSATIONS WITHIN THE LAST FEW WEEKS WITH REPRESENTATIVES OF THE GOVERNMENTS MOST DIRECTLY CONCERNED.

I VERY MUCH LOOK FORWARD TO THE PROSPECT OF DISCUSSING THE TRAGIC SITUATION OF THE INDO-CHINESE REFUGEES AS WELL AS OTHER MATTERS WITH YOU PERSONALLY DURING MY FORTHCOMING VISIT TO LONDON.
SINCERELY YOURS,

KURT WALDHEIM SECRETARY-GENERAL

COL ETATPRIORITE MRS. MCP2325-06 MINISTER, 17 1979 INDO-CHINESE PROBLEM. 4 JUNE, SUGGESTION, SUBJECT, MATTER. NATIONS, CHARACTER. PROBLEM. CONCERNED, 20 JULY. SEPARATELY. SAY, PROBLEM. OFFICES, CONCERNED. INDO-CHINESE LONDON. YOURS, SECRETARY-GENERAL

POST OFFICE AL TELEGRAPHS To send Telegrams - CONSULT TELEPHONE DIRECTORY OR TELEX DIALLING CARD INTERNATIONAL POST OFFICE TELEGRAPHS To send Telegrams - CONSULT TELEPHONE DIRECTORY OR TELEX DIALLING CARD INTERNATIONAL POST OFFICE TELEGRAPHS To send Telegrams - CONSULT TELEPHONE DIRECTORY OR TELEX DIALLING CARD INTERNATIONAL



From

LKMIS NEW YORK TELNO 667 (NOW REPEATED IMMEDIATE TO CANBERRA):

2

UN CONFERENCE ON INDO-CHINESE REFUGEES.

Prime Minister

Blu
30/6

1. WHEN, AS NOW SEEMS LIKELY, DR WALDHEIM ANNOUNCES HIS ARRANGEMENTS FOR A CONFERENCE BETWEEN 30 JUNE AND 2 JULY WE SHALL BE ASKED FOR IMMEDIATE COMMENT. AS SEEN FR XM HERE IT WOULD BE VIRTUALLY IMPOSSIBLE FOR US TO CONSULT THE SECRETARY OF STATE AND THE PRIME MINISTER ABOUT THE TERMS OF OUR COMMENT AND PRODUCE IT SUFFICIENTLY QUICKLY. IF WE OFFER NO COMMENT, EVEN FOR A SHORT TIME, THE MEDIA WILL SUSPECT THAT WE ARE AT ODDS WITH DR WALDHEIM.

2. IF DR WALDHEIM'S ANNOUNCEMENT IS MADE OVER THE WEEKEND AND IS IN REASONABLY ACCEPTABLE TERMS, THE FCO SPOKESMAN WILL SAY THAT THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT WELCOMES THE CALL FOR A CONFERENCE AND WILL PLAY A FULL PART.

3. WE SHALL MAKE NO FURTHER COMMENT UNTIL WE KNOW THE VIEWS OF THE PRIME MINISTER AND THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

CARRINGTON

NNNNO

CONFIDENTIAL

DWN CANB 070/30

DX 746

RESTRICTED

2

FDW G 170/30

Prime Minister

OO CANBERRA

GR 95



BW
30/6

RESTRICTED

FM HONG KONG 300415Z JUN 79

TO IMMEDIATE CANBERRA

TELNO. 10 OF 30 JUNE.

FOR P.S TO PRIME MINISTER.

FOLLOWING TELEGRAM REPEATED TO YOU AT REQUEST OF P.A TO S OF S...

BEGINS:

FM SINGAPORE 290854Z JUN

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 224 OF 29 JUN 79

INFO IMMEDIATE TOKYO AND HONG KONG (FOR P/S FOREIGN SECRETARY.

MYTELNO 222: VIETNAMESE REFUGEES: MV ASHFORD

1. UNHCR HAVE JUST INFORMED US THAT THEY MAY NOT (NOT) HAVE TIME TO INTERVIEW THE 41 IMMEDIATELY BECAUSE TWO GERMAN SHIPS CARRYING 310 REFUGEES ARE DUE IN SHORTLY.

2. THE GERMAN EMBASSY HAS ALREADY ISSUED GUARANTEE. UNHCR LEFT THE MORAL UN^{SP}ROKEN.

3. THEY ADDED THAT 2 OF THE 41 HAVE POSSIBLE US CONNECTIONS, AND ONE HAS A CANADIAN CONNECTION. THE 41 ARE ABOVE AVERAGE PEOPLE, INCLUDING TEACHERS, STUDENTS AND TECHNICIANS. THERE ARE 30 ADULTS AND 11 CHILDREN.

HHENNINGS

ENDS

LDW 942

LKN NR 428/29

OO F C O

OO TOKYO

OO HONG KONG
GR 161

RESTRICTED

FMDEINGAPORE 290813Z
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TEL NO. 222 OF 29 JUNE 1979
REPEATED TO IMMEDIATE TOKYO (FOR PS/FOREIGN SECRETARY)

AND HONG KONG

YOUR TEL NO. 149: VIETNAMESE REFUGEES: MV ASHFORD

1. AS EXPECTED, SINGAPORE AUTHORITIES ARE ADAMANT THAT THE REFUGEES CANNOT DISEMBARK WITHOUT A GUARANTEE.
2. NEITHER UNHCR NOR SINGAPORE AUTHORITIES HAVE YET CONDUCTED DETAILED INTERVIEWS WITH THE 41, BUT WOULD UNDERSTAND THAT ONLY TWO OR THREE HAVE CONNECTIONS WITH OTHER COUNTRIES. WE HAVE ASKED UNHCR TO ASCERTAIN DETAILS. YOU SHOULD HOWEVER BE AWARE THAT, UNLESS THE FAMILY CONNECTION WITH A THIRD COUNTRY IS VERY STRONG, THERE IS LITTLE CHANCE THAT ANY OF THE 41 WOULD BE ACCEPTED BY ANOTHER RECIPIENT COUNTRY GIVEN EXISTING PRESSURE ON PLACES. UNFORTUNATELY, THEREFORE, WHERE THE REFUGEES WANT TO GO WILL HAVE LITTLE INFLUENCE ON THE UNHCR'S ABILITY TO PLACE THEM.
3. SHIP'S MASTER IS REPROVISIONING AND IS SERIOUSLY CONSIDERING RETURNING TO HIS SALVAGE OPERATIONS WITH THE 41 ABOARD, POSSIBLY ON MONDAY, 2 JULY.

HENNINGS.

NNNN

Prime Minister

Shul
29/6

IMMEDIATE
CYPRUS

0852/29

RESTRICTED

GR 60

RESTRICTED

FM SINGAPORE 280850Z JUNE 79

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 220 OF 28 JUNE

MY TELS NOS 202 AND 207: VIETNAMESE REFUGEES: MV ASHFORD
[art]

1. VESSEL HAS COMPLETED MINOR REPAIRS AND IS NOW TAKING ON BUNKERS. IT HOPES TO SAIL TOMORROW, 29 JUNE, IF REFUGEES CAN FIRST BE OFFLOADED.

2. GRATEFUL AT LEAST FOR INDICATION OF WHEN A DECISION IS LIKELY.

HENNINGS

FILES
SEAD
HK & GD
UND
FED
EESD
N AM D
SAD
EID
PUSD
OVB
IPD

NEWS D
M & VD
PS
PS/LPS
PS/MR. HURD
PS/MR. BLAKER
PS/PUS
SIR A DUFF
SIR A PARSONS
MR. CORTAZZI
MR. MURRAY
MR. STRATTON

ADDITIONAL DISTN.
BOAT PEOPLE

RESTRICTED

CONFIDENTIAL

GR 285

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM HONG KONG 280613Z JUN 79

TO IMMEDIATE FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
TELNO.871 OF 28 JUNE,

INFO IMMEDIATE: WASHINGTON,

PRIORITY : UKMIS GENEVA, UKMIS NEW YORK, TOKYO,
H.K.GOVERNMENT OFFICE LONDON.

MY TELNO.867 : U.S PROGRAMME FOR REFUGEE RESETTLEMENT.

1. THIS INFORMATION THAT THE AMERICANS HAVE MADE VIRTUALLY NO CHANGE IN THEIR QUOTA FOR HONG KONG DESPITE WHAT WAS SAID TO ME IN WASHINGTON IS VERY DISTURBING. QUOTAS FOR MALAYSIA AND INDONESIA ARE BOTH SUBSTANTIALLY INCREASED EVEN THOUGH, ACCORDING TO OUR FIGURES FOR 1 MAY TO 15 JUNE, HONG KONG RECEIVED FAR MORE REFUGEES THAN EITHER OF THESE TWO COUNTRIES DURING THIS PERIOD. THE DIFFERENCE IF COURSE IS THAT MALAYSIA, AND TO A LESSER EXTEND INDONESIA, HAVE THREATENED TOUGH ACTION TO PREVENT REFUGEES LANDING. SUCH DISCRIMINATION IN FAVOUR OF INHUMANE TREATMENT MAKES HONG KONG'S POSITION INTOLERABLE.

2. AMBASSADOR CLARK (CO-ORDINATOR OF REFUGEE AFFAIRS) IS DUE IN HONG KONG BRIEFLY TOMORROW ON HIS WAY TO BALI. I WILL TRY TO SEE HIM AND ASK HOW THESE FIGURES SQUARE WITH THE ASSURANCE THAT THE U.S QUOTA WOULD BE ADJUSTED TO INTAKE AND WHAT I TOOK TO BE GENERAL AGREEMENT IN WASHINGTON THAT HUMANITY SHOULD NOT BE SEEN TO BE PENALISED. PROVIDING YOU SEE NO OBJECTION, I WOULD BE GRATEFUL IF WASHINGTON COULD REINFORCE THESE REPRESENTATIONS WITH THE STATE DEPARTMENT.

CONFIDENTIAL

/ 3. I AM REPEATING

CONFIDENTIAL

3. I AM REPEATING THIS AND MY TEL UNDER REF TO TOKYO FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE. INCIDENTALLY, THE AMERICANS HAVE JUST TOLD US THAT THE FIGURES FOR OFFTAKE IN JUNE QUOTED IN MY TEL UNDER REF CONTAINED AN ERROR. THE CORRECT FIGURES WERE 3,000 FROM MALAYSIA AND 2,800 FROM THAILAND. THIS MAKES THE DISCRIMINATION AGAINST HONG KONG IN THE JULY QUOTAS EVEN MORE STRIKING.

MACLEHOSE

FILES
SEAD
HK & GD
UND
FED
EESD
N AM D
SAD
EID
PUSD
OID
IPD

NEWS D
M & VD
PS
PS/LPS
PS/MR. HURD
PS/MR. BLAKER
PS/PUS
SIR A DUFF
SIR A PARSONS
MR. CORTAZZI
MR. MURRAY
MR. STRATTON

ADDITIONAL DISTN.
BOAT PEOPLE

CONFIDENTIAL

GR 200

CONFIDENTIAL

P S TO P M No10 DOWNING ST

FM UKMIS NEW YORK 281535Z JUNE 79

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 667 OF 28 JUNE

INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS GENEVA, WASHINGTON, HONG KONG, TOKYO,
PRIORITY MANILA, KUALA LUMPUR, SINGAPORE, BANGKOK, JAKARTA,
OTTAWA, PEKING, MOSCOW, PARIS, BONN.

UKMIS NEW YORK TELNO 661: UN CONFERENCE ON INDO-CHINESE REFUGEES.

1. THE CHINESE MADE REPRESENTATIONS TO WALDHEIM LAST NIGHT. THEY SAID THAT THEY WANTED THE PROPOSED CONFERENCE TO LAY EMPHASIS ON THE POLITICAL ASPECTS OF THE PROBLEM. IF THESE WERE NOT SPECIFICALLY INCLUDED, THEY WOULD NOT ATTEND. WALDHEIM IS STILL DETERMINED TO GO AHEAD WITH THE CONFERENCE ON THE HUMANITARIAN ASPECTS OF THE PROBLEM, THOUGH HE NOW CONSIDERS THAT 20/21 JULY WILL BE THE BEST DATE. HE HAS, HOWEVER, DECIDED THAT IT WOULD BE IMPRUDENT TO ANNOUNCE THE CONFERENCE IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE CHINESE DEMARCHE ASKING HIM TO RECONSIDER HIS POSITION, PARTICULARLY SINCE THEY HAD RECENTLY STARTED TO PLAY A MORE POSITIVE ROLE IN THE UNHCR.
2. WALDHEIM LEAVES TOMORROW FOR GENEVA AND WILL BE MEETING HARTLING ON SATURDAY. IT IS POSSIBLE THAT HE WILL MAKE THE ANNOUNCEMENT IMMEDIATELY AFTER THAT BUT, IF NOT, BUFFUM SAYS THAT HIS PRESENT INTENTION IS TO MAKE THE ANNOUNCEMENT BY MONDAY 2 JULY.

MANSFIELD

FILES
SEAD
HK & GD
UND
FED
EESD
N AM D
SAD
EID
PUSE
CID
IPD

NEWS D
M & VD
PS
PS/LPS
PS/MR. HURD
PS/MR. BLAKER
PS/PUS
SIR A DUFF
SIR A PARSONS
MR. CORTAZZI
MR. MURRAY
MR. STRATTON

ADDITIONAL DISTN.
BOAT PEOPLE

CONFIDENTIAL

original on
Econ PD, May 79
Tokyo Summit

SPECIAL STATEMENT OF THE SUMMIT
ON INDOCHINESE REFUGEES

June 28, 1979
Tokyo

The plight of refugees from Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia poses a humanitarian problem of historic proportions and constitutes a threat to the peace and stability of Southeast Asia. Given the tragedy and suffering which are taking place, the problem calls for an immediate and major response.

The Heads of State and Government call on Vietnam and other countries of Indochina to take urgent and effective measures so that the present human hardship and suffering are eliminated. They confirm the great importance they attach to the immediate cessation of the disorderly outflow of refugees without prejudice to the principles of free emigration and family reunification.

The Governments represented will, as part of an international effort, significantly increase their contributions to Indochinese refugee relief and resettlement - by making more funds available and by admitting more people, while taking into account the existing social and economic circumstances in each of their countries.

The Heads of State and Government request the Secretary-General of the United Nations to convene a conference as soon as possible with a view to attaining concrete and positive results. They extend full support to this objective and are ready to participate constructively in such a conference.

The Heads of State and Government call on all nations to join in addressing this pressing problem.

C O N F I D E N T I A L

file

VB



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

28 June 1979

Dear George,

Ships for Vietnam

The Prime Minister has seen the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary's minute of 26 June about the four ships contracted for by Vietnam with Austen and Pickersgill, part of the purchase of which is being financed by aid.

The Prime Minister has noted the considerations set out in Lord Carrington's minute and agrees that, in all the circumstances, the outstanding instalments of £350,000 should be paid at once, and that the remaining instalments should be met as they fall due.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Martin Hall (HM Treasury), John Chilcot (Home Office), Andrew Duguid (Department of Industry), Tom Harris (Department of Trade), Bill Beckett (Law Officers' Department) and Martin Vile (Cabinet Office).

Yours ever,

Ryan Corbett

G.G.H. Walden, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

C O N F I D E N T I A L

M



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

28 June 1979

Dear George,

Vietnamese Refugees: MV Ashford

Thank you for your letter of 26 June about the 41 Vietnamese refugees who have been picked up in the South China Sea by the UK registered salvage vessel MV Ashford.

The Prime Minister has seen your letter. She does not consider that the guarantee for which the Singapore authorities are likely to ask should be given for the time being. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary may wish to discuss this matter with the Prime Minister further while they are in Tokyo.

I am sending copies of this letter, for the record, to John Chilcot (Home Office), Tom Harris (Department of Trade), Bill Beckett (Law Officers' Department) and Martin Vile (Cabinet Office).

*Yours ever,
G. G. H. Walden*

G.G.H. Walden, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

LDW 788/27

OO TOKYO

GR100

CONFIDENTIAL

FM FCO 271955Z JUN 79

TO IMMEDIATE TOKYO (PS)

TELEGRAM NUMBER 310 OF 27 JUNE

FOLLOWING TELEGRAM NOW REPEATED TO YOU AT REQUEST OF DEPARTMENT WAS
RECEIVED FROM UKMIS NEW YORK TELNO 661 OF 27 JUNE

MY TELNO 656: UN CONFERENCE ON INDO-CHINESE REFUGEES

1. ACCORDING TO BUFFUM, WALDHEIM EXPECTS TO ANNOUNCE THE
CONFERENCE TOMORROW, THURSDAY. HE WILL NOT WAIT LONGER FOR A
POSITIVE VIETNAMESE RESPONSE AND WILL ONLY RECONSIDER IF HE
RECEIVES A STRONGLY ADVERSE REPLY FROM THEM BEFORE HIS
ANNOUNCEMENT.

CARRINGTON

NNNN

Prime Minister

6/27/79

IMMEDIATE
CYBER

2305/27

CONFIDENTIAL

GRS 290

CONFIDENTIAL

FM PARIS 271514Z JUNE 79

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 363 OF 27 JUNE

INFO PRIORITY KUALA LUMPUR BANGKOK HANOI SINGAPORE PEKING JAKARTA
HONG KONG (PERSONAL FOR GOVERNOR) UKMIS GENEVA UKREP BRUSSELS
WASHINGTON MOSCOW CANBERRA

MY TELNO 361 (NOT TO ALL): VIETNAMESE REFUGEES

1. WE HAVE DISCUSSED PRESIDENT GISCARD'S ANNOUNCEMENT WITH BOTH THE QUAI D'ORSAY AND THE ELYSEE. IT WAS IN PART MOTIVATED BY INTERNAL POLITICS, AS THERE HAVE BEEN CALLS FROM ALL SECTORS OF PUBLIC OPINION FOR A SPECIAL EFFORT TO BE MADE BY FRANCE. ONLY THE COMMUNIST PARTY HAS BEEN EQUIVOCAL IN ITS SUPPORT FOR HUMANITARIAN AID FOR REFUGEES, BECAUSE ITS LINE IS TO REMIND PUBLIC OPINION OF THE WEST'S RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE PRESENT SITUATION IN VIETNAM. THE ANNOUNCEMENT WAS TIMED TO ENABLE PRESIDENT GISCARD TO LEAVE FOR TOKYO HAVING MADE A GESTURE WHICH WOULD BOTH SATISFY PUBLIC OPINION HERE AND MAINTAIN FRANCE'S PROMINENT POSTURE INTERNATIONALLY.

2. IT APPEARS THAT PRESIDENT GISCARD WOULD VERY MUCH LIKE TO SEE FRANCE'S PARTNERS TAKING MORE REFUGEES. IT SEEMS THAT HE IS SCEPTICAL ABOUT THE LIKELIHOOD OF AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE SOLVING THE PROBLEM. THE BEST THAT COULD BE HOPED FOR WOULD BE BETTER ORGANISED RELIEF. THE QUAI THINK ON THE SAME LINES, WITH THE ADDITIONAL NUANCE THAT THEY REMEMBER FRANCE'S HISTORIC LINKS WITH VIETNAM AND HAVE NO ENTHUSIASM FOR GANGING UP AGAINST IT.

3. THE ELYSEE HAVE TOLD US THAT THE PRESIDENT IS PERSONALLY OPPOSED TO CONTINUING AID TO VIETNAM AND WOULD PROBABLY THEREFORE BE IN FAVOUR OF DIVERTING COMMUNITY FOOD AID TO THE REFUGEES. ALTHOUGH WE HAVE HAD NO FORMAL RESPONSE TO THE APPROACH RECORDED IN MY TELNO 351, IT SEEMS, IF THESE ARE INDEED THE PRESIDENT'S FEELINGS, THAT IT SHOULD BE POSSIBLE TO COUNT ON FRENCH SUPPORT.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

4. A CORRECTED VERSION OF YESTERDAY'S COUNCIL OF MINISTERS' COMMUNIQUE ON REFUGEES HAS NOW APPEARED. LINE 3 OF THE FIRST PARAGRAPH READS: ''....., FRANCE WITH HER EUROPEAN PARTNERS HAS CALLED FOR.....''.

HIBBERT

FILES
SEAD
HK & GD
UND
FED
EESD
N AM D
SAD
EID
PUSD
OID
IPD

NEWS D
M & VD
PS
PS/LPS
PS/MR. HURD
PS/MR. BLAKER
PS/PUS
SIR A DUFF
SIR A PARSONS
MR. CORTAZZI
MR. MURRAY
MR. STRATTON

ADDITIONAL DISTN.
BOAT PEOPLE



010 PRIME MINISTER
FCO report on efforts to
make world
opinion aware of
the scale of the
Vietnamese refugee
problem. MAD 28/6.

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

27 June 1979

NMM
Su
2/1

Dear Nick,

Vietnamese Refugees

In his letter of 15 June about Sir Murray Maclehole's call on the Prime Minister, Bryan Cartledge recorded that it had been agreed that something should be done to make world opinion more aware of the scale of the refugee problem. In particular, the Prime Minister had suggested that some of the large press corps in Tokyo to cover the Summit should be persuaded to accompany Lord Carrington afterwards to Hong Kong. The point had been made that French and non-aligned journalists should be included. You asked for a report in due course on action taken.

Lord Carrington leaves Tokyo for Hong Kong before the final press conference of the Summit, which the journalists present will wish to attend. We can expect on past form that the press conference will be followed by bilateral briefings, some of them possibly the next morning, that will further detain the visiting press in Tokyo. But a number of leading British correspondents have said that they would wish to catch up with Lord Carrington in Hong Kong; and we are now rearranging Lord Carrington's programme there so that these people can accompany him on the refugee part of the programme.

In addition to them there will be a BBC Panorama team in Hong Kong preparing a special programme on the refugee problem (for screening on 16 July). We will try to give them every opportunity to cover Lord Carrington's visit. They will also accompany him to Kuala Lumpur (along with most of the other British journalists) and film further relevant material there.

Since the problem of timing will make it difficult for French journalists at Tokyo to accompany Lord Carrington to Hong Kong, we have been in touch with the Agence France Presse Office in London, who will alert their offices in Hong Kong and Singapore (which covers Kuala Lumpur) to cover those parts of Lord Carrington's onward journey. The AFP London Office expect their colleagues to respond very willingly to this suggestion.

The copy filed by Agence France Presse from Hong Kong and Kuala Lumpur should get a wide coverage, not only in metropolitan France but also in a large number of non-aligned countries, particularly in the South East Asian area.

We have also had a request from the Asian Wall Street Journal, which is edited in Hong Kong, for an interview with Lord Carrington that would cover the refugee problem, as well

/as



as the Tokyo Summit. The Asian Wall Street Journal is read throughout the area.

Finally, we have alerted the Information Officer in Tokyo to encourage other correspondents at the Summit to go to Hong Kong if they can.

I am sending copies of this letter to Tony Butler (Home Office), Tom Harris (Department of Trade) and Martin Vile (Cabinet Office).

Yours etc

Paul
(P Lever)

Private Secretary

N Sanders Esq
10 Downing Street
LONDON

27 JUN 1979



CONFIDENTIAL

HS



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

27 June 1979

Ships for Vietnam

The Prime Minister has seen Lord Carrington's minute of 26 June about ships for Vietnam. (I assume that the copy she has seen in Tokyo is no different in substance from the one we have here numbered PM/79/60, although this reference is apparently lacking from the copy in Tokyo.) The Prime Minister is content with the course of action proposed in paragraph 6 of Lord Carrington's minute, subject to the views of colleagues.

I am sending copies of this letter to Martin Hall (H.M. Treasury), John Chilcot (Home Office), Tom Harris (Department of Trade), Andrew Duguid (Department of Industry), Bill Beckett (Law Officers' Department) and Martin Vile (Cabinet Office).

M. A. PATTISON

Paul Lever, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CONFIDENTIAL

SM

CONFIDENTIAL



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

27 June 1979

I understand that George Walden wrote to Bryan Cartledge on 26 June about the Vietnamese refugees on board MV Ashford. (There also appears to be an identical letter of the same date to Bryan from Stephen Wall).

The Prime Minister has seen (in Tokyo) the letter from George Walden. She does not wish any action to be taken on Lord Carrington's proposal at this stage.

I am sending copies of this letter to John Chilcot (Home Office), Tom Harris (Department of Trade), Bill Beckett (Law Officers' Department) and Martin Vile (Cabinet Office).

M. A. PATTISON

Paul Lever, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CONFIDENTIAL



PRIME MINISTER

Prime Minister

Agree to para. 6,
subject to colleagues'
views?

Yes Sir,

pl. 10 in hand
J.C.
J.M.
28/10

Ships for Vietnam

4. You will remember the question of the four ships contracted for by Vietnam with Austen and Pickersgill (A & P), one of which was paid for and delivered. About one quarter of the order was to be financed by aid, of which £2.3 million has still to be paid. We discussed this question a few days ago as one part of the Vietnam refugee problem, but came to no conclusion. Since then two instalments, totalling about £350,000, have matured and are now overdue to be paid out of aid funds direct to Austen and Pickersgill under the terms of the relevant agreement (copy attached at Annex A). They have been held up by administrative action, but the firm are pressing for their money and are concerned about the future of the order. They have already sent a telegram to Neil Marten protesting about the suspension of payments and asking for a very urgent decision.

2. I have looked further into the costs of cutting off the aid. These are difficult to predict, but the following is the order of magnitude:-

	<u>Estimated Cost £m.</u>
(a) Vietnam would probably not only cancel the outstanding order for <u>three</u> vessels but also <u>refuse repayment on ECGD and commercial loans for the ship already sold</u>	£3.7
(b) Lazards' cancellation charges on commercial loans already taken up for the remaining three vessels	£1.5
(c) Further costs would depend on whether or not construction of the additional three vessels was completed. Substantial commitments have already been entered into and abandonment would incur penalties (loss of profit, redundancy payments, etc) probably no lighter than the cost of continuing construction.	

/ (d)



Estimated
Cost £m.

(d)	If the vessels were completed, the total cost would be	£13.5
(e)	It is highly uncertain when or at what price they could be sold. There would be a heavy charge in interest payments on the capital involved until they were sold	£2.3
	Sub total	£21.0
(f)	Against this would be set the resale value	£9.0
(g)	An offsetting saving would arise from cancellation of ODA's obligation under the ATCP	£2.3

The approximate overall cost of rescinding the ATCP commitment would thus be £9.7 million.

3. In the Department of Industry's view, which seems to be valid, if action is taken to abrogate the aid agreement or to prohibit the export of the ships it would:-

- (a) Give the Vietnamese the one ship already delivered for no payment and the financial loss would fall on the taxpayer;
- (b) In addition it would intensify the serious anxiety now felt about the future of the merchant shipbuilding industry before the Government is ready to make a response on its shipbuilding policy. The Government would be seen to be jeopardising the present employment and prospect of the best merchant shipbuilding yard in the industry;
- (c) At the same time it would damage the efforts of British shipbuilders to obtain overseas contracts for merchant and naval ships. Possible buyers would be worried that the Government could prevent the fulfilment of their contracts.

4. I do not believe that we would gain any leverage over Vietnam by depriving them of our ships. They could quite easily get hold of ships elsewhere. Indeed they might be prepared, at some stage, to denounce their agreement with us as a sign of their dissatisfaction with our policy over refugees: but they would claim that their action resulted from the delays in our implementing the agreement.



5. To continue with what is, at least in form, aid to this regime sticks in the gullet: nor does public opinion like it, although it has not yet become a major issue. Once a decision is made we should take steps to make it better known that the aid passes direct to our own shipbuilders and cannot be mis-applied by Vietnam.

6. I conclude that we should:-

- (a) Pay the outstanding instalments (£350,000) at once; ✓
- (b) Meet the remaining instalments (rather under £2 million) as they fall due over the next year or so. ✓

7. I am copying this minute to the Chancellor of the Exchequer, the Home Secretary, the Secretaries of State for Industry and Trade, the Attorney General and Sir John Hunt.

C

(CARRINGTON)

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

26 June 1979



PM/79/60

PRIME MINISTER

Ships for Vietnam

1. You will remember the question of the four ships contracted for by Vietnam with Austen and Pickersgill (A & P), one of which was paid for and delivered. About one quarter of the order was to be financed by aid, of which £2.3 million has still to be paid. We discussed this question a few days ago as one part of the Vietnam refugee problem, but came to no conclusion. Since then two instalments, totalling about £350,000, have matured and are now overdue to be paid out of aid funds direct to Austen and Pickersgill under the terms of the relevant agreement (copy attached at Flag A). They have been held up by administrative action, but the firm are pressing for their money and are concerned about the future of the order. They have already sent a telegram to Neil Marten protesting about the suspension of payments and asking for a very urgent decision.

2. I have looked further into the costs of cutting off the aid. These are difficult to predict, but the following is the order of magnitude:-

	<u>Estimated Cost</u>
(a) Vietnam would probably not only cancel the outstanding order for three vessels but also refuse repayment on ECGD and commercial loans for the ship already sold	£3.7 million
(b) Lazard's' cancellation charges on commercial loans already taken up for the remaining three vessels	£1.5 million



	<u>Estimated Cost</u>
(c) Further costs would depend on whether or not construction of the additional three vessels was completed. Substantial commitments have already been entered into and abandonment would incur penalties (loss of profit, redundancy payments, etc) probably no lighter than the cost of continuing construction.	
(d) If the vessels were completed, the total cost would be	£13.5 million
(e) It is highly uncertain when or at what price they could be sold. There would be a heavy charge in interest payments on the capital involved until they were sold.	£ 2.3 million
Sub Total	<hr/> £21.0 million
(f) Against this would be set the resale value	£ 9.0 million
(g) An offsetting saving would arise from cancellation of ODA's obligation under the ATCP	£ 2.3 million

The approximate overall cost of rescinding the ATCP commitment would thus be £9.7 million.

3. In the Department of Industry's view, which seems to me to be valid, if action is taken to abrogate the aid agreement or to prohibit the export of the ships it would:-

/(a)



(a) Give the Vietnamese the one ship already delivered for no payment and the financial loss would fall on the taxpayer;

(b) In addition it would intensify the serious anxiety now felt about the future of the merchant shipbuilding industry before the Government is ready to make a response on its shipbuilding policy. The Government would be seen to be jeopardising the present employment and prospect of the best merchant shipbuilding yard in the industry;

(c) At the same time it would damage the efforts of British shipbuilders to obtain overseas contracts for merchant and naval ships. Possible buyers would be worried that the Government could prevent the fulfilment of their contracts.

4. I do not believe that we would gain any leverage over Vietnam by depriving them of our ships. They could quite easily get hold of ships elsewhere. Indeed they might be prepared, at some stage, to denounce their agreement with us as a sign of their dissatisfaction with our policy over refugees; but they would claim that their action resulted from the delays in our implementing the agreement.

5. To continue with what is, at least in form, aid to this regime sticks in the gullet: nor does public opinion like it, although it has not yet become a major issue. Once a decision is made we should take steps to make it better known that the aid passes direct to our own shipbuilders and cannot be misapplied by Vietnam.



6. I conclude that we should:-

(a) Pay the outstanding installments (£350,000) at once;

(b) Meet the remaining installments (rather under £2 million) as they fall due over the next year or so.


7. I am sending copies of this minute to the Chancellor of the Exchequer, the Home Secretary, the Secretaries of State for Industry and Trade, the Attorney-General and Sir John Hunt.

C
(CARRINGTON)

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

26 June 1979

27 JUN 1979





Excellency

19 February 1979

UNITED KINGDOM/VIETNAM GRANT 1979

I have the honour to inform you that it is the intention of the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (hereinafter referred to as "the Government of the United Kingdom") to make available to the Government of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam (hereinafter referred to as the "Government of Vietnam") by way of a grant a sum not exceeding £4.5 m (four and one half million pounds sterling) (hereinafter referred to as the "grant") being £4.454 m in respect of four SD14 (Series IV) cargo vessels to be purchased from Austin and Pickersgill Limited of Sunderland, England (hereinafter referred to as the "Contractors") together with the charges and commissions payable under paragraph 7B of this Note.

2. The arrangements and the procedures described in the following paragraphs of this Note, which, insofar as they relate to things to be done by or on behalf of, or to matters under the control of the Government of the United Kingdom, my Government intend to adopt. It is the understanding of the Government of the United Kingdom that the Government of Vietnam intend to adopt the arrangements and procedures so described insofar as they relate to things to be done by or on behalf of, or to matters under the control of, the Government of Vietnam.

3. Subject to the overall limit shown in paragraph 1 and subject to paragraphs 4, 5, 6, and 7 of the Note, drawings from the grant will be applied to payments to the Contractors and will become due and payable for each vessel as follows:-

	<u>£ Sterling</u>
(i) On the coming into operation of the United Kingdom/Vietnam Grant 1979	179,000
(ii) Commencement of Steel deliveries	179,000
(iii) Commencement of Assembly	179,000
(iv) Keel Laid	179,000
(v) Launch	179,000



(vi) Completion and acceptance
by the Government of Vietnam 218,500

Initial Procedure

4. For the purpose of these arrangements, the Government of Vietnam will, by a request in the form set out in Appendix A to this Note, open a Special Account (hereinafter referred to as "the Account") with the Crown Agents for Oversea Governments and Administrations, 4 Millbank, London SW1P 3JD (hereinafter referred to as "the Crown Agents"). The Account will be operated solely for the purposes of the grant and in accordance with the instructions contained in the said request.



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

26 June 1979

Dear Byron

Vietnamese Refugees: M V Ashford

The owners of the UK registered salvage vessel M V Ashford have sought advice urgently about 41 Vietnamese refugees picked up in the South China Sea on 18 June. The M V Ashford entered Singapore on 22 June.

The Singapore Government have made it clear in the past that they are not prepared to allow refugees rescued at sea to disembark unless they receive a guarantee from the vessel's flag country that it will accept any of the refugees whom the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees has not placed elsewhere within 90 days. There is unfortunately little possibility of persuading the Singapore Government to take such refugees for permanent settlement. - Mr Lee Kuan Yew's remarks on the refugee problem while in London amply bear this out.

As a result of four previous incidents there are now 57 refugees in Singapore covered by such guarantees from Britain, although it is likely that some of these will eventually go elsewhere. Of the 57, three are due to come to this country soon because the end of the period permitted by the Singapore authorities for them is imminent.

When the Government announced on 28 May that refugees on board the M V Sibonga who wished to come to this country would be accepted here, we stated that no general commitment could be given about similar action in future, and that each case would be considered on its merits.

For this case Lord Carrington proposes that, provided the Home Secretary concurs, we should convey a guarantee to the Singapore authorities should this in the event be required.

I am copying this letter to John Chilcot in the Home Office, Thomas Harris (Department of Trade), Martin Vile (Cabinet Office) and Bill Beckett (Law Officers' Department).

*Yours ever,
Stephen*

(J S Wall)

Private Secretary

B G Cartledge Esq
10 Downing Street



Prime Minister

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

26 June 1979

Agree to "x"?

*Byul
27/6*

Wait-

*No. 10 informed
Byul
27/6*

Dear *Byul,*

Vietnamese Refugees: MV Ashford

The owners of the UK registered salvage vessel MV Ashford have sought advice urgently about 41 refugees picked up in the South China Sea on 18 June. The MV Ashford entered Singapore on 22 June.

The Singapore Government have made it clear in the past that they are not prepared to allow refugees rescued at sea to disembark unless they receive a guarantee from the vessel's flag country that it will accept any of the refugees whom the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees has not placed elsewhere within ninety days. There is unfortunately little possibility of persuading the Singapore Government to take such refugees for permanent settlement - Mr Lee Kuan Yew's remarks on the refugee problem while in London amply bear this out.

As a result of four previous incidents there are now 57 refugees in Singapore covered by such guarantees from Britain, although it is likely that some of these will eventually go elsewhere. Of the 57, three are due to come to this country soon because the end of the period permitted by the Singapore authorities for them is imminent.

When the Government announced on 28 May that refugees on board the MV Sibonga who wished to come to this country would be accepted here, we stated that no general commitment could be given about similar action in future, and that each case would be considered on its merits.

For this case Lord Carrington proposes that, provided the Home Secretary concurs, we should convey a guarantee to the Singapore authorities should this in the event be required.

X ||

I am copying this letter to John Chilcot in the Home Office, Tom Harris in the Department of Trade, Martin Vile in the Cabinet Office, and Bill Beckett in the Law Officers Department.

Tom Harris

GGH

G G H Walden

B G Cartledge Esq
10 Downing Street

LDW 718

P TOKYO

GGRRRRRRR 200

CONFIDENTIAL

CYPHER

FM UKMIS NEW YORK 261555Z JUNE 79

Prime Minister

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

Shu
N-2876

TELEGRAM NUMBER 656 OF 26 JUNE

INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS GENEVA, WASHINGTON, HONG KONG,

PRIORITY MANILA, KUALA LUMPUR, SINGAPORE, BANGKOK, JAKARTA,

OTTAWA, PEKING, OTKYO, MOSCOW, PARIS, BONN.

MY TELEGRAM NO 644 AND MANILA TELNO 325: UN CONFERENCE ON INDO-CHINESE REFUGEES.

1. BUFFUM TOLD US TODAY THAT ROMULO HAD TELEPHONED THE SECRETARY-GENERAL YESTERDAY CONFIRMING ASEAN AGREEMENT TO THE PROPOSED CONFERENCE ON HUMANITARIAN ASPECTS OF THE INDO-CHINESE REFUGEE PROBLEM, THOUGH SINGAPORE STILL FELT THAT THE POLITICAL

ASPECTS SHOULD ALSO BE DISCUSSED. WALDHEIM WAS NOW AWAITING

VIETNAM'S RESPONSE. HE TOLD ME YESTERDAY THAT HE HOPED TO ANNOUNCE
A CONFERENCE IN THE NEXT DAY OR TWO.

2. WALDHEIM STILL FAVOURS GENEVA ON 18-19 JULY. BUT HARTLEY HAS
POINTED OUT THAT THE OAU SUMMIT MAY CONTINUE UNTIL 19 JULY. THEY
HAVE AN ITEM ON THEIR AGENDA ABOUT AFRICAN REFUGEES AND HARTLEY
EXPECTS TO ATTEND FOR THIS. WALDHEIM PROPOSES TO INVITE ABOUT 64
COUNTRIES. IN ADDITION TO THOSE WHO RECEIVED HIS NOTE OF 24 MAY,
HE WILL INCLUDE MEMBERS OF THE UNHCR EXECUTIVE AND A FEW OTHER
POTENTIAL CONTRIBUTORS.

RICHARD

NNNN

17-54
297
03552/27
JULY 1977

PP TOKYO

90

L

C O N F I D E N T I A L

CYPHER

FM HONG KONG 260951Z JUN 79

TO PRIORITY FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

TELNO.865 OF 26 JUNE,

Prime Minister

INFO PRIORITY: TOKYO,

Stul
28/6

ROUTINE : HONG KONG GOVT OFFICE LONDON.

YOUR TELNO.441 : VIETNAMESE REFUGEES ON JAPANESE SHIPS.

1. IN PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES, WITH REFUGEE ARRIVALS OUTNUMBERING

DEPARTURES BY 12 TO 1, WE CAN GIVE NO UNDERTAKINGS CONCERNING

OCEAN-GOING VESSELS WHICH BRING REFUGEES TO HONG KONG.

2. IN EXPLAINING THIS TO THE JAPANESE, WE SUGGEST YOU POINT OUT

THAT IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT FOR HONG KONG TO TREAT SHIPS REGISTERED

IN JAPAN IN A DIFFERENT WAY FROM ONES REGISTERED IN THE U.K, SUCH

AS THE 'SIBONGA'.

2326/26

CATER

NNNN

N

M

15.

LDW 661

OO TOKYO

Prime Minister
Sgt
276

.,.2

CONFIDENTIAL

DESKBY 261400Z

IMMEDIATE
CAPTION

FM BANGKOK 261130Z JUN

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TEL NO 421 OF 26 JUNE 79

INFO IMMEDIATE TOKYO, WASHINGTON, PRIORITY UKMIS NEW YORK, UKMIS
GENEVA, HONG KONG (FOR GOVERNOR), ROUTINE SINGAPORE, KUALA LUMPUR,
MANILA, JAKARTA, OTTAWA, CANBERRA, MOSCOW

INFO SAVING WELLINGTON

MY TELEGRAM NO 415: VIETNAM.

1. CORTAZZI WAS WARMLY RECEIVED TODAY BY GENERAL KRIANGSAK, THE
THAI PRIME MINISTER, WHO HAD WITH HIM AIR MARSHAL SITTHI, THE
SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL. GENERAL
KRIANGSAK STRONGLY SUPPORTED THE BRITISH PRIME MINISTER'S
INITIATIVE IN CALLING FOR A UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON
REFUGEES FROM VIETNAM. IN HIS MESSAGE TO MRS THATCHER OF 18 JUNE

①

HE HAD MENTIONED BANGKOK AS A POSSIBLE SITE FOR THE CONFERENCE NOT BECAUSE HE THOUGHT THIS NECESSARILY APPROPRIATE OR DESIRABLE BUT AS A GOODWILL GESTURE TO UNDERLINE THE THAI WISH TO SEE EARLY AND EFFECTIVE INTERNATIONAL ACTION OVER REFUGEES. HE APPRECIATED THE TOUGH LINE THAT WE HAD TAKEN WITH VIETNAM, WHICH WAS THE ROOT CAUSE OF THE TROUBLE.

2. CORTAZZI EXPLAINED OUR CURRENT THINKING ON THE LINES HE HAD USED WITH DR UPADIT YESTERDAY. HE PARTICULARLY STRESSED THE HUMANITARIAN POLICIES OF THE HONG KONG GOVERNMENT DESPITE THE INCREASING PRESSURE ON HONG KONG AND URGED THAT ALL THE ASEAN COUNTRIES SHOULD COOPERATE WITH US IN MAINTAINING A HUMANITARIAN STANCE. ALTHOUGH CORTAZZI SAID THAT WE HAD NO WISH TO BE CRITICAL OF THAI POLICIES IN THE DIFFICULT CIRCUMSTANCES THEY WERE FACING KRIANGSAK LAUNCHED INTO A LONG DEFENCE OF THE RECENT ACTION TO REPATRIATE FORCIBLY CAMBODIAN REFUGEES. HE ARGUED THAT MANY OF THEM HAD GONE BACK VOLUNTARILY AND THAT ALL HAD BEEN PROVIDED WITH FOOD AND OTHER SUPPLIES. HE MADE IT CLEAR THAT THEY HAD NO CURRENT INTENTION OF REPATRIATING OTHERS. HOWEVER, HE STRESSED THE DIFFICULTIES WHICH FACED THE THAI AUTHORITIES IN THE BORDER AREAS AND THE NEED TO PROTECT THE RIGHTS AND LIVELIHOOD OF THAI CITIZENS THERE AGAINST THE DEPREDATIONS OF SOME OF THE REFUGEES. HE SAID THAT A REPORT IN TODAY'S BANGKOK PAPERS QUOTING AN INTERIOR MINISTRY OFFICIAL TO THE EFFECT THAT THE THAI GOVERNMENT INTENDED TO REPATRIATE ALL THE 120,000 LAO REFUGEES IN THAILAND WAS UNTRUE. THEY WERE THE REMARKS OF A JUNIOR OFFICER ACTING WITHOUT AUTHORITY.

3. AT THE REQUEST OF THE UNITED STATES AMBASSADOR CORTAZZI ASKED GENERAL KRIANGSAK WHETHER THE THAI GOVERNMENT WOULD NOW ALLOW FOOD SUPPLIES FROM THE UNITED STATES TO BE PASSED ACROSS THE BORDER TO REFUGEES WHO HAD BEEN SENT BACK. GENERAL KRIANGSAK RESPONDED POSITIVELY BUT SAID THAT IT WAS ESSENTIAL THAT VIETNAM AND THE SOVIET UNION SHOULD BE TOLD WHAT THE THAIS WERE DOING AND WHY. HE WAS CLEARLY ANXIOUS THAT THAILAND SHOULD NOT BE ACCUSED OF INTERFERENCE IN CAMBODIA. THAI ACTION WOULD BE IN RESPONSE TO WORLD OPINION. THEY RECOGNISED THE POL POT REGIME BUT WOULD ALLOW FOOD TO GO THROUGH TO HENG SAMRIN OR EVEN THE VIETNAMESE IF THIS WAS WHAT THE WORLD WANTED IN ORDER TO PREVENT FAMINE IN CAMBODIA.

4. GENERAL KRIANGSAK SAID THAT HE WAS LOOKING FORWARD TO PRINCESS ANNE'S VISIT AND TOOK THE POINT WHEN CORTAZZI STRESSED HER STRONG INTEREST IN HUMANITARIAN CAUSES, ESPECIALLY THOSE CONNECTED WITH CHILDREN.

5. KRIANGSAK MENTIONED THE RE-EQUIPMENT OF THE THAI ARMY. CORTAZZI EXPLAINED THE EFFORTS WHICH WE HAD MADE TO MEET THEIR REQUIREMENT OVER SCORPIOMS.

6. FINALLY KRIANGSAK ASKED CORTAZZI TO CONVEY HIS PARTICULARLY WARM GREETINGS TO MRS THATCHER AND TO YOU.

GORING-MORRIS

NNNN

2238/26

UNCLASSIFIED

FM FCO 262010Z JUN 79

TO IMMEDIATE TOKYO FOR PS TO S OF S

TELEGRAM NO 268 OF 26 JUNE

IMMEDIATE

FOLLOWING TELEGRAM NOW REPEATED TO YOU AT REQUEST OF PRIVATE OFFICE
WAS RECEIVED FROM PARIS TELEGRAM NO 361 OF 26 JUNE

BEGINS

FM PARIS 261645Z JUN 79

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 361 OF 26 JUN 1979

INFO PRIORITY KUALA LUMPUR SINGAPORE BANGKOK HANOI JAKARTA

HONG KONG (PERSONAL FOR GOVERNOR) CANBERRA WASHINGTON

UKMIS GENEVA PEKING AND MOSCOW

FRANCE : COUNCIL OF MINISTERS : INDO-CHINESE REFUGEES

1. THE FOLLOWING IS THE EXTRACT ON INDO-CHINESE REFUGEES FROM
THE COMMUNIQUE ISSUED AFTER TODAY'S COUNCIL OF MINISTERS'
MEETING:

"SINCE THE TRAGEDY OF REFUGEES FROM VIETNAM, CAMBODIA AND
LAOS HAS RECENTLY BEGUN TO ASSUME THE PROPERTIES OF A VERITABLE
TRANSFER OF POPULATION, FRANCE HAS CALLED FOR THE URGENT CONVENING
OF AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE UNDER UNITED NATIONS AUSPICES.
ONLY THIS CONFERENCE, WHICH SHOULD TAKE PLACE IN MID-JULY,
WILL ALLOW HUMANE, EFFECTIVE AND LASTING SOLUTIONS TO BE FOUND
COMMENSURATE WITH THE DRAMATIC NATURE OF THE PROBLEM.

WITHOUT WAITING FOR THE INTERNATIONAL MEETING, AND BECAUSE

*L.
27*

Prime Minister

*del
27*

OF THE NEED FOR IMMEDIATE ACTION, THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC
HAS DECIDED THAT FRANCE WILL WELCOMEPTNPPP ADDITIONAL REFUGEES
DURING THE COMING WEEKS. THIS WILL MEAN THAT FRANCE'S CAPACITY
TO HOUSE AND ARRANGE TRANSIT FOR REFUGEES WILL BE FULLY USED.

THIS EXCEPTIONAL EFFORT FOLLOWS THAT WHICH FRANCE HAS
MADE CONTINUOUSLY OVER THE PAST FOUR YEARS AND WHOSE IMPORTANCE
SHOULD NOT BE FORGOTTEN SINCE, FOR EVERY THOUSAND INHABITANTS
IN FRANCE, THERE IS ONE REFUGEE FROM INDO-CHINA. FRANCE URGES
ALL STATES ABLE TO DO SO TO ADD THEIR EFFORTS TO THOSE OF FRANCE
AND MAKE A SIMILAR GESTURE IMMEDIATELY.

FINALLY THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC PAID TRIBUTE TO
THE GENEROSITY WHICH INSPIRED RECENT OFFERS MADE WITHIN FRANCE
TO TAKE IN REFUGEES. HE PARTICULARLY NOTED THE REMARKABLE
ACTION OF ASSOCIATIONS WHICH FOR THE LAST FOUR YEARS HAVE
UNDERTAKEN QUIETLY AND CONSCIENTIOUSLY THE TASK OF INTEGRATING
INDO-CHINESE REFUGIES INTO THE FRENCH NATION."

FCO PLEASE PASS TO ALL.

ENDS

CARRINGTON

NNNN

JUN 17 0200/27

FDW G 136/26

4

OO TOKYO

Prime Minister

GRS 120

You may wish
to discuss with
Lord Carrington.

RESTRICTED

6/26
28/6

FM F C O 261800Z JUNE 1979

TO IMMEDIATE TOKYO

IMMEDIATE
CYD
L

TELEGRAM NUMBER 265 OF 26 JUNE

FOR PS/S OF S.

FOLLOWING TELEGRAM NOW REPEATED TO YOU AT REQUEST OF PRIVATE OFFICE

WAS RECEIVED FROM SINGAPORE TELEGRAM NUMBER 217 OF 26 JUNE.

RESTRICTED

FM SINGAPORE 260850Z JUN

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 217 OF 26 JUN 79

MY TELNO 202 : VIETNAMESE REFUGEES : MV "ASHFORD".

1. VESSEL ARRIVED IN SINGAPORE LATE ON 22 JUNE AND HAS BEEN UNDER
GUARD SINCE THEN. AGENTS AND A REPRESENTATIVE OF THE OWNERS
WHO FLEW IN OVER THE WEEKEND AND UNHCR HAVE BEEN PRESSING FOR
NEWS OF A UK GUARANTEE. VESSEL'S PRESENCE IN HARBOUR WITH 41
REFUGEES WAS REPORTED IN TODAY'S PRESS, THOUGH WITHOUT MENTION
OF COUNTRY OF REGISTRATION.

2. WE RECOGNISE YOUR DIFFICULTIES BUT HOPE WE CAN RECEIVE EARLY
INSTRUCTIONS.

CARRINGTON

NNNN

2247/26

RESTRICTED

GR 80
RESTRICTED
FM SINGAPORE 260850Z JUN
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELNO 217 OF 26 JUN 79
MY TELNO 202: VIETNAMESE REFUGEES: MV ''ASHFORD''.

1. VESSEL ARRIVED IN SINGAPORE LATE ON 22 JUNE AND HAS BEEN UNDER GUARD SINCE THEN. AGENTS AND A REPRESENTATIVE OF THE OWNERS WHO FLEW IN OVER THE WEEKEND AND UNHCR HAVE BEEN PRESSING FOR NEWS OF A UK GUARANTEE. VESSEL'S PRESENCE IN HARBOUR WITH 41 REFUGEES WAS REPORTED IN TODAY'S PRESS, THOUGH WITHOUT MENTION OF COUNTRY OF REGISTRATION.

2. WE RECOGNISE YOUR DIFFICULTIES BUT HOPE WE CAN RECEIVE EARLY INSTRUCTIONS.

HENNINGS.

[COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING ST]

FILES
SEAD
HK & GD
UND
FED
EESD
N AM D
SAB
EID (E)
PUBB
OTB
IPB

NEWS D
M & VD
PS
PS/LPS
PS/MR. HURD
PS/MR. BEAKER
PS/PUS
SIR A DUFF
SIR A PARSONS
MR. CORTAZZI
MR. LEAHY
MR. MURRAY

COPIES TO:
HONG KONG GOVT. OFFICE LONDON
MR. WOODFIELD } HOME OFFICE
MR. BURLEIGH } QUEEN ANNE'S GATE
MR. HILLARY } HOME OFFICE
MR. BIRT } LUNAR HOUSE
CROYDON.
MR. V. ROCCE PAO/ODA

RESTRICTED

GRS 285

UNCLASSIFIED

FM PARIS 261645Z JUN 79

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 361 OF 26 JUN 1979

INFO PRIORITY KUALA LUMPUR, SINGAPORE, BANGKOK, HANOI, JAKARTA, HONGKONG (PERSONAL FOR GOVERNOR), CANBERRA, WASHINGTON, UKMIS GENEVA, PEKING AND MOSCOW.

FRANCE : COUNCIL OF MINISTERS : INDO-CHINESE REFUGEES

1. THE FOLLOWING IS THE EXTRACT ON INDO-CHINESE REFUGEES FROM THE COMMUNIQUE ISSUED AFTER TODAY'S COUNCIL OF MINISTERS' MEETING:

"SINCE THE TRAGEDY OF REFUGEES FROM VIETNAM, CAMBODIA AND LAOS HAS RECENTLY BEGUN TO ASSUME THE PROPERTIES OF A VERITABLE TRANSFER OF POPULATION, FRANCE HAS CALLED FOR THE URGENT CONVENING OF AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE UNDER UNITED NATIONS AUSPICES. ONLY THIS CONFERENCE, WHICH SHOULD TAKE PLACE IN MID-JULY, WILL ALLOW HUMANE, EFFECTIVE AND LASTING SOLUTIONS TO BE FOUND COMMENSURATE WITH THE DRAMATIC NATURE OF THE PROBLEM.

WITHOUT WAITING FOR THE INTERNATIONAL MEETING, AND BECAUSE OF THE NEED FOR IMMEDIATE ACTION, THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC HAS DECIDED THAT FRANCE WILL WELCOME 5,000 ADDITIONAL REFUGEES DURING THE COMING WEEKS. THIS WILL MEAN THAT FRANCE'S CAPACITY TO HOUSE AND ARRANGE TRANSIT FOR REFUGEES WILL BE FULLY USED.

THIS EXCEPTIONAL EFFORT FOLLOWS THAT WHICH FRANCE HAS MADE CONTINUOUSLY OVER THE PAST FOUR YEARS AND WHOSE IMPORTANCE SHOULD NOT BE FORGOTTEN SINCE, FOR EVERY THOUSAND INHABITANTS IN FRANCE, THERE IS ONE REFUGEE FROM INDO-CHINA. FRANCE URGES ALL STATES ABLE TO DO SO TO ADD THEIR EFFORTS TO THOSE OF FRANCE AND MAKE A SIMILAR GESTURE IMMEDIATELY.

FINALLY THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC PAID TRIBUTE TO THE GENEROSITY WHICH INSPIRED RECENT OFFERS MADE WITHIN FRANCE TO TAKE IN REFUGEES. HE PARTICULARLY NOTED THE REMARKABLE

/ ACTION

ACTION OF ASSOCIATIONS WHICH FOR THE LAST FOUR YEARS HAVE
UNDERTAKEN QUIETLY AND CONSCIENTIOUSLY THE TASK OF INTEGRATING
INDO-CHINESE REFUGEES INTO THE FRENCH NATION.''
FCO PLEASE PASS TO ALL.
HIEBERT.

[COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING ST]

FILES
SEAD
HK & GD
UND
FED
EESD
N AM D
SAD
EID (E)
PUSD
CID
IPD

NEWS D
M & VD
PS
PS/LPS
PS/MR. HURD
PS/MR. BLAKER
PS/PUS
SIR A DUFF
SIR A PARSONS
MR. CORTAZZI
MR. LEAHY
MR. MURRAY.

COPIES TO:
HONG KONG GOVT. OFFICE LONDON
MR. WOODFIELD }
MR. BURLEIGH } HOME OFFICE
 } QUEEN ANNE'S GATE
MR. HILLARY }
MR. BIRT } HOME OFFICE
 } LUNAR HOUSE
 } CROYDON.
MR. V. MCGEE FAO/ODA

CONFIDENTIAL

FM PEKING 260910Z JUNE 79

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 591 OF 26 JUNE 79

INFO IMMEDIATE HONG KONG, ~~PRIORITY UKMIS GENEVA~~, UKMIS NEW YORK, WASHINGTON, KUALA LUMPUR, BANGKOK, JAKARTA, HANOI, ROUTINE CANBERRA, WELLINGTON, TOKYO AND MOSCOW.*Amor*
Amor
the
27th

MY TELNO 577: VIETNAMESE REFUGEES

1. WHEN I SAW VICE-FOREIGN MINISTER, ZHANG WENJIN, ON 26 JUNE HE REAFFIRMED CHINESE SUPPORT FOR THE PRIME MINISTER'S PROPOSAL FOR A UN CONFERENCE ON REFUGEES. HE REFERRED TO THE NEED TO SOLVE THE ROOT CAUSE OF THE PROBLEM BY GETTING THE VIETNAMESE TO CHANGE THEIR POLICY AND ABIDE BY THE UN CHARTER, BUT ACKNOWLEDGED THE DIFFICULTIES.
2. ON CHINA'S OWN EFFORTS, HE SAID THAT THERE WERE NOW 240,000 REFUGEES IN CHINA, WITH MORE STILL COMING. THERE WAS DIFFICULTY IN SETTLING THEM, MANY BEING SMALL MERCHANTS AND FISHERMEN, WHEREAS AGRICULTURE WAS THE ONLY POSSIBLE SOURCE OF IMMEDIATE EMPLOYMENT FOR THEM IN CHINA. WHERE REFUGEES HAD RELATIVES ABROAD AND COUNTRIES WERE PREYTERED TO ACCEPT THEM, CHINA WAS WILLING TO LET THE REFUGEES LEAVE. BUT THIS WOULD APPLY TO ONLY A FEW AND, FOR THE GREAT MAJORITY, CHINA WOULD DO HER BEST TO HELP THEM TO SETTLE. HE THOUGHT IT UNLIKELY THAT OTHER COUNTRIES WOULD ACCEPT MORE VIETNAMESE REFUGEES FROM CHINA.
3. REFERRING TO THE HARTLING PROPOSAL ZHANG CONFIRMED THAT THIS RELATED TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF PROCESSING CAMPS IN CHINA TO TAKE REFUGEES FROM HONG KONG FOR A PERIOD OF THREE YEARS WHILE EFFORTS WERE MADE TO RESETTLE THEM. CHINA HAD FOUND THIS PROPOSAL DIFFICULT TO ACCEPT. TO ALLOW MORE REFUGEES TO ENTER CHINA WOULD ADD TO HER PROBLEMS SEMICOLON AND IF LIVING STANDARDS IN THE REFUGEE CENTRE WERE HIGHER THAN THOSE OF REFUGEES ALREADY BEING SETTLED IN CHINA, THERE WOULD BE FRICTION. THIS VIEW HAD BEEN CONVEYED TO HARTLING WHO UNDERTOOK TO "THINK OF SOMETHING ELSE". AT A LATER POINT IN THE CONVERSATION, ZHANG SAID THAT THE GREATEST CONTRIBUTION THAT CHINA COULD MAKE TO SOLVING HONG KONG'S VIETNAMESE REFUGEE PROBLEM WOULD BE THE SOLUTION OF THE LEGAL/ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION QUESTION.
4. ZHANG TOOK THE OPPORTUNITY TO EXPLAIN THE ORIGIN OF THE VOICE OF AMERICA REPORT THAT CHINA HAD ACCEPTED THE HARTLING PROPOSAL. AT THE END OF A CONVERSATION WITH THE US SECRETARY OF HEALTH, CALIFANO, IN WHICH LI XIANNIAN HAD URGED THE US TO TAKE MORE REFUGEES, LI HAD SAID THAT CHINA WOULD CONSIDER THE HARTLING PROPOSAL, BUT ONLY BY WAY OF ENDING THE CONVERSATION. CALIFANO SUBSEQUENTLY MISBRIEFED PRESSMEN.
5. ZHANG ALSO INDICATED THAT CHINA HAD CONSIDERED THE POSSIBILITY OF ACCEPTING INTERNATIONAL AID TO CREATE EMPLOYMENT FOR REFUGEES BEING SETTLED BY CHINA, BUT FOUND THE IDEA "VERY COMPLICATED". THE CHINESE FELT THAT IT WOULD SIMPLY CREATE JEALOUSIES BETWEEN REFUGEES AND THE CHINESE POPULATION, JUST AS THE PRIVILEGES GIVEN THE FAMILIES OF OVERSEAS CHINESE CAUSED DIFFICULTIES.

CRADOCK

NNNN

2316/26

Vietnam



10 DOWNING STREET


No: P.O.,

I think
John

Please see Trade's reply to my
David Roper of the General
Council of British Shoppers
(dated 19/6)

This answers a letter that
was sent directly to John Nott.

In view of this, do we still need
to answer Roper's letter of the 29th
May to the Prime Minister, which
has apparently been superseded

 26/6.

tw

General Kriangsak's Message to the
Prime Minister

As I told Maggie Turner on the telephone on 26 June, the Prime Minister has approved the draft reply, enclosed with your letter of 25 June, to General Kriangsak's message to her of 14 June expressing his support for the Prime Minister's proposal for a conference under UN auspices on refugees from Indo-China.

I understand that Mr. Cortazzi will by now have been instructed to convey the text of the Prime Minister's reply to General Kriangsak. I enclosed the signed original and should be grateful if you would forward it to our Embassy in Bangkok in due course for onward transmission.

JSC

J.S. Wall, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

Bx

cc Fco

SUBJECT



PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE 10 DOWNING STREET

SERIAL No. T 32A/79T
THE PRIME MINISTER

26 June 1979

My dear Prime Minister,

Thank you for your letter of 14 June. I was glad to see that your Government fully supports our proposal for a special conference about refugees. I hope your Government's views will be made widely known, particularly as you bear a particularly heavy burden in caring for so many thousands of refugees. Thailand has had much world sympathy for its difficulties.

We are seeking to put maximum pressure on Vietnam to stem the flow of refugees, and are also trying to arouse world consciences so that asylum can be found for the thousands of people who have already been made homeless. We want the conference to have wide membership, so that we can encourage as many members as possible of the international community to live up to their responsibilities. I look forward to increasingly close co-operation between our two countries on this problem which now affects so many countries.

I should like to assure Your Excellency of the importance which my Government attaches not only to the maintenance of friendly relations between our two countries but also to the development of ASEAN as a force for stability in South-East Asia.

Yours sincerely
Rafael Delibes

General Kriangsak Chomanan

21

CONFIDENTIAL



Prime Minister

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

*Agree with his
Draft reply?*

London SW1A 2AH

25 June 1979

Sean Bryan,

*Byn
25/6*

Yes mb.

Letter to Mrs Thatcher from the Prime Minister of Thailand: Proposed Acknowledgement

Generak Kriangsak has written support^{ing} Mrs Thatcher's proposal for a special conference, under United Nations auspices, on Indo-China refugees. I enclose the letter.

General Kriangsak is critical of Vietnamese policy and apprehensive that the Vietnamese may attack Thailand through Cambodia. He does not allude directly to the Thais' forcible repatriation of Cambodian refugees. Mr Blaker has conveyed concern about this to the Thai Ambassador, and we need not revert to the matter directly. The Thais are evidently nervous and would value reassurance.

I enclose a draft reply. It does not refer to the Thai offer of Bangkok as a venue. This point will have been decided by the time the Prime Minister's reply reaches General Kriangsak. There would be no advantage in telling General Kriangsak that we do not favour Bangkok.

Mr Cortazzi, who will be visiting Bangkok this week, hopes to meet General Kriangsak on 26 June. It would be useful if he could hand over the Prime Minister's reply which we could telegraph to him if approved.

*For ever
Stephen*

J S Wall
Private Secretary

Bryan Cartledge Esq
10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL

25 JUN 1979



Registry
No.

DRAFT LETTER

Type 1 +

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

Top Secret,
Secret,
Confidential,
Restricted,
Unclassified.

To:-

General Kriangsak Chomanan
Prime Minister of Thailand

From

Prime Minister

Telephone No. Ext.

Department

PRIVACY MARKING

..... In Confidence

INDO-CHINA REFUGEES

Thank you for your letter of 14 June. I was glad to see that your Government fully supports our proposal for a special conference about refugees. I hope your Government's views will be made widely known, particularly as you bear a particularly heavy burden in caring for so many thousands of refugees. Thailand has had much world sympathy for its difficulties.

We are seeking to put maximum pressure on Vietnam to stem the flow of refugees, and are also trying to arouse world consciences so that asylum can be found for the thousands of people who have already been made homeless. We want the conference to have wide membership, so that we can encourage as many members as possible of the international community to live up to their responsibilities. I look forward to increasingly close cooperation between our two countries on this problem which now affects so many countries.

I should like to assure Your Excellency of the importance which my Government attaches not only to the maintenance of friendly relations between our two countries but also to the development of ASEAN as a force for stability in South-East Asia.





3

10 DOWNING STREET

PRIME MINISTER

Vietnamese Refugees

The Department of Trade have delayed suggesting a reply which you might sent to Lord Inverforth's last letter about the Roachbank until the situation was clearer.

I attach a draft for your signature. Advice is also attached below.

John

25 June 1979



From the Secretary of State

RESTRICTED

Bryan Cartledge Esq
10 Downing Street
London, SW1

25 June 1979

Dear Bryan,

VIETNAMESE REFUGEES

You asked last week for a revised draft of a reply for the Prime Minister to send to Lord Inverforth. I explained that it was difficult for this Department to provide such a draft without an input from the FCO who were handling the negotiations over the "Roachbank". I now attach a reply based on information we have received from the FCO that a DC10 belonging to BCal has been chartered by a UNHCR offshoot to fly all the Roachbank refugees into the UK today. There will be no reception or temporary holding of the refugees by the Taiwanese Authorities who have procrastinated in order to reach a position whereby they will merely allow transit between the ship and the aircraft. There has, however, been no aircraft space available until now. Their haste now to get rid of the problem has, apparently, led to their accepting the BCal DC10 despite the fact that landings by this aircraft in Taiwan are otherwise banned.

No reference has been made in the draft to the problem of recompense to Bank Line since there is only an oblique and not a direct reference to this in Lord Inverforth's letter. You should know, however, that he made reference to this idea in the House of Lords' debate on 21 June on Lord Rochdale's motion about the UK shipping industry.

The draft has been cleared with the FCO at official level.



I am sending a copy of this letter to Stephen Wall (FCO) and John Chilcott (Home Office).

Yours sincerely,

Tom Harris

(T G Harris)

Private Secretary

RESTRICTED

DRAFT REPLY FROM THE PRIME MINISTER

The Lord Inverforth
The Bank Line Limited
Baltic Exchange Buildings
21 Bury Street
London, EC3A 5AU

Thank you for your letter of 6 June. I am of course conscious of the frustrations which faced your Company and the Master and Crew of the Roachbank in the past few weeks. You will be aware from your knowledge of the region that it is not easy to establish a line of communication between ourselves and the Taiwanese Authorities, thus efforts to persuade them to give at least temporary asylum to the refugees on the Roachbank have been fraught with difficulty.

I can assure you, however, that every endeavour was made to persuade the Taiwanese to accept their responsibilities, or to allow transit facilities, and it now appears that most of our difficulties have been overcome. As you will know arrangements are now in hand for the refugees to be flown to the United Kingdom.

DRAFT REPLY FROM THE PRIME MINISTER

25 JUN 1979

The Lord Inverchryss
The Bank Lane Building
Bank Lane Building
24 Bank Lane
London, EC2A 4AB

Thank you for your letter of 8 June. I am of course
conscious of the frustration which faced your country
and the Master and crew of the Kosciuszko in the past few
weeks. You will be aware from your knowledge of the
region that it is not easy to establish a line of
communication between ourselves and the Taiwanese Authorities,
and efforts to persuade them to give at least temporary
access to the refugees on the Kosciuszko have been frustrated
with difficulty.

I can assure you, however, that every endeavour has been
made to persuade the Taiwanese to accept their responsibilities
to allow transit facilities, and it now appears that most
of our difficulties have been overcome. As you will know
arrangements are now in hand for the refugees to be flown
to the United Kingdom.

cc Mr. Carrington.
Mr. Sargent.

2



PM/79/57

PRIME MINISTER

Prime Minister

You may like to read
this useful compendium
of facts en route to
Tokyo and discuss with
Lord Carrington.

Vietnamese Refugees

1. We discussed this problem in Cabinet on 20 June.
2. We need to decide very soon how to respond to the suggestion from Mr Hartling, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, that, as part of the pledging that he is seeking in advance of an international conference Britain should take a further 10,000 refugees over the next twelve months.
3. When Peter Blaker saw Mr Hartling in Geneva, the latter stressed that a figure of this size was indicative of the burden that the world would have to shoulder if the refugee flood was to be absorbed. A conference in about mid-July now seems likely.
4. We know that President Carter wants to raise the subject at the Tokyo Summit. As initiators of the proposed UN Conference we are out in front and we shall be in difficulties if we are unable to make some positive offer soon.
5. I attach a factual paper which provides background for discussions which the Home Secretary and I would like to have soon with you and perhaps other Ministers.
6. I am copying this minute to the Secretary of State for the Home Department and to Sir John Hunt.

25/6

C

(CARRINGTON)


Foreign and Commonwealth Office

25 June 1979

Ans.
Add to Tokyo file



25 JUN 1979



CONFIDENTIAL

VIETNAMESE REFUGEES: THE FACTS

Short Notes are attached as follows:-

1. The Scale of the Problem P.1 - 2
2. Legal Obligations P.3
 - (a) Safety of Life at Sea
 - (b) First Port of Call
 - (c) Admission of refugees
3. Attitude of Maritime Nations to Vietnamese boat refugees P.4 - 5
including section: Number of refugees picked up or likely to be picked up at sea
4. Acceptances for settlement by other countries P.6
5. The situation in South East Asia P.7
6. Attitude of South East Asian countries towards Indo-Chinese refugees P.8 - 10
7. Hong Kong: Vietnamese Refugees P.11 - 12
8. British Assistance to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees P.13
9. Attitudes towards a UN Conference P.14 - 15
10. Action taken by HMG to Secure a Special Conference under UN Auspices P.15_A - 18
11. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees Consultations Preliminary to a Conference P.19 - 20
12. Agreement between the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and the Vietnamese Government P.21
13. Numbers of refugees accepted into the UK P.22 - 24
14. Effects of migration movements into and out of UK P.25
15. Capacity for receiving more refugees P.26
16. UK assistance to Domestic Refugee Organisations P.27

22 June 1979

CONFIDENTIAL

1. SCALE OF THE PROBLEM IN SOUTH EAST ASIA

Numbers

1. There may still be over one million ethnic Chinese in South Vietnam, and 20,000-30,000 in the North, whom it is the Vietnamese Government's policy to get rid of.
2. Additionally, many of the ethnic Vietnamese of the former middle class in the South, whose means of livelihood have been removed, and who face the stark alternative of being transferred to a "New Economic Zone" will prefer to risk leaving by sea if they can get the money to pay for the trip; many of them have relatives abroad, who can make money available.
3. It is impossible to guess how many Vietnamese will be able to leave, but the figure could amount to hundreds of thousands.
4. 3,000 people a day may now be leaving Vietnam on "official auspices", over half of whom drown. Others try to leave independently but risk interception by coastal patrols.
5. According to the UNHCR, 200,000 Indo-Chinese refugees have been resettled in 31 countries since 1975, but 300,000 are still in the region (an increase of 100,000 since 1 January). The UNHCR is sending out 10,000 refugees a month for permanent resettlement. In 1978, 53,000 resettlement places were available; partly as a result of consultations in December, there are now 125,000 places (10,000 a month).
6. The figure in Note No 5 of 200,000 Indo-Chinese refugees awaiting resettlement in Thailand does not include the Cambodians who cross and recross the Thai frontier in large numbers, and whom the Thais now send back. If there is famine in Cambodia, there

/may

may be a migration of Cambodians seeking food.

2. VIETNAMESE REFUGEES: LEGAL OBLIGATIONS

(a) Safety of Life at Sea

1. There is an obligation in international law for States parties to the relevant Conventions* to require Masters of their registered ships to render assistance to people in distress at sea provided that he would not seriously endanger his own ship by doing so. This obligation is made part of the UK law by the Maritime Conventions Act 1911 and the Merchant Shipping (Safety Conventions) Act 1949.

*The Brussels Convention on Assistance and Salvage at Sea, 1911

The Geneva High Seas Convention, 1958

The London Convention on the Safety of Life at Sea, 1960

(b) First port of call

2. There is no rule of international law providing for a vessel which has picked up people in distress to disembark them at its first port of call. The so-called "First Port of Call Rule" is no more than a practice which was given compliance in October 1978 by a consensus of the UNHCR's Executive Committee. This called for all States to allow temporary asylum to refugees coming to their shores after rescue by a ship. It was however an exhortation and did not have the force of law.

(c) Admission of refugees

3. There is no rule of international law which places an obligation on a State to admit for resettlement people rescued by its vessels, though in the light of the UNHCR Executive Committee's consensus of October 1978 (paragraph 2 above) several States expressed their willingness to accept ultimate responsibility for such people.

CONFIDENTIAL

3. ATTITUDE OF MARITIME NATIONS TO VIETNAMESE BOAT REFUGEES

1. The following 12 countries are now known to have given commitments to accept for resettlement any refugees picked up by their flag vessels:

- Australia (on a case by case basis)
- Belgium (refugees to be delivered to Belgium, not to first port of call)
- Canada (automatic acceptance)
- Denmark (no public commitment)
- France (automatic acceptance)
- FRG (last resort)
- Greece (no public commitment)
- Italy (last resort)
- Netherlands (automatic acceptance)
- Norway (last resort)
- Sweden (also meets cost of rescue)
- USA (last resort)

2. The position of Japan has not yet been ascertained, but the Department of Trade are pressing them for a reply.

NUMBER OF REFUGEES PICKED UP OR LIKELY TO BE PICKED UP AT SEA

3. It is impossible to quantify the numbers of refugees whom British ships might rescue over any given period, but the following table of pick-up incidents in the first five months of 1979 (provided in response to an enquiry by the Department of Trade) suggests that sizeable rescues like that by the Sibonga may be statistically rare:

/UK

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL
2.

	<u>Number of incidents</u>	<u>Approximate number of refugees</u>
UK	5	1,700 (since October 1978)
Norway	5	335
USA	12	855 (since 1 July 1978)
Netherlands	1	66
Italy	1	22
FRG	2	96
France	2	140

4. No information is yet available about any such incidents involving vessels of other nations, including "flag of convenience" states, or the countries of South East Asia itself.

5. There are believed to be some 30 UK vessels in the South China Sea at present. It has not been possible to discover what proportion this represents of total shipping in the area. We could consult the computer of Lloyds Register of Shipping at a cost of £500. Our share of shipping should not, however, be exaggerated. The Press has reported that British Shipping lines have altered their routes to avoid the areas where refugees would be most likely to be encountered.

CONFIDENTIAL

4. INDOCHINA REFUGEES: ACCEPTANCE FOR RESETTLEMENT

1. Since 1975 the following resettlement places have been made available:-

USA	230,000	
China	230,000	
France	51,500	
Australia	19,500*	
Canada	15,000	
Hong Kong	11,200	
United Kingdom	4,497	(of which 2,181 have not yet arrived)
FRG	3,500*	
Malaysia	1,600*	
Switzerland	1,500*	
Belgium	1,300*	
Norway	1,400	
New Zealand	800*	
Denmark	600*	(plus another 500 just approved)
Netherlands	380*	
Austria	340*	
Italy	250*	
Israel	170*	
Japan	50*	
Luxembourg	30*	
Sweden	200	(plus another 1,250 just approved)

Sources: principally UNHCR, updated by later information.

* 1 May 1979

5. VIETNAMESE REFUGEES: THE SITUATION IN SOUTH-EAST ASIA

1. The number of Indo-Chinese refugees awaiting resettlement in the countries of South-East Asia is as follows:

Thailand	200,000 (mainly Laotians and Cambodians)
Malaysia	75,000
Indonesia	31,200
Hong Kong	58,000
Philippines	1,600*
Singapore	300*
Japan	400*
Macao	1,800*

* 1 May 1979

2. Refugees may be leaving Vietnam at the rate of about 3,000 a day. Of these over half perish at sea.

6. ATTITUDE OF SOUTH EAST ASIAN COUNTRIES TOWARDS INDO-CHINESE REFUGEES

1. The Malaysians were initially hospitable to refugees, who were received in camps where the UNHCR was given access to them. 75,000 are now there. But out of 48,000 arrivals in 1979, less than 22,000 have been resettled outside the country.

2. But the Malaysians do not contemplate permanent resettlement for any of the refugees. They claim to have spent already the equivalent of £6.5 million on their welfare.

3. Opinion has hardened against the refugees. The Malaysians acknowledge having towed away from their shores in 1979 267 boats carrying 40,000 people. The boats are alleged to have been replenished before being sent on. Many of the boats will have gone to Indonesia. Discussions between Malaysia and Indonesia are in progress aimed at enabling joint naval patrols to be maintained in future, to see off newcomers but the Malaysians are critical of alleged Indonesian incompetence and failure to grasp the magnitude of the problem.

4. The Malaysians have no current intention of expelling refugees from the permanent camps in their country, but they are adopting a harsher policy towards all refugees, and the Malaysian Prime Minister has spoken of the need to "send them out" if they are not accepted elsewhere for resettlement with a reasonable time-frame. (See postscript)

5. The Indonesians have stated that they will not accept any further Vietnamese refugees (although we believe they will do so, if boats would sink if pushed out to sea again). Otherwise their naval vessels "see off" refugee boats. As many of the refugees are of Chinese ethnic origin, the Indonesians, who recall the role of

/their

their own Chinese community during the attempted coup d'etat in 1965, are especially reluctant to receive them.

6. The Indonesian Government has set aside a Refugee Processing Centre on Galang Island (South of Singapore), and are in touch with the UNHCR on its feasibility. The Centre will have a capacity of only 10,000 and will be for people already allotted resettlement places outside South East Asia. It will not, therefore, deal with the major problem; the Indonesians may, indeed, intend to decant into it refugees who have already landed on their shores and whom they wish to be rid of.

7. The Philippines' policy is to turn away refugee boats before these can land, but refugees who succeed in landing have so far been allowed to remain.

8. The policy may now be under review, as the Philippines do not wish to seem to be more accommodating than their ASEAN neighbours, thereby running the risk of being a "soft option" for refugee boats.

9. The Singaporeans have always had a hard attitude towards refugees, whose boats have been turned away (after having been replenished). Some refugees have got ashore, but the Singapore authorities have only been willing to allow refugees to land from foreign ships, when the country of ownership has agreed to give a written guarantee (in cooperation with the UNHCR) that the refugees will be maintained and will be removed within 90 days.

10. Thailand has over 125,000 Laotian refugees, who are maintained by the UNHCR, and has a Vietnamese refugee colony dating from 1954. The UNHCR is also responsible for 15,000 Cambodians.

/11. ...

11. Recently, however, tens of thousands of Cambodians, many of whom have been armed soldiers of one or other of the Cambodian military factions, have crossed and recrossed the Thai frontier. According to the Thais 80,000 of the Cambodians have squatted on Thai territory. The Thais have been unwilling for the UNHCR to have access to them, for fear that the refugees would acquire permanent status. Many are women and children in pitiful condition.

12. The Thais have embarked on a policy of forcibly repatriating these people, despite the risk that many of them might perish in Cambodia, but have agreed to suspend expulsions temporarily in view of the US guarantee to take 1,121 refugees and to try to persuade other countries to accept some.

13. The Thais have for some time been attempting to turn away boat-loads of Vietnamese refugees, but as many as 4,349 people may have succeeded in coming ashore.

Postscript: Malaysia. Daily Mail 22 June carried front page report of a boat-load actually on the point of landing being forced off by warning shots.

7. VIETNAMESE REFUGEES IN HONG KONG

Hong Kong Government Policy

1. The Hong Kong Government provide temporary refuge, pending permanent resettlement elsewhere by UNHCR, for all refugees who reach the territory in their own boats or are brought there after being picked up at sea by vessels for whom Hong Kong is the next scheduled port of call (in view of present overcrowding in Hong Kong, they may no longer automatically accept the first port of call principle)

Numbers of Refugees

2. On 22 June, there were 57,173 Vietnamese refugees in Hong Kong awaiting resettlement.* Because of processing delays (partly due to shortage of staff in the UNHCR office) only 14,221 of them were under UNHCR care.

3. 55,484 have arrived in Hong Kong this year. Only 4,209 have been sent on by UNHCR to countries of permanent settlement.

Action by Hong Kong Government

4. The Hong Kong Government have introduced tough new laws to deter trafficking in refugees (the trial of the Captain and 11 others associated with the Huey Fong, which brought 3,400 refugees to Hong Kong in January, is now in process). The Governor, after discussions with Ministers in London, has met American officials in Washington and the UN Secretary-General in New York, and impressed on them the seriousness of Hong Kong's problems. He is also calling on the UN High Commissioner for Refugees in Geneva next week.

Illegal Immigration from China

5. Hong Kong's problems are compounded by a sharp increase in illegal immigrants from China. While only 8,000 were arrested in

*As there is no space on shore over five thousand are still in their boats.

/the

the whole of 1978, over 42,000 have been arrested and returned to China already this year (and at least twice as many are believed to have avoided arrest and succeeded in entering Hong Kong). The Government have stepped up border patrols, while attempts are being made to persuade the Chinese authorities to take effective action to control the flow from their side. The garrison has been temporarily reinforced to help cope with the extra burden.

8'. BRITISH ASSISTANCE TO THE UNITED NATIONS' HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES (UNHCR)

1. UNHCR assistance to Indo-China refugees is provided from the High Commissioner's General Programme. The previous British Government, in October 1978, pledged £3.5m to that Programme for 1979 (about 8.5% of the then estimated budget of US\$88 million). Because of the increasing number of refugees and newly-identified additional requirements in South-East Asia and Southern Africa, the UNHCR had to revise upwards his estimated budget for the year to US\$115million. He has asked governments to increase their contributions. If the UK is to maintain the original level of 8.5% of the budget this would cost about £1.25 million at today's rates. The Minister of State (Overseas Development) has said that, following the cut of £50 million in the aid programme which was already over-committed, he is looking for savings of around £100 million to reconstitute a contingencies reserve; these savings will take two or three weeks to identify. He prefers to defer consideration of an additional contribution to the UNHCR until he can say what contingency funds may be available.

2. The UNHCR is desperately short of money, particularly for his programme in South-East Asia. Looking forward to the end of 1979, he will have a deficit of some US\$67 million (based on the numbers of refugees in the region remaining at their present level).

CONFIDENTIAL

9. ATTITUDES TOWARDS A CONFERENCE

1. The United States, France and Australia, which have already offered a large number of resettlement places, support the idea and have made their views known. During a meeting in Paris of Foreign Ministers of the Nine, who expressed support in a declaration on 18 June, President Giscard d'Estaing said that his Government would put a request for a conference to Dr Waldheim. He added, that "the international community has the right to know the reasons for the exodus and the intentions of Governments involved concerning the size of the population (under transfer) and the rate of departure".

2. Countries and territories where the burden of accommodating refugees initially is heaviest have expressed strong support. They include ^{China,} Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia and the Government of Hong Kong. States such as Japan and Bangladesh, bordering on the region immediately affected have also welcomed the proposal.

3. General support has been given by Austria, Colombia, Portugal, Spain and Sweden. In other countries, such as the Philippines, officials and Ministers have reacted favourably. Only a few Governments have shown disinclination to support a conference; Syria and Saudi Arabia, for instance, have shown little response. The initial coolness of some countries, such as India, seems to be fading with realisation of the gravity of the situation. Singapore considers pressure for places of resettlement, without withdrawal of the reason for the exodus, would only play into Vietnamese hands. Some other countries favour emphasis on humanitarian rather than political questions. Others consider that the case of refugees outside South East Asia, for example in Africa, should be considered.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

4. There is a marked contrast between committed countries close to the scene of action, eg China and Singapore, who believe a Conference must expose and condemn Vietnamese action, and others who share UNHCR's view that a special Conference must be essentially non-political.

5. The Americans favour 'delinking' the political and humanitarian aspects, with prior action in the Security Council to focus world attention, followed by a humanitarian conference. We believe the Security Council might be useful after a Conference: to have it beforehand might stultify the efforts towards practical measures to get the world to accept more refugees, particularly if the Security Council was acrimonious or long drawn out. The Swedes tend to agree with this last view.

CONFIDENTIAL

10. VIETNAMESE REFUGEES: ACTION BY HMG TO SECURE A SPECIAL CONFERENCE UNDER UN AUSPICES

CONTACTS WITH THE UNITED NATIONS IN NEW YORK AND GENEVA

1. The Prime Minister sent a message to Dr Waldheim on 31 May urging him to convene a conference. The Prime Minister sent a second message on 18 June. Our Mission at the United Nations has been in frequent contact with Dr Waldheim and his staff. Mr Blaker flew to Geneva on 18 June for meetings with Dr Hartling, the United Nations' High Commissioner for Refugees. Sir James Murray, the British Ambassador in Geneva has been in daily contact with Dr Hartling and his staff.

THE UNITED STATES

2. We have been in close touch with the Americans throughout. Mr Blaker had talks in Washington on 29 May and Sir M MacLehose, Governor of Hong Kong on 18/19 June. The Secretary of State discussed the problem with Mr Vance on 21 May.

THE NINE

3. We have urged the Nine both in London and in capitals to support our initiative. Foreign Ministers of the Nine issued a Declaration in Paris on 18 June. Following a request by the Prime Minister, President Giscard d'Estaing also supported her proposal with Dr Waldheim.

4. Support for the proposed conference was also sought from the following countries and governments were urged to take refugees or more refugees if they already had a programme.

OLD COMMONWEALTH

5. Canada

Australia (who may intend to raise the refugees issue in Lusaka) and

/New Zealand

New Zealand

OTHER EUROPEANS

6. Portugal (in view of the importance of Macao for Hong Kong and Portuguese links with Brazil)

Spain

Austria

Switzerland, and

Greece

SCANDINAVIANS

7. Sweden (they were also urged to cut off their aid)

Finland

Norway

LATIN AMERICA

8. Venezuela

Brazil

Argentina

Ecuador

Paraguay

Guyana

Jamaica

Bolivia

Colombia

Costa Rica

Mexico

ASIANS

9. India (because of India's influence in Hanoi and her aid programme)

Japan (which was also urged to accept refugees from the "Norse Viking", and to cut off her aid to Vietnam)

Sri Lanka

/Korea

Korea

Burma

Bangladesh

THE ASEAN COUNTRIES

10. Mr Cortazzi briefed the ASEAN representatives in London on 30 May and HM Representatives followed up in capitals. The Prime Minister sent a message to the Malaysian Prime Minister following reports that Malaysian policy towards refugees was becoming tougher.

11. The Prime Minister has received a message from the Thai Prime Minister supporting the proposal for a conference.

MIDDLE EAST

12. Algeria

Syria

Saudi Arabia

COMMUNIST COUNTRIES

13. The Lord Privy Seal saw the Soviet Ambassador on 1 June. Representatives in London of the following countries have also been summoned:

Bulgaria

Poland

Rumania

Czechoslovakia

Hungary

China

Yugoslavia

Cuba

PROTESTS TO THE VIETNAMESE

14. Mr Cortazzi summoned the Vietnamese Chargé d'Affaires on

/24 May

24 May to protest at his Government's behaviour. A further protest was made on 15 June. Protests have also been made in Hanoi on other occasions about aspects of Vietnamese behaviour.

PUBLICITY

15. The Lord Privy Seal's speech on 30 May at Great Missenden was widely reported. The Foreign and Commonwealth Office's News Department has secured widespread coverage of reports of the Vietnamese Government's complicity in the refugee traffic, and for Hong Kong's problems. The Huey Fong trial has been widely reported. Answers to several Parliamentary Questions have also secured publicity.

16. On the Prime Minister's instructions we are pursuing the attempt to interest journalists, especially from the Non-Aligned countries, in Hong Kong's problems.

CONFIDENTIAL

11. UNHCR CONSULTATIONS PRELIMINARY TO A CONFERENCE

1. The UNHCR, at the request of the Secretary-General, started on 14 June to consult governments for a possible conference. He is consulting all members of his Executive Committee, all present countries of resettlement, the countries of South East Asia and several Latin American countries as well as the USSR and the current Chairman of the African Group.

2. In preparation for the conference, Mr Hartling is suggesting to governments an "indicative number" of Indo-Chinese refugees which they might take. The UNHCR has carefully worked out such numbers for all countries where resettlement would be practicable (he has excluded the USSR from this category). He has based his calculations both on GNP and the size of the country. The aim is to double the current total of offers of 125,000; the sum total of all indicative numbers is slightly over 250,000, over the next 12 months.

3. He plans to take the line with South East Asian countries that for every one person resettled in their area, two will be accepted for resettlement in other countries. He is not proposing individual indicative numbers for South East Asian countries but considers that a group total of 60-70,000 would be reasonable.

4. The figure would be for permanent resettlement and would be taken from among refugees in camps; they would not cover those taken direct by countries when rescued by ships of their own flag.

5. The UK's and Hong Kong's "indicative quotas" are each 10,000* the only others known to us are:

- Sweden 2,000
- Denmark 1,000
- Norway 1,000

/Finland

CONFIDENTIAL

Finland	100
Iceland	50

There is no information available about the responses of other countries to the UNHCR's approach, although we understand that Sweden has just agreed to take 1,250 refugees and Denmark an extra 500.

* This figure would be for the next 12 months and would subsume the unused part of the previous government's commitment to take 1,500.

12. THE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES AND THE VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT

1. The Agreement provides a role for the UNHCR in arranging emigration for people who already have resettlement offers from relatives abroad. At present levels of outflow, the 20,000-30,000 people who may qualify equal barely two weeks' outflow of boat people. The Vietnamese have said that there is no point in any conference that does more than discuss the implementation of the Agreement. They will evidently make use of the Agreement to "prove" that they can work with the UNHCR; but there is no reason to expect that they will not continue to expel boat people at great benefit to their exchequer.

13. NUMBERS OF REFUGEES ACCEPTED INTO THE UK

1. Excluding the refugees recently accepted from the mv Sibonga (943) and Roach Bank (293) the UK has received for resettlement, since the spring 1975, (or allowed to remain) a total of 2,316 Indo-Chinese refugees - as indicated by the following table:

	<u>Vietnamese</u>	<u>Cambodian</u>	<u>Laotian</u>	<u>TOTALS</u>
Allowed to remain	150	136	51	337
UK ties	363	39	160	562
Boat rescues)	1,147			1,417
1,500 quota)	270			
TOTALS	1,930	175	211	2,316

Of the 1,500 quota (1,000 from Hong Kong, 250 from Malaysia and 250 from Thailand) about 1,200 have still to arrive.

2. The numbers of refugees coming to this country from the Sibonga and Roach Bank will be approximately 1,250. In addition, there are 57 refugees in Singapore who were landed there, under the previous Government's policy, with a guarantee that they will be accepted into the UK if not resettled elsewhere. There are 41 refugees at present on board the mv Ashford on the way to Singapore and in respect of which a similar guarantee will not doubt be required before they can land. Of the 40 refugees on the Norse Viking (whose next port of call is Japan) six have indicated that they would wish to come to the UK, and on the basis of the formula agreed with the Japanese, we have indicated that we will accept them.

3. In sum, the total number of refugees the UK has accepted from Indo-China since 1975 and to which it is committed to receiving in the near future, including the Sibonga and the Roach Bank refugees

/and the

and the remaining balance of the quota, but excluding the small numbers in Singapore and on the Norse Viking and the Ashford, amounts to about 4,500 (the great majority from Vietnam).

From Latin America

4. Since 1974 (the fall of the Allende Government in Chile) about 3,000 refugees have been accepted for settlement from Latin America (principally from Chile) - as indicated in the following table:

	<u>Refugees accepted from</u> <u>Latin America</u> (rounded figures)
October 1973-74	450
1975	900
1976	600
1977	600
1978	400
1979 (to date)	50

Others

5. In recent years, other groups in distress have also been accepted. These include the Ugandan Asians in 1972-73 (about 29,000) and the Cypriots in 1974 (about 9,000).

Timetable for arrival of Refugees from Sibonga and Roach Bank

6. Most of the refugees from the Sibonga will have arrived in the UK by 27 June (a few will be delayed because of illness). The first of the refugees from the Roach Bank are expected to start arriving during the week beginning 25 June. (Their travel arrangements /are

are still being made by the Intern-Governmental Committee for European Migration (ICEM) who act for UNHCR in the transport of refugees.)

14. THE EFFECTS OF MIGRATION MOVEMENTS INTO AND OUT OF THE UK

1. The effects of population movements into and out of the country since the war are shown in the following table:

POPULATION AND NET MIGRATION: GREAT BRITAIN: 1946-1978

<u>Period</u> (<u>mid-year to</u> <u>mid-year</u>)	<u>Population</u> <u>at beginning</u> <u>of period</u> <u>'000</u>	<u>Net annual</u> <u>migration</u> <u>during period</u> <u>'000</u>	(Net outward flow shown by "-"; net inward by "+")
1946-51	47,867	- 38	
1951-56	49,176	- 35	
1956-61	50,004	+ 43 ⁷	
1961-66	51,380	- 1	
1966-71	53,025	- 50	
1971-72	54,071	-32	
1972-73	54,236	+ 8*	
1973-74	54,366	- 67	
1974-75	54,376	- 63	
1975-76	54,363	- 14	
1976-77	54,347	- 16	
1977-78	54,315	- 22	
1978-79	54,283		

⁷ This period characterised by large-scale West Indian and Asian immigration.

* This figure affected by arrival of Ugandan Asians
Source: OPCS; Population Trends, Spring 1979

15. CAPACITY FOR RECEIVING MORE REFUGEES

1. The total capacity of the reception accommodation now being used for the Vietnamese refugees by the voluntary refugee organisations is between 1,500 and 2,000. The voluntary refugee organisations think that they would be able to find extra accommodation if this was necessary - but it is not clear on what scale. However, an influx of (say) over 1,000 over a short space of time while the present accommodation was still occupied would almost certainly mean either that more camps would have to be opened or that the Government would have to find other suitable premises (eg redundant hospitals or teachers' training colleges).
2. Factors which determine the length of time spent in reception centres and, hence, also affect the capacity for receiving more refugees are the availability of long-term housing and employment opportunities.
3. So far, refugees have had to spend, as a general rule, little more than 3-6 months in a reception centre, before they are settled in permanent local authority housing. The voluntary bodies have received an encouraging response from local authorities in respect of the refugees who have arrived up to now; their overall response to the situation created by the Sibonga and the Roach Bank has yet to be tested. The GLC, however, have now offered 400-500 housing units - mostly in Greater London.

16. UK ASSISTANCE TO DOMESTIC REFUGEE ORGANISATIONS

(a) Assistance to voluntary refugee organisations

1. Assistance to the voluntary refugee organisations by the Home Office during 1978/79 amounted to £343,000. During 1979/80, this assistance will have to cover not only the commitments inherited from the previous year but also the costs of receiving the refugees from the Sibonga and Roach Bank and the balance of the quota. A precise estimate of these extra costs is not yet available, but total expenditure for the year could be of the order of £2 million (an element of this will be central Government expenditure incurred in making ready the reception centres at Sopley and Moreton Hall, Lincolnshire).

2. The cost of receiving significant additional groups of refugees depends on whether their numbers, and the phasing of their arrival, requires new camps to be opened from scratch (as opposed to taking over a going concern such as an existing teachers' training college). If the refugees could be received in existing accommodation, the cost of assistance to the voluntary bodies for dealing with (say) 1,000 refugees in the course of a year could, on past experience, be of the order of £0.5million - but this can only be a rough estimate. The figure could more than double if expenditure is incurred on new camps. This estimate is exclusive of social security payments (which could be of the order of £.5-.6 million for 1,000 refugees in a full year).

(b) Local authorities

3. Local authorities in whose areas the latest refugees from the Sibonga and the Roach Bank are being received will be asking the Government for assistance towards extra costs incurred by them on education and social services etc. It is not yet known what these will amount to.



10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

25 June 1979

Dear Nicholas

Thank you for your letter of 15 June enclosing a number of letters you have received about Vietnamese refugees.

I was grateful to you for letting me see these letters, and I can well understand the feelings expressed in them. Although the Government reached the conclusion that it was right to accept the refugees picked up by the Sibonga and the Roachbank, we have been most careful to avoid any kind of open-ended commitment for the future.

This kind of decision is of course extremely difficult. We have to weigh in each case humanitarian considerations against other factors, and in the case of these two groups of people, rescued at sea by British ships and who have nowhere else to go, we thought it right to admit them as refugees. The responsibility for their plight rests squarely with the Vietnamese authorities, and the Government is doing all it can to draw international attention to their conduct. I have taken the initiative by pressing for an international conference, so that the problem may be faced - as it must be - by the international community as a whole.

/ Our

Original in G/R. JI

cc Ho
press

25

Our approach to the problem will take full account of the Government's commitment to strict control on immigration. This commitment is extremely important. I can assure you that we intend to implement it.

Can I emphasise that there are refugees from a tyranny.

Yours truly

Raymond

Nicholas Winterton, Esq., M.P.

CONFIDENTIAL

2

CRI 50

CONFIDENTIAL

FM FCO 251315Z JUN 79
TO PRIORITY HONG KONG
TELEGRAM NUMBER 441 OF 25 JUNE
INFO PRIORITY TOKYO
VIETNAMESE REFUGEES

AW

Prime Minister

*8/21
26/6*

1. THE JAPANESE EMBASSY HAVE INFORMED US THAT THEIR GOVERNMENT DECIDED ON 23 JUNE THAT THEY WOULD NO LONGER REQUIRE GUARANTEES OF RESETTLEMENT PLACES FROM THIRD COUNTRIES WHOSE SHIPS REACHED JAPAN WITH REFUGEES ON BOARD, WHETHER OR NOT THE JAPANESE PORT WAS FIRST SCHEDULED PORT OF CALL. THIS HOWEVER IS WITH THE PROVISIO THAT RECIPROCITY WAS GUARANTEED IN RESPECT OF JAPANESE REGISTERED SHIPS ARRIVING IN PORTS OF OTHER TERRITORIES.

2. THE EMBASSY SPECIFICALLY ASKED WHETHER THE HONG KONG GOVERNMENT WOULD BE PREPARED IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES TO WAIVE THE NEED FOR A GUARANTEE OF RESETTLEMENT PLACES FROM THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT IN RESPECT OF JAPANESE REGISTERED VESSELS ARRIVING IN HONG KONG WITH REFUGEES ON BOARD.

3. GRATEFUL FOR YOUR VIEWS WHICH WE HAVE UNDERTAKEN TO PASS TO THE JAPANESE.

CARRINGTON

[COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING ST]

FILES
SEAD
HK & GD
UND
FED
EESD
N AM D
SAD
EID (E)
PUSD
OJD
IPD

NEWS D
M & VD
PS
PS/LPS
PS/MR. HURD
PS/MR. BLAKER
PS/PUS
SIR A DUFF
SIR A PARSONS
MR. CORTAZZI
MR. LEAHY
MR. MURRAY

COPIES TO:
HONG KONG GOVT. OFFICE LONDON
MR. WOODFIELD } HOME OFFICE
MR. BURLEIGH } QUEEN ANNE'S GATE
MR. HILLARY } HOME OFFICE
MR. BIRT } LUNAR HOUSE
CROYDON.
MR. V. MCGEE } FAO/ODA

CONFIDENTIAL

IMMEDIATE

424

ADVANCES: BOAT PEOPLE

PS
PS/LPS
PS/MR HURD
PS/MR BLAKER
PS/PUS
SIR A DUFF
MR CORTAZZI
MR MURRAY
MR LEAHY
HD/UND
HD/HK & GD
HD/EVD
HD/NEWS DEPT
HD/SEAD
HD/N AM D
HD/EESD
HD/OID

~~RESTRICTED~~

HONG KONG GOVERNMENT OFFICE
LONDON

{ MR WOODFIELD
{ MR BURLEIGH HOME OFFICE
QUEEN ANNE'S GATE
{ MR HILLARY
{ MR BIRT HOME OFFICE
LUNAR HOUSE CROYDON

Mr V McGee, FAO, ODA

No 10 Downing St / (E)

2
PRIME MINISTER
MS

ans

GR 270

CONFIDENTIAL

FM WELLINGTON 220030Z JUN 79

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 170 OF 22 JUNE

INFO PRIORITY UKMIS NEW YORK, ROUTINE UKMIS GENEVA, WASHINGTON,
HONG KONG, MANILA, KUALA LUMPUR, SINGAPORE, BANGKOK, JAKARTA.

1. SENIOR MFA OFFICIAL (HARLAND) TOLD HEAD OF CHANCERY TODAY THAT NEW ZEALAND HAD NOT (REPEAT) NOT YET FORMULATED A FIRM POLICY ON THE CONFERENCE PROPOSAL AND WAS UNLIKELY TO DO SO UNTIL AFTER THE A S E A N MEETING IN BALI. IF A CLEAR LINE, FOR OR AGAINST, A CONFERENCE EMERGED FROM A S E A N, NEW ZEALAND WOULD BE LIKELY TO GO ALONG WITH IT. AT THE MOMENT A S E A N WAS DIVIDED, WITH SINGAPORE AND THAILAND WANTING TO TAKE A HARD LINE WITH VIETNAM, INDONESIA TAKING THE OPPOSITE VIEW AND MALAYSIA SOMEWHERE IN THE MIDDLE.
2. HARLAND SAID FOREIGN MINISTER'S VIEW (PUBLICLY EXPRESSED) WAS (A) THAT THE VIETNAMESE REFUGEE PROBLEM COULD ONLY BE RESOLVED THROUGH A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT IN INDO-CHINA AND THAT ONLY THE U S COULD INITIATE SUCH A SETTLEMENT AND (B) THAT HE HAD DOUBTS THAT A CONFERENCE WAS THE WAY TO SKIN THIS PARTICULAR CAT. EXPERIENCE HAD SHOWN THE VIETNAMESE COULD NOT BE FORCED TO DO ANYTHING. THE VIETNAMESE WOULD RESPOND ON THE REFUGEE QUESTION ONLY IF A (NEXT 3 WORDS UNDERLINED) QUID PRO QUO WERE OFFERED.

3. THE PRIME MINISTER TOO HAD DOUBTS ABOUT VALUE OF CONFERENCE BUT WAS MORE CONCERNED ABOUT SETTLEMENT QUESTION. NEW ZEALAND UNDOUBTEDLY COULD TAKE MORE VIETNAMESE REFUGEES THIS YEAR, SAID HARLAND, BUT PM WAS RESISTING THIS BECAUSE HE BELIEVED IT WOULD LEAD TO FURTHER PRESSURE TO TAKE EVEN MORE. SIGNS OF PUBLIC PRESSURE TO TAKE MORE REFUGEES ARE HOWEVER INCREASING. WE HAVE REPEATED TO MFA HOPE THAT IF INTAKE IS INCREASED HONG KONG'S SPECIAL DIFFICULTIES WILL BE BORNE IN MIND.

WILSON

NNNN

ADVANCES: BOAT PEOPLE

PS
PS/LPS
PS/MR HURD
PS/MR BLAKER
PS/PUS
SIR A DUFF
MR CORTAZZI
MR MURRAY
MR LEAHY
HD/UND
HD/HK & GD
HD/MVD
HD/NEWS DEPT
HD/SEAD
HD/N AM D
HD/EESD
HD/OID

HONG KONG GOVERNMENT OFFICE
LONDON

{ MR WOODFIELD
{ MR BURLEIGH HOME OFFICE
QUEEN ANNE'S GATE

{ MR HILLARY
{ MR BIRT HOME OFFICE
LUNAR HOUSE CROYDON

Mr V McGee, FAO, ODA

No 10 Downing St / (E)

(Jes)

2

PRIME MINISTER

MS

OPS 570

CONFIDENTIAL

FM KUALA LUMPUR 220610Z JUN 79

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 205 OF 22 JUNE

INFO PRIORITY UKMIS NEW YORK UKMIS GENEVA

INFO ROUTINE WASHINGTON GOV HONG KONG MANILA SINGAPORE

BANGKOK JAKARTA TOKYO CANBERRA WELLINGTON

PEKING MOSCOW

MY TEL NO 204

VIETNAMESE REFUGEES

1. THE MINISTER OF HOME AFFAIRS, TAN SRI GHAZALI SHAFIE, SUMMONED A MEMBER OF MY STAFF ON 21 JUNE AND TOLD HIM THAT HE WANTED YOU TO KNOW THE LATEST POSITION ON THE MALAYSIAN ATTITUDE TOWARDS THE VIETNAMESE REFUGEE PROBLEM BEFORE YOU SEE HIM ON 1 JULY.

2. TAN SRI GHAZALI SAID THAT HE HAD RECEIVED A VISIT FROM GENERAL YOGA, HEAD OF BAKIN AND KOPKAMTIB (INDONESIA) ON 20 JUNE. YOGA HAD SOUGHT HIS AGREEMENT, WHICH HE HAD GIVEN, TO THE IDEA OF JOINT MALAYSIAN-INDONESIAN POLICING OF THE SOUTH CHINA SEA IN ORDER TO PREVENT REFUGEES FROM INDOCHINA FROM LANDING ALONG THEIR COASTS. GHAZALI SAID THAT THE NEXT STEP WAS FOR THE NAVAL STAFFS OF BOTH COUNTRIES TO MEET AND WORK OUT HOW THIS MIGHT BE DONE, ALTHOUGH HE WAS DOUBTFUL WHETHER THE INDONESIANS WERE IN A POSIT VN TO CONTRIBUTE A GREAT DEAL.

3. HE DESCRIBED WHAT HE THOUGHT MIGHT HAPPEN AT THE BALI MEETING OF ASEAN FOREIGN MINISTERS (TO BE HELD FROM 28 TO 30 JUNE). ONE

3. HE DESCRIBED WHAT HE THOUGHT MIGHT HAPPEN AT THE BALI MEETING OF ASEAN FOREIGN MINISTERS (TO BE HELD FROM 28 TO 30 JUNE). ONE IDEA THAT WAS CERTAIN TO BE DISCUSSED WAS THAT ASEAN SHOULD BRING PRESSURE ON THE VIETNAMESE FOR AN ASSURANCE THAT THEY COULD TAKE ALL THE MEASURES REQUIRED TO PREVENT PEOPLE LEAVING VIETNAM ILLEGALLY AND THAT THEY WOULD TAKE BACK THE RESIDUE OF ALL THOSE REFUGEES WHO WERE NOT RESETTLED IN OTHER COUNTRIES. HE DID NOT KNOW WHAT FORM THIS WOULD TAKE. IT MIGHT BE EITHER A RESOLUTION OR A MESSAGE. IN ANY EVENT, HE WAS DOUBTFUL WHETHER ANYTHING AGREED AT BALI WOULD BE VERY EFFECTIVE.

4. HE EXPLAINED THAT MALAYSIAN PLANNING MUST ASSUME THE WORST AND THAT THE VIETNAMESE WOULD NOT BE SHIFTED FROM THEIR DETERMINATION TO EXPULSION OF THE BULK OF THEIR CHINESE POPULATION. WHAT HE SEEMED TO FEAR MOST WAS THAT IF THE REFUGEES WERE UNABLE TO MAKE LANDFALL IN MALAYSIA, INDONESIA AND HONG KONG BECAUSE OF THE IMPOSITION OF AN EFFECTIVE SEA BLOCKADE, THE VIETNAMESE MIGHT DECIDE TO PUSH THEIR CHINESE OVERLAND TO THAILAND. THIS WOULD BE ALMOST IMPOSSIBLE TO PREVENT.

5. THIS WAS WHY HE ATTACHED SO MUCH IMPORTANCE TO THE EARLY CREATION OF A SINGLE ISLAND FACILITY WITH A CAPACITY TO PROCESS UP TO 200,000 REFUGEES (HE MENTIONED GALANG BUT SAID IT COULD BE ANY OTHER INDONESIAN ISLAND). WITHOUT SUCH A FACILITY, REFUGEES MIGHT FINISH UP ANYWHERE. BUT IF IT EXISTED IT WOULD BE AVAILABLE AS A CENTRE TO WHICH ALL REFUGEES IN THE ASEAN COUNTRIES COULD EVENTUALLY BE TRANSFERRED, INCLUDING THE UNRESETTLED RESIDUE. HE DID NOT SEEM TO THINK IT COULD BE MADE AVAILABLE FOR USE BY HONG KONG BUT BELIEVED THAT HONG KONG TOO WOULD BENEFIT BECAUSE, AS SOON AS THE EXISTENCE OF THE FACILITY BECAME KNOWN, POTENTIAL REFUGEES WOULD BE ATTRACTED TO SOMEWHERE WHERE THEY KNEW THEY WOULD BE WELCOME RATHER THAN MAKING THEIR WAY TO AN UNCERTAIN WELCOME IN HONG KONG.

6. HE COMMENDED THIS IDEA TO HMG AND IF, AS HE HOPED, IT WOULD BE GIVEN AN AIRING AT THE PROPOSED INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE (WHICH HE POSSIBLY MIGHT ATTEND), HE HOPED THAT IT WOULD RECEIVE HMG'S SUPPORT.

HUNT

IMMEDIATE

ADVANCES: BOAT PEOPLE

+24

PS
PS/LPS
PS/MR HURD
PS/MR BLAKER
PS/PUS
SIR A DUFF
MR CORTAZZI
MR MURRAY
MR LEAHY
HD/UND
HD/HK & GD
HD/MVD
HD/NEWS DEPT
HD/SEAD
HD/N AM D
HD/EESD
HD/OID

SIR A PARSONS

HONG KONG GOVERNMENT OFFICE
LONDON

(MR WOODFIELD
(MR BURLEIGH HOME OFFICE
QUEEN ANNE'S GATE

(MR HILLARY
(MR BIRT HOME OFFICE
LUNAR HOUSE CROYDON

Mr V McGee, FAO, ODA

No 10 ~~Downing St~~ (1)

2

PRIME MINISTER

MJS

CONFIDENTIAL

FM SEOUL 220600Z JUN 79

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 117 OF 22 JUNE

INFO PRIORITY HONG KONG (GOVERNOR) SINGAPORE AND UKMIS GENEVA

YOUR TELEGRAM 77

VIETNAMESE REFUGEES: ROACHBANK

1. WE INFORMED THE MFA OF THE LATEST DEVELOPMENTS THIS MORNING, ASKING THEM TO PRESS THE TAIWANESE TO AGREE TO THE POSSIBLE CHARTER FLIGHT AND TO INFORM THEIR MINISTERS OF THE POSSIBILITY THAT WE MIGHT ASK TO BRING THE ROACHBANK TO BUSAN. THE MFA HAD NOT YET RECEIVED ANY REPORT FROM THEIR EMBASSY IN LONDON.

2. DURING OUR DISCUSSION A CABLE ARRIVED FROM THE ROK EMBASSY IN TAIWAN TO THE EFFECT THAT THE DIRECTOR GENERAL FOR CONSULAR AFFAIRS OF THE FOREIGN MINISTRY OF TAIWAN HAD PRAISED THE HUMANITARIAN EFFORTS OF HMG AND HAD PROMISED TO ALLOW 140 REFUGEES TO LAND ON PENG HU ISLAND ON 25 JUNE. ONCE THESE REFUGEES HAD BEEN FLOWN OUT THE REMAINING 155 WOULD BE ALLOWED TO LAND THERE. THE TAIWANESE AUTHORITIES WERE IN TOUCH WITH SCOTT ABOUT THE DETAILS AND THE ROK EMBASSY WOULD BE NOTIFIED OF WHAT WAS AGREED.

3. THE MFA WERE INCLINED TO REGARD THIS AS EXCELLENT NEWS. WE TRIED TO DAMPEN THEIR ENTHUSIASM BY POINTING OUT THE SNAGS WHICH WERE LIKELY TO ARISE AND BY ASKING WHY ALL THE REFUGEES

WE TRIED TO DAMPEN THEIR ENTHUSIASM BY POINTING OUT THE SNAGS WHICH WERE LIKELY TO ARISE AND BY ASKING WHY ALL THE REFUGEES COULD NOT BE LANDED IMMEDIATELY. WE FEAR, HOWEVER, THAT THEY MAY NOW RELAX THEIR EFFORTS. UNLESS THERE HAS BEEN ANY CHANGE IN THE SITUATION TODAY YOU MAY WISH TO IMPRESS UPON THE ROK EMBASSY IN LONDON THE DESIRABILITY OF KEEPING THE PPRESSURE ON THE TAIWANESE TO PERMIT A DC10 CHARTER IF NECESSARY. WE HAVE GIVEN THE MFA A SUPPLEMENTARY LETTER SETTING OUT AGAIN ALL THE RELEVANT POINTS FROM YOUR TUR.

TALLBOYS

NNNN

ADVANCES: BOAT PEOPLE

PS/LPS
PS/MR HURD
PS/MR BLAKER
PS/PUS
SIR A DUFF
MR CORTAZZI
MR MURRAY
MR LEAHY
HD/UND
HD/HK & GD
HD/EVD
HD/NEWS DEPT
HD/SEAD
HD/N AM D
HD/EESD
HD/OID

IMMEDIATE

HONG KONG GOVERNMENT OFFICE
LONDON

{ MR WOODFIELD
{ MR BURLEIGH HOME OFFICE
QUEEN ANNE'S GATE

{ MR HILLARY
{ MR BIRT HOME OFFICE
LUNAR HOUSE CROYDON

Mr V McGee, FAO, ODA

No 10 Downing St / (E)

(Jiles)

Ans

2

PRIME MINISTER
MS

CONFIDENTIAL

FM HANOI 210500Z JUN 79

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 183 OF 21 JUNE

INFO IMMEDIATE HONG KONG UKMIS GENEVA WASHINGTON.

ROUTINE JAKARTA MANILA BANGKOK KUALA LUMPUR SINGAPORE AND
CANBERRA

MIPT: VIETNAMESE REFUGEES

1. VICE MINISTER, HOANG DICH SON, BRIEFED WESTERN
AND NON-ALIGNED AMBASSADORS ON THE EVENING OF
20 JUNE AND DISTRIBUTED STATEMENT IN MIPT.

2. SON REITERATED VIEW ON PROPOSED INTERNATIONAL
CONFERENCE CONTAINED IN OFFICIAL STATEMENT (MIPT) AND
SAID THAT AS THE 7-POINT PROGRAMME HAD BEEN AGREED WITH
UNHCR THERE WAS NO PURPOSE IN ANY CONFERENCE WHICH DID MORE
THAN DISCUSS IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PROGRAMME. ANY OTHER
TYPE OF CONFERENCE WOULD SERVE THE PURPOSES AND CRIMES OF
CHINA AND USA. ASKED WHAT OFFICIAL STATEMENT WHEN IT SAID
VIETNAM WAS WILLING TO ATTEND NA CONFERENCE OF "DIRECTLY
CONCERNED COUNTRIES", SON SAID THIS MEANT COUNTRIES
OF DEPARTURE, TRANSIT AND FINAL DESTINATION.

3. AMONGST WELL KNOWN CHARGES AGAINST CHINA AND
USA ON WHICH HE DWELT AT LENGTH, SON INCLUDED A NEW ONE
TO THE EFFECT THAT CHINA WAS SENDING PEOPLE FROM THE MAIN-
LAND IN DISGUISE AS REFUGEES. SOME, WHO HAD BEEN ON
THEIR WAY BY BOAT TO MALAYSIA AND SINGAPORE, HAD BEEN

LAND IN DISGUISE AS REFUGEES. SOME, WHO HAD BEEN ON THEIR WAY BY BOAT TO MALAYSIA AND SINGAPORE, HAD BEEN FORCED BY BAD WEATHER TO LAND IN VIETNAM WHERE THEY HAD BEEN CAPTURED AND QUESTIONED. HE CLAIMED THIS WAS AN EXAMPLE OF CHINA TRYING TO DRIVE A WEDGE BETWEEN VIETNAM AND NEIGHBOURING COUNTRIES. WHEN QUESTIONED, HE SAID THAT ONE NEIGHBOURING COUNTRY CLAIMED IT HAD RECEIVED 29,000 REFUGEES IN MAY. VIETNAMESE FIGURES SHOWED THAT ONLY 6,000 HAD LEFT VIETNAM FOR THAT COUNTRY, OF WHICH 2,000 HAD BEEN CAPTURED BY VIETNAMESE AUTHORITIES. RATHER LESS THAN ONE-EIGHTH OF THOSE REACHING THAT COUNTRY HAD THEREFORE ORIGINATED IN VIETNAM. WHEN QUESTIONED ON HOW HE KNEW NUMBERS OF THOSE LEAVING VIETNAM, HE SAID THEY WERE KNOWN "IN AN APPROXIMATE MANNER FROM LOCAL REPORTS".

4. IN ANSWER TO A FURTHER QUESTION, SON SAID THAT ACCORDING TO HIS STATISTICS THE NUMBERS OF ILLEGAL IMMIGRANTS FROM VIETNAM HAD BEEN REDUCED SINCE THE VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT'S STATEMENT OF JANUARY THIS YEAR, AND ESPECIALLY SINCE AGREEMENT ON 7-POINT PROGRAMME WITH UNHCR HAD BEEN REACHED IN APRIL. SON LAID PARTICULAR EMPHASIS ON THIS PROGRAMME WHICH HE CLAIMED "WOULD LESSEN DIFFICULTIES FOR NEIGHBOURING COUNTRIES". HE SAID THAT ANY COUNTRY WHICH SPOKE OF HUMANITARIAN MATTERS SHOULD SHOW HUMANITARIAN CONCERN BY COOPERATING WITH UNHCR.

COMMENT

5. GENERAL REACTION OF MY COLLEAGUES TO THE BRIEFING WAS THAT SON HAD SURPASSED HIMSELF IN UNTRUTHS AND EVASIONS. EFFECT WAS VERY COUNTER-PRODUCTIVE. HE MUST HOWEVER BE GIVEN ONE GOOD MARK. AT PRESS CONFERENCE IN THE AFTERNOON SON HAD SAID DURING HIS INTRODUCTORY REMARKS THAT BRITAIN HAD PURSUED A POLICY OF SLANDERING VIETNAM OVER REFUGEES. I HAD A WORD WITH HIM BEFORE AMBASSADORIAL BRIEFING AND SAID THAT IF HE MENTIONED MY COUNTRY HE SHOULD USE DIPLOMATIC LANGUAGE. HE PROBABLY REALISED THAT IF HE HE DID NOT DO SO, I AND SOME OF MY COMMUNITY COLLEAGUES WOULD HAVE WALKED OUT. IN THE EVENT HE DROPPED ANY REFERENCE TO THE UK WHICH HE MAY HAVE HAD IN MIND TO MAKE.

MARGETSON

RMNN

CONFIDENTIAL

2

GPS 470

CONFIDENTIAL

FM KUALA LUMPUR 200430Z JUN 79

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 195 OF 20 JUNE

INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS GENEVA WASHINGTON GOV HONG KONG

INFO PRIORITY MANILA SINGAPORE BANGKOK JAKARTA TOKYO

UKMIS NEW YORK CANBERRA WELLINGTON PEKING

MOSCOW

PRIME MINISTER
91

M I P T : VIETNAMESE REFUGEES

1. THE MINISTER OF HOME AFFAIRS, TAN SRI GHAZALI SHAFIE, CALLED IN ONE OF MY STAFF ON 19 JUNE AND EXPLAINED THE BACKGROUND TO RECENT GOVERNMENT STATEMENTS ABOUT THE VIETNAMESE REFUGEES. HE SAID THAT DR MAHATHIR'S REMARKS ABOUT THE PROBLEM LAST WEEK HAD TO BE READ AGAINST A BACKGROUND OF THE MOOD IN THE UMNO PARTY CAUCUS AND THE FORTHCOMING UMNO GENERAL ASSEMBLY (NEXT MONTH). MALAY MINISTERS WERE VYING WITH EACH OTHER TO BE MORE QUOTE HAWKISH UNQUOTE THAN THE REST OVER THE QUESTION OF VIETNAMESE REFUGEES AND DR MAHATHIR WAS ACTING IMPETUOUSLY, AS WAS HIS TEMPERAMENT. HE HAD OVER - REACTED OVER THE MAS INDUSTRIAL DISPUTE AND NOW OVER THE REFUGEES, AND COULD BE EXPECTED TO DO SO AGAIN. AS A RESULT HE, GHAZALI, HAD BEEN COMPELLED TO ACT AGAIN IN THE ROLE OF QUOTE SALVAGE ENGINEER UNQUOTE.
2. HE RE-AFFIRMED THAT HE WAS STILL THE MINISTER RESPONSIBLE FOR DEALING WITH THE REFUGEE PROBLEM AND THAT THEREFORE IT WAS HIS PUBLIC (AND PRIVATE) STATEMENTS ON POLICY WHICH ALONE CARRIED ANY WEIGHT. HE CLAIMED TO BE THE AUTHOR OF THE PRIME MINISTER'S REPLY TO DR WALDHEIM. HE SAID HE HAD BEEN CALLED BACK TO KL ON 16 JUNE TO DRAFT IT. HE HAD CABLED THE TEXT TO LEE KUAN YEW IN LONDON WHO, HKSSAID, WAS BEING MOST HELPFUL IN PUTTING OVER THE MALAYSIAN VIEW.
3. HE MAINTAINED THAT THERE HAD BEEN NO SHIFT IN MALAYSIAN POEHCY SINCE LAST AUTUMN SEMI COLON THE ONLY NEW FACTOR WAS HIS EXASPERATION WITH THE INDONESIANS, AND PARTICULARLY WITH PROFESSOR MOCHTAR, OVER THEIR FAILURE TO CREATE A REFUGEE FACILITY ON AN INDONESIAN ISLAND

/ WHICH

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

WHICH IN ANY WAY APPROACHED HIS FORMULATION (IE A PROCESSING CENTRE WITH A CAPACITY OF 200,000, NOT A TRANSIT CAMP F200RRRCN 10 SAID HE WAS IN TOUCH WITH THE INDONESIANS ABOUT THIS : HE HAD SEEN MOCHTAR IN SINGAPORE EN ROUTE TO COLOMBO AND WOULD BE SEEING GENERAL YOGA ON 20 JUNE. INDEED HE CLAIMED THAT, ALTHOUGH IT COULD NOT BE SAID PUBLICLY, THE REASON FOR REASSERTING THE MALAYSIAN INTENTION TO TOW AWAY REFUGEE BOATS ENTERING MALAYSIAN WATERS WAS TO PUT THE WIND UP THE INDONESIANS, SINCE THEIR COUNTRY WOULD BE THE NEXT PORT OF CALL, AND TO INEDUCE IN THEM A WILLINGNESS TO COOPERATE MORE CLOSELY WITH THE MALAYSIANS IN CREATING A BETTER ISLAND FACILITY. HE INTENDED TO PURSUE THIS POLICY BUT DID NOT SAY WHETHER HE EXPECTED IT TO SUCCEED. HE SAID ONE WEAKNESS WAS THE LACK OF COOPERATION WITHING THE INDONESIAN GOVERNMENT. THEY DID NOT REALLY KNOW HOW MANY REFUGEES THEY ALREADY HAD. THEY WERE ALSO INCLINED TO VIEW THE PROBLEM IN ASEAN RATHER THAN INTERNATIONAL TERMS.

4. HE CONCLUDED BY REITERATING THAT MALAYSIAN POLICY WAS TO SEND AWAY ONLY NEW ARRIVALS. BUT THE MALAYSIAN GOVERNMENT WOULD HAVE TO DECIDE EVENTUALLY HOW TO DISPOSE OF THE RESIDUE IN THE CAMPS. THEY WOULD HAVE TO BE SENT AWAY BUT HE WOULD NOT BE DRAWN ON WHEN THIS MIGHT HAPPEN. THE MALAYSIAN POLICY WAS NOT TO ALLOW ANY TO SETTLE IN MALAYSIA - THE REASONS FOR THIS WERE POLITICAL AND RACIAL AS WELL AS SOCIAL.

HUNT

[COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING ST]

FILES
SEAD
HK & GD
UND
FED
EESD
N AM D
SAD
EID (E)
PUSD
OID
IPD

NEWS D
M & VD
PS
PS/LPS
PS/MR. HURD
PS/MR. BLAKER
PS/PUS
SIR A DUFF
SIR A PARSONS
MR. CORTAZZI
MR. LEAHY
MR. MURRAY

COPIES TO:
HONG KONG GOVT. OFFICE LONDON
MR. WOODFIELD } HOME OFFICE
MR. BURLEIGH } QUEEN ANNE'S GATE
MR. HILLARY } HOME OFFICE
MR. BIRT } LUNAR HOUSE
CROYDON.
MR. V. MCGEE } FAO/ODA

2
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

AMENDED COPY - 22 JUNE 1979

CONFIDENTIAL

FM FCO 201900Z JUNE 1979

TO IMMEDIATE HANOI

TELEGRAM NUMBER 116 OF 20 JUNE

INFO PRIORITY JAKARTA MANILA BANGKOK KUALA LUMPUR SINGAPORE HONG KONG WASHINGTON CANBERRA UKMIS GENEVA UKMIS NEW YORK

End w ma
6/21
23/6

OUR TELEGRAM NO 110: VIETNAMESE REFUGEES

1. THE VIETNAMESE CHARGE D'AFFAIRES CALLED THIS AFTERNOON AT HIS OWN REQUEST ON THE ASSISTANT IN SEAD. HE SAID THAT ON INSTRUCTIONS FROM HANOI, HE WAS RETURNING THE AIDE MEMOIRE HANDED TO HIM ON 15 JUNE, ON THE GROUNDS THAT IT WAS SLANDEROUS AND INACCURATE.
2. KHANG DENIED THAT HIS GOVERNMENT WERE CAUSING HARDSHIP TO THE REFUGEES WHO WERE FOR THE MOST PART, LEAVING VOLUNTARILY AND ILLEGALLY. IT WAS UNTRUE THAT THE CHINESE WERE BEING EXPELLED, OR THAT HIS AUTHORITIES WERE INVOLVED IN ANY RACKET (THEY HAD RECENTLY ARRESTED A GREEK REGISTERED SHIP AT HO CHI MINH CITY FOR TRYING TO TAKE REFUGEES OUT). ON THE CONTRARY, THEY WERE CO-OPERATING FULLY WITH THE UNHCR AND WOULD INCREASE THE NUMBER OF REFUGEES LEAVING THE COUNTRY UNDER HIS ARRANGEMENTS IF RESETTLEMENT COUNTRIES WERE PREPARED TO ACCEPT GREATER NUMBERS. VIETNAM SYMPATHISED WITH COUNTRIES AFFECTED BY THE EXODUS. BRITAIN WAS PRACTISING DOUBLE STANDARDS BY ATTACKING VIETNAM FOR QUOTE COMING TO THE HELP OF CAMBODIA UNQUOTE BUT NOT CHINA FOR INVADING VIETNAM, AND FOR NOT RECOGNISING THE HENG SAMRIN REGIME WHEN WE HAD RECOGNISED THE NEW GOVERNMENT OF UGANDA.
3. FLOWER REPLIED THAT THE AIDE MEMOIRE WAS SCRUPULOUSLY ACCURATE AND CAREFULLY WORDED. HE REPEATED THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT'S VIEWS, STRESSING THAT MORE EVIDENCE WAS EMERGING ALL THE TIME ABOUT VIETNAMESE *ACTIONS AND THAT THE SITUATION COULD IN NO WAY BE INTERPRETED AS SHOWING A WISH ON PART OF THE VIETNAMESE* AUTHORITIES TO CO-OPERATE WITH OTHERS AFFECTED BY THEIR POLICIES.
4. IN REPLY TO A QUESTION, KHANG SAID THAT HIS GOVERNMENT WERE TOTALLY OPPOSED TO A FURTHER UN CONFERENCE ON THE REFUGEE ISSUE, THE ONLY PURPOSE OF WHICH WOULD BE TO VILIFY VIETNAM.

15.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

5. NEWS DEPARTMENT ARE DRAWING ON THE TEXT OF THE NOTE AND SAYING THAT IT HAS BEEN RETURNED.

CARRINGTON

[COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING ST]

FILES

SEAD

HK & GD

UND

FED

EESD

N AM D

SAD

EID (E)

PUSD

OID

IPD

NEWS D

M & VD

PS

PS/LPS

PS/MR. HURD

PS/MR. BLAKER

PS/PUS

SIR A DUFF

SIR A PARSONS

MR. CORTAZZI

MR. LEAHY

MR. MURRAY

COPIES TO:

HONG KONG GOVT. OFFICE LONDON

MR. WOODFIELD

MR. BURLEIGH

MR. HILLARY

MR. BIRT

MR. V. MCGEE

HOME OFFICE

QUEEN ANNE'S GATE

HOME OFFICE

LUNAR HOUSE

CROYDON.

FAO/ODA

- 2 -
CONFIDENTIAL

ADVANCES:

PS (2)
PS/LPS
PS/MR HURD
PS/MR BLAKER
PS/PUS
SIR A DUFF
MR CORTAZZI
MR MURRAY
MR LEAHY
HD/UND
HD/HK & GD
HD/EVD
HD/NEWS DEPT
HD/SEAD
HD/N AM D
HD/EESD
HD/OID

~~RESIDENTIAL~~

to WED

RESTRICTED

FM PARIS 201628Z JUN 79

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELNO 338 OF 20 JUNE 1979

INFO ROUTINE UKMIS NEW YORK AND UKMIS GENEVA

INFO SAVING TO HANOI, KUALA LUMPUR, BANGKOK AND SINGAPORE.

MY TELNO 334 (NOT TO ALL) : PRESIDENT GISCARD'S TELEVISION INTERVIEW
- IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEES.

1. PRESIDENT GISCARD EXPLAINED THAT THE MEASURES RECENTLY PROPOSED BY THE GOVERNMENT TO STRENGTHEN FRANCE'S IMMIGRATION CONTROLS WERE DESIGNED TO RECTIFY THE CURRENT STATE OF TOTAL DISORDER OVER IMMIGRATION. THOSE WHO CAME TO FRANCE, ACCOMPANIED BY THEIR FAMILIES, TO LIVE AND WORK HERE WOULD BE UNLIKELY TO BE AFFECTED. THE CONTROLS WERE DESIGNED PRIMARILY TO DEAL WITH THOSE WHO ENTERED THE COUNTRY SEEKING WORK ON A TEMPORARY BASIS. IF THEY WERE UNABLE TO FIND WORK, THEIR RIGHT TO STAY IN FRANCE SHOULD BE WITHDRAWN. IF THEY SUCCEEDED IN FINDING A JOB BUT STILL DID NOT INTEND TO SETTLE PERMANENTLY IN FRANCE, THEIR RESIDENCE PERMITS WOULD BE RENEWED AT THREE-YEARLY INTERVALS DEPENDING ON THE STATE OF THE LABOUR MARKET. (COMMENT: DESPITE THIS INTERPRETATION OF THE PROPOSED IMMIGRATION LEGISLATION, FEARS REMAIN AMONG IMMIGRANTS THAT ITS EFFECTS WILL BE MORE FAR-REACHING.)

2. THE REFUGEE PROBLEM WAS, HOWEVER, TOTALLY DIFFERENT. THE FRENCH PEOPLE SHOULD REALISE THAT FRANCE WAS THE WORLD'S LEADING SANCTUARY

HONG KONG GOVERNMENT OFFICE
LONDON

{ MR WOODFIELD
MR BURLEIGH HOME OFFICE
QUEEN ANNE'S GATE

{ MR HILLARY
MR BIRT HOME OFFICE
LUNAR HOUSE CROYDON

Mr V McGee, FAO, ODA

No 10 Downing St / E)

Prime Minister

mu
uh

(Depth dist)

2. THE REFUGEE PROBLEM WAS, HOWEVER, TOTALLY DIFFERENT. THE FRENCH PEOPLE SHOULD REALISE THAT FRANCE WAS THE WORLD'S LEADING SANCTUARY FOR REFUGEES. IN HIS OWN PRESIDENCY ALONE, FRANCE HAD FOR INSTANCE ADMITTED 5,000 REFUGEES FROM CHILE AND 1,500 REFUGEES FROM OTHER LATIN AMERICAN STATES. FRANCE HAD BEEN WELL AWARE FOR MANY YEARS NOW OF THE GRAVITY OF THE REFUGEE PROBLEM IN SOUTH EAST ASIA. OVER 50,000 REFUGEES HAD BEEN ADMITTED FROM THAT AREA, SPECIAL AGENCIES HAD BEEN SET UP TO DEAL WITH THEM AND THE MAJORITY HAD FOUND JOBS AND SETTLED DOWN WELL. GISCARD THOUGHT AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ABOUT SOUTH EAST ASIAN REFUGEES WAS ESSENTIAL. IT SHOULD DEAL WITH THE POLICIES OF THE COUNTRIES DIRECTLY INVOLVED TO DISCOVER HOW MANY REFUGEES WERE EXPECTED TO LEAVE, WITH THE SITUATION IN OTHER SOUTH EAST ASIAN COUNTRIES WHERE REINTEGRATION OF THE REFUGEES WOULD BE EASIEST, AND FINALLY WITH THE AID WHICH OTHER COUNTRIES IN SOUTH EAST ASIA NEEDED TO HELP RESETTLE THE REFUGEES. IF IT WAS IMPOSSIBLE TO RESETTLE THE REFUGEES IN SOUTH EAST ASIA, SHOULD OTHER COUNTRIES DO WHAT FRANCE HAD DONE TO ACCEPT A REGULAR FLOW OF REFUGEES?

FCO PLEASE PASS SAVING TO ALL.

HIBBERT.

MNNN

SENT PARIS 20/1713Z PD

CONFIDENTIAL

2

GR 925

CONFIDENTIAL

DESKBY 210900Z

FM UKMIS NEW YORK 210026Z JUNE 79

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 644 OF 20 JUNE

INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS GENEVA WASHINGTON HONG KONG PRIORITY, MANILA
KUALA LUMPUR SINGAPORE BANGKOK JAKARTA WELLINGTON OTTAWA PEKING
TOKYO MOSCOW PARIS BONN.

PRIME MINISTER
MS

YOUR TELNO 284: UN CONFERENCE ON INDO-CHINESE REFUGEES

1. SIR MURRAY MACLEHOSE, ACCOMPANIED BY MANSFIELD, CALLED THIS
AFTERNOON ON WALDHEIM, WHO HAD BUFFUM AND URQUHART IN SUPPORT.

2. THE GOVERNOR STRESSED THE GRAVITY OF THE REFUGEE SITUATION
IN HONG KONG. THE CURRENT INFLUX OF REFUGEES FROM VIETNAM
AT THE RATE OF 1000 A DAY SET AGAINST THE BACKGROUND OF THE MASSIVE
INCREASE IN IMMIGRATION FROM CHINA (A PROJECTED TOTAL OF 270,000
THIS YEAR), MEANT THAT TEMPER IN HONG KONG COULD SNAP AT ANY TIME,
PARTICULARLY IF SOUTH EAST ASIAN COUNTRIES WERE SEEN TO BE SUCCEED-
ING IN STEMMING THE FLOW BY STRONG-ARM MEASURES. RECENT MALAYSIAN
STATEMENTS WERE SEEN AS BLACKMAIL, AND THERE WAS FOR EXAMPLE ALREADY
GREAT RESENTMENT AT THE DIFFERENTIAL BETWEEN MALAYSIAN AND HONG KONG
IMMIGRATION QUOTAS IN THE US. THE WHOLE SOUTH EAST ASIAN AREA AND
HONG KONG COULD BE HEADING FOR AN EXPLOSION IF PROGRESS TOWARDS
CREDIBLE RESETTLEMENT ARRANGEMENTS WERE NOT SEEN IN THE IMMEDIATE
FUTURE. IT WAS IMPORTANT THAT COUNTRIES WHICH MIGHT BE ABLE TO HELP
DID NOT EVADE THEIR RESPONSIBILITIES ON THE GROUNDS THAT THE PROBLEM
WAS TOO BIG TO HANDLE. THE PROBLEM WAS FINITE. THE FINAL FIGURE OF
BOAT REFUGEES FROM VIETNAM NEEDING RESETTLEMENT WAS NOT LIKELY TO
EXCEED 800,000. IT WAS NOT NECESSARY OR POSSIBLE TO FIND AN INSTANT
SOLUTION BUT IT WAS NECESSARY TO REACH DECISIONS VERY SOON WHICH
WOULD PROVIDE REASSURANCES THAT CONCRETE STEPS WOULD BE TAKEN WITHIN
A MEASUREABLE TIME PERIOD. BUT THIS COULD BE A PROGRAMME SPREAD OVER
AS MUCH AS TWO YEARS. IT WOULD BE HELPFUL IF THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF A
MINISTERIAL MEETING COULD BE MADE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. IT WAS
ESSENTIAL THAT THE VIETNAMESE AT LEAST BE PERSUADED THAT THEY MUST
ENSURE THAT REFUGEES HAD SAFE MEANS OF TRANSPORT AND A SURE DESTINAT-
ION.

CONFIDENTIAL

13.

CONFIDENTIAL

3. WALDHEIM ACCEPTED THE EXTREME URGENCY OF THE PROBLEM. HE SAID HE WAS HEAVILY INVOLVED IN CONSULTATIONS. VANCE HAD TELEPHONED TWICE TODAY. ROMULO HAD CALLED (TO UNDERLINE THAT THERE WAS UNREST AMONG THE LOCAL POPULATION IN MANILA WHO RESENTED THE SPECIAL TREATMENT BEING GIVEN TO REFUGEES). THE PRIME MINISTER OF MALAYSIA HAD ALSO STRESSED HIS DOMESTIC DIFFICULTIES. WALDHEIM WAS PERSONALLY READY TO CONVENE A MINISTERIAL MEETING AT THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE MOMENT BUT HE MUST HAVE SUFFICIENT SUPPORT. ROMULO HAD AT HIS REQUEST TELEPHONED OTHER ASEAN FOREIGN MINISTERS AND WOULD HOPE TO GIVE HIM A FINAL DECISION SOON ON THE PROPOSAL FOR AN INTERNATIONAL MEETING. THE VIETNAMESE HAD SAID THEY WOULD ATTEND A MEETING, BUT ONLY PROVIDED IT WAS NON-POLITICAL AND CHAIRED BY THE UNHCR. THERE HAD BEEN NO POSITIVE RESPONSE FROM THE LATIN AMERICANS WHO SHOULD BE IN A POSITION TO PROVIDE ASSISTANCE TO THE REFUGEES. (VANCE HAD STRESSED TO HIM THE NEED TO INVOLVE THE LATIN AMERICANS.) IT WAS NOT NECESSARY TO WAIT FOR FIRM PLEDGES OF ASSISTANCE BEFORE CONVENING A MINISTERIAL MEETING, BUT THERE HAD TO BE ENOUGH BROADLY POSITIVE REACTIONS (WE UNDERSTAND THAT THE CHINESE HAVE TODAY WRITTEN TO WALDHEIM IN SUPPORT OF THE PROPOSED MEETING.)

4. WALDHEIM CONFIRMED THAT HE REGARDED IT AS NECESSARY TO ESTABLISH THAT THE MINISTERIAL MEETING WOULD ONLY ADDRESS THE HUMANITARIAN ASPECTS OF THE PROBLEM. IT WAS ESSENTIAL THAT THE MINISTERIAL MEETING SHOULD PRODUCE RESULTS. OTHERWISE THE FRUSTRATIONS AND RESENTMENT DESCRIBED BY THE GOVERNOR WOULD BE EXACERBATED. A FAILED MEETING WAS WORSE THAN NO MEETING AND A POLITICAL CONFRONTATION WOULD ENSURE THAT THE MEETING WOULD FAIL. MANSFIELD DESCRIBED OUR LATEST ATTITUDE TO A MINISTERIAL MEETING, DRAWING ON YOUR TELEGRAM UNDER REFERENCE. WALDHEIM SAID HE WELCOMED THIS CLARIFICATION OF HMG'S ATTITUDE. HE SAID THAT VANCE HAD AGREED THAT THERE MUST BE A CLEAR SEPARATION BETWEEN THE POLITICAL AND HUMANITARIAN ASPECTS, AND HAD SUGGESTED THAT A SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING MIGHT FOLLOW THE TOKYO SUMMIT. BUT WALDHEIM ACCEPTED THE STRENGTH OF OUR ARGUMENTS THAT ANY COUNCIL MEETING WOULD BEST FOLLOW THE PROPOSED MINISTERIAL MEETING. (DUFFUM INTERJECTED THAT THE WORST THING WOULD BE FOR THE MINISTERIAL MEETING TO RUN CONCURRENTLY WITH A SECURITY COUNCIL DEBATE).

5. WALDHEIM SAID THE VIETNAMESE HAD BEEN PEDDLING THE LINE TO HIM THAT THE REFUGEE PROBLEM WAS GREATLY EXAGGERATED AND THAT THE REFUGEES WERE A FEW MALCONTENTS WHO HAD LEFT SAIGON VOLUNTARILY. BUT THEY HAD BEEN QUITE UNABLE TO ANSWER WHEN WALDHEIM ASKED THEM TO EXPLAIN, WHY, IN THAT CASE THOUSANDS WERE LANDING DAILY ON SHORES OF NEIGHBOURING STATES. THE GOVERNOR SAID THAT HE HAD A MASS OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE THAT THE MAJORITY OF THE REFUGEES ARRIVING IN HONG KONG CAME FROM NORTH VIETNAM AND THAT THERE WAS A WELL-ESTABLISHED OFFICIAL NETWORK FOR EXPELLING THEM. THIS EVIDENCE COULD EASILY BE PUBLISHED IF NECESSARY. HOWEVER, WALDHEIM'S ADVISERS FELT IT WOULD BE PRUDENT NOT TO DO SO AT THIS STAGE.

6. WALDHEIM WAS IN PREDICTABLY CAUTIOUS FORM BUT THERE STILL SEEMS A GOOD CHANCE THAT HE CAN BE PREVAILED UPON TO ISSUE INVITATIONS IN THE NEXT DAY OR TWO FOR A MINISTERIAL MEETING ON OR AROUND 18 JULY IN GENEVA. HE MAY BE ENCOURAGED TO MAKE THIS DECISION QUICKLY BY ANY POSITIVE MESSAGE FROM ASEAN COUNTRIES AND SOME OF THE MAJOR LATIN AMERICAN MAIN-LAND COUNTRIES. YOU MAY LIKE TO CONSIDER WHETHER THERE IS ANYTHING FURTHER WE CAN DO IN CAPITALS TO STIMULATE THESE POSITIVE REACTIONS.

RICHARD

[COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING ST]

FILES

SEAD
HK & GD
UND
FED
EESD
N AM D
SAD
EID (E)
PUSD
OID
IPD

NEWS D
M & VD
PS
PS/IPS
PS/MR. HURD
PS/MR. BLAKER
PS/PUS
SIR A DUFF
SIR A PARSONS
MR. CORTAZZI
MR. LEAHY
MR. MURRAY

COPIES TO:

HONG KONG GOVT. OFFICE LONDON
MR. WOODFIELD }
MR. BURLEIGH } HOME OFFICE
QUEEN ANNE'S GATE
MR. HILLARY }
MR. BIRT } HOME OFFICE
LUNAR HOUSE
CROYDON.
MR. V. MCGEE FAO/ODA



Original in C&R
cc: HO
FCO
Press Office.

10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

20 June 1979

Dear Gerry.

Thank you for your letter of 6 June enclosing this one from your constituent Mr. Roy Anthony Fisher of Treharroek, Port Isaac, Cornwall.

I was glad to have Mr. Fisher's letter and can well understand his feelings. Although the Government reached the conclusion that it was right to accept refugees from the Sibonga and Roachbank, we have been most careful to avoid any kind of open-ended commitment as regards future cases. This kind of decision is extremely difficult. We take account of humanitarian considerations when faced with a group of people rescued at sea by a British ship who have nowhere else to go and we thought it right to admit the people on the Sibonga and Roachbank as refugees. Of course, the real responsibility for their plight rests with the Vietnamese authorities and the Government has done all it can to draw international attention to their conduct and to seek an international conference so that the problem may be faced by the international community as a whole.

The Government's commitment to strict control on immigration is important. I can assure you that we intend to implement it.

Yours ever
Rogers

Gerry Neale, Esq., M.P.

56

RESTRICTED

2



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

*Prime Minister has seen
for imperialism,*

20 June 1979

Dear Bryan,

*Jim
28/6*

Vietnam

Our Ambassador in Hanoi, Mr J Margetson, is due for mid-tour leave at the end of this month. Hanoi is a dreadful post at all times and the last few months have been particularly difficult for Mr and Mrs Margetson. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary has decided therefore that Mr Margetson should take his leave now but that the post should be reinforced during his absence by a First Secretary, Mr R T Fell, from London.

Although diplomatic activity over the refugees has centred mainly on London, New York and Geneva, it would be as well to have someone in Hanoi capable of taking action at a reasonably high level if necessary. Mr Fell will be able to do so.

Given the very sour state of our relations at present, the Vietnamese may interpret Mr Margetson's departure on leave as a political gesture. Lord Carrington does not, however, believe we should be deterred by fear of any reaction of this kind.

The Vietnamese Ambassador has been absent from London for several months, we believe because he is involved in the Vietnam/China talks.

Present plans are for Mr Margetson to return to Hanoi at the end of August.

mf. *Jan ever,*
Stephen

(J S Wall)
Private Secretary

Bryan G Cartledge Esq
10 Downing Street
LONDON

RESTRICTED

20 JUN 1979



CONFIDENTIAL

Vietnam (P+2)
Refugees

Subject copy filed on
Singapore (May 79)



file

Visit by Lee Kuan Yew
10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

20 June 1979

Dear Sir,

THE PRIME MINISTER'S DISCUSSION WITH THE PRIME MINISTER OF SINGAPORE,
MR. LEE KUAN YEW, AT 10 DOWNING STREET ON 20 JUNE 1979:
SOUTH EAST ASIA AND THE VIETNAMESE REFUGEES

The Prime Minister's tete-a-tete discussion with Mr. Lee Kuan Yew at No. 10 this morning, which lasted for one hour, concentrated mainly on oil/Middle East and on the problem of the Vietnamese refugees. I have summarised the exchanges on oil and the Middle East in a separate letter to Paul Lever. The following is a summary of the main points which arose during the discussion of South East Asia and the Vietnamese refugees.

Mr. Lee Kuan Yew gave the Prime Minister a substantial survey of the origins and underlying causes of the problem of the Vietnamese refugees. For over eight years, Mr. Lee said, the Soviet Union's propaganda organs had been saturating South East Asia with warnings of the threat which was being created to many governments in South East Asia by their ethnic Chinese minorities. The Russians depicted the ethnic Chinese throughout South East Asia as a fifth column, intent on changing the established order. Mr. Lee recalled that at the Bandung Conference in 1955, China had agreed to allow the overseas Chinese to choose between Chinese nationality and that of their country of residence. The Indonesians were firmly convinced that the large ethnic Chinese minority which they had acquired as a result of this decision had been substantially involved in the coup of 1975 and had actively supported the Communist Party of Indonesia. Thousands of ethnic Chinese had been butchered as a result. There were similar ethnic tensions in Malaysia and in other South East Asian countries. Mr. Lee pointed out that there were approximately 400,000 Ethnic Chinese in North Vietnam and 1.5 million in South Vietnam.

Mr. Lee went on to say that during the cultural revolution in Peking, the Bandung understanding had been reversed: the Red Guards had demanded that the overseas Chinese who had retained

/Chinese nationality

Chinese nationality should be disavowed. Those who had chosen to return to China had been ill-treated and humiliated. The arrest of the Gang of Four in 1976 had been followed by a further switch in Chinese policy. Mr. Lee recalled that in January 1978, the Peking Daily had published a major statement of the Chinese regime's attitude towards the overseas Chinese; this was along the lines of Bandung understanding but emphasis had been placed on the fact that people of Chinese descent, irrespective of their present nationality, retained an undeniable affinity with China. The statement was a thinly veiled appeal to the overseas Chinese to assist in the modernisation of China. Mr. Lee said that, for him, the statement amounted to a direct appeal to the Chinese population of Singapore over the heads of the Singapore Government. About this time, Mr. Lee went on, there were rumours of problems, inspired and encouraged by the Chinese Embassy, between the Vietnamese Government and the ethnic Chinese. Relations between China and Vietnam had deteriorated; the Chinese had cut off aid to Vietnam and Vietnam had joined COMECON. Vietnam had then embarked on the invasion of Cambodia, in the full knowledge that, as a result, China would do everything possible to subvert and disrupt the countries in Indo-China. This had led the Vietnamese regime to the conclusion that they would be compelled to expel from Vietnam the entire ethnic Chinese population of the country, together with everybody of Vietnamese nationality who was disaffected.

Mr. Lee told the Prime Minister that the implementation of this policy amounted to an attempt to blackmail the entire world. The Vietnamese knew very well that the expelled would cause trouble wherever they went, by upsetting the racial balance of the countries which gave them refuge. The Vietnamese were transporting thousands of ethnic Chinese every day across Cambodia, in order to dump them over the border into Thailand. The purpose of this was to impose an unacceptable strain on the Thai economy and on Thai society in order to subvert the regime. From all this, the main gainer was the Soviet Union: eight years of Soviet propaganda about the threat proposed by the Chinese minorities would have been proved up to the hilt. Moreover, the fate of the Vietnamese refugees would enable the Russians to expose President Carter's human rights campaign as a sham; China would be isolated and South East Asia destabilised. The Vietnamese, for their part, would enhance their image as the torch-bearers of revolution in the region: they were willing to commit any atrocity in the cause of creating socialist man. Mr. Lee noted that the Vietnamese were exceptionally polished international actors, as their performance at the Geneva Conference on Refugees, in December 1978, had shown.

Mr. Lee made the further comment that the whole problem of the ethnic Chinese in South East Asia was given only very sporadic attention by the media. If it would cause no embarrassment to the Prime Minister, he might use the occasion of his present visit to London to try to correct this. The Prime Minister made it clear that she would have no objection

/whatsoever

whatsoever if Mr. Lee were to do so. Mr. Lee said that the problem of the Vietnamese refugees had to be linked to the activities of the Soviet Union, since otherwise it was incomprehensible.

The Prime Minister told Mr. Lee that she had felt strongly that Taiwan should have agreed to accept the refugees from the United Kingdom ship Roachbank: she was grateful for Mr. Lee's agreement to make an approach to the Taiwan authorities but the outcome had been disappointing. Mr. Lee explained that, for the Taiwanese as for him in Singapore, it was not simply a lack of space although population density could not be increased indefinitely. The more serious difficulty was the fact that the non-Chinese minorities would bitterly resent the take-over of any more land by the ethnic Chinese and that this would create political problems. The Taiwanese, for their part, were primarily concerned by the possibility of subversive infiltration by Chinese Communist agents posing as refugees: they had even refused to take back some of their own Generals who had been imprisoned in Communist China, on the grounds that they would have been brainwashed. Mr. Lee said that, in his view, the best solution would be for the United Nations to purchase one or more islands, from Indonesia, Malaysia or the Philippines, to which the refugees could go. They were hard-working, talented and productive people and, given an island and twenty years, they could create another Singapore. Neither he nor, for example, the Indonesians would welcome this, but it would solve the problem.

Concluding the discussion, the Prime Minister said that the free world would have to find a way of providing a refuge for those who fled from Communism, just as the Soviet Union invariably took in its own sympathisers. It would be essential to put forward practical proposals at the forthcoming conference which the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees had agreed to convene.

I am sending copies of this letter to Tony Butler (Home Office), Tom Harris (Department of Trade) and Martin Vile (Cabinet Office).

*Yours ever,
Gordon Corbett.*

J.S. Wall, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.



Vietnam ML

BF 29.6.79

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

20 June 1979

Vietnamese Refugees

I enclose a copy of a message which has been addressed to the Prime Minister by the Prime Minister of Israel, Mr. Begin, in which he proposes that all Governments should offer to accept a member of Vietnamese Refugees currently in Malaysia relative to the size of their territory and population.

I should be grateful for advice on how the Prime Minister might respond to Mr. Begin's proposal. It would be helpful if this, together with a draft reply could reach me no later than 29 June.

I am sending copies of this letter and enclosure to Tony Butler (Home Office) and Martin Vile (Cabinet Office).

B. G. CARTLEDGE

Stephen Wall, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.



file M

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

20 June 1979

I am writing on the Prime Minister's behalf to thank you for your letter of 20 June, with which you enclosed a message to Mrs. Thatcher from the Prime Minister of Israel about the problem of the Vietnamese Refugees.

I am, of course, bringing Mr. Begin's message to the Prime Minister's immediate attention.

B. G. CARTLEDGE

His Excellency Mr. Abraham Kidron



2

10 DOWNING STREET

PRIME MINISTER

Vietnamese Refugees

The attached message ^{-19/6/79}
from Mr. Begin was delivered
by the Israeli Embassy today.
I have asked for advice on
how you might respond.

Begin.

*The Jo-juts
of Thailand.*

Hong Kong.

ans.

20 June 1979

*P.O.
Begin
22/6*



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

20 June 1979

Jan Ryan,

*NGSYM 46.
SM
20/6*

Vietnamese Refugees

Thank you for your letter of 14 June.

The legal position is that, while masters of British vessels are obliged to pick up those in distress at sea, we are under no international legal obligation to accept permanently in our territory those picked up. But as the Malaysians are finding, that legal position is not very convincing as a basis for deciding what to do with the refugees. Lord Carrington therefore agrees with the Prime Minister that the question of further acceptance of refugees rescued by British ships is essentially one of policy.

Lord Carrington's comments on the three points raised in your letter are:

- (a) the issue of the NORSE VIKING refugees is covered by your letter of 18 June;
- (b) the Prime Minister's latest message to Dr Waldheim has added impetus to our call for a conference. The French statement (Paris telno 324) was encouraging, as was the decision by conference should be convened under the aegis of the UN. These decisions followed further lobbying on our part and the signs now point to Dr Waldheim calling a conference in the middle of July;
- (c) as regards the UK stance at such a conference, you will have seen the report of Mr Blaker's discussions with the UNHCR (UKMIS Geneva telno 211). It is clear that Mr Hartling attaches importance to getting assurances from leading governments that they will accept specific quotas of refugees; and, as the Prime Minister knows, he has suggested an "indicative number" of 10,000 for Britain. Mr Hartling made it clear to Mr Blaker that he is hoping for positive replies from the UK and other governments by the end of this week so that he can report to Dr Waldheim next week. Lord Carrington is considering urgently how we should react to this approach and will give further advice to the Prime Minister within the next two days.

I am copying this letter to the recipients of yours.

J S Wall

J S Wall
Private Secretary

Bryan Cartledge Esq
10 Downing Street

7
6
5
4
3
2
1
11
12
1

20 JUN 1979



EMBASSY OF ISRAEL
2 PALACE GREEN
LONDON W8 4QB
Telephone: 01-937 8050



שגרירות ישראל
לונדון

20th June, 1979

Dear Mrs. Thatcher,

I have been requested by the Prime Minister of Israel, Mr. Menachem Begin, to transmit to you the enclosed message.

Yours sincerely,

Abraham Kidron
Ambassador of Israel

The Rt. Hon. Mrs. Margaret Thatcher, MP,
The Prime Minister,
10 Downing Street,
London, S. W. 1.

SUBJECT



EMBASSY OF ISRAEL
2 PALACE GREEN
LONDON W8 4QB
Telephone: 01 937 8050

שגרירות ישראל
לונדון

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T29/79T

19th June, 1979
Jerusalem

Dear Mrs. Thatcher,

According to the information at hand there are some 70,000 Vietnamese refugees presently in Malaysia. The Government of Malaysia has publicly declared its intention to expel them to the open seas where they face the peril of drowning or death by exposure. This horrific tragedy must be prevented in this, our generation of the Holocaust.

Proposals have been made to call an international conference to debate the issue. I respectfully submit to you that such a conference would be an exercise in futility. As a Jew I cannot forget the useless conferences at Evian and Bermuda whose end results were the non-saving of even one Jewish child out of the one and a half million Jewish children who were dragged to a wanton death.

Among the Vietnamese refugees there are many children, and they too may lose their lives until such time as an international conference convenes, until its deliberations get under way and until its resolutions are adopted.

I hereby submit to you a different practical approach for your immediate consideration. Let each of the 151 sovereign countries in the world contact forthwith the High Commissioner for Refugees in Geneva, Mr. Paul Hartling, and inform him of its readiness, in principle, to accept a number of the Vietnamese refugees presently in Malaysia, relative to size of territory and population. Should Mr. Hartling receive from our Governments such pronouncements he will be in a position to inform the Government of Malaysia accordingly and request that the deportations cease. There is no doubt in my mind that the Government of Malaysia would be willing to comply since it would be assured that the problem was being practically tackled with a view to a solution in a matter of weeks or, at the most, months.

/ Over



EMBASSY OF ISRAEL
2 PALACE GREEN
LONDON W8 4QB
Telephone: 01-937 8050

שגרירות ישראל
לונדון

- 2 -

I therefore respectfully submit this proposal to you with a view to your conveying to Mr. Hartling a communication in this spirit as I am doing now on behalf of the Government of Israel.

By a common effort of all our countries this staggering human problem can be resolved in a humane way without creating undue difficulty of absorption for the participating countries.

I thank you, Madame Prime Minister for your attention to this, my proposal and appeal.

Yours sincerely,

Menachem Begin
Prime Minister of Israel

The Rt. Hon. Mrs. Margaret Thatcher, MP,
The Prime Minister,
10 Downing Street,
London, S. W. 1.



DEPARTMENT OF TRADE
1 Victoria Street
London SW1H 0ET

Telephone Direct Line 01-215
Switchboard 01-215 7877

With the Compliments of
the Private Secretary
to the Secretary of State



From the Secretary of State

D Ropner Esq
President
General Council of British Shipping
30-32 St Mary Axe
London EC3A 8ET

19 June 1979

Dear Mr Ropner.

VIETNAMESE REFUGEES

Thank you for your letter of 6 June. I am sorry not to have replied earlier. May I say that the points made by your Vice President, Lord Inverforth and Patrick Shovelton at our meeting on 4 June were well taken and have been given full consideration by myself and colleagues. Naturally we have the interests of the British Shipping industry at heart but we must also consider the Government's wider responsibilities of finding an international solution to this tragic problem which places an obligation on other states as well as ourselves.

I would like first of all to deal with your suggestion of a tacit understanding between Government and industry. The difficulty of coming to a tacit understanding is, as I am sure you will recognise, that it would not remain so for long, and that in due course it would become an open declaration of policy that the Government will in the last resort make itself responsible for giving asylum to refugees. You will appreciate that any suggestions that this would be the case will make it all the harder to persuade coastal states to give asylum at first or subsequent ports of call.

Your members with experience of the geographical area will recognise the difficulties with which we are faced in persuading coastal states in that area to accept refugees when they themselves have a considerable overseas Chinese population. I am sure you will understand that, in



such circumstances, persuasion on a case by case basis takes time. Nevertheless, we will endeavour to deal with such cases as expeditiously as possible in order to lessen the burden placed on UK shipowners.

So far as concerns the question of reimbursement to shipowners, possibly by the UN High Commission for Refugees, for feeding, medical supplies and other services rendered, I am sure you recognise that this is not a question which can be answered without taking further advice. I have asked my officials to follow up this question and they will be in touch in due course.

I am sorry I cannot be more helpful. Your colleagues who were present at the meeting on 4 June will have told you of the many conflicting considerations which the Government has to take into account. Our difficulties have not lessened in the intervening period.

I would like to add my personal apologies again for the delay in answering you, but the situation has been a moving one changing from day to day, hence the delay.

Kind regards - John Nott.

JOHN NOTT



25 JUN 1979

Original in Co/looms filing

Vietnam

cc 710
DT



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

19 June 1979

VIETNAMESE REFUGEES

I enclose a copy of a letter which has been addressed to the Prime Minister by the Managing Director of Norplant International Limited about the possible provision of temporary housing units to accommodate Vietnamese refugees arriving in this country.

I should be grateful if you would arrange for a suitable reply to be sent to Mr. Thorpe on the Prime Minister's behalf and for a copy to be sent to me in due course for our records here at No. 10.

I am sending copies of this letter, and enclosure, to Stephen Wall (FCO) and Tom Harris (Department of Trade).

B. G. CARTLEDGE

A.J. Butler, Esq.,
Home Office.

gm

GRS 195

UNCLASSIFIED

FM HONG KONG 190839Z JUN 79

TO PRIORITY F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 816 OF 19 JUNE

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON

INFO PRIORITY HONG KONG GOVERNMENT OFFICE LONDON, UKMIS GENEVA,
UKMIS NEW YORK.

INFO ROUTINE PEKING, HANOI, MANILA, JAKARTA, KUALA LUMPUR,
SINGAPORE, BANGKOK.

2

Pins Minutes

*But
207
h*

MY TELNO 769 (NOT TO ALL): VIETNAMESE REFUGEES.

1. REFUGEES IN HONG KONG ON 19 JUNE :

- A. UNDER UNHCR CARE : 14,221
- B. AWAITING ACCEPTANCE BY UNHCR: 38,017
- C. ON BOARD THE "SKYLUCK" : 2,665
- D. TOTAL : 54,903

arb

2. 53,215 REFUGEES HAVE ARRIVED SINCE 1 JANUARY. THE INCREASE
OF 3,487 SINCE 12 JUNE IS DUE TO THE ARRIVAL OF 29 SMALL BOATS.

3. UNHCR HAS SENT 3,875 (INCLUDING 343 EX-"SIBONGA") REFUGEES
TO THIRD COUNTRIES SINCE 1 JANUARY 1979.

4. IN FUTURE WE WILL INCLUDE UKMIS NEW YORK, HANOI AND ASEAN
POSTS AS COPY ADDRESSEES FOR THESE WEEKLY SITREPS.

5. FOR WASHINGTON: PLEASE PASS TO GOVERNOR AND POLITICAL
ADVISER.

CATER

[COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING ST]

FILES
SEAD
HK & GD
UND
FED
EESD
N AM D
SAD
EID (E)
PUSD
OID
IPD

NEWS D
M & VD
PS
PS/LPS
PS/MR. HURD
PS/MR. BLAKER
PS/PUS
SIR A DUFF
SIR A PARSONS
MR. CORTAZZI
MR. LEAHY
MR. MURRAY

COPIES TO:
HONG KONG GOVT. OFFICE LONDON
MR. WOODFIELD } HOME OFFICE
MR. BURLEIGH } QUEEN ANNE'S GATE
MR. HILLARY } HOME OFFICE
MR. BIRT } LUNAR HOUSE
CROYDON.
MR. V. MCGEE } FAO/ODA

CONFIDENTIAL

2

GR 650

CONFIDENTIAL

DESKBY 200900Z

FM UKMIS NEW YORK 192330Z JUN 79

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 640 OF 19 JUNE

INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS GENEVA WASHINGTON HONG KONG MANILA KUALA LUMPUR
SINGAPORE BANGKOK JAKARTA CANBERRA WELLINGTON PEKING TOKYO MOSCOW

YOUR TELNO 275: UN CONFERENCE ON INDO-CHINESE REFUGEES

Prime Minister
SW
27/6

ms

ms

1. WALDHEIM TOLD ME AT LUNCH TODAY THAT HE HOPED TO CONVENE A CONFERENCE SOON, MANSFIELD THEREFORE CALLED THIS AFTERNOON ON UNDER-SECRETARY GENERAL BUFFUM WHO REPORTED THAT WALDHEIM HAD TOLD A FRENCH TELEVISION INTERVIEWER THIS MORNING THAT HE HOPED TO CONVENE A CONFERENCE, PERHAPS IN JULY, ON THE HUMANITARIAN ASPECTS OF THE REFUGEE PROBLEM.

2. BUFFUM EXPANDED ON WALDHEIM'S THINKING. IT WAS CLEAR THAT THE THAIS AND MALAYSIANS WERE QUOTE DISTRAUGHT UNQUOTE AND URGENT ACTION WAS ESSENTIAL. WALDHEIM BELIEVED THAT THE PRESENT DISASTROUS STATE OF AFFAIRS WOULD BE MADE EVEN WORSE IF AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE WAS TO FAIL TO BRING SOME RELIEF TO THEM. WALDHEIM HAD TOLD HARTLING THIS MORNING TO INTENSIFY HIS CONSULTATIONS AND TO WORK FOR A CONFERENCE AT MINISTERIAL LEVEL IN MID-JULY. HE HOPED TO BE ABLE TO ANNOUNCE BY THE END OF THIS WEEK THE CONVENING OF THIS CONFERENCE. BUT HE NEEDED TO BE CLEAR THAT HMG WOULD NOT INSIST ON A CONFERENCE QUOTE IN THE POLITICAL CONTEXT UNQUOTE. THE RUSSIANS AND VIETNAMESE HAD TOLD WALDHEIM TODAY THAT THEIR ATTITUDE TOWARDS ANY CONFERENCE WOULD DEPEND ON WHETHER THEY BELIEVED THAT THE SECRETARY-GENERAL WAS PANDERING TO US/UK DESIRES TO LAUNCH A WELL-PUBLICISED POLITICAL ATTACK ON VIETNAM. BUFFUM SAID IT WAS NOT WITHIN THE PRACTICAL BOUNDS OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S AUTHORITY TO CONVENE A MEETING TO DISCUSS THE POLITICAL ISSUES WITHOUT A SPECIFIC MANDATE FROM THE SECURITY COUNCIL. HE WOULD NOT BE PREPARED TO JEOPARDISE HIS POTENTIAL ROLE AS AN IMPARTIAL MEDIATOR. THE SECURITY COUNCIL OR THE GENERAL

/ASSEMBLY

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

ASSEMBLY WERE THE RIGHT FORA FOR POLITICAL DEBATE. (WE UNDERSTAND FROM URQUHART THAT WALDHEIM WILL BE REPLYING SHORTLY TO MRS THATCHER'S FURTHER MESSAGE AND WILL MAKE CLEAR THE BASIS ON WHICH HE IS PREPARED TO CALL A CONFERENCE).

3. WALDHEIM ENVISAGED THAT THE CONFERENCE SHOULD BE OPEN-ENDED AND LAST FOR TWO OR THREE DAYS. IT WOULD BE MORE IN THE NATURE OF A UN QUOTE PLEDGING CONFERENCE UNQUOTE THAN A GENERAL DEBATE. GENEVA SEEMED TO BE THE MOST CONVENIENT VENUE, SINCE ECOSOC WOULD BE IN SESSION IN JULY. (BUT BUFFUM READILY ACCEPTED THE VALIDITY OF OUR ARGUMENTS THAT THIS COULD BE A DRAWBACK IF GOVERNMENTS DECIDED THAT REPRESENTATION SHOULD BE THE SAME AS FOR ECOSOC. HE AGREED TO PUT TO WALDHEIM WHO HAD NOT TAKEN ANY FIRM DECISION IN FAVOUR OF GENEVA THE ARGUMENTS IN FAVOUR OF NEW YORK). WALDHEIM WAS NOT KEEN TO PRESIDE OVER THE CONFERENCE HIMSELF AND WOULD CERTAINLY NOT DO SO IF IT LOOKED LIKE TURNING INTO A POLITICAL CONFRONTATION, INVOLVING HIM IN COMPROMISING PROCEDURAL QUESTIONS.

4. MANSFIELD LATER DISCUSSED WITH MCHENRY (US MISSION) HIS CONVERSATION WITH BUFFUM. MCHENRY SAID THAT HE HAD NOT RECEIVED INSTRUCTIONS (WASHINGTON TELNO 1566) BUT THAT HE WAS NOT, REPEAT NOT, HIMSELF IN FAVOUR OF A SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING. HE THOUGHT IT WOULD BE BEST TO GO AHEAD WITH A QUOTE HUMANITARIAN UNQUOTE CONFERENCE AS PROPOSED BY THE SECREATRY-GENERAL WITH THE EXPECTATION THAT THE POLITICAL ASPECTS WOULD EMERGE.

5. AS SEEN FROM HERE IT WILL ALMOST CERTAINLY NOT BE POSSIBLE TO PERSUADE WALDHEIM TO CONVENE A CONFERENCE UNLESS WE CAN AGREE THAT ITS TERMS OF REFERENCE SHOULD BE LIMITED TO THE HUMANITARIAN ASPECTS OF THE PROBLEM. IN REALITY IT IS MOST UNLIKELY, AS MCHENRY POINTS OUT, THAT A CONFERENCE AT MINISTERIAL LEVEL WHATEVER ITS TERMS OF REFERENCE WOULD NOT TOUCH UPON THE POLITICAL CAUSES OF THE PRESENT CRISIS. IT WOULD IN ANY CASE BE OPEN TO US TO ADDRESS THE POLITICAL ISSUES AFTER THIS CONFERENCE IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL OR A SUBSEQUENT CONFERENCE.

29
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

6. BUFFUM SAID THAT WALDHEIM WOULD LIKE TO SPEAK TO US BEFORE THE END OF THIS WEEK AND IF HE IS TO ANNOUNCE THE CONVENING OF A CONFERENCE THIS WEEK WE SHOULD TRY TO GET BACK TO HIM BY 21 JUNE, WHETHER OR NOT HE HAS BY THEN SENT HIS REPLY TO MRS THATCHER. WE SHOULD BE GRATEFUL FOR FURTHER INSTRUCTIONS BEFORE THEN.

RICHARD

[COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING ST]

FILES
SEAD
HK & GD
UND
FED
EESD
N AM D
SAD
EID (E)
PUSD
OID
IPD

NEWS D
M & VD
PS
PS/LPS
PS/MR. HURD
PS/MR. BLAKER
PS/PUS
SIR A DUFF
SIR A PARSONS
MR. CORTAZZI
MR. LEAHY
MR. MURRAY

COPIES TO:
HONG KONG GOVT. OFFICE LONDON
MR. WOODFIELD } HOME OFFICE
MR. BURLEIGH } QUEEN ANNE'S GATE
MR. HILLARY } HOME OFFICE
MR. BIRT } LUNAR HOUSE
CROYDON.
MR. V. MCGEE } FAO/ODA

BF 26-6-79 2



Foreign and Commonwealth Office
London SW1A 2AH

19 June 1979

Dear Bryan.

ms.

Prime Minister

*P.A.
by
20/6*

*SM
19/6*

Vietnamese Refugees

T25A/79T
18.6.79 ---

The Thai Ambassador called on Hugh Cortazzi on 18 June to ask him to pass on to the Prime Minister the enclosed message from General Kriensak, the Prime Minister of Thailand.

Hugh Cortazzi in thanking the Ambassador for this message repeated, on the lines used by Mr Blaker with the Thai Ambassador on 14 June, our concern over the plight of the refugees in Thailand and the forcible repatriation of Cambodians. Cortazzi explained our efforts to get effective international action to deal with the problem of refugees. We were seeking to put maximum pressure on Vietnam to stem the flow as well as to arouse world consciences so that asylum could be found for the thousands of refugees from Vietnam. If Thailand did not maintain humanitarian policies she would be in danger of losing world sympathy and effective action might be jeopardised.

We shall be submitting a draft reply as soon as possible.

*Yours ever
Stephen*

(J S Wall)

B G Cartledge Esq
10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL

GRS 300

CONFIDENTIAL

FM FCO 181800Z JUNE 79

TO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK

TELEGRAM NUMBER 276 OF 18 JUNE

INFO TO IMMEDIATE UKMIS GENEVA WASHINGTON KUALA LUMPUR BANGKOK
SINGAPORE JAKARTA MANILA HONG KONG PRIORITY MOSCOW TOKYO PARIS
BONN ROUTINE OTTAWA CANBERRA WELLINGTON BRUSSELS THE HAGUE
LUXEMBOURG DUBLIN ROME COPENHAGEN DELHI

Edw *na*
for
2/1/79

VIETNAMESE REFUGEES

1. PLEASE PASS THE FOLLOWING FURTHER MESSAGE TO DR WALDHEIM FROM
THE PRIME MINISTER AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

BEGINS

MY DEAR SECRETARY GENERAL

I WAS GLAD TO LEARN THAT YOU WERE TAKING EARLY SOUNDINGS
ABOUT THE PROPOSAL WHICH I MADE IN MY MESSAGE OF 31 MAY
FOR AN EARLY CONFERENCE ABOUT THE CRISIS CAUSED BY THE
INHUMAN ACTIONS OF THE VIETNAMESE REGIME. WHILE I SHARE YOUR
VIEW THAT A CONFERENCE SHOULD BE PROPERLY PREPARED I AM
CONCERNED THAT THERE SHOULD BE NO DELAY.

THE ACTIONS OF THE THAI GOVERNMENT IN EXPELLING CAMBODIAN
REFUGEES AND THE PROBLEMS OF MALAYSIA MAKE THE PROBLEM OF THE
UTMOST URGENCY. HONG KONG WITH OVER 54,000 VIETNAMESE REFUGEES,
IS IN A VERY SERIOUS SITUATION. WE SHALL CONTINUE TO MAINTAIN
HUMANE POLICIES AS LONG AS POSSIBLE, BUT THAI AND REPORTED
MALAYSIAN ACTIONS CAN ONLY MAKE HONG KONG'S POSITION STILL
MORE DESPERATE.

I AM APPEALING TO THE MALAYSIAN PRIME MINISTER TO CO-OPERATE
IN OUR EFFORTS TO FIND A HUMANE SOLUTION, BUT IF MANY THOUSAND
MORE LIVES ARE NOT TO BE LOST WE MUST HAVE VERY EARLY ACTION BY
THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY. MAY I URGE YOU TO TAKE AN INITIATIVE
NOW AND CALL AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE UNDER YOUR OWN AUSPICES?

/OUR

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

OUR AIM MUST BE TO PUT MAXIMUM PRESSURE ON VIETNAM AND PERSUADE THE REST OF THE WORLD TO HELP TO REDUCE THE APPALLING HUMAN MISERY WHICH VIETNAMESE POLICIES ARE CAUSING.

YOURS SINCERELY MARGARET THATCHER.

ENDS

2. WE DO NOT INTEND TO PUBLISH THIS MESSAGE BUT WE SHALL ANNOUNCE THAT A FURTHER MESSAGE CALLING FOR A VERY EARLY CONFERENCE HAS BEEN SENT. REFERENCE TO IT WAS MADE BY THE LORD PRIVY SEAL IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS ON 18 JUNE.

CARRINGTON

[COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING ST]

FILES
SEAD
HK & GD
UND
FED
EESD
N AM D
SAD
EID (E)
PUSD
OID
IPD

NEWS D
M & VD
PS
PS/LPS
PS/MR. HURD
PS/MR. BLAKER
PS/PUS
SIR A DUFF
SIR A PARSONS
MR. CORTAZZI
MR. LEAHY
MR. MURRAY

COPIES TO:
HONG KONG GOVT. OFFICE LONDON
MR. WOODFIELD } HOME OFFICE
MR. BURLEIGH } QUEEN ANNE'S GATE
MR. HILLARY } HOME OFFICE
MR. BIRT } LUNAR HOUSE
CROYDON.
MR. V. MCGEE } FAO/ODA

2
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

2

GR 180

CONFIDENTIAL

FM FCO 181746Z JUN 79

TO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK

TELEGRAM NUMBER 275 OF 13 JUNE

INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS GENEVA, WASHINGTON, HONG KONG, MANILA,
KUALA LUMPUR, SINGAPORE, BANGKOK, JAKARTA, CANBERRA, WELLINGTON,
PEKING TOKYO AND MOSCOW

Prime Minister

SM
24
/6

YOUR TELNO 621 AND 623: UN CONFERENCE

1. WE THINK THAT:-

- (A) IT WOULD BE BEST IF THE UN SECRETARY-GENERAL WERE TO CONVENE A HIGH LEVEL INTERNATIONAL MEETING ON HIS OWN INITIATIVE:
- (B) MEMBERSHIP SHOULD BE WIDE-RANGING:
- (C) DR WALDHEIM SHOULD PRESIDE THROUGHOUT:
- (D) THE OBJECTIVES OF THE CONFERENCE SHOULD BE:-
 - (I) TO PUT MAXIMUM PRESSURE ON THE VIETNAMESE TO MEND THEIR WAYS:
 - (II) TO STIR THE CONSCIENCES OF MEMBER STATES TO CONTRIBUTE TO (I) AND TO OFFER AT LEAST TEMPORARY ASYLUM TO THE CURRENT FLOOD OF REFUGEES:
 - (III) TO REDUCE THE PRESSURES ON THAILAND, MALAYSIA, INDONESIA AND HONG KONG AND TO PERSUADE THE THREE FORMER TO TREAT THE REFUGEES IN A HUMANE WAY.
- (E) THE CONFERENCE SHOULD BE HELD PREFERABLY IN NEW YORK BUT DEFINITELY NOT IN THE REGION:
- (F) THE CONFERENCE SHOULD BE CONVENED AS SOON AS PRACTICABLE AND INVITATIONS ISSUED IN A MATTER OF DAYS:
- (G) THE CONFERENCE SHOULD AT LEAST BEGIN AT FOREIGN MINISTER LEVEL:
- (H) THE PROCEEDINGS SHOULD BE KEPT AS SHORT AS POSSIBLE TO ENSURE THAT INTEREST DOES NOT FIZZLE OUT:

/ (1)

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

(1) THE AGENDA SHOULD BE SIMPLE, EG REFUGEES FROM INDO-CHINA: THE REASONS FOR THE EXODUS AND WAYS OF DEALING IN A HUMANE MATTER WITH THE RESETTLEMENT PROBLEMS.

CARRINGTON

[COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING ST]

FILES
SEAD
HK & GD
UND
FED
EESD
N AM D
SAD
EID (E)
PUSD
OID
IPD

NEWS D
M & VD
PS
PS/LPS
PS/MR. HURD
PS/MR. BLAKER
PS/PUS
SIR A DUFF
SIR A PARSONS
MR. CORTAZZI
MR. LEAHY
MR. MURRAY

COPIES TO:
HONG KONG GOVT. OFFICE LONDON
MR. WOODFIELD } HOME OFFICE
MR. BURLEIGH } QUEEN ANNE'S GATE
MR. HILLARY } HOME OFFICE
MR. BIRT } LUNAR HOUSE
CROYDON.
MR. V. MCGEE } FAO/ODA

2.
CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT

CONFIDENTIAL

GRS 300

CONFIDENTIAL

FM FCO 181426Z JUNE 79

TO IMMEDIATE KUALA LUMPUR

TELEGRAM NUMBER 146 OF 18 JUNE

INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS GENEVA UKMIS NEW YORK WASHINGTON SINGAPORE

BANGKOK JAKARTA MANILA HONG KONG

PRIORITY TO MOSCOW TOKYO PARIS BONN

ROUTINE OTTAWA CANBERRA WELLINGTON BRUSSELS THE HAGUE LUXEMBOURG

DUBLIN ROME COPENHAGEN DELHI

PRIME MINISTER'S

PERSONAL MESSAGE

SERIAL No. T 27A/79 T

*Endo na
6/21
1979*

VIETNAMESE REFUGEES

1. PLEASE PASS THE FOLLOWING PERSONAL MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO DATUK HUSSEIN ONN AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

BEGINS

I REALISE THE HARDSHIPS AND DIFFICULTIES MALAYSIA FACES IN THE CURRENT CRISIS OVER REFUGEES FROM VIETNAM AND KNOW WELL THE NEED TO TAKE EFFECTIVE EARLY ACTION TO STEM THE FLOW AND FORCE THE CALLOUS VIETNAMESE REGIME TO RECOGNISE ITS RESPONSIBILITIES AND IMPROVE THE LOT OF ITS UNFORTUNATE PEOPLE. TO THIS END I HAVE, AS YOU KNOW, APPEALED TO THE UN SECRETARY GENERAL TO CALL AN EARLY INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE TO FIND IMMEDIATE MEASURES TO DEAL WITH THIS CRISIS. I AM REPEATING MY REQUEST IN A FURTHER MESSAGE I AM SENDING TODAY. WE MUST DO ALL WE CAN TO PUT MAXIMUM PRESSURE ON VIETNAM AND TO PERSUADE THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY AS A WHOLE TO SHARE THE BURDENS WHICH VIETNAMESE POLICIES ARE THROWING ON THE REGION. MY GOVERNMENT ARE DOING EVERYTHING THEY CAN TO ACHIEVE THESE OBJECTIVES BY DIPLOMATIC ACTION AND PUBLICITY.

WE ARE, OF COURSE, DIRECTLY INVOLVED THROUGH HONG KONG. THERE ARE ALREADY OVER 54,000 BOAT REFUGEES THERE AND HUNDREDS MORE ARE COMING IN EVERY DAY. THE GOVERNMENT OF HONG KONG, WITH OUR FULL SUPPORT, WILL CONTINUE AS LONG AS POSSIBLE TO PROVIDE A HAVEN FOR THESE MISERABLE PEOPLE.

| 1 APPEAL

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

I APPEAL TO YOU AS A COMMONWEALTH STATESMAN WHOSE EXPERIENCE
COMMANDS RESPECT TO HELP MEET THIS CRISIS IN A HUMANE WAY.
I HOPE WE CAN WORK TOGETHER FOR EFFECTIVE INTERNATIONAL ACTION
AND THE MAINTENANCE OF HUMANITARIAN POLICIES TOWARDS REFUGEES.

I LOOK FORWARD TO MEETING YOU SOON. LORD CARRINGTON, WHOM
YOU WILL BE SEEING ON 1 JULY, VERY MUCH HOPES TO DISCUSS ALL THIS
WITH YOU THEN, BUT ACTION IS NEEDED NOW IF MANY THOUSAND MORE
LIVES ARE NOT TO BE LOST.

WITH KINDEST REGARDS. MARGARET THATCHER.

ENDS.

2. WE DO NOT INTEND TO PUBLISH THE TEXT OF THIS MESSAGE
BUT WE SHALL ANNOUNCE THAT AN APPEAL HAS BEEN MADE IN A
MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER.

CARRINGTON

[COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING ST]

FILES
SEAD
HK & GD
UND
FED
EESD
N AM D
SAD
EID (E)
PUSD
OID
IPD

NEWS D
M & VD
PS
PS/LPS
PS/MR. HURD
PS/MR. BLAKER
PS/PUS
SIR A DUFF
SIR A PARSONS
MR. CORTAZZI
MR. LEAHY
MR. MURRAY

COPIES TO:
HONG KONG GOVT. OFFICE LONDON
MR. WOODFIELD } HOME OFFICE
MR. BURLEIGH } QUEEN ANNE'S GATE
MR. HILLARY } HOME OFFICE
MR. BIRT } LUNAR HOUSE
CROYDON.
MR. V. MCGEE } FAO/ODA

CONFIDENTIAL

PRIME MINISTER'S

PERSONAL MESSAGE

SERIAL No. T25A/79T

MESSAGE FROM GENERAL KRIANGSAK CHOMANAN

PRIME MINISTER OF THAILAND

T27/79T

CONFIDENTIAL

OFFICE OF THE PRIME MINISTER
GOVERNMENT HOUSE,
BANGKOK, THAILAND.

18 June, 1979.

Excellency,

I have just learned through our Ambassador in London that the British Government has taken a keen interest in the refugee problem from Indochina. This information was conveyed to the five ASEAN Ambassadors by Mr. H.A.H. Cartazzi, Deputy Under-Secretary of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, during a briefing and an exchange of views on this problem on 30th May 1979 at the Foreign Office. This is most gratifying for me to hear since this problem is presently the most pressing one for us. I should therefore not fail in bringing to your attention the latest developments in this matter.

Following the armed invasion of Democratic Kampuchea by the Socialist Republic of Vietnam towards the end of December last year, incessant waves of illegal immigrants have fled across the border into Thailand. With the recent intensification of military operations by the Vietnamese side in the Western and South-Western parts of Kampuchea, the influx of these uprooted persons has increased dramatically.../

The Right Honourable Mrs. Margaret Thatcher, MP.,
Prime Minister,
10 Downing Street,
LONDON.

dramatically, sometimes each wave numbering tens of thousands. In fact, these recent arrivals numbers well over 80,000. This is over and above those who have already fled into Thailand, that is, 134,660 Laotians, 13,030 Kampuchean and 1,457 Vietnamese, a total of 149,147. There are also 4,349 boat-people. Such a large number of displaced persons well exceeds the limits of our capacity to bear with, economically and socially; posing also a grave threat to our national security.

What is especially disturbing is that we have reason to believe that the Vietnamese Government is organizing "human export", who are mostly of Chinese origin, from both former South Vietnam and Kampuchea to serve a two-fold purpose, namely getting rid of the undesirables of Chinese origin and at the same time inflicting on Thailand onerous economic, social and security burdens. It is also suspected that the Vietnamese have the intention to make the entire Kampuchean population perish through famine and starvation and replace them with Vietnamese immigrants. It is therefore imperative that this problem should be solved not only insofar as where these displaced persons may be, but also at its source. This opinion, I believe, is shared by the British Government. Our own population, especially near the border, are becoming increasingly dissatisfied with these illegal immigrants because, for example, their houses and properties are damaged or stolen by the illegal immigrants or in some instances even forced to abandon their homes. Despite a great deal of expressions of good intention, appropriate actions and assistance have not been forthcoming sufficiently from the world community. The Government of Thailand has always been guided by humanitarian considerations in dealing with these illegal immigrants. However, in view of the aggravating circumstances which now imperil our national security.../

security, it has become an absolute necessity to the Government of Thailand to repatriate these refugees to their places of origin.

Turning to the situation in general, there are indications that Vietnam may launch an armed incursion into Thailand across the Thai - Kampuchean border, although initially this may be limited in scope and under the pretext of hot pursuit. It is noteworthy that lately both Phnom-Penh and Hanoi have been quite vocal and strident in their accusations that Thailand has not been strictly neutral and is helping the Pol Pot forces. Should such an incursion by Vietnamese forces occur, armed clashes with Thai forces would be inevitable and could lead to uncontrollable escalation of conflicts. Such an eventuality would gravely endanger peace and stability of the entire Southeast Asian region, let alone world peace. Facing with these new challenges, the Government of Thailand is still determined to exercise a policy of restraint and moderation, but as a sovereign country, Thailand will not and cannot allow its integrity to be violated.

It is therefore heartening and gratifying to learn that peace-loving nations like Great Britain share our concern and are exerting increasing efforts to help solve this problem and to ensure that peace and stability be restored to our region. In this connection, the Government of Thailand give its full support to the British Government's proposal to the United Nations Secretary-General to convene another U.N. conference on the Indochinese refugees as soon as possible.

For.../

For our part, as Thailand is the principal country which bears the brunt of this problem, the Thai Government would like to offer Bangkok as the venue of the said conference. It is also our view that, for this conference to be successful, the major powers, the ASEAN countries and all parties to the present conflicts in Indochina as well as other interested parties should be represented.

Please accept, Dear Prime Minister, my best wishes for your continued good health and success.

K. Chomanan
General Kriangsak Chomanan
Prime Minister of Thailand

2

CONFIDENTIAL

ESKBY FCO 181100Z
FM SINGAPORE 181000Z JUN
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELNO 206 OF 18 JUN 79
INFO IMMEDIATE TO WASHINGTON SEOUL GENEVA AND PEKING.

Prime Minister
Just to this minimal extent,
you will wish to thank Mr. Lee on
20 June for agreeing to
approach Taiwan.

OUR TELNO 200: (NOT TO OTHERS), VIETNAMESE REFUGEES-- ROACHBANK.
1. DIRECTOR OF POLITICAL DIVISION MFA SUMMONED ME THIS EVENING TO RECEIVE REPLY FROM TAIPEH DATED 15 JUNE. MFA HAD SENT TEXT TO MR LEE IN LONDON BUT LATTER HAD INDICATED THAT IT SHOULD BE PASSED THROUGH THIS HIGH COMMISSION TO YOU. TAN READ OUT EXTRACTS BUT DID NOT LET ME SEE FULL TEXT, FOLLOWING WERE MAIN POINTS: AS A SPECIAL FAVOUR, IN VIEW OF THE HIGH REGARD IN WHICH MR LEE WAS HELD IN TAIPEH, THE AUTHORITIES THERE WERE PREPARED TO ALLOW THE 295 REFUGEES TO LAND AND STAY IN TAIWAN FOR UP TO 3 MONTHS PROVIDED THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT AGREED TO TAKE STEPS TO EVACUATE THE REFUGEES FOR RESETTLEMENT ELSEWHERE WITHIN THAT PERIOD. THIS WAS AN EXCEPTIONAL MEASURE, WHICH WOULD NOT BE REPEATED. FOREIGN SHIPS WERE NOT NORMALLY ALLOWED TO DISCHARGE ANY UNAUTHORISED PASSENGERS IN TAIWAN. THE TAIWAN AUTHORITIES HAD CARRIED OUT A PRELIMINARY SURVEY OF THE REFUGEES ON THE ROACHBANK. NONE OF THEM COULD PRODUCE EVIDENCE THAT THEY WERE OF CHINESE ORIGIN. MOREOVER, ALL HAD INDICATED THAT THEY WISHED TO GO TO BRITAIN.

6/21
19/6

2. TAN SAID THAT HE WAS SORRY THAT THIS ADDED UP TO SO LITTLE. I AGREED, BUT SAID THAT FROM OTHER CONTACTS WE HAD ALREADY BEEN LED TO EXPECT THIS SORT OF RESPONSE. NEVERTHELESS THE 90 DAYS CONCESSION WAS WELCOME AND GAVE A CHANCE FOR OTHER SOLUTIONS TO BE FOUND, ALTHOUGH WE HAD UNDERTAKEN TO ACCEPT ANY OF THE REFUGEES NOT TAKEN BY TAIWAN. I THANKED TAN WARMLY FOR THE EFFORTS OF HIS PRIME MINISTER AND SAID I WAS SURE THAT YOU AND MRS THATCHER WOULD BE GRATEFUL FOR HIS INTERVENTION.

DAVIES [COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING ST]

- | | | |
|---------|---------------|---------------------------------|
| FILES | NEWS D | COPIES TO: |
| SEAD | M & VD | HONG KONG GOVT.OFFICE LONDON |
| HK & GD | PS | MR.WOODFIELD } HOME OFFICE |
| UND | PS/LPS | MR.BURLEIGH } QUEEN ANNE'S GATE |
| FED | PS/MR.HURD | MR.HILLARY } HOME OFFICE |
| EESD | PS/MR.BLAKER | MR.BIRT } LUNAR HOUSE |
| N AM D | PS/PUS | |
| SAD | SIR A DUFF | |
| EID (E) | SIR A PARSONS | |
| PUSD | MR.CORTAZZI | MR.V.MCGEE } FAO/ODA |
| OID | MR.LEAHY | |
| IPD | MR.MURRAY | |

CONFIDENTIAL

2

GPS 640

CONFIDENTIAL

FM KUALA LUMPUR 180730Z JUNE 79

TO FLASH FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 187 OF 18 JUNE

INFO IMMEDIATE GOV HONG KONG MANILA SINGAPORE BANGKOK
JAKARTA TOKYO UKMIS GENEVA UKMIS NEW YORK WASHINGTON
CANBERRA

INFO PRIORITY WELLINGTON PEKING MOSCOW

Prime Minister

Gen
19/6

OUR TEL NO 185 AND TELECON RESIDENT CLERK/JOY 0230=8 (LOCAL TIME) : VIETNAMESE REFUGEES

1. I SPOKE TO TENGKU RITHAUDDEEN, MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, THIS MORNING AND HE SAID THAT THE MAIN PURPOSE OF DR MAHATHIR'S STATEMENT ABOUT TAKING HARSHER MEASURES AGAINST THE VIETNAMESE REFUGEES WAS TO PREVENT MORE FROM COMING. HE SPOKE OF THEM AS QUOTE POSSIBLE UNQUOTE MEASURES TO BE IMPLEMENTED RATHER THAN MEASURES ALREADY IN OPERATION.
2. THIS CONFIRMS MFA AND UNHCR REPORTS THAT IT IS NOT INTENDED TO MOVE REFUGEES OUT OF EXISTING CAMPS, BUT THOSE WHO HAD RECENTLY ARRIVED ON THE BEACHES MIGHT BE TOWED AWAY. THE MALAYSIAN AUTHORITIES HAVE TRIED TO FOLLOW THIS POLICY SINCE FEBRUARY : THE ONLY EXTENSION IS THAT, IF BOATS ARE UNSEAWORTHY, THEY WILL NOW BE REPAIRED OR THE REFUGEES WILL BE PROVIDED WITH NEW ONES.
3. UPI REPORT ON THE ALLEGED EXPULSION OF 2,500 REFUGEES OVER THE WEEKEND (ON WHICH ITN STORY WAS PRESUMABLE BASED) CAME FROM QUOTE A DIPLOMATIC SOURCE UNQUOTE, WHICH A LOCAL JOURNALIST SAID WAS QUOTE NATURALLY UNRELIABLE UNQUOTE. LOCAL PRESS HAVE REPORTED SEVERALLY THAT FROM 450 TO 800 VIETNAMESE WHO LANDED ON THE EAST COAST CLOSE TO THE THAI BORDER OVER THE WEEKEND WERE SENT BACK TO SEA AFTER BEING STOCKED WITH FOOD, WATER AND MEDICAL SUPPLIES. THIS ACTION HAS BEEN NORMAL PRACTICE BUT IT IS NOW DOUBTFUL WHETHER THEY WILL BE ACCEPTED AT ONE OF THE MALAYSIAN PROCESSING CENTRES FURTHER SOUTH.

14.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

4. MAHATHIR CLAIMED THAT CERTAIN ASPECTS OF HIS STATEMENT ON 15 JUNE (FOR EXAMPLE, THE SHOOT ON SIGHT REMARK) WERE WRONGLY REPORTED BY FOREIGN CORRESPONDENTS. HE SAID THAT THE PRIME MINISTER WOULD MAKE A STATEMENT ON THE GOVERNMENT'S POLICY LATER TODAY IN ANSWER TO A TELEGRAM FROM DR KURT WALDHEIM SEEKING CLARIFICATION. I UNDERSTAND THAT THIS WILL BE IN THE FORM OF A PRESS STATEMENT AND WE SHALL SEND YOU A COPY AS SOON AS IT IS RELEASED. RITHAUDDEEN TOLD ME THAT HE PROPOSED TO BRIEF ASEAN ENVOYS HERE AFTER THE PRIME MINISTER'S STATEMENT.

5. WHEN HE SAW THE PRIME MINISTER ON 15 JUNE THE HIGH COMMISSIONER ASKED WHETHER THE GOVERNMENT HAD, AS REPORTED, DECIDED ON A TOUGH POLICY. HE SAID THEY HAD, BUT THE DILEMMA WAS HOW TOUGH THEY COULD ACTUALLY BE. IT POSED A TERRIBLE PROBLEM FOR A COUNTRY WHICH HAD TRIED TO DEAL WITH THE REFUGEES HUMANELY UP TILL NOW. IT WAS THE WORST AND GRAVEST TASK HE HAD HAD TO FACE. BUT THE INFLUX HAD ALREADY CAUSED CONSIDERABLE POLITICAL AND SOCIAL DIFFICULTIES FOR THE GOVERNMENT AND THEY COULD NOT POSSIBLY ALLOW THINGS TO GO ON AS THEY WERE. HE REMINDED THE HIGH COMMISSIONER OF THE 73,000 REFUGEES NOW IN MALAYSIA AND THE CONTINUOUS FLOW - 13,828 IN APRIL, 17,508 IN MAY AND ABOUT 4,000 FOR THE FIRST WEEK IN JUNE (ALTHOUGH MALAYSIA HAD ANNOUNCED IN FEBRUARY THAT SHE WOULD TAKE NO MORE). HE CONSIDERED THAT THE PROBLEM WAS OF WORLD MAGNITUDE AND HE WAS THEREFORE VERY MUCH IN FAVOUR OF THE CONFERENCE PROPOSED BY MRS THATCHER.

6. THE MALAYSIANS HAVE FELT FOR SOME TIME THAT THE WORLD IS NOT TAKING THE PROBLEM OF THE EXODUS FROM VIETNAM SERIOUSLY ENOUGH. THEY WOULD BE WILLING TO CO-OPERATE OVER ANY PRACTICAL SOLUTION, BUT WE SUSPECT THAT MAHATHIR, WHO HAS OF COURSE A REPUTATION FOR QUOTE SHOOTING FROM THE HIP UNQUOTE, CHOSE TO MAKE THE TOUGH STATEMENT TO REASSURE MALAY OPINION BEFORE THE UMNO GENERAL ASSEMBLY IN JULY, TO INDUCE NEW BOAT PEOPLE NOT TO AIM FOR MALAYSIA, AND POSSIBLY TO CONCENTRATE WORLD EYES STILL FURTHER ON THIS MASSIVE POLITICAL TRAGEDY.

17.

CONFIDENTIAL

7. ALTHOUGH FEELINGS ARE RUNNING HIGH AGAINST THE REFUGEES AMONG EAST COAST MALAYS, I DOUBT WHETHER THE PRIME MINISTER WILL IMPLEMENT THE EXTREME MEASURES SUGGESTED BY MAHATHIR. HIS SYMPATHIES ARE MORE LIKELY TO LIE WITH THOSE EXPRESSED BY TUNKU ABDUL RAHMAN : QUOTE WE CANT SHOOT DEFENCELESS HUMAN BEINGS. THAT'S ONLY DONE IN CAMBODIA AND VIETNAM. IT WAS EQUALLY INHUMAN TO PACK THE REFUGEES AND SEND THEM AWAY. THE MATTER NOW HAD TO BE DEALT WITH MORE FIRMLY THAN EVER BY THE WORLD COMMUNITY. UNQUOTE.

HUNT

[COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING ST]

FILES
SEAD
HK & GD
UND
FED
EESD
N AM D
SAD
EID (E)
PUSD
OID
IPD

NEWS D
M & VD
PS
PS/LPS
PS/MR. HURD
PS/MR. BLAKER
PS/PUS
SIR A DUFF
SIR A PARSONS
MR. CORTAZZI
MR. LEAHY
MR. MURRAY

COPIES TO:
HONG KONG GOVT. OFFICE LONDON
MR. WOODFIELD } HOME OFFICE
MR. BURLEIGH } QUEEN ANNE'S GATE
MR. HILLARY } HOME OFFICE
MR. BIRT } LUNAR HOUSE
CROYDON.
MR. V. MCGEE } FAO/ODA

3

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

GPS360

CONFIDENTIAL

DESKBY 190900Z

FROM UKMIS NEW YORK 182223Z JUN 79

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TEL NO 630 OF 18 JUNE

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON UKMIS GENEVA HONG KONG MANILA KUALA
LUMPUR BANGKOK JAKARTA SINGAPORE

INFO PRIORITY CANBERRA WELLINGTON PEKING TOKYO MOSCOW

Scan by PA 2
Prime Minister
SW 19/6

YOUR TELS NOS 275 AND 276: INDO-CHINA REFUGEES: UN CONFERENCE

1. MANSFIELD DELIVERED THE PRIME MINISTER'S MESSAGE IN YOUR TELNO 276 TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S OFFICE THIS EVENING. HE EXPLAINED IN ANSWER TO A QUESTION THAT THE MESSAGE ITSELF WOULD NOT BE PUBLISHED BUT THAT WE WOULD SAY THAT THE PRIME MINISTER HAS SENT A FURTHER MESSAGE TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL. BUFFUM, THE UNDER SECRETARY RESPONSIBLE IN THE U N SECRETARIAT, WELCOMED THE DECISION NOT TO PUBLISH THE TEXT.

2. MANSFIELD DID NOT DRAW ON THE POINTS IN YOUR TELNO 275 SINCE WE HAD JUST LEARNT FROM WASHINGTON AND THE US MISSION HERE THAT THE STATE DEPARTMENT ARE NOW URGENTLY CONSIDERING THE POSSIBILITY OF INVOLVING THE SECURITY COUNCIL AT AN EARLY STAGE. THE US MISSION HAVE SO FAR HEARD FROM THE STATE DEPARTMENT ONLY BY TELEPHONE. THEY THINK THAT WHAT IS ENVISAGED IS A COUNCIL MEETING LEADING TO A BRIEF RESOLUTION URGING RESTRAINT BY ALL CONCERNED IN THE AREA, AND ASKING THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO CONVENE A CONFERENCE. WHILE WELL AWARE OF THE LOCAL DIFFICULTIES OF GETTING THE RIGHT OUTCOME WITHOUT DAMAGING ACRIMONY IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL, THE US MISSION THINK THAT IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE TO DO SO. THEY ACCEPT THAT THE SECRETARY-GENERAL IS BECOMING MORE ACTIVE AND POSITIVE OVER A CONFERENCE, BUT BELIEVE THAT SOMETHING SHOULD BE DONE BEFORE MID-JULY IN GENEVA (THE DATE WHICH THE STATE DEPARTMENT STILL APPEAR TO ENVISAGE FOR A CONFERENCE) AND NOW BELIEVE THAT A SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING MAY BE THE BEST WAY OF DOING THIS. ON THE OTHER HAND, THEY AGREE WITH US THAT IT WOULD BE IMPORTANT TO AVOID PUTTING WALDHEIM IN A POSITION WHERE HE CANNOT DO MORE ABOUT CONVENING A CONFERENCE UNTIL THE SECURITY COUNCIL HAS PRONOUNCED (IN CASE THE COUNCIL PROCEEDINGS PROVE PROTRACTED).

N

CONFIDENTIAL

/3.

CONFIDENTIAL

3. WE HAVE AGREED TO DISCUSS FURTHER WITH THE US MISSION TOMORROW IN THE LIGHT OF THE EXPECTED REPORTS FROM WASHINGTON. MEANWHILE, THEY AGREED NOT TO DISCUSS COUNCIL ACTION MORE WIDELY, AND WE AGREED TO HOLD ACTION ON THE POINTS IN YOUR TELNO 275.
4. WE HAVE TOLD THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S OFFICE THAT WE HOPE TO BE IN A POSITION TO DISCUSS THE WAY FORWARD WITH THEM MORE FULLY TOMORROW OR WEDNESDAY. SINCE THE ABOVE WAS DRAFTED WE HAVE SEEN SIR IAN GILMOUR'S ANSWER TO A PNQ TODAY ON THIS SUBJECT.
5. YOU SHOULD KNOW THAT MCHENRY (US) WAS QUESTIONED BY THE PRESS THIS AFTERNOON ABOUT IDEAS OF INVOLVING THE SECURITY COUNCIL. HE AVOIDED COMMITTING HIMSELF.

RICHARD

[COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING ST]

FILES
SEAD
HK & GD
UND
FED
EESD
N AM D
SAD
EID (E)
PUSD
OID
IPD

NEWS D
M & VD
PS
PS/LPS
PS/MR. HURD
PS/MR. BLAKER
PS/PUS
SIR A DUFF
SIR A PARSONS
MR. CORTAZZI
MR. LEAHY
MR. MURRAY

COPIES TO:
HONG KONG GOVT. OFFICE LONDON
MR. WOODFIELD } HOME OFFICE
MR. BURLEIGH } QUEEN ANNE'S GATE
MR. HILLARY } HOME OFFICE
MR. BIRT } LUNAR HOUSE
CROYDON.
MR. V. MCGEE } FAO/ODA

2

CONFIDENTIAL

See by Pn 2
Pine Minister
GJM
19/6

UNCLASSIFIED
FM PARIS 180500Z JUNE 79
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 324 OF 18 JUNE 1979
INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK UKMIS GENEVA
INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON HANOI UKREP BRUSSELS

MY TELEGRAM NUMBER NO 321: VIETNAMESE REFUGEES

1. THE ELYSEE HAVE NOW OFFICIALLY ANNOUNCED THEIR SUPPORT FOR AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE TO DEAL WITH THE REFUGEE PROBLEM IN SOUTH EAST ASIA. THE PRINCIPAL EXTRACTS OF THE ELYSEE COMMUNIQUE ARE AS FOLLOWS:

QUOTE THIS PROBLEM CANNOT BE HANDLED EITHER THROUGH T INDIVIDUAL ACTION BY SEVERAL STATES OR THROUGH THE GENEROSITY OF HUMANITARIAN ORGANISATIONS FRANCE HAS ALREADY ACCEPTED BETWEEN 15 MAY 1975 AND 10 JUNE 1979, 51,515 REFUGEES FROM THIS AREA. THIS EFFORT, WHICH AMOUNTS TO ONE REFUGEE FOR EACH THOUSAND OF THE FRENCH POPULATION, IS THE HIGHEST LEVEL ACHIEVED IN THE WORLD, ALONG WITH WHAT THE UNITED STATES AND AUSTRALIA HAVE DONE..... BUT IT IS NOW NECESSARY TO DEAL WITH THE PROBLEM IN ALL ITS DIMENSIONS, IF AN EFFECTIVE AND HUMANE SOLUTION IS TO BE FOUND.

QUOTE THE PROBLEM ARISES FIRST OF ALL IN THE COUNTRIES FROM WHICH THESE REFUGEES ARE COMING. THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY HAS THE RIGHT TO KNOW THE REASONS FOR SUCH AN EXODUS AND ALSO THE INTENTIONS OF THE GOVERNMENTS INVOLVED ABOUT THE SCALE OF THE POPULATION INVOLVED AND THE ANTICIPATED SPEED OF THEIR DEPARTURE. THE PROBLEM ALSO HAS A REGIONAL DIMENSION SINCE COUNTRIES IN THE SOUTH EAST ASIAN AREA ARE AFFECTED IN THE FIRST INSTANCE AND SINCE THE GREAT MAJORITY OF THE REFUGEES ARE NOW ETHNIC CHINESE. FINALLY, THE PROBLEM HAS A WORLD DIMENSION. NO CIVILISED STATE CAN REMAIN INDIFFERENT TO THE MATERIAL AND MORAL DISTRESS OF SUCH A LARGE NUMBER OF REFUGEES AMONG WHOM THERE IS A HIGH PROPORTION OF ELDERLY PEOPLE, WOMEN AND CHILDREN. / QUOTE

QUOTE THIS IS WHY FRANCE HAS DECIDED TO SUPPORT THE PROPOSAL FOR AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE WHICH SHOULD BE CALLED UNDER THE AUSPICES OF THE UNITED NATIONS TO EXAMINE THE PROBLEM AS A WHOLE. A DEMARCHE TO THIS EFFECT WILL BE MADE TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS, KURT WALDHEIM.

UNQUOTE

FCO PASS ALL

HIBBERT

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

[COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING ST]

FILES
SEAD
HK & GD
UND
FED
EESD
N AM D
SAD
EID (E)
PUSD
OID
IPD

NEWS D
M & VD
PS
PS/LPS
PS/MR. HURD
PS/MR. BLAKER
PS/PUS
SIR A DUFF
SIR A PARSONS
MR. CORTAZZI
MR. LEAHY
MR. MURRAY

COPIES TO:
HONG KONG GOVT. OFFICE LONDON
MR. WOODFIELD } HOME OFFICE
MR. BURLEIGH } QUEEN ANNE'S GATE
MR. HILLARY } HOME OFFICE
MR. BIRT } LUNAR HOUSE
CROYDON.
MR. V. MCGEE } FAO/ODA

CONFIDENTIAL

See by PO 2

GRS 620
CONFIDENTIAL

Prime Minister

DESKBY 190830Z

FM WASHINGTON 182222Z JUNE 79

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1566 OF 18 JUNE

INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS GENEVA, HONG KONG, UKMIS NEW YORK,

PRIORITY OTTAWA

INFO SAVING HANOI.

GM
19/
16

MY TELNO 1483 (TO FCO ONLY): VIETNAMESE REFUGEES.

1. THE STATE DEPARTMENT ARRANGED A MEETING THIS MORNING FOR THE GOVERNOR OF HONG KONG WITH CHRISTOPHER, HOLBROOKE AND CLARK. WHAT WAS TO HAVE BEEN A SERIES OF INDIVIDUAL MEETINGS WAS AMALGAMATED SINCE THOSE CONCERNED HAD A MEETING ON REFUGEES WITH THE VICE-PRESIDENT LATER IN THE MORNING. THE AMERICANS SAID THAT THE GOVERNOR'S VISIT CAME AT AN OPPORTUNE MOMENT TO EMPHASISE THE URGENCY OF THE REFUGEE PROBLEM. THEY PRAISED HONG KONG FOR THE WAY IN WHICH REFUGEES HAD BEEN HANDLED THERE. THEY ALSO WELCOMED THE PRIME MINISTER'S CALL FOR A CONFERENCE AND HOPED THAT ADVANTAGE COULD BE TAKEN OF WALDHEIM'S NEW SIGNS OF DYNAMISM. THE GOVERNOR COMMENTED THAT UNDER THE DOUBLE BURDEN OF INFLUXES FROM CHINA AND VIETNAM THE HONG KONG PUBLIC'S TOLERANCE OF THE LATTER COULD SNAP. THIS WAS PARTICULARLY SO IF THEY SAW THAT LESS HUMANE TREATMENT BY OTHER COUNTRIES WAS REWARDED BUT ALSO IF, IN RECESSION, THEY HAD TO COMPETE FOR SCARCE JOBS. THE FORMER WAS OF MORE IMMEDIATE IMPORTANCE.
2. FOLLOWING ARE THE MAIN POINTS TO EMERGE FROM THE MEETING:
 - A. CHRISTOPHER SAID THAT, ALTHOUGH AMERICAN POLICY TOWARDS A CONFERENCE WAS STILL BEING FORMULATED, IT WAS TENDING TOWARDS DE-LINKING THE TWO ASPECTS OF FINDING MORE RESETTLEMENT PLACES AND DIRECT CRITICISM OF VIETNAM AND EVEN DE-EMPHASISING THE LATTER, WHILE CONTINUING TO CONDEMN VIETNAM AS OCCASSION OFFERED. HE THOUGH PRIORITY SHOULD BE

/GIVEN

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

GIVEN TO DEALING WITH THE VERY REAL PROBLEM OF A LARGE INCREASE IN THE NUMBER OF REFUGEES AND THE LIKELY CONTINUATION OF THIS TREND. HE SAID THAT THE SUBJECT OF VIETNAM REFUGEES WAS ON THE AGENDA FOR THE HEADS OF GOVERNMENT LUNCH AT TOKYO. HE WAS SURE THAT PRESIDENT CARTER WOULD WANT TO GIVE IT CONSIDERABLE PROMINENCE.

B. HOLBROOKE OUTLINED A TENTATIVE SCENARIO FOR THE COMING WEEKS STARTING WITH WHAT CARTER HAD SAID TO BREZHNEV IN VIENNA ABOUT VIETNAM (WHICH THEY RECOGNISED WOULD NOT YIELD IMMEDIATE RESULTS) AND GOING ON THROUGH THE TOKYO SUMMIT, THE BALI MEETING WITH ASEAN COUNTRIES, AND THEN, AS SOON AS POSSIBLE, A CONFERENCE ON RESETTLEMENT.

C. THE AMERICANS HAD BEEN CONSIDERING A POSSIBLE SECURITY COUNCIL DEBATE, USING ARTICLE 34, WHICH THEIR NEW YORK MISSION THOUGHT APPLICABLE.

D. CLARK (CO-ORDINATOR ON REFUGEE AFFAIRS) RESPONDED TO THE GOVERNOR'S COMMENTS ABOUT THE DISPARITY BETWEEN THE NUMBER OF REFUGEE ARRIVALS IN HONG KONG AND THE OFFTAKE BY SAYING THAT THE US WOULD HAVE A FLEXIBLE APPROACH WITH ADJUSTMENTS MONTH BY MONTH. THEY WERE DOING THEIR SUMS AT THE MOMENT. HE IMPLIED THAT HONG KONG WOULD BE GIVEN A HIGHER QUOTA TO MATCH RECENT INCREASED ARRIVALS. CLARK EMPHASISED HOWEVER THAT THE US FELT A PARTICULAR RESPONSIBILITY TOWARDS CERTAIN LAND-CROSSERS FROM LAOS TO THAILAND WHO HAD PREVIOUS CONNECTIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES. THEY WOULD HAVE TO BE GIVEN FAVOURABLE TREATMENT IN THE OVERALL QUOTA.

E. THE AMERICANS HAD BEEN IMPRESSED BY WHAT WAS APPARENTLY SAID PRIVATELY BY PRIME MINISTER CLARK OF CANADA OVER THE WEEKEND ABOUT HIS WISH TO TAKE A MAJOR NEW CANADIAN INITIATIVE ON REFUGEES BEFORE THE TOKYO SUMMIT. THEY WERE INSTRUCTING THEIR AMBASSADOR TO ENCOURAGE THIS.

F. THE GOVERNOR EMPHASISED THAT TO HOLD PUBLIC OPINION IN HONG KONG (AND THE SAME MIGHT APPLY IN OTHER SE ASIAN COUNTRIES) IT WAS NECESSARY TO PROVIDE A CREDIBLE PLAN FOR RELIEVING COUNTRIES OF THE REFUGEES. THIS NEED NOT NECESSARILY BE IN ONE YEAR OR EVEN TWO SO LONG AS EVENTUAL DISEMBARRASSMENT WAS ASSURED. SUCH AN APPROACH MIGHT STAND MORE CHANCE OF ATTRACTING ADEQUATE BIDS.

/3.

CONFIDENTIAL

3. THE GENERAL IMPRESSION FROM THIS MEETING WAS THAT THE AMERICANS NOW SEE A NEW NEED FOR URGENCY IN DEALING WITH THE VIETNAM REFUGEE PROBLEM. (THEY SHOWED MORE CONCERN AND MORE URGENCY THAN WHEN MR BLAKER SAW WARREN CHRISTOPHER AND WE SAW CLARK LAST WEEK). CLARK SAID THAT THIS WAS REFLECTED BY FEELING IN CONGRESS AMONGST THOSE CONCERNED WITH FOREIGN AFFAIRS, ALTHOUGH THE NEW ATTITUDE HAD NOT YET PENETRATED TO THE APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE.

FCO PASS SAVING TO HANOI.

JAY

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

[COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING ST]

FILES
SEAD
HK & GD
UND
FED
EESD
N AM D
SAD
EID (E)
PUSD
OID
IPD

NEWS D
M & VD
PS
PS/LPS
PS/MR. HURD
PS/MR. BLAKER
PS/PUS
SIR A DUFF
SIR A PARSONS
MR. CORTAZZI
MR. LEAHY
MR. MURRAY

COPIES TO:
HONG KONG GOVT. OFFICE LONDON
MR. WOODFIELD } HOME OFFICE
MR. BURLEIGH } QUEEN ANNE'S GATE
MR. HILLARY } HOME OFFICE
MR. BIRT } LUNAR HOUSE
CROYDON.
MR. V. MCGEE } FAO/ODA

GPS 750

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FM UKMIS GENEVA 181500Z JUN 79

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 211 OF 18 JUNE 1979

INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK, WASHINGTON, HONG KONG.

INFO SAVING HANOI, JAKARTA, KUALA LUMPUR, BANGKOK, SINGAPORE,
MANILA.

See by SR **2**
Prime Minister
bu
19/6

MR BLAKER'S DISCUSSIONS WITH UNHCR

1. THE MINISTER OF STATE HAD A USEFUL DISCUSSION WITH HARTLING THIS MORNING LASTING OVER 2 HOURS. DISCUSSION WAS RESUMED OVER LUNCH. NOTHING PARTICULARLY NEW EMERGED BUT BOTH SIDES WERE ABLE TO EXPRESS THEIR VIEWS FULLY. UNHCR WELL UNDERSTOOD OUR MAIN PRE-OCCUPATIONS.

2. THE FOLLOWING ARE UNHCR'S 4 MAIN CONCERNS:-

(A) THE PRINCIPLE OF ASYLUM IS THE VERY SOUL OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER'S WORK AND MUST BE PRESERVED. HE NEEDS OUR HELP AND THAT OF OTHER FRIENDLY GOVERNMENTS TO URGE THOSE CONCERNED, PARTICULARLY IN SOUTH EAST ASIA, NOT TO DEPART FROM THIS PRINCIPLE. IT WAS DISTURBING TO HEAR A COMMONWEALTH (MALAYSIAN) GOVERNMENT STATING THAT THAILAND'S EXPULSION OF REFUGEES WAS UNDERSTANDABLE:

(B) WE AND OUR FRIENDS SHOULD TELL THE TRUTH TO THOSE IN THE REGION ABOUT THE NEED FOR THE REGION ITSELF TO ACCEPT LARGE NUMBERS OF REFUGEES FOR PERMANENT SETTLEMENT THERE. SO FAR THE HIGH COMMISSIONER WAS A LONE VOICE IN PREACHING THIS AND HE HAD RECEIVED LITTLE SUPPORT AT LAST DECEMBER'S CONSULTATIONS OR AT THE JAKARTA MEETING IN MAY. THE BEST WAY TO PERSUADE ASEAN COUNTRIES TO TAKE THEIR FAIR SHARE WOULD BE IF COUNTRIES OUTSIDE THE REGION WERE PREPARED TO TAKE MORE REFUGEES FOR RESETTLEMENT AND COULD THEN SAY IN EFFECT THEY WOULD TAKE 2 FOR EVERY ONE SETTLED IN THE REGION:

(C) IT WAS IMPORTANT TO PUT PRESSURE ON LATIN AMERICA, BUT THIS TOO COULD ONLY BE DONE BY GOVERNMENTS, IN PARTICULAR THOSE OF WESTERN EUROPE. THE LATTER HAD ACCEPTED SEVERAL THOUSAND

CONFIDENTIAL

/ REFUGEES

CONFIDENTIAL

REFUGEES FROM LATIN AMERICA AND COULD REASONABLY SAY IT WAS LATIN AMERICA'S TURN TO HELP WITH THIS NEW PROBLEM. IT WOULD BE HARD FOR THE LATIN AMERICANS TO ASSIMILATE NEW COMERS SINCE THEY HAVE NO MACHINERY FOR RECEIVING REFUGEES AND FINANCIAL INDUCEMENTS FROM OTHER GOVERNMENTS WOULD PROBABLY BE NECESSARY:

(D) WHETHER THERE WAS A CONFERENCE OR NOT, IT WAS ESSENTIAL TO OBTAIN MORE OFFERS OF RESETTLEMENT PLACES AND FINANCE. IF NOT THERE WAS NO POSSIBILITY OF PERSUADING GOVERNMENTS IN SOUTH EAST ASIA TO LIVE UP TO THEIR OBLIGATIONS.

3. UNHCR CONTINUED TO SHOW OPTIMISM ABOUT THE USEFULNESS OF THEIR AGREEMENT WITH VIETNAM. THEY EXPECT 2,500 PEOPLE TO LEAVE VIETNAM FOR PERMANENT SETTLEMENT UNDER THIS SCHEME IN JULY.

4. MR BLAKER AGREED WITH MR HARTLING THAT THE DIMENSIONS OF THE REFUGEE PROBLEM WORLD WIDE WERE ENORMOUS. BUT WE HAD TO CONCENTRATE ON SOUTH EAST ASIA. THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY HAD NOT PROPERLY UNDERSTOOD THE EXTENT OF THE CRISIS THERE. THE UK WAS TAKING THE REFUGEES FROM SIBONGA AND THOSE FROM ROACHBANK WHO COULD NOT BE RESETTLED IN TAIWAN. WE WERE PARTICULARLY CONCERNED WITH HONG KONG, WHICH WAS PROPORTIONATELY TAKING THE BIGGEST BURDEN. THE GOVERNOR WOULD DISCUSS THE DETAIL WITH UNHCR NEXT WEEK. IF OTHER COUNTRIES IN SOUTH EAST ASIA PUT UP THE SHUTTERS, HONG KONG'S POSITION WOULD BE EVEN WORSE. WE HAD ALREADY SPOKEN TO THE THAIS AND WOULD BE SPEAKING TO THE MALAYSIANS. UNHCR'S FAMILY REUNION AGREEMENT WITH VIETNAM WAS HELPFUL, BUT WOULD NOT DEAL WITH THE MAIN PROBLEM WE HAD TO TRY TO PERSUADE VIETNAM TO CHANGE ITS CURRENT POLICIES OF COMPULSORY EXPULSION. THERE WAS AN URGENT NEED FOR AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE WHICH WOULD TACKLE BOTH THE HUMANITARIAN AND THE POLITICAL ASPECTS OF THE CRISIS. WE HAD ALREADY SPOKEN TO 56 MISSIONS IN LONDON AND THE RESPONSE TO THE PRIME MINISTER'S CALL FOR A CONFERENCE WAS ENCOURAGING.

- 2 -
CONFIDENTIAL

/ 5. AS

CONFIDENTIAL

5. AS REGARDS THE PROPOSED CONFERENCE , HARTLING RE-ITERATED HIS EARNEST DESIRE NOT TO BE INVOLVED IN ANY POLITICAL ASPECTS OF IT. IF PRESSURE ON VIETNAM WAS TO BE A MAJOR FEATURE HE THOUGHT THE VENUE SHOULD BE NEW YORK. HE WAS PROCEEDING QUICKLY WITH HIS CONSULTATIONS AND HOPED TO HAVE MADE ALL HIS APPROACHES THIS WEEK. GOVERNMENTS WOULD NEED A WEEK OR SO TO RESPOND, BUT HE WISHED TO REPORT TO WALDHEIM WHEN THE LATTER ARRIVES HERE ON 30 JUNE FOR THE ACC AND ECOSOC MEETINGS.

6. HARTLING READ FROM A LETTER HE HAD JUST RECEIVED FROM WALDHEIM. THIS MENTIONED US SUPPORT FOR THE CONFERENCE AND SAID THEY WERE THINKING OF SETTING UP A STEERING COMMITTEE IN NEW YORK TO PREPARE FOR IT. HE WAS UNAWARE OF WALDHEIM'S IDEA OF HOLDING A CONFERENCE HERE ON ABOUT 18 JULY.

7. HARTLING DID NOT PUSH HARD FOR UK OFFERS OF RESETTLEMENT AND FINANCE AND UNDERSTOOD THAT THE MINISTER OF STATE COULD NOT GIVE FIRM INDICATIONS NOW. BUT HE SUGGESTED THAT IT MIGHT BE APPROPRIATE FOR US TO MERGE OUR QUOTE INDICATIVE NUMBER UNQUOTE OF 10,000 WITH THE SIMILAR FIGURE HE HAS MENTIONED FOR HONG KONG.

8. FURTHER REPORT WITH COMMENTS FOLLOWS.

FCO PLEASE PASS SAVING ADDRESSEES

MURRAY

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

[COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING ST]

FILES

SEAD
HK & GD
UND
FED
EESD
N AM D
SAD
EID (E) } S AM D
PUSD } M & CD
OID
IPD

NEWS D
M & VD
PS
PS/IPS
PS/MR. HURD
PS/MR. BLAKER
PS/PUS
SIR A DUFF
SIR A PARSONS
MR. CORTAZZI
MR. LEAHY
MR. MURRAY
MR HALL

COPIES TO:
HONG KONG GOVT. OFFICE LONDON
MR. WOODFIELD } HOME OFFICE
MR. BURLEIGH } QUEEN ANNE'S GATE
MR. HILLARY } HOME OFFICE
MR. BIRT } LUNAR HOUSE
CROYDON.
MR. V. MCGEE } FAO/ODA

CONFIDENTIAL

Vietnam

COPY

Top copy on: USA, May 79, UK/US Retention

CONFIDENTIAL
DESKBY 181400Z *Sup H5*
FM FCO 181152Z JUNE
TO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON
TELEGRAM NUMBER 693 OF 18 JUNE 1979

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. *T26A/79*
T26A/79T

PRIME MINISTER'S MESSAGE TO THE PRESIDENT

1. THE PRIME MINISTER SIGNED ON 15 JUNE HER REPLY TO MR CARTER'S MESSAGE OF 13 MAY (OUR TELNO 502). SIGNED ORIGINAL FOLLOWS BY DAG BUT PLEASE NOW PASS TO THE WHITE HOUSE FOR TRANSMISSION TO THE PRESIDENT TEXT AS FOLLOWS.

DEAR MR PRESIDENT,

AS YOU KNOW I DEFERRED A FULL REPLY TO YOUR MESSAGE OF 13 MAY UNTIL MY COLLEAGUES AND I HAD BEEN ABLE TO TALK TO MR VANCE.

THOSE TALKS WERE MOST VALUABLE. CY VANCE WILL HAVE REPORTED TO YOU. BUT I THOUGHT YOU WOULD WISH TO KNOW MY THOUGHTS ON THE POINTS MADE IN YOUR MESSAGE.

YOUR RIGHTLY GAVE PRIDE OF PLACE TO SALT AND THE FUTURE STRATEGIC BALANCE. WE HAVE FOLLOWED THE SALT II DEVELOPMENTS WITH CLOSE ATTENTION AND ARE GRATEFUL FOR THE CARE YOU HAVE TAKEN TO KEEP US INFORMED. I SHARE YOUR CONVICTION THAT THE SUBSEQUENT DEBATE ON RATIFICATION OF THE TREATY WILL BE OF CRITICAL IMPORTANCE. AS I SEE IT, YOU IN THE UNITED STATES PARTICULARLY IN YOUR DIALOGUE WITH THE SENATE, AND WE AND OUR OTHER ALLIES HAVE TO STRIKE THE RIGHT BALANCE IN SUPPORTING THE RATIFICATION OF SALT II WHILE AT THE SAME TIME ENSURING THAT OUR PUBLIC OPINION UNDERSTANDS THE NEED FOR THE ALLIANCE TO MAINTAIN AND MODERNISE ITS NUCLEAR FORCES. CY VANCE ASSURED PETER CARRINGTON AT THE OUTSET OF HIS DISCUSSIONS THAT SALT II WAS WHOLLY COMPATIBLE WITH THE RETENTION OF A STRONG US DEFENCE CAPABILITY. WE WELCOME THAT. BOTH SIDES OF THE EQUATION WILL NEED TO BE EMPHASISED IN THE NEXT FEW MONTHS, IF WE ARE TO AVOID CREATING A FALSE SENSE OF SECURITY THAT MIGHT UNDERMINE THE CONTINUING DEFENCE EFFORT THE ALLIANCE MUST MAKE.

I NOTE WHAT YOU SAY ABOUT THE IMPORTANCE OF EUROPEAN VIEWS IN THE RATIFICATION DEBATE THAT LIES AHEAD OF YOU. AND I ACCEPT THAT THE ATTITUDE OF BRITAIN, AS A NUCLEAR POWER, WILL BE SCRUTINISED PARTICULARLY CLOSELY. ON OUR REACTIONS TO DATE WE HAVE

CONFIDENTIAL

/DONE OUR BEST

CONFIDENTIAL

DONE OUR BEST TO BE HELPFUL, BOTH IN OUR NATIONAL STATEMENTS AND IN THE COMMUNIQUE OF THE NATO DEFENCE PLANNING COMMITTEE AND FOREIGN MINISTERS' COUNCIL. WE HAVE CONSISTENTLY SUPPORTED EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE LIMITATIONS ON STRATEGIC ARMS AND I HAVE MADE IT QUITE CLEAR THAT I HOPE THE TREATY WILL BE RATIFIED. MAY I ASK YOU TO LET ME KNOW AT ANY STAGE HOW BEST YOU THINK WE CAN CONTINUE TO HELP ?

AS YOU KNOW, OUR REACTIONS SO FAR HAVE BEEN GOVERNED BY THE VIEW THAT A STATEMENT ON THE SUBSTANCE OF THE AGREEMENT MADE AFTER ONLY A BRIEF PERIOD IN GOVERNMENT AND BEFORE WE HAD THE OPPORTUNITY TO STUDY THE FULL TEXT OF THE TREATY WOULD NOT HAVE CARRIED CONVICTION EITHER WITH THE PUBLIC HERE OR WITH YOUR CONGRESS. BUT I ASSURE YOU THAT, WITHIN THE ALLIANCE AND IN OUR PUBLIC STATEMENTS, WE WILL DO ALL WE CAN TO ASSIST YOU IN SECURING RATIFICATION.

CY VANCE WILL HAVE CONFIRMED TO YOU THAT ONE ASPECT OF THE SALT II NEGOTIATIONS THAT HAD GIVEN US, AS IT HAD OUR PREDECESSORS, SERIOUS CAUSE FOR CONCERN WAS THE WORDING ON NON-CIRCUMVENTION AND THE POSSIBILITIES FOR NUCLEAR TRANSFERS IN THE FUTURE. I THEREFORE MUCH APPRECIATE THE CATEGORICAL ASSURANCES IN THIS RESPECT THAT HE GAVE US. THIS WILL ALLOW US WHEN QUESTIONED, IN PARLIAMENT AND ELSEWHERE, AS WE SHALL BE, TO CONFIRM UNEQUIVOCALLY THAT OUR INTERESTS ARE SAFEGUARDED.

LOOKING AHEAD, I FULLY SHARE YOUR VIEW OF THE IMPORTANCE OF FULFILLING THE LONG-TERM DEFENCE PROGRAMME. PETER CARRINGTON FRANCIS PYM AND I ALL UNDERLINED TO CY VANCE THE STRENGTH OF OUR COMMITMENT TO THE NATO TARGET OF 3 PERCENT GROWTH IN DEFENCE EXPENDITURE. I AGREE TOO THAT WE NEED TO ENSURE THAT CONCRETE DECISIONS ON THEATRE NUCLEAR FORCE MODERNISATION ARE TAKEN BY THE ALLIANCE BY THE END OF THIS YEAR, AND IN THAT RESPECT THE RECENT NATO COUNCIL MEETING MARKED A MAJOR STEP FORWARD. AS FOR SALT III, I HAVE NO DOUBT THAT CY VANCE'S VISIT HAS GIVEN ADDED IMPETUS TO WHAT I HOPE WILL BE A PERIOD OF INTENSIVE CONSULTATION BOTH WITHIN THE ALLIANCE AND BETWEEN OUR TWO GOVERNMENTS. FOR THIS REASON I VERY MUCH WELCOME YOUR POSTSCRIPT AND LOOK FORWARD TO HEARING YOUR VIEWS ON SALT III AT ANY TIME.

ON THE COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN NEGOTIATIONS IT IS GOOD OF YOU TO HAVE ARRANGED FOR YOUR SCIENCE ADVISER TO COME OVER HERE TO BRIEF ME ON THE TECHNICAL ASPECTS AND ON YOUR OWN THINKING. CLEARLY WE NEED TO KEEP IN CLOSE TOUCH ON THIS.

YOU WILL HAVE HEARD THAT, IN RESPONSE TO THE CONCERN WHICH BOTH YOU AND HELMUT SCHMIDT HAD EXPRESSED, WE HAVE RECENTLY ANNOUNCED A DOUBLING OF THE CONTRIBUTION PROMISED BY THE PREVIOUS ADMINISTRATION TO THE TURKEY RESCUE OPERATION. I AM NO LESS PERSUADED THAN YOU OF THE STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE OF TURKEY. BUT I MUST STRESS THAT POUNDS STERLING 15 MILLION IS ABSOLUTELY AS FAR AS WE CAN GO, BEYOND THE SUBSTANTIAL SUMS WE ARE ALREADY PROVIDING TO THE TURKS THROUGH THE EEC, GIVEN OUR DETERMINATION TO CUT PUBLIC EXPENDITURE IN THE UK. AND I THINK WE ALL AGREE THAT THE TURKS MUST COME TO AN AGREEMENT WITH THE IMF BEFORE OUR CONTRIBUTIONS ARE PAID OVER.

I SHARE YOUR CONCERN ABOUT SOUTHERN AFRICA. I AGREE THAT CLOSE COLLABORATION BETWEEN US WILL BE OF GREAT IMPORTANCE AS WE TRY TO RESOLVE THE PROBLEMS WHICH CONCERN US EQUALLY IN THAT AREA. ON RHODESIA WE WELCOMED THE TALKS WITH CY VANCE. DAVID HARLECH IS NOW IN AFRICA FOR DISCUSSIONS WITH THE COMMONWEALTH AND OTHER AFRICAN GOVERNMENTS DIRECTLY CONCERNED. WE SHALL BE CONSIDERING THE WAY FORWARD IN THE LIGHT OF HIS REPORT: AND WE SHALL WISH TO KEEP IN THE CLOSEST TOUCH WITH YOU OVER THIS PROBLEM.

PETER CARRINGTON AND CY VANCE HAVE BEEN IN CLOSE TOUCH ABOUT THE VARIOUS IDEAS ON NAMIBIA WHICH WE PUT FORWARD AFTER RICHARD LUCE'S VISIT TO THE AREA, AND I THINK YOU, WE AND OUR OTHER PARTNERS ARE NOW LARGELY AGREED ON THE NEXT STEPS.

MY MEETING WITH MR BEGIN WAS PROFOUNDLY DISHEARTENING. I WELL UNDERSTAND YOUR CAUTION ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF MAKING PROGRESS IN THE WEST BANK NEGOTIATIONS. I EMPHASISED TO MR BEGIN THE DANGER WHICH CONTINUED EXPANSION OF ISRAELI SETTLEMENTS REPRESENTS TO THE AUTONOMY NEGOTIATIONS AND ALSO THE NEED TO HELP PRESIDENT SADAT. BUT HE WILL NOT LISTEN AND EVEN RESENTS THE SUBJECT OF SETTLEMENTS BEING RAISED AT ALL.

PETER CARRINGTON WILL DISCUSS WITH HIS COMMUNITY COLLEAGUES HOW THEY CAN BEST HELP. FOR OUR PART WE SHALL CONTINUE TO SUPPORT YOUR GENERAL APPROACH WITH ITS EMPHASIS ON THE NEED TO ACHIEVE A COMPREHENSIVE SETTLEMENT. WE SHALL BE HAPPY TO KEEP IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH MR STRAUSS AS YOU SUGGEST.

AS FOR THE DIVISIONS IN THE ARAB WORLD, I DOUBT WHETHER ANY EARLY PROGRESS TOWARDS RECONCILIATION BETWEEN PRESIDENT SADAT AND SOME OF THE MORE MODERATE ARAB GOVERNMENTS IS POSSIBLE. THE FIRST STEP MUST BE TO URGE PRESIDENT SADAT HIMSELF TO STOP HIS ATTACKS ON HIS

NATURAL ALLIES SUCH AS THE SAUDIS AND THE JORDANIANS. I WAS GLAD TO HEAR THAT YOUR AMBASSADOR IN CAIRO HAS BEEN ABLE TO HELP WITH THIS. I EXPECT TO SEE KING HUSSEIN IN THE NEXT WEEK AND SHALL URGE ON HIM THE NEED NOT TO COMMIT HIMSELF IRREVOCABLY AGAINST THESE PEACE NEGOTIATIONS.

BOTH FOREIGN MINISTER SONODA, AND HIS COLLEAGUE, MR ESAKI, WHOM I HAVE SEEN RECENTLY, UNDERLINED THE IMPORTANCE THE JAPANESE ATTACH TO THE TOKYO SUMMIT. I ACCEPT THAT SUCH MEETINGS CAN BE USEFUL AND I SHALL BE INTERESTED TO TAKE PART IN IT WITH YOU AND OUR FIVE OTHER COLLEAGUES. BUT I MUST ADMIT THAT PREVIOUS MEETINGS IN THE SERIES HAVE STRUCK ME AS SOMETIMES LONGER ON DIAGNOSIS THAN ON PRESCRIPTIONS. THE PROBLEM WE FACE THIS TIME ARE EVEN MORE ACUTE THAN BEFORE, WITH THE ENERGY SHORTAGE AGGRAVATING AN ALREADY UNCERTAIN SITUATION. I HOPE WE SHALL BE ABLE TO GET NEARER TO FINDING SOLUTIONS - BUT FRANKLY I AM NOT OPTIMISTIC. ON ONE POINT I WHOLLY AGREE WITH YOU. WE MUST TRY TO DEAL ONLY WITH A LIMITED NUMBER OF SPECIFIC ISSUES AND AVOID THE OVER-GENERALISED APPROACH. I HOPE ALSO THAT WE SHALL BE ABLE TO AVOID A COMMUNIQUE WHICH DEALS MAINLY IN PIOUS PLATITUDES.

WE WERE ABLE TO ASSURE BOTH JAPANESE MINISTERS OF THE IMPORTANCE WE ATTACH TO A HEALTHY AND CONSTRUCTIVE RELATIONSHIP WITH THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT, BOTH BILATERALLY AND THROUGH THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY. I THINK THERE IS A LIMIT TO HOW FAR OTHERS CAN OR SHOULD GO IN ADVISING THE JAPANESE HOW TO RUN THEIR AFFAIRS, BUT I AGREE THAT THE CONTINUING JAPANESE TRADE SURPLUS IS A CAUSE FOR CONCERN FOR US ALL. ALTHOUGH THE LATEST FIGURES ARE SLIGHTLY MORE REASSURING, THIS MAY BE NO MORE THAN TEMPORARY, AS THE DEPRECIATION OF THE YEN ONCE AGAIN LEADS TO AN INCREASE IN JAPANESE EXPORTS.

FINALLY, I SHOULD LIKE BRIEFLY TO MENTION ONE SUBJECT NOT COVERED IN YOUR LETTER TO ME. I AM VERY CONCERNED ABOUT THE REFUGEE SITUATION IN SOUTH EAST ASIA, AND IN PARTICULAR ABOUT THE INCREASING FLOOD OF BOAT REFUGEES FROM VIETNAM. THE IMPACT IN HONG KONG, WHERE OVER 50,000 VIETNAMESE REFUGEES HAVE ARRIVED THIS YEAR, IS NOW VERY SERIOUS INDEED. THE UNITED STATES AND A HANDFUL OF OTHER COUNTRIES INCLUDING BRITAIN, ARE MAKING A SUBSTANTIAL CONTRIBUTION. BUT WHAT

CONFIDENTIAL

IS NEEDED IS A CONCERTED INTERNATIONAL EFFORT BOTH TO GET MORE COUNTRIES TO OPEN THEIR DOORS TO THESE UNFORTUNATE REFUGEES, AND TO EXERT MORE EFFECTIVE PRESSURE ON THE VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT TO STOP EXPORTING THEIR UNWANTED PEOPLE. AND WE NEED TO ACT SOON - WHICH IS WHY I HAVE ASKED DR WALDHEIM TO CONVENE AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE UNDER UN AUSPICES. I HOPE WE CAN COUNT ON YOUR SUPPORT. I AM LOOKING FORWARD TO OUR MEETING IN TOKYO.

YOURS TRULY
MARGARET THATCHER.

CARRINGTON

[COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING ST]

FILES

N AM D

HD/DEF D

HD/ACDD

HD/SED

HD/S AF D

HD/RHOD D

HD/NENAD

HD/MED

HD/FRD

HD/FED

HD/ES & SD

HD/SEAD

HD/HK & GD

PS

PS/LPS

PS/MR. RIDLEY

PS/MR. HURD

PS/MR. LUCE

PS/PUS

SIR A DUFF

SIR A PARSONS

MR. BULLARD

MR. BUTLER

MR. CORTAZZI

MR. LEAHY

MISS BROWN

MR. P. H. MOBERLY

MR. FERGUSON

MR. WILLIAMS

MR. P. C. MOBERLY

5

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

Vietnam



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London S.W.1

18 June 1979

Dear Bryan.

VIETNAMESE REFUGEES

The Prime Minister will have seen reports of a statement by Dr Mahathir, the Malaysian Deputy Prime Minister, that Malaysia will ship more than 70,000 Vietnamese refugees in Malaysia back into international waters and will shoot on sight any 'boat people' entering Malaysian waters. The Malaysian Government has since said that no drastic action will be taken for a reasonable period pending the resettlement of the refugees elsewhere, and Dr Mahathir has retracted his threat to shoot refugees. However it is clear that the Malaysians feel themselves hard-pressed and intend to close their doors firmly. The Indonesians are also refusing to accept more refugees. These actions follow reports that the Thai Government, despite appeals from the International Committee of the Red Cross, are forcibly repatriating refugees into Cambodia and will expel 'boat people'.

These threats and actions have greatly exacerbated the crisis. They will inevitably lead to still greater pressure on Hong Kong. Public opinion in Britain has been aroused and the Government will be pressed to take further action. A PNQ has been put down by Mr Shore for this afternoon.

We shall be replying to your letter of 14 June when we have been able to review the situation in the light of talks which Mr Blaker is having with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees in Geneva today. In the meantime

/the

B G Cartledge Esq
No 10 Downing Street

*Memorandum approved by PM,
subject to amendment,
and forwarded. GJM
P.A.*

CONFIDENTIAL



CONFIDENTIAL

- 2 -

/ the Lord Privy Seal recommends that the Prime Minister should send messages to the Malaysian Prime Minister and the UN Secretary General along the lines of those in the attached draft telegrams to Kuala Lumpur and New York. The Lord Privy Seal has also instructed Mr Cortazzi to summon the Acting Malaysian High Commissioner to express our serious concern about the problems facing the refugees from Vietnam.

We are, in accordance with the Prime Minister's wishes, maintaining our pressure on Dr Waldheim to call an early conference. The Lord Privy Seal thinks that, inevitably, in the light of this and developments in Malaysia and Thailand, that the UK contribution will come under scrutiny. The Hong Kong Government will also have increasing difficulty in maintaining its humane policies unless we can offer them some relief. He would appreciate an early opportunity to have a word on this with the Prime Minister and the Home Secretary.

I am copying this letter to the Private Secretaries to the Home Secretary and Sir John Hunt.

Yours ever
S J Gomersall

S J Gomersall
Private Secretary to the
Lord Privy Seal

CONFIDENTIAL

File No. _____
Department SEAD
Drafted by CORTAZZI
(Block Capitals)
Tel. Extn. 233 5877

OUTWARD
TELEGRAM

Security Classification	
CONFIDENTIAL	
IMMEDIATE	Precedence
DESKBY	Z

FOR
COMMS. DEPT.
USE

Despatched (Date) _____
(Time) _____ Z

POSTBY _____ Z

PREAMBLE

(Time of Origin) _____ Z (G.M.T.) (Restrictive Prefix) _____
(Security Class.) CONFIDENTIAL (Caveat/Privacy Marking) _____
(Codeword) _____ (Deskby) _____ Z

TO IMMEDIATE KUALA LUMPUR Tel. No. _____ of _____
(precedence) (post)

AND TO (precedence/post) _____

AND SAVING TO _____

REPEATED TO (for info) IMMEDIATE UKMIS GENEVA, UKMIS NEW YORK, WASHINGTON
SINGAPORE, BANGKOK, JAKARTA, MANILLA, HONG KONG, PRIORITY MOSCOW
TOKYO, PARIS, BONN, ROUTINE OTTAWA, CANBERRA, WELLINGTON, BRUSSELS
~~XXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~ THE HAGUE, LUXEMBOURG, DUBLIN, ROME, COPENHAGEN, DELHI
SAVING TO (for info)

Distribution:-
'BOAT PEOPLE'

[TEXT]

VIETNAMESE REFUGEES

1. Please pass the following personal message from the Prime Minister to Datuk Hussein Onn as soon as possible. Begins.

I realise the hardships and difficulties Malaysia faces in the current crisis over refugees from Vietnam and ~~share your Government's wish~~ ^{know well the need} to take ~~effective~~ ^{effective} early action to stem the flow and force the callous Vietnamese regime to recognise its responsibilities and improve the lot of its unfortunate people. To this end I have, as you know, appealed to the UN Secretary General to call an early international conference to

/find

Copies to:-

CONFIDENTIAL

find immediate measures to deal with this crisis. I am repeating my request in a further message I am sending today. We must do all we can to put maximum pressure on Vietnam and to persuade the international community as a whole to share the burdens which Vietnamese policies are throwing on the region. My Government are doing everything they can to achieve these objectives by diplomatic action and publicity.

We are, of course, directly involved through Hong Kong. There are already over 54,000 boat refugees there and hundreds more are coming in every day. The Government of Hong Kong, with our full support, will continue as long as possible to provide a haven for these miserable people.

I appeal to you as a ~~great~~ Commonwealth statesman whose ~~humanity and~~ experience commands ~~the~~ respect ~~of us all~~ to help meet this crisis in a humane way. I hope we can work together for effective international action and ~~feel sure that~~ ^{we} you ~~will wish to maintain~~ ^{care of} humanitarian policies ~~towards~~ ^{and} refugees.

I look forward to meeting you soon. Lord Carrington, whom you will be seeing on 1 July, very much hopes to discuss all this with you then, but action is needed now if many thousand more lives are not to be lost.

With kindest regards. Margaret Thatcher Ends.

/2.

CONFIDENTIAL

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

2. We do not intend to publish the text of this message, but we shall announce that an appeal has been made in a message from the Prime Minister.

File No.

Department SEAD

Drafted by (Block Capitals) HAH CORTAZZI

Tel. Extn. 233 5877

OUTWARD

TELEGRAM

Security Classification
CONFIDENTIAL

Precedence
IMMEDIATE

DESKBYZ

FOR
COMMS. DEPT.
USE

Despatched

(Date)

(Time)Z

POSTBY.....Z

PREAMBLE

(Time of Origin)Z(G.M.T.)

(Restrictive Prefix).....

(Security Class.)CONFIDENTIAL.....

(Caveat/
Privacy Marking).....

(Codeword)

(Deskby).....Z

TO.....IMMEDIATE.....UKMIS NEW YORK..... Tel. No. of

AND TO (precedence/post).....

AND SAVING TO.....

REPEATED TO (for info).....IMMEDIATE UKMIS GENEVA, WASHINGTON, KUALA LUMPUR,
BANGKOK, SINGAPORE, JAKARTA, MANILA, HONG KONG, PRIORITY MOSCOW,
TOKYO, PARIS, BONN, ROUTINE OTTAWA, CANBERRA, WELLINGTON, BRUSSELS,
THE HAGUE, LUXEMBOURG, DUBLIN, ROME, COPENHAGEN, DELHI

Distribution:-

'BOAT PEOPLE'

[TEXT]

Vietnamese Refugees.

1. Please pass the following further message to Dr Waldheim from the Prime Minister as soon as possible. Begins.

My dear Secretary General

I was glad to learn that you were taking early soundings about the proposal which I made in my message of 31 May for an early conference about the crisis caused by the inhuman actions of the Vietnamese regime. While I share your view that a conference should be properly prepared I am concerned that there should be no delay.

The actions of the Thai Government in expelling

/Cambodian

Copies to:-

D

CONFIDENTIAL

2

Cambodian refugees and the ~~reported~~ ^{problems} statement on
14 June by ~~Dr Mahathir, the Malaysian Deputy Prime~~ ^{Malaysia}
~~Minister, that Malaysia intends to ship back to~~
~~sea Vietnamese refugees in their country and to~~
~~shoot on sight new boat people entering Malaysian~~
~~waters~~ makes ^{the} the problem of the utmost urgency.
Hong Kong with over 54,000 Vietnamese refugees is
in a very serious situation. We shall continue to
maintain humane policies as long as possible but
Thai and ^{reported} Malaysian actions can only make Hong Kong's
position still more desperate.


I am appealing to the Malaysian Prime Minister
to cooperate in our efforts to find a humane solution,
but if many thousand more lives are not to be lost
we must have very early action by the international
community. May I urge you to take an initiative
now and call an international conference under
your own auspices? Our aim must be to put maximum
pressure on Vietnam and persuade the rest of the
world to help to reduce the appalling human misery
which Vietnamese policies are causing.

Yours sincerely Margaret Thatcher ends.

2. We do not intend to publish this message but
we shall announce that a further message calling
for a very early conference has been sent.

CONFIDENTIAL

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN



18 JUN 1979

CONFIDENTIAL

GR 35

CONFIDENTIAL

FM SEOUL 180500Z JUN 79

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 105 OF 18 JUNE

INFO ROUTINE PEKING HONG KONG (GOV) SINGAPORE WASHINGTON AND
UK MIS GENEVA

YOUR TELEGRAM 69

VIETNAMESE REFUGEES: ROACHBANK

1. KOREAN MFA CONFIRM THAT THEY INSTRUCTED THEIR EMBASSY IN
TAIWAN ON 16 JUNE TO GIVE A WRITTEN GUARANTEE.

TALLBOYS

[COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING ST]

FILES
SEAD
HK & GD
UND
FED
EESD
N AM D
SAD
EID (E)
PUSD
OID
IPD

NEWS D
M & VD
PS
PS/LPS
PS/MR.HURD
PS/MR.BLAKER
PS/PUS
SIR A DUFF
SIR A PARSONS
MR.CORTAZZI
MR.LEAHY
MR.MURRAY

COPIES TO:
HONG KONG GOVT.OFFICE LONDON
MR.WOODFIELD } HOME OFFICE
MR.BURLEIGH } QUEEN ANNE'S GATE
MR.HILLARY } HOME OFFICE
MR.BIRT } LUNAR HOUSE
CROYDON.
MR.V.MCGEE } FAO/ODA

CONFIDENTIAL

Vietnam

CONFIDENTIAL

AD
TRADE
CO

JA



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

18 June 1979

Vietnamese Refugees: MV Norse Viking

Thank you for your letter of 15 June, in which you summarised the solution now proposed by the Japanese for dealing with the 40 Vietnamese refugees on board the MV Norse Viking.

The Prime Minister has seen your letter and agrees with the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary that the solution offered by the Japanese should be accepted.

I should be grateful if you would let me know in due course how many of the 40 refugees on the Norse Viking decide to seek admission to the UK.

I am sending copies of this letter to Tony Butler (Home Office), Tom Harris (Department of Trade) and Martin Vile (Cabinet Office).

B. G. CARTLEDGE

J.S. Wall, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

CONFIDENTIAL

JB



10 DOWNING STREET

Phone Minister

The Foreign and
Commonwealth Office
Resident Clerk and
Mr Sanders thought
that you should be
aware of the current
situation.

Robert G. J.

MB

Res.
Clerk

17/6.

Vietnamese Refugees in Malaysia

The Prime Minister will have seen reports of a statement by the Malaysian Deputy Prime Minister, Dr. Mahathir Mohammed, that Malaysia will ship more than 70,000 Vietnamese refugees already in Malaysia back into international waters and will shoot on sight any "boatpeople" entering Malaysian waters. It has since been reported that some 2,000 refugees have already been towed out to sea. It is not yet clear whether this action represents the continuation of Malaysia's existing policy of turning back new arrivals or the implementation of new policy announced by Dr. Mahathir.

Both Lord Carrington and the Lord Privy Seal have been kept in close touch with the situation and the Lord Privy Seal will make contact with the Prime Minister tomorrow about possible action with the Malaysian Prime Minister and Dr. Waldheim. Lord Carrington will be in Paris tomorrow for the Political Co-operation meeting of the Nine. /

ms

17 June 1979

Vietnam
PA

VIETNAMESE REFUGEES

Geoff Roberts telephoned me at 1500 concerned about the response he should give to press enquiries about the Malaysian statement.

I spoke to Mr. Stiff in South East Asia Department of the Foreign Office. He said that we were urgently seeking clarification from the Malaysian Government and that our High Commission in Kuala Lumpur had been asked to report by first thing Monday morning. News Department had been briefed to make no formal statement beyond that information, since the FCO took the view that it was too early to make a considered statement.

He also said that it would be helpful if the Prime Minister could deal urgently with a letter which had come to her about the Norse Viking. The Japanese Government had, it seemed from the lunch time press reports, agreed to admit the 40 refugees at least temporarily. They still needed to hear from us, however; and the fact that they had admitted the refugees did not mean that they would keep them permanently.

MJS

16 June 1979

GR 120
UNCLASSIFIED
DESKBY 151000Z
FM BANGKOK 150815Z JUN
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TEL NO 389 OF 15 JUNE 79

ms

Prime Minister

*Mr
Key*

INFO KUALA LUMPUR, SINGAPORE, JAKARTA, MANILA, TOKYO, WASHINGTON,
CANBERRA, WELLINGTON, HONG KONG (GOVERNOR), UKMIS GENEVA, UKMIS
NEW YORK, PEKING, MOSCOW.

MY TELEGRAM NO 382. VIETNAMESE REFUGEES.

1. PRIME MINISTER KRIANGSAK TOLD LOCAL PRESS TODAY THAT HE SUPPORTED THE PRIME MINISTER'S IDEA FOR AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE AND HAD TODAY TELEXED A MESSAGE TO MRS THATCHER.
2. HE SAID THAT THE THAI GOVERNMENT WAS READY TO PROPOSE THE USE OF BANGKOK AS THE SITE OF THE CONFERENCE WHICH SHOULD BE HELD IMMEDIATELY. THEY WOULD INVITE ALL THE MAJOR POWERS, THOSE COUNTRIES INVOLVED WITH REFUGEE PROBLEMS AND THE ASEAN COUNTRIES TO PARTICIPATE. THE MESSAGE INFORMED MRS THATCHER OF THE EXTENT OF THE REFUGEE PROBLEM IN THAILAND AND THANKED HER FOR HER INTEREST. THAILAND WELCOMED HER INITIATIVE ON THIS SUBJECT.
3. WE STILL AWAIT COPY OF TEXT.

GORING - MORRIS

[COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING ST]

FILES
SEAD
HK & GD
UND
FED
EESD
N AM D
SAD
EID (E)
PUSD
OID
IPD

NEWS D
M & VD
PS
PS/LPS
PS/MR. HURD
PS/MR. BLAKER
PS/PUS
SIR A DUFF
SIR A PARSONS
MR. CORTAZZI
MR. LEAHY
MR. MURRAY

COPIES TO:
HONG KONG GOVT. OFFICE LONDON

MR. WOODFIELD	}	HOME OFFICE
MR. BURLEIGH		QUEEN ANNE'S GATE
MR. HILLARY	}	HOME OFFICE
MR. BIRT		LUNAR HOUSE CROYDON.
MR. V. MCGEE		FAO/ODA

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FROM SEOUL 150810Z JUN 79

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 103 OF 15 JUNE

INFO PRIORITY GOV HONG KONG WASHINGTON SINGAPORE PEKING AND

UKMIS GENEVA

YOUR TELEGRAM 64

VIETNAMESE REFUGEES

1. THE MFA INFORMED US THIS AFTERNOON THAT THEY HAD HEARD FROM THE ROK EMBASSY IN TAIPEI THAT STEWART HAD ARRIVED AND THAT THE EMBASSY HAD GIVEN HIS ASSISTANCE AS REQUESTED. WE EXPRESSED GRATITUDE FOR THIS.
2. THE MFA WENT ON TO SAY THAT STEWART HAD REPORTED VIA THE KOREAN EMBASSIES IN TAIPEI AND LONDON THAT ALL THE 295 REFUGEES HAD ELECTED TO BE EVACUATED TO THE UK. YOU THEN ASKED THE KOREANS AGAIN TO TRY TO PERSUADE THE TAIWANESE TO ACCEPT SOME OF THEM AND TO ENQUIRE WHETHER OTHERS WISHED TO EMIGRATE TO THE USA.
3. THE ANSWER HAS NOW COME FROM THE KOREAN EMBASSY IN TAIPEI THAT ALL THE REFUGEES STAND BY THEIR WISH TO GO TO THE UK. STEWART HAS PROPOSED TO THE TAIWANESE THAT HE SHOULD ARRANGE THE DESPATCH OF 140 IN THE FIRST INSTANCE, THE REST TO FOLLOW WITHIN 3 WEEKS.
4. THE TAIWANESE HAVE HOWEVER ASKED FOR CONFIRMATION THAT STEWART IS ACTING WITH HMG'S APPROVAL. IN OTHER WORDS THEY DO NOT WISH TO ALLOW THE REFUGEES ASHORE UNLESS THEY ARE CERTAIN THAT HMG WILL ACCEPT THEM ALL. WE REMINDED THE MFA OF THE TEXT OF THE HOME SECRETARY'S STATEMENT OF 11 JUNE BUT APPARENTLY THE TAIWANESE CONSIDER THIS INSUFFICIENT TO COVER THE NEW SITUATION AND ARE DEMANDING AN UNEQUIVOCAL UNDERTAKING. GRATEFUL FOR FURTHER INSTRUCTIONS.

TAKKBOYS

[COPIES SENT TO NO10 DOWNING ST]

FILES

SEAD
HK & GD
UND
FED
EESD
N AM D
SAD
EID (E)
PUSD
OID
IPD

NEWS D
M & VD
PS
PS/LPS
PS/MR. HURD
PS/MR. BLAKER
PS/PUS
SIR A DUFF
SIR A PARSONS
MR. CORTAZZI
MR. LEAHY
MR. MURRAY

COPIES TO:

HONG KONG GOVT. OFFICE LONDON
MR. WOODFIELD } HOME OFFICE
MR. BURLEIGH } QUEEN ANNE'S GATE
MR. HILLARY } HOME OFFICE
MR. BIRT } LUNAR HOUSE
CROYDON.
MR. V. MCGEE } FAO/ODA

CONFIDENTIAL



Prime Minister

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

15 June 1979

Dear Bryan,

We are unlikely to
get any better offer than
the Japanese: accept?

Bill
16/6

Yes out

Vietnamese Refugees: MV Norse Viking

We have over the past weeks been pressing first the Chinese and then the Japanese hard to accept the 40 Vietnamese refugees rescued by the British ship the MV Norse Viking at the end of May. As you know, the Chinese refused to let them land at Whampoa. The boat is now due in Osaka on Saturday.

The Japanese have now suggested a solution. Their position to date, which was agreed by the Japanese Cabinet in December 1978, has been to require a guarantee of resettlement from the flag state of any vessel which comes to Japan with refugees as its second port of call.

The Japanese have now offered to permit the Norse Viking refugees "temporary landing" at Osaka if the British Government will give an assurance that we will give "most sympathetic consideration" to applications from any of the group of refugees who wish to come to the United Kingdom.

This language is identical with that used in the case of a group of 26 Vietnamese boat refugees rescued by the Hong Kong owned vessel "Golden Dolphin" in September 1977. On that occasion none of the refugees eventually settled in the United Kingdom.

Under the formula the Japanese have suggested, and following the 1977 precedents, the refugees would be handed over to UNHCR for processing and resettlement. The Japanese have told us that they understand that 32 of the refugees want to go to the United States, 6 to the UK and 2 to Canada. Any that came here could be absorbed as far as is practicable into the present quota of 1,500.

The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary believes that we should accept the solution which the Japanese have offered.

I am copying this letter to the Private Secretaries to the Home Secretary, the Secretary of State for Trade and to Sir John Hunt.

Yours ever,
Stephen

J S Wall

B G Cartledge Esq
10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL



B/F 27.6.79
File
VH

copy on: Master Set
Hong Kong, June 7,
Visit of Governor.

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

15 June 1979

Dear Sir,

Vietnamese Refugees

When the Governor of Hong Kong, Sir Murray MacLehose, called on the Prime Minister on 14 June at 1800 in the House of Commons, there was some discussion of the problem of Vietnamese refugees. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary was present. I have recorded separately the discussion of the need for reinforcement of the Hong Kong garrison.

The Prime Minister asked Sir Murray MacLehose how the Hong Kong Government could deal with the Chinese and Vietnamese refugees who reached the colony by water. Sir Murray said that it was impossible to send them back. Refugees who were put to sea from Thailand could hope to end up eventually on the virtually unadministered islands of the Indonesian archipelago; but from Hong Kong there was no destination which they could hope to reach. Hong Kong could only do its best to accommodate refugees and hope for some form of international solution to the problem. The Prime Minister asked whether she should not send a further message to the UN Secretary General and Lord Carrington mentioned Mr. Blaker's forthcoming meeting with the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, Mr. Hartling. Sir Murray MacLehose said that he would be asking the Americans to increase their settlement quota for refugees from Hong Kong. It was also essential that the office of the UNHCR in Hong Kong should be enlarged; but the UNHCR was desperately short of funds.

In further discussion, it was agreed that something should be done to make world opinion more aware of the scale of the problem. The Prime Minister suggested that some of the large press corps who would be in Tokyo to cover the Economic Summit should be persuaded to accompany Lord Carrington on his visit to Hong Kong after the Summit meeting. Lord Carrington and Sir Murray MacLehose agreed that this would be valuable, particularly if French and non-aligned journalists could be included in the party. I should be grateful if you would arrange for this possibility to be pursued and for a report in due course on the action taken, for the Prime Minister's information.

/Turning to the

CONFIDENTIAL

gm

CONFIDENTIAL

- 2 -

Turning to the possibility of an international conference on refugees, Sir Murray MacLehose said that its object might be to secure bids from other countries, perhaps spread over a period, on the number of refugees which they would be willing to accept. He hoped that the UK would feel able to make a bid of her own. The Prime Minister explained the difficulties created for the British Government by the pressure of 2 million immigrants on our large cities and by the negative attitude of public opinion. Lord Carrington made the point that if the UK could not offer to take more people, the British Government would at least have to offer to give more money. Any UK offer, either to accept more refugees or to provide more financial help, could of course be made conditional on other countries doing the same. The Prime Minister expressed serious doubt as to whether the UK could offer to take any more refugees; she asked whether ships registered in other countries than the UK picked up large numbers of refugees in the South Pacific. Sir Murray said that they did but that, since it was the policy of the countries concerned to take in refugees so rescued as a matter of policy, less publicity surrounded incidents involving non-UK ships. Lord Carrington commented that a number of UK ships were now changing their usual routes in order to avoid encountering Vietnamese refugees.

Lord Carrington and Sir Murray MacLehose both stressed the difficulties which might arise if the UK, having pressed for an international conference, found herself unable to make a positive contribution to it.

As you know, I have already asked for advice (in my letter to you yesterday) on the position which the Government should adopt towards the next batch of refugees picked up by UK ships (probably those on the Norse Viking) and on whether further action should be taken with the United Nations. ^{PC1}

I am sending copies of this letter to Tony Butler (Home Office), Tom Harris (Department of Trade) and Martin Vile (Cabinet Office).

*Yours we,
Elizabeth*

J.S. Wall, Esq,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

GPS450

CONFIDENTIAL

FROM UKMIS NEW YORK 160025Z JUN 79

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TEL NO 623 OF 15 JUNE

INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON MANILA KUALA LUMPUR SINGAPORE BANGKOK
HONG KONG (FOR GOVERNOR) CANBERRA WELLINGTON TOKYO UKMIS GENEVA
PEKING MOSCOW
INFO SAVING TO HANOI

MIPT AND YOUR TELNO 259: INDO-CHINA REFUGEES

1. THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S COMMENT THAT HE CANNOT CONVENE A FULL SCALE UN CONFERENCE WITHOUT A MANDATE FROM A UN ORGAN IS CORRECT, THOUGH THE DISTINCTION IS IN PRACTICE MORE SEMANTIC THAN REAL. UN CONFERENCES ARE OFTEN OF A SOMEWHAT ROUTINE NATURE AND ATTRACT LIMITED MEDIA INTEREST. IT WOULD BE BETTER TO AIM FOR AN INTERNATIONAL MEETING UNDER THE DIRECT AUSPICES OF AND CHAIRED BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL HIMSELF.

2. A SPECIAL SESSION WOULD IN ITSELF SERVE THE PURPOSE WE WISH, BUT WOULD BE OPEN TO THE OBJECTION WHICH YOU MENTION IN PARA 2A OF YOUR TELEGRAM UNDER REFERENCE. IN ADDITION, IT WOULD PROBABLY NOT BE ATTENDED AT A SUFFICIENTLY HIGH LEVEL (BY RESIDENT MISSIONS HERE DEPLETED FOR ECOSOC IN GENEVA AND THE NON-ALIGNED SUMMIT IN HAVANA). NOTWITHSTANDING ARTICLE 34 OF THE CHARTER, WE THINK IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT TO GET THE SECURITY COUNCIL TO PRODUCE THE RIGHT ANSWER UNLESS THE SITUATION ON THE GROUND DETERIORATES IN SUCH A WAY THAT THERE IS AN EVIDENT THREAT TO PEACE: EVEN THEN IT WOULD BE HIGHLY CONTROVERSIAL. ON THE OTHER HAND, A SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING WOULD AT LEAST FOCUS INTERNATIONAL ATTENTION ON THE PROBLEM, AND EMPHASISE OUR FEELING OF URGENCY, EVEN IF IN THE END IT DID NOT PRODUCE THE DESIRED RESULT.

3. IN ALL THE CIRCUMSTANCES, WALDHEIM'S SUGGESTION IN MIPT SEEMS WORTH PURSUING. AS YOU WILL SEE, IT IS SIMILAR TO THE SUGGESTION IN PARA 3 OF YOUR TELEGRAM UNDER REFERENCE, THOUGH WALDHEIM WOULD CLEARLY HOPE FOR SOMETHING MORE DRAMATIC THAN A MEETING WITH PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVES IN GENEVA: HE WANTS TO PERSUADE MINISTERS TO ATTEND AND REGARDS THE MEETING, EVEN THOUGH OF

CONFIDENTIAL

/only

CONFIDENTIAL

ONLY SHORT DURATION, AS BEING THE CONFERENCE ITSELF RATHER THAN A PREPARATION FOR A CONFERENCE.

4. AS TO WHETHER THERE SHOULD BE TWO CONFERENCES OR ONE, THIS MUST DEPEND TO SOME EXTENT ON THE RELATIVE IMPORTANCE WHICH YOU ATTACH TO OUR TWO OBJECTIVES FOR THE CONFERENCE (PLEDGES OF RESETTLEMENT ASSISTANCE AND PRESSURE ON THE VIETNAMESE). AS WALDHEIM SAYS, A LONGER CONFERENCE MAY BE NECESSARY TO ACHIEVE THE SECOND (AND MANY GOVERNMENTS MAY BE RELUCTANT TO ATTEND IF THE OBJECT IS OVERTLY STATED). IF A POLITICAL CONFERENCE IS OUR MAIN OBJECTIVE HOWEVER, IT WOULD BE BETTER TO WAIT FOR A LATER DATE WHEN MORE TIME WOULD BE AVAILABLE. BUT DELAY WILL MAKE THE RESETTLEMENT PROBLEM WORSE AND THAT SURELY IS THE MOST URGENT PRIORITY.

5. IT WOULD BE HELPFUL IN FURTHER DISCUSSION WITH THE SECRETARY-GENERAL AND HIS STAFF TO RECEIVE ANY IDEAS WHICH YOU HAVE ABOUT PARTICIPATION AND THE KIND OF AGENDA WHICH WOULD BE BEFORE THE CONFERENCE. WOULD ATTENDANCE BY THE VIETNAMESE, THE RUSSIANS, AND THE CHINESE BE ESSENTIAL OR MERELY HIGHLY DESIRABLE? THE SECRETARIAT HAVE JUST TOLD US THAT THE JAPANESE HAVE ANNOUNCED THAT THEY THINK VIETNAM AND CHINA SHOULD BE INVITED AND THAT THEY ARE SENDING EMISSARIES TO THOSE TWO COUNTRIES TO DISCUSS THE PROBLEM.

6. I DETECT A GROWING ENTHUSIASM ON WALDHEIM'S PART OR AT LEAST A FEELING THAT SOMETHING HAS TO BE DONE; AND I WOULD NOT WISH THIS TO BE DAMPENED BY GIVING THE IMPRESSION THAT THE U.K. IS TOO CRITICAL OF HIS EFFORTS SO FAR. THERE ARE PROCEDURAL DIFFICULTIES WHICH HAVE TO BE OVERCOME AND I THINK THAT HE IS NOW GENUINELY TRYING TO GET ROUND THEM AND COME UP WITH A SENSIBLE RESULT.

FCO PASS SAVING TO HANOI.

RICHARD.

[COPIES SENT TO NO10 DOWNING ST]

FILES
SEAD
HK & GD
UND
FED
EESD
N AM D
SAD
EID (E)
PUSD
OID
IPD

NEWS D
M & VD
PS
PS/LPS
PS/MR. HURD
PS/MR. BLAKER
PS/PUS
SIR A DUFF
SIR A PARSONS
MR. CORTAZZI
MR. LEAHY
MR. MURRAY

COPIES TO:
HONG KONG GOVT. OFFICE LONDON
MR. WOODFIELD } HOME OFFICE
MR. BURLEIGH } QUEEN ANNE'S GATE
MR. HILLARY } HOME OFFICE
MR. BIRT } LUNAR HOUSE
CROYDON.

MR. V. MCGEE FAO/ODA

2 [PASSED SAVING AS REQUESTED]

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

2

GA 450

CONFIDENTIAL

FM UKMIS NEW YORK 160016Z JUNE 79

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 621 OF 15 JUNE

INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON MANILA KUALA LUMPUR SINGAPORE BANGKOK
HONG KONG (FOR GOVERNOR) CANBERRA WELLINGTON TOKYO UKMIS GENEVA
PEKING MOSCOW

INFO SAVING HANOI

Prime Minister

Sam 18/6

MY TELNO 611: INDO-CHINA REFUGEES

1. THE SECRETARY-GENERAL SPOKE AGAIN TO MANSFIELD THIS MORNING. HE SEEMS NOW TO BE TAKING AMORE ACTIVE PART AND IS BEGINNING TO SOUND OUT PERMAMENT REPRESENTATIVES HERE IN PARALLEL WITH HARTLING'S CONSULTATIONS IN GENEVA.
2. HE TOLD MANSFIELD THAT HE HAD CONCLUDED IT WOULD BE IMPOSSIBLE TO LAY ON A CONFERENCE TO COINCIDE WITH HIS VISIT TO GENEVA AT THE BEGINNING O JULY. HE COULD RETURN TO GENEVA FROM THE OAU SUMMIT ON 18 JULY AND HOLD THE MEETING IN THE LATTER PART OF THAT WEEK. THE ALTERNATIVE WOULD BE TO AIM FOR A DATE IN AUGUST, AFTER THE END OF THE ECOSOC SESSION THERE (3 AUGUST). HE SEEMED TO PREFER THE EARLIER DATE.
3. HE COMMENTED THAT, UNLESS AUTHORISED TO DO SO BY A UN BODY, HE CANNOT CONVENE A UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE AS SUCH, BUT THAT HE COULD CONVENE A "HIGH LEVEL INTERNATIONAL MEETING" ON HIS OWN INITIATIVE. IF THE PROPOSED MEETING WAS TO BE AT FOREIGN MINISTERS LEVEL, HE DID NOT THINK IT REALISTIC TO AIM AT A DURATION OF MORE THAN TWO TO THREE DAYS. HE WANTED TO KNOW WHAT WE FELT SHOULD BE THE PRINCIPAL AIM OF THE CONFERENCE. IF THE MAIN AIM WAS TO TRY TO EXTRACT PLEDGES FROM GOVERNMENTS, TWO OR THREE DAYS WOULD BE SUFFICIENT. IF, ON THE OTHER HAND, WE WANTED THE CONFERENCE TO EXAMINE THE POLITICAL CAUSES OF THE REFUGEE PROBLEM, THAT COULD ENTAIL PROLONGED AND ACRIMONIOUS DISCUSSION. MANSFIELD STRESSED OUR VIEW THAT THE CONFERENCE SHOULD SEEK TO PURSUE BOTH OBJECTIVES.

14.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

4. WALDHEIM ENQUIRED IF WE HAD ANY SUGGESTIONS AS TO HOW PARTICIPANTS SHOULD BE SELECTED. IT WAS AGREED THAT ONE OF THE POSSIBILITIES, WOULD BE TO INVITE THE RECIPIENTS OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S MESSAGE OF 25 MAY (ABOUT 52), ANOTHER MIGHT BE TO INVITE ALL MEMBERS STATES ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT MANY WOULD NOT TURN UP.

5. WALDHEIM ENVISAGED PRESIDING OVER THE OPENING OF WHATEVER CONFERENCE MIGHT BE CALLED WHICH WOULD THEN ELECT ITS OWN CHAIRMAN, BUT HE DID NOT DEMUR WHEN MANSFIELD SUGGESTED THAT HE SHOULD PRESIDE THROUGHOUT.

6. WALDHEIM ALSO SAID THAT THE THAIS HAD OFFERED BANGKOK AS THE VENUE OF THE CONFERENCE. HE THOUGHT IT WOULD BE UNWISE TO HOLD THE CONFERENCE IN ONE OF THE COUNTRIES MOST DIRECTLY AFFECTED.

7. FOR COMMENTS SEE MIFT.

FCO PASS INFO SAVING HANOI.

RICHARD

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

[COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING ST]

FILES
SEAD
HK & GD
UND
FED
EESD
N AM D
SAD
EID (E)
PUSD
OID
IPD

NEWS D
M & VD
PS
PS/LPS
PS/MR.HURD
PS/MR.BLAKER
PS/PUS
SIR A DUFF
SIR A PARSONS
MR.CORTAZZI
MR.LEAHY
MR.MURRAY

COPIES TO:
HONG KONG GOVT.OFFICE LONDON
MR.WOODFIELD } HOME OFFICE
MR.BURLEIGH } QUEEN ANNE'S GATE
MR.HILLARY } HOME OFFICE
MR.BIRT } LUNAR HOUSE
CROYDON.
MR.V.MCGEE } FAO/ODA

2
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

15 June, 1979

Dear Tom,

*Norman
JSH
15/6*

Vietnamese Refugees

Thank you for sending me a copy of your letter of 8 June to John Chilcott .

Since you wrote, the Government have agreed to accept refugees from this vessel who are not accepted by Taiwan. The matter should soon be resolved, therefore, although, despite all our efforts, we have not yet ascertained how many of the refugees will have to be admitted.

The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary does not think it would be realistic to have a tacit understanding for the Government to be responsible for taking refugees off a vessel if the vessel's country of first port of call refused to accept them.

Lord Carrington also sees great difficulty in the idea that the Government should reimburse companies for costs involved while diplomatic representations were made to other countries. As we know from the Roachbank and Norse Viking affairs, our efforts with other countries are likely to be difficult and protracted. To do as Mr Ropner suggests would involve an open-ended commitment.

The GCBS are of course likely to come back at the Government on the question of their members' financial losses. We would not discourage them from seeking reimbursement from UNHCR for some of the costs though the UNHCR may well refuse to accept responsibility.


Copies of this letter go to Bryan Cartledge (No 10), John Chilcott (Home Office) and Martin Vile (Cabinet Office).

*Yours ever,
Stephen*

J S Wall
Private Secretary

T G Harris Esq
Private Secretary
Department of Trade
London S W 1

CONFIDENTIAL



11 12 1
2 3 4
5 6 7 8 9

15 JUN 1979



Original in G/Loms VLB
cc Ho

10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

15 June 1979

Dear Mr. Lee,

Thank you for your letter of 4 June about the admission of Vietnamese refugees to this country.

I fully recognise the unfortunate circumstances in which many of these people find themselves. I am sure you are right in saying that the overall situation requires international action and, as the Home Secretary said in the House of Commons on 11 June, we will continue to bring to bear the maximum international pressure on Vietnam. The Home Secretary also announced our decision that, in addition to those from the MV "Sibonga", those refugees on board the MV "Roachbank" who are not accepted by Taiwan will be brought to this country as soon as possible.

I am very grateful for the work which your organisation has undertaken in the reception of the refugees from the Sibonga and I gladly echo the tribute which the Home Secretary paid to the voluntary bodies generally during his statement last Monday.

Yours sincerely
Margaret Thatcher

Kenneth Lee, Esq.

to

REFUGEES & DISPLACED PERSONS FROM INDOCHINA ACCEPTED FOR SETTLEMENT^a

AS OF 1 MAY 1979

<u>Country</u>	<u>Number accepted (1000)</u>	<u>Area (1000 sq. m.)</u>	<u>Number per 1000 sq. m.</u>	<u>Rank</u>
China	230	3,706	62	6
Taiwan	1 ^b	13.8	72	5
U.S.A.	217	3,614	60	7
France	48.8	213	229	2
Australia	19.5	2,968	6.6	18
Canada	14.4	3,560	4.0	19
Hong Kong	8 ^c	0.4	20,000	1
Germany	3.5	96.0	38	8
U.K.	2.2	94.2	23	12
Malaysia	1.6	128	12.5	14
Switzerland	1.5	15.9	94	4
Belgium	1.3	11.8	110	3
Norway	0.9	125	7.2	17
N. Zealand	0.8	104	7.7	16
Denmark	0.6	16.6	36	9
Netherlands	0.38	15.9	24	11
Austria	0.34	32.4	10.4	15
Italy	0.25	116	2.2	20
Israel	0.17	8.0	21	13
Japan	0.05	143	0.4	21
Luxembourg	0.03	1.0	30	10
Others	0.7			
Total	553	(including more than 70,000 boat people)		

REFUGEES & DISPLACED PERSONS FROM INDOCHINA IN COUNTRIES OF TEMPORARY ASYLUM

IN NEED OF (RE)SETTLEMENT^d ON 1 MAY 1979

(thousands of persons)

Thailand	149	(of whom 3,126 boat people)
Malaysia	54.1	
Hong Kong	20.2 ^e	
Indonesia	11.7	
Macau	1.8	
Philippines	1.6	
Japan	0.4	
Singapore	0.3	
Other countries	0.1	
Total	239.2	(of whom 79,514 boat people)

^a These figures exclude refugees "sur place", i.e. those who were in the country of settlement at the time of the change of régime in South Vietnam. They include refugees accepted by the country of resettlement but still awaiting departure in the country of temporary asylum.

^b Estimate.

^c Estimate of the Hong Kong Government.

^d These figures exclude persons who are still in the country of temporary asylum, but have been accepted for resettlement by another country and are merely awaiting departure. They total some 12,500 persons, of whom 9,463 are boat people.

^e Plus 2,661 persons on "Skyluck" still awaiting permission to land.


PART 2 begins:-

PM to K. Lee.
~~ECO to D. Trade~~ 15.6.79

PART 1 ends:-

Home Office to D. Trade 14.6.79





END

Filmed at the National
Archives (TNA) in London

February 2010