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ZAIRE

(Call on MT by Foreign
Minister of)

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Visit of Foreign Minister, Mr. NGUZA.

ZAIRE

NOVEMBER 1979

Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date
13. 11. 79							
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Zaire



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

13 November, 1979.

Visit by the Foreign Minister of Zaire

As you know, Mr. Nguza called on the Prime Minister this evening to deliver a personal message from President Mobutu. In the event, the only letter that Mr. Nguza had with him was the enclosed letter of introduction. The substantive message was an oral one. This is set out in the attached record of Mr. Nguza's talk with the Prime Minister.

M. O'D. B. ALEXANDER

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G.G.H. Walden, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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Rhodesia Sitn Pt 9

RECORD OF A TALK BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER AND THE FOREIGN MINISTER
OF THE REPUBLIC OF ZAIRE, MR. NGUZA KARL-I-BOND, AT 10 DOWNING STREET
ON 13 NOVEMBER, 1979, AT 1800

Present:

Prime Minister

Mr. Nguza

Mr. M.O'D.B. Alexander

H.E. M. Matungulu N'Kuman Tavun

The Prime Minister thanked Mr. Nguza for taking the trouble to come to London, and asked him to convey to President Mobutu her gratitude for the positive interest he was taking in the problems of Rhodesia. Mr. Nguza said that the Government of Zaire felt closely involved in the Rhodesian problem in both a physical and moral sense. They were close in a physical sense because of the obvious facts of geography. They were close in a moral sense because they themselves had suffered too much at the time of gaining independence, and did not wish to see others going down the same path. The Prime Minister could feel assured of the friendship and support of the Zaire Government in her efforts to find a solution in Rhodesia.

The Prime Minister said that she was hopeful that decisions might be taken in the next day or two. Mr. Nguza said that he had seen both Bishop Muzorewa and Mr. Nkomo in the course of the day. He had given them President Mobutu's message which was that they should take care not to let the conference fail. The people of Rhodesia would never forgive them if the present opportunity was missed. Bishop Muzorewa had replied that he had agreed to everything that had been asked of him. He had gone on to say that if Lord Carrington so wished, he remained willing to make further concessions. The Prime Minister commented that Bishop Muzorewa had already made great concessions. The problem lay with the unwillingness of the other side to allow progress to be made. Could Mr. Nguza do anything to help with Mr. Nkomo and Mr. Mugabe.

/ Mr. Nguza

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Mr. Nguza said that he had been into considerable detail with Mr. Nkomo about the various outstanding problems. Mr. Nkomo had left him with the impression that none of the problems were likely to prove insurmountable. Although he would not take a final decision until he was sure that nothing more could be extracted from the situation, he intended to accept the British Government's proposals. He asked Mr. Nguza to pass this message to President Mobutu.

Mr. Nguza said that Mr. Nkomo attached importance to having some of "his boys" inside Rhodesia. They should be there not as a guerrilla or rebel army, but on the same basis as the other forces. He was thinking in terms of bringing in two or three brigades from Zambia. The Prime Minister said that Mr. Nkomo already had a considerable number of his men inside Rhodesia. If there were a ceasefire, they would have to be assembled at a specific point. Once they were assembled, Britain would be responsible for housing and feeding them. Subsequently, we would help with rehabilitation and resettlement. We assumed that most of the men would go home. Some would no doubt wish to become full-time soldiers: it would be for the new Government to deal with the amalgamation of the three armies. Mr. Nguza strongly agreed that the three armies could not continue in being after independence.

The Prime Minister said that she was hoping the discussion on the interim could come to an end on the following day. Bishop Muzorewa had been away from Salisbury too long, and would probably wish to return at the end of the week. Satisfactory arrangements could be made if the will was there. The length of the transition should not be a problem; the proposed period was very close to three months.

Mr. Nguza repeated that Mr. Nkomo had asked him to tell President Mobutu that he would be back in Salisbury. Mr. Nkomo still had some "psychological problems" with his people. He

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was worried about the return of the refugees and their registration for the elections. Mr. Nguza had told him this was no problem. Mr. Nguza had also told him that two to three months gave ample time in which to prepare for the elections. He had the impression that this was not a big problem for Mr. Nkomo. The Prime Minister commented that Mr. Nkomo was very well known in Rhodesia.

Mr. Nguza said that he had not seen Mr. Mugabe in London on this visit, but that he had seen him in the Netherlands two weeks previously. He had told Mr. Mugabe that if he were to cause a breakdown of the Conference by adopting an excessively hard policy, many African leaders, including President Mobutu, would blame him. Mr. Mobutu had denied that he was causing problems and had undertaken to be more flexible. Mr. Nguza said that if Mr. Nkomo were to settle, Mr. Mugabe would, however reluctantly, follow him. He had no choice.

Mr. Nguza said that, in the course of his talks during the day, he had tried to bring Bishop Muzorewa and Mr. Nkomo together. Bishop Muzorewa had said that he was willing to talk to Mr. Nkomo. If Mr. Nkomo wanted to go with him, he was "my brother". Mr. Nkomo had said that the past was the past and might perhaps be forgotten. He would talk to his "boys". Mr. Nguza said that when he had last seen Lord Carrington he had told him that he thought there would be an agreement on the constitution within two or three days, and there had been. His feeling now was that the Patriotic Front would accept Britain's proposals with only very minor changes. For example, acceptance of a three-month interim and some stepping up of the Commonwealth monitoring force. Acceptance would not necessarily come within two or three days, but it would come. The Prime Minister said that if this result were achieved, most of the credit would go to the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary and to his helpers in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. Despite the length of the negotiations and

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
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the large number of people involved, she had never heard a word of criticism about the way things had been done. Mr. Nguza agreed.

The Prime Minister then asked about the attitude of the neighbouring countries. Mr. Nguza said that President Kaunda wanted the problem resolved as rapidly as possible. President Nyerere was also very positive; more so than President Machel. There were differences between President Nyerere and Mr. Mugabe. President Nyerere did not regard the Patriotic Front as the sole representative of the people of Zimbabwe, and was in favour of elections whatever their outcome. He had told President Mobutu during a recent meeting, attended by Mr. Nguza, that if Ian Smith were elected Prime Minister in a free and fair election, he would be received in Tanzania.

In the course of a brief discussion about Zaire Mr. Nguza said that there would be an important meeting in Brussels next month to discuss Zaire's economic problems and to try to agree on aid to enable the Zairean economy to take off. There was a need to restore confidence in Zaire. In this context Mr. Nguza said that recent talk about massacres in Zaire was proving very damaging. President Mobutu denied that any massacre had taken place, and had made it clear that he would welcome any international commission which wished to come to investigate the situation. Mr. Nguza would be meeting Mr. Ennals on the following day to invite Amnesty to send a team to Zaire.

The meeting ended at 1835.



13 November, 1979.

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

13 November 1979

Dear Michael,

Handwritten initials/signature

Visit by Foreign Minister of Zaire

I enclose a short brief for Mr Nguza's call on the Prime Minister this evening. Mr Luce will be giving a lunch for Mr Nguza today, and we hope to arrange for him to call on Lord Carrington or Sir Ian Gilmour tomorrow.

The purpose of Mr Nguza's visit to London is to deliver a personal message from President Mobutu to the Prime Minister about Rhodesia. We have told the Zairean Embassy that it has not been easy to fit in a call at No 10 at such short notice, and to expect a meeting of about 15 minutes; and have suggested that any substantive discussions should take place with FCO Ministers.

Yours ever

Handwritten signature: Paul Lyne

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(R M J Lyne)
Private Secretary

M O'D B Alexander Esq
10 Downing Street
LONDON

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POINTS TO MAKE

VISIT OF FOREIGN MINISTER OF ZAIRE: 13/15 NOVEMBER

1. Welcome M. Nguza as a special emissary of President Mobutu. Recall that M. Nguza paid official visit to London at beginning of October.
2. Grateful for helpful attitude shown by Zaire over difficult problem of Rhodesia. Wish to keep Zaire fully informed - hence message of 8 November. Will study President Mobutu's reply with great care.
3. Conference at crucial point. Patriotic Front must decide now whether they can accept arrangements for interim. Realise some aspects difficult for them, but we are convinced these arrangements are only basis on which agreement is possible. Muzorewa has made important concessions: Front must also compromise. Nkomo seems more interested in elections than Mugabe. If Front do not agree interim arrangements, we shall have to go ahead without them.
4. [Defensive]. Britain is aware of Zaire's economic problems. We shall be represented at the meeting in Brussels on 28/29 November to discuss Zaire's plans for economic recovery.

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Essential Facts

- Flag A 1. The Prime Minister sent a message to President Mobutu on 8 November about Rhodesia. Mobutu has sent his reply by hand of his Foreign Minister (Nguza) to emphasise the importance he attaches to the Rhodesia problem. The Prime Minister has agreed to see M. Nguza at 6.00 pm on Tuesday, 13 November.
2. Zaire has shown a consistently helpful attitude over Rhodesia. Although President Mobutu does not carry much weight with other African states, Zaire is one of the few African countries which might support a settlement not endorsed by the Patriotic Front.
3. M. Nguza, although only 41, is a well-known African politician. He became Foreign Minister in 1972; was sentenced to death for treason in 1977; and was subsequently reprieved and re-appointed Foreign Minister in March 1979. He has visited Britain on several occasions, most recently in October 1979, when he was seen by the Secretary of State. He speaks fluent English.
- Flag B 4. Zaire's economy is in a mess. But the IMF concluded a standby arrangement in August, and meetings between creditor banks to discuss the rescheduling of Zaire's commercial debts are due to be held shortly. The Belgians have called a meeting of interested governments in Brussels on 28/29 November, and we shall be represented at official level.

Central African Department
12 November 1979

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TO IMMEDIATE CAIRO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 461 OF 8 NOVEMBER

AND TO IMMEDIATE TUNIS RABAT DAKAR LILONGWE YAOUNDE KINSHASA

LIBREVILLE ABIDJAN MASERU KHARTOUM BANJUL

INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON PARIS UKMIS NEW YORK ADDIS ABABA

LAGOS LUSAKA DAR ES SALAAM MAPUTO PRETORIA.

RHODESIA.

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF PERSONAL MESSAGE FROM PRIME MINISTER TO PRESIDENT (RABAT : KING HASSAN) WHICH ACTION ADDRESSEES SHOULD ARRANGE TO DELIVER AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. IN ANY DISCUSSION ARISING FROM THIS MESSAGE YOU SHOULD DRAW ON MY TELEGRAM NO 1584 TO WASHINGTON. YOU MAY AT YOUR DISCRETION MAKE IT CLEAR THAT IF THE PATRIOTIC FRONT ARE UNWILLING TO PUT THEIR POLITICAL SUPPORT TO THE TEST IN ELECTIONS HELD UNDER THE AUTHORITY OF A BRITISH GOVERNOR, THEY CAN NOT BE PERMITTED UNILATERALLY TO DECIDE THAT RHODESIA SHOULD REMAIN IN A STATE OF ILLEGALITY, THAT THE PEOPLE OF RHODESIA SHOULD BE FURTHER PUNISHED FOR THE ILLEGAL INDEPENDENCE OR THAT THEY SHOULD BE DEPRIVED OF THE OPPORTUNITY OF BEING BROUGHT TO LEGAL INDEPENDENCE UNDER OUR AUTHORITY.

2. MESSAGE BEGINS.

I KNOW THAT YOU WILL HAVE BEEN FOLLOWING CLOSELY THE PROGRESS OF THE RHODESIA CONFERENCE AT LANCASTER HOUSE. THE PURPOSE OF THAT CONFERENCE IS TO BRING RHODESIA TO INDEPENDENCE ON THE BASIS OF GENUINE MAJORITY RULE. WE ARE ALSO ENGAGED IN A DETERMINED EFFORT TO SEE IF IT IS POSSIBLE TO BRING AN END TO THE WAR AND IN CONSEQUENCE TO ENABLE US AND OTHER COUNTRIES TO CONTRIBUTE TO A JOINT EFFORT TO SOLVE THE REFUGEE PROBLEM WHICH HAS BEEN CREATED BY IT.

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WE HAVE REACHED AGREEMENT WITH ALL THE PARTIES AT THE CONFERENCE ON THE ~~THE~~ INDEPENDENCE CONSTITUTION, WHICH INDISPUTABLY PROVIDES FOR GENUINE MAJORITY RULE, WITH APPROPRIATE SAFEGUARDS FOR THE RIGHTS OF INDIVIDUALS AND MINORITIES. IT IS A CONSTITUTION WHICH, WHEN IT IS IMPLEMENTED, WILL FULFIL THE ASPIRATIONS FOR WHICH NATIONALIST LEADERS IN RHODESIA HAVE BEEN STRIVING FOR MANY YEARS.

THE QUESTION OF MAJORITY RULE, WHICH WAS THE CAUSE OF THE WAR, HAS THEREFORE BEEN RESOLVED. THE QUESTION NOW AT ISSUE IS WHO IS TO EXERCISE POWER UNDER THE INDEPENDENCE CONSTITUTION. THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT BELIEVE THAT THE CHOICE OF THEIR FUTURE GOVERNMENT MUST BE LEFT TO THE PEOPLE OF RHODESIA TO DECIDE IN FREE ELECTIONS SUPERVISED BY THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT AND HELD UNDER OUR AUTHORITY. WE HAVE MADE PROPOSALS TO ENABLE SUCH ELECTIONS TO BE HELD. THE KEY ELEMENT IN THEM IS THE APPOINTMENT OF A BRITISH GOVERNOR IN WHOM EXECUTIVE AND LEGISLATIVE AUTHORITY WILL BE VESTED UNTIL INDEPENDENCE. BISHOP MUZOREWA AND HIS COLLEAGUES HAVE DECLARED THEIR READINESS TO HAND OVER THEIR MINISTERIAL POWERS TO THE GOVERNOR AND TO PUT THEIR POLITICAL STANDING TO THE TEST IN ELECTIONS HELD UNDER HIS AUTHORITY. THIS WAS A DIFFICULT DECISION FOR THEM TO TAKE. BUT THEY HAVE DONE IT IN THE INTERESTS OF PEACE AND THE WELFARE OF THEIR COUNTRYMEN AND OF ENABLING RHODESIA TO BE BROUGHT TO INDEPENDENCE WITH WIDE INTERNATIONAL ACCEPTANCE.

THE PATRIOTIC FRONT HAVE NOT YET AGREED TO OUR PROPOSALS : WITH YOUR HELP, WE HOPE THAT THEY WILL DO SO. THEY ARE BEING ASKED, ON A STRICTLY EQUAL BASIS, TO PUT THEIR POLITICAL SUPPORT TO THE TEST IN ELECTIONS HELD UNDER OUR AUTHORITY. OUR CONCERN IN BRINGING ALL OUR OTHER FORMER DEPENDENT TERRITORIES TO INDEPENDENCE HAS ALWAYS BEEN TO CREATE THE CONDITIONS FOR INDEPENDENCE AND NOT TO FAVOUR THE CLAIMS OF ONE PARTY OR THE OTHER. THE PRESENT BRITISH GOVERNMENT IS DETERMINED TO DISCHARGE ITS CONSTITUTIONAL RESPONSIBILITY TO BRING RHODESIA TO LEGAL INDEPENDENCE : AND WE ARE IN A POSITION TO DO SO.

I F THE PATRIOTIC FRONT AGREE TO THE PROPOSALS WE HAVE PUT FORWARD ON THE PRE-INDEPENDENCE PERIOD, WE WILL ARRANGE NEGOTIATIONS ON A CEASE-FIRE INCLUDING THE MILITARY COMMANDERS ON BOTH SIDES. WE ENVISAGE THAT THERE WILL BE A CEASE-FIRE COMMISSION, UNDER THE GOVERNOR, WITH REPRESENTATIVES OF THE MILITARY COMMANDERS OF THE RHODESIAN SECURITY FORCES AND THE PATRIOTIC FRONT. THERE WILL BE ARRANGEMENTS TO MONITOR THE CEASE-FIRE, UNDER BRITISH AUSPICES, WITH THE PARTICIPATION OF SOME OTHER COMMONWEALTH GOVERNMENTS.

IT IS MY HOPE THAT THE PARTIOTIC FRONT WILL AGREE TO TAKE PART IN THE ELECTIONS. THEY WILL BE GIVEN EVERY OPPORTUNITY TO PRESENT THEIR CASE TO THE PEOPLE OF RHODESIA. WE SHALL GRANT INDEPENDENCE TO WHATEVER GOVERNMENT EMERGES FROM THE ELECTIONS: BUT WE SHALL NOT BE PREPARED TO TRANSFER POWER TO ANY PARTY WHICH IS NOT READY TO WIN IT IN ELECTIONS.

I KNOW THAT THIS IS A SUBJECT OF GREAT CONCERN TO ALL AFRICAN LEADERS. IF OUR PROPOSALS ARE REJECTED, I DO NOT BELIEVE THAT IT WILL BE POSSIBLE TO REACH AGREEMENT ON ANY OTHER BASIS. I HOPE THAT YOU WILL JOIN ME IN URGING THE PATRIOTIC FRONT TO TAKE THIS OPPORTUNITY TO REACH A FAIR AND HONOURABLE SOLUTION TO THE RHODESIA PROBLEM.

MESSAGE ENDS.

CARRINGTON

F I L E S

RHODESIA D
OADS
NAD
PUSD
PLANNING STAFF
ES & SD
CCD
FRD
UND
LEGAL ADVISERS
(MR FREELAND)
(MR FIFOOT)
ECON D
PCD
DEF D
OID

NEWS D
PS
PS/SIR I GILMOUR
PS/MR LUCE
PS/MR RIDLEY
PS/MR HURD
PS/PUS

SIR J GRAHAM
LORD N G LENNOX
MISS BROWN
MR DAY
MR WILLSON
MR ASPIN

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION
RHODESIA POLICY

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Mr Sankey (Central African Department)

Call by the Foreign Minister of Zaire

Lord Carrington had a private discussion for a quarter of an hour this morning with Mr Nguza before the main session of talks, which you will be recording separately.

Nguza was clearly delighted to receive the insignia of GCMG to replace those which he lost when charged with treason.

Nguza told Lord Carrington that he had met Joshua Nkomo this morning and would be seeing Bishop Muzorewa this afternoon. He had urged Nkomo not to reject any of the proposals put forward by the British Government, and in so doing had referred to the views recently expressed to him by Mr Vance, Representative Solarz and other members of the US Congress. Nkomo told him that the Patriotic Front would be giving a qualified 'yes' to the British constitutional proposals at the Lancaster House session later today.

Nguza commented that Nkomo was most anxious to extract some personal advantage from the negotiations - ie by becoming the Prime Minister or Executive President. Nguza had told Nkomo that he thought the British and Americans liked him. Nkomo had replied to the effect that he had a similar impression, though neither the British nor the Americans had told him so directly.

Lord Carrington agreed that the Patriotic Front were likely to accept the constitutional proposals, but warned Nguza that discussion of the pre-independence arrangements would be very difficult. He thanked Nguza warmly for the help which he personally and his government had given over Rhodesia, and asked that his thanks should be conveyed to President Mobutu.

RM/Lyner

(R M J Lyne)

PS

VISIT BY FOREIGN MINISTER OF ZAIRE

1. I met M. Nguza on arrival at Heathrow this morning. He was delighted to hear that the Prime Minister would receive him at 6.00 pm today, and that he would be having lunch with his 'good friend', Mr Luce.

2. I asked M. Nguza about the message he was bringing from President Mobutu. He said that this covered three main points:


- (i) Governor: Mobutu was anxious that the Governor should have executive authority and not simply be a diplomatic representative. He also hoped that there would be a council to enable the African politicians to tender advice. I assured him that the Governor would have full legal and executive authority, and that all parties would be represented on the Elections Council which would advise the Governor.
- (ii) Transitional Period: Mobutu considered that the six month period requested/ ^{by the} Patriotic Front was too long, while the two month period proposed by Britain was possibly too short. He considered that three months would be a reasonable compromise. I said that the British proposals envisaged a period of two to three weeks after the arrival of the Governor for the ceasefire to come into effect, after which the two month period would begin. Thus the whole transitional period would be about three months.
- (iii) Control of the Police and Observance of the Ceasefire: M. Nguza said that the Patriotic Front representatives were concerned about the impartiality of the police and military. I explained that the British proposals envisaged the appointment of a very senior British

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police officer as police adviser to the Governor, and the stationing of a significant number of British police officers in district police headquarters. In addition, the ceasefire would be observed by a monitoring group of several hundred military personnel drawn from Commonwealth countries. M. Nguza said that these arrangements ought to satisfy the Patriotic Front.

3. M. Nguza said that he had been instructed by President Mobutu to see Nkomo (he will be staying in the same hotel) and Bishop Muzorewa. He would urge Nkomo to accept any reasonable British proposals on the transitional period and ceasefire arrangements, and would urge Bishop Muzorewa to show flexibility if there was some final sticking point. He was prepared to see Mugabe as well if we thought this would be helpful.



John A Sankey
Central African Department

13 November 1979

cc.
PS/Mr Luce
Mr Aspin
Rhodesia Dept.

13 NOV 1979





SUBJECT

cf Mante
Op.
Mordavia bit 1+9

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T139A | 79T

Le Président

Kinshasa, le 11 novembre 1979.

A Son Excellence
Madame Margaret THATCHER M.P.
Premier Ministre Britannique

L O N D R E S

Madame le Premier Ministre,

C'est avec un bien réel plaisir que J'ai reçu et lu Votre dernière lettre, dans laquelle Vous avez eu l'extrême amabilité d'évoquer le problème du règlement politique au Zimbabwe.


J'ai toujours apprécié, à leur juste valeur, les efforts considérables que Votre Gouvernement ne cesse de déployer pour dénouer cette délicate question.

Et, comme Vous l'avez indiqué Vous-même, J'accorde aussi personnellement toute l'importance voulue à ce problème.

Voilà pourquoi J'ai estimé nécessaire de dépêcher auprès de Votre Excellence, Mon Commissaire d'Etat aux Affaires Etrangères, le Citoyen NGUZA KARL-i-BOND, que J'ai chargé de Vous transmettre, de vive voix, Mes avis et suggestions sur cette question.

En Vous renouvelant tous Mes vœux de succès et, dans l'espoir que nos relations bilatérales vont se renforcer davantage, Je Vous prie de croire, Madame le Premier Ministre, à l'expression de Ma très haute considération.

LE PRESIDENT-FONDATEUR DU MOUVEMENT POPULAIRE
DE LA REVOLUTION, PRESIDENT DE LA REPUBLIQUE,


MOBUTU SESE SEKO KUKU NGBENDU WA ZA BANGA,
Général de Corps d'Armée.





END

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Archives (TNA) in London

February 2010