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PREM 19/134

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Confidential Filing

internal Situation. Soviet military intervention

AFGHANISTAN

Part 1:

December 1979

Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date
1.1.80							
3.1.80.							
7.1.80							
4.1.80							
6.1.80							
ends							
PREM 19/134							

PART 1 ends:-

Fm UKmis New York to Fco Tel: 39 6.1.80.

PART 2 begins:-

Fm Moscow to Fco Tel: 15 7.1.80.

Afghanistan

- PS
- PS/LPS
- PS/MR BLAKER
- PS/MR LUCE
- PS/MR HURD
- PS/PUS
- SIR D MAITLAND
- MR CORTAZZI
- MR FERGUSSON
- MR MURRAY
- MR BULLARD
- HD/SAD
- HD/EESD
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- HD/MED
- HD/NENAD
- HD/NEWS DEPT
- LORD N. G. LENNIX
- MR P. H. MOBILLY

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CONFIDENTIAL

DESKBY 070900Z

FROM UKRIS NEW YORK 070130Z JAN 80

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 39 OF 6 JANUARY

INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON PARIS BONN ROME OTTAWA DACCA ISLAMABAD
AND MOSCOW

MY TELNO 26 (NOT TO ALL):
AFGHANISTAN: UNITING FOR PEACE.

1. BOTH KAISER (BANGLADESH) AND NAIK (PAKISTAN) ARE VERY KEEN TO GO STRAIGHT TO THE ASSEMBLY UNDER THE UNITING FOR PEACE PROCEDURE IMMEDIATELY AFTER A SOVIET VETO IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL. THEY ARE BEING EGGED ON BY THE CHINESE. I HAVE TOLD KAISER THAT THIS MUST BE A GENUINE NON-ALIGNED EXERCISE: IF THERE IS ANY SIGN OF A WESTERN HAND BEHIND IT, THERE COULD BE A FIASCO I.E. A SMALL MAJORITY IN THE ASSEMBLY FOR AN EVEN WEAKER RESOLUTION THAN THE ONE WHICH HE HAS PRESENTED TO THE COUNCIL. THIS RESULT WOULD, IN UN TERMS, BE VERY ENCOURAGING TO THE RUSSIANS. THEY WOULD CONCLUDE THAT THEY CAN GET AWAY WITH ALMOST ANYTHING WITHOUT SERIOUS TROUBLE FROM THE THIRD WORLD HERE.

2. I INTEND TO REINFORCE THESE POINTS WITH NAIK TOMORROW. I WILL ARGUE THAT HE MUST NOT RUSH THINGS AND THAT CAREFUL

WILL ARGUE THAT HE MUST NOT RUSH THINGS AND THAT CAREFUL PREPARATION IS NECESSARY. I WILL POINT OUT THAT, IN THE COUNCIL DEBATE, ALTHOUGH THE NON-ALIGNED STATEMENTS HAVE ON THE WHOLE BEEN GOOD, ONLY THREE (EGYPT, LIBERIA AND SOMALIA) OF THE 50 AFRICANS HAVE SPOKEN AND THAT, APART FROM EGYPT AND SOMALIA ONLY ONE ARAB, SAUDI ARABIA, HAS SPOKEN. I WILL SUGGEST THAT HE SPEND SOME DAYS IF NECESSARY CANVASSING ACTIVE SUPPORT AMONGST THE MASS OF NON-ALIGNED WHO HAVE SO FAR HELD BACK. I WILL SAY THAT THE ISLAMIC CONFERENCE WHICH MEETS NEXT WEEK IN JEDDA MIGHT PROVE A GOOD LAUNCHING PLATFORM FOR FURTHER UN ACTION: A STRONG AND UNITED DECLARATION FROM THE CONFERENCE WOULD PUT BACKBONE INTO THE ARABS AND OTHER MOSLEMS.

3. GIVEN THE JITTERS WHICH KAISER'S RESOLUTION HAS GIVEN THE NON-ALIGNED IN THE COUNCIL, I WILL ALSO SAY THAT IF NAIK AND KAISER NEVERTHELESS DECIDE TO GO TOMORROW FOR A SNAP DECISION OF THE COUNCIL TO CALL FOR AN EMERGENCY SPECIAL SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY, THEY MUST MAKE ABSOLUTELY SURE THAT THEY HAVE NINE VOTES (RULE 8(B) OF THE GA RULES OF PROCEDURE). THE ALTERNATIVE OF TRYING TO GET AFGHANISTAN INSCRIBED ON THE AGENDA OF THE CURRENT GA SESSION SEEMS TO BE RULED OUT, BECAUSE SALIM INTENDS TO WIND IT UP TOMORROW MORNING IF POSSIBLE AND, IN ANY CASE, AN ATTEMPT TO USE THE REGULAR SESSION WOULD LEAD TO HEAVY PROCEDURAL BATTLES IN THE GENERAL COMMITTEE AND THE PLENARY WHICH MIGHT DAUNT MANY MEMBERS AT THE OUTSET.

PARSONS

IMMEDIATE

NNNN

AFGHANISTAN [ADVANCE COPIES]

- 30

IMMEDIATE

PS

PS/LPS

PS/MR BLAKER

PS/MR LUCE

PS/MR HURD

PS/PUS

SIR D MAITLAND

MR CORTAZZI

MR FERGUSSON

MR MURRAY

MR BULLARD

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LORD N. G. LENNOX

MR P. H. MOBERLY

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CABINET OFFICE

IMMEDIATE

FROM UKMIS NEW YORK 062102Z JAN 80

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 37 OF 6 JANUARY

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON PARIS BONN OTTAWA MOSCOW KABUL PEKING
OSLO LISBON DACCA LUSAKA KINGSTON MANILA TUNIS ABIDJAN EAST BERLIN
ISLAMABAD NEW DELHI UKDEL NATO

MY 2 IPTS: AFGHANISTAN: SECURITY COUNCIL

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF REVISED NON-ALIGNED DRAFT RESOLUTION
REFERRED TO IN PARAGRAPH 2 OF MY FIRST IPT:

BEGINS

HAVING CONSIDERED THE LETTER DATED 3 JANUARY 1980
ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL (S/13724
AND ADD. 1 AND 2),

GRAVELY CONCERNED OVER RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN
AFGHANISTAN AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE
AND SECURITY,

REAFFIRMING THE RIGHT OF ALL PEOPLES TO DETERMINE THEIR
OWN FUTURE FREE FROM OUTSIDE INTERFERENCE, INCLUDING THEIR
RIGHT TO CHOOSE THEIR OWN FORM OF GOVERNMENT,

MINDFUL OF THE OBLIGATIONS OF MEMBER STATES TO REFRAIN
IN THEIR INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS FROM THE THREAT OR USE OF

MINDFUL OF THE OBLIGATIONS OF MEMBER STATES TO REFRAIN
IN THEIR INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS FROM THE THREAT OR USE OF
FORCE AGAINST THE TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OR POLITICAL INDEPENDENCE
OF ANY STATE, OR IN ANY OTHER MANNER INCONSISTENT WITH THE
PURPOSES OF THE UNITED NATIONS,

1. REAFFIRMS ANEW ITS CONVICTION THAT THE PRESERVATION
OF SOVEREIGNTY, TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY AND POLITICAL INDEPENDENCE
OF EVERY STATE IS A FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLE OF THE CHARTER OF
THE UNITED NATIONS, ANY VIOLATION OF WHICH ON ANY PRETEXT
WHATSOEVER IS CONTRARY TO ITS AIMS AND PURPOSES:

2. DEEPLY DEPLORES THE RECENT ARMED INTERVENTION IN AFGHANISTAN,
WHICH IS INCONSISTENT WITH THAT PRINCIPLE:

3. AFFIRMS THAT THE SOVEREIGNTY, TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY, POLITICAL
INDEPENDENCE AND NON-ALIGNED STATUS OF AFGHANISTAN MUST BE FULLY
RESPECTED:

4. REQUESTS THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO SUBMIT A REPORT
ON PROGRESS TOWARDS THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS RESOLUTION WITHIN
TWO WEEKS:

5. DECIDES TO REMAIN SEIZED OF THIS QUESTION.

ENDS

PARSONS

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IMMEDIATE

IMMEDIATE

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 PS/MR BLAKER
 PS/MR LUCE
 PS/MR HURD
 PS/PUS
 SIR D MAITLAND
 MR CORTAZZI
 MR FERGUSSON
 MR MURRAY
 MR BULLARD
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 HD/NEWS DEPT
 LORD N. G. LENNOX
 MR P. H. MOBILLY
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FROM UKMIS NEW YORK 062101Z JAN 80

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 36 OF 6 JANUARY

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON PARIS BONN OTTAWA MOSCOW KABUL PEKING
 OSLO LISBON DACCA LUSAKA KINGSTON MANILA TUNIS ABIDJAN EAST BERLIN
 ISLAMABAD NEW DELHI UKDEL NATO

MIPT: AFGHANISTAN: SECURITY COUNCIL

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF ORIGINAL NON-ALIGNED DRAFT RESOLUTION:

BEGINS

HAVING CONSIDERED THE LETTER ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE
 SECURITY COUNCIL IN DOCUMENT NO. OF 3 JANUARY 1980.

GRAVELY CONCERNED OVER RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN AFGHANISTAN AND
 THEIR IMPLICATIONS FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY.

REAFFIRMING THE RIGHT OF ALL PEOPLES TO DETERMINE THEIR OWN
 FUTURE FREE FROM OUTSIDE INTERFERENCE.

MINDFUL OF THE OBLIGATIONS OF MEMBER STATES TO REFRAIN IN THEIR
 INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS FROM THE THREAT OR USE OF FORCE AGAINST THE
 TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OR POLITICAL INDEPENDENCE OF ANY STATE,
 OR IN ANY OTHER MANNER INCONSISTENT WITH THE PURPOSES OF THE

OR IN ANY OTHER MANNER INCONSISTENT WITH THE PURPOSES OF THE UNITED NATIONS.

1. REAFFIRMS ANEW ITS CONVICTION THAT THE PRESERVATION OF SOVEREIGNTY, TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY AND POLITICAL INDEPENDENCE OF EVERY STATE IS A FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLE OF THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS, ANY VIOLATION OF WHICH IS INCONSISTENT WITH ITS AIMS AND PURPOSES.

2. CALLS FOR THE IMMEDIATE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL FOREIGN TROOPS FROM AFGHANISTAN IN ORDER TO ENABLE ITS PEOPLE TO DETERMINE THEIR OWN FORM OF GOVERNMENT AND CHOOSE THEIR ECONOMIC, POLITICAL AND SOCIAL SYSTEMS FREE FROM OUTSIDE INTERVENTION, COERCION OR CONSTRAINT OF ANY KIND WHATSOEVER.

3. REQUESTS THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO SUBMIT A REPORT ON PROGRESS TOWARDS THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS RESOLUTION WITHIN TWO WEEKS.

4. DECIDES TO REMAIN SEIZED OF THIS QUESTION.

ENDS

PARSONS

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PS/LPS
PS/MR BLAKER
PS/MR LUCE
PS/MR HURD
PS/PUS
SIR D MAITLAND
MR CORTAZZI
MR FERGUSSON
MR MURRAY
MR BULLARD
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MR P. H. MOBILLY
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DESKBY UKDEL NATO FIRST CONTACT
FROM UKMIS NEW YORK 062100Z JAN 80
TO IMMEDIATE F C O
TELEGRAM NUMBER 35 OF 6 JANUARY

IMMEDIATE

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON PARIS BONN OTTAWA MOSCOW KABUL PEKING
OSLO LISBON DACCA LUSAKA KINGSTON MANILA TUNIS ABIDJAN EAST BERLIN
ISLAMABAD NEW DELHI UKDEL NATO

MY TELNO 30: AFGHANISTAN: SECURITY COUNCIL

1. BANGLADESH, ON BEHALF OF THE OTHER NON-ALIGNED ON THE COUNCIL (EXCEPT ZAMBIA), INVITED US THIS MORNING TO COMMENT ON THE DRAFT RESOLUTION THE NON-ALIGNED HAD AGREED YESTERDAY (TEXT IN MY FIRST IFT). THIS WAS LAMENTABLY WEAK. WE, WITH SUBSEQUENT SUPPORT FROM THE OTHER WESTERN MEMBERS AND CHINA, SAID THAT, GIVEN THE BLATANT VIOLATION BY THE SOVIET UNION OF SO MANY PRINCIPLES OF THE UN CHARTER, WE WOULD FIND IT DIFFICULT TO GO ALONG WITH A RESOLUTION WHICH NEITHER MENTIONED THE SOVIET UNION BY NAME NOR CONDEMNED THEIR ACTION. THE PRESENT DRAFT WAS SO WEAK THAT THE RUSSIANS MIGHT EVEN FEEL ABLE TO ABSTAIN ON IT. WE PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO STRENGTHEN THE DRAFT.

2. AFTER FURTHER LENGTHY CONSULTATIONS AMONGST THEMSELVES, THE NON-ALIGNED PRODUCED THE DRAFT IN MY SECOND LET. THIS WAS AN

2. AFTER FURTHER LENGTHY CONSULTATIONS AMONGST THEMSELVES, THE NON-ALIGNED PRODUCED THE DRAFT IN MY SECOND IFT. THIS WAS AN IMPROVEMENT, NOTABLY IN THE THIRD PREAMBULAR PARAGRAPH AND IN THE NEW OPERATIVE PARAGRAPHS 2 AND 3, BUT IT STILL NEITHER CONDEMNED THE RUSSIANS NOR MENTIONED THEM BY NAME. WE, THE OTHER WESTERNERS AND THE CHINESE MADE FURTHER UNSUCCESSFUL ATTEMPTS TO PERSUADE BANGLADESH TO TRY TO GET THE NON-ALIGNED TO ACCEPT A STRONGER TEXT. HE MADE AN EFFORT BUT ALL THAT HE WAS ABLE TO ACHIEVE WAS THE INSERTION OF "DEEPLY" BEFORE "DEPLORES" IN OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH 2.

3. THE DRAFT IN MY SECOND IFT WAS DULY TABLED THIS EVENING. WITH BANGLADESH, JAMAICA, NIGER, PHILIPPINES AND ZAMBIA AS CO-SPONSORS. TUNISIA MAY ALSO DECIDE TO CO-SPONSOR.

4. KAISER HAS PRESSED ME STRONGLY TO ACCEPT THE PRESENT DRAFT. HIS ARGUMENT IS THAT THIS IS THE STRONGEST CRITICISM OF THE SOVIET UNION THAT HAS EVER BEEN CO-SPONSORED BY A GROUP OF NON-ALIGNED COUNTRIES, THAT IT WILL PRODUCE A VOTE OF 12 IN FAVOUR AND 2 AGAINST AND THAT IT WILL THUS OPEN THE WAY FOR "UNITING FOR PEACE" IN THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY. IF WE AND THE OTHERS CONTINUE TO PRESS FOR A STRONGER DRAFT, HE SAYS, WE WILL RISK SPLITTING THE NON-ALIGNED FURTHER AND PRODUCING A MUCH LESS CLEAR-CUT DEFEAT FOR THE RUSSIANS IN THE COUNCIL.

5. I AND MY WESTERN COLLEAGUES THINK THAT WE HAD BETTER ACCEPT KAISER'S ARGUMENTS IN WHICH THERE IS SOME FORCE. ON BALANCE IT WILL BE A BETTER RESULT FOR THE WEST FOR THE RUSSIANS TO VETO A COMPARATIVELY MILD DRAFT SPONSORED BY THE NON-ALIGNED AND COMMANDING 12 VOTES RATHER THAN A STRONGER ONE SPONSORED BY THE WEST ON WHICH SOME AT LEAST OF THE NON-ALIGNED WOULD FEEL OBLIGED TO ABSTAIN AND FOR WHICH WE MIGHT NOT EVEN GET NINE VOTES. I RECOMMEND THEREFORE THAT YOU INSTRUCT ME TO VOTE IN FAVOUR BUT TO MAKE A STRONG EXPLANATION OF VOTE.

6. THE DRAFT IS LIKELY TO BE VOTED ON TOMORROW. GRATEFUL THEREFORE FOR INSTRUCTIONS BY 071400Z.

PARSONS

IMMEDIATE

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(X-3)

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PS/MR BLAKER
PS/MR LUCE
PS/MR HURD
PS/PUS
SIR D MAITLAND
MR CORTAZZI
MR FERGUSSON
MR MURRAY
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IMMEDIATE

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[Handwritten signature]

to: N-G. Lennof
MR P. H. MUBERTY

UNCLASSIFIED

DESKBY 070900Z JAN '80

FM WASHINGTON 062000Z JAN 80

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 73 OF 6 JANUARY 1980

INFO PRIORITY UKDEL NATO, MOSCOW, PARIS, BONN, OTTAWA, KABUL, DELHI, ISLAMABAD, PEKING, CANBERRA, UKMIS NEW YORK.

INFO ROUTINE TOKYO, NAIROBI, MUSCAT, MOGADISHU, TEL AVIV, CAIRO, KINGSTON, JEDDA

INFO SAVING ALL OTHER NATO POSTS, WARSAW, SOFIA, BUCHAREST, EAST BERLIN, BUDAPEST, PRAGUE, BELGRADE, WELLINGTON, DUBLIN, JAKARTA, MANILA, BANGKOK, SINGAPORE, KUALA LUMPUR.

MY TELNO 68: U.S. REACTIONS TO AFGHANISTAN.

DURING THE COURSE OF A TELEVISION INTERVIEW TODAY (6 JANUARY) DEPUTY SECRETARY OF STATE, WARREN CHRISTOPHER, MADE THE FOLLOWING POINTS ABOUT THE U.S. RESPONSE TO THE SOVIET INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN:

(A) IT WOULD NOT BE RIGHT TO PRONOUNCE THE DEATH OF DETENTE BUT THE U.S. RESPONSE WAS DESIGNED BOTH TO INFLUENCE THE SOVIET UNION TO WITHDRAW ITS FORCES FROM AFGHANISTAN AND TO DETER SIMILAR ACTION IN FUTURE. THE ALLIED RESPONSE MUST BE A DETERMINED ONE OF CONSIDERABLE DURATION. THEY SHOULD NOT REPEAT THE MISTAKE MADE AFTER

CONSIDERABLE DURATION. THEY SHOULD NOT REPEAT THE MISTAKE MADE AFTER, CZECHOSLAVAKIA OF REVERTING TOO QUICKLY TO BUSINESS AS USUAL, (B) THE U.S. GOVERNMENT EXPECTED HER PRINCIPAL GRAIN-EXPORTING ALLIES (HE NAMED CANADA AND AUSTRALIA) NOT TO FILL THE GAP LEFT BY AMERICAN NON-DELIVERY. EUROPEAN COUNTRIES SHOULD ALSO REFRAIN FROM FILLING THE GAP FROM THEIR GRAIN STOCKS. THE U.S. ALSO HOPED HER ALLIES WOULD TERMINATE AID PROGRAMMES TO AFGHANISTAN, WOULD TAKE ACTION (WHICH CHRISTOPHER DID NOT SPELL OUT) OVER DIPLOMATIC REPRESENTATION AND WOULD TAKE SUCH PARALLEL STEPS IN THE ECONOMIC SPHERE, E.G. HALTING EXPORT CREDITS, AS WOULD BE MOST APPROPRIATE AND EFFECTIVE. A NATO GROUP MEETING THIS WEEK WOULD BE CONSIDERING WHAT ACTION TO TAKE. (C) ASKED ABOUT REPORTS OF FRENCH RELUCTANCE TO JOIN IN SUCH MOVES, CHRISTOPHER SAID THAT FRANCE HAD BEEN VERY SUPPORTIVE OVER IRAN. IT WAS NOT POSSIBLE TO SAY PRECISELY WHAT THE FRENCH POSITION WOULD BE BUT HE HAD NOT ENCOUNTERED ANY DIFFICULTY IN DISCUSSION WITH HIS FRENCH COLLEAGUE.

(D) SOVIET ACTION AGAINST AFGHANISTAN MIGHT BE RELATED TO HER INTEREST IN A WARM WATER PORT AND IN OIL. THE U.S. MUST BE READY AND WAS TAKING IMPORTANT STEPS TO IMPROVE HER MILITARY POSTURE E.G. BY THE DEPLOYMENT OF THE CARRIER TASK FORCE, BUILDING UP FACILITIES IN DIEGO GARCIA AND SEEKING ADDITIONAL NAVAL FACILITIES IN OMAN, SOMALIA AND KENYA. HE CONFIRMED THAT ISRAEL AND EGYPT WERE ALSO BEING CONSIDERED AS POSSIBLE SITES FOR SUCH FACILITIES,

(E) WHILE THE UNITED STATES REMAINED CONCERNED OVER NUCLEAR DEVELOPMENTS IN PAKISTAN THAT WAS ONLY ONE ASPECT OF U.S. FOREIGN POLICY. THE U.S. WAS READY TO ASSIST PAKISTAN IF THE GOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN SO DESIRED. THE NEXT WEEK OR TWO WOULD SHOW MORE CLEARLY WHAT MIGHT BE DONE. THE UNITED STATES ALSO WANTED GOOD RELATIONS WITH INDIA. INDIA OUGHT TO SEE SOVIET ACTION IN AFGHANISTAN AS A THREAT TO INDIA'S SECURITY. SOME ELEMENTS OF THE INDIAN GOVERNMENT APPEARED TO REALISE THAT ALREADY. THINGS WOULD BECOME CLEARER AFTER THE INDIAN ELECTIONS.

(F) THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT DID NOT INTEND TO LET SOVIET MISCONDUCT PREVENT THE DEVELOPMENT OF NORMAL RELATIONS BETWEEN THE U.S. AND CHINA. THE VISIT TO PEKING OF DEFENCE SECRETARY BROWN WOULD PROVIDE AN IMPORTANT INDICATION OF HOW THE TWO COUNTRIES COULD COOPERATE AND BROWN WOULD BE DISCUSSING POSSIBLE CHINESE AID TO OTHER COUNTRIES WHICH MIGHT BE THREATENED BY SOVIET BEHAVIOUR. CHRISTOPHER DID NOT DIRECTLY ANSWER A QUESTION ABOUT THE STATIONING OF U.S. RADAR IN CHINA BUT HE SAID TWICE THAT THE U.S. WOULD NOT FURNISH CHINA WITH ARMS AND WEAPONS.

(G) THE UNITED STATES WOULD ABIDE BY THE TERMS OF SALT II BUT IF THE SOVIET UNION DEVIATED FROM THE TERMS OF THE TREATY THEN THE UNITED STATES WOULD BE IN A COMPLETELY DIFFERENT POSITION.

(H) ASKED WHETHER THE UNITED STATES WOULD FOLLOW SAUDI ARABIA IN

(H) ASKED WHETHER THE UNITED STATES WOULD FOLLOW SAUDI ARABIA IN WITHDRAWING FROM THE OLYMPIC GAMES CHRISTOPHER SAID THAT THE UNITED STATES WOULD PREFER TO PARTICIPATE BUT THAT SOVIET ACTION MUST PUT AT RISK THE PARTICIPATION OF BOTH ATHLETES AND SPECTATORS.

(I) THE U.S. GOVERNMENT WOULD BE ANNOUNCING ON 7 JANUARY A MAJOR PROGRAMME INVOLVING THE USE OF 5 MILLION TONS OF CORN IN THE PRODUCTION OF 500 MILLION GALLONS OF GASOHOL OVER THE NEXT YEAR. BY THE END OF 1980 TEN PERCENT OF A PARTICULAR TYPE OF GASOLINE WOULD CONTAIN ADDED ALCOHOL. UNLIKE THOSE WHO HAD CRITICISED PRESIDENT CARTER'S DECISION ON GRAIN SALES, HE BELIEVED THE AMERICAN FARMER WOULD PREFER TO GROW GRAIN FOR ENERGY USE IN THE UNITED STATES RATHER THAN FURTHER BENEFIT OF SOVIET HERDS.

2. CHRISTOPHER'S ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE GASOHOL PROGRAMME WAS DOUBTLESS DESIGNED TO MEET THE SHARP CRITICISM OF PRESIDENT CARTER'S DECISION ON GRAIN SALES WHICH HAS COME FROM NEARLY ALL HIS POLITICAL OPPONENTS, BOTH DEMOCRATIC AND REPUBLICAN. SENATOR KENNEDY HAS SAID THAT THE MEASURE WOULD NOT WORK AND WILL BE UNFAIR TO THE FARMERS WHO WILL QUOTE PAY THE PRICE FOR AN INEFFECTIVE FOREIGN POLICY UNQUOTE. KENNEDY HAS CALLED FOR QUOTE REINFORCED POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND MILITARY POSITIONS IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND SOUTHWEST ASIA UNQUOTE. ALL THE CANDIDATES FOR THE REPUBLICAN PRESIDENTIAL NOMINATION, EXCEPT FOR REAGAN, TOOK PART IN A TELEVISED DEBATE IN IOWA LAST NIGHT. IOWA IS A MAJOR GRAIN-GROWING STATE AND ON 21 JANUARY WILL PROVIDE THE FIRST EVENT OF THE PRIMARY/CAUCUS ELECTION CALENDAR. NOT SURPRISINGLY THEREFORE ALL THE PARTICIPANTS, APART FROM CONGRESSMAN ANDERSON, CRITICISED THE CURB ON GRAIN SALES AS HURTING THE AMERICAN FARMER MORE THAN THE SOVIET UNION. ANDERSON MADE THE POINT, REPEATED BY CHRISTOPHER THIS MORNING, THAT THOSE WHO CALLED THE LOUDEST FOR EFFECTIVE ACTION AGAINST THE SOVIET UNION WERE THE FIRST TO CRY FOUL WHEN EFFECTIVE ACTION WAS ANNOUNCED AND THAT THE OPPONENTS OF THE MOVE HAD NOTHING BETTER TO OFFER.

FCO PASS SAVING ANKARA, ATHENS, BRUSSELS, COPENHAGEN, LISBON, LUXEMBOURG, OSLO, ROME, REYKJAVIK, THE HAGUE, WARSAW, SOFIA, BUCHAREST, EAST BERLIN, BUDAPEST, PRAGUE, BELGRADE, WELLINGTON, DUBLIN, JAKARTA, MANILA, BANGKOK, SINGAPORE AND KUALA LUMPUR.

HENDERSON

NNNN

31900

DESKBY 060900Z

UNCLASSIFIED

FROM UKMIS NEW YORK 060230Z JAN 80

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 31 OF 5 JANUARY

MIPT: AFGHANISTAN: SECURITY COUNCIL

FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF MY STATEMENT:

MR PRESIDENT

THERE IS A FEATURE OF THE LANDSCAPE OF THE UNITED NATIONS WHICH HAS BECOME ONLY TOO FAMILIAR TO ALL OF US. THIS IS THE ANNUAL PRESENTATION TO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY BY THE SOVIET UNION OF AN ELABORATE PROPOSAL ON SOME SUBJECT CONCERNING RELATIONS BETWEEN NATIONS. THESE PROPOSALS ARE INVARIABLY DEPLOYED IN HIGH SOUNDING AND PIOUS LANGUAGE, PREGNANT WITH SENTIMENTS WHICH ARE, I PRESUME, FASHIONED WITH THE OBJECT OF CONVINCING THE MEMBERSHIP OF THE PACIFIC INTENTIONS OF THE SOVIET UNION, AND OF ITS PROFOUND ATTACHMENT TO THE PRINCIPLES AND PURPOSES OF OUR ORGANISATION. IN THE LAST FOUR YEARS THESE INITIATIVES HAVE INCLUDED, IN CHRONOLOGICAL ORDER, A PROPOSITION AIMED AT CONCLUDING A WORLD TREATY ON THE NON-USE OF FORCE IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS; A DRAFT DECLARATION CONCERNING THE DEEPENING AND CONSOLIDATION OF INTERNATIONAL DETENTE AND PREVENTION OF THE DANGER OF NUCLEAR WAR; A PROPOSAL THAT THE COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT CONSIDER APPROPRIATE INTERNATIONAL ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE STRENGTHENING OF THE SECURITY OF NON-NUCLEAR WEAPON STATES; AND, THIS YEAR, A PARTICULARLY CURIOUS ITEM ENTITLED "ON THE INADMISSABILITY OF A POLICY OF HEGEMONISM IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS". HEGEMONISM, WE WERE TOLD, MEANS STRIVING FOR WORLD DOMINATION, FOR DOMINATION OVER OTHER COUNTRIES AND PEOPLES. AND THAT, MR PRESIDENT, IS WHY WE ARE HERE TODAY.

OVER THE YEARS WE, THE BRITISH, HAVE DETECTED A FEELING AMONG EAST EUROPEAN DELEGATIONS THAT MY DELEGATION IS LESS THAN ENTHUSIASTIC ABOUT THESE GRANDIOSE GESTURES. THE FACT

IS THAT MY COUNTRY IS DISPOSED TO JUDGE OTHER STATES BY THEIR ACTIONS RATHER THAN BY THEIR WORDS. WE REMAIN UNIMPRESSED BY HIGH FLOWN RHETORIC: THE HIGHER FLOWN THE RHETORIC THE MORE SUSPICIOUS WE ARE OF THE MOTIVES THAT LIE BEHIND IT. AND SHOULD WE NOT BE SUSPICIOUS? WE FORGET AT OUR PERIL WHAT HAS BEEN DONE OUTSIDE THIS BUILDING BY THE PROPONENTS OF THESE INITIATIVES EVEN AS THEY HAVE BEEN DISSEMINATING UNEXCEPTIONABLE PHRASES, SUCH AS NON-INTERFERENCE AND PEACEFUL COOPERATION, TO ALL OF US HERE.

THE SUBJECT OF TODAY'S DEBATE, MR PRESIDENT, IS A STARK CASE IN POINT. IN THIS YEAR OF 'ANTI-HEGEMONISM', UNDER THE CLOAK, ALBEIT THE EX-POST FACTO CLOAK, OF A TREATY OF FRIENDSHIP AND COOPERATION, AND A TRULY REMARKABLE INVOCATION OF ARTICLE 51 OF OUR CHARTER, THE SOVIET UNION HAS MOUNTED A MASSIVE ARMED INTERVENTION INTO A NEIGHBOURING STATE: AN ASIAN STATE: A NON-ALIGNED STATE: A MEMBER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: AND, FOR THE FIRST TIME, A STATE NOT DIRECTLY WITHIN THE SOVIET UNION'S OWN SPHERE OF INFLUENCE.

IT NOW SEEMS TO BE UNIVERSALLY ESTABLISHED THAT THERE ARE THE BEST PART OF 50,000 SOVIET TROOPS IN AFGHANISTAN. WE ARE ASKED TO BELIEVE THAT THIS IS A 'LIMITED' MILITARY RESPONSE TO AN APPEAL FROM A GOVERNMENT OF AFGHANISTAN IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF THE TREATY OF FRIENDSHIP AND COOPERATION SIGNED IN 1978. WE ARE ALL FAMILIAR WITH THE EVENTS IN AFGHANISTAN SINCE APRIL 1978 WHEN, AFTER A BRIEF BUT BLOODY CONVULSION, MR TARAKI EMERGED AS THE PRESIDENT OF AFGHANISTAN. SOME FOUR MONTHS AGO HE, IN TURN, WAS OVERTHROWN IN SIMILAR CIRCUMSTANCES BY MR HAFIZULLAH AMIN. HE, WE ARE GIVEN TO UNDERSTAND, LIKE HIS PREDECESSOR, MADE REPEATED APPEALS FOR MILITARY ASSISTANCE FROM HIS NORTHERN ALLY IN ACCORDANCE YET AGAIN WITH THE PROVISIONS OF THE TREATY OF FRIENDSHIP. THE SOVIET INVASION WAS IN RESPONSE TO THIS CALL, FREQUENTLY REPEATED, WE ARE ASKED TO BELIEVE. IS IT NOT STRANGE AND PUZZLING THAT THE NEXT DEVELOPMENT WAS THE OVERTHROW AND DEATH OF MR AMIN AND HIS REPLACEMENT BY MR KAMAL, WHO APPEARS TO HAVE ARRIVED IN THE COUNTRY ONLY AFTER SOVIET FORCES HAD MADE IT SAFE FOR HIM TO DO SO? MR AMIN, IT SEEMS, WOULD HAVE BEEN WISE NOT TO HAVE INVOKED THE TREATY OF FRIENDSHIP, BUT HE DID NOT LIVE TO CORRECT THIS MISTAKE.

● WOULD TAKE A CREDULOUS PERSON TO BELIEVE THAT MR KAMAL'S GOVERNMENT CAME TO POWER IN RESPONSE TO THE FREELY EXPRESSED WISHES OF THE PEOPLE OF AFGHANISTAN AS A WHOLE. IF THIS IS THE CASE, WHY HAS THE MILITARY INVASION BEEN NECESSARY, WHY HAS THE MASSIVE SOVIET MILITARY BUILD-UP CONTINUED EVEN SINCE THE "ELECTION" OF MR KAMAL? WHY HAS IT BEEN NECESSARY TO DESPATCH SOVIET TROOPS TO ALL PARTS OF AFGHANISTAN TO QUELL A REBELLIOUS PEOPLE? THE FACTS AS THEY APPEAR TO THE WORLD JUSTIFY TO MY GOVERNMENT THE VIEW THAT THE SOVIET UNION HAS RUTHLESSLY ACTED WITH MILITARY FORCE AGAINST A SMALL AND DEFENCELESS NEIGHBOUR. THE TALK OF A RESPONSE TO OTHER OUTSIDE INTERVENTION, INCLUDING THE STATEMENT WE HAVE JUST HEARD FROM THE DISTINGUISHED REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SOVIET UNION STRAINS OUR CREDULITY WELL BEYOND BREAKING POINT. AND THEN, WE ARE TOLD THAT WE, THE SECURITY COUNCIL, SHOULD NOT BE DISCUSSING THE SITUATION IN AFGHANISTAN. SUCH DISCUSSION, WE ARE TOLD, CONSTITUTES AN UNWARRANTED INTERFERENCE IN THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF AFGHANISTAN. HOW MANY FOREIGN-ASSISTED COUPS MUST THERE BE IN AFGHANISTAN BEFORE WE, THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY, ARE ALLOWED THE PRIVILEGE OF EVEN SUGGESTING THAT ALL MIGHT NOT BE WELL THERE AND THAT EVENTS IN THAT COUNTRY HAVE WIDER REPERCUSSIONS? WHAT PRICE THESE TREATIES OF FRIENDSHIP AND COOPERATION? THE GROWING AWARENESS THAT MOSCOW ABIDES ONLY BY THOSE TREATY PROVISIONS WHICH SUIT ITS ENDS, HAS ALREADY RESULTED IN TWO COUNTRIES REVOKING SUCH AGREEMENTS WITH THE SOVIET UNION. MR PRESIDENT, THE SOVIET INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN IS A DIRECT AND FLAGRANT VIOLATION, NOT ONLY OF THE MASS OF RESOLUTIONS BROUGHT BY THE SOVIET UNION TO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY BUT ALSO OF THE MORE SOBER AND COMPELLING LANGUAGE OF THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER TO WHICH ALL OF US SUBSCRIBE. AS I SAID EARLIER, REPRESENTATIVES OF THE SOVIET UNION LOSE NO OPPORTUNITY IN THIS AND OTHER PLACES TO REMIND US OF THEIR DEVOTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF NON-INTERVENTION, RESPECT FOR SOVEREIGNTY, NON-USE OF FORCE AND NON-AGGRESSION. I WOULD ASK THEM TO RE-READ, AND RE-READ CLOSELY, CHAPTER I OF THE CHARTER THAT BINDS US ALL.

IT IS NO WONDER THAT THE ACTIONS OF THE SOVIET UNION IN AFGHANISTAN HAVE CREATED EVER WIDENING RIPPLES OF DEEP CONCERN THROUGHOUT THE WORLD. THESE FEELINGS MUST CLEARLY BE HELD

MOST STRONGLY IN THOSE COUNTRIES NEIGHBOURING AFGHANISTAN AND THE SOVIET UNION. CONDEMNATIONS FROM CHINA, PAKISTAN AND IRAN HAVE BEEN FORTHRIGHT. MANY OTHER COUNTRIES IN THE REGION, INCLUDING SEVERAL OUTSIDE THE LONG LIST OF TODAY'S PETITIONERS TO THE COUNCIL, HAVE DENOUNCED THE SOVIET INVASION. THEY MUST PERCEIVE THAT, IF THE SOVIET UNION, WITHOUT AN INTERNATIONALLY ACCEPTABLE PRETEXT, CAN MARCH INTO A NEIGHBOURING COUNTRY, THEY THEMSELVES ARE IN DANGER. IT IS TEMPTING TO SPECULATE ABOUT WHAT CONCEPT OF THEIR NATIONAL INTERESTS HAS MOTIVATED THE SOVIET UNION TO ACT AS THEY HAVE. STUDENTS OF HISTORY WILL RECALL, NOT WITHOUT IRONY, THE AIMS OF NINETEENTH CENTURY TSARIST RUSSIA, AND THE FATE OF THE THEN INDEPENDENT STATES OF CENTRAL ASIA.

MR PRESIDENT, THE PRESENT SITUATION, IN THE VIEW OF MY DELEGATION, UNDOUBTEDLY CONSTITUTES A THREAT TO INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY AND AS SUCH IT IS ENTIRELY APPROPRIATE THAT THE SECURITY COUNCIL SHOULD BE IN URGENT SESSION. THE SOVIET UNION MUST WITHDRAW ITS INVADING TROOPS FROM AFGHANISTAN AND ALLOW THE PEOPLE OF THAT BELEAGUERED COUNTRY DEMOCRATICALLY AND FREELY TO CHOOSE THEIR OWN LEADERSHIP, AND TO DETERMINE THEIR OWN FUTURE. I URGE THE SOVIET UNION TO STICK BY THE PRINCIPLES STATED ONLY THREE MONTHS AGO BY MR GROMYKO, IN THE GENERAL DEBATE, THAT THE SOVIET UNION IN ITS APPROACH TO ALL CONTINENTS AND COUNTRIES DOES NOT APPLY DIFFERENT YARDSTICKS WHEN IT COMES TO THE SOVEREIGNTY OF STATES, THE FREEDOM OF PEOPLES AND GENUINE HUMAN RIGHTS. HE TOLD US THEN, AND RIGHTLY, THAT ONE CANNOT HOLD ALOFT THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER IN ONE SITUATION AND HIDE IT UNDER THE TABLE IN ANOTHER.

IN CONCLUSION MR PRESIDENT I SAY THIS. WE LIVE IN A DANGEROUS WORLD, RIVEN BY CONFLICTS OF VIEW, DIVERGENT INTERESTS, DEEP SEATED DISPUTES, AND WIDELY DIFFERING POLITICAL SYSTEMS. IT IS NOT A WORLD WHICH CAN OR WILL BE CONTROLLED BY THE THREAT OR USE OF FORCE BY POWERS GREAT OR SMALL. THAT WAY LIES DESTRUCTION, DEATH, HUMAN MISERY. OUR ONLY HOPE IS TO RESOLVE OUR DIFFERENCES PEACEFULLY, TO SUBORDINATE NAKED NATIONAL INTEREST TO THE WIDER IMPERATIVES OF PEACE AND SECURITY AMONGST NATIONS AND PEOPLES. WE MUST ABIDE BY THE PRECEPTS OF THE CHARTER OF WHICH THE SECURITY COUNCIL IS THE ULTIMATE GUARDIAN.

THE COUNCIL MUST EXPRESS ITSELF IN THIS GRAVE CRISIS WHICH WE ARE CONSIDERING TODAY. IT MUST DO SO IN PLAIN LANGUAGE, CLEARLY AND WITHOUT EQUIVOCATION. ONLY IF THE SOVIET UNION IS READY TO RIGHT THE WRONG WHICH IT HAS COMMITTED CAN ALL OF US FEEL A SENSE OF CONFIDENCE AND RENEWED SECURITY. THE SOVIET UNION IS A GREAT POWER AND GREAT POWERS SHOULD SUFFER NO COMPLEXES OR INHIBITIONS WHEN IT COMES TO THE REVERSAL OF ACTIONS WHICH ARE UNACCEPTABLE TO THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY.

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TELEGRAM NUMBER 30 OF 5 JANUARY

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MY TELNO 24: AFGHANISTAN: SECURITY COUNCIL

1. WHEN THE COUNCIL MET THIS MORNING, THE SOVIET UNION AND THE GDR OBJECTED TO THE AGENDA, SPEAKING ON THE SAME LINES AS THEY HAD YESTERDAY, THOUGH AT GREATER LENGTH. THE PRESIDENT HAD HOWEVER AGREED IN ADVANCE WITH TROYANOVSKY (USSR) THAT THE LATTER WOULD NOT PROLONG THE PROCEDURAL WRANGLE IF, FOLLOWING HIS AND THE GDR STATEMENTS, TWO OR THREE MEMBERS WERE TO STATE THE OPPOSING VIEW BRIEFLY. WE THEREFORE ARRANGED FOR BANGLADESH AND NORWAY TO SPEAK IN FAVOUR OF THE AGENDA. CHINA ALSO SPOKE, IN FORTHRIGHT TERMS. THE AGENDA WAS THEN ADOPTED WITHOUT A VOTE.

2. THE PRESIDENT THEN ANNOUNCED THAT A NUMBER OF COUNTRIES, INCLUDING AFGHANISTAN, HAD ASKED TO TAKE PART. AFTER IT HAD BEEN AGREED WITHOUT A VOTE THAT THEY SHOULD DO SO, I MADE THE STATEMENT IN PARAGRAPH 3 OF YOUR TEL NO 9. SIMILAR STATEMENTS WERE MADE BY PORTUGAL, THE UNITED STATES AND CHINA, AND IN RATHER MORE NEUTRAL TERMS BY NORWAY AND BANGLADESH. TROYANOVSKY SAID THAT HE SAW NO NEED TO REPLY TO OUR "ABSURD STATEMENTS".

3. THE PRESIDENT ANNOUNCED THAT SOMALIA HAD SIGNED THE LETTER CALLING FOR THE MEETING (SAMOA ALSO SIGNED LATER TODAY).

4. IN HIS STATEMENT ON THE AGENDA TROYANOVSKY MADE A DISOBLIGING REFERENCE TO "BEHIND-THE-SCENES MANOEUVRES BY THE UNITED STATES TO BLOCK THE ELECTION OF CUBA" AS A RESULT OF WHICH THE COUNCIL HAD TO MEET WITH ONLY 14 MEMBERS. BUT HE SAID NOTHING TO IMPLY THAT SUCH A MEETING WAS ILLEGAL.

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5. THE FIRST SPEAKER IN THE DEBATE PROPER WAS THE PHILIPPINES. IN AN UNIMPRESSIVE STATEMENT, YANGO SPOKE ABOUT THE NEED TO ESTABLISH THE FACTS AND, IN VERY GENERAL TERMS, ABOUT THE IMPORTANCE OF RESPECTING THE PRINCIPLES OF NON-INTERFERENCE, TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY, ETC. IF ARMED INTERVENTION TOOK PLACE, THE UNITED NATIONS OUGHT TO CALL FOR THE CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES AND THE WITHDRAWAL OF FOREIGN FORCES.

6. MY PAKISTAN COLLEAGUE, BY CONTRAST, MADE AN EXCELLENT SPEECH. THE INTRODUCTION OF 50,000 FOREIGN TROOPS WAS A SERIOUS VIOLATION OF PEACEFUL CO-EXISTENCE AND THE PRINCIPLES OF THE UN CHARTER, AND CONSTITUTED A SERIOUS THREAT TO PEACE AND STABILITY. PAKISTAN HAD TRIED TO ESTABLISH FRIENDLY RELATIONS WITH AFGHANISTAN AND HAD BEEN THE FIRST ISLAMIC COUNTRY TO RECOGNISE THE TARAKI REGIME AFTER THE APRIL 1978 REVOLUTION. RELATIONS HAD BEEN COMPLICATED BY THE INFLUX OF NEARLY 400,000 AFGHAN REFUGEES, WHOM PAKISTAN HAD FELT OBLIGED TO LOOK AFTER. CHARGES OF PAKISTANI INTERFERENCE IN AFGHANISTAN HAD BEEN REPEATEDLY REFUTED BY THE PAKISTAN GOVERNMENT. NAIK THEN DETAILED THE SOVIET INTERVENTION DURING THE LAST TEN DAYS OF 1979: THERE WAS NO LOGIC IN SAYING THAT THE AMIN GOVERNMENT HAD INVITED FOREIGN TROOPS INTO AFGHANISTAN TO LIQUIDATE IT. THE OUTRAGEOUS SOVIET MILITARY INTERVENTION HAD AROUSED THE INDIGNATION OF FREEDOM LOVING PEOPLE THROUGHOUT THE WORLD. THE RESIGNATION YESTERDAY OF TABIBI, THE NUMBER 2 IN THE AFGHAN MISSION HERE AND A MEMBER OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION, HAD SPOKEN FOR MILLIONS OF AFGHANS WHO WERE RESISTING EXTERNAL INTERVENTION IN THEIR COUNTRY. THE SECURITY COUNCIL SHOULD CALL FOR THE IMMEDIATE AND UNCONDITIONAL WITHDRAWAL OF ALL FOREIGN TROOPS, FOR THE CREATION OF CONDITIONS FOR SELF-DETERMINATION IN AFGHANISTAN, FOR RESPECT FOR THAT COUNTRY'S SOVEREIGNTY ETC, AND FOR THE VOLUNTARY RETURN OF THE REFUGEES.

7. THE NEXT SPEAKER WAS DOST, WHOM THE PRESIDENT INTRODUCED AS 'H.E. THE FOREIGN MINISTER OF AFGHANISTAN'. IN A STUMBLING AND CONFUSED STATEMENT, HE SPOKE MAINLY OF THE INIQUITIES OF THE AMIN REGIME AND OF IMPROVEMENTS BABRAK KAMAL HAD ALREADY INTRODUCED. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL HAD VERIFIED AMIN'S FASCIST OPPRESSION: THEY AND THE ICRC SHOULD RETURN TO AFGHANISTAN TO OBSERVE THE AMNESTY INTRODUCED BY KAMAL AND THE ATMOSPHERE OF

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PEACE AND SECURITY WHICH NOW PREVAILED IN AFGHANISTAN. THE SOVIET CONTINGENTS HAD COME IN RESPONSE TO REQUESTS ORIGINALLY MADE BY TARAKI IN DECEMBER 1978 AND REPEATED DURING AMIN'S RULE, IN ORDER TO PUT DOWN FOREIGN INTERFERENCE. AFGHANISTAN WANTED TO MAINTAIN FRIENDLY RELATIONS WITH ALL COUNTRIES, ESPECIALLY THE MUSLIM COUNTRIES AND HER FRIENDS IN THE NAM.

8. AFTER A BRIEF BUT HELPFUL SPEECH BY JAPAN, DESCRIBING THE SOVIET INTERVENTION AS "UTTERLY DEPLORABLE" AND REJECTING SOVIET INVOCATION OF ARTICLE 51, THE EGYPTIAN PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE MADE A LONG AND MAGISTERIAL STATEMENT IN WHICH HE QUOTED TO GREAT EFFECT FROM SPEECHES MADE BY THE SOVIET UNION DURING THE LAST FIFTEEN YEARS IN FAVOUR OF THEIR ANNUAL ITEMS IN THE FIRST COMMITTEE ON THE INADMISSIBILITY OF INTERVENTION IN THE DOMESTIC AFFAIRS OF STATES, THE PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW ON RELATIONS BETWEEN STATES, THE NON-USE OF FORCE, HEGEMONISM ETC. ABDEL MEGUID CHALLENGED TROYANOVSKY TO SAY WHETHER THIS LATEST MANIFESTATION OF HEGEMONISM INDICATED A DEPARTURE FROM THE TRADITIONAL ATTITUDE OF THE SOVIET UNION. THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY SHOULD MOBILISE SUPPORT FOR THE LIBERATION STRUGGLE OF THE AFGHANISTAN PEOPLE. HE CALLED FOR A COUNCIL RESOLUTION ON THE SAME LINES AS THE PAKISTANI HAD SUGGESTED.

9. THERE WERE TEN MORE SPEAKERS AT THIS EVENING'S SESSION. TROYANOVSKY (USSR) WAS FIRST, AND REHEARSED ALL THE NOW FAMILIAR ARGUMENTS IN DEFENCE OF THE SOVIET ACTION. HE ACCUSED THE UNITED STATES, WESTERN COUNTRIES AND CHINA OF ARMING, TRAINING AND SUPPLYING AFGHAN COUNTER-REVOLUTIONARIES. IT WAS WELL KNOWN THAT SOME OF THESE GROUPS HAD HAD MEETINGS IN LONDON. THE US AND WESTERN COUNTRIES HAD ONLY BROUGHT THE ISSUE TO THE COUNCIL TO CAMOUFLAGE THE AMERICAN MILITARY THREAT TO IRAN AND ITS REVOLUTION, AND TO HIDE HER INTENT TO DESTABILISE THE ENTIRE REGION. THEIR BASE AT DIEGO GARCIA WAS BEING STRENGTHENED, AND AN ARMADA OF NAVAL FORCES WAS NOW IN THE PERSIAN GULF. ANY ISSUE WAS BEING SEIZED ON BY THOSE OPPOSING DETENTE AND HOPING TO REVIVE THE COLD WAR. THE CHINESE WERE NO BETTER, AND HAD CLEARLY NOT LEARNED THE LESSON OF THEIR DEFEAT IN VIETNAM. BUT FOR ITS PART, THE SOVIET UNION WOULD FIRMLY PURSUE ITS UNWAVERING POLICY OF PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE AND DETENTE.

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10. CHEN CHU (CHINA) SPOKE IN PREDICTABLY ACID TERMS, ASKING WHETHER THERE COULD BE ANY GOVERNMENT IN THE WORLD WHICH WOULD ASK ANOTHER COUNTRY TO SEND TROOPS TO HELP OVERTHROW ITSELF. REFERRING TO THE SOVIET INVASION OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA, CHEN CHU SAID THAT THE SOVIET UNION HAD NOW EXTENDED THE USE OF ITS NOTORIOUS 'THEORY OF LIMITED SOVEREIGNTY' FROM ITS 'COMMUNITY OF NATIONS' TO A NON-ALIGNED AND ISLAMIC COUNTRY OF THE THIRD WORLD. WHO WOULD BE THE NEXT VICTIM? THE COUNCIL SHOULD NOT ONLY CONDEMN THE SOVIET MILITARY AGGRESSION IN THE STRONGEST TERMS, BUT SHOULD UNEQUIVOCALLY CALL FOR THE IMMEDIATE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL SOVIET FORCES.

11. I SPOKE NEXT. THE TEXT OF MY STATEMENT IS IN MIFT.

12. THE OTHER SPEAKERS WERE COLOMBIA, BULGARIA, KAMPUCHEA, SAUDI ARABIA, POLAND, NEW ZEALAND AND TURKEY. POLAND AND BULGARIA FOLLOWED THE SOVIET LINE. KAMPUCHEA'S PARTICIPATION, ALTHOUGH OF COURSE CRITICAL OF THE SOVIET UNION, HAS PROBABLY NOT HELPED OUR CAUSE. SAUDI ARABIA, IN A GOOD SPEECH, REMINDED THE SOVIET UNION OF THE RESPONSIBILITY IT HAD TAKEN ON WHEN, WITH THE OTHER FOUR, IT ESTABLISHED ITSELF AS A PERMANENT MEMBER OF THE COUNCIL WITH THE POWER OF VETO. THEIR BRAZEN AND UNWARRANTED INVASION WAS COMPLETELY CONTRARY TO THE PRINCIPLES OF THE CHARTER. SAUDI ARABIA CONDEMNED IT IN THE STRONGEST TERMS AND ASKED THE SECURITY COUNCIL TO TAKE THE NECESSARY STEPS TO GET RID OF FOREIGN TROOPS FROM AFGHANISTAN. NEW ZEALAND SAID THAT IT WAS CLEAR THAT THE SOVIET UNION HAD BEEN INSTRUMENTAL IN REMOVING ONE GOVERNMENT AND INSTALLING ANOTHER. THIS WAS BLATANT INTERFERENCE IN THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF AFGHANISTAN, AND THE SOVIET EXCUSES HELD NO CONVICTION. MOREOVER THEIR COUNTER ALLEGATIONS HAD NOT BEEN SUBSTANTIATED. THEIR ACTIONS BROUGHT INTO DOUBT THE DEGREE OF SOVIET COMMITMENT TO THE PRINCIPLES IT HAD SWORN TO UPHOLD. COLOMBIA AND TURKEY ALSO SPOKE FIRMLY AND WELL.

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13. THE COUNCIL WILL MEET AGAIN TOMORROW AT 1600Z. THERE SEEM TO BE PLENTY OF SPEAKERS TO COME. THE NON-ALIGNED ARE WORKING ON A RESOLUTION. I EXPECT IT TO BE CIRCULATED SOME TIME TOMORROW WITH A VOTE ON MONDAY.

14. SO FAR ALL HAS GONE AS WELL AS WE COULD EXPECT.

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AFGHAN CIVILIANS ARE FLEEING IN THEIR HUNDREDS FROM THE
NANGARHAR PROVINCE IN THE EAST OF THE COUNTRY AS RED ARMY UNITS
CONTINUE THEIR BATTLE AGAINST THE MOSLEM GUERRILLAS. AT LEAST
TWO OF THE FIVE RUSSIAN DIVISIONS (TOTALLING AT LEAST 50,000
MEN) FLOWN INTO THE COUNTRY FOR THE COUP ARE MEETING FIERCE
RESISTANCE AS THEY PUSH ON A WIDE FRONT ALONG THE ROAD TO
THE KHYBER PASS. THE ROAD BACK TO KABUL LATE YESTERDAY
AFTERNOON WAS UNUSUALLY BUSY WITH CARS LORRIES AND BUSES PACKED
WITH PEOPLE TRYING TO ESCAPE WHAT THEY DESCRIBED AS VERY FIERCE
FIGHTING.
ALTHOUGH THE RUSSIANS TALK PUBLICLY OF A LIMITED PUNITIVE ACTION
AGAINST THE GUERRILLAS, SOME OF THEM SEEM TO BE SETTLING IN FOR
A LONG STAY.

AGAINST THE GUERRILLAS, SOME OF THEM SEEM TO BE SETTLING IN FOR A LONG STAY.

ABOUT FIVE MILES EAST OF KABUL, IN TERRITORY THEY SECURED A FULL WEEK AGO, I SAW HUNDREDS OF RUSSIAN SOLDIERS BUSY DIGGING AND EQUIPPING GUN-EMPLACEMENTS AND TRENCHES. MANY ARE ALREADY IN POSITION AND - INTERESTINGLY - THE HEAVY ARTILLERY IS AIMED NOT JUST AT THE MOUNTAINS AROUND THE KABUL PASS AHEAD - BUT BACK TOWARDS THE CAPITAL CITY ITSELF - AN ACKNOWLEDGMENT, PERHAPS, THAT A SIZEABLE PROPORTION OF THE AFGHAN PEOPLE HAVE NEVER LIKED THE RUSSIAN PRESENCE HERE, AND THAT IN THE CURRENT POLITICAL ATMOSPHERE OF DIRTY NEED AND DOUBLE CROSS THE RUSSIANS ARE TRUSTING NO-ONE. (INDEED, AT LEAST 10 RUSSIANS - THOUGHT TO BE TECHNICIANS - WERE MURDERED IN THE CITY'S MONEY BAZAAR A FEW DAYS AFTER THE COUP).

IT'S THOUGHT THAT A DOUBLE AGENT WHOSE TRUE LOYALTIES LAY WITH THE OLD REGIME WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR FOILING AN EARLIER PRE-COUP ATTEMPT TO ASSASSINATE THE FORMER PRESIDENT AMIN. AMIN HAD NOT ONLY SHOWN RELUCTANCE TO TOW THE MOSCOW LINE AS PRECISELY AS THE SOVIET LEADERS WOULD HAVE LIKED, BUT HAD BEEN RESPONSIBLE FOR WIDESPREAD TORTURE AND DETENTION WITHOUT TRIAL. I WAS TOLD THAT NOT ONLY WERE THE MAIN PRISONS FULL - BUT IN MANY PRIVATE HOUSES ROOMS HAD BEEN CONVERTED INTO CELLS WHERE MORE DISSIDENTS WERE HELD. MANY POLITICAL PRISONERS - SOME REPORTS SPEAK OF 20,000 ARE IN THE PROCESS OF BEING RELEASED, NOT ALL AT ONCE - BUT IN BATCHES OF A HUNDRED OR SO - SPREAD OVER THE LAST THREE DAYS AND EXPECTED TO CONTINUE INTO THE NEXT WEEK.

THE TALES THESE PRISONERS TELL ARE MORE THAN MATCHED BY THE MANNER OF PRESIDENT AMIN'S DEATH - WHICH THE RUSSIANS MAY WELL HAVE REGARDED AS A KIND OF POETIC JUSTICE. IT WAS APPARENTLY NOT A STRAIGHTFORWARD EXECUTION. REPORTS CIRCULATING IN THE CAPITAL SUGGEST THAT TWO DAYS BEFORE THE COUP TWO RUSSIANS DIVISIONS FLEW INTO KABUL OSTENSIBLY TO HELP AMIN WITH THE GROWING THREAT FROM THE REBELS. ON THE DAY OF THE COUP, THEY ADVISED AMIN TO MOVE FROM THE PRESIDENTIAL PALACE TO A SMALLER BUILDING NEARBY WHERE, THEY SAID, THEY WOULD BE MORE CONFIDENT OF BEING ABLE TO GUARANTEE HIS SECURITY. ONCE HE WAS IN THE BUILDING, THEY TURNED THEIR GUNS ON IT AND PUMPED IN A BARRAGE OF SHELL FIRE. THE INSIDE OF THE BUILDING WAS COMPLETELY DESTROYED, LEAVING THE BURNT SKELETON OF THE OUTER WALL. THE ONLY REMINDER OF ITS SIGNIFICANCE IS THE GUARD OF SOLDIERS WITH THEIR ARMoured CAR WHO STILL KEEP AWAY TOO INQUISITIVE PASSERS-BY. ALTHOUGH UNITS OF THE AFGHAN ARMY WERE REPORTEDLY STRIPPED OF THEIR WEAPONS AND OTHERS ARE SAID TO BE ACTUALLY FIGHTING ALONGSIDE THE REBELS, THERE IS SOME EVIDENCE THAT SOME AFGHAN SOLDIERS STILL ENJOY THE CONFIDENCE OF THE RUSSIANS.

MILITARY LIFE APPEARS TO BE GOING ON AS USUAL AT LEAST ONE

THE RUSSIAN MILITARY, THERE IS SOME EVIDENCE THAT SOME AFGHAN SOLDIERS STILL ENJOY THE CONFIDENCE OF THE RUSSIANS. MILITARY LIFE APPEARS TO BE GOING ON AS USUAL AT AT LEAST ONE OF THEIR BASES WHICH I VISITED BRIEFLY YESTERDAY. AND I SAW AN AFGHAN UNIT, ALSO FULLY ARMED, MANNING THE ROAD BLOCK AND FIRST LINE OF DEFENCE ON THE EASTERN APPROACHES TO KABUL CITY. OBTAINING RELIABLE INFORMATION ABOUT FIGHTING GOING ON IN OTHER PARTS OF THE COUNTRY IS AT PRESENT IMPOSSIBLE, AS THE TELEPHONE EXCHANGE HAD MOST OF ITS EQUIPMENT BADLY DAMAGED IN THE FIGHTING THAT ACCOMPANIED THE COUP. SO IT MUST BE STRESSED THAT VIRTUALLY ALL THE INFORMATION ON THE FIGHTING REACHING THE WEST OVER THE LAST FEW DAYS HAS COME FROM REBEL SOURCES, FROM TRAVELLERS COMING IN FROM OUTLYING DISTRICTS, AND FROM PASSENGERS ON THE REGULAR DAILY FLIGHTS FROM KABUL TO INDIA AND EUROPE - NONE OF WHICH HAVE BEEN INTERRUPTED BY THE TROOP MOVEMENTS AT ANY TIME. ADD TO THAT THE FACT THAT RUMOUR-MONGERING IS ONE OF KABUL'S BIGGEST INDUSTRIES, AND IT BECOMES CLEAR WHY A GLOBAL PICTURE OF THE CONFLICT IS, AT THIS STAGE, LITTLE MORE THAN A PIPEDREAM.

THE COMMUNICATIONS PROBLEM EVEN EXTENDS TO THE RUSSIAN FORCE ITSELF. IN AFGHANISTAN'S RUGGED TERRAIN, THE VHF RADIOS WITH WHICH MANY SOVIET UNITS ARE EQUIPPED ARE USELESS. GIANT SCREENS OF BROWN SACKING SET UP ON A HILLSIDE ON THE WESTERN OUTSKIRTS OF THE CAPITAL ARE THOUGHT TO CONCEAL A TEAM OF SOVIET TECHNICIANS BUILDING A SATELLITE GROUND STATION AND COMMUNICATIONS CENTRE. IN KABUL ITSELF LIFE FOR THE ORDINARY CITIZEN SEEMS TO HAVE RETURNED TO NORMAL. THE GUARDS ON GOVERNMENT BUILDINGS - A FAMILIAR SIGHT SINCE THE MONARCHY WAS OVERTHROWN SEVEN YEARS AGO - ARE STILL THERE. THE BAZARRS ARE BUSTLING, TRAFFIC FLOWS BUSILY THROUGH STREETS WHICH SHOW LITTLE SIGN OF THE FIGHTING REPORTED TO ACCOMPANY THE COUP, AND MUCH OF LAST WEEKS HEAVY SNOW FALL HAS DISAPPEARED IN THE BRILLIANT SUNSHINE. THE ONLY REMINDER OF THE RUSSIAN MILITARY PRESENCE IN THE COUNTRY COMES FROM THE COLUMNS AND CONVOYS MOVING BETWEEN THE AIRPORT, WHERE ARMY HELICOPTERS AND TROOP CARRIERS STILL LINE THE RUNWAY, AND THE VARIOUS CAMPS THE RUSSIANS HAVE SET UP ON THE OUTSKIRTS OF THE CITY. A UNIQUE OPPORTUNITY FOR A BRIDS EYE VIEW OF THREE OF THOSE CAMPS CAME WHEN I WAS ARRESTED BY RUSSIAN SOLDIERS TEN MILES EAST OF KABU LAST FRIDAY. ALONG WITH TWO CAMERMEN, ITN'S DEREK SEYMOUR AND CLAES BRATT OF UPITN (AND DAVID PHILLIPS OF NBC TV) I HAD BEEN TRAVELLING IN A HIRE CAR ALONG THE ROAD TO THE KHYBER PASS. AND THE ARREST CAME AFTER WE STOPPED TO FILM THE RUSSIAN TROOPS DIGGING IN BESIDE THE ROAD. THE SOLDIERS, WHO INCLUDED A CAPTAIN AND A MAJOR, WERE COURTEOUS BUT FIRM, AND LEFT AT LEAST ON AK47 AUTOMATIC RIFLE TRAINED ON US AT ALL TIMES. THEY SPOKE A LITTLE ENGLIS AND EVEN LESS GERMAN BUT THROUGH THESE LANGUAGES WE

ON US AT ALL TIMES. THEY SPOKE A LITTLE ENGLISH AND EVEN LESS GERMAN BUT THROUGH THESE LANGUAGES WE MANAGED TO HAVE A ROUGH KIND OF CONVERSATION. THE TROOPS WE HAD SEEN SEEMED TO REFLECT THE WIDE RACIAL SPECTRUM WITHIN THE SOVIET UNION - SOME OF EUROPEAN TYPE COMPLEXION, OTHERS OF ASIAN ORIGIN. THOSE WITH US NOW SAID THEY CAME FROM TASHKENT, JUST ACROSS THE BORDER FROM AFGHANISTAN. THEY HAD, IT SEEMED, ALONG WITH MANY OF THEIR FELLOW SOLDIERS, VOLUNTEERED FOR THE AFGHANISTAN ASSIGNMENT. BUT NOW THAT THEY WERE HERE THEY DIDN'T LIKE IT ONE LITTLE BIT. THEY THOUGHT KABUL WAS A DISTINCTLY UGLY CITY AND THE COUNTRY A MISERABLE PLACE. THEY WERE NOT FREE TO WALK AROUND OUTSIDE THEIR CAMPS. NOT NEARLY AS BEAUTIFUL AS TASHKENT SAID ONE, DREAMING, LIKE MOST SOLDIERS ON FOREIGN SOIL, OF HIS HOMELAND. THEY SMILED AND JOKED THROUGHOUT OUR CONVERSATION, ASKED ME WITH GREAT INTEREST WHAT THE 'LONDON TIMES' WAS SAYING ABOUT THEIR ROLE IN AFGHANISTAN AND GRATEFULLY ACCEPTED THE CHOCOLATE AND CIGARETTES WE WERE ABLE TO OFFER THEM. IT WOULD BE UNFAIR TO GENERALISE FROM THIS ABOUT THE MORALE OF THE SOVIET FORCE, BUT CLEARLY THESE MEN DIDN'T VIEW THE POLITICAL DECISION THAT LED TO THEIR PRESENCE HERE WITH A GREAT DEAL OF ENTHUSIASM.

THE MOOD CHANGED DRAMATICALLY WITH THE ARRIVAL OF ANOTHER OFFICER CLEARLY VASTLY SUPERIOR IN RANK. HIS UNIFORM WAS MUCH MORE CASUAL AND DISTINGUISHED BY A BLACK ANORAK. WITH LITTLE TIME FOR PLEASANTRIES HE CONFISCATED ALL OUR CAMERA EQUIPMENT, FILM, STILL CAMERAS, RADIOS, TAPE RECORDERS AND OTHER PERSONAL POSSESSIONS, AND AFTER QUESTIONING THE OTHER SOLDIERS ORDERED US TO ACCOMPANY HIM BACK TOWARDS KABUL. HE AND ONE OF THE ARMED GUARDS TRAVELLED IN OUR CAR. CLAES BRATT AND MYSELF WERE ORDERED TO CLIMB THROUGH THE TURRET OF A SCOUT CAR WHICH WAS TO BE OUR TRANSPORT. THEN FOLLOWED A REMARKABLE THREE HOURS, DURING WHICH OUR DRIVER, WHO SAID HE'D BEEN ORDERED TO TAKE US TO THE SOVIET EMBASSY, PROVED UNABLE TO FIND IT. WE DROVE, IT SEEMED, THROUGH EVERY STREET IN KABUL, THE ROOF HATCHES OPEN FOR MOST OF THE TIME, AND THE INSIDE TEMPERATURE NOT FAR OFF THE OUTSIDE TEN DEGREES FAHRENHEIT BELOW ZERO. IT TRANSPIRED THAT SUCH SOVIET SCOUT CARS DO NOT HAVE HEATERS - BUT THAT DIDN'T PERTURB THE 3 HARDY SOLDIERS WITH US WHO MADE NO SIGN OF DISCOMFORT EVEN THOUGH THEY WORE NO GLOVES THE WHOLE TIME. WHAT THEIR UNIFORMS LACKED IN TAILORING THEY CLEARLY MADE UP FOR IN WARMTH - WITH GREAT PADDED LEGGINGS TUCKED INTO CALF LENGTH BOOTS, AND TRADITIONAL RUSSIAN HATS. OTHER FEATURES OF THE SCOUT CAR WHICH SEEMED AS OLD AND AS WELL USED AS THE UNIFORMS WERE THE CHAIN OF SMALL WINDOWS THAT SEEMED TO HAVE SOME KIND OF IMAGE INTENSIFIERS BUILT INTO THEM. EVEN AFTER THE SUN DISAPPEARED BEHIND THE MOUNTAINS THE LANDSCAPE OUTSIDE LOOKED

DISAPPEARED BEHIND THE MOUNTAINS THE LANDSCAPE OUTSIDE LOOKED AS IF IT WAS BATHED IN BRILLIAN SUNSHINE. THE SMALL AUTOMATIC CANNON MOUNTED IN THE ROOF INCORPORATED SOME KIND OF PERISCOPE DEVICE SO THAT ITS OPERATOR DIDN'T HAVE TO LOOK DIRECTLY ALONG THE SIGHTS WHEN FIRING.

IT WAS CRAMPED AND UNCOMFORTABLE, AND IN OUR SEARCH FOR THE SOVIET EMBASSY WE PASSED BESIDE OR THROUGH THREE LARGE RUSSIAN MILITARY CAMPS. ALTHOUGH SO CLOSE TO THE REPUTEDLY "SAFE" CAPITAL, DEFENSIVE POSITIONS HAD BEEN DUG OR BUILT AND WERE BEING MANNED - ANOTHER SIGN PERHAPS OF THE BASIC INSECURITY THAT LIES BENEATH THE ARMoured SKIN.

INSIDE THE CAMPS TRACKS ARE VIRTUALLY NON-EXISTENT. WE WERE THROWN AROUND OUR SCOUT CAR AS IT CARVED ITS OWN PATH IN THE ICE AND MUD. WE SAW VAST AREAS UNDER BROWN CANVAS. THE TENTS SEEMED SMALLISH AND AT LEAST ONE UNIT DIDN'T HAVE A FIELD KITCHEN AND WERE BUSY COOKING A MEAL ON A TRUNCATED PYRAMID OF ROCKS THEY'D BUILT OVER AN OPEN FIRE. OBVIOUSLY THE MAIN WIEGHT OF THE SOVIET EFFORT AND SUPPORT IS BEING CHANNELLED TO THE FRONT LINE UNITS MANY MILES AWAY. ADMITTEDLY THOSE THEY LEFT BEHIND HAVEN'T HAD MUCH TIME TO MAKE THEMSELVES AT HOME - BUT THEY SEEMED RATHER DISORGANISED AND NOT A LITTLE CONFUSED.

OUR DRIVER'S CONFUSION OVER OURSELVES AND OUR DESTINATION WAS EVENTUALLY RESOLVED WHEN WE SUGGESTED POLITELY THAT HE TAKE US TO OUR HOTEL TO THE HOTEL, BUT THEN INDICATED WITH A GUESTURE THAT WE WERE FREE TO GO.

TAKE US TO OUR HOTEL TO ASK THE DOORMAN THE WAY. HE DID TAKE US BACK TO THE HOTEL, BUT THEN INDICATED WITH A GUESTURE THAT WE WERE FREE TO GO. HALF FROZEN WE STUMBLED OUT AND INTO THE WELCOME WARMTH.

LATE ADDITION.

MEANWHILE DEREK SEYMOUR AND DAVID PHILLIPS WERE HAVING A RATHER TOUGHER TIME. LIKE US THEY WERE DRIVEN AROUND AIMLESSLY FOR HOURS BUT THEN TAKEN TO THE MINISTRY OF THE INTERIOR WHERE THE RUSSIANS HANDED THEM OVER THE THE AFGHAN SECURITY POLICE. THEY WERE PUT INTO SEPERATE ROOMS, ASKED TO MAKE OUT STATEMENTS AND THEN INTERROGATED FOR FIVE HOURS. BEDS WERE BROUGHT TO THE ROOMS AND THEY MANAGED A LITTLE SLEEP. THE ONLY FOOD THEY HAD WAS TEA AND BISCUITS AND A LITTLE BREAD. THEY WERE KEPT LOCKED UP ALL MORNING AND FINALLY RELEASED AFTER ALMOST 24 HOURS IN DETENTION. BOTH SAID THEY WERE NOT PHYSICALLY HARMED IN ANY WAY.

THE FACT THAT THEY WERE HANDED OVER TO THE AFGHAN AUTHORITIES IS ONE SMALL INDICATION THAT THE RUSSIANS ARE NOT AIMING FOR A TAKEOVER HERE. MORE EVIDENCE OF THAT IS THAT THE DOORS

TO THE SMALL PROTECTION THAT THE RUSSIANS ARE NOT AIMING FOR
A TAKEOVER HERE. MORE EVIDENCE OF THAT IS THAT THE DOORS
TO AFGHANISTAN ARE NOW BEING OPENED TO OUTSIDE PRESS AND TV
CREWS AFTER A BAN THAT HAS BEEN IN FORCE SINCE THE START OF THE
COUP.

NOTES FOR ITN FOREIGN DESK FROM MARTYN LEWIS.

AS WE AMONG FIRST OUTSIDERS TO GET IN FOR CLOSE LOOK AT
SITUATION, HAVE SENT THIS DESPATCH IN STRONGEST REPEAT STRONGEST
HOPE THAT YOU WILL NOT THROW AWAY THE VALUE OF MY PRESENCE HERE,
AND WILL TRY TO PLACE THE ABOVE STORY WITH THE SUNDAY TIMES OR
TELEGRAPH FOR TOMORROW. IT DOES NOT REPEAT NOT CLASH WITH
STORY BRING SHIPPED SUNDAY. HAVE ROOMS IN INTERCONTINENTAL
NUMBERS 319, 323 AND 324. EMBASSY EXCEPTIONALLY HELPFUL.
WOULD APPRECIATE ACKNOWLEDGMENT AND USAGE ON DISPATCH BUT
SUGGEST THAT THIS IS A ONE-OFF MESSAGE, AND METHOD OF COMMUNIC-
ATION SHOULD NOT BE EXPLOITED. SITUATION EXTREMELY DIFFICULT BUT
STRONGLY URGE PIDDINGTON FLY IN FROM DLEHI WITH NEW CAMERA GEAR
WHICH HE HAS IN HIS POSSESSION. REPORTERS NOW BEING ALLOWED IN
MANY HERE. IN VIEW OF ABC NOW IN HERE WITH ENG WILL WORK CLOSELY
WITH THEM. ALSO WHIPPING FILM OF TROOP MOVEMENTS ALREADY SHOT
TO FRANKFURT SUNDAY. PROBABLY AS HANDCARRY WITH SEYMOUR UNLESS
ADVISE DIFFERENTLY PUT HIM OR ANOTHER CREW ON SAME FLIGHT BACK.
ESTIMATES OF 100,000 TROOPS IN COUNTRY GREATLY EXAGGERATED.
ONPASS MUCH LOVE TO LIZ AND A BIG HUG AND A KISS TO SYLVIE AND
KATE.

IMPORTANT CHANGE PLEASE NOTE THAT RUSSIANS KILLED IN BAZAAR
WHERE SEPARATE INCIDENTS.

KATE.

REGARDS MARTY.

HILLIER-FRY.

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TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NO 12 OF 5 JANUARY 80.

AND IMMEDIATE DESKBY UKMIS NEW YORK.

INFO ROUTINE MOSCOW, WASHINGTON, UKDEL NATO, NEW DELHI AND ISLAMABAD.

SOVIET INTERVENTION IN AFGHANISTAN.

I TOOK ADVANTAGE OF MY MEETING WITH THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR THIS MORNING ABOUT THE TWO ITN MEN DETAINED BY SOVIET TROOPS (MY TELEGRAM 14 NOT RPTD) TO QUIZ HIM ABOUT THE PRESENCE OF SOVIET FORCES. WITHOUT PROMPTING HE SAID THEY HAD BEEN INVITED BY HAFIZULLAH AMIN AND HAD ESTABLISHED THEMSELVES IN KABUL BY AGREEMENT. THEIR ROLE ON 27 DECEMBER HAD BEEN TO ENSURE ORDER IN KABUL AND INCIZLNTALLY TO ENSURE THERE WERE NO ATTACKS ON FOREIGN EMBASSIES WHICH COULD HAVE CAUSED TROUBLE. IN ANSWER TO MY QUESTION HE SAID THAT SOVIET TROOPS HAD NOT SUFFERED ANY CASUALTIES. THE ATTACK ON THE DARULAMAN PALACE HAD BEEN CARRIED OUT BY PARCHAMITES AND IT WAS THEY WHO HAD CAPTURED AMIN. THE PARCHAMITES HAD ALREADY A GOOD FOLLOWING IN THE ARMY AND HALF OF THE TROOPS GUARDING AMIN TURNED AGAINST HIM WHEN THE PARCHAMITES ATTACKED.

2. IN ANSWER TO FURTHER QUESTIONS TABEYEV SAID THAT THE ONLY PERSONS EXECUTED WITH AMIN WERE SOME OF HIS MILITARY AIDES. SOME OF HIS MINISTERS (HE INSTANCED ZIARI AND PANJSHIRI) HAD BEEN SET FREE AND WERE ACTIVE WITH PARTY MATTERS : OTHERS WERE IN CUSTODY AND WOULD BE BROUGHT TO TRIAL. THERE WOULD BE NO (NO) KILLINGS. TABEYEV WAS AT PAINS TO EXPLOSISE THAT BABRAK KARMAL HAD DECLARED A GENERAL AMNESTY AND HAD GUARANTEED HUMAN RIGHTS. THERE WAS NO REASON WHY HMG SHOULH NOT RECOGNISE HIS GOVERNMENT.

3. I ASKED WHETHER THE NEW GOVERNMENT WAS SATISFIED WITH THE SECURITY SITUATION THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY. TABEYEV IMPLIES THAT THIS WAS WELL IN HAND. THERE WERE SOME SOVIET TROOPS

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OUTSIDE KABUL BUT THESE WERE ONLY THERE IN ORDER TO DEFEND SOVIET DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS IN THE EAST AND AT KANDAHAR. HE ADMITTED THERE MIGHT BE SOME SOVIET TROOPS IN HERAT BUT "PROBABLY ONLY A FEW ARMPRED CARS PASSING THROUGH". THERE WAS VERY LITTLE FIGHTING. SOVIET TROOPS WOULD BE WITHDRAWN AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

HILLIER-FRY.

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TO PRIORITY FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 11 OF 4 JANUARY

INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON, PARIS, OTTAWA, ROME, MOSCOW, UKMIS NEW YORK, UKDEL NATO

AFGHANISTAN: FRG STATEMENTS TO THE PRESS.

no

1. THE FOLLOWING IS OUR TRANSLATION OF A STATEMENT BY WISCHNEWSKI, STATE SECRETARY IN THE CHANCELLOR'S OFFICE AND SPD DEPUTY CHAIRMAN, ISSUED TO THE PRESS ON 3 JANUARY THROUGH THE SPD PRESS SERVICE:

QUOTE:

THE SOVIET ACTION IN AFGHANISTAN

- ENDANGERS PEACE IN THIS REGION:

- IS A GRAVE VIOLATION OF THE RIGHT OF SELF-DETERMINATION OF NATIONS:

- IS A SERIOUS INTERVENTION IN THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF ANOTHER STATE:

- AFFECTS THE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO MAJOR POWERS AND THUS DETENTE POLICY AS A WHOLE.

THERE IS NO JUSTIFICATION WHATSOEVER FOR THE SOVIET ACTION. BUT THIS CANNOT BE THE HOUR OF THE COLD WAR. AT THIS TIME IT IS IMPORTANT TO CONTAIN THE CONFLICT, TO LIMIT THE CRISIS AND NOT TO WIDEN THE CONFLICT. IT IS OF COURSE JUSTIFIED FOR THE UNITED NATIONS TO DEAL WITH THIS EVENT.

THE RATIFICATION OF SALT II, WHICH HAS NOW CERTAINLY BECOME MORE DIFFICULT, IS STILL IN OUR INTEREST. THE INITIATION OF NEGOTIATIONS ON SALT III INCLUDING MEDIUM-RANGE MISSILES IS ALSO STILL IN OUR INTEREST. THIS ALSO APPLIES TO THE CONTINUATION OF THE VIENNA TALKS AND TO THE SECOND CSCE FOLLOW-UP CONFERENCE. WE MUST START OUT FROM OUR INTERESTS. AND OUR INTERESTS ARE COMMON WESTERN INTERESTS, BUT OURS ARE CERTAINLY THE MOST PRESSING. IT IS NOW A QUESTION OF SAFEGUARDING THESE INTERESTS WITH A COOL HEAD. AS A RESULT OF ITS ACTION IN AFGHANISTAN THE SOVIET UNION HAS MET WITH EXTREME DIFFICULTIES IN THE THIRD WORLD, IN THE NON-ALIGNED WORLD AND PARTICULARLY IN THE ISLAMIC WORLD. IT IS NOW IMPORTANT FOR THE WEST TO ASSUME AN ACTIVE ROLE IN THE THIRD WORLD. OUR CHANCE WAS NEVER GREATER.

AT NO TIME WILL THE THIRD WORLD BETTER UNDERSTAND THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE SOVIET UNION'S MILITARY INTERVENTION AND HONEST

/ ENDEAVOURS

ENDEAVOURS TO ACHIEVE TRUE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC INDEPENDENCE. WE MUST NOW CLEARLY BRING OUT THIS DIFFERENCE AND EXPLAIN IT AND ACTIVELY REPRESENT IT IN EVERY THIRD WORLD COUNTRY. THE SOVIET UNION'S MILITARY INTERVENTION MUST BE TURNED INTO A POLITICAL DEFEAT. THIS MUST BE SO CLEAR THAT SUCH VENTURES WILL NOT BE UNDERTAKEN IN FUTURE.

UNQUOTE

2. THE FOLLOWING IS OUR TRANSLATION OF THE STATEMENT DESCRIBING GENSCHER'S EXPLANATION TO THE FEDERAL CABINET ON 2 JANUARY (BONN TELNO 5) WHICH WAS ISSUED BY THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT PRESS SERVICE:

QUOTE

SOVIET INTERVENTION IN AFGHANISTAN VIOLATES BASIC PRINCIPLES OF THE PEACEFUL CO-EXISTENCE OF PEOPLES, THE INDIVISIBILITY OF DETENTE AND THE RIGHT OF SELF-DETERMINATION. THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT AND ITS PARTNERS VIEW WITH GREAT CONCERN THE FACT THAT THIS ENDANGERS PEACE AND STABILITY IN THE REGION. IT IS THEREFORE AN EXTREMELY SERIOUS MATTER. THE POLITICAL AND MILITARY RESISTANCE OF THE AFGHAN PEOPLE SHOWS THAT THEY WANT TO LIVE ACCORDING TO THEIR TRADITIONS AND THEIR ISLAMIC ORDER WITHOUT EXTERNAL INTERVENTION. THE SOVIET UNION'S MILITARY ACTION CANNOT BE JUSTIFIED. THERE CAN BE NO QUESTION OF INTERVENTION IN AFGHANISTAN BY STATES OTHER THAN THE SOVIET UNION, AS THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT MAINTAINS. THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT WILL STATE ITS OPINION TO THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT THROUGH ITS AMBASSADOR TO MOSCOW. THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT AGREES WITH ITS PARTNERS THAT THE EVENTS IN AFGHANISTAN CANNOT LEAVE THE ENTIRE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY UNAFFECTED. TOGETHER WITH ITS PARTNERS IT THEREFORE CONSIDERS IT NECESSARY FOR THE UNITED NATIONS TO DEAL WITH THE SOVIET MILITARY INTERVENTION. THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT IS IN CONSTANT TOUCH WITH ITS ALLIES AND IS CONTINUING TALKS WITH THE GOVERNMENTS OF STATES IN THE REGION AND OTHER FRIENDLY THIRD WORLD STATES. THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT SHARES THE DEEP ANXIETY OF THE STATES IN THE REGION ABOUT THE SOVIET ACTION. IT AGREES WITH ITS PARTNERS THAT THE WILL OF THESE STATES TO PRESERVE THEIR INDEPENDENCE AND THEIR NATIONAL AND RELIGIOUS IDENTITY DESERVES THE FULL SUPPORT OF ALL THE MEMBERS OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY. THIS ALSO CORRESPONDS TO THE AIMS OF THE NON-ALIGNMENT MOVEMENT. THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT VIEWS THE HUMAN FATE OF THE HUNDREDS OF THOUSANDS OF AFGHAN REFUGEES IN PAKISTAN WITH GREAT CONCERN. THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT BELIEVES THAT A WORLDWIDE CAMPAIGN IS NECESSARY TO HELP THESE PEOPLE.

UNQUOTE

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TELEGRAM NUMBER 010 OF 4TH JANUARY

FOR INFO ROUTINE UKDEL NATO, WASHINGTON, PARIS, BONN AND KABUL

AFGHANISTAN

1. THE SPANISH AMBASSADOR, WHO IS A MEMBER OF THE INTERNATIONAL OLYMPIC COMMITTEE AND MORE CLOSELY IN TOUCH WITH THE SOVIET OLYMPIC ORGANISERS THAN ANY OTHER AMBASSADOR IN MOSCOW, MENTIONED TO ME WITH SOME ANXIETY THE POSSIBILITY THAT THE SOVIET OCCUPATION OF AFGHANISTAN MIGHT AFFECT PARTICIPATION IN THE MOSCOW OLYMPICS. I DO NOT KNOW WHAT VIEW YOU TAKE OF THIS AND I THEREFORE REPLIED IN NON-COMMITTAL TERMS.
2. I HAVE SUBSEQUENTLY DISCUSSED THE MATTER WITH OTHER COLLEAGUES AND I FIND GENERAL AGREEMENT THAT THERE IS NO OTHER SINGLE GESTURE WHICH WOULD BRING HOME SO EFFECTIVELY, NOT ONLY TO THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT BUT TO THE SOVIET PEOPLE, THE DEGREE OF REVULSION AT THEIR ACTION IN AFGHANISTAN THAN A BOYCOTT OF THE GAMES. IT WOULD NOT NEED TO BE TOTAL IN ORDER TO BE EFFECTIVE. THE ABSENCE OF THE US, CANADA, WESTERN EUROPE, CHINA AND A SPRINKLING OF OTHERS WOULD SUFFICE.
3. I RECOGNISE THAT THE CHANCE OF ACTUALLY EFFECTING A BOYCOTT MUST BE MINIMAL. THERE ARE CERTAIN TO BE DIVIDED VIEWS IN ALL COUNTRIES, THE MATTER IS ONE FOR THE NATIONAL OLYMPIC COMMITTEES RATHER THAN THE GOVERNMENTS AND IT WILL BE ARGUED WITH FORCE THAT POLITICS SHOULD NOT INTERFERE WITH SPORT. BUT THE MOSCOW OLYMPICS ARE FOR THE SOVIET UNION A POLITICAL EVENT - AND SO, INEVITABLY, IS THE ISSUE OF WESTERN PARTICIPATION.

(REPEATED AS REQUESTED)

F C O PSE PASS UKDEL NATO, WASHINGTON, PARIS AND BONN

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TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 22 OF 4 JANUARY

MY TELNO 16 : AFGHANISTAN IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL: RESOLUTIONS.

1. KAISER (BANGLADESH) HAS TOLD ME THAT HE HAS A DRAFT RESOLUTION IN HIS POCKET WHICH HE HAS SO FAR SHOWN TO NO-ONE. FROM HIS DESCRIPTION, IT SOULDS TOO WEAK. I DECIDED THAT IT MUST BE TOUGHENED UP BEFORE IT GETS INTO GENERAL CIRCULATION.
2. I SAW ALGARD (NORWAY) THIS AFTERNOON. HE HAS A SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP WITH KAISER, HAVING KNOWN HIM WELL FOR MANY YEARS. I SAID THAT I FELT AS HE DID THAT ANY RESOLUTION MUST COME FROM THE NON-ALIGNED. KAISER WAS THE BEST PERSON IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL TO TAKE THE LEAD. BUT THE DRAFT WHICH HE WAS TALKING ABOUT WAS TOO WEAK. ONCE IT GOT OUT, IT WOULD BE VERY DIFFICULT TO NEGOTIATE IT UPWARDS.
3. I THEN GAVE HIM A COPY OF THE DRAFT IN MY TELNO 1972. I TOLD HIM THAT NO ONE ELSE IN THE UN KNEW OF ITS EXISTENCE AND THAT OUR CONVERSATION HAD NOT TAKEN PLACE. THE IDEAS IN OUR DRAFT WERE THE KIND OF THINGS WE WANTED TO BRING TO THE VOTE. COULD HE GOT HOLD OF KAISER ON A PERSONAL BASIS AND STIFFEN UP HIS DRAFT WITHOUT MENTIONING THAT ANY OF THE IDEAS THAT HE MIGHT PUT FORWARD HAD EMANATED FROM ME?
4. ALGARD GOT THE POINT IMMEDIATELY AND UNDERTOOK TO ACT ACCORDINGLY. HE SAID THAT HE PERSONALLY WAS HAPPY WITH OUR DRAFT WHICH, SO FAR AS HE WAS CONCERNED, HAD NOT COME FROM ME: THERE WAS NO SUCH THINK AS A BRITISH DRAFT RESOLUTION.

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5. I UNDERSTAND FROM PARA 4 OF YOUR TELNO 1017 THAT OUR DRAFT WAS NOT CIRCULATED TO THE SIX IN LONDON. HOWEVER, WE HAVE HAD PRIVATE INDICATIONS FROM THE NEW ZEALANDERS AND, I THINK, FROM THE GERMANS SHOWING KNOWLEDGE OF ITS EXISTENCE. IN THE LIGHT OF MY PLOY WITH ALGARD, I HOPE THAT ANYONE WHO HAS KNOWLEDGE OF THE DRAFT CAN NOW BE TOLD TO FORGET THAT IT EVER EXISTED.

PARSONS

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TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 008 OF 4TH JANUARY

FOR INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON

PRIORITY ISLAMABAD, PEKING, JEDDA, UKDEL NATO AND KABUL.

AFGHANISTAN

1. A TASS REPORT IN ENGLISH OF 3 JANUARY BY GONCHAROV DESCRIBED PRESIDENT CARTER'S INTERVIEW WITH ABC TELEVISION AS 'BELLICOSE, WICKED AND A MALICIOUS ATTACK ON SOVIET POLICY'. THE WESTERN RESPONSE AS A WHOLE WAS SAID TO 'BREAK ALL RECORDS OF HYPOCRISY AND LIES'.
2. THE ALLEGATION OF BRITISH INVOLVEMENT IN ANTI AFGHAN ACTIVITY HAS BEEN GIVEN FURTHER CURRENCY AFTER THE IZVESTIYA ARTICLE 1 JANUARY OF (MY TEL 001). TASS ASSERTED THAT BRITISH SPECIAL SERVICES ALONG WITH THOSE OF AMERICA AND CHINA WERE ENGAGED IN TRAINING THE AFGHAN REBELS. REFUSAL BY THE USA AND UK TO DESIST FROM SUPPORTING ARMED INCURSIONS INTO AFGHANISTAN FROM PAKISTAN HAD LED TO THE PRESENT INSTABILITY IN THE AREA. IZVESTIA OF 3 JANUARY ALSO MADE THE FIRST ACCUSATION OF SOME (UNSPECIFIED) SAUDI ARABIAN INVOLVEMENT IN AGGRESSION AGAINST AFGHANISTAN.
3. THE TASS ARTICLE STATED THAT AMIN WAS PLANNING TO ANNIHILATE THE HAZARARA TRIBE BY NAPALM (REQUESTED FROM THE WEST). HAD EVENTS NOT INTERVENED, HE WOULD ALSO HAVE EXECUTED ALL POLITICAL PRISONERS ON THE MORNING OF 29 DECEMBER. THE AIMS OF AMIN AND WASHINGTON WERE SAID TO HAVE COINCIDED IN THE DESIRE TO ELIMINATE POLITICAL OPPOSITION.
4. ACCORDING TO TASS, AMERICAN REACTION TO SOVIET AID TO AFGHANISTAN, HAD THE AIM OF DISTRACTING INTERNATIONAL ATTENTION FROM ITS OWN MILITARY THREAT TO IRAN, REPLACING IT BY AN INVENTED SOVIET THREAT FROM ACROSS THE AFGHAN BORDER.

/ NATO

NATO COUNTRIES WERE ACCUSED OF TRYING TO STIFLE PROTESTS AGAINST TNF BY MAKING MUCH PUBLICIZED STATEMENTS ABOUT EVENTS IN A COUNTRY WHICH "HAS NOTHING TO DO EITHER WITH THE NORTH OR THE ATLANTIC".

5. TAKING UP THE THEME OF THE LIMITED SCALE OF SOVIET MILITARY INVOLVEMENT, NOVOSTI STATED ON 3 JANUARY THAT "SOVIET TROOPS HAD NO INTENTION TO TAKE MILITARY ACTION AGAINST THE AFGHAN POPULATION, NOR ARE TAKING ANY ACTION NOW AGAINST IT". REFERENCES IN 'PRAVDA' OF THE SAME DATE TO SHOOTING INCIDENTS IN KABUL AND OTHER REGIONS OF THE COUNTRY ARE ASCRIBED TO FOREIGN INTERFERENCE.
6. COVERAGE OF AFGHANISTAN IN TODAY'S 'PRAVDA' IS LIMITED TO ANTI-AMERICAN EXTRACTS FROM THE 'KABUL NEW TIMES'.

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TO IMMEDIATE UKDEL NATO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 5 OF 4 JANUARY

INFO PRIORITY ISLAMABAD, NEW DELHI, WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK,
MODUK

YOUR TEL NO 7: AFGHANISTAN: REGIONAL ASPECTS.

1. AT THE MEETING OF THE POLITICAL COMMITTEE DURING THE AFTERNOON OF 7 JANUARY TO CONSIDER RELATIONS WITH COUNTRIES IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND THE SUB-CONTINENT, YOU MAY DRAW UPON THE FOLLOWING POINTS:

MIDDLE EAST.

2. WE LOOKED CAREFULLY AT THE STABILITY OF THE SMALL GULF STATES AFTER THE FALL OF THE SHAH. OUR INITIAL IMPRESSIONS WERE RE-ASSURING: EVEN THE SHI'A INTERNAL THREAT SEEMED TO HAVE BEEN CONTAINED. BUT SELF CONFIDENCE OF THE RULERS HAS BEEN SHAKEN BY MECCA MOSQUE INCIDENT AND NOW AFGHANISTAN. ARAB PERCEPTIONS OF THE WEST, PARTICULARLY THE UNITED STATES, AS THE PRIME SUPPORTERS OF ISRAEL MEAN THAT RULERS ARE RELUCTANT FOR PERHAPS JUSTIFIABLE INTERNAL SECURITY REASONS, TO BE ASSOCIATED TOO CLOSELY WITH NATO COUNTRIES. THEY WANT SUPPORT BUT CAN NOT DECIDE WHAT FORM THIS SHOULD TAKE.

3. WE HAVE SLIGHTLY RAISED OUR MILITARY PROFILE IN THE AREA WITH JOINT EXERCISES (ENGINEER AND AN INFANTRY COMPANY) PLANNED FOR OMAN IN 1980 PLUS NAVAL AND RAF VISITS. WE ALREADY PROVIDE EXTENSIVE MILITARY TRAINING FOR THE GULF STATES AND LOAN SERVICE OFFICERS. IN OMAN THESE ARE STILL IN COMMAND, ELSEWHERE THEY ARE IN SPECIALIST OR TRAINING POSTS.

4. DURING THE SECRETARY OF STATE'S VISITS AND THOSE OF MR HURD LATER THIS MONTH TO BAHRAIN, QATAR AND TO UAE WE SHALL ASSURE THE GULF RULERS OF OUR CONTINUED SUPPORT, URGE THEM TO CO-OPERATE WITH EACH OTHER IN SECURITY AND DEFENCE AND TO RESPOND TO INTERNAL PRESSURES TO PREVENT THESE BECOMING EXPLOSIVE. WE SHALL SEEK THEIR VIEWS ON WHAT FURTHER MEASURES OF WESTERN SUPPORT ARE NEEDED.

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5. OUR THINKING IS NOT YET FIRM. WE ARE WORKING AGAINST A TIMETABLE OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE'S VISIT TO ISLAMABAD AND DELHI IN THE WEEK BEGINNING 14 JANUARY. MOREOVER, THE PAKISTANI'S ARE BEING CAUTIOUS IN THEIR APPEALS TO THE WEST LEST THEY PREJUDICE THEIR POSITION WITH THEIR ISLAMIC AND NAM FRIENDS. BUT YOU MAY DRAW UPON THE FOLLOWING IDEAS, EMPHASISING THEIR TENTATIVE NATURE:

(A) WE ARE RE-EXAMINING ASSISTANCE ON THE DEFENCE SIDE. WE ALREADY PROVIDE SOME TRAINING. THIS WE HOPE TO DEVELOP. NAVAL SHIP VISITS TO PAKISTAN ARE A FURTHER POSSIBILITY: ONE IS ALREADY PLANNED FOR LATE 1980.

(B) AID. PAKISTAN IS ALREADY A MAJOR RECIPIENT OF UK AID. ALL AID IS ON GRANT TERMS, WE ARE OFFERING MORE ON SHIPS, AND WE ARE LOOKING AGAIN AT FUTURE PLANS.

(C) AID FOR REFUGEES. WE HOPE SHORTLY TO ALLOCATE SUBSTANTIAL SUM FOR EMERGENCY SUPPLIES FOR AFGHAN REFUGEES NOW IN PAKISTAN (BLANKETS, TENTS, MEDICAL SUPPLIES, ETC).

(D) MULTILATERAL AID. WE ARE RE-EXAMINING THE BENEFITS PAKISTAN RECEIVES UNDER MULTILATERAL AID SCHEMES, AND WOULD ENCOURAGE ASSISTANCE FROM MULTILATERAL AGENCIES.

(E) DEBT RESCHEDULING. UNDER OUR RETROSPECTIVE TERMS ADJUSTMENT AGREEMENT, WE HAVE ALREADY RESCHEDULED OFFICIAL DEBT. WE HOPE OTHERS MIGHT NOW LOOK FAVOURABLY UPON PAKISTANI REQUESTS.

(F) THERE HAS BEEN SOME TALK OF PAKISTAN REJOINING THE COMMONWEALTH. THIS IS SOMETHING ON WHICH WE (AS MOTHER COUNTRY) PREFER NOT TO TAKE THE LEAD, BUT RATHER TO WAIT FOR ANY INITIATIVE TO GAIN MOMENTUM. THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE COMMONWEALTH KNOWS OF THE POSSIBILITY. THE IDEA IS NOT LIKELY TO BE ACTED UPON IN THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE.

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6. IN YOUR REMARKS YOU SHOULD ALSO DRAW ATTENTION TO THE IMPORTANCE OF KEEPING INDIA INVOLVED, AND ON THE RIGHT SIDE. THE INITIAL INDIAN STATEMENT ON AFGHANISTAN WAS SURPRISINGLY ROBUST. BUT A NEW INDIAN GOVERNMENT IS ABOUT TO BE FORMED, AND IT IS IMPORTANT THAT THE NECESSARY MEASURES OF SUPPORT AND SYMPATHY FOR PAKISTAN DO NOT ALARM THE INDIANS AND DRIVE THEM BACK INTO RUSSIAN ARMS.

THIS IS ONE ASPECT OF THE GENERAL TRUTH: NAMELY, THAT WE RISK FORFEITING THE SUPPORT OF THIRD WORLD COUNTRIES -IF THEY SENSE THEY ARE BEING FORCED INTO THE WESTERN CAMP.

WE HAVE NOT YET SEEN YOUR REPORT, WHICH WE UNDERSTAND IN ON THE WAY, OF THE DISCUSSION AMONG PERMREPS TODAY, FRIDAY, 4 JANUARY.

CARRINGTON

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DESKBY 041700Z

FM DELHI 041330Z JAN

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 20 OF 4 JANUARY 1980.,

INFO PRIORITY ISLAMABAD, WASHINGTON, UKDEL NATO, PEKING, MOSCOW
KABUL, AND UKMIS NEW YORK.

MY TELNO 10 OF 2 JANUARY: AFGHANISTAN: PRESS COMMENT.

1. THE INDIAN MEDIA CONTINUE TO DEVOTE A GREAT DEAL OF ATTENTION TO DEVELOPMENTS IN AFGHANISTAN, ALTHOUGH THE FACT THAT YESTERDAY WAS THE FIRST ROUND OF POLLING IN THE INDIAN GENERAL ELECTION HAS REDUCED NEWSPAPER COVERAGE TO SOME EXTENT. THE PRESS CONTINUE TO TAKE A ROBUST LINE AND M.I.F.T. CONTAINS EXERTS FROM SOME OF THE MORE STRIKING REPORTS IN THE LAST DAY OR SO.
2. THERE IS NO DOUBT THAT THIS PRESS LINE REFLECTS A VERY GENERAL LEVEL OF ANXIETY AMONG WELL INFORMED INDIANS. VERY FEW PEOPLE ARE DISPOSED SERIOUSLY TO QUESTION THAT THE SOVIETS ARRIVED IN AFGHANISTAN UNINVITED AND HAVE SINCE BEEN IMPOSING THEIR WILL ON THE COUNTRY BY FORCE. WE SHALL DO WHAT WE CAN TO SUSTAIN THE CURRENT LEVEL OF ANXIETY. TWO ASPECTS OF THE SOVIET INTERVENTION ARE PROBABLY WORTH STRESSING IN THE INDIAN CONTEXT. THE FIRST IS THAT THE SOVIETS HAVE VIOLATED THE SOVEREIGNTY AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF A NON-ALIGNED COUNTRY., AND THE SECOND, THAT THERE ARE NOW SOVIET TROOPS IN THE INDIAN SUB-CONTINENT FOR THE FIRST TIME.
3. THE MOST DISTURBING DEVELOPMENT IN THE LAST 24 HOURS FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF DELHI HAS BEEN THE REPORTS THAT THE AMERICANS INTEND TO SEND ARMS TO PAKISTAN VIA CHINA. THIS WAS THE MAIN ITEM ON THIS MORNING'S AIR NEWS BROADCAST (AHEAD OF YESTERDAY'S POLLING IN THE GENERAL ELECTION) AND THERE ARE REPORTS TOO IN TODAY'S

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ENGLISH LANGUAGE PAPERS. THERE IS NOW A SERIOUS RISK THAT, FACED WITH WHAT THE INDIANS WILL SEE AS A THREATENING COALITION OF CHINA AND PAKISTAN SUPPLIED WITH US WEAPONS, WHATEVER GOVERNMENT EMERGES HERE WILL FEEL OBLIGED TO MODERATE THEIR ATTITUDE TO THE SOVIET INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN. IF THESE REPORTS ABOUT AMERICAN INTENTIONS ARE TRU THE US MAY BRING ABOUT A MOST UNFORTUNATE POLARISATION OF THE SUB-CONTINENT AT A TIME WHEN THE NEED IS TO PROMOTE INCREASED INDO-PAKISTANI CO-OPERATION.

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DESKBY 041830Z

FM UKDEL NATO 041745Z JAN 80

TO IMMEDIATE FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE,
TELEGRAM NUMBER 007 OF 4 JANUARY 1980,

AND TO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, MOSCOW, BONN, PARIS,
AND TO PRIORITY UKMIS NEW YORK, OTTAWA, OTHER NATO POSTS, WARSAW,
BUDAPEST, PRAGUE, SOFIA, BUCHAREST, EAST BERLIN, DUBLIN, ISLAMABAD,
DELHI, CANBERRA, WELLINGTON, PEKING,

INFO SAVING UKDEL VIENNA, KABUL, TOKYO, JAKARTA, SINGAPORE, MANILA,
DACCA, KUALA LUMPUR.

MY TELNO 6 (NOT TO ALL): COUNCIL MEETING ON AFGHANISTAN.

1. NATO PERMREPS MET THIS AFTERNOON UNDER LUNS' CHAIRMANSHIP IN
PRIVATE SESSION (IE ONE PLUS ONE AND NOT ANNOUNCED TO THE PRESS)
TO DISCUSS PROPOSALS BASED ON YOUR TELNO 3. COPIES OF MY LETTER
OF 3 JANUARY TO LUNS AND MY SPEAKING NOTE AT THE MEETING HAVE BEEN
SENT BY BAG TO THE FCO ONLY.

2. OUR INITIATIVE WAS WIDELY WELCOMED. AFTER A LONG DISCUSSION
AGREEMENT WAS REACHED AS FOLLOWS:

(I) THE SENIOR POLITICAL COMMITTEE (SPC) WAS INSTRUCTED TO
UNDERTAKE A STUDY OF THE IMPLICATIONS FOR EAST-WEST
RELATIONS ON THE BASIS OF THE TERMS OF REFERENCE IN THE FIRST
SENTENCE OF PARAGRAPH 3 OF YOUR TELNO 3 WITH THE ADDITION (AT THE
REQUEST OF THE AMERICAN) OF THE WORDS QUOTE INCLUDING THE LONGER
RUN IMPLICATIONS OF THE SOVIET MOVE UNQUOTE.

(II) THE POLITICAL COMMITTEE WAS INSTRUCTED TO PUT IN HAND AN
EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION ABOUT WESTERN RELATIONS WITH COUNTRIES
IN THE REGION AND ABOUT THE POSSIBILITIES FOR THEIR DEVELOPMENT
IN THE LIGHT OF THE SOVIET INTERVENTION IN AFGHANISTAN. IT WAS
ACCEPTED, AT THIS STAGE, THAT THIS WOULD PROBABLY HAVE TO BE
LIMITED TO A COLLATION OF NATIONAL POSITIONS (ALTHOUGH PAULS (FRG)
NEARLY LOST THE FRENCH AT ONE POINT BY PRESSING FOR CO-ORDINATION).

(III) THE FIRST MEETINGS OF THE COMMITTEES FOR THIS PURPOSE WOULD
BE AT 1000 AND 1400 RESPECTIVELY (GMT) ON 7 JANUARY. THE
COMMITTEES WOULD MEET WITH THEIR NORMAL COMPOSITION FROM DELEGAT-
IONS, BUT EXPERTS FROM CAPITALS COULD ATTEND THESE OR SUBSEQUENT
MEETINGS AS DESIRED.

(IV) THE SPC WAS INSTRUCTED TO MAKE RECOMMENDATIONS BY THE MIDDLE
OF NEXT WEEK FOR IMMEDIATE MEASURES WHICH GOVERNMENTS MIGHT
TAKE (YOUR TELNO 25 TO WASHINGTON, NOT TO ALL) AND TO PRODUCE A
FIRST REPORT FOR CONSIDERATION BY THE COUNCIL ON 15 JANUARY.

(V) THE POLITICAL COMMITTEE WAS INSTRUCTED TO PREPARE A PAPER
FOR CONSIDERATION BY THE COUNCIL AT THE SAME TIME. / (VI)

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(VI) THE COUNCIL WOULD MEET IN THE AFTERNOON OF 15 JANUARY WITH ATTENDANCE BY MINISTERS (SUB-CABINET LEVEL, TO QUOTE THE AMERICAN TITLE) OR SENIOR OFFICIALS, AT THE DISCRETION OF GOVERNMENTS. THIS TIMING WILL NEED TO BE CONFIRMED NEXT WEEK. I SAID MR HURD WOULD ATTEND. WARREN CHRISTOPHER WILL ALMOST CERTAINLY BE THERE AND PROBABLY OTHERS WHO WERE AT THE LONDON MEETING ON 31 DECEMBER.

(VII) THE SPC STUDY SHOULD BE A CONTINUING ONE WHICH WILL GO ON TO CONSIDER LONGER TERM IMPLICATIONS PLUS ANY OTHER REMIT GIVEN TO IT FOLLOWING THE COUNCIL MEETING.

3. THE FRENCH REPRESENTATIVE (JESSEL) VOICED THE EXPECTED MISGIVINGS BUT, SINCE WE WERE ALL DETERMINED TO BE AS FLEXIBLE AS WE COULD TO KEEP HIM ON BOARD, IN THE END WENT ALONG WITH THE CONSENSUS. FROM A SHORT CONVERSATION I HAD WITH HIM AFTERWARDS, I DOUBT IF WE ARE OUT OF THE WOODS YET. OUR REPRESENTATIVES WILL DO ALL THEY CAN TO KEEP THE FRENCH STRICTLY TO THE TERMS OF REFERENCE.

4. SCOTT WILL BE OUR REPRESENTATIVE ON THE SPC. FOR THE MEETING ON MONDAY I HOPE HE WILL BE GIVEN AUTHORITY TO DRAW ON YOUR TELNO 17 TO WASHINGTON, WHICH CONTAINS EXACTLY THE MATERIAL ON WHICH I TOLD PERMREPS TODAY WE SHOULD WISH TO CONCERT OUR ACTIONS WITH OTHERS. HE WILL ALSO NEED AN INDICATION OF WHICH MEASURES YOU CONSIDER SUITABLE FOR IMMEDIATE TREATMENT AS INDICATED IN PARAGRAPH 2 OF YOUR TELNO 25 TO WASHINGTON. FOR THIS PURPOSE I SUGGEST HE MIGHT USE PARAGRAPH 2 AND SELECTED ITEMS IN PARAGRAPH 18 OF YOUR TELNO 17.

5. HOWELLS, WHO WILL BE OUR REPRESENTATIVE ON THE POLITICAL COMMITTEE, IS IN TOUCH WITH THE DEPARTMENT ABOUT BRIEFING HE WILL NEED FOR MONDAY AFTERNOON'S MEETING.

6. SEE MIFT (NOT TO ALL) FOR FURTHER ACCOUNT OF THIS AFTERNOON'S MEETING.

FCO PLEASE PASS SAVING TO UKDEL VIENNA, KABUL, TOKYO, JAKARTA, SINGAPORE, MANILA, DACCA, KUALA LUMPUR.

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FM DELHI 040725Z JAN 80

TO FLASH FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 015 OF 4 JANUARY.

INFO IMMEDIATE ISLAMABAD

INFO PRIORITY ANKARA, JEDDA, MUSCAT, KABUL, MOSCOW, WASHINGTON, PARIS, BONN, OTTAWA, UKDEL NATO, UKMIS NEW YORK, PEKING, BOMBAY, CALCUTTA AND MADRAS.

YOUR TELNO 1 AND TELECONS ARCHER/CULLIMORE AND CULLIMORE/WHITE:
SECRETARY OF STATE'S TOUR

1. SATHE (PUS IN THE MEA) RANG ME THIS MORNING TO CONFIRM THAT SUBJECT TO THE FORMATION OF A NEW GOVERNMENT, INDIA WOULD BE VERY HAPPY TO RECEIVE YOU ON 16 AND 17 JANUARY. HE SPOKE IN A WARM AND WELCOMING WAY AND SAID THAT HE SAW NO DIFFICULTY AT ALL ABOUT THE VISIT.

2. THIS WAS WELCOME CONFIRMATION OF MY TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH SATHE YESTERDAY EVENING AHEAD OF YOUR TELEVISION INTERVIEW. IN THAT FIRST CONVERSATION, ALTHOUGH HE SAID SPECIFICALLY THAT "WE WOULD LIKE TO SEE LORD CARRINGTON", HE WAS MORE CAUTIOUS AND ASKED THAT IN ANNOUNCING YOUR TOUR YESTERDAY EVENING, YOU SHOULD SAY ONLY THAT YOU HOPED TO VISIT INDIA AND THAT YOU SHOULD NOT SPECIFY THAT THE REASON WAS SOLELY TO DISCUSS THE SITUATION ARISING FROM THE SOVIET INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN. IN THE FIRST TELEPHONE CONVERSATION, SATHE WAS OF COURSE TALKING OFF THE CUFF. I JUDGE THAT HE HAS SINCE BEEN ABLE TO SPEAK TO THE PRIME MINISTER. NEVERTHELESS, I BELIEVE THAT WE SHALL GET BETTER INDIAN COOPERATION IF WE REFRAIN FROM CLAIMING THAT THE SOLE REASON FOR YOUR VISIT IS THE AFGHANISTAN SITUATION. I HOPE THAT IN EXPLAINING THE PURPOSE OF THE VISIT WE CAN TAKE THE LINE THAT IN THE PRESENT FRAUGHT WORLD SITUATION YOU WISH TO CONSULT THE NEW INDIAN GOVERNMENT AS SOON AS IT IS FORMED. IT IS INEVITABLE THAT IF THE INDIAN GOVERNMENT ARE ASKED WHAT^{TOP} THEY EXPECT TO DISCUSS WITH YOU THEY WILL MENTION AT LEAST RHODESIA AS WELL AS THE AFGHAN SITUATION.

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3. THE BBC EXTERNAL SERVICES THIS MORNING REFERRED TO YOUR VISIT TO PAKISTAN AS A FACT AND MADE NO SPECIFIC MENTION OF A POSSIBLE VISIT TO INDIA. HOWEVER, ALL INDIA RADIO IN ITS NEWS BROADCAST THIS MORNING SAID THAT YOU MIGHT ALSO BE VISITING INDIA. I ATTACH IMPORTANCE TO MAKING A VERY EARLY ANNOUNCEMENT, SO THAT YOUR VISIT WILL BE UNDERSTOOD AS OUR INITIATIVE RATHER THAN SOMETHING EXTRACTED FROM US BY WHAT I EXPECT TO BE RATHER SEVERE INDIAN REACTIONS TO THE MAIN ITEM (DESPITE THE ELECTIONS) IN THE ALL INDIA NEWS THIS MORNING THAT THE US WOULD COOPERATE WITH CHINA IN IMPROVING THE MILITARY SECURITY OF PAKISTAN (PARA 1 I OF WASHINGTON TELNO 17). MEANWHILE IN ANSWER TO PRESS QUESTIONS HERE WE ARE SAYING THAT IT IS EXPECTED THAT YOU WILL VISIT INDIA SUBJECT TO THE FORMATION OF A NEW INDIAN GOVERNMENT.

4. IN ORDER TO GET THE NEWS OF THE VISIT TO THE PUBLIC TODAY, I WILL AGREE A SHORT FACTUAL STATEMENT WITH THE MEA AND ISSUE IT AS SOON AS POSSIBLE UNLESS INSTRUCTED TO THE CONTRARY BY FLASH TELEGRAM

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FM PARIS 031912Z

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 13 OF 03 JANUARY 1980.

INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON, BONN, OTTAWA, ROME, MOSCOW, UKMI S
NEW YORK

YOUR TELEGRAM TO UKDEL NATO 173: AFGHANISTAN

ms.

1. WE HAVE TAKEN ACTION WITH THE QUAI, AT DIFFERENT LEVELS, MAKING THE POINTS IN PARAGRAPHS THREE AND FIVE OF TUR. THE FRENCH HAVE STILL TO FORMULATE FINAL VIEWS ON FOLLOW-UP TO THE RECENT MEETINGS OF THE SIX IN LONDON AND OF THE NAC (ON WHICH WE ARE TOLD, THE PRESIDENT WILL HAVE THE FINAL SAY) BUT WE HAVE RECEIVED SEVERAL INDICATIONS OF THE WAYS THEIR MINDS ARE MOVING.
2. DUPONT, DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS, CLAIMING THAT HE WAS NOT FULLY IN THE PICTURE, SAID THE FRENCH WOULD WISH TO CONSIDER VERY CAREFULLY JUST HOW FAR THEY WOULD GO IN THE VARIOUS FIELDS OF ACTION DISCUSSED IN LONDON AND BRUSSELS. THEY REGARDED THE SOVIET INTERVENTION IN AFGHANISTAN AS ONE AFFECTING RELATIONS BETWEEN THE SOVIET UNION AND THE WORLD OF ISLAM RATHER THAN RELATIONS BETWEEN EAST AND WEST. THEY ACCEPTED THE NEED TO ENSURE NO (NO) REPETITION ELSEWHERE OF THE SOVIET ACTION, BUT WOULD NOT WANT TO PUT AT RISK THE FUNDAMENTALS OF THEIR RELATIONSHIP WITH THE SOVIET UNION.
3. DUPONT TOOK CAREFUL NOTE, HOWEVER, OF OUR POINTS THAT THE FRENCH THEMSELVES SAW DETENTE AS BEING GLOBAL IN CHARACTER (SEE THE COMMUNIQUE REPORTED IN MY TELEGRAM NUMBER 1035) AND THAT FAILURE BY THE WEST TO RESPOND ADEQUATELY TO RUSSIAN INTERVENTION MIGHT COMPROMISE ACHIEVEMENT OF THE AIM, TO WHICH THE FRENCH SUBSCRIBED, OF PREVENTING A REPETITION ELSEWHERE.
4. DUPONT WAS SCEPTICAL AT THE POSSIBILITY OF THE WEST BRINGING EFFECTIVE PRESSURE TO BEAR, SHORT OF TAKING EXTREME MEASURES WHICH MIGHT LEAD TO A RETURN TO THE COLD WAR AND BE IN NOBODY'S INTERESTS. NEVERTHELESS, THE WHOLE QUESTION OF FOLLOW UP TO THE LONDON AND BRUSSELS MEETINGS WOULD BE STUDIED WITH URGENCY. AS SOON AS FIRM DECISIONS HAD BEEN TAKEN, THE QUAI WOULD BE IN TOUCH. SPEAKING PERSONALLY, HE DID NOT EXCLUDE FRENCH SUPPORT FOR SOME GESTURE AT THE UNITED NATIONS AND SOME MEASURE OF FRENCH ASSISTANCE TO PAKISTAN.

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5. BEAUVAIS IN THE DIRECTION D'ASIE TOLD US THAT THE FRENCH HAD NOT YET FORMULATED ANY SPECIFIC PLANS FOR ASSISTANCE TO PAKISTAN. DIFFICULTIES AROSE FROM THE FACT THAT RELATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES WERE NOT PARTICULARLY CORDIAL, FOLLOWING, INTER ALIA, FRENCH CANCELLATION OF THEIR CONTRACT FOR A NUCLEAR REPROCESSING PLANT. THE FRENCH HAD TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF THE AFFECT OF ANY SPECIFIC AID TO PAKISTAN ON THEIR RELATIONS WITH INDIA, WHICH PRESIDENT GISCARD WOULD BE VISITING TOWARDS THE END OF THE MONTH. HE DREW ATTENTION TO THE RECALL FOR CONSULTATIONS OF THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR AT KABUL.

6. VAUGIER, THE DESK OFFICER DEALING WITH THE SOVIET UNION, CONFIRMED THAT THE QUAI DID NOT WISH TO DAMAGE THE DIALOGUE WITH THE SOVIET UNION AND DID NOT WANT TO SEE SOVIET INTERVENTION IN AFGHANISTAN BECOME THE OCCASION OR PRETEXT FOR CONFRONTATION BETWEEN EAST AND WEST: HENCE THEIR RETICENCE OVER ACTION CO-ORDINATED THROUGH NATO. IN PARTICULAR THEY WERE NOT HAPPY ABOUT PROPOSALS FOR WORKING GROUPS IN NATO IF THESE WERE LIKELY TO LEAD TO RECOMMENDATIONS FOR JOINT ACTION. HE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THE INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN CONSTITUTED A MAJOR CHANGE BY COMPARISON WITH PREVIOUS SOVIET INTERVENTIONS ABROAD, WHETHER UNDERTAKEN BY THE SOVIET UNION ITSELF OR THROUGH PROXIES, BUT HE WAS RELUCTANT TO ACCEPT THAT IT CALLED FOR RESPONSE FROM THE WEST REQUIRING CONCERTED ACTION. HE SIMPLY REPEATED THAT FRANCE WISHED TO BE FREE TO DECIDE WHAT MEASURES SHE SHOULD TAKE, IMPLYING THAT, IN THE QUAI AT LEAST, THE HOPE WOULD BE TO DO JUST ENOUGH TO SATISFY DOMESTIC PUBLIC OPINION AND TO DAMPEN CRITICISM FROM ALLIES.

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7. ON SPECIFICS, VAUGIER SAID THAT THE QUAI WERE NOT DISPOSED TO POSTPONE GROMYKO'S VISIT PLANNED FOR END MARCH/BEGINNING APRIL NOR TO SUSPEND THE REGULAR MEETINGS OF EXPERTS. NOR WERE THEY KEEN ON INTERRUPTING NEW CREDIT ARRANGEMENTS. IT WAS POSSIBLE, HOWEVER, THAT M. CHABAN-DELMAS, THE PRESIDENT OF THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY, MIGHT BE ADVISED TO POSTPONE HIS VISIT TO MOSCOW, DUE AT THE END OF JANUARY, AND THAT THE FRENCH FOREIGN MINISTER WOULD SUMMON THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR TO SEEK FURTHER EXPLANATIONS OF SOVIET ACTION.

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FM PARIS 031848Z JAN 80
TELEGRAM NO 012 OF 03 JANUARY
TO PRIORITY FCO

INFO PRIORITY KABUL, MOSCOW, WASHINGTON, UKDELNATO, UKMIS NEW YORK,
NEW DELHI, ISLAMABAD

MY TELNO 01 : AFGHANISTAN

1. SINCE THE SIX-POWER MEETING IN LONDON, PRESIDENT GISCARD HAS INTERVENED IN THE HANDLING OF THE AFGHAN CRISIS TO GAIN MANOEUVRING ROOM BOTH DOMESTICALLY AND INTERNATIONALLY. IN HIS NEW YEAR TELEVISION BROADCAST HE SAID THAT A DANGER OF WAR EXISTED AND THAT WORLD STABILITY DEPENDED ON THE COOL JUDGEMENT OF A FEW MEN. THE IMPLICATION WAS THAT, IN THE FACE OF A GENERAL ECONOMIC CRISIS AND CRISES LIKE THE AFGHAN ONE, FRANCE WAS IN SAFE HANDS WITH HIM.

2. THE PRESIDENT HAS WRITTEN TO THE SOCIALIST AND COMMUNIST LEADERS, MM MITTERRAND AND MARCHAIS, INVITING THEM TO CONTACT M FRANCOIS-PONCET FOR BRIEFINGS ON THE AFGHAN SITUATION. HE ENVI SAGES MEETING THEM HIMSELF IF THE AFGHAN SITUATION DETERIORATES. HE HAS ON PREVIOUS OCCASIONS SHOWN READINESS TO KEEP THE OPPOSITION INFORMED ON MAJOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS DEVELOPMENTS, PARTICULARLY SINCE THE LEGISLATIVE ELECTIONS OF MARCH 1978. THIS REINFORCES THE PRESIDENT'S CLAIM TO BE ABOVE PARTY POLITICS AND DEMONSTRATES THAT OTHER FRENCH POLITICAL FIGURES ARE OF A LESSER STATURE, TO BE INFORMED ON SUCH WEIGHTY MATTERS AS HE SEES FIT. BUT ON THIS OCCASION THE PRESIDENT'S MOVE, LIKE HIS BROADCAST, HELPS TO GENERATE AN ATMOSPHERE OF CRISIS WHICH COULD MAKE IT EASIER FOR THE GOVERNMENT TO MAKE LIMITED MOVES TO KEEP UP WITH THE OTHERS IN REACTING TO THE AFGHAN CRISIS.

3. THE SOCIALISTS HAVE REACTED CAUTIOUSLY TO THE PRESIDENT'S LETTER. THEY ARE NOT INTERESTED IN LENDING WEIGHT TO THE NOTIONS WHICH PRESIDENT GISCARD SEEKS TO PROMOTE. M. MITTERRAND HAS DESIGNATED THE PARTY'S INTERNATIONAL SECRETARY TO CONTACT THE QUAI AND HAS SAID THAT HE WOULD BE WILLING TO MEET THE PRESIDENT IF THE VITAL INTERESTS OF THE COUNTRY WERE AT STAKE. THE SOCIALIST PARTY HAS ISSUED A STATEMENT CONDEMNING SOVIET ACTION IN AFGHANISTAN AS INTERFERENCE IN THAT COUNTRY'S INTERNAL AFFAIRS SEMI COLON BUT THEY PUT IT IN THE SAME SERIES AS THEIR EARLIER CONDEMNATION OF THE AMERICANS IN VIETNAM AND OF FRANCE IN THE CENTRAL AFRICAN EMPIRE.

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4. THE COMMUNIST LEADER, M GEORGES MARCHAIS IS STILL IN CUBA AND HAS NOT YET RESPONDED TO THE LETTER FROM THE PRESIDENT. THE COMMUNIST DAILY, L'HUMANITE, CONTINUES TO REFLECT MOSCOW'S LINE.

5. IT WAS ANNOUNCED YESTERDAY THAT THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR IS BEING RECALLED FROM KABUL FOR CONSULTATIONS. IT IS CAREFULLY EXPLAINED IN THE PRESS THAT THIS IS IN ORDER TO ENABLE THE GOVERNMENT TO HAVE FIRST HAND INFORMATION ABOUT THE RECENT EVENTS. IT IS NOT GIVEN A MORAL CONNOTATION, BUT FRANCE HAS THE BENEFIT OF A CERTAIN AMBIGUITY IN THE ACT. IT HAS THE ADDED ATTRACTION FOR THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT OF NOT BEING IN THE MAIN LINE OF INITIATIVES AGREED COLLECTIVELY UNDER US LEADERSHIP.

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KABUL,)

FM UKMIS NEW YORK 032345Z JAN 80

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 10 OF 3 JANUARY 1980

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON PARIS ROME OTTAWA BONN MOSCOW KABUL
PRIORITY PEKING OSLO LISBON DACCA LUSAKA KINGSTON MANILA
TUNIS ABIDJAN(FOR NIAMEY) EAST BERLIN ISLAMABAD
NEW DELHI.

MIPT: AFGHANISTAN : SECURITY COUNCIL:

TEXT OF LETTER IS AS FOLLOWS:

BEGINS,

YOUR EXCELLENCY,

ON BEHALF OF THE GOVERNMENTS OF AUSTRALIA, BAHAMAS, BELGIUM,
CANADA, CHILE, CHINA, COLOMBIA, COSTA RICA, DENMARK, THE DOMINICAN
REPUBLIC, ECUADOR, EGYPT, EL SALVADOR, FIJI, THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC
OF GERMANY, GREECE, HAITI, HONDURAS, ICELAND, ITALY, JAPAN, LIBERIA,
LUXEMBOURG, NETHERLANDS, NEW ZEALAND, NORWAY, OMAN, PAKISTAN, PANAMA,
PAPUA NEW GUINEA, PHILIPPINES, PORTUGAL, SAINT LUCIA, SAUDI ARABIA,
SINGAPORE, SPAIN, SURINAME, SWEDEN, TURKEY, THE UNITED KINGDOM OF
GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND, THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
URUGUAY AND VENEZUELA, WE HAVE THE HONOUR TO REQUEST AN URGENT MEET-
ING OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL TO CONSIDER THE SITUATION IN AFGHANISTAN
AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY.
ENDS.

PARSONS

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FM UKMIS NEW YORK 040113Z JAN 80

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 9 OF 3 JANUARY 1980

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON PARIS ROME OTTAWA BONN MOSCOW KABUL

PRIORITY PEKING OSLO LISBON DACCA LUSAKA KINGSTON MANILA

TUNIS ABIDJAN (FOR NIAMEY) EAST BERLIN ISLAMABAD

NEW DELHI.

YOUR TELNO 4: AFGHANISTAN : SECURITY COUNCIL 

1. DURING THE COURSE OF THE DAY WE AND OTHERS SUCCEEDED IN PERSUAD-
ING FORTY-THREE COUNTRIES TO SIGN THE LETTER IN M.I.F.T. WHICH I
DELIVERED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL THIS EVENING.
THE AMERICANS, AS YOU WILL SEE, SUCCEEDED IN OBTAINING THE SIGN-
ATURES OF MOST OF THE LATIN AMERICAN GROUP. BY CONTRAST, PAKISTAN
DID LESS WELL WITH THE NON-ALIGNED THAN WE HAD BEEN LED TO EXPECT
YESTERDAY, AND THE LIST IS DISAPPOINTINGLY SHORT OF MOSLEM AND
AFRICAN COUNTRIES. ONLY TWO OF THE ASEANS OBTAINED INSTRUCTIONS IN
TIME AND THERE ARE ONLY TWO AFRICANS. DURING THE LATTER PART OF THE
DAY, REALISING THAT THE PAKISTANIS WERE NOT GOING TO DELIVER, WE
OURSELVES LOBBIED HARD AMONGST THE ARABS AND AFRICANS AND
I HOPE THAT SOME OF THESE MAY COME ON BOARD TOMORROW. THE PRESIDENCY
AND THE SECURITY COUNCIL SECRETARIAT ARE READY TO ACCEPT LATE SIGN-
ATURES FROM THOSE WHOSE INSTRUCTIONS DID NOT ARRIVE TODAY.

2. MY SOVIET COLLEAGUE HAD SEEN THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL
IMMEDIATELY BEFORE ME. HIS PURPOSE HAD EVIDENTLY BEEN TO CHECK THAT
LEPRETTE HAD RECEIVED THE TELEGRAM FROM THE 'FOREIGN MINISTER' OF
AFGHANISTAN (SHAH MOHAMMAD DOST) WHOSE TEXT IS IN MY SECOND I.F.T.
AND WHICH CONVEYS THE AFGHAN 'GOVERNMENT'S' OPPOSITION TO ANY
SECURITY COUNCIL DISCUSSION OF THE SITUATION IN AFGHANISTAN. LEPRETTE
HAD TOLD TROYANOVSKY THAT HE HAD RECEIVED THE TELEGRAM BUT
WOULD HAVE TO VERIFY THE IDENTITY OF ITS SENDER WHO WAS UNKNOWN TO
HIM. TROYANOVSKY HAD SAID THAT THE SOVIET UNION WOULD OPPOSE ANY
MEETING OF THE COUNCIL.

3. WHEN I SAW HIM, LEPRETTE ASKED FOR MY ADVICE ON HOW HE SHOULD
PROCEED. I SAID THAT I THOUGHT HE SHOULD GET US INTO OPEN COUNCIL

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AS SOON AS POSSIBLE AND THAT INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS SHOULD BE CONTINUED TO DECIDING AN AGENDA AND THE TIME OF A MEETING. LEPRETTE SAID (AND I AM SURE HE IS RIGHT) THAT TROYANOVSKY WOULD PLAY FOR TIME, FIRST BY OPPOSING A MEETING OUTRIGHT, AND THEN PERHAPS BY ARGUING THAT THE COUNCIL'S MEETING SHOULD NOT BEGIN UNTIL THE AFGHAN 'FOREIGN MINISTER' HAD HAD TIME TO REACH NEW YORK. (WE HAVE JUST HEARD FROM THE AMERICANS THAT DOST HAS APPLIED FOR A VISA AT THE U.S. EMBASSY IN KABUL). THE FRENCH ARE WORRIED THAT THE SPONSORS OF A MEETING MIGHT NOT HAVE A MAJORITY IF THE RUSSIANS RESORTED TO THIS OR SOME OTHER PROCEDURAL DEVICE IN ORDER TO DELAY PROCEEDINGS. THEY HOPE THEREFORE THAT WE CAN GET TWO OR THREE MORE NON-ALIGNED MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL TO ASSOCIATE THEMSELVES WITH TODAY'S LETTER AND WE ARE WORKING ON THIS. YOU MAY CONSIDER THAT FURTHER ACTION SHOULD BE TAKEN IN THE CAPITALS CONCERNED I.E. DACCA, TUNIS, KINGSTON, LUSAKA, AND ABIDJAN (FOR NIAMEY). THE FRENCH ALSO FEAR THAT, IN THE LAST RESORT, THE RUSSIANS MIGHT TRY TO HOLD UP PROCEEDINGS BY ARGUING THAT A 14 MEMBER COUNCIL COULD NOT MEET LEGALLY, THOUGH TROYANOVSKY SHOWED NO SIGN AT ALL TODAY OF TAKING THIS VIEW.

4. LEPRETTE IS CIRCULATING OUR LETTER AND THE KABUL TELEGRAM IMMEDIATELY. HE PLANS TO SEE TROYANOVSKY FIRST THING TOMORROW AND THEN TO SUMMON INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS OF THE WHOLE COUNCIL EARLY TOMORROW AFTERNOON. I PERSUADED HIM, I THINK, THAT IT WOULD BE BETTER FOR NO RESOLUTION TO BE SURFACED UNTIL THE DEBATE HAS STARTED. THE TIMING MAY BE COMPLICATED IF REPORTS CIRCULATING HERE TONIGHT THAT WALDHEIM IS ON HIS WAY BACK FROM TEHRAN ARE CONFIRMED.

5. AT LEPRETTE'S REQUEST I SAID NOTHING ON THE RECORD TO THE PRESS AFTER LEAVING MY MEETING WITH HIM, BUT OFF THE RECORD I STRESSED THAT I HAD DELIVERED THE LETTER IN THE CAPACITY OF A MESSENGER ON BEHALF OF ALL THE COUNTRIES WHO HAD SIGNED IT AND THAT THIS SHOULD NOT BE REGARDED OR DESCRIBED AS A BRITISH INITIATIVE. FOR THE SAME REASON I TOLD LEPRETTE THAT, HAVING CARRIED THE BALL THIS FAR, I DID NOT INTEND TO TAKE THE LEAD IN PROMOTING ANY RESOLUTION. WE WILL OBVIOUSLY GET BETTER RESULTS IF WE CAN GET THE NON-ALIGNED TO PLAY THE LEADING ROLE, PARTICULARLY IF AND WHEN WE RESORT TO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY FOLLOWING A SOVIET VETO.

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DESKBY 040830Z UKDEL NATO
FM WASHINGTON 040126Z JANUARY 1980
TO IMMEDIATE F C O
TEL NO 38 OF 3 JANUARY
INFO IMMEDIATE UKDEL NATO, PRIORITY PARIS, BONN, ROME, OTTAWA,
UKMIS NEW YORK, MOSCOW,

MIPT: AFGHANISTAN AND EAST/WEST RELATIONS: UK PROPOSAL FOR TWO
WORKING GROUPS WITHIN NATO FRAMEWORK.

1. GOODBY GAVE THE FOLLOWING INITIAL INDICATIONS OF AMERICAN
THINKING AT OFFICIAL LEVEL ON THE QUESTIONS COVERED IN MY
TELEGRAM NO 16:

- (I) THERE WAS GENERAL AGREEMENT WITH OUR IDEAS ON THE FIRST
WORKING GROUP. AS REGARDS THE SECOND, THEY WOULD PREFER TO
LIMIT ITS TERMS OF REFERENCE TO EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION RATHER
THAN CONCERTATION OF POLICIES.
- (II) THEY WOULD PREFER TO KEEP BOTH WORKING GROUPS WITHIN THE
NATO FRAMEWORK, THOUGH THEY RECOGNISED THE NEED TO KEEP THE
FRENCH ON BOARD. THEY WOULD NOT FAVOUR DEVELOPING THE SIX-
NATION FORUM. THEY THOUGHT QUADLATERAL OR BILATERAL MEETINGS
COULD COMPLEMENT THE WORKING GROUPS.

2. GOODBY SAID, AMERICAN IDEAS ON THESE LINES WERE AT PRESENT
BEING CLEARED WITH MINISTERS. THE INTENTION WAS THAT THEY SHOULD
BE PUT FORWARD AT THE MEETING OF NATO PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVES
TOMORROW WITH SOME MORE DETAILED SUGGESTIONS FOR HOW THE WORKING
GROUPS MIGHT BE PUT TOGETHER.

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TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 5 OF 3 JANUARY

INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK UKDEL NATO KABUL ISLAMABAD PRIORITY
WASHINGTON PARIS ROME PEKING MOSCOW BMG BERLIN OTTAWA DELHI

AFGHANISTAN : FRG VIEWS

1. I CALLED ON VAN WELL LAST NIGHT, SPOKE AS INSTRUCTED IN YOUR TELEGRAM NO. 173, LEFT A COPY OF THE TRANSCRIPT OF MR HURD'S BBC INTERVIEW AND ASKED WHAT VIEW THE FEDERAL CABINET, WHICH HAD MET THAT MORNING, HAD TAKEN OF LATEST DEVELOPMENTS.
2. VAN WELL SAID THAT THE CABINET HAD ENDORSED GENSCHER'S REPORT ON THE SITUATION AND INDEED HIS OWN, VAN WELL'S, GENERAL APPROACH AT THE LONDON MEETING ON 31 DECEMBER. THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT'S VIEW WAS THAT IT WAS IN THE WESTERN INTEREST TO EMPHASISE THE REGIONAL ASPECTS OF THE PROBLEM, TO MOBILISE MOSLEM AND NON-ALIGNED OPPOSITION TO SOVIET ACTIONS AND TO TAKE ACTION IN SUPPORT OF THAT OPPOSITION ONCE MOBILISED. WHILE THE CONSEQUENCES FOR EAST-WEST RELATIONS WERE UNAVOIDABLE AND THE FRG WOULD NOT SHIRK THEM - PUBLIC OPINION AND THE POLITICAL PARTIES WOULD NOT ALLOW THEM TO - IT WOULD BE COUNTER-PRODUCTIVE TO THE WESTERN INTEREST TO MAKE TOO MUCH, ESPECIALLY IN PUBLIC, OF BILATERAL REPRISALS IN THE EAST-WEST CONTEXT. THE MOSLEM AND NON-ALIGNED WORLD DID NOT WISH TO GET INVOLVED IN THE COLD WAR ASPECTS OF RELATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO POWER BLOCS AND IT COULD ONLY DO HARM TO THE WESTERN INTEREST IF WE WENT FULL SPEED AHEAD WITH REPRISALS IN A COLD WAR SPIRIT. THE ESSENTIAL THING WAS TO GIVE OURSELVES A FEW DAYS FOR OPINION IN THE THIRD WORLD TO GET MOBILISED. VAN WELL WAS ENCOURAGED BY THE WAY IN WHICH LEADERS OF THE THIRD WORLD WERE STARTING TO SPEAK OUT.
3. IN THIS CONTEXT, THE FEDERAL CABINET HAD APPROVED THE FOLLOWING ACTION. FIRST, THEY WOULD SEEK TO STIMULATE MAXIMUM PUBLICITY FOR SOVIET AGGRESSION. SECONDLY, THEY HAD SENT INSTRUCTIONS TO THEIR AMBASSADORS IN THE MOSLEM AND NON-ALIGNED WORLD TO STIMULATE ACTION BY THESE COUNTRIES AT THE UNITED NATIONS. THIRDLY, THEY HAD AGREED THAT THE UK DRAFT RESOLUTION PROVIDED A GOOD BASIS

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FOR ACTION IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL. FOURTH, THEY HAD APPROVED A DRAFT REPLY TO THE SOVIET UNION, WHICH WOULD MAKE IT CLEAR IN NO UNCERTAIN TERMS THAT SOVIET ACTION WAS A THREAT TO PEACE ETC.

4. IN AFGHANISTAN, THEY WERE RECALLING THEIR AMBASSADOR FOR CONSULTATIONS AND HAD TOLD HIM TO BRING HIS WIFE AND FOUR CHILDREN WITH HIM. DEPENDANTS WOULD BE WITHDRAWN FROM THE EMBASSY IN KABUL AND THE NUMBER OF STAFF THINNED OUT. AID EXPERTS WOULD BE TOLD TO LEAVE AND WORK ON CAPITAL PROJECTS, E.G. WATER SUPPLY, POWER STATIONS AND TELEPHONE SYSTEMS, WOULD BE SUSPENDED. THE GERMAN TEACHERS IN THE TWO GERMAN SCHOOLS WOULD BE WITHDRAWN.

5. IN PAKISTAN, THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT WOULD PROVIDE MONEY TO HELP AFGHAN REFUGEES. THEY HAD DM 100 MILLION IN THEIR AID BUDGET WHICH COULD BE USED FOR THIS PURPOSE. THEY HAD NOT YET DECIDED WHETHER TO DISBURSE THIS AID THROUGH PRIVATE CHARITIES OR OFFICIAL CHANNELS: THEY WOULD PROBABLY DO SO THROUGH A MIXTURE OF BOTH. THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT WOULD TAKE THE LEAD IN CALLING A CONFERENCE, UNDER THE AUSPICES OF THE IMF/WORLD BANK, TO RE-SCHEDULE PAKISTAN'S DEBTS.

6. IN NATO THEY WOULD, OF COURSE, TAKE A FULL PART IN THE TWO WORKING GROUPS TO BE SET UP TO CONSIDER EAST-WEST RELATIONS AND REGIONAL ASPECTS: BLECH WOULD BE IN CHARGE OF HANDLING THE FIRST, MEYER-LANDRUT THE SECOND. VAN WELL HOPED THERE WOULD BE NO LEAKS. THE LEAK IN BRUSSELS ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF A BOYCOTT OF THE OLYMPIC GAMES HAD BEEN UNHELPFUL, SINCE NUMEROUS PROMINENT SPORTSMEN, INCLUDING THE CHAIRMAN OF THE GERMAN NATIONAL OLYMPIC COMMITTEE, HAD AT ONCE APPEARED ON TELEVISION TO PROTEST ABOUT THE MIXING OF SPORT WITH POLITICS. PRECISELY THE REACTION, SAID VAN WELL, THEY DID NOT WANT.

7. VAN WELL ALSO SAID THAT IF THE AMERICANS DECIDED TO STOP WHEAT EXPORTS TO THE SOVIET UNION, A VERY SERIOUS SITUATION WOULD ARISE. HE EMPHASISED THAT IN SUCH CIRCUMSTANCES SOLIDARITY WITH THE AMERICANS WOULD BE ESSENTIAL. WHEN I ASKED HIM WHETHER HE THOUGHT SUCH ACTION WOULD BE COUNTER-PRODUCTIVE, HE DECLINED TO ANSWER AND SAID THE DECISION WAS ONE FOR THE AMERICANS.

8. COMMENT. THE FEDERAL GERMANS HAVE OF COURSE PARTICULAR GERMAN REASONS FOR NOT WISHING TO BURDEN THEIR BILATERAL RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION - CONSEQUENCES FOR BERLIN, WHICH PRESUMABLY WE SHARE, INNER-GERMAN RELATIONS AND THEIR OSTPOLITIK IN GENERAL.

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THEY THEREFORE DRAW A DISTINCTION BETWEEN GENERAL CONDEMNATION OF SOVIET AGGRESSION, WHICH THEY FAVOUR, AND SPECIFIC BILATERAL REPRISALS, WHICH THEY DO NOT, AT LEAST AT PRESENT. THEY PREFER TO CONCENTRATE SPECIFIC ACTION AT THE UNITED NATIONS AND IN THE REGION CONCERNED. AND AS PARAGRAPHS 3 TO 5 INDICATE, THEY HAVE ALREADY SET IN TRAIN A WIDE RANGE OF PRACTICAL MEASURES. AS SEEN FROM BONN, THEIR ARGUMENT THAT TO DRAW THE MOSLEM AND NON-ALIGNED INTO THE EAST-WEST CONFLICT WOULD BE COUNTER-PRODUCTIVE TO WESTERN INTERESTS MAKES A GOOD DEAL OF SENSE. MOREOVER, THE OPPOSITION HERE, AND STRAUSS IN PARTICULAR, WOULD QUICKLY POUNCE ON ANY SIGN OF WEAKNESS IN THE GOVERNMENT'S APPROACH.

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TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TEL NO 20 OF 3 JANUARY

INFO PRIORITY ISLAMABAD, DELHI, KABUL.

ROUTINE MOSCOW, UKDEL NATO, PEKING, PARIS, BONN, UKMIS NEW YORK.

AFGHANISTAN AND THE INDIAN DIMENSION

1. THE US ADMINISTRATION ARE WELL AWARE OF THE INDIAN DIMENSION. IN SUPPORT OF THIS I WOULD CITE VANCE'S MENTION TO ME ON 28 DECEMBER (MY TEL 4377) OF PLANNED OFFERS OF NUCLEAR SUPPLIES AND MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO INDIA, AND CHRISTOPHER'S BALANCED REFERENCE ON 1 JANUARY (UKDEL NATO TEL 002 PARA 10) TO A HIGHER PRIORITY FOR US RELATIONS WITH BOTH INDIA AND PAKISTAN.
2. I ALSO RAISED THE QUESTION WITH ASSISTANT SECRETARY SAUNDERS TODAY (BEFORE RECEIPT OF YOUR TELNO 2 TO DELHI) WHO READILY CONFIRMED THAT SIGHT WAS NOT BEING LOST OF INDIA IN THE ADMINISTRATION'S KEENNESS TO REASSURE PAKISTAN. HE WAS NOT SURPRISED TO LEARN THAT THE INDIANS HAD NOTICED THE OMISSION OF INDIA FROM BRZEZINSKI'S LIST OF COUNTRIES CONSULTED OVER AFGHANISTAN IN HIS 30 DECEMBER TELEVISION INTERVIEW, AND RESPONDED POSITIVELY TO MY SUGGESTION THAT THE PRESIDENT SHOULD NOT MAKE THE SAME MISTAKE WHEN HE ANNOUNCES THE US RESPONSE TO THE AFGHANISTAN INVASION (SCHEDULED FOR TOMORROW). SAUNDERS, WHO HAS NO ILLUSIONS ABOUT THE FRAGILITY OF THE PAKISTAN PIECE OF THE JIGSAW, ACKNOWLEDGED AMERICAN LONG TERM INTERESTS LIE IN GOOD RELATIONS WITH INDIA.
3. HE NEVERTHELESS MADE IT CLEAR THAT THE IMMEDIATE PROBLEM WAS THAT PAKISTAN BOTH FELT AND PROBABLY WAS THREATENED, AND THAT THE U.S. WOULD DO THE NECESSARY TO MEET THAT CONCERN. THAT MEANT THE SUPPLY OF MILITARY EQUIPMENT, AND THE PRESIDENT COULD BE EXPECTED TO ANNOUNCE AS MUCH TOMORROW. THE REASONS WOULD HAVE TO BE CAREFULLY EXPLAINED TO THE INDIANS WHO WERE ALREADY BEING FULLY BRIEFED BY THE AMERICANS ABOUT AFGHANISTAN ON THE INTELLIGENCE NETWORK.

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4. BOTH BRZEZINSKI AND SAUNDERS WOULD READILY ACCEPT THAT IN THE PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES OUR RELATIONS WITH INDIA ARE CLOSER THAN THEIR'S AND OUR INFLUENCE IN DELHI CORRESPONDINGLY GREATER. SAUNDERS WAS PLEASED TO LEARN, WHEN I TOLD HIM OF YOUR MIDDLE EASTERN TRAVEL PLANS (YOUR TEL 2 TO JEDDA), THAT YOU WERE THINKING OF ADDING DELHI.

HENDERSON

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TO FLASH WASHINGTON

TELEGRAM NUMBER 17 OF 3 JANUARY 1980.

INFO IMMEDIATE UKDEL NATO, PARIS, BONN, ROME, OTTAWA, UKMIS NEW YORK, MOSCOW.

ROUTINE WARSAW, PRAGUE, BUDAPEST, BUCHAREST, TOKYO, SOFIA, BELGRADE, EAST BERLIN, PEKING, DUBLIN, ISLAMABAD, DELHI, CANBERRA, WELLINGTON, DACCA, OTHER NATO POSTS, SINGAPORE, KUALA LUMPUR, BANGKOK, MANILA AND JAKARTA.

MY TELNO 12 (NOT TO ALL) : AFGHANISTAN AND EAST-WEST RELATIONS.

1. IN RESPONSE TO THE US AMBASSADOR'S DEMARCHE TO MR HURD ON 3 JANUARY, PLEASE TELL THE AMERICANS TODAY AT A HIGH LEVEL THAT THE UK IS WILLING TO CONSIDER TAKING THE ACTIONS TOWARDS THE SOVIET UNION DESCRIBED BELOW, AS PART OF A CONCERTED SERIES OF PARALLEL ACTIONS BY MEMBERS OF NATO. WE HOLD TO OUR VIEW THAT TWO WORKING GROUPS ARE NEEDED IN NATO TO CONCERT THE ALLIES' ACTIONS.

2. ONE OF THE MOST IMPORTANT FIELDS FOR CONSIDERATION IS HIGH LEVEL VISITS TO AND FROM THE SOVIET UNION. PROVIDED OTHER MEMBERS OF THE ALLIANCE DO LIKE-WISE I AM WILLING TO LET IT BE KNOWN THAT A VISIT BY GROMYKO, WHOM I HAD INVITED TO LONDON IN FEBRUARY OR MARCH, IS NO LONG CONVENIENT. BREZHNEV AND KOSYGIN HAVE OUTSTANDING INVITATIONS TO VISIT BRITAIN, AND WE COULD LET IT BE KNOWN THAT NO DATES WERE AVAILABLE FOR THE TIME BEING. SIR HAROLD WILSON, WHO WAS DUE TO VISIT MOSCOW IN MID-JANUARY IN HIS CAPACITY AS PRESIDENT OF THE GB/USSR ASSOCIATION, HAS DECIDED NOT TO GO.

3. THE FOLLOWING PARAGRAPHS COMMENT ON THE POINTS IN THE US AMBASSADOR'S SPEAKING NOTE.

4. WITHDRAWAL OF AMBASSADORS FROM MOSCOW. THIS IS A MATTER ON WHICH WE WOULD WISH TO ACT TOGETHER WITH OUR PARTNERS IN THE NINE. WE ARE CONSULTING THEM.

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5. THERE ARE NO PLANS FOR BRITISH CONSULATES-GENERAL IN THE USSR. WE COULD, HOWEVER, FREEZE NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION ON EXCHANGES ON NEW EMBASSY SITES IN MOSCOW AND LONDON.

6. BROADCASTING ETC. THE BBC OVERSEAS SERVICES ARE GIVING FULL COVERAGE TO EVENTS IN AFGHANISTAN AND WE ARE TAKING PARTICULAR CARE TO BRIEF THEM FULLY. OUR MISSIONS ESPECIALLY IN NONALIGNED COUNTRIES ARE BEING INSTRUCTED TO DRAW ATTENTION AS WIDELY AS POSSIBLE TO THE SOVIET AGGRESSION. AT HOME, THE GOVERNMENT WILL CONTINUE TO GIVE A LEAD TO PUBLIC OPINION, NOTABLY IN PARLIAMENT AFTER IT REASSEMBLES ON 14 JANUARY. PUBLICITY IS BEING GIVEN TO THE PRIME MINISTERS REMARKS TO THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR WHEN HE CALLED TODAY.

7. OUR MISSION AT KABUL CONSISTS OF ONLY SIX UK BASED STAFF, BUT WE SHALL CONSIDER SOME FURTHER REDUCTIONS. THE NO 2 IN THE EMBASSY IS ABSENT ON LEAVE. THE FIVE UK BASED STAFF OF THE BRITISH COUNCIL ARE BEING WITHDRAWN.

8. SINCE 1971, WE HAVE MAINTAINED STRICT CEILINGS ON SOVIET DIPLOMATIC STAFF IN THE UK. WE HAVE BEGUN APPLYING OUR TRAVEL RESTRICTIONS ON SOVIET DIPLOMATS IN THE UK WITH ESPECIAL STRICTNESS.

9. THERE ARE RELATIVELY FEW SOVIET MEDIA CORRESPONDENTS IN UK AND FEW RESPONSIBLE BRITISH ONES IN MOSCOW. WE WOULD NOT LIKE THE LATTER TO BE REDUCED. NOR DO WE THINK THAT EXPELLING SOVIET CORRESPONDENTS FROM LONDON WOULD HURT THE RUSSIANS MUCH.

10. OLYMPICS. IF OTHER ALLIES DID LIKEWISE, WE WOULD NOT EXCLUDE MAKING THE GOVERNMENT'S VIEWS KNOWN TO THE BRITISH NATIONAL OLYMPIC COMMITTEE. BUT THAT COMMITTEE IS COMPLETELY INDEPENDENT OF GOVERNMENT, WHICH HAS NO POWER TO FORCE IT TO TAKE ANY ACTION. WE SHOULD BE INTERESTED IN US VIEWS ON WHETHER THE INTERNATIONAL OLYMPIC COMMITTEE MIGHT BE PREVAILED UPON TO POSTPONE THE GAMES OR CHANGE THE VENUE.

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11. WE ARE GLAD THAT THE US IS CONSIDERING CANCELLATION OR RESTRICTION OF GRAIN SALES TO THE USSR. BRITAIN DOES NOT EXPORT GRAIN BUT CONSIDERS THAT A DECISION ON RESTRICTION BY WESTERN EXPORTERS WOULD BE A VERY EFFECTIVE LEVER AGAINST THE SOVIET UNION. THE UK COULD APPROACH THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION ABOUT STOPPING BUTTER SALES TO THE USSR.

12. THE ANGLO-SOVIET FIVE YEAR CREDIT AGREEMENT EXPIRES NEXT MONTH. WE BELIEVE THAT PREFERENTIAL INTEREST RATES MORE FAVOURABLE THAN THOSE WHICH WOULD APPLY UNDER THE OECD CONSENSUS, SHOULD CEASE. WE HAVE MADE THIS VIEW CLEAR TO FRANCE, ITALY AND CANADA, WHOSE BILATERAL AGREEMENTS WITH THE SOVIET UNION ALSO EXPIRE ABOUT NOW. IF THESE OTHER COUNTRIES JOIN US, WE WOULD MOREOVER BE WILLING TO CONSIDER REFUSAL TO REPLACE THE EXISTING AGREEMENT WITH A NEW ONE. ECGD EXPORT CREDIT WOULD THEN BE AVAILABLE ON A CASE BY CASE BASIS TO THE USSR.

13. THE UK WOULD BE WILLING TO JOIN IN APPLYING THE FULL REGOUR OF THE COCOM SYSTEM TO SALES OF TECHNOLOGY AND EQUIPMENT SUCH AS COMPUTERS TO THE USSR. MOREOVER, THE QUESTION OF RESTRICTING EXPORTS OF CIVIL TECHNOLOGY IN KEY AREAS LIKE CHEMICAL PLANT AND ADVANCED MACHINE TOOLS HAS NEVER BEEN STUDIED JOINTLY BY WESTERN COUNTRIES. THE UK WOULD BE WILLING TO PARTICIPATE WITH OTHERS IN SUCH A STUDY.

14. AID. WE HAVE TERMINATED BILATERAL AID TO AFGHANISTAN AND ARE CUTTING OFF AID IN THE PIPELINE (ALTHOUGH STUDENTS HERE MAY REMAIN). WE SHALL OPPOSE ANY PROPOSAL FOR NEW ALLOCATIONS OF AID UNDER UNDP AND OTHER AID AGENCIES, THE WORLD BANK, AND THE ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK. WE INTEND TO ENSURE THAT NO FURTHER EEC FOOD AID GOES TO AFGHANISTAN.

15. CIVIL AVIATION. WE EXPECT LIKE THE AMERICANS TO BE ABLE TO REDUCE SPECIAL PRIVILEGES GRANTED TO THE RUSSIANS OUTSIDE THE BILATERAL AIR SERVICES AGREEMENT.

16. THE NUMBERS OF SOVIET NATIONALS ENGAGED IN COMMERCIAL ACTIVITY IN UK HAS BEEN LIMITED BY NUMERICAL CEILINGS SINCE 1971.

17. SOVIET FISHING IN UK WATERS IS A MATTER FOR THE EEC. THERE IS NONE AT PRESENT.

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18. ON OTHER EXCHANGES, DEPENDING ON OTHER ALLIES' ACTIONS, WE SHALL CONSIDER :

- (A) CANCELLING A VISIT BY THE SOVIET COAL MINISTER THIS MONTH.
- (B) POSTPONING THE ANNUAL REVIEW OF OUR MEDICAL EXCHANGE AGREEMENT, DUE IN MARCH WITH THE PARTICIPATION OF A SOVIET DEPUTY MINISTER.
- (C) SHELIVING PLANNED CONSULTATIONS BETWEEN SENIOR FOREIGN MINISTRY OFFICIALS ON INTERNATIONAL SUBJECTS, FOR INSTANCE CSCE, DISARMAMENT AND UN MATTERS.
- (D) CANCELLING PLANS FOR AN EXCHANGE OF VISITS BY MILITARY STAFF ACADEMIES AND REJECTING A SOVIET PROPOSAL FOR AN EXCHANGE OF SHIPS' VISITS.
- (E) HOLDING UP NEGOTIATIONS ON A BILATERAL AGREEMENT ON VISA HANDLING.
- (F) CANCELLING A VISIT TO UK IN MAY-JUNE BY THE RED ARMY CHOIR.
- (G) CANCELLING THE ANGLO-SOVIET AGREEMENT ON AGRICULTURAL RESEARCH COOPERATION.
- (H) DELAYING ISSUING INVITATIONS FOR THE NEXT MEETING OF THE ANGLO-SOVIET JOINT COMMISSION, DUE IN MAY AND LED ON THE SOVIET SIDE BY THE FIRST DEPUTY MINISTER OF FOREIGN TRADE.
- (J) REJECTING A SOVIET PROPOSAL FOR AN ANGLO-SOVIET AGREEMENT ON PREVENTION OF INCIDENTS AT SEA.
- (K) CANCELLING OR DELAYING OTHER EXCHANGES WHICH MIGHT ATTRACT PUBLIC ATTENTION.

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19. ON THE UN, FOLLOWING THE PRESIDENT'S REQUEST TO THE PRIME MINISTER, THE UK HAS TAKEN THE INITIATIVE IN SEEKING ACTION IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND HAS LOBBIED WIDELY IN CAPITALS FOR SUPPORT FOR THIS MOVE. WE ARE ALSO LOOKING INTO THE PROSPECTS FOR A SPECIAL OR EMERGENCY SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY AFTER A SOVIET VETO IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL, ALTHOUGH ANY WESTERN INITIATIVE OF THIS TYPE COULD HAVE IMPLICATIONS CONCERNING ISRAEL OR SOUTH AFRICA.

20. IN ADDITION TO THE ABOVE, I AM PLANNING A VISIT BETWEEN 9 AND 16 JANUARY TO TURKEY, OMAN, SAUDI ARABIA, PAKISTAN AND PROBABLY INDIA, WHICH WILL PROVIDE GOOD OPPORTUNITIES FOR DEMONSTRATING BRITISH SUPPORT FOR THE COUNTRIES CONCERNED.

21. WE SHALL CONSIDER WHETHER OUR BILATERAL RELATIONS WITH OTHER MEMBERS OF THE WARSAW PACT SHOULD BE INFLUENCED BY THE DEGREE TO WHICH EACH ENDORSES THE SOVIET INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN.

22. I CONSIDER THAT THE IMPORTANT THING IS FOR WESTERN COUNTRIES TO ACT TOGETHER AND IN CONCERT AFTER PROPER THOUGHT AND PREPARATION. AN IMPRESSION OF ALLIED DISARRAY IS HIGHLY UNDESIRABLE. WHATEVER DECISIONS THE AMERICANS REACH UNILATERALLY SHOULD THEREFORE NOT BE ANNOUNCED UNTIL FURTHER CONSULTATIONS HAVE TAKEN PLACE.

CARRINGTON

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PS/MR BLAKER
PS/MR LUCE
PS/MR HURD
PS/PUS
SIR D MAITLAND
MR CORTAZZI
MR FERGUSSON
MR MURRAY
MR BULLARD
HD/SAD (4)
HD/EESD
HD/N AM D
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TO PRIORITY F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 17 OF 3 JANUARY

INFO KABUL, MOSCOW, ISLAMABAD, DELHI, UKDEL NATO, BONN, PARIS, ROME,
UKMIS NEW YORK, PEKING, CAIRO, TEL AVIV

US REACTION TO EVENTS IN AFGHANISTAN

1. FOLLOWING A DAY OF MEETINGS IN THE WHITE HOUSE, THE FOLLOWING ADMINISTRATION REACTIONS TO EVENTS IN AFGHANISTAN WERE MADE PUBLIC:
 - A. THE DECISION TO GO FOR A RESOLUTION IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL RATHER THAN THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY:
 - B. THE SENATE WOULD BE ASKED TO DELAY CONSIDERATION OF THE SALT TREATY (SEE SEPARATE TELEGRAM):
 - C. THE US AMBASSADOR IN MOSCOW HAD BEEN RECALLED FOR CONSULTATIONS - MOSCOW TELNO.6 (THE FIRST TIME THIS HAD HAPPENED DURING A US/SOVIET CRISIS IN LIVING MEMORY):
 - D. THE CONFIRMATION THAT THE ADMINISTRATION HAD RULED OUT THE POSSIBILITY OF US MILITARY INTERVENTION IN AFGHANISTAN IN RESPONSE TO SOVIET ACTIONS:
 - E. THE STATE DEPARTMENT STATEMENT THAT DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH

RESPONSE TO SOVIET ACTIONS:

- E. THE STATE DEPARTMENT STATEMENT THAT DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH AFGHANISTAN'S QUOTE PRESENT GOVERNMENT WERE UNDER REVIEW UNQUOTE
- F. A VIGOROUS DENIAL OF ANY CIA INVOLVEMENT IN THE AFGHAN INSURGENCY, OR ATTEMPTS TO TURN AFGHANISTAN INTO A US BASE:
- G. A WHITE HOUSE DENIAL THAT AT PRESENT THERE WERE ANY PLANS FOR A HIGH-LEVEL MISSION TO COUNTRIES IN THE REGION OF AFGHANISTAN:
- H. THE ADMISSION BY THE STATE DEPARTMENT THAT THE ISRAELI AND EGYPTIAN OFFERS OF BASES FOR US FORCES IN THEIR COUNTRIES WERE BEING CONSIDERED IN CONNECTION WITH THE CURRENT STUDY ON INCREASING THE US MILITARY PRESENCE IN THE AREA. ACCORDING TO STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIALS, THIS AMOUNTED TO A CHANGE IN APPROACH, BUT THEY EMPHASIZED IT DID NOT MEAN THE OFFERS WOULD BE ACCEPTED:
- I. SUGGESTIONS BY US OFFICIALS THAT THE US WOULD SEEK CHINESE COOPERATION IN MEASURES TO SHORE UP PAKISTAN'S DEFENCES (SEE SEPARATE TELEGRAM). THESE WERE LIKELY TO BE DISCUSSED DURING HAROLD BROWN'S VISIT TO CHINA STARTING TOMORROW.

2. THE PRESIDENT IS EXPECTED TO MAKE A STATEMENT TOMORROW INCORPORATING THE DECISIONS HE HAS TAKEN, AND WILL LOOK TO TAKE WITH OTHERS AS A RESULT OF THE RECENT DISCUSSIONS IN WASHINGTON AND EUROPE.

HENDERSON

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Afghanistan.

RECORD OF A MEETING BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER AND THE SOVIET
AMBASSADOR, MR. N.M. LUNKOV AT 10 DOWNING STREET ON THURSDAY,
3 JANUARY 1980 AT 1500 HOURS

*cc. Mr. L. set.
Sov. Union recall
by Lunkov.*

Present:-

Prime Minister	H.E. Mr. N.M. Lunkov
Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary	
Mr. M.O'D.B. Alexander	Mr. N.N. Ouspenski

* * * *

After Mr. Lunkov had completed reading the message from President Brezhnev which he was delivering, the Prime Minister asked him about the "acts of external aggression" referred to in the message. She was aware of none. The Soviet Union ^{has} constantly asserted in recent days that there had been external intervention or aggression but she could find no evidence of this. The only aggression of which the British Government was aware was that carried out by Soviet forces. The Prime Minister also enquired about the request which, according to the message, had been addressed to the Soviet Government by the Government of Afghanistan on 26 December. So far as she was aware President Amin had still been in power then. Had the invitation to the Soviet Government come from President Amin? Mr. Lunkov said that information from the Afghan authorities confirmed that internal counter-revolutionaries in Afghanistan had been receiving unlimited support from external sources. The support included weapons, equipment and money and the sources included the United States, China, Pakistan, Egypt and other countries. Scores of centres for subversives had been set up in Pakistan. They were disguised as refugee camps. Armed formations had been prepared for despatch into Afghanistan in these centres and had returned to them for recuperation. Among the instructors in the camps were members of the CIA, and specialists in subversion from China and Egypt. The United States had sought the agreement of

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- 2 -

the Pakistan Government to an expansion of its activities. A good deal of evidence about these activities had appeared in the British media. There were relevant articles in The Times and Telegraph of the previous day. In an interview with Mr. Peter Sissons on New Year's Eve, the Chinese Ambassador had practically admitted that his Government was interfering in Afghanistan.

The Prime Minister said that even supposing subversive activity was taking place in a country this did not justify others in intervening. After all the Soviet Union itself was responsible for subversive activity in many countries. Such activity should be dealt with by the existing authorities in the countries affected. The Prime Minister noted the sequence of coups in Afghanistan involving Messrs Daud, Tarakki and Amin and repeated her question about the timing of the request from the Afghan Government to the Soviet Government for help. Mr. Lunkov said that the Soviet Government had had nothing to do with the coups in Afghanistan. He could only repeat what was said in President Brezhnev's letter. The Prime Minister said that it was remarkable that the Soviet intervention had begun while President Amin was still in power but that within a few hours of the arrival of the Soviet troops, President Amin had been shot and a man who was not even in the country at the time of the intervention placed in power. She could only assume that the new President was not the choice of the Afghan people but had been placed in power by the Soviet Army and was being kept there by 50,000 troops. Mr. Lunkov replied that following President Tarakki's assumption of power in the spring of 1979, the Afghan authorities had warned the world about external intrusions into the country and asked that assistance should not be given to those responsible.

The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary said that as he understood the position, President Amin had outraged the Muslims to the point where they had taken up arms against him. The opposition was internal. As a result President Amin had appealed to the Soviet Government. But no sooner had Soviet forces arrived than they had shot President Amin. Mr. Lunkov disclaimed any knowledge of these events. They were internal Afghan matters with which the Soviet

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/Government had

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- 3 -

Government had nothing to do. The Soviet forces were limited in scale and had been sent purely to repel incursions. They had met ~~no~~ ^{help} opposition within Afghanistan. On the contrary, some very influential Muslims had welcomed them. Their presence was entirely in accord with the Afghan/Soviet Friendship Treaty. Once a request for / had been made under that Treaty, the Soviet Government could not have rejected it. In any case the Soviet Government had a very long frontier in common with Afghanistan and could not be indifferent to what was happening there. Afghanistan might in some circumstances open a bridgehead for intervention in the Soviet Union. The Prime Minister interjected that this last point was the real reason for the Soviet Government's action.

Mr. Lunkov said that many other Governments had troops from the United States on their soil. When the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary observed that this was condemned by the Soviet Government, Mr. Lunkov replied that this depended on whether or not the forces in question were present by invitation. Soviet troops had been invited to enter Afghanistan. The Prime Minister said that this was not the case. Soviet troops had marched with the intention of annexing Afghanistan and turning it, in due course, into a buffer state. President Karmal was a puppet and a considerable military presence would be required to keep him in power. There would probably be continuing trouble from the Muslim population. If the Soviet Union's own claims were justified, Soviet forces could presumably leave Afghanistan within days. Mr. Lunkov agreed but declined to be drawn further when asked for a precise estimate of the length of time Soviet forces would remain in the country.

The Prime Minister said that this was the first time that the Soviet troops had entered a genuinely independent country. While their intervention in Hungary and Czechoslovakia had been appalling, it had been recognised that those countries were in the Soviet Union's sphere of influence. But heretofore Afghanistan had been regarded as a country which was free to choose its own destiny.

/Now it

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- 4 -

Now it was occupied by 40,000 or 50,000 Soviet soldiers. Mr. Lunkov said that he was unable to confirm the number of Soviet troops in Afghanistan. This was a matter for the Soviet and Afghan Governments alone. He asked the Prime Minister to look beyond the text of President Brezhnev's message and to recognise that if stability in the region were to be preserved, the Governments concerned would need to display qualities of soberness, equanimity and commonsense.

The Prime Minister said that the British Government had all these qualities but this did not diminish the gravity of the situation that had been created. There were many Governments in the world of which she did not approve but she did not attempt to use armed force to change them. There was only one large imperialist and expansionist power left in the world today. This was the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union was engaged in annexing territory and using its undoubted military power to impose a Government of its own choosing. This was the first time since the war that the Soviet Government had taken such action. Although the Soviet Government had used proxies and surrogates elsewhere e.g. the East Germans in South Yemen, and the Cubans in Angola and Ethiopia, their action in Afghanistan was something new. The Soviet Government should not be surprised that Western Governments regarded the situation as grave. Fresh light had been cast on the motives for the Soviet Government's enormous military expenditure. Nonetheless, the Prime Minister said that she was hopeful the Soviet Government would agree to withdraw from Afghanistan.

Mr. Lunkov said that the Soviet Government categorically rejected the Prime Minister's allegations about the situation in Afghanistan. He asked why the British Government pretended it knew better than the Soviet Government about the situation in the country. The Prime Minister said that the presence of massive Soviet forces and of a new Head of Government who required their presence to retain his office was obvious enough. Nonetheless it was of great importance for relations between the Warsaw Pact and the North Atlantic Alliance that the troops should be withdrawn

/soon. Their

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- 5 -

soon. Their presence could only cause great alarm. She accepted that the Soviet Government was entitled to take measures to defend itself. So was the West. Both sides should be prepared to negotiate from positions of equal strength and to reduce that strength step by step. On that basis she was anxious to see as many contacts as possible between East and West. But recent events in Afghanistan cast doubts on the Soviet Government's motives and in the whole field of East/West relations.

The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary asked about the implications of the statement in President Brezhnev's message that Britain "could do something if it so wished" about the ending of armed invasions of the territory of Afghanistan. Did this mean that the British Government were being accused of involvement in these invasions. Mr. Lunkov said that President Brezhnev was seeking stability and peaceful co-operation in the region. The message invited the British Government to appeal to those who were seeking to overthrow the new regime to desist from their efforts. Despite what had been said in the Press, Mr. Lunkov was aware of no Soviet Government statement accusing Britain of involvement. Of course there had been some reports from Afghanistan of such involvement: the British Government would know best what weight to give these. The Prime Minister said that the British Government had not been involved in any way in activities of the kind referred to. Mr. Lunkov said that this was a very important statement. The Prime Minister concluded the conversation by repeating her hope that Soviet troops would leave Afghanistan very soon. The Afghan people must be free to choose their own Government. Mr. Lunkov said that he agreed.

The discussion ended at 1540 hours.

Phms

3 January 1980

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: Mum*

Mr Cortesi

AFGHANISTAN

1. The American Ambassador called on Mr Hurd this morning and left with him a copy of instructions giving details of what measures the United States plan in response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan (attached). They have asked for at least our preliminary reaction by close of play today. The list is a long one and this will be difficult to do. But Mr Hurd did undertake that we would do our best.

2. You have agreed to chair a meeting in your room at 2.30 this afternoon to consider the American list. Mr Bullard may wish to attend. At this stage it will clearly be impossible to work out a comprehensive and detailed reaction. It would though be helpful if EESD, OID, CRD, FRD and TRED could attend. I am however circulating this minute to others who will be interested.

D. A. Lavers.

3 January 1980

R Lavers
South Asian Department

- cc: PS
- PS/Mr Hurd
- PS/Mr Blaker
- PS/PUS
- Sir D Maitland
- Mr Bullard
- Mr Murray
- Mr Fergusson
- Lord W Gordon-Lennox
- Mr Evans
- EESD
- NAD
- MED
- OID
- CRD
- FRD
- TRED
- JND

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You should seek appointment with appropriate Foreign Ministry official to continue the consultations begun in London and Brussels on our response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. You should say that we have been considering further what steps should be taken as part of our overall response. We would like to have the considered reactions of all the Allies by close of business Thursday, January 3, Washington time.

The subjects which you should include in your approach are as follows. No final decisions have been taken here, except for recall of Ambassador Watson, and you should present the following as tentative decisions under consideration depending on Allied response.

-- We have recalled Ambassador Watson from Moscow for consultations. Although this action has already been taken by us we would appreciate knowing of any plans Allies might have to take a similar step.

-- We propose to suspend preparations for opening of Consulates General in Kiev and New York.

MD -- We propose to step up RL/RFE and VOA broadcasts and to increase publicity about the Soviet role in Afghanistan. We hope the Allies will follow our lead in this.

-- We propose to reduce the number of U.S. diplomatic personnel in Kabul to a minimum. We would leave a Charge with a total of ten people at our Mission.

LESD -- We have under consideration reduction of Soviet diplomatic staffs which are disproportionately large as well as strict reciprocity in travel restrictions.

-- We propose to reduce Soviet media representation in the U.S. to a number which would make the number formally equal with our representation in the Soviet Union.

-- The question of canceling participation in the Moscow Olympic Games is under serious discussion, it having been raised in London and Brussels. We recognize that

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it would be very controversial. We would be especially grateful for further Allied views on this subject.

-- As for commercial matters, we propose to keep the Soviet MEN issue moribund. We are particularly anxious to learn further Allied views on: (A) grain sales. If we were to cancel or restrict our sales in significant way, what would the Allies be prepared to do? Would those countries which export grain be prepared to cancel or restrict their grain sales?

(B) Credits. We need more information on what possibilities exist for the Allies to curtail credits to the Soviets and what possibilities there are that they would be willing to do this, especially if U.S. curtails grain sales.

(C) U.S. proposes to tighten up sales of high technology items. What steps would the Allies consider feasible in curbing technology transfer?

(D) We propose to urge IFI's and countries with assistance programs to Afghanistan to terminate such assistance.

(E) We propose to limit Soviet flights under our Civil Aviation Agreement to the present level, not granting the Soviets any special treatment.

(F) We propose to limit or prevent expansion of commercial activity in U.S. Would allies be prepared to do likewise?

(G) As for Soviet fishing in U.S. zones, we are studying the question of allocations further.

-- On exchanges, we propose to:

(A) Cancel a trip by a U.S. Congressman;

(B) Cancel or downgrade the Joint Committee meeting on agriculture scheduled for the third week of January in Moscow;

(C) Cancel the Joint Committee meeting scheduled to begin February 28 in Moscow on the US/USSR Housing Agreement;

(D) Defer indefinitely measures taken under the US/USSR Energy Agreement.

(E) We will go ahead with activities under the Health Agreement as long as they are low level and of humanitarian interest.

(F) On exchange contacts in general we will review each special case, seeking to avoid high visibility (in practice this will probably mean not allowing any participation by Assistant Secretaries or above).

(G) We intend to postpone the Joint Commercial Commission meeting scheduled for April. Soviet side would have been headed by Soviet Trade Minister.

-- We are actively studying at the UN the best way of introducing Afghanistan into the agenda. Action here is centered in New York where Ambassador McHenry is consulting with Allied and other delegations. An impressively large number of nations have expressed willingness to join with us in bringing matter to Security Council under Chapter 7.

In addition to the above, any thoughts the Allies have on other actions would be welcome. The ability of the U.S. to take tough and painful decisions here will be closely related to willingness of Allies to do likewise.

FYI. Help for Pakistan and other independent nations in the region is being considered separately. End FYI.

FYI. The reason for urgency is that it is hoped that final decisions will be made by Friday. End FYI.

Tel. Extn.....

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SAVING TO (for info).....

Distribution:-

[TEXT]

fcc/WH

EESD

My telno 12 (not to all): Afghanistan and East-West Relations:

Copies to:-

Mr Knighton DOT

Mr J Pownall DOT

1. In response to the US Ambassador's demarche to Mr Hurd on 3 January, please tell the Americans at a high level at the UK is willing to consider taking the actions towards the Soviet Union described below, as part of a concerted series of parallel actions by members of NATO. We hold to our view that two working groups are needed in NATO to concert the Allies' actions.

2. One of the most important fields for consideration is high level visits to and from the Soviet Union.

Provided other members of the Alliance do like-wise I am willing to ~~tell~~ ^{let it be known that a visit by} Gromyko, whom I had invited to visit

London in February or March, ~~that these dates~~ ^{would} are no longer ~~available~~ ^{he convenient}. Brezhnev and Kosygin have outstanding

invitations to visit Britain, and we could tell the Russians that no dates for such contacts were available for the time being. Sir Harold Wilson, who was due to visit Moscow in mid-January in his capacity as President of the GB/USSR Association, has decided not to go.

3. The following paragraphs comment on the points in the US Ambassador's speaking note.

4. Withdrawal of Ambassadors from Moscow. This is a matter on which we would wish to act together with our partners in the Nine. We are consulting them.

5. There are no plans for British Consulates-General in the USSR. We could, however, freeze negotiations with ^{the} Soviet Union on exchanges on new Embassy sites in Moscow and London.

6. Broadcasting etc. The BBC overseas services are giving full coverage to events in Afghanistan and we are taking particular care to brief them fully. We are also briefing our overseas missions to be active on the information front. At home, the government will continue to give a lead to public opinion, notably in Parliament after it reassembles on 14 January.

7. Our Mission at Kabul consists of only six UK based staff, but we shall consider some further reductions. The No 2 in the Embassy is absent on leave. The five UK based staff of the British Council are being withdrawn.

8. Since 1971, we have maintained strict ceilings on Soviet diplomatic staff in the UK. We have begun applying our travel restrictions on Soviet diplomats in the UK with especial strictness.

9. There are relatively few Soviet media correspondents in UK and few responsible British ones in Moscow. We would not like the latter to be reduced. Nor do we think that expelling Soviet correspondents from London would hurt the Russians much.

10. Olympics. We do not exclude making the government's views known to the British National Olympics Committee. But that Committee is completely independent of Government, which has no power to force it to take any action. We should be interested in US views on whether the International Olympics Committee might be prevailed upon to postpone the Games or change their venue.
11. We are glad that the US is considering cancellation or restriction of grain sales to the USSR. Britain does not export grain but considers that a decision on restrictions by Western exporters would be a very effective lever against the Soviet Union. The UK could approach the European Commission about stopping butter sales to the USSR.
12. The Anglo-Soviet Five Year Credit Agreement expires next month. We believe that preferential interest rates ~~on credit~~, more favourable than those which would apply ^{under} ~~in~~ the OECD consensus, should cease. We have made this view clear to France, Italy and Canada, whose bilateral agreements with the Soviet Union also expire about now. If these other countries join us, we would ⁱⁿ be willing to consider refusal to replace the existing agreement with a new one. ECGD export credit would then be available on a case by case basis to the USSR.
13. The UK would be willing to join in applying the full rigour of the COCOM system ^{to} of sales of technology and equipment to the USSR. Moreover, the question of restricting exports of civil technology in key areas like chemical plant and advanced machine tools has never been studied jointly by Western countries. The UK would be willing to participate with others in such a study.
14. Aid. We have terminated bilateral aid to Afghanistan and are cutting off aid in the pipeline. We shall oppose any proposal for new allocations of aid under UNDP and other aid agencies, the World Bank, and the ^{Development Bank} Asian. We intend to ensure

ensure that no further EEC food aid goes to Afghanistan.

15. Civil aviation. We expect ~~to be able to act~~ like the Americans to be able to reduce special privileges granted to the Russians outside the bilateral air services agreement.

16 The numbers of Soviet nationals engaged in commercial activity in UK has been limited by numerical ceilings since 1971.

17 Soviet fishing in UK waters is a matter for the EEC. There is ^{none} ~~no such~~ fishing at present.

18 On other exchanges, we could consider:

a) ~~consider~~ cancelling a visit by the Soviet ^{Coal} ~~Coal~~ Minister this month.

b) postponing the annual review of our medical exchange agreement, due in March with the participation of a Soviet Deputy Minister.

(c) shelve ^{Foreign Ministry} planned consultations between senior officials on international subjects, for instance CSCE, disarmament and UN matters.

d) cancel ^{lit} plans for an exchange of visits by military staff academies and reject ^{ing} a Soviet proposal for an exchange of ships' visits.

(e) hold ^{ing} up negotiations on a bilateral agreement on visa handling.

(f) cancel ^{lit} a visit ^{to UK} in May-June by the Red Army Chief.

(g) cancel ^{lit} the Anglo-Soviet agreement on agricultural research cooperation.

(h) delay ^{ing} ~~xxxx~~ issuing invitations for the next meeting of the Anglo-Soviet Joint Commission, due in May and led on the Soviet side by the First Deputy Minister of Foreign Trade.

(j) reject ^{ing} a Soviet proposal for an Anglo-Soviet agreement on prevention of incidents at sea.

(k) cancel^{like} (or delay^{ize}) other exchanges which might attract public attention.

19 On the UN, following the President's request to the Prime Minister, the UK has taken the initiative in seeking action in the Security Council and has lobbied widely in capitals for support for this move. We are also looking into the prospects for a special^{or} emergency session of the General Assembly after a Soviet veto in the Security Council, although any Western initiative of this type could have implications concerning Israel or South Africa.

20 In addition to the above, I am planning a visit between 9 and 16 January to Turkey, Oman, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and probably India, which will provide good opportunities for demonstrating British support for the countries concerned.

21 We shall consider whether our bilateral relations with other members of the Warsaw Pact should be influenced by the degree to which each endorses the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan

22.

TI Consider

22 I consider that the important thing is for Western countries to act together and in concert after proper thought and preparation. Whatever decisions the Americans reach unilaterally should therefore not be announced until further consultations have taken place.



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

3 January 1980

Call by the Soviet Ambassador

I enclose a copy of the record of this afternoon's discussion between the Prime Minister and the Soviet Ambassador. I also enclose a copy of the message to the Prime Minister from President Brezhnev delivered by Mr. Lunkov.

* Russian Text
copied to FCO.
GB.

I should be grateful if the record of the discussion could be given a limited distribution.

I am sending a copy of this letter and its enclosures to Brian Norbury (Ministry of Defence) and Martin Vile (Cabinet Office).

MA

G.G.H. Walden, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

COPIED TO FCO

GB

SUBJECT.

PRIME MINISTER'S

PERSONAL MESSAGE

SERIAL No. T 3/80

Unofficial translation

In connection with Your message delivered in Moscow on 29 December I must note that the picture it draws of what is happening in the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan is quite far from reality. We have already informed You about the facts of the matter and still stranger seem to look the assertions contained in Your message.

You seem not to wish to notice the fact that the question is about the entry of limited Soviet military contingents on request of the government of Afghanistan, I emphasize, exactly on its request. Attempts to cast a doubt on the fact itself of the approach to us on this score by the Afghan side are totally groundless. For almost two years the government of Afghanistan has repeatedly made such requests to us, with one such request addressed on 26 December 1979. You can not fail to know recent public statements of the Afghan side itself which mention these approaches.

The motivations of these requests are no secret as well. For a prolonged period of time acts of external aggression against the democratic Afghanistan have been taking place, and now at an ever greater scale. In these circumstances the approach of the government of Afghanistan to the Soviet Union for help and assistance in repelling the external aggression, as well as our positive reaction to this request are natural and lawful actions provided for by Article 51 of the UN Charter which clearly states the right of any state - member of the UN to not only individual, but also collective self-defence.

Totally unacceptable are the hints in Your message to the effect that the Soviet Union allegedly did something to overthrow the government of Afghanistan. I must quite definitely stress that the changes in the Afghan leadership are made by Afghans themselves. Soviet military contingents took no military actions against the Afghan side and we naturally have no intentions to take them. The Soviet Union has not at all interfered and does not interfere in the internal affairs of Afghanistan which are settled by the Afghans themselves. The Afghan people express its will itself by its words and its deeds.

It has already been said to the British side - and I can repeat it once again, - that as soon as the reasons which caused the request of Afghanistan to the Soviet Union cease to exist we intend to withdraw completely our military contingents from the territory of this country.

As to the Soviet Union, it invariably builds its relations with all countries on the basis of complete equality and mutual respect without dividing them to strong and weak, big and small.

In the light of all this any attempts of others to speak as if on behalf of the Afghan people, to determine what is better and what is worse for it can not be taken seriously. If a real care is to be taken about the interests of the people of Afghanistan, one should above all contribute to the ending of armed invasions from outside to the territory of this country. And it is here that Britain could do something if it so wished.

In conclusion I would like to emphasize - although this subject is not touched upon in Your message - that despite obvious differences on a number of questions of the international politics, the Soviet Union favours that no excessive emotions and artificial complications are introduced in the Soviet-British relations, but that they should develop in the spirit of mutual understanding, detente and peace. We are convinced that this would be in keeping with the vital interests of the peoples of both countries.

В связи с Вашим посланием, переданным в Москве 29 декабря, должен отметить, что обрисованная в нем картина происходящего в Демократической Республике Афганистан весьма далека от действительности. Мы уже информировали Вас о фактической стороне дела. Тем более странно выглядят утверждения, содержащиеся в Вашем послании.

Вы как будто не хотите замечать того факта, что речь идет о вводе ограниченных советских воинских контингентов по просьбе правительства Афганистана, подчеркиваю, именно по его просьбе. Попытки поставить под сомнение сам факт обращения к нам на этот счет афганской стороны лишены всяких оснований. На протяжении почти двух лет правительство Афганистана неоднократно обращалось к нам с такими просьбами, причем одна из них была направлена 26 декабря 1979 года. Вам не могут не быть известны недавние публичные заявления самой афганской стороны, в которых говорилось об этих ее обращениях.

Не секрет и то, чем мотивировались эти просьбы. В течение длительного времени против демократического Афганистана имеют место акты внешней агрессии, которая сейчас приняла еще более широкие масштабы. В этих условиях обращение правительства Афганистана к Советскому Союзу об оказании помощи и содействия в отражении внешней агрессии, как и то, что мы положительно откликнулись на такую просьбу, представляют собой действия естественные и правомерные, которые предусмотрены статьей 51 Устава ООН, где четко зафиксировано право любого государства — члена ООН не только на индивидуальную, но и на коллективную самооборону.

Совершенно неприемлемы намеки в Вашем послании на то, будто Советский Союз что-то предпринял для свержения правительства Афганистана. Должен со всей определенностью подчеркнуть, что изменения в афганском руководстве произведены самими афганцами. Советские воинские контингенты не предпринимали никаких военных действий против афганской стороны, и у нас, разумеется, нет намерений предпринимать их. Советский Союз вообще не вмешивался и не вмешивается во внутренние дела Афганистана, которые решаются самими афганцами. Свою волю афганский народ выражает сам, своим словом и своим делом.

Английской стороне уже говорилось, и могу повторить это еще раз: как только отпадут причины, вызвавшие просьбу Афганистана к Советскому Союзу, мы намерены полностью вывести наши воинские контингенты с территории этой страны.

Что касается Советского Союза, то он неизменно строит свои отношения со всеми странами на основе полного равенства и взаимного уважения, не разделяя их на сильные и слабые, на большие и малые.

В свете всего этого всякие попытки других говорить как бы от имени афганского народа, определять, что для него лучше и что хуже, не могут быть приняты всерьез. Если по-настоящему проявлять заботу об интересах народа Афганистана, то следует прежде всего способствовать прекращению вооруженных вторжений извне на территорию этого государства. И тут Англия могла бы кое-что сделать, если бы того пожелала.

В заключение хотел бы подчеркнуть — хотя эта тема в Вашем послании и не затронута, — что, несмотря на очевидные расхождения в ряде вопросов международной политики, Советский Союз — сторонник того, чтобы в советско-английские отношения не привносились излишние эмоции и искусственные осложнения, а чтобы они развивались в духе взаимопонимания, разрядки и мира. Это, по нашему убеждению, отвечало бы коренным интересам народов обеих стран.

L.A. Pm 3/1

PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING WITH AMBASSADOR LUNKOV: LINE TO TAKE

The Prime Minister told Mr. Lunkov that she agreed about the need to avoid introducing "artificial complications" into Soviet/British relations. But the present problems had been created by the Soviet Union's armed intervention in Afghanistan. A grave situation now existed. The Prime Minister said that she hoped the situation would be resolved at a very early date by the removal of the Soviet forces.

The Prime Minister noted the reference in President Brezhnev's message to acts of external aggression which had been committed against Afghanistan and which, according to the Soviet Government, had led to a request from the Afghan Government on 26 December for help from the Soviet Union. The Prime Minister said that she knew of no evidence of acts of aggression against Afghanistan or of anything that would have justified the Soviet Union's own armed intervention. As regards the invitation said to have been issued on 26 December, the Prime Minister noted that this appeared to mean that it had been issued by the late President Amin. It was not easy to reconcile this sequence of events with the assertion that the Soviet Union had done nothing to overthrow the previous Government of Afghanistan.

Finally the Prime Minister expressed surprise at the claim that Soviet military contingents had taken no military action against the Afghans. There appeared to be considerable public evidence contradicting this claim.

The Prime Minister concluded the discussion by stressing once again the importance of an early Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan.

Pm
-

3 January 1980

PRESS OFFICE BULLETIN

HOLDING LINE FOR USE IMMEDIATELY.

The Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary, Lord Carrington, had a 40-minute meeting with Ambassador Lunkov, of the Soviet Union, on the subject of Afghanistan.

The meeting was held at the request of Mr Lunkov who delivered a reply from President Brezhnev to the Prime Minister's letter ~~dated~~ of December 29 in which she said she had been profoundly disturbed by recent developments in Afghanistan.

The Prime Minister reinforced her very serious concern over the Soviet action; reiterated the points made in her letter to President Brezhnev; and expressed the hope there would be an early withdrawal ~~of~~ of Soviet troops from Afghanistan.

COPY: JAND Britany

Feb. News.

CA 16.28.

3/1/80.

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

3 January 1980

Dear Vindal,
Afghanistan

I enclose a brief for the Prime Minister's use when the Soviet Ambassador calls this afternoon to deliver a reply to the Prime Minister's message of 29 December about Afghanistan. The reply will presumably be in sharp terms and will seek to justify the Soviet intervention and to tell the UK to mind its own business.

A handwritten signature in blue ink, appearing to read 'G G H Walden'.

(G G H Walden)
Private Secretary

M O'D B Alexander Esq
10 Downing Street
LONDON

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SOVIET INTERVENTION IN AFGHANISTAN

Points to Make

1. The Soviet Union has completely failed to show any convincing reason why it has committed aggression in a non-aligned country. On 27 December the Soviet Embassy informed us that the 'leadership' in Afghanistan had sought assistance. But the leader until that day was Amin, who was killed in the coup. The 'leadership' in question cannot have been the present one, since the new government was only announced on 28 December. Indeed Izvestia has said that the request for Soviet help was made on 28 December, the day after your Embassy spoke to the FCO.

2. Nor has the Soviet Union produced any evidence of any outside interference in Afghanistan except its own. The suggestion in the Soviet press that Britain somehow instigated Pakistan in actions against Afghanistan is absolutely untrue, and is typical of the transparent pretexts the Soviet government have tried to use.

3. The UK warned the Soviet Embassy on 20 December against intervention which would infringe the freedom of Afghanistan to determine its own future. A large number of countries, including the West, China and the non-aligned, have sharply criticised what you have done. Now you have tens of thousands of troops in the country. The anger of the international community will increase even more if you send in further troops. You have said you will withdraw your troops when they are no longer needed. There is no justification for their presence. When will they leave the country?

4. The Soviet government should be in no doubt that this kind of action strikes at the very basis of East-West relations. You must understand that the West means what it says when it tells you that detente is indivisible and Soviet actions anywhere will affect East-West relations.

The parallel of US intervention in Vietnam (if raised)

5. The Soviet Union condemned US actions in Vietnam. Are you now saying that you are copying those actions?



ESSENTIAL FACTS (NOT FOR USE)

1. There are now about 40,000 Soviet troops in Afghanistan. It is not yet clear whether they will undertake a major attempt to quell the rebels. If they do, more Soviet troops may be needed.
2. Members of NATO are considering what steps can now be taken against the Russians. One possibility is not to replace the bilateral Credit Agreements, expiring about now, which Britain, Canada, Italy and France have with the USSR. Action in the Security Council is under way.
3. The US Ambassador has been withdrawn from Moscow for 'consultations'. The FCO are finding out the full details about this US step. There are arguments for the Nine taking a joint position on whether to withdraw Ambassadors.

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GRS 540

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FM BAHRAIN 030430Z JAN 80

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 2 OF 3 JANUARY 1980

INFO PRIORITY UKMIS NEW YORK ABU DHABI DOHA DUBAI

INFO ROUTINE JEDDA KABUL KUWAIT MOSCOW MUSCAT WASHINGTON

YOUR TEL 01 TO ANKARA : AFGHANISTAN.

1. I CALLED ON THE MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS YESTERDAY MORNING. HE RAISED THE SUBJECT OF AFGHANISTAN BEFORE I DID, SAYING HE THOUGHT THE SITUATION WAS MORE ANALAGOUS TO THE RUSSIANS' INVASION OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA THAN TO THEIR INTERVENTION IN CUBA. IT WAS NOT DIFFICULT TO ENVISAGE THAT IN A YEAR OR TWO'S TIME THEY MIGHT ACT IN ANOTHER OF THEIR NEIGHBOURING STATES, IRAN, AS THEY HAD DONE IN AFGHANISTAN.

2. I DULY URGED THAT THE BAHRAIN AMBASSADOR IN NEW YORK SHOULD SIGN THE LETTER TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL, ADDING THAT I KNEW SIR A PARSONS WOULD BE VERY GLAD IF THE AMBASSADOR GOT IN TOUCH WITH HIM. SHAIKH MOHAMMED BIN MUBARAK AL KHALIFA SAID THAT THE AFGHAN CRISIS WAS JUST AS MUCH THE CONCERN OF NON-ALIGNED COUNTRIES LIKE BAHRAIN AS IT WAS OF THE WEST : HE WOULD SPEAK TO THE BAHRAIN AMBASSADOR BY TELEPHONE LATER IN THE DAY AND INSTRUCT HIM TO SIGN THE LETTER. AS I LEFT HIS OFFICE SHAIKH MOHAMMED REPEATED THAT BAHRAIN WOULD PLAY A FULL PART IN NEW YORK.

3. THE MINISTER SAID HE THOUGHT IT OUGHT TO BE POSSIBLE TO TAKE A LEAF OUT OF THE COMMUNIST BOOK WHERE THE INTERNATIONAL HANDLING OF CONTENTIOUS ISSUES WAS CONCERNED. THE COMMUNIST COUNTRIES HAD OFTEN BEEN VERY CLEVER AT GETTING A LINE ON A SUBJECT ESTABLISHED IN A RESTRICTED GROUP AND THEN BUILDING ON THE RESTRICTED GROUP'S WORK TO GET THE LINE EVENTUALLY ACCEPTED BY THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY. IN THE PRESENT CASE HE THOUGHT A LINE OUGHT TO BE ESTABLISHED BY THE LEAGUE OF ISLAMIC STATES (WHILE I WAS IN HIS OFFICE I HEARD HIM SUGGESTING THIS COURSE OF ACTION TO THE QATAR FOREIGN MINISTER OVER THE TELEPHONE).

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4. IN DISCUSSION THE MINISTER WENT OFF ON ONE OF HIS APOLYPTIC REVIEWS OF WORLD EVENTS AFFECTING THIS PART OF THE WORLD. IN THE 1960S AND '70S THE WEST HAD BEEN IN RETREAT IN THE FACE OF COMMUNISM AND CHAOS (KHOMEINI BEING A GOOD REPRESENTATIVE OF THE LATTER). BY CONTRAST, WHATEVER ELSE MIGHT BE SAID ABOUT THE USSR'S ACTION IN AFGHANISTAN IT HAD SHOWN SKILL AND COURAGE IN DEFENCE OF ITS INTERESTS (CF PARA 1(D) OF MY TEL 28¹² [sic] NOT REPEATED). THE MODERATE ARAB STATES WERE BY NATURE IN THE WESTERN CAMP. BUT IT WAS IMPOSSIBLE FOR THEM TO ACT IN THE NATURAL WAY BECAUSE OF THE US'S SUPPORT FOR ISRAEL. EVEN AHMAD ZAKI YAMANI WAS NOW TALKING OF THE DIFFICULTY OF KEEPING OIL PRICES DOWN IN THE INTERESTS OF THE US. THE US RESPONSE TO EVENTS IN IRAN AND NOW AFGHANISTAN MIGHT BE TO TRY TO INCREASE THEIR MILITARY EFFECTIVENESS IN THE MIDDLE EAST. BUT GIVEN THE US'S ALIGNMENT WITH ISRAEL BAHRAIN COULD NOT POSSIBLY WELCOME THIS. PERHAPS IT WOULD BE TOO MUCH TO EXPECT THE US RADICALLY TO CHANGE ITS POLICY TOWARDS ISRAEL, BUT THE US AND THE WEST GENERALLY OUGHT TO BE CAPABLE OF A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF THE CONCERNS OF THIS PART OF THE WORLD. THE EXTENT TO WHICH ISRAEL HELD THE US IN THRALL WAS RIDICULOUS (HE REFERRED TO A RECENT ARTICLE BY MR GEORGE BALL AND SAID HE WOULD SEND ME A COPY.). HE LOOKED FORWARD TO DISCUSSING ALL OF THIS WITH MR HURD. IF THE WEST DID NOT CHANGE ITS POLICIES THE MODERATE ARAB COUNTRIES WOULD BE TAKEN OVER BY A SERIES OF QADDAFIS. THE WEST COULD EVENTUALLY FIND ITSELF FORCED BACK ON TO ITS NATO BASE AND NOTHING ELSE.

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DESKBY FCO 031300Z

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FM KABUL 031100Z

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NO 009 OF 3 JANUARY 80.

INFO ROUTINE BONN, PARIS, ROME, MOSCOW, WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK, UKDEL NATO, ISLAMABAD AND NEW DELHI.

AFGHANISTAN : RECOGNITION/WITHDRAWAL OF AMBASSADORS.

MY ITALIAN COLLEAGUE HAS STILL HEARD NOTHING FROM ROME ABOUT BEING WITHDRAWN. I TOLD HIM AS SOON AS I KNEW OF THE STATEMENT AT THE LONDON MEETING OF 31 DECEMBER. HE IS HAVING TROUBLE WITH HIS CYPHERS BUT IS COMMUNICATING THROUGH US EMBASSY.

2. MY FRENCH COLLEAGUE CALLED ON ME TOGETHER WITH THE ITALIAN THIS MORNING TO SAY THAT HE HAD RECEIVED HIS INSTRUCTIONS THIS MORNING AND WOULD BE LEAVING TOMORROW MORNING FOR CONSULTATIONS WHICH HE EXPECTED TO MEAN 7-10 DAYS. HE HAD EARLIER SEEN THE GERMAN AMBASSADOR WHO SHOWED HIM INSTRUCTIONS HE HAD JUST RECEIVED TO BE IN BONN (PLUS WIFE AND CHILDREN) BY 7 JANUARY. OTHER EMBASSY DEPENDANTS ARE ALSO TO BE SENT HOME.

3. I SAW MY PAKISTANI COLLEAGUE YESTERDAY. HIS INSTRUCTIONS ARE TO AVOID ANY CONTACT WITH THE NEW AFGHAN GOVERNMENT WHICH MIGHT BE HELD TO CONSTITUTE RECOGNITION. HE EXPECTS TO GO TO ISLAMABAD FOR CONSULTATIONS AFTER A FEW DAYS.

4. THIS MORNING I CALLED ON MY INDIAN COLLEAGUE WHOSE INSTRUCTIONS ARE SIMILARLY TO TAKE NO ACTION CONSTITUTING RECOGNITION. HOWEVER HE SAID THAT IF HE WERE SUMMONED TO THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS HE WOULD GO.

5. NONE OF THE COLLEAGUES WHOM I HAVE ASKED SENT ANY ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF THE CIRCULAR NOTE WHICH WE RECEIVED A FEW DAYS AGO FROM THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS INFORMING US TO THE CHANGE OF GOVERNMENT. THE NOTE GAVE THE NAMES OF MEMBERS OF THE GOVERNMENT AND OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE KHALQ PARTY AND ENDED BY SAYING THAT THERE WAS COMPLETE SECURITY IN THE COUNTRY AND THE GOVERNMENT WAS IN FULL CONTROL OF AFFAIRS.

6. BABRAK KARMAL HAS RECEIVED TELEGRAMS OF CONGRATULATIONS FROM HEADS OF GOVERNMENTS IN USSR, GDR, BULGARIA, MONGOLIA AND VIETNAM.

HILLIER-FRY

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FM TEHRAN 031100Z JAN

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 007 OF 3 JANUARY 80

INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK, KABUL,
ISLAMABAD AND MOSCOW.

YOUR TELNO 839 : AFGHANISTAN.

1. I HAVE ASKED TO SEE KHARAZI, DEPUTY MINISTER IN THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, TO HAND OVER THE VARIOUS STATEMENTS (EG THAT IN YOUR TELNO 405 TO ANKARA) AS A PEG ON WHICH TO HAVE A DISCUSSION. I AM AFRAID HOWEVER THAT THE IRANIANS ARE LIKELY TO BE A BROKEN REED. I HAVE LITTLE DOUBT THAT THEY ARE INCENSED BOTHX ON BEHALF OF THEIR MUSLIM BROTHERS IN AFGHANISTAN AND BECAUSE OF THEIR REAL FEAR OF RUSSIAN ENCIRCLEMENT AND SUBVERSION. NEVERTHELESS IT IS PRECISELY THIS FEAR WHICH WILL TEMPER THEIR REACTION.
2. THE REACTION OF THE "STUDENTS" OCCUPYING THE AMERICAN EMBASSY TO THE ATTACK ON THE RUSSIAN EMBASSY ON 1 JANUARY IS SIGNIFICANT. THEY ARGUED, REVERSING THE POINT MADE TO QOTBZADEH BY THE EEC AMBASSADORS, ON 28 DECEMBER, THAT CRITICISM OF THE SOVIET UNION WAS A DIVERSION FROM THE QUARREL WITH THE US, WHO WERE THE REAL ENEMY. NO DOUBT THEY HAVE THEIR RACTICAL REASONS, SINCE THE TAKEOVER OF ANOTHER EMBASSY WOULD HAVE DIVERTED ATTENTION FROM THEIR OWN OPERATION, BUT I AM CERTAIN ALSO THAT IN A REAL SENSE IRANIANS WILL BE ALIVE TO THE DANGERS OF BAITING THE RUSSIANS, WHO ARE A NEIGHBOUR, AS COMPARED

...HAVE DIVERTED ATTENTION FROM THEIR OWN OPERATION, BUT I AM CERTAIN
ALSO THAT IN A REAL SENSE IRANIANS WILL BE ALIVE TO THE DANGERS
OF BAITING THE RUSSIANS, WHO ARE A NEIGHBOUR, AS COMPARED
WITH THE AMERICANS, WHO ARE FAR AWAY. MOREOVER, IRAN HAS NO
CAPACITY TO DO MUCH ABOUT AFGHANISTAN AND IF SANCTIONS ARE VOTED
, THEY WILL LOOK TO THE SOVIET UNION FOR ALTERNATIVE SUPPLIES.
THE MOST THEREFORE THAT I THINK WE CAN LOOK FOR FROM THEM IS
ORAL CONDEMNATION IN THE ISLAMIC COUNCIL AND PERHAPS IN THE
UN, THE MORE WILLINGLY GIVEN THE LESS THE WEST SEEMS TO BE
STIMULATING IT.

3. THERE IS A REPORT HERE ATTRIBUTED TO QOTBZADEH, THAT
THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR ARRIVED IN QOM AT 0200 HOURS ON THE
MORNING OF 28 DECEMBER WITH INSTRUCTIONS TO SEE KHOMEINI.
HE WAS KEPT WAITING UNTIL 0900 HOURS THE FOLLOWING MORNING.
(IT IS KNOWN THAT KHOMEINI DID INDEED SEE THE SOVIET
AMBASSADOR ON 28 DEC) IT IS FURTHER SAID THAT AT THE MEETING
HE OFFERED A SOVIET VETO ON THE US RESOLUTION SEEKING
SANCTIONS AGAINST IRAN IN RETURN FOR IRANIAN SILENCE OVER SOVIET
ACTIVITIES IN AFGHANISTAN, AND THAT KHOMEINI REPLIED THAT THE
RUSSIANS COULD KEEP THEIR VETO : WHAT THEY WERE DOING IN
AFGHANISTAN WAS WRONG. I HAVE LITTLE DOUBT THAT THIS REFLECTS
GENUINE FEELING HERE (BEHESTI MADE A SIMILAR POINT IN A PRESS
CONFERENCE YESTERDAY) AND I THINK IT IS
IN CHARACTER FOR KHOMEINI TO VOICE IT. BUT I THINK ALSO THAT
IRAN'S PUBLIC REACTIONS WILL BE TEMPERED BY THE CONSIDERATIONS
I HAVE OUTLINED.

4. THE FRG AMBASSADOR HAS HEARD THAT GDR PERSONNEL ARE
INVOLVED IN THE MILITARY ACTIVITIES IN AFGHANISTAN
AND WOULD BE GLAD TO KNOW IF WE HAVE ANY CONFIRMATION OF THIS.

GRAHAM

NNNN

AFGHANISTAN

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FM WARSAW 031000Z JAN
TO PRIORITY FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 2 OF 3 JAN
AND TO PRIORITY UKDEL NATO, MOSCOW

MY TELNO 355 OF 31 DECEMBER: AFGHANISTAN

1. POLISH PRESS HAS NO MENTION WHATEVER OF AFGHANISTAN TODAY. BBC CORRESPONDENT TELLS US THAT POLISH JOURNALISTS HE HAS QUESTIONED ARE BEWILDERED WITH NO ANSWERS TO ANY QUESTIONS. CLEARLY THE POLISH GOVERNMENT WERE CAUGHT UNAWARES.

PRIDHAM

NNNN

Top Copy

Situation, Pt 3



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

3 January 1980

cc HO
LCO
TSY
MOD
WPO
MPS
DIT
JIN
CO

file with MODBA
cc Member Lett

Dear George,

Iran and Afghanistan

As you know, the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary called on the Prime Minister yesterday evening to review the situation in Iran and Afghanistan. For the most part the discussion covered the same issues as are dealt with in Lord Carrington's minute to the Prime Minister of 2 January. However, some of the points which came up should be recorded separately.

The Prime Minister agreed that the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary, accompanied by Lady Carrington, should make, next week, the tour of the Middle East countries summarised in the final paragraph of his minute under referenece.

The Prime Minister expressed concern about the evident intention of the United States to push ahead with a sanctions resolution in the United Nations if and when the deadline set in the resolution of 31 December expires. She wondered whether the continued drive to isolate the Iranians should not be reconsidered in the light of events in Afghanistan. However, she agreed with Lord Carrington's comment that those in control in Iran were not acting with sufficient rationality to make it likely that they would give the United States any credit for softening the line being taken in the United Nations. The Prime Minister said that if the sanctions resolution were to fail next week, the UK could not be committed to implementing its contents unilaterally or voluntarily.

The Prime Minister agreed with Lord Carrington that it would be "unthinkable" to recognise the new Afghan regime in present circumstances. She also agreed that implications for our current representation in Kabul would need careful consideration. More generally, the Prime Minister agreed that a continued effort would be necessary to ensure that the enormity of the act which the Soviet Government had committed was not lost to sight.

/I am sending

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JS

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- 2 -

I am sending copies of this letter to the Private Secretaries of the members of OD, to Ian Ellison (Department of Industry), Bill Burroughs (Department of Energy) and to Martin Vile (Cabinet Office).

Yours ever

Richard Alexander

G. G. H. Walden, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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PM/80/1

PRIME MINISTER

Iran and Afghanistan

Both you and my other colleagues in OD will wish to know where we stand following developments over the holiday period.

IRAN

1. The Security Council adopted on 31 December a further Resolution on Iran (with the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, Kuwait and Bangladesh this time abstaining) calling for the release of the US hostages, and committing the UN to mandatory sanctions under Chapter VII if this did not happen by 7 January. (Text at Annex A). It was fortunate that the Americans agreed to move towards sanctions in two stages in this way, following pressure from ourselves and others. This opened the way for the UN Secretary General's current visit to Tehran, with the ground prepared by the Pakistan Foreign Affairs Adviser, to investigate the possibility of a face-saving method for the Iranians to release the hostages. It also avoided giving a further twist to the spiral of US/Iranian confrontation, in a way which would have undercut the development of more moderate opinion in Iran, and diminished the chances of the Iranian leaders realising, with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, that they are attacking the wrong enemy in continuing to hold the US hostages.

2. But the situation remains ominous for several reasons. First, there is no evidence of significant movement by Khomeini. It remains extremely doubtful whether the Iranians will be able to release the hostages, or even to make a helpful gesture in that direction, before the expiry of the UN deadline. It is not even certain that Khomeini will agree to see Waldheim. Second, domestic opinion in the US is growing increasingly restive and pressure is developing on the President to take more forceful action. This means that

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means that the Americans will probably be determined to push ahead with a sanctions resolution when the UN deadline expires, which may well strengthen the hardliners and weaken the moderates in Iran. If the Resolution fails to attract the necessary votes (or is vetoed by the USSR), it would gravely undermine the American attempt to put international pressure on Iran, leaving them with few, and mostly unpalatable, options. Discussion on the detailed text of a sanctions resolution is continuing in New York and Washington. The latest text, which includes a ban on all exports to Iran except food and medicines, a ban on Iranian ships and aircraft and on new service contracts, and certain measures in the field of finance, is attached (Annex B). Our reservations have been put to the Americans, and we shall press for as helpful a text as possible. But solidarity with the Americans may well oblige us to vote for mandatory sanctions on these lines as early as 7 January.

3. We may have to withdraw HM Ambassador and his staff (eight persons in all) from Tehran if and when we have to speak in the Security Council in favour of concrete sanctions, but I am keeping this under review. A caretaker staff of two UK-based persons would be left under the aegis of the Australian Embassy. A suitable warning would be issued to the British Community (now only about 300).

4. The Americans have also been pressing their allies, separately from the Security Council action, to adopt certain voluntary economic measures. We have agreed to help over this, in line with action taken by other countries. The exchange of telegrams setting out the details of the action taken are also attached (Annex C).

AFGHANISTAN

1. The Soviet aim seems to be to bring the whole of the country rapidly under their control, using whatever force may be necessary and hoping that Babrak Karmal will prove more acceptable to the population than Amin. To achieve this, they may tolerate apparent concessions to Afghan and Islamic feeling and soft-pedal Marxist measures for the time being.

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2. The Russians for their own reasons might like to withdraw most of their troops once the new government is firmly established, and if the Afghan army later was capable of controlling the country. But we certainly cannot rely on this. They are more likely to be drawn into a prolonged anti-insurgent campaign. And the possibilities of using Afghanistan as a staging post for troublemaking elsewhere, for instance Pakistan or Iran, could in time prove attractive.

3. Afghan governments have long lived in the Russian shadow, and a change from one Marxist to another is in itself not significant. But the manner of the change is unprecedented and could have extremely serious repercussions. I think it important that the West's response should be robust, lest the Russians are led to believe that such tactics pay off. The Prime Minister's letter to Brezhnev set the tone. We met the Americans, Germans, French, Italians and Canadians in London on 31 December, and we hope to get action in the Security Council this week. The meeting of 31 December produced a number of ideas we shall be pursuing; while no one spoke in favour of upsetting the framework of detente (European Security Conference, MBFR, Salt II and III etc), it was agreed that we needed urgently to bring the matter to the Security Council and to consider the implications for detente and bilateral relations with the Soviet Union. We are pressing for further allied consultations on this. On 31 December there was also agreement about the need to provide encouragement to Pakistan; my / visit to Islamabad next week serves this end (see below) intended

4. The Russian move has angered some Non-Aligned and Islamic countries. We are doing what we can to encourage a robust response here too. There is even some hope that the Iranians may eventually begin to think straight about the world.

5. We are in touch with our European and Commonwealth colleagues on recognition. Meanwhile our Ambassador in Kabul has been instructed to avoid political contacts.

/NEXT STEPS

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NEXT STEPS

Against this background, it is important that the West should make clear its concern at the threats to stability in the region and that a coherent response should be made to the Soviet move.

It may of course take time to work out the most appropriate positive steps to take. But as a first measure I have it in mind to advance to the middle of next week the date of my proposed visit to Saudi Arabia and Oman, and to extend it by including Pakistan and Turkey. My main objectives would be:-

- (a) to familiarise myself at first hand with the problems of the region;
- (b) to discuss the threats to stability with the leaders of the countries visited;
- (c) to reassure our friends that we view these threats with concern.

I am copying this minute to our colleagues in OD and to Keith Joseph and David Howell.

(CARRINGTON)

Foreign and Commonwealth Office
2 January 1980

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FROM UKMIS NEW YORK 022250Z JAN 80

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 005 OF 2 JANUARY

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON PARIS ROME OTTAWA BONN MOSCOW KABUL

INFO PRIORITY PEKING OSLO LISBON DACCA LUSAKA KINGSTON MANILA TUNIS

ABIDJAN EAST BERLIN ISLAMABAD NEW DELHI

MY TELNO 1988 (NOT TO ALL): AFGHANISTAN: SECURITY COUNCIL

1. I CALLED A MEETING TODAY OF THE SIX COUNTRIES REPRESENTED AT THE LONDON MEETING, PLUS NORWAY, PORTUGAL, PAKISTAN, PHILLIPPINES (AS A MEMBER OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL) AND SINGAPORE (AS PRESIDENT FOR JANUARY OF THE ASIAN GROUP). BEFORE THE MEETING STARTED, THE US REPRESENTATIVE TOLD ME PRIVATELY THAT HE HAD HAD WORD FROM THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING IN WASHINGTON THAT THE AMERICANS WERE CONTENT THAT WE SHOULD PRESS AHEAD NOW ON AFGHANISTAN AND NOT WAIT UNTIL AFTER STAGE 2 ON SANCTIONS AGAINST IRAN.

2. ALL WERE AGREED THAT THERE SHOULD BE AN URGENT MEETING OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND THAT THIS SHOULD BE REQUESTED IN A LETTER TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL PRESIDENT (FRANCE) SIGNED BY AS BROAD A GROUP OF MEMBER STATES AS POSSIBLE. RESPONSIBILITY FOR COLLECTING SIGNATURES WAS SHARED OUT AMONGST THE MISSIONS REPRESENTED AT MY MEETING. THE AIM IS TO DELIVER THE LETTER FIRST THING TOMORROW AFTERNOON WITH AS MANY SIGNATURES AS WE WILL BY THEN HAVE MANAGED TO MUSTER.

3. MY PAKISTAN COLLEAGUE HAS ALREADY BEEN IN TOUCH WITH A LARGE NUMBER OF DELEGATIONS, ESPECIALLY THE OTHER ASIANS AND THE ARABS. HE THINKS THAT WE WILL HAVE LITTLE DIFFICULTY IN ASSEMBLING 40 OR 50 SIGNATURES, WITH A GOOD GEOGRAPHICAL SPREAD. HE SAYS HIS FOREIGN MINISTER MAY COME TO NEW YORK TO TAKE PART IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL DEBATE. THE YUGOSLAV PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE HAS ALSO BEEN ACTIVE SEPARATELY IN LINING UP A NUMBER OF NON-ALIGNED COUNTRIES TO SUPPORT A POSSIBLE INITIATIVE IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL, THOUGH HE DOES NOT, IT SEEMS, WANT TO TAKE THE LEAD HIMSELF. THE PAKISTANI IS TRYING TO CONVENE A MEETING OF THE NON-ALIGNED GROUP HERE FOR TOMORROW.

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4. TO JUDGE FROM MY MEETING TODAY, THERE WILL BE WIDE SUPPORT FOR A DEBATE IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL. THIS BEING SO, I HOPE THAT MY FRENCH COLLEAGUE WILL MOVE AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE INTO A FORMAL MEETING AND NOT LOSE TIME IN INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS WHICH WOULD GIVE THE RUSSIANS THE OPPORTUNITY TO DELAY PROCEEDINGS BY ONE PROCEDURAL DEVICE OR ANOTHER. THE FRENCH SEEM TO BE WORRIED THAT THE RUSSIANS MAY ARGUE THAT THE COUNCIL CANNOT MEET LEGALLY WITH ONLY FOURTEEN MEMBERS. HOWEVER, THE AMERICANS TOLD MY MEETING TODAY THAT, IN THE IRAN CONTEXT, THE RUSSIANS HAD EXPRESSED VERY FIRMLY THE VIEW THAT THE COUNCIL CAN MEET LEGALLY WITH ONLY FOURTEEN MEMBERS AND THAT THIS WAS A MATTER OF DOCTRINE FOR THEM.

5. AT MY MEETING TODAY, THERE WAS LITTLE DISCUSSION OF WHAT KIND OF RESOLUTION WE SHOULD GO FOR, THOUGH THE NORWEGIAN SAID THAT HE THOUGHT IT SHOULD BE BRIEF, SHOULD NOT 'CONDEMN' THE USSR AND SHOULD CALL FOR THE IMMEDIATE WITHDRAWAL OF SOVIET TROOPS FROM AFGHANISTAN. WE HAVE NOT YET SHOWN ANY ONE THE DRAFT IN MY TELNO 1972.

6. TODAY'S NEW YORK PRESS CARRIES STORIES ABOUT POSSIBLE ACTION IN THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY AND THE US MISSION TELL US THAT SOME IN THE STATE DEPARTMENT FAVOUR THIS. WE HAVE, HOWEVER, URGED THE AMERICANS TO LET OUR SECURITY COUNCIL INITIATIVE RUN FIRST. THE PAKISTANIS HAVE DONE THE SAME. FURTHER ACTION IN THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY COULD BE CONSIDERED AFTER WHAT EVERYONE ASSUMES TO BE THE INEVITABLE SOVIET VETO IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL.

PARSONS

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FM MOSCOW 020830Z JAN 80

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 001 OF 2ND JANUARY

FOR INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON, PEKING, ISLAMABAD AND UKDEL NATO

SOVIET/AFGHAN RELATIONS

1. AN ARTICLE BY MIKHAILOV IN IZVESTIA OF 1 JANUARY REPEATS THE ARGUMENTS OF THE PETROV COMMENTARY (MY TELNO 875) BUT GIVES GREATER DETAIL TO SUPPORT THE CHARGE OF EXTERNAL INTERFERENCE IN AFGHAN AFFAIRS. IT CONTAINS THE FIRST DIRECT SOVIET STATEMENT THAT THE REQUEST FOR SOVIET HELP WAS MADE ON 28 DECEMBER. IT IS ALSO OF SOME INTEREST IN ITS CAREFUL REAFFIRMATION OF THE DOCTRINE OF SOVIET CONTROL OVER NEIGHBOURING STATES. PETROV SAID THAT THE SOVIET UNION WOULD NOT TOLERATE THE USE OF AFGHANISTAN AS A BRIDGEHEAD OF IMPERIALIST AGGRESSION AGAINST THE SOVIET UNION. MIKHAILOV SAYS "IT OUGHT TO BE CLEAR TO ALL THAT WE SHALL NOT PERMIT A NEIGHBOURING COUNTRY WITH A LONG COMMON SOVIET AFGHAN FRONTIER TO BE USED AS A BRIDGEHEAD ETC"

[Handwritten signature]

2. ON EXTERNAL INTERFERENCE, MIKHAILOV SAYS THAT CIA AGENTS - THREE OF WHOM ARE NAMED - OPERATED UNDER THE COVER OF THE "NARCOTICS BUREAU" AND THE "ASIAN FUND" TO SET UP 12 CAMPS IN THE PAKISTAN BORDER AREA WHERE SOME 5,000 AFGHAN REBELS WERE TRAINED. PAKISTAN'S OPPOSITION TO THE AFGHAN REVOLUTION, WAS THE DIRECT CONSEQUENCE OF AMERICAN AND BRITISH INSTIGATION. THE MORE OVERT HOSTILITY OF CHINA, EGYPT AND OTHER COUNTRIES WAS ALSO A FACTOR. REBELS WERE ALSO TRAINED IN CHINA AND THE AIR FORCE COMMANDER ZHANG TING FA WAS SENT TO PAKISTAN TO REAFFIRM CHINA'S INTENTION TO CONTINUE SUPPLYING ARMS TO THE AFGHAN REBELS. MEANWHILE THE CIA WAS BUSY TRYING TO EXPLOIT THE UPSURGE OF ISLAMIC FERVOUR FOR IMPERIALIST ENDS.
3. MIKHAILOV STRESSES THAT AFGHANISTAN REMAINED A FAITHFUL MEMBER OF THE UN AND OF THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT. THE COUNTRY WOULD CONTINUE TO HONOUR ITS TREATIES WITH OTHER COUNTRIES - INCLUDING THE USSR. REPEATEDLY THROUGHOUT 1978/79 AFGHANISTAN HAD REQUESTED MILITARY ASSISTANCE UNDER THE TERMS OF THE AFGHAN/SOVIET TREATY OF FRIENDSHIP. THE USSR HAD HELD BACK UNTIL NOW WHEN THE EXTERNAL THREAT TO AFGHANISTAN HAD FORCED IT TO TAKE ACTION. THE AFGHAN PEOPLE COULD COUNT ON FULL AND UNSTINTING SOVIET SUPPORT IN THE CONTEXT OF THE LENINIST INTERNATIONAL POLICY OF THE CPSU AND THE SOVIET STATE.

FCO PSE PASS TO WASHINGTON AND UKDEL NATO

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Prime Minister²

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FM ISLAMABAD 021130Z JAN 80
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 12 OF 2 JANUARY

FOR CORTAZZI.

MIPT. AFGHANISTAN: SUPPORT FOR PAKISTAN

1. FOR WHAT THEY ARE WORTH AND IN CASE THEY MAY BE HELPFUL TO YOU AT THIS STAGE, HERE ARE SOME SUGGESTIONS FOR HELP WE MIGHT GIVE THE PAKISTANIS: OTHER IDEAS MAY OCCUR TO US AFTER I HAVE DISCUSSED WITH COLLEAGUES:-

A. HELP FOR AFGHAN REFUGEES WOULD BE A TANGIBLE SIGN OF OUR CONCERN. HITHERTO THE PAKISTAN AUTHORITIES HAVE NOT WISHED TO RISK INFALMING THE SITUATION BY INTERNATIONALIZING THE PROBLEM TOO MUCH, BUT NOT ONLY IS THE POLITICAL BACKGROUND NOW QUITE DIFFERENT, BUT THE SITUATION IN WINTRY CONDITIONS IS VERY MUCH WORSE, AND THEY CAN NO LONGER SUPPORT THE EXPENSE OF THE EVER-GROWING NUMBERS. IF WE COULD OFFER IMMEDIATE SUPPLIES OF SOME ITEMS SUCH AS BLANKETS, TENTS AND POSSIBLY MOBILE CLINICS AND MOBILE HOMES, THIS WOULD HAVE CONSIDERABLE IMPACT, AS WOULD A VISIT BY LORD CARRINGTON TO A REFUGEE CAMP. LONGER TERM AN OFFER OF FURTHER CASH ASSISTANCE OR OF FOOD AID (IN CONJUNCTION WITH OUR EEC COLLEAGUES) WOULD BE WELCOMED AS LIKELY TO LEAD OTHER POTENTIAL DONORS TO PLEDGE FURTHER HELP.

CASH ASSISTANCE OR OF FOOD AID (IN CONJUNCTION WITH OUR EEC COLLEAGUES) WOULD BE WELCOMED AS LIKELY TO LEAD OTHER POTENTIAL DONORS TO PLEDGE FURTHER HELP.

B) BOTH THE AMERICANS AND THE PAKISTANIS WILL EXPECT THE USA EVENTUALLY TO TAKE ON THE RESPONSIBILITY OF SUPPLYING ARMS, BUT EQUALLY BOTH MAY WELCOME A SMALL PARALLEL CONTRIBUTION FROM US. THE PAKISTAN ARMY HAVE LONG WANTED INFANTRY RADIO SETS (PLESSEY'S PRC 321), TOGETHER WITH A LICENCE TO MANUFACTURE THEM LOCALLY. HOWEVER, NO DEAL HAS BEEN POSSIBLE BECAUSE OF LACK OF MONEY OR ANY ECGD COVER. THE SETS WOULD BE OF PARTICULAR VALUE FOR COMMUNICATIONS IN THE MOUNTAINOUS REGIONS FACING AFGHANISTAN AND SHOULD FACE FEW OBJECTIONS FROM THE INDIANS AND WE COULD PROBABLY LET THEM HAVE A SMALL NUMBER FAIRLY QUICKLY. THE PAKISTANIS WOULD ALSO LIKE OUR LIGHT GUN - THE 105MM GUN, AND AMMUNITION. AND WE KNOW THEY ARE KEEN TO BUY CYMBELINE, THE MORTAR LOCATING RADAR. LONGER TERM WE MIGHT BE ABLE TO HELP WITH THE SUPPLY OF TRANSPORT VEHICLES. ALL THESE IDEAS WOULD DEPEND ON SOME FORM OF SUBSIDY, EITHER PARTIAL GIFT, OR LOW COST LOANS (AND PROBABLY COVER UNDER AN INCREASED ECGD CEILING), OR SAUDI FINANCE.

C) WE CANNOT MATCH THE AMERICAN COMMITMENT UNDER THE 1959 TREATY, BUT THERE MAY BE SOME FORMS OF INTER-SERVICES COOPERATION WHICH WOULD BE OF VALUE TO THE PAKISTANIS AND WOULD INDICATE OUR SUPPORT FOR THEIR DEFENCE EFFORTS. SOME SPECIALIZED TRAINING, SUCH AS INCREASED VACANCIES IN UK COURSES, SHIP VISITS, RAF STAGING, ETC., MIGHT BE APPRECIATED, BUT WOULD HAVE TO BE CONSIDERED CAREFULLY IN THE CONTEXT OF PAKISTAN'S ISLAMIC AND REGIONAL POLICIES INCLUDING THE INDIAN DIMENSION. THEY MIGHT VALUE THE RESUSCITATION OF SOME OF THE TECHNICAL HELP WHICH USED TO BE AVAILABLE UNDER CENCO.

D) THE PAKISTANIS WOULD ALSO STILL LIKE TO HAVE THE SURVEY VESSEL WHICH WE DISCUSSED GIVING TO THEM, AND IT WOULD BE A TANGIBLE NON-MILITARY SIGN OF PRACTICAL GOOD WILL AND COOPERATION.

E) THERE MAY NOT BE MUCH WE CAN DO ON THE AID FRONT GIVEN THE FINANCIAL CONSTRAINTS. BUT I WOULD HOPE THAT CONSIDERATION WOULD BE GIVEN TO REINSTATING THOSE PROJECT WHICH WERE IN PROSPECT AND WHICH WERE FROZEN AS A RESULT OF THE 1979 CUTS.

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TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NO 004 OF 2 JANUARY 80.

INFO ROUTINE MOSCOW, ISLAMABAD, NEW DELHI, WASHINGTON, UKMIS
NEW YORK AND UKDEL NATO.

SAVING TO TEHRAN.

SPEECH BY BABRAK KARMAL.

BABRAK KARMAL DELIVERED A 25 MINUTE SPEECH IN THE COURSE OF
A CELEBRATION OF THE 15TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE FOUNDATION OF
THE KHALQ PARTY WHICH WAS CARRIED ON KABUL RADIO AND TV
YESTERDAY AT 2000 HRS. THE AUDIENCE NUMBERED ABOUT ONE
HUNDRED AND MEMBERS OF THE NEW GOVERNMENT OCCUPIED THE
FRONT ROW. THE PROCEEDINGS INCLUDED PRAYERS FOR TARA WHOSE
PORTRAIT WAS PROMINENTLY DISPLAYED AND A MINUTE'S SILENCE
FOR ALL THE VICTIMS OF THE BLOODY TYRANT HAFIZUALLAH AMIN.
THE TV BROADCAST WAS PRECEDED BY A VERY FANCIFUL AND
MELODRAMATIC REPRESENTATION OF POLITICAL PRISONERS BEING
RELEASED WITH AN EMOTIONAL RECITATION PLAYING AMIN OVER A
BACKGROUND OF THE FIRST TWO MOVEMENTS OF BEETHOVIN'S FIFTH
SYMPHONY. (THE SPEECH WAS FOLLOWED BY A RUSSIAN FEATURE
FILM DEALING LARGELY WITH NAZI ATROCITIES DURING THE WAR.
2. THE PRINCIPAL APPLAUSE DURING BABRAK'S SPEECH WAS
RESERVED FOR THE ANNOUNCED FREEING OF POLITICAL PRISONERS
AND FOR THE REFERENCES TO HELP FROM THE SOVIET UNION. ON
THE LATTER POINT HE SAID HIS GOVERNMENT WOULD ASK FOR
FURTHER HELP IF NECESSARY TO DEFEAT THE AGENTS OF IMPERIALISM
LED BY AMERICA - HELP NOT ONLY FROM THE SOVIET UNION BUT
FROM OTHER FRIENDLY SOCIALIST STATES SUCH AS ANGOLA. THE
MAIN THRUST OF THE SPEECH WAS A CALL FOR UNITY UNDER THE
RED FLAG (PARCHAM) OF THE PARTY OF THE PEOPLE (KHALQ) OF
AFGHANISTAN WITH THE PROMISE OF PERSONAL FREEDOM AND ALL THE

Course Minutes²

psb

/ RIGHT

RIGHT THINGS. THERE WAS NATURALLY A BITTER ATTACK ON HAFIZULLAH AMIN FOR HAVING ESTABLISHED A DICTATORSHIP IN THE NAME OF THE PEOPLE WHOM HE HAD TYRANNISED MERCILESSLY.

H

FCO PLEASE PASS SAVING TEHRAN.

HILLIER-FRY.

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FM ISLAMABAD 021115Z JAN 80

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 10 OF 2 JANUARY

INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON, UKDEL NATO, DELHI, KABUL, UKMIS NEW YORK,
 MOSCOW, BONN, PARIS, ROME, OTTAWA AND PEKING.

AFGHANISTAN: SUPPORT FOR PAKISTAN

1. AS I INDICATED IN MY TEL NO. 001 (NOT TO ALL), THE PAKISTANIS ARE IN A DILEMMA AT THE MOMENT. IN RECENT TIMES THEY HAVE USED A COMBINATION OF CHINA'S POLITICAL AND MILITARY SUPPORT AND FINANCIAL BACKING FROM THEIR MUSLIM FRIENDS TO COMPENSATE FOR THE RUN-DOWN STATE OF THEIR RELATIONS WITH THE WEST. BUT WHEN THEY ARE FACED BY A DIRECT SOVIET THREAT, AS NOW, THEY KNOW THAT THEY HAVE NO OPTION BUT TO LOOK TO THE WEST (AND THE CHINESE WILL UNDERLINE THE FACT) FOR THE MAJOR ECONOMIC AND PROBABLY MILITARY ASSISTANCE WHICH THEY NEED.
2. ON THE OTHER HAND, THEY REMAIN ANXIOUS TO KEEP IN LINE WITH THEIR MUSLIM FRIENDS AND PAYMASTER AND WITH THE NON-ALIGNED WORLD. IN ADDITION THEY ARE EXTREMELY ANXIOUS TO SEE THE SITUATION IN IRAN STABILISED AND TO GET IRAN BACK IN THE ANTI-SOVIET FRONT. THIS IS LARGELY SELF-INTEREST SINCE THEY ARE FRIGHTENED OF THE IRANIAN REVOLUTION SPREADING TO PAKISTAN AND A STRONG IRAN COULD AGAIN SUPPLY THEM WITH MONEY AND MATERIAL. EVEN IF A REVIVED CENTO IS NO LONGER POSSIBLE, THE LOGIC BEHIND THAT SORT OF COOPERATION REMAINS VALID.

Prime Minister²

3. IT IS ALSO PART OF THEIR MYTHOLOGY THAT THE WEST, AND PARTICULARLY THE AMERICANS, HAS REPEATEDLY LET THEM DOWN OVER THE LAST 30 YEARS AND THAT EVERY TIME THEY WERE GIVEN AMERICAN MILITARY ASSISTANCE, STRINGS WERE ATTACHED AND IT WAS WITHHELD WHEN THE CRUNCH CAME.

4. FINALLY THEY ARE WARY OF BEING DRAWN INTO A SUPER POWER CONFRONTATION. THEY WANT TO BE PROTECTED FROM THE USSR BUT WITHOUT PROVOKING THE RUSSIANS OR INCREASING THE NATURE OF THE THREAT TO THEMSELVES.

5. THEIR PROBLEM IS TO RECONCILE THESE DESIDERATA. TO THE EXTENT THAT THEY ACCEPT HELP FROM THE WEST THEY FEAR THAT THEY WILL DAMAGE THEIR STANDING WITH THE MUSLIM AND NON-ALIGNED WORLD AND WITH IRAN. THIS ACCOUNTS FOR THEIR APPARENT COOLNESS TOWARDS AMERICAN OFFERS OF MILITARY ASSISTANCE (MY TEL NO.7, NOT TO ALL). IT IS A BIT EMBARRASSING FOR THEM AT THE MOMENT TO HAVE THE WEST PRESSING THEM TOO HARD, MUCH THOUGH THEY WANT HELP, AND AID IN A NATO CONTEXT, E.G. THE CHRISTOPHER MEETING, IS AS EMBARRASSING AS AMERICAN AID. IDEALLY THEY WOULD LIKE FIRST TO RECRUIT THE MAXIMUM ISLAMIC AND NON-ALIGNED SUPPORT, WHILE KEEPING THE WEST IN PLAY, AND THEN TO ACCEPT WESTERN POLITICAL AND MILITARY HELP.

6. THE ABOVE REPRESENTS VERY MUCH AGHA SHAHI'S AND, TO A LESSER EXTENT, SHAH NAWAZ'S THINKING. GENERAL ZIA AND HIS FELLOW GENERALS IN THE KEY CIVILIAN AND MILITARY POSITIONS MAY WELL TAKE A MORE ROBUST VIEW AND I WOULD ANYHOW EXPECT PAKISTAN THINKING TO EVOLVE ONCE THEY HAVE EXPRESSIONS OF ISLAMIC SOLIDARITY BEHIND THEM AND THE DANGERS OF THE SITUATION AND THE INABILITY OF THEIR ISLAMIC AND NON-ALIGNED FRIENDS TO DO ANYTHING SIGNIFICANT FOR THEM BECOME MORE APPARENT. BUT IN THE MEANTIME I HOPE WE CAN BEAR WITH THE PAKISTANIS, EVEN IF THEY SEEM AT INTERVALS CHURLISH IN THEIR BEHAVIOUR, AND TAKE ACCOUNT OF THEIR INHIBITIONS.

7. IN MY VIEW, IT IS WORTH MAKING A MAJOR EFFORT TO USE THIS OPPORTUNITY TO GET THE PAKISTANIS BACK TO RESPECTABILITY AND A BASICALLY PRO-WESTERN STANCE. THEY ARE NOW EVEN MORE IN A KEY STRATEGIC POSITION AND ARE ONE OF THE SOLE REMAINING BULWARKS AGAINST FURTHER SOVIET EXPANSION IN THIS REGION. ALSO, THEY HAVE DEVELOPED LINKS WITH THE MUSLIM WORLD AND WITH IRAN WHICH COULD BE OF USE TO THE WEST. HOWEVER, WE SHOULD, I THINK, LET THEM MOVE AT THEIR OWN PACE TOWARDS THE WESTERN CAMP GIVING THEM A PUSH NOW AND AGAIN BUT NOT PRESSING THEM TOO HARD AND TOO FAST.

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FM JEDDA 021130Z JAN

TO IMMEDIATE FCO TELNO 7 OF 2 JAN

Prime Minister ²

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON AND UKMIS NEW YORK

YRTELNO 1 TO ANKARA: AFGHANISTAN

1. I SPOKE ACCORDINGLY TO THE HEAD OF EASTERN DEPARTMENT IN THE MFA. HE SAID THAT SAUDI VIEWS COINCIDED CLOSELY WITH OUR OWN. SAUDI ARABIA WAS CONSULTING ACTIVELY ON THREE LEVELS: WITH ITS GULF NEIGHBOURS, WITH OTHER ARAB STATES AND WITH OTHER ISLAMIC STATES. HE READILY TOOK MY POINT THAT IT WAS DESIRABLE THAT ISLAMIC AND NON-ALIGNED COUNTRIES SHOULD TAKE A LEAD.
2. I ASKED WHETHER THERE HAD BEEN ANY REPORTS FROM THE SAUDI MISSION IN NEW YORK ABOUT THE CONSULTATIONS DUE TO BEGIN THERE TODAY. HE RANG THE DEPUTY MINISTER'S OFFICE TO FIND OUT BUT DISCOVERED (AS I ALREADY KNEW) THAT THE DEPUTY MINISTER HAD NOT YET COME IN. I URGED HIM TO SEEK A REPORT FROM NEW YORK AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.
3. UKMIS NEW YORK MAY WISH TO URGE THEIR SAUDI COLLEAGUES TO REPORT AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.
4. SPEAKING PERSONALLY, GHAZZAWI SAID HE FEARED THE AMERICANS WERE IN LARGE PART TO BLAME. IT WAS CLEAR THAT THEY HAD KNOWN ABOUT THE IMMINENCE OF THE SOVIET ACTION A WEEK BEFORE IT TOOK PLACE. THEY SHOULD HAVE TAKEN STEPS IMMEDIATELY. I RESISTED THIS SPECULATION (WHICH HAS BEEN REPORTED IN THE SAUDI PRESS FROM SOURCES IN KUWAIT) BUT MADE LITTLE HEADWAY.

CRAIG

FCO/WHITEHALL DISTN.

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AFGHANISTAN

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Prime Minister²

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FM PARIS 021030Z JAN 79

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 001 OF 02 JAN 80

INFO PRIORITY UKMIS NEW YORK, ISLAMABAD, NEW DELHI, KABUL,
BONN, ROME, DUBLIN, UKDEL NATO, PEKING, JEDDA,
OTTAWA.

MY TEL NO: 1035

AFGANISTAN: FRENCH ATTITUDES

1. THE QUAI D'ORSAY'S STATEMENT REPORTED IN MY TEL UNDER REF WAS VERY CAUTIOUSLY WORDED. IT DID NOT (NOT) CONDEMN SOVIET ACTION: IT DID NOT EVEN ACKNOWLEDGE EXPLICITLY THAT THE SOVIET UNION HAD INTERVENED MILITARILY IN AFGHANISTAN.

2. EVENTS IN AFGHANISTAN EMBARRASS FRANCE ON A NUMBER OF COUNTS. FIRST OF ALL THEY MAKE FRANCE'S SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP WITH THE SOVIET UNION LOOK IRRELEVANT. SECOND THEY PUT PRESSURE ON FRANCE TO STAND UP AND TO BE COUNTED ALONGSIDE THE UNITED STATES, AN ACTIVITY WHICH GOES AGAINST THE GRAIN OF FRANCE'S POLICY OF INDEPENDENCE. MANY FRENCH COMMENTATORS SEE THE GREATEST DANGER IN A RENEWAL OF INTENSE SUPER-POWER RIVALRY, WHICH WOULD ECLIPSE FRANCE'S ATTEMPTS TO BE AN IMPORTANT POLE IN THE MULTI-POLAR WORLD TO WHICH PRESIDENT GISCARD AND M FRANCOIS-PONCET FREQUENTLY ALLUDE IN THEIR REMARKS ON FOREIGN POLICY. ON THE LEFT THE COMMUNIST PARTY IS DISCREDITING ITSELF IN THE EYES OF

THE COMMUNIST PARTY IS DISCREDITING ITSELF IN THE EYES OF MANY BY ITS FAITHFUL ECHOING OF MOSCOW'S LINE ON THIS ISSUE (AS ON TNF MODERNISATION). ON THE RIGHT THE GAULLISTS WILL BE WAITING TO POUNCE ON ANY SIGN OF TOO MUCH QUOTE ATLANTICISM UNQUOTE ON THE PART OF THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT. THERE IS ALSO THE QUESTION OF THE RECENT FRENCH MILITARY INTERVENTION IN THE CENTRAL AFRICAN EMPIRE/REPUBLIC, WHICH WAS MUCH CRITICISED BY THE LEFT IN FRANCE. ALTHOUGH THE SCALE OF THE TWO EVENTS IS NOT COMPARABLE, THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT WILL WISH TO AVOID LAYING ITSELF OPEN TO ACCUSATIONS OF HYPOCRISY BY TOO STRENUOUS A CONDEMNATION OF THE SOVIET UNION.

3. THE FRENCH PRESS COVERAGE OF EVENTS IN AFGHANISTAN IS NOT INHIBITED IN ITS DESCRIPTION OF THE MASSIVE SOVIET INTERVENTION, AND EDITORIALS OTHER THAN COMMUNIST ONES CONDEMN IT. BUT THERE IS A TENDENCY TO BLAME THE US FOR NOT HAVING FORESEEN IT, NOT HAVING DONE MORE, BEING TOO OBSESSED BY THE PROBLEM OF THE HOSTAGES AT TEHRAN, ETC, ETC. THE QUESTION OF FRENCH FORESIGHT, READINESS OR RESPONSIBILITY IS NOT MENTIONED, NOR IS THERE ANY SUGGESTION THAT EUROPEAN COUNTRIES SHOULD DO ANYTHING. THERE IS ALSO SOME CRITICISM OF THE US TRACK RECORD REGARDING RESPECT FOR SOVEREIGNTY AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY. A WAY-OUT SLANT HAS BEEN GIVEN TO THE ANTI-AMERICAN CARPING BY AURORE (RIGHT-WING) WHICH SUGGESTS THAT THE US SHOULD HAVE THE COURAGE TO BALANCE THE ACCOUNT BY INVADING CUBA.

4. ALL OF THIS SHOULD BE REGARDED AS BACKGROUND TO LEUSSE'S ATTITUDE AT THE SIX-POWER MEETING IN LONDON ON 31 DECEMBER, AS RECORDED IN PARA 4 OF YOUR TEL TO UKDEL NATO NO 173. FRANCE'S INCISIVENESS IN SMALLER PROBLEMS (SHABA CHAD MAURITANIA, CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC) EVAPORATES BEFORE BIG ONES BECAUSE OF HER POLITICAL INHIBITIONS AGAINST WESTERN TEAMWORK. REPORTS OF THE LONDON MEETING IN THE FRENCH PRESS HAVE MADE IT CLEAR THAT GUIDANCE HAS BEEN GIVEN FROM THE QUAI TO THE EFFECT THAT ALL FRANCE HAS SUBSCRIBED TO IS THE COMMUNIQUE ISSUED IN LONDON. QUOTE AUTHORISED FRENCH SOURCES UNQUOTE HAVE MADE IT CLEAR THAT MR WARREN CHRISTOPHER SPOKE ONLY FOR THE UNITED STATES AND CERTAINLY NOT FOR FRANCE WHEN HE HINTED RETALIATORY MEASURES AGAINST THE SOVIET UNION. IT IS SAID THAT THERE IS NO QUESTION OF FRANCE, FOR EXAMPLE, RECALLING HER AMBASSADOR FROM KABUL. THE FRENCH APPEAR TO HOPE TO CONCENTRATE ATTENTION TO THE SENTENCE IN THE COMMUNIQUE ON THE NEED TO ENSURE A REPETITION OF THE EVENTS IN AFGHANISTAN.

HIBBERT

CCN PARA 3 LINE 8 SHD READ "NOR IS THERE"

PARA 4 LINE 1 SHD READ "M. DE LEUSSE'S"

AFGHANISTAN ADVANCE COPIES

28

PS
PS/LPS
PS/MR BLAKER
PS/MR LUCE
PS/MR HURD
PS/PUS
SIR D MAITLAND
MR CORTAZZI
MR FERGUSSON
MR MURRAY
MR BULLARD
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Prime Minister²

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FM DELHI 021330Z JAN

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 10 OF 2 JANUARY 1980.

INFO PRIORITY TO ISLAMABAD, WASHINGTON, UKDEL NATO, PEKING,
MOSCOW, KABUL, AND UKMIS NEW YORK.

MY TELNOS 1 AND 2 OF 1 JANUARY: AFGHANISTAN.

1. TODAY'S PRESS COMMENT CONTINUES TO BE ROBUST. A LEADER IN THE TIMES OF INDIA TALKS OF "THE SOVIET INSTALLED MARXIST CLIQUE RUNNING AFGHANISTAN", AND THE INDIAN EXPRESS HAS AS ITS MAIN HEADLINE "US AND ALLIES TO SEEK UN ACTION AGAINST RUSSIAN 'AGGRESSION'". THE LATTER PIECE IS A REPORT ABOUT THE SIX-POWER CONFERENCE IN LONDON WHICH SAYS KE UNITED STATES AND ITS FIVE MAJOR ALLIES AGREED IN LONDON TO SEEK UN ACTION "AS SOON AS POSSIBLE ON THE SOVIET UNION'S 'NAKED AGGRESSION' AGAINST AFGHANISTAN. "IT ADDS THAT THE SIX AGREED TO CONSULT OTHER COUNTRIES IN THE REGION ABOUT THE AFGHAN SITUATION INCLUDING INDIA (WHICH IS USEFUL PRESENTATIONALLY HERE).

2. THE LINE TAKEN BY THE PRESS IS A GOOD DEAL STRONGER THAN THAT FOLLOWED BY LEADING POLITICIANS IN THE LAST 24 HOURS. THE CONGRESS (I) LEADER, C M STEPHEN, WAS FAIRLY TYPICAL IN LINKING THE SOVIET UNION AND THE UNITED STATES AS TOGETHER POSING A THREAT TO THE SECURITY OF THE AREA, ARGUING THAT AMIN'S COUP AGAINST TARAKKI HAD BEEN ENGINEERED BY THE AMERICANS, THEREBY PROVOKING SOVIET INTERVENTION. HOWEVER HE REJECTED THE SOVIET ARGUMENT THAT THEY

HAD BEEN ENGINEERED BY THE AMERICANS, THEREBY PROVOKING SOVIET INTERVENTION. HOWEVER HE REJECTED THE SOVIET ARGUMENT THAT THEY HAD SENT IN TROOPS AT THE REQUEST OF THE AFGHAN GOVERNMENT, DESCRIBING THIS AS A "MERE EXCUSE". VAJPAYEE (JANATA) YESTERDAY URGED THE GOI TO SEND A PROMINENT PUBLIC FIGURE TO WASHINGTON AND MOSCOW FOR DIRECT TALKS TO ENSURE THAT THE SITUATION CREATED BY THE SOVIET INTERVENTION IN AFGHANISTAN DID NOT DETERIORATE ANY FURTHER. HE WAS OPPOSED TO BOTH THE SOVIET INTERVENTION AND TO THE US DECISION TO PROVIDE ARMS TO PAKISTAN. HE URGED THAT SOVIET INTERVENTION SHOULD CEASE, AND THAT THE US SHOULD REVERSE ITS DECISION TO GIVE MILITARY AID TO PAKISTAN.

3. THE REACTION OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF INDIA (CPI) AND THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF INDIA MARXIST (CPIM) HAS BEEN PREDICTABLE., BOTH HAVE PUT OUT STATEMENTS JUSTIFYING SOVIET INTERVENTION ON THE GROUNDS THAT IT HAD BEEN NECESSARY TO CHECK COUNTER REVOLUTIONARIES SUPPORTED BY THE UNITED STATES.

T H O M S O N

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DESKBY KABUL AND TEHRAN 040500Z

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TO IMMEDIATE CERTAIN MISSIONS AND DEPENDENT TERRITORIES
GUIDANCE TELEGRAM 2 OF 1 JANUARY 1980

AFGHANISTAN

1. WHILE WORLD INDIGNATION OVER THE SOVIET UNION'S RUTHLESS MILITARY INTERVENTION IN AFGHANISTAN REMAINS HIGH, THE SOVIET UNION HAS RESORTED TO A VARIETY OF SPECIOUS ARGUMENTS IN AN ATTEMPT TO JUSTIFY ITS ACTIONS.
2. YOU SHOULD TAKE ALL STEPS POSSIBLE TO MAINTAIN AND ENCOURAGE THE MOMENTUM OF OFFICIAL AND PUBLIC CONDEMNATION OF THE SOVIET AGGRESSION, AND TO EXPOSE THE MENDACITY OF THE SOVIET CASE DRAWING ON PARAS 3-11 BELOW AND ON MR HURD'S INTERVIEW ON BBC RADIO ON 1 JANUARY (RETRACTS 16301/17802).

PRIME MINISTER'S MESSAGE

3. THE TEXT OF MRS THATCHER'S MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT BREZHNEV HAS NOT REPEAT NOT BEEN RELEASED BUT YOU MAY QUOTE THE PM'S PRESS OFFICE AS SAYING:

BEGINS MRS THATCHER SAID THAT SHE WAS PROFOUNDLY DISTURBED AT RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN AFGHANISTAN AND THAT SHE WAS FRANKLY PUZZLED BY THE ASSERTION THAT RECENT SOVIET ACTION WAS AT THE INVITATION OF THE AFGHAN GOVERNMENT. THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE TO SUBSTANTIATE SOVIET CHARGES OF OUTSIDE INTERFERENCE IN AFGHANISTAN: THE ONLY COUNTRY WHICH HAD INVOLVED ITSELF IN RECENT YEARS IN AFGHAN INTERNAL AFFAIRS WAS THE SOVIET UNION. THE PRIME MINISTER TOLD MR BREZHNEV THAT SHE BELIEVED THAT THE PEOPLE OF AFGHANISTAN HAD THE RIGHT TO CHOOSE THEIR OWN GOVERNMENT WITHOUT OUTSIDE INTERFERENCE ENDS

4. THE PRIME MINISTER MET THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR TO THE UK, MR LUNKOV, TODAY AT HIS REQUEST TO RECEIVE A REPLY FROM MR BREZHNEV TO HER LETTER.

YOU MAY SAY UNATTRIBUTABLY THAT THE PRIME MINISTER TOLD LUNKOV THAT SHE KNEW OF NO EVIDENCE OF ACTS OF AGGRESSION AGAINST AFGHANISTAN OR OF ANYTHING THAT WOULD HAVE JUSTIFIED THE SOVIET UNION'S OWN ARMED INTERVENTION. SHE FOUND IT DIFFICULT TO RECONCILE THE SEQUENCE OF EVENTS WITH THE SOVIET ASSERTION THAT IT HAD DONE NOTHING TO OVERTHROW THE PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT OF AFGHANISTAN. SHE REAFFIRMED HER VERY SERIOUS CONCERN OVER THE SOVIET ACTION AND RE-ITERATED THE POINTS SHE HAD MADE IN HER LETTER. THE PRIME MINISTER CONCLUDED BY STRESSING ONCE AGAIN THE IMPORTANCE OF EARLY SOVIET WITHDRAWAL FROM AFGHANISTAN.

ADDITIONAL POINTS

5. THE RUSSIANS ARE RESORTING TO 'THE BIG LIE' BY SAYING THAT THEY INTERVENED AT THE INVITATION OF THE AFGHAN AUTHORITIES AS ALLEGEDLY PROVIDED FOR IN THE SOVIET/AFGHANISTAN FRIENDSHIP TREATY OF 1978. IT IS NOT CREDIBLE THAT THE GOVERNMENT OF THE FORMER PRESIDENT AMIN, WHICH WAS IN POWER WHEN THE RUSSIANS LAUNCHED THEIR INVASION, INVITED THE SOVIET ACTION WHICH DEPOSED IT AND LED TO OWN MURDER. BY ALL ACCOUNTS THE NEW PRESIDENT, BABRAK KARMAL, WAS STILL IN THE SOVIET UNION WHEN THE COUP TOOK PLACE ON 27 DECEMBER. ACCORDING TO IZVESTIA OF 1 JANUARY THE INVITATION TO INTERVENE CAME ON 28 DECEMBER BUT THE SOVIET BUILD UP HAD COMMENCED WELL BEFORE THIS.

6. THERE ARE RELIABLE INDICATIONS THAT INITIAL RADIO REPORTS OF THE COUP WERE PRE-RECORDED TAPE RECORDINGS BROADCAST FROM TRANSMITTERS LOCATED INSIDE THE SOVIET UNION RATHER THAN FROM RADIO KABUL AS CLAIMED. THERE IS EVIDENCE THAT WHEN NEWS OF THE COUP WAS FIRST BROADCAST, RADIO KABUL WAS TRANSMITTING ITS NORMAL PROGRAMMES.

7. THE ASSERTION IN IZVESTIA OF 1 JANUARY THAT THE UK HAD INSTIGATED PAKISTAN'S OPPOSITION TO THE AFGHAN 'REVOLUTION' IS A TRANSPARENT FALSEHOOD. IT IS ABSURD TO SUGGEST THAT THE TROUBLES IN AFGHANISTAN HAVE BEEN CAUSED BY ANY GOVERNMENTS

OTHER THAN THE PREVIOUS AFGHAN REGIME AND THE SOVIET UNION THEMSELVES WITH THEIR POLICY OF IMPOSING A SOCIALIST REVOLUTION FROM ABOVE.

8. THE SOVIET UNION PROVIDED MILITARY ADVICE AND ASSISTANCE TO THE GOVERNMENT WHICH THEY HAVE NOW OVERTHROWN WHICH BABRAK, THE MAN THEY THEMSELVES PLACED IN OFFICE DESCRIBES AS A MERCILESS TYRANNICAL DICTATORSHIP AND AGAINST WHICH THERE WAS A WIDESPREAD REBELLION.

9. BY ITS ACTION, THE SOVIET UNION HAS DEMONSTRATED THAT IT IS PREPARED TO CONTINUE TO RIDE ROUGHSHOD OVER THE INTERESTS OF PEOPLE IN AN INDEPENDENT STATE. IT IS EVIDENT THAT IT WAS NOT SATISFIED IN HAVING AFGHANISTAN AS AN ALLY BUT WANTED FULL CONTROL OVER THE REGIME AND ITS POLICIES. IN SO DOING THEY ARE PREPARED TO TOTALLY DISCOUNT THE WISHES OF THE PEOPLE OF THE COUNTRY IN THE FURTHERANCE OF THE SOVIET UNION'S OWN INTERESTS.

10. THIS IS THE FIRST OCCASION SINCE WORLD WAR II THAT THE SOVIET UNION HAS USED ARMED FORCE OUTSIDE THE BORDERS OF THE WARSAW PACT, THOUGH IT CONTINUES THE TREND ESTABLISHED BY SOVIET PROXIES IN ANGOLA AND ELSEWHERE. THE IMPLICATIONS ARE FAR REACHING. IF THE WORLD DOES NOT MAKE IT CLEAR BY ITS ACTIONS THAT THE SOVIET BEHAVIOUR IS TOTALLY UNACCEPTABLE THE SOVIET UNION MAY BE LED TO BELIEVE THAT THE WORLD IS APATHETIC ABOUT SUCH ACTION. IT IS IMPORTANT TO DRIVE HOME TO THE SOVIET UNION THAT THE CONSEQUENCES OF SUCH ACTION ARE DAMAGING TO SOVIET INTERESTS. HENCE THE IMPORTANCE OF ACTION IN THE UNITED NATIONS.

11. SOVIET ATTEMPTS TO JUSTIFY THE AGGRESSION ON THE BASIS OF THE UN CHARTER ARE A TRAVESTY OF UN PRINCIPLES. THEIR ACTION IN INVADING AN INDEPENDENT COUNTRY WITHOUT ANY MANDATE FROM ITS PEOPLE IS HOWEVER IN CLEAR VIOLATION OF THE CHARTER.

FOR YOUR OWN INFORMATION

12. BRITISH OFFICIALS WARNED THE SOVIET EMBASSY IN LONDON ABOUT THE MILITARY BUILD UP IN AFGHANISTAN AS EARLY AS 20 DECEMBER, I.E. WELL BEFORE THE ALLEGED AFGHAN INVITATION TO INTERVENE. THERE APPEARS TO BE LITTLE HOPE OF PERSUADING THE RUSSIANS TO REVERSE THEIR COURSE BUT WE SHOULD TAKE EVERY OPPORTUNITY TO

MAKE THEM UNCOMFORTABLE AND BRING HOME TO THEM THE CONSEQUENCES OF THEIR ACTIONS. THEY SHOULD BE MADE TO REALISE THAT THEY HAVE MISCALCULATED. THIS CAN BEST BE DONE IN THE UN WHERE THERE ARE THREE POSSIBILITIES: THE UNGA, OR THE SECURITY COUNCIL UNDER CHAPTER VI OR VII. URGENT CONSULTATIONS ARE TAKING PLACE AIMED AT AGREEING A LETTER ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL WHICH WE HOPE WILL BE SIGNED BY A LARGE NUMBER OF ISLAMIC AND NON-ALIGNED COUNTRIES.

13. ALL POSTS, BUT PARTICULARLY THOSE IN ISLAMIC AND NON-ALIGNED COUNTRIES, ARE ASKED TO REPORT BY TELEGRAM ANY SIGNIFICANT OFFICIAL STATEMENTS, BROADCASTS OR ARTICLES IN THE MEDIA CONDEMNING THE SOVIET INTERVENTION. OI D WILL SHORTLY ISSUE A FULLER BACKGROUND BRIEF.

CARRINGTON

BY TELEGRAPH TO:

LAGOS	PORT OF SPAIN	
NAIROBI	GEORGETOWN	[ALL IMMEDIATE]
LUSAKA	BRIDGETOWN	
KINGSTON	SALISBURY	

ACCRA	LILONGWE	MBABANE	SUVA	HONG KONG
BANJUL	GABORONE	VALLETTA	PORT MORESBY	
FREETOWN	MASERU	NICOSIA	VICTORIA	
DAR ES SALAAM	PORT LOUIS	NASSAU	HONIARA	

[ALL PRIORITY]

AND SAVING TO CERTAIN OTHER POSTS

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Prime Minister²

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TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 2 OF 1 JANUARY 1980.,

REPEATED IMMEDIATE INFO TO ISLAMABAD AND WASHINGTON.,

INFO PRIORITY UKMIS NEW YORK, KABUL, MOSCOW, UKDEL NATO, AND PEKING.

YOUR TELNO 221 TO KABUL, PARA 5: AFGHANISTAN.

1. I TOLD KRISHNAN TODAY THAT WE WOULD NOT TAKE AN EARLY DECISION ON RECOGNITION AND THAT MEANWHILE WE WOULD TRY TO AVOID POLITICAL CONTACTS. I URGED THAT THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA SHOULD DO LIKEWISE. I STRESSED MY PARTICULAR HOPE THAT THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA WOULD NOT BE SWIFT TO RECOGNISE BABRAK KARMAL AND THUS PUT THEMSELVES IN THE SAME CAMP AS THE EAST EUROPEANS. IN REPLY, KRISHNAN SAID THAT THE POSITION REMAINED AS HE HAD EXPLAINED IT TO ME YESTERDAY (MY TELNO 1096). IT WAS LIKELY THAT THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA WOULD TAKE SOME DECISION IN THE NEXT SEVERAL DAYS AND HE WOULD LIKE TO CONTINUE TO BE IN TOUCH WITH ME ON THE SUBJECT.

2. THE INDIANS, AND KRISHNAN IN PARTICULAR, ARE WELL AWARE OF THE CONSIDERATIONS IN PARA 2 OF YOUR TELEGRAM UNDER REFERENCE, ESPECIALLY BECAUSE OF CORTAZZI'S TALKS HERE IN DECEMBER. I HAVE NO DOUBT THAT THEY WILL BE JUDGING THE QUESTION OF RECOGNITION OF BABRAK WITH THE HENG SAMRIN SITUATION ALSO IN MIND. THE INDIAN DOCTRINE OF RECOGNITION DERIVES FROM OURS AND I SHOULD WELCOME ANY FURTHER INFORMATION OR ARGUMENTS THAT MAY HELP TO GUID THEM IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION.

3. THE POSITION OF THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA AS REVEALED IN THIS THIS MORNING'S PRESS (MY TELNO 1 OF 1 JANUARY) SHOWS A DRAMATIC CHANGE FROM FEEBLENESS TO FORTH-RIGHTNESS. THEIR REPRESENTATION TO THE SOVIET AND AMERICAN AMBASSADORS BOTH APPEAR PROMINENTLY ON THE FRONT PAGES OF EVERY NEWSPAPER. BUT THE TREATMENT IS DIFFERENT. THE BIG HEADLINES SINGLE OUT THE RUSSIANS FOR CONDEMNATION AND THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER SENDING FOR THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR AND THE NUMBER TWO OFFICIAL IN THE MEA SENDING FOR THE US AMBASSADOR IS OBVIOUS. IT IS CLEAR THAT WHAT APPEARS IN THE PRESS AND THE WAY IT IS PRESENT DERIVES DIRECTLY FROM OFFICIAL BRIEFING. INDIA CAN THEREFORE NOW BE COUNTED AMONGST THE COUNTRIES WHICH HAVE CLEARLY CONDEMNED THE SOVIET ACTION AND ASKED FOR THE REMOVAL OF SOVIET TROOPS FROM AFGHANISTAN.

4. SO FAR SO GOOD. BUT THE FACT REMAINS THAT THE INDIANS SEE THE STRENGTHENING OF PAKISTAN AS MORE DANGEROUS TO THEIR SECURITY THAN THE SOVIET OCCUPATION OF AFGHANISTAN. WE ARE THEREFORE BY NO MEANS SECURE OF A CONTINUING SATISFACTORY ATTITUDE BY THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA. MUCH DEPENDS UPON THE LINE TAKEN BY THE US GOVERNMENT AND THE WAY THEY PRESENT IT. I STRESS THIS BECAUSE TO JUDGE FROM PUBLICITY, WASHINGTON SEEMS OBLIVIOUS TO THE INDIAN DIMENSION OF THIS PROBLEM. MY US COLLEAGUE, WHO SHOULD NOT BE QUOTED, IS BITTERLY AWARE OF THIS AND MAY BE ABLE TO DO SOMETHING TO CORRECT IT NOW THAT HE IS IN WASHINGTON. NEVERTHELESS THE INDIANS ARE BOUND TO CONSIDER AS PRO-PAKISTANI, AND THEREFORE ALMOST AUTOMATICALLY ANTI-INDIAN, THE NOISES EMANATING FROM WASHINGTON. IT IS NOT MERELY THAT PAKISTAN IS BEING SUPPORTED: IT IS ALSO THAT INDIA IS BEING NEGLECTED. BRZEZINSKI'S TELEVISION INTERVIEW (WASHINGTON TELNO 4406 PARA 1B) WITH ITS REFERENCES TO CONSULTING THE EUROPEANS, JAPANESE, CHINESE AND ISLAMIC COUNTRIES IS A PRIME EXAMPLE OF THE WAY THE AMERICANS INADVERTENTLY DAMAGE THEMSELVES AND THE WHOLE WESTERN POSITION.

5. THIS POINT SEEMS TO ME OF GREAT IMPORTANCE AND IN THIS CONNECTION, I WOULD LIKE TO DRAW ATTENTION AGAIN TO THE CONSIDERATIONS IN MY TELNO 1099. I HOPE THAT WE SHALL BE ABLE TO GET THE AMERICANS TO UNDERSTAND THE IMPORTANCE OF THE INDIAN DIMENSION. IT WOULD BE HELPFUL IF THEY WOULD AT ONCE OFFER TO SEND A SPECIAL HIGH LEVEL REPRESENTATIVE TO DELHI TO CONSULT WITH THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA. THE INDIANS MIGHT REPLY THAT THEY WOULD PREFER TO DEFER SUCH A VISIT UNTIL THE FORMATION OF A NEW GOVERNMENT. THIS WOULD NOT MATTER. THE IMPORTANT POINT IS THAT THE AMERICANS SHOULD PUBLICLY RECOGNISE THAT THE INDIANS ARE CLOSELY CONCERNED AND SHOULD BE SEEN TO BE READY TO CONSULT WITH THEM. THIS WILL CARRY MORE WEIGHT WITH THE INDIANS THAN A CONCESSION OVER THE SUPPLY OF

THAT THE INDIANS ARE CLOSELY CONCERNED AND SHOULD BE SEEN TO BE READY TO CONSULT WITH THEM. THIS WILL CARRY MORE WEIGHT WITH THE INDIANS THAN A CONCESSION OVER THE SUPPLY OF ENRICHED URANIUM (MY TELNO 1097). I ALSO RECOMMEND THAT WE OURSELVES SHOULD DO ALL WE CAN TO KEEP THE INDIANS ON THEIR PRESENT HELPFUL LINE. FOR EXAMPLE, I HOPE THAT HM AMBASSADOR KABUL WILL BE ABLE TO KEEP IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH HIS INDIAN COLLEAGUE AS WELL AS THE OTHERS (PARA 3 OF YOUR TELEGRAM UNDER REFERENCE). THE SOVIETS RECOGNISE THE IMPORTANCE OF INDIA TO THE ASIAN BALANCE OF POWER AND FOR THIS REASON THE NEW INDIAN GOVERNMENT WILL COMMAND A HEARING ON AFGHANISTAN (AND OTHER SUBJECTS) IN MOSCOW ONCE THE ELECTIONS HAVE TAKEN PLACE.

6. I DO NOT WANT TO CLAIM THAT THIS MISSION HAS EXCEPTIONAL INFLUENCE WITH THE MEA AND STILL LESS WITH WHATEVER INDIAN GOVERNMENT MAY EMERGE IN THE NEXT 2 WEEKS, BUT YOU MAY WISH TO BEAR IN MIND THAT ANTI-SOVIET FORCES ARE SOMEWHAT SHORT OF SPOKESMEN HERE. MY AMERICAN COLLEAGUE WILL BE IN WASHINGTON UNTIL MID-JANUARY AND THERE IS AT PRESENT NO GERMAN AND NO CHINESE AMBASSADOR HERE. EVEN IF THE OTHER WESTERN MISSIONS EXERT THEMSELVES (AND SO FAR THERE IS PRECIOUS LITTLE SIGN OF THIS), I DOUBT IF THEY WOULD BE LIKELY TO HAVE MUCH IMPACT ON INDIAN THINKING. FOR THIS REASON, AS WELL AS FOR THE WIDER CONSIDERATIONS MENTIONED IN MY TELNOS 1096 AND 1099, I SHOULD BE GRATEFUL FOR INFORMATION AND ASSESSMENTS WHICH I CAN FEED TO KRISHNAN BOTH SO AS TO NOURISH OUR PRESENT CONSTRUCTIVE RELATIONSHIP AND TO INFLUENCE THE THINKING OF THE MEA. BOTH HE AND THE FOREIGN SECRETARY HAVE ASKED ME FOR OUR ASSESSMENTS OF WHAT IS HAPPENING ON THE GROUND IN AFGHANISTAN AND SPECIFICALLY FOR THE NUMBERS OF SOVIET TROOPS AND THE MEANS BY WHICH THEY ARE ENTERING THE COUNTRY. IN ADDITION TO THIS, I SHOULD LIKE TO BE ABLE TO TELL THE INDIANS HOW OUR THINKING IS EVOLVING IN THE LIGHT OF THE SIX POWER MEETING IN LONDON AND WHETHER ANYONE IS THINKING OF TAKING ACTION AT THE UNITED NATIONS. THE MORE WE CAN CONSULT THEM ABOUT A SITUATION WHICH THEY SEE AS CRUCIAL TO THEIR OWN SECURITY AND INFLUENCE THE BETTER.

THOMSON

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TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TEL NO 001 OF 1 JANUARY

INFO PRIORITY ISLAMABAD, WASHINGTON, UKDEL NATO ROUTINE MOSCOW, KABUL AND UKMIS NEW YORK.

MY TELNOS 1096 TO 1099: AFGHANISTAN

*Prime Minister*²

1. TODAY'S INDIAN PRESS REPORTS THAT THE INDIAN PRIME MINISTER YESTERDAY SUMMONED THE RUSSIAN AMBASSADOR IN ORDER TO EXPRESS 'DEEP CONCERN AT THE SUBSTANTIAL INVOLVEMENT OF SOVIET MILITARY FORCES IN AFGHANISTAN'. ACCORDING TO AN OFFICIAL STATEMENT, 'THE PRIME MINISTER RECALLED THAT BOTH THE SOVIET UNION AND INDIA HAD AGREED IN JUNE 1979 THAT BOTH SIDES WERE OPPOSED TO ANY FOREIGN INTERFERENCE IN THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF AFGHANISTAN. THE PRIME MINISTER POINTED OUT THAT THE PRESENCE OF SOVIET TROOPS WOULD HAVE FAR-REACHING CONSEQUENCES FOR THIS REGION AND FOR THIS REASON EXPRESSED THE HOPE THAT THE SOVIET TROOPS WOULD WITHDRAW FROM AFGHANISTAN AS SOON AS POSSIBLE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE MESSAGES CONVEYED TO THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP. THE PRIME MINISTER ALSO STATED THAT INDIA CHERISHES ITS TRADITIONAL AND CLOSE RELATIONSHIP WITH AFGHANISTAN AND WOULD LIKE ITS INDEPENDENCE AND NON-ALIGNMENT STRENGTHENED.'

2. THE PRESS ALSO REPORTS GONSALVES' MEETING WITH THE AMERICAN AMBASSADOR (MY TELNO 1097). GOHEEN IS SAID TO HAVE BEEN ASKED FOR CLARIFICATION OF HIS GOVERNMENT'S INTENTIONS OVER THE SUPPLY OF ARMS TO PAKISTAN AND TO HAVE BEEN TOLD THAT THIS WOULD ONLY AGGRAVATE THE SITUATION AND BE DETERIMENTAL TO THE PROCESS OF NORMALISATION OF RELATIONS IN THE SUB-CONTINENT.

3. BOTH MRS GANDHI AND MR VAJPAYEE, THE FORMER JANATA EXTERNAL AFFAIRS MINISTER, HAVE ALSO SPOKEN CRITICALLY OF THE SOVIET ACTION.

THOMSON

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MR BULLARD

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TO IMMEDIATE FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE,

TELEGRAM NUMBER 004 OF 1 JANUARY 1980,

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, PARIS, BONN, MOSCOW, UKMIS NEW YORK,
PRIORITY OTTAWA, ROME, ROUTINE OTHER NATO POSTS, WARSAW, BUDAPEST,
PRAGUE, SOFIA, BUCHAREST, EAST BERLIN, DUBLIN, ISLAMABAD, KABUL,
DELHI, PEKING, CANBARRA, WELLINGTON, UKDEL VIENNA, AND SAVING
TO TOKYO, JAKARTA, SINGAPORE, MANILA, BANGKOK, KUALA LUMPUR.

MIPT: COUNCIL DISCUSSION: COMMENTS.

1. THE MEETING FOT OFF TO A WELL-INFORMED START WITH WARREN CHRISTOPHER'S COMPREHENSIVE STATEMENT, WHICH (ALTHOUGH HE DID NOT SAY SO) WAS PRESUMABLY SIMILAR TO THE ONE HE MADE IN LONDON ON 31 DECEMBER. PAULS, IN A SOMBRE MOOD, EMPHISED THE SERIOUS IMPLICATIONS FOR THE ALLIANCE OF THE SOVIET ACTION AND THIS LINE WAS REFLECTED BY ALL SUBSEQUENT SPEAKERS. THERE WAS GENERAL AGREEMENT THAT THE RUSSIAN USE OF THEIR OWN TROOPS AGAINST A COUNTRY OUTSIDE THE SOVIET BLOC INTRODUCED AN ENTIRELY NEW FACTOR WHICH WE SHOULD NEED TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT IN OUR ASSESSMENT OF THEIR INTENTIONS AND THAT THEY COULD NOT GET AWAY WITH IT WITH IMPUNITY. DESPITE CHRISTOPHER'S OPENING REMARKS, NO-ONE DISPUTED THE TURKISH VIEW THAT AFGHANISTAN WAS ALMOST CERTAINLY LOST AND THAT WE SHOULD CONCENTRATE ON PREVENTING ANY FURTHER ENCROACHMENTS. THERE WAS SOME DISCUSSION OF THE ATTITUDES OF REGIONAL COUNTRIES AND OF SUSPENDING AID TO AFGHANISTAN, BUT THE MAIN EMPHASIS WAS ON SOVIET POLICY AND INTENTIONS WHICH WERE RECOGNISED AS BEING MATTERS OF DIRECT CONCERN TO THE ALLIANCE. THERE WAS AGREEMENT THAT THE COUNCIL SHOULD BE THE FORUM FOR CONSULTATION ON THESE MATTERS.

2. THE POINT MADE BY SEVERAL SPEAKERS THAT DETENTE WAS INDIVISIBLE AND THAT THE RUSSIANS SHOULD BE MADE TO REALISE THAT IT WAS NOT IRREVERSIBLE WAS GENERALLY ACCEPTED. IT WAS AGREED THAT THE ALLIANCE WOULD NEED TO REVIEW ALL AREAS OF EAST-WEST CONTACT, INCLUDING NOT ONLY BILATERAL VISITS, CULTURAL EXCHANGES, CREDIT

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BUT EXTENDING ALSO TO THE FUTURE OF CSCE AND THE MOSCOW OLYMPICS. ON THIS LAST, PAULS' ANALOGY WITH THE 1936 BERLIN OLYMPICS WAS PARTICULARLY STRIKING. AS REGARDS ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS (MBFR, PREPARATIONS FOR SALT III), IT WAS RECOGNISED THAT NATO'S INTEREST LAY IN THEIR CONTINUATION BUT THAT WE SHOULD NEED TO REVIEW THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE SOVIET ACTION FOR OUR TACTICS.

3. MR HURD'S SUGGESTION FOR TWO WORKING GROUPS (PARAGRAPH 3 OF YOUR TELEGRAM NO. 173) WAS WELL RECEIVED AND WAS SPECIFICALLY ENDORSED BY LUNS IN HIS SUMMING UP. GEORGE VEST TOLD ME PRIVATELY THAT THE AMERICANS WERE PARTICULARLY GLAD I HAD RAISED THIS. I PROPOSE TO DISCUSS WITH LUNS TOMORROW HOW THIS MIGHT BEST BE FOLLOWED UP. HE IS LIKELY TO SEE THEM AS EXPERT GROUPS TO BE SET UP BY AND REPORTING TO THE (PERHAPS REINFORCED) COUNCIL. IT IS DIFFICULT TO KNOW HOW FAR THE FRENCH WILL GO ALONG WITH THIS. THEY WERE PREDICTABLY THE ODD MAN OUT AT TODAY'S MEETING. BUT JESSEL DELIBERATELY SPOKE LAST, SO AS TO GIVE NO OPPORTUNITY TO OTHERS TO POINT OUT THE FALLACIES IN THE FRENCH POSITION (WHICH WERE EVIDENT FROM ALL THE PRECEEDING CONTRIBUTIONS). WHATEVER THEIR MOTIVES, THE FRENCH WOULD FIND IT HARD TO DISPUTE THE DIRECT RELEVENCE OF THE SOVIET ACTION TO NATO'S INTERESTS AND THUS THE CASE FOR CONTINUING CONSULTATION AND COORDINATION IN THE COUNCIL.

FCO PLSE PASS SAVING TO TOKYO, JAKARTA, SINGAPORE, MANILA, BANGKOK AND KUALA LUMPUR.

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Prime Minister ²

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FM UKDEL NATO 011830Z JAN 80

TO IMMEDIATE FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE,
TELEGRAM NUMBER 003 OF 1 JANUARY 1980,

INFRO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, PARIS, BONN, MOSCOW, UKMIS NEW YORK,
PRIORITY OTTAWA, ROME, ROUTINE OTHER NATO POSTS, WARSAW, BUDAPEST,
PRAGUE, SOFIA, BUCHAREST, EAST BERLIN, DUBLIN, ISLAMABAD, KABUL,
DELHI, PEKING, CANBARRA, WELLINGTON, UKDEL VIENNA, AND SAVING
TO TOKYO, JAKARTA, SINGAPORE, MANILA, BANGKOK, KUALA LUMPUR.

MIPT: NATO COUNCIL MEETING: AFGHANISTAN.

1. FOLLOWING IS SUMMARY OF COUNCIL DISCUSSION.
2. PAULS (FRG) SAID THAT THE SOVIET UNION VIEWED DETENTE AS MILITARY DETENTE IN EUROPE WHICH ALLOWED THE SOVIET UNION TO PURSUE ITS AIMS ELSEWHERE IN THE WORLD WITHOUT HINDRANCE. THE FIRST LINE OF DETERRENCE FOR THE ALLIANCE WAS POLITICAL SOLIDARITY. THIS SOLIDARITY HAD SUFFERED OVER THE TNF DECISION. IF IT WAS NOT RESTORED THE ALLIANCE COULD ONLY RELY ON MILITARY DETERRENCE. IN THE 1930S THE ALLIANCE HAD TO BE PROPERLY PREPARED BOTH FOR AN EAST-WEST CONFLICT IN EUROPE AND FOR THE CRISES ARISING IN OTHER AREAS OF THE WORLD. THIS WOULD REQUIRE A MAJOR NEW EFFORT. BY ITS INTERVENTION IN AFGHANISTAN THE SOVIET UNION HAD ADVANCED TO WITHIN 100KMS OF THE STRAITS OF HORMUZ. THE POSSIBILITY OF DIRECT CONFRONTATION WITH PAKISTAN AND IRAN WAS GREATLY EXTENDED. THE SOVIET UNION, NOT THE AFGHANS, WERE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE EVENTS IN AFGHANISTAN. ACTION BY ALLIANCE MEMBERS SHOULD THEREFORE BE DIRECTED AT THE SOVIET UNION. IF THE WEST DID NOT REACT, THIS WOULD INVITE SIMILAR SOVIET ADVENTURES, AND MISCALCULATIONS. IT WOULD REPEAT THE MISTAKES OF THE 1930S. WESTERN COUNTRIES MIGHT REVIEW THEIR POSSIBLE ATTENDANCE AT THE 1980 OLYMPICS AS THEY SHOULD HAVE DONE IN 1936. IT WAS DOUBTFUL THAT CHINA COULD HELP PAKISTAN VERY MUCH. THE SOVIET UNION COULD HELP IRAN BY VETOING A SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION ON IRAN; THE TIMING OF A SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION ON AFGHANISTAN WOULD THEREFORE BE VERY IMPORTANT. REDUCING THE SIZE OF MISSIONS IN KABUL MIGHT SERVE SOVIET INTERESTS BY REDUCING THE NUMBER OF OBSERVERS OF SOVIET ACTIONS THERE.

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13

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3. I SPOKE ON THE LINES OF YOUR TURS. I AGREED WITH CHRISTOPHER'S POINT ABOUT THE QUALITATIVE CHANGE IN SOVIET POLICY DEMONSTRATED BY THE USE OF SOVIET TROOPS. THE SOVIET UNION HAD TAKEN AN ENORMOUS RISK, INCONSISTENT WITH ITS POLICY ON DETENTE, ARMS CONTROL AND BILATERAL LINKS WITH WESTERN COUNTRIES. IT WAS IMPORTANT THAT WESTERN COUNTRIES SHOULD CONTINUE TO MAKE KNOWN THEIR CONDEMNATION SO AS TO GIVE LEAD TO NON-ALIGNED COUNTRIES AND TO KEEP WORLD OPINION ENGAGED. I ENDORSED PAULS' VIEW THAT IT WAS IMPORTANT NOT TO GIVE THE SOVIET UNION ANY IMPRESSION THAT IT COULD GET AWAY WITH EACH ACTION, WITH THE RISK OF MISCALCULATION WHICH WAS INVOLVED. THE ALLIANCE SHOULD DEMONSTRATE ITS SOLIDARITY AND CONSOLIDATE THE MEASURE OF AGREEMENT REACHED OVER THE IMPORTANT DECISIONS ON TNF. WE WERE LOOKING AT OUR PROGRAMME OF BILATERAL CONTACTS WITH THE SOVIET UNION AND WOULD WISH TO CONSIDER THE FUTURE OF THESE WITH OUR ALLIES. THE UK AND OTHER COUNTRIES HAD CREDIT AGREEMENTS WITH THE SOVIET UNION WHICH WERE ABOUT TO EXPIRE, AND THERE SHOULD BE CONSULTATION BETWEEN THE ALLIES BEFORE ANY NEW AGREEMENTS WERE CONCLUDED. ON FUTURE CONSULTATION IN THE ALLIANCE I PUT FORWARD MR HURD'S PROPOSAL THAT WORKING GROUPS SHOULD BE ESTABLISHED TO CONSIDER WHAT ACTION ALLIANCE MEMBERS MIGHT TAKE.

4. FERRARI (ITALY) SAID THAT PRIME MINISTER COSSIGA HAD EXPRESSED CONCERN ABOUT THE SOVIET ACTION TO THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR IN ROME. THE ITALIAN AMBASSADOR IN KABUL HAD BEEN RECALLED. THE PCI HAD ISSUED A STATEMENT CONDEMNING THE INTERVENTION. ITALY WAS READY TO TAKE ACTION IN CONCERT WITH ITS ALLIES. IT SUPPORTED ACTION AT THE U.N..

5. MACWHINNEY (CANADA) SAID THAT THE SOVIET UNION HAD TO PAY SOME PRICE FOR ITS ACTION IN AFGHANISTAN. THE ISSUE WAS WHAT THIS SHOULD BE. CANADA HOPED THAT THE NATO FORUM WOULD CONTINUE TO BE USED TO COORDINATE POLICIES. ISLAMIC AND THIRD WORLD OPINION SHOULD BE ENGAGED QUICKLY. ACTION SHOULD BE TAKEN AT THE UN. CANADA INTENDED TO WITHHOLD RECOGNITION FROM THE NEW AFGHAN REGIME AND WAS IN THE PROCESS OF REVIEWING ITS AID PROGRAMME. ACTION SHOULD ALSO BE CONSIDERED IN THE AREA OF DETENTE. IF THE SOVIET INTERVENTION IN AFGHANISTAN HAD NO EFFECT ON DETENTE THIS WAS AN ADMISSION THAT DETENTE WAS QUOTE DIVISIBLE UNQUOTE. CONSIDERATION MIGHT THEREFORE BE GIVEN TO ACTION IN THESE AREAS OF CSCE OF MAXIMUM BENEFIT TO THE

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SOVIET UNION. FOR EXAMPLE, THE WESTERN ATTITUDE TO THE FORTHCOMING SCIENTIFIC FORUM MIGHT BE REVIEWED AS MIGHT THE SENDING OF CSCE COORDINATORS TO MOSCOW.

6. OLCAY (TURKEY) ARGUED THAT FOR THE LAST 25 YEARS WESTERN COUNTRIES HAD REACTED TO SOVIET ADVANCES, AND HAD DONE SO WITHOUT MUCH SUCCESS. THE ALLIANCE WAS NOW OPERATING IN A PERIOD OF PERMANENT CRISIS. IT WAS TIME FOR A NEW APPROACH AND A NEW LONG TERM POLICY WHICH WOULD BOTH STRENGTHEN THE ALLIANCE AND PREVENT FURTHER DETERIORATION IN THE REST OF THE WORLD IN THE WAKE OF AFGHANISTAN.

7. VOORST TOT VOORST (NETHERLANDS) SUPPORTED A FIRM REACTION BY THE WEST. PUBLIC OPINION SHOULD BE MOBILISED TO UNDERPIN THIS. FOOD EXPORTS TO THE SOVIET UNION MIGHT BE AN AREA FOR ACTION. THE ALLIANCE SHOULD CONSULT ABOUT REPLIES TO THE SOVIET QUOTE EXPLANATIONS UNQUOTE OF THEIR ACTIONS IN AFGHANISTAN. ALTHOUGH THE EVENTS IN AFGHANISTAN MIGHT CONFIRM SAUDI ARABIA AND OTHERS IN THEIR PRO-WESTERN LEANINGS THIS WOULD ONLY BE SO IF THE WEST REACTED APPROPRIATELY. THE NETHERLANDS WOULD CONTINUE TO GIVE ECONOMIC HELP TO PAKISTAN WHICH WAS CURRENTLY RUNNING AT 60M DUTCH GUILDERS PER ANNUM.

8. JESSEL (FRANCE) SAID HIS GOVERNMENT TOOK A VERY SERIOUS VIEW OF THE SOVIET ACTION. HE QUOTED PRESIDENT GISCARD'S REMARK IN HIS NEW YEAR MESSAGE THAT QUOTE A DANGER OF WAR EXISTED UNQUOTE. HE WENT ON TO DESCRIBE THE SOVIET ACTION AS AN ACT OF DEFIANCE TO MOSLEM AND OTHER THIRD WORLD COUNTRIES. THE REACTION OF THESE COUNTRIES WOULD DEPEND ON EVENTS AND ON WESTERN REACTIONS. EACH WESTERN GOVERNMENT SHOULD CONSIDER WHAT CONCRETE ACTION IT COULD TAKE AND CONSULT WITH ITS FRIENDS AND ALLIES. WESTERN COUNTRIES SHOULD BE CAUTIOUS HOWEVER IN THEIR PUBLIC STATEMENTS AND NOT SAY MORE THAN IN FACT THEY WERE PREPARED TO DO. IT WOULD BE PRUDENT TO AVOID CHARACTERISING THE EVENTS IN AFGHANISTAN AS AN EAST-WEST ISSUE, OR TO PIN A NATO LABEL ON THEM. TO DO SO WOULD RISK A REACTION FROM MOSLEM COUNTRIES WHO WOULD THINK THAT THE ALLIANCE REGARDED AFGHANISTAN AS NO MORE THAN A PAWN ON THE EAST-WEST CHESS BOARD.

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9. THE COUNCIL APPROVED A PRESS STATEMENT THE JIST OF WHICH WAS THAT THEY HAD MET TO HEAR THE UNITED STATES PRESENTATION ON THE DEVELOPMENTS IN AFGHANISTAN AND AGREED TO CONTINUE CONSULTATION ON THE MATTER.

FCO PLSE PASS SAVING TO TOKYO, JAKARTA, SINGAPORE, MANILA, BANGKOK AND KUALA LUMPUR.

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TO IMMEDIATE FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE,
TELEGRAM NUMBER 002 OF 01 JANUARY 1980

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, PARIS, BONN, MOSCOW, UKMIS NEW YORK,
INFO PRIORITY OTTAWA, ROME.

INFO ROUTINE OTHER NATO POSTS, WARSAW, BUDAPEST, PRAGUE, SOFIA,
BUCHAREST, EAST BERLIN, DUBLIN, ISLAMABAD, KABUL, DELHI, PEKING,
CANBERRA, WELLINGTON, UKDEL VIENNA.

INFO SAVING TOKYO, JAKARTA, SINGAPORE, MANILA, BANGKOK, KUALA
LUMPUR.

YOUR TELNOS 173 AND 174 (NOT TO ALL) : NATO COUNCIL MEETING:
AFGHANISTAN

1. THE COUNCIL MET THIS MORNING TO DISCUSS AFGHANISTAN. THE US DEPUTY SECRETARY OF STATE , WARREN CHRISTOPHER, OPENED THE DISCUSSION WITH A STATEMENT OF THE US POSITION. HIS MAIN POINTS WERE AS FOLLOWS.
2. CHRISTOPHER SAID THAT THE SOVIET MILITARY INTERVENTION IN AFGHANISTAN WAS THE FIRST OCCASION SINCE WORLD WAR 11 ON WHICH SOVIET TROOPS HAD BEEN USED FOR MILITARY ACTION OUTSIDE THE WARSAW PACT COUNTRIES. IN ETHIOPIA AND ANGOLA THE SOVIET UNION HAD USED PROXIES. AFGHANISTAN REPRESENTED A QUALITATIVE CHANGE IN THE SOVIET APPROACH. THE JUSTIFICATION PROVIDED BY THE SOVIET UNION WAS GROUNDLESS. CHRISTOPHER RECALLED THE PASSAGE ON CZECHOSLOVAKIA IN THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL COMMUNIQUE IN 1968. THE VIEWS EXPRESSED IN THAT WERE EQUALLY RELEVANT TO AFGHANISTAN AND PERHAPS MORE SO BECAUSE OF AFGHANISTAN'S HISTORY AS A NON-ALIGNED BUFFER STATE.
3. AS REGARDS POSSIBLE REASONS FOR THE SOVIET ACTION, IT APPEARED THAT THE SOVIET UNION WAS NOT SATISFIED IN HAVING AFGHANISTAN AS AN ALLY BUT WANTED FULL CONTROL OVER THE AFGHAN REGIME AND ITS POLICIES BECAUSE OF ITS CONCERN ABOUT THE EFFECT ON ITS MOSLEM POPULATION OF ITS POSSIBLE EMERGENCE OF AN ISLAMIC STATE. THE SOVIET UNION MIGHT HAVE DECIDED TO ACT NOW IN THE

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BELIEF THAT THE POSSIBILITY OF US REACTION WAS LESSENER BY THE DIFFICULTIES THE US WAS FACING IN IRAN. IF SO THE RUSSIANS HAD MISJUDGED SINCE, AS A RESULT OF THE IRANIAN CRISIS, US DOMESTIC OPINION WAS MORE UNITED THAN EVER BEFORE. TIMING WAS PROBABLY ALSO RELATED TO THE HOLIDAY SEASON. THE SOVIET UNION APPEARED READY T

TO PUT SALT11 AT RISK OR HAD PERHAPS CONCLUDED THAT SALT11 WOULD NOT BE RATIFIED. THE SOVIET UNION MAY ALSO HAVE CALCULATED THAT HOSTILITY TOWARDS THE US IN THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT WOULD WORK TO ITS ADVANTAGE.

4. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE EVENTS IN AFGHANISTAN FOR THE FUTURE WOULD VERY MUCH DEPEND ON WESTERN AND WORLD REACTION. IF THE SOVIET UNION COULD BE SHOWN THAT ITS INTERVENTION WAS TOO COSTLY IT MIGHT BE DISSUADED FROM REPEATING IT ELSEWHERE AND MIGHT REMOVE ITS TROOPS FROM AFGHANISTAN.

5. AS REGARDS THE PRESENT SITUATION IN AFGHANISTAN, THE US ESTIMATED THAT THERE WERE NOW 30 TO 40 THOUSAND SOVIET TROOPS IN THE COUNTRY. THEY WERE OCCUPYING KABUL, FORMING A DEFENSIVE PERIMETER AROUND KABUL AND MOVING OUT INTO THE COUNTRYSIDE WHERE THEY WERE ALREADY BELIEVED TO HAVE CLASHED WITH MOSLEM INSURGENTS AND REPORTS OF MASS DEFECTION FROM THE AFGHAN ARMY. BABRAK KARMAL'S REGIME WAS TOTALLY DEPENDENT ON SOVIET SUPPORT AN HAD A VERY NARROW POLITICAL BASE.

6. THE EVENTS IN AFGHANISTAN WOULD CONFIRM THE FEARS OF MANY COUNTRIES IN THE REGION ABOUT SOVIET AIMS. PAKISTAN WOULD LOOK FOR WESTERN SUPPORT. PRESIDENT ZIA WOULD NO DOUBT USE THE EVENTS TO TRY TO FOSTER NATIONAL UNITY. THERE WERE SIGNS THAT PAKISTAN MIGHT MOBILISE A MOSLEM CONFERENCE TO CONDEMN THE SOVIET INTERVENTION . ALLIANCE ME

ALLIANCE MEMBERS SHOULD ENCOURAGE THIS. ALTHOUGH THE INITIAL INDIAN RESPONSE TO THE SOVIET ACTION HAD BEEN CAUTIOUS THERE WAS NO DOUBT THAT THE INDIANS WOULD BE VERY CONCERNED. THEY SHOULD BE ENCOURAGED TO RECOGNISE THE DANGERS OF THE SOVIET ACTION.

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● IRAN HAD ALREADY CONDEMNED THE SOVIET INTERVENTION. THIS COULD PROVIDE AN OPPORTUNITY FOR WESTERN COUNTRIES TO ENCOURAGE IRAQ TOWARDS CLOSER RELATIONS WITH THE WEST. IN THE HORN, MENGISTU MIGHT WELL BE VIEWING EVENTS IN AFGHANISTAN WITH SOME ALARM: THE OTHER COUNTRIES IN THE AREA WOULD BE CONFIRMED IN THEIR ANTI-SOVIET POSITION. CHINA WOULD BE CONFIRMED IN ITS LONG HELD OPINION OF SOVIET EXPANSIONISM AND MIGHT OFFER FURTHER ASSISTANCE TO PAKISTAN.

8. ON THE IMPLICATIONS FOR THE ALLIANCE AND EAST/WEST RELATIONS, THE SOVIET ACTION HAD UNDERSCORED THE VITAL NATURE OF ALLIED DEFENCE PROGRAMMES, SPECIFICALLY THE NEED TO PURSUE TNF AND THE LONG RANGE DEFENCE PROGRAMME AND THREE PER CENT GOAL FOR INCREASES IN DEFENCE EXPENDITURE. THERE WOULD BE A HEAVY PRICE TO PAY IF THE SOVIET UNION SAW A DIS-UNITED ALLIANCE, FOR EXAMPLE ON TNF ARMS CONTROL PROPOSALS IN THE CONTEXT OF TNF AND MBFR WERE AT PRESENT IN THE SOVIET COURT. THE US INTENDED TO MOVE FORWARD ON SALT 11 RATIFICATION BECAUSE OF ITS VITAL IMPORTANCE ALTHOUGH IT WOULD NOW BE MUCH MORE DIFFICULT TO SECURE THIS. IT WAS FOR CONSIDERATION HOWEVER WHETHER IT WOULD BE RIGHT FOR THE ALLIANCE TO AGREE TO A EUROPEAN DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE AS A FOLLOW-UP TO MADRID.

9. THE SOVIET ACTION IN AFGHANISTAN WOULD HAVE AROUSED CONSIDERABLE UNEASE IN EASTERN EUROPE, NOTABLY IN ROMANIA AND YUGOSLAVIA WESTERN CONTACTS WITH THE GOVERNMENTS OF THESE COUNTRIES SHOULD BE REINFORCED. THE US AMBASSADOR IN BELGRADE HAD CALLED ON THE YUGOSLAVE GOVERNMENT. THE AMERICANS HOPED THAT OTHER WESTERN AMBASSADORS MIGHT FOLLOW THIS EXAMPLE. YUGOSLAVIA WOULD BE IMPORTANT IN THE CONTEXT OF MOBILISING NON-ALIGNED CONCERN ABOUT THE SOVIET ACTION.

10. CHRISTOPHER SAID THAT IT WAS A TIME FOR SOLIDARITY AND RESOLVE BY THE ALLIANCE. HE HOPED THAT ALLIANCE MEMBERS WOULD SHOW A STRONG RESPONSE TO THE SOVIET ACTION. SEVERAL POSSIBILITIES SHOULD BE EXPLORED. THERE WAS THE QUESTION OF RELATIONS WITH THE NEW AFGHAN REGIME. THE US HAD NO AMBASSADOR IN KABUL AND DID NOT INTEND TO HAVE POLITICAL CONTACTS WITH THE NEW REGIME IN THE NEAR FUTURE. IT MIGHT GO FURTHER AND REDUCE ITS EMBASSY STAFF OR SUSPEND RELATIONS. THE US ADMINISTRATION WAS

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ALSO CONSIDERING ACTION WITH REGARD TO ITS BILATERAL RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION, IN THE ECONOMIC AND OTHER FIELDS. THE AMERICANS WERE ALSO GIVING HIGHER PRIORITY TO THEIR RELATIONS WITH INDIA , AND WITH PAKISTAN, INCLUDING POSSIBLY MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO PAKISTAN COMPATIBLE WITH LEGISLATION ON NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION AS WELL AS AID FOR AFGHAN REFUGEES IN PAKISTAN. THE US INTENDED TO ENHANCE ITS PRESENCE ON DIEGO GARCIA AND WAS CONSIDERING THE POSSIBILITY OF A MILITARY PRESENCE IN SOMALIA, KENYA AND OMAN. SOVIET ACTION SHOULD MAKE IT IN THE INTEREST OF IRAN TO SOLVE THE HOSTAGES PROBLEM QUICKLY. THE US WOULD ALSO REVIEW THE POSITION WITH CHINA DURING SECRETARY OF DEFENCE BROWN'S FORTHCOMING VISIT. ACTION IN THE UN WOULD BE NECESSARY . IT WOULD BE IMPORTANT TO MOBILISE AND SUSTAIN A STRONG PUBLIC REACTION IN THE NON- ALIGNED AND MOSLEM COUNTRIES.

11. AT THE END OF THE COUNCIL DISCUSSION CHRISTOPHER SAID THAT HE WOULD BE HAVING MEETINGS WITH THE PRESIDENT AND OTHERS TOMORROW 02 JANUARY TO DISCUSS AFGHANISTAN. THE VIEWS WHICH HAD BEEN EXPRESSED IN THE COUNCIL WOULD BE VERY HELPFUL AT THESE MEETINGS. THE US WAS NOT CONSIDERING ANY IMMEDIATE CHANGE OF POLICY OVER THE HOSTAGES IN IRAN AS A RESULT OF EVENTS IN AFGHANISTAN. THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION PASSED YESTERDAY PROVIDED A BREATHING- SPACE FOR THE UN SECRETARY GENERAL TO MEDIATE WITH THE IRANIAN GOVERNMENT. THE US ADMINISTRATION NATURALLY HOPED THAT DR WALDHEIM'S EFFORTS WOULD BE SUCCESSFUL THOUGH THEY WERE NOT OVERLY OPTIMISTIC. AS FAR AS ACTION IN THE UN ON AFGHANISTAN WAS CONCERNED, THE PERMANENT MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL WERE CONSULTING ON HOW BEST THIS MIGHT BE PURSUED. THERE WERE THREE POSSIBILITIES: THE UNGA, THE SECURITY COUNCIL UNDER CHAPTER VI OR UNDER CHAPTER VII . ACTION IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL WOULD RAISE THE ISSUE OF A SOVIET VETO. THE US WAS DETERMINED HOWEVER TO PROCEED WITH SOME FORM OF UN ACTION.

12. MIFTS CONTAIN SUMMARY OF COUNCIL DISCUSSION, AND MY COMMENT. FCO PLEASE PASS SAVING TO TOKYO, JAKARTA, SINGAPORE, MANILA, BANGKOK, KUALA LUMPUR. [REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

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FED	MR BULLARD
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
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Prime Minister²


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TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 003 OF 1 JANUARY

INFO IMMEDIATE KABUL, WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK, PRIORITY MOSCOW,
BONN, PARIS, ROME, DUBLIN, UKDEL NATO AND PEKING.

YOUR TEL TO KABUL NO. 221: AFGHANISTAN RECOGNITION

1. I SPOKE TO SHAH NAWAZ, FOREIGN SECRETARY.
HE SAID THAT PAKISTANIS INTENDED TO DELAY RECOGNITION UNTIL
IT BECAME CLEARER WHAT SORT OF REGIME WOULD EMERGE FROM PRESENT
RUSSIAN ACTIONS. THEIR INFORMATION WAS THAT NO SIZEABLE BLOCK OF
AFGHAN OPINION WAS YET SUPPORTING THE RUSSIANS AND INDEED THERE
HAD BEEN FIGHTING BETWEEN THE RUSSIANS AND THE AFGHAN ARMY AND
CIVILIANS. IT WAS POSSIBLE THAT THE RUSSIANS WOULD END UP HAVING
TO RUN THE COUNTRY THEMSELVES WITH ONLY MINIMAL AFGHAN SUPPORT.
FURTHER, NO-ONE HAD YET SEEN BABRAK KARMEL OR KNEW WHETHER HE
WAS EVEN IN AFGHANISTAN (I GATHER HE HAS NOW IN FACT BEEN SEEN).

2. THEY ACCEPT THAT EVENTUALLY THEY MAY HAVE TO RECOGNISE AND DO
BUSINESS WITH BABRAK AND IN THOSE CIRCUMSTANCES WOULD CERTAINLY
HOPE TO SEE A CONTINUING WESTERN PRESENCE IN KABUL. BUT FOR THE
MOMENT THEY WOULD HOPE THAT NO-ONE WOULD GIVE COMFORT TO THE
RUSSIANS BY RECOGNISING THE REGIME AND THEY HAVE INSTRUCTED
THEIR AMBASSADOR TO TAKE NO STEP WHICH MIGHT IMPLY RECOGNITION

THEY AMBASSADOR TO TAKE NO STEP WHICH MIGHT IMPLY RECOGNITION
WITHOUT REFERENCE TO ISLAMABAD. THEY WILL CONTINUE TO CONSULT
WITH US ON THIS QUESTION.

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 MR FERGUSSON
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TELEGRAM NO 002 OF 1 JANUARY 80.

INFOR ROUTINE UKMIS NEW YORK, WASHINGTON, MOSCOW, ISLAMABAD,
 NEW DELHI AND UKDEL NAW.

A. SECURITY SITUATION.

THE FINE WEATHER HAS RETURNED BUT THERE HAS BEEN NO (NO)
 GREAT AIR ACITIVITY. MOVEMENT OF TANKS ROUND KABUL
 RESUMED LAST NIGHT. THERE ARE CONTINUING REPORTS OF
 FIGHTING WITH SOVIET TROOPS IN LOGAR VALLEY. IN KABUL
 ITSELF DURING THE NIGHT ACTIVITY IS LIMITED TO SPORADIC
 EXCHANGES OF FIRE WHICH SUGGEST INDIVIDUAL ATTACKS ON
 SOVIET SOLDIERS PROVOKING RETURN FIRE. ACCORDING TO
 UNITED NATIONS SOURCES 10-15 SOVIET SOLDIERS HAVE BEEN
 KILLED ON STREETS OF KABUL SINCE THEY ARRIVED. UNDP
 ALSO HAVE REPORTS OF FIGHTING IN HERAT.

B. POLITICAL SITUATION.

2. WE HAVE A SECOND-HAND REPORT THAT BABRAK KARMAL HAS
BEEN SEEN IN KABUL BY THE CZECHOSLOVAK AMBASSADOR BUT DO
 NOT KNOW THE CIRCUMSTANCES. ANOTHER SPEECH BY KARMAL IS
 FORECAST FOR BROADCASTING TONIGHT AND IT IS ALSO HOPED
 TO GET TELEVISION WORKING AGAIN. THERE ARE STILL NO
 NEWSPAPERS.

3. MINISTRIES SEEM TO BE WORKING NORMALLY AND IT IS
 SAID THERE HAVE BEEN NO (NO) FAR-REACHING CHANGES

FORECAST FOR BROADCASTING TONIGHT AND IT IS ALSO HOPED
TO GET TELEVISION WORKING AGAIN. THERE ARE STILL NO
NEWSPAPERS.

3. MINISTRIES SEEM TO BE WORKING NORMALLY AND IT IS
SAID THERE HAVE BEEN NO (NO) FAR-REACHING PURGES.

HILLIER-FRY.

NNNN

29

PS
 PS/LPS
 PS/MR BLAKER
 PS/MR LUCE
 PS/MR HURD
 PS/PUS
 SIR D MAITLAND
 MR CORTAZZI
 MR FERGUSSON
 MR MURRAY
 MR BULLARD
 HD/SAD (6)
 HD/EESD
 HD/N AM D
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NO 10 DOWNING ST
 ASSESSMENT STAFF
 CABINET OFFICE

Afghanistan

HD/FED
 HD/PUSD
 HD/UND

CONFIDENTIAL

FM UKDEL NATO 011830Z JAN 80

TO IMMEDIATE FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE,

TELEGRAM NUMBER 004 OF 1 JANUARY 1980,

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, PARIS, BONN, MOSCOW, UKMIS NEW YORK,
 PRIORITY OTTAWA, ROME, ROUTINE OTHER NATO POSTS, WARSAW, BUDAPEST,
 PRAGUE, SOFIA, BUCHAREST, EAST BERLIN, DUBLIN, ISLAMABAD, KABUL,
 DELHI, PEKING, CANBARRA, WELLINGTON, UKDEL VIENNA, AND SAVING
 TO TOKYO, JAKARTA, SINGAPORE, MANILA, BANGKOK, KUALA LUMPUR.

MIPT: COUNCIL DISCUSSION: COMMENTS.

1. THE MEETING FOT OFF TO A WELL-INFORMED START WITH WARREN CHRISTOPHER'S COMPREHENSIVE STATEMENT, WHICH (ALTHOUGH HE DID NOT SAY SO) WAS PRESUMABLY SIMILAR TO THE ONE HE MADE IN LONDON ON 31 DECEMBER. PAULS, IN A SOMBRE MOOD, EMPHISED THE SERIOUS IMPLICATIONS FOR THE ALLIANCE OF THE SOVIET ACTION AND THIS LINE WAS REFLECTED BY ALL SUBSEQUENT SPEAKERS. THERE WAS GENERAL AGREEMENT THAT THE RUSSIAN USE OF THEIR OWN TROOPS AGAINST A COUNTRY OUTSIDE THE SOVIET BLOC INTRODUCED AN ENTIRELY NEW FACTOR WHICH WE SHOULD NEED TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT IN OUR ASSESSMENT OF THEIR INTENTIONS AND THAT THEY COULD NOT GET AWAY WITH IT WITH IMPUNITY. DESPITE CHRISTOPHER'S OPENING REMARKS, NO-ONE DISPUTED THE TURKISH VIEW THAT AFGHANISTAN WAS ALMOST CERTAINLY LOST AND THAT WE SHOULD CONCENTRATE ON PREVENTING ANY FURTHER ENCROACHMENTS. THERE WAS SOME DISCUSSION OF THE ATTITUDES OF REGIONAL COUNTRIES AND OF SUSPENDING AID TO AFGHANISTAN, BUT THE MAIN EMPHASIS WAS ON SOVIET POLICY AND INTENTIONS WHICH WERE RECOGNISED AS BEING MATTERS OF DIRECT CONCERN TO THE

... THAT THE COUNCIL SHOULD BE THE FORUM

WERE RECOGNISED AS BEING MATTERS OF DIRECT CONCERN TO THE ALLIANCE. THERE WAS AGREEMENT THAT THE COUNCIL SHOULD BE THE FORUM FOR CONSULTATION ON THESE MATTERS.

2. THE POINT MADE BY SEVERAL SPEAKERS THAT DETENTE WAS INDIVISIBLE AND THAT THE RUSSIANS SHOULD BE MADE TO REALISE THAT IT WAS NOT IRREVERSIBLE WAS GENERALLY ACCEPTED. IT WAS AGREED THAT THE ALLIANCE WOULD NEED TO REVIEW ALL AREAS OF EAST-WEST CONTACT, INCLUDING NOT ONLY BILATERAL VISITS, CULTURAL EXCHANGES, CREDIT BUT EXTENDING ALSO TO THE FUTURE OF CSCE AND THE MOSCOW OLYMPICS. ON THIS LAST, PAULS' ANALOGY WITH THE 1936 BERLIN OLYMPICS WAS PARTICULARLY STRIKING. AS REGARDS ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS (MBFR, PREPARATIONS FOR SALT III), IT WAS RECOGNISED THAT NATO'S INTEREST LAY IN THEIR CONTINUATION BUT THAT WE SHOULD NEED TO REVIEW THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE SOVIET ACTION FOR OUR TACTICS.

3. MR HURD'S SUGGESTION FOR TWO WORKING GROUPS (PARAGRAPH 3 OF YOUR TELEGRAM NO. 173) WAS WELL RECEIVED AND WAS SPECIFICALLY ENDORSED BY LUNS IN HIS SUMMING UP. GEORGE VEST TOLD ME PRIVATELY THAT THE AMERICANS WERE PARTICULARLY GLAD I HAD RAISED THIS. I PROPOSE TO DISCUSS WITH LUNS TOMORROW HOW THIS MIGHT BEST BE FOLLOWED UP. HE IS LIKELY TO SEE THEM AS EXPERT GROUPS TO BE SET UP BY AND REPORTING TO THE (PERHAPS REINFORCED) COUNCIL. IT IS DIFFICULT TO KNOW HOW FAR THE FRENCH WILL GO ALONG WITH THIS. THEY WERE PREDICTABLY THE ODD MAN OUT AT TODAY'S MEETING. BUT JESSEL DELIBERATELY SPOKE LAST, SO AS TO GIVE NO OPPORTUNITY TO OTHERS TO POINT OUT THE FALLACIES IN THE FRENCH POSITION (WHICH WERE EVIDENT FROM ALL THE PRECEEDING CONTRIBUTIONS). WHATEVER THEIR MOTIVES, THE FRENCH WOULD FIND IT HARD TO DISPUTE THE DIRECT RELEVENCE OF THE SOVIET ACTION TO NATO'S INTERESTS AND THUS THE CASE FOR CONTINUING CONSULTATION AND COORDINATION IN THE COUNCIL.

FCO PLSE PASS SAVING TO TOKYO, JAKARTA, SINGAPORE, MANILA, BANGKOK AND KUALA LUMPUR.

ROSE

NNNN

SENT AT 01/2140Z LRD/MJC

f.s.
Hurd

CONFIDENTIAL

FM F C O 011906Z JAN 80

TO PRIORITY UKDEL NATO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1 OF 1 JANUARY

INFO ISLAMABAD, DELHI, KABUL, WASHINGTON, ROME, OTTAWA, BONN, PARIS, UKMIS NEW YORK, MOSCOW, PEKING, OTHER NATO POSTS, PRAGUE, BUCHAREST, BUDAPEST, SOFIA, EAST BERLIN, DUBLIN, CANBERRA, WARSAW, WELLINGTON, TOKYO, JAKARTA, SINGAPORE, MANILA, BANGKOK, KUALA LUMPUR, DACCA, KATHMANDU, ADEN, AMMAN, BAGHDAD, BAHRAIN, DOHA, DUBAI, ABU DHABI, MUSCAT, BEIRUT, JEDDA, KUWAIT, TEHRAN, TEL AVIV, SANAA, DAMASCUS AND LAGOS.

MY TELNO 172: AFGHANISTAN: LONDON MEETING.

1. FOLLOWING SUMMARISES MAIN POINTS THAT EMERGED DURING DISCUSSION NOT COVERED IN MY TELS 172 AND 173 AND 1 TO ISLAMABAD AND 1017 TO UKMIS NEW YORK NOW REPEATED TO ALL (SEE MIFTS).

2. CHRISTOPHER STRESSED IN HIS INTRODUCTORY REMARKS THAT THE US TOOK A VERY GRAVE VIEW OF SOVIET ACTION. IT WAS THE FIRST TIME SINCE WORLD WAR II THAT SOVIET FORCES HAD BEEN USED OUTSIDE THE SOVIET BLOC. AMERICAN CONCLUSION WAS THAT A VERY FIRM REACTION WAS NECESSARY. IF REACTION WAS WEAK THE THRESHOLD FOR SOVIET INTERFERENCE ELSEWHERE WOULD BE LOWERED. THE WEST MUST ACT FIRMLY AND IN UNISON.

3. THERE WAS ALSO NEED TO DO SOMETHING TO REASSURE PAKISTAN WHICH FACED A DILEMMA: THEIR TRADITIONAL FEARS OF SOVIET INTENTIONS HAD BEEN CONFIRMED BUT THEY WONDERED WHETHER HELP FROM THE WEST WOULD BE SUFFICIENTLY STRONG TO PROVIDE THEM WITH SECURITY. THEY MIGHT WONDER WHETHER THEY NEEDED A RAPPROCHEMENT WITH THE SOVIET UNION.

4. MR HURD NOTED THE ELEMENTS OF OPPORTUNISM, RUTHLESSNESS AND SECRECY IN THE SOVIET ACTION. HE SAID THAT THE UK SAW THE MAIN SOVIET OBJECTIVES AS TO ENSURE NO REVERSAL OF AFGHAN COMMITMENT TO COMMUNIST REVOLUTION: TO ENSURE NO OPPORTUNITY WAS GIVEN FOR A REGIME HOSTILE TO THE SOVIET UNION TO BE ESTABLISHED IN KABUL: AND FOR THE LONGER TERM TO BUILD UP A POSITION OF STRENGTH IN AFGHANISTAN FROM WHICH TO INFLUENCE CENTRAL AND SOUTH ASIA. HE AGREED REASSURANCE TO PAKISTAN WAS IMPORTANT.

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5. VAN WELL (GERMANY) DOUBTED IF THE RUSSIANS WERE INTENT ON ABSORBING AFGHANISTAN INTO THE SOVIET UNION. THE GERMANS THOUGHT THAT THE WESTERN RESPONSE SHOULD BE FRAMED WITH THE WIDER REGION IN MIND INCLUDING THE GULF AND HORN.

6. DE LEUSSE (FRANCE) QUESTIONED WHETHER SOVIET ACTION HAD REALLY CROSSED A NEW THRESHOLD. THEY HAD BEEN MASSIVELY INVOLVED IN VIETNAM AND THROUGH THE CUBANS IN AFRICA. HE THOUGHT IT WAS FOR THE THIRD WORLD TO LEAD PROTESTS.

7. GOTLIEB (CANADA) THOUGHT PAKISTAN MIGHT BE PARTICULARLY WORRIED THAT IF MRS GANDHI WAS RETURNED AT THE INDIAN ELECTION THEY MIGHT BE SANDWICHED BETWEEN TWO HOSTILE COUNTRIES THAT WOULD CO-OPERATE CLOSELY. THE AMERICANS HAD COMMENTED THAT THERE HAD BEEN PAST LINKS BETWEEN KARMAL AND MRS GANDHI. ACTION IN THE UN (MY TEL 1017 TO UKMIS NEW YORK REFERS).

8. THERE WAS GENERAL AGREEMENT THAT THE UN WAS THE APPROPRIATE FORUM FOR ACTION. MR HURD STRESSED THAT IT WAS ESSENTIAL TO ACT WHILE THE TIDE OF PROTEST IN THE MUSLIM WORLD WAS FLOWING SHARPLY. HE SAW NO HOPE OF PERSUADING THE SOVIET UNION TO REVERSE THEIR ACTION BUT THEY SHOULD BE MADE UNCOMFORTABLE AND THE CONSEQUENCES SHOULD BE FULLY BROUGHT HOME TO THEM.

9. THE CANADIANS SUGGESTED THAT THE SOVIET UNION, BY REFERRING TO ARTICLE 51 AS THEIR PRETEXT FOR ACTION, HAD THEMSELVES NECESSITATED SECURITY COUNCIL ATTENTION AS THE ARTICLE REQUIRED A COUNCIL REPORT.

10. THE FRENCH WERE STRONGLY OF THE VIEW THAT AN ASIAN MEMBER OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL SHOULD TAKE THE LEAD. MR HURD POINTED OUT THAT THOUGH SUCH COUNTRIES MIGHT SUPPORT SECURITY COUNCIL ACTION IT WAS A CONSIDERABLE JUMP TO TAKING THE INITIATIVE THEMSELVES BUT THE FRENCH RESERVED THEIR POSITION ON WHAT ACTION TO TAKE.

AFGHANISTAN: RECOGNITION (MY TELNO 221 (NOT TO ALL) REFERS)

11. THE ITALIANS SET THE TONE FOR THIS PART OF THE DISCUSSION BY ANNOUNCING THAT THEY HAD ALREADY ACTED TO WITHDRAW THEIR AMBASSADOR. (THE FRENCH SUBSEQUENTLY INDICATED OUTSIDE THE MEETING THAT THEY WOULD CONSIDER DOING THE SAME). THE GERMANS WERE RELUCTANT TO CONTEMPLATE ANY TOTAL WITHDRAWAL BECAUSE OF THEIR CONSULAR RESPONSIBILITIES. IT WAS AGREED THAT ALL SHOULD ABSTAIN FROM POLITICAL CONTACTS WITH THE NEW REGIME.

/AFGHANISTAN:

CONFIDENTIAL

AFGHANISTAN: AID

12. CHRISTOPHER SOUGHT VIEWS AGAINST THE BACKGROUND OF THE MOVE FROM A FORMALLY NON ALIGNED STATE TO A SOVIET PUPPET STATE. MR HURD SAID WE MIGHT NOT TERMINATE SCHOLARSHIPS BUT IT WOULD BE HARD TO JUSTIFY BILATERAL AID PROJECTS. VAN WELL SAID THE GERMANS WOULD REVIEW THEIR PROGRAMME. THEY WOULD BE RELUCTANT TO CONTRIBUTE TO ANY FURTHER MULTILATERAL AID TO AFGHANISTAN. THE CANADIANS EXPRESSED INTEREST IN AN ATTEMPT TO HAVE WORLD BANK AID SUSPENDED.

13. CHRISTOPHER SUMMED UP THAT ALL COUNTRIES HAD EITHER SUSPENDED OR WERE PHASING OUT AID. THEY WOULD CONTINUE TO DO THIS AND WOULD ENCOURAGE MULTILATERAL INSTITUTIONS TO DO THE SAME.

PAKISTAN AND INDIA (MY TEL 1 TO ISLAMBAD REFERS)

14. CHRISTOPHER ASKED ABOUT MORE AID FOR REFUGEES BUT THE CANADIANS FRENCH AND MR HURD POINTED TO DIFFICULTIES BECAUSE OF SQUEEZE ON BILATERAL AID PROGRAMMES. GOTLIEB COMMENTED THAT DESPITE CANADAS PROBLEMS WITH PAKISTAN THE CANADIANS FELT SOMETHING SHOULD BE DONE TO HELP WITH PAKISTAN'S SENSE OF ISOLATION AND WONDERED IF THEY SHOULD BE REINVITED TO JOIN THE COMMONWEALTH.

NON ALIGNED MOVEMENT

15. CHRISTOPHER SAID THAT IF THE NAM STOOD BY ITS PRINCIPLES ITS MEMBERS SHOULD BE CONCERNED AT THE OVERTHROW OF ANOTHER NON ALIGNED GOVERNMENT. SUBSEQUENT DISCUSSION REACHED AGREEMENT THAT ALL COUNTRIES SHOULD ENCOURAGE FRIENDS IN THE NON ALIGNED WORLD TO SPEAK OUT. SOME MEMBERS OF THE MOVEMENT MIGHT BE PREPARED TO RAISE THE CASE FOR THE MOVEMENT CONSIDERING SUSPENSION OF AFGHANISTAN. GOTLIEB SUGGESTED IT MIGHT BE HELPFUL TO CONTACT COUNTRIES SUPPORTING CUBA IN THE CURRENT STATEMENT WITH COLOMBIA AT THE UN. IF SOME OF THESE E.G. ISLAMIC COUNTRIES CHANGED SIDES THIS WOULD BE A SIGNAL TO SOVIET UNION OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF THEIR ACTION (WE UNDERSTAND FROM UKMIS NEW YORK THAT PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVES HAD ALREADY REGISTERED THIS POINT).

CHINA

16. MR HURD WONDERED WHETHER WE SHOULD NOT EXPECT THAT CHINA WOULD SEE ADVANTAGE IN SENDING ARMS TO AFGHAN REBELS. CANADIANS PROPOSED AND IT WAS AGREED THAT THE CHINESE BE KEPT BRIEFED ON DEVELOPMENTS.

EAST/WEST RELATIONS

17. THE DISCUSSION IS FULLY SUMMARIED IN MY TEL 173 TO UKDEL NATO.

CARRINGTON
FCO/WHITEHALL DISTRIBUTION
SAD

OUT TELEGRAM

Classification and Caveats

CONFIDENTIAL

Precedence/Deskby

IMMEDIATE DESKBY 311930Z

ZCZC 1 ZCZC
 GRS 2 GRS
 CLASS 3 CONFIDENTIAL
 CAVEATS 4
 DESKBY 5 311930Z
 FM FCO 6 FM FCO 311810Z DECEMBER 79
 PRE/ADD 7 TO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK
 TEL NO 8 TELEGRAM NUMBER

9 INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, PARIS, ROME, OTTAWA, BONN, MOSCOW,
 10 KABUL, AND PRIORITY PEKING, OSLO, LISBON, DACCA, LUSAKA,
 11 KINGSTON, MANILA, TUNIS, NIAMEY, EAST BERLIN
 12 AFGHANISTAN: ACTION IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL
 13 1. The meeting of the Six (USA, France, FRG, Canada, Italy and
 14 ourselves) took place in London this morning. Mr Hurd emphasised
 15 the need for speed. The West should act while the tide of
 16 indignation in the NAM and Islamic world was still flowing
 17 strongly; experience showed that the mood could subside rapidly.
 18 It would be a pity to wait until the second stage of the Iranian
 19 discussions was completed. We could not aim to reverse the
 20 Soviet action. But we could try to make them recognise that they
 21 have miscalculated.
 22 2. The group reached the following conclusions:
 23 a) action in the Security Council was necessary, and at least the
 24 first steps in bringing the matter before the Council should be
 25 taken ~~very~~ urgently;

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 //
 /

NNNN ends telegram	BLANK	Catchword b)
File number	Dept SAD	Distribution Departmental SAD UND
Drafted by (Block capitals) R D Lavers		
Telephone number 233 5578		
Authorised for despatch		
Comcen reference	Time of despatch	

OUT TELEGRAM (CONT)

Classification and Caveats
CONFIDENTIAL

Page
2

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1 <<<<

- 2 b) ideally the lead should be taken by or shared with other than
- 3 Western countries; the Asian non-aligned seemed the best bet;
- 4 c) if no other country was willing to take the lead, the ~~six~~ ^{W6}
- 5 should do so, ~~jointly~~. (France entered a reservation on this
- 6 point "at least until tomorrow".)
- 7 d) There was some discussion on whether the item should taken
- 8 under Chapter 6 or 7. The Canadians commented that Chapter 7
- 9 seemed appropriate whereas Chapter 6 did not.

10 3. Your telecon with the Private Secretary indicated reasonable
 11 chances of success. You should continue working on these lines.
 12 Grateful for your urgent advice on whether you see any value in
 13 lobbying NAM countries in capitals.

14 4. We are generally content with the draft in your telegram No
 15 1972 (not to all) but ^{have some anxiety that} ~~have reservations~~ about the idea for a
 16 commission. ^{might} ~~That could~~ offer undesirable opportunities to the
 17 Cubans, should they acquire a seat and the presidency. Also,
 18 1 February seems rather late to report. We prefer "obligation"
 19 rather than "responsibility" in preambular paragraph 3, and
 20 replacement of "its actions" by "this action" in operative para-
 21 graph 1. We are willing to consider any suggestions for amend-
 22 ments you may have. (We have not circulated any draft to the Six
 23 in London.)

24 5. Subject to the views of the other five, you should seek to
 25 involve Norway and Portugal as much as possible in the exercise.

26 6. We accept that action before 2 January is unlikely.

28 CARRINGTON

29 NNNN

*The prospects for Sponsorship
 by NAM countries
 and*

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NNNN ends telegram	BLANK	Catchword
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~~SECRET~~ COMMUNICATION TO THE PRESS

Senior representatives of the United Kingdom, Canada, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy and the United States met today to examine the serious situation created by the Soviet Union's military intervention in Afghanistan.

They considered that this intervention ^{goes well beyond} ~~represents a significant advance on~~ the previous level of Soviet activity in Afghanistan and in the Third World generally, and could carry grave implications for the future. They reaffirmed that the people of Afghanistan have the right to determine their own future without foreign interference, and that it is necessary to ensure that the course of recent events in Afghanistan is not repeated elsewhere.

They therefore formulated appropriate recommendations to their respective Governments, which are in the spirit of the public statements already made by them.

31 December 1979

PRIME MINISTER 3²

SECRET

Mr Hurd's report on
yesterday's meeting.

Secretary of State

AFGHANISTAN

As already reported by telephone, the Allied meeting today was disappointing. US ideas were not clear, and the French (de Leusse) were determined to block any action today - even an agreement that the West take the Soviet Union to the Security Council. As regards both the UN and possible restriction of bilateral relations with the USSR our own position was well ahead of the field - but no harm in that.

2. Interesting ideas were produced over a wide range:

- (a) The UN. We all agreed that it would be best if the non-aligned took the lead. All except the French agreed that if this was not quickly feasible, the West should take the initiative. I argued for action this week before anxiety died away, and before the second stage on Iran. According to Sir A Parsons the prospects for this are not too bad, and (though he did not tell the meeting) Warren Christopher was telephoned this afternoon by President Carter, who wanted immediate action in the Security Council.
- (b) Kabul. Everyone has different procedures. It was agreed that no one should have political contacts with the new régime for the time being.
- (c) Détente and contacts with the Soviet Union. Noone spoke in favour of upsetting the framework of détente (European Security Conference, MBFR, Salt II and III etc). There was agreement that we needed to look restrictively at our bilateral contacts and concert a response. I mentioned visits and credit. Noone else was specific, except Christopher who said the US would look at a range of things including grain sales.
- (d) Iran. Christopher made the point that there was just a chance of getting the Iranians now to think straight about the world. The EEC Ambassadors in Tehran will be encouraged to speak accordingly.
- (e) Pakistan. The need for encouragement was strongly stressed by the US, eg on debts and Afghan refugees. The Canadian suggested she should rejoin the Commonwealth.

/(f)

SECRET

. SECRET

(f) China. To be kept in touch, but handled with care.

(g) Christopher told me privately that the US would now step up covert help to the Afghan rebels, which up to now has been food and medicine only.

3. There were thus several loose ends, and our proposal for working groups to tackle specific areas of action was not taken up. A lot of hard work and clear thinking is required if this US initiative is to bear any fruit.

Douglas Hurd.

Douglas Hurd

31 December 1979

Copies to:

Lord Privy Seal

Mr Blaker

PUS

SECRET

GRS 400

UNCLASSIFIED

FM BELGRADE 311330Z DEC 79

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 246 OF 31/12/79.

YOUR TELEGRAM NO 179: AFGHANISTAN.

1. I HAVE AN APPOINTMENT WITH AN UNDER-SECRETARY IN THE FEDERAL SECRETARIAT FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS THIS AFTERNOON AND WILL REPORT RESULT.

2. THE FSFA ISSUED A STATEMENT ON 30 DECEMBER "IN CONNECTION WITH THE MILITARY ACTION OF THE SOVIET UNION IN AFGHANISTAN" AS FOLLOWS:

"THE INFORMATION OF THE MOST RECENT DEVELOPMENT OF THE CRISIS IN AFGHANISTAN HAS BEEN RECEIVED IN YUGOSLAVIA WITH SURPRISE. EVEN MORE SO, SINCE A COUNTRY IS INVOLVED WHICH HAS OPTED FOR NON-ALIGNMENT A LONG TIME AGO. YUGOSLAVIA EXPRESSES ITS DEEP CONCERN OVER THE SERIOUS CONSEQUENCES THAT SUCH A DEVELOPMENT CAN HAVE NOT ONLY BY CAUSING GREATER INSTABILITY IN THAT REGION, BUT ALSO BY AFFECTING INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AS A WHOLE.

AS IS KNOWN, YUGOSLAVIA HAS ALWAYS RESOLUTELY ADVOCATED STRICT RESPECT FOR THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS IN RELATIONS AMONG STATES. AT THE SAME TIME, GUIDED BY THE PRINCIPLES AND OBJECTIVES OF THE POLICY OF NON-ALIGNMENT. YUGOSLAVIA CONSIDERS THAT THE REALIZATION OF THE SOVEREIGN RIGHTS OF STATES TO INDEPENDENCE, TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY AND THEIR OWN WAY OF LIFE, MUST BE THE ONLY RECOGNISED PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS.

THIS INCLUDES THE INADMISSIBILITY OF ANY FORM OF FOREIGN INTERVENTION OR OF THE IMPOSITION OF AN ALIEN WILL UPON SOVEREIGN STATES. IT IS THEIR INALIENABLE RIGHT TO SOLVE THEIR OWN PROBLEMS AND TO CHOOSE THEIR OWN SOCIO-POLITICAL SYSTEM WITHOUT INTERFERENCE FROM OUTSIDE.

/CONSISTENT

CONSISTENT ADHERENCE TO THESE PRINCIPLES AND THEIR RESOLUTE IMPLEMENTATION IN PRACTICE SHOULD BE A COMMITMENT OF ALL THE MEMBERS OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY.

+9

YUGOSLAVIA ASSESSES THAT THE SITUATION IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, WHICH IS ALREADY FRAUGHT WITH GREAT DANGERS, IS CONSTANTLY BECOMING WORSE. PARTICULARLY DISTURBING IS THE EVER MORE FREQUENT RECOURSE TO POWER POLITICS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AS A METHOD FOR THE SETTLEMENT OF PROBLEMS AND DISPUTES.

THIS CALLS FOR AN EVEN MORE RESOLUTE STRUGGLE BY THE POLICY OF NON-ALIGNMENT AND THE MOVEMENT OF NON-ALIGNED COUNTRIES FOR STRENGTHENING THE RELAXATION OF TENSION AS A UNIVERSAL PROCESS, FOR THE SAFEGUARDING OF PEACE, SECURITY AND STABILITY IN THE WORLD, AGAINST BLOC DIVISIONS AND CONFRONTATIONS."

FCO PLEASE REPEAT AS NECESSARY.

FARQUHARSON

[COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING STREET]

F I L E S

SAD
EESD
N AM D
DEF D
MED
NEMAD
NEWS D
FED
PUSD
UND
PS

PS/LPS
PS/MR HURD
PS/MR BLAKER
PS/MR LUCE
PS/PUS
SIR D MAITLAND
MR CORTAZZI
MR BULLARD
MR MURRAY
MR FERGUSSON

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Prime Minister²

GRS 400

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DESKBY 011000 LOCAL JEDDA ANKARA ISLAMABAD MUSCAT RABAT ALGIERS.
FM FCO 311930Z DEC 79

TO IMMEDIATE JEDDA

TELNO 479 OF 31 DEC 79

AND TO ANKARA ISLAMABAD MUSCAT RABAT ALGIERS

INFO TEHRAN KUWAIT BAGHDAD ABU DHABI DUBAI BAHRAIN DOHA DELHI
KABUL MOSCOW WASHINGTON UKDEL NATO.

STABILITY IN THE NEAR EAST.

1. IN VIEW OF THE INCREASED THREAT TO REGIONAL STABILITY CAUSED BY THE SOVIET INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN COMING ON TOP OF THE SITUATION IN IRAN, I HAVE IT IN MIND TO ADVANCE MY VISIT TO SAUDI ARABIA AND OMAN PLANNED FOR FEBRUARY AND TO EXTEND IT BY ADDING PAKISTAN AND TURKEY.

2. MY PROPOSED ITINERARY IS AS FOLLOWS:

WEDNESDAY 9 JANUARY : FLY TO ISLAMABAD

FRIDAY 11 JANUARY : ISLAMABAD TO MUSCAT

SATURDAY 12 JANUARY (PM) : MUSCAT TO RIYADH

MONDAY 14 JANUARY (PM) : RIYADH TO ANKARA

TUESDAY 15 JANUARY (PM) : FLY HOME

3. MY MAIN OBJECTIVES WOULD BE

A) TO FAMILIARISE MYSELF AT FIRST HAND WITH THE PROBLEMS OF THE REGION:

B) TO DISCUSS THE THREATS TO STABILITY WITH THE LEADERS OF THE COUNTRIES VISITED:

C) TO REASSURE OUR FRIENDS THAT WE VIEW THESE THREATS WITH CONCERN.

/4. GRATEFUL

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4. GRATEFUL IF POSTS WOULD LET ME HAVE COMMENTS ON THESE PROPOSALS BY 1600Z ON 1 JANUARY WITHOUT (WITHOUT) CONSULTING HOST GOVERNMENTS AT THIS STAGE. I SHOULD BE PARTICULARLY GRATEFUL FOR ANY COMMENTS ON THE PROPOSED ORDER OF POSTS TO BE VISITED BEARING IN MIND THAT IN ISLAMABAD AND ANKARA I MAY BE TOLD THAT THE LACK OF DEVELOPMENT AND OTHER FINANCE IS ONE OF THE CHIEF THREATS TO STABILITY, WHEREAS SAUDI ARABIA IS ONE OF THE COUNTRIES IN A POSITION TO HELP OVER THIS.

5. I PROPOSE TO TRAVEL BY RAF VC10. LADY CARRINGTON WOULD PROBABLY ACCOMPANY ME. MY ARRIVAL IN RIYADH SEEMS LIKELY TO COINCIDE WITH MR HOWELL'S DEPARTURE. SUBJECT TO JEDDA'S VIEWS, IT DOES NOT SEEM THAT THE SAUDIS WOULD BE DISCOMMODDED BY BEING ASKED TO MAKE ARRANGEMENTS FOR THESE VISITS CONSECUTIVELY.

6. RABAT AND ALGIERS SHOULD NOTE THAT, IF CONFIRMED, THIS TRIP WOULD NECESSITATE A POSTPONEMENT OF MY VISITS TO MOROCCO AND ALGERIA.

CARRINGTON

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F I L E S

MED	PS
SAD	PS/LPS
SED	PS/MR HURD
DEF D	PS/PUS
PUSD	SIR D MAITLAND
PCD	MR CORTAZZI
PSD	MR J C MOBERLY
FINANCE D	MR MURRAY
NEWS D	MR BULLARD
NENAD	MR FERGUSSON

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OR 190

CONFIDENTIAL

DESKBY 010700Z

FM FCO 312020Z DEC 79

TO IMMEDIATE UKDEL NATO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 174 OF 31 DECEMBER

M I P T AFGHANISTAN

1. FOLLOWING IS GENERAL LINE TO TAKE.

2. YOU SHOULD REITERATE THE TERMS IN WHICH THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT HAVE PUBLICLY CONDEMNED THE SOVIET INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN AND SHOULD GO ON TO EXPRESS CONCERN AT THE WIDER IMPLICATIONS OF THE SOVIET ACTION FOR MEMBERS OF THE ALLIANCE. THIS IS THE FIRST TIME SINCE THE WAR THAT SOVIET TROOPS HAVE BEEN USED DIRECTLY AGAINST A COUNTRY OUTSIDE THE SOVIET BLOC. THE CIRCUMSTANCES MUST GIVE RISE TO QUESTIONS AS TO THE PURPOSES FOR WHICH THE RUSSIANS HAVE BEEN STEADILY INCREASING THE LEVEL OF THEIR FORCES IN RECENT YEARS AND AS TO SOVIET WILLINGNESS TO RESORT TO ARMED FORCE TO ACHIEVE THEIR ENDS. WE NEED TO THINK VERY CAREFULLY ABOUT OUR RESPONSE SO AS NOT TO LET THE RUSSIANS THINK THAT THEY CAN GET AWAY LIGHTLY WITH SUCH BLATANT AGGRESSION AGAINST ANOTHER COUNTRY. WE ALSO NEED TO CONSIDER THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE SOVIET INVASION FOR THE ALLIANCE'S OWN DEFENCE POLICIES AND HOW THE PROSPECTS FOR DETENTE, INCLUDING ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS, MAY BE AFFECTED. ALL THIS MAKES US WELCOME THE OPPORTUNITY OF TODAY'S CONSULTATION IN THE COUNCIL AND THE LEAD GIVEN BY THE AMERICANS.

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TO IMMEDIATE UKDEL NATO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 173 OF 31 DECEMBER 79

AND TO WASHINGTON PARIS BONN OTTAWA ROME

INFO IMMEDIATE MOSCOW UKMIS NEW YORK

INFO ROUTINE WARSAW BUDAPEST PRAGUE SOFIA BUCHAREST EAST BERLIN

AND OTHER NATO POST AND DUBLIN ISLAMABAD KABUL DELHI PEKING

CANBERRA

INFO SAVING TOKYO JAKARTA SINGAPORE MANILA BANGKOK KUALA LUMPUR
WELLINGTON

MIPT: AFGHANISTAN.

1. AT TODAY'S LONDON MEETING, THE DISCUSSION OF ACTION AGAINST THE SOVIET UNION IN EAST-WEST AND BILATERAL RELATIONS WAS INCONCLUSIVE, AS IS SHOWN BY MIPT.

2. CHRISTOPHER (US) OPENED THIS PART OF THE DISCUSSION BY SAYING WITHOUT ELABORATION, THAT THE ADMINISTRATION WOULD CONSIDER WHETHER TO CONTINUE TO WORK TOWARDS MFN STATUS FOR THE SOVIET UNION AND WOULD REVIEW THE QUESTIONS OF EXPORT LICENCES, GRAIN SALES, SCIENTIFIC EXCHANGES AND SOCIAL AND OFFICIAL CONTACTS. GOTLIEB (CANADA) SAID HIS GOVERNMENT WOULD CONSIDER THE QUESTIONS OF HIGH LEVEL VISITS: OF ANY NEW AGREEMENTS PENDING WITH THE RUSSIANS: AND OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF EXISTING AGREEMENTS. MALFATTI (ITALY) SAID THIS WHOLE SUBJECT SHOULD BE STUDIED IN THE NEAR FUTURE: HE STRESSED THAT THE 6 COUNTRIES SHOULD ACT TOGETHER. VAN WELL (FRG) SAID IT WAS NECESSARY TO CONSIDER BILATERAL REPRISALS VERY CAREFULLY. HE MENTIONED SCHMIDT'S PLANNED VISIT TO THE SOVIET UNION IN THE FIRST QUARTER OF 1980, WITHOUT INDICATING IN ANY WAY THAT IT MIGHT BE POSTPONED OR CANCELLED. HE SAID THE GERMANS THOUGHT IT BEST TO REACT FIRST IN THE REGION CONCERNED, FOR INSTANCE BY GESTURES TOWARDS PAKISTAN.

3. MR HURD SAID THE UK WOULD LOOK AGAIN AT OUR PROGRAMME OF BILATERAL CONTACTS WITH THE SOVIET UNION. FOR INSTANCE, MILITARY EXCHANGES WERE UNDER DISCUSSION AND SIR HAROLD WILSON WAS DUE TO VISIT MOSCOW IN JANUARY AS PRESIDENT OF THE GB-USSR ASSOCIATION. GROMYKO HAD BEEN INVITED TO VISIT BRITAIN IN FEBRUARY. WE WOULD LOOK AT THESE MATTERS IN THE LIGHT OF WHAT OTHER COUNTRIES PLANNED TO DO, FOR INSTANCE THE GERMANS ON THE QUESTION OF SCHMIDT'S VISIT. THERE WAS ALSO THE QUESTION OF WHAT IF ANYTHING SHOULD REPLACE /THE

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THE BRITISH AND OTHER CREDIT AGREEMENTS WITH THE SOVIET UNION WHICH WERE EXPIRING ABOUT NOW, THE RUSSIANS WOULD INTERPRET THE CONCLUSION OF ANY NEW BILATERAL CREDIT AGREEMENT WITHIN THE NEXT FEW MONTHS AS A SIGNAL OF BUSINESS AS USUAL, AND NONE OF THE WESTERN COUNTRIES CONCERNED SHOULD CONCLUDE AN AGREEMENT WITHOUT CONSULTING THE OTHERS. MR HURD SUGGESTED THAT TWO GROUPS OF OFFICIALS MIGHT BE SET UP, IN WHICH OTHER NATO COUNTRIES COULD PARTICIPATE IF THEY WISHED : ONE WOULD STUDY THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE AFGHANISTAN CRISIS FOR OUR CONTACTS WITH THE SOVIET UNION, AND THE OTHER THE MEASURES WE SHOULD TAKE TO SUPPORT REGIONAL COUNTRIES LIKE PAKISTAN. MR HURD ALSO POINTED TO THE NEED TO CONSIDER MEANS, INCLUDING LEVERAGE, IN WHICH THE WEST COULD TRY TO REDUCE THE LIKELIHOOD OF SOVIET INTERVENTIONS IN YET MORE COUNTRIES.

4. DE LEUSSE (FRANCE) MENTIONED THAT THE QUESTION OF BILATERAL CONTACTS WITH THE SOVIET UNION WOULD BE STUDIED IN PARIS. HE EMPHASISED THAT WESTERN COUNTRIES SHOULD NOT OVER-REACT OR HARM THEIR OWN INTERESTS. WE SHOULD ABIDE BY THE PRINCIPLES WHICH WE HAD FOLLOWED FOR 15 YEARS IN EAST-WEST RELATIONS.

5. AT THE NATO COUNCIL MEETING ON 1 JANUARY YOU SHOULD DRAW ON PARA 3 ABOVE TO DESCRIBE OUR POSITION ON CONTACTS WITH THE SOVIET UNION, ADDING IN ELABORATION THAT:

- (A) WE ARE WILLING TO DISCUSS THE CURTAILMENT OF OUR CONTACTS WITH THE SOVIET UNION, IN COMMON WITH SIMILAR ACTION BY OTHER WESTERN COUNTRIES, AS SOON AS OTHERS HAVE GIVEN THOUGHT TO THE MATTER:
- (B) AS VAN WELL SAID AT TODAY'S MEETING, WESTERN PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR DETENTE WILL BE UNDERMINED BY THE SOVIET INTERVENTION IN AFGHANISTAN, AND THE PUBLIC WILL EXPECT THIS TO BE REFLECTED IN THE WAY WESTERN GOVERNMENTS HANDLE EAST-WEST RELATIONS. IN THE BRITISH VIEW, BILATERAL RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION CANNOT BE IGNORED IN CONSIDERING THE FUTURE WESTERN CONDUCT OF EAST-WEST RELATIONS.

6. AFTER YOU HAVE REPORTED ON THE COUNCIL MEETING, WASHINGTON, PARIS, OTTAWA, ROME AND BONN SHOULD REPEAT OUR POSITION TO FOREIGN MINISTRIES AND ASK TO BE INFORMED AS SOON AS THE GOVERNMENTS CONCERNED HAVE FORMED VIEWS.

7. MY IFT NOT TO OTHER COUNTRIES A LINE FOR YOU TO TAKE IN THE COUNCIL ON THE GENERAL SIGNIFICANCE OF THE SOVIET INTERVENTION.

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TO IMMEDIATE UKDEL NATO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 172 OF 31 DECEMBER

INFO IMMEDIATE ISLAMABAD DELHI KABUL WASHINGTON ROME OTTAWA
BONN PARIS UKMIS NEW YORK MOSCOWINFO ROUTINE PEKING, OTHER NATO POSTS, WARSAW PRAGUE BUCHAREST
BUDAPEST SOFIA EAST BERLIN DUBLIN CANBERRA WELLINGTON TOKYO
JAKARTA SINGAPORE MANILA BANGKOK KUALA LUMPUR.

AFGHANISTAN

1. IN HIS SUMMING UP AT THE END OF TODAY'S LONDON MEETING OF US, UK, FRANCE, FRG, ITALY AND CANADA, THE US DEPUTY SECRETARY OF STATE, WARREN CHRISTOPHER, MADE THE FOLLOWING POINTS:
 - A) OUR REACTION SHOULD BE SUSTAINED. IT SHOULD BE PURSUED BY DEMARCHES, PUBLIC STATEMENTS, ETC.
 - B) ALL COUNTRIES WERE CONSIDERING WHAT ACTION THEY SHOULD TAKE IN THEIR BILATERAL RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION. OUR DISPLEASURE SHOULD BE SHOWN IN SOME WAY. WE WOULD KEEP IN TOUCH.
 - C) COUNTRIES MIGHT DECIDE TO CHANGE THE NATURE OF THEIR DIPLOMATIC RELATIONSHIP WITH AFGHANISTAN. NOT RECOGNISING, DRAWING DOWN OUR MISSIONS AND RECALL OF AMBASSADORS WERE AMONG THE POSSIBILITIES DISCUSSED. THE UNITED STATES WOULD BE GUIDED BY WHAT THE REST WOULD DO.
 - D) WE SHOULD TAKE THE OPPORTUNITY TO POINT OUT THE LESSONS OF THE SOVIET ACTION TO THE IRANIANS.
 - E) HELP SHOULD BE GIVEN TO PAKISTAN. THIS COULD BE DONE THROUGH AID, POSSIBLY AN EARLY DEBT RESCHEDULING MEETING. ADDITIONAL WAYS OF EASING THE BURDEN OF THE REFUGEES SHOULD BE CONSIDERED.
 - F) THERE WAS A NEED TO BRING TO INDIAN ATTENTION THE REAL SIGNIFICANCE OF THE SOVIET MOVE, AND TO POINT OUT THAT WHAT WE DID TO HELP THE PAKISTANIS WAS NOT A THREAT TO INDIA.
 - G) CHINA COULD BE EXPECTED ROUNDLY TO CONDEMN THE SOVIET UNION AND TO SUPPORT PAKISTAN AND ANTI-SOVIET GROUPS IN AFGHANISTAN.
 - H) THE SOVIET AGGRESSION SHOULD BE TAKEN TO THE UNITED NATIONS WITHOUT DELAY.
 - I) WE SHOULD POINT OUT THE ANTI-ISLAMIC NATURE OF SOVIET POLICY, THE DISREGARD OF NON-ALIGNMENT AND THE INCREASING THREAT TO REGIONAL COUNTRIES.

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2. CHRISTOPHER CONCLUDED THAT IT HAD BEEN AGREED THAT CONTINUING ACTION WAS NECESSARY. POSSIBILITIES INCLUDED AN EARLY MEETING OF MINISTERS OR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A WORKING GROUP, OR GROUPS, BUT NO AGREEMENT HAD BEEN REACHED ON HOW TO PROCEED.

3. THERE WAS ALSO GENERAL AGREEMENT WITH CHRISTOPHER'S VIEW THAT IT WAS NOT IN THE WESTERN INTEREST TO MAKE THREATS ABOUT ENDING GENERAL ARMS CONTROL MEASURES WHICH WERE TO THE BENEFIT OF THE WEST, AND THAT THE SALT PROCESS SHOULD BE PURSUED.

4. FULLER SUMMARY FOLLOWS ON 1 JAN.

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TO IMMEDIATE KABUL

TELEGRAM NUMBER 221 OF 31 DECEMBER

AND TO IMMEDIATE ISLAMABAD, NEW DELHI

INFO IMMEDIATE MOSCOW, WASHINGTON, URMIS NEW YORK, BONN, PARIS,
ROME

PRIORITY DUBLIN, UKDEL NATO, PEKING
AFGHANISTAN: RECOGNITION.

1. AT 31 DECEMBER LONDON MEETING (U.S., GERMANY, ITALY, FRANCE, CANADA, AND U.K.) THERE WAS SOME DISCUSSION ON DIPLOMATIC RECOGNITION AND LEVEL OF REPRESENTATION. THE ITALIAN AMBASSADOR WILL BE WITHDRAWN IN THE NEXT FEW DAYS BUT HIS EMBASSY WILL REMAIN. THE FRENCH AND GERMANS WHO RECOGNISE STATES NOT GOVERNMENTS HAVE NOT YET DECIDED ON WHETHER TO MAINTAIN AMBASSADORS. WE AND CANADIANS REITERATED OUR WISH TO AVOID AN EARLY DECISION ON RECOGNITION. MEANWHILE WE WOULD ALL TRY TO AVOID POLITICAL CONTACTS.

2. WHILE WE WILL TRY TO KEEP THE QUESTIONS SEPARATE, YOU WILL BE AWARE THAT WE HAVE REFUSED TO RECOGNISE THE HENG SAMPIN REGIME IN CAMBODIA AS IT DEPENDS ON VIETNAMESE MILITARY STRENGTH FOR ITS SURVIVAL AND DOES NOT THEREFORE MEET OUR CRITERIA FOR RECOGNITION. IF WE WERE TO RECOGNISE THE NEW AFGHAN REGIME THIS WOULD COMPLICATE OUR POSITION OVER CAMBODIA.

3. PLEASE KEEP IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH YOUR AMERICAN, EUROPEAN, AND COMMONWEALTH COLLEAGUES, AND WITH THE PAKISTANI AMBASSADOR. WE RECOGNISE THAT YOUR ABILITY TO CONTINUE EVERYDAY BUSINESS (ON E.G. CONSULAR PROBLEMS) WHIST STILL WITHHOLDING RECOGNITION WILL IN LARGE MEASURE DEPEND ON SOLIDARITY AMONGST YOUR COLLEAGUES. WE WOULD WELCOME REGULAR REPORTS.

4. TO ISLAMABAD. YOU SHOULD CONSULT URGENTLY WITH PAKISTANI AUTHORITIES. ARE WE CORRECT IN ASSUMING THEY WANT TO SEE A CONTINUING WESTERN PRESENCE IN KABUL? WHAT DO THEY INTEND ON RECOGNITION?

5. TO DELHI: YOU SPOKE WELL TO KRISHNAN. YOU SHOULD CONTINUE TO KEEP IN TOUCH, IN PARTICULAR URGING THAT ON THIS OCCASION THE INDIANS SHOULD NOT BE SWIFT TO RECOGNISE.

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TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1985 OF 31 DECEMBER

INFO IMMEDIATE PARIS LISBON OSLO WASHINGTON ISLAMABAD

INFO PRIORITY KABUL PEKING

^F₀ IN ROUTINE BONN UKDEL NATO MOSCOW OTTAWA AND ROME

MY TELNO 1979: AFGHANISTAN

1. THE WORD IS INEVITABLY KYF

M LLNIMHE UN THAT WE ARE PLANNING A MOVE IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL. THE PAKISTANI AMBASSADOR TACKLED ME ABOUT THIS THIS MORNING. I TOLD HIM THAT NO DECISION HAD YET BEEN TAKEN, BUT THAT WE AND OTHER WESTERN COUNTRIES WERE THINKING ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY. WE WOULD OBVIOUSLY WANT TO HAVE AS MANY ASIAN COUNTRIES WITH US AS POSSIBLE. WAS PAKISTAN THINKING OF TAKING THE INITIATIVE? IF NOT, WOULD PAKISTAN BE PREPARED TO SIGN A LETTER EMANATING FROM A NUMBER OF WESTERN COUNTRIES, ASKING FOR A MEETING OF THE COUNCIL?

2. NAIK SAID THAT PAKISTAN WOULD NOT TAKE THE INITIATIVE HERSELF. BUT HE WOULD SIGN SUCH A LETTER AND SPEAK IN THE DEBATE IF OTHER ASIAN, AND PARTICULARLY ISLAMIC, COUNTRIES DID SO.

3. EMPHASISING AGAIN THAT NOTHING HAD BEEN DECIDED, I SAID THAT, FOR TACTICAL REASONS, I WOULD NOT IN ANY CASE PROPOSE TO TRY TO MOBILISE ANY ACTION BEFORE WEDNESDAY. THE COUNCIL HAD JUST FINISHED AN EXHAUSTING SESSION ON IRAN. NO ONE, INCLUDING THE NEW NON-PERMANENT MEMBERS, WOULD BE WELL DISPOSED TO ACTION ON 1 JANUARY. NAIK AGREED. I WENT ON TO SAY THAT, IF THE WEST DECIDED TO ACT, I HOPED THAT HE WOULD BE READY TO MOBILISE ASIAN PARTICIPATION. HE AGREED WITHOUT HESITATION.

4. THE CHINESE THEN TACKLED ME AND WE HAD A SIMILAR CONVERSATION.

5. IN HIS STATEMENT IN THE IRAN DEBATE THIS MORNING, KAISER (BANGLADESH) MENTIONED THE SITUATION IN AFGHANISTAN AS A THREAT TO INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND STABILITY AND AS AN ADDED REASON FOR ALL PARTIES TO EXERCISE RESTRAINT OVER IRAN.

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6. SUBJECT TO THE DISCUSSIONS IN LONDON TODAY WITH CHRISTOPHER AND SUBJECT TO THE POINT IN PARAS 2 ATO 4 OF MY TELEGRAM UNDER REFERENCE (VANCE HAD NOTHING TO ADD WHEN I SAW HIM THIS MORNING), I WOULD BE READY TO START CONSULTATIONS WITH OTHER WESTERN MEMBERS AND NON-MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL AND WITH NAIK ON WEDNESDAY MORNING.

PARSONS

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TO IMMEDIATE DESKBY FCO

TELEGRAM NO 293 OF 31 DECEMBER 79.

INFO ROUTINE UKMIS NEW YORK, WASHINGTON, MOSCOW, NEW DELHI,
UKDEL NATO AND ISLAMABAD.

A. SECURITY SITUATION.

SOVIET TANK MOVEMENT CONTINUED ON OUTSKIRTS OF KABUL ALL DAY YESTERDAY. MY ITALIAN COLLEAGUE (WHO MAY EXAGGERATE) SAID THAT A SQUADRON (12 TANKS) WAS PASSING HIS EMBASSY (WHICH IS ON THE MAIN AIRPORT ROAD) EVERY HALF HOUR AND THEN TURNING EAST. MORE TANKS, PROBABLY A REGIMENT OF 36, CAME FROM THE BACK AIRPORT ROAD BEHIND THIS EMBASSY JUST BEFORE MIDNIGHT WHEN IT WAS BEGINNING TO SNOW. IT HAS SNOWED HEAVILY SINCE SO THE AIRPORT IS NOW CLOSED.

2. SOVIET SUPPLY CONVOYS HAVE BEGUN ARRIVING HERE BY ROAD VIA SALANG. THESE TROOPS ARE ORIENTAL-LOOKING LIKE THE FEW FOOT PATROLS IN KABUL WHO HAVE BEEN HEARD SPEAK IOB DARI.

3. THERE ARE RELIABLE REPORTS OF FIGHTING BETWEEN SOVIET TROOPS AND REBELS (OR PERHAPS LOCAL AFGHANS) IN THE LOGAR VALLEY SOUTH OF KABUL AND ALSO TO THE EAST OF KABUL WHERE TWENTY-ONE SOVIET TANKS ARE SAID TO HAVE BEEN DESTROYED.

4. FROM UNITED NATIONS SOURCES WE HAVE HEARD OF TEN OR TWELVE RUSSIAN CIVILIANS BEING KILLED IN KABUL YESTERDAY. OTHER REPORTS SPEAK OF TEN BEING KILLED THE DAY BEFORE.

B. POLITICAL SITUATION.

5. WE HAVE RECEIVED A CIRCULAR NOTE FROM THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS GIVING THE NAMES OF THE NEW GOVERNMENT BUT THE WHEREABOUTS OF BABRAK KARMAL REMAIN

A MYSTERY.

THERE HAS HOWEVER BEEN A REPORT THAT WATANJAR AND SOME

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OTHER MINISTERS (BUT NOT BABRAK) HAVE BEEN CONFERRING WITH SOME OF AMIN'S MINISTERS IN THE RADIO STATION (WHICH IS ON THE AIRPORT ROAD AND GUARDED BY SOVIET TROOPS).

HILLIER-FRY.

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TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 4420 OF 31 DECEMBER 1979

INFO IMMEDIATE UKDEL NATO MODUK PRIORITY KABUL ISLAMABAD NEW
DELHI MOSCOW ROUTINE JEDDA PEKING DACCA TOKYO UKMIS NEW YORK ROME
PARIS BONN.

AFGHANISTAN

1. LORTON (STATE DEPARTMENT) BRIEFED THIS EVENING THE SAME GROUP OF REPRESENTATIVES AS LAST WEEK (MY TELNO 4395) ON THE CURRENT SITUATION. A SIMILAR BRIEFING WOULD BE GIVEN BY U S EMBASSIES IN CAPITALS LATER THIS WEEK.
2. THE RUSSIANS HAD QUICKLY FOLLOWED UP THE COUP BY OCCUPYING KABUL AND WERE NOW SECURING THEIR GRIP OVER THE OTHER CITIES, IMPORTANT ROADS AND MILITARY INSTALLATIONS. THERE WERE SOME REPORTS THAT THEY HAD ENCOUNTERED RESISTANCE FROM THE AFGHAN ARMY, E.G. AROUND HERAT AND HAD ENGAGED THE INSURGENTS DIRECTLY. ESTIMATES OF SOVIET CASUALTIES BY 30 DECEMBER WERE SOME 250 KILLED AND WOUNDED. THESE WERE NO DOUBT GREATER BY NOW. OF THE 30 - 40,000 SOVIET TROOPS IN AFGHANISTAN, MOST HAD CROSSED THE BORDER BY LAND (THE REST BEING AIRLIFTED). AT LEAST AN EQUAL NUMBER WERE AVAILABLE ON SOVIET TERRITORY FOR RAPID DEPLOYMENT INTO AFGHANISTAN. SOVIET AIRCRAFT INCLUDING MIG 23'S (NOT IN THE AFGHAN INVENTORY) HAD BEEN SEEN OVER KABUL (MY TEL UNDER REF PARA 6). THERE WERE NO REPORTS OF CASUALTIES AMONG OTHER FOREIGN NATIONALS APART FROM RUSSIANS. KABUL AIRPORT WAS NOW CLOSED BECAUSE OF SNOW.
3. ALTHOUGH BABRAK KARMAL HAD STILL NOT BEEN SEEN IN PUBLIC IN KABUL, NOR HAD HE BEEN HEARD ON RADIO OR TELEVISION, THE U S PLACED CONFIDENCE IN REPORTS (SOME FROM PEOPLE WHO CLAIMED TO HAVE SEEN HIM) THAT HE WAS NOW THERE. IT WAS NOT CLEAR WHERE HE HAD BEEN AT THE TIME OF THE COUP, AND THERE WAS EVIDENCE THAT HE HAD BEEN IN MOSCOW AT THAT POINT. WHILE SOME POLITICAL FIGURES (JALALAR AND FAIZ MOHAMMED) WITH LINKS TO FORMER REGIMES HAD JOINED BABRAK'S GOVERNMENT, THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE OF PROMINENT FORMER POLITICIANS, LET ALONE LEADERS OF THE INSURGENTS, ACCEPTING A ROLE. THE REBELS HAD ALREADY DECLARED THEIR OPPOSITION TO BABRAK. SOME WESTERN JOURNALISTS HAD BEEN PREVENTED FROM ENTERING AFGHANISTAN AND THE REST WERE CONFINED TO THE INTERCONTINENTAL HOTEL (WHERE THEY APPARENTLY HAD NO COMMUNICATION WITH THE OUTSIDE). THERE WAS EVIDENCE OF POLITICAL PRISONERS, PROBABLY MAINLY PARCHMISTS, BEING RELEASED, AND THE NEW REGIME WAS BEGINNING TO REPORT CONGRATULATORY MESSAGES (EG FROM BULGARIA, THE GDR AND VIETNAM).

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4. THE INDIAN PRIME MINISTER, ACCORDING TO NEWS AGENCY REPORTS, HAD CALLED IN THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR THIS EVENING IN DELHI AND ASKED FOR THE WITHDRAWAL OF SOVIET TROOPS FROM AFGHANISTAN AS SOON AS POSSIBLE, IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE STATEMENT FROM MOSCOW. HE HAD SAID THAT THE PRESENCE OF THESE TROOPS WOULD HAVE FAR-REACHING CONSEQUENCES FOR THE SUB-CONTINENT, AND RECALLED THE SOVIET-INDIAN JOINT STATEMENT IN JUNE WHICH TOOK A STAND AGAINST FOREIGN INTERVENTION IN AFGHANISTAN. THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR HAD UNDERTAKEN TO CONVEY THE INDIAN CONCERN TO MOSCOW. LORTON NOTED THAT, APART FROM THE REACTIONS FROM WESTERN COUNTRIES, THERE HAD BEEN GOOD STATEMENTS BY IRAN, YUGOSLAVIA, ROMANIA AND A NUMBER OF OTHER NON-ALIGNED NATIONS.

5. IN ANSWER TO QUESTIONS LORTON MADE THE FOLLOWING COMMENTS ON CURRENT U S THINKING:

(A) STATEMENTS ABOUT THE COUP FROM OTHER COUNTRIES WERE ENCOURAGING FOR THE U S, ALTHOUGH IT REMAINED TO BE SEEN WHAT FURTHER RESPONSE (EG AT THE UN) WOULD EMERGE. THE LATEST INDIAN REACTION, WHICH WENT MUCH FURTHER THAN THEIR EARLIER STATEMENT, WAS PARTICULARLY HELPFUL.

(B) FUTURE U S STRATEGY TOWARDS PAKISTAN WAS STILL BEING CONSIDERED. THERE HAD BEEN DETAILED EXCHANGES WITH THE PAKISTANIS IN ISLAMABAD ON THE PRESENT SITUATION IN AFGHANISTAN, BUT SO FAR NO POLICY REVIEW HAD BEEN INITIATED. THIS WOULD NOT HAPPEN UNTIL A PACKAGE HAD BEEN ASSEMBLED OF OPTIONS FOR THE FUTURE, WHICH COULD OBVIOUSLY INCLUDE US MILITARY AND ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE. LORTON NOTED THAT THE ADMINISTRATION HAD TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF LEGISLATIVE CONSTRAINTS (THOUGH LEGISLATION COULD ALWAYS BE CHANGED). THERE HAD BEEN NO PARTICULAR REACTION YET FROM CONGRESS. THIS COULD BE EXPECTED TO EMERGE WHEN CONGRESS RETURNED FROM THE CURRENT RECESS. THE U S HAD TAKEN NOTE OF THE INDIAN STATEMENT ABOUT THE DANGERS OF A U S -INDUCED BUILD-UP OF WEAPONS IN PAKISTAN.

(C) LORTON COULD ADD NOTHING TO WHAT HAD ALREADY BECOME PUBLIC ABOUT HOT-LINE ACTIVITY BETWEEN WASHINGTON AND MOSCOW. THE STATE DEPART-

MENT SPOKESMAN HAD REFUSED TO SPECULATE TODAY ON WHAT THE QUOTE SERIOUS CONSEQUENCES UNQUOTE MIGHT BE TO WHICH THE PRESIDENT HAD REPORTEDLY REFERRED OVER THE WEEKEND IN DISCUSSIONS WITH JOURNALISTS (MY TELNO 4406 PARA 2).

/(D) THE

(D) THE U S ACCEPTED THAT THE FIRST STATEMENT BY BABRAK HAD BEEN DESIGNED TO BE CONCILIATORY, AND TO PROVIDE A FRAMEWORK FOR POLITICAL SOLUTIONS TO THE INSURGENCY. HOWEVER THE RUSSIANS SEEMED DETERMINED FIRST TO OCCUPY THE COUNTRY, AND THIS WOULD INEVITABLY INVOLVE THEM IN SOME SORT OF MILITARY STRUGGLE. THE INITIAL RESULT MIGHT BE A GREATER FLOW OF REFUGEES TO PAKISTAN (BRING THE TOTAL TO PERHAPS AS MANY AS HALF A MILLION), AND THE INSURGENCY SEEMED UNLIKELY TO END UNLESS THE RUSSIANS TOTALLY SEALED THE BORDER, WHICH WAS VIRTUALLY IMPOSSIBLE.

(E) THE RUSSIANS PROBABLY DID NOT WANT TO STAY IN AFGHANISTAN IN THEIR PRESENT NUMBERS BUT WOULD WISH TO REALISE THE AIMS OF THEIR INTERVENTION: TO END THE INSURGENCY AND REBUILD THE AFGHAN MILITARY FORCES, IN ORDER TO PROVIDE PROTECTION FOR THE REGIME AND PREVENT A NEW OUTBREAK OF REBELLION. THIS WOULD BE A TIME-CONSUMING PROCESS EVEN IF THEY WERE SUCCESSFUL.

5. ON RECOGNITION (YOUR TELNO 221 TO KABUL), LORTON SAID THAT THERE WERE TWO QUESTIONS UPPERMOST IN THE ADMINISTRATION'S MIND: DID THE ISSUE ARISE AND IF SO, WHAT RESPONSE SHOULD BE GIVEN. NO U S POSITION HAD YET BEEN DECIDED AND HE EXPECTED THE SUBJECT TO HAVE BEEN DISCUSSED TODAY IN LONDON AND TO BE CONSIDERED FURTHER AT TOMORROW'S MEETING OF THE NAC IN BRUSSELS. THE U S WERE AWARE OF THE CAMBODIAN PRECEDENT.

6. LORTON CONCLUDED THAT THE ADMINISTRATION FELT THE SOVIET ACTION IN AFGHANISTAN WAS SUFFICIENTLY SERIOUS TO REQUIRE THEM TO PAY AN APPROPRIATE PRICE. THE EXACT SUM WOULD BE DETERMINED AS A RESULT OF THE PRESENT CONSULTATIONS WITH THE ALLIES. THE INTERNATIONAL IMPACT OF THE SOVIET INTERVENTION COULD BE EXPECTED TO BE GREATER THAN IN THE CASE OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA, GIVEN AFGHANISTAN'S STATUS AS A MOSLEM AND NON-ALIGNED COUNTRY. LORTON ADDED (AND ASKED FOR SPECIAL PROTECTION TO BE GIVEN TO THIS) THAT THE U S HAD REASON TO BELIEVE THAT THE DECISION TO INTERVENE IN AFGHANISTAN HAD BEEN TAKEN AT THE HIGHEST LEVEL IN THE SOVIET UNION.

HENDERSON

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31 December 1979

fa.
Ph... 31/12/79

Dear Michael,

Afghanistan: Prime Minister's Television Interview with
with BBC Television, 4pm, 31 December

/ I attach a note of points that could be made by the Prime
Minister.

/ The six-country meeting in the FCO (list of participants
attached) is expected to continue throughout the afternoon.
It is hoped that there will be an agreed communique at the
conclusion, but probably only in very brief and formal terms:
the French are resisting any sort of agreed conclusions.
Nothing has been said to the Press about what was discussed
this morning. The main substantive point covered was how to
deal with the Soviet action in the United Nations. The French
delegation have not yet accepted that the West should take
the lead. This necessitates some caution about what the Prime
Minister says on this subject. The brief takes this into account.

(G G H Walden)
Private Secretary

M O'D B Alexander Esq
10 Downing Street

POINTS TO MAKE

1. The Government have already condemned the Soviet Union's brutal military intervention in Afghanistan. I have sent a message to Mr Brezhnev expressing my profound concern at the Soviet action. The reasons the Russians have given for sending their troops into Afghanistan are totally unconvincing. They have no mandate for what they have done from the Afghan people.
2. We and other countries are giving urgent attention to how to respond. President Carter proposed that the United States should exchange views on this with a number of allied countries. I was delighted to be able to offer to have this meeting in London, which was a convenient location for those involved in the consultations. The United States Deputy Secretary of State has come over for this purpose. I understand that useful talks took place this morning. The meeting is still going on as we are speaking.
3. It is the first time since the end of the Second World War that formed units of the Soviet Army have been used for military operations in an independent country outside the Soviet Bloc. This poses a grave situation for South Asia, and indeed the world as a whole. The aggression is contrary to the United Nations Charter and one of the issues that has to be considered is how this should be handled at the United Nations.
4. I have received reports of deep concern felt in other countries throughout the world, including the non-aligned and Muslim world, at the Soviet action. I hope that this will persuade the Russians that all Soviet troops should be withdrawn from Afghanistan at an early date, leaving the Afghan people to determine their own future.



BACKGROUND

1. The texts of the Government statement of 23 December and the
// Prime Minister's message to President Brezhnev are attached.

2. At this morning's meeting at the FCO, UN action was discussed. There was general agreement that this was a matter for the Security Council but the French delegation reserved their position on how this should be dealt with. They did not agree that it would be necessary for the West to take the initiative and hope that Third World countries might do so.

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RECORD OF DISCUSSIONS HELD IN THE INDIA OFFICE COUNCIL CHAMBER
AT THE FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
AT 10 AM ON MONDAY 31 DECEMBER 1979

THOSE PRESENT:

F. N. 4/1

UK

Mr Douglas Hurd, MP Minister of State
Mr H Cortazzi, Deputy Under Secretary of State
Mr J Bullard, Deputy Under Secretary of State
Mr K White, Head of South Asia Department
Mr C Mallaby, Head of Eastern European and Soviet Department
Mr G Archer, South Asia Department
Mr R Lavers, South Asia Department

US

Mr Warren Christopher, Deputy Secretary of State
Ambassador Brewster, US Embassy
Mr George Vest, Assistant Secretary European Affairs
Mr Peter Constable, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Middle East & South Asian Affairs
Mr John Trattner, Executive Assistant to Mr Christopher
Mr Marshall Bremont, White House
Mr James Siena, Department of Defence
Miss Glaspie, US Embassy

CANADIANS

Mr Alan Gotlieb, Under-Secretary
Mr Klaus Goldschlag, DUS
Mr Tom Delworth, Director General Asia Pacific
Mr Christien Hardy, Acting Canadian High Commissioner
Mr Robinson, Canada House

FRENCH

M. de Leusse, PUS Quai d'Orsay
HE M Sauvagnarges, French Ambassador
M. Noiville, Quai d'Orsay
M. Vilmorin, French Embassy

GERMANS

Dr Van Well, State Secretary
Dr Steger, Head of South and South East Asia Department
Dr von Studintz, PS/Dr Van Well
Dr Burger, Deputy to Dr Steger

ITALIANS

Sr Francesco Malfatti, PUS MFA
HE Sr Roberto Ducci, Italian Ambassador
Sr Ludovico Incisa, Minister/Counsellor Italian Embassy
Sr Luigi Amaduzzi, Counsellor, PUS's Office

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1. Mr Hurd welcomed other delegations. There was general agreement that Mr Christopher should take the chair.
2. Mr Christopher expressed appreciation that other delegations were participating. The United States had suggested consultations because of the very grave view that they took of Soviet action and the need which they saw for agreement between allies on an appropriate response. The United States saw this as a most important development as it was the first time since World War II that Soviet forces had been used outside the Soviet bloc. What had happened was naked aggression for which the Soviets had offered an unconvincing explanation. It was a travesty to suggest that the intervention had been invited by Amin. He and other members of his Government had been assassinated within hours of the attack. To instance the Soviet/Afghan Friendship Treaty as grounds for Soviet involvement was equally false. Similar grounds could be claimed by as many as ten countries with comparable treaties. The question that needed to be asked was why the Soviet Union had chosen the present time to make this direct and massive further escalation of their involvement in the country. It followed an attempt to get rid of Amin earlier in the year which misfired.
3. The Afghanistan rebels now appeared to have been operating more effectively than had been assumed. Amin had failed to win support and the Soviets had removed him. What was initially a massive Soviet airlift had been complemented by a massive cross border invasion bringing their troop levels up to 25-30,000. The Soviet troops were reaching out throughout the country and occupying strategic lines including the border area between Afghanistan and Pakistan. Babrak Karmal was not yet believed to be in Afghanistan. The Soviets could expect to have continuing trouble with insurgents. To deal with this they would probably need to bring in more troops from the substantial forces lined up inside the Soviet border. An increasing number of Afghans could be expected to cross the border into Pakistan. The present 350,000 refugees there might soon become 500,000. Pakistan faced a dilemma. Their traditional fears of Soviet intentions had been confirmed. They would wonder whether help from the West would be sufficiently strong to provide security. They might wonder whether they needed a rapprochement with the Soviet Union. The Pakistan Government was weak.

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However the Government was trying to bolster its position by stressing its Islamic commitment. The President and Foreign Affairs Adviser were thinking of calling for a meeting of the Islamic Conference. The United States wished to encourage them to do so but this would not be an alternative to the West providing assistance to Pakistan. Any Indian Government could be expected to follow a cautious approach in public but their underlying concern would be that South Asia was becoming an area for super power confrontation. Mr Desai had been careful about dealings with Pakistan. Mrs Gandhi might not be so cautious. Past relations between Mrs Gandhi and Babrak were reported to have been close. The Soviet action in Afghanistan might help us with US/Iran relations. But there could be no certainty. The Americans thought that Iraqi suspicions of Soviet motives would be increased. Elsewhere President Mengistu would be worried. The governments of Somalia, Kenya and Djibouti would be reinforced in their anti-Soviet attitudes. The Chinese could be counted upon to speak out and even to take an initiative. They might offer more aid to Pakistan. Recent events would have a special message for Yugoslavia and Romania. The West should reinforce their contacts with them and watch their reactions. It was necessary to review the consequence of Soviet action on general East/West relations. The TNF modernisation programme seemed wise and necessary. Soviet arms control measures needed to be looked at with new scepticism. President Carter's desire was to push ahead with SALT II which he saw as in the interest of the West but the Soviet Afghanistan venture would make it much more difficult to achieve agreement in the Senate. Congressional reaction would be apparent only after Congress returned. The general American conclusion was that the events in Afghanistan reinforced the need for Western solidarity and vigilance. Did events mean that the Soviet Union would in future move to support pro Soviet regimes in other countries whenever they seemed threatened? Their intentions would be influenced by the reaction to them. If this was weak the threshold for Soviet interference would be lowered. A firm reaction would lessen the likelihood that the Soviet Union would pursue similar action in future.

4. Mr Hurd noted the elements of opportunism, ruthlessness and secrecy in the Soviet action. He said that the UK analysis of the

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situation was close to the American. We saw three main Soviet objectives: to ensure that there was no reversal of Afghan commitment to furtherance of the communist revolution of April 1978; to ensure that there was no opportunity for a regime hostile to the Soviet Union to be established in Kabul; and for the longer term to build up a position of strength in Afghanistan from which it would be possible to influence events in Central and South Asia. The Soviets had probably not yet decided how to use Afghanistan as a satellite. But it was not possible to dismiss the prospect that the Soviet Union would seek to tie in Afghanistan very closely to the Soviet Union. Karmal's prospects of acceptance by the Afghans had started badly because of the way he had come to power. The Soviet immediate priority would be to build up his regime. The opposition was chaotic and incoherent but the Soviet intervention had neutralised the Afghan Army. Hence the Soviet Union would need to carry through operations in the field themselves. This might be the reason for the size of the Soviet intervention. The prospects were for massive intervention over a considerable period.

5. Pakistan was seriously worried. They feared that the new regime in Kabul might revive the case for Paktunistan with which Karmal had in the past been closely identified. The Soviet Ambassador to Pakistan had told the Pakistan Government that Pakistan was an external power whose interference in Afghanistan had necessitated Soviet intervention. Reports from other capitals however indicated that the Iranians and the Americans had also been named in some capitals as interfering powers.

6. The Indians could be expected to put the best face possible on what had happened. They would be concerned to see an Islamic regime in Kabul and might prefer a pro-Soviet Government. But there would be deep concern at the role that Soviet forces had played in the country even if this was not publicly expressed.

7. Mr Christopher interjected that he had seen a report that one Soviet Ambassador had commented, when asked to identify the third country accused of interference by the Soviet Union, that he could not remember which country it was.

8. Dr Van Well analysed the situation at some length on similar lines to previous speakers. He said that the Germans doubted

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whether the Russians were intent on absorbing Afghanistan into the Soviet Union. But Afghanistan now provided a new platform for the Soviet Union to extend its influence in the region. The alliance should take this new factor into account. The Russians would have difficulty controlling the tribal rebels. Although the opposition was disunited there was intense hatred of the Russians. Appeals for national reconciliation would have little attraction. Nonetheless, any reaction indicating acquiescence in the intervention would psychologically undermine the rebels. The West should be alert to this consideration.

9. He thought that the Soviet timing of their move had been influenced by the Iranian crisis. There were parallels with Hungary in 1956. Initially his government had thought that the Iranians must now recognise where their true interests lay. Unfortunately the climax to the Security Council debate had come at the same time. Meanwhile the Iranians still thought their battle with the Americans was the main priority.

10. Turning to other countries in the region, Dr Van Well commented on Pakistan's lack of direction and governmental weakness. On India, he thought it unlikely that a caretaker government would make strong statements. But the Russian action would have a deep impact on Indian policy planning. The Chinese would issue strong statements but were not in a position to do much else. The Germans thought that the Western response should be framed with the wider region in mind, including the Gulf and the Horn. A strong reaction would stiffen governments uncertain how to play things.

11. Detente had lost ground. The German press had strongly condemned the Russians. Confidence building measures would hardly seem appropriate now to German public opinion. The Russians would not wish to negotiate with the Americans while there was so much uncertainty in East/West relations.

12. M. de Leusse asked if the Soviet action was really a move over a completely new threshold. He accepted that there had been no intervention of this size in a non-Soviet bloc country since 1945 but the Soviet Union had supplied armed troops and military hardware in Viet-Nam and had used the Cubans as surrogates in Africa. There had been no protest over Soviet action in Eritrea. He thought that the most appropriate response to the situation in Afghanistan would

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be from third world countries. So far they had said very little. The idea of Pakistan convening a meeting of the Islamic Conference was extremely desirable. The reactions of Romania and Yugoslavia would be important.

13. Sr. Malfatti agreed with previous assessments. He pointed to the problems for the Soviet Union from the anti-Islamic policies of Presidents Taraki and Amin. He thought that one of the reasons for the timing of the Soviet intervention might be that they felt that the winter season would be a good opportunity to end the revolution while lines of supply were interrupted by winter. The Italians had considered that a suitable response to the present situation was to recall their Ambassador from Kabul immediately. They supported action in the Security Council.

14. Mr Gotlieb said that Canada agreed with views already expressed. He thought that the Russians had taken the opportunity to position themselves in the arc of instability. The Pakistanis were particularly worried. They saw a prospect that they might be sandwiched between two hostile countries that might establish a close cooperation if Mrs Gandhi won the Indian election. He agreed that third world countries should be engaged in any action at the United Nations to the maximum extent possible.

Action at the UN

15. Mr Christopher said that he proposed that the meeting should now discuss the various possibilities for action at the UN. He thought that action under Chapter 6 would underestimate the gravity of the situation. Action under Chapter 7 involved the threat of a Soviet veto. Some might see some advantage in forcing the Soviets to that position. Taking action to the General Assembly tended to be sequential to Chapter 7 action. Another alternative would be a letter to the Security Council but the Americans believed that this also underestimated the gravity of the situation.

16. Mr Hurd said that the United Kingdom felt that there should be recourse to the United Nations through the Security Council. There was provision in the UN Charter for countries to have the right to choose their own governments and a requirement for members to refrain from use of force against independent states. This could provide

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the framework for an approach. The operative paragraph could condemn Soviet action. A call for a withdrawal of Soviet troops would be a necessary consequence of condemnatory action. Another operative paragraph could perhaps establish a commission of three members to examine progress by, for example, 1 February. Early action was important. It was essential to act when the tide of protest in non-aligned countries and particularly the Muslim world was flowing strongly. Indignation subsided quickly. Fears remained but the inclination to do or say anything faded. It would be a pity to wait until after the second stage of the Iranian discussion and better to use the window between stage one and two. He saw no hope of persuading the Soviet Union to reverse their action. The aim should be to make the Soviet Union uncomfortable about what they had done in order that it would be less likely that they would repeat similar action elsewhere.

17. Mr Gotlieb said that it would be logical to use Chapter 7, as Chapter 6 referred to the peaceful settlement of disputes. By referring to Article 51 as their pretext for action the USSR had themselves necessitated Security Council attention as the Article required a Council report. It would not be desirable to take action to the General Assembly under peace procedures without widespread support. He thought it would be more desirable for a non-aligned country or countries to sponsor a resolution than for the rest to take the lead. It would be worth a 24 or even 48 hour delay to see if this could be achieved.

18. Mr Christopher agreed that it was desirable to involve Third World countries but no dependence could be placed on them to be self starting.

19. Sr. Malfatti said that the best solution would be to persuade an Asian member of the Security Council to take the lead.

20. Mr Gotlieb commented that any one of the 150 members could bring a complaint.

21. Mr Christopher added that the Indonesians, Niger and the Philippines would be the new members of the Council from 1 January. Third World countries could play a very helpful rôle in a resolution. Nigeria had played an important rôle over Iran.

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22. M. de Leusse suggested that Permanent Representatives in New York should consult together and try to get a Third World country, if possible from Asia, to take the initiative.
23. Mr Hurd commented that Bangladesh was, in principle, in favour of action in the Security Council but it would be a considerable jump for them to take the initiative themselves.
24. Mr Gotlieb thought that Sri Lanka, Singapore and the Philippines might perhaps jointly be persuaded to take the lead.
25. Mr Christopher hoped that the other countries present would take action in capitals around the world to urge other countries to take action. He hoped other countries would make similar demarches to those which the US had issued.
26. M. de Leusse thought it important not to make Afghanistan just an East/West quarrel; it should be dealt with as a world problem.
27. Mr Hurd asked whether all could agree to work for an early meeting of the Security Council. He did not think there was any need to decide at the meeting how or by whom the action should be taken forward.
28. There was general agreement but the French said that they must reserve their position on a Western initiative in the UN at least until 1 January.

Recognition

29. Mr Christopher proposed that there should be an exchange of views on the question of recognition of the new Afghanistan government. The US Embassy staff were down to about 30. The US had not yet reached a decision on what to do. There were a range of possibilities from breaking relations, removal of Ambassadors without a break and the drawing down of staff.
30. Dr Van Well said that a consideration for the Germans was the number of the German technical experts, school teachers and UNDP staff. It would be difficult for them to withdraw their mission.
31. If one country withdrew its Ambassador that would increase the pressure on the others. The Italians were going to withdraw their representative. Mr Hurd said we did face a problem of recognition. We would not take an early decision. The British Ambassador had

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been asked not to have any political contacts with the new government. The UK would be ready to fall in with any consensus.

32. Mr Gotlieb said that Canada had no resident Ambassador to withdraw. Afghanistan had been virtually annexed. It created an exceptional situation for the legal criteria for recognition.

33. M. de Leusse said France recognised states not governments. Recognition was not, therefore, a problem. They had not made a decision on the future of their small embassy in Kabul. There was no question of political contacts yet.

34. Dr Van Well saw a dilemma. The Germans would like to withdraw their Ambassador but found his presence useful. They would be prepared to go along with the general consensus to withdraw.

35. Mr Christopher agreed with Mr Hurd that all should abstain from political contacts with the new regime.

Aid

36. Mr Christopher said that the Americans had cancelled their programme. Under Taraki the Afghans had been at least nominally non-aligned. The new government was a puppet. He asked for views.

37. Dr Van Well said his government would reassess their programme. They would be reluctant to provide money to multilateral organizations for projects in Afghanistan.

38. Mr Hurd said the British programme was small but diminishing. We might not terminate the scholarships of students in the United Kingdom. But it would now be hard to justify bilateral projects. He hoped international organizations would adopt a similarly critical attitude.

39. Mr Gotlieb thought his government should see whether the World Bank could suspend its aid.

40. M. de Leusse said the French programme now amounted virtually to nothing.

41. Mr Christopher said that all the countries represented had either suspended or were phasing out their programmes. They would continue to do this and would encourage multilateral institutions to

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re-evaluate their involvement in Afghanistan. The US Government would urge them to suspend programmes and not initiate new projects.

Bilateral Relations with Soviet Union, Pakistan and India

42. Mr Christopher said the United States had contemplated granting most favoured nation status to the Soviet Union. They were looking at that again now. They were also reviewing their policy on export licences, grain sales, scientific exchanges, and the whole gamut of social and official contacts. In effect this amounted to the totality of their bilateral relations. Mr Christopher invited comments on the intentions of other governments.

43. Mr Gotlieb said that the Canadians had not yet reviewed their position. He would advise his Ministers of the sense of the meeting. He envisaged two immediate possibilities. The first priority should be the suspension of visits in both directions. Secondly they could postpone signature of new agreements. Both were visible signs of good will. They bore re-examination.

44. Sr Malfatti said his government would review the question. It was important that all the allies should adopt a common line. Dr Van Well outlined his government's intentions. Firstly they would reply to the Soviet communication about their intervention. The Germans planned to criticise the use of force against the Afghans, to call for the withdrawal of Soviet troops and to reject the pretext and arguments used to justify the Russian invasion. Thereafter they would examine the possibility for reprisals, starting with participation in the Olympics. Careful study was required in the context of East/West relations. His government had a tight schedule of visits, including Mr Schmidt's to the Soviet Union and bloc countries. Should the East Europeans be included in the West's disapproval? In the immediate future though it was more important to establish our attitude in the region with, for instance, visits to Pakistan. Pakistan was suffering from a refugee problem. His government was ready to join an international programme to help Afghan refugees. Another possibility was a conference on debt relief for Pakistan. His government was ready to consider an increase in aid. Moreover, these were signals which should be noted in Moscow. After a brief reference to Iran and the possibility of a community gesture, Dr Van Well commented that the

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West should not allow the Soviet Union to exert additional pressure to complicate an already serious situation.

45. Mr Christopher said the United States had re-stated its commitment of the 1959 Treaty with Pakistan (the so-called Eisenhower doctrine). They intended to speed up the supply of weapons in the pipe-line. His Government would be more forthcoming to Pakistan in every way not prevented by the statutes on nuclear proliferation.

46. Mr Hurd described the public reaction here and the Prime Minister's message to Mr Brezhnev. The United Kingdom would also reply to the Soviet communiqué. The range of contacts with the Soviet Union planned for 1980 would be reviewed. He cited examples such as the proposed delegation to be led by Sir Harold Wilson and the Royal Air Force Staff College visit. Mr Gromyko had been invited for February. That might be cancelled but any action had to be the same as taken by the others. It would be particularly important to know whether Mr Schmidt went to Moscow. Credits to the Soviet Union presented another possibility. Our own were due soon to expire. Britain was prepared to consider this weapon but it would only be sensible if all acted together. The Alliance also needed to think of ways of reassuring the Pakistanis without upsetting the Indians. Perhaps action could be categorised under the headings firstly of implications for contacts with the Soviet Union and, secondly, measures of support to Pakistan.

47. Mr Hurd mentioned that Mr Blaker would be in Delhi from 24-26 January which would provide an opportunity to speak to the Indians.

48. Dr Van Well said that a German Minister would also be going to New Delhi for discussions shortly.

49. Mr Christopher asked whether one way of following up the present discussions could be through a working group. He asked if there was a consensus that Governments should increase aid to the refugees in Pakistan.

50. The Canadians, British and French commented that there could be difficulties because of the squeeze on bilateral aid programmes.

51. Mr Gotlieb commented that for Canada there was the problem with Pakistan of the nuclear issue. Nevertheless the Canadians

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thought that something should be done to help with Pakistan's sense of isolation. Ought they to be re-invited to join the Commonwealth?

Non Aligned Movement

52. Mr Christopher asked how best to approach the Non Aligned Movement. If the Movement stood by their principles they should be concerned at the overthrow of a non-aligned government.

53. Mr Gotlieb said that he was pessimistic about the NAM taking any firm action.

54. Mr Christopher thought that Yugoslavia and possibly India could be approached.

55. Mr Hurd thought that some members of the Movement might be prepared to raise the case for the Movement considering the suspension of Afghanistan.

56. Mr Christopher commented that there was already an Executive Committee set up after the Havana meeting which might cut back on the power of Cuba as the Chairman.

57. Mr Gotlieb suggested that it might be useful to contact countries supporting Cuba in the current stalemate with Colombia. If some of these, eg Islamic countries, changed sides, this would be a useful signal to the Soviet Union of the damage done by their Afghan venture.

China

58. Mr Christopher reported that Harold Brown, the US Secretary for Defence, would be visiting China in the next few days. The trip now had a new importance.

59. Mr Hurd thought that the Chinese might now see advantage in offering material support to Afghan rebels as an attractive option.

60. Mr Gotlieb said that the Canadians had heard from their mission in Peking that the Chinese were asking about action in the UN and about the present meeting. He proposed that the Chinese should be informed of the substance of the day's discussions. Mr Christopher agreed.

East/West Relations

61. Mr Gotlieb thought that it was important to consider the cost
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to the West of any action. The West had an interest in arms control, détente and the CSCE. Policies should not be abandoned where Western interests would suffer, but there might be areas where we could without damage adjust our approach to issues. The style, timing and substance of our approach to such issues should be carefully examined.

62. M. de Leusse thought that the West must be careful not to over react so as to damage their own interests. They thought that the West should abide by the principles that had guided them for the last 15 years or so.

63. Mr Hurd agreed that the framework of détente should be maintained. Countries should, however, look at their bilateral dealings with the Soviet Union. British and other credit agreements with the Soviet Union were expiring about now. The Russians would interpret the conclusion of the next few months as a signal of business as usual and none of the Western countries concerned should conclude an agreement without consulting the others. He suggested that two groups of officials might be set up in which other NATO countries could participate if they wished: one would study the implications of the Afghan crisis for our contacts with the Soviet Union, and the other the measures we should take to support regional countries like Pakistan. He also pointed to the need to consider means, including leverage, in which the West could try to reduce the likelihood of Soviet interference in yet more countries.

64. Mr Gotlieb said that no one was advocating not pursuing détente but the credibility of détente would be in question with the public.

Summing up

65. Mr Christopher, in summing up what had been agreed, made the following points:

- (a) Our reaction should be sustained. It should be pursued by demarches, public statements, etc.
- (b) All countries were considering what action they should take in their bilateral relations with the Soviet Union. Our displeasure should be shown in some way. We would keep in touch.

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- (c) Countries might decide to change the nature of their diplomatic relationship with Afghanistan. Not recognising, drawing down our Missions and recall of Ambassadors were among the possibilities discussed. The United States would be guided by what the rest would do.
- (d) We should take the opportunity to point out the lessons of the Soviet action to the Iranians.
- (e) Help should be given to Pakistan. This could be done through aid, possibly an early debt rescheduling meeting. Additional ways of easing the burden of the refugees should be considered.
- (f) There was a need to bring to Indian attention the real significance of the Soviet move, and to point out that what we did to help the Pakistanis was not a threat to India.
- (g) China could be expected roundly to condemn the Soviet Union and to support Pakistan and anti-Soviet groups in Afghanistan.
- (h) The Soviet aggression should be taken to the United Nations without delay.
- (i) We should point out the anti-Islamic nature of Soviet policy, the disregard of non-alignment and the increasing threat to regional countries.

He concluded that it had been agreed that continuing action was necessary. Possibilities included an early meeting of Ministers or the establishment of a working group, or groups, but no agreement had been reached on how to proceed.

66. Mr Hurd noted that there was also general agreement with Mr Christopher's view that it was not in the Western interest to make threats about ending general arms control measures which were to the benefit of the West, and that the SALT process should be pursued.

South Asian Department
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

1 January 1980

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Distribution:

PS/Prime Minister (Mr Alexander)

PS

PS/LPS

PS/Mr Hurd

PS/Mr Blaker

PS/Mr Ridley

PS/Mr Luce

PS/PUS

Sir D Maitland

Mr Cortazzi

Mr Murray

Mr Bullard

Mr Fergusson

Mr Moberly

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Muscat

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Jedda

Kuwait

Tehran

Tel Aviv

Sana'a

Damascus

Kuala Lumpur

Singapore

Manila

Jakarta

Bangkok

Lagos

LIST OF DELEGATIONS AT MEETING IN INDIA OFFICE COUNCIL CHAMBER
31 JANUARY 1979

US

Mr Warren Christopher, Deputy Secretary of State
Ambassador Brewster, US Embassy
Mr George Vest, Assistant Secretary European Affairs
Mr Peter Constable, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Middle East & South Asian Affairs
Mr John Trattner, Executive Assistant to Mr Christopher
Mr Marshall Bremont, White House
Mr James Siena, Department of Defence
Miss Glaspie, US Embassy

CANADIANS

Mr Alan Gottlieb, Under-Secretary
Mr Klaus Goldschlag, DUS
Mr Tom Delworth, Director General Asia Pacific
Mr Christien Hardy, Acting Canadian High Commissioner
+ notetaker

FRENCH

M. de Leusse, PUS Quai d'Orsay
HE M Sauvagnarges, French Ambassador
Another from the Quai d'Orsay
M. Vilmorin, French Embassy

GERMANS

Dr Van Well, State Secretary
Dr Steger, Head of South and South East Asia Department
Dr Von Studintz, PS/Dr Van Well
Dr Burger, Deputy to Dr Steger

ITALIANS

Sr Francesco Malfatti, PUS MFA
HE Sr Roberto Ducci, Italian Ambassador
Sr Ludovico Incisa, Minister/Counsellor Italian Embassy
Sr Luigi Amaduzzi, Counsellor, PUS's Office

UK

Mr Douglas Hurd, MP Minister of State
Mr J Bullard, Deputy Under Secretary of State
Mr H Cortazzi, Deputy Under Secretary of State
Mr K White, Head of South Asia Department
Mr C Mallaby, Head of Eastern European and Soviet Department
Mr G Archer, South Asia Department
Mr R Lavers, South Asia Department

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FM KABUL 301139Z

TO IMMEDIATE DESKBY FCO

TELEGRAM NO 292 OF 30 DECEMBER 1979.

INFO ROUTINE WASHINGTON, PARIS, BONN, ROME, OTTAWA, UKMIS
NEW YORK, UKDEL NATO AND MOSCOW.

YOUR TELEGRAM 215 (NOT RPTD) : ALLIED MEETING ON AFGHANISTAN
31 DECEMBER.

MY COMMENTS ON PARA 2 OF DRAFT AGENDA IN WASHINGTON TELEGRAM
4403 ARE AS FOLLOWS:

2. (A) SOVIET TROOPS, DISPOSITION, LIKELY USAGE. THE AMERICANS HAVE THE BEST SOURCES OF INTELLIGENCE REGARDING GENERAL DISPOSITION OF SOVIET TROOPS. IN THE KABUL AREA THE DISPOSITIONS SEEM DESIGNED TO MEET ANY THREAT FROM OUTSIDE KABUL. SOVIET TROOPS ARE GUARDING KEY POINTS SUCH AS AIRPORT AND RADIO STATION BUT OTHERWISE ARE NOT MUCH IN EVIDENCE. IT IS NOTEWORTHY THAT THERE ARE VERY FEW AFGHAN TROOPS ON GUARD CARRYING WEAPONS. THE IMPRESSION IS THAT THE AFGHAN MILITARY, AT LEAST IN KABUL, HAS BEEN NEUTRALISED. I AM NOT (NOT) ABLE TO CONFIRM REPORTS OF SOVIET TROOPS IN OTHER PARTS OF AFGHANISTAN BUT CONTINUING REINFORCEMENT IN KABUL SUGGEST THAT ELEMENTS MAY BE BEING MOVED INTO LIKELY REBEL COMBAT AREAS.
3. (B) DURABILITY OF PRESENT REGIME. BABRAK KARMAL HAS GOT OFF TO A BAD START BY BEING INSTALLED BY RUSSIAN BAYONETS. PRESENCE OF SOVIET TROOPS IS CLEARLY RESENTED BY AFGHANS GENERALLY AND IF THEY REMAIN THEIR PRESENCE WILL DRASTICALLY REFUCE KARMAL'S CHANCES OF GAINING POPULAR SUPPORT. HE COULD ADVANCE HIS CAUSE BY SLOWING DOWN THE SOCIAL REFORMS IN THE COUNTRYSIDE (ALTHOUGH LAND REFORM IS BY NOW IRREVERSIBLE) BUT HIS REPUTATION AS A HARD-LINE COMMUNIST DOES NOT AUGUR WELL. HIS PROMISED RELEASE OF POLITICAL PRISONERS AND CESSATION OF ARBITRARY ARREST SHOULD WIN HIM SUPPORT, AT LEAST IN THE SHORT TERM, BUT THE BIG QUESTION IS WHETHER HE WILL IN THE LONG TERM ALLOW THE /PROMISED

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PROMISED HUMAN RIGHTS TO BRING REAL FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION AND CONSEQUENT OPPOSITION. AN INITIAL AFGHAN REACTION, PROBABLY SYMPTOMATIC OF MOST, IS THAT THE NEW TEAM ARE COMMUNISTS LIKE THE LAST LOT ONLY MORE LIKELY TO BE UNDER MOSCOW'S DIRECTION - THE ONLY IMPROVEMENT MAY BE THAT POLITICAL OPPONENTS WILL NO LONGER BE ARRESTED AND KILLED.

4 (C) FUTURE PROSPECTS FOR CONTINUED CIVIL WAR.

IT SEEMS UNLIKELY THAT THE AFGHAN ARMY, AFTER ITS SHAMEFUL ECLIPSE BY THE SOVIET FORCES, WILL HAVE ANY GREAT STOMACH FOR FIGHTING THE REBELS. THERE IS THEREFORE A DANGER FOR THE RUSSIANS OF FINDING THEMSELVES OBLIGED TO USE THEIR OWN FORCES TO STEM A REBEL ADVANCE. THE CHARACTER OF THE GREATER PART OF THE COUNTRY AS WELL AS OF THE REBELS THEMSELVES MEANS THAT THE RUSSIANS COULD NOT OBTAIN A MILITARY SOLUTION WITHOUT A MASSIVE INTERVENTION OVER SEVERAL MONTHS AT LEAST. IN OTHER WORDS, THEY WOULD FIND THEMSELVES IN THE SAME SORT OF STALEMATE AS THE AMIN GOVERNMENT.

HILLIER-FRY.

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TELEGRAM NO 291 OF 30 DECEMBER 79.

IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK.

INFO ROUTINE WASHINGTON, MOSCOW, ISLAMABAD, NEW DELHI, UKDEL
NATO. **SAVING TO TEHRAN**

GENERAL SITUATION.

AIRPORT WAS RE-OPENED YESTERDAY AFTERNOON FOR CIVIL FLIGHTS.
I WAS AT AIRPORT THIS MORNING FOR (DELAYED) DEPARTURE OF
ARIANA FLIGHT TO LONDON AND SAW ONE CONVOY OF OVER THIRTY
SOVIET BMD TANKS AND SUPPORTING VEHICLES LEAVING THE
AIRPORT. I WAS TOLD THESE HAD JUST ARRIVED BY AIR. SHORTLY
AFTERWARDS ANOTHER CONVOY OF THIRTY-SIX BMD TANKS, SIX
TRACKED VEHICLES TOWING FIELD GUNS AND SUPPORTING VEHICLES,
APPARENTLY ALSO JUST LANDED, FORMED UP AND DROVE AWAY,
ALONG THE TAXI-ING RUNWAY.

2. AN AIRPORT OFFICIAL TOLD ME THAT FORTY-FIVE THOUSAND
TROOPS HAD LANDED ALTHOGETHER. HE ALSO SPOKE OF SOVIET
LANDINGS IN HERAT, SHINDAN (MILITARY AIR-BASE SOUTH OF
HERAT) AND JALALABAD BUT WE HAVE NO (NO) CONFIRMATION OF THESE.

3. I ASSUME THAT TEXT OF BABRAK KARMAL'S SPEECH OF 28
DECEMBER IS AVAILABLE TO YOU. THERE ARE NO NEWSPAPERS
HERE AND WE HAVE NOT SEEN AN OFFICIAL TEXT BUT WE
CAN TELEGRAPH SUMMARY IF DESIRED.

FCO PASS SAVING TEHRAN.

HILLIER-FRY.

(REPEATED AS REQUESTED)

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CABINET OFFICE

Private Secretary

copy to: PS/Prime Minister (Mr Alexander)
 PS/Lord Privy Seal
 PS/Mr Hurd
 PS/Mr Blaker
 PS/PUS
 PS/Sir D Maitland
 Mr Cortazzi
 Mr Bullard
 Mr Fergusson
 SAD
 EESD
 UND
 Defence Dept
 News Dept
 MED
 Legal Adviser
 FED

AFGHANISTAN: MEETING ON 31 DECEMBER

1. At the American request (Washington telegram No. 4394 of 28 December, copy attached), we have arranged for a meeting to be held in London to discuss Afghanistan. The Americans have invited to this meeting, in addition to ourselves, German, French, Italian and Canadian representatives and they wish it to be held at "Deputy Foreign Minister level". We have not yet had details of all the delegations but the American delegation will be led by Mr Warren Christopher, the Deputy Secretary of State, the French by M. Leusse, who is PUS equivalent in the Quai d'Orsay, and the German by Mr van Well (also PUS equivalent). The Secretary of State has decided that Mr Hurd should lead the UK side.

2. The following arrangements have been made:-

(a) The meeting will be held in the India Office Council Chamber beginning at 10.00 a.m. The general expectation is that it will finish in one day.

(b) Chairmanship: since this is an American initiative it will be logical for Mr Christopher to take the Chair. The Americans are likely to agree.

(c) Lunch has been arranged at Carlton Gardens at 1 o'clock, with the Secretary of State as host. There will be two tables, one of twelve for the leaders of delegations plus one, with the remainder at another table.

/(d)

(d) Publicity: on the Secretary of State's instructions, News Department have confined themselves to answering questions and unattributably have tried to avoid building up expectations in advance about the outcome of the meeting.

- // 3. The agenda is set out in paragraph 2 of Washington telegram No 4394. Briefs are attached on each item. Since the agenda was drawn up the Americans added two new points. ^{The first is about the UN aspect.} _{(Section D3).} This is covered in the brief/ ^{The second is about the wider impact of the Afghan crisis on détente, China disarmament and arms control.} A separate note is attached on this.
- / 4. The Prime Minister has expressed particular interest in using the crisis to get the Ayatollah to come closer to the Western point of view. This presents difficulties at this stage of UN discussions on Iran, but we might be able to develop the channel to the Ayatollah which has been established by Agha Shahi, the adviser on foreign affairs to President Zia of Pakistan.
5. Mr Blaker has asked that the question of leverage against the Soviet Union should be considered. This is covered in the brief about relations with the Soviet Union under Item D1. The meeting would provide an opportunity for us to ask the Americans if they see grain supplies as a possible lever with the Soviet Union.
6. We suggest that if possible the focus of the discussion should be on the practical steps under Item D (In what way might the Allies best respond?). There is not much that we can do directly against the current regime in Afghanistan. We should therefore best concentrate on supporting Pakistan. As to the Soviet Union, the brief offers a wide range of options from public statements to global moves to counter the spread of Soviet power.
7. Mr Bullard has seen and agreed this material.

H A H Cortazzi
H A H Cortazzi

29 December 1979

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TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 4394 OF 28 DECEMBER, 1979,
AND TO IMMEDIATE PARIS, BONN, ROME AND OTTAWA.

Mr. Cortright
HD/SAD
RC

AFGHANISTAN: PROPOSAL FOR ALLIED MEETING.

1. THIS IS TO CONFIRM THE ARRANGEMENTS MADE THAT AROSE OUT OF AN APPROACH THAT VANCE MADE TO ME TODAY FOR TRANSMISSION TO YOU.
2. THE PRESIDENT HAS ANNOUNCED THAT HE IS SENDING THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF STATE, WARREN CHRISTOPHER, TO EUROPE IN THE NEXT DAY OR TWO TO CONSULT WITH SEVERAL OTHER COUNTRIES ON HOW THE WORLD COMMUNITY MIGHT RESPOND TO THE UNWARRANTED SOVIET BEHAVIOUR IN AFGHANISTAN. THE U S THEREFORE PROPOSE A MEETING OF THE LEADING MEMBERS OF NATO, BUT NOT UNDER NATO, I.E. THE USA, UK, FRG, FRANCE, ITALY AND CANADA, AT DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER LEVEL TO CONSIDER THE FOLLOWING SUBJECTS, (THOUGH A MORE SPECIFIC AGENDA COULD BE WORKED OUT LATER):
 - A. WHAT ARE THE CURRENT FOREIGN POLICY OBJECTIVES OF THE SOVIET UNION ?
 - B. WHAT ARE THEY UP TO IN AFGHANISTAN ?
 - C. WHAT IS THE EFFECT OF THEIR INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN LIKELY TO BE UPON THE REST OF THE REGION ? AND
 - D. IN WHAT WAY MIGHT THE ALLIES BEST RESPOND ?
3. THE MEETING WOULD BE ANNOUNCED. INDEED ONE OF THE PURPOSES WOULD BE TO SHOW THAT THE WEST WAS NOT INDIFFERENT TO THE SOVIET MOVE. BUT THE AMERICANS ARE THINKING IN TERMS OF A VERY BLAND COMMUNIQUE AT THE END AND THEY CERTAINLY DO NOT WANT TO BUILD UP EXPECTATIONS IN ADVANCE ABOUT THE OUTCOME.
4. VANCE HAS REQUESTED THAT THE MEETING WILL TAKE PLACE IN LONDON AND YOU HAVE AGREED TO THIS. IT WILL THEREFORE START AT 10 A.M. ON MONDAY 31 DECEMBER IN CARLTON GARDENS. I HAVE TOLD CHRISTOPHER THAT WE WILL PROVIDE LUNCH.
5. THE STATE DEPARTMENT WILL DO ALL THE INVITING. APART FROM CHRISTOPHER, THEY THINK THAT VAN WELT WILL ATTEND FROM THE FRG, AND MINISTER STIRN FROM FRANCE. THE AMERICANS OBVIOUSLY WANT THE LEVEL TO BE HIGH.
6. AS REGARDS THE TAKING OF THE CHAIR, THIS WILL BE DECIDED WHEN THE MEETING OPENS. I HAVE TOLD CHRISTOPHER THAT WE ARE NOT PARTICULARLY ANXIOUS TO BE IN THE CHAIR. HE DOES NOT THINK THERE SHOULD BE ANY DIFFICULTY ABOUT REACHING A DECISION ON THIS IN SUCH A SMALL GATHERING.
7. RESIDENT CLERK PLEASE PASS ADVANCE TO BULLARD.

CONFIDENTIAL

Private Secretary

AFGHANISTAN: MEETING ON 31 DECEMBER

1. Shortly before midnight, as I was putting together the attached material (most of it prepared under Mr Cortazzi's direction, but with some input from me on the Soviet aspects), a messenger from the American Embassy arrived with the attached telegram containing a proposed agenda for the meeting on 31 December.
2. The new agenda seems to be a 'stretched' version of the points already communicated to us. I told the American Embassy representative that the briefing already prepared for the meeting covered most points listed, but not in quite so much detail; for example, we had not specifically considered the impact of the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan on Berlin or on the MBFR talks in Vienna. Nor had we ranged quite so far afield as the Horn of Africa. I hoped that those who had done work on these subjects ~~would be~~ ready on Monday to communicate their conclusions to the rest of us.
3. In other words I have not thought it necessary to add yet more pages to the briefing to take account of the super-detailed agenda now provided by the Americans.

J L Bullard

J L Bullard

29 December 1979

cc:

PS/Prime Minister (Mr Alexander)
PS/Lord Privy Seal
PS/Mr Hurd
PS/Mr Blaker
PS/PUS
PS/Sir D Maitland
Mr Cortazzi
Mr Fergusson
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E.O. 12065: GDS 12/29/85 (DEAL, TIMOTHY)

TAGS: PEPR, AF

SUBJECT: CONSULTATIONS ON AFGHANISTAN

REF: STATE 333612

1. (S - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. BELOW IS PROPOSED AGENDA FOR LONDON MEETING ON AFGHANISTAN. PLEASE BRING TO ATTENTION OF GOVERNMENTS CONCERNED. WE REALIZE HOUR IS LATE, BUT WOULD WELCOME GOVERNMENT'S REACTION, IF ANY, TO THE PROPOSED AGENDA.

3. BEGIN TEXT

A. ANALYSIS OF SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY INTENTIONS

- EXTRAORDINARY CHARACTER OF MOVE INTO AFGHANISTAN
- DOES THE ACTION REFLECT A FUNDAMENTAL SOVIET REASSESSMENT OF ITS GLOBAL STRATEGY AND RELATIONS WITH THE REST OF THE WORLD.

B. SITUATION IN AFGHANISTAN

- SOVIET TROOPS, DISPOSITION, LIKELY USAGE
- DURABILITY OR PRESENT REGIME
- FUTURE PROSPECTS FOR CONTINUED CIVIL WAR

C. IMPACT ON REGION

- IMMEDIATE NEIGHBORS (E.G., IRAN, PAKISTAN, INDIA)
- LARGER REGION (E.G. SAUDI ARABIA, THE HORN, CHINA)

D. IMPACT ON EAST-WEST RELATIONS

- SALT, MBFR
- TNF AND ALLIED DEFENSE PLANS

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SECRET/EXDIS

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- DOMESTIC POLITICAL EFFECT IN WEST

- YUGOSLAVIA AND ROMANIA

- BERLIN

E. WESTERN RESPONSES TO IMMEDIATE SITUATION:

- PUBLIC CONDEMNATION

- BILATERAL ACTIONS VIS A VIS SOVIETS

- AFGHANISTAN: E.G. BREAKING RELATIONS/DRAWING DOWN
IN KABUL/AID PROGRAM

- IRAN

- PAKISTAN

- INDIA

- PERSIAN GULF/INDIAN OCEAN

- AFGHAN REFUGEES

- CHINA

- UNITED NATIONS

- APPROACH TO NAM

- APPROACHES TO MUSLIM NATIONS

F. LONGER TERM WESTERN RESPONSE

G. DRAFT PUBLIC STATEMENT ON CONCLUSION OF MEETING
END TEXT. CHRISTOPHER

SECRET/EXDIS

STATE 333864

IMPACT OF THE SOVIET INTERVENTION IN AFGHANISTAN ON DÉTENTE, CHINA, DISARMAMENT AND ARMS CONTROL

1. There are perhaps two questions here: the first is whether the Soviet intervention in Kabul marks a deliberate deviation by the Russians from the policy of détente as hitherto practised by Brezhnev; the second is whether détente may, or should, come to an end as a result of reactions from the Western side.

2. The general belief hitherto has been that the Soviet interest in détente, defined in their own terms, remains very strong, and that they would wish to preserve it in almost any circumstances. Does the Christmas coup in Kabul alter this analysis?

3. There are at least three possible explanations for what the Russians did:-

(a) They may regard the whole episode as unfortunate but unavoidable, limited in time and space and intended to secure a local Soviet objective in a particular area without upsetting, or at least not for long, the fundamental nature of their relations with the West and especially the United States: in other words, they may see this as an Asian Czechoslovakia, but less serious.

(b) Brezhnev's grip is visibly failing. The Afghan adventure could be a sign that the military men in Moscow are in a position to impose their will. The normal pattern of civilian control could reassert itself when the leadership is changed, but meanwhile we could be in for a dangerous period.

(c) The Russians may have decided that détente is already ailing as a result of the delay in American ratification of SALT II, the fuss over the Soviet combat brigade in Cuba, NATO's decision to modernise TNF, etc. They could have drawn the conclusion that there is nothing much to be got out of détente in an American election year. They may see 1980 as a period during which they should concentrate on securing their own objectives, but with the option of reverting to Brezhnev-type détente later.

/4.

4. The Americans are best placed to say whether one of these explanations, or some other, is the right one: they may already have received signals of some sort from Moscow.

5. Mr Hurd could perhaps take the line that the events in Afghanistan reinforce the message of the Prime Minister's recent speeches in Luxembourg, at the Guildhall and to the Foreign Policy Association in New York. The Afghan episode bears out her warning about the need for Western strength and vigilance, without in any way damaging her advocacy of East/West agreements where these can be achieved on a basis of strict mutual advantage. SALT II was an negotiated agreement with great labour over many years and HMG have expressed themselves repeatedly in favour of its ratification. We should continue to negotiate patiently for a satisfactory agreement on MBFR, and we should stand by our offer of talks on TNF as a complement to the NATO decision on modernisation.

/ 6. Washington telegram No 4401 (attached) suggests that the Americans may be prepared to make Soviet intervention in Afghanistan a test case for the US-Soviet relationship as a whole. It seems out of the question for the Russians to withdraw from the country entirely, but if American pressure is strong enough they might reduce their presence to the level it stood at in November. The Americans could be asked how they intend to play matters bilaterally with Moscow. We had understood earlier that they saw Afghanistan as a bog into which the Soviet Union was likely to be sucked ever deeper, not necessarily to their ultimate advantage, and that they were concerned to avoid over-reaction. Is this still the American view? If so, they will presumably not burn any of their boats, e.g. by denouncing the 1972 Declaration of Principles; nor will they allow too great expectations to build up as to the outcome of the present meeting.

7. As to China, it is right to look carefully at the possibilities. China has contested the extension of Soviet/Vietnamese power in South-East Asia and have shown themselves willing to play this role on a wider stage. We should certainly compare notes with the Chinese as to the lessons to be drawn from the Afghan episode, and we can benefit from China's support when the matter comes up in the

/UN

UN. But we need to handle the Chinese aspect with prudence, and not to oversimplify matters as Peking itself is prone to do: it would not be practical to think of China as the cornerstone of a new Asian alliance to resist Soviet encroachment.

Private Secretary

copy to: PS/Prime Minister (Mr Alexander)
PS/Lord Privy Seal
PS/Mr Hurd
PS/Mr Blaker
PS/PUS
PS/Sir D Maitland
Mr Cortazzi
Mr Bullard
Mr Fergusson
SAD
EESD
UND
Defence Dept
News Dept
MED
Legal Adviser
FED

AFGHANISTAN: MEETING ON 31 DECEMBER

As a supplement to the main brief the attached background note gives a short summary of developments in Afghanistan since April 1978.

R. D. Lavers.

R D Lavers
South Asian Department
FCO

29 December 1979

AFGHANISTAN: BACKGROUND

In April 1978, President Daoud was overthrown in a coup in which he and many members of his family and advisers were killed. A Marxist, pro-Soviet, regime took power, led by Nur Mahommed Taraki, a veteran communist and leader of the "Khalq" faction. His Government included members of the rival "Parchamite" group, led by Babrak Karmal, who became Prime Minister. They had buried their differences two years before to form a united Communist party. In August, however, Taraki got rid of the Parchamites and they were sent into exile as Ambassadors - posts which they rapidly lost.

2. The Russians immediately took advantage of the new government to develop much closer relations with the Afghans. In December 1978 they signed a Treaty of Friendship to set a seal on this new relationship, which was described by Mr Brezhnev as being "qualitatively different". Nonetheless within Afghanistan the regime failed to acquire widespread support. Afghan society is fiercely conservative and based on tribal and religious loyalties. The communism and secularism of the government aroused intense distrust, and their rapid pace of reform provoked fierce opposition. This soon developed into insurgency, beginning in the provinces adjoining the Pakistan border but spreading throughout the country. In March 1979 there was a major uprising in Herat, a major garrison town in the West, and by the middle of this year the Government had lost control of much of the country. Although the disunity of the tribal rebels meant that they were unlikely ever to overthrow the régime the Russians were seriously worried by its lack of a power base. Although they backed Taraki with extensive supplies of military equipment, and advisers who numbered 4,000 around May 1979, this was not enough. It began to look as if they would prefer a Government more sensitive to the susceptibilities of the Afghan people which would nonetheless preserve Russian gains since the coup.

3. On 14 September President Taraki was ousted by his right-hand man and Prime Minister, Hafizullah Amin, in a Chicago-style shoot-out in which he lost his life. This outcome almost certainly represented an unsuccessful attempt by Taraki, with Russian connivance, to eliminate the hard-line Amin whose ruthlessness was largely responsible for the Khalqs' unpopularity. For some months it looked as if the Russians were prepared to work with Amin. But recently there had been signs that his position was insecure. This may have prompted them to take the decisive steps of 27 December.

- A. WHAT ARE THE CURRENT FOREIGN POLICY OBJECTIVES OF THE SOVIET UNION?

- B. WHAT IS THE SOVIET UNION UP TO IN AFGHANISTAN?

- C. EFFECTS OF THE SOVIET INVASION IN THE REST OF THE REGION
 - 1. Iran;
 - 2. Pakistan;
 - 3. India.

- D. IN WHAT WAY MIGHT THE ALLIES BEST RESPOND?
 - 1. Relations with the Soviet Union.
 - 2. Relations with Afghanistan.
 - 3. United Nations Aspects.
 - 4. Action by Iran
 - 5. Pakistan.
 - 6. Action with the Non-Aligned.
 - 7. Action with NATO,
 - 8. Action with the Nine.

A. WHAT ARE THE CURRENT FOREIGN POLICY OBJECTIVES OF THE SOVIET UNION?

1. There is no reason to revise fundamentally the analysis of Soviet foreign policy contained in the 'Alliance Study of East-West Relations' approved by NATO Heads of Government in Washington on 30-31 May 1978, CM(78)35 (Revised). (Copy attached for Secretary of State only.)

2. Recent events in Afghanistan do however illustrate three characteristics of Soviet policy which Governments and public opinion in the West may tend to underrate: -

a. opportunism: the Soviet Christmas coup in Kabul was deliberately carried out at a moment when vigilance and the capacity to respond would be at their lowest in the West and in the world at large;

b. ruthlessness: having decided, evidently after some hesitation, that the Soviet interest required the removal of Amin, the Russians deployed and used the substantial forces necessary to secure this objective, with only a perfunctory attempt to claim legal or moral justification for their action. (The pattern of prolonged hesitation followed by intervention in decisive strength is exactly that shown in the cases of Hungary and Czechoslovakia in 1956 and 1968.) The Russians were no doubt aware of the risks (e.g. to the standing of the Soviet Union in the Third World, to U.S.-Soviet relations and to détente as a whole), but judged these

.2.

to be acceptable in the interests of securing their aims in Afghanistan;

c. secrecy: the Soviet preparatory moves were on such a scale that they were bound to be (and were) detected by the West, but the true purpose of the intervention was effectively concealed until it had been successfully completed.

3. It should be assumed that these features would also be present in any future Soviet intervention in similar circumstances.

B. WHAT ARE SOVIET OBJECTIVES IN AFGHANISTAN?

1. Soviet objectives in Afghanistan are likely to be:-
 - (a) to ensure that there is no reversal of the policies of closer alignment with the Soviet Union followed by Afghan Governments since the toppling of Daoud in 1978;
 - (b) conversely, to deny any opportunity for the establishment in Afghanistan of a regime hostile to the Soviet Union - in particular a Nationalist Islamic Government that might pursue xenophobic and reactionary policies and might infect Muslims within the Soviet Union.
 - (c) in the longer term, to build up a position of strength in Afghanistan from which to influence events in central and South Asia, especially in Iran and the Indian Sub-Continent, to Soviet advantage.
2. The December coup seems to have resulted from a Soviet realisation that, with Amin at the head of the Government in Afghanistan, the situation was not developing in accordance with Soviet wishes. He was both unpopular and unsuccessful. Further unexplained killings on 16/17 December may have finally convinced the Russians that a change was essential.
3. In the immediate future the Russians are likely to concentrate on stabilising and consolidating the new regime, hoping that the fait accompli will be accepted. They will want to keep Kabul quiet, to establish as much normality as possible throughout the country and to secure maximum international recognition of the new Government. For the moment they are likely to be cautious about any further commitment to military operations against the opponents of the regime in the field.

4. We nevertheless expect that the trend towards progressive Soviet military involvement will continue. The Parchan party is no more popular than the Khalq party and the new Government will remain totally reliant on Soviet support. There will be strong pressure to build up still further the scale of Soviet military intervention with the aim of the complete suppression of opposition. It is doubtful whether this aim can ever in fact be achieved, given Afghan history, terrain and social characteristics.

5. If and when relative stability has been restored, the Russians may seek to tie Afghanistan more closely into the Soviet system. At that stage we could expect to see a series of steps up to and including the formal entry of Afghanistan into COMECON (the communist economic grouping, together with even tighter bilateral agreements than those existing already. On this scenario the ultimate destiny of Afghanistan could be that of a de facto Asian colony on the model of Mongolia. (The East European members might oppose formal membership of the Warsaw Pact if the Soviet Union were to propose it.)

6. A legal critique of the Soviet pretext for intervention is attached.

THE SOVIET PRETEXT: LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS

1. The Soviet Union has sought to justify its intervention in Afghanistan under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter.


Article 51 provides:

'Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defence shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it seems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security.'

We have no evidence that there was outside interference in the affairs of Afghanistan, and the Russians have refused to answer the question where this interference is supposed to have come from. The fact is that the only country to have interfered in recent years is the Soviet Union, and the only armed 'attack' occurring against Afghanistan by another country was that of the Soviet Union on 27 December.

2. In their communication to the FCO on 27 December the Soviet Union claimed that 'the leadership of the state of Afghanistan approached the Soviet Union for help and assistance in the struggle against the outside aggression.' It is hard to see what leadership is referred to. Hafizullah Amin was overthrown on the night of

/27 December



27 December, when the new government took over. The new government was announced only on 28 December.

3. In the same communication the Russians referred to their Treaty of Friendship of December 1978. The same objection applies here. The Soviet action cannot properly be justified on the basis of this Treaty. Article 4 presupposes that the parties agree on appropriate measures to ensure the security, independence and territorial integrity of the two countries. It is hard to see how the agreement of the Afghanistan Government in office at the moment of Soviet intervention could have been given.

C. EFFECTS OF THE SOVIET INVASION IN THE REST OF THE REGION

1. Iran

1. The Iranians have always been wary of the USSR, a distrust much increased by the professed dislike of the clergy for communism. They will be very concerned by the invasion: it will demonstrate their vulnerability to the super-powers. They will also see it as super-power suppression of a Moslem people struggling for its freedom. Khomeini's own reaction (extract from AFP attached) has been to condemn the invasion as an unfriendly gesture to all Moslems as well as an excuse to use the crisis between Iran and the U.S. to intervene in the affairs of weak nations. Iranian support for the Moslem opponents of the Kabul régime is likely to intensify, though such support is likely to be more in the nature of propaganda and encouragement than in any significant material form so long as the Iranians remain distracted by their own domestic divisions and problems.

2. However, in the short term the Iranians are likely to equate the Russian action with what they see as the U.S. position in Iran, and may resist any suggestion that the USSR poses a more serious menace than the U.S. (The Foreign Minister, Qotbzadeh, has already said, at a meeting with EEC Ambassadors on 28 December which closed with him losing his temper, that he sees no distinction between the USSR and the U.S.) But in the long term Iran may realise the need to think more seriously about the real threat which Soviet military action poses.

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RUQMIF/FBIS AMMAN JO

RUQMZN/SINAI SUPPORT MISSION

RUSNAAA/USCINCEUR VAHINGEN GE

RUDONBA/CINCUSNAVEUR LONDON UK/N2

RUFRBAA/COMIDEASTFOR

RULYQJQ/COMSIXTHFLT

RHFRAAB/HQUSAFE IN RAMSTEIN AB GE

RUFDAAA/USAREUR DEP COFS INT HEIDELBERG GE

RUDORRA/USNMR SHAPE BE

RUHHFAA//376TH STRAT WG DCI KADENA AB JA

RUHQHQA/CINCPAC HONOLULU HI

RUQMRA/AMEMBASSY JIDDA SA

RUQYSDG/FOSIF ROTA SP

RUQMFV/FBIS TEL AVIV IS

RUCLAKA/CDR 4TH PSYOP GP FT BRAGG NC

RUEAIJU/NPIC WASH DC

RUFHUKI/AMEMBASSY LONDON UK

RUAJMAB/FOSIF WESTPAC KAMI SEYA JA

RUMTFI/FBIS BANGKOK TH

RUHHFBA/FBIS OKINAWA JA

RULPSEL/FBIS CHIVA CHIVA PN

RUMTFI/FBIS BANGKOK TH

RUHQHQA/COMIPAC HONOLULU HI

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IRANIAN STATEMENT URGES USSR TO WITHDRAW FORCES FROM AFGHANISTAN

NC282255 REF NC282234 (REOPENING PARIS AFP ENGLISH 282227--IRAN

PROTESTS USSR'S MILITARY INTERVENTION IN AFGHANISTAN)

PARIS AFP IN ENGLISH 2252 GMT 28 DEC 79 NC

((TEXT)) TEHRAN, 28 DEC (AFP)--((///UP THE WORLD.)) AFTER NOTING THAT THE SOVIET ACTION WAS "AN UNFRIENDLY GESTURE TOWARDS NOT ONLY THE AFGHAN PEOPLE BUT ALL MOSLEMS," THE STATEMENT ACCUSED THE KREMLIN OF "USING THE CRISIS BETWEEN IRAN AND THE UNITED STATES TO INTERVENE IN THE AFFAIRS OF WEAK NATIONS."

THE SOVIET ACTION "HAS CAUSED GREAT CONCERN IN THE WORLD AND AFFORDS IMPERIALISTS AND ZIONISTS AN EXCUSE AND OPPORTUNITY FOR CONTINUING TO ATTACK EVEN HARDER THE OPPRESSED OF THE WORLD," THE IRANIAN STATEMENT SAID.

IRAN CALLED ON THE SOVIET UNION TO WITHDRAW ITS FORCES FROM AFGHANISTAN "IF ONLY TO PROVE ITS SUPPORT FOR IRANIAN ANTI-IMPERIALISM." 282252/CALDWELL/CM 28/2301Z DEC

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C. EFFECTS OF THE SOVIET INVASION IN THE REST OF THE REGION

2. Pakistan

1. The Pakistanis have not yet commented on the Russian action. Their reactions may well be ambivalent.

2. Traditionally they perceive the Soviet Union as a threat. They are deeply concerned lest a pro-Soviet regime in Kabul becomes a source of Soviet inspired subversion in the sensitive province of Baluchistan.

3. The presence of over 300,000 Afghan refugees in Pakistan presents them with a major problem. At the worst there is now ^a prospect of a Russian attack on camps or villages within Pakistan, on the grounds that the refugees within Pakistan are supporting the rebellion in Afghanistan.

4. Conversely the Pakistanis would welcome a political settlement. They have cancelled a visit by the Pakistani Foreign Affairs Adviser to Kabul that was due to take place on 30/31 December. But their relations with Amin had been difficult. They may hope for improvement and they will be reluctant to start off their relations with a new Afghan Government on a bad footing. In particular they must be hoping that Karmal will achieve a political settlement which will enable Afghan refugees to leave Pakistan.

C. EFFECTS OF THE SOVIET INVASION IN THE REST OF THE REGION

3. India

1. The Indians have tried to put a good interpretation on what has happened. They enjoy good relations with the Soviet Union and with an election pending in early January are unwilling to stick their necks out. If Mrs Gandhi with her pro-Soviet views were returned to power the Indians would be even less likely to be openly critical of the Soviet rule.

2. The Acting Indian High Commissioner in London told us earlier this year that India would find it easier to deal with the Parchamites than the Khalq leadership. The Indians would view any more Islamic-orientated government with suspicion and fear that the alternative to a Soviet-supported government would not be a government better inclined towards India.

3. Privately however the Indians must be aware that the extension, in effect, of the Soviet Union's border with the Sub-Continent from the Oxus to the Khyber has important implications for them as well as the Pakistanis.

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(D) RESPONSE OF THE ALLIES: RELATIONS WITH THE USSR

Action by the UK

The UK has already done the following:-

- a) On 28 December the FCO issued a statement (attached) condemning the USSR's military intervention.
- b) Also on 28 December the Prime Minister sent a message to President Brezhnev expressing her profound concern (attached).
- c) A telegram has been sent to all our East European posts and Belgrade giving them the FCO statement and asking Bucharest and Belgrade to bring it to the attention of the Romanian and Yugoslav authorities and seek their views. A similar telegram has been sent to other posts, and to the Nine through the Political Cooperation (COREU) channel.

2. We are now considering what further bilateral action we might take. One possibility might be to curtail contacts with the USSR. In practice we have few high level contacts in prospect. Invitations to Brezhnev and Kosygin have been outstanding for a long time, but it is unlikely that they will take them up. Gromyko has been invited to visit the UK in February or March, but so far there has been no response: it now seems unlikely that he will come. We could consider formally/^{cancelling}these invitations if similar action were taken by others. We have no other high level contacts planned in the immediate future with the Russians. We could consider the possibility of freezing or diminishing exchanges with the Russians in other fields such as science and technology, atomic energy, medicine and cultural affairs. These are largely routine and low-level; the

/impact

impact on the Russians would be limited.

Action by the West

3. It is essential that the West should show that we are united in our response and that we should leave as little room as possible for Soviet miscalculation of the way in which we view their actions. This can be done by public statements (unilateral, by the 6 powers represented at the London meeting, by the Nine, by NATO) and by high-level messages to the Russians. The Americans have a particularly important role to play in this. We should also consider the other means available to us of demonstrating to the Russians the cost of their actions, e.g. by the cancellation by Western countries as a whole of planned high-level visits and other exchanges. The Russians may be particularly sensitive to such moves in the run-up to the Olympics and the CSCE conference in Madrid. The Russians will also be concerned about the possibly adverse impact on East/West relations generally and the growing Western relationship with China. The possibilities here should be looked at, although any deliberate attempt to exploit the Sino-Soviet dispute would be risky and its effects unpredictable. The West should in any case undertake an appropriate information effort directed towards selected other Governments (including those of Eastern Europe) as well as public opinion generally.

Leverage

4. The only country which can exercise very strong leverage on its own is the US. It would be helpful if the Americans could tell us how they see the scope for exercising leverage in this case and what their intentions are. We ourselves have recently prepared a

/preliminary

preliminary paper on the general question of the potential for using leverage. Further study on this needs to be carried out but some of the most promising areas appear to be:-

- (a) Credit: availability and terms.
- (b) Denial of advanced technology: investigation of specific fields where this would bite hardest.
- (c) Grain sales: the effect of restrictions on US supplies and of involving other actual or potential suppliers (e.g. Australia and Canada).

5. It might also be appropriate to consider action of a more far-reaching kind on a global basis, to counter the spread of Soviet power. This is a subject which would require careful study by all the countries concerned. Possibilities would however include:-

- increases in defence spending;
- development of improved global intervention capability, whether on a national or joint basis, including use of facilities in strategic areas;
- deliberate and coordinated intensification of relations with China;
- coordinated efforts to weaken the loyalty of regimes and peoples in Eastern Europe to Moscow;
- deliberate exploitation of political and social weaknesses in the USSR.

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DRAFT STATEMENT FOR NEWS DEPARTMENT (ON THE RECORD) 28 December.

The British Government condemns the Soviet Union's military intervention. We believe that the people of Afghanistan have a right to choose their own Government without outside interference.

Line for supplementaries

Much is still unclear about yesterday's events in Kabul, but nothing can disguise the fact that the Soviet Union have carried out an open military intervention in the affairs of another independent country without any mandate to do so from the Afghan people as a whole.

The Soviet Union have offered no convincing explanation for their action or for the fact that their military deployment has coincided with an apparent coup carried out by someone who has been absent from Afghanistan and appears to have returned from Eastern Europe at the same time as the arrival of the Soviet troops.

We are still piecing together the story. Reports from Kabul confirm that there has been fighting in the city and that the Soviet Union have carried out a major military deployment there.

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FROM F C O 290129Z DEC 79

TO IMMEDIATE MOSCOW

TELEGRAM NUMBER 800 OF 29 DECEMBER

INFO IMMEDIATE KABUL, WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK, ISLAMABAD,
BONN, PARIS, ROME, DUBLIN, UKDEL NATO.

M.I.P.T.

AFGHANISTAN: MESSAGE FROM PRIME MINISTER TO PRESIDENT BREZHNEV.

I HAVE BEEN PROFOUNDLY DISTURBED AT RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN
AFGHANISTAN. THE LARGE SCALE DEPLOYMENT OF SOVIET TROOPS HAS
COINCIDED WITH A COUP LED BY SOMEONE WHO HAD BEEN ABSENT FROM
AFGHANISTAN, LIVING IN EASTERN EUROPE FOR OVER A YEAR, AND WHO
RETURNED TO THE COUNTRY AT THE SAME TIME AS THE ARRIVAL OF THE
SOVIET TROOPS.

I HAVE SEEN THE STATEMENT BY THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT HANDED TO
THE FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE LATE ON 27 DECEMBER BY THE
SOVIET EMBASSY IN LONDON AND AM FRANKLY PUZZLED BY THE
ASSERTION THAT RECENT SOVIET ACTION WAS AT THE INVITATION OF THE
AFGHAN GOVERNMENT. AFTER ALL, THE NEW GOVERNMENT WAS ONLY
ANNOUNCED ON 28 DECEMBER. NOR CAN I SEE THAT SOVIET ACTION IS
JUSTIFIED IN TERMS OF ARTICLE 51 OF THE UN CHARTER. THERE IS
NO EVIDENCE OF WHICH WE ARE AWARE TO SUBSTANTIATE CHARGES OF
OUTSIDE INTERFERENCE IN THE AFFAIRS OF AFGHANISTAN. THE ONLY
COUNTRY WHICH HAS INVOLVED ITSELF IN RECENT YEARS IN AFGHAN
INTERNAL PROBLEMS IS THE SOVIET UNION.

/IT IS CLEAR

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IT IS CLEAR THAT THE SOVIET UNION HAS SOUGHT A PRETEXT TO IMPOSE ITS WILL ON A SMALLER NEIGHBOUR. AND WHAT YOU ADMIT TO BE OPEN SOVIET MILITARY INTERVENTION IN THE AFFAIRS OF ANOTHER INDEPENDENT COUNTRY HAS BEEN UNDERTAKEN WITHOUT ANY MANDATE FROM THE AFGHAN PEOPLE AS A WHOLE. I BELIEVE THAT THE PEOPLE OF AFGHANISTAN HAVE A RIGHT TO CHOOSE THEIR OWN GOVERNMENT WITHOUT OUTSIDE INTERFERENCE. RECENT SOVIET ACTION APPEARS TO LIMIT THIS FREEDOM. I SHOULD WELCOME YOUR ASSURANCE THAT ALL SOVIET TROOPS WILL BE WITHDRAWN AT A VERY EARLY DATE, LEAVING THE AFGHAN PEOPLE TO DETERMINE THEIR OWN FUTURE.

CARRINGTON

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F I L E S

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PS

PS/LPS

PS/MR BLAKER

PS/MR HURD

PS/PUS

SIR A DUFF

MR CORTAZZI

MR MURRAY

MR BULLARD

MR FERGUSSON

MR J C NOBERLY

D. IN WHAT WAY MIGHT THE ALLIES BEST RESPOND?

2. Relations with Afghanistani. The question of recognition

a. There is no need for us to take a decision on recognition of the new government in a hurry. Our direct interests in Afghanistan are small.

b. Unless we decide to withdraw altogether our small Embassy from Kabul, recognition will be necessary in order to conduct business with the Government. Complete withdrawal might not serve Western interests. We would lack information and would have no capacity to influence the new régime. The Pakistan Government would not welcome our withdrawal which they might see as a lessening of our involvement in the area. We shall need to consider carefully the pros and cons of recognition or withdrawal. There is a close analogy with Cambodia.

ii. United Kingdom Aid

Our aid programme is small (see background) and has already been sharply reduced. So far however we have continued to offer training to Afghan students on the basis that individual contacts are worthwhile. We shall now need to reconsider whether even this is justified. Aid could not be continued without a mission.

/iii.

iii. Multilateral aid and financial assistance

We shall be ready to discuss with our friends whether there are steps that we could take to limit the involvement of the IBRD and other international agencies in Afghanistan.

iv. Afghan credentials at the United Nations and other bodies

(See D 3(6) .)

D.2.

BACKGROUND (TO BE USED IF NECESSARY)

RECOGNITION

1. Our criteria for recognition, leaving aside for the moment the question of foreign intervention, are that the new government (a) has a reasonable prospect of permanence, (b) controls much the greater part of the territory of the state, and (c) enjoys the obedience of the majority of the population.
2. Our current information on the situation in Afghanistan is that the situation in Kabul appears to have stabilised. The new régime is in control but the reaction of Afghans elsewhere is uncertain and there are hostile reactions from some of the tribal leaders.
3. If a new government takes office as the result of the military intervention of a foreign state we would not give recognition unless it could be demonstrated that it resulted, to some reasonable extent, from the will of the people of the country concerned. Otherwise the third criterion would not be satisfied. We shall, of course, have to be careful not to take decisions which are inconsistent with those we have taken on Cambodia and Uganda. In the case of Cambodia our derecognition of the Pol Pot Government was based on the fact that the existence of the regime depended solely on the military intervention of a foreign state. It therefore failed to satisfy the criterion that it enjoyed the obedience of the majority of the people.

4. In the case of Uganda, there was clear evidence that the people of the country supported the Tanzanian intervention and that our normal criteria for recognition were satisfied.

UNITED KINGDOM INTERESTS

5. We maintain a resident mission in Kabul with eight U.K.-based and five locally-engaged staff.

6. The British Council have premises in Kabul comprising an office, library and classrooms. There are five staff from London.

7. British exports to Afghanistan were worth £17.5 million in 1978 representing 0.05% of total British exports. Imports from Afghanistan totally £17.9 million. Aid in 1977/78 was £1.591 million and £1.098 million in 1978/79. By 1980/81 the figure will drop to £0.7 million.

8. Some basic statistics dealing with the Afghan economy and trade including figures for development aid from multilateral organisations are attached.

ANNEX A: BASIC STATISTICS

Population and Land Area

(a)	Land Area		647,497	km ²
(b)	Population	(1978)	17.855	mill
(c)	Population growth rate	(1970-1977)	2.5	%p.a.

2. Economic

(i)	<u>Gross National Product</u>		<u>1977</u>	
(a)	Total		2,760	US \$m
(b)	Growth rate (1970-76)		4.86	%p.a.
(c)	Position in Total GNP League Table		84th	(of 146)
(d)	Per Capita (1978 - \$240)		190	US \$
(e)	Position in Per Capita League Table		=125th	(of 146)

(ii) Overseas Finance

(a)	Exchange Rate	<u>1975</u>	<u>1976</u>	<u>1977</u>	<u>1978</u>	
	£1 =Afghanis	99.98	81.28	78.55	86.38	
	US \$ =Afghanis	45.00	45.00	45.00	45.00	
(b)	<u>Balance of Payments</u>	<u>1974/5</u>	<u>1975/6</u>	<u>1976/7</u>	<u>1977/8</u>	¹ US \$ mill
	Exports fob	218.7	224.5	282.5	322.0	
	Imports cif	-246.3	-327.8	-327.6	-419.9	
	Invisibles and Transfers (net)	-0.5	10.8	16.0	12.1	
	Current Account	-28.1	-92.5	-29.1	-85.8	
	Capital Account	43.6	92.8	70.6	167.8	
	Balancing Item	10.0	52.2	23.3	72.6	
	Overall Balance	25.5	52.5	64.8	154.6	
(c)	<u>International Reserves</u>	<u>1975</u>	<u>1976</u>	<u>1977</u>	<u>1978</u>	
	Total	124.74	168.82	315.83	433.83	US \$ mill
	Months of Imports covered *2	6.08	6.18	11.57	12.40	

(iii) Foreign Trade

(a) Main Exports

Commodities:

	<u>1974/5</u>	<u>1977/8</u> ^{*1%}
Cotton	15.05	17.55
Raisins	16.13	16.40
Natural Gas	13.92	12.54
Carpets and Rugs	8.63	12.28
Other Fruits and Nuts	11.84	10.05
Less Sophisticated Manufactures	10.27	9.21 ^{*3}
Sophisticated Manufactures	14.25	20.63

(b) Main Export Markets

	<u>1974/5</u>	<u>1977/8</u> ^{*1%}
USSR	39.9	36.7
UK	10.0	14.6
Pakistan	11.4	9.5
India	16.3	7.7

(c) Major Imports

	<u>1974/5</u>	<u>1977/8</u> ^{*1%}
Manufactures	60.50	60.71
Foodstuffs	21.14	11.57
Oil	10.59	9.52

(d) Major Sources of Imports

	<u>1974/5</u>	<u>1977/81</u> ^{*1%}
Japan	24.6	27.2
USSR	30.2	25.6
India	10.1	5.7
UK	3.5	3.9

(e) UK Trade With;

	<u>1974</u>	<u>1978</u>	
Total Value of Exports	3.34	17.5	£m
Real Growth of Exports (five years ending)	na	19.7	%p.a.
Position in UK's Export League Table	na	105th	(of 15)

<u>Development Aid</u>				
(a)	<u>Reported Aid Receipts</u>	<u>1976</u>	<u>1977</u>	US \$ m
	From (i) DAC countries on a	78.4	100.4	
	bilateral basis	34.7	27.7	
	(of which UK)	(0.7)	(3.0)	
	(ii) Multilateral			
	organisations	29.0	51.2	
(b)	<u>Aid Per Head</u>	<u>1976</u>	<u>1977</u>	US \$
	(i) Afghanistan	5.60	7.02	
	(ii) ALL LDC's	10.10	7.13	
(v)	<u>Inflation</u>	<u>1975/6</u>	<u>1976/7</u>	<u>1977/8</u> %pa
	(a) Consumer Price Index *4	6.4	1.6	11.6
(vi)	<u>Overseas Debt</u>	<u>1975/6</u>	<u>1976/7</u>	<u>1977/8</u> %
	(a) Debt Service Ratio *5	10.31	9.48	11.64
	(b) Overseas Debt to Exports Ratio *5	342.7	284.0	283.0
	(c) Overseas Debt to GNP Ratio	34.04	31.84	33.02
(vii)	<u>Overseas Direct Investment</u>	<u>197</u>	<u>197</u>	<u>197</u>
	(a) UK Investment in Afghanistan	na	na	na £m
	(b) Position in UK League Table	na	na	na (of)
	(c) Afghanistan Investment in UK	na	na	na £m

Kevin Mowbray
 Statistics Section
 Economists Department

*Number Key

- 1 ALL 1977/78 figures are preliminary.
- 2 Only imports of merchandise as figures for imports of services are not available.
- 3 Figures for 1975/76 financial year as no later figures are available.
- 4 Kabul price index as no official consumer price index is available.
- 5 Exports of merchandise only as figures for export of services are not available.

D. IN WHAT WAY MIGHT THE ALLIES BEST RESPOND?

3. United Nations Aspects

1. The Security Council, which has the primary responsibility for international peace and security, should not ignore the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. The Russians will veto any resolution critical of their action, but the attempt to obtain such a resolution should still be made. The United Kingdom would be ready to sponsor a resolution in what we would hope could be a joint initiative with the other Western members.

[If appropriate]

2. Contents of a possible resolution In its preambular paragraphs a resolution might inter alia refer to the Afghans' right to choose their own government and (quoting Article 2 of the Charter) to the responsibility of members of the United Nations to refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state. Its operative paragraphs might condemn the Soviet Union's action, call for the immediate withdrawal of its forces from Afghanistan and establish a commission of three members of the Security Council (for which there are precedents) to examine the situation in Afghanistan and to report back to the Council by (say) 1 February 1980. [Not for use. U K Mission New York's first draft of such a resolution, which looks satisfactory, is attached (UKMis New York Tel No 1972).]

3. Tactics The United Kingdom would be ready to request a meeting of the Security Council by means of a letter to the President; we would seek to associate other Western countries with this and possibly some of the regional countries. The President of the Security Council will probably first call for informal consultations, to be followed by a formal meeting.
4. Timing The Americans now propose trying for a first stage resolution on Iran by 31 December, with the second stage following after a week or so. Afghanistan could be dealt with in the intervening period, with our Representative sending his letter to the President as soon as practicable after the first Iran vote.
5. Prospects In order to pass, a resolution by the Security Council requires nine positive votes and no veto. The closest recent parallel is the Council's debate on Cambodia/Vietnam in early 1979, when the resolution condemning Vietnam for its invasion of Cambodia was vetoed by the Soviet Union but earned thirteen positive votes. The circumstances are less propitious this time - particularly since any resolution will be directed against the Soviet Union itself, rather than its surrogate - but it is not impossible that at least nine positive votes could be found for a resolution on the lines described.
6. Afghan credentials at the UN In any Security Council debate, it would be normal for the countries affected to be represented. If there is a dispute over the credentials of the representative of the new Afghan régime, this is unlikely to stop his taking part in the debate. (Under the Security

/Council's

Council's rules of procedure he would be seated provisionally until the Secretary-General had reported on his credentials to the Council and the Council had taken a decision; all this would take time.)

7. We shall need to consider whether to vote in favour of acceptance of Afghan credentials in the UN and other international organizations. What are the views of others? This is related to the question of recognition. (See paragraph D2 (Background).)

8. Further action at the UN In the event of the expected Soviet veto, the prospects for further UN action will be poor. The 34th General Assembly, which should have ended before Christmas, will have to continue in session until it settles the Security Council election: so that it might conceivably be possible to propose that it consider an item on Afghanistan. But it seems unlikely that the General Committee would agree to inscription; even if it did and a debate were held, it would be difficult to win enough support among the non-aligned for a resolution condemning the Russians. Nor does the 'Uniting for Peace' procedure look to be a starter. In other words the notorious 'double standards' of United Nations member states are likely to be applied in this case also.

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TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1972 OF 28 DECEMBER

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON PARIS LISBON OSLO PRIORITY KABUL ROUTINE

BONN UKDEL NAO ISLAMABAD

MIPT : AFGHANISTAN

1. SUGGESTED TEXT OF RESOLUTION IS AS FOLLOWS:

QUOTE THE SECURITY COUNCIL

DEEPLY DISTURBED BY THE SITUATION IN AFGHANISTAN,

CONVINCED THAT THE PEOPLE OF AFGHANISTAN HAVE A RIGHT TO CHOOSE
THEIR OWN GOVERNMENT WITHOUT OUTSIDE INTERFERENCE,

CONSCIOUS OF THE RESPONSIBILITY OF MEMBER STATES TO REFRAIN IN
THEIR INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS FROM THE THREAT OR USE OF FORCE
AGAINST THE TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OR POLITICAL INDEPENDENCE OF
ANY STATE, OR IN ANY OTHER MANNER INCONSISTENT WITH THE PURPOSES
OF THE UNITED NATIONS,

GRAVELY CONCERNED AT THE INTERVENTION IN AFGHANISTAN BY SOVIET
MILITARY FORCES,

1. CONDEMNS THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS FOR ITS
ACTIONS WHICH IS IN BREACH OF THE PRINCIPLES AND PURPOSES OF
THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS,

2. CALLS UPON THE USSR IMMEDIATELY TO WITHDRAW ITS MILITARY FORCES
FROM AFGHANISTAN THUS ENABLING THE PEOPLE OF AFGHANISTAN FREELY
TO CHOOSE THEIR OWN GOVERNMENT.

3. ESTABLISHES A COMMISSION CONSISTING OF 3 MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY
COUNCIL, TO BE APPOINTED BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL AFTER
CONSULTATION WITH THE MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL, TO EXAMINE THE
SITUATION IN AFGHANISTAN,

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4. REQUESTS THE COMMISSION TO SUBMIT ITS REPORT TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL BY 1 FEBRUARY 1980,
5. REQUESTS THE SECRETARY GENERAL TO PROVIDE THE COMMISSION WITH THE NECESSARY FACILITIES TO ENABLE IT TO CARRY OUT ITS MISSION,
6. DECIDES TO KEEP THE SITUATION IN AFGHANISTAN UNDER CONSTANT AND CLOSE SCRUTINY AND TO RECONVENE IN FEBRUARY 1980 TO REVIEW THE SITUATION IN THE LIGHT OF THE FINDINGS OF THE COMMISSION.

PARSONS

FILES

SAD

EESD

UND

NAD

EID(E)

PS

PS/MR BLAKER

PS/PUS

SIR. D. MAITLAND

SIR. A. DUFF

MR FERGUSSON

MR STRATTON

MR CORTAZZI

ACTION AT THE UNITED NATIONS

BACKGROUND (to be drawn on as appropriate)

1. The 5 Western powers on the Security Council are the UK, US, France, Norway and Portugal. France will be president of the Council during January (on the assumption that the contest between Cuba and Columbia for election to the second Latin American seat on the council is still unresolved. If either one of them is elected in time, they would assume the presidency, which passes in alphabetical order. China is president for December). France will thus be in control of the Council's procedure, but will be inhibited from taking an overactive part in the Western initiative. The French have already told us they regard consideration of action at the UN as premature before the meeting and before they know the result of the démarche they are making in Moscow.

TACTICS

2. Our Permanent Representative to the UN would be given the customary discretion to handle the item according to his tactical judgement, including the lobbying of delegations in New York, over the text of any resolution and the point at which it is formally tabled; but we would be ready to support him by lobbying in Council members' capitals and possibly more widely. (The non-permanent members of the 1980 Council will be Norway, Portugal, GDR, Bangladesh, Philippines, Tunisia, Zambia, Niger, Jamaica and the eventual winner in the contest for the second Latin-American seat.)

PROSPECTS

3. In order to obtain a result as good as 9 votes in favour, it will be necessary for the Western members to demolish the Soviet/Afghan arguments, which will no doubt follow the Soviet statement

of 27 December, on the lines of the Prime Minister's message to
--- President Brezhnev (FCO telno. 800 to Moscow: attached ^{to P.12}). It
has to be assumed that the 5 western members will vote in favour.
China will certainly do so, and take an active part in the debate.
Bangladesh and the Philippines might be persuaded to support.
France might work on Niger and the US on Jamaica (and Colombia if
elected). Zambia and Tunisia cannot be counted on for more than
an abstention. It is inconceivable that the Soviet Union would not
veto, supported by the negative votes of the GDR and (if elected)
Cuba.

UNITING FOR PEACE PROCEDURE

4. This has only been used once, after Suez, since its institution
in 1950. It provides for the calling of an emergency session of
the Assembly, at the request of a majority of the members of the UN
or on the vote of at least 9 members of the Security Council, after
a veto has stymied the wish of a clear majority of the Council to
take some action 'in any case where these appeared to be a threat to
the peace, a breach of the peace or an act of aggression.' There
is little prospect of any resolution on Afghanistan which contained
this sort of (Chapter.7) language obtaining the necessary 9 votes in
the Council to trigger the Uniting for Peace Procedure after a
Soviet veto..

D. IN WHAT WAY MIGHT THE ALLIES BEST RESPOND?

4. Action with Iran

1. First reactions by Khomeini and Qotbzadeh, quoted in Brief C1 above, have been to the effect that the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan shows that one super-power is no better than the other. This provides only a very limited basis for establishing a common attitude between the West and Iran towards the Afghan situation and the Soviet Union, given the suspiciousness of the revolutionary régime towards all Western moves.
2. Nevertheless the attempt should be made. It will be something if the anti-Western xenophobia of the Khomeini régime and of the mass organisations which support it can be shifted in the direction of xenophobia à tous azimuths. The facts about the Soviet action in Afghanistan should be given the maximum publicity in any media to which the régime and people of Iran have access. The moral should continue to be drawn, as it was by the Ambassadors of the Nine in their talk with Qotbzadeh on 28 December, that in challenging the United States and the West Iran is fighting the wrong enemy.
3. It might be possible to use an intermediary like Agha Shahi (Adviser (i.e. Foreign Minister) to the Pakistan Government on Foreign Affairs) to put this view to the Iranian leaders.
[Not for use. The Americans are currently unhappy that Agha Shahi's recent contacts with Khomeini may risk causing a diversion to their envisaged Security Council procedure for a sanctions Resolution against Iran. But once the Resolution committing the Council to sanctions within any certain period has been adopted, there seems to be merit in using Agha Shahi as a channel to Khomeini.]

/If

If the Americans and others see no objection, we should be ready to take this up with Agha Shahi through HM Ambassador in Islamabad when the time seems ripe.

AGENDA ITEM D: IN WHAT WAY MIGHT THE ALLIES BEST RESPOND?

5. ACTION WITH PAKISTAN

(1) The Pakistanis will more than ever look for reassurance from their traditional friends. But they will recognise that the West will now be disposed to place greater stress on the regional and geo-political aspects of their relationship with Pakistan than on the nuclear issue [see also Washington telno. 4377 (annexed)].

(2) In practical terms our means of demonstrating our awareness of Pakistan's concerns are limited:

(a) Military Assistance

We have no formal military obligations towards Pakistan. And there is little we can do in concrete terms by way of military reassurance [Not for use. We have neither the available forces nor equipment nor the resources to offer large scale military aid.] We have no outstanding orders for arms awaiting delivery. The Pakistanis have, however, shown interest in acquiring equipment from us. The problem has been lack of funds and their low credit rating. [Not for use. A decision now to supply arms (e.g. defensive equipment for use in their North-West frontier area) would therefore have to be on credit notwithstanding their rating and the Treasury have so far strongly resisted any extension].

(b) Aid

It would be difficult to increase our bilateral aid programme given budgetary constraints.

(c) Ministerial Visit

The easiest way to reassure the Pakistanis is an early ministerial visit to build on recent exchanges.

/Background

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CONFIDENTIAL

FM WASHINGTON 280140Z DEC 79

TO PRIORITY F C O

TELEGRAM NO 4377 OF 27 DECEMBER

INFO PRIORITY KABUL, ISLAMABAD, NEW DELHI, PEKING, MOSCOW, MODUK,
UKMIS NEW YORK.

MY TELNO 4364: AFGHANISTAN

1. WHEN I SAW VANCE THIS EVENING ABOUT IRAN, HE HAD JUST EMERGED FROM CHAIRING A MEETING ON AFGHANISTAN. IT WAS CLEAR TO THE AMERICANS THAT THE RUSSIANS HAD TAKEN A FIRM DECISION TO PUT IN THEIR OWN STOOGES, PROBABLY AS A RESULT OF THE REPORT MADE TO THEM BY THE SOVIET GENERAL WHO WAS IN KABUL IN OCTOBER/NOVEMBER. I SUGGESTED THAT AT LEAST THIS WAS CLEAR-CUT AND IN SOME WAYS MADE THE AMERICAN POSITION EASIER. HE AGREED.

2. VANCE MENTIONED THAT HE HAD AT AN EARLIER STAGE RAISED THE RECENT RUSSIAN BUILD-UP WITH THE CHINESE EMBASSY WHO HAD VIEWED IT WITH GREAT SERIOUSNESS BUT CONFINED THEMSELVES TO ASKING WHAT THE AMERICANS PLANNED TO DO ABOUT IT.

3. MORE INTERESTINGLY, VANCE SAID THAT HE WOULD BE RECOMMENDING TO THE PRESIDENT THAT, WITH REGARD TO PAKISTAN, THE US SHOULD ACCEPT THE FACTS OF NUCLEAR LIFE AND BE CONTENT WITH WHAT THEY HAD BEEN ABLE TO EXTRACT SO FAR FROM THE PAKISTANIS - I.E. THAT PAKISTAN DID NOT YET HAVE THE CAPABILITY TO MAKE A BOMB, THAT SHE WOULD NOT TRANSFER NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY AND THAT SHE WOULD NOT EXPLODE A NUCLEAR DEVICE WHILE ZIA WAS IN POWER - AND INDICATE A WILLINGNESS TO SELL THEM MILITARY HARDWARE. AS REGARDS INDIA, VANCE WILL RECOMMEND THAT THE NEXT TRANCHE OF FUEL FOR TARAPUR SHOULD BE APPROVED WHICH WOULD IN SOME WAY RESTORE THE STATUS QUO. AFTER THE INDIAN ELECTION, THE NEW GOVERNMENT WOULD BE TOLD THAT THE US WOULD BE PREPARED TO DISCUSS THE SUPPLY OF CERTAIN TECHNOLOGICALLY ADVANCED EQUIPMENT, INCLUDING HOWITZERS THEY WANTED FOR THEIR MOUNTAIN TROOPS.

HENDERSON

F I L E S

SAD	PS
EESD	PS/MR HURD
SEAD	PS/MR BLAKER
MED	PS/PUS
N AM D	MR CORTAZZI
PUSD	MR BULLARD
UND	MR FERGUSSON
EID	MR MURRAY
DEF D	
PLANNING STAFF	

COPIES TO:

ASSESSMENTS STAFF, CABINET OFFICE

DIO, CABINET OFFICE

CONFIDENTIAL

Background

UK Aid has been reduced from £20 million in 1977/78 to £16 million in 1978/79.

6. ACTION WITH NON-ALIGNED COUNTRIES

We are ready to lobby further in NAM capitals (British Missions have already been asked to do so in ASEAN and some other capitals). But the Non-Aligned Movement as such is unlikely to condemn Soviet action. Individual members may be more critical, e.g. Yugoslavia and China, but unless neighbouring countries speak out strongly it is unlikely that many NAM countries will choose to say much. It might be best to concentrate on the more moderate governments in the Islamic World.

7. ACTION IN NATO

(1) There is obvious value in involving NATO as a whole. Following a suggestion by the UK Delegation on 28 December, the Council convened on 29 December at US initiative. Most delegations were represented at Chargé d'Affaires level. No decisions were taken. The main US interest appeared to be to get an Alliance view on record. All delegations expressed strong concern at the Soviet intervention and it was agreed that the Secretary-General would issue a statement on behalf of the Alliance (text attached).

(2) No further action is envisaged in the Council in the immediate future (the next meeting of the Council is planned for Friday, 4 January). We should however keep this possibility in mind. The presence of countries such as Portugal, Norway and, most important, Turkey (as a member of the Islamic Community) makes NATO a valuable forum. There have been press reports that Mr Christopher may be speaking to the Council on his present tour, although, as far as we are aware, there has been no official confirmation. We would see value in this if it can be arranged.

D. IN WHAT WAY MIGHT THE ALLIES BEST RESPOND?

8. Action by the Nine

1. The Italians are in the chair with effect from 1st January 1980. The four member states in London (the Federal Republic of Germany, France, Italy and the United Kingdom) could discuss together possible action by the Nine. This could include:

- i. a joint statement;
- ii. a joint démarche in Moscow or joint coordinated action in capitals;
- iii. pooling of information on the situation in Afghanistan and on international reactions to it;
- iv. coordinated information activity in other countries.

2. There will be other areas (e.g. recognition) where joint or coordinated action will be more difficult, owing to differing national procedures.

3. The Soviet Authorities appear to have transmitted the Soviet Government Statement to members of the Nine, as to other governments.

4. We have informed the Nine of the Press Statement issued on 28 December and have enquired what action the Presidency was proposing to take, but no response has yet been received.

ADVANCE COPY

IMMEDIATE

PS
PS/LPS
PS/MR BAKER
PS/POUS
SW-D MATTHEW
MR. COLEMAN
MR. FERGUSON
HD. SA
HD. NAM
HD. EESD
HD. DEF
HD. NEWS
R.C. XX
PS. MTO [signature]

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GRS 110

UNCLASSIFIED
DESKBY 291533Z (FCO)
FM UKDEL NATO 291455Z DEC 79
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 359 OF 29 DEC 1979

MIPT: AFGHANISTAN

1. TEXT OF STATEMENT ISSUED BY SECRETARY GENERAL IMMEDIATELY
AFTER COUNCIL;
BEGINS

QUOTE THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL MET IN SPECIAL SESSION DECEMBER
29 TO DISCUSS THE RECENT SOVIET MILITARY INTERVENTION IN AFGHANISTAN.
THE COUNCIL WILL CONTINUE ITS CLOSE AND EXTENSIVE CONSULTATIONS
ON THIS SUBJECT.

SECRETARY GENERAL LUNS EXPRESSED HIS STRONG CONCERN OVER THE
SOVIET ACTION WHICH HE SAID REPRESENTS GROSS INTERFERENCE IN THE
INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF AFGHANISTAN AND IS A MATTER OF MAJOR CONCERN
TO THE ENTIRE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY.

HE NOTED THAT SOVIET ATTEMPTS TO JUSTIFY ITS ACTION IN AFGHANISTAN
ON THE BASIS OF THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER ARE A PERVERSION OF THE
UN'S PRINCIPLES AND SHOULD BE CONDEMNED BY ALL ITS MEMBERS. UNQUOTE
ENDS

HOWELLS

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RR COPENHAGEN

ADVANCE COPY

BRUSSELS

IMMEDIATE

RR ROME

PS
PS/LPS
PS/ma BLAKER

RR WASHINGTON

HD DEF-D

PS/PJS.

RR LUXEMBOURG

HD. NORD

GD MATHIAS

RR REYKJAVIK

Prime Minister

MR. CORREY

MR. CORREY FEARMAN

HD. SAJ

HD. NORD

HD. EESD

GRS 238

M.I.

R.C.

CONFIDENTIAL

DESKBY 291538Z (FCO)

PS/No. 10 Downing St.

FM UKDEL NATO 291430Z DEC 1979

Typists

TO IMMEDIATE FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

TELEGRAM NUMBER 358 OF 29 DECEMBER 1979

INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON, MOSCOW, PARIS, BONN, UKNIS NEW YORK,

KABUL, ISLAMABAD, NEW DELHI, TEHRAN, MODUK

INFO ROUTINE ALL OTHER NATO POSTS

WASHINGTON TELNO 4395 (NOT TO ALL): AFGHANISTAN

1. AT U S REQUEST THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL MET THIS MORNING TO DISCUSS AFGHANISTAN.

2. LEGERE (U S CHARGE) OPENED BY MAKING THE POINTS IN PARAGRAPHS 2 TO 9 OF TUR. IT EMERGED IN DISCUSSION THAT THE U S, GERMANY, BELGIUM, CANADA, FRANCE AND NORWAY HAD ALSO RECEIVED APPARENTLY IDENTICAL SOVIET QUOTE EXPLANATIONS UNQUOTE OF THE INTERVENTION IN AFGHANISTAN. I DREW ATTENTION TO THE STATEMENT ISSUED BY NEWS DEPARTMENT ON 28 DECEMBER WHICH WE CIRCULATED HERE YESTERDAY, AND INFORMED THE COUNCIL OF THE PRIME MINISTER'S MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT BREZHNEV (FCO TELNO 933 TO MOSCOW NOT TO ALL). THIS WAS VERY WELL RECEIVED AND I HOPE WE MAY BE PERMITTED TO CIRCULATE THE TEXT HERE.

3. IN A TENTATIVE FIRST EXCHANGE OF VIEWS ON POSSIBLE WIDER REPERCUSSIONS THE TURKISH AMBASSADOR, SPEAKING PERSONALLY, ARGUED FOR AN EARLY ANALYSIS BY THE ALLIANCE WHICH MIGHT POINT TO WAYS OF PREVENTING FURTHER DETERIORATION IN THE AREA. THIS ASPECT WILL BE DISCUSSED FURTHER WHEN THE COUNCIL NEXT MEETS AT 1433Z ON FRIDAY 4 JANUARY.

4. IN CONCLUSION THE SECRETARY GENERAL SAID THAT HE PROPOSED TO

BE DISCUSSED FURTHER WHEN THE COUNCIL NEXT MEETS AT 1430Z ON
FRIDAY 4 JANUARY.

4. IN CONCLUSION THE SECRETARY GENERAL SAID THAT HE PROPOSED TO
ISSUE A STATEMENT NOTIFYING THE PRESS OF THE COUNCIL MEETING AND
EXPRESSING THE STRONG CONCERN OF ALLIANCE MEMBERS. ARNAUD(FRANCE)
ARGUED THAT THE EXPRESSION OF CONCERN SHOULD BE LEFT TO CAPITALS.
LUNS PROPOSED, AND IT WAS AGREED NEM CON, THAT HE WOULD INFORM
THE PRESS OF THE MEETING AND THE REASON FOR IT, AND THAT ANY COMMENT
IN ANSWER TO QUESTIONS WOULD BE PRESENTED AS HIS OWN.

5. SEE MIFT
HOWELLS

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FCO PLEASE PASS INFO PRIORITY MODUK

SENT/RECD 291523Z LT/KDS

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 PS/MR HURD
 PS/PUS
 MR J C MOBERLY
 LORD BRIDGES
 HD/MED
 HD/FRD
 HD/NEWAD
 HD/UND (2)
 HD/OID (2)
 HD/DEF DEPT
 HD/MAED
 HD/ES & SD (2)
 HD/CONS-DEPT
 Sir D Taitland
 HD/POD
 MR EVANS
 MISS BROWN
 PUSD (2)
 NEWS DEPT
 RESIDENT CLERK
 Hd COD

PS NO 10 ~~DOWNING~~ ST
 SIR R ARMSTRONG)
 ASSESSMENTS STAFF) CABINET
 MR LE CHEMINANT) OFFICE

CABINET OFFICE DIO
 MR F R BARRATT TREASURY

ps/chancellor, Treasury
 Mr D J S Hancock, Treasury

Mr C. W. McTahan } B/England
 Mr S Payton }

Mr W Knighton, D/Trade
 Mr C Benjamin, DOI.

Mr D le B Jones } D/Energy
 Mr C Lucas }

OO FCO
 OO UKMIS NEW YORK
 RR WASHINGTON
 RR MOSCOW
 RR NEW DELHI
 RR UKDEL NATO
 RR ISLAMABAD
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FM KABUL 291156Z

TO IMMEDIATE DESKBY FCO

TELEGRAM NO 298 OF 29 DECEMBER 79.

AND TO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK.

INFO ROUTINE WASHINGTON, MOSCOW, NEW DELHI, UKDEL NATO AND ISLAMABAD.

SOVIET INTERVENTION IN AFGHANISTAN.

THE RUSSIANS CLAIM TO HAVE BEEN REQUESTED TO SEND TROOPS HERE BY THE AMIN GOVERNMENT. IT IS HARDLY LIKELY THAT AMIN WOULD HAVE REQUESTED SUCH LARGE NUMBERS OF COMBAT TROOPS. THAT THIS MAY WELL HAVE BEEN AN EXERCISE IN DUPLICITY BY THE RUSSIANS IS SUGGESTED BY THE FOLLOWING.

2. AT THE TIME OF THE RUSSIAN AIR-LIFT MY FRENCH COLLEAGUE WAS OFFICING POST (THEN POLITICAL DEPUTY MINISTER MFA AND NOW

Prime Minister
referred to Chequers

THAT THIS MAY WELL HAVE BEEN AN EXERCISE IN DUPLICITY BY THE RUSSIANS IS SUGGESTED BY THE FOLLOWING.

2. AT THE TIME OF THE RUSSIAN AIR-LIFT MY FRENCH COLLEAGUE WAS SEEING DOST (THEN POLITICAL DEPUTY MINISTER MFA AND NOW MFA) ON ANOTHER MATTER AND DOST ASSURED HIM CATEGORICALLY THAT NO RUSSIAN COMBAT TROOPS WERE ARRIVING : THE AIR-LIFT WAS TO BRING IN SUPPLIES AND ANY RUSSIAN TROOPS INVOLVED WERE ONLY A FEW NEEDED FOR UNLOADING. AT THE SAME TIME THE ADMINISTRATIVE DEPUTY MFA TOLD ANOTHER COLLEAGUE THAT BECAUSE THE SALANG PASS WAS BLOCKED BY SNOW THE RUSSIANS WERE HAVING TO FLY IN URGENTLY NEEDED SUPPLIES.

3. BOTH OFFICIALS MAY HAVE BEEN ACTING VERY DISINGENUOUSLY (WHICH IS NOT UNKNOWN FOR THEM) BUT IT SEEMS LIKELY THAT THE RUSSIANS HAD ESTABLISHED A PRETEXT FOR BRINGING IN TRANSPORT PLANES TO KABUL AIRPORT AND BY THE TIME AMIN DISCOVERED WHAT WAS HAPPENING IT WAS TOO LATE TO DO ANYTHING ABOUT IT.

4. PRESENT SITUATION. OUTWARDLY THINGS ARE NORMAL IN KABUL ITSELF. MOST OF THE CIVILIAN MILITIA HAVE DISAPPEARED AND THE FIFTY OR SO SOVIET TANKS AND SUPPORT VEHICLES PARKED ALL DAY YESTERDAY BY THE ORBITAL ROAD INTERSECTION NEAR THIS EMBASSY HAD GONE BY THIS MORNING. LARGE SUPPLY CONVOYS (FUEL ETC) HAVE HOWEVER BEEN MOVING IN OUR VICINITY, POSSIBLY FOR ARMOUR WITHDRAWN TO OUTSKIRTS OF TOWN. THE AIRPORT APPROACH ROAD IS GUARDED BY RUSSIAN TANKS AND CIVIL FLIGHTS ARE SUSPENDED.

HILLIER-FRY.

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CONFIDENTIAL

FM WASHINGTON 291731Z DEC 79

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 4401 OF 29 DECEMBER 1979

INFO IMMEDIATE PARIS BONN ROME OTTAWA UKMIS NEW YORK MOSCOW KABUL
AND UKDEL NATO.

YOUR TELNO 799 TO MOSCOW (NOT TO OTTAWA): AFGHANISTAN

1. BRZEZINSKI ASKED TO SEE ME TODAY TO SHOW ME THE TEXT OF THE
PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE TO BREZHNEV. HE ASKED THAT I SHOULD NOT TAKE
NOTES OF IT. THE MAIN POINTS IN THE MESSAGE, APART FROM PREDICTABLY
STRONG STATEMENTS OF CONDEMNATION, WERE AS FOLLOWS:

A. THE SOVIET ACTION COULD BE A LONG-LASTING TURNING POINT IN
RELATIONS BETWEEN THE USA AND THE USSR:

B. SOVIET ACTION WAS INCOMPATIBLE WITH THE TERMS OF THE 1972
TREATY:

C. THE PRESIDENT CALLED UPON THE SOVIET UNION TO TAKE PROMPT ACTION
TO END THEIR INTERVENTION IN AFGHANISTAN: AND

D. THE SITUATION WAS REVERSIBLE BUT ONLY IF THIS ACTION WAS
TAKEN SOON.

2. IN SHOWING ME THE MESSAGE BRZEZINSKI SAID THAT THE US GOVERNMENT
WANTED THERE TO BE NO DOUBT ABOUT HOW GRAVE A VIEW THEY TOOK OF
WHAT THE RUSSIANS WERE UP TO.

3. I SHOWED HIM THE TEXT OF THE PM'S MESSAGE TO BRZHNEV.

4. IN DISCUSSION WITH BRZEZINSKI AND SUBSEQUENTLY WITH WARREN
CHRISTOPHER, THE FOLLOWING POINTS EMERGED REGARDING MONDAY'S MEETING
IN LONDON:

CHRISTOPHER WILL BE PROVIDING IDEAS FOR AN AGENDA. THIS WILL
INCORPORATE THE POINTS ALREADY CONVEYED TO YOU IN MY TELNO 4394
(NOW BEING REPEATED TO KABUL, MOSCOW AND UKMIS NEW YORK) AS WELL
AS THE FOLLOWING: THE WIDER IMPACT OF SOVIET ACTION IN AFGHANISTAN
ON DETENTE, CHINA AND ARMS CONTROL: AND
THE HANDLING OF THE ISSUE IN THE UN.

THE US THINK IT BEST TO LET TWO OR THREE DAYS ELAPSE BEFORE
DISCUSSING THIS SUBJECT IN THE UN FORUM. THIS COULD ENABLE THE
ISLAMIC AND NON-ALIGNED REACTION TO BUILD UP. THE IDEA IS THERE-
FORE THAT A RESOLUTION SHOULD BE TABLED BETWEEN THE FIRST AND THE
SECOND IRANIAN RESOLUTIONS. THEY APPEAR TO BE THINKING, FOLLOWING
THE PM'S TALK WITH THE PRESIDENT, THAT THE UK AND OTHER WESTERN
ALLIES WILL TABLE IT. BRZEZINSKI IS ENLIVENED BY THE IDEA THAT THE
CHINESE MIGHT JOIN US IN DOING SO.

CONFIDENTIAL

/s.

CONFIDENTIAL

5. IN RESPONSE TO THE SUGGESTION I PUT TO CHRISTOPHER AT BULLARD'S REQUEST HE SAID THAT HE WOULD BE PREPARED TO TAKE THE CHAIR AT THE LONDON MEETING IF THAT WAS WHAT THE OTHER REPRESENTATIVES WOULD LIKE. HE THOUGHT THAT ONE DAY SHOULD BE SUFFICIENT BUT IN ORDER NOT TO UNDERMINE THE IMPORTANCE OF THE MEETING PERHAPS THE IMPRESSION COULD BE GIVEN THAT THE PARTIES WOULD BE READY TO GO ON LONGER IF NECESSARY. CHRISTOPHER WOULD BE PREPARED TO FALL IN WITH THE WISHES OF OTHERS ABOUT THE SIZE OF DELEGATIONS, THOUGH HE WOULD WANT TO HAVE THE CHANCE TO SAY ONE OR TWO THINGS INRESTRICTED SESSIONS, PERHAPS LIMITED TO US AND ONE OR TWO OTHER DELEGATIONS.
6. AS REGARDS INFORMING NATO, CHRISTOPHER THOUGHT THAT IT MIGHT BE USEFUL IF THIS WAS DONE. HE HIMSELF MIGHT NOT BE AVAILABLE, BUT VEST COULD TAKE IT ON.

HENDERSON

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Ps.
Ps LPS
AS Mr. Baker
Ps Mr Hurd
Ps PUS
Sir D. Martland
Mr Colkazzini
Mr Ferguson
SAD
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OO KABUL

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OO WASHINGTON

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FM MOSCOW 291453Z DEC 79

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 871 OF 29TH DECEMBER

FOR INFO IMMEDIATE KABUL, ISLAMABAD, WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEWYORK,
ROUTINE BONN, PARIS, UKDEL NATO, NEW DELHI AND TEHRAN.

[Typists]

YOUR TELEGRAM NO 799: AFGHANISTAN.

1. I DELIVERED THE TEXT OF THE PRIME MINISTER'S MESSAGE (YOUR TELEGRAM NO 800) TO DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER FIRYUBIN THIS AFTERNOON FOR TRANSMISSION TO BREZHNEV. I EMPHASIZED THE SERIOUSNESS WITH WHICH HMG VIEWED SOVIET ACTIONS IN AFGHANISTAN, AND THEN ASKED THAT A FULL TRANSLATION OF THE MESSAGE BE READ OUT.
2. FIRYUBIN REPLIED THAT HE DID NOT THINK THE OCCASION RIGHT FOR A FULL DISCUSSION. HE THEN SPOKE IN THE TERMS OF THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT STATEMENT AS SET OUT IN YOUR TELEGRAM

AFGHANISTAN, AND THEN ASKED THAT A FULL TRANSLATION OF THE MESSAGE BE READ OUT.

2. FIRYUBIN REPLIED THAT HE DID NOT THINK THE OCCASION RIGHT FOR A FULL DISCUSSION. HE THEN SPOKE IN THE TERMS OF THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT STATEMENT AS SET OUT IN YOUR TELEGRAM NO 797, ADDING AT THE START ONLY THAT THE BRITISH KNEW VERY WELL WHENCE CAME THE LONG STANDING INTERFERENCE IN INTERNAL AFGHAN AFFAIRS, INCLUDING MILITARY INTERFERENCE, WHICH HAD PROVOKED THE PRESENT SITUATION. HE CONCLUDED THAT THE ANSWERS TO THE PRIME MINISTER'S POINTS ON THE UN CHARTER, AND THE LENGTH OF THE SOVIET TROOPS STAY WERE AS IN THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT STATEMENT. THE SOLE SOVIET AIM WAS TO SEE AFGHANISTAN UNDER AN INDEPENDENT SOVEREIGN GOVERNMENT EXERCISING ITS RIGHT AND OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE UN CHARTER.

3. I SAID THAT THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT SEEM TO BASE THEIR WHOLE CASE ON AN ALLEGATION OF PRIOR EXTERNAL AGGRESSION BY SOME OTHER POWER, BUT AS THE PRIME MINISTER'S LETTER MADE CLEAR, THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THIS BASIC SOVIET ASSERTION. FIRYUBIN HAD REFERRED TO EFFORTS TO TOPPLE THE AFGHAN GOVERNMENT BY FORCE. SO FAR AS I KNEW, THAT GOVERNMENT HAD BEEN TOPPLED ONLY AFTER THE INTRODUCTION OF SOVIET TROOPS. NOR WAS IT CLEAR WHICH GOVERNMENT HAD APPEALED FOR SOVIET HELP OR WHEN. UNAMBIGUOUS ANSWERS TO THESE QUESTIONS WOULD HELP TO CLARIFY THE SITUATION. FIRYUBIN SAID I WOULD HAVE SEEN THE TEXT OF THE APPEAL IN THE SOVIET PRESS. WHAT WENT ON IN AFGHANISTAN WAS THE INTERNAL AFFAIR OF THE AFGHAN PEOPLE. NO ONE HAD THE RIGHT TO QUESTION THE LEGITIMACY OF THEIR GOVERNMENT. AS TO MY QUESTION ABOUT OUTSIDE INTERFERENCE, I WOULD KNOW THE ANSWER FROM THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT STATEMENT.

4. FIRYUBIN WAS OBVIOUSLY NEITHER ABLE NOR PREPARED TO SAY MORE.

F CO PLEASE PASS TO WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK,
BONN PARIS UKDEL NATO

KEEBLE

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SUBJECT

CONFIDENTIAL

fg. Am

PRIME MINISTER'S
T181/79T
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T181/79T

GPS 350
CONFIDENTIAL
DESKBY MOSCOW 290530Z
FROM F C O 290129Z DEC 79
TO IMMEDIATE MOSCOW
TELEGRAM NUMBER 800 OF 29 DECEMBER
INFO IMMEDIATE KABUL, WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK, ISLAMABAD,
BONN, PARIS, ROME, DUBLIN, UKDEL NATO.

M.I.P.T.

AFGHANISTAN: MESSAGE FROM PRIME MINISTER TO PRESIDENT BREZHNEV.

I HAVE BEEN PROFOUNDLY DISTURBED AT RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN AFGHANISTAN. THE LARGE SCALE DEPLOYMENT OF SOVIET TROOPS HAS COINCIDED WITH A COUP LED BY SOMEONE WHO HAD BEEN ABSENT FROM AFGHANISTAN, LIVING IN EASTERN EUROPE FOR OVER A YEAR, AND WHO RETURNED TO THE COUNTRY AT THE SAME TIME AS THE ARRIVAL OF THE SOVIET TROOPS.

I HAVE SEEN THE STATEMENT BY THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT HANDED TO THE FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE LATE ON 27 DECEMBER BY THE SOVIET EMBASSY IN LONDON AND AM FRANKLY PUZZLED BY THE ASSERTION THAT RECENT SOVIET ACTION WAS AT THE INVITATION OF THE AFGHAN GOVERNMENT. AFTER ALL, THE NEW GOVERNMENT WAS ONLY ANNOUNCED ON 28 DECEMBER. NOR CAN I SEE THAT SOVIET ACTION IS JUSTIFIED IN TERMS OF ARTICLE 51 OF THE UN CHARTER. THERE IS NO EVIDENCE OF WHICH WE ARE AWARE TO SUBSTANTIATE CHARGES OF OUTSIDE INTERFERENCE IN THE AFFAIRS OF AFGHANISTAN. THE ONLY COUNTRY WHICH HAS INVOLVED ITSELF IN RECENT YEARS IN AFGHAN INTERNAL PROBLEMS IS THE SOVIET UNION.

/IT IS CLEAR

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IT IS CLEAR THAT THE SOVIET UNION HAS SOUGHT A PRETEXT TO IMPOSE ITS WILL ON A SMALLER NEIGHBOUR, AND WHAT YOU ADMIT TO BE OPEN SOVIET MILITARY INTERVENTION IN THE AFFAIRS OF ANOTHER INDEPENDENT COUNTRY HAS BEEN UNDERTAKEN WITHOUT ANY MANDATE FROM THE AFGHAN PEOPLE AS A WHOLE. I BELIEVE THAT THE PEOPLE OF AFGHANISTAN HAVE A RIGHT TO CHOOSE THEIR OWN GOVERNMENT WITHOUT OUTSIDE INTERFERENCE. RECENT SOVIET ACTION APPEARS TO LIMIT THIS FREEDOM. I SHOULD WELCOME YOUR ASSURANCE THAT ALL SOVIET TROOPS WILL BE WITHDRAWN AT A VERY EARLY DATE, LEAVING THE AFGHAN PEOPLE TO DETERMINE THEIR OWN FUTURE.

CARRINGTON

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PS/MR HURD
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SIR A DUFF
MR CORTAZZI
MR MURRAY
MR BULLARD
MR FERGUSSON
MR J C MOBERLY

CONFIDENTIAL

GRS 80

CONFIDENTIAL

DESKBY 220530Z

FM FCO 220122Z DEC 79

TO IMMEDIATE MOSCOW

TELEGRAM NUMBER 799 OF 29 DECEMBER

INFO IMMEDIATE KABUL WASHINGTON UKNIS NEW YORK ISLAMABAD BONN
PARIS ROME DUBLIN UKDEL NATO

AFGHANISTAN

1. MIFT CONTAINS TEXT OF MESSAGE FROM PRIME MINISTER TO PRESIDENT BREZHNEV. YOUR AMERICAN COLLEAGUE WILL BE RECEIVING TEXT OF MESSAGE IN SIMILAR TERMS FROM PRESIDENT CARTER TO BREZHNEV. PLEASE ASCERTAIN THAT US EMBASSY HAVE DELIVERED PRESIDENT CARTER'S MESSAGE AND THEN DELIVER PRIME MINISTER'S MESSAGE AT FIRST OPPORTUNITY.
2. PLEASE REPORT ACTION SO THAT WE CAN CONSIDER POSSIBLE ARRANGEMENTS FOR PUBLICATION OF TEXT.

CARRINGTON

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F I L E S

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EID

SEAD

UND

PS

PS/LPS

PS/MR BLAKER

PS/MR HURD

PS/PUS

SIR A DUFF

MR CORTAZZI

MR MURRAY

MR BULLARD

MR FERGUSSON

MR J C MOBERLY

CONFIDENTIAL

PRIME MINISTER

Lg
Rus

AFGHANISTAN

Soon after he spoke to you for the last time this evening, Lord Carrington telephoned me to say that the idea of a preparatory meeting at official level this weekend to be followed by a higher level meeting early next week was not going to work. For reasons which I did not fully understand, the French had told the Americans that they would only attend a high level meeting consisting of the Five - i.e. the United States, United Kingdom, Germany, Italy and themselves. The Americans had already invited the Canadians, and they were likely to be added in spite of French objections. (Nicko Henderson had telephoned him with this latest information). Lord Carrington is now resigned to a meeting of the Five plus Canada here in London at Deputy Foreign Minister level. He proposes that Mr. Hurd will represent the United Kingdom. This is now essentially a US initiative, and the Chairmanship still has to be decided. The meeting is most likely to take place on Monday at Carlton Gardens; (the FCO think it will be almost impossible to set it up before then).

There should be a telegram in from Washington in the morning suggesting how we should play this meeting; the FCO will also of course be considering. Michael or I will be in touch with you.

I told Lord Carrington that I was sure that you would go along with these arrangements - in fact, of course, it is what the US seemed to have in mind earlier. Lord Carrington will probably ring you tomorrow to bring you up-to-date further.

out

R.

28 December 1979

AFGHANISTAN: Michael Brunson - 28 December, 1979

The Russians sent plenty of troops into Kabul, the capital of Afghanistan, perhaps as many as six thousand, in what seems to have been their biggest military operation since the invasion of Czechoslovakia 11 years ago.

Moscow Radio said today that it had been asked for military help by the new leader, President Karmul, and had agreed: in fact, it's clear that Russia's been sending in some troops for months, and vast numbers since Christmas Day.

It was the Russians who engineered the coup which overthrew this man, President R. Hafizullal Amin: Kabul radio said today that he'd been executed after being found guilty by a revolutionary court. It's suggested that he wasn't pro-Russian enough, but that isn't the main reason for the Russian move.

What concerns Moscow most is where Afghanistan is, and who her neighbours are.

To the West, Iran: and Moscow is incredibly uneasy about the Islamic revolution there. To the East, the Muslim state of Pakistan, which has close links with China. Their great fear is that their own huge Muslim population, especially that centred around the Russian cities of Tashkent and Samarkand, might get similar ideas of a Muslim religious uprising, something which an Afghanistan in the hands of Muslim rebels could make even more likely.

In fact, such rebels already hold sizeable areas of Afghanistan. These men have long been opposed to what they see as the godless ideas of the Russians who have been controlling their government in Kabul.

The last President of Afghanistan - the one that's just been executed - tried bombing the rebels into submission: it didn't work, and that seems to be the main reason why the Russians moved in.

Today the new President tried a new line with the rebels - offering them in a radio broadcast the possibility of political talks rather than military confrontation. But in Iran and Pakistan exiled representatives of these men said they will continue to fight the new regime, just as they fought the old one. Which raises the possibility of the Russians now getting involved directly in a Vietnam style war in Afghanistan.

ITN 'News at Ten'

Mufaxed to
Chequers at
P.M.'s request.

AFGHANISTAN: Michael Brunson - 28th December, 1979

The Russians sent plenty of troops into Kabul, the capital of Afghanistan, perhaps as many as six thousand, in what seems to have been their biggest military operation since the invasion of Czechoslovakia 11 years ago.

Moscow Radio said today that it had been asked for military help by the new leader, President Karmal, and had agreed: in fact, it's clear that Russia's been sending in some troops for months, ~~President Karmal~~ and vast numbers since Christmas Day.

It was the Russians who engineered the coup which overthrew this man, President ~~K~~ Hafizullah Amin: Kabul radio said today that he'd been executed after being found guilty by a revolutionary court. It's suggested that ~~being found guilty by~~ he wasn't pro-Russian enough, but that isn't the main reason for the Russian move.

What concerns Moscow most is where Afghanistan is, and who her neighbours are.

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CONFIDENTIAL



Mufaxed to
Chequers.
21.30 hrs
28.12.79.

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London S.W.1

28 December 1979

f.s.
Vance

Prime Minister

Are you content with
draft to message to Brezhnev?

Dear Tim,

Afghanistan

28/12

Following President Carter's telephone conversation with the Prime Minister this afternoon, and the Prime Minister's subsequent conversation with the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary, I attach:

1. A telegram which we have sent to UKMIS New York seeking Sir A Parsons views on how best to put in hand a Western initiative in the United Nations condemning Soviet behaviour in Afghanistan; and
2. A suggested text, in the form of a draft telegram to Moscow, for a message from the Prime Minister to President Brezhnev.

Mr Vance told Lord Carrington that the message from President Carter to Mr Brezhnev would issue this evening. We shall confirm with the Americans that it has in fact been delivered before instructing HM Embassy Moscow to deliver any message from the Prime Minister. If the Prime Minister is content with the text, could you inform the FCO Resident Clerk so that the telegram to Moscow can issue.

Yours etc

(P Lever)
Private Secretary

T Lankester Esq
10 Downing Street

Spoke to Resident Clerk :

① told him that PM/LA

Carrington content with text.

CONFIDENTIAL

② should be delivered subject to X.

③ asked for advice on whether to release to press. He will consider.

28/12

28 DEC 1979

11 12 1
10 2 3
9 4
8 7 6 5

File No.

Department

Drafted by
(Block Capitals)

Tel. Extn.....

OUTWARD

TELEGRAM

Security Classification
CONFIDENTIAL

Precedence
IMMEDIATE

DESKBYZ

FOR
COMMS. DEPT.
USE

Despatched

(Date)

(Time)Z

POSTBY.....Z

PREAMBLE

(Time of Origin)Z(G.M.T.)

(Restrictive Prefix).....

(Security Class.) CONFIDENTIAL

(Caveat/
Privacy Marking).....

(Codeword)

(Deskby).....Z

TO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK Tel. No. of
(precedence) (post)

AND TO (precedence/post).....

AND SAVING TO.....

REPEATED TO (for info) IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON

SAVING TO (for info).....

Distribution:-

- Files
- SAD EESD
- UN Dept
- NAD
- EID(E)
- Mr Fergusson
- ~~Mr. ...~~
- Mr Stratton
- Mr Cortazzi
- Sir D. Maitland
- PS/Mr Bisher
- PS

Copies to:-
 with the aim of
 securing a resolution
 condemning
 the Soviet action,
 or at least the
 faking of such
 a resolution.

[TEXT]

Your telegram No 1956: AFGHANISTAN

1. President Carter telephoned the Prime Minister today. The Americans are greatly concerned about the situation and Carter is sending a personal message to Brezhnev tonight. At the President's request the Prime Minister agreed to send Brezhnev a message of her own. This will be despatched over the weekend.

2. Carter also attached importance to action being taken in the United Nations, but explained that the Americans were not best placed at the moment to take an initiative themselves. He therefore asked if the UK ^{and other western countries} could take action.

The Prime Minister and I agree that action in the UN is desirable. We hope that

3. ~~We need to consider how best we can persuade the other~~ ^{with} Western members of the Security Council to join us in a joint initiative. Grateful for your views, ~~on how we might~~ ^{back} go about this, ~~and your suggestions for a possible~~ ^{draft} draft on how best to achieve this and your suggestions for a possible draft.

File No.

Department SAD

Drafted by G R Archer

(Block Capitals)

Tel. Extn. 233 5993

OUTWARD

TELEGRAM

Security Classification CONFIDENTIAL
Precedence
DESKBYZ

FOR COMMS. DEPT. USE	Despatched	(Date)	POSTBY.....Z
		(Time)Z	

PREAMBLE

(Time of Origin)Z(G.M.T.) (Restrictive Prefix).....

(Security Class.) CONFIDENTIAL (Caveat/Privacy Marking).....

(Codeword) (Deskby).....Z

TO..... MOSCOW Tel. No. of
(precedence) (post)

AND TO (precedence/post).....

AND SAVING TO.....

REPEATED TO (for info) KABUL, WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK, ISLAMABAD, BONN, PARIS, ROME, DUBLIN, UKDEL NATO

SAVING TO (for info).....

Distribution:-

[TEXT]

DRAFT MESSAGE FROM PRIME MINISTER TO PRESIDENT BREZHNEV

I have been profoundly disturbed at recent developments in Afghanistan. The large scale deployment of Soviet troops has coincided with a coup led by someone who had been absent from Afghanistan, living in Eastern Europe for over a year, and who returned to the country at the same time as the arrival of the Soviet troops.

I have seen the statement by the Soviet Government handed to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office late on 27 December by the Soviet Embassy in London and am frankly puzzled by the assertion that recent Soviet action was at the invitation of the Afghan Government. After all, the new Government was only announced on 28 December. Nor can I see that Soviet action is justified in terms of Article 51 of the UN Charter. There is no evidence of which we are aware to substantiate charges of outside interference in the affairs of Afghanistan. The only country which has

/involved

Copies to:-

CONFIDENTIAL

involved itself in recent years in Afghan internal problems is the Soviet Union.

It is clear that the Soviet Union has sought a pretext to impose its will on a smaller neighbour. And what you admit to be open Soviet military intervention in the affairs of another independent country has been undertaken without any mandate from the Afghan people as a whole. I believe that the people of Afghanistan have a right to choose their own Government without outside interference. Recent Soviet action appears to limit this freedom. I should welcome your assurance that all Soviet troops will be withdrawn at a very early date, leaving the Afghan people to determine their own future.

*Agreed - subject
to hard c's
agreement.
out.*

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET

2



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

28 December 1979

President Carter telephoned the Prime Minister at 1745 hours today about developments in Afghanistan. The following is a summary of their conversation.

The President said that he regarded the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan as an extremely grave development. It was similar in scope and permanent impact to their intervention in Czechoslovakia. They had in effect converted Afghanistan into a puppet nation, and this would have profound strategic consequences on the stability of the whole region. It was essential that this action should be made as politically costly for the Soviet Union as possible. It was likely to cause serious problems for the non-aligned countries of the area, and he intended to call upon them to speak out against it. The Administration did not intend to allow their concern about the signing of SALT II to interfere with their taking a strong stand against the Soviets for what they had done in Afghanistan. He would have been prepared to take this issue immediately to the Security Council; but because of the initiative over Iran, it would be better if other countries could do so. Perhaps the United Kingdom, or China or some of the non-aligned countries could take the lead. He hoped that there could be a Council meeting on Afghanistan in the very near future. Furthermore, he thought that an early meeting of the North Atlantic Council would be highly desirable. In order to discuss these possibilities, he proposed to send Mr. Warren Christopher to Europe over the weekend. There was a real need for urgency since the Soviets had been allowed to get away with too much. He would probably make known to the American press later today his serious concern about the Soviet intervention. He had already spoken to Herr Genscher, who had said that the Germans shared the Administration's concern. They (the Germans) were particularly worried about the impact which the latest Soviet move might have on Romania and Yugoslavia, and the precedent which it might set in Europe generally. Finally, he intended to send a personal message to Brezhnev expressing deepest concern about this development. It would be helpful if the United Kingdom could do the same.

/ The Prime Minister

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- 2 -

The Prime Minister said that she shared the President's concern about the Soviet move and she agreed that swift action was needed. She and Lord Carrington would be very happy to receive Mr. Christopher over the weekend to discuss the possibilities of taking this issue to the Security Council and to the North Atlantic Council. She also agreed to consider immediately the President's suggestion that we should send a message to Brezhnev.

I am sending copies of this letter to Brian Norbury (Ministry of Defence) and Martin Vile (Cabinet Office).

TPL


Paul Lever, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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COVERING SECRET

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Ag
Rush

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

28 December 1979

I am enclosing a copy of the transcript of the Prime Minister's conversation with the President of the United States this evening as requested.

TPL

Paul Lever, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

COVERING SECRET

CB

SUBJECT

SECRET

Iran (Sit^u)

la

TELEPHONE CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER AND THE PRESIDENT
CARTER ON FRIDAY 28 DECEMBER 1979

PRIME MINISTER'S

PERSONAL MESSAGE

SERIAL No. T180A/79T

Prime Minister: Hello, how are you?

President: Just fine. It's a great pleasure to talk to you.

Prime Minister: Well I know you have a very busy round of telephone calls and I think the right greeting is that I hope you have had a very happy christmas and a peaceful new year to us all.

President: Well you beat me to it, that was exactly what I was going to say to start with.

Prime Minister: And thank you for the marvellous visit that we had with you.

President: Let me tell you what I wanted to discuss with you. First of all we regard the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan as an extremely grave development. I would say similar in scope and permanent impact of what they did in Czechoslovakia. They have in effect changed a proper nation into a puppet nation and I think it/have profound strategic consequences on the stability of that entire region. Secondly I think that it is essential that we make this action as politically costly as possible to the Soviet Union. I don't think we can force them out but they have a very serious problem with the non-aligned movement in particular with the Moslem countries not only Pakistan and Iran, India and others of a similar nature in the region but also I think with the entire non-aligned movement and I intend to call on these countries, the Moslem countries and the non-aligned countries to speak out. The next thing is that . . . PM interrupts . . . with SALT independently of what happened in Afghanistan but we are not going to let our concern about SALT interfere with a strong move to condemn the Soviets about what they have done in Afghanistan. I don't think we can afford to let them get away with this, with impunity. But we are prepared to carry it all away to the United Nations in the next number of days but because of our own efforts in getting the Security Council to vote on Iran as regards to the hostages it is probably not advisable for us to take the initiative with the United Nations. There are others that can do this. You all or maybe China or some of the non-^{aligned} countries. And the last point I would like to

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/ make is

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- 2 -

make is I think we ought to dramatise our concern. We would like very much to have an automatic council meeting just on the Afghanistan question. And I would like to send a high level person to meet maybe even this weekend and preferably this weekend to decide how we as a body are going to address the issue.

Prime Minister: Yes well good. I shall be about and Peter Carrington will because it so happens that I am seeing him on Sunday.

President: That's good.

Prime Minister: So certainly one would be very welcome here. And it so happens that Peter and I will be meeting on Sunday.

President: OK. Do you agree that we ought to get the North Atlantic Council together.

Prime Minister: Oh I think so. I think so. I think when something like this occurs the important thing is to act right at the beginning.

President: Yes so do I. I think that the Soviets have gotten away with it already maybe for too many hours. We have been raising as you may have noticed our concern about the Soviet military movements now for two or three weeks.

Prime Minister: Yes. I know you notice that we . . .

President: continuing . . at Secretary of State level but I am probably going to make my concern known to the American press personally this afternoon - I haven't yet decided about that - and we have all a real need I think to let the Soviets know how serious it is. We have got a message from the Germans and so I talked to Genscher this morning. They are extremely concerned about the future impact on countries like not only Pakistan but Romania, Yugoslavia, even the precedent that it establishes concerning the relationship with the Warsaw Pact countries towards our European allies. And so I think that we ought to weigh in very heavily.

Prime Minister: Well certainly we'll welcome anyone you send over. Tomorrow or the next day or the day after that. Just whenever he comes.

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- 3 -

President: Well I'll probably send Warren Christopher. He's our top man second only to Cy.

Prime Minister: Yes

President: And I think that I'll suggest to Cy that he gives maybe Lord Carrington a call within the next few hours to discuss in some detail.

Prime Minister: Yes I will be calling Peter Carrington fairly quickly. He doesn't live very far away. We're both in the country and I'll call him. Warren Christopher will be coming and if Cy will call Peter then Peter and I can be in contact very quickly. I do think its important to act quickly.

President: Well so do I.

Prime Minister: What action we can take . . .

President: Cy will be delivering our Iran message to the United Nations Security Council personally and this will take his time tomorrow and the next day.

Prime Minister: Of course.

President: One of the things that has caused us some serious concern are the very extensive amendments that you all have requested on the Security Council Resolution and I would hope that you would not be so, excuse me using the word, adamant about these three items I think they are going to require a great deal of . .

Prime Minister: What I wanted to make clear is that they are technical amendments as far as we are concerned because of our own legislation. They are technical but I'll get our boys to get on to you . . .

President: . . legality question I don't believe we can solve it within the next couple of days .

Prime Minister: No.

SECRET

/ President:

SECRET

- 4 -

President: And we have expressed ourselves willing to make a change in the Resolution to permit the jointly owned Iranian flag ships to carry their oil but the other points that would be very difficult for us to resolve within the next day or two.

Prime Minister: Who in your office could my technical boys get on to about this?

President: I think that can be worked out with Cy and No. 10 or Lord Carrington better than between you and me - I don't know that much about this.

Prime Minister: I asked exactly before when I knew you were telephoning I asked exactly about the details of the technical amendments and I haven't got the full details but they said look they are not wrecking in any way they are merely necessary but they might have to be unnecessary in view of what you said. They are merely advisable for us because of our own legislation.

President: I understand that. But I think there is no way that you and I in the next couple of days even if we met personally could resolve the extritoriality question. This is something that has been kicking around among the legal people for a long time.

Prime Minister: And we can't do it because they have raised cases before the courts.

President: And we can't do it in the Security Council either. But there were three points and that was one and another one that I recall was that there are, I think, ten ships that are jointly owned between your companies and Iran and five of them fly British flags and the other five fly the Iranian flag. That wouldn't be any problem for us we could make a quick change in the language and could accommodate your need on that. And I don't even recall what the other one is.

Prime Minister: No well I don't offhand.

President: No well I'll tell Cy to try to work it out with Lord Carrington.

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Prime Minister:

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- 5 -

Prime Minister: I'll tell him too.

President: I'll be calling Helmut and Giscard d'Estaing and the Prime Minister of Italy as well after I've got to talk to you but I wanted to talk to you first.

Prime Minister: Well that's very kind of you. Well I'll get them onto that and if they can't be dealt with then that's that.

President: I understand. Well thank you very much. We'll stay in close touch with you.

Prime Minister: All right. And very best wishes. I just hope that you 've got the requisite number of votes. Have you? Lined up?

President: Margaret I think we will have the requisite number of votes if we give some time for the Secretary General to work something out pending the imposition of the sanctions.

Prime Minister: I see you're going in two stages to get the approval for sanctions but suspension of the operations so as to give . . .

President: . . maybe for five, six days time.

Prime Minister: Yes I've got it.

President: And we have just finished our National Security Council meeting and this is what I have decided and we wouldn't want to announce this but I think that would bring aboard more than enough votes.

Prime Minister: I think its advisable, because I think it gives them some incentive to release them.

President: Yes it does and it lets them save face if they want to save face.

Prime Minister: That's right.

SECRET

/ President:

SECRET

- 6 -

President: My judgement is that Khomeini doesn't want to do anything but his Proletarian and other members of the Revolutionary Council - that's how I guess but there is no way to tell what he has in his own mind.

Prime Minister: Yes.

President: Well good luck and thank you very much.

Prime Minister: Well thank you very much. And please don't hesitate to get someone to ring me if it helps and I'll be on straightaway to Peter. I will look forward to receiving someone over the weekend.

President: One thing that you might . . . I'm going to send a personal message to Brezhnev, worded very strongly expressing our deep concern about this development and if you would consider doing that it would help.

Prime Minister: Right I will get onto it immediately.

President: And just well I'm here if you need to call me.

Prime Minister: All right Jimmy. Thank you very much. Thank you for phoning and all best wishes. Thank you. Goodbye.

SECRET

UNCLASSIFIED

14186 - 1

GRS 246

UNCLASSIFIED

FM FCO 281300Z DECEMBER 79

TO IMMEDIATE KABUL

TELEGRAM NUMBER 211 OF 28 DECEMBER 79

AND TO IMMEDIATE MOSCOW

INFO WASHINGTON, DUBLIN, PARIS, ROME, BONN, UKDEL NATO, UKMIS NEW YORK, ISLAMABAD, NEW DELHI, TEHRAN, PEKING, KUALA LUMPUR, SINGAPORE JAKARTA MANILA BANGKOK

MIPT: AFGHAN COUP D'ETAT

TEXT OF STATEMENT WAS AS FOLLOWS:

THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT CONDEMN THE SOVIET UNION'S MILITARY INTERVENTION. WE BELIEVE THAT THE PEOPLE OF AFGHANISTAN HAVE A RIGHT TO CHOOSE THEIR OWN GOVERNMENT WITHOUT OUTSIDE INTERFERENCE. (LINE FOR SUPPLEMENTARIES)

MUCH IS STILL UNCLEAR ABOUT YESTERDAY'S EVENTS IN KABUL BUT NOTHING CAN DISGUISE THE FACT THAT THE SOVIET UNION HAVE CARRIED OUT AN OPEN MILITARY INTERVENTION IN THE AFFAIRS OF ANOTHER INDEPENDENT COUNTRY WITHOUT ANY MANDATE TO DO SO FROM THE AFGHAN PEOPLE AS A WHOLE.

THE SOVIET UNION HAVE OFFERED NO CONVINCING EXPLANATION FOR THEIR ACTION OR FOR THE FACT THAT THEIR MILITARY DEPLOYMENT HAS COINCIDED WITH AN APPARENT COUP CARRIED OUT BY SOMEONE WHO HAS BEEN ABSENT FROM AFGHANISTAN AND APPEARS TO HAVE RETURNED FROM EASTERN EUROPE AT THE SAME TIME AS THE ARRIVAL OF THE SOVIET TROOPS.

WE ARE STILL PIECING TOGETHER THE STORY. REPORTS FROM KABUL CONFIRM THAT THERE HAS BEEN FIGHTING IN THE CITY AND THAT THE SOVIET UNION HAVE CARRIED OUT A MAJOR MILITARY DEPLOYMENT THERE.

CARRINGTON

NNNN

[COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING ST]

FCO/WHITEHALL

SAD

COPIES TO
ASSESSMENTS STAFF, CABINET OFFICE

Prince Amir

This is the statement
which Lord Carrington

mentioned he had put out.

[Handwritten initials]

R 28/12

[Handwritten initials]

DRAFT STATEMENT FOR NEWS DEPARTMENT (ON THE RECORD)

The British Government condemns the Soviet Union's military intervention. We believe that the people of Afghanistan have a right to choose their own Government without outside interference. ~~We call upon the Soviet Union to withdraw their forces and to refrain from further intervention in Afghanistan.~~

Line for supplementaries

Much is still unclear about yesterday's events in Kabul but nothing can disguise the fact that the Soviet Union have carried out an open military intervention in the affairs of another independent country without any mandate to do so from the Afghan people as a whole.

The Soviet Union have offered no convincing explanation for their action or for the fact that their military deployment has coincided with an apparent coup carried out by someone who has been absent from Afghanistan and appears to have returned from Eastern Europe at the same time as the arrival of the Soviet troops.

We are still piecing together the story. Reports from Kabul confirm that there has been fighting in the city and that the Soviet Union have carried out a major military deployment there.

GRS 175

CONFIDENTIAL

FM FCO 281250Z DEC 79

TO IMMEDIATE KABUL

TELEGRAM NUMBER 210 OF 28 DECEMBER

AND TO IMMEDIATE MOSCOW

INFO WASHINGTON, DUBLIN, PARIS, ROME, BONN, UKDEL NATO, UKMIS NEW YORK, ISLAMABAD, NEW DELHI, TEHRAN, PEKING, KUALA LUMPUR, SINGAPORE, JAKARTA, MANILA, BANGKOK.

YOUR TELEGRAM NO 288: AFGHAN COUP D'ETAT

1. WE DO NOT WISH TO TAKE EARLY DECISION ON RECOGNITION BUT IF YOU ARE SUMMONED (EG FOR ANY GENERAL DIPLOMATIC BRIEFING) YOU MAY ATTEND IF THE OTHER MEMBERS OF THE DIPLOMATIC CORPS (AND IN PARTICULAR YOUR COMMUNITY COLLEAGUES) DO SO.

2. NEWS DEPARTMENT ARE ISSUING ON THE RECORD PRESS STATEMENT AT 1230 PM PRESS BRIEFING TODAY AS IN MIFT. THEY WILL CONFIRM THAT WE ARE NOT YET TAKING ANY DECISION ABOUT RECOGNITION.

3. A COREU HAS BEEN SENT INFORMING OUR COMMUNITY PARTNERS OF THE NEWS DEPARTMENT LINE.

4. (FOR NEW DELHI PEKING KUALA LUMPUR SINGAPORE JAKARTA MANILA BANGKOK) YOU SHOULD ADVISE GOVERNMENTS TO WHICH YOU ARE ACCREDITED OF NEWS DEPT STATEMENT AND ASK ABOUT THEIR OWN REACTIONS.

CARRINGTON

NNNN

DIST

FCO/WHITEHALL

SAD

[COPIES SENT TO 'NO 10 DOWNING ST']

COPIES TO
ASSESSMENTS STAFF - CABINET
OFFICE

UNCLASSIFIED

FM F C O 281130Z DEC 79

TO IMMEDIATE MOSCOW

TELEGRAM NUMBER 797 OF 28 DECEMBER

INFO IMMEDIATE KABUL, ISLAMABAD, WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK,
ROUTINE BONN, PARIS, UKDEL NATO, NEW DELHI, TEHRAN.

M.I.P.T. AFGHANISTAN.

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF SOVIET GOVERNMENT STATEMENT.

QUOTE.

IT IS OF COMMON KNOWLEDGE TO THE WORLD, AND TO THE GOVERNMENT OF GREAT BRITAIN, THAT FOR A LONG PERIOD OF TIME AN OUTSIDE INTERFERENCE IN THE INTERNAL AFGHAN AFFAIRS IS TAKING PLACE, INCLUDING THE ONE WITH A DIRECT USE OF AN ARMED FORCE. IT IS QUITE OBVIOUS THAT THE PURPOSE OF THIS INTERFERENCE IS TO OVERTHROW THE DEMOCRATIC SYSTEM ESTABLISHED AS A RESULT OF THE VICTORY OF THE APRIL REVOLUTION OF 1978. AFGHAN PEOPLE, ITS ARMED FORCES ARE ACTIVELY REPELLING THESE AGGRESSIVE ACTS, GIVE A REBUFF TO THE ATTEMPTS ON DEMOCRATIC ACHIEVEMENTS, SOVEREIGNTY AND NATIONAL DIGNITY OF AFGHANISTAN. HOWEVER THE ACTS OF THE OUTSIDE AGRESSION CONTINUE AND AT AN EVER LARGER SCALE AT THAT. UP TO THIS MOMENT MILITARY UNITS AND ARMS ARE BEING SENT FROM ABROAD.

IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES THE LEADERSHIP OF THE STATE OF AFGHANISTAN APPROACHED THE SOVIET UNION FOR HELP AND ASSISTANCE IN THE STRUGGLE AGAINST THE OUTSIDE AGGRESSION. THE SOVIET UNION, GUIDED BY THE COMMUNITY OF INTERESTS OF AFGHANISTAN AND OUR COUNTRY IN THE MATTERS OF SECURITY AS IT IS SET FORTH IN THE TREATY OF FRIENDSHIP, GOOD-NEIGHBOURLINESS AND COOPERATION OF 1978, BY THE INTERESTS OF MAINTAINING PEACE IN THIS REGION, MET POSITIVELY THIS REQUEST OF THE LEADERSHIP OF AFGHANISTAN AND MADE A DECISION TO SEND TO AFGHANISTAN LIMITED MILITARY CONTINGENTS TO ACCOMPLISH THE TASKS REQUESTED BY THE LEADERSHIP OF AFGHANISTAN. THE SOVIET UNION HERE PROCEEDS ALSO FROM THE RELEVANT PROVISIONS OF THE UN CHARTER, IN PARTICULAR, FROM ARTICLE 51 WHICH PROVIDES FOR THE RIGHT OF STATES FOR INDIVIDUAL AND COLLECTIVE SELF-DEFENCE IN ORDER TO REPEL AGGRESSION AND RESTORE PEACE.


/THE SOVIET

THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT, INFORMING THE GOVERNMENT OF GREAT BRITAIN ABOUT ALL THIS, FINDS IT ALSO NECESSARY TO STATE THAT AFTER THE REASONS WHICH CAUSED THIS ACTION OF THE SOVIET UNION CEASE TO EXIST IT INTENDS TO WITHDRAW ITS MILITARY CONTINGENTS FROM THE TERRITORY OF AFGHANISTAN.

THE SOVIET UNION EMPHASISES AGAIN THAT, AS BEFORE, ITS ONLY WISH IS TO SEE AFGHANISTAN AS AN INDEPENDENT, SOVEREIGN STATE WHICH PURSUES THE POLICY OF GOOD-NEIGHBOURLINESS AND PEACE AND WHICH FIRMLY RESPECTS AND FULFILLS ITS INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS INCLUDING THOSE UNDER THE UN CHARTER.

UNQUOTE

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FROM FCO 281130Z DEC 79

TO IMMEDIATE MOSCOW

TELEGRAM NUMBER 796 OF 28 DECEMBER

INFO IMMEDIATE KABUL ISLAMABAD WASHINGTON UKMIS NEW YORK ROUTINE BONN

PARIS UKDEL NATO NEW DELHI TEHRAN

*La
Ruh*

AFGHANISTAN

1. KELINE, MINISTER-COUNSELLOR OF THE SOVIET EMBASSY, ASKED FOR AN APPOINTMENT LATE ON 27 DECEMBER TO DELIVER AN URGENT COMMUNICATION ABOUT AFGHANISTAN. HE SAW BULLARD AT THE LATTER'S HOME JUST BEFORE MIDNIGHT.

2. KELINE HANDED OVER A STATEMENT BY THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT (UNOFFICIAL TRANSLATION IN MIFT) AND ASKED THAT IT BE BROUGHT URGENTLY TO MY ATTENTION AND THAT OF THE PRIME MINISTER. IN ANSWER TO QUESTIONS HE SAID HE THOUGHT THAT THE STATEMENT WAS ALSO BEING GIVEN TO OTHER GOVERNMENTS BUT WAS NOT BEING PUBLISHED. (THE GERMANS HERE HAVE CONFIRMED THAT THE SOVIET MISSION HAVE TAKEN SIMILAR ACTION IN BONN). IT WAS NOT TO BE REGARDED AS THE REPLY TO CORTAZZI'S REMARKS OF 20 DECEMBER (MY TELNO 786) BUT AS AN EXPRESSION OF THE WISH OF THE SOVIET UNION THAT ITS POLICY IN AFGHANISTAN BE CORRECTLY UNDERSTOOD.

3. KELINE DECLINED TO ANSWER FURTHER QUESTIONS ABOUT THE SOURCE OF THE ALLEGED OUTSIDE INTERFERENCE REFERRED TO IN THE FIRST PARAGRAPH, THE PRESENT AND LIKELY FUTURE SIZE OF THE SOVIET MILITARY CONTINGENTS AND THE CONNEXION WITH YESTERDAY'S COUP D'ETAT IN KABUL ETC. BULLARD SAID THAT AS LONG AS SUCH QUESTIONS WENT UNANSWERED THERE WOULD BE SUSPICION THAT THE SOVIET UNION WAS INVENTING A PRETEXT TO IMPOSE ITS WILL ON A SMALLER NEIGHBOUR. HE HOPED THE RUSSIANS KNEW WHAT THEY WERE DOING: THEIR PRESENT INVOLVEMENT IN AFGHANISTAN RECALLED A CERTAIN PERIOD IN THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE IN VIETNAM, WHICH MANY AMERICANS NOW BITTERLY REGRETTED. THE STATEMENT WOULD BE DULY NOTED, ESPECIALLY THE SENTENCE ABOUT THE INTENTION TO WITHDRAW SOVIET TROOPS WHEN THEIR MISSION WAS COMPLETE.

4. KELINE'S MANNER WAS EVEN MORE NERVOUS AND UNCERTAIN THAN USUAL.

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FM FCO 201730Z DEC 79

TO IMMEDIATE MOSCOW

TELEGRAM NUMBER 786 OF 20 DECEMBER

AND TO UKDEL NATO

INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON, PARIS, BONN, KABUL, ISLAMABAD, DELHI,
WELLINGTON, CANBERRA, OTTAWA MODUK (D 14)FELL'S LETTER OF 13 DECEMBER TO LAVERS (NOT TO ALL)
AFGHAN/SOVIET RELATIONS

1. THE AMERICANS HAD ALSO ASKED US HERE TO EXPRESS OUR CONCERN
TO THE RUSSIANS ON THE BUILD-UP OF SOVIET FORCES IN AFGHANISTAN.

2. CORTAZZI SAW KELINE, SOVIET MINISTER COUNSELLOR ON
20 DECEMBER. CORTAZZI SAID WE HAD RECEIVED REPORTS THAT THE
SOVIET UNION HAD SUBSTANTIALLY INCREASED ITS MILITARY PRESENCE
IN AFGHANISTAN. WE UNDERSTOOD THAT A BATTALION OF AIR-BORNE
TROOPS HAD RECENTLY BEEN STATIONED AT BAGRAM NORTH OF KABUL.
THEY WERE SAID TO HAVE WITH THEM THEIR FULL COMBAT EQUIPMENT.
THIS WAS IN ADDITION TO THE SOVIET MILITARY PERSONNEL WHO WERE
ALREADY IN AFGHANISTAN. THE SOVIET UNION SHOULD BE IN NO DOUBT
THAT THIS WAS A DEVELOPMENT WHICH CAUSED US CONCERN. THE
PRESIDENCY, ON BEHALF OF FOREIGN MINISTERS OF THE NINE, HAD
RECENTLY STATED THEIR VIEW IN THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT THAT THE
PEOPLE OF AFGHANISTAN SHOULD BE FREE TO DETERMINE THEIR FUTURE FOR
THEMSELVES. WE SHOULD BE GLAD OF AN ASSURANCE THAT NO SOVIET
INTERVENTION WAS CONTEMPLATED WHICH WOULD INFRINGE THAT FREEDOM.

3. CORTAZZI ADDED THAT HE HAD RECENTLY BEEN IN PAKISTAN. WE
HAD SOME DIFFERENCES OF VIEW WITH THE PAKISTANIS, BUT WE HAD
FRIENDLY RELATIONS WITH THEM AND UNDERSTOOD THEIR FEARS ABOUT
WHAT MIGHT BE HAPPENING IN AFGHANISTAN. CORTAZZI ASKED THAT THE
DEMARCHE BE REPORTED TO MOSCOW AND KELINE UNDERTOOK TO DO THIS.

4. KELINE SAID THAT THE SOVIET EMBASSY IN LONDON WAS NOT (NOT) INFORMED ABOUT EVENTS IN AFGHANISTAN. THE SOVIET UNION HAD 'ABSOLUTELY NORMAL' BILATERAL RELATIONS WITH AFGHANISTAN, AND EVERYTHING THAT WAS HAPPENING IN AFGHANISTAN WAS A PURELY BILATERAL MATTER. HE COULD NOT THEREFORE SAY WHAT THE REACTION WOULD BE IN MOSCOW TO THE REQUEST FOR AN ASSURANCE CONCERNING THESE BILATERAL RELATIONS. THE SOVIET UNION DID NOT REQUIRE ASSURANCES FROM THE UNITED KINGDOM ABOUT HER BILATERAL RELATIONS WITH THIRD COUNTRIES. HE FOUND IT STRANGE THAT WE SHOULD REFER TO 'INTERVENTION'.

5. IT WOULD BE HELPFUL TO KNOW WHAT ACTION HAS BEEN TAKEN BY OTHER MAJOR NATO GOVERNMENTS. IN PARTICULAR DO THE FRENCH AND THE GERMANS PROPOSE TO TAKE A ROBUST LINE? WE HAVE NOT YET RECEIVED AN ACCOUNT FROM THE AMERICAN EMBASSY HERE OF PRECISELY WHAT CHRISTOPHER SAID TO THE SOVIET CHARGE ON 11 DECEMBER (WASHINGTON TELNO 4021). WE SHOULD BE GRATEFUL FOR THIS.

6. COPY ADDRESSEES (EXCEPT KABUL) MAY INFORM GOVERNMENT'S TO WHICH THEY ARE ACCREDITED OF THE ACTION WE HAVE TAKEN.

7. SEE MIFT (NOT TO ALL).

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SIR A DUFF

UND

MR CORTAZZI

EID (E)

MR BULLARD

DEF DEP

MR FERGUSSON

PLANN STAFF

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Subject filed on
USA : Nov. 79: Visit to
US Policy

Extract from Record of Meeting between
PM and President Carter, Washington, 17.12.79 (Pt 4)

Afghanistan

The President said that Soviet troop levels in Afghanistan were building up. A new battalion had been flown in the previous day. Mr. Brzezinski said that two Soviet divisions which had previously been located just to the north of the Afghanistan frontier had disappeared. The evidence was derived from satellite photographs. It was not now known where the two divisions were but it was obviously possible they had moved into Afghanistan. The President said that the American Government had made the moves public and had expressed concern. It might be helpful if the Prime Minister could do the same e.g. by public statement or on the BBC. Mr. Vance said that the Russians now had four battalions in the area near the airstrip at Kabul, i.e. 1,800 men plus an HQ. The President noted that the group was equipped with aircraft and personnel carriers. The Soviet Union had shown they were increasingly prepared to act militarily in Afghanistan. There was evidence that they had participated in air-strikes and in suppressing groups of opposition guerrillas. If the Prime Minister would like to receive regularly reports through the CIA, this could be arranged. The Prime Minister said she would indeed be interested in seeing such reports. Mr. Brzezinski noted that in a recent incident a Soviet manned aircraft had dropped bombs on the Russian side of the border.

SECRET

