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Pt 2

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Internal Situation.
Soviet Military Intervention.

AFGHANISTAN

Pt 1 - December 1979

Pt 2: January 1980

Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date
7.1.80							

PART 2 ends:-

US Embassy + T13/80 to PM 20.1.80.

PART 3 begins:-

Tel Frm Dacca 42 of 21.1.80



EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

London

January 20, 1980

*Original on SPORT Jan 1980
Question of UK participation in the
1980 Olympics following Soviet invasion
of Afghanistan.*

Afghanistan

*1 to
10
20.1.80*

Dear Prime Minister:

I have been asked to deliver the enclosed message to you from President Carter, which was received at the Embassy this morning.

Sincerely,

Paul P. Pilkauskas

Paul P. Pilkauskas
First Secretary
Duty Officer

The Rt. Hon. Margaret Thatcher, M.P.
Prime Minister
10 Downing Street
London SW1

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T 13/80

January 20, 1980

The Rt. Hon. Margaret Thatcher, M.P.
Prime Minister
10 Downing Street
London, SW1

Dear Prime Minister:

On January 20, I am sending the attached letter to the President of the United States Olympic Committee informing him that I cannot support United States participation in the Summer Olympic Games in Moscow, the capital city of a nation whose invading military forces are occupying Afghanistan. I am requesting that the Committee work with other national olympic committees to seek the transfer or cancellation of the 1980 Moscow Olympic Games unless the Soviet Union withdraws its troops from Afghanistan within the next month. If the Soviets do not withdraw and the Games are not transferred or cancelled, I am asking that the United States Olympic Committee not participate in the Games in Moscow, and, instead, work with other nations to organize alternative Games.

I hope that you will urge your own Olympic Committee to take similar action. I believe that such action is necessary to support the position of the United Nations General Assembly, to convince the Soviet Government and people of the world's outrage at Soviet aggression in Afghanistan and to deter future aggression.

Please hold my action in confidence until after 1:00 PM, Washington time, January 20.

Sincerely,

/s/

Jimmy Carter

Attachment

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Text of Letter to Robert Kane

As President of this nation and as Honorary President of the United States Olympic Committee, I write to advise you of my views concerning the Games of the XXII Olympiad scheduled to be held in Moscow this summer.

I regard the Soviet invasion and the attempted suppression of Afghanistan as a serious violation of international law and an extremely serious threat to world peace. This invasion also endangers neighboring independent countries and access to a major part of the world's oil supplies. It therefore threatens our own national security, as well as the security of the region and the entire world.

We must make clear to the Soviet Union that it cannot trample upon an independent nation and at the same time do business as usual with the rest of the world. We must make clear that they will pay a heavy economic and political cost for such aggressions. That is why I have taken the severe economic measures announced on January 4, and why other free nations are supporting these measures. That is why the United Nations General Assembly, by an overwhelming vote of 103 to 18, condemned the invasion and urged the prompt withdrawal of Soviet troops.

I want to reaffirm my own personal commitment to the principles and purposes of the Olympic movement. I believe in the desirability of keeping government policy out of the Olympics, but deeper issues are at stake.

In the Soviet Union international sports competition is itself an aspect of Soviet government policy, as is the decision to invade Afghanistan. The head of the Moscow Olympic organizing committee is a high Soviet government official.

The Soviet government attaches enormous political importance to the holding the 1980 Olympic Games in Moscow, and if the Olympics are not held in Moscow because of Soviet military aggression in Afghanistan, this powerful signal of world outrage cannot be hidden from the Soviet people, and will reverberate around the globe. Perhaps it will deter future aggression.

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I therefore urge the USOC, in cooperation with other National Olympic Committees, to advise the International Olympic Committee that if Soviet troops do not fully withdraw from Afghanistan within the next month, Moscow will become an unsuitable site for a festival meant to celebrate peace and good will. Should the Soviet Union fail to withdraw its troops within the time prescribed above, I urge the USOC to propose that the games either be transferred to another site such as Montreal or to multiple sites, or be cancelled for this year. If the International Olympic Committee rejects such a USOC proposal, I urge the USOC and the Olympic Committees of other like-minded nations not to participate in the Moscow Games. In this event, if suitable arrangements can be made, I urge that such nations conduct alternative Games of their own this summer at some other appropriate site or sites. The United States Government is prepared to lend its full support to any and all such efforts.

I know from your letter to me and your meeting with Secretary Vance and Lloyd Cutler of your deep concern for the men and women throughout the world who have trained tirelessly in the hopes of participating in the 1980 Olympic Games. I share your concern. I would support the participation of athletes from the entire world at Summer Olympic Games or other Games this summer outside the Soviet Union, just as I welcome athletes from the entire world to Lake Placid for the Winter Olympic Games.

I have the deepest admiration and respect for Olympic athletes and their pursuit of excellence. No one understands better than they the meaning of sacrifice to achieve worthy goals. There is no goal of greater importance than the goal at stake here - the security of our nation and the peace of the world.

I also urge that the IOC take a further step to eliminate future political competition among nations to serve as hosts for the Olympic Games. I call upon all nations to join in supporting a permanent site for the Summer Olympics in Greece, and to seek an appropriate permanent site for the Winter Olympics.

The course I am urging is necessary to help secure the peace of the world at this critical time. The most important task of world leaders, public and private, is to deter aggression and prevent war. Aggression destroys the international amity and good will that the Olympic Movement attempts to foster. If our response to aggression is to continue with international sports as usual in the capital

Continued

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3.

of the aggressor, our other steps to deter aggression are undermined.

The spirit and the very future of the games depends upon courageous and resolute action at this time. I call for your support of the other Olympic Committees throughout the world.

/s/

Jimmy Carter

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TELEVISION INTERVIEW WITH PRESIDENT CARTER

PRESIDENT CARTER WAS INTERVIEWED ON AMERICAN TELEVISION TODAY.

FOLLOWING ARE MAIN POINTS FROM HIS REPLIES:

(A) NEITHER HE NOR THE AMERICAN PEOPLE WOULD SUPPORT U.S. PARTICIPATION IN THE OLYMPIC GAMES IN MOSCOW WHILE SOVIET TROOPS REMAINED IN AFGHANISTAN. HE HAD SENT A MESSAGE TO THE U.S. OLYMPIC COMMITTEE PROPOSING THAT, UNLESS SOVIET TROOPS WITHDREW FROM AFGHANISTAN WITHIN A MONTH, THE GAMES SHOULD BE TRANSFERRED TO AN ALTERNATIVE SITE OR SITES OR POSTPONED OR CANCELLED. IF SOVIET TROOPS DID NOT WITHDRAW WITHIN A MONTH HE WOULD NOT SUPPORT U.S. PARTICIPATION IN THE GAMES IN MOSCOW. HE HAD ASKED THE U.S. OLYMPIC COMMITTEE QUOTE TO TAKE THIS POSITION UNQUOTE TO THE INTERNATIONAL OLYMPIC COMMITTEE. THE PRESIDENT HOPED THAT AS MANY NATIONS AS POSSIBLE WOULD SUPPORT THE UNITED STATES BUT, REGARDLESS OF THE POSITION TAKEN BY OTHER COUNTRIES, HE WOULD NOT FAVOUR SENDING A U.S. TEAM TO MOSCOW WHILE SOVIET TROOPS REMAINED IN AFGHANISTAN. (FULL TEXT OF THE PRESIDENT'S REMARKS ON THE OLYMPICS IN MIFT: NOT TO ALL)

(B) THE PRESIDENT HAD NEVER DOUBTED THE NATURE OF THE SOVIET UNION'S LONG-RANGE POLICY AND AMBITIONS AND U.S. DEFENCE POLICY HAD REFLECTED THAT FACT BUT THE SOVIET INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN WAS THE MOST

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ED THAT FACT, BUT THE SOVIET INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN WAS THE MOST SERIOUS THREAT TO WORLD PEACE SINCE WORLD WAR 2 AND THE FIRST TIME THE SOVIET UNION HAD USED HER OWN TROOPS TO ATTACK A COUNTRY OUTSIDE THE WARSAW PACT. THE SOVIET ATTACK CREATED A THREAT IN AN AREA OF VITAL INTEREST TO THE UNITED STATES AND HER ALLIES, PARTICULARLY BECAUSE OF OIL SUPPLIES, AND WAS OF MAJOR STRATEGIC SIGNIFICANCE. IN THE PAST, RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION HAD BEEN A MIXTURE OF INTENSE COMPETITION AND EFFORTS TO FIND PEACEFUL ACCOMMODATIONS. THE PRESIDENT WAS STILL COMMITTED TO PEACE BUT PEACE THROUGH STRENGTH. IT WAS IMPORTANT THAT THE UNITED STATES AND HER ALLIES DEMONSTRATE TO THE SOVIET UNION THAT SHE COULD NOT ATTACK ANOTHER COUNTRY WITH IMPUNITY BUT MUST FACE THE CONSEQUENCES. THE SOVIET UNION HAD SERIOUSLY UNDERESTIMATED THE STRENGTH BOTH OF THE U.S. RESPONSE AND OF THE CONDEMNATION OF WORLD OPINION.

(C) THE GOVERNMENT HAD RECONFIRMED THE 1959 COMMITMENT TO PAKISTAN: THE U.S. WAS COMMITTED TO CONSULTING PAKISTAN AND TO TAKING WHATEVER ACTION WAS NECESSARY, WITHIN THE CONSTITUTIONAL GUIDELINES LAID DOWN, TO PROTECT THE SECURITY OF PAKISTAN, INVOLVING MILITARY FORCE IF NECESSARY. THE U.S. HAD INCREASED, AND WOULD MAINTAIN AT AN INCREASED LEVEL, NAVAL STRENGTH IN THE NORTHERN INDIAN OCEAN AND THE PERSIAN GULF AND WAS EXPLORING THE ESTABLISHMENT OF SERVICING FACILITIES FOR THE U.S. NAVY AND AIRFORCE IN THE SAME AREA.

(D) THE PRESIDENT DEFENDED HIS DECISION TO ADMIT THE SHAH INTO THE U.S.

THE TAKING OF THE U.S. EMBASSY HAD FOLLOWED REPEATED ASSURANCES OF PROTECTION FROM IRANIAN GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS AND STEMMED FROM AN ABUSIVE SPEECH BY KHOMEINI WHICH HAD LED FOR THE WITHDRAWAL OF PROTECTION. HE COULD NOT PREDICT AN EARLY END TO THE ORDEAL OF THE HOSTAGES IN TEHRAN. HIS CONCERN REMAINED AS GREAT AS EVER. THE CAPTURE OF THE HOSTAGES WAS AN ABHORRENT VIOLATION OF EVERY MORAL AND ETHICAL STANDARD AND OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: IT WAS A CRIMINAL ACT SUPPORTED AND ENCOURAGED IN AN UNPRECEDENTED WAY BY OFFICIALS OF THE IRANIAN GOVERNMENT. HIS AIMS WERE TO PROTECT U.S. INTERESTS AND THE SAFETY AND LIVES OF THE HOSTAGES AND TO PURSUE EVERY AVENUE LEADING TO THEIR RELEASE, AVOIDING BLOODSHED IF POSSIBLE. HE HAD FELT FROM THE START THAT THE INITIATION BY THE U.S. MILITARY ACTION WOULD RESULT IN THE DEATHS OF THE HOSTAGES.

(E) THE U.S. WOULD SEEK TO MAINTAIN CONCERTED WORLD PRESSURE ON IRAN, INCLUDING THROUGH SANCTIONS.

IT HAD BEEN HIS CONSTANT CONCERN TO AVOID PUSHING IRAN INTO THE ARMS OF THE SOVIET UNION. HE WANTED A UNITED, STABLE, SECURE AND INDEPENDENT IRAN. BUT THE U.S. HAD DECIDED TO TAKE ACTION AGAINST IRAN THROUGH THE PRESENCE OF HER NAVAL FORCES TO PREVENT INJURY TO THE HOSTAGES AND THROUGH SANCTIONS OF INCREASING SEVERITY. THE INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN INTRODUCED A NEW ELEMENT INTO THE SITUATION AND MANY

RESPONSIBLE OFFICIALS IN IRAN REALISED THE NEED TO RELEASE THE
HOSTAGES AND END IRAN'S ISOLATION. IRAN SHOULD NOW RELEASE THE
HOSTAGES AND TAKE REDRESS FOR THE PAST THROUGH INTERNATIONAL FORA AND
THE COURTS OF INDIVIDUAL COUNTRIES. HE WOULD NOT IN THE MEANTIME
ACCEPT THE POSTPONEMENT OF SANCTIONS WHICH WOULD BE PURSUED
UNILATERALLY BY THE U.S. JOINED BY AS MANY OF THE ALLIES AS WOULD
AGREE. HE DESCRIBED ALLIED SUPPORT FOR SANCTIONS AS "VERY ACCEPTABLE"
(F) DEFENDING HIS RECORD, THE PRESIDENT DESCRIBED THE STEPS HE HAD
TAKEN TO KEEP THE ECONOMY STRONG SAYING THAT ALL THE INCREASE IN
INFLATION SINCE HE HAD ASSUMED OFFICE WAS DIRECTLY ATTRIBUTABLE TO
OPEC OIL PRICE RISES. IN LISTING THE FOREIGN POLICY ACHIEVEMENTS OF
HIS GOVERNMENT, HE REFERRED TO U.S. COOPERATION WITH BRITAIN OVER
RHODESIA.

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THE AFGHAN CRISIS

1. A FRIEND OF MINE WHO IS VERY CLOSE TO MRS GANDHI (I CAN VOUCH FOR THIS) CALLED TODAY WITH A PERSONAL COMMUNICATION FROM HER. THE COMMUNICATION WAS ORAL, UNAVOWABLE AND SEEMED TO BE A MATTER OF THINKING ALOUD ON HER PART. I DO NOT SUPPOSE THE NEA ARE AWARE OF IT AND I PASS IT ON FOR WHAT IT IS WORTH.
2. AS I UNDEGSTOOD IT, MRS GANDHI WAS MAKING THE FOLLOWING POINTS.
 - (A) SHE WAS PLEASED WITH YOUR VISIT AND WAS GLAD THAT WE FOUND NARASHIMA RAO A REASONABLE INTERLOCUTOR.
 - (B) THE ASSESEMENT SHE HAD BEEN GIVEN OF THE SITUATION IN PAKISTAN WAS THAT GENERAL ZIA HAD DECIDED THAT THE SOLUTION TO HIS PERSONAL DIFFICULTIES AS THE LEADER OF A SHAKY MILITARY DICTATORSHIP WAS

DIFFICULTIES AS THE LEADER OF A SHAKY MILITARY DICTATORSHIP WAS TO BE FOUND IN A MILITARY UNDERSTANDING WITH THE US AND CHINA. (C) SHE HAD TAKEN ABOARD THE POINT YOU MADE ABOUT THE URGENCY THE SITUATION BUT SHE COULD NOT OVERLOOK THE PRESENT VISIT BY HUANG HUA TO ISLAMABAD. WHATEVER THE ORIGINS OF THIS VISIT THE FACT THAT IT WAS TAKING PLACE NOW AND LASTING FOR 4 OR 5 DAYS WAS OF GREAT SIGNIFICANCE AND SHE COULD NOT COMMIT HERSELF TO ANY COURSE OF ACTION UNTIL SHE KNEW THE RESULT.

(D) GIVEN THE ASSESSMENT AT (B) ABOVE SHE WAS NOT PREPARED TO GO FURTHER TOWARDS GENERAL ZIA THAN SHE HAD ALREADY DONE IN HER MESSAGE TO HIM. (PARA 2 OF ISLAMABAD TELNO 106 TO THE FCO.)


(E) IF, HOWEVER, GENERAL ZIA WERE TO LET HER KNOW IN A RELIABLE, BUT NOT NECESSARILY WRITTEN, FORM THAT PAKISTAN WOULD BE READY TO JOIN WITH INDIA IN MAKING CLEAR THEIR JOINT DETERMINATION TO AVOID SUPER POWER CONFRONTATION IN THE SUB-CONTINENT, SHE WOULD BE INCLINED TO RESPOND FAVOURABLY.

(F) THERE SHOULD BE NO MENTION OF KASHMIR ON EITHER SIDE.

3. MY FRIEND SAID THAT MRS GANDHI WAS BECOMING INCREASINGLY CONCERNED WITH WHAT SHE ENVISAGED AS THE DANGER FROM CHINA. SHE WAS ALSO IMPATIENT WITH THE WHOLE SITUATION WHICH WAS IMPEDING HER FROM CONCENTRATING ON HER DOMESTIC PRIORITIES. I REPLIED THAT I TOOK NOTE OF WHAT I HAD BEEN TOLD BUT THAT WE WERE NOT PREPARED TO GET INTO THE POSITION OF A GO-BETWEEN WHO WAS ALL TOO LIKELY TO BE CUFFED BY BOTH SIDES.

4. I DO NOT THINK THAT THIS COMMUNICATION (THOUGH RELIABLE IN ITS WAY) IS TO BE TAKEN AS A FORMAL OR EVEN A WELL-CONSIDERED INITIATIVE. I AM SURE THAT IF IT WERE TO COME TO LIGHT MRS GANDHI WOULD VEHEMENTLY DENY ANY INVOLVEMENT. NEVERTHELESS I BELIEVE IT PROBABLY REPRESENTS HER REAL VIEWS AND WISHES. NO DOUBT THERE IS ALSO A TACTICAL ELEMENT IN INSERTING THIS THOUGHT WHILE HUANG HUA IS IN ISLAMABAD. HOWEVER IF IT WAS THOUGHT THAT EITHER MR FORSTER OR HIS US COLLEAGUE COULD ENCOURAGE GENERAL ZIA TO MAKE A COMMUNICATION ON THE LINES OF PARA (E) ABOVE THIS COULD ONLY HELP TO REDUCE THE INCREASING POLARIZATION OF THE SUB-CONTINENT.

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TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 91 OF 19 JANUARY 1980

INFO PRIORITY ALL EEC POSTS WASHINGTON UKDEL NATO MOSCOW DELHI
ISLAMABAD AND UKMIS NEW YORK

MIPT: AFGHANISTAN: MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT GISCARD TO BREZHNEV.

1. ACCORDING TO A REPORT, INSPIRED BY THE ELYSEE, THE PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE CONTAINED THE FOLLOWING POINTS:

(I) THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT WAS NOT SATISFIED WITH THE EXPLANATIONS PROVIDED BY BREZHNEV IN HIS MEMORANDUM OF 28 DECEMBER EXPLAINING WHY THE SOVIET TROOPS HAD GONE INTO AFGHANISTAN:

(II) FRANCE CONSIDERED DETENTE AS GLOBAL AND THAT THE INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN WAS GRAVELY IN CONTRADICTION WITH THIS PRINCIPLE:

(III) FRANCE HOPED THAT AN END WOULD BE PUT TO THE SOVIET EXPEDITION IN AFGHANISTAN AND THAT SOVIET ACTION WOULD NOT COMPROMISE THE BENEFITS OF 15 YEARS OF PRIVILEGED RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN FRANCE AND THE SOVIET UNION.

2. THE MESSAGE ALSO CONTAINED A SUGGESTION THAT THE SOVIET UNION SHOULD PROVIDE EXPLANATIONS IN LINE WITH THE PRINCIPLES WHICH INFORMED POLITICAL COOPERATION BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES.

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FM PARIS 191300Z JANUARY 1980.

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 90 OF 19 JANUARY 1980.

INFO PRIORITY EEC POSTS, WASHINGTON, UKDEL NATO, MOSCOW, NEW DELHI.
ISLAMABAD, UKMIS NEW YORK.

FRENCH ATTITUDE TOWARDS THE SOVIET INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN.

IN THE COURSE OF A GENERAL REVIEW OF THE AFTERMATH OF THE SOVIET INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN THE MINISTER WAS ABLE TO GIVE ROBIN, THE POLITICAL DIRECTOR AT THE QUAI, A GENERAL ACCOUNT OF YOUR VISITS TO INDIA AND PAKISTAN. IN RESPONSE HE ASKED ROBERT WHETHER HE COULD COMMENT ON THE REPORT, CLEARLY INSPIRED BY THE ELYSEE, THAT PRESIDENT GISCARD HAD REPLIED TO BREZHNEV SUGGESTING FURTHER DISCUSSIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION ON AFGHANISTAN (SEE MIFT FOR THE TEXT OF THE REPORT PUT OUT BY THE ELYSEE).

2. ROBIN CONFIRMED THAT THE PRESIDENT'S REPLY WAS ALONG THE LINES OF THE REPORT IN THE PRESS. THE PRESIDENT HAD MADE IT CLEAR TO BREZHNEV THAT HE CONSIDERED THE PRESENT SITUATION TO BE A VERY GRAVE ONE AND THAT THE SOVIET EXPLANATIONS OF THEIR ACTIONS INSUFFICIENT. THEY WERE A VIOLATION OF DETENTE AND PLACED A QUESTION MARK AGAINST THE FUTURE OF THE 15 YEARS OF QUOTE PRIVILEGED UNQUOTE DIALOGUE BETWEEN FRANCE AND THE SOVIET UNION. THE FRENCH BELIEVED THAT IT WAS IMPORTANT TO GIVE THE SOVIET UNION A CHANCE TO EXPLAIN WHY THEY HAD ACTED IN AFGHANISTAN EVEN IF THE FRENCH GOVT WERE TO FIND SUCH EXPLANATIONS UNACCEPTABLE. THEY WANTED A CHANCE TO PUT POINTED QUESTIONS TO THE RUSSIANS AND TO MAKE SURE THAT THEY FULLY REALISED THE GRAVITY OF THE PRESENT SITUATION.

3. THE MAIN AIM OF THE FRENCH WAS TO GET THE SOVIET UNION TO WITHDRAW FROM AFGHANISTAN. THEY WERE CONCERNED THAT THE UNITED STATES WISHED MORE TO PUNISH THE SOVIET UNION THAN TO BRING ABOUT THE WITHDRAWAL OF SOVIET TROOPS. THEY THOUGHT THAT THE AMERICANS HAD PUT A CROSS AGAINST AFGHANISTAN AND HAD GIVEN UP

HOPE OF CHANGING THE SITUATION THERE. BUT THE FRENCH DID NOT BELIEVE THAT THE GAME WAS OVER NOR DID THEY THINK IT WAS WISE DIPLOMATICALLY TO ACT AS IF IT WERE. HOWEVER DIFFICULT IT MIGHT BE, THEY WOULD TRY TO CONVINCING THE RUSSIANS THAT AFGHANISTAN WAS A COUNTRY WHICH DID NOT THREATEN SOVIET SECURITY AND WHERE THEY COULD PERMIT A SITUATION TO PREVAIL ALONG THE LINES OF FINLAND OR YUGOSLAVIA. (IT IS INTERESTING THAT WAHL ALSO ALLUDED TO FINLAND'S STATUS WHEN WE WERE TALKING A FEW DAYS AGO).

4. THEY BELIEVED THAT THE STICK AND THE CARROT SHOULD BE USED WITH THE SOVIET UNION. THE STICK WOULD BE THE RESISTANCE OF THE AFGHANS. IT WOULD ALSO BE THE PRICE THAT THE RUSSIANS WOULD HAVE TO PAY IN THE THIRD WORLD. THEY THOUGHT IN THIS RESPECT THAT THE VOTE AT THE UNITED NATIONS HAD BEEN HIGHLY SUCCESSFUL. THE CARROT WOULD BE ANY ASSURANCES THAT MIGHT BE CONTRIVED OVER THE FUTURE STATUS OF AFGHANISTAN.

5. THEY WERE WORRIED AT POSSIBLE ERRORS OF JUDGMENT BOTH IN WASHINGTON AND IN MOSCOW. IN MOSCOW, THEY THOUGHT THAT THE RUSSIANS EXAGGERATED THE THREAT OF A SINO-AMERICAN AGRESSION, WHILE THEY BELIEVED THE AMERICANS TENDED TO EXAGGERATE THE SOVIET UNION'S EXPANSIONIST AIMS. THE FRENCH VIEW WAS THAT THE RUSSIANS' AIM WAS TO CONSOLIDATE THEIR POSITION IN AFGHANISTAN BUT NOT TO EMBARK ON FURTHER MILITARY ACTIONS OUTSIDE THE AFGHAN BORDERS. BUT THERE WAS A DANGER, IF INSURGENCY FROM PAKISTAN GREW AND THIS WAS COUPLED WITH ACTIONS BY CHINA AND THE UNITED STATES, THAT WE WOULD SEE CONFRONTATION WHICH COULD LEAD TO A WORLD WAR. JAMES ASKED WHETHER THE FRENCH APPROVED OF THE FIRM STAND TAKEN BY THE UNITED STATES. IT WAS SURELY NECESSARY TO REACT FIRMLY IN ORDER TO BRING HOME TO THE SOVIET UNION THE DANGERS OF ANY POSSIBLE FURTHER MOVEMENT. IF THE REACTION WERE NOT STRONG, THE SOVIET UNION WOULD ASSUME THAT THE OPPOSITION OF THE WEST AND THE THIRD WORLD TO THEIR ACTIONS WAS HESITANT AND LIMITED. THIS COULD LEAD ALSO TO ALL KINDS OF DANGERS AND MISJUDGEMENTS ON THE PART OF A TOTALITARIAN STATE LIKE THE SOVIET UNION.

6. ROBIN SAID THAT THE FRENCH ENTIRELY APPROVED OF THE FIRM AMERICAN ACTION ON CEREALS. BUT THEY THOUGHT THAT THERE WAS A DANGER OF WORKING UP TOO MUCH PUBLIC EXCITEMENT. THEY ALSO THOUGHT THAT AN EXCESSIVE BRANDISHING OF SOLIDARITY HAD THE DANGERS WHICH COULD LEAD TO CONFRONTATION.

7. THEY DID NOT THINK THAT BOYCOTTING THE OLYMPIC GAMES WAS WISE. THEY THOUGHT IT WOULD IRRITATE THE SOVIET UNION AND UNITE NATIONAL OPINION FIRMLY BEHIND THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT. MOREOVER IT WAS A CARD WHICH WOULD PROBABLY NOT TAKE THE TRICK. SOME COUNTRIES WOULD GO AND SOME WOULD NOT GO TO MOSCOW. IF IT WERE SUCCESSFUL IT WOULD NOT AFFECT OTHER THAN ADVERSELY A RUSSIAN DECISION TO WITHDRAW THEIR TROOPS FROM AFGHANISTAN. THERE WAS ALWAYS A DANGER OF MAKING THE RUSSIANS LOSE TOO MUCH FACE, A DANGER ADMIRABLY FORESEEN AND ACCEPTED BY KENNEDY AT THE TIME OF THE CUBA CRISIS.

8. ROBIN REVEALED UNDER FURTHER QUESTIONING THAT THE FRENCH EXPECTED KORNIENKO, VICE MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS , TO COME TO PARIS, PROBABLY TOWARDS THE END OF NEXT WEEK, TO ENGAGE IN THE CONSULTATIONS PROPOSED BY GISCARD IN HIS MESSAGE TO BREZHNEV.
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Prime Minister ² 3

S.J. Pike
 19.1.80

PM/80/5

PRIME MINISTER

Afghanistan

1. On 9-18 January I visited Turkey, Oman, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and India, primarily to discuss with the governments of these countries the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and their reactions to it. I had discussions with the Foreign Ministers and Heads of Government of all these countries. I also had a brief meeting during a stop-over on my return journey with the Foreign Minister of Bahrain. The following are my impressions and conclusions.

A. IMPRESSIONS

General

2. All the countries I visited, except India, agreed broadly with our own analysis of Soviet motives for their invasion and with our estimate of the dangers to the security and integrity of other states in the region, and with the need for a significant and sustained response, both from the West and from those countries which feel threatened. The Western reaction so far has disappointed them. Oman, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan probably underestimate the threat of internal subversion. India's attitude is influenced by her traditional tendency to give the Russians the benefit of the doubt and her distrust of Pakistan.

Individual Countries

3. (a) Turkey: The Turkish economy is in a parlous state and internal security is bad. The Turks are especially concerned about the maintenance of the integrity of Iran. They fear that Khomeini's policies could lead to the country's disintegration, stimulated by Soviet subversion in Azerbaijan and elsewhere. The Turks will require large-scale financial help over the next few years.

(b) Oman: Sultan Qaboos is not a natural leader and receives

/indifferent

indifferent advice. But Oman is prosperous and Qaboos is likely to survive for some time longer. He remains anxious about the threat from the PDRY. The Omanis are discussing the possible provision of facilities for US forces but do not want Western personnel on Oman's territory. Their initiative for the establishment by the Gulf States of a minesweeper capability in the Straits of Hormuz was mishandled, but this could be rectified.

(c) Saudi Arabia: The Saudis are ready to help Turkey, eg over oil. They are also prepared to offer financial help for strengthening the military capabilities of the countries in the region under threat, though they are opposed to any Western military presence. They are playing a leading role, together with Pakistan, in mobilising Moslem opinion against the Soviet action in Afghanistan. But they regard the Camp David Agreement as an obstacle to full-hearted co-operation between the countries of the region and the United States. They look for a new move on the Middle East problem when, as they expect, the Camp David process runs into the sand in April/May; (this view was shared by the Bahraini Foreign Minister). The Saudis are concerned about Soviet influence in both the PDRY and the YAR and about possible subversion through the many expatriates in their own country. The Mecca incident was a shock to them.

(d) Pakistan: The Pakistanis are deeply concerned at the new threat on their western frontier. They feel squeezed between the Russians in Afghanistan and the Indians on their eastern border. They particularly fear the possibility of Soviet ''retaliatory'' raids from Afghanistan into their own territory. They are painfully aware that their military equipment is out of date. They were affronted by the meagreness of the US offer of credit. In both respects their attitude is justified. Moreover, the refugees from Afghanistan, who they think may number one million by the Spring, are an increasing burden. But their reaction to the Soviet invasion was dominated by their complex over India, who, they are convinced, still wants to establish hegemony over the sub-continent. Nonetheless, they are ready to resume the process of ''normalising'' relations with India as a means of sanitising their eastern frontier. President Zia is in a dilemma over elections: if he holds them, the Bhutto faction will win; and if he does not, popular discontent will grow.

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(e) India: The Indians accept that the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan poses a danger to the sub-continent. But they are anxious to find excuses for Soviet behaviour in the policies and activities of Pakistan, China and the United States, by whom they profess to feel surrounded. They resent the possibility of a super-power confrontation so close to India, not only on grounds of national security, but also because of the effect on the Non-Aligned Movement and India's role in it if she had to make a choice. They were somewhat shame-faced and defensive over the Indian statement at the United Nations and apprehensive about the Islamic line-up against the Soviet action. They are also preoccupied with their domestic economic problems and with unrest in their north-east and eastern border areas. They are ready to talk to the Pakistanis but with little enthusiasm or hope of success, given the weakness of Zia's position and above all their congenital distrust of Pakistani promises against the background of three Indo-Pakistani wars, which leads them to express apprehension about any revival of a closer US/Pakistan military relationship.

B. CONCLUSIONS

4. My talks in the capitals I visited confirmed my view that the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan is a most serious challenge and unless the West reacts with vigour, any repetition of it eg, in Yugoslavia, could be disastrous. We must urgently pursue our discussions with the Americans and with our principal European allies. The following are among the actions we might undertake:-

(a) We should pursue the political and economic measures directed at the Soviet Union which we have been discussing in NATO, even though for the most part, apart from a boycott or the removal of the Olympic Games (See Annex), these are unlikely to cause the Russians major difficulties or embarrassment.

(b) We should encourage the non-aligned countries, and particularly the Moslem countries, to continue their denunciation of the Soviet action and, if possible, to take measures against the Afghan regime. We should continue to urge the Americans to handle the Iran crisis in

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On reflection I am a ^{SECRET} ~~little~~ ^{more} ~~intending~~ ^{about} ~~such~~ ^{guarantee}, it would look as if we were ~~guaranteeing~~ ^{guaranteeing} ~~Pakistan's~~ ^{Pakistan's} ~~rights~~ ^{rights} rather than the territory. *one*

such a way as not to hinder this.

(c) We should encourage the United States formally to guarantee Pakistan against aggression from Afghanistan and to meet Pakistan's legitimate military requirements up to a level which would give the Indians no justifiable grounds for concern. We should also support the Americans in their search for suitable defence facilities in the region.

(d) We should conclude as rapidly as possible negotiations over our own sales of defence equipment to Oman, Saudi Arabia and other states in the Gulf and to Pakistan.

(e) We should prepare a European initiative amending Resolution 242 to provide for the acknowledgement of the Palestinians' rights in return for their recognition of Israel. This proposal could be put forward when, as seems likely, the Camp David process comes to an end in April/May.

(f) We should provide friendly states in the Gulf and Pakistan with more information about our assessments of Soviet activities and intentions in the area.

(g) We should also provide these states with assistance in counter-subversion.

(h) We should encourage closer co-operation among the Gulf States, eg over the security of the Straits of Hormuz.

(i) We should work carefully for an EEC/Gulf dialogue.

(j) We should increase Western and Saudi/Omani influence in the YAR.

(k) We should consider the practicability of promoting insurgency in Soviet-dominated areas such as the PDRY, Ethiopia and Afghanistan itself.

(l) We should participate to the extent possible in further financial help for Turkey.

(m) We should encourage the Indians and Pakistanis, despite their pathological distrust of one another, to normalize their relationship.

(n) We should review with others our policy towards China including arms sales.

/(o)

(o) We should review with the others concerned possible support for Yugoslavia.

5. I am copying this minute to the members of OD and to Sir R Armstrong.



(CARRINGTON)

Foreign and Commonwealth Office
19 January 1980

OLYMPIC GAMES

1. Following the meeting of Ministers on 16 January, we have asked the Germans and Italians whether they would join us in a formal approach to the International Olympic Committee to suggest moving the Games. The Germans are very cautious but Dr Genscher is expected to discuss the Olympics with Mr Vance when they meet on 21 January. The Italians have yet to react. Sir N Henderson will put the matter to Mr Vance on 19 January.
2. The Canadian Prime Minister said on 18 January that Canada would approach the IOC about moving the Games and that the practical difficulties at Montreal might be less than the city authorities have said. The Japanese would probably be extremely reluctant to accept part of the Games. The Mexicans and the Germans would also be likely to see political objections to using their Olympic facilities. The Australian Government is reviewing the subject and the difficulties at Melbourne might be less than elsewhere.
3. The chances of getting the Olympic Games moved are very slight. On the other hand the Russians might be glad to have Britain excluded from the Games on the grounds of our sporting contacts with South Africa.
4. The Winter Olympics begin next month in New York State, but the United States Government do not intend to take any action on this front, such as denying visas to the Soviet team.
5. Another idea, not yet discussed with our Allies, would be a Western proposal to the International Olympic Committee that the Olympic sailing events should be moved from Tallinn in the Baltic States to another country. This would have political attractions. Summer 1980 is the 40th anniversary of another Soviet act of aggression, the annexation of the Baltic States. A number of Western countries, including the UK, France, Germany and the US, do not recognise the annexation de jure. Moreover, the relocation of the sailing alone would present far fewer practical difficulties than moving the entire Games. On the other hand, the response of the International Olympic Committee would probably be negative.

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6. Yet other options include a Western boycott of the Moscow Games, or a boycott by the Western contingents of ceremonial events such as the opening and closing parades and official Soviet receptions. The British Olympic Committee would resist the first and probably the second. One thing in the Government's power is to decide that the Duke of Edinburgh and the Minister for Sport should not go to Moscow.

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CABINET OFFICE

70 Whitehall, London SW1A 2AS Telephone 01-233 8319

From the Secretary of the Cabinet: Sir Robert Armstrong KCB, CVO

Ref. A01166

18th January, 1980

Dear Michael,

As you know, during the course of my meeting in Paris on Tuesday, there was some discussion of support for Afghan resistance to the invading Soviet troops. I reported the conclusion of that discussion in a letter of 16th January. I am now enclosing a fuller record of the discussion. For obvious reasons, I am circulating it separately from the record of the rest of the discussion.

I am sending a copy of this letter to George Walden.

Yours ever
Robert Armstrong

M. O'D. B. Alexander, Esq.

18 JAN 1980

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ANNEX

Herr von Staden asked whether the Western countries needed to co-ordinate a policy towards the Afghan refugee camps in Pakistan. He had been disturbed to hear that there was a possibility of Soviet intrusions into Pakistani territory against the refugee camps, and asked why such intrusions were likely to occur. Dr. Brzezinski said that the camps were liable to be attacked in so far as they were used as bases by guerrillas who were set on continuing resistance to Soviet invasion. The camps were at present within a few miles of the frontier between Pakistan and Afghanistan. If they were moved back and brought under close control, they could not be used as bases for Afghan resistance. That would weaken Afghan resistance and facilitate the pacification of Afghanistan by the Russians. Leaving the camps where they were, and providing adequate support for them, would help to keep Afghan resistance alive. So long as they remained in forward positions, they would need some defensive equipment, possibly including surface to air missiles to defend themselves against air attack.

M. Wahl said that, as he understood the United States position, it would be consistent with that position to take whatever steps were available to nurture Afghan resistance to the Soviet invasion. So far as the French Government were concerned, they had indicated a willingness to help the Iraqis to build their armed forces: if the Iraqis were to use some of that support to help Afghan resistance, the French Government would not object. The decision on supporting Afghan resistance should be taken in the light of a clear view of the final objective for the future status of Afghanistan. If one of the objectives of the West in this crisis was to

keep the Islamic world aroused about the Soviet invasion, that would be served by encouraging a continuing guerrilla resistance.

Herr von Staden suggested that the objectives of the West should be to exploit Russia's political and economic weakness. To encourage guerrilla resistance would be to take the Russians on where they were strongest. It was not at all clear that it could succeed; and it would be a risk that guerrilla resistance could escalate to a border war.

Sir Robert Armstrong said that there would be general agreement on the desirability of avoiding a border war. Nonetheless, so long as Afghans were ready to continue guerrilla resistance, and Pakistan was prepared at least to acquiesce in Pakistani territory being a base for such activity, the West could hardly refuse to provide support, where it could do so with suitable discretion.

Herr von Staden was anxious to make it clear that the German Government was constitutionally debarred from exporting arms, and could not therefore give direct military support to Afghan guerrillas. The German intelligence service was also under charter restraints which were likely to prevent it from taking any part in activities of that kind. He accepted that the German Government would be powerless to prevent aid provided for humanitarian reasons being used in substitution for other funds which might then be in practice diverted to the support of a guerrilla movement.

Mr. Brzezinski said that the consensus of opinion seemed to be that it was politically justifiable to keep some resistance going in Afghanistan, both because it retarded and made more difficult Soviet pacification of Afghanistan and because it would provide a focus for Islamic sentiment. It was agreed that Heads of Government should be invited to endorse this

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conclusion and, if they did so, to authorize discussions at the appropriate level in the agencies involved as to feasibility and methods of providing discreet support for Afghan guerrilla resistance. In view of the special position of the German Government, these discussions should be tripartite, between the United States, the United Kingdom and France, but Germany should be represented by an observer.

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CABINET OFFICE

70 Whitehall, London SW1A 2AS Telephone 01-233 8319

From the Secretary of the Cabinet: Sir Robert Armstrong KCB, CVO

Ref. A01165

18th January, 1980

Dear Michael,

I am enclosing herewith a copy of the record of my talks in Paris on Tuesday, 15th January.

Copies of the record go to George Walden and Brian Norbury.

*Yours ever,
Robert Armstrong*

M. O'D. B. Alexander, Esq.

18 JAN 1960



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Ref. A01163

NOTE FOR RECORD

Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski, Monsieur Jacques Wahl, Herr von Staden and Sir Robert Armstrong met in the Palais Marigny, Paris, on Tuesday, 15th January 1980 for a tour d'horizon following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

General assessment

Dr. Brzezinski said that, whatever view one might take of the subjective motivations for the Soviet invasion - and his own view was that these motivations were primarily provincial and parochial rather than strategic - it had major strategic consequences. Afghanistan had been a buffer; now it was a wedge. Whether or not this was intended or foreseen by the Russians, the risk was that the next stage would be political intimidation by the Soviet Union of Pakistan and Iran, leading to a major crisis. The United States Government did not wish to reignite the cold war (sic). They hoped to keep arms control negotiations alive, insulated from measures to demonstrate the unacceptability of the Soviet invasion; they also hoped in due course to reactivate SALT II. But they saw the invasion as a qualitatively new step in Soviet behaviour. The West's reaction to the invasion of Czechoslovakia had been half-hearted and of short duration. The Soviet Government had probably calculated that the reaction to the invasion of Afghanistan would be similar. There was reason to believe that they had been surprised and dismayed by the strength of the initial reaction. The West must now avoid repeating the mistakes of 1968. The United States Government were not contemplating further measures at this time; but there was need to concert a long-term response to the regional problem. Two aspects of this were important:

- (a) the West should not get too far ahead of the Moslem world, which had reacted strongly to the invasion;
- (b) the countries of the West should consider how they could help each other.

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Monsieur Wahl, while going along with much of Dr. Brzezinski's analysis, thought it impossible to assess the likely consequences of the Soviet invasion without first assessing the causes of it. Were the Russians protecting a buffer or creating a wedge? He thought the former: Amin had proved incapable of crushing the Islamic rebellion in Afghanistan, and the Russians were forced to move in to prevent the infection from spreading to the Islamic Republics in the Soviet Union. The invasion was a sign of Soviet weakness and failure, not just of strength. This was the first Soviet intervention in a country of the Third World and an Islamic country: what we had now was the first development of an East-South confrontation, which the West should seek to exploit rather than take over.

Sir Robert Armstrong was inclined to share the view that the causes for the Soviet invasion were primarily defensive rather than strategic. But it changed the strategic position in the area, and the West must consider the consequences. In the British Government's view it would be important for the Western countries to preserve the strength of the Islamic reaction to the Soviet invasion: to move so far as possible by supporting and strengthening the Islamic countries in their determination to resist Soviet aggression rather than by direct intervention in the area.

Herr von Staden was in general agreement, adding that he thought that the timing of the Soviet invasion was related to the difficulties created for the United States and other Western countries by the situation in Iran. He shared the view that the Third World countries should be in front, and should not be allowed to lose sight of the feeling that this was their affair. But they would not follow a coherent and co-ordinated line if the West did not. They were not individually strong, and constituted potential bases for Soviet action.

Dr. Brzezinski, noting a wide measure of agreement on the general assessment, said that he thought that recent developments had implications for the succession to the Soviet leadership, which might now be more hard-line and militarily orientated than had previously been supposed.

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Pakistan

Dr. Brzezinski said that the Pakistanis needed reassurance on the political, military and economic levels. The test they were most likely to face was that of political intimidation, reinforced by subversion. It was in order to provide reassurance that both publicly and privately the United States Government had reiterated its commitments to Pakistan under the 1959 Agreement. The Pakistanis were apprehensive of the possibility of ground incursions from Afghanistan against the refugee camps, where there were now getting on for 400,000 refugees. The United States did not propose to send in troops to defend the camps. They would, however, give the Pakistanis equipment to fight attacks on the camps. The Russians would then have to choose whether to desist, or to escalate. It would be clear to them that escalation could involve confrontation with the United States, not necessarily in Pakistan: the form of United States action would be a matter for choice; and it could be in Cuba or in the Far East rather than in Pakistan. The United States Government were proposing to provide \$100 million of military aid in 1980 and a similar amount in 1981: it would include anti-tank weapons, destroyers and helicopters, but no aircraft. Dr. Brzezinski asked whether the French would be providing Mirages.

Monsieur Wahl said that they were not so far in precise negotiations with the Pakistanis on this. If the Pakistanis wanted to purchase Mirages, he thought that the French would be willing to sell.

Sir Robert Armstrong said, in response to a question from Dr. Brzezinski, that the British were in discussion with the Pakistanis on the supply of communications equipment, mortar locating radar and 105 mm. light guns.

Dr. Brzezinski said that the United States Government was also considering funding for military production in Pakistan; debt relief; food aid; and an increase in aid for refugees. Congress would be invited to waive restrictions on military aid to Pakistan.

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Monsieur Wahl drew attention to the problems presented by the undemocratic nature of the regime in Pakistan, and by Pakistan's nuclear programme. Dr. Brzezinski said first things first: it was no doubt desirable to broaden the base of the regime, but the first consideration must be to ensure that the Pakistanis were not politically intimidated by the Russians. He judged that the Pakistanis were, like the Poles, fighters by instinct and spirit; what they needed was reassurance and support. The present state of their nuclear development was a threat to no-one, since even if they could make a warhead they had no means of delivery.

Sir Robert Armstrong drew attention to the need to reassure India, if military aid to Pakistan was increased. Mrs. Gandhi was acutely sensitive to the threat from Pakistan and to the implications for India of an alliance between China and Pakistan. Dr. Brzezinski thought that these fears were in the nature of a phobia, and would respond to rational argument. Pakistan would hardly take India on, with the Russians on her North-West Frontier. The Pakistanis were equally nervous of India, and were already talking of a Moscow-Kabul-New Delhi axis.

India

Dr. Brzezinski said that the United States Government were very worried about the attitude of the new Government in India, in the light of Mrs. Gandhi's previous positions. Her suspicions of the United States were likely to be exacerbated, when she learned that the United States were prepared to go ahead with expanding their facilities in Diego Garcia. Mr. Clark Clifford would be leading a high level mission to India. The United States would be prepared to offer India military assistance. He enquired what plans there might be for other visits to India in the near future.

Sir Robert Armstrong said that Lord Carrington was hoping to visit India later in the week on his tour of the region. There was no doubt that Mrs. Gandhi would be very preoccupied with what she would see as the threat to India from an alliance between China and a Pakistan reinforced by military assistance from the United States.

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Monsieur Wahl said that President Giscard was proposing to visit India shortly. The programme was being adjusted so as to leave more time for tete-a-tete discussions between the President and Mrs. Gandhi.

It was agreed that it would be useful for all the Governments represented at the meeting to be fully informed about the outcome of visits from any one of them to India in the coming weeks and months.

East-West relations

Dr. Brzezinski said that the United States Government took the view that no further actions to register disapproval of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan were necessary at this stage. There would be no announcement to this effect. It was not intended that the measures taken should be of short duration: if they were to impinge upon the Russians, they should last for some time. The United States Government hoped, however, to insulate arms control discussions from the general cooling of relations with the Soviet Union, and eventually to resume SALT discussions. Discussions on arms control in the context of theatre nuclear forces in Europe should be kept going, but at a measured pace. Dr. Brzezinski thought that a major peace "offensive" by the Soviet Union in Europe was now to be expected, with the object of driving a wedge between the United States and her European allies. He asked what measures the other Governments represented were proposing.

Monsieur Wahl said that the basic principle of the French measures was that there should be no substitution from French suppliers for goods denied to the Soviet Union by the Americans. The French Government had no high level visits to the Soviet Union planned, though M. Chaban Delmas was due to go very shortly. For the rest, it would be business as usual, but without any haste. Negotiations would go forward on a deal involving the Peugeot/Citroen group. The Franco-Soviet credit agreement would be renewed, but the French Government would adhere to consensus rates.

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Dr. Brzezinski suggested, rather sharply, that the French appeared to be conspicuously avoiding any action which might cost them anything.

Sir Robert Armstrong said that the Anglo-Soviet credit agreement which expired on 16th February 1980 would not be renewed. The British Government would also adhere to consensus rates in respect of any credits that might be granted. They would favour applying the full rigour of COCOM restrictions on exports of technology. Trade matters would be dealt with in a Community context, but the British Government would firmly support the principle of no substitution for cancelled grain exports, and would press for an end to subsidised sales of butter to the Soviet Union. The British Government took the view that the measure that would have the most impact would be for the Western countries to boycott the Olympics, or to arrange for the venue for the Olympics to be moved to, say, Munich or Montreal.

Monsieur Wahl intervened at this point to say that the French Government would support decisions agreed in the European Community.

Herr von Staden suggested that Monsieur Wahl's phrase "business as usual" was semantic. General moral and political condemnation of the Soviet invasion was of very high importance. In considering what measures to take, the German Government had to have regard to the fact that West German trade with the Soviet Union was twice as large, in volume terms, as United States trade with the Soviet Union, and Germany's GNP was $3\frac{1}{2}$ times less than that of the United States; so that what Germany had at risk was proportionately 7 times greater. The Germans would support the principle of no substitution, and they would discuss sympathetically operating the COCOM rules at their full vigour. There should be further discussions about exports of civil technology; Herr von Staden understood that Mr. Cooper would shortly be consulting other Governments on this. As to contacts between the West German Government and the Soviet Government, a meeting of the German/Soviet Joint Commission had been postponed indefinitely. There were provisional plans for the Federal Chancellor to see Brezhnev, and Herr Genscher to see Mr. Gromyko. No dates had been discussed for these exchanges, and the West German Government would take no initiative. If the East German leader, Herr Honecker, showed interest

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in a meeting with the Federal Chancellor, the Federal Chancellor would be bound to respond positively, in the interests of relations between the two parts of Germany. Herr von Staden asked what view the United States Government were taking about the export of oil-rig technology to the Soviet Union, which had been mentioned in a recent article in the New York Times. Dr. Brzezinski said that for the time being all exports of technology were suspended and under review. The United States Government's inclination was to hold up on exports of oil-rig technology.

Sir Robert Armstrong said that the British Government might wish to look at the possibility of high level contacts with the Polish Government, if it appeared that that Government was distancing itself from the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

On the Olympic Games, Dr. Brzezinski said that the United States Government had taken no formal position. He thought that it would be advantageous to keep the matter in a high state of uncertainty for the time being. There would be much to be said for finding another venue for the Olympics. So long as the Soviet Government were perceived as defending the Olympics, their propaganda position was strong; if they could be put into the position of defending Moscow as the venue, against some competing venue, their position would be weakened. Monsieur Wahl said that it would only be practicable to move the Olympics to another venue if the International Olympic Committee could be persuaded to agree. Herr von Staden said that he thought that at this stage there was little chance of being able to organise the Games in another venue: even if it were practicable at this late date, it would be very expensive. If it was not possible to prevent the Olympics taking place at Moscow, it would be possible to consider a concerted policy of denying official visits to the Games. It was agreed that this was a matter which ought to be discussed further by political directors.

Dr. Brzezinski said that the United States had stepped up the level of broadcasts directed at the Soviet Union and at the Moslem world. He suggested that the other Governments represented should consider doing likewise. This also was a matter which could be discussed by political directors.

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Detente, SALT, etc.

Dr. Brzezinski repeated that the United States Government did not intend to close all the doors in this area, though the atmosphere was bound to become chillier and discussions more difficult.

Herr von Staden said that the Federal Chancellor was to make a statement in the Bundestag on 17th January. He would argue that detente was indivisible, and that Soviet actions in Asia could not be without repercussions in Europe; but that the West should not cut communications or reduce co-operation with the Soviet Union in areas where continued communication and co-operation were in the interest of mutual security, such as arms control, and CSCE.

Monsieur Wahl agreed that detente was global, and said that the French Government were firmly, though not unconditionally, attached to detente. They were convinced that the United States also put a very high price on preserving detente, as witness their failure to act in Angola, and in Afghanistan in 1978. The only alternative to preserving detente could be the resumption of cold war.

Dr. Brzezinski said that the United States Government wanted a debate that was reciprocal, and in which each side showed respect for the other side's susceptibilities. Recently detente had not been fulfilling these objectives. It was not dead, but injured; and the injury would not heal in a few weeks. The President of the United States was now expecting to be re-elected; so the United States position on these matters could be expected to continue for some time. Nonetheless he emphasised that the United States Government wished to preserve detente, provided that it could be made to meet the objectives he had outlined.

Monsieur Wahl drew a distinction between detente between states and detente between peoples. Detente between states tended to be in the short term, and to favour the Soviet Union; detente between peoples was longer term, but would in the end benefit the countries of the West.

Iran

Dr. Brzezinski said that the United States Government had a feeling that ruling groups in Iran were now beginning to want to see a solution of the problem of the hostages. They did not think that the authority of Khomeini had been behind previous overtures, but they thought that it might be different this

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time. The trouble was that there were three centres of power in Iran: the "soviet" which was in charge of the siege of the United States Embassy; the Revolutionary Council; and the Ayatollah Khomeini. Since the invasion of Afghanistan the United States had come away from the idea of "having a smack" at the Iranians. Once the hostages were out, they would be prepared to work with Iran, and thought that they could come to arrangements with the Iranian authorities, who were frightened of what was happening on their Northern and Eastern frontiers. The United States Government were indicating their willingness to consider a package whereby they acquiesced in arrangements to investigate "legitimate" Iranian grievances in exchange for Iran's release of the hostages. It was necessary to get the hostage issue out of the way, before they could get into other business with Iran. But Dr. Brzezinski stressed the need for voluntary implementation of the sanctions which the Security Council had been unable to vote. This was essential for United States domestic public opinion, if the United States Government was to be able to avoid having to proceed to more drastic measures. They could not be left in the lurch on this. If they were, they would have to go further: they did not want to, but American public opinion would not sit it out, especially if they felt that the United States were isolated.

Sir Robert Armstrong said that the problems which voluntary implementation of the sanctions would create had been explained to Mr. Warren Christopher by the Prime Minister and her colleagues the previous day.

Monsieur Wahl said that, even if it was not possible to achieve the full range of the sanctions, measures would have been taken which would be very significant. He asked what would be the United States Government's estimate of the reaction in the Gulf to resort to further measures. Dr. Brzezinski said that, since the invasion of Afghanistan, the reaction would be more mixed, and would depend on whether those concerned saw the measures as "the logical final step".

Monsieur Wahl expressed doubts about the effect of sanctions in Iran. Dr. Brzezinski said that sanctions would increase their sense of isolation, and could thus help to change political attitudes.

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Saudi Arabia and Yemen

Dr. Brzezinski said that the United States Government were increasingly concerned about security in the Arabian peninsula. There were indications of developments in North Yemen which could lead to the establishment of a union of North and South Yemen under a Soviet controlled left-wing government. This could happen within days; and if it happened, the united Yemen would have a larger population than Saudi Arabia. There were signs that the North Yemen leadership were in touch with the PDRY about bringing pressure on Saudi Arabia. Soviet officials were becoming very visible in North Yemen, and were already heavily represented in the PDRY: 25 senior advisers, 200 other advisers, 500 Russian technical instructors, 500 Cuban instructors and 50 East German intelligence instructors. At the same time recent events had demonstrated the deficiencies of the security systems in Saudi Arabia whether in fighting subversion, in obtaining intelligence on subversion, or in domestic policing. Worries about the peninsula were not confined to the Yemen and Saudi Arabia, but extended also to Oman and the United Arab Emirates. Dr. Brzezinski proposed the establishment of a Middle East regional security group to look at this problem systematically.

Monsieur Wahl agreed that such a group would be useful if it led to action which could help the Saudis. There were things that could be done to help, though it would be necessary to guard against the risk of upsetting the balance in the Saudi Royal Family. The organisation of security in the region would not be easy; the UAE had refused to enter into a regional structure. President Giscard was proposing to visit the area at the beginning of March, and could perhaps begin to bring pressure to bear for the improvement of regional security.

Herr von Staden said that all these matters had to be considered in relation to the Palestinian problem. Dr. Brzezinski said that the United States Government had been trying to get that problem forward; this was an area where it should be possible for the European Governments to be ahead of the Americans.

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It was agreed to propose to Heads of Government that a quadripartite Middle East regional security group should be set up, to consist of senior officials at approximately Deputy Assistant Secretary of State level.

Regional security

Dr. Brzezinski said that the United States Government were investigating the possibility of a regional structure of facilities in the Middle East, to compensate for the loss of the two "shields" against the Soviet Union, Iran and Ethiopia. Survey teams were already visiting Mombasa, Berbera and Oman; other possible sites for facilities were Diego Garcia, Masirah, Mogadishu and perhaps something in Egypt. It was essential for the United States in particular and the West in general to have a military presence in that part of the world. What was proposed was not a system of bases or of alliances but of facilities, which would provide increased access, greater proximity to potential trouble spots, a communication system, capacity to receive rapid development forces, and some measure of pre-positioning of materials. This would facilitate better and quicker reaction to contingencies. The United States already had a partial naval presence in the region, and marine and airborne divisions ready for deployment in that part of the world, together with a considerable air presence; what was now proposed was additional support facilities. Dr. Brzezinski enquired what contribution could be made by the French forces in Djibouti.

Monsieur Wahl said that the French forces were in Djibouti to keep the peace and to prevent the two neighbouring states partitioning the territory. It would be difficult for them to be engaged outside the area. Nonetheless oil supply from the Near East was vital for France, and it was for that reason that the French had a naval presence in the Indian Ocean.

It was agreed that, if the proposed Middle East regional security group was set up, it should consider whether the French forces in Djibouti and naval presence in the region could be related to the general regional security efforts.

Turkey

Herr von Staden said that the German Government understood that Mr. Demirel was in principle prepared to "let the Market in"; but the country needed additional aid: they were talking in terms of \$1 billion dollars military aid and \$1 billion dollars economic aid. The Federal Chancellor was willing to take the lead in organising further aid to Turkey, and had instructed him to find out what the intentions of the Secretary General of OECD might be: if OECD was likely to take an initiative, it might not be necessary for the German Government to do so.

Dr. Brzezinski welcomed this forthcoming attitude. He suggested that Germany would be the natural leader for a consortium on aid to Turkey. The United States would be ready to take its part. This could lead to the development of a tripartite relationship between Turkey, Iran and Pakistan, once current Iranian problems were out of the way.

Monsieur Wahl said that France would be ready to follow.

Sir Robert Armstrong said that the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary had just visited Turkey, and would no doubt want to tell Herr Genscher the outcome of his conversations.

Iraq

Monsieur Wahl said that the French Government had always assumed stability of the regime in Iraq. Under the impact of events in that part of the world, the Iraqi Government was becoming progressively more inclined towards the West, and was looking for scope for diversifying and enlarging its relationships with the West.

Dr. Brzezinski seemed a little sceptical about this analysis of the position of the Iraq Government, and preferred to describe it as "non-aligned towards the West". He recognised, however, that there had been a shift of attitude. There appeared to have been a similar shift of attitude in Libya, as a result of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan: President Qadhafi had sent President Carter a private message of violent denunciation of the Soviet Union, and could be expected to support Islamic reaction to the invasion. As for Iraq, if the French Government could do anything to improve relations between the United States and Iraq, President Carter would be very grateful.

Yugoslavia

Dr. Brzezinski said that it was important to consider as a matter of urgency how to deal with the crisis which would follow the death of President Tito. The United States was considering how it could provide bilateral military assistance in the first fortnight after such an event.

It was noted that there was to be a meeting of quadripartite political directors on 31st January on Yugoslavia, and that that meeting should discuss contingency plans for the situation that would follow President Tito's death.

Monsieur Wahl asked whether the United States had made clear to the Soviet Union the consequences that would follow their invading Yugoslavia.

Dr. Brzezinski said that the Soviet Union knew the consequences that would follow, and they knew that the Yugoslavs would resist such an invasion.

China

Dr. Brzezinski said that the United States Government were redefining their readiness to help the Chinese in technology, including some security equipment. They were willing to provide certain non-lethal sophisticated equipment. They would not themselves be selling arms, but would have no objection to the Europeans doing so. A delegation led by the Chinese Minister of Defence would shortly be coming to the United States. The United States Government favoured the Belgian formula for treatment of exports to China in COCOM.

After the meeting concluded, Dr. Brzezinski said in informal conversation that he thought that it had been very useful, and he hoped that further such meetings could take place from time to time.

ROBERT ARMSTRONG

ROBERT ARMSTRONG

18th January, 1980

CONFIDENTIAL

MINISTRY OF AGRICULTURE, FISHERIES AND FOOD
WHITEHALL PLACE, LONDON SW1A 2HH



From the Minister

The Rt Hon the Lord Carrington KCMG MC
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
Downing Street
London SW1

kg
1
hmv
18 January 1980

Robert
AFGHANISTAN: SUPPORT FOR MEASURES AGAINST USSR

In considering our action on food sales to the USSR we have been hampered by the absence of firm and comprehensive information about what the US Government is doing or planning in this area.

First, we need to know exactly what US agricultural and food exports have been or are to be restricted and precisely what form of restriction is involved, ie whether a complete embargo, including the breaking of existing contracts, or whether something of a less drastic nature.

Since President Carter's initial announcement about grain exports, there have been reports from various sources of other restrictions, for example on poultrymeat. I understand the US Embassy has just told the FCO that the President has restricted all agricultural exports. What we now need is a list of all the products involved, including quantities, and details of the type of action taken by the US Administration if it varies from product to product. If in a particular case the restriction applies only to exceptional sales, it would also be helpful to know what the USA regards as traditional trade.


Secondly, we do not have a clear statement of the measures which the US Government is taking to compensate its producers for the lost markets in the USSR and to protect them from the continuing effect of the restrictions in the coming months. For grain we need to know precisely what measures the US Government is taking to buy up supplies on the US market and to take over existing contracts with the USSR. Are similar steps being adopted for other agricultural products? If so, what are they and over what timescale will they apply?

Thirdly, it is particularly important to know how the US Government see their action affecting world markets. What assessment has been made of the impact on world prices and what policy will the USA be pursuing over, say, the next 12 months? How do they propose to dispose of the supplies withheld from Russia? In particular, what sort of programme is envisaged, and over what period, for their release on to the market and how is it proposed to ensure orderly marketing? In so far as food aid is affected, what steps will be taken to ensure that any expansion of aid programme does not interfere with commercial transactions?

Fourthly, it would be helpful to know whether the USA has plans for co-ordinating its actions with other interested countries, and for exchanging information, on a continuing basis.

Some of these questions have already been put to the Americans, but so far little hard fact has been received in reply. With full information we shall all be better placed to see how best we can support the USA in the food sector. At the same time we must, in our own planning, keep in mind the risk that, unless suitable arrangements are made, the embargoed US supplies could disrupt world markets.

I should therefore be grateful if arrangements could be made for definite answers to be sought from the US authorities as quickly as possible. I am sending copies of this letter to the Prime Minister, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, the Secretary of State for Trade and Sir Robert Armstrong.


PETER WALKER

GRS 1330

UNCLASSIFIED

FM BONN 171805Z JAN 80

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 62 OF 17 JANUARY

INFO PRIORITY UKDEL NATO, UKREP BRUSSELS, UKMIS NEW YORK, WASHINGTON,
PARIS

MIPT AFGHANISTAN/IRAN: FRG VIEWS

1. THE FOLLOWING IS OUR TRANSLATION OF EXTRACTS FROM CHANCELLOR SCHMIDT'S DECLARATION ON BEHALF OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT WHICH WAS DELIVERED TO THE BUNDESTAG TODAY.

THE OCCUPATION OF AFGHANISTAN DIRECTLY AFFECTS VITAL INTERESTS OF THE THIRD WORLD AND THE NON-ALIGNED STATES. BUT THE CRISES ALSO CONCERN ALL THE MEMBERS OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY. THAT IS TO SAY, THEY INEVITABLY ALSO CONCERN US IN EUROPE AND IN GERMANY.

WE GERMANS KNOW THE CONCERN ABOUT HOSTAGES FROM OUR OWN EXPERIENCE. WE THEREFORE HAVE SOLIDARITY WITH OUR AMERICAN FRIENDS AND WITH PRESIDENT CARTER. FOR ELEVEN WEEKS A WHOLE NATION HAS BEEN WAITING FOR THE RELEASE OF THEIR COUNTRYMEN IN TEHRAN WITH BITTERNESS BUT WITH PATIENT AND ADMIRABLE DISCIPLINE.

WE RESPECT THE RIGHT OF THE IRANIAN PEOPLE TO DETERMINE ITS OWN FUTURE. BUT TOGETHER WITH OUR FRIENDS IN THE UNITED STATES, TOGETHER WITH GOVERNMENTS THROUGHOUT THE WORLD AND THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL, WE INSIST ON ALL STATES COMPLYING WITH INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ON THE RELEASE OF THE HOSTAGES.

IF THE UNITED STATES NOW FEEL COMPELLED TO TAKE THE ANNOUNCED MEASURES, BASED UPON THE DECISIONS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE, THEY CAN RELY ON THE SUPPORT OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY AS A COMPLETELY RELIABLE ALLY AND FRIEND.

THE SOVIET UNION HAS OCCUPIED THE NON-ALIGNED STATE OF AFGHANISTAN WITH THE USE OF MASSIVE MILITARY FORCE.

/ BUT AT THE

BUT AT THE SAME TIME THE SOVIET UNION HAS ISOLATED ITSELF FROM THE REST OF THE WORLD MORE THAN EVER BEFORE, ABOVE ALL IN THE NON-ALIGNED STATES AND THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES OF THE THIRD WORLD.

THE SOVIET UNION HAS HAD RECOURSE TO ITS RIGHT OF VETO THREE TIMES IN RECENT MONTHS ALONE.

ABOVE ALL, THE OCCUPATION OF AFGHANISTAN BY THE SOVIET UNION CONCERNS EAST-SOUTH RELATIONS. BUT IT ALSO AFFECTS EAST-WEST RELATIONS IN A SENSITIVE WAY, AS IS THE CASE WITH ANY SHIFT IN THE POLITICAL BALANCE OF POWER.

MOST THIRD WORLD STATES SHARE THE OPINION OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC AND OUR FRIENDS IN THE EEC THAT THE SOVIET INTERVENTION CONSTITUTES A FLAGRANT INTERFERENCE IN THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF A NON-ALIGNED COUNTRY OF THE ISLAMIC WORLD AND THAT THIS MILITARY ACTION REPRESENTS A THREAT TO THE PEACE, SECURITY AND STABILITY OF THE WHOLE GEOGRAPHICAL REGION, INCLUDING THE INDIAN SUB-CONTINENT, THE MIDDLE EAST AND THE ARAB WORLD.

OUR COOPERATION WITH THE STATES IN THE REGION WILL NOW BE INTENSIFIED STILL FURTHER. WE THEREFORE WANT TO HELP PAKISTAN, ALREADY A RECEIVER OF GERMAN DEVELOPMENT AID, TO A GREATER EXTENT IN SOLVING ITS MAJOR ECONOMIC PROBLEMS, BEYOND HUMANITARIAN AID FOR THE AFGHAN REFUGEES. INDIA IS THE MOST IMPORTANT RECIPIENT OF GERMAN DEVELOPMENT AID AND WILL REMAIN SO IN FUTURE. WE SHALL CONTINUE TO SUPPLY OUR MANIFOLD AID TO OUR ALLY TURKEY. WE ARE ALSO PREPARED TO SHARE THE INITIATIVE FOR OTHER FRIENDS AND, AS HAPPENED IN 1979, AGAIN SET UP A PROGRAMME OF EXTRAORDINARY AID.

I SHOULD LIKE TO REMIND YOU, MOREOVER, OF THE EUROPEAN-ARAB DIALOGUE AND THE INITIATIVE OF MY COLLEAGUE HERR GENSCHER FOR COOPERATION BETWEEN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY AND THE STATES BORDERING ON THE GULF, SOME OF WHICH MY COLLEAGUE GRAF LAMBSDORFF VISITED RECENTLY.

THE USA HAVE TAKEN A NUMBER OF MEASURES TO DRAW THE SOVIET UNION'S ATTENTION TO THE FACT THAT A VIOLATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW CANNOT REMAIN WITHOUT CONSEQUENCES. THE USA HAVE CALLED UPON THEIR FRIENDS TO BEHAVE ACCORDINGLY. THIS WE SHALL DO, PARTICULARLY WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE EEC AND THE COORDINATING COMMITTEE FOR EAST-WEST TRADE POLICY (COCOM).

WE HAVE NO USE FOR NERVOUSNESS, CRISIS-MONGERING, EXCITED OR RABBLE-ROUSING SPEECHES. WHAT WE NEED INSTEAD IS A CAREFULLY THOUGHT-OUT QUOTE CRISIS MANAGEMENT UNQUOTE. A CALM APPROACH IS NOT PUSSY-FOOTING. ANYONE WHO EXPECTS A POLICY OF HIGH-SOUNDING PHRASES IN THIS SITUATION IS MISTAKEN ABOUT OUR INTERESTS AND THE STYLE OF OUR STATE. THAT MUST NOT BECOME THE STYLE OF OUR STATE. WE MUST MAKE OUR POSITION CLEAR, UNOBTRUSIVELY BUT, AT THE SAME TIME, UNMISTAKEABLY. THAT WE ARE DOING.

TO THIS END WE MUST TALK WITH EACH OTHER -- ALSO WITH THE SOVIET UNION. OUR POLICY MUST BE CLEAR FOR ALL TO SEE, PARTICULARLY DURING DIFFICULT TIMES. IT WAS FOR SUCH SITUATIONS THAT THE HOT-LINES WERE INSTALLED.

PEACE IS NOT A NATURAL STATE: PEACE MUST BE ESTABLISHED OVER AND OVER AGAIN.

WE SHALL NOT RELAX BUT RATHER INCREASE OUR EFFORTS TO SECURE PEACE IN EUROPE. OUR POLICY OF DETENTE IS NOT (NOT) AN APPEASEMENT POLICY. IT IS ONE OF TWO MAIN ELEMENTS OF OUR SECURITY POLICY WHICH IS BASED ON THE BALANCE OF MILITARY POWER. THIS MEANS CONTINUED WORK FOR US ON THREE TASKS:

FIRST -- PRESERVING WHAT WE HAVE ALREADY ACHIEVED. THAT ALSO MEANS STRICT COMPLIANCE WITH AND FULL APPLICATION OF THE QUADRIPARTITE AGREEMENT AND TREATIES WITH THE SOVIET UNION, POLAND AND CZECHOSLAVAKIA AND THE BASIC TREATY WITH THE GDR. THAT ALSO MEANS PRESERVING WHAT BOTH WEST AND EAST HAVE ACHIEVED IN THE CSCE SINCE 1975.

SECOND - CONTINUED DEVELOPMENT OF WHAT WE HAVE ALREADY ACHIEVED, I.E. FURTHER IMPROVEMENTS IN CONTACT BETWEEN PEOPLE IN THE TWO GERMAN STATES; CONTINUATION OF WORK ON ARMS LIMITATION AND ARMS CONTROL, PARTICULARLY WITH REGARD TO MBFR. I EXPRESSLY WELCOME PRESIDENT CARTER'S RENEWED STATEMENT THAT THE SALT II TREATY IS IN THE INTERESTS OF THE SECURITY OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE WHOLE WORLD. I ASSUME THAT THE TREATY WILL BE ABIDED BY, EVEN IF IT CANNOT BE RATIFIED AT PRESENT.

THIRD - PERSEVERING WITH WORK ON THE NEW TASKS. THIS INCLUDES IN PARTICULAR THE FACT THAT WE ARE NOT WITHDRAWING NATO'S OFFER OF NEGOTIATIONS ON MEDIUM-RANGE NUCLEAR MISSILES MADE IN DECEMBER 1979.

WE KNOW FROM EXPERIENCE, PARTICULARLY FROM THE BERLIN CRISIS IN THE LATE 50'S AND EARLY 60'S, THAT WE CAN DEPEND ON THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA. THE USA ARE IRREPLACEABLE FOR OUR SECURITY.

OUR SOLIDARITY WITH THE USA IS THE CRUX OF OUR SECURITY AND, AT THE SAME TIME, THE SECURITY OF BERLIN.

WE SHALL NOT ALLOW WHAT WE HAVE ACHIEVED IN TEN YEARS OF DEFENCE AND DETENTE POLICY TO BE EITHER DIMINISHED OR PULLED APART. HUNDREDS OF THOUSANDS OF PEOPLE HAVE COME TO US FROM EASTERN EUROPE AND HAVE RECEIVED FULL CITIZENS RIGHTS. TRAVEL AND THE EXCHANGE OF GOODS HAVE MULTIPLIED. BERLIN IS NOT A CRISIS CENTRE.

I AM STILL PREPARED TO MEET THE CHAIRMAN OF THE GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC'S COUNCIL OF STATE, HERR HONECKER, AND TO DISCUSS THE DEVELOPMENT OF BILATERAL RELATIONS AND ALSO THE CONTRIBUTION WHICH WE HAVE TO MAKE TOWARDS PEACE AND SECURITY IN EUROPE.

THE WESTERN INITIATIVE IN NAMIBIA, THE SUCCESSFUL RHODESIA NEGOTIATIONS, THE COOPERATION OF THE EEC AND ASEAN STATES, THE SECOND LOME AGREEMENT, THE EUROPEAN-ARAB DIALOGUE - ALL OF THIS PROVES THAT WE DO NOT INTEND TO ESTABLISH POLITICAL OR MILITARY HEGOMONY IN THE THIRD WORLD BUT THAT WE WANT AN EQUAL EXCHANGE WITH SOVEREIGN PARTNERS. THIS POLICY MUST NOT BE ENDANGERED BY HASTY TALK ABOUT A GEOGRAPHICAL EXPANSION OF NATO-COMMITMENTS. THIS DOES NOT HELP THE STATES OF THE THIRD WORLD, IT AROUSES DISTRUST AND THUS DAMAGES OUR ALLIANCE.

TO SUM UP:

FIRST - THE SECURITY OF OUR COUNTRY IS GUARANTEED BY NATO AS A SELF-DEFENCE ALLIANCE AND BY OUR PARTNERSHIP WITH THE USA. WE THEREFORE HAVE NO NEED TO BE AFRAID IN A CRISIS.

SECOND - THE MOST URGENT INTERNATIONAL TASK - FOR THE QUOTE CRISIS MANAGEMENT UNQUOTE IS: TO PREVENT AN EXPANSION OF THE CRISIS AND TO DEFUSE IT. THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC IS NOT A SUPER POWER BUT WE ARE PARTICIPATING WITHIN THE LIMITS OF OUR POSSIBILITIES:

OF COURSE THE CONTACT TO PRESIDENT CARTER IS PARTICULARLY CLOSE. BUT I ALSO INTEND TO MEET GENERAL SECRETARY BREZHNEV IN MOSCOW.

WRIGHT

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TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 61 OF 17 JANUARY

INFO IMMEDIATE UKDEL NATO, UKREP BRUSSELS, UKMIS NEW YORK,
WASHINGTON, PARIS, ROME, OTTAWA.

AFGHANISTAN/IRAN: FRG VIEWS

1. CHANCELLOR SCHMIDT TODAY DELIVERED TO THE BUNDESTAG A FEDERAL GOVERNMENT DECLARATION ON THE SITUATION IN AFGHANISTAN AND IRAN WHICH HAD BEEN PREPARED YESTERDAY AT A MEETING OF THE FEDERAL CABINET. THIS WAS FOLLOWED BY A DEBATE. MIFT CONTAINS A TRANSLATION OF EXTRACTS FROM THE DECLARATION (FULL TEXT FOLLOWS BY BAG).
2. THE SPEECH CONFIRMED THE BASIC GUIDELINES OF FRG POLICY: FIRST SOLIDARITY WITH THE UNITED STATES, SECONDLY, PRESERVATION OF DETENTE: THIRDLY, SUPPORT TO COUNTRIES IN THE AREA OF CRISIS. ON THE FIRST, SCHMIDT ROUNDLY CONDEMNED THE RUSSIAN OCCUPATION OF AFGHANISTAN QUOTING COPIOUSLY FROM UN RESOLUTIONS TO WHICH THE FRG HAD SUBSCRIBED. THE INVASION TOUCHED ABOVE ALL UPON EAST-SOUTH RELATIONS BUT ALSO NECESSARILY AFFECTED EAST-WEST RELATIONS. SCHMIDT WAS CAREFUL NOT TO IMPLY THAT THE FRG HAD A SPECIAL, INDIVIDUAL ROLE TO PLAY AND REFERRED PARTICULARLY TO ACTION THROUGH THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY AND COCOM. HOWEVER HE SEVERAL TIMES EMPHASISED GERMAN SUPPORT FOR THE UNITED STATES, THE CLOSENESS OF CONTACT WITH PRESIDENT CARTER AND THE IRREPLACEABLE NATURE OF THE US COMMITMENT.
3. AS TO THE POLICY OF NON-REPRISALS, WHILE SCHMIDT CLEARLY SEES THE IMPORTANCE OF NOT UNDERMINING THE AMERICAN POSITION, HIS EMPHASIS IN EUROPE WAS ON DETENTE: ON PRESERVING WHAT HAD BEEN ACHIEVED (THE QUADRIPARTITE AGREEMENT AND THE EASTERN TREATIES), DEVELOPING FURTHER MULTILATERAL CONTACTS (MBFR ETC) AND WORKING AT NEW TASKS (TNF MODERNISATION AND ARMS CONTROL). HE SAID THAT HOT LINES WERE THERE TO BE USED, ESPECIALLY IN BAD TIMES, AND THAT HE WOULD PERSIST WITH HIS VISITS TO MOSCOW AND EAST BERLIN. THE ESSENTIAL THINGS WERE FIRST, TO PREVENT THE CRISIS FROM SPREADING AND SECONDLY, TO DEFUSE THE CRISIS ITSELF.

CONFIDENTIAL

/ 4. CONSISTENT

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4. CONSISTENT WITH WHAT THE GERMANS HAVE ALREADY MADE CLEAR IN BRUSSELS AND BILATERALLY, THE CHANCELLOR EMPHASISED THE NEED FOR ECONOMIC MEASURES TO SUPPORT THE THIRD WORLD COUNTRIES WHO WERE DIRECTLY AND INDIRECTLY THREATENED BY RUSSIAN ACTION RATHER THAN ON TAKING SANCTIONS AGAINST THE RUSSIANS. HE MADE IT CLEAR THAT THE GERMANS WOULD HAVE TO PROVIDE SUBSTANTIAL SUMS OF MONEY FOR TURKEY AND PAKISTAN.

5. THE SPEECH HAS SHOWN THAT THE GOVERNMENT HAVE NOT ESSENTIALLY ALTERED THEIR APPROACH TO AFGHANISTAN, CHARACTERISED BY THE UNFLAPPABLE WAY IN WHICH SCHMIDT STAYED ON HOLIDAY AS PLANNED AND VISITED MADRID AND PARIS, IN THE LAST FORTNIGHT DESPITE PRESSURE FROM THE OPPOSITION, THE PRESS AND INTERNATIONALLY FOR THEM TO TAKE A MORE ROBUST LINE TOWARDS THE EAST. THE SPEECH WAS ENTHUSIASTICALLY RECEIVED BY SCHMIDT'S OWN PARTY. THE OPPOSITION HAVE MADE A FAIR AMOUNT OF NOISE BUT VERY LITTLE IMPRESSION. NEITHER, IT WOULD APPEAR, HAVE VISITS FROM COOPER AND CHRISTOPHER. INDEED, THE COALITION PARTIES WHICH INVENTED OSTPOLITIK ARE MOST UNLIKELY TO REPUDIATE IT, LEAST OF ALL IN AN ELECTION YEAR. HAVING NOW WORKED OUT A RATIONALE, THE GOVERNMENT ARE LIKELY TO STICK TO THEIR LINE, EMPHASISING THEIR SUPPORT FOR THE UNITED STATES WITH THE INTENTION OF DISGUIISING AS FAR AS POSSIBLE THE DIFFERENCES OF APPROACH WITHIN THE ALLIANCE.

WRIGHT

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Prime Minister
You may prefer to defer a decision on this until you have seen how Armstrong on his return.

CABINET OFFICE

70 Whitehall, London SW1A 2AS Telephone 01-233 8319

From the Secretary of the Cabinet: Sir Robert Armstrong KCB, CVO

Yes out
Armstrong
16/1

16th January, 1980

Ref. A01147

Dealt with rally.
H. Armstrong 12/2

Dear Michael,

I have written to you separately about the proposals which emerged from my meeting yesterday in Paris.

This letter deals with one other proposal, which will need to be handled on a separate net.

We had some discussion of the question of support for Afghan resistance to the Soviet invasion. After some discussion we agreed that it would probably not be in the interests of the West that any such support should assume levels which might create the risk of a border war on the North West frontier. We thought, however, that, so long as there were Afghans able and willing to continue to resist the Soviet invasion - as guerrillas in the mountains - and so long as the Pakistanis were willing to see their own territory, and particularly the refugee camps, being in some degree used as a base for guerrilla operations, it would be in the interests of the West to encourage and support resistance. That would make more difficult the process of Soviet pacification of Afghanistan, and would make that process take much longer than it otherwise would; and the existence of a guerrilla movement in Afghanistan would be a focus of Islamic resistance, which we should be wanting to continue to stimulate.

We agreed that, if this conclusion was accepted by Heads of Government, then it would be a matter of some urgency to examine the feasibility and modalities of support. We thought that this could be best done by a representative of our friends, meeting together with representatives of their United States and French counterparts.

My German colleague had considerable difficulty with this subject. He pointed out that the German Government was not allowed, under the Constitution, to export arms (I suppose that this is true); and he said that the German intelligence service would not be allowed to include expenditure on activities of this kind in its budget under the terms of its charter. Nevertheless he agreed that, if it was decided to hold a meeting of the kind suggested, a representative of the German counterpart of our friends should be invited to attend the meeting as an observer.

/I should be

M. O'D. B. Alexander, Esq.

SECRET AND PERSONAL

I should be grateful to know whether the Prime Minister and the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary would agree to British participation in a study of this kind.

I am sending a copy of this letter to the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary and to "C".

Yours ever
Robert Armstrong



2A.

CABINET OFFICE

70 Whitehall, London SW1A 2AS Telephone 01-233 8319

From the Secretary of the Cabinet: Sir Robert Armstrong KCB, CVO

16th January, 1979^{80.}

Ref. A01143

Dear Michael

South West Asia

I shall of course be letting you have a full record of the conversations which I had in Paris yesterday with Dr. Brzezinski, M. Wahl and Herr von Staden; but I thought that it might be useful if, before this afternoon's meeting, I let you have a note of the points on which we agreed, subject to the approval of our Heads of Government, that further action or discussion should be arranged.

We noted that the United States Government had proposed an early quadripartite meeting of political directors on Pakistan. We agreed that it would be useful for that meeting to go ahead in the week beginning 21st January. We noted a number of points to be included on the agenda for the meeting:

- (a) It would be useful for Governments to define the final objectives which it was hoped that Western action would achieve for Afghanistan.
- (b) We took note of proposals to have the Olympic Games moved from Moscow to some other place - notably Munich or Montreal. We thought it unlikely that this would be practicable; and we doubted whether it would be politically acceptable for our athletes not to participate in the Games, even if they were held in Moscow and even if we had power to prevent the athletes from going. We should, however, consider a concerted policy of not sending any official representatives to the Games, if they were held in Moscow.
- (c) We should consider stepping up broadcasts from the free world to Soviet Russia and to the Moslem world.

We thought that it would be useful to reactivate the consortium on aid to Pakistan. The United Kingdom Government was invited to take the initiative on this.

/We noted

M. O'D. B. Alexander, Esq.

SECRET

We noted that Lord Carrington was about to visit India, and that there were proposals for President Giscard to visit India in a few weeks' time. We agreed that it was important to exchange early and full information, as a result of these and other high level visits, about the views and attitudes about the new Indian Government.

We noted with concern recent developments in North Yemen, and the imminent prospect of a union of North and South Yemen under a left-wing leadership, to form a new country or grouping in the south of the Arabian peninsula which would be Soviet dominated and would have a larger population than Saudi Arabia. We also noted with concern the deficiencies in Saudi Arabian security arrangements thrown up by the Mecca siege and other events. We thought that it would be useful to have a quadripartite Middle East regional security group to look systematically at the problems of security in the region. The United States would be represented on such a group at Deputy Assistant Secretary of State level, probably by somebody on the staff of the National Security Council. Amongst other things, the group should consider the role for French troops in Djibouti and the arguments for a French naval presence in the area.

We noted Turkey's need for further military and economic aid. We agreed that the German Government should be invited to take a lead in the co-ordination of further aid for Turkey. I was asked that the German Federal Chancellery should be given a full brief on Lord Carrington's talks in Turkey.

We noted the change in Iraqi attitudes brought about by recent events in the Middle East and South West Asia. The French Government had developed better relations with the Iraqi Government than the rest of us and we agreed that they should be invited to see what they could do to promote better relations between the Iraqi Government and the United States Government.

We noted that there was to be a meeting of the quadripartite political directors at the end of the month on Yugoslavia. We agreed that that meeting should consider urgently how to deal with the crisis that would follow the death of Marshal Tito, and should review contingency plans, including plans for providing military assistance to Yugoslavia in the event of a Soviet threat in the period of uncertainty which would follow Tito's death.

I am sending a copy of this letter to George Walden.

Yours sincerely

Bligh

(for Sir Robert Armstrong)

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FM BONN 161625Z JAN 80

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 54 OF 16 JANUARY

INFO PRIORITY EAST BERLIN, BMS BERLIN, MOSCOW, UKMIS NEW YORK, PARIS, UKDEL NATO, WASHINGTON, OTTAWA.

EAST BERLIN TELNO 8 OF 14 JANUARY:

AFGHANISTAN: INNER GERMAN RELATIONS

1. IT IS CLEAR BOTH FROM PUBLIC STATEMENTS AND PRIVATE DISCUSSIONS THAT THE FEDERAL AUTHORITIES DO NOT HAVE IN MIND ANY PUNITIVE ACTION AGAINST THE GDR FOR ITS SUPPORT OF SOVIET INTERVENTION IN AFGHANISTAN. NOR IS THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT UNDER ANY GREAT PRESSURE FROM THE OPPOSITION TO TAKE RETALIATORY MEASURES AGAINST THE GDR. KOHL HAS ADVISED THE CHANCELLOR NOT TO MEET HONECKER IN THE NEAR FUTURE BUT THERE HAS BEEN NO SUGGESTION THAT THE CURRENT NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE GDR SHOULD BE BROKEN OFF OR INNER-GERMAN TRADE CURTAILED. IN SUM, THE FEDERAL AUTHORITIES ARE CLEARLY RELUCTANT TO CHANGE THE BASIS ON WHICH THEIR DEALINGS WITH THE GDR ARE NOW CONDUCTED, BECAUSE OF THEIR CONCEPT OF THE NATURE OF INNER-GERMAN RELATIONS AND BECAUSE OF THEIR CONCERN THAT THE RUSSIANS MIGHT BE LED TO BRING PRESSURE ON BERLIN AS A RESPONSE TO US PRESSURES ELSEWHERE.

Afghanistan

PS

PS/PS

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PS/M. Blaker

PS/PUS

Sen D. Parland

Sen A. Adland

N. Bullard

N. Ferguson

N. Murray

N. P. Hutchinson

Hd WED

Hd EESD

Hd SAD(6)

Hd PUSD(4)

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RC

NO 10 Downing St

Assessor Staff, Cabinet office (4)

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2. BRIEFING THE BONN GROUP ON 15 JANUARY RICHTHOFEN SAID THAT THE FEDERAL AUTHORITIES EXPECTED THE PRESENT NEGOTIATIONS ON TRAFFIC IMPROVEMENTS BETWEEN THE FRG AND BERLIN TO CONTINUE, AND, AS THEY BECAME MORE TECHNICAL, TO BECOME MORE INTENSIVE. ALTHOUGH NO DATE HAD YET BEEN AGREED, HE THOUGHT THAT THE MEETING BETWEEN THE FEDERAL CHANCELLOR AND HONECKER WOULD TAKE PLACE IN LATE FEBRUARY OR EARLY MARCH. THE FEDERAL AUTHORITIES BELIEVED THAT ALL THIS WAS IN THE INTEREST OF RELATIONS BETWEEN GERMANS IN DIVIDED GERMANY, OF BERLIN AND OF PEACE IN CENTRAL EUROPE.

3. THE FEDERAL AUTHORITIES BELIEVE THAT THE GDR AND THE SOVIET UNION ALSO DO NOT FOR THE MOMENT WISH TO CREATE PROBLEMS IN BERLIN AND INNER-GERMAN RELATIONS. THEY SEE AS CONFIRMATION OF THEIR VIEW THE NEWS THAT THE ALLIED TELECOMMUNICATIONS CABLES FROM BERLIN TO THE FRG ARE WORKING AGAIN AND THAT THE RUSSIANS HAVE AGREED TO A FURTHER MEETING WITH THE POLITICAL ADVISERS TO DISCUSS REICHSBAHN TARIFFS. INDEED SOME IN THE AUSWAERTIGES AMT BELIEVE THAT THE GDR IS MORE EAGER TO PRESS AHEAD IN THE NEGOTIATIONS THAN IT HAS BEEN FOR SOME TIME.

4. THE FEDERAL AUTHORITIES' CONCERN THAT THE INCREASED CONTACTS BETWEEN EAST AND WEST GERMANS SHOULD NOT BE PUT AT RISK IS REAL AND DEEPLY FELT. MOREOVER THE FEDERAL AUTHORITIES MAY JUDGE THAT CONTINUING PROGRESS IN INNER-GERMAN NEGOTIATIONS, ESPECIALLY IF THIS WAS ACCOMPANIED BY ANY GDR CONCESSION ON HUMANITARIAN ISSUES, WOULD MUTE OPPOSITION-INSPIRED CRITICISM OF THE PURSUIT OF DETENTE AND MAINTAIN THE CHANCELLOR'S IMAGE AS A RELIABLE AND PREDICTABLE LEADER. THEY RECOGNISE THE DANGER THAT THE GDR MAY BE WEDGE-DRIVING, AND RECOGNISE ALSO THE IMPORTANCE OF SOLIDARITY WITH THEIR ALLIES, BUT THEY SEE INNER-GERMAN RELATIONS NOT SIMPLY AS THE CONDUCT OF BUSINESS BETWEEN THE FRG AND GDR GOVERNMENTS BUT RATHER AS SERVING, BY THE MAINTENANCE OF CONTACTS BETWEEN GERMANS IN THE TWO GERMANIES, THE CONTINUED EXISTENCE OF A SINGLE NATION. AGAINST THIS BACKGROUND WE DOUBT IF THE FEDERAL AUTHORITIES WOULD CONSIDER ANYTHING APPROACHING PUNITIVE ACTION TOWARDS THE GDR SHORT OF CIRCUMSTANCES IN WHICH GDR TROOPS WERE PARTICIPATING DIRECTLY IN A SOVIET ADVENTURE IN EUROPE - EG YUGOSLAVIA.

5. I THINK IT IS CLEAR THAT THE GDR, NO DOUBT WITH RUSSIAN SUPPORT, HAVE FOR THE MOMENT DECIDED TO TURN THE SMILING FACE OF COMMUNISM TOWARDS THE FRG AND BERLIN, AND THAT THIS IS WELCOME TO THE FEDERAL AUTHORITIES. AS SEEN FROM BONN, THERE IS NO SPECIFIC BRITISH INTEREST IN DISTURBING THIS STATE OF AFFAIRS. THE PSYCHOLOGICAL MOOD OF BERLIN AND ITS ECONOMIC VIABILITY REQUIRE CALM IN AND

INTEREST IN DISTURBING THIS STATE OF AFFAIRS. THE PSYCHOLOGICAL MOOD OF BERLIN AND ITS ECONOMIC VIABILITY REQUIRE CALM IN AND AROUND THE CITY AND ALLIED AND BRITISH RESPONSIBILITIES ARE MOST EASILY MET WHEN THIS EXISTS. MOREOVER THE GERMANS ON WHOM WE DEPEND HEAVILY IN MANY FIELDS WOULD NOT UNDERSTAND IT IF WE ADOPTED A SHARPLY DIFFERENT POLICY IN AN AREA WHICH THEY CONSIDER OF SUBSTANTIALLY GREATER IMPORTANCE TO THEM THAN TO US. MORE GENERALLY, THE WESTERN POSITION IN BERLIN IS SO EXPOSED THAT IT WOULD SEEM UNWISE TO DO ANYTHING WHICH MIGHT DRAW IT INTO THE AREA OF DETERIORATION IN EAST/WEST RELATIONS. SO I RECOMMEND DISCRETION AS THE BETTER PART OF VALOUR IN THIS PARTICULAR AREA.

WRIGHT

NNNN

WENT AT 16/1711Z JMC+SHC

Jif. JF

IMMEDIATE

- PS
- PS/LPS
- MR BLAKER
- PS/MR LUCE
- PS/MR HURD
- PS/PUS
- SIR D MAITLAND
- MR COZZAZZI
- MR FERGUSSON
- MR MURRAY
- MR BULLARD
- LORD N G LENNOX
- MR P H MOBERLY
- HD/FED
- HD/PUSD (2)
- HD/UND
- HD/SEAD
- HD/SAD (4)
- HD/SESD
- HD/N AM D
- HD/DEF DEPT
- HD/ACD
- HD/RENAD
- HD/NEWS DEPT
- RC

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ASSESSMENT STAFF
CABINET OFFICE

Sir A. Adani

IMMEDIATE

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MR AUST LEGAL ADVISER

CRS 700

CONFIDENTIAL

FM CANBERRA 160720Z JAN 80

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 40 OF 16 JANUARY

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, ROUTINE WELLINGTON, TOKYO, MOSCOW, PARIS, BONN, UKDEL NATO, UKREP BRUSSELS, AND UKNIS NEW YORK.

MY TELNO 22: AFGHANISTAN: AUSTRALIAN DECISIONS

1. DFA HAVE NOW BRIEFED US ON THE CABINET DECISIONS OUTLINED IN MY TELNO 21. THE RATIONALE BEHIND THE AUSTRALIAN DECISIONS IS TO DISCOURAGE ANY EXTENSION OR REPETITION OF THE CURRENT SOVIET ACTION AND NOT MERELY TO REACT TO IT. THE CABINET FELT THAT THERE WERE LIMITS TO THE ACTIONS WHICH COULD USEFULLY BE TAKEN BY A NATION OF ONLY 14 MILLION PEOPLE BUT THEY FELT IT IMPORTANT TO LEND THEIR WEIGHT TO THE MORE SUBSTANTIAL DECISIONS WHICH WERE BEING OR HAD BEEN TAKEN BY LARGER NATIONS.

INDIAN OCEAN

2. AN AUSTRALIAN OFFER TO INVOLVE THEMSELVES MORE CLOSELY IN THE INDIAN OCEAN HAD BEEN MADE SOME MONTHS AGO BUT THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF

INDIAN OCEAN HAD BEEN MADE SOME MONTHS AGO BUT THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF THAT OFFER WAS MADE ON MR FRASER'S INSTRUCTIONS AT THE SAME TIME AS OTHER MEASURES ANNOUNCED ON AFGHANISTAN. THE AUSTRALIANS WERE AT PRESENT EXAMINING THE OPTIONS OPEN TO THEM. THEY WERE PREPARED TO ASSIST THE AMERICANS IN ALL THEIR INDIAN OCEAN ACTIVITIES, INCLUDING DEPLOYMENT, SURVEILLANCE AND PROVISION OF PORT FACILITIES BUT THEY WOULD FIRST NEED TO KNOW WHAT PRECISELY THE AMERICANS WANTED. TO THIS END, A TEAM OF OFFICIALS FROM CANBERRA WOULD SHORTLY BE SENT TO WASHINGTON TO DISCUSS THE MATTER WITH THE U S ADMINISTRATION. ON DIEGO GARCIA, THE AUSTRALIANS SAID THAT IF THE AMERICANS PLANNED, AS WE UNDERSTAND THEY DO, TO EXTEND THEIR FACILITIES IN DIEGO GARCIA, THE AUSTRALIANS WOULD BE PREPARED TO HELP THEM IN PROVIDING STAGING FACILITIES IN AUSTRALIA. NO THOUGHT HAS APPARENTLY DOEEN TAKEN AT PRESENT TO ANY DIRECT AUSTRALIAN INVOLVEMENT IN THE BIOT. NEVERTHELESS, THE AUSTRALIANS WOULD BE RE-CONSIDERING THEIR POSITION IN THE LIGHT OF THE AMERICAN STRATEGIC ANALYSIS OF THE AREA CURRENTLY IN PREPARATION.

SCIENTIFIC COLLABORATION

3. THIS WOULD BE INDEFINITELY SUSPENDED AND WOULD NOT APPLY SOLELY TO THE GOVERNMENT TO GOVERNMENT PROGRAMME OF EXCHANGES. THE AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT WERE ALSO CONSIDERING EXTENDING IT TO MULTILATERAL EXCHANGES IN E G THE AREA OF GRAVITY MEASUREMENT.

CULTURAL PROGRAMME

4. THE PRESENT BIENNIAL PROGRAMME EXPIRES IN MID-1980 AND WOULD NOT BE RENEWED, ALTHOUGH THE CURRENT ART EXHIBITION OF RUSSIAN PAINTINGS WILL PROCEED.

CIVIL AVIATION

5. THE AUSTRALIANS HAVE REJECTED GENERAL AEROFLOT PROPOSALS FOR DIRECT FLIGHTS TO SYDNEY AND A PARTICULAR AEROFLOT PROPOSAL TO STATION TWO OF THEIR PERSONNEL HERE TO LOOK AFTER THE INTERESTS OF THEIR CHARTER FLIGHTS TO NEW ZEALAND. (THE AUSTRALIANS HAD FELT OBLIGED, UNDER DOMESTIC LEGISLATION, TO GRANT THE SOVIET UNION FIRST AND SECOND FREEDOMS BUT HAD SUBSEQUENTLY FOUND OUT THAT THE NEW ZEALANDERS WERE UNAMARE OF WHAT THE SOVIET UNION HAD IN MIND.)

SHIPPING

6. A FURTHER STUDY IS IN PROCESS OF POSSIBLE ACTION AGAINST SOVIET

6. A FURTHER STUDY IS IN PROCESS OF POSSIBLE ACTION AGAINST SOVIET LINER SHIPPING.

OFFICIAL TALKS AND VISITS

7. INDEFINITELY SUSPENDED AT A SENIOR LEVEL AT LEAST. OTHER, LOWER LEVEL, VISITS WOULD BE CONSIDERED ON A CASE BY CASE BASIS.

WHEAT

8. AS ALREADY REPORTED, AUSTRALIA WOULD NOT UNDER-CUT THE AMERICAN POSITION.

FISHERIES

9. NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN WESTERN AUSTRALIA AND TASMANIA AND THE SOVIET UNION TO BE SUSPENDED INDEFINITELY AND ANY APPROVALS GIVEN TO BE WITHDRAWN.

VISITS BY RESEARCH VESSELS

10. NO MORE VISITS TO BE ALLOWED. THE CURRENT VISIT BY THE "PROFESSOR BOGOROV" WAS REDUCED TO 24 HOURS FROM FOUR DAYS.

11. AS FOR RELATIONS WITH THE AFGHAN PUPPET REGIME, THE AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT DID NOT PROPOSE TO RECOGNISE IT, NOR WOULD SHE RE-ACTIVATE HER LAPSED AID OFFER OF 500 TONNES OF WHEAT. NO FURTHER BILATERAL AID COMMITMENTS WOULD BE ENTERED INTO AND NO FURTHER AFGHAN STUDENTS WOULD BE ADMITTED, ALTHOUGH THE CASES OF THOSE ALREADY HERE WOULD BE CONSIDERED ON A PRAGMATIC BASIS.

12. THE CABINET AGREED IN PRINCIPLE, SUBJECT TO NORMAL BUDGETARY RESTRAINTS, TO PROVIDE HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE TO PAKISTAN FOR AFGHAN REFUGEES AND TO REMAIN ALERT TO FURTHER REQUESTS FOR AID FROM PAKISTAN. THEY ALSO AGREED THAT THE QUESTION OF PAKISTAN'S RE-ADMITTANCE TO THE COMMONWEALTH SHOULD BE LOOKED AT ACTIVELY.

13. THE CABINET ALSO AGREED TO INDICATE, WHERE APPROPRIATE, TO PAKISTAN THAT AUSTRALIAN AND WESTERN ASSISTANCE TO HER WOULD BE FACILITATED IF PAKISTAN WOULD CHANGE ITS ATTITUDE ON THE ACQUISITION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

OLYMPIC GAMES

OLYMPIC GAMES

14. THE CABINET ADOPTED A VERY CAUTIOUS POSITION ON THE OLYMPIIC GAMES (SEE PARA 4 OF MY TUR).

DUDGEON

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IMMEDIATE

GRS 850

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FM UKDEL NATO 151730Z JAN 80

TO IMMEDIATE FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE,
TELEGRAM NUMBER 038 OF 15 JANUARY 1980.

INFO IMMEDIATE ISLAMABAD (FOR PS), WASHINGTON, BONN, PARIS, UKREP
BRUSSELS, BUDAPEST,
INFO PRIORITY ALL OTHER NATO POSTS, DUBLIN.

MIPT: NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL MEETING ON AFGHANISTAN, 15 JANUARY.

1. THIS TELEGRAM RECORDS THE INFORMATION GIVEN DURING THE COUNCIL MEETING ON MEASURES TAKEN OR PROPOSED IN RESPECT OF RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION. A FULL REPORT OF THE COUNCIL DISCUSSION WILL FOLLOW BY TELEGRAM TOMORROW.

ITALY:

2. (A) DEMARCHES TO THE SOVIET UNION:

(B) CANCELLATION OF VISIT BY SOVIET VICE-MINISTER IVANOFF TO ROME AND THAT BY AN ITALIAN MINISTER TO MOSCOW:

(C) POSTPONEMENT OF VISITS BY SOVIET MILITARY AND RESEARCH SHIPS AND OF OTHER POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND CULTURAL CONTACTS. THE LEVEL AND FREQUENCY OF OFFICIAL AND DIPLOMATIC CONTACTS WILL BE CLOSELY MONITORED:

(D) STRICT APPLICATION OF VISA REGULATIONS FOR SOVIET COMMERCIAL OFFICIALS AND CONTROL OF THEIR ACTIVITIES IN ITALY:

(E) INTENDS TO REDUCE OR DISCOURAGE CERTAIN TRADE PROMOTION INITIATIVES EVEN WHERE NON-OFFICIAL ORGANISATIONS ARE INVOLVED.

3. ITALY WOULD ALSO BE PREPARED TO CONSIDER OTHER ECONOMIC MEASURES, IF THERE WAS SOLIDARITY AMONGST ALLIANCE MEMBERS, INCLUDING THE PROVISION OF COMMERCIAL CREDIT TO THE SOVIET UNION.

FRANCE:

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/ 4. (A)

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4. (A) HAS DENOUNCED THE SOVIET INVASION AND MADE CLEAR THAT IS IS A BLOW TO DETENTE.
- (B) HAS DECIDED TO POSTPONE SOME MEETINGS.
- (C) FAVOURS CONTINUING WITH BILATERAL CONTACTS TO MAINTAIN DETENTE AND THE CSE PROCESS, WHILST USING THEM TO REITERATE THE FRENCH ATTITUDE TO THE SOVIET INTERVENTION IN AFGHANISTAN.
- (D) WOULD NOT RULE OUT THE POSSIBILITY OF A CHANGE IN THE NATURE AND TEMPO OF CONTACTS WITH THE SOVIET UNION IN THE LIGHT OF EXPERIENCE OVER THE COMING WEEKS.

BELGIUM:

5. (A) RESTRICTIONS WILL BE APPLIED TO VISAS FOR INTOURIST, AEROFLOT AND SOVIET COMPANIES.
- (B) BILATERAL VISITS AND EXCHANGES: NONE PLANNED.
- (C) NO OFFICIAL CREDITS: AGREEMENT TO OECD CONSENSUS RATES.
- (D) OLYMPICS: LEVEL OF OFFICIAL PARTICIPATION TO BE CONSIDERED.
- (E) IPU MEETING IN BRUSSELS NEXT YEAR: VIEWS OF OTHERS WELCOME.

FRG:

6. (A) SIGNATURE OF 25 YEAR ECONOMIC AGREEMENT PUT OFF (AT SOVIET REQUEST).
- (B) WILL APPLY COCOM RULES STRICTLY.
- (C) NO OFFICIAL CREDITS, BUT WILL EXAMINE BANK CREDITS ON A CASE BY CASE BASIS TO INSURE THAT GERMAN TRADERS ARE NOT PROFITING UNFAIRLY, QUOTE PROVIDING PARTNERS AGREE UNQUOTE.
- (D) BILATERAL VISITS AND EXCHANGES POSTPONED OR CANCELLED.
- (E) NEGOTIATIONS ON 2 - YEAR CULTURAL PROGRAMME TO BE DISCONTINUED.
- (F) OFFICIAL ACTION ON THE OLYMPIC GAMES TO BE CONSIDERED FURTHER AT A LATER STAGE.

GREECE:

7. (A) TALKS ON CONSULAR AGREEMENT TO BE DEFERRED.
- (B) IS CONSIDERING REDUCING SOVIET COMMERCIAL STAFF AND JOURNALISTS IN ATHENS.
- (C) WILL TURN DOWN SOVIET OFFER OF TALKS ON UN HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS.
- (D) MEASURES ARE NOT A PACKAGE AND WILL BE ANNOUNCED AND IMPLEMENTED AT THE APPROPRIATE TIME.
- (E) THOUGHT MIGHT BE GIVEN TO HOLDING ALL FUTURE OLYMPIC GAMES IN GREECE.

NETHERLANDS:

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8. (A) VARIOUS BILATERAL MEETINGS CANCELLED OR POSTPONED.
- (B) WILL APPLY COCOM RULES STRICTLY.
- (C) AGREES TO APPLY OECD CONSENSUS RATES ON CREDIT.
- (D) THERE SHOULD BE NO SUBSTITUTION FOR U S GRAIN.

NORWAY:

9. (A) CANCELLATION OF VISIT IN 1980 DEPUTY DEFENCE MINISTER PAVLOVSKY, AND RETURN VISIT BY INSPECTOR-GENERAL OF NORWEGIAN NAVY. (NO OTHER HIGH-LEVEL VISITS PLANNED).
- (B) NO BILATERAL CREDIT AGREEMENTS WILL BE SIGNED. WOULD LIKE TO SEE GENERAL ADHERENCE TO OECD CONSENSUS.
- (C) WILL CONTINUE TO APPLY COCOM RULES STRICTLY. WILL JOIN OTHERS IN REVIEWING THESE REGULATIONS.
- (D) SCEPTICAL ABOUT GETTING NATIONAL OLYMPIC COMMITTEES TO CURTAIL OR CANCEL PARTICIPATION.
- (E) WILLING TO DISCUSS GUIDELINES FOR ECONOMIC RESTRICTIONS ON THE SOVIET UNION.
- (F) WILL NOT TAKE ACTION IN RELATION TO FISHERIES.

US:

10. NO NEW MEASURES ANNOUNCED.

CANADA:

11. MEASURES ALREADY ANNOUNCED AS IN OTTAWA TELNO 31. CANADA FAVOURS THE FOLLOWING AREAS FOR FURTHER WORK:
 - (A) A THOROUGH REVIEW OF CREDIT TO THE SOVIET UNION (POSSIBLY BRINGING IN JAPAN AND AUSTRALIA):
 - (B) A THOROUGH REVIEW OF SUBSIDIES, IN NATO AND AT OECD:
 - (C) STUDY OF THE TIGHTENING UP OF EXPORT, STRATEGIC AND OTHER HIGH TECHNOLOGY GOODS TO THE SOVIET UNION. SUCH A COCOM REVIEW MIGHT BE COMBINED WITH A REVIEW OF THE CURRENT COCOM POLICY ON THE SALE OF NON-MILITARY EQUIPMENT AND TECHNOLOGY TO CHINA. A RELAXATION FOR CHINA MIGHT WELL BE WORTHWHILE IN ITSELF AS WELL AS A SIGNAL TO THE SOVIET UNION:
 - (D) FURTHER STUDY OF ACTION ON THE OLYMPIC GAMES:
 - (E) FURTHER POOLING OF INFORMATION ON VISITS AND EXCHANGES.

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/ TURKEY :

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TURKEY:

12. BECAUSE OF TURKEY'S ECONOMIC DIFFICULTIES, SHE WOULD FIND IT VERY DIFFICULT TO JOIN IN ECONOMIC MEASURES AGAINST THE SOVIET UNION AND SEES NO VALUE IN MAKING GESTURES IN THIS AREA WHICH HAVE NO SUBSTANCE.

DENMARK:

13. (A) PUBLIC CONDEMNATION OF THE SOVIET ACTION AND SUPPORT FOR INITIATIVES IN THE UN.

(B) A LETTER TO PRESIDENT BREZHNEV WHICH HAS JUST ISSUED.

(C) THE SUSPENSION OF PLANNING FOR INTER-GOVERNMENTAL VISITS.

(D) NO MILITARY EXCHANGES OR NAVAL VISITS.

(E) A READINESS TO PARTICIPATE IN A COCOM REVIEW.

(F) AGREEMENT NOT TO UNDERCUT THE U S ACTION ON GRAIN.

(G) DANISH CREDIT TO THE SOVIET UNION WAS ALREADY AT OECE CONSENSUS RATES.

(H) NO MAJOR CULTURAL EVENTS.

LUXEMBOURG:

14. AS IN LUXEMBOURG TELNO 17.

15. ICELAND AND PORTUGAL DID NOT SPEAK.

ROSE.

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SOUTH WEST ASIA

NOTE OF A MEETING HELD AT 10 DOWNING STREET AT 4 PM ON 16 JANUARY 1980

PRESENT

PRIME MINISTER
HOME SECRETARY
CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER
SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDUSTRY
MINISTER OF AGRICULTURE, FISHERIES AND FOOD
SECRETARY OF STATE FOR TRADE
SECRETARY OF STATE FOR ENERGY
ATTORNEY GENERAL
MINISTER OF STATE, FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
(MR DOUGLAS HURD)
MINISTER OF STATE, MINISTRY OF DEFENCE (LORD STRATHCONA)
PARLIAMENTARY UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE,
DEPARTMENT OF THE ENVIRONMENT (MR HECTOR MONRO)
GOVERNOR OF THE BANK OF ENGLAND
SIR ROBERT ARMSTRONG)
MR R L WADE-GERY) Cabinet Office
MR PJ FOWLER)

The meeting was called to consider the United States request for the voluntary implementation of sanctions against Iran which the United Nations Security Council had only failed to make mandatory because of the Soviet veto; and possible action against the Soviet Union in the light of events in Afghanistan and of the message from President Carter delivered to the Prime Minister on 14 January. It had before it, on Iran, a minute from the Lord Privy Seal to the Prime Minister of 11 January; and, on Afghanistan, a minute from the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary to the Prime Minister of 8 January and a background paper by officials circulated under cover of a letter of 15 January from the Private Secretary to the Secretary of the Cabinet.

Iran

It was noted that there had been no substantive discussion at the meeting of the European Community's Foreign Affairs Council on 15 January; and that at the North Atlantic Council on the same date the United States Deputy Secretary of State, Mr Christopher, had said only what he had already said in London on 14 January.

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It was agreed that no further measures could be contemplated in the financial field. The Iranians were behaving with scrupulous correctness. They appeared to have understood that Britain would not take action to freeze their assets, and were not therefore seeking to withdraw their deposits in London.

It was noted that the Iranians had threatened to reduce their oil production and to sell no oil to any country which applied sanctions.

It was agreed that no new primary legislation could be considered in the context of sanctions; and that there was no legal force in Mr Christopher's suggestion that the Security Council resolution of 31 December, which had not been vetoed, might provide cover for action by Britain under the United Nations Act in spite of the vetoing of the resolution of 13 January.

It was agreed that Mr Hurd would seek the views of HM Ambassador in Tehran on the advisability of

- a. reducing the number of Iranian diplomats in London, preferably as part of a joint move with other countries;
- b. imposing a visa requirement for Iranians entering the United Kingdom.

It was noted that, quite apart from the question of sanctions, it was desirable to restrict the abnormally high flow of Iranian visitors.

It was agreed

- i. that the Department of Trade should give further consideration to imposing a ban on Iranian civil aviation, which would have disadvantages in terms of British interests but might be desirable as part of a package of measures;
- ii. that there was a prima facie case for allowing Iranians attending military courses in the United Kingdom to complete them (as was being done in equivalent cases in the United States).

As regards the possibility of an arms embargo, it was agreed that the main problem would be whether to allow current contracts to be fulfilled. The Foreign and Commonwealth Office, in consultation with the Ministry of Defence,

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were invited to arrange for the possibility of so doing to be discussed with the Italian and French Governments, who were comparably placed; and to ascertain whether in the case of Iran the United States Government would in fact be breaking contracts, which it was noted they had decided not to do in the context of their Afghanistan-related ban on grain supplies to the Soviet Union. Although the Americans might well be dissatisfied with a British arms embargo which exempted current contracts, it was argued that in the absence of a United Nations sanctions resolution the Government had both a moral and a legal obligation to make such an exemption. It was agreed to revert to the question when fuller information was available about what contracts were actually involved and what attitude allies such as France and Italy were taking.

On the particular case of the fleet replenishment ship Kharg, which Swan Hunter were almost ready to deliver to the Iranian Navy, it was agreed

- a. that when further administrative delay became impossible the Ministry of Defence should advise Swan Hunter to issue the 30-day notice of availability in accordance with the terms of the contract, which would mean that final sea trials would begin;
- b. that the Ministry of Defence should make clear to Swan Hunter that the ship could not actually be handed over to the Iranians without the Government's permission, since this would require either an export licence or The Queen's permission for the commissioning of the ship into the Iranian Navy to take place in Britain;
- c. that the ship should be delivered to the Iranians at the end of the 30 days period, if the American hostages had by then been released or if the Government had decided to exempt existing contracts from any arms embargo;
- d. that the Attorney General, in consultation with others concerned, should give further thought to what the Government's legal position and financial liability might be if neither of the conditions at c. above were fulfilled and the handing over of the ship to the Iranians had to be prevented.

Finally, it was noted that the economic cost to Britain of Iranian retaliation for any economic sanctions imposed might be considerable and would need to be carefully weighed before any decision to impose such sanctions was taken; and that local opinion in South West Asia seemed to be increasingly inclined to regard the question of sanctions against Iran as much less important than the major issue of how to react to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

Afghanistan

It was noted that the European Community's Foreign Affairs Council had on 15 January issued a declaration which was forcefully worded but lacking in substance. Satisfactory agreement had been reached on not replacing American grain exports to the Soviet Union. But the French and Irish had not agreed to a British proposal that subsidised butter sales to the Soviet Union should be terminated, although something had been achieved in that the Commission were temporarily suspending the prefixation of export restitution, and it was encouraging that Chancellor Schmidt had told the Prime Minister on the telephone on 15 January that he was opposed to butter sales continuing. On credit, there had been a disagreement between the French view that this was not a matter for the Community and the Commission's view that it was.

It was further noted that the discussion in the North Atlantic Council on 15 January had been lamentably indecisive. Some minor political measures, eg on the cancellation of visits, had been agreed. The Germans were sympathetic to the American wish for economic measures. But the French seemed to be against these, while claiming that they were not excluded. Some joint action might be possible on credit and on COCOM. On the Olympic Games, the Americans and Canadians appeared willing to support their transfer away from Moscow; the Germans had noted that public opinion seemed to be moving in that direction; but no one else had spoken on the issue, except for the Norwegians who were sceptical.

It was agreed

- i. that further consideration should be given to the possibility of Britain, in agreement with the Americans and perhaps others such as the Germans, taking a firm lead in proposing the transfer of the

Olympic Games away from Moscow, on the basis of an initial approach either to the Canadian Government (as potential hosts if the transfer were to Montreal) or to the International Olympic Committee.

ii. that further consideration should also be given to the less attractive possibility of officially discouraging British athletes from attending the Games if these were after all held in Moscow;

iii. that as a minimum, if the Games were held in Moscow with the participation of British athletes and the British Olympic Committee, there should be no official British representation.

As regards economic measures against the Soviet Union, it was agreed

a. that Britain should only adopt measures in common with her principal allies;

b. that, subject to a, no British credit should be made available to the Soviet Union on terms more favourable than those envisaged by the OECD Consensus;

c. that the Anglo-Soviet credit agreement should not be renewed after its expiry in February;

d. that it should be made clear, publicly but without undue emphasis, that Britain would be exploring with her partners the possibility of tightening and extending the COCOM restrictions;

e. that as regards food exports by the European Community, the Government should make clear, forcefully and publicly, their opposition to any subsidised sales of butter, sugar or meat.

It was further agreed that the case for Britain being as helpful as possible in support of American policy over Afghanistan was all the stronger because of her comparative inability to support present American policy over Iran.

THE PRIME MINISTER, summing up the discussion, said that the meeting's conclusions should be reported to the Cabinet on 17 January; and that further consideration should be given to outstanding points at the meeting of the Defence and Oversea Policy Committee already arranged for 22 January. For that meeting, the Secretary of the Cabinet should arrange for a paper to be prepared by officials on the Iranian problem, making clear the issues for decision and providing the necessary factual background; and the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary, in consultation with others concerned, should similarly put forward a paper on the issues which needed to be decided in relation to Afghanistan. Meanwhile, no reply would be sent to her message from President Carter.

The Meeting -

1. Took note, with approval, of the Prime Minister's summing up of their discussion.
2. Instructed the Secretary of the Cabinet to arrange for the preparation of a paper setting out issues for decision on Iran, with supporting details.
3. Invited the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary similarly to put forward a paper on issues for decision on Afghanistan.
4. Agreed to resume consideration of both subjects at the meeting of the Defence and Oversea Policy Committee on 22 January.

Cabinet Office

18 January 1980

SUBJECT

cc Master

CONFIDENTIAL

BK

Sport - Olympics

Iran - Sit



FILE

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

15 January 1980

Dear Rosalie,

The Prime Minister's telephone conversation
with Chancellor Schmidt

Chancellor Schmidt telephoned the Prime Minister at lunchtime today. The Chancellor's office, in arranging the call yesterday, made it clear that Chancellor Schmidt had no specific points to put to the Prime Minister but that he wished to make contact with her about the problems of Iran and Afghanistan. They implied that the Chancellor viewed the conversation in the same context as his recent meeting in Paris with President Giscard.

Chancellor Schmidt told the Prime Minister (as his office had told us yesterday) that he had not been very well recently. He added that his illness had not yet completely cleared up and that he would be cancelling a number of engagements scheduled for the next few days.

Afghanistan

Chancellor Schmidt told the Prime Minister that, given the present international situation, he thought it important that they should be in personal touch. The Prime Minister agreed. She said that the important thing seemed to her to be that the European countries should do what they could to help the United States and that they should do it together. She was anxious that the West's condemnation of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan should not be limited to words. It was important that action should follow. She instanced the extension of credit, the sale of butter and the export of high technology as matters on which Europe could do something. Chancellor Schmidt agreed about the need for collective support for the United States and also agreed on credit (while pointing out that the Federal Republic did not extend special credit terms to the Soviet Union), and on the sale of butter. As regards the export of high technology, he thought this should be dealt with in COCOM.

The Prime Minister said that it would be a great propaganda coup for the Russians if the Olympics were held as planned in Moscow. She thought that it might be worth trying to persuade the International Olympic Committee to move the Games to eg Montreal. Chancellor Schmidt said he hoped the Games would not be moved to Munich. He also

/wondered

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wondered whether action on the Olympics should not be held back for a month or two in order to leave the West with a lever for future use. The Prime Minister said that she was doubtful whether the decision could be left for long.

Chancellor Schmidt said that he wanted to intensify the political dialogue between Europe and the Gulf States. He had mentioned this idea to the Americans. They were in favour of it as long as the dialogue was not aimed at economic cooperation. He thought that the Gulf States needed guidance and psychological reassurances at present. The Prime Minister said that it was for this kind of reason that the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary had gone to the area. She said that she agreed about the need to develop the dialogue but that it would be important to avoid raising false hopes about what might be achieved. She agreed with Chancellor Schmidt that it would be useful if the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary could share his assessment of the situation in South-West Asia, as soon as possible after his return with his European colleagues.

Chancellor Schmidt commented that he had been very impressed by the knowledge of those whom he had met in Madrid about the under-currents of thinking and feeling in some of the Arab countries. He had asked Mr. Suarez to share these insights with President Carter. In his own view, there was at present a greater possibility of rapprochement among the Arab countries, including Egypt, than at any time since the Camp David Agreement had been signed. Chancellor Schmidt said that he intended to make a statement in the Bundestag on his Government's policy on Afghanistan. He would stress the need for solidarity within the Western Alliance and within the EEC. His remarks on this would be strong and unequivocal. He would go on to add that in times of crisis one should not interrupt all ones lines of communication. Indeed in times of crisis communication was even more important than normally. He hoped therefore that SALT II, CSCE and MBFR would be proceeded with. He intended to check this part of his speech with President Carter. The Prime Minister said that she doubted whether the President would wish to upset the MBFR, CSCE or SALT talks. The Chancellor added that he intended to hint at willingness on the part of his Government to give further financial aid to Turkey. He agreed with the Prime Minister that this might be very expensive.

Chancellor Schmidt said that he and his Cabinet distinguished between their attitude towards the Soviet Union and that towards the other Communist States of Eastern Europe. It was important not to force the latter States into a stronger alignment with the Soviet Union on the Afghan issue than they would otherwise have been inclined to adopt. The Prime Minister agreed. She said that she was particularly worried about the position of Yugoslavia. Chancellor Schmidt added Romania and Berlin to the list of territories of particular concern.

On high level talks, Chancellor Schmidt said that the Soviet Union had not yet proposed dates for his own visit and that of Mr. Genscher to Moscow. On the other hand they had postponed a

/prospective

prospective visit by a Deputy Prime Minister, Mr. Tikhonov, who was at present acting for Mr. Kosygin. His general approach to the question of visits was that there was no question of business as usual but that very high level meetings might be useful. In that connection, he mentioned that there was still a possibility that he might meet soon with the Head of State of the German Democratic Republic.

Iran

The Prime Minister asked Chancellor Schmidt whether he had any ideas about the way forward on Iran. Chancellor Schmidt said that leadership on this problem should be left to President Carter. The 50 hostages were American citizens. The Prime Minister pointed out that Mr. Carter would probably try to persuade the Europeans to implement voluntarily the trade sanctions which had been included in the vetoed resolution. Although the British Government had agreed to implement some financial measures voluntarily, they had no power to implement trade sanctions without a UN resolution. Chancellor Schmidt said that the German Government also would have legal difficulties on some points. He had told President Carter that he would, in principle, participate in the implementation of voluntary sanctions but it was not clear to him what the President had in mind. These matters would best be discussed in the EEC. On the general situation in Iran, Chancellor Schmidt commented that there was no longer any focal point on which pressure could be brought to bear. There was no-one who would respond to pressure or who was in a position to give instructions to the people who were holding the hostages. However, it had to be left to President Carter to decide how to play the hand. He said that he agreed with the Prime Minister's assessment that there was no prospect of the "students" releasing the hostages.

I am sending copies of this letter to Brian Norbury (Ministry of Defence), John Wiggins (HM Treasury), Stuart Hampson (Department of Trade) and Martin Vile (Cabinet Office).

Yours ever

Richard Alexander

Roderic Lyne, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

SUBJECT

TELEPHONE CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER AND CHANCELLOR
SCHMIDT ON TUESDAY 15 JANUARY 1980

PRIME MINISTER'S

PERSONAL MESSAGE

SERIAL No. T10A/80

Chancellor Schmidt: Margaret, how are you?

Prime Minister: I am fine, and you?

CS: Not so well, I was a little ill and I have plenty of things to worry about.

PM: Oh, I am so sorry. So the holiday did not do a lot of good?

CS: No it did not.

PM: I am very sorry.

CS: Thank you.

PM: But you will look after yourself.

CS: Yes I will. I'm just about to cancel many appointments. I am calling Margaret just in order to be in touch. I have nothing specific but I think the international situation is such that one should to some degree be in personal touch so I have no specific ideas than to exchange a few views about Iran, about Afghanistan and whatever you like.

PM: Yes that's all right. Well let's start on those because I think the important thing is we all try to do

CS: I can't catch you.

PM: Is that better?

CS: Yes that's better.

PM: Right. I think the important thing is that we try to do as much as we can to help the United States and that we try to do it together.

/CS:

CS: Right.

PM: I am a little bit concerned that we might just condemn the Russian invasion in Afghanistan but do nothing about it, which I think would be fatal to the future and I just hope that ⁱⁿ Europe together therefore we can do things like agreeing on not having for example very generous credit terms to the Soviet Union. And on not in fact selling butter cheaply.

CS: I agree with that.

PM: I know that there will be some difficulty about technology but I don't think we should sell to them technology which could help them with their armaments programme.

CS: I think that the technology issue should be settled in the surrounding of COCOM.

PM: I agree and I do think that propaganda-wise if the Olympics are held in Moscow it will be a tremendous achievement for the Russians and I do think it is worth trying to persuade the International Olympic Committee to see if they can be moved perhaps to Montreal.

CS: Please not to Munich.

PM: Not to Munich. I think it could only be to Montreal but I think it would be a tremendous propaganda victory for the Soviet Union if we just did nothing.

CS: I ask myself about the Olympic Games, whether we should save this for a later stage or do it now. If we can at all get a majority.

PM: Well if we can get a majority I always think it's better to do it now because the young sportsmen and women will have been trained to compete to the best of their ability in the Olympics this year and they will have tried to reach peak performance at that time and it would be different if it were in a year's time. So one is trying to balance their interests with political interests.

/CS:

CS: My question is if we at all believe that you can get a majority for shifting from one locality to another say Montreal, whether we should try this right now in January of 1980 or whether we should do it a little later on in Spring so as to leave us an instrument which we could use later on if necessary .

PM: By way of saying to Soviet Russia "Look we'll move if you don't come out of Afghanistan". I think in practical terms unless we move now it is doubtful whether mechanically it could be done later.

CS: Yes, I see. Well I assume that you bring this up either in the EEC Ministerial meeting or in NATO.

PM: I think it is being discussed today at the Council of Foreign Ministers and possibly ^{at} NATO as well.

CS: By the way is Peter Carrington participating?

PM: No, he's still away.

CS: What is his experience so far Margaret?

PM: I don't think anything unusual to date at all. I think he is in Pakistan at the moment or going to Pakistan today and then to India and those really will be the two most important ones at the moment.

CS: I am thinking of using the situation within the Islamic and especially the Arab communities to intensify the political dialogue between European States and the Gulf States. I have mentioned this to the Americans before Christmas. They seem to be in favour if it does not so much aim at economic harmonisation or economic cooperation which is not in my mind. I have the feeling that some of the Gulf States feel a little helpless right now and need some assurances psychologically from Europe.

PM: I think that's right. It's not easy to give it except of course by the way you are suggesting through more personal contact which is one reason I think why Peter Carrington has gone. I agree so long as we don't

/try to

PM (cont): try to raise false hopes about what it can achieve.

CS: Once he comes back I would be so much interested if he could share his views or his insights and impressions with us.

PM: Of course he will.

CS: Thank you very much.

PM: Indeed, he would be silly not to do so because it does affect us all.

CS: I was very much impressed with the knowledge I met the other week in Madrid as regards the currents and undercurrents within the Arab community. They have a magnificent insight to the undercurrents in a couple of Arab countries and I urged them to (unclear) impressions with the Americans which in the meantime is being done. Jimmy is receiving Suarez these days.

PM: This is differences between various sections of the Arab community.

CS: Yes, but it seems as if right now there is a greater possibility for drawing together than ever has existed since Camp David.

PM: Drawing the Arab community together?

CS: Between the Arabs.

PM: Yes. That would be good news, particularly if it also involves Egypt as well.

CS: That's what I'm hinting at.

PM: Yes.

CS: On the other hand, this is the only time in which Jimmy could put some pressure on Israel in order to come to grips with the West Bank thing.

/PM:

PM: Yes, yes. Do you have any ideas about the situation in Iran because it is an enormous political thing for Jimmy Carter, particularly since Afghanistan because, foreign affairs-wise we ought to be as friendly as we can with Iran but politically because of the hostages we can't.

CS: I think in this field we should more or less leave the leadership to Jimmy Carter and just follow suit when he has made up his mind. It is his 50 hostages.

PM: Yes, indeed, but he will of course be trying to persuade us all to adopt trade sanctions.

CS: Yes.

PM: Now, we will have to decide what we can do and we'll have to decide to do it together. But for many things we have no power to adopt trade sanctions. No legal power, short of a United Nations resolution.

CS: Yes.

PM: We have agreed as you know together to do certain things voluntarily on the financial side.

CS: This we have done also.

PM: Yes. But what we do again we have to do together.

CS: I think this also should be considered in the realm of the EEC Meeting. If it is not being considered today there ought to be a special meeting rather soon.

PM: Yes.

CS: I have assured Jimmy that we would principally participate as regards voluntary sanctions but to me it's not specifically clear what he has in mind.

/PM:

PM: Well I think he's going to ask us to carry out what we would have had to carry out had the United Nations motion gone through.

CS: Yes.

PM: But the thing that you can do under a United Nations motion are very different from the things which you can do without it.

CS: That's right.

PM: And so much falls unless it's done together.

CS: We also will have some legal difficulties. They can more easily be overcome if we do it together.

PM: Yes. But I'm very sorry for him because I don't see any way of persuading the Iranis to release the hostages.

CS: I think there is almost total anarchy now in Tehran so that you don't have a focal point at which to address your pressure.

PM: No.

CS: And that means that on the other side of the line there is nobody who would yield to pressure and who at the same time has command over the people who have besieged and conquered the Embassy and are holding the hostages but I think to evaluate that situation we have to leave to Jimmy because it's his people who are at stake.

PM: Yes. But I unfortunately see no prospect of the students suddenly releasing the hostages.

CS: We share your impressions.

PM: Yes, I know. Which leaves Jimmy with an impossible position.

CS: Yes.

/PM:

PM: I just hope that nothing precipitate would be done.

CS: I would like to inform you that I am going to make a governmental statement in my Parliament on Thursday, the day after tomorrow about this double crisis of Iran and Afghanistan and the two main points will be of course

1. Solidarity within the Western Alliance, solidarity within the EEC and especially solidarity with the United States

PM: I'm very glad to hear about that, yes.

CS: And will be said in very strong and unequivocal terms.

PM: Good.

CS: And, secondly, I will also say that in times of crises one should not interrupt all ones lines of communications. Indeed in times of crisis communications might be even more important than just at Christmas or New Year's Eve when you exchange congratulations. So I will also stress this after having made sure that also Jimmy is willing to maintain the substance of SALT II without ratifying it at the time that Jimmy is willing to go ahead whatever comes out of it with the CSCE preparation and with the MBFR thing. I don't know whether there is a future in 1980 for all these operations but it should not be wise to cut these lines of communication. If they are being cut it should be done from the other side.

PM: Yes. I doubt very much whether he would want to upset MBFR or CSCE and he's only delayed SALT for obvious reasons.

CS: Yes.

PM: But I do think that when we face solidarity with the United States it will mean something in practical terms and that we must work it out together. Because there is no hope of it operating unless we work it out together.

/CS:

CS: I have some hope that this private meeting which is today taking place in Paris will give us some more light about the intentions of our friend on the other side.

PM: Yes, I hope so.

CS: Let me also mention that I will in Parliament hint to Germany's will to again be helpful if financial aid again should be necessary to be brought about for Turkey.

PM: Yes, right. That would be an expensive one, wouldn't it?

CS: Yes. We did it the last time and we would if necessary undertake to again act as the Secretary of such a combined or joint move.

PM: Yes. All right. Well thank you very much for letting us know about that one.

CS: I would also like to mention that my Cabinet so far has come to the conclusion that we should as of now make a clear distinction between our attitude vis-a-vis the Soviet Union and with the other Communist States in Eastern Europe which so far have only done lip service if I understand it correctly.

PM: Yes. Poland, Czechoslovakia etc.

CS: Yes. And GDR.

PM: Yes, of course. And the danger with some of them is that if one were to supply goods to them but not to the USSR the goods would go straight to the Soviet Union.

CS: Well, I'm not too sure. It depends. I mean if it were butter, yes. If it were sausages, the Poles would not pass the sausages on to Moscow.

PM: No. but technology is the sensitive one isn't it.

CS: But one must not force the other Communist States into a stronger alignment with the Soviet Union as regards Afghanistan than they themselves want to take.

/PM:

PM: Yes. Accepted. But most of us are particularly worried in the future about Yugoslavia. If we do nothing about Afghanistan.

CS: Right.

PM: But one doesn't need to dwell on that because we are all aware of it.

CS: Yugoslavia comes to mind, Romania comes to mind. The same is true of Berlin of course.

PM: Yes. One has to remember that you're so much nearer the immediate problem than we are.

CS: Yes. I would also like to mention the fact that right now there are no dates for the principally agreed counter-visits of Genscher in Moscow and myself. The Soviets have not proposed dates so far. On the contrary, they have moved to postpone a meeting of Deputy Prime Minister, Tikonov, who is now acting instead of Kosygin. He was due to arrive in Bonn at the end of this month. He has cancelled that and a new date has not been talked about just now.

PM: Good. We are doing a similar thing. We are not making visits either way at the moment. Quite rightly not. I think that on a very high level such meetings might be purposeful. Not appearing as if it were business as usual.

PM: There must be some penalty for a a nation doing what the Soviet Union has and be seen to be some meaningful penalty but it isn't easy to work that meaningful penalty out. It isn't easy to decide exactly what that penalty shall be.

CS: What I think is necessary is a good close personal contact between the Foreign Secretaries in London and Paris and in Bonn.

PM: Yes. Well the moment that Peter comes back we'll let you have as full an account as we possibly can.

CS: Very good. There's one little point I forgot. Oh yes. I was going to mention to you that I had an appointment without a date so far

CS (cont): with the Head of State of East Germany. It is still pending so that I cannot judge whether they want to have it or not. As of ^{now} I would like to have it because I would like to show that I treat other East Communist States different as of treating the Soviet Union right now. But it is pending, there is no fixed date so far. I just wanted to bring this to your attention. We will not have any military exchange with the Soviet Union. We will not have any difficulties with the OECD consensus as regards credit with the Soviet Union. We think that the EEC is right as regards the assistance for the American grain embargo. I am absolutely on your side as regards butter and ^{regards} as/technology I look forward to this being raised within the COCOM normal meeting. This should be done quickly I guess.

PM: Yes. Our credit agreement expires next month and we are anxious to concert any arrangements on new credit because at the moment they are very cheap and we don't like providing them so cheap.

CS: We have no such difficulty because we do not have and never had a credit agreement with them.

PM: Ah, I see.

CS: They are paying normal market interest in our case.

PM: Yes, I think it is France that has one and Italy and we must concert with them.

CS: And to some degree also the United States.

PM: Yes, right.

CS: Well, Margaret, may I ask you whether you have some more points that you would like to raise?

PM: No, I don't think so. No more points at the moment. Not on these two things.

/CS:

CS: Then I am looking forward to hearing what Sir Ian Gilmour will tell our Ministers.

PM: Yes, I hope he'll be able to see several of them. I think he has not yet been able to arrange meetings with Herr Matthofer and Viscount Lamsdorf. At least one of them would certainly receive him. Good. All right. I'm sure he'll look forward to seeing them and to talk about other things. All right, Helmut, thank you very much for 'phoning it's much appreciated and I hope you soon are fully recovered.

CS: Thank you very much.

PM: Thank you, goodbye.

SECRET

Letter to Mulholland.

H.A. Mulholland, 15/1

Private Secretary

PRIME MINISTER'S TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH CHANCELLOR SCHMIDT

1. At your request I attach a brief for the Prime Minister's telephone conversation with Chancellor Schmidt which is expected to take place at noon today. You will be seeing Mr Alexander at 10.30.

2. Two additional points:-

- i. I have no further news about President Tito's state of health, but it obviously continues to give cause for concern;
- ii. The FRG will be represented at the EEC Council of Ministers at 3.00 pm by Herr Genscher and at the simultaneous NATO meeting by the State Secretary, Herr van Well. There is, therefore, time for the Chancellor to transmit instructions following the telephone call.

E A J Fergusson

15 January 1980

- cc: PS/PUS
- Mr Bullard
- Mr Murray
- SAD
- MED
- EESD

Iran

Afghan.

Wheat - Butter -

← Credits - Trade

← Technology → Co-com

← Olympics

SECRET

BRIEF FOR PRIME MINISTER'S TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
WITH CHANCELLOR SCHMIDT ON 15 JANUARY

AFGHANISTAN AND IRAN

1. The following are some points which Schmidt is likely to make, with suggested answers:-

- As Mr Hurd was told in Bonn last week, essential to stay in step with the US.

We absolutely agree. Brezhnev's interview with Pravda shows that he thinks his best chance is to split the US away from Europe. Some American newspapers are starting to play this angle up. Essential to use today's meetings in Brussels to re-establish unity of assessment and action both in the Alliance and within the Nine.

- Best to play down the East/West aspect of Afghanistan and give priority to implications for Non-Aligned countries.

We agree challenge is to Third World and Non-Aligned Movement; hence Lord Carrington's trip. And UN vote very satisfactory demonstration of Non-Aligned concern. But Afghanistan is also a threat to the West. Unless cost to Soviet interests works out higher than Russians foresaw, temptation will be strong for them to repeat the enterprise - possible in some country of really vital importance to us, e.g. Iran or Yugoslavia. Need to agree today in NATO on a list of coordinated but not necessarily identical measures for each member government to announce. We must also agree in the Community on measures falling in EEC competence, and Foreign Ministers of the Nine must adopt a declaration on Afghanistan for issue today and transmission to European Parliament tomorrow.

/Western

SECRET

SECRET

- Western assistance to regional countries must be a mix of political and economic aid.

We want to see what impressions Lord Carrington brings back from the area before deciding what to do there. Essential to convince India that any aid to Pakistan is not directed against her. Mrs Gandhi's eyes need to be opened to the Soviet threat to the region.

- US imposition of national sanctions on Iran risks mobilising Islamic world against the West and jeopardising any gains to us from Russian unpopularity over Afghanistan.

We have pointed this out too. Largely because of our intervention that Americans agreed to tackle Iranian sanctions exercise in New York in 2 stages. But fortnight gained in this way was wasted by Iranian prevarication. After weekend wobbling by Tehran Americans had no option but to put resolution to vote. We urged Christopher yesterday to pause and tackle next stage slowly. But he feels under domestic compulsion and it would be weak to turn back now. He was slow to recognise that situation in Iran had been transformed by Afghanistan. Hope you will arrange for this message to be repeated to Christopher when he gets to Bonn.

- EEC should intensify relations with Gulf States by developing some kind of new machinery.

We like this idea but must avoid duplication with Euro-Arab dialogue itself, and not raise false hopes about what it might lead to on political as well as economic side.

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2. The Prime Minister may also like to make the following points:-

- need for intense vigilance on Yugoslavia, especially if Tito's health gets worse;
- grateful to you for influencing French position on Afghanistan: enormous difference between first and second French public statements on this;

3. On a separate subject, the Prime Minister could express disappointment at the present state of the arrangements for the Lord Privy Seal's visit to Bonn later this week (Bonn telno 51 attached): hope Chancellor Schmidt will be able to spare him half an hour and that Ministers of Finance (Matthoefer) and Economy (Graf Lambsdorff) can fit him in too.

SECRET

eg Iran (Situation) P4

SECRET

Prime Minister

1 ①

Ref: B05894

It will be important to keep the discussions on Iran + Afghanistan, so far as possible, distinct. It would be helpful to go through the points in paras 11 + 12 separately.

PM - 15/1

PRIME MINISTER

Iran and Afghanistan

Your meeting at 4 pm tomorrow is to consider -

- a. On Iran, how far can we agree to the United States request to implement voluntarily the sanctions which the Security Council only failed to make mandatory because of the Russian veto? The Lord Privy Seal's minute to you of 11th January is the key document, plus the records of Mr Christopher's visit on 14th January.
- b. On Afghanistan, how far can Ministers collectively agree to the measures against the Soviet Union suggested in the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary's minute to you of 8th January, and how should you reply to the message from President Carter which Mr Christopher brought you on 14th January?

2. The meeting will be attended by the Home Secretary, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, the Lord Privy Seal (and/or Mr Hurd), the Secretaries of State for Industry, Trade and Energy, the Minister of Agriculture, the Attorney General, Lord Strathcona (representing the Defence Secretary) Mr Monro (as "Minister for Sport"), the Governor of the Bank and Sir Robert Armstrong.

BACKGROUND

3. The Cabinet on 10th January expressed considerable doubt about economic measures against Iran or the Soviet Union, given the vulnerability of our position as a trading nation, and the extent of our economic problems. A factual paper was commissioned on (essentially) the economic costs of action against the Soviet Union. This will be circulated by Sir Robert Armstrong's office tonight.

Attached -

4. British action is contemplated only in association with our major Allies. The American position was put to you and others here by Mr Christopher on 14th January. They are pressing strongly, on Iran,

for voluntary implementation of all the sanctions voted on by the Security Council; and, on Afghanistan, for the maximum Western effort both on "punitive" measures against the Soviet Union and on "affirmative" action vis-a-vis Pakistan and other potential victims. They were disappointed by our cautious response on Iran, which they contrasted with your firm support in December. They are since likely to have been further ~~similarly~~ disappointed by similar caution on the Continent.

5. Allied positions should be clearer in the light of today's meetings in Brussels of the European Council and the North Atlantic Council, attended by Sir Ian Gilmour and Mr Hurd respectively. The French were initially negative, but on Afghanistan have since shown signs of co-operativeness, despite their "special relationship" with the Russians. "Solidarity but not alignment" with the Americans is now their slogan. The Germans will be more sympathetic to the Americans. But their relations with the Soviet Union are of special importance to them, both economically (they have the biggest Western stake in the Soviet market) and politically (Berlin, etc.); and in the end their instinct for solidarity with the French is likely to be decisive.

6. Sir Robert Armstrong is today attending a quadripartite meeting in Paris with Dr Brzezinski and their French and German opposite numbers. This was set up by the White House to discuss both Iran and Afghanistan. The Federal Chancellery has concealed its existence from the German Foreign Ministry, and the White House and Elysee may have done likewise. We have not. But colleagues should be warned that knowledge of this meeting should not be revealed to others.

7. In Parliament, Mr Hurd's preliminary statement on Afghanistan on 14th July clearly disappointed some Government supporters, particularly over the Olympic Games, on which there was also a Labour call for action. Your meeting will need to consider the timing and level of future statements on both Afghanistan and Iran. Lord Carrington will no doubt report to the Lords on his Asian tour, from which he returns on 18th January. He hopes to circulate that evening a paper on the subject for consideration

by OD on 22nd January. He is naturally the main advocate of maximum British action on both fronts. Mr Nott, who led for the minimalists in the Cabinet, will be in the Far East from 18th to 31st January.

8. The JIC is working on an Afghanistan-related note on what effect United States counter-measures can be expected to have on the Soviet Union. This will not be available before 18th January. The main conclusion is likely to be that only the grain ban could do lasting damage.

9. Wedge-driving within the Western Alliance is clearly going to be an important Soviet objective, in relation both to Iran and to Afghanistan. They will hope to divide America from her main Continental allies (and Japan); and they will be only too glad if Britain can be shown in this context as an anti-European stooge of America.

HANDLING

10. Reports of Meetings You will wish to begin by asking Sir Ian Gilmour and/or Mr Hurd to report on yesterday's meetings in Brussels; and Sir Robert Armstrong to report on his Paris meeting. All three reports will cover both Iran and Afghanistan. Thereafter, despite the difficulties, it would probably be best to try to consider the two issues separately, until you draw the threads together at the end.

11. Iran

a. The Lord Privy Seal and/or Lord Strathcona may wish to comment on the prospects for United States military action, eg mining or blockading the Gulf. }

b. The Lord Privy Seal should report on plans for withdrawing or retaining our Embassy. →

c. The Secretary of State for Energy may wish to comment on the oil supply position. →

d. The Lord Privy Seal and Attorney General should comment on Mr Christopher's idea that the Security Council's un-vetoed resolution of 31st December may give us legal cover to use the United Nations Act to implement the sanctions which the Russians vetoed on 13th January. }

Mr Hurd will be standing in for the Lord Privy Seal.

*2.8
1.5*

e. Your colleagues should be invited to endorse your statement to Mr Christopher that we cannot contemplate new legislation.

f. The meeting could then consider the list of measures in paragraph 4 of Sir Ian Gilmour's minute of 11th January. The need for legislation seems to rule out items vii-x. A civil trade embargo (item vi) depends on Community attitudes. That leaves -

i. reducing the Iranian Embassy here. Lord Privy Seal to lead. Pretty small beer.

ii. Arms embargo. Lord Strathcona to lead. Expensive but probably inevitable. Note the Kharg case (Mr Pym's minute to Sir Ian Gilmour of 11th January).

iii. Immigration control. Home Secretary to lead. A useful step, if not too dangerous to our Embassy.

iv. Civil aviation ban. Mr Nott to lead. Probably worthwhile.

g. General Neither we nor other United States allies are likely to be able to do much to meet United States wishes. Objectively, this ought not to make the hostages' release less likely, since we regard United States pressure as misconceived. But subjectively it will annoy the Americans and so strengthen the case against snubbing them over Afghanistan too.

12. Afghanistan

a. Counting the cost. You will wish to draw attention to the factual paper commissioned by the Cabinet. Mr Nott and Sir Geoffrey Howe may wish to comment. The figures involved are inevitably imprecise.

b. Olympics Mr Monro to lead. Do your colleagues agree that public opinion seems to be moving in favour of Government action? If so, what should be done and when? Internationally, should we take the lead (thus risking Soviet economic reprisals) or follow others?

- c. Credit Mr Nott to lead. Is it agreed
- to do only what our main relevant partners also agree to?
 - to aim at no credit below Consensus rates?
 - not to renew the Anglo-Soviet Agreement?
- d. COCOM Sir Ian Gilmour to lead on tightening and Mr Nott on extending. Is it agreed
- that we should aim at tightening vis-a-vis the Soviet Union, but not Eastern Europe or China?
 - that we should further explore widening, without commitment?
- e. Food Mr Walker to lead. Is it agreed
- that action on grain is complete?
 - that action on meat should be further studied?
 - that we should press for action on butter?
 - that we should oppose action on sugar?
- f. "Positive" measures Action vis-a-vis Pakistan and other Asian countries to be considered after Lord Carrington's return? But does Sir Ian Gilmour wish to comment on the threat to Yugoslavia and what should be done about it?

CONCLUSIONS

13. The substance of these must depend on the outcome of today's Brussels and Paris meetings. But the underlying principles on which to base agreement might be
- i. No British action in advance of main allies, including no British pack-leading.
 - ii. Preference for action on Afghanistan rather than on Iran, given that the danger to the hostages is narrow and temporary while the Soviet threat to peace is wide and permanent.

14. Procedurally, you will wish to conclude

i. that the Lord Privy Seal should draft a message from you to President Carter, replying to his message on Afghanistan and to Mr Christopher's representations on Iran (alternatively the latter could be dealt with through diplomatic channels);

ii. that your colleagues conclusions tomorrow should be reported to the Cabinet on 17th January by the Lord Privy Seal;

iii. that unresolved issues should be taken up at OD on 22nd January (NB no Mr Nott);

iv. that the timing and level of statements in Parliament will have to depend on the nature and timing of decisions reached, by us and by others.



R L WADE-GERY

15th January 1980

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cc from (SIA) P4



①
Pamie Miller

CABINET OFFICE

70 Whitehall, London SW1A 2AS Telephone 01-233 8319

From the Secretary of the Cabinet: Sir Robert Armstrong KCB, CVO

15/1

Ref. A01141

15th January, 1980

Dear Michael

South West Asia

The Prime Minister is to discuss the situation in South West Asia with her colleagues most closely concerned at 4.00 pm tomorrow, 16th January, at 10 Downing Street.

I attach for consideration at this meeting the report commissioned at Cabinet last week on the extent of Britain's and the European Community's economic interests vis-a-vis the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.

I am copying this letter and its attachment to the Private Secretaries to those attending tomorrow's meeting, namely the Home Secretary, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, the Secretary of State for Defence, the Secretary of State for Industry, the Lord Privy Seal, the Minister of Agriculture, the Secretaries of State for Trade and for Energy, the Attorney General, the Parliamentary Under Secretary of State, Department of the Environment (Mr. Monro) and the Governor of the Bank of England.

Since the report fulfils a remit from Cabinet, copies go additionally to all members of the Cabinet not specified above, to the Minister of Transport and the Chief Whip.

Yours ever

Martin Vile

(M.J. Vile)
Private Secretary

M. O'D. B. Alexander, Esq.

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AFGHANISTAN: POTENTIAL COSTS OF MEASURES AGAINST THE SOVIET UNION

INTRODUCTION

1. This paper gives a preliminary assessment of the potential economic costs to the United Kingdom, either directly or through retaliation, of measures which might be taken against the Soviet Union in the context of its intervention in Afghanistan. The measures considered are those set out in paragraphs 3 and 4 of the minute PM/80/4 of 8 January from the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary (other than the suspension of visits and exchanges).

GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

2. i. General restrictions on civil trade would fall within Community competence and could only be adopted by agreement of the Nine. Several of the Nine export more to the USSR and East Europe than the United Kingdom and for economic (and other) reasons might be unwilling to agree to some measures which might involve relatively lower costs for the United Kingdom.
- ii. Although any measures would primarily be directed to the USSR account must be taken of the varying scope for evasion or retaliation by the USSR using East European countries and of costs which might arise vis-a-vis those countries.
- iii. Soviet retaliation could take a variety of forms and need not be confined to the field of any particular western measure. The United Kingdom must act in conjunction with other countries relevant in each field for measures to be effective. Also the cost to the United Kingdom would be likely to be much increased if it was identified as a prime mover in action against the Soviet Union. That cost would be risked and might materialise even if measures advocated by us were not (after discussion with our western allies) eventually adopted.

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iv. Britain, which is relatively more highly dependent on overseas trade (30 per cent of GDP) and international investment than other major countries, has long been opposed in principle to the use of civil economic weapons for political purposes, except under the authority and with the near universal applicability entailed by a mandatory United Nations resolution (and even then possible implications for our policy in Southern Africa must be kept in mind). The experience of such weapons is that they have had little success. And their use unsanctioned by international law has serious implications for international economic relations. The United States has a tradition of readier use of these weapons. Her recent tendency, albeit under great political pressures, to act first and then seek reinforcing actions from her allies, presented serious problems in the case of the Iranian assets freeze; and in relation to the grain embargo on the USSR, though the United States interest in this trade is the dominant one, is not without these disturbing wider implications. To the extent that the Community nonetheless decides in the Afghanistan situation to take action on civil trade, there will be least conflict with our general position if measures adopted: involve withdrawal of Governmental treatment arguably favourable to the USSR (eg withdrawal of EEC restitutions on grain or butter sales), rather than direct interruption of normal civil trade flows; in the field of technology are fully justifiable on strategic grounds.

v. Any measures which lessen the Russian contribution to world energy supplies will hurt the west as well as the Soviet Union.

POTENTIAL DIRECT COSTS

3. A. Ending credits to the USSR at lower than OECD Consensus rates

No costs, provided other western countries also offer no rates below the OECD Consensus (see Annex A). To the extent they did not conform and undercut our rates United Kingdom companies would be seriously disadvantaged. The Anglo-Soviet 1975 Credit Agreement expires on 16 February. Those of France, Italy and Canada have already expired. Refusal to renew the Anglo-Soviet Agreement would not involve costs to the United Kingdom if others did not renew but if they did our exporters would also be at a disadvantage.

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B. Tightening COCOM Restrictions

The loss to United Kingdom exports would be around £14 million (1979) if all COCOM countries agreed to suspend present procedures for exceptions. However some member countries are likely to resist complete suspension and the end result may fall short of this; the United Kingdom export loss would be proportionately less. See Annex B.

The Americans have said that they wish to pursue a differentiated policy designed to encourage signs of independence in Eastern Europe. This fits with our own views. Although there is always some risk that technology sold to Eastern European countries will be passed on to the Soviet Union, this risk is limited by the COCOM requirement for end use certificates. A stricter COCOM embargo on exports to the Soviet Union should not involve significant extra costs for the United Kingdom in terms of reduced exports to Eastern European countries.

Widening the scope of COCOM would require detailed and difficult technical study. Much will depend on what the Americans envisage. We understand that they have not yet reached any conclusions on what new products might be covered by an extended embargo; we have been told informally that they see this as a second phase which would have to be taken more slowly than tightening the existing rules. At this stage it is not possible to make even a rough guess at the possible cost to the United Kingdom of the widening of COCOM's scope. cf C. below.

C. Extending the scope of COCOM

The United States has proposed significantly extending the scope of present COCOM controls to prevent the transfer of a wider range of civil technology to the Soviet Union. The United States could do a certain amount of this unilaterally by refusing re-export licences where equipment provided by other countries incorporated American technology. The effects of this, and of a wider ban on exports would of course depend on the extent of new restrictions but they could seriously affect United Kingdom exports to the Soviet Union which mainly comprise specialist chemicals, plant and other advanced industrial products. Other countries can and do supply most of these products so the ban would be ineffective unless applied in concert with our allies and the Soviets could make much in propaganda terms of less than

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concerted action. Restrictions on particular areas of technology could raise broader policy considerations such as the implication for future world energy markets of limiting Soviet oil and gas development. See Annex C.

D. EEC restrictions on food sales to the USSR

i. Grain

Any restrictions on grain sales to the USSR would be a matter of Community competence. The Commission have just proposed a change in the system of export restitutions which, if confirmed, should shortly prevent any future sales of EEC grains to the USSR except at the full Community price - ie well above the present world price; monitoring of restitutions on grain sales to East European countries would also be extended to cover all such countries.

There would be no significant cost, unless withdrawal of export restitutions were extended to East European countries (though France, the principal Community cereals exporter, claims that she stands to lose some trade with the USSR). If however the United States or Community were to seek to seal up every gap and as a consequence restitutions for East European countries were withdrawn United Kingdom grain prices would be severely hit by the loss of feed barley sales to Poland (which is a major market for the United Kingdom's current surplus of about 1 m. tonnes). See Annex D.

NB The United States unilateral action may already entail United Kingdom costs if world prices are thereby lowered. Each \$1 fall in world prices would mean a net increase of £1.25 million by the United Kingdom to the EEC budget. See Addendum A to Annex D.

Shipping freight rates have already fallen as a result of the United States action and this could affect the profitability of United Kingdom shippers. See Addendum B to Annex D.

ii. Meat

An effective United States food embargo will result in an increasing meat shortage in 1980/81. Community exports of meat to the USSR have fluctuated substantially in the past. Recently they have been mainly poultrymeat: until last year (when it reached 10,000 tonnes) the United Kingdom's share of this trade was negligible.

It is understood that the Commission have indicated to the United States that they will be seeking arrangements to ensure that any withdrawal of United States supplies shall not be replaced by the Community. The Commission have therefore suspended pre-fixing export refunds for poultrymeat. They are expected to propose reductions in the level of refunds and the exclusion of the USSR, while seeking other ways of regulating this trade.

What support is likely for these proposals is not clear. The Community has a surplus of poultrymeat. Member States are therefore concerned about the repercussions on the EEC industry, for which there are no alternative support measures. To attempt to maintain the Community's level of exports it would be necessary to increase export refunds, thus adding to the budgetary cost (there is no intervention for poultrymeat). Given the great fluctuations in the volume of Community trade and the increased pressure from United States sales, it has not been possible to quantify the additional FEOGA expenditure.

iii. Butter

Ending subsidised EEC sales, beyond the quantities already contracted for this winter, would produce a saving to the EEC budget in the short term, since much of the butter would be offered to intervention, and storage costs the community less than export refunds. But in the longer term continuing restrictions on butter sales to the USSR would require a shift in EEC policy towards lower producer price levels, allowing higher unsubsidised consumption; if this did not occur there would be major new costs for the Community with increased expenditure on subsidised internal disposal and on export refunds. Pressure for higher refunds would be greater if New Zealand also restricted sales to the USSR, since this would increase the quantity of butter surplus to requirements on the

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world market. Officials' estimate of the cost of clearing 100,000 additional tonnes of butter on present EEC policies is of the order of £16-17 million for the United Kingdom. See Annex E.

iv. Sugar

The Russians generally import about 4 million tonnes a year and usually get most of this sugar from Cuba. This year, following a poor Cuban crop, they have bought about half their needs from the free world market and have contracted already to buy a fair quantity (which Tate's now think may be as much as 1 million tonnes) from the EEC. Because of the large numbers of importers and exporters and the multiplicity of trade flows the Community has little possibility of hurting the Russians by restricting their purchases from the EEC in future should they again need to make substantial imports from the free world market, though it could force them to rely mainly on raw rather than white sugar. However, action to withdraw EEC subsidies from sales of sugar to Russia could not be achieved without substantial changes in the present EEC regime, would not prevent the substantial EEC sales of unsubsidised quota C sugar (likely to total nearly a million tonnes this year), would be strongly opposed by the French and would be particularly costly to the United Kingdom in terms of increased FEOGA contributions. It is estimated that, for every ECU per tonne that the world price dropped relative to Community price and the export refund increased, our United Kingdom expenditure via our share of Community expenditure on export refunds would increase by about £3 million.

POTENTIAL COSTS FROM RUSSIAN RETALIATION

4. A. Trade: raw materials and manufactured goods

Russian retaliation would be limited by the country's overriding need to earn hard currency but, at a cost to itself, the Soviet Union could use its central planning machinery to steer orders so as to damage the interests of particular suppliers. The effect could be increased, to a limited extent as far as the United Kingdom is concerned, by co-ordinating action with other East European countries. Exports of raw materials could not be manipulated as specifically because the Western market mechanism would generally spread

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the effect over the market as a whole. Nevertheless withholding supplies could disrupt particular markets and interests. While the importance of Russian supplies of strategic metals such as chromium, vanadium and manganese to the West should not be exaggerated, it could create difficulty in the future that in each case South Africa is a very important alternative supplier. The situation over platinum group metals, used in industrial catalyts, could be more serious; here South Africa dominates supply. Diverting supplies of industrial diamonds worth some £200-250 million a year from the United Kingdom market would lose us a valuable entrepot trade. Previously the USSR has supplied about 2 per cent of the free world demand for oil but shortages at home and in other CMEA countries suggest that this proportion is likely to drop anyway. As regards manufactured goods, the USSR is an important supplier to the United Kingdom of methanol and particularly naphtha. Withholding Soviet supplies would cause ICI serious difficulty and Eastern Europe as a whole supplies 60 per cent of the methanol used in Western Europe. See Annexes F and G.

B. Agricultural trade and fishing

No significant costs or difficulty from losses of imports from the USSR. See Annex H.

C. Credit Exposure

ECGD has at risk on the USSR some £20 million on up to six-month credit and £860 million (including interest) over 10 years. In addition United Kingdom banks have outstanding against the USSR uninsured lending of some £500 million. But it seems likely that the USSR would be reluctant to abandon its excellent repayment record by defaults, particularly in view of the implications for the credit worthiness and requirements of its East European allies. See Annex I.

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ECGD CREDITS AND THE OECD CONSENSUS

THE CONSENSUS

1. The OECD Consensus sets out guidelines related to the relative wealth of importing countries for maximum credit periods and minimum interest rates which may apply to officially supported export credit of 2 years or more. The United Kingdom, all other EEC countries and the major Western trading countries subscribe to the Consensus. The minimum interest rates currently applying to countries in the category in which the USSR is placed are -

for credits between 2 years and 5 years inclusive	7 $\frac{1}{4}$ %
for credits of over 5 years	7 $\frac{3}{4}$ %

THE ANGLO-SOVIET CREDIT AGREEMENT

2. The Anglo-Soviet Credit Agreement was signed in February 1975. It provided a framework for ECGD support for export credits to USSR. ECGD indicated willingness to support contracts of up to £950m over a 5-year period on up to 8 $\frac{1}{2}$ years credit terms. In order to match the French, lower than Consensus interest rates (7.1 per cent to 7.45 per cent) were indicated. So far firm contracts for some £540m have been financed under the Agreement. The Agreement comes to an end on 16 February 1980. There is no provision in the Agreement for its renewal, and ECGD could continue support trade with the USSR on a case by case basis without a formal Agreement. On the other hand it is Russian practice to operate with Agreements of this nature and it is likely that other Western countries will renew existing Agreements. Every effort is being made to ensure that if they do so the interest rate charged will be on at least Consensus terms. If other countries renew Agreements the United Kingdom could be at a disadvantage in future trade with the USSR if a new Agreement was refused. Similarly United Kingdom exports would suffer if we offered less favourable credit terms than the USSR could obtain elsewhere.

OFFICIALLY INSURED COMMITMENTS ON THE USSR

3. i. ECGD has at risk on the USSR some £20m of business on up to six months credit and £860m, including interest, on business on terms in excess of six months. This latter figure is repayable over the 1980s.

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ii. other EEC countries have collectively £250m at risk on terms up to six months credit and £7,142m on terms in excess of six months. Of this latter figure French commitments amount to £2,928m and West German commitments to £2,495m.

OFFICIALLY INSURED COMMITMENTS ON EASTERN EUROPE
EXCLUDING USSR

4. i. ECGD has at risk on all other East European countries some £44m on up to six months credit and £1,540m on terms in excess of six months.

ii. Other EEC countries have collectively £110m at risk on up to six months credit and £5,191m on terms in excess of six months. Of this latter figure French commitments amount to £2,545m and West German commitments to £954m. The West German figure excludes commitments on East Germany.

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ANNEX B

TIGHTENING COCOM RESTRICTIONS

1. Application of the "full rigour" of COCOM regulations would affect -
 - a. goods caught by COCOM's embargo on strategic exports, but which member countries agree unanimously should be exempted (General Exceptions Procedure);
 - g. goods caught by the COCOM embargo but of low strategic importance, for which individual member countries may issue an export licence without reference to COCOM (Administrative Exceptions Procedure). Spare parts etc of goods already approved under the General Exceptions procedure can also be approved administratively.

2. British goods, for which application was made for export to the Soviet Union under category a. were worth a total of US\$ 13.51 million in 1979. Much the biggest item was a crop forecasting system worth \$8.75 million, for which approval is still pending. The bulk of the other cases were computer-related. British goods, approved administratively under category b. in 1979, were worth \$18.66 million. Of these, computers and related equipment accounted for \$16.75 million.

3. If no exceptions were made under either category, either by unilateral United Kingdom action or as a matter of (unanimous) COCOM policy, the cost in terms of British exports to the Soviet Union foregone would be of the order of £14 million. The Americans are likely to aim for the exclusion of all exceptions and have the sanctions both of a veto on exceptions and of the refusal of an export licence for essential components of United States origin. But other member countries of COCOM might be unwilling to accept a policy so rigorous as to exclude all exceptions. For example, the French, who seem particularly lenient in their application of COCOM regulations to computer exports, might be expected to resist a complete ban. In the last resort COCOM must operate on the basis of consent and the end result may be less than complete suspension.

4. If all COCOM countries agreed to apply the regulations more rigorously the Soviet Union might retaliate in some unrelated area. Also if only certain countries applied the regulations rigorously not only might the Soviet Union's ability to obtain high-technology goods be little affected but it might discriminate against the goods of the countries which had applied the regulations rigorously even after the rigour has been relaxed.

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5. The Americans are now seeking our support for a differential in favour of China within COCOM. A differential has long been an objective of British policy in order to facilitate our defence sales to China. It will be important to ensure that British policy on exports of technology to the Soviet Union takes account of the requirements of our policy towards China.

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ANNEX C

EXTENDING THE SCOPE OF COCOM

1. The United States has proposed a significant extension to the scope of the present COCOM list to cover sales to the Soviet Union of items closely allied to those already on the list (eg additional computer equipment and machine tools, new areas of technology (eg oil extraction technology) and to deal effectively with inadvertent transfer of technology through sales which, while being individually unimportant are much more significant when taken together.

2. The extent of these proposals still has to be defined but, as a rough guide perhaps one-third of total United Kingdom exports to the Soviet Union involve some transfer of relatively sophisticated technology. Looked at in terms of sales under the 1975-80 credit agreement, the proportion is even higher - perhaps £300 million out of a total of £500 million. Such sales include some items covered by present COCOM controls but as shown in paragraph 3 above, these are relatively small. Thus it seems likely that United Kingdom trade interests would be considerably affected by extending the controls and, unless other countries observed the same restrictions, the Soviets could readily place the business elsewhere. Germany, France and Japan have potentially even more to lose because their sales of technology-based equipment to the Soviet Union are larger than the United Kingdom's. A further factor which is difficult to quantify would be the effect of a United States decision to impose more stringent conditions on the issue of re-export licences for equipment containing some element of American technology (as is the case with nearly all computer installations and a significant proportion of process plant). Re-export licensing is burdensome for firms; to tighten it would be liable both to create greater uncertainty for them and increase the risk of circumvention.

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GRAIN SALES TO RUSSIA: CHANGES IN THE EEC RESTITUTION SYSTEM

1. Export restitutions are provided in two main ways. The bulk of the Community's exports are made under a system of weekly tenders which are awarded to those traders who bid for least subsidy. In order to take account of market conditions in different areas the tenders are held on a regional basis. This system is designed to enable the Commission to minimise the FEOGA cost of export restitutions and to control the quantities exported. Because subsidy payment is not made until the trader has produced evidence of delivery at the destination specified it could also provide a measure of control, but only post hoc, of destination. In addition to the tenders there is a less attractive standing restitution which normally operates on a general basis though currently restitutions are available only for certain near destination in Western Europe and for East Germany (which for legal reasons has hitherto been excluded from the tender system). All exports require an export licence: but licences are transferable and do not provide information about destinations. The Commission thus relies mainly on trade sources for information about exports to individual countries though the tender system provides information about exports to the various zones.

2. The information available suggests that so far this year the Russians have not bought up significant quantities of EEC grain though, since Russia is at present covered by two of the tender zones (for Baltic and Black Sea ports) they may, to the extent that present licences have not been taken up for other destinations, be able to benefit from tenders already held. The Commission however believe that in practice there is little scope for Russia buying: so far as the standing refund is concerned the Russians could have obtained no subsidised EEC grain because they fall into the class of destinations for which a zero refund is set.

3. In order to prevent Russian purchases of subsidised EEC grain in future and to monitor more effectively the supplies of grain going into Eastern Europe the Commission have proposed -

- a. to take East Germany out of the standing refund which would then exclude all Eastern bloc countries;

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- b. to rearrange the zones for the weekly tenders so that Russia is removed from the tender system and the satellite countries including East Germany are all brigaded into one group including no other countries.
4. The effect of this will be that export restitutions will not be available in future on exports to Russia though of course they will not be prevented from buying Community grain without restitutions at the full Community price (which is at present substantially higher than the world price). A total embargo on sales to Russia could only be achieved by imposing a comprehensive destination control through export licences and enforcing it with stringent penalties eg by requiring payment of substantial caution money: this would represent a major interference with normal trade.
5. The Commission is not proposing at this stage to lay any fresh restraints on trade with the satellites. There is obviously a danger that the Russians may seek to divert such supplies to their own use but this will be resisted by the East European countries who have considerable need of Community grain particularly barley this season following a poor harvest. Moreover no such restrictions have been proposed by the United States and politically it would seem unwise to take action which would unite rather than divide the Eastern bloc.
6. So far as United Kingdom interests are concerned we rely heavily on outlets in Eastern Europe, particularly Poland, for our exports of feed barley, likely this year to amount in total to about 1 million tonnes of which Poland could take a substantial share. Because the French are nearer to the main alternative outlet they have the edge on us in the Mediterranean market and, since we have only a limited intervention capacity, any restriction of Community exports to Eastern Europe would have serious effect on United Kingdom grain prices.
7. Most other Member States have supported or gone along with the Commission proposals except France who took the unusual step of refusing to participate in the Management Committee discussion and voting on them. It is evident that this attitude is governed not only by her interest as the largest Community cereals exporter but also by her general political coolness towards sanctions against the Russians.

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Addendum A to ANNEX D

FINANCIAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE UNILATERAL UNITED STATES ACTION

1. The unilateral United States action on grain exports will have financial consequences for the United Kingdom and other EEC countries quite apart from any costs associated with EEC support for the United States action. But these depend on the effects on world grain prices and cannot be realistically estimated at this stage. World prices could firm slightly if the United States takes effective steps to withdraw from the market quantities of grain equivalent to those being denied to the USSR and if other grain exporters do not fill the gap. But if these conditions are not fulfilled there could be a fall in world prices. This could affect the United Kingdom contribution to the EEC budget in two ways. First by increasing income from import levies on grain, it would increase what the United Kingdom has to hand over to the Community and decrease the need for VAT contributions from other Member States: secondly it would increase the unit cost of the export restitutions needed to dispose of the Community's grain surplus - expenditure from which we benefit less than most other Member States. Both effects would be likely to be adverse for the United Kingdom contribution.

2. On the assumption that there was no change in the volume of Community grain imports and exports and that the prices of all grains were affected to the same extent, a rough estimate suggests that the United Kingdom contribution to the budget would rise by £1.25 million net for every \$1 fall in grain prices.

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Addendum B to ANNEX D

SHIPPING CONSEQUENCES

Restrictions on grain sales would have significant implications for our shipping interests. There is minimal involvement of United Kingdom and United States ships in the Russian grain trade at present but cargoes carried by other countries' ships could have an appreciable effect on the market for charters and consequently on bulk freight rates, which in turn would affect the revenues of our shipping companies.

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EXPORTS OF BUTTER TO THE USSR

1. It is estimated that between 75,000 and 100,000 tonnes of Community butter might be sold to the USSR over the winter of 1979/80. 70-80,000 tonnes would be a more normal figure but Community stocks are higher than usual and the USSR has an increasing deficit as butter consumption rises faster than production. New Zealand also sold exceptional quantities to Russia in 1979 because of this situation. We do not know how many of the winter deals remain to be completed; it would be prudent to assume that the bulk has either been delivered or is contracted for. On the assumption that, while Soviet deficit lasts, Russia could purchase up to 100,000 tonnes a year, any restriction would only affect sales from the second half of 1980 onwards, say, 50,000 tonnes this year.

2. It is reasonable to assume that the Russians would not take up butter which did not receive a large refund, since they would be unwilling to establish the precedent that they were prepared to purchase at full Community prices (although in practice they sell at over Community prices to Russian consumers). Any butter which was prevented from going to Russia is likely to go into intervention in Member States other than the United Kingdom (our butter is too salty for the Russian market and is not therefore at issue).

3. The storage and interest charges for a tonne of butter in intervention for the year amounts to about 357 ECUs, whereas the cost of disposing butter by means of export refunds is 1880 ECUs per tonne. The purchase price of intervention butter is borne by the Member State until the butter is sold. If 50,000 tonnes of butter which would otherwise have gone to the USSR went into intervention the cost to the Community's budget for storage would be 24 MUAAs of which 4 MUAAs would be borne by the United Kingdom. Assuming the USSR imported 100,000 tonnes in a full year the cost on storage alone to the United Kingdom would be £5m.

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4. In the short term the budget would gain from the saving (some 100 MCUM) on refunds on sales to Russia. However this benefit would be lost in subsequent years as the butter had to be disposed of, and the prospect of this old butter going by the cheapest route, ie export, would be significantly reduced with further adverse budgetary effects in subsequent years. The cost to the United Kingdom in those circumstances could be £20m per annum.

5. Moreover the effect of restrictions on sales to the USSR on the cost of the Community's export policy as a whole would depend on the actions of New Zealand, who is virtually the only other major supplier of the world market. Clearly if New Zealand supported the Community policy and avoided increasing her sendings to the USSR, increased pressure on world prices would result. This process would put great pressure on the Commission to increase export refunds, if not immediately then in 1981, at a time when we are campaigning to reduce them by substantial amounts. Every £100 fall in the world price of butter could involve an increase in the United Kingdom contribution via the budget to the cost of refunds of £7m additional to the costs cited in paragraph 4.

6. If on the other hand New Zealand made up the assumed shortfall of 50,000 tonnes to the USSR to the limit of her ability (say 25,000 tonnes) the surplus of butter on world markets would be significantly reduced, and Community traders would find it easier to place exports at existing refund levels.

7. Community exports to Eastern Europe are normally small, under 10,000 tonnes, to Poland and it should be possible to monitor exports to prevent any unusual increase which would indicate Poland importing on behalf of the USSR.

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SCOPE FOR SOVIET RETALIATION BY WITHHOLDING RAW MATERIALS

The Soviet Union is a major producer of essential raw materials. They could retaliate against the West by withholding or decreasing supplies of the following -

Metals - The Soviet Union is estimated to produce over 30 per cent of the world's gold and about 45 per cent of the world's platinum group metals (important as industrial catalysts). It is also a significant supplier to Western markets of chromium, manganese and vanadium. By withholding supplies of any of these materials, the Soviet Union would increase Western dependence on South African sources. Other consequences would include a further upward movement in gold prices and, in the longer term, the need to cut back Western consumption of platinum group metals, particularly palladium.

Oil - The Soviet Union is not a major supplier of crude oil to the United Kingdom and supplies only 2 per cent of free world oil demand. Nevertheless, the withdrawal of Soviet supplies could lead to a material increase in world oil prices, assuming that the Soviet Union were willing to forego vital foreign currency earnings by such a move. The Soviet Union is an important source of United Kingdom supplies of semi-processed crude oil products (about 10 per cent of our supplies) and of naphthas (about $7\frac{1}{2}$ per cent of our supplies); in the short term, we should have difficulty locating alternative sources.

Diamonds - The Soviet Union is after South Africa the United Kingdom's largest supplier of diamonds (mainly industrial). The trade is extremely valuable to the United Kingdom in view of the value added in this country before many of the diamonds are re-exported.

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Monetary - If the Soviet Union restricted sales of monetary gold it could
Gold be quite as damaging for itself as to others on account of the
hard currency foregone. There would be little effect in
foreign currency markets on speculative gold prices.

Uranium Enrichment

The electricity generating boards have placed contracts for the enrichment of 1000 tonnes of United Kingdom uranium in the Soviet Union over the next 10 years at a cost of \$100m. The work could be switched to United Kingdom processing facilities, although there would probably be a resulting financial penalty. If the Soviets refused at any time to release uranium in their hands, a relatively small (but nevertheless valuable) quantity would be affected. Additional uranium is being processed for German and Austrian users.

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UNITED KINGDOM-USSR TRADE : GENERAL

1. The Soviet Union ranks about 20th in the league of Britain's export markets accounting for around 1 per cent of our total exports. Trade figures for 1974-78 and January-November 1979 are set out in the Addendum as are figures for the same periods for our trade with the other Eastern Bloc countries.
2. Both imports from and exports to the Soviet Union are concentrated in relatively few sectors. Timber, furs, oil and non-metallic minerals (mainly diamonds) account for over 80 per cent of our imports from the Soviet Union. A significant proportion of the furs and diamonds is re-exported. Plant and equipment account for over 25 per cent of our exports to the Soviet Union.
3. A wide range of companies, large and small, conduct regular business with the Soviet Union including Shell, Courtaulds, ICI, Davy, ICL and Rank Xerox. The market has been and will continue to be important for the process plant and engineering sectors. The largest contract currently under discussion (worth approximately £175m) is for oil rig fabrication yards at Baku and Astrakhan on the Caspian Sea. The United Kingdom bidder is the International Offshore Consortium (BP, Wimpey and Brown and Root). A Russian decision on placing this contract is expected this year. Other major projects under discussion, mainly for plant, are worth about £300m.
4. The Soviet economy is at present in the doldrums and, the Afghanistan situation apart, it is unlikely that there would be a significant expansion of trade with Western countries. However, the United Kingdom could expect continuation of the current level of exports. Also energy is expected to be given high priority in the next Five Year Plan (1981-85). The United Kingdom's experience in the North Sea and elsewhere puts her in a good position to bid for energy projects, particularly in the offshore oil and gas sectors.
5. The United Kingdom's main competitors in the Soviet market (all with higher shares of the market) are the USA, West Germany, Japan, France, Italy and Finland. There are very few areas in which the United Kingdom has a clear competitive advantage so that any unilateral action by Britain

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to withdraw from business in the Soviet Union would result in opportunities being quickly taken up by our competitors with little or no loss to the Russians.

6. As the second page of the table shows, which also deals with visible trade, Eastern Europe other than the USSR and Yugoslavia is a rather more significant market for United Kingdom exports than the Soviet Union, but our imports from the Soviet Union exceed those from the rest of Eastern Europe. The proportions of Soviet and other Eastern Europe exports and imports in United Kingdom manufactured trade follow a very similar pattern to trade in total. Imports of manufactures from the Soviet Union are dominated by precious stones.

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UNITED KINGDOM - SOVIET TRADE

	<u>1974</u>	<u>1975</u>	<u>1976</u>	<u>1977</u>	<u>1978</u>	Jan-Nov* <u>1979</u>	£ million
EXPORTS:							
Manufactures	99	196	227	326	375	N/A	
Non-manufactures	10	12	11	18	47	N/A	
Total	110	210	240	347	423	381	
IMPORTS:							
Manufactures	251	229	278	319	275	N/A	
Non-manufactures	164	179	389	461	413	N/A	
Total	395	408	667	781	688	752	
BALANCE							
Manufactures	- 132	- 33	- 51	+ 7	+ 98	N/A	
Non-manufactures	- 154	- 167	- 378	- 443	- 366	N/A	
Total	- 285	- 198	- 427	- 434	- 265	- 371	

*provisional

UNITED KINGDOM/EAST EUROPE TRADE (EXCLUDING USSR AND YUGOSLAVIA)

UK Imports	283	282	376	464	499	529
UK Exports	319	374	416	488	553	499
Balance	36	92	40	24	54	- 30

[After the Soviet Union Poland is the United Kingdom's only other substantial market in Eastern Europe]

EEC TRADE WITH THE SOVIET UNION

	<u>£ million in 1978</u>		
	<u>Imports</u>	<u>Exports</u>	<u>Balance</u>
EEC total			
(excluding UK)	3512	3314	-198
France	636	757	+121
West Germany	1403	1636	+233
Italy	868	590	-278

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PROPORTIONS OF TOTAL UNITED KINGDOM VISIBLE TRADE WITH THE
USSR AND EASTERN EUROPE (EXCLUDING USSR AND YUGOSLAVIA)

	<u>Per cent</u>					
	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979 (Jan-Nov)
USSR						
Exports	0.7	1.0	0.9	1.1	1.1	1.0
Imports	1.7	1.7	2.1	2.1	1.7	1.7
Eastern Europe (Less USSR and Yugoslavia)						
Exports	1.9	1.9	1.6	1.5	1.5	1.3
Imports	1.2	1.2	1.2	1.3	1.2	1.2

AGRICULTURAL TRADE: SCOPE FOR SOVIET RETALIATION BY WITHHOLDING EXPORTS

GENERAL

1. Details of trade in agricultural and food products between the USSR and EEC and with the United Kingdom are given in tables A and B of the Addendum.
2. Trade between the USSR and the EEC is substantially in the Community's favour. Dairy products, cereals and sugar products accounted for some 50 per cent by value of EEC exports. For these products the possibility of action to restrict exports is being examined. Meat and meat products were the largest element of the balance in 1977 due to an exceptional quantity of poultry meat exports.
3. Table B gives the corresponding figures for United Kingdom/USSR trade in both 1977 and 1978. The substantial United Kingdom surplus in 1978 is attributable to exceptional shipments of unmilled barley and to fish exports, mainly mackerel trans-shipped from United Kingdom fishing vessels. This surplus compares with a more customary deficit in 1977, when United Kingdom imports and exports were, respectively, some 24 per cent and 1.8 per cent of total EEC trade with the USSR.
4. Imports from the USSR are not significant as a proportion of total United Kingdom and EEC supplies. The effect of any Soviet retaliation on exports in this sector would therefore be very limited. Comments on the more significant commodities follow.

Meat and Meat Products

5. Minimal quantities of Beef and Pigmeat and more significant amounts of poultry meat are imported into the Community from the USSR. Any shortfall could be made up from a variety of alternative sources without any problem, and there is no likelihood of any effect on prices.

Fruit and Vegetables

6. The United Kingdom does not import any significant amount of fruit and vegetables from the USSR, and would have no difficulty in finding alternative supplies. Information on imports by other Community members from the USSR is not readily available, but it seems most unlikely that withdrawal of Soviet supplies would have any serious impact, since there are many alternative sources.

Sugar, Sugar Products and Honey

7. The quantities involved are negligible in relation to total supplies. The Community as a whole has a substantial surplus over consumption. Small quantities of honey are imported for blending and could be replaced without great difficulty.

Coffee, Tea, Cocoa and Spices

8. Imports into the United Kingdom are entirely of low grade tea. The 8,075 mts imported in 1977 were only 3 per cent of total imports. Withdrawal of Soviet supplies would have a minimal effect on the market. The United Kingdom accounted for some 75 per cent (by value) of total EEC imports of these commodities from the USSR in 1977. The Netherlands was the only other substantial importer, taking 6 per cent (by quantity) of its supplies from the USSR in 1977.

Beverages

9. Vodka imports are not particularly significant to the United Kingdom (9,476 proof gallons in Jan-Oct 1979, valued at £45,112) and domestic and other supplies could make up the shortfall both in the United Kingdom and the rest of the Community. Certain flavourings for gin and liqueurs are imported from the Soviet Union: information on alternative supplies is not readily available. There could be some risk that the Soviet Union would retaliate with barriers against Scotch whisky, although their imports (£541,000 worth in 1977) have in any case been small.

Fish and fish products

10. These are the largest item in Soviet food exports to the Community. In 1977 they accounted for 60 per cent by value of the total and 47 per cent in the case of the United Kingdom. France was the largest importer of Soviet fish products, taking some 38 per cent of the total. The United Kingdom's share was 19 per cent, the products involved being canned salmon, prawns and cod. However, Soviet supplies have represented only a tiny fraction of total United Kingdom (and EEC) imports around 2 per cent in 1978. Curtailment of this trade would therefore have negligible effect on our importers, except possibly for those committed to Soviet supplies of canned salmon.

Fishing rights

11. EEC Member States have no fishing rights in Soviet waters and the only possible countermeasures Russia could take would be harassment of United Kingdom vessels fishing, by agreement with Norway, in the 'grey zone' which is the subject of a formal dispute between Norway and the USSR. There would also be scope for the USSR and its Baltic satellites to withhold co-operation in the Baltic Fisheries Commission (of Baltic States). Further afield, the USSR could obstruct, or even withdraw from the International Whaling Commission. Any such public moves, however, would cause the USSR itself some embarrassment. (The USSR has no fishing access to United Kingdom or other EEC Member State waters and the scope for measures against Russia is limited to facilities such as transshipment.)

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TABLE A

Addendum to Annex H

EEC/USSR AGRICULTURAL TRADE IN 1977

(£000s)

	<u>EEC IMPORTS</u>	<u>EEC EXPORTS</u>
Meat and Meat Products	2,738	42,630
Dairy Products and Eggs	-	26,524
Fish and Fish Products	28,726	101
Cereals and Cereal Products	16	11,739
Fruit and Vegetables	3,545	6,512
Sugar, Sugar Prpducts and Honey	801	43,022
Coffee, Tea, Cocoa, Spices	6,901	13,578
Miscellaneous Food Products	-	2,574
Beverages	6,101	6,887
TOTAL	48,828	153,569

TABLE B

UK/USSR AGRICULTURAL TRADE IN 1977-78

(£000s)

	<u>IMPORTS</u>		<u>EXPORTS</u>	
	<u>1977</u>	<u>1978</u>	<u>1977</u>	<u>1978</u>
Live Animals (Chiefly for food)	9	5	58	264
Meat and Meat Preparations	-	-	18	3
Dairy Products and Eggs	-	-	1	0
Fish and Fish Preparations	5,491	3,842	59	4,438
Cereals and Cereal Preparations	8	-	5	15,398
Vegetables and Fruit	860	319	6	65
Sugar, Sugar Preparations, Honey	116	115	1	42
Coffee, Tea, Cocoa, Spices	5,192	1,214	160	1,139
Animal Feedingstuffs (except unmilled cereals)	-	20	-	49
Miscellaneous Food Products	-	-	1,866	3,944
Beverages	58	49	548	600
Total Agricultural Trade	11,733	5,563	2,721	25,944
Total Trade	780,572	688,170	347,432	423,085
% Agricultural Trade	1.5%	0.8%	0.8%	6.1%

BANK CREDITS

1. As can be seen from the following table, United Kingdom banks have a significant net creditor position vis a vis the USSR, and there are further potential claims of varying degrees of formality in the form of as yet unused credit lines. Thus, if the United Kingdom took action against the USSR in the financial field, USSR retaliation could result in substantial direct losses for United Kingdom banks. The possible damage to London's role as a financial centre would also need to be considered.
2. The possibility that the USSR might take extreme action, such as repudiation of debts, would presumably be increased by the fact that, deprived of the possibility of at least some imports of capital goods and grain, the USSR would have less need of credit in the future; moreover, the current gold price and rising prices for Russian oil exports (as long as these can continue) are further factors reducing the USSR's need for Western credit, and hence reducing the potential cost of repudiation.
3. In the case of Eastern Europe, the considerations are somewhat different. Net claims of United Kingdom banks are very much greater than those towards the Soviet Union. The Eastern Europeans, who have been notably reticent about the whole Afghan adventure, are far less self-sufficient than the USSR and are hence in greater need of Western credit - assuming that they could still get it in the changed atmosphere prevailing, after Afghanistan.
4. Action directed solely against the USSR would have implications for the other East Europeans. First, as some United Kingdom banks lend under the "umbrella" theory, countries such as Bulgaria who are particular beneficiaries would suffer if Western bankers assumed that the USSR would no longer tacitly guarantee debt to the West.
5. Even if it were felt that the risks of retaliation were not too great, it is not entirely obvious what course of action in the credit field would most hurt the USSR at the present time, particularly if it is hoped to avoid hurting the other East Europeans. If the USSR cannot buy the grain it had expected, then it will save foreign currency not only for the grain, but also for shipment etc. It might, therefore, be able to reduce gold and oil sales still further, thus further improving its terms of trade by putting up their respective prices.

Liabilities and Claims of United Kingdom banks vis a vis Eastern bloc

Mid-November 1979 (in £ millions)

	(a) Foreign Currencies				Eastern Europe ⁽¹⁾		Unused ⁽²⁾ Credit Facilities	
	Liabilities	Claims	Net	Unused ⁽²⁾ Credit Facilities	Liabilities	Claims		Net
UK banks	1,402	1,240	- 162	476	2,022	6,023	+ 4,001	1,246
British banks	261	304	+ 43	306	385	1,487	+ 1,102	1,089
UK banks	1,436	1,508	+ 72	759	2,106	6,771	+ 4,665	1,866
British banks	287	562	+ 275	490	438	2,225	+ 1,787	1,089

(b) All Currencies

(1) Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, GDR, Hungary, Poland,
Romania, USSR

(2) end-June 1979

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32*Afghanistan*

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 PS/MR LUCE
 PS/MR HURD
 PS/PUS
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~~MR COSTAZZI~~
 MR FERGUSSON
 MR MURRAY
 MR BULLARD
 LORD N G LENNOX
 MR P H MOBERLY
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 HD/PUSD (2)
 HD/UND
 HD/SEAD
 HD/SAD (4)
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CABINET OFFICE

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DESKBY UKREP BRUSSELS 151000Z

FM BONN 141823Z JAN 80

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 52 OF 14 JANUARY

INFO IMMEDIATE UKDEL NATO, UKREP BRUSSELS

INFO ROUTINE WASHINGTON, MOSCOW, PARIS, OTTAWA, ROME

MY TELNO 31: AFGHANISTAN: FRG VIEWS

1. IN THE LAST FEW DAYS THE OPPOSITION HAS BECOME MORE CRITICAL OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT'S APPROACH TO EVENTS IN AFGHANISTAN. THERE HAS ALSO BEEN QUITE A LOT OF CRITICISM IN THE PRESS WHICH APPEARS TO BE SHARED BY MANY OF OUR NON-POLITICAL CONTACTS.
2. DURING A CDU PARTY CONFERENCE ON SECURITY MATTERS OVER THE WEEKEND (ARRANGED BEFORE THE RUSSIAN INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN) THE CDU DEFENCE SPOKESMAN, WOERNER, WAS PARTICULARLY CRITICAL AND ACCUSED SCHMIDT AND BRANDT OF BEING INSUFFICIENTLY FORTHRIGHT IN CONDEMNING THE SOVIET UNION. SCHMIDT WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR GIVING THE IMPRESSION THAT THE WEST WAS A PAPER TIGER. AFGHANISTAN SHOULD NOT BE ACCEPTED AS A FAIT ACCOMPLI AS HUNGARY AND CZECHOSLAVIKIA HAD BEEN.

MG

AS A FAIT ACCOMPLI AS HUNGARY AND CZECHOSLAVIKIA HAD BEEN.

3. A SUGGESTION BY WOERNER THAT THE GEOGRAPHICAL LIMITS OF NATO SHOULD BE EXTENDED TO COVER AT LEAST THE MIDDLE EAST HAS ALSO GAINED SOME CURRENCY IN THE OPPOSITION AND HAS BEEN SUPPORTED BY STRAUSS. GENSCHER, BRANDT AND THE GOVERNMENT SPOKESMAN HAVE DISAGREED.

4. STRAUSS WAS MEASURED AND STATESMANLIKE AT THIS CONFERENCE, ALTHOUGH ON THE PREVIOUS DAY HE WAS REPORTED AS DESCRIBING THE GOVERNMENT AS PUSSYFOOTING AND APPEASING. THERE IS GENERAL AGREEMENT THAT A POLICY OF DETENTE SHOULD CONTINUE, ALTHOUGH STRAUSS HAS DECLARED THAT EVENTS IN AFGHANISTAN SHOULD END THE ILLUSIONS SURROUNDING IT.

5. PRESS ARGUMENT CONTINUES ABOUT THE DIVISIBILITY OF DETENTE. THIS REFLECTS, ON THE ONE HAND, THE PARTICULAR EMPHASIS OF GENSCHER AND THE OPPOSITION ON THE NEED TO SUPPORT THE US AND, ON THE OTHER HAND, WHILE NOT CONTRADICTING THIS, THE RELUCTANCE OF THE SPD, AND NOTABLY BRANDT, TO SEE THE SITUATION DESCRIBED PRIMARILY IN EAST-WEST TERMS.

6. THE VIEWS OF GOVERNMENT AND OPPOSITION ARE STILL EVOLVING AND WILL BECOME CLEARER AFTER THE GOVERNMENT DECLARATION IN THE BUNDESTAG ON 17 JANUARY.

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TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 51 OF 14 JANUARY

AND TO IMMEDIATE UKREP BRUSSELS FOR PS TO LPS AND MR HURD

BONN TELNO 41

VISIT TO BONN OF LORD PRIVY SEAL

1. THE SITUATION AT CLOSE OF PLAY 14 JANUARY IS AS FOLLOWS:

A) THE LPS' CALLS ON THE EUROPEAN STATE SECRETARIES COMMITTEE AND ON HERR GENSCHER ARE CONFIRMED FOR AM 18 JANUARY.

B) THE GERMANS ARE CONSIDERING OFFERING A LUNCH WHICH WOULD PROBABLY BE HOSTED BY STATE SECRETARY LAUTENSCHLAGER.

C) THERE IS NO NEWS OF A CALL ON CHANCELLOR SCHMIDT.

D) THE AUSWAERTIGES AMT ARE STILL PURSUING THE QUESTION OF A CALL ON HERR MATTHOEFER.

E) CONTRARY TO WHAT DOHNANYI TOLD ME ON 11 JANUARY, A QUESTION MARK STILL HANGS OVER THE PROPOSED CALL ON GRAF LAMBSDORFF. IT APPEARS THAT THERE ARE GREAT TIMETABLE DIFFICULTIES BUT THE AUSWAERTIGES AMT ARE STILL TRYING TO LINE HIM UP.

2. THIS IS VERY UNSATISFACTORY. MINISTERS MAY WISH TO RAISE THE MATTER WITH GENSCHER OR DOHNANYI IN BRUSSELS TOMORROW.

WRIGHT

FILES

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PS/MR HURD

PS/FUS

LORD BRIDGES

MR HANNAY

MR FERGUSSON

COPIES TO

MR FRANKLIN

CABINET OFFICE

MR JORDAN-MOSS TREASURY

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 MR CORTAZZI
 MR FERGUSSON
 MR MURRAY
 MR BULLARD
 LORD N G LENNOX
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CABINET OFFICE

MC AUST LEGAL ADVISER

RR UKMIS NEW YORK

RR KABUL

GRS 1200

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IMMEDIATE

DESKBY FCO 150800Z

DESKBY ISLAMABAD FIRST CONTACT

FROM DELHI 141440Z JAN

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 62 OF 14 JANUARY

INFO IMMEDIATE ISLAMABAD (FOR PRIVATE SECRETARY)

INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON, MOSCOW, UKDEL NATO, PEKING

INFO ROUTINE UKMIS NEW YORK, KABUL

MY TELNO 55: AFGHANISTAN

1. I HAD A LONG TALK WITH THE PAKISTAN AMBASSADOR TODAY. I TOLD HIM OF MY CONVERSATIONS WITH MRS GANDHI AND SATHE. ABDUL SATTAR THOUGHT, AS DID MY US COLLEAGUE WHO I WAS EARLIER IN THE DAY,

THOUGHT, AS DID MY US COLLEAGUE WHO I WAS EARLIER IN THE DAY, THAT THE INDIAN STATEMENT AT THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY WAS SO EXTREME THAT IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE TO EXPLOIT THE PROBABLE REACTION HERE TO MODIFY THE INDIAN POSITION PUBLICLY AND TO GET THEM TO GO FURTHER PRIVATELY THAN THEY MIGHT OTHERWISE HAVE DONE. HE WAS CONCERNED HOWEVER ABOUT THE EXTENT TO WHICH INDIA WOULD USE HER INFLUENCE WITH NON-ALIGNED DELEGATIONS AT THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY. HE THOUGHT SHE HAD ENOUGH POSSIBLY TO PREVENT A TWO THIRDS MAJORITY AND CERTAINLY TO INCREASE THE NUMBER OF ABSTENTIONS. HE THOUGHT THAT SATHE WAS BASICALLY WELL DISPOSED TO A PAKISTAN/ INDIAN UNDERSTANDING AND SAID THAT HE HAD TAKEN UP WHERE JAGAT MEHTA LEUV OFF. THIS IS ENCOURAGING, ESPECIALLY SINCE A WELL INFORMED JOURNALIST HAS TOLD US THAT MRS GANDHI HAD GIVEN LITTLE THOUGHT TO THE INDIAN STATEMENT AT THE UN AND THAT IT WENT RATHER FURTHER THAN SHE HAD PERSONALLY AUTHORISED. IT WAS THE CONSEQUENCE OF A MUDDLE AMONGST HER PERSONAL STAFF INVOLVING, HOWEVER, THE NEW MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

2. ABDUL SATTAR SPOKE IN A SENSIBLE WAY ABOUT INDO-PAKISTAN RELATIONS AND WAS ON THE WHOLE BULLISH ABOUT THEM. AS REGARDS THE POINTS IN PARA 4 OF MY TUR, HE SPOKE AS FOLLOWS:-

(A) IN ADDITION TO THE WRITTEN COMMUNICATION PRESIDENT ZIA HAD AT HIS SUGGESTION TELEPHONED MRS GANDHI. HE DID NOT KNOW WHETHER MRS GANDHI HAD YET REPLIED TO THE WRITTEN MESSAGE.

(B) THE PAKISTAN GOVERNMENT FULLY ACCEPTED SATHE'S REASONS FOR NOT BEING ABLE TO GO TO ISLAMABAD IN EARLY JANUARY AND NOW EXPECTED HIM IN THE FIRST WEEK OF FEBRUARY. HOWEVER, IT WOULD BE A CONSIDERABLE IMPROVEMENT IF HE COULD VISIT ISLAMABAD NEXT WEEK AS SOON AS THE CHINESE FOREIGN MINISTER HAD LEFT. THE PAKISTAN GOVERNMENT WOULD WISH TO DISCUSS A WIDE RANGE OF MATTERS AND NOT ONLY BILATERAL QUESTIONS. WIDE RANGING TALKS HAD BEEN INAUGURATED AT THE PAKISTANI'S SUGGESTION WHEN SHAH NAWAZ HAD COME TO DELHI IN MAY 1979 AND THE SATHE VISIT WOULD BE OSTENSIBLY IN RETURN FOR THIS.

(C) THERE COULD BE PRESENTATIONAL ADVANTAGE IN A MEETING OF ALL THE COUNTRIES IN THE SUB-CONTINENT, BUT IT WAS HARD TO SEE WHAT PRACTICAL STEPS COULD BE AGREED, A WIDER RCD WOULD PROBABLY NOT WORK BUT SEE (D) BELOW.

(D) IN THEORY IT SHOULD BE POSSIBLE TO IMPROVE TRADE BETWEEN INDIA AND PAKISTAN. THE DIFFICULTY WAS THAT WHEREAS PAKISTAN

INDIA AND PAKISTAN. THE DIFFICULTY WAS THAT WHEREAS PAKISTAN BOUGHT MANUFACTURED GOODS FROM INDIA, INDIA BOUGHT ONLY RAW MATERIALS FROM PAKISTAN. THIS LOOKED LIKE A "COLONIAL SITUATION" AND THE AMOUNTS WERE VERY UNBALANCED. THE NEED WAS FOR INDIA TO TAKE SOME VALUE ADDED GOODS FROM PAKISTAN. AS FOR TRANSIT TRADE, THE INDIANS WERE ANXIOUS FOR FACILITIES TO TRADE BY ROAD TO AFGHANISTAN AND IRAN AND PAKISTAN WOULD LIKE TO TRADE IN A SIMILAR WAY WITH BANGLADESH. A SIGNIFICANT PART OF THE PROBLEM WAS CONGESTION ON THE EXISTING PAKISTANI ROADS. AN EAST/WEST ROAD SYSTEM TO PERMIT TRADE WITH IRAN WAS REQUIRED, BUT WAS BEYOND PAKISTAN'S RESOURCES. COOPERATIVE ARRANGEMENTS WERE REQUIRED IN THIS AND OTHER AREAS. HE MENTIONED THE EXPLOITATION OF NATURAL GAS IN PAKISTAN. PAKISTAN WOULD BE PREPARED TO SEND A SENIOR REPRESENTATIVE TO DELHI TO DISCUSS TRADE.

(E) PROGRESS HERE WAS VERY POSSIBLE. AN INDIAN POLO TEAM HAD JUST BEEN INVITED TO PLAY IN PAKISTAN. THIS WAS OF SPECIAL SIGNIFICANCE BECAUSE IT WOULD BE COMPOSED OF INDIAN ARMY OFFICERS. THE PAKISTANIS WOULD WELCOME INDIAN CULTURAL PERFORMANCES, PROVIDED THEY WERE IN THE CLASSICAL OR FOLK TRADITIONS BUT NO POP MUSIC PLEASE.

(F) NEITHER OF US MENTIONED THE POSSIBILITY OF PAKISTAN RETURNING TO THE COMMONWEALTH.

(G) ABDUL SATTAR HAD JUST BEEN GIVEN DISCRETION TO APPROACH THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA FOR HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE TO THE AFGHAN REFUGEES. HE PROPOSED TO DO THIS IN A GENTLE WAY AND THOUGHT THERE MIGHT BE A FORTHCOMING ANSWER.

(H) SATHE HAD TOLD HIM THAT INDIA WOULD WELCOME ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE TO PAKISTAN. (MY US COLLEAGUE TOLD ME THIS MORNING THAT HIS GOVERNMENT WAS PREPARED TO PROVIDE DOLLARS 200 MILLIONS OF "RESERVED ECONOMIC CREDIT".)

(I) SATHE HAD ALSO TOLD HIM THAT THERE WAS NO PROSPECT OF INDIA SIMILARLY WELCOMING ARMS ASSISTANCE TO PAKISTAN. BUT BELOW A CERTAIN THRESHHOLD THEY WOULD ACQUIESCE IT. ABDUL SATTAR DID NOT KNOW WHAT THE THRESHHOLD WOULD BE, BUT HE HAD THE IMPRESSION THAT SAY DOLLARS 200 MILLION WOULD BE ALL RIGHT WITH THE INDIANS WHEREAS DOLLARS 500 MILLION WOULD NOT. HE SAID THERE WAS NO TRUTH IN THE STORY CIRCULATING HERE THAT THE AMERICANS WOULD SUPPLY DOLLARS 1 BILLION WORTH OF ARMS. (MY US COLLEAGUE TOLD ME SEPARATELY THIS MORNING THAT HIS GOVERNMENT HAD TOLD ACA SHANI THAT THEY HAD A CREDITS FOR ARMS UP TO DOLLARS 100 MILLION

ME SEPARATELY THIS MORNING THAT HIS GOVERNMENT HAD TOLD AGA SHANI THAT THEY WOULD PROVIDE CREDIT FOR ARMS UP TO DOLLARS 100 MILLION IN EACH OF THE NEXT 2 YEARS. HOWEVER IF THE PAKISTANIS COULD GET THE SAUDIS TO PAY , THE AMERICANS WOULD PROVIDE MORE ARMS. BUT IN ANY EVENT, THE US WOULD NOT SUPPLY SOPHISTICATED AIRCRAFT. THEY HAD FIRMLY TURNED DOWN PAKISTANI REQUESTS FOR F16 AND F13 AND ALSO FOR A7. HOWEVER, GOHEEN ADDED THAT IT WOULD TAKE 4 YEARS FOR A7 TO BE DELIVERED.)

(J) THE INDIANS HAD NOT TOLD THE PAKISTANIS OF ANY CONVERSATIONS THEY HAD HAD WITH THE RUSSIANS SINCE CHARAN SINGH'S STRONG STATEMENT TO THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR ON 31 DECEMBER. ABDUL SATTAR WAS NOT AWARE OF ANY ASSURANCE WHICH THE RUSSIANS HAD GIVEN DIRECT TO THE PAKISTANIS.

3. ABDUL SATTAR SAID THAT THE INDIANS BELIEVED THAT IF WE ALL REFRAINED FROM ACTION THE RUSSIANS WOULD WITHDRAW FROM AFGHANISTAN. HIS GOVERNMENT COULD NOT DO NOTHING. HOWEVER THE INDIANS SHOULD NOT BELIEVE SOVIET STORIES ABOUT TRAINING AND ARMING THE AFGHAN REFUGEES. CERTAINLY CHINESE EQUIPMENT WAS COMING TO PAKISTAN BUT THIS WAS NOT GOING TO THE REFUGEES. NOR WAS PAKISTAN HELPING THEM MILITARILY IN OTHER WAYS. ALL THIS ILLUSTRATED THE IMPORTANCE OF "TRANSPARENCY". IT WAS NOT ENOUGH FOR THE PAKISTANIS OR INDIANS TO BEHAVE REASONABLY. THE SUSPICIONS WERE SUCH THAT ANY ACTION MUST BE TAKEN IN SUCH A WAY THAT THE OTHER SIDE COULD SEE THAT IT WAS REASONABLE. THE PAKISTANIS HAD SOME TIME AGO TOLD THE AFGHANS THAT THEY WISHED THEY WOULD SEAL OFF THE FRONTIER BECAUSE PAKISTAN COULD NOT DO SO HERSELF. HER WRIT DID NOT RUN IN THE TRIBAL AREAS WHICH WERE SELF-ADMINISTERING AND CERTAINLY THERE MIGHT BE CROSSING OF THE BORDER THERE. ONE PROBLEM WAS THAT THE AFGHANS DID NOT ACCEPT THE DURAND LINE AND THIS MADE IT VERY DIFFICULT TO AGREE ON MUTUAL STEEPS TO PREVENT CROSSING. ABDUL SATTAR SAID THAT HE WAS THINKING OF PROPOSING TO ISLAMABAD THE INTRODUCTION OF SOME UNITED NATIONS PRESENCE IN THE FRONTIER AREA.

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SIR D MAITLAND

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ASSESSMENT STAFF
CABINET OFFICE

~~MR CORIAZZI~~
MR FERGUSSON
MR MURRAY
MR BULLARD
LORD N G LENNOX
MR P H MOBERLY
HD/FED
HD/PUSD (2)
HD/UND
HD/SEAD
HD/SAD (4)
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MR AUST LEGAL ADVISER

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DESKBY FIRST CONTACT

FROM DELHI 141420Z JAN

TO IMMEDIATE ISLAMABAD

TELNO 05 OF 14 JANUARY

INFO IMMEDIATE FCO

INFO PRIORITY KABUL, WASHINGTON, MOSCOW, PEKING, UKMIS NEW YORK,
UKDEL NATO.

MY TEL NO 003 TO MUSCAT: AFGHANISTAN: PRESS ROUND UP

1. THERE HAS BEEN A NOTABLE CHANGE IN THE PAST TWO DAYS IN THE ULTIMATE OF INDIAN PRESS COVERAGE OF DEVELOPMENTS. TYPICAL HEADLINES INCLUDE "PAKISTAN AND USA SET FOR ARMS AID AGREEMENT", "US TIES WITH INDIA COOLING FAST", "CHINESE AID TO PAKISTAN ON THE CARDS", "JOINT WESTERN STAND ON AFGHANISTAN CRISIS DOUBTFUL", "US ASSAILED FOR MOVE TO ARM PINDI", "PINDI'S AMBITIOUS LIST FOR US ARMS", "PAK BOMB IN THREE MONTHS", "HUANG TO VISIT PAKISTAN".

2. PROMINENCE IS GIVEN TO MISHRA'S SPEECH AT THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY (UKMIS NEW YORK TEL NO 93) UNDER SUCH HEADLINES AS

ASSEMBLY (UKMIS NEW YORK TEL NO 93) UNDER SUCH HEADLINES AS "INDIA ACCEPTS SOVIET ASSURANCES ON AFGHANISTAN", "PUMPING IN OF ARMS THREAT TO REGION". BREZHNEV'S INTERVIEW WITH PRAVDA, STATING THAT SOVIET TROOPS WOULD BE WITHDRAWN "ONCE THE CAUSES THAT MADE THE AFGHAN LEADERSHIP REQUEST THEIR INTRODUCTION DISAPPEAR", IS ALSO WIDELY REPORTED.

3. ALMOST THE ONLY EXPLICIT RECOGNITION THAT MISHRA'S SPEECH REPRESENTS A MAJOR CHANGE IN THE INDIAN POSITION IS AN ARTICLE IN THE INDIAN EXPRESS HEADLINED "SHIFT IN DELHI STAND ON SOVIET INTERVENTION". THERE IS LITTLE LEADER COMMENT EXCEPT FOR A CRITICAL LEADER, ALSO IN THE INDIAN EXPRESS, HEADLINED "NON-ALIGNMENT BETRAYED".

4. A REPORT FROM NAIR IN LONDON MAKES MUCH OF ALLEGED DIFFERENCES WITHIN THE WESTERN ALLIANCE. A PIECE FROM TIWARI IN LONDON SAYS THAT YOUR VISIT TO INDIA HAS BECOME ALL THE MORE IMPORTANT IN THE LIGHT OF THE US "DECISION TO SUPPLY ARMS TO CHINA AND PAKISTAN". IT GOES ON TO SAY, "BRITISH OFFICIALS HAVE STATED THAT THEIR (IE BRITAIN'S) PROPOSED ACTION AGAINST THE SOVIET UNION WOULD TAKE ... CONCRETE SHAPE ONLY AFTER THEY HAVE KNOWN THAT MRS GANDHI HAS TO SAY ABOUT DEVELOPMENT IN THE REGION". THE ARTICLE CONCLUDES WITH THE SUGGESTION THAT YOU MAY PROPOSE SOME SORT OF LOOSE CONFEDERATION BETWEEN INDIA, PAKISTAN AND BANGLADESH AND POSSIBLE A MEETING BETWEEN MRS GANDHI AND GENERAL ZIA.

5. THE STATESMAN QUOTES A PTI REPORT THAT PRESIDENT CARTER'S TELEPHONE CALL TO MRS GANDHI AFTER HER VICTORY IN THE ELECTIONS WAS PROMPTED BY MR CALLAGHAN.

6. SEE MY IPT.

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DESKBY FIRST CONTACT

FROM DELHI 141410Z JAN

TO IMMEDIATE ISLAMABAD (FOR BRIGHTY)

TELNO 04 OF 14 JANUARY

INFO IMMEDIATE FCO

INFO PRIORITY KABUL WASHINGTON, MOSCOW, PEKING, UKMIS NEW YORK,
UKDEL NATO.

IMMEDIATE

MY IFT: INDIAN POSITION ON AFGHANISTAN.

1. THE INDIAN PRESS IS NOW "TRIMMING" HARD. THE EMPHASIS HAS SHIFTED FROM RUSSIA'S INIQUITY IN AFGHANISTAN TO WESTERN AND CHINESE INIQUITY IN SUPPORTING PAKISTAN. THIS UNDOUBTEDLY REFLECTS OFFICIAL BACKGROUND BRIEFING IN THE WAKE OF MISHRA'S UN STATEMENT. NO DOUBT THE RUSSIANS HAVE ALSO BEEN BUSY BEHIND THE

STATEMENT. NO DOUBT THE RUSSIANS HAVE ALSO BEEN BUSY BEHIND THE SCENES.

2. IN THE LIGHT OF THAT STATEMENT, THE RUSSIANS' WORK IS GOING TO BE MADE EASIER THAN IT HAS BEEN. THEY HAVE BEEN BUYING SPACE IN INDIAN NEWSPAPERS AND ARE STILL DOING SO. WITHIN THE LIMITS OF OUR SLENDER RESOURCES, WE HAVE BEEN FEEDING BACKGROUND INFORMATION AND BRIEFING TO DELECTED PRESS CONTACTS. WE SHALL CONTINUE TO DO SO AND SHOULD BE GRATEFUL FOR ANY FRESH BACKGROUND WE CAN USE. BUT IT WILL NOW BE MORE DIFFICULT TO PERSUADE EDITORS TO TAKE A FAVORABLE LINE, EVEN THOUGH SOME OF THEM ARE PREPARED TO ADMIT PRIVATELY THAT THE INDIAN POSITION AT THE UN IS BARELY RESPECTABLE. AS USUAL, MUCH OF THE AWKWARD COMMENT IS COMING FROM THE INDIAN CORRESPONDENTS IN LONDON (NOTABLY NAIR, JOSHI AND TIWARI). PARTICULARLY IN ADVANCE OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE'S VISIT HERE, IT COULD BE VALUABLE IF THEY WERE GIVEN BACKGROUND BRIEFING BY NEWS DEPARTMENT.

3. I NOTE FROM THE TELEGRAMS (IN PARTICULAR UKDEL NATO NO 026) THAT HMG'S MEASURES AGAINST THE SOVIET UNION MAY BE ANNOUNCED THIS WEEK. NO DOUBT THOSE CONCERNED WILL BEAR IN MIND THE TIMING OF SUCH AN ANNOUNCEMENT IN RELATION TO YOUR VISIT HERE.

THOMSON

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- ~~MR COSETAZZI~~
- MR FERGUSSON
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TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 110 OF 14 JANUARY

INFO IMMEDIATE ISLAMABAD

INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON PARIS BONN MOSCOW KABUL PEKING AND UKDEL
NATO

MY TEL NO 98: AFGHANISTAN: GENERAL ASSEMBLY

1. THE DEBATE CONCLUDED THIS EVENING. THE RESOLUTION WAS ADOPTED 104 - 18 (EASTERN EUROPEANS, AFGHANISTAN, ANGOLA, CUBA, PDRY, ETHIOPIA, GRENADA, LAOS, MOZAMBIQUE, VIETNAM) - 18 (ALGERIA, BENIN, BURUNDI, CONGO, CYPRUS, EQUATORIAL GUINEA, FINLAND, GUINEA, GUINEA BISSAU, INDIA, MALI, MADAGASCAR, NICARAGUA, SAO TOME, SYRIA, UGANDA, YEMEN, ZAMBIA). ROMANIA DID NOT PARTICIPATE.

2. THE INDIANS, ASSISTED BY SRI LANKA AND ALGERIA, CIRCULATED INFORMALLY AN ALTERNATIVE DRAFT RESOLUTION WHICH WAS VERY MUCH WEAKER IN TONE THAN THE PAKISTANI DRAFT AND AMOUNTED TO LITTLE MORE THAN A STATEMENT OF THE PRINCIPLES OF NON-INTERVENTION. THE

INFORMALLY AN ALTERNATIVE DRAFT RESOLUTION WHICH WAS VERY MUCH WEAKER IN TONE THAN THE PAKISTANI DRAFT AND AMOUNTED TO LITTLE MORE THAN A STATEMENT OF THE PRINCIPLES OF NON-INTERVENTION. THE CO-SPONSORS OF THE PAKISTANI DRAFT DECLINED TO ACCEPT IT AND IT WAS NOT FORMALLY TABLED.

3. THE PAKISTANIS ALSO RODE THE AFRICANS OFF THEIR AMENDMENT ABOUT THE WITHDRAWAL OF SOUTH AFRICAN GROUPS FROM BEIT BRIDGE (MY TEL NO 100, NOT TO ALL). SIERRA LEONE, MOZAMBIQUE, AND YUGOSLAVIA CONDEMNED THE SOUTH AFRICAN PRESENCE IN RHODESIA. SIERRA LEONE CALLED FOR ITS WITHDRAWAL "IN SPITE OF PRESSURE ON LORD SAMES FROM THE SMITH CLIQUE".

4. THERE WERE AGAIN FEW SURPRISES IN TODAY'S 18 STATEMENTS AND MORE THAN 20 EXPLANATIONS OF VOTE. THE ONLY NON-ALIGNED WHO SUPPORTED THE SOVIET INTERVENTION WERE CUBA WHO MADE A WILD ATTACK ON THE US, GRENADA, WHO WERE PARTICULARLY SHAMELESS, MADAGASCAR AND ETHIOPIA. THE PLO ALSO CONDEMNED THE US. THE YUGOSLAVS, IN A WIDE-RANGING EXPRESSION OF NON-ALIGNED PRINCIPLES, CAME DOWN CLEARLY AGAINST THE RUSSIANS BUT EMBRACED ALL OTHER "INTERVENTIONS" INCLUDING THE SOUTH AFRICANS IN RHODESIA. IRAQ, WHO VOTED IN FAVOUR, QUOTED EXTENSIVELY FROM SADDAM HUSSEIN'S STATEMENT OF 6 JANUARY. THERE WERE NO WESTERN STATEMENTS TODAY.

5. THE REPORT OF THE CREDENTIALS COMMITTEE WAS ADOPTED THIS MORNING WITHOUT VOTES OR STATEMENTS.

6. THIS WAS UNDOUBTEDLY A FAMOUS DEFEAT FOR THE RUSSIANS. MUCH CREDIT MUST GO TO NAIK (PAKISTAN) FOR GETTING OUT SUCH A LARGE NUMBER OF NON-ALIGNED VOTERS. THE PROBLEM FROM OUR POINT OF VIEW IS THAT THIS WILL HAVE WHETTED THE NON-ALIGNEDS' APPETITE FOR EMERGENCY SESSIONS.

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TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 216 OF 14 JANUARY 1980

INFO IMMEDIATE ISLAMABAD (FOR SOSFAS PARTY) PRIORITY UKDEL NATO
MOSCOW PEKING TOKYO PARIS BONN DELHIFOREIGN POLICY SPEECH BY PRESIDENT CARTER

1. ARTICLES IN THE NEW YORK TIMES OF 13 AND 14 JANUARY (TEXTS BY BAG TO DEPARTMENT) BY HEDRICK SMITH AND BERNARD GWERZTMAN STATE THAT PRESIDENT CARTER IS PREPARING A MAJOR SPEECH TO SET OUT A NEW AMERICAN STRATEGIC DOCTRINE TO CONTAIN THE SOVIET THREAT IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND SOUTHERN ASIA DURING THE 1980S. ACCORDING TO THESE ARTICLES, NO PRECISE DATE OR FORUM HAS YET BEEN SET FOR THE SPEECH. ONE POSSIBILITY WOULD BE TO INCLUDE ITS CONTENTS IN THE PRESIDENT'S STATE OF THE UNION ADDRESS ON 23 JANUARY. A DRAFT COMMISSIONED BY BRZEZINSKI AND WRITTEN IN THE NSC SO FAR WITHOUT STATE DEPARTMENT PARTICIPATION HAS GONE TO THE WHITE HOUSE.

2. ACCORDING TO HEDRICK SMITH CARTER "SENSES A PARALLEL TO PRESIDENT HARRY S TRUMAN'S STERN REACTION TO SOVIET THREATS TO GREECE AND TURKEY IN 1947, WHICH GAVE BIRTH TO THE TRUMAN DOCTRINE OF CONTAINMENT AGAINST SOVIET EXPANSIONISM IN THE IMMEDIATE POST-WORLD WAR II PERIOD. CARTER, SERIOUSLY DISTURBED BY THE LONG-RANGE IMPLICATIONS OF THE SOVIET INTERVENTION IN A NON ALIGNED

WORLD WAR II PERIOD. CARTER, SERIOUSLY DISTURBED BY THE LONG-RANGE IMPLICATIONS OF THE SOVIET INTERVENTION IN A NON ALIGNED NATION OUTSIDE EASTERN EUROPE, HAS SOUGHT TO CONVINCED THE KREMLIN THAT HE REGARDS AMERICAN INTERESTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST AS SO GREAT THAT HE WOULD NOT HESITATE TO TAKE ANY ACTION, INCLUDING MILITARY STEPS, TO PROTECT THEM." HENDRICK SMITH ADDS THAT "AT PRESENT, MR CARTER'S INCLINATION IS NOT (NOT) TO RELY ON THE KIND OF LARGE ALLIANCE SYSTEMS THAT CHARACTERIZED THE EISENHOWER ADMINISTRATION AND THE STRATEGIC DIPLOMACY OF SECRETARY OF STATE JOHN FOSTER DULLES. HE HAS TALKED IN TERMS OF LETTING THE ISLAMIC NATIONS OF THE MIDDLE EAST AND SOUTHERN ASIA, THE OIL PRODUCING STATES AND THE THIRD-WORLD COUNTRIES TAKE THE INITIATIVES AND HAVING WASHINGTON SUPPORT THEM WHERE APPROPRIATE, ONLY OCCASIONALLY TAKING THE LEAD WHEN NECESSARY."

3. NSC CONTACTS HAVE CONFIRMED TO US THAT THESE REPORTS ARE SUBSTANTIALLY CORRECT AND THAT HEDRICK SMITH'S ARTICLE WAS BASED ON A PERSONAL BRIEFING BY THE PRESIDENT. THE UNDERLYING MOTIVE FOR THE SPEECH IN THE MINDS OF DRAFTERS HAD BEEN THE NEED TO PUT THE AFGHANISTAN CRISIS IN A WIDER PERSPECTIVE FOR THE AMERICAN PEOPLE, TO EXPLAIN CLEARLY TO THEM WHY THE GULF AND SOUTH WEST ASIA ARE OF CRITICAL IMPORTANCE TO THE SECURITY OF THE UNITED STATES AND TO UNDERLINE THE ADMINISTRATION'S RESOLVE TO PROTECT ITS INTERESTS THERE. THE REFERENCE TO THE HISTORICAL ANALOGY OF THE TRUMAN DOCTRINE IN THE LATE 40S REFLECTS A MEMORANDUM SENT BY BRZEZINSKI TO THE PRESIDENT ON 2 JANUARY. THIS REMINDED THE PRESIDENT THAT THE TRUMAN DOCTRINE, BORN OUT OF CONCERN FOR SOVIET THREATS TO GREECE AND TURKEY IN 1947, HAD ALSO BEGUN OVER "TWO COUNTRIES WHICH WERE AT THE OUTER LIMITS OF U S CONSCIOUSNESS" AT THE TIME. DESPITE POST-WAR FATIGUE AND SOME ISOLATIONIST FEELING AT HOME, PRESIDENT TRUMAN HAD BROKEN NEW GROUND, ABANDONED HESITANCY AND INITIATED ONE OF THE MORE CREATIVE PERIODS OF US DIPLOMACY WITH HIS FIRM AND DECISIVE ACTION TO BUTTRESS REGIONAL SECURITY. THE MEMORANDUM HAD DRAWN THE OBVIOUS PARALLEL WITH PRESENT DAY EVENTS, WHICH NOW CONCERN COUNTRIES OCCUPYING A COMPARABLE POSITION IN THE PUBLIC CONSCIOUSNESS TO THAT OF GREECE AND TURKEY THEN. BUT BRZEZINSKI HAD NOTED THAT THE SOVIET UNION WAS NOW MORE POWERFUL, AND USED MORE BLATANT AND BRUTAL METHODS: AND THAT THE GULF WAS NOW MORE VITAL TO US INTERESTS.

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FM MOSCOW 141101Z

TO IMMEDIATE FCO DESKBY 141145Z

Reccam number 44 of 14 January
AND INFO PRIORITY TO UKDEL NATO, PARIS, BONN, WASHINGTON
UKMIS NEW YORK.

MY TELNOS 42 AND 43: AFGHANISTAN

1. TODAY'S PARLIAMENTARY STATEMENT WILL BE STUDIED CLOSELY HERE. THE RUSSIANS WILL HOPE TO BE ABLE TO FIT IT INTO THE PICTURE OF WESTERN POLICIES WHICH BREZHNEV'S STATEMENT PRESENTS AND TO USE IT IN ORDER TO DRIVE WEDGES BETWEEN THE US AND EUROPE. (THEY REGARD BRITIAN AS ESSENTIALLY AN ATLANTIC RATHER THAN A EUROPEAN POWER).

2. I DO NOT KNOW WHAT KIND OF STATEMENT IS ENVISAGED, BUT IT WILL HELP TO FRUSTRATE THE SOVIET TACTIC IF WE CAN:

A) EXPOSE THE TACTIC ITSELF AS BLATANTLY ILLUSTRATED IN BREZHNEV'S STATEMENT.,

B) DWELL ON THE ESSENTIAL UNITY OF THE INTERNATIONAL REACTION TO THE SOVIET OCCUPATION OF AFGHANISTAN, NOT JUST ON THE PART OF EUROPE AND THE US BUT OF MUCH OF THE DEVELOPING WORLD, WELL ILLUSTRATED BY THE WAY IN WHICH THE SOVIET UNION FINDS ITSELF FORCED TO DISMISS THE UN ACTION AS "INTERFERENCE".,

C) KEEP BILATERAL MEASURES IN PERSPECTIVE, TREATING THEM NOT AS A SANCTION BUT AS A NATURAL EXPRESSION OF THE GENERAL REVULSION AT THE SOVIET ACTIONS.,

D) STRESS THE DAMAGE WHICH SOVIET ACTION HAS DONE TO THE VERY CAUSE OF DETENTE WHICH THE SOVIET UNION HAS PROFESSED WHILE THE WEST HAS PRACTISED.,

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E) POINT OUT THAT THE CONCEPT OF EUROPEAN DETENTE WHICH BREZHNEV SEEMS TO ENVISAGE IS MEANINGLESS BY ITSELF. THE SAFER WORLD WHICH WE ALL SEEK REQUIRES UNDERSTANDING NOT ONLY WITHIN EUROPE, AND NOT ONLY BETWEEN THE TWO SUPER POWERS, BUT IN THE WHOLE NETWORK OF WORLD WIDE RELATIONSHIPS. THE SOVIET CONCEPT OF INTERNATIONAL CONDUCT IS WHAT THEIR ACTION IN AFGHANISTAN HAS ILLUSTRATED AND THAT IS WHY ALL THOSE WHO SEEK DETENTE HAVE REASON TO WORRY. BRITAIN AND HER PARTNERS -LIKE INDEED EVERY NATION IN THE WORLD- MUST REASSESS THEIR POLICIES IN THE LIGHT OF SOVIET POLICY AS EXPRESSED BY THE AFGHANISTAN ADVENTURE.

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TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NO 039 OF 14 JANUARY 80.

AND IMMEDIATE ISLAMABAD (FOR PRIVATE SECRETARY), UKMIS NEW YORK,
UKDEL NATO.

INFO ROUTINE NEW DELHI, TEHRAN, MOSCOW, WASHINGTON AND PEKING.

FCO TELEGRAM NO 026 : AFGHANISTAN : SITREP.

POLITICAL INTERNAL.

1. THE MEMBERS OF THE PARTY CENTRAL COMMITTEE, THE POLITBURO,
 THE REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL AND THE GOVERNMENT HAVE BEEN
 ANNOUNCED (DETAILS BY BAG). THE BIG NAMES WHO APPEAR ON
 MOST ORGANS ARE BABRAK, NOOR AHMED NOOR, ANAHITA (ALL PARCHAMIST
 EXILED AMBASSADORS, LATER DISMISSED BY TARAKI, WHO FOUND REFUGE
 IN EASTERN EUROPE) KESHTMAND (PARCHAMIST IMPRISONED BY TARAKI
 FOR PLOTTING AGAINST REGIME) ZEARY (MINISTER OF AGRICULTURE
 UNDER TARAKI AND AMIN) AND ASSADULLAH SARWARI (HEAD OF THE
 INTELLIGENCE ORGANISATION, AGSA, UNDER TARAKI). MILITARY
 REPRESENTATION HAS BEEN MUCH INCREASED, WITH 9 IN THE 34
 MEMBER CC AND 12 IN THE 57 MEMBER RC. THE MIXTURE OF
 PARCHAMISTS, THE GANG OF FOUR, THOSE WHO SERVED UNDER BOTH
 TARAKI AND AMIN, AND 2 OR 3 WHO ARE ANNOUNCED AS NOT PARTY
 MEMBERS AT ALL, LOOKS UNEASY, AND A SHAKOUT SEEMS LIKELY

TARAKI AND AMIN, AND 2 OR 3 WHO ARE ANNOUNCED AS NOT PARTY MEMBERS AT ALL, LOOKS UNEASY, AND A SHAKEOUT SEEMS LIKELY BEFORE LONG. THE PRESENCE OF ASSUDUALLAH AS BABRAK'S NO. 2, WITH HIS ABASA BACKGROUND, IS STRANGE AND ATTRACTS A LOT OF CRITICISM.

2. BABRAK GAVE A PRESS CONFERENCE ON 10 JANUARY (DETAILS BY BAG). HE WAS UNCHARACTERISTICALLY NERVOUS, CHAIN-SMOKING AND OFTEN STUMBLING OVER HIS WORDS & AN INEPT PERFORMANCE FOR A MAN WHO IS NO MEAN ORATOR. HE DREW AN IMMEDIATE DISTINCTION BETWEEN CORRESPONDENTS OF 'FRIENDLY COUNTRIES' AND THOSE 'OF THE OPPOSITION'; HE ADDRESSED BOTH ITN AND BBC AS 'DISTINGUISHED REPRESENTATIVES OF BRITISH IMPERIALISM' AND DESCRIBED THE BBC AS 'THE GREATEST PROPAGANDIST LIAR OF THE OF THE WORLD'. HE SAID THAT SOVIET TROOPS WOULD LEAVE WHEN AFGHANISTAN WAS NO LONGER THREATENED BY THE US, CHINA, PAKISTAN, EGYPT AND SAUDI ARABIA.

3. THE WIDOW OF TARAKI HAS SENT AN OPEN LETTER TO PRESIDENT CARTER EXPRESSING SHOCK THAT HE SHOULD DESCRIBE AMIN, WHO HAD MURDERED HER HUSBAND, AS 'THE LAWFUL PRESIDENT' AND ACCUSING THE US OF GIVING SUPPORT TO 'ALL THE SINISTER FORCES WHICH COME OUT AGAINST OUR PEOPLESS.

4. NIGHT LETTERS TILL CIRCULATE IN KABUL CALLING FOR THE REMOVAL OF BABRAK AND THE INVADERS AND RUMOURS ARE HEARD OF ORGANIZED RESISTANCE MOVEMENTS BEING SET UP. THE RESENTMENT IS UNDOUBTEDLY THERE BUT ORGANISATION IS NOT AN AFGAN TALENT.

POLITICAL EXTERNAL.

5. BABRAK HAS SENT A MESSAGE TO KHOMEINI. IT EXUDES BROTHERLY AND RESPECTFUL ISLAMIC FEELINGS, CALLS FOR THE STRENGTHENING OF BILATERAL RELATIONS, COMPARES AMIN WITH THE SHAH, DENOUNCES THE US, EGYPT, REACTIONARY CIRCLES OF PAKISTAN AND OTHER ASSOCIATES OF IMPERIALISM, AND SUGGEST A MEETING BETWEEN BABRAK AND KHOMEINI. MOSCOW WILL BE BETTER ABLE TO JUDGE WHETHER THIS LOOKS LIKE SIMPLY AN ATTEMPT TO FORESTALL TROUBLE FROM KHOMEINI OR THE COURTSHIP THAT PRECEDES THE RAPE.

6. AGRS GANDHI'S VICTORY HAS BEEN GIVEN WIDE AND LAUDATORY COVERAGE IN THE PRESS.

7. CONSULTATIONS HERE SUPPORT THE ASSESSMENT OF SOVIET MOTIVES IN JIC TEL 33 OF 13 JANUARY. IT MAY WELL BE THAT AMIN HAD REQUESTED INCREASED SOVIET MILITARY SUPPORT AND BY THE TIME HE REALISED THE EXTENT OF THE CHRISTMAS AIRBRIDGE, IT WAS TOO LATE.

MILITARY ACTIVITY.

8. THE AMERICAN ASSESSMENT IS THAT THERE ARE ABOUT 80,000 RUSSIAN TROOPS IN AFGHANISTAN, BUT IF SO, THEY ARE NOT MUCH IN EVIDENCE. IN KABUL THEY ARE BARELY SEEN BY DAY BUT AT

8. THE AMERICAN ASSESSMENT IS THAT THERE ARE ABOUT 20,000 RUSSIAN TROOPS IN AFGHANISTAN, BUT IF SO, THEY ARE NOT MUCH IN EVIDENCE. IN KABUL THEY ARE RARELY SEEN BY DAY BUT AT ABOUT 2200 HOURS THEY TAKE UP KEY POSITIONS IN APCs.

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

9. THERE ARE RELIABLE BUT ISOLATED REPORTS OF RUSSIANS BEING ASSASSINATED WITH GUN AND KNIFE, IN KABUL, KANDAHAR AND ELSEWHERE.

HUMAN RIGHTS.

10. THE RELEASE OF POLITICAL PRISONERS HAS NOT BEEN THE UNQUALIFIED PUBLIC RELATIONS SUCCESS THAT WAS NO DOUBT HOPED. THERE ARE VERY MANY AFGHANS WHOSE ARRESTED RELATIVES HAVE NOT REAPPEARED AND SOME DISPUTE THE GOVERNMENT'S CONTENTION THAT ALL POLITICAL PRISONERS HAVE BEEN RELEASED; IT IS POSSIBLE OF COURSE THAT ALL WHO ARE ALIVE HAVE BEEN RELEASED BUT THAT MANY MORE DIED THAN HAD BEEN THOUGHT AND SOME OF THE ACCOUNTS CIRCULATING FROM THOSE WHO HAVE BEEN RELEASED SPEAK OF CRAZY, INDISCRIMINATE KILLING IN PULI CHARKHI. THERE WAS A DISTURBANCE, WITH SHOOTING, AT PULI CHARKHI ON 11 JANUARY WHEN GRANTIC RELATIVES DEMANDED FURTHER RELEASES.

BRITISH COMMUNITY.

11. NO CHANGE AND NO PROBLEMS. HMA CALLED A MEETING OF THE COMMUNITY ON 13 NOVEMBER AND RELAYED TO THEM THE ADVICE IN YOUR TELEGRAM NO. 7.

HOWELL.

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Published Papers

The following published paper(s) enclosed on this file have been removed and destroyed. Copies may be found elsewhere in The National Archives.

House of Commons Hansard,

14 January 1980, columns 1222 - 1233

"Afghanistan"

Signed AWayland Date 29 December 2009

PREM Records Team

STATEMENT ON AFGHANISTAN TO BE MADE BY THE MINISTER OF STATE
FOR FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH AFFAIRS, MR DOUGLAS HURD IN THE
HOUSE OF COMMONS ON MONDAY 14 JANUARY

I will, with permission, Mr Speaker, make a statement on Afghanistan.

In the view of Her Majesty's Government, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan on 27th of December was an unprovoked act of aggression against an independent country. It represents a serious threat to world peace and an unprecedented development in the history of post-war Russian expansion. The Soviet Union acted, to establish a military hold on a sovereign country, in violation of the international principles which the Soviet Union constantly calls on others to observe. The Soviet Union justified its act by alleging prior foreign intervention. Yet the intervention has been the Soviet invasion.

In our view it is essential that we and our allies should draw the right conclusion. The Russians have shown, more vividly than ever before, that, when they have the chance of gaining positions of power in developing countries, they are willing to put at risk their relations with the West. Non-alignment is no protection against their appetites. We can expect further Soviet interventions elsewhere unless the international community shows clearly that acts of this kind cannot be undertaken with impunity.

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● With these considerations in mind we are developing our own response.

First, we fully supported the action taken in the United Nations Security Council. The letter to the President of the Council was signed by fifty-two States. Now a number of Third World countries are pressing their arguments in the General Assembly using the Uniting for Peace procedure. This rallying of opinion in the Third World is a new and important factor.

Second, in Afghanistan itself, we have recalled our Ambassador in Kabul for consultations. We have ended our aid programme in Afghanistan, though Afghan students now in the United Kingdom may complete their courses. We have closed the British Council office in Kabul. We have provided relief aid - tents, blankets and medical supplies - to help the Afghan refugees in Pakistan, who now total about four hundred thousand.

Thirdly, we are considering the necessary firm and calculated response to the Soviet Union. The Government welcome the measures announced by the President of the United States. The United States must not be alone in its firmness. Her Majesty's Government have been reconsidering all aspects of British-Soviet relations. On the 31st of December the United States presided at a meeting in London attended also by the United Kingdom, Canada, France, the Federal Republic of Germany and Italy to discuss what steps might be taken. Discussion has since continued in Brussels among the members of the North Atlantic

/Alliance.

alliance. The measures which might be undertaken by individual Western countries include curtailment of high-level and Ministerial meetings and other important contacts with the Soviet Union. Suitable measures in the economic field are also being considered. It is highly desirable that measures by Western countries should be concerted, especially in the economic field, where solidarity with our Community partners will be particularly important.

These matters will be discussed tomorrow at a meeting of Ministers of the European Community in Brussels at which my right honourable Friend the Lord Privy Seal will attend and also at a meeting of the North Atlantic Council, which I and Ministers from some other member countries will attend. We will of course keep the House informed.

We saw an urgent need to consult and express support for our friends in the area. My right honourable Friend the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary is at present visiting Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Oman, Pakistan and India. He is discussing the current situation with their leaders, seeing the problems of the region at first hand, and reassuring our friends and consulting them about the right response. He is due in Islamabad this evening and will be going on to Delhi before returning to London later this week.

/In

In our judgement this is not a time for either panic or weakness. The Soviet Union has launched into an unprecedented foreign adventure. The chances of such an adventure being repeated will be reduced if it is met with a firm and concerted response. The Soviet Union cannot expect relations with Western Europe to continue unaffected while it invades and subjugates independent countries of other continents.



file B

BF 18/1/80

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

14 January 1980

AFGHANISTAN

I enclose the text of a letter to the Prime Minister from the Prime Minister of Australia on Afghanistan.

I should be grateful for the draft text of a reply which the Prime Minister might send to Mr. Fraser. It would be helpful if this could reach me by close of play on Friday, 18 January.

M. O'D. B. ALEXANDER

R M J Lyne Esq
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

GC



File 216

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

14 January 1980

I am replying on the Prime Minister's behalf to your letter to her of 12 January enclosing the text of a letter from your Prime Minister. Mr. Fraser's letter has, of course, been brought to the Prime Minister's immediate attention.

M. O'D. B. ALEXANDER

His Excellency The Honourable
Sir Gordon Freeth, K.B.E.

GC



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10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

14 January 1980

Dear Robin,

CALL BY MR. WARREN CHRISTOPHER

As you know, Mr. Warren Christopher called on the Prime Minister this morning. He was accompanied by the US Ambassador, Mr. Kingman Brewster. Mr. Hurd was also present.

Afghanistan

At the beginning of the meeting, Ambassador Brewster handed over the enclosed message from President Carter to the Prime Minister. Commenting on the letter, Mr. Christopher said that the United States Government needed the help of the British Government on both the punitive and the affirmative aspects of its policy on the Afghan crisis. In regard to the punitive measures, President Carter had taken a number of decisions which were, in domestic political terms, very risky. Mr. Christopher mentioned the grain embargo, the action on the export of high technology and the action on fisheries agreements. The United States hoped that its Allies would produce parallel action. He would be exploring steps that might be taken in London and thereafter in Rome, Brussels and in other capitals. On the affirmative side, Mr. Christopher said that he had just had a good meeting with a Pakistani delegation headed by Agha Shahi. The United States Government would be offering the Pakistan Government \$400 million of new aid. There would be \$200 million worth of economic aid and \$200 million worth of foreign military credits. Half of the aid would be included in the 1980 budget (a supplementary appropriation would be necessary) and half in the 1981 budget.

The Prime Minister said that her views on the Soviet action in Afghanistan were well known. She had been warning for a long time that the Soviet Government were capable of behaving in this way. The Western Allies would now have to work out what could be done. She asked about the United States Government's attitude towards a boycott of the Olympics. She thought that this would have the biggest impact on the people of the Soviet Union. Mr. Christopher commented that there was a ground swell of opinion in the United States in favour of moving the Olympics.

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BK

This was, of course, an issue where governments had to be responsive to public opinion. The Prime Minister agreed and said that the difficulty was that many sportsmen wanted to participate in the Games. It would be much easier to get opinion moving if there was an alternative venue. In any case, an early decision was needed. The British Government had made its views clear on the British Lions tour of South Africa and it would be difficult for it not to take a position on the Olympic Games.

Iran

Mr. Christopher said that President Carter regarded it as important that the objectives of the UN Sanctions Resolution should not be frustrated by the Soviet veto. The United States Government's view was that the Russians had been committed by the 31 December Resolution to permitting the passage of the Sanctions Resolution. A way to impose the sanctions which had been envisaged must now be found. Mr. Christopher said that he was more than ever convinced that sanctions would have an effect in Tehran. The Prime Minister recalled her letter of 10 January to President Carter. There were some things that the British Government could do and some things that they could not do because primary legislation would be required. In reply to a question from Mr. Christopher, the Prime Minister said that it would be out of the question for the Government to seek new legislation at the moment. When Mr. Christopher asked whether it was not open to the Government to take some measures because of Iran's non-compliance with the 31 December Resolution, the Prime Minister said that she would have this looked into. The more that the Allies could do together, the better. When Mr. Christopher asked whether he could tell President Carter that the Prime Minister had said she would do all she could, the Prime Minister cautioned him against trying to read more into her words than was there. There was no point in her making promises until the matter had been looked at in detail. None the less, he could certainly tell the President that what could be done would be done. Mr. Christopher expressed his gratitude and commented on the psychological importance to President Carter of the Prime Minister's support.

I am sending copies of this letter, and its enclosure to John Wiggins (HM Treasury), Brian Norbury (Ministry of Defence), Stuart Hampson (Department of Trade), Bill Burroughs (Department of Energy) and to Martin Vile (Cabinet Office).

Yours truly

Michael Alexander

R.M.J. Lyne, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

SUBJECT.

SECRET

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T9/80

Dear Margaret:

As I know you will agree, the Soviet Union's invasion and occupation of Afghanistan are matters of the gravest concern. In my view, the Soviet action represents one of the most serious security challenges which our countries have faced in the post-war era. This naked aggression has implications in Southwest Asia and the Middle East, as well as globally, in the bilateral relationship between each of our countries and the Soviet Union, and in the multilateral relationships which have developed among the countries of the West and the Warsaw Pact involving European matters in the past decade. A failure on our part to respond adequately to the Soviet challenge in Afghanistan can only encourage Moscow to move in the future even more aggressively. Pakistan, Iran, the Gulf, Yugoslavia and even Turkey come immediately to mind. By the same token, a strong united Western response can correct Soviet perceptions, restrain Soviet behavior and ultimately advance the cause of detente to which both our countries are dedicated over the longer term. I know that you share my view that in these circumstances, it is imperative that you and I and our representatives in Washington and London maintain close and continuous consultations and coordination.

You are already familiar with the measures which I announced on January 4 involving our bilateral relations with the Soviet Union, and I appreciate your support for these actions. I had previously announced my decision that the SALT II Treaty not be called up for Senate action in light of the Soviet invasion and occupation of Afghanistan. I did not withdraw the Treaty because I believe its ratification would be in the interest of the West, and I hope that circumstances will, in time, make it possible for me to request that the Senate proceed with action on the Treaty. Further, I believe that it is important to continue our efforts in MBFR to reach agreement with the East which will lower military forces and tensions in Europe and to pursue vigorously our TNF arms control proposal. In my judgment we should also continue to participate in the CSCE process which if carefully managed promotes Western interests.

SECRET

However, I feel strongly that we would be making a grave error should we, in the interest of preserving an atmosphere of detente, attempt to separate developments in Southwest Asia involving the Soviet Union from the bilateral or multilateral relations which we have with the USSR. The process of detente can continue only if we, collectively and individually, make clear to the Soviet Union that actions such as its invasion and occupation of Afghanistan must have serious consequences for the Soviet Union in other areas of the world, including Europe.

The Soviet Union's invasion of Afghanistan is simply not consistent with detente in Europe, and this must be made clear to the Soviet leadership. If Moscow does wish to pursue detente, then in the wake of Afghanistan it must give us evidence of such a desire. The most convincing confirmation of Moscow's desire to retrace its steps back to policies consistent with the principles of detente would be an early and total withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan. To this point, I regret to say that we have seen no evidence that that is Moscow's intention and the continually growing USSR deployment in Afghanistan appears to us to suggest that the Soviet Army went to that small and defenseless country to stay. And in the light of other Soviet activities in the region--especially in Ethiopia and the Yemens--we would have to regard a prolonged Soviet occupation of Afghanistan as part of a calculated strategic thrust against the West's vital interests.

We have already noted a predictable tendency in the Soviet Union's propoganda to try to divide the United States and Western Europe over the matter of Afghanistan. Indeed, I think we can expect the Soviets to launch a "peace offensive" in Europe in the near future. Moscow will undoubtedly hope that by offering various inducements to West European countries they can secure a "business-as-usual" approach by these countries, a tacit agreement to let concern about the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan fade away. I know that you will be particularly sensitive to this Soviet objective and will work with me and our colleagues from the other Western European countries to ensure that this Soviet aim is not realized.

Finally, I want to assure you that I am prepared to commit the United States to take the necessary steps to enhance security in Southwest Asia and the Middle East,

not just because of U.S. interests, but because of the broad stakes the West in general has in this region's stability and the flow of oil. In this effort, it will be important for the United States to have the support-- and some cases the direct involvement of our European allies. The challenge to our common and crucial interests in this area is unprecedented; it calls for an unprecedented and coordinated Western response. This includes support for Pakistan, intensified political involvement with specific nations stretching from South-west Asia to the Eastern Mediterranean, increased security involvement and military presence, increased economic assistance, as appropriate, and arms support to friendly nations. The United Kingdom's role in this effort will be particularly important and I look forward to learning of Peter Carrington's impressions after his visit to the region.

I want to thank you for your support in these trying times. I will be anxious to have your views in the coming period on the posture that we should adopt to convince this Soviet leadership and the following one that they cannot undertake naked aggression such as in Afghanistan without the most serious penalties for them.

Sincerely,

/s/ Jimmy Carter

as of 14 Jan 1980.

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AND TO IMMEDIATE MUSCAT (FOR PRIVATE SECRETARY) AND ISLAMABAD
AND TO PRIORITY WASHINGTON UKMIS NEW YORK
AND TO ROUTINE KABUL MOSCOW UKDEL NATO AND PEKING

MY IPT: AFGHANISTAN

1. SATHE AND GONSALVES (WHO WAS PRESENT PART OF THE TIME) SHOWED
A SMALL MINDED ANIMOSITY TOWARDS PAKISTAN AND I BELIEVE THEY DRAFTED
THE INDIAN SPEECH. IT REMOVES INDIA FROM THE LIST OF THOSE WHO
HAVE CLEARLY CONDEMNED THE SOVIET ACTION AND AT A MINIMUM PUTS
HER IN OPPOSITION TO THE US, PAKISTAN AND CHINA. THE QUESTION IS
WHETHER THE NEW INDIAN GOVERNMENT CAN BE MOVED BACK TO A MORE REASON-
ABLE ATTITUDE AND INDEED TO ONE WHICH HELPS TO SOLIDIFY RATHER
THAN SPLIT THE SUB-CONTINENT.

2. IT IS POSSIBLE MRS GANDHI WILL APPOINT A FOREIGN MINISTER
OF RECOGNISED STATURE, BUT EVEN SO SHE WILL ULTIMATELY HOLD THE
REINS IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS. FOR THE PURPOSE OF THIS CRISIS, INDIRA
IS INDIA. IT IS THEREFORE FORTUNATE THAT YOU SHOULD BE COMEING HERE
NEXT WEDNESDAY TO SPEAK AT A TOP LEVEL. THE BEST PREPARATION FOR
YOUR VISIT WOULD BE FOR THE NON ALIGNED RESOLUTION TO BE PASSED
BY A TWO THIRDS MAJORITY AT THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY, DESPITE INDIA'S
ABSTENTION. INDIA DOES NOT LIKE BEING IN A MINORITY OF THE NON-
ALIGNED, ESPECIALLY IF THE MAJORITY IS GOING TO BE WITH PAKISTAN.

3. IN YOUR VISIT HERE YOU WILL WANT TO CONCENTRATE ON SOME CLEAR
CUT AND POTENTIALLY ATTAINABLE OBJECTIVES, AND I ASSUME YOU MAY
WANT TO PREPARE THE WAY FOR ANYTHING YOU SAY HERE BY TAKING SOUND-
INGS IN ISLAMABAD. OF THE AREAS IN WHICH IT IS CONCEIVABLE THAT
THE INDIANS MIGHT BE BROUGHT TO TAKE A HELPFUL LINE, THE MOST PROMI-
SING AT PRESENT, DESPITE SATHE AND GONSALVES, SEEMS TO BE RELATIONS
WITH PAKISTAN. MRS GANDHI IS NOT A WOMAN OF GREAT VISION, BUT SHE
IS PRAGMATIC, EXPERIENCED AND RELUCTANT TO BECOME A PRISONER OF
SOVIET POLICY. MOREOVER, WHEN SHE WAS LAST PRIME MINISTER, SHE

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/ CONCLUDED

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CONCLUDED THE SIMLA AGREEMENT WITH PAKISTAN AND SET IN MOTION OTHER STEPS TO IMPROVE RELATIONS. LIKE ALL INDIANS SHE WILL BE HIGHLY RESISTANT TO ANY ATTEMPT TO INSTRUCT HER ON HOW TO CONDUCT RELATIONS WITH HER NEIGHBOURS. BUT AS YOU WILL BE COMING STRAIGHT FROM ISLAMABAD, THERE MAY BE ROOM FOR SOME HONEST BROKERAGE.

4. THE FOLLOWING IS A LIST OF SOME MEASURES WHICH MRS GANDHI MIGHT BE PREPARED TO CONSIDER IN THE INTERESTS OF IMPROVING INDO-PAKISTAN RELATIONS AND WITH THE OBJECT OF KEEPING THE SUB-CONTINENT AWAY FROM SUPER POWER CONFRONTATION.

(A) A FORTHCOMING AND FRIENDLY PERSONAL MESSAGE TO GENERAL ZIA IN REPLY TO HIS MESSAGE OF CONGRATULATIONS WHICH I UNDERSTAND FROM THE MEA HE HAS NOW SENT. (MY TELNO 44).

(B) THE PROMPT DESPATCH OF SATHE OR SOME OTHER HIGH LEVEL REPRESENTATIVE TO ISLAMABAD.

(C) AGREEMENT TO A MEETING IN PAKISTAN, SAY IN LAHORE, OF ALL THE COUNTRIES IN THE SUB-CONTINENT PERHAPS AT FOREIGN MINISTER LEVEL TO CONSIDER THE POSITION IN THE LIGHT OF THEIR COMMON NON-ALIGNED PHILOSOPHY.

(D) RENEWED INDIAN OFFERS (POSSIBLY IN THE CONTEXT OF ONE OF THE FOREGOING MOVES) TO EASE ARRANGEMENTS FOR INDO-PAKISTANI TRADE, INCLUDING TRANSIT TRADE.

(E) OTHER OFFERS RELATING TO SPORTING AND CULTURAL EXCHANGES.

(F) THE RETURN OF PAKISTAN TO THE COMMONWEALTH.

(G) SOME CONTRIBUTION TO HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE TO THE AFGHAN REFUGEES.

(H) A REASONABLY WELCOMING ATTITUDE TOWARDS WESTERN ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE TO PAKISTAN.

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(I) ACQUIESCENCE IN AMERICAN AND IF POSSIBLE FRENCH ARMS SUPPLIES TO PAKISTAN FOR "NORMAL DEFENCE REQUIREMENTS".

(J) KEEPING THE PAKISTANIS INFORMED OF RENEWED INDIAN REPRESENTATIONS IN MOSCOW (MY TELNO 39, PARA 3).

5. MRS GANDHI WILL NO DOUBT HAVE HER OWN LIST OF REQUESTS WHICH MIGHT INCLUDE:

(A) A READINESS ON THE PART OF PAKISTAN TO SEND A REPRESENTATIVE HERE.

(B) SOME ASSURANCE THAT THE WEST DOES NOT FAVOUR PAKISTAN OVER INDIA.

(C) REFUSAL OF SUPPORT FOR A US/CHINESE GANGING UP EITHER IN FAVOUR OF PAKISTAN OR AGAINST THE SOVIET UNION.

(D) NO MASSIVE REARMAMENT OF PAKISTAN OR LARGE NEW US DEPLOYMENT IN THE INDIAN OCEAN AREA.

(E) ASSURANCE THAT THERE WILL BE NO WESTERN SUPPORT FOR MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO THE AFGHAN REFUGEES, WHICH IN HER VIEW IS LIKELY TO CAUSE THE RUSSIANS TO STAY IN AFGHANISTAN. (DENG'S LINE IN PARA 5 AND 6 OF PEKING TELNO 18 IS PRECISELY WHAT THE INDIANS BELIEVE THE CHINESE ATTITUDE TO BE AND TO WHICH THEY REACT IN A VERY STRONG AND EMOTIONAL WAY. "A MAJOR US PROGRAMME TO SUPPORT INSURGENCY IN AFGHANISTAN" WILL CAUSE THE INDIANS TO BECOME VERY ANTI-PAKISTAN AND ANTI-WEST)

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6. THE INDIAN STATEMENT AT THE UN SHOWS THAT THEY ARE IN GRAVE DANGER OF GETTING CLOSELY ALIGNED WITH THE SOVIET UNION. I DOUBT IF THIS IS WHAT MRS GANDHI WANTS, BUT SHE IS VERY SENSITIVE TO ANY SUGGESTION OF PRESSURE ON HER AND HAS AN ANTI-AMERICAN BIAS. SHE IS LIKELY TO BE LESS AMENABLE TO WHAT SHE HEARS FROM WASHINGTON THAN TO PERSUASION BY YOURSELF. MY GUESS IS THAT WHAT SHE WOULD LIKE IS RESTORATION OF THE STATUS QUO ANTE CHRISTMAS AND THAT SHE BELIEVES THIS TO BE POSSIBLE, AS THE MEA CERTAINLY DO. I SUGGEST THAT ALTHOUGH IT MAY SOUND DISAPPOINTINGLY LIMITED, A REALISTIC OBJECTIVE IN DELHI WOULD BE TO HOLD MRS GANDHI TO THIS AIM AND TO GET HER TO FOLLOW SOME OF THE SUGGESTIONS IN PARA 4 ABOVE. IN PUTTING FORWARD THESE SUGGESTIONS I AM ASSUMING THAT THEY WOULD BROADLY BE WELCOMED BY PAKISTAN.

T H O M S O N

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AND TO IMMEDIATE MUSCAT(FOR PRIVATE SECRETARY) AND ISLAMABAD
PRIORITY WASHINGTON UKMIS NEW YORK
ROUTINE KABUL MOSCOW PEKING AND UKDEL NATO

AFGHANISTAN

1. THE INDIAN PRESS THIS MORNING IS FULL OF REPORTS HEADLINED "SHIFT IN DELHI STAND ON SOVIET INTERVENTION" AND "INDIA WILL OPPOSE UN MOVE ON KABUL" AND "INDIA TO SUPPORT RUSSIA AT UN". THE BASIS FOR THESE REPORTS IS OFFICIAL BRIEFING ON THE LINES OF THE INSTRUCTIONS SENT TO THE INDIAN PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE AT THE UN. I CALLED ON SATHE (PUS) TO SEEK ELUCIDATION AND TO GIVE HIM MY OPINION ON THE SUBJECT.

2. SATHE READ ME THE INSTRUCTIONS TO THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE IN NEW YORK. THE U.S. EMBASSY HAVE SINCE SHOWN US THE SPEECH AS DELIVERED. IT IS TEXTUALLY THE SAME AS THE INSTRUCTIONS AND I ASSUME AVAILABLE TO YOU. SATHE SAID THAT INDIA WOULD ABSTAIN IN THE VOTE ON THE RESOLUTION. I ASKED SATHE WHETHER THE PRESS WAS CORRECT IN DESCRIBING THIS AS A U-TURN IN INDIAN POLICY. HE SAID THAT WAS EXAGGERATED. I ASKED HIM UNDER WHOSE AUTHORITY THE STATEMENT HAD BEEN MADE. IT WAS MY UNDERSTANDING OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL POSITION THAT THE PRESIDENT HAD ASKED MR CHARAN SINGH'S GOVERNMENT TO REMAIN IN OFFICE UNTIL MRS GANDHI WAS SWORN IN ON MONDAY. WAS I TO UNDERSTAND THAT THIS WAS MR CHARAN SINGH'S WORK? SATHE SAID IT WAS NOT. THE STATEMENT HAD BEEN MADE ON THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE MINISTRY OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS. MRS GANDHI HAD BEEN CONSULTED PERSONALLY.

3. I ASKED WHAT COUNTRIES THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA HAD IN MIND WHEN THEY SAID THEY COULD NOT LOOK WITH EQUANIMITY ON THE INTERVENTION OF SOME OUTSIDE POWERS "BY TRAINING, ARMING AND ENCOURAGING SUBVERSIVE ELEMENTS TO CREATE DISTURBANCES INSIDE AFGHANISTAN." HE REPLIED PAKISTAN, THE US AND CHINA. I ASKED

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/ HIM WHAT

HIM WHAT HIS EVIDENCE WAS. HE REPLIED THAT THE RUSSIANS HAD TOLD THE INDIANS THAT THEIR SATELLITE PHOTOGRAPHY OF THE KARAKORAM HIGHWAY SHOWED A LARGE FLOW OF ARMS INCLUDING HEAVY EQUIPMENT FROM CHINA TO PAKISTAN, THAT THEY KNEW THE CHINESE WERE EGGING ON THE PAKISTANIS AND THAT THE ARMS WERE BEING SENT ON THE UNDERSTANDING THAT THE BULK OF THEM WOULD BE GIVEN TO THE REFUGEES. SATHE CONTINUED THAT THE RUSSIANS SEEMED TO FEEL THAT US INVOLVEMENT WAS "MUCH MORE SOPHISTICATED", BUT HE WAS UNABLE TO EXPLAIN WHAT THIS MEANT IN DETAIL. HE SAID THAT THE RUSSIANS' BIG WORRY WAS THAT THE REFUGEES WOULD UPSET THE SITUATION IN AFGHANISTAN AND FOR THAT REASON THEY WOULD, AS THEY HAD TOLD THE INDIANS, SEAL OFF THE AFGHAN/PAKISTAN BORDER. I ASKED HIM WHY HE THOUGHT THERE WERE SO MANY RUSSIAN TROOPS IN AFGHANISTAN AND HE REPLIED THAT HE BELIEVED THEY WOULD BE SUBSTANTIALLY RUN DOWN IN THE NEXT FEW MONTHS. INDEED HE WOULD NOT BE SURPRISED, ON THE BASIS OF "ELLIPTICAL" STATEMENTS MADE BY THE RUSSIANS, IF A CERTAIN NUMBER OF THEM WERE PULLED OUT "FAIRLY SOON". HE DID NOT THINK THE RUSSIANS OR AFGHANS HAD ANY BAD INTENTIONS TOWARDS PAKISTAN. THE WEST SEEMED MORE CONCERNED THAN THE PAKISTANIS THEMSELVES ABOUT WHETHER THE LATTER WERE IN ANY IMMEDIATE DANGER. SATHE WENT ON ABOUT THE DANGER TO INDIA INVOLVED IN THE ARMING OF PAKISTAN, BUT WHEN I TOOK HIM UP SHARPLY, HE ADMITTED THAT THE PAKISTANIS HAD "LEGITIMATE CAUSE FOR CONCERN" AND THAT THEY HAD A RIGHT TO ACQUIRE "NORMAL DEFENCE REQUIREMENTS". I REMINDED SATHE OF THE STRESS WHICH HE AND OTHERS HAD LAID IN SPEAKING WITH ME ON THE IMPORTANCE OF AVOIDING GREAT POWER CONFRONTATION ENTERING INTO THE POLITICS OF THE SUB-CONTINENT AND I ASKED HIM WHETHER THIS WAS STILL THE INDIAN POSITION. HE SAID IT WAS, WHEREUPON I ASKED HIM WHY THEY HAD THROUGH THEIR STATEMENT INTENSIFIED POLARISATION WITHIN THE SUB-CONTINENT.

4. I SAID YOU WOULD SHORTLY BE IN ISLAMABAD AND WOULD BE WONDERING WHETHER THERE WAS ANY WAY IN WHICH THE PRESENT CRISIS COULD BE USED TO IMPROVE INDO-PAKISTAN RELATIONS. SATHE SAID HE HOPED SO, BUT THIS WAS DIFFICULT IF THE PAKISTANIS CONTINUED TO TALK ABOUT KASHMIR, REFUSED TO ACCEPT INDIAN OVERTURES ON THE FREEING OF TRADE,

CONFIDENTIAL

SENT AGHA SHAHI PLUS GENERALS TO WASHINGTON AND HIS DEPUTY TO RIYADH AND RECEIVED THE CHINESE FOREIGN MINISTER. WHY DID THEY NOT SEEK TO CONSULT WITH THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA? I PRESSED HIM ON MODALITIES FOR CONSULTATION AND SATHE THEN ADMITTED THAT THE PAKISTANIS HAD SUGGESTED THAT HE SHOULD GO TO ISLAMABAD, BUT THAT HE HAD PLEADED INABILITY TO DO SO AT ONCE, GIVEN A LACK OF GOVERNMENT AND HIS OWN RECENT ARRIVAL. IT WAS ARRANGED THAT HE WOULD GO IN FEBRUARY. THE INDIANS HAD INSTEAD ASKED THE PAKISTANIS TO SEND SOMEONE TO DELHI, BUT THEY HAD DECLINED TO DO SO. I PRESSED HIM FURTHER AND HE SAID THAT INDIA WOULD BE GLAD TO HAVE A DIALOGUE WITH PAKISTAN AND AGREED THAT IT WAS NOT OUT OF THE QUESTION THAT HE HIMSELF MIGHT ADVANCE THE DATE OF HIS PROJECTED TRIP TO ISLAMABAD.

5. PLEASE SEE MY IFT.

THOMSON

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AUSTRALIAN HIGH COMMISSION · LONDON

THE HIGH COMMISSIONER

The Hon. Sir Gordon Freeth, KBE

12 January 1980

Dear Prime Minister

I enclose the text of a letter to you from my Prime Minister, the Rt. Hon. Malcolm Fraser, on the subject of Afghanistan. I will let you have the signed original as soon as it arrives.

Yours sincerely
Gordon Freeth

(Gordon Freeth)

The Rt Hon. Margaret Thatcher, MP,
Prime Minister of Great Britain,
10 Downing Street,
LONDON, SW1.

SECRET

PRIME MINISTER'S

PERSONAL MESSAGE

SERIAL No. T8/80.....

TEXT OF LETTER FROM THE PRIME MINISTER OF AUSTRALIA,
THE RT HON. MALCOLM FRASER, CH MP, TO
THE PRIME MINISTER OF THE UNITED KINGDOM,
THE RT HON. MARGARET THATCHER, MP.

SECRET
SUBJECT

My dear Prime Minister,

I am writing to applaud the vigorous way in which your government has denounced the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan and to tell you of my own concerns, which I know you share, about the implications of what has occurred. I feel that it will be necessary for Western governments to keep closely in touch about these recent events.

We have been deeply outraged, as I know you have, by what has occurred. The Soviet invasion is totally without justification and violates everything that the United Nations and detente stand for. As a mode of behaviour it gravely undermines normal relationships between nations.

As you will already have been informed, Australia has taken firm steps of its own to help to demonstrate to the Soviet Union that the latter's action is too costly to be repeated.

The purpose of our decisions is to contribute to international attempts to penalise the Soviets for their aggressive behaviour, and so seek to deter them from repeating it elsewhere. I believe that our actions again underline Australia's solidarity with our friends and allies, it has been one of our fundamental considerations that we and others must be seen to be taking tangible measures, in accordance with our national perspectives. In short, we should try to match our words with actions. Otherwise, it seems to me that there will be a danger of the Soviets, and possibly others, doubting our credibility and our resolve.

From the point of view of Western interests, and those of international security generally, what has happened in Afghanistan seems to me to represent a failure of the existing structure of deterrence. The Soviets felt free to act as they did and were prepared to accept the costs entailed. However, by concerted action now we can hope to make that cost unacceptably high, and thus to dissuade them from further aggression.

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- 2 -

As to their present aggression, I doubt very much that they will withdraw from Afghanistan at the behest of the United States and likeminded countries or in response to wider international protests. They will be moved to do so only by a sense of their own interests. If we were to insist repeatedly on Soviet withdrawal while being unable to compel it, we would run the risk of appearing ineffectual. In this situation I believe we should direct our main attention and efforts to future contingencies rather than past events, to deter the Soviet Union from further aggression rather than to seek a result which we might not be able to guarantee.

I believe we need to be particularly concerned that the Soviet move into Afghanistan could be the forerunner of a further Soviet move into Pakistan, or more likely Iran, bearing in mind the unsettled state of that country. If that were to happen, the Soviet Union would be well placed to exert a dangerous influence over the free world's oil supplies. This is a contingency that cannot be ignored.

I am concerned that the Western allies too often find themselves obliged to react to events, and perhaps there is a need for greater capacity for control and initiative on our part. As far as possible we should be able to anticipate events such as occurred in Afghanistan in order to forestall them, or to modify their consequences.

It was with this in mind that I thought it necessary to communicate directly with you and to advise you of the nature of our concern at recent developments and the perspectives in which we see them. There may be ways in which we can work more closely in the service of Western interests in the circumstances which now prevail, and I would very much welcome knowing your views.

I have written in similar vein to a number of our friends and neighbours, including those in our near region, and also to Jimmy Carter in response, particularly, to his initiatives and leadership. It seems to me that the world has entered a new and potentially more dangerous era and that there is an urgent need for likeminded countries to consider together how best to cope with the problems and challenges which lie ahead of us. No one country can hope to face these problems in isolation and accordingly, I have taken an early opportunity to inform you of our concerns.

Yours sincerely

MS of 12 Jan 1980.

(Malcolm Fraser)

SECRET

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112 JAN 1960

PS/LPS
 PS/MR BLAKER
 PS/MR LUCE
 PS/MR HURD
 PS/PUS
 SIR D MAITLAND
 MR CORTAZZI
 MR FERGUSSON
 MR MURRAY
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TO PRIORITY MUSCAT (FOR BRIGHTY)

TELEGRAM NUMBER 003 OF 11 JANUARY

INFO ROUTINE FCO, KABUL, ISLAMABAD, WASHINGTON, MOSCOW, PEKING,
UKMIS NEW YORK AND UKDEL NATO.MY TELNO 30 AND PARA 3 OF MY TELNO 44: AFGHANISTAN;
PRESS ROUND UP

1. IN AN INTERVIEW WITH BARBARA WALTERS OF ABC ON 9 JANUARY REPORTED IN THE PRESS HERE TODAY, MRS GANDHI HAS NOW SAID THAT THE SOVIET MILITARY PRESENCE IN AFGHANISTAN WAS AN ISSUE FOR THE AFGHAN PEOPLE TO DECIDE. SHE REPEATED SOVIET CLAIMS THAT THEY WERE INVITED BY AMIN TO INTERVENE IN AFGHANISTAN. WHEN ASKED IF SHE BELIEVED THE SOVIET CLAIMS, SHE IS REPORTED AS SAYING "THAT IS THEIR WORD". MRS GANDHI ALSO SAID THAT THE SOVIETS WERE "DEEPLY WORRIED ABOUT THE DEVELOPING FRIENDSHIP BETWEEN CHINA AND THE USA" AND THAT AS A RESULT "THEY WERE REACTING". THE COMBINATION OF THE U.S. AND CHINA" AS WELL AS "ARMING PAKISTAN ... DOES POSE A DANGER".

2. ON YOUR FORTHCOMING VISIT, TIWARI OF LONDON REPORTS IN THE INDIAN EXPRESS THAT YOU ARE LIKELY TO MEET MRS GANDHI AND THAT INDIA'S HELP AND COOPERATION IN DIFFUSING THE EXPLOSIVE SITUATION IN THE AREA IS CONSIDERED ESSENTIAL. THE TIMES OF INDIA CARRIES AN AP REPORT TO THE EFFECT THAT YOU TOLD REPORTERS ON YOUR DEPARTURE FROM HEATHROW THAT BRITAIN WOULD CONSIDER A NAVAL PRESENCE EAST OF SUEZ FOLLOWING THE SOVIET MILITARY PRESENCE IN AFGHANISTAN IF REQUESTED BY THE U.S.

3. THE INDIAN EXPRESS TODAY CARRIES A HELPFUL STORY FROM WASHINGTON REPORTING A MEETING OF THE INDIAN CHARGE WITH US OFFICIALS WHICH STATES THAT THE OFFICIALS STRESSED THAT THE UNITED STATES WOULD TAKE NOTE OF INDIA'S CONCERNS IN FORMULATING FUTURE (US) POLICY FOR THE REGION. STATE DEPARTMENT SPOKESMAN, HODDING CARTER, IS QUOTED AS SAYING "THIS IS NOT SOME CONFRONTATION BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION ON AFGHANISTAN HALFWAY ROUND THE GLOBE. IT IS A CONFRONTATION BETWEEN THE SOVIET UNION AND THE REST OF THE WORLD BECAUSE IT IS AN ACT OF CLEAR, UNPRINCIPLED AGRESSION ... AGAINST A NON-ALIGNED POWER. WE ARE NOT GOING ABOUT THE AREA SEEKING FORMAL ALLIANCES OR THE IMPOSITION OF SOME KIND OF NEW FORM OF PAX AMERICANA. WHAT WE ARE TRYING TO DEAL WITH IS A SHARED CONCERN VOICED TO US BY NATIONS IN THE REGION ABOUT THEIR OWN SECURITY AND INTERESTS." THE ARTICLE GOES ON TO REPORT THAT OFFICIALS STRESSED THAT THE U.S. DID NOT WISH TO COMPLICATE INDIA'S RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIETS BUT HOPED TO INTENSIFY CONSULTATIONS WITH NEW DELHI.

4. YESTERDAY, THE INDIAN EXPRESS CARRIED A LONG ARTICLE BY NOORANI ENTITLED "LECSONS OF AFGHANISTAN" WHICH REFERS TO THE SOVIET "INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN" AS "DESTROYING A WHOLE SET OF ILLUSIONS ABOUT SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY". IT DRAWS THE CONCLUSION THAT WHAT IS NOW REQUIRED BY THE COUNTRIES OF SOUTH ASIA IS A MORE "REALISTIC AND ENLIGHTENED APPRECIATION... WHICH RECKONS WITH THE NEW CHALLENGE AND INSPIRES CHANGES IN THE RELATIONS BETWEEN SOUTH ASIAN COUNTRIES AND OTHERS NEARBY WHICH ARE APPROPRIATE TO MEET THE CHALLENGE". THE ARTICLE DOES NOT REFER TO AMERICAN ARMS FOR PAKISTAN, IN CONTRAST TO OTHER RECENT PRESS REPORTING AND COMMENT.

5. OUR OVERALL IMPRESSION IS THAT THE PRESS CONTINUES TO REMAIN ROBUST OVER THE SOVIET INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN, AT THE SAME TIME BEING CRITICAL OF THE NATURE OF THE AMERICAN REACTION SO FAR. THE SOVIETS HAVE HAD A THOROUGHLY BAD PRESS AND IT IS

5. OUR OVERALL IMPRESSION IS THAT THE PRESS CONTINUES TO REMAIN ROBUST OVER THE SOVIET INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN, AT THE SAME TIME BEING CRITICAL OF THE NATURE OF THE AMERICAN REACTION SO FAR. THE SOVIETS HAVE HAD A THOROUGHLY BAD PRESS AND IT IS PERHAPS SYMPTOMATIC OF THIS THAT THEY PAID FOR AN ADVERTISEMENT IN THE NATIONAL DAILIES YESTERDAY CARRYING THE TEXT OF THE TASS STATEMENT ABOUT PRESIDENT CARTER'S TELEVISION INTERVIEW.

6. THERE WAS INCIDENTALLY A FURTHER (MY TELNO 21) DEMONSTRATION YESTERDAY BY ABOUT 250 STUDENTS OUTSIDE THE SOVIET EMBASSY CONDEMNING THE SOVIET IMPERIALISM AND CALLING FOR DETERRENT ACTION TO BE TAKEN AGAINST IT. *H*

THOMSON

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CONFIDENTIAL

FROM PARIS 111822Z JAN 80

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 61 OF 11 JANUARY 1980

INFO PRIORITY UKDEL NATO, BONN, UKREP BRUSSELS, UKMIS NEW YORK AND
WASHINGTON

INFO ROUTINE MOSCOW AND OTHER EEC POSTS

MY TELNO 50: AFGHANISTAN, THE UNITED STATES AND EUROPE

1. I CALLED ON THE SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE ELYSEE THIS EVENING AND ASKED HIM IF HE COULD TELL ME ANYTHING ABOUT THE PRESIDENT'S CONVERSATION WITH CHANCELLOR SCHMIDT TWO DAYS AGO. HE HAD TRIED TO PUT ME OFF FROM COMING BY SAYING ON THE TELEPHONE THAT HE HAD NO USEFUL INFORMATION ABOUT IT. BUT HE GAVE WAY WHEN I SUGGESTED TO HIM THAT IT WOULD BE STRANGE IF THERE WAS NOTHING TO SAY TO A BRITISH REPRESENTATIVE ON THIS SUBJECT.

2. WAHL SAID THAT IT WAS MOST IMPORTANT TO TAKE CAREFUL NOTE OF WHAT THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS HAD SAID ABOUT AFGHANISTAN (MY TELNO 41) RATHER THAN OF WHAT THE FOREIGN MINISTER HAD SAID ABOUT IT LAST WEEKEND (MY TELNO 26). IT WOULD BE SEEN THAT THE GOVERNMENT

AT

STATEMENT WAS MUCH FIRMER.

3. I SHOULD ADD AT THIS POINT THAT THE US AMBASSADOR TOLD ME YESTERDAY THAT PRESIDENT GISCARD'S TELEPHONE CALL TO PRESIDENT CARTER ON THE EVENING OF THE 8TH HAD TAKEN PLACE AS A RESULT OF REPRESENTATIONS WHICH HE, HARTMAN, HAD MADE TO WAHL PROTESTING ABOUT THE TERMS OF FRANCOIS-PONCET'S STATEMENT AND MORE PARTICULARLY ABOUT HIS REFERENCE TO COOL HEADS IN EUROPE WHICH HAD IMPLIED THAT THERE WERE HOOTHEADS IN WASHINGTON. HARTMAN TOLD ME THAT THE TELEPHONE CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE PRESIDENTS HAD GIVEN SATISFACTION IN WASHINGTON AS HAD THE STATEMENT ISSUED BY THE FRENCH COUNCIL OF MINISTERS, ALTHOUGH HARTMAN AND I AGREED THAT THERE WAS LITTLE IN THE STATEMENT PROMISING ACTION RATHER THAN WORDS.

4. WAHL DREW MY ATTENTION TO A STATEMENT WHICH HAD BEEN MADE IN BONN THIS AFTERNOON TO THE EFFECT THAT CHANCELLOR SHMIDT IS SHORTLY GOING TO MEET PRESIDENT CARTER. HE SAID THAT THIS WAS AN INITIATIVE BY THE CHANCELLOR AND GAVE ME TO UNDERSTAND THAT IT WAS PART OF THE OUTCOME OF THE CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE CHANCELLOR AND PRESIDENT GISCARD. WAHL SAID THAT THE LATEST INDICATIONS THAT THEY HAD HAD FROM THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR AT WASHINGTON ON THE BASIS OF HIS TALKS WITH THE US GOVERNMENT WAS THAT THE LATTER WAS GOING TO CONTINUE ITS CONTACTS WITH THE SOVIET UNION ON ARMS CONTROL MATTERS AND WOULD USE THESE AS A VEHICLE FOR DISCREET CONTACTS WITH THE SOVIET UNION ABOUT THE AFGHAN AFFAIR AND ITS AFTERMATH. AS THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT UNDERSTOOD IT, THIS WAS THE REALITY WHICH LAY BEHIND PRESIDENT CARTER'S LATEST DECLARATION THAT HE WAS NOT DAMAGING DETENTE. THIS SORT OF ATTITUDE SEEMED MORE INTELLIGIBLE TO FRANCE THAN SOME OF THE OTHER STATEMENTS WHICH HAD COME FROM WASHINGTON. WAHL SAID THAT AT THE ELYSEE THEY HAD YET TO SEE AND CONSIDERED ASSESSMENT OF THE SITUATION IN AFGHANISTAN OR ITS IMPLICATIONS FROM ANY OF THOSE WHO PRESSED FRANCE TO TAKE OR ENDORSE VARIOUS FORMS OF ACTION AGAINST THE SOVIET UNION.

5. WAHL SAID THAT THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT'S CONTACTS WITH THE GERMAN GOVERNMENT WERE IN NO WAY INTENDED TO BE EXCLUSIVE. IF THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT WOULD LIKE TO DISCUSS THESE MATTERS WITH THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT BILATERALLY, HE WAS SURE IT COULD BE ARRANGED. IN PARTICULAR HE WAS SURE THAT MONSIEUR FRANCOIS-PONCET WOULD WELCOME AN EARLY DISCUSSION WITH YOU AFTER YOUR RETURN FROM SOUTHERN ASIA. I SAID THAT THERE MIGHT BE DIFFICULTY ABOUT ARRANGING AN IMMEDIATE DISCUSSION AFTER YOUR RETURN SIMPLY BECAUSE OF PRESSURE OF OTHER THINGS, BUT I THOUGHT IT OUGHT TO BE POSSIBLE TO ARRANGE AN EARLY COMPARISON OF NOTES THROUGH OFFICIALS.

6. WAHL SEEMED TO BE CONVINCED THAT THERE WAS DEFINITELY GOING TO BE SOME DISCUSSION IN POLITICAL COOPERATION IN THE MARGINS OF THE COUNCIL (FOREIGN AFFAIRS) ON 15 JANUARY. I SAID THAT I HAD SEEN NO DEFINITE ARRANGEMENTS TO THIS EFFECT AND KNEW OF NO ARRANGEMENTS FOR ANY PREPARATORY WORK BY THE POLITICAL DIRECTORS. WAHL SAID THAT FRANCE WOULD CERTAINLY BE READY TO TAKE PART IN ANY WORK WHICH ARRIVED AT A EUROPEAN POINT OF VIEW.

7. WAHL SAID THAT FRANCE ATTACHED RELATIVELY LITTLE IMPORTANCE TO MINOR CANCELLATIONS OF CONTACT WITH THE SOVIET UNION, ALTHOUGH IN THE PRESENT CLIMATE THERE WOULD CERTAINLY BE SOME CANCELLATIONS. I ASKED HIM ABOUT CREDIT FOR THE SOVIET UNION AND HE SAID THAT WE COULD TAKE IT THAT FRANCE WANTED TO GET BACK TO OECD CONSENSUS RATES. THERE WAS GOING TO BE NO EARLY DEMOUEMENT ON THIS QUESTION. ONE COULD BE CONFIDENT THAT IN PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES, WHEN MARCHAIS HAD BEEN RECEIVED IN MOSCOW AS THOUGH HE WAS HEAD OF STATE, THERE WOULD BE NO READINESS ON THE FRENCH SIDE TO MAKE CONCESSIONS TO THE SOVIET UNION.

8. WAHL EXPRESSED SOME PUZZLEMENT THAT SOME AT NATO HAD APPEARED TO THINK THAT YUGOSLAVIA MIGHT BE IN SOME IMMEDIAT DANGER. I TOLD HIM THAT MY PERSONAL VIEW WAS THAT NOTHING HAD CHANGED RECENTLY IN YUGOSLAVIA'S IMMEDIATE ENVIROMENT. THE REAL DANGER WAS NOW IN IRAN, AS CHIRAC HAD REMINDED THE FRENCH PUBLIC YESTERDAY. WAHL SAID THAT FRANCE OF COURSE AGREED THAT ANY MEASURE WHICH HELPED TO KEEP IRAN OUT OF SOVIET HANDS WOULD BE WORTHWHILE. HE REVERTED TO THE THOUGHT THAT WHAT WAS REQUIRED OF THE WESTERN SIDE WAS A CAREFUL RE-ASSESSMENT OF RELATIVE DANGERS IN ORDER TO ESTABLISH WHERE THE MAIN WEIGHT OF WESTERN REACTION SHOULD LIE.

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TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 30 OF 11 JAN

AND PRIORITY INFO TO WASHINGTON, UKDEL NATO, PARIS AND BONN.

AFGHANISTAN.

1. THIS IS NOT A TIME FOR AN ANTI-SOVIET CRUSADE, WHICH WILL CONSOLIDATE THE MOST DANGEROUS ELEMENTS IN THE KREMLIN, BUT IF WE ARE TO INFLUENCE FUTURE SOVIET POLICY IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION WE HAVE TO DEMONSTRATE WITH CLARITY THAT THE AFGHAN ADVENTURE HAS DAMAGED BOTH THE STANDING OF THE SOVIET UNION AND SOVIET INTERESTS, INTERNAL AND INTERNATIONAL.

THE DIRECT AMERICAN MEASURES AND THE SECURITY COUNCIL ACTION HAVE BEEN MOST USEFUL, BUT SOME OF THE ACTIONS UNDER CONSIDERATION BY EUROPEAN MEMBERS OF NATO IN THE FIELD OF BILATERAL RELATIONS ARE MERE TRIVIA. THEY MIGHT SERVE AS A GESTURE IF THEY WERE PURSUED WHOLE-HEARTEDLY, UNANIMOUSLY AND AS A COROLLARY TO A SUBSTANTIVE RESPONSE IN OTHER FIELDS, BUT A PATCHWORK OF MINOR GESTURES OF IRRITATION, WITH FRENCH DISSENT PUBLICLY REGISTERED, WILL WEAKEN THE EFFECT OF AMERICAN ACTION AND ENCOURAGE SOVIET MISCHIEF MAKING.

AMERICAN ACTION AND ENCOURAGE SOVIET MISCHIEF MAKING.

2. I HOPE THERE IS ROOM FOR MORE EFFECTIVE ACTION IN RELATION TO THE COUNTRIES THREATENED BY SOVIET EXPANSION TO THE SOUTH. MY FRENCH COLLEAGUE IS VERY PESSIMISTIC ABOUT PAKISTAN, BUT MY OWN VIEW IS THAT THE THREAT THERE MAY NOT BE AS IMMEDIATE AS IT NOW APPEARS, ALTHOUGH THERE IS CERTAIN TO BE FRICTION OVER AFGHAN REFUGEES (IF ONLY AS A JUSTIFICATION FOR THE CONTINUED PRESENCE OF SOVIET TROOPS IN AFGHANISTAN) AND A CERTAIN ATTEMPT AT INTIMIDATION. IT WILL TAKE TIME TO DIGEST AFGHANISTAN AND A MORE IMPORTANT SOVIET OBJECTIVE MAY WELL BE THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A PRO-SOVIET REGIME IN IRAN. FOR THIS THEY ARE DEPENDANT ON EVENTS WHICH THEY CANNOT CONTROL, SO THE TIMING MUST BE LEFT OPEN, BUT IF THE CIRCUMSTANCES WERE RIGHT THEY WOULD ACT AND IT IS PECULIARLY DIFFICULT TO ENVISAGE AN EFFECTIVE WESTERN RESPONSE.

3. THE ARE OF GREATEST SOVIET VULNERABILITY COULD BE AFGHANISTAN ITSELF. IF SOVIET FORCES ARE TIED DOWN THERE WITH SPORADIC FIGHTING GOING ON INDEFINITELY THIS WILL BE THE BEST POSSIBLE DETERRENT TO A SIMILAR ADVENTURE ELSEWHERE. IT WILL ALSO MAINTAIN THE EXPOSURE OF SOVIET POLICY TO THE NON-ALIGNED COUNTRIES, ALTHOUGH THE LATTER OBJECTIVE WILL OF COURSE BE FRUSTRATED BY ANY IDENTIFICATION OF EXTERNAL SUPPORT FOR THE REBELS. THE SOVIET MEDIA ARE ALREADY CARRYING INTERVIEWS WITH CAPTURED REBELS TELLING OF THEIR TRAINING IN PAKISTAN BY US AND CHINESE INSTRUCTORS AND THEIR USE OF FOREIGN INCLUDING BRITISH WEAPONS.

4. LOOKING MORE WIDELY AT AREAS WHERE THE SOVIET UNION IS VULNERABLE TO PRESSURE OR HAS OBJECTIVES WHICH WE MAY FRUSTRATE, THE KIND OF GESTURE WHICH WOULD BE MOST EFFECTIVE WOULD BE A WITHDRAWAL OF THE DUTCH AND BELGIAN RESERVATIONS ON THE TNP DECISION. IF IT IS POLITICALLY UNREALISTIC TO EXPECT THIS, DOES THE MADRID CONFERENCE OFFER MORE ROOM FOR MANOEUVRE? CERTAINLY THE SOVIET OBJECTIVE IS A QUIET MEETING ON THE BASIS OF WHICH SOVIET OBJECTIVES IN THE FIELD OF MILITARY DETENTE WILL BE PURSUED. IT IS AT LEAST ARGUABLE THAT THE WEST SHOULD NOW PREPARE FOR A SUBSTANTIALLY ROUGHER CONFERENCE, DESIGNED TO DAMAGE THE SOVIET FACADE OF INTERNATIONAL RESPECTABILITY WHICH HAS ALREADY SUFFERED FROM THE AFGHANISTAN ACTION AND WHICH THEY WILL BE THE MORE ANXIOUS TO REPAIR. THE ARGUMENT THAT AFGHANISTAN IS IRRELEVANT TO CSCE IS EXACTLY WHAT WE NEED TO DISPROVE IF WE THINK THAT DETENTE REALLY IS INDIVISIBLE. EASTERN EUROPE TOO IS AN AREA OF SOVIET VULNERABILITY IN BOTH POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC TERMS AND ONE

REALLY IS INDIVISIBLE. EASTERN EUROPE TOO IS AN AREA OF SOVIET VULNERABILITY IN BOTH POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC TERMS AND ONE WHERE THERE MIGHT BE SOME CHANCE OF A DEGREE OF HARMONY IN THE WESTERN RESPONSE. POSSIBLY SOME DISCREET HARMONISED AND EFFECTIVE DRIVING OF WEDGES BETWEEN THE SOVIET UNION AND HER EAST EUROPEAN PARTNERS? POSSIBLY TOO SOME PUBLICITY -THOUGH NOT IN MINISTERIAL SPEECHES- FOR PAST SOVIET USE OF THE AFGHANISTAN TECHNIQUE, EG THE ATTEMPT TO INSTAL KUUSINEN AT THE HEAD OF A PEOPLE'S GOVERNMENT OF FINLAND IN 1939 AND HIS EVENTUAL INSTALLATION AS PRESIDENT OF THE KARELO-FINNISH REPUBLIC WITHIN THE SOVIET UNION (PRAYDA DECEMBER 4, 1939: "THE RED ARMY IS APPROACHING FINLAND'S BORDERS AT THE REQUEST OF THE FINNISH PEOPLE'S GOVERNMENT. AS SOON AS THE PEOPLE'S GOVERNMENT REQUESTS IT, IT WILL LEAVE FINNISH TERRITORY.").

5. I RECOGNISE THAT VARIOUS OF OUR ALLIES WILL RECOIL IN ANXIETY FROM THE THOUGHT OF ROBUST ACTION IN ANY PARTICULAR AREA,. THAT THE FRENCH WILL CONTINUE TO RUN DETENTE THEIR WON WAY,. AND THAT THERE IS INDEED A SERIOUS RISK THAT HEIGHTENED CONFRONTATION MAY DAMAGE OUR INTERESTS BY FRIGHTENING OFF THE NON-ALIGNED. I CANNOT TRY FROM HERE TO WEIGH ALL THE FACTORS. THE POINT I WANT TO MAKE IS SIMPLY THAT SOVIET POLICY IS WORLD-WIDE,. THAT IT MAY BE AT A CRITICAL STAGE OF DEVELOPMENT,. AND THAT IN OUR SEARCH FOR A RESPONSE WE SHOULD LOOK WIDELY FOR THE AREAS IN WHICH SOVIET VULNERABILITY MAY MAKE OUR INFLUENCE EFFECTIVE. AT THE SAME TIME I HOPE OUR PUBLIC THEME WILL BE THAT THE SAFETY OF THE WORLD REQUIRES A MEASURE OF EAST-WEST UNDERSTANDING,. THAT THIS IS WHAT WE SEEK,. BUT THAT IT IS NOT COMPATIBLE WITH THE ARBITRARY EXTENSION OF SOVIET POWER.

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AFGHANISTAN [ADVANCE COPIES]

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FROM UKMIS NEWYORK 120301Z JAN 80

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 93 OF 11 JANUARY

INFO IMMEDIATE NEW DELHI PRIORITY WASHINGTON PARIS BONN MOSCOW
KABUL PEKING UKDEL NATO

MY 2 IPTS: AFGHANISTAN: GENERAL ASSEMBLY.

1) FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF INDIAN STATEMENT:

BEGINS:

RECENT EVENTS IN OUR NEIGHBOURHOOD, ESPECIALLY IN AFGHANISTAN, ARE OF VITAL CONCERN TO US. INDIA HAS CLOSE AND FRIENDLY RELATIONS WITH THE GOVERNMENT AND PEOPLE OF AFGHANISTAN. INDIA IS DEEPLY CONCERNED AND VITALLY INTERESTED IN THE PEACE, SECURITY, INDEPENDENCE AND NON-ALIGNMENT OF THIS TRADITIONALLY FRIENDLY NEIGHBOUR. INDIA CANNOT LOOK WITH EQUANIMITY ON THE ATTEMPTS BY SOME OUTSIDE

ENCE AND NON-ALIGNMENT OF THIS TRADITIONALLY FRIENDLY NEIGHBOUR. INDIA CANNOT LOOK WITH EQUANIMITY ON THE ATTEMPTS BY SOME OUTSIDE POWER TO INTERFERE IN THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF AFGHANISTAN BY TRAINING, ARMING AND ENCOURAGING SUBVERSIVE ELEMENTS TO CREATE DISTURBANCES INSIDE AFGHANISTAN.

WE ARE AGAINST THE PRESENCE OF FOREIGN TROOPS AND BASES IN ANY COUNTRY. HOWEVER THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT HAS ASSURED OUR GOVERNMENT THAT ITS TROOPS WENT TO AFGHANISTAN AT THE REQUEST OF THE AFGHAN GOVERNMENT FIRST MADE BY PRESIDENT AMIN ON DECEMBER 26, 1979 AND REPEATED BY HIS SUCCESSOR ON DECEMBER 28, 1979. AND WE HAVE BEEN FURTHER ASSURED THAT SOVIET TROOPS WILL BE WITHDRAWN WHEN REQUESTED TO DO SO BY THE AFGHAN GOVERNMENT. WE HAVE NO REASON TO DOUBT ASSURANCES, PARTICULARLY FROM A FRIENDLY COUNTRY LIKE THE SOVIET UNION WITH WHOM WE HAVE MANY CLOSE TIES.

AFGHANISTAN HAS EVERY RIGHT TO SAFEGUARD ITS SOVEREIGNTY, INTEGRITY AND INDEPENDENCE. INDIA HOPES THAT THE PEOPLE OF AFGHANISTAN WILL BE ABLE TO RESOLVE THEIR INTERNAL PROBLEMS THEMSELVES WITHOUT ANY INTERFERENCE FROM OUTSIDE. INDIA HOPES THAT THE SOVIET UNION WILL NOT VIOLATE THE INDEPENDENCE OF AFGHANISTAN AND THAT SOVIET FORCES WILL NOT REMAIN THERE A DAY LONGER THAN NECESSARY.

THE DISCUSSION IN THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THIS QUESTION WHICH RELATES TO THE SOVEREIGN RIGHT OF THE GOVERNMENT AND PEOPLE OF AFGHANISTAN TO SAFEGUARD THEIR SOVEREIGNTY AND INDEPENDENCE DOES NOT HELP IN RESTORING PEACE IN THE REGION. IT MAY WELL LEAD TO INTENSIFICATION OF COLD WAR AND THREATEN THE PEACE AND SECURITY OF THE REGION.

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE ASIAN REGION INCLUDING THE INDIAN OCEAN HAVE ALREADY BEEN A SOURCE OF GRAVE CONCERN TO US. BUILDING BASES, PUMPING ARMS TO SMALL AND MEDIUM COUNTRIES AND INTERFERING IN THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF NATIONS WITH A VIEW TO ISOLATING AND DIVIDING NON-ALIGNED COUNTRIES POSE A THREAT EVEN TO OUR OWN SECURITY ENDS.

PARSONS

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AFGHANISTAN

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TO IMMEDIATE FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE,

TELEGRAM NUMBER 020 OF 11 JANUARY 1980,

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, BONN, PARIS, MOSCOW,

INFO PRIORITY ALL OTHER NATO POSTS, NEW DELHI, ISLAMABAD, UKMIS
NEW YORK, UKREP BRUSSELS.

MY TELNO 026: AFGHANISTAN AND EAST-WEST RELATIONS.

1. THIS WAS A REASONABLY SATISFACTORY DISCUSSION, BUT THE GERMAN CONTRIBUTION WAS SOMEWHAT MUTED. PAULS OBVIOUSLY DID HIS BEST WITH HIS INSTRUCTIONS BUT WAS MUCH LESS ROBUST THAN AT THE MEETING ON 1 JANUARY. THIS FOLLOWS THE GENERAL APPROACH THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT HAVE RECENTLY BEEN ADOPTING AND IS CONSISTENT WITH THE OUTCOME OF THE SCHMIDT/GISCARD TALKS (PARIS TELEGRAM NO 49). ARNAUD AVOIDED BEING OBSTRUCTIVE BUT LEFT HIS FLANK VERY EXPOSED BY CLAIMING THAT THE SOVIET INVASION WAS, AND SHOULD BE TREATED SOLELY AS, AN

STATEMENT MADE BY FRENCH REPRESENTATIVE

BEING OBSTRUCTIVE BUT LEFT HIS FLANK VERY EXPOSED BY CLAIMING THAT THE SOVIET INVASION WAS, AND SHOULD BE TREATED SOLELY AS, AN EAST/SOUTH PROBLEM. THE STATEMENT MADE BY FRENCH REPRESENTATIVE IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL DEBATE (UKMIS NEW YORK TELEGRAM NO 48 PARAGRAPH 3 - THE FULL VERSION CONVEYS AN EVEN TOUGHER ATTITUDE) AND THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT'S DECLARATION OF 9 JANUARY BELIE THIS. I AGREED WITH MY AMERICAN COLLEAGUE THAT WE SHOULD LEAVE ANY RIPOSTE UNTIL 15 JANUARY. OLCAY'S CONTRIBUTION WAS INTERESTING AND THOUGHTFUL ON A SUBJECT ON WHICH (UNLIKE SO MANY OTHERS WHERE HE IS INCLINED TO SPEAK OFF THE TOP OF HIS HEAD) HE REALLY HAD SOMETHING TO SAY. I EXPRESSED APPRECIATION AND SAID WE WOULD WISH TO RETURN TO SOME OF HIS IDEAS NEXT WEEK. OTHER CONTRIBUTIONS WERE UNREMARKABLE, BUT THE ITALIAN, BELGIAN, DUTCH, NORWEGIAN, CANADIAN AND ICELANDIC REPRESENTATIVES ALL GAVE INFORMATION ABOUT MEASURES THEIR GOVERNMENTS WERE CONSIDERING WHICH ARE GENERALLY IN LINE WITH OURS. ONE POSITIVE OUTCOME WAS AGREEMENT (WHICH THE FRENCH DID NOT DISPUTE) THAT THE SPC AND POLITICAL COMMITTEE SHOULD REMAIN SEIZED OF THEIR RESPECTIVE REMITS ON A CONTINUING BASIS BEYOND THE COUNCIL MEETING ON 15 JANUARY AND WOULD REPORT TO THE COUNCIL AS APPROPRIATE.

2. THERE IS A REASONABLY GOOD PROSPECT THAT, BY THE TIME OF THE MEETING ON 15 JANUARY, ALL ALLIED GOVERNMENTS EXCEPT THE FRENCH WILL HAVE TAKEN SUFFICIENTLY FIRM DECISIONS ON A RANGE OF MEASURES INCLUDING, I HOPE, ALL OF THOSE ON OUR IMMEDIATE LIST, TO ENABLE VIRTUALLY SIMULTANEOUS ANNOUNCEMENTS TO BE MADE IN CAPITALS SOON AFTER THAT MEETING. MOST OF THESE DECISIONS WILL HAVE BEEN COMMUNICATED IN THE SPC (WHICH MEETS AGAIN ON THE MORNING OF 14 JANUARY) AND SHOULD NOT THEREFORE HAVE TO OCCUPY MUCH TIME AT THE COUNCIL MEETING ITSELF. THE MAIN AREAS IN WHICH DIFFERENCES OF VIEW PERSIST WITHIN THE ALLIANCE ARE:

- (A) WHETHER THERE IS A NEED FOR URGENT ACTION BY THE WESTERN POWERS (ON WHICH THE FRENCH ARE ISOLATED).
- (B) WHETHER SUCH MEASURES SHOULD INCLUDE STEPS WHICH COULD DAMAGE DETENTE IN EUROPE AND THE CSCE PROCESS (ON WHICH THE GERMANS, FOR OBVIOUS REASONS, ARE PARTICULARLY SUSCEPTIBLE TO FRENCH ARGUMENTS AND A NUMBER OF OTHER ALLIES ARE NERVOUS ABOUT MOVES WHICH COULD DAMAGE CSCE).
- (C) THE DEGREE TO WHICH THESE MEASURES ARE TO BE PRESENTED AS BEING TAKEN BY NATO AS A WHOLE (IT IS AGREED THAT THERE IS NO QUESTION OF COLLECTIVE NATO DECISIONS, BUT SEVERAL ALLIES, EG THE CANADIANS, ARE SUSCEPTIBLE TO FRENCH ARGUMENTS ABOUT THE EFFECT ON THE THIRD WORLD OF MEASURES TAKEN BY THE ALLIES IN CONCERT IN AN EAST-WEST CONTEXT).

3. NO FURTHER INFORMATION IS AVAILABLE ABOUT ATTENDANCE ON 15

3. NO FURTHER INFORMATION IS AVAILABLE ABOUT ATTENDANCE ON 15 JANUARY BEYOND THAT IN PARAGRAPH 1 OF MY TELEGRAM NO 16. AT THIS MEETING (WHICH IS BEING CALLED AT OUR SUGGESTION) I HAVE ARRANGED FOR LUNS TO CALL ON MR HURD TO SPEAK FIRST (OR POSSIBLY SECOND, AFTER WARREN CHRISTOPHER). SINCE THIS IS LIKELY TO BE FOLLOWED BY A TOUR DE TABLE I RECOMMEND THAT MR HURD'S OPENING STATEMENT SHOULD BE SUBSTANTIVE AND COMPREHENSIVE, COVERING:-

- I. ASSESSMENT OF SOVIET MOTIVES AND INTENTIONS.
- II. IMPLICATIONS FOR REGIONAL COUNTRIES AND ACTION TO SUPPORT THEM.
- III. IMPLICATIONS FOR NATO, IN PARTICULAR (F.F. ARNAUD) WHY THIS IS AN EAST-WEST PROBLEM WHICH MUST BE SEEN IN THE ALLIANCE CONTEXT.
- IV. IMMEDIATE MEASURES WE ARE PROPOSING TO TAKE.
- V. LONGER TERM ASPECTS INCLUDING FURTHER MEASURES (ECONOMIC ETC) AND EFFECT ON OUR ATTITUDE TOWARDS NEGOTIATIONS SUCH AS CSCE AND EVENTS SUCH AS OLYMPIC GAMES.
- VI. IMPORTANCE OF ALLIANCE SOLIDARITY, DIFFERENTIATING BETWEEN II AND IV ABOVE, BUT ENSURING THAT WE DO NOT ACT INCONSISTENTLY WITH ONE ANOTHER AND ARE NOT SEEN TO BE IN DISARRAY.

4. INCIDENTALLY, I DO NOT SHARE SIR R HIBBERT'S VIEW (HIS TELNO 50) THAT BRITAIN IS IN DANGER OF BEING ISOLATED IN THE COMMUNITY ON THIS QUESTION, OR THAT IT WOULD BE BETTER TO MAKE OUR EFFORT TO RALLY OUR PARTNERS IN POLITICAL COOPERATION OF THE NINE RATHER THAN IN NATO. MOST OF MY COLLEAGUES HAVE EXPRESSED THE VIEWS OF THEIR GOVERNMENTS THAT NATO IS THE RIGHT PLACE IN WHICH TO CONSULT ON WHAT IS PRIMARILY A QUESTION OF THE FUTURE CONDUCT OF EAST WEST RELATIONS IN RESPONSE TO A SITUATION IN WHICH OUR SECURITY INTERESTS ARE AT RISK, WITH THE POSSIBLE EXCEPTION OF THE FRENCH, THE LEAD WE HAVE TAKEN IN THIS PROCESS HAS BEEN GENERALLY WELCOMED BY OUR ALLIES. IT IS IN THE ALLIANCE CONTEXT THAT THE ARGUMENTS IN FAVOUR OF A FIRM RESPONSE TO SOVIET ACTION, AND OF SOLIDARITY WITH THE UNITED STATES, ARE MOST LIKELY TO PREVAIL ON THE GERMANS AND, TO THE EXTENT THAT THEY NEED FURTHER STIFFENING, THE ITALIANS. IN ANY CASE, I AM ENCOURAGED TO SEE FROM, EG, BONN TELNO 31 AND PARIS TELNO 40, THAT BOTH THE FRENCH AND GERMAN GOVERNMENTS MAY BE UNDER A DEGREE OF INTERNAL PRESSURE TO AVOID THE DANGERS OF APPEASEMENT.

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- MR FERGUSSON
- MR MURRAY
- MR BULLIARD
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TO IMMEDIATE FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE,
TELEGRAM NUMBER 026 OF 11 JANUARY 1983,

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, MOSCOW, BONN, PARIS,
INFO PRIORITY OTHER NATO POSTS, UKMIS NEW YORK, UKREP BRUSSELS,
NEW DELHI, ISLAMABAD.

YOUR TELNO 18: AFGHANISTAN AND EAST/WEST RELATIONS.

1. THE COUNCIL MET THIS MORNING TO TAKE STOCK OF THE WORK DONE OVER THE LAST WEEK BY THE SENIOR POLITICAL COMMITTEE (SPC) AND POLITICAL COMMITTEE, AND TO PREPARE THE GROUND FOR THE 15 JANUARY REINFORCED COUNCIL MEETING (WHICH WILL MEET AT 1400Z). THERE WAS GENERAL AGREEMENT THAT THE PROCESS OF CONSULTATION SHOULD CONTINUE AFTER 15 JANUARY, WITH THE EMPHASIS SHIFTING TO LONGER-TERM IMPLICATIONS OF SOVIET ACTIONS. MANY REPRESENTATIVES ENDORSED THE U S VIEW THAT CLOSE CONSULTATIONS ON MEASURES REMAINED VITAL IN THE FACE OF SOVIET EFFORTS TO EXPLOIT DIFFERENCES OF APPROACH AMONG ALLIANCE MEMBERS; AND THERE WAS SOME DISCUSSION OF THE POSSIBLE IMPACT OF SUCH CLOSE ALLIED CONSULTATION IN THE THIRD WORLD. SEVERAL

SUCH CLOSE ALLIED CONSULTATION IN THE THIRD WORLD, SEVERAL DELEGATIONS EXPECTED TO BE IN A POSITION TO ANNOUNCE DECISIONS ON MEASURES AT THE 15 JANUARY COUNCIL.

2. THE SECRETARY GENERAL OPENED THE MEETING WITH A PROGRESS REPORT ON THE WORK OF THE SPC AND POLITICAL COMMITTEE, WHICH HE COMMENDED. HE ADDED THAT HE WOULD BE PROPOSING A MECHANISM BASED ON ONE OF THESE COMMITTEES TO POOL INFORMATION AND VIEWS ON A CONTINUING BASIS. LOOKING AHEAD TO THE 15 JANUARY MEETING HE COMMENTED THAT IT WAS NOT POSSIBLE FOR NATO TO TAKE A COLLECTIVE DECISION ON MEASURES AGAINST THE SOVIET UNION, BUT HE HOPED THAT THE NATIONAL DECISIONS OF ALLIED GOVERNMENTS WOULD BE PROMPT AND CONSISTENT, TESTIFYING TO THE EFFECTIVENESS OF CONSULTATION AND UNDERLINING THE COHESION OF THE ALLIANCE.

3. I SPOKE NEXT (COPIES OF SPEAKING NOTE BY BAG TO FCO ONLY).

I SAID THAT THE UK UNDERSTOOD THE DIFFICULTIES FACED BY SOME ALLIED GOVERNMENTS IN DECIDING ON MEASURES. IN VIEW OF THE IMPORTANCE WE ATTACHED TO ALLIED CONSULTATION, WE HAD DECIDED TO DEFER ANNOUNCING ANY MEASURES UNTIL AFTER THE MEETING ON 15 JANUARY, AT WHICH TIME WE HOPED THAT OTHERS WOULD BE ABLE TO SAY WHAT THEY WERE INTENDING TO DO. THE SOVIET AGGRESSION HAD STRUCK A BLOW AT DETENTE. WHILE WE SHOULD ALL WORK TO MINIMISE THE DAMAGE, THE UK CONSIDERED THAT THE WEST SHOULD TAKE MEASURES WHICH WOULD SHOW THE RUSSIANS THAT SUCH ACTION ENTAILED REAL PENALTIES AND TO STRENGTHEN THE COUNTRIES WHICH FELT THREATENED.

4. ON MEASURES, I SAID THAT THE UK ACCEPTED THAT ALL RESPONSES WOULD NOT BE IDENTICAL. I THEN REHEARSED THE IMMEDIATE MEASURES WE HAD IDENTIFIED AS ALREADY GIVEN TO THE SPC (PARA 2 OF MY TELNO 18) AND DREW ON PARAS 5 AND 6 OF YOUR TELEGRAM UNDER REFERENCE). I DESCRIBED OPERATION FOOT AND ASKED WHAT OTHER ALLIES WERE DOING ABOUT LEVELS OF SOVIET REPRESENTATION. I ADDED THAT THE SPC SHOULD TURN ITS ATTENTION AFTER 15 JANUARY TO FURTHER IMPLICATIONS FOR OUR RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION, AND THAT THE COUNCIL SHOULD ALSO REVIEW THIS REGULARLY.

5. I THEN REFERRED TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE'S TOUR, AND ADDED THAT IT WAS SOMETIMES SUGGESTED THAT THE COUNTRIES OF THE THIRD WORLD MIGHT REACT UNFAVOURABLY TO ANYTHING WHICH GAVE THE IMPRESSION OF A CONCERTED ALLIANCE REACTION. I QUOTED JEDDAH TELNO 36 TO SHOW THAT THIS WAS NOT NECESSARILY TRUE. I ACCEPTED THAT IT WOULD BE COUNTER-PRODUCTIVE TO DISPLAY A NATO LABEL ON OUR ACTIVITIES IN THE THIRD WORLD. HOWEVER, IN THE EAST/WEST CONTEXT IT WAS IMPORTANT THAT THE RUSSIANS AND OTHERS CLEARLY PERCEIVED THE SOLIDARITY OF THE ALLIANCE. THIS DID NOT MEAN COLLECTIVE ACTIONS, BUT ACTIONS CONCERTED SO AS

THIS DID NOT MEAN COLLECTIVE ACTIONS, BUT ACTIONS CONCERTED SO AS TO MINIMISE THE OPPORTUNITIES FOR SOVIET WEDGE-DRIVING.

7. IN CONCLUSION I DREW THE ATTENTION OF MY COLLEAGUES TO THE JIC ASSESSMENT OF 10 JANUARY, WHICH HAS BEEN CIRCULATED TODAY, AND PARTICULARLY TO THE LAST TWO SENTENCES.

8. BARKMAN (NETHERLANDS) AGREED THAT IT WAS IMPORTANT TO BEAR IN MIND THE SENSITIVITIES OF THE THIRD WORLD; THE ALLIANCE SHOULD MONITOR THEIR REACTIONS CLOSELY. THEY WERE IN GENERAL REALISTIC ABOUT POWER RELATIONSHIPS, AND WOULD UNDERSTAND THE IMPORTANCE OF COORDINATED ACTION WITHOUT THE NEED FOR A NATO LABEL.

9. PAULS (FRG) EMPHASISED THE IMPORTANCE OF CONTACTS WITH THE NEW GOVERNMENT IN INDIA AND WITH YUGOSLAVIA. ALLIES SHOULD TAKE ALL OPPORTUNITIES TO PUT ACROSS WESTERN VIEWS AND SEEK REACTIONS. ON THE COORDINATION OF ALLIED RESPONSES, HE AGREED THAT IT WAS IMPORTANT TO CONCERT ACTION TOWARDS THE THIRD WORLD WITHIN THE ALLIANCE, BUT EQUALLY THAT ALLIES SHOULD APPEAR IN THE THIRD WORLD TO BE ACTING PURELY AS NATIONAL GOVERNMENTS.

10. HARDY (CANADA) CONSIDERED THAT THE 15 JANUARY COUNCIL SHOULD NOT ONLY DISCUSS MEASURES, BUT ALSO EXCHANGE VIEWS ON SOVIET MOTIVES, AND THE SITUATION IN AFGHANISTAN. HE NOTED THAT THE DISTINCTION HAD BEEN DRAWN IN THE PRESS BETWEEN THE EAST/SOUTH ASPECT OF THE CRISIS, AND THE EAST/WEST DIMENSION. IT WOULD BE INTERESTING TO EXCHANGE VIEWS ON THIS ALSO. ARNAUD (FRANCE) AGREED, ADDING THAT IN THE FRENCH VIEW, AFGHANISTAN WAS ESSENTIALLY AN EAST/SOUTH CRISIS. HE ALSO OBSERVED THAT IF THE MAIN OUTCOME OF THE 15 JANUARY COUNCIL WAS THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF A SERIES OF MEASURES, THIS WOULD A) HIGHLIGHT THE DIVERSITY OF ALLIED REACTIONS AND B) INEVITABLY GIVE SUCH MEASURES THE NATO LABEL IN THE THIRD WORLD THAT ALL WISHED TO AVOID.

1. IN THE COURSE OF THE DISCUSSION, SEVERAL REPRESENTATIVES GAVE FURTHER DETAILS OF MEASURES UNDER CONSIDERATION BY THEIR AUTHORITIES. GLITMAN (US) SAID THAT CHRISTOPHER WOULD GIVE THE COUNCIL MORE INFORMATION ON THE OPERATION OF SOME U S MEASURES ALREADY INTRODUCED. HE ALSO RECOUNTED A CONVERSATION BETWEEN CHRISTOPHER AND THE SOVIET CHARGE IN WASHINGTON (REPORT FOLLOWS BY BAG). FERRARI (ITALY) SAID THAT THE VISIT OF THE SOVIET MINISTER FOR FOREIGN TRADE TO ROME, AND THE ITALIAN MINISTER FOR STATE HOLDINGS TO MOSCOW HAD BEEN CANCELLED, AS HAD THE VISIT OF A SOVIET HYDROGRAPHIC VESSEL TO ITALY. VAN USSEL (BELGIUM) SAID THAT BECAUSE OF THEIR PREOCCUPATION WITH INTERNAL AFFAIRS, HIS AUTHORITIES HAD NOT BEEN ABLE TO FOCUS ON MEASURES. THEY WOULD DO SO ON 14 JANUARY, AFTER WHICH SIMONET

ON MEASURES. THEY WOULD DO SO ON 14 JANUARY, AFTER WHICH SINGHET
WOULD MAKE A SUBSTANTIVE STATEMENT. THEY WOULD HOWEVER HOLD THE
ANNOUNCEMENT OF MEASURES UNTIL AFTER THE 15 JANUARY MEETING.

12. PAULS SAID THAT THE GERMAN AMBASSADOR TO MOSCOW WOULD RETURN
NEXT WEEK WITH A MESSAGE FOR BREZHNEV. THE BUNDESTAG WOULD HOLD A
DEBATE ON 17 JANUARY AT WHICH THE CHANCELLOR WOULD MAKE A POLICY
STATEMENT. IN ADDITION THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC HAD DECIDED TO ACCELERATE
130 MILLION D. MARKS OF AID TO PAKISTAN; AND TO RESCHEDULE PAKISTAN'S
DEBTS. SVART (DENMARK) SAID THAT ALL HIGH LEVEL CONTACTS WITH THE
SOVIET UNION HAD BEEN SUSPENDED. VIBE (NORWAY) SAID THAT HIS
AUTHORITIES HAD REACHED TENTATIVE CONCLUSIONS ON MEASURES, ALONG
THE LINES OF THE UK POINTS WHICH THEY WOULD DISCUSS WITH PARLIAMENT
BEFORE ANNOUNCING. MILITARY VISITS WOULD BE CANCELLED, AND POLITICAL
VISITS HANDLED ON A CASE BY CASE BASIS.

13. N.I.F.T. (NOT TO ALL) CONTAINS AN ACCOUNT GIVEN BY OLCAY
(TURKEY) OF A CONVERSATION WITH THE PAKISTAN AMBASSADOR HERE.
MY 2ND I.F.T. CONTAINS MY COMMENTS AND SUGGESTIONS FOR HANDLING
THE MEETING ON 15 JANUARY.

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FROM MUSCAT 111500Z JANUARY 1980

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 27 OF 11 JANUARY 1980

INFO PRIORITY ANKARA JEDDA ISLAMABAD NEW DELHI SANAA TEHERAN
KABUL ADDIS ABABA MOGADISHU MOSCOW WASHINGTON PARIS BONN UKDEL
NATO UKMIS NEW YORK DOHA ABU DHABI KUWAIT BAHRAIN BAGHDAD
DAMAS

JS CAIRO NAIROBI ADEN.

AFGHANISTAN.

1. I DISCUSSED THE SITUATION IN AFGHANISTAN TODAY WITH THE OMANI MINISTER OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS. I TOLD HIM OF THE MEASURES WHICH WE AND, WE HOPED, OUR NATO ALLIES WOULD BE PREPARED TO TAKE AGAINST THE SOVIET UNION. I EMPHASISED THAT IT WAS IN MY VIEW IMPORTANT THAT OUR RESPONSE SHOULD BE EFFECTIVE AND LONG-LASTING. THE RUSSIANS MUST BE MADE TO REALISE THAT THEY HAD MISCALCULATED THE STRENGTH OF WESTERN RESOLVE. I ADDED THAT MY IMPRESSION FROM MY DISCUSSIONS IN ANKARA WAS THAT THE MAIN TURKISH PREOCCUPATIONS WERE FIRST OVER THE POSSIBLE DISINTEGRATION OF IRAN, THE PRESERVATION OF WHOSE TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY THEY THOUGHT ESSENTIAL SEMI COLON AND SECONDLY THEIR CONCERN OVER THE UNPOPULARITY OF PRESIDENT ZIMWSS GOVERNMENT IN PAKISTAN. IN BOTH CASES THE TURKS WERE AFRAID OF INTERNAL SUBVERSION RATHER THAN DIRECT MILITARY INVASION. BUT THE SOVIET MILITARY PRESENCE IN AFGHANISTAN MADE SUCH SUBVERSION EASIER.

2. I ALSO EMPHASISED THAT, ALTHOUGH THERE WAS A NEED FOR A STRONG WESTERN RESPONSE TO THE SOVIET INTERVENTION IN AFGHANISTAN, MY PRIME CONCERN, AND THE REASON FOR MY CURRENT VISIT, WAS TO STRENGTHEN AND SUPPORT THE COUNTRIES IN THE REGION. I WAS THUS ENCOURAGED THAT, ALTHOUGH THE UNITED KINGDOM HAD HAD INITIALLY TO TAKE THE LEAD IN GENERATING ACTION IN THE UNITED NATIONS OVER AFGHANISTAN, THE RUNNING HAD NOW CLEARLY BEEN TAKEN UP BY THE NON-ALIGNED COUNTRIES THEMSELVES. I ALSO WELCOMED THE CONVENING OF THE CONFERENCE OF ISLAMIC COUNTRIES IN ISLAMABAD ON 26 JANUARY, WHICH COULD HAVE AN IMPORTANT INFLUENCE ON THE SOVIET UNION.

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3. ZAWAWI AGREED ON THE NEED TO MAINTAIN FIRM AND CONTINUING PRESSURE ON THE SOVIET UNION. HE ACCEPTED THAT SUSPENSION OF GRAIN SUPPLIES AND RESTRICTIONS ON THE EXPORT OF TECHNOLOGY WERE THE MOST EFFECTIVE LEVERS OPEN TO THE WEST. IN ADDITION, HOWEVER, HE THOUGHT IT IMPORTANT TO SUPPORT COUNTER-REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENTS INSIDE COUNTRIES LIKE AFGHANISTAN AND THE PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE YEMEN. OMAN WOULD BE PREPARED, IN CONJUNCTION WITH COUNTRIES LIKE SAUDI ARABIA AND PAKISTAN, TO ENCOURAGE SUCH MOVEMENTS, BUT NEEDED WESTERN SUPPORT OVER THE PROVISION OF INTELLIGENCE, TRAINING AND HARDWARE. HE HOPED THAT THE WESTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES, PARTICULARLY BRITAIN, AND THE UNITED STATES COULD PROVIDE THIS. AN INTENSIFICATION OF PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS AND PROPAGANDA WOULD BE USEFUL AS WELL.

4. AS REGARDS PAKISTAN, ZAWAWI THOUGHT IT IMPORTANT THAT PRESIDENT ZIA SHOULD MAINTAIN AN ACTIVE DEVELOPMENT POLICY IN BALUCHISTAN. INCREASED INVESTMENT IN SCHOOLS, ROADS AND HOSPITALS WAS NEEDED. THE AREA WAS ALREADY A PRIME TARGET FOR SOVIET SUBVERSION AND THE BALUCHI LIBERATION FRONT RECEIVED TRAINING IN THE USSR. THE SOVIET AIM IN THE LONG RUN WAS TO ESTABLISH AN INDEPENDENT BALUCHISTAN, EITHER ENCOMPASSING ALL THE AREA PEOPLED BY THE BALUCHIS IN BOTH IRAN AND PAKISTAN, OR ONE LIMITED TO PAKISTANI BALUCHISTAN ALONE. SUCH A STATE WOULD, FOLLOWING THE SOVIET INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN, BE SUSCEPTIBLE TO SOVIET INFLUENCE AND WOULD OFFER THE RUSSIANS THE PROSPECT OF A MILITARY PRESENCE IN THE GULF OR OMAN WHICH WOULD COMMAND THE EASTERN BOUND TANKER ROUTES FROM THE PERSIAN GULF IN THE WAY THEIR PRESENCE IN ETHIOPIA AND ADEN COMMANDED THOSE TO THE WEST. IF, HOWEVER, THE PAKISTANI GOVERNMENT SHOWED SUFFICIENT CONCERN, AND RECEIVED ADEQUATE SUPPORT FROM THE WEST, THE SEPARATIST TENDENCIES IN BALUCHISTAN COULD BE CONTAINED.

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5. ZAWAWI ALSO ADVOCATED SUPPORT FOR A COUNTER-REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENT IN THE PDRY. THERE WAS ALREADY A CONSIDERABLE DEGREE OF DISSATISFACTION WITHIN THE COUNTRY AND THERE WERE YEMENIS IN THE YAR, SAUDI ARABIA AND IN OMAN ITSELF, WHO COULD BE ORGANISED FOR AN OPPOSITION MOVEMENT. EVEN IF IT DID NOT PROVE POSSIBLE ACTUALLY TO REPLACE THE PRESENT REGIME, THE EXISTENCE OF A COUNTER-REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENT WOULD INFLUENCE ITS POLICIES. THE PRESENT SOVIET PREOCCUPATION WITH AFGHANISTAN WOULD MAKE IT DIFFICULT FOR THE RUSSIANS, DESPITE THE PRESENCE OF 400-500 SOVIET ADVISERS AND MANY CUBANS, TO INTERVENE IN THE PDRY IN THE SAME WAY.

6. ZAWAWI ADDED THAT THE OMANIS HAD RECENTLY HAD CONTACTS WITH THE PDRY UNDER BOTH SAUDI AND KUWAITI AUSPICES. HE HAD MET THE PDRY FOREIGN MINISTER BRIEFLY IN TUNIS IN NOVEMBER IN THE MARGINS OF THE ARAB LEAGUE FOREIGN MINISTERS MEETING AND HAD BEEN DUE TO HAVE A FURTHER MEETING WITH HIM ON 15 DECEMBER IN KUWAIT. THE PDRY GOVERNMENT HAD SEEMED INTERESTED IN ESTABLISHING DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH OMAN, BUT HAD RAISED TWO POINTS, NAMELY, A CLAIM FOR COMPENSATION FOR DAMAGE INFLICTED ON THE PDRY BY OMANI FORCES AND THE RETURN OF MEMBERS OF THE PFLO TO OMAN. ON THE FIRST POINT THE OMANIS HAD ARGUED THAT IF THERE WAS TO BE ANY TALK OF COMPENSATION THEY THEMSELVES WOULD HAVE CLAIMS AGAINST THE PDRY. ON THE SECOND, THEY HAD SAID THAT UNDER THE GENERAL AMNESTY WHICH THE SULTAN HAD DECLARED, ANY OMANI CITIZEN WHO HAD BEEN ACTIVE IN THE PFLO WAS FREE TO RETURN. THE PDRY HAD HOWEVER INSISTED ON THE NEED FOR NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE OMANI GOVERNMENT AND THE PFLO. THE OMANIS HAD REPLIED THAT THIS WAS OUT OF THE QUESTION.

7. IN GENERAL, THE OMANIS WISHED, ALONG WITH COUNTRIES LIKE SAUDI ARABIA AND PAKISTAN, TO BE "PREDICTABLE" IN THE EYES OF THE RUSSIANS, IE TO BE SEEN TO HAVE A CONCERTED PLAN OF ACTION. WESTERN SUPPORT WAS, HOWEVER, A NECESSARY INGREDIENT FOR THIS. ALTHOUGH THE OMANIS FELT QUITE CAPABLE OF DEFENDING THEMSELVES AGAINST ANY LOCAL AGRESSION, OR EVEN AGAINST AGGRESSION INVOLVING THE CUBANS, THEY WISHED TO BE ASSURED THAT, IN THE EVENT OF AN ATTACK BY THE SOVIET UNION, THEY COULD COUNT ON THE PROTECTION /OF THE

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OF THE UNITED STATES. THEY HAD MADE THIS CLEAR TO THE AMERICANS DURING THE RECENT VISIT OF BARTHOLEMW AND HIS TEAM TO DISCUSS THE POSSIBLE PROVISION BY OMAN OF SUPPORT AND LOGISTIC FACILITIES FOR THE US NAVAL FORCES. A FURTHER US SURVEY TEAM WOULD VISIT OMAN SHORTLY TO DISCUSS REQUIREMENTS IN MORE DETAIL. OMAN DID NOT WANT US MARINES OR COMBAT TROOPS ON ITS TERRITORY, BUT WAS PREPARED IN PRINCIPLE TO PROVIDE STORAGE AND SUPPORT FACILITIES.

8. I ASKED ZAWAWI WHAT WOULD BE THE EFFECT ON OMAN'S RELATIONS WITH THE OTHER ARAB STATES OF AN OVERT ASSOCIATION WITH THE AMERICANS ALONG THESE LINES. HE REPLIED THAT THE OMANIS WERE ANYWAY NOT AT THE PEAK OF POPULARITY WITH THEIR FELLOW ARABS, BUT THEY HAD LOOKED AT THE PROBLEM REALISTICALLY AND FELT THAT SOME ARRANGEMENTS ALONG THESE LINES WERE ESSENTIAL FOR THEIR SURVIVAL. THE SOVIET UNION AFTER ALL HAD FACILITIES IN ETHIOPIA AND ADEN. THE SAUDI REACTION SO FAR HAD BEEN CAUTIOUS, BUT THEY DID NOT SEEM OPPOSED TO THE IDEA. HE WOULD HIMSELF BE GOING TO SAUDI ARABIA THE FOLLOWING WEEK TO DISCUSS THE EXTENT TO WHICH THE SAUDIS WERE THEMSELVES PREPARED TO JOIN IN COMMON ACTION.

IRAN.

9. I ASKED WHETHER THE POSITION OF THE US HOSTAGES IN TEHRAN WOULD BE DISCUSSED AT THE FORTHCOMING ISLAMIC CONFERENCE. ZAWAWI SAID THAT THE IRANIANS WOULD THEMSELVES BE PRESENT, AND TO TRY TO RAISE THE ISSUE THERE WOULD DETRACT FROM THE MAIN FOCUS OF THE MEETING. I SAID THAT NONETHELESS THE POSSIBLE IMPLICATIONS OF FUTHER US ACTION COULD BE SERIOUS. THE AMERICANS SEEMED COMMITTED TO GOING TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL WITHIN THE NEXT DAY OR SO BUT IT SEEMED UNLIKELY, EVEN IF THE RUSSIANS REFRAINED FROM USING THEIR VETO, THAT THEY WOULD OBTAIN AN AFFIRMATIVE RESOLUTION. THE AMERICANS WOULD THEREFORE BE OBLIGED TO TAKE FURTHER STEPS, EVEN IF NOT IN THE MILITARY SPHERE. IT WAS SIMPLY NOT CREDIBLE, IN AN ELECTION YEAR, FOR A US PRESIDENT TO DO NOTHING. I WONDERED WHETHER THERE WERE ANY PROSPECTS FOR AN APPROACH TO THE IRANIANS, PRESUMABLY TO KHOMEINI HIMSELF, BY A GROUP OF NON-ALIGNED, INCLUDING PERHAPS SOME ISLAMIC, COUNTRIES. ZAWAWI SAID HE REALISED THE DANGERS OF THE AMERICANS TAKING SOME ACTION WHICH WOULD ALIENATE FURTHER ARAB INFLUENCE. THE TROUBLE WITH ANY NON-ALIGNED OR ISLAMIC APPROACH TO THE IRANIANS WAS THAT IT WOULD BE /NECESSARY

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NECESSARY TO HAVE SOME ASSURANCE IN ADVANCE OF THE PROSPECTS OF SUCCESS. HE WONDERED WHETHER, NOW THAT THE ISSUE OF THE RETURN OF THE SHAH HIMSELF TO IRAN SEEMED TO HAVE BEEN DROPPED, THERE MIGHT BE MILEAGE IN THE IDEA OF A COMMISSION OF INVESTIGATION TO STUDY THE SHAH AND HIS FAMILY'S ASSETS. I SAID THAT I THOUGHT THE AMERICANS MIGHT BE PREPARED TO CONSIDER THIS, PROVIDED THAT THEY WERE GIVEN ASSURANCES THAT THE HOSTAGES WOULD BE RELEASED SOON AFTER ITS ESTABLISHMENT.

STRAITS OF HORMUZ.

10. ZAWAWI ASKED MY VIEWS ON THE OMANI PROPOAL ON THE SECURITY OF THZ STRAITS OF HORMUZ. I SAID THAT, AS HE WOULD KNOW, WE WELCOMED IN PRINCIPLE THE OMANI INITIATIVE. BUT THE ISSUE WAS IN THE FIRST INSTANCE FOR THE GULF STATES THEMSELVES. HAD THERE BEEN ANY FORMAL REACTION SO FAR? ZAWAWI SAID THAT ONLY THE IRAQIS HAD SENT A FORMAL REPLY WHICH WAS ON THE WHOLE FAVOURABLE, SUBJECT TO THE PROVISO THAT THERE SHOULD BE NO INVOLVEMENT IN ANY SECURITY ARRANGEMENT FOR THE STRAITS OF COLONIAL OR IMPERIALIST COUNTRIES. THE SAUDIS HAD SAID INFORMALLY THAT THEY WERE ALSO FAVOURABLE IN PRINCIPLE BUT THERE HAD BEEN NO REACTION YET FROM THE UAE.

11. ZAWAWI ALSO RAISED THREE BILATERAL ISSUES. SEE MIFT
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From the Private Secretary

11 January 1980

The Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan

Thank you for your letter to me of 9 January enclosing a note of FCO views on the reasons for the Soviet Union's invasion of Afghanistan. I had planned to put the note in the Prime Minister's weekend box but it has now been overtaken by a JIC assessment on the same subject. The JIC assessment seems to reflect many of the thoughts in the FCO paper.

M. O'D. B. ALEXANDER

Roderic Lyne, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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FM PARIS 101731Z JAN 80

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 50 OF 10 JANUARY 1980

 INFO PRIORITY UKDEL NATO BONN UKREP BRUSSELS UKMIS NEW YORK
 AND WASHINGTON

 INFO ROUTINE BRUSSELS COPENHAGEN DUBLIN LUXEMBOURG ROME
 THE HAGUE AND MOSCOW

MIPT: BRITAIN, THE COMMUNITY AND THE AFGHANISTAN CRISIS

1. THE SCHMIDT/GISCARD MEETING, THE SITUATION IN NATO DESCRIBED IN SIR CLIVE ROSE'S TELNO 20 AND THE IMMINENCE OF THE LORD PRIVY SEAL'S VISITS TO COMMUNITY CAPITALS DESERVE PERHAPS FROM THE PARIS VIEW POINT TO BE BROUGHT TOGETHER IN A SINGLE TELEGRAM.

2. THE SCHMIDT/GISCARD ATTITUDE HAS BECOME PUBLIC SIMULTANEOUSLY WITH A FIRING UP OF THE US ATTITUDE (PRESIDENT CARTER'S DECISION TO HOLD UP INDUSTRIAL/TECHNOLOGICAL EXPORTS TO THE SOVIET UNION). THE IMPRESSION HERE IN PARIS IS THAT A DIVERGENCE FROM THE UNITED STATES IS BEING CULTIVATED, THAT FRANCE IS WORKING TOWARDS A EUROPEAN POSITION ON AFGHANISTAN DIFFERENT IN VARIOUS RESPECTS FROM THAT

PEAN POSITION ON AFGHANISTAN DIFFERENT IN VARIOUS RESPECTS FROM THAT OF THE US (SOLIDARITY WITH THE US BUT NO ALIGNMENT), AND THAT THE PROCESS OF EUROPEANISING THE SCHMIDT/GISCARD ATTITUDE IS GOING TO BE PURSUED AT THE MEETING OF THE MINISTERS OF THE NINE IN POLITICAL COOPERATION NEXT TUESDAY, 15 JANUARY.

3. A GAP IS GROWING BETWEEN BRITAIN ON THE ONE HAND AND FRANCE AND GERMANY ON THE OTHER IN BOTH SUBSTANCE AND FORM, IN SUBSTANCE BECAUSE BRITAIN IS SEEN TO BE SEEKING ALIGNMENT AS WELL AS SOLIDARITY, AND IN FORM BECAUSE THE UK EFFORT HAS BEEN CONCENTRATED IN NATO AND NOT IN POLITICAL COOPERATION OF THE NINE (NOR IN THE UNMENTIONABLE BUT NEVERTHELESS INDESPENSIBLE TRIPARTITE COOPERATION WHICH NEEDS TO UNDERLINE POLITICAL COOPERATION OF THE NINE).

4. I ARGUED IN THE AUTUMN OF LAST YEAR THAT ONE IMPORTANT WAY IN WHICH BRITAIN COULD INCREASE ITS VALUE TO FRANCE AND GERMANY WAS BY COMING CLOSER TO THEM IN EAST/WEST RELATIONS AND THAT THIS PRESUPPOSED A BRITISH CONCEPT OF DETENTE WHICH, WHILE NOT IDENTICAL WITH FRANCE'S AND GERMANY'S, WOULD AT LEAST, BY EXISTING, MAKE IT POSSIBLE TO SEEK COMMON GROUND WITH THEM.

5. THE DIVERGENCE CAUSED BY THE AFGHANISTAN CRISIS MAKES IT MUCH MORE DIFFICULT TO PURSUE THIS LINE, AND I NOTE FROM FCO DESPATCH TO MOSCOW OF 7 DECEMBER FOLLOWING THE EASTERN EUROPEAN HEADS OF MISSIONS MEETING THAT THE FCO NO LONGER HAS A CONCEPT OF DETENTE BUT ONLY A CONCEPT OF PRAGMATIC DEALINGS WITH THE SOVIET UNION. I SUGGEST NEVERTHELESS THAT CONSIDERATION SHOULD BE GIVEN TO TRYING TO FIND A WAY OF CLOSING THE DIVERGENCE IF, AS I ASSUME, THE LORD PRIVY SEAL'S TASK ENJOYS A VERY HIGH PRIORITY IN BRITISH POLICY AT THE PRESENT TIME. IT WOULD MUCH FACILITATE PRESIDENT GISCARD'S INTEREST IN KEEPING BRITAIN ISOLATED IN THE COMMUNITY IF THERE WERE TO BE A FRANCO/GERMAN LINE-UP ON AFGHANISTAN FROM WHICH BRITAIN WAS CLEARLY EXCLUDED. HE WILL ALSO BE WATCHING FOR OPPORTUNITIES TO ARGUE THAT BRITAIN IS INHERENTLY UN-EUROPEAN AND ALWAYS LINES UP FIRST WITH THE USA.

6. I VENTURE TO SUGGEST THAT, AS REGARDS FORM, IT WOULD BE HELPFUL IF A BRITISH EFFORT TO RALLY PARTNERS ON THE AFGHANISTAN QUESTION WERE TO BE PURSUED MORE IN POLITICAL COOPERATION OF THE NINE THAN IN NATO AND IF AN EFFORT COULD BE MADE TO PRECONCERT A POINT OF VIEW WITH FRANCE, GERMANY AND PERHAPS ITALY. AS REGARDS SUBSTANCE, IT SEEMS VERY DESIRABLE TO TRY TO FIND A CONCEPTUAL BASIS FROM WHICH TO PULL FRANCE AND GERMANY BACK FROM AN ATTITUDE WHICH BEGINS TO VERGE ON APPEASEMENT. IF IT IS THOUGHT THAT THE WORD DETENTE IS TOO DANGEROUS TO USE BECAUSE OF ITS NON-TECHNICAL OVERTONES, I SUGGEST THAT THE SORT OF CONCEPT ON WHICH A SATISFACTORY APPROACH COULD BE

... SUGGEST
THAT THE SORT OF CONCEPT ON WHICH A SATISFACTORY APPROACH COULD BE
BASED COULD BE DRAWN FOR EXAMPLE FROM PAGES 119, 120 AND 123 OF
HENRY KISSINGER'S WHITE HOUSE YEARS.

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FROM PARIS 101715Z JAN 80

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 49 OF 10 JANUARY 1980

INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON, UKDEL NATO, BONN, UKMIS NEW YORK
INFO ROUTINE KABUL, UKREP BRUSSELS AND OTHER EEC POSTSAFGHANISTAN : MEETING BETWEEN PRESIDENT GISCARD AND CHANCELLOR
SCHMIDT

1. CHANCELLOR SCHMIDT HAD A TWO AND A HALF-HOUR TALK WITH PRESIDENT GISCARD D'ESTAING HERE YESTERDAY AFTERNOON ON HIS WAY BACK FROM HIS OFFICIAL VISIT TO SPAIN. HIS STOP OVER IN PARIS SEEMS TO HAVE BEEN ARRANGED AT THE LAST MOMENT. ALTHOUGH OTHER SUBJECTS WERE BRIEFLY DISCUSSED, THE AFGHAN CRISIS AND ITS IMPLICATIONS ARE REPORTED TO HAVE BEEN THE MAIN TOPICS. BUT I GATHER THAT ALL EXCEPT THE LAST FEW MINUTES WERE TETE-A-TETE AND NO RECORD HAS BEEN CIRCULATED.

2. THERE WAS NO FORMAL COMMUNIQUE, BUT THE ELYSEE SPOKESMAN ANNOUNCED AFTERWARDS THAT THE PRESIDENT HAD FOUND HIS CONVERSATION WITH CHANCELLOR SCHMIDT VERY USEFUL AT A MOMENT WHEN EVENTS MADE THE SEARCH FOR AN IDENTICAL APPROACH NECESSARY FOR THE COUNTRIES OF EUROPE. THE IMPRESSION WAS GIVEN THAT THE TWO LEADERS WERE LAYING THE BASIS FOR A EUROPEAN POSITION AT THE FORTHCOMING MEETINGS OF THE NINE.

3. "SOLIDARITY, BUT NOT ALIGNMENT" WITH THE US WAS THE HARD LINE IN TODAY'S "LE FIGARO". IT HAS BEEN STRESSED THAT NEITHER FRANCE NOR GERMANY HAS ANY INTEREST IN RENOUNCING THE POLICY OF DIALOGUE WITH THE SOVIET UNION, ALTHOUGH BOTH SEE THE SOVIET INTERVENTION AS A BLOW TO DETENTE. BOTH PARIS AND BONN ARE SAID TO REMAIN OPPOSED TO ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AGAINST THE SOVIET UNION THOUGH NEITHER IS IN FAVOUR OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY MAKING UP ANY SHORTFALL IN AMERICAN GRAIN DELIVERIES TO RUSSIA.

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4. PRESIDENT CARTER'S LATEST DECISION TO BAN A FURTHER RANGE OF EXPORTS, INCLUDING SOPHISTICATED EQUIPMENT, TO THE USSR HAS PARTIALLY ECLIPSED THE GISCARD/SCHMIDT MEETING IN THE HEADLINES. THIS HAS HAD THE EFFECT OF POINTING UP THE APPEARANCE OF GROWING DIVERGENCE BETWEEN FRANCE AND THE FRG ON THE ONE HAND AND THE UNITED STATES ON THE OTHER. "LE FIGARO" AND "LE MATIN" CARRY ARTICLES ATTRIBUTING TOUGH AND HARD-LINE POLICIES TO THE AMERICANS. THIS AFTERNOON'S "LE MONDE" IN AN ARTICLE ENTITLED "DIVIDED EUROPE" REGRETS THAT THERE WILL BE NO JOINT EUROPEAN ATTITUDE OR POLICY IN REGARD TO EITHER THE AFGHAN CRISIS OR DETENTE AND OBSERVES THAT ONLY BRITAIN, AMONG MEMBER STATES OF THE COMMUNITY, HAS YIELDED TO WASHINGTON'S APPEALS TO JOIN IN REPRISALS AGAINST THE USSR.

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TO ROUTINE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 050 OF 10 JANUARY

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UDKEL NATO, PARIS, BONN, ROME, UKREP BRUSSELS, THE HAGUE,
BRUSSELS, ATHENS, COPENHAGEN AND DUBLIN.

BONN TELNO 22 TO YOU (NOT TO ALL): AFGHANISTAN

1. THE ITALIAN AMBASSADOR CHAIRED AN EEC HEADS OF MISSION MEETING TODAY. UNANIMITY WAS SWIFTLY ACHIEVED ON AN ORAL ANALYSIS OF THE INDIAN ATTITUDE TOWARDS THE AFGHAN CRISIS. THE ITALIAN AND BELGIAN AMBASSADORS DID MOST OF THE TALKING. THE MAIN POINTS OF THE CONSENSUS WERE:

(A) THE INDIANS VERY MUCH DISLIKE THE SOVIET OCCUPATION OF AFGHANISTAN WHICH THEY CONSIDER DETRIMENTAL TO THEIR INTERESTS.

(B) HOWEVER, THE AMERICAN PROPOSAL TO PROVIDE ARMS ON A LARGE SCALE TO PAKISTAN AND STILL MORE THE SUGGESTION THAT CHINA SHOULD BE INVOLVED IN THIS ENTERPRISE IS ANATHEMA TO

(B) HOWEVER, THE AMERICAN PROPOSAL TO PROVIDE ARMS ON A LARGE SCALE TO PAKISTAN AND STILL MORE THE SUGGESTION THAT CHINA SHOULD BE INVOLVED IN THIS ENTERPRISE IS ANATHEMA TO INDIANS AND OVERLAYS THEIR OPPOSITION TO THE SOVIET MOVE. THEY REGARD THIS AS A REAL LONG TERM DANGER TO INDIA, NOT MERELY BECAUSE OF THE RISKS THAT PAKISTAN WILL USE THE ARMS AGAINST INDIA AS IN THE PAST, BUT ALSO BECAUSE OF THE POSSIBILITY THAT IT WILL BRING SUPER-POWER CONFRONTATION INTO THE POLITICS OF THE SUB-CONTINENT.

(C) IT IS AXIOMATIC WITH THE INDIANS THAT THE RUSSIANS HAVE NEVER LET THEM DOWN, WHEREAS THEY THINK OTHERS HAVE DONE SO. ACCORDINGLY IF THEY HAVE TO CHOOSE BETWEEN THE SUPER-POWERS THEIR TENDENCY WILL BE TO FAVOUR THE SOVIET UNION. GIVEN THIS THEY HAVE TAKEN THE AMERICAN ACTIONS VIS A VIS PAKISTAN AND CHINA AS A REASON (OR EXCUSE) TO REFRAIN FROM PRESSING THE SOVIET UNION.

(D) BEFORE THE INDIANS WERE FULLY AWARE OF THE EXTENT OF WHAT THE AMERICANS PROPOSED TO DO WITH PAKISTAN AND CHINA, THEY HAD CRITICISED THE RUSSIANS (AND WE HAVE REASON TO SUPPOSE, MY TELNO 39 (NOT TO ALL), THAT THEY HAVE CONTINUED TO DO SO THROUGH DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS).

(E) THE INDIAN PRESS, PARTICULARLY THE EDITORIALISTS, HAVE TAKEN A REMARKABLY ROBUST ANTI-RUSSIAN LINE, BUT WE CANNOT COUNT ON THIS CONTINUING OR ON THE POLITICIANS TAKING THEIR CUE FROM IT.

2. I DID NOT QUOTE PARAGRAPH 5 OF THE BONN TUR TO THE MEETING, BUT I BELIEVE THAT NONE OF MY COLLEAGUES INCLUDING THE GERMAN CHARGE D'AFFAIRES, WOULD CONCUR WITH IT. IT IS NOT RIGHT TO SAY SIMPLY THAT MRS GANDHI HAS ALREADY CONDEMNED US POLICY TOWARDS PAKISTAN. HER ATTITUDE IS BETTER CONVEYED IN A RECENT NEWSPAPER HEADLINE WHICH READS "MRS GANDHI CONDEMNS USSR, BLAMES WEST". THE GENERAL FEELING OF THE MEETING WAS THAT IT WOULD INDEED BE DIFFICULT TO KEEP INDIA TO THE LINES OF THE EXCELLENT POSITION TAKEN BY CHARAN SINGH AS PRIME MINISTER WITH THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR (MY TELNO 1) BUT THAT THERE WAS A SPORTING CHANCE OF DOING SO IF DUE REGARD WAS PAID TO HER SUSCEPTIBILITIES. THE TONE OF THE MEETING WAS IN FAVOUR OF VAN WELL'S EARLIER (BONN TELNO 3) STRESS ON THE NEED TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF NON-ALIGNED SUSCEPTIBILITIES AND TO AVOID AS FAR AS POSSIBLE BEING LABELLED AS THE AUTHORS OF A NEW COLD WAR.

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TO IMMEDIATE

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TELEGRAM NUMBER 77 OF 10 JANUARY

INFO PRIORITY PARIS BONN ROME WASHINGTON TOKYO KABUL PEKING ISLAM-
ABAD UKDEL NATO.

MIPT: EMERGENCY GENERAL ASSEMBLY ON AFCHANISTAN

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF DRAFT RESOLUTION:

THE SITUATION IN AFCHANISTAN AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR PEACE AND
SECURITY.

THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY,

TAKING NOTE OF THE LETTER FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY
COUNCIL TRANSMITTING THE TEXT OF THE COUNCIL RESOLUTION 462(1979),

GRAVELY CONCERNED AT THE RECENT DEVELOPMENT IN AFGHANISTAN

GRAVELY CONCERNED AT THE RECENT DEVELOPMENT IN AFGHANISTAN AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY,

REAFFIRMING THE RIGHT OF ALL PEOPLES TO DETERMINE THEIR OWN FUTURE FREE FROM OUTSIDE INTERFERENCE INCLUDING THEIR RIGHT TO CHOOSE THEIR OWN FORM OF GOVERNMENT,

MINDFUL OF THE OBLIGATIONS OF MEMBER STATES TO REFRAIN IN THEIR INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS FROM THREAT OR USE OF FORCE AGAINST THE TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY, POLITICAL INDEPENDENCE OF ANY STATE, OR IN ANY OTHER MANNER INCONSISTENT WITH THE PRINCIPLES AND PURPOSES OF THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS,

RECOGNIZING THE URGENT NEED FOR IMMEDIATE TERMINATION OF FOREIGN ARMED INTERVENTION IN AFGHANISTAN AND CREATION OF CONDITIONS OF NORMALCY IN THAT COUNTRY TO ENABLE THE PEOPLE OF AFGHANISTAN TO DETERMINE THEIR INTERNAL AFFAIRS WITHOUT OUTSIDE INTERFERENCE OR COERCION,

DISTRESSED AT THE LARGE EXODUS OF REFUGEES FROM AFGHANISTAN,

RECALLING GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTIONS 2734 (XXV) ON "THE DECLARATION ON THE STRENGTHENING OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY"; 2131 (XX) ON "THE INADMISSIBILITY OF INTERVENTION IN DOMESTIC AFFAIRS OF STATES AND THE PROTECTION OF THEIR INDEPENDENCE AND SOVEREIGNTY"; 2625 (XXV) ON "DECLARATION ON PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW CONCERNING FRIENDLY RELATIONS AND COOPERATION AMONG STATES IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS"; 2160 (XXI) ON "STRICT OBSERVANCE OF THE PROHIBITION OF THE THREAT OR USE OF FORCE IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, AND THE RIGHT OF PEOPLES TO SELF-DETERMINATION"; 3314 (XXIX) ON "DEFINITION OF AGGRESSION"; AND (XXXIV) ON "INADMISSIBILITY OF THE POLICY OF HEGEMONISM IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS".

MINDFUL OF THE PURPOSES AND PRINCIPLES OF THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY'S RESPONSIBILITY UNDER THE RELEVANT PROVISIONS OF THE CHARTER AND OF GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION 377A (V) OF 3 NOVEMBER 1950,

1. REAFFIRMS ANEW ITS CONVICTION THAT THE PRESERVATION OF SOVEREIGNTY, TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY AND POLITICAL INDEPENDENCE OF EVERY STATE IS A FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLE OF CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS, ANY VIOLATION OF WHICH ON ANY PRETEXT WHATSOEVER IS CONTRARY TO ITS AIMS AND PURPOSES,

2. STRONGLY DEPLORES THE RECENT ARMED INTERVENTION IN AFGHANISTAN

2. STRONGLY DEPLORES THE RECENT ARMED INTERVENTION IN AFGHANISTAN WHICH IS INCONSISTENT WITH THAT PRINCIPLE,

3. AFFIRMS THAT THE SOVEREIGNTY, TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY, POLITICAL INDEPENDENCE AND NON-ALIGNED STATUS OF AFGHANISTAN MUST BE FULLY RESPECTED,

4. CALLS FOR THE IMMEDIATE AND UNCONDITIONAL WITHDRAWAL OF ALL FOREIGN TROOPS FROM AFGHANISTAN IN ORDER TO ENABLE ITS PEOPLE TO DETERMINE THEIR OWN FORM OF GOVERNMENT AND CHOOSE THEIR ECONOMIC, POLITICAL AND^D SOCIAL SYSTEMS FREE FROM OUTSIDE INTERVENTION, SUBVERSION OR COERCION OR CONSTRAINT OF ANY KIND WHATSOEVER,

5. URGES ALL PARTIES CONCERNED TO HELP IN BRINGING ABOUT, SPEEDILY AND IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PURPOSES AND PRINCIPLES OF THE UNITED NATIONS, CONDITIONS NECESSARY FOR THE VOLUNTARY RETURN OF THE AFGHAN REFUGEES TO THEIR HOMES,

6. APPEALS TO ALL STATES AND NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN ORGANIZATIONS TO EXTEND RELIEF ASSISTANCE TO RELIEVE THE HARDSHIP OF THE AFGHAN REFUGEES,

7. REQUESTS THE SECRETARY GENERAL TO KEEP THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY AND THE SECURITY COUNCIL PROMPTLY AND CURRENTLY INFORMED ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PRESENT RESOLUTION,

8. DECIDES TO FOLLOW THE QUESTION CLOSELY AND TO MEET AGAIN SHOULD THE SITUATION SO DEMAND,

9. CALLS UPON THE SECURITY COUNCIL TO TAKE IMMEDIATE AND APPROPRIATE ACTION IN THE LIGHT OF THE PRESENT RESOLUTION.

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FROM UKMIS NEWYORK 110020Z JAN 80
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 TELEGRAM NUMBER 76 /OF 10 JANUARY
 INFO PRIORITY PARIS BONN ROME WASHINGTON TOKYO KABUL PEKING
 ISLAMABAD UKDEL NATO

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MY TELNO 70: EMERGENCY GENERAL ASSEMBLY ON AFGHANISTAN.

1. NAIK (PAKISTAN) CALLED A MEETING THIS MORNING OF QUOTE LIKE MINDED COUNTRIES UNQUOTE. HE SAID THAT HE HAD RESISTED A PROPOSAL THAT THERE SHOULD BE A MEETING OF THE NON-ALIGNED COUNTRIES AS A WHOLE. HIS MEETING WAS ATTENDED BY MORE WESTERN COUNTRIES THAN NON-ALIGNED, BUT THERE WERE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE LATTER FROM EACH REGION. NAIK CIRCULATED THE DRAFT RESOLUTION IN MIFT.
2. JAPAN SAID IT WAS TOO MILD, BUT CANADA POINTED OUT THAT IT WAS CONSISTENT WITH THE RESOLUTION IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND THAT IF IT WAS STRENGTHENED IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT TO GET WIDESPREAD SUPPORT. THIS VIEW PREVAILED AND THERE WAS PARTICULAR SUPPORT FOR INCLUSION OF THE REFERENCES TO REFUGEES. BUT CLARK (NIGERIA) SAID THAT HE, AND SEVERAL QUOTE LIKE-MINDED COUNTRIES UNQUOTE, WANTED TO PROPOSE AMENDMENTS TO THE DRAFT WHICH WOULD MAKE IT MORE APPLICABLE TO

OF THE REFERENCES TO REFUGEES. BUT CLARK (NIGERIA) SAID THAT HE, AND SEVERAL QUOTE LIKE-MINDED COUNTRIES UNQUOTE, WANTED TO PROPOSE AMENDMENTS TO THE DRAFT WHICH WOULD MAKE IT MORE APPLICABLE TO OTHER SITUATIONS, EG IN AFRICA, WHERE FOREIGN INTERVENTION HAD OCCURRED RECENTLY.

3. SOME WANTED THE DEBATE TO CONTINUE OVER THE NEXT FEW DAYS OMITTING THE WEEKEND TO GIVE ALL DELEGATIONS TIME TO GET INSTRUCTIONS AND TO ENSURE THAT AS MANY SUPPORTED THE RESOLUTION AS POSSIBLE. ANOTHER VIEW, WHICH WE FAVOURED, ARGUED THAT SINCE IT WAS AN EMERGENCY SESSION IT WOULD BE MORE APPROPRIATE TO PRESS ON AND TO BRING THE MATTER TO A VOTE AS EARLY AS POSSIBLE. FOR THIS IT WOULD BE NECESSARY TO CIRCULATE THE DRAFT SOONER RATHER THAN LATER. ON SPONSORSHIP, THE AIM WHICH NAIK SEEMED TO FAVOUR WAS A SMALL NON-ALIGNED GROUP SIMILAR TO THAT WHICH SPONSORED THE SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION.

4. NAIK TOOK RESPONSIBILITY FOR FURTHER DISCUSSIONS WITH CLARK AND OTHER ELEMENTS IN THE NON-ALIGNED TO PRODUCE AN AGREED DRAFT RESOLUTION. THESE DISCUSSIONS ARE CONTINUING. THERE ARE LIKELY TO BE SOME CHANGES TO THE TEXT IN MIFT.

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TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 75 OF 10 JANUARY

MIPT: AFGHANISTAN: GENERAL ASSEMBLY.

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF COMMON STATEMENT (TO BE DELIVERED AT THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY TOMORROW MORNING) AS AGREED AT A MEETING OF 'EXPERTS' OF THE NINE TODAY:

'MR. PRESIDENT,

AS REPRESENTATIVE OF THE COUNTRY WHICH CURRENTLY EXERCISES THE PRESIDENCY OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY I AM TAKING THE FLOOR ON BEHALF OF ITS NINE MEMBER STATES.

1. THE EVENTS WHICH LED TO THIS EMERGENCY MEETING OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY ARE WELL KNOWN AND HAVE BEEN EXTENSIVELY COMMENTED IN THE DEBATE WHICH TOOK PLACE IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL FROM 5 TO 7 JANUARY 1980 AT THE REQUEST OF 53 MEMBERS OF THIS ORGANISATION BELONGING TO PRACTICALLY ALL REGIONS OF THE WORLD.

2. THE NINE REGRET THAT A DRAFT RESOLUTION REAFFIRMING SOME BASIC PRINCIPLES ENSHRINED IN THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND CALLING, IN THE LIGHT OF THOSE PRINCIPLES, FOR THE IMMEDIATE AND UNCONDITIONAL WITHDRAWAL OF ALL FOREIGN TROOPS FROM AFGHANISTAN WAS VETOED IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL BY THE DELEGATION OF THE SOVIET UNION. THEY NOTE HOWEVER THAT THE RESOLUTION WAS SUPPORTED BY 13 MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL INCLUDING ALL THOSE BELONGING TO THE MOVEMENT OF NON-ALIGNED COUNTRIES. THEY ALSO NOTE THAT IN THE COURSE OF THE LENGTHY DEBATE WHICH TOOK PLACE IN THE COUNCIL, ON THE SOVIET MILITARY INTERVENTION IN AFGHANISTAN THE JUSTIFICATIONS GIVEN FOR IT WERE REJECTED BY AN OVERWHELMING MAJORITY OF DELEGATIONS.

3. THE DEBATE IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL HAS THUS SHOWN THE DEGREE OF CONCERN OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY FOR THE EVENTS WHICH ARE TAKING PLACE IN AFGHANISTAN AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS FOR PEACE AND SECURITY IN THE REGION AND IN THE WORLD AS A WHOLE. THE NINE FULLY

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SHARE THIS CONCERN. ALL THE EVIDENCE AVAILABLE SHOWS THAT THE PURPOSE OF THE SOVIET MILITARY INTERVENTION WAS TO OVERTHROW THE GOVERNMENT OF AFGHANISTAN AND REPLACE IT WITH A REGIME MORE RESPONSIVE TO SOVIET INTERESTS. IT IS WELL KNOWN THAT INTERNAL TENSIONS HAVE EXISTED IN AFGHANISTAN FOR SOME TIME AND THAT THESE ARISE FROM THE ASPIRATIONS OF THE AFGHAN PEOPLE TO LIVE AND BE RULED IN ACCORDANCE WITH ITS SOCIAL AND RELIGIOUS TRADITIONS. ACCORDINGLY OUR GOVERNMENTS CANNOT ACCEPT THAT THIS MILITARY INTERVENTION WAS PROMPTED BY EXTERNAL ACTS OF AGGRESSION AGAINST AFGHANISTAN NOR THAT IT WAS THEREFORE BASED ON THE EXERCISE OF THE RIGHT OF SELF-DEFENSE, INDIVIDUAL OR COLLECTIVE, ENSHRINED IN ART. 51 OF THE U.N. CHARTER.

4. THE NINE ARE CONVINCED OF THE NEED FOR THE IMMEDIATE WITHDRAWAL OF THE SOVIET TROOPS FROM THE TERRITORY OF AFGHANISTAN. THEY CALL FOR FULL RESPECT OF THE SOVEREIGNTY, INDEPENDENCE AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF THAT COUNTRY. THEY REAFFIRM THE RIGHT OF THE PEOPLE OF AFGHANISTAN TO DETERMINE THEIR OWN FORM OF GOVERNMENT AND DECIDE THEIR OWN DESTINY FREE FROM EXTERNAL INTERFERENCE. THEY ARE ALSO DEEPLY CONCERNED ABOUT THE SUFFERING OF THE AFGHAN PEOPLE, THE PLIGHT OF THE REFUGEES AND THE INCREASING BURDEN THEY PLACE ON NEIGHBOURING COUNTRIES.

5. THE NINE ATTACH PARTICULAR IMPORTANCE TO THE URGENT FULFILMENT OF THESE CONDITIONS WHICH ARE THE PREREQUISITES FOR THE RE-ESTABLISHMENT OF THE ATMOSPHERE OF TRUST WHICH IS THE BASIS OF THE POLICY OF DETENTE AND WHICH HAS BEEN SERIOUSLY SHAKEN BY THE MILITARY INTERVENTION OF THE USSR IN AFGHANISTAN. OUR COUNTRIES HAVE BEEN ENDEAVOURING TO IMPROVE THEIR RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION. THERE HAS BEEN EVIDENT PROGRESS FOR THE BENEFIT OF ALL SIDES AND THE SITUATION OF EUROPE AS A WHOLE. WE SEE THAT PROGRESS AS AN IMPORTANT CONTRIBUTION TO THE SAFEGUARDING OF WORLD PEACE. HOWEVER, DETENTE IS INDIVISIBLE AND HAS A GLOBAL DIMENSION WHICH REQUIRES PARTICULAR RESTRAINT ON THE PART OF THOSE COUNTRIES WHICH BEAR A SPECIAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE MAINTENANCE OF INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY. WE THEREFORE URGE THE SOVIET UNION, AS ONE OF THOSE COUNTRIES TO ABIDE BY THE PURPOSES AND PRINCIPLES OF THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND PROMPTLY PUT AN END TO ITS MILITARY INTERVENTION IN AFGHANISTAN. WE RECALL IN THIS CONTEXT THAT THE SOVIET UNION HAS PRODUCED MANY INITIATIVES IN THE U/N. PURPORTING TO UNDERLINE ITS ATTACHMENT TO INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY.

6. THE NINE HOPE THAT THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY WILL CONCLUDE THIS DEBATE BY SUPPORTING SUCH A CALL BY AN OVERWHELMING MAJORITY. WHAT IN FACT IS AT STAKE HERE IS NOT ONLY THE INDEPENDENCE AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF AFGHANISTAN BUT THE VERY PRINCIPLES ON WHICH THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY HAS ATTEMPTED FOR YEARS TO BUILD A SYSTEM OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS BASED ON THE EQUALITY OF ALL STATES, LARGE AND SMALL, AND THE RESPECT OF THE RULE OF LAW. SHOULD POLITICAL EXPEDIENCY PREVAIL AND THE ARMED INVASION OF A SMALL COUNTRY BY A GREAT POWER BE CONDONED OR TOLERATED, THERE WOULD BE A GREAT RISK THAT THE RULE OF LAW WOULD BE PROGRESSIVELY ERODED AND REPLACED BY THE RULE OF FORCE."

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GR 350A

CONFIDENTIAL

FROM UKMIS NEWYORK 110024Z JAN 80

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 74 OF 10 JANUARY

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON PARIS OTTAWA BONN MOSCOW KABUL PEKING
PRIORITY UKDEL NATO

MY TELS NOS 70 TO 72: AFGHANISTAN: GENERAL ASSEMBLY.

1. THE EMERGENCY SPECIAL SESSION OPENED THIS AFTERNOON. I AM REPORTING SEPARATELY ON TODAY'S SPEECHES AND ON THE DRAFT RESOLUTION PREPARED BY PAKISTAN.

2. THE DEBATE WILL CONTINUE THROUGHOUT TOMORROW AND SATURDAY AND MAY WELL RUN ON INTO MONDAY. THERE ARE AT PRESENT ABOUT 50 COUNTRIES ON THE SPEAKERS LIST, ABOUT HALF OF THEM NON-ALIGNED. ITALY IS TO DELIVER THE NINE'S STATEMENT (ON WHICH PLEASE SEE MIFT) TOMORROW MORNING. MY FRENCH AND WEST GERMAN COLLEAGUES HAVE DECIDED TO MAKE NATIONAL STATEMENTS OF THEIR OWN. GIVEN THE PROMINENT PART WE PLAYED IN THE FIRST STAGE OF THIS EXERCISE, I HAD BEEN WONDERING WHETHER I SHOULD NOT REFRAIN FROM SPEAKING IN THE ASSEMBLY AND RELY SIMPLY ON THE STATEMENT FOR THE NINE. BUT NOW THAT THE FRENCH AND GERMANS HAVE DECIDED TO SPEAK, I THINK I

HAD BEEN WONDERING WHETHER I SHOULD NOT REFRAIN FROM SPEAKING IN THE ASSEMBLY AND RELY SIMPLY ON THE STATEMENT FOR THE NINE. BUT NOW THAT THE FRENCH AND GERMANS HAVE DECIDED TO SPEAK, I THINK I SHOULD DO SO TOO. I HAVE PUT MYSELF ON THE SPEAKERS LIST FOR SATURDAY.

3. I WILL SPEAK RATHER MORE BRIEFLY THAN I DID IN THE COUNCIL. IN ADDITION TO DEVELOPING SOME OF THE POINTS IN THAT STATEMENT, I WOULD PROPOSE TO REBUT THE CHARGE IN THE SOVIET SPEECHES THAT THIS IS A COLD WAR EXERCISE AND ALSO TO EXPOSE THE HOLLOWNESS OF THEIR INVOCATION OF ARTICLE 51. IF THERE ARE ANY POINTS WHICH YOU WOULD PARTICULARLY LIKE ME TO INCLUDE, I SHOULD BE GRATEFUL TO KNOW BY 1500Z TOMORROW (FRIDAY).

4. GIVEN OUR SOUTH AFRICAN PROBLEM I AM RELUCTANT TO INCLUDE THE OLYMPIC GAMES IN MY STATEMENT. THE AMERICANS ARE ENCOURAGING OTHER DELEGATIONS TO DO SO.

PARSONS

NNNN

IMMEDIATE

PS
 PS/LPS
 PS/MR BLAKER
 PS/MR LUCE
 PS/MR HURD
 PS/PUS
 SIR D MAITLAND
 MR CORTAZZI
 MR FERGUSSON
 MR MURRAY
 MR BULLARD
 LORD N G LENNOX
 MR P H MOBERLY
 HD/FED
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CABINET OFFICE*M. figs**20*

CONFIDENTIAL

FM AMMAN 101125Z JAN 80

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 014 OF 10 JANUARY

INFO IMMEDIATE MUSCAT (FOR PS/S OF S).

PRIORITY JEDDA. ROUTINE ANKARA, BAGHDAD, BAHRAIN, BEIRUT, BONN,
 DAMASCUS, ISLAMABAD, KABUL, KUWAIT, MOSCOW, OTTAWA, PARIS,
 QATAR, RABAT, ROME, TEL AVIV, TRIPOLI, UKDEL NATO, UKMIS NKVYORK,
 WASHINGTON AND CG JERUSALEM.

MY TELNO 5 OF 7 JANUARY (NOT TO ALL):

JORDANIAN REACTIONS TO EVENTS IN AFGHANISTAN

1. WHEN I SAW KING HUSSEIN YESTERDAY EVENING HE TOLD ME OF HIS
 INTENTION (SINCE RELEASED TO THE PRESS) TO VISIT SAUDI ARABIA,
KUWAIT, BAHRAIN, QATAR AND OMAN OVER THE NEXT FEW DAYS. HE WOULD
ARRIVE IN SAUDI ARABIA ON SATURDAY 12 JANUARY AND LEAVE THE FOLLOWING
 MORNING FOR KUWAIT. HE WAS UNCERTAIN EXACTLY WHEN HE WOULD BE
 RETURNING TO AMMAN, BUT THOUGHT IT WOULD NOT BE BEFORE 15 JANUARY.
 HE WOULD THEN LEAVE FOR LONDON ON 19 JANUARY WHERE HE EXPECTED TO
 SPEND ABOUT 10 DAYS (HE EXPLAINED THAT HIS YOUNGEST DAUGHTER
 REQUIRED AN URGENT FACIAL OPERATION AND UNFORTUNATELY QUEEN NOOR,
 WHO IS PREGNANT, COULD NOT ACCOMPANY HER: HE HAD THEREFORE DECIDED
 TO GO TO LONDON HIMSELF).

TO GO TO LONDON HIMSELF).

2. I THEN GAVE HIM YOUR ITINERARY AND HE WONDERED WHETHER THERE WAS ANY POSSIBILITY THAT YOU MIGHT BE ABLE TO COME BACK THROUGH AMMAN, AS HE WOULD GREATLY VALUE AN OPPORTUNITY TO COMPARE NOTES WITH YOU ON REACTIONS IN THE DIFFERENT COUNTRIES YOU HAD VISITED. I EXPLAINED THAT, ALTHOUGH I DID NOT KNOW PRECISELY WHEN YOUR JOURNEY WAS FINISHING, IT DID NOT LOOK FROM THE ITINERARY I HAD RECEIVED AS IF THERE WOULD BE TIME FOR YOU TO COME BACK VIA AMMAN BEFORE HE LEFT FOR LONDON ALTHOUGH I WOULD OF COURSE PUT THIS TO YOU. ALTERNATIVELY, PERHAPS A MEETING MIGHT BE ARRANGED IN LONDON. THE KING SAID THAT IF YOU COULD NOT COME TO AMMAN, HE WOULD VERY MUCH VALUE AN OPPORTUNITY TO TALK TO YOU AND, IF POSSIBLE, THE PRIME MINISTER WHILE HE WAS IN LONDON.

3. KING HUSSEIN CONFIRMED THAT JORDAN BELIEVED AN EARLY MEETING OF ISLAMIC FOREIGN MINISTERS WOULD BE THE MOST APPROPRIATE FORUM IN WHICH TO EXPRESS ARAB/ISLAMIC VIEWS ON THE SOVIET INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN AND THAT HE WOULD BE DISCUSSING THIS IN THE ARAB COUNTRIES HE WAS VISITING. HE JUST WISHED THAT THIS WERE THE ONLY PROBLEM FACING THE AREA, BUT UNFORTUNATELY THERE WERE SO MANY OTHERS AND THEY TENDED TO CUT ACROSS EFFORTS TO OBTAIN A UNIFIED RESPONSE TO WHAT THE RUSSIANS HAD DONE IN AFGHANISTAN. HE REFERRED RUEFULLY TO A MESSAGE HE HAD RECEIVED FROM PRESIDENT CARTER AND TO DISCUSSIONS HE, HIS PRIME MINISTER AND OTHERS HAD HAD WITH THE US AMBASSADOR HERE REGARDING JORDAN'S PUBLIC POSITION ON THE SOVIET INVASION. THE KING EMPHASISED THAT, WHILE HE DID NOT IN ANY WAY UNDERESTIMATE THE VERY GRAVE DANGERS THE SOVIET ACTION REPRESENTED FOR ARAB COUNTRIES, AT ANY MOMENT THE UNITED STATES ITSELF MIGHT BE FORCED TO TAKE MILITARY ACTION TO DEAL WITH IRAN AND HOW SHOULD ARAB COUNTRIES REACT TO THAT? THE YEMEN ARAB REPUBLIC FACED DANGERS OF A DIFFERENT KIND WHICH HE WOULD ALSO BE DISCUSSING WITH THE SAUDIS. UNDERLYING IT ALL WAS THE FACT THAT, AS LONG AS THE PALESTINIAN PROBLEM REMAINED UNRESOLVED, THE AREA ITSELF WOULD BE DIVIDED WITHIN ITSELF AND ILL-PLACED TO WITHSTAND THE THREAT WHICH THE SOVIET ACTION POSED FOR COUNTRIES IN THE REGION. AS HE SAW IT, THEREFORE, THE EXTERNAL DANGERS MADE IT MORE RATHER THAN LESS IMPORTANT AND URGENT TO SEEK A SOLUTION TO THE PALESTINIAN PROBLEM WHICH REMAINED AT THE CENTRE OF THE AREA'S TROUBLES. HE ENDED BY ASKING ME TO LET HIM HAVE ANY FRESH INFORMATION WE MIGHT RECEIVE BEFORE HIS DEPARTURE CONCERNING RECENT EVENTS.

4. I SHALL BE TELEGRAPHING SEPARATELY (NOT TO ALL) JORDANIAN PRESS REACTIONS TO RECENT EVENTS WHICH SHOW VERY CLEARLY THE DIFFICULTIES IN WHICH THE JORDANIANS FIND THEMSELVES IN TRYING TO STEER A COURSE BETWEEN THEIR DIFFERENT INTERESTS AND FRIENDS IN THE AREA AND THE

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5. I HAVE HEARD FROM MY US COLLEAGUE THAT MR LINOWITZ MAY TRY TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF KING HUSSEIN'S VISIT TO LONDON TO ARRANGE A MEETING WITH HIM THERE.

6. FCO ONLY. PLEASE REPEAT MY TELNO 005 OF 7 JANUARY IMMEDIATE TO MUSCAT AND ROUTINE BAHRAIN, BEIRUT, QATAR, TEL AVIV AND CG JERUSALEM.

URWICK

NNNN

ADVANCE COPY

PS
 PS/LPS
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 PS/MR LUCE
 PS/MR HURD
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 MR CORTAZZI
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 MR MURRAY
 MR BULLARD
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 LORD N. G. LENNIX
 MR P. H. MOBERLY
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(Boyle)

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CONFIDENTIAL

FM CANBERRA 100540Z JAN 87

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 22 OF 10 JANUARY

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, ROUTINE WELLINGTON, TOKYO, MOSCOW, PARIS, BONN, UKDEP NATO, UKREP BRUSSELS AND UKMIS NEW YORK.

MIPT: AFGHANISTAN: AUSTRALIAN DECISIONS

1. DFA OFFICIALS HAVE TOLD US IN CONFIDENCE THAT THEY PRESENTED A SERIES OF OPTIONS TO MINISTERS WITH THE RECOMMENDATION THAT THEY SHOULD STEER A MIDDLE COURSE. CABINET HOWEVER DECIDED IN GENERAL TO EMBRACE THE TOUGHER OPTIONS AND IN THE CASE OF THE DECISION TO INVOLVE THEMSELVES MORE ACTIVELY IN THE INDIAN OCEAN (PARA 3(A) OF MIPT), THIS WAS AN OPTION WHICH HAD NOT EVEN BEEN CANVASSED BY OFFICIALS. IT BEARS THE PERSONAL HALLMARK OF MR FRASER WHO MAY HAVE RAISED IT PERSONALLY WITH PRESIDENT CARTER.

2. WE HAVE BEEN PROMISED AN EXTENSIVE BRIEFING EARLY NEXT WEEK WHEN THE FULL IMPLICATIONS OF THE CABINET DECISION HAVE BEEN EXAMINED. THESE COULD CONCEIVABLY INCLUDE A REQUEST TO US FOR USE OF THE FACILITIES AT DIEGO GARCIA IN THE CONTEXT OF INCREASED AUSTRALIAN INVOLVEMENT IN THE INDIAN OCEAN.

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2. WE HAVE BEEN PROMISED AN EXTENSIVE BRIEFING EARLY NEXT WEEK WHEN THE FULL IMPLICATIONS OF THE CABINET DECISION HAVE BEEN EXAMINED. THESE COULD CONCEIVABLY INCLUDE A REQUEST TO US FOR USE OF THE FACILITIES AT DIEGO GARCIA IN THE CONTEXT OF INCREASED AUSTRALIAN INVOLVEMENT IN THE INDIAN OCEAN.

TEBBIT

NNNN

AFGHANISTAN [ADVANCE COPIES]

- 2631

IMMEDIATE

PS
PS/LPS
PS/MR BLAKER
PS/MR LUCE
PS/MR HURD
PS/PUS
SIR D MAITLAND
MR CORTAZZI
MR FERGUSSON
MR MURRAY
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Typists.

LORD N. G. LENDLOX
MR P. H. MOBBERLY

UNCLASSIFIED

FM CANBERRA 100540Z JAN 80

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 21 OF 10 JANUARY

IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON

ROUTINE WELLINGTON TOKYO MOSCOW PARIS BONN UKDEL NATO UKREP BRUSSELS
UKMIS NY.

AFGHANISTAN: AUSTRALIAN DECISIONS

1. IN A STATEMENT FOLLOWING YESTERDAY'S CABINET MEETING ON
AFGHANISTAN, THE PRIME MINISTER, MR FRASER SAID THAT INVASION
HAD ALREADY BEEN CONDEMNED AS TOTALLY WITHOUT JUSTIFICATION: AS
A VIOLATION OF EVERYTHING THE UNITED NATIONS STOOD FOR: AND
AS A MODE OF BEHAVIOUR WHICH WOULD MAKE NORMAL RELATIONSHIPS
BETWEEN NATIONS TOTALLY IMPOSSIBLE. THE GOVERNMENT HAD
CONSEQUENTLY REJECTED SOVIET EXPLANATIONS OF THE INVASION.

2. MR FRASER SAID HE HAD MADE IT PLAIN THAT IT WAS NOT JUST A
QUESTION OF WANTING THE RUSSIANS OUT OF AFGHANISTAN BUT OF
ESTABLISHING CIRCUMSTANCES IN WHICH THIS KIND OF ACTION WOULD
NOT BE REPEATED. COLLECTIVELY, THE WORLD NEEDED TO

2. FRASER SAID HE HAD FALLEN TO THE REALITY THAT IT WAS NOT ONLY A QUESTION OF WANTING THE RUSSIANS OUT OF AFGHANISTAN BUT OF ESTABLISHING CIRCUMSTANCES IN WHICH THIS KIND OF ACTION WOULD NOT BE REPEATED. COLLECTIVELY, THE WORLD NEEDED TO DEMONSTRATE THAT THE PRICE OF THE SOVIET INVASION WOULD BE MUCH HIGHER THAN THE SOVIETS ENVISAGED AND HIGHER THAN THEY WOULD BE PREPARED TO CONTEMPLATE ON FUTURE OCCASIONS. AGAINST THAT BACKGROUND, HE SAID, THE SOVIET UNION SHOULD UNDERSTAND THAT THE PRICE OF ITS ACTIONS IN AFGHANISTAN WOULD BE A HEAVY ONE INDEED.

AUSTRALIAN ACTIONS

3. THERE WERE INEVITABLE LIMITS TO THE INFLUENCE OF A NATION OF 14 MILLION PEOPLE: BUT A NUMBER OF DECISIONS HAD BEEN TAKEN ON A BROAD FRONT DESIGNED TO DEMONSTRATE CONCERN AND TO REGISTER THE STRONGEST POSSIBLE OPPOSITION TO THE SOVIET UNION'S ACTIONS. TO THIS END, AUSTRALIA:-

- (A) HAD RECENTLY MADE AN OFFER TO THE UNITED STATES TO CONSULT WITH THEM CONCERNING GREATER AUSTRALIAN INVOLVEMENT IN PATROLLING AND SURVEILLANCE OF THE INDIAN OCEAN. THIS COULD INVOLVE AUSTRALIAN PARTICIPATION WITH UNITED STATES FORCES, OR A GREATER INDEPENDENT EFFORT BY AUSTRALIA TO SURVEY LARGER AREAS OF THE INDIAN OCEAN. THE UNITED STATES HAD RESPONDED WARMLY TO THE SUGGESTION.
- (B) WOULD SUPPORT UNITED STATES ACTION IN RELATION TO WHEAT SALES TO THE SOVIET UNION AND WOULD NOT PICK UP ANY OF THE SHORT-FALL:
- (C) WOULD SUGGEST TO THE UNITED STATES THAT THE 17 MILLION TONNES SHORT-FALL RESULTING FROM PRESIDENT CARTER'S DECISION SHOULD BE HANDLED IN SUCH A WAY THAT THE INTERNATIONAL MARKET IN WHEAT WOULD NOT BE PREJUDICED:
- (D) WOULD SUSPEND INDEFINITELY DISCUSSIONS OR ARRANGEMENTS OVER FISHERIES MATTERS, IN PARTICULAR A JOINT FEASIBILITY FISHING VENTURE ON THE NORTH WEST SHELF OFF THE WESTERN AUSTRALIAN COAST: AND A FEASIBILITY FISHING PROJECT INVOLVING JACK MACKEREL IN WATERS ADJACENT TO TASMANIA. APPROVALS PREVIOUSLY GIVEN IN RELATION TO THESE FISHERIES PROJECTS WERE WITHDRAWN:
- (E) WOULD REVIEW SHIPPING OPERATIONS AND OTHER FACILITIES PROVIDED BY AUSTRALIA AND REJECT APPLICATIONS FOR SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH VESSELS TO VISIT AUSTRALIAN PORTS. THE SOVIET FISHERIES DELEGATION DUE IN FEBRUARY WILL NOT BE PERMITTED TO ENTER AUSTRALIA. REQUESTS TO STATION AEROFLOT PERSONNEL IN AUSTRALIA TO FACILITATE RUSSIAN SERVICES TO THIRD COUNTRIES WOULD NOT BE MET NOR WOULD REQUESTS

FISHING TERRITORY ON THE NORTH WEST SHELF OFF THE WESTERN AUSTRALIAN COAST: AND A FEASIBILITY FISHING PROJECT INVOLVING JACK MACKEREL IN WATERS ADJACENT TO TASMANIA. APPROVALS PREVIOUSLY GIVEN IN RELATION TO THESE FISHERIES PROJECTS WERE WITHDRAWN:

- (E) WOULD REVIEW SHIPPING OPERATIONS AND OTHER FACILITIES PROVIDED BY AUSTRALIA AND REJECT APPLICATIONS FOR SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH VESSELS TO VISIT AUSTRALIAN PORTS. THE SOVIET FISHERIES DELEGATION DUE IN FEBRUARY WILL NOT BE PERMITTED TO ENTER AUSTRALIA. REQUESTS TO STATION AEROFLOT PERSONNEL IN AUSTRALIA TO FACILITATE RUSSIAN SERVICES TO THIRD COUNTRIES WOULD NOT BE MET NOR WOULD REQUESTS FOR DIRECT SOVIET/ AUSTRALIA AIR FLIGHTS:
- (F) WOULD SUSPEND INDEFINITELY SCIENTIFIC COLLABORATION WITH THE SOVIET UNION.
- (G) WOULD INDEFINITELY SUSPEND OFFICIAL TALKS AND VISITS BETWEEN AUSTRALIA AND THE SOVIET UNION AND WOULD NOT ENTER INTO NEW PROGRAMMES UNDER THE CULTURAL PROGRAMME.

OLYMPIC GAMES

4. MR FRASER SAID THAT ALTHOUGH A NUMBER OF COUNTRIES HAD MADE STATEMENTS CONCERNING THE OLYMPIC GAMES AND WOULD PREFER THAT THE GAMES WERE NOT HELD IN MOSCOW, THE GAMES WERE AN INTERNATIONAL, NOT A RUSSIAN, EVENT AND SHOULD BE SEEN IN THAT CONTEXT. ANY DECISION ON THIS MATTER DIFFERED FROM DECISIONS AFFECTING BILATERAL RELATIONS WITH RUSSIA. THE GOVERNMENT WOULD THEREFORE CLOSELY EXAMINE THE WIDER ASPECTS AND ASSESS THE VIEWS OF OTHER COUNTRIES.

5. SEE MIFT.

TEBBIT

NNNN

CONFIDENTIAL

FM MOSCOW 100805Z JAN 80

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 028 OF 10TH JANUARY

FOR INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON, BONN, PARIS, UKDEL NATO
UKREP BRUSSELS AND UKMIS NEW YORK.

UKDEL NATO TELNO 20: AFGHANISTAN AND EAST-WEST RELATIONS

1. I SHOULD BE GRATEFUL IF YOU WOULD COPY MY LETTER OF 9 JANUARY TO FERGUSSON TO UKDEL NATO, AS A COMPLEMENT TO MY TELEGRAM NO 372, SIR CLIVE ROSE WILL I HOPE ALSO BY NOW HAVE SEEN MY ANNUAL REVIEW.
2. WE CANNOT OF COURSE JUDGE WITH ANY CONFIDENCE HOW SOVIET DECISIONS ON AFGHANISTAN WERE MADE, OR HOW THEY FIT INTO THE CURRENT LEADERSHIP SITUATION. IT HAS BEEN PUT ABOUT OFTEN ENOUGH THAT BREZHNEV HAS HAD TO FACE OPPOSITION OF THE IDEA OF DETENTE, NOTABLY BY THE SOVIET MILITARY. SOME SAY HE HAS NOW HAD TO YIELD TO SUCH OPPONENTS, IN THE FACE OF WESTERN INTRANSIGENCE IN RECENT MONTHS. IT HAS HOWEVER BEEN NOTICEABLE THAT SUCH STORIES HAVE APPEARED WHENEVER THE WEST HAS BEEN ABOUT TO TAKE SOME DECISION UNWELCOME TO THE SOVIET UNION, SUCH AS THAT ON TMF, WHICH THE RUSSIANS HAVE SOUGHT TO FRUSTRATE. I AM IN ANY CASE SCEPTICAL OF A SIMPLE DIVISION BETWEEN CIVILIAN AND MILITARY INTERESTS WITHIN THE SOVIET HIERARCHY, WITH THE IMPLICATION THAT THE LATTER ARE ALWAYS HARD-LINE AND ANTI-WEST. IN THE CASE OF AFGHANISTAN, THERE MAY WELL HAVE BEEN SOVIET MILITARY MEN WARNING OF THE DIFFICULTIES OF CAMPAIGNING IN THAT COUNTRY AS COMPARED TO, FOR INSTANCE, CZECHOSLOVAKIA.
3. THERE ARE NEVERTHELESS SOME INDICATIONS THAT COULD SUGGEST EITHER A CHANGE OF MOOD OR A CHANGE OF RELATIVE INFLUENCE WITHIN THE LEADERSHIP AS A RESULT OF WHICH WE NOW FACE A LEADERSHIP WHICH AS A WHOLE, IS MORE DOGMATIC AND IDEOLOGICALLY BASED THAN IN THE IMMEDIATE PAST. SUCH A LEADERSHIP WOULD HAVE FOUND A DECISION TO INVAD E AFGHANISTAN RELETIVELY EASY.

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KOSYGIN, WHO WAS WIDELY SUPPOSED TO HAVE HAD HIS DOUBTS ABOUT 1968, HAS BEEN ABSENT PROBABLY THROUGH ILLNESS, SINCE MID-OCTOBER. HIS NAME DID NOT APPEAR WITH BREZHNEV'S UNDER THE MESSAGE OF CONGRATULATIONS SENT TO BABRAK KARMAL, ALTHOUGH HE WAS CO-SIGNATORY ON THE EARLIER ONE TO AMIN. TWO DAYS LATER, HIS NAME WAS ATTACHED TO A JOINT ANNIVERSARY MESSAGE TO CASTRO. THERE IS NO SUGGESTION THAT KOSYGIN HAS LOST OFFICE, BUT HIS ABSENCE AT A CRITICAL TIME MAY HAVE BEEN IMPORTANT AND IT IS POSSIBLE THAT SOME OF THE CRITICISM BREZHNEV HAD OF MINISTERS DURING HIS SPEECH OF 27 NOVEMBER ON THE ECONOMY (WOOD'S LETTER OF 28 NOVEMBER) WAS INTENDED FOR HIM. THAT SPEECH AND SUSLOV'S EARLIER ONE AT THE IDEOLOGICAL MEETING IN OCTOBER (WOOD'S LETTER OF 17 OCTOBER) MAY ALSO HAVE REFLECTED A LESS FLEXIBLE LINE THAN WAS PREVALENT DURING THE SUMMER. IT IS ALSO PROBABLE THAT WITH BREZHNEV PERHAPS NOT ALWAYS SUFFICIENTLY WELL TO LAY DOWN A CONSISTENT POLICY LINE THE INFLUENCE OF SUSLOV AND PONOMAREV MAY BE GREATER THAN USUAL.

4. HOWEVER THIS MAY BE, PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES ARE SUCH THAT, AS I SAID IN MY LETTER OF 9 JANUARY TO FERGUSSON, SOME RE-ASSESSMENT OF PRIORITIES IN EAST-WEST RELATIONS MUST NOW BE GOING ON IN THE LEADERSHIP. IF THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP ARE INDEED RE-ASSESSING THEIR POSITION, IT REMAINS ALL THE MORE IMPORTANT FOR THEM TO BE FORCED TO RECOGNISE THE WAY THEIR POLICIES IN AFGHANISTAN HAVE DAMAGED THREE MAJOR SOVIET INTERESTS - DETENTE WITH THE WEST, THE ISOLATION OF CHINA AND THE EXTENSION OF INFLUENCE IN THE DEVELOPING WORLD.

F C O PLEASE PASS ALL

KEEBLE

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

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CABINET OFFICE

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION:
AFGHANISTAN

- 2 -

CONFIDENTIAL



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

10 January 1980

I have been asked to reply to your letter of 7 January to the Prime Minister about the British Government's firm stand against Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

We do indeed believe that it is essential at this time to make our position unequivocally clear following the ruthless invasion of its neighbour by the Soviet Union. As you will know, the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary is at present visiting a number of countries in the region, four of which are Islamic ones, in order to have first-hand talks with their leaders, express our concern at what has happened, and discuss what measures are now appropriate.

In the Prime Minister's letter to Mr. Brezhnev in the New Year she told him that she was profoundly disturbed at what had happened, and said that she was puzzled by the assertion that the Soviet action was at the invitation of the Afghan Government. Moreover there was no evidence to substantiate Soviet charges of outside interference in Afghanistan. The only country which had involved itself in recent years in Afghan internal affairs was the Soviet Union. The deep concern of the British Government has been expressed in a number of other public statements.

M. O'D. B. ALEXANDER

Mr. Salem Azzam

TR



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London S.W.1

10 January 1980

To Mr
Pugh

Dear Michael,

I enclose a draft reply to a letter dated 7 January addressed to the Prime Minister from the Islamic Council of Europe (your letter of the same date refers).

The Islamic Council is an organisation whose Secretary-General is on the Saudi diplomatic list and pretends to diplomatic status without our blessing. The organisation has at times engaged in non-diplomatic activity such as organising disturbances in London against the policy of Egypt. It would not in our view be appropriate for Mrs Thatcher to reply. We therefore recommend that you should reply on her behalf.

The Embassy in Islamabad will be instructed to reply to the telegram from the Afghan Group in Peshawar.

Yours ever
Rodney Lyne

(R M J Lyne)
Private Secretary

M O'D B Alexander Esq
10 Downing Street

Registry
No.

DRAFT Letter

Type 1 +

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

Top Secret,
Secret.
Confidential.
Restricted.
Unclassified.

To:-

Mr Salem Azzam
Secretary-General
Islamic Council of Europe
16 Grosvenor Crescent
LONDON
SW1 7EP

From

PS/Prime Minister

Telephone No. Ext.

Department


PRIVACY MARKING

..... In Confidence


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10 JAN 1980





CONFIDENTIAL

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

9 January 1980

Dear Michael,

Why did the Soviet Union invade Afghanistan?

Following the conversation between the Prime Minister and Lord Carrington on 2 January, I enclose a note of FCO views on this question. It has not been cleared with other government departments.

yours ever

Roderic Lyne

(R M J Lyne)

Private Secretary

M O'D B Alexander Esq
10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL

WHY DID THE SOVIET UNION INVADE AFGHANISTAN?

Soviet Foreign Policy: Expansion and Opportunism

1. A major aim of Soviet foreign policy is to gain influence world-wide and to reduce and limit Western and Chinese influence. The cohesion of NATO, reinforced recently by demonstrations of resolve such as the decision on TNF modernisation, has blocked Soviet military expansion in Europe for the time being. So the Russians have been concentrating on amassing military strength which could be used for political arm-twisting in Europe, as well as on subversion, propoganda and diplomatic blandishment.

2. The main thrust of their expansionism has been in the developing world, where in recent years they have become much more assertive. In 1975 they correctly judged that the United States, after Vietnam, would not react strongly to the unprecedented military intervention by Cuban proxy forces in Angola. Then came the intervention in Ethiopia, much greater influence in South Yemen, and Vietnam's invasion of Kampuchea.

Motives in Afghanistan

3. The Soviet desire for greater influence is especially strong in relation to nearby countries. The Russians have steadily built up their influence in Afghanistan, particularly since 1973 when the monarchy was overthrown. In April 1978 they made a major advance through the installation of Taraki's communist regime. Although this was rapidly weakened by internal dissension, the Russians continued to support the government and gradually increased the numbers of Soviet civilians and military advisers. The crude doctrinaire approach of the government, aimed at increasing its power in the provinces, and a hurried land reform programme alienated the Moslem tribes. The Afghan army proved incapable of dealing with the insurgents. Russians began to be killed. The rebellion was very disorganised but the government began to crumble with purges and shootings. President Taraki tried to remove his prime minister Amin; but Amin, in whom the Russians seem to have had no confidence, came out on top. Moscow was soon faced with a dilemma; to risk the ousting of Amin by some group which might prove anti-Soviet and possibly pursue a nationalistic Moslem extremist line, or to intervene, install an alternative or their own choosing and try to end the revolt. Careful plans had clearly been laid in case the

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second course was chosen, and the infrastructure had been installed during many years of Soviet aid. The Russians used excuses for aggression that were even more breathtakingly untrue than on past occasions. The major reasons why they acted were that they thought they risked losing their investment in a neighbouring country, when Iran was already in chaos and, on the other side of Afghanistan, China was becoming a world power. In addition, abandonment of a 'socialist revolution' would have meant loss of face.

The Invasion

4. In undertaking this first use of Soviet armed forces outside the Warsaw Pact since the War, the Russians must have calculated that the advantages for their position in Afghanistan outweighed the risks in East-West relations and to Soviet standing in the world. They perhaps thought that Western protests and gestures would be short-lived and that there would be no retaliatory measures which would really hurt the USSR. They will have foreseen the risk of driving the West and China closer together but may have judged that this process was in any case taking place. They presumably now intend to quell the rebels to a large extent but, despite the disunity and inefficiency of the rebels, this may require more than the 50,000 Soviet troops so far in the country. The Soviet political purpose will be to consolidate a lasting grip on Afghanistan, while maintaining the country's nominal independence and its membership of the Non-Aligned movement.

Implications

5. The Russians will hope, from their new base in Afghanistan, to be better placed to extend their influence in Asia, and to make further advances in Russia's long-standing search for access to the Indian Ocean. Pakistan is unstable and could be vulnerable. The Soviet Union could seek to exploit the border disputes between Afghanistan and Pakistan as a basis for political and military intervention. In Iran, the Russians have not so far been involved in the revolution, and their invasion of Afghanistan will add to Iran's distrust of the Soviet Union. But the latter has very strong power-political and energy motives for trying to gain influence in Iran if opportunities arise out of the current chaos there. The

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Russians will hope to increase their influence in India if Pakistan moves closer to the West.

6. New Soviet leaders may prefer to be cautious on the international scene for a time. But, if the present military intervention succeeds, the use of Soviet or proxy forces in developing countries will attract the Soviet Union even more in the future. At the same time, the Russians have reasons for pursuing a limited kind of ~~c~~tente with the West - notably the desire to avoid confrontation with the US and for technology and grain on credit. Whether the military option is actually adopted on future occasions will thus depend significantly on whether the West and the world react now to the invasion of Afghanistan more sharply and lastingly than the Russians have expected.

Eastern European and Soviet Department
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

7 January 1980

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FROM PARIS 091828Z JAN 80

TO PRIORITY F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 40 OF 9 JANUARY 1980

INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK, MOSCOW, UKDEL NATO AND BONN
INFO SAVING KABUL AND OTHER EEC POSTS

MIPT : FRENCH PRESS AND PARTY REACTIONS

1. A CRITICAL COMMUNIQUE ISSUED BY BERNARD PONS, SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE RPR (GAULLISTS), HAS BEEN WIDELY QUOTED IN THE PRESS. PONS SAID HE WAS "SADDENED FOR TODAY AND WORRIED FOR TOMORROW" BY FRANCOIS-PONCET'S COMMENTS: "PRESERVING DETENTE HAS NEVER CONSISTED OF LETTING IT SERVE AS A COVER FOR ATTEMPTS AT HEGMONY. THERE IS NO WAY THAT FRANCE COULD BETTER AFFIRM HER INDEPENDENCE THAN BY TAKING THE LEAD IN DEFENDING THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLE OF THE LIBERTY OF PEOPLES TO DECIDE THEIR OWN FATE. THIS PRINCIPLE HAS BEEN TRAMPLED UNDER FOOT IN AFGHANISTAN...IT WOULD BE DOING A SERVICE TO FRANCO-SOVIET RELATIONS TO INDICATE TO THE RUSSIANS THE LIMITS WHICH MUST NOT BE CROSSED IF THESE RELATIONS ARE TO BE PRESERVED". "LA LETTRE DE LA NATION" (THE GAULLIST MOUTHPIECE) ADDED "WOULD WEST BERLIN EXIST TODAY IF THE PRESENT REASONING HAD BEEN ADOPTED THEN? HAS GAULLIST FRANCE REALLY BECOME SUBJECT TO THE AMERICAN BLOC BECAUSE SHE REFUSED TO LET RUSSIA GRAB BERLIN?"

2. AT THE OTHER END OF THE SPECTRUM HUMANITE (COMMUNIST) ARGUES "WE STILL LIVE TODAY IN A WORLD WHERE INTERVENTION BY MILITARY OR OTHER MEANS IN THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF POPULATIONS HAS BEEN ERECTED INTO A UNIVERSAL PRINCIPLE BY THE IMPERIALIST STATES...THE US HAVE DONE THEIR BEST TO BRING DOWN THE NEW AUTHORITIES IN KABUL BY SUPPORTING A REBELLION OF THE AFGHAN TRIBES WHICH THEY HAVE SUPPLIED WITH MONEY AND ARMS FROM NEIGHBOURING PAKISTAN... SUCH ARE THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF AN AFFAIR WHICH IS SUFFICIENTLY COMPLEX FOR M. GISCARD D'ESTAING, WHO IS LITTLE SUSPECT OF EXCESSIVE LOVE FOR THE SOVIET UNION, TO SHOW A PRUDENT JUDGEMENT DEPLORED BY SOME OF HIS POLITICAL FRIENDS."

3. THE LINE OF THE FRENCH COMMUNIST PARTY HAS ITSELF PROVOKED A GOOD DEAL OF COMMENT IN OTHER SECTIONS OF THE PRESS. THE EDITOR OF L'AURORE (RIGHT-WING) ASKS "WHY SHOULD ONE BE INDIGNANT AT THE EXTENUATING ATTITUDE OF THE PCF IN A MATTER WHERE THE GOVERNMENT ARE

ADOPTING

ADOPTING A LINE OF CONDUCT APPRECIABLY CLOSE TO THAT OF GEORGES MARCHAIS?...FRANCE BY THE VOICE OF M. JEAN FRANCOIS-PONCET DECLARES HERSELF READY TO PURSUE THE DIALOGUE. WHAT DIALOGUE, GOOD HEAVENS? THAT WHICH WILL LEAD TOMORROW TO THE IMPLACABLE GENOCIDE OF THE AFGHAN PEOPLE?''.

4. LE MONDE FOR ITS PART HAS ADOPTED A LESS CLEAR CUT POSITION. AFTER AN EDITORIAL OVER THE WEEKEND HEADED ''THE END OF DETENTE'', THE PAPER IS NOW PUBLISHING A SERIES OF ARTICLES BY THE EDITOR IN CHIEF ANDRE FONTAINE ARGUING THAT IT WAS EVENTS IN AFGHANISTAN ITSELF THAT DETERMINED THE SOVIET DECISION TO INTERVENE, AND THAT IT IS THE ABSENCE OF A COHERENT POLICY TOWARDS THE SCARCE RAW MATERIALS OF THE PLANET IN EASTERN OR WESTERN BLOCS WHICH PRESENTS THE GREATEST DANGERS FOR PEACE. ELSEWHERE, HOWEVER, THE FOREIGN EDITOR HAS CRITICISED FRANCOIS-PONCET FOR NOT CONDEMNING SOVIET ACTION MORE CLEARLY AND HAS CHALLENGED THE GOVERNMENT, IF THE LATTER REALLY BELIEVES THAT IN AFGHANISTAN THE RUSSIANS HAVE BITTEN OFF MORE THAN THEY CAN CHEW, TO SAY SO PLAINLY.

5. SOME OF THE MOST STRIKING CRITICISM OF THE OFFICIAL VIEW SO FAR HAS COME FROM THE RECENTLY REBORN DAILY, THE QUOTIDIEN DE PARIS (WRITTEN BY AND FOR SOCIAL DEMOCRAT INTELLECTUALS). THE EDITOR SAYS THAT GISCARD HAS WHITE-WASHED BREZHNEV. '' A GREAT MANY FRENCHMEN WILL TODAY FEEL WOUNDED. IT IS NOT FOR FRANCE TO SEEK THROUGH ITS HIGHEST-PLACED SPOKESMAN TO EXCUSE THE PERPERTRATORS OF AN AGGRESION THAT, QUITE OBVIOUSLY, IS CRIMINAL, IMPERIALIST AND OPPRESSIVE''.

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TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 71 OF 9 JANUARY

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON PARIS OTTAWA BONN MOSCOW KABUL PEKING

INFO PRIORITY MANILA ISLAMABAD UKDEL NATO

MIPT: AFGHANISTAN

TEXT OF RESOLUTION IS AS FOLLOWS:

THE SECURITY COUNCIL

MIPT: AFGHANISTAN

TEXT OF RESOLUTION IS AS FOLLOWS:

THE SECURITY COUNCIL
HAVING CONSIDERED THE ITEM ON THE AGENDA OF ITS 2185TH MEETING, AS
CONTAINED IN DOCUMENT S/AGENDA/2185,

TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THAT THE LACK OF UNANIMITY OF ITS PERMANENT
MEMBERS AT THE 2190TH MEETING OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL HAS PREVENTED
IT FROM EXERCISING ITS PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE MAINTENANCE
OF INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY,

DECIDES TO CALL AN EMERGENCY SPECIAL SESSION OF THE GENERAL
ASSEMBLY TO EXAMINE THE QUESTION CONTAINED IN DOCUMENT S/AGENDA/2185.]

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TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 70 OF 9 JANUARY

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON PARIS OTTAWA BONN MOSCOW KABUL PEKING
INFO PRIORITY MANILA ISLAMABAD UKDEL NATO.

MY TELNO 63 : AFGHANISTAN : UNITING FOR PEACE

1. YANGO (PHILLIPINES) FINALLY GOT HIS ACT TOGETHER THIS MORNING AND WITH MEXICO, AND I SUSPECT SOME HELP FROM THE FRENCH, PRODUCED A DRAFT RESOLUTION CALLING FOR AN EMERGENCY SPECIAL SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY. THE WORDING OF THE OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH WAS BASED ON RESOLUTION 129 OF AUGUST 1958 RATHER THAN RESOLUTION 303 OF 1971 AND THUS OMITTED ANY DIRECT REFERENCE TO THE UNITING FOR PEACE RESOLUTION IN THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY (377 OF 1950).
2. CONSULTATIONS WITH THE VARIOUS GROUPS OF THE COUNCIL WENT ON THROUGHOUT THE DAY AND THE COUNCIL FINALLY MET IN FORMAL SESSION THIS EVENING AND ADOPTED THE DRAFT IN MIFT AS RESOLUTION 462 BY 12 - 2 (USSR AND GDR) - 1 (ZAMBIA).
3. AFTER YANGO AND THE MEXICAN FOREIGN MINISTER HAD INTRODUCED THEIR RESOLUTION, TROYANOVSKY (USSR) REITERATED HIS COUNTRY'S OBJECTIONS TO THE UNITED NATIONS INTERFERING IN AFGHANISTAN'S INTERNAL AFFAIRS. LEPRETTE (FRANCE) IN EXPLANATION OF VOTE SAID THAT THE SERIOUSNESS OF THE SITUATION JUSTIFIED REFERENCE TO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY UNDER ARTICLE 12(1) OF THE CHARTER. FRANCE DID HOWEVER HAVE RESERVATIONS ON THE SECOND PREAMBULAR PARAGRAPH (CLEARLY AN ALLUSION TO THE UNITING FOR PEACE PROCEDURE).

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/ 4. ZAMBIA

4. ZAMBIA MADE NO EXPLANATION OF ITS ABSTENTION BUT IN A TELEVISION INTERVIEW LAST NIGHT MUTUKWA, DEPUTY ZAMBIAN REPRESENTATIVE, SAID THAT THE PROBLEM WAS A MATTER FOR THE SUPER POWERS AND THE COUNTRIES IN THE AREA AND NOT OF MAJOR CONCERN TO AFRICAN NATIONS. OTHER AFRICANS HERE MAY SHARE THIS VIEW.

5. THE EMERGENCY SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY WILL COMMENCE TOMORROW (THURSDAY) AFTERNOON. MY 2ND IFT (NOT TO ALL) DEALS WITH THE QUESTION OF CREDENTIALS. THE ITALIANS HAVE TODAY CIRCULATED A FIRST DRAFT OF A JOINT STATEMENT BY THE NINE. WE SHALL BE CONSIDERING WHETHER AND WHEN TO MAKE A SEPARATE STATEMENT OF OUR OWN IN ADDITION.

6. NAIK (PAKISTAN) IS STARTING TO ORGANISE THE NON-ALIGNED FOR THE ASSEMBLY SESSION. HE AND HIS MAIN SUPPORTERS WILL NEED TO WORK HARD TO ENSURE A REASONABLE RESOLUTION AND A GOOD VOTE.

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TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 48 OF 09 JANUARY 1980.

INFO IMMEDIATE ALL NATO POSTS, MOSCOW, TEHRAN, JEDDAH, ISLAMABAD, NEW DELHI, MUSCAT, UDKEL NATO, UKMIS NEW YORK.

FOLLOWING FROM SECRETARY OF STATE

AFGHANISTAN AND IRAN

1. I DISCUSSED THE SITUATION IN AFGHANISTAN AND IRAN WITH THE TURKISH FOREIGN MINISTER THIS AFTERNOON. WE ARE CONTINUING OUR DISCUSSIONS TOMORROW MORNING. THE FOLLOWING ARE THE MAIN POINTS TO EMERGE SO FAR.

2. IRAN

SENATOR ERKMEN DOUBTED THE EFFICACY OF ECONOMIC SANCTIONS. THE TURKS HAD TRIED TO INFLUENCE THE IRANIANS AT THE GOVERNMENTAL LEVEL.

SENATOR ERKMEN DOUBTED THE EFFICACY OF ECONOMIC SANCTIONS. THE TURKS HAD TRIED TO INFLUENCE THE IRANIANS AT THE GOVERNMENTAL LEVEL OVER THE RELEASE OF THE HOSTAGES AND HAD ACHIEVED SOME DEGREE OF UNDERSTANDING. BUT THIS HAD HAD NO EFFECT ON KHOMEINI OR THE STUDENTS. NOW THAT WALDHEIM'S MISSION HAD FAILED, IT SEEMED NECESSARY TO TRY AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH. ONE POSSIBILITY MIGHT BE TO SEEK TO INFLUENCE KHOMEINI THROUGH SOME APPROACH FROM THE NON-ALIGNED. IT WAS IMPORTANT, IN THE LIGHT OF THE SOVIET INTERVENTION IN AFGHANISTAN, TO PRESERVE IRAN'S TERRITORIAL AND POLITICAL INTEGRITY, AND TO SEEK TO "BRING IT BACK INTO THE SYSTEM". THE DISINTEGRATION OF IRAN WOULD HAVE SERIOUS CONSEQUENCES AND WOULD JEOPARDISE WESTERN INTERESTS. THE RUSSIANS WERE ACTIVE IN SUPPORT OF SECESSIONIST TRENDS IN IRAN AMONGST THE AZERBAIJANIS AND KURDS. ALTHOUGH SECESSIONISM HAD NO SIGNIFICANT PUBLIC SUPPORT IN TURKEY, SUCH TRENDS IN A NEIGHBOURING COUNTRY WERE DISTURBING FOR HER.

3. I SAID THAT I TOO PERSONALLY DOUBTED WHETHER ECONOMIC SANCTIONS IF APPLIED AGAINST IRAN WOULD HELP SECURE THE EARLY RELEASE OF THE HOSTAGES. NONETHELESS, THE UNITED STATES NOW SEEMED COMMITTED TO SEEKING TO ACHIEVE SANCTIONS IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL, EVEN IF SUCH AN ATTEMPT FAILED TO SECURE NINE AFFIRMATIVE VOTES OR PROVOKED A SOVIET VETO. (ERKMEN COMMENTED THAT THE SOVIET UNION MIGHT WELL GAIN KUDOS FROM SUCH A VETO). MOREOVER, IT WAS KHOMEINI'S OWN POLICIES WHICH WERE CAUSING THE DISINTEGRATION IN IRAN.

4. AFGHANISTAN

ERKMEN SHARED OUR ANALYSIS OF THE SOVIET INTERVENTION WHICH HE THOUGHT SHOULD HAVE BEEN FORESEEN BY THE WEST. HE THOUGHT THAT THE MOST EFFECTIVE DETERRENT AGAINST ANY SIMILAR SOVIET ACTION IN THE FUTURE WAS THE STRENGTHENING OF THE REGIONAL COUNTRIES WHICH MIGHT BE THREATENED, PARTICULARLY PAKISTAN AND TURKEY, BY ECONOMIC AND MILITARY ASSISTANCE. HE SEEMED DOUBTFUL ABOUT THE NEED FOR RETALIATORY MEASURES DIRECTED AT THE SOVIET UNION. I COMMENTED THAT ALTHOUGH SUPPORT FOR THE REGIONAL COUNTRIES WAS ESSENTIAL, AND WAS THE IMMEDIATE CAUSE OF MY PRESENT VISIT, I THOUGHT IT INCONCEIVABLE THAT THE WEST SHOULD BEHAVE VIS-A-VIS THE SOVIET UNION AS THOUGH NOTHING HAD HAPPENED. SOME CONCRETE MEASURES WERE NECESSARY AS WELL, FOR EXAMPLE THE SUSPENSION OF GRAIN SUPPLIES, RESTRICTIONS ON THE SUPPLY OF TECHNOLOGY AND THE PROVISION OF CREDIT, OR, THOUGH THIS WOULD BE THE MOST DIFFICULT TO ACHIEVE, THE BOYCOTTING OF THE OLYMPIC GAMES.

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AFGHANISTAN

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MY TELNO 26
 AFGHANISTAN: FRENCH REACTIONS

1. THERE CONTINUES TO BE WIDE PRESS, RADIO AND TV COVERAGE OF THE AFGHAN CRISIS, WITH MUCH SPECULATION ABOUT ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR WORLD PEACE. AT THE END OF LAST WEEK COMMENTATORS FOUND IT DIFFICULT TO DECIDE WHAT LINE TO TAKE. THERE WAS NO CLEAR LEAD FROM THE GOVERNMENT, AND THE CRISIS RAISED DIFFICULT QUESTIONS ABOUT MANY OF THE RECEIVED IDEAS OF FRENCH FOREIGN POLICY (THE COMMITMENT TO DETENTE, THE INDEPENDENCE OF FRENCH POLICY, THE INABILITY TO ACCEPT US LEADERSHIP, THE ABSENCE FROM NATO).

2. THE WEAK STATEMENT OF THE OFFICIAL FRENCH POSITION MADE BY

2. THE WEAK STATEMENT OF THE OFFICIAL FRENCH POSITION MADE BY FRANCOIS-PONCET AT THE WEEKEND (MY TUR) HAS PROVOKED SHARPER REACTIONS. COMMENTATORS ARE GETTING BACK TO THE MORE FAMILIAR BUSINESS OF CRITICISING ONE ANOTHER AND THE GOVERNMENT, WHICH ENABLES THEM TO DEAL WITH THE UNCOMFORTABLE AFGHAN PROBLEM INDIRECTLY RATHER THAN DIRECTLY. PARADOXICALLY, COMMENT IS BECOMING CLEARER AS IT BECOMES MORE OBLIQUE.

3. M FRANCOIS-PONCET'S STATEMENT HAS COME IN FOR SOME STIFF CRITICISM FROM THE RIGHT EG FROM THE GAULLISTS AND FROM L'AURE (FOR EXTRACTS SEE MIFT). BUT LE MAS MONDE HAS PUT THE GAULLIST CRITICISM INTO FOCUS BY PRINTING QUOTATIONS FROM STATEMENTS MADE BY PRESIDENT DE GAULLE AND HIS FOREIGN MINISTER, M DEBRE, AFTER THE SOVIET INVASION OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA IN 1969. THESE QUOTATIONS SHOW THAT THE GAULLIST REACTION THEN WAS LIMITED TO WORDS AND THAT FRANCE WAS SOON RESUMING HIGH-LEVEL CONTACTS WITH THE SOVIET UNION. THE CRITICISM IN THE UNITED STATES OF M FRANCOIS-PONCET'S STATEMENT HAS ATTRACTED ATTENTION IN FRANCE.

4. AT THE OTHER END OF THE SPECTRUM, THE GOVERNMENT HAS RECEIVED AN UNWELCOME BACKHANDED COMPLIMENT FROM HUMANITE (FOR EXTRACT SEE MIFT) WHICH COMMENDED PRESIDENT GISCARD D'ESTAING'S PRUDENT JUDGEMENT IN A COMPLEX SITUATION.

5. THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT HAS NOW EVIDENTLY FELT IT NECESSARY TO TAKE FURTHER STEPS TO CLARIFY AND DEFEND ITS POSITION. TODAY'S FIGARO CARRIES A CAREFULLY REASONED ARTICLE BY SERGE MAFFERT, THE PAPER'S FOREIGN EDITOR, WHICH TRIES, CLEARLY ON THE BASIS OF OFFICIAL INSPIRATION, TO SPELL OUT THE CONSIDERATIONS UNDERLYING FRENCH POLICY AND TO CORRECT THE IMPRESSION THAT FRANCE IS COMPLACENT OVER EVENTS IN AFGHANISTAN.

6. ACCORDING TO MAFFERT, THE FRENCH ANALYSE THE CRISIS AT THREE LEVELS: AT THE LOCAL LEVEL, WHERE THE FRENCH CONSIDER THAT THE SOVIET UNION WAS BEGINING TO LOSE ITS FOOTING IN AFGHANISTAN AND COULD NOT RISK A MAJOR POLITICAL DEFEAT SEMI COLON AT THE REGIONAL LEVEL, WHERE THE SITUATION WAS MORE COMPLEX AND DIFFICULT TO ASSESS BECAUSE, WHILE THE RUSSIANS MIGHT HAVE FURTHER EXPANSIONIST AMBITIONS, IT WAS IMPORTANT IN FRANCE'S VIEW NOT TO ENCOURAGE THE DEVELOPMENT OF A MOSCOW/DELHI AXIS WHICH MIGHT POSSIBLY EXTEND TO HANOI SEMI COLON AND FINALLY AND MOST IMPORTANT, AT THE GLOBAL LEVEL WHERE THE PROBLEM WAS TO ASSESS WHETHER OR NOT THE SOVIET UNION HAD CHANGED HER POLICY TOWARDS DETENTE AND ABANDONED THE BREZHNEV LINE.

7. FRENCH REACTIONS, EXPLAINS MAFFERT, SHOULD BE ADJUSTED AT THE SAME THREE LEVELS. AS REGARDS ACTION AT THE LOCAL LEVEL FRANCE HASO

7. FRENCH REACTIONS, EXPLAINS MAFFERT, SHOULD BE ADJUSTED AT THE SAME THREE LEVELS. AS REGARDS ACTION AT THE LOCAL LEVEL, FRANCE HASO ALREADY CALLED AT THE UN FOR THE WITHDRAWAL OF SOVIET TROOPS. AT THE REGIONAL LEVEL THE NEED WAS TO HELP THE COUNTRIES CONCERNED TO DEFINE A COMMON POLICY AND TO AVOID QUOTE WESTERNISING UNQUOTE THE PROBLEM - KABUL WAS NOT IN EUROPE, WHERE IN FRENCH EYES THE FATE OF WORLD PEACE WAS REALLY DETERMINED. AT THE GLOBAL LEVEL IT WOULD BE NECESSARY (BUT NOT EASY) TO DECIDE WHETHER THE SOVIET UNION WAS ACTING FROM WEAKNESS OR WAS INDEED BEGINNING A MAJOR SHIFT OF POLICY. THE ARTICLE WHICH CONTINUALLY QUOTED OFFICIAL SOURCES, ENDED BY STRESSING FRANCE'S SPECIAL ROLE BOTH IN PROMOTING DETENTE AND IN COUNTERING INTERNATIONAL SUBVERSION: QUOTE IN AFRICA, FRANCE HAS BEEN THE ONLY COUNTRY TO DO ANYTHING IN REPLY TO SUBVERSION, AND THE LESSONS THAT PEOPLE WANT TO READ TO HER ARE ILL-DIRECTED. WHO FOR EXAMPLE, BLOCKED CUBAN ACTION IN ZAIRE? UNQUOTE FCO PLEASE PASS SAVING TO ADDRESSEES HIBBERT

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TO IMMEDIATE FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE,
TELEGRAM NUMBER 20 OF 9 JANUARY 1980,
INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, BONN, PARIS, MOSCOW,
INFO PRIORITY OTHER NATO POSTS, UKREP BRUSSELS, UKRIS NEW YORK.

MY TELNOS 16 AND 18: AFGHANISTAN AND EAST WEST RELATIONS.

1. WE HAVE FROM THE START PLAYED THE LEADING ROLE HERE IN PRESSING FOR FULL ALLIANCE CONSULTATION ON THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE SOVIET ACTION AND IN SEEKING TO CONCERT MEASURES TO BE TAKEN BY GOVERNMENTS. GIVEN THE ATTITUDES OF THE FRENCH AND (SO FAR) THE GERMANS AND ITALIANS, THIS HAS MEANT WE HAVE FOUND OURSELVES CONSPICUOUSLY OUT IN FRONT BOTH AS REGARDS URGENCY AND CONTENT OF THE MEASURES WE ARE CONSIDERING. THE AMERICANS HAVE OF COURSE SUPPORTED OUR EFFORTS, BUT THEY HAVE BEEN TO SOME EXTENT INHIBITED BY THE FACT THAT PRESIDENT CARTER HAS ALREADY ANNOUNCED A WIDE RANGE OF MEASURES WITHOUT WAITING FOR ALLIED CONSULTATION (OR, SO FAR AS I HAVE OBSERVED, MAKING ANY PUBLIC REFERENCE TO THE IMPORTANCE HE ATTACHES TO THIS). THEY ARE ALSO LOCALLY HANDICAPPED BY THE CONTINUED ABSENCE ON LEAVE (SINCE MID-DECEMBER) OF THE UNITED STATES PERMANENT

ABSENCE ON LEAVE (SINCE MID-DECEMBER) OF THE UNITED STATES PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE, (WHICH I FIND ASTONISHING IN A SITUATION WHICH PRESIDENT CARTER HAS DESCRIBED AS THE MOST SERIOUS CRISIS SINCE WORLD WAR II) AND THE FACT THAT AS A RESULT GLITMAN, AS ACTING U S REPRESENTATIVE, HAS HAD TO LEAVE THE IMPORTANT STUDY OF EAST/WEST RELATIONS IN THE SPC TO AN INEFFECTIVE POLITICAL COUNSELLOR.

2. I HOPE YOUR MESSAGE TO GENSCHER (YOUR TELNO 11 TO BONN) WILL HELP TO STIFFEN THE GERMANS. I AM SURE MY GERMAN COLLEAGUE WILL DO HIS BEST OVER THIS AT THE MEETING HE IS DUE TO ATTEND IN BONN ON 10 JANUARY (PARA 2 OF MY TELNO 16). AS REGARDS THE ITALIANS, ALTHOUGH THE ACTING PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE HAS SPOKEN BRAVELY ENOUGH IN THE COUNCIL, HIS WORDS HAVE NOT BEEN MATCHED BY ANY SENSE OF URGENCY IN THE SPC. AS REGARDS THE FRENCH, WITHOUT A MAJOR CHANGE IN INSTRUCTIONS FROM PARIS (WHICH SIR R. HIBBERT'S REPORTS GIVE US NO REASON TO EXPECT), I FEAR WE SHALL HAVE VIRTUALLY TO WRITE OFF ANY HOPE OF THEM COOPERATING WITHIN THE ALLIANCE IN THIS EXERCISE.

3. THE SPC AND POLITICAL COMMITTEE ARE MEETING TODAY AND TOMORROW AND COUNCIL MEETINGS HAVE BEEN ARRANGED FOR THE MORNING OF 11 JANUARY AND (WITH MR HURD AND OTHERS PRESENT) ON THE AFTERNOON OF 15 JANUARY. I UNDERSTAND THAT THE LATTER WILL FOLLOW A LUNCHTIME POLITICAL COOPERATION MEETING IN BRUSSELS WHICH MR HURD WILL ATTEND. AS AGREED WITH THE DEPARTMENT (MY TELECON WITH FERGUSSON) I WILL TAKE THE LINE AT FRIDAY'S COUNCIL THAT WE CONTINUE TO ATTACH URGENCY TO THIS EXERCISE AND WOULD HAVE LIKED TO BE ABLE TO ANNOUNCE MEASURES BY THE MIDDLE OF THIS WEEK. HOWEVER WE UNDERSTAND THE PROBLEMS SOME OF OUR ALLIES HAVE HAD IN REACHING FIRM VIEWS ON IMMEDIATE MEASURES AND, BECAUSE OF THE HIGH PRIORITY WE GIVE TO CONSULTATION WITHIN THE ALLIANCE, WE PROPOSE TO DEFER ANNOUNCING MEASURES WE ARE TAKING UNTIL AFTER THE REINFORCED COUNCIL MEETING ON 15 JANUARY. WE HOPE OUR ALLIES WILL BE IN A POSITION TO STATE AT THAT MEETING WHAT THEIR GOVERNMENTS INTEND TO DO.

4. AT THE 15 JANUARY MEETING, THE COUNCIL WILL ALSO HAVE A REPORT FROM THE POLITICAL COMMITTEE ON WHAT GOVERNMENTS ARE DOING IN RELATION TO REGIONAL COUNTRIES. ON THIS THE MATERIAL IN YOUR TELEGRAM NO 37 IS HELPFUL AND I HOPE OTHERS WILL PRODUCE SIMILAR INFORMATION. BUT, ESPECIALLY GIVEN THE FRENCH ATTITUDE, THERE IS NO CHANCE OF THE REPORT BEING ANYTHING MORE THAN A COLLATION OF NATIONAL INPUTS. DISCUSSION OF POLICY AND FUTURE ACTION WILL DEPEND ON HOW FAR THOSE ATTENDING ON 15 JANUARY ARE PREPARED TO GO. I DOUBT WHETHER THE FRENCH (REPRESENTED BY THEIR PERM REP) WILL BE WILLING TO CONTRIBUTE MUCH, BUT WE MIGHT GET MORE OUT OF THEM AT THE PROCEEDING POLITICAL COOPERATION MEETING.

WILLING TO CONTRIBUTE MUCH, BUT WE MIGHT GET MORE OUT OF THEM AT THE PRECEDING POLITICAL COOPERATION MEETING.

5. THE SPC SO FAR HAS BEEN MAINLY CONCERNED WITH IMMEDIATE MEASURES. BUT WE NEED NOW TO MOVE THEM ON TO CONSIDERATION OF MEDIUM AND LONGER TERM ACTION. AS REGARDS THE MEASURES NOT (NOT) INCLUDED IN THE LIST IN MY TELEGRAM NO 17, I HAVE THE FOLLOWING COMMENTS ON ITEMS MENTIONED IN YOUR TELNO 17 TO WASHINGTON:--

- (A) PARA 4: U S AND GERMAN AMBASSADORS HAVE ALREADY BEEN RECALLED AND THEIR RETURN TO MOSCOW IS PLANNED. I HAVE SEEN NOTHING OF THE OUTCOME OF OUR CONSULTATIONS WITH THE NINE ON THIS SUBJECT, AND WOULD BE GRATEFUL TO BE BROUGHT UP TO DATE. ONE POSSIBILITY WHICH YOU MAY WISH TO CONSIDER AT THE RIGHT MOMENT WOULD BE TO PROPOSE TO OUR ALLIES THAT ALL 15 AMBASSADORS IN MOSCOW SHOULD BE WITHDRAWN AT THE SAME TIME FOR CONSULTATIONS, AND SHOULD PARTICIPATE IN A SPECIAL MEETING OF THE COUNCIL HERE TO DISCUSS THE LONG TERM IMPLICATIONS OF SOVIET ACTIONS IN AFGHANISTAN. THIS COULD HAVE SUBSTANTIVE VALUE AS WELL AS BEING A DRAMATIC GESTURE.
- (B) PARA 8: IF YOUR AGREE, I WOULD PROPOSE TO GIVE OUR ALLIES AN ACCOUNT OF THE WAYS IN WHICH WE HAVE OPERATED OUR RESTRICTIONS ON SOVIET PERSONNEL IN THE UK SINCE 1971 (OPERATION FOOT) AND SUGGEST TO THEM THAT NOW IS AN EXCELLENT MOMENT FOR THEM TO FOLLOW OUR LEAD IN THIS TO THE EXTENT THEY CAN.
- (C) PARA 11: I HOPE IT WILL BE POSSIBLE FOR THE COUNCIL TO BE KEPT CLOSELY INFORMED OF WHAT THE COMMUNITY IS DOING ABOUT AGRICULTURE EXPORTS TO THE SOVIET UNION (YOUR TELEGRAM NO 37 TO UKREP BRUSSELS) SO THAT WE CAN HELP TO KEEP THE PRESSURE UP ON NON-COMMUNITY NATO COUNTRIES. PRESUMABLY THE ITALIANS AS PRESIDENCY SHOULD BE ASKED TO TAKE THIS ON.

6. ON OTHER POINTS I SHOULD WELCOME GUIDANCE ON YOUR INTENTIONS WITH REGARD TO:

- (I) LOWER LEVEL EXCHANGES BETWEEN FOREIGN MINISTRIES, EG ON DISARMAMENT QUESTIONS AND CSCE. IN PARTICULAR ARE WE PROPOSING TO CONTINUE THE DIALOGUE WITH THE RUSSIANS ON CBMS IN THE PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES?
- (II) ACTION INVOLVING OTHER MEMBERS OF THE WARSAW PACT. I ASSUME THAT IN SOME CASES (EG EXPORT OF TECHNOLOGY) MEASURES WILL HAVE TO BE APPLIED TO ALL WARSAW PACT OR COMECON COUNTRIES TO AVOID CIRCUMVENTION, BUT THAT IN OTHER CASES YOU WILL WISH TO DISCRIMINATE BETWEEN THOSE COUNTRIES WHICH HAVE WHOLEHEARTEDLY ENDORSED SOVIET ACTION (EG THE GDR) AND THOSE WHOSE RELUCTANCE TO DO SO HAS BEEN MORE OR LESS APPARENT. I SHOULD BE GLAD TO KNOW WHAY YOU WISH ME TO SAY ABOUT THIS.

TO SAY ABOUT THIS.

7. I SHOULD ALSO WELCOME ANY ASSESSMENT WHICH HAS BEEN MADE IN LONDON OF SOVIET MOTIVES AND OBJECTIVES, INCLUDING OUR VIEW OF WHAT CALCULATIONS THE RUSSIANS MADE ABOUT THE POSSIBLE CONSEQUENCES OF THEIR ACTIONS AND THE EXTENT TO WHICH THEY MAY EITHER HAVE MISCALCULATED WESTERN AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL REACTIONS OR DISCOUNTED THEM. IT WOULD ALSO BE HELPFUL TO KNOW WHAT LIGHT (IF ANY) IT IS THOUGHT THAT RECENT EVENTS SHED ON THE CURRENT LEADERSHIP SITUATION IN MOSCOW. I FOUND MOSCOW TELNO 872 OF 30 DECEMBER MOST HELPFUL IN THIS CONTEXT, BUT I ASSUME THAT MORE RECENT ASSESSMENTS HAVE BEEN MADE IN LONDON AND I WOULD FIND IT VALUABLE TO BE ABLE TO DRAW ON THESE IN COUNCIL.

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MR CORTAZZI

MR FERGUSSON

MR MURRAY

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TELEGRAM NUMBER 31 OF 9 JANUARY

INFO PRIORITY UKDEL NATO MOSCOW PARIS OTTAWA ROME WASHINGTON.

AFGHANISTAN: FRG REACTIONS.

1. CHANCELLOR SCHMIDT RETURNS TO BONN TODAY AFTER HIS HOLIDAY IN MAJORCA, HIS VISIT TO MADRID AND A BRIEF STOP IN PARIS TO CONSULT PRESIDENT GISCARD ON THE RETURN JOURNEY. HE WILL PRESIDE OVER A MEETING OF THE FEDERAL SECURITY COUNCIL TOMORROW TO DISCUSS AFGHANISTAN BUT TODAY'S DISCUSSION IN THE FEDERAL CABINET WILL BE CHAIRED BY GENSCHER. SCHMIDT IS DUE TO MAKE A GOVERNMENT DECLARATION IN THE BUNDESTAG ON 17 JANUARY, THE DAY AFTER IT RESUMES FOLLOWING THE CHRISTMAS BREAK.

2. SCHMIDT'S ABSENCE FROM THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC FOR NEARLY TWO WEEKS SINCE THE NEWS OF THE RUSSIAN INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN BROKE HAS BEEN DULY REGISTERED BY POLITICAL CIRCLES AND THE PRESS. WHILE THERE HAS BEEN NO PARTICULAR CLAMOUR FOR HIM TO RETURN EARLY AND WHILE POLITICAL PARTIES HAVE IN GENERAL BEEN RESTRAINED IN SUCH CRITICISMS AS THEY HAVE MADE OF FEDERAL GOVERNMENT STATEMENTS AND ACTIONS SINCE THE CRISIS BEGAN, THE PRESS HAS

STATEMENTS AND ACTIONS SINCE THE CRISIS BEGAN, THE PRESS HAS BEEN MORE FORTHRIGHT PARTICULARLY IN THE LAST TWO OR THREE DAYS.

3. THERE IS GENERAL AGREEMENT ACROSS THE POLITICAL SPECTRUM ON THE NEED TO PRESERVE DETENTE AND HENCE TO CONTINUE TO NEGOTIATE WITH THE EAST ON ARMS CONTROL. IN AN INTERVIEW PUBLISHED IN TODAY'S GENERAL ANZEIGER, THE CDU FOREIGN POLICY SPOKESMAN, MERTES, WITH THE SUPPORT OF KOHL, DECLARED THE OPPOSITION'S BROAD AGREEMENT WITH THE GOVERNMENT LINE. GENSCHER HAS BEEN DILLIGENT IN BRIEFING THE THREE PARTIES SEPARATELY AND HAS EMPHASISED THAT CONTROVERSY WOULD DAMAGE GERMAN INTERESTS, PARTICULARLY AS REGARDS BERLIN. ALTHOUGH MARX (RIGHT WING CDU) HAS CALLED FOR A NEW TOUGHER COURSE IN GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY, CRITICISM GENERALLY FROM THAT PART OF THE POLITICAL SPECTRUM HAS BEEN CONFINED TO ARGUMENT ABOUT THE MERITS OF SPECIFIC COURSES OF ACTIONS SUCH AS THE POSSIBLE BOYCOTT OF THE OLYMPIC GAMES (ON WHICH VIEWS SEEM TO BE FAIRLY EVENLY DIVIDED WITH A MAJORITY AGAINST) RATHER THAN CALLING THE POLICY OF DETENTE INTO QUESTION. STRAUSS HAS BEEN NOTICEABLY VAGUE IN HIS FEW CRITICAL COMMENTS SO FAR.

4. SOME SECTIONS OF THE PRESS ON THE OTHER HAND HAVE BEEN MORE FORTHRIGHT IN THEIR CRITICISM. THEY HAVE POINTED OUT THAT DESPITE GENSCHER'S DECLARED AIM OF DEMONSTRATING EUROPEAN SOLIDARITY WITH THE UNITED STATES LITTLE HAS BEEN ACHIEVED IN THIS DIRECTION SO FAR. IN A SHARP EDITORIAL THIS MORNING THE FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG (FAZ) COMMENTS THAT MOSCOW WAS BANKING ON THE QUOTE CHAMBERLAIN FIGURES UNQUOTE OF THE ERA TO DO ITS WORK FOR THEM AND REFERS IN THIS CONTEXT TO BRANDT'S CALL FOR MORE DETENTE. IT REFERS TO THE BRIEFNESS AND OBLIQUENESS OF SCHMIDT'S REFERENCE TO AFGHANISTAN IN HIS REVISED NEW YEAR'S SPEECH, WHICH GIVEN THE TIMING, WAS QUOTE A MISERABLE AND THOROUGHLY INAPPROPRIATE RESPONSE WHICH BETRAYED UNCERTAINTY UNQUOTE. ACCORDING TO FAZ THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT HAS CONTINUED TO SHY AWAY FROM A CONDEMNATION OF RUSSIAN ACTION. MRS THATCHER ON THE OTHER HAND IS CLEARLY TAKING EFFECTIVE STEPS. THE UNITED STATES, UNLIKE BONN, APPEARS TO REALISE THAT IF THE WEST BACKS DOWN, MOSCOW'S CALCULATION WILL BE PROVED RIGHT.

5. BUT THE PRESS ALSO SUPPORT THE CONTINUATION OF DETENTE. AS DER SPIEGEL COMMENTS THIS WEEK QUOTE BERLIN IS MORE IMPORTANT THAN KABUL UNQUOTE. BUT IN ACCEPTING THAT THE GOVERNMENT MUST TRY TO SALVAGE WHAT CAN REASONABLY BE PRESERVED OF DETENTE POLICY THE PRESS IS GENERALLY CRITICAL OF THE LACK OF A SERIES OF CONCRETE MEASURES WHICH WOULD DETER MOSCOW FROM FURTHER AGGRESSION E.G. IN YUGOSLAVIA.

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TO IMMEDIATE FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE,

TELEGRAM NUMBER 018 OF 8 JANUARY 1980,

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, BONN, PARIS, MOSCOW,

INFO PRIORITY OTHER NATO POSTS, UKMIS NEW YORK, UKREP BRUSSELS.

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MY TELNO 16 : AFGHANISTAN AND EAST/WEST RELATIONS.

1. AT THE MEETING OF THE SENIOR POLITICAL COMMITTEE (SPC) THIS AFTERNOON SEVERAL DELEGATIONS PROVIDED FURTHER DETAILS OF MEASURES TAKEN OR UNDER CONSIDERATION BY THEIR GOVERNMENTS IN RESPONSE TO THE SOVIET ACTION. MOST DELEGATIONS AGREED THAT PRIORITY SHOULD BE GIVEN BY THE SPC TO THE COMPILATION OF A LIST OF SUCH MEASURES FOR SUBMISSION TO THE COUNCIL AT ITS NEXT MEETING. THE FRENCH ARGUED THAT IT WOULD BE BETTER TO AGREE FIRST ON AN ANALYSIS OF SOVIET MOTIVES AND THE OBJECTIVES OF WESTERN RESPONSES, BUT THEY DID NOT IN THE END OPPOSE THE PRODUCTION OF A CATALOGUE OF MEASURES, AND HAVE ACQUESCED IN THE PREPARATION OF A WRITTEN QUOTE SUMMING-UP UNQUOTE BY THE CHAIRMAN WHICH WILL COVER BOTH ASPECTS OF THE SPC'S DISCUSSIONS.

2. SCOTT (UK) CIRCULATED THE LIST OF MEASURES IN MY TELNO 17, OMITTING NUMBERS 2, 5 AND 7. HE EMPHASISED THAT THE UK WOULD PREFER TO TAKE THESE STEPS WITHIN THE NEXT DAY OR TWO, BUT WISHED TO ACT AS FAR AS POSSIBLE IN CONJUNCTION WITH OTHER ALLIES, PARTICULARLY IN THE CASE OF TRANSFER OF CREDIT, HE WENT ON TO MAKE THE POINTS IN PARAS 1 AND 2 OF YOUR TELNO 8.

3. THE PORTUGUESE REPRESENTATIVE RECALLED THAT HIS GOVERNMENT HAD MADE TWO STRONGLY-WORDED PRESS STATEMENTS, AND HAD DELIVERED A TOUGH NOTE TO THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR IN LISBON, WHICH WOULD BE PUBLISHED. THEY HAD RECALLED THEIR AMBASSADOR FROM MOSCOW. OF THE MEASURES IN THE UK LIST HE ENVISAGED THAT NUMBER 1 AND 2 WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE TO LISBON: THE REMAINDER DID NOT APPLY. FINALLY HE OBSERVED THAT MOST OF THE MEASURES WHICH PORTUGAL COULD TAKE WOULD NOT IN PRACTICE HURT THE SOVIET UNION: BUT THEY COULD TAKE STEPS (EG IN TRADE) WHICH WOULD HURT PORTUGAL. DID OTHER ALLIES HAVE VIEWS ON THIS PROBLEM?

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4. OSTREM (NORWAY) SAID THAT BECAUSE OF THE DELICATE BILATERAL PROBLEMS ON THE NORTHERN FLANK, THE MAIN SCOPE FOR RETALIATORY ACTION FOR HIS GOVERNMENT WOULD BE IN THE FIELDS OF VISITS IN POLITICAL, MILITARY AND CULTURAL AREAS. AS REGARDS COMMERCIAL RELATIONS, THE RUSSIANS WERE ANXIOUS TO BUY ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY EQUIPMENT EG FOR FISH EXPLORATION ETC: HE WENT ON TO QUERY HOW THE U S DEFINED QUOTE ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY UNQUOTE.

5. OSTREM CONTINUED THAT CSCE AND MBFR SHOULD BE MAINTAINED: PREPARATIONS FOR MADRID SHOULD CONTINUE, AND THE SCIENTIFIC FORUM SHOULD NOT BE CANCELLED. ON THE OLYMPICS, NORWAY WAS SCEPTICAL OF THE WISDOM OF MINGLING POLITICS AND SPORT. THERE WAS NO PRECEDENT FOR A BOYCOTT, WHICH WOULD BE HIGHLY CONTROVERSIAL. AS TO REALTIONS WITH AFGHANISTAN, THESE HAD BEEN CONDUCTED FROM TEHERAN, BUT THE ENTIRE EMBASSY THERE HAD NOW BEEN RECALLED. THERE WERE NO BILATERAL ASSISTANCE AGREEMENT, AND PRACTICALLY NO TRADE.

6. WILSON (US) SAID THAT ON THE SUPPLY OF ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY EQUIPMENT THE PRESIDENT HAD ORDERED A REVIEW OF LICENSES ALREADY ISSUED (EG FOR OIL DRILLING EQUIPMENT). HE ALSO QUERIED WHETHER THE ABSENCE OF A REFERENCE TO VISITS BY BREZHNEV/KOSYGIN IN THE UK LIST MEANT THAT THESE REMAINED UNDER CONSIDERATION.

7. PFEFFER (FRG) THEN READ OUT A LIST OF THE MEASURES THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT HAD DECIDED TO TAKE, AS FOLLOWS:

- I) THEY UNDERSTOOD THE US DECISION TO SHELVE THE SENATE DEBATE ON SALT II, BUT WELCOMED THE PARALLEL DECLARATION THAT THE RATIFICATION OF SALT II REMAINED OF FUNDAMENTAL IMPORTANCE:
- II) THEY AGREED THAT EXISTING ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS, AND CSCE, SHOULD BE PURSUED:
- III) THE GERMAN AMBASSADOR IN MOSCOW HAD BEEN RECALLED FOR CONSULTATIONS AND WOULD RETURN LATER WITH FRESH INSTRUCTIONS TO RESUME HIS DIALOGUE IN MOSCOW:
- IV) THE PRESENT POLICY OF APPLYING RESTRICTIONS ON DIPLOMATS' TRAVEL RECIPROCALLY WOULD CONTINUE, AS WOULD THE POLICY OF MAINTAINING EQUAL STAFFS IN THE RESPECTIVE EMBASSIES.
- V) THE PROGRAMME OF VISITS WAS UNDER REVIEW: THE GERMANS AGREED WITH THE U S CRITERIA FOR PERMITTING VISITS:
- IV) A PROJECTED VISIT BY MEMBERS OF THE BUNDESTAG TO MOSCOW WOULD BE REVIEWED:

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- VII) VISITS BY MINISTERS FROM DEPARTMENTS OTHER THAN THE FOREIGN OFFICE WOULD BE REVIEWED:
- VIII) THE PLANNED SESSION OF THE MIXED GERMAN/SOVIET COMMISSION WOULD BE DEALT WITH AS SOON AS THE RESPONSIBLE MINISTERS RETURNED TO BONN:
- IX) THE RUSSIANS HAD AS YET OFFERED NO (NO) DATE FOR VISITS TO MOSCOW BY SCHMIDT AND GENSCHER:
- X) THEY AGREED WITH THE U S VIEW ON THE OLYMPICS:
- XI) ON CIVIL AVIATION, THERE WOULD BE NO (NO) FURTHER NEGOTIATIONS ON AN EXTENSION OF THE AEROFLOT SERVICES.
- XII) DISCUSSIONS ON THE SCIENTIFIC/TECHNICAL AND CULTURAL AGREEMENTS WOULD BE DISCONTINUED:
- XIII) THE GERMAN GOVERNMENT DID NOT OFFER OFFICIAL CREDIT OR PAY CREDIT SUBSIDIES TO PRIVATE COMPANIES:
- XIV) THEY WOULD NOT ACCEPT CONTRACTS OFFERED AS A RESULT OF ACTION TAKEN IN THE COMMERCIAL FIELD BY ANOTHER ALLY:
- XV) THEY AGREED THAT STRICT APPLICATION OF THE COCOM RULES WAS NECESSARY, AND WERE EXAMINING THE POSSIBILITY OF CURTAILING THE EXPORT OF NON-STRATEGIC HIGH TECHNOLOGY ITEMS BY DENYING EXPORT GUARANTEES.

8. JESSEL (FRANCE) QUOTED FROM REMARKS MADE BY M. FRANCOIS-PONCET TO THE PRESS ON 6 JANUARY (PARIS TELNO 26 TO FCO) AND ADDED THAT FRANCE WOULD NOT BE PREPARED TO TAKE ACTION ON ANY OF THE MEASURES SO FAR PUT FORWARD.

9. BALKAR (TURKEY) SAID THAT HIS AUTHORITIES WERE THINKING OF FREEZING THE NUMBER OF DIPLOMATS IN THE SOVIET EMBASSY AT ANKARA. THERE WAS NO NEED FOR HASTY DECISIONS ON THE OLYMPICS, OR CSCE.

10. THE DUTCH, CANADIAN AND ITALIAN REPRESENTATIVES REPORTED THAT THEIR AUTHORITIES WERE ENGAGED IN URGENT STUDY OF MEASURES WHICH MIGHT BE TAKEN: BUT NONE EXPECTED TO BE IN A POSITION TO REPORT DECISIONS BEFORE THE END OF THE WEEK.

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TO IMMEDIATE FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE,
TELEGRAM NUMBER 017 OF 8 JANUARY 1980,
INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, BONN, PARIS, MOSCOW,
INFO PRIORITY ALL OTHER NATO POSTS, UKMIS NEW YORK, UKREP
BRUSSELS.

MIPT: AFGHANISTAN AND EAST WEST RELATIONS

FOLLOWING IS LIST OF PROPOSED MEASURES

1. CANCELLATION OF ALL ARRANGEMENTS FOR VISITS BETWEEN THE SOVIET UNION AND THE UNITED KINGDOM AT THE LEVEL OF MINISTER OR DEPUTY MINISTER.

SQUARE BRACKETS BEGIN

2. CANCELLATION OR POSTPONEMENT OF ALL ARRANGEMENTS FOR BILATERAL EXCHANGES AND VISITS INVOLVING SENIOR OFFICIALS. SQUARE BRACKETS END.

END.

3. CANCELLATION OR POSTPONEMENT OF MAJOR EVENTS UNDER BILATERAL CULTURAL EXCHANGE PROGRAMMES.

4. CANCELLATION OF PLANS FOR EXCHANGES OF VISITS BETWEEN MILITARY STAFF COLLEGES, AND OTHER MILITARY EXCHANGES.

SQUARE BRACKETS BEGIN

5. KEEP OFFICIAL GOVERNMENTAL REPRESENTATION AT THE MOSCOW OLYMPICS UNDER CLOSE AND CONTINUOUS REVIEW. SQUARE BRACKETS END.

6. MORE STRINGENT APPLICATION OF COCOM RULES TO SALES OF TECHNOLOGY AND EQUIPMENT SUCH AS COMPUTERS TO THE USSR.

SQUARE BRACKETS BEGIN

7. WE INTEND TO REDUCE THE PRIVILEGES IN THE FIELD OF CIVIL AVIATION GRANTED TO THE RUSSIANS OUTSIDE THE BILATERAL AIR SERVICES AGREEMENT SQUARE BRACKETS END.

8. APPLICATION OF OECD CONSENSUS TERMS TO ALL OFFICIALLY SUPPORTED EXPORT CREDIT TO THE SOVIET UNION.

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TO IMMEDIATE FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE,
TELEGRAM NUMBER 016 OF 8 JANUARY 1980,
INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, BONN, PARIS, MOSCOW,
INFO PRIORITY ALL OTHER NATO POSTS, UKMIS NEW YORK, UKREP
BRUSSELS.

Prime Minutes ②
9.1.80

MY TELNO 7: AFGHANISTAN AND EAST-WEST RELATIONS.

1. AT THE PERMREPS LUNCH TODAY THERE WAS A LONG DISCUSSION ABOUT THE HANDLING OF THE CONCLUSIONS REACHED AT THE MEETING REPORTED IN MY TELEGRAM UNDER REFERENCE AND THE TIMETABLE FOR FURTHER ACTION. THE SECRETARY GENERAL REPORTED HIS UNDERSTANDING OF THE REMITS GIVEN TO THE SPC AND POLITICAL COMMITTEE ON THE LINES OF PARAGRAPH (1) AND (2) OF MY TELEGRAM UNDER REFERENCE AND SAID THAT HE ENVISAGED REPORTS BEING MADE TO THE COUNCIL, POSSIBLY IN THE FORM OF CHAIRMAN'S SUMMARIES OF CONCLUSIONS. ARNAUD (FRANCE) DISPUTED THE SUGGESTION THAT THERE HAD BEEN ANY AGREEMENT ON DRAWING UP CONCLUSIONS OR THAT THERE COULD BE ANY QUESTION OF THE COUNCIL COLLECTIVELY MAKING RECOMMENDATIONS TO GOVERNMENTS. HE WAS PREPARED TO ACCEPT THAT DISCUSSION IN THE COUNCIL SHOULD BE ON THE BASIS OF AN EXCHANGE OF VIEWS ON THE FACTS AS ASCERTAINED BY THE TWO COMMITTEES, AND INDIVIDUAL DELEGATIONS WOULD THEN REPORT TO THEIR GOVERNMENTS FOR CONSIDERATION OF ANY APPROPRIATE ACTION. IN THE SUBSEQUENT DISCUSSION SEVERAL PERMREPS EMPHASISED THAT THERE WAS NO QUESTION OF THE COUNCIL TAKING DECISIONS OR INDEED OF THE ALLIANCE AGREEING ON COLLECTIVE ACTION. THE INTENTION OF THE EXERCISE WAS TO ACHIEVE THE MAXIMUM HARMONY IN THE MEASURES OUR GOVERNMENTS TOOK AND THIS COULD BEST BE ACHIEVED BY COORDINATING OUR EFFORTS THROUGH THE COUNCIL BUT WITHOUT IN ANY WAY PREJUDICING THE PREROGATIVE OF INDIVIDUAL GOVERNMENTS. THE MATTER WAS LEFT ON THIS BASIS AND I HOPE WE SHALL NOW HAVE NO FURTHER TROUBLE WITH THE FRENCH OVER THE NATURE OF THE REPORTS TO BE PRODUCED BY THE TWO COMMITTEES. THE COUNCIL MEETING ON THE AFTERNOON OF 15 JANUARY WAS CONFIRMED. VAN WELL (FRG), RUTTEN (NETHERLANDS), HOLST (NORWAY) AND CHRISTOPHER (US) WILL ALMOST CERTAINLY ATTEND. MOST OTHERS HAVE NO INSTRUCTIONS EXCEPT FOR FRANCE AND TURKEY, WHO WILL BOTH BE REPRESENTED BY THEIR PERMREPS.

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/ 2. I HAD MUCH

2. I HAD MUCH MORE DIFFICULTY OVER OUR PROPOSAL FOR CONSIDERATION OF IMMEDIATE MEASURES TO BE ANNOUNCED IN THE MIDDLE OF THIS WEEK (YOUR TELNO 25 TO WASHINGTON). THERE WAS VIRTUAL UNANIMITY AMONG THE PERMREPS THAT IT WOULD BE PREMATURE TO TRY TO REACH ANY CONCLUSIONS AT A COUNCIL MEETING TOMORROW AS I HAD SUGGESTED, SINCE MOST GOVERNMENTS HAD NOT YET CONSIDERED THEIR POLICIES AND IN ANY CASE THE WORK OF THE SPC HAD NOT YET GOT FAR ENOUGH. PAULS (FRG) WHO IS RETURNING TO BONN ON 10 JANUARY FOR A MEETING TO DISCUSS THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT'S POSITION AND HARDY (CANADA) WHOSE GOVERNMENT IS NOT DUE TO ADDRESS THE SUBJECT UNTIL 11 JANUARY WERE ESPECIALLY OPPOSED TO AN EARLY MEETING. THEY WERE SUPPORTED BY MOST OTHERS, ALTHOUGH ARNAUD DID NOT TAKE PART IN THIS DISCUSSION, AND THERE WERE EVEN SOME SUGGESTIONS THAT IT WOULD BE BETTER TO DEFER CONSIDERATION OF ANY ANNOUNCEMENTS UNTIL THE COUNCIL MEETING ON 15 JANUARY.

3. I ARGUED STRONGLY THE CASE FOR EARLIER ACTION. I SAID THAT WE WERE IN FAVOUR OF THE MAXIMUM CONSULTATION WITH OUR ALLIES WITH A VIEW TO CONCERTING THE MEASURES TAKEN BY INDIVIDUAL ALLIED GOVERNMENTS. WE ALSO ATTACHED IMPORTANCE TO BEING ABLE TO ANNOUNCE AT LE^{AST} SOME MEASURES QUICKLY IN ORDER TO SHOW THAT OUR CONDEMNATION OF THE SOVIET ACTION WAS NOT CONFINED TO WORDS. THE U S ADMINISTRATION HAD ALREADY ANNOUNCED A SERIES OF MEASURES AND THEIR EUROPEAN ALLIES SHOULD NOT BE SEEN TO BE LAGGING FAR BEHIND. GLITMAN (US) EMPHASISED THE IMPORTANCE THAT HIS AUTHORITIES ATTACHED TO THIS LAST POINT, AS A MEANS OF DEMONSTRATING ALLIANCE SOLIDARITY WITH THE UNITED STATES STAND. I CONTINUED THAT WHILE WE WERE ANXIOUS NOT TO GET OUT AHEAD OF OUR EUROPEAN ALLIES, WE MIGHT HAVE TO MAKE A JUDGEMENT AS TO WHETHER THE NEED FOR AN EARLY ANNOUNCEMENT OUTWEIGHED THE DESIRABILITY OF BEING ABLE TO ACT IN CONCERT. I GAVE MY COLLEAGUES AN INDICATION OF THE IMMEDIATE MEASURES WE WERE CONSIDERING (AS DISCUSSED BY TELEPHONE WITH FERGUSSON) AND SAID THAT THESE WERE BEING PUT FORWARD BY SCOTT IN THE SPC THIS AFTERNOON. I FELT SURE MY AUTHORITIES WOULD TAKE THE VIEW THAT TO DELAY THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF ANY MEASURES UNTIL AFTER THE COUNCIL MEETING ON 15 JANUARY WOULD NOT BE ACCEPTABLE. BUT I WAS PREPARED TO CONSULT THEM ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF POSTPONING THE COUNCIL MEETING TO CONSIDER IMMEDIATE MEASURES UNTIL THE MORNING OF 11 JANUARY, IF THIS WOULD ENABLE OTHER GOVERNMENTS TO REACH CONSIDERED VIEWS BY THEN.

4. IT WAS LEFT THAT I WOULD INFORM THE SECRETARY GENERAL BY FIRST THING ON 9 JANUARY IF I COULD AGREE TO THIS POSTPONEMENT. ALTHOUGH THE VIEWS EXPRESSED INDICATE A LACK OF URGENCY ON THE PART OF OUR ALLIES, SOME OF THEM OF COURSE HAVE SPECIAL PROBLEMS, EG THE GERMANS, WHICH DO NOT APPLY TO THE SAME EXTENT TO US. PAULS URGED MY PRIVATELY, AFTER THE LUNCH, TO AGREE TO POSTPONEMENT, SINCE HE HOPES TO BE ABLE TO GET BACK AFTER THURSDAY'S MEETING IN BONN WITH A CLEARER, AND FIRMER, POSITION THAN HIS EXISTING INSTRUCTIONS PERMIT. I AM THEREFORE GLAD THAT, AS FERGUSON HAS JUST INFORMED ME BY TELEPHONE, YOU ARE ABLE TO AGREE TO DEFER THE MEETING UNTIL THE MORNING OF 11 JANUARY. I RECOMMEND THAT I SHOULD BE INSTRUCTED TO INFORM THE COUNCIL AT THAT MEETING THAT WE INTEND TO GO AHEAD WITH THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF CERTAIN IMMEDIATE MEASURES BEFORE THE WEEKEND EVEN IF ALL OUR ALLIES ARE NOT BY THEN READY TO JOIN US.

5. MIFT CONTAINS THE LIST OF MEASURES I READ OUT TO THE PERMREPS. ON YOUR INSTRUCTIONS ITEMS 2, 5 AND 7 WERE OMITTED FROM THE LIST SCOTT CIRCULATED TO THE SPC. I HOPE IT MAY BE POSSIBLE BY THE TIME OF FRIDAY'S MEETING TO REINSTATE ITEM 5.

ROSE.

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Prime Minister ②

FM WASHINGTON 081807Z JAN 80

9.1.80

TO PRIORITY FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
 TELEGRAM NUMBER 105 OF 8 JANUARY 1980
 INFO UKDEL NATO, KABUL, MOSCOW, ISLAMABAD, NEW DELHI, OTTAWA, BONN,
 PARIS, ROME, PEKING, MODUK, UKMIS NEW YORK..

MIPT: SOVIET TROOPS IN AFGHANISTAN.

1. ACCORDING TO OUR INTELLIGENCE CONTACTS IN THE PENTAGON, HARD EVIDENCE ONLY EXISTS OF TWO SOVIET DIVISIONS ON AFGHAN TERRITORY, WITH DIVISIONAL SUPPORT, MISCELLANEOUS TROOP FORMATIONS AND UNITS OF THE SOVIET AIR FORCE (ABOUT 50 AIRCRAFT). THIS GIVES A SURE TOTAL OF A MINIMUM OF 40 TO 45,000 MEN.

2. THE PENTAGON BELIEVE THAT THERE ARE AT LEAST TWO DIVISIONS WHICH COULD BE PREPARING TO MOVE FROM THE SOVIET UNION INTO AFGHANISTAN, BUT THEY PRESUME THAT THESE ARE STILL ON SOVIET TERRITORY. IF THEY ENTERED AFGHANISTAN THIS WOULD PRODUCE AN EXTRA 25,000 TROOPS THERE, GIVING A POSSIBLE TOTAL OF A MAXIMUM OF SOME 70,000.

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FM JEDDAH 081500Z JAN

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 36 OF 8TH JANUARY 1980

REPEATED PRIORITY WASHINGTON, MOSCOW, UKDEL NATO, UKMIS NEW YORK,
ANKARA, ROUTINE TO MUSCAT, ISLAMABAD.

Prime Minister ②

9.1.80

SAUDI REACTION TO AFGHANISTAN

1. MR HOWELL WAS RECEIVED THIS MORNING BY THE KING WHO, THOUGH OFFERED THE CHANCE TO DISCUSS AFGHANISTAN, HAD LITTLE TO SAY EXCEPT THAT IT WAS ALL THE FAULT OF THE WEST. PEOPLE OF RELIGION SHOULD BAND TOGETHER TO RESIST THE GODLESS. ALL WOULD BE CURED BY FAITH.
2. PRINCE FAH'D WAS PRESENT BRIEFLY BUT WAS UNABLE TO ARRANGE AN APPOINTMENT WITH MR HOWELL BECAUSE THE CABINET IS SITTING TODAY TO DECIDE THE FATE OF THE MECCA DISSIDENTS. HE DID, HOWEVER, SEND AN ORAL MESSAGE WHICH WAS PASSED TO MR HOWELL OVER THE LUNCH TABLE. FOLLOWING IS THE GIST, GIVEN TO ME BY MR HOWELL. YOU WILL BEAR IN MIND THAT IT IS NOW THIRD-HAND.
3. PRINCE FAH'D SAID THAT EVENTS IN AFGHANISTAN WERE THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE WEST AND IN PARTICULAR OF THE US AND GREAT BRITAIN. WE HAD FOR TOO LONG FAILED TO RESPOND TO RUSSIAN MOVES OR HAD RESPONDED TOO LATE OR SUPPORTED THE WRONG SIDE. WE HAD, FOR EXAMPLE, FAILED TO SUPPORT THE SAUDIS: INDEED WE HAD SUPPORTED THE ETHIOPIANS. IT WAS TIME FOR US, AT LAST, TO TAKE ACTION. IF WE DID NOT ACT NOW, THE STATES OF THE AREA COULD BE PLUCKED OFF ONE BY ONE. PDRY WOULD BE THE FIRST TO GO, AND THEN OMAN. KHOMEINI COULD AT ANY TIME BE REPLACED BY A LEFT-WING REGIME. SAUDI ARABIA WOULD THEN FIND HER ENEMIES WERE AT HER VERY GATES.

14.

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4. PRINCE FAH'D STRESSED THAT THERE WAS NEED FOR THE MOST ROBUST ACTION. IT WAS A WESTERN RESPONSIBILITY; THERE WAS NO USE EXPECTING THE NON-ALIGNED TO PICK UP THE TAB, THOUGH THEY WOULD DO THEIR BEST TO FOLLOW IF THE WEST WOULD GIVE A LEAD. FORCE SHOULD BE MET WITH FORCE: THE RUSSIANS DID NOT UNDERSTAND ANYTHING ELSE. PRINCE FAHD GAVE NO INDICATION OF WHAT PRECISE ACTION HE HAD IN MIND.
5. MED PLEASE REPEAT FURTHER IF NECESSARY

CRAIG

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DESKBY MOSCOW 090600Z

DESKBY KABUL 090600Z

DESKBY PEKING 090300Z

FM UKMIS NEW YORK 090042Z JAN 80

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 63 OF 8 JANUARY

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON PARIS BONN OTTAWA MOSCOW KABUL

PEKING PRIORITY MANILA ISLAMABAD UKDEL NATO

Prime Minister ^②

9-1-80

MT

MY TELNO 48: AFGHANISTAN: UNITING FOR PEACE

1. AT THIS MORNING'S CONSULTATION OF THE WESTERN FIVE (MY TELNO 62 - NOT TO ALL) THE AMERICANS SAID THAT THEIR CONTACTS WITH YANGO (PHILIPPINES) EARLIER THIS MORNING HAD NOT BEEN ENCOURAGING. DESPITE PRESS REPORTS TO THE CONTRARY, YANGO STILL INSISTED THAT HE HAD NOT RECEIVED INSTRUCTIONS TO TABLE A RESOLUTION IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL UNDER THE UNITING FOR PEACE PROCEDURE. ON THE OTHER HAND NAIK (PAKISTAN) HAD TOLD THE AMERICANS THAT THE SAUDI ARABIAN PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE HAD RECEIVED AUTHORITY FROM HIS GOVERNMENT TO TAKE THE LEAD IN PUTTING A RESOLUTION TO THE COUNCIL. UNDER RULE 38 OF THE COUNCIL RULES OF PROCEDURE THIS COULD BE PUT TO THE VOTE AT THE REQUEST OF A COUNCIL MEMBER. PORTUGAL AND NORWAY SAID THAT, IF NECESSARY, THEY WOULD ASK FOR SUCH A VOTE BUT BOTH BELIEVED THE REQUEST WOULD BE BETTER COMING FROM A MEMBER OF THE NON-ALIGNED GROUP. MCHENRY SAID NAIK AND THE SAUDI WERE MEANWHILE TRYING TO DRUM UP BROAD BASED NON-ALIGNED SUPPORT FOR THE PROPOSAL AND THAT THE AMERICANS HOPED THE COUNCIL WOULD MEET LATER TODAY TO VOTE ON IT.

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2. THERE HAS HOWEVER BEEN DELAY. EARLY THIS EVENING YANGO STILL CLAIMED NOT TO HAVE RECEIVED INSTRUCTIONS FROM HIS GOVERNMENT. BUT THE CHINESE HAVE TOLD THE AMERICANS THAT YANGO HAS IN FACT RECEIVED INSTRUCTIONS TO SUPPORT SUCH AN INITIATIVE BUT NOT TO LEAD IT WITHOUT THE BACKING OF THE REST OF THE NON-ALIGNED COUNCIL MEMBERS. MEANWHILE THE AMERICANS HAVE HEARD THAT BOTH BANGLADESH AND JAMAICA HAVE BEEN ADVISING YANGO AGAINST TAKING FURTHER ACTION ON AFGHANSITAN. TO COMPLICATE MATTERS FURTHER NAIK HAS TOLD THE AMERICANS THAT HE AND THE SAUDIS ARE HAVING DIFFICULTY GETTING WIDER NON-ALIGNED SUPPORT FROM NON-COUNCIL MEMBERS.

PARSONS

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cc Press Office Afghanistan

BF 16.1.80

(2)

Prime Minister

Lord Carrington told you that he would be circulating this minute. Serious action is being taken in our response to the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan.

Hand 9/1

PM/80/4

PRIME MINISTER

Soviet Intervention in Afghanistan

1. Following my minute of 2 January to members of OD, we have been pressing on with the discussion of British and Western reactions to the Soviet intervention. The UK took the lead in calling for discussion in the United Nations Security Council, which resulted satisfactorily in the USSR having to veto a Resolution sponsored by the Non-Aligned. In view of the new importance, following Afghanistan, of developing our relations with countries in the region, I am off tomorrow on a visit to Turkey, Oman, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and India. We are withdrawing our Ambassador from Afghanistan, reducing the Embassy staff, closing the British Council office and cutting off our aid apart from allowing Afghan students to stay in Britain.
2. I am firmly convinced that it is very important that Western countries should react to the invasion of Afghanistan in ways which will demonstrate to the Soviet Union, and to the Soviet people, that aggression brings penalties. The strength and durability of the Western reactions will influence the likelihood of further Soviet moves of this kind in the future. President Carter has already announced some important steps which should hurt the Russians, notably the restriction on grain sales. At British suggestion, discussion is taking place in NATO about the measures which the members of the Alliance could take in their relations with the USSR. Some of our Allies, notably the French, may well remain reluctant to do anything much. A meeting of the NATO Council with ministerial participation, which Douglas Hurd will be attending on 15 January, should show whether concerted action is possible.

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3. So far as the UK is concerned, I think there is inter-departmental agreement at official level that we can join in concerted moves by members of NATO to abstain from top level and ministerial and deputy ministerial contacts with the USSR for three months and perhaps longer; end the special preferential credit rates at present available to the Russians and not replace the Anglo-Soviet credit agreement which expires next month; cancel military exchanges, such as naval visits; and apply the full rigour of the COCOM restrictions on exports of sensitive technology to the USSR.

4. But I am not satisfied that these measures alone would meet the major need for a firm move against the Russians. I hope my colleagues will agree on further measures, in the economic field. I suggest that the UK should press in the European Community for moves to prevent any supply to the Soviet Union of grain which would help to replace that withheld by the United States; to halt butter exports to the Soviet Union by removing the much criticised export subsidy; and to consider restriction of sugar sales. I think we should also be ready to join with our Allies in a study of whether civil technology which the USSR needs from the West should be brought under restrictions. Officials, in urgently studying these measures, should also consider what scope the Soviet Union would have for counter-moves. It would of course be important, until joint decisions were taken in these fields, to take all precautions to prevent leaks to the press.

5. I believe that few things would hurt Soviet prestige more than the absence of a number of Western countries from the Olympic Games this year. But we face the major difficulty that the decision on British participation is not for the government. On the other hand, if we do not advise those concerned in Britain against participation in the Games, we could be criticised for inconsistency in the light of our advice that the rugby tour of South Africa should not go ahead. I should be interested to know Michael Heseltine's views on this problem.

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/6. ..



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6. I am copying this minute to our colleagues in OD, to Keith Joseph, David Howell, Michael Heseltine, Peter Walker and Michael Havers, and to the Secretary to the Cabinet.

C

(CARRINGTON)

Foreign and Commonwealth Office
8 January 1980

—99 JAN 1980

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✓ Sport Jan 80 (olympic) CONFIDENTIAL



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

8 January 1980

Handwritten initials

Prime Minister

Handwritten circled number 2

Handwritten initials

Handwritten initials and date 8/1

Dear Michael,

Soviet Intervention in Afghanistan

As a way of bringing home to the Russians by every means available our strong disapproval of their actions in Afghanistan, the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary has instructed all posts abroad and officials in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office to avoid social contact with Soviet officials and to reduce business contacts to a minimum. He hopes, therefore, that his colleagues will ensure that they, other Ministers and officials in their departments will, until further notice, restrict their contacts with the Soviet Ambassador in London and members of his staff to the minimum necessary to permit essential business to be carried on.

I am sending copies of this letter to the Private Secretaries to members of the Cabinet and to Martin Vile (Cabinet Office).

Yours etc
Paul
(P Lever)
Private Secretary

M O'D B Alexander Esq
10 Downing Street

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10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

8 January 1980

cc. Afghanistan situ
cc: DOE
Sport
Afghanistan

Dear Rodric,

Original on:
SPORT: Olympic participation
Jan 80.

Afghanistan: Participation in the Olympic Games

When the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary called on the Prime Minister this afternoon he raised the question of Britain's participation in the Olympic Games in Moscow this summer.

The Prime Minister said that she agreed with Sir Curtis Keeble that withdrawal from the Olympics by a substantial number of the Western nations would be the gesture that would hurt the Soviet Government most, at least in the short term. She asked whether there was any possibility of another city offering to host the Games. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary said that he thought this would be impracticable. He and the Prime Minister agreed that the role of Government in this question was limited. But the Prime Minister pointed out that it would be very difficult for the Government to avoid taking up a position, e.g., in dealing with Parliamentary Questions. The Government had expressed a view on the question of the British Lions Rugby Tour to South Africa and would certainly be asked to do the same in regard to the Olympic Games.

The Prime Minister made it clear that her own inclination would be to recommend against participation, but she agreed with the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary that it would be important to co-ordinate our position with that of other Western Governments. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary said that perhaps the best outcome would be if the Government recommended against participation but the various committees, and the participants themselves, decided to go to Moscow none the less.

Given the Prime Minister's interest in this problem, I should be grateful to be kept in the picture as thinking develops.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Geoffrey Needham (Department of the Environment).

Yours ever

Richard Alexander

R. M. J. Lyne, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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FM UKREP BRUSSELS 081155Z JAN 80

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 50 OF 8 JANUARY

INFO IMMEDIATE PARIS ROUTINE BRUSSELS COPENHAGEN THE HAGUE ROME
DUBLIN BONN LUXEMBOURG WASHINGTON MOSCOW UKDEL NATO.

PARIS TELNO 28: AFGHANISTAN

1. CONTACTS IN THE COMMISSION HAVE TOLD US THAT NO CEREALS ARE BEING EXPORTED FROM THE COMMUNITY TO THE SOVIET UNION AT PRESENT AND THAT THE COMMISSION AT ITS MEETING ON 9 JANUARY IS EXPECTED TO MAKE ARRANGEMENTS TO ENSURE THAT NONE WILL BE IN FUTURE. LIKEWISE NO BUTTER IS BEING EXPORTED TO THE SOVIET UNION (THE LAST CONSIGNMENT WAS BEFORE CHRISTMAS) AND WE RECEIVED THE IMPRESSION THAT THE COMMISSION WILL TAKE STEPS TO AVOID BUTTER SALES AS WELL. CEREALS CONTINUE TO BE EXPORTED TO EASTERN EUROPE BUT ARE BEING CAREFULLY MONITORED TO AVOID DIVERSION TO THE SOVIET UNION.

2. RESTITUTION PAYMENTS ARE A MATTER FOR THE COMMISSION. I DO NOT SEE HOW WE CAN OBJECT IF IT TAKES A DECISION WITHIN ITS OWN COMPETENCE WITH WHICH WE AGREE. IF THE SUBJECT COMES UP IN THE INFORMAL MEETING OF COREPER ON WEDNESDAY 9 JANUARY, I PROPOSE TO WELCOME THE COMMISSION'S DECISION.

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FM WARSAW 081400Z JAN

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 9 OF 8 JANUARY.

 INFO ROUTINE BUDAPEST, BUCHAREST, PRAGUE, SOFIA, MOSCOW,
 BELGRADE, EAST BERLIN.

YOUR TELNO 402 TO ANKARA OF 31 DECEMBER 1979

1. I CALLED ON VICE-MINISTER KULAGA ON JAN 7TH AND LEFT HIM IN NO DOUBT OF THE SERIOUSNESS WITH WHICH THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT VIEWED THE SOVIET ACTION, THE FIRST AGAINST A NON-ALIGNED COUNTRY SINCE 1945. I REFERRED TO MRS THATCHERS'S EXCHANGE OF LETTERS WITH MR BREZHNEV AND OUR INABILITY TO ACCEPT THE SOVIET EXPLANATION GIVEN THE SEQUENCE OF EVENTS.

2. THE VICE-MINISTER, WHO WAS CLEARLY UNHAPPY, MADE NO ATTEMPT TO EXPLAIN THE SEQUENCE OF EVENTS. IN ANSWER TO MY QUESTION ABOUT THE POLISH ATTITUDE HE TOOK REFUGE BEHIND GIEREK'S REMARKS (MY TELNO 5) AND THE POLISH STATEMENT AT THE UN.

3. I ASKED HIM WHY HE THOUGHT THE RUSSIANS HAD ACTED. AFTER VAGUE REMARKS ABOUT THE NEED TO CONSIDER THE BACKGROUND, HIS ANSWER WAS THAT THE SITUATION IN EASTERN

BACKGROUND , HIS ANSWER WAS THAT THE SITUATION IN EASTERN
AFGHANISTAN HAD BEEN DETERIORATING BADLY AND THEY HAD DETECTED
CHINESE INTERVENTION THERE, WHICH WAS INTOLERABLE TO THEM.
HE WAS INCLINED TO ASSENT TO THE SUGGESTION THAT THE
MODERNISATION MIGHT HAVE MADE THEM CONSIDER SALT II WORTH
RISKING. HE EXPRESSED CONCERN THAT RETALIATION BY THE WEST
MIGHT ESCALATE THE CRISIS.

4. IN DEALING WITH THE POLES WE HAVE, IT SEEMS TO ME,
TO STEER A COURSE BETWEEN LETTING THEM THINK THAT THEIR
UNENTHUSIASTIC SUPPORT OF THE SOVIET CASE IS OF NO CONCERN
TO US AND FORCING THEM, BY PRESSING TOO HARD, TO DECLARE THEMSELVES
MORE EMPHATICALLY ON THE SOVIET SIDE. I JUDGE THAT THEY HAVE BEEN
GIVEN LITTLE INFORMATION BY THE RUSSIANS (KULAGA SAID THE POLISH
EMBASSY IN KABUL FOUND IT DIFFICULT TO GET INFORMATION) BUT
ARE UNDER STRONG PRESSURE TO GET INTO LINE. THE ARRANGEMENT
WITH THE USSR HAS FOR LONG BEEN THAT POLAND SUPPORTS SOVIET
FOREIGN POLICY BUT RECEIVES LATITUDE IN DOMESTIC AFFAIRS.

PRIDHAM

NNNN

PS
 PS/LPS
 PS/MR BLAKER
 PS/MR LUCE
 PS/MR HURD
 PS/PUS
~~SIR D. MANTON~~
 MR CORTAZZI
 MR FERGUSSON
 MR MURRAY
 MR BULLARD
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LORD N. G. LENNIX
 MR P. H. MOBBERLY
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FM UKDEL NATO 081700Z JAN 80

TO IMMEDIATE FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE,
 TELEGRAM NUMBER 016 OF 8 JANUARY 1980,
 INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, BONN, PARIS, MOSCOW,
 INFO PRIORITY ALL OTHER NATO POSTS, UKMIS NEW YORK, UKREP
 BRUSSELS.

MY TELNO 7: AFGHANISTAN AND EAST-WEST RELATIONS.

1. AT THE PERMREPS LUNCH TODAY THERE WAS A LONG DISCUSSION ABOUT THE HANDLING OF THE CONCLUSIONS REACHED AT THE MEETING REPORTED IN MY TELEGRAM UNDER REFERENCE AND THE TIMETABLE FOR FURTHER ACTION. THE SECRETARY GENERAL REPORTED HIS UNDERSTANDING OF THE REMITS GIVEN TO THE SPC AND POLITICAL COMMITTEE ON THE LINES OF PARAGRAPH (1) AND (2) OF MY TELEGRAM UNDER REFERENCE AND SAID THAT HE ENVISAGED REPORTS BEING MADE TO THE COUNCIL, POSSIBLY IN THE FORM OF CHAIRMAN'S SUMMARIES OF CONCLUSIONS. ARNAUD (FRANCE) DISPUTED THE SUGGESTION THAT THERE HAD BEEN ANY AGREEMENT ON DRAWING UP CONCLUSIONS OR THAT THERE COULD BE ANY QUESTION OF THE COUNCIL COLLECTIVELY MAKING RECOMMENDATIONS TO GOVERNMENTS. HE WAS PREPARED

COLLECTIVELY MAKING RECOMMENDATIONS TO GOVERNMENTS. HE WAS PREPARED TO ACCEPT THAT DISCUSSION IN THE COUNCIL SHOULD BE ON THE BASIS OF AN EXCHANGE OF VIEWS ON THE FACTS AS ASCERTAINED BY THE TWO COMMITTEES, AND INDIVIDUAL DELEGATIONS WOULD THEN REPORT TO THEIR GOVERNMENTS FOR CONSIDERATION OF ANY APPROPRIATE ACTION. IN THE SUBSEQUENT DISCUSSION SEVERAL PERMREPS EMPHASISED THAT THERE WAS NO QUESTION OF THE COUNCIL TAKING DECISIONS OR INDEED OF THE ALLIANCE AGREEING ON COLLECTIVE ACTION. THE INTENTION OF THE EXERCISE WAS TO ACHIEVE THE MAXIMUM HARMONY IN THE MEASURES OUR GOVERNMENTS TOOK AND THIS COULD BEST BE ACHIEVED BY COORDINATING OUR EFFORTS THROUGH THE COUNCIL BUT WITHOUT IN ANY WAY PREJUDICING THE PREROGATIVE OF INDIVIDUAL GOVERNMENTS. THE MATTER WAS LEFT ON THIS BASIS AND I HOPE WE SHALL NOW HAVE NO FURTHER TROUBLE WITH THE FRENCH OVER THE NATURE OF THE REPORTS TO BE PRODUCED BY THE TWO COMMITTEES. THE COUNCIL MEETING ON THE AFTERNOON OF 15 JANUARY WAS CONFIRMED. VAN WELL (FRG), RUTTEN (NETHERLANDS), HOLST (NORWAY) AND CHRISTOPHER (US) WILL ALMOST CERTAINLY ATTEND. MOST OTHERS HAVE NO INSTRUCTIONS EXCEPT FOR FRANCE AND TURKEY, WHO WILL BOTH BE REPRESENTED BY THEIR PERMREPS.

2. I HAD MUCH MORE DIFFICULTY OVER OUR PROPOSAL FOR CONSIDERATION OF IMMEDIATE MEASURES TO BE ANNOUNCED IN THE MIDDLE OF THIS WEEK (YOUR TELNO 25 TO WASHINGTON). THERE WAS VIRTUAL UNANIMITY AMONG THE PERMREPS THAT IT WOULD BE PREMATURE TO TRY TO REACH ANY CONCLUSIONS AT A COUNCIL MEETING TOMORROW AS I HAD SUGGESTED, SINCE MOST GOVERNMENTS HAD NOT YET CONSIDERED THEIR POLICIES AND IN ANY CASE THE WORK OF THE SPC HAD NOT YET GOT FAR ENOUGH. PAULS (FRG) WHO IS RETURNING TO BONN ON 10 JANUARY FOR A MEETING TO DISCUSS THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT'S POSITION AND HARDY (CANADA) WHOSE GOVERNMENT IS NOT DUE TO ADDRESS THE SUBJECT UNTIL 11 JANUARY WERE ESPECIALLY OPPOSED TO AN EARLY MEETING. THEY WERE SUPPORTED BY MOST OTHERS, ALTHOUGH ARNAUD DID NOT TAKE PART IN THIS DISCUSSION, AND THERE WERE EVEN SOME SUGGESTIONS THAT IT WOULD BE BETTER TO DEFER CONSIDERATION OF ANY ANNOUNCEMENTS UNTIL THE COUNCIL MEETING ON 15 JANUARY.

3. I ARGUED STRONGLY THE CASE FOR EARLIER ACTION. I SAID THAT WE WERE IN FAVOUR OF THE MAXIMUM CONSULTATION WITH OUR ALLIES WITH A VIEW TO CONCERTING THE MEASURES TAKEN BY INDIVIDUAL ALLIED GOVERNMENTS. WE ALSO ATTACHED IMPORTANCE TO BEING ABLE TO ANNOUNCE AT LE^{AS}T SOME MEASURES QUICKLY IN ORDER TO SHOW THAT OUR CONDEMNATION OF THE SOVIET ACTION WAS NOT CONFINED TO WORDS. THE U S ADMINSTRATION HAD ALREADY ANNOUNCED A SERIES OF MEASURES AND THEIR EUROPEAN ALLIES SHOULD NOT BE SEEN TO BE LAGGING FAR BEHIND. GLITMAN (US) EMPHASISED THE IMPORTANCE THAT HIS AUTHORITIES ATTACHED TO THIS LAST POINT AS A MEANS OF DEMONSTRATING ALLIANCE SOLIDARITY WITH

LAST POINT, AS A MEANS OF DEMONSTRATING ALLIANCE SOLIDARITY WITH THE UNITED STATES STAND. I CONTINUED THAT WHILE WE WERE ANXIOUS NOT TO GET OUT AHEAD OF OUR EUROPEAN ALLIES, WE MIGHT HAVE TO MAKE A JUDGEMENT AS TO WHETHER THE NEED FOR AN EARLY ANNOUNCEMENT OUTWEIGHED THE DESIRABILITY OF BEING ABLE TO ACT IN CONCERT. I GAVE MY COLLEAGUES AN INDICATION OF THE IMMEDIATE MEASURES WE WERE CONSIDERING (AS DISCUSSED BY TELEPHONE WITH FERGUSSON) AND SAID THAT THESE WERE BEING PUT FORWARD BY SCOTT IN THE SPC THIS AFTER-NOON. I FELT SURE MY AUTHORITIES WOULD TAKE THE VIEW THAT TO DELAY THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF ANY MEASURES UNTIL AFTER THE COUNCIL MEETING ON 15 JANUARY WOULD NOT BE ACCEPTABLE. BUT I WAS PREPARED TO CONSULT THEM ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF POSTPONING THE COUNCIL MEETING TO CONSIDER IMMEDIATE MEASURES UNTIL THE MORNING OF 11 JANUARY, IF THIS WOULD ENABLE OTHER GOVERNMENTS TO REACH CONSIDERED VIEWS BY THEN.

4. IT WAS LEFT THAT I WOULD INFORM THE SECRETARY GENERAL BY FIRST THING ON 9 JANUARY IF I COULD AGREE TO THIS POSTPONEMENT. ALTHOUGH THE VIEWS EXPRESSED INDICATE A LACK OF URGENCY ON THE PART OF OUR ALLIES, SOME OF THEM OF COURSE HAVE SPECIAL PROBLEMS, EG THE GERMANS, WHICH DO NOT APPLY TO THE SAME EXTENT TO US. PAULS URGED MY PRIVATELY, AFTER THE LUNCH, TO AGREE TO POSTPONEMENT, SINCE HE HOPES TO BE ABLE TO GET BACK AFTER THURSDAY'S MEETING IN BONN WITH A CLEARER, AND FIRMER, POSITION THAN HIS EXISTING INSTRUCTIONS PERMIT. I AM THEREFORE GLAD THAT, AS FERGUSSON HAS JUST INFORMED ME BY TELEPHONE, YOU ARE ABLE TO AGREE TO DEFER THE MEETING UNTIL THE MORNING OF 11 JANUARY. I RECOMMEND THAT I SHOULD BE INSTRUCTED TO INFORM THE COUNCIL AT THAT MEETING THAT WE INTEND TO GO AHEAD WITH THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF CERTAIN IMMEDIATE MEASURES BEFORE THE WEEKEND EVEN IF ALL OUR ALLIES ARE NOT BY THEN READY TO JOIN US.

5. MIFT CONTAINS THE LIST OF MEASURES I READ OUT TO THE PERMREPS. ON YOUR INSTRUCTIONS ITEMS 2, 5 AND 7 WERE OMITTED FROM THE LIST SCOTT CIRCULATED TO THE SPC. I HOPE IT MAY BE POSSIBLE BY THE TIME OF FRIDAY'S MEETING TO REINSTATE ITEM 5.

ROSE.

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 TELEGRAM NUMBER 30 OF 8 JANUARY 1980
 INFO IMMEDIATE BONN, MOSCOW, UKDEL NATO, WASHINGTON, OTTAWA AND ROME
 INFO ROUTINE ALL OTHER NATO POSTS

YOUR TELNO 5
 AFGHANI STAN : EAST/WEST RELATIONS

1. M. FRANCOIS-PONCET'S DIRECTEUR DE CABINET TELEPHONED ME THIS MORNING ON BEHALF OF THE FOREIGN MINISTER TO CONVEY AN ORAL MESSAGE FROM THE MINISTER TO YOU.
2. M. VIOT SAID THAT M. FRANCOIS-PONCET WAS GRATEFUL FOR THE MESSAGE WHICH HE HAD RECEIVED FROM YOU YESTERDAY EVENING. HE WAS GLAD TO BE INFORMED OF YOUR ITINERARY. HE SHARED YOUR CONCERN ABOUT THESE MATTERS, WHICH WERE OF THE GREATEST IMPORTANCE. YOUR MESSAGE WAS BEING STUDIED URGENTLY AND THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT WOULD DEFINE ITS POSITION AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE. M. FRANCOIS-PONCET THOUGHT IT WOULD BE BEST IF YOU AND HE WERE TO DISCUSS THIS MATTER NEXT TIME YOU MET.

AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE. M. FRANCOIS-PONCET THOUGHT IT WOULD BE BEST IF YOU AND HE WERE TO DISCUSS THIS MATTER NEXT TIME YOU MET.

3. I ASKED M. VIOT WHAT THIS MEANT. WAS HE SUGGESTING THAT NO ACTION WOULD BE TAKEN UNTIL YOU VISITED M. FRANCOIS-PONCET IN FRANCE ON 2/3 FEBRUARY? M. VIOT SAID THAT THIS WAS NOT AT ALL WHAT HE MEANT. HE WAS SURE THAT YOU AND M. FRANCOIS-PONCET WOULD SEE EACH OTHER BEFORE THEN. I PRESSED HIM ON THIS AND ASKED HIM WHAT GROUNDS HE HAD FOR THINKING THIS. I WAS NOT MYSELF AWARE OF ANY DATE ON WHICH YOU AND M. FRANCOIS-PONCET COULD BE CERTAIN OF MEETING, FOR EXAMPLE AT BRUSSELS. M. VIOT RENEWED HIS ASSURANCES THAT THE QUESTIONS WOULD BE URGENTLY STUDIED.

4. I DREW HIS ATTENTION TO THE FACT THAT YOU HAD SPECIFICALLY ASKED WHETHER THE UK AND FRANCE COULD AGREE THIS WEEK THAT EXPORT CREDITS TO THE SOVIET UNION WOULD IN FUTURE BE ON OECD CONSENSUS TERMS. WAS I TO REPORT THAT M. FRANCOIS-PONCET'S REPLY WAS TO BE UNDERSTOOD AS MEANING THAT AGREEMENT COULD NOT BE REACHED THIS WEEK? M. VIOT SAID THAT THIS WAS NOT WHAT HE WAS SAYING. THE FACT WAS THAT THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT WAS LOOKING CAREFULLY AT THE QUESTIONS RAISED AND WOULD REACH A DECISION AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. HE WAS SURE THAT THIS DECISION WOULD BE COMMUNICATED TO THE UK WITHOUT WAITING FOR THE NEXT OCCASION ON WHICH YOU WOULD MEET M. FRANCOIS-PONCET. I PRESSED M. VIOT TO SAY WHETHER A DECISION MIGHT BE REACHED THIS WEEK, BUT HE REFUSED TO BE TEMPTED INTO A DEFINITE PROPHECY. THE MATTER WOULD BE STUDIED URGENTLY.

5. THIS IS A QUESTION ON WHICH IT WOULD CERTAINLY NOT BE POSSIBLE FOR M. FRANCOIS-PONCET TO GIVE A DEFINITE ANSWER OR EVEN PERHAPS TO HAVE A DECISIVE INFLUENCE ON THE FORMULATION OF THE ANSWER. THE QUESTION WILL HAVE TO BE DECIDED AT THE ELYSEE. I SHALL PURSUE THE MATTER FURTHER WITH THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE ELYSEE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. BUT THE MESSAGE FROM THE QUAI D'ORSAY SEEMS TO BE INTENDED TO INDICATE FAIRLY CLEARLY THAT FRANCE DOES NOT INTEND TO BE RUSHED.

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FM MOSCOW 070800Z JAN 80

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 015 OF 7TH JANUARY

FOR INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK, UKDEL NATO AND KABUL.

AFGHANISTAN

1. PRAVDA OF 6 JANUARY CONTAINED A SHARP ATTACK IN ITS INTERNATIONAL OBSERVER COLUMN, (THIS WEEK BY ZHUKOV) ON US AGGRESSION. TO THE NOW FAMILIAR SOVIET LINE ON AFGHANISTAN, THIS ADDED THE CHARGE THAT THE USA SHOULD ABIDE BY THE UN CHARTER BY ORDERING THOSE UNDER ITS PROTECTION TO STOP INVADING AFGHANISTAN. ARMS SUPPLIED TO PAKISTAN WOULD INEVITABLY FALL INTO THE HANDS OF THE AFGHAN REBELS. IT WAS ALSO CLAIMED THAT THE ISSUE OF CONTINUING MILITARY SUPPORT FOR THE REBELS WOULD BE DISCUSSED BY HAROLD BROWN DURING HIS VISIT TO CHINA. THE ARTICLE CONCLUDED WITH A RESTATEMENT OF SOVIET REFUSAL TO RENEGE ON ITS OBLIGATIONS TO THE AFGHAN GOVERNMENT.
2. TASS IN ENGLISH ON 4 JANUARY HAD ALREADY PREPARED THE GROUND BY STATING THAT "WASHINGTON IS MAKING A BIG EFFORT TO LEGALISE UNDER ANY PRETEXT MASSIVE ARMS DELIVERIES INTENDED FIRST OF ALL FOR THE AFGHAN INSURGENTS". THE STATEMENT WENT FURTHER THAN PRAVDA IN PREDICTING A POSSIBLE "SLACKENING OF US EFFORTS IN THE SPHERE OF PREVENTING NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION".
3. TASS LINKED SUCH SIGNS OF CONTINUING US AGGRESSION WITH YOUR FORTHCOMING VISIT TO THE COUNTRIES OF THE AREA - SAUDI ARABIA, OMAN, TURKEY AND PAKISTAN WERE SINGLED OUT - THE SUPPOSED AIM OF WHICH WAS TO SEE WHAT SUPPORT THESE COUNTRIES COULD GIVE TO WESTERN PLANS.
4. ALTHOUGH THE US CONTINUES TO BEAR THE OVERWHELMING BRUNT OF THE ATTACK, BRITISH INVOLVEMENT WAS TAKEN UP IN AN INTERVIEW GIVEN TO SOVIET JOURNALISTS IN NEW YORK BY THE AFGHAN FOREIGN MINISTER, SHAH DOST AND PUBLISHED IN "IZVESTIA" OF 5 JANUARY.

AFGHAN FORCES

AFGHAN FORCES WERE SAID TO HAVE CAPTURED LARGE QUANTITIES OF WEAPONS OF AMERICAN, BRITISH, CHINESE AND PAKISTANI ORIGIN AS WELL AS SEIZING CACHES OF DOLLARS AND STERLING, THUS GIVING PROOF OF IMPERIALIST AGGRESSION. IN A CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS, DOST STATED THAT THE NEW AFGHAN GOVERNMENT TOOK POWER ON 27 DECEMBER AND REQUESTED SOVIET ASSISTANCE ON 28 DECEMBER. ASSERTIONS OF SOVIET INVOLVEMENT IN EVENTS LEADING UP TO THIS PERIOD WERE COMPLETELY UNTRUE.

5. COVERAGE OF THE UN RESOLUTION HAS BEEN LIMITED TO EXTRACTS FROM THE SPEECHES OF THE AFGHAN AND SOVIET REPRESENTATIVES COUPLED WITH THE ARGUMENT THAT IT ILL BEFITS THE USA AND ITS ALLIES TO CAST THE FIRST STONE. THERE HAVE BEEN NO INDIVIDUAL ATTACKS ON OTHER COUNTRIES SUPPORTING THE RESOLUTION.
6. REPORTING OF INTERNAL AFGHAN AFFAIRS TAKES TWO FORMS. THE MAJOR STATEMENTS OF BABRAK KARMAL AND HIS MINISTERS ARE REPRODUCED VERBATIM WHILST REPORTS FROM SOVIET CORRESPONDENTS IN AFGHANISTAN SEEK TO STRESS THE RETURN TO CALM AND NORMALITY IN THE COUNTRY.

F C O PSE PASS IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK AND UKDEL NATO.

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FM ISLAMABAD 071230Z JAN 80.

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELNO 43 OF 07 JANUARY.

REPEATED FOR INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK, PEKING,
MOSCOW, DELHI AND KABUL.

AFGHANISTAN : VISITORS TO PAKISTAN.

1. PAKISTAN AUTHORITIES HAVE BEEN HINTING PRIVATELY ABOUT AN IMMINENT ANNOUNCEMENT THAT "A SECOND VERY IMPORTANT VISITOR" WILL SHORTLY BE COMING TO PAKISTAN. THE CHINESE EMBASSY TOLD US TODAY IN CONFIDENCE THAT THEY EXPECT IT TO BE ANNOUNCED SHORTLY THAT THE CHINESE FOREIGN MINISTER, HUANG HUA, WILL VISIT PAKISTAN AFTER YOUR OWN VISIT. IN TELLING US THIS THE CHINESE SHOWED THEMSELVES VERY AWARE OF THE REPERCUSSIONS VIS A VIS DELHI AND HINTED THAT THIS WAS WHY A "POLITICAL" RATHER THAN "MILITARY" FIGURE WAS BEING CHOSEN FOR A CLEAR DEMONSTRATION OF CHINESE SOLIDARITY WITH PAKISTAN AT THIS TIME. FOR THE SAME REASON ALTHOUGH THE CHINESE HERE SAY THAT PEKING IS PREPARED TO DO WHAT IT CAN TO HELP PAKISTAN'S REQUIREMENTS FOR ARMS, IT CONSIDERS THAT IT MAY BE PRESENTATIONALLY PREFERABLE FOR WESTERN COUNTRIES (THE UNITED STATES AND POSSIBLY BRITAIN) WHO CAN ALSO PROVIDE ARMS TO THE INDIANS, TO TAKE THE LEAD. INCIDENTALLY, THE CHINESE EMBASSY IS SPEAKING FREELY OF THE NEED TO

INCIDENTALLY, THE CHINESE EMBASSY IS SPEAKING FREELY OF THE NEED
GIVE ARMS AS WELL AS HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE TO THE AFGHAN REFUGEES,
CLAIMING THAT SINCE THE RUSSIANS HAVE INTERNATIONALISED THE SITUATION
THIS WOULD NOT CONSTITUTE INTERFERENCE IN AFGHANISTAN'S INTERNAL
AFFAIRS.

FORSTER.

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TELEGRAM NO 20 OF 7 JANUARY 80.

INFO ROUTINE ISLAMABAD, NEW DELHI, MOSCOW, WASHINGTON, UKMIS
NEW YORK AND UKDEL NATO.

SITUATION REPORT.

1. WESTERN JOURNALISTS, INCLUDING A BBC CAMERA TEAM, HAVE BEEN ARRIVING IN FORCE SINCE LAST FRIDAY. THIS MORNING THEY WERE INVITED TO A PRESS BRIEFING AT THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS.
2. YESTERDAY TWO THOUSAND POLITICAL PRISONERS WERE RELEASED FROM THE PULI CHARKHI JAIL IN KABUL. THE ACTUAL RELEASE WAS GIVEN MAXIMUM PUBLICITY COVERAGE WITH TV CAMERAS ETC. SMALL BATCHES HAD BEEN RELEASED IN PRECEDING DAYS, MEMBERS OF THE PARTY HAVING BEEN RELEASED FIRST. IT IS OFFICIALLY STATED THAT ANOTHER TWO THOUSAND OR SO WILL BE RELEASED FROM PULI CHARKHI IN THE NEXT FEW DAYS. RELEASES FROM PROVINCIAL JAILS ARE ALSO TAKING PLACE - ONE THOUSAND HAVE BEEN RELEASED SO FAR. IT IS ALSO OFFICIALLY STATED THAT AFTER THESE RELEASES ONLY EIGHTY-FOUR MEMBERS OF THE MAIWANDVAL GROUP JAILED IN 1973, MEMBERS OF THE ROYAL FAMILY AND A FEW OTHERS WILL REMAIN IN JAIL PENDING CONSIDERATION OF THEIR CASES. SIXTEEN PAKISTAN NATIONALS REMAIN AT PULI CHARKHI AND THE PAKISTANI AUTHORITIES ARE BEING CONTACTED ABOUT THEM.

NATIONALS REMAIN AT PULI CHARKHI AND THE PAKISTANI AUTHORITIES ARE BEING CONTACTED ABOUT THEM.

3. FURTHER CONGRATULATORY MESSAGES HAVE BEEN RECEIVED BY THE NEW GOVERNEMENT FROM POLAND, CZECHOSLOVAKIA, HUNGRY, PDRY AND LAOS. NO MENTION HAS SO FAR BEEN MADE OF CUBA OR ROMANIA.

4. THE SECURITY SITUATION IN KABUL REMAINS NORMAL. ONLY ISOLATED SOVIET MILITARY VEHICLES ARE SEEN DURING THE DAY ALTHOUGH SOME MOVEMENT CONTINUES ON THE OUTSKIRTS OF THE TOWN AT NIGHT.

HILLIER-FRY.

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AFGHANISTAN

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TO ROUTINE FCO

TELNO 30 OF 7TH JANUARY 1980.

YOUR TELNO 2: AFGHANISTAN: SAUDI OFFICIAL AND PRESS COMMENTS

1. THE 5 JANUARY EDITION OF OKAZ CONDEMNS THE SOVIET INVASION DESCRIBING IT AS HUBCLEME OF THE CENTURY AND URGES ALL COUNTRIES TO SUPPORT UN POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC MOVES AGAINST THE USSR'S ACTION. AL MADINA IS MORE SPECIFIC. IT PRAISES SAUDI ARABIA'S EFFORTS SO FAR (OUR TELNO 24) AND GOES ON TO CONDEMN THE IDLENESS OF MOST OTHER ISLAMIC COUNTRIES IN THEIR RESPONSE TO THE THREAT AND PUTS FORWARD THE IDEA OF A JOINT ISLAMIC DEFENCE ARRANGEMENT 'AGAINST GREEDY AND AMBITIOUS IMPERIALISTS BENT ON EXPANDING THEIR SPHERES OHLINFLUENCE AND SPREADING THEIR CORRUPT IDEOLOGIES'.

2. ON 6 JANUARY AL MADINA CONTINUES IN THE SAME VEIN. THIS TIME PRAISING WESTERN EFFORTS AND IN PARTICULAR THE UK DECISION TO SEND LORD CARRINGTON TO CONSULT WITH ISLAMIC COUNTRIES IN THE AREA. IT CONTRASTS THESE MOVES WITH THE LACK OF RESPONSE AT

AREA. IT CONTRASTS THESE MOVES WITH THE LACK OF RESPONSE AT
"ISLAMIC LEVEL" SUGGESTING THERE SHOULD BE AN ISLAMIC SUMMIT
AND THAT THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE ISLAMIC CONFERENCE
ORGANISATION SHOULD HAVE BEEN AHEAD OF LORD CARRINGTON IN GOING
TO THE "INVASION AREA". IT ASKS WHY MUSLIM COUNTRIES
"NEIGHBOURING" AFGHANISTAN HAVE NOT MET AND WHY MUSLIM
COUNTRIES SUCH AS IRAQ AND SYRIA WHO HAVE CLOSE TIES WITH
THE USSR HAVE KEPT SILENT AND NOT CONDEMNED THE INVASION.
THE PAPER INFERRED THAT THE USSR WOULD NOT HAVE DARED TO INVADE
AFGHANISTAN IF SUCH STANDS HAD BEEN MADE AND IF IT HAD NOT
SEEN "AFGHAN REBELS BEGGING FOR AID IN ISLAMIC CAPITALS".

3. THE MAIN ITEM IN ALL PAPERS ON 7 JANUARY IS THE STATEMENT BY
PRINCE FAISAL BIN FAHD, THE PRESIDENT OF YOUTH WELFARE
AND CHAIRMAN OF THE SAUDI OLYMPIC COMMITTEE, THAT SAUDI
ARABIA HAS DECIDED TO BOYCOTT THE MOSCOW OLYMPICS IN PROTEST
AGAINST SOVIET AGGRESSION IN AFGHANISTAN. THE RADIO AND
PRESS CONTINUE TO CONDEMN THE SOVIET ACTION.

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AFGHANISTAN

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TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 48 OF 7 JANUARY

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON PARIS BONN OTTAWA MOSCOW KABUL PEKING
OSLO LISBON DACCA KINGSTON MANILA TUNIS ABIDJAN EAST BERLIN
ISLAMABAD MEXICO CITY NEW DELHI UKDEL NATO.

MY TELNOS 35 TO 38 AND YOUR TELNO 23; AFGHANISTAN: SECURITY COUNCIL

1. WHEN THE DEBATE CONCLUDED THIS AFTERNOON THE DRAFT IN MY TELNO 37, AMENDED BY MY TELNO 41, WAS PUT TO THE VOTE WITH A RESULT OF 13-2-0. TROYANOVSKY (USSR) USED HIS VETO AND WAS SUPPORTED BY THE GDR. ALL OTHER MEMBERS, INCLUDING THE NEWLY ELECTED MEXICAN WHO TOOK HIS SEAT FOR THE FIRST TIME THIS AFTERNOON, VOTED IN FAVOUR. THERE WAS NO IMMEDIATE UNITING FOR PEACE PROPOSAL FROM THE NON-ALIGNED - THE FILIPINO STILL CLAIMING NOT TO HAVE RECEIVED FINAL INSTRUCTIONS - AND, BY PRIOR ARRANGEMENT, LEPRETTE (FRANCE) QUOTE SUSPENDED UNQUOTE THE SESSION UNTIL FURTHER NOTICE RATHER THAN USING THE USUAL FORMULA THAT CONSIDERATION OF THE ITEM HAD BEEN COMPLETED FOR THE TIME-BEING. SINCE THE 34TH SESSION OF THE GA WAS CLOSED THIS MORNING (MY TELNO 45 - NOT TO ALL)

OF THE ITEM HAD BEEN COMPLETED FOR THE TIME-BEING. SINCE THE 34TH SESSION OF THE GA WAS CLOSED THIS MORNING (MY TELNO 45 - NOT TO ALL THE CONSIDERATIONS IN PARAS 3 AND 4 OF YOUR TELEGRAM UNDER REFERENCE HAVE BEEN OVERTAKEN.

2. IT IS STILL NOT CLEAR WHEN THE NON-ALIGNED WILL INTRODUCE THEIR UNITING FOR PEACE PROPOSAL. ASSUMING ENTHUSIASM FOR THE PROCEDURE IS MAINTAINED, AND THERE IS EVIDENCE OF GROWING SUPPORT FOR IT AMONG THIRD WORLD COUNTRIES, THE MOST SUITABLE TIME COULD BE AT THE BEGINNING OF THE NEXT SESSION OF THE COUNCIL, JUST BEFORE WE RESUME THE DEBATE ON IRAN (FOR LIKELY TIMING SEE MY TELNO 50 - NOT TO ALL). I THINK THE NON-ALIGNED WERE WISE NOT TO GO OFF AT HALF-COCK THIS AFTERNOON.

3. THERE WERE 15 SPEAKERS IN THE DEBATE TODAY: ZAMBIA, MONGOLIA, BANGLADESH, NIGER, FRG, YUGOSLAVIA, LAOS, PANAMA, ZAIRE, CANADA, CHILE, AFGHANISTAN, TUNISIA, USSR AND FRANCE. THE NON-ALIGNED COUNCIL MEMBERS SPOKE WITH VARYING DEGREES OF FIRMNESS AGAINST THE SOVIET INVASION AND IN FAVOUR OF THE DRAFT RESOLUTION (TUNISIA HAD ANNOUNCED HER CO-SPONSORSHIP FIRST THING THIS MORNING). KAISER (BANGLADESH) WAS THE MOST EXPLICIT IN HIS CONDEMNATION OF RUSSIAN ACTION, WHILST MUTUKWA (ZAMBIA), ALTHOUGH CRITICAL OF FOREIGN INTERVENTION IN THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF ANOTHER STATE, WAS UNABLE TO BRING HIMSELF TO MENTION THE NAME OF THE SOVIET UNION. LIKE MANY OTHERS VON WECHMAR (FRG) SAID THAT THE FACTS DID NOT BEAR OUT THE SOVIET INVOCATION OF ARTICLE 51. LEPRETTE (FRANCE) SAID THAT SOVIET ACTION HAD UNDERMINED THE PROGRESS TOWARDS WORLD DETENTE TO THE CONCEPT OF WHICH FRANCE HAD BEEN WEDDED FOR OVER 20 YEARS. SUCH DETENTE MUST BE BASED ON TRUST AND FRANCE WISHED TO SAY CLEARLY THAT SUCH TRUST WOULD SUFFER A SOLID BLOW IF THE SOVIET ACTION WAS NOT REVERSED.

4. THE MOST INTERESTING APPEARANCE AT THE TABLE WAS THAT OF KOMATINA (YUGOSLAVIA). YUGOSLAVIA, HE SAID, SUPPORTED THE DECISION OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL TO CONSIDER THE SITUATION IN AFGHANISTAN. THE EVER MORE FREQUENT USE OF FORCE, IN CONTRADICTION OF THE CHARTER, WAS PARTICULARLY DISQUIETING AS WAS THE STAGNATION IN THE PROCESS OF DETENTE. THERE WAS NO REASON WHATSOEVER FOR JUSTIFYING INTERVENTION AND THE PARTICULAR RESPONSIBILITY OF THE PERMANENT MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL WAS CLEAR. AFTER REHEARSING THE PRINCIPLES OF THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT, KOMATINA SAID THAT A SELECTIVE APPLICATION AND ARBITRARY INTERPRETATION OF THESE BASIC PRINCIPLES, AS WELL AS THE USE OF THE CHARTER AND OTHER MULTILATERAL AND BILATERAL INSTRUMENTS TO JUSTIFY INTERVENTION IN THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF ANOTHER STATE, WAS

THESE BASIC PRINCIPLES, AS WELL AS THE USE OF THE CHARTER AND OTHER MULTILATERAL AND BILATERAL INSTRUMENTS TO JUSTIFY INTERVENTION IN THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF ANOTHER STATE, WAS NOT ACCEPTABLE.

5. DOST (AFGHANISTAN) GAVE ANOTHER INEPT PERFORMANCE DEFENDING FRIENDLY RUSSIAN ASSISTANCE AND OUTLINING THE PRINCIPLES ON WHICH THE NEW GOVERNMENT WOULD OPERATE. TROYANOVSKY THEN CLAIMED THAT NONE OF THE ALLEGATIONS LEVELLED AT THE SOVIET UNION HAD BEEN SUBSTANTIATED: IT WAS SURELY BECOMING CLEAR TO ALL THAT THE US AND HER ALLIES WERE ATTEMPTING TO DISTRACT ATTENTION FROM THEIR REAL AIMS OF SUBVERTING THE TRUE GOVERNMENT OF AFGHANISTAN. THE TASK OF THE UN WAS TO PROMOTE PROPITIOUS CIRCUMSTANCES FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ENLIGHTENED POLICIES OF THE NEW GOVERNMENT OF AFGHANISTAN AND NOT TO TAKE STEPS TO HINDER THIS PROCESS. THE UPROAR INITIATED BY THE US "MAKING USE OF CERTAIN WESTERN CIRCLES WHO WERE TRYING TO TAKE US BACK TO THE AGE OF THE COLD WAR" SEEMED TO HAVE AFFECTED THE PROSPECTS FOR SALT. NONETHELESS THE SOVIET UNION WOULD CONTINUE TO PROMOTE MOVES WHICH WOULD HELP, NOT UNDERMINE, PEACEFUL CO-EXISTENCE. THE DRAFT RESOLUTION, HE SAID, WAS A FLAGRANT INTERVENTION IN THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF A MEMBER COUNTRY AND THEREFORE UNACCEPTABLE.

6. IN EXPLANATION OF VOTE THE GDR SPOKE IN SIMILAR BUT BRIEFER TERMS THAN TROYANOVSKY AND THE CHINESE DESCRIBED THE DRAFT AS INADEQUATE ALTHOUGH IT WAS CLEARLY AIMED AT THE SOVIET INTERVENTION.

7. SEE M.I.F.T.

PARSONS

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AFGHANISTAN [ADVANCE COPIES]

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PS
PS/LPS
PS/MR BLAKER
PS/MR LUCE
PS/MR HURD
PS/PUS
SIR D MAITLAND
MR CORTAZZI
MR FERGUSSON
MR MURRAY
MR BULLARD
HD/SAD (4)
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DESKBY UKDEL NATO 080800Z
FROM UKMIS NEW YORK 080131Z JAN 80
TO IMMEDIATE F C O
TELEGRAM NUMBER 49 OF 7 JANUARY
INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON PARIS BONN OTTAWA MOSCOW KABUL PEKING
OSLO LISBON DACCА KINGSTON MANILA TUNIS ABIDJAN EAST BERLIN
ISLAMABAD MEXICO CITY NEW DELHI UKDEL NATO

MIPT: AFGHANISTAN: SECURITY COUNCIL

1. I THINK THAT THIS EXERCISE WENT WELL. IF WE HAD NOT KICKED THE BALL OFF BY ORGANISING THE LETTER TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL, I DOUBT IF ANYBODY ELSE WOULD HAVE, CERTAINLY NOT THE NON-ALIGNED. I WOULD HAVE PREFERRED TO GET MORE CONVINCING NON-ALIGNED COUNTRIES TO HAVE SIGNED THE LETTER AND PARTICIPATED IN THE DEBATE. THE AFRICAN AND ARAB TURN-OUT WAS DISAPPOINTING. HOWEVER, 52 NAMES ON THE LETTER WAS REASONABLY IMPRESSIVE AND BETWEEN 30 AND 40 SPEAKERS, INCLUDING ABOUT 25 NON-ALIGNED/THIRD WORLD, SPOKE CRITICALLY OF THE SOVIET ACTION, SOME OF THEM IN VERY STRONG TERMS. ALL THE SOVIET UNION COULD DO IN RESPONSE WAS TO MOBILISE THE RATHER LUDICROUS AFGHAN FOREIGN MINISTER PLUS THE HARDCORE OF THE EASTERN EUROPEANS (EXCLUDING ROMANIA) AND LAOS AND VIETNAM. WE HAVE

CRITICALLY OF THE SOVIET ACTION, SOME OF THEM IN VERY STRONG TERMS. ALL THE SOVIET UNION COULD DO IN RESPONSE WAS TO MOBILISE THE RATHER LUDICROUS AFGHAN FOREIGN MINISTER PLUS THE HARDCORE OF THE EASTERN EUROPEANS (EXCLUDING ROMANIA) AND LAOS AND VIETNAM. WE HAVE EVEN HEARD THAT IRAQ, ONE OF THE COUNTRIES WITH A TREATY OF FRIENDSHIP WITH THE USSR, MAY SPEAK AGAINST THE SOVIET UNION IF AND WHEN THE PROCEEDINGS COME TO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY.

2. I WOULD ALSO HAVE PREFERRED THE RESOLUTION TO HAVE BEEN TOUGHER BUT, AT LEAST, IT WAS A GENUINE NON-ALIGNED EFFORT: STRONGER LANGUAGE WOULD NOT HAVE PRODUCED SUCH UNANIMITY AT THE VOTE AND THERE WAS NO DOUBT FROM THE MASS OF SPEECHES WHERE THE CAP FITTED. OUR TACTICS OF LOWERING OUR PROFILE AS SOON AS THE DEBATE STARTED AND LETTING THE NON-ALIGNED TAKE UP THE RUNNING WORKED.

3. I WOULD NOT FOR A MOMENT EXPECT ALL THIS UN ACTION TO AFFECT WHAT THE SOVIET UNION PROPOSE TO DO ON THE GROUND IN AFGHANISTAN. BUT THE DEBATE SO FAR SHOULD HAVE MADE THEM FEEL A LITTLE UNCOMFORTABLE AND IT HAS HELPED TO MOBILISE THE NON-ALIGNED FOR ONCE ON AN ANTI-SOVIET PLATFORM. THE PROCEEDINGS AS A WHOLE CERTAINLY CONTRIBUTED TO FINALLY DESTROYING CUBA'S CHANCES OF ELECTION TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL THIS YEAR.

PARSONS

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TO PRIORITY F C O

TELEGRAM NO 93 OF 7 JANUARY

INFO PRIORITY UKDEL NATO, PARIS, BONN, ROME, MOSCOW, OTTAWA,
ROUTINE OTHER NATO POSTS, BELGRADE, BUCHAREST, SOFIA, WARSAW,
EAST BERLIN, PRAGUE, BUDAPEST, UKMIS NEW YORK, CANBERRA, UKREP
BRUSSELS .

OUR TELEGRAMS 68 AND 73: AFGHANISTAN AND US/SOVIET RELATIONS

1. SHINN, SOVIET COUNTRY DIRECTOR (STATE) HAS GIVEN US THE FOLLOWING DETAILS OF THE IMMEDIATE IMPLICATIONS FOR US/SOVIET RELATIONS. (THIS NO DOUBT OVERLAPS THE CATALOGUE GIVEN TO NATO EARLIER TODAY - UKDEL NATO TELNO 011, PARAGRAPH 2).

2. WARREN CHRISTOPHER IS HANDING TO THE SOVIET CHARGE THIS AFTERNOON THREE NOTES COVERING

(A) A REDUCTION IN THE FREQUENCY OF AEROFLOT FLIGHTS TO THE UNITED STATES PERMITTED UNDER THE CIVIL AIR AGREEMENT. OF THE TWO FLIGHTS PER WEEK TO NEW YORK AND ONE FLIGHT PER WEEK TO WASHINGTON, THE RUSSIANS WILL HAVE TO CUT OUT ONE FLIGHT PER WEEK OF THEIR CHOICE.

(B) THE WITHDRAWAL OF CONSULAR PERSONNEL (ROUGHLY 15-20 IN EACH CASE) FROM THE RESPECTIVE CONSULATES IN KIEV AND NEW YORK;

(C) THE DECISION TO MAKE NO FURTHER ALLOCATION OF FISHING RIGHTS IN US WATERS. THE ALLOCATION ALREADY MADE TO THE RUSSIANS COVERING UP TO 120 THOUSAND TONS FROM THE BERING SEA TO THE END OF THE CURRENT FISHING YEAR WILL BE ALLOWED TO STAND. ANOTHER BATCH OF ALLOCATIONS DUE TO BE MADE WITHIN THE NEXT TWO TO THREE WEEKS COVERING A TOTAL OF ABOUT 350 THOUSAND TONS IN THE PACIFIC OCEAN WILL BE CANCELLED.

3. THREE JOINT COMMITTEE MEETINGS (HOUSING, HEALTH AND AGRICULTURE) DUE TO BE HELD SOON HAVE BEEN CANCELLED. A MEETING OF THE TRADE COMMISSION SCHEDULED FOR APRIL HAS BEEN POSTPONED. TRADE SEMINARS DUE TO BE HELD AT THE US EMBASSY IN MOSCOW HAVE BEEN CANCELLED. THE BAN ON ALL HIGH TECHNOLOGY EXPORTS, PENDING A REVIEW OF US LICENSING POLICY TO DEVISE NEW CRITERIA, WOULD AFFECT QUITE A FEW IMMINENT EXPORTS (NOT SPECIFIED). THE MAGNETO HYDRO-DYNAMIC

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/ PROJECT

PROJECT OUTSIDE MOSCOW, A COOPERATIVE VENTURE UNDER THE BILATERAL ENERGY AGREEMENT, HAS BEEN SUSPENDED INDEFINITELY.

4. THE RUSSIANS HAVE BEEN TOLD THAT THERE IS NO PROSPECT OF MOVING FORWARD THE NECESSARY LEGISLATION TO GRANT MFN. THE ADMINISTRATION HAVE BEEN IN TOUCH WITH US INDUSTRY TO DISCOURAGE NEW VENTURES. SPECIFICALLY, SHUSHKOV HAS BEEN TOLD THAT FURTHER ACTION IS SUSPENDED UNDER CONTRACTS SIGNED BY ALCOA FOR A NEW ALUMINIUM SMELTER AND BY ARMCO STEEL (WHOSE HEAD, BILL VERITY, IS ALSO VICE CHAIRMAN OF THE SEMI-OFFICIAL TRADE AND ECONOMIC COUNCIL).

5. ON EXCHANGES OF LESSER IMPORTANCE US POLICY WOULD BE TO HOLD THEM DOWN TO A LEVEL OF LOW VISIBILITY WHILE PERMITTING ACTIVITIES WHERE THERE IS A CLEAR HUMANITARIAN INTEREST (EG SENDING TWO EXPERTS IN ARTERIO SCHLEROSIS UNDER THE HEALTH AGREEMENT) AND EXCHANGES INVOLVING OFFICIALS OF NOT MORE THAN ASSISTANT SECRETARY RANK. NEGOTIATIONS BEGUN RECENTLY ON A NEW CULTURAL AGREEMENT WOULD BE DELAYED. CONGRESSMAN GREEN, DUE TO VISIT SOVIET UNION NEXT WEEK, HAS POSTPONED AND OTHER PARLIAMENTARY EXCHANGES WILL PROBABLY BE SUSPENDED. THE AMERICANS WOULD DISCOURAGE SOCIAL CONTACTS BETWEEN US OFFICIALS AND THE RUSSIANS. THEY WOULD SCALE DOWN THEIR EMBASSY IN KABUL TO ABOUT TEN UNDER A CHARGE D'AFFAIRES. THEY WOULD STEP UP BROADCASTING BY RADIO LIBERTY, FREE EUROPE AND THE VOICE OF AMERICA WITH PARTICULAR EMPHASIS ON THE INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN. NO JUDGMENT HAD BEEN MADE YET ABOUT IMPLICATIONS FOR US POLICY TOWARD INDIVIDUAL EAST EUROPEAN COUNTRIES.

6. THE EVALUATION OF US POLICY WITH THE HELP OF AMBASSADOR WATSON, TO WHICH THE PRESIDENT HAD REFERRED IN HIS BROADCAST, HAD NOW BEEN ESSENTIALLY COMPLETED. WATSON WOULD BE RETURNING TO MOSCOW BY THE END OF THIS WEEK. (SHINN PAID A COMPLIMENT IN PASSING TO HM AMBASSADOR AT MOSCOW FOR WHAT HE DESCRIBED AS HIS "PROFOUND INFLUENCE" ON AMBASSADOR WATSON'S THINKING ABOUT THE NEED FOR US RESPONSIVE MEASURES TO BE BOTH SIGNIFICANT AND OF LONG DURATION). IN ADDITION TO THE FOREGOING, THE EVALUATION HAD ENABLED THEM TO IDENTIFY A FURTHER SET OF MEASURES TO BE KEPT IN RESERVE FOR POSSIBLE FUTURE USE. THESE INCLUDED COMPLETE SUSPENSION OF THE AIR SERVICES AGREEMENT, SUSPENSION OF THE MARITIME AGREEMENT GIVING

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TO PRIORITY F C O

TELEGRAM NO 93 OF 7 JANUARY

INFO PRIORITY UKDEL NATO, PARIS, BONN, ROME, MOSCOW, OTTAWA,
ROUTINE OTHER NATO POSTS, BELGRADE, BUCHAREST, SOFIA, WARSAW,
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SOVIET SHIPS ACCESS TO SOME 40 US PORTS, AND REDUCTION OF EMBASSY PERSONNEL. SHINN SAID HE WAS UNABLE TO SHED MUCH LIGHT ON WHAT THE PRESIDENT HAD MEANT BY HIS REFERENCE TO "THE NECESSARY LEGISLATION" BY CONGRESS IN RESPONSE TO THE CRISIS. NONE OF THE MEASURES IN PARAGRAPHS 2-5 ABOVE REQUIRED ACTION BY CONGRESS, THOUGH COMPLETE SUSPENSION OF EXISTING AGREEMENTS AND/OR NEGOTIATION OF NEW ONES WOULD DO SO. HE ASSUMED THAT THE PRESIDENT WAS REFERRING TO DOMESTIC ASPECTS OF THE GRAIN EMBARGO DECISION AS WELL AS THE PACKAGE OF ASSISTANCE FOR PAKISTAN. (ON THESE TWO SUBJECTS WE ARE REPORTING SEPARATELY - SEE ALSO MY 2 IFTS, NOT TO ALL).

HENDERSON

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FM WASHINGTON 072040Z JAN 80

TO PRIORITY F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 83 OF 7 JANUARY 80.

INFORMATION UK DEL NATO, UK MIS NEW YORK, KABUL, ISLAMABAD, NEW DELHI, PARIS, BONN, ROME, OTTAWA AND MOSCOW.

U.S. CONTACTS WITH AFGHANISTAN.

1. WE GAVE STATE DEPARTMENT LAST WEEK A BRIEF ACCOUNT OF OUR CURRENT STEPS TO WIND DOWN RELATIONS WITH THE REGIME IN KABUL (YOUR TEL NO 007 TO KABUL). LORTON (STATE DEPARTMENT) BRIEFED US TODAY ON U.S. INTENTIONS, ALTHOUGH THESE HAD NOT YET BEEN FINALLY AGREED. BRIEFING ON THEM WOULD BE SENT TO CAPITALS LATER THIS WEEK.

2. THE ADMINISTRATION HAD DECIDED:

(A) TO END ALL BILATERAL AID AGREEMENTS WITH AFGHANISTAN, AND TO DIVERT ELSEWHERE ANY AID-FINANCED EQUIPMENT STILL IN THE PIPELINE. (IN ANY CASE THE PIPELINE WOULD HAVE HAD TO BE CLOSED DOWN BY 31 MAY; IT WOULD NOW BE CLOSED DOWN WITH IMMEDIATE EFFECT.)

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(B) TO REDUCE THE U.S. EMBASSY STAFF IN KABUL BY AT LEAST HALF. NO MORE THAN 20 US-BASED STAFF (INCLUDING MARINE GUARDS) WOULD BE LEFT. THE POSITION ON LOCALLY ENGAGED STAFF WAS STILL UNCLEAR.

(C) TO AVOID ANY IMPRESSION OF "BUSINESS AS USUAL" U.S. OFFICIALS HAD BEEN INSTRUCTED TO ESCHEW SOCIAL CONTACTS WITH THEIR AFGHAN COUNTERPARTS.

(D) RECOGNITION AS SUCH DID NOT ARISE AS AN ISSUE, GIVEN U.S. PRACTICE. BUT THE LINE THAT RELATIONS WERE STILL "UNDER REVIEW" WOULD BE MAINTAINED FOR THE TIME BEING. THE U.S. WAS IN NO HURRY TO ANNOUNCE THAT RELATIONS (ON WHICH RECOGNITION WAS BASED) WERE NORMAL.

(E) TO REVIEW EXPORTS TO AFGHANISTAN OF STRATEGIC SIGNIFICANCE IN THE SAME WAY AS THOSE TO THE SOVIET UNION WOULD BE REVIEWED. HOWEVER AFGHANISTAN WOULD NOT BE FORMALLY PLACED IN CATEGORY Y I-E. CLASSIFIED AS A COCOM COUNTRY.

(F) TO CLOSE THE ICA OFFICE IN KABUL TEMPORARILY, WITH THE PRESUMPTION THAT THIS WOULD BE THE CASE INDEFINITELY.

(G) TO CONTINUE PREVIOUS U.S. OPPOSITION, ON HUMAN RIGHTS GROUNDS, TO AFGHANISTAN FROM IFIS.

3. THE ADMINISTRATION WERE ALSO REVIEWING:

(I) THEIR SMALL COMMITMENT TO THE WFP PROGRAMME IN AFGHANISTAN; AND

(II) THE DESIRABILITY OF MULTILATERAL APPROACHES TO THE UNDP AND IFIS TO LIMIT THEIR PROGRAMMES WHICH WERE UNDERSTOOD TO BE SIGNIFICANT IN AFGHANISTAN. THE U.S. HAD TAKEN NO POSITION ON THIS POINT AND WOULD WISH TO CONSULT THE ALLIES.

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FM FCO 071910Z JAN 80

TO ROUTINE MOSCOW

TELEGRAM NUMBER 14 OF 7 JANUARY

AND TO CERTAIN OTHER POSTS AND MISSIONS

INFO UKDEL NATO

SOVIET INTERVENTION IN AFGHANISTAN

1. WE WISH TO BRING HOME TO THE RUSSIANS BY EVERY MEANS AVAILABLE OUT STRONG DISAPPROVAL OF THEIR ACTIONS. ONE METHOD IS RESTRICTION OF CONTACTS WITH SOVIET OFFICIALS.
2. MOSCOW ONLY. WHILE ESSENTIAL BUSINESS (INCLUDING COMMERCIAL WORK) MUST OF COURSE CONTINUE, YOU SHOULD FOR THE TIME BEING AVOID UNNECESSARY CALLS ON AND SOCIAL CONTACTS WITH SOVIET OFFICIALS.
3. ALL OTHER POSTS. UNTIL FURTHER NOTICE SOCIAL CONTACTS WITH SOVIET EMBASSIES SHOULD BE AVOIDED AND OTHER CONTACTS REDUCED TO A MINIMUM.
4. SIMILAR ACTION IS BEING TAKEN IN LONDON.
5. PLEASE INFORM SUBORDINATE POSTS AS NECESSARY.
6. WE DO NOT AT PRESENT WISH TO REDUCE CONTACTS WITH OTHER WARSAW PACT COUNTRIES. DEPENDING ON THE DEGREE TO WHICH THEY ENDORSE THE SOVIET INTERVENTION, WE MAY ISSUE A SEPARATE INSTRUCTION ON THIS.

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TO IMMEDIATE TOKYO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 8 OF 7 JANUARY

INFO MOSCOW, WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK, ISLAMABAD, DELHI, BONN,
PARIS, ROME, OTTAWA, CANBERRA, WELLINGTON, KABUL.

AFGHANISTAN.

1. THE JAPANESE AMBASSADOR CALLED ON CORTAZZI TODAY TO SEEK OUR VIEWS ON THE FUTURE HANDLING OF ISSUES ARISING OUT OF THE AFGHAN CRISIS.

2. AFTER BRIEFLY OUTLINING THE RECENT DEVELOPMENTS, INCLUDING THE LONDON MEETING OF SIX NATO COUNTRIES, CORTAZZI STRESSED OUR VIEW THAT THE WESTERN REACTION NEEDED TO BE SUSTAINED AND FIRM. THE SOVIETS MUST BE DETERRED FROM FURTHER SIMILAR ACTIONS. CORTAZZI SAID THAT WE ACCORDINGLY ATTACHED IMPORTANCE TO A COORDINATED RESPONSE, AND EXPLAINED BRIEFLY CURRENT DISCUSSIONS IN THE NATO FORUM. HE SAID THAT AMONG MEASURES BEING CONSIDERED WERE:-

A) CANCELLATION OF VISITS AND EXCHANGES.

B) FOOD EXPORTS, EG BUTTER, IN LINE WITH THE AMERICAN DECISION TO REDUCE GRAIN EXPORTS.

C) TECHNOLOGY, WHICH MIGHT BE PURSUED IN THE COCOM FORUM.

D) CREDIT. SHOULD SPECIAL CREDIT AGREEMENTS BE MAINTAINED AND WHAT SHOULD TERMS OF FUTURE CREDIT FOR THE SOVIET UNION BE ?

ON THE QUESTION OF PARTICIPATION IN THE OLYMPIC GAMES CORTAZZI SAID THAT THE BRITISH OLYMPIC COMMITTEE WAS AN INDEPENDENT BODY AND TO BE EFFECTIVE A BOYCOTT WOULD NEED TO BE SUPPORTED BY A LARGE NUMBER OF COUNTRIES.

3. CORTAZZI SAID THAT ON AFGHANISTAN WE HAD DECIDED:-

A) TO WITHDRAW OUR AMBASSADOR AND TO REDUCE THE STAFF OF OUR EMBASSY.

B) TO CLOSE THE BRITISH COUNCIL AND CUT OFF ALL AID (ALTHOUGH AFGHAN STUDENTS IN THIS COUNTRY WOULD BE ALLOWED TO COMPLETE THEIR COURSES).

C) NOT TO HAVE POLITICAL CONTACTS WITH THE PRESENT REGIME. WE DID NOT WISH TO RECOGNISE WHAT WAS A PUPPET GOVERNMENT.

4. ON PAKISTAN CORTAZZI SAID THAT WE SUPPORTED DEBT RESCHEDULING. WE HAD DONE OUR PART BY APPLYING RETROSPECTIVE TERMS ADJUSTMENT TO PAKISTAN. WE WERE INVESTIGATING WHAT COULD BE DONE TO STEP UP AID AND WE WERE CONSIDERING ASSISTANCE TO AFGHAN REFUGEES IN PAKISTAN. PAKISTAN WAS PRIMARILY INTERESTED IN AMERICAN ARMS AND EQUIPMENT. WE ALL NEEDED TO BE CONSCIOUS OF THE INDIAN ANGLE AND TO REASSURE THE INDIANS THAT SUPPORT FOR PAKISTAN WAS NOT DIRECTED AT INDIA.

5. CORTAZZI SAID THAT WE HAD NOTED THE EFFECTIVE SPEECH OF THE JAPANESE AMBASSADOR AT THE UNITED NATIONS. FOLLOWING THE LIKELY VETO ON THE SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION THERE WOULD NO DOUBT BE A CALL FOR A SPECIAL SESSION OF THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY. THIS WOULD REQUIRE WIDESPREAD SUPPORT FROM THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT, ESPECIALLY ISLAMIC COUNTRIES.

6. CORTAZZI SAID THAT WE HOPED THAT THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT WOULD TAKE A ROBUST LINE AND WORK IN COOPERATION WITH OTHER WESTERN COUNTRIES. WE SHOULD KEEP IN CLOSE CONTACT ABOUT MEASURES TO BRING HOME OUR MESSAGE TO THE SOVIET UNION. HE SUGGESTED THAT THE JAPANESE MIGHT WITHDRAW THEIR AMBASSADOR FROM KABUL AND TRUSTED THAT THERE WAS NO QUESTION OF THEIR RECOGNISING THE PRESENT AFGHAN REGIME. WE PRESUMED THAT THEY WOULD CUT OFF ALL AID TO AFGHANISTAN: (THE JAPANESE AMBASSADOR SAID THAT THEY WERE REVIEWING THEIR AID). WE HOPED THAT JAPAN WOULD BE AS HELPFUL AND GENEROUS TOWARDS PAKISTAN AS POSSIBLE. WE TRUSTED THAT THEY WOULD USE THEIR INFLUENCE WITH THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT AND ISLAMIC COUNTRIES TO ENSURE AN EFFECTIVE WORLD RESPONSE TO SOVIET AGGRESSION.

7. FUJIYAMA UNDERTOOK TO REPORT THESE SUGGESTIONS AND ASKED THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS:-

- A) WERE WE RECALLING OUR AMBASSADOR FROM MOSCOW? CORTAZZI SAID THAT THIS WAS A MATTER ON WHICH WE WOULD WISH TO ACT TOGETHER WITH OUR PARTNERS.
- B) WOULD THE SOVIETS WITHDRAW SOON FROM AFGHANISTAN? CORTAZZI THOUGHT THIS MOST UNLIKELY. THE NEW AFGHAN REGIME DEPENDED ON SOVIET TROOPS FOR ITS EXISTENCE.

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- C) WOULD NOT MRS GANDHI IF SHE CAME TO POWER TAKE A PRO-SOVIET POSITION? CORTAZZI REPLIED THAT MRS GANDHI HAD TWICE CRITICISED THE SOVIET ACTION IN AFGHANISTAN. IT WAS IMPORTANT THAT WE SHOULD MAINTAIN A CLOSE DIALOGUE WITH THE INDIANS ABOUT THE AFGHAN SITUATION.
- D) SHOULD WE NOW CEASE TO WORRY ABOUT NUCLEAR DEVELOPMENT IN PAKISTAN? CORTAZZI REPLIED THAT THE NON-PROLIFERATION ISSUES WERE STILL IMPORTANT BUT THEY HAD TO BE SEEN IN A GEO-POLITICAL CONTEXT. OUR MAIN AIM AT THE MOMENT SHOULD BE TO PERSUADE THE PAKISTANIS NOT TO EXPLODE A NUCLEAR DEVICE.
- E) WHAT WAS THE TIME FRAME FOR WESTERN DECISION-MAKING? CORTAZZI SAID THAT WE HOPED THAT DECISIONS WOULD BE MADE THIS WEEK. WE SHOULD HAVE TO MAKE A STATEMENT WHEN PARLIAMENT RESUMED NEXT WEEK ABOUT OUR REACTION TO RECENT EVENTS.
- F) WERE DISCUSSIONS TAKING PLACE IN THE EEC FORUM AS WELL AS IN NATO? CORTAZZI SAID THAT THE ASIA WORKING GROUP IN ROME LATER THIS WEEK WOULD CERTAINLY CONSIDER AFGHANISTAN AMONG OTHER TOPICS.

8. PLEASE SEEK AN EARLY OPPORTUNITY TO REINFORCE AT A HIGH LEVEL THE REQUESTS WHICH CORTAZZI MADE TO THE JAPANESE AMBASSADOR (PARAGAPH 6).

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From the Private Secretary

7 January 1980

file
H/F 9-1-80

Afghanistan

We spoke just now about the letter to the Prime Minister from the Secretary-General of the Islamic Council of Europe. I should be grateful for advice as to whether or not the Prime Minister herself should reply to Mr. Azzam and, if so, in what terms. Assuming your advice will be that the Prime Minister herself should reply, I should be grateful for a draft by close of play on Wednesday, 9 January.

I also enclose a telegram from an Afghan group in Peshawar. I should be grateful if you would arrange for this to be acknowledged in whatever way you consider appropriate.

M. O. D. R. ALEXANDER

Paul Lever, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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FM MOSCOW 071205Z JAN 80

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 016 OF 7TH JANUARY

FOR INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON AND UKMIS NEW YORK

PRIORITY KABUL, BONN, PARS, UKDEL NATO, ISLAMABAD, DELHI
PEKING AND TEHERAN.

AFGHANISTAN: SOVIET REACTION TO US POLICIES

1. A TASS STATEMENT, ISSUED YESTERDAY AND PRINTED IN TODAY'S PRAVDA PROVIDED AN AUTHORITATIVE RESPONSE TO PRESIDENT CARTER'S TELEVISED STATEMENT OF 4 JANUARY.

THE MAIN POINTS WERE:

- A. CARTER'S SPEECH SMACKED OF THE COLD WAR, NEGLECTED SUCH VITAL LONG TERM INTERESTS AS PEACE AND DETENTE, AND WAS INCONSISTENT WITH US RESPONSIBILITIES AS A LARGE POWER. IT DID NOT LOOK LIKE THE STATEMENT OF A PERSON WHO HELD THE HIGHEST GOVERNMENT POST, BUT RATHER OF A CANDIDATE TO THAT POSITION, AND APPEARED INFLUENCED BY ELECTORAL CONSIDERATIONS. IT WAS HOSTILE THE THE INTERESTS OF PEACE. THE USE OF AFGHANISTAN AS THE PRETEXT FOR SUCH A SPEECH WAS REMARKABLE. THE AFGHAN PEOPLE HAD THE RIGHT TO CHOOSE THEIR OWN ROAD OF INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL DEVELOPMENT, AND IT WAS GROSS INTERFERENCE FOR THE US TO DENY THIS RIGHT:
- B. SIMILARLY, CARTER WAS USING THE "DETAINMENT OF MEMBERS OF THE STAFF OF THE US EMBASSY IN TEHRAN" FOR BLACKMAIL AND THREATS AGAINST IRAN. AS WAS WELL KNOWN, THE SOVIET UNION SUPPORTED THE OBSERVANCE OF THE VIENNA CONVENTION, AND THE RESOLUTION OF THE DISPUTE BY PEACEFUL MEANS. THE US PREFERRED DIFFERENT MEANS E.G. ECONOMIC BLOCKADE. WERE THE CONSEQUENCES OF AN ATTEMPT TO ESTABLISH A BLOCKADE REALISED IN WASHINGTON?
- C. CARTER HAD NOT MENTIONED EUROPE, WHERE THE US HAD JUST IMPOSED ON A NUMBER OF WEST EUROPEAN STATES, THROUGH THE NATO BLOC, A DECISION TO DEPLOY US MEDIUM RANGE MISSILES:

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- D. IN THE BILATERAL FIELD, CARTER HAD ANNOUNCED THE CURTAILMENT OF ECONOMIC, SCIENTIFIC, TECHNOLOGICAL AND CULTURAL TIES. THESE WERE ALREADY LIMITED, BECAUSE THE US HAD OBSTRUCTED THE FULL IMPLEMENTATION OF GRAIN CONTRACTS. THE SOVIET UNION HAD NOT SOUGHT SUCH TIES AS FAVOURS, AND REGARDED THEM AS BEING OF MUTUAL BENEFIT. SIMILAR MEASURES HAD FAILED BEFORE AND WOULD FAIL NOW. THE PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT LACKED POLITICAL BALANCE, OVER-ESTIMATING THE POTENTIALITIES OF THE US AND UNDER-ESTIMATING THE POTENTIALITIES OF OTHERS: AND
- E. THE SOVIET UNION WOULD UPHOLD ITS LAWFUL INTERESTS AND THOSE OF ITS ALLIES. THOSE WHO LIKED TO IGNORE THIS RISKED BLUNDERING AND CAUSING MORE HARM TO THEIR OWN COUNTRY THAN TO OTHERS. THE SOVIET UNION LIKED TO HOPE THAT A SANE AND FARSIGHTED APPROACH TO BILATERAL RELATIONS WOULD PREVAIL IN THE US.
2. THE TASS STATEMENT IS HOSTILE AND NOTABLY CONTEMPTUOUS IN TONE. EVEN THE PIOUS SENTIMENT AT THE END, WHICH PAYS LIP SERVICE TO THE HOPE OF IMPROVED RELATIONS, IS COUCHED IN INSULTING TERMS. THE MAIN POINT OF THE STATEMENT IS TO CLAIM THAT THE MEASURES ADOPTED BY THE US WILL BE INEFFECTIVE AND WILL HARM AMERICAN RATHER THAN SOVIET INTERESTS. THE REFLECTS THE CONCLUSION OF THE INTERNATIONAL REVIEW COLUMN IN YESTERDAY'S PRAVDA (MY TELNO 15) WHICH REFERRED TO A SUBSTANTIAL CHANGE IN THE CORRELATION OF FORCES IN THE WORLD SINCE THE 1950S AND CAUTIONED AGAINST REVIVING "OLD FORMULAS".
3. THE VARIOUS ACCUSATIONS MADE AGAINST THE US ADMINISTRATION IN THE TASS STATEMENT HAVE BEEN SUPPORTED IN OTHER ARTICLES IN THE SOVIET PRESS OVER THE WEEKEND. THE LINE HAS BEEN TO PLAY UP ACCUSATIONS OF US INVOLVEMENT IN AFGHANISTAN AND MILITARY PRESSURE DIRECTED AGAINST IRAN, TO LINK THESE WITH THE FIVE-YEAR DEFENCE PROGRAMME, THE BARTHOLOMEW MISSION, THE TNF DECISION AND THE POSTPONEMENT OF SALT RATIFICATION, AND TO CLAIM THE EXISTENCE OF A NEW WAVE OF US ATTEMPTS TO IMPOSE ITS MILITARY HEGEMONISM. THIS MORNING'S PRAVDA ALSO

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BLAMES THE US FOR MASTERMINDING THE ATTEMPT TO DEPRIVE CUBA OF HER RIGHTFUL PLACE ON THE SECURITY COUNCIL: AND TO WARN THAT THE "UNUSUAL SITUATION" OF A 14-MAN COUNCIL COULD ONLY HAVE BEGATIVE CONSEQUENCES FOR ITS WORK AND FOR ITS DECISIONS.

4. A NOTABLE OMISSION FROM SOVIET COMMENT ABOUT CARTER'S SPEECH IS ANY REFERENCE TO WHAT HE SAID ABOUT THE OLYMPICS.

F C O PLEASE PASS IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON AND UKMIS NEW YORK
PRIORITY BONN PARIS UKDEL NATO

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(REPEATED AS REQUESTED)

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TO FLASH PARIS

TELEGRAM NUMBER 5 OF 7 JANUARY

AND TO BONN

INFO IMMEDIATE MOSCOW, UKDEL NATO, WASHINGTON, ROME, OTTAWA, UKMIS
NEW YORK: ROUTINE OTHER NATO POSTS.

AFGHANISTAN AND EAST-WEST RELATIONS.

1. IN VIEW OF THE MOST RECENT EVENTS, INCLUDING TODAY'S MEETING OF THE SENIOR POLITICAL COMMITTEE AT NATO, I HAVE DECIDED TO SEND A MESSAGE TO THE FRENCH AND GERMAN FOREIGN MINISTERS. PLEASE DELIVER IT AS SOON AS POSSIBLE TODAY.

TEXT BEGINS:

I AM SURE THAT YOU, LIKE ME, WILL HAVE BEEN GIVING MUCH THOUGHT TO EVENTS IN AFGHANISTAN, AND FOLLOWING CLOSELY THE CONTACTS BETWEEN OUR PEOPLE ON THIS SUBJECT. I ENTIRELY AGREE ABOUT THE IMPORTANCE OF WESTERN REACTIONS IN THE REGION. THAT IS LARGELY WHY I AM LEAVING ON 9 JANUARY FOR A VISIT TO TURKEY, QIAN, SAUDI ARABIA, PAKISTAN AND PROBABLY INDIA. I HOPE THAT THIS TRIP WILL DEMONSTRATE SUPPORT FOR THESE COUNTRIES AND ENABLE ME FULLY TO UNDERSTAND THEIR VIEWS ON THE SITUATION.

AT THE SAME TIME IT SEEMS TO ME THAT IT WOULD BE A MISTAKE TO CONFINE OUR REACTIONS TO THE REGION. OTHER NON-ALIGNED COUNTRIES ARE WORRIED: THE CASE OF YUGOSLAVIA SPEAKS FOR ITSELF. INDEED, ONE OF THE FIRST THINGS THE REGIONAL COUNTRIES WILL ASK IS WHAT ACTIONS WESTERN COUNTRIES ARE GOING TO TAKE TOWARDS THE RUSSIANS. NON-ALIGNED CONCERN ON THIS POINT WOULD BE UNDERSTANDABLE, FOR THE CHANCES THAT THIS UNPRECEDENTED SOVIET ACT OF AGGRESSION WILL BE REPEATED ELSEWHERE DEPEND SIGNIFICANTLY ON WHAT THE WEST CAN DO TO SHOW THE RUSSIANS NOW THAT AGGRESSION BRINGS REAL PENALTIES. I AM THEREFORE GLAD THAT THIS EAST-WEST ASPECT, AS WELL AS THE REGIONAL ONE, IS BEING DISCUSSED IN NATO. THE IMPACT ON THE SOVIET UNION OF THE WESTERN REACTIONS WOULD BE SADLY REDUCED IF WE DO NOT ACT IN CONCERT. IT WOULD ALSO BE VERY REGRETTABLE IF OUR ACTIONS WERE MUCH LONGER DELAYED. THE

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MOST EFFECTIVE RESPONSE WOULD BE TO REACH AGREEMENT ON A FIRST LIST OF STEPS, WHICH EACH OF US COULD ANNOUNCE WITHIN A FEW DAYS.

COMMENCE SQUARE BRACKETS: FOR THE MESSAGE TO THE FRENCH ONLY
ENDS SQUARE BRACKETS: ONE IMPORTANT AREA WHERE BRITAIN AND FRANCE CAN ACT - TOGETHER WITH CANADA AND ITALY - IS THAT OF CREDITS FOR THE SOVIET UNION. COULD WE AGREE THIS WEEK THAT EXPORT CREDITS WILL IN FUTURE BE ON O E C D CONSENSUS TERMS? AND WOULD YOU BE WILLING TO CONSIDER THE IDEA OF JOINING THE U K, AND THE OTHER WESTERN COUNTRIES CONCERNED, IN NOT REPLACING THE EXPIRED CREDIT AGREEMENTS, SO THAT EXPORT CREDIT WOULD BE AVAILABLE TO THE SOVIET UNION ON THE NORMAL CASE BY CASE BASIS?

IT WOULD HELP ME BEFORE MY VISIT IF YOU COULD LET ME KNOW HOW YOU SEE THINGS, BY MESSAGE OR TELEPHONE TOMORROW.
TEXT ENDS.

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PS/MR LUCE

PS/MR HURD

PS/PUS

SIR D MAITLAND

MR CORTAZZI

MR FERGUSSON

MR MURRAY

MR BULLARD

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TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 26 OF 7 JANUARY 1980

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON UKMIS NEW YORK MOSCOW UKDEL NATO

INFO ROUTINE KABUL BONN BRUSSELS COPENHAGEN DUBLIN LUXEMBOURG

ROME THE HAGUE AND UKREP BRUSSELS

AFGHANISTAN: M FRANCOIS-PONCET'S INTERVIEW WITH THE CLUB DE LA PRESSE

1. THE FRENCH FOREIGN MINISTER, M. FRANCOIS-PONCET, WAS THE GUEST ON A REGULAR RADIO PROGRAMME, CLUB DE LA PRESSE D'EUROPE 1, ON 6 JANUARY. HE WAS QUESTIONED CLOSELY AND AT LENGTH BY 22 JOURNALISTS INCLUDING THE EDITORS OF THE OFFICIAL UDF, GAULLIST AND SOCIALIST PARTY JOURNALS. MOST OF THE INTERVIEW WAS DEVOTED TO AFGHANISTAN BUT THE MIDDLE EAST, IRAN AND COMMUNITY MATTERS WERE ALSO DISCUSSED BRIEFLY: I AM REPORTING THESE SEPARATELY.

2. FRANCOIS-PONCET BEGAN BY UNDERLINING THE CONCERN WHICH THE SOVIET INTERVENTION HAD CAUSED THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT AND ADDED THAT SOVIET ACCOUNTS OF THEIR ACTIONS DID NOT TALLY WITH FRANCE'S OWN INFORMATION, ALTHOUGH HE REFUSED TO BE DRAWN INTO SAYING THAT THE RUSSIANS HAD LIED. FRANCE WOULD BE READY TO SUPPORT A CALL IN THE UNITED NATIONS FOR THE WITHDRAWAL OF SOVIET TROOPS.

HAD LIED. FRANCE WOULD BE READY TO SUPPORT A CALL IN THE UNITED NATIONS FOR THE WITHDRAWAL OF SOVIET TROOPS.

EAST/WEST RELATIONS AND DETENTE

3. WHILE FRANCOIS-PONCET REPEATED SEVERAL TIMES THAT THE SOVIET ACTION HAD INDEED CAST A SHADOW OVER DETENTE (THE LATTER, BY NATURE BEING GLOBAL), HE STRESSED THAT THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT INTENDED TO KEEP COOL IN THE FACE OF THESE EVENTS AND DID NOT INTEND LIGHTLY TO THROW AWAY ALL THAT HAD BEEN ACHIEVED IN FIFTEEN YEARS OF DETENTE: FRANCE HAD A SPECIAL RESPONSIBILITY IN THE MATTER SINCE FRANCE IN 1965, UNDER GENERAL DE GAULLE, HAD LAUNCHED THE INITIATIVE OF DETENTE. DETENTE HAD BENEFITTED NOT ONLY THE SOVIET UNION: THE BEGINNINGS OF LIMITATION OF THE ARMS RACE HAD BEEN OF GREAT BENEFIT TO ALL AND THE SOVIET UNION HAD IN ANY CASE BEEN OBLIGED TO WITHDRAW FROM A NUMBER OF AREAS WHERE SHE HAD PREVIOUSLY HAD CONSIDERABLE INFLUENCE EG. EGYPT, SOMALIA AND GUINEA. THIS DID NOT AT ALL, HOWEVER, MEAN FRANCE'S BEING COMPLACENT, OR REACTING WEAKLY - "THAT IS NOT THE POSITION OF FRANCE".

RETALIATION AGAINST SOVIET UNION

4. FRANCOIS-PONCET SAID THAT FRANCE DID NOT BELIEVE IN USING ECONOMIC RELATIONS WITH OTHER STATES AS A POLITICAL WEAPON. THE UNITED STATES' COMMERCIAL RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION WERE OF AN ESSENTIALLY POLITICAL NATURE. FRANCE'S COMMERCIAL RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION WERE OF A NORMAL COMMERCIAL KIND. FRANCE WOULD NOT RETALIATE BY RESTRICTING COMMERCIAL RELATIONS WITH THE USSR BUT SHE WOULD NOT MAKE UP THE SHORTFALL RESULTING FROM RESTRICTIONS IMPOSED BY OTHERS LIKE THE UNITED STATES WHO WERE PLANNING SUCH ACTION. IN ANSWER TO A QUESTION, M FRANCOIS-PONCET SAID THAT IN ANY CASE FRANCE HAD NO GRAIN TO SELL TO THE SOVIET UNION. IN RESPONSE TO AN OBSERVATION FROM SOME OF THE JOURNALISTS THAT FRANCE'S POLICY WAS ONE OF ANALYSIS RATHER THAN ACTION, M FRANCOIS-PONCET SAID "WE CONSIDER THAT THE SOVIET MILITARY OPERATION IN AFGHANISTAN IS A SERIOUS BLOW TO THE GLOBAL NATURE OF DETENTE. IT WILL LEAD US, IN THE CONVERSATIONS WHICH WILL HAVE IN THE COMING WEEKS WITH THE SOVIET AUTHORITIES, TO EXPRESS THIS POINT OF VIEW AND TO SEEK ASSURANCE THAT THE SOVIET UNION HAS PROPERLY WEIGHED UP THE CONSEQUENCES WHICH THIS BLOW MIGHT HAVE FOR A POLICY WHICH HAS FORMED THE VERY KEYSTONE OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS FOR THE PAST FIFTEEN YEARS. IN THE LIGHT OF THE SOVIET REACTION, WE SHALL SEE WHAT THE FINAL FRENCH POSITION SHOULD BE IN THE LONG TERM AND NOT NECESSARILY IN THE FEW DAYS AND WEEKS OF THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE".

SOLIDARITY WITH PARTNERS AND ALLIES

5. FRANCOIS-PONCET HAD TO COPE WITH QUESTIONS FROM TWO ANGLES. THERE WAS PRESSURE FROM SOME OF THE JOURNALISTS PRESENT TO SHOW

SOLIDARITY WITH PARTNERS AND ALLIES

5. FRANCOIS-PONCET HAD TO COPE WITH QUESTIONS FROM TWO ANGLES. THERE WAS PRESSURE FROM SOME OF THE JOURNALISTS PRESENT TO SHOW SOLIDARITY WITH THE US AND WITH FRANCE'S OTHER PARTNERS AND ALLIES BUT HE WAS ALSO PRESSED TO SAY WHETHER CHRISTOPHER'S REMARKS FOLLOWING THE 31 DECEMBER MEETING MEANT THAT FRANCE WAS ENGAGED IN SOME COLLECTIVE REVIEW OF POLICY TOWARDS THE SOVIET UNION. M FRANCOIS-PONCET SAID THAT "FRANCE DID NOT INTEND IN THIS AFFAIR THAT ITS DIPLOMACY SHOULD BE ALIGNED ON THE SPUR OF THE MOMENT WITH THAT OF OTHER COUNTRIES ... TO CONSULT WITH OUR PARTNERS IS NATURAL; TO ENGAGE HOWEVER IN A COLLECTIVE DECISION-MAKING PROCESS WHICH WOULD CALL INTO QUESTION THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE ACTIONS WHICH WE INTEND TO UNDERTAKE ... IS QUITE ANOTHER THING".

POSSIBLE BOYCOTT OF OLYMPIC GAMES

6. FRANCOIS-PONCET DID NOT THINK THAT IT WOULD BE A GOOD IDEA TO USE THE OLYMPIC GAMES AS A POLITICAL WEAPON. IT WOULD BE COUNTER-PRODUCTIVE SINCE A LARGE NUMBER OF COUNTRIES WOULD IN ANY CASE ATTEND AND WOULD THUS BE MADE TO SEEM TO APPROVE THE OPERATION OF WHICH THEY PROBABLY DISAPPROVED.

HIBBERT.

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TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 015 OF 7TH JANUARY

FOR INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK, UKDEL NATO AND KABUL.

AFGHANISTAN

1. PRAVDA OF 6 JANUARY CONTAINED A SHARP ATTACK IN ITS INTERNATIONAL OBSERVER COLUMN, (THIS WEEK BY ZHUKOV) ON US AGGRESSION. TO THE NOW FAMILIAR SOVIET LINE ON AFGHANISTAN, THIS ADDED THE CHARGE THAT THE USA SHOULD ABIDE BY THE UN CHARTER BY ORDERING THOSE UNDER ITS PROTECTION TO STOP INVADING AFGHANISTAN. ARMS SUPPLIED TO PAKISTAN WOULD INEVITABLY FALL INTO THE HANDS OF THE AFGHAN REBELS. IT WAS ALSO CLAIMED THAT THE ISSUE OF CONTINUING MILITARY SUPPORT FOR THE REBELS WOULD BE DISCUSSED BY HAROLD BROWN DURING HIS VISIT TO CHINA. THE ARTICLE CONCLUDED WITH A RESTATEMENT OF SOVIET REFUSAL TO RENEGE ON ITS OBLIGATIONS TO THE AFGHAN GOVERNMENT.
2. TASS IN ENGLISH ON 4 JANUARY HAD ALREADY PREPARED THE GROUND BY STATING THAT "WASHINGTON IS MAKING A BIG EFFORT TO LEGALISE UNDER ANY PRETEXT MASSIVE ARMS DELIVERIES INTENDED FIRST OF ALL FOR THE AFGHAN GOVERNMENT."

LEGALISE UNDER ANY PRETEXT MASSIVE ARMS DELIVERIES INTENDED FIRST OF ALL FOR THE AFGHAN INSURGENTS''. THE STATEMENT WENT FURTHER THAN PRAVDA IN PREDICTING A POSSIBLE ''SLACKENING OF US EFFORTS IN THE SPHERE OF PREVENTING NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION''.

3. TASS LINKED SUCH SIGNS OF CONTINUING US AGGRESSION WITH YOUR FORTHCOMING VISIT TO THE COUNTRIES OF THE AREA - SAUDI ARABIA, OMAN, TURKEY AND PAKISTAN WERE SINGLED OUT - THE SUPPOSED AIM OF WHICH WAS TO SEE WHAT SUPPORT THESE COUNTRIES COULD GIVE TO WESTERN PLANS.
4. ALTHOUGH THE US CONTINUES TO BEAR THE OVERWHELMING BRUNT OF THE ATTACK, BRITISH INVOLVEMENT WAS TAKEN UP IN AN INTERVIEW GIVEN TO SOVIET JOURNALISTS IN NEW YORK BY THE AFGHAN FOREIGN MINISTER, SHAH DOST AND PUBLISHED IN ''IZVESTIA'' OF 5 JANUARY. AFGHAN FORCES WERE SAID TO HAVE CAPTURED LARGE QUANTITIES OF WEAPONS OF AMERICAN, BRITISH, CHINESE AND PAKISTANI ORIGIN AS WELL AS SEIZING CACHES OF DOLLARS AND STERLING, THUS GIVING PROOF OF IMPERIALIST AGGRESSION. IN A CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS, DOST STATED THAT THE NEW AFGHAN GOVERNMENT TOOK POWER ON 27 DECEMBER AND REQUESTED SOVIET ASSISTANCE ON 29 DECEMBER. ASSERTIONS OF SOVIET INVOLVEMENT IN EVENTS LEADING UP TO THIS PERIOD WERE COMPLETELY UNTRUE.
5. COVERAGE OF THE UN RESOLUTION HAS BEEN LIMITED TO EXTRACTS FROM THE SPEECHES OF THE AFGHAN AND SOVIET REPRESENTATIVES COUPLED WITH THE ARGUMENT THAT IT ILL BEFITS THE USA AND ITS ALLIES TO CAST THE FIRST STONE. THERE HAVE BEEN NO INDIVIDUAL ATTACKS ON OTHER COUNTRIES SUPPORTING THE RESOLUTION.
6. REPORTING OF INTERNAL AFGHAN AFFAIRS TAKES TWO FORMS. THE MAJOR STATEMENTS OF BABRAK KARMAL AND HIS MINISTERS ARE REPRODUCED VERBATIM WHILST REPORTS FROM SOVIET CORRESPONDENTS IN AFGHANISTAN SEEK TO STRESS THE RETURN TO CALM AND NORMALITY IN THE COUNTRY.

F C O PSE PASS IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK AND UKDEL NATO.

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


PART _____ 1 _____ ends:-

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PART _____ begins:-

Fr. Moscow to Fco Tel: 15 7.1.80



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