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FILE TITLE: COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN AND STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION TALKS (CTB + SALT) MUTUAL BALANCED FORCE REDUCTIONS (MBFR)	SERIES: DEFENCE
	PART: 1
PART BEGINS: MAY 1979	PART ENDS: 15TH JUNE 1979.
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PREM 19/212

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CAW to PM 15.6.79

TO BE RETAINED AS TOP ENCLOSURE

Cabinet / Cabinet Committee Documents

Reference	Date
OD (79) 1st Meeting, Minute 2	14.5.79
CC (79) 2nd Conclusions, Minute 2 (extract)	17.5.79
CC (79) 3rd Conclusions, Minute 2 (extract)	24.5.79
MISC 7 (79) 1st Meeting, Minutes 2 and 3	24.5.79

The documents listed above, which were enclosed on this file, have been removed and destroyed. Such documents are the responsibility of the Cabinet Office. When released they are available in the appropriate **CAB** (CABINET OFFICE) CLASSES

Signed O Wayland Date 10 August 2010

PREM Records Team

Reference

1.

PRIME MINISTER

COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN: MEETING WITH DR. FRANK PRESS

The Americans have confirmed that Dr. Frank Press, President Carter's Scientific Adviser, will be able to call on you at 3.00 p.m. on Monday 18 June to brief you on Comprehensive Test Ban issues. Dr. Press will be accompanied by Mr. Marcum and Mr. Huberman, both of the U.S. National Security Council.

Sir John Hunt has proposed that you should be supported at the meeting by him and by Dr. Robert Press of the Cabinet Office (I am afraid that it is confusing that we have an American Press and a British Press involved in this subject). You had earlier said that you wished Dr. Johnson of the MOD, whom you met at your recent Intelligence briefing, to be present when you saw Dr. Frank Press. We could, of course, have him there if you wish, but the scientific aspects of a Comprehensive Test Ban are much more in Dr. Robert Press's field than Dr. Johnson's. Are you content to have only Sir John Hunt and Dr. Robert Press with you at the meeting?

I should like Dr. Johnson there as well. MT

15 June 1979

SECRET

18

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1
Telephone 01-~~930 7022~~ 218 2111/3

SECRET

MO 12/2/5

15th June 1979

Dear Bryan,

COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN: PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING WITH DR FRANK PRESS

At the suggestion of President Carter, Dr Frank Press, his Scientific Adviser, is calling on the Prime Minister on Monday, 18th June at 3 pm for a briefing on Comprehensive Test Ban issues.

/ 2. I attach two papers by MOD scientists covering those technical questions on which the Prime Minister has expressed particular interest:

a. the maintenance of the nuclear weapons stockpile under a CTBT; and

b. the technology of evasion.

3. In our view there is likely to be little technical incentive for the Soviet Union to attempt to conduct clandestine tests under a three year treaty. The risks of being discovered (which are not confined to seismic means) would be likely greatly to outweigh any technical advantage they might hope to gain. Clandestine testing by the Soviet Union during a three year treaty would be unlikely to disturb significantly the nuclear balance to the disadvantage of the West.

4. The papers do not attempt to assess the balance of advantage as between, on the one hand, the risks which have always been recognised to be inherent in a fully comprehensive test ban, ie without a threshold, and, on the other, the political and non-proliferation benefits which may flow from such a ban, even if of limited duration. These benefits are discussed in the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary's minute of 23rd May to the Prime Minister.

/5. ...

B G Cartledge Esq
10 Downing Street

SECRET

SECRET

5. Dr Frank Press's technical speciality covers evasion technology and CTB monitoring. He will, however, no doubt be ready to elaborate on the range of factors, political as well as technical, underlying the President's support for the conclusion of a CTBT. The Prime Minister might wish to establish with him how the President assesses the risks, whether he sees future improvements in verification capabilities reducing these risks and what he sees as the benefits of a treaty along the lines of that currently under negotiation.

6. The Americans have not yet responded to the recent Ministerial decision on National Seismic Stations (NSS). The Americans were told that the UK would be unwilling to pay for more than one NSS but that if the Americans could find some way of providing the necessary funds then Ministers would be prepared to accept up to four NSS on British territory. We have no indication that Dr Frank Press will be in a position to give an answer on this.

7. I am sending copies of this letter to George Walden (Foreign and Commonwealth Office), Martin Vile, Sir Clive Rose and Dr R Press (Cabinet Office).

Yours sincerely

John Gutteridge

pp (R L L FACER)
Private Secretary

NUCLEAR WEAPON STOCKPILE MAINTENANCE

Modern British and American nuclear warheads are produced to very close engineering tolerances with a wide range of accurately specified materials, some of which are very reactive chemically and/or radioactive. To economise in both warhead size and weight, the designs are marginal in the sense that a minor degradation in the performance of a warhead component could cause the warhead to fail completely. It is therefore vital that any ageing effects in warheads in storage, e.g. due to corrosion, should be detected promptly and, where assessed as significant, corrected. To this end, stockpiled warheads are returned from the Services on a regular sampling basis for detailed examination and assessment.

2. When this surveillance programme detects an ageing effect, the causes and the consequences for warhead functioning are estimated by warhead designers and, where necessary, remedial measures are proposed. Because of the marginal characteristics of warheads, only trivial changes in design or material specification can be validated without any form of testing. Somewhat larger changes can be accepted based on a combination of the experience of warhead designers, laboratory experiments and computer simulations. Experience has shown that other more drastic modifications can be required and these can only be confidently introduced after they have been proven by underground nuclear testing. It is rare that a remedy for a stockpile warhead defect requires a special nuclear proving test; the proposed modification can almost always be validated, or faulted, by including it in an underground test device detonated for some other purpose.

3. A Comprehensive Test Ban has two direct effects on the current procedures for maintaining stockpile serviceability. Clearly it precludes a nuclear test to prove a proposed design modification to correct a detected fault. But it also withdraws from the warhead designers the ability to demonstrate their continuing professional competence and this undermines the confidence with which they can advise on all technical warhead matters. The competence of the designers is essential for producing confident assessments of the results of stockpile surveillance.

4. Taking the above into account, UK and US warhead designers have advised that the risks to the viability of warhead stockpiles are acceptably small for a CTB of strictly three years duration. In this period, the probability of finding an ageing fault demanding an underground nuclear test before a correction could enter into Service is small. And, even if such a test were required, it could be carried out immediately after the three year period now envisaged for the CTB Treaty without, in most cases, having caused in the meantime an unacceptable drop in overall operational nuclear capability. To

ensure that this option is kept open it would be necessary, during the CTB, to maintain a readiness to resume testing. The remote possibility of having to test during the three year period of a Treaty because operational capabilities would otherwise be seriously affected, would be protected by the "Supreme National Interest" provision in the Treaty.

5. As far as the competence of weapon establishments is concerned, this could be maintained at an acceptable level over a three year period providing they pursue sufficiently interesting programmes to retain their present staffs and to exercise their skills on warhead-related work short of full-scale nuclear testing. Such "safeguards" programmes have been drawn up in both the UK and US and they include experiments which would give very small nuclear yields of up to 100lb (the so-called "permitted experiments") but which are not nuclear weapon tests. These experiments would include work on inertial confinement fusion (ICF) which could lead to a greater understanding of weapon physics and to nuclear weapon effects simulations; the simulation of warhead implosions to normalise computer codes for warhead design; and safety experiments where zero yield would be expected but where yields of some tens of pounds could occur. However the experiments would not serve the development of new warhead designs but it cannot be excluded that they may be more valuable than can now be envisaged. Co-operation between the UK and the US on safeguards programmes would clearly be mutually beneficial.

6. On the basis of present technical knowledge and experience the risk to the stockpile would increase the longer the Treaty were extended beyond three years. Without UK testing there is bound to be a progressive decline in confidence in the serviceability of the stockpile. And in the long run there appears to be no prospect of maintaining the essential competence of weapon laboratories without a freedom to conduct nuclear weapons tests at a few kilotons yield.

7. It is not possible to be precise about the Soviet appreciation of their stockpile maintenance problem. The indications are that they may find it less acute than the West for two main reasons. First because the payload capacity of their missiles is so much larger, their warhead designs may be less sophisticated and hence less prone to significant ageing faults. Second, they would have no difficulty in retaining the staffs in their weapon laboratories although with a declining level of competence. However in a time-scale longer than that appropriate to the West, their nuclear capability would inevitably decline.

CTB EVASION TECHNOLOGY

It is technically impossible to verify completely that the terms of a truly comprehensive test ban are not being evaded. There will always be a detection threshold below which a country could cheat without a real risk of being found out. The seismic monitoring network already deployed by the Americans is proven to detect, with 90% confidence, Soviet nuclear tests conducted in close contact with hard rock, at yields in excess of 800 tons. It is estimated that the improvements planned for the US network and the addition of National Seismic Stations (NSS) in the Soviet Union would reduce this threshold to about 300 tons.

2. The capability of seismic networks is less against explosions conducted in soft rock by a factor of about 10, i.e. for the current and planned networks the detection thresholds would be about 8 kilotons and 3 kilotons respectively. Three measures by which monitoring capability could be reduced further have been suggested. The most straightforward of these rests on de-coupling the energy from an underground explosion from its geological environment. From theoretical studies, high explosive simulations and one full scale US nuclear experiment, it is estimated that the seismic signal from a nuclear device detonated underground in a large cavity could be up to about 100 times less than that generated by the same device detonated underground in close contact with the surrounding hard rock. A spherical cavity of about 100m diameter would be needed to de-couple a 10 kiloton explosion so that its seismic signal appeared to have originated from an explosion close-coupled in hard rock of down to 100 tons yield.

3. Cavities of up to 100m diameter, or perhaps somewhat greater, can be created in, for example, salt dome formations either by a large nuclear explosion or by conventional engineering techniques. This theoretically offers the opportunity for undetected clandestine testing up to a few tens of kiloton yield. To reduce this possibility, the US has proposed that some NSS should be located in those areas of the Soviet Union where salt dome formations are found. Moreover, the US satellite capability would have a chance of detecting the surface preparations for a de-coupled test if one were attempted.

4. The overall assessment is that the Russians would be unlikely to cheat under a 3 year Treaty. But if they decided to do so, they would have to set a limit on the yield they could use taking into account the uncertainties about the capabilities of the monitoring system deployed against them and the safety factor required to be sure of escaping detection. With this in mind, it is assessed that the Russians would not seek to test above a few kilotons, perhaps 10 kilotons at maximum, even with the use of de-coupling. However, there is evidence of Soviet work on detonating nuclear explosives in large cavities. More detailed Intelligence information on this can be provided separately.

5. The two other less practical evasion techniques rely on either simulating an earthquake signal by a specially timed series of nuclear explosions or hiding the signals from a single nuclear explosion in that from an earthquake. The first of these possibilities should present no great problem to a seismic verification network which includes broad-band seismometer stations. The alternative earthquake scenario poses greater verification difficulties but equally imposes major constraints on a clandestine test operation. The test would have to be staged in a seismically active area (there are such areas in the Soviet Union) and would have to be carried out at a time when an appropriately timed and located earthquake of sufficient magnitude occurred. Such earthquakes occur, on average, in seismically active regions a few times a year, but at wholly unpredictable times. If the operational uncertainties were accepted for tests of perhaps up to a few kilotons, then this evasion technique would defeat the seismic verification network. But the general assessment is that in the unlikely event of evasion being planned, de-coupling rather than hide-in-earthquake would be preferred.

17

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1
Telephone 01-~~930 7022~~ 218 2111/3

SECRET

15th June 1979

No 10. A.R. 26.

COVERING TOP SECRET
ATOMIC PRINCIPAL

MO 12/2/5

Dear Bryan.

COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN
NUCLEAR WEAPON STOCKPILE MAINTENANCE

The Defence Secretary believes that the Prime Minister may find the attached note useful in connection with a meeting on 18th June with President Carter's Scientific Adviser, Dr Frank Press. It has been prepared by Ministry of Defence officials after consultation with their American counterparts who are in full agreement with it.

I am sending a copy of this letter, without attachment, to Martin Vile (Cabinet Office).

Yours sincerely,

Roger Facer

(R L L FACER)

B G Cartledge Esq
No 10 Downing Street

SECRET
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ATOMIC PRINCIPAL

The National Archives

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GR 90

Mr. Whitmore

CONFIDENTIAL
FM WASHINGTON 151621Z JUN 79
TO IMMEDIATE F C O
TELNO 1529 OF 15 JUNE

MYTEL NO 1507: CTB

1. MARCUM HAS CONFIRMED THAT THE PROGRAMME ON MONDAY 18 JUNE AS OUTLINED IN TELECON REEVE/WESTON IS FINE. FOR TUESDAY, HE HIMSELF WOULD BE AVAILABLE FOR FURTHER MEETINGS UNTIL HIS FLIGHT TO PARIS AROUND 1600 HOURS. DR PRESS AND HUBERMAN, HOWEVER, WILL HAVE TO CATCH A FLIGHT OUT OF HEATHROW AT 1030 A.M.

2. THE PARTY ARE EXPECTING THE U S EMBASSY TO LOOK AFTER THEM ON ARRIVAL.

3. RESIDENT CLERK PLEASE INFORM REEVE (ACDD) A.M. ON 16 JUNE.

JAY

[COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING ST]

FILES
ACDD
NAMD
EESD
DEF. D
PLANNING STAFF
PS
PS/LPS
PS/MR HURD
PS/PUS

SIR A DUFF
SIR A PARSONS
MR GULLAND
MR P.H. MOBERLY
MR FERGUSSON

COPIES TO:
SIR C ROSE } CABINET OFFICE
DR R PRESS }

CONFIDENTIAL

GR 75

Enter via
Bell
Wyn

CONFIDENTIAL
FM F C O 141130Z JUNE
TO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON
TELEGRAM NUMBER 673 OF 14 JUNE
INFO ROUTINE UKMIS GENEVA (FOR C T B DEL).

YOUR TEL NO 1473 : C T B.

1. THE PRIME MINISTER IS UNABLE TO MANAGE A MEETING ON THE DATES PREFERRED BY DR PRESS BUT WOULD BE GLAD TO SEE HIM ON MONDAY 18 JUNE AT 3 PM. PLEASE INFORM DR PRESS IMMEDIATELY AND CONFIRM THAT THIS APPOINTMENT IS ACCEPTABLE.

2. OFFICIALS WOULD LIKE TO TALK TO DR PRESS ON MONDAY MORNING. PLEASK IF 11 AM WOULD BE CONVENIENT.

CARRINGTON

FILES
ACDD. MR BULLARD
NAMD. MR P H MOBERLY
EESD. MR FERGUSSON.
DEF D.
PLANNING STAFF
PS
PS/LORD PRIVY SEAL
PS/MR HURD
PS/PUS.
SIR A DUFF
SIR A PARSONS.

COPIES TO
SIR C ROSE } CAB. OFFICE
DR R PRESS }

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CONFIDENTIAL

Original in G/R.

BROADLANDS,
ROMSEY,
HAMPSHIRE.
SO5 9ZD.

TELEPHONE
ROMSEY (0794) 513333

Prime Minister.

You may care to reply to Mountbatten on the basis of the letter below. — ? Not at least!

Yes but letter here! But his health was shaky and not.

13th June 1979

My dear Prime Minister,

It was a real pleasure having the chance of a talk with you at the Kenya State Banquet, and to thank you again for the splendid help you gave me when I was President of the International Council of the United World Colleges and also in getting 'A' level Electronics pushed through for schools in the teeth of the opposition of the Schools Advisory Council. I have never forgotten your help on those occasions.

You were worried about the present nuclear situation in the world; so am I. You said you would be interested to read the speech I made in the Palais de Nations at Strasbourg in May on the occasion when I received the Award of one of the big Foundations of France to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, of which I have been a member of the Scientific Committee since its foundation. I immediately passed on the Award to the President, Madame Karin Soders.

I made my speech in French and it was prepared to be spoken in French. However, I have an English translation ~~which~~ and I enclose ~~and I have side-lined~~ the bits that I think would interest you.

If you want to talk further about this then I do suggest you get hold of Solly Zuckerman for he and I have thought alike about this ever since I persuaded him to come into the Ministry of Defence when I became Chief of the Defence Staff in 1960.

You will have an outstanding Chief of the Defence Staff in Terry Lewin and I am sure he will be very helpful to you, on the official side, but Solly, of course, has the advantage of being on the "unofficial" side.

At all events, I send you my very best wishes for the success of your time in office at this critical period.

Yours sincerely

Mountbatten of Burma

PRIME MINISTER

P.A. [illegible]
14/6

Comprehensive Test Ban: American Scientific Briefing

The Americans have now acted on Mr. Vance's offer to you to send over one of their top scientists to brief you on their view of the technological aspects of a comprehensive test ban treaty. President Carter has offered to send over his Scientific Adviser, Mr. Frank Press, on 18/19 or 20 June.

I think it is important that you should, if possible, hear what Mr. Press has to say before you meet President Carter in Tokyo on 29 June. However, the diary for the three days which President Carter has offered is very crowded indeed. We have looked at all the options and the best, if not the only possibility, would be for you to see Mr. Press on the afternoon of Monday 18 June, after your lunch for King Hussein, instead of sitting in on the last afternoon of the Budget Debate. We could move your appointment with Mr. Ramphal to 1745 so that you could have a good session with Mr. Press from, say, 1515 to 1645. This would still enable you to look in on the Debate for an hour before receiving Mr. Ramphal. Agreed MT

Could you agree to this? If so I shall ask for briefing.

[illegible]

Can you please indicate if present (Mr Thomas?)

13 June 1979

SECRET

File 16 Defence

Original NATO - ' May 79 (The PM's mtg with SACEUR)

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

13 June 1979

Dear Paul,

General Haig's Farewell Call on the Prime Minister at 10 Downing Street on 13 June 1979 at 1000

The Supreme Allied Commander Europe, General Haig, called on the Prime Minister at No. 10 this morning to say farewell before leaving his appointment. The following is a summary of the main points which arose during half an hour's conversation.

General Haig told the Prime Minister that the arrival in office of the new British Government had been a shot in the arm for NATO. The Prime Minister said that she had been surprised by the reluctance of some of the smaller NATO members to engage in the open discussion of defence matters; she said that a shot in the arm for the Alliance was clearly useful but much would depend on what other Governments were prepared to do. The Prime Minister went on to say that although her initial reaction to her first briefings on the East/West military balance had been one of discouragement, her considered conclusion had been that the West's supericrity in human and material resources should enable it to respond to any challenge. General Haig agreed and commented that the Soviet Union would face major problems during the 1980s, both demographic - as a result of the high birth rate among the non-Russian peoples of the Soviet Union - and economic. There would be significant shortfalls in economic growth, industrial productivity and agriculture. The Soviet Union and its empire would also be subjected to strong centrifugal pressures, as the Pope's visit to Poland had demonstrated. General Haig said that he saw the period of the 1980s, and particularly the years between 1981 and 1987, as being one of the greatest danger but also of the greatest promise for the West and, in any event, the most crucial period since the end of the Second World War. The Prime Minister said that much would depend on who succeeded President Brezhnev and on the international climate in which he took office: his policies would be to a large extent determined by the depth of the resolve which he saw in the West.

/ General Haig

PL

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General Haig told the Prime Minister that the new British Government was making an important contribution in the Nuclear Planning Group, where the positions adopted by the previous Government had been damaging: Chancellor Schmidt had earlier been pushed towards his own left-wing but his resolve was now much strengthened. So far as the problem of the deployment of Theatre Nuclear Weapons was concerned, General Haig thought that in the end the Belgians and the Italians could probably help by accepting such weapons on their territory, possibly with an element of phasing. General Haig described the Danish position, which he had recently discussed with Prime Minister Jorgensen, of insisting on the development of negotiating positions for the dismantlement of TNFs before embarking on a modernisation programme as a recipe for disaster.

The Prime Minister told General Haig that the West had dropped from a position of superiority to one of equivalence with the Warsaw Pact without, apparently, noticing it: her fear was that the West might, in the same way, drop from equivalence to inferiority. General Haig agreed that there was no military area in which the Soviet Union had not surprised the West by the pace of their technological advance: NATO's best estimate had been that the Soviet Union could not develop their new ICBM warheads until 1985; but these warheads would in fact be operational by 1981.

The Prime Minister told General Haig that she was particularly concerned by Soviet preparations for offensive chemical warfare. General Haig agreed that the West was fundamentally deficient in this area and that NATO had no deterrent capacity in the chemical warfare field. He hoped that President Carter would discuss this problem with President Brezhnev at the Vienna Summit, on the basis that if no progress was made in negotiations on chemical warfare the United States would have to develop an offensive system of its own. General Haig said that it would be helpful if the Prime Minister were to express her concern about this problem to other members of the Alliance, including the Americans. His personal view was that it was essential for the West to develop a binary system of chemical weapons.

Turning to the Comprehensive Test Ban negotiations, the Prime Minister said that she had considerable reservations about a CTB Treaty in view of the fact that the Russians could decouple their nuclear test explosions in underground caverns. Scientific opinion was apparently divided: British scientists seemed to agree that decoupling was possible whereas some American scientists thought that it was not. The Prime Minister said that she was also concerned about the problem of stockpile testing. General Haig said that he thought that the majority of US scientists regarded a threshold of 5 kts as the minimum which should be accepted. President Carter,

/ however,

however, had a strong preference for a total ban and had been encouraged in this by the British Labour Government. General Haig said that, in his personal view, a ban was naive and dangerous. He thought that this problem, too, would be discussed in Vienna.

In a discussion of SALT II, the Prime Minister explained that, although the British Government had a number of questions to ask about the Treaty, she had concluded that the political consequences of its non-ratification would be more serious than the defects of the Treaty itself. General Haig said that he thought that the outcome in Congress would be, not a series of amendments which the Soviet Union would never accept, but resolutions criticising parts of the Treaty but which would have no binding force on the President; they would simply be domestic, political face-savers. Several aspects of the SALT II agreement were, he thought, unsatisfactory; these included the protocol and the constraints on what the United States could do in the field of strategic arms development. He thought that the Congressional debate on SALT would continue until the end of 1979 and could well spill over into the Presidential campaign in 1980.

The Prime Minister told General Haig that the Government was at present considering the problem of a successor to the UK's Polaris deterrent; whatever choice was made, the UK would need technology from the United States. General Haig said that he felt very strongly that, in the strategic arms field, quality was more important than numbers; and that, therefore, the UK should go for a successor ballistic missile rather than for the cruise missile.

I should be grateful if you, and the other recipients of this letter, would ensure that it is given a suitably restricted distribution. I am sending a copy of this letter to Roger Facer (Ministry of Defence) and Martin Vile (Cabinet Office).

Yours ever,

Bryan Cartledge.

Paul Lever, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

Rote ce

GR320

CONFIDENTIAL

Mr Whitmore has seen 16/6

CONFIDENTIAL
DESKBY 130800Z
FM WASHINGTON 122217Z
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1473 OF 12 JUNE 79.

YOUR TEL NO 635 : CTB.

1. MARCUM (ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT'S ADVISER ON SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY POLICY) TOLD US TODAY THAT THE PRIME MINISTER'S CONVERSATION WITH VANCE LAST MONTH AND HER WILLINGNESS TO HEAR A MORE DETAILED EXPOSITION OF THE AMERICAN APPROACH TO CTB HAD BEEN REPORTED TO PRESIDENT CARTER. THE PRESIDENT HAD DIRECTED THAT HIS SCIENTIFIC ADVISER FRANK PRESS SHOULD OFFER TO GO TO LONDON NEXT WEEK AND GIVE THE PRIME MINISTER A BRIEFING ON CTB AS A FOLLOW-UP TO THE VANCE VISIT. THE PRESIDENT THOUGHT THAT IF IT WERE POSSIBLE TO ARRANGE FOR PRESS TO SEE THE PRIME MINISTER NEXT WEEK THIS WOULD PROVIDE A USEFUL PRELIMINARY TO HIS OWN MEETING WITH MRS THATCHER AT TOKYO.

2. MARCUM SAID THE AMERICANS WERE VERY FLEXIBLE ON DATES MENTIONED THAT 19, 20 OR 21 JUNE MIGHT BE BEST. IF PRESS CAME HE WOULD PROBABLY BE ACCOMPANIED BY MARCUM AND BEN HUBERMAN (HIS ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS). HE ASSUMED IT MIGHT ALSO BE RIGHT TO INVOLVE THE US AMBASSADOR IN LONDON, THOUGH THE US EMBASSY THERE ARE NOT YET AWARE OF THIS APPROACH.

3. IF THE ABOVE PROPOSAL PROVED TO BE UNWORKABLE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER'S POINT OF VIEW GIVEN THE SHORT NOTICE, AN ALTERNATIVE WOULD BE FOR MARCUM HIMSELF TO GO TO LONDON NEXT WEEK TO BRIEF THE PRIME MINISTER'S ADVISERS. NOR DID THEY WISH TO EXCLUDE A VISIT BY PRESS OR MARCUM AFTER TOKYO, IF NEITHER EARLIER SUGGESTION PROVED FEASIBLE.

/ 4. MARCUM

4. MARCUM SAID HE WOULD BE GRATEFUL IF THE PRESIDENT'S SUGGESTION COULD BE GIVEN EARLY CONSIDERATION AND HE WOULD AWAIT A REACTION VIA THIS EMBASSY.

JAY

F I L E S:
ACDD
NAD
EESD
DEFENCE DEPT
PLANNING STAFF
PS
PS/SIR I. GILMOUR
PS/MR HURD
PS/PUS
SIR A. DUFF
SIR A. PARSONS
MR BULLARD
MR P.H. MOBERLY
MR FERGUSSON
MR EDMONDS

COPIES TO:
DR R. PRESS CABINET OFFICE
SIR C. ROSE, " "

Defence

Enter on
Ogm
13/6

GPS 430 CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

UK EYES A

FM UKMIS GENEVA 111545Z JUNE 1979

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELNO 191 OF 11 JUNE

INFO PRIORITY MODUK (DS 17), ROUTINE WASHINGTON, MOSCOW.

COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN NEGOTIATIONS

FROM EDMONDS, CTB DELEGATION

MY TELNOS 187 AND 188: NATIONAL SEISMIC STATIONS (NSS)

1. ON 8 JUNE, THIS SUBJECT WAS DISCUSSED BILATERALLY BY PETROSYANTS (USSR) AND YORK (US), EACH ACCOMPANIED BY HIS DEPUTY ONLY.

2. PETROSYANTS DESCRIBED THE MAIN POINTS OF HIS COVERSATION WITH ME ON 7 JUNE AND THEN SAID THAT THE PROBLEM OF NUMBERS OF NSS COULD PERHAPS BE USEFULLY RELATED TO THE TIMESCALE FOR THEIR INSTALLATION.

3. WHEN YORK ASKED HOW THIS WOULD BE DONE, PETROSYANTS SAID HE ENVISAGED THAT THE NSS IN ALL 3 COUNTRIES WOULD ONLY BECOME FULLY OPERATIONAL IN THE FOURTH YEAR OF THE TREATY. (HE WAS EVIDENTLY TRYING TO MAKE THE OPERATION OF NSS CONDITIONAL ON EXTENSION OF THE TREATY BEYOND THE INITIAL 3 YEARS). THERE WAS SOME CONFUSED DISCUSSION STARTED BY THE RUSSIANS, OF A POSSIBLE INTERVAL BETWEEN THE FIRST 3-YEAR PERIOD AND THE FURTHER EXTENSION OF THE TREATY, IF THE US HAD A REQUIREMENT TO CONDUCT TESTS FOR STOCKPILE RELIABILITY AT THE END OF THE THIRD YEAR. (PLEASE SEE CAVEAT IN PARAGRAPH 7 BELOW.)

4. WITHOUT ACCEPTING PETROSYANTS' BASIC PREMISE, YORK ASKED HOW MANY STATIONS HE WOULD EXPECT TO BE INSTALLED AFTER 3 YEARS. THE ANSWER WAS 10 EACH IN THE USSR AND USA AND 5 (REPEAT 5) ON UK TERRITORY. PETROSYANTS CLAIMED TO BE INTERESTED IN THE DEPENDENT TERRITORIES BUT NOT IN THE UK ITSELF.

5. PETROSYANTS EMPHASISED THAT ALL THIS, ESPECIALLY THE EXACT NUMBERS, WAS JUST HIS PERSONAL THINKING. HE SAID IT WOULD BE A GREAT HELP IF THE UK, WITH US SUPPORT, WOULD COME UP WITH A FIRM NEW PROPOSAL FOR THE NUMBER OF UK STATIONS. LATER HE ASKED WHAT YORK THOUGHT WOULD BE REASONABLE. AGAIN ON A PERSONAL BASIS, YORK SAID HE THOUGHT 3 OR 4, BUT CONFINED TO THE UK ITSELF.

6. COMMENT. YORK AND I ARE AGREED THAT THIS CONFRIMS THAT THE RUSSIANS ARE PREPARED TO ACCEPT THAT THERE SHOULD BE FEWER NSS ON UK TERRITORY THAN IN THE USSR OR THE USA. FURTHER INFORMAL DISCUSSION MAY ESTABLISH MORE CLEARLY WHAT STRINGS THE RUSSIANS WOULD HOPE TO ATTACH TO THIS CONCESSION.

7. CAVEAT. YORK GAVE ME AN ACCOUNT OF THIS CONVERSATION BEFORE BRIEFING HIS OWN DELEGATION. SINCE HE IS A GOOD TALKER BUT NEITHER HE NOR HIS DEPUTY IS A VERY CAREFUL LISTENER, WE HAVE CHECKED THE 2 ACCOUNTS. THEY COINCIDE IN ALL ESSENTIALS, BUT THE US DELEGATION TELL US THAT THEIR REPORT TO WASHINGTON OMITS ALL MENTION OF WHAT THE RUSSIANS SAID ABOUT A POSSIBLE INTERVAL FOR TESTING AND ONLY BRINGING NSS INTO OPERATION IN THE FOURTH YEAR. I SHOULD THEREFORE BE GRATEFUL IF PARAGRAPH 3 ABOVE COULD BE IGNORED IN ANY DISCUSSIONS WITH THE AMERICANS.

MURRAY

[PASSED TO KODUK (DS17)]

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GPS 350

FM WASHINGTON 081558Z JUN 79
TO ROUTINE F C O
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1403 OF 8 JUNE 1979,
INFO MOD UK (DS 11) BONN,
INFO SAVING PARIS, MOSCOW, UKDEL NATO.

P S TO P M

2

Prime Minister

CHANCELLOR SCHMIDT ON S A L T II

1. AT THE PRESS CONFERENCE FOLLOWING HIS MEETING ON 6 JUNE WITH PRESIDENT CARTER, SCHMIDT WARMLY ENDORSED THE S A L T AGREEMENT. HE LOOKED FORWARD ''TO SWIFT AND POSITIVE RATIFICATION'' BY THE SENATE, BECAUSE HE REGARDED THE AGREEMENT AS BEING IN THE INTERESTS OF WEST GERMANY AND WESTERN EUROPE.

2. SPEAKING YESTERDAY IN HARVARD, SCHMIDT REPORTEDLY RE-EMPHASIZED HIS SUPPORT FOR S A L T AND URGED THE SENATE TO APPROVE IT OR RISK ''AN EVEN FIERCER ARMS RACE'', WHICH COULD SHATTER THE FRAGILE BALANCE OF POWER BETWEEN EAST AND WEST IN THE COMING DECADE OF UNREST.

3. SCHMIDT PREFACED HIS COMMENTS BY SAYING ''IT IS NOT MY INTENTION TO INTERFERE WITH THE U S SENATE'S ONCOMING DECISION ON RATIFYING S A L T II''. HOWEVER, HE ADDED THAT THE TREATY WAS ''NOT ONLY A DOMESTIC MATTER FOR THE AMERICAN NATION. THIS TREATY IS ALSO A PIECE OF WORLD SECURITY AND A PIECE OF MY OWN COUNTRY'S SECURITY''. HE DESCRIBED S A L T AS ''A PREREQUISITE FOR THE MILITARY AND POLITICAL STABILIZATION OF THE EAST-WEST RELATIONSHIP AND . . . A DECISIVE FACTOR IN MILITARY AND POLITICAL DETENTE''. SCHMIDT ALSO NOTED THAT ''FAILURE OF S A L T II WOULD BE A SETBACK FOR DETENTE AND A SERIOUS SETBACK FOR ONGOING ARMS CONTROL EFFORTS . . . A FAILURE OF S A L T II WOULD ALSO BE A SIGNAL TO THE EAST. IT WOULD WEAKEN THE POLITICAL ELEMENTS THERE WHO ARE IN FAVOUR OF RECONCILIATION AND UNDERSTANDING WITH US IN THE WEST . . . IN EUROPE, NO NATION WOULD BE MORE SERIOUSLY AFFECTED BY THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE FAILURE OF S A L T II THAN THE GERMAN NATION''.

F C O PASS SAVING PARIS, MOSCOW, UKDEL NATO.
ROBINSON.

FILES
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ACDD
ES&SD
JNU.
WED
NAD
MR PM MOBERLY
MR FERGUSSON

ADDITIONAL DISTN
SALT

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

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Copied to: Master Set
Defence, May 1979 (Briefing on Warsaw Pact).

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

B/F 21/6/79 Answered on Part 2

7 June 1979

Intelligence Briefing: C.T.B. and Chemical Warfare

As you know, the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary and the Lord Privy Seal attended the first part of the intelligence briefing arranged for the Prime Minister by the Ministry of Defence (Roger Facer's letter of 5 June to me, copied to you) at No. 10 on 6 June at 1500. As the briefing started late, however, they were obliged to leave halfway through and consequently missed the concluding discussion.

During the course of that discussion, following Sir John Aiken's illustrated account of those sectors of the Soviet Union's military capability in which the Russians are believed to have achieved parity with or superiority over N.A.T.O., the Prime Minister recalled her concern over certain aspects of the C.T.B. negotiations. You will remember (my letter of 23 May to George Walden) that the Prime Minister voiced these concerns, centering in particular around the possibility that the Soviet Union could decouple underground nuclear explosions and that a C.T.B. treaty could inhibit essential stockpile testing, to Mr. Cyrus Vance when they discussed nuclear and strategic matters at No. 10 on 23 May. Mr. Vance commented that the Prime Minister's anxieties were not shared by the U.S. scientific community and offered to put U.S. scientific experts in touch with their U.K. counterparts in order to discuss the matter. I should be grateful if you would let me know whether there is any sign of this offer bearing fruit; the Prime Minister will wish to see the summary of the whole spectrum of expert opinion on this issue before making a final judgement.

There was also some reference in the discussion following Sir John Aiken's briefing to Soviet preparations for chemical warfare. The Prime Minister's attention was drawn to the fact that the U.K. had put forward, in 1976 in Geneva, a draft convention on the banning of chemical weapons. The Prime Minister asked for more information about this: I should be grateful if a note could be prepared on the progress of the U.K. proposal. The note should cover, in particular, the question of whether the West might lose rather than gain from a convention on chemical weapons which the Soviet Union might violate without detection.

I am sending copies of this letter to Roger Facer (MOD) and Martin Vile (Cabinet Office).

B. G. CARTLEDGE

Paul Lever, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

Mr Coulledge
No 10 D.St

GPS 900
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FM UKMIS GENEVA 061020Z JUNE 1979
TO PRIORITY FCO
TELNO 179 OF 06 JUNE
INFO PRIORITY MODUK (DS 17), ROUTINE WASHINGTON, MOSCOW, UKDEL NATO.

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COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN NEGOTIATIONS
FROM CTB DELEGATION

1. SUMMARY. THE CTB NEGOTIATIONS RESUMED ON 5 JUNE WITH THE 7TH PLENARY MEETING, THE FIRST SINCE 4 APRIL. THE MAIN FEATURE WAS THE ARGUMENT ABOUT NATIONAL SEISMIC STATIONS (NSS) ON UNITED KINGDOM TERRITORY. THE UK EXPLAINED THAT MINISTERS HAD NOT YET COMPLETED THEIR CONSIDERATION OF THIS QUESTION AND, WITH US SUPPORT, CALLED FOR EARLY DISCUSSION OF OTHER NSS ISSUES. THE USSR AGAIN INSISTED THAT THESE ISSUES COULD NOT BE DISCUSSED UNTIL IT WAS AGREED THAT THERE SHOULD BE EQUAL NUMBERS OF NSS IN THE TERRITORIES OF THE UK, USA AND USSR. AFTER THE PLENARY, THE UK TOLD THE USSR THAT THE NEW BRITISH GOVERNMENT WERE NO MORE IMPRESSED BY THE SOVIET CASE THAN THEIR PREDECESSORS. THE 3 DELEGATIONS SHOULD TRY INFORMALLY TO FIND A SENSIBLE ANSWER.

2. PETROSYANTS (USSR) DISCLAIMED SOVIET RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE SLOW PACE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS IN RECENT MONTHS. HE CONFIRMED SOVIET ACCEPTANCE OF NSS AND READINESS TO DISCUSS THEIR TECHNICAL CHARACTERISTICS ONCE AGREEMENT HAD BEEN REACHED ON THEIR NUMBERS AND LOCATIONS IN UK, US AND SOVIET TERRITORY. BECAUSE THE AMERICANS MAINTAINED THAT THE FATE OF THE TREATY WOULD LARGELY DEPEND ON ITS VERIFICATION MEASURES, THE RUSSIANS WERE DOING EVERYTHING TO FACILITATE A PRACTICAL SOLUTION OF THE NSS PROBLEM. QUOTE GENTLEMEN, THE BALL IS IN YOUR COURT UNQUOTE.

3. AS REGARDS THE QUESTION OF THE QUOTE EXTENSION OF THE TREATY UNQUOTE, ALL THREE DELEGATIONS HAD SPOKEN OF WANTING A DURABLE TEST BAN. THEY SIMPLY HAD TO REFLECT THIS IN TREATY LANGUAGE.

4. HE HOPED THE CARTER/BREZHNEV SUMMIT AND THE SIGNATURE OF SALT II WOULD GIVE A STRONG IMPETUS TO THE NEGOTIATIONS.

/S. EDMONDS

CONFIDENTIAL

5. EDMONDS (UK) SAID THE NEW BRITISH GOVERNMENT WISHED TO SEE THE CTB NEGOTIATIONS CARRIED FORWARD TO A SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION, BUT HAD NOT YET COMPLETED DETAILED CONSIDERATION OF THE SOVIET PROPOSAL FOR NSS IN UK TERRITORY. THE PRESENT INABILITY TO AGREE ON THIS ISSUE SHOULD NOT HOLD UP DISCUSSION OF OTHER NSS ISSUES - INCLUDING TECHNICAL CHARACTERISTICS, PROCEDURES FOR SITE SELECTION, AND THE TIME-SCALE FOR INSTALLING STATIONS.

6. YORK(US) ALSO LOOKED TO THE SUMMIT TO GIVE RENEWED IMPETUS TO THE CTB NEGOTIATIONS. THE MOST IMPORTANT SUBJECT TO BE TACKLED WAS VERIFICATION, ESPECIALLY NSS. WITHOUT EFFECTIVE VERIFICATION THERE COULD BE NO TREATY. SOVIET UNWILLINGNESS TO DISCUSS OTHER NSS QUESTIONS UNTIL AGREEMENT WAS REACHED ON THE NUMBERS OF NSS IN UK TERRITORY HAD BROUGHT ABOUT AN IMPASSE. THE USSR REGARDED NSS NUMBERS AS QUOTE A MATTER OF GREAT IMPORTANCE UNQUOTE AND THE UK WAS RELUCTANT QUOTE TO AGREE TO AN UNDERTAKING THAT IN THEIR CASE APPEARS TO HAVE LITTLE TECHNICAL JUSTIFICATION UNQUOTE. THE US HAD QUOTE NO EASY SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM UNQUOTE, BUT URGED BOTH THE UK AND USSR TO ADOPT A FLEXIBLE APPROACH SO THAT A MUTUALLY SATSFACTORY SOLUTION COULD BE FOUND. MEANWHILE IT WAS QUOTE IMPERATIVE UNQUOTE THAT WORK ON OTHER NSS ISSUES BEGIN IMMEDIATELY.

7. IN SUBSEQUENT DISCUSSION, PETROSYANTS REGRETTED THAT THE UK HAD FAILED TO USE THE LENGTHY RECESS TO REVIEW THE QUESTION OF NUMBERS OF NSS. IT WAS A QUOTE CARDINAL UNQUOTE QUESTION WHICH WOULD HAVE A QUOTE DETERMINING EFFECT ON THE WHOLE OPERATION OF THE TREATY BETWEEN THE 3 COUNTRIES UNQUOTE. TECHNICAL CHARACTERISTIC AND THE TIME-SCALE FOR INSTALLING STATIONS COULD NOT BE DISCUSSED UNTIL AGREEMENT HAD BEEN REACHED ON EQUAL NUMBERS OF NSS.

8. IT WAS WRONG OF YORK TO SUGGEST THAT THE SOVIET UNION WAS NOT PREPARED TO SETTLE THE QUESTION OF NSS NUMBERS, NOR WAS IT LEGITIMATE TO CALL ON THE SOVIET UNION ALONE FOR THE PROMPT RESOLUTION OF OUTSTANDING ISSUES: THIS WAS A JOINT PROBLEM AND JUST AS MUCH A MATTER FOR THE UK AND US. THIS WAS NOT A TIME FOR APPEALS, BUT FOR PRACTICAL ACTION.

9. YORK RECALLED THAT HE HAD URGED BOTH THE UK AND USSR TO ADOPT A FLEXIBLE APPROACH: BUT THE IMPASSE ON NSS HAD BEEN BROUGHT ABOUT BY SOVIET UNWILLINGNESS TO DISCUSS OTHER ISSUES UNTIL AGREEMENT HAD BEEN REACHED ON NUMBERS.

/10. EDMONDS

10. EDMONDS SAID IT WAS UNTRUE THAT HIS DELEGATION HAD NOT STUDIED NSS NUMBERS DURING THE RECESS. HE REGRETTED PETROSYANTS' UNWILLINGNESS TO TACKLE OTHER NSS ISSUES UNTIL NUMBERS WERE AGREED.

11. AT THE SUBSEQUENT RESTRICTED MEETING OF HEADS OF DELEGATION, PETROSYANTS SAID THE NSS NUMBERS PROBLEM HAD BEEN AROUND FOR A LONG TIME AND THE SOVIET UNION HAD NO INTEREST IN FRUITLESS DISCUSSION OF IT. NSS WERE A US NOT A SOVIET, PROPOSAL, SO IT WAS UP TO THE US AND UK TO FIND A SOLUTION. YORK EMPHASISED THAT ANY SOLUTION SHOULD REFLECT GEOGRAPHICAL AND MILITARY REALITIES. NSS WERE NECESSARY TO MONITOR THE LAND MASSES OF THE USSR AND USA WHERE NATURAL SEISMIC EVENTS AND NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS WERE COMMON. THE UK HAD NO COMPARABLE LAND MASS AND HAD NEVER CONDUCTED UNDERGROUND TESTS ON ITS TERRITORY. BUT, LIKE THE US AND USSR, THE UK WAS A NUCLEAR WEAPON STATE WITH TESTING EXPERIENCE. WE NEEDED TO FIND A SOLUTION WHICH TOOK ACCOUNT OF THE DIFFERENCES AND SIMILARITIES BETWEEN THE UK ON THE ONE HAND AND THE US AND SOVIET UNION ON THE OTHER.

12. EDMONDS SAID THAT, WHILE THE NEW BRITISH GOVERNMENT WANTED THE NEGOTIATIONS BROUGHT TO A SUCCESFUL CONCLUSION, IT WAS NO MORE IMPRESSED THAN THE LAST GOVERNMENT BY THE SOVIET CASE FOR 13 NSS ON UK TERRITORY. WITH YORK'S SUPPORT, HE SUGGESTED THAT THE 3 DELEGATIONS SHOULD DISCUSS INFORMALLY AND WITHOUT COMMITMENT ALL CONCEIVABLE WAYS OF RESOLVING THE PRESENT DIFFICULTY. PETROSYANTS DID NOT REJECT THIS PROPOSAL BUT MADE IT CLEAR THAT ANY NEW IDEAS WOULD HAVE TO COME FROM THE UK OR US.

MURRAY

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MRS ALEXANDER, TREASURY

PM/Giscard Meeting Note : 5 June 1979

Original on: France: PM's Visit: May 79

Defence

The Prime Minister said that the British Government would certainly not recognise Bishop Muzorewa's regime before the Commonwealth Conference in Lusaka. The critical time would be between that Conference and the Parliamentary debate on sanctions in November. Lord Carrington said that more would be known of the American attitude when President Carter made his determination on the Case/Javits amendment: this would probably be to the effect that the settlement was not acceptable as it stood but could be made so. There was no real distinction between the lifting of sanctions, which were imposed by a mandatory UN resolution, and recognition of the new regime.

President Giscard repeated that the French Government would do everything it could to be helpful on this issue. He pointed out that the next meeting of the Organisation of African Unity would take place before the Commonwealth meeting in Lusaka and that the one could very well have an effect on the other. The President of Liberia would be Chairman of the OAU Conference and it would obviously be useful if the UK were to make contact with him. The best outcome from the OAU meeting would be the appointment of a Committee to review the situation in Rhodesia, thus postponing any immediate judgement as to the new regime's legality. In that situation, the UK's hands would still be free at the time of Lusaka. If the OAU Conference adopted a public position, this could only be a negative one. The Prime Minister agreed and said that the prize for the West in a peaceful settlement in Rhodesia would be enormous: a prosperous Rhodesia would bring great benefit to the whole region.

Defence

The Prime Minister said that the British Government was being pressed by President Carter to support Salt II. The Government had some worries about it but had concluded that the consequences of failure by the United States Congress to ratify the Treaty would be more serious than any shortcomings in the Treaty itself. The UK was concerned about the Soviet SS20 missile, to which the Russians could easily add a third stage. The British Government also faced major decisions on the replacement of its Polaris deterrent and would have to choose between a new missile of that type or cruise missiles. She understood that France would soon have its own

/ satellite

satellite guidance system for cruise missiles. President Giscard said that this was so. The Prime Minister asked President Giscard whether he thought that Europe should be directly involved in the SALT III negotiations. Lord Carrington pointed out that Europe did not as yet know even the terms of reference for SALT III: the UK could not be involved in these negotiations if they directly concerned the UK's own deterrent.

President Giscard said that he had not taken a firm position on SALT II, since no text of the Treaty had yet been made available to the French Government. Lacking a text, he could only support the agreement in principle. He expected, however, to take up a positive public position on the Treaty when the text became available in the middle of June. The President said that he took the view that failure to ratify the Treaty would do grave damage to international stability: ultimately, he saw no alternative to a decision by the U.S. Senate to ratify.

President Giscard went on to say that SALT III raised more difficult issues. It was important to France that their strategic forces should not be included, since if they were the Western ceiling would be increased, and French forces would come under de facto U.S. leadership. There was also the problem of the "grey areas". The FRG, having raised the issue, now appeared to have retracted their concerns about it, since they did not wish to be the first Western country to create a situation in which the West would have to move towards a production of a counter-poise to the SS20. He found the German position more vague now than it had been a year ago. The fact remained that any discussion of the grey areas in the absence of a Western bargaining counter would be a nonsense. Why should the Russians dismantle their SS20s? The question was, did the willingness exist on the Western side to develop such a counter weapon? If it did, the level of weapons in the grey areas could be discussed in SALT III. But Europe had a further interest which distinguished its position from that of the United States. President Giscard said that he was concerned less too many levels of parity in strategic weapons might diminish the clarity of the United States' nuclear commitment to Europe. For this reason, France was rather ambivalent about the grey area negotiations. President Giscard said that he thought that France

would probably develop the cruise missile but without entering prior commitments on parity or equilibrium. When the Prime Minister commented that the Soviet Union had developed a very significant lead in medium-range missiles, President Giscard said that France was ahead so far as submarine launched missiles were concerned.

Lord Carrington said that the need to proceed with the modernisation of Theatre Nuclear Forces in parallel with SALT III created an added complication, along with domestic political difficulties in the Low Countries. It was likely that Belgium, the Netherlands, and the FRG would insist on a new strategic arms limitation conference as a pre-condition of TNF modernisation, perhaps even in advance of SALT III. So far, the NATO Council had decided only that there must be a decision on TNF modernisation by the end of 1979. President Giscard said that it would be useful to exchange views on this further. The French Government was at present studying France's interest in SALT III and in the development of the French deterrent after 1990. The main options under consideration were cruise missiles and mobile launching systems. The necessary scientific data would be ready during 1980. President Giscard went on to say that the French had never had a real discussion of these matters with the FRG, since they did not wish to imply a commitment to German security which would involve France's own deterrent. It was impossible not to discuss these problems with the Germans but equally impossible to have a real discussion. The Prime Minister said that she had discussed these matters with Chancellor Schmidt.

Lord Carrington said that he had some understanding of the West German view that they could not accept the deployment of medium-range systems on German soil unless a third country, in addition to the UK, did so too. President Giscard said that he thought that Belgium would probably accept medium-range systems in the end, perhaps for a limited period of time.

Defence Sales to China

President Giscard asked the Prime Minister whether the British Government had reached a final decision on the sale of Harrier aircraft to China. The Prime Minister said that the Government, for their part, were ready to sell Harriers to the Chinese

/but

GRS 700

Defence 14

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FM WASHINGTON 252222Z MAY 79
TO IMMEDIATE F C O
TEL NO 1254 OF 25 MAY.
INFO IMMEDIATE UKDEL NATO AND MODUK (DS11)

MIPT.
SALT 2: RECENT DEVELOPMENTS.

1. STATE DEPARTMENT REPRESENTATIVES BRIEFED US IN THE FOLLOWING TERMS ON DEVELOPMENTS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS SINCE OUR 25 APRIL BRIEFING. AS BEFORE, THIS BRIEFING WAS NOT BEING SHARED WITH ANY OTHER ALLIES, ALTHOUGH THE NATO MEETINGS OF 28 MAY WOULD BE GIVEN A MORE GENERAL PICTURE. FULL AGREEMENT HAD BEEN REACHED IN THE FOLLOWING AREAS.

NEW TYPES
2. THERE HAD BEEN 3 NEW AREAS OF AGREEMENT: PARAMETERS - THE NUMBER OF STAGES, THE LENGTH, THE LARGEST ALLOWABLE DIAMETER, THE LAUNCH WEIGHT AND THROW WEIGHT OF MISSILES, AND THE PROPELLANT TYPE OF STAGES: THE BASE LINE DEFINING THE NEW TYPE - THE LAST 12 LAUNCHES BEFORE DEPLOYMENT OR LAUNCHES 13 TO 25, WHICHEVER CAME EARLIER: AND A DEFINITION OF QUOTE DIFFERENT UNQUOTE (IE NEW) - PLUS OR MINUS 5 PER CENT ALTERATIONS IN THE ABOVE PARAMETERS.

BEAR ASW (TU142)
3. THERE WAS NOW AN EXPLICIT STATEMENT IN THE TREATY THAT THIS TYPE OF BEAR WAS DIFFERENT FROM THE BEAR HEAVY BOMBER (TU95), AND THAT THE OBSERVABLE DIFFERENCES (ODS) ALREADY FITTED TO BEAR ASW SET NO PRECEDENT FOR FUTURE FUNCTIONAL RELATED OBSERVABLE DIFFERENCES (FRODS) DESIGNED TO DISTINGUISH BETWEEN HEAVY BOMBERS AND OTHER VARIANTS IN THE FUTURE. THE ONLY BEAR-UPGRADE PERMISSIBLE WOULD HAVE TO BE RELATED TO ITS ASW CAPABILITY.

/CRUISE

CRUISE MISSILES (CM) ON CURRENT HEAVY BOMBERS.
4. THE RUSSIANS HAD AGREED THAT THE PROVISION FOR 20 CMS PER CURRENT HEAVY BOMBER SHOULD BE CONTAINED IN THE TREATY RATHER THAN IN AN EXCHANGE OF LETTERS.

5. AGREEMENT WAS CLOSE BUT NOT YET FULLY NAILED DOWN, ON THE FOLLOWING ISSUES.

MIRV LAUNCHER DISTINGUISHABILITY.
6. THE RUSSIANS HAD CEASED TO PRESS FOR A DISTINCTION TO BE DRAWN BETWEEN MIRVED AND NON-MIRVED LAUNCHERS FOR BOTH PRESENT AND FUTURE GENERATIONS, AND HAD AGREED THAT DISTINGUISHABILITY SHOULD PERTAIN ONLY TO FUTURE GENERATIONS.

SIMULATION
7. THE RUSSIANS HAD TODAY ACCEPTED THE ENTIRE US POSITION: IE IF THE SAME PROCEDURES WERE EMPLOYED FOR TESTING REAL AND SIMULATED RE-ENTRY VEHICLES (RCVS), THEN THE TOTAL NUMBER OF VEHICLES COULD NOT EXCEED THE FRACTIONATION LIMITS: AND IF DIFFERENT PROCEDURES WERE EMPLOYED, THEN THE LIMITS COULD BE EXCEEDED ONLY SO LONG AS IT WAS CLEAR THAT THE EXCESSIVE VEHICLES WERE PENETRATION AIDS RATHER THAN RVS.

JOINT STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES.
8. THERE WAS NOW COMPLETE AGREEMENT EXCEPT FOR ONE SMALL DIFFERENCE ON THE LANGUAGE ABOUT THE FUTURE, (IE RELATING TO SALT 3) ROLE OF CO-OPERATIVE MEASURES TO APPLY TO NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS.

DATA BASE
9. REMAINING DIFFERENCES CONCERNED THE WAYS IN WHICH THE AGREEMENTS ALREADY REACHED SHOULD BE REFLECTED IN SPECIFIC LANGUAGE, AND POSSIBLE AMBIGUITIES REMOVED. THIS WAS NOT AN ISSUE OF GREAT SUBSTANCE.

/CRUISE MISSILE

CRUISE MISSILE DEFINITIONS.

10. THE CONCEPTS HAD ALREADY BEEN AGREED OF SEPARATE DEFINITIONS FOR CMS IN THE TREATY AND THE PROTOCOL, OF THE MEANING OF QUOTE ARMED UNQUOTE, OF A DISTINCTION BETWEEN TYPES BY MEANS OF EXTERNAL OBSERVABLE DESIGN FEATURES, OF CM RANGE DEFINITIONS, AND OF A CONVERSION BAN (FROM UPVS TO CMS AND VICE VERSA, AND FROM UNDER 600 KM RANGE TO OVER 600 KM AND VICE VERSA). AGREEMENT REMAINED TO BE REACHED ON THE APPLICATION OF THE US PROPOSED BAN ON UPVS IN CERTAIN INSTANCES, ON EXEMPTIONS FROM THIS BAN FOR TARGET DRONES, AND (MOST IMPORTANT) THE EXACT FORM OF SPECIFIC LANGUAGE TO BE APPLIED TO CM DEFINITIONS IN THE TREATY AND IN THE PROTOCOL.

RV WEIGHT

11. THE US HAD TABLED PROPOSALS FOR LIMITING THE WEIGHT OF RVS ON A SINGLE-RV ICBM BOTH WITH AND WITHOUT POST-BOOST VEHICLES. THE RUSSIANS SEEMED TO AGREE TO THESE IN PRINCIPLE.

OFF-LOADING

12. THE RUSSIANS APPEARED TO BE COMING ROUND TO ACCEPT THE US QUOTE NOD IN THE DIRECTION OF ARMS CONTROL UNQUOTE. THAT REDUCTIONS IN LAUNCHER AND THROW-WEIGHT OF NEW TYPES BELOW THE PERMISSIBLE 5 PER CENT SHOULD ONLY BE ALLOWED IN CASES OF OFF-LOADING RVS, FUEL AND/OR PENETRATION AIDS.

FRACTIONATION LIMITS

13. IT SHOULD BE POSSIBLE SOON TO WRAP UP AGREEMENT ON STIPULATING IN THE TREATY THE NUMBER OF RVS ON EXISTING TYPES OF MISSILES IN TERMS OF THE NUMBER ALREADY TESTED. THE RUSSIANS (FOR REASONS OF MINUTEMAN 3 MIRVING TESTS) HAD PRESSED FOR THIS STIPULATION TO BE EXPRESSED IN TERMS OF DEPLOYED RVS BUT THE US HAD SUCCESSFULLY RETAINED THE TESTING CRITERION. HOWEVER, IN A FORMAT STILL TO BE DECIDED, THE US WOULD UNDERTAKE NOT TO DEPLOY MORE THAN 3 RVS ON MINUTEMAN 3.

/EXEMPTIONS

EXEMPTIONS FOR CM AND ASBM CARRIERS.

14. AGREEMENT WAS NOW CLOSE ON HOW THESE EXEMPTIONS SHOULD BE HANDLED. THE US WOULD BE ALLOWED THE 16 WHICH THEY REQUIRED, BUT THE EXACT MAKE-UP OF THIS TOTAL HAD STILL TO BE RESOLVED.

BACKFIRE

15. REFLECTING AGREEMENT AT HIGHER LEVELS, THE LISTS OF HEAVY BOMBERS COMPILED AT GENEVA NOW NO LONGER REFERRED TO BACK-FIRE.

JAY

F I L E S
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13

PRIME MINISTER

Restricted Meeting on Thursday, 24 May at 1700 on Nuclear Matters

I attach your briefs for the restricted meeting on nuclear matters, now arranged for tomorrow at 1700, which is to discuss four items:-

Future of the UK deterrent
SALT II
Comprehensive Test Ban
Nuclear release procedures

You have already read most of the papers in this folder but I should draw your attention to some new ones, namely:-

A note (at the front of the folder) conveying Sir John Hunt's advice on how you might handle the agenda. The folder has been arranged in the order he suggests.

C A minute by the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary on the CTB item.

D A minute by Sir John Hunt on handling the CTB item.

E The CTB papers also include a note on the National Seismic Stations issue which I do not think you have yet seen.

F A note by Sir John Hunt on how you might handle the SALT II item; and

G A brief on the non-circumvention issue.

Roger Carter
(Duty Clerk)

23 May 1979

pp Bryan Cartledge.

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Ref. A09613

PRIME MINISTER

Comprehensive Test Ban: National Seismic Stations

TPM

The paper by officials attached to my minute of 21st May sets out the problem for consideration by Ministers at the restricted meeting on 24th May. The NSS problem is only one of the outstanding issues in the negotiations; others, which were described in the background brief attached to my minute of 4th May, include the role of the Review Conference and the question of small nuclear experiments. The latter issues are likely to prove just as difficult as the NSS problem, but the onus for resolving them rests with the Americans. Meanwhile the negotiations are currently concentrating on the Separate Verification Agreement (SVA), over which we are in the firing-line because of the position we have adopted on NSS.

2. You may wish first to invite Lord Carrington to report on his talk with Mr. Vance on the NSS problem. Thereafter you might ask your colleagues for their views on the options set out in the paper.

3. On technical grounds, there is clearly no case for moving from the present position. But this would mean continued deadlock. Withdrawal from the SVA (Option A) would be a logical step, which would avoid our having to finance NSS on British territory and should be defensible in Parliament. But it would have all the disadvantages set out in paragraph 8.

4. A move to six (or eight) NSS (Option C) could be presented as a major concession to the Russians (paragraph 10). It would not be technically justified and would be expensive. But it could be explained as the necessary price for a CTB. If we were to adopt this Option, we should be in a strong position to press the Americans to be flexible on the Review Conference formula. If this Option is adopted, it will be necessary to decide how the cost of NSS on British territory should be borne (paragraph 13). The Chancellor will not, of course, be present but I feel sure he would not accept this as a charge against the Contingency Reserve. Unless therefore the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary thinks the

Americans might contribute to the cost, I think there is little option but to say that the defence budget (whose level in future years remains to be settled) should bear the cost.

5. In your summing up you will wish to indicate which Option is to be adopted. Further conclusions, on the lines of either paragraph 15 or paragraph 16 will depend on this decision.

JOHN HUNT

23rd May, 1979

F

Ref: A09614

SECRET

PRIME MINISTER

SALT II: Non-circumvention

With my minute of 21st May I sent you a paper by officials on this subject, for consideration by the restricted group of Ministers on 24th May. You will also have seen that the subject came up during my talks with Dr. Brzezinski (my separate minute of 21st May, paragraph 5). I do not think anything he said affects the conclusions in paragraph 10 of the paper.

2. I suggest you turn straight to these conclusions and invite your colleagues' comments on them. Do they agree with those at i, ii and iii in paragraph 10? If so the only action needed is to send instructions to the British Representative to NATO on the lines of paragraph 8.

3. The conclusion in paragraph 10(iv) is relevant to whatever decision you take on sending a message to President Carter about the future of our deterrent. This is dealt with in paragraph 6 of my minute on this subject of 18th May. During his present visit Mr. Vance has given very firm assurance to Lord Carrington that "in no way would the terms of the SALT II agreement stand in the way of United States aid to the United Kingdom over a Polaris replacement, though the provision of such aid would of course be a political decision". This is very satisfactory but there is something to be said for getting it on record since President Carter and Mr. Vance may not be around when a successor system is being developed. If you are sending a message to President Carter about talks on a successor system it will be easy enough to make it clear that we assume that non-circumvention will not be a problem and to invite his concurrence. I am however doubtful about the need for putting "concrete cases" into such a message (as the paper suggests) both in view of Mr. Vance's assurance and because it could well imply that Ministers had got further into the choice of options than is likely to be the case. We will prepare a draft for your consideration after the meeting.

John Hunt

23rd May 1979

12

PM/79/45

PRIME MINISTER

Comprehensive Test Ban Negotiations

1. We are due to discuss this subject on 24 May.

2. Taking the issues which most affect UK interests, I understand that the Ministry of Defence regard the verification measures under negotiation, including National Seismic Stations in the Soviet Union, as adequate for a test ban lasting 3 years. It also seems clear that the British and American nuclear stockpiles are unlikely to encounter serious problems because of such a treaty. All the options about what should happen after 3 years remain open. The US, UK and Soviet Union will each have a veto on the extension of the treaty. It is moreover very possible that the Russians will not want extension. Their position is that this decision should take account of whether China (and France) is still testing, and China is extremely unlikely to give up testing in 3 years.

3. I suggest, therefore, that the treaty under negotiation presents no significant security risks (subject to our receiving adequate assurances on stockpile testing and on "decoupling" from the American experts whose visit Mr Vance suggested to you today). And it may present advantages, especially in non-proliferation. About a dozen states, some of them highly unreliable, have not signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty and are capable of developing nuclear weapons. They include Pakistan, now working on a nuclear weapons programme; India, which has conducted one nuclear explosion; South Africa, Israel and Brazil. If any of these acquired nuclear weapons, its potential rivals would want to follow suit. With widening proliferation the world would become a much more dangerous place. A CTB could help prevent this. There is a possibility of persuading some of these near-nuclear powers to renounce nuclear explosions by adhering to it, since a CTB Treaty can be presented as less discriminatory that the Non-Proliferation Treaty. More generally, the non-aligned are complaining increasingly that, if they are to renounce nuclear weapons, the nuclear powers must make progress towards nuclear

/disarmament.

disarmament. In this context, they have called above all for a CTB, which is also supported by our NATO allies except France. Satisfying the widespread hope for a CTB would strengthen our hand in arguing for further measures to help prevent nuclear weapons proliferation.

4. A CTB would also be the kind of practical advance in East-West relations which I believe the Government should promote. British participation in the negotiations accords with our position as a nuclear weapons state and with the active support which successive British Governments have given to specific measures of arms control. It was of course Mr Macmillan who played the key role in the Partial Test Ban Treaty of 1963.

5. I also believe that a British move to withdraw from the negotiations, which have been going for nearly 2 years, would have widespread political consequences. These would include serious difficulties with the Americans, which could affect our crucially important nuclear relationship with them. Apart from the fact that US participation in a CTB Treaty would also deny us the use of American testing facilities, our withdrawal from the negotiations would be a propaganda gift to the Russians, and many other governments would be dismayed.

6. My view, on these grounds, is that the UK should continue to play a positive role in the CTB negotiations and should not seek to change the concept of the treaty under negotiation.

7. On 24 May we are also due to consider the specific issue of National Seismic Stations (NSS) in the UK and dependent territories, on which officials have prepared a paper. I had a preliminary word about this with Mr Vance on 21 May. I told him that I thought it would be very difficult for the Government to justify the acceptance of costly seismic monitoring stations to check that the UK is not engaged in an activity - nuclear testing - for which we ourselves have no facilities. Mr Vance expressed understanding for our difficulties but said he thought it would nevertheless be essential for the UK to accept more than 5 NSS. I tried on him the alternative idea of British withdrawal from the tripartite Separate Verification Agreement. He clearly did not favour this. Although I mentioned the cost of NSS several times, he did not take the cue to mention

/ any

any possibility of American financial help.

8. The existing British position on NSS has created an impasse in the negotiations. It will have to be changed one way or the other. The acceptance of, say, 6 NSS would probably unblock the negotiations but would be costly and difficult to justify against the background of public expenditure cuts or indeed in terms of common sense. If my colleagues share this view, the alternative would be to consider British withdrawal from the Separate Verification Agreement. But this would be a difficult option if the Americans were strongly opposed to it, for instance on the grounds that it would prejudice the chances of securing NSS in the Soviet Union. Rather than trying on 24 May to reach a final decision, I suggest that we could decide to explore urgently and in detail US views on the implications of British withdrawal from the Separate Verification Agreement. We might also discuss on 24 May whether to ask the Americans more directly about financial help over NSS on British territory, although this would not remove the political difficulties.

9. I am sending copies of this minute to the Defence Secretary, the Home Secretary and the Secretary to the Cabinet.

C

(CARRINGTON)

Foreign and Commonwealth Office
23 May 1979

SALT.

SECRET

Original on: USA: May 79

1

NOTE OF PART OF A DISCUSSION BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER AND THE U.S. SECRETARY OF STATE, MR. CYRUS VANCE, AT 10 DOWNING STREET ON 23 MAY 1979 AT 10.00 A.M.

Present:

The Prime Minister

The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary

The Lord Privy Seal

Mr. B. G. Cartledge

Mr. Cyrus Vance

His Excellency the American Ambassador

* * * * * *

SALT 2

The Prime Minister asked Mr. Vance about the non-circumvention provisions in SALT 2, which seemed to her unusual and presumably went beyond the implied terms of non-circumvention. She also asked Mr. Vance to confirm that the protocol to SALT 2, covering ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCMs) and sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs) would come to an end in 1981. Mr. Vance confirmed that this was the case and said that President Carter would stress publicly that the protocol would not be extended, and that it could not continue without reference back to Congress. The Prime Minister said that if there was no question of extending the protocol in order to prevent the Soviet Union from improving the weapons systems covered by it, there should therefore be no constraints on the acquisition by the UK of the technology we needed. The Prime Minister said that she had, however, noted Mr. Vance's reference to the possibility of coming back to Congress on the question of extending the protocol; this implied that extension might be possible. Mr. Vance explained that although it was a constitutional fact that the protocol could not be extended without Congressional assent, this certainly did not mean that the Administration would go back to Congress with a request for extension.

/ Mr. Vance

SECRET

Mr. Vance went on to say that he agreed with the Prime Minister that the Soviet Union was engaged in a considerable programme of improvement to its weapons systems. The US response to this was to strengthen all three legs of its strategic triad. So far as ground-launched missiles were concerned, the Americans were developing the MX system and the mobile basing mode. For sea-launched systems, the Americans were going ahead faster with the Trident 1 missile and the Trident 1 submarine; in addition, forward planning and purchasing was well advanced for the Trident 2 system. In the air, the Americans were developing their air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs) and increasing their range. This all added up to a $30 billion programme and it would be difficult to persuade the US taxpayer that, SALT 2 notwithstanding, expenditure of this order was necessary.

Lord Carrington said that it would be very helpful from the point of view of UK public opinion if Mr. Vance could lay emphasis on the US modernisation programme when he spoke to the Press. Misgivings in the UK about SALT 2 were not related to the actual provisions of the treaty - of which very few people were aware - but to the psychological climate which some people thought might be created by the treaty and which might inhibit the kind of modernisation effort which Mr. Vance had described. Mr. Vance fully accepted this and said that he would speak to the Press accordingly later in the day.

The Prime Minister said that her understanding was that the limitations on GLCMs and SLCMs imposed by the protocol to SALT 2 meant that the UK could not acquire this technology from the United States. Mr. Vance said that this was not necessarily the case. Systems on which a numerical limitation was imposed were not necessarily excluded from technological transfer. The inclusion of the word "necessarily" in the protocol was needed in order to prevent the non-circumvention

/ provisions

provisions from being meaningless: but, in practice, this formulation would create no impediment or problem so far as the transfer of GLCM and SLCM technology was concerned. Mr. Vance pointed out that the non-circumvention provisions now constituted a clause in the treaty itself. He described the negotiating history which lay behind this. The Prime Minister asked whether technology transfer could take place even while the protocol remained in force. Mr. Vance said that it could and pointed out that the protocol formed part of the SALT 2 treaty. In addition to these two documents, there would also be an exchange of letters on the Backfire problem and a document entitled "Common Understandings" which would be designed to establish authoritative, agreed interpretations of the treaty and thereby avoid the ambiguities which had surrounded SALT 1.

The Prime Minister said that she understood that SS 16s would now be ruled out but that it would be possible to convert the SS 20 into an intercontinental missile by adding to it a third stage. Mr. Vance said that he thought that any attempt by the Soviet Union to cheat in this way would be readily detected.

CTB

Turning to the Comprehensive Test Ban treaty, the Prime Minister said that she was very worried about the possibility that the Soviet Union could decouple nuclear tests of up to 10 kt by conducting the explosions in underground caverns and that they could also conduct tests up to this level during periods of seismic disturbance, thereby escaping detection. The Prime Minister said that she believed that tests of up to 10 kt should therefore be excluded from the provisions of a CTB treaty so that stockpile testing could continue satisfactorily. The Prime Minister went on to say that she was

/ also concerned

also concerned about the possibility that the Soviet Union would make elaborate preparations, towards the end of the treaty period, for a comprehensive testing programme so that this could be carried out as soon as the treaty expired.

Mr. Vance replied that these concerns were not shared by the scientific community, at least in the US. American scientists believed that the planned installation of 10 seismic stations on Soviet territory would pick up evidence of any significant Soviet testing programme. American scientists were also confident that it was not necessary to conduct proof testing of the nuclear stockpile during the three-year period covered by the treaty. The US military were also now prepared to accept this. The United States would keep her testing laboratories fully operational so that stockpile testing could be resumed as soon as the three-year period was over. On the question of decoupling, Mr. Vance said that there were also differences of view between scientists. Mr. Vance said that if the treaty were to suffer from the defects which the Prime Minister had mentioned, President Carter certainly would not sign it. Mr. Vance went on to suggest that it might be helpful if US scientists could get together with their UK counterparts to discuss these matters.

Lord Carrington mentioned the problem which had arisen over Soviet insistence that the UK, like the US and the Soviet Union, should provide 10 national seismic stations (NSS). Since everybody knew that the UK had no intention of conducting nuclear tests on UK territory or UK dependent territory, these very costly installations would be impossible to defend politically. The Prime Minister asked about Soviet motives in sticking out for 10 UK NSS; there was clearly more to it than mere reciprocity.

/ Mr. Vance

Mr. Vance expressed the view that the Soviet Union might budge from its insistence on 10 NSS for the UK but thought that they would not agree to less than five. Lord Carrington suggested that the criterion for the number of NSS for which each signatory would be responsible might be that of land mass area. Mr. Vance commented that on this basis the UK would be entitled to only half of an NSS. He said that the United States would argue, at the forthcoming US/Soviet Summit, that the NSS issue should be de-linked from all the other verification issues in the treaty negotiations. The Prime Minister asked whether the Russians had perhaps got cold feet about concluding the treaty. Lord Carrington said that the difficulties they were creating seemed to stem primarily from their bureaucratic methods and general awkwardness.

23 May 1979

Also copied to:
1. Master Set
2. Orig - Soviet May 79 - Relations
3. Soviet - Visit of Patolichev May 79
4. Soviet May 79 - (Nat Exhibition Centre)

CONFIDENTIAL

cc: D/Tr.
C.O.
for Secret file

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

23 May 1979

Dear Paul,

CALL ON THE PRIME MINISTER BY THE SOVIET MINISTER OF FOREIGN TRADE, MR. PATOLICHEV, AT 10 DOWNING STREET ON 23 MAY 1979

As you know, the Prime Minister accepted the joint recommendation of the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary and the Secretary of State for Trade that she should receive the Soviet Minister of Foreign Trade, Mr. Patolichev, during his current visit to London to open the National Exhibition of the USSR. Mr. Patolichev duly called at No. 10 this evening at 1715, accompanied by the Soviet Ambassador and an interpreter. The following is a summary of the main points which arose during a conversation lasting three-quarters of an hour.

Mr. Patolichev conveyed to the Prime Minister the congratulations of the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, Mr. Kosygin, and added his own. The Prime Minister thanked Mr. Patolichev and said that although she doubted whether she would be able to remain in office for as long as Mr. Kosygin she was not without hope. The Prime Minister went on to say that the invitations which had been extended by her predecessor to President Brezhnev and Mr. Kosygin to visit the United Kingdom still stood: they would both be very welcome here.

After a further exchange of courtesies and reminiscences, Mr. Patolichev gave the Prime Minister an account of the National Exhibition of the USSR which he had opened this morning; he had read out, at the opening ceremony, a special message from Mr. Brezhnev. The Prime Minister said that she had read this message and thought it a kind gesture by Mr. Brezhnev which was greatly appreciated. Mr. Patolichev asked whether he could tell Mr. Brezhnev that the Prime Minister had read his message and the Prime Minister readily agreed, asking Mr. Patolichev to convey her thanks to President Brezhnev at the same time. The Prime Minister said that she would visit the National Exhibition if she possibly could, as a special compliment to Mr. Patolichev for his kindness in calling on her.

/ In response

In response to an enquiry from the Prime Minister about Mr. Brezhnev's health, Mr. Patolichev simply referred to his recent discussions with President Giscard and the forthcoming Summit Meeting with President Carter.

After a discussion of current developments in the Soviet economy, and especially of the Soviet energy programme, in which Mr. Patolichev outlined the achievements of the tenth five-year plan on familiar lines, the Soviet Ambassador reminded Mr. Patolichev that when he returned to Moscow he would be asked to give an account of the Prime Minister's views on longer-term political issues. The Prime Minister said that Mr. Patolichev could take back to Moscow a message of the greatest goodwill. The Government believed in detente, so long as it was two way; they believed in trade, so long as it was two way; and, like the Soviet Union, they believed in defence. The Prime Minister said that she believed in making judgements on the basis of actions rather than on words; for example, when she had told Mr. Patolichev that she would visit the Soviet Exhibition, she meant it and would go - she had not simply said this for effect. She believed that the talks which international statesmen had together should live in terms of action: the Government would make its judgements on the basis of what happened after an agreement had been signed. Mr. Patolichev told the Prime Minister that it was urgent to conclude the SALT II Treaty, since otherwise the world would find itself in an impasse. The Prime Minister said that the British Government hoped that the Treaty would be ratified; she herself believed that it would be, since otherwise the consequences would be so grave. The US Senate might, of course, have some small amendments to suggest.

The Prime Minister went on to say that the United Kingdom naturally had a strong interest in the next negotiation of SALT III, largely because of the deployment of the SS-20 missile by the Soviet Union; such weapons were described as "theatre nuclear forces" but in reality they were strategic in nature. Mr. Lunkov referred to Mr Brezhnev's proposal for an all-European conference at the political level to discuss disarmament and put an end to the arms race. The Prime Minister said that it was necessary to make progress in all the negotiations which had been begun, including those on CTB and MBFR. The purpose of nuclear missiles was to ensure that they were never used; but to be effective, deterrence had to be balanced.

The Prime Minister told Mr. Patolichev that lasting trust between countries could be built up only through the way in which they carried out the agreements they had arrived at, whether in the field of defence or in that of trade. The British Government would work to build up this trust; but, the Prime Minister said, if the Soviet Union was tough she would be tough too. Mr. Patolichev said that the Prime Minister had described the Soviet Union's own position; the Soviet Government

/ could not,

could not, however, understand why anybody should find the Soviet Union's proposal on the non-first use of nuclear weapons unacceptable. The Prime Minister commented that it was important that a balance should be maintained between East and West so that the Third World could develop in its own way, without pressure on it from either side. The UK was concerned by the appearance of Cubans and East Germans in Africa and the Middle East; this had an unsettling effect and was disturbing. Mr. Lunkov said that the Soviet Government was not responsible for the Cubans, who had been invited into Africa by the Angolans. Mr. Patolichev said that he would report the Prime Minister's views on all these matters to the Soviet leadership.

Concluding the conversation, the Prime Minister reaffirmed that the invitations extended by her predecessor to President Brezhnev and Mr. Kosygin still stood. Mr. Patolichev said that he would be glad to convey this to them and added that before taking his leave he would like to give the Prime Minister one word of advice: she had said that she could be tough, but he hoped that she would always be as she had been in receiving him.

I shall be in touch with you in due course about a possible date during the recess, and the arrangements, for the Prime Minister's visit to the National Exhibition of the USSR.

I am sending copies of this letter to Tom Harris (Department of Trade) and Martin Vile (Cabinet Office).

Yours ever,

Brian Cartledge.

Paul Lever, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

GRS 400

MR V H B MACKLEN DCA(PN)
MOD MAIN BLDG

CONFIDENTIAL
DESKBY 230830Z MAY 1979
FM WASHINGTON 222126Z MAY
TO IMMEDIATE F C O
TEL NO 1206 OF 22 MAY
INFO PRIORITY MODUK (DS11 AND DS12) UKDEL NATO AND BONN.

MIPT: SALT 2: NAC STATEMENT.

1. FOLLOWING IS REVISED US DRAFT:

STATEMENT BY THE SECRETARY GENERAL FOLLOWING THE SALT II AGREEMENT.

1. I WOULD LIKE TO ADD MY VOICE TO ALL THOSE WHO HAVE WELCOMED THE STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION AGREEMENT WHICH WAS SIGNED ON ....

2. THE NEW AGREEMENT FULLY ACCORDS WITH THE DETERMINATION OF THE ALLIES TO PURSUE REALISTIC MEASURES OF ARMS CONTROL IN THE SEARCH FOR A MORE STABLE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN EAST AND WEST. SALT II IS AN AIMPORTANT STEP IN THIS CONTINUING PROCESS. THEY HOPE THAT THE AGREEMENT WILL SOON ENTER INTO FORCE.

3. THE ACTUAL TERMS OF THE AGREEMENT CONTAIN IMPORTANT CONSTRAINTS ON THE STRATEGIC ARMS COMPETITION, WHICH WILL HELP LIMIT THE THREAT TO THE WEST. MORE GENERALLY, THE AGREEMENT SYMNOLIZES, AND GIVES SUBJSTANCE TO, THE CONTINUING HOPE OF THE ALLIES THAT THE DANGERS OF NUCLEAR WAR CAN BE REDUCED AND THE PROSPECTS FOR IMPROVING POLITICAL RELATIONS WITH THE WARSAW PACT ENHANCED.

4. THROUGHOUT THE NEGOTIATIONS LEADING UP TO THE NEW AGREEMENT THE ALLIES HAVE BEEN REGULARLY INFORMED OF PRGRESS AND CLOSELY CONSULTED BY THE UNITED STATES PARTICULARLY ON THOSE ASPECTS OF SPECIAL CONCERN TO THE ALLIANCE. THE ALLIES ARE SATISFEID THAT UNDER THE NEW AGREEMENT THE ALLIANCE FULLY RETAINS BOTH THE ABILITY TO CARRY OUT ITS DETERRENT STRATEGY OF FORWARD DEFENCE AND FLEXIBLE RESPONSE AND THE NECESSARY OPTIONS TO ENSURE ITS COMMON DEFENCE IN THE FUTURE. IN VIEW OF THE CONTINUED GROWTH IN SOVIET

/JINTARY

MILITARY POWER, PARTICULARLY IN THOSE CAPABILITIES NOT LIMITED BY SALT II, THE ALLIES ARE RESOLVED TO DO WHATEVER IS NECESSARY TO PRESERVE THEIR SECURITY.

5. THE ALLIES HAVE WELCOMED THE FACT THAT THERE IS NO PROVISION IN THE AGREEMENT PROHIBITING THE TRANSFER OF SYSTEMS OR TECHNOLOGY COVERED BY THE AGREEMENT. THEY HAVE BEEN GIVEN EXPLICIT ASSURANCES BY THE UNITED STATES THAT NUCLEAR AND CONVENTIONAL COOPERATION AMONG THE ALLIES CAN AND WILL CONTINUE.

6. THE ALLIES HAVE ALSO WELCOMED THE INTENTION TO PROCEED WITH FURTHER STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION TALKS. ALONG WITH THOSE OTHER ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS IN WHICH THE ALLIES ARE ACTIVELY TAKING PART, THEY SEE THE CONTINUATION OF THIS PROCESS IN THE CONTEXT OF NATO'S TWIN OBJECTIVES OF DEFENCE AND DETENTE AS A SIGNIFICANT CONTRIBUTION TOWARDS SAFEGUARDING THE ENDEPENDENCE AND SECURITY OF ITS MEMBERS AND PROMOTING A LASTING STRUCTURE OF PEACE.

ROBINSON

FILES
DEFD
ACDD
EESD
NAD
WED
PUSD
PS
PS | LPS
PS | MR HURD
PS | MR RIDLEY
PS | MR BLAKER
PS | PUS
SIR A DUFF
SIR A PARSONS
MR P H MOBERLY
MR FERGUSSON
MR LEAHY

ADDITIONAL DISTN
SAMT

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

22 May 1979

Prime Minister

You asked about para. 6 (a) of the minute below.

Dear Bryan,

Soviet Deployments in the Absence of SALT II

You mentioned in your letter of 14 May that the Prime Minister would like to know the basis of the assessment in Lord Carrington's minute (PM/79/43) of 11 May that, in the absence of SALT II, the Soviet Union would probably have about 3,000 strategic weapon systems, with 30 or so MIRVs to each of their SS18s.

[below]

Calculations about Soviet deployment of strategic systems are based on the assumption that in the absence of SALT II the Russians would:

(a) continue to produce new ICBMs of the SS17, 18 and 19 type at their present rate (around 125 a year) until 1985. Under SALT II they will have reached the MIRVed ICBM ceiling of 820 by 1982 and will thereafter have to cease production;

(b) run on a number of the older Yankee class submarines (with around 144 missile tubes) which have several years life left in them. Under SALT II these are expected to be phased out early to allow the deployment of new SLBMs on the Typhoon submarine;

(c) deploy the SS16 which is prohibited under SALT.

Taking these possibilities alone (and there may be others) the Russians could deploy, over and above their present holding (which we estimate at about 2370 systems), some 625 ICBMs in the SS17, 18 and 19 range as well as a number of SS16s. Our own intelligence is that the Russians have sufficient material and production facilities to realise these programmes.

We do not have a precise national estimate for Soviet deployments in 1985. The figure of 3,000 is however the standard American assessment which has been used in briefing the Alliance and members of the Nuclear Planning Group over the last year.

The statement that the Soviet SS18s could each carry about 30 MIRVs is based on the assumption that the Soviet Union could in the next five years resolve some of the present technical problems it faces in delivering very large numbers of MIRVs from a single missile. Our own intelligence community believes that

/the

Bryan Cartledge Esq
10 Downing Street

the present warhead dispenser (or "Post Boost Vehicle") on the SS18 can carry a maximum of 12-14 warheads. The assessment that the Russians could produce a completely new dispenser carrying much larger numbers of warheads is made by a number of senior American officials in recent speeches on SALT II and is presumably based on what the Americans know of Soviet technological capabilities in this field. General Seignious, the Director of the US Government's Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, recently stated that "the Soviet SS18 heavy ICBM could pack 30 or more warheads rather than the 10 SALT will permit". Harold Brown, the US Secretary of Defence, stated on 9 May that the SS18 "could have 20, perhaps 40" warheads.

I am sending copies of this letter to the Private Secretaries to the others members of OD and to Martin Vile (Cabinet Office).

Yours ever

Paul

P Lever
Private Secretary

9

SECRET

Ref. A09598

PRIME MINISTER

SALT II: Non-Circumvention

The provisions in the SALT II agreement on non-circumvention are of special concern to us, not only because of their implications for American collaboration with the Alliance generally, but also because of the possible effect on American willingness or ability to help us with future requirements for our own deterrent force. We have had a number of bilateral exchanges with the United States Administration over the past two years with a view to clarifying the position. These are summarised in the attached note prepared by a group of officials of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and Ministry of Defence under Cabinet Office chairmanship. It is being circulated for consideration by the Restricted Group of Ministers at the meeting on 24th May.

2. I am sending copies of this minute and the enclosure to the Home Secretary, the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary and the Secretary of State for Defence.

John

(John Hunt)

21st May, 1979

SALT II: NON-CIRCUMVENTION

Note by Officials

Background

1. From the start of the SALT II negotiations the Russians pressed hard for inclsuion of a "no-transfer" clause, the effect of which would have been to ban the transfer to any third party of any weapon or components covered by the Treaty. The Americans resisted this but, by June 1977, judged it necessary for tactical reasons to respond by offering a "non-circumvention" clause. Though recognising that the Americans must be the final judges of tactics, other members of the Alliance, including the United Kingdom, expressed misgivings. To meet these, the Americans offered to make a unilateral interpretative statement to be published after the Treaty had been signed, explaining how the non-circumvention clause would be applied. On this basis the Government, in line with our other Allies, accepted the American proposal and agreement was subsequently reached on the inclusion in the Treaty of the following:

> "In order to ensure the viability and effectiveness of the Agreement, each Party undertakes not to circumvent the provisions of this Agreement through any other State or States or in any other manner."

On the strength of this, the Americans were able to ride the Russians off their demand for a "no-transfer" clause.

The Interpretative Statement

2. The Americans gave the Germans, the French and ourselves, in March 1978, a draft of the statement and invited our comments. So far as we know the French did not comment. Several amendments proposed by the Germans and ourselves were taken into account in the revised draft (Annex A) which the Americans gave us in February this year. The only point in this draft which causes us concern is the inclusion of the word "necessarily" in the fifth sentence of the third paragraph of the text (underlined in Annex A). The numerically limited systems to which this sentence applies are:

Air Launched Cruise Missiles with a range of over 600 Km
Heavy Bombers (defined by type)
Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles
Air to Surface Ballistic Missiles
Sea Launched Ballistic Missiles.

3. We have three grounds for concern about the inclusion of the word "necessarily":

i. critics of the SALT Treaty, both in the United Kingdom and elsewhere, might focus on the significance of this qualification and argue that European interests could be adversely affected;

ii. the Russians might seek to use this qualification to support protests against any transfers to which they objected;

iii. it could in certain circumstances be held by the Americans to inhibit them from agreeing to transfers which we required for the maintenance of our strategic deterrent.

The Americans have however maintained that the word "necessarily" must be retained in order to:

a. maintain the credibility of their interpretative statement as a whole;

b. avoid the impression that completely unrestricted transfers of numerically limited systems would be permitted, without regard to size, character or overall impact;

c. avoid the need for precise definition of what transfers might or might not be approved (which might be disputed in public by the Russians).

4. We have told the Americans that, in our view, the word "necessarily" is not needed to safeguard this position since this is adequately covered by the succeeding sentence which provides for each transfer requested to be considered on its merits. As an alternative, in order to underline this last point, we have suggested that these two sentences should be run

together, with the word "necessarily" omitted. Our representations have however been rejected at all levels in the United States Administration, including the President. Mr Carter's reply to Mr Callaghan of 27 April is at Annex B. The American intention is to circulate the text of the interpretative statement to the North Atlantic Council about two weeks before the SALT Treaty is signed, ie before the Summit meeting now fixed for 15 June. We have now to decide:

i. whether to make any further representations to the Americans;

ii. what instructions to give the United Kingdom Delegation to NATO.

Bilateral Assurances

5. From our point of view the most important aim is to ensure that neither the non-circumvention clause nor the interpretative statement will inhibit the Americans from providing us with vital assistance for our nuclear forces. In June 1977 we asked the State Department how their proposed non-circumvention formulation would affect:

a. bilateral co-operation under the terms of the United States/ United Kingdom 1958 Defence Agreement (under which we receive materials and equipment for our military nuclear programmes and have the use of the United States underground test facilities);

b. American assistance currently provided under the 1963 Polaris Sales Agreement; and

c. any other forms of assistance in the future.

The State Department's reply is at Annex C. This is satisfactory as regards a. and b. On c, the reply is positive but qualified. But in the absence of any precise indication by the United Kingdom of what assistance we might want this was to be expected. Subsequently, in October 1978, we put three more specific questions to the Americans about the extent which they considered the SALT Treaty might limit their freedom to transfer Air Launched Cruise Missiles to us. These questions and the replies given by the United States Secretary of State in December are at Annex D. We were asked at the time to treat these

replies on a very restricted basis. Although the word "necessarily" is retained in the answer to the first question, the assurances are clear and forthcoming. Finally , we have the general assurance contained in President Carter's message to Mr Callaghan (Annex B). This adds nothing in substance to the previous responses but carries the personal authority of the President. Although not completely watertight, these private assurances go as far as we could reasonably hope in dealing with possible future requirements about which we have not been able to be specific. No reference was made by either side in these exchanges to the question of Polaris replacement.

6. The remaining question for consideration is whether we should seek to remove any possibility that, as a result of the qualification implied by the word "necessarily", the Americans might regard the non-circumvention clause itself or the numerical ceilings the Americans have accepted on their systems as inhibiting them from agreeing to the transfer of whatever system we may select as a replacement for Polaris. Given the assurances we have had, this may be unlikely. But in order to make absolutely certain, an early message to President Carter would be needed. This might be done in the context of an approach to the Americans suggesting preliminary consultation about possible successor systems, which would enable us to ask for assurances relating to concrete cases. The request for assurances at this stage would, of course, relate only to the United States Administration's view of its obligations under SALT II and not to any wider considerations the Americans might wish to apply to a British request.

Public criticism

7. A more immediate problem is how to deal with public criticism. We can point to the various public statements made by the United States Administration (Annex E). But they do not explain away the use of the word "necessarily". On the assumption that this word is retained we have suggested to the Americans, ad referendum to British Ministers, language for a unilateral United Kingdom explanatory statement if Her Majesty's Government comes under strong pressure as the SALT ratification debate develops, to set out the United Kingdom's understanding of the position. The Americans have considered this language

at a high level and, subject to minor drafting changes, have agreed that we could use it on a contingency basis with the assurance that the United States Administration would not contradict it (text at Annex F). This is not a wholly satisfactory arrangement, because it raises the obvious question why it is needed. But the language of the United Kingdom contingency statement should enable us to explain the position satisfactorily in public. The fact that the Americans have agreed to it is a further reassurance that our foreseeable requirements should not be debarred by SALT II.

8. It is possible that other members of the Alliance may question the word "necessarily" when the text of the American interpretative statement is circulated to the Council. If so, they are likely to look to us for a lead. Their direct interests are however covered by the statement in the second paragraph that the non-circumvention provision "will [not] preclude co-operation in [TNF] modernisation"; and in any case, none of our Allies is likely to be interested in the transfer of systems which are numerically limited in SALT II. On the basis that our own position is adequately safeguarded by the bilateral assurances we have received, we should therefore be able to say in the Council that in our view the Alliance's interests will not be prejudiced by the word "necessarily".

Soviet objections

9. The Russians may quote the qualification to reinforce a protest at some future date against United States transfers to members of the Alliance. This is possible, but we do not attach great importance to the extra leverage which the word "necessarily" might give them. They are likely to make a fuss anyway about any transfer they find objectionable, eg cruise missiles, and will no doubt claim that such transfers are contrary to the non-circumvention clause, The Americans have however made clear, by the lead they have taken in the Alliance, that they mean to go ahead with TNF modernisation. They are not likely to be deflected from this by Soviet references to an American unilateral statement. Our own position is covered by the confidential bilateral assurances.

Conclusions

10. In view of the firm position President Carter has taken, we believe that a renewed attempt to get the word "necessarily" removed would be unsuccessful and counter productive to our wider interests. On this basis we conclude that:

i. any public criticism should be dealt with on the lines of paragraph 7;

ii. if the point is raised in the Council our representative should take the line in paragraph 8;

iii. given American support for TNF modernisation, we need not concern ourselves unduly about possible Soviet exploitation of the word "necessarily" (paragraph 9);

iv. Ministers may however wish to consider seeking as soon as possible more concrete assurances from the United States Administration about the effect of SALT II on our possible future requirements (paragraph 5).

May 1979

INTERPRETIVE STATEMENT ON NON-CIRCUMVENTION

The following is a revised text of the US interpretive statement, incorporating three additional changes.

In the view of the United States, the non-circumvention provision in the SALT agreement simply makes explicit the inherent obligation any state assumes when party to an international agreement not to circumvent the provisions of that agreement. It is a basic tenet of international law that agreements once entered into are to be carried out and not circumvented, and the United States would be so obligated with or without a non-circumvention provision. It is the position of the United States that the non-circumvention provision does not impose any additional obligation whatever on it beyond the specific obligations of the provisions of the treaty and, for the period of its effectiveness, the protocol, nor does it broaden the interpretation of those obligations.

The United States has consulted intensively with the Alliance throughout the SALT II negotiations, recognizing the important Alliance interest in the SALT II agreement which deals only with the strategic relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union. In view of the possible implications of the non-circumvention clause for Alliance cooperation, the United States reiterates what it has specifically stated in Alliance consultations during the negotiations, that is, the non-circumvention provision will not affect existing patterns of collaboration and co-operation with its allies, nor will it preclude cooperation in modernization. The United States believes that, in practice, the non-circumvention provision, which it will apply as stated below, will not interfere with continued nuclear and conventional cooperation with its allies.

As to the issue of transfers, the United States has consistently rejected the inclusion of a provision on non-transfer in the SALT agreement. We have made clear in the negotiating record that transfers of weapons or technology to our allies will continue and cannot, ipso facto, constitute circumvention. The United States will deal with future requests for transfers of weapons systems and technology on a case-by-case basis under the SALT II agreement, as it has done in the past. The transfer of weapons systems or technology for systems which were not numerically limited or prohibited by the agreement would be unaffected by the agreement. With respect to systems numerically limited in

the agreement, as under the interim agreement, transfers would not be necessarily precluded by the agreement. Of course, requests for such transfers would have to be dealt with in light of the circumstances of the situation and the particular request. This would also be the case if there were no agreement.

The United States will not be able to transfer to its allies or other states those weapons systems or technology uniquely related to such systems, which are prohibited to the United States itself by the agreement. The United States fully accepts its responsibility not to circumvent the agreement. For the United States to supply to other states systems of a type that is prohibited to the United States itself by a provision of the agreement would be a circumvention of the agreement, even if there were no non-circumvention provision.

In accordance with recognized international practice, no third party can be bound or legally affected by the obligations the United States assumes under the SALT agreement. The United States would reject and would view as inconsistent with the political and strategic purposes of the agreement any attempt by the Soviet Union to raise, on the basis of the non-circumvention provision, questions concerning the activities of states not party to the agreement. In both a legal and practical sense, only the United States is subject to challenge in connection with questions raised by the Soviet Union with respect to the SALT agreement.

ANNEX B

MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT CARTER TO MR CALLAGHAN OF
27 APRIL 1979

I discussed very carefully with my advisers your recent message regarding SALT and non-circumvention. Let me state, first of all, that I very much appreciate the support that you have given me. Support for SALT by our closest friends is of enormous help to me.

As to the issue of wording that you raised, I am afraid that I cannot accommodate you for reasons that have already been communicated to your associates. At the same time I want to assure you that the agreement will not preclude established forms of co-operation and that requests for transfers of systems numerically limited in the Agreement will be dealt with on a case by case basis in the light of the circumstances of the situation and the particular request.

You can rest assured that the security concerns of our closest friends will be given priority attention. Again, let me thank you for your support and wish you well.

ANNEX C

STATE DEPARTMENT REPLY OF JUNE 1977

In general, the non-circumvention language proposed by the United States would not add any obligation to those of the other provisions in the Treaty. The fact of signing the Treaty indicates that we undertake not to circumvent it. Making this explicit through non-circumvention language adds no obligation, but does attempt to meet a Soviet concern on this point without the specificity and restrictions the Soviets have proposed. The United States position is that the non-circumvention language would apply only to the provisions of the Treaty.

As regards questions a. and b., nothing in either variant of the non-circumvention language proposed by the United States would affect the terms of the 1958 Agreement or the Polaris Sales Agreement of 1963. If the Soviets cited the provision in objection to United States/ United Kingdom co-operation under these agreements, the United States would respond that nothing in this non-circumvention language would prevent the United States from meeting its obligations under these two agreements, which predate the Treaty. The provision of the Treaty on conflicting international obligations applies only to future obligations.

Regarding question c., the non-circumvention language proposed by the United States would permit new forms of assistance which might be agreed by the United States and the United Kingdom in the future. Obviously, neither the United States nor the USSR would be free to pursue through third countries actions which it would be prohibited from pursuing on its own by the provisions of the Treaty. Any additional forms of assistance not prohibited by the Treaty would, of course, be a subject for discussion between the Governments of the United States and the United Kingdom.

ANNEX D

THEATRE NUCLEAR FORCES - AIR LAUNCHED CRUISE MISSILES

A. United Kingdom Questions to the State Department (October 1978)

1. Does the United States view the expected SAL Treaty limitations on air launched cruise missiles (ALCMs) as precluding in principle the transfer of long range nuclear capable ALCMs to the United Kingdom as part of an agreed programme to improve and modernise NATO's Theatre Nuclear Forces?

2. If the answer to 1. is Yes, would the position be changed if the United Kingdom were to establish that it was seeking ALCMs only to replace an obsolescent theatre nuclear system (the Vulcan force) with an up-dated capability?

3. Would any limitations under 1. and 2. above preclude a partial transfer of technology related to ALCMs?

B. Replies handed by Mr Vance to HM Ambassador on 20 December 1978

Question 1.

a. With respect to transfers, the United States has rejected the inclusion of a provision on non-transfer in the SALT Agreement, and has made it clear to the Soviets thattransfers of weapons or technology to United States allies will continue and cannot, ipso facto, constitute circumvention. The United States draft interpretative statement provides that the non-circumvention provision will not affect existing patterns of collaboration and co-operation between the United States and the Alliance, nor will it preclude co-operation on modernisation.

b. The proposed SALT Two agreement would permit the deployment of long-range nuclear-armed cruise missiles on airplanes and provides that air-planes equipped for such ALCMs capable of a range in excess of 600 km would be counted as heavy bombers in both the 2400 and 1320 aggregate limitations. There may also be a limit on the average number of ALCMs which could be deployed in a side's overall number of ALCM carriers.

c. As we have indicated in the draft United States interpretative statement, transfers of weapons numerically limited would not be necessarily precluded by the Agreement. Thus, the answer to question number 1 is No, the United States does not view the transfer of long-range ALCMs to the United Kingdom as precluded in principle.

d. Beyond the relationship to the SALT Two agreement, any actual United Kingdom request for long-range nuclear-armed ALCMs would, of course, pose policy issues, and would have to be dealt with in light of the circumstances of the situation and taking into account all relevant policy considerations.

Question 2.

a. Since the answer to question number 1 is No, the United States does not view the transfer of long-range ALCMs to the United Kingdom as precluded in principle. The answer to question number 2 is No, a fortiori.

b. In this case, as in the case of question number 1, a specific United Kingdom request would have to be dealt with in light of the circumstances at the time, taking into account all relevant policy considerations.

c. The qualification embodied in the United Kingdom's second question (ie the case of a United Kingdom request for ALCMs as replacements for an obsolescent portion of its nuclear capability) would be a factor in the consideration of a specific request, although we cannot say in advance whether it would be a decisive consideration.

Question 3.

a. Transfer of technology for systems numerically limited would not be precluded under the provisions of the proposed SALT Two agreement.

b. The qualification embodied in the United Kingdom's third question (ie technology vice systems) would, again, be one factor taken into account in the consideration of a specific United Kingdom request, although we cannot say in advance whether it would be a decisive consideration. Because major policy issues would be posed by an actual United Kingdom request along the lines of questions 1, 2 or 3, a United States decision on any such request would have to be taken at the highest level of government.

ANNEX E

UNITED STATES PUBLIC STATEMENTS ABOUT NON-CIRCUMVENTION

Department of State pamphlet, November 1978

There will be no ban on the transfer of cruise missile and other sophisticated technology.

Department of Defence Annual Report FY80, 25 January 1979

SALT II will not interfere with continued nuclear or conventional co-operation with our Allies.

Dr Harold Brown to the Senate Armed Services Committee, 25 January 1979

The agreement will protect the security interests of our Allies. We have consulted with the Allies on a regular basis throughout the negotiations. Improved theatre nuclear force options, including cruise missiles, remain open. The agreement will not affect existing patterns of collaboration and co-operation with our Allies, nor will it preclude co-operation in modernisation.

President Carter in a speech at Atlanta on 20 February 1979

The agreement will also permit us and our Allies to pursue all the defence programmes we believe we may eventually need - the MX missile; the Trident submarine and missiles; air, ground and sea launched cruise missiles; cruise missile carrier aircraft; and a new penetrating bomber.

ANNEX F

TEXT OF UNITED KINGDOM EXPLANATORY STATEMENT
(AGREED WITH AMERICANS)

The key part of the United States interpretative statement is the comment that transfers of weapons or technology will continue and cannot ipso facto constitute circumvention. The statement makes clear that transfers of numerically limited systems are not precluded in principle. The Americans have told us that the word "necessarily" was included in the phrase "with respect to systems numerically limited in the agreement, transfers would not be necessarily precluded by the agreement" in order to guard against the suggestion that all transfers of such systems to their Allies would be possible without infringing the integrity of the SALT agreement, irrespective of their magnitude and character. We are satisfied that the United States Administration would not feel debarred from meeting reasonable requests for such transfers on account of their SALT obligations. The United States statement makes clear the view of the United States Government that in practice the SALT non-circumvention provision will not interfere with continued nuclear and conventional co-operation between the United States and its Allies. This is also the understanding of the British Government.

E

CONFIDENTIAL

Ref. A09597

PRIME MINISTER

Comprehensive Test Ban: National Seismic Stations in the United Kingdom and Dependent Territories

One of the outstanding points in the Comprehensive Test Ban (CTB) negotiations concerns the number of National Seismic Stations (NSS) we should accept in the United Kingdom and Dependent Territories. The Russians are pressing us to accept 10, on the basis of "equal obligations" with the United States and themselves; the previous Administration saw no technical justification for this and offered one. The negotiations stalled on this point and the Americans are pressing us to break the deadlock. The attached note prepared by a group of officials of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and Ministry of Defence under Cabinet Office chairmanship describes the problem and concludes (paragraph 14) that there are two alternative options: either to withdraw from the tripartite Separate Verification Agreement or to offer to accept six (or if necessary eight) NSS in the United Kingdom and Dependent Territories. The note is being circulated for consideration by the Restricted Group of Ministers on 24th May.

2. I am sending copies of this minute and enclosure to the Home Secretary, the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary and the Secretary of State for Defence.

(John Hunt)

21st May, 1979

COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN: NATIONAL SEISMIC STATIONS IN THE UNITED KINGDOM AND DEPENDENT TERRITORIES

Note by Officials

Problem

1. The tripartite negotiations for a Comprehensive Test Ban (CTB) Treaty are held up by disagreement between the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union over the number of National Seismic Stations (NSS) to be installed in United Kingdom territory.

Background

2. It has been agreed in the negotiations that the verification arrangements under the multilateral CTB Treaty should be supplemented for the 3 negotiating states (the United Kingdom, the United States and the Soviet Union) by a tripartite Separate Verification Agreement (SVA) providing for extra measures to enhance their confidence in each other's compliance with the Treaty. As the most important verification provision of the SVA, the United States and the United Kingdom are seeking high quality data from 10 seismic monitoring stations, known as National Seismic Stations (NSS), in the Soviet Union, to be installed within 2 years of the Treaty's entry into force. NSS, though operated by host countries, would be tamperproof, and the case for proposing them is described at Annex A.

3. The Soviet Union agreed on 27 November 1978 to accept 10 NSS, on condition that the United States and United Kingdom each accepted 10 on their territory. The 10 locations proposed by the Soviet Union on British territory - 9 of them outside the United Kingdom itself - are listed at Annex B. The Soviet Union has consistently refused to discuss individual locationsof NSS, their technical characteristics (governing performance) and the timescale for their installation until agreement was reached on numbers. The United States has agreed to accept 10 NSS in the continental USA. But the United Kingdom has only agreed to the principle of NSS on British territory and to accept one station in the United Kingdom itself - at Eskdalemuir in Scotland. The purpose of NSS, in the British view, is to augment existing means of detecting, identifying and locating seismic events in large land areas. There is no verification case for NSS in United Kingdom

dependent territories: most of the territories are technically unsatisfactory for seismic monitoring and all are small so that the Soviet Union can monitor them effectively by means at its own disposal, such as reconnaissance satellites.

4. During the last round of negotiations, from 5 February to 4 April, the United Kingdom explained repeatedly the verification reasons why we could not accept more than one NSS. Our technical arguments were not satisfactorily answered by the Russians. They claimed that there was no technical justification for NSS anywhere under a 3 year CTB Treaty; and that the American requirement for NSS in the Soviet Union was purely political (to make the CTB acceptable to the United States Congress). They explained that acceptance of NSS on Soviet territory would be a major inroad into their sovereignty and traditional policy of secrecy, and that for the United Kingdom to have fewer NSS would imply that the British were more trustworthy. The Soviet Union therefore had a political requirement that each of the 3 sides must accept "equal obligations". They said that only the United Kingdom position was preventing full discussion of other outstanding NSS issues. Although the Americans accepted the logic of our technical case, their support for our position became increasingly unconvincing.

5. On 27 April American officials gave us a statement of United States views approved by Mr Vance (Annex C). This argued that the stalemate on NSS could reduce the prospects of securing NSS in theSoviet Union, which would be "the most intrusive verification arrangements in any arms control agreement". The Americans called for a substantial British move which should go "more than halfway toward the Soviet position", leaving open the possibility of accepting the full Soviet demand of 10 NSS if the impasse continued.

6. Following their repeated calls for a change in the United Kingdom position during the last round, the Russians too will be expecting a change from the present United Kingdom position when or shortly after the negotiations resume on 4 June. Failing that, they will probably remain unwilling to engage in detailed discussion of other outstanding NSS issues, and the negotiations will then remain stalled on all substantive questions.

Options

7. For the above reasons we need to consider the following options which are open to us -

Option A: withdrawal from the Separate Verification Agreement

8. The United Kingdom has negotiated to date on the assumption that it would be a party to the SVA. This would accord with our position as a nuclear weapon state and our traditional role in nuclear arms control. It would give the United Kingdom membership of the tripartite Joint Consultative Commission which is to be established when the test ban enters into force, and which will be the only permanent consultative machinery between the states now negotiating the Treaty. This Commission will play a key role in discussion of sensitive matters in which the United Kingdom has an interest, including verification of Soviet compliance, the initiation of inspections on Soviet territory and the major subject of what should happen after expiry of the Treaty's initial duration. If we withdrew from the SVA we should lose these advantages, and our further role in the negotiations would immediately be severely reduced because the outstanding issues mainly concern the SVA. On the other hand, withdrawal might spare us the obligation to accept costly NSS which are not needed for verification purposes, and the leverage we could exert over future test ban arrangements would not be entirely lost because we would have a veto under the main Treaty. But we should have to reckon with the likelihood that the United States would strongly oppose such a move because it could damage the prospects of the Soviet Union accepting NSS and possibly have other unforeseeable consequences. Moreover, even if we withdrew from the SVA the Russians might still insist that the price for NSS in the Soviet Union was acceptance of stations in the United Kingdom as well as the United States.

Option B: acceptance of 10 NSS

9. Acceptance of 10 NSS on United Kingdom territory would solve the numbers problem and remove the Soviet excuse for delaying discussion of the other important issues concerning NSS. But it would be the most expensive course. And there are reasons why acceptance of the Soviet principle of "equal obligations" might not be in our interests. The Americans may want to make an increase in the numbers of NSS in theSoviet Union a condition of any extension of the CTB Treaty beyond 3 years. If we had not accepted a strict

equality of numbers, the Russians would be less likely to insist on an equal increase not only for the United States, but also for the United Kingdom. Moreover a rigid requirement for equal numbers of NSS in nuclear weapon states could reduce the chances that France and China might one day adhere to a CTB. The Americans are not pressing us to accept 10 NSS now, but are likely to do so if it becomes clear that any other position would jeopardise the chances of achieving the objective of 10 NSS in the Soviet Union.

Option C: acceptance of fewer than 10 NSS

10. A middle course would be to accept considerably more than one NSS but fewer than 10. An offer of 6 NSS would be consistent with the United States view that we should move more than halfway towards the Soviet position. Unlike a lower offer it could be presented to the Russians as a serious compromise solution and we could call for corresponding flexibility on their side. It would of course be clear that we were making an essentially political gesture designed to promote progress in the negotiations. Although 6 NSS in the United Kingdom and dependent territories are not necessary to monitor United Kingdom compliance with the CTB Treaty, it would be possible to find locations which should present no serious constitutional political or security problems. We could offer 6 stations in the form of 2 networks of 3 stations each in the United Kingdom and Caribbean. An offer of 6 stations, provided the Americans wholeheartedly supported it, would have a reasonable chance of unblocking the negotiations. If it did not, it would be open to us to fall back to a position of say, 8 NSS - still short of acceptance of the full Soviet demand.

Locations

11. Any United Kingdom offer of more than one NSS will need to be backed up by a list of suggested locations. The Russians have made clear that their requirement for 10 NSS on United Kingdom territory is purely political and have indicated that they will be flexible about locations. But we cannot rely on their being entirely permissive, especially if we and the Americans are firm about the locations we want in the Soviet Union. It would therefore be useful to identify a few locations as possible alternatives to the ones we first propose. Annex D gives a list of constitutionally and politically acceptable locations for offers of 6, 8 or 10 stations.

Costs

12. The total cost of installing and running 6 to 10 stations is difficult to predict. But, if the United Kingdom had to pay the full cost of NSS on British territory, the capital cost, spread over 2 to 3 years, of 6 stations might be £10 to £15 million and of 10 stations £20 to £30 million, depending very much on the accessibility and nature of the locations chosen in the dependent territories. Running costs for 6 stations might be about £3 million and for 10 stations about £5 million per annum. But our aim should be to negotiate a more favourable basis for sharing the costs of NSS in the 3 countries. The justification for costs of this order would not be that NSS were needed for verifying British compliance with a CTB, but that the United Kingdom had accepted NSS in order to help secure this major new system for verifying Soviet compliance.

Source of funds

13. The costs would have to be met either from the Defence Budget or from the Foreign and Commonwealth Office Vote. It has been agreed that the Ministry of Defence should bear the cost of the one NSS accepted so far. But neither Department has made provision in its forward financial planning for additional stations and neither has agreed to find expenditure of this order at the expense of items within its existing programmes. The Treasury view is that the cost should be borne by the Defence Budget, but MOD officials do not accept this.

Conclusions

14. There is no convincing case at present for adopting Option B above - acceptance of 10 NSS. Ministers are invited to choose between the other two options -

Option A: withdrawal from the SVA

Option C: an offer of 6 NSS provided the Americans will wholeheartedly support this number.

15. If Ministers choose Option A it may be best to convey the decision to the United States by means of a high level message.

16. If Ministers choose Option C, they are invited also to decide -

a. That officials should seek wholehearted United States support for the decision.

b. That, given this support, 6 NSS should be offered in the negotiations.

c. That, if the negotiations remain stalled because the Russians persistently say the offer is inadequate, we should fall back to 8 NSS at a tactically suitable moment.

d. Which Department should meet the costs of NSS.

Cabinet Office

18 May 1979

ANNEX A

NATIONAL SEISMIC STATIONS (NSS)

Characteristics

1. The main components of a NSS will be -

a. a "borehole package" comprising seismometers placed in contact with firm rock in a borehole 18 cm in diameter and 100 m in depth, measures to guard against tampering and an authenticating device to ensure the reliability of the data being transmitted; and

b. a surface installation which will include a means of continuously transmitting data from the seismometers to Moscow/Washington.

2. The party or parties requesting a NSS and the party on whose territory it is to be located will participate jointly in the selection of the precise sites, installation of the stations and routine maintenance of the "borehole packages" which will be necessary at intervals of a year or more. The host party will be responsible for the operation of the NSS and the maintenance of the surface installation.

The purpose of NSS

3. NSS can play an important role in the verification of Soviet compliance with a CTB Treaty in 3 major respects -

a. IDENTIFICATION: at present, between 30 and 60 seismic events in the Soviet Union at yields of one kiloton or more (TNT equivalent) are detected each year by teleseismic monitors but not positively identified as earthquakes or explosions. A network of 10 suitably located NSS would bring this number down to less than 10;

b. DETECTION: NSS would improve the capability of teleseismic monitors to detect seismic events in areas (eg underground salt cavities) where clandestine testing might be attempted;

c. LOCATION: a network of NSS would help to pinpoint the locations of seismic events within large land masses.

NSS and a 3 year Treaty

4. A network of 10 NSS would take 2 years to instal after the Treaty entered into force. There is therefore only limited technical justification for NSS under a 3 year Treaty. However it is clear, and the Russians accept, that a CTB Treaty which did not provide for NSS in the Soviet Union would stand little chance of being ratified by the United States Congress. Perhaps most important, the success of NSS arrangements in a 3 year Treaty will be a key factor in the decision whether any test ban regime will follow the 3 year Treaty.

ANNEX B

LOCATIONS PROPOSED BY THE USSR, 27 NOVEMBER 1978

ALDABRA ISLAND

1. Already independent as part of the Seychelles.

BRUNEI

2. A sovereign state, in treaty relations until 1983 with the United Kingdom, which handles only international relations and defence.

TARAWA ISLAND

3. To be the capital of the Gilbert Islands when they become independent in July 1979.

PITCAIRN ISLAND

4. Colonial territory of only 1.75 square miles. Population 65. No deep water port. No regular communications. NSS would present enormous logistic difficulties.

MALDEN ISLAND

5. Will become independent as part of the Gilbert Islands in July 1979.

EDKDALEMUIR

6. In Scotland. A good location in seismic and logistic terms. The United Kingdom has accepted it.

PORT STANLEY

7. Capital of the Falkland Islands. A NSS would probably be acceptable to the Islanders but could be expected to meet strong protests from Argentina.

EGMONT

8. Part of the British Indian Ocean Territory. Can only be serviced from Diego Garcia.

BELIZE

9. United Kingdom policy is to bring Belize to independence. Guatemala, which claims the territory, would object to NSS.

HONG KONG

10. United Kingdom policy is to exclude Soviet nationals as far as possible. The Chinese would interpret NSS as intended to monitor their nuclear tests.

ANNEX C

STATEMENT OF UNITED STATES VIEWS

At the beginning of the last round of the CTB negotiations in Geneva, the United Kingdom informed the Soviet Union that the United Kingdom would be willing to accept only one National Seismic Station (NSS) in its territory. The United States delegation has been supportive of British efforts to obtain as favourable a solution as possible.

Since that time, a deadlock has developed over this issue. The United States is sympathetic with the problems that the United Kingdom faces on the NSS question. However, it now appears that this stalemate could go on indefinitely if the United Kingdom maintains its current position. We are concerned, in particular, that this situation could undercut the verification arguments which both the United Kingdom and the United States have made to the Soviets. Both have pressed hard and have achieved Soviet acceptance, in principle, of a network of ten NSS in the USSR. This could prove to be the most intrusive verification arrangement in any arms control agreement to date. Since this prospect is of such great importance to the Western side in both the technical and political sense, it is important to avoid the risk of unravelling the measure of agreement which has been achieved thus far.

The Soviet Union has refused to discuss other vital NSS issues - such as locations in the USSR, technical characteristics and phasing of installation - until agreement on the issue of the number of stations in the United Kingdom and its dependent territories is reached.

Months of difficult negotiations remain on verification issues, and the United States believes it is important to achieve significant progress in CTB in the near future if our objective is to be attained. The United States considers it important that the United Kingdom reexamine this question soon. We hope that as a result of this review, the United Kingdom will be able to adopt a new position as soon as possible, so that the round beginning May 21 can be productive.

If we are to have any prospect of overcoming the current stalemate, a United Kingdom move must be substantial. We understand the practical problems posed by the Soviet request for ten NSS in the United Kingdom and its dependent territories, and will do all we can to assist in finding a

credible compromise solution. In the United States view, this would probably require a British proposal to move more than halfway toward the Soviet position if there is to be any hope of getting the Soviets to be more flexible on this issue. This, of course, would keep open the possibility of the United Kingdom moving to accept ten stations if the impasse nevertheless continues well into the next round. We believe the difficulties of making such a move should be weighed against the opportunity available to us, and to the West in general, to achieve a verification arrangement that is in the West's security interest and could set an important precedent for future arms control agreements.

The details of a new British proposal, such as the number of stations and their locations, must naturally be left to the judgment of the United Kingdom. However, the United States urges the consideration and offer of a new proposal at the level of significance described above, so that there is a reasonable chance of overcoming the present stalemate. Once a new NSS proposal is developed, we would be pleased to consult with British officials prior to a final United Kingdom decision to table this in Geneva.

ANNEX D

Possible offers of 6, 8 or 10 National Seismic Stations (NSS) in politically acceptable locations

6	8	10
UK	UK	UK
1. Eskdalemuir	1. Eskdalemuir	1. Eskdalemuir
2. North Wales	2. North Wales	2. North Wales
3. East Anglia	3. East Anglia	3. East Anglia
		4. One other, eg in Southern England
Caribbean	Caribbean	Caribbean
4. Bermuda	4. Bermuda	5. Bermuda
5. Cayman Islands	5. Cayman Islands	6. Cayman Islands
6. Turks and Caicos Islands	6. Turks and Caicos Islands	7. Turks and Caicos Islands
Reserves for Nos 5 and 6	Other Areas	Other Areas
Montserrat	7. Ascension Island	8. Ascension Island
British Virgin Isles	8. St Helena	9. St Helena
		10. Tristan da Cunha
	Reserves for Nos 5 and 6	Reserves for Nos 5 and 6
	Montserrat	Montserrat
	British Virgin Isles	British Virgin Isles
	Reserves for No 8	Reserve for No 9 or 10
	Tristan da Cunha	Egmont
	Egmont (British Indian Ocean Territory)	

PRIME MINISTER

YOUR TALKS WITH MR. CYRUS VANCE

You will be meeting Mr. Vance first at the American Ambassador's dinner party (1900 for 1930) on Monday 21 May; and again, if you agree with the suggestion which I have put to you separately, at No. 10 on Wednesday 23 May at 1000.

The briefs have purposely been confined to the three important subjects which you and Mr. Vance will wish to discuss in depth, namely SALT and other strategic matters; Rhodesia and other Southern African issues; and the Middle East. Mr. Vance may raise Northern Ireland, and a defensive brief is included in case he does so. A short brief is to follow on the Tokyo Economic Summit.

Papers filed to Defence: SALT: May 79

Lord Carrington mentioned to you today the paper on SALT which he had sent over by Ambassador Gerard Smith, the SALT negotiator. I attach this immediately below, together with the text of a recent speech by Mr. Vance on a number of foreign policy issues and in which I have sidelined the SALT passage.

I also attach, inside the folder at Flag A, the text of the SALT Protocol (we cannot be certain that it is the final text) in which I have sidelined the passage about the transfer of weapons or technology which includes the word "necessarily". You agreed that Lord Carrington might give some indication to Mr. Vance of the reasons for our concern for this passage.

CDP.

18 May 1979

① Would France's Pym ask Geoffrey Parker to see me before Wednesday about SALT II.

② Could I have the original Namibia [illegible] UN [illegible]

SECRET

INTERPRETIVE STATEMENT ON NON-CIRCUMVENTION

The following is a revised text of the US interpretive statement, incorporating three additional changes.

In the view of the United States, the non-circumvention provision in the SALT agreement simply makes explicit the inherent obligation any state assumes when party to an international agreement not to circumvent the provisions of that agreement. It is a basic tenet of international law that agreements once entered into are to be carried out and not circumvented, and the United States would be so obligated with or without a non-circumvention provision. It is the position of the United States that the non-circumvention provision does not impose any additional obligation whatever on it beyond the specific obligations of the provisions of the treaty and, for the period of its effectiveness, the protocol, nor does it broaden the interpretation of those obligations.

The United States has consulted intensively with the Alliance throughout the SALT II negotiations, recognizing the important Alliance interest in the SALT II agreement which deals only with the strategic relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union. In view of the possible implications of the non-circumvention clause for Alliance cooperation, the United States reiterates what it has specifically stated in Alliance consultations during the negotiations, that is, the non-circumvention provision will not affect existing patterns of collaboration and co-operation with its allies, nor will it preclude cooperation in modernization. The United States believes that, in practice, the non-circumvention provision, which it will apply as stated below, will not interfere with continued nuclear and conventional cooperation with its allies.

As to the issue of transfers, the United States has consistently rejected the inclusion of a provision on non-transfer in the SALT agreement. We have made clear in the negotiating record that transfers of weapons or technology to our allies will continue and cannot, ipso facto, constitute circumvention. The United States will deal with future requests for transfers of weapons systems and technology on a case-by-case basis under the SALT II agreement, as it has done in the past. The transfer of weapons systems or technology for systems which were not numerically limited or prohibited by the agreement would be unaffected by the agreement. With respect to systems numerically limited in

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

20 min

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the agreement, as under the interim agreement, transfers would not be necessarily precluded by the agreement. Of course, requests for such transfers would have to be dealt with in light of the circumstances of the situation and the particular request. This would also be the case if there were no agreement.

The United States will not be able to transfer to its allies or other states those weapons systems or technology uniquely related to such systems, which are prohibited to the United States itself by the agreement. The United States fully accepts its responsibility not to circumvent the agreement. For the United States to supply to other states systems of a type that is prohibited to the United States itself by a provision of the agreement would be a circumvention of the agreement, even if there were no non-circumvention provision.

In accordance with recognized international practice, no third party can be bound or legally affected by the obligations the United States assumes under the SALT agreement. The United States would reject and would view as inconsistent with the political and strategic purposes of the agreement any attempt by the Soviet Union to raise, on the basis of the non-circumvention provision, questions concerning the activities of states not party to the agreement. In both a legal and practical sense, only the United States is subject to challenge in connection with questions raised by the Soviet Union with respect to the SALT agreement.

SALT TWO -- A CRITICAL STEP IN ARMS CONTROL

An Address by Secretary of State

CYRUS VANCE

Speaking to the American Association of

Community and Junior Colleges

Chicago, Tuesday, May 1st, 1979

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From the first days of our nation, Americans have held a staunch optimism about the future. We have been a self-confident people, certain about our ability to shape our destiny.

And we are a people who have not only adapted well to change, we have thrived on it.

We are now living in a period of history marked by deep and rapid change. Tonight, I want to talk about change, and how America can use its extraordinary strength to meet the challenges of a changing world.

America's optimism has been jarred in recent years--by a bitter war; by domestic divisions that tested our democratic institutions and left many of our people skeptical about government; by the sudden awareness that our economic life at home can be shaped by actions abroad; and by the realization that there are events which affect us but which we can only partly influence.

There is much that we can and have learned from these experiences. But fear of the future is not one of them.

Let me share with you frankly my concern that the distorted proposition being advanced by some that America is in a period of decline in the world is not only wrong as a matter of fact but dangerous as a basis for policy.

For we would imperil our future if we lost confidence in ourselves and in our strength and retreated from energetic leadership in the world.

And we would imperil our future, as well, if we reacted in frustration and used our power to resist change in the world, or employed our military power when it would do more harm than good.

The realization that we are not omnipotent should not make us fear we have lost our power or the will to use it. If we appreciate the extraordinary strengths we have...if we understand the nature of the changes taking place in the world...and if we act effectively to use our different kinds of power to shape different kinds of change, we have every reason to be confident about our future.

We must begin with a clear understanding of our own strengths as a nation.

--America's military strength today is formidable. I know of no responsible military official who would exchange our strategic position for that of any other nation.

We have friendly neighbors on our borders.

We have strong and reliable security relationships.

Together, these allies more than double our over-all military strength.

We have easy access to the sea, which enables us to have diversified strategic forces and the ready capacity to project our power.

--Our economy, and those of our allies, are more than three times as productive as those of the soviets and their allies.

--The industrial democracies continue to lead the way in technological innovation, and in harnessing that technology to serve mankind.

--And the way of life of our people and what we stand for as a nation continue to have magnetic appeal around the world.

Because we and our allies are the engines of creative change in almost every field...because of the vitality of our political institutions and the strength of our military forces, we have a capacity for leadership--and an ability to thrive in a world of change--that is unsurpassed.

The issue is not whether we are strong.

We are.

The challenge is to use these unquestioned strengths appropriately and effectively to advance our interests in a world undergoing different kinds of change.

What are these changes, and how can we use our strength effectively?

The first element of change is the evolution from an earlier period of American strategic supremacy to an era of stable strategic equivalence.

We should harbor no illusion that we could return to the earlier era. Neither side will permit the other to hold an exploitable strategic advantage. Each side has the financial and technical resources to keep pace with the other. With the stakes so high, we know that both of us will do whatever is necessary to keep from falling behind. That is why essential equivalence has become the only realistic strategy in today's nuclear world.

This rough balance can also serve the cause of stability --even if some find it unsettling compared with our earlier supremacy. It is this essential equivalence in strategic arms which allows us to move ahead on arms limitation. For if one side were far ahead, it would feel no special urgency about arms control--and the side that was behind would refuse to negotiate from a position of weakness. Only when both sides perceive a balance, as is now the case, can we hope for real arms control progress.

Our response to this broad change in the security environment has several elements.

We will assure that essential equivalence in nuclear arms is maintained. We will not be overtaken by the momentum of soviet military programs.

We have undertaken a far-reaching modernization of our strategic forces. We are improving each leg of our strategic triad--with cruise missiles for our B-52 bombers; with a new Trident One missile for existing submarines and the development of a new Trident submarine and Trident Two missile; and with development funding for the M-X Missile. And we are examining, in a timely fashion, the options for offsetting the probable future threat to the land-based portion of our missile force.

At the same time, we are equally determined to enhance our security by applying mutual limits to nuclear arms. We are at the threshold of a Salt Two Treaty. It is a critical step in the process of bringing strategic weapons under sensible control. As its arms become known and debated, I am confident that the Senate will agree that it will enhance our national security and that of our allies. Its rejection would lead to an intensification of the nuclear arms race. The risk of nuclear war would increase. The costs to our taxpayers would rise sharply. It would heighten tensions with the soviets, trouble our allies, and deal a crippling blow to future arms control prospects.

The American people, and our allies, understand the importance of decreasing tensions with the Soviet Union and seeking common ground where our interests my converge.

While we address strategic issues, we must also be especially sensitive to the importance of maintaining a balance of conventional forces. At the NATO summit last summer, we and our allies committed ourselves to real increases of three percent in defense expenditures, and to modernize and upgrade NATO forces. Last year's repeal of the arms embargo against Turkey was an important step to help bolster NATO's southern flank. In Europe and elsewhere, we are committed to maintain strong conventional forces.

And no one should doubt that we will use those forces if our vital interests or those of our allies are threatened.

In these ways, we will maintain, and strengthen, our security in an age of essential equivalence--by meeting the new problems it presents and by seizing the new arms control opportunities it affords.

A second change is the reality that the risks posed by regional conflicts have grown.

Many of these conflicts are long-standing. They have roots deep in history, in geography, in religious and ethnic differences.

But as more nations acquire more sophisticated arms, regional conflicts become more dangerous. They pose a constant threat of wider confrontation. As a result, the United States must be more active in working to help settle these disputes peacefully.

The fact is that no nation is more intensively engaged in the continuing effort to dampen the flames of conflict around the world than the United States.

No other nation could have played the role that the United States has played in helping Israel and Egypt achieve an historic peace treaty. And we will continue to remain actively involved in the effort to achieve a comprehensive peace--a peace in which Israel, the neighboring Arab states, and the Palestinian people can live with security and with dignity.

In Southern Africa...in the Eastern Mediterranean...in Southeast Asia...and elsewhere in the world, we are using the influence we have...for peace. Progress does not come easily or quickly. There will be setbacks, for the path to peace is often more difficult than the road to war. But

with persistence and steadiness, we can help provide the parties to conflict with an alternative to violence--if they choose to take it.

In some cases, these efforts will involve working with other interested nations as a catalyst for bringing the parties together. In other situations, we will support international and regional institutions that provide a framework for easing tensions. When we believe it will contribute to regional stability, we will assist nations threatened by external force to strengthen their ability to defend themselves.

In all cases, we will oppose attempts by others to transform local disputes into international tests of will. Every nation has a responsibility to recognize that there is greater safety in healing, rather than fueling, local conflicts.

A third kind of change we must address is change within nations.

As a result of mass communications, better education, urbanization and growing expectations for a better life, there is a new tide in many third world nations, as more and more people demand a fuller share in their government and their economy. These demands can place extraordinary pressures on economic, social and political institutions.

This ferment can, at times, cause the kind of turmoil that adversely affects our interests, at least in the shortrun. But rather than reacting in opposition to such change, or assuming that it necessarily works against us, let us look at two central questions:

--Is this kind of change generally in the interest of our nation?

--And what are the best instruments through which we can help others meet popular aspirations in an orderly and peaceful fashion?

The answer to the first question, in my judgment, is that the growing demand of individuals around the world for the fulfillment of their political, social and economic rights is generally in our interest. These apsirations are producing new or strengthened democratic institutions in many nations throughout the world. And America can flourish best in a world where freedom flourishes.

Should we not gain confidence from this expansion of democracy--which is taking place not because we force it, but because of its inherent appeal?

And what is that inherent appeal? Surely it lies in the enhanced opportunity that democracy provides for the realization of fundamental human rights--the rights to political and religious expression, to political participation, and to economic justice.

These values are remarkably attuned to the demands of change. The change which confronts many nations--particularly the less developed nations--challenges cultures, ways of living and communicating, notions of individual and national autonomy. The great strength of democratic processes is their flexibility and resilience. They allow accommodation and compromise. By giving all groups a voice in the decisions which affect their lives, democratic societies are far better able to shape a peaceful and stable balance between tradition and progress.

Internal change in other countries will sometimes be turbulent and difficult. At times, it may run in repressive directions. But we must not let our concerns about the cross-currents blind us to the tide running in favor of freedom.

In seeking to help others meet the legitimate demands of their peoples, what are the best instruments at hand?

Let me state first that the use of military force is not, and should not be, a desirable American policy response to the internal politics of other nations. We believe we have the right to shape our destiny; we must respect that right in others.

We must clearly understand the distinction between our readiness to act forcefully when the vital interests of our nation, our allies and our friends are threatened, and our recognition that our military forces cannot provide a satisfactory answer to the purely internal problems of other nations.

In helping other nations cope with such internal change, our challenge is to help them develop their own institutions, strengthen their own economies and foster the ties between government and people.

To do so, we must continue to provide them with increasing levels of development assistance. We must maintain human-rights policies which work in practical ways to advance freedom. And we must accept the fact that other societies will manage change, and build new institutions, in patterns that may be different from our own.

Third world nations will fiercely defend their independence. They will reject efforts by outsiders to impose their institutions. We should welcome this spirit.

For our national interest is not in their becoming like us. It is that they be free of domination by others.

This strategy of affirmative involvement and support for the independence and the diversity of developing nations serves us well. It capitalizes on the West's inherent strengths. And it improves our ties to developing countries in a context which does not force them to make an explicit choice between East and West.

The test of our will in dealing with domestic change abroad will come, not in how we use our military might, but in whether we are willing to put our resources behind our words--and to make them work effectively.

A fourth kind of change that we are seeing is in the international system itself. Building on our experience as a pluralistic nation, we must learn to deal effectively with an increasingly pluralistic world.

--Since the early 1960's, we have seen the emergence of dozens of new nations, each with its distinctive identity, each fiercely intent on fulfilling its national aspirations.

--We have seen the development of new powers in the world, nations which play an increasingly important role in international economic and political life.

--And we have come to recognize that many of the challenges we face are genuinely global in scope. Halting the spread of nuclear weapons, managing the world's resources sensibly and fairly, preserving an environment that can sustain us--these problems do not derive from any single nation, nor can any single nation--working alone-resolve them.

A world where many must participate in designing the future rather than a few, where progress often requires cooperative effort, demands more--not less--American leadership. It requires us to exercise that leadership creatively--to inspire others to work with us toward goals we share but cannot achieve separately.

It calls for a new kind of diplomacy.

--We must practice, wherever possible, an inclusive form of diplomacy, working together with others to achieve common goals. Such multilateral efforts are time-consuming and complex. But they can often be more productive than working alone.

--The core around which these broader efforts must be built is a strong and solid relationship with our traditional allies. We have worked hard in this administration to strengthen that partnership, and we have done so.

--Working together with our allies we are able, on an increasing number of issues, to engage others in collective efforts to resolve some of the more tractable problems we face. Let me cite just one example--our effort to find a more proliferation-resistant nuclear fuel cycle. At our initiative, 44 nations have come together to search for ways--both technical and institutional--to enable nations to pursue peaceful nuclear energy without adding to the danger of nuclear weapons proliferation. There is no "American" answer to the threat of nuclear weapons proliferation; there is only an international answer, and we are working with others to find it.

--We are strengthening our ties with those developing nations which exert increasing economic and political influence. We have worked to bring these--and other developing nations--more fully and fairly into the decision-making of international institutions which affect their life and ours. For enduring solutions to problems we face in common can be found only if all who have a stake also have a role, and recognize their responsibilities as well as their rights in the world community.

--To work effectively in a changing international system we must be prepared to work with nations whose ideologies are different than our own. By establishing full diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China, for example, we are now in a better position to deal directly and forthrightly with a government that represents one-fourth of the world's people.

--We have embarked on a deliberate effort to enhance the role of the United Nations and regional institutions such as the Organization of American States, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, and the Organization of African Unity. These institutions often can provide the most effective setting for resolving international disputes and for broadening the realm of international cooperation.

--To secure the cooperation of other nations we must deal with them on a basis of mutual respect and independence. Our achievement of a new Panama Canal Treaty, which secures our use of the canal for coming generations, has demonstrated that fair dealing with other nations, whatever their size, can serve our interests as well as theirs. Our relations throughout this hemisphere have benefitted as a result.

Let me turn finally to the change we are seeing in

the international economy--the growing stake every nation has in economic decisions made beyond its borders.

America's strength rests on the vitality of America's economy. Our economy continues to provide expanding opportunity for our people and continues to fuel growth around the world. We must also recognize the other side of this coin--the health of other economies around the world increasingly affects the health of our economy.

Our exports provide Americans with jobs--in fact, one out of every eight jobs in the manufacturing sector--and income for our firms and farmers. Every third acre of our farmland produces for export.

Imports from abroad provide us with essential raw materials; they afford our consumers greater choice; and they dampen our inflation.

This growing economic interdependence requires that our government work with others to help create international conditions in which all nations can thrive. We cannot seek to build our own economic future at the expense of others...nor will we allow others to compete unfairly. For a new era of economic nationalism could have tragic consequences, just as it did during the protectionist warfare of the 1930's.

We are deeply involved in working with other nations to meet the challenges of a changing world economic order.

--We have been successful in strengthening economic cooperation among the industrial nations. We have instituted regular economic summits to coordinate our economic policies so that they reinforce rather than undermine one another. And there has been far closer collaboration among our monetary authorities in restoring order to foreign exchange markets.

--We have initialed an important new multilateral trade agreement that will establish fair trading rules for the next decade. It will have a direct and positive impact on our economy.

--We have agreed with the other industrialized members of the International Energy Agency to cut back our collective demand for oil by two million barrels a day. To fulfill this commitment--and to reduce our own costly and dangerous dependence on oil imports--the President has initialed a sensible program for achieving greater domestic conservation and production. For we must begin to deal urgently with a markedly changed global energy environment.

--We recognize that a well-managed foreign assistance program contributes to the economic performance of the developing countries. Their growth has become an increasingly important factor in the health of our own economy. Aiding that development is not only an investment in the future of others; it is an investment in our own future as well.

In the foreign policy choices we are now making, we are determining the path we will follow in a new era.

In unsettled times, each of us has a responsibility to be clear about how we would deal with the world as we find it.

Most Americans now recognize that we alone cannot dictate events. This recognition is not a sign of America's decline. It is a sign of growing American maturity in a complex world.

We are stronger today because we recognize the realities of our times. This recognition, together with an equally clear understanding that we remain the most powerful of nations, should make every American as staunchly optimistic about our nation's future as we have always been.

There can be no going back to a time when we thought there could be American solutions to every problem. We must go forward into a new era of mature American leadership--based on strength, no belligerence; on steadiness, not impulse; on confidence, not fear.

We have every reason to be confident. For 200 years, we have prospered by welcoming change, and working with it--not by resisting it. We have understood, at home and abroad, that stability is not the status quo. It comes through human progress.

We will continue in this American tradition.

SALT PERSPECTIVES
BY
AMBASSADOR GERARD SMITH
AT
THE CONFERENCE ON U.S. SECURITY AND THE SOVIET CHALLENGE
NEW ORLEANS, LOUISIANA
APRIL 20, 1979

IT IS MORE THAN SIX YEARS SINCE I HAD RESPONSIBILITIES FOR SALT I NEGOTIATIONS AND I WILL USE THAT AS AN EXCUSE FOR SPARING YOU A LOT OF THE DETAILED ARITHMETIC OF SALT II. THERE HAVE BEEN MANY REPORTS ABOUT SALT IN THE PRESS BUT NO OFFICIAL TEXTS ARE YET AVAILABLE. A FEW ISSUES REMAIN UNRESOLVED -- BUT ENOUGH HAS BEEN NEGOTIATED TO LET US UNDERSTAND THE LIKELY OUTCOME.

RIGHT AT THE START I WOULD STRESS THAT WITH OR WITHOUT SALT WE ARE IN FOR A CONTINUATION OF THE FATEFUL COMPETITION WITH THE SOVIET UNION IN THE FIELD OF STRATEGIC WEAPONS. SINCE THE TIME BEFORE SALT -- ALMOST A DECADE AGO WHEN THE SOVIETS WERE FAR BEHIND -- THEY HAVE BEEN MOUNTING LARGE, BROADLY BASED MISSILE PROGRAMS. WE HAVE ALSO BEEN MODERNIZING OUR FORCES BUT IN THE CASE OF OUR LAND-BASED INTERCONTINENTAL MISSILES, ICBMS, WITH LESS DYNAMISM. DESPITE THIS WE ARE NOT IN AN INFERIOR POSITION. WE LEAD THE SOVIETS IN A NUMBER OF IMPORTANT STRATEGIC AREAS. OUR FORCES ARE MORE SURVIVABLE, RELIABLE AND DIVERSE. BUT EVEN IF SALT II COMES ABOUT, WE PROBABLY WILL HAVE TO GO IN FOR EXTENSIVE IMPROVEMENT MEASURES IF WE ARE TO AVOID IN THE FUTURE A PERCEIVED IMBALANCE BETWEEN SOVIET AND AMERICAN STRATEGIC FORCES. THE BASIC QUESTION IS -- CAN WE

IMPROVE OUR STRATEGIC POSITION WITH LESS RISK AND COST WITHIN A SALT II FRAMEWORK THAN IN THE ABSENCE OF SALT.

BEFORE CONSIDERING SALT II, LET US LOOK BRIEFLY AT THE EXPERIENCE UNDER SALT I.

THE MAIN PRODUCT WAS THE ANTI-BALLISTIC MISSILE TREATY LIMITING ABM SITES TO TWO FOR EACH NATION. MANY OF US THINK THAT TREATY AVERTED A COSTLY AND ABSURD COMPETITION TO TRY TO BUILD DEFENSIVE BALLISTIC MISSILE SYSTEMS. IN THE LATE 1960'S THERE WERE OUTSPOKEN PROPONENTS FOR DEPLOYING DEFENSIVE MISSILES TO REDUCE DAMAGE WHICH ATTACKING SOVIET MISSILES COULD DO TO OUR POPULATION CENTERS AND TO OUR LAND-BASED OFFENSIVE MISSILES, THE INTERCONTINENTAL BALLISTIC MISSILES. THEN IT WAS REALIZED THAT ANY SUCH DEFENSIVE SYSTEM COULD PROBABLY BE NEUTRALIZED BY THE OTHER SIDE'S SIMPLY DEPLOYING MORE OFFENSIVE MISSILES -- AND TO THE EXTENT THAT AN ABM SYSTEM DID PROMISE TO BE EFFECTIVE, IT COULD BE DESTABILIZING SINCE IT MIGHT LEAD A NATION TO BELIEVE IT COULD ATTACK THE OTHER WHILE EXPECTING TO DEFLECT THE BRUNT OF THE RETALIATION.

I THINK IT IS GENERALLY RECOGNIZED THAT THIS ABM TREATY HAS WORKED. SECRETARY OF DEFENSE BROWN RECENTLY SAID IT HAD CONTRIBUTED GREATLY TO STABILITY. THE SOVIETS DID NOT COMPLETE THE ONE EXISTING SYSTEM WHICH THEY HAVE AROUND MOSCOW. THE LIMIT WAS LATER REDUCED FROM TWO TO

ONE SITE FOR EACH SIDE AND WE LATER DECOMMISSIONED THE ONE SITE WHICH WE HAD BUILT. THE ABM TREATY WAS REVIEWED BY THE PARTIES IN 1977 AND FOUND TO BE EFFECTIVE. IT WILL BE REVIEWED AGAIN IN 1982.

THE SECOND OF THE SALT I AGREEMENTS WAS CALLED AN "INTERIM FREEZE". IT LIMITED THE AGGREGATE NUMBER OF INTERCONTINENTAL AND SUBMARINE BALLISTIC MISSILE LAUNCHERS TO APPROXIMATELY THE NUMBER WHICH THEN WERE IN EXISTENCE OR UNDER CONSTRUCTION. U.S. HEAVY BOMBERS WERE EXCLUDED AND WE HAD SIGNIFICANT LEADS IN WARHEADS AND TECHNOLOGY, BUT THE SOVIETS HAD SUBSTANTIALLY MORE ICBM LAUNCHERS AND WERE PERMITTED TO KEEP THEM UNDER SALT I. THE FREEZE THUS HAD AN APPEARANCE OF STRATEGIC INEQUALITY ALTHOUGH THIS WAS NOT THE CASE IF OUR OTHER STRATEGIC FORCES WERE TAKEN INTO CONSIDERATION. PSYCHOLOGICALLY, THE FREEZE GOT OFF TO A POOR START. AND FOR SOME REASON THERE WAS AN EXPECTATION THAT THE SOVIETS WOULD NOT SUBSTANTIALLY MODERNIZE AND IMPROVE THEIR MISSILE FORCES AS PERMITTED UNDER THE FREEZE, A GREAT EXPECTATION WHICH WAS DISAPPOINTED. I THINK THAT IS A MAJOR FACTOR IN THE NEGATIVE ATTITUDE WHICH A NUMBER OF PEOPLE NOW HAVE TOWARDS SALT II.

ALSO AGREED DURING SALT I WERE TWO ARRANGEMENTS OF SPECIAL SIGNIFICANCE FOR THE PROBLEM OF NUCLEAR ACCIDENTS -- THE AGREEMENT ON MEASURES TO REDUCE THE

RISK OF OUTBREAK OF NUCLEAR WAR AND THE AGREEMENT TO MODERNIZE THE WASHINGTON-MOSCOW HOT LINE. THEY ARE LARGELY FORGOTTEN NOW, BUT THE HOT LINE HAS MORE THAN ONCE PROVED ITS USE IN EMERGENCIES AND THE WAR RISK REDUCTION AGREEMENT COULD BE OF IMPORTANCE IN THE FUTURE.

AS PART OF SALT I, IT WAS AGREED THAT FULFILLMENT OF THE COMMITMENTS WOULD BE MONITORED BY WHAT WERE CALLED "NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS OF VERIFICATION", A EUPHEMISM FOR SOME OF THE INTELLIGENCE SYSTEMS OF THE TWO SIDES, INCLUDING SATELLITE PHOTOGRAPHY. THIS PROVISO, IN EFFECT, LEGITIMIZED THE USE OF INTELLIGENCE SYSTEMS FOR ARMS CONTROL WHICH SEEMED TO ME AN EXTRAORDINARY THING FOR THE SOVIETS TO AGREE TO.

THE TWO SIDES ALSO TOOK COMMITMENTS NOT TO INTERFERE WITH THE OPERATION OF THESE INTELLIGENCE SYSTEMS AND NOT TO CONCEAL FROM THEM THE WEAPONS SYSTEMS LIMITED BY THE AGREEMENTS. THESE "NO INTERFERENCE AND NO CONCEALMENT" UNDERSTANDINGS HAVE BEEN AN IMPORTANT PLUS FOR OUR INTELLIGENCE SYSTEMS. WITH OR WITHOUT SALT WE NEED TO KEEP TRACK OF SOVIET STRATEGIC FORCE DEPLOYMENTS. BUT WITHOUT SALT, THE SOVIETS COULD TAKE ANY CONCEALMENT MEASURES AVAILABLE, THUS MAKING OUR MONITORING TASK HARDER.

THERE WAS ALSO ESTABLISHED BY SALT I A STANDING CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION WHOSE FUNCTION IS TO CONSIDER AMBIGUITIES WHICH MIGHT ARISE AND CLARIFY DOUBTS AS TO

POSSIBLE VIOLATIONS. THIS GROUP HAS MET FREQUENTLY AND HAS OPERATED SUCCESSFULLY. A NUMBER OF AMBIGUITIES HAVE BEEN CLARIFIED. ON SOME OCCASIONS PRACTICES WHICH WERE CONSIDERED INCONSISTENT WITH THE AGREEMENTS HAVE CEASED AND BOTH PRESIDENTS FORD AND CARTER HAVE CERTIFIED THAT THERE HAVE BEEN NO VIOLATIONS OF THE 1972 AGREEMENTS. ALTHOUGH BY ITS TERMS THE "FREEZE" EXPIRED IN 1977, BOTH COUNTRIES HAVE STATED THEY WOULD DO NOTHING CONTRARY TO IT WHILE SALT II NEGOTIATIONS CONTINUE. IN FACT, THE SOVIETS EVEN NOW ARE DECOMMISSIONING SOME BALLISTIC MISSILE SUBMARINES IN ORDER TO STAY UNDER A CEILING CALLED FOR BY THIS FREEZE. THIS SHOWS THAT THE SOVIETS TAKE SALT SERIOUSLY.

I WOULD SAY THAT AMERICAN SECURITY IS BETTER NOW, AFTER ALMOST 7 YEARS OF OPERATING UNDER SALT I, THAN IF THE ABM TREATY AND THE MISSILE FREEZE HAD NOT BEEN APPROVED BY THE CONGRESS IN 1972 AND AN UNLIMITED COMPETITION HAD CONTINUED. WE HAVE GAINED CONFIDENCE THAT CERTAIN COMMITMENTS TAKEN BY THE SOVIET UNION IN STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATIONS CAN BE VERIFIED. WE ARE APPROACHING SALT II, NOT AS SOMETHING NEW AND UNTRIED, BUT AS A CONTINUATION OF A PROCESS THAT WE HAVE LEARNED TO LIVE WITH AND TO COUNT ON.

THE SALT II NEGOTIATION HAS BEEN GOING ON SINCE

NOVEMBER OF 1972. THE AMERICAN DELEGATION IS MADE UP OF DIPLOMATS, TECHNICIANS, AND OFFICERS OF THE ARMY, NAVY AND AIR FORCE. AT TIMES MEMBERS OF CONGRESS HAVE PARTICIPATED TO GOOD EFFECT AND CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES HAVE BEEN KEPT FULLY AND CURRENTLY INFORMED. IT IS MY UNDERSTANDING THAT THE TREATY AND RELATED DOCUMENTS, WHEN AND IF SUBMITTED BY THE PRESIDENT TO THE SENATE FOR ADVICE AND CONSENT, WILL HAVE SUPPORT OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE AND THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

IT IS REPORTED THAT THE MAIN EFFECTS OF THE AGREEMENTS WOULD BE:

THE TOTAL NUMBER OF STRATEGIC NUCLEAR DELIVERY VEHICLES ON EACH SIDE WOULD BE SUBJECT TO EQUAL CEILINGS -- 2400 AT THE START AND 2250 BY THE END OF 1981. Throw weight?

THE SOVIETS WOULD HAVE TO DISMANTLE SOME 270 LAUNCHERS TO GET UNDER THE CEILING. THE UNITED STATES WOULD NOT HAVE TO DISMANTLE ANY SYSTEMS THAT CURRENTLY ARE OPERATIONAL AND COULD, IN FACT, BUILD OVER TWO HUNDRED ADDITIONAL LAUNCHERS BEFORE REACHING THE CEILING.

THERE WOULD BE EQUAL SUB-CEILINGS ON VARIOUS CATEGORIES OF MISSILES CONTAINING MIRV'S WHICH ARE MULTIPLE WARHEADS THAT CAN TARGET MORE THAN ONE AIM POINT. How many?

EACH SIDE COULD ONLY TEST AND DEPLOY ONE NEW TYPE OF ICBM WHICH CANNOT CONTAIN MORE THAN 10 WARHEADS.

THE NUMBER OF WARHEADS THAT COULD BE PLACED IN EXISTING MISSILES WOULD BE FROZEN AT THE MAXIMUM NUMBER TESTED IN PRESENT MISSILES. THIS LIMIT IS VERY IMPORTANT. IT RESTRICTS THE SOVIETS' ABILITY TO CAPITALIZE ON THEIR LARGER MISSILE THROW-WEIGHT. ONE TYPE OF SOVIET MISSILE, FOR EXAMPLE, WITHOUT THIS CONSTRAINT COULD CONTAIN 30 OR MORE WARHEADS.

why? TESTING AND DEPLOYMENT OF MOBILE ICBMs WOULD BE PROHIBITED DURING THE FIRST 2 YEARS BUT AFTER THAT WOULD BE PERMITTED UNDER THE TREATY.

what? THERE WOULD BE A NUMBER OF ADDITIONAL LIMITATIONS ON THE SIZE OF MISSILES.

THE TREATY WOULD LAPSE AT THE END OF 1985 BUT EITHER SIDE COULD TERMINATE IT SOONER ON GIVING 6 MONTHS' NOTICE.

IN SUM, SALT II WOULD -- FOR THE FIRST TIME -- PLACE LIMITS ON ALL TYPES OF CENTRAL STRATEGIC SYSTEMS, BOMBERS AS WELL AS BALLISTIC AND CRUISE MISSILES;

FOR THE FIRST TIME IT WOULD PARTIALLY REVERSE THE ARMS COMPETITION IN OFFENSIVE SYSTEMS AND CALL FOR REDUCTION FROM AN EXISTING FORCE LEVEL;

FOR THE FIRST TIME IT WOULD PUT SOME CONSTRAINT ON THE TOTAL NUMBER OF WARHEADS THE SIDES COULD HAVE. IT WOULD NOT SOLVE THE ICBM VULNERABILITY PROBLEM (WHICH I WILL MENTION LATER), BUT IT WOULD PUT FINITE LIMITS ON

THE SIZE OF THE THREAT TO OUR LAND-BASED ICBMs.

FOR THE FIRST TIME IT WOULD PUT RESTRAINTS ON THE COMPETITION TO DEVELOP AND FIELD NEW AND BETTER WEAPONS BY LIMITING EACH SIDE TO TESTING AND DEPLOYING ONLY ONE NEW ICBM BY 1985.

PROPONENTS POINT OUT THAT THESE ARE SIGNIFICANT RESTRAINTS AND THAT IF SALT IS REJECTED, THERE WILL BE A RENEWED OPEN COMPETITION WITH LARGE ADDITIONAL COSTS AS WELL AS INCREASES IN THE RISKS OF ESCALATION AND WAR. IN THE ABSENCE OF SALT II, THE SOVIETS COULD SUBSTANTIALLY INCREASE THEIR FORCES. IT IS ESTIMATED THAT IN THE ABSENCE OF SALT IN 6 YEARS OF AN OPEN COMPETITION THE SOVIETS COULD HAVE AS MANY AS 3,000 STRATEGIC LAUNCHERS AS OPPOSED TO THE SALT LIMIT OF 2,250. THEY COULD ALSO HAVE TWO TO THREE THOUSAND MORE WARHEADS THAN SALT II WOULD ALLOW.

WHAT IS THE CASE AGAINST SALT II? IT IS SAID THAT SALT I DIDN'T STOP THE SOVIETS' STRATEGIC PROGRAMS WHICH MAY SOON BE SUPERIOR TO OUR FORCES, SO WHY AGREE TO SALT II? AND SALT I DID NOT LEAD TO THE EXPECTED RELAXATION OF SOVIET-AMERICAN TENSIONS. DURING THE PAST SIX YEARS THE SOVIETS HAVE ENGAGED IN AN ADVENTURIST FOREIGN POLICY WHICH HAS BEEN DESTRUCTIVE OF A NUMBER OF U.S. AIMS.

I WOULD POINT OUT THAT USEFUL ARMS CONTROL ARRANGE-

MENTS SHOULD NOT BE LIMITED TO TIMES OF SUPERPOWER GOOD BEHAVIOR. THE TREATY PROHIBITING NUCLEAR TESTS IN THE ATMOSPHERE FOLLOWED SHORTLY AFTER THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS. SALT I WAS CONCLUDED ONLY A FEW WEEKS AFTER THE U.S. STARTED BOMBING HAIPHONG IN VIETNAM, A COMMUNIST ALLY OF THE USSR.

I WOULD SAY THAT UNDERLYING MOST OF THE OPPOSITION'S ARGUMENTS IS A BELIEF THAT IN AN OPEN COMPETITION NOT LIMITED BY ARMS CONTROL, UNITED STATES SUPERIOR TECHNOLOGY WOULD GIVE US SOME ADVANTAGE. CLAIMS ARE MADE THAT THE EXISTENCE OF THE ARMS CONTROL RELATIONSHIP TENDS TO MODERATE OUR REACTION TO SOVIET BAD BEHAVIOR ABROAD AND THAT SALT II WOULD BE A PSYCHOLOGICAL CONSTRAINT ON MODERNIZATION OF U.S. FORCES.

IT IS SAID THAT THE SALT PROCESS HAS LULLED US INTO INERTIA AND HAS HAD NO SUCH EFFECT ON THE SOVIETS AND IN THE ABSENCE OF AGREED ARMS LIMITATIONS WE WOULD BE MORE KEENLY AWARE THAT WE HAD TO DO MUCH MORE.

CRITICS OF SALT ARE ESPECIALLY CONCERNED ABOUT THE PREDICTED VULNERABILITY OF OUR LAND-BASED BALLISTIC MISSILES, THE ICBM VULNERABILITY PROBLEM. THEY BELIEVE THAT IN A SHORT TIME THE SOVIETS WILL HAVE THE CAPABILITY TO DESTROY ALMOST ALL OF THEM, A THREAT WHICH THEY THINK WILL TEND TO MAKE THE UNITED STATES RELUCTANT TO STAND UP

TO THE SOVIETS IN A CRISIS. I WOULD INJECT HERE THIS THOUGHT -- IF EVER THE SOVIETS WERE TEMPTED TO SUCH A DESPERATE ACT AS ATTACKING OUR ICBMs, THEY WOULD HAVE TO MAKE THE RISKY CALCULATION THAT THE AMERICANS WOULD NEVER FIRE THEIR MISSILES BEFORE SOVIET MISSILES HIT AMERICAN TARGETS. I WONDER. THE SOVIETS WOULD ALSO KNOW THAT IN SUCH AN EVENT THE U.S. WOULD STILL HAVE 5 TO 6 THOUSAND WARHEADS IN THE ALERT BOMBER FORCE AND ON ITS MISSILE SUBMARINES AT SEA. NEVERTHELESS, THIS ICBM VULNERABILITY QUESTION NEEDS MORE ATTENTION. IT CAN BE REMEDIED UNDER SALT LIMITS IF THAT PROVES NECESSARY.

CRITICS ALSO EMPHASIZE THAT THE SOVIETS COULD KEEP SOME 300 LAUNCHERS FOR VERY LARGE BALLISTIC MISSILES NOW IN THEIR FORCE WHILE THE UNITED STATES COULD NOT DEPLOY ANY. ADMITTEDLY, THIS PROVISION WOULD LOOK BETTER IF IT ALLOWED THE UNITED STATES TO BUILD THE SAME NUMBER OF SUCH LAUNCHERS AS THE SOVIETS NOW HAVE. IT SEEMS TO ME THAT THIS CLAUSE WOULD HAVE LITTLE OR NO PRACTICAL EFFECT ON U.S. FORCES DURING THE LIFE OF SALT II. THE U.S. HAS NO USE FOR AND DOES NOT PLAN TO DEPLOY THIS KIND OF MISSILE. AND THE SITUATION WOULD BE EXACTLY THE SAME IF THE TREATY WAS NOT RATIFIED. ON THE SOVIET SIDE THERE WOULD BE SOME 300 VERY LARGE LAUNCHERS* WHILE WE WOULD NOT NOT DEPLOY ANY. NOTHING IN THE TREATY WOULD PREVENT THE

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* IF NOT MORE

TESTING OR DEPLOYMENT OF OUR NEW HEAVIER MISSILE, THE MX.

CRITICS ALSO DON'T LIKE THE FACT THAT EFFECTIVE LIMITATIONS WOULD NOT BE PLACED ON A SOVIET BOMBER "BACKFIRE" WHICH, THOUGH NOT TRULY INTERCONTINENTAL, DOES HAVE SOME CAPABILITY TO STRIKE TARGETS IN THE UNITED STATES. THERE ARE MANY MORE NUCLEAR CAPABLE NATO FIGHTER BOMBERS WHICH CAN STRIKE TARGETS IN THE USSR AND WHICH ALSO WOULD NOT BE SALT LIMITED NOR WOULD THE STRATEGIC FORCES OF THE UK AND FRANCE.

CERTAINLY THERE ARE WEAKNESSES IN OUR STRATEGIC FORCES THAT NEED CORRECTION AND CERTAINLY SALT DOES NOT SOLVE ALL OUR STRATEGIC PROBLEMS. BUT I BELIEVE SALT WOULD MAKE THESE PROBLEMS MORE MANAGEABLE. THE SALT CONSTRAINTS WOULD NOT PROHIBIT ANY U.S. PROGRAMS DESIGNED TO REDUCE OR ELIMINATE PRESENT WEAKNESSES. WHAT MODERNIZATION MEASURES ARE NECESSARY INVOLVES IMPORTANT ISSUES NEEDING ENLIGHTENED DEBATE. BUT A JUDGMENT ABOUT SALT SHOULD NOT DEPEND ON WHETHER ONE FAVORS THESE MEASURES OR NOT. SALT DOES NOT REQUIRE OR PREVENT ANY OF THEM. SECRETARY OF DEFENSE BROWN RECENTLY SAID THAT SALT II WOULD MAKE THE STRATEGIC BALANCE MORE PREDICTABLE AND WOULD PLACE IMPORTANT LIMITS ON THE THREAT WE WILL FACE.

I HAVE A HUNCH THAT SOME SALT CRITICISM REFLECTS THE FRUSTRATING KNOWLEDGE THAT IT IS EASIER TO PERSUADE A THIRD OF THE SENATE TO VOTE NO TO A TREATY THAN IT IS TO

PERSUADE A MAJORITY OF BOTH HOUSE AND SENATE TO VOTE FOR VERY LARGE INCREASES IN DEFENSE BUDGETS FOR YEARS TO COME. BUT THAT HARDLY SEEMS TO WARRANT A NEGATIVE CONCLUSION ABOUT SALT II.

CRITICS BELIEVE THAT THE SOVIETS DO NOT HOLD TO OUR DOCTRINE THAT THE MAIN FUNCTION OF STRATEGIC ARMS IS TO DETER THE OTHER SIDE FROM USING OR THREATENING TO USE ITS STRATEGIC FORCES. THEY SAY THAT THE SOVIETS ARE PLANNING NOT ONLY TO DETER BUT TO FIGHT A NUCLEAR WAR TO A SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION WITH DAMAGE LIMITED BY THEIR WEAPON SYSTEMS AND BY A LARGE SCALE CIVIL DEFENSE PROGRAM TO PROTECT THEIR PEOPLE. THESE CRITICS FEEL THAT STRATEGIC ARMS CONTROL WILL NOT WORK TO OUR INTEREST IN THE ABSENCE OF ACCEPTANCE BY THE USSR AND THE US OF A COMMON STRATEGIC DOCTRINE. ONLY A FEW CRITICS STRESS, HOWEVER, THAT TO BE CREDIBLE SUCH AN ALLEGED SOVIET STRATEGIC DOCTRINE, IF IMITATED BY THE U.S., WOULD REQUIRE, AMONG OTHER THINGS, A LARGE SCALE AMERICAN CIVIL DEFENSE PROGRAM.

LOOMING BEHIND MUCH OF THE CRITICISM OF THE SALT PACKAGE IS DOUBT ON THE PART OF CRITICS AS TO THE VERIFIABILITY OF COMMITMENTS TO BE TAKEN. THEY FEAR THAT THE SOVIETS WILL VIOLATE THE AGREEMENTS AND STEAL A MARCH ON THE UNITED STATES. I SOMETIMES WONDER HOW SOME CRITICS HAVE REACHED TWO CONCLUSIONS SIMULTANEOUSLY: 1) THAT THE

AGREEMENTS ARE MUCH TOO ADVANTAGEOUS TO THE SOVIETS, AND 2) THAT THE SOVIETS WOULD VIOLATE THEIR TERMS. IF, IN FACT, THEY WERE TO THE SOVIET ADVANTAGE, WHY WOULD THEY FAIL TO HONOR THEM?

IN CONSIDERING VERIFICATION, KEEP IN MIND THAT IT DOES NOT INVOLVE TRUSTING THE SOVIETS. IT DOES INVOLVE CONFIDENCE THAT OUR INTELLIGENCE SYSTEMS HAVE PROVED CAPABLE OF MONITORING PERFORMANCE OF SALT OBLIGATIONS. IN ADDITION, IN SALT II (BY A PROVISION WHICH IS UNIQUE IN ARMS CONTROL ARRANGEMENTS) THE SIDES HAVE DISCLOSED THE EXACT COMPOSITION OF THEIR PRESENT STRATEGIC FORCES AND HAVE AGREED TO UPDATE THIS "DATA BASE" TO REFLECT FUTURE CHANGES. SECRETARY OF DEFENSE BROWN RECENTLY SAID, "WE ARE CONFIDENT THAT NO SIGNIFICANT VIOLATION OF THE TREATY COULD TAKE PLACE WITHOUT THE U.S. DETECTING IT." WE WOULD BE ABLE TO RESPOND WITH APPROPRIATE ACTIONS BEFORE ANY SERIOUS ADVERSE IMPACT ON THE STRATEGIC BALANCE COULD TAKE PLACE. THE RELATIVELY SHORT LIFE OF THE TREATY, WHICH WOULD END IN 1985 AND IN ADDITION COULD BE TERMINATED ON 6 MONTHS' NOTICE, IS GOOD INSURANCE THAT THE SOVIETS CANNOT GAIN ANY ADVANTAGE FROM NOT LIVING UP TO ITS PROVISIONS. EVEN SUCH A TOUGH SALT SCRUTINIZER AS MY FRIEND, PAUL NITZE, TAKES A SOMEWHAT RELAXED VIEW OF THE MATTER. IN AN ARTICLE IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS IN 1976 HE WROTE, "I PERSONALLY TAKE THE

VERIFICATION ISSUE LESS SERIOUSLY THAN MOST BECAUSE THE LIMITS ARE SO HIGH THAT WHAT COULD BE GAINED BY CHEATING AGAINST THEM WOULD NOT APPEAR TO BE STRATEGICALLY SIGNIFICANT." BUT THE PRESIDENT HAS ASSURED US THAT HE WILL NOT APPROVE ANY AGREEMENTS THAT CANNOT BE ADEQUATELY VERIFIED. I THINK THAT ASSURANCE CAN BE RELIED ON.

INTELLIGENCE ABOUT SOVIET STRATEGIC ARMS IS A COMBINATION OF KNOWLEDGE ABOUT PRESENT CAPABILITIES AND ESTIMATES ABOUT FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS. SALT HELPS IN BOTH RESPECTS. PRESENT DEPLOYMENTS CAN BE MORE PRECISELY DETERMINED SINCE THE SOVIETS ARE NOT PERMITTED UNDER THE AGREEMENTS TO CONCEAL WEAPONS SYSTEMS WHICH ARE LIMITED AND THEY HAVE AGREED NOT TO INTERFERE WITH OUR NATIONAL MEANS OF VERIFICATION. AS FOR ESTIMATING FUTURE DEPLOYMENTS, THE AGREEMENT SPELLS OUT THE MAXIMUM PERMITTED LEVELS OF THE LIMITED SYSTEMS, THUS SIMPLIFYING SOMEWHAT THE PROBLEM OF PREDICTION OF FUTURE FORCE LEVELS. THE ABSENCE OF THIS "PREDICTABILITY", WHICH WOULD RESULT FROM A SALT REJECTION, WOULD MAKE THE FUTURE STRATEGIC BALANCE MORE UNCERTAIN WHICH WOULD BE DESTABILIZING.

YOU MAY BE WONDERING WHETHER IN THE SOVIET UNION THERE ARE ALSO CRITICS OF SALT. WHILE WE DON'T HEAR THEIR VOICES, I SUSPECT THAT THERE ARE. HERE ARE A FEW POINTS THEY MAY BE MAKING:

1. THE USSR WOULD HAVE TO REDUCE ITS FORCES WHILE THE AMERICANS COULD INCREASE THEIRS.

2. THE AMERICANS WILL HAVE MANY HIGHLY ACCURATE AIR-LAUNCHED CRUISE MISSILES DURING THE LIFE OF THE TREATY AND THE SOVIETS WILL HAVE FEW OR NONE AT ALL.

3. SOVIET SUBMARINES ARE OF LOWER QUALITY AND SOVIET ACCESS TO THE HIGH SEAS IS MUCH MORE CONSTRAINED THAN THE AMERICAN'S. AND THE AMERICANS HAVE FORWARD BASES FOR THEIR MISSILE SUBMARINES IN EUROPE AND THE SOVIETS HAVE NONE.

4. THE SOVIETS HAVE FOUR NUCLEAR ADVERSARIES WITH STRATEGIC FORCES -- THE U.S., THE UK, FRANCE AND CHINA -- AND THE AMERICANS HAVE BUT ONE.

5. THE SOVIETS HAVE AN INFERIOR HEAVY BOMBER FORCE. THE UNITED STATES HAS OVER 300 TRULY INTERCONTINENTAL BOMBERS.

6. THE SOVIETS HAVE NEARLY THREE-QUARTERS OF THEIR WARHEADS IN VULNERABLE ICBMS WHILE THE UNITED STATES HAS NEARLY THREE-QUARTERS OF ITS IN LESS VULNERABLE SYSTEMS -- BOMBERS AND SUBMARINES.

7. THE UNITED STATES CAN COUNT ON MANY HUNDREDS OF NUCLEAR CAPABLE FIGHTER BOMBERS DEPLOYED CLOSE TO THE SOVIET UNION WHICH COULD DESTROY HUNDREDS OF TARGETS IN RUSSIA. THESE SYSTEMS ARE UNLIMITED BY THE AGREEMENT.

THERE IS ANOTHER ANGLE OF CRITICISM COMING FROM SOME LIBERAL POLITICIANS, ACADEMICS AND CHURCH PEOPLE. UNLIKE OUR CONSERVATIVE AND MORE WEAPON ORIENTED CRITICS, THESE CRITICS FIND THE SALT PACKAGE TO BE TOO LITTLE, TOO LOOSE, TOO PERMISSIVE; SOME CALL IT A SHAM. THEY WANT SHARP REDUCTIONS AND TIGHTER CONSTRAINTS ON WEAPONS CHARACTERISTICS. BUT SALT II WOULD INCLUDE UNPRECEDENTED AND SIGNIFICANT QUALITATIVE AND QUANTITATIVE CONSTRAINTS. SOMETIMES SUCH CRITICS REMIND ONE OF AESOP'S WRY REMARK, "IT IS EASY TO PROPOSE IMPOSSIBLE SOLUTIONS."

I HAVE NOT ATTEMPTED A COMPREHENSIVE SURVEY OF CRITICISMS OF THE SALT PACKAGE, BUT I THINK THESE WILL GIVE YOU AN IDEA OF WHAT IS TROUBLESOME TO SALT OPPONENTS.

THERE ARE SEVERAL OTHER IMPORTANT CONSIDERATIONS TO HAVE IN MIND BEFORE DRAWING CONCLUSIONS.

MY RESPONSIBILITIES ARE NOW IN THE FIELD OF NON-PROLIFERATION -- TO TRY TO CONTROL THE SPREAD OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AROUND THE WORLD. THIS IS CALLED HORIZONTAL PROLIFERATION, AS OPPOSED TO VERTICAL, WHICH REFERS TO THE BUILD-UP BY THE 2 SUPERPOWERS OF THEIR NUCLEAR FORCES.

TO MY MIND THE THREAT TO AMERICAN SECURITY FROM HORIZONTAL PROLIFERATION IS SUBSTANTIALLY GREATER THAN THAT PRESENTED BY THE CONTINUING IMPROVEMENT IN SOVIET FORCES. IMAGINE THE INSTABILITIES THAT WOULD BE CREATED

IF AND WHEN MORE NATIONS HAVE NUCLEAR WEAPONS OR EVEN A WEAPONS POTENTIAL. THIS IS NO EMPTY ANXIETY. RECENTLY WE READ REPORTS THAT PAKISTAN APPEARS HEADED IN THAT DIRECTION. IT IS NOT DIFFICULT TO THINK OF OTHER AREAS IN THE WORLD WHERE -- CONTINUING TO CARRY OUT TRADITIONAL RIVALRIES WILL BE MUCH MORE DANGEROUS WITH NUCLEAR WEAPONS PRESENT. A KEY COUNTRY FOR OUR NONPROLIFERATION EFFORTS IS INDIA WHICH EXPLODED A NUCLEAR DEVICE 5 YEARS AGO. ONE CAN HARDLY EXPECT INDIA FORMALLY TO GIVE UP A WEAPONS OPTION IF THERE IS LITTLE PROSPECT THAT THE SUPERPOWERS ARE GOING TO AGREE TO PUT THEIR NUCLEAR WEAPONS UNDER SOME CONSTRAINTS.

ONE OF THE MAIN INSTRUMENTS TO CONTAIN THE SPREAD OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IS THE NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY WHICH HAS BEEN IN FORCE FOR ALMOST TEN YEARS. OVER 100 COUNTRIES HAVE TAKEN COMMITMENTS NOT TO GO FOR NUCLEAR WEAPONS. BUT THERE IS A BASIC BARGAIN EMBEDDED IN THIS TREATY. THOSE NON-WEAPONS COUNTRIES' COMMITMENTS ARE EXPRESSLY CONTINGENT ON SOVIET AND AMERICAN PROGRESS IN CONTROLLING THEIR NUCLEAR ARMS. IF THE EFFORTS TO THIS END OF THE LAST SIX YEARS ARE REJECTED BY THE SENATE, THE INTEGRITY OF THIS ESSENTIAL NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY WILL BE CAST INTO DOUBT AND OUR TASK OF TRYING TO CONTROL PROLIFERATION WILL BE SUBSTANTIALLY INCREASED. THAT, TO MY MIND, IS A VERY IMPORTANT REASON FOR GETTING ON WITH SALT II. I WAS GLAD TO SEE A

RECENT PRESS REPORT THAT THE PRESIDENT HAD STRESSED THIS IMPORTANT ASPECT OF SALT.

IF SALT II IS REJECTED, THE CONTINUANCE OF THE ABM TREATY COULD BE IN DOUBT AND WE COULD ONCE AGAIN FACE A RACE TO DEPLOY DEFENSIVE MISSILE SYSTEMS. WHEN, IN 1972, THE FIRST SALT AGREEMENTS WERE PRESENTED TO THE CONGRESS, THEY INCLUDED THE STATEMENT WHICH I HAD MADE TO THE SOVIETS AT THE DIRECTION OF PRESIDENT NIXON THAT IF A SALT II TREATY LIMITING OFFENSIVE FORCES TO MATCH THE ABM TREATY WAS NOT REACHED, THAT COULD CONSTITUTE A JUSTIFIABLE CAUSE FOR ABROGATION OF THE ABM TREATY. IF SALT II IS REJECTED, THERE WILL BE CALLS FOR TERMINATING THE ABM TREATY -- ESPECIALLY FROM THOSE CONCERNED WITH THE DEFENSE OF OUR INCREASINGLY VULNERABLE ICBMS. IN FACT, ONE GROUP OF SALT OPPONENTS HAS ALREADY PROPOSED ABROGATION OF THIS TREATY. AND THE USSR COULD TAKE THE SAME POSITION THAT WE HAD RESERVED FOR OURSELVES IN 1972. WHETHER THE ABM TREATY SURVIVED OR NOT WOULD THEN BE ENTIRELY UP TO THE SOVIETS -- WHO FACE NUCLEAR THREATS FROM THE THREE SMALLER NUCLEAR POWERS FOR WHICH ABMS MIGHT BE EFFECTIVE.

IF THE ABM TREATY IS LOST, WE WOULD AGAIN BE IN AN UNLIMITED STRATEGIC COMPETITION IN WHICH THE SOVIETS WOULD NO LONGER BE COMMITTED NOT TO INTERFERE WITH OUR TECHNICAL MEANS OF VERIFICATION AND NOT TO CONCEAL THEIR LAUNCHERS.

GONE ALSO WOULD BE THE S.C.C. CONSULTING MECHANISM WHICH HAS WORKED WELL TO CLEAR UP AMBIGUITIES. I THINK THESE WOULD BE SUBSTANTIAL LOSSES FOR OUR INTELLIGENCE CAPABILITIES. IT CERTAINLY WOULD NOT OFFER A FAVORABLE PROSPECT FOR STRATEGIC STABILITY.

IT HAS BEEN SAID THAT SALT WILL PREJUDICE THE INTERESTS OF OUR ALLIES, BUT THE LEADERS OF FRANCE, ENGLAND AND GERMANY EXPRESSLY AND PUBLICLY ENDORSED THE SALT PACKAGE AT THE RECENT WINTER MEETING IN GUADALUPE. LAST MONTH CHANCELLOR SCHMIDT TOLD A MEETING IN HAMBURG THAT REJECTION OF SALT WOULD BE A "CATASTROPHE".

I COULDN'T PUT THE CASE FOR SALT BETTER THAN SCHMIDT DID RECENTLY IN THE BUNDESTAG. "SALT II CAN BE CONCLUDED ONLY IN THE FORM OF A COMPROMISE...IF EVERYONE INVOLVED WILL ACCEPT SOMETHING THAT IS NOT FULLY IN LINE WITH THEIR OWN INTERESTS -- IT IS NECESSARY TO DIFFERENTIATE BETWEEN CRITICAL REMARKS INVOLVING INDIVIDUAL ASPECTS OF THIS PACKAGE...AND THE GREAT WORLD POLITICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF THE WHOLE TREATY -- OTHERWISE THE WHOLE WORLD WILL SUFFER A MOST SERIOUS CONFIDENCE CRISIS."

OUR TURNING AWAY FROM SALT LIMITATIONS WOULD INCREASE THE RELATIVE SOVIET ADVANTAGE IN AN AREA WHERE THEY ALREADY HAVE CLEAR SUPERIORITY -- IN THEIR COMMAND OF INFORMATION. THEY HAVE THE ABILITY TO PREDICT THE SIZE AND QUALITY OF

AMERICAN STRATEGIC FORCES OF THE FUTURE MERELY BY STUDYING OUR DEFENSE BUDGETS AND READING CONGRESSIONAL DOCUMENTS. BEFORE SALT I WE HAD TO DEPEND SOLELY ON HARD WON INTELLIGENCE. IN SALT I WE OBTAINED A DEGREE OF PREDICTABILITY ABOUT WHAT SOVIET FORCE LEVELS WOULD BE DURING THE ABM TREATY AND AT THE END OF THE 5-YEAR FREEZE. WE ALSO GAINED AN ADVANTAGE FROM THE SOVIET COMMITMENT NOT TO INTERFERE WITH OUR MEANS OF VERIFICATION OR TO CONCEAL LIMITED ARMS FROM THEM. AS A RESULT, SO-CALLED WORST CASE PLANNING HAS HAD LESS OF A ROLE IN PENTAGON THINKING. WITHOUT SALT CEILINGS FOR THE FUTURE, OUR UNCERTAINTIES WOULD INCREASE. THIS AGAIN WOULD HARDLY MAKE FOR STABILITY.

PERHAPS THE MOST SERIOUS LOSS THAT THE SALT REJECTION WOULD ENTAIL WOULD BE THE CONCLUSION BY OUR FRIENDS AND ANTAGONISTS ABROAD THAT THE U.S. GOVERNMENT WAS INCAPABLE OF CONDUCTING A COHERENT FOREIGN POLICY. IF THE PRODUCT OF SIX YEARS OF NEGOTIATION IS BROUGHT TO NAUGHT, WHAT WOULD BE THE CHANCES FOR SUCCESS IN OTHER NEGOTIATIONS LIKE THE COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN AND MUTUAL BALANCED FORCE REDUCTIONS?

AND IN THE CURRENT, UNEASY STATE OF RELATIONS WITH OUR ALLIES, REJECTION WOULD PREJUDICE ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL COOPERATION AS WELL AS DEFENSE POLICY COORDI-

NATION. U.S. INFLUENCE AND LEADERSHIP AROUND THE WORLD WOULD SUFFER BADLY.

WHAT ABOUT POSSIBLE SENATE APPROVAL BUT WITH PROPOSED AMENDMENTS OR RESERVATIONS? IF THEY WERE SUBSTANTIVE AND REQUIRED THAT THE NEGOTIATION BE REOPENED AND THE BARGAINING RESUMED, IT SEEMS LIKELY TO ME THAT THE RENEGOTIATION WOULD FAIL. AGREED SOVIET-AMERICAN ARMS LIMITATIONS ARE REACHED ONLY AS A RESULT OF CONCESSIONS AND COUNTER-CONCESSIONS WHICH IN TURN ARE THE RESULT OF INTERNAL BARGAINING IN WASHINGTON AND I BELIEVE ALSO IN MOSCOW. NOTHING IS AGREED UNTIL EVERYTHING IS AGREED. TO START AFRESH WOULD MEAN TO REOPEN THE WHOLE BARGAIN -- NOT JUST TO NEGOTIATE FOR ONE OR MORE ADDITIONAL PROVISIONS. HOW WOULD WE FEEL IF, AFTER REACHING TOTAL AGREEMENT, MOSCOW THEN SAID THAT THERE WERE JUST A FEW MORE ITEMS ON WHICH WE MUST REACH AGREEMENT BEFORE WE HAD A DEAL?

OUR CHOICE, THEREFORE, IT SEEMS TO ME, IS TO CONTINUE TO MODERNIZE OUR FORCES FOR SOME 6 YEARS UNDER AGREED SALT II CEILINGS WITH CERTAIN LIMITATIONS ON SOVIET AND AMERICAN WEAPONS SYSTEMS <u>OR</u> TO GO BACK TO AN UNLIMITED COMPETITION. ON BALANCE, I BELIEVE THE UNITED STATES WILL BE IN A RELATIVELY BETTER POSITION IF WE PURSUE FORCE MODERNIZATION PROGRAMS UNDER THE SALT II PACKAGE THAN IF WE GO AHEAD IN UNLIMITED COMPETITION. BUT I THINK WE

SHOULD RECOGNIZE THAT SALT II IS NO PANACEA, THAT IT DOES NOT WARRANT THE EUPHORIC EXPECTATIONS GENERATED AT THE TIME OF SALT I, AND THAT IT IS A STEP, A NECESSARY MOVE TOWARD MORE SIGNIFICANT REDUCTIONS AND CONSTRAINTS WHICH WE SHOULD PRESS FOR IN THE YEARS AHEAD.

WHILE THE SENATE ALONE HAS THE CONSTITUTIONAL MANDATE TO GIVE ITS ADVICE AND CONSENT TO TREATY RATIFICATION, THE COLLECTIVE COMMON SENSE OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE, ALL OF WHOM HAVE A VERY HIGH PERSONAL STAKE IN THE OUTCOME, WILL ALSO BE OF CRUCIAL IMPORTANCE.



USA

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Subject on USA: UK/USA Relations May 1979

~~SUBJECT~~

~~ACTION~~

PRIME MINISTER'S PERSONAL MESSAGE SERIAL No. T8/79T

IMMEDIATE 170940Z MAY 79
FROM CABINET OFFICE LONDON
TO WHITE HOUSE

TO: PRESIDENT CARTER
FROM: PRIME MINISTER THATCHER
CONFIDENTIAL

DEAR MR PRESIDENT,

THANK YOU FOR THE HELPFUL LETTER WHICH YOUR EMBASSY DELIVERED TO ME ON 13 MAY LETTING ME KNOW YOUR THINKING ON THE MANY ISSUES WE FACE, WHICH I HOPE TO DISCUSS WITH YOU NEXT MONTH. I WAS ALSO GRATEFUL FOR YOUR MESSAGE OF 9 MAY ABOUT SALT: IT WAS MOST USEFUL TO ME TO HAVE THIS ADVANCE NOTICE OF YOUR ANNOUNCEMENT.

WE ARE LOOKING FORWARD TO MR. VANCE'S VISIT NEXT WEEK. I AM VERY GLAD HE IS COMING AND THAT WE SHALL HAVE THE CHANCE TO COVER SOME OF THE GROUND WITH HIM.

I SHOULD PREFER, IF I MAY, TO DELAY SENDING YOU A FULL REPLY TO THE VARIOUS POINTS YOU MAKE UNTIL AFTER OUR TALKS WITH MR. VANCE. AT THIS STAGE, I SIMPLY WISH TO ASSURE YOU THAT I AM VERY CONSCIOUS OF THE IMPORTANT DECISIONS THAT HAVE TO BE TAKEN IN THE NEXT FEW MONTHS, PARTICULARLY ON DEFENCE AND ARMS CONTROL ISSUES, IN THE MIDDLE EAST, IN SOUTHERN AFRICA AND OVER INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC MATTERS. YOU CAN RELY ON THE NEW BRITISH GOVERNMENT TO PLAY A RESPONSIBLE AND CONSTRUCTIVE ROLE IN THE SEARCH FOR SOLUTIONS TO THESE PROBLEMS.

WITH WARM BEST WISHES,
MARGARET THATCHER

NNNNN

SENT AT 0955Z/17 NH
RECD AT 0955Z/17
AND MATE QSL FOR THAT AT 0957Z KKKK

B.G. Cartledge, Esq.

CABINET OFFICE

With the compliments of
The Private Secretary to the
Secretary of the Cabinet

70 Whitehall, London SW1A 2AS
Telephone 01-233 8319

SECRET

10A

CABINET OFFICE

70 Whitehall, London SW1A 2AS Telephone 01-233 8319

From the Secretary of the Cabinet: Sir John Hunt GCB

Ref. A09565

16th May, 1979

P.Q. 17/5

Restricted Ministerial Meetings

Sir John Hunt has recently informed your Secretary of State that the Prime Minister would like him to attend meetings of a restricted group of Ministers which is convened to discuss matters relating to the nuclear deterrent. The first meeting of this group is to be held at 5.00 pm on 21st May and papers for this have been sent personally to Mr. Whitelaw. In view of the extreme sensitivity of this subject arrangements have been made for Sir Robert Armstrong to take custody of these papers when Mr. Whitelaw is not using them.

There will be a further meeting of the restricted group, probably on 24th May at 5.00 pm (subject to confirmation), to discuss aspects of SALT and the comprehensive test ban (CTB) negotiations. Papers to be considered at this meeting will be sent to you nearer the time for Mr. Whitelaw's use. Meanwhile I enclose for his information copies of background briefs on these two subjects which were prepared by officials in the FCO and MOD under Cabinet Office chairmanship for the information of incoming Ministers. These briefs have been seen by the Prime Minister, Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary and Secretary of State for Defence.

I am sending copies of this letter only to Bryan Cartledge, George Walden and Roger Facer. I should be glad if they would note Mr. Whitelaw's need to receive copies of any further correspondence on these two subjects relating to issues for consideration by the restricted group.

M. J. VILE

(M.J. Vile)
Private Secretary

J.A. Chilcot, Esq.
(Home Office)

Miss Stephens
to see.
Prime Minister

CONFIDENTIAL

Ref. A09558

MR. CARTLEDGE

Cabinet Office
informed. 15/5 p.m.

This will be an important meeting. Could you agree to have it on 24 May at 1700 as suggested? 15/5

Restricted Ministerial Meeting

The Prime Minister is having a restricted meeting with Lord Carrington, Mr. Pym and Mr. Whitelaw next Monday to discuss certain domestic nuclear matters. We need to arrange a further meeting at an early date to discuss SALT and CTB.

On SALT, Ministers need to agree the line that Lord Carrington should take, including what public line by the Alliance he should be prepared to endorse, at the NATO Ministerial meeting in The Hague which begins on Tuesday, 29th May. There is also a particular point relating to the text on non-circumvention on which a submission will be coming forward, as foreshadowed in paragraph 4(i) of the brief on SALT prepared for incoming Ministers.

On CTB, Ministers need to consider their general policy towards negotiations, which are due to resume in early June. There will also be a separate submission coming forward dealing with the problem of National Seismic Stations covered in paragraphs 11 and 12 of the brief on CTB for incoming Ministers.

Given the other commitments in the Prime Minister's diary, the options for the meeting seem to be on the afternoon of Thursday, 24th May, after Questions, or on Friday, 25th May. Mr. Whitelaw is due to be in the North East campaigning in the European Assembly Elections on the Friday. I would be grateful if you would let me know if the Prime Minister would be content to hold this meeting at 5.00 pm on Thursday, 24th May, for which Miss Stephens has made tentative provision in the diary.

Agreed

MJV.

(M.J. Vile)

15th May, 1979

Original copied to Germany May 79 - Chancellor Schmidt's visit

SECRET

Defence (SALT)

Rules — No. 10a

PARTIAL RECORD OF THE PRIME MINISTER'S DISCUSSIONS WITH THE FEDERAL GERMAN CHANCELLOR, HERR SCHMIDT, AT 10 DOWNING STREET ON 11 MAY 1979 AT 1030

Present

The Prime Minister
The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary
Chancellor of the Exchequer
Secretary of State for Defence
Lord Privy Seal
and officials

H.E. Herr Helmut Schmidt
Herr Hans-Dietrich Genscher (Foreign Minister)
Herr Matthofer (Minister of Finance)
and officials

* * * * * * * * * *

Nuclear Matters

/Following a discussion of SALT II, Chancellor Schmidt initiated a substantial exchange of views on Theatre Nuclear Forces in Europe and asked, at its conclusion, that it should not be recorded. The Prime Minister endorsed this and directed that the record should show only that "there was a discussion on nuclear weapons"./

Chancellor Schmidt said that, under the umbrella of talks on Theatre Nuclear Forces (TNF) modernisation, discussions were proceeding within the Alliance at official level on the future of nuclear weapons in Western Europe. Initially, this assessment had been confined to the high level military group which was considering what type or types of tactical and medium-range (which in Europe meant strategic) weapons should be stationed in Western Europe. These discussions had now been complemented by the meeting of the Special Group which was considering the arms control aspects of the question: and he thought it essential that these two sets of discussions should proceed in parallel. Defence Ministers had met recently in Florida and had envisaged a procedure by which, before the end of 1979,

/the NATO Council

the NATO Council could take an integrated decision based on the conclusions of the high level and special groups. This was satisfactory but it needed to be given a political dimension. For example the military would always argue that GLCMs were more reliable than SLCMs but they ignored the fact that politically the latter might give rise to lesser problems.

Chancellor Schmidt went on to say that it would be difficult to help the United States, in any clearly defined way, to identify the goals of SALT III without a co-ordinated European view. It should be borne in mind that if the US/Soviet Summit were to take place soon /news arrived during the meeting of the American announcement that the Summit was to take place in Vienna on 15/18 June/ President Carter and President Brezhnev might well cover a wide range of subjects including SALT III, MBFR, the CSCE follow-up meeting in Madrid, Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, the Middle East and Southern Africa. For his own part, he would welcome it if MBFR were to be given a push during the next few weeks. So far as SALT III was concerned, the FRG intended to ensure that she should not be singled out for the stationing of a new kind of nuclear weapon on her soil which would present a threat to the Soviet Union unless another non-nuclear weapon state within the Alliance did the same. Since 1945, there had been no nuclear weapons stationed on German soil which could reach Moscow. To put them on German soil alone would amount to a qualitative change in the FRG's defence procedure. The FRG already had 500,000 troops, well trained and of high quality, under arms, and was quite prepared to modernise this force further. The FRG would not, however, like anything to be done which would divide the FRG from her non-nuclear allies or create the misapprehension that the FRG was embarking on participation in the nuclear weapons field.

Lord Carrington said that the British Government shared the FRG view that there should be no public criticism of SALT II

/and that nothing

and that nothing should be done which could make things difficult for President Carter. The main UK interest was in the transfer of nuclear technology and the Government would be studying the final text of SALT II from that point of view. Lord Carrington said that he agreed that SALT III would be of vital importance to the West and to Europe in particular. He had been given the impression in Washington that SALT III would be a continuation of the long bilateral negotiation between the United States and the Soviet Union and this could become a permanent process. Europe should seriously consider whether it would be right to accept this. Lord Carrington said that he saw every advantage in the closest co-operation between the UK and the FRG in order to safeguard the European interest. He fully recognised the FRG's problems on the stationing of nuclear weapons. The Defence Secretary said that the urgent question was TNF. Unless modernisation had been agreed upon it was pointless to discuss arms control measures. Serious risks would arise if the problem of TNF modernisation was not solved by the end of 1979. He had considered Chancellor's Schmidt's suggestion that the work of the high level and special groups should be brought closer together and this was an interesting idea; but he still believed that it would be right to allow the high level group to reach its conclusions first. Perhaps the UK and the FRG should put Ministerial weight behind the high level group's activities and then endeavour to carry the Belgians, the Dutch and the Americans along with them. It would be important to consider very clearly the public opinion aspects of the TNF problem. Mr. Pym suggested that the Prime Minister and Chancellor Schmidt might instruct their Defence Ministers to take a more direct interest in the technical/military decisions of the high level group so that they would be in a stronger position in the special group.

The Prime Minister commented that the West had suffered a psychological defeat over the neutron bomb. She also found it hard to understand how the West had fallen from superiority to

/parity, and

parity, and even inferiority, in the nuclear weapons field without really being aware of this. The full extent of the Soviet military build-up was now much more widely recognised in the UK and this would enable the Government to spend more on defence. The fact remained that NATO has no counter to the SS20 missile. The Government would be considering the question of a successor to the UK Polaris force. The Prime Minister asked Chancellor Schmidt if his position was that the FRG would not agree to the stationing of any new nuclear systems on her soil.

Chancellor Schmidt replied that if the Alliance were to decide that it would be necessary to have long-range ground-launched missiles as part of the TNF modernisation programme, the FRG could not agree to these being stationed only on Federal German soil. It would not be sufficient that these missiles might be stationed in the UK as well since nuclear weapons with the capacity to reach moscow had always been deployed on British territory. It was essential that the FRG should not be the only non-nuclear power to have these weapons on her territory. Turning to the neutron bomb, Chancellor Schmidt said that he would like Lord Carrington and Mr. Pym to study exactly what had happened during that episode. He suggested that they should have a private talk with their German opposite numbers. Chancellor Schmidt added that he was not entirely persuaded by Mr. Pym's preference for allowing the high level group to reach its decisions on TNF modernisation before an integrated decision was attempted: and Lord Carrington agreed that Foreign Ministers had to be involved from the arms control aspect also.

It was noted that Mr. Pym and Herr Apel would meet in Brussels on 14 May: and it was agreed that both Mr. Pym and Lord Carrington would remain in close touch about these matters with their opposite numbers.

Chancellor Schmidt repeated if the outcome of TNF was proposals for deploying GLCMs or Pershing IIs this must be an Alliance

/decision and

decision and if Germany was to be involved in deployment she would want another non-nuclear weapon state involved also. No MRBMs under NATO control had been stationed on European soil since the late 1950s/early 1960s: they had been scrapped by the agreements between President Kennedy and Mr. Kruschev and Europe had thus had two decades without them. This reinforced the need to pay very close attention to the public opinion aspects of the question. The Soviet Union would do its best to arouse European opinion against the reintroduction of ground-launched missiles, just as it had done with such success on the neutron bomb issue.

The Prime Minister agreed that the psychological battle was of great importance. The climate of opinion had now improved in the UK and, she thought, in the US: there had, however, been no such improvement in Belgium.

The discussion then turned to the political aspects of East/West relations.

11 May 1979

Defence 10

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

B/F when 'X' is received. [illegible] 16/5

15 May 1979

pa [illegible] 16/V

Dear Bryan

In your letter of 10 May you asked for a draft reply to President Carter's message to the Prime Minister on SALT II on 9 May. I enclose a draft agreed by the Ministry of Defence. This draws on the press line approved by the Prime Minister and amplified in your letter of 14 May.

Now however that the Prime Minister has received a more substantive letter from President Carter (sent to us under cover of your further letter of 14 May), covering SALT and a number of other international issues, the Prime Minister may prefer to respond to both messages in one single reply. We shall be letting you have a draft reply to President Carter's second message by 17.00 hours on Thursday 17 May.

See: - USA May '79 (US/UK Relations)

X/

Yours ever

Michael

M J Richardson
Private Secretary to the
Lord Privy Seal
(Sir Ian Gilmour)

B G Cartledge Esq
No 10 Downing Street

DSR 11

SECRET

Registry No.

DRAFT

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To:-

From

Telephone No. Ext.

Department

DRAFT MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO PRESIDENT CARTER VIA CABINET OFFICE CHANNELS

Thank you very much for your message of 9 May on SALT. It was most useful to have this advance notice of your announcement. As you may have heard, we have welcomed it and the resolution of the remaining outstanding issues.

I should like to send you my warm congratulations on bringing to a successful conclusion seven arduous years of negotiation on such a complex and important subject. Peter Carrington and I look forward to discussing the agreement with Cyrus Vance next week and to seeing the final document as soon as it can be made available to us. Meanwhile I wish you well in your forthcoming talks with President Brezhnev and in your efforts to bring the ratification process to a satisfactory end.

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

TW

cc HO D/T
LCO
HMT Defence
MOD
LPO
LPSO

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

6/F 18.5.79

14 May 1979

Dear George,

SALT: The Government's Public Reaction

The Prime Minister has seen the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary's minute (PM/79/43) of 11 May about the public response which the Government should make to the announcement of the US/Soviet Summit and signature of the SALT II agreement.

The Prime Minister has noted the formulation suggested by Lord Carrington in paragraph 8 of his minute, the first sentence of which reflects the press line which the Prime Minister has already approved. The Prime Minister has no objection to the subsequent statement that the Government "have long supported efforts to achieve strategic arms limitation". The Prime Minister is not, however, happy with the statement which follows, to the effect that "SALT II is an important step on the long road to a more stable and peaceful world": the Prime Minister is not yet fully persuaded that this statement is true. The Prime Minister has made no comment on the final sentence of the formula in paragraph 8 of Lord Carrington's minute. The Prime Minister recalls, in addition, that at her press conference with Chancellor Schmidt on 11 May she expressed the hope that the SALT II treaty, which has taken a long time to come to a conclusion, will be ratified; the Prime Minister would not object if any public comment were to repeat this hope. The Prime Minister would, however, prefer to avoid - at any rate for the time being and until the final text of the agreement has been studied - an unqualified expression of welcome for the SALT II agreement as such.

The Prime Minister has taken particular note of the statement in paragraph 6(a) of Lord Carrington's minute that if SALT II were to be rejected the Soviet Union would probably possess by the late '80s about 3,000 strategic weapons systems, including SS16s and with 30 MIRVs to each of their SS18s. The Prime Minister would like to know the provenance of this assessment. She has commented that if it is correct it is difficult to see why the Soviet Union is so pleased with the SALT II agreement. I should be grateful for advice.

I am sending copies of this letter to the Private Secretaries to the other members of OD and to Martin Vile (Cabinet Office).

Yours ever, Brian Cartledge.

G.G.H. Walden, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET

9

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1
Telephone 01-~~930 7022~~ 218 2111/3

SECRET

14th May 1979

MO 11/9/4

NBPM
14/5

Dear Bryan,

SALT: THE GOVERNMENT'S PUBLIC RESPONSE

The Defence Secretary (who was unable to attend OD today) has seen the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary's minute to the Prime Minister of 11th May.

Mr Pym welcomes Lord Carrington's proposal to circulate a draft to OD on the substance of SALT II, and in this connection he notes that one aspect of the agreement which will be of very particular concern to the UK, will be whether the non-circumvention provisions will impede the provision of any nuclear technology we might subsequently wish to acquire from the United States.

Mr Pym is content with the terms of the public reaction to SALT II which Lord Carrington proposes in his 8th paragraph.

I am sending a copy of this letter to George Walden, the Private Secretaries to the other members of OD, and Martin Vile (Cabinet Office).

Yours sincerely,

(D B OMAND)

B G Cartledge Esq

SECRET

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18

Ref A09543

PRIME MINISTER

Prime Minister
In the light of these minutes, can you agree to the formula proposed by Lord Carrington, with the addition proposed by Sir John Hunt at "X" below?
TPL
11/5

SALT

1. In his minute of 11 May 1979 the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary says that he would like to discuss briefly at the meeting of OD arranged for 11.30 am on Monday 14 May what the Government's immediate public line on SALT II should be. He promises a more substantive paper on the Agreement for a subsequent meeting of the Committee.

2. I know you have reservations about whether the Americans have struck a good bargain in SALT II and there are indeed aspects of it which worry officials. But I am convinced that whether or not the Americans could have stuck out for more, this SALT II is better than no SALT II. Do we need however to take a public line (with all your reservations) on an Agreement to which we are not a party and for which we have no responsibility? You heard what Chancellor Schmidt said this morning. President Carter has gone out of his way to make it clear that he expects his major allies to give him their support: otherwise the lack of this will be exploited by his opponents in the Senate. He cannot of course demand this support from a new Government, since you are not bound by what Mr Callaghan said at Guadeloupe. Nevertheless I do believe that, particularly after you have gone out of your way to stress your support for the Alliance, he would much resent it if we alone of the Allies appeared to stand aside, and that this could prejudice his attitude to matters where we want his help (in particular the deterrent and also Rhodesia).

No - other than the hope it will be ratified as I said at the press conference.

3. The question then is how to find a form of words which will be sufficiently warm for Alliance purposes and yet avoid trouble domestically. On the whole I think Lord Carrington's formula does this: it calls

See overleaf note.

SALT II "an important step" but makes it clear that we are not committed to the small print. The only question is whether it would be worth adding a last sentence saying "we shall of course be ready to join in consultations about the next steps in this process" (This would be forthcoming in tone but also signal that we shall have close interests and views to express on SALT III).

JOHN HUNT

I don't like the sentence I have marked

MT

11th May 1979

7

PM/79/43

PRIME MINISTER

SALT: THE GOVERNMENT'S PUBLIC RESPONSE

1. Now that the US/Soviet Summit has been announced for 15 June, SALT II is attracting considerable public attention and we will come under pressure to declare our attitude. You and I will be seeing Secretary Vance on 21 and 22 May and he will no doubt urge us to give SALT II a warm welcome. At the end of the month I am attending the NATO Ministerial meeting in The Hague, where the Americans are likely to press for the support of their Allies over the SALT agreement.

2. I know that you have doubts about aspects of SALT II. We all agree, President Carter included, that it is not a perfect agreement. But I feel strongly that public support for the agreement is desirable for reasons of important national interest.

3. SALT ratification is President Carter's top priority for 1979. Alliance attitudes will be a key factor in the outcome. Among the Allies, our own view is crucial both because of our nuclear expertise and because we are known to be well informed about SALT. Our public reactions will therefore be closely scrutinised, by the US Administration, by our Allies, by the Soviet Union, and by US public opinion. Even a neutral reaction will harm President Carter's position. There are signs that our initial response has been interpreted as cool by the Americans, as well as the Italians and French.

4. Our public attitude to SALT II will therefore set the tone for our relations with the American Administration. If it is felt that we are adding to the President's difficulties, it could seriously affect US attitudes on issues of crucial importance to us (Polaris replacement, Africa, etc).

5. Our attitude will also have implications for relations with our other allies. Chancellor Schmidt and President Giscard have already welcomed SALT II. Our smaller allies are, for the most part, even more enthusiastic. Many face domestic problems over

/theatre

theatre nuclear force (TNF) modernisation and have indicated that this can go ahead only in the context of continuing progress in arms control, of which SALT II is the corner-stone. For us to hold back alone would set us at odds with the rest of the Alliance.

6. Finally, we need to bear in mind not only the pluses and minuses of SALT II as it stands, but also the consequences if SALT II is rejected. These fall under five headings:

(a) The Soviet strategic build-up will continue unchecked. By the late '80s they will probably have about 3,000 systems (compared with the 2,250 SALT ceiling), including SS16 (banned in SALT), with 30 or so MIRVs to each of their SS18s (compared with 10 under SALT). On past form, they would also probably develop three or four new types, compared with only one permitted in SALT II;

Where comes this assessment? If correct - why are the Soviets so keen with SALT II?

(b) East/West relations will be less manageable at a time when the Soviet Union is increasingly powerful and when a new Soviet leadership is emerging;

(c) US defence expenditure will have to be diverted to strategic competition and this could be at the expense of NATO's Long-Term Defence Programme for conventional forces;

(d) Verification of Soviet programmes will be more difficult, since there will be no restriction on Soviet interference in American "national technical means" of verification or on the Soviet use of coded testing for their new systems;

(e) Other arms control negotiations will be set back, in particular MBFR and our hopes of negotiating restrictions on SS20 and Backfire in future stages of SALT.

7. We shall of course want to take a closer look at the final detail of SALT II in deciding our position, and I propose shortly to circulate a further paper for discussion in OD. This paper will deal with the impact of the non-circumvention article on our own future plans and will suggest how we might respond when SALT II is signed, and the line we should take in the Alliance.

/8.

8. Meanwhile I believe it is essential for the sake of our wider foreign policy and defence interests that our attitude to SALT II should not be open to misinterpretation. I suggest that, for the moment, our public reaction should be on the following lines:

> "We are glad that the SALT II negotiations have progressed far enough for a summit to take place between President Carter and President Brezhnev and welcome the settlement of major outstanding issues. We have long supported efforts to achieve strategic arms limitation and believe that SALT II is an important step on the long road to a more stable and peaceful world. It touches on important British and Alliance interests and we look forward to examining the details of what has finally emerged."

9. If you, or other colleagues, see difficulties with this line, perhaps we could discuss the matter briefly in OD on Monday.

10. I am sending copies of this minute to all colleagues on OD, and Sir John Hunt (Cabinet Office).

C

(CARRINGTON)

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

11 May 1979

With the compliments of

Pa
Bin
1/76

DEFENCE DEPARTMENT

FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
LONDON, SW1A 2AH

197

RECORD OF A BREAKFAST MEETING BETWEEN THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH AFFAIRS AND THE MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY AT THE CARLTON TOWERS HOTEL ON FRIDAY 11 MAY AT 8.30 AM

Present:

The Rt Hon The Lord Carrington PC

Mr G H Walden

His Excellency Herr Hans-Dietrich Genscher

Mr H-G Petersmann

Interpreter

SALT/MBFR/TNF

1. Herr Genscher emphasised the importance of the SALT Agreement. The effect on East/West relations if it were rejected by Congress would be very bad. We should help the Americans to secure ratification of the Treaty. We were all free to comment, as Congress would, on certain aspects of SALT II, but our overall interest lay in detente. What was important was to ensure that special European interests were taken into account in SALT III.

2. In the MBFR negotiations one of the main Eastern motives was to impose an inferior status on German forces. Given the role of the Bundeswehr in the defence of Western Europe, its numerical strength, and the strategic position of Germany, this was not only a matter for the Germans, but for the Alliance as a whole. It was vital to preserve the principle of collectivity and of parity. In Vienna we would need stamina and perseverance. There were voices in Germany and in Western Europe as a whole who were constantly urging the injection of new ideas into the negotiations. This only encouraged the Russians to play it long. For that reason he felt it was important to work out a common alliance position in the negotiations. He gathered that the Americans and Russians would discuss MBFR during their Summit, in the hope of giving the negotiations a new impulse. The Western position must be coordinated before the Summit. We should also take account of the French who remained adamantly opposed to MBFR.

3. Reverting to SALT, Lord Carrington asked whether the Germans thought that the terms of the Agreement were equitable. Herr Genscher said that he thought they were. On SALT III Lord Carrington said that the Americans seemed to want to retain the right to keep the negotiations bilateral. Herr Genscher said that this was not exactly his impression. The Americans wanted to preserve a certain exclusivity in SALT, but the European interest was being increasingly recognised. Lord Carrington said that he did not think that the Americans were neglecting our interests, but that they would not want us in the negotiations.

/4.

4. Herr Genscher said that the British and German situations were different, in that the United Kingdom was a nuclear power. But our basic interests were the same. He attached great importance to the new Special Group set up within NATO on the arms control aspects of theatre nuclear forces (TNF). The purpose of this group was to ensure that arms control initiatives on grey areas could proceed in parallel to studies on TNF modernisation. The High Level Group on TNF modernisation was proceeding well. The problem was that the basic Soviet position was that, wherever they felt inferior they tried to establish parity and to push negotiations ahead. In fields where they were superior, however, they wanted to freeze the situation and play it long. Lord Carrington agreed. In MBFR, while we must clearly be seen to be trying to achieve progress, we must retain our sense of reality. Herr Genscher said that he was sometimes accused of being a disenchanted idealist. If this meant that he had learned from experience, he was not sorry to have had these experiences.

Distribution:

Private Secretary
PS/Lord Privy Seal
PS/Mr Hurd
PS/PUS
Sir A Duff
Sir A Parsons
Mr P Moberly
ACDD
Mr R L L Facer (PS/Defence Secretary)
Mr B Cartledge (No 10)

Chanceries:

Bonn
Washington
UKDEL NATO
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Moscow

the UK to take any particular action but it was obvious that the political and psychological impact if the UK were to enter the EMS at an early date would be considerable and would have an effect on other issues. The Prime Minister said that she certainly hoped that this would be the case. It might be difficult to reach a decision in advance of the exchange rate review in September. In the meantime, Strasbourg would be an important occasion for the Government to set out its different strategy to the Community and this would be done.

International Questions

The Prime Minister asked the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary to report on his discussions with Herr Genscher. Lord Carrington said that he and Herr Genscher had exchanged views, over breakfast, about the UK's approach to the EEC, the Berlin question, NATO forces and defence issues. Herr Genscher had told him about his recent visit to Spain and of the Spanish interest in reaching a solution of the problem of Gibraltar; this would have to be tackled in the context of Spain's accession to the EEC. He and Herr Genscher had discussed Southern Africa; he had told Herr Genscher of the Government's commitments on Rhodesia and that they had not yet decided on the method of their approach to a resolution of the problem. Herr Genscher had expressed the view that the problems of Namibia and Rhodesia were closely related. There had also been an exchange of views on SALT II and SALT III and they had agreed that SALT III would be vital to the interests of Europe. There had been some discussion of MBFR and the latest Soviet approach to the Americans about the negotiations. Herr Genscher had raised the question of a possibly adverse Soviet reaction, in the context of Berlin, to the European Elections. The Middle East had been discussed in general terms.

Herr Genscher said that he had nothing to add to Lord Carrington's summary of their talk.

Chancellor Schmidt said that he would like to say a word about the attitude of the two governments to the ratification of SALT II. Despite some private criticisms and some misgivings,

/the Federal

the Federal Government would be careful not to allow these to come into the open and would give President Carter every assistance in his fight for ratification. Chancellor Schmidt said that he believed that if President Carter were to lose this battle, trust and confidence between the Soviet and American leaderships, which had already been diminished in recent years, would be further damaged. This could have an undesirable effect on the Soviet leadership and particularly, given Brezhnev's ailing health, on a new Soviet leader. If the United States Senate were to refuse ratification, after so many years of negotiation to which three US Presidents had been committed, a change of climate in East/West relations could result. There would be less eager or positive comments on SALT II from Paris but, the Chancellor thought, French reactions would not be negative. So far as SALT III was concerned, he expected that the French would stick to the line of refusing to participate in any aspect of these negotiations which could affect the national interests of France.

There followed a discussion of a number of questions concerning nuclear weapons. It was agreed that the Defence Secretary and the Federal Minister of Defence, Herr Apel, would have a private meeting in Brussels on 14 May to pursue these matters further.

East/West Relations

At the Prime Minister's invitation, Chancellor Schmidt said a few words about the Federal Government's approach to East/West relations. Chancellor Schmidt said that his Government's position was that they should endeavour energetically to reduce tension with the Soviet Union and her allies but on the basis of continuous Soviet awareness that the Alliance was strong enough to deter aggression or to defend itself if aggression were committed. This could be achieved by maintaining a credible balance of forces. The coalition government in Bonn, and the Chancellor and Herr Genscher personally, could be relied upon to adhere firmly to their policy of doing everything necessary to maintain the defences of the FRG at an effective level, but without entering the nuclear field and without

/enlarging

CONFIDENTIAL

CR 140

CONFIDENTIAL
FM FCO 111555Z MAY 79
TO IMMEDIATE MOSCOW
TELNO 227 OF 11 MAY
INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON, MODUK (DS11, DSC6, DPSC)

Enlu
14/5

MY TELNO 459 TO WASHINGTON: COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN NEGOTIATIONS
1. PLEASE SPEAK AS SOON AS POSSIBLE TO THE RUSSIANS, PREFERABLY TIMERBAEV, ON THE FOLLOWING LINES. IT IS UNLIKELY THAT THE NEW GOVERNMENT WILL HAVE COMPLETED CONSIDERATION OF CTB, INCLUDING THE QUESTION OF NATIONAL SEISMIC STATIONS (NSS), BEFORE 21 MAY. WE ARE NOT PROPOSING A POSTPONEMENT OF RESUMPTION OF NEGOTIATIONS BUT WE HOPE THAT THE RUSSIANS WILL UNDERSTAND THAT WE SHALL NOT BE ABLE TO OFFER VIEWS ON NSS ON BRITISH TERRITORY AT THE OUTSET. WE HAVE SPOKEN SIMILARLY TO THE AMERICANS AND UNDERSTAND THEY ARE NOT THINKING OF PROPOSING A DELAY IN RESUMPTION.
2. PLEASE ADD THAT EDMONDS LOOKS FORWARD TO SEEING PETROSYANTS IN GENEVA.

CARRINGTON

FILES
ACDD
DEFENCED
NAMD
EESD
LEGAL ADVISERS
PLANNING STAFF
PS
PS/SIR I GILMOUR
PS/MR HURD
PS/PUS
SIR A DUFF
SIR A PARSONS
MR BULLARD
MR PH MOBERLY

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Prime Minister

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FOLLOWING FROM ROBINSON

OUR TELNO 1052:SALT

1. WE HAVE COME ACROSS A NUMBER OF FURTHER INDICATIONS OF THE ADMINISTRATION'S ANXIETY ABOUT HMG'S LIKELY POSITION ON OR PUBLIC REACTIONS TO THE SALT 2 AGREEMENT IN THE LAST TWO OR THREE DAYS. THIS ISSUE SEEMS INCREASINGLY LIKELY TO BE THE MOST IMPORTANT SINGLE ISSUE FOR THE ADMINISTRATION, AND FOR CARTER PERSONALLY, IN THEIR FIRST CONTACTS WITH HMG. THE POINT HAS BEEN MADE, FIRMLY BUT FOR THE MOST PART WITHOUT AGGRESSIVITY, THAT THERE COULD BE FAR-REACHING DAMAGE TO HMG'S RELATIONS WITH THIS ADMINISTRATION IF THIS ISSUE IS ALLOWED TO GO WRONG. IT SEEMS LIKELY TO BE PARAMOUNT ON THE AMERICAN SIDE WHEN VANCE IS IN LONDON ON 21/22 MAY.

2. IN OUR TELNO 989 (NOT TO ALL), COMMENTING ON THE OUTLOOK FOR US FOREIGN POLICY, WE UNDERLINED THE CLOSE CONNECTION BETWEEN THE SALT DEBATE AND THE PRESIDENT'S RE-ELECTION PROSPECTS, WITH THE ATTITUDES OF AMERICA'S NATO ALLIES PLAYING AN IMPORTANT AND PERHAPS CRUCIAL PART IN THE WASHINGTON DEBATE. WITH THE NEGOTIATIONS OVER AND THE SUMMIT NOW APPROACHING, PRESIDENT CARTER'S TOTAL PERSONAL COMMITMENT TO SALT IS BEING PUT ACROSS IN INCREASINGLY APOCALYPTIC TERMS. HE TOLD A PUBLIC MEETING YESTERDAY QUOTE I HAVE ONLY ONE LIFE TO LIVE ON THIS EARTH .... I THINK THE MOST IMPORTANT SINGLE ACHIEVEMENT THAT COULD POSSIBLY TAKE PLACE FOR OUR NATION DURING MY LIFETIME IS THE RATIFICATION OF THE SALT TREATY THAT WE HAVE JUST NEGOTIATED WITH THE SOVIET UNION .... REJECTION OF THIS TREATY .... WOULD BE A MASSIVE DESTRUCTIVE BLOW TO WORLD PEACE. UNQUOTE

3. AT GUADELOUPE IN JANUARY PRESIDENT CARTER OBTAINED VALUABLE SUPPORT FOR SALT FROM THE MAJOR EUROPEAN ALLIES. HE IS BANKING ON THIS SUPPORT REMAINING FIRM. YOU MAY HAVE GOT A FLAVOUR OF THIS DURING YOUR VISIT TO WASHINGTON IN FEBRUARY. THE CHANGE OF GOVERNMENT IN BRITAIN HAS LED THE ADMINISTRATION TO BECOME EVEN MORE SENSITIVE TO THE POSSIBILITY THAT PRESIDENT CARTER'S OPPONENTS ON SALT MIGHT SEEK TO EXPLOIT AUTHORITATIVE BRITISH VIEWS AGAINST HIM AS EVIDENCE OF ALLIED DISQUIET. SOME RECENT BRITISH PRESS REACTIONS ARE LIKELY TO FEED ANXIETIES HERE. STATEMENTS ABOUT SALT BY HMG WILL BE SCRUTINISED WITH WHAT MAY SOMETIMES SEEM EXAGGERATED CARE BY

THE AMERICANS IN ASSESSING THE NEW BRITISH GOVERNMENT'S ATTITUDE. BUT THE ANXIETY RUNS DEEP, ESPECIALLY BUT CERTAINLY NOT EXCLUSIVELY AMONG THE PRESIDENT'S IMMEDIATE ADVISERS: THE INCIDENT REPORTED IN MY TELNO 1051 IS ONE EXAMPLE. (IN THIS CONTEXT CAREFUL CONSIDERATION WILL HAVE TO BE GIVEN TO REQUESTS FROM US VISITORS, PARTICULARLY SENATORS, FOR MEETINGS WITH UK MINISTERS AND OFFICIALS TO DISCUSS EUROPEAN ATTITUDES TO SALT: OUR TELNO 1052 IS A CASE IN POINT.)

4. PROBLEMS OF SUBSTANCE APART (NOTABLY THOSE RELATING TO NON-CIRCUMVENTION), THE AMERICANS HAVE, FOR DOMESTIC POLITICAL REASONS, INTRODUCED COMPLICATION FOR THEMSELVES FROM THE PROCEDURAL ANGLE. SINCE FEBRUARY THEY HAVE BEEN PRESSING THE UK AT THE OFFICIAL LEVEL TO TAKE THE LEAD IN DRAFTING LANGUAGE FOR THE PUBLIC NATO RESPONSE TO SIGNATURE ON SALT 2 WHICH THEY ENVISAGE WOULD BE MADE AT A NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL A WEEK OR TWO AFTER THE SUMMIT. WE SHOWED THEM A POSSIBLE DRAFT, AD REFERENDUM TO MINISTERS, ON 2 MAY, WHILE EXPLAINING OUR OWN INEVITABLE CONSTRAINTS. BUT WHILE THE AMERICANS HAVE BEEN ANXIOUS TO SET THE WHEELS TURNING WITHIN THE ALLIANCE AND TO START PRE-COOKING THAT LANGUAGE AT AN EARLIER MEETING OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL TO TAKE PLACE ABOUT A FORTNIGHT BEFORE THE SUMMIT, THEY HAVE AT THE SAME TIME DECLINED TO MAKE THE FULL TEXTS OF THE SALT AGREEMENT AND RELATED DOCUMENTS AVAILABLE TO THE ALLIES BEFORE THESE ARE SENT TO CONGRESS (PROBABLY A DAY OR TWO AFTER SIGNATURE AT THE SUMMIT). WE HAVE REPEATEDLY REMINDED THE AMERICANS THAT, HOWEVER GOOD THE ORAL BRIEFINGS THEY HAVE GIVEN US, THE ABSENCE OF FULL SALT TEXTS SETS A LIMIT TO THE DEGREE OF PUBLIC SUPPORT OR PREPARATORY WORK FOR IT THAT THE EUROPEAN ALLIES CAN GIVE. THIS DERIVES NOT FROM AN ABSENCE OF GOODWILL, BUT FROM THE DIFFICULTY OF SAYING PUBLICLY WE SUPPORT AN AGREEMENT WHICH WE MUST ADMIT TO NOT HAVING SEEN. THE AMERICANS PROFESS TO UNDERSTAND THIS BUT IN PRACTICE THEY ARE SLOW TO DRAW THE THE CONCLUSION THAT EITHER THE TEXTS MUST COME TO US SOONER OR PUBLIC SUPPORT AND WORK TO THAT END MAY BE DELAYED. THE ENSUING HIATUS RISKS MISGIVINGS ON EACH SIDE ABOUT THE MOTIVES OF THE OTHER.

JAY

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PS/SIR I. GILMOUR
PS/MR HURD
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PS/PUS
SIR A. DUFF
SIR A. PARSONS
MR BULLARD
MR P. MOBERLY
MR LEAHY
MR FERGUSSON

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION:
SALT

GR 345

CONFIDENTIAL
FM WASHINGTON 111345Z MAY 79
TO IMMEDIATE F C O
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1070 OF 11 MAY, 1979,
INFO PRIORITY MOSCOW, MODUK (DS11, DSC6, DPSC).

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YOUR TELNO 459: CTB NEGOTIATIONS.

1. WE SPOKE BY TELEPHONE TO DAVIES YESTERDAY AS INSTRUCTED. LATER AMBASSADOR YORK (LEADER OF THE U S CTB DELEGATION) AND DAVIES ASKED US TO CALL AT ACDA TO DISCUSS MATTERS FURTHER.

2. THE BURDEN OF WHAT THEY HAD TO SAY (NEIDLE, EINHORN AND FINCH WERE ALSO PRESENT) WAS THAT IT WOULD BE UNFORTUNATE IF NEGOTIATIONS WERE TO RESUME ON 21 MAY WITHOUT SOME PROSPECT OF RENEWED MOMENTUM. AT PRESENT THE BRITISH POSITION ON NSS WAS BEING USED BY THE RUSSIANS TO PREVENT DISCUSSION OF OTHER ISSUES TO WHICH THE AMERICANS ATTACHED IMPORTANCE. CONTINUED STALEMATE WOULD BE LIKELY TO SOUR THE ATMOSPHERE BADLY. WHATEVER THE REFERENCE TO CTB AT THE CARTER/BREZHNEV SUMMIT (AND THEY CONCEDED IT COULD PROBABLY BE NO MORE THAN A CALL FOR PROGRESS IN GENERAL TERMS) THERE COULD NOT BE MUCH HOPE OF CARRYING NEGOTIATIONS FORWARD IN PRACTICE SO LONG AS THE BASIC OBSTACLE REMAINED. THEY ENQUIRED WHETHER THE U K INTENDED TO PROPOSE A DELAY IN RESUMPTION AT GENEVA (THEY THEMSELVES DID NOT).

3. WE SAID YOU WERE NOT PROPOSING POSTPONEMENT. WE URGED THE AMERICANS NOT TO GET THINGS OUT OF PERSPECTIVE. THE NEW BRITISH GOVERNMENT HAD TO BE ALLOWED TIME TO ADDRESS A NUMBER OF PRESSING FOREIGN POLICY ISSUES, INCLUDING CTB. WE HAD THOUGHT IT RIGHT TO INFORM THE AMERICANS THAT MINISTERS MIGHT NOT HAVE TIME TO COMPLETE THEIR REVIEW OF CTB BEFORE 21 MAY SINCE THIS OBVIOUSLY HAD A BEARING ON THE TIMING OF US/UK BILATERAL CONSULTATIONS. NO MORE SHOULD BE READ INTO IT THAN THAT. WE SAID THAT WHEN YOU SEE VANCE ON 21/22 MAY, YOU WOULD DOUBTLESS BE INTERESTED TO HEAR FROM HIM ABOUT HOW THE

ADMINISTRATION SAW CTB IN RELATION TO ITS OTHER PRIORITIES, WHAT IF ANYTHING IT WOULD BE REASONABLE TO EXPECT FROM THE SUMMIT AND THE PREFERRED TIMETABLE FOR NEGOTIATIONS THEREAFTER. THIS WOULD BE VALUABLE IN HELPING MINISTERS TO REVIEW THE U K POSITION. IN THE MEANTIME THERE SEEMED TO BE NO REASON WHY THE ATMOSPHERE IN GENEVA SHOULD BE SOURED, PARTICULARLY WITH THE MEETING BETWEEN PRESIDENT CARTER AND MR BREZHNEV IN PROSPECT.

JAY

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LEGAL ADVISERS
PLANNING STAFF
PS
PS/LPS
PS/MR HURD
PS/PUS
SIR A DUFF
SIR A PARSONS
MR BULLARD
MR P H MOBERLY
MR FERGUSSON
MR EDMONDS
CABINET OFFICE

COPIES TO:

~~MR CARTLEDGE, NO 10 DOWNING STREET~~
DR R PRESS, CABINET OFFICE
MRS ALEXANDER, TREASURY

SECRET

6

Defence

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1
Telephone 01-~~XXXXX~~ 218 2111/3

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M/S Mtg Thurs.

MO 12/2/5

11th May 1979

Prime Minister

This is in response to the queries you raised in your original CTB brief. Best regs.

Dear Bryan,

COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN (CTB)

The Prime Minister may be interested to have the views of Ministry of Defence officials on the points made in your letter of 8th May to Martin Vile.

It has always been recognised that it is technically impossible to verify that the terms of a truly comprehensive test ban are not being evaded. There will always be a detection threshold below which any country could cheat without any real risk of being found out. The seismic monitoring system at present deployed by the Americans is proven to be capable of detecting, with at least 90% confidence, Soviet nuclear tests conducted underground in hard rock at yields in excess of 800 tons. Improvements planned for this system and the addition of National Seismic Stations (NSS) in the Soviet Union would, it is estimated, reduce this threshold to about 300 tons. The equivalent detection thresholds for explosions conducted in soft rock are 10 times higher, ie 8 kilotons and 3 kilotons respectively. They have to be increased yet further if underground explosions are carried out in a way which reduces the seismic signals, ie by decoupling using an underground cavity, or which masks the seismic signals ie by hiding the explosion signal in that from an earthquake occurring at roughly the same time and place. Taking these evasion possibilities into account, the broad estimate of Western verification capability is that it can give a

/ high ...

B G Cartledge Esq.,
10 Downing Street

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high probability of detecting clandestine tests above a yield level of a few tens of kilotons.

Should a country decide to cheat, it would have to set an upper limit on the yield for a clandestine test taking into account its uncertainties about the verification capabilities of deployed detection systems and the safety factor required to be sure of escaping detection. With this in mind, if the Russians decided to cheat, it is assessed that they would not do so above a few kilotons, perhaps 10 kilotons at maximum, even with the use of evasion techniques; but naturally much depends upon the Russian assessment of the consequences of being found out.

It is a joint United States/United Kingdom technical assessment that it would be certainly possible to maintain the reliability and safety of the existing Western nuclear weapon stockpiles in the long term if underground nuclear testing up to a limit of 5 kilotons were permitted, and it is possible that 3 kilotons would be sufficient. The indications, based on our intelligence of Soviet nuclear warhead designs obtained from their pre-1963 atmospheric testing programme and, latterly, on intelligence about their nuclear delivery systems, are that a 5 kiloton test limit could be too low for their potential stockpile maintenance purposes. A limit of say between 15 and 30 kilotons might be required by them.

In the light of the above, the MOD view is that the West's deployed seismic detection capability, if augmented by 10 NSS in the Soviet Union, would be adequate for verifying a three-year CTB Treaty. But, for a Treaty of longer duration an increased verification capability would be required. MOD has also advised that a suspension of all testing for a three year period would not entail a significant risk to the viability of the UK's nuclear weapon stockpile.

The concept of permitted experiments is based on the essential consideration that, during a CTB, the skilled

/ manpower ...

manpower in the Defence nuclear programme must be kept competent not only for stockpile maintenance reasons but also to permit a resumption of warhead development and production if and when the ban ceased. One route for this purpose is through a programme of very low nuclear yield experiments. In addition there is a requirement for civil nuclear experiments in aid of power generation research. In particular, there is a defence and a civil interest in laser fusion research. Nuclear experiments up to 100 lb yield would provide the freedom that is required in this context and technically there would be no advantage in increasing the yield to 500 lb or even to several tons. There are some Americans who suggest that work directly useful for stockpile maintenance might be carried out at 300 ton yields, but, as stated in paragraph 4, confidence in Western stockpile maintenance could at present only be assured with tests up to 3 to 5 kilotons. If testing at these levels were allowed, then the test ban would clearly be not a comprehensive but a threshold test ban.

From a purely technical point of view, MOD would prefer a threshold Treaty at the 3 to 5 kiloton level. Under such a Treaty, it would be possible to conduct a programme of nuclear tests aimed at investigating how the problems of stockpile maintenance could be solved with a reducing threshold. But for wider reasons it was decided to seek a comprehensive Treaty but one with a strictly limited duration because of potential stockpile problems. In the light of the assessment in paragraph 4, MOD would not seek a threshold of 10 or more kilotons because this might be to the advantage of the Russians. A threshold Treaty at 3 to 5 kilotons could, moreover, be adequately verified without the need for NSS.

The Americans intend to institute a so-called "Safeguards Programme" during the currency of a CTB. The aim of this programme will be to maintain the whole range of US nuclear weapon expertise, including the ability to resume underground nuclear testing immediately a test ban lapses.

/ MOD ...

MOD envisages a similar programme for the UK nuclear establishments and has had informal exchanges with the Americans on the types of "safeguards" that would be required. Technical opinions in the US and UK run along very similar lines and the Americans have shown considerable interest in adopting a joint approach to the common problem. Of special interest to the UK would be a co-operative agreement which would allow us access to American facilities for permitted nuclear experiments during a test ban.

An additional important question is the degree to which a CTB on the present lines would restrict our options for a new strategic nuclear deterrent to succeed Polaris/Chevaline. A definitive answer must await decisions on the type of successor system, if any, required. But the candidate which would pose us the most difficult problem is the warhead for a MIRV-d submarine launched missile. In this case, the choice for UK production would lie between copying an appropriate US design, a design depending on a device scheduled for testing in mid-1980, and a design based on a device already tested. It would not be possible to buy a US-manufactured warhead because this is prohibited by US law. The feasibility of copying a US design cannot be assessed until the design details are released to us by the US; but there would be problems in duplicating the advanced fabrication techniques already used in the US for their warheads and confidence in the UK production route could be low if it were not proven by nuclear testing.

For warhead designs based on UK devices, we would rely upon results already obtained from nuclear testing and those from tests which are scheduled. The aim of the two most recent UK tests and that scheduled for August 1979 is to provide information on very small and hard warhead designs suitable for MIRV-d systems but with a nuclear yield lower than that desired. A further successful test in mid-1980 should enable a full yield requirement for a successor system warhead to be met. Of course, if a CTB entered into

/ force ...

force in say 1981 and lasted for no more than three years, then a new area of possibilities opens up in that nuclear testing for a successor system could resume in 1985. Even so, the window into which tests could be fixed and still meet a requirement to replace Polaris/Chevaline at the end of its operational life in the early 1990s would be narrow, but might be met.

I am sending copies of this letter to George Walden (Foreign and Commonwealth Office) and Martin Vile (Cabinet Office).

Yours sincerely,

Roger Facer

(R L L FACER)

CONFIDENTIAL

VLB

FILE

10 DOWNING STREET

cc MOD
CO

From the Private Secretary

10 May 1979

BF ~~15/5/79~~

SALT II

I should have included in my letter to you of 9 May, with which I enclosed the text of President Carter's message to the Prime Minister about SALT II, a request for advice on a reply which the Prime Minister might send to the President.

I should be grateful if the draft of a reply to President Carter, agreed with the MOD, could reach me by 1700 on Tuesday, 15 May.

I am sending copies of this letter to Roger Facer (MOD) and Martin Vile (Cabinet Office).

B. G. CARTLEDGE

G. G. H. Walden, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CONFIDENTIAL

GB

PS TO PM

GR 100

UNCLASSIFIED
FM FCO 101815Z MAY
TO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON
TELNO 470 OF 10 MAY
INFO PRIORITY UKDEL NATO, UKDEL VIENNA, PARIS, BONN,
UKMIS NEW YORK
ROUTINE OSLO COPENHAGEN THE HAGUE BRUSSELS ROME ATHENS ANKARA
LUXEMBOURG OTTAWA.

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SALT: INITIAL GOVERNMENT REACTION

1. IN COMMENTING ON THE ANNOUNCEMENT THAT SALT II HAS BEEN COMPLETED, NEWS DEPARTMENT TODAY TOOK THE FOLLOWING LINE.

BEGINS
QUOTE WE ARE GLAD THAT PROGRESS ON SALT II HAS GONE FAR ENOUGH TO PERMIT THE LONG-AWAITED SUMMIT MEETING TO TAKE PLACE, AND WE WELCOME THE SETTLEMENT OF THE MAJOR OUTSTANDING ISSUES. THE GOVERNMENT WILL OF COURSE STUDY THE FINAL TEXT OF THE AGREEMENT WHEN IT IS AVAILABLE, AND ITS IMPLICATIONS. THE GOVERNMENT WILL ALSO HAVE AN OPPORTUNITY TO DISCUSS ALL ASPECTS OF THE AGREEMENT WITH AMERICANS, ESPECIALLY DURING THE FORTHCOMING VISIT OF SECRETARY VANCE TO LONDON. UNQUOTE. ENDS.

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PS|MR RIDLEY
PS|PUS
SIR·A·DUFF
SIR·A·PARSONS
MR BULLARD
MR·P·H·MOBERLY
MR FERGUSSON

ADDITIONAL DISTN
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FM WASHINGTON 101432Z MAY
TO IMMEDIATE FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1052 OF 10 MAY 1979
INFO PRIORITY MODUK FOR DUS(P)

MYTELS NOS 984 AND 1026: SALT AND SENATOR GARN.

1. SENATOR GARN'S OFFICE TELEPHONED US AGAIN TODAY, WITH REFERENCE TO THE EARLIER CONTACTS VIA PROFESSOR MARTIN AND MICHAEL QUINLAN (MOD) (YOURTEL NO 448).
GARN'S OFFICE EXPRESSED INTEREST IN A VISIT TO LONDON BY SENATOR GARN AROUND MID-JUNE TO TALK ABOUT SALT, GREY AREAS, TNF MODERNISATION AND THE UNITED STATES AND WESTERN DEFENCES IN GENERAL. GARN'S OFFICE ALSO INITIALLY CLAIMED TO BE SPEAKING FOR SENATOR NUNN BUT SUBSEQUENTLY ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THE POSITION FOR NUNN WAS AS DESCRIBED IN PARA 1 OF MYTEL NO 1026.

2. IN ANSWER TO OUR QUERY THEY CONFIRMED THAT SENATOR GARN WOULD WISH TO COME ON HIS OWN INITIATIVE AND WOULD NOT BE REPRESENTING ANY WIDER BODY OR GROUP WITHIN THE SENATE. HIS OFFICE THOUGHT HE WOULD PROBABLY WISH TO ASK FOR MEETINGS WITH YOU, THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR DEFENCE , AND MICHAEL QUINLAN, AS WELL AS OUTSIDERS SUCH AS PROFESSOR MARTIN. HE WOULD ALSO HOPE FOR A BRIEF MEETING WITH THE PRIME MINISTER. GARN'S OFFICE ADDED THAT THE SENATOR (WHO WOULD NOT BE VISITING OTHER WESTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES AT LEAST ON THIS TRIP) WOULD BE EXPECTING QUOTE A LITTLE HELP FROM THE EUROPEANS UNQUOTE IN STANDING UP AND SPEAKING OUT ON SALT, SO THAT THERE SHOULD NOT BE QUOTE ROOM FOR COERCION FROM MOSCOW UNQUOTE. THIS IS OF COURSE CONSISTENT WITH SENATOR GARN'S OUTSPOKEN PERSONAL OPPOSITION TO SALT 2.

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/ 3. THIS

3. THIS REQUEST CARRIES WITH IT A RISK IN TERMS OF HMG'S RELATIONS WITH THE ADMINISTRATION ON WHICH I AM COMMENTING SEPARATELY. IN THIS PARTICULAR CASE OUR ADVICE WOULD BE AGAINST RECEIVING SENATOR GARN AT MINISTERIAL LEVEL, IF HE DOES NOT COME ACCOMPANIED BY SENATOR NUNN OR OTHER MEMBERS OF THE SENATE.

JAY

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PS/MR HURD
PS/PUS
SIR I. GILMOUR
PS/MR RIDLEY

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SIR A. PARSONS
MR BULLARD
MR P.H. MOBERLY
MR FERGUSSON

Mr Goulden, Defence Dept

SALT

As I explained to you on the telephone, the draft press line you proposed on SALT was put to No 10 immediately, in view of the time factor.

The Prime Minister said that she would like our response to be somewhat warmer:

> "We are glad the progress on SALT II has gone far enough to permit the long-awaited summit meeting to take place, and we welcome the settlement of the major outstanding issues. The Government will of course study the final text of the agreement when it is available, and its implications."
>
> [Changes underlined.]

I gather that the Prime Minister commented that, whatever our private reservations about SALT, we should avoid displaying these publicly.

(G G H Walden)

9 May 1979

cc:- PS/Mr Hurd
PS/PUS
Sir A Duff
Mr Moberly
Mr Gillmore
Mr Melhuish
Mr Thomas, News Dept

2

GRS 750A

Prime Minister

CONFIDENTIAL
DESKBY 100830Z
FM UKDEL NATO 091520Z MAY 79
TO IMMEDIATE FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
TELEGRAM NUMBER 53 OF 9 MAY 1979,
INFO IMMEDIATE MODUK, PRIORITY WASHINGTON, MOSCOW.

TELECON HAWTIN/JANVRIN: NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL, 9 MAY: SALT BRIEFING.

1. AT TODAY'S MEETING OF THE COUNCIL ON EAST/WEST RELATIONS, TAPLEY BENNETT (IS) SAID THAT AT 3PM WASHINGTON TIME TODAY BROWN AND VANCE WOULD ANNOUNCE THAT PRESIDENT CARTER AND MR BREZHNEV WOULD MEET ''IN THE NEAR FUTURE'' TO SIGN THE SALT II AGREEMENT. THE DATE AND PLACE OF THE SUMMIT MEETING WOULD BE DECIDED SHORTLY, POSSIBLY THIS WEEK. HE THEN OUTLINED A PROGRAMME OF FUTURE COUNCIL BRIEFINGS ALONG EXPECTED LINES. HE CONCLUDED BY SAYING THAT AFTER SIGNATURE OF THE TREATY THE US WOULD WELCOME FORMAL ALLIED SUPPORT. IN THE INTERIM THE US HOPED THE ALLIES WOULD WELCOME US-SOVIET AGREEMENT AND NOTE THE POSITIVE CONTRIBUTION THIS MADE TO ALLIANCE SECURITY AND EAST-WEST RELATIONS.

2. BARRY, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE IN CHARGE OF SOVIET AND EASTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS, SUBSEQUENTLY DESCRIBED THE US APPROACH TO THE SUMMIT. THE US WISHED TO AVOID THE PATTERN SET BY PREVIOUS SUMMIT MEETINGS. APART FROM THE SALT AGREEMENT ITSELF, THEY WOULD EMPHASISE THEIR MODEST EXPECTATIONS OF THE MEETING. THEIR INTENTION WAS TO AVOID AMBITIOUS STATEMENTS WHICH COULD UNDERMINE THE RATIFICATION PROCESS BY INCREASING PUBLIC SCEPTICISM ABOUT RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION. THE US DID NOT EXPECT MUCH FROM BREZHNEV PERSONALLY OR TO OBTAIN NEW INSIGHTS INTO SOVIET THINKING. MEETINGS BETWEEN PRESIDENT CARTER AND BREZHNEV WOULD HAVE TO BE SHORT AND CAREFULLY PRE-PLANNED, IN VIEW OF BREZHNEV'S HEALTH. THE US WOULD DETERMINE THE SUBJECTS TO BE INCLUDED IN THE AGENDA IN THE LIGHT OF THE CONTRIBUTION THEY MIGHT MAKE TO THE RATIFICATION PROCESS. AT PRESENT, THEY ENVISAGED THREE ELEMENTS:

A) OTHER ARMS CONTROL ISSUES, IN PARTICULAR SALT III, THOUGH DISCUSSION ON THE LATTER COULD ONLY BE IN GENERAL TERMS. MBFR AND NON-PROLIFERATION WOULD PROBABLY FIGURE ALSO.

/ B) A GENERAL

B) A GENERAL SURVEY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS COVERING THE MIDDLE EAST, INDO-CHINA, CSCE, AND PERHAPS NORTH/SOUTH ISSUES, IN WHICH THE US OBJECTIVE WOULD BE TO PLACE THEIR VIEWS ON RECORD.

C) BILATERAL ISSUES, OF WHICH THE MOST IMPORTANT WAS THE MFM ISSUE, THOUGH THE ADMINISTRATION HAD NO INTENTION OF ATTEMPTING TO DO AWAY WITH THE JACKSON-VARNIK AMENDMENT.

IN KEEPING WITH THEIR DESIRE TO PLAY THE MEETING IN LOW KEY, THE US WOULD WISH TO AVOID A MULTIPLICITY OF DOCUMENTS AND ENVISAGED ONLY A STRAIGHT-FORWARD COMMUNIQUE. HOWEVER, THIS MIGHT NOT ACCORD WITH SOVIET WISHES.

3. BARRY ADDED THAT HOWEVER LIMITED ITS RESULTS IN AREAS OTHER THAN SALT, THE CARTER-BREZHNEV MEETING WOULD BE IMPORTANT. ALTHOUGH THERE WAS NOTHING NEW WHICH SUGGESTED THAT BREZHNEV'S DEPARTURE WAS IMMINENT, THE MEETING WOULD PLACE US/SOVIET RELATIONS ON A MORE STABLE BASIS AND THEREBY DEMONSTRATE THE BENEFITS OF CO-OPERATION BETWEEN THE TWO POWERS TO BREZHNEV'S SUCCESSORS.

4. TURNING TO THE RATIFICATION PROCESS, BARRY SAID THAT VERIFICATION INCLUDING THE NEED TO COMPENSATE FOR THE LOSS OF INTELLIGENCE SITES IN IRAN, WOULD BE AKEY ISSUE IN THE SENATE. SOVIET BEHAVIOUS IN THE THIRD WORLD WOULD ALSO FIGURE PROMINENTLY, HOWEVER MUCH THE ADMINISTRATION PLAYED DOWN LINKAGE. IT WAS NECESSARY TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE POSSIBILITY THAT THE SENATE MIGHT SO AMEND THE AGREEMENT AS TO MAKE IT UNACCEPTABLE TO THE RUSSIANS. THERE WAS ALSO A SLIGHT POSSIBILITY THAT THE AGREEMENT MIGHT BE REJECTED OUT-OF-HAND. BOTH THE US AND THE SOVIET UNION WERE REFLECTING ON THESE POSSIBILITIES. INDEED, SOVIET PRONOUNCEMENTS HAD GONE SOME WAY TOWARDS PREPARING THE SOVIET PUBLIC FOR POSSIBLE FAILURE.

5. BARRY WENT ON TO SAY THAT IF THE SALT PROCESS WAS BROUGHT TO A HALT THIS WOULD ALMOST CERTAINLY OBSTRUCT PROGRESS IN OTHER ARMS CONTROL FORA. IT WOULD ALSO WEAKEN CONSTRAINTS ON SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE THIRD WORLD: MIGHT COMPEL THE US TO DEVOTE GREATER RESOURCES TO ITS STRATEGIC FORCES THEREBY REDUCING THOSE AVAILABLE FOR CONVENTIONAL ARMAMENTS: COULD ADVERSELY INFLUENCE THE THINKING OF

/ A NEW SOVIET

A N[illegible] SOVIET LEADERSHIP: AND FINALLY WOULD GIVE THE SOVIET UNION A MAJOR PROPAGANDA ADVANTAGE IN THE FIELD OF ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT. THUS THE US FELT THAT THE SALT II AGREEMENT SHOULD BE JUDGED BOTH ON THE CONTRIBUTION TO WESTERN SECURITY AND ITS IMPACT ON EAST/WEST RELATIONS IN GENERAL.

6. IT WAS AGREED THAT ONCE THE ANNOUNCEMENT HAD BEEN MADE AT WASHINGTON THE SECRETARY GENERAL WOULD CONFIRM TO THE PRESS THAT THE COUNCIL HAD BEEN BRIEFED.

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SIR A PARSONS
MR BULLARD
MR P H MOBERLY
MR FERGUSSON

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FILE DS

bc: Mr. Henry James

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

9 May 1979

Dear George,

SALT

As I told you on the telephone this afternoon President Carter sent a message to the Prime Minister over the hot line this afternoon to give her advance notice of the forthcoming announcement in Washington that the United States has reached agreement with the Soviet Union on all significant outstanding issues in the SALT II Treaty.

I enclose a copy of the text of President Carter's message, which the Prime Minister has seen.

As I also mentioned to you, the Prime Minister considers that our Press line on the Washington announcement should be to the effect that the Government is glad that progress on SALT II has now reached the point at which a Summit Meeting will be possible and the Government welcomes the settlement of the major outstanding issues in the negotiation. The Government will of course study the agreement (when the final text is available) and its implications.

I am sending copies of this letter and enclosure to Roger Facer (Ministry of Defence) and Martin Vile (Cabinet Office).

Yours ever,

Brian Cartledge.

George Walden, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CONFIDENTIAL

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CONFIDENTIAL

bc. Mr. Harry James

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

9 May 1979

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As I told you on the telephone this afternoon President Carter sent a message to the Prime Minister over the hot line this afternoon to give her advance notice of the forthcoming announcement in Washington that the United States has reached agreement with the Soviet Union on all significant outstanding issues in the SALT II Treaty.

I enclose a copy of the text of President Carter's message, which the Prime Minister has seen.

As I also mentioned to you, the Prime Minister considers that our Press line on the Washington announcement should be to the effect that the Government is glad that progress on SALT II has now reached the point at which a Summit Meeting will be possible and the Government welcomes the settlement of the major outstanding issues in the negotiation. The Government will of course study the agreement (when the final text is available) and its implications.

*

I am sending copies of this letter and enclosure to Roger Facer (Ministry of Defence) and Martin Vile (Cabinet Office).

Yours ever,

Brian Cartledge.

* The original version read: "The Government is glad that progress on SALT II has now reached the point at which the Summit can take place. The Govt. will need time to study the text and its implications".

George Walden, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CONFIDENTIAL

T3/79T

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T3/79T

AND MATE LETS TRY AGAIN

Prime Minister

I shall ask FCO and MOD for advice on a reply.

GH
9/5

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FM THE WHITE HOUSE
TO PRIME MINISTER THATCHER
ZEM
S E C R E T VIA CABINET OFFICE CHANNELS WH91075

MAY 9, 1979

TO: THE RIGHT HONORABLE MARGARET THATCHER
10, DOWNING STREET
LONDON

DEAR MADAM PRIME MINISTER:

THIS AFTERNOON AT 3:00 P.M., WASHINGTON TIME, WE WILL ANNOUNCE THAT WE HAVE REACHED AGREEMENT WITH THE SOVIET UNION ON ALL THE SIGNIFICANT OUTSTANDING ISSUES IN THE SALT II TREATY. DURING THE NEXT FEW WEEKS, THE FINAL DETAILS OF THE TREATY WILL BE COMPLETED IN GENEVA. WE ALSO EXPECT TO ANNOUNCE IN THE NEAR FUTURE THE TIME AND PLACE OF MY MEETING WITH PRESIDENT BREZHNEV, AT WHICH THE SALT II TREATY WILL BE SIGNED.

I WANTED YOU TO KNOW ABOUT THIS ANNOUNCEMENT IN ADVANCE, BECAUSE OF THE IMPORTANCE TO THE UNITED KINGDOM AND THE ALLIANCE OF THE SALT II AGREEMENT, AND BECAUSE OF OUR CLOSE COLLABORATION ON STRATEGIC AND EAST - WEST ISSUES.

I AM CONVINCED THAT THIS IS A GOOD AGREEMENT, WHICH FULLY PROTECTS BOTH U.S. AND ALLIED INTERESTS. I WILL ENSURE THAT YOUR GOVERNMENT RECEIVES DETAILS ON THE MOST RECENT POINTS OF AGREEMENT, AS WELL AS THE FULL TEXT OF THE TREATY AS SOON AS IT IS COMPLETED. IN THE NEXT FEW WEEKS, WE WOULD LIKE TO HAVE FURTHER CONSULTATIONS WITH YOU -- AND WITH THE FULL ALLIANCE -- BOTH ON THE TREATY AND ON STATEMENTS WE WILL MAKE AT THE TIME IT IS SUBMITTED TO THE SENATE.

IT WILL BE PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT FOR ME TO HAVE YOUR OWN PERSONAL VIEWS ON THE SALT II TREATY. AS YOU KNOW, THE POSITION TAKEN BY YOUR GOVERNMENT WILL BE VERY IMPORTANT DURING THE SENATE DEBATE, AND ANY SUPPORT YOU CAN GIVE TO THE TREATY WILL BE OF GREAT HELP IN ENSURING ITS RATIFICATION.

I AM VERY MUCH LOOKING FORWARD TO SEEING YOU IN TOKYO.

WITH BEST REGARDS,

END OF PAGE 01

SINCERELY,
JIMMY CARTER

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Original in Master Set.

NOTE FOR THE RECORD

Extract from :—

CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER, THE FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH SECRETARY AND THE LORD PRIVY SEAL IN 10 DOWNING STREET ON 8 MAY 1979 AT 1230

CTB

The Prime Minister said that it was essential to allow the continuation of nuclear tests of up to 10 ktns. Lord Carrington pointed out that the treaty currently under negotiation would only last for three years. The Prime Minister commented that during the last 18 months of a test ban treaty, everybody planned to resume tests: there was therefore no point in having a CTB at all. The Russians could decouple their nuclear test explosions in underground caverns and it was impossible to distinguish seismic from nuclear explosions. Moreover, it was necessary to carry out periodic tests of nuclear stockpiles. The Prime Minister said she would like to have a full technical brief on this matter.

Lord Carrington pointed out that the UK would wish in due course to secure a successor to Polaris and would need American help: if we pursued a policy unpalatable to the Americans on CTB, this might adversely affect the Polaris question. In further discussion, it was agreed that the reference in The Queen's Speech to a "total" ban on nuclear tests should be reworded.

SECRET

4 file JKS Defence

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

8 May 1979

COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN

The Prime Minister has seen the note prepared by officials for incoming Ministers on the comprehensive test ban negotiations. The Prime Minister has made the general comment on the paper that she is unhappy and concerned over this issue. The Prime Minister has made the following specific comments on the paper:-

Para. 4. The Prime Minister has commented that it is not surprising that the Russians have claimed to want a CTB, given that they can test small explosions without detection.

Para. 6. The Prime Minister has expressed the view that the 100 lb limit on small nuclear experiments is too ~~small~~ low. On the same paragraph, the Prime Minister has commented that the UK must not give way on the question of nuclear experiments and should work to exclude from the Treaty much bigger tests than so far envisaged, since the Russians have the capability of decoupling their test explosions by using underground caverns.

Para. 8. The Prime Minister has noted that the Americans would like the review conference to consider the introduction of a threshold of 3 kt below which testing could be resumed: the Prime Minister has commented that the threshold should be 10 kt.

Para. 11. On the question of National Seismic Stations, the Prime Minister has commented that the Soviet Union can arrange for testing to take place during a period of seismic disturbance. The Prime Minister has also made the general comment that the Russians will make comprehensive preparations for a resumption of testing so that their testing programme can continue as soon as the CTB Treaty comes to an end, with the consequence that the West will be left behind.

I am sending copies of this letter to George Walden (Foreign and Commonwealth Office) and Roger Facer (Ministry of Defence).

M.J. Vile, Esq.,
Cabinet Office.

B. G. CARTLEDGE

SECRET

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

8 May 1979

SALT

The Prime Minister has seen the paper prepared by officials for incoming Ministers on the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks. The Prime Minister has made the following comments on the paper:

Paragraph 3(i):

The Prime Minister has expressed doubts over the statement that the requirements placed on SALT II by the deterrence strategy of the Alliance are satisfied by SALT II's provisions.

Paragraph 3(iii):

The Prime Minister has expressed the view that it is vital that the Protocol to SALT II should not be renewed.

Paragraph 3(iv):

The Prime Minister is not convinced by the statement that the constraints imposed by SALT II mean that the Soviet Union is able to undertake fewer strategic military programmes than would otherwise by the case. She takes the view that the Russians have taken care to ensure that these constraints represent the ceiling of their actual capacities.

Paragraph 8:

The Prime Minister has expressed doubts over the statement that the rejection of SALT II would set back the process of arms control and undermine the possibility of restraining Soviet theatre nuclear forces in the future.

The Prime Minister has made the general comment that, despite these reservations about SALT II, she will do nothing and say nothing which could undermine the authority of the President of the United States of America.

I am sending copies of this letter to George Walden (FCO) and Roger Facer (MOD).

B. G. CARTLEDGE

Martin Vile, Esq.,
Cabinet Office.

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MY TEL. 861
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11/5.

1. STATE DEPARTMENT ASKED US TO CALL TODAY TO BRIEF US ON CERTAIN US/SOVIET EXCHANGES ON MBFR WHICH HAVE NOW LEAKED AND ARE TO BE THE SUBJECT OF AN ARTICLE IN TOMORROW'S NEW YORK TIMES BY RICHARD BURT.

2. PALMER (PM/DCA) SAID THAT IN THE CONTEXT OF PREPARATIONS FOR THE SUMMIT THERE HAD OVER THE PAST MONTH OR SO BEEN EXCHANGES IN WASHINGTON WITH THE RUSSIANS DURING WHICH THE LATTER HAD RAISED IDEAS ABOUT PROGRESS ON MBFR VERY SIMILAR TO THOSE PUT FORWARD ON A PERSONAL BASIS RECENTLY BY TARASOV TO DEAN IN VIENNA. THE AMERICANS WERE STILL TRYING TO DETERMINE WHETHER THE RUSSIANS WERE SERIOUS, BOTH SIDES HAD ENTERED MANY CAVEATS, AND THE TALKS WERE ESSENTIALLY EXPLORATORY. THE AMERICANS HAD MADE IT VERY CLEAR THAT THEY WOULD HAVE TO HAVE DISCUSSIONS WITH THE ALLIES BEFORE THEY COULD TAKE ANY FIRM POSITION AND AS IN VIENNA HAD INSISTED THAT NO NEW APPROACH TO MBFR WAS LIKELY TO BE ACCEPTABLE THAT DID NOT ADDRESS THE PROBLEM OF DATA.

3. PALMER CHARACTERISED THE MAIN ELEMENTS IN THE SOVIET IDEAS AS FOLLOWS:

(A) US AND SOVIET PHASE I MANPOWER REDUCTIONS PROPORTIONATE TO THEIR OVERALL NUMERICAL STRENGTH IN THE AREA, WITH THE IMPLICATION THAT NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD CENTRE ON A FIGURE LYING BETWEEN THE CURRENT EASTERN AND WESTERN POSITIONS:

(B) US AND SOVIET REDUCTIONS IN THOSE ARMAMENTS THAT CAUSED CONCERN TO EACH SIDE. IT SEEMED TO BE ASSUMED THAT FOR PHASE I THIS MEANT CUTS IN US NUCLEAR WARHEADS AND SOVIET TANKS. DISCUSSION OF NUMBERS HAD NOT BEEN PRECISE, BUT WAS CONSISTENT WITH ABOUT A THOUSAND SOVIET TANKS AND PERHAPS EVEN (THOUGH THIS WAS UNCLEAR) LEAVING OUT THE OTHER TWO ELEMENTS (PERSHINGS AND F-4S) OF OPTION III:

(C) OTHER DIRECT PARTICIPANTS WOULD UNDERTAKE MANPOWER REDUCTIONS IN PHASE II APPROXIMATELY PROPORTIONATE. TO PRESENT FORCE LEVELS IN THE NGA UNTIL THE COMMON CEILING WAS REACHED. THEY WOULD NOT HAVE TO AGREE IN PHASE I TO SPECIFIC SIZES FOR THEIR REDUCTIONS IN PHASE II, BUT IT SEEMED TO BE ASSUMED THAT EACH OF THE OTHER DIRECT PARTICIPANTS WOULD IN PRACTICE FREEZE THE LEVEL OF THEIR FORCES AT THE TIME OF A PHASE I AGREEMENT

/(D) THE

(D) THE PHASE I AGREEMENT WOULD LAPSE AFTER TWO TO THREE YEARS IF NO PHASE II AGREEMENT HAD BY THEN BEEN NEGOTIATED:
(E) THE EAST WOULD BE READY TO CONSIDER ASSOCIATED MEASURES.

4. PALMER SAID THAT SOME PARTS OF ALL THIS WERE UNCLEAR, WHILE SOME PARTS WHICH WERE CLEAR DID NOT APPEAR TO MEET WESTERN INTERESTS. BUT THE AMERICANS FELT IT WAS RIGHT TO EXPLOIT THE OPPORTUNITY PRESENTED BY THE SUMMIT TO TEST RUSSIAN POSITIONS AND IN PARTICULAR TO SEE WHETHER THERE WAS A PROSPECT OF BREAKTHROUGH ON DATA IN THE NEAR FUTURE. THE AMERICANS HAD THEREFORE TOLD THE RUSSIANS THAT WHILE SOME OF THESE POINTS MIGHT PERHAPS PROVE WORKABLE, THEY NEEDED TO KNOW FIRST WHETHER THE RUSSIANS WOULD AGREE:
(A) TO RESOLVE THE DATA PROBLEM, AT LEAST BY AGREEING IN EACH PHASE ON ALL THE DATA NEEDED FOR THAT PHASE AND,
(B) THAT THERE SHOULD BE FULL AGREEMENT IN PHASE II ON DATA COVERING ALL EASTERN AND WESTERN ACTIVE DUTY PERSONNEL IN THE AREA BEFORE REDUCTIONS TO THE COMMON COLLECTIVE CEILING.

5. PALMER ADDED THAT IF IN THEIR CONTINUING DISCUSSIONS THE RUSSIANS SHOWED SERIOUS INTENT THE AMERICANS WOULD WISH TO DISCUSS ALL THIS FURTHER WITH US. INSOFAR AS MBFR MIGHT FEATURE AT THE SUMMIT, HE THOUGHT (FROM WHAT THEY HAD HEARD FROM THE FRENCH ABOUT GISCARD'S VISIT TO MOSCOW) THAT THE OUTCOME WOULD HAVE TO BE PRE-ARRANGED AND NOT DEPENDENT ON DISCUSSION THERE WITH BREZHNEV.

6. THE STATE DEPARTMENT ARE CALLING IN LATER TODAY OTHER WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS AND KEY NATO EMBASSIES FOR A SIMILAR BRIEFING AND BENNETT WILL SPEAK ON THE SAME LINES IN NATO TOMORROW. IN ANSWER TO OUR QUERY, PALMER SAID THAT THE AMERICANS HAD IN ANY CASE INTENDED TO VOLUNTEER THIS BRIEFING TO US AND THE GERMANS, BUT THE IMMINENT APPEARANCE OF THE BURT ARTICLE HAD PRECIPITATED ACTION AND HAD LED THEM TO DECIDE THEN TO INCLUDE THE OTHER ALLIES (WHO ARE OF COURSE SO FAR UNAWARE OF THE TARASOV/DEAN EXHCANGES).

JAY

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Ref. A09463

PRIME MINISTER

Comprehensive Test Ban

You will of course know that since July 1977 the United Kingdom has participated in negotiations with the United States and the Soviet Union for a multilateral comprehensive test ban treaty. Much of the treaty has already been agreed tripartitely, but there are a few outstanding and important issues still to be settled, including especially problems relating to verification.

2. I attach a note describing the current state of play in the negotiations and indicating the problems which remain to be resolved. It has been prepared by a small group of officials under Cabinet Office chairmanship and is for information only. Further submissions will be made as and when decisions are required by Ministers.

3. It is convenient to mention one related point at this stage. Difficult scientific and technical questions arise over e.g. stockpile reliability and safety in the absence of testing (see paragraph 7 of the attached note): and we have felt the need for some independent source of advice in addition to that provided by the experts in the Ministry of Defence. Accordingly a small panel of eminent outside scientists was established a few months ago under the chairmanship of Lord Penney to advise on such nuclear weapons matters as might be referred to it.

4. Copies of the attached note are being given to the incoming Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary and the Secretary of State for Defence: but it will not have any wider circulation until you decide whether you wish sensitive matters of this kind to be handled in the Defence Committee or in a smaller group. I will let you have a separate submission on this when your main appointments have been made.

JOHN HUNT 4/5

COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN NEGOTIATIONS

The United States, the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom have been engaged since July 1977 in negotiations in Geneva on a multilateral Comprehensive Test Ban (CTB) Treaty, to be supplemented by a Separate Verification Agreement (SVA) between the three of them. The greater part of the multilateral treaty has been agreed, but much of the SVA has still to be negotiated.

United Kingdom Objectives

2. Since the Partial Test Ban Treaty was concluded in 1963, the United Kingdom has supported the aim of making the ban comprehensive, by extending it to cover underground tests. This objective is widely shared in the international community. The non-nuclear powers see a CTB as a necessary demonstration of the nuclear weapon states' commitment to nuclear arms control, as a counterpart to their own renunciation of nuclear weapons.

3. The United Kingdom's main objectives in seeking a CTB, which are shared by the United States Administration, are to curb the qualitative development of nuclear weapons without adversely affecting Western security; and to help prevent their proliferation to more countries. The first of these objectives should be met, provided the CTB is properly verified and provided no safety or reliability problems arise in the existing weapons stockpile which are beyond our capability to solve without nuclear testing. The second objective requires the kind of treaty which will attract the adherence of key non-nuclear weapon states, such as India and Pakistan, that have kept open the nuclear weapons option by not adhering to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. This is an aspect to which we have attached special importance since there is disquieting intelligence about the extent to which Pakistan in particular is pressing ahead with a nuclear weapons programme.

Soviet Motives

of course - they can test small explosions without detection.

4. The Russians have long claimed to want a CTB. When President Carter proposed negotiations on assuming office they readily agreed. They share our interest in non-proliferation, and they probably see a CTB as contributing to the process of detente. We have to recognise that no CTB is totally verifiable and we must therefore seek to reduce to a minimum the possibility for the Russians to gain military advantages by cheating (see paragraphs 9-11 below).

The Scope of the Treaty

5. It has been agreed in the negotiations that the multilateral treaty should ban all nuclear tests in all environments. A protocol, which would form an integral part of the treaty, is to provide for the cessation of peaceful nuclear explosions (PNE). The Russians earlier in the negotiations wanted to exempt PNE, which they argued were necessary in the development of the Soviet economy. But the United States and United Kingdom insisted that PNE should cease, since in their development the same basic technology as nuclear warheads is used and they would inevitably confer military benefits.

6. The Americans intend during a CTB to continue very small nuclear experiments (of yields below 100 lb in TNT equivalent) in order to maintain their technical capability. Such experiments are not nuclear tests in the accepted sense of the term and therefore in our view would not detract from the comprehensiveness of the treaty. The United Kingdom will have similar requirements but no decisions have been taken on any British programme of experiments. Experiments of these very small yields cannot be used to test weapons in the stockpile or to develop new weapons. The Americans will probably want the Russians to accept some understanding that such experiments will not fall within the treaty prohibitions. But the Russians are likely to resist because they can conduct them without detection and see no need for any understanding. This difficult point has yet to be settled.

The Duration of the Treaty

7. The United States and United Kingdom originally proposed unlimited duration. This position was changed in order to take account of possible problems in maintaining the safety and reliability of their stockpiles of nuclear weapons indefinitely without testing. On United States initiative all parties are now negotiating on the basis that the treaty will have an initial duration of three years as advocated by the Russians from the start. But the United Kingdom has made clear that it would have preferred an initial duration of five years, as a greater inducement to non-nuclear weapon states.

8. It is envisaged that during the final year there will be a review conference of the parties to the treaty to consider what should happen on expiry of the initial period. The Americans want the conference to be able to consider all options, including not only the lapsing or extension of the

10 kt required.

SECRET

treaty, but also its modification, eg by the introduction of a threshold of, say, 3 kt below which testing could be resumed. The Russians insist that the conference should consider only the question of extending the treaty and that this should depend on whether non-parties - ie France and especially China, neither of whom can be expected to adhere to a CTB for the foreseeable future - are conducting tests. The United Kingdom has supported the United States position which would enable us to decide in the light of all the relevant considerations (including the state of our nuclear stockpiles) what should happen after the initial period. In particular we attach importance to keeping the possibility of extension open, so as not to prejudice the chances of adherence to the treaty by key non-nuclear weapon states. This has so far proved an intractable issue.

Verification

9. The multilateral treaty will provide for parties to use their national technical means for verifying the compliance of others with the Treaty; and for an international exchange of data from seismic monitoring stations in many countries. It will also give each party the right to request an on-site inspection of another party's territory, if it has reason to suspect that a violation of the treaty may have occurred. The United States and United Kingdom at the start of the negotiations were still insisting that such inspection should be mandatory. But other means of verification, notably satellite monitoring, have been developed, so that inspection, while still important as a means of checking suspect events, is not as central to verification as in the past. We have accordingly accepted that inspection will be subject to the agreement of the inspected state.

10. In the case of the three negotiating states, these multilateral measures of verification will be supplemented by additional ones in the tripartite Separate Verification Agreement (SVA). This will make clear that refusal of a properly substantiated request for inspection under the SVA would be a serious political matter. It will also spell out the detailed arrangements for inspections between the three parties. We have proposed that the United Kingdom should have a special status in this connection: rather than exercising an independent inspection capability, we should be free to participate in United States inspections in the Soviet Union.

SECRET

They can answer the testing to take place during a seismic disturbance.

11. The most important provision of the SVA will be for high quality seismic monitoring installations, known as National Seismic Stations (NSS), to be located on Soviet, United States and British territory. The United States, with British support, is seeking 10 NSS in the Soviet Union, to be installed during the first two years of the treaty. These tamper-proof stations will augment the existing means of detecting, identifying and locating seismic events in the Soviet Union. It is estimated that United States national technical means of verification supplemented by 10 NSS in the Soviet Union would reliably detect seismic events (whether earthquakes or nuclear explosions) in the Soviet Union down to a yield between about 300 tons and about 3 kilotons (TNT equivalent) depending upon whether the event occurred in hard or soft rock. The network would positively identify a seismic event as an explosion (and not an earthquake) at yields three times those levels. This United States verification capability would deter attempts at evasion and have a high chance of detecting Soviet testing at large enough yields to advance nuclear warhead technology. The Russians might hope to get away with very small clandestine tests to check the safety and reliability of warheads in their stockpiles. But under a three year treaty this would be unlikely to bring them militarily significant advantages over the Americans.

No

They will get all the tests set up ready to go the moment the treaty ends and we shall be left behind.

12. The Russians have agreed to accept 10 NSS on condition that the United States and United Kingdom each does likewise. They have proposed that 9 of the United Kingdom stations should be in British dependent territories. They have refused to discuss the technical characteristics of NSS (which will govern their performance) and the timetable for installation until agreement is reached on numbers. The United States has accepted 10 NSS. The United Kingdom has agreed to one NSS in the United Kingdom itself (at Eskdalemuir in Scotland) but has maintained that there is no technical justification for NSS in United Kingdom dependent territories. We have argued that NSS are relevant only for monitoring large land masses and would add nothing to the capability of Soviet national technical means, such as satellite observation, to monitor our dependent territories. Moreover they would represent an addition to public expenditure and there may be difficulties over finding enough suitable sites in dependent territories. The Russians have countered that there is no technical case for NSS anywhere under a three year treaty; that they only accepted 10 NSS because they considered that this was a political requirement of the United States Administration (to make the CTB acceptable to Congress); and that it is

a Soviet political requirement that the United States and United Kingdom should accept "equal obligations". The Americans, at official level, have suggested to us that the present United Kingdom position could endanger the chances of securing the important breakthrough of 10 NSS in the Soviet Union and that we shall have to change it when the negotiations resume (scheduled for 21 May) if progress is to be made. This is another very difficult issue, which will be the subject of a separate submission.

Negotiating Timetable

13. The timetable for completion of the tripartite negotiations is likely to be determined largely by the time it takes to negotiate the details of NSS. That might involve several months of intensive discussion. Meanwhile the Russians recognise that, because arms control proposals are controversial in the United States, the Administration will not wish to reduce the chances of SALT II ratification by submitting a CTB treaty to the Senate before the latter has voted on SALT II.

14. There is no agreement yet on how the treaty should be handled once tripartite agreement has been reached. The Russians favour immediate signature by themselves, the Americans and ourselves. The United States and United Kingdom consider that there will be more chance of persuading key non-nuclear powers to adhere if they are given some part in the preparation of the treaty. We therefore envisage that the tripartite negotiations might be followed by a series of consultations about the resulting treaty with key non-nuclear powers. In the light of these, we would decide whether to sign the treaty or first to submit it for discussion - but not substantive amendment - to the 40-nation Committee on Disarmament in Geneva.

May 1979

Am very unhappy & suspicious about this

MT.

SECRET

Ref. A09462

PRIME MINISTER

Strategic Arms Limitation Talks

It is probable that the SALT II Agreement will be signed shortly at a Summit meeting between President Carter and President Brezhnev. This will be followed by a lengthy and controversial ratification debate in the United States Congress. The Government will need to take up a public position, both nationally and through the Alliance, soon after signature of the agreement. Separate advice will be submitted on the line we should take. Meanwhile I attach a background note which has been prepared by a small group of officials under Cabinet Office chairmanship on the content of the SALT II Agreement, and on the main issues which have arisen during the negotiations and are likely to affect our interests in SALT III.

2. Copies of this note are being given to the incoming Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary and the Secretary of State for Defence.

4/5

(John Hunt)

STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION TALKS

The SALT II Agreement is virtually complete and is likely to be signed soon at a summit between Presidents Carter and Brezhnev, although no date has yet been fixed. Thereafter there will be pressure for early governmental reactions. European statements on SALT II will be scrutinised very closely in the United States and will have an important bearing on relations with the Carter Administration and on the ratification process. Advice will be submitted separately about the line which might be taken publicly by Her Majesty's Government.

Content of the Agreement

2. The main provisions of SALT II are summarised at Annex. SALT II is an advance on the 1972 Interim Agreement in several important ways. It covers all types of strategic nuclear delivery systems. It imposes equal ceilings within each category. It limits certain new systems both in number and in kind. It also makes more detailed provision for verification.

General Criteria

3. For the Alliance as a whole SALT II is likely to be assessed under four general criteria.

i. The East/West balance SALT II codifies the "essential equivalence" in strategic arms between the super powers. It does not assume exact equivalence: the Soviet Union will retain its advantages in heavy missiles, throw-weight and "deliverable megatonnage", while the United States will still have more warheads (except possibly for a short time in the middle of the treaty period), greater accuracy and a more balanced spread between land, sea and air systems. The agreement provides a framework of limitations within which each side can develop its own strategic posture and which does not in itself confer an overall strategic advantage on either side.

ii. NATO strategy The Alliance's deterrence strategy places four main requirements on SALT II: that strategic sufficiency should be maintained; that the Alliance's ability to maintain an adequate theatre nuclear capability should not be impaired; that there should

continue to be credible linkage between strategic and theatre nuclear systems; and the continued effectivensss of the strategic and theatre nuclear elements of the deterrent triad, where survivability is one of the major considerations. In our judgement, these requirements are satisfied by the provisions of SALT II. But the United States Administration accept that they will need to improve their forces during the life of the treaty (see iii. below), and there are some special British and European interests which we shall wish to keep under review (see paragraph 4 below).

Doubtful.

iii. Future options The United States Administration consider that American strategic needs can be met fully within the SALT II framework. The agreement would allow the United States to develop and (after the Protocol expires at the end of 1981) to deploy a mobile ICBM to offset the problem of the vulnerability of its existing land-based missiles. It also permits the deployment of cruise missiles on aircraft with the proviso that those with a range greater than 600 km should be carried only on designated heavy bombers and should count against the agreed ceilings. The deployment, but not the testing and development, of ground and sea-launched cruise missiles with a range greater than 600 km is prohibited for the duration of the Protocol (this is especially relevant to the European Allies - see paragraph 4 below).

What that Protocol be not renewed.

iv. Arms control The SALT II cuts are modest: about 250 Soviet systems in all. But, in addition to tighter verification provisions, SALT II also bans certain new systems, limits the total number of MIRVs and restricts each side to one new ICBM. All of these constraints mean that the Soviet Union is able to undertake fewer strategic military programmes than would probably be the case in the absence of an agreement.

No - they have got as much as they could do.

Special British and European interests

4. In addition to these general criteria (which are of overriding importance to the United States as well as Europe) there are three issues of special concern to the Europeans. These have dominated our consultations with the United States on SALT II.

i. Transfers of systems and technology SALT II does not forbid the transfer to a third party of equipment or technology. But each side undertakes "not to circumvent the provisions of this agreement through any other State or States or any other manner". The United States will set out their interpretation of this clause in a unilateral statement after signature. This will state that the non-circumvention provision simply makes explicit the inherent obligation any State assumes when party to an international agreement and that it will not in practice interfere with continued United States nuclear co-operation with the Allies. In this connection we have sought and obtained confidential bilateral assurances from the Americans. In July 1977, they assured us that SALT II would not prevent the United States from meeting its obligations under the 1958 Defence Agreement and the 1963 Polaris Agreement; and that, under SALT II, new forms of United States assistance could be agreed in the future. In December 1978, the Americans clarified that the transfer of long range air-launched cruise missiles to the United Kingdom was not precluded in principle under SALT II. They have, understandably, emphasised throughout that any United Kingdom request for transfers would have to be dealt with in the light of circumstances at the time. These private assurances, although in theory not completely watertight, are substantial and should ensure that in practice the United States will be able to transfer systems and technology to meet our foreseeable needs. They have been reflected in a number of official public statements made in the United States (including one by President Carter on 20th February) that the agreement will permit the United States and the Allies to pursue all the defence programmes that may eventually be needed, including cruise missiles. There is one outstanding point on the proposed United States' public statement which has caused us difficulty and which we were trying to resolve in discussion with the Americans. A separate submission will be made on this.

ii. The Protocol Concern has been expressed that the United States will come under pressure to extend the Protocol limits on ground and sea-launched missiles and mobile ICBMs after 1981. The United States have, however, frequently assured us that the restrictions contained in the Protocol would lapse on its expiry.

Furthermore all the indications are that the United States takes seriously the freedom of choice which it will regain when the Protocol expires. It is spending over $200 million on ground and sea-launched cruise missiles this year and has budgeted $670 million for the development of a mobile ICBM next year. According to the State Department, any future limitation on these systems would require United States agreement and Congressional approval. Moreover, Alliance policy on long range theatre systems is being made (under active United States leadership) on the assumption that all types of cruise missile will be deployable from 1982 onwards.

iii. "Grey area" The Soviet Union has a growing advantage in the grey area between strategic systems covered by SALT II and battlefield nuclear systems. It is a source of concern for Western Europe, particularly the Federal Republic of Germany, that SALT II puts no limits on Soviet long range theatre systems, notably the SS20 missile and Backfire, which are targetted on Europe and are therefore strategic in European terms. They were excluded partly because they do not have a genuinely inter-continental range, but, more importantly, as a consequence of United States insistence which, with the support of the Alliance, has been maintained since SALT I, on excluding American theatre nuclear systems from the negotiations. It is expected that the Russians will press for such systems, together with British and French nuclear forces, to be included in SALT III. The Americans intend to state publicly that any future limitations on United States systems principally designed for theatre missions should be accompanied by appropriate limitations on Soviet theatre systems. Meanwhile a NATO Group of senior officials is studying what improvements are needed in NATO's long range theatre nuclear forces (TNF). The indications are that in its final report to Ministers in the autumn, the Group will recommend a mixture of cruise missiles (probably ground-launched) and a longer range

version of the Pershing ballistic missile launcher. In parallel with this a Special Group is considering possible arms control options for limiting Soviet long range theatre systems. This Group will also report in the autumn. It is hoped that Ministers will thus have a wide framework within which to take timely decisions about TNF modernisation.

5. Although we judge that British and European concerns have so far been adequately safeguarded in the SALT process, our interests will increasingly be at issue as future negotiations focus on deeper cuts and possibly on grey area systems. There will be a need for close consultation in the Alliance and for a clearer view of where our interests lie. We hope that the two NATO Groups referred to above will provide the basis for a stronger and more coherent European input.

The United States Ratification Debate

6. It is at present far from certain that President Carter will secure the two-thirds Senate majority needed to ratify SALT II. The position of the United States Administration would become even more difficult if, as seems increasingly likely, the issue becomes entangled with the 1980 Presidential elections. Much of the debate addresses technical questions such as verifiability, ICBM silo vulnerability and whether the United States can afford to allow the Soviet Union to retain the advantages that it has (eg in heavy missiles, throw weight and deliverable megatonnage). But it also coincides with a painful realisation that the United States has lost strategic superiority and must work hard to maintain parity with the Soviet Union during the 1980s. As a result, SALT II is being blamed for problems which have other causes and the issue is broadening into a critique of United States defence policy and of detente in general. But the signs are that the ratification debate, far from inducing complacency, is serving to alert the United States to the need for fresh efforts to preserve strategic stability.

Assessment

7. SALT II is a compromise which covers only a facet, albeit an important one, of East-West competition. It is ideal for neither side. For the West, its main limitations are that, while confirming a rough

equivalance in strategic systems, it will not change the existing and growing imbalance in long range theatre nuclear systems; that it sets a precedent for restraining one of the West's most promising answers to this problem - the cruise missile; and that it has only limited effect on the advances which the Soviet Union has made since SALT I in strategic programmes.

8. These problems would however not disappear if SALT II was rejected; some could be made worse. Rejection would, moreover, set back the process of arms control and would undermine the possibility of restraining Soviet theatre nuclear forces in the foreseeable future. It would rupture the consensus on strategic matters which has served the United States and the Alliance well over the last three decades, and would damage the credibility of United States' leadership. Moreover it would adversely affect the whole conduct of relations between the United States and the Soviet Union. It will therefore be very important that the Alliance is seen to give solid support to the Americans over SALT II. In any case there are positive advantages for the West in the new agreement. It will be seen to be compatible with Alliance strategy. It will largely preserve our own and the Alliance's nuclear options. It will help to reduce the vulnerability of United States ICBM silos. It should provide a useful, if by no means infallible, constraint on Soviet behaviour, especially in the post-Brezhnev era. Finally, it will avoid an all-out competition between the super powers in strategic systems.

Doubtful

I am less complacent - but will do nothing to say nothing to undermine the authority of the President.

MT.

May 1979

SALT II: THE BROAD OUTLINES

The Shape of the Agreement

1. The SALT II Agreement consists of three parts:

(a) A Treaty lasting until 31 December 1985.

(b) A Protocol expiring on 31 December 1981, which will cover a number of issues not included in the Treaty.

(c) A Joint Statement of Principles on subsequent SAL negotiations.

2. There are also a number of associated documents or statements including:

(a) An agreed exchange of statements on the Backfire bomber.

(b) A unilateral American interpretative statement on non-circumvention.

(c) A unilateral American statement on Theatre systems.

The Treaty

3. The SALT II Treaty is based on the 1974 Vladivostock Accord. The central feature is the ceiling agreed for the total number of strategic nuclear delivery systems both sides may possess, and sub-ceilings for different elements within that aggregate, as follows:

MIRVed ICBM launchers	820
MIRVed ICBM launchers plus SLBM launchers	1,200
MIRVed ICBM and SLBM launchers plus aircraft carrying long-range cruise missiles	1,320
All strategic systems	2,250

4. The Treaty contains a large number of detailed provisions associated with these ceilings. In particular:

(a) an agreed timetable of reductions to reach the overall aggregate by 31 December 1981. About 250 Soviet systems will be dismantled. The Americans are already below the ceilings.

(b) provisions limiting fractionation (ie the number of separate Re-entry Vehicles (RVs) which may be fitted to any one missile). The maximum number of RVs on existing missiles is frozen at existing levels. For new ICBMs, up to 10 RVs are permitted. For new SLBMs the figure is 14.

(c) provisions permitting the testing and deployment of ALCMs capable of ranges in excess of 600 km only on aircraft counted under the sub-ceiling for MIRVed systems. This restraint applies both to conventional and nuclear-armed ALCMs.

(d) provisions to aid verification, which, as with SALT I, will be carried out by "national technical means". These include exchange of data, advance notification of missile tests, and the prohibition of the encoding of radio signals transmitted from missiles under test ("telemetry encryption"). This scope of this prohibition remains one of the important unresolved issues.

5. The Treaty also prohibits the flight testing and deployment of new types of ICBMs, with the exception of one light ICBM for each side (MIRVed or non-MIRVed). There are no limitations on new types of SLBMs.

6. There are restrictions on the modification of existing types of ICBM and SLBM although the details remain a key unresolved issue.

7. The Treaty also prohibits additional fixed launchers of heavy ICBMs as well as the development, testing and deployment of mobile launchers of heavy ICBMs, of heavy SLBMs and their launchers, and of heavy ASBMs.

8. The non-circumvention provision states:-

> "In order to ensure the viability and effectiveness of this Agreement each party undertakes not to circumvent the provisions of this Agreement through any other State or States or in any other manner."

There is also a requirement not to assume international obligations in conflict with the Treaty.

The Protocol

9. The central feature is the limitation on Ground and Sea launched Cruise Missiles and mobile ICBMs.

(a) The deployment of conventional and nuclear-armed Cruise Missiles with a range over 600 km on sea-based (SLCMs) or land-based (GLCMs) launchers is prohibited. Testing and development are permitted.

(b) Testing and deployment of light ICBMs from mobile launchers banned. The testing of mobile light ICBM launchers themselves is permitted.

The Joint Statement of Principles

10. This statement contains four agreed principles governing the approach to be adopted towards future negotiations.

(a) a commitment to continue to negotiate to limit strategic arms further in number and in kind.

(b) a reference to the need to strengthen verification and the Standing Consultative Commission in the interests of strengthening compliance with the Treaty.

(c) three specific objectives for future negotiations:

(i) substantial reductions in the number of strategic arms;

(ii) qualitative limitations on strategic arms, including restrictions on the development, testing and deployment of new types of strategic arms, as well as the modernisation of existing strategic arms;

(iii) the resolution of issues included in the protocol.

(d) agreement to consider further measures to enhance strategic stability, including a provision that "each party will be free to raise any issue relative to the further limitation of strategic arms".

/Exchange of Statements on Backfire

Exchange of Statements on Backfire

11. The Americans have accepted that the Soviet Backfire bomber will not count in the overall limitations on strategic systems but they are looking for assurances on this aircraft outside the formal Treaty. The Russians have indicated that they will provide a unilateral statement giving assurances that they would freeze their current Backfire production rate at "approximately 30" per year and not upgrade the aircraft so as to give it a capability against the United States. The Americans want the production rate to be stipulated precisely at 30 per year and assurances that there will be no significant upgrading of the aircraft's capability.

Unilateral American Interpretative Statement on Non-Circumvention

12. The Americans intend to issue an interpretative statement on non-circumvention for the North Atlantic Council and for Congress. We are still discussing the US draft bilaterally. No draft has yet been considered by the Alliance.

Unilateral American Statement on Theatre Systems

13. The American unilateral statement is designed to reinforce their position on future negotiations. It states that:-

> "Any future limitations on US systems principally designed for theatre missions should be accompanied by appropriate limitations on Soviet theatre systems."

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