


TOP SECRET

# 10 DOWNING STREET

THIS FILE MUST NOT GO OUTSIDE 10 DOWNING ST

FILE TITLE: <i>East/West Relations</i>		SERIES <i>FOREIGN POLICY</i>
<i>US Foreign Policy</i>		
PART BEGINS: <i>July 1979</i>		PART: <i>1</i>
PART ENDS: <i>May 1980</i>		CAB ONE: 

*Part 1  
closed*

*PREM 19/238*

TOP SECRET

**PART**

**CLOSED**

## Cabinet / Cabinet Committee Document

The following document, which was enclosed on this file, has been removed and destroyed. Such documents are the responsibility of the Cabinet Office. When released they are available in the appropriate **CAB (CABINET OFFICE) CLASSES**.

Reference:

JIC (80) (N) 40

Date:

30 May 1980

Signed

Wayland

Date

8 April 2010

**PREM Records Team**

*Action*

**UK CONFIDENTIAL**

THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF HER BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT

JIC(80)(N) 40

30 May 1980

*fa. Hunt*

COPY NO *2* (2)

CABINET

JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE

IMPACT OF WESTERN TRADE RESTRICTIONS ON THE SOVIET ECONOMY

The attached Note was approved by the Committee at its meeting on  
FRIDAY 30 MAY 1980.

Signed I SEMPLE  
for Secretary  
Joint Intelligence Committee

*1 note France  
is not  
to be sent  
on credit.  
out*

Cabinet Office

30 May 1980

DISTRIBUTION

JIC (Immediate Assessment)  
Mr R F Stolz, US Embassy  
Mr C O Spencer, Canadian High Commission  
Mr R A Rowe, Australian High Commission  
Ms S A Dennis, New Zealand High Commission

And sent by bag to - CIA (Washington) and Associates, JIC(L) Rep Washington, IAC Ottawa and Associates, BHC Ottawa, ONA and JIO(Aust), JIC(L) Rep Canberra, NZIC, BHC Wellington, ACOS(I) SHAPE, ACOS(I) SACLANT, HQ 58 Group, HQ Strike Command, HQ UKLF, C in C Fleet, UK Del NATO (edited version released to NATO), UK Del OECD, UK Rep EEC, UK Mission to UN New York, JIC Germany, JIG Cyprus, BEs Ankara, Athens, Bonn, Brussels, Copenhagen, Lisbon, Luxembourg, Oslo, Paris, Rome, The Hague, East Berlin, Bucharest, Moscow, Prague, Sofia, Warsaw, Belgrade, Berne, Dublin, Helsinki, Madrid, Stockholm, Vienna, Peking, Tokyo.

**UK CONFIDENTIAL**

**CONFIDENTIAL**

CONFIDENTIAL

DESKBY 200900Z

FM WASHINGTON 192300Z MAY 80  
TO IMMEDIATE F C O  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1927 OF 19 MAY 1980  
INFO PRIORITY PARIS, BONN, MOSCOW, UKDEL NATO AND KABUL  
INFO SAVING OTHER NATO POSTS, DUBLIN, CANBERRA WELLINGTON TOKYO  
MADRID.

MUSKIE'S MEETING WITH GROMYKO IN VIENNA: US/SOVIET RELATIONS.

1. MUSKIE TOLD A GROUP OF AMBASSADORS TODAY (NATO, AUSTRALIA, NEW ZEALAND, SPAIN AND JAPAN) ABOUT HIS MEETING WITH GROMYKO. HE HAD NOT HAD HIGH EXPECTATIONS IN ADVANCE. HE WAS NOT MORE PESSIMISTIC AFTERWARDS THAN HE HAD BEEN BEFORE. BUT NOR HAD HE BEEN ENCOURAGED BY ANYTHING HE HAD HEARD TO BELIEVE THAT ANYTHING WAS GOING TO BE ACHIEVED QUICKLY. HE CERTAINLY DID NOT INTEND TO RAISE EXPECTATIONS AS THIS WOULD RELIEVE THE PRESSURE ON THE SOVIET UNION. HIS OVER-RIDING VIEW WAS THAT THE BUILDING PROCESS WOULD BE A SLOW ONE. THE USA WISHED TO RESUME ARMS CONTROL TALKS BUT COULD SEE NO WAY OF MOVING UNTIL THE AFGHANISTAN PROBLEM HAD BEEN DEALT WITH. HE DID NOT WISH TO BLUR THIS ISSUE. THE RUSSIANS WERE HAVING GREATER DIFFICULTIES THAN THEY HAD EXPECTED IN AFGHANISTAN.
2. ON A PERSONAL PLANE, GROMYKO HAD GIVEN MUSKIE THE IMPRESSION OF MAKING AN EFFORT TO BE RELAXED AND NOT TO BE ABRASIVE. ON SUBSTANCE HE HAD TAKEN A HARD LINE, BUT HE HAD BEEN READY TO SMILE, SOMETHING THAT HAD NOT HAPPENED WHEN MUSKIE HAD SEEN HIM A FEW YEARS AGO. THIS MEETING HAD BEEN INTENDED TO LAST TWO HOURS BUT GROMYKO HAD EXTENDED IT TO THREE. EVEN SO, THEY HAD NOT HAD TIME TO DO MORE THAN DISCUSS PRINCIPLES. MUSKIE THOUGHT THAT GROMYKO'S AIM HAD BEEN TO TEST HIM OUT, TO PROBE POTENTIAL SOFT SPOTS IN THE US ATTITUDE AND IN THE WESTERN ALLIANCE.
3. MUSKIE SAID THAT HE AGREED WITH GROMYKO'S DESCRIPTION OF THE MEETING AS NECESSARY. HE SAW IT AS A BEGINNING OF THE OPENING OF A DIALOGUE TO RESOLVE THE GROWING DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE USA AND THE SOVIET UNION. HE HAD HAD TWO PARTICULAR PURPOSES IN MIND:  
(A) TO SHOW THAT THE US WERE PREPARED TO KEEP CHANNELS OF DISCUSSION OPEN TO THE SOVIET UNION, AND  
(B) TO CONVEY US CONCERN OVER AFGHANISTAN.
4. GROMYKO HAD OPENED THE DISCUSSION BY ASKING MUSKIE WHY THE UNITED STATES HAD DECIDED TO DISRUPT DETENTE. MUSKIE HAD LEFT GROMYKO IN NO DOUBT THAT THE SOVIET INVASION HAD BROUGHT ABOUT A SEA CHANGE IN THE US PERCEPTION OF HOW THE SOVIETS REGARDED DETENTE. AFGHANISTAN

**CONFIDENTIAL**

/WAS

WAS THE MOST IMPORTANT OBSTACLE TO THE IMPROVEMENT OF RELATIONS, AND IT HAD AN IMPORTANCE GOING BEYOND THAT OF AFGHANISTAN ITSELF. IT WOULD, FOR EXAMPLE, BE IMPOSSIBLE FOR THE SENATE TO RATIFY SALT IN PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES. MUSKIE HAD TOLD GROMYKO THAT US/SOVIET RELATIONS WERE CENTRAL TO WORLD PEACE AND THAT THE USA ACCEPTED THE SOVIET UNION AS A SUPER-POWER. HE, MUSKIE, HAD SPOKEN OF EQUALITY RECIPROCITY AND RESTRAINT.

5. GROMYKO REJOINED THAT THE SOVIET UNION WOULD NOT ACCEPT PRE-CONDITIONS FOR TALKING. THE SENATE HAD DECIDED AGAINST RATIFYING SALT II BEFORE AFGHANISTAN. THE DECISION BY NATO COUNTRIES TO INCREASE DEFENCE EXPENDITURE BY 3 PER CENT WAS AN INDICATION OF THEIR INTENTION TO SEEK SUPERIORITY. HE ALSO DENOUNCED THE US PERSHING MISSILE DECISION. (MUSKIE HAD THE IMPRESSION THAT FOR THE RUSSIANS, PERSHING WAS QUALITATIVELY DIFFERENT FROM OTHER TNF.) ALL THESE WERE INDICATIONS IN THE SOVIET VIEW, THAT THE U S HAD ABANDONED THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUALITY AND WERE SEEKING DOMINATION. TO THIS, MUSKIE REPLIED THAT THE CONTINUED SOVIET DEFENCE EXPENDITURE OVER 15 YEARS WAS ENOUGH TO EXPLAIN THE NATO DECISION TO INCREASE THEIR DEFENCE EXPENDITURE. THE PERSHING DECISION HAD BEEN TAKEN BECAUSE OF THE SOVIET DECISION ON SS20S. THE US WERE PREPARED FOR TALKS WITH THE SOVIETS ON THEATRE NUCLEAR FORCES, WEAPONS THAT WERE NOT INCLUDED IN THE SALT NEGOTIATIONS. THE U S WERE STILL COMMITTED TO SALT BUT THE CALENDAR WAS GOING TO BE DIFFICULT BECAUSE OF AFGHANISTAN.

6. EXPLAINING THE SOVIET INTERVENTION IN AFGHANISTAN, GROMYKO REFERRED TO CONTINUED ARMED INCURSIONS FROM PAKISTAN INVOLVING AMERICANS AND PAKISTANIS. THE SOVIETS HAD BEEN INVITED BY THE GOVERNMENT OF AFGHANISTAN TO SEND IN TROOPS. MUSKIE HAD CHALLENGED THIS FIRST POINT BY SAYING THAT THE MAN WHO HAD ISSUED THE INVITATION HAD NOT SURVIVED THE ARRIVAL OF SOVIET TROOPS.

7. MUSKIE REPORTED THE SCEPTICISM THAT GROMYKO HAD SHOWN ABOUT AMERICAN STATEMENTS THAT THEY INTENDED OBSERVING THE TERMS OF SALT EVEN IN THE ABSENCE OF A TREATY. MUSKIE HAD EXPLAINED THAT IT WAS DESIRABLE TO KEEP THE PROSPECTS OF THE TREATY ALIVE AND THEREFORE TO EXERCISE RESTRAINT. THIS DID NOT DEPEND UPON A TREATY. GROMYKO DID NOT REPLY TO THIS POINT BUT MUSKIE HAD THE IMPRESSION THAT HE WAS QUOTE NOT UNRESPONSIVE UNQUOTE.

8. GROMYKO ADVANCED THE PROPOSALS OF THE AFGHANISTAN GOVERNMENT RELATING TO THE FUTURE OF AFGHANISTAN: A SETTLEMENT BETWEEN AFGHANISTAN, PAKISTAN AND IRAN (MENTIONED BY GROMYKO AS AN AFTER-THOUGHT). TROOP WITHDRAWALS WOULD TAKE PLACE IF SUCH A SETTLEMENT WAS WORKED OUT AND WHEN THE CAUSES OF THE INTERVENTION HAD BEEN ELIMINATED. NO INDICATION HAD BEEN GIVEN OF WHO WOULD JUDGE WHEN THE CAUSES HAD BEEN ELIMINATED.

# CONFIDENTIAL

9. MUSKIE HAD PROTESTED THAT THIS AMOUNTED TO LEGITIMISATION OF THE SOVIET INVASION AND OF THE KARMEL GOVERNMENT. IT LEFT THE DECISION ON TROOP WITHDRAWAL UP TO THE SOVIETS. MUSKIE THOUGHT THAT THIS HAD BEEN A SUFFICIENTLY NEGATIVE REACTION TO DETER GROMYKO FROM COMING BACK FOR MORE; BUT THE LATTER HAD ASKED FOR A FURTHER REPLY, WHICH INDICATED TO MUSKIE THAT THE RUSSIANS WANTED TALKS TO CONTINUE.

10. MUSKIE SAID THAT THE NEUTRALITY IDEA HAD NOT BEEN MENTIONED. GROMYKO HAD TALKED ABOUT NON-ALIGNMENT BUT HAD NOT MENTIONED NEUTRALITY.

11. ACCORDING TO MUSKIE, GROMYKO HAD RIDICULED THE NOTION THAT THE SOVIETS HAD MOVED INTO AFGHANISTAN TO CONTROL THE OIL OF THE PERSIAN GULF. THE SOVIETS DID NOT NEED PERSIAN GULF OIL.

12. GROMYKO SAID NOTHING ABOUT WESTERN ECONOMIC MEASURES THAT HAD BEEN TAKEN AGAINST THE SOVIETS ON ACCOUNT OF AFGHANISTAN. NOR HAD GROMYKO RAISED THE OLYMPICS OR GRAIN. BUT MUSKIE DID NOT THINK THAT THIS NECESSARILY MEANT ANYTHING VERY MUCH AS THERE HAD NOT BEEN TIME TO DISCUSS EVERYTHING.

13. NEITHER MUSKIE NOR GROMYKO HAD SPOKEN ABOUT THE PROSPECT OF A FURTHER MEETING.

FCO PASS TO ALL SAVING POSTS.

HENDERSON

(REPEATED AS REQUESTED)

[COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING ST]

## DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

REGSD  
SAD  
NAD  
MED  
HEWAD  
FED  
SED  
CAD  
TRED  
CSCG UNIT  
ACDD  
ESYSD

WED  
TRED  
SEAD  
UND  
FED  
EOD (E)  
CABINET OFFICE

## ADDITIONAL DISTN.

AFGHANISTAN

3

# CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

GRS 72P

CONFIDENTIAL

FM MOSCOW 191537Z MAY 88

TO PRIORITY F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 343 OF 19TH MAY

FOR INFO PRIORITY PARIS, BONN, WASHINGTON, WARSAW, UNKDEL NATO  
AND KABUL.

MY TELNO 333: SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY ATTITUDES

*MR*

1. IN THE IMMEDIATE AFTERMATH OF THEIR INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN THE SOVIET LEADERS WERE INHIBITED FROM PURSUING BILATERAL CONTACTS WITH MOST WESTERN COUNTRIES AT A SENIOR LEVEL., TO DO SO WOULD HAVE BEEN TO COUNT A SERIES OF SNUBS AND AT BEST TO RISK EXPOSING THEMSELVES TO SEVERE CRITICISM WHILE LITTLE OR NO COMPENSATING ADVANTAGE. THEY THEREFORE TOOK THE INITIATIVE IN POSTPONING GROMYKO'S VISIT TO LONDON AND DELAYED INVITING CHANCELLOR SCHMIDT TO VISIT MOSCOW. AT THE SAME TIME HOWEVER THEY WISHED TO DEMONSTRATE THAT DESPITE AFGHANISTAN IT WAS POSSIBLE AND NECESSARY TO PURSUE BUSINESS AS USUAL. THEY ALSO EVIDENTLY HOPED TO DIVIDE THE WESTERN EUROPEANS FROM THE UNITED STATES BY HARPING ON THE VALUE FOR EUROPE OF CONTINUING THE PROCESS OF DETENTE AS INTERPRETED BY THE USSR.

2. IT WAS THEREFORE ONLY A MATTER OF TIME BEFORE THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP WISHED TO RENEW AND EXTEND A DIALOGUE WITH THE WEST- AND ESPECIALLY WITH THOSE WESTERN EUROPEANS MOST LIKELY TO GIVE THEM A POLITE HEARING. HENCE THEIR EXCHANGES WITH THE FRENCH, INCLUDING CONTINUING CONTACTS ON POLITICAL SUBJECTS AT OFFICIAL LEVEL, GROMYKO'S VISIT TO PARIS AND NOW THE FRANCO-SOVIET SUMMIT IN WARSAW. THE LATTER HAS THE ADDED ADVANTAGE FROM THE SOVIET POINT OF VIEW THAT IT WILL HELP TO ASSUAGE EASTERN EUROPEAN FEARS OF THE PRICE THEY MIGHT HAVE TO PAY FOR THE SOVIET ADVENTURE IN AFGHANISTAN IF DETENTE WERE TO COLLAPSE ALTOGETHER. HENCE TOO, THE RENEWAL OF THE INVITATION TO SCHMIDT AND THE TREATMENT ACCORDED TO THE MEETINGS IN VIENNA (MY TELNO 342) BY THE SOVIET MEDIA. BREZHNEV'S ATTENDANCE AT TITO'S FUNERAL ALSO NO DOUBT HELPED TO PRESENT THE SOVIET UNION AS LESS OF AN OUTCAST IN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS THAN SHE WAS IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN. THE RUSSIANS WILL CERTAINLY WISH TO ENCOURAGE AS WIDE A RANGE OF COUNTRIES AS POSSIBLE TO ACCEPT A RESUMPTION OF THE DIALOGUE AS BOTH NECESSARY AND POSSIBLE. THEIR INVITATION TO THE NORWEGIAN FOREIGN MINISTER (OSLO TELNO 97) PROVIDES A CASE IN POINT.

3. THE RUSSIANS ARE STILL TRYING TO HEAP ALL THE BLAME FOR INTERNATIONAL TENSION ON THE UNITED STATES. BUT THERE ARE, I THINK, SOME SIGNS THAT, HERE TOO, THEY HOPE A DIALOGUE WILL GRADUALLY BE RENEWED. THEIR PROPAGANDA AGAINST THE US, WHILE

CONFIDENTIAL

*PROGAMING*



## CONFIDENTIAL

REMAINING HARSH, HAS LOST SOME OF ITS FEPCOCITY AND THE TASS REPORT OF THE MEETING WITH MUSKIE REFERRED TO THE NEED TO CONTINUE CONTACTS BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES. THE ABSENCE FROM THE PCC DECLARATION OF STRONGLY VITUPERATIVE LANGUAGE, THE STANDARD FORMULATIONS ON MOST ISSUES AND THE TREATMENT IN IT OF THE MADRID CSCE MEETING AND THE PROPOSED CONFERENCE ON MILITARY DETENTE AND DISARMAMENT ARE ALL INDICATIVE OF AN ATTEMPT TO PRESENT SOVIET POLICY AS ESSENTIALLY REASONABLE, WITH AFGHANISTAN APPEARING MERELY AS ONE OF A SERIES OF AWKWARD PROBLEMS WHICH NEED TO BE DISCUSSED. THE RECENT ROUND OF HIGH LEVEL MEETINGS WILL NO DOUBT BE SEEN BY ORDINARY PEOPLE HERE (INSOFAR AS PUBLIC MOODS LEAVE SIGNIFICANCE) AS SHOWING THAT THE SOVIET UNION HAS COME IN FROM THE COLD.

4. AS SEEN FROM MOSCOW HOWEVER THESE CHANGES IN SOVIET POLICY ARE PRESENTATIONAL. THE UNDERLYING OBJECTIVES SEEM UNCHANGED. THERE IS LITTLE TO SHOW THE RUSSIANS HAVE DRAWN FROM WESTERN REACTIONS TO THEIR INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN THE LESSON THAT THEY NEED TO MAKE SIGNIFICANT CHANGES IN POLICY TO WIN THEIR WAY BACK TO INTERNATIONAL ACCEPTABILITY. THERE IS STILL GOOD REASON TO BELIEVE THAT WESTERN AND THIRD WORLD REACTIONS TO THEIR AFGHANISTAN POLICIES WERE STRONGER THAN THEY EXPECTED, ALTHOUGH THEY NOW PROBABLY HOPE THAT, FOR EXAMPLE, THE EARLIER CONSENSUS OF ISLAMIC STATES WILL DISINTEGRATE. IT IS ALSO LIKELY THAT OVER RECENT WEEKS THEY HAVE BEEN INCREASINGLY EMBARRASSED BY THE DEGREE OF SUPPORT WHICH HAS GATHERED AROUND THE IDEA OF BOYCOTTING THE OLYMPICS. AS NOTED IN MY TELNO 333 HOWEVER THE MESSAGE OF THE PCC DECLARATION AND ACCOMPANYING STATEMENT IS THAT THEY HAVE DECIDED TO SIT TIGHT FOR THE TIME BEING, WHILE MAINTAINING A FACADE OF BENEVOLENT ACTIVITY. THIS APPLIES IN PARTICULAR TO AFGHANISTAN. THEY HAVE DONE THEIR BEST TO ADORN THEIR OWN POSITION, WITH REFERENCES TO A POLITICAL SOLUTION, TO THE WITHDRAWAL OF SOVIET TROOPS AND EVEN TO A SOVIET GUARANTEE, BUT BEHIND THIS THEY ARE STILL INSISTING ON THE ACCEPTANCE OF THE STATUS QUO IN AFGHANISTAN, AND WHAT THEY ARE WORKING TOWARDS IS THE PRESERVATION OF A PRO-SOVIET PUPPET REGIME LIKE BADRAX'S IN A SITUATION WHERE THE REBELS ARE DEPRIVED OF OUTSIDE SUPPORT AND ANY CONTINUANCE OF INTERNAL RESISTANCE IS TREATED AS A REASON FOR DELAYING THE WITHDRAWAL OF SOVIET TROOPS.

BROOK TURNER

*Propagandistic Distortion*  
EE 50

## CONFIDENTIAL



file DS9

10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

19 May 1980

Dear Hugh

*dated 14/3/80*

I thought you would wish to know that we are pressing ahead with the effort to develop an effective framework for the Western response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. The results of our work are due to be discussed at the forthcoming Heads of Government meeting in Venice. The paper which you, Michael Howard, Elie Kadourie and Leonard Schapiro prepared before Easter has been extremely useful. It has given me an independent measure against which to judge the proposals being put forward by officials.

It remains to be seen just which of your recommendations will be accepted. But whatever the final outcome, your contribution has already proved its worth. I am most grateful to you for your own part in preparing the paper. Perhaps you would be kind enough to pass on my thanks to your collaborators. I look forward to having an opportunity to thank you and them personally at some point in the next few weeks.

Yours ever

Margaret

Professor Hugh Thomas.

LPO



Foreign  
Policy (2)

10 DOWNING STREET

Prime Minister.

These are the papers for  
your meeting on policy  
towards Afghanistan on  
Tuesday morning.

My minute of 2  
Ray gives the background.

A letter to Prof.  
Thomas is in your  
signature folder.

mb.

Paul  
19/5/80.

WESTERN STRATEGY IN THE WAKE OF AFGHANISTAN

A REPORT TO THE PRIME MINISTER BY  
PROFESSORS MICHAEL HOWARD, ELIE KEDOURIE,  
LEONARD SCHAPIRO AND HUGH THOMAS

*my*

CONTENTS

- I THE WEST ... para. 1
- II THE 'THIRD WORLD' ... para. 3
- III THE SOVIET THREAT ... para. 6
- IV SOVIET MILITARY STRENGTH ... para. 18
- V 'DETENTE' ... para. 22
- VI THE SOVIET UNION AND OIL ... para. 25
- VII AFGHANISTAN : CONSEQUENCES AND RESPONSES ... para. 26
- VIII WESTERN POLICY ... para. 36
  - (a) General ... para. 36
  - (b) The Alliance ... para. 42
  - (c) Political warfare ... para. 49
  - (d) Propaganda ... para. 50
  - (e) Military preparedness ... para. 61
  - (f) Contacts with the Soviet Union & East Europe ... para. 64
  - (g) Aid ... para. 69
  - (h) 'Militant Islam' ... para. 70
  - (i) Arms Control ... para. 71
  - (j) South Africa ... para. 72
  - (k) China ... para. 73
- IX BRITISH DEFENCE ... para. 74
- X WESTERN INITIATIVES ... para. 78
  - (a) General Appreciation ... para. 78
  - (b) The Persian Gulf ... para. 83
  - (c) Angola; Sahara; OPEC; the Caribbean ... para. 88
- CONCLUSION ... para. 94
- SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS
- APPENDIX WHY THE FOREIGN OFFICE MUST CONTROL AID

## I : THE WEST

1. The West constitutes a group of sovereign states whose principles are summed up in the preamble to the NATO Treaty: 'democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law'. By 'democracy' we understand 'representative democracy'; by individual liberty, we understand free enterprise as well as freedom of conscience. We think of 'the West' as synonymous with 'the Free World', which is in some ways a superior formulation, for it enables us to rank free countries of the East (Australia, Japan) as being associated with the old states of Christendom.

2. There is no institutional link between the countries of the West. (Unlike the institutions which connect many other groups of nations: such as NATO itself, the Commonwealth, the 'Non-Aligned' countries, the Organisation of American States, the Warsaw Pact, COMECON, the European Economic Community, etc.) There might be advantage in exploring the benefits of some such organisation.

## II : THE 'THIRD WORLD'

3. The countries of the West have been the principal activators and beneficiaries of the industrial and scientific transformations of the past two centuries. They were enabled, during the nineteenth century, to extend political dominance over more backward societies throughout the world. That dominance has now been surrendered. But memories of imperial subordination, continuing racial enmities and a consciousness of economic inequalities have created in the 'Third World' an antagonism to Western societies and institutions which can easily be exploited by radical or Marxist agitators. This is the more serious because of Western dependence on the raw materials controlled by the 'Third World'. We were not asked to advise on 'North-South' relations, but the importance of these attitudes must constantly be borne in mind when dealing with those of East versus West. The Soviet invasion and occupation of Afghanistan makes this more important than ever. If the Soviet Union were to succeed in establishing a 'hegemonial' control over the states of the Third World, we should probably have 'lost'.

4. Many countries in Africa, the Middle East and Asia are not states in the European sense of the world (nor, indeed, in the Latin American sense). Traditions of continuity of government as of law are weak there. The rulers of the states concerned often recognise that they lack legitimacy. Their economies are unstable. The rulers seek protection not from the most generous, but from the strongest, power. Those rulers are more likely to be impressed by military capability than by aid. It is difficult enough to devise policies towards each of them individually, but impossible to find a policy to treat all the poorer countries together. There is a dangerously emotive content in the term 'Third World' in the way that it is usually used in public rhetoric: we use it in this paper simply as a label.

WJH to  
use it

5. We face too in this 'Third World' a problem of radicalism compounded by racial tensions which could have ugly consequences for our own societies. This radicalism is in many cases channelled into various forms, or perversions, of Marxist ideology, and commands some sympathy within the West. Even if it may be unrealistic to see this in the form of a 'global conspiracy', it would be foolish to ignore the extent to which its various branches are linked by common ideological perceptions, even when national interests diverge. The Communist Party of the Soviet Union has made persistent and often successful attempts to penetrate all these radical activities.

### III : THE SOVIET THREAT

6. The Bolsheviks (later called Communists) seized power in 1917 after a coup d'etat in the expectation that that act would trigger the revolutionary conquest of the world. That did not then occur. But 'the complete and final victory of Communism on a world scale' remains the main aim of Soviet policy. Most of the institutions and dispositions of the Russian Government are arranged to serve that end.

7. Three other aims of Soviet international politics in increasing order of ambition are:

(i) The preservation of the Soviet homeland and its ring of satellites, particularly those in Eastern Europe;

(ii) A state of affairs whereby the Soviet Union would automatically be a party to the resolution of all matters 'of any significance' - the definition of 'significance' to be up to the Soviet leaders. Mr. Gromyko, in a well-known speech at the 24th party congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, in 1971 (echoing Mr. Brezhnev, the previous year), claimed that this aim had already been achieved;

(iii) 'World hegemony', a state of affairs in which, though the Soviet Union would not be responsible for the government of the entire globe, no state would be able, or wish, to do things which the Soviet Union did not want; all states would give the Soviet Union such favourable terms, in economic, cultural and military matters, as would be demanded; that is, world 'Finlandisation'.

8. In all these roles, the Soviet leaders see Russia as the 'vanguard' of the world revolution. 'Leninist principles of proletarian internationalism' are the justification for Soviet (or Cuban, or East German) subversion of poor peoples and rich ones alike. Marxist-Leninist ideology is a decisive preoccupation in the minds of every Soviet leader. Even if this does not give the Soviet leaders a chart, it always gives them a compass. Soviet leaders have a picture of the sort of world which they would like to see, even if they may not have a precise timetable to achieve it. They are sustained by the sense that they are themselves subordinate to a scientific system whose future victories are pre-ordained, and every aspect of their policy, in their minds (from trade deals to chess tournaments), is subordinated to the ultimate goal. This ideological motive outweighs, if it does not quite extinguish, the link between revolutionary Marxism and the expansionist foreign policy of Tsarist days.

9. The distinction sometimes made between the 'defensive' and 'offensive' intentions of the Soviet Union does not appear to us to be a valid one. Empires seldom grow as a matter of settled policy. As often as not they expand reluctantly and piecemeal, with repeated and occasionally sincere disclaimers of predatory intent. Weak states on their borders are said to need to be 'protected' against the designs of potential adversaries; protection gradually turns into occupation. A process of this sort is likely to be the more rapid if fired by a sense of cultural superiority and by missionary zeal; it commonly continues until it meets firm resistance backed by military force.

10. We are, therefore, unimpressed by the argument that Russia's expansion is due to its sense of insecurity and the consequent requirement for 'buffer states'. Russia's bad communications, low population density, and depth of defence, have always made it a difficult country to conquer. Today's buffer states have a way of becoming tomorrow's homeland which in turn demands new buffers to protect it.

11. Nuclear weapons may have altered the tactics of Soviet governments since 1945 but, however many excursions into 'détente' or 'pacts' with enemies there may have to be, the Soviet Government is still of the view that there can be no permanent peace between communist and 'bourgeois' countries.

12. In order to carry out these aims, the Soviet Union have used the following methods:

(a) Open political methods such as:

- (i) organising local Communist parties for the 'peaceful' capture of parliaments;
- (ii) indirect support of other parties or movements, e.g., those led by Colonel Nasser or President de Gaulle which may temporarily seem to serve Soviet foreign policy.
- (iii) organising Communist-dominated trade unions.



(b) Propaganda

Typically this has been conducted by campaigns to support the Soviet Union's line on e.g. 'foreign bases', the 'neutron bomb', the consequences of nuclear war, nuclear energy, détente, China, etc. These campaigns have been waged by:

(i) press, radio, films, television and other technical means; and

(ii) front organisations.

(c) Subversion, such as the organisation of

(i) direct espionage - by either the KGB or GRU - of long-term or immediate benefit to the Soviet Union.\*

(ii) secret communist parties whose aims are clandestinely to penetrate institutions - particularly police and security services, but also the Church, Civil Service or trade unions;

(iii) training and backing for terrorist and/or guerilla movements - often performed by surrogates; and

(iv) the penetration of international organisations.

(d) Military Methods

(i) the use of surrogate forces belonging to states friendly to the Soviet Union and trained for the purpose (North Korea, Vietnam, East Germany, Cuba, perhaps Yemen). The PLO may come into this category;

(ii) the deployment of military force by the Soviet armed forces;

(iii) the threat of military force by the Soviet armed forces.

---

\* It is fair to suppose that at least a quarter of Russian diplomats abroad are members of the KGB, while Soviet Ambassadors and Embassies have always played a part in Soviet subversion: e.g. Zorin (Prague 1948); Solod (Egypt, 1953; Guinea, 1966).

(e) Economic Warfare

13. At his 'open' speech at the 20th Party Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in 1956, Mr. Khrushchev said that Communist parties 'should increase and deepen the contradictions in capitalist countries and that capitalist countries could be severely hindered by the Communist penetration of overseas markets and sources of raw materials'. The recession following the oil crisis of 1973 cannot be attributed to Russia but the effects of that event have placed her in a position where she can weaken the mechanism of international trade when it suits her.

14. The Soviet leaders would probably not like to see an immediate collapse of the Western economic system. This fact may explain certain inconsistencies in Soviet behaviour. The Soviet Union presumably hopes to use Western technology until such time as it stands on its own feet. It has, after all, been the consistent policy of the Soviet Union to rely on our technology and economic support ever since 1920.

15. The oil crisis tests the West severely: but it bankrupts many poor countries which do not have oil. Those countries finance themselves by borrowing from Western banks, above all dollars, whose outflow further damages the US. Soviet treatment of such countries (if they are of strategic, or other, interest to them, see paragraph 80 below) is to offer them a soft loan, at a lower rate than might be available from the World Bank. The country uses the credit to buy Soviet goods. The Soviet Union accepts repayment in the form of imports from the country concerned. The administration of the loan will allow Soviet technicians to go to the country; if this does not lead to Soviet domination of the economy, it will probably at least cause the abandonment of Western defence agreements.

16. The Soviet Union has also been active in establishing itself as a major supplier of fuel (oil, natural gas and some uranium for Western reactors) to West Germany and Italy. One result could be to establish conditions of economic dependence which could be politically exploited.

17. Other economic tactics, since 1971, have been to pursue foreign loans and technology for the Soviet Union herself. However striking an admission of failure that change of policy was, there have been many benefits to Russia: for example, assistance to meet home demand for consumer goods and the interest of some Western governments and banks to support the Soviet economy - at least to enable them to service their loans.

#### IV: SOVIET MILITARY STRENGTH

18. The Soviet Union has never distinguished, as has the West, between a 'deterrent' and a war-fighting capability. Their military leaders believe that the best way to deter a war is to have the evident capacity to win it, whether it 'goes nuclear' or not. As a result, they have built up forces, nuclear and conventional, which at every level challenge, and increasingly surpass, those of the West. In the last resort, the Soviet strength is no doubt intended to compel the West to withdraw in a battle of wills. Should that fail, the Russians are determined to go on and win the consequent war, nuclear or not, and to keep their system going. But one effect of this military investment is to produce those 'foreign policy benefits'\* mentioned by Dr. Kissinger in his speech at Brussels in September 1979. In the short run, therefore, the armaments can be used to intimidate and to threaten, in however vague a way, any country from which the Soviet Union wants something which it does not want to give.

19. We do not necessarily endorse the belief, current in some American circles that, at some time in the 1980s, the United States may be unable, because of the vulnerability of her land-based missiles, to deter the threat of a Soviet nuclear attack by a credible second-strike capability; and may, therefore, have to surrender. But the perception that this might be true could have a formidable effect on the overall balance of power and enable the Soviet Union confidently to take the initiative in disputes anywhere in the world.

---

\* "Never in history has it happened that a nation achieved superiority in all significant weapons categories without seeking to put it into some foreign policy benefits."

20. The Soviet leaders are men who grew up in a world of violence. They are indoctrinated in the belief both of the inevitability of struggle and of the legitimacy of using force as an instrument in that struggle. They do not have (as did the Nazis) an inclination to war for its own sake: the experience of the Second World War, if nothing else, will have inclined them to pursue their aims by means other than war wherever possible and to ensure that war, should it come, would be fought on the territories of their adversaries rather than theirs. The threat to Russian territory in a nuclear war, on however limited a scale, is likely to remain a dissuasion against military adventure, save in circumstances where they are certain of victory.

21. The prestige of the Soviet armed forces has never been higher than it is today. But it would be a mistake to suppose that Soviet policy is determined by its military establishment or that there are clashes between the military leaders and the civilians, in which the former pursue the more aggressive line. All the evidence which we have studied leads us to believe that, while the military leaders may have an important voice in the process of formulating policy, decisions rest squarely with the party leaders. Everything suggests that this state of affairs is fully accepted by the military men.

#### V: DÉTENTE

22. Détente is an ambiguous word. We want to point out firmly that there is no point in saying that such-and-such a measure would take us back to the "height of the cold war". The fact is that, during the years 1945-55 (the years to which reference is presumably made), the West's position vis-à-vis the Soviet Union was better than it is now. Throughout the years of peaceful co-existence (1955-1964) or détente (say 1967-1979), the Soviet Union was developing one missile after another, and extending its areas of operation in many ways.

23. There have been some gains to the West from the last few years of peaceful co-existence:

- (i) a heightening of the dispute with China, which has not wished to be left out in what has seemed like a partition of the world between two 'super powers';
  - (ii) to say that the 'cold war is over' must raise questions in Russia as to why the repression (justified in the past by the need to fight spies and traitors) needs to go on;
  - (iii) the Germany question has been stabilised;
  - (iv) the opening up of contacts with East Europe, particularly the DDR, has been a most significant gain to the West. The increasing freedom of communication between the two halves of Europe following the Helsinki agreements may result in the gradual 'Westernisation' of the DDR, Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia, not only easing the strains on those unfortunate countries but adding to the difficulties of the Warsaw Pact. The Soviet leadership must be aware that East Europe is the area of their greatest vulnerability.
24. On the other hand, détente has
- (a) helped to make Communism seem respectable again in left-wing circles in the West;
  - (b) secured for the Soviet Union a legitimisation of their military control over Eastern Europe;
  - (c) afforded the Soviet Union loans and economic and technical assistance (as noticed earlier);
  - (d) above all, given the impression in the West that the Soviet Union is just one more state in the world; hence the nature of the Soviet threat has been concealed; while the size and momentum of the threat has grown - particularly in Africa and Asia. The consequence is a lack of preparedness which contrasts with the resolve so characteristic of the West between 1945 and 1953.

VI: THE SOVIET UNION AND OIL

25. The interest of the Soviet Union in the question of oil has three sides to it:

- (i) the possibility that, at some stage in the course of the 1980s, the Soviet Union's own sources of this fuel will fall short of their domestic requirements, and the probability that they will not have enough to export to their satellites (including Cuba);
- (ii) The Soviet need for Western specialised technology to gain oil from the more inaccessible fields in their country;
- (iii) the chance that Soviet control over the sources of Western oil in the Middle East would assist them to browbeat the West generally. This point needs to be distinguished from the economic considerations in (i) above. It would be a great victory for the Soviet Union to be able to lay their hand over the tap which produces oil for the West. It is true that Britain would be able to survive such calamity more easily than would the continent of Western Europe or Japan. But the whole of international commerce would be affected, and through it ourselves. 'Global Finlandisation' (see paragraph 7(iii)) would be close.

VII AFGHANISTAN

VII: AFGHANISTAN

26. The background to the Soviet decision to intervene forcefully in Afghanistan will probably remain unclear for many years. We attach no more importance to the rumours of major divisions in Soviet opinion before this invasion than we do to similar rumours concerning the invasions of Hungary and Czechoslovakia. Evidently some (or all) of the following reasons may have been prevailing:

- (i) The alternative to action would have been the collapse of a pro-Soviet regime;
- (ii) The Russian military mission already in Afghanistan was inadequate; to withdraw was unthinkable; the effect on internal Russian politics might have been considerable, and not only in Central Asia; therefore, as usually occurs in Russian affairs, a large scale military response seemed essential;
- (iii) Concern about the effect of a rebellion in Afghanistan may have been heightened by the flight of Sheikh Mohseni of Kandahar to Qom where he had begun to publicise the cause of the Afghan rebels. Russia has always been reluctant to stir up as much trouble as she might do in Islamic states on her border for fear of the consequences within Russia. The establishment of an Iranian base for an anti-Soviet religious cause would have been unwelcome.
- (iv) The Russians had no reason, on the basis of US behaviour over, for example, Angola, Ethiopia and even Iran, to suppose that their action in Afghanistan would provoke the unfavourable reaction which did follow;
- (v) The Soviet Union may have felt that the countries of the Middle East which they wish to influence were ripe to be overawed by a display of force and brutality;

/(vi) After

(vi) After the subjection of Afghanistan, Russia would be in an improved position versus Pakistan (and hence China). Pressure on Pakistan has already led to better Western links with that country and that in turn has brought India closer to Russia. Soviet control of Afghanistan would make it easier to intimidate an unstable Iran or to support a pro-Soviet regime there. The South-West part of Afghanistan and the Straits of Hormuz are separated by barely 300 miles. Even if the roads in that region are bad, Russian short-range aircraft would be in a better position than before to catch the Persian Gulf in one part of a pincer (the other part being in Soviet-controlled South Yemen, slightly further to the South West). The assistance of the always turbulent Baluchis - not too difficult to obtain - might assure Soviet control of the coastline between Karachi and the Straits of Hormuz.

27. If the conquest of Afghanistan were to be completed, some of the above things would have been achieved. Soviet leaders would then be expected to embark on a new "peace offensive", with hopes of further dividing the Western alliance. They might perhaps divert the Muslim world with a new initiative, and would presumably continue high-lighting in propaganda broadcasts the general impotence of the U.S. in the Middle East.

28. The Soviet Government has admittedly suffered some setbacks over Afghanistan by:

- (i) The UN vote of 14 January deploring the invasion, with the unprecedented support of thirty-four Muslim nations;
- (ii) The Cuban withdrawal from the contest for the Latin-American seat in the Security Council;



- (iii) The loss of prestige, in the face of the Soviet people, from the international campaign for the boycott of the Olympics;
- (iv) The apparent revival, in the minds of the Western nations, of a realistic appreciation of the Soviet threat. If this can be maintained, the tragedy of Afghanistan will seem a turning point. In particular, it was encouraging to see (but see paragraph 71 below) that at long last SALT II was being linked to general questions of Soviet behaviour.

29. The Soviet occupation of Afghanistan is unlikely to be completed for some time. But we think it an illusion to suppose that it could become anything in the nature of a 'Soviet Vietnam', since there are large Soviet forces at hand for the task of pacification, and public opinion in the Soviet Union presents no problem.

30. The US response was stated by President Carter on January 4. Measures proposed included:

- (i) a deferral of further debate on the SALT II treaty;
- (ii) a deferral of several cultural exchanges as well as statements leading to the US boycott of the Moscow Olympics;
- (iii) a curtailment of fishing privileges for the Soviet Union in US waters;
- (iv) a ban on certain sales of grain and of 'high technology' to the Soviet Union.

31. In a State of the Union address on January 23, President Carter added that:

- (i) US intelligence would be allowed to operate more effectively;

/(ii)

(ii) a military and economic assistance programme for Pakistan would be begun;

(iii) a search would be made for modest military facilities in the Persian Gulf or South Asia.

32. We understand that some other help may have gone to the Afghans from the West.

33. The President has also said that he would regard any outside attempt to intervene in the free flow of oil from the Middle East as an 'assault on the vital interests of the US' to be resisted by all means necessary, including military force.

34. The tone of these and other statements in January by President Carter was vigorous. The President said, for example, that the moment constituted one of 'the most serious challenges in the history of the nation', and that the Soviet Union had built 'a war machine far beyond any reasonable requirements for their own defence and security'. He pledged 'equivalence' in the face of the consequent threat; he recognised that the U.S. had to 'pursue a global foreign policy', and he recalled that 'aggression unopposed becomes a contagious disease'.

35. Those remarks seemed encouraging. Five points, however, need to be made:

(i) all these categorical statements by President Carter may lead him into difficulties. No provision can at present be made for any action if, say, a coup d'état in the Persian Gulf were to turn one or other of the States there, or even Saudi Arabia come to that, into a 'revolutionary Islamic' government. (See paras. 83-87 for further discussion of this matter);

/ (ii)

- (ii) the search for military facilities in South Asia or the Persian Gulf seems not to have been successful. Recent statements by Mr. Harold Brown, the Secretary of Defense, raise doubts about the will of the U.S. really to do very much even if the Persian Gulf were threatened by a Soviet armoured thrust either from Azerbaijan or Afghanistan; further, though some of the new defence plans of the U.S. are admirable in themselves, they may (like the new ships for the Marine Corps) take four or five years to be fulfilled;
- (iii) save for the immediate support of the U.S. by Great Britain, the reaction of the European and other allies was divided;
- (iv) it still seems necessary for the Administration to put all its ideas for 'covert warfare' to several Senate Committees before approval. That denies the possibility of an effective U.S. reply to the Soviet Union in the field of subversion;
- (v) past experience suggests the strong reaction in the West will lose its impetus and that the Soviet Union will accompany any final pacification of Afghanistan by an international peace offensive for which we have be ill-prepared.

#### VIII: WESTERN POLICY

##### (a) General

36. Our first concern should be to ensure that the invasion of Afghanistan is used as an occasion to reaffirm that our relations with the Soviet Union cannot be those of one like-minded state with another. The Soviet Union, we repeat, is not a normal state. Its aims are not normal aims. Something like a new rallying call is needed, such as was issued by Winston Churchill at Fulton in 1947. It is of the greatest importance to resolve to oppose the general

policy of the Soviet Union, and to make that resolve known, both to the Russians and to our own people. This should be the frame for our policies.

37. We take it as self-evident that all policies to oppose the Soviet Union, though often carried into effect by diplomacy, propaganda or 'political warfare', must in the end be backed by military force adequately deployed.

38. We must resolve to counter each of the Soviet methods noticed in paragraphs 12 and 13 at its own level and to work out detailed plans to do so.

39. We should explore how far it may be possible to divide Marxist states, capitalising on the differences which already exist between Russia and China and doing all possible to find other gaps between them.

40. We should not always take Marxist rhetoric in the 'Third World' at its face value. Sometimes it conceals opportunism. We should deal with the leaders of these new states as human beings with human weaknesses, who do not always act in support of the ideologies they proclaim.

41. The West's economic strength is far greater than that of the Soviet Union. It should be used to benefit us as a political tool in order to extend our influence, especially in the 'Third World'.

(b) The Alliance

42. We recognise that the U.S. sees itself as requiring a direct relation to the U.S.S.R. to which Britain, like the other Europeans, is not immediately privy. West Germany has its own relations with the U.S.S.R. and so does France. All the same, it is important that there should be confidence, and swift exchange of information between the U.S. and her allies about their separate relations with the U.S.S.R..

The Alliance could not survive easily continuous bids for approaches to the USSR of which the other partners were unaware till they had been launched.

43. The role of Britain within the Alliance is considered in detail in para. 74-77 below, but here we recognise that Britain is the best interpreter of the US to the Western European continent, as it is of the continent to the US. The British Government is in a good position to strengthen the resolve of the US through both public and private initiatives.

44. It is necessary to distinguish between two aspects of European co-operation in resistance to the Soviet Union:

- (a) the strengthening of the defences of Western Europe in order to permit the United States to re-deploy its forces at crisis-points elsewhere; and
- (b) Europe's own co-operation in military activities in other parts of the world.

45. NATO is the appropriate forum for European discussions on defence questions of all kinds. The reluctance of some of its members to concern themselves at the moment with extra-European activities render it difficult for NATO to extend its formal area of responsibilities. The best contribution that such countries can make may anyway be to strengthen their commitment to the defence of Western Europe, in order to enable Britain, Australia, France and the United States to deploy forces (preferably jointly) in the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean regions. French action in Zaire, Tunisia and elsewhere has been of benefit to the Western cause and such undertakings are to be encouraged, if not imitated.

46. One country, Ireland, is a member of the EEC, but is not a member of NATO. We think it would be desirable at least to raise and perhaps even press the question of Irish membership of the Alliance - as indeed of other European countries which enjoy the benefits of the Alliance without bearing any of the burdens.

47. Among these other countries is Spain, which has applied to join the EEC and whose present government has pronounced in favour of joining NATO. It is, however, hesitant about making formal application till after the next European Security Conference in Madrid (which we understand will still be held) in September 1980. We should nevertheless do all we can to encourage Spain to take this important step as soon as possible. The Soviet Union will probably use that Conference to make propaganda to persuade the Spaniards to keep out of NATO and is probably undertaking other measures to secure this aim. Spanish Governments can fall, and the Spanish Socialist Party, like the Communists, are at the moment hostile to Spanish membership of NATO. A neutralist attitude in Spain is as possible as it would be undesirable. In making this proposal, NATO is not asking Spain to impose a burden on herself, but is helping Spain to preserve her new freedoms.

48. Bearing in mind both that the common ideals named in para. 1 are shared by many countries and that a common threat is posed at them all, we believe that it may be desirable to explore whether some kind of trans-oceanic alliance - Europe/North America/Japan/Australia - could be instigated. The low level of Japanese defence spending is anyway scarcely in keeping with her dependence on world trade (and oil imports) to maintain her great prosperity. There are in the world rich democratic states such as Venezuela which make no serious contribution to the preservation of the freedom of which they are proud.

(c) Political Warfare

49. The use of clandestine activities is the most likely general approach of the Soviet Union in all ex-imperial countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America. In countering this, we think it likely that Britain, with her long experience of "political warfare", her skilful creation, during World War II, of such organisations as SOE, and MI9, and her known capacity for discretion, might play a large part. The security services of the U.S. such as the CIA have been weakened; as earlier noticed, there is no evidence that President Carter's suggestions that their efficiency should be renewed have been followed up. The willingness of Britain to make a substantial contribution in this sphere might enable her to offer something to the U.S. in order to compensate for the inevitably small scale of our military effort.

/ (d)

(d) Propaganda

50. The Soviet Union has enjoyed major advantages in the battle for minds in the 'Third World'. She is not associated with a colonialist past in Africa and South Asia, nor with economic dominance in Latin America and the Caribbean. She enjoys a primacy even among those Marxists who dissent from her policies as the first revolutionary state. She shares the ideological perceptions of many leaders of the 'Third World'. More important than any of these points, however, is the organised effort she makes to exploit these advantages. We have good cause, for example, to suppose that the status of 'agitprop' in the Communist world is at every stage higher than, better connected than, and more centrally linked than it is in the West.

51. Western propaganda should always be so organised as to be directed at specific targets; in particular, our own people; the growing literate classes of the Third World; and public opinion behind the Iron Curtain.

52. Because of the widespread use of English and the desire of so many to learn it, Britain has in this sphere too a role potentially greater than that of our continental partners. We think that this might be developed further by:

(i) a more purposeful use of the British Council;

(ii) an even greater use of the external services of the BBC. Already one of the few trump cards in British hands, it might be improved at modest cost, in comparison with the cost of weapons, by:

(a) longer hours of broadcasting;

(b) larger transmitters; and

(c) better co-operation with the Voice of America and other allied radio services.



53. Political parties in most democracies nowadays have recourse to professional advice in the presentation of policies. We think that there may be a case for integrating into the foreign services of Western Governments special advisers who

- (a) are familiar with public relations;
- (b) are fully informed about, and expert in, the nature of the ideological struggle; and
- (c) have carefully explored the recent history of Western propaganda successes and failures.

54. The assets which are possessed by the Soviet Union, and which were outlined in paragraph 50 above, are waning ones. We should do all we can to cause them to wane faster. Soviet activities as an interventionist power should, for example, be constantly exposed and pilloried. There could, for example, be

- (i) a determined attempt in the Middle East to demonstrate that the Soviet threat is a greater menace to the Muslim world than is Israel;
- (ii) more emphasis on the known link between terrorism and the Soviet Union, Cuba and East Germany.
- (iii) lavish illustrations of the racial discrimination against blacks among students in the Soviet Union;
- (iv) illustration of the failure of Russian aid programmes which have concentrated on weapons, showpiece projects, guaranteed purchase of cash crops, and direct currency subventions (e.g. to Cuba). (Russian goods have often gone wrong because of bad quality, lack of durability, delay in shipment and bullying at the point of delivery);

(v) the relative failure of Khrushchev's plans for modernisation of the Soviet economy and the greater reliance on the technology and money of the West since 1971 could be shown;

(vi) the persecution of religions, including Islam.

55. The boycott of the Olympics is a continuing act of propaganda which will certainly bring home to the Soviet public the extent of international hostility to the system.

56. The UN is now primarily a place for the exchange of propaganda. Whenever the USSR or its allies commit an act of aggression, the issue should instantly be raised, as a matter of course, at the Security Council. We look on the failure to put the issue of Angola or Ethiopia on the agenda as having been quite mistaken.

57. After the Second World War, recourse was often had to UN special committees for the discussion of specific themes. The UN Special Committee for the Balkans (1946), for example, kept the essential facts of the Greek civil war before the public eye and the objective and persistent dissemination of truth helped to neutralise the communist propaganda about that struggle. This method could be revived for Afghanistan.

58. In propaganda, we should not forget that it is success that counts. It was not the brutality of the Italians in Libya between 1912 and 1940 which impressed the Arab world but their defeat by Britain. The Germans were also popular until their defeat at El Alamein. Success by the Russians in Afghanistan will be compared with failure by the U.S. in Iran.

59. The long term benefits of receiving in the West students from remote and poor countries must be considerable. Like Aid (see para. 69) this should be looked upon as a matter of foreign policy; it should not be relegated to economic, administrative or educational argument, so that foreign students have to compete for scarce resources with nursery schools. Whatever is decided, the decisions should be taken on grounds of foreign policy.

60. Necessary measures of economy in higher education should not be allowed seriously to curtail the study of the Soviet Union nor of Communism in our universities.

(e) Military Preparedness

61. In the case of military force, which the Russians commonly use only reluctantly and as a last resort, it should not be necessary to counter them at every point with equivalent military force. It is, however, desirable to make clear to them that the commitment of their own armed forces anywhere in the world is likely to involve them in a shooting war with those of the West, with all the gruesome escalatory consequences<sup>to</sup> which this could lead.

62. No doubt it was apprehension of a response of that nature which led the Soviet Union to invest so much in the securing and the training of surrogate forces. An approach to this problem is considered in para. 88 and 89 below.

63. We think it just possible that if the Russians had known that the modest measures which have been taken would be taken, they might not have moved into Afghanistan.

(f) Contacts with the Soviet Union and East Europe

64. We do not under any circumstances, short of open war, advocate a complete break in all relations with the Soviet Union. The benefits from visits to Russia, commercial and diplomatic relations, and personal appreciations of Soviet leaders are considerable from the point of view both of countering Soviet plans and of preserving peace. But greater effort should be spent in trying to ensure that there is contact between peoples and not just between governments.

65. We are not encouraged by the idea of imposing economic sanctions on Russia after Afghanistan, nor indeed on any country, as an alternative to war. Not only have sanctions never worked but they have strengthened the state allegedly under attack (Italy, 1936; Spain, 1946-47; Cuba, 1961 onwards; Rhodesia, 1968). Anything like full economic sanctions against the Soviet Union by the USA would, to be effective, have to cover the US's allies and the USSR's. We, therefore, do not think that much will come of the plans to cut the sale to the USSR of grain, butter, etc., indefinitely.

66. On the other hand, we believe that we should insist on a strict ban, in all Western countries, on the sale to the Soviet Union of all material (including especially technology) which could be in any way useful for waging an aggressive war. There is, of course, difficulty in deciding what such material is: but the subject has been successfully dealt with before. Entrepreneurs and businessmen may be asked to make sacrifices as a result but, if governments give them a lead, and make certain that the reason for them is known, we believe that most people concerned will agree to help. We recognise that this may have repercussions for national economic policy but, as Adam Smith wrote, 'defence . . . . is of much more importance than opulence'. (The Wealth of Nations, Book IV, Chapter II.)

67. The West have been persuaded since the 1950s to refrain from supporting Russian dissident or minority groups. There is good reason for this. Counter-revolutionary activities sustained by foreign arms and money have seldom been successful in the past;

they have usually enabled the 'revolutionary' forces to identify themselves with the cause of national independence. Most dissident Soviet groups are easily penetrated by the KGB, and material Western support for them does the KGB's work for it. Nor is any service done to the minorities concerned by encouraging them to prolong a heroic but hopeless resistance, only to abandon them in the last ditch - as was done in Hungary in 1956. But such groups should always be made to feel that they have friends in the West who will help and encourage them within the bounds of political possibility. Dissident critics within the Soviet Empire help to tarnish the Soviet reputation, particularly in Western left-wing circles. We should recognise that in giving such dissidents all the moral and political support which we can and, by publicising their protests, we are not merely acting from humanitarian principles, but are conducting effective political warfare against the Soviet Union.

68. We regard the strengthening of relations with Eastern Europe (in many ways the Achilles heel of the Soviet Empire) as one of the highest priorities of Western, especially West-European, policy. This is something for which our continental allies are particularly well fitted, but Britain should play an encouraging role. In extending friendly relations with Eastern European powers, we should be guided by them in deciding how far we can go, since they will normally be the best judges of the limits to which they can go without provoking Soviet military intervention.

(g) Aid

69. We are pleased that programmes of overseas aid by Britain are now administered from the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. Aid should be given with political and strategic considerations in mind. What happens if aid is not so considered is well illustrated by recent events in the Seychelles. We read with interest a recent letter in The Sunday Times from the ex-Prime Minister of that country. Absit omen. (See Appendix )

/ (h)

(h) 'Militant Islam'

70. The divisions and subdivisions within Islam are such that for that reason alone the concept of 'militant Islam' is a disconcerting and inadequate one. We do not think that there can be a single policy towards it. There are in Islam thousands of contrasting currents.

(i) Arms Control

71. The Western, especially American, belief that negotiations on arms control could be isolated from general political events has proved as wrong as the contrary assumption, that arms control agreements could provide the main instrument for East-West detente. We hold differing views as to the value of the SALT II treaty, but we are in agreement that the Russians must earn by their good behaviour elsewhere the right to be treated as an interlocuteur valable in all talks on arms control. We thought the suspension by the US Government of the ratification of the SALT II treaty an entirely appropriate measure and we would not press the United States Administration to be in any hurry to resume negotiations. If and when negotiations for SALT III begin, Britain must work closely with her continental allies to ensure that nothing is done to derogate from her own security.

(j) South Africa

72. It seems possible that South Africa should be placed in para. 80 below, as a country likely to receive attention from the Soviet Union. In the long run that is certain because of (a) the strategic and commercial importance of South Africa, with its ports on the hinge between two great oceans; (b) its mineral resources; (c) the dependence of the West on those resources; and (d) the embarrassment which the Western world has in having (and having to have) close economic relations in consequence. It is, therefore, particularly easy to link South Africa with troubles fomented in Europe (particularly Britain) or the US. It seems essential to work out as soon as possible a coherent and realistic plan which will ensure the stability of South Africa.

(k) China

73. The value of China as an ally to the West rests on
- (a) its capacity to impose a major regional restraint on Soviet expansion; and
  - (b) its divisive effect within the Marxist camp.

For these two reasons, all possible should be done in order to encourage China to oppose Soviet initiatives within the Communist community. A Western alliance with China is, of course, no less a mariage de convenance than was that with the Soviet Union in 1941-45, but such marriages have to be made, and they are effective so long as too much is not expected of them. Any long term alliance with a Communist country would, of course, be inherently unstable.

IX : BRITISH DEFENCE POLICY

74. The threat from the Soviet Union is in the last resort a military one which needs to be countered by a strong and evident capacity to meet force with effective force and so to deter the Russians from using it anywhere in the world as an instrument of their policy. The main responsibility for this rests with the United States. But the more that we can share that burden, the greater our influence will be both with the United States and with the Alliance as a whole.

75. We assume that our economic position will render any increase in our defence expenditure beyond the promised 3% impracticable. Even that increase is likely to be absorbed by rising costs of manpower and equipment. It will not be easy to maintain our full commitment to the Central Front, our maritime capability as well as our strategic nuclear forces without an erosion in the efficiency of all three. To abandon any of them, however, would not only have a bad effect on our allies but would be seen as a weakening in the defensive capacity of the West as a whole. The maintenance of defence expenditure at a level to sustain them must, therefore, be given the highest priority as must the need for this to be made clear to the British people.

76. The main danger of Soviet aggression lies outside Europe. As earlier noted, it is in Europe that we have allies best fitted, geographically and economically, to assume an increasing share of the defence of their own territories. A British presence on the Central Front, like a US one, remains essential to the cohesion of the Alliance. But in helping to check Soviet expansion outside Europe, the US looks, in the first place, to its British allies, and it is outside Europe that we should do our best to help them. We should, therefore, strengthen our maritime forces to the greatest possible extent, both to give greater help to the US Navy in protecting the waters of the North Atlantic, and to provide contingents to 'show the flag', as we did in Korea, in cooperation with the United States anywhere in the world. The exclusive preoccupation with the European theatre which has marked our policy for the past twelve years needs to be modified.

77. We should do everything necessary to help the United States to maintain both the strategic and the theatre nuclear balance. The provision of bases in this country for US theatre nuclear forces is an essential contribution to this. It must, however, be accompanied by significant and well-publicised measures of civil defence, which should be seen not only as prudent provision for an emergency but as an intrinsic part of our defence posture. We welcome the evidence of increasing governmental interest in this matter.

#### X : WESTERN INITIATIVES

##### 78. (a) General appreciation

The Western position would be enhanced by some positive initiative designed both to reverse the Soviet tide and be seen to do so. The Russians had many setbacks between 1945 and 1975 but none to speak of since the fall of Saigon (April 1975) except, perhaps, the Russian failure to confirm its psychological dominance in the North Pacific (which led to the Japanese-Chinese Treaty, specifically against the idea of Soviet hegemony in 1978). We think it should be possible and desirable deliberately to seek an instance where a Soviet position could be reversed.



79. Exposed nerves in the Soviet Empire where the Russians are already the defenders would seem to include:

- (i) Angola (including Cabinda);
- (ii) Guinea;
- (iii) Congo (Brazzaville); and, perhaps,
- (iv) Cuba

80. We should also look carefully at places where the Soviet Union might be expected to "strike next". Apart from the obvious instances of Pakistan, the Persian Gulf, and Iran (and, perhaps, Rhodesia/Zimbabwe), possibilities would seem to be quite numerous: e.g.\*

- (i) Turkey (strategy);
- (ii) Morocco-Sahara (phosphates, strategy);
- (iii) Thailand (strategy);
- (iv) Yugoslavia (strategy);
- (v) The Basque country (strategy);
- (vi) Puerto Rico (referendum in 1981)(strategy);
- (vii) Jamaica (bauxite, strategy);
- (viii) Belize (strategy);
- (ix) El Salvador (strategy);
- (x) Namibia (minerals, strategy);
- (xi) Zaire (again)(chrome);
- (xii) Oman (strategy); and
- (xiii) Yemen (strategy)

81. The Soviet Union may also try and exploit further the advantages which she already has in OPEC. Soviet emissaries could very easily secure what they want from that organisation by the threat of military intervention or of subversion. That policy could be repeated with other international cartels such as the International Bauxite Association.

82. The Western reply to these or other challenges should be guided by a careful assessment of the balance of social and political forces inside the countries concerned; an assesment

/ at least as

---

\* The reasons for possible Soviet interest are noted in parenthesis.

at least as careful and expert as that which will be made by our adversaries. Our main weapons are economic and technological as well as military and clandestine, and the first two of these must be used as tools for sustaining or regaining political influence. No general guidelines can be laid down: all depends on expert knowledge of each area, acute political analysis, and - perhaps most important of all - skilful conduct of personal relations with the key actors: the fact that many African leaders of the present time are nearing death may present us with opportunities as well as risks.

83. (b) The Persian Gulf

The importance of the oil on either side of the Persian Gulf to the industrialised nations makes this region and its access to the sea at Hormuz now the most critical one in the world. Resistance to Soviet pressure would in ideal circumstances be the responsibility of the inhabitants of that area itself. But these are not ideal circumstances. We are sceptical whether the rulers in a majority of the States there accept or understand such notions as 'responsibility'. They hanker for protection. Most of them are caught between fear of the USSR and scepticism about the Western will to defend them.

84. Saudi Arabia in particular is in a difficult position since much of her population is potentially disloyal, and she has a political system in which few have faith. She has an unconditional Soviet satellite to her South (South Yemen), a state with an ambiguous future on the South West (North Yemen) and states even more unsure of themselves than is Saudi Arabia herself in the East. The establishment of a Palestinian State under any rulers likely to emerge would not assuage this dangerous state of affairs.

85. Accordingly, we think it necessary to make clear to the states concerned the will and the capacity of the West to bring them rapid and effective help. Military aid should be given so as not to contribute to the destabilisation of the society concerned, as occurred in Iran. The establishment of Western bases is naturally in this area, or any other, a matter of

political delicacy. Even so, our readiness to establish anew such bases, and our capacity to provide forces for intervention, must be made crystal-clear. It is possible that the British links severed so short a time ago in the area may make it easier for us to take the lead than the United States; but only the United States possess mobile forces in sufficient quantity to take advantage of any such bases.

86. If as a result of continuing troubles in Iran, an invitation were to be received from, say, secessionary forces in that country, it should be seriously considered. A substantial Western presence in the region of the Iranian oil wells could betoken the rebirth of the West's reputation in that whole area. Great diplomatic skill and subtlety would no doubt be necessary to secure the acceptance of Iraq and the other states bordering on the Gulf for such an action. But no other course would, on the one hand, serve so well the long term economic interests of the West and, on the other hand, make possible the protection of the West's allies in the zone. The fall of the Shah should have taught us that we cannot expect any ally in the Middle East to be dependable when our own physical remoteness from the scene makes us undependable for them. Thus, if Iran were to remain unstable, we should explore very carefully whether an invitation of the type described might not be forthcoming.

87. We must naturally be aware of the danger that the Soviet Union, alarmed by a new Western presence near its border, might undertake warlike counter measures, in the form either of a formidable conventional intervention against the Western forces concerned or even of a nuclear threat against the territory of the US. This would present the West with the alternative either of a humiliating withdrawal, or of hostilities rapidly escalating to the nuclear level. So the measure suggested in para. 86 could only be put into effect if, first, public opinion in the West were to be persuaded of an urgent danger to its vital interests in the Gulf; and second, if this conviction were forcibly conveyed to the Soviet Union through all possible channels. The first of these two provisions could not, of course, be achieved overnight.

88. (c) Angola, Sahara, OPEC

Certain factors incline some of us to believe that the West could recoup some of its losses in Angola. These factors include:

- (i) the unpopularity of the new government of Eduardo Santos;
- (ii) the unpopularity of the Cubans;
- (iii) the availability of well entrenched guerilla forces, now apparently on the Western side;
- (iv) the contiguity of Namibia; and,
- (v) the exposed position of Angola in the South Atlantic.

Any victory in Angola would be worthwhile because:-

- (i) it would defeat the 'myth of Cuba';
- (ii) it would, therefore, have disruptive effects elsewhere where the Cubans are acting as the Russians' surrogates;
- (iii) it would have a destructive effect in Cuba itself and perhaps weaken or even help to dislodge the communist government there - an event much to be desired and one which would have the most salutary effect in Latin America, perhaps leading to a general halt to the slide in the Caribbean;
- (iv) it would help the emergence of a democratic Namibia;
- (v) it would guarantee the Angolans' oil to the West. Gulf Oil get what they want at the moment. But that tap could be turned off.

89. A Western victory in Angola could be followed by taking up the suggestion of Lord Home in the House of Lords that the UN should be required to call on Cuba to withdraw from Africa.

90. We recognise, however, that such an attempt, if it failed, might lead to a prolongation of Soviet-Cuban activities in Africa and the inflammation, rather than the appeasement, of the situation in Namibia. The problem demands more intensive study than we have the time or expertise to give it.

91. It also seems important to us to ensure a Moroccan victory in what used to be Spanish Sahara. That region is not only of strategic importance but, along with Morocco itself, Sahara has a large proportion of the world's exports of phosphates, whose significance is almost as important for Western agriculture as is oil for its industry. Every assistance, therefore, should be given to Morocco whose present government is anyway one of the West's best allies. At the moment, the rebel Polisario's excellent public relations enable them to appear much more successful than they actually are.

92. We feel that OPEC as now constituted presents so grave a threat to the West (since it may become a major political issue between the West and the USSR) that ways and means should be explored to secure its disintegration.

93. The Caribbean also needs a careful examination. Although plainly a US zone of influence, Britain still has residual responsibilities and interests. The US has not conducted its policies there with the necessary tact, knowledge and determination. The West's most reliable friend in the region is Venezuela. Everything should be done to assist and encourage that country to play a part in opposing the influence of Cuba both in the Caribbean islands and on the mainland of Central America - perhaps in collaboration with the US's new Caribbean Task Force, perhaps independently.

/ CONCLUSION

CONCLUSION

94. The principle which should guide our policy towards the Soviet Union, in this present age of competitive co-existence, should be the realisation that that power normally avoids military moves which it has reason to believe may lead to a serious clash with the West, with the risk of escalation. The invasions of Hungary in 1956 and of Czechoslovakia in 1968 were operations which they knew they could carry out without such a clash occurring. Even more instructive was the Soviet decision in 1973 to cancel an imminent military intervention in the Middle East in response to a nuclear alert ordered by the US. We believe, on the evidence of the facts which we have studied, that the invasion of Afghanistan falls into the same category too, and that (as we have earlier stated) the Soviet Union did not, indeed had no valid reason to, anticipate anything like the full extent of the retaliatory US reaction. The only real deterrent against further Soviet expansion is, therefore, warning of retaliation - provided such warning is both effective and credible. Our main aim, in cooperation with the United States and our European allies, should be to ensure by our activities in the military, political and economic fields, that our warnings to the Russians are both effective and credible.

95. To ensure this credibility among our own people, an increased level of hostility may be necessary, along with a deliberate attempt to ensure both greater public awareness of the nature of the threat, and public readiness to accept a higher proportion of governmental expenditure to be spent on defence. We must also prevent the Soviet Union from making impossible the growth of good relations between us and the 'Third World'. For this it is necessary both to maintain an effective military deterrent against any Soviet use of force as an instrument of their policy; and to counter Soviet

/ subversion

subversion wherever it occurs. While making our warnings clear, we should always be ready for negotiations, and for trade and other exchanges which we consider to be beneficial to ourselves and which do not strengthen the military potential of the Soviet Union.

96. In the course of this paper we have tried to put forward a number of specific proposals aimed at countering Soviet expansion. We have listed them at the conclusion of the text. We realise that not all of them are easy to achieve. We also appreciate that many contingencies will arise in the future which we have not foreseen and which will alter the basis of our analysis. But there is one factor which will remain constant: the implacable and determined enmity of the Soviet Union. We in the West are faced with an enemy whose avowed aim ultimately is to create a communist world which looks towards Moscow as its directing centre. It has never weakened in this since 1917, but has only recently acquired the military means to make possible the attempt. This threat is the over-riding issue, in the light of which all other considerations must be judged. Though resolute and implacable, the enemy has many weaknesses: and we have the superior moral and economic strength. The victories of our enemy in the past have mainly been due to our own failure of will to resist him and to his constant and alert readiness to exploit this failure. No action or series of actions will in the end stem Soviet advance unless we in the West possess this will: on the other hand, if we do display, and display credibly, our determination to resist communist expansion and to defend our way of life and essential interests, we thereby close the open doors through which alone the Soviet enemy in the past has sought to push. The West has been repeatedly deceived and misled about Soviet intentions: this must not happen again.

*Michael Howard*

*Elio Sestouni*  
*Leonard Solazito*  
*Hugh Thomas*

14 March 1980

SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Consider a worldwide association of democratic states (para.2)
2. Issue a 'rallying call' (para.36) for a new public awareness (para.95).
3. Secure harmony of allied contacts with USSR (para.42).
4. Complete NATO membership (para.46).
5. Consider a wider alliance (para.48).
6. Reinvigorate our capacity for political warfare (para.49).
7. Aim Westernpropaganda precisely (para.51).
8. Develop further the BBC, British Council, etc. as weapons in the ideological struggle (para.52).
9. Ensure real professionalism in international propaganda (para. 53).
10. Re-examine themes for effective propaganda (para.54).
11. Look at some parts of higher education from a strategic angle (para.59-60).
12. Think through every level of military preparedness (para.61-63).
13. Persevere in the search for East-West contacts between peoples, not governments (para.64).
14. Forget sanctions as a weapon (para.65).
15. Ban all sales of technology useful for aggression (para.66).
16. Ensure wise attitudes to Russian and East European dissidents (para.67-69)
17. Secure that aid is determined by strategic considerations (para 69) and Appendix .
18. Devise plans to ensure South African stability (para.72).
19. Define the nature of the West's association with China (para.73).
20. Consider the appropriate emphasis in British defence (para.74-77).
21. Achieve a Western "success" (para.78) by realistic policies in the Persian Gulf (para.83-86) or/and imaginative ones in Angola (para.88).
22. Secure Morocco (para.91).
23. Devise the demise of OPEC (para.92).



## Appendix

### Why FO must control aid

I READ with interest your article on Britain's aid to developing countries (page 8, last week). As a former leader of a third world country who has had considerable experience with the previous state of affairs, I regard the decision of the British government to put the Ministry of Overseas Development under the control of the Foreign Office and to tie down aid to "political, industrial and commercial considerations" as a most enlightened one.

After winning three popular elections to get the Seychelles integrated with Britain, when the British government of the day decided to pull out East of Suez, Whitehall suddenly brought pressure on me to change for a policy of independence. I agreed, on one condition, that the British government would, before independence, help us build an intelli-

gence unit to monitor local and regional intelligence and develop a para-military capability to deter the possibility of an internal insurrection.

The Foreign Office categorically agreed. But when it came to deliver the goods, the Foreign Office was unable to do so. Dame Judith Hart, whose Ministry of Overseas Development controlled the way British aid was to be spent, repeatedly argued that her sole concern was "social welfare development." And it appeared that there was nobody in a position to overrule her.

As a result my pro-British government was toppled less than one year after independence by a few people trained in Tanzania—a country with a record for receiving British aid. And since my overthrow, more than 1,000 Tanzanian soldiers

have been stationed in Seychelles and despite the fact that on February 15 the Seychelles government signed a Maritime Agreement with the Soviet Union, British aid to the Islands and to Tanzania still flows without the least protest.

Dame Judith Hart's "social welfare" concept was ill-conceived and out of touch with the reality of this world. I remember one year she allotted

some £25m to India for social development purposes—and only a few weeks later the same India gave to Mauritius, a country where the per capita living standard was at least twice higher than her own, about £10m for purely political consideration.

James R Mancham  
Former President,  
Republic of Seychelles  
London SW1

Sunday Times, Mar. 2 1980

GR 500

CONFIDENTIAL

FM VIENNA 162225Z MAY 80

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 173 OF 16 MAY80

AND TO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, MOSCOW

INFO IMMEDIATE PARIS, BONN, UKDEL NATO, UKMIS NEW YORK

CONFIDENTIAL

4 bells on the  
Siscomms i Vienna.

mt

FOLLOWING FROM PRIVATE SECRETARY

MUSKIE'S TALKS WITH GROMYKO

1 MUSKIE BRIEFED THE SECRETARY OF STATE AND SR COLOMBO IMMEDIATELY AFTER HIS MEETING WITH GROMYKO THIS EVENING. THE MEETING LASTED MUCH LONGER THAN EXPECTED, ( KEEPING GENSCHER WAITING FOR HIS TALK WITH GROMYKO).

2. GROMYKO ASKED WHY THE US HAD DECIDED TO DISRUPT DETENTE MUSKIE MADE OUT THE US CASE, CHALLENGING THIS ASSERTION WITH THE USUAL EXPLANATIONS. GROMYKO INSISTED THAT THE US AND NATO HAD DISRUPTED DETENTE BY:

- (A) THE 3 PER CENT INTEREST IN DEFENCE SPENDING;
- (B) THE DEPLOYMENT OF PERSHING 2 MISSILES;
- (C) THE AMERICAN QUOTE BURIAL UNQUOTE OF SALT II.

THIS HAD CREATED THE IMPRESSION OF A SHIFT IN THE AMERICAN ATTITUDE TO DETENTE. THE SOVIET UNION HAD CONCLUDED THAT THE AMERICANS WERE MOUNTING A CAMPAIGN TO ACHIEVE SUPERIORITY, ABANDONING THE IDEA OF EQUALITY.

3. GROMYKO HAD SPENT SOME TIME PROMOTING THE SOVIET/AFGHAN PROPOSALS ON AFGHANISTAN. HE GAVE THE FAMILIAR REASONS FOR SOVIET INTERVENTION, CLAIMING THAT THE PAKISTANIS AND AMERICANS HAD MOUNTED ARMED INTRUSIONS AND THAT THE RUSSIANS HAD MOVED IN AFTER MANY REQUESTS FROM AFGHANISTAN. IT WAS A MISTAKE FOR A SETTLEMENT. THIS WAS TOTALLY UNACCEPTABLE.

4. MUSKIE REHEARSED THE AMERICAN RESERVATIONS ON THE SOVIET AFGHAN PROPOSALS, WHICH WERE DESIGNED TO LEGITIMISE THE INVASION AND THE KARMAL GOVERNMENT, WHILE ENABLING KARMAL TO CALL THE RUSSIANS IN AGAIN. THESE MADE THE PROPOSALS UNACCEPTABLE TO THE AMERICANS. BUT MUSKIE FELT THAT GROMYKO WANTED TO QUOTE CLEAR AWAY THE UNDERBUSH UNQUOTE OF SOVIET AND AMERICAN FRUSTRATIONS, AND TO DEAL WITH SOME OF THE THRUSTING AND PARRYING THAT HAD BEEN CARRIED ON THROUGH THE MEDIA. HE MAY ALSO HAVE BEEN PROBING FOR WEAKNESSES IN THE US POSITION. MUSKIE WAS NOT SURE, BUT HE THOUGHT THAT THERE WAS A POSSIBILITY THAT GROMYKO HAD SURFACED THE PROPOSALS ON AFGHANISTAN AS A POSSIBLE FORMULA FOR A RESOLUTION OF THE PROBLEM. GROMYKO HAD SAID THAT HE WANTED A REPLY TO THESE PROPOSALS.

CONFIDENTIAL

/s.

5. WHEN GROMYKO HAD COMPLAINED ABOUT MAKING AFGHANISTAN A PRECONDITION FOR THE RESUMPTION OF DETENTE, MUSKIE HAD INSISTED THAT AFGHANISTAN WAS A REAL PROBLEM, AND A FACTOR OF POLITICAL LIFE, PREVENTING FOR EXAMPLE THE RATIFICATION OF SALT II. GROMYKO HAD EMPHASISED THAT DETENTE WAS THE ONLY REASONABLE POLICY BETWEEN THE TWO SUPER POWERS. HE HAD TAKEN A SWIPE AT BREZINEFSKI, WITHOUT MENTIONING HIS NAME, RIDICULING THE VIEW THAT THE SOVIET UNION WAS TO DIG IN AFGHANISTAN IN ORDER TO MOVE INTO THE GULF AS QUOTE ABSURD LOW LEVEL CRITICISM BASED ON THE ARC OF CRISIS UNQUOTE, AND SUGGESTING THAT THERE HAD TO BE AN ARC IN THE THINKING OF THOSE WHO TALKED IN THIS WAY. MUSKIE HAD REPLIED THAT IF THE RUSSIANS REMAINED IN AFGHANISTAN PERMANENTLY, THEY WOULD BE GEOGRAPHICALLY CLOSE TO A VERY SENSITIVE AND VITAL OIL LIFELINE. THIS WAS A SERIOUS MATTER FOR THE WEST, WHICH WAS THOUSANDS OF MILES AWAY.

6. MUSKIE SAID THAT GROMYKO HAD KEPT THE CONVERSATION GOING ALTHOUGH HE HAD ANOTHER ENGAGEMENT (WITH GENSCHER). HE HAD WANTED TO GO ON TO TALK ABOUT CHINA AND IRAN (ON WHICH THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT TIME TO DEBRIEF MUSKIE)

7. MUSKIE HAD CRITICISED SOVIET BROADCASTS TO TEHRAN. GROMYKO (IN HIS ONLY REFERENCE TO THE OLYMPICS) HAD RIPOSTED THAT IN COMPETITION WITH SOVIET BROADCASTS TO TEHRAN, AMERICAN BROADCASTS TO THE SOVIET UNION WOULD WIN A GOLD MEDAL, THOUGH THE AMERICANS SEEMED TO HAVE LOST THEIR BELIEF IN GOLD MEDALS. IN GENERAL, GROMYKO HAD BEEN RELAXED THROUGHOUT. MUSKIE'S IMPRESSION

WAS THAT GROMYKO HAD BEEN FEELING HIM OUT. IN ADVISING THE SECRETARY OF STATE ON THE BEST LINE TO TAKE WITH GROMYKO DURING HIS OWN MEETING THE FOLLOWING MORNING, MUSKIE SAID THAT IT WAS IMPORTANT TO MAKE HIM AWARE OF THE QUOTE AFGHANISTAN BLOCK UNQUOTE WHICH HE COULD NOT WISH AWAY, AND OF THE FORCE OF PUBLIC OPINION. THE RUSSIANS MUST UNDERSTAND THE PRESSURE FOR WITHDRAWAL, AND FAVOUR OF A NEUTRAL AFGHANISTAN. THEY WERE KEEN TO DIVIDE WESTERN COUNTRIES, AND IT WAS IMPORTANT THAT WE TAKE THE SAME LINE. GROMYKO HAD TRIED PARTICULARLY HARD TO PUT HIM ON THE DEFENSIVE BY ACCUSING HIM OF

RESPONSIBILITY FOR DISRUPTING DETENTE. IN HIS VIEW, WE SHOULD NOT WASTE TIME ON EG. SALT II, NOW THAT GROMYKO HAS GOT THIS OFF HIS CHEST, BUT CONCENTRATE ON AFGHANISTAN.

GORDON

[ COPIES SENT TO N910 Downing St ]

DEPARTMENTAL DIST:

ADDITIONAL DIST:

EE5D ACDD  
NAD SAD  
WGD HGD  
UND FED  
ECB CAD  
DGA.D ES45D

SALT

2

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET UK EYES ONLY



cc Soviet Union  
Aug 79: Policy towards...  
Foreign Policy  
5

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

6 May 1980

BF for mtg  
12.5.80

The Management of East/West Relations

The Prime Minister has read with interest the paper on this subject forwarded to me under cover of your letter of 2 May and the related, more highly classified, letter on a similar subject which you sent to me on the same day. She would like to discuss both papers at a meeting on Tuesday 13 May at 1600. She would be grateful if Lord Carrington could be accompanied by Sir Michael Palliser, Messrs Bullard, Mallaby, Braithwaite and yourself. Apart from discussing any points the Prime Minister wishes to raise, the objective of this meeting would be to identify those points which might be included in a paper to go to OD later in the month or early in June.

MODBA

G.G.H. Walden, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

SECRET UK EYES ONLY

TOP SECRET

*and*

4

PRIME MINISTER

East/West Relations in the Wake of Afghanistan

I attach two FCO papers on UK policy in the wake of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

✓ The first - on the Management of East/West Relations - is a refinement of the earlier paper on the Prevention of Soviet Expansion in the Developing World which you saw over Easter. The second - on the Destablising of Soviet Client States - is the top secret paper which was promised to you as part of the previous exercise. It is an abbreviated version of a much longer paper.

✓  
*see Soviet Union Aug 75 (P.M. to USSR)*

These papers have not been cleared with other Departments and are not at present in a form suitable for wider Whitehall distribution. The proposal is to hold a small meeting here next Thursday (at 1630) in the same format as your earlier discussions with the FCO. It would be attended by the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary, Mr. Bullard, Mr. Mallaby, Mr. Walden ~~and a member of the planning staff (unfortunately Mr. Braithwaite is in Washington that day).~~ You may think that since the papers are getting nearer the policy stage, we should add Sir Michael Palliser to the above list.

*Agreed Mr.*

In the light of the outcome of next Thursday's discussion, the FCO would aim to prepare a paper for discussion at OD later in the month.

I think we have passed the point where there is much point in involving the academics formally. But perhaps you would like me to draft a letter from you to Hugh Thomas telling him how helpful and stimulating his paper has been?

*Mr. P. ...*

*AmS*

2 May 1980

TOP SECRET



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

2 May 1980

Dear Michael

The Management of East/West Relations

I enclose a copy of a paper prepared in the FCO. This builds on the earlier material which the Prime Minister has seen on the "Prevention of Soviet Expansion in the Developing World". It is designed to bring out more clearly the areas in which action is already being taken, or where new decisions are perhaps needed. It has not, however, been cleared with other Whitehall Departments who have an interest, such as the Ministry of Defence and the Treasury. It is therefore not suitable in its present form for wider Whitehall distribution.

When he visits Washington at the end of the week, Lord Carrington plans to sketch out the way our minds are moving on the lines of the attached paper, without of course committing Her Majesty's Government and without going into detail.

We have given the paper a particularly restricted classification. It is critical of present arrangements in Washington. The code words "burning bush" cover all papers referring to Quadripartite discussions in the particularly restricted format of "Heads of Government Representatives" initiated by Brzezinski in January.

Yours  
G G H

G G H Walden  
Private Secretary

M O'D B Alexander Esq  
10 Downing Street

SECRET - UK EYES ONLY -  
BURNING BUSH

THE MANAGEMENT OF EAST-WEST RELATIONS

Summary of Conclusions and Recommendations

1. We need above all to restore the coherence of the West. This means improving the existing arrangements for consultation, and perhaps devising new arrangements to bring in the Japanese and Australasians (paragraph 10).
2. We need to improve the North-South economic relationship and seek solutions for political problems of particular concern to the Third World (paragraph 15).
3. In addition we should:
  - a) Review our arrangements for applying economic sanctions to the Russians (paragraph 13);
  - b) Develop our capacity for long range military intervention outside the NATO area (paragraphs 17-20);
  - c) Improve our arrangements for giving military assistance in the Third World (paragraph 21);
  - d) Improve our machinery for conducting propaganda (paragraphs 22-24);
  - e) Develop our links with Third World political organisations (paragraphs 25-27);
  - f) Consider measures for destabilising states in the Soviet orbit (not further discussed in this paper).
4. Work is already in hand on some of these. Only modest changes in existing arrangements may be needed: we have in any case few resources available. For this and other reasons, we need effective cooperation with our allies, and an appropriate division of tasks. Some possibilities are indicated in the body of the paper.

BACKGROUND

5. The West has developed a number of arrangements for managing the relationship with the Soviet Union and its allies, covering defence, the negotiation of political and arms control agreements in the mutual interest, the development of political, commercial and other links. These arrangements remain adequate in principle for managing the direct East-West relationship. They depend however on the West's cohesion, its determination to maintain adequate forces, and its willingness in a crisis to use both its levers of pressure on the Soviet Union and its channels of communication. Recent events have called these in question: paragraphs 7-14 below therefore consider how existing arrangements might be improved.

/6. But in

SECRET - UK EYES ONLY -  
BURNING BUSH

6. But in the 1970s existing arrangements were insufficient to prevent repeated Soviet intervention in the Third World. Here the problems are more complex. In the "North" the East-West confrontation is explicit, Soviet ambitions are contained, and most countries know well enough which side they are on. In the "South", most countries hope to evade being caught up in the East-West conflict. They feel considerable resentment toward the West, partly because of past history, partly because of their continuing economic dependence on the developed West for markets, industrial products, aid and education. Because the West is also to some extent dependent upon them, they hope to extract concessions through political and economic pressure. By contrast the Russians have ambitions rather than real interests in the Third World: they can move into (or out of) situations and countries at little cost, provided they can avoid a direct military confrontation with Western (or overtly Western-backed) forces. They offer military assistance and an ideology which is attractive to guerilla movements and to authoritarian regimes in newly independent countries. They have hitherto been little criticised for their poor economic aid performance. But their invasion of Afghanistan may lead to a more clear-sighted view of Soviet policies in this and other fields. Paragraphs 15 to 30 below consider what policies the West should pursue to reinforce such a trend.

THE MANAGEMENT OF EAST-WEST RELATIONS IN THE "NORTH"

Western Consultation and Coordination

7. The essential basis for all our dealings with the Russians has always been the healthy functioning of relationships within the West itself, combined with clear and purposeful leadership by the United States.

8. These relationships are managed formally within the Atlantic Alliance and the European Community; and less formally through the irregular Summits of the Seven and through the (secret) quadripartite and (more recently initiated) tripartite exchanges between ourselves, the French, the Germans and the Americans. These arrangements have a number of weaknesses. NATO is precluded by its terms of reference from dealing with (or - for the most part - even discussing) issues arising outside the "treaty area", some of its members have strongly resisted change, and the French insist on independence. The European Community, though a powerful influence in international affairs because of its economic weight, is rarely able to agree on effective political action, and is precluded from dealing with defence issues. The arrangements for Tripartite and Quadripartite discussion have deliberately been kept informal to preserve their confidentiality: this makes it harder to ensure that the discussions lead to effective action. The

/ Summits of

SECRET - UK EYES ONLY -  
BURNING BUSH



SECRET - UK EYES ONLY -  
BURNING BUSH

Summits of the Seven, an important function of which is to involve the Japanese beyond their narrow relationship with the US, meet too seldom and have hitherto dealt with economic issues: and the Japanese (as well as the Italians) are not secure. Apart from the US link, there is no arrangement for involving the Australians and New Zealanders, despite their concern with Soviet ambitions in the "South".

9. As long as the West did not face a divisive crisis, these weaknesses did not matter much. The situation has been changed by the crises in Iran and Afghanistan, and by the vacillation, confusion, and ineptitude of the present US administration. The lack of a clear and consistent lead from the Americans, and their preoccupation with their hostages in Tehran, risks greatly increasing the scope for Soviet meddling in Iran, and encouraging the Germans to develop policies in Eastern Europe which go beyond or cut across the policies of the West as a whole: this it has been the object of all post-war policy to avoid. In the interests of solidarity with the Americans, which all recognise as an overriding interest, the Europeans have adopted policies in which they do not believe. The multiplication of "consultations" has hardly helped: it has done little to reduce misunderstanding between the Americans and the Germans, and too often the Americans have failed to follow through their own proposals, either through muddle or because they have changed their minds.

10. In these circumstances we need:

- a) to strengthen our embryonic Tripartite relationship with the French and Germans. This will be a frustrating and painful process, for well-known reasons. It will need much patience. But the Europeans will not be able to function effectively unless they are reasonably united; and this depends on agreement amongst the Three.
- b) To make the Quadripartite discussions, which are the most firmly established and useful of all the smaller forums, more effective. We should limit the proliferation of meetings and ensure that they are properly prepared and followed up despite internal problems of coordination in the capitals of the other Three. The price may be a certain bureaucratisation, and an increased risk of resentment from the non-participants.
- c) To develop the political cooperation of the Nine, where we have now a certain authority. The FCO has been examining ways of improving the administration of political cooperation (eg by strengthening the Presidency). This might be pursued, though it is unrealistic to expect dramatic improvements in the present cumbersome way of doing business.

/ d) To continue

- d) To continue to nudge NATO towards discussing issues outside the treaty area; and to get the Americans in particular to make more genuine use of the North Atlantic Council for political consultation (their Permanent Representative was not even in Brussels for the first weeks of the Afghan crisis).
- e) To devise better ways of involving the Japanese (despite their leakiness) and Australasians. Bilateral relations will continue to be important. The network of meetings between officials for preparing political discussions could be maintained beyond the Venice Summit of the Seven. The recent meeting between the Japanese Foreign Minister and the Nine set a useful precedent: the Presidency might be instructed to follow it up both with the Japanese and the Australasians when issues became ripe for useful discussion. It would probably be unnecessarily cumbersome to formalise the political consultations of the Seven by setting up new institutions.

#### Defence arrangements in Europe

11. Despite the obvious connexion between the two, the defence arrangements of the Alliance are, for the present at least, in a slightly better state than its political arrangements. Provided that members of the Alliance stand by their existing decisions and meet their commitments, then the increase in defence budgets, the adoption of new programmes by the United States, the agreement on theatre nuclear forces, will all help to sustain the essential minimum military means for deterring Soviet adventures in the NATO area. But there are signs that even on these military issues Alliance resolution may be wavering; and the French refusal to participate in the integrated military structure is still a stumbling block. The chief problem, however, (discussed in the previous paragraph) is to ensure that the political basis is not eroded. Military arrangements outside the NATO area are discussed in paragraphs 17-20 below.

#### East-West Links: threats and levers

12. The East-West political links developed in the 1960s and 1970s worked well enough in the past as an instrument of crisis management. The most important channel was the secret link between Presidents Nixon and Ford (and Dr Kissinger) and Mr Brezhnev. As far as we know, this channel is not working at present, partly perhaps because of disarray in Washington, and partly because the Soviet leadership is moribund. Public exchanges (East-West summits, visits to Moscow, etc) are less effective for crisis management because they can give opportunities to the Russians to divide

/allies and

SECRET - UK EYES ONLY -  
BURNING BUSH

allies and put pressure on Western opinion. The severance of such public exchanges as an expression of displeasure at Soviet actions or a warning to Moscow against actions in preparation is a gesture which can have value but cannot easily be long sustained: their resumption is a matter of timing.

13. In recent years the Soviet Union has ceased to strive for economic autarky: it is beginning to become dependent on the world economic system. To some extent, East-West trade can create a two-way dependence (e.g. Germany's interest in East European trade and gas supplies may affect her political judgement, as Poland's may be by her current debt problems). But the West has some real economic levers (grain, credit, and technology) and used them after Afghanistan. It is not clear how far these sanctions have affected Soviet actions, or will deter the Russians from future adventures. But they have presumably raised the cost of the invasion to the Russians; they could be further extended in the current crisis; and they could be used again in a future crisis. In preparation we might establish (and then discuss with our allies) a list of Soviet industries particularly dependent on technology imported from key Western countries, in order to plan and to implement a coordinated and selective deterrent embargo on a future occasion. This is a difficult project, but it should be discussed if we are serious in trying to create leverage against the Russians.

14. Other East-West links - professional, cultural and human - may have an intrinsic value, and are certainly welcome to the peoples of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. Their contribution to political evolution in those countries is likely to be slow and uncertain. Their severance in a crisis is unlikely to weigh much with Soviet policy makers, though it may be a necessary public gesture of displeasure by the West.

SOVIET EXPANSIONISM IN THE "SOUTH"

15. A new policy is needed to contain Soviet expansionism in the Third World, as a major addition in the '80s to Western policies towards the Soviet Union. This will require measures both to constrain the Russians and to influence the actions and attitudes of the Third World countries themselves. This latter element would be designed to strengthen the resistance of the developing countries to Soviet infiltration and intimidation. It would involve, in the first instance, tackling problems with which the Russians have little direct concern: the overall economic relationship between the developing world and the developed West; the need to reduce the West's dependence on uncertain oil supplies by conservation and the development of alternative sources of energy; the Arab-Israel dispute; racial disputes in Namibia and South Africa. These and

/others are

SECRET - UK EYES ONLY -  
BURNING BUSH

SECRET - UK EYES ONLY -  
BURNING BUSH

others are problems to be handled separately and on their merits, rather than as part of an overall plan for countering the Russians. But if these problems could be solved, or mitigated, the Russians would lose much of their scope for making trouble where the West, but not they, have real political and economic interests at stake; and Western coordination would be made easier by the removal of points of dissension, e.g. on policy towards the Palestinians.

16. Nevertheless, there are a number of things the West can do to counter Soviet influence in the Third World more or less directly.

Military Measures: Long Range Intervention Forces

17. A Western capacity to use force at a distance can have three purposes:

- i) to intervene locally to protect our interests, or our friends;
- ii) to deter or oppose military action by a Soviet proxy;
- iii) to deter a Soviet military move in the Third World by posing the risk that a direct local clash could escalate.

18. The West's capacity to do these things has declined since Vietnam and the British withdrawal from East of Suez. But the French regularly intervene in local quarrels, and American plans for a Rapid Deployment Force will substantially increase their capacity especially in the Indian Ocean. And because people are always worried when a superpower intervenes, there may be a particularly useful role here for modest European forces.

19. Ministers have agreed that we should improve our capacity in a modest way, and the Ministry of Defence are conducting studies. When these are completed we should consider military discussions with the French and Americans about the cooperative use of our forces before or during a crisis (the French have already shown some interest in talks) and about a possible role for the Australasian forces in South East Asia and the South Pacific.

20. We might also examine the scope for more extended military cooperation with the Japanese: Japanese domestic politics may become slightly less of an inhibition in future.

/Military assistance

SECRET - UK EYES ONLY -  
BURNING BUSH

SECRET - UK EYES ONLY -  
BURNING BUSH

Military assistance

21. Military aid to developing countries is an effective way of influencing their policies, as the Russians have found. It should be a central element in our own policies. Military aid consists of:

- a) Training assistance (on which we will spend only £5.2 million in 1980-81);
- b) The provision of loan service personnel (eg to Sudan which will cost £2 million in 1980-81);
- c) Very occasionally, the provision of cheap, or free military equipment (eg to Zambia in 1978/9 at a cost of £7 million).

A review of overall policy in this field is about to be undertaken. The terms of reference which have been proposed to MOD are general and comprehensive. The review should look at the scale of training now provided and at obstacles to our efforts. In particular, it should address both the availability of training programmes for foreign personnel and the financial charges made. It should also look at the possibility of providing emergency aid in the form of military equipment: the Russians do this, but we do not. And it should examine the possibility of a division of tasks between ourselves, the French, the Germans, the Americans, and perhaps the Australasians, and suggest ways of carrying this forward.

Political Measures: Propaganda

22. The Russians have always proclaimed the right to conduct the ideological struggle despite "detente". They attack Western domestic arrangements and foreign policies. They strongly resent Western counter-propaganda as an illegitimate interference in their affairs.

← 23. Ministers have said in public that they do not accept this "one way option", and that we welcome the ideological struggle. But our machinery for doing so has been run down. We do not need elaborate or extensive arrangements of the kind we had in the past. In any case, we do not have the money. But within the limits of our resources we need:

- ← a) arrangements to produce high quality and carefully tailored material angled towards audiences in the Soviet bloc and the Third World;
- ← b) arrangements to disseminate this material, if appropriate by covert means.

/ Modest work

SECRET - UK EYES ONLY -  
BURNING BUSH

Modest work is being done by the Special Producer Unit, our friends, and the FCO itself especially following the Afghanistan invasion. The External Services of the BBC play an important role. So do Ministerial speeches disseminated by the COI.

24. We should review:

- ✓ a) whether the existing arrangements could be streamlined to get better value for money;
- ✓ b) whether more money is needed, and where it might come from;
- c) whether there is scope for cooperation with allies.

Non-alignment: Third World political organisations

25. Soviet relations with the Third World have come under increased strain not only as a result of Afghanistan, but as developing countries look beyond propaganda and at, for example, the inadequacy of Soviet economic aid.

26. We cannot expect the Third World to abandon non-alignment. But we can hope to undermine its earlier bias towards the Soviet Union. Some of this is a matter for propaganda (see above). Among other things Ministers have made appropriate references in recent speeches. But we also need to get close to Third World policymakers, and their own institutions for coordinating foreign policy. There is some scope for cooperating with the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) and our Ambassadors are under instructions to be positive about the movement and to the philosophy of genuine non-alignment. The Islamic Conference is another important vehicle of Third World opinion; our discussions in April with the Secretary-General, Mr Chatty, about Afghanistan are an example of the cooperation we are seeking to develop. Relations with ASEAN are developing well.

27. No new decisions are needed in this field for the time being.

Destabilisation of States in the Soviet Orbit

28. The question of destabilisation has been dealt with in a separate paper and is not therefore covered here. Besides considering specific action which might be taken by the United Kingdom, we also need to look at the machinery for consulting our allies in this area.

/ Economic Measures:

SECRET - UK EYES ONLY -  
BURNING BUSH

SECRET - UK EYES ONLY -  
BURNING BUSH

Economic Measures: Aid

*2 Cambodia?  
Turmeric?*

29. Massive and carefully directed economic aid buys political support, as the Russians have demonstrated in Cuba, Afghanistan and Vietnam. Ministers have decided in principle to give greater weight to political and commercial considerations in framing our current Aid Programme. The cuts in our aid will fall particularly heavily on our bilateral programmes. We are trying to concentrate where we can on politically vulnerable countries, e.g. Turkey, Pakistan and Zimbabwe, though the sums we now have available are unlikely to make a dramatic difference.

*Notes on  
Prop. 1  
C.N.P.*

30. The Americans, Germans, French and Japanese all give more aid than we do. We should examine what scope there is for persuading our allies to move in where we cannot (the Germans are already increasing their aid to Turkey and Pakistan for example).

PLANNING STAFF

2 May 1980

SECRET - UK EYES ONLY -  
BURNING BUSH

E2 (M...)





GRS 845

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FM PARIS 251227Z APR 80

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 396 OF 25 APRIL 1980

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON

INFO PRIORITY BONN UKDEL NATO AND MOSCOW

INFO SAVING TO BRUSSELS COPENHAGEN DUBLIN ROME LUXEMBOURG

THE HAGUE UKREP BRUSSELS AND UKMIS NEW YORK

*Read in full*

**RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION**

1. THERE WILL BE A COMMUNITY BRIEFING ON THE GROMYKO VISIT ON 26 APRIL. THIS MORNING I WAS ABLE TO SEE THE SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE QUAI BEFORE HE WENT OFF TO SAY GOODBYE TO MR GROMYKO AT THE AIRPORT.
2. DE LEUSSE SAID THAT MR GROMYKO HAD SKETCHED A BROAD FRESCO OF SOVIET/US RELATIONS AND HAD USED VERY HARD LANGUAGE ABOUT THE UNITED STATES. AS REGARDS AFGHANI<sup>STAN</sup>, HE HAD REPEATED THE FAMILIAR SOVIET LINE THAT THE SOVIET UNION HAD BEEN OBLIGED TO INTERVENE BECAUSE OF EXTERNAL INTERFERENCE IN AFGHANI<sup>STAN</sup> AND THAT THE INTERFERENCE MUST STOP BEFORE THE SOVIET TROOPS COULD BE WITHDRAWN. THE SOVIET UNION WOULD BE CONTENT WITH A NON-ALIGNED AFGHANI<sup>STAN</sup> FRIENDLY TOWARDS THE SOVIET UNION. HE HAD SPOKEN IN A WAY WHICH MADE IT CLEAR THAT THE SOVIET UNION WAS CHIEFLY CONCERNED TO LEGITIMISE THE BABRAX REGIME AND THEREFORE THE SOVIET PRESENCE AND TO WORK FOR THE ACCEPTANCE OF THE STATUS QUO BY PAKISTAN AND IRAN. FOR THE FIRST TIME IN FRENCH EXPERIENCE THERE HAD BEEN SOME LIVELY SOVIET CRITICISM OF PAKISTAN.
3. FRENCH MINISTERS HAD CONCENTRATED ON TRYING TO IMPRESS ON MR GROMYKO THE GRAVITY OF THE SITUATION BOTH FOR INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS IN GENERAL AND FOR RELATIONS IN EUROPE IN PARTICULAR. WHATEVER THE SOVIET ARGUMENTS MIGHT BE ABOUT EXTERNAL INTERFERENCE IN AFGHANI<sup>STAN</sup> (AND ANY ALLEGATIONS TO THIS EFFECT COULD HAVE BEEN CONSIDERED BY SOME SUITABLE INTERNATIONAL FORUM), THE USE OF FORCE BY AN ARMY OF ~~80,000~~ MEN WAS TOTALLY UNJUSTIFIED. THE FRENCH SIDE HAD, THROUGHOUT THE CONVERSATIONS, INSISTED ON THE CONDITIONS FOR A SETTLEMENT SET OUT BY PRESIDENT GISCARD ON 26 FEBRUARY, I.E., WITHDRAWAL OF SOVIET TROOPS AND SELF-DETERMINATION FOR AFGHANI<sup>STAN</sup>. GROMYKO'S RESPONSE HAD BEEN TO INDICATE READINESS IN PRINCIPLE TO ACCEPT THIS SORT OF APPROACH WHILE LAYING DOWN CONDITIONS WHICH IN FACT CANCELLED ITS VALUE. HE HAD NEITHER ACCEPTED NOR REFUSED THE FRENCH POSITION.

CONFIDENTIAL

/L. DE LEUSSE

CONFIDENTIAL

4. DE LEUSSE SUMMED UP THE SOVIET POSITION BY SAYING THAT THEY APPEARED TO BE WAITING FOR THE NEXT TWO WORDS UNDERLINED FAIT ACCOMPLI IN AFGHANISTAN TO BE ACCEPTED BY THE OUTSIDE WORLD AND IN SO FAR AS IT WAS NOT ACCEPTED THEY HEAPED THE BLAME FOR RESULTANT TENSION ON THE UNITED STATES. THEY SEEMED TO EXPECT THAT THERE MIGHT EVENTUALLY BE SOME MOVEMENT TOWARDS ACCEPTANCE IN THE SOUTH WEST ASIAN REGION OF A NEW STATUS QUO. THIS WAS THE PURPOSE BEHIND BABRAK'S FIVE PROPOSITIONS AND THE ACTIVITIES OF THE CUBAN FOREIGN MINISTER.

5. DE LEUSSE SAID THAT MR GROMYKO HAD MADE A STATEMENT ABOUT THE SOVIET POSITION ON TNF MODERNISATION IN EUROPE. THE FRENCH SIDE HAD MADE NO REPLY AS THEY WERE NOT INVOLVED IN TNF MODERNISATION. HE SAID THAT MR GROMYKO HAD NOT SHOWN MUCH SYMPATHY FOR CHANCELLOR SCHMIDT'S HINTS AND SUGGESTIONS ON THIS SUBJECT. HE HAD TREATED THEM AS A WESTERN TRICK. WHEN QUESTIONED ON THE FRENCH VIEW OF CHANCELLOR SCHMIDT'S ORIGINAL STATEMENT AND THE LATER CLARIFICATION, HE FIRST SAID THAT THIS WAS NOT FRANCE'S BUSINESS BUT LATER SAID THAT THE FRENCH THOUGHT TOO MUCH FUSS HAD BEEN MADE ABOUT IT BECAUSE IT WAS CLEAR THAT CHANCELLOR SCHMIDT WAS SIMPLY RESPONDING TO URGENT INTERNAL POLITICAL NEEDS, PARTICULARLY WITHIN HIS OWN PARTY. FRANCE DETECTED NO WEAKENING ON CHANCELLOR SCHMIDT'S PART.

6. ON THE MIDDLE EAST, MR GROMYKO HAD MADE THE USUAL DENUNCIATION OF THE CAMP DAVID PROCESS. ON THE MADRID CSCE REVIEW MEETING HE HAD SPOKEN AS THOUGH NOTHING HAD HAPPENED ELSEWHERE IN THE WORLD TO CAUSE THE SLIGHTEST DIFFICULTY ABOUT IT. THE MADRID MEETING SHOULD GO ON AS ARRANGED AND DETENTE SHOULD BE DEVELOPED, ETC.

7. I ASKED DE LEUSSE WHAT HE THOUGHT ALL THIS IMPLIED FOR FUTURE CONTACT WITH THE SOVIET UNION AND THE FUTURE WORK OF THE NINE. HE HAD NOTHING POSITIVE TO OFFER BUT CONTINUED TO ARGUE THAT IT WAS IMPORTANT TO KEEP IN TOUCH WITH MOSCOW. I ASKED HIM HOW THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT VIEWED THE PROSPECTS FOR A VISIT TO MOSCOW BY CHANCELLOR SCHMIDT AFTER THEIR EXPERIENCE WITH MR GROMYKO. HE SAID THAT THIS WAS ENTIRELY THE FRG'S AFFAIR. HE THOUGHT CHANCELLOR SCHMIDT WOULD FEEL OBLIGED TO GO TO MOSCOW AND THERE WOULD BE NO HARM IN THIS PROVIDED IT WAS SEEN SIMPLY AS AN EPISODE IN FRG/SOVIET RELATIONS AND NOT GIVEN PARTICULAR IMPORTANCE IN THE WIDER CONTEXT OF WESTERN EUROPEAN RELATIONS WITH MOSCOW OR EAST/WEST RELATIONS IN GENERAL. THE TIME WAS CERTAINLY NOT RIGHT FOR ANYONE TO GO TO MOSCOW SPEAKING AS THE REPRESENTATIVE OF WESTERN EUROPE OR OF THE WIDER WESTERN GROUP. CHANCELLOR SCHMIDT HAD HIS OWN INTERNAL POLITICAL IMPERATIVES AND HE COULD PROBABLY NOT AVOID GOING TO MOSCOW. THE SENSIBLE THING WAS TO TRUST CHANCELLOR SCHMIDT. I COMMENTED THAT IT STRUCK ME THAT EVEN THE BALANCE OF INTERNAL POLITICAL FORCES IN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC MIGHT NOT NECESSARILY POINT IN THE DIRECTION OF A TRIP TO MOSCOW. DE LEUSSE WAS INCLINED TO DISMISS THIS.

CONFIDENTIAL

8. DE LEUSSE WAS GLOOMY OVER THE LATEST NEWS FROM IRAN ABOUT THE FAILED US EFFORT TO FREE THE HOSTAGES. HE COMMENTED ON RECENT REMARKS BY BRZEZINSKI IN WASHINGTON, SAYING THAT BRZEZINSKI WAS OF COURSE RIGHT IN THE LONG TERM SENSE THAT THE REAL CRISIS WAS IN AFGHANISTAN AND NOT IN IRAN. BUT IN THE SHORT TERM SENSE THE CRISIS WAS DEFINITELY IN IRAN AND IT WOULD NOT HELP THE LONG TERM APPROACH ON AFGHANISTAN IF THE IRAN ISSUE WAS BUNGLED.

FOO PLEASE PASS TO SAVING ADDRESSEES

HIBBERT

FCO/WHITEHALL DISTN.

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

EESD

GRS 1330

SECRET

FM BONN 211000Z APR 80

TO IMMEDIATE FOO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 343 OF 21 APRIL

AND TO IMMEDIATE UKREP BRUSSELS

AND TO PRIORITY WASHINGTON AND PARIS

SECRET

NO 10 DS.

*Lead w/ full*

*mt*

YOUR TELNO 200 (NOT TO ALL): GERMAN POLICY TOWARDS THE EAST

1. IT WOULD BE A MISLEADING AND DANGEROUS OVER-SIMPLIFICATION TO INTERPRET CHANCELLOR SCHMIDT'S LATEST MOVES AS PART OF A DRIFT TOWARDS SELF-FINLANDISATION. THE CHANCELLOR AND HIS COLLEAGUES HAVE NO ILLUSIONS ABOUT THE IMPORTANCE OF MAINTAINING ALLIANCE SOLIDARITY OR ABOUT THE FRG'S ULTIMATE DEPENDENCE UPON THE US. AT THE SAME TIME THEY ARE AWARE OF THE FRG'S NEW WEIGHT IN THE WORLD, CONSCIOUS THAT US AND FRG INTERESTS ARE NO LONGER IDENTICAL AND DEEPLY WORRIED ABOUT PRESIDENT CARTER'S ABILITY TO CONTROL EVENTS OR FORESEE THE CONSEQUENCES OF HIS ACTIONS.
2. THERE HAS ALL ALONG BEEN A FUNDAMENTAL, AND PARTLY INSTINCTIVE, DIFFERENCE OF UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN WASHINGTON AND BONN ABOUT THE SIGNIFICANCE OF AFGHANISTAN. THE AMERICANS APPEAR TO HAVE SEEN IT AS A QUALITATIVELY NEW CONFIRMATION OF THE AGGRESSIVELY EXPANSIONIST CHARACTER OF THE SOVIET REGIME: THE CULMINATION OF A SERIES OF SIMILAR BUT LESSER AGGRESSIVE ACTIONS ELSEWHERE, (EG ANGOLA AND ETHIOPIA), SIGNALLING THE MOMENT WHEN THE WEST MUST AT LAST CALL A CLEAR AND DECISIVE HALT. HENCE THE REQUIREMENT FOR A STRONG AND QUOTE PUNITIVE UNQUOTE WESTERN RESPONSE AND EMPHASIS ON THE NEED TO REPAIR THE IMBALANCE WHICH HAS DEVELOPED BETWEEN SOVIET AND WESTERN MILITARY CAPABILITIES. THE GERMANS, CLAIMING THAT THEY HAVE ALWAYS BEEN WITHOUT ILLUSIONS ABOUT THE EXPANSIONIST NATURE OF SOVIET INTENTIONS, HAVE FOUND IT DIFFICULT TO THINK IN SUCH CATAclySMIC TERMS. AGGRESSIVE AND OPPORTUNISTIC THOUGH THE SOVIET UNION IS, THEY BELIEVE THAT LASTING BARGAINS CAN BE STRUCK WITH IT ON A BASIS OF MUTUAL INTEREST: THAT THIS HAS BEEN DEMONSTRATED BY THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A PROGRESSIVELY MORE STABLE AND MUTUALLY PROFITABLE EAST-WEST RELATIONSHIP IN EUROPE: AND THAT ALTHOUGH THIS CONCEPT OF DETENTE IS SO FAR LIMITED TO EUROPE, IT SHOULD EVENTUALLY BE EXTENDED TO THE THIRD WORLD. THEY SEE AFGHANISTAN AS A SERIOUS INTERRUPTION IN THIS CONSTRUCTIVE PROCESS AND THAT HAS SOMEHOW TO BE QUOTE MANAGED UNQUOTE SO AS (A) TO PREVENT IT JEOPARDISING WHAT HAS ALREADY BEEN ACHIEVED IN EUROPE AND (B) TO MAKE IT POSSIBLE TO RESUME THE DETENTE PROCESS AFTER A REASONABLE INTERVAL, WITHOUT AN UNACCEPTABLE LOSS OF FACE ON EITHER SIDE.
3. UNDERLYING AND COLOURING THIS GERMAN REACTION TO THE CRISIS ARE THE FACTS OF HISTORY AND GEOGRAPHY: THE FRG'S PROXIMITY TO THE SOVIET UNION, THE DIVISION OF GERMANY, BERLIN. ABOVE ALL, THERE IS THE FRG'S MASSIVE INVESTMENT - POLITICAL, PSYCHOLOGICAL AND ECONOMIC - IN EUROPEAN DETENTE, AND THE EXTENT TO WHICH THIS

SECRET

*/15 SEAN*

SECRET

IS SEEN BY THE PRESENT SPD/FDP COALITION AS THEIR GREATEST ACHIEVEMENT IN 10 YEARS OF OFFICE. TO HAVE ALL THIS PUT AT RISK IN AN ELECTION YEAR IS A DAUNTING PROSPECT.

4. EVEN WITHOUT THE ADDED COMPLICATION OF IRAN, THEREFORE, AFGHANISTAN AND THE AMERICAN REACTION TO IT WAS BOUND TO BE SEEN HERE AS THREATENING CRUCIAL GERMAN INTERESTS. BUT THE INABILITY OF THE UNITED STATES TO RESOLVE THE IRAN PROBLEM WITHOUT AN ACCELERATING ESCALATION TOWARDS MILITARY MEASURES HAS RAISED THE EVEN MORE ALARMING PROSPECT OF THE UNITED STATES INVOLVING ITS ALLIES IN A CONFRONTATION WHICH COULD CUT WESTERN EUROPE OFF FROM ITS MAIN SOURCE OF ENERGY AND PRECIPITATE A WAR BETWEEN THE SUPER POWERS. SCHMIDT'S PESSIMISM AND ANXIETY ON THIS SCORE ARE GENUINE, AND HE IS TAKING EVERY OPPORTUNITY TO UNDERLINE THEM. THEY ARE COMPOUNDED BY HIS LONG-STANDING LACK OF CONFIDENCE IN PRESIDENT CARTER: BY HIS BELIEF THAT THE UNITED STATES HAS - AT LEAST FOR THE MOMENT - ALLOWED ITSELF TO BECOME TOO WEAK TO BACK UP ITS STRONG WORDS WITH EFFECTIVE ACTION; AND BY THE CARTER ADMINISTRATIONS ERRATIC TRACK RECORD ON CONSULTATION SINCE THE AFGHANISTAN CRISIS BEGAN. JUST AS SCHMIDT REACTED TO THE WEAKNESS OF US ECONOMIC MANAGEMENT BY SETTING UP A COMPLEMENTARY POLE OF STABILITY IN EUROPE IN THE SHAPE OF THE EMS, SO NOW, IN THE FACE OF WHAT HE SEES AS AMERICAN INABILITY TO CONTROL THE WORLD POLITICAL CRISIS, HE FEELS HE MUST DO WHAT HE CAN TO PROVIDE A SUPPLEMENTARY VOICE AND A SUPPLEMENTARY SOURCE OF INITIATIVE ON THE WESTERN SIDE. BUT THE EMPHASIS IS STILL FIRMLY ON SUPPLEMENTARY - NOT (NOT) ALTERNATIVE.

5. I BELIEVE THAT THIS IS THE DETERMINING FACTOR IN SCHMIDT'S THINKING. BUT ELECTORAL AND PARTY POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS IMPEL HIM IN THE SAME DIRECTION. HE HAS LONG WANTED TO GO TO MOSCOW FOR THE BENEFICIAL EFFECTS A VISIT WOULD BRING TO FRG/SOVIET RELATIONS, ITS USEFUL SIDE EFFECTS ON INNER-GERMAN RELATIONS AND THE ADVANTAGE IT COULD BE EXPECTED TO GIVE HIS POLITICAL IMAGE IN THE RUN-UP TO AN ELECTION. ALTHOUGH THE FOCUS OF THE VISIT MAY NOW BE SOMEWHAT DIFFERENT FROM WHAT HE ORIGINALLY ENVISAGED, IT COULD STILL USED TO ADVANTAGE BOTH IN THE COUNTRY AT LARGE AND WITH HIS OWN PARTY. THE SPD IS GREATLY CONCERNED ABOUT THE DANGEROUS DRIFT IN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS AND THE LEFT WING IN PARTICULAR IS KEENLY INTERESTED IN PROGRESS ON ARMS CONTROL DESPITE AFGHANISTAN.

6. SOME OF THE ANSWERS TO THE QUESTIONS IN PARA 3 OF YOUR TUR ARE IMPLICIT IN THE FOREGOING ANALYSIS. AS TO THE IMPACT OF HIS INTENTIONS ON THE ALLIANCE, HE ALMOST CERTAINLY THINKS THAT THE RISK OF JEOPARDISING ALLIANCE SOLIDARITY BY GOING TO MOSCOW IS OUTWEIGHED BY THE DANGER OF DOING NOTHING TO STOP THE SLIDE TOWARDS SHARPER SUPER-POWER CONFRONTATION - ESPECIALLY IF HE CAN GO TO MOSCOW WITH A BROADLY AGREED REMIT FROM THE ALLIANCE (AS VON STADEN HAS EMPHASISED THAT HE WANTS TO DO: SEE MY TELNO 342).

14E 15

SECRET

HE IS MEANWHILE BEING CAREFUL TO FLOURISH HIS CREDENTIALS AS A LOYAL ALLY OF THE US BY THE IMPENDING DECISIONS ON A GERMAN OLYMPIC BOYCOTT AND ON GERMAN SUPPORT FOR SANCTIONS AGAINST IRAN. HE IS NOW BACKPEDALLING ON BOTH THE CONTENT AND IMPORTANCE OF HIS TNF INITIATIVE (ALTHOUGH HE HAS ALL ALONG FAVOURED INVOLVING THE RUSSIANS IN AN EAST/WEST ISSUE DISTINCT FROM AFGHANISTAN, IN THE HOPE THAT THIS WOULD HELP TO STABILISE THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION AND OPEN UP A WIDER DIALOGUE). THE DESIRE TO KEEP CLOSE TO THE FRENCH IS OF COURSE A CONTINUING FACTOR OF GREAT IMPORTANCE IN SCHMIDT'S CALCULATIONS, BUT I DO NOT BELIEVE THAT IT IS THE MAIN MOTIVE FORCE BEHIND HIS URGENT DESIRE TO KEEP OPEN THE DIALOGUE WITH THE SOVIET UNION AND TO PREVENT THE WESTERN ALLIES FROM BEING TOTALLY IDENTIFIED WITH CARTER'S CONFRONTATIONAL POLICIES - POLICIES WHICH, AS VON STADEN SAID TO ME ON 18 APRIL, THE CHANCELLOR IS NOT CONVINCED THAT THE US IS EITHER STRONG ENOUGH OR (UNDER CARTER) CONSISTENT ENOUGH TO CARRY THROUGH TO THE END. ON THE OLYMPICS, VON STADEN MADE IT CLEAR THAT THE DECISION TO RECOMMEND A BOYCOTT WOULD GO AHEAD. I DOUBT WHETHER A VISIT BY SCHMIDT TO MOSCOW, WITH ALLIANCE APPROVAL, WOULD IN ITSELF UNDERMINE PUBLIC SUPPORT HERE FOR THE BOYCOTT AND THE IDEA OF SUCH A VISIT IS MORE LIKELY TO APPEAL TO GERMAN PUBLIC OPINION THAN THE REVERSE. OPPOSITION CRITICISM WILL BE MUTED TO THE EXTENT THAT THE VISIT IS ENDORSED BY THE FRG'S ALLIES. IN ALL THIS, THERE IS NO EVIDENCE THAT SCHMIDT'S HEALTH IS A SIGNIFICANT FACTOR.

7. AGAINST THIS BACKGROUND, I BELIEVE WE SHOULD BE VERY CAUTIOUS ABOUT ADOPTING TOO NEGATIVE AN ATTITUDE TO SCHMIDT'S ACCEPTING THE INVITATION. DESPITE THE DISCLAIMERS REPEATED BY VON STADEN, THERE CAN BE LITTLE DOUBT THAT SCHMIDT WANTS TO GO AND BELIEVES THAT HE WOULD BE RIGHT TO DO SO. MY JUDGEMENT IS THAT GERMAN PUBLIC OPINION WOULD BACK HIM, UNLESS HE WERE THOUGHT TO BE GOING IN ORDER TO MEDIATE FROM A POSITION INDEPENDENT OF BOTH SUPER POWERS AND/OR IN DIRECT CONTRAVENTION OF US WISHES. THE FRENCH ARE MOST UNLIKELY TO WANT TO DISSUADE HIM. THE BRITISH ATTITUDE IS LIKELY TO BE TAKEN AS A TEST OF OUR CONFIDENCE IN THE CHANCELLOR AND THE EXTENT TO WHICH WE SHARE QUOTE EUROPEAN UNQUOTE CONCERNS IN THE PRESENT CRISIS. IT WILL CERTAINLY HAVE A BEARING ON GERMAN HELPFULNESS OVER OUR COMMUNITY BUDGET PROBLEM.

8. I RECOGNISE THAT THIS PICTURE OF GERMAN THINKING IS NOT ALTOGETHER REASSURING AND THAT THERE ARE EVIDENT RISKS FOR THE ALLIANCE IN THE CHANCELLOR TAKING UP THE INVITATION IN THE COURSE OF THE SUMMER. IF TIME PERMITS, SIR G. WRIGHT MAY WISH TO ADD HIS OWN COMMENTS WHEN HE RETURNS TO BORN ON 24 APRIL. MEANWHILE, HOWEVER, AS SEEN FROM HERE, I BELIEVE THAT OUR INTERESTS WOULD BEST BE SERVED BY ACCEPTING THAT THE VISIT COULD MAKE A HELPFUL CONTRIBUTION TO WESTERN CRISIS MANAGEMENT; AND THAT WE SHOULD CONCENTRATE ON HOLDING THE CHANCELLOR TO HIS STATED WILLINGNESS TO SPEAK FROM A CO-ORDINATED WESTERN BRIEF, AND ON GETTING HIM TO ACCEPT ALLIED ADVICE ON TIMING.

G0-2A66

FILES DEF 15/4/75 15/4/75  
 WED 15  
 LESS  
 PLANNING START  
 15/4 SLAKER 15/4/75  
 15/4 TAITLAND  
 T PERKINSON  
 SECRET

UNCLASSIFIED

DESKBY 180800Z FCO  
DESKBY 180700Z SALISBURY

FM WASHINGTON 172315Z

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1506 OF 17 APRIL 80.

INFO IMMEDIATE SALISBURY (FOR P.S.).

INFO PRIORITY MOD UK, UK DEL NATO, BONN, PARIS, MOSCOW, UK MIS  
NEW YORK AND UK REP BRUSSELS.

INFO SAVING ANKARA, ATHENS, BRUSSELS, COPENHAGEN, LISBON,  
LUXEMBOURG, OTTAWA, OSLO, ROME, REYKJAVIK AND THE HAGUE.

US RELATIONS WITH THE ALLIES.

1. FOLLOWING IS PRESIDENT CARTER'S ANSWER, AT HIS PRESS CONFERENCE  
THIS AFTERNOON, TO A QUESTION ABOUT US/EUROPE DEFENCE BURDEN-  
SHARING, AND ALLIED ATTITUDES.

2. QUESTION: I WAS WONDERING SIR, IS IT TRUE THAT THE AMERICAN  
PEOPLE WILL CONTINUE INDEFINITELY TO PROVIDE THE MAIN DEFENCE OF  
WESTERN EUROPE WHEN THERE WAS A STORY IN THE PAPERS THIS MORNING  
THAT SHOWED PLURALITIES BOTH IN WEST GERMANY AND BRITAIN NOW OPPOSE  
BACKING THE UNITED STATES IN THE FUTURE DISPUTE WITH THE SOVIET  
UNION?

ANSWER: THE UNITED STATES HAS NEVER PROVIDED THE MAJORITY OF OR  
THE OVERWHELMING PORTION OF TROOPS OR FIGHTING EQUIPMENT IN  
EUROPE FOR THE DEFENCE OF WESTERN EUROPE AGAINST THE WARSAW PACT.  
THE NUMBER OF TROOPS THAT AMERICA HAS IN ALL IN THE EUROPEAN  
THEATRE IS ABOUT 300,000 AND WE AND OUR NATO ALLIES COMBINED HAVE  
I THINK MORE THAN 2 MILLION - I DON'T NOW REMEMBER THE EXACT  
FIGURE. WE HAVE ALWAYS PROVIDED THE STRATEGIC NUCLEAR UMBRELLA FOR  
THE PROTECTION OF EUROPE AND WE HAVE HAD DIRECT CONTROL AS YOU KNOW  
OVER MOST OF THE TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS. I SAW THE RESULTS OF  
A POLL TODAY FROM GERMANY THAT SHOWED THAT OVER 80 PERCENT OF THE  
PEOPLE IN WEST GERMANY THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY FAVOUR A  
BOYCOTT OF THE MOSCOW OLYMPICS BY THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY.  
I THINK THE NATO ALLIANCE IS AS STRONG NOW AS IT HAS BEEN IN ANY  
TIME IN MY MEMORY SINCE THE WAR.

UNDER VERY DIFFICULT ECONOMIC CIRCUMSTANCES THE MAJOR NATIONS IN  
THE ALLIANCE HAVE COMMITTED THEMSELVES TO A REAL GROWTH IN  
DEFENCE EXPENDITURE UNDER HEAVY PRESSURE PROPAGANDA EFFORTS BY THE  
WARSAW PACT NATIONS. THE ALLIES VOTED LAST DECEMBER TO GO AHEAD  
WITH A MODERNISATION OF THEATRE NUCLEAR FORCES - A VERY DIFFICULT  
DECISION AND MY OWN PERSONAL RELATIONSHIP WITH THE LEADERS IN  
THOSE COUNTRIES BOTH THE HEADS OF STATE AND MILITARY AND DIP-  
LOMATIC SHOW A VERY STRONG COMMITMENT TO THE ALLIANCE AND A VERY

/ STRONG

STRONG SUPPORT FOR US. I HAVE SOMETIMES BEEN DISAPPOINTED AT THE RAPIDITY OF ACTION AND THE SUBSTANCE OF THE ACTION TAKEN BY SOME OF OUR ALLIES IN THE IRANIAN AND AFGHANISTAN QUESTIONS BUT WE LOOK AT THINGS FROM A DIFFERENT PERSPECTIVE, WE ARE MUCH MORE INVULNERABLE THAN THEY ARE TO ANY SORT OF CONVENTIONAL ATTACK. GERMANY FOR INSTANCE IS A DIVIDED COUNTRY. 17 MILLION GERMANS LIVE UNDER COMMUNIST RULE IN EAST GERMANY. AND BERLIN IS ESPECIALLY EXPOSED. MOST EUROPEAN COUNTRIES HAVE A MUCH HIGHER DEPENDENCE OF FOREIGN TRADE THAN DO WE. BUT I THINK WITHIN THE BOUNDS OF THE LIMITATIONS AND DIFFERENCE OF PERSPECTIVE, ALTHOUGH I HAVE SOMETIMES BEEN DISAPPOINTED, I THINK THEY HAVE PERFORMED ADEQUATELY. I BELIEVE RECENTLY IN THE LAST FEW DAYS AND I BELIEVE NEXT WEEK WE WILL SEE A STRONG RUSH OF SUPPORT TO JOIN US IN THE 'BOYCOTT OF THE MOSCOW OLYMPICS WHICH WILL BE A HEAVY PROPAGANDA AND PSYCHOLOGICAL BLOW TO THE SOVIET UNION AND CONDEMNATION OF THEIR INVASION AND I BELIEVE THEIR SUPPORT FOR US IN IRAN WILL PROVE, THAT THE PREMISE OF YOUR QUESTION, THAT WE DON'T HAVE THEIR SUPPORT AND COOPERATION, IS INACCURATE.

FCO PSE PASS SAVING ANKARA, ATHENS, BRUSSELS, COPENHAGEN, LISBON, LUXEMBOURG, OTTAWA, OSLO, RCME, REYKJAVIK AND THE HAGUE.

HENDERSON

[COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING STREET]  
[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

N AM D  
WED  
EESD  
DEPENDENCE D  
CABINET OFFICE

COPIES TO:

ASSESSMENT STAFF,  
CABINET OFFICE



Head of EES-1)

CL PS

PS/OPS

PS/MH Head

PS/MR Runkel

PS/PJS

PS/Sgt J. Marklew

Sgt P. Arkand

Mt Runkel

Mt Pasquon

Mt P. Mochy

Mt J. Mochy

Head of Planning Staff

SECRET

Mr Alexander (M012)

Rev. Col 1

2/19/80

US parcel left with the Secretary of State by Mr Vance today

Handwritten notes

Handwritten signature and date 27/2

GOALS AND ACTIONS

I. GOAL: Buttress Western defense forces and reduce energy dependence

Soviet aggression in an area of vital Western interests dramatizes need to improve our own defenses and reduce our dependence on imported oil.

Issues will be addressed at NATO Ministerial and Venice Summit, but let me note how vital they are.

One of the clearest signals we can send of Western unity and resolve would be to improve implementation of existing defense measures.

1) Defenses

- a) Meet NATO force goals (all Allies\*)
b) Improve implementation of LTDP (all Allies\*)
c) Meet 3% goals (raise with FRG, Italy, Canada)
d) Implement AWACS program
e) These not enough. Intensify efforts to reduce energy consumption in all our countries.

2) Energy

- a) Reduce consumption (all)
b) New energy sources in OECD countries and LDCs (all)

II. GOAL: For sake of deterrence elsewhere, make Soviets pay price for Afghanistan and prevent their driving wedges among Allies

- We understand our responsibility to take lead.
-- Pleased at European understanding of fact that Western, not only US, interests at stake in Southwest Asia.
-- Direct sanctions and pressures designed to produce Soviet policies in Afghanistan and elsewhere that will allow improved East-West relations.
-- Duration of measures: depends on Soviet policies. If withdraw from Afghanistan, and no new adventures, sanctions we have undertaken since invasion would be removed.
-- Importance of coordinated Western actions to Soviet perceptions, US public.

\*Except France

SECRET

1. Olympics

Important form of psychological pressure.

- a) Boycott (all)
- b) Alternative games (all)

2) Economic Measures

- a) Strict implementation of current COCOM list (all Allies)
- b) Possible expansion of list (all Allies) /See President's letter/
- c) Restraint of credits (all Allies) (2-1/2 years - Lambsdorff)
- d) Restraint of investment in major Soviet development projects (all Allies)

-- How long measures should remain in place -- must depend essentially on Soviet behavior.

III. GOAL: Maintain pressures to gain Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, holding out acceptable political scenario

-- We are conveying these costs both for deterrence of further aggression, and to gain Soviet withdrawal.

-- In addition to pressures for withdrawal, should address our position on a future for Afghanistan that is acceptable to Soviets, regional states and West.

-- Frankly, don't see Soviet withdrawal likely in near future.

-- Token or partial withdrawal should not lead to relaxation of pressures, unless it were part of an agreed plan for total withdrawal.

1) Pressures

- a) As in goal (2)
- b) Encourage continued international expressions of opposition, official and popular. (VOA, others' broadcasts. Diplomatic demarches.)

2) Political Scenario

- a) Canadian proposal: Austrian formula for a neutralized Afghanistan
- b) Issues on which we need to develop thoughts further: nature of neutral government; form of international guarantees; peacekeeping presence; who best to propose a diplomatic solution -- presumably a Third World government like India. (For discussion with all Allies, particularly Canada.)

IV. GOAL: While conveying these costs so long as Soviets remain in Afghanistan, to manage East-West relations in ways that protect our and European interests in arms control and the possibility of improved relations with Moscow when Soviet policies allow.

-- Since we can't predict when Soviet actions will allow a relaxation of our pressures, our current posture towards Soviets must combine, with continued pressures, the essential framework of East-West relations. We don't seek return to unrelenting Cold War.

1) Maintain dialogue with Soviets	2) Will not abrogate existing formal agreements	3) Arms control	4) CSCE process	5) Eastern Europe
a) US communications with USSR. Gromyko (US) b) Encourage Allies' dialogue with Moscow. Schmidt. (all Allies)	a) e.g., yearly grain sales agreement (note: expires 9/81), maritime agreement, air agreement, etc.	a) Ratify SALT II when feasible. b) Interim observance of SALT I and II. c) Keep TNF offer on table. d) Pursue MBFR, CTB, others.	Keep alive by: a) Working level preparations for Madrid. b) CDE (US cautions) c) We are open to exploration of CBMs*.	We are sensitive to sustaining and where possible to improving relations with Eastern Europe. a) Pursue current policies of improving ties. b) Yugoslavia, Romania, Poland: special attention c) COCOM nations - should differentiate in licensing to USSR and to Eastern Europe.

\*Would have to be firmly under CSCE auspices, not interfere with MBFR, and not include a commitment to a second phase reductions conference.

V. GOAL: To strengthen the Western position in Southwest Asia and the Persian Gulf

-- Regardless of future Soviet actions in Afghanistan, the region will remain of vital importance. We must each look to what we can do to bring about sustained, coordinated Western actions to strengthen regional security, stability, independence.

-- Strength and coherence of Western policies towards the USSR have an important impact on perceptions of nations in SWA/PG area.

1) Strengthen Turkey through massive assistance	2) Pakistan	3) Other Security Threats, Assistance	4) Western Military Presence	5) Regional Cooperation and Strengthened Western Ties
<p>Most urgent problem of internal stability in Southwest Asia is Turkey.</p> <p>a) We welcome German lead in organizing long-term program of economic and military aid.</p> <p>b) Other allies increase contributions. (Raise with all others in light of what Schmidt says.)</p>	<p>Most urgent external threat in region is possibility of further moves against either Pakistan or Iran. As to Pakistan:</p> <p>a) US reaffirmed interest in Pakistan's security (discuss different threats?).</p> <p>b) Economic aid to meet BOP gap of \$500-600 million. Saudi and Gulf contributions. Need increased Western aid: FRG triple aid, others double. UK committed to increase.</p> <p>c) Military aid when Pakistan has defined needs and nature of security relations it wants. Aid from Saudis and Gulf (of \$750 million). PRC.</p> <p>(cont.)</p>	<p>a) Warning Soviets about moves on Iran. (All Allies; US has done so)</p> <p>b) Assistance to Saudi National Guard (primarily sabotage and subversion) (US).</p> <p>c) Increased US military aid to Egypt, in addition to other US security assistance, e.g., Israel.</p> <p>d) New US aid for Oman, Somalia, Kenya.</p> <p>e) UK aid to Oman.</p>	<p>a) US RDF development.</p> <p>b) Increased US naval presence; arrangements with Oman, Kenya, Somalia; UK agreement on expanded access to Diego Garcia; French concurrence in use of Djibouti.</p> <p>c) French naval presence in region.</p> <p>d) UK plans for I.O. deployments this summer?</p> <p>e) Cooperation of <u>all</u> Allies regarding transit and logistic facilities for rapid deployments in crisis.</p>	<p>a) Minimize reaction of local rivals to Western security assistance. France and UK help allay Indian fears re Western help for Pakistan.</p> <p>b) Saudi help for Pakistan, Morocco, perhaps Somalia, Oman, Sudan. Saudi-Yemen.</p> <p>c) Encourage cooperation among PG states and Saudis in security and counter-subversion. UK and FRG role in encouraging PG cooperation?</p> <p>d) EC-Gulf discussions promote cooperation among PG states and with IRAQ. Appreciate FRG leadership.</p> <p>(cont.)</p>

V. (continued)

## 2) Pakistan

---

Particular roles in supplying military equipment for France, UK, and Italy as well as US.

- d) Encourage Indo-Pak rapprochement. (UK, French as well as US efforts.)

6) Arab-Israeli dispute

-- We recognize this is key.

- a) Full agreement by May not certain.  
 b) But progress.  
 c) Europeans avoid complicating initiatives.

5) Regional Cooperation and Strengthened Western Ties

- e) Western economic assistance to help internal progress. Sensitivity to Islam's values. Don't contribute to corruption problem. (SA)
- f) Better post-hostage US relations with Iran. Lead role for others.
- g) US willing to have better relations with Iraq. European, especially FRG and French, lead roles.



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

February 25, 1980

*Freight Broker* 21

Ambassador Nicholas Henderson  
British Embassy  
3100 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W.  
Washington, D.C. 20008

Dear Mr. Ambassador:

Thank you for your thoughtfulness in sending me the text of Mrs. Thatcher's speech of January 28 in the House of Commons. It was well-said, putting directly and forthrightly what must be the foundation for our revised relations with the USSR.

We have appreciated greatly the resolve of Her Majesty's Government in these difficult times. Cooperation over the long term will be all the more important as we respond to the challenge set by the USSR.

Sincerely,

*Harold Brown*



12 MAR 1980



(2)

Pennie Amster  
+ for.

*Forwarded with the Compliments  
of the Private Secretary, British Embassy,  
Washington, D.C.*

Amst  
- 4/3



FRANK CHURCH, IDAHO CHAIRMAN

ELIOT A. BELL, N.J.  
BOB C. GUYVERN, S. DAK.  
JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR., DEL.  
JOHN GLENN, OHIO  
RICHARD (DICK) STONE, FLA.  
PAUL S. TALKES, MD.  
EDWARD R. BIE, MAINE  
EDWARD B. SHANKS, NEBR.

JACOB K. JAVITS, N.Y.  
CHARLES M. PERCY, ILL.  
HOWARD H. BAKER, JR., TENN.  
JESSE HELMS, N.C.  
S. I. HAYAKAWA, CALIF.  
RICHARD G. LUGAR, IND.

# United States Senate

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

WILLIAM B. BADER, STAFF DIRECTOR

February 21, 1980


His Excellency  
Nicholas Henderson  
Ambassador of Great Britain  
3100 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W.  
Washington, D. C. 20008

Dear Mr. Ambassador:

Thank you very much for sending me a copy of Prime Minister Thatcher's excellent foreign policy speech.

I know that her call for unity and resolve in countering Soviet aggression will be deeply appreciated by the government and people of the United States.

Sincerely,



Charles H. Percy  
United States Senator

CHP:ayn



CHARLES E. BONNETT, FLA.  
SAMUEL B. STRATTON, N.Y.  
WILLIAM R. SCROED, MD.  
MURPHY A. WEEZI, MICH.  
CHARLES H. WYBON, CALIF.  
DAVID C. WELLS, TEX.  
L. NICHOLS, ILL.  
J. BRINKLEY, LA.  
ROBERT H. (BOB) MULLOCHAN, W. VA.  
DAN DANIEL, VA.  
G. V. (BOB) MONTGOMERY, MISS.  
HAROLD RUNNELS, N. CAR.  
LEE ASPIN, WIS.  
RONALD V. DELLINGER, CALIF.  
MICHIEL J. DAVIS, S.C.  
PATRICIA SCHROEDER, COLO.  
ABRAHAM KAZEN, JR., TEX.  
ANTHONY B. WOP PAT, GUAM  
BOB GARR, MICH.  
JIM LLOYD, CALIF.  
LARRY McDONALD, BA.  
BOB STUMP, ARIZ.  
VIC PASO, CALIF.  
CLAUDE (BOB) LEACH, LA.  
BEVERLY B. BYRON, MD.  
NICHOLAS BAYPOLLER, MASS.  
JOE WYATT, JR., TEX.  
DON BAILEY, PA.

U.S. House of Representatives  
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES  
Washington, D.C. 20515  
NINETY-SIXTH CONGRESS  
MELVIN PRICE, CHAIRMAN

February 20, 1980

72  
BOB WILSON, CALIF.  
WILLIAM L. DICKINSON, ALA.  
G. WILLIAM WHYTEHURST, VA.  
FRYD B. SPENCE, R.C.  
DAVID C. TRENK, LA.  
ROBIN L. BEARD, TENN.  
DONALD J. MITCHELL, N.Y.  
MARJORIE S. HOYT, MD.  
ROBERT W. DANIEL, JR., VA.  
ELWOOD H. (BOB) HILLIS, IND.  
DAVID F. EMERY, MAINE  
PAUL B. TRIBLE, JR., VA.  
ROBERT E. BACHAM, CALIF.  
CHARLES DOWDHERTY, PA.  
JAMES COURTER, N.J.  
MELVIN H. STARRS, V.I.  
JOHN J. FORD, STAFF DIRECTOR

Sir Nicholas Henderson GCMG  
British Ambassador  
British Embassy  
Washington, D.C. 20008

Dear Ambassador Henderson:


I thank you for sending the text of Prime Minister, Mrs. Margaret Thatcher's statement in the House of Commons on January 28, 1980.

The Prime Minister's call for a united effort in response to the Soviet Union's recent actions is essential. For this is the only way the United States and the NATO allies will be able to demonstrate in the most unmistakable terms possible that improved equitable relations between east and west can not proceed unless principles of international respect for national and individual rights are practiced.

The statement's power and accuracy, I believe, extends beyond the expressions of support for unified positions to the Prime Minister's realization and presentation of the requirement to improve national defense postures during this time of reassessment in east-west relations.

I again thank you for allowing me the benefit of reviewing Mrs. Thatcher's thoughts on these very important issues.

Sincerely,

  
Melvin Price  
Chairman

MP/r1

8 9 0  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7

28 FEB 1980

File

For Pol

889

18 February 1980

Thank you for your letter of 12 February about the Prime Minister's House of Commons speech. The Prime Minister has read the enclosures to your letter with interest.

M. O'D. B. ALEXANDER

His Excellency Sir Nicholas Henderson, GCMG.



PERSONAL

BSG

Fue

V

18 February 1980

Nicko Henderson sent copies of the Prime Minister's speech in the House of Commons on 28 January to a number of leading personalities in Washington. You may be amused to see the enclosed selection of replies that he received.

M. O'D. B. ALEXANDER

Rodric Braithwaite, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

PERSONAL

CLEMENT J. ZARLOCKI, WIS., CHAIRMAN

L. H. FORD, I.C.  
 DANTE B. F., FLA.  
 CHARLES C. WEAVER, JR., MICH.  
 BENJAMIN S. ROSENTHAL, N.Y.  
 LEE H. HAMILTON, IND.  
 LESTER L. WOLFF, N.Y.  
 JONATHAN B. BINGHAM, N.Y.  
 GUS YATRON, PA.  
 CAROLIS COLLINS, ILL.  
 STEPHEN J. BOLANZI, N.Y.  
 DON BOWEN, WASH.  
 GERRY E. STUODS, MASS.  
 ANDY IRELAND, FLA.  
 DONALD J. PEASE, OHIO  
 DAN MICA, FLA.  
 MICHAEL D. BARNES, MD.  
 WILLIAM H. GRAY III, PA.  
 TONY P. HALL, OHIO  
 HOWARD WOLFE, MICH.  
 DAVID N. BOWEN, MISS.  
 FLOYD J. FITZHAR, IND.

WILLIAM E. BROOMFIELD, MICH.  
 EDWARD J. DERWINSKI, ILL.  
 PAUL FINDLEY, ILL.  
 JOHN H. BUCHANAN, JR., ALA.  
 LARRY WINN, JR., KANS.  
 BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, N.Y.  
 TERRYSON GUYER, OHIO  
 ROBERT J. LAGOMARRINO, CALIF.  
 WILLIAM F. GOODLING, PA.  
 JOEL PRITCHARD, WASH.  
 HILLCENT FENWICK, N.J.  
 DAN QUAYLE, IND.

## Congress of the United States Committee on Foreign Affairs

House of Representatives  
 Washington, D.C. 20515

February 13, 1980

JOHN J. BRADY, JR.  
 CHIEF OF STAFF

His Excellency Sir Nicholas Henderson  
 Ambassador of the United Kingdom  
 Office of the Embassy  
 3100 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W.  
 Washington, D.C. 20008

Dear Mr. Ambassador:

Thank you for your recent letter, together with the text of Mrs. Thatcher's January 28 speech to the House of Commons.

I was most interested in your Prime Minister's assessment of the Afghanistan situation and her interpretation of the Soviet outlook toward "detente." Her views on this subject are, I believe, widely shared by many Members of Congress, including myself.

Let me just add, Mr. Ambassador, that the strong support expressed by Mrs. Thatcher, during her recent Washington visit and since her return to the United Kingdom, in behalf of our government's attempts to free the American hostages in Iran is very deeply appreciated.

With cordial best wishes and renewed thanks for bringing these remarks to my attention, I am

Sincerely yours,

*Clement J. Zarlocki*  
 Chairman

CJZ:jcy

*Handwritten notes:*  
 H...  
 cc M. Atkinson  
 No 10  
 Minnie  
 H...  
 M...  
 M...  
 N...  
 11/2

FRANK CHURCH, IDAHO, CHAIRMAN

CLAUDE PEPPER, N.J.  
GEORGE MC GOWAN, S. CAR.  
JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR., DEL.  
JIM LEAHY, N.H.  
BIL CLAY, KY.  
PAUL T. ROYCE, CALIF.  
EDWARD BROWNE, MASS.  
EDWARD ZORINSKY, NEBR.

JACOB K. JAVITS, N.Y.  
CHARLES H. PERCY, ILL.  
HOWARD H. BAKER, JR., TENN.  
JESSE HELMS, N.C.  
R. J. BAYBACAWA, CALIF.  
RICHARD G. LUGAR, IND.

WILLIAM B. BADER, STAFF DIRECTOR

## United States Senate

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

February 12, 1980


Dear Mr. Ambassador:

I wanted to express my appreciation to you for sending me a copy of Prime Minister Thatcher's speech before the House of Commons on January 28. The speech was indeed remarkable, but no more so than your Government's active and visible support for U.S. actions in both the Iranian and Afghan crises. As I have said on numerous occasions in the past, Allied unity is more vital than ever if the West is to meet the threats posed to our common interests in the Persian Gulf, and thus U.S./Great Britain agreement on these questions bodes well for future cooperation.

Thank you again for taking the time to send me your Prime Minister's speech.

With warm regards,

Sincerely,

  
Jacob K. Javits, U.S.S.

His Excellency  
Nicholas Henderson  
Ambassador  
Great Britain  
British Embassy  
3100 Massachusetts Avenue, NW  
Washington, DC 20008



FROM THE AMBASSADOR

BRITISH EMBASSY,

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20008

TELEPHONE: (202) 462-1340

*M*

12 February 1980

M O B Alexander Esq  
10 Downing Street

Prime Minister <sup>(2)</sup>  
You may like to see the enclosures.

*Prints - 14/2*

*Dear Michael,*

I sent to twenty leading Ministers, Congressmen etc, the text of the Prime Minister's speech in the House of Commons on 28 January on foreign policy. I thought you might like to see the enclosed among the replies I have already received.

*Yours ever,*

*NHLW*

Nicholas Henderson

Enc.



114

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

February 11, 1980

Dear Mr. Ambassador:

Thank you for sending me a copy of the Prime Minister's recent speech. Frankly, I consider it to be the best statement on this subject. I say this with heavy heart, having made some myself.

Best regards,

*Zb*  
Zbigniew Brzezinski

His Excellency  
Nicholas Henderson  
Ambassador of Great Britain  
3100 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W.  
Washington, D.C. 20008

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON


February 7, 1980

Dear Nicko:

Many thanks for sending me the text of Mrs. Thatcher's speech in the House on January 28. I wholeheartedly agree with your description of it as a remarkable speech -- so much so that of course I ensured that it was brought to the attention of both the Secretary and the President. It is a perfect example of something you British do better than anyone else.

My congratulations and again my thanks.

Sincerely,

  
George S. Vest

His Excellency  
Sir Nicholas Henderson,  
British Embassy,  
Washington, D.C.

United States Senate

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

February 6, 1980

Sir Nicholas Henderson  
British Ambassador  
3100 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W.  
Washington, D. C.

*Dear Mr. Ambassador,*

Thank you so much for your note of 31 January and the accompanying text of the speech delivered by the Prime Minister, Mrs. Thatcher, in the House of Commons on 28 January.

It is a splendid, tough-minded statement based on realistic perceptions of the world as it is. It is a reflection of the kind of national will that should be manifested in every country of the alliance if we are to successfully challenge the Soviets in their pursuit of global objectives which are incompatible with our vital interests and world stability.

I have underlined portions of it which I will quote frequently and will this day enter a copy of it in the Congressional Record.

*Very truly yours,*

*John Tower*

CLAIBORNE PELL  
BRIDGE ISLAND

United States Senate  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

February 7, 1980

Dear Mr. Ambassador:

Thank you for sending me the copy of  
your Prime Minister's speech.

I thought it excellent and may I add  
that I think she made a very strong and  
favorable impression on us when she visited  
the Hill.

With warm regards.

Ever sincerely,



Claiborne Pell

His Excellency Sir Nicholas Henderson  
Ambassador of Great Britain  
Embassy of Great Britain  
3100 Massachusetts Ave., N.W.  
Washington, D.C. 20008



BRITISH EMBASSY,  
 WASHINGTON, D. C. 20008  
 TELEPHONE: (202) 462-1340

FROM THE AMBASSADOR

The Honorable  
 Harold Brown  
 Secretary of Defense  
 Department of Defense  
 The Pentagon, Room 3E880  
 Washington DC 20301

*plis + f.a.*

*Prints 10/12*

31 January 1980

*Dear Mr Secretary,*

You may have seen accounts of the statement on foreign relations which my Prime Minister, Mrs Margaret Thatcher, delivered in the House of Commons on 28 January.

It strikes me as a remarkable speech - or I would not have sent you the attached copy with the suggestion that you might like to read it.

*Yours sincerely*

*Nicholas Henderson*

Nicholas Henderson

*Letter sent to all those listed behind.*

Honorable Cyrus R Vance  
Secretary of State  
Department of State  
7th Floor  
2201 C Street NW  
Washington DC 20520

Mr George S Vest  
Assistant Secretary, European Affairs  
Department of State  
Room 6226  
2201 C Street NW  
Washington DC 20520

Dr Zbigniew K Brzezinski  
Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs  
The White House  
1600 Pennsylvania Ave NW  
Washington DC 20500

~~The Honorable~~  
~~Dr~~ Harold Brown  
Secretary of Defense  
Department of Defense  
The Pentagon, Room 3E880  
Washington DC 20301

~~Ambassador~~ ~~The Honorable~~  
Robert W Komer  
Advisor to Secretary and Deputy  
Secretary of Defense on NATO Affairs  
Department of Defense  
The Pentagon  
Room 3E 941  
Washington DC 20301

~~Ambassador~~ ~~The Honorable~~  
Ralph Earle II  
Director  
US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency  
320 21st Street NW  
Washington DC 20451

~~Senator~~ ~~The Honorable~~  
Frank Church  
Chairman  
Committee on Foreign Relations  
Suite S-116  
US Capitol  
Washington DC

Senator Jacob K Javits  
Committee on Foreign Relations  
Suite S-116  
US Capitol  
Washington DC

Senator Joseph R Biden  
Chairman European Subcommittee  
Committee on Foreign Relations  
Suite S-116  
US Capitol  
Washington DC

Representative Clement J Zablocki  
Chairman  
House Committee on Foreign Affairs  
Suite 2170  
Rayburn House Office Building  
Washington DC 20515

Representative Thomas P O'Neill Jr  
Speaker of the House of Representatives  
Suite H-204  
US Capitol  
Washington DC

Senator Claiborne Pell  
Committee on Foreign Relations  
Suite S-116  
US Capitol  
Washington DC

Senator Charles H Percy  
Committee on Foreign Relations  
Suite S-116  
US Capitol  
Washington DC

Senator John C Stennis  
Committee on Armed Services  
Room 212  
Russell Senate Office Building  
Washington DC 20510

Senator John G Tower  
Committee on Armed Services  
Room 212  
Russell Senate Office Building  
Washington DC 20510

Senator Sam Nunn  
Committee on Armed Services  
Room 212  
Russell Senate Office Building  
Washington DC 20510

Representative Melvin Price  
Chairman  
House Committee on Armed Services  
Room 2120  
Rayburn House Office Building  
Washington DC 20510

Representative Lee H Hamilton  
Chairman  
Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East  
Committee on Foreign Affairs  
Room B-359  
Rayburn House Office Building  
Washington DC 20510

Representative Bob Wilson  
Committee on Armed Services  
Room 2120  
Rayburn House Office Building  
Washington DC 20510

Representative Thomas S Foley  
Chairman  
Democratic Caucus  
Room 1202  
Longworth House Office Building  
Washington DC 20515



## Published Papers

The following published paper(s) enclosed on this file have been removed and destroyed. Copies may be found elsewhere in The National Archives.

House of Commons Hansard  
East-West Relations

28/01/80  
Columns 933-990

Signed Wayland Date 8 April 2010

**PREM Records Team**

GRS 1200  
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FM WASHINGTON 291820Z JANUARY 1980  
TO IMMEDIATE F C O  
TEL NO 435 OF 28 JAN.

*Foreign Policy*  
*Read in full.*

INFO PRIORITY UKMIS NEW YORK, PARIS, BONN, ROME, TOKYO.

*mt*

MIPTS: US FOREIGN POLICY: IMPLICATIONS FOR THE ALLIES.

1. IT IS CLEAR ENOUGH THAT THE NEW DIRECTIONS OF US FOREIGN POLICY REMAIN BLURRED AND THAT THEY ARE LOOKING TO THE ALLIES FOR SUPPORT, BOTH OVER THE MEANS OF ARRIVING AT A CHANGED RELATIONSHIP WITH THE COUNTRIES OF THE ARC OF CRISIS AND OVER THE ULTIMATE SHAPE THAT THIS SHOULD TAKE; THOUGH THEY ARE AWARE OF THE DIFFICULTIES OF CONCERTING POLICY, GIVEN THE DISPARITY OF VIEWS WITHIN THE ALLIANCE.
2. BUT I SHOULD STRESS TO YOU, AS THE WHITE HOUSE HAVE DONE TO ME, THE IMPORTANCE OF THE PHRASE IN PRESIDENT CARTER'S STATE OF THE UNION ADDRESS WHEN HE CALLED FOR QUOTE COLLECTIVE EFFORTS UNQUOTE TO MEET THE NEW THREAT. HE SAID THAT THIS NEW THREAT QUOTE DEMANDS THE PARTICIPATION OF THOSE WHO RELY ON THE OIL FROM THE MIDDLE EAST AND ARE CONCERNED WITH GLOBAL PEACE AND STABILITY UNQUOTE. THIS SUBJECT MAY, I REALISE, HAVE BEEN DISCUSSED WITH NEWSOM AND OTHER AMERICANS IN LONDON LAST WEEK: IN WHICH CASE I ASK YOU TO OVERLOOK ANY DUPLICATION IN THIS PRESENT TELEGRAM. BUT IT MAY BE USEFUL IF I TELL YOU VERY BROADLY THE WAY AMERICANS SEEM TO BE SETTING ABOUT THE TASK AND HOW HMG MIGHT MOST USEFULLY RESPOND.
3. THE US'S FIRST PRIORITY SEEMS TO BE TO SHORE-UP PAKISTAN: HENCE THE VISIT THERE LATER THIS WEEK BY BRZEZINSKI AND CHRISTOPHER AND THE EFFORT THAT THE ADMINISTRATION WILL BE MAKING TO GET ADDITIONAL FUNDS FOR PAKISTAN TUCKED INTO THE CURRENT BUDGET. BUT ON THE WIDER QUESTION, I GATHER - VERY CONFIDENTIALLY FROM WARREN CHRISTOPHER - THAT THE US GOVERNMENT ARE THINKING OF CALLING A MEETING SOON, PERHAPS IN THE FIRST HALF OF NEXT MONTH, OF THE FOREIGN MINISTERS OF THE SEVEN. SUCH AN IDEA IMMEDIATELY GIVES RISE TO CERTAIN DANGERS: THE RESENTMENT OF OTHERS IN THE COMMUNITY WHO THINK THEY ARE BEING LEFT OUT (NOT TO MENTION THE AUSTRALIANS): AND THE HOSTILE REACTION THAT A MEETING OF THIS KIND (IF IT BECAME KNOWN, AS IT ALMOST CERTAINLY WOULD) COULD BE EXPECTED TO AROUSE IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND SOUTH WEST ASIA WHERE IT MIGHT BE SEEN AS THE FIRST STEP TO IMPOSING SOME FORM OF ASSOCIATION ON THE REGION FROM OUTSIDE.

CONFIDENTIAL

4. NEVERTHELESS THE AMERICANS BELIEVE THAT THE STUDY OF THIS SUBJECT MUST START SOMEWHERE, AND THAT THE COUNTRIES OF THE REGION, THOUGH THEY MUST OF COURSE BE CLOSELY INVOLVED, AND AT AN EARLY STAGE, DO NOT HAVE THE MATERIAL OR EXPERTISE AVAILABLE TO DO THE SORT OF PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS REQUIRED WHICH, BY ANALOGY, THE EUROPEAN COUNTRIES PERFORMED THEMSELVES IN THE EARLY DAYS OF THE MARSHALL PLAN. WHAT, I SUPPOSE, MAY EMERGE FROM THE AMERICANS IS THE IDEA OF SOME DIVISION OF LABOUR SO FAR AS EUROPEAN INVOLVEMENT IS CONCERNED. THIS MIGHT INVOLVE EITHER BUILDING ON REGIONAL LINKS SUCH AS THOSE BETWEEN THE EEC AND THE GULF STATES, OR INDIVIDUAL COUNTRIES TAKING THE LEAD, AS THE FRG HAVE AGREED TO DO IN TURKEY. THE UK MIGHT UNDERTAKE A SIMILAR ROLE IN OMAN AND INDIA, FRANCE IN SYRIA AND LEBANON (AND IRAQ?) ITALY IN SOMALIA ETC. IT IS STRETCHING THE IMAGINATION TOO FAR AT THIS STAGE TO TRY TO DEFINE WHAT TAKING THE LEAD MIGHT MEAN: BUT IT IS POSSIBLE TO CONCEIVE OF THE LEAD-COUNTRY BEING RESPONSIBLE FIRST OF ALL FOR SOME ANALYSIS OF THE ECONOMIC AND STRATEGIC PROBLEMS OF THE COUNTRY INDICATED AND THEN EVENTUALLY TAKING THE MAIN RESPONSIBILITY FOR DISCUSSING REMEDIES WITH THAT COUNTRY AND COOPERATING IN THEIR IMPLEMENTATION.

5. AN ENORMOUS QUESTION MARK REMAINS OF COURSE ABOUT WHAT THE FRAMEWORK ITSELF AMOUNTS TO, WHAT THE LINK IS BETWEEN A SERIES OF BILATERAL UNDERSTANDINGS, AND WHAT IT IS THAT CAN POSSIBLY BRING COHESION TO THE COMPLETELY DIFFERENT PROBLEMS SAY OF THE ARAB/ ISRAEL DISPUTE AND THE THREAT TO PAKISTAN. BUT, WHATEVER THE UNCERTAINTIES, THE AMERICANS ARE CLEAR THAT THE COUNTRIES THEMSELVES NEED HELP FROM OUTSIDE AND THAT THE HELP FROM OUTSIDE HAS TO BE GIVEN IN SUCH A WAY THAT IT DOES NOT AMOUNT TO THE ASSERTION OR EVEN THE SUGGESTION OF CONTROL.

6. MY OWN PURELY PERSONAL REFLECTION IS THAT THE AMERICANS STILL TEND TO SEE THINGS RATHER IN TERMS OF RESISTANCE TO COMMUNISM AND TO THE SOVIET THREAT AND TO UNDERESTIMATE THE COMPLEX MENTALITIES OF THE POPULATIONS AND LEADERS IN THE ARC OF CRISIS. IT WILL NOT SURELY BE POSSIBLE FOR THE GENERAL PROBLEM OF INTERNAL STABILITY AND THE EXTERNAL THREAT TO BE SOLVED SIMPLY ALONG THE LINES OF STAVING OFF COMMUNISM: SOME OF THE ELEMENTS OF THE DISCREDITED NORTH-SOUTH DIALOGUE WOULD HAVE TO BE INCORPORATED WITH THE RICH CIL COUNTRIES OF COURSE BEING PREVAILED UPON TO FORK OUT.

/7. ALL

CONFIDENTIAL

7. ALL THIS IS HIGHLY SPECULATIVE AND WHAT I THINK WOULD BE IMMEDIATELY RELEVANT WOULD BE A MESSAGE FROM YOU TO VANCE TAKING UP CARTER'S CALL IN THE STATE OF THE UNION ADDRESS FOR COLLECTIVE EFFORTS AND THE PARTICIPATION OF ALLIES. YOU COULD SAY THAT YOU WOULD BE INTERESTED TO HEAR MORE ABOUT AMERICAN THINKING ON THIS SUBJECT AND INDEED TO OFFER TO BRING TO BEAR OUR INFORMATION AND EXPERTISE. FOR THIS PURPOSE YOU MIGHT SAY THAT THE FIRST THING THAT LOOKS TO US TO BE NECESSARY IS TO WORK TOGETHER TO COLLATE THE FACTS AND TO TAKE STOCK OF THE PROBLEMS OF EACH COUNTRY AND THE POSSIBLE REMEDIES. IF WE COULD OFFER TO SEND PEOPLE OVER HERE WITH SPECIFIC EXPERTISE, I AM SURE THAT THAT WOULD BE WELCOMED. THE MAIN POINT WOULD BE TO SHOW THAT WE ARE EAGER TO RESPOND TO THEIR WISH FOR COOPERATION AND THAT WHILE A WIDER FORUM MAY BE NECESSARY AT SOME STAGE, AS WELL AS ONE AT A VERY HIGH LEVEL, THE FIRST STEP MIGHT BEST INVOLVE SOMETHING MORE IN THE NATURE OF A WORKING PARTY, SUCH SEPCIALIST GROUPS ALREADY EXIST WITHIN NATO AND THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY AND IT MAY BE THAT OUR PROCEDURES HAVE TO EVOLVE TO DEAL WITH AN AREA THAT IS BOTH EXTREMELY VARIED AND NOT COVERED BY ANY EXISTING INSTITUTIONS.

HENDERSON



FCO/WHITEHALL DISTRIBUTION  
N AM D

GRS 1600

CONFIDENTIAL

FM WASHINGTON 290103Z JAN 80  
TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 434 OF 28 JANUARY

INFO PRIORITY NATO POSTS, MOSCOW, PEKING, TOKYO, UKMIS NEW YORK,  
CAIRO, TEL AVIV, TEHRAN, DELHI, ISLAMABAD, CANBERRA, JEDDA, NAIROBI,  
AMMAN, KUWAIT, ABU DHABI, BAHRAIN, MUSCAT, MOGADISHU, BAGHDAD,  
DAMASCUS, BEIRUT, DOHA  
INFO SAVING TO E. EUROPEAN POSTS, KABUL

*Read in full**M*

MIPT: US FOREIGN POLICY - PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS

1. THERE ARE SIGNS OF CHANGE IN U S FOREIGN POLICY THAT REFLECT THIS NEW ANALYSIS AND I AM STRUCK BY THE WAY THINKING IS ALREADY MOVING FROM THE NEGATIVE PROBLEM OF PUNISHING THE RUSSIANS AND THREATENING THE IRANIAN TO THE POSITIVE TASK OF DEALING WITH THE UNDERLYING CAUSES OF INSTABILITY IN AN AREA THAT IS AT ONCE THE MOST EXPOSED TO THE SOVIET UNION AND THE MOST IMPORTANT TO THE USA.
2. THE RUSSIANS MUST OF COURSE, BE SHOWN THAT THEY CANNOT COMMIT ACTS OF AGGRESSION WITH IMPUNITY (HENCE ACTION ON GRAIN EXPORTS, OLYMPIC GAMES, ELIMINATION OF HIGH-LEVEL VISITS AND PROVISION OF TECHNOLOGY ETC). BUT I EXPECT THE AMERICANS TO GO SLOW NOW IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF SANCTIONS AGAINST IRAN, UNLESS THERE IS SOME MARKED DETERIORATION IN THE POSITION OF THE HOSTAGES. THEY ARE CLEARLY HOPING THAT BANI SADR'S ELECTION AS PRESIDENT, COUPLED WITH IRAN'S PERCEPTION OF WHERE THE TRUE THREAT TO THEIR INTERESTS LIES, WILL LEAD TO THE RELEASE OF THE HOSTAGES BEFORE VERY LONG: AND THE U S ADMINISTRATION ARE FLEXIBLE ENOUGH TO BE PREPARED TO SHIFT GEAR COMPLETELY AND START WORKING AS HARD AS POSSIBLE TO BUILD UP IRAN AND PREVENT IT DISINTEGRATING.
3. SO FAR AS THE COMMUNIST WORLD ARE CONCERNED PUNISHMENT WILL BE SUBJECT TO QUALIFICATIONS:
  - (A) WHILE ONE OF THE CENTRAL PILLARS OF DETENTE - THE PURSUIT OF ARMS CONTROL, AND SALT, ETC - HAS BEEN RELEGATED, THE BELIEF IN THE CONCEPT OF DETENTE HAS NOT BEEN ENTIRELY ABANDONED. (NOR FOR THAT MATTER HAS CARTER'S OWN PARTICULAR DEVOTION TO HUMAN RIGHTS). IT REMAINS (AS DOES THE HUMAN RIGHTS POLICY) SOMEWHAT IN LIMBO, BUT ALIVE, WHICH INDEED IS VERY NECESSARY IF THE CONSTITUENCY OF MEN OF GOODWILL IS NOT TO BE FORFEITED.
  - (B) THE U S GOVERNMENT WILL TRY TO AVOID PUNISHING THE EAST EUROPEANS: THE PURPOSE WILL BE NOT SIMPLY TO AVOID THE INJUSTICE OF

BLAMING THEM FOR SOMETHING FOR WHICH THEY ARE NOT RESPONSIBLE BUT ALSO TO TRY TO SHARPEN THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN THEM AND THE SOVIET UNION.

4. BUT WHAT ARE THE NEW AND POSITIVE STEPS THAT THE U S ARE GOING TO TAKE IN FOREIGN AND DEFENCE POLICY? THE HOPES EXPRESSED BY PRESIDENT CARTER WHEN HE CAME TO POWER OF REDUCING ARMAMENTS' EXPENDITURE HAVE BEEN ABANDONED: NOT ONLY IS THE U S NOW COMMITTED TO A HEAVY INCREASE IN REAL DEFENCE EXPENDITURE AFTER A DECLINE THAT HAS LASTED OVER 15 YEARS, BUT THERE IS MUCH EMPHASIS ON THE RAPID DEPLOYMENT FORCE FOR NON-NATO CONTINGENCIES AND THE NEED FOR AN IMPROVED AIR AND SEA LIFT CAPABILITY TO GET THE FORCES QUICKLY INTO ACTION WHEREVER THEY MIGHT BE NEEDED. NOR WILL THE RUSSIANS OVERLOOK THE CALL FOR REGISTRATION FOR SELECTIVE SERVICE, A DECISION THAT I BELIEVE THE PRESIDENT MADE PERSONALLY, NOR THE INTENDED REHABILITATION OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY. APART FROM THE INCREASE IN THE DEFENCE PROGRAMME AND THE STRENGTHENING OF THE U S NAVAL PRESENCE IN THE INDIAN OCEAN, THE MOST IMPORTANT NEW STEPS SEEM TO ME TO BE AS FOLLOWS:

- (I) THE NEW SECURITY GUARANTEE FOR THE PERSIAN GULF: AND
- (II) THE IDEA OF A FRAMEWORK OF COOPERATION FOR THE SECURITY OF THE ARC OF CRISIS.

5. THE PRACTICAL ACTION SO FAR TAKEN HAS BEEN

(A) THE CONFIRMATION OF THE 1959 AGREEMENT TO HELP PRESERVE THE INDEPENDENCE AND INTEGRITY OF PAKISTAN: AND THE URGENT EFFORT TO PUT TOGETHER A PROGRAMME OF MILITARY AND ECONOMIC AID FOR PAKISTAN.

(B) THE SEARCH THAT IS BEING MADE TO ESTABLISH DEFENCE FACILITIES IN THE REGION E.G. OMAN, SOMALIA AND KENYA, TO HELP SUPPORT ANY RAPID BUILD-UP THAT MAY BE NEEDED OF U S GROUND AIR AND NAVY REINFORCEMENTS. DIEGO GARCIA IS ALREADY IMPORTANT IN THIS RESPECT BUT CLEARLY THE U S ARE LOOKING TO CONSIDERABLE DEVELOPMENTS THERE.

(C) THE CLEAR TILT THAT THE U S ARE GIVING TOWARDS PEKING - BY THE GRANTING OF MFN TREATMENT AND THE AGREEMENT TO SUPPLY DUAL PURPOSE TECHNOLOGY AND SELECTED ITEMS OF MILITARY EQUIPMENT.

6. THE U S GOVERNMENT CAN BE EXPECTED TO EXPLOIT, WITH LESS INHIBITION THAN HITERTO, THE CHINA DIMENSION. BUT THEY WILL AVOID BEING PROVOCATIVE SO FAR AS THE SOVIET UNION ARE CONCERNED, AND THEY WILL BE VERY AWARE OF THE PSYCHOSIS THAT NEW DELHI HAS ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF A WASHINGTON/ISLAMABAD/PEKING TRIANGLE.

7. AS REGARDS THE SECURITY GUARANTEE FOR THE PERSIAN GULF THERE ARE TWO THINGS TO BE SAID ABOUT IT AT THIS STAGE. FIRSTLY IT MARKS A DECISIVE BREAK WITH THE POST-VIETNAMESE MOOD OF THE U S. CARTER HIMSELF ORIGINALLY ACCEPTED THAT RESPONSIBILITY FOR REGIONAL SECURITY

CONFIDENTIAL

SHOULD BE DEVOLVED AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE UPON THE LOCAL POWERS. BUT HE HAS NOW HAD TO MODIFY THIS AND TO ADOPT A POLICY OF DIRECT U S MILITARY INVOLVEMENT IN ANOTHER DISTANT PART OF THE WORLD. CARTER'S COMMITMENT TO USE MILITARY FORCE IF NECESSARY TO PREVENT OUTSIDE CONTROL OF THE PERSIAN GULF REGION IS CATEGORICAL (IT IS IN SOME WAYS REMARKABLY CLOSE TO EISENHOWER'S 1957 DOCTRINE DECLARING READINESS TO USE ARMED FORCE TO DEFEND THE AREA AGAINST OVERT ARMED AGGRESSION IN THE FACE OF A SERIOUS THREAT TO U S VITAL INTERESTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST): IT PUTS THE REGION ON A PAR WITH EUROPE AND THE FAR EAST AS KEY AREAS WHERE U S SECURITY COMMITMENTS CAN BE AUTOMATICALLY TRIGGERED. BUT THE SECOND MAIN FEATURE OF IT, SO FAR, IS THAT THE COMMITMENT, WHILE CERTAIN, IS ILL-DEFINED. IT LEAVE UNDETERMINED THE PRECISE CONDITIONS WHICH WOULD ELICIT A MILITARY RESPONSE FROM THE UNITED STATES, HOW THIS WOULD BE PROVIDED FOR AND, NO LESS IMPORTANT, HOW FAR THE COMMITMENT WOULD RELATE TO INTERNAL SUBVERSION AS WELL AS EXTERNAL THREAT.

B. THIS SAME IMPRECISION CHARACTERISES THE OTHER NEW MAIN PLATFORM, THE FRAMEWORK FOR COOPERATION. THE WORDS CARTER HAS USED HAVE BEEN THAT HE IS PREPARED TO WORK WITH OTHER NATIONS IN THE REGION TO FORM A QUOTE COOPERATIVE SECURITY FRAMEWORK UNQUOTE FOR THE INDEPENDENCE, SECURITY AND PROSPERITY OF ALL. THE ADMINISTRATION ARE WELL AWARE OF THE DIFFICULTIES OF TRYING TO LUMP TOGETHER SUCH DISPARATE ELEMENTS AS THE NEED FOR FACILITIES FOR U S FORCES IN THE AREA, THE ACUTE ECONOMIC PROBLEM OF TURKEY, THE MAJOR ANTAGONISM OF THE ARAB/ISRAEL DISPUTE AND THE INDO/PAKISTAN RELATIONSHIP AND THE UNREGENERATE NATURE OF SOME OF THE REGIMES. IN TALKING TO THE AMERICANS I AM STRUCK BY THEIR AWARENESS OF THE SCALE AND VARIETY OF THE PROBLEMS INVOLVED, SO MUCH SO THAT THEY DO NOT THINK THAT THEY CAN BE MET BY ANYTHING IN THE NATURE OF A SINGLE DOCTRINE. ALTHOUGH THIS WORD HAS BEEN PUT INTO CARTER'S MOUTH IT IS NOT ONE THAT THE US ADMINISTRATION WISH TO PROPAGATE. THE QUOTE FRAMEWORK UNQUOTE, AS WARREN CHRISTOPHER HAS PUT IT TO ME, IS INTENDED TO ALLOW FOR DIFFERENT SOLUTIONS FOR DIFFERENT PROBLEMS WITHIN THE GENERAL AMBIT OF SAFEGUARDING BOTH THE INTERESTS OF THE COUNTRIES CONCERNED AND THOSE OF THE WEST. THE AMERICANS CANNOT DEAL WITH THESE PROBLEMS ALONE. THEY ALSO BELIEVE THAT OTHERS ARE AFFECTED BY THEM AS MUCH AS THEY ARE. THE FIRST NEED THEREFORE IS TO GET TOGETHER WITH THE ALLIES AT AN EARLY STAGE TO CONSIDER HOW TO START TACKLING THEM: AND I SHALL BE DEALING WITH THIS IN MIFT.

FCO PASS SAVING TO BUCHAREST, SOFIA, BELGRADE, BUDAPEST, PRAGUE, WARSAW, EAST BERLIN, AND KABUL.

HENDERSON

FCO/WHITEHALL DISTRIBUTION  
N AM D

*Revised as per [unclear]*

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FM WASHINGTON 290102Z JAN 80

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NO 433 OF 28 JANUARY

INFO PRIORITY NATO POSTS MOSCOW PEKING TOKYO UKMIS NEW YORK  
 CAIRO TEL AVIV TEHRAN DELHI ISLAMABAD CANBERRA JEDDA NAIROBI  
 AMMAN KUWAIT ABU DHABI BAHRAIN MUSCAT MOGADISHU BAGHDAD DAMASCUS  
 BEIRUT DOHA  
 INFO SAVING EAST EUROPEAN POSTS KABUL

*Read in full**mb*US FOREIGN POLICY - THE REASONS FOR CHANGE.

1. WHEN PRESIDENT CARTER CAME TO POWER IN JANUARY 1977 HE WAS ANXIOUS TO SET US FOREIGN POLICY UPON A NEW COURSE INSPIRED BY A CERTAIN VISION OF THE WORLD AND BASED ON CLEAR PROPOSITIONS: (A) UNITED STATES POWER AND INFLUENCE WERE TO BE USED FOR QUOTE HUMANE PURPOSES UNQUOTE. THE WORLD NEEDED A QUOTE NEW AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY BASED ON CONSTANT DECENCY IN ITS VALUES AND ON OPTIMISM IN ITS HISTORICAL VISION UNQUOTE.

(B) THE IDEA THAT THE MAIN EMPHASIS SHOULD BE TO CONTAIN THE SOVIET UNION BY KISSINGER'S WEB OF CONTRACTS AND CONTACTS WAS TO BE SUPPLANTED BY A BROADER BELIEF IN THE NEED TO FOCUS US ATTENTION ON COOPERATION WITH THE INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACIES, ON TACKLING THE PROBLEMS OF THE THIRD WORLD, AND ELEVATING TO HIGH PRIORITY INSISTENCE ON HUMAN RIGHTS SO AS TO ALIGN AMERICA WITH THE TIDE OF HISTORY. THUS CARTER DECLARED THAT THE UNITED STATES WAS NOW FREE OF QUOTE THAT INORDINATE FEAR OF COMMUNISM WHICH ONCE LED US TO EMBRACE ANY DICTATOR WHO JOINED US IN OUR FEAR UNQUOTE.

(C) IN PRACTICE THIS MEANT THAT A DETENTE SEEN AS TOO EXCLUSIVELY CONCERNED WITH ENMESHING THE USA AND THE SOVIET UNION CLOSELY TOGETHER SO AS TO REDUCE THE RISK OF WAR GAVE WAY TO A WIDER POLICY PERSPECTIVE: THIRD COUNTRIES' HUMAN RIGHTS PERFORMANCE WAS TO BE HIGH AMONG CRITERIA DETERMINING US POLICY TOWARD THEM, AND THERE WAS A HEIGHTENED EMPHASIS ON ARMS CONTROL IN ALL ITS FORMS, ON PREVENTING NU<sup>CLEAR</sup> PROLIFERATION, ON LIMITING CONVENTIONAL ARMS TRANSFERS, AND ON THE DIVERSION OF RESOURCES TO FIGHTING HUNGER, DISEASE, RACIAL HATRED AND ILLITERACY.

(D) THE USA WAS NOT TO OPPOSE CHANGE, BUT ON THE CONTRARY TO PROMOTE IT, BUT WITHIN A FRAMEWORK THAT TRANSLATED TO THE INTERNATIONAL SCENE THE MORAL VALUES THAT HAD IMBUEED AMERICAN HISTORY. ALL COUNTRIES WERE QUOTE TO RISE ABOVE NATIONAL INTERESTS UNQUOTE.



2. MUCH OF THIS HIGH-SOUNDING STUFF LOOKS PRETTY IRRELEVANT TODAY AND WHAT IS EXTRAORDINARY IS THE WAY EVENTS IN IRAN AND AFGHANISTAN HAVE ALMOST SIMULTANEOUSLY BROUGHT HOME TO THE UNITED STATES THE TWO MATTERS OF FUNDAMENTAL INTEREST TO THEM: THE REALITIES OF SOVIET POWER AND POLICY, AND THE GROWING US DEPENDENCE UPON MIDDLE EAST OIL AT A TIME WHEN THAT AREA OF THE WORLD IS BECOMING INCREASINGLY UNSTABLE.

3. IT WOULD BE GOING TOO FAR TO SAY THAT CARTER UNTIL RECENTLY HAS OVERLOOKED THE TRUE NATURE OF SOVIET POWER OR BEEN NAIVE ABOUT THEIR ULTIMATE OBJECTIVES. BUT HE HAS ALWAYS BELIEVED THAT THE SOVIET LEADERS, GOVERNED BY REASON, KNEW FROM THE SIGNALS THAT THE US WERE CONSTANTLY SENDING THROUGH THEIR VARIOUS MEANS WHAT IT WAS THAT THE USA WERE PREPARED TO ACCEPT IN SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY. THE US COULD TOLERATE, FOR EXAMPLE, SOVIET ATTAINMENT OF NUCLEAR PARITY, AND EVEN APPARENTLY SOVIET-BACKED COUPS OR PROXY ADVENTURES IN ETHIOPIA, SOUTH YEMEN, OR CAMBODIA. BUT DIRECT MASSIVE SOVIET MILITARY INTERVENTION OUTSIDE THE SOCIALIST CAMP AND IN A NON-ALIGNED COUNTRY CLOSE TO THE MOST SENSITIVE PARTS OF THE GULF AND THE MIDDLE EAST WAS ANOTHER MATTER. IT HAS BEEN THE FAILURE OF THE SOVIET UNION TO KEEP WITHIN WHAT THE US GOVERNMENT THOUGHT WERE CLEARLY DEFINED LIMITS BY INVADING AFGHANISTAN THAT HAS PRODUCED SUCH A SHOCK IN WASHINGTON.

4. THE FRENCH MAY THINK THAT THERE HAVE BEEN OTHER EVENTS SINCE THE WAR E.G. THE BERLIN BLOCKADE OR THE CUBA MISSILE CRISIS THAT HAVE BEEN MORE OF A THREAT TO PEACE THAN THE INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN. BUT I AM SURE THAT THE AUTHORITIES IN WASHINGTON DO NOT THINK THE RUSSIANS SHOULD HAVE BEEN IN ANY DOUBT ABOUT THE GRAVE VIEW THAT THE US GOVERNMENT WOULD TAKE OF THIS LATEST SOVIET ACTION: AND IT IS MOSCOW'S READINESS TO FLOUT THIS THAT SO DISTURBS THEM. IT MIGHT BE ASKED WHY AFGHANISTAN IS WORSE THAN CUBA. THE ANSWER INDICATES THE EXTENT TO WHICH DEPENDENCE ON MIDDLE EAST OIL AND THE CLOSENESS OF THE SOVIET THREAT IN THE REGION HAS NOW BECOME IDENTIFIED WITH AMERICAN VITAL INTERESTS.

5. TO THE REST OF US THERE IS CERTAINLY SOMETHING SURPRISING IN THE FACT THAT THE US SHOULD ONLY NOW HAVE SUDDENLY AWOKEN TO THE THREAT POSED TO US INTERESTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST, NOT ONLY BY THE NEW-FOUND FORCE OF ISLAM AND THE ADVANCE OF SOVIET POWER BUT BY THE INHERENT CONTRADICTION THAT HAS EXISTED FOR SO LONG IN US POLICY TOWARDS THE AREA. WE, THE BRITISH, KNOW BETTER THAN ANY OTHER PEOPLE HOW LONG-STANDING HAS BEEN THE PERVERSITY OF US POLICY TOWARD THE MIDDLE EAST- AN AMALGAM OVER THE YEARS OF BLINDNESS, SELF-INTEREST, IGNORANCE AND DOMESTIC US POLITICS THAT LED THEM FIRST OF ALL TO HELP

PUSH US OUT OF THE REGION AND THEN MOST RECENTLY TO UNDERESTIMATE THE PROBLEM OF SQUARING THE CIRCLE CREATED BY DEPENDENCE ON ARAB OIL AND FAVOURED RELATIONS WITH ISRAEL. I AM SURE IT WOULD BE WRONG TO ASSUME THAT EVERYTHING THAT CARTER IS NOW SUGGESTING AND DOING IS MOTIVATED MAINLY OR EVEN LARGELY BY ELECTORAL CONSIDERATIONS. WHAT HAS HAPPENED ABROAD WOULD HAVE REQUIRED A REVIEW OF US FOREIGN POLICY REGARDLESS OF THE ELECTION. A NEW MORE RATIONAL POLICY TOWARDS THE AREA IS GOING TO BE EXTREMELY DIFFICULT TO CONSTRUCT, AND THE CHANCES OF THE US BEING ABLE TO IMPLEMENT A CONSISTENT OR SUCCESSFUL POLICY ON NEW LINES IS GREATLY COMPLICATED BOTH BY CARTER'S COMMITMENT TO CAMP DAVID AND BY THE INEVITABLE IMPACT OF THE JEWISH LOBBY ON THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY. BUT THIS ATTEMPT IS NOW ONE OF THE MAIN PRIORITIES OF US FOREIGN POLICY, UPON WHICH I SHALL BE COMMENTING IN MY TWO IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING TELEGRAMS. FCO PASS SAVING BUCHAREST SOFIA BELGRADE BUDAPEST PRAGUE WARSAW EAST BERLIN AND KABUL.

HENDERSON

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

FCO/WHITEHALL DISTRIBUTION  
N AM D

RESTRICTED

FM WASHINGTON 242340Z JAN 80  
TO PRIORITY FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 390 OF 24 JANUARY

INFO MODUK UKDEL NATO PARIS BONN MOSCOW ROME AND PEKING  
INFO SAVING TO OTHER NATO POSTS.

REVIEW OF U.S. FOREIGN POLICY.

1. COMING ON TOP OF MOUNTING CONCERN HERE ABOUT THE INCREASE IN SOVIET MILITARY POWER AND ABOUT THE GROWING AMERICAN DEPENDENCE ON MIDDLE EAST OIL AT A TIME WHEN THAT AREA IS SHOWING SEISMIC INSTABILITY, THE SOVIET OCCUPATION OF AFGHANISTAN HAS PRODUCED A SHOCK-WAVE HERE THE IMPACT OF WHICH DOES NOT SEEM TO BE NECESSARILY FELT OR UNDERSTOOD ELSEWHERE.

2. MANY OF THE ASSUMPTIONS HELD BY PRESIDENT CARTER WHEN HE TOOK OFFICE HAVE BEEN SHATTERED AND A REVIEW OF U.S. FOREIGN POLICY IS TAKING PLACE. FROM ALL THE LENGTHY PASSAGES OF CARTER'S STATE OF THE UNION ADDRESS LAST NIGHT DEVOTED TO FOREIGN POLICY I WOULD PICK OUT AS THE SINGLE MOST IMPORTANT HIS WARNING THAT QUOTE AN ATTEMPT BY ANY OUTSIDE FORCE TO GAIN CONTROL OF THE PERSIAN GULF REGION WILL BE REGARDED AS AN ASSAULT ON THE VITAL INTERESTS OF THE UNITED STATES UNQUOTE AND QUOTE WILL BE REPELLED BY USE OF ANY MEANS NECESSARY, INCLUDING MILITARY FORCE UNQUOTE.

3. AS HM AMBASSADORS IN BONN AND PARIS HAVE ALREADY INDICATED, THE CHANGE IN ATTITUDE HERE ABOUT EAST-WEST RELATIONS HAS FAR REACHING IMPLICATIONS FOR RELATIONS BETWEEN THE USA AND THEIR EUROPEAN ALLIES. I SHALL BE TRYING TO PUT TOGETHER AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE AN ANALYSIS OF THE NEW U.S. POLICY, THE CONSEQUENCES OF THIS FOR THE ALLIANCE AND THE PARTICULAR SCOPE THIS HOLDS OUT FOR HMG.

FCO PAS<sup>S</sup> SAVING ANKARA ATHENS BRUSSELS COPENHAGEN LISBON LUXEMBOURG  
OSLO REYKJAVIK AND THE HAGUE.

HENDERSON

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

FCO/WHITEHALL DISTRIBUTION

N AM D

RESTRICTED

CONFIDENTIAL



*For Pol.*

10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Principal Private Secretary*

17 September 1979

EAST EUROPEAN HEADS OF MISSION  
CONFERENCE 18/19 OCTOBER

Thank you for sending me a copy of your letter of 14 September to Richard Mottram.

This is just to say that I am afraid that I will not be able to get away to attend the session on the morning of 19 October.

C. A. WHITMORE

R. A. Burns, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

*R.A. Burns*

CONFIDENTIAL

FILE

VBS



For. Policy.

10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

14 September 1979

East European Heads of Mission Conference  
18/19 October

Thank you for sending me a copy of your letter to Richard Mottram about the Heads of Mission Conference. I fear that I shall be in Luxembourg with the Prime Minister on the day in question.

M. O'D. B. ALEXANDER

R. A. Burns, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

14 September 1979

R Mottram, Esq  
PS to Sir Frank Cooper GCB CMG  
Ministry of Defence  
Main Building  
Whitehall

~~Michael~~

No good for you - handwriting.

I am not inclined to go myself.

In any case I have got Sir John  
Hunt's regards however meeting at 0945.

best  
14/9

*Dear Richard,*

EAST EUROPEAN HEADS OF MISSION CONFERENCE 18/19 OCTOBER

1. As foreshadowed in Sir Michael Palliser's letter of 11 July (not to all) we are arranging for the conference on East/West relations which was originally planned for July to take place on the morning of 19 October. Sir Michael hopes that Sir Frank Cooper and other recipients of this letter will be able to participate. We should be grateful for early replies. The format for the conference was set out in Sir Michael's letter of 5 July. The Conference will start at 10am and will be held in Room 102 Downing Street East, Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

2. We have also decided to hold a related conference on 18 October involving Ambassadors from Eastern Europe, to discuss British bilateral relations with the Warsaw Pact countries and Yugoslavia. We are writing separately to Whitehall Departments about participation, which we envisage will be at a somewhat less exalted level than for the session on 19 October.

3. I also enclose for your information a copy of the proposed timetable for the two conferences, together with the lists of persons invited.

*Yours ever,*  
*Andrew*

R A Burns  
PS/PUS

CCS:

M E Quinlan, Esq MOD  
C A Whitmore, Esq, No 10  
M O'D B Alexander, Esq No 10  
W M Knighton, Esq, DOT  
P M Maxey, Esq, Cabinet Office  
R W Wade-Gery, Esq CMG, Cabinet Office  
K W Cotterill, Esq CMG, ECGD

CONFIDENTIAL

ANNEX A

Draft Programme

17 October

1800                    Drinks given by Eastern European Trade Centre  
for Ambassadors from the Warsaw Pact followed  
by dinner hosted by Lord Shackleton

18 October

1000                    Conference opened by Mr Blaker.  
Discussion of the political aspects of  
regional and bilateral affairs.

Lunch

1500                    Discussion of economics and trade.

1830                    Reception hosted by the Lord Privy Seal.

19 October

1000-1300              Enlarged session on East/West relations.

The meetings will be held in Room 102, Downing Street East.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

ANNEX B

PARTICIPANTS ON 18 OCTOBER

AWAY\_TEAM

Sir Curtis Keeble	Moscow
Mr Cloake	Sofia
Mr Farquharson	Belgrade
Mr Foster	East Berlin
Mr Holmer	Bucharest
Mr Male	Prague
Mr Parsons	Budapest
Mr Pridham	Warsaw

HOME\_TEAM

Mr Blaker (Chairman)	Representatives of:
Mr Bullard	DEI (MOD)
Mr Fergusson	DOT
Mr Mallaby	ECCD
Mr Braithwaite	Assessments Staff
Mr Tait	Bank of England
WED	HM Treasury
Research Department	British Council
CSCE Unit	
TRED	
OID	
EID(E)	
IPD	
CRD	
FRD	

CONFIDENTIAL



CONFIDENTIAL

ANNEX C

PARTICIPANTS ON 19 OCTOBER

AWAY TEAM

Sir N Henderson  
Sir R Hibbert  
Sir Curtis Keeble  
Sir D Maitland  
Sir C Rose  
Sir O Wright

Washington  
Paris  
Moscow  
UKREP Brussels  
NATO-designate  
Bonn

Mr Bolland  
Sir J Cable  
Mr Cloake  
Mr Edmonds  
Mr Farquharson  
Mr Foster  
Mr Holmer  
Mr Male  
Mr Parsons  
Mr Pridham

MBFR Delegation  
Helsinki  
Sofia  
CTD Delegation  
Belgrade  
East Berlin  
Bucharest  
Prague  
Budapest  
Warsaw

FCO

Secretary of State (Chairman)  
Lord Privy Seal  
Mr Blaker  
Mr Hurd  
PUS  
Mr Bullard  
Mr Fergusson  
Mr P H Moberly  
Mr Mallaby  
Mr Braithwaite  
Defence Department  
WED  
ACDD  
CSCE Unit  
NAD

Whitehall

Mr Whitmore  
Mr Alexander  
Sir F Cooper  
Mr Quinlan  
Mr Knighton  
Mr Maxey  
Mr Wade-Gery  
Mr Cotterill

No. 10  
No. 10  
MOD  
MOD  
DOT  
Cabinet  
Office  
Cabinet  
Office  
ECGD



14 SEP 1979

CONFIDENTIAL

MR WHITMORE  
Foreign Policy

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH



11 July 1979

Sir Curtis Keeble KCMG  
C/O Heads of Mission Section  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office  
London SW1

M Carlsberg  
✓  
16/11

Dear Curtis,

EAST-WEST HEADS OF MISSION CONFERENCE: PLANNING STAFF "PAPER"

In his letter of 5 July, the Permanent Under-Secretary said that he had commissioned a paper from us about East-West Relations.

2. We had intended to circulate two documents as background for the Conference: the 1976 Planning Paper on "Detente and the Future Management of East-West Relations", and an essay by the Planning Staff on "Managing Russia". Despite the postponement of the Conference, it still seems worth circulating these, and I therefore enclose copies.

3. The Planning Staff essay reflects a particular point of view. It has not been cleared through the Office, and should not therefore be regarded as any sort of official statement. It was simply intended to help stimulate discussion, and I have no doubt that many people will disagree with large bits of it.

4. The 1976 Planning Staff paper was a very substantial piece of work, and was endorsed by Ministers at the time. The basic analysis in it remains valid, although events have moved forward on some of the detailed issues. The Planning Staff is now engaged in updating the paper. I expect that we will need to make very little change in the analytical sections; though the passages on such matters as the CSCE, MBFR, SALT, and human rights will need to be modified in the light of events. We had hoped that the Conference on 20 July would give us useful additional material. In fact we hope to have the revision more or less complete by the time the Conference takes place at its postponed date.

5. I am sending copies of this letter and its enclosures to the people who received copies of Sir M Palliser's letter of 5 July.

Yours ever,

Rodni

R Q Braithwaite  
Planning Staff

CONFIDENTIAL

MANAGING RUSSIA

"When during the last 1000 years have such enormous acquisitions been made in so brief a period by any European conqueror? .... There is no sane mind in Europe that can look with satisfaction at the immense and rapid overgrowth of Russian power."

The Times, 16 October 1829

1. Managing East-West relations means managing Russia, a very large country which began to trouble its neighbours long before the Revolution of 1917. A number of other countries, and other factors - China, Cuba, Eastern Europe, Eurocommunism, anti-colonialism - must be brought into the equation. But all is conditioned by the strengths, weaknesses, fears and ambitions of Russia; and by the manner in which these are exploited or countered by the West.

2. Over the centuries, various attempts have been made, in Russia and the West, to devise a unifying theory to explain the complexity of Russia's relations with the outside world: Orthodoxy, Pan Slavism, Tsarist Imperialism, world communism, Soviet Imperialism, convergence. These theories often reflected the natural ebb and flow of political sentiment between optimism and pessimism about the chances of dealing with Russia successfully. But they were not always the best basis for a durable analysis. In the late 1960s and the 1970s the fashionable concept was "détente", a hopeful but unrevealing catchword whose meaning was further obscured by arguments about whether détente was a "process," whether it was "indivisible," and whether it might not - alas - even be "reversible." If the word "détente" is to be retained as a useful piece of shorthand, it is best described in the sober words of the 1976 Planning Paper: "The goal of détente is the containment of hostility rather than a qualitative transformation of relations."

The Sources of Soviet Power

3. Since the Bolshevik Revolution, people have argued endlessly about the aims and motives of the Soviet Union: is it driven in its external policies by Communist ideology, by Russian historical experience, or by the inevitable pressures of geo-politics on a great power? There is no definitive answer to these questions. But they are not entirely academic since a balanced judgment helps to devise appropriate responses to Soviet actions and attitudes which are neither complacent nor alarmist.

4. In the long-term, the main factors conditioning any country's external relations are geographical, economic and socio-political. This is as true of great powers as of small. Russia has been a great

/power

power, and recognised as such, at least since the time of Catherine the Great, and despite the numerous reverses she has suffered since then. Since 1945 she has been accepted as a super-power, and has increasingly become one in fact. Great powers, like small, extend their reach to the limit of their ability; and define their "interests" as a function of what they can defend or acquire. The Americans and the British did this in their day. The Russians have used their power first to dominate the glacis in Eastern Europe (already a major aim of Russia in the 18th Century); then to control the empty spaces to the East and South of the Russian heartland; and now to promote their "interests" world-wide.

5. It is possible to explain most of the actions (as opposed to the rhetoric) of the Soviet Union abroad in these terms. But this is not the whole story: Russian history and Communist ideology give Soviet external policy a distinctive flavour.

6. Since the Middle Ages, the history of Russia has been the history of an insecure despotism, regularly shaken by violent and unpredictable movements within, and subject to repeated attack from without. Geography, climate, and a political system which discouraged enterprise have always held back Russia's economy by comparison with the West: since the Middle Ages she has depended heavily on state intervention and the importation of Western technology. At the same time, the Russians have always been conscious of their greatness as a people. Because of their material backwardness, they have preferred for centuries to base their claims to world attention on superior moral insight.

7. Hence Russia's well-known suspicion and inferiority complex towards the West, her great reliance on very substantial (and - as the series of almost unbroken military defeats between 1815 and 1917 demonstrate - often unduly cumbersome) military machinery; a nagging feeling that Russia's practical achievements do not match up to her moral grandeur; and the complete absence of any tradition of the advantages of international cooperation. Peter the Great boasted, "We have come out of the darkness into the light, and people who did not know we existed now do us honour." The search for recognition has been a driving motive in Russian foreign policy ever since. These Russian attitudes have naturally produced a reaction amongst the other countries which have had to deal with Russia: see Annex 1.

8. The strain of Messianic fervour in Russian thought made it natural, after the Bolshevik Revolution, to adopt Marxism as a banner serving Russia's spiritual as well as her political needs. But Soviet Communism bears comparatively little philosophical relationship with German Marxism, which was an attempt to analyse and predict the future of advanced Western economic societies. The modifications introduced by Lenin were tactical prescriptions, not contributions to thought. Lenin's tactical sense and his will-power were effective in the domestic struggle within Russia. But the attempts of Lenin and his successors to analyse international developments in terms of their ideology were often mistaken, and led the Soviet Union into serious errors (see, for example, the attempts to formulate a sensible policy towards Germany between 1918 and 1941).

CONFIDENTIAL

9. Nothing in Soviet ideology adds up to a convincing blueprint for "world domination", in itself a meaningless concept. There is no Soviet equivalent of Mein Kampf (inadequate though that book was as a sound basis for the creation of a 1000 Year Reich). The Marxist ideology has failed even to sustain the unity of the world Communist movement. For thirty years, since the defection of Yugoslavia, it has been quite clear that any country beyond the reach of the Red Army will promote its own national interest as it sees them, regardless of the interests of the Soviet Union (and regardless, of course, also of the interests of the West).

10. Nevertheless ideology serves a purpose. It provides the Soviet Government with a philosophical justification for its domestic regime and for Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe. It provides an alternative source of political philosophy for Third World countries who resent the West's past colonial and present economic influence. It can be used to justify the apparatus of power in Third World totalitarian states (though right-wing dictators in the Third World manage to stay in power with no such justification). Above all the claim (and perhaps belief) that history is on the side of the Soviet Union helps to offset the natural lack of self-confidence of Russian leaders; and no doubt also inclines them to a certain cautious activism in attempting to extend the limits of Soviet influence and in developing contacts outside their sphere of control with countries they regard as potentially "Socialist".

Russia and the West: The Balance

11. The menacing size of Russia's armed forces has always seemed a threat to her neighbours, even though she has more often used her forces for defensive operations, police actions, or wars of conquest against primitive or decadent oriental enemies. (Contrast France from the 17th Century to Waterloo, and Germany from 1864.) In purely military terms, the threat is now more serious than it has ever been in the past. The Soviet Union is a nuclear superpower. The size of the Russian forces is offset by their inadequate equipment and training. This, rather than any tradition of aggressive behaviour or the nature of Communist ideology, is what justifiably gives concern to the West.

12. But even in the purely military field, the balance doubtless looks different in Moscow. In Europe we are much impressed by the size and quality of the numerous Soviet divisions which face us; and the natural growth of Soviet capacity to intervene militarily beyond Europe has been a disagreeable, if probably unavoidable, experience. The Russians, on the other hand, see themselves isolated in a circle of enemies. They have no reliable military allies. They have had to put down rebellions in three of the Warsaw Pact countries by military force; in Poland they nearly did so in 1956 and have had several worrying moments since; the Romanians are shifty; only the Bulgars have so far caused no trouble. The Russians could not be happy about the security of their lines of communication in any European war. They could hardly rely on the non-Soviet Warsaw Pact forces in attack; or even defence, provided that advancing Western armies did not repeat the mistakes the Germans made in the Ukraine in 1941. A pessimistic Soviet General making a "worst case" calculation - which is the sort of calculation Russian Generals habitually make - might well judge that, word-wide, Soviet forces were outnumbered by those of NATO

/except

**CONFIDENTIAL**

except in certain important equipment categories; and that the numbers arrayed against the Soviet Union become quite frightening if you throw in a hostile China and a Japan allied to the United States (see figures at Annex 2, Section A). The Soviet preponderance in Europe might seem no more than an insurance, or at most a counterbalancing threat.

13. In the economic field the balance is firmly tilted against the Soviet Union (Annex 2, Section B). Unlike the industrialised West she has of course access to almost all the indigenous raw materials she requires. But climate and geography mean that many of these are very difficult to exploit. The Soviet economy is burdened with a wasteful and inefficient system of management which helps to ensure that, in the technological field, the Russians have consistently remained about fifteen years behind the West, with little hope of closing the gap. Despite the fuss over the sputnik, that symbol of the superiority of "Socialism", it was the Americans who got to the Moon.

14. The Soviet Union's domestic political arrangements are equally unprepossessing compared with those of the West. The Soviet regime, like its predecessors, relies on the use of force and a pervasive secret police to control the passive and apparently servile Russian people.

15. But they fear the "elemental forces" which lurk below the surface. And they do not even feel quite sure of their security forces.<sup>(1)</sup> The Soviet Union is, of course, not on the brink of revolution. But no political or economic reforms will be undertaken that would loosen the hold of the authorities over the people, even if that is the only way to encourage individual initiative and a qualitative improvement in the performance of the Soviet economy.

16. The Soviet Union has, of course, had its successes abroad. But we should be clear about the causes. The Soviet Union's position in Europe is the aftermath of military victory. She has not expanded her power there since the 1940s<sup>(2)</sup>; she has been able to retain it only through the presence of the Red Army. Beyond Europe, she has been able to expand her influence into the vacuum left by the departing colonial powers. Now that decolonisation is practically complete, except in Southern Africa, the countries of the Third World will doubtless become more eclectic in seeking support for their aims. In the economic sphere they will probably look to the West, because of the Soviet Union's dismal aid performance (Annex 2, Section C) and her comparative self-sufficiency in raw materials. In the political field, most Third World countries seem capable of accepting or rejecting Soviet influence as they think it tactically useful.

/17.

---

(1) Khrushchev's successors said publicly that his haphazard methods risked unleashing "elemental forces". In 1962 the army shot 300 bread rioters in the streets of Novochoerkassk: in 1965 Brezhnev bought a billion dollars of American grain because (commented that shrewd observer, Victor Louis, at the time) "he could not be sure that next time the soldiers would shoot." In 1975 the Soviet Air Force bombed into submission a frigate of the Baltic Fleet which had set off for Sweden after celebrating the anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution too liberally.

(2) Indeed, she abandoned Austria in 1955.

17. Russia's gains outside Europe have for the most part been offset by losses. The Russians have failed to blackmail the Japanese into signing an unequal treaty. They cannot get a grip on the Middle East. Iran and Afghanistan are worryingly militant on their Muslim borders. Above all there is the apparently permanent defection of China. When they contemplate the balance, even in the comparatively successful year of 1978, and despite the cheering predictions of their ideology, the Russians may not find it easy to convince themselves that world history is inexorably on their side.

#### Future Prospects

18. These Soviet attitudes are unlikely to change soon. Soviet foreign policy will doubtless remain an alliance of caution and opportunism, laced with paranoia and Messianic rhetoric. The Russians will not relax their firm grip on Eastern Europe, and whatever the political disadvantages, they would again intervene by force if their grip were threatened. They will go on trying their luck in the Third World, though hampered by their lack of tact, and by the desire not to provoke the Americans too far. Their military conservatism, and fear of the "external threat" will lead them to continue improving their armed forces despite the economic, technological and political problems.

19. Social and economic change inside Russia itself could eventually lead to helpful change. But there is no likelihood of this happening for many decades. Meanwhile, the Russians are unlikely to become easier to manage than hitherto; the hopes that "détente" would quickly lead to significant improvement in the way Russia conducts her affairs at home and abroad, which were common in the early 1970s, were therefore illusory. It is a mistake to think that the West can "educate" the Russians to behave much better; and even more of a mistake to think (as certain revisionist historians do) that if only we had been nicer to the Russians after the War, they would have been nicer to us.

20. Nevertheless, we have come a good way since the height of the Cold War (1947-63). If East-West relations remain uneasy, and they are bound to fluctuate, it seems unlikely that they will get as bad as they then were. Various scenarios for a breakdown of East-West relations can be devised: but none of them are particularly probable.

#### The Western Response

21. Russia's political and economic weaknesses, and the record of history, cast serious doubt on Soviet claims, and Western fears, that the global "correlation of forces" is moving inexorably in favour of the Soviet Union. The security of the West depends not only on sustaining an appropriate level of military preparedness, but also on managing effectively the many political, economic, technological, and even military advantages the West enjoys. The West needs to avoid complacency; it also needs to avoid the kind of exaggerated panic at the prospect of Soviet power which could, in the Soviet Union's more vulnerable neighbours, lead unnecessarily to some form of "self-Finlandisation".



CONFIDENTIAL

22. Many of these problems of self-management concern issues over which the Russians have almost no influence: the world economy and the energy crisis; relations with the developing world; the crisis of American leadership; the proper operation of the European Community. Even in the military field, the current nuclear debate in NATO is important less because new weapons are needed to match the Russian build-up, than because the Alliance has set itself a manhood test which it must pass to demonstrate its continued vitality. Healthy West-West relations are the essential pre-requisite for the management of a satisfactory East-West relationship.

23. This relationship is played out in the Third World, with the Soviet Union's present and former allies, and in bilateral dealings between the Soviet Union and individual Western countries. The competition for influence in the Third World needs to be got into perspective. America's world power has never been absolute, and is now not much diminished. At the height of her nuclear power, America could not protect Chiang Kai Shek or the successive governments in Saigon against overwhelming internal political forces; it is unreasonable now to lose confidence in America because she failed to save the Shah. Fears that the Americans would intervene by force or in secret have deterred the Russians from meddling in the past. It is desirable that these fears should not be discouraged. The instruments of American intervention - aid, the armed forces and the CIA - remain to hand. How they will be used in future is largely a matter of American domestic politics. But it is primarily the domestic politics of the Third World countries themselves which determine whether, and for how long, they come under Soviet influence; or whether they prefer to remain linked with the West, where for the most part their economic interest lies.

24. Ever since President Nixon played the "China card" in 1972, the Russians have feared - to an irrational degree - closer links between China and the West. They have always resented Western interference in their dealings with Eastern Europe.\* This is not an argument against the West developing the closest practicable relationships with both: rather the reverse. But it is a matter for careful management: to a large extent both the China and the East European cards can be left to play themselves.

25. In their bilateral relations with the Soviet Union itself, Western countries have to hand the traditional instruments of trade, political and professional exchanges. (Annex 2, Section D) These can be exploited up to the limit of what Russia has to offer. This varies from country to country: the Germans have a considerable interest in using the Russians as an indirect channel for improving their links with East Germany; French Governments find the "special" Franco-Russian relationship a useful asset in domestic politics; while the range of US-Soviet bilateral relations, from strategic arms limitation talks to grain deals, is substantial and expanding.

/26.

---

\* In a poem written during the Russian suppression of the Warsaw Rising of 1831, the liberal Pushkin threatens the West with Napoleon's fate if it interferes in this "brotherly quarrel between Slavs."

26. Our own interest in a bilateral relationship with the Russians is comparatively small. We have no common border with the Soviet Union; we have a tiny Communist Party; British opinion is not much interested in the Soviet Union; and the trade opportunities are not great. We are rather more free, therefore, than some of our allies to point out publicly the disagreeable aspects of Soviet behaviour (eg over human rights), and to take such actions as the large-scale expulsion of Soviet diplomats in 1971 with comparatively little damage to our real interests. The corollary is that when the Soviet Union is looking for a Western propaganda scapegoat, she naturally tends to choose us. This need not worry us unduly. But we do have a major interest in a satisfactory East-West relationship overall. Our scope for action towards the Soviet Union is therefore perhaps limited less by the danger of retaliation, than by the need to keep within a broad Western consensus if we are not unduly to trouble our relations with our Allies.

#### Conclusion

27. The Russian menace is not new, it is not diminishing, and its nature is unlikely to change for a very long time. But it needs to be kept in proportion. It is perfectly manageable by a healthily united West. More constructively, it still makes sense to pursue the overall aim which lay behind the more sober definitions of détente in the early 1970s: the creation of a network of practical East-West relationships, in which the Soviet Union has a material stake, and which multiplies the links between the two sides, reinforcing the trend when the overall relationship is improving, and cushioning the shock when it deteriorates, as it is bound to from time to time.

Planning Staff

July 1979

The Russian Domestic Scene

"A people rude, to vices vile inclined."

16th Century British businessmen  
in Moscow

"So that they may remain tranquil in slavery and terror they are forbidden, on pain of corporal punishment, to travel out of the country on their own initiative [lest they] tell their countrymen of the free institutions which exist in foreign lands."

Olearius, 17th Century German diplomat

"For making people tipsy here is an honour and a sign of esteem; the man who is not put under the table holds himself ill respected. The Muscovites are indeed masters at talking to others and persuading them to drink."

Herberstein, 16th Century German observer

"Secrecy presides over everything; administrative secrecy; political and social secrecy; discretion useful and discretion useless. A silence that is superfluous assures the silence that is necessary."

Custine, 1839.

Russian Negotiating Tactics and Diplomacy

"We do not find the [Russian] Ambassadour nowe at the last so conformable to reason as wee had thought wee shoulde. He is very mistrustfull, and thinketh everie man will beguile him. Therefore you had neede to take heede howe you have to doe with him or with any such, and to make your bargaines plaine, and to set them down in writing. For they bee subtil men to bee like themselves."

Instructions of the Directors of the  
Company of the Merchant Adventurers to  
Russia to their Moscow agent, 1557

"They do not regard deception as a matter of conscience, but more as a wise and praiseworthy mode of conduct .... If they light upon a point favourable to them when they are dealing with others, they clutch at it to their advantage, and anything they say or promise is turned to their own favour, however they may have pledged themselves, for they swear oaths only with the purpose of deceiving."

Olearius

/"One...

"One does not need to worry much about negotiations when one has six hundred thousand men under arms."

Anonymous Russian General at the  
Congress of Vienna\*

"I should have liked to be friendly with [Russia]; but she simply would not permit it, and those responsible for managing her foreign policy betrayed a brutality and ignorance, an arrogance and shortsightedness, which are not often combined."

Teddy Roosevelt

"I look upon .... Soviet Diplomacy not only as being unreliable, but, above all, as being incapable of being of the same nature as the foreign political activity of other nations, and in consequence, as being something with which one cannot negotiate or conclude treaties."

Adolf Hitler.

### The Russian Threat

"You must make up your minds to watch him and resist him [the Tsar]. Acquiescence will not keep him back, nor will opposition accelerate his march."

Castlereagh

"It was believed that the Emperor Nicholas numbered almost a million of men under arms; and of these a main part were brave, steady, obedient soldiers. Gathering from time to time great bodies of troops upon his Western frontier, he caused the minds of men in the neighbouring states to be weighed down with a sense of his strength. Moreover, he was served by a diplomacy of the busy sort, always labouring to make the world hear of Russia and to acknowledge her might."

Kinglake, writing in 1863 of the  
eve of the Crimean War

"The steady and systematic manner in which by conscious accretions year by year, 'hastelessly but remorselessly' the immense military forces of Russia are being welded into a standing army more than double the size of any other European army, with untold masses of reserves in the background."

Despatch from Sir R Morier,  
HM Ambassador in St Petersburg  
in the 1880s

The development of the Russian armed forces, in fighting power as well as transport capacity, is "one of the most striking phenomena in modern military history."

Encyclopedia Britannica, 1910 edition.

/Pessimism and Optimism

\*Footnote: Cf Nelson: "I hate your pen-and-ink men: a fleet of British ships of war are the best negotiators in Europe."

### Pessimism and Optimism

"When our cosmopolitan democracy, bearing its final fruit, has made out of war something odious to entire populations, when those nations that are supposed to be the most civilised ones on earth have finally cultivated themselves in their political debauchery and have fallen progressively into internal somnolence and the world's contempt, when, swooning in their egotism, they have lost all attraction for others as allies, then the floodgates of the North will be opened once more in our faces, and we shall be subjected to a final invasion, no longer by ignorant barbarians but by sophisticated masters, masters more enlightened than ourselves. For they will have learned from our excesses how we could and should be ruled. A Russian domination, even if it should limit itself to diplomatic demands, would seem to me to be the deadliest possible thing for the world."

Custine, 1839

The Russian government deliberately interposes "a thick veil between her and the rest of Europe, leaving the latter to ruminate over her vast but unknown resources, till at length everyone is affected by a panic fear, for which there is absolutely no reason whatsoever."

Edinburgh Review, 1854.

THE EAST-WEST BALANCE

This Annex contains the following Sections:

SECTION A : The Military Balance

- (a) Strategic Nuclear Balance
- (b) Long-Range Theatre Nuclear Balance
- (c) World-wide Conventional Balance
- (d) Conventional Balance in Europe

SECTION B : The Economic Balance

SECTION C : Aid Statistics

SECTION D : East-West Trade

Note on sources: The Annexes are intended for illustrative purposes only. They are based for the most part on published sources to avoid unnecessarily high classification. They are nevertheless reasonably accurate.

SECTION A : THE MILITARY BALANCEa. Strategic Nuclear Balance <sup>(1)</sup>

	<u>USA</u>	<u>USSR</u>
Launchers of ICBMs	1,054	1,398
Fixed Launchers of ICBMs	1,054	1,398
Launchers of ICBMs equipped with MIRVs	550	608
Launchers of SLEMs	656	950
Launchers of SLEMs equipped with MIRVs	496	144
Heavy bombers	573	156
Heavy bombers equipped for cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometres	3	0
Heavy bombers equipped only for ASBMs	0	0
ASBMs	0	0
ASBMs equipped with MIRVs	0	0

Note:

- (1) As declared by the Chiefs of the US and Soviet delegations to the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, 18 June 1979.

CONFIDENTIAL  
(SECTION A, continued)

b. Long-range Theatre Nuclear Balance<sup>(1)</sup>

	<u>NATO</u>	<u>WP</u>
(i) <u>Land-Based</u>		
Missiles	18 (France)	690 (SU)
Warheads	18	890
(ii) <u>Sea-Based</u>		
Missiles	128 (France & UK)	54 (SU)
Warheads	128	54
(iii) <u>Bombers</u>		
Aircraft	265 (France, UK, US)	841 (SU) (4)
Warheads	265-435 (2)	841-1682 (3)

Notes: Figures based mainly on The Military Balance 1978-79

- (1) Range from approx 1000 to 5000 kms.
- (2) Free-fall bombs only.
- (3) Conservative estimate for air-surface missiles. Figure for free-fall bombs probably higher.
- (4) Includes 350 Naval Air Force. Some of these systems are currently deployed facing East: given the mobility of aircraft, the figures are not to be relied on.



UNCLASSIFIED  
(SECTION A, continued)

World-wide

c. Conventional Balance

i. Men

(a) Army

US	774,200			1,825,000
Non-US NATO	1,861,797 (1)		USSR	813,000
Japan	155,000		NSWP	
China	3,625,000			
	<u>6,415,997</u>			
Total			Total	<u>2,638,000</u>

(b) Navy

US	532,300			433,000
	+ 191,500	Marines	USSR	59,000
Non-US NATO	341,570 (2)		NSWP	
Japan	41,000			
China	300,000			
	<u>1,406,370</u>			
Total			Total	<u>492,000</u>

(c) Air Force

US	570,800			455,000
Non-US NATO	533,246 (3)		USSR	222,000
Japan	44,000		NSWP	
China	400,000			
	<u>1,548,046</u>			
Total			Total	<u>677,000</u>

(d) Total Armed Forces

US	2,068,800			3,638,000 (4)
Non-US NATO	2,757,013 (5)		USSR	1,094,000
Japan	240,000		NSWP	
China	4,325,000			
	<u>9,390,813</u>			
Total			Total	<u>4,732,000</u>

Notes: Figures taken from The Military Balance 1978-1979

(1) Includes 324,400 France

(2) Includes 68,200 France

(3) Includes 100,800 France

(4) Excludes some 750,000 uniformed civilians. Includes 375,000 Strategic Rocket Forces and 550,000 Air Defence Force

(5) Includes 20,400 inter-Service staffs, France and FRG

UNCLASSIFIED  
(SECTION A, continued)

ii Tanks (1)

US	approx	12,100		USSR	50,000
Non-US NATO		14,931 (2)		NSWP	14,725
Japan		790			
China		10,000			
		Total		Total	64,725
		37,821			

iii Major Surface Combat Vessels (3)

US		172		USSR	243
Non-US NATO		279 (4)		NSWP	17
Japan		58			
China		23			
		Total		Total	260
		532			

iv Submarines

US		75		USSR	243
Non-US NATO		126 (5)		NSWP	8
Japan		14			
China		75			
		Total		Total	251
		290			

v Combat Aircraft (Air Force)

US	approx	3,400		USSR	approx 4,650
Non-US NATO		3,152 (6)		NSWP	2,580
Japan		358			
China	approx	5,000			
		Total		Total	7,230
		11,910			

Notes: Figures taken from The Military Balance 1978-1979

- (1) Covers both medium and light tanks
- (2) Includes 2160 French tanks
- (3) Carriers, cruisers, destroyers, frigates, escorts, corvettes
- (4) Includes 46 French
- (5) Includes 21 French
- (6) Includes 471 French

CONFIDENTIAL  
(SECTION A, continued)

d. Conventional Balance in Europe

(i) In MBFR reductions area (1)

	<u>NATO</u>	<u>Warsaw Pact</u>
Ground Forces	791,500 (2)	956,200 (3)
Air Forces	189,500	219,100 (4)

(ii) "From the Atlantic to the Urals" (5)

	<u>NATO</u>	<u>Warsaw Pact</u>
Ground Forces	2,028,497	2,163,000 (6)
Air Forces	637,046	approx 600,000

Notes

- (1) NATO estimates: these exclude civilians, reservists, border guards and paramilitary organisations concerned with external defence.
- (2) Includes an estimated 60,000 French forces in FRG.
- (3) Warsaw Pact claim the figure is 805,000.
- (4) Warsaw Pact claim the figure is 182,300
- (5) These figures are rough calculations based on The Military Balance 1978-79. (Include UK, Danish, Greek, Italian, Norwegian, French, Turkish & Portuguese forces not in MBFR reductions area.)
- (6) Figure calculated on the assumption that there are 10,000 men in a Soviet tank division and 12,000 in a motorised division. Includes divisions in Central and Eastern Europe, Eastern USSR, Central USSR and Southern USSR.

SECTION B : THE ECONOMIC BALANCE

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
United States	216,817	1.1	1,874,270	3.5	8,640	2.4
Non-US NATO	<u>344,430</u>	0.9	<u>1,868,740</u>	4.7	5,426	3.8
NATO total	561,247		3,743,010			
Japan	113,860	1.1	642,200	9.2	5,640	8.0
China	<u>849,020</u>	1.6	<u>346,350</u>	6.9	410	5.2
NATO + Japan & China	<u>1,624,127</u>		<u>4,731,560</u>			
USSR	259,126	1.1	780,930	4.9	3,010	3.8
NSWP	<u>107,110</u>	0.6	<u>338,250</u>	5.1	3,158	4.4
	<u>366,236</u>		<u>1,119,180</u>			

(1) Population '000 1977

(2) Population growth rate - average % increase 1960-76

(3) GNP US\$ m 1977

(4) GNP Growth rate - average % increase 1960-76

(5) GNP per capita US\$ 1977

(6) GNP per capita growth rate - average % increase 1960-76

SECTION C : AID STATISTICSNet ODA as % of GNP in 1977

USA	0.22%	
EEC	0.40%	
OPEC <sup>(1)</sup>	2.01%	(2.7% in 1975)
China	0.07%	(0.14% in 1973)
Eastern Europe	0.05%	(0.07% in 1973)
USSR	0.03%	(0.09% in 1973)

- Notes: (1) This is "concessional assistance" by OPEC governments.
- (2) Although the OECD has a standard definition of aid, the figures for areas other than USA and EEC are estimates of concessional flows.

Sources: DAC Chairman's Report 1978  
OID Brief  
World Bank Atlas

SECTION D  
EAST-WEST TRADE

UNCLASSIFIED

1. Trade with Warsaw Pact as proportion of total trade

	<u>1958</u>	<u>1968</u>	<u>1977</u>
US	0.6	0.6	1.3
FRG	5.2	3.8	5.1
Italy	3.3	5.8	5.3
France	3.0	3.4	3.7
UK	2.5	3.7	2.9

2. Trade (both ways) in US\$m in current prices

	<u>USSR</u>			<u>NSWP</u>			<u>WP</u>			<u>China</u>			<u>Balance (Warsaw Pact only)</u>		
	1958	1968	1977	1958	1968	1977	1958	1968	1977	1958	1968	1977	1958	1968	1977
US	21	117	1879	176	297	1608	197	414	3487	0.1	-	397	+29	+16	+1595
FRG	164	567	4755	676 <sup>1</sup>	1138 <sup>1</sup>	6492 <sup>1</sup>	840	1705	11247	221	258	789	-68	+170	+2063
Italy	71	463	2676	118	724	2209	189	1187	4885	46	108	248	-6	-115	-309
France	170	438	2654	143	489	2345	318	927	4999	56	141	289	-14	+183	+563
UK	312	629	2005	188	631	1562	500	1260	3567	128	152	292	-68	-180	-657

3. Growth in East-West Trade, 1958 = 100

	<u>USSR</u>			<u>NSWP</u>			<u>WP</u>			<u>China</u>		
	1958	1968	1977	1958	1968	1977	1958	1968	1977	1958	1968	1977
US	100	511	3326	100	154	339	100	192	650	-	-	-
FRG	100	317	1078	100 <sup>1</sup>	153 <sup>1</sup>	357 <sup>1</sup>	100	186	497	100	92	133
Italy	100	598	1401	100	562	695	100	576	960	100	215	200
France	100	236	580	100	303	589	100	267	584	100	230	192
UK	100	184	239	100	307	309	100	231	265	100	108	84

(Figures deflated for inflation)

Note: 1 Excludes FRG-GDR tradeSource: Direction of Trade

CONFIDENTIAL

Uron

Circular 'O' 227/76  
Home 'B' 79/76  
RS 081/1

Foreign and Commonwealth Office  
London SW1A 2AH

15 December 1976

PLANNING PAPER ON DÉTENTE AND THE FUTURE MANAGEMENT  
OF EAST/WEST RELATIONS

1. The attached Planning Paper was commissioned by the PUS earlier this year. Its purpose was to put into focus a subject which, after Angola, had been provoking more emotion than clarity of thought, and to provide a coherent analysis of where British interests lie in the détente process. The paper sets out to review dispassionately the various stands and concerns which make détente of interest to both East and West, but which at the same time impose limits on what can be achieved.
2. After approval by the PUS's Steering Committee, the paper was submitted to FCO Ministers and formed the basis of a recent office meeting on détente chaired by the Secretary of State. The Secretary of State expressed general approval of the paper, and intends to draw on it when he refers in speeches to East/West relations.
3. The paper is now being circulated to all FCO departments and to all posts overseas. As the final paragraph explains it does not call for new initiatives by the UK, but provides a frame of reference and a basis for UK contributions to intra-Western discussions. It should be drawn on (with due discretion) by all posts which have occasion to discuss this subject with their contacts.

PLANNING STAFF

ENC

DISTRIBUTION:

All Heads of Mission  
All Heads of Department  
All Under-Secretaries

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

DÉTENTE AND THE FUTURE MANAGEMENT OF EAST/WEST RELATIONS

S U M M A R Y

INTRODUCTION

1. The word "détente" has been much overworked and misused, but the gradual evolution of East/West relations away from the cold war and confrontation cannot conveniently be described by any other term. The paper attempts to define how the evolution of détente would best accord with Western interests.

(para 1)

I: THE NATURE OF DÉTENTE

2. After the breakdown of earlier attempts to move away from sterile confrontation, both sides in the later 1960s attached increasing importance to the creation of a more stable relationship. This led to the negotiation in the 1970s of a modest modus vivendi based upon a common interest in the avoidance of military confrontation leading to nuclear war.

(paras 2-3)

3. Below this level, different countries have different interests and objectives. The Soviet Union sees the process of détente both as meeting state interests and as facilitating the promotion through the ideological struggle of the world-wide triumph of communism. The Soviet Union seeks to avoid a renewed nuclear arms spiral, to secure access to Western technology, capital and grain, to isolate China, to retain elbow-room for the political and ideological struggle and to preserve and perhaps extend its authority on the European continent. The United States seeks to manage the emergence of the Soviet Union as a superpower and to create a vested interest in cooperation; and eventually perhaps even to achieve a breaking down of East/West barriers. Western Europe shares United States interests, but attaches greater importance to East/West trade. Of the European Community countries, the FRG has special concerns arising from the division of Germany. France has sought to assert an independent personality, while the UK has aimed to play a responsible role in the formulation of overall Western policy towards the East. The Eastern European states seek opportunities for advantageous dealings with Western countries, access to Western markets and technology and opportunities for some assertion of national personality.

(paras 4-9)

/4.



4. Recent changes in East/West relations have been changes of degree, not of kind. The nature of the Soviet and Eastern European regimes has not changed. This, together with the continuing Soviet military build-up, has led to some disillusionment in the West. However, the West has not given away valuable cards, and there have been real if limited gains. Disappointment has resulted from exaggerated and unwarranted expectations.

(paras 10-12)

## II: THE CURRENT BUSINESS OF DÉTENTE

5. East/West negotiations combine a cooperative approach to solving difficult problems and a confrontational approach aimed at achieving advantage. SALT lies at the heart of the détente process and the interests of both sides make it reasonable to hope for a SALT II Agreement in 1977. The CSCE embodies and exemplifies both the search for common ground and the unresolved struggle. Basket III is very important for Western public opinion, but the Russians cannot fail to see it as an exercise in confrontation. MBFR rests in part on common interests, but the Western hope of reducing the Warsaw Pact's existing advantage is bound to seem confrontational to the Soviet Union. Reconciliation of the conflicting approaches will be difficult. There are common interests in some other areas of arms control (eg the Test Ban Treaty, the NPT), but the prospects for genuine disarmament are remote.

(paras 13-19)

6. The motives behind the Soviet proposals for all European conferences on energy, transport and the environment are not entirely clear, but the West is right to be prudently unenthusiastic, and should continue to emphasise the rôle of the ECE.

(para 20)

7. The growth of East/West trade has been an important factor in the development of East/West relations, and has led to suggestions that the economy of the Soviet Union is no longer autarkic. Because of the sizeable balance of payments deficits run up by some of the East European countries, it has also led to a greatly increased level of indebtedness to the West. For the West this trade remains no more than marginal; for the Soviet Union it is sufficiently significant to be a factor in foreign policy decisions. On the other hand, the competitive aspects of Soviet foreign economic policy (eg in shipping and fisheries) could provoke political problems. Problems have arisen from the refusal of the Soviet Union and its allies to deal directly with the Community. It would be against Western interests to allow the Soviet Union to use this as a pretext for strengthening the CMEA.

(paras 21-25)

## III: DEVELOPMENTS WHICH MIGHT AFFECT DÉTENTE

8. The next generation of Soviet leaders are an unknown factor but they are unlikely to have a changed view of essential Soviet interests. On the American side, Mr Carter is more likely to change style than substance. The new Chinese leadership may see advantage in a degree of normalisation of Sino/Soviet relations, but this is unlikely to have any major effect on East/West relations over the next few years.

(paras 26-29)

9. If the West does not maintain defence expenditure, the discrepancy in resource allocation between the two sides could undermine the credibility of NATO's strategy; and defence cuts by other NATO members could make the Alliance increasingly a bilateral US/German affair. Developments in military technology, assuming that they are introduced by both sides, are not likely to confer any significant advantage on either.

(paras 30-31)

10. The superpowers could be drawn into regional crises, most obviously in the Middle East, but perhaps most awkwardly in Korea. Communist participation in an Italian or French government would weaken the North Atlantic Alliance, but would also pose problems for the Soviet Union in Eastern Europe and in East/West relations.

(paras 32-36)

11. The Soviet Union will continue to find openings to exploit in some Third World countries, but its dismal aid performance and its economic irrelevance in the dialogue between developed and developing countries may hamper the extension of its influence.

(paras 37-38)

12. The status quo in Eastern Europe is inherently unstable, but there are limits to the scope for change. There is a risk of East/West confrontation over Yugoslavia after Tito's death. Even the Soviet Union itself is not immune from pressures for change and this is the only way in which the confrontational element in East/West relations might eventually be diminished; but the process of change could equally lead to greater confrontation.

(paras 39-42)

## IV: POSSIBLE IMPLICATIONS FOR WESTERN POLICY MAKERS

13. The fundamental requirement is the avoidance or successful management of crises. From the Western point of view

/this

this calls for the early identification of situations which might tempt the Russians and for postures which leave as little room as possible for Soviet miscalculation of the limits of Western tolerance. If the Soviet Union does not exercise restraint, the West can choose between a sharply destabilising and potentially dangerous reaction - eg calling off SALT; a partially destabilising and probably ineffectual reaction designed to punish the Soviet Union - eg restrictions on trade; or threatening to react if the Soviet Union does not pull back - ie diplomatic deterrence of the sort adopted by the US in the case of Angola. The problem reduces in the end to early identification of situations which might tempt the Russians and the devising of sets of signals which would make it clear to them that Soviet misbehaviour would have serious consequences. Bilateral contacts can make a useful contribution in this area.

(paras 43-53)

14. Threats to cut off existing trade are less likely to influence Soviet behaviour than steps to encourage the belief that Soviet restraint would facilitate increased trade of the sort which the Soviet Union wants. Western countries need better coordination of their credit policies. The European Community could develop more common policies towards the Soviet Union.

(paras 54-59)

15. Détente cannot be stable if it is not carried into the armaments field and there is a strong case for making MEFR the proving ground for détente.

(paras 60-64)

16. The development of bilateral relations at many levels will continue to be a major element in the détente process. Western countries should continue to expand bilateral links and contacts, perhaps differentiating between individual Eastern European countries.

(para 65)

17. Despite the limited prospects of success, the West should continue to promote the freer movement of people and ideas through steady pressure for the implementation of Basket III and otherwise. Broadcasting to the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe is particularly important. The main target will always be the Soviet Union, but it could be influenced via developments in Eastern Europe.

(paras 66-68)

## V: WESTERN COORDINATION

18. The West can achieve its objectives in East/West relations only by maintaining its cohesion and firmness of purpose. Of the points examined in Section IV, crisis management is an area in which the lead has to be taken by the US. Careful pursuit of consultation within NATO is important. The need for greater Western coordination in economic policies is already recognised, and work is in progress both in the OECD and in the Community. The degree of importance to be attached to MBFR, and the tactical handling of the promotion of freer movement of people and ideas, are already matters of continuing discussion between Western countries. In general none of the ideas discussed in Section IV calls for new UK initiatives; but they could contribute to the UK input to intra-NATO and intra-Community discussions which are already in train.

(paras 69-76)

## MAIN PAPER

## INTRODUCTION

1. The word "détente" is encrusted with contradictory interpretations. It has been over-used as a propaganda cliché, an instrument of Soviet hyperbole on the one hand and a target for denigration on the other. There is however an important diplomatic process which can hardly be described conveniently by any other term. "Détente" is used in this paper in this strictly diplomatic sense. It denotes the process by which in recent years political relations between the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe on the one hand and the United States and Western Europe on the other have gradually moved away from the cold war era of hostility and confrontation which reached its peak in the last years of Stalin's life. Difficulty arises not in mapping the moves away from the cold war but in determining the positive direction which the evolution is supposed to take. This paper attempts to determine what evolution would best accord with Western interests. It does this by identifying and separating the various strands that make up the phenomenon described as détente (Section I), examining current negotiations in this light (Section II), looking at developments which may affect the future of East/West relations (Section III), discussing the implications of these various considerations about détente for Western policy-making (Section IV) and considering briefly how the conclusions in Section IV should be handled with the UK's partners (Section V).

## SECTION I: THE NATURE OF DÉTENTE

2. After the death of Stalin in 1953, there was a series of attempts to move East/West relations towards a more constructive relationship and away from the pattern of sterile confrontation into which they had fallen in the late 1940s and early 1950s. These efforts repeatedly broke down for reasons which reflected the unwillingness of one side to exercise restraint in areas of importance to the other. The most serious of these setbacks was the Cuba crisis in 1962 which, however, because it brought the two sides nearer /than

than ever before to war, also resulted in a greater realisation of the dangers of nuclear confrontation. Despite the setbacks of Czechoslovakia and Vietnam, the later 1960s saw both sides attaching increasing importance to the creation of a more stable relationship on politico-military and also (for the Soviet Union) on economic grounds. Talks between the United States and the Soviet Union on strategic arms limitation started seriously in 1970 and have continued ever since, producing the SALT I Agreement as their main achievement to date. The Soviet/West German Treaty signed on 12 August 1970 was the first in a series of East/West agreements in the first half of the present decade. These have included several cosmetic measures, but also a number of concrete steps which made important contributions to the defusing of potentially dangerous issues, notably the Four Power Agreement on Berlin. All in all, the first half of the 1970s produced a modest negotiated modus vivendi between the superpowers in the conduct of their relations with each other and between the two sides in facing each other across the dividing line in Central Europe. At its highest and most important level détente has been the recognition by the two sides and in particular by the two superpowers of their common interest in so managing their relations that war - and in consequence nuclear war - between them is avoided. This was expressed in the US/Soviet Declaration of Principles of 1972.

3. Within this general pattern, different countries have different interests and objectives in détente. The following paragraphs describe these in turn by countries.

(i) For the Soviet Union:-

4. Soviet foreign policy objectives are publicly stated in ideological terms. Soviet behaviour is governed in practice by state interests. The pragmatic policies which Soviet leaders adopt have to be justified ideologically, and this has its effect on the outlook of Soviet decision makers trained to think in Marxist-Leninist terms. The Soviet Union spreads abroad its own version of what society should be and it tries unceasingly to extend Soviet influence; but no Soviet leader has put the security of the Soviet Union at risk in the pursuit of external ideological objectives. In

/keeping

keeping with this, the process of détente is seen in the Soviet Union both as contributing to the safety of the Soviet Union and as creating favourable conditions for the world-wide triumph of communism in the long-term. At the 25th Soviet Communist Party Congress Mr Brezhnev expressed this latter aspect in the following terms:

"Détente does not in the slightest abolish, nor can it abolish or change the laws of the class struggle ... We do not conceal the fact that we see détente as a way of creating more favourable conditions for the peaceful building of socialism and communism".

5. Against this general background, the particular interests governing the Soviet attitude to detente can be summarised as follows:

- (a) need to avoid a renewed nuclear arms spiral which would place an additional and probably crippling burden on the Soviet economy (which already devotes 11-12% of GNP to defence expenditure) and in which all the technological aces are in the American hand. The Russians could be aiming at no more than a breathing space. But for the moment they have a strong interest in keeping the international temperature below the point at which it might generate public and Congressional pressure in the US for the launching of a new surge of research and development leading to a new generation of strategic weaponry;
- (b) access to Western technology, capital and grain to improve the backward Soviet economy. For several years the Soviet Union has been experiencing increasing economic difficulties. The communist planning system was relatively successful in pushing through the first, elementary industrial revolution. However, despite undeniable achievements - considerable in some spheres - it is experiencing much more difficulty in coping with the second, more consumer-oriented, computer-based, technological revolution. Inefficiency and low productivity are even more marked in agriculture than in the industrial sector. Devolution of decision making might lead to enough flexibility in planning to go far towards solving the present problems; but, apart from

/the

the unwelcome political implications of devolution, the Soviet planning system would find it difficult to accommodate such a solution. Their chosen alternative is to go for massive investment and for imports of Western technology and its products in order to narrow the technological gap and produce at the required pace the goods needed in a modern society;

- (c) the isolation of China. So long as the Sino/Soviet dispute backed by major military forces on both sides of the frontier continues, an important objective of Soviet policy will be to seek to avoid any risk of a crisis arising simultaneously on the USSR's Eastern and Western borders. The Soviet Union will also want to prevent other countries supporting China and to obstruct the extension of Chinese influence in the Third World;
- (d) elbow-room for the pursuit of the political and ideological struggle. Externally the Russians continue to seek to extend their political influence and to propagate their own ideology. In the Soviet definition "peaceful co-existence" allows for intergovernmental cooperation between states with different social systems but also for continuation of the class and ideological struggle. The Russians may not have any far-sighted or consistent concept for implementing this contradictory strategy. But their "automatic pursuit of increased strength in the global relationship of forces" (Dr Kissinger) and their military build-up, when combined with their Marxist-Leninist mental habits, give them both the ability and the inclination to pursue the negative side of it wherever "cooperation between states" allows, and the latter may sometimes actually prepare the way for the former;
- (c) maintenance of preponderant Soviet power in a divided Europe. It would be in accordance with both its State interests and its ideology for the Soviet Union to have a long-term vision of Western Europe from which US forces would have been withdrawn and which would have become part of a pan-European system

/within



within a Soviet sphere of influence.\* Circumstances could arise through demoralisation and weakness in the West in which a future Soviet leadership might be tempted to engage in a more active pursuit of this vision. Failing such a temptation, however, current Soviet objectives in Europe appear essentially defensive: to preserve the position of power which the Soviet Union holds and to prevent threats arising against it. Germany remains the most sensitive area of Soviet interest; and the US presence there may be seen for the moment as a desirable ingredient of stability. The principal long-term threat which the Soviet leadership may see is German revanchism within a European Community whose economic and industrial capacity had been translated into a commensurate military capability. The maintenance of preponderant Soviet military power on the continent is one safeguard against this. The Soviet Union also seeks, as a political safeguard, to cultivate bilateral relations with Western European countries and to a lesser extent to promote pan-European political concepts. This political activity does not contradict the longer term aim of eroding NATO solidarity;

- (f) decoupling of chosen adventure areas from the area of balance and détente. The Russians would weigh carefully the implications for their relations with the United States of any intervention outside their own borders and would in most circumstances stop short of an open confrontation. But so far as possible they will try to keep their support for liberation movements in a separate compartment from their conduct of East/West and US/Soviet relations.

6. There are also constraints working on the Soviet Union and influencing its attitude to détente. These include:

---

\* A standard assessment is to be found in JIC(A)(74)17 on "The Soviet Threat" which says on Western Europe: "We see the long-term Soviet objective as a Western Europe from which the United States defence cover has been largely withdrawn, which remains divided, which like Finland exists under the shadow of Soviet military strength and is increasingly compelled to adjust its policies accordingly. The current Soviet approach to this ultimate objective is by a policy of détente."

(a) the need to retain and consolidate control in Eastern Europe. For the Russians their control of Eastern Europe is a vital national interest. As they showed in East Germany in 1953, Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968, they are prepared in extreme cases to use military repression to maintain it. They cannot allow détente to impair their ability to repeat these interventions;

(b) resistance to the importation of Western ideas. The Russians dare not risk the political and social consequences of allowing freedom of thought and expression on Western lines in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.

(ii) For the United States:-

7. (a) management of the superpower relationship. With the strategic gap between the two powers narrowing and ultimately disappearing over the last decade, détente for the United States is a means of managing the emergence of the Soviet Union as a superpower and of living with Soviet power over the long term. In a classical exposition of this view before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on 19 September 1974, Dr Kissinger said that détente could not wait until there was "a convergence of American and Soviet purposes", and that it must not be tied to "a basic change in Soviet motivation" or used "to produce internal changes in foreign countries". In this view, the goal of détente is the containment of hostility rather than a qualitative transformation of relations;
- (b) the creation of a vested interest in cooperation. Dr Kissinger's concept of détente embraces the idea of a network of agreements and arrangements in a variety of spheres, designed to create economic and technological bonds which cannot be broken without damaging Soviet interests and to strengthen the influences in the Soviet leadership in favour of preserving a good relationship with the United States;
- (c) the elimination of East/West barriers, ie not only the avoidance of war and the containment of antagonism but also in the longer term the breaking down of barriers to the spread of Western ideas

in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. This objective enjoys particular support in the Democratic Party. The ultimate aim of such aspirations is a change in the nature of communist society and the emergence of a more genuinely cooperative relationship.

(iii) For Western Europe:-

8. (a) shared interests with the United States. These parallel those above;
- (b) trade with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. Although only a small proportion of West European countries' trade is with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe (5.5%), large contracts with a number of important firms and even industries are often involved. Because of this and also for general political reasons, East/West trade assumes a special importance for Western European countries;
- (c) a desire for a greater European role. Many West Europeans, especially in the European Community, see East/West problems in a different perspective from the Americans. They are concerned to see European regional interests taken into account in ways which will foster or at least not impede the development of a European identity. A real and dependable diminution of East/West tension, by making it less necessary for Western Europe to rely on the United States for its security, would make it easier for the European countries to develop a more independent role in the world. At the same time, the West Europeans do not want to encourage US/Soviet bilateralism, ie the conclusion of deals over the heads of Europeans;
- (d) particular interests of the EEC countries. All the member countries of the EEC share an interest in obtaining greater acceptance of the Community. They also have particular interests. The FRG seeks a reduction of East/West tensions in order to develop interchange with the GDR and to protect and enhance the position of Berlin. In the very long run, the FRG still aspires to peaceful reunification through self-determination,

/which

which can come about only as a result of profound changes in the East/West relationship. For sound internal reasons French Presidents starting with de Gaulle have felt the need for France to assert an independent role and personality as well as to have something of a special relationship with the Soviet Union. The UK has sought to play a responsible role in promoting East/West understanding and agreement and has made an important contribution to the formulation of Western policy on East/West relations in general and in MBFR, the CSCE and nuclear proliferation matters in particular.

(iv) For Eastern Europe:-

9. (a) the achievement of more opportunities for advantageous dealings with Western countries as a result of a more relaxed international atmosphere and of some assertion of national personality, although many in the leadership of the Eastern European countries share the Soviet concern to guard against the possible dangers in such developments;
- (b) access to Western markets and technology. For similar reasons to those of the Soviet Union, but also in the hope of diluting Soviet control (this applies particularly to Romania, Hungary and Poland).

10. The combined effect of the flurry of negotiations and agreements in the early 1970s was to create in the West the somewhat illusory impression of a qualitative change in the character of East/West relations. In fact, however, the difference between the experience of recent years and the earlier periods of thaw is a difference of degree, not of kind - it lies in the range and number of agreements reached and in the length of time for which the process has continued. Important though some of these agreements are, the underlying character of the relationship has remained an adversary one. The present relatively relaxed atmosphere may continue and improve, but there is nothing inevitable or irreversible about it. The agreements so far reached were relatively easy to attain because they amounted to no more than a practical modus vivendi, leaving underlying principles untouched. Because of the number of loose ends left over from the Second World War it was possible to despatch business with a sense of

/rather

rather rapid momentum. But even before the signature of the Final Act at Helsinki, new ways of improving East/West relations which did not undermine one side or the other's view of its vital interests were becoming increasingly difficult to perceive. This loss of momentum has been one reason for some public cynicism in the West. Another has been the realisation that (contrary to the expectations of those who hoped that the improvement of East/West relations would bring liberalisation in the East, and despite the undoubted, if limited, changes for the better which have taken place) the essential nature of the Soviet and Eastern European systems has not changed. From the Soviet point of view the need for greater vigilance to prevent expanded contacts resulting in contamination by Western ideologies is logical. To many Westerners, it suggests that détente is not working.

11. Another cause for Western concern has been the continuing improvement in the quality and capabilities of the Soviet armed forces. There is increasingly an apparent discrepancy between the Soviet Union's defensive protestations and the size and composition of its forces, even allowing for the obsessive Soviet fear of invasion and the value placed by Soviet military doctrine on large forces and huge numbers of armoured formations as the best form of defence. Soviet armed forces, at any rate in Central Europe, have not increased much in size during the last five years, but they have been systematically re-equipped with more effective and sophisticated weapons, with the result that the qualitative advantage once enjoyed by NATO has now largely been eroded. The Soviet armed forces generally have now acquired capabilities - such as immediate readiness airborne brigades and a sophisticated blue-water navy - which would enable them to operate on a global scale. The Soviet capability, recently demonstrated in Angola, to support the Cuban intervention with speed and on a substantial scale in a country thousands of miles away reinforced Western public concern about the extent of the Soviet global capability and about Soviet willingness to exploit a distant local situation to their own advantage. In Angola, the Russians judged accurately the extent to which they could promote and then consolidate a communist gain. It would be wrong to draw precise analogies from this particular

/case.

case. It seems unlikely that the Russians would deliberately provoke a situation which would lead to direct confrontation with the United States. But they must be expected in comparable circumstances to exploit opportunities and take calculated risks. By its nature a calculated risk can turn into a miscalculated one.

12. These sobering considerations have led critics of the détente process to argue that the West has legitimised Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe and at the same time eased the way to the longer term Soviet objective of undermining and eventually dominating Western Europe. These propositions are unsound. It is not true that in the FRG's Eastern Treaties and the Quadripartite Agreement on Berlin or at the CSCE the West endorsed Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe; the West had acquiesced in that hegemony long before, and the Eastern Treaties, the Quadripartite Agreement and the Final Act of Helsinki were an attempt to create the basis for a new departure in the direction of peaceful (and favourable) change based on acknowledgement of existing reality. Helsinki did nothing to change the European power balance one way or the other, and in any case it was not an international treaty. What the West did in the negotiations which led up to Helsinki (ie the German Eastern Treaties and the Quadripartite Agreement) was to achieve certain limited but important objectives in improving conditions and defusing potentially explosive tensions in Central Europe, notably Berlin. The West also entertained the hope that the reduction in political tensions in Central Europe might, by permitting freer movement, help over a period of time to loosen bonds between the East Europeans and the Soviet Union. The immediate results are difficult to evaluate and change is likely to show itself only slowly. But it was not to be expected that there would be early results. Disappointment about the results of the CSCE and détente is due not to much to the nature of CSCE itself as to the exaggerated and unwarranted expectations originally aroused by political hyperbole.

/SECTION II

## SECTION II: THE CURRENT BUSINESS OF DÉTENTE

13. The process of East/West negotiations is made up of contradictory elements. On the one hand there is the element of identifying and capitalising on areas of common interest, such as in superpower crisis management or trade. On the other hand there is the element of pressure by one side against the other to bring about more change, or more rapid change, than the other wants. In fact East/West negotiations are a combination of a cooperative approach to solving difficult problems and a confrontational approach aimed at achieving advantage whether for one side as a whole or individual members of that side. The following paragraphs analyse the current negotiating agenda in the light of this consideration.

SALT

14. The Strategic Arms Limitation Talks lie at the heart of the detente process. A breakdown would be destabilising psychologically and politically as well as in strategic terms and would be a serious setback in East/West relations even if great restraint were exercised by both sides. So far the agreements reached in SALT, both SALT I and the Vladivostok Agreement, have been measures of restraint rather than disarmament, aimed broadly at eliminating potentially destabilising and expensive developments by maintaining parity near the level of existing armaments. Dr Kissinger has argued in NATO that, in view of the difficulty in a democratic system of ensuring adequate defence resources over the long run, there is a risk, without further SALT agreements, of the Russians attaining strategic nuclear superiority. The Russians have however to take into account their enormous disadvantages in terms of technological strength and size of GNP compared with the US if there were to be a new all-out missile race. There is therefore a large element of common ground in the negotiations. The interests of both sides make it reasonable to hope for the conclusion of a SALT II Agreement in the course of 1977.

CSCE

15. The CSCE embodies both the main strands of the East/West  
/relationship

relationship - the search for common ground and the unresolved struggle - but the confrontational aspect is difficult to keep under control. The Final Act at Helsinki was a compromise package deal. For the Russians the important part was the Declaration of Principles in Basket I. For the West, the main gain was in securing acceptance that the topics covered in Basket III, the freer movement of people and freer traffic in ideas, are legitimate subjects for East/West negotiations. Freer movement is the very thing which the Soviet leaders most fear in connection with their control both over Eastern Europe and over their own country. Western opinion now expects the implementation of Basket III to be pressed on the Russians and East Europeans. The Russians are bound to see this as an exercise in confrontation rather than a cooperative search for solutions to common problems. In this area, Western countries are demanding almost entirely unilateral concessions from the East.

MBFR

16. The political will towards détente expressed in other East/West negotiations is unlikely to have lasting validity without progress towards the creation of greater confidence between the two sides in the military field. The Vienna negotiations on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions are a recognition of this. They can be seen as an attempt to identify an area of common interest, the maintenance of undiminished security for all the countries concerned at a lower level of forces and armaments. From the Soviet point of view, however, the Western approach to the negotiations is "confrontational" in that the West's principal objective of a common ceiling is designed to reduce the Warsaw Pact's present preponderance in ground forces and armour and to achieve an outcome of approximate parity which would in practice enhance Western security. In addition the Western European participants have made clear their determination to resist any arrangements in MBFR which would impede the development of closer European defence cooperation, while the Germans are particularly concerned that nothing should be done in MBFR which would result in specific limitations on the Bundeswehr or single out Federal German territory for special treatment. Both

/these



these objectives are the converse of Soviet objectives. There seems little prospect at present of reconciling the very different approaches of the two sides. It is not inconceivable that the Russians may eventually be brought to accept the concept of parity in MBFR (the SALT precedent is helpful in this respect) and thus to agree to a common ceiling which would provide a continuing limitation, albeit a collective one, on Western force levels in Central Europe. Even then they will remain reluctant to accept the Western argument about the size of the disparities and to undertake the disproportionate reductions necessary to achieve an outcome of genuine parity. Alternatively linkage with some other negotiation of particular interest to the Russians (although it is difficult to see what) or a need imposed on them by their relationship with the USA might produce Soviet concessions sufficient to permit a compromise.

#### Arms Control and Disarmament

17. East and West have identified common interests in some areas of arms control. Public concern with the threat to health presented by nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere led to the signing of the Partial Test Ban Treaty in 1963. Common concern about the danger of nuclear proliferation also led to the negotiation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1968. This treaty has provided the framework for specific close collaboration between the USSR, US and UK - the only nuclear-weapon-state parties and its three depositary powers. The Russians have supported US and UK initiatives in the IAEA, at the 1975 NPT Review Conference and, more recently, in the Nuclear Suppliers Group.

18. Agreement has also been reached over less important subjects such as the Sea Bed Treaty (1971) and the Biological Weapons Convention (1972). Many Soviet arms control proposals are, however, designed largely for their propagandist effect. (The latest is the patently propagandist Soviet draft World Treaty on the Non-Use of Force presented to the 1976 UN General Assembly). At the XXV Congress of the CPSU in February 1976 Mr Brezhnev accused "aggressive imperialist groups", supposedly motivated by "a so-called Soviet threat", of intensifying the arms race. He went on to outline a "programme of further struggle for peace and international /cooperation".

cooperation". This listed SALT, MBFR and a string of other disarmament topics, old and new, on most of which realistic progress is in fact blocked by the Soviet position or their known unacceptability to the West.

19. The prospects for genuine disarmament are poor. The Soviet economy has always been geared to a high level of armament production, and to reduce the size of the defence sector would be a difficult task. The Soviet Union has refused to countenance the principle of inspection in its territory to ensure that it is complying with arms control treaties. Conversely, the West has insisted that such inspection is essential when extra-territorial means are inadequate. The problems are compounded by the closed nature of Soviet society which makes it difficult for Western countries to be confident about Soviet objectives or their security decisions, or to make assumptions about the future.

#### Soviet Proposals for Pan-European Arrangements

20. A feature of Soviet diplomacy over the last two decades has been a series of proposals for all-European activities and agreements. The consideration underlying these proposals appears to be that in an all-European setting the Soviet Union, as the Continent's only superpower, would be able to play the dominant role. Such arrangements would tend to reduce American influence in European affairs, cut across the competence of the EEC and undermine the Community by diverting the energies of its members to a wider, less purposeful and less fruitful cooperation. The CSCE was originally conceived on these lines, although the Russians eventually conceded that the Americans and Canadians should also participate. The latest examples of Soviet pan-European proposals are the proposals for all-European Conferences on Energy, Transport and the Environment. It is not yet easy to assess either the common-ground or the confrontational elements in the proposals and Soviet motives for advancing them are not entirely clear. In addition to the general motives referred to above the Soviet Union may be attempting to divert attention to certain chosen aspects of Basket II of the Final Act and away from the (for them) more difficult subjects particularly in Basket III. In the absence

of any perceptible practical advantage to the West the Western response has been unenthusiastic. Work in all three fields is already being done in the Economic Commission for Europe. If the Russians want to propose new aspects - eg joint exploitation of resources - and persuade Western governments that there is something in it for them, this could be done in the ECE. The ECE has a special role in the multilateral implementation of the economic aspects of the CSCE Final Act, and it is in the interests of the Western members to ensure that this is not eroded by the establishment of new institutional machinery to follow up the Conference. The Soviet Union made strenuous but unsuccessful attempts to achieve this during the CSCE negotiations. At some stage there may be something to be said for using the Soviet proposals against them by proposing the participation of the European Commission and compelling the Russians to deal with it, thereby increasing the standing of the Community. But difficult problems of Community competence would need to be settled before this became possible. Meanwhile Western governments can continue pressure on the Soviet Union to show what it really has in mind by emphasising the work done by the ECE and the good sense in keeping it there.

#### Economic Relations

21. An important aspect of the development of East/West relations over the last few years has been the growth of East/West trade and particularly of Soviet imports of machinery and equipment, the value of which increased from \$831M in 1971 to \$2,167M in 1975 (in post-Smithsonian constant prices). To some extent these imports consist of goods which the Soviet Union could produce itself but not in sufficient quantity or quality or in time to meet plan requirements. Although trade with the West constitutes only 4% of Soviet GNP, the increasing role of imports in the Soviet economy and the recent signing of a five-year grain agreement with the United States have led many commentators to argue that the Soviet Union can no longer be described as an autarkic economy. The proportion of trade conducted by any Western country with the Soviet Union is also small (eg 3.1% of West German exports in 1975 and 1.06% of UK exports), but some major Western firms have

/a

a significant proportion of their output going to the Soviet Union. The sizeable balance of payments deficits run up by some of the East European countries, especially in the last 18 months, have been covered to a large extent by Western government-guaranteed credits and by borrowing in the Euro-currency market. This has led to a greatly increased level of indebtedness to the West. The countries concerned have an excellent record of debt repayment (only in the case of Poland does the situation give grounds for serious concern); but the greatly increased level of indebtedness to the West has created a new interrelationship of interests. The question arises whether a degree of economic interdependence has been created which makes it difficult or impossible for either side to break the links without unacceptable damage.

22. In practice both the Soviet Union and Western countries have deliberately ensured that they do not become completely dependent on the other side for important materials or products. The FRG, for example, has been careful about the proportion of natural gas it will buy from the Russians. Equally, it must be doubted whether the Soviet Union would ever allow itself to become economically dependent on the West to a degree which would restrict its freedom of action. For the West East/West trade still remains of minor economic significance: it affects particular firms and may affect employment levels at the margin, but not in any way fundamental to the workings of the Western economies, individually or collectively. For the Soviet Union on the other hand East/West trade makes an essential contribution to important planned economic targets. Hence the listing of Western trade and technology high among the particular interests governing the Soviet attitude to détente in paragraph 5(b) above. The Russians are most unlikely to sacrifice any major, let alone vital national interest for the sake of trade with the West, but they are likely to be sensitive in their foreign policy decisions to the need to avoid creating an international atmosphere in which East/West trade might be jeopardized.

23. At the same time as Soviet imports from the West have grown, there has also been a growth in Soviet competition with the West

in various areas which have hitherto been Western preserves. This is to some extent connected with the growth in Soviet imports, since it reflects among other things the desire to increase hard currency earnings. But whereas the Soviet interest in importing from the West may arguably contribute to greater Soviet willingness to seek political accommodations, the competitive aspect of Soviet external economic policy risks leading to a degree of political conflict. Examples of this kind of Soviet policy are the efforts of the Soviet Merchant Fleet to gain a bigger share of world freight, often by undercutting the rates of Western shippers; the very considerable amount of fishing by Soviet trawlers off the coasts of Western countries (which is likely to lead to difficult negotiations as Western countries extend their fishing limits to 200 miles); and the increasing supply of goods to Western markets at what look like dumping prices (a policy also pursued by the Eastern European countries).

24. The development of the European Community's Common Commercial Policy (CCP) has brought problems in its train arising out of the persistent refusal of the Soviet Union and the East European countries (except Romania) to deal bilaterally with the Community. Intermittent discussions have been in train for some two years about an agreement between the EEC and the CMEA. The Russians would like any agreement to make it appear as if the two organizations are on a par and have identical competence. The CMEA is not an economic and political community of nations which has inter alia decided to act jointly in external trade relations. It would be against Western interests if the Soviet Union were able to use the pretext of the CCP to strengthen the CMEA and give the Soviet Union a greater droit de regard over the trade which individual East European countries conduct with the West.

#### Bilateral Relations

25. If trade is an essential component of bilateral relations between Eastern and Western countries (except for the superpowers), so are bilateral political relations. Exchanges of visits from the level of head of government downwards play a part in leading to greater understanding of the political and psychological constraints on the policies of the other side, to the identification

of areas of cooperation and to the management of relations generally. They create an atmosphere, give an impulse and provide the rudiments of a potential crisis management system. The relationship between the superpowers is the most important one, but the network of bilateral relations between East and West increases the frequency and depth of contact between the two sides and underpins the slow process of seeking to widen and deepen détente.

/SECTION III

## SECTION III: DEVELOPMENTS WHICH MIGHT AFFECT DÉTENTE POLICIES

26. Before examining the policy implications of this analysis, it is worth considering whether future developments are identifiable which could substantially affect it and in particular the objectives of the main participants in the détente process. The most important areas in which changes could affect developments are:

- (a) leadership changes in the Soviet Union, the United States, China and the principal Western European countries;
- (b) changes in the military balance;
- (c) regional crises;
- (d) the movement of public opinion;
- (e) the accession to power of communist parties in Western Europe;
- (f) changes in relations between the developed and developing countries;
- (g) internal changes in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union.

Leadership Changes

27. Because so little is known about the inner workings of the Politburo it is impossible to be confident who will follow Brezhnev. He is 69, and the three Politburo members next in seniority (Podgorny, Kosygin and Suslov) are all over 70 and are not in the running for the succession. The role of the military in the Soviet leadership is also uncertain. There is however no reason to think that the next generation of leaders, whoever they are, will have a different view of Soviet interests in East/West relations. In particular, the Soviet Union's economic problems will continue to preoccupy them and the need to avoid nuclear war will be an overriding factor in foreign policy. Equally, however, there is no reason to think that they will not continue to promote Marxist ideology and action abroad where this can be done without serious threat to their own national security or interests.

28. President-elect Carter has criticised the Ford Administration's handling of détente and the over-dramatic Kissinger style of operation. Nonetheless, he has broadly endorsed the Ford

/Administration's

Administration's concept and policy of détente with the Soviet Union (and China), while indicating that there would be some differences in his pursuit of this policy. First, he would take a tougher line with the Soviet Union, insisting on reciprocity of benefit. Second, he would not allow pursuit of détente to detract from close consultation and cooperation with America's friends and allies. Third, he would pursue détente by sustained low key discussions aimed at negotiating specific agreement in areas of mutual interest. Fourth, he would reach beyond mere negative cessation of hostilities to seek positive cooperation with the Soviet Union on world problems such as agricultural development and the population crisis. His strong views on human rights may influence his attitude on the issue of Soviet Jews wishing to leave the Soviet Union. Mr Carter has gone further than the present Administration in saying that he might wish to use American economic levers in relations with the Soviet Union, although he appears to appreciate the practical limitations and difficulties of such a policy. He has also said that SALT is "too important to be dependent on the solution of other problems". These attitudes suggest that, once he is in office, any changes will be more of style than substance.

29. With regard to China, the main question is whether, following Mao's death and the emergence of a Chinese leadership purged of radical influence, the Chinese and the Russians will be less wary of each other, less competitive in their relations with Third World countries and more cooperative in promoting revolution. An important element in the Sino/Soviet dispute has undoubtedly been Mao's personal antagonism towards the Soviet "revisionists". The Russians may now entertain hopes of a limited rapprochement following his death: there has been a marked softening of propaganda. These gestures have as yet met with no response from the Chinese, and there is as yet no evidence to suggest that there is any group within the Chinese leadership which favours rapprochement. Anti-revisionism in China is such an article of faith, and Sino/Soviet hostility is so deeply engrained and so bound up with territorial issues affecting vital political interests in the area, that fundamental changes are

/unlikely



unlikely in the foreseeable future. However, a pragmatic leadership may in time see advantage in a slight shift away from the present level of hostilities, which may include some degree of closer cooperation in the economic field and a reduction of tension on the border. Such changes are likely to be gradual and undertaken with extreme caution by the Chinese. The best forecast which can be made now is that changes in the Sino/Soviet relationship are unlikely to have any major effect on East/West relations over the next few years

#### Changes in the Military Balance

30. The present East/West correlation of forces, both locally and globally, is tolerable from a Western point of view. What is disquieting is the likely projection of this balance into the future. Judging by their investment in armaments production, the Russians have no intention of slowing down the development of their military capabilities. According to current Western estimates, using a revised methodology, they are prepared to devote about 12% of GNP to defence expenditure. This indicates the priority the Soviet leaders are willing to attach to it despite the strain it imposes on the economy. Future levels of Western defence expenditure are much less certain. The USA, France and Germany have shown their concern at the scale of Soviet military spending by increasing their own defence spending in real terms and introducing long term defence programmes. But in some countries, including the UK and the Netherlands, defence spending is being reduced, and there is no certainty in the longer term that public opinion in the West will be prepared to tolerate the continued devotion of resources to defence on a scale sufficient to maintain the present military balance with the Soviet Union. Ironically, the negative aspects of Soviet policy usually provide the best assurance against this happening. The possibility cannot be discounted that the discrepancy in resource allocation between the two sides could grow to a point where the credibility of NATO's defensive strategy of forward defence and flexible response was undermined. Another possibility is defence cuts by several members of the Alliance such that the defence of the

/Central

Central Front could become increasingly a bilateral US/German affair, with the FRG providing additional forces to fill the gaps and thus having an overwhelming preponderance in the Alliance's conventional forces. The Soviet Union and East Europeans would certainly find this alarming. There is no immediate danger of either of these things happening, but it remains important to maintain Western defence expenditure in the absence of a reduction in the Soviet threat.

31. There are other ways in which the East/West military balance could change. Defence equipment technology has its own self-generating dynamism and it has been argued that some of the recent developments in this technology may change the nature of warfare, and thus the relative capabilities of the two sides, over the next decade. This is a complex field in which experts differ and on which serious analytical work, at any rate within NATO, has only fairly recently begun. Any predictions which can be offered can therefore be only tentative. If NATO alone introduced the new technologies (which is most unlikely) there would probably be a considerable enhancement of the Alliance's defensive capacity. But if, as is more likely, both sides introduce them at roughly the same rate and to roughly the same extent, there seems no reason to suppose that either would gain any very significant unilateral advantage; and there is certainly nothing to suggest that in these circumstances it would be any easier or cheaper for NATO to sustain its policy of forward defence which, for all its inconveniences, is the only militarily and politically acceptable means of defending all NATO's territory on the Central Front.

#### Regional Crises

32. A regional crisis involving governments not under the control of the superpowers could draw them into a conflict despite themselves. The Middle East is the most obviously high-risk area, but there, both superpowers are able, if only to some extent, to exercise restraint

/on

on their protégés. In most other areas - eg in Southern Africa - both superpowers have sufficient room for manoeuvre and lack of commitment to be able to hold back or control their involvement. In one area, Korea, this is probably not the case. Neither the superpowers nor China want war. At the same time Sino/Soviet rivalry means that China and the Soviet Union outbid each other to keep in with Kim Il Sung, making it impossible for either to control him. Both would probably feel compelled to provide moral and material support if North Korea invaded South Korea. The United States and Japan would be seriously concerned in the event of a Korean war, and the United States would probably be physically involved, at least during the next five years or so. The consequences for détente would be serious.

#### The Movement of Public Opinion

33. In the West, public moods and government policies interact. During the period when most of the crucial East/West agreements were reached there was unquestionably wide-spread public support for the efforts of Western leaders to obtain a more satisfactory modus vivendi with the East. At the same time, particularly in the United States and Germany, there has always been a strong section of opinion arguing that the nature of the Soviet threat has not and will not change and that a high level of defence effort and greater caution in dealing with the Soviet Union are needed. These different tendencies co-exist. Their relative influence at any one time will vary according to domestic political situations and the actions of the Soviet Union. As a generalisation, the likelihood is that there will be a continuing long-term public desire for efforts to improve relations with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe and to reduce defence expenditure. This will however be matched, particularly in the United States, by a determination not to be outdone by the Soviet Union. Public support in the West for defence expenditure and for NATO will to a great extent depend on the ability of the Western Governments to show that they are making serious efforts to improve relations with the Soviet Union and that the obstacles come from the Soviet side. It would in theory be possible for the Soviet Union to exploit this situation to their advantage. In

/practice

practice Soviet international and domestic conduct is likely to continue to be such as to discourage excessive optimism about the possibilities of détente and to convince Western public opinion of the need for a continuing defence effort. In particular, if American public opinion felt that the Soviet Union was gaining the upper hand and out-maneuvring the US, there could be a tougher and more aggressive American approach which would affect détente. In most countries pressures for reductions in defence spending will come less from an anti-defence sentiment among the public than from pressure of other claims on scarce resources.

#### Western Communist Parties

34. It is very difficult to predict what the effect on East/West relations would be of Communist participation in an Italian or French government. Taken at their face value, the most recent statements of Italian and French Communist leaders are compatible with continued membership by both countries in the North Atlantic Alliance (and by Italy in the integrated military structure of the Alliance). But there must be a serious risk that the Alliance would be weakened by the withdrawal of one or other country from it; or alternatively that their continued membership without whole-hearted commitment might undermine its effectiveness and credibility in a time of crisis, making it more difficult for the Allies to act together in coordinating their policies towards the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe and in seeking to manage the behaviour of the Soviet Union as a superpower. In such a situation, the United States, probably increasingly in bilateral consultation with the FRG and any other countries whose defence efforts justified it, would tend to act without consultation with the fringe members of the Alliance. United States relations with several Alliance members could become strained and ultimately US troop levels in Europe could be affected.

35. This would not be pure gain for the Soviet Union. The emergence of communist parties in Western governments, asserting their right to be independent of the Soviet Union and supporting their /countries'

countries' membership of the European Community and the North Atlantic Alliance would greatly increase the already considerable problems the Soviet Union faces in trying to manage the international communist movement. It could also cause stirrings dangerous to the Soviet Union in Eastern Europe. Although this would be unlikely to amount to an immediate threat to the Soviet Union's hold over Eastern Europe, it would be sufficient to dampen Soviet encouragement of Western European communist parties. In addition, the Russians would be wary of any rapid political change in individual Western European countries which could lead to a general destabilisation in East/West interstate relations (particularly in the US/Soviet relationship) and put détente, and the very real material advantage the Russians see in détente, at risk.

36. Communist participation in one or more member governments could produce both a weakening of Western responses to Soviet behaviour and an increased Soviet preoccupation with the preservation of the status quo in Eastern Europe. The effect might in the first place be to encourage a more forward Soviet policy outside Europe. If successful, this would eventually react on the European and Atlantic balance too.

#### Impact of Developments in the Third World

37. Increasingly, relations between developed and developing countries have become a new focus of interest in international relations. The developing countries have become a force in their own right rather than a political battleground over which East and West compete for spheres of influence, as tended to be the case in the 50s and early 60s. However, the Soviet Union continues to seek opportunities to build up its own position in particular countries, especially by the supply of arms, sometimes in substantial quantities, to selected recipients. The racial problems of Southern Africa will afford the Russians perhaps their best opening, since Western countries, as a result of history and economic links, are almost inevitably identified in African minds with the white minorities. More generally, there will always be radical, and sometimes maverick, regimes in individual Third World countries whose quarrels with the West will create openings for the Soviet Union.

38. Although they still have an ideological appeal, the Soviet Union and other East European countries have shown themselves, in terms of their practical contribution, to be largely irrelevant to the dialogue about aid and economic development between developed and developing countries. The Soviet Union's largely autarkic economic policy means that its trade with the Third World is limited. Its need to spend its foreign exchange resources on its own development in any case leaves little over for aid - indeed in 1975 the net aid flows from the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, after taking account of debt service payments, were very small and possibly even negative. The Soviet Union argues that help for the developing countries is the responsibility of the former "imperialist" powers. But the developing countries have begun to realise the spuriousness of claimed Soviet sympathy for their needs and to make demands on the Soviet bloc countries as well as on the Western industrialised countries. If the West plays its cards skilfully, the Soviet Union's dismal aid performance and its irrelevance to the economic problems of the developing countries may begin to stand out in starker relief and this could have an adverse effect on the Soviet Union's ability to extend its influence in the Third World.

Developments in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe

39. The status quo in Eastern Europe is inherently unstable. In most cases the East European populations would reject both their present regimes and their ties with the Soviet Union in the absence of a Soviet military presence or threat. Culturally and economically, most East Europeans have traditionally looked westward rather than to Russia, and they continue to be influenced by Western ideas and attitudes. Three times since 1945 an explosion of popular feeling in an Eastern European country has necessitated Soviet military intervention, and on two others (in Poland in 1956 and 1970) it has changed the regime. It is noteworthy that these explosions usually occur at times of relaxed rather than strained East/West relations and that this is one reason for Soviet caution in the détente process. There is great sympathy in Western countries for Eastern European aspirations. However,

/while

while greater individual national freedom in Eastern Europe would be welcome to Western public opinion, developments leading to Soviet military intervention would serve the interests of neither the populations concerned nor the West. There are strict limits within which change in Eastern Europe is possible without fundamental prior change in Soviet policies or perhaps even in the Soviet system as a whole.

40. A particular problem will arise in Yugoslavia when Marshal Tito dies. Economic difficulties, nationalist tendencies in the different republics and divergent political attitudes could create a situation in which there was political tension or a danger of Yugoslavia breaking up. In such circumstances the Soviet Union would be tempted to intervene in the hope of securing the return of an apostate to the fold and a bonus of bases on the Adriatic. This would create a major crisis which would not only destroy the limited degree of mutual confidence which has been built up between East and West in recent years but also risk sparking off a wider conflict.

41. Unlike the Eastern European regimes, the Soviet regime is firmly entrenched although not able entirely to exclude some of the restlessness which the East Europeans have shown. Whatever the efforts of the Soviet leadership, Western ideas and attitudes seep into the Soviet Union. There is some evidence that the scientists, technologists, and engineers on whom the Soviet Union depends for its economic progress are calling for more freedom to exchange information and views with one another and with their Western colleagues and are increasingly recognising the inability of their system to cope with their country's problems. There are also the problems posed by nationalism in a country where Russians constitute a bare majority of the population and have a much lower birth rate than the peoples of the Asian republics. The intensification of the regime's russification policies could further stimulate minority self-consciousness and lead to increasing

/clashes

clashes and heavy-handed repression. The combined effects of all these trends are not quantifiable, but it is not inconceivable that a situation could ultimately develop in which the leadership was faced by such a variety of pressures that the dictatorial communist regime had to be modified. At the same time the process of change in the Soviet Union could throw up leaders, situations and attitudes which would lead to greater confrontation with the West. Whatever the long-term possibilities of change, however, they are so far off as to make it wholly unrealistic to use them as a basis for Western policy making now. Yet it is difficult at present to see any way apart from Western acceptance of Soviet hegemony, ie "Finlandisation", by which the confrontational element in East/West relations might eventually be eliminated.

42. Short of an upheaval in the Soviet Union there may be a prolonged period in the Soviet economy of ever deepening difficulties. The problems caused by low labour productivity, industrial and agricultural wastefulness and poor management are likely to be exacerbated by the rising expectations of the people and, increasingly, by a shortage of skilled labour resulting from the very low birth rate and the manpower demands of the armed forces. The large-scale demand for Western technology, goods and credit is likely to continue in an attempt to overcome these problems. Whether this might give the West powers of leverage is discussed below.

/SECTION IV



SECTION IV: POSSIBLE IMPLICATIONS FOR  
WESTERN POLICY MAKING

43. Up to now, East and West have identified a number of areas where they have had a mutual interest in establishing and developing co-operative relations. On the other hand both sides maintain objectives antithetical to each other. This means that there is a continuing risk of crisis, and it sets tight limits to the scope for further advances in East/West relations. Ways in which the West can play its hand are considered below under the following headings:-

- (a) Crisis management;
- (b) Economic relations;
- (c) Reducing the threat;
- (d) Bilateral relations;
- (e) Promotion of change in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.

(a) Crisis Management

44. Crisis avoidance, crisis management and the avoidance of war depend fundamentally on understanding by both sides of the likely consequences of their actions. From the Western point of view it will remain essential that the Western countries, and the United States in particular, leave as little room as possible for Soviet miscalculation. It will be a matter of judgement whether a particular area or situation is so vital, or the principle involved so important, that the West should make a stand. Provided no vital Soviet interest is involved, the Russians are likely to back away from any action which they know would put the whole détente process at risk.

45. However, the limits will not always be clear and the Soviet Union may not always exercise restraint. Angola was a good example of a situation where the interests of the two sides were not clearly defined and where the Soviet Union was able to exploit an unprepared situation. The issues were blurred

/because

because the Russians were backing one indigenous side against another and did not intervene directly themselves but only assisted the Cubans to do so.

46. In such a situation, ie, one in which Soviet concern about Western (especially US) reaction has been insufficient to deter Soviet action or intervention, the West can in theory choose between a range of possible responses. These might be set out as follows (in descending order of severity):

- (a) A destabilising reaction - ie one which causes or reinforces a sharp deterioration in East/West relations;
- (b) A partially destabilising reaction, designed to punish the Soviet Union, but without upsetting the whole pattern of East/West relations;
- (c) Indication of disapproval by public statements and signals designed to warn the Soviet Union to draw back or at any rate to halt its dangerous initiatives.

47. Examples of a destabilising reaction would be the calling off of SALT, or (in the case of Angola) direct military action against Cuba. Only the United States could react in this way on her own, though it could of course also be a reaction open to Western countries collectively. The difficulty with this option is its danger. The West has as much interest in détente as the Soviet Union. A breaking off of the SALT talks followed by a reversion to a more antagonistic relationship in the arms field, in Europe (eg Berlin) and elsewhere would be seriously damaging to American and Western interests - and probably damaging to US/European relations. The hope would have to be that the Soviet Union would retreat chastened from the experience, but the risks would be high and not easily predictable. The secretive nature of the Soviet Government makes it impossible to calculate with confidence the pressures which

/would

would prevail in such a situation. The issues at stake on the Western side would have to be felt by Western governments or public opinion to be vital before the risks could be justified.

48. The partially destabilising reaction - punishment - raises complex issues. It is difficult to think of any possible punishment of a general nature other than restriction of trade and of Soviet access to Western technology. The possibility of using trade as a political weapon is considered in the section on East/West economic relations below, and the conclusion there is that trade has very limited use as a political stick but somewhat more as a political carrot. At this point it is perhaps enough to say that the greater the punishment it was desired to inflict the larger the cuts would have to be in trade and the greater the damage would be to material Western interests. But the essential point is that economic sanctions would probably prove ineffectual. The Soviet leaders might be prepared to back down when faced with a choice between peace and war, as in the Cuban missile crisis in 1962. Short of that, however, when faced by economic reprisals they would almost certainly prefer to revert to severer domestic controls and greater autarky rather than give in to direct pressure and be left in the position of having to explain away a defeat.

49. The third option, signals of displeasure and warnings of future reaction, is the only one which could be safely and readily at the West's disposal. It was this approach which was adopted in the Angola case. The United States cancelled some meetings of secondary importance and gave strongly worded warnings about the consequences of continued efforts to impose change in Southern Africa by force. Soviet comments in public and in private suggest that the Soviet leadership have taken some heed of these signals, and may now consider their policy options in Southern Africa to be more limited than hitherto. This must, however, necessarily remain a speculative judgement.

/50.

50. The problem of crisis management thus reduces in the end to early identification of situations in which the Russians might be tempted to intervene, an assessment of Western interests and options, and the devising of sets of signals. "Hot lines" exist in order to convey signals in extreme cases. But signals need to be made well in advance of the times at which "hot lines" might be used. Western détente diplomacy needs to be equipped with, and trained in the use of, a full range of diplomatic signalling techniques.

51. One aid to signalling could be the negotiation of declarations setting out principles by which their parties agree in advance to abide. The Helsinki Final Act produced a code of conduct for Europe. The US/Soviet Summit of 1972 produced a statement of principles applicable to US/Soviet relations. The usefulness of even superpower declarations is limited - the Russians have repeatedly ignored the principles in the US/Soviet Declaration (for example at the time of the Yom Kippur War in 1973 and over Angola in 1975). But they are a further factor to be invoked and taken into account when decisions are taken in a gathering crisis. They provide yardsticks against which behaviour can be publicly measured. They make it easier for the weight of public opinion, especially world opinion, to be brought to bear on a situation.

52. Other ideas which have been considered include the establishment of codes of behaviour on a regional basis. One possibility would be agreement between the major powers to abide by declarations produced by regional organisations. Another would be East/West agreements or declarations of mutual restraint in certain areas. In particular, agreements to restrict or prohibit arms transfers to certain areas might help to reduce regional instability by curbing local arms races. Neither of these approaches seems very promising. The disadvantage of the major powers promoting and abiding by declarations by regional organisations or groups of countries would be that such declarations would usually if not invariably contain principles which

/the

the West would find unacceptable. A major difficulty in seeking restrictions on arms transfers is that the first effect would be to limit Soviet influence, because arms constitute a far higher proportion of Soviet than of Western exports to the developing countries. For this reason alone, the Russians would be unlikely to be sympathetic (although this is no reason for not advocating the proposal). The idea is under examination in NATO and could result in constructive proposals.

53. All approaches to crisis management depend on the existence and maintenance of good working contacts between governments. The Soviet Union and the East European countries attach great importance to Ministerial visits. These often have relatively little content in terms of current business, but the building up of contacts plays an important role in establishing channels of communication and increasing mutual knowledge. Ministerial visits in both directions are an important element in laying the foundations for crisis avoidance and crisis management.

(b) Economic Relations

54. One of the main benefits accruing to and sought by the Soviet Union in détente is trade and more particularly trade giving access to Western technology. The only political limits imposed on such trade by the West are the COCOM controls which are intended to prevent exports to Communist countries of items of strategic significance. They still work but their coverage has been reduced over the years.

55. The Soviet need for trade and technology might in theory give the West considerable leverage in dealing with the Soviet Union. The theoretical possibilities would range from a complete embargo if the Soviet Union did not fall in with general Western political demands, through specific trade-offs between economic deals and political concessions, to non-specific Western threats

/or

or implied threats that trade would suffer if the Soviet Union acted in ways unacceptable to the West. In practice it is inconceivable that there could be a general withholding of trade beyond the terms of the strategic embargo (COCOM supplemented in the United States by somewhat stricter national controls) if only because Western countries depend on free trade and the initiative of private firms. The Russians showed themselves willing to make informal, publicly unadmitted concessions over emigration from the Soviet Union in order to secure passage of the US Trade Bill, and strictly limited and informal deals have been successful in some West German negotiations with East European countries, eg Poland. But the Soviet rejection of the Jackson-Vanik amendment to the Trade Bill which sought to formalise the concessions demonstrated their unwillingness to be pushed into a position which they judged humiliating or otherwise damaging to their interests. The trade-off approach works only within narrow limits.

A threat or implied threat that trade would suffer in the absence, for example, of Soviet restraint in some aspects of international affairs might appear to offer more scope for exploitation by the West, but it would carry inherent disadvantages. With the exception of American domination in the grain trade, no country has a sufficient monopoly to take effective action to damage Soviet commercial or economic interests unilaterally to a degree which could have a restraining influence over the whole field of Soviet policy. Even in the case of US grain supplies action which would damage the Soviet Union would also damage the domestic interests of the United States.

56. A more effective way of using trade and economic relations as a means of modifying Soviet international behaviour might be to encourage Soviet leaders to believe not so much that existing trade would suffer in certain circumstances, but that the future growth of East/West trade and Soviet access to Western technology would be facilitated by a degree of restraint in Soviet external policies. Present Soviet détente policies show that they already

/subscribe

subscribe in a general way to this belief. The Soviet need for Western credits, against a background of increasing Soviet Bloc indebtedness combined with the doubtful economic attractiveness to Western industry of projects of great importance to the Soviet Union (eg the exploitation of raw material resources in Siberia), ought in any period other than one of economic depression in the West to put the Russians naturally in the position of demandeurs needing Western goodwill.

57. The difficulty about any attempts to influence Soviet behaviour in this way is that, to be effective, it requires a common approach by all major Western countries. Differing commercial and political interests mean that there is no possibility of a sufficient degree of consensus to make a policy of threats effective. Even to ensure that the Russians remain in the position of demandeurs requires a considerable degree of consultation. The Russians need trade with the West much more than the West needs trade with the Soviet Union, but they have been able to exploit competition between Western countries and to play one off against another.

58. Perhaps the most striking example of this has been the competition between Western Governments to improve national shares of East/West trade by arranging credit terms beyond those which firms would normally find justifiable. Subsidised Government credits or any other similar form of official over-enthusiasm in the sponsorship of East/West trade ties up resources for insufficient return. Such measures simply strengthen the bargaining hand of the Russians. Because of this, it would be helpful if the "Gentlemen's Agreement" on minimum credit and repayment terms concluded by the FRG, France, UK, Italy, US, Canada and Japan in July 1976 could be turned into a binding international agreement to which all OECD members were party. Although the Gentlemen's Agreement guidelines are in theory applicable world-wide, the French have so far shown themselves reluctant to apply them to trade with the Soviet Union and other Eastern European countries.

/59.

59. Co-ordination of credit policies is not in itself sufficient. The whole question of East/West trade is being studied in the OECD, following Dr Kissinger's speech to the OECD Ministerial meeting in June 1976. Dr Kissinger argued then that the OECD nations should adopt "a systematic work programme for developing objectives and approaches for our economic relations with the Communist countries". He suggested examination inter alia of the implications of the growing external debt of the communist countries and of ways in which the industrial democracies might deal with possible efforts to misuse economic relations for political purposes inimical to their interests. The American objective, to which the Carter Administration is likely to subscribe, is to bring out the inter-connection between the various strands of East/West relationships and to promote greater realisation of the problems Western countries cause for each other by unprofitable competition in trade with the East. A degree of mutual education would be beneficial, and in principle there is every reason for the UK to give the American position strong support. However, it will be necessary to make sure that American pressure to conduct such a wide ranging exercise in OECD does not provoke so much opposition, for example from the neutrals, as to be counterproductive.

60. There is scope for more development of common European Community policies towards the Soviet Union. This is in any case happening naturally in some areas. For example, the Common Fisheries Policy means that the Community as a whole will need to negotiate with the Russians about reciprocal access. The Common Commercial Policy puts in the hands of the Commission responsibility for negotiating new trade arrangements with the East Europeans as with other Third countries or in multilateral negotiations. Nevertheless there is a disposition on the part of member states to allow the Russians to circumvent the CCP by claiming that the subject matter under negotiation is about economic co-operation rather than trade. Britain has a better

/record



record in this respect than most and it is in the UK interest to press for a strict interpretation of the CCP. The UK will, for example, protect itself better from retaliation if the Community takes measures against East European dumping or market-disrupting imports than by unilateral action. Generally the Community's collective and economic strength and bargaining position are greater than those of individual member states. More widely, a strong Community is a considerable asset on the Western side in the overall pattern of East/West relations. The very fact of Soviet coolness towards it is an indication of its success in, and its potential for, limiting the spread of Soviet influence and the opportunity for Soviet mischief-making in Western Europe. The more the Community can act together, the more effective European policies towards the Soviet Union will be and the less able the Soviet Union will be to undermine Western strength by playing one member state off against another.

61. The heavy external indebtedness of some Eastern European countries is an actual or potential problem. It was suggested at the Puerto Rico summit meeting held on 27 and 28 June 1976 that Western creditor countries should be prepared to "carry" Eastern European debtors in order to forestall the further political hold which the Soviet Union would obtain over them if it had to bail them out. The necessary rescheduling or refinancing would not necessarily be costly. However, in practice the first recourse of any Eastern European country faced with economic difficulties is likely to be to its CMEA partners and notably to the USSR. The hold of the Soviet Union over the Eastern European countries is so strong in other ways that accommodation of debt problems by the West rather than by the Soviet Union would make little difference to political dependence. Nevertheless the political dimension should be kept in mind if the need should arise for special accommodation for individual Eastern European countries. (The case of Yugoslavia is clearly different, since there it is a matter of helping the Yugoslavs to maintain an already existing independence.)

/(c)

(c) Reducing the Military Threat

62. It is both sound in itself and useful from the propaganda point of view to draw attention unremittingly to the contrast between the Soviet Union's peaceful protestations and the Soviet military build-up. It is argued on both sides of the European dividing line that détente cannot be stable if it is not carried into the armaments field. The Western countries have a direct interest in focussing attention on the Soviet military threat and the need to reduce it. SALT and the MBFR negotiations are the means by which this problem is being tackled. The confidence building measures agreed at the CSCE are of no real military value in controlling the threat, and further development of them is not a promising avenue. It has already been stated that a SALT agreement is likely in 1977. It needs to be considered whether better use can be made of the MBFR talks.

63. It is difficult to see a chance of a breakthrough in the Vienna negotiations at the moment. During the first three years of negotiations the West have made a number of concessions, and these have not yet been matched by any corresponding modification in the Soviet approach. Nevertheless, in the longer term the Soviet government might be brought to agree to a balanced limitation of ground forces as they have been prepared to agree to a balance of strategic forces in SALT. Although they envisage disproportionately greater reductions of Warsaw Pact manpower, the Western proposals taken as a whole do not involve more far-reaching commitments and obligations by the East than those which the Western countries are ready to undertake. Nor does the Western approach to MBFR - unlike the promotion of freer movement of people and ideas - challenge the integrity of the Soviet system or pose a threat to vital Soviet interests. There is a strong case for developing a concerted effort on the part of the Western powers to make MBFR the proving ground for detente. There should be no question of the West putting itself under time or any other pressure to achieve results for their own sake.

/The

The West also needs to be in a position to counter Soviet attempts to deny the real disparities in numbers of combat troops and heavy equipment, especially tanks, which exist in Central Europe. The pressure should be on the Soviet Union to make concessions in order to make its own advocacy of détente convincing. If MBFR is brought more to public attention maintenance of an adequate Western defence effort will incidentally be made easier.

64. Other possibilities have been mooted for reducing or regulating the Soviet military threat. None of them is very promising. They include:

- (a) the negotiation of constraints on military expenditure;
- (b) agreement to ban certain existing weapons or the production of specific new ones;
- (c) a comprehensive nuclear test ban;
- (d) a global or regional limitation on naval forces.

With regard to (a) the Russians proposed in 1973 that the military budgets of the permanent members of the Security Council should be reduced by 10%. Progress has proved impossible because the Soviet Union publishes few statistics about its own military expenditure and has refused to participate in the UN committee now attempting to see whether a basis for comparing military budgets can be established. With regard to (b), bans on militarily significant weapons must be capable of stringent verification if they are to be effective. The Russians recently agreed to limited on-site inspection under the terms of the US/Soviet agreement on Peaceful Nuclear Explosions. Although this may set a precedent, they are likely to continue to reject real verification by non-national means in most disarmament areas - for example in the draft treaty banning the production and stockpiling of toxic chemical weapons tabled by the UK at the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD)

in Geneva in August 1976. The USSR has proposed a treaty banning the production of new types of mass destruction weapons, but has so far failed to define them. On the other hand, the CCD has negotiated a more limited treaty banning environmental modification in war, and it is possible that bans on other specified weapons of secondary military importance can be negotiated. With regard to (c) progress towards a comprehensive test ban is prevented not only by Western insistence that on-site inspection is necessary but also by Soviet insistence that all nuclear states (including China and France) should accept a ban.

65. With regard to (d), although the West has felt increasingly threatened by the Soviet build up which has taken place since the early 1960s, Western superiority in tonnage over the Warsaw Pact navies means that any negotiations designed to achieve parity between East and West would be against Western interests. Since it would be politically unrealistic to expect the Russians to negotiate reductions which would limit their ability to exercise the defensive tactics they regard as vital in the North Atlantic, to limit their global intervention capability to a state of permanent inferiority vis-a-vis the other superpower or limit their ability to strike at NATO's North Atlantic sea routes, there is no visible scope for an overall naval limitation agreement. Regional limitation agreements have been proposed which would restrict the entry of non-littoral navies into the Mediterranean and the Indian Ocean. An agreement in the Mediterranean would be seriously damaging to Western interests because it would exclude the US Sixth Fleet. It would in any case be unacceptable to the United States in the Arab/Israel context. The possibility of agreement covering the Indian Ocean has been examined in detail and rejected by Western defence experts as disadvantageous to the West. It would restrict the freedom of the seas which is important to the West and generally curb Western more than Soviet activity. It would also set a precedent for limitations

/elsewhere

elsewhere. There are in addition numerous technical difficulties (eg verification, definition of bases, the inclusion of air forces). These reservations have been strengthened by the Soviet decision to breach the naval limitation clauses in the Montreux Convention by sending the aircraft carrier "Kiev" through the Dardanelles in July 1976.

(d) Bilateral Relations

66. Much of the work of détente has been or is being done in multilateral negotiations (eg CSCE, MBFR) or bilaterally between the superpowers (eg SALT). Nevertheless the groundwork for détente from its earliest days has been laid by the development of a network of bilateral relationships at many levels between individual Western countries and the Soviet Union and East European countries. This will continue to be a major element in the overall structure of détente. As pointed out in paragraph 25 above, bilateral exchanges of ministerial visits help to establish channels of communication and thus to provide the rudiments of a crisis-management system. Trade, a major component of détente, will also be pursued on an almost entirely bilateral basis even if the Common Commercial Policy provides an increasingly multilateral framework. There are many other areas in which individual countries can add bricks to the structure, eg in the cultural, scientific and technological fields, tourism, exchanges of all kinds and co-operative endeavours such as those demonstrated in the Soviet/US joint space flights, but more usefully exploited in such fields as medicine. The natural predilection of the East Europeans is to channel and control these contacts under official auspices, while the natural predilection of the West is to seek to promote them as far as possible through private initiative, enterprise and finance. A compromise is necessary - Western agreement to official arrangements with a view to promoting unofficial arrangements growing naturally out of the more formal ones. An interest in Western ideas in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe is thereby

/created.

created. The number of people in Eastern Europe in influential positions whose work and success is identified with co-operation with the West is also enlarged. The West, including the UK, should therefore continue to foster this process in their bilateral relations with the East European countries, working individually but keeping in close touch with one another and co-ordinating their approach among the Nine and in NATO as appropriate. There is a case for a degree of differentiation in relations with individual Eastern European countries. Those Eastern European governments which have been most successful in distancing themselves from Soviet practices or policies deserve to secure a more forthcoming approach from Western countries wherever this is possible.

(e) Promoting Western Ideas and Ultimately Changes in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe

67. Intensive Western efforts to facilitate popular access in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe to Western ideas and information through agreements with communist governments (eg on the circulation of Western newspapers) are likely to have only very limited success. Eastern European governments will continue to regard the penetration of Western ideas as a threat to their regimes and to the survival of their system. This is, therefore, an area in which the West will always be pushing against a very closed door. Nevertheless, the West needs to continue to promote the freer movement of people and ideas because:

- (a) in the long term world stability and peace can best be assured by free interchange between open societies;
- (b) the West needs a response to the Soviet ideological offensive: the issue of free movement of people and ideas is an invaluable tactical weapon;

/(c)

- (c) by maintaining pressure in this field, Western governments engage Western public support for their policy towards the Soviet Union and continually remind the public of the nature of the Soviet regime and the confrontational elements underlying détente;
- (d) the free movement of people and ideas has already become an issue in East/West relations through the CSCE and it would show weakness not to maintain pressure in pursuit of it.

Efforts to increase contacts and exchanges will need to be made both bilaterally and multilaterally. A particularly significant forum will be the Belgrade CSCE Review Conference in 1977. The Russians have been moving very slowly on the implementation of Basket Three, and it is important that the West should demand more speed. But it has to be borne in mind that Soviet progress on Basket Three cannot be expected to be anything other than slow and deliberate. The task for the Western countries will be to maintain steady pressure on the Soviet Union (and, in so far as the point applies to them, on the other Eastern European countries also) to live up to the very limited obligation they have undertaken, but this has to be done without moving over into open confrontation. It will be important to keep Basket Three on the agenda in any follow-up action agreed at Belgrade and at subsequent Review Conferences, if there are any. Careful preparation by Western countries, and especially by the Nine, of their positions for the Belgrade Conference will be essential. As the UK will hold the Presidency of the Nine during the first half of 1977, when positions for Belgrade will be worked out, the UK role will be important.

68. Whatever can be won through negotiation in the field of freer movement, its significance will continue to be less than

/that

that of the Western ideas which percolate through into the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe by radio, the smuggling of literature, etc, despite the efforts of the Soviet authorities to stop them. Much of this traffic in ideas is conducted via entirely unofficial channels, where government intervention on the Western side is neither necessary nor desirable. However, there are fields where only governments can act, and in them government action is of great importance and value. Broadcasting is a particularly important medium in this context, and it is clear that it has an audience and influence in the Soviet Union. The work of the BBC is particularly respected, and its broadcasts to the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe deserve the fullest support. Soviet efforts to choke off Western broadcasting by political and other pressures should be resisted\*. So should Soviet efforts to restrict broadcasting techniques - for example by banning direct transmissions from satellites to television receivers in the home. There is every reason to carry the battle of ideas on to Soviet territory.

69. Although this general approach is valid for both the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, the main western target will always be the Soviet Union. It is there that in the long run a change in the nature of the regime must be looked for if the confrontational nature of East/West relations is to be eradicated or even significantly reduced. So long as the regime remains unchanged, so long also will Eastern Europe be subject to Soviet control. It would be relatively easier for the West to promote dissent and even rebellion in Eastern Europe, but the Soviet repression which this would bring would serve neither the interests of the people nor Western interests. On the other

/hand

---

\* In principle this applies also to Radio Liberty and Radio Free Europe, which have become much less cold-warish in their approach since they stopped being funded by the CIA. Research Department is doing an analysis of their output with a view to judging how objective their broadcasting is.



hand, as the Soviet Union is itself so difficult to influence, the possibility of influencing it through developments in Eastern Europe cannot be ignored. The spread of Western ideas in Eastern Europe and the fostering of a more questioning attitude among the Eastern European peoples will create difficulties for the Soviet leaders in Eastern Europe and eventually in the Soviet Union too. The process must be so gradual that the Soviet Union finds no easy way of drawing a line between the acceptable and the unacceptable and is thus inhibited from direct intervention and military repression. Given a relatively slow pace of implementation, there is no danger that the limited requirements of the Helsinki Final Act will have an explosive effect in Eastern Europe, and there is therefore every reason for pressing them on East European Governments who are as unwilling as the Soviet Government to implement them. The same consideration applies to most aspects of Western efforts to increase the flow of information and ideas in East/West exchanges of all sorts.

/SECTION V

## SECTION V: WESTERN CO-ORDINATION

70. The West can achieve its objectives in East/West relations in both "common ground" and confrontational aspects only by maintaining its own cohesion and firmness of purpose. This requires in particular keeping the North Atlantic Alliance in good repair and maintaining the credibility of the US commitment to the defence of Europe. The American role is fundamental to most aspects of East/West relations. Crisis avoidance and crisis management outside Europe depend to an even greater extent than within Europe on American resolution. The co-ordination of Western views on almost all subjects of interest in East/West relations (eg trade, political exchanges, propaganda effort) will facilitate their success. In multilateral negotiations such as MBFR and CSCE detailed co-ordination is essential. Although the different attitudes to the US of member-states have at times threatened to damage both the European Community and the Alliance, the Community has also now become an important instrument of Western cohesion in the face of Soviet power in Europe.

71. The influence of the UK alone on the overall state of East/West relations is inevitably limited. The UK can play its part most usefully not by individual gestures but by contributing to the general process of Western policy making. It remains, therefore, to consider how the points examined in Section IV can best be discussed with Britain's partners.

72. Crisis-management is pre-eminently an area in which the lead has to be taken by the US. As was demonstrated in 1973, attempts at crisis management by the US can lead to intra-Western disputes and recriminations. To some extent this is inevitable, because in a fast-moving crisis in an area in which the Alliance itself is not involved there is not always time for alliance consultation. However, both sides have learned from their experience in 1973. The present Administration have since then shown themselves more aware of the need for consultation both during crises and in relation to situations which could develop into crises. Mr Carter has made a special point of his belief in the need for close consultation

/with

with America's allies. The European members of the Alliance need to maintain pressure on the US for substantial - not just formal - consultation, and to respond to it and reciprocate where appropriate. This is generally common ground in the Alliance and requires continued awareness rather than any new measures.

73. As regards economic relations, there has been a general realisation of the need for greater Western co-ordination, of which the work in progress in the OECD is a sign. Work on the development of joint Community policies is also in progress in some areas. This will accelerate when (and if) negotiations get under way between the EEC and the CMEA. The Community is on the point of transmitting its reply to the CMEA and inviting it to start negotiations on a draft agreement. The Community should be able to capitalise on a general need in the CMEA and in particular in the Soviet Union for Western technology and trade. These are matters for British representatives to pursue in appropriate ways on appropriate occasions rather than matters on which the UK needs to take specific initiatives with her partners.

74. All Britain's Western partners except France recognise the importance of MBFR. (France does not participate on the grounds that it is risky to negotiate force reductions with the Soviet Union.) The degree of emphasis to be attached to MBFR as compared with other aspects of détente is a matter of continuing discussion between Western countries for which NATO - supplemented by bilateral consultations - is the natural forum.

75. There is no disagreement between Western countries that the West should continue to promote the freer movement of people and ideas. There may however be differences of view about tactics and about the amount of pressure which should be put upon the Soviet Union at any given time. This subject will be fully discussed both within the Nine and in NATO in preparation for Belgrade.

76. In general, none of the ideas discussed in Section IV call for new UK initiatives via-à-vis Britain's partners. Rather,

/they

they provide a possible basis for the UK input to intra-NATO and intra-Community discussions which are already in train. It is recommended that the paper should be approved for use in this way as a general frame of reference in London and at posts abroad.



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

5 July 1979

*Mr Carrington**Yes, certainly. Will you go to this, if possible?**Yes**6/29*

Sir Curtis Keeble KCMG  
c/o East European and Soviet  
Department  
FCO  
London SW1

*Dear Curtis,*

## "EAST-WEST" HEADS OF MISSION CONFERENCE

1. As you know, the Secretary of State has agreed that we should hold a small, informal Heads of Mission Conference to discuss the main East-West issues relating to our national security. Lord Carrington, Sir Ian Gilmour and Mr Hurd hope to attend for at least some of the time, as well as myself. It has not been easy to find a date which suits everyone, but we have settled on the morning of 20 July as the best available. I regret that this will not be possible for Nicko Henderson, but I very much hope that despite the difficulties, John Robinson (or if this proves really impossible John Weston) can represent Washington. All other recipients of this letter should regard it as a formal invitation to attend the meeting at 9.30am on 20 July in the India Office Council Chamber. Those in London have not been forewarned of the Conference, but I hope that as many as possible will manage to attend.
2. It is easy for conferences of this sort to produce only a series of unstimulating statements. That must be avoided. One aim of the exercise is of course to give our new Ministers and our Ambassadors a chance to meet, exchange views and have an informal discussion on the main East-West issues. But I hope the away team will regard it less as an opportunity to gauge the attitude of the new Government than as a chance to advance ideas on the way our Ministers should approach the issues in question. The meeting should try to foresee the main trends in East-West relations in the next year or so, possible future risks to our security and areas where we might be able to build on the positive aspects of detente to achieve further progress. The discussion must be structured without being stilted. Above all, interventions must be brief if we are to cover the ground in the one morning available.
3. As a starting point I have asked the Planning Staff to prepare a short paper on East-West relations, which I hope will establish some common ground and avoid our having to start at first principles. I hope it will also be provocative and forward-looking and that the participants themselves will not shrink from provocative thoughts. I rely on you to help make it a lively discussion.



4. I think we should start with a very few and very brisk prepared statements on selected topics, followed by a free-for-all discussion. I should be glad if you could perhaps lead off with a 10 minute sketch of the Kremlin's perspective on East-West relations in the coming months, bearing in mind Brezhnev's failing health and the problem of succession and assessing the risk of further Soviet/Cuban interventions in the developing world. John Robinson might follow with a view from Washington, including of course the latest betting on SALT ratification and the domestic prospects of the President. Next, I should be glad if Michael Quinlan, if he can attend, would speak on TNF modernisation and Patrick Moberly on SALT II, SALT III AND MBFR.

5. Then would come the free-for-all. During it Julian Bullard would speak on CSCE and next year's Madrid meeting (including CBMs and human rights) and also on China as a factor in East-West relations. Other areas which could be covered in general discussions are the German question and the possibilities of East-West cooperation over non-proliferation. I hope the Department of Trade will give a view on whether there is any chance of doing anything to moderate the cut-throat competition between Western firms for contracts in CMEA countries, where the winner's profit is reduced and the often very high tendering costs of the losers are money down the drain. We should also have an exchange about the prospects for more sensible interest rates on export credits in East-West trade.

6. There will clearly not be time for detailed discussion of all these issues. I hope, however, that Eddie Bolland and John Edmonds will be able to attend the meeting since they will no doubt find it helpful to listen to discussion of the overall East-West picture which is the backdrop to their specific negotiations.

7. The meeting need not draw firm conclusions. It may however succeed in bringing out some new ideas, dispelling our misapprehensions and informing us all rather better about each other's preoccupations in what promises to be a difficult period in East-West relations.

8. We hope to arrange a lunch after the meeting for the overseas participants and the senior ones from London, where informal discussion can continue.

*Michael Palliser*  
Michael Palliser

ccs: Sir John Killick GCMG, UKDel NATO, Brussels  
 Sir Oliver Wright GCV0, KCMG, DSC, Bonn  
 Sir Reginald Hibbert KCMG, Paris  
 J A Robinson Esq CMG, Washington  
 E Bolland Esq CMG, UKDel to MBFR Vienna  
 J C Edmonds Esq CMG CVO, Adviser on Disarmament  
 Sir Clive Rose KCMG, c/o Heads of Mission Section  
 R W Wade-Gery Esq CMG, Cabinet Office  
 P M Maxey Esq, Cabinet Office  
 Sir Frank Cooper GCB CMG, Ministry of Defence

CONFIDENTIAL



copies continued:

M E Quinlan Esq, MOD

C A Whitmore Esq, No 10

B G Cartledge Esq, No 10

W M Knighton Esq, DOT

Sir Antony Duff

Sir Anthony Parsons

Sir Edward Youde

Mr Cortazzi

Mr Butler

Mr Bullard

Mr Fergusson

Mr P H Moberly

Planning Staff

WED

Defence Department

ACDD

CSCE Unit

NAD

TRED

CONFIDENTIAL

1944

1944

