

5B  
831

PREM 19/278

PART 1

MT

SECRET.

Confidential file

Internal situation. Iraqi / Iranian relations

Iraqi / Syrian Relations.

The threat to Oil supplies from the

Gulf.

IRAQ

September 1979  
April 1980

Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date
<del>10.4.80</del>							
<del>16.4.80</del>							
<del>19.6.80</del>							
<del>21.6.80</del>							
<del>19.8.80</del>							
<del>15.9.80</del>							
<del>19.9.80</del>							
<del>27.9.80</del>							
29.9.80							
30.9.80							
<del>ENDS.</del>							

PREM 19/278



PART 1 ends:-

Press Office Bulletin 30/9/80

PART 2 begins:-

Schmidt to PM T189/80





Might it not be better to  
ring P. Cunningham up as soon  
as this meeting is over?

Yes: but I'm not  
happy about the  
telephonic confusion  
there has been. I'd  
rather get him a  
telegram or note.


[Notes found on front inside cover  
at review]

In addition to the address  
we should need to drop  
a topic rel. to Carrington  
as from a this week  
is over.



Has he  
talked to  
F - Ponce?

I don't really understand why we aren't making more active efforts to activate the quadripartite machinery now with a view to taking action with the various counterparts. I do not believe that unilateral action by the UK will have the slightest effect on Oman or anyone else.

I agree: but a) time is v. short and I think we should get the action with Cameroon <sup>in</sup> taken now.  
b) I'd rather talk about it en petit comité after lunch 



● from Gilmore to me

---

I will raise the

French font when

this is out of the

way.

AF  
Spares  
Inventory Officer  
Get Paid



1 Chorranchan  
Desps 225 tanks

Naval

10 DOWNING STREET

Over

THE PRIME MINISTER

Over  
Ingr. Fines

1. Latest JIC assessment.

Low Service  
Pangondr

2. Action taken so far.

Defense Units.

Political.

3. TEA - Stocks  
Oil.

4. Further action required now.

Political

Defense

Prescription.

5. Daily Meeting?

P.S

Quadrilateral Consultations



# PRESS OFFICE BULLETIN

Mr Alexander  
date: 30.9.80  
Iraq

## IRAN/IRAQ

Inquiries from journalists say that President Carter last evening gave a briefing to Congressmen in which he said that the US was making military preparations in concert with Britain and other allies to protect the Straits of Hormuz. There was a possibility that the Americans would send some advance communications and control planes to the area.

Senator Javits, who may be the source of all this, is reported to have made a strong plea for military support from the United States's allies

In response to these inquiries, press officers should take the following unattributable line:

The United Kingdom is in consultation with the United States and other Governments about the Iran/Iraq situation. These consultations are continuing. Their prime objective is to secure a ceasefire and a negotiated settlement and to safeguard oil supplies.

Any talk of sending military forces to the area is premature. In any case, they are not needed at this stage. Moreover a report in the Guardian this morning suggests that the US now believes it may have over-sold the danger in the Gulf.

The prime objective of British policy is to end the war; secure a lasting ceasefire; and to secure a negotiated settlement. Those objectives, if achieved, would of course be the best and surest way of safeguarding oil supplies.

Attached for background are cuttings from today's Guardian and International Herald Tribune and FCO guidance of yesterday.

BI

## Keeping the Gulf open

MUCH of the official concern in the United States over the Iran-Iraq war has focused on the potential threat to the Strait of Hormuz, the narrow passageway at the southern end of the Gulf that carries a third of the non-Communist world's oil.

But, in private, US officials are a great deal less worried about the freedom of navigation through the strait. Military and Intelligence analysts say it is their best guess that neither Iran nor Iraq is capable of blocking the strait physically. What is more, they assert, it is in neither country's interest to attempt such a move.

President Carter said last week that the war might lead to the blocking or closing of the strait, cutting off the West's key oil lifeline. US officials hinted that an international naval force might have to be formed to assure

oil tanker passage through the strait, which is the only maritime exit from the Gulf.

In a television interview, Carter vowed that the US would do "whatever is required" to keep the strait open to navigation.

But one Pentagon official concedes: "I think maybe we oversold the importance of the Strait of Hormuz in this. Right now, looking at the players and the situation out there, we don't see any real threat to the strait."

The strait is physically less constricted than most casual observers believe. "Looking at the thing on a world globe, it seems pretty tight," says a military source. "But it is really too wide and too deep to close very easily."

The strait, which is about 170 miles long, averages 50 miles in width, and even at its narrowest point is about 30 miles wide. For most of

its length the depth is between 245 and 733 feet, and it is nowhere shallower than 143 feet.

Thus, Pentagon sources say, even if Iran — which has several small naval ships in the strait — should sink one or more huge oil tankers, the shipping channels probably would not be impassable. Iraq, which has no ships there, is even less capable of blocking the strait. Neither nation is believed to have the mine-laying ability to close the strait.

One Pentagon official asserts that only the US and Soviet navies are really capable of bottling up the Gulf, and the Russians, who always have a single frigate on patrol at the strait, do not show any signs so far of attempting such a move.

Walter Mossberg

cutting dated

30 SEP 1980  
19

x  
Iran/Iraq

# West Switches Tactic on Hormuz

## Quiet Diplomacy Seen More Effective Than Threats

By Joseph Fitchett

International Herald Tribune

PARIS — The United States and other industrial countries have decided that the Strait of Hormuz can be better protected by quiet diplomacy than by threats of Western intervention, diplomats said Monday.

But Western leaders are on record as saying that any attempts to block the strait would threaten the West's vital interests.

"As long as the oil tankers keep moving, speculation about allied moves or an allied force in the Gulf can only hurt, perhaps even becoming a self-fulfilling prophecy," according to an official involved in U.S.-European contacts about the current fighting in the Gulf.

It seems clear that the United States, France and Britain are determined to use force as a last resort to keep the strait open, but all these governments have concluded that talk about such an eventuality is likely to be counter-productive.

The Carter administration has denied earlier, apparently distorted reports that it tried to organize a crisis meeting with other industrial countries: Britain, France, Italy, Japan and West Germany.

Western hints of possible naval action to keep the strait open drew criticism both from the Soviet Union and from Saudi Arabia. Now Western governments are concentrating their diplomatic efforts on trying to contain the Iran-Iraq conflict and insure that other Arab governments are not drawn into it, diplomats said.

Iran's President Abolhassan Bani-Sadr said in an interview with Newsweek that Iran would block shipping in the strait if the country was attacked from all sides — an apparent reference to the possibility of other Arab governments supporting Iraq if the undeclared war becomes a military stalemate.

In the Gulf, ship captains quoted on French radio said that several tankers have been intercepted by the Iranian navy and asked their destinations but none has been stopped. Both the United

States and France have said publicly that any interference with shipping in the strait would jeopardize their vital interests — a phrase implying readiness to use military force.

### Local Navies

Both countries have sizable Indian Ocean fleets cruising near the strait and Britain has dispatched two ships to join the U.S. task group. These forces, separately or combined, would be more than a match for local navies in a crisis. However, both the Soviet Union and Saudi Arabia assert that any U.S. move to increase the level of forces in the Gulf is liable to spread the conflict.

Reflecting European doubts about the wisdom of an allied force there, West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt said that his government cannot deploy war vessels outside Europe. Japan, which had said it was ready to attend a U.S.-sponsored Gulf meeting, announced Monday that such a meeting was unnecessary because a threat to Gulf shipping appeared unlikely.

Japan was the source of a leak in garbled form of a letter from President Carter last week to other leaders about the Gulf. But the letter was not a formal invitation or a call to action, French and U.S. officials said.

The Strait of Hormuz is too wide to block by simply sinking ships in the waterway. The two channels used by tankers entering and leaving the Gulf both lie in Oman's territorial waters but that country has no force capable of repelling an Iranian naval interdiction of the channels.

N.F.  
cc. R.W.  
P.T.

we might do worse than  
commend this piece to our  
clients. Mr. Fitchett has it  
just right.  
RF  
30/9



NOTE TO PRESS OFFICERS

IRAN/IRAQ

Secretary of State's Movements

Lord Carrington decided to return to London because of the continuing conflict between Iran/Iraq.

[As necessary]. The decision was not occasioned by any specific aspect of the crisis. (Iraqi air movements in the Southern Gulf - FT story: US proposals for a Western Conference: the conclusion of Mrs Thatcher's meetings at Chequers: British intervention to dissuade Oman etc.)

The situation on Iran/Iraq is serious. Quite clearly the potential dangers are very grave indeed. It was clear in New York that the peace making efforts of the Security Council and the Islamic Conference were unlikely to achieve immediate success. In these circumstances Lord Carrington quite simply decided that the right place to be was at his desk in London.

[As necessary] The decision had nothing whatever to do with Lord Carrington's health.

See also Spokesman for 29 September

Straits of Hormuz (FT story)

It is not for us to confirm or deny reports of Iraqi troop movements, or to speculate about the intentions of combatant governments.

Unattributably: We are aware of these reports and are in touch with Gulf Governments.

The thrust of British policy is clear from the public record:



(a) Statement of the Nine on 23 September: Paragraph 4 "They recall the capital importance for the international community of freedom of navigation in the Gulf which it is imperative not to infringe."

(b) Security Council Resolution of 28 September: Paragraph 3 "calls upon all other States to exercise the utmost restraint and to refrain from any act which may lead to a further escalation and widening of the conflict."

(c) Sir A Parsons' explanation of the vote on 28 September: "It is essential that all States exercise the utmost restraint to avoid any escalation of the current perilous situation, an escalation with incalculable consequences not only for the parties, but for us all."

Like other governments, we are anxious to avoid this conflict spreading and attach great importance to free navigation in the Straits. We should be extremely concerned at any development which threatened to impede this.

Q: Have we made representations?

A: We are in touch with many governments in the area. Our views are reflected in the public statements above.

#### US Sponsored Meeting/Meetings

We are already in the closest possible consultation with our partners and allies and with a wide range of governments about the serious situation deriving from the conflict between Iraq and Iran. We shall continue to participate in such consultation.

Questions about messages to the Prime Minister should be referred to Number Ten. Unattributably: It is true that Mrs Thatcher has received a message from President Carter and that she has replied to it. The exchange is confidential. You will have noted the statement from the White House on 26 September that the President was in touch with "key friends and allies on a wide range of issues related to the conflict". In the context

of the economic effects of the conflict, the US '' would be willing to host a meeting to review these issues if that should seem desirable. If it is determined that a meeting of experts is required, we will work out timing and location. No such meeting has been set. In the meantime our consultations are continuing.''

That remains the position. We have no details of timing, location or level of any such consultation.

The urgent priority remains to stop the war. We fully endorse the efforts of the UN and of the Islamic Conference to this end, and support the goodwill mission of President Zia.

#### Naval Deployment

Talk of a joint naval task force is premature. Asked about this on ABC TV in New York on 26 September, Lord Carrington said: '' obviously we have all been talking about every possible eventuality, but I do not think that that at the moment is what we ought to worry about''. He went on to talk about the commercial risks involved in sending ships into the Gulf.

Questions about the movements of HM Ships are for the Ministry of Defence. Unattributably: HMS Coventry, in company with Royal Fleet Auxiliary Tanker Olwen, has indeed been detached from the Task Group currently in the Far East. The two vessels are now off Singapore and are moving into the Indian Ocean. This is purely a precautionary move.

NF

29 September 1980

# CONFIDENTIAL

GPS 130

CONFIDENTIAL

FM DUBAI 300604Z SEP 80

TO IMMEDIATE ABU DHABI

TELEGRAM NUMBER 37 OF 30 SEPTEMBER

AND TO IMMEDIATE FCO

INFO IMMEDIATE MODUK MUSCAT BAGHDAD

INFO PRIORITY JEDDA KUWAIT BAHRAIN DOHA

IRAN/ IRAQ

1. I ACCOMPANIED MR JENKIN TO CALLS ON THE RULERS OF SHARJAH AND DUBAI YESTERDAY. THE FORMER WAS VERY PESSIMISTIC ABOUT THE WAR SITUATION. THE IRAQIS HAD SERIOUSLY MISCALCULATED IRANIAN MILITARY CAPABILITIES, AND WOULD FACE INCREASINGLY STIFF RESISTANCE AS THE IRANIANS TRANSFERRED FORCES FROM OTHER AREAS.
2. SHAIKH SULTAN SAID THAT IT WOULD BE MADNESS FOR THE U A E TO BECOME INVOLVED IN THE CONFLICT. IRAN STILL HAD 300 WARPLANES; THE SMOKE FROM ONE OF THEM WOULD BE ENOUGH TO FINISH OFF THE U A E. THE IRAQIS HAD KNOWN BETTER THAN TO ASK HIM FOR FACILITIES TO ATTACK THE GULF ISLANDS, BUT OF COURSE SHAIKH SAQR OF RAS AL-KHAIMAH WAS DEEPLY INVOLVED WITH THEM.
3. SHAIKH RASHID, WHO HAD SPENT MOST OF THE DAY IN ABU DHABI, AT A CABINET MEETING AND RECEIVING THE IRAQI AMBASSADOR, WAS EQUALLY CLEAR THAT THE U A E SHOULD NOT BE INVOLVED; IT WAS NOT THEIR QUARREL.
4. YOU WILL SEE FROM DA'S SIC U2H OF 300620Z TO MODUK THAT RAS AL-KHAIMAH HAS INDEED BEEN HEAVILY INVOLVED WITH THE IRAQIS BUT IS NOW HAVING SECOND THOUGHTS. ALL IN ALL, IT LOOKS AS THOUGH THE U A E HAVE WITHDRAWN FROM THE BRINK.

HASKELL

IRAQ/IRAN STANDARD

MED

NENAD

NAD

UND

EESD

ECD

WED

MAED

TRED

ERD

ECON D

CONS D

CONS EM UNIT

CABINET OFFICE

ADDITIONAL DISTN.

IRAQ/IRAN

# CONFIDENTIAL



GRS 235

UNCLASSIFIED

FM BONN 291430Z SEP 80

TO PRIORITY FCC

TELEGRAM NUMBER 711 OF 29 SEPTEMBER

INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON PARIS UKDEL NATO UKMIS NEW YORK UKDEL OECD

INFO ROUTINE ROME

MS.

**SCHMIDT ON IRAN/IRAQ**

1. ON 26 SEPTEMBER CHANCELLOR SCHMIDT GAVE HIS LAST SCHEDULED PRESS CONFERENCE BEFORE THE FEDERAL ELECTIONS ON 5 OCTOBER. PRESS REPORTING HAS FOCUSED MAINLY ON HIS COMMENTS ON THE IRAN/IRAQ DISPUTE.
2. SCHMIDT SAID IT WAS INCORRECT THAT CONSULTATIONS WERE TAKING PLACE BETWEEN THE GERMAN AND OTHER GOVERNMENTS TO ESTABLISH A NAVAL PRESENCE TO PROTECT THE STRAITS OF HORMUZ. THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT HAD NOT BEEN APPROACHED BY HER ALLIES IN THIS CONNECTION. IN ANY CASE THE CONSTITUTION FORBODE THE USE OF GERMAN SHIPS OUTSIDE THE NATO AREA. BESIDES, IT WAS NOT THE VIEW OF THE WESTERN POWERS THAT FREEDOM OF PASSAGE IN THE STRAITS COULD BE AFFECTED. ASKED WHETHER THE FRG WOULD BE PREPARED TO EXTEND ITS NAVAL RESPONSIBILITIES WITHIN THE NATO AREA TO ENABLE ALLIES TO SEND A PRESENCE INTO THE INDIAN OCEAN, SCHMIDT SAID IT WAS CONCEIVABLE THAT THE GERMANS SHOULD TAKE OVER TASKS IN THE SEA AREAS ADJACENT TO THE NORTHERN PARTS OF THE NORTH SEA. THERE WOULD BE NOTHING NEW IN THIS. HE DENIED PRESS REPORTS THAT DURING HIS RECENT CONVERSATIONS IN BONN THE AMERICAN DEPUTY SECRETARY OF STATE, CHRISTOPHER, HAD RAISED THIS QUESTION. SCHMIDT HAD HOWEVER REMINDED HIM OF THE GERMAN POSITION.
3. THE LOSS OF IRAQI OIL WOULD HAVE MORE EFFECT THAN THE LOSS OF IRANIAN SUPPLIES TO THE WORLD MARKET BUT THIS WOULD NOT BE A CAUSE FOR ACUTE CONCERN. THE BLOCKING OF THE STRAITS OF HORMUZ WOULD BE MORE SERIOUS BUT AT PRESENT THERE WAS NO ACUTE DANGER OF THIS. TOO MUCH ATTENTION SHOULD NOT BE PAID TO THE EFFECTS OF SPECULATION ON OIL PRICES IN THE SPOT MARKET.

WRIGHT

**IRAQ/IRAN STANDARD**

MED	MAED
NENAD	TRED
NAD	ERD
UND	ECON D
EESD	CONS D
EGD	CONS EM UNIT
WED	CABINET OFFICE

**ADDITIONAL DISTN.**

**IRAQ/IRAN**

**THIS TELEGRAM  
WAS NOT  
ADVANCED**



GR 500

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FM WASHINGTON 292218Z SEP 80

TO PRIORITY F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 4138 OF 29 SEPTEMBER

INFO UKDEL OECD.

*Read in full.*

IRAN/IRAQ: OIL

COUNSELLOR (ENERGY) AND HEAP (ESSD) CALLED ON THE STATE AND ENERGY DEPARTMENTS TODAY. TREAT (ENERGY) SAID HIS DEPARTMENT WELCOMED THE MANY PUBLIC STATEMENTS PLAYING DOWN THE LIKELIHOOD OF EARLY SUPPLY DIFFICULTIES. NEVERTHELESS HE THOUGHT THAT ALTHOUGH THE OVERALL POSITION WAS SATISFACTORY, IT WAS NOT EVIDENT THAT SOME DIFFICULTIES MIGHT ARISE BECAUSE OF THE PARTICULAR DISTRIBUTION PATTERN FOR OIL FROM IRAN AND IRAQ. FOR INSTANCE MOZAMBIQUE AND SOMALIA OBTAINED ALL THEIR OIL FROM THESE SOURCES AND OTHER LDC'S WERE ALSO UNUSUALLY DEPENDENT EG: SRI LANKA (68 PERCENT), TANZANIA (59 PERCENT), BANGLADESH (52 PERCENT). OTHER SERIOUSLY RELIANT COUNTRIES, EITHER IN TERMS OF VOLUME OR PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL SUPPLIES, INCLUDED FRANCE, BRAZIL, TURKEY, YUGOSLAVIA, SOUTH KOREA, SPAIN, ROMANIA, INDIA, AND GREECE. IT WAS NOT CLEAR HOW MANY OF THESE COUNTRIES CARRIED ADEQUATE STOCKS. IN MANY OF THEM THE MAJOR OIL COMPANIES NO LONGER PLAYED A ROLE AND WERE THEREFORE UNLIKELY TO HELP OUT IN THE NORMAL COURSE OF EVENTS. TO SOME EXTENT THESE PROBLEMS MIGHT BE OVERCOME IF VARIOUS OPEC PRODUCERS INCREASED PRODUCTION LEVELS, OR RESTORED RECENT CUTS IN PRODUCTION, AND GAVE PREFERENCE TO LDC'S IN MARKETING THEIR EXTRA OUTPUT. BUT THERE COULD STILL BE A NEED TO TAKE SPECIAL ACTION TO HELP SOME AFFECTED COUNTRIES, PARTICULARLY TO PREVENT THEIR ENTERING THE SPOT MARKET. ONE OBVIOUS WAY OF DOING THIS WOULD BE TO ENLIST THE HELP OF THE INTERNATIONAL OIL COMPANIES. IN THE CASE OF THE US, HOWEVER, GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION OF THIS SORT MIGHT BE CONSTRAINED BY ANTI-TRUST PROBLEMS.

2. MORSE (STATE) ALSO EMPHASISED THIS PROBLEM BUT THOUGHT THAT IT MIGHT TO SOME EXTENT BE DEALT WITH BY OIL PRODUCING COUNTRIES ON A REGIONAL BASIS. FOR INSTANCE VENEZUELA OR POSSIBLY MEXICO MIGHT WELL ASSIST BRAZIL. THE FACT THAT IRAQ HAD REQUESTED OTHER OPEC COUNTRIES TO INCREASE PRODUCTION IN THE CURRENT SITUATION MIGHT PROVE HELPFUL.

3. MORSE SAID THAT IT WAS NO LONGER THE US INTENTION TO PROMOTE DISCUSSIONS ABOUT OIL TANKER INSURANCE ARRANGEMENTS IN THE MARGINS OF THIS WEEK'S SLT MEETING IN PARIS. THIS SUGGESTION HAD ARISEN BECAUSE OF A MISUNDERSTANDING ABOUT THE US MESSAGE TO CERTAIN CAPITALS LAST WEEK. THEY HAD SINCE SENT A FURTHER MESSAGE TO CAPITALS OVER THE WEEKEND MAKING IT CLEAR THAT THEY WERE NOT AT THIS STAGE IN FAVOUR OF A FORMAL MEETING, BUT IN DOING SO HAD FELT IT NECESSARY TO OFFER TO ARRANGE DISCUSSIONS IN THE MARGINS OF SLT IF

CONFIDENTIAL

*ANYONE*

CONFIDENTIAL

ANYONE WANTED THAT. TO DATE NO SUCH REQUEST HAD BEEN MADE. STATE DEPARTMENT'S FEELING AT PRESENT WAS THAT ALTHOUGH TANKER INSURANCE RATES WERE INCREASING THE CASE FOR GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION DID NOT AS YET EXIST. FOR INSTANCE TANKER INSURANCE RATES DURING THE KOREAN WAR HAD BEEN SEVERAL TIMES HIGHER THAN THOSE NOW IN FORCE IN THE GULF AREA.

4. PLEASE ADVANCE TO D LE B JONES AND KELLY IN DEPT OF ENERGY AND HEAP, ESSD.

HENDERSON

(ADVANCED AS REQUESTED)

IRAQ/IRAN STANDARD

MED	MAED
NEHAD	TRED
NAD	ERD
UND	ECON D
EEED	CONS D
ECB	CONS EM UNIT
WED	CABINET OFFICE

ADDITIONAL DISTR.

IRAQ/IRAN

*COPIES TO  
MR JONES } D/ENERGY  
MR KELLY }*

2.  
CONFIDENTIAL

29

GR 475

S E C R E T

SECRET

FM WASHINGTON 292210Z SEP 80

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 4137 OF 29 SEPTEMBER

INFO IMMEDIATE MUSCAT, JEDDA, BAGHDAD, MODUK

PRIORITY AMMAN, BAHRAIN, KUWAIT, ABU DHABI, DUBAI, DOHA, UKHLEB

NEW YORK

*Read in full*

*ms*

MUSCAT TEL 276: IRAQ/IRAN

1. WE HAVE BEEN IN TOUCH TODAY WITH STATE DEPARTMENT AND NSC. WHILE STILL KEEPING THEIR FINGERS CROSSED, THE AMERICANS THINK THAT WE MAY HAVE QUOTE SQUEAKED THROUGH UNQUOTE THE IMMEDIATE CRISIS. THEY ATTRIBUTE THIS PARTLY TO OUR JOINT DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS AND PARTLY TO IRAQI SLOWNESS IN LAUNCHING THE OPERATION ONCE THEY HAD SECURED OMANI AGREEMENT. THEY THINK THAT IT WOULD HAVE BEEN MUCH MORE DIFFICULT TO PREVENT IF THE IRAQIS HAD BEEN READY WHEN THEY ORIGINALLY SAID THEY WOULD BE. THE DELAY AND THE FINANCIAL TIMES LEAK WOULD HAVE MADE IT EASIER FOR THE OMANIS TO CHANGE THEIR MINDS.

2. THE AMERICANS ARE NOT HOWEVER CONFIDENT THAT THE EVIDENCE SO FAR AVAILABLE, WHICH IS BASED ONLY ON INTELLIGENCE SOURCES, DEMONSTRATES CONCLUSIVELY THAT THE IRAQIS HAVE CALLED OFF THEIR OMAN OPERATION. THEY HAVE NOT, THEREFORE, ACCEPTED AMBASSADOR WILEY'S SUGGESTION THAT THERE IS NO NEED TO DELIVER THE VERBAL MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT TO SULTAN QABUS AND HAVE INSTRUCTED HIM TO SPEAK TO THE SULTAN, MAKING IT CLEAR THAT AMERICAN MISGIVINGS ABOUT OMANI INVOLVEMENT COME FROM THE HIGHEST LEVEL. THEY BELIEVE THAT EVEN IF THE INDICATIONS THAT THE OPERATION HAS BEEN CALLED OFF TURN OUT TO BE CORRECT, THE OMANIS COULD STILL CHANGE THEIR MINDS AGAIN.

3. AMERICAN ATTENTION IS NOW INCREASINGLY CONCENTRATED ON THE SAUDI REQUEST, SO FAR ONLY INFORMALLY CONVEYED, FOR US HELP WITH AIR DEFENCE IN THE EASTERN PROVINCE, PARTICULARLY AROUND THE OIL TERMINALS. PRINCE SAUD, IN TALKING TO MUSKIE STUCK TO THE LINE THAT THE SAUDIS ARE STILL ONLY INTERESTED IN QUOTE INVISIBLE UNQUOTE US SUPPORT. THE AMERICANS ARE HOWEVER, HEARING ON THE MILITARY NET THAT THE NEED FOR INVISIBILITY DOES NOT OUT-WEIGH THE NEED FOR A PROMPT AND EFFECTIVE US CONTRIBUTION. THEY HAVE THEREFORE INSTRUCTED AMBASSADOR WEST TO SEEK CLARIFICATION FROM PRINCE FAHD AND AWAIT HIS ACCOUNT OF THE TALKS HE AND GENERAL JONES (CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS WHO IS IN SAUDI ARABI AS A RESULT OF A LONG-STANDING INVITATION) SHOULD HAVE HAD IN TAIF TODAY. IF IT TURNS OUT THAT

S E C R E T

/SAUDI



S E C R E T

SAUDI PRIORITIES HAVE CHANGED, THE FIRST STEP MIGHT BE TO FLY SOME AWAC MISSIONS FROM SAUDI ARABIA. THE AMERICANS COULD, THOUGH NOT EASILY, DEPLOY QUITE RAPIDLY SOME MOBILE HAWK UNITS IN THE RIGHT PLACES IF THE SAUDIS WERE ABLE TO DIVERT MEN FROM TRAINING TO MANNING THEM. ANY REQUEST FOR US PERSONNEL TO BE PROVIDED IN WHAT AMOUNTS TO A COMBAT ZONE, EITHER TO MAN THE HAWKS OR TO FLY F15S, WOULD PRESENT MUCH MORE SERIOUS POLITICAL/CONGRESSIONAL COMPLICATIONS

4. AMBASSADOR WEST HAS ALSO BEEN INSTRUCTED TO ENSURE AND TO CONFIRM TO WASHINGTON THAT THE SAUDIS ARE FULLY AWARE OF THE DANGEROUS CONSEQUENCES FOR THEM AND OTHER PENINSULA STATES OF ALLOWING THEMSELVES TO GET INVOLVED IN THE IRAN/IRAQ FIGHTING.

HENDERSON

IRAQ/IRAN STANDARD

MED	MAED
MEMAD	TRED
NAD	ERD
UND	ECOW D
EESD	CONS D
ECD	CONS EM UNIT
WED	CABINET OFFICE

ADDITIONAL DESTN.

IRAQ/IRAN



IRAN/IRAQ

ADVANCE COPIES

22

IMMEDIATE

PS  
PS/SIR I GILMOUR  
PS/MR HURD  
PS/PUS  
SIR E YOUDE  
SIR J GRAHAM  
MR J C MOBERLY  
MR BRAITHEWAITE  
HD/MED  
HD/KENAD  
HD/UKD  
HD/CONS D  
CONSULAR EMERGENCY UNIT  
HD/ES & SD  
HD/MAED  
HD/DEF D  
FUSD (2)  
NEWS D

NO 10 DOWNING STREET  
CABINET OFFICE DIO

2

*Sir A ALLAN D*

*mt*

GR 640

CONFIDENTIAL

FM AMMAN 291038Z SEP 80

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 365 OF 29 SEP

INFO IMMEDIATE MODUK, BAGHDAD, JEDDA, MUSCAT, UKMIS NEWYORK AND WASHINGTON.

PRIORITY ABU DHABI, BAHRAIN, DOHA, ISLAMABAD, KUWAIT, PARIS AND TUNIS.

IRAQ/IRAN

1. THE PAKISTANI PRESIDENT ACCOMPANIED BY MR HABIB CHATTI, SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE ISLAMIC CONFERENCE, ARRIVED IN AMMAN YESTERDAY EVENING FROM TEHRAN AND LEFT FOR BAGHDAD THIS MORNING IN AN IRAQI MILITARY AIRCRAFT. THEY ARE DUE TO RETURN TO AMMAN THIS AFTERNOON SEMICLN PRESIDENT ZIA-UL-HAQ IS EXPECTED TO MAKE ONLY A BRIEF STOP HERE AND THEN GO ON TO PARIS TO SEE PRESIDENT GISCARDI; AFTERWARDS HE GOES TO NEW YORK WHERE HE IS TO ADDRESS THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY ON WEDNESDAY. AGENCY REPORTS CARRIED IN TODAY'S JORDANIAN PRESS QUOTE AN IRANIAN PRESIDENCY OFFICIAL AS STATING THAT THE MISSION HAD ACHIEVED NOTHING AND THAT IRAN WOULD FIGHT ON UNTIL THE LAST IRAQI SOLDIER WAS OFF IRANIAN SOIL.

2. EMPHASISING THAT HE HAD NOT BEEN PRESENT DURING A LENGTHY TETE-A-TETE DISCUSSION BETWEEN KING HUSSEIN AND PRESIDENT ZIA (THEY ARE OLD AND CLOSE FRIENDS, AS ZIA HEADED THE PAKISTANI MILITARY MISSION TO JORDAN FOR SOME YEARS), THE PAKISTANI AMBASS-

ACCOUNT OF HIS PRESIDENT'S MISSION

MILITARY MISSION TO JORDAN FOR SOME YEARS), THE PAKISTANI AMBASSADOR HAS GIVEN ME THE FOLLOWING ACCOUNT OF HIS PRESIDENT'S MISSION SO FAR BASED MAINLY ON HIS DISCUSSIONS WITH THE DELEGATION ACCOMPANYING HIM. PRESIDENT ZIA HAD HAD TWO LONG MEETINGS WITH MR. BANI SADR AND HAD ALSO SEEN THE IRANIAN PRIME MINISTER AND THE PRESIDENT OF THE IRANIAN NATIONAL ASSEMBLY. HE HAD NOT BEEN ABLE TO SEE THE AYATOLLAH KHOMEINI. AMONG ALL THE IRANIANS THEY HAD MET, PRESIDENT ZIA'S DELEGATION HAD FOUND THE UTMOST DETERMINATION TO CONTINUE THE STRUGGLE UNTIL IRAQI TROOPS WERE OFF IRANIAN SOIL AND A REFUSAL TO CONTEMPLATE A CEASEFIRE WHILE IRAQI TROOPS REMAINED IN OCCUPATION OF IRANIAN TERRITORY (PRESIDENT ZIA AND HIS DELEGATION HAD OF COURSE LEFT TEHRAN BEFORE THE IRAQI PRESIDENT'S OFFER OF A CEASEFIRE WAS MADE KNOWN). HOWEVER THE PAKISTANI DELEGATION FORMED THE IMPRESSION THAT THIS WAS NOT NECESSARILY THE IRANIANS' LAST WORD AND THAT, IF THE IRAQIS WOULD AGREE TO WITHDRAW THEIR TROOPS, THE IRANIANS WOULD BE WILLING TO DISCUSS THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE 1975 ALGIERS TREATY. THE PAKISTANI AMBASSADOR REMARKED THAT PAKISTAN'S RELATIONS WITH IRAN WERE NO LONGER ANYTHING LIKE AS CLOSE AS THEY HAD BEEN IN THE PAST AND THAT THE IRANIANS NOW TENDED TO REGARD THE PAKISTANIS AS BEING UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF THE AMERICANS; THIS HAD RESULTED IN PRESIDENT ZIA'S MISSION BEING RECEIVED BY THE IRANIANS INITIALLY AT LEAST WITH SOME SUSPICION.

3. THE JORDANIANS HAD BEEN PUT OUT BY WHAT PRESIDENT ZIA'S DELEGATION HAD HAD TO SAY CONCERNING IRANIAN DETERMINATION TO CONTINUE THE WAR AND ALSO BY THE WIDE GAP BETWEEN THE PAKISTANI DELEGATION'S ESTIMATE OF IRANIAN ABILITY TO DO SO AND IRAQI REPORTS THAT THE IRANIAN ARMED FORCES WERE ON THE EDGE OF COLLAPSE. THE PAKISTANIS HAD NOT MUCH LIKE WHAT THE JORDANIANS HAD TOLD THEM CONCERNING IRAQI INTENTIONS IN RELATION TO KHUZESTAN AND OTHER PARTS OF IRANIAN TERRITORY, BUT IT HAD AT LEAST GIVEN THEM A GOOD IDEA OF WHAT THEY COULD EXPECT TO HEAR WHEN THEY REACHED BAGHDAD. THE PAKISTANI DELEGATION WERE NATURALLY ANXIOUS TO STAY ENTIRELY NEUTRAL ON THESE MATTERS AND NOT TO JEOPARDISE ANY CHANCE THEIR MISSION MIGHT HAVE OF SUCCEEDING.

4. SUMMING UP THE IMPRESSIONS HE HAD OBTAINED FROM THE DELEGATION, THE PAKISTANI AMBASSADOR SAID THAT HE PERSONALLY DID NOT EXPECT PRESIDENT ZIA'S MISSION TO PRODUCE RESULTS ON THE PRESENT ROUND BECAUSE THERE WAS AS YET NO COMMON GROUND BETWEEN THE IRANIANS AND IRAQIS ON THE BASIS ON WHICH A CEASEFIRE MIGHT COME ABOUT. BUT HE THOUGHT THE MISSION MIGHT NEVERTHELESS STILL HAVE A USEFUL ROLE TO PLAY AT A SUBSEQUENT STAGE. A POINT WHICH KING HUSSEIN APPARENTLY REPEATEDLY MADE TO PRESIDENT ZIA WAS HIS FEAR THAT PRESIDENT SADDAM'S OFFER OF A CEASEFIRE MIGHT BE INTERPRETED BY THE IRANIANS AS A SIGN OF WEAKNESS.





La. V. M. S.

## SOVIET ATTITUDE TO THE IRAN/IRAQ CONFLICT

1. Soviet policy in the Middle East aims to extend Soviet influence while avoiding military confrontation with the US. The Soviet Union has a long-term interest in securing a share of Middle East oil supplies but recognises that access to Middle East oil is a vital Western interest of which it must take account.

2. The current conflict places the Soviet Union in a difficult position. It has a friendship treaty with Iraq<sup>(i)</sup> and is that country's main supplier of arms. It will wish to avoid putting pressure on Iraq of a kind which would put at risk its influence in Baghdad and antagonise other Arabs. It will also be conscious of the need to be seen to live up to its treaty commitments. However, one of the Soviet Union's major objectives in the Gulf Area is to gain a high degree of influence in Iran. While its efforts to get on terms with the Khomeini regime have been unsuccessful, it may be reluctant to see a breakdown of government in Iran and a struggle for power while the Tudeh Party is too weak to have a decisive say in the outcome.

3. So far, while maintaining normal arms supplies to Iraq and acknowledging their treaty obligations, the Russians have been reasonably even handed in their attitude to the conflict between Iraq and Iran. Mr Gromyko assured Mr Muskie in New York on 25 September that the Russians would not intervene as long as others did not.

Possible Scenarios

4. If the fighting between Iran and Iraq remains at a fairly low level the Russians are likely to maintain their present attitude. They might offer to mediate in the dispute, but only if they thought this could be done successfully. They would in any case hope to be

---

(i) The Soviet Iran Treaty of 1921 is not of the same degree of relevance. The Iranians have denounced it, and the Russians could use it to justify military intervention only if they could plausibly claim that Iranian territory was being used to threaten the Soviet Union.



associated as much as the United States in any negotiated settlement of the crisis. Behind the scenes, they may put some quiet pressure on the Iraqis to accept a negotiated settlement which would allow them limited territorial gains.

5. If the Iraqis press on they may succeed in taking over the oil-producing province of Khuzestan and in setting up a nominally independent 'Arabistan' with a regime sympathetic to Baghdad. It would then be a major Soviet objective to gain influence over the new regime.

6. An Iraqi take-over of Khuzestan could well be accompanied by nationalist risings in areas of Iran such as Kurdistan and Azerbaijan. If a pro-Soviet grouping with a reasonable degree of popular backing were to emerge in Azerbaijan and request Soviet assistance the Russians would find it difficult to refuse. But they would see the establishment of a puppet republic in Iranian Azerbaijan, or more ambitious moves to take parts of Iran, in the light of their major objective of increasing their influence over Iran as a whole. If the cost of a lesser move were to decrease the chances of attaining the major prize the Russians might restrain themselves. But if the chance of attaining the major prize was deemed slight, the lesser moves might be undertaken.

7. Were the Iranian regime to seek Soviet military assistance, the Russians would find themselves in a dilemma. They would be offered the opportunity of an internationally defensible military intervention with the prospect of eventual control, either directly or by proxy, of Iranian oil. But the cost would be correspondingly high: the risk of confrontation with the US, and the alienation of Iraq and other Arab states. On balance, we doubt whether the Russians would embark on such a course.

8. If Iran suffered a humiliating defeat at the hands of the Iraqis, which led to the disintegration of the Khomeini regime, the Russians would face a new set of problems. A collapse of the regime could lead to a military take over, anarchy or civil war. In the short term the Russians would probably be content to settle for the first: the risks would be less, and they would hope to be able to extend their influence in the longer term.





9. The Russians must also consider how they would react to any US move to protect its interests in the area. If there were an attempt by Iran to close the Straits of Hormuz, and the US were to take naval or other military measures to keep the Straits open, the Russians would probably recognise this to be in pursuit of a vital Western interest and would confine their response to a propaganda and diplomatic onslaught. Much, however, would depend on how the Arabs reacted.

#### Conclusions

10. By maintaining a reasonably even-handed attitude to the Iran/Iraq crisis, the Russians can hope:

- (i) to minimise the risk of a major East-West crisis in the run up to the US elections;
- (ii) to avoid damaging their relations with the Arabs and other Islamic countries (particularly important post-Afghanistan); and
- (iii) to keep their longer term options open.

A successful Soviet effort to promote a settlement - like Tashkent in 1966 - would be a triumph and would greatly increase Soviet influence in the area. But the Russians will undertake one only if they can be confident of success, and may be more concerned to ensure that they are not excluded from any international peace-making efforts in which the US is involved. In short, they may see greater scope for extending their influence in the longer term if the present crisis can be played in a relatively low key.

EASTERN EUROPEAN & SOVIET DEPARTMENT

29 September 1980

IRAN/IRAQ

ADVANCE COPIES

22 21

PS

PS/SIR I GILMOUR

PS/MR HURD

PS/PUS

SIR E YOUDE

SIR J GRAHAM

MR J C MOBERLY

MR BRAITHEWAITE

HD/MED

HD/NENAD

HD/UND

HD/CONS D

CONSULAR EMERGENCY UNIT

HD/ES & SD

HD/MAED

HD/DEF D

PUSD (2)

NEWS D

SIR A. AGLAND

~~RESIDENT CLERK~~

NO 10 DOWNING STREET

CABINET OFFICE DIO

IMMEDIATE

CONFIDENTIAL

FM JEDDA 290954Z SEP 80

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 711 OF 29 SEPTEMBER

INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON, MUSCAT, AMMAN, BAGHDAD.

WASHINGTON TELNO 4129: IRAQ/IRAN

1. THE AMERICAN AMBASSADOR WILL CARRY OUT HIS INSTRUCTIONS TODAY AT 15.30 GMT WITH PRINCE FAHD IN TAIF. HE WILL BRIEF ME ON THE RESPONSE TOMORROW.
2. THE SAUDIS ARE BY NOW AWARE OF THE IRAQI APPROACH TO OMAN. THE AMERICANS BRIEFED PRINCE SULTAN ABOUT IT YESTERDAY SO THAT HE COULD BRIEF PRINCE FAHD IN PREPARATION FOR THIS EVENING'S MEETING. GENERAL DAVID JONES, CHAIRMAN OF JOINT DEFENCE STAFFS, WILL BE WITH THE AMBASSADOR. HE HAPPENS TO BE HERE ON A ROUTINE VISIT ARRANGED SOME TIME AGO.
3. YOU WILL BE AWARE FROM MY DA'S REPORTING THAT IRAQI AIRCRAFT HAVE <sup>been</sup> SIGHTED ON THE GROUND AT RIYADH AND TAIF.

CRAIG



IRAN/IRAQ

ADVANCE COPIES

28

PS  
PS/SIR I GILMOUR  
PS/MR HURD  
PS/PUS  
SIR E YOUDE  
SIR J GRAHAM  
MR J C MOBERLY  
MR BRAITHEWAITE  
HD/MED  
HD/NENAD  
HD/UND  
HD/CONS D  
CONSULAR EMERGENCY UNIT  
HD/ES & SD  
HD/MAED  
HD/DEF D  
PUSD (2)  
NEWS D  
SIR A ACLAND  
RESIDENT CLERK

NO 10 DOWNING STREET  
CABINET OFFICE DIO (2)

ms

GR 270

RESTRICTED

FM BAGHDAD 291028Z SEP 80

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 452 OF 29/9/80

AND IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK

INFO PRIORITY KUWAIT, JEDDA, DAMASCUS, AMMAN, ANKARA, MOSCOW, WASHINGTON, ABU DHABI AND MUSCAT.

IRAQ/IRAN: MY TEL NO 432 (NOT TO ALL)

1. IN A SPEECH TO THE NATION BROADCAST ON THE EVENING OF 28 SEPTEMBER PRESIDENT SADDAM HUSSAIN ANNOUNCED THAT IRAQ WAS READY TO END THE FIGHTING AND TO BEGIN NEGOTIATIONS. IRAQ WAS PREPARED TO NEGOTIATE DIRECTLY, THROUGH A THIRD PARTY OR THROUGH ANY INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATION IN WHICH IT HAD CONFIDENCE IN ORDER TO REACH A JUST AND HONOURABLE SOLUTION THAT WOULD GUARANTEE IRAQ RIGHTS OF SOVEREIGNTY.

2. IRAQ WOULD NOT BE TEMPTED BY ITS STRENGTH OR BY ITS VICTORIES TO IMPOSE UNJUST CONDITIONS. BUT IT DEMANDED THE FOLLOWING:

(A) THE IRANIAN GOVERNMENT'S OPEN, DE JURE AND DE FACTO, RECOGNITION OF IRAQ'S LEGITIMATE HISTORICAL RIGHTS TO ITS LAND AND WATERS;

(B) THE IRANIAN GOVERNMENT'S ADHERENCE TO A POLICY OF GOOD NEIGHBOURLINESS AND RENUNCIATION OF RACISM, AGGRESSION AND

(B) THE IRANIAN GOVERNMENT'S ADHERENCE TO A POLICY OF GOOD NEIGHBOURLINESS AND RENUNCIATION OF RACISM, AGGRESSION AND EXPANSIONISM, AS WELL AS ALL ATTEMPTS TO INTERFERE IN THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE REGION:

(C) THE RETURN OF "EVERY INCH OF USURPED IRAQI LAND AND THE OBSERVANCE OF IRAQI AND ARAB RIGHTS ON THIS BASIS."

(D) RESPECT BY IRAN FOR INTERNATIONAL LAWS, CONVENTIONS AND TREATIES.

3. AFTER A DIGRESSION ABOUT IRAQ'S DESIRE TO LIVE IN PEACE AND FRIENDSHIP WITH IRAN, SADDAM CALLED ON THE IRANIAN GOVERNMENT TO END ITS OCCUPATION OF THE THREE GULF ISLANDS SEIZED BY THE SHAH. IT IS NOT QUITE CLEAR, HOWEVER, WHETHER THIS IS A SPELLING OUT OF CONDITION (C) ABOVE, OR AN ATTEMPT TO PLAY TO THE ARAB GALLERY.

4. A MORE DETAILED ACCOUNT OF THE SPEECH, TAKEN FROM THE ARABIC TEXT, WILL FOLLOW SHORTLY.

EGERTON

NNNN



28

DWF  
G 132/29

LFH 223/29

CO FCO (DESKBY 291500Z)

IRAN/IRAQ

ADVANCE COPIES 22

PS  
PS/SIR I GILMOUR  
PS/MR HURD  
PS/PUS  
SIR E YOUDE  
SIR J GRAHAM  
MR J C MOBERLY  
MR BRAITHWAITE  
HD/MED  
HD/MENAD  
HD/UND  
ED/CONS D  
CONSULAR EMERGENCY UNIT  
HD/ES & SD  
HD/MAED  
HD/DEF D  
PUSD (2)  
NEWS D

*See it ALLAND*

NO 10 DOWNING STREET  
CABINET OFFICE DIO

~~RESIDENT CLERK~~

SECRET UK COMMS ONLY

SIC

GR 350

SECRET UK COMMS ONLY

FM MUSCAT 291350Z SEPT 80

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 276 OF 29 SEPTEMBER 80

AND TO IMMEDIATE MODUK, WASHINGTON UKNMIS NEW YORK BAGHDAD JEDDA  
BAHRAIN KUWAIT ABU DHABI DUBAI DOHA

IMMEDIATE

IRAN/IRAQ

YOU WILL NOW HAVE SEEN FROM A MESSAGE ON OTHER CHANNELS (NOT TO ALL) THAT THE IMMEDIATE DANGER OF AN IRAQI OPERATION MOUNTED FROM OMAN MAY NOW BE SUBSIDING AS A RESULT OF A DECISION BY THE IRAQIS THEMSELVES THAT THE LOGISTICS WERE TOO UNCERTAIN. UNTIL THE IRAQI AIR FORCE UNITS CURRENTLY HERE ARE REMOVED, WE CANNOT BE CERTAIN THAT THEY WILL NOT THINK AGAIN AND WE SHALL REPORT

BE CERTAIN THAT THEY WILL NOT THINK AGAIN AND WE SHALL REPORT ANY AIR MOVEMENTS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

2. IF THE ABOVE PROVES CORRECT, IT LOOKS AS THOUGH A VERY SATISFACTORY WAY OUT OF THE IMPASSE MAY HAVE BEEN FOUND; THE OMANIS WILL BE ABLE TO CLAIM TO HAVE DEMONSTRATED THEIR ARAB CREDENTIALS TO THE FULL BY OFFERING THE IRAQIS THE ASSISTANCE REQUESTED ONLY TO HAVE THE LATTER DECLINE THEIR HELP AT THE LAST MOMENT. THEY MIGHT ALSO IF THEY WISH CLAIM TO HAVE STOOD UP TO BE COUNTED IN THE FACE OF WESTERN ADVICE TO THE CONTRARY. IN ADDITION THE IRANIANS MAY BELIEVE THAT THEIR WARNINGS ABOUT ARAB GULF STATES ASSISTING THE IRAQIS HAVE HAD SOME EFFECT.

3. MY U.S. COLLEAGUE TELLS ME THAT THE AMERICANS WILL NOT NOW BE DELIVERING PRESIDENT CARTER'S MESSAGE TO QABOOS AND THAT THEY WILL TRY TO AVOID RUBBING OMANI NOSES IN THE DIRT. IT WOULD BE PLEASING TO THINK THAT QABOOS HAD LISTENED TO OUR ADVICE BUT THIS MAY NOT HAVE BEEN A DECISIVE FACTOR.

IT MAY HOWEVER BE RELEVANT THAT WE HAVE HEARD THAT THE SULTAN HAS BEEN MOST DISPLEASED BY SUGGESTIONS THAT THE OMANI AIR DEFENCES MIGHT NOT HAVE BEEN UP TO MARK AGAINST THE DEGREE OF RETALIATION ENVISAGED SEMI COLON SO THERE IS REASON TO BELIEVE THAT OUR MESSAGE (AND POSSIBLY WARNINGS BY HIS AIR FORCE COMMANDER) HAVE BEEN HEDED.

4. WE SHALL OF COURSE CONTINUE TO WATCH DEVELOPMENTS CLOSELY. FOR THE FUTURE I BELIEVE THAT THE OMANI HANDLING OF THIS POTENTIALLY GRAVE CRISIS (WHICH HAS TO A LARGE EXTENT REINFORCED MISGIVINGS OVER THEIR "SHOOT FROM THE HIP" APPROACH TO PREVIOUS PROBLEMS, E.G. THE INITIATIVE ON PROTECTION OF THE STRAITS OF HORMUZ LAST YEAR) INDICATES A NEED FOR REASSESSMENT OF OUR HANDLING OF THIS REGIME. THE OTHER GULF STATES WHATEVER OUR MISGIVINGS ABOUT THEIR POLICIES IN GENERAL APPEAR FROM HERE TO BE HANDLING THIS PARTICULAR CRISIS IN A MUCH MORE REALISTIC MANNER.

TUNNEL

BT

IMMEDIATE

NNNN

CONFIDENTIAL



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

29 September 1980

Dear Michael,

I enclose the paper on Soviet attitudes which it was agreed at Chequers yesterday the FCO should prepare for this afternoon's meeting on the Iran/Iraq conflict.

I am sending a copy of this letter and enclosure to PS/Secretary of State for Defence, PS/Secretary of State for Energy, and to Sir Robert Armstrong.

*For me  
GGH*

(G G H Walden)  
Private Secretary

M O'D B Alexander Esq  
10 Downing Street  
London

CONFIDENTIAL



## SOVIET ATTITUDE TO THE IRAN/IRAQ CONFLICT

1. Soviet policy in the Middle East aims to extend Soviet influence while avoiding military confrontation with the US. The Soviet Union has a long-term interest in securing a share of Middle East oil supplies but recognises that access to Middle East oil is a vital Western interest of which it must take account.

2. The current conflict places the Soviet Union in a difficult position. It has a friendship treaty with Iraq<sup>(i)</sup> and is that country's main supplier of arms. It will wish to avoid putting pressure on Iraq of a kind which would put at risk its influence in Baghdad and antagonise other Arabs. It will also be conscious of the need to be seen to live up to its treaty commitments. However, one of the Soviet Union's major objectives in the Gulf Area is to gain a high degree of influence in Iran. While its efforts to get on terms with the Khomeini regime have been unsuccessful, it may be reluctant to see a breakdown of government in Iran and a struggle for power while the Tudeh Party is too weak to have a decisive say in the outcome.

3. So far, while maintaining normal arms supplies to Iraq, and acknowledging their treaty obligations, the Russians have been reasonably even handed in their attitude to the conflict between Iraq and Iran. Mr Gromyko assured Mr Muskie in New York on 25 September that the Russians would not intervene as long as others did not.

Possible Scenarios

4. If the fighting between Iran and Iraq remains at a fairly low level the Russians are likely to maintain their present attitude. They might offer to mediate in the dispute, but only if they thought this could be done successfully. They would in any case hope to be

---

(i) The Soviet Iran Treaty of 1921 is not of the same degree of relevance. The Iranians have denounced it, and the Russians could use it to justify military intervention only if they could plausibly claim that Iranian territory was being used to threaten the Soviet Union.

associated as much as the United States in any negotiated settlement of the crisis. Behind the scenes, they may put some quiet pressure on the Iraqis to accept a negotiated settlement which would allow them limited territorial gains.

5. If the Iraqis press on they may succeed in taking over the oil-producing province of Khuzestan and in setting up a nominally independent 'Arabistan' with a regime sympathetic to Baghdad. It would then be a major Soviet objective to gain influence over the new regime.

6. An Iraqi take-over of Khuzestan could well be accompanied by nationalist risings in areas of Iran such as Kurdistan and Azerbaijan. If a pro-Soviet grouping with a reasonable degree of popular backing were to emerge in Azerbaijan and request Soviet assistance the Russians would find it difficult to refuse. But they would see the establishment of a puppet republic in Iranian Azerbaijan, or more ambitious moves to take parts of Iran, in the light of their major objective of increasing their influence over Iran as a whole. If the cost of a lesser move were to decrease the chances of attaining the major prize the Russians might restrain themselves. But if the chance of attaining the major prize was deemed slight, the lesser moves might be undertaken.

7. Were the Iranian regime to seek Soviet military assistance, the Russians would find themselves in a dilemma. They would be offered the opportunity of an internationally defensible military intervention with the prospect of eventual control, either directly or by proxy, of Iranian oil. But the cost would be correspondingly high: the risk of confrontation with the US, and the alienation of Iraq and other Arab states. On balance, we doubt whether the Russians would embark on such a course.

8. If Iran suffered a humiliating defeat at the hands of the Iraqis, which led to the distintegration of the Khomeini regime, the Russians would face a new set of problems. A collapse of the regime could lead to a military take over, anarchy or civil war. In the short term the Russians would probably be content to settle for the first: the risks would be less, and they would hope to be able to extend their influence in the longer term.

9. The Russians must also consider how they would react to any US move to protect its interests in the area. If there were an attempt by Iran to close the Straits of Hormuz, and the US were to take naval or other military measures to keep the Straits open, the Russians would probably recognise this to be in pursuit of a vital Western interest and would confine their response to a propaganda and diplomatic onslaught. Much, however, would depend on how the Arabs reacted.

#### Conclusions

10. By maintaining a reasonably even-handed attitude to the Iran/Iraq crisis, the Russians can hope:

- (i) to minimise the risk of a major East-West crisis in the run up to the US elections;
- (ii) to avoid damaging their relations with the Arabs and other Islamic countries (particularly important post-Afghanistan); and
- (iii) to keep their longer term options open.

A successful Soviet effort to promote a settlement - like Tashkent in 1966 - would be a triumph and would greatly increase Soviet influence in the area. But the Russians will undertake one only if they can be confident of success, and may be more concerned to ensure that they are not excluded from any international peace-making efforts in which the US is involved. In short, they may see greater scope for extending their influence in the longer term if the present crisis can be played in a relatively low key.

EASTERN EUROPEAN & SOVIET DEPARTMENT

29 September 1980



IRAN/IRAQ

IMMEDIATE

ADVANCE COPIES

22

ADVANCE COPY

PS  
PS/SIR I GILMOUR  
PS/MR HURD  
PS/PUS  
SIR E YOUDE  
SIR J GRAHAM  
MR J C MOBERLY  
MR BRAITHEWAITE  
HD/MED  
HD/MENAD  
HD/UND  
HD/CONS D  
CONSULAR EMERGENCY UNIT  
HD/ES & SD  
HD/MAED  
HD/DEF D  
PUSD (2)  
NEWS D

~~NO 10 DOWNING STREET~~  
CABINET OFFICE DIO.

*Sir: it ALLAND*

~~RESIDENT CLERK~~

GRS 327

CONFIDENTIAL

FM DOHA 290603Z SEP 80

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 137 OF 28 SEPTEMBER

INFO PRIORITY MUSCAT, ABU DHABI, DUBAI, BAHRAIN, BAGHDAD, KUWAIT  
AND JEDDA.

IRAN/IRAQ.

1. THE AMIR ASKED ME TO CALL YESTERDAY EVENING TO BRIEF HIM ON DEVELOPMENTS. HE WAS CHEERFUL AND RELAXED SEMI CLN BUT HE EXPRESSED CONCERN ABOUT THE EXTENT TO WHICH CURRENT HOSTILITIES WOULD COME TO AFFECT THE GULF AS A WHOLE, AND QATAR IN PARTICULAR. HE QUESTIONED ME CLOSELY ON HOW WE SAW THE SOVIET ATTITUDE, AND WHETHER U.S. NAVAL UNITS WERE LIKELY TO INTERVENE IN ANY HOSTILITIES AT THE MOUTH OF THE GULF. HIS MAIN FEAR, UNDERSTANDABLY, GIVEN THE LOCATION OF QATAR'S OFFSHORE OIL-FIELDS, WAS THAT ANY MILITARY ACTION MOUNTED AGAINST IRAN FROM THE ARAB SIDE OF THE GULF MIGHT PROMPT THE IRANIANS TO GENERAL AND IRRESPONSIBLE REPRISALS AGAINST OFFSHORE ARAB OIL INSTALLATIONS ALL ALONG THE GULF. HE WAS AWARE THAT THE IRAQIS MIGHT WELL BE UP TO SOMETHING: THEY HAD APPROACHED HIM TWO DAYS AGO FOR (UNSPECIFIED) "FACILITIES" FOR THEIR FORCES - WHICH HE HAD REFUSED. THE QATARIS HAD SPOTTED THE TWO IRAQI MILITARY HELICOPTERS SNEAKING ALONG THEIR FRONTIER WITH SAUDI ARABIA AS THEY

MOUNTED AGAINST IRAN FROM THE ARAB SIDE OF THE GULF MIGHT PROMPT THE IRANIANS TO GENERAL AND IRRESPONSIBLE REPRISALS AGAINST OFFSHORE ARAB OIL INSTALLATIONS ALL ALONG THE GULF. HE WAS AWARE THAT THE IRAQIS MIGHT WELL BE UP TO SOMETHING: THEY HAD APPROACHED HIM TWO DAYS AGO FOR (UNSPECIFIED) "FACILITIES" FOR THEIR FORCES - WHICH HE HAD REFUSED. THE QATARIS HAD SPOTTED THE TWO IRAQI MILITARY HELICOPTERS, SNEAKING ALONG THEIR FRONTIER WITH SAUDI ARABIA, AS THEY MADE FOR THE EMIRATES AND SEEB. THE GOVERNMENT HERE HAD ALSO RECEIVED REPORTS THAT SAQR OF SHARJAH MIGHT BE PLAYING A DOUBLE GAME.

2. I BELIEVE THAT I REASSURED HIM ABOUT YOUR READING OF SOVIET INTENTIONS. I LEFT A COPY OF THE AMENDED JIC SUMMARY IN YOUR TEL. 513 TO MOSCOW, WHICH DEALS WITH THIS POINT, WITH HIS CHEF DE CABINET, FOR TRANSLATION AND STUDY. THE AMIR ALSO EXPRESSED UNCERTAINTIES INITIALLY ABOUT U.S. INTENTIONS: MY U.S. COLLEAGUE WILL BE TAKING UP THE RUNNING ON THAT POINT.

3. I AM TO SEE THE AMIR AGAIN ON 30 SEPTEMBER WITH MR JENKIN, AND CAN THEN PASS ON ANY FURTHER ASSESSMENT BY H M GOVERNMENT. IN THE MEANTIME THERE HAS BEEN NO MILITARY PREPERATIONS OF ANY KIND HERE: GHQ ARE TOO BUSY DIGESTING THEIR ARMS DEALS WITH OURSELVES AND THE FRENCH EXCLAMATION.

4. IRONICALLY, AT HIS REQUEST MY IRAQI COLLEAGUE HAD FOLLOWED ME IN TO SEE THE AMIR. I LEARNED LATER FROM THE CHEF DE CABINET THAT HE CONVEYED THE DOUBTLESS WELCOME AND RELIEVING MESSAGE TO THE AMIR THAT THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT UNDERSTOOD AND ACCEPTED HIS ATTITUDE OVER "FACILITIES". SO I ASSUME THAT THESE COULD NOT HAVE BEEN VITAL TO WHATEVER PLANS THEY MAY HAVE LAID FOR ACTION IN THE LOWER GULF.

BRANT.

NNNN



Subject

PRIME MINISTER'S  
PERSONAL MESSAGE  
SERIAL No. T189/80

ZZ 281610Z SEP 80  
BONN FROM LONDON  
SECRET GOVERNMENTAL 0022

BT  
MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO CHANCELLOR SCHMIDT

DEAR HELMUT,

I SHOULD HAVE LIKED TO TALK TO YOU ON THE TELEPHONE ABOUT THE VERY SERIOUS SITUATION IN THE GULF BUT I KNOW HOW BUSY YOU MUST BE WITH YOUR ELECTION CAMPAIGN. I AM THEREFORE SENDING YOU THIS MESSAGE INSTEAD.

APART FROM THE FIGHTING BETWEEN IRAQ AND IRAN AT THE HEAD OF THE GULF, WITH ITS POTENTIAL EFFECTS ON OIL SUPPLIES, WE NOW HAVE REASON TO BELIEVE THAT THERE IS A POSSIBILITY OF MILITARY ACTION AT THE SOUTHERN END OF THE GULF. THIS COULD LEAD TO THE CLOSURE OF THE STRAITS OF HORMUZ TO ALL OIL TRAFFIC INTO AND OUT OF THE GULF, WITH THE GRAVEST REPERCUSSIONS FOR US ALL. OBVIOUSLY IT IS IMPORTANT THAT NONE OF US SHOULD SAY ANYTHING ABOUT THIS IN PUBLIC, FOR FEAR OF DAMAGING CONFIDENCE IN THE OIL MARKETS AND EVEN OF PRECIPITATING EVENTS WHICH WE ALL WISH TO AVOID. THE AMERICANS AND WE ARE DOING WHAT WE CAN BEHIND THE SCENES TO ENSURE THAT THESE DANGERS ARE UNDERSTOOD IN THE REGION, AND I AM SUGGESTING TO PRESIDENT GISCARD THAT HE MIGHT CONSIDER THE DISCREET USE OF FRENCH INFLUENCE WITH THE IRAQIS IN THE SAME DIRECTION.

THESE DEVELOPMENTS UNDERLINE THE NEED FOR CLOSE AND CONTINUING QUADRIPARTITE CONSULTATION ABOUT THE SITUATION. YOU WILL HAVE HEARD FROM HERR GENSCHER OF THE PROPOSAL THAT A QUADRIPARTITE CONSULTATIVE GROUP SHOULD BE ESTABLISHED IN PARIS. I HAVE TOLD PRESIDENT GISCARD THAT I THINK THIS IS AN EXCELLENT IDEA, AND I HAVE EXPRESSED MY HOPE THAT THE GROUP CAN MEET URGENTLY. WE ARE READY TO SEND A REPRESENTATIVE TO PARIS IMMEDIATELY A MEETING IS CONVENED.

WITH WARM PERSONAL REGARDS.

MARGARET THATCHER

SENT AT 1709 2/28



MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO CHANCELLOR SCHMIDT

Dear Helmut,

I should have liked to talk to you on the telephone about the very serious situation in the Gulf but I know how busy you must be with your election campaign. I am therefore sending you this message instead.

Apart from the fighting between Iraq and Iran at the head of the Gulf, with its potential effects on oil supplies, we now have reason to believe that there is a possibility of military action at the southern end of the Gulf. This could lead to the closure of the Straits of Hormuz to all oil traffic into and out of the Gulf, with the gravest repercussions for us all. Obviously it is important that none of us should say anything about this in public, for fear of damaging confidence in the oil markets and even of precipitating events which we all wish to avoid. The Americans and we are doing what we can behind the scenes to ensure that these dangers are understood in the region, and I am suggesting to President Giscard that he might consider the discreet use of French influence with the Iraqis in the same direction.

These developments underline the need for close and continuing quadripartite consultation about the situation. You will have heard from Herr Genscher of the proposal that a Quadripartite Consultative Group should be established in Paris. I have told President Giscard that I think this is an excellent idea, and I have expressed my hope that the Group can meet urgently. We are ready to send a representative to Paris immediately a meeting is convened.

With warm personal regards.

MARGARET THATCHER

SUBJECT

26

PRIME MINISTER'S  
PERSONAL MESSAGE

SERIAL No. T188/80

ZZ 281547Z SEP  
PARIS FROM LONDON  
SECRET GOVERNMENTAL 0022  
BT

MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO PRESIDENT GISCARD.

MY DEAR PRESIDENT,

THANK YOU FOR YOUR MESSAGE OF 25 SEPTEMBER ABOUT YOUR MEETING WITH M. TAREQ AZIZ. I AM GRATEFUL TO YOU FOR HAVING KEPT ME INFORMED. IT IS CLEARLY IMPORTANT THAT WE SHOULD KEEP IN THE CLOSEST POSSIBLE TOUCH AS THE SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST DEVELOPS.

THE POSITION IS IF ANYTHING MORE WORRYING NOW THAN WHEN YOU SENT YOUR MESSAGE. YOU WILL HAVE LEARNT, THROUGH OUR AMBASSADOR, OF THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT'S PLAN TO LAUNCH AN ATTACK, USING OMANI FACILITIES, AGAINST THE TUMBS AND ABU MUZA AND POSSIBLY AGAINST BANDAR ABBAS. SUCH AN OPERATION, WHICH MAY WELL BE IMMINENT, WOULD BE BOUND TO HAVE THE GRAVEST REPERCUSSIONS FOR US ALL. WE OURSELVES, WHO HAVE A PARTICULAR CONCERN BECAUSE OF THE PRESENCE OF BRITISH SERVICE PERSONNEL IN OMAN, HAVE BEEN URGING CAUTION ON THE OMANIS. I BELIEVE THAT THE AMERICANS ARE DOING LIKEWISE AND THAT THEY ARE MAKING REPRESENTATIONS IN JEDDA AND AMMAN.

IT IS DIFFICULT TO JUDGE WHETHER THE OMANIS WILL DRAW BACK. THEY MAY CONSIDER THEMSELVES COMMITTED TO THE IRAQIS. BUT I GATHER THAT THERE ARE SOME SIGNS THAT THE IRAQI'S THEMSELVES MAY BE HAVING SECOND THOUGHTS. I WONDER, WHETHER YOU HAVE BEEN CONSIDERING MAKING AN APPROACH DIRECT TO BAGHDAD. I NOTE FROM YOUR MESSAGE THAT THE IRAQIS WERE SAYING ON THURSDAY THAT QUOTE AT THAT STAGE UNQUOTE THEY HAD NO INTENTION OF UNDERTAKING MILITARY OPERATIONS AGAINST THE GULF ISLANDS. THIS MIGHT OFFER A BASIS ON WHICH TO GO BACK TO THEM AND URGE RESTRAINT.

IF YOU DECIDE TO DO SO, I SHOULD BE GRATEFUL IF YOU WOULD BE GOOD ENOUGH NOT TO REVEAL THAT WE HAD DIRECT KNOWLEDGE OF IRAQI INTENTIONS THROUGH THE OMANIS. THERE HAS, OF COURSE, BEEN A GREAT DEAL OF PRESS SPECULATION ABOUT POSSIBLE MILITARY ACTION AT THE SOUTHERN END OF THE GULF. MOVEOVER THE IRAQIS MUST ASSUME THAT THEIR AIRCRAFT MOVEMENTS WILL HAVE BEEN OBSERVED.

THESE DEVELOPMENTS UNDERLINE, IN MY VIEW, THE NEED FOR CLOSE AND CONTINUING QUADRIPARTITE CONSULTATION ABOUT THE SITUATION WHICH HAS ARISEN. YOU WILL HAVE HEARD FROM M. FRANCOIS PONCET OF THE PROPOSAL THAT A QUADRIPARTITE CONSULTATIVE GROUP SHOULD BE ESTABLISHED IN PARIS. THIS SEEMS TO ME TO BE AN EXCELLENT IDEA. I WOULD HOPE, IF YOU AGREE, THAT THE GROUP COULD MEET URGENTLY. WE ARE READY TO SEND A REPRESENTATIVE TO PARIS IMMEDIATELY A MEETING IS CONVENED. I PLAN TO BE IN TOUCH WITH HELMUT SCHMIDT ABOUT THIS LATER TODAY.

YOURS SINCERELY

MARGARET THATCHER.

BT

Sent at 16:11 2/38 Perm.



MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO PRESIDENT GISCARD

MY DEAR PRESIDENT,

Thank you for your message of 25 September about your meeting with M. Tareq Aziz. I am grateful to you for having kept me informed. It is clearly important that we should keep in the closest possible touch as the situation in the Middle East develops.

The position is if anything more worrying now than when you sent your message. You will have learnt, through our Ambassador, of the Iraqi Government's plan to launch an attack, using Omani facilities, against the Tums and Abu Muza and possibly against Bandar Abas<sup>b</sup>. Such an operation, which may well be imminent, would be bound to have the gravest repercussions for us all. We ourselves, who have a particular concern because of the presence of British service personnel in Oman, have been urging caution on the Omanis. I believe that the Americans are doing likewise and that they are making representations in Jedda and Amman.

It is difficult to judge whether the Omanis will draw back. They may consider themselves committed to the Iraqis. But I gather that there are some signs that the Iraqis themselves may be having second thoughts. I wonder, whether you have been considering making an approach direct to Baghdad. I note from your message that the Iraqis were saying on ~~Wednesday~~<sup>THURSDAY</sup> that "at that stage" they had no intention of undertaking military operations against the Gulf Islands. This might offer a basis on which to go back to them and urge restraint.

If you decide to do so, I should be grateful if you would be good enough not to reveal that we had direct knowledge of Iraqi intentions through the Omanis. There has, of course, been a great deal of press speculation about possible military action at the Southern end of the Gulf. Moreover the Iraqis must assume that their aircraft movements will have been observed.

/These



These developments underline, in my view, the need for close and continuing quadripartite consultation about the ~~critical~~ situation which has arisen. You will have heard from M. Francois Poncet of the proposal that a Quadripartite Consultative Group should be established in Paris. This seems to me to be an excellent idea. I would hope, if you agree, that the Group could meet urgently. We ~~here stand~~ <sup>ARE</sup> ready to send a representative to Paris immediately a meeting is convened. I plan to be in touch with Helmut Schmidt about this later today.

Yours sincerely

Margaret Thatcher.

AM

28 September, 1980

FLASH

④

~~XXXX~~  
25

IRAN/IRAQ

ADVANCE COPY

ADVANCE COPIES

22 28

PS  
PS/SIR I GILMOUR  
PS/MR HURD  
PS/PUS  
SIR E YOUDE  
SIR J GRAHAM  
MR J C MOBERLY  
MR BRAITHWAITE  
HD/MED  
HD/NENAD  
HD/UND  
HD/CONS D  
CONSULAR EMERGENCY UNIT  
HD/ES & SD  
HD/MAED  
HD/DEF D  
PUSD (2)  
NEWS D

NO 10 DOWNING STREET  
CABINET OFFICE DIO

*Prime Minister*

*29-9-80*

RESIDENT CLERK

*S. A. Adair*

*M. Adams*

FM MODUK  
TO RBDWDFG/BRITDEFAT MUSCAT  
INFO RBDWDFA/FCO LONDON  
RBDWW/PRODROME WASHINGTON

BT  
SECRET  
SIC 13D

FOLLOWING INFO REQUIRED BY 280800Z SEP BY DIPTTEL TO FCO AND  
MODUK AND INFO WASHINGTON  
1. SOAF ALFA BREAKDOWN OF NUMBER OF PILOTS FOR JAGUAR, HUNTER AND  
STRIKEMASTER AIRCRAFT IN OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE ROLE BY LSP,  
CONTRACT AND OMANI PILOTS.  
BRAVO. ARMAMENTS. DETAILS OF WEAPON LOADS BY TYPE IN PARTICULAR  
AIR TO AIR MISSILES  
2. ANTI-AIRCRAFT DEFENCE NUMBER OF BRITISH PERS INVOLVED IN  
WEAPONS IN GROUND TO AIR ROLE AND ASSESSMENT OF RAPIER  
OPERATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS

BT

IRAN/IRAQ

*Mufaxed*

(A)

ADVANCE COPIES

~~22~~ 33

PS  
 PS/SIR I GILMOUR  
 PS/MR HURD  
 PS/PUS  
 SIR E YOUDE  
 SIR J GRAHAM  
 MR J C MOBERLY  
 MR BRAITHEWAITE  
 HD/MED  
 HD/MENAD  
 HD/UND  
 HD/CONS D  
 CONSULAR EMERGENCY UNIT  
 HD/ES & SD  
 HD/MAED  
 HD/DEF D  
 PUSD (2)  
 NEWS D  
 RESIDENT CLERK

NO 10 DOWNING STREET  
 CABINET OFFICE DIO

*5*  
*4*

*si A Ahmad*

*noDBA informed*

GRS 1250  
 SECRET UK COMMS ONLY  
 FLASH FCO  
 FLASH MODUK  
 FLASH CINC FLEET  
 FLASH BAGHDAD  
 FLASH MUSCAT  
 FLASH WASHINGTON  
 ABU DHABI DESKBY 281800Z SEP  
 BAHRAIN DESKBY 281800Z SEP  
 DOHA DESKBY 281800Z SEP  
 DUBAI DESKBY 281800Z SEP  
 JEDDA DESKBY 281800Z SEP  
 KUWAIT DESKBY 281800Z SEP  
 UKMIS NEWYORK DESKBY 281800Z  
 WASHINGTON DESKBY 281800Z SEP  
 FM AMMAN 281600Z SEP 30  
 TO FLASH FCO

**FLASH**

TELEGRAM NUMBER 363 OF 28 SEP  
 INFO FLASH MODUK (FOR COSSEC, DI4 AND DNOT - MODUK PSE PASS),  
 CINC FLEET, BAGHDAD, MUSCAT.  
 IMMEDIATE ABUDHABI, BAHRAIN, DOHA, DUBAI, JEDDA, KUWAIT, UKMIS  
 NEWYORK AND WASHINGTON



IMMEDIATE ABUDHABI, BAHRAIN, DOHA, DUBAI, JEDDA, KUWAIT, UKMIS  
NEW YORK AND WASHINGTON  
PRIORITY ANKARA, DAMASCUS AND TRIPOLI.

IRAN/IRAQ.

1. I WAS SUMMONED TO SEE KING HUSSEIN THIS AFTERNOON SEMICLN HE HAD SEEN THE US AMBASSADOR HALF AN HOUR PREVIOUSLY. THE KING SAID HE HAD SPOKEN ON THE TELEPHONE TO THE IRAQI PRESIDENT TODAY. PRESIDENT SADDAM HAD CLAIMED TO BE WELL SATISFIED WITH THE RESULT OF THE FIGHTING AND HAD SAID THAT, NOW THAT IRAQ'S MILITARY OBJECTIVES HAD BEEN LARGELY ACHIEVED, HE INTENDED OFFEREING IRAN I CEASEFIRE LATER TODAY. KING HUSSEIN SAID HE HAD TOLD PRESIDENT SADDAM THAT HE WOULD WARMLY WELCOME THIS.
2. REFERRING TO HIS OWN CONTACTS WITH OTHER ARAB LEADERS, KING HUSSEIN SAID KING KHALID WAS SUPPORTING IRAQ FULLY. SHEIKH ZAID OF ABU DHABI HAD ALSO OFFERED IRAQ ANY FINANCIAL OR OTHER HELP SHE NEEDED SEMI CLN HOWEVER WHEN PRESIDENT SADDAM HAD ASKED THROUGH KING HUSSEIN FOR THE LOAN OF SOME FRENCH MIRAGE AIRCRAFT SIMILAR TO THOSE IN THE IRAQI AIR FORCE, SHEIKH ZAID HAD SHIED AWAY AND OFFERED MONEY INSTEAD. SYRIA WAS BEING EXTREMELY DIFFICULT, REFUSING TO SUPPORT IRAQ AND CONTINUING TO ACCUSE JORDAN OF INTERFERENCE IN SYRIA'S INTERNAL AFFAIRS. HE HAD HAD SOME VERY DIFFICULT CONVERSATIONS WITH PRESIDENT ASSAD ON THE TELEPHONE IN WHICH "WE REALLY SHOUTED AT EACH OTHER." BUT HE CLAIMED THAT ASSAD HAD CALMED DOWN IN THE LAST DAY OR TWO. THE KING ALSO REFERRED TO IRAQI INTEREST IN THE USE OF OMANI AIRBASE FACILITIES AND HIS OWN INTERCESSION WITH SULTAN QABOOS ON BEHALF OF IRAQ. WHILE I WAS WITH HIM, KING HUSSEIN RECEIVED A TELEPHONE CALL FROM QABOOS TO SAY THAT HE WAS SENDING A EMISSARY TO AMMAN IMMEDIATELY, FROM WHICH THE KING DEDUCED THAT HE MIGHT BE HAVING SECOND THOUGHTS ABOUT OFFERING THE IRAQIS DIRECT MILITARY ASSISTANCE.
3. THE KING SAID HE DID NOT KNOW WHERE, FOR EXAMPLE, LIBYA AND ALGERIA NOW STOOD IN RELATION TO THE CONFLICT. BUT HE AND OTHER ARAB LEADERS HAD BEEN DISTURBED BY REPORTS THAT IRAN WAS SEEKING WEAPONS FROM MANY SOURCES, INCLUDING LIBYA (SEE ALSO PARAGRAPH 8 BELOW) AND EVEN THE UK, ALTHOUGH HE REALISED THAT SUCH REPORTS WERE PROBABLY WITHOUT FOUNDATIONS. I SAID I FELT QUITE SURE WE WOULD NOT BE WILLING TO ACCEDE TO SUCH REQUESTS EVEN IF WE HAD RECEIVED THEM. THE KING SAID HE HAD HAD NO DIRECT CONTACT WITH THE LIBYANS SINCE THE CONFLICT BEGAN.
4. I ASKED KING HUSSEIN WHETHER THE IRAQIS HAD ASKED JORDAN FOR ANY FORM OF MILITARY ASSISTANCE. THE KING SAID HE HAD NOT RECEIVED ANY SUCH REQUEST.
5. KING HUSSEIN EMPHASISED HIS FULL SUPPORT FOR WHAT IRAQ WAS TRYING TO ACHIEVE. THE JORDANIANS HAD CAREFULLY EXAMINED



5. KING HUSSEIN EMPHASISED HIS FULL SUPPORT FOR WHAT IRAQ WAS TRYING TO ACHIEVE. THE JORDANIANS HAD CAREFULLY EXAMINED THE HISTORICAL BASIS FOR THE IRAQI POSITION ON THE SHATT AND BELIEVED THE IRAQIS WERE FULLY JUSTIFIED IN THEIR CLAIMS. THE WHOLE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN IRAN AND THE ARAB STATES MUST BE PUT ON A NEW AND SOUNDER FOOTING, WITH AN END TO IRANIAN THREATS TO THE ARAB COUNTRIES OF THE REGION AND PRETENSIONS TO ACT AS A POLICEMEN FOR THE GULF. HE ALSO HOPED THAT THE FLEETS OF THE SUPERPOWERS COULD BE REMOVED FROM THE GULF AND THAT IT MIGHT CEASE TO BE AN AREA OF TENSION. I ASKED ABOUT THE TUNBS AND ABU MUSA SEMICLN THE KING SAID HE HOPED THESE MIGHT BE RETURNED TO THE ARABS TO WHOM THEY UNCOUBTEDLY BELONGED.

6. THE KING WENT ON TO REFER TO IRAQI IDEAS ABOUT THE FUTURE OF KHUZESTAN, WHICH THEY HAD FIRST RAISED WITH THE JORDANIAN PRIME MINISTER WHEN HE VISITED BAGHDAD EARLIER THIS WEEK AND WHICH PRESIDENT SADDAM HAD RAISED AGAIN WITH THE KING ON THE TELEPHONE YESTERDAY. THE IRAQI PRESIDENT CLAIMED OT HAVE NO TERRITORIAL AMBITIONS FOR IRAQ IN KHUZESTAN BUT WANTED, IN CONSULTATION WITH OTHER ARAB STATES, TO FIND SOME WAY OF ALLOWING THE INHABITANTS TO EXPRESS THEIR IDENTITY (HE RECALLED THAT KHUZESTAN WAS ONCE A SELF-RULING SHEIKHDOM, HAD BEEN RUTHLESSLY SUPPRESSED BY THE SHAH'S FATHER AND THAT THE DESCENDANT OF THE LAST ARAB FULER OF KHUZESTAN WAS NOW LIVING IN, HE THOUGHT, THE UAE). THE IRAQIS HAD NO FIXED IDEAS AND WERE PREPARED TO CONTEMPLATE AN ARAB SOLUTION OR AN AUTONOMOUS, SEMI-INDEPENDENT STATE WITHIN AN IRANIAN FRAMEWORK. THEIR THINKING WAS THAT, IF AS SEEMED QUITE LIKELY THE REST OF IRAN WERE EVENTUALLY TO FALL UNDER COMMUNIST RULE, IT SHOULD THEN PROVE POSSIBLE TO SALVAGE KHUZESTAN. PRESIDENT SADDAM MIGHT BE SENDING AN EMISSARY WITHIN THE NEXT DAY OR TWO TO A NUMBER OF ARAB STATES IN ORDER TO SOUND OUT THEIR VIEWS ON THESE IDEAS.

7. WHEN KING HUSSEIN INVITED MY COMMENTS, I EMPHASISED THAT I WAS WITHOUT INSTRUCTIONS BUT THAT SPEAKING PERSONALLY I FELT BOUND TO ADVISE HIM THAT ACCORDING TO OUR OWN BEST ESTIMATES THE IRANIAN AIR FORCE AND THE BULK OF THE IRANIAN NAVY WERE STILL OPERATIONAL SEMICLN ANY MOVES WHICH MIGHT SPREAD THE CONFLICT FURTHER DOWN THE GULF COULD THEREFORE HAVE THE MOST SERIOUS REPERCUSSIONS. I FELT SURE THAT HE AND THE OTHER ARAB LEADERS CONCERNED WOULD WEIGH THESE FACTORS VERY CAREFULLY IN CONSIDERING ANY MOVES THEY MIGHT BE CONSIDERING. I WENT ON TO SUGGEST THAT ARAB IDEAS FOR AN AUTONOMOUS OR INDEPENDENT KHUZESTAN, IF THEY BECAME KNOWN, WOULD ONLY BE LIKELY TO PROLONG THE CONFLICT SEMICLN THE KING SAID HE ENTIRELY AGREED. I SAID THAT THE ESSENTIAL THING SEEMED TO ME TO BE TO IMPLEMENT A CEASEFIRE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE AND TO DO NOTHING IN THE MEANWHILE WHICH MIGHT MAKE THIS MORE DIFFICULT. I THEREFORE

IN THE MEANWHILE WHICH MIGHT MAKE THIS MORE DIFFICULT. I THEREFORE FELT SURE YOU WOULD WELCOME HIS SUPPORT FOR PRESIDENT SADDAM'S PROPOSAL TO OFFER A CEASEFIRE LATER TODAY.

8. I HAVE SINCE COMPARED NOTES WITH MY US COLLEAGUE, WHO ON INSTRUCTIONS HAD ONCE AGAIN WARNED THE KING IN THE STRONGEST TERMS OF THE DANGERS THE AMERICANS SAW IN INVOLVING OMAN IN THE CONFLICT. HE HAD FOUND HIM MORE RECEPTIVE TO US ARGUMENTS ON THIS OCCASION AND ALTOGETHER LESS EUPHORIC AND MORE REALISTIC ABOUT THE SITUATION AND IRAN'S ABILITY TO CONTINUE THE WAR. WITH REFERENCE TO PARAGRAPH 3 ABOVE, THE KING MENTIONED TO VELIOTES THAT HE HAD HEARD THE LIBYANS WERE PRESSING THE TURKS TO OFFER THE IRANIANS MILITARY EQUIPMENT AND THAT HE HAD THEREFORE SUMMONED THE TURKISH AMBASSADOR TO ENQUIRE IF THERE WERE ANY TRUTH IN THE STORY. VELIOTES HAD REMINDED THE KING THAT MOST OF THE TURKISH EQUIPMENT WAS OF US ORIGIN, WAS SUBJECT TO STRICT END-USER CONTROLS AND THAT AS FAR AS HE KNEW THE AMERICANS HAD RECEIVED NO REQUEST FROM THE TURKS CONCERNING IT.

URWICK

BT

FLASH

NNNN



IRAN/IRAQ

ADVANCE COPIES

22 32

6  
 PS/SIR I GILMOUR *cf*  
 PS/MR HURD  
 PS/PUS  
 SIR E YOUDE  
 SIR J GRAHAM  
 MR J C MOBERLY  
 MR BRAITHWAITE  
 HD/MED  
 HD/MENAD  
 HD/UND  
 HD/CONS D  
 CONSULAR EMERGENCY UNIT  
 HD/ES & SD  
 HD/MAED  
 HD/DEF D  
 FUSD (2)  
 NEWS D  
 RESIDENT CLERK

~~NO 10 DOWNING STREET~~  
 CABINET OFFICE DIO

(A)

*Sir A Almond*

*Mufaxed*

*MUSCAT informed*

CONFIDENTIAL

FM WASHINGTON 281455Z SEP 80

TO FLASH F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 4129 OF 28 SEPTEMBER

INFO IMMEDIATE TO MUSCAT JEDDA AMMAN BAGHDAD

**FLASH**

1. IRAQ/IRAN

SAUNDERS TOLD ME THIS MORNING THAT THE AMERICAN CHARGE IN MUSCAT HAS NOW SPOKEN TO ZAWAWI. ZAWAWI INDICATED THAT ALTHOUGH A DECISION TO ACCEDE TO THE IRAQI REQUEST HAD IN PRINCIPLE BEEN TAKEN, THERE MIGHT BE ROOM FOR RECONSIDERATION. ZAWAWI ASKED IF THE AMERICAN APPROACH WAS ATTRIBUTABLE TO BRITISH THINKING. THE AMERICAN CHARGE REPLIED THAT HE HAD NOT DISCUSSED THE SUBJECT WITH HIS BRITISH COLLEAGUE UNTIL AFTER THEY BOTH HAD BEEN SUMMONED BY ZAWAWI ON 27 SEPTEMBER. HE BELIEVED THAT THE BRITISH ALSO HAD SERIOUS MISGIVINGS BUT THAT HIS OWN APPROACH REPRESENTED INDEPENDENTLY HELD AMERICAN VIEWS.

2. THE AMERICANS HAVE ALSO SENT INSTRUCTIONS TO THEIR EMBASSIES IN AMMAN AND JEDDA TO SPEAK TO THE JORDANIANS AND SAUDIS. SAUNDERS HAD HAD NO REPORT OF THE OUTCOME OF THESE REPRESENTATIONS.

3. SAUNDERS TOLD ME INCIDENTALLY THAT AMBASSADOR VELIOTES HAD REPORTED HIS CONVERSATION WITH HM AMBASSADOR, AMMAN ABOUT HIS 24 SEPTEMBER DISCUSSION WITH KING HUSSEIN (AMMAN TEL 362).

HENDERSON

**FLASH**

IRAN/IRAQ

**IMMEDIATE**

ADVANCE COPIES

22

To Chequers  
28.9.80

24

PS  
PS/SIR I GILMOUR  
PS/MR HURD  
PS/PUS  
SIR E YOUDE  
SIR J GRAHAM  
MR J C MOBERLY  
MR BRAITHEWAITE  
HD/MED  
HD/NENAD  
HD/UND  
HD/CONS D  
CONSULAR EMERGENCY UNIT  
HD/ES & SD  
HD/MAED  
HD/DEF D  
FUSD (2)  
NEWS D

NO 10 DOWNING STREET  
CABINET OFFICE DIO =

RC. MOD (4)  
for Dir  
COSSAC  
DNOT.

RESIDENT CLERK

(Sent)

Six A. Acland -

M Acland -

X SECRET

DESKBY 280800Z X

FM WASHINGTON 280527Z SEP 80

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 4126 OF 28 SEPTEMBER

X FOLLOWING FROM PRIVATE SECRETARY FOR ACLAND X

1. PLEASE ENSURE THAT THE FOLLOWING CONSIDERATIONS, WHICH REFLECT THE SECRETARY OF STATE'S VIEWS, ARE AVAILABLE TO PARTICIPANTS AT TOMORROW'S MEETING AT CHEQUERS.

2 IT IS CLEAR THAT THE IRAQIS ARE NOW GETTING MORE ACTIVE SUPPORT FROM THE ARABS (NOTABLY SAUDIS AND JORDANIANS) IN THEIR STRUGGLE WITH IRAN. THE POSSIBLE IRAQI ATTACK ON BANDAR ABAS SHOULD BE SEEN IN THIS CONTEXT, AS SHOULD OUR OWN REACTION TO THIS PROSPECT.

3. OUR IMPRESSION IS THAT THE AMERICANS HAVE BEEN SLOW TO REACT TO EVENTS, BUT APPEAR TO BE DOING SO NOW. THEY HAVE SENT STRONG MESSAGES TO KING HUSSEIN AND THE SAUDIS. (THE SAUDIS INCIDENTALLY HAVE APPARENTLY PUT OUT FEELERS TO THE AMERICANS ASKING FOR HELP WITH AIR DEFENCE IF -AS THEY SEEM TO EXPECT - THEY ARE AT SOME STAGE ATTACKED BY IRAN).



APPARENTLY PUT OUT FEELERS TO THE AMERICANS ASKING FOR HELP WITH AIR DEFENCE IF -- AS THEY SEEM TO EXPECT -- THEY ARE AT SOME STAGE ATTACKED BY IRAN).

4. WE KNOW THAT THE IRAQIS ARE ALREADY MOVING EQUIPMENT INTO OMAN. FROM THIS AND ZAWAWI'S ATTITUDE IT SEEMS PROBABLE THAT THE OMANIS HAVE ALREADY PROMISED THE IRAQIS THAT THEY WILL COOPERATE, AND WOULD FIND IT HARD TO RETRACT.

5. JUDGING BY THE MILITARY ASSESSMENTS WE HAVE SEEN HERE, HOWEVER, THE OMANIS WOULD BE RUNNING SERIOUS RISKS OF WHICH THEY HAVE NOT TAKEN FULL ACCOUNT. THERE WOULD BE ADVANTAGE IN DRAWING THESE TO THEIR ATTENTION. IT NOW SEEMS PROBABLE THAT THE AMERICANS WILL BE MAKING A STRONGER PITCH THAN HITHERTO TO CONVEY THEIR OWN SERIOUS MISGIVINGS. THERE THEREFORE SEEMS A CHANCE THAT OUR ACTION AND THEIRS MAY GIVE THE OMANIS CAUSE FOR SECOND THOUGHTS. THE SECRETARY OF STATE RECOMMENDS THAT THE CHARGE D'AFFAIRS IN MUSCAT MAKE A FURTHER APPROACH TO ZAWAWI. HE COULD MAKE IT CLEAR THAT H M G HAVE AN OBVIOUS INTEREST IN THE MILITARY CONTEXT IN WHICH BRITISH L.S.P. WILL OPERATE, AND HAND OVER A PIECE OF PAPER MAKING THE FOLLOWING POINTS:

- A. ACCORDING TO OUR INTELLIGENCE, THE IRANIAN AIRFORCE, THOUGH POTENTIALLY SHORT OF AVIATION FUEL, ARE STILL CAPABLE OF MOUNTING SIGNIFICANT ATTACKS FROM A NUMBER OF AIRFIELDS NOT PREVIOUSLY ACTIVE IN THE FIGHTING WITH IRAQ, AND WITHIN RANGE OF MUSCAT SEMICLN.
- B. IT SEEMS LIKELY THAT THE IRANIANS WILL HAVE DETECTED IRAQI AIR MOVES TOWARDS OMAN, AND MIGHT SOON TAKE OBVIOUS EVASIVE MEASURES E.G. BY DISPERSING THEIR SHIPS FROM BANDAR ABAS. ANY NAVAL FORCE SURVIVING AN INITIAL ATTACK WOULD FIND OMAN AN EASIER TARGET THAN IRAQ SEMICLN.
- C. FROM WHAT WE KNOW OF THE U.S.-OMANI ACCESS AGREEMENT THERE IS NO GUARANTEE THAT THE AMERICANS WOULD FEEL COMMITTED TO COMING TO OMAN'S DEFENCE AGAINST RETALIATORY ATTACK FROM IRAN, PARTICULARLY GIVEN THE PROBLEM OF THE HOSTAGES.

6. IN CONVEYING THIS PIECE OF PAPER, MR TUNNELL SHOULD HOWEVER AVOID ANY SUGGESTION THAT WE MIGHT PREVENT OUR LOAN SERVICE PERSONNEL FROM TAKING PART IN THE DEFENCE OF OMANI TERRITORY, FOR THE FOLLOWING REASONS:

- A. WE WOULD LOSE ALL CREDIBILITY WITH THE OMANIS IF OUR LOAN SERVICE PERSONNEL STAND BY WHILE THEY GET A BLOODY NOSE SEMICLN



WE WOULD LOVE TO SEE  
PERSONNEL STAND BY WHILE THEY GET A BLOODY NOSE SEMICLN

WE WOULD TURN THE ARABS AS A WHOLE AGAINST US SEMICLN

C. CONVERSELY, WE SHOULD GAIN CREDIT IN ARAB OPINION IF OUR LOAN SERVICE PERSONNEL WERE KNOWN TO HAVE PLAYED THEIR PART IN DEFENCE OF OMANI TERRITORY.

7. LORD CARRINGTON THINKS THAT OUR GUIDING PRINCIPLES SHOULD BE TO DISCOURAGE THE OMANIS AS UNATTRIBUTABLY AS POSSIBLE SEMICLN TO MINIMISE THE RISK OF RETALIATION BY IRAQ OR OTHER ARAB COUNTRIES WHO MIGHT THINK THAT WE ARE FRUSTRATING A BLOW AGAINST IRAN SEMICLN AND TO AVOID GETTING TOO FAR IN FRONT OF THE AMERICANS.

HENDERSON

NNNN

**IMMEDIATE**

B/B 280900Z

*Teleprinted*

IRAN/IRAQ

ADVANCE COPIES

*22 28*

PS (6)  
 PS/SIR I GILMOUR  
 PS/MR HURD  
 PS/PUS  
 SIR E YOUDE  
 SIR J GRAHAM  
 MR J C MOBERLY  
 MR BRAITHEWAITE  
 HD/MED  
 HD/NENAD  
 HD/UND  
 HD/CONS D  
 CONSULAR EMERGENCY UNIT  
 HD/ES & SD  
 HD/MAED  
 HD/DEF D  
 PUSD (2)  
 NEWS D  
 RESIDENT CLERK *S. Adams*

NO 10 DOWNING STREET  
CABINET OFFICE DIO

**IMMEDIATE**

*Prime Minister  
28.9.80*

*M Adams*

UNCLASSIFIED  
 DESKBY 280900Z  
 FM UKMIS NEW YORK 280116Z SEP 80  
 TO IMMEDIATE FCO  
 TELEGRAM NUMBER 1398 OF 28 SEPTEMBER

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON PRIORITY BAGHDAD ROUTINE PARIS BONN  
MOSCOW NEW DELHI ISLAMABAD UKDEL NATO

MIPT: IRAQ/IRAN.

TEXT OF THE REVISED OPERATIVE PARAGRAPHS IS:

1. CALLS UPON IRAN AND IRAQ TO REFRAIN IMMEDIATELY FROM ANY FURTHER USE OF FORCE AND TO SETTLE THEIR DISPUTE BY PEACEFUL MEANS AND IN CONFORMITY WITH PRINCIPLES OF JUSTICE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW;
2. URGES THEM TO ACCEPT ANY APPROPRIATE OFFER OF MEDIATION OR CONCILIATION OR TO RESORT TO REGIONAL AGENCIES OR ARRANGEMENTS OR OTHER PEACEFUL MEANS OF THEIR OWN CHOICE THAT WOULD FACILITATE THE FULFILMENT OF THEIR CHARTER OBLIGATIONS;
3. CALLS UPON ALL OTHER STATES TO EXERCISE THE UTMOST RESTRAINT AND TO REFRAIN FROM ANY ACT WHICH MAY LEAD TO A FURTHER ESCALATION

THE FULFILLMENT OF THEIR CHARTER OBLIGATIONS!

3. CALLS UPON ALL OTHER STATES TO EXERCISE THE UTMOST RESTRAINT AND TO REFRAIN FROM ANY ACT WHICH MAY LEAD TO A FURTHER ESCALATION AND WIDENING OF THE CONFLICT:
4. SUPPORTS THE EFFORTS OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL AND THE OFFER OF HIS GOOD OFFICES FOR THE RESOLUTION OF THIS SITUATION:
5. REQUESTS THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO REPORT TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL WITHIN FORTY-EIGHT HOURS.

PARSONS

NNNN



D/B 280900Z

Teleprinted

IRAN/IRAQ

ADVANCE COPIES

IMMEDIATE

(6)  
PS  
PS/SIR I GILMOUR  
PS/MR HURD  
PS/PUS  
SIR E YOUDE  
SIR J GRAHAM  
MR J C MOBERLY  
MR BRAITHEWAITE  
HD/MED  
HD/MENAD  
HD/UND  
HD/CONS D  
CONSULAR EMERGENCY UNIT  
HD/ES & SD  
HD/MAED  
HD/DEF D  
PUSD (2)  
NEWS D  
RESIDENT CLERK

NO 10 DOWNING STREET  
CABINET OFFICE DIO

IMMEDIATE

Prime Minister  
29.9.80.

CONFIDENTIAL

DESKBY 280900Z

FM UKMIS NEW YORK 280115Z SEP 80

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1397 OF 28 SEPTEMBER

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON PRIORITY BAGHDAD ROUTINE PARIS BONN  
MOSCOW NEW DELHI ISLAMABAD UKDEL NATO

MY TEL 1394; SECURITY COUNCIL; IRAQ/IRAN

1. THE NEWS OF PRESIDENT ZIA'S ARRIVAL IN TEHRAN WAS BROKEN TO US BY NAIK (PAKISTAN) WHEN MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL ASSEMBLED THIS MORNING (27 SEPTEMBER).

NAIK ADDED THAT HIS PRESIDENT HAD ASKED THAT NO RESOLUTION SHOULD BE ADOPTED DURING HIS TALKS IN TEHRAN AND BAGHDAD, PRESUMABLY FOR FEAR OF ADVERSE IRANIAN REACTION. MEANWHILE KITTANI (IRAQ), IN THE PLUNTEST POSSIBLE TERMS, ARGUED AGAINST THE ADOPTION OF A RESOLUTION UNTIL AFTER THE ARRIVAL OF HIS FOREIGN MINISTER (CURRENTLY SCHEDULED FOR 30 SEPTEMBER).

S. A. Adam

M. Adams

SCHEDULED FOR 30 SEPTEMBER).

2. BETWEEN THEM THEY SUCCEEDED IN FRIGHTENING OF THE NON-ALIGNED. AT THE INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS OF THE WHOLE (WHICH EVENTUALLY BEG AT 6 PM) MUNOZ LEDO (MEXICO), SPEAKING ON BEHALF OF HIS GROUP, SAID THAT ALTHOUGH THE TEXT OF THE RESOLUTION WAS ACCEPTABLE HE COULD NOT AGREE TO FIXING A TIME FOR IT TO BE PUT TO A VOTE. ALGARD (NORWAY) HAD PREVIOUSLY SAID THAT HE COULD ONLY AGREE TO A POSTPONEMENT OF THE VOTE UNTIL TOMORROW (28 SEPTEMBER) ON CONDITION THAT ALL AGREED THAT A VOTE WOULD BE TAKEN AT 11 AM OUR TIME. MUNOZ LEDO AND THE OTHER NON-ALIGNED ALL REFUSED TO ACCEPT THIS CONDITION AND WERE ADAMANT THAT THE COUNCIL SHOULD ACCEDE TO ZIA'S REQUEST.

3. SINCE NO TIME FOR A VOTE WAS AGREED ALGARD REFUSED EVEN TO TABLE THE RESOLUTION. IT WAS THEN DECIDED THAT, WITHOUT A RESOLUTION OR VOTE, IT WAS POINTLESS TO CONVENE IN FORMAL SESSION TONIGHT MERELY TO HEAR A FEW SPEECHES.

MCHENRY (US) WHO HAD EARLIER ARGUED STRONGLY FOR A VOTE ON THE DRAFT TODAY PUT UP NO FURTHER FIGHT. A FORMAL SESSION OF THE COUNCIL HAS BEEN FIXED FOR 281900Z BY WHICH TIME THE RESULTS OF ZIA'S EFFORTS MAY BE KNOWN. FIRST RADIO REPORTS FROM TEHRAN ARE NOT ENCOURAGING.

4. TEXT OF THE SLIGHTLY REVISED OPERATIVE PARAGRAPHS OF THE DRAFT RESOLUTION IS IN MIFT.

PARSONS

NNNN

*Mufaxed 2879*

ADVANCE COPY (32)

IRAN/IRAQ

ADVANCE COPIES

*22-28*

PS (6)  
PS/SIR I GILMOUR  
PS/MR HURD  
PS/PUS  
SIR E YOUDE  
SIR J GRAHAM  
MR J C MOBERLY  
MR BRAITHEWAITE  
HD/MED  
HD/MERAD  
HD/UND  
HD/CONS D  
CONSULAR EMERGENCY UNIT  
HD/ES & SD  
HD/MAED  
HD/DEF D  
PUSD (2)  
NEWS D  
RESIDENT CLERK

IMMEDIATE

NO 10 DOWNING STREET  
CABINET OFFICE DIO

*s.d. A. Adnan*

CONFIDENTIAL

SIC LAA/UAJ

GR 185

CONFIDENTIAL

FM BRITNAVAT MUSCAT 280533Z SEP 80

TO IMMEDIATE MODUK

TELEGRAM NUMBER LAA/UAJ OF 280533Z SEPTEMBER

AND TO CINCFLEET, FCO

INFO PRIORITY CTG 318.2, JEDDA, BAGHDAD, KUWAIT, BAHRAIN, ABU  
DHABI, DUBAI, WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK.

FOR DNOT. FCO MED.

STRAITS OF HORMUZ. SITREP 280200Z SEP.

1. DURING LAST 24 HOURS TRAFFIC IN AND OUT OF STRAITS HAS  
BEEN NORMAL. NO INTERFERENCE OR INTERROGATION BY IRANIANS.

2. OMANI FORCES NOT IN CONTACT WITH IRANIAN SHIPS BUT RADAR  
TRACKING INDICATES ONLY ONE IRANIAN ON EAST WEST PATROL 15  
MILES NORTH GREAT QUOIN ISLAND. NOTHING HEARD IRANIAN PATROL  
ABU MUSA/TUNBS. WHEN SNV AL SAID PASSED ISLANDS NIGHT 25/26  
SEP AN IRANIAN FLASHED HER UP AND WARNED HER TO KEEP SOUTH  
OF ISLANDS AND CLEAR IRANIAN WATERS. ASSESS ONE IRANIAN ON



SEP AN IRANIAN FLASHED HER UP AND WARNED HER TO KEEP SOUTH  
OF ISLANDS AND CLEAR IRANIAN WATERS. ASSESS ONE IRANIAN ON  
PATROL STRAITS AND ONE OFF ISLANDS. OTHER UNITS PROBABLY  
RETURNED BANDAR ABBAS TO REPLENISH.

3. OMANI UNIT IN CLOSE CONTACT WITH IRANIANS IN OMANI WATERS  
PM 22 SEP REPORTS THAT IRANIAN WAS OPERATING SEARCH AND NAVIGATIONAL  
RADARS BUT NOT FIRE CONTROL. 35MM GUNS WERE TRAINED TOWARDS  
OMANIS BUT DID NOT TRACK THEM. THEY ASSESSED IRANIANS AS NOT  
AT FULL OPERATIONAL EFFICIENCY.

4. KRIVAK REMAINS ABSENT.

TUNNELL

BT

NNN

IRAN/IRAQ

*unfaxed 23*

ADVANCE COPIES

22

PS  
PS/SIR I GILMOUR  
PS/MR HURD  
PS/PUS  
SIR E YOUDE  
SIR J GRAHAM  
MR J C MOBERLY  
MR BRAITHWAITE  
HD/MED  
HD/MENAD  
HD/UND  
HD/CONS D  
CONSULAR EMERGENCY UNIT  
HD/BS & SD  
HD/MAED  
HD/DEF D  
PUSD (2)  
NEWS D  
RESIDENT CLERK

NO 10 DOWNING STREET  
CABINET OFFICE DIO

*Prime Minister  
28.9.80*

*S. A. A. Adani*

GR 148

SECRET

FM BRITNAVAT MUSCAT 280825Z SEP 80

TO IMMEDIATE MODUK

TELEGRAM NUMBER U2H/KAG/LAA OF 280825Z SEPTEMBER

AND TO FCO, CINCFLEET

INFO IMMEDIATE JEDDA, BAGHDAD, KUWAIT, BAHRAIN, ABU DHABI, DUBAI,  
WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK

FCO MED.

IRAQI HELOS MUSCAT. SITREP TWO.

BRITNAVAT MUSCAT U2H/KAG/LAA 270915Z SEP.

1. TWO IRAQI SUPER FRELONS PREVIOUSLY REPORTED REMAIN SOAF

SEEB. NO SIGN OF STORES LANDED BY IRAQI AN 12 CUBS NIGHT

26/27 SEP BUT BELIEVED TO HAVE INCLUDED AIRCRAFT MISSILES.

NO KNOWLEDGE OF TYPE LANDED BUT FRELONS CAN BE FITTED TO CARRY

EXOCET FOR GROUND/SHIP ATTACK. MISSION RADIUS WITH TWO EXOCET

IS 350 NM. UNABLE TO GET SIGHT OF HELO WEAPON STATIONS.

2. DURING EVENING 27 SEP SKYVANS/DEFENDERS/HELOS NORMALLY

STATIONED SOAF SEEB WERE DISPERSED TO FIRQ/SAIQ/NIZWA/IZKI

AIRSTRIPS AND RETURNED SOAF SEEB AM 28 SEP.

3. NO IRAQI AIR MOVEMENT INTO SOAF SEEB NIGHT 27/28 SEP DESPITE  
SOAF DISPERSAL.

4. SOAF DISPERSAL FROM SEEB AGAIN PROGRAMMED FOR NIGHT 28/29  
SEP.

TUNNELL

BT

NNNN



IRAN/IRAQ

ADVANCE COPIES

22

*Mufaxed*

(A)

PS  
PS/SIR I GILMOUR  
PS/MR HURD  
PS/PUS  
SIR E YOUDE  
SIR J GRAHAM  
MR J C MOBERLY  
MR BRAITHEWAITE  
HD/MED  
HD/NENAD  
HD/UND  
HD/CONS D  
CONSULAR EMERGENCY UNIT  
HD/ES & SD  
HD/MAED  
HD/DEF D  
PUSD (2)  
NEWS D  
RESIDENT CLERK

*Sir A ALLAN D*

~~NO 10 DOWNING STREET~~  
CABINET OFFICE DIO

*MOBA informed 2*

*3*

SECRET UK COMMS ONLY  
SIC

**FLASH**

GR 600

SECRET

FM MUSCAT 281741Z SEP 80

TO FLASH FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 275 OF 28 SEPTEMBER

INFO FLASH MODUK (FOR COSSEC DIA AND DNOT), CINCFLEET, WASHINGTON,  
UKMIS NEW YORK, BAGHDAD, ABU DHABI, 2577-3,  
INFO IMMEDIATE KUWAIT, BAHRAIN, DOHA, JEDDA, AMMAN, DAMASCUS,  
PARIS.

YOUR TELNO 370 OF 28 SEPTEMBER: IRAQ/IRAN

1. I WAS ABLE TO SEE QAIS ZAWAWI THIS EVENING SHORTLY BEFORE HE LEFT TO SEE THE SULTAN IN SALALAH. HE WILL BE RETURNING TO MUSCAT TOMORROW EVENING (29TH).

2. I THANKED ZAWAWI FOR SEEING ME AT SHORT NOTICE AND FOR HIS FRANKNESS WITH US THROUGHOUT THIS CRISIS. I SAID THAT THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT HAD A NATURAL INTEREST IN THESE MATTERS NOT

BRITISH GOVERNMENT HAD A NATURAL INTEREST IN THESE MATTERS NOT ONLY BECAUSE OF OUR CLOSE RELATIONSHIP WITH OMAN BUT ALSO BECAUSE OF THE PRESENCE OF LOAN SERVICE PERSONNEL AND THAT IT WAS NATURAL THAT WE SHOULD WISH TO BE CLEAR ABOUT ANY MILITARY OPERATIONS. QAIS SHOWED NO DISPOSITION TO RAISE ANY QUESTIONS ABOUT THE ROLE OF LSP AND I LEFT THE MATTER THERE. FROM OUR CONVERSATION YESTERDAY-(MY TELNO 268) I WOULD JUDGE THAT THE OMANIS ARE CONFIDENT THAT LSP WOULD PARTICIPATE IN ANY DEFENSIVE OPERATION WITHIN OMANI TERRITORY.

3. I WENT ON TO SAY THAT IT WAS GOOD THAT WE COULD, AS OLD FRIENDS, SPEAK FRANKLY. MY GOVERNMENT'S VIEW REMAINED THAT OMAN MIGHT BE BITING OFF MORE THAN IT COULD CHEW AND IT WAS FOR THIS REASON THAT WE WERE URGING RESTRAINT AND FURTHER CONSIDERATION. I STRESSED THAT WE HAD NO AXE TO GRIND ABOUT IRAQI ACTIONS IN GENERAL BUT THAT OUR SOLE CONCERN WAS OMAN'S WELL-BEING.

4. I THEN HANDED OVER A PIECE OF PAPER CONTAINING THE POINTS IN PARA 1 OF TUR. IN THE BRIEF CONVERSATION WHICH FOLLOWED I HAD THE IMPRESSION THAT QAIS HIMSELF HAD SERIOUS WORRIES ABOUT THE OPERATION. I SAID THAT, SPEAKING PERSONALLY, IT SEEMED TO ME THAT THE IRANIANS STILL HAD A SURPRISING AMOUNT OF FIRE-POWER LEFT AND THAT IT MIGHT BE PRUDENT TO WAIT AND SEE HOW LONG THIS STRENGTH WOULD LAST. QAIS SEEMED TO AGREE ABOUT THE IRANIAN STRENGTH AND COMMENTED THAT THE LATTER STILL APPEARED TO BE HOLDING OUT IN AHWAZ. IN RESPONSE TO POINT B IN PARA 1 OF TUR HE ARGUED RATHER WEAKLY THAT IT WAS STILL POSSIBLE THAT THE IRANIANS MIGHT NOT BE ABLE TO ESTABLISH THE POINT OF DEPARTURE OF THE HELICOPTERS. I SAID THAT I WOULD BE SURPRISED IF THEY HAD NOT ALREADY PUT TWO AND TWO TOGETHER. (IN THIS CONNECTION MY US COLLEAGUE HAS TOLD ZAWAMI OF A US REPORT FROM LONDON TO THE EFFECT THAT THE BRITISH PRESS - MONDAY'S FINANCIAL TIMES - WILL BE REPORTING THE MOVEMENT OF IRAQI AIRCRAFT TO OMAN OR THE UAE).

5. FINALLY I SAID THAT IF HIS MAJESTY REQUIRED ANY FURTHER INFORMATION OR WISHED HIMSELF TO PASS ANY MESSAGES TO LONDON I WOULD OF COURSE BE AVAILABLE.

6. I AM MAINTAINING CLOSE CONTACT WITH MY US COLLEAGUE. HE MADE PARALLEL REPRESENTATIONS TO ZAWAMI ON 28 SEPTEMBER AND HANDED OVER A MESSAGE URGING RESTRAINT FROM THE US SECRETARY OF STATE. BUCK SHARES MY VIEW THAT THE OMANIS ARE BEING EXTREMELY NAIVE IN FALLING IN WITH IRAQI PLANS WITH NO SERIOUS ATTEMPT TO ASSESS THE STRENGTH OF LIKELY IRANIAN REACTION.



ATTEMPT TO ASSESS THE STRENGTH OF LIKELY IRANIAN REACTION.

7. BUCK ALSO SHARES MY IMPRESSION THAT ZAWAWI AND OTHERS ARE ENTHUSIASTIC ABOUT THE OPERATION BUT HAVE LITTLE PROSPECT OF PREVAILING ON QABOOS. THERE IS SOME SUGGESTION THAT THE US MAY CONSIDER SENDING OUT A SENIOR OFFICIAL TO SEEK TO DISSUADE THE OMANIS. BUT TIME IS SHORT. FROM A REMARK DROPPED BY ZAWAWI TO BUCK IT SEEMS LIKELY THAT THE ORIGINAL TIMING FOR THE OPERATION MAY HAVE BEEN TOMORROW MORNING (29 SEPTEMBER). ZAWAWI'S DEPARTURE FOR SALALAH WILL WE HOPE RESULT IN SOME DELAY, BUT THE OMANIS ARE PLAYING THIS CLOSE TO THE CHEST.

8. I HAVE THE IMPRESSION THAT MY US COLLEAGUE HAS BEEN FAIRLY TOUGH IN HIS REPRESENTATIONS TO ZAWAWI AND I DO NOT THEREFORE BELIEVE THAT WE ARE GETTING IN FRONT OF THE AMERICANS (Q RA 3 OF TUR).

TUNNELL  
BT

F E A S H

NNNN



IRAN/IRAQ

ADVANCE COPIES

22

PS  
PS/SIR I GILMOUR  
PS/MR HURD  
PS/PUS  
SIR E YOUDE  
SIR J GRAHAM  
MR J C MOBERLY  
MR BRAITHEWAITE  
HD/MED  
HD/NEENAD  
HD/UND  
HD/CONS D  
CONSULAR EMERGENCY UNIT  
HD/ES & SD  
HD/MAED  
HD/DEF D  
PUSD (2)  
NEWS D

RESIDENT CLERK

*Sir A Acland.*

*unfaxed to*  
*Chequers*  
*28-9-80*  
NO 10 DOWNING STREET  
CABINET OFFICE DIO

*Dept of Energy.*

GR 90

CONFIDENTIAL

FM JEDDA 280922Z SEP 80

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 710 OF 28 SEPTEMBER

INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON, BAGHDAD, DAMASCUS, DEPT OF ENERGY.

IRAQI OIL

1. ZAKI YAMANI SEEMED WELL INFORMED LAST NIGHT ON THE IRAQI OIL SITUATION. HE ANTICIPATED THE BBC REPORT OF THE DAMAGE DONE TO THE PIPELINE THROUGH TURKEY. HE SAID THAT DAMAGE DONE TO THE OIL INSTALLATIONS IN NORTHERN IRAQ WAS MINOR. HE SAID THAT THE PIPELINE THROUGH SYRIA TO THE MEDITERRANEAN HAD NOT BEEN OPERATING FOR SOME MONTHS EXCEPT FOR MINOR SUPPLIES FOR SYRIAN DOMESTIC CONSUMPTION. IT WOULD TAKE TWO OR THREE WEEKS TO GET IT BACK INTO FULL RUNNING ORDER.

CRAIG

Teletyped.

28-9

**IMMEDIATE**

O/S 281400Z

IRAN/IRAQ

ADVANCE COPIES

22 28

PS  
PS/SIR I GILMOUR

PS/MR HURD

PS/PUS

SIR E YOUDE

SIR J GRAHAM

MR J C MOBERLY

MR BRAITHEWAITE

HD/MED

HD/NENAD

HD/UND

HD/CONS D

CONSULAR EMERGENCY UNIT

HD/BS & SD

HD/MAED

HD/DEF D

PUSD (2)

NEWS D

RESIDENT CLERK

NO 10 DOWNING STREET

CABINET OFFICE DIO

**IMMEDIATE**

Prime Minister

29.9.80

M Adam

S. A. Adani

CONFIDENTIAL

DESKBY 281400Z

FM JEDDA 280800Z SEP 80

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 709 OF 28 SEPTEMBER.

AND TO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK, MUSCAT, BAGHDAD.

YOUR TELEGRAM NO. 558: IRAN/IRAQ

1. I RECOGNISE THAT THE PROS AND CONS OF TELLING THE SAUDIS OF THE PROPOSED IRAQI/OMANI OPERATION ARE FINELY BALANCED. BUT WE ARE COMMITTED TO KEEPING THE SAUDIS INFORMED OF MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS (UKMIS NEW YORK TELNO 1364 PARA 4) -- A PROCESS WHICH I BEGAN YESTERDAY WITH THE MFA. AND NOW THAT THE RULER OF DUBAI HAS BEEN TOLD (DUBAI TELNO 34 TO ABU DHABI) AND WE KNOW THAT KING HUSSEIN IS IN THE PICTURE (AMMAN TELNO 362) I WONDER WHETHER WE CAN AFFORD NOT TO TELL THE SAUDIS.

2. WE NEED NOT URGE THEM TO ANY PARTICULAR COURSE OF ACTION.

2. WE NEED NOT URGE THEM TO ANY PARTICULAR COURSE OF ACTION, BUT SIMPLY SAY THAT IN THE CONTEXT OF OUR COMMITMENT TO PASS INFORMATION TO THEM WE THOUGHT THEY OUGHT TO KNOW OF THIS LATEST DEVELOPMENT. IF ASKED FOR OUR VIEWS, WE COULD EXPRESS DISQUIET BUT ADD THAT THE DECISION WHAT TO DO WAS UP TO THEM.

3. PRINCE SAUD IN NEW YORK WOULD STILL BE THE BEST CHANNEL OF APPROACH; ALTERNATIVELY, OR IN PARALLEL, PRINCE TURKI HERE.

CRAIG

NNNN



AD ANOTHER

FOCAB 007/28

GR 160

CONFIDENTIAL

FM JEDDA 280709Z SEP 80

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 708 OF 28 SEPTEMBER

INFO IMMEDIATE DEPT. OF ENERGY, WASHINGTON AND CARACAS.

WASHINGTON TELNO 4123: SECRETARY OF STATE FOR ENERGY

1. YAMANI, WHOM I SAW LAST NIGHT WITH MR LAMONT, MADE NO REPEAT NO MENTION OF ANY DECISION TO INCREASE PRODUCTION. ON THE CONTRARY, WHILE AGREEING THAT THE LOSS OF IRAQI AND IRANIAN EXPORTS OF CRUDE WOULD NOT FOR THE TIME BEING CONSTITUTE A SERIOUS PROBLEM, HE SAID THAT THE WAR WOULD STRENGTHEN THE POSITION OF THOSE PRODUCERS (E.G. LIBYA AND NIGERIA) WHO MIGHT OTHERWISE HAVE BEEN FORCED BY THE GLUT TO REDUCE THEIR PRICES BY THE END OF THE YEAR. HE ADDED THAT PROVIDED THE WAR DID NOT LAST MORE THAN, SAY, A MONTH, THE GLUT MIGHT WELL RETURN BY SPRING/SUMMER 1981. UNLESS HE WAS BEING VERY DISINGENUOUS HE SURELY WOULD NOT HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT WITHOUT AT LEAST MENTIONING A DECISION BY SOME OPEC MEMBERS TO INCREASE PRODUCTION, IF SUCH A DECISION HAD BEEN TAKEN.

CRAIG

NNNN

SENT 1 TO 7 AT 28/1042Z RAF

ADVANCE COPY

IRAN/IRAQ

IMMEDIATE

Teletyped  
28-9

2199

ADVANCE COPIES

22/28

PS (6) PS/SIR I GILMOUR

IMMEDIATE

NO 10 DOWNING STREET  
CABINET OFFICE DIO

PS/MR HURD  
PS/PUS

SIR E YOUDE

SIR J GRAHAM

MR J C MOBERLY

MR BRAITHEWAITE

HD/MED

HD/NENAD

HD/UND

HD/CONS D

CONSULAR EMERGENCY UNIT

HD/ES & SD

HD/MAED

HD/DEF D

PUSD (2)

NEWS D

RESIDENT CLERK

Prime Minister

28-9-80

S.A. Adnan

SECRET

UK EYES ONLY

FM JEDDA 280704Z SEP 80

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 707 OF 28 SEPTEMBER

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON

INFO PRIORITY UKMIS NEW YORK, MUSCAT, ABU DHABI, DUBAI.

MUSCAT TELNOS 269 (PARA 4) AND 270.

1. IT SEEMS TO ME UNLIKELY THAT THE SAUDIS HAVE AGREED TO COOPERATE IN THIS WAY. THE MFA, SHAIKH ZAKI YAMANI AND PRINCE TURKI (HEAD OF INTELLIGENCE) ALL CONFIRMED TO US YESTERDAY THAT KING KHALID, IN SPEAKING BY TELEPHONE TO SADDAM HUSSAIN, HAD EXPLAINED SAUDI INABILITY TO ISSUE A STATEMENT OF PUBLIC SUPPORT. INDEED, RPINCE TURKI SAID THAT SADDAM HAD ASSURED THE KING THAT HE QUITE UNDERSTOOD THE REASONS FOR THIS.

CRAIG

IRAN/IRAQ

ADVANCE COPIES

22

*Chve Las typcopy  
21/11/80*

PS  
PS/SIR I GILMOUR  
PS/MR HURD  
PS/PUS  
SIR E YOUDE  
SIR J GRAHAM  
MR J C MOBERLY  
MR BRAITHEWAITE  
HD/MED  
HD/NENAD  
HD/UND  
HD/CONS D  
CONSULAR EMERGENCY UNIT  
HD/ES & SD  
HD/MAED  
HD/DEF D  
PUSD (2)  
NEWS D  
RESIDENT CLERK

*Sir A ALLAN D*

~~NO 10 DOWNING STREET~~  
CABINET OFFICE DIO

3

SECRET UK COMMS ONLY  
SIC

**FLASH**

GR 600

SECRET

FM MUSCAT 281741Z SEP 80

TO FLASH FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 275 OF 28 SEPTEMBER

INFO FLASH MODUK (FOR COSSEC DIA AND DNOT), CINCFLEET, WASHINGTON,  
UKMIS NEW YORK, BAGHDAD, ABU DHABI, 2977-8,  
INFO IMMEDIATE KUWAIT, BAHRAIN, DOHA, JEDDA, AMMAN, DAMASCUS,  
PARIS.

YOUR TELNO 370 OF 28 SEPTEMBER: IRAQ/IRAN

1. I WAS ABLE TO SEE QAIS ZAWAWI THIS EVENING SHORTLY BEFORE  
HE LEFT TO SEE THE SULTAN IN SALALAH. HE WILL BE RETURNING TO  
MUSCAT TOMORROW EVENING (29TH).

2. I THANKED ZAWAWI FOR SEEING ME AT SHORT NOTICE AND FOR HIS  
FRANKNESS WITH US THROUGHOUT THIS CRISIS. I SAID THAT THE  
BRITISH GOVERNMENT HAD A NATURAL INTEREST IN THESE MATTERS NOT



BRITISH GOVERNMENT HAD A NATURAL INTEREST IN THESE MATTERS NOT ONLY BECAUSE OF OUR CLOSE RELATIONSHIP WITH OMAN BUT ALSO BECAUSE OF THE PRESENCE OF LOAN SERVICE PERSONNEL AND THAT IT WAS NATURAL THAT WE SHOULD WISH TO BE CLEAR ABOUT ANY MILITARY OPERATIONS. QAIS SHOWED NO DISPOSITION TO RAISE ANY QUESTIONS ABOUT THE ROLE OF LSP AND I LEFT THE MATTER THERE. FROM OUR CONVERSATION YESTERDAY-(MY TELNO 268) I WOULD JUDGE THAT THE OMANIS ARE CONFIDENT THAT LSP WOULD PARTICIPATE IN ANY DEFENSIVE OPERATION WITHIN OMANI TERRITORY.

3. I WENT ON TO SAY THAT IT WAS GOOD THAT WE COULD, AS OLD FRIENDS, SPEAK FRANKLY. MY GOVERNMENT'S VIEW REMAINED THAT OMAN MIGHT BE BITING OFF MORE THAN IT COULD CHEW AND IT WAS FOR THIS REASON THAT WE WERE URGING RESTRAINT AND FURTHER CONSIDERATION. I STRESSED THAT WE HAD NO AXE TO GRIND ABOUT IRAQI ACTIONS IN GENERAL BUT THAT OUR SOLE CONCERN WAS OMAN'S WELL-BEING.

4. I THEN HANDED OVER A PIECE OF PAPER CONTAINING THE POINTS IN PARA 1 OF TUR. IN THE BRIEF CONVERSATION WHICH FOLLOWED I HAD THE IMPRESSION THAT QAIS HIMSELF HAD SERIOUS WORRIES ABOUT THE OPERATION. I SAID THAT, SPEAKING PERSONALLY, IT SEEMED TO ME THAT THE IRANIANS STILL HAD A SURPRISING AMOUNT OF FIRE-POWER LEFT AND THAT IT MIGHT BE PRUDENT TO WAIT AND SEE HOW LONG THIS STRENGTH WOULD LAST. QAIS SEEMED TO AGREE ABOUT THE IRANIAN STRENGTH AND COMMENTED THAT THE LATTER STILL APPEARED TO BE HOLDING OUT IN AHWAZ. IN RESPONSE TO POINT B IN PARA 1 OF TUR HE ARGUED RATHER WEAKLY THAT IT WAS STILL POSSIBLE THAT THE IRANIANS MIGHT NOT BE ABLE TO ESTABLISH THE POINT OF DEPARTURE OF THE HELICOPTERS. I SAID THAT I WOULD BE SURPRISED IF THEY HAD NOT ALREADY PUT TWO AND TWO TOGETHER. (IN THIS CONNECTION MY US COLLEAGUE HAS TOLD ZAWAWI OF A US REPORT FROM LONDON TO THE EFFECT THAT THE BRITISH PRESS - MONDAY'S FINANCIAL TIMES - WILL BE REPORTING THE MOVEMENT OF IRAQI AIRCRAFT TO OMAN OR THE UAE).

5. FINALLY I SAID THAT IF HIS MAJESTY REQUIRED ANY FURTHER INFORMATION OR WISHED HIMSELF TO PASS ANY MESSAGES TO LONDON I WOULD OF COURSE BE AVAILABLE.

6. I AM MAINTAINING CLOSE CONTACT WITH MY US COLLEAGUE. HE MADE PARALLEL REPRESENTATIONS TO ZAWAWI ON 28 SEPTEMBER AND HANDED OVER A MESSAGE URGING RESTRAINT FROM THE US SECRETARY OF STATE. BUCK SHARES MY VIEW THAT THE OMANIS ARE BEING EXTREMELY NAIVE IN FALLING IN WITH IRAQI PLANS WITH NO SERIOUS ATTEMPT TO ASSESS THE STRENGTH OF LIKELY IRANIAN REACTION.

7. BUCK ALSO SHARES MY IMPRESSION THAT ZAWAWI AND OTHERS ARE UNENTHUSIASTIC ABOUT THE OPERATION BUT HAVE LITTLE PROSPECT OF PREVAILING ON QABOOS. THERE IS SOME SUGGESTION THAT THE US MAY CONSIDER SENDING OUT A SENIOR OFFICIAL TO SEEK TO DISSUADE THE OMANIS. BUT TIME IS SHORT. FROM A REMARK DROPPED BY ZAWAWI TO BUCK IT SEEMS LIKELY THAT THE ORIGINAL TIMING FOR THE OPERATION MAY HAVE BEEN TOMORROW MORNING (29 SEPTEMBER). ZAWAWI'S DEPARTURE FOR SALALAH WILL WE HOPE RESULT IN SOME DELAY, BUT THE OMANIS ARE PLAYING THIS CLOSE TO THE CHEST.

8. I HAVE THE IMPRESSION THAT MY US COLLEAGUE HAS BEEN FAIRLY TOUGH IN HIS REPRESENTATIONS TO ZAWAWI AND I DO NOT THEREFORE BELIEVE THAT WE ARE GETTING IN FRONT OF THE AMERICANS (Q RA 3 OF TUR).

TUNNELL  
BT

F E A S H

NNNN



120  
IRAN/IRAQ

ADVANCE COPIES

22

*Mufaxed to Cheques  
28-9-80*

PS  
PS/SIR I GILMOUR  
PS/MR HURD  
PS/PUS  
SIR E YOUDE  
SIR J GRAHAM  
MR J C MOBERLY  
MR BRAITHEWAITE  
HD/MED  
HD/RENAD  
HD/UND  
HD/CONS D  
CONSULAR EMERGENCY UNIT  
HD/ES & SD  
HD/MAED  
HD/DEF D  
PUSD (2)  
NEWS D  
RESIDENT CLERK

NO 10 DOWNING STREET —  
CABINET OFFICE DIO

*S. A. Adad*

OO BAGHDAD

CR 174

CONFIDENTIAL

FM MUSCAT 280920Z SEP 80

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 274 OF 28 SEPTEMBER

INFO IMMEDIATE JEDDA, WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK, BAGHDAD

JEDDA TELNO 558: IRAN/IRAQ

1. AS YOU KNOW THE OMANIS HAVE PUT GREAT EMPHASIS ON THE SECRECY OF THIS OPERATION, AND I HOPE THAT THERE WILL BE NO REPERCUSSIONS ON OUR RELATIONS WITH THEM FROM THE DISCLOSURES ALREADY MADE IN THE UAE. FOR THIS REASON I WOULD PREFER THE SAUDIS NOT TO BE TOLD BUT I RECOGNISE THAT IN OUR WIDER INTERESTS IT MAY BE DESIRABLE.

2. IT IS NOT CLEAR TO WHAT EXTEND THE IRAQIS HAVE BRIEFED OTHER ARAB STATES IN THE AREA OR FOR THAT MATTER WHICH STATES THEY HAVE USED FOR STAGING THEIR HELICOPTERS. IT MAY BE THAT THE IRAQIS WILL NOW HAVE TOLD THE SAUDIS. WHATEVER DECISION IS TAKEN WE SHOULD BE AWARE THAT ANY SUBSEQUENT CRITICISM OVER



IS TAKEN WE SHOULD BE AWARE THAT ANY SUBSEQUENT CRITICISM OVER  
LEAKS APPEARS LIKELY ON PRESENT FORM TO BE DIRECTED AT US  
RATHER THAN THE AMERICANS. IN ANY EVENT I THINK WE MIGHT  
CONSIDER DISCUSSING WITH AMERICANS A JOINT APPROACH ON DISCLOSURES  
IN GENERAL.

TUNNELL

NNNN

2100

FOCAB 006/28

GR 115

SECRET

DESKBY FCO AND WASHINGTON 281030Z

FM MUSCAT 280855Z SEP 80

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 273 OF 28 SEPTEMBER

AND TO WASHINGTON (FOR PRIVATE SECRETARY)

YOUR TELNO 369 OF 28 SEPTEMBER: IRAQ/IRAN

1. I TOOK ACTION ON PARAGRAPH 2 BY TELEPHONE WITH ZAWAWI WHO IS AT HOME INDISPOSED THIS MORNING. SINCE HE APPEARED TO TAKE THE NEWS OF A LEAK SURPRISINGLY CALMLY AND SUGGESTED THAT THE IRAQIS MIGHT HAVE TOLD RASHID I DID NOT MAKE THE POINT THAT WE WERE RESPONSIBLE BUT MERELY SAID THAT WE WISHED THE OMANIS TO BE AWARE OF THIS DEVELOPMENT AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

2. QAIS SAID HE WOULD CONSIDER THIS MATTER FURTHER WITH THOSE RESPONSIBLE IN THE GOVERNMENT AND WOULD CONTACT ME AGAIN IF HE REQUIRED ANY FURTHER INFORMATION.

TUNNELL

NNNN

XX  
**IMMEDIATE**

⑦

XXXX 21ai

IRAN/IRAQ

ADVANCE COPIES

28  
22

PS (6)  
PS/SIR I GILMOUR  
PS/MR HURD  
PS/PUS  
SIR E YOUDE  
SIR J GRAHAM  
MR J C MOBERLY  
MR BRAITHEWAITE  
HD/MED  
HD/NENAD  
HD/UND  
HD/CONS D  
CONSULAR EMERGENCY UNIT  
HD/ES & SD  
HD/MAED  
HD/DEF D  
PUSD (2)  
NEWS D

**ADVANCE COPY**

NO 10 DOWNING STREET  
CABINET OFFICE DIO

**IMMEDIATE**

0910

RESIDENT CLERK

In A Adair

M<sup>u</sup> A. Lang

SECRET

FM MUSCAT 280658Z SEP 80  
TO FLASH FCO  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 272 OF 28 SEPTEMBER  
AND TO MODUK  
INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON

1. MODUK 13D 272137Z SEP DELAYED HEAVY HIGH PRECEDENCE TRAFFIC.  
RECEIVED DEFENCE SECTION 280400Z.

2. PILOTS.  
A. HUNTER. 2 BRIT LSP. 3 BRIT CONTRACT. 5 OMANI (1 UK).  
B. JAGUAR. 2 BRIT LSP. 5 BRIT CONTRACT. 1 OMANI DOING  
CONVERSION.  
C. STRIKEMASTER. 3 BRIT LSP. 3 BRIT CONTRACT. NIL OMANI  
QUALIFIED BUT 11 STUDENTS.

3. WEAPGLOADS.  
A. HUNTER. 4 X 30MM. 2 X 1000 LB OR 18 SURA. NO AAM.  
B. JAGUAR. 2 X 30MM. UP TO 8 X 400 KILO. NO AAM.  
C. STRIKEMASTER. 2 X 7.62MM. 24 SURA OR 4 X 550 LB.

4. AA DEFENCE. OPERATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS RAPIER FIRE UNITS



C. STRIKEMASTER. 2 X 7.62MM. 24 SURA OR 4 X 550 LB.

4. AA DEFENCE. OPERATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS RAPIER FIRE UNITS  
VERY GOOD BUT OPTICAL ONLY. CREWS WELL TRAINED AND PRACTICED.  
4 BRIT CONTRACT.

TUNNELL

BT

NNNN

IRAN/IRAQ

*Mufaxed*

ADVANCE COPIES

22

~~PS~~  
PS/SIR I GILMOUR  
PS/MR HURD  
PS/PUS  
SIR E YOUDE  
SIR J GRAHAM  
MR J C MOBERLY  
MR BRAITHWAITE  
HD/MED  
HD/NEHAD  
HD/UND  
HD/CONS D  
CONSULAR EMERGENCY UNIT  
HD/ES & SD  
HD/MAED  
HD/DEF D  
PUSD (2)  
NEWS D  
~~RESIDENT CLERK~~

~~NO 10 DOWNING STREET~~  
CABINET OFFICE DIO

*Sir A. Acland*

RESTRICTED

FM BAGHDAD 281050Z SEP 80

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 446 OF 28/9/80

FOR INFO TO PRIORITY KUWAIT JEDDA DAMASCUS ANKARA MOSCOW AMMAN  
WASHINGTON TOKYO (FOR SEC OF STATE)

IRAQ/IRAN SITREP: MY TEL NO 442

1. BY THE EVENING OF 27 SEPTEMBER, IRAQ HAD CLAIMED THAT ITS TROOPES WERE IN AHWAZ CAPITAL OF KHUZISTAN, AND WITHIN SIGHT OF DEZFUL. THERE WERE THREE MINOR AIR RAIDS ON MILITARY TARGETS IN BAGHDAD YESTERDAY (27 SEPTEMBER), AND TWO FALSE ALARMS.
2. THE GENERAL COMMAND OF THE IRAQI ARMED FORCES ISSUED SEVEN STATEMENTS DURING 27 SEPTEMBER. MAIN POINTS AS FOLLOWS:-

STATEMNET 39

BY THE END OF 26 SEPTEMBER, IRAQI FORCES HAD MADE THE FOLLOWING GAINS:

THE GAMES  
NORTHERN SECTOR:

---

IRAQI FORCES IN CONTROL OF THE KHUSRAWI - QASR-I--SHIRIN - SAR-I--PUL ZUHAB ROAD AND ALL IRANIAN RESISTANCE BETWEEN NAFTSHAH AND SUMAR WIPED OUT.

CENTRAL SECTOR:

---

IRAQI FORCES WITHIN SIGHT OF DEZFUL AFTER TAKING CONTROL OF THE IMAM ZADA ABBAS, AL KANANEH AND AL BISAITIN AREAS.

SOUTHERN SECTOR:

---

IRAQI FORCES WITHIN SIGHT OF AHWAZ AND SUSANGERD AFTER TAKING CONTROL OF THE AL SHARIF AND AL SHATLIYAT AREAS. HEAVY LOSSES INFLICTED ON THE IRANIANS IN ALL SECTORS.

FORTY-FOUR TANKS CAPTURED (FORTY IN THE KHUSRAWI AREA) AND SIXTY THREE DESTROYED. ONE HELICOPTER SHOT DOWN AND ONE PATROL BOAT SUNK OPPOSITE ABADAN.

IRANIAN CASUALTIES: ALLEGEDLY EIGHTY DEAD AND A LARGE NUMBER CAPTURED. IRAQI LOSSES: SIXTEEN DEAD, FOURTEEN WOUNDED.

STATEMENT 40.

---

IRAQI ADVANCED IN THE KHAFAJIYA AREA AND THE IRAQI FLAG WAS RAISED OVER SUSANGERD.

STATEMENT 41

---

IRAQI FORCES IN AHWAZ. THE OBJECTIVE SET BY THE LEADERSHIP HAS BEEN ACHIEVED.

STATEMENT 42.

---

AT 1000 HOURS ON 27 SEPTEMBER, IRANIAN FORCES OPENED FIRE WITH HEAVY ARTILLERY AND ROCKETS ON IRAQI FORCES IN SURBIL ZAHAB. OUR FORCES RETURNED THE FIRE, KILLING EIGHTY IRANIANS.

TWO IRANIAN AIRCRAFT SHOT DOWN OVER ZAIN AL QAWS.

STATEMENT 43.

---



THE IRAQI AIRFORCE TODAY ATTACKED THE FOLLOWING TARGETS:  
SANANAJ AIRPORT  
ALRADA'IYA AIRPORT  
A CONCENTRATION OF VEHICLES IN DEHLARAN  
ENEMY ARMOUR IN THE SOUTHERN SECTOR  
AN OIL DEPOT IN MASJID-I-SULAIMAN (ONE HELICOPTER DESTROYED  
NEARBY)  
TWO IRAQI AIRCRAFT LOST.

STATEMENT 44.

---

FIERCE FIGHTING ALONG THE FRONT LINE: ENEMY FORCES FLEEING  
AND HEAVY LOSSES INFLICTED.  
THE COMPLETE DESTRUCTION OF MOHAMMARAH (KHORRAMSHAHR)  
NAVAL BASE. TEN AIRCRAFT AND ONE HELICOPTER SHOT DOWN OVER THE  
BATTLEFIELD. THIRTY TANKS CAPTURED.  
IRANIAN CASUALTIES: THIRTY DEAD  
IRAQI            : NINE DEAD, 26 WOUNDED.

STATEMENT 45

---

IRANIAN AIR ATTACKS ON BAGHDAD AT 1255 HOURS AND 1630 HOURS.  
MATERIAL DAMAGE ONLY. (MENTION OF THE EARLY MORNING RAID WITHOUT  
ADVANCE WARNING REPORTED IN MY TUR SEEMS TO HAVE BEEN SUPPRESSED).

3. THE STATEMENTS DO NOT REPORT AIR ATTACKS ELSEWHERE IN IRAQ.  
THE IRAQIS MAY BE TRYING TO SUPPRESS MENTION OF THEM. ALTERNATIVELY,  
THE IRANIAN AIR FORCE MAY NOT BE ABLE TO MOUNT ATTACKS WITH THE  
SAME FREQUENCY AS IT DID IN THE FIRST FEW DAYS OF THE FIGHTING:  
OR THEIR AIRCRAFT ARE BEING USED MORE TO SUPPORT TROOPS IN THE  
FRONT LINE: OR BOTH.

4. THERE HAVE ALSO BEEN A NUMBER OF FALSE ALARMS (TWO YESTERDAY  
AND TWO THIS MORNING, 28 SEPTEMBER). THE AUTHORITIES MAY SIMPLY  
BE JUMPY AFTER THEIR FAILURE TO PROVIDE WARNING OF THE DAWN RAID  
ON 27 SEPTEMBER. IT MAY, HOWEVER, BE A DELIBERATE IRANIAN PLOY:  
BY USING THEIR AIRCRAFT TO TRIGGER THE RADAR DEFENCE SYSTEM AND  
THE ALARM SIRENS IN BAGHDAD WITHOUT PRESSING HOME AN ATTACK,  
THEY CAUSE ALMOST THE SAME AMOUNT OF DISRUPTION TO LIFE IN THE  
CITY AS A GENUINE RAID, THEREBY UNDERMINING CIVILIAN MORALE.

5. DRIVING HIS OWN CAR, SADDAM HUSSAIN CONDUCTED A MUCH PUBLICISED  
MORALE BOOSTING TOUR OF BAGHDAD AT NOON ON 7 SEPTEMBER. SHADES  
OF QASIM AFTER THE ASSASSINATION ATTEMPT IN 1959. NOT TO

MORALE BOOSTING TOUR OF BAGHDAD AT NOON ON 7 SEPTEMBER. SHADES  
OF QASIM AFTER THE ASSASSINATION ATTEMPT IN 1959, NOT TO  
MENTION HARUN AL-RASHID WHEN CHECKING UP ON THE BARMECIDES

EGERTON

NNNN



IRAN/IRAQ

ADVANCE COPIES

22

*Mufaxed*

~~PS~~

PS/SIR I GILMOUR

PS/MR HURD

PS/PUS

SIR E YOUDE

SIR J GRAHAM

MR J C MOBERLY

MR BRAITHEWAITE

HD/MED

HD/NENAD

HD/UND

HD/CONS D

CONSULAR EMERGENCY UNIT

HD/ES & SD

HD/MAED

HD/DEF D

FUSD (2)

NEWS D

~~RESIDENT CLERK~~

~~NO 10 DOWNING STREET~~

CABINET OFFICE DIO

*Sir A Akbar*

RESTRICTED

FM ISLAMABAD 280935Z SEP 80

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1304 OF 28 SEPTEMBER

INFO WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK

INFO SAVING BAGHDAD, MOSCOW, UKDEL NATO, DELHI.

UKMIS NEW YORK TEL NO 1397

IRAQ-IRAN: PRESIDENT ZIA'S MISSION

1. BEFORE HE LEFT ISLAMABAD FOR TEHRAN AND BAGHDAD ON 27 SEPTEMBER, PRESIDENT ZIA-UL-HAQ TOLD REPORTERS THAT HIS MISSION WAS QUOTE PURELY EXPLORATORY UNQUOTE. TODAY'S PAKISTAN PRESS REPORTS FROM TEHRAN THAT HE TOOK THE SAME LINE WITH THE IRANIANS ON ARRIVAL AND HAD BEEN WELCOMED BY KHOMEINI'S REPRESENTATIVE AS HEAD OF A BROTHERLY COUNTRY NOT AS A MEDIATOR. A PAKISTAN FOREIGN OFFICE STATEMENT HAD EARLIER SAID THAT THE MISSION WAS MEANT TO ASCERTAIN THE VIEWS OF IRAN AND IRAQ IN REGARD TO A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF THEIR CONFLICT IN THE SPIRIT OF ISLAMIC SOLIDARITY.

2. BRIEFING THE RCDS TODAY, RIAZ PIRACHA, FOREIGN SECRETARY, SAID THAT ZIA HAD BEEN IN DIRECT TELEPHONIC CONTACT WITH THE TWO HEADS OF STATE TO SEE IF HE COULD HELP, BEFORE THE SUGGESTION OF A MISSION WAS RAISED. THERE WERE TALKS LAST...



HEADS OF STATE TO SEE IF HE COULD HELP, BEFORE THE SUGGESTION OF A MISSION WAS RAISED. THERE WERE TALKS LAST NIGHT OVER DINNER WITH THE IRANIANS, AND THEY WERE TO BE RESUMED THIS MORNING, THE PAKISTANIS HAD NOT YET HAD A REPORT. ZIA'S PLANE HAD BEEN SENT TO PICK UP HABIB CHATTY, WHO WAS STRANDED IN DHAHRAN. ZIA WAS AIMING TO LEAVE FOR BAGHDAD TODAY, 28 SEPTEMBER, GOING ON TO PARIS TONIGHT OR TOMORROW.

3. PIRACHA EMPHASISED THAT IT WAS ENTIRELY A GOODWILL MISSION AND THERE WAS NO QUESTION OF MEDIATING OR OFFERING GOOD OFFICES; THE OBJECT WOULD BE TO SEE IF THERE WAS THE BASIS FOR A CEASE FIRE AND THEN HAND OVER THE PEACE MAKING PROCESS TO OTHERS. THE PAKISTANIS HAD NO PARTICULAR SOLUTION IN MIND, AND HAD NO AXE TO GRIND, BEING ANXIOUS ONLY TO END A DANGEROUS SITUATION AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. MOST OF THE ARAB COUNTRIES WERE SUPPORTING IRAQ, BUT PAKISTAN HAD BEEN ACCEPTED (APPARENTLY RATHER RELUCTANTLY BY THE IRANIANS) AS A NEUTRAL. IN ANSWER TO A QUESTION, PIRACHA SAID THAT PAKISTAN WOULD CONTRIBUTE TO AN ISLAMIC PEACE KEEPING FORCE IF INVITED TO DO SO, BUT NO SUCH SUGGESTION HAD BEEN MADE AND ANYHOW THIS WAS A WORLD PROBLEM AS WELL AS AN ISLAMIC ONE.

FCO PSE PASS SAVING TO BAGHDAD, MOSCOW, UKDEL NATO.

FORSTER

NNNN

IRAN/IRAQ

ADVANCE COPIES

~~22~~ 33

PS  
PS/SIR I GILMOUR  
PS/MR HURD  
PS/PUS  
SIR E YOUDE  
SIR J GRAHAM  
MR J C MOBERLY  
MR BRAITHEWALTE  
HD/MED  
HD/NENAD  
HD/UND  
HD/CONS D  
CONSULAR EMERGENCY UNIT  
HD/ES & SD  
HD/MAED  
HD/DEF D  
PUSD (2)  
NEWS D  
RESIDENT CLERK

~~NO 10 DOWNING STREET~~  
CABINET OFFICE DIO

*Sir A Account*

*Prime Minister*  
*28-9-80*

*Per seen*

CONFIDENTIAL

FROM ABU DHABI 281900Z SEP 80

TO FLASH FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 302 OF 28 SEPTEMBER

INFO IMMEDIATE MODUK WASHINGTON UKMIS NEW YORK BAGHDAD

MUSCAT JEDDA KUWAIT BAHRAIN DOHA AND DUBAI

MIPT IRAQ/IRAN.

1. SUROOR CLEARLY KNOWS MORE ABOUT IRAQI/OMANI INTENTIONS THAN HE CLAIMS. HE CAN HARDLY HAVE ALLOWED THE IRAQIS TO TRANSIT ABU DHABI WITHOUT ENQUIRING WHAT THEY WERE UP TO.
2. HE OBVIOUSLY THINKS THAT THE SOURCE OF OUR INFORMATION IS BRITISH OFFICERS IN MUSCAT, I DID NOT ENLIGHTEN HIM.
3. I JUDGE THAT IT HAS DONE NO HARM TO LET THE UAE SIDE KNOW THAT WE ARE AWARE THAT SOMETHING IS AFOOT, IF NOTHING ELSE IT WILL HAVE CAUSED THEM TO THINK AGAIN ABOUT ANY ACTION TO RECOVER THE ISLANDS WHETHER THEY ARE OVERTLY INVOLVED OR NOT

**FLASH**

ROBERTS



21

S E C R E T

GR 350

SECRET

FM F. C. O. 281308Z SEP 80

TO FLASH MUSCAT

TELEGRAM NUMBER 370 OF 28 SEPTEMBER

INFO FLASH MODUK (FOR COSSEC DIA AND DNOT), CINCFLEET, WASHINGTON,  
UKMIS NEW YORK, BAGHDAD, ABU DHABI, DUBAI,

INFO IMMEDIATE KUWAIT, BAHRAIN, DOHA, JEDDA, AMMAN, DAMASCUS, PARIS.

YOUR TELNO 269: IRAN/IRAQ

1. YOU SHOULD FORTHWITH MAKE A FURTHER APPROACH TO ZAWAMI. YOU SHOULD MAKE IT CLEAR THAT H. M. G. HAVE AN OBVIOUS INTEREST IN THE MILITARY CONTEXT IN WHICH BRITISH L. S. P. WILL OPERATE, AND HAND OVER A PIECE OF PAPER MAKING THE FOLLOWING POINTS:-

- A. ACCORDING TO OUR INTELLIGENCE, THE IRAN AIRFORCE, THOUGH POTENTIALLY SHORT OF AVIATION FUEL, ARE STILL CAPABLE OF MOUNTING SIGNIFICANT ATTACKS FROM A NUMBER OF AIRFIELDS NOT PREVIOUSLY ACTIVE IN THE FIGHTING WITH IRAQ, AND WITHIN RANGE OF MUSCAT:
- B. IT SEEMS LIKELY THAT THE IRANIANS WILL HAVE DETECTED IRAQI AIR MOVES TOWARDS OMAN, AND MIGHT SOON TAKE OBVIOUS EVASIVE MEASURES E. G. BY DISPERSING THEIR SHIPS FROM BANDAR ABBAS. ANY NAVAL FORCE SURVIVING AN INITIAL ATTACK WOULD FIND OMAN AN EASIER TARGET THAN IRAQ.
- C. FROM WHAT WE KNOW OF THE US- OMANI ACCESS AGREEMENT THERE IS NO GUARANTEE THAT THE AMERICANS WOULD FEEL COMMITTED TO COMING TO OMAN'S DEFENCE AGAINST A RETALIATORY ATTACK FROM IRAN, PARTICULARLY GIVEN THE PROBLEM OF THE HOSTAGES.

2. IN CONVEYING THIS PIECE OF PAPER, YOU SHOULD HOWEVER AVOID ANY SUGGESTION THAT WE MIGHT PREVENT OUR LOAN SERVICE PERSONNEL FROM TAKING PART IN THE DEFENCE OF OMANI TERRITORY, FOR THE FOLLOWING REASONS:-

- A. WE WOULD LOSE ALL CREDIBILITY WITH THE AMANIS IF OUR LOAN SERVICE PERSONNEL STAND BY WHILE THEY GET A BLOODY NOSE.
- B. WE WOULD TURN THE ARABS AS A WHOLE AGAINST US.

S E C R E T

/ C. CONVERSELY



S E C R E T

C. CONVERSELY, WE SHOULD GAIN CREDIT IN ARAB OPINION IF OUR LOAN SERVICE PERSONNEL WERE KNOWN TO HAVE PLAYED THEIR PART IN DEFENCE OF AMANI TERRITORY.

3. OUR GUIDING PRINCIPLES SHOULD BE TO DISCOURAGE THE AMANIS AS UNATTRIBUTABLY AS POSSIBLE, TO MINIMISE THE RISK OF RETALIATION BY IRAQ OR OTHER ARAB COUNTRIES WHO MIGHT THINK THAT WE ARE FRUSTRATING A BLOW AGAINST IRAN, AND TO AVOID GETTING TOO FAR IN FRONT OF THE AMERICANS.

4. YOU SHOULD KEEP YOUR US COLLEAGUE INFORMED AND REPORT ABOUT PARALLEL ACTION HE IS TAKING.

CARRINGTON

IRAQ/IRAN STANDARD

MED	MAED
NEWAD	TRED
NAD	ERD
UND	ECON D
EPED	CONS D
ECD	CONS EM UNIT
WED	CABINET OFFICE

ADDITIONAL DISTR.

IRAQ/IRAN

- 2 -

S E C R E T

Muzarad b NO10 13.35hs

File No. ....

OUTWARD

Security Classification	20(A)
SECRET	
Precedence	
FLASH	
DESKBY	Z

Department .....

TELEGRAM

Drafted by  
(Block Capitals) .....

Tel. Extn. ....

FOR  
COMMS. DEPT.  
USE

Despatched

(Date) .....

(Time) ..... Z

POSTBY ..... Z

PREAMBLE

(Time of Origin) ..... Z (G.M.T.) (Restrictive Prefix) .....

(Security Class.) SECRET (Caveat/Privacy Marking) .....

(Codeword) ..... (Deskby) ..... Z

TO FLASH MUSCAT Tel. No. .... of  
(precedence) (post)

AND TO (precedence/post) FLASH MODUK (FOR COSSEC D14 & DNOT) CINC FLEET

WASHINGTON UKMIS NEW YORK BAGHDAD ABU DHABI DUBAI

AND IMMEDIATE KUWAIT BAHRAIN DOHA JEDDA AMMAN

AND SAVING TO .....

REPEATED TO (for info) .....

SAVING TO (for info) .....

Distribution:-

[TEXT]

YOUR TELNO 269: Iran/Iraq

1. You should forthwith make a further approach to Zawawi. You should make it clear that HMG have an obvious interest in the military context in which British LSP will operate, and hand over a piece of paper making the

following points -

A. According to our intelligence, the Iran airforce, though potentially short of aviation fuel, are still capable of mounting significant attacks from a number of airfields not previously active in the fighting with Iraq, and within range of Muscat;

B. It seems likely that the Iranians will have detected Iraqi air moves towards Oman, and might soon take obvious

/evasive

Copies to:-



evasive measures e.g. by dispersing their ships from Bandar Abas. Any naval force surviving an initial attack would find Oman an easier target than Iraq;

C. From what we know of the US - Omani access agreement there is no guarantee that the Americans would feel committed to coming to Oman's defence against <sup>a</sup> retaliatory attack from Iran, particularly given the problem of the hostages.

2. In conveying this piece of paper, you should however avoid any suggestion that we might prevent our loan service personnel from taking part in the defence of Omani territory, for the following reasons:-

A. We would lose all credibility with the Omanis if our loan service personnel stand by while they get a bloody nose.

B. We would turn the Arabs as a whole against us.

C. Conversely, we should gain credit in Arab opinion if our loan service personnel were known to have played their part in defence of Omani territory.

3. Our guiding principles should be to discourage the Omanis as unattributable<sup>y</sup> as possible; to minimise the risk of retaliation by Iraq or other Arab countries who might think that we are frustrating a blow against Iran; and to avoid getting too far in front of the Americans.



4. You should keep your US colleague informed and report about parallel action he is taking.

Reed

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

IRAN/IRAQ

ADVANCE COPIES

22

PS  
PS/SIR I GILMOUR  
PS/MR HURD  
PS/PUS  
SIR E YOUDE  
SIR J GRAHAM  
MR J C MOBERLY  
MR BRAITHWAITE  
HD/MED  
HD/NENAD  
HD/UND  
HD/COES D  
CONSULAR EMERGENCY UNIT  
HD/ES & SD  
HD/MAED  
HD/DEF D  
PUSD (2)  
NEWS D  
RESIDENT CLERK

~~NO 10 DOWNING STREET~~  
CABINET OFFICE DIO

*Sir H Acland*

*Prime Minister*  
*28.9.80*

CONFIDENTIAL

FROM ABU DHABI 281835Z SEP 80

TO FLASH FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 301 OF 28 SEPTEMBER

INFO IMMEDIATE MODUK WASHINGTON UKMIS NEW YORK BAGHDAD MUSCAT  
JEDDA KUWAIT BAHRAIN DOHA AND DUBAI

**FLASH**

MUSCAT TELS NOS 268 AND 269 AND DUBAI TEL NO 34 TO ME

IRAQ/IRAN

1. I PAID A COURTESY ON THE PRESIDENTIAL CHAMBERLAIN, SHAIKH SUROOR, THIS AFTERNOON WITH THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR SOCIAL SERVICES.
2. SUROOR IMMEDIATELY ASKED ABOUT MR HASKELL'S CONVERSATION WITH SHAIKH RASHID REPORTED IN DUBAI'S TUR. HE HAD BEEN TELEPHONED ABOUT THIS BY RASHID.
3. I EXPLAINED THAT WE HAD HEARD THAT THERE WAS A POSSIBILITY THAT IRAQ AND OMAN WERE PLANNING AN ACTION TO EVICT THE IRANIANS FROM THE TUNBS AND ABU MUSA. WE WERE CONCERNED, AS FRIENDS, THAT IF THE UAE BECAME INVOLVED IN SUCH AN ACTION IT COULD PROVOKE AN ESCALATION OF THE PRESENT CONFLICT AND HAVE THE MOST SERIOUS CONSEQUENCES FOR THE EMIRATES.

MOST SERIOUS CONSEQUENCES FOR THE EMIRATES.

4. SUROOR SAID IT WAS TRUE THAT HE HAD GIVEN PERMISSION TO THE MILITARY AUTHORITIES TO ALLOW "IRAQI ILLYUSHINS TRANSPORTING HELICOPTERS" TO PASS THROUGH ABU DHABI ON THEIR WAY TO MUSCAT HOWEVER HE HAD NO IDEA WHAT THEY WERE TO BE USED FOR. HE PERSONALLY HAD MADE IT CLEAR TO BOTH THE IRAQI AMBASSADOR AND THE IRANIAN CHARGE THAT THE UAE DID NOT INTEND TO INTERVENE IN THE CONFLICT OTHER THAN TO PROMOTE A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT, THE IRANIAN HAD ORIGINALLY BELIEVED THAT RAS AL KHAIMAH WAS BEING USED AS AN IRAQI BASE BUT HAD NOW ACCEPTED SUROOR'S ASSURANCE THAT THIS WAS NOT SO. THE IRAQIS HAD IN FACT ASKED FOR THIS ORIGINALLY.

5. I THANKED HIM FOR THIS EXPLANATION AND SAID THAT IT WAS ONLY OUR DEEP CONCERN FOR THE INTERESTS OF THE UAE WHICH HAD LED US TO RAISE THE MATTER AT ALL WITH THE FEDERAL PRIME MINISTER.

6. I ASKED SUROOR WHAT HE THOUGHT WOULD HAPPEN NOW. HE SAID THE IRAQIS HAD TOLD HIM THAT THEY HAD ALREADY ACHIEVED THEIR OBJECTIVES AND WERE READY TO START NEGOTIATING, THEY HAD NO INTENTION OF HOLDING ON TO MOST OF THE TERRITORY THEY HAD OCCUPIED IN KHUZISTAN BUT WOULD USE IT TO EXTRACT CONCESSIONS. IT WAS NOW UP TO THE IRANIANS TO STOP FIGHTING, HE HOPED THAT THE OFFERS OF MEDIATION BY PRESIDENT ZIA AND THE REST WOULD HAVE SOME EFFECT.

7. SUROOR SEVERAL TIMES SAID THAT HE HOPED THE UK WOULD NOT BE DRAWN INTO ANY JOINT OPERATION WITH THE AMERICANS TO POLICE THE STRAITS OF HORMUZ. THIS WOULD BE BOUND TO BRING THE RUSSIANS ON THE SCENE. THE SITUATION DID NOT WARRANT IT.

8. SEE MIFT

ROBERTS

BT

FLASH

NNNN



IRAN/IRAQ

ADVANCE COPIES

22

PS  
PS/SIR I GILMOUR  
PS/MR HURD  
PS/PUS  
SIR E YOUDE  
SIR J GRAHAM  
MR J C MOBERLY  
MR BRAITHEWAITE  
HD/MED  
HD/NENAD  
HD/UND  
HD/CONS D  
CONSULAR EMERGENCY UNIT  
HD/ES & SD  
HD/MAED  
HD/DEF D  
PUSD (2)  
NEWS D  
RESIDENT CLERK ✓

NO 10 DOWNING STREET  
CABINET OFFICE DIO

*unfaxed to Chequers  
28.9.80.*

*In a adal*

GPS 280

CONFIDENTIAL

FM DUBAI 280820Z SEP 80

TO IMMEDIATE ABU DHABI

TELEGRAM NUMBER 35 OF 28 SEPTEMBER

INFO IMMEDIATE FCO MODUK MUSCAT BAGHDAD WASHINGTON

UKMIS NEW YORK

INFO PRIORITY BAHRAIN DOHA JEDDA KUWAIT AMMAN

IRAN/IRAQ

1. I CALLED ON THE FEDERAL MINISTER OF DEFENCE, SHAIKH MOHAMMED BIN RASHID, THIS MORNING TO COMPARE NOTES ONCE AGAIN. MOST OF OUR CONVERSATION CONCERNED IRAQI MILITARY OBJECTIVES. SHAIKH MOHAMMED THOUGHT THAT IN THE SHATT AL-ARAB AREA THESE WERE CONFINED TO SEIZING SUFFICIENT GROUND ON THE EAST BANK TO ENFORCE THEIR CONDITION THAT ANY SETTLEMENT MUST INCLUDE RECOGNITION OF IRAQI SOVEREIGNTY OVER THE WHOLE WATERWAY. HE BELIEVED THERE WAS NO IRAQI INTENTION PERMANENTLY TO OCCUPY ABADAN OR KHORRAMSHAHR. HOWEVER IRAQ WAS LOOKING FOR TERRITORIAL GAINS FURTHER NORTH, AS WAS SHOWN BY YESTERDAY'S ADVANCE ON AHWAZ.

2. SHAIKH MOHAMMED SAID THAT HE COULD NOT BELIEVE THE IRAQIS HAD ANY SERIOUS INTENTION OF OCCUPYING THE GULF ISLANDS, WHICH WOULD BE IMPOSSIBLE TO GARRISON ON A PERMANENT BASIS GIVEN THE STRENGTH OF THE IRANIAN AIR FORCE AND NAVY AROUND BANDAR ABASS. A HIT AND

ANY SERIOUS INTENTION OF OCCUPYING THE GULF ISLANDS, WHICH WOULD BE IMPOSSIBLE TO GARRISON ON A PERMANENT BASIS GIVEN THE STRENGTH OF THE IRANIAN AIR FORCE AND NAVY AROUND BANDAR ABBAS. A HIT AND RUN RAID WAS A POSSIBILITY. ALTERNATIVELY, YESTERDAY'S MOVEMENTS OF IRAQI TRANSPORT AIRCRAFT AND HELICOPTERS TO THE LOWER GULF MIGHT BE INTENDED ONLY AS A DECOY, TO DETER THE IRANIANS FROM TRANSFERRING AIRCRAFT AND SHIPS TO REINFORCE THEIR HARD-PRESSED FORCES FURTHER NORTH.

3. SHAIKH MOHAMMED SAID THAT THE IRANIANS HAD NOW ADMITTED YESTERDAY'S 3 PHANTOM OVERFLIGHTS OF THE U A E ( RAS AL-KHAIMAH, SHARJAH AND AN AREA BETWEEN DUBAI AND ABU DHABI ). THEY HAD STATED QUITE OPENLY THAT THE FLIGHTS WERE MADE TO RECONNOITRE WHAT WAS GOING ON IN THE U A E, AND HAD REFUSED TO GUARANTEE THAT THERE WOULD NOT BE OTHERS.

4. ANTI-AIRCRAFT GUNS HAVE SUDDENLY APPEARED AROUND SHARJAH PORT, BUT NO OVERT MILITARY PRECAUTIONS ARE APPARENT IN DUBAI. ( EVEN THE GUARD ON THE MINISTRY OF DEFENCE IS BACK TO NORMAL ).

HASKELL

BT

NNNN

*Refaxed 27/9*

IRAN/IRAQ

ADVANCE COPIES

~~22~~ 31.

PS 5  
 PS/SIR I GILMOUR 3  
 PS/MR HURD  
 PS/PUS  
 SIR E YOUDE  
 SIR J GRAHAM  
 MR J C MOBERLY  
 MR BRAITHEWAITE  
 HD/MED  
 HD/MENAD  
 HD/URD  
 HD/CONS D  
 CONSULAR EMERGENCY UNIT  
 HD/ES & SD  
 HD/MAED  
 HD/DEF D  
 PUSD (2)  
 NEWS D  
~~RESIDENT CLERK~~

~~NO 10 DOWNING STREET~~  
 CABINET OFFICE DIO (2)

*Mr Adams*  
 MR ADAMS

GRS 500  
 RESTRICTED  
 FM BAGHDAD 271125Z SEP 80  
 TO PRIORITY FCO  
 TELEGRAM NUMBER 442 OF 27/9/80  
 FOR INFO TO PRIORITY KUWAIT JEDDA AMMAN DAMASCUS ANKARA  
 WASHINGTON MOSCOW TOKYO

IRAQ/IRAN SITREP: MY TEL NO 436 (NOT TO TOKYO):

1. BY THE EVENING OF 26 SEPTEMBER , IRAQ CLAIMED TO HAVE SHOT DOWN AFURTHER FOURTEEN IRANIAN AIRCRAFT AND BOMBED TEHRANS OIL REFINERY, BUT HAD NOT (NOT) CLAIMED FURTHER ADVANCES INTO IRANIAN TERRITORY.
2. THE GENERAL COMMAND OF THE IRAQI ARMED FORCES ISSUED SIX STATEMENTS ONLY DURING 26 SEPTEMBER , A FRIDAY. MAIN POINTS AS FOLLOWS:

STATEMENT 33



-----

FIERCE FIGHTING ALONG THE FRONTIER WITH HEAVY LOSS OF LIFE AND MATERIAL SUSTAINED BY IRANIAN FORCES.  
NINE IRANIAN AIRCRAFT SHOT DOWN OVER THE BATTLE FIELD AND AN IRANIAN CAMP INCLUDING NINETEEN SERVICEABLE TANKS CAPTURED. IRANIAN LOSSES PUT AT TWENTY SEVEN TANKS, TEN ARMoured VEHICLES AND EIGHT 155 MM GUNS DESTROYED.  
IRAQI LOSSES GIVEN AS SEVEN SOLDIERS KILLED, TWENTY EIGHT WOUNDED.  
THREE IRAQI JETS AND ONE HELICOPTER SHOT DOWN.

STATEMENT 34

-----

IRANIAN AIRCRAFT ATTACKED ON 26 SEPTEMBER AS FOLLOWS:-

0755 HOURS	MOSUL ONE AIRCRAFT SHOT DOWN FOUR CIVILIANS WOUNDED.
0806 "	OIL INSTALLATIONS IN KIRKUK
0836 "	THREE AIRCRAFT SHOT DOWN
1035 "	MOSUL, KIRKUK, QAIYARA, DIRBANDIKHAN. FIVE AIRCRAFT SHOT DOWN.

STATEMENT 35

-----

ONE IRANIAN AIRCRAFT SHOT DOWN OVER AMARA AND ONE AIRCRAFT AND ONE HELICOPTER OVER THE FRONT LINE.

STATEMENT 36

-----

IRAQI JETS LAUNCHED A STRIKE AGAINST TEHRAN'S OIL REFINERY AT 1600 HOURS. THE ATTACK WAS IN RETALIATION FOR IRAN'S REPEATED ATTACKS ON CIVIL AND ECONOMIC TARGETS IN IRAQ. SAID TO TBE SECOND LARGEST REFINERY IN IRAN AFTER ABADAN COMPLEX.

STATEMENT 37

-----

- ALL IRAQI JETS RETURNED TO BASE SAFELY FOLLOWING ATTACK ON THE TEHRAN REFINERY.

STATEMENT 38

---

AT 0455 HOURS AN IRANIAN MINE SWEEPER AND GUN BOAT APPROACHED THE HEAD OF THE GULF AND WERE SUNK BY IRAQI NAVAL FORCES.

3. THE REPORT THAT IRAQ HAD HALTED ALL OIL EXPORTS (REFERRED TO ON THE BBC WORLD SERVICE BUT NOT (NOT) ANNOUNCED HERE) SUGGESTS THAT IRANIAN STRIKES AGAINST OIL INSTALLATIONS IN KIRKUK HAVE BEEN DAMAGING.

A BRITISH ENGINEER WORKING ON THE OIL FIELDS IN KIRKUK WHO PASSED THROUGH BAGHDAD YESTERDAY CONFIRMED REPORTS OF EXTENSIVE DAMAGE. THIS, THE FAILURE TO RECORD ANY TERRITORIAL ADVANCES IN FIGHTING ON 26 SEPTEMBER AND THE DOUBTS ABOUT WHETHER IRAQIS HAVE IN FACT CAPTURED KHORRAMSHAHR INDICATE THAT THE IRAQIS MAY BE MEETING STIFFER RESISTANCE THAN THEY EXPECTED IN THE FIRST HALF OF THE WEEK.

4. SHORTLY BEFORE 0400 HOURS (LOCAL) THIS MORNING (27 SEPT) IRANIAN AIRCRAFT RAIDED BAGHDAD. FOR THE FIRST TIME THERE WAS NO ADVANCE WARNING FROM THE AIR RAID SIRENS WHICH MAY MEAN THE AIRCRAFT MANAGED TO ESCAPE RADAR DETECTION. THE IRAQIS HAVE NOT YET ISSUED ANY STATEMENTS ON TODAY'S FIGHTING OR ON THIS RAID, BUT THERE HAVE BEEN CASUALTIES: WE HEARD THE AMBULANCES. THERE ARE NO (NO) REPORTS OF BRITISH CASUALTIES.

EGERTON

NNNN

FLASH

IRAN/IRAQ

*referred to Cheques.  
27-g*

ADVANCE COPIES

*22 32*

PS  
PS/SIR I GILMOUR *5*  
PS/MR HURD *4*  
PS/PUS  
SIR E YOUDE  
SIR J GRAHAM *Sw. A. ALI*  
MR J C MOBERLY  
MR BRAITHWAITE  
HD/MED  
HD/NENAD  
HD/UND  
HD/CONS D  
CONSULAR EMERGENCY UNIT  
HD/ES & SD  
HD/MAED  
HD/DEF D  
PUSD (2)  
NEWS D  
RESIDENT CLERK *3*

NO 10 DOWNING STREET  
CABINET OFFICE DIO

*2*

VZCZCFDG SEC  
SPE  
PRI  
271830Z SEP 80  
FROM COMMCEN HSP  
TO MODUK

FLASH

SECRET ECLIPSE UK COMMS ONLY  
SIC

GRS 498  
SECRET  
ECLIPSE  
FM AMMAN 271830Z SEP 80  
TO FLASH FCO  
TELNO 362 OF 27 SEP 80  
AND TO FLASH WASHINGTON  
IMMEDIATE MUSCAT

INFO PRIORITY MODUK ABU DHABI BAGHDAD BAHRAIN DAMASCUS DOHA  
DUBAI JEDDA AND KUWAIT



Mufaxed  
27/9

1. MY US COLLEAGUE HAS JUST TOLD ME OF A DISCUSSION HE HAD WITH KING HUSSEIN ON 24 SEPTEMBER. THE KING REVEALED THAT THE IRAQI DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER TARIQ AZIZ HAD ASKED HIM TO INTERVENE WITH SULTAN QABOOS IN SUPPORT OF AN IRAQI REQUEST TO OMAN FOR REFUELLING FACILITIES TO ENABLE THE IRAQI AIR FORCE TO TAKE OUT THE IRANIAN NAVAL BASE AT BANDAR ABBAS (AN ATTACK ON ABU MUSA AND THE TUNBS WAS NOT APPARENTLY MENTIONED). KING HUSSEIN TOLD AMBASSADOR VELIOTES THAT IN RESPONSE TO THIS REQUEST HE HAD SENT AN EMISSARY TO OMAN TO ASK SULTAN TO DO AS THE IRAQIS WISHED. ACCORDING TO THE KING, THE IRAQIS HAD MADE A PREVIOUS DIRECT APPROACH TO OMAN BUT HAD BEEN TURNED DOWN. WE KNOW THAT TARIQ AZIZ WAS IN AMMAN ON 24 SEPTEMBER (SEE MY TELNO 354 OF 25 SEPTEMBER NOT TO MUSCAT), BUT NOTHING HAS BEEN MADE PUBLIC HERE ABOUT THE DESPATCH OF A JORDANIAN EMISSARY TO SULTAN QABOOS.

2. VELIOTES, WHO WAS OF COURSE WITHOUT INSTRUCTIONS, ARGUED STRONGLY AGAINST THE INVOLVEMENT OF OMAN IN THE CONFLICT BETWEEN IRAQ AND IRAN, DRAWING ON SIMILAR ARGUMENTS TO THOSE DEPLOYED BY MR TUNNELL WITH THE OMANI MINISTER OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS (MUSCAT TELNO 268 OF 27 SEPTEMBER) AND HE THINKS HE MAY HAVE MADE SOME IMPACT ON THE KING. BUT HE WAS ALMOST CERTAINLY TOO LATE, AS THE KING HAD ALREADY DESPATCHED HIS EMISSARY TO SULTAN QABOOS. VELIOTES HAS SINCE RECEIVED INSTRUCTIONS FROM WASHINGTON APPROVING THE LINE HE TOOK WITH KING HUSSEIN AND ASKING HIM TO REINFORCE THE POINTS HE HAD ALREADY MADE TO THE KING AND ALSO TO DRAW HIS ATTENTION TO THE POSSIBLE EFFECT ON THE LIVES OF THE US HOSTAGES IF OMAN WERE THOUGHT TO BE IN ANY WAY ACTING IN CONNIVANCE WITH THE US, TO THE IMPORTANCE OF KEEPING OMAN NEUTRAL BECAUSE OF THE STRATEGIC POSITION SHE OCCUPIED IN RELATION TO THE STRAITS OF HORMUZ AND TO THE DANGERS FOR OMAN OF IRANIAN RETALIATION.

3. AMBASSADOR VELIOTES HAS NOT YET BEEN ABLE TO SEE KING HUSSEIN AGAIN (HE IS APPARENTLY SPENDING MOST OF TODAY WITH HIS ARMED FORCES). I TOO THIS MORNING ASKED IF I MIGHT SEE THE KING WITHIN THE NEXT DAY OR TWO: IF I HAD SPECIFIC AND URGENT INSTRUCTIONS, I AM SURE HE WOULD RECEIVE ME QUICKLY.

4. PARAS 1 AND 2 ABOVE. THIS IS PRESUMABLY WHAT LIES BEHIND THE INFORMATION IN WASHINGTON TELEGRAM NO 4115 OF 26 SEPTEMBER TO FCO. I SHOULD BE GRATEFUL IF VELIOTE'S CONFIDENCE COULD BE PROTECTED. HE WAS INCIDENTALLY MOST

4. PARAS 1 AND 2 ABOVE. THIS IS PRESUMABLY WHAT LIES  
BEHIND THE INFORMATION IN WASHINGTON TELEGRAM NO 4115 OF 26  
SEPTEMBER TO FCO. I SHOULD BE GRATEFUL IF VELIOTE'S  
CONFIDENCE COULD BE PROTECTED. HE WAS INCIDENTALLY MOST  
APOLOGETIC THAT HE HAD NOT BEEN ABLE TO LET ME KNOW SOONER:  
WE HAVE BOTH BEEN HEAVILY INVOLVED WITH EVACUATION FROM IRAQ.

URWICK  
BT

FLASH

NNNN

[Faint, mostly illegible text, possibly bleed-through from the reverse side of the page]



IRAN/IRAQ

IMMEDIATE

*Unfaxed  
27-9*

ADVANCE COPIES

22

6

PS  
PS/SIR I GILMOUR 3  
PS/MR HURD  
PS/PUS  
SIR E YOUDE  
SIR J GRAHAM  
MR J C MOBERLY  
MR BRAITHWAITE  
HD/MED  
HD/NENAD  
HD/UND  
HD/CONS D  
CONSULAR EMERGENCY UNIT  
HD/ES & SD  
HD/MAED  
HD/DEF D  
PUSD (2)  
NEWS D  
RESIDENT CLERK

~~NO 10 DOWNING STREET~~  
CABINET OFFICE DIO

*Sir A. H. ...*

GR 150

RESTRICTED

FM AMMAN 271250Z SEP 80

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 360 OF 27 SEP

AND TO IMMEDIATE ABU DHABI MUSCAT AND NEWYORK

ROUTINE TO BAHRAIN BAGHDAD JEDDA KUWAIT AND WASHINGTON

WASHINGTON TELNO 4115 IRAQ/IRAN

1. JORDANIAN PRESS REPORTED ON 27 SEPTEMBER THAT AN UNDER-SECRETARY AT THE OMANI MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, COLONEL GHAZZAWI IS EXPECTED TO ARRIVE SHORTLY IN AMMAN. TARIQ AZIZ VISITED AMMAN ON HIS WAY BACK FROM PARIS (MY TELNO 354 OF 25 SEPTEMBER TO FCO). HE LEFT FOR BAGHDAD ON 26 SEPTEMBER.

2. THE JORDANIAN PRESS REPORTED THIS MORNING THAT KING HUSSEIN HAD HELD TELEPHONE CONVERSATIONS ON THE SITUATION BETWEEN IRAQ AND IRAN AND THE NEED FOR A UNIFIED ARAB POSITION "IN SUPPORT OF JUST IRAQI DEMANDS" WITH KING KHALID OF SAUDI ARABIA, THE RULERS OF KUWAIT AND ABU DHABI, PRINCE KHALIFAH OF QATAR, SHEIKH ISSA BIN SULTAN OF BAHRAIN AND THE PRESIDENT OF THE YAR. LITTLE FURTHER EMERGED IN THE PRESS ABOUT WHAT IF ANYTHING RESULTED FROM THESE TALKS.

URWICK



IRAN/IRAQ

ADVANCE COPIES

22

ADVANCE COPY

Impacted to  
Cheques 27.9.80

PS (6)  
PS/SIR I GILMOUR (3)  
PS/MR HURD  
PS/PUS  
SIR E YOUDE  
SIR J GRAHAM  
MR J C MOBERLY  
MR BRAITHWAITE  
HD/MED  
HD/NEENAD  
HD/UND  
HD/CONS D  
CONSULAR EMERGENCY UNIT  
HD/ES & SD  
HD/MAED  
HD/DEF D  
PUSD (2)  
NEWS D  
RESIDENT CLERK  
*Sir R. A. A. A.*

NO 10 DOWNING STREET

CABINET OFFICE DIO (2)

GRS 90

CONFIDENTIAL

FM BAHRAIN 270847Z SEP 80

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 157 OF 27 SEPTEMBER

INFO ROUTINE ABU DHABI DOHA JEDDA KUWAIT DUBAI

YOUR TEL 549 TO JEDDA: IRAN/IRAQ

1. MY VIEW IS THAT THERE WOULD BE LITTLE IMMEDIATE EFFECT ON THE BAHRAIN ECONOMY OF A COMPLETE CLOSURE OF THE STRAITS OF HORMUZ.
2. WHILE LARGE QUANTITIES OF FOODSTUFFS ARE IMPORTED BY SEA, THE PRIME MINISTER, WITH WHOM MR PATRICK JENKIN HAD A MEETING THIS MORNING, VOLUNTEERED THAT THERE WERE SUFFICIENTLY LARGE STOCKS OF ESSENTIAL FOODSTUFFS TO LAST FOR SOME MONTHS. FUEL FOR ELECTRICITY GENERATION AND WATER DESALINATION IS LOCALLY PRODUCED.
3. THE LONGER-TERM EFFECT WOULD BE THAT ALMOST ALL ITEMS EXCEPT FUEL WOULD HAVE TO COME VIA MORE CIRCUITOUS AND COSTLY ROUTES.

WALKER

NNNN

D/B 272300Z

REG  
09202

ADVANCE COPIES

IRAN/IRAQ

ADVANCE COPIES

22 28

Mufaxed

PS  
PS/SIR I GILMOUR  
PS/MR HURD  
PS/PUS  
SIR E YOUDE  
SIR J GRAHAM  
MR J C MOBERLY  
MR BRAITHEWAITE  
HD/MED  
HD/NENAD  
HD/UND  
HD/CONS D  
CONSULAR EMERGENCY UNIT  
HD/ES & SD  
HD/MAED  
HD/DEF D  
FUSD (2)  
NEWS D

RESIDENT CLERK

S.A. Adad

IMMEDIATE

NO 10 DOWNING STREET  
CABINET OFFICE DIO

IMMEDIATE

RESTRICTED

DESKBY TOKYO (NEXT CONTACT)

DESKBY F C O 272300Z

DESKBY HONG KONG (NEXT CONTACT)

FM WASHINGTON 272130Z SEP 80

TO IMMEDIATE TOKYO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 6 OF 27 SEPTEMBER

INFO IMMEDIATE F C O (FOR RESIDENT CLERK) HONG KONG (FOR GOVERNOR)

PRIORITY PEKING BAGHDAD MUSCAT DUBAI DAMASCUS AMMAN JEDDA BAHRAIN

UKMIS NEW YORK KUWAIT PARIS BONN.

FOLLOWING FROM PRIVATE SECRETARY: SECRETARY OF STATE'S MOVEMENTS.

1. AS THE SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST CONTINUES TO CAUSE CONCERN, LORD CARRINGTON HAS DECIDED TO REMAIN IN WASHINGTON FOR A FURTHER 24 HOURS SO THAT HE CAN KEEP IN CONTINUOUS TOUCH WITH LONDON AND WITH THE AMERICANS. DEPARTURE OF THE VC10 HAS THEREFORE BEEN POSTPONED FOR THE TIME BEING UNTIL NOON WASHINGTON TIME ON SUNDAY 28 SEPTEMBER, WHICH WOULD GIVE AN ETA AT TOKYO AIRPORT OF 17.55 ON MONDAY 29 SEPTEMBER. LORD CARRINGTON WILL PROBABLY NOT BE ABLE TO TAKE A FINAL DECISION TO PROCEED WITH HIS VISIT TO TOKYO UNTIL THE MORNING OF SUNDAY 28 SEPTEMBER.

2. IF THE SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST DOES NOT OBLIGE HIM TO

2. IF THE SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST DOES NOT OBLIGE HIM TO RETURN TO LONDON, HE WOULD LIKE TO GO AHEAD WITH THE TOKYO PROGRAMME ARRANGED FOR TUESDAY 30 SEPTEMBER AND WEDNESDAY 1 OCTOBER.

3. PRESS LINE IS IN MY TEL NO 4125 TO F C O, REPEATED TO YOU BUT NOT TO ALL. YOU WILL DOUBTLESS WISH TO SPEAK IN SIMILAR TERMS TO THE JAPANESE. YOU MAY ALSO WISH TO WARN THEM THAT THERE IS SOME RISK THAT LORD CARRINGTON MAY NOT BE ABLE TO CARRY OUT THE VISIT (THOUGH HE WOULD GREATLY REGRET THIS) AND TO APOLOGISE FOR THE CONTINUING UNCERTAINTY, FOR REASONS WHICH THEY WILL DOUBTLESS UNDERSTAND. SIR A PARSONS HAD AN OPPORTUNITY TO WARN THE JAPANESE FOREIGN MINISTER IN NEW YORK THAT THIS EVENTUALITY MIGHT ARISE. ITO WAS UNDERSTANDING.

HENDERSON

NNNN



D/A 272300Z (247809112)

IMMEDIATE  
ADVANCE COPY

faxed 28/9

IRAN/IRAQ

ADVANCE COPIES

22-8

PS (1)  
PS/SIR I GILMOUR  
PS/MR HURD  
PS/PUS  
SIR E YOUDE  
SIR J GRAHAM  
MR J C MOBERLY  
MR BRAITHEWAITE  
HD/MED  
HD/NEAD  
HD/UND  
HD/CONS D  
CONSULAR EMERGENCY UNIT  
HD/ES & SD  
HD/MAED  
HD/DEF D  
PUSD (2)  
NEWS D  
RESIDENT CLERK

NO 10 DOWNING STREET  
CABINET OFFICE DIO

Sir A. Adani

CONFIDENTIAL

DESKBY 272300Z TO ALL  
FM JEDDA 272115Z SEP 80  
TO IMMEDIATE FCO  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 706 OF 27 SEPTEMBER  
AND TO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK

MUSCAT TELNO 268 AND MY TELNO 705: IRAN/IRAQ

1. I HAVE JUST RETURNED FROM A TRIP TO YAMANI IN TAIF AND SEEN THESE TELEGRAMS. BOTH PRINCE SAUD AND HIS DEPUTY ON THE POLITICAL SIDE ARE IN NEW YORK. IF YOU WISH ME TO SPEAK TO THE SAUDIS I SHALL HAVE TO TRY TO LOCATE PRINCE FAHD WHOSE WHEREABOUTS I DO NOT AT THIS MOMENT KNOW.
2. THE QUICKEST METHOD OF LOBBYING THE SAUDIS WOULD BE THROUGH SAUD IN NEW YORK. I COULD REINFORCE SUCH AN APPROACH AS SOON AS I COULD FIND FAHD. BUT IT IS NOW 2415 HOURS HERE.
3. RESIDENT CLERK PLEASE REPEAT DESKBY TO TOKYO. IF NECESSARY.

HOURS HERE.

3. RESIDENT CLERK PLEASE REPEAT DESKBY TO TOKYO IF NECESSARY.

CRAIG

NNNN

IMMEDIATE

IRAN/IRAQ

ADVANCE COPIES

32 D/B 2718007

PS  
PS/SIR I GILMOUR (5)  
PS/MR HURD (4)  
PS/PUS  
SIR E YOUDE  
SIR J GRAHAM *Sir A ALLAN*  
MR J C MOBERLY  
MR BRAITHWAITE  
HD/MED  
HD/RENAD  
HD/UND  
HD/CONS D  
CONSULAR EMERGENCY UNIT  
HD/ES & SD  
HD/MAED  
HD/DEF D  
PUSD (2)  
NEWS D  
RESIDENT CLERK

NO 10 DOWNING STREET  
CABINET OFFICE DIO (2)

IMMEDIATE

SECRET

DESKBY 271800Z

FM JEDDA 271705Z SEP 80

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 705 OF 27 SEPTEMBER  
AND TO IMMEDIATE (DESKBY) WASHINGTON.

MUSCAT TELNO 268 AND WASHINGTON TELNO 002. IRAN/IRAQ.

1. GRATEFUL FOR INSTRUCTION ON WHETHER WE SHOULD, IN ACCORDANCE WITH YOUR TELNO 555, INFORM THE SAUDIS OF THE OMANI'S INTENTIONS AND OF THE SECRETARY OF STATES RESPONSE.

2. ALTHOUGH THE SAUDIS COULD NOT PUBLICLY CONDEMN AN IRAQI MILITARY TAKE OVER OF THE ISLANDS, THEY PROBABLY WOULD SHARE SOSFA'S FEELINGS. THEY MIGHT BE WILLING TO RAISE THE MATTER WITH THE OMANI'S.

CRAIG.



*my fax to  
Chequers  
27-9-80*

ADVANCE COPIES

IRAN/IRAQ

*25*

ADVANCE COPIES

*22*

- PS (6)
- PS/SIR I GILMOUR (3)
- PS/MR HURD
- PS/PUS
- SIR E YOUDE
- SIR J GRAHAM
- MR J C MOBERLY
- MR BRAITHWAITE
- HD/MED
- HD/NENAD
- HD/UND
- HD/CONS D
- CONSULAR EMERGENCY UNIT
- HD/ES & SD
- HD/MAED
- HD/DEF D
- PUSD (2)
- NEWS D
- RESIDENT CLERK

NO 10 DOWNING STREET  
CABINET OFFICE DIO (2)

*S. in a deck 1*

GR130

CONFIDENTIAL

FM JEDDAH 270915Z SEP 80

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 704 OF 27TH SEPTEMBER 1980.

REPEATED PRIORITY KUWAIT, ABU DHABI, BAHRAIN, DOHA.

MY TELNO 703: IRAN/IRAQ

WHEN I ACCOMPANIED MR LAMONT ON A VISIT TO JEDDA REFINERY TODAY THE FOLLOWING FACTS EMERGED: THE REFINERY BRINGS IN BY SEA FROM RAS TANOURA 100 PERCENT OF ITS REQUIREMENTS OF CRUDE AND 40 PERCENT OF PRODUCTS, STOCKS HELD ARE 15 DAYS OF CRUDE AND 10 DAYS OF PRODUCTS. PETROMIN HAVE 5 TANKERS UNDER THE SAUDI FLAG (2 OWNED AND 3 CHARTERED). THE DIRECTOR OF THE REFINERY SAID ALL THESE COULD BE ORDERED TO SAIL INTO THE GULF IF NECESSARY. AT THE MOMENT THERE WAS NO PROBLEM WITH THEIR TANKERS IN THE GULF. BUT THEY WERE WATCHING THE SITUATION CLOSELY.

2. DIRECTOR SEEMED TO ASSUME THAT THE 60 PERCENT OF PRODUCTS IMPORTED WOULD CONTINUE TO ARRIVE.

IMMEDIATE

*Sir M. Palmer  
has a copy of  
cheques*

IRAN/IRAQ

ADVANCE COPIES

ADVANCE COPIES

*22 28*

PS (6)  
PS/SIR I GILMOUR  
PS/MR HURD  
PS/PUS  
SIR E YOUDE  
SIR J GRAHAM  
MR J C MOBERLY  
MR BRAITHEWAITE  
HD/MED  
HD/NENAD  
HD/UND  
HD/CONS D  
CONSULAR EMERGENCY UNIT  
HD/ES & SD  
HD/MAED  
HD/DEF D  
PUSD (2)  
NEWS D  
RESIDENT CLERK

*~~2/28~~  
D/O 280900Z*

NO 10 DOWNING STREET  
CABINET OFFICE DIO

IMMEDIATE

*Prime Minister  
29-9-80*

*Sir A. Adams*

*M Adams*

CONFIDENTIAL  
DESKBY 280500Z  
FM DUBAI 272155Z SEP 80  
TO IMMEDIATE ABU DHABI  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 34 OF 27 SEPTEMBER  
AND TO IMMEDIATE FCO (*DUBAI 280900Z*)  
INFO IMMEDIATE MODUK WASHINGTON UKMIS NEW YORK BAGHDAD MUSCAT  
JEDDA KUWAIT BAHRAIN DOHA

YOUR TELNO 19 TO ME AND WASHINGTON TELNO 2 TO MUSCAT: IRAN/IRAQ.  
1. WITH YOUR AGREEMENT, I CALLED ON SHAIKH RASHID AT 2300 HOURS  
TONIGHT. I SAID THAT WE HAD BEEN OFFICIALLY INFORMED OF THE  
LIKELY USE OF OMANI FACILITIES BY IRAQI FORCES FOR AN IMMINENT  
ASSAULT ON THE GULF ISLANDS OCCUPIED BY IRAN BUT BELONGING TO  
THE U A E. THIS CLEARLY TOUCHED THE U A E'S VITAL INTERESTS VERY  
DEEPLY. WE DID NOT KNOW HOW FAR THE U A E MIGHT BE INVOLVED IN  
DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN THE OMANI AND IRAQI GOVERNMENTS ON THIS  
MATTER, BUT ALTHOUGH THIS EMBASSY HAD NO DIRECT INSTRUCTIONS, WE  
BELIEVED THAT THE U A E SHOULD BE AWARE THAT H M G VIEWED THE  
PROPOSED ACTION WITH THE GRAVEST MISGIVINGS, AND WERE URGING CAUTION  
ON THE OMANI GOVERNMENT IN THE STRONGEST POSSIBLE TERMS.  
2. THE NEWS CLEARLY CAME AS A TOTAL SURPRISE TO SHAIKH RASHID. HE  
SAID THAT HE WOULD IMMEDIATELY CONSULT SHAIKH ZAID AND OTHER  
MEMBERS OF THE U A E GOVERNMENT



2. THE NEWS CLEARLY CAME AS A TOTAL SURPRISE TO SHAIKH RASHID. HE SAID THAT HE WOULD IMMEDIATELY CONSULT SHAIKH ZAID AND OTHER MEMBERS OF THE U A E GOVERNMENT. HE SAID THAT HE HAD REPEATEDLY TAXED SHAIKH SAQR OF RAS AL-KHAIMAH WITH PLOTTING SOME MISCHIEF WITH THE IRAQIS, BUT SAQR HAD ALWAYS ASSURED HIM THAT HE HAD NO INTENTION OF USURPING THE AUTHORITY OF SHAIKH ZAID AS PRESIDENT OR THE SUPREME COUNCIL OF RULERS, AND HAD EMPHASISED THAT HE NO LONGER HAD ANY ARMED FORCES UNDER HIS PERSONAL CONTROL. I SAID THAT I HAD NO INDICATION OF ANY INVOLVEMENT BY SHAIKH SAQR IN THE SCHEME, WHICH APPEARED TO HAVE BEEN EVOLVED SOLELY BY THE OMANI AND IRAQI GOVERNMENTS.

3. SHAIKH RASHID CLEARLY APPRECIATED ALL THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE PLAN FOR THE SAFETY OF THE STRAITS OF HORMUZ AND THE STABILITY OF THE WHOLE GULF AREA. I TOLD HIM THAT I WAS ALREADY DUE TO SEE SHAIKH MOHAMMED AT 1000 LOCAL TIME TOMORROW, 28 SEPTEMBER ( 0600 G M T ), BUT HE MAY WELL SUMMON ME HIMSELF. I SHALL TELEGRAPH AGAIN AS SOON AS I SEE EITHER OF THEM.

4. SHAIKH RASHID MENTIONED, INCIDENTALLY, THAT THERE WERE SEVERAL OVERFLIGHTS OF U A E TERRITORY BY IRANIAN MILITARY AIRCRAFT TODAY. A PROTEST HAD BEEN MADE TO THE IRANIAN AMBASSADOR, WHO HAD SIMPLY DENIED THE FLIGHTS OCCURRED AT ALL. I IMAGINE THEY MAY HAVE BEEN IN REACTION TO MOVEMENTS OF IRAQI AIRCRAFT TO SIB: IN WHICH CASE, THE IRANIANS WILL ALREADY BE AWARE THAT SOMETHING IS AFOOT.

HASKELL

BT

NNNN



GR 607

SECRET UK COMMS ONLY

FM MUSCAT 272200Z SEPT 83

TO FLASH FCO

TELNO 269 OF 27 SEPT 83

AND TO FLASH MODUK (FOR COSSEC DIA AND DMOT) CINC FLEET

WASHINGTON UKMIS NEW YORK BAGHDAD ABU DHABI DUBAI

AND IMMEDIATE KUWAIT BAHRAIN DOHA JEDDA

AMMAN

MY TELNO 268 OF 27 SEPT AND TELECOM S OF S/TUNNELL.

IRAN/IRAQ.

1. I SAW QAIS ZAWAMI AGAIN AT MY REQUEST ON THE EVENING OF 27 SEPTEMBER. HE WAS ACCOMPANIED BY ALI MAJID, THE SULTAN'S EQUERRY.

2. I SAID THAT THE REACTION OF THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT WAS ONE OF HORROR THAT THE OMANIS SHOULD CONTEMPLATE PARTICIPATION IN THE PROPOSED OPERATION. THE SECRETARY OF STATE HAD PERSONALLY REQUESTED ME TO URGE THE UTMOST RESTRAINT. THE ACTION CONTEMPLATED COULD NOT ONLY ENDANGER THE ADMIRABLE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL PROGRESS WHICH OMAN HAD BEEN MAKING OVER THE PAST YEARS BUT COULD ALSO ADD TO THE DANGERS OF PASSAGE OF SHIPPING THROUGH THE STRAITS OF HORMUZ. I ADDED THAT THE SECRETARY OF STATE HAD DEMONSTRATED OVER RECENT MONTHS HIS SUPPORT FOR THE LEGIMATE RIGHTS OF THE ARABS IN THE REGION AND HIS PARTICULAR ATTACHMENT TO OMAN. HE WAS SPEAKING AS A PERSONAL FRIEND OF OMAN WHICH WE SAW AS PERHAPS OUR MOST RELIABLE AND SENSIBLE ALLY IN THE AREA. I WENT ON TO SAY THAT, ALTHOUGH WE SYMPATHISED WITH OMANI/IRAQI DESIRES TO BRING ABOUT A MORE AMENABLE REGIME IN IRAN, WE COULD NOT GO ALONG WITH THE MEANS ENVISAGED TO BRING THIS ABOUT. I HINTED THAT THE OMAN APPRECIATION OF IRAN'S ABILITY TO STRIKE BACK AGAINST THOSE WHO HELPED IRAQ TO REGAIN THE ISLANDS MIGHT BE MORE OPTIMISTIC THAT THE FACTS SUGGESTED AND THAT THE VIEW FROM WASHINGTON, WHERE THE SECRETARY OF STATE NOW WAS MIGHT SUGGEST GREATER IRANIAN MILITARY STRENGTH THAN THE OMANIS SUPPOSED. FINALLY I URGED THAT THE OMANIS SHOULD DELAY ANY DECISION UNTIL WE AND THE US HAD TIME TO PRESENT TO THE OMANIS A MORE CONSIDERED APPRECIATION OF THE SITUATION. AT MY URGING ZAWAMI UNDERTOOK TO PASS THE SECRETARY OF STATE'S MESSAGE URGENTLY TO THE SULTAN IN SALALAH.

3. ZAWAWI'S RESPONSE WAS THAT HE WAS SURPRISED AT THE STRENGTH OF BRITISH OPPOSITION TO THE OPERATION. HE ACCEPTED THAT THE SECRETARY OF STATE WAS A GOOD FRIEND OF OMAN AND WAS GENUINELY CONCERNED WITH THE COUNTRY'S WELL-BEING SEMI COLON BUT WE WERE ALWAYS URGING THE OMANIS TO COOPERATE MORE CLOSELY WITH THEIR BROTHER ARABS, AND WHEN, AS IN THIS CASE, THEY DECIDED TO DO SO, ALL THEY GOT WAS CRITICISM.

4. I SAID THAT, IN GENERAL TERMS, WE WERE TALKING ABOUT PEACEFUL CO-OPERATION WITH NEIGHBOURS. WOULD IT NOT BE BETTER FOR THE OMANIS IN THIS CASE TO ACT LIKE THEIR NEIGHBOURS, GIVE VOCAL SUPPORT TO THE IRAQIS AND STAY OUT OF THE CONFLICT? ZAWAWI DISMISSED THE EXAMPLE OF THE GULF STATES WHICH WERE TOO DISORGANISED AND HAD TO MANY INTERNAL PROBLEMS TO ACT IN A POSITIVE MANNER. WHEN TAXED WITH THE SAUDI EXAMPLE, HE REPLIED THAT THE SAUDIS HAD ALSO AGREED TO PROVIDE "FACILITIES". I SAID THAT I FOUND THIS SUGGESTION UNBELIEVABLE (ALTHOUGH SOMEONE MUST AT LEAST BE REFUELLING THE HELICOPTERS.)

5. I HOPE I WAS ABLE TO BUDGE ZAWAWI TO SOME EXTENT ON THE QUESTION OF THE POTENTIAL APPRECIATION WHICH A SUCCESSOR IRANIAN REGIME MIGHT SHOW TO OMAN. BUT MY FEELING IS THAT THE OMANIS HAVE THE PAN-ARAB BIT BEYWEEN THE TEETH AND WILL TAKE SOME SHAKING. ZAWAWI WENT SO FAR AS TO SUGGEST THAT OMANI ASSISTANCE IN THIS OPERATION IS TO SOME EXTENT DESIGNED TO BRING ROUND THE IRAQIS TO THE VIEW THAT THEY SHOULD FOLLOW THE OMANIS IN BACKING CAMP DAVID.

6. MORE OMINOUSLY ZAWAWI SUGGESTED IN STRICT CONFIDENCE THAT THE IRAQIS IN THEIR GRATITUDE MIGHT CEDE THE ISLAND TO OMAN INSTEAD OF THE STATES OF THE UAE SHOULD THE OPERATION BE SUCCESSFUL. I SAID THAT I COULD SEE NO POSSIBLE BENEFIT TO OMAN FROM SUCH A SOLUTION, WHICH WOULD SET THEM AGAINST NOT ONLY IRAN BUT THEIR CLOSEST NEIGHBOURS ALSO.

7. THIS WAS A FREE-RANGING CONVERSATION WITH NO HOLDS BARRED. I CAN ONLY HOPE THAT ZAWAWI AND/OR MAJID REPEATS THE FULL FLAVOUR TO THE SULTAN IN SALALAH. IN ANY EVENT I BELIEVE THE DANGER IS THAT, AS USUAL, THE SULTAN HAS MADE UP HIS MIND IN ADVANCE OF CONSULTATIONS WITH HIS ALLIES AND THAT, TO BACK DOWN NOW WOULD INVOLVE UNACCEPTABLE LOSS OF FACE WITH THE IRAQIS. WE CAN, I IMAGINE, ENVISAGE A DEMARCHE BY THE AMERICANS TODAY, BUT I STILL CONSIDER THAT OUR BEST BET TO CALL OFF A POTENTIALLY DISASTROUS AND NAIVE ADVENTURE IS TO ENLIST KING HUSSEIN'S SUPPORT IF POSSIBLE.

8. SINCE I HAVE BEEN URGED TO KEEP THE ABOVE CONFIDENTIAL BETWEEN OURSELVES AND THE US, I HAVE NOT APPROACHED THE SERVICE COMMANDERS. IF TIME PERMITS HOWEVER (AND I STILL HAVE NO CLEAR IDEA OF THE TIME-SCALE ENVISAGED FOR THE OPERATION) I CONSIDER THAT I SHOULD BE AUTHORISED TO MENTION OUR MISGIVINGS TO THEM.

GRATEFUL FOR INSTRUCTIONS.

TUNNELL

BT

NNNN



FLASH

19

IRAN/IRAQ

ADVANCE COPIES

22 32

unfaxed to  
Chequers  
27-9-80

PS  
PS/SIR I GILMOUR  
PS/MR HURD  
PS/PUS  
SIR E YOUDE  
SIR J GRAHAM  
MR J C MOBERLY  
MR BRAITHEWAITE  
HD/MED  
HD/NENAD  
HD/UND  
HD/CONS D  
CONSULAR EMERGENCY UNIT  
HD/ES & SD  
HD/MAED  
HD/DEF D  
PUSD (2)  
NEWS D  
RESIDENT CLERK

5  
4

NO 10 DOWNING STREET  
CABINET OFFICE DIO 2

*Sir Adam*  
*MR ADAMS*

FLASH

SECRET UK COMMS ONLY  
FM MUSCAT 271230Z SEPT 80  
TO FLASH FCO  
TELNO 268 OF 27 SEPT 80  
AND TO FLASH MODUK (FOR COSSEC DIA AND DNOT). CINC  
FLEET WASHINGTON UKMIS NEW YORK BAGHDAD ABU DHABI DUBAI  
IMMEDIATE KUWAIT BAHRAIN DOHA JEDDA

WASHINGTON TELNO 4115 OF 26 SEPT: IRAN/IRAQ.  
1. I WAS SUMMONED TO SEE THE MINISTER OF STATE FOR FOREIGN  
AFFAIRS THIS MORNING. QAIS ZAWAWI EXPLAINED THAT A HIGH-LEVEL  
IRAQI DELEGATION HAD VISITED THE SULTAN IN SALALAH YESTERDAY  
TO REQUEST ASSISTANCE IN THEIR CONFLICT WITH IRAN. WHEN I PRESSED  
HIM HE ADMITTED THAT A DECISION HAD BEEN TAKEN IN PRINCIPLE TO OFFER  
THE IRAQIS FACILITIES TO MOUNT OPERATIONS AGAINST THE TUMBS AND  
ABU MUSA AND ALSO TO "TAKE CARE OF" IRANIAN NAVAL UNITS.  
HE WOULD NOT BE DRAWN ON THE TIMESCALE BUT IT IS ALMOST CERTAINLY  
IMMINENT (SEE NAVAL ATTACHES TELNO UZH/KAG/LAA OF 27 SEPT  
NOT TO ALL. OMAN HAD COME TO THE CONCLUSION THAT, SUCH WAS THE  
DEGREE OF INSTABILITY IN THE GULF AREA CAUSED BY THE  
KHOMEINI REGIME THAT THEY FELT OBLIGED TO GIVE ASSISTANCE  
TO THE IRAQIS.

2. I SAID THAT I WAS SPEAKING WITHOUT SPECIFIC INSTRUCTIONS BUT

2. I SAID THAT I WAS SPEAKING WITHOUT SPECIFIC INSTRUCTIONS BUT THAT THE BRITISH VIEW WAS THAT THE AREA OF CONFLICT SHOULD BE LIMITED AND A PEACEFUL SOLUTION SOUGHT. I DID NOT THINK THAT THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT WOULD BE IN FAVOUR OF THE OPERATION. WE HAD ADMIRERD THE EVEN-HANDEDNESS SHOWN BY THE OMANIS IN THE FIRST DAYS OF THE CONFLICT. I ASKED WHETHER THE OMANIS HAD CONSIDERED THE DANGERS OF RETALIATION FROM IRAN AND ALSO THE DANGERS OF THE IRANIANS HAMPERING FREEDOM OF PASSAGE IN THE STRAITS OF

HORMUZ. ON RETALIATION, ZAWAWI SAID THAT THIS HAD OF COURSE BEEN CONSIDERED. THE OMANIS HAD FAITH IN THEIR AIR DEFENCE SYSTEM, AND "THIS WOULD BE A GOOD TEST". HE SEEMED TO BELIEVE (UNREALISTICALLY IN MY VIEW) THAT IT WOULD BE SOME DAYS BEFORE THE IRANIANS DISCOVERED THE BASE FROM WHICH THE OPERATION WAS LAUNCHED. ON HORMUZ, ZAWAWI THOUGHT THAT THE OPERATION WOULD HELP GUARANTEE FREE PASSAGE. I ASKED WHETHER THE OMANIS EXPECTED THE US FLEET TO COME TO THEIR ASSISTANCE IN THE EVENT OF DIFFICULTIES. HE REPLIED THAT THIS WAS THE PURPOSE OF THE ACCESS AGREEMENT. MY US COLLEAGE, WHO WAS ALSO SUMMONED FOR THE SAME PURPOSE TODAY, CLAIMS HOWEVER THAT ZAWAWI'S ASSUMPTION MAY BE PREMATURE.

3. FINALLY I MADE THE POINT THAT OMAN WOULD HAVE TO LIVE WITH ANY FUTURE IRANIAN REGIME AND THAT THE LATTER, WHATEVER COMPLEXION IT MIGHT TAKE, COULD WELL HARBOUR A GRUDGE AGAINST OMANI PARTICIPATION IN THIS ADVENTURE. SINCE THE ISLANDS WOULD PRESUMABLY EVENTUALLY REVERT TO THE STATES OF THE UAE, WHY SHOULD NOT THEY, RATHER THAN THE OMANIS PROVIDE THE FACILITIES? QAIS MERELY COMMENTED THAT THE SULTAN HAD DECIDED AND THAT THESE WERE RISKS THE OMANIS WOULD HAVE TO TAKE. IN ANY CASE THE UAE COULD NOT PROVIDE ADEQUATE FACILITIES. WHEN I ASKED HIM WHETHER HE THOUGHT KHOMEINI WOULD REALLY BE OUT OF THE PICTURE IN A MATTER OF DAYS HE SAID THAT IT WAS ONLY A QUESTION OF MONTHS AT THE MOST AND THAT HE WAS CONVINCED ANY FUTURE REGIME WOULD SEE THE WISDOM OF THE OMANI ACTION.

4. IT IS NOT CLEAR WHETHER, IN GIVING US AND THE AMERICANS THIS FOREWARNING THE OMANIS GENUINELY WISH TO HEED OUR VIEWS. THERE MAY IN ANY CASE BE LITTLE TIME, AND I WOULD JUDGE THAT IT WILL BE DIFFICULT TO CHANGE THE SULTAN'S MIND NOW THAT HE HAS GIVEN SOME SORT OF UNDERTAKING TO THE IRAQIS. NEVERTHELESS I HAVE URGED DELAY ON ZAWAWI AND WOULD BE GRATEFUL FOR URGENT INSTRUCTIONS.



BE DIFFICULT TO CHANGE THE SULTAN'S MIND NOW THAT HE HAS GIVEN  
SOME SORT OF UNDERTAKING TO THE IRAQIS. NEVERTHELESS I HAVE  
URGED DELAY ON ZAWAWI AND WOULD BE GRATEFUL FOR URGENT INSTRUCTIONS.  
ZAWAWI HAS INVITED OUR FURTHER VIEWS AS SOON AS THEY ARE RECEIVED.  
MY US COLLEAGUE HAS RESPONDED IN SIMILAR VEIN SEMI COLON AND  
IT MIGHT WELL BE PRODUCTIVE IF WE WERE INSTRUCTED TO MAKE A  
JOINT DEMARCHE TO THE OMANIS. MOREOVER, IF WASHINGTON TUR IS  
TO BE BELIEVED, ANY FURTHER CALLS FOR RESTRAINT MIGHT ALSO BE  
DIRECTED AT KING HUSSAIN, WHO HAS GREAT INFLUENCE WITH QABOOS.

5 ZAWAWI ALSO MENTIONED IN REPLY TO MY QUESTION THAT LOAN SERVICE  
PERSONNEL WOULD BE EXPECTED TO TAKE PART IN ANY OPERATIONS  
WITHIN OMANI TERRITORIAL LIMITS WHICH MIGHT ARISE FROM IRAQI  
ACTIONS. GRATEFUL FOR INSTRUCTIONS ON THIS POINT ALSO.

TUNNELL  
BT

FLASH

NNNN



IRAN/IRAQ

FLASH

unfaxed 27/9 18

ADVANCE COPIES

32  
~~22~~

PS (5)  
 PS/SIR I GILMOUR (4)  
 PS/MR HURD  
 PS/PUS  
 SIR E YOUDE  
 SIR J GRAHAM  
 MR J C MOBERLY  
 MR BRAITHERWAITE  
 HD/MED  
 HD/NEHAD  
 HD/UND  
 HD/CONS D  
 CONSULAR EMERGENCY UNIT  
 HD/ES & SD  
 HD/MAED  
 HD/DEF D  
 PUSD (2)  
 NEWS D  
 RESIDENT CLERK

~~NO 10 DOWNING STREET~~  
 CABINET OFFICE DIO (2)

*Sir A. Adams*  
*MR ADAMS*

FLASH

SECRET

FM DUBAI 271500Z SEP 80  
 TO FLASH ABU DHABI  
 TELEGRAM NUMBER 33 OF 27 SEPTEMBER  
 AND TO FLASH FCO  
 RFI FLASH MUSCAT, MODUK, WASHINGTON  
 IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK, BAGHDAD, JEDDA, KUWAIT, BAHRAIN AND  
 DOHA

MUSCAT TELS NO 268 TO FCO AND U2H/KAG/LAA 270915Z TO MODUK:  
 IRAN/IRAQ.

1. I HAVE AN APPOINTMENT WITH THE FEDERAL MINISTER OF DEFENCE  
 AT 1000 LOCAL TIME (0600 GMT) TOMORROW, 28 SEPTEMBER. PURPOSE  
 WAS TO COMPARE NOTES ON THE SITUATION, DRAWING ON JIC  
 ASSESSMENTS ETC (FCO TEL NO 555 TO JEDDA).

2. GRATEFUL FOR INSTRUCTIONS DESKBY 280500Z ON WHETHER I  
 SHOULD RAISE THE OMANI ACTION. I THINK WE CAN TAKE IT  
 THAT THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT (THOUGH NOT THAT OF RAS AL-KHAIMAH)  
 WILL BE DISMAYED AT THE POSSIBILITIES THIS OPENS UP, BUT I  
 DOUBT WHETHER THEY HAVE THE CAPACITY OR THE WILL ACTIVELY TO  
 INTERVENE.

*reply attached*

HASKELL  
BT

*Mufaxed*  
*279*

**FLASH**

IRAN/IRAQ

ADVANCE COPIES

~~22~~ 32

PS  
PS/SIR I GILMOUR (5)  
PS/MR HURD (4)  
PS/PUS  
SIR E YOUDE  
SIR J GRAHAM  
MR J C MOBERLY *Sir. A. Ahmad*  
MR BRAITHWAITE  
HD/MED  
HD/NEWAD  
HD/UND  
HD/CONS D  
CONSULAR EMERGENCY UNIT  
HD/ES & SD  
HD/MAED  
HD/DEF D  
PUSD (2)  
NEWS D  
RESIDENT CLERK

~~NO 10 DOWNING STREET~~  
CABINET OFFICE DIO (2)

**FLASH**

GR 30  
RESTRICTED  
FROM ABU DHABI 271525Z SEP 80  
TO FLASH DUBAI  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 19 OF 27 SEPTAMBER  
AND TO FLASH FCO.  
INFO ROUTINE DOHA AND BAHRAIN

YOUR TELNO 33 OF 27 SEPTEMBER.

IRAQ/IRAN

1 AGREE NO OBJECTION.

2. YOU COULD CITE THE TREATY OF FRIENDSHIP , ARTICLE 2.

3. PLEASE REPEAT AS NECESSARY



FLASH

IRAN/IRAQ

ADVANCE COPIES

2-32

PS  
 PS/SIR I GILMOUR (4)  
 PS/MR HURD  
 PS/PUS  
 SIR E YOUDE  
 SIR J GRAHAM  
 MR J C MOBERLY  
 MR BRAITHWAITE  
 HD/MED  
 HD/NEAD  
 HD/UND  
 HD/CORS D  
 CONSUL & EMERGENCY UNIT  
 HD/ES & SD  
 HD/MAED  
 HD/DEF D  
 PUSD (2)  
 NEWS D  
 RESIDENT CLERK

(5)

(4)

Sir A. ACUMD

~~NO 10 DOWLING STREET~~  
 CABINET OFFICE DIO (2)

*ms*

FLASH

GR 33  
 RESTRICTED  
 FROM ABU DHABI 271525Z SEP 83  
 TO FLASH DUBAI  
 TELEGRAM NUMBER 19 OF 27 SEPTEMBER  
 AND TO FLASH FCO.  
 INFO ROUTINE DOHA AND BAHRAIN

YOUR TELNO 33 OF 27 SEPTEMBER.

IRAQ/IRAN

1 AGREE NO OBJECTION.

2. YOU COULD CITE THE TREATY OF FRIENDSHIP , ARTICLE 2.

3. PLEASE REPEAT AS NECESSARY



FO 029/27

XX  
1717

OO FCO (DESKBY 290930Z)

OO CARACAS

PP JEDDA

GPS 250

UNCLASSIFIED

DESKBY 290930Z

FM WASHINGTON 271655Z SEP 80

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NO 4123 OF 27 SEPTEMBER

INFO IMMEDIATE CARACAS

PRIORITY JEDDA

MY TELNO 4119: VISIT OF SECRETARY OF STATE FOR ENERGY

TO-DAY'S WASHINGTON POST AND NEW YORK TIMES BOTH REPORT MR HOWELL'S UNDERSTANDING, DERIVED FROM HIS TALKS IN VENEZUALA, THAT THE AGREEMENT BY SOME OPEC COUNTRIES TO CUT PRODUCTION HAD BEEN QUOTE PUT ON ICE UNQUOTE. BOTH ARTICLES ALSO REPORT A STATEMENT IN FRANCE BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE VENEZUALAN CONGRESS THAT OPEC COUNTRIES WOULD INCREASE PRODUCTION TO COVER ANY SHORTFALL RESULTING FROM THE IRAN/IRAQ CONFLICT. THE TIMES ADDS THAT A VENEZUALAN OFFICIAL HERE WAS UNWILLING TO CONFIRM ANY PLAN TO INCREASE PRODUCTION.

2. THE POST REPORTS THAT QUOTE OIL SPECIALISTS UNQUOTE IN BAHRAIN HAVE PRIVATELY CONFIRMED MR HOWELL'S UNDERSTANDING AND INDICATED THAT SAUDI ARABIA INITIATED THE MOVE TO END CUTBACKS IN PRODUCTION. THIS ACCOUNT ASSERTS THAT KUWAIT AND THE UAE HAVE BACKED THE SAUDI POSITION BUT THAT INTENTIONS IN ALGERIA AND LIBYA ARE STILL UNCLEAR.

3. RESIDENT CLERK PLEASE INFORM NEWS DEPARTMENT AND TELEPHONE THE ABOVE TO WEST, PS/SECRETARY OF STATE FOR ENERGY TO-DAY (HOME TELEPHONE 446 1115).

4. PLEASE ADVANCE TO PS/SECRETARY OF STATE FOR ENERGY, D LE B JONES AND KELLY IN THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY AND FALL ESSD  
DESKBY 0930 29 SEPTEMBER.

HENDERSON



country ~~SECRET~~.

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

Mr. Alexander.

Mr. Flobertley asked for more  
texts to be made available of you,  
in the light of your discussions  
today.

The telegrams were not sent;  
the ~~two~~ copies are for your  
information.

J. Paton Resident Clerk  
27/9.

This is a copy. The original has been ~~declassified~~ <sup>Security Classified</sup> and retained under Section 3(4)

File No. ....

OUTWARD

Department ..... Res. Clerk .....

TELEGRAM

Drafted by .....

(Block Capitals) .....

Tel. Extn. ....

PRECEDENCE
Precedence
FLASH
DESKBY .....Z

FOR COMMS. DEPT. USE	Despatched	(Date) .....	POSTBY .....
		(Time) .....Z	.....Z

PREAMBLE

(Time of Origin) ..... Z (G.M.T.) (Restrictive Prefix) .....

(Security Class.) ..... SECRET (Caveat) .....

(Codeword) ..... (Privacy marking) .....

(Deskby) ..... Z

TO ..... FLASH ..... AMMAN ..... Tel. No. .... of .....

(precedence) (post)

AND TO (precedence/post) ..... JEDDA, KILWAIT, BAHRAIN, DOHA, DUBAI AND ABU DHABI .....

AND SAVING TO .....

REPEATED TO (for info) ..... MUSCAT, WASHINGTON, BAGHDAD AND DAMASCUS .....

SAVING TO (for info) .....

Distribution:-

As for Muscat  
re no 268

Copies to:-

\*~\* passage  
deleted and  
retained under  
Section 3(4).

Wayland  
2 June 2010

[TEXT]

WASHINGTON TELNO 2: IRAQ/IRAN

- In approaching other governments in the area I would wish you to avoid making use of the specific information given to us in confidence\* ~~~~~ \*  
To do so could be particularly damaging in the context of our relations with the Iraqis and more widely in the area given Arab suspicions of our role when the Iranians occupied Turbs.
- You should, however, speak urgently to the local government at the highest possible level to convey my personal concern about recent reports of an Iraqi intention to widen the area of hostilities by a coup de main against Abu Musa and the Turbs. You should

/stress



stress the incalculable consequences of any such armed action in the present circumstances which could do the gravest damage to the security and prosperity of all states in the area. Recovery of the islands by negotiation would be quite another matter.

3. You should urge governments to use their influences on all concerned to exercise the utmost restraint.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

File No. ....  
Department Res. Clerk  
Drafted by  
(Block Capitals) .....  
Tel. Extn. ....

OUTWARD  
TELEGRAM

Security Classification
SECRET
Precedence
FLASH
DESKBY .....Z

FOR  
COMMS. DEPT.  
USE

Despatched (Date) .....  
(Time) .....Z

POSTBY .....Z

PREAMBLE

(Time of Origin) ..... Z (G.M.T.) (Restrictive Prefix) .....  
(Security Class.) SECRET (Caveat/  
Privacy marking) .....  
(Codeword) ..... (Deskby) ..... Z

TO FLASH MUSCAT Tel. No. .... of .....  
(precedence) (post)

AND TO (precedence/post) .....

AND SAVING TO .....

REPEATED TO (for info) Flash WASHINGTON, Immediate Baghdad, Amman,  
Kuwait, Bahrain, Doha, Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Jeddah, Damascus and  
Paris.

SAVING TO (for info) .....

Distribution: -

*As for Muscat file  
No. 268*

Copies to: -

[TEXT]

WASHINGTON TELNO 2: IRAQ/IRAN

1. Please arrange most urgent delivery of the following message to the Sultan from the Prime Minister by whatever means you consider most appropriate:-

"I am gravely concerned by the news of possible Iraqi military action in the area of the Straits of Hormuz, making use of Omani territory and facilities. I most strongly urge you to reconsider Omani involvement in this operation the consequences of which for the security and prosperity of Oman and the whole Gulf area would be incalculable. *Recovery of the islands by negotiation would be another matter.*"

CONFIDENTIAL

FM PARIS 270920Z SEP 80

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 825 OF 27 SEPTEMBER 1980

INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON UKMIS NEW YORK AND BONN

INFO ROUTINE MOSCOW BAGHDAD AND UKDEL NATO

*Mutated to  
Cheques 27.9.80  
The 10 DSK.*  
ADVANCE COPY

YOUR TELNO 782 TO UKMIS NEW YORK (NOT TO ALL): IRAN/IRAQ

1. TARIQ AZIZ, THE IRAQI DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER, SAW PRESIDENT GISCARD ON 25 SEPTEMBER. AZIZ WAS REPORTED AT A SUBSEQUENT PRESS CONFERENCE TO HAVE LISTED THE FOLLOWING CONDITIONS FOR IRAQI WITHDRAWAL FROM OCCUPIED IRANIAN TERRITORY: '1. RESPECT FOR IRAQ'S SOVEREIGN RIGHTS OVER HER WATERS AND TERRITORY: 2. THE ESTABLISHMENT OF NEIGHBOURLY RELATIONS BETWEEN IRAN AND IRAQ AND NEARBY ARAB STATES: 3. NON-INTERVENTION BY IRAN IN IRAQ'S INTERNAL AFFAIRS: 4. THE ENDING OF ALL AGGRESSIVE ACTION BY IRAN.' AZIZ REPEATED THAT IRAQ WOULD RESPECT FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION IN THE STRAITS OF HORMUZ AND IN THE PERSIAN GULF AS A WHOLE. ON 26 SEPTEMBER, THE ELYSEE SPOKESMAN WELCOMED 'THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT'S INTENTION TO OPEN NEGOTIATIONS'. THE PAKISTAN PRESIDENT IS EXPECTED TO MEET PRESIDENT GISCARD IN PARIS ON 28 SEPTEMBER ON HIS WAY TO NEW YORK.

2. IN DISCUSSION ON 26 SEPTEMBER, THE DEPUTY DIPLOMATIC ADVISOR AT THE ELYSEE CLAIMED THAT AZIZ HAD NOT RAISED THE QUESTION OF ARMS SUPPLIES IN HIS DISCUSSION WITH PRESIDENT GISCARD. ACCORDING TO LEVITTE, AZIZ HAD SAID THAT THE SUBJECT HAD NOT BEEN RAISED IN MOSCOW EITHER. THE FRENCH DID NOT KNOW WHETHER THIS WAS THE TRUTH OR WHETHER IT MEANT THAT AZIZ HAD ASKED FOR ARMS FROM THE RUSSIANS BUT HAD OBTAINED NOTHING. LEVITTE APPEARED TO HAVE NO IDEA HOW LONG THE IRAQIS COULD CONTINUE TO FIGHT AT THE PRESENT LEVEL WITHOUT RE-SUPPLY.

3. ON IRAQ'S OBJECTIVES, LEVITTE SAID THAT THE ELYSEE'S IMPRESSION AFTER THE TALKS YESTERDAY WAS THAT IRAQ'S IMMEDIATE AIM WAS TO CAPTURE ENOUGH TERRITORY TO BE ABLE TO BARGAIN FROM A POSITION OF STRENGTH, AND THEN BY GIVING UP SOME OF THE TERRITORY TO END UP WITH WHAT SHE REGARDED AS HISTORICALLY HERS. HOWEVER, IF THE FIGHTING MOVED DECISIVELY IN IRAQ'S FAVOUR, THERE WAS A POSSIBILITY THAT THE IRAQIS WOULD TRY TO TOPPLE KHOMEINI. THERE WAS THE FURTHER RISK THAT THEY WOULD BE TEMPTED TO OCCUPY THE GULF ISLANDS. PRESIDENT GISCARD HAD WARNED AZIZ STRONGLY AGAINST SUCH ACTION. LEVITTE SEEMED SCEPTICAL ABOUT IRAQI PROTESTATIONS THAT THEY WOULD HAND OVER THE ISLANDS TO THE UAE.



IRAN/IRAQ

*Mutaxed*

*27-9*

ADVANCE COPIES

*22 32*

PS  
PS/SIR I GILMOUR *et*  
PS/MR HURD  
PS/PUS  
SIR E YOUDE  
SIR J GRAHAM  
MR J C MOBERLY  
MR BRAITHEWAITE  
HD/MED  
HD/NENAD  
HD/UND  
HD/CONS D  
CONSULAR EMERGENCY UNIT  
HD/ES & SD  
HD/MAED  
HD/DEF D  
FUSD (2)  
NEWS D  
RESIDENT CLERK

~~NO 10 DOWNING STREET~~  
CABINET OFFICE DIO

*2*

*Sir Adams*  
*MR ADAMS*

SECRET

FM WASHINGTON 271525Z SEP 80

TO FLASH MUSCAT

TELEGRAM NUMBER 2 OF 27 SEPTEMBER

INFO FLASH FCO, MODUK, BAGHDAD, AMMAN, ABU DHABI, DUBAI, JEDDA  
IMMEDIATE KUWAIT, BAHRAIN, DOHA, DAMASCUS.

TO CHARGE D'AFFAIRES FROM SECRETARY OF STATE.

YOUR TELNO 268: IRAN/IRAQ.

1. PLEASE SEE ZAWAWI SOONEST AND SAY HOW STRONGLY I DEPLORE THE  
SUGGESTED ACTION WHICH CAN HAVE THE GRAVEST CONSEQUENCES FOR OMAN  
AS WELL AS FOR THE SECURITY OF THE HORMUZ STRAITS. I AM IN TOUCH  
WITH OTHER GOVERNMENTS ABOUT THIS AND WILL COMMUNICATE AGAIN BUT  
WOULD BE GRATEFUL IF YOU WOULD USE ALL THE AUTHORITY POSSIBLE TO  
TRY TO DETER THE OMANIS.

HENDERSON

FLASH

NNNN

*Master Set*

CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER AND THE FOREIGN AND  
COMMONWEALTH SECRETARY ON SATURDAY 27 SEPTEMBER 1980 AT 2000

PM: Hello Peter.

FCS: I thought I'd just have another round up with you in the light of what's been happening here. On reflection, I think that we must be careful not to get ourselves too far in front in terms of the other people. Not with Oman but with the others. Because it is fairly obvious from information that the cooperation between them and Iraq is growing fairly close and if, as I suspect, we are not really going to find it possible to alter the decision, I think we must be careful not to have put ourselves in a position in which everybody gangs up against us. So what I've done is, I've sent that telegram as I told you to Oman and I've talked to the man on the telephone. Tunnel his name is, who is extremely sensible. Unfortunately the Ruler is about 500 miles away

PM: So he can't pop in and see him

FCS: No, but he can see the Foreign Minister they've good communication, this was about an hour ago and he was just off to see him. He didn't know what the timescale of all this was, he thought it might be tomorrow morning or it could conceivably be in about 48 hours and there was evidence that there were more things coming along.

PM: I must say I'm very very depressed about this because I think the first decision was right. And the first decision, the instinctive one, is usually right in terms of what may happen. And what depresses me is that it looks as if we were the only people prepared to give a lead. I'm certain the first decision was right, that it was right to stop it.

FCS: You were right to stop it if you could. The difficulty is it was all confidential information and to have sent a telegram round as my first reaction was and second thoughts prevailed, is of course to breach the confidentiality which of course would have conceivably and perhaps even probably made things worse.

/ PM:

PM: Yes, that I understand except I suppose it would have been possible to ask him to consult with certain people before deciding. That would not have broken the confidentiality but said look we don't think you're right but please before you continue would you consult with blah blah blah ..

FCS: Unfortunately you see I think in this particular case they're working their passage back into the Arab fold.

PM: I see, yes.

FCS: And there is no doubt that he's been giving, been getting advice on the lines that he has now accepted from Hussain.

PM: What???

FCS: Yes. There is a real ...

PM: I must tell you I'm very very shocked because I think they're going in to it far too naively.

FCS: Yes, so do I.

PM: It's dead easy to go into these things and within three days you'll wish you hadn't.

FCS: Yes, for sure. I don't think they've thought of the consequences.

PM: No neither do I.

FCS: But I think that the information, you know all of which came a little bit later, leads one to suppose that there isn't going to be very much chance of changing his mind if all the friends are urging him to do it. The Americans are not sending messages to anybody.

PM: So I understand.

/ FCS:



FCS: But I think they're probably going to get hold of Fahd. I've had a talk with the French. I had a word with Francois-Poncet.

PM: On the basis of published reports, yes.

FCS: Yes. I said there were indications, you know, all that. And his immediate reaction was, well it's going to happen anyway.

PM: Peter, I must say that when anyone says that to me I think it's a specious argument. Our job is to influence events, not to assume they're going to happen.

FCS: Well no I agree. I'm not defending the attitude but that's what he said. He then went on to say since it's going to happen anyway, I think it would be better if it were short and sharp and successful. But of course it isn't going to be.

PM: Exactly. That's exactly what it's not going to be. It's not going to be short, it's not going to be sharp and it's going to be disastrous.

FCS: Yes, well that's right, if it happens. He said he was going to ring his boss up and his boss knows a little bit more than he does because I think Reg Hibbert has told him.

PM: Oh!!

FCS: Within the sort of seal of secrecy, I think. I don't think it matters. On the UN front I was talking to Tony Parsons. Zia is at the moment in Tehran and has had quite a good reaction about mediation from the Iranians but he ..

PM: With the Iranians?

FCS: Bani-Sadr. But he gets the feeling, according to the Pakistan Ambassador at the UN, he gets it very strongly, that any association with the UN, any mediation associated with the UN is totally unacceptable. The UN is in the doghouse. Consequently,

/ according to the

according to the Pakistan Ambassador,<sup>a</sup>/resolution at the UN would be the most counter-production thing that could happen, because it might really stop all this mediation going on. Well now I think it's a very moot point whether this is true or whether this is a Pakistani assessment of it being true, I don't know. But what Tony is doing, and this is right, I'm sure, is in the sidelines to say well look a resolution isn't going to help very much so let's not press it too hard. The Americans want a resolution and the Norwegians want a resolution and the Mexicans want a resolution. And of course is there is a resolution which says cease-fire we should support it. But on the whole it might be better to delay things rather than to risk what I think is the only possibility of getting a solution here, which is Islamic mediation on one side or another.

PM: Where's Zia's next stop?

FCS: He's going to Baghdad. And after that he's coming to New York. I think he's probably stopping in Paris on the way to see Giscard.

PM: On the way to New York?

FCS: Well he was going to because the French were getting very worried about the Pakistan attitude on Afghanistan and he was going to stop off and have a word with Giscard on the way. Whether he will now I don't know.

PM: Well that's for him to decide, isn't it.

FCS: Yes. Anyway he will then come and I hope that there will be a mediation. But if this other thing happens all hell will break loose I think. And I think it's very difficult to say what the reaction ...

PM: I suppose there's no hope if the Iraqis indicate certain things to him that he could stop off in Oman on his way?

FCS: He doesn't know anything about it.

/ PM: No,

PM: No, I wonder if they said certain things to him. I mean he really is mediating on the assumption that the conflict is isolated.

FCS: Yes. The Americans feel that to let him know would be unwise.

PM: It's not possible to bring certain press reports to his attention.

FCS: Well I think that's going to happen anyway. I would doubt whether, in the light of what's going on here, it will not leak.

PM: I still think the other thing that we're basically talking about is the most worrying thing I've heard. The most naive thing and the most disastrous thing. And it could lead to the fall of the person himself.

FCS: Well it could lead to anything, couldn't it. But the whole thing is pretty gruesome and I don't really believe that anybody has looked at the consequences of it because if anybody should suppose that it could be isolated in a couple of days, I think that they are misjudging the actions. Because I cannot believe that the Iranians will not retaliate.

PM: I think they're misjudging the Iranian reaction and their capacity to react which is greater than most people, I think, have calculated. Because you see their capacity, they only need to issue threats.

FCS: It's difficult to know what the capacity is you see because the Americans have turned off the tap of spare parts over a considerable period of time.

PM: Yes, but their ship capacity is quite big.

FCS: Well, it's the only one in the area really.

PM: Yes. Their ship capacity across the Straits is quite big.

/ FCS: It's the



FCS: It's the only one in the area.

PM: Yes. There's no-one else there.

FCS: Yes. But one doesn't know in what condition it is. This is presumably partly the objective of this exercise.

PM: But Peter would you take a tanker in under those circumstances?

FCS: No, not on your life.

PM: Exactly.

FCS: This is what I didn't think the French had quite hoisted in.

PM: I mean they've only got to threaten.

FCS: Tony Parsons thinks that that if this other thing happens that there would be an outrage on the part of most countries on the grounds that this was spreading the conflict beyond the bounds of what was necessary for what the Iraqis have claimed.

PM: Yes, but are they still, but does he still think that they'd keep the Arab world with them? Clearly he does and that's what worries me.

FCS: Yes. Oh I think that there's evidence that it's becoming solid rather than less solid.

PM: Yes, but this is not a calculation of the consequences, this is of teaching Khomeini a lesson which implies that they think he can be taught a lesson. I'm not certain that he can.

FCS: I think that the evidence today is beginning to make it look less likely, don't you?

PM: Yes. They're good fighters.

/ FCS: Yes and

FCS: Yes, and it looks, the military reports I thought reading the telegrams this morning, to me indicate that the Iranians are doing rather better.

PM: I know.

FCS: And the other thing, I don't know whether you've noticed, the other thing is that it looks as if the Soviet Union are rather hedging their bets.

PM: Well I didn't quite notice that.

FCS: Yes. They started off by being inclined to favour the Iraqis and they now seem to be back in the middle.

PM: Well, what frightens me is that they might not merely go back in the middle but the other way.

FCS: Well that's possible too.

PM: Because they're right near them and they could go in and help. That's the frightening thing. That the other side looks like winning remotely and they'll be absolutely in a position to help.

FCS: Well we'll just play the thing hour by hour, do what we can and I'll keep in touch with you.

PM: It's Hussain that bothers me because I thought he was the ...

FCS: I think it's not just him. Christopher told me that there was evidence that there was supportive action on the part of other people.

PM: Yes, well there has been for two or three days, hasn't there.

FCS: Yes, a bit more though.

/ PM: But that

PM: But that was at a time when they thought it was all going to over in a short time therefore they might as well weigh in on the winning side. Warlike cricket isn't like that. I think it's the wish is father to their thought at the moment rather than calculation. There's no point in sending anyone Peter is there? Too late.

FCS: Well I doubt it. I don't think there's time apart from anything else. I've told the Tunnel to go in on my authority and say that I have said this because the Americans are doing it on the Muskie net and not the Presidential one.

PM: Well Peter in that case we just have to wait. Your first reaction was still the right one.

FCS: Well it was the right one in logic.

PM: No, it was the right one in feel and judgement. Damn the logic it was the right one in feel and in judgement.

FCS: I think on the whole though we don't want to get out in front too much.

PM: I don't know, I don't know.

FCS: I think we stand ...

PM: Well what we're saying is that no-one's going to give a lead therefore we can't afford to ..

FCS: No I don't think we're really quite saying that. I think we're saying if we did do it, would it make matters worse. And I think it might conceivably make matters worse. And I think every indication, I've got some telegrams in front of me now, every indication is that all of them are now getting behind Iraq, you know, Hussain. I think the Saudis are getting behind.

PM: You know what will happen to Iraq. They'll be left out in front and alone when things don't go that way. Iraq is out in



front, she's asked certain people to follow her. Other people are and if that operation is not successful and rebounds, Iraq too will find that she's left out in front, alone.

FCS: Well that's absolutely true. But that isn't any particular skin off our nose.

PM: No it isn't.

FCS: The skin off our nose is the Gulf.

PM: Yes, all I'm saying is that the whole operation, even from the viewpoint of Iraq would have been better not conducted. All right Peter, well if we can't do anything else we'll have to do that.

FCS: Well I think we're probably right. Just sort of wait and see now. I think we've done, the French aren't going to do anything, we've done what we can with the people concerned and I think probably that's the best we can do

PM: The Tunnel will go in and say that it's the Omanis best interests we have at heart. I mean they must obviously be the best judges of their interest but ..

FCS: That's right but it's going to be very very important that in the Arab world we're seen not to let them down, so to speak. I mean we've got no interest in Iran and we've got a lot of interest in the Arab world.

PM: Yes, but you see my worry is that we are letting them down by not giving them our best judgement.

FCS: Well I think we are, we are giving them our best judgement, I promise you that. The trouble is I think he's actually promised it and can't retreat.

PM: Well I said to Clive when he was here, the fact is that he's too nice a man, he doesn't like to refuse a request from a friend.

/ FCS: He's working

FCS: He's working his passage back. That's my judgement.

PM: Yes. All right Peter.

FCS: I won't bother you again tonight unless there's a crisis.  
Have a good dinner. Goodbye.

PM: Goodbye Peter.

*cc Martin Set*

CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER AND THE FOREIGN AND  
COMMONWEALTH SECRETARY ON SATURDAY 27 SEPTEMBER 1980 AT 1630

PM: Hello, Peter

FCS: Sorry to bother you. Have you seen the flash telegram from Muscat?

PM: Yes, I have. And I'm very worried about it.

FCS: Well, I think this is very serious.

PM: I think they're going into it without having any idea of the consequences.

FCS: Right.

PM: Both for them and on the rest of the world.

FCS: The consequences for us are really gruesome beyond words. I'll tell you what I've done. I've sent off a flash telegram to Muscat telling the Charge d'Affaires to go in and try and do everything he possibly can to stop them allowing it to happen. We've sent, or are sending - I've been on to the, Acland in the Foreign Office - we're sending telegrams to all Gulf States, plus Saudi Arabia, plus Hussain, the King, pointing out, you know if the Gulf is closed. Because you know if they attack Bandara... Incidentally, the Americans, who have a slightly different interpretation, say that the object of this exercise is to take out Bandarabas and not so much the islands. And of course if they take out Bandarabas, nothing is going to go through those Straits.

PM: At all.

FCS: So we've sent these telegrams trying to point out the problems and the difficulties.

PM: Is Carter sending one too?

/ FCS:



FCS: Well, they're all away. Muskie's playing golf in Maine, I don't know what Carter's doing. But I've just talked to Warren Christopher.

PM: I really think it shouldn't only be us.

FCS: Oh they've got the skids on. I've suggested that we get hold of the French and I will get hold of Francois-Poncet who's in New York who must want the Gulf closed rather less than anyone else and see if they can do anything with the Iraqis.

PM: Iraqis, yes.

FCS: Antony Acland's getting on to the Elysee and I'll get on to Francois-Poncet here. And the last person we think might be useful is Aga Shari, whose been mounting this mediation exercise and won't want to see it collapse around his ears, and therefore might be prepared to take some action. But I would judge that it's very unlikely that we shall bump the Iraqis and Omanis off this. And I think it's going to happen.

PM: Yes, I know.

FCS: Really I do think there ought to be, we ought to be thinking about how to pick up the pieces and localise it.

PM: Yes. The whole strategy, Peter, was to isolate it. And I thought we'd succeeded.

FCS: I mean this is a lunacy. I've asked Douglas Hurd and Michael Palliser at Oxford I gather and I've suggested they all get back to London and have a talk before you see them tomorrow morning. There really is an urgency about it.

PM: Who would be most likely to bring pressure to bear on the Sultan?

/ FCS:

FCS: I think Hussain but there is evidence that Hussain has not been entirely blameless in this.

PM: But I thought that I had read telegrams or something in the paper to the effect that both the Kuawaitis and Saudi Arabia were slightly on the side of Iraq.

FCS: Well I think all the Arabs are.

PM: Yes, but that's different from enlarging the area of conflict.

FCS: Well I think it is, don't you?

PM: Yes, I think so.

FCS: Well because surely they don't want the Straits of Hormuz closed and no tankers coming in to the Gulf.

PM: Well Kuwait certainly would find it extremely difficult because of desalination.

FCS: That's right. They'll be all right for a bit but the food I think will be very difficult for them. I've read a telegram today. But in any event we've sent telegrams hoping they can do something.

PM: Well thank goodness. I was so very alarmed indeed when I read it.

FCS: Well I think this is the worst news so far.

PM: It upsets the entire strategy.

FCS: More than that at the moment we can't do. But I hope that they will be doing some thinking and you will have a chance of talking at Chequers tomorrow. I think I'll hang around here for a bit and see what's happening.

/ PM:

PM: In view of the latest development I think you should. How to stop it starting.

FCS: That's right. And then when it starts it may mean even more necessary to Iran. The last bit of the telegram which is also rather worrying is this business of the loan service personnel.

PM: Indeed yes. Because it involves us.

FCS: I think the position is that the loan service personnel are required to obey the orders of the Sultan under an agreement made in 1971 provided what they're asked to do is legal and not, I've forgotten exactly what the words are, are not contrary to, not putting Her Britannic Majesty in danger or something. But it seems at first brush that the implication is that they have to do what they are told.

PM: Yes. We've done it very badly if that is so. I mean are they actually seconded from us or are they independently employed?

FCS: No there are two sorts. There are the contract officers who are in effect mercenaries and there are the loan service personnel ..

PM: I would have thought that the loan service personnel operated only so long as it was not contrary to the fundamental interests of HMG or if in peace-time operations.

FCS: Well I don't think it's written like that. And you see it would have been difficult to write it like that because they were there originally because they were fighting a war against the PDRY. That was the problem I think. But anyway they're looking up the agreement.

PM: Yes, and they will come with advice? But even so the main thing is to stop the proposed event, isn't it?

/ FCS:



FCS: That's right. But I think it's going to be extremely difficult to do. I really do.

PM: Who else could bring pressure on Iraq?

FCS: The French are the only ones immediately to mind.

Mr. Alexander: Should the Prime Minister speak to Giscard?

FCS: Either that or I'll talk to Francois-Poncet here in New York.

PM: Quicker to talk to Francois-Poncet. But who else ...

FCS: I think on the whole I'd better do that. If I get nowhere perhaps you could go in to Giscard.

PM: Yes. Look, as I told you the Yugoslav PM is in Delhi with Mrs Gandhi. Yugoslavia gets 45% of their oil from there. They're non-aligned, Mrs Gandhi's non-aligned, is there nothing that the non-aligned movement can do in connection with Iraq?

FCS: I should think it's a bit too ponderous to get into action ...

PM: Yes, certainly the Yugoslavs are too ponderous altogether.

FCS: But we might consider, the Yugoslavs and the Indians might, the Indians do have quite a close relationship with Iraq.

PM: They're a very big country too.

FCS: I'll have a think about that, Margaret, OK?

PM: It's just that the more people who bring pressure to bear the better. All right Peter.

FCS: I'll keep in touch. What's the time with you now then?

PM: The time with us now is about a quarter to five. I'm here all the time.

CONFIDENTIAL

FM PARIS 270920Z SEP 80

PRIORITY FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 825 OF 27 SEPTEMBER 1980

INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON UKMIS NEW YORK AND BONN

INFO ROUTINE MOSCOW BAGHDAD AND UKDEL NATO

*the 10 JST*  
ADVANCE COPY

YOUR TELNO 782 TO UKMIS NEW YORK (NOT TO ALL): IRAN/IRAQ

1. TARIQ AZIZ, THE IRAQI DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER, SAW PRESIDENT GISCARD ON 25 SEPTEMBER. AZIZ WAS REPORTED AT A SUBSEQUENT PRESS CONFERENCE TO HAVE LISTED THE FOLLOWING CONDITIONS FOR IRAQI WITHDRAWAL FROM OCCUPIED IRANIAN TERRITORY: "1. RESPECT FOR IRAQ'S SOVEREIGN RIGHTS OVER HER WATERS AND TERRITORY: 2. THE ESTABLISHMENT OF NEIGHBOURLY RELATIONS BETWEEN IRAN AND IRAQ AND NEARBY ARAB STATES: 3. NON-INTERVENTION BY IRAN IN IRAQ'S INTERNAL AFFAIRS: 4. THE ENDING OF ALL AGGRESSIVE ACTION BY IRAN." AZIZ REPEATED THAT IRAQ WOULD RESPECT FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION IN THE STRAITS OF HORMUZ AND IN THE PERSIAN GULF AS A WHOLE.

ON 26 SEPTEMBER, THE ELYSEE SPOKESMAN WELCOMED "THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT'S INTENTION TO OPEN NEGOTIATIONS". THE PAKISTAN PRESIDENT IS EXPECTED TO MEET PRESIDENT GISCARD IN PARIS ON 28 SEPTEMBER ON HIS WAY TO NEW YORK.

2. IN DISCUSSION ON 26 SEPTEMBER, THE DEPUTY DIPLOMATIC ADVISOR AT THE ELYSEE CLAIMED THAT AZIZ HAD NOT RAISED THE QUESTION OF ARMS SUPPLIES IN HIS DISCUSSION WITH PRESIDENT GISCARD. ACCORDING TO LEVITTE, AZIZ HAD SAID THAT THE SUBJECT HAD NOT BEEN RAISED IN MOSCOW EITHER. THE FRENCH DID NOT KNOW WHETHER THIS WAS THE TRUTH OR WHETHER IT MEANT THAT AZIZ HAD ASKED FOR ARMS FROM THE RUSSIANS BUT HAD OBTAINED NOTHING. LEVITTE APPEARED TO HAVE NO IDEA HOW LONG THE IRAQIS COULD CONTINUE TO FIGHT AT THE PRESENT LEVEL WITHOUT RE-SUPPLY.

3. ON IRAQ'S OBJECTIVES, LEVITTE SAID THAT THE ELYSEE'S IMPRESSION AFTER THE TALKS YESTERDAY WAS THAT IRAQ'S IMMEDIATE AIM WAS TO CAPTURE ENOUGH TERRITORY TO BE ABLE TO BARGAIN FROM A POSITION OF STRENGTH, AND THEN BY GIVING UP SOME OF THE TERRITORY TO END UP WITH WHAT SHE REGARDED AS HISTORICALLY HERS. HOWEVER, IF THE FIGHTING MOVED DECISIVELY IN IRAQ'S FAVOUR, THERE WAS A POSSIBILITY THAT THE IRAQIS WOULD TRY TO TOPPLE KHOMEINI. THERE WAS THE FURTHER RISK THAT THEY WOULD BE TEMPTED TO OCCUPY THE GULF ISLANDS. PRESIDENT GISCARD HAD WARNED AZIZ STRONGLY AGAINST SUCH ACTION. LEVITTE SEEMED SCEPTICAL ABOUT IRAQI PROTESTATIONS THAT THEY WOULD HAND OVER THE ISLANDS TO THE UAE.



DISTRIBUTION SELECTORS  
FILE COPY

15

GR680  
SECRET

SECRET

ADVANCE COPY

Ch 10 Dkt.

FM BAGHDAD 270935Z SEP 80  
TO IMMEDIATE FCO  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 439 OF 27/9/80  
AND IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK  
INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, MOSCOW AND UK DEL NATO BRUSSELS  
PRIORITY AMMAN, ABU DHABI, DUBAI, KUWAIT, SAUDI ARABIA, MUSCAT, PARIS,  
BONN, JEDDA, DAMASCUS AND ANKARA.

JIC TEL 845 OF 22 SEPTEMBER, PARA 9: IRAQ/IRAN.

1. WE OWE YOU AN ASSESSMENT OF IRAQ'S AIMS IN THE PRESENT FIGHTING. I WOULD HAVE TELEGRAPHED EARLIER BUT FOR OUR PREOCCUPATION WITH GETTING MOST BRITISH COMMUNITY WIVES AND CHILDREN OUT OF THIS COUNTRY.

2. I AGREE WITH ABU DHABI (MR ROBERTS' TEL 297 TO YOU) THAT IRAQI AMBITIONS GO FURTHER THAN INDICATED IN THE LAST SENTENCE OF JICTEL UNDER REFERENCE. THIS BELIEF IS PERHAPS SUPPORTED BY THE RELEASE OF IRAQ'S "THREE CONDITIONS" FOR NEGOTIATION (MY TEL NO 432 AS AMENDED BY PARA 2 OF AMMAN TEL NO 354, BOTH OF 25 SEPTEMBER).

3. AN IMPORTANT NEW CONSIDERATION IS THAT THE PACE OF IRAQI SUCCESSES IN THE DISPUTED LAND AREAS IS NOW SLOWING DOWN, IN SPITE OF KING HUSSEIN'S BELIEF THAT 48 HOURS (FROM 25 SEPTEMBER) WOULD SUFFICE FOR ALL IRAQI MILITARY OBJECTIVES TO BE ACHIEVED (PARA 3 OF AMMAN TUR). AGAINST THAT BACKGROUND, SADDAM'S MILITARY PLAN MAY LOOK SOMETHING LIKE THE FOLLOWING, BUT IS NO DOUBT CONSTANTLY BEING REASSESSED IN THE LIGHT OF DEVELOPMENTS ON THE GROUND AND THE AVAILABILITY OF SPARES:-

FIRST PRIORITY:

----- OCCUPATION OF ABADAN AND KORRAMSHAHR AND ADVANCE AS FAR AS POSSIBLE TOWARDS REGIONAL CAPITAL, AHWAZ. SADDAM MAY NOW BE LEARNING THAT KHUZISTANI ARAB WELCOME FOR LIBERATING IRAQI TROOPS IS LESS WARM THAN HE EXPECTED. IRANIAN ARMED FORCES RESISTANCE IS CERTAINLY A SURPRISE.

SECOND PRIORITY:

----- ADVANCE UP THE KERMANSHAH ROAD (WELL BEYOND QASR-I-SHIRIN) TO BUILD UP NEGOTIATING POSITION ON THE TWO CLAIMED STRIPS OF TERRITORY RESPECTIVELY NORTH AND SOUTH OF MANDALI (ZAIN AL-WAUS AND SAIF SAAD). IT SEEMS THAT THE IRAQIS ARE DETERMINED TO HAVE SUBSTANTIAL RECTIFICATIONS IN THEIR FAVOUR HERE AT THE END OF THE DAY.

SECRET

/THIRD



SECRET

THIRD PRIORITY:

----- IF SAQR OF RAS AL-KHAIMAH HAS INDEED MADE A DEAL WITH SADDAM, AND IF A MEASURE OF UAE SUPPORT OR AT LEAST ACQUIESCENCE EG. IN REFUELLING IRAQI MIGS AFTER A STRIKE MISSION CAN BE OBTAINED (BOTH BIG IFS), I CAN FORESEE SOME LIMITED MOVE AGAINST THE TUNBS AND/OR "OCCUPIED" ABU MUSA (CF WASHINGTON TEL TO YOU 4115). THIS MIGHT TAKE THE FORM OF AN AIRBORNE ROCKET ATTACK ON IRANIAN INSTALLATIONS ON EG. THE TUNBS, AND WOULD BE A ONE/OFF OPERATION TO GET THE WEST (OR WHOEVER) TO PUT PRESSURE ON IRAN TO NEGOTIATE. IT SEEMS UNLIKELY THAT THE IRAQIS COULD MOUNT AN EFFECTIVE LAND/SEA ATTACK AGAINST ANY OF THE ISLANDS, SINCE BOTH THEIR AMPHIBIAN FORCES AND AIR SUPPORT ARE PROBABLY INADEQUATE AND COULD NOT COUNT ON SYSTEMATIC GULF ARAB LOGISTIC SUPPORT (PARA1 (D) OF DUBAI TEL TO ABU DHABI NO 29 IS RELEVANT HERE).

4. THE ABOVE IS ALL SPECULATIVE. BUT ONE SHOULD AT ALL TIMES REMEMBER THE IMMENSE STUBBORNNESS AND SELF-IMPORTANCE OF SADDAM HUSSEIN, WITH HIS INNATE TENDENCY TO "UP THE ANTE" IF HIS WISHES OR PRESTIGE ARE THREATENED. AS THIS FEATURE IS MORE OR LESS MATCHED BY WHAT I UNDERSTAND TO BE THE IRANIAN ATTITUDE, THE MOOD TO NEGOTIATE MAY TAKE A FEW DAYS YET TO DEVELOP, AND WILL BE INFLUENCED LARGELY BY THE RESUPPLY POSITION ON BOTH SIDES.

5. NO DOUBT YOU HAVE MANY OTHER SOURCES AT YOUR DISPOSAL WHICH THROW LIGHT ON IRAQI AMBITIONS. HERE WE SEE THROUGH A GLASS DARKLY, BUT ARE IN NO DOUBT THAT SADDAM'S PRETENSIONS AS A LEADER OF ARABISM, THOUGH NOT YET HIS FUTURE AS LEADER OF IRAQ, ARE VISIBLY AT STAKE. FURTHERMORE HE MAY BE REALISING A BIT LATE THAT THE DIFFICULTY OF FINDING AN IRANIAN LEADER PREPARED OR EMPOWERED TO NEGOTIATE (AS NABIL NAJM TOLD ME ON 23 SEPTMBER) IS A SEVERE ONE. A SKILLED MEDIATOR IS SURELY GOING TO BE REQUIRED.

EGERTON

LIMITED

MED

NENAD

UND

ESSD

PUSD

DEF D

PS

PS/LPS

PS/MR HURD

PS/PUS

SIR E YOUDE

SIR J GRAHAM

MR J C MOBERLY

MR P H MOBERLY

MR BRAITHWAITE

COPIES TO

MR MAXEY CABINET OFFICE

-2-

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

GRPS 1500  
CONFIDENTIAL

DESKBY 270900Z

FM WASHINGTON 262318Z SEP 80

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 4120 OF 26 SEPTEMBER 1980,

INFO UKDEL O E C D, UKREP BRUSSELS, PARIS, BONN, OTTAWA, ROME,  
TOKYO, BAGHDAD.

MY TELNO 4109: VISIT OF SECRETARY OF STATE FOR ENERGY

MR HOWELL ALSO ME LANTZKE (I E A), CHRISTOPHER (STATE) AND OWEN  
(N S C).

2. LANTZKE'S VIEW WAS THAT LOSS OF 2 M B P D FROM IRAN AND IRAQ SHOULD BE HANDLED WITHOUT PULLING THE I E A TRIGGER. HE THOUGHT THAT COORDINATED ACTION ON STOCKS AND SOME INFORMAL ASSISTANCE TO THOSE COUNTRIES MOST AFFECTED (FRANCE, JAPAN, ITALY, SPAIN AND BELGIUM, ALTHOUGH HE HAD DOUBTS ABOUT WHETHER THE JAPANESE HAD A CASE AND WAS NOT YET SURE ABOUT SPAIN) WOULD BE SUFFICIENT TO KEEP THE SPOT MARKET QUIET. HE WOULD ALSO BE WORKING FOR A STATEMENT FROM ALL I E A GOVERNMENTS THAT THEY WERE ENCOURAGING THEIR COMPANIES TO DRAW ON STOCKS. THE S O M WAS TO MEET ON 29/30 SEPTEMBER AND HE WOULD PRESS THEM FOR REACTIONS TO THESE IDEAS WITHIN 10 DAYS. HE THOUGHT IT IMPORTANT THAT THE U S ADMINISTRATION SHOULD TAKE THE LINE THAT THE STRATEGIC RESERVE SHOULD BE FILLED ONLY IN THE LIGHT OF MARKET CONDITIONS. HE DID NOT WANT THE I E A TO GET INVOLVED IN PRESSING ARAMCO TO HELP CRUDE SHORT COMPANIES.

3. CHRISTOPHER SAID THERE WERE NOW SIGNS OF BUYING ACTIVITY IN THE REFINED PRODUCT SPOT MARKETS BY FRENCH AND BELGIAN COMPANIES. IT MIGHT BE NECESSARY TO TAKE QUICK ACTION TO ARREST SUCH DEVELOPMENTS. COOPER SUGGESTED THAT THIS MIGHT BE HANDLED BY ARRANGING STOCK TRANSFERS BETWEEN OIL COMPANIES BUT NOTED THAT THIS APPROACH COULD RUN INTO U S ANTI-TRUST DIFFICULTIES. ANOTHER REMEDY MIGHT BE TO ASK OIL PRODUCING COUNTRIES, FOR INSTANCE KUWAIT, TO EXPAND PRODUCTION WHERE POSSIBLE. MR HOWELL NOTED THAT THERE WAS A DIFFERENCE BETWEEN GENERALLY ENCOURAGING O P E C COUNTRIES NOT TO CUT PRODUCTION LEVELS AND TALKING TO THEM DIRECTLY ABOUT THE USE OF THEIR SURPLUS CAPACITY.

4. MR HOWELL NOTED THAT OTHER O P E C COUNTRIES MUST HAVE A STRONG INTEREST IN STOPPING THE CONFLICT. CHRISTOPHER AGREED AND SAID THAT THE PROPOSED ISLAMIC CONFERENCE INITIATIVE MIGHT HAVE A GOOD CHANCE OF SUCCESS.

5. STATE DEPARTMENT AGREED THAT THE MINIMUM POSSIBLE PUBLICITY SHOULD BE GIVEN TO CONSULTATIONS BETWEEN MAJOR POWERS ABOUT THE MIDDLE EAST SITUATION. THE JAPANESE HAD MISINTERPRETED THE AMERICAN

CONFIDENTIAL

/ PROPOSAL



CONFIDENTIAL

PROPOSAL ABOUT CONSULTATIONS ON TANKER INSURANCE TO MEAN THAT A LARGE INTERNATIONAL MEETING WOULD BE HELD. THIS QUESTION COULD PROBABLY BEST BE HANDLED INFORMALLY AND COOPER SUGGESTED THAT AN INITIAL EXCHANGE OF VIEWS MIGHT TAKE PLACE NEXT WEEK IN THE MARGINS OF THE S L T MEETINGS IN PARIS.

6. AMBASSADOR OWEN ALSO REFERRED TO ACTIVITY IN THE SPOT MARKET AND SAID THAT HE HAD SUGGESTED TO DUNCAN THAT SOME AMERICAN COMPANIES SHOULD BE ASKED TO RELEASE THEIR STOCKS INTO THE MARKETPLACE. HE HAD ALSO SUGGESTED THAT DUNCAN SHOULD RING GIRAUD TO ASK HIM TO URGE MODERATION ON THE FRENCH COMPANIES. OWEN HAD ALSO ENCOURAGED LANTZKE TO PROPOSE TO THE S O M MEETING NEXT WEEK THAT COUNTRIES SHOULD REDUCE STOCK LEVELS BY AN AVERAGE OF 10 DAYS. IF POSSIBLE THIS ACTION SHOULD BE AGREED WITHIN A WEEK AFTER THE MEETING. MR HOWELL SUGGESTED THAT A STATEMENT ABOUT THIS INTENTION AFTER THE S O M MEETING MIGHT HELP TO CALM DOWN THE MARKET SITUATION. OWEN AGREED WITH THIS IDEA, AND ADDED THAT IT WOULD BE NECESSARY TO PERSUADE THE FRENCH TO ACT ALONGSIDE THE I E A INITIATIVE. HE ALSO RAISED THE QUESTION OF SHARING CRUDE OIL SUPPLIES AMONGST COMPANIES BUT SAID THAT THIS WOULD NOT BE EASY TO ARRANGE IN THE CASE OF ARAMCO. NEVERTHELESS THE ARAMCO SHARE-HOLDERS MIGHT SEE ADVANTAGE IN DAMPING DOWN THE SPOT MARKET BECAUSE OF THEIR FEARS THAT THE SAUDIS WOULD RENEW THEIR CRITICISM OF EXCESSIVE PROFITS. OWEN TOOK THE POINT THAT THE QUESTION OF U S PURCHASES FOR THE STRATEGIC RESERVE MIGHT BE RAISED IN THE S O M DISCUSSIONS.

7. PLEASE ADVANCE TO P S NUMBER 10, P S/L P S, P S/SECRETARY OF STATE FOR ENERGY AND SIR D MAITLAND DESKBY 09.00Z 27 SEPTEMBER.

HENDERSON.

[ADVANCED AS REQUESTED]  
[COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING STREET]

OIL STANDARD

ES & SD  
ERD  
TRED  
ECON D  
ECD  
NAD

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION

OIL



IRAN/IRAQ

ADVANCE COPIES

22 29

PS  
PS/SIR I GILMOUR  
PS/MR HURD  
PS/PUS  
~~SIR B. TOUBE~~  
SIR J GRAHAM  
MR J C MOBERLY  
MR BRAITHWAITE  
HD/MED  
HD/NEPAD  
HD/UND  
HD/CONS D  
CONSULAR EMERGENCY UNIT  
HD/ES & SD  
HD/MAED  
HD/DEF D  
PUSD (2)  
NEWS D  
RESIDENT CLERK

NO 10 DOWNING STREET  
CABINET OFFICE DIO

*Sir A. Adams*

*Mr Adams*

ADVANCE COPY

IMMEDIATE

UNCLASSIFIED  
FM UKMIS NEW YORK 270140Z SEP 80  
TO IMMEDIATE F C O  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1395 OF 26 SEPTEMBER 1980  
INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON.  
INFO PRIORITY BAGHDAD.  
INFO ROUTINE PARIS, BONN, MOSCOW, NEW DELHI, ISLAMABAD, UKDEL NATO.

*DB 270900Z*

M I P T : IRAQ/IRAN

TEXT OF THE DRAFT RESOLUTION IS:

HAVING BEGUN CONSIDERATION OF THE ITEM ENTITLED, "THE SITUATION BETWEEN IRAN AND IRAQ,"

MINDFUL THAT ALL MEMBER STATES HAVE UNDERTAKEN THE CHARTER OBLIGATIONS TO SETTLE THEIR INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES BY PEACEFUL MEANS AND IN SUCH A MANNER THAT INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY AND JUSTICE ARE NOT ENDANGERED,

MINDFUL AS WELL THAT ALL MEMBERS ARE OBLIGED TO REFRAIN IN THEIR INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS FROM THE THREAT OF OR USE OF FORCE AGAINST THE TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OR POLITICAL INDEPENDENCE OF ANY STATE,

RECALLING THAT UNDER ARTICLE 24 OF THE CHARTER THE

SECURITY COUNCIL HAS PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE MAINTENANCE

MINDFUL AS WELL THAT ALL MEMBERS ARE OBLIGED TO REFRAIN IN THEIR INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS FROM THE THREAT OF OR USE OF FORCE AGAINST THE TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OR POLITICAL INDEPENDENCE OF ANY STATE,

RECALLING THAT UNDER ARTICLE 24 OF THE CHARTER THE SECURITY COUNCIL HAS PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE MAINTENANCE OF INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY,

DEEPLY CONCERNED ABOUT THE DEVELOPING SITUATION BETWEEN IRAN AND IRAQ:

1. CALLS ON IRAN AND IRAQ TO REFRAIN IMMEDIATELY FROM ANY FURTHER THREAT OR USE OF FORCE AND TO SETTLE THEIR DISPUTE BY PEACEFUL MEANS;
2. URGES THEM TO ACCEPT ANY APPROPRIATE OFFER OF MEDIATION OR ANY ASSISTANCE THAT MAY BE FORTHCOMING THAT WOULD PERMIT THE FULFILLMENT OF THEIR CHARTER OBLIGATIONS;
3. SUPPORTS THE EFFORTS OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL AND THE OFFER OF HIS GOOD OFFICES FOR THE RESOLUTION OF THIS SITUATION;
4. REQUESTS THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO REPORT TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL WITHIN FORTY-EIGHT HOURS.

PARSONS



IRAN/IRAQ

ADVANCE COPIES

28-29

PS  
PS/SIR I GILMOUR  
PS/MR HURD  
PS/PUS  
~~SIR D HOUD~~  
SIR J GRAHAM  
MR J C MOBERLY  
MR BRAITHEWAITE  
HD/MED  
HD/NENAD  
HD/UND  
HD/CONS D  
CONSULAR EMERGENCY UNIT  
HD/ES & SD  
HD/MAED  
HD/DEF D  
PUSD (2)  
NEWS D  
RESIDENT CLERK

*Sue A Adams*

*MR ADAMS*

NO 10 DOWNING STREET  
CABINET OFFICE DIO

ADVANCE COPY

IMMEDIATE

DB 270900Z

CONFIDENTIAL

DESKBY 270900Z

FM UKMIS NEW YORK 270135Z SEP 80

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1394 OF 26 SEPTEMBER 1980

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON.

INFO PRIORITY BAGHDAD,

INFO ROUTINE PARIS, BONN, MOSCOW, NEW DELHI, ISLAMABAD, UKDEL NATO.

MYTEL 1383 : SECURITY COUNCIL : IRAQ/IRAN.

1. AT THE CONCLUSION OF THIS MORNING'S (26 SEPTEMBER) ISLAMIC CONFERENCE MEETING AGHASHAHI (PAKISTAN), WHO PRESIDED, ISSUED A STATEMENT SAYING THAT PRESIDENT ZIA, ASSISTED BY SECRETARY GENERAL CHATTI, HAD BEEN ENTRUSTED WITH A GOODWILL MISSION TO CONTACT THE GOVERNMENTS OF IRAQ AND IRAN TO "ASCERTAIN THEIR VIEWS WITH REGARD TO A SOLUTION OF THEIR CONFLICT IN THE SPIRIT OF ISLAMIC SOLIDARITY". IN THE ENSUING QUESTION AND ANSWER SESSION SHAHI SAID THAT ZIA WOULD COME TO NEW YORK TO MEET THE ISLAMIC CONFERENCE AND THAT "BOTH IRAN AND IRAQ HAVE ACCEPTED THE PROPOSAL WHICH WAS UNANIMOUSLY ADOPTED". SHEMIRANI (THE IRANIAN ACTING PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE) ATTENDED THE MEETING, AS DID KITTANI (IRAQ). THERE HAVE HOWEVER BEEN SUBSEQUENT



IRANIAN ACTING PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE) ATTENDED THE MEETING, AS DID KITTANI (IRAQ). THERE HAVE HOWEVER BEEN SUBSEQUENT REUTER REPORTS FROM TEHRAN ACCORDING TO WHICH THE IRANIAN PRIME MINISTER HAS REJECTED THE PROPOSAL.

2. BEFORE THIS AFTERNOON'S INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS THE MEXICANS AND NORWEGIANS SUBMITTED FORMAL LETTERS ASKING FOR A MEETING OF THE COUNCIL AND CIRCULATED INFORMALLY A PROPOSED DRAFT RESOLUTION (TEXT IN MIFT).

3. AT THE CONSULTATIONS THE PRESIDENT (SLIM-TUNISIA) ANNOUNCED THE RECEIPT OF A TELEGRAM FROM THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT WELCOMING THE ISLAMIC CONFERENCE PROPOSAL. WALDHEIM SAID THAT BOTH KITTANI AND CHATTI HAD MADE CLEAR TO HIM THAT THE MISSION WAS BEING UNDERTAKEN IN ACCORDANCE WITH ARTICLE 39 OF THE CHARTER, AND WAS COMPLEMENTARY TO ANY ACTION THE COUNCIL MIGHT TAKE. IT WAS THEN AGREED THAT WE SHOULD PROCEED TO A FORMAL MEETING TO HEAR THOSE WHO WISHED TO SPEAK TONIGHT AND CONVENE AGAIN TOMORROW (27 SEPTEMBER) FOR CONSULTATIONS ON THE DRAFT RESOLUTION PRIOR TO A FURTHER OPEN MEETING.

4. AT THE FORMAL MEETING WALDHEIM DISCUSSED THE EVENTS OF THE LAST FEW DAYS. ONLY MEXICO, NORWAY AND KITTANI THEN SPOKE. NO FOREIGN MINISTERS ATTENDED. MUNOZ LEDO (MEXICO) AND ALGARD (NORWAY) UNDERLINED THE GRAVITY OF THE SITUATION AND EMPHASISED THE RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE COUNCIL UNDER THE CHARTER. KITTANI CONFINED HIMSELF TO QUOTING FROM A STATEMENT HIS FOREIGN MINISTER HAD ISSUED IN BAGHDAD EARLIER IN THE DAY. IRAQ WAS CONCERNED ABOUT INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY: DEVOTED TO THE PRINCIPLES OF NON INTERFERENCE AND RESPECT FOR SOVEREIGNTY: AND HAD NO WISH TO CONTINUE THE FIGHTING IF IRAN WOULD SHOW RECOGNITION OF THESE PRINCIPLES. IRAQ HAD ONLY RESORTED TO DEFENDING ITS PRINCIPLES AFTER EXHAUSTING ALL DIPLOMATIC AND LEGAL CHANNELS. HE CONCLUDED WITH AN APPEAL THAT TIME SHOULD BE ALLOWED FOR HIS FOREIGN MINISTER TO COME TO PRESENT IRAQ'S CASE IN FULL. HE WAS WILLING TO COME AS SOON AS IT WAS CLEAR THAT THE TIME FOR SUBSTANTIVE DELIBERATIONS AND RESOLUTIONS HAD BEEN REACHED.

5. IT IS STILL NOT CLEAR WHETHER THE WATERED DOWN ISLAMIC CONFERENCE INITIATIVE IS OFF THE GROUND. EVEN IF IT IS, IT WILL TAKE SOME TIME TO DEVELOP IF IT IS TRUE THAT ZIA IS COMING TO NEW YORK FIRST. MEANWHILE THE IRAQIS AND RUSSIANS HAVE WON ANOTHER ROUND IN THE DELAYING GAME. LUSAKA (ZAMBIA), PRESUMABLY AT RUSSIAN INSTIGATION, PREVENTED NON-ALIGNED CONSENSUS ON THE NORWEGIAN/MEXICAN DRAFT THIS AFTERNOON.

CONFERENCE INITIATIVE IS OFF THE GROUND. EVEN IF IT IS, IT WILL TAKE SOME TIME TO DEVELOP IF IT IS TRUE THAT ZIA IS COMING TO NEW YORK FIRST. MEANWHILE THE IRAQIS AND RUSSIANS HAVE WON ANOTHER ROUND IN THE DELAYING GAME. LUSAKA (ZAMBIA), PRESUMABLY AT RUSSIAN INSTIGATION, PREVENTED NON-ALIGNED CONSENSUS ON THE NORWEGIAN/MEXICAN DRAFT THIS AFTERNOON.

6. THE SCENE IS NOW SET FOR AN ARGUMENT TOMORROW THAT THE COUNCIL SHOULD NOT ADOPT A RESOLUTION:

- (A) BECAUSE SOME MEMBERS MAY INVOKE THE 24 HOUR RULE (THE DRAFT HAS NOT YET BEEN FORMALLY TABLED) AND/OR
- (B) BECAUSE OF KITTANI'S APPEAL TO AWAIT THE ARRIVAL OF HIS FOREIGN MINISTER.

WE MAY THEREFORE OCCUPY OURSELVES WITH MORE SPEECHES AND NO OUTCOME.

7. SO FAR THE SECURITY COUNCIL HAS BEEN AT ITS VERY WORST.

PARSONS

NNNN



RESTRICTED

GR 600

RESTRICTED

FM UKMIS NEW YORK 270030Z SEP 80  
TO ROUTINE F C O  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1393 OF 26 SEPTEMBER 1980  
INFO SAVING UKMIS GENEVA.

UNGA GENERAL DEBATE: 22-26 SEPTEMBER.

1. I HAVE ALREADY REPORTED MUSKIE'S AND GROMYKO'S STATEMENTS (MY TELNOS 1318 AND 1338). MY TELNO 16 SAVING SUMMARISES REFERENCES TO SOUTH AFRICA AND NAMIBIA. THERE WAS LITTLE ELSE OF INTEREST TO REPORT DURING THIS FIRST WEEK OF THE GENERAL DEBATE. THE STATEMENTS WERE TEDIOSLY LONG AND ATTENDANCE LOW. THE GENERAL DEBATE IS BECOMING MORE AND MORE OF A FORMALITY. THE WAR BETWEEN IRAQ AND IRAN PASSED UNNOTICED UNTIL YOU REFERRED TO IT ON TUESDAY AFTERNOON.
2. IN A RAMBLING SPEECH FRANCOIS-PONCET (FRANCE) CONCENTRATED ON THE FOUR TROUBLE SPOTS OF AFGHANISTAN, THE MIDDLE EAST, CAMBODIA AND SOUTHERN AFRICA, BUT ALSO DELIVERED A HOMILY TO THE SUPERPOWERS (SO CALLED BECAUSE "THEY ALONE HAVE THE POWER TO THRUST THE WORLD HEADLONG INTO GENERAL CONFLAGRATION"). FRANCE WAS THE FRIEND AND ALLY OF ONE OF THEM: WITH THE OTHER SHE SOUGHT TO MAINTAIN AND DEVELOP RELATIONS OF CO-OPERATION. IN THE PAST FRANCE HAD NOT CONCEALED HER FEELINGS ABOUT US POLICY IN VIETNAM: TODAY SHE HAD TO SAY THAT SOVIET INTERVENTION IN AFGHANISTAN WAS UNACCEPTABLE. RESPONSIBILITY FOR ENDING THE ARMS RACE RESTED ON THE SUPERPOWERS.
3. GENSCHER (FRG), IN A SPEECH WHICH HE ADMITTED TO YOU WAS LARGELY ELECTIONEERING, CONCENTRATED ON DEVELOPMENT, DETENTE, DISARMAMENT AND HUMAN RIGHTS. HE INTRODUCED, AS EXPECTED, A "NEW AND URGENT AGENDA ITEM" ENTITLED "INTERNATIONAL CO-OPERATION TO AVERT NEW REFUGEE FLOWS". HE PROPOSED A CONVENTION TO ELIMINATE CAPITAL PUNISHMENT. AND HE PROPOSED THAT THE UN DRAW UP TWO REGISTERS TO RECORD:
  - (A) THE AMOUNT EACH INDUSTRIAL COUNTRY SPENDS PER CAPITA ON ARMAMENTS AND ON DEVELOPMENT:
  - (B) THE VALUE OF WORLD-WIDE IMPORTS AND EXPORTS OF ARMS.
4. HUANG HUA (CHINA) ATTACKED THE SOVIET UNION IN FIERCE BUT FAMILIAR TERMS.

RESTRICTED

/ 5. ADDITIONAL



RESTRICTED

5. ADDITIONAL POINTS OF INTEREST WERE:

(A) KOREA: THE GDR, RWANDA, YUGOSLAVIA, CHINA, ZAMBIA, TOGO, GUYANA AND ROMANIA CALLED FOR RESUMPTION OF THE DIALOGUE ON THE UNIFICATION OF KOREA AND FOR THE WITHDRAWAL OF US TROOPS FROM SOUTH KOREA.

(B) DHANABALAN (SINGAPORE) DELIVERED A STINGING ATTACK ON VIETNAM FOR BETRAYING THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT AND ON THE SOVIET UNION WHICH HAD NOW TO BE SUSPECTED OF SUPPORTING NON-ALIGNMENT ONLY IN ORDER TO WEAKEN THIRD WORLD LINKS WITH THE WEST.

(C) DIEGO GARCIA: VIETNAM AND AFGHANISTAN URGED THE US TO CUT BACK ITS MILITARY BASES IN THE GULF AND INDIAN OCEAN. AND MENTIONED DIEGO GARCIA IN PARTICULAR.

(D) TURKEY: COLOMBO (ITALY) WAS UNEXPECTEDLY CRITICAL OF THE MILITARY REGIME AND PRESSED FOR A SPEEDY RETURN TO DEMOCRATIC RULE.

(E) CZYREK (POLAND) TOOK CARE TO MAINTAIN A CORDIAL AND DEFERENTIAL TONE TOWARDS THE SOVIET UNION AND WARSAW PACT COUNTRIES, BUT REFERRED OBLEQUELY TO THE RECENT DEVELOPMENTS AT HOME, MAINLY IN A SERIES OF CALLS FOR "FULL AND INTEGRATED IMPLEMENTATION OF THE FINAL ACT OF THE CSCE". "WE HAVE LEFT OUT MANY IMPORTANT AND CRUCIAL ISSUES", HE SAID, BUT "OUR INDEPENDENT EXISTENCE, OUR SOVEREIGN DEVELOPMENT AND OUR LASTING SECURITY ARE INSEPARABLY BOUND UP WITH THE STRENGTHENING OF SOCIALIST POLAND".

(F) ENLARGEMENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL: VAN DER KLAUW (NETHERLANDS) AND FRYDENLUND (NORWAY) MADE HELPFUL REFERENCES TO THE RISKS INHERENT IN TAMPERING WITH THE STRUCTURE OF UN BODIES.

F C O PLEASE PASS SAVING TO UKMIS GENEVA

PARSONS

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]  
[THIS TELEGRAM WAS NOT ADVANCED]

FCO/WHITEHALL DISTRIBUTION

UND

FOLLOWING TELEGRAM NOW REPEATED TO YOU AT REQUEST OF PRIVATE SECRETARY WAS RECEIVED FROM UKMIS NEW YORK TELNO. 1354 OF 26 OF SEPT. INFO IMMEDIATE DELHI, ISLAMABAD, WASHINGTON, INFO ROUTINE PARIS, BONN, MOSCOW, KABUL.

M I P T

FOLLOWING FROM PRIVATE SECRETARY: SECRETARY OF STATE'S MEETING WITH INDIAN FOREIGN MINISTER: AFGHANISTAN.

1. RAO BEGAN BY RECAPITULATING INDIA'S EFFORTS TO BRING THE PAKISTANIS AND AFGHANS TOGETHER. DURING HIS VISIT TO DELHI EARLIER IN THE YEAR, AGA SHAHI HAD ASKED THE INDIANS TO HELP. RAO HAD THEREFORE HELD EXPLORATORY MEETINGS DURING THE UN SPECIAL SESSION ON PALESTINE IN JULY. AGA SHAHI HAD OFFERED TO TALK TO AFGHAN LEADERS UNDER THEIR PARTY, RATHER THAN GOVERNMENT, HATS: AND DOST HAD SAID THAT HE WOULD MEET AGA SHAHI IF THE LATTER CAME TO HIM AS FOREIGN MINISTER. RAO SAID THAT HE HAD BEEN ON THE VERGE OF SETTING UP A MEETING IN NEW YORK, BUT THAT THE POSITIONS OF BOTH SIDES HAD INEXPLICABLY HARDENED OVERNIGHT AT THE END OF THE SESSION. RAO THOUGHT THAT THE AFGHANS AND PAKISTANIS HAD BEEN STANDING ON CEREMONY FOR TOO LONG, AND THAT THE PROBLEM OF BRINGING ABOUT DIRECT TALKS WAS NOT INSOLUBLE.

2. RAO HAD SEEN AGA SHAHI EARLY ON 24 SEPTEMBER. THE LATTER HAD MADE IT CLEAR THAT HE WAS NOW FOCUSING HIS EFFORTS ON A UN RESOLUTION, AS FURTHER PROGRESS ON THE CONFERENCE PROPOSAL WAS IMPOSSIBLE. AGA SHAHI WANTED A RESOLUTION WHICH WOULD BE CONSTRUCTIVE RATHER THAN CONDEMNATORY.

3. LORD CARRINGTON SAID THAT HE HAD CONCLUDED FROM GROMYKO'S SPEECH AND HIS SUBSEQUENT MEETING WITH HIM THAT THE RUSSIANS DID NOT HAVE THE LEAST INTENTION OF WITHDRAWING FROM AFGHANISTAN. HE THOUGHT ANY AGREEMENT REACHED BETWEEN PAKISTAN AND AFGHANISTAN AS A RESULT OF TALKS OF THE KIND DESCRIBED BY RAO WOULD COME TO NAUGHT, BECAUSE IT WAS CLEAR THAT BABRAK KARMAL COULD NOT SURVIVE IF THE SOVIET TROOPS WERE REMOVED. AN AGREEMENT WHICH WAS NOT IMPLEMENTED WOULD BE NO GOOD TO AGA SHAHI. RAO ARGUED THAT THE PAKISTANIS SHOULD SEEK AN AGREEMENT, IN ORDER TO CONFRONT THE RUSSIANS WITH THE PROBLEM OF IMPLEMENTATION: HE REFERRED TO THE ASSURANCES GIVEN BY BREZHNEV AND GROMYKO THAT THE RUSSIANS WOULD WITHDRAW ONCE GUARANTEES OF NON-INTERFERENCE WERE GIVEN. HE ADDED THAT THE MEMBERS OF THE ISLAMIC CONFERENCE WOULD BE WILLING TO MODIFY THEIR RESOLUTIONS IN ANY WAY REQUESTED BY THE PAKISTANIS. LORD CARRINGTON SAW NO PROSPECT OF A SOVIET WITHDRAWAL, REGARDLESS OF THEIR PREVIOUS ASSURANCES, AND SAID THAT MERELY TO SHOW THE RUSSIANS UP WOULD ACHIEVE NOTHING. RAO REPLIED THAT HE NEITHER BELIEVED NOR DISBELIEVED THE SOVIET UNION'S ASSURANCES. BUT HE THOUGHT THE CORRECT COURSE WAS TO ACT ON THEM AND SEE WHAT HAPPENED. THE ISLAMIC CONFERENCE SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO STAND IN THE WAY. HE SAW NO OTHER WAY OUT.

CARRINGTON

NNNN

**CONFIDENTIAL**

**CYPHER**

0700/26



IRAN/IRAQ

ADVANCE COPY

ADVANCE COPIES

23  
-22

PS  
PS/SIR I GILMOUR  
PS/MR HURD  
PS/PUS  
SIR E YOUDE  
SIR J GRAHAM  
MR J C MOBERLY  
MR BRAITHWAITE  
HD/MED  
HD/NENAD  
HD/UND  
HD/CONS D  
CONSULAR EMERGENCY UNIT  
HD/ES & SD  
HD/MAED  
HD/DEF D  
PUSD (2)  
NEWS D

NO 10 DOWNING STREET  
CABINET OFFICE DIO

~~RESIDENT CLERK~~

*Sir A. ...*

*He EESJ*

GRS 170

RESTRICTED

FM MOSCOW 260930Z SEP 80

TO PRIORITY F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 583 OF 26TH SEPTEMBER

FOR INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON, UKDEL NATO, UKMIS NEW YORK AND  
ROUTINE BONN, PARIS AND BAGHDAD.

IRAN / IRAQ.

1. AFTER A PERIOD IN WHICH SOVIET COVERAGE OF THE FIGHTING HAS SEEMED TO HAVE A PRO-IRAQI SHADING, TODAY'S PRAVDA'S BATTLE REPORT APPEARED TO LEAN IF ANYTHING THE OTHER WAY. IRAQI TROOPS WERE DESCRIBED AS 'CONTINUING TO ATTACK', BOTH BY MOVING SOUTH FROM QASR-I-SHIRIN AND BY DRIVING FROM ABADAN AND KHORRAMSHAHR 'INTO THE COUNTRY'S HINTERLANDS'. THE IRAQI COMMAND WAS SAID TO HAVE SET ITSELF THE TASK OF GAINING CONTROL OF THE IRANIAN OIL-REFINING CENTRE AT ABADAN. THE COVERAGE FROM BAGHDAD RELIED MORE THAN IN THE PAST ON AGENCY REPORTS, AND LESS ON THE OFFICIAL IRAQI COMMUNIQUE. THE IRANIAN FORCES WERE DESCRIBED AS CONDUCTING 'DEFENSIVE FIGHTING'. IT IS TOO EARLY TO KNOW HOW MUCH WEIGHT TO GIVE THIS APPARENT SHIFT.



CONDUCTING "DEFENSIVE FIGHTING". IT IS TOO EARLY TO KNOW HOW MUCH WEIGHT TO GIVE THIS APPARENT SHIFT.

2. A COMMENTARY COLUMN IN THE SAME PRAVDA, REFERRING TO THE US NAVAL FORCES IN THE INDIAN OCEAN, ONCE AGAIN PLAYED UP THE DANGER OF AN AMERICAN 'ADVENTURE'. QUOTING THE WASHINGTON POST, THE ARTICLE ALSO CLAIMED THAT THE WHITE HOUSE HAD SENT THE PENTAGON A SECRET DIRECTIVE "TO PREPARE A VERSION OF THE USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN THE UNSTABLE REGION OF THE MIDDLE EAST". INTERFERENCE IN THE IRAN/IRAQ CONFLICT, IT CONCLUDED, WAS INADMISSIBLE.

KEEDLE

NNNN

IRAN/IRAQ

ADVANCE COPIES

22

PS  
PS/SIR I GILMOUR  
PS/MR HURD  
PS/PUS  
SIR E YOUDE  
SIR J GRAHAM  
MR J C MOBERLY  
MR BRAITHWAITE  
HD/MED  
HD/NENAD  
HD/UND  
HD/CONS D  
CONSULAR EMERGENCY UNIT  
HD/ES & SD  
HD/MAED  
HD/DEF D  
PUSD (2)  
NEWS D

~~NO 10 DOWNING STREET~~  
CABINET OFFICE DIO

~~RESIDENT CLERK~~

*Sir A. ...*

*[Handwritten signature]*

SECRET

FROM UKDEL NATO 261205Z SEP 80

TO PRIORITY FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

TELEGRAM NUMBER 392 OF 26 SEP 1980

INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON, PARIS, BONN, MOSCOW

INFO SAVING BAGHDAD, DAMASCUS, ANKARA, KUWAIT, TEL AVIV

IRAQ/IRAN

1. PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVES HAD A PRIVATE MEETING THIS MORNING TO DISCUSS IRAQ/IRAN. THE CHAIRMAN OF THE MILITARY COMMITTEE GAVE A BRIEFING LARGELY BASED ON THE MOST RECENT JIC ASSESSMENT RELEASED TO NATO ON 25 SEPTEMBER. AS AGREED, (MY TELECON WITH MOSS) I ADDED THE ADDITIONAL POINT THAT WE HAD INFORMATION THAT BEFORE THE RECENT INTENSIFICATION OF FIGHTING BETWEEN IRAQ AND IRAN THE IRAQI MILITARY HAD INFORMED THE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP THAT THE IRAQI ARMED FORCES COULD HAVE SEVERE PROBLEMS IF HOSTILITIES CONTINUED FOR SEVERAL WEEKS. THIS SUPPORTED THE HYPOTHESIS THAT IRAQ HAD SPECIFIC LIMITED TERRITORIAL AIMS WHICH IT WOULD WANT TO ACHIEVE QUICKLY.

2. GLITMAN (US) SAID THAT WESTERN OBJECTIVES SHOULD BE TO MOBILISE INTERNATIONAL PRESSURE ESPECIALLY IN THE UN TO BRING AN END TO THE HOSTILITIES, TO PREVENT THE DISINTEGRATION OF IRAN, AND TO PREVENT

INTERNATIONAL PRESSURE ESPECIALLY IN THE UN TO BRING AN END TO THE HOSTILITIES, TO PREVENT THE DISINTEGRATION OF IRAN, AND TO PREVENT SOVIET DIRECT INVOLVEMENT IN, OR GAINS FROM, THE CONFLICT. HE COULD GIVE NO CLARIFICATION ON MR MUSKIE'S REPORTED STATEMENT THAT THE US WAS CONSULTING WITH ITS ALLIES ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF CREATING AN INTERNATIONAL NAVAL FORCE WHICH WOULD BE SENT TO THE GULF IF THE STRAITS OF HORMUZ WERE BLOCKED. VIBE (NORWAY) SAID THAT CHINESE LEADERS HAD EXPRESSED CONCERN ABOUT THE CONFLICT TO THE NORWEGIAN PRIME MINISTER DURING THE LATTER'S VISIT TO PEKING THIS WEEK. THE CHINESE HAD ADDED THAT THEY WOULD BE SPEAKING TO IRAQI QUOTE LEADERS UNQUOTE IN PEKING ON 26 SEPTEMBER. JESSEL (FRANCE) WHO OBVIOUSLY HAD IN MIND PRESS REPORTS OF FRENCH ARMS SUPPLIES TO IRAQ, SAID THAT 95% OF IRAQ'S MILITARY ARMAMENT HAD BEEN SUPPLIED BY THE SOVIET UNION AND ONLY 2% OR 3% BY FRANCE. OLCAY (TURKEY) OBSERVED THAT THE ALGIERS AGREEMENT BETWEEN IRAN AND IRAQ HAD BEEN SIGNED AT THE HEIGHT OF IRAN'S, AND THE SHAH'S, STRENGTH. IRAQ'S MILITARY ACTION HAD CHANGED THE STATUS QUO EXISTING SINCE THE AGREEMENT. AYATOLLAH KHOMEINI WOULD FEEL IT NECESSARY TO DEMONSTRATE THAT HE WAS AS POWERFUL AS THE SHAH AND WE MUST THEREFORE RECKON WITH THE POSSIBILITY OF A PROLONGED CONFLICT.

FCO PLEASE PASS SAVING ADDRESSEES  
ROSE

NNNN

SENT/RECD 251350Z LT/CS



GR 260

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FM BRITNAVAT MUSCAT 260516Z SEP 80

TO IMMEDIATE MODUK

TELEGRAM NUMBER LAA/UJ OF 260516Z SEPTEMBER

AND TO CINCFLEET, FCO

INFO PRIORITY CTG 318.0, JEDDA, BAGHDAD, KUWAIT, BAHRAIN, ABU DHABI, DUBAI

*ms*

FOR DNOT. FCO MED.

STRAITS OF HORMUZ. SITREP 260200Z.

1. TRAFFIC CONTINUES NORMAL. TWELVE IN AND SIX OUT IN SIX HOURS ENDING 252359D. NO INTERFERENCE OR HARASSMENT BY IRANIANS.

2. OMANI PATROL CRAFT NOT IN CONTACT WITH IRANIANS BUT THREE RADAR CONTACTS HELD PATROLLING EAST/WEST FIFTEEN MILES NORTH GREAT QUOIN ISLAND. EITHER IRANIANS HAVE PULLED THEIR ABU MUSA/TUNBS ISLAND PATROL BACK TO THE STRAITS OR THERE ARE MORE IRANIAN UNITS AT SEA THAN APPRECIATED. UNLIKELY THEY WOULD LEAVE ISLANDS UNPROTECTED. IRANIANS HAVE NOW BEEN OPERATING AT SEA CONTINUOUSLY FOR FIVE DAYS WITH SENSORS AND COMMUNICATIONS APPARENTLY FUNCTIONING ADEQUATELY AND ARMAMENT AVAILABLE. MECHANICAL AND ELECTRONIC RELIABILITY AND MAINTENANCE MUST BE AT MUCH HIGHER LEVEL THAN ASSESSED IN RECENT MONTHS.

3. OMANI ROYAL YACHT AL SAID DEPARTED BAHRAIN EX REFIT 24 SEP FOR MUSCAT. AT 251320D OFF FURUR ISLAND SHE WAS OVERFLOWN AND CIRCLED AT THREE THOUSAND FEET BY IRANIAN PHANTOM RECCE ASSESSED AS PROBABLY SUPPORTING IRANIAN ABU MUSA/TUNB ISLAND PATROL.

4. BOTH THE MATERIAL STATE OF IRANIAN UNITS AND THE CONTROL AND COORDINATION OF THEIR OPERATIONS ARE SIGNIFICANTLY BETTER THAN MIGHT BE EXPECTED AT THIS STAGE OF THE IRANIAN REVOLUTION.

5. DESPITE OMANI INTENTION NOT TO BECOME INVOLVED IN ANY INCIDENT IN STRAITS AS REPORTED MY LAST SITREP UNITS OF OMAN AIR FORCE ARE ON ALERT TO SUPPORT OMANI PATROL BOATS IF NECESSARY.

6. THERE HAS BEEN NO CHANGE TO NORMAL OMAN ARMY DISPOSITION AND READINESS.

TUNNELL

IRAQ/IRAN STANDARD

MED

MAED

NENAD

TRED

NAD

ERD

UND

ECON D

EESD

CONS D

ECD

CONS EM UNIT

WED

CABINET OFFICE

ADDITIONAL DISTN.

IRAQ/IRAN

COPIES SENT TO  
No. 11 DOWNING STREET

CONFIDENTIAL

IRAN/IRAQ

IMMEDIATE

ADVANCE COPIES

22

PS  
PS/SIR I GILMOUR  
PS/MR HURD  
PS/PUS  
SIR E YOUDE  
SIR J GRAHAM  
MR J C MOBERLY  
MR BRAITHWAITE  
HD/MED  
HD/NENAD  
HD/UND  
HD/CONS D  
CONSULAR EMERGENCY UNIT  
HD/ES & SD  
HD/MAED  
HD/DEF D  
PUSD (2)  
NEWS D

~~NO 10 DOWNING STREET~~  
CABINET OFFICE DIO

*Sir Helen*  
*MR ADAMS*

GR 250

IMMEDIATE

CONFIDENTIAL

FROM KUWAIT 261025Z SEPT  
TO IMMEDIATE FCO  
TELNO 411 OF 26/9/80  
INFO BAGHDAD.

IRAN/IRAQ: ROUNDUP FROM KUWAIT

IRAQI HELICOPTERS

1. DESPITE THE FACT THAT WE UNDERSTAND KUWAIT HAS WITHDRAWN OVERFLYING AND REFUELLING FACILITIES FOR IRAQI AIRCRAFT (MY TEL NO 194 PARA 6), TWO IRAQI MILITARY HELICOPTERS (SOVIET M1 OR M4) LANDED AT SOUTH BASE 1750 ON 25/9 AND AROUND FIFTY CIVILIANS ALIGHTED. THE USE OF SOUTH BASE IS UNUSUAL. THE NORMAL HELICOPTER PORT IS AT NORTH BASE.

TANK AND ARTILLERY AMMUNITION

2. PLANS HAVE BEEN COMPLETED FOR TANK AND ARTILLERY AMMUNITION TO BE MOVED FROM JAHRA NORTHWARDS. CHIEFTAIN TANKS, ALTHOUGH READY HAVE NOT YET MOVED FROM JAHRA. 1 REGT VICKERS TANKS AND 16 BDE ARMOURD CARS ARE DEPLOYED EITHER SIDE OF ROAD TO SAFWAN SOME 20 MILES SOUTH OF BORDER.



HAVE NOT YET MOVED FROM UMMER. 1 REGT VICKERS TANKS AND  
16 BDE ARMoured CARs ARE DEPLOYED EITHER SIDE OF ROAD TO SAFWAN  
SOME 20 MILES SOUTH OF BORDER.

BASRA

3. EVACUEES REPORT THAT BETWEEN 0500 AND 1200 ON 24/9 THERE WERE  
FEW AIR RAIDS OF FLIGHTS OF THREE OR MORE F5 OR F6 PHANTOMS.  
IRANIAN ATTACKS APPEARED SURPRISINGLY DISCIPLINED -- DIRECTED AGAINST  
SPECIFIC STRATEGIC OR MILITARY TARGETS. IRAQI TANKS WERE SEEN FIRING  
EAST FROM POSITIONS ON THE IRANIAN SIDE OF THE SHATT -- 20 KMS AWAY.  
ONE IRAQI GUNBOAT OPPOSITE BASRA HOSPITAL FIRED CONTINUOUSLY EASTWARD  
DURING THE DAY. THERE IS A LARGE OIL STORAGE TANK FIRE IN CENTRAL  
BASRA. PETROCHEMICAL PLANT AND REFINERY ALSO ON FIRE. IRAQI  
CIVILIANS REPORTED TO BE LESS CONFIDENT IN VIEW OF CONTINUED  
IRANIAN AERIAL ACTIVITY BUT GROUND ADVANCES KEEPING MORALE UP.

BRITISH SUBJECTS

4. CONSULAR STAFF AT SAFWAN ON 24/9 HELPED THROUGH THREE BRITISH  
FAMILIES AND ABOUT 25 HONG KONG SEAMEN FROM BASRA. ON 25/9 A  
FURTHER EIGHT BRITISH WERE HELPED THROUGH. THE BULK OF ACTIVITY AT  
SAFWAN/ABDALI IS NOW WITH EASTERN EUROPEANS (POLES, CZECHS,  
HUNGARIANS) WHO SEEM WELL ORGANISED IN DISCIPLINED GROUPS. OUR  
EVACUEES SAY THAT THERE ARE VERY FEW BRITISH LEFT IN BASRAH NOW  
-- OTHER THAN WIVES OF IRAQIS.

BALFOUR

NNNN

IMMEDIATE



IMMEDIATE  
ADVANCE COPY

ADVANCE COPY

IRAN/IRAQ

ADVANCE COPIES

22

IMMEDIATE

PS  
PS/SIR I GILMOUR  
PS/MR HURD  
PS/PUS  
SIR E YOUDE  
SIR J GRAHAM  
MR J C MOBERLY  
MR BRAITHEWAITE  
HD/MED  
HD/NENAD  
HD/UND  
HD/CONS D  
CONSULAR EMERGENCY UNIT  
HD/ES & SD  
HD/MAED  
HD/DEF D  
PUSD (2)  
NEWS D

RESIDENT CLERK

~~NO 10 DOWNING STREET~~  
CABINET OFFICE DIO

GR 390

CONFIDENTIAL

FROM KUWAIT 261010Z SEPT

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 410 OF 26/9/80,

INFO JEDDA, ABU DHABI, BAHRAIN AND DOMA.

YOUR UNNUMBERED TELEGRAM OF 251720Z TO JEDDA.

IRAN/IRAQ.

1. EFFECT OF TOTAL STOPPAGE OF TRAFFIC THROUGH STRAITS OF HORMUZ WOULD NOT HAVE MUCH EFFECT ON KUWAIT'S ELECTRICITY GENERATING CAPACITY. FUEL FOR THE POWER STATIONS IS LOCALLY SUPPLIED AND SINCE THE BULK OF KUWAIT'S WATER SUPPLY COMES FROM DISTILLATION PLANTS ASSOCIATED WITH THE POWER GENERATING STATIONS THIS WOULD ALSO NOT BE AFFECTED. BUT SEE PARA 3 BELOW.

2. THE EFFECT OF THE CESSATION OF FOOD IMPORTS ON WHICH KUWAIT IS ALMOST TOTALLY DEPENDENT WOULD BE IMMEDIATELY APPARENT BUT NOT DISASTROUS. ALTERNATIVE SUPPLY ROUTES WOULD BE BY AIR BUT CHIEFLY

ALMOST TOTALLY DEPENDENT WOULD BE IMMEDIATELY APPARENT BUT NOT DISASTROUS. ALTERNATIVE SUPPLY ROUTES WOULD BE BY AIR BUT CHIEFLY ROAD USING LONG DISTANCE LORRIES OPERATING FROM JORDAN AND SYRIA. THESE COULD COME VIA IRAQ IF THE ROUTE WAS SAFE OTHERWISE THROUGH SAUDI ARABIA. THERE ARE ALREADY PRIVATE SECTOR COMPANIES WHICH OPERATE BOTH REFRIGERATED AND UNREFRIGERATED TRANSPORT SERVICES AND DOUBTLESS THESE COULD BE STEPPED UP WITH THE PROFIT MOTIVE ACTING AS AN INCENTIVE. HOWEVER, OTHER GULF STATES WOULD BE COMPETING FOR ADDITIONAL SUPPLIES BY THESE ROUTES AND THERE WOULD BE INEVITABLE SHORTAGES. NO DOUBT THERE WOULD BE DRAMATIC PRICE INCREASES.

3. CESSATION OF BUILDING MATERIAL IMPORTS AND EQUIPMENTS AND REPLACEMENT PARTS FOR ESSENTIAL PUBLIC UTILITIES COULD CAUSE MORE THAN A LITTLE INCONVENIENCE AND SLOW DOWN CONSTRUCTION ACTIVITIES. A REPLACEMENT PARTS SHORTAGE MIGHT CAUSE PROBLEMS FOR THE ELECTRICITY GENERATING AND WATER DISTILLATION PROGRAMMES (PARA 1 ABOVE) BUT THE COOL WEATHER SEASON IS NOW BEGINNING AND THE CONSEQUENT DECREASE IN DEMAND FOR BOTH ELECTRICITY AND WATER WOULD HELP MATTERS. REALLY URGENT EQUIPMENT COULD BE FLOWN IN OR TRANSHIPPED AT AQABA OR LATTAKIA AND THENCE BY ROAD.

4. MY CONCLUSION IS THAT AT THE BEGINNING OF A PERIOD OF TOTAL STOPPAGE THERE WOULD BE FOOD SHORTAGES BUT ONCE RELIEF MEASURES WERE ORGANISED THESE WOULD BE LARGELY OVERCOME. PRICES WOULD RISE. WATER AND ELECTRICITY SUPPLIES SEEM ASSURED.

BALFOUR

NNNN



GYPHER

LVO NR 289/26

FDW G 59/26

VOO BELGRADE

DESKBY 260700Z

CONFIDENTIAL

GRS 270

CONFIDENTIAL

DESKBY 260700Z

FM FCO 260048Z SEP 80

TO IMMEDIATE BELGRADE

TELEGRAM NUMBER 219 OF 26 SEPTEMBER

FOR PS/PRIME MINISTER

FOLLOWING TELEGRAM NOW REPEATED TO YOU AT REQUEST OF PRIVE  
SECRETARY WAS RECEIVED FROM UKMIS NEW YORK TELEGRAM NUMBER 1329  
OF 22 SEPTEMBER

INFO TEL AVIV, CAIRO, DUBLIN, THE HAGUE, COPENHAGEN, BRUSSELS.

FOLLOWING FROM PRIVATE SECRETARY

SECRETARY OF STATE'S MEETING WITH DR WALDHEIM: MIPTS (NOT TO ALL):  
ARAB/ISRAEL.

1. DR WALDHEIM SAID HE HAD HEARD FROM M. FRANCOIS-PONCET THAT  
THE NINE MIGHT BE PLAYING A MORE ACTIVE ROLE IN THE ARAB/ESRAEL  
QUESTION NEXT YEAR. HE THOUGHT IT VERY IMPORTANT FOR THE EUROPEANS  
TO TAKE ACTION, AND THAT THIS SHOULD BE CO-ORDINATED WITH THE  
AMERICANS.

2. LORD CARRINGTON WARNED DR WALDHEIM NOT TO EXPECT TOO MUCH  
FROM THE NINE. IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT TO TAKE ANY DECISIONS BEFORE  
THE DECEMBER MEETING OF THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL. BUT THE VENICE  
DECLARATION HAD RAISED ARAB EXPECTATIONS: IT WAS ESSENTIAL THAT  
THE ARABS SHOULD NOT BE DISAPPOINTED. THE NINE WOULD THEREFORE  
HAVE TO PRODUCE SOMETHING. LORD CARRINGTON DID NOT THINK THAT  
THE MODERATE ARABS EXPECTED THE NINE TO COME UP WITH A SOLUTION:  
THEY WERE AWARE OF EUROPE'S LIMITATIONS: BUT THEY HOPED THAT  
THE EUROPEANS COULD INFLUENCE THE AMERICANS.

3. DR WALDHEIM SAID HE HAD BEEN WORRIED BY REPORTS THAT THE  
SAUDI ARABIANS WERE PREPARED TO SUPPORT THE EXPULSION OF ISRAEL  
FROM THE UNITED NATIONS. LORD CARRINGTON REPLIED THAT, DURING HIS  
VISIT TO SAUDI ARABIA IN AUGUST, HE HAD FOUND PRINCE FAHD  
AND PRINCE SAUD SENSIBLE AND MODERATE IN PRIVATE.

CARRINGTON

NNNN



DB 261500Z

ADVANCE COPY

IRAN/IRAQ

21  
22

ADVANCE COPIES

PS  
PS/SIR I GILMOUR  
PS/MR HURD  
PS/PUS  
SIR E YOUDE  
SIR J GRAHAM  
MR J C MOBERLY  
MR BRAITHEWAITE  
HD/MED  
HD/NENAD  
HD/UND  
HD/CONS D  
CONSULAR EMERGENCY UNIT  
HD/ES & SD  
HD/MAED  
HD/DEF D  
PUSD (2)  
NEWS D

~~NO 10 DOWNING STREET~~  
CABINET OFFICE DIO

RESIDENT CLERK

*Sm A. Adnan*

*Mr Adams*

*Typists*

00 FCO DESKBY 261500Z

00 BAGHDAD DESKBY 261500Z

GR 195

RESTRICTED

FM AMMAN 261350Z SEP 80

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER DISTRESS 024 OF 26 SEP

INFO IMMEDIATE BAGHDAD

YOUR TELNO DISTRESS 36 TO BAGHDAD.

1. YOU WILL NOW HAVE SEEN MY TELNO 37 TO BAGHDAD, COPIED IMMEDIATE TO FCO. FURTHER SITREP IS IN MY TELNO DISTRESS 22 TO YOU (PRECEDENCE PRIORITY: WE HAVE ASKED HSP TO UPGRADE TO IMMEDIATE DESKBY 1500Z)
2. TRAVELLERS ARRIVING HERE SAY THAT THE IRAQ BORDER AUTHORITIES AT RUTBA ARE TURNING BACK MALES, INCLUDING EVEN CONSTRUCTION WORKERS, IDENTIFIED BY SPECIAL STAMPS IN THEIR PASSPORTS AS WORKERS ON IRAQI GOVERNMENT PROJECTS. WE HAVE HEARD OF AT LEAST TWENTY MEN INCLUDING THREE BRITONS, WHO HAVE BEEN REFUSED EXIT FROM IRAQ ON THIS COUNT.
3. GENERALLY MALES WITHOUT EXIT VISAS ARE BEING TURNED BACK BUT

THIS COUNT.

3. GENERALLY MALES WITHOUT EXIT VISAS ARE BEING TURNED BACK BUT REPORTED EXPERIENCES VARY AND SOME BRITISH MEN HAVE ARGUED THE WAY THROUGH, WITH ASSISTANCE FROM AN ARABIST MEMBER OF MY STAFF WHO WENT TO RUTBA TO MEET THE CONVOY.

4. TOTAL NUMBER OF BRITONS KNOWN TO HAVE CROSSED THE BORDER TODAY (PARA 1 AND 2 OF MY TELNO 37 TO BAGHDAD) IS ABOUT 160

5. SUBJECT TO BAGHDAD'S NEWS, YOU MAY WISH TO CONSIDER ARRANGING A HIGH-LEVEL MESSAGE TO THE IRAQI PRESIDENT TO FACILITATE THE DEPARTURE OF BRITISH FAMILIES FROM IRAQ.

URWICK

NNNN

IRAN/IRAQ

ADVANCE COPIES

22

PS  
PS/SIR I GILMOUR  
PS/MR HURD  
PS/PUS  
SIR E YOUDE  
SIR J GRAHAM  
MR J C MOBERLY  
MR BRAITHWAITE  
HD/MED  
HD/NENAD  
HD/UND  
HD/CONS D  
CONSULAR EMERGENCY UNIT  
HD/ES & SD  
HD/MAED  
HD/DEF D  
PUSD (2)  
NEWS D  
RESIDENT CLERK

NO 10 DOWNING STREET  
CABINET OFFICE DIO

ADVANCE COPY

*Sir A Adams*  
*Mr Adams*

GR 200

RESTRICTED

FM BEIRUT 261033Z SEP 80

TO IMMEDIATE DAMASCUS

TELEGRAM NUMBER 76 OF 26 SEPTEMBER 1980

AND TO IMMEDIATE AMMAN

INFO PRIORITY F C O

CONVOYS FROM BAGHDAD: CITIZENS OF THE IRISH REPUBLIC.

1. THE IRISH EMBASSY IN BEIRUT HAVE ASKED FOR OUR HELP IN CONTACTING IRISH CITIZENS WHO MAY ARRIVE, OR HAVE ARRIVED, ON ROAD CONVOYS FROM BAGHDAD. THEY BELIEVE THAT AT LEAST ONE IRISH CITIZEN, MR. MAYNES OF THE IRISH MILK EXPORT BOARD, HAS ALREADY ARRIVED IN DAMASCUS. THEY DO NOT KNOW HOW MANY OF THEIR CITIZENS MAY BE HEADING FOR AMMAN,

2. THE IRISH EMBASSY WOULD BE GRATEFUL IF YOU AND AMMAN COULD LET THEM KNOW THROUGH US THE NUMBER AND NAMES OF THEIR CITIZENS WHO ARRIVE IN YOUR CAPITALS AND WHAT REQUIREMENTS THEY HAVE FOR MONEY, AIR TICKETS ETC. ALTHOUGH IT IS NOT SENSIBLE FOR THE RESIDENCE TO COME ON TO BEIRUT IN PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES THE IRISH



WHO ARRIVE IN YOUR CAPITALS AND WHAT REQUIREMENTS THEY HAVE FOR MONEY, AIR TICKETS ETC. ALTHOUGH IT IS NOT SENSIBLE FOR THE REFUGEES TO COME ON TO BEIRUT IN PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES, THE IRISH EMBASSY HERE WISH TO DO WHATEVER THEY CAN TO HELP. THE IRISH EMBASSY WILL SEND A REPRESENTATIVE TO AMMAN AND DAMASCUS IF NECESSARY, BUT WOULD OF COURSE LOOK AFTER ANY IRISH WHO PREFERRED NEVERTHELESS TO COME TO BEIRUT.

MOORE.

NNNN

GRS 1130

**CONFIDENTIAL**

CONFIDENTIAL

FM STOCKHOLM 260655Z SEPTEMBER 1980

TO IMMEDIATE FCO (DESKBY 260830Z)

TELEGRAM NUMBER 180 OF 26 SEPTEMBER 1980

IRAN/IRAQ

1. FOLLOWING IS UNOFFICIAL TRANSLATION OF TELEGRAM DATED 24 SEPTEMBER RECEIVED FROM SWEDISH AMBASSADOR IN TEHRAN AND PASSED TO US IN CONFIDENCE BY MFA. BELFRAGE ADDED THAT SWEDISH HON CONSUL, KHORRAMASHAH HAD TRAVELLED FROM TEHRAN TO KHORRAMASHAH BY TRAIN WITHOUT INCIDENT ON 23 SEPTEMBER AND WAS PROPOSING TO RETURN ON 25 SEPTEMBER. THIS HE FELT, APPEARED TO SUPPORT BUNDY'S ASSESSMENT THAT THE REPORTS OF THE FIGHTING WERE EXAGGERATED

2. QUOTE

1. THE REPORTS WHICH HAVE BEEN APPEARING IN THE LOCAL PRESS IN RECENT DAYS ABOUT THE FIGHTING BETWEEN IRAN AND IRAQ ARE PROBABLY FAIRLY EXAGGERATED. THIS IS ALSO CONFIRMED IN CONVERSATION WITH THE MILITARY ATTACHE IN TEHRAN. UP UNTIL YESTERDAY AFTERNOON AT ANY RATE THE SITUATION WAS BY NO MEANS AS SERIOUS AS THE MEDIA MADE OUT. REPORTS THAT 8 MIG AIRCRAFT HAVE BEEN SHOT DOWN, 10 TANKS DESTROYED AND 500 IRAQI SOLDIERS KILLED ARE NOT BELIEVED TO BE CORRECT. THE IRANIANS HAVE NOT BEEN ABLE TO CORROBORATE THESE REPORTS. THERE IS OF COURSE NO DOUBT THAT BORDER FIGHTING HAS TAKEN PLACE- CERTAINLY OF A SERIOUS NATURE. AMONG THOSE TAKING PART ARE ALSO KURDS, VARIOUS LEFT-WING GROUPS AND ANTI- GOVERNMENT ELEMENTS IN GENERAL. SMALL MILITARY UNITS HAVE CROSSED THE BORDERS OF BOTH COUNTRIES AND THERE HAVE BEEN LIMITED EXCHANGES OF FIRE. IN KHORRAMASHAH WITNESSES HAVE REPORTED THE SOUND OF FIGHTING IN THE PAST FEW DAYS. MILITARY OBSERVERS HOWEVER DOUBT WHETHER REGULAR FORCES WERE INVOLVED BEFORE THE ATTACKS MADE BY BOTH SIDES YESTERDAY. HERE , TOO, REPORTS THAT NAVAL BATTLES HAVE TAKEN PLACE ARE PROBABLY ALSO INCORRECT.

FOREIGN JOURNALISTS HAVE BEEN BANNED FROM VISITING THE AREAS CONCERNED AND THE FOREIGN PRESS CAN ONLY QUOTE THE CERTAINLY EXAGGERATED REPORTS CARRIED BY THE IRANIAN AND IRAQI PRESS.

2. IT IS STILL TOO EARLY TO GET ANY VERY COMPLETE PICTURE OF WHAT REALLY TOOK PLACE DURING YESTERDAY'S RAID INTO IRAN. IT IS HOWEVER CERTAIN THAT A GOOD MANY AIRFIELDS WERE BOMBED. HOW MUCH DAMAGE WAS DONE AND HOW MANY WERE KILLED AND INJURED IS NOT KNOWN AT PRESENT. DURING THE ATTACK ON TEHRAN AIRPORT HOWEVER ONLY TWO PERSONS BELONGING TO AIR IRAN WERE HURT, EVEN ALTHOUGH THE PRESS REPORTED NINE DEAD AND 37 INJURED. IRAN RADIO SAYS THAT AT LEAST TEN AIRFIELDS THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY WERE DAMAGED. WELL INFORMED SOURCES CONFIRM THAT IN PARTICULAR THE AIRFIELDS AT KERMANSHAH BRI AND BUSHEHR SUFFERED SEVERE DAMAGE. AT TEHRAN AIRPORT, WHICH IS CLOSED FOR THE TIME BEING, DAMAGE WAS REALLY ONLY DONE TO ONE RUNWAY AND AN ADMINISTRATIVE BUILDING.

ONE BOEING, SOME HURCULES AIRCRAFT AND A NUMBER OF HELICOPTERS ARE ALSO BELIEVED TO HAVE BEEN SET ON FIRE.

**CONFIDENTIAL**



3. IN CONVERSATION WITH THE INDIAN MILITARY ATTACHE AND OTHERS TODAY IT WAS CONFIRMED THAT A NUMBER OF MIG23'S FLEW IN OVER IRANIAN TERRITORY YESTERDAY. A FURTHER RAID IS SAID TO HAVE TAKEN PLACE EARLY THIS MORNING. IT IS REPORTED BY IRANIAN SOURCES THAT THEY SUCCEEDED IN SHOOTING DOWN 16 IRAQI MIGS AND KNOCKING OUT 22 TANKS. THESE FIGURES MUST OF COURSE BE TAKEN WITH A GRAIN OF SALT. ACCORDING TO THE USUALLY WELL-INFORMED FRENCH MILITARY ATTACHE'S OFFICE, IT IS BELIEVED THAT 7 TO 8 PLANES WERE SHOT DOWN. THIS WOULD INDICATE, IF CORRECT, A FAIRLY WELL-FUNCTIONING IRANIAN AIR DEFENCE, AND MUST BE REGARDED AS DEFINITE SETBACK FOR IRAQ. THE QUESTION IT IS OF COURSE NECESSARY TO ASK IN THIS CONTEXT IS HOW THE IRAQI OVERFLIGHT SUCCEEDED IN AVOIDING DETECTION BY RADAR. THE NEAREST TAKE-OFF STRIP IN IRAQ IS SAID TO BE ABOUT 560 KM FROM IRAN. ONE EXPLANATION - THE MOST PROBABLE - IS THAT THE RADAR SYSTEM SIMPLY DOES NOT FUNCTION SATISFACTORILY, AS THIS MORNING'S OVERFLIGHT WOULD ALSO SUGGEST. ANOTHER IS OF COURSE THE POSSIBILITY OF AN QUOTE INSIDE JOB UNQUOTE - SOMETHING WHICH AS WE KNOW HAS ALSO HAPPENED BEFORE. ANOTHER QUESTION STILL OUTSTANDING IS WHY THE IRAQI AIR FORCE DID NOT ATTACK THE MANY PHANTOM AIRCRAFT AND 747 JETS LINED UP, FULLY VISIBLE, ON TEHRAN AIRPORT. SHORTLY AFTER THE IRAQI QUOTE VISIT UNQUOTE TO TEHRAN, FOUR PHANTOMS TOOK OFF FOR AN UNKNOWN DESTINATION. FOUR SHIPS ARE REPORTED TO BE IN PORT AT SHAT-EL-ARAB AT PRESENT, UNABLE TO LEAVE. 17 VESSELS ARE SUPPOSED TO HAVE OBTAINED PERMISSION YESTERDAY TO LEAVE SHAT-EL-ARAB (INCLUDING ONE SCANDINAVIAN). ACCORDING TO WHAT MILITARY OBSERVERS HAVE TOLD US TODAY, IRAN SUCCEEDED IN SINKING FOUR RUSSIAN-BUILT GUNBOATS IN BUSHEHR, WHICH IS REGARDED AS BEING A SEVERE SETBACK FOR IRAQ. IRAN IS UNDERSTOOD TO HAVE DECLARED QUOTE ALL SEA FRONTIERS WITH IRAQ UNQUOTE A WAR ZONE AND FORBIDDEN ALL FURTHER FREIGHTS INTO IRAQI PORTS.

4. WITH REGARD TO THE RELATIVE STRENGTHS OF THE TWO COUNTRIES, THESE ARE PROBABLY IN FACT OF THE ORDER 1:1. IRAN, WITH ITS 36 MILLION POPULATION HAS OF COURSE GREATER RESOURCES AND MORE MEN. THE ARMY USED TO CONSIST OF APPROX 450,000 MEN, OF WHOM ABOUT HALF HAVE NOW GONE. IRAQ, 13 MILLION POPULATION, ON THE OTHER HAND HAS THE ADVANTAGE OF HAVING AN ARMY WITH THE REPUTATION OF BEING VERY WELL-ORGANISED AND WELL-DISCIPLINED. IRAQ IS REPORTED TO HAVE 350 COMBAT AIRCRAFT WHEREAS IRAN HAS/HAD 450, OF WHICH 30 ARE SAID TO BE CAPABLE OF TAKING OFF AT THE PRESENT TIME. AS IS KNOWN, THE POSITION WITH REGARD TO WAR MATERIAL, SPARE PARTS, MAINTENANCE ETC IS CAUSE FOR CONCERN IN IRAN. MORALE ON THE IRANIAN SIDE MUST BE DESCRIBED AS LOW, WHEREAS THE REVERSE IS PROBABLY TRUE OF IRAQ. A LARGE NUMBER OF DESERTIONS HAVE OCCURRED AMONG IRANIAN MILITARY FORCES IN RECENT TIMES. THE DESERTIONS FROM THE APPROX 80,000- STRONG HATED REVOLUTIONARY GUARD (PASDARS) ARE INCREASING. ACCORDING TO CERTAIN MILITARY OBSERVERS, IRAQ MIGHT POSSIBLY BE ABLE TO WIN AN QUOTE ALL OUT WAR UNQUOTE IN THE SPACE OF 10 TO 15 DAYS WHEREAS A LONG-DRAWN OUT WAR WOULD MEET WITH SERIOUS DIFFICULTIES. IN THE LIGHT OF THIS, ONE WONDERS WHY IRAQ DID NOT YESTERDAY ALSO INVADE WITH GROUND FORCES AND KNOCK OUT THE PHANTOMS WHICH WERE IN TEHRAN.

<sup>2</sup>  
CONFIDENTIAL

/5.



# CONFIDENTIAL

5. THE 1975 ALGIERS AGREEMENT ON SHATT-EL-ARAB IS NOT LONGER VALID ACCORDING TO THE IRANIANS, WHEREAS IRAQ CONSIDERS ITSELF TO BE JUSTIFIED IN SEIZING AS MUCH AS IS NECESSARY TO SECURE THEIR OWN BORDERS. SEEN AGAINST THIS BACKGROUND AND IN THE LIGHT OF THE GENERAL IRAQI AMBITIONS IN THE AREA, POOR PORT CONDITIONS IN IRAQ, VERY MUCH LOWER OIL RESERVES THAN IRAN ETC, WE BELIEVE IT NOT IMPOSSIBLE THAT IRAQ HAS PLANS TO TRY AND TAKE POSSESSION OF THE KHUZESTAN AREA AND THUS CUT OFF IRAN'S MOST IMPORTANT NERVE. THIS WOULD GIVE THEM A WHOLE NEW DIMENSION IN THE IMPORTANT AREA THROUGH WHICH APPROX 35-40 PERCENT OF THE WORLD'S NON-COMMUNIST OIL PASSES. THE 2-3 KM WIDE SHAT-EL-ARAB HAS LONG BEEN INADEQUATE AS A SHIPPING CHANNEL FOR IRAQ. THE POPULATION OF KHUZESTAN ARE APPROX 60 PERCENT ARAB, AND LOYALTY TO IRAN MUST BE REGARDED AS UNRELIABLE. THE DISAFFECTED MINORITY GROUPS IN CLOSE PROXIMITY TO KHUZESTAN, NAMELY THE KURDS IN THE NORTH, LARESTAN, QASHQAI - BAHTER GROUPS IN THE SOUTH-WEST COULD ALSO GIVE THEIR SUPPORT TO AN IRAQI PENETRATION. WE DO NOT THINK IT LIKELY AT THE PRESENT TIME THAT THERE IS A RISK OF THE CONFLICT SPREADING ALSO THERE TO OTHER COUNTRIES IN THE AREA.

BUNDU UNQUOTE

3. FCO PLEASE REPEAT AS NECESSARY.

MURRAY

## IRAQ/IRAN STANDARD

MED	MAED
NENAD	TRED
NAD	ERD
UND	ECON D
EESD	CONS D
ECD	CONS EM UNIT
WED	CABINET OFFICE

## ADDITIONAL DISTN.

IRAQ/IRAN

3  
CONFIDENTIAL

ADVANCE COPIES: OIL 28

PS  
PS/SIR I GILMOUR  
PS/MR HURD  
PS/PUS  
LORD BRIDGES  
MISS BROWN  
MR J C MOBERLY  
MR EVANS

PS/SIR D. MAITLAND )  
PS/S OF S FOR ENERGY )  
PS/MINISTER OF STATE )  
FOR ENERGY )  
SIR J RAMPTON )  
MR D LE B JONES )  
MR J R BRETHERTON )  
CIP DIVN )  
MR J WHALEY )  
MR J LIVERMAN )  
MR I GILLIS. PRESS )  
OFFICE )  
MR B HAMPTON )  
MR MUIR )

DEPT OF ENERGY

THAMES HSE SOUTH

0012

.....

HD/NEWS

HD/ES & SD (2)  
HD/ERD  
HD/MED  
HD/NENAD  
RESIDENT CLERK

MR J F SLATER TREASURY  
MR I MEEK RM 303 DOT  
1 VICTORIA ST  
MR J C EDWARDS )  
MR R L BAXTER ) ODA

D.O. / DOT  
No. 10

ADVANCE COPY

IMMEDIATE

DB 2709302

RESTRICTED  
DESK BY 270930Z  
FM WASHINGTON 260312Z SEP 80  
TO IMMEDIATE FCO  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 4119 OF 26 SEPTEMBER  
AND TO CARACAS

CARACAS TELNO 273:  
VISIT OF SECRETARY OF STATE FOR ENERGY

1. AT A BREAKFAST MEETING WITH THE PRESS TODAY MR HOWELL WAS ASKED ABOUT REPORTS THAT CERTAIN OPEC COUNTRIES HAD AGREED AT VIENNA TO CUT THEIR PRODUCTION BY 10 PERCENT. IN REPLY HE SAID THAT IT WAS HIS UNDERSTANDING THAT THIS AGREEMENT HAD BEEN PUT ON ICE. ASKED BY THE QUESTIONER FOR THE SOURCE OF HIS UNDERSTANDING HE SAID QUOTE THAT VIEW WAS EXPRESSED TO ME IN VENEZUELA UNQUOTE.

2. THIS COMMENT HAS SUBSEQUENTLY BEEN THE SUBJECT OF CONSIDERABLE PRESS INTEREST AND ALSO FEATURED IN A RADIO INTERVIEW WITH THE BBC. MR HOWELL HAS STRESSED THAT THIS WAS A VENEZUELAN VIEW THAT HAD BEEN PUT TO HIM AND HAS GONE ON TO PRAISE VENEZUELAN MODERATION AND THEIR SYMPATHETIC UNDERSTANDING OF THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE IRAN/IRAQ CONFLICT. HE HAS ALSO REFERRED TO PUBLIC STATEMENTS MADE BY DR CALDERON BERTI IN CARACAS ON ARRIVAL FROM THE OPEC MEETING THAT ALL SIDES SHOULD ACT IN A MODERATE WAY AND WITHOUT SEEKING TO EXPLOIT THE SITUATION.

3. IF THERE IS PRESS INTEREST IN LONDON OVER THE WEEKEND FURTHER BACKGROUND CAN BE OBTAINED FROM JULIAN WEST, PS TO MR HOWELL, HOME TELEPHONE 446 1115 FROM A.M. 27 SEPT.

4. ADVANCE TO DUTY OFFICER NEWS DEPT AND PS TO SIR DONALD MAITLAND DEPT OF ENERGY.

HENDERSON

NNNN



CONFIDENTIAL

GR1100

CONFIDENTIAL

DESKBY 270800Z

FM WASHINGTON 262142Z SEP

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 4109 OF 26 SEPT 80.

INFO UK DEL OECD, UKREP BRUSSELS, OTTAWA, BONN, PARIS, ROME,  
TOKYO AND BAGHDAD.

VISIT OF SECRETARY OF STATE FOR ENERGY.

MR HOWELL CALLED ON SECRETARY DUNCAN TODAY. SAWHILL AND GOLDMAN WERE ALSO PRESENT ON THE U.S. SIDE. MR HOWELL BEGAN THE MEETING BY REFERRING TO CALDERON BERTI'S CALL FOR OPEC COUNTRIES TO EXERCISE MODERATION IN THE CURRENT SITUATION. THE VENEZUELAN'S HAD INDICATED THAT THE PLAN AGREED IN VIENNA FOR A NUMBER OF OPEC COUNTRIES TO CUT PRODUCTION MIGHT BE SHELVED FOR THE TIME BEING.

2 DUNCAN ASKED HOW MR HOWELL VIEWED THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE IRAN/IRAQ CONFLICT. MR HOWELL SAID THAT THE SITUATION WAS CLEARLY VERY DIFFERENT FROM THE IRAN CRISIS LAST YEAR IN THAT WORLD OIL DEMAND WAS CONSIDERABLY LOWER.

STOCKS WERE HIGH. HE HAD BEEN TAKING THE LINE WITH THE PRESS THAT THE PROBLEM WAS CONTAINABLE AT THE MOMENT. DUNCAN SAID THAT HE AGREED WITH THIS VIEW AND THAT THIS WAS CERTAINLY THE BEST LINE TO TAKE IN PUBLIC STATEMENTS. THE SITUATION MIGHT OF COURSE DETERIORATE LATER.

HE HAD FOR INSTANCE HEARD TWO REPORTS THIS MORNING THAT OIL PIPELINES FROM IRAQ TO THE MEDITERRANEAN WERE NOW OUT OF ACTION. HE ASKED WHAT STEPS MIGHT NEED TO BE TAKEN TO AVOID RENEWED PRICE ESCALATION AND MENTIONED THAT LANTZKE, WHO HAD CALLED ON HIM IMMEDIATELY BEFORE-HAND, INTENDED TO RAISE THE QUESTION OF STOCK MANAGEMENT AT THE SOM MEETING NEXT WEEK. LANTZKE RECOGNISED THAT IT WOULD NOT BE FEASIBLE TO REACH ANY SUBSTANTIVE DECISIONS AT THAT MEETING BUT WANTED TO ENCOURAGE MEMBER COUNTRIES TO INITIATE CONSULTATIONS IN THEIR CAPITALS.

3. NEITHER DUNCAN NOR MR HOWELL THOUGHT THAT THERE WAS ANY CASE FOR CALLING A SPECIAL IEA MINISTERIAL AT THIS STAGE. LANTZKE HAD INDICATED THAT HE WOULD ONLY CALL SUCH A MEETING IF THERE WERE A DRAMATIC RISE IN SPOT MARKET PRICES. AT THE MOMENT THERE WERE NO SIGNS OF THIS HAPPENING.

4. IT WAS AGREED THAT IT WAS IMPORTANT NOT TO GIVE ANY PUBLICITY TO CONSULTATIONS ABOUT CONTINGENCY PLANS. DUNCAN STRESSED THAT ANY PUBLIC MENTION OF THE POSSIBILITY OF GOVERNMENTS UNDERWRITING TANKER INSURANCE MIGHT LEAD INSURANCE COMPANIES TO DISCONTINUE COVERAGE IMMEDIATELY. THE U.S. WAS STUDYING THIS PROBLEM BUT HAD NOT YET REACHED ANY DECISIONS. SAWHILL COMMENTED THAT THE ADMINISTRATION ALREADY HAD THE LEGAL POWERS TO INTERVENE ON

CONFIDENTIAL

/ INSURANCE

INSURANCE BUT STRESSED THAT MANY PRACTICAL DETAILS WOULD HAVE TO BE SORTED OUT BEFORE ANY ACTION WAS TAKEN.

5. DUNCAN RAISED THE PROBLEM OF COUNTRIES WHICH WERE ABNORMALLY RELIANT ON OIL FROM IRAQ. HE HAD SPOKEN TO GIRAUD ON 24 SEPTEMBER WHO HAD SEEMED FAIRLY RELAXED ABOUT THE FRENCH SUPPLY POSITION. BRAZIL WAS PROBABLY IN THE WORST SITUATION SINCE NEARLY 60 PERCENT OF THEIR SUPPLIES WERE AFFECTED. THE U.S. ADMINISTRATION WAS ASSESSING WHAT COULD BE DONE TO HELP BRAZIL, PARTICULARLY TO AVOID THEIR ENTERING THE SPOT MARKET. MR HOWELL AND DUNCAN AGREED THAT EVERY EFFORT SHOULD BE MADE TO DEAL WITH THE IMPACT OF THE SUPPLY DISRUPTION BY INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS BETWEEN COUNTRIES AND OIL COMPANIES WITHOUT ACTIVATING IEA SHARING ARRANGEMENTS. THE ITALIAN ENERGY MINISTER, WHO HAD BEEN IN WASHINGTON YESTERDAY, HAD TAKEN THE SAME LINE. IT WAS NOTED THAT ACTION TO HELP BRAZIL MIGHT SET A PRECEDENT FOR CLAIMS BY OTHER AFFECTED COUNTRIES.

6. DUNCAN ASKED FOR MR HOWELL'S VIEWS ON THE OPEC LONG-TERM PRICE STRATEGY RECOMMENDATIONS. IN HIS VIEW THERE WAS A RISK THAT, UNLESS THE PRICE FORMULA WAS ACCOMPANIED BY PRODUCTION ASSURANCES, IT WOULD ESTABLISH ONLY A FLOOR PRICE RATHER THAN A SAFE-GUARD AGAINST FURTHER SUDDEN INCREASES.

IN ADDITION A DANGEROUS PRECEDENT MIGHT BE SET FOR OTHER COMMODITIES. MR HOWELL SAID THAT HE RECOGNISED THESE RISKS BUT THAT THE ALTERNATIVE OF LEAVING THINGS AS THEY NOW STOOD MIGHT BE EVEN WORSE. DUNCAN AGREED WITH THIS POINT BUT ADDED THAT IT MIGHT BE HELPFUL, AND WOULD PROBABLY DO NO HARM, IF THE MAJOR CONSUMING COUNTRIES COULD AGREE A COLLECTIVE VIEW OF OPEC'S LONG-TERM STRATEGY PLANS. HE HAD ALREADY RAISED THIS POINT WITH THE ITALIAN MINISTER AND LANTZKE. GIRAUD HAD PUT THE SAME ARGUMENT TO HIM.

A COLLECTIVE VIEW MIGHT BEST BE REACHED BY INFORMAL DISCUSSIONS AMONGST A FEW KEY COUNTRIES, WHICH WOULD HAVE TO INCLUDE FRANCE, OUTSIDE THE IEA OR SUMMIT FORA. THIS MIGHT BE ARRANGED IN THE FRINGES OF AN IEA MEETING E.G. : THE GOVERNING BOARD IN OCTOBER. MR HOWELL AGREED THAT SUCH DISCUSSIONS WOULD BE USEFUL.

7. AT THE CONCLUSION OF THE MEETING GOLDMAN EXPRESSED SATISFACTION AT BRITISH GAS'S DECISION TO REDUCE THE PRICE THEY WERE OFFERING FOR ALGERIAN LNG. THE U.S. WAS GRATEFUL FOR HMG'S ROLE IN BRINGING THIS ABOUT.

8. PLEASE ADVANCE TO PS/SECRETARY OF STATE, SIR D MAITLAND, DE LE B JONES AND KELLY IN DEPT OF ENERGY, MISS BROWN AND FALL, ESSD.

HENDERSON

[ADVANCED AS REQUESTED]  
[COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING STREET]

OIL STANDARD  
ES & SD      ECON D  
ERD            ECD  
TRED          NAD

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION  
OIL



IRAN/IRAQ

ADVANCE COPIES

22 23

PS  
PS/SIR I GILMOUR  
PS/MR HURD  
PS/PUS  
SIR E YOUDE  
SIR J GRAHAM  
MR J C MOBERLY  
MR BRAITHEWAITE  
HD/MED  
HD/NENAD  
HD/UND  
HD/CONS D  
CONSULAR EMERGENCY UNIT  
HD/ES & SD  
HD/MAED  
HD/DEF D  
PUSD (2)  
NEWS D

NO 10 DOWNING STREET  
CABINET OFFICE DIO

*Sir A Adams*  
*B Adams*

ADVANCE COPY

IMMEDIATE

~~RESIDENT CLERK~~

GRS 180

RESTRICTED

FM BAGHDAD 260900Z SEP 80

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 434 OF 26/9/80

INFO TO PRIORITY KUWAIT AND AMMAN

IRAQ/IRAN: BRITISH COMMUNITY DEPENDANTS

1. PROTOCOL DEPARTMENT OF THE MFA TELEPHONED DIPLOMATIC MISSIONS THIS MORNING (26 SEPTEMBER) TO SAY THAT WIVES AND CHILDREN OF NATIONALS WISHING TO LEAVE IRAQ DO NOT (NOT) REQUIRE EXIT PERMITS.
2. THE MFA DID NOT (NOT) REFER TO HUSBANDS AND SINGLE MEN AND THE CLEAR IMPLICATION IS THAT THEY WILL NOT (NOT) BE ALLOWED TO LEAVE UNLESS THEY HAVE THE NECESSARY EXIT PERMITS. WE HAVE ALREADY HEARD THAT A LARGE NUMBER OF FOREIGN MALES NATIONALS ARE AT RUTBA, UNABLE TO CROSS THE BORDER BECAUSE THEY DO NOT HAVE THEIR PERMITS. THE BRITISH ELEMENT OF THIS IS SMALL, AND IS BEING ADVISED BY US TO RETURN TO BAGHDAD UNLESS THEY ARE ACCOMPANYING WIVES AND CHILDREN AND FEEL THEY CAN MAKE A SPECIAL CASE TO THE RUTBA AUTHORITIES.
3. THE MFA ALSO SAID THAT DEPENDANTS OF EMBASSY STAFF COULD



3. THE MFA ALSO SAID THAT DEPENDANTS OF EMBASSY STAFF COULD  
OBTAIN THE NECESSARY EXIT PERMIT FROM THE MFA AT ANY TIME.

THERE ARE NO (NO) DEPENDENTS ON EMBASSY OR COUNCIL STAFF  
WHO WISH TO LEAVE AT PRESENT.

EGERTON

NNNN

CONFIDENTIAL

re 5



10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

26 September 1980

The Prime Minister has seen the suggested draft reply to President Carter's message of 24 September. She has now approved the text which was set out in FCO telegram no. 213 to Belgrade, and this has been despatched.

I am sending copies of this letter to Brian Norbury (Ministry of Defence), Stuart Hampson (Department of Trade), Julian West (Department of Energy) and David Wright (Cabinet Office).

M. A. PATTISON

Paul Lever, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CONFIDENTIAL



14

SECRET

LVO 308

FDW G 077/26

CRYPTIC

SECRET

OO BELGRADE DESKBY 260700Z

GRS 800  
D E D I P  
BURNING BUSH  
SECRET  
DESKBY 260700Z  
FM FCO 260101Z SEP 80  
TO IMMEDIATE BELGRADE  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 222 OF 26 SEPTEMBER

FOR PS/PRIME MINISTER

FOLLOWING TELEGRAM NOW REPEATED TO YOU AT REQUEST OF PRIVATE SECRETARY WAS RECEIVED FROM UKMIS NEW YORK TELEGRAM NUMBER 1352 OF 24 SEPTEMBER

FOLLOWING FROM PRIVATE SECRETARY.

1. A TRIPARTITE BREAKFAST, HOSTED BY THE FRENCH, TOOK PLACE THIS MORNING, WITH THREE A SIDE PRESENT. THE CONVERSATION WAS VERY INFORMAL, WITH FRANCOIS PONCET IN PARTICULAR THINKING ALOUD RATHER THAN EXPRESSING CONSIDERED VIEWS.

IRAN/IRAQ

2. FRANCOIS PONCET WAS SOMEWHAT MYSTIFIED BY MUSKIE'S ATTITUDE DURING A BRIEF INFORMAL DISCUSSION AMONGST THE FOUR FOREIGN MINISTERS THE PREVIOUS EVENING. IT WAS AGREED THAT MUSKIE PROBABLY WANTED TO QUOTE THE EUROPEANS IN SUPPORT OF A CONTROLLED REACTION TO EVENTS IN THIS AREA SHOULD HE ENCOUNTER AN EXCITED MOOD AT A WHITE HOUSE MEETING THIS MORNING. THERE WAS ALSO SOME DISCUSSION OF THE POSITION IN THE GULF AND THE THREAT TO SHIPPING IN THE STRAITS OF HORMUZ. FRANCOIS PONCET HAD CLEARLY TAKEN SERIOUSLY AN ENQUIRY BY MUSKIE THE PREVIOUS EVENING ABOUT WHAT THE FRENCH COULD DO TO HELP MILITARILY: HE THOUGHT A FRENCH AIRCRAFT CARRIER AND FORTY PLANES WERE IN THE AREA, POSSIBLE OFF DJIBUTI. ANY ATTEMPT TO CLOSE THE STRAITS COULD PRESENT A REASONABLY MANAGEABLE CHALLENGE. HE SUPPOSED THAT THE AMERICANS WERE RELUCTANT TO BE INVOLVED BECAUSE OF THE HOSTAGES. HE HAD BEEN STRUCK ONCE AGAIN BY THE PERSISTENCE OF THE 'VIETNAM SYNDROME' IN MUSKIE'S REMARKS. THE AMERICANS WERE EMBARKING ON A HIGH-RISK PROGRAMME IN THE AREA BY ESTABLISHING BASES AND INCURRING GREAT EXPENSE. THEY WERE AFRAID THAT THESE MIGHT LEAD TO ENTANGLEMENTS, AND OF BEING LEFT ALONE TO FACE THE CONSEQUENCES. FRANCOIS PONCET HAD ALSO BEEN STRUCK BY MUSKIE'S REACTION TO GROMYKO'S SPEECH: HE SEEMED TO BE APPREHANSIVE ABOUT ESCALATION IF THE RUSSIANS ACTUALLY BELIEVED WHAT THEY SAID. LORD CARRINGTON THOUGHT THAT MUSKIE HAD MEANT THAT GROMYKO'S SPEECH MIGHT HAVE MADE SOME IMPACT ON DETACHED OBSERVERS, WHO MIGHT THINK THAT HE HAD MADE OUT A CASE WHICH NEEDED ANSWERING.

3. LORD CARRINGTON THOUGHT THAT THE THREAT TO THE STRAITS OF HORMUZ WAS LESS MILITARY (IT WAS LESS EASY TO CLOSE THE STRAITS THAN MIGHT BE SUPPOSED) THAN PSYCHOLOGICAL. LLOYDS HAD ALREADY DECLARED THE GULF A WAR AREA, AND THE RISK WAS THAT SHIP OWERS WOULD SIMPLY STAY CLEAR. FRANCOIS PONCET SAID THAT ANY ACTION TO KEEP THE STRAITS OPEN WOULD NEED TO BE CAREFULLY PREPARED DIPLOMATICALLY WITH THE ARABS, WHO MIGHT SUPPORT IT IN PRIVATE, BUT NOT IN PUBLIC. AS A FIRST STEP WE NEEDED TO FIND OUT WHAT SHIPS WERE THERE: WHAT THE THREAT TO THE STRAITS OF HORMUZ WAS AND HOW TO COUNTER IT: AND WHAT THE POLITICAL DIFFICULTIES WOULD BE.

QUADRIPARTITE CONSULTATIONS.

4. LORD CARRINGTON SAID IT WAS ESSENTIAL TO RESPOND WHEN THE AMERICANS SHOWED INTEREST IN QUADRIPARTITE CONSULTATION. NOW THAT WE HAD TO DEAL SIMULTANEOUSLY WITH AFGHANISTAN, THE MIDDLE EAST, IRAN/IRAQ AND POLAND, IT WAS ALSO ESSENTIAL TO KEEP IN CLOSER TOUCH THAN THE POLITICAL DIRECTORS COULD NORMALLY MANAGE. FOUR POWER CONSULTATIONS IN WASHINGTON BASED ON THE EMBASSIES WOULD PROBABLY LEAK. AFTER SOME DISCUSSION (AND SOME SLIGHT HESITATION BY FRANCOIS PONCET) IT WAS AGREED TO PROPOSE TO THE AMERICANS THAT THIS MORE CONTINUOUS CONSULTATION SHOULD TAKE PLACE IN PARIS BETWEEN THE AMERICAN AMBASSADOR THERE AND THE THREE POLITICAL DIRECTORS, WITH MILITARY ADVICE AS NECESSARY.

PAKISTAN

5. THERE WAS GENERAL AGREEMENT THAT THE SLIPPAGE IN THE PALISTANI ATTITUDE WAS A CAUSE FOR REAL CONCERN. FRANCOIS PONCET SAID THAT GISCARD WOULD SEE PRESIDENT ZIA IN PARIS TOMORROW. LORD CARRINGTON



PAKISTAN

5. THERE WAS GENERAL AGREEMENT THAT THE SLIPPAGE IN THE PAKISTANI ATTITUDE WAS A CAUSE FOR REAL CONCERN. FRANCOIS PONCET SAID THAT GISCARD WOULD SEE PRESIDENT ZIA IN PARIS TOMORROW. LORD CARRINGTON SAID THAT AGHA SHAHI WAS VERY BITTER ABOUT THE EUROPEANS' "BUSINESS AS USUAL" ATTITUDE TO THE RUSSIANS. GENSCHER SAID THAT THE PAKISTANIS WERE FACING SOVIET AND INDIAN PRESSURE. THE FACT WAS THAT, IN A CRUNCH, NO-ONE WOULD HELP THEM, AND THEY KNEW IT. THE GERMANS HAD MADE IT CLEAR THAT THEY COULD ONLY HELP FINANCIALLY AND NOT MILITARILY, AND THE AMERICANS HAD OBVIOUS DIFFICULTIES TOO. IT WAS NOTED THAT HOPES THAT THE SAUDIS WOULD FINANCE LARGE-SCALE MILITARY SUPPLIES TO PAKISTAN HAD NOT MATERIALISED. ARAB COUNTRIES WERE GIVING PRIORITY TO THE MIDDLE EASTERN SITUATION. LORD CARRINGTON SUGGESTED THAT THE NINE OUGHT TO BE ABLE TO GET SOME RETURN FROM THE ARABS FOR THEIR POSITION ON THE MIDDLE EAST IN TERMS OF AFGHANISTAN: IF THEY COULD ESTABLISH THIS LINK, SO COULD WE.

6. FRANCOIS PONCET SAID THAT IF THE PAKISTANIS RECOGNISED BABRAK KAMAL, OTHER MOSLEM COUNTRIES WOULD FOLLOW. THE PAKISTANIS WERE ALSO THE MAIN SUPPLY ROUTE FOR THE RESISTANCE. WE SHOULD THINK ABOUT ALTERNATIVE ROUTES. LORD CARRINGTON SAID IT WAS CLEAR FROM HIS TALK WITH GROVMO THAT THE RUSSIANS WERE NOT INTERESTED IN A SETTLEMENT. WE THEREFORE HAD TO DECIDE ON A LONG TERM POLICY. FRANCOIS PONCET AGREED: WE NEEDED "A MATURE AND CYNICAL ATTITUDE OVER A LONG PERIOD". WE SHOULD DECIDE JUST WHAT WE WERE PREPARED TO DO BOTH ON HELPING THE RESISTANCE AND ON PAKISTAN.

POLAND

7. GENSCHER THOUGHT THAT THE RUSSIANS MIGHT MOVE INTO POLAND IN ABOUT SIX MONTHS, AFTER MADRID WAS OUT OF THE WAY. THE ONLY WAY THE WEST COULD HELP TO STABILISE THE SITUATION, EVEN AT A LOW ECONOMIC LEVEL WHICH EXISTED BEFORE THE STRIKES BEGAN, WAS BY STRONG ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL SUPPORT. FRANCOIS PONCET SAID THAT SO FAR AS WESTERN ECONOMIC AID WAS CONCERNED THE QUESTION WAS NOT WHETHER BUT HOW MUCH. WHEN HE HAD SEEN THE FORMER POLISH FOREIGN MINISTER IN PARIS RECENTLY, WOJTASEK HAD IMPLIED THAT THE GOVERNMENT WOULD STICK TO THE LETTER OF THE GDANSK AGREEMENT, BUT WOULD FEEL FREE TO BREAK IT UNLESS THE UNIONS DID LIKEWISE. GENSCHER SAID THAT THE GDR FOREIGN MINISTER, FISCHER, HAD CLAIMED THAT THE POLISH COMMUNIST PARTY WOULD SOON REGAIN LOST GROUND AND POLAND WOULD "GET BACK INSTEP". PUJA, THE HUNGARIAN FOREIGN MINISTER, HAD TAKEN A SIMILAR LINE. LORD CARRINGTON THOUGHT THAT THIS REFLECTED CONCERN AMONGST THE MORE HARD-LINE EAST EUROPEAN COUNTRIES AND PERSONALITIES, AND ALSO A CERTAIN DEFENSIVENESS.

U.N. SPECIAL SESSION ON DEVELOPMENT

8. GENSCHER THOUGHT THE US, UK AND GERMAN TACTICS HAD BEEN MISTAKEN, AND MADE IT CLEAR THAT HE HOPED TO SECURE A CHANGE IN THE GERMAN POSITION AFTER THE ELECTIONS. WE SHOULD NOT HAVE FOUGHT THE BATTLE ON THE MANDATE, BUT DURING SUBSTANTIAL NEGOTIATIONS HE HOPED THAT THE BRITISH WOULD CHANGE THEIR POLICY TOO. LORD CARRINGTON SAID THAT HE HAD BEEN SURPRISED HOW LITTLE REACTION THERE HAD BEEN TO THE US-UK-GERMAN ACTION.

MIDDLE EAST

9. FRANCOIS PONCET SAID THAT HE INTENDED TO SPELL OUT SOME FACTS OF LIFE TO MUSKIE AT THE MINISTERIAL QUADRIPARTITE MEETING THAT EVENING, BUT ACCEPTED GENSCHER'S ADVICE NOT TO FIX MUSKIE ON A HOOK.

10. FOR COMMUNICATIONS DEPT. PLEASE CONSULT PRIVATE OFFICE ON DISTRIBUTION.

CARRINGTON

NNNN

SECRET

0644/26



LVO 278

FDA G 112/25

OO BELGRADE DESKBY 260500Z

GRS 342

CONFIDENTIAL

FM FCO 251900Z SEP 80

TO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK

TELEGRAM NUMBER 782 OF 25 SEPTEMBER

INFO IMMEDIATE BELGRADE FOR NO 10 DUTY CLERK (DESKBY 260500Z)  
AND IMMEDIATE TO WASHINGTON, PARIS, BONN

**CONFIDENTIAL**

IRAN/IRAQ

1. FOLLOWING IS A TRANSLATION OF THE TEXT OF A MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT GISCARD TO THE PRIME MINISTER RECEIVED THIS AFTERNOON: MY DEAR PRIME MINISTER,

AT THE REQUEST OF PRESIDENT SADDAM HUSSEIN, WHO HAS SENT ME THREE MESSAGES BY DIPLOMATIC MEANS SINCE THE BEGINNING OF THE IRAQ-IRANIAN HOSTILITIES, I RECEIVED THIS MORNING MR TAREQ AZIZ, DEPUTY PM OF IRAQ.

MY INTERLOCUTOR AFFIRMED THAT HIS GOVERNMENT HAD NO TERRITORIAL OBJECTIVE BEYOND THE CONTESTED TERRITORIES AND THAT IT WAS NOT THE INTENTION OF THE IRAQI AUTHORITIES TO MAINTAIN ANY MILITARY PRESENCE IN IRAN OUTSIDE THESE TERRITORIES. WE DISCUSSED THE CONDITIONS FOR OPENING NEGOTIATIONS LEADING TO A POLITICAL SOLUTION OF THIS CONFLICT AS WELL AS VARIOUS POSSIBLE FORMULAE FOR NEGOTIATION. IN THIS RESPECT, I SAID THAT A SPECIAL ROLE MUST DEVOLVE TO THE ISLAMIC STATES IN THE PROCESS LEADING TO A POLITICAL SOLUTION OF THE CONFLICT.

I ALSO URGED ON MR TAREQ AZIZ THAT IRAQ EXPRESS AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE HER POSITION ON THE OPENING OF NEGOTIATIONS.

FINALLY, I RECALLED EMPHATICALLY THE IMPORTANCE WHICH FRANCE ATTACHES TO THE MAINTENANCE OF FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION IN THE GULF AND THE STRAITS OF HORMUZ.

THE IRAQI DEPUTY PM GAVE ME THE ASSURANCE THAT THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT WOULD NOT INTERFERE WITH THE FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION IN THAT ZONE.

MR TAREQ AZIZ CONFIDED TO ME ALSO THAT IRAQ DID NOT AT THIS STAGE INTEND TO UNDERTAKE MILITARY OPERATIONS AGAINST THE GULF ISLETS (LITTLE TUMB, GREAT TUMB AND ABU MUSA) WHICH SHOULD HOWEVER REVERT TO THE UAE.

AFTER THIS CONVERSATION, MY PERSONAL EVALUATION IS THAT IRAQ'S OBJECTIVE IS TO SEIZE TERRITORIAL GAINS, AND EQUALLY POLITICAL GAINS IN THE FORM OF PUBLICLY INFLICTED DEFEATS ON THE IRANIAN ARMED FORCES. MY OPINION IS THAT THE GOVERNMENT OF MR SADDAM HUSSEIN GIVES ITSELF ANOTHER FOUR TO FIVE DAYS TO REACH THIS OBJECTIVE.  
MESSAGE ENDS.

CARRINGTON

NNNN

**CONFIDENTIAL**  
2220/25

*This is a copy. The original  
has been extracted and  
closed, 40 years.*

CONFIDENTIAL

44992 - 1

GRS 1129

CONFIDENTIAL

FM FCO 251800Z SEP 80

TO IMMEDIATE CERTAIN MISSIONS AND DEPENDENT TERRITORIES  
GUIDANCE TELEGRAM NUMBER 101 OF 25 SEPTEMBER 1980

IRAQ/IRAN: THE GULF ISLANDS (ABU MUSA AND THE TUNBS)

1. IRAQ HAS CALLED FOR THE RETURN TO THE ARABS POSSESSION OF THREE PERSIAN GULF ISLANDS NEAR THE STRAITS OF HORMUZ: ABU MUSA AND THE GREATER AND LESSER TUNB. SOVEREIGNTY OVER THE ISLANDS HAS LONG BEEN DISPUTED. FROM AT LEAST THE EARLY PART OF THE 19TH CENTURY AND UNTIL 1971 THE ISLANDS HAVE BEEN OCCUPIED BY ARABS, IN PARTICULAR BY SHARJAH (ABU MUSA) AND RAS AL KHAIMAH (THE TUNBS). DURING THE PERIOD OF THE UK'S SPECIAL TREATY RELATIONSHIP WITH THE GULF STATES, THE PERSIAN CLAIM TO THE ISLANDS WAS FIRMLY REJECTED BY US ON BEHALF OF SHARJAH AND RAS AL KHAIMAH. BUT WITH THE APPROACH OF BRITISH WITHDRAWAL FROM THE GULF (DECEMBER 1971), IRAN MADE CLEAR ITS INTENTION OF SEIZING THE ISLANDS, ARGUING IN PART THAT RECOGNITION OF HER CLAIM TO THEM WAS THE PRICE OF HER SURRENDER OF HER CLAIM TO BAHRAIN, A POSITION WE DID NOT ACCEPT. SHARJAH AGREED TO A COMPROMISE OVER ABU MUSA WHEREBY BOTH SIDES SHARED THE ISLAND WITHOUT SACRIFICING SOVEREIGNTY. BUT RAS AL KHAIMAH WAS OFFERED A LESS FAVOURABLE ARRANGEMENT WHICH WOULD HAVE RESULTED IN THE ISLANDS' LOSS, EFFECTIVELY, IN RETURN FOR MONEY. THE RULER REFUSED. IRAN OCCUPIED THE TUNBS BY FORCE THE DAY BEFORE THE UK'S PROTECTIVE RESPONSIBILITIES EXPIRED: AS A RESULT IRAQ SEVERED DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH BOTH IRAN AND THE UK AND LIBYA NATIONALISED BRITISH PETROLEUM'S OPERATIONS IN LIBYA.

LINE TO TAKE

2. WE DO NOT WISH TO ADVERTISE BRITAIN'S PAST ROLE IN RELATION TO THE ISLANDS. BUT YOU MAY DRAW FULLY ON THE FOLLOWING PARAGRAPHS (EXCEPT FOR PARAGRAPHS 8 AND 9) TO REBUT THE

/ACCUSATIONS

1

CONFIDENTIAL



CONFIDENTIAL

44992 - 1

ACCUSATIONS THAT WILL INEVITABLY BE MADE.

SOVEREIGNTY

3. THE UK HAS NEVER CHANGED ITS POSITION ON THIS. WE SUPPORTED THE CLAIMS OF THE SHEIKDOMS. AS FAR BACK AS THE AVAILABLE EVIDENCE STRETCHES, THE ISLANDS HAVE BEEN IN ARAB OCCUPATION. WE NEVER ACCEPTED THAT THE IRANIAN OCCUPATION OF THE TUNBS CHANGED THE LEGAL POSITION OVER SOVEREIGNTY. THE 1971 ARRANGEMENTS FOR ABU MUSA LEFT BOTH SIDES FREE TO MAINTAIN THEIR CLAIMS TO SOVEREIGNTY (SEE BACKGROUND BELOW) AND WE HAVE NO REASON TO SUPPOSE THAT THE POSITION HAS CHANGED SINCE THEN.

BRITISH ROLE IN THE PERIOD BEFORE ISLANDS' SEIZURE

4. DURING THE CENTURY AND A HALF OF THE BRITISH PRESENCE IN THE GULF, WE MAINTAINED THE ARAB POSITION CONCERNING SOVEREIGNTY OVER THE ISLANDS IN THE FACE OF PERSIAN CLAIMS. BUT WHEN THE DATE WAS SET FOR THE ENDING OF OUR PROTECTIVE RESPONSIBILITIES, WE TRIED TO PROMOTE AGREED SOLUTIONS TO OUTSTANDING DISPUTES, IN ORDER TO ENCOURAGE STABILITY AFTER OUR DEPARTURE AND TO GIVE THE NEWLY INDEPENDENT STATES OF THE GULF A SOUND START (AND IN PARTICULAR TO OBTAIN IRANIAN RECOGNITION OF THEM). THUS WE PERSUADED THE IRANIANS TO DROP THEIR CLAIM TO BAHRAIN, AND SECURED BAHRAIN'S ADMISSION TO THE UN (AFTER A CAREFULLY NEGOTIATED UN MISSION OF ENQUIRY) WITH IRAN'S AGREEMENT. WE URGED SHARJAH AND RAS AL KHAIMAH TO REACH AN ACCOMMODATION WITH IRAN, SINCE WE COULD NO LONGER PROTECT THEM. SHARJAH DID SO, ON TERMS THAT WERE NOT UNFAVOURABLE (SEE BELOW). RAS AL KHAIMAH DID NOT, AND WE RESPECTED THE RULER'S DECISION. WE DID NOT (NOT) ASSIST THE SHAH TO SEIZE THE TUNBS. THE OVERALL BALANCE OF THE ABOVE ARRANGEMENTS (IRANIAN RECOGNITION OF BAHRAIN AND MUTUALLY AGREED ARRANGEMENTS FOR ABU MUSA, AGAINST UNAVOIDABLE LOSS OF THE TUNBS) WAS FAVOURABLE AND IN ANY CASE THE BEST OBTAINABLE IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF OUR WITHDRAWAL.

USE OF FORCE

5. WE DO NOT BELIEVE THAT THE USE OF FORCE TO RECOVER THE ISLANDS SHOULD BE ENCOURAGED. THERE ARE OTHER WAYS OF SETTLING DISPUTES. WE ALWAYS BELIEVED THAT THE ARABS HAD A STRONG CASE. THE USE OF FORCE WOULD HAVE GRAVE CONSEQUENCES FOR THE STABILITY

/OF THE GULF

2

CONFIDENTIAL



CONFIDENTIAL

44992 - 1

OF THE GULF AND WOULD NOT NECESSARILY RESULT IN A PERMANENT SOLUTION.

REGIONAL DANGERS

6. IF IRAQ ATTEMPTED TO SEIZE THE ISLANDS BY FORCE WITH OR WITHOUT THE SUPPORT OF THE ARAB STATES OF THE GULF, THERE WOULD BE A CLEAR DANGER OF THE ALREADY GRAVE CONFLICT BETWEEN IRAQ AND IRAN SPREADING TO WIDER AREAS. THIS MIGHT DESTABILIZE THE WHOLE OF THE OIL PRODUCING AREA OF THE GULF. IT WOULD BE IN THE INTERESTS NEITHER OF THE WEST, NOR THE DEVELOPING WORLD, NOR THE OIL PRODUCING STATES, TO SEE THIS HAPPEN.

BACKGROUND

7. IN 1887 THE PERSIAN GOVERNMENT CHALLENGED THE AUTHORITY OF THE ARABS OVER THESE ISLANDS. IN THAT YEAR A PERSIAN CLAIM TO THE TUNBS WAS FIRST MADE AND WAS FIRMLY REJECTED BY THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT ON BEHALF OF RAS AL KHAIMAH. IN 1904 SOME VISITING PERSIANS RAISED THE PERSIAN FLAG IN ALL THREE ISLANDS BUT THE PERSIANS REMOVED IT AFTER PRESSURE FROM LORD CURZON, THEN BRITISH VICEROY OF INDIA. THE IRANIANS HAVE ALLEGED THAT CERTAIN DOCUMENTS SUPPORT THEIR CLAIM. WE PROPOSED AN EXCHANGE OF DOCUMENTS BUT IRAN WAS NEVER WILLING TO DO THIS. IN NOVEMBER 1971, SHORTLY BEFORE BRITISH WITHDRAWAL FROM THE GULF (WHICH WAS DUE ON 1 DECEMBER), A COMPROMISE SETTLEMENT WAS REACHED FOR ABU MUSA. THE SHAH AND THE RULER OF SHARJAH ACCEPTED THAT ON ABU MUSA NEITHER SIDE WOULD GIVE UP ITS CLAIM TO SOVEREIGNTY OR RECOGNISE THE OTHER'S, BUT THAT THE IRANIANS SHOULD OCCUPY PARTS OF IT AND THAT OIL INCOME DERIVING FROM IT WOULD BE SHARED EQUALLY, MINERAL AND OTHER RESOURCES WERE ALSO TO BE SHARED, AND AN AGREEMENT WOULD BE SIGNED ON FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE FROM IRAN TO SHARJAH.

FOR YOUR OWN INFORMATION

8. THE RULER OF RAS AL KHAIMAH DID NOT ACCEPT THAT THE TUNBS SHOULD PASS UNDER IRANIAN SOVEREIGNTY, \*~~~~~\*

CONFIDENTIAL

44992 - 1

\* ~~~~~ \*

THE SHAH MADE IT CLEAR THROUGHOUT THE DISCUSSIONS OF THE ISLANDS PROBLEM THAT THE IRANIANS WOULD IN THE LAST RESORT OCCUPY THE TUNBS WHETHER OR NOT THE RULER OF RAS AL KHAIMAH AGREED.

9. THIS ALL CAME AT THE END OF A PERIOD WHICH HAD SEEN THE DROPPING OF THE IRANIAN CLAIM TO BAHRAIN (1970) AND THE BRINGING TO FULLY RECOGNISED INDEPENDENCE OF BAHRAIN, QATAR AND THE UAE. ALTHOUGH THE IRANIAN TAKEOVER OF THE ISLANDS HAS BEEN A LINGERING CAUSE OF SOME DISAPPOINTMENT WITH BRITAIN IN THE GULF AND OUTRIGHT HOSTILITY IN IRAQ, THE POSITION WHICH WAS THEN REACHED ENSURED IRANIAN SUPPORT FOR THE NEWLY INDEPENDENT STATES ON THE ARAB SIDE OF THE GULF AND ENSURED HARMONIOUS RELATIONS BETWEEN THEM AND IRAN DURING THE IMPORTANT INITIAL YEARS AFTER THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE BRITISH PRESENCE. AFTER THE IRANIAN REVOLUTION THE IRANIAN CLAIM TO BAHRAIN WAS REVIVED BY CERTAIN MULLAHS. THIS, AND THE IRAQI DISLIKE OF THE KHOMEINI REGIME, COUPLED WITH IRAN'S MILITARY WEAKNESS CAUSED BY INTERNAL TURMOIL APPEARS TO HAVE ENCOURAGED BAGHDAD TO TRY TO REDRESS THE OLD GRIEVANCE BY IRAQ RESTATING THE ARAB CLAIM TO ABU MUSA AND THE TUNBS.

10. ADDITIONAL BACKGROUND MATERIAL IS BEING SENT TO CERTAIN POSTS BY BAG.

CARRINGTON

BY TELEGRAPH

BONN  
BRUSSELS  
UKREP EC BRUSSELS  
UKDEL NATO BRUSSELS  
PARIS  
ROME  
UKMIS NEW YORK  
WASHINGTON  
ADEN  
AMMAN

BAGHDAD  
BAHRAIN  
DOHA  
DUBAI  
ABU DHABI  
MUSCAT  
BEIRUT  
JEDDA  
KUWAIT  
SANAA

DAMASCUS  
ALGIERS  
CAIRO  
KHARTOUM  
RABAT  
TRIPOLI  
TUNIS  
ISLAMABAD  
NEW DELHI

[IMMEDIATE]

AND SAVING TO CERTAIN OTHER POSTS

FCO/WHITEHALL DISTRIBUTION  
OID

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION  
GUIDANCE

4

CONFIDENTIAL

\* ~ \* Passage deleted and closed, 40 years,  
under a FOI Exemption. *BW* Wayland  
2 June 2010



# CONFIDENTIAL

GRS64  
CONFIDENTIAL

FROM FCO 251720Z SEPTEMBER 1980  
TO IMMEDIATE JEDDA TELNO 549 OF 25 SEPTEMBER  
AND TO KUWAIT, ABU DHABI, BAHRAIN, DOHA  
IRAN/IRAQ

1. WE SHOULD BE GRATEFUL FOR YOUR URGENT ASSEMENT, WITHOUT CONSULTING LOCAL GOVERNMENTS, OF THE EFFECTS OF A TOTAL STOPPAGE OF TRAFFIC THROUGH THE STRAITS OF HORMUZ ON THE LOCAL ECONOMY, E.G. THROUGH THE NON-AVAILABILITY OF GAS FOR WATERDISTILLATION, ETC AND SHORTAGES OF OTHER ESSENTIAL COMMODITIES.

CARRINGTON

IRAQ/IRAN STANDARD	
MED	MAED
NENAD	TRED
NAD	ERD
UND	ECON D
EESD	CONS D
ECD	CONS EM UNIT
WED	CABINET OFFICE

ADDITIONAL DISTN.  
IRAQ/IRAN

COPIES SENT TO  
No. 10 DOWNING STREET

# CONFIDENTIAL

UNCLASSIFIED

44924 - 1

GRS 187

UNCLASSIFIED

FM FCO 251000Z SEPTEMBER 80

TO PRIORITY DAMASCUS

TELEGRAM NUMBER 134 OF 25 SEPT 80

FOR INFO AMMAN, BAGHDAD, ANKARA, TEL AVIV. DI4 MOD

IRAN/IRAQ

1. TODAY'S DAILY TELEGRAPH HAS REPORT BY JOHN BULLOCK (WITH MUCH CIRCUMSTANTIAL DETAIL) THAT SYRIA HAS BROKEN ARAB RANKS AND SENT HELP TO IRAN.

2. BULLOCK CLAIMS THAT A SPECIAL ENVOY OF BANI SADR VISITED ASSAD EIGHT DAYS AGO WITH REQUESTS FOR A PUBLIC STATEMENT OF SYRIAN SUPPORT FOR IRAN, IMMEDIATE ARMS DELIVERIES AND DIVERSIONARY MANOUVRES ON THE IRAQI BORDER. ASSAD REFUSED MOST OF THESE REQUESTS BECAUSE OF THE EFFECT SUCH MEASURES WOULD HAVE IN THE ARAB WORLD. MANOUVRES WOULD HAVE TO AWAIT A SUITABLE MOVEMENT AND DEPEND UPON THE GENERAL SITUATION. BUT, BULLOCK SAYS, SYRIA HAS SINCE AIRLIFTED ARMS TO TEHRAN SECRETLY BY NIGHT TAKING A ROUNDABOUT ROUTE ALONG THE TURKISH BORDER. ARMS LISTED INCLUDE:

150 SAM 7 LAUNCHERS WITH 600 ROCKETS:

200 RPG 7 ANTI-TANK LAUNCHERS WITH 1,000 ROCKETS:

100,000 ROUNDS OF 7.62 MM AMMUNITION, ANTI-VEHICLE MINES, DEMOLITION CHARGES AND TNT.

SEVEN SYRIAN DOCTORS AND ELEVEN ORDINANCE EXPERTS ARE ALSO SAID TO HAVE ARRIVED IN TEHRAN.

CARRINGTON

IRAQ/IRAN STANDARD

MED MAED

NENAD TRED

NAD ERD

UND ECON D

EESD CONS D

EGD CONS EM UNIT

WED CABINET OFFICE

ADDITIONAL DISTN.

IRAQ/IRAN



RESTRICTED

GRS 133

RESTRICTED

FM CAIRO 251200Z SEP 83

TO ROUTINE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 624 OF 25 SEPTEMBER

INFO BAGHDAD, KUWAIT, MDDUK

IRAQ/IRAN: MY TELNO 619

1. PRESIDENT SADAT MADE HIS FIRST PUBLIC COMMENT ON THE FIGHTING ON 24 SEPTEMBER IN AN INTERVIEW WITH DUTCH TV AND URUGUAYAN JOURNALISTS, REPORTED IN TODAY'S LOCAL PRESS.
2. HE DEPLORED THE WAR, REITERATED EGYPT'S NEUTRAL STAND AND SPOKE OF THE PERSONAL ANIMOSITY BETWEEN SADDAM HUSSEIN AND KHOMEINI. TO SUPPLY ARMS TO SUCH ADOLESCENTS WAS A TRAGEDY. EGYPT HAD RESPONSIBILITIES FOR PEACE AND SECURITY IN THE REGION, WHICH HE WOULD REVIEW AT THE CONFERENCE OF THE GOVERNING NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY NEXT WEEK. THE SITUATION THREATENED THE STABILITY OF THE WEST AS WELL AS THE MIDDLE EAST. THE QUESTION WAS WHETHER THE UNITED STATES AS THE WORLD'S BIGGEST POWER, AND WESTERN EUROPE WOULD ASSUME THEIR RESPONSIBILITIES TO PROTECT THEIR INTERESTS IN THE GULF.

BARRINGTON

IRAQ/IRAN STANDARD

MED MAED  
NENAD TRED  
NAD ERD  
UND ECON D  
EESD CONS D  
ECD CONS EM UNIT  
WED CABINET OFFICE

ADDITIONAL DISTN.

IRAQ/IRAN

[NOT ADVANCED]

RESTRICTED



CONFIDENTIAL

GRS 780

CONFIDENTIAL

DESKBY FCO 261100Z

DESKBY UKMIS NEW YORK FIRST CONTACT

FM AMMAN 260725Z SEP 80

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 354 OF 25 SEP 80

INFO IMMEDIATE BAGHDAD, UKMIS NEW YORK

ROUTINE CAIRO DAMASCUS JEDDA KUWAIT TEL AVIV AND WASHINGTON

BAGHDAD TELNO 432 TO FCO:

IRAQ/IRAN.

1. KING HUSSEIN SENT A DELEGATION TO BAGHDAD ON 24 SEPTEMBER HEADED BY THE JORDANIAN PRIME MINISTER AND INCLUDING THE MINISTERS OF COURT, INFORMATION AND FOR WEST BANK AFFAIRS. THEY RETURNED TO AMMAN EARLY THIS MORNING AFTER HAVING HAD TALKS WITH THE IRAQI PRESIDENT. THE IRAQI DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER, TARIQ AZIZ, CAME TO AMMAN ON 24 SEPTEMBER WITH A MESSAGE TO KING HUSSEIN FROM THE IRAQI PRESIDENT.

2. WHEN HE SAW THE LIBERAL PARTY DELEGATION LED BY MR STEEL THIS AFTERNOON, KING HUSSEIN DESCRIBED THE CONFLICT BETWEEN IRAQ AND IRAN AS HIGHLY UNFORTUNATE AND POTENTIALLY DISASTROUS FOR THE AREA. HE HOPED SOMETHING POSITIVE MIGHT NONETHELESS STILL COME OF IT, ESPECIALLY IF IT WERE TO PUT AN END TO WHAT HE TERMED IRANIAN THREATS TO THE ARABS IN THE GULF OVER A PERIOD OF MANY YEARS. GIVING THE IMPRESSION THAT HE WAS REPEATING ASSURANCES HE HAD RECEIVED FROM THE IRAQIS, THE KING CLAIMED THAT THEY HAD NO TERRITORIAL CLAIMS AGAINST IRAN AND NO WISH TO RETAIN ANY OF THE IRANIAN TERRITORY THEY HAD RECENTLY OCCUPIED, BUT THAT THEY WOULD INSIST ON:

- A. IRAQI SOVEREIGNTY OVER THE SHATT EL ARAB SEMICOLON
- B. THE RETURN TO THE ARABS OF THE TUNGS AND ABU MUSA SEMICOLON
- C. AN END TO IRANIAN THREATS AGAINST ARAB STATES IN THE GULF REGION.

3. KING HUSSEIN SAID THAT JORDAN WAS CURRENTLY EXCHANGING VIEWS WITH FRIENDLY COUNTRIES IN THE HOPE THAT IT MIGHT PROVE POSSIBLE TO MOUNT A PEACE INITIATIVE VERY SHORTLY, EITHER IN AN ISLAMIC OR NON-ALIGNED CONTEXT OR POSSIBLY AT THE UNITED NATIONS. I HAD A BRIEF PRIVATE EXCHANGE WITH THE KING AFTER THE LIBERAL PARTY DELEGATION HAD LEFT THE ROOM SEMICOLON HE TOLD ME HE THOUGHT THAT

CONFIDENTIAL

JTHE

# CONFIDENTIAL

THE IRAQIS WOULD BE ABLE TO ACHIEVE ALL THEIR MILITARY OBJECTIVES WITHIN THE NEXT 48 HOURS OR SO AND THAT THE WAY WOULD THEN BE OPEN FOR A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT.

4. ABU ODEH, THE JORDANIAN MINISTER OF INFORMATION, GAVE THE LIBERAL PARTY DELEGATION A MUCH FULLER BRIEFING AT WHICH I WAS ALSO PRESENT ONLY A FEW HOURS AFTER HE HAD RETURNED FROM IRAQ. IN REVIEWING THE DIFFERENT ELEMENTS IN THE 1975 ALGIERS AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE SHAH AND THE IRAQIS, ABU ODEH CLAIMED THAT THE IRANIANS HAD FAILED TO CARRY OUT THEIR OBLIGATION CLEARLY TO DELINEATE THE BORDER WITH IRAQ, FIRST DRAGGING THEIR FEET IN HIRING A FOREIGN FIRM TO CARRY OUT THE WORK INVOLVED AND THEN REFUSING TO COMPLETE THE REQUIRED MAPS. WHEN THE IRAQIS HAD PRESSED THE KHOMEINI REGIME FOR THE MAPS, THE IRANIANS HAD RESPONDED BY MOVING TROOPS INTO THE DISPUTED AREAS. WITH REGARD TO THE SHATT, THE IRAQIS HAD UNDERSTOOD DIVIDED SOVEREIGNTY TO COVER ONLY QUESTIONS OF NAVIGATION BUT THE IRANIANS HAD SOUGHT TO EXTEND THE CONCEPT TO INCLUDE, FOR EXAMPLE, NEW IRRIGATION WORKS ON THE TIGRIS AND EUPHRATES OVER WHICH THEY CLAIMED A RIGHT OF VETO.

5. ABU ODEH ALSO CLAIMED THAT IRAQ HAD NO TERRITORIAL DESIGNS, EVEN ON KHUZESTAN WHOSE FUTURE MUST BE DECIDED BY ITS OWN INHABITANTS, BUT THAT THE IRAQIS WERE LOOKING FOR A LASTING SETTLEMENT WHICH WOULD PUT AN END TO ARAB DIFFERENCES WITH IRAN. HE THOUGHT IRAQI MILITARY COMMUNIQUES HAD ON THE WHOLE BEEN FAIRLY ACCURATE AND THAT IRANIAN BOMBING OF CIVILIAN TARGETS IN BAGHDAD HAD NOT CAUSED HEAVY CASUALTIES: IRAQI MILITARY INSTALLATIONS WERE WELL DEFENDED AGAINST AIR ATTACK. THE JORDANIAN DELEGATION HAD BEEN SHOWN TEXTS OF MESSAGES EXCHANGED BETWEEN IRANIAN MILITARY UNITS WHICH SHOWED THEM TO BE COMPLETELY DEMORALISED, AND THE IRAQIS SEEMED CONFIDENT THAT THEY COULD FORCE THE IRANIANS TO THE NEGOTIATING TABLE. THE IRAQIS HAD NOT ASKED FOR ANY MILITARY ASSISTANCE FROM JORDAN: THEY ONLY WANTED POLITICAL HELP IN BRINGING ABOUT EARLY NEGOTIATIONS SEMICOLON ABU ODEH TOO DID NOT BELIEVE THE WAR WOULD CONTINUE FOR MORE THAN ANOTHER FEW DAYS. THE IRAQIS APPEARED TO BE HOPING THAT KHOMEINI'S OPPONENTS IN THE IRANIAN ARMED FORCES MIGHT RALLY AGAINST HIM. IRANIAN PRISONERS TAKEN BY THE IRAQIS WERE BLAMING KHOMEINI FOR THE SET-BACKS IRAN HAD SUFFERED AND ALSO ASSERTING THAT THE REVOLUTIONARY GUARDS WERE ALWAYS THE FIRST TO RUN AWAY.



# CONFIDENTIAL

6. ABU ODEH SAID HE EXPECTED THE IRAQIS TO TRY TO COMPLETE THEIR MILITARY OCCUPATION OF THE SHATT BEFORE OPENING NEGOTIATIONS. THEY HAD AT THE BEGINNING BEEN WORRIED BY THE POSSIBILITY OF IRANIAN AIR AND NAVAL SUPERIORITY AND HAD THUS CONCENTRATED THEIR AIR ATTACKS ON IRANIAN AIR AND NAVAL BASES, ONLY BOMBING CIVILIAN INSTALLATIONS IN REPRISAL FOR IRANIAN ATTACKS. IF THE IRANIAN POSITION BECAME DESPERATE, ABU ODEH THOUGHT THEY WOULD SEEK TO BLOCK THE STRAITS OF HORMUZ.

URWICK

IRAQ/IRAN STANDARD

MED	MAED
NENAD	TRED
NAD	ERD
UND	ECON D
EESD	CONS D
EGD	CONS EM UNIT
WED	CABINET OFFICE

ADDITIONAL DISTN.

IRAQ/IRAN

# CONFIDENTIAL



ADVANCE COPY

IMMEDIATE

IRAN/IRAQ

ADVANCE COPIES

22

PS  
PS/SIR I GILMOUR  
PS/MR HURD  
PS/PUS  
SIR E YOUDE  
SIR J GRAHAM  
MR J C MOBERLY  
MR BRAITHWAITE  
HD/MED  
HD/NENAD  
HD/UND  
HD/CONS D  
CONSULAR EMERGENCY UNIT  
HD/ES & SD  
HD/MAED  
HD/DEF D  
PUSD (2)  
NEWS D

NO 10 DOWNING STREET  
CABINET OFFICE DIO

~~RESIDENT CLERK~~

GR 800

CONFIDENTIAL

DESKBY 260830Z

FM UKMIS NEW YORK 260445Z SEP 80

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1383 OF 25 SEPTEMBER 1980

INFO PRIORITY BAGHDAD

INFO ROUTINE WASHINGTON, PARIS, BONN, MOSCOW, NEW DELHI,  
ISLAMABAD, UKDEL NATO.

MY TELNO 1348: IRAN/IRAQ: SECURITY COUNCIL.

1. THE WHOLE DAY HAS BEEN TAKEN UP WITH CONFUSED ATTEMPTS TO AGREE ON A BASIS FOR A FORMAL MEETING OF THE COUNCIL. THE COUNCIL EVENTUALLY STARTED INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS OF THE WHOLE AT ABOUT 1030PM. AFTER INTERMINABLE STATEMENTS BY THE PRESIDENT (SLIM OF TUNISIA), WALDHEIM AND THE MEXICAN, IT WAS AGREED, AT THE SPECIFIC REQUEST OF NORWAY AND MEXICO, THAT THE COUNCIL SHOULD MEET FORMALLY TOMORROW (26 SEPTEMBER) AFTERNOON. AT THE SUGGESTION OF THE ZAMBIAN, WITH SOVIET SUPPORT, IT WAS ALSO AGREED THAT WE SHOULD MEET FIRST IN INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS TO DISCUSS THE PROCEDURE AND TO HEAR THE RESULTS OF THE MINISTERIAL MEETING OF THE ISLAMIC CONFERENCE (SEE PARA 3 BELOW).

DESKBY  
0830

*mb*

THE ISLAMIC CONFERENCE (SEE PARA 3 BELOW).

2. THE IRAQI ENVOY, KITTANI, WORKED ALL DAY TO PREVENT ANY MEETING TAKING PLACE. WHEN I MET HIM EARLY IN THE MORNING HE TOLD ME THAT BAGHDAD WAS OPPOSED TO A MEETING "FOR THE TIME BEING": A MEETING NOW WOULD PREJUDICE THE CHANCES FOR HELPFUL UN MEDIATION AT A LATER STAGE; MORE TIME SHOULD BE ALLOWED FOR THE EFFORTS OF THE ISLAMIC CONFERENCE (SEE BELOW); HE HOPED THE UK WOULD NOT BE FORWARD IN PRESSING FOR A MEETING. KITTANI WAS FULLY AND UNSCRUPULOUSLY BACKED BY TROYANOVSKY (USSR) WHO COULD BE COUNTED ON TO RAISE DIFFICULTIES WHENEVER WE SEEMED TO BE APPROACHING A POSSIBLE CONSENSUS.

3. THE FOREIGN MINISTERS OF PAKISTAN AND SAUDI ARABIA LED EFFORTS TO PROMOTE MEDIATION BY THE ISLAMIC CONFERENCE. THEIR PROPOSAL IS THAT PRESIDENT ZIA, ACCOMPANIED BY SHATTI, THE SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE CONFERENCE, SHOULD VISIT TEHRAN AND BAGHDAD DURING THE NEXT FEW DAYS. ZIA HAS APPARENTLY AGREED TO DO THIS ON THE CONDITIONS THAT THE ISLAMIC FOREIGN MINISTERS (WHO ARE TO MEET HERE TOMORROW MORNING 26 SEPTEMBER) ENDORSE THE PROPOSAL AND THAT THE IRANIAN AND IRAQI AUTHORITIES INDICATE WILLINGNESS TO RECEIVE HIM. BANI SADR IS REPORTED TO HAVE DONE SO BUT THERE IS DOUBT ABOUT THE IRAQI POSITION: KITTANI HAS DECLINED SO FAR TO SEEK INSTRUCTIONS FROM BAGHDAD. SLIM HAS SENT IDENTICAL TELEGRAMS TO BANI SADR AND SADDAM HUSSEIN ASKING THEM TO LET HIM KNOW WHETHER THEY HAVE ACCEPTED THE MEDIATION OF THE ISLAMIC CONFERENCE.

4. THOSE PRESSING FOR A MEETING HAVE INCLUDED:

(A) THE SECRETARY GENERAL WHO, EARLY IN THE DAY, ALLOWED HIMSELF TO BE MISLED BY TROYANOVSKY INTO THINKING THAT THE RUSSIANS HAD CHANGED THEIR POSITION AND WERE READY TO ACCEPT A MEETING. WALDHEIM WAS TORN BETWEEN THE DESIRE TO "DO HIS DUTY" BY THE ORGANISATION AND RELUCTANCE TO ANTAGONISE THE RUSSIANS AND THE ARABS. HE UNHELPEFULLY ISSUED A FURTHER LETTER "SUGGESTING" AN EARLY COUNCIL MEETING JUST AT THE MOMENT WHEN THERE SEEMED TO BE A CHANCE THAT WE WOULD ALL AGREE TO LEAVE IT TO THE MUSLIMS FOR THE MOMENT:

(B) MCHENRY (US), WHO THOUGHT A MEETING ESSENTIAL IN ORDER TO PRESERVE THE COUNCIL'S REPUTATION BUT WAS NOT PREPARED TO TAKE THE LEAD IN CALLING FOR ONE:

(C) ALGARD (NORWAY) WHO WAS UNDER STRICT INSTRUCTIONS FROM HIS FOREIGN MINISTER:

(D) THE PRESIDENT (SLIM OF TUNISIA) WHO EMERGED AS AN INCOMPETENT, SELF-IMPORTANT AND VERBOSE CHAIRMAN. HE SUCCEEDED IN LINING UP SEVERAL OF THE NON-ALIGNED MEMBERS (ESPECIALLY MEXICO) IN FAVOUR OF A MEETING BY ARGUING THAT ONE WAS ESSENTIAL FOR



SEVERAL OF THE NON-ALIGNED MEMBERS (ESPECIALLY MEXICO) IN FAVOUR OF A MEETING BY ARGUING THAT ONE WAS ESSENTIAL FOR THE COUNCIL'S STANDING AND (ERRONEOUSLY) THAT THE FIVE WESTERN MEMBERS WERE ADAMANT THAT THERE SHOULD BE ONE.

5. THE PORTUGUESE AND THE FRENCH WERE UNENTHUSIASTIC ABOUT A MEETING. IN ACCORDANCE WITH YOUR INSTRUCTIONS, I KEPT MY HEAD DOWN BUT ARGUED FROM TIME TO TIME THAT IT WOULD BE BETTER FOR THE COUNCIL TO ALLOW THE ISLAMIC CONFERENCE TO GET ON WITH ITS MEDIATION EFFORTS THAN TO PRODUCE, AFTER LONG CONSULTATIONS, A STATEMENT WHICH WENT NO FURTHER THAN THAT OF 23 SEPTEMBER (MY TELNO 1340), WHICH WAS THE MOST THE RUSSIANS WERE PREPARED TO ACCEPT.

6. WHAT HAPPENS IN THE COUNCIL TOMORROW WILL, IN MY VIEW, DEPEND ON THE MILITARY SITUATION ON THE GROUND. IF THE IRAQIS FEEL THAT THEY HAVE DONE ENOUGH, THE RUSSIANS MAY NOT STALL AND BLOCK A POSITIVE OUTCOME, EG A FIRMER STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT, OR EVEN A RESOLUTION. IF THE IRAQIS WANT TO CONTINUE THE BATTLE, THE RUSSIANS PROBABLY WILL STALL, HOLDING THE COUNCIL UP IN ENDLESS INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS. EQUALLY, THE ISLAMIC CONFERENCE MAY URGE THE COUNCIL TO HOLD OFF WHILE THEY DEVELOP THEIR MEDIATION ATTEMPTS.

7. IF WE GET INTO A FORMAL MEETING, COUNCIL MEMBERS ARE LIKELY TO MAKE SHORT STATEMENTS, CAREFULLY AVOIDING TAKING SIDES AND CONCENTRATING ON THE NEED FOR A CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES, PEACEFUL NEGOTIATION, ETC. IF THIS HAPPENS, I RECOMMEND THAT WE TOO SHOULD MAKE SUCH A STATEMENT. I CAN EASILY DRAFT THIS IN THE LIGHT OF DEVELOPMENTS THROUGH THE DAY.

PARSONS

NNNN



GYPHIER

CONFIDENTIAL

LVO NR 288/26

FDW G 50/26

OO BELGRADE (DESKBY 260700Z)

GR 50

CONFIDENTIAL

DESKBY BELGRADE 260700Z

FM UKMIS NEW YORK 260205Z SEP 80

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1382 OF 25 SEPTEMBER 1980

AND TO BELGRADE (FOR P.S. TO P.M.).

FOLLOWING FROM PRIVATE SECRETARY

YOUR TELNO 213: REPLY TO PRESIDENT CARTER.

LORD CARRINGTON AGREES WITH THE TERMS OF THE DRAFT REPLY.

PARSONS

NNNN

GYPHIER

0407/26

IRAN/IRAQ

ADVANCE COPIES

22

PS  
PS/SIR I GILMOUR  
PS/MR HURD  
PS/PUS  
SIR E YOUDE  
SIR J GRAHAM  
MR J C MOBERLY  
MR BRAITHWAITE  
HD/MED  
HD/NENAD  
HD/UND  
HD/CONS D  
CONSULAR EMERGENCY UNIT  
HD/ES & SD  
HD/MAED  
HD/DEF D  
PUSD (2)  
NEWS D

~~NO 10 DOWNING STREET~~  
CABINET OFFICE DIO

~~RESIDENT CLERK~~

*Can be held  
FED*

GR 200

RESTRICTED

FM PEKING 250814Z SEP 80

TO ROUTINE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 621 OF 25 SEPTEMBER

INFO ROUTINE BAGHDAD MOSCOW HONG KONG ISLAMABAD

#### CHINESE VIEWS ON IRAN-IRAQ CONFLICT

THE CHINESE MEDIA ON 24 SEPTEMBER PUBLICIZED ZHAO ZIYANG'S COMMENT TO VISITING NORWEGIAN PRIME MINISTER NORDLI ON THE IRAN/IRAQ CONFLICT. HE SAID BOTH WERE THIRD WORLD COUNTRIES FRIENDLY TO CHINA. HE HOPED THE DISPUTES COULD BE SOLVED PEACEFULLY THROUGH NEGOTIATIONS AND SUPERPOWER INTERFERENCE AVOIDED.

2. A XINHUA COMMENTARY OF THE SAME DATE GAVE A FACTUAL BUT ENTIRELY NEUTRAL ACCOUNT OF DEVELOPMENTS. IT ARGUED THAT SETTling TRADITIONAL DISPUTES THROUGH CONFLICT RATHER THAN CONSULTATION COULD ONLY DAMAGE BOTH COUNTRIES' FUNDAMENTAL INTERESTS. THE SOVIET UNION WAS ACCUSED OF "FISHING IN TROUBLED WATERS" BY SUGGESTING THAT THE CONFLICT WAS PROVOKED

INTERESTS. THE SOVIET UNION WAS ACCUSED OF "FISHING IN TROUBLED WATERS" BY SUGGESTING THAT THE CONFLICT WAS PROVOKED BY THE WEST. MFA HAVE TAKEN SIMILAR LINE IN INFORMAL DISCUSSION WITH HEAD OF CHANCERY.

COMMENT

3. THE CHINESE ARE NO DOUBT SOMEWHAT EMBARRASSED BY THIS CONFLICT. THEY HAVE BEEN MAKING MOVES TO STRENGTHEN RELATIONS WITH IRAQ (EG THE OPENING OF AN AIRLINK IN JULY, AND VICE-PREMIER JI PENGFEI'S VISIT THIS MONTH). MEANWHILE, ALTHOUGH PREPARED TO GIVE MUTED SUPPORT TO THE UNITED STATES OVER HOSTAGES, CHINA HAS IN GENERAL USED KID GLOVES IN HANDLING HER RELATIONS WITH IRAN, FLAWED BY HUA GUOFENG'S VISIT TO THE SHAH IN 1978, AND HAS TRIED TO AVOID ANTAGONISING THE PRESENT REGIME. THE CHINESE HAVE STUDIOUSLY AVOIDED ATTRIBUTING RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE PRESENT CONFLICT.

CRADOCK

NNNN



RESTRICTED

GRS 240

RESTRICTED

FM BAGHDAD 251210Z SEP 80

TO FLASH AMMAN

TELEGRAM NUMBER 34 OF 25/9/80

FOR INFO TO IMMEDIATE FCO

YOUR TEL NO 34: BRITISH COMMUNITY DEPENDANTS

1. MANY THANKS FOR FIELDING THE FIRST DESERT BUSLOAD AND THE SELTRUST MINI BUS CONTAINING 12 PERSONS.

2. BRITISH COMMUNITY TODAY ORGANISED FURTHER CONVOYS OF TWO BUSES, CONTAINING RESPECTIVELY 44 AND 50 WOMEN AND CHILDREN, ACCOMPANIED BY SEVEN LAND-ROVER TYPE VEHICLES CONTAINING 35 PERSONS. THESE TOTALS INCLUDE SIX MEN ON THE BUSES, NONE WITH EXIT PERMIT PROBLEMS. ALL COULD REACH AMMAN TONIGHT.

3. BOTH BUSES ARE HIRED THROUGH TO AMMAN. NOT ALL THE SEVEN CARS HAVE CORRECT DOCUMENTATION SO SOME MAY HAVE TO BE LEFT AT RUTBA, WITH PASSENGERS TRANS-SHIPING TO ONE OR OTHER BUS. (THE BUS CONTAINING 50 SOULS CARRIES 19 CHILDREN).

4. COSTS OF BUS HIRE HERE ARE RISING DRAMATICALLY AS THE SCRAMBLE OF DEPENDANTS TO LEAVE DEVELOPS. BRITISH COMMUNITY PLANS TO ARRANGE FOR A FOURTH BUS TO LEAVE DURING TOMORROW (26 SEPTEMBER) . I SHALL BE INFORMING MY EC COLLEAGUES OF THIS AT A MEETING LATER TODAY AND TELLING THEM THAT THIS BUS MAY HAVE A FEW SEATS FREE FOR THEIR WOMEN AND CHILDREN (BUT NOT MALES).

5. WILL TELEGRAPH AGAIN ABOUT DEPARTURE OF FOURTH BUS.

6. MIFT CONTAINS LIST OF THOSE WHO LEFT TODAY.

EGERTON

IRAQ/IRAN STANDARD

MED	MAED
NENAD	TRED
NAD	ERD
UND	ECON D
EESD	CONS D
ECD	CONS EM UNIT
WED	CABINET OFFICE

ADDITIONAL DISTN.

IRAQ/IRAN

RESTRICTED

GYPHER

LVO 301

FDW G 71/26

OO BELGRADE DESKBY 260700Z

GR 155  
CONFIDENTIAL  
DESKBY 260700Z  
FROM FCO 260122Z SEP 80  
TO IMMEDIAT BELGRADE (FOR PS/PRIME MINISTER)  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 227 OF 25 SEPTEMBER

CONFIDENTIAL

FOLLOWING TELEGRAM NOW REPEATED TO YOU AT REQUEST OF PRIVATE SECRETARY WAS RECEIVED FROM UKMIS NEW YORK TELEGRAM NUMBER 1359 OF 25 SEPTEMBER

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, PARIS, BONN, UKDEL NATO, MOSCOW, BAGHDAD, KUWAIT, JEDDA, AMMAN.

FOLLOWING FROM PRIVATESECRETARY.

SECRETARY OF STATES MEETING WITH MR MUSKIE, 25 SETEPMBER IN NEW YORK

MIPT: (NOT TO ALL).

IRAN/IRAQ.

1. IT WAS AGREED THAT THE UN MUST BE SEEN TO AQACT. BUT FOR THE WESTERN FIVE TO PUSH FOR A SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING COULD CAUSE THE NON-ALIGNED TO PULL BACK. IN MCHENRY'S WORDS, THERE WAS A LONG QUEUE OF PEOPLE PRESSING FOR A SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING, BUT NO-ONE WAS IN FRONT. IT WAS AGREED THAT THE SITUATION WOULD BE GREATLY CLARIFIED AFTER WALDHEIM'S PRELIMINARY CONTACTS WITH THE IRAQI REPRESENTATIVE, MR KITTANI, WHO WAS ALSO DUE TO SEE THE RUSSIANS THIS MORNING. WALDHEIM WAS ALSO TRYING TO GET IN TOUCH WITH BANI SADR BY TELEPHONE, THOUGH WITHOUT SUCCESS SO FAR. THE AMERICANS FEARED THAT THE IRANIANS WOULD WANT NOTHING TO DO WITH THE UN.

2. FOR DISCUSSION ON SOUTH AFRICAN ARMS EMBARGO, SEE MIFT.

CARRINGTON

NNNN

GYPHER

0545/26



IMMEDIATE

ADVANCE COPY

IRAN/IRAQ

ADVANCE COPIES

22

PS  
PS/SIR I GILMOUR  
PS/MR HURD  
PS/PUS  
SIR E YOUDE  
SIR J GRAHAM  
MR J C MOBERLY  
MR BRAITHWAITE  
HD/MED  
HD/NENAD  
HD/UND  
HD/CONS D ← *25 Sent by ASM - used by Kelliphase*  
CONSULAR EMERGENCY UNIT  
HD/ES & SD  
HD/MAED  
HD/DEF D  
PUSD (2)  
NEWS D  
~~RESIDENT-CLERK~~

~~NO 10 DOWNING STREET~~  
CABINET OFFICE DIO

RESTRICTED

FM STOCKHOLM 251341Z SEPTEMBER 1980

TO PRIORITY FCG

TELEGRAM NUMBER 178 OF 25 SEPTEMBER 1980

FOLLOWING RECEIVED FROM SWEDISH EMBASSY BRITISH INTEREST SECTION

TEHRAN: ADDRESSED PRIORITY FCG TELNO 4 OF 24 SEPTEMBER.

IRAN-IRAN DISPUTE.

1. WE HAVE HAD NO REPORTS OF BRITISH SUBJECTS IN IRAN SUFFERING DEATH OR INJURY.
2. WE HAVE REGISTRATION CARDS FOR THREE BRITISH SUBJECTS IN ABADAN.  
(A) MR NISRAT KIRMANI. PPT 494062B ISSUED PETERBOROUGH 9 SEPTEMBER 1979. PLUS WIFE AND TWO CHILDREN (NATIONALITY UNKNOWN).  
(B) MR DAVID ANTHONY NORMAN, PPT L 010257A 25 APRIL 1975.  
(C) MISS CYNTHIA MARY WILSON PPT 95279B LONDON MARCH 1972  
TELEPHONE LINES TO ABADAN ARE OUT. WE HAVE BEEN UNABLE TO CONTACT ABOVE TO ENQUIRE AFTER WELL-BEING.

3. ACCORDING TO RECORDS THERE ARE NOW NO BRITISH SUBJECTS IN KHOORRAMSHAH.

MURRAY

NNNN



13a

LVO 286/26  
FDW G 23/26  
OO ATHENS  
OO ANKARA  
OO BELGRADE  
GRS600

**STAMPER**  
**SECRET**

*ms*

SECRET  
BURNING BUSH  
ECLIPSE  
FROM F C O 251855Z SEP 80  
TO IMMEDIATE ATHENS (PERSONAL FOR AMBASSADOR)  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 174 OF 25 SEPTEMBER  
AND TO IMMEDIATE ANKARA (PERSONAL FOR AMBASSADOR)  
BELGRADE (FOR FERGUSSON/DAUNT)

FOLLOWING TELEGRAM NOW REPEATED TO YOU AT REQUEST OF SED  
WAS RECEIVED FROM UKDEL NATO TELEGRAM NUMBER 1 TO UKMIS NEW YORK  
OF 24 SEPTEMBER.

ATHENS TELNO 4 TO UKMIS NEW YORK: GREEK REINTEGRATION.

1. I AM SURE THE SECRETARY OF STATE WILL BEAR IN MIND THAT:  
(A) WHAT ROGERS TOLD ME ON 16 SEPTEMBER ABOUT HIS EFFORTS WAS  
GIVEN IN CONFIDENCE THAT IT WOULD BE HANDLED ON A VERY RESTRICTED  
BASIS AND NOT PASSED ON TO ANY OF OUR ALLIES. (HE MENTIONED  
ESPECIALLY THE AMERICANS, TO WHOM HE CLAIMS TO HAVE PROVIDED  
VERY LITTLE INFORMATION):  
(B) THE FRENCH ARE NOT DIRECTLY INVOLVED IN THE PROBLEM OF GREEK  
REINTEGRATION, NOT BEING MEMBERS OF THE DPC, AND IT WOULD  
THEREFORE BE DIFFICULT, IN ALLIANCE TERMS, TO ASSOCIATE THEM  
WITH ANY ARRANGEMENTS FOR POLITICAL MONITORING OF ROGERS'  
ACTIVITIES.

2. THE ABOVE SAID, THE LINE TAKEN WITH THE PRIME MINISTER BY  
GREEK MINISTERS (ATHENS TELNO 256 TO FCO) CONVEYS A COMPLETELY  
DIFFERENT IMPRESSION OF THE SITUATION FROM THE ONE I HAD FROM  
ROGERS. I THEREFORE SPOKE TO HIM BY SECURE TELEPHONE THIS  
AFTERNOON AND, AS AUTHORISED IN THE TELEGRAM UNDER REFERENCE,  
TOLD HIM IN CONFIDENCE OF THE LINE TAKEN BY RALLIS AND HIS  
COLLEAGUES. ROGERS AGREED WITH ME THAT THIS LINE WAS  
INCONSISTENT BOTH WITH WHAT HE HAD TOLD ME PREVIOUSLY AND WITH  
HIS UNDERSTANDING OF THE ACTUAL SITUATION NOW. THE POSITION  
IS THAT EVREN WAS NOT ABLE TO MEET ROGERS, AS HAD BEEN PLANNED,  
BECAUSE OF THE TURKISH COUP BUT, AT EVREN'S REQUEST, ROGERS  
SENT HIS PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE TO ANKARA AT THE BEGINNING OF  
THIS WEEK TO DISCUSS THE LATEST TEXT. AS A MATTER OF DETAIL,  
THERE WERE SEVEN WORDS IN THE TEXT WHICH THE TURKS WANTED  
THE GREEKS TO ELIMINATE AND THREE WORDS WHICH THE GREEKS WANTED  
THE TURKS TO ELIMINATE. THE WORDS INVOLVED ARE IMPORTANT  
TO EACH PARTY, BUT THIS IS THE FOCUS OF THE CURRENT  
DISCUSSIONS. SO FAR AS ROGERS IS CONCERNED THE PROCESS IS  
STILL CONTINUING AND HE DOES NOT ADMIT THAT AN IMPASSE HAD  
BEEN REACHED. IN FACT, EVREN HAS ASKED HIM TO MEET HIS, EVREN'S  
PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE TOMORROW EVENING (25 SEPTEMBER) AT THE  
END OF A VISIT WHICH ROGERS IS PAYING TO EXERCISE ANVIL EXPRESS.  
ROGERS ASSURED ME THAT IF HE REACHED THE POINT WHERE IT WAS  
EVIDENT THAT THERE WAS NO PROSPECT OF MAKING FURTHER PROGRESS,  
HE WOULD REPORT PERSONALLY TO LUNS SO THAT CONSIDERATION  
COULD BE GIVEN AS TO WHAT STEPS SHOULD BE TAKEN. I IMPRESSED  
ON HIM THE IMPORTANCE OF DOING THIS BEFORE THERE WAS ANY QUESTION  
OF A FINAL BREACH BECOMING PUBLIC.

**SECRET**

3. IN VIEW OF THE ABOVE, I AM CONCERNED ABOUT THE CONCLUSIONS  
THE GREEKS HAVE EVIDENTLY DRAWN FROM WHAT HAS BEEN SAID TO  
THEIR AMBASSADOR IN ANKARA (PARAGRAPH 4 OF ATHENSTELNO 256).  
I CAN UNDERSTAND THAT TURKMAN MIGHT HAVE SAID THAT THE TURKS  
FOUND IT DIFFICULT TO ACCEPT THE LATEST GREEK LANGUAGE AND THAT,  
AFTER THE CONFIDENCE EXPRESSED BY MITSOTAKIS TO HIS AMBASSADOR  
(PARAGRAPH 2 OF ATHENS TELNO 247), THE GREEKS WOULD HAVE BEEN  
DISAPPOINTED. BUT, IN VIEW OF THEIR EVIDENT WISH TO KEEP THE  
DIALOGUE WITH ROGERS GOING, IT SEEMS UNLIKELY THAT TURKS WOULD  
HAVE INTENDED THIS TO BE INTERPRETED AS IMPLYING ANYTHING  
APPROACHING AN IMPASSE. ONE CANNOT EXONERATE EITHER SIDE FROM  
SEEKING TO EXERT POLITICAL PRESSURE OVER THESE NEGOTIATIONS,  
WHENEVER THE OPPORTUNITY ARISES, AND I CANNOT HELP FEELING THAT  
THE GREEKS MAY HAVE SEEN SUCH AN OPPORTUNITY IN THE PRIME  
MINISTER'S VISIT.

4. SINCE DRAFTING THE ABOVE, I HAVE SEEN BELGRADE TELEGRAM NO 237  
WITH THE TEXT OF RALLIS MESSAGE TO CARTER. THIS MAKES ME WONDER  
WHETHER GENERAL GRATSIOS HAS BEEN FULLY REFLECTING THE CURRENT  
VIEWS OF HIS POLITICAL MASTERS IN HIS DISCUSSIONS WITH SACEUR'S  
REPRESENTATIVE. THIS MESSAGE SEEMS TO TAKE US STRAIGHT BACK TO  
GREEK INSISTENCE ON THE ALLEGED QUOTE HATIG/DAVO'S UNQUOTE  
AGREEMENT.



1. I AM SURE THE SECRETARY OF STATE WILL BEAR IN MIND THAT:  
 (A) WHAT ROGERS TOLD ME ON 16 SEPTEMBER ABOUT HIS EFFORTS WAS GIVEN IN CONFIDENCE THAT IT WOULD BE HANDLED ON A VERY RESTRICTED BASIS AND NOT PASSED ON TO ANY OF OUR ALLIES. (HE MENTIONED ESPECIALLY THE AMERICANS, TO WHOM HE CLAIMS TO HAVE PROVIDED VERY LITTLE INFORMATION):  
 (B) THE FRENCH ARE NOT DIRECTLY INVOLVED IN THE PROBLEM OF GREEK REINTEGRATION, NOT BEING MEMBERS OF THE DPC, AND IT WOULD THEREFORE BE DIFFICULT, IN ALLIANCE TERMS, TO ASSOCIATE THEM WITH ANY ARRANGEMENTS FOR POLITICAL MONITORING OF ROGERS' ACTIVITIES.

2. THE ABOVE SAID, THE LINE TAKEN WITH THE PRIME MINISTER BY GREEK MINISTERS (ATHENS TELNO 256 TO FCO) CONVEYS A COMPLETELY DIFFERENT IMPRESSION OF THE SITUATION FROM THE ONE I HAD FROM ROGERS. I THEREFORE SPOKE TO HIM BY SECURE TELEPHONE THIS AFTERNOON AND, AS AUTHORISED IN THE TELEGRAM UNDER REFERENCE, TOLD HIM IN CONFIDENCE OF THE LINE TAKEN BY RALLIS AND HIS COLLEAGUES. ROGERS AGREED WITH ME THAT THIS LINE WAS INCONSISTENT BOTH WITH WHAT HE HAD TOLD ME PREVIOUSLY AND WITH HIS UNDERSTANDING OF THE ACTUAL SITUATION NOW. THE POSITION IS THAT EVREN WAS NOT ABLE TO MEET ROGERS, AS HAD BEEN PLANNED, BECAUSE OF THE TURKISH COUP BUT, AT EVREN'S REQUEST, ROGERS SENT HIS PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE TO ANKARA AT THE BEGINNING OF THIS WEEK TO DISCUSS THE LATEST TEXT. AS A MATTER OF DETAIL, THERE WERE SEVEN WORDS IN THE TEXT WHICH THE TURKS WANTED THE GREEKS TO ELIMINATE AND THREE WORDS WHICH THE GREEKS WANTED THE TURKS TO ELIMINATE. THE WORDS INVOLVED ARE IMPORTANT TO EACH PARTY, BUT THIS IS THE FOCUS OF THE CURRENT DISCUSSIONS. SO FAR AS ROGERS IS CONCERNED THE PROCESS IS STILL CONTINUING AND HE DOES NOT ADMIT THAT AN IMPASSE HAD BEEN REACHED. IN FACT, EVREN HAS ASKED HIM TO MEET HIS, EVREN'S PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE TOMORROW EVENING (25 SEPTEMBER) AT THE END OF A VISIT WHICH ROGERS IS PAYING TO EXERCISE ANVIL EXPRESS. ROGERS ASSURED ME THAT IF HE REACHED THE POINT WHERE IT WAS EVIDENT THAT THERE WAS NO PROSPECT OF MAKING FURTHER PROGRESS, HE WOULD REPORT PERSONALLY TO LUNS SO THAT CONSIDERATION COULD BE GIVEN AS TO WHAT STEPS SHOULD BE TAKEN. I IMPRESSED ON HIM THE IMPORTANCE OF DOING THIS BEFORE THERE WAS ANY QUESTION OF A FINAL BREACH BECOMING PUBLIC.

3. IN VIEW OF THE ABOVE, I AM CONCERNED ABOUT THE CONCLUSIONS THE GREEKS HAVE EVIDENTLY DRAWN FROM WHAT HAS BEEN SAID TO THEIR AMBASSADOR IN ANKARA (PARAGRAPH 4 OF ATHENSTELNO 256). I CAN UNDERSTAND THAT TURKMAN MIGHT HAVE SAID THAT THE TURKS FOUND IT DIFFICULT TO ACCEPT THE LATEST GREEK LANGUAGE AND THAT, AFTER THE CONFIDENCE EXPRESSED BY MITSOAKIS TO HIS AMBASSADOR (PARAGRAPH 2 OF ATHENS TELNO 247), THE GREEKS WOULD HAVE BEEN DISAPPOINTED. BUT, IN VIEW OF THEIR EVIDENT WISH TO KEEP THE DIALOGUE WITH ROGERS GOING, IT SEEMS UNLIKELY THAT TURKS WOULD HAVE INTENDED THIS TO BE INTERPRETED AS IMPLYING ANYTHING APPROACHING AN IMPASSE. ONE CANNOT EXONERATE EITHER SIDE FROM SEEKING TO EXERT POLITICAL PRESSURE OVER THESE NEGOTIATIONS, WHENEVER THE OPPORTUNITY ARISES, AND I CANNOT HELP FEELING THAT THE GREEKS MAY HAVE SEEN SUCH AN OPPORTUNITY IN THE PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT.

4. SINCE DRAFTING THE ABOVE, I HAVE SEEN BELGRADE TELEGRAM NO 237 WITH THE TEXT OF RALLIS MESSAGE TO CARTER. THIS MAKES ME WONDER WHETHER GENERAL GRATSIOS HAS BEEN FULLY REFLECTING THE CURRENT VIEWS OF HIS POLITICAL MASTERS IN HIS DISCUSSIONS WITH SACOURIS REPRESENTATIVE. THIS MESSAGE SEEMS TO TAKE US STRAIGHT BACK TO GREEK INSISTENCE ON THE ALLEGED QUOTE HAJG/DAVOS UNQUOTE AGREEMENT.

CARRINGTON

SECRET

SECRET



CONFIDENTIAL

GR 350

CONFIDENTIAL

FM BRITNAVAT MUSCAT 250928Z SEP 80

TO IMMEDIATE MODUK NAVY

TELEGRAM NUMBER LAA/UAJ OF 250928Z SEPTEMBER

AND TO CINCFLEET, FCO

INFO PRIORITY CTG 318.0, JEDDA, BAGHDAD, KUWAIT, BAHRAIN,  
ABU DHABI, DUBAI

FOR DNOT. FCO MED.

STRAITS OF HORMUZ. SITREP 250900Z SEP.

1. OVERALL SITUATION UNCHANGED. TRAFFIC REMAINS NORMAL. OMAN NAVY HQ AND PATROL BOATS STILL RECEIVING MANY CALLS FOR REASSURANCE FROM SHIPPING COMPANIES AND SHIPS IN TRANSIT AS RESULT OF NEWS BULLETINS FROM BBC OVERSEAS SERVICE AND OTHERS. WOULD APPRECIATE CORRECTION OF BBC INPUT IF POSSIBLE.

2. APPRECIATION IRANIAN OPERATIONS.

A. PATROL NORTH OF GREAT QUOIN ISLAND. THIS IS ASSESSED AS DUAL ROLE. SEAWARD DEFENCE BANDAR ABBAS AND NOMINAL INTERCEPTION IRAQI MERCHANT SHIPS. NOT EFFECTIVE IN LATTER ROLE AND SUSPECT IN FORMER. WHEN CHALLENGED YESTERDAY AN IRAQI MERCHANT SHIP IN OMANI WATERS ADMITTED ITS NATIONALITY BUT NO ACTION WAS TAKEN BY IRANIANS. THIS IS IN KEEPING WITH IRANIAN RELUCTANCE TO TAKE DECISIONS OR DO ANYTHING POSITIVE WHICH MIGHT LAY THEM OPEN TO CRITICISM. ALTHOUGH THEY ARE PROBABLY GOING THROUGH THE MOTIONS HASTY ACTIONS BY INEXPERIENCED COMMANDING OFFICERS CANNOT BE RULED OUT.

B. ABU MUSA/TUNBS PATROL. ASSESSED AS DUAL ROLE SHIPPING INTERCEPTION AND DEFENCE ISLANDS AGAINST IRAQI AMPHIBIOUS ASSAULT. IRANIANS HAVE MOVED SEPARATION ROUTES TWELVE MILES SOUTH OF ABU MUSA PRESUMABLY TO GIVE THEM CLEAR RADAR ZONE TO EASE DETECTION OF POSSIBLE HOSTILES. ALL MERCHANT SHIPS ARE BEING CALLED AND WARNED TO KEEP WELL TO THE SOUTH OF THE ISLANDS AND NOT TO PROCEED TO IRAQI PORTS. NO EVIDENCE OF ANY INTERCEPTION OF IRAQI SHIPS OR INTERFERENCE WITH MOVEMENT OF TRAFFIC WHICH REMAINS NORMAL.

CONFIDENTIAL

/3.ACTION BY



CONFIDENTIAL

3. ACTION BY OMAN NAVY. IN THE EVENT OF AN INCIDENT INVOLVING AN IRANIAN WARSHIP AND A MERCHANT SHIP OF ANY NATIONALITY IN OMANI WATERS OMANI PATROL CRAFT WOULD TAKE NO OFFENSIVE ACTION. IRANIANS WOULD BE WARNED, THE INCIDENT REPORTED AND RECORDED AND FOLLOED UP BY DIPLOMATIC PROTEST. OMAN DOES NOT WANT TO BECOME DIRECTLY INVOLVED.

TUNNELL

IRAQ/IRAN STANDARD		ADDITIONAL DISTN.
MED	MAED	IRAQ/IRAN
NENAD	TRED	
NAD	ERD	
UND	ECON D	
EESD	CONS D	
ECD	CONS EM UNIT	
WED	CABINET OFFICE	

2  
CONFIDENTIAL

YG

LVO NR 280/25

FDW F 001/25

OO BELGRADE

OO CARACAS

OO TOKYO

TRS 545

CONFIDENTIAL

FM FCO 25 161000Z SEP 80

TO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK (FOR PS/SOFS)

TELEGRAM NUMBER 773 OF 25 SEPTEMBER

AND TO IMMEDIATE BELGRADE (FOR PS/PM)

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, CARACAS, PARIS, BONN, TOKYO,

UKDEL OECD, UKREP BRUSSELS

IRAN/IRAQ: OIL SITUATION

1. ALTHOUGH THE SERIOUS PRESS IS TAKING A BALANCED VIEW, THERE HAVE BEEN MORE ALARMIST REPORTS ELSEWHERE ABOUT OIL SUPPLIES. THE FOLLOWING POINTS MAY HELP TO PUT THE SITUATION IN PERSPECTIVE

I) TWO BRITISH SHIPS ARE STILL BLOCKED IN THE SHATT EL ARAB, THE GULF HERON IN BASRA AND THE ALTAMEN 4 MILES OFF KHORRAMSHAHR. NO EVIDENCE OF HOSTILE ACTION AGAINST TRAFFIC IN THE STRAITS OF HORMUZ ALTHOUGH THE IRANIANS ARE STOPPING VESSELS PASSING NEAR THE ISLANDS TO CHECK THEIR BUSINESS. THE IRANIAN INSTRUCTIONS ON THE ROUTE TO BE FOLLOWED WEST OF THE ISLANDS COULD IN SOME AREAS LEAVE VERY LARGE CRUDE CARRIERS (VLCC'S) WITH INSUFFICIENT CLEARANCE AND SOME TANKERS ARE REPORTED TO BE RESTRICTING THEIR LOADS. THERE ARE, HOWEVER, DIFFERENT VERSIONS OF THE IRANIAN INSTRUCTIONS. GENERAL COUNCIL OF BRITISH SHIPPING (GCBS) ARE TRYING TO CLARIFY POSITION THROUGH BP. LLOYDS' ACTION IN INCREASING THE WAR RISKS PREMIUM THROUGHOUT THE GULF IS ALSO REPORTED TO BE DETERRING SOME FOREIGN VESSELS INCLUDING TANKERS FROM ENTERING THE STRAITS. BRITISH VESSELS HAVE FEWER PROBLEMS AS THE P AND I CLUBS WAR RISKS SCHEME WHICH APPLIES ONLY TO UK REGISTERED SHIPS, CONTINUES TO PROVIDE COVER EXCEPT IN BOX ZONE EXTENDING 50 MILES SOUTH OF THE SHATT EL ARAB ESTUARY. UK SHIPPING TO KUWAIT AND OTHER PORTS ON THE SOUTHERN COAST OF THE GULF IS THEREFORE NOT AFFECTED.

II) THE IEA ARE KEEPING THE SITUATION UNDER CLOSE REVIEW BUT DO NOT INTEND TO HOLD AN EMERGENCY MEETING AT THIS STAGE. THE SECRETARIAT HAS ASKED MEMBER STATES TO URGE RESTRAINT ON COMPANIES TO AVOID A SURGE IN PRICES.

III) THE COMPANIES THEMSELVES HAVE SO FAR TAKEN A RELAXED VIEW. NEITHER BP NOR SHELL NOW HAVE VESSELS IN THE DANGER AREA, AND HAVE NO FURTHER SCHEDULED LIFTINGS FOR AT LEAST A WEEK.

IV) AT PRESENT NO WESTERN COMPANIES ARE LIFTING IRANIAN OR IRAQI OIL FROM THE GULF: THIS REPRESENTS A LOSS OF SUPPLY OF ABOUT 2 MILLION BARRELS PER DAY (MBPD).

V) SOME HARDENING IN PRODUCT PRICES ON THE SPOT MARKET BUT LEVEL OF ACTIVITY HAS REMAINED LOW.

VI) IT WOULD TAKE ABOUT A MONTH FOR SUPPLY SITUATION TO BE AFFECTED BECAUSE OF STEAMING TIME.

VII) STOCKS ARE VERY HIGH, ABOUT 100 DAYS IN MOST CONSUMING COUNTRIES.

VIII) UK'S DIRECT DEPENDENCE ON SUPPLIES FROM KUWAIT, IRAN AND IRAQ IS SMALL, MAXIMUM LOSS OF 300,000 BPD.

2. NOTHING, THEREFORE, HAS HAPPENED SO FAR WHICH CAUSES SERIOUS TROUBLE FOR OIL SUPPLIES. IF UPPER GULF SUPPLIES WERE CUT OUT FOR ONE OR TWO MONTHS, WITH THE ACCUMULATION OF STOCKS AND SURPLUS PRODUCTION, THERE SHOULD BE NO REAL DIFFICULTIES. BUT THE LONGER THE SITUATION PERSISTED THE WIDER THE MEASURES OF DEMAND RESTRAINT WOULD HAVE TO BE. IF OTHER GULF SUPPLIES WERE AFFECTED, PARTICULARLY THOSE OF SAUDI ARABIA, (15-16 MBPD NORMALLY PASS FROM THE STRAITS OF HORMUZ) THERE WOULD BE NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT ON SUPPLIES BUT THE SITUATION WOULD BE VERY SERIOUS IN THE MEDIUM TERM. HOWEVER, POLITICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL FACTORS COULD LEAD TO A DAMAGING DECLINE IN CONFIDENCE, LEADING TO A RAPID AND SHARP RISE IN PRICES, EVEN THOUGH THE ACTUAL SITUATION DID NOT SEEM TO WARRANT THIS.

CARRINGTON

NNNN

GYPHER  
CONFIDENTIAL

GYPHER

230/25



# CONFIDENTIAL

GRS 65  
CONFIDENTIAL  
FM FCO 251040Z SEPT 80  
TO IMMEDIATE BAGHDAD  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 323 OF 25 SEPTEMBER  
INFO IMMEDIATE KUWAIT

YOUR TEL 431 PARA TWO : BRITISH SUBJECTS IN BASRAH AREA  
1. WE AGREE. BUT YOU SHOULD EMPHASISE THAT THE FINAL DECISION  
MUST BE LEFT TO INDIVIDUALS. IF THEY DECIDE THEY HAVE NO IMPORTANT  
REASON TO STAY AND THEY JUDGE THERE IS NO DANGER THEY SHOULD MAKE  
FOR KUWAIT BY ROAD.

CARRINGTON

IRAQ/IRAN

STANDARD  
MED  
NENAD  
NAD  
UND  
EESD  
ECD  
WED  
MAED

ES&SD  
ERD  
ECON D  
CONS D  
CONS EM UNIT  
CABINET OFFICE

COPIES SENT TO  
No. 10 DOWNING STREET

# CONFIDENTIAL



**SECRET**

OO BELGRADE (DESKBY 260700Z)

PP MOSCOW

GR 350

D E D I P

SECRET

DESKBY BELGRADE 260700Z

FM UKMIS NEW YORK 260051Z SEP 80

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1380 OF 25 SEPTEMBER 1980

AND TO BELGRADE (FOR ALEXANDER)

INFO PRIORITY MOSCOW, WASHINGTON.

FOLLOWING FROM PRIVATE SECRETARY

M I P T MUSKIE'S TALK WITH GROMYKO

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF U S NON-PAPER HANDED TO GROMYKO  
BEGINS

IN OUR VARIOUS EXCHANGES OF VIEWS ON THE SITUATION IN AFGHANISTAN AND THE MIDDLE EAST/PERSIAN GULF REGION, WE HAVE EACH RECOGNISED THE POTENTIAL DANGERS OF THE AREA TO THE PEACE OF THE WORLD, AND THE IMPORTANCE OF AVOIDING POSSIBLE MISUNDERSTANDINGS AND MISINTERPRETATIONS OF EACH OTHER'S ACTIONS AND INTENTIONS. THIS APPLIES PARTICULARLY TO THE MILITARY BUILDUP THAT HAS BEEN TAKING PLACE IN THE AREA.

LET ME REMIND YOU THAT PRESIDENT CARTER HAS MADE CLEAR THAT VITAL INTERESTS OF THE U.S. ARE INVOLVED IN THE REGION OF THE PERSIAN GULF. ANY MILITARY ATTEMPT TO GAIN CONTROL OF THE PERSIAN GULF AREA, INCLUDING SPECIFICALLY SOVIET MILITARY ACTION IN IRAN, COULD LEAD TO A DIRECT MILITARY CONFRONTATION WITH THE U.S.

IT WOULD BE A PROFOUND MISTAKE TO DISMISS OUR DECLARATION THAT OUR INTERESTS IN THIS AREA ARE VITAL TO US. FROM YOUR OWN OBJECTIVE ANALYSIS, THE IMPORTANCE OF THIS AREA TO US AND OUR ALLIES SHOULD BE CLEAR AND UNMISTAKEABLE. THEREFORE, WE WANT THE SOVIET UNION TO BE FULLY AWARE OF THE INCALCULABLE CONSEQUENCES OF THE DIRECT MILITARY CONFRONTATION OF THE GREAT POWERS IN THE AREA.

IN THIS CONNECTION, I WISH TO REAFFIRM THAT THE UNITED STATES HAS NO INTENTION OF INVADING IRAN OR INTERVENING IN THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF IRAN OR ANY OTHER STATE IN THE AREA. I STATE FLATLY THAT WE HAVE NO OFFENSIVE INTENTIONS ANYWHERE IN THE REGION. BY THE SAME TOKEN WE WOULD EXPECT THE SOVIET UNION TO REFRAIN FROM ANY ADDITIONAL MILITARY MOVES INTO THE TERRITORY OF THE INDEPENDENT STATES IN THE REGION.

GIVEN THE INSTABILITIES AND VOLATILE TENSIONS OF THE AREA, IT IS ESPECIALLY IMPORTANT THAT WE SHOULD REMAIN IN CLOSE COMMUNICATION AS CONDITIONS MAY CHANGE, TO REDUCE THE DANGER OF MISCALCULATION OR MISINTERPRETATION OF EACH OTHER'S INTENTIONS.  
ENDS

PARSONS

NNNN

**SECRET****CRYPTIC**

0650/26



FDW G 076/26

THERES FIVE ON ONE OF WHICH IS 800 GPS HERE GOES

SYNOPSIS

SECRET

FDW G 076/26

00 F C O  
 00 BELGRADE DESKBY 260700Z  
 PP MOSCOW  
 D E D I P  
 GPS200  
 DEDIP  
 SECRET  
 DESKBY BELGRADE 260700Z  
 FROM UKMIS NEW YORK 260050Z SEP 80  
 TO IMMEDIATE F C O  
 TELEGRAM NUMBER 1379 OF 25 SEPTEMBER  
 AND TO BELGRADE (FOR ALEXANDER)  
 INFO PRIORITY MOSCOW WASHINGTON

FOLLOWING FROM PRIVATE SECRETARY  
 MUSKIE'S TALK WITH GROMYKO, 25 SEPTEMBER.

1. MUSKIE HAD A BRIEF PERSONAL WORD WITH THE SECRETARY OF STATE ABOUT HIS MEETING WITH GROMYKO. HE DESCRIBED THE TALK AS RELAXED. GROMYKO HAD MADE A DELIBERATE EFFORT TO BE FRIENDLY, AND EVEN WHEN HE HAD BEEN HARD-HITTING, THERE HAD BEEN NO ABUSE. HE HAD BEEN STARTLED TO RECEIVE A "NON-PAPER" FROM MUSKIE ON THE STATE OF US/SOVIET RELATIONS AND THE DANGER OF POSSIBLE MISUNDERSTANDINGS, AND HAD ASKED WHETHER THIS WAS PART OF THE CONVERSATION. (TEXT IN MIFT WAS GIVEN TO LORD CARRINGTON PERSONALLY BY MUSKIE AND SHOULD BE TREATED IN THE STRICTEST CONFIDENCE). MUSKIE EXPRESSED HIS HOPE THAT GROMYKO WOULD NOT LEAK. HE COMMENTED THAT GROMYKO SEEMED TO HAVE ACQUIRED SOME CONFIDENCE IN HIS OWN (MUSKIE'S) STRAIGHT-FORWARDNESS.

2. ON AFGHANISTAN, MUSKIE HAD BEEN SURPRISED AT GROMYKO'S INSISTENCE ON A FULL DISCUSSION. GROMYKO HAD RESTATED THE AFGHAN 14 MAY PROPOSALS IN AN EFFORT TO MAKE THEM SEEM MORE LIBERAL AND FORTHCOMING THAN THEY REALLY WERE. MUSKIE INTERPRETED THIS AS A SIGN THAT THE RUSSIANS WERE DETERMINED TO GET THE AFGHAN ISSUE BEHIND THEM SOMEHOW.

3. COD PLEASE CONSULT PRIVATE OFFICE ON DISTRIBUTION.

4. SEE M I F T.

PARSONS



GR 650

UNCLASSIFIED

FROM UKMIS NEWYORK 251850Z SEPT 80

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1365 OF 25 SEPTEMBER

AND TO C O I

INFO IMMEDIATE HONG KONG TOKYO PEKING BAGHDAD WASHINGTON

INFO PRIORITY STOCKHOLM JEDDA KUWAIT ABU DHABI DAMASCUS

AMMAN MUSCAT ANKARA MOSCOW

FOLLOWING FROM HEAD OF NEWS DEPARTMENT IN NEW YORK.

1. THE SECRETARY OF STATE GAVE AN INTERVIEW TO MARTIN BELL OF BBC TV NEWS THIS MORNING. FOLLOWING IS EDITED TRANSCRIPT.

Q: LORD CARRINGTON, WHAT WAS THE REASON FOR YOUR DECISION TO STAY ON HERE?

A: I THINK ITS POSSIBLE THERE MAY BE A SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING EITHER THIS AFTERNOON OR PERHAPS TOMORROW, AND IN ANY EVENT THERE IS A GOOD DEAL OF DISCUSSION GOING ON BEHIND THE SCENES. I THOUGHT IT WAS RIGHT FOR ME TO STAY ON RATHER THAN GO RATHER A LONG WAY AWAY WHERE THE ACTION ISNT.

Q: HAS ANYTHING USEFUL COME OUT OF YOUR MEETINGS WITH SECRETARY OF STATE MUSKIE THIS MORNING AND WITH THE SAUDI FOREIGN MINISTER?

A: WELL, WE DISCUSSED THE SITUATION AND WHAT THE POSSIBILITIES WERE. I THINK THAT MOST OF US FEEL THAT THERE OUGHT TO BE A MEETING OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL, EVEN THOUGH WHAT MAY COME OUT OF IT IS PERHAPS RATHER DOUBTFUL. CERTAINLY THE UNITED NATIONS REALLY MUST TRY TO DO SOMETHING TO STOP A WAR BETWEEN TWO OF ITS MEMBERS. THERE IS A SPILL OVER OF PROBLEMS ARISING FROM THE WAR, NOT LEAST WHAT IS HAPPENING IN THE GULF, THE STRAITS OF HORMUZ. SO THERE IS QUITE A LOT TO TALK ABOUT, AND I THINK IT WAS USEFUL THAT WE MANAGED TO TALK ABOUT IT THIS MORNING.

Q: HAS THERE BEEN ANY DISCUSSION WITH THE AMERICANS OF CONTINGENCY PLAN FOR A JOINT NAVAL TASK FORCE OF SOME KIND?

A: NO. I DONT THINK THATS THE PROBLEM. THE IMMEDIATE PROBLEM REALLY IS NOT THAT THERE IS GOING TO BE A PHYSICAL BLOCKADE OF THE STRAITS OF HORMUZ. I THINK THE DIFFICULTY MAY ARISE - I DONT THINK ITS ARISEN YET - THAT THE AREA MAY BE CALLED A WAR AREA, OR THE IRANIANS MAY SAY ITS NOT SAFE TO GO THROUGH, AND THERE WILL BE A DISINCLINATION OF SHIPPING COMPANIES AND TANKER COMPANIES TO SEND THEIR SHIPS IN TO THE GULF, AND CONSEQUENTLY THERE WILL NOT ONLY BE A LOSS OF OIL FROM IRAQ AND IRAN, BUT ALSO FROM THE OTHER GULF STATES. THIS IS THE PROBLEM AND THIS IS WHAT WE ARE THINKING ABOUT.

Q: IF THE SECURITY COUNCIL MEETS AND CALLS FOR A CEASEFIRE, DO YOU THINK THATS GOING TO DO ANY GOOD?

A: ITS IMPOSSIBLE TO SAY AT THE MOMENT. IT DEPENDS UPON THE SITUATION IT DEPENDS IF THE IRANIANS AND IRAQIS ARE READY TO HAVE A CEASEFIRE

*1/207*

BUT EVEN IF NOT I AM QUITE SURE THAT THE SECURITY COUNCIL OUGHT TO TAKE ACTION. THERE ARE OTHER WAYS OF GOING FORWARD: THERE IS THE APPOINTMENT OF A MEDIATOR FOR EXAMPLE, EITHER BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OR THE SECURITY COUNCIL; AND THEN THERE ARE THE GOOD OFFICES OF THE ISLAMIC CONFERENCE, WHICH IS VERY CONCERNED ABOUT THIS, SINCE BOTH THE COUNTRIES CONCERNED ARE MEMBERS OF THE ISLAMIC CONFERENCE. ALL THIS REALLY IS HAPPENING IN NEW YORK, AND THATS WHY I THINK ITS NECESSARY TO STAY.

Q: BRITAINS ROLE BEING WHAT?

A: OUR ROLE BEING THAT WE ARE PERMANENT MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL, THAT WE ARE - LIKE THE WHOLE OF THE WESTERN WORLD AND THE WORLD GENERALLY - INVOLVED IN WHAT THE CONSEQUENCES MAY BE IF THIS WAR IS NOT STOPPED. WE SHALL DO OUR BEST TO HELP BRING AN END TO THE WAR AND TO GET A MEDIATION GOING.

BELL: THANK YOU LORD CARRINGTON.

PARSONS

IRAQ/IRAN STANDARD

ADDITIONAL DISTN.

MED

MAED

IRAQ/IRAN

NENAD

TRED

NAD

ERD

UND

ECON D

EESD

CONS D

ECD

CONS EM UNIT

WED

CABINET OFFICE



GPST00

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FROM UKMIS NEW YORK 251820 Z SEP 80

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1364 OF 25 SEPTEMBER

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON PARIS BONN JEDDA ISLAMABAD  
BAGHDAD AMMAN DAMASCUS MOSCOW KUWAIT

FOLLOWING FROM PRIVATE SECRETARY

SECRETARY OF STATE'S MEETING WITH SAUDI FOREIGN MINISTER

IRAN/IRAQ

1. PRINCE SAUD SAID THAT IRAN HAD INDICATED WILLINGNESS TO REVIEW THE HOSTAGES QUESTION ON 28 SEPTEMBER AND TO ACCEPT A CONTACT FROM THE ISLAMIC CONFERENCE. BUT SHE HAD NOT RESPONDED TO THE IRAQI DEMAND THAT SHE SURRENDER THE DISPUTED TERRITORIES AND THE ISLANDS. ASKED ABOUT IRAQ'S OBJECTIVES, SAUD SAID THAT THESE INCLUDED THE OVERTHROW OF KHOMEINI AND BANI SADR. THE IRAQIS PROBABLY HAD NOT THOUGHT WHOM TO INSTAL INSTEAD, BUT THEY MIGHT BELIEVE THAT ANY CHANGE WOULD BE FOR THE BETTER. ELEMENTS OF THE IRANIAN OPPOSITION WERE IN TOUCH WITH BAGHDAD.

2. SAUD ASKED ABOUT THE SOVIET ATTITUDE. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THAT GROMYKO ON 23 SEPTEMBER HAD SEEMED UNCERTAIN WHERE THE SOVIET ADVANTAGE LAY. BUT THEY WOULD NOT WANT THEIR CREDIBILITY AS ARMS SUPPLIERS THREATENED: THEY MIGHT THEREFORE WANT TO STOP THE FIGHTING BUT WITH A SLIGHT BIAS TOWARDS IRAQ.

3. SAUD ASKED HOW IRAN COULD IMPLEMENT HER THREAT TO STOP SHIPPING IN THE STRAITS. LORD CARRINGTON SAID THAT THE DANGER LAY NOT SO MUCH IN THIS POSSIBILITY AS IN THE RISK THAT TANKERS WOULD SIMPLY STAY AWAY FROM PORTS IN IRAQ AND IRAN. WE COULD NOT STOP THIS HAPPENING, BUT WE COULD TRY TO HELP THEM CONTINUE TO CALL AT OTHER PORTS IN THE GULF. IDEAS DISCUSSED WITH THE AMERICANS HAD INCLUDED THAT OF GOVERNMENTAL WAR RISK INSURANCE. THIS SEEMED A BETTER PROSPECT THAN THE CONVOY SCHEME. SAUD THOUGHT THAT THE LATTER WOULD NOT BE ACCEPTABLE.

4. SAUD SAID THAT THE SAUDIS WOULD WELCOME MORE INFORMATION BOTH ABOUT THE MILITARY THREAT AND ABOUT THE INTENTIONS OF TANKER OWNERS, INSURANCE COMPANIES ETC. HE ASKED THAT THIS BE PROVIDED IN JEDDA. LORD CARRINGTON AGREED. (HE IS MOST ANXIOUS THAT THIS SHOULD BE SET IN TRAIN FORTHWITH.)

5. LORD CARRINGTON SAID THAT THE UN SO FAR HAD BEEN EXTRAORDINARILY FEEBLE. THE SECRETARY-GENERAL HAD NOT BEEN ABLE TO FIND A MEMBER OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL TO PROPOSE A MEETING. EACH HAD HIS REASONS

CONFIDENTIAL

/For

# CONFIDENTIAL

FOR DECLINING: IN THE BRITISH CASE IT WAS A DESIRE NOT TO POLARISE THE CRISIS INTO AN EAST/WEST PROBLEM. WAS PRINCE SAUD OPOSED TO A MEETING? SAUD SAID THAT ON THE CONTRARY, HE SAW NO ALTERNATIVE. THE RISKS OF THE SITUATION WERE OBVIOUS. THE IRAQIS WOULD NOT BE AVERSE TO A RESOLUTION SO LONG AS IT DID NOT INCLUDE A CALL FOR WITHDRAWAL TO THE ORIGINAL FRONTIER. THE BEST MEDIATOR MIGHT BE THE ISLAMIC CONFERENCE. THERE WAS NO CONTRADICTION BETWEEN THIS AND LORD CARRINGTON'S SUGGESTION THAT THE SECURITY COUNCIL COULD AT LEAST MEET AND SIMPLY CALL FOR A CEASEFIRE.

## PAKISTAN

6. LORD CARRINGTON EXPRESSED CONCERN ABOUT AGHA SHAHI'S ATTITUDE AND HIS POSITION OF INCREASING LONELINESS. PRINCE SAUD AGREED. PAKISTAN WAS UNDER INTENSE PRESSURE AND DID NOT FEEL SECURE EXTERNALLY OR INTERNALLY. THE SUGGESTION OF A CONFERENCE WAS AN ATTEMPT TO QUIETEN THINGS DOWN, BUT IT WAS DANGEROUS AND USELESS. HOWEVER AGHA SHAHI HAD PROMISED TO TAKE NO FURTHER STEPS UNTIL PRESIDENT ZIA HAD ARRIVED AND DISCUSSED MATTERS WITH THE SAUDIS. SAUD AGREED THAT WE SHOULD STAY IN THE CLOSEST TOUCH ABOUT HOW TO PREVENT THE PAKISTANI ATTITUDE SLIPPING FURTHER AND NOT ALLOW THE AFGHANISTAN PROBLEM TO BE ECLIPSED.

## PARSONS

### IRAQ/IRAN STANDARD

MED	MAED
NENAD	TRED
NAD	ERD
UND	ECON D
EESD	CONS D
ECD	CONS EM UNIT
WED	CABINET OFFICE

### ADDITIONAL DISTN.

IRAQ/IRAN

2.

# CONFIDENTIAL



IRAN/IRAQ

IMMEDIATE

ADVANCE COPIES

19  
22

PS  
PS/SIR I GILMOUR  
PS/MR HURD  
PS/PUS  
SIR E YOUDE  
SIR J GRAHAM  
MR J C MOBERLY  
MR BRAITHWAITE  
HD/MED  
HD/NENAD  
HD/UND  
HD/CONS D  
CONSULAR EMERGENCY-UNIT  
HD/ES & SD  
~~HD/MAED~~  
HD/DEF D  
PUSD (2)  
NEWS D  
~~RESIDENT CLERK~~

NO 10 DOWNING STREET  
CABINET OFFICE DIO

CONFIDENTIAL

FROM ABU DHABI 250740Z SEP 80  
TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 298 OF 25 SEPTEMBER

INFO IMMEDIATE DUBAI MODUK BAGHDAD UKMIS NEW YORK AND WASHINGTON  
PRIORITY BAHRAIN DOHA JEDDA KUWAIT TRIPOLI AND MUSCAT  
SAVING TO BONN PARIS UKREP BRUSSELS AND MOSCOW.

IMMEDIATE

DUBAI TELEGRAM NO 29 OF 24 SEPTEMBER AND MY TELEGRAM NO 297 OF  
24 SEPTEMBER (NOT TO ALL):

IRAN/IRAQ

1. I SAW THE UNDER-SECRETARY IN THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS THIS MORNING. HIS MAIN THEME WAS THAT THE UAE WANTED TO STAY OUT. HE HAD NO PARTICULAR NEWS TO IMPART ABOUT THE SITUATION.
2. JARWAN WAS WELL AWARE THAT THE RECOVERY DDOF THE ISLANDS WAS A DECLARED AND OFFICIAL AIM OF THE IRAQIS.  
(THE IRAQI AMBASSADOR SAID THE SAME TO ME LAST NIGHT).  
I ASKED HIM OUT-RIGHT WHETHER HE THOUGHT THE RULER OF RAS

(THE IRAQI AMBASSADOR SAID THE SAME TO ME LAST NIGHT).

I ASKED HIM OUT-RIGHT WHETHER HE THOUGHT THE RULER OF RAS AL KHAIMAH HAD ENTERED INTO SOME DEAL WITH THE IRAQIS WHILE HE WAS IN BAGHDAD. HE SAID THAT SAROUR (WHO SOMETIMES ACTS AS A SUPER-NUMERARY FOREIGN SECRETARY THESE DAYS) HAD TAXED SAQR WITH THIS YESTERDAY AND THAT SAQR HAD DENIED IT STRENUOUSLY, AS ~~SAQR~~ JARWAN SAID, HOWEVER, "WITH SAQR YOU NEVER KNOW".

3. HE THEN SHOWED ME A NOTE FROM THE LIBYAN EMBASSY WHICH CALLED ON QADDAFIS BEHALF FOR THE ISLAMIC CONFERENCE TO HOLD AN EMERGENCY SESSION IN TRIPOLI TO PRESERVE PEACE AND PREVENT A WAR BETWEEN ISLAMIC BRETHERN. HE THOUGHT THAT THEY WOULD HAVE TO GO TO SUCH A MEETING.

4. I TOLD JARWAN THAT IT WAS MOST IMPORTANT THAT WE SHOULD KEEP IN TOUCH. I WAS AT HIS DISPOSAL AT ANY HOUR. HE THANKED ME AND SAID THAT THE SAME APPLIED TO HIM.

5. ALL IN ALL, I AM SATISFIED THAT THE UAE "AUTHORITIES" ARE DETERMINED TO STAY OUT IF THEY CAN: BUT THEY ARE NO MORE SURE ABOUT WHAT SAQR MAY OR MAY NOT HAVE DONE THAN WE CAN BE

6. FCO PLEASE PASS SAYING TO BONN PARIS UKREP BRUSSELS AND MOSCOW

ROBERTS

BT

NNNN



RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED

FM UKMIS NEW YORK 251715Z SEPT 80

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1361 OF 25 SEPTEMBER.

INFO IMMEDIATE HONG KONG, TOKYO, PEKING, BAGHDAD, AND PRIORITY STOCKHOLM.

FOLLOWING FROM HEAD OF NEWS DEPARTMENT IN NEW YORK.

IRAN/IRAQ: SECRETARY OF STATES MOVEMENTS.

1. I HAVE MADE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT THIS MORNING ON THE RECORD: QUOTE IN VIEW OF THE SITUATION ON THE IRAN/IRAQ CONFLICT AND RELATED DEVELOPMENTS IN THE UNITED NATIONS, LORD CARRINGTON HAS DECIDED TO POSTPONE FOR THE MOMENT HIS DEPARTURE FOR HONG KONG. UNQUOTE.

2. UNATTRIBUTABLY, IN ANSWER TO QUESTIONS, I AM TAKING THE FOLLOWING LINE.

(A) HE HAS NOT AT THIS TAGE CANCELLED HIS VISIT TO HONG KONG. HE WILL KEEP THE SITUATION UNDER REVIEW. THERE IS NO QUESTIONS OF CHANGING THE ARRANGEMENTS FOR HIS VISITS TO TOKYO (29 SEPTEMBER) AND PEKING (2 OCTOBER). HE WOULD BE VERY SORRY TO MISS HONG KONG THIS TIME, IF IT CAME TO THAT, BUT HE HAS OF COURSE BEEN THERE BEFORE AS FOREIGN SECRETARY AND THERE IS NO CURRENT CRUCIAL MATTER TO DISCUSS. IN VIEW OF ALL THE CIRCUMSTANCES HE THINKS IT RIGHT TO STAY HERE FOR THE MOMENT.

Q: WHAT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE UN?

A: THERE IS A STRONG POSSIBILITY THAT THE SECURITY COUNCIL MAY MEET URGENTLY. THE SITUATION SHOULD BE CLEARER IN A FEW HOURS.

Q: WILL THE UK CALL THE COUNCIL?

A: I WOULD NOT EXPECT US TO DO SO ALONE, BUT WOULD NOT EXCLUDE THE POSSIBILITY THAT A NUMBER OF STATES MIGHT DO SO.

Q: WHAT WILL THE COUNCIL DO?

A: WE SHALL BE WORKING FOR A CEASEFIRE AND NEGOTIATIONS.

Q: PROSPECTS FOR MEDIATION? (WHICH LORD CARRINGTON HAS MENTIONED PUBLICLY).

A: THERE ARE MANY WAYS IN WHICH THE SECURITY COUNCIL MAY BE ABLE TO CONTRIBUTE TO A PEACEFUL RESOLUTION OF THE CONFLICT. MEDIATION IS ONE. THERE IS ALSO THE PROVISION FOR THE SECRETARY-GENERALS GOOD OFFICES.

RESTRICTED

10.

RESTRICTED

Q: IS THERE EVIDENCE THAT THE PARTIES ARE READY FOR SECURITY COUNCIL ACTION?

A: A SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE OF IRAQ, MR KITTANI, ARRIVED IN NEW YORK LAST NIGHT. THE IRAQIS HAVE WRITTEN TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL INDICATING THEIR READINESS TO EXPLAIN THEIR VIEWS. I HAVE NO READING TODAY ON THE VIEWS OF IRAN.

FOR HONG KONG.

3. PLEASE EXPLAIN THE POSITION TO THE JOURNALISTS AS THEY ARRIVE. WE SHALL KEEP YOU CLOSELY POSTED ON OUR MOVEMENTS AS SOON AS DECISIONS ARE TAKEN. YOUR TELEGRAM NUMBER 6, PARA 4. YES. I WILL BE GLAD TO MEET THE UK PRESS WHEN WE ARRIVE, IF WE ARRIVE (AND IF THE HOUR IS NOT TOO BARBARIC).

PARSONS

IRAQ/IRAN STANDARD

MED	MAED
NENAD	TRED
<del>NAD</del>	ERD
UND	<del>P.C.D.</del> EGON D
EESD	CONS D
ECD	CONS EM UNIT
WED	CABINET OFFICE

ADDITIONAL DISTN.

IRAQ/IRAN

2.  
RESTRICTED



SECRET

SECRET

11

DESKBY BELGRADE 260500Z

FM FCO 251910Z SEP 80  
TO IMMEDIATE BELGRADE (FOR PS NO 10 DUTY CLERK)  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 212 OF 25 SEPTEMBER  
AND TO FLASH UKMIS NEW YORK (FOR PRIVATE SECRETARY)  
INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON (PERSONAL FOR AMBASSADOR AND SIR R.  
ARMSTRONG).

IRAQ/IRAN

1. MY IFT CONTAINS A DRAFT REPLY TO PRESIDENT CARTER'S  
LETTER TO THE PRIME MINISTER. (TEXT IN FCO TELS NO'S 205 TO BELGRADE  
AND 766 TO UKMIS NEW YORK).

SO FAR AS WE HAVE BEEN ABLE TO ESTABLISH, SIMILAR MESSAGE WENT TO  
PRESIDENT GISCARD, AND PARALLEL COMMUNICATIONS HAVE BEEN MADE TO  
THE FRG, ITALY AND JAPAN ON THE SUBJECT OF INSURANCE, ETC. HOWEVER  
IN THE COURSE OF A CALL TODAY ON THE LORD PRIVY SEAL, THE AUSTRALIAN  
HIGH COMMISSIONER MADE CLEAR THAT MUSKIE HAD PUT THESE PROPOSALS  
ALSO TO THE AUSTRALIANS WHEN HE MET MR PEACOCK IN NEW YORK YESTERDAY,  
AND IT MAY WELL BE THAT OTHERS HAVE BEEN SIMILARLY CONTACTED.).

2. AS BACKGROUND TO THE DRAFT REPLY, THE PRIME MINISTER WILL WISH  
TO KNOW THAT THE MOD RECEIVED YESTERDAY AN ENQUIRY WHETHER WE WERE  
PREPARED TO ENGAGE IN NAVAL STAFF TALKS ON A CONFIDENTIAL AND CONTIN-  
GENCY BASIS WITH THEMSELVES AND PROBABLY THE FRENCH. MINISTERS HERE  
APPROVED THIS AND THE PENTAGON WERE INFORMED EARLIER TODAY.

3. THE LAST SENTENCE OF PARA 2 OF THE DRAFT RELATES TO A RESTRICTED  
DISCUSSION AT THE QUADRIPARTITE DINNER, AN ACCOUNT OF WHICH WILL  
FOLLOW SEPARATELY.

4. CURRENT NAVAL DEPLOYMENTS ARE AS FOLLOWS.  
A TASK GROUP OF 5 SHIPS WILL BE IN HONG KONG AS FROM 26 SEPTEMBER  
AND PUBLICITY WILL BE MINIMISED IF ANY DIVERSIONS ARE MADE BEFORE  
THEY ENTER HARBOUR. THIS REQUIRES AN IMMEDIATE DECISION.  
THE LORD PRIVY SEAL HAS THEREFORE AGREED WITH THE DEFENCE SECRETARY  
THAT ONE DESTROYER (HMS CONVENTRY) WITH A ROYAL FLEET AUXILIARY  
SHOULD MOVE IMMEDIATELY TOWARDS THE GULF. THEY CANNOT HOWEVER ARRIVE  
IN THE AREA BEFORE 7 OCTOBER. THE REMAINDER OF THE TASK GROUP WILL  
VISIT HONG KONG AS PLANNED. A SECOND FORCE OF 3 SHIPS IS PAYING AN  
OFFICIAL VISIT TO LISBON BEFORE ENTERING THE MEDITERRANEAN ON 30  
SEPTEMBER TO TAKE PART IN A NATO EXERCISE IN THE EASTERN MEDITERRAN-  
EAN. THESE DISPOSITIONS CAN BE CHANGED IF THE SITUATION WARRANTS.

SECRET

15.

SECRET

5. WE THINK THAT IF MAJOR NAVAL REDEPLOYMENTS ARE SEEN TO BE MADE AT THIS STAGE THERE COULD BE A GOOD DEAL OF SPECULATION AND THE RISK OF A DANGEROUS REACTION FROM THE IRANIANS. THE REDEPLOYMENT FROM HONG KONG IS THE LEAST NOTICEABLE AND ALSO MEETS THE PRESIDENT'S REQUEST FOR IMMEDIATE ACTION.

6. IN GENERAL, WHILE IT IS CLEARLY PRUDENT TO BE DRAWING UP CONTINGENCY PLANS AS PROPOSED BY PRESIDENT CARTER, AND TO BE MAKING DISPOSITIONS WHICH WILL PUT US IN A POSITION TO PUT THEM INTO EFFECT, WE DO HAVE SOME LEEWAY, THANKS TO OUR BUOYANT OIL STOCKS AMOUNTING TO 100 DAYS, WITH MORE IN TANKERS AT SEA. THUS IT SEEMS PROBABLE THAT THE EFFECTS OF CLOSURE OF THE STRAITS OF HORMUZ WILL BE FELT MORE QUICKLY BY SOME OF THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES AND INDEED BY THE OTHER LITTORAL STATES IN THE PERSIAN GULF, SUCH AS KUWAIT AND THE EMIRATES. THE ECONOMIES OF THESE INCLUDING WATER DISTILLATION, ARE LARGELY DEPENDENT ON THE PRODUCTION OF ASSOCIATED GAS, SO THAT A CESSATION OF LIFTINGS WOULD, ONCE STORAGE TANKS ARE FULL, LEAD QUICKLY TO INCONVENIENCE AND POSSIBLY BREAKDOWN. AT THAT STAGE IT SEEMS TO US THAT, WHILE WE MAY NOT BE ABLE TO COUNT ON A POSITIVE INVITATION TO ENSURE THE SAFETY OF SHIPS IN THE STRAITS OF HORMUZ, WE WOULD BE LIKELY TO RECIEVE TACIT SUPPORT WHICH WOULD GREATLY REDUCE THE RISKS INVOLVED IN THE OPERATION.

7. IF THE SECRETARY OF STATE HAS ANY COMMENTS THEY SHOULD REACH BELGRADE BY 260500Z IN ORDER THAT THEY CAN BE CONVEYED BY THE NO 10 DUTY CLERK TO THE PRIME MINISTER IN DUBROVNIK.

CARRINGTON

LIMITED  
H/TEO  
H/D/TAED  
H/D/DEK.2  
H/D/PLANNING STAFF  
PS  
PS/US  
PS/AA HULD  
PS/POB  
SIR J. GRAHAM  
MR J. TOBERLY  
MR BULLARD  
MR P. TOBERLY  
MR BLATHWAITE

Copy To  
PS/No 10 3002 NAME OF

2  
SECRET



GRS 488

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FM MOSCOW 251435Z SEP 80

TO PRIORITY F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 584 OF 25TH SEPTEMBER

FOR INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON, UKDEL NATO, UKMIS NEW YORK,  
HONG KONG (FOR PRIVATE SEC)

INFO ROUTINE BONN, PARIS AND BAGHDAD.

IRAN/IRAQ.

1. THE RUSSIANS ARE STILL BEING CAUTIOUS IN PUBLIC, ALTHOUGH THEIR REPORTING SUGGESTS A TENDENCY TO FAVOUR IRAQ. THEY PAY LIP SERVICE TO THE NEED FOR A SETTLEMENT, BUT I WOULD NOT SAY, ON THE EVIDENCE SO FAR AVAILABLE, THAT THEY ARE PRESSING FOR ONE (PARA 7 OF YOUR TEL 500). THEY MAY WELL SUSTAIN THIS POSITION FOR SOME TIME UNLESS WESTERN ACTION IS TAKEN TO KEEP OPEN THE STRAIT OF HORMUZ.

2. APART FROM THE MEDIA, THE ONLY DIRECT INDICATIONS OF SOVIET POLICY WHICH WE HAVE ARE:

(A) TWO MEMBERS OF THE AMERICAN EMBASSY CALLED ON STANISLAV KOVRYGIN, A COUNSELLOR IN THE MFA'S MIDDLE EAST DEPARTMENT, ON 24 SEPTEMBER. KOVRYGIN EMPHASISED THAT THE SOVIET UNION DID NOT WANT CONFLICT ON HER BORDERS. THEY WISHED TO BE EVEN HANDED: AS FAR AS IRAQ WAS CONCERNED THEY WOULD CONTINUE TO SUPPLY ARMS AS FORESEEN IN THE TREATY, BUT THIS WOULD NOT BE IN SUCH A WAY AS TO CAUSE ANY SPECIAL HARM TO ANY THIRD PARTY. IT WAS UP TO IRAN TO RECOGNISE THAT THE SOVIET UNION WAS NOT TAKING ANY NEW INITIATIVES AGAINST IRANIAN INTERESTS. HE DID NOT BELIEVE THAT IRAQ WOULD GO SO FAR AS TO SEIZE KHUZESTAN. HOWEVER, WHILE THE SOVIET UNION WANTED A SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM, THEY DID NOT BELIEVE THAT THE UNITED NATIONS WAS THE APPROPRIATE FORUM: THIS WAS A BILATERAL ISSUE.

(B) THE AMERICANS ALSO COMPLAINED ABOUT THE RECENT PRESS ARTICLES BLAMING THE WEST FOR EXPLOITING THE CONFLICT (OUR TELNO 580 REFERS), AND WERE TOLD THAT THEY SHOULD NOT ATTACH TOO MUCH SIGNIFICANCE TO WHAT INDIVIDUAL JOURNALISTS WROTE. KOVRYGIN SAID THAT THE SOVIET UNION AGREED WITH PRESIDENT CARTER ON THE NEED FOR NON-INTERFERENCE, BUT THE "OBJECTIVE CONDITIONS" FOR US INVOLVEMENT EXISTED (PRESUMABLY A REFERENCE TO US NAVAL FORCES IN THE INDIAN OCEAN). TODAY'S PRAYDA QUOTED A "HUMANITE" REPORT TO THE EFFECT THAT THE US WAS PREPARING TO INTERVENE.

(C) THE IRAQI AMBASSADOR TOLD MY INDIAN COLLEAGUE THAT AZIZ HAD COME TO MOSCOW TO INVOKE THE TREATY, AND HAD BEEN SATISFIED. HOWEVER THERE ARE WIDESPREAD REPORTS THAT PART OF AZIZ'S MISSION WAS TO ASK FOR ADDITIONAL SUPPLIES, AND THAT HE WAS REFUSED. KOVRYGIN'S COMMENT SUGGESTS AT LEAST A DEGREE OF CAUTION.

(D) QUESTIONED BY A MEMBER OF THE FRG EMBASSY AN MFA OFFICIAL INDICATED THAT THE SOVIET UNION WAS NOT YET SEEKING A MEDIATORY ROLE.

(E) MOKARI,

CONFIDENTIAL

(E) MOKHRI, IRANIAN AMBASSADOR, TOLD MINISTER YESTERDAY THAT HIS DEMANDS THAT THE SOVIET UNION SHOULD CONDEMN IRAQI AGGRESSION AND STOP SUPPLYING ARMS TO IRAQ HAD BEEN REJECTED. CONTINUED ARMS SUPPLY WAS JUSTIFIED BY THE RUSSIANS BY REFERENCE TO THE SOVIET-IRAQI FRIENDSHIP TREATY, BUT MOKHRI'S IMPRESSION (BASED ON UNSPECIFIED EVIDENCE) WAS THAT THE FLOW OF SUPPLIES HAD RECENTLY SLOWED DOWN. MOKHRI EMPHATICALLY REJECTED ANY IDEA OF MEDIATION BY SOVIET UNION, BUT WAS UNINFORMED ABOUT ANY OTHER MEDIATION INITIATIVES. HE NOW SEEMS TO HAVE NO REGULAR COMMUNICATION WITH TEHRAN AND RELIES ON THE BBC NEWS OF WHAT IS HAPPENING.

KEEBLE

IRAQ/IRAN STANDARD

MED MAED  
NENAD TRED  
NAD ERD  
UND ECON D  
EESD CONS D  
ECD CONS EM UNIT  
WED CABINET OFFICE

ADDITIONAL DISTN.

IRAQ/IRAN

2

CONFIDENTIAL



IRAN/IRAQ

ADVANCE COPIES

22

IMMEDIATE

PS  
PS/SIR I GILMOUR  
PS/MR HURD  
PS/PUS  
SIR E YOUDE  
SIR J GRAHAM  
MR J C MOBERLY  
MR BRAITHWAITE  
HD/MED  
HD/NENAD  
HD/UND  
HD/CONS D  
CONSULAR EMERGENCY UNIT  
HD/ES & SD  
HD/MAED  
HD/DEF D  
PUSD (2)  
NEWS D  
~~RESIDENT CLERK~~

NO 10 DOWNING STREET  
CABINET OFFICE DIO

CONFIDENTIAL

FM MUSCAT 250535Z SEP 80

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 267 OF 25 SEPTEMBER

AND TO DOHA, BAHRAIN, KUWAIT, JEDDA

INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK, ATHENS, BAGHDAD, DUBAI, ROUTINE  
WASHINGTON, PARIS, BONN

YOUR TELNO 194 TO ABU DHABI: IRAQ/IRAN.

1. THE ASSESSMENT IN YOUR TEL NO 76 TO DOHA HAS TO SOME EXTENT BEEN OVERTAKEN BY EVENTS (E.G. PARAGRAPH 4 ABOUT ATTACKS ON OIL INSTALLATIONS). NEVERTHELESS I HAVE NO REASON TO QUESTION THE CONCLUSIONS ABOUT IRAQI MOTIVES. FOR WHAT IT IS WORTH THE OMANIS CONSIDER THE MAIN MOTIVE TO BE TERRITORIAL GAIN. IT MAY BE RELEVANT THAT AN IRAQI EMISSARY WAS HERE LAST WEEK TO DELIVER A MESSAGE FROM SADDAM HUSSAIN TO THE SULTAN. WE DO NOT KNOW THE CONTENT OF THE MESSAGE, BUT I SUPPOSE IT COULD HAVE BEEN AIMED AT REINFORCING RECENT IRAQI ATTEMPTS AT RAPPROCHEMENT WITH THE GULF STATES (AND PERHAPS EVEN TO WARN THE OMANIS THAT IRAQI PATIENCE WITH IRAN WAS RUNNING OUT).

OMANIS THAT IRAQI PATIENCE WITH IRAN WAS RUNNING OUT).

2. THE OMANIS THEMSELVES SEEM DETERMINED TO TAKE A SENSIBLE LINE, ADOPTING A LOW PROFILE AND AVOIDING TAKING SIDES. THIS IS BORNE OUT BY THE TENOR OF LOCAL NEWS BROADCASTS WHICH ARE BEING CONFINED TO FACTUAL BULLETINS.

3. THE MAJOR CONCERN HERE IS NATURALLY ENOUGH THAT THE IRANIANS SHOULD NOT INTERFERE WITH SHIPPING IN THE STRAIT OF HORMUZ. AS YOU WILL HAVE SEEN FROM THE NAVAL ATTACHE'S TELEGRAM LAA/UAJ 240422Z THE IRANIAN NAVAL UNITS IN THE AREA ARE NOW BEHAVING CORRECTLY. ANY ATTEMPT BY THEM TO DENY FREEDOM OF PASSAGE WOULD PUT THE OMANIS, WHO SEE THEMSELVES AS THE GUARANTORS OF ACCESS TO THE GULF, IN AN EMBARRASSING POSITION. HOWEVER I BELIEVE THAT THEY WOULD REGARD DISCRETION AS THE BETTER PART OF VALOUR AND DO THEIR BEST TO AVOID ANY INFLAMMATORY ACTION.

4. THE OMANI VIEW IS THUS ONE OF "A PLAGUE ON BOTH THEIR HOUSES" AND A FERVENT DESIRE NOT TO BE DRAWN IN. AS THEY CONTINUE TO STRESS, OMAN IS THE ONLY STATE IN THE AREA WHICH CANNOT BE BLOCKADED AT THE STRAIT OF HORMUZ. IT WOULD, THEY THINK, BE IRONIC IF, AFTER THEIR ABORTIVE EFFORT LAST YEAR TO WHIP UP SUPPORT TO STRENGTHEN THE SECURITY OF THE WATERWAY, THEY SHOULD SO SOON BE PROVEN RIGHT.

TUNNELL

NNNN



FOLLOWING TELEGRAM NOW REPEATED TO YOU AT REQUEST OF PRIVATE SECRETARY WAS RECEIVED FROM UKMIS NEW YORK TELEGRAM NUMBER 1357 OF 25 SEPTEMBER

INFO IMMEDIATE WARSAW PRIORITY MOSCOW WASHINGTON BUCHAREST PARIS SOFIA PRAGUE BONN BUDAPEST UKDEL NATO EAST BERLIN INFO SAVING BELGRADE

FOLLOWING FROM PRIVATE SECRETARY SECRETARY OF STATE'S MEETING WITH POLISH FOREIGN MINISTER IN NEW YORK: 24 SEPTEMBER

1. CZYREK SAID THAT THE DANGER OF AN INTERNAL CONFRONTATION IN POLAND SEEMED TO HAVE PASSED. THE TROUBLES STILL OCCURRING WERE ONLY SPLINTER ACTIVITIES OR PUBLICITY-SEEKING, THE DIFFICULTIES HAD BEEN SOLVED IN THE FRAMEWORK OF POLAND'S POLITICAL SYSTEM AND A SOCIAL CONSENSUS ESTABLISHED. ALL SIDES, INCLUDING THE CHURCH, HAD SHOWN GREAT MATURITY AND RESPONSIBILITY. POLAND HAD EMERGED WITH THE SENSE OF NATIONAL UNITY STRENGTHENED, DESPITE DIFFERENCES OF OPINION AS TO WHAT HAD HAPPENED AND WHY.
2. Q BUT SHE NOW FACED LONG-TERM PROBLEMS OF GREAT DIFFICULTY. THE GOVERNMENT WISHED TO FULFIL ALL THEIR COMMITMENTS TO THE WORKERS, NOT ONLY IN THE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC FIELDS BUT ALSO IN THE POLITICAL SPHERE TOWARDS THE TRADE UNIONS. THERE WAS A NEED FOR CONFIDENCE AND FOR CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES. SPECIFIC REFORMS WOULD BE REQUIRED IN POLAND'S ECONOMY, WHOSE FUNDAMENTAL SOUNDNESS HAD BEEN SPOILED MAINLY BY SUBJECTIVE MISTAKES, EG OVER INVESTMENT IN HEAVY INDUSTRY. THE INVESTMENT RATIO MUST BE LOWERED AND EMPHASIS ON CONSUMER GOODS AND AGRICULTURE INCREASED.
3. POLAND COUNTED ON HELP FROM SOCIALIST STATES, BUT ALSO ON THE UNDERSTANDING OF HER WESTERN PARTNERS, ESPECIALLY THE BIGGER TRADITIONAL PARTNERS INCLUDING THE UK. THE MAIN PROBLEM WAS THAT THREE-QUARTERS OF ALL POLAND'S FOREIGN DEBT WAS DUE TO BE REPAYED IN THE THREE YEARS 1981-83. IN THE NEW AND WORSE ECONOMIC SITUATION POLAND WOULD NEED EITHER TO BORROW MORE IN ORDER TO REPAY THE AMOUNTS DUE, OR, WHERE THIS WOULD BE MORE SUITABLE FOR HER PARTNERS, TO REQUEST A PROLONGATION OF THESE REPAYMENTS FOR TWO YEARS BEYOND 1983, OR BOTH.
4. POLAND DID NOT WANT A MORATORIUM. SHE WOULD LIKE TO SOLVE THE PROBLEM BY BILATERAL ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL AGREEMENTS. SHE WOULD NOT ASK FOR ANY PROLONGATION OF REPAYMENTS OF PRIVATE LOANS, BUT SHE WOULD SEEK THIS FOR CREDITS GUARANTEED BY GOVERNMENTS. CZYREK DID NOT WISH TO MENTION ANY FIGURES: HE WAS SIMPLY ASKING THE BRITISH AND OTHER WESTERN GOVERNMENTS FOR THEIR UNDERSTANDING. HE COULD ASSURE THEM THAT POLAND WOULD REMAIN A STABLE PARTNER AND REPAY ALL HER DEBTS IN GOOD TIME WITHOUT NARROWING HER PRESENT TRADE AND ECONOMIC RELATIONS. CZYREK TRUSTED THAT TAKING THESE STEPS WOULD NOT JEOPARDISE POLAND'S POSITION ON THE FINANCIAL MARKETS. SHE WANTED A SOLUTION FAVOURABLE TO HER AND TO HER PARTNERS.
5. POLAND'S POLICIES ABROAD WOULD NOT CHANGE. EVEN MORE THAN PREVIOUSLY SHE NEEDED PEACE, DETENTE AND COOPERATION. POLISH-BRITISH RELATIONS WERE GOOD AND STABLE. CZYREK LOOKED FORWARD TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE'S VISIT IN LATE OCTOBER.
6. LORD CARRINGTON SAID THAT THE POLES WOULD FIND CONSIDERABLE UNDERSTANDING FROM THE BRITISH AND OTHER WESTERN FRIENDS OF THE PROBLEMS THEY FACED. WE WOULD LOOK SYMPATHETICALLY AT WHAT COULD BE DONE. HE PARTICULARLY LOOKED FORWARD TO HIS FORTHCOMING VISIT TO POLAND. WE HAD FOLLOWED EVENTS CLOSELY, BUT HAD SOME DIFFICULTY IN UNDERSTANDING THE REASONS FOR THE EVENTS OF POLAND, AND THE SOLUTIONS REACHED. IN HIS EXPERIENCE, WHEN SOMEBODY GOT SOME CAKE THEY WANTED ANOTHER SLICE. WOULD THE SETTLEMENT BE A FINAL SOLUTION? OR WOULD ITS IMPLEMENTATION BE MADE DIFFICULT BY THE EFFECTS OF THE STRIKES.
7. CZYREK SAID THAT THE NEW ROLE OF THE TRADE UNIONS WOULD BE LINKED TO A BILL WHICH WAS UNDER PREPARATION TO REGULATE SELF-MANAGEMENT IN FACTORIES. THE MANAGEMENT TOO MUST HAVE A ROLE, AND TRADE UNIONS MUST ACCEPT A BALANCE BETWEEN RIGHTS AND DUTIES. THE GDANSK AGREEMENTS GAVE THE IMPRESSION THAT THE NEW TRADE UNIONS WERE MAKING ALL THE DEMANDS AND OTHERS HAD TO DO THE GIVING. NO SOCIETY COULD SURVIVE THAT WAY. THE WORKERS MUST HAVE THE RIGHT OF ASSOCIATION, BUT THE LEGITIMATE INTERESTS OF THE WORKING CLASS MUST ALSO BE DEFENDED. TRADE UNIONS MUST ACCEPT OBLIGATIONS, IN THE INTEREST OF THE NATIONAL ECONOMY. A COMMISSION, ON WHICH THE NEW TRADE UNIONISTS WERE REPRESENTED, WAS PREPARING THE BILL.
8. LORD CARRINGTON WONDERED WHETHER FREE TRADE UNIONS WERE COMPATIBLE WITH THE FORM OF GOVERNMENT PRACTISED IN POLAND. CZYREK SAID THAT CHANGES WERE NEEDED IN THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE TRADE UNIONS AND THE GOVERNMENT, AND BETWEEN THE TRADE UNIONS AND THE PARTY. THE LATTER WAS THE MORE DIFFICULT. THE SYSTEM OF PARTY DIRECTIVES WOULD HAVE TO GO, TO BE REPLACED BY A DEMOCRATIC PROCESS OF EXPLAINING AND CONVINCING THE TRADE UNIONS. THIS WOULD NOT BE EASY. THE POLES HAD SCOURED LEGISLATION ON TRADE UNIONS AND STRIKES IN BOTH EASTERN AND WESTERN COUNTRIES. LORD CARRINGTON OBSERVED THAT OUR EXPERIENCE SHOWED THAT NO LEGISLATION WAS EFFECTIVE IN THIS AREA UNLESS IT HAD THE CONSENT OF THOSE TO WHOM IT APPLIED. WORKERS IN NATIONALISED INDUSTRIES DID NOT THINK THAT THE INDUSTRY BELONGED TO THEM, BUT THAT THE GOVERNMENT COULD NOT LET THEM DOBN. NO COUNTRY HAD RESOLVED THIS PROBLEM YET.
9. CZYREK SAID THAT HE WAS AN ECONOMIST AND DID NOT BELIEVE IN MAGIC. POLAND'S SOCIALIST PARTNERS HAD ALSO DRAWN CERTAIN LESSONS FROM HER EXPERIENCES: THE HUNGARIANS WERE EXPEDITING A BILL AMENDING TRADE UNION LEGISLATION: THE ROMANIANS WERE CONDUCTING A SURVEY OF THE ECONOMY: AND PRICE RISES DUE IN OTHER SOCIALIST COUNTRIES HAD BEEN DROPPED. HE HIMSELF REMAINED AN INVETERATE OPTIMIST. HISTORY SHOWED THAT WITHOUT OPTIMISM THERE WOULD BE NO POLAND.
10. LORD CARRINGTON SAID THAT HE WOULD LIKE TO SEE A LITTLE OF THE HISTORY OF POLAND AS WELL AS OF ITS MODERN ACHIEVEMENTS DURING HIS STAY.

FCO PASS SAVING BELGRADE

CARRINGTON

RECEIVED



OTHER WESTERN GOVERNMENTS FOR THEIR UNDERSTANDING. HE COULD ASSURE THEM THAT POLAND WOULD REMAIN A STABLE PARTNER AND REPAY ALL HER DEBTS IN GOOD TIME WITHOUT NARROWING HER PRESENT TRADE AND ECONOMIC RELATIONS. CZYREK TRUSTED THAT TAKING THESE STEPS WOULD NOT JEOPARDISE POLAND'S POSITION ON THE FINANCIAL MARKETS. SHE WANTED A SOLUTION FAVOURABLE TO HER AND TO HER PARTNERS.

5. POLAND'S POLICIES ABROAD WOULD NOT CHANGE. EVEN MORE THAN PREVIOUSLY SHE NEEDED PEACE, DETENTE AND COOPERATION. POLISH-BRITISH RELATIONS WERE GOOD AND STABLE. CZYREK LOOKED FORWARD TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE'S VISIT IN LATE OCTOBER.

6. LORD CARRINGTON SAID THAT THE POLES WOULD FIND CONSIDERABLE UNDERSTANDING FROM THE BRITISH AND OTHER WESTERN FRIENDS OF THE PROBLEMS THEY FACED. WE WOULD LOOK SYMPATHETICALLY AT WHAT COULD BE DONE. HE PARTICULARLY LOOKED FORWARD TO HIS FORTHCOMING VISIT TO POLAND. WE HAD FOLLOWED EVENTS CLOSELY, BUT HAD SOME DIFFICULTY IN UNDERSTANDING THE REASONS FOR THE EVENTS OF POLAND, AND THE SOLUTIONS REACHED. IN HIS EXPERIENCE, WHEN SOMEBODY GOT SOME CAKE THEY WANTED ANOTHER SLICE. WOULD THE SETTLEMENT BE A FINAL SOLUTION? OR WOULD ITS IMPLEMENTATION BE MADE DIFFICULT BY THE EFFECTS OF THE STRIKES.

7. CZYREK SAID THAT THE NEW ROLE OF THE TRADE UNIONS WOULD BE LINKED TO A BILL WHICH WAS UNDER PREPARATION TO REGULATE SELF-MANAGEMENT IN FACTORIES. THE MANAGEMENT TOO MUST HAVE A ROLE, AND TRADE UNIONS MUST ACCEPT A BALANCE BETWEEN RIGHTS AND DUTIES. THE GDANSK AGREEMENTS GAVE THE IMPRESSION THAT THE NEW TRADE UNIONS WERE MAKING ALL THE DEMANDS AND OTHERS HAD TO DO THE GIVING. NO SOCIETY COULD SURVIVE THAT WAY. THE WORKERS MUST HAVE THE RIGHT OF ASSOCIATION, BUT THE LEGITIMATE INTERESTS OF THE WORKING CLASS MUST ALSO BE DEFENDED. TRADE UNIONS MUST ACCEPT OBLIGATIONS, IN THE INTEREST OF THE NATIONAL ECONOMY. A COMMISSION, ON WHICH THE NEW TRADE UNIONISTS WERE REPRESENTED, WAS PREPARING THE BILL.

8. LORD CARRINGTON WONDERED WHETHER FREE TRADE UNIONS WERE COMPATIBLE WITH THE FORM OF GOVERNMENT PRACTISED IN POLAND. CZYREK SAID THAT CHANGES WERE NEEDED IN THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE TRADE UNIONS AND THE GOVERNMENT, AND BETWEEN THE TRADE UNIONS AND THE PARTY. THE LATTER WAS THE MORE DIFFICULT. THE SYSTEM OF PARTY DIRECTIVES WOULD HAVE TO GO, TO BE REPLACED BY A DEMOCRATIC PROCESS OF EXPLAINING AND CONVINCING THE TRADE UNIONS. THIS WOULD NOT BE EASY. THE POLES HAD SCOURED LEGISLATION ON TRADE UNIONS AND STRIKES IN BOTH EASTERN AND WESTERN COUNTRIES. LORD CARRINGTON OBSERVED THAT OUR EXPERIENCE SHOWED THAT NO LEGISLATION WAS EFFECTIVE IN THIS AREA UNLESS IT HAD THE CONSENT OF THOSE TO WHOM IT APPLIED. WORKERS IN NATIONALISED INDUSTRIES DID NOT THINK THAT THE INDUSTRY BELONGED TO THEM, BUT THAT THE GOVERNMENT COULD NOT LET THEM DOWN. NO COUNTRY HAD RESOLVED THIS PROBLEM YET.

9. CZYREK SAID THAT HE WAS AN ECONOMIST AND DID NOT BELIEVE IN MAGIC. POLAND'S SOCIALIST PARTNERS HAD ALSO DRAWN CERTAIN LESSONS FROM HER EXPERIENCES: THE HUNGARIANS WERE EXPEDITING A BILL AMENDING TRADE UNION LEGISLATION; THE ROMANIANS WERE CONDUCTING A SURVEY OF THE ECONOMY; AND PRICE RISES DUE IN OTHER SOCIALIST COUNTRIES HAD BEEN DROPPED. HE HIMSELF REMAINED AN INVETERATE OPTIMIST. HISTORY SHOWED THAT WITHOUT OPTIMISM THERE WOULD BE NO POLAND.

10. LORD CARRINGTON SAID THAT HE WOULD LIKE TO SEE A LITTLE OF THE HISTORY OF POLAND AS WELL AS OF ITS MODERN ACHIEVEMENTS DURING HIS STAY.

FCO PASS SAVING BELGRADE

CARRINGTON

NNNN

SYMPHONY  
05/20/26



PS  
 PS/SIR I GILMOUR  
 PS/MR HURD  
 PS/PUS  
 SIR E YOUDE  
 SIR J GRAHAM  
 MR J C MOBERLY  
 MR BRAITHWAITE  
 HD/MED  
 HD/NENAD  
 HD/UND  
 HD/CONS D  
 CONSULAR EMERGENCY UNIT  
 HD/ES & SD  
 HD/MAED  
 HD/DEF D  
 PUSD (2)  
 NEWS D  
~~RESIDENT CLERK~~

NO 10 DOWNING STREET  
 CABINET OFFICE DIO

RESTRICTED

FM AMMAN 250805Z SEP 80  
 TO FLASH BAGHDAD  
 TELEGRAM NUMBER 034 OF 25 SEP  
 INFO IMMEDIATE FCO

YOUR TELNO 32: BRITISH COMMUNITY DEPENDANTS

1. FIRST GROUP OF ABOUT 45 PEOPLE IN DESERT BUS CHARTERED BY BRITISH CLUB HAS GOT THROUGH SAFELY AND MOST ARE NOW AT AMMAN AIRPORT MAKING ARRANGEMENTS FOR ONWARD JOURNEY TO LONDON (WE HAVE NO NEWS OF SECOND GROUP OF 12 REFERRED TO IN PARA 1 OF YOUR TUR). WE HAVE JUST SPOKEN TO A MR ELGEY OF THE FIRM HOUCHIN WHO WAS A MEMBER OF THE GROUP, WHICH INCLUDED A BRITISH AIRWAYS CREW AND SOME GERMAN AND IRISH CITIZENS. ONLY A FEW HAD EXIT VISAS AND THEY WERE HELD UP FOR ABOUT TWO HOURS BY THE IRAQI AUTHORITIES AT RUTBA BEFORE BEING ALLOWED TO PROCEED. ELGEY'S VIEW BASED ON THE EXPERIENCE OF THIS GROUP WAS THAT OTHER PARTIES WITHOUT EXIT VISAS WOULD BE ALLOWED TO CROSS EVEN IF ONLY AFTER SOME ARGUMENT.
2. A FEW OTHER BRITISH SUBJECTS WHO HELD EXIT VISAS AND WERE TRAVELLING IN TAXIS HAVE TRANSITED H4 EN ROUTE FOR AMMAN. ONE OF THESE (FREELAND OF WHITE HORSE DISTILLERS), WHO HAD BEEN IN BAGHDAD ON A SHORT VISIT FROM THE UK, LEFT BAGHDAD YESTERDAY MORNING IN A TAXI AND GOT THROUGH WITHOUT DIFFICULTY. WE HAVE LEARNT THAT A GROUP OF 12 AUSTRALIANS CROSSED THE FRONTIER AND ARE EXPECTED TO ARRIVE IN ABOUT TWO HOURS. ALTHOUGH ONE OF THEIR TAXIS OVERTURNED

A GROUP OF 12 AUSTRALIANS CROSSED THE FRONTIER AND ARE EXPECTED IN AMMAN IN ABOUT TWO HOURS, ALTHOUGH ONE OF THEIR TAXIS OVERTURNED AND 3 ARE IN HOSPITAL IN RUTBA. WE ARE ALSO TOLD BY THE US EMBASSY HERE THAT 20 AMERICANS INCLUDING SOME EMBASSY DEPENDANTS WERE TURNED BACK AT THE FRONTIER YESTERDAY AS THEY HAD NO EXIT VISAS; THEY RETURNED TO BAGHDAD AND WERE REFUSED EXIT VISAS BY THE IRAQI AUTHORITIES IN BAGHDAD. A GROUP OF FRENCH CIVILIANS WORKING AS ADVISERS TO THE IRAQI ARMED FORCES ALSO REACHED AMMAN YESTERDAY FROM BAGHDAD TRAVELLING BY BUS; THEY WERE WITHOUT EXIT VISAS AND GOT THROUGH THE IRAQI FRONTIER ON THE STRENGTH OF IDENTITY CARDS ISSUED BY THE IRAQI MILITARY AUTHORITIES.

3. MINTO (CONSUL) WHO IS NOW AT H4 WITH CONSULS OF A NUMBER OF OTHER WESTERN EMBASSIES ADVISES THAT TRANSPORT FROM RUTBA ONWARDS COULD PROVE A MAJOR DIFFICULTY. IF AT ALL POSSIBLE, THEREFORE, THE BEST COURSE WOULD SEEM TO BE TO CONTINUE TO RENT BUSES OR TAXIS IN BAGHDAD WHICH ARE ABLE TO MAKE THE JOURNEY THROUGH TO AMMAN. IF TRANSPORT IS REQUIRED FROM RUTBA, WE SHALL NEED TO HAVE SOME IDEA OF TIMING AND NUMBERS, AS WE SHALL ALMOST CERTAINLY HAVE TO SEEK HELP FROM THE JORDANIAN ARMED FORCES OR POLICE TO GET THEM TO AMMAN.

4. FCO ONLY. WITH REFERENCE TO MY TELECON WITH CONSULAR DEPARTMENT LAST NIGHT, WE HAVE OF COURSE WELL IN MIND THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN AN OFFICIALLY ASSISTED EVACUATION AND THE CUSTOMARY HELP EXTENDED TO BRITISH SUBJECTS IN NEED. HOWEVER I HOPE IT IS ALSO REALISED THAT THE JOURNEY FROM BAGHDAD TO AMMAN IS TAKING 15-17 HOURS IN PRESENT CONDITIONS AND IS MAINLY ACROSS DESERT, WITH LITTLE HELP AVAILABLE ON THE ROUTE, AND THAT THE IRAQI FRONTIER POST AT RUTBA AND THE JORDANIAN POST AT H4 ARE SOME 50KMS APART. WE ARE THEREFORE BOUND TO HAVE TO SEEK HELP FROM THE JORDANIAN AUTHORITIES, WHO ARE DOING EVERYTHING THEY CAN TO HELP US ON ORDERS FROM KING HUSSEIN. IF THERE IS A GENERAL EXODUS OF THE FOREIGN COMMUNITY FROM BAGHDAD, FACILITIES HERE ARE LIKELY TO BE UNDER CONSIDERABLE STRAIN AND THE FINE DISTINCTIONS BETWEEN OFFICIAL EVACUATION AND NORMAL HELP TO BRITISH SUBJECTS IN DISTRESS MAY BECOME MORE DIFFICULT TO DRAW. YOU WILL ALSO WISH TO BEAR IN MIND THAT THE BRITISH PRESS IS HERE IN NUMBERS, AS WELL AS A BRITISH LIBERAL PARTY DELEGATION LED BY MR STEEL, AND THAT FAILURE TO RENDER PROPER ASSISTANCE TO BRITISH SUBJECTS WILL WIN US IMMEDIATE ADVERSE PUBLICITY.

URWICK

NNNN



SECRET

10a

FDW F 012/25

OO SINGAPORE

PP BELGRADE

GRS 425

SECRET

DESKBY 260200Z

FM FCO 251835Z SEP 80

TO IMMEDIATE HONG KONG

TELEGRAM NUMBER 839 OF 25 SEP 80

INFO IMMEDIATE SINGAPORE WASHINGTON UKMIS NEW YORK (FOR PS)

PRIORITY BONN PARIS BELGRADE (FOR PS/PM)

COPY

PERSONAL FOR GOVERNOR

IRAQ/IRAN: NAVAL DEPLOYMENTS

1. YOU SHOULD KNOW THAT MINISTERS HAVE DECIDED AS A PRELIMINARY PRECAUTIONARY MEASURE TO DETACH HMS COVENTRY AND RFA OLWEN FROM THE TASK GROUP DUE TO ARRIVE IN HONG KONG ON 26 SEPTEMBER. HMS COVENTRY HAS BEEN INSTRUCTED TO PROCEED TOWARDS SINGAPORE IMMEDIATELY.

STRICTLY FOR YOU OWN INFORMATION THIS DEPLOYMENT IS CONNECTED WITH CURRENT PROBLEMS IN THE GULF.

2. WE WISH TO DO ALL WE CAN TO AVOID PUBLIC KNOWLEDGE OF THIS REDEPLOYMENT, ALTHOUGH WE REALISE OF COURSE THAT THE ABSENCE OF HMS COVENTRY IS BOUND TO BE NOTICED IN HONG KONG. IF YOU ARE QUESTIONED ABOUT THIS YOU SHOULD

DRAW ON THE CONTINGENCY PRESS LINE IN THE FOLLOWING PARAGRAPH. MOD ARE SENDING SIMILAR INSTRUCTIONS TO CBF HONG KONG.

3. Q.1 WHAT IS HMS COVENTRY DOING IN THE FAR EAST?

A.1 SHE IS ONE OF A NUMBER OF SHIPS COMPRISING THE TASK FORCE CURRENTLY DEPLOYED IN THE AREA.

Q.2 IS IT TRUE THAT HMS COVENTRY'S VISIT TO HONG KONG HAS BEEN CANCELLED?

A.2 YES.

Q.3 WHERE IS HMS COVENTRY GOING?

A.3 HMS COVENTRY IS PROCEEDING TOWARDS SINGAPORE.

Q.4 IS HMS COVENTRY ALONE?

A.4 SHE IS IN COMPANY WITH THE ROYAL FLEET AUXILIARY TANKER OLWEN.

Q.5 WHAT ABOUT THE OTHER SHIPS IN THE TASK FORCE?

A.5 THEY ARE CONTINUING WITH THEIR PLANNED PROGRAMME.

Q.6 WHY HAS HMS COVENTRY'S VISIT TO HONG KONG BEEN CANCELLED?

A.6 WE OFTEN CHANGE PLANS, OUR AIM IS TO BE AS FLEXIBLE AS POSSIBLE. (IF PRESSED: WE DO NOT DISCUSS OPERATIONAL DETAILS).

Q.7 IS HMS COVENTRY BEING SENT TO THE GULF?

A.7 IT HAS ALWAYS BEEN PLANNED THAT SHE SHOULD RETURN HOME TO THE UK VIA THE GULF. (IF PRESSED ON WHETHER THE SHIP IS GOING STRAIGHT TO THE GULF). SHE IS CURRENTLY PROCEEDING TOWARDS SINGAPORE. (IF FURTHER PRESSED) WHERE SHE GOES AFTER SINGAPORE REMAINS TO BE SEEN. (AS I HAVE SAID) OUR AIM IS TO BE AS FLEXIBLE AS POSSIBLE.

Q.8 IS HMS COVENTRY'S DIVERSION CONNECTED WITH THE GULF CRISIS?

A.8 IT IS NOT OUR PRACTICE TO DISCUSS OPERATIONAL DETAILS.

Q.9 ARE THERE ANY PLANS TO LINK UP WITH OTHER NAVIES?

A.9 WE ARE ALWAYS IN TOUCH WITH OUR FRIENDS AND ALLIES.

Q.10 WHAT ARE OTHER NAVIES DOING?

A.10 I HAVE NO INFORMATION ON THIS.

SECRET

SECRET

V  
LK  
UDM OCØ(8.  
00

*RECEIVED*  
*SEP 25 1980*  
*1830/25*

LVO NR 275/25  
FDW G Ø72/25

00 TOKYO (DESKBY 26ØØØ1Z)

00 PEKING

00 BELGRADE

GRS 13ØA

RESTRICTED  
DESKBY HONG KONG (25193ØZ)  
DESKBY TOKYO (26ØØØ1Z)  
FM UKMIS NEW YORK 2516ØØZ SEPT 8Ø  
TO IMMEDIATE GOVERNOR HONG KONG  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 11 OF 25 SEPTEMBER.  
INFO IMMEDIATE TOKYO, FCO, PEKING, BELGRADE (FOR PS TO PM).

FROM SECRETARY OF STATE.

MY VISIT.

1. I REGRET THAT BECAUSE OF THE CONFLICT BETWEEN IRAN AND IRAQ I CANNOT LEAVE NEW YORK TODAY AS PLANNED. IT IS NOT YET CLEAR WHETHER THE SECURITY COUNCIL WILL MEET. IF IT DOES SO I WILL WISH TO BE PRESENT. I MUST IN ANY CASE KEEP IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH MUSKIE AND OTHERS, AND CANNOT BE IN THE AIR AND OUT OF CONTACT WITH LONDON WHILE MATTERS ARE SO UNCERTAIN.

2. I MAY BE ABLE TO LEAVE NEW YORK IN THE COURSE OF 26 SEPTEMBER, THOUGH I SHALL NOT BE TAKING A FINAL DECISION ON THIS YET. HOWEVER, IT WILL BY THEN BE TOO LATE TO REACH HONG KONG IN TIME TO CARRY OUT A SENSIBLE PROGRAMME. WITH SINCERE APOLOGIES TO YOU, YOUR WIFE AND YOUR STAFF, I MUST THEREFORE CANCEL THE VISIT TO HONG KONG. I AM SORRY THAT YOU SHOULD HAVE BEEN PUT TO SO MUCH UNNECESSARY TROUBLE; AND ALSO THAT WE SHALL BE MISSING A VISIT TO WHICH WE WERE LOOKING FORWARD. PLEASE ALSO CONVEY MY REGRETS TO THE MEMBERS OF THE EXECUTIVE COUNCIL. BUT I KNOW THAT YOU AND THEY WILL UNDERSTAND WHY WE HAVE TO TAKE THIS DECISION.

3. WE SHALL BE IN TOUCH TOMORROW WITH TOKYO ABOUT OUR FURTHER MOVEMENTS. I HOPE TO BE ABLE TO GO AHEAD WITH MY VISITS TO JAPAN AND CHINA, BUT THIS MUST OF COURSE DEPEND ON THE WAY THINGS GO IN THE MIDDLE EAST.

PARSONS

NNNN

*1830/25*



SECRET

10 HCS



10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

25 September 1980

BF 30 a 80,

I enclose the text of a message from President Giscard d'Estaing to the Prime Minister reporting a meeting with the Deputy Prime Minister of Iraq.

I should be grateful if you could arrange for a translation to be telegraphed to Belgrade for the Prime Minister's party and to be circulated to those who will be attending the Prime Minister's meeting at Chequers on Sunday on the Iran/Iraq conflict.

If appropriate, it would be helpful for us to have a draft reply in time for the Prime Minister to consider it over the weekend.

MAP

SP.

Paul Lever, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

SECRET

GPS 450A

SECRET

9

SECRET

DESKBY BELGRADE 260500Z

PRIME MINISTER'S  
PERSONAL MESSAGE  
SERIAL No. T187/80

FM FCO 251910Z SEP 80  
TO IMMEDIATE BELGRADE (FOR PS TO PM)  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 213 OF 25 SEPTEMBER  
AND TO FLASH UKMIS NEW YORK (FOR PS)  
INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON

MY IPT

FOLLOWING IS DRAFT REPLY.

1. I WAS GLAD TO RECEIVE YOUR LETTER OF 24 SEPTEMBER, ADDRESSING QUESTION THAT HAS INDEED BEEN ON MY MIND THESE PAST FEW DAYS. I ENTIRELY AGREE THAT OUR OVERRIDING OBJECTIVE IS THAT THE FIGHTING SHOULD STOP, AND WE WILL CONTINUE TO DO ANYTHING WE CAN TO HELP.
2. I BELIEVE THAT IT WOULD BE USEFUL TO OUR TWO GOVERNMENTS, AND THE FRENCH AND GERMANS AS WELL, TO CONSULT CONFIDENTIALLY ON THE BROAD POLITICAL AND INTERNATIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF THIS MATTER, AND THAT THE BEST FORUM FOR THIS IS THE QUADRIPARTITE ONE, AT LEAST AS A FIRST STEP. YOU WILL PROBABLY HAVE HAD AN ACCOUNT OF THE DISCUSSION OF QUADRIPARTITE MACHINERY THAT TOOK PLACE AMONG THE FOUR FOREIGN MINISTERS AT DINNER ON 24 SEPTEMBER.
3. I SHARE YOUR PARTICULAR CONCERN ABOUT THE SAFETY OF SHIPPING IN THE GULF AND THE CONSEQUENCES OF ITS DISRUPTION. WE DO NOT AT THIS MOMENT HAVE ROYAL NAVY SHIPS NEAR THE GULF AND THE EARLIEST DATE BY WHICH ANY COULD REACH THE AREA IS 7 OCTOBER. I HAVE INSTRUCTED THAT TWO SHIPS BE DETACHED IMMEDIATELY FROM A TASK FORCE WHICH IS NOW IN HONG KONG, AND MOVE TO THE AREA. THIS IS THE MAXIMUM THAT WE CAN DEPLOY AT ONCE WITHOUT ATTRACTING PUBLICITY, WHICH WE BELIEVE IT IMPORTANT TO AVOID AT THIS STAGE. WE ALSO HAVE SHIPS IN A TASK FORCE WHICH WILL REACH THE MEDITERRANEAN ON 30 SEPTEMBER. THEY ARE DESTINED FOR AN EXERCISE IN THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN BUT COULD BE DIVERTED TO THE GULF IF NECESSARY. THESE AND OTHER DISPOSITIONS CAN BE DISCUSSED IN THE NAVAL STAFF TALKS ABOUT WHICH YOUR DEFENCE PEOPLE ARE ALREADY IN TOUCH WITH OURS. IN MY VIEW IT WOULD BE USEFUL FOR THE FRENCH, WHO ALREADY HAVE A SIGNIFICANT NAVAL FORCE IN THE AREA, TO JOIN THESE TALKS FROM THE OUTSET.
4. I AGREE ALSO WITH YOU THAT THERE IS AN URGENT NEED TO REASSURE SHIPPERS AND INSURERS, AND TO LIMIT THE IMPACT OF THE IRAN/IRAQ HOSTILITIES ON THE PRICE OF OIL AND INSURANCE RATES. IT WOULD INDEED BE USEFUL FOR OUR OFFICIALS - AND THOSE OF OTHER NATIONS PRINCIPALLY CONCERNED - TO MEET TO TAKE STOCK OF THE PROBLEMS FOR SHIPPING AND TO CONSIDER POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS, ALTHOUGH WE SHALL HAVE

SECRET

| TO BEAR



# SECRET

TO BEAR IN MIND THAT SHIPPING INSURANCE RATES ARE THE RESULT OF MARKET DECISIONS OVER WHICH OUR GOVERNMENTS HAVE LITTLE DIRECT INFLUENCE. MY OFFICIALS COULD ATTEND A MEETING IN WASHINGTON IN THE NEAR FUTURE.

5. I SHARE YOUR ASSESSMENT THAT THE CONFLICT BETWEEN IRAN AND IRAQ IS DANGEROUS FOR US ALL, WITH MANY POTENTIAL RISKS BOTH FOR OTHER STATES IN THE AREA AND FOR OIL CONSUMING COUNTRIES. NEVERTHELESS, AS YOU HAVE SAID IN YOUR STATEMENT OF 24 SEPTEMBER, BY GOOD FORTUNE AND GOOD MANAGEMENT WE HAVE AMPLE STOCKS OF OIL AND THIS DOES GIVE US SOME ROOM FOR MANOEUVRE. I THINK IT IS IMPORTANT THAT IN ANYTHING WE DO WE CARRY WITH US THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE REGION, SO FAR AS IS POSSIBLE. WE SHOULD ALSO CONSIDER THE POSSIBILITY OF OBTAINING SOME FORM OF U.N COVER FOR ANY ACTION THAT WE MAY UNDERTAKE.

6. FINALLY, LIKE YOU, I AM VERY CONSCIOUS OF THE NEED TO AVOID SETTING AT RISK THE LIVES OF AMERICAN HOSTAGES, AND INDEED OF OUR OWN CITIZENS IN IRAN, PARTICULARLY THOSE IN DETENTION. THIS MUST BE CONTINUALLY IN OUR MINDS AS OUR CONSULTATIONS GO FORWARD.

CARRINGTON

LIMITED

HD / MED  
HD / MAED  
HD / DEF. D  
HD / PLANNING STAFF

PS

PS / LPS

PS / MR HURD

PS / PUS

SIR J. GRAMHAM

MR. J. C. MOBERLY

MR. BULLARD

MR. P. H. MOBERLY

MR. BRAITHWAITE

COPIES SENT TO  
No. 10 DOWNING STREET

2

SECRET

ZZ 251616Z  
LONDRES DE PARIS  
SECRET GOUVERNEMENTAL NR 101  
BT  
DE M. VALERY GISCARD D'ESTAING  
PRESIDENT DE LA REPUBLIQUE FRANCAISE  
PALAIS DE L'ELYSEE  
PARIS  
A MADAME MARGARET THATCHER  
PREMIER MINISTRE DU ROYAUME UNI  
10 DOWNING STREET LONDRES

T 186/80  
*mt*

PARIS, LE 25 SEPTEMBRE 1980

MON CHER PREMIER MINISTRE,

A LA DEMANDE DU PRESIDENT SADDAM HUSSEIN QUI M'AVAIT  
ADRESSE TROIS MESSAGES PAR LA VOIE DIPLOMATIQUE DEPUIS LE  
DEBUT DES HOSTILITES IRAKO-IRANIENNES, J'AI RECU CE MATIN  
M. TAREK AZIZ, VICE PREMIER MINISTRE D'IRAK.

MON INTERLOCUTEUR A AFFIRME QUE SON GOUVERNEMENT N'AVAIT  
AUCUN OBJECTIF D'ORDRE TERRITORIAL EN DEHORS DES TERRITOIRES  
CONTESTES, ET QUE L'INTENTION DES AUTORITES IRAKIENNES ETAIT  
DE NE MAINTENIR AUCUNE PRESENCE MILITAIRE EN IRAN HORS DE  
CES TERRITOIRES. NOUS AVONS EVOQUE LES CONDITIONS D'OUVERTURE  
DE NEGOCIATIONS CONDUISANT A UN REGLEMENT POLITIQUE DE CE  
CONFLIT AINSI QUE DIVERSES FORMULES EVENTUELLES DE  
NEGOCIATION. J'AI DIT A CET EGARD QU'UN ROLE PARTICULIER DEVAIT  
ETRE DEVOLU AUX ETATS ISLAMIQUES DANS LE PROCESSUS CONDUISANT  
A UN REGLEMENT POLITIQUE DU CONFLIT.

J'AI EGALEMENT INSISTE AUPRES DE M. TAREK AZIZ POUR QUE  
L'IRAK EXPRIME LE PLUS RAPIDEMENT POSSIBLE SA POSITION SUR  
L'OUVERTURE DE NEGOCIATIONS.

ENFIN, J'AI RAPPELE AVEC FORCE L'IMPORTANCE ATTACHEE PAR  
LA FRANCE A LA PRESERVATION DE LA LIBERTE DE NAVIGATION  
DANS LE GOLFE ET LE DETROIT D'ORMUZ.

.../...



SECRET GOUVERNEMENTAL NR 101  
BT  
DE M. VALERY GISCARD D'ESTAING  
PRESIDENT DE LA REPUBLIQUE FRANCAISE  
PALAIS DE L'ELYSEE

T 186/80

*mt*

PARIS  
A MADAME MARGARET THATCHER  
PREMIER MINISTRE DU ROYAUME UNI  
10 DOWNING STREET LONDRES

PARIS, LE 25 SEPTEMBRE 1980

MON CHER PREMIER MINISTRE,

A LA DEMANDE DU PRESIDENT SADDAM HUSSEIN QUI M'AVAIT  
ADRESSE TROIS MESSAGES PAR LA VOIE DIPLOMATIQUE DEPUIS LE  
DEBUT DES HOSTILITES IRAKO-IRANIENNES, J'AI RECU CE MATIN  
M. TAREK AZIZ, VICE PREMIER MINISTRE D'IRAK.

MON INTERLOCUTEUR A AFFIRME QUE SON GOUVERNEMENT N'AVAIT  
AUCUN OBJECTIF D'ORDRE TERRITORIAL EN DEHORS DES TERRITOIRES  
CONTESTES, ET QUE L'INTENTION DES AUTORITES IRAKIENNES ETAIT  
DE NE MAINTENIR AUCUNE PRESENCE MILITAIRE EN IRAN HORS DE  
CES TERRITOIRES. NOUS AVONS EVOQUE LES CONDITIONS D'OUVERTURE  
DE NEGOCIATIONS CONDUISANT A UN REGLEMENT POLITIQUE DE CE  
CONFLIT AINSI QUE DIVERSES FORMULES EVENTUELLES DE  
NEGOCIATION. J'AI DIT A CET EGARD QU'UN ROLE PARTICULIER DEVAIT  
ETRE DEVOLU AUX ETATS ISLAMIQUES DANS LE PROCESSUS CONDUISANT  
A UN REGLEMENT POLITIQUE DU CONFLIT.

J'AI EGALEMENT INSISTE AUPRES DE M. TAREK AZIZ POUR QUE  
L'IRAK EXPRIME LE PLUS RAPIDEMENT POSSIBLE SA POSITION SUR  
L'OUVERTURE DE NEGOCIATIONS.

ENFIN, J'AI RAPPELE AVEC FORCE L'IMPORTANCE ATTACHEE PAR  
LA FRANCE A LA PRESERVATION DE LA LIBERTE DE NAVIGATION  
DANS LE GOLFE ET LE DETROIT D'ORMUZ.

.../...

LE VICE PREMIER MINISTRE D'IRAK M'A DONNE L'ASSURANCE QUE  
LE GOUVERNEMENT IRAKIEN NE PORTERAIT PAS ATTEINTE A LA LIBERTE  
DE NAVIGATION DANS CETTE ZONE.

M. TAREK AZIZ M'A EGALEMENT CONFIE QUE L'IRAK N'AVAIT PAS  
A CE STADE L'INTENTION D'ENTREPRENDRE DES OPERATIONS MILITAIRES  
EN DIRECTION DES ILOTS DU GOLFE (PETITE TOMB, GRANDE TOMB ET  
ABBU MOUSSA), QUI DEVRAIENT CEPENDANT REVENIR AUX EMIRATS  
ARABES UNIS.

A LA SUITE DE CET ENTRETIEN, MON EVALUATION PERSONNELLE  
EST QUE L'OBJECTIF DE L'IRAK EST DE SAISIR DES GAGES  
TERRITORIAUX, ET EGALEMENT DES GAGES POLITIQUES SOUS LA  
FORME DE DEFAITES PUBLIQUEMENT INFLIGEEES AUX FORCES ARMEES  
IRANIENNES. MON SENTIMENT EST QUE LE GOUVERNEMENT  
DE M. SADDAM HUSSEIN SE DONNE ENCORE DE QUATRE A CINQ  
JOURS POUR ATTEINDRE CET OBJECTIF.

JE VOUS PRIE DE CROIRE, MON CHER PREMIER MINISTRE,  
EN MES SENTIMENTS LES MEILLEURS.

VALERY GISCARD D'ESTAING

BT



CONFIDENTIAL

na  
45021 - 1  
**PRIME MINISTER'S**  
**PERSONAL MESSAGE**  
SERIAL No. T186/80

OO BELGRADE DESKBY 260500Z

GRS 342

CONFIDENTIAL

FM FCO 251900Z SEP 80

TO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK

TELEGRAM NUMBER 782 OF 25 SEPTEMBER

INFO IMMEDIATE BELGRADE FOR NO 10 DUTY CLERK (DESKBY 260500Z)

AND IMMEDIATE TO WASHINGTON, PARIS, BONN

IRAN/IRAQ

1. FOLLOWING IS A TRANSLATION OF THE TEXT OF A MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT GISCARD TO THE PRIME MINISTER RECEIVED THIS AFTERNOON: MY DEAR PRIME MINISTER,

AT THE REQUEST OF PRESIDENT SADDAM HUSSEIN, WHO HAS SENT ME THREE MESSAGES BY DIPLOMATIC MEANS SINCE THE BEGINNING OF THE IRAQI-IRANIAN HOSTILITIES, I RECEIVED THIS MORNING MR TAREQ AZIZ, DEPUTY PM OF IRAQ.

MY INTERLOCUTOR AFFIRMED THAT HIS GOVERNMENT HAD NO TERRITORIAL OBJECTIVE BEYOND THE CONTESTED TERRITORIES AND THAT IT WAS NOT THE INTENTION OF THE IRAQI AUTHORITIES TO MAINTAIN ANY MILITARY PRESENCE IN IRAN OUTSIDE THESE TERRITORIES. WE DISCUSSED THE CONDITIONS FOR OPENING NEGOTIATIONS LEADING TO A POLITICAL SOLUTION OF THIS CONFLICT AS WELL AS VARIOUS POSSIBLE FORMULAE FOR NEGOTIATION. IN THIS RESPECT, I SAID THAT A SPECIAL ROLE MUST DEVOLVE TO THE ISLAMIC STATES IN THE PROCESS LEADING TO A POLITICAL SOLUTION OF THE CONFLICT.

I ALSO URGED ON MR TAREQ AZIZ THAT IRAQ EXPRESS AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE HER POSITION ON THE OPENING OF NEGOTIATIONS.

FINALLY, I RECALLED EMPHATICALLY THE IMPORTANCE WHICH FRANCE ATTACHES TO THE MAINTENANCE OF FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION IN THE GULF AND THE STRAITS OF HORMUZ.

THE IRAQI DEPUTY PM GAVE ME THE ASSURANCE THAT THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT WOULD NOT INTERFERE WITH THE FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION IN THAT ZONE.

MR TAREQ AZIZ CONFIDED TO ME ALSO THAT IRAQ DID NOT AT THIS STAGE INTEND TO UNDERTAKE MILITARY OPERATIONS AGAINST THE GULF

1

CONFIDENTIAL

/ISLETS



CONFIDENTIAL

45021 - 1

ISLETS (LITTLE TUMB, GREAT TUMB AND ABU MUSA) WHICH SHOULD HOWEVER REVERT TO THE UAE.

AFTER THIS CONVERSATION, MY PERSONAL EVALUATION IS THAT IRAQ'S OBJECTIVE IS TO SEIZE TERRITORIAL GAINS, AND EQUALLY POLITICAL GAINS IN THE FORM OF PUBLICLY INFLICTED DEFEATS ON THE IRANIAN ARMED FORCES. MY OPINION IS THAT THE GOVERNMENT OF MR SADDAM HUSSEIN GIVES ITSELF ANOTHER FOUR TO FIVE DAYS TO REACH THIS OBJECTIVE.  
MESSAGE ENDS.

CARRINGTON

[COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING STREET]

LIMITED

HD/MED  
HD/MAED  
HD/DEFENCE D  
HD/PLANNING STAFF  
PS  
PS/LPS  
PS/MR HURD  
PS/PUS  
SIR A ACLAND  
SIR J GRAHAM  
MR J MOBERLY  
MR P MOBERLY  
MR BULLARD

COPIES TO

MR S HAMPSON DOT  
MR J WEST DEPT/ENERGY  
MR D WHITE CABINET OFFICE

RESTRICTED

GRS 500

RESTRICTED

FM BAGHDAD 251020Z SEP 80

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 433 OF 25/9/80

FOR INFO TO PRIORITY KUWAIT JEDDA AMMAN DAMASCUS ANKARA  
MOSCOW WASHINGTON

IRAQ/IRAN SITREP: MY TEL NO 427

1. BY THE EVENING OF 24 SEPTEMBER, IRAQ CLAIMED TO HAVE ADVANCED ON ALL FRONTS, CAPTURING MEHRAN AND SHOOTING DOWN THIRTY THREE IRANIAN AIRCRAFT. IRAN MOUNTED AIR ATTACKS ON MOSUL, KIRKUK, BAGHDAD, KUT AND BASRA THIS MORNING (25 SEPTEMBER). THE GENERAL COMMAND OF THE ARMED FORCES ISSUED TWELVE STATEMENTS NUMBERED 11-22 FOR THE PERIOD 24 SEPTEMBER.

SUMMARY AS FOLLOWS:

STATEMENT 11

---

IRANIAN LOSSES FOR 23 SEPTEMBER GIVEN AS: THREE OFFICERS AND EIGHTEEN MEN KILLED, TWENTY TANKS AND EIGHT ARMoured CARS DESTROYED TWO TANKS AND TWO APCs CAPTURED.

STATEMENT 12

---

IRANIAN AIRCRAFT ATTACKED ON 24 SEPTEMBER AS FOLLOWS:

0630 HOURS SHUAIBA OIL REFINERY (BASRA) AND THE DEEP WATER OIL TERMINAL. ONE AIRCRAFT SHOT DOWN

0635 MILITARY INSTALLATIONS IN ERBIL.

STATEMENT 13

---

THE IRAQI AIRCRAFT ATTACKED IRANIAN AIRFIELDS AND MILITARY INSTALLATIONS:

0510 AND 0640 HOURS TABRIZ

0525 AHWAZ AIRFIELD

0530 SANANDAJ AIRFIELD

0540 KERMANSHAH

RESTRICTED

/0540



0540

SHAHROKHI

0543 AND 0725

DEZFUL

0600

SHAHABAD (4 PHANTOMS SAID TO HAVE BEEN DESTROYED ON THE GROUND).

STATEMENT 14

DEEP WATER OIL TERMINAL IN BASRA ATTACKED BY IRANIAN GUNBOATS.  
FIVE IRANIAN VESSELS SUNK. THE ATTACK CONTINUING.

STATEMENT 15

NORTH SECTOR: QASR-I-SHIRIN AREA CLEARED OF ENEMY FORCES.  
SANJAN NORTH OF MEHRAN AND ZAID AREA TO THE SOUTH CAPTURED. MEHRAN BESIEGED.

CENTRAL SECTOR: IRAQI FORCES CONTINUING TO ADVANCE

SOUTHERN SECTOR: IRAQI GRIP INCREASING.

STATEMENT 16

0700 HOURS : ARTILLERY EXCHANGES ACROSS THE SHATT AL ARAB.  
AN IRANIAN NAVAL REPAIR YARD AND THREE IRANIAN PATROL BOATS HIT.

TWO PHANTOMS SHOT DOWN IN THE BADRA AREA.

STATEMENT 17

THE IRANIANS REPORTED TO BE RETREATING IN PANIC LEAVING BEHIND THEIR EQUIPMENT AND AMMUNITION INCLUDING TANKS.

IRAQ CALLS ON IRANIAN FORCES TO SURRENDER.

STATEMENT 18

STATEMENT 18 CLAIMS THAT IRAQ FORCES ARE SCORING HOURLY VICTORIES BUT GIVES NO FURTHER DETAILS.

STATEMENT 19

IRANIAN AIRCRAFT ATTACKED OIL INSTALLATIONS AND THE MILITARY AIRFIELD IN KIRKUK AT 1105 HOURS AND 1110. TEN AIRCRAFT SHOT DOWN. IRAQI CASUALTIES GIVEN AS THIRTEEN WOUNDED. ONE IRAQI TRANSPORT AIRCRAFT DESTROYED.

STATEMENT 20

IRANIAN NAVAL LOSSES FOR 24 SEPTEMBER: TWO FRIGATES AND SEVEN GUNBOATS.

STATEMENT 21

IRANIAN AIR LOSSES PUT AT THIRTY THREE AIRCRAFT, NINETEEN OVER KIRKUK AND MOSUL, TWO SHOT DOWN BY BORDER FORCES, TWELVE IN THE SOUTHERN SECTOR

3. THERE HAS BEEN NO (NO) MENTION OF THE REPORTED ATTACK ON KHARG ISLAND.

4. THIS MORNING, 25 SEPTEMBER, IRAQI RADIO REPORTED IRANIAN AIR ATTACKS ON MOSUL, KIRKUK, BAGHDAD, KUT AND BASRA. THE ATTACK ON BAGHDAD (WHICH WE WITNESSED) CAME IN TWO WAVES: THE FIRST AT 0630 HOURS APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN AGAINST RASHID AIR BASE AND THE DAWRA OIL REFINERY (NO SIGN OF ANY MAJOR FIRE AT DAWRA).

THE SECOND, AT 0650 HIT THE OLD BAGHDAD AIRPORT OF MUTHANNA SEVERAL PHANTOMS WERE SHOT DOWN. WE HAVE HAD NO (NO) REPORTS OF INJURIES TO BRITISH CITIZENS. THERE HAVE BEEN SEVERAL PHONE CALL FROM THE UK MEDIA, WHICH I HAVE REFERRED TO MED AND NEWS DEPT.

5. THE TONE OF IRAQI REPORTS IN INCREASINGLY CONFIDENT. FILM OF A GROUP OF PILOTS WHO HAD BOMBED KERMANSHAH THAT MORNING BEING INTERVIEWED ON AN AIR STRIP " SOMEWHERE IN IRAQ " WAS SHOWN ON TELEVISION LAST NIGHT. THERE WAS ALSO FILM OF A GROUND -TO - GROUND MISSILE BATTERY IN ACTION AND OF SOME CRASHED AIRCRAFT, BUT NONE OF THE ACTUAL FIGHTING.

EGERTON

IRAQ/IRAN STANDARD

ADDITIONAL DISTN.

MED	MAED
NENAD	TRED
NAD	ERD
UND	ECON D
EESD	CONS D
ECD	CONS EM UNIT
WED	CABINET OFFICE

IRAQ/IRAN

3  
RESTRICTED



RESTRICTED *GL 28*  
FM BAGHDAD 251018

RESTRICTED

SEP 80

TO IMMEDIATE FCO  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 432 OF 25/9/80  
INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIW NEW YORK  
PRIORITY JEDDAN KUWAIT, ABU DHABI, WASHINGTON, MOSCOW, MUSCAT,  
PARIS, DAMASCUS AND AMMAN

MY TEL NO 427( NOT TO ALL): IRAQ/IRAN: REPORTED IRAQI CONDITIONS.

1. TODAY'S PRESS (25 SEPTEMBER) HAS NOT (NOT) PUBLISHED IRAQ'S CONDITIONS FOR ENDING THE HOSTILITIES WITH IRAN WHICH WERE REPORTED ON YESTERDAY'S BBC WORLD SERVICE. NOR DO THEY APPEAR TO HAVE BEEN BROADCAST ON TELEVISION OR RADIO HERE. THERE IS A BRIEF MENTION OF A PRESS CONFERENCE HELD HERE BY ADNAN KHAIRALLAH, THE DEFENCE MINISTER, YESTERDAY EVENING BUT NO TEXT IS GIVEN.

2. THE PRESS DOES, HOWEVER, REPORT SADDAM HUSSAIN'S MEETINGS IN BAGHDAD WITH YASSIR ARAFAT AND WITH THE JORDANIAN PRIME MINISTER. TARIQ AZIZ, THE DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER, IS REPORTED AS HAVING ARRIVED IN PARIS AFTER HIS TRIP TO MOSCOW. THERE HAS SO FAR BEEN NO (NO) ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE IMPENDING ARRIVAL OF THE CUBAN FOREIGN MINISTER.

03. THE CONDITIONS AS WE REMEMBER THEM FROM RAPID HEARINGS ON THE RADIO ARE:-

(I) SOME "JUST" TERRITORIAL CONCESSIONS BY IRAN:

(II) REVERSION TO THE PRE-1975 POSITION ON THE SHATT AL-ARAB.

(III) RETURN TO ARAB OWNERSHIP OF THE TUNBS AND THE WHOLE OF ABU MUSA.

4. THE FACT THAT THEY HAVE NOT (NOT) SO FAR BEEN CARRIED ON THE STRICTLY CONTROLLED MEDIA WITHIN IRAQ SUGGEST THAT THEY ARE A BALLON D'ESSAI AUTHORISED FOR RELEASE BY AN IRAQI OFFICIAL ABROAD. E.G. AT THE UN.

5. GRATEFUL TO KNOW IF ANY ADDRESSEE CAN SOURCE OR DUCMENT THESE "CONDITIONS."

EGERTON

IRAQ/IRAN  
STANDARD  
MED  
NENAD  
NAD  
UND  
EESD  
ECD  
WED  
MAED

ES&SD  
ERD  
ECON D  
CONS D  
CONS EM UNIT  
CABINET OFFICE

*ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION  
IRAQ/IRAN*

RESTRICTED

CONFIDENTIAL

GR 470

CONFIDENTIAL

FM BAGHDAD 250700Z SEP 80

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 429 OF 25/9/80

FOR MIERS, M.E.D.

VISITORS AND MISSIONS TO BAGHDAD INTERNATIONAL FAIR.

1. BAGHDAD WAS SUBJECTED TO ANOTHER AIR-RAID TODAY, 25 SEPTEMBER, AND BOMBS WERE DROPPED ON THE CITY'S PERIPHERY, POSSIBLY INCLUDING THE AIRPORT.

2. THE AIRPORT REMAINS SHUT, AND WILL I THINK ONLY BE REOPENED WHEN THE IRAQIS JUDGE THAT THEY HAVE MADE SUFFICIENT TERRITORIAL GAINS FOR A CEASEFIRE TO BECOME ACCEPTABLE TO THEM. PER CONTRA, IT MUST BE AN IRANIAN AIM (SO LONG AS THEY HAVE ENOUGH PILOTS) TO INTERDICT BAGHDAD AIRPORT AND CAUSE DAMAGE TO INSTALLATION AT KEY POINTS ALL OVER IRAQ. THUS THE IRAQI LINE THAT THE FAIR REMAINS ON FROM 1 - 15 OCTOBER, AND THAT BUSINESS WILL BE CONDUCTED AS USUAL WITH THOSE VISITORS WHO SHOW UP, SHOWS SANG FROID BUT IS NOT YET PRACTICAL.

3. AGAINST THIS BACKGROUND I RECOMMEND, THAT IF THE AIRPORT REOPENS BY SUNDAY, 28 SEPTEMBER, MR JENKIN AND PARTY SHOULD ARRIVE AS PLANNED ON THE EVENING OF MONDAY, 29 SEPTEMBER. I WILL TELEGRAPH A FINAL RECOMMENDATION ON THIS VISIT DURING SATURDAY, 27 SEPTEMBER.

4. AS REGARDS THE COMET MISSION, I WOULD WELCOME THIS TOO, TO ARRIVE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE AFTER THE AIRPORT REOPENS. IT MAY BE THAT THE MISSION WILL NOT (NOT) BE ABLE TO GET HERE UNTIL THE MIDDLE OF NEXT WEEK, BUT I BELIEVE THAT THE IRAQIS WOULD WELCOME LORD SELSDON, MR ROAD AND AS MANY OTHERS OF THE MISSION WHO CAN MANAGE TO RESCHEDULE THEIR OWN PROGRAMMES BY A FEW DAYS.

5. AS REGARDS BRITISH EXHIBITORS AT THE FAIR, THE POSITION IS COMPLICATED BY THE DECISION OF OUR (GERMAN) STAND CONTRACTOR TO WITHDRAW HIS STAFF BECAUSE OF THE POLITICAL SITUATION. IN SPITE OF OUR EARNEST ENTREATIES (SEE MY ESBOT 279), BRITISH ERECTION SUPERVISORS ARE ALSO LEAVING BAGHDAD TODAY, BY ROAD. KEARNEY OF FPB ADVISES THAT WITH NO CONTRACTORS OR SUPERVISORY STAFF, IT WILL BE IMPOSSIBLE TO UNPACK MANY OF THE HEAVY MECHANICAL EXHIBITS OR COMPLETE OUR STANDS. NO IRAQI SKILLED LABOUR TO HANDLE THE HEAVY EQUIPMENT IS AVAILABLE EITHER. THUS THE BRITISH PAVILION WILL NOT (NOT) BE READY FOR THE OFFICIAL OPENING IF HELD ON 1 OCTOBER.

CONFIDENTIAL

/6.I RECOMMEND



CONFIDENTIAL

6. I RECOMMEND THAT YOU DISCUSS THIS ASPECT WITH CRE5 AND FPB REMINDING THEM THAT MANY OF OUR MAJOR COMPETITORS WILL STILL MOUNT MATERIAL STANDS, PERHAPS ON A REDUCED SCALE. CREDIT WILL GO TO THOSE WHO KEEP THEIR NERVE AND HANG ON, TO MAKE SOME SORT OF A NATIONAL SHOWING. I THINK UK PARTICIPANTS SHOULD BE ALLOWED TO DECIDE FOR THEMSELVES WHETHER OR NOT TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THEIR ENTRY VISAS AS AND WHEN AIRPORT REOPENS TO VISIT AND DO WHAT BUSINESS THEY CAN, WITH OR WITHOUT BENEFIT OF THEIR STANDS.

7. I WILL TELEGRAPH AGAIN ON 27 SEPTEMBER. MR KEARNEY OF FPB IS STAYING HERE MEANTIME.

EGERTON

IRAQ/IRAN STANDARD

MED	MAED
NENAD	TRED
NAD	ERD
UND	ECON D
EESD	CONS D
ECD	CONS EM UNIT
WED	CABINET OFFICE

ADDITIONAL DISTN.

IRAQ/IRAN

2  
CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET



8

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

25 September 1980

I enclose a copy of a message to the Prime Minister from President Carter. I understand that the text has already been seen in the Foreign Office, as it has been passed to Belgrade through your channels.

The Prime Minister's initial reaction to this message is that both the proposals are reasonable, and we should respond as positively and as quickly as possible. I imagine that there should certainly be no difficulty over the procedural proposal, and I should be grateful if you could let us have a draft reply for the Prime Minister to consider by close of play today.

The Prime Minister also wishes to discuss the implications of the Iraq/Iran conflict in a meeting at Chequers at 11 a.m. on ~~Saturday~~ <sup>Friday</sup> morning. I hope that it will be possible for the Lord Privy Seal to attend. I should also be grateful if other recipients of this letter will indicate which Minister or senior official would be available to attend if required.

I am sending copies of this letter and enclosure to Brian Norbury (Ministry of Defence), Stuart Hampson (Department of Trade), Julian West (Department of Energy) and David Wright (Cabinet Office).

M. A. PATI

(Tube)  
Paul Lever Esq  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

SECRET

WPM



VZCZCWAG035  
00 WTE24  
DE WTE 17099 2690251  
O 250400Z SEP 80  
FM THE WHITE HOUSE  
TO THE CABINET OFFICE  
ZEM

S E C R E T VIA CABINET OFFICE CHANNELS WH07099

7  
PRIME MINISTER'S  
PERSONAL MESSAGE  
SERIAL No. T 184/80

SEPTEMBER 24, 1980

FOR: PRIME MINISTER THATCHER

FROM: PRESIDENT CARTER

I KNOW YOU ARE AS PREOCCUPIED AS I AM ABOUT THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE CONTINUING CONFLICT BETWEEN IRAQ AND IRAN. SECRETARY MUSKIE AND LORD CARRINGTON ARE INVOLVED IN CLOSE CONSULTATIONS AT THE UN. OUR OVERRIDING CONCERN, OF COURSE, IS TO SEE THE CONFLICT BROUGHT TO A PROMPT END SO THAT ISSUES BETWEEN IRAQ AND IRAN CAN BE NEGOTIATED. HOWEVER, I WANTED TO COMMUNICATE DIRECTLY WITH YOU ON ASPECTS OF THE CRISIS FOR WHICH I BELIEVE PRECAUTIONARY STEPS BY OUR RESPECTIVE GOVERNMENTS APPEAR NECESSARY.

I AM CONCERNED ABOUT THE SECURITY OF SHIPPING IN THE PERSIAN GULF TO AND FROM SAUDI ARABIA AND THE OTHER GULF STATES. THE IRANIAN INTERROGATION OF VESSELS ENTERING THE GULF AND THE SHARP CONSTRAINTS AND INCREASED PRICES FOR INSURANCE THREATEN TO REDUCE DRASTICALLY OIL SHIPMENTS FROM THE PERSIAN GULF STATES. WHILE THE WORLD CAN, IN ALL LIKELIHOOD, ADJUST TO THE STOPPAGE OF IRAQI AND IRANIAN OIL SHIPMENTS FOR A TIME, THE EXTENDED HALT IN ALL OIL EXPORTS FROM THE GULF COULD BE AN ECONOMIC CATASTROPHE.

AS A FIRST STEP IN PREPARING TO DEAL WITH THIS POTENTIAL THREAT, I WOULD URGE THAT YOU MOVE ANY NAVAL FORCES YOU MAY HAVE IN THE INDIAN OCEAN AREA CLOSER TO THE GULF. SUCH A PRESENCE ITSELF WOULD BE A REASSURING FACTOR. ADDITIONALLY, I WOULD RECOMMEND THAT OUR TWO GOVERNMENTS -- WITH OTHER INTERESTED GOVERNMENTS-- COMMENCE URGENT CONTINGENCY CONSULTATIONS ON HOW BEST TO ASSURE NAVAL PROTECTION FOR OIL TANKERS ENTERING AND DEPARTING THE PERSIAN GULF FOR PORTS OTHER THAN THOSE OF IRAQ AND IRAN.

SECONDLY, I AM CONCERNED ABOUT REPORTS THAT MANY NATIONS AND SHIPPING COMPANIES ARE RESTRAINING THEIR TANKERS FROM OPERATING IN THE PERSIAN GULF, BOTH BECAUSE OF THE RISK AND THE PROBLEM OF INSURANCE. I WOULD SUGGEST THAT OUR APPROPRIATE OFFICIALS BE IN CONTACT, TOGETHER WITH THOSE OF FRANCE, THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY, ITALY AND JAPAN, TO ASSESS THE MAGNITUDE OF THIS PROBLEM AND CONSIDER POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS. IF NECESSARY, WE WOULD BE PREPARED TO HOST AN APPROPRIATE MEETING IMMEDIATELY.

I HOPE THAT HOSTILITIES CAN BE BROUGHT TO AN END SOON, BUT I

END OF PAGE 01

OF THE CONTINUING CONFLICT BETWEEN IRAQ AND IRAN. SECRETARY HUSKIE AND LORD CARRINGTON ARE INVOLVED IN CLOSE CONSULTATIONS AT THE UN. OUR OVERRIDING CONCERN, OF COURSE, IS TO SEE THE CONFLICT BROUGHT TO A PROMPT END SO THAT ISSUES BETWEEN IRAQ AND IRAN CAN BE NEGOTIATED. HOWEVER, I WANTED TO COMMUNICATE DIRECTLY WITH YOU ON ASPECTS OF THE CRISIS FOR WHICH I BELIEVE PRECAUTIONARY STEPS BY OUR RESPECTIVE GOVERNMENTS APPEAR NECESSARY.

I AM CONCERNED ABOUT THE SECURITY OF SHIPPING IN THE PERSIAN GULF TO AND FROM SAUDI ARABIA AND THE OTHER GULF STATES. THE IRANIAN INTERROGATION OF VESSELS ENTERING THE GULF AND THE SHARP CONSTRAINTS AND INCREASED PRICES FOR INSURANCE THREATEN TO REDUCE DRASTICALLY OIL SHIPMENTS FROM THE PERSIAN GULF STATES. WHILE THE WORLD CAN, IN ALL LIKELIHOOD, ADJUST TO THE STOPPAGE OF IRAQI AND IRANIAN OIL SHIPMENTS FOR A TIME, THE EXTENDED HALT IN ALL OIL EXPORTS FROM THE GULF COULD BE AN ECONOMIC CATASTROPHE.

AS A FIRST STEP IN PREPARING TO DEAL WITH THIS POTENTIAL THREAT, I WOULD URGE THAT YOU MOVE ANY NAVAL FORCES YOU MAY HAVE IN THE INDIAN OCEAN AREA CLOSER TO THE GULF. SUCH A PRESENCE ITSELF WOULD BE A REASSURING FACTOR. ADDITIONALLY, I WOULD RECOMMEND THAT OUR TWO GOVERNMENTS -- WITH OTHER INTERESTED GOVERNMENTS-- COMMENCE URGENT CONTINGENCY CONSULTATIONS ON HOW BEST TO ASSURE NAVAL PROTECTION FOR OIL TANKERS ENTERING AND DEPARTING THE PERSIAN GULF FOR PORTS OTHER THAN THOSE OF IRAQ AND IRAN.

SECONDLY, I AM CONCERNED ABOUT REPORTS THAT MANY NATIONS AND SHIPPING COMPANIES ARE RESTRAINING THEIR TANKERS FROM OPERATING IN THE PERSIAN GULF, BOTH BECAUSE OF THE RISK AND THE PROBLEM OF INSURANCE. I WOULD SUGGEST THAT OUR APPROPRIATE OFFICIALS BE IN CONTACT, TOGETHER WITH THOSE OF FRANCE, THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY, ITALY AND JAPAN, TO ASSESS THE MAGNITUDE OF THIS PROBLEM AND CONSIDER POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS. IF NECESSARY, WE WOULD BE PREPARED TO HOST AN APPROPRIATE MEETING IMMEDIATELY.

I HOPE THAT HOSTILITIES CAN BE BROUGHT TO AN END SOON, BUT I

END OF PAGE 01

SUSPECT THAT, EVEN IF THEY ARE, WE WILL BE FACED WITH DEEP CONCERNS ABOUT A CONTINUING THREAT TO SHIPPING IN THE PERSIAN GULF AND INSURANCE REQUIREMENTS THAT COULD HAVE THE EFFECT OF CURTAILING OIL EXPORTS IN THAT REGION.

I LOOK FORWARD TO AN EARLY RESPONSE.

SINCERELY,

JIMMY CARTER

0477  
£7099

NNNN

THATS FINE TKU

QSL 25/0416Z JJ

THIS MESSAGE HAS BEEN PASSED TO BELGRADE FOR PRIME MINISTER



SECRET

loa

SECRET *GIS 280*  
FROM D.A. ABU DHABI 240624Z SEP 80  
TO IMMEDIATE MODUK  
INFO IMMEDIATE FCO AND DUBAI  
PRIORITY MUSCAT, DOHA , BAHRAIN, KUWAIT, BAGHDAD  
AND JEDDA.

FOR DI4 FROM DA. IRAN/IRAQ.

REF YOUR U2H OF 221420Z SEP AND OUR TEL 295 OF 23 SEP.

1. UAE ARMED FORCES HAVE BEEN BROUGHT TO A STATE OF READINESS. ALL PERSONNEL IN UNITS ARE CONFINED TO CAMP AND MOST UNITS ARE READY TO MOVE AT SHORT NOTICE. OPS CENTRES ARE MANNED. TYPICALLY, NO ONE HAS RECEIVED ANY BRIEFING NOR ANY INDICATION TO WHERE THEY ARE LIKELY TO DEPLOY. HOWEVER THESE PREPARATORY MOVES HAVE BEEN ACCOMPLISHED WITH MORE PROFESSIONALISM THAN IN PREVIOUS INCIDENTS OF THIS SORT.

2. IN THE AIR FORCE AND AIR DEFENCE BRIGADE, WHICH COULD BE THE FIRST TO BECOME INVOLVED, LIVE MUNITIONS HAVE BEEN DRAWN. MIRAGE PILOTS, WHILST NOT ACTUALLY SITTING IN AIRCRAFT, ARE IN CREW ROOMS. THE RAPIER BATTERY HAS TWO TROOPS EACH OF FOUR DETACHMENTS WITH SIXTY FIVE LIVE MISSILES. THERE IS A 50% BLINDFIRE CAPABILITY. THE BATTERY HAS JUST BEEN ORDERED TO DEPLOY AS FOLLOWS:

- A. TWO DETACHMENTS TO THE BEACH PALACE (BB 3708).
- B. THREE DETACHMENTS TO UMM AN NAR REFINERY (BB 4504).
- C. FIVE DETACHMENTS IN RESERVE AT AIRFIELD CAMP.

THE CROTALE BATTERY HAS TWENTY EIGHT MISSILES. HOWEVER, NEITHER GUNS NOR MISSILES HAVE BEEN DEPLOYED TO DAS ISLAND AS YET.

3. THE NAVY HAS ITS CUSTOMARY ONE CRAFT IN THE NEIGHBOURHOOD OF DAS WITH THE REAMAINDER AT SHORT NOTICE IN ABU DHABI. THE FIRST TWO GERMAN STRIKE CRAFT ARRIVED TWO DAYS AGO. THESE COULD DRAMATICALLY INCREASE NAVY'S CAPABILITY BUT THEY COULD HARDLY BE COMMISSIONED FOR A WHILE YET. I WILL BE CHECKING ON THIS TOMORROW.

*Re SECRET*

IRAN/IRAQ

STANDARD  
MED  
NENAD  
NAD  
UND  
EESD  
ECD  
WED  
MAED

ES&SD  
ERD  
ECON D  
CONS D  
CONS EM UNIT  
CABINET OFFICE

COPIES SENT TO  
No. 10 DOWNING STREET

SECRET

GRS 290

UNCLASSIFIED

FM MOSCOW 240830Z SEP 80

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 580 OF 24TH SEPTEMBER

FOR INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON, UKDEL NATO, UKMIS NEW YORK AND  
ROUTINE BONN, PARIS AND BAGHDAD.

OUR TEL NO 578: IRAN/IRAQ: SOVIET COMMENT.

1. IZVESTIA OF 23 SEPTEMBER AND PRAVDA OF 24 SEPTEMBER BROKE THE LONG SILENCE WITH SEPARATE ARTICLES CLAIMING THAT THE CONTINUING CONFLICT ONLY SERVED IMPERIALISM'S INTERESTS, AND ACCUSING THE WEST OF TRYING TO INFLATE AND EXPLOIT THE SITUATION. IZVESTIA ALSO CLAIMED THAT US INTEREST IN THE DISPUTE WAS THE RESULT OF HOPES THAT IT WOULD WEAKEN OPPOSITION TO THE CAMP DAVID PROCESS. BOTH ARTICLES NOTED THE CONTRIBUTION MADE IN THE PAST BY THE TWO COUNTRIES TO THE ANTI-IMPERIALIST STRUGGLE. THEY CLAIMED THAT THE PRESENT SITUATION WAS CAUSING SERIOUS CONCERN TO THE COUNTRIES' FRIENDS, AND PRESSED FOR A RESOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM THROUGH PEACEFUL NEGOTIATIONS. IZVESTIA ADDITIONALLY NOTED THAT NO-ONE HAD THE RIGHT TO INTERFERE IN RELATIONS BETWEEN IRAN AND IRAQ.

2. THE TWO ARTICLES DID NOT DEAL WITH THE SUBSTANCE OF THE DISPUTE, BUT IZVESTIA DID QUOTE THE IRAQI JUSTIFICATION THAT IRAN HAD NOT FULFILLED ITS SIDE OF THE 1975 AGREEMENT. A SEPARATE REPORT IN PRAVDA QUOTED AN IRAQI REPRESENTATIVE OUTLINING IRAQ'S CONDITIONS FOR A SETTLEMENT, INCLUDING THE RETURN TO IRAQ OF THE THREE PERSIAN GULF ISLANDS "SEIZED BY IRAN", AND RESPECT FOR IRAQ'S RIGHTS TO THE WHOLE SHATT-EL-ARAB.

3. IRANIAN AMBASSADOR MOKRI CALLED YESTERDAY ON A DEPUTY CHAIRMAN OF THE PRAESIDIUM (USMANKHODZHAYEV) AND FIRST DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER MALTSEV (WHO EARLIER SAW AZIZ - OUR TUR REFERS), AND AFTERWARDS HELD A PRESS CONFERENCE. HE SAID HE HAD MADE TWO REQUESTS, FIRSTLY THAT THE SOVIET UNION SHOULD CONDEMN IRAQI 'AGRESSION' AGAINST IRAN, AND SECONDLY THAT ARMS DELIVERIES TO IRAQ SHOULD CEASE. HE SAID THAT HE HAD BEEN TOLD THAT THE SOVIET UNION WOULD REMAIN NEUTRAL, BUT THAT THEY WERE BOUND TO SUPPLY ARMS TO IRAQ BY THEIR FRIENDSHIP TREATY.

KEEBLE

IRAN/IRAQ

STANDARD

MED

NENAD

NAD

UND

EESD

ECD

WED

ES&SD

ERD

ECON D

CABINET OFFICE

COPIES SENT TO  
No to DOWNING STREET



RESTRICTED

GPS 110  
RESTRICTED  
FM DUBAI 240515Z SEP 80  
TO IMMEDIATE FCO  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 113 OF 24 SEPTEMBER  
INFO IMMEDIATE ABU DHABI BAHRAIN DOHA JEDDA KUWAIT MUSCAT  
BAGHDAD UKMIS NEW YORK

IRAN/IRAQ

1. SHIPPING AGENTS HERE CONFIRM THAT TRAFFIC THROUGH THE STRAITS OF HORMUZ IS STILL NORMAL, THOUGH ALL SHIPS ARE OBEYING IRANIAN NAVY INSTRUCTIONS TO KEEP WELL SOUTH OF MEDIAN LINE. ONE NORWEGIAN TANKER CARRYING IRAQI OIL WAS CHALLENGED THREE TIMES BY IRANIAN WARSHIPS BUT ALLOWED TO PROCEED.
2. WE KNOW OF ONLY TWO SHIPS SO FAR WHICH HAVE CANCELLED PLANS TO ENTER THE GULF. A U S CONTAINER SHIP HAS OFF-LOADED CARGO FOR DUBAI AND ABU DHABI AT KHOR FAKHAN, AND AN EMPTY NORWEGIAN TANKER HAS HALTED THERE FOR ORDERS. GRAY MACKENZIE'S GRAYSWIFT LAUNCH SERVICE FROM RAS AL-KHAIMAH IS STILL OPERATING, WITH INSTRUCTIONS TO KEEP WELL INSIDE ARAB WATERS.

HASKELL

COPIES SENT TO  
10 DOWNING STREET

IRAN LIMITED

MED  
NENAD  
DEF D  
CONS D  
CONS EM UNIT  
SED  
NAD  
FUSD  
ERD  
ECD (E)  
MAED  
ES & SD  
OID  
UND  
IPD

NEWS D  
SECURITY D  
POD  
PSD  
PS  
PS/LPS  
PS/MR HURD  
PS/FUS  
SIR J GRAHAM  
LORD GARDNER  
MR BULLARD  
MR ADAMS  
MR J.C. HOBELLY  
MR FERGUSSON

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION

TEHRAN SPECIAL

RESTRICTED

# CONFIDENTIAL

GRS 460

CONFIDENTIAL UK COMMS ONLY

FM AMMAN 241130Z SEP 80

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 351 OF 24 SEP

INFO BAGHDAD, BEIRUT, CAIRO, DAMASCUS, JEDDA, TEL AVIV, UKMIS  
NEWYORK, WASHINGTON, CG JERUSALEM, FCO MED AND RESEARCH DEPT  
AND MODUK (DI4)

MY TELELETTER OF 17 SEPTEMBER TO MILES IN NENAD (NOT TO ALL):  
IRAN/IRAQ/JORDAN

1. FURTHER STATEMENTS OF JORDANIAN SUPPORT FOR IRAQ HAVE BEEN PUBLISHED IN THE PRESS ON 23 AND 24 SEPTEMBER, WHICH REPORTED THAT KING HUSSEIN HAD TELEPHONED THE IRAQI PRESIDENT ON 22 SEPTEMBER TO ASSURE HIM OF JORDANIAN BACKING FOR IRAQ IN THE FACE OF "IRANIAN AGGRESSION AGAINST IRAQI TERRITORY." THE KING IS ALSO REPORTED HAVE HAD LENGTHY TELEPHONE CONVERSATIONS WITH PRESIDENT ASAD OF SYRIA AND CROWN PRINCE FAHD OF SAUDI ARABIA ON THE IRAN/IRAQ DISPUTE.
2. AT A SPECIALLY SUMMONED CABINET MEETING ON 23 SEPTEMBER, ALSO ATTENDED BY CROWN PRINCE HASSAN, THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF THE JORDANIAN ARMED FORCES AND OTHERS, KING HUSSEIN IS REPORTED AS HAVING CALLED ON ALL ARAB STATES TO ADOPT A UNIFIED STAND IN SUPPORT OF IRAQ'S DEFENCE OF ITS TERRITORY IN FACE OF "IRAN'S AGGRESSION ON IRAQI TERRITORY AND ITS CONSTANT THREATS TO THE ARAB STATES OF THE GULF WHICH CONSTITUTE A DRAIN ON ARAB EFFORTS AND CAPABILITIES CONFRONTING ISRAEL."
3. JORDAN'S SUPPORT FOR IRAQ IS ECHOED IN THE EDITORIAL COLUMNS OF THE JORDANIAN PRESS, WHICH CRITICISE WHAT THEY DESCRIBE AS IRAN'S AGGRESSIVE INTENTIONS AGAINST IRAQ AND THE WHOLE ARAB NATION AND IRAN'S "DEEP HATRED" OF THE ARABS.
4. THE JORDANIAN PRESS OF 24 SEPTEMBER ALSO CARRIES PROMINENTLY A JORDANIAN OFFICIAL DENIAL OF A REPORT ON RADIO ISRAEL TO THE EFFECT THAT THE JORDANIANS HAD INFORMED THE ISRAELIS OF THE PRESENCE OF IRAQI AIRCRAFT AT JORDANIAN AIR BASES (TEL AVIV TELNO 450 REFERS). THE STATEMENT DID NOT COMMENT ON THE ALLEGED PRESENCE OF IRAQI AIRCRAFT IN JORDAN, BUT ASSERTED THAT JORDAN WAS FREE TO ACT IN ANY WAY IT PLEASED ON ITS OWN SOIL AND WOULD NOT ACCEPT INTERFERENCE FROM ANY OTHER PARTY IN ITS OWN AFFAIRS AND SOVEREIGNTY. SEE ALSO MY DA'S TELEGRAM SIC ACA/U2G OF 231120Z (NOT TO ALL).

CONFIDENTIAL

15.



CONFIDENTIAL

5. IN SPEAKING TO THE VISITING RCDS GROUP ON THE EVENING OF 22 SEPTEMBER, KING HUSSEIN EMPHASISED THE DANGER FOR THE AREA OF THE IRAQ/IRAN CONFLICT AND SAID THAT JORDAN WOULD "OBVIOUSLY LEND HER FULL SUPPORT TO IRAQ" WHICH IN RECENT YEARS HAD BECOME A SOURCE OF STABILITY IN THE AREA AND THAT, BUT FOR THE POSITIVE ROLE PLYAED BY IRAQ IN RESISTING EXTERNAL INTERFERENCE IN THE ARAB WORLD, THE SITUATION IN THE AREA WOULD UNDOUBTEDLY HAVE BEEN MUCH WORSE THAT IT NOW WAS.

URWICK

IRAN/IRAQ  
STANDARD  
MED  
NENAD  
NAD  
UND  
EESD  
ECD  
WED  
MAED

ES&SD  
ERD  
ECON D  
CONS D  
CONS EM UNIT  
RESEARCH D  
CABINET OFFICE

( Repetition to ~~SECRET~~  
referred for departmental decision,  
repeated as requested to other posts. )

COPIES SENT TO  
No. 10 DOWNING STREET

2  
CONFIDENTIAL

UNCLASSIFIED

44770 - 1

OO BAGHDAD

GRS 45

UNCLASSIFIED

FM FCO 241635Z SEPTEMBER 1980

TO IMMEDIATE BAGHDAD

TELEGRAM NUMBER 317 OF 24 SEPTEMBER

FROM MAED

OUR TELNO 314 : IRAQ/IRAN

1. GCBS HAVE HEARD RUMOUR THAT BRITISH VESSEL GULF HERON  
AT BASRA HAS BEEN DAMAGED BY A BOMB. GRATEFUL ANY NEWS.

CARRINGTON

IRAN STANDARD

MED	ECD
NENAD	UND
NAD	TRED
WED	MAED
SED	CONS D
SAD	CONS EM UNIT
EESD	

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION

TEHRAN SPECIAL

COPIES TO:

MR R W SIMPSON SPD DOT

MR G BULLEY SP2 DOT



CONFIDENTIAL

GRS 219

CONFIDENTIAL

FM DOHA 240849Z SEP 80

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 135 OF 24 SEPTEMBER

INFO IMMEDIATE NEW YORK (FOR S OF S) INFO PRIORITY KUWAIT, BAGHDAD,  
MUSCAT, ABU DHABI, BAHRAIN AND JEDDA.

SAVING PARIS AND WASHINGTON.

YOUR TELNO: 194 TO ABU DHABI: IRAN/IRAQ.

1. QATARIS HAVE AS YET GIVEN THE SITUATION LITTLE INFORMED CONSIDERATION. THE AMIR IS STILL IN PARIS: THE DEPUTY C-IN-C AND HIS ASSISTANT ARE IN LONDON. OTHER MINISTERS ARE ALSO ABSCENT.

2. ACTING RULER, SHAIKH HAMAD, WITH WHOM I DISCUSSED MATTERS ON 20 SEPTEMBER, DISMISSED THE MESSAGE HE HAD RECEIVED FROM THE IRAQI PRESIDENT AS A PROPAGANDA EXERCISE. BUT HIS OFFICE LATER EVINced ANXIETY ABOUT POSSIBLE RESTRICTION OF SHIPPING IN THE STRAITS OF HORMUZ.

3. AMIR'S CHEF DE CABINET WAS PERPLEXED, WHEN HE LUNCHEd WITH ME ON 22 SEPTEMBER, ABOUT THE IMPLICATIONS FOR QATAR'S SECURITY OF ANY SPREAD OF FIGHTING. HE ADMITTED TO A GENERAL SENSE OF UNEASE ABOUT IT, RATHER THAN ANY ABILITY TO IDENTIFY THE DANGERS IT MIGHT BRING HERE. QATARIS KEPT THE INTERNAL SITUATION QUIET THROUGH PREVIOUS IRANIAN UPHEAVALS. THE IRANIAN COMMUNITY, HOWEVER, NUMBERS SOME 40-60,000 AND COULD YET CAUSE TROUBLE. I SHARE CHEF DE CABINET'S FEELINGS: THERE IS AS YET NO IDENTIFIABLE PROBLEM FOR QATAR GOVERNMENT EXCEPT THE POSSIBILITY OF INTERFERENCE WITH SHIPPING IN THE GULF.

FCO PLEASE PASS SAVING PARIS AND WASHINGTON.

BRANT

REPEATED AS REQUESTED

IRAN/IRAQ

STANDARD

MED

NENAD

NAD

UND

EESD

ECD

WED

MAED

ES&SD

ERD

ECON D

CONS D

CONS EM UNIT

CABINET OFFICE

COPIES SENT TO  
No. 10 DOWNING STREET

CONFIDENTIAL

RR MUSCAT

RR ROME

RR SANAA

RR TELAVIV

GROUPS 150

FM CENTROFORM LONDON 241343Z

UNCLASSIFIED

RETRACT 33224SEPT

FOLLOWING IS EXTRACT FROM TODAY'S FCO SPOKESMAN 24-9-80

IRAN/IRAQ:

SPOKESMAN DREW ATTENTION TO THE TERMS OF THE STATEMENT ISSUED BY THE FOREIGN MINISTERS OF THE NINE IN NEW YORK ON 23 SEPTEMBER.

ASKED ABOUT THE BRITISH COMMUNITY IN IRAQ, SPOKESMAN SAID THAT THE BRITISH AMBASSADOR HAD MET REPRESENTATIVES OF THE COMMUNITY THIS MORNING. THE EMBASSY WAS NOT AT PRESENT ADVISING THE COMMUNITY TO LEAVE. SOME MEMBERS HAD DECIDED HOWEVER TO MAKE ARRANGEMENTS FOR THEIR DEPENDENTS TO GO BY ROAD TO AMMAN. THE EMBASSY IS CO-OPERATING FULLY. A CONVOY WOULD BE LEAVING IN THE COURSE OF THE MORNING, TAKING ADVANTAGE OF THE PRESENT LULL. MANY BRITISH SUBJECTS IN THE BASRAH AREA HAD LEFT BY ROAD FOR KUWAIT. A TOTAL OF ABOUT 100 PERSONS WOULD BE LEAVING BAGHDAD TODAY. THE EMBASSY HAD BEEN IN TOUCH WITH THE IRAQI MFA ABOUT THE GROUP'S DEPARTURE. A CONSULAR OFFICIAL FROM THE EMBASSY WOULD BE ACCOMPANYING THE GROUPS TO RUTBA. THE EMBASSY IN AMMAN WAS ARRANGING FOR A CONSULAR OFFICIAL TO MEET THE GROUP AT THE JORDANIAN FRONTIER.

ENDS FCO SPOKESMAN

CENTROFORM LONDON

NNNN

NUFU EU

1510/24



IMMEDIATE

D/BY 240930Z

IRAN/IRAQ

ADVANCE COPIES

22

PS  
PS/SIR I GILMOUR  
PS/MR HURD  
PS/PUS  
SIR E YOUDE  
SIR J GRAHAM  
MR J C MOBERLY  
MR BRAITHEWAITE  
HD/MED w. 39  
HD/NENAD  
HD/UND  
HD/CONS D  
CONSULAR EMERGENCY UNIT  
HD/ES & SD  
HD/MAED  
HD/DEF D  
PUSD (2)  
NEWS D

NO.10 DOWNING STREET  
CABINET OFFICE DIO

~~RESIDENT CLERK~~

GRS 725

RESTRICTED

FM BAGHDAD 240830Z SEP 80

TO FLASH AMMAN

TELEGRAM NUMBER 31 OF 24/9/80

INFO IMMEDIATE FCO, UKMIS NEW YORK,

PRIORITY KUWAIT, JEDDA, DAMASCUS AND WASHINGTON

FOR AMBASSADOR.

MY TEL NO 424: DEPARTURE OF DEPENDENTS OF BRITISH BUSINESS COMMUNITY

1. AT A MEETING AT 0600Z IN THE NEW BRITISH CLUB HERE TODAY, IT WAS DECIDED TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THE PRESENT LULL IN FIGHTER ACTIVITY OVER BAGHDAD TO GET ABOUT ONE HUNDRED DEPENDENTS ON THE ROAD, IN THEIR OWN CARS AND ESCORTED BY SOME HUSBANDS, STARTING AT 0930Z TODAY, 24 SEPTEMBER. TOTAL WILL BE APPROX 100 PERSONS. ROUTE WILL BE RUTBA-H4-AMMAN. A SMALL LOCAL BUS LEAVING AT 1100Z WILL TAKE ANY OVERFLOW.

ROUTE WILL BE RUTBA-H4-AMMAN. A SMALL LOCAL BUS LEAVING AT 1100Z WILL TAKE ANY OVERFLOW.

2. I HAVE EXPLAINED THE REASONS FOR THIS EXODUS TO THE DIRECTOR-GENERAL OF PROTOCOL AT THE FOREIGN MINISTRY AND ASKED FOR EXEMPTION FOR ALL THESE TRAVELLERS FROM EXIT PERMIT REQUIREMENTS, ON THE ANALOGY OF THE SAFWAN CROSSING YESTERDAY. NAJM WAS HELPFUL AND PROMISED TO PHONE THE BORDER POLICE AT RUTBA. I ALSO MENTIONED THAT SIR J. GRAHAM HAD REQUESTED VERY SPEEDING GRANTING OF EXIT PERMITS TO BRITISH SUBJECTS WANTING TO LEAVE WHEN HE SAW AMBASSADOR SHAWI ON 23 SEPT (FCO TEL TO ME NO 316).

3. AS IT HAS NOT (NOT) BEEN POSSIBLE TO COMPLETE EXIT DOCUMENTATION FOR MANY OF THE PRIVATE CARS OF TODAY'S EVACUEES, SOME MAY HAVE TO BE LEFT BEHIND AT RUTBA. GRATEFUL THEREFORE IF YOU WOULD ARRANGE MOST URGENTLY FOR A 40 SEATER DESERT BUS (WITH JORDANIAN OR OTHER ARAB DRIVER) TO PROCEED TODAY, 24 SEPTEMBER, TO RUTBA TO AWAIT THE CONVOY. BRITISH CLUB REPRESENTATIVE HAS GIVEN CONSUL HERE UNDERTAKINGS TO REPAY FULL COSTS OF BUS HIRE AND DRIVER'S SUBSISTENCE WHEN KNOWN.

4. IF YOU COULD ARRANGE FOR A MEMBER OF YOUR CONSULAR STAFF TO MEET THE PARTY AT H4, EITHER LATE TONIGHT OR MORE LIKELY EARLY ON THURSDAY, 25 SEPTEMBER, THAT WOULD BE MOST HELPFUL.

5. A SECOND, LARGER EXODUS OF BUSINESSMEN'S WIVES AND CHILDREN AND SOME HUSBANDS FROM OUTLYING AREAS (EG NORTH IRAQ) IS PLANNED FOR EARLY 25 SEPTEMBER IF THE GROUP, TOTALLING SOME THREE HUNDRED AND FIFTY, CAN BE ASSEMBLED BY THEN. A TOTAL OF SEVEN IRAQI BUSES ARE BEING HIRED TODAY. THESE MAY NOT (NOT) BE PERMITTED BY THE AUTHORITIES TO PROCEED BEYOND RUTBA FOR MILITARY REASONS, SO I MAY HAVE TO ASK YOU TO SEND AN EQUAL NUMBER OF BUSES, ON REPAYMENT, OVER TO RUTBA DURING 25 SEPTEMBER, IF THE FIRST BUS (PARA 3 ABOVE) GETS THROUGH SAFELY.

6. I AM STILL NOT (NOT) ADVISING BRITISH SUBJECTS WITH BUSINESS HERE TO LEAVE IRAQ OR ADVISING EVACUATION. BUT IF DEPENDENTS WANT TO GO, AS THEY CLEARLY DO VERY STRONGLY, I AM HELPING THEM TO GET OUT WITH THE MINIMUM OF DISCOMFORT. WE HAVE WARNED THAT THE CONVOY MAY BE SERIOUSLY DELAYED AT ROADBLOCKS, EG AT HABBANIYA.

7. I AM ASKING FOREIGN MINISTRY TO ALLOW, EXCEPTIONALLY

, A CONSULAR OFFICER

A CONSULAR OFFICER TO ACCOMPANY THE FIRST PARTY TO RUTBA TO FACILITATE



6. I AM STILL NOT (NOT) ADVISING BRITISH SUBJECTS WITH BUSINESS HERE TO LEAVE IRAQ OR ADVISING EVACUATION. BUT IF DEPENDENTS WANT TO GO, AS THEY CLEARLY DO VERY STRONGLY, I AM HELPING THEM TO GET OUT WITH THE MINIMUM OF DISCOMFORT. WE HAVE WARNED THAT THE CONVOY MAY BE SERIOUSLY DELAYED AT ROADBLOCKS, EG AT HABBANIYA.

7. I AM ASKING FOREIGN-MINISTRY TO ALLOW, EXCEPTIONALLY

, A CONSULAR OFFICE

A CONSULAR OFFICER TO ACCOMPANY THE FIRST PARTY TO RUTBA TO FACILITATE THEIR DEPARTURE, AND TO STAY THERE UNTIL THE SECOND PARTY HAS STAGED THROUGH ON 25 SEPTEMBER.

8. I AM NOT (NOT) CONFIDENT THAT IT IS WITHIN THE FOREIGN MINISTRY'S POWER TO GRANT SUCH AN EXEMPTION FROM THE TRAVEL REGULATIONS AT A TIME OF NATIONAL EMERGENCY, BUT SEE NO (NO) HARM IN ASKING. I WILL REPORT FURTHER BY BRIEF FLASH TELS TO YOU AND FCO WHEN FIRST PARTY HAVE LEFT. NO OBJECTION TO NEWS DEPT DRAWING ON PARAS 1 TO 4 INCLUSIVE AND PARAS 6 AND 7 ABOVE, IN TODAY'S BRIEFINGS.

9. I AM HAVING ANOTHER MEETING WITH BRITISH COMMUNITY LEADER LATER TODAY TO DISCUSS THE SECOND EXODUS (SEE 5 ABOVE) AND ALSO WITH MEMBER OF EMBASSY AND BRITISH COUNCIL STAFF. SOME OF WHOM HAVE YOUNG CHILDREN HERE. IT MAY BE THAT THEY WISH TO JOIN A SECOND OR SUBSEQUENT CONVOY.

EGERTON

NNNN



LVO 245/24

FDW G 081/24

GYPHER

OO BELGRADE

GR 400

SECRET  
FM F.C.O. 241420Z SEP 80  
TO IMMEDIATE BELGRADE  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 202 OF 24 SEPTEMBER

SECRET

FOR ALEXANDER

FOLLOWING TELEGRAM NOW REPEATED TO YOU AT REQUEST OF PRIVATE OFFICE  
WAS RECEIVED FROM DUBAI TELEGRAM NUMBER 29 OF 24 SEPTEMBER TO  
ABU DHABI  
AND TO IMMEDIATE FCO  
INFO IMMEDIATE MODUK UKMIS NEW YORK BAGHDAD WASHINGTON  
INFO PRIORITY BAHRAIN DOHA JEDDA KUWAIT  
INFO ROUTINE BONN PARIS

FCO TELNO 194 TO YOU AND YOUR TELNO 297: IRAN/IRAQ.

1. I SAW MOHAMMED BIN RASHID, FEDERAL MINISTER OF DEFENCE, AT 1300 LOCAL TIME. HE HAD NO INSIDE INFORMATION ON THE MILITARY SITUATION, BUT ON THE BASIS OF CURRENT PRESS AND RADIO REPORTS, AND PAST CONTACTS WITH THE IRAQIS, HIS ASSESSMENT WAS AS FOLLOWS:
  - (A) THE IRAQIS HAD BEGUN HOSTILITIES WITH ONLY LIMITED TERRITORIAL OBJECTIVES IN MIND. HOWEVER, THE QUALITY OF IRANIAN RESISTANCE HAD BEEN POORER THAN EXPECTED, AND THIS HAD ENCOURAGED THEM TO RAISE THEIR SIGHTS.
  - (B) NEVERTHELESS, THE IRAQIS WERE REALISTIC ENOUGH TO KNOW THAT THEY COULD NOT PERMANENTLY SUBDUCE LARGE AREAS OF HOSTILE TERRITORY. MOREOVER, RESUPPLY PROBLEMS WOULD FAIRLY SOON PRESENT THEMSELVES. THE FIGHTING COULD BE EXPECTED TO DIE DOWN OF ITS OWN ACCORD IN THE NEXT FEW DAYS.
  - (C) HOWEVER, IT WAS IMPORTANT THAT THE IRANIANS SHOULD BE SEEN CLEARLY TO HAVE HAD THE WORST OF IT. ANY SUGGESTION THAT THEY HAD ENDED ON EQUAL OR SUPERIOR TERMS IN ANY ASPECT OF THE FIGHTING COULD ENCOURAGE THEM TO DO SOMETHING REALLY IRRESPONSIBLE IN THE STRAITS OF HORMUZ.
  - (D) THE IRAQIS HAD MADE NO REPEAT NO APPROACH TO THE U A E FOR SEA OR AIR BASE FACILITIES TO SUPPORT ANY MOVE ON THE GULF ISLANDS. SHAIKH SAQR OF RAS AL-KHAIMAH WAS QUITE CAPABLE OF OFFERING THEM SOME KIND OF DEAL, BUT SHAIKHS ZAID AND RASHID WERE IN A POSITION TO THWART HIM AND WOULD DO SO.
  - (E) SOVIET INTERVENTION WAS A REMOTE BUT STILL SERIOUS THREAT. THE RUSSIANS WERE AT PRESENT TRYING TO AVOID TAKING SIDES BETWEEN IRAQ AND IRAN. BUT IF THEY DECIDED TO GRAB A CHUNK OF IRANIAN TERRITORY, THEY WOULD NOT BE CONTENT WITH A SMALL BORDER ZONE BUT WOULD AIM TO OCCUPY UP TO HALF OF IRAN.
2. SHIPPING IS STILL PASSING NORMALLY THROUGH THE STRAITS OF HORMUZ, THOUGH INWARD TRAFFIC IS THIN. THERE IS A RUMOUR, ALLEGEDLY ORIGINATING FROM A DANISH SHIPPING AGENT IN ABU DHABI, THAT CONTACT HAS BEN LOST WITH AN ITALIAN SHIP IN MID-GULF, BUT THIS MAY WELL BE ONLY A ROUTINE EQUIPMENT FAILURE. GUARDS ON MINISTRY OF DEFENCE AND ELSEWHERE



SECRET

BE ONLY A ROUTINE EQUIPMENT FAILURE. GUARDS ON MINISTRY OF DEFENCE AND ELSEWHERE IN DUBAI HAVE BEEN INCREASED AND ARE WEARING BATTLE EQUIPMENT, BUT OTHERWISE SITUATION IS NORMAL AND BRITISH AND U S COMMUNITIES ARE RELAXED.

3. SHAIKH MOHAMMED IS KEEN TO REMAIN IN CLOSE CONTACT AND EXCHANGE INFORMATION WITH ME. GRATEFUL IF WE COULD BE INCLUDED, WITH HIGH PRIORITY, IN REPETITION OF ALL RELEVANT TELEGRAMS.

CARRINGTON

NNNN

GYPTHER

SECRET

1835/24

IRAN/IRAQ

ADVANCE COPIES

22

ADVANCE COPY

PS  
PS/SIR I GILMOUR  
PS/MR HURD  
PS/PUS  
SIR E YOUDE  
SIR J GRAHAM  
MR J C MOBERLY  
MR BRAITHEWAITE  
HD/MED  
HD/HENAD  
HD/UKD  
HD/CONS D  
CONSULAR EMERGENCY UNIT  
HD/ES & SD  
HD/MAED  
HD/DEF D  
PUSD (2)  
NEWS D  
RESIDENT CLERK

NO 10 DOWNING STREET  
CABINET OFFICE DIO

00 DISTRESS/FCO DESKBY 241700Z

00 BAGHDAD

GR 120

UNCLASSIFIED

DESKBY 241700Z

FROM KUWAIT 241500Z SEPT

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO DISTRESS 32 OF 24/9/80,

INFO IMMEDIATE BAGHDAD.

YOUR TEL NO DISTRESS 19: EVACUEES FROM IRAQ.

1. AT 0230 THIS MORNING WHEN VICE-CONSUL ROSE LEFT THE BORDER ABOUT 200 BRITISH NATIONALS HAD CROSSED INTO KUWAIT. THERE WERE NONE LEFT ON THE IRAQI SIDE.

2. WE HAVE NOT HEARD SINCE OF ANY BRITISH WAITING THERE. WE HAVE PLANNED TO MAKE A PHYSICAL LATER TODAY.



2. WE HAVE NOT HEARD SINCE OF ANY BRITISH WAITING THERE. WE HAVE PLANNED TO MAKE A PHYSICAL LATER TODAY.

3. NEARLY ALL THE 220 ALREADY THROUGH WERE FROM THE BOMBED CONSTRUCTION SITE AT KHOR AL ZUBAIR. VERY FEW WERE FROM BASRAH TOWN. THEY DID NOT HAVE INFORMATION ABOUT NUMBERS STILL IN BASRAH, BUT WE WILL INVESTIGATE THIS FURTHER. (WE HAVE HAD ONE TELEPHONE CENQUIRY FROM UK ABOUT PERSONS SAID TO BE IN BASRAH BUT NOT IN OUR LISTS.)

4. WE THINK IT MIGHT BE ADVISABLE FOR CONSULAR OFFICER TO VISIT BASRAH, INCLUDING HOSPITALS (OUR TEL NO 404 OF 23/9 REFERS).

5. AMERICAN EMBASSY HAVE HEARD FROM THREE AMERICANS STILL AT THE BOMBED SITE THAT THE BODIES OF THE PERSONS KILLED WERE UNIDENTIFIABLE AND WERE BURIED. THE REMAINING AMERICANS ARE EXPECTED TO EVACUATE TO KUWAIT SHORTLY.

NNNN

SENT JIM/1600Z

265286 PRDRME G

919347 CONSUL G

GR 300

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FM UKMIS NEW YORK 250435Z SEP 80

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1353 OF 24 SEPTEMBER 1980

INFO PRIORITY DELHI, BAGHDAD, WASHINGTON, PARIS, BONN.

INFO ROUTINE ISLAMABAD, MOSCOW, AMMAN, DAMASCUS, KUWAIT, JEDDA  
ANKARA.

FOLLOWING FROM PRIVATE SECRETARY: SECRETARY OF STATE'S MEETING  
WITH THE INDIAN FOREIGN MINISTER, 24 SEPTEMBER, NEW YORK.

IRAN/IRAQ

1. LORD CARRINGTON ASKED RAO HOW THE INDIANS, WHO ENJOYED CLOSE RELATIONS WITH IRAQ, INTERPRETED THE LATTER'S RECENT ACTIONS.
2. RAO SAID IT WAS NOT ALWAYS EASY TO UNDERSTAND ONE'S FRIENDS. THE IMMEDIATE CAUSE FOR THE ESCALATION OF THE LONG-RUNNING DISPUTE BETWEEN IRAN AND IRAQ, AND IRAQ'S ULTIMATE OBJECTIVES, WERE NOT CLEAR TO THE INDIANS. HOWEVER, THE IRAQIS HAD BEEN CONVINCED THAT KHOMEINI WAS FOMENTING TROUBLE IN THEIR COUNTRY, HENCE THEIR DESIRE TO RETALIATE. RAO THOUGHT THERE WOULD BE CONTINUING CONFUSION AND NEAR-ANARCHY IN IRAN, BUT DID NOT EXPECT THE COUNTRY TO DISINTEGRATE. NOR DID HE EXPECT THE TUDEH PARTY TO TAKE CONTROL, THOUGH HE DID NOT EXCLUDE ITS POSSIBLE INVOLVEMENT IN A COALITION.
3. RAO WAS INCLINED TO AGREE WITH LORD CARRINGTON THAT UN MEMBERS WERE TAKING TOO RELAXED A VIEW (HE ASCRIBED THIS TO A GENERAL FEELING OF "SERVE THEM RIGHT"). MISHRA SUGGESTED THAT THE 5 PERMANENT MEMBERS SHOULD GET TOGETHER, AS PROLONGATION OF THE DISPUTE WAS IN NONE OF THEIR INTERESTS.
4. THE POSSIBILITY OF THE INDIANS ACTING AS INTERMEDIARIES WAS NOT RAISED ON EITHER SIDE.
5. SEE MIFT FOR DISCUSSION ON AFGHANISTAN.

PARSONS

IRAN/IRAQ

STANDARD

MED

NENAD

NAD

UND

EESD

ECD

WED

MAED

ES&SD

ERD

ECON D

CONS D

CONS EM UNIT

CABINET OFFICE

COPIES SENT TO  
No. 11 DOWNING STREET

CONFIDENTIAL



PS  
PS/SIR I GILMOUR  
PS/MR HURD  
PS/PUS  
~~SIR P YOUDE~~  
~~SIR J GILMOUR~~  
MR J C NOBERLY  
MR BRAITHWAITE  
HD/MED  
HD/MENAD  
HD/UND  
HD/CONS D  
CONSULAR EMERGENCY UNIT  
HD/ES & SD  
HD/MAED  
HD/DEF D  
PUSD (2)  
NEWS D

NO 10 DOWNING STREET  
CABINET OFFICE DIO

ADVANCE COPY

IMMEDIATE

Prime Minister

RESIDENT CLERK

FROM UKMIS NEW YORK 250015Z SEP 63  
TO IMMEDIATE F C O  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1350 OF 24 SEPTEMBER  
INFO IMMEDIATE TO WASHINGTON PARIS BONN  
INFO PRIORITY TO BAGHDAD  
INFO AMMAN DAMASCUS KUWAIT MUSCAT JEDDAH ANKARA MOSCOW

FOLLOWING FROM HEAD OF NEWS DEPARTMENT  
STRAIT OF HORMUZ

1. I UNDERSTAND THAT AFTER TODAY'S NSC, MR MUSKIE WAS ASKED BY REPORTERS: "WHAT ABOUT THE STRAIT OF HORMUZ, MR SECRETARY? IS THERE A BIG FOUR PLAN TO KEEP THEM OPEN?". HE IS REPORTED TO HAVE ANSWERED "THERE ARE CONSULTATIONS GOING ON". UPI HAVE REPORTED THAT THE US IS CONSULTING WITH ITS ALLIES ON CONTINGENCY PLANS TO KEEP THE STRAIT OPEN. FRANCOIS PONCET IS REPORTED TO HAVE SAID AFTER LUNCH WITH MUSKIE THAT THE FOUR HAD AGREED THAT THE CONTINUED FLOW OF OIL WAS OF VITAL INTEREST.

2. IN RESPONSE TO INSISTENT QUESTIONS ON THE SUBJECT, WE ARE TAKING THE FOLLOWING LINE.

(A) AS THE NINE SAID IN THEIR STATEMENT LAST NIGHT, IT IS IMPERATIVE NOT TO INFRINGE THE FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION IN THE GULF.

(B) THE IMMEDIATE THREAT TO NAVIGATION IS NOT THE PHYSICAL INTERDICTION OF TRAFFIC BUT THE DETERRANT AFFECT OF THE CONFLICT ITSELF AND THE REACTION OF UNDERWRITERS TO IT. THEREFORE THE URGENT NEED IS TO END THE WAR.

(C) THERE IS NO QUESTION OF A MILITARY PLAN. THERE IS A SERIES OF URGENT CONSULTATIONS ON HOW TO STOP THE WAR.

PARSONS

IRAN/IRAQ

ADVANCE COPIES

22

NO 10 DOWNING STREET  
CABINET OFFICE DIO

PS  
PS/SIR I GILMOUR  
PS/MR HURD  
PS/PUS  
~~SIR D YOUNG~~  
~~SIR J GRAHAM~~  
MR J C MOBERLY  
MR BRAITHWAITE  
HD/MED  
HD/MENAD  
HD/UND  
HD/CONS D  
CONSULAR EMERGENCY UNIT  
HD/ES & SD  
HD/MAED  
HD/DEF D  
PUSD (2)  
NEWS D  
RESIDENT CLERK

IMMEDIATE

ADVANCE COPY

DB 250830Z

CONFIDENTIAL

DESKBY 250830Z

FROM UKMIS NEW YORK 242250Z SEP 80

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1348 OF 24 SEPTEMBER

INFO WASHINGTON PARIS BONN MOSCOW BAGHDAD NEW DELHI ISLAMABAD

UKDEL NATO AMMAN

MY TELNOS 1339 AND 1340 (NOT TO ALL): IRAN/IRAQ

1. THERE WAS NO FURTHER ACTIVITY BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL TODAY (24 SEPTEMBER). THERE IS WIDE AGREEMENT WITH THE VIEW YOU EXPRESSED IN YOUR MEETING WITH WALDHEIM AND AT YOUR PRESS CONFERENCE HERE (MY TELNOS 1325, 1332 AND 1333) THAT THE COUNCIL OUGHT TO BE DOING SOMETHING TO TRY TO PREVENT THE CONFLICT DEVELOPING. BUT WITH THE ARABS DIVIDED ON WHAT, IF ANYTHING, SHOULD BE DONE HERE (WALDHEIM TOLD ME TODAY THAT HE HAD JUST RECEIVED FROM KING HUSSEIN A LETTER WHICH SUPPORTED THE IRAQIS 100 PERCENT) AND WITH THE LIKELIHOOD OF SOVIET OPPOSITION, NO ONE IS PREPARED TO TAKE THE LEAD IN ASKING FOR A FORMAL MEETING OF THOSE NON-ALIGNED MEMBERS SUCH AS BANGLADESH AND



NO ONE IS PREPARED TO TAKE THE LEAD IN ASKING FOR A FORMAL MEETING OF THE COUNCIL. THOSE NON-ALIGNED MEMBERS SUCH AS BANGLADESH AND TUNISIA WHO FEEL MOST STRONGLY THAT SOMETHING SHOULD BE DONE WANT THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO USE HIS POWERS UNDER ARTICLE 99 OF THE CHARTER TO BRING THE MATTER TO THE COUNCIL'S ATTENTION. BUT WALDHEIM FEELS, APPARENTLY WITH SOME BITTERNESS, THAT HE IS ALREADY IN AN EXPOSED POSITION AND HE TOLD ME TODAY THAT HE WAS NOT PREPARED TO STICK HIS NECK OUT FURTHER. ALL HE HAS DONE TODAY IS TO FORWARD TO BANI SADR AND SADDAM HUSSEIN THE TEXT OF LAST NIGHT'S STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL, THOUGH HE HOPES TO SPEAK TO BANI SADR BY TELEPHONE LATE TONIGHT.

3. THIS IS A SORRY SITUATION, WHICH CONFIRMS YET AGAIN THAT THE COUNCIL FINDS GREAT DIFFICULTY IN ACTING EFFECTIVELY ON A CONFLICT BETWEEN TWO THIRD WORLD COUNTRIES. THE INHIBITIONS ARE OF COURSE PARTICULARLY STRONG WHEN BOTH COMBATANTS ARE MAJOR OIL PRODUCERS.

3. SINCE THE ABOVE WAS DRAFTED WE HAVE LEARNT THAT AN IRAQI ENVOY (ISMET KITTANI) IS DUE HERE OVERNIGHT AND WILL SEE THE PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL TOMORROW MORNING (25 SEPTEMBER)  
-C.F. BAGHDAD TELNO 428.

PARSONS

NNNN

**CONFIDENTIAL**

CONFIDENTIAL

FROM UKMIS NEWYORK 242146Z SEPT 80  
TO PRIORITY F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1346 OF 24 SEPTEMBER

INFO PRIORITY TEL AVIV BEIRUT DAMASCUS AMMAN CAIRO

INFO ROUTINE BAGHDAD WASHINGTON PARIS BONN JEDDA KUWAIT

INFO SAVING MUSCAT ABU DHABI QATAR BAHRAIN KHARTOUM TRIPOLI

TUNIS RABAT.

*Prime Minister**To see all**mb**MAD  
17/26/80*FOLLOWING FROM PRIVATE SECRETARY: SECRETARY OF STATE'S CONVERSATION  
WITH ISRAELI FOREIGN MINISTER: 24 SEPTEMBER IN NEW YORK.**IRAN/IRAQ**

1. SHAMIR USED THIS TO ILLUSTRATE HIS ARGUMENT THAT THE ARAB/ISRAEL PROBLEM WAS NOT THE CAUSE OF THE TROUBLED SITUATION IN THE AREA. LORD CARRINGTON SAID HIS INTERPRETATION WAS THAT THE IRAQIS HAD DECIDED THAT THE PRESENT TIME OF IRANIAN WEAKNESS WAS THE MOMENT TO PURSUE THEIR LONG STANDING DEMANDS. WHETHER THEY ALSO WANTED TO BRING DOWN KHOMEINI AND BANI SADR WAS A MATTER FOR SPECULATION. IF SO, THEY MIGHT NOT HAVE THOUGHT THROUGH THE CONSEQUENCES. A FRAGMENTED IRAN MIGHT NOT EVEN SUIT THE RUSSIANS; THEY WOULD PREFER TO TAKE OVER THE COUNTRY INTACT. SHAMIR EXPRESSED CONCERN ABOUT SADDAM HUSSAIN, WHOM HE SAW AS ASPIRING TO THE MANTLE OF NASSER.

ARAB/ISRAEL

2. SHAMIR SAW THE IRAN/IRAQ CRISIS AS IMPROVING THE PROSPECTS OF PROGRESS ON THIS, BECAUSE THE PROBLEM WOULD BE LESS IN THE LIME-LIGHT AND SADAT LESS OBLIGED TO LOOK OVER HIS SHOULDER AT THE REST OF THE ARABS, THE NON-ALIGNED, ETC. SHAMIR EXPLAINED HIS HOPES FOR THE CAMP DAVID PROCESS IN THE COMING MONTHS. NEGOTIATIONS WOULD BE RESUMED, PROBABLY IN OCTOBER. THERE WAS THE IDEA OF A SUMMIT AFTER THE AMERICAN ELECTIONS, AND TALK OF A SUMMIT USUALLY LED TO IT BEING HELD. THERE WERE SOME POSSIBILITIES OF REACHING A CERTAIN AGREEMENT ON AUTONOMY. AFTER THAT THE ATTITUDES OF THE LOCAL POPULATION WOULD BECOME CLEAR, AND ISRAEL HOPED THAT NEW ELEMENTS WOULD EMERGE WHEN, FOR THE FIRST TIME, THERE WAS THE CHANCE OF ELECTED PALESTINIAN REPRESENTATIVES PARTICIPATING IN NEGOTIATIONS ABOUT THE AREA.

3. SHAMIR ASKED WHAT THE NINE WOULD DO WHEN THE THORN MISSION WAS CONCLUDED. HE HOPED THERE WOULD NOT BE SOME NEW DECISION DAMAGING TO THE ISRAEL/EGYPT NEGOTIATIONS. LORD CARRINGTON HOPED THAT ANY DECISION BY THE NINE WOULD BENEFIT THE SITUATION AS A WHOLE.

4. ON JERUSALEM, SHAMIR RECALLED THAT THIS HAD BEEN DELIBERATELY SET ASIDE AT THE TIME OF CAMP DAVID ITSELF. IT WAS STILL USELESS TO THINK OF DISCUSSING IT.

5. LORD CARRINGTON SAW THE ARAB/ISRAEL PROBLEM AS INTER-CONNECTED WITH OTHERS. MANY ISLAMIC COUNTRIES WERE UNWILLING TO PUT THEIR EFFORTS BEHIND GETTING THE SOVIET UNION OUT OF AFGHANISTAN SO LONG AS THERE WAS NO PROGRESS ON ARAB/ISRAEL, WHICH TO THEM WAS MORE IMPORTANT.

CONFIDENTIAL

*16.*



6. SHAMIR SAID HE WAS AWARE OF THIS LINE OF THOUGHT, BUT THE ISRAELI VIEW WAS THAT PROBLEMS SHOULD BE SETTLED ONE BY ONE. THE ZONE OF STABILITY CREATED BY THE ISRAEL/EGYPT PEACE TREATY WOULD BE ENLARGED IF THERE WERE AN AUTONOMY AGREEMENT. AFTER THAT THERE WOULD BE THE CHANCE OF BRINGING IN JORDAN. LORD CARRINGTON THOUGHT IT UNLIKELY THAT AN AUTONOMY AGREEMENT WOULD BE RECOGNISED BY ANY ARAB COUNTRY. SHAMIR SAID THAT EGYPT, AND SADAT PERSONALLY, HAD AT ONE TIME BEEN BITTERLY HOSTILE TO ISRAEL. THEY HAD CHANGED, AND ONE DAY ALL ARABS MIGHT CHANGE.

7. LORD CARRINGTON SAID THAT ANYTHING WAS POSSIBLE ONE DAY, BUT MEANWHILE THE WORLD FACED A PERIOD OF VERY GREAT DANGER. THE ARAB STATES WERE BEING DRIVEN TOWARDS THE SOVIET UNION. SHAMIR DOUBTED IF THIS WAS HAPPENING, OR AT LEAST NOT BECAUSE OF THE ARAB/ISRAEL DISPUTE. HE SAW NO OTHER WAY FORWARD THAN CAMP DAVID, DIFFICULT AND SLOW THOUGH THIS MIGHT BE. HE CONCEDED THAT IT WAS NOT CERTAIN THAT THE PALESTINIANS WOULD WANT TO TAKE PART IN ELECTIONS: SO LONG AS THERE WAS NO AUTONOMY AGREEMENT, ISRAEL COULD NOT BEGIN TO IDENTIFY PALESTINIANS TO WORK WITH. BUT WITH AN AGREEMENT THEY COULD SEE WHERE THEIR INTERESTS LAY AND WOULD COME FORWARD.

8. LORD CARRINGTON SUPPOSED THAT THE REFERENCES TO THE PLO HAD BEEN THE CAUSE OF ISRAEL'S PARTICULAR OBJECTION TO THE VENICE DECLARATION BY THE NINE AND OF SHAMIR'S DISOBLIGING REMARKS ABOUT HIM PERSONALLY. DID ISRAEL REALLY BELIEVE THAT A SETTLEMENT IN THE MIDDLE EAST WAS POSSIBLE WITHOUT TAKING ACCOUNT OF THE PLO? SHAMIR REPLIED THAT PROGRESS WOULD BE IMPOSSIBLE WITH THE PLO. THEIR RAISON D'ETRE WAS REJECTION OF PEACE WITH ISRAEL. THEIR METHODS MIGHT BE THE SAME AS MUGABE'S, BUT THEIR AIM WAS DIFFERENT IN KIND. THEY WANTED A FREE ARAB PALESTINE AND THE ABOLITION OF THE JEWISH STATE. A RETURN TO THE 1967 FRONTIERS WAS ONLY THE FIRST STAGE FOR THEM. THEY HAD MADE THEIR BELIEFS CLEAR IN DAMASCUS IN MAY.

9. LORD CARRINGTON SAID THAT SUCH A POLICY WAS, OF COURSE, TOTALLY UNACCEPTABLE TO BRITAIN AND THE NINE. THE PLO MUST RECOGNISE ISRAEL, AND ABANDON THE COVENANT. BUT SO LONG AS ISRAEL HAD NOT EVEN ATTEMPTED TO TALK TO THE PLO, SHE COULD NOT PROVE THAT HER VIEW OF THE PLO WAS THE RIGHT ONE. IT WAS IMPOSSIBLE TO IMAGINE A LASTING SETTLEMENT WITHOUT BRINGING IN THE PLO. SHAMIR REPEATED THAT HIS VIEW WAS THE EXACT OPPOSITE, AND IT WAS SHARED BY HIS GOVERNMENT AND HIS PARTY.

#### LEBANON

10. SHAMIR SAID THAT AS A COUNTRY LEBANON DID NOT EXIST. THE GOVERNMENT WAS A FICTION AND ITS TERRITORY WAS OCCUPIED BY SYRIANS, THE PLO AND VARIOUS ARMED GROUPS. ISRAEL HAD NO TERRITORIAL CLAIMS OR AMBITIONS.

# CONFIDENTIAL

11. LORD CARRINGTON ASKED WHETHER ISRAEL WOULD CARRY OUT MORE STRIKES AGAINST LEBANON. SHAMIR SAID THAT THERE WOULD BE MORE STRIKES BUT THEY WOULD BE AGAINST THE PLO. GREAT TROUBLE WAS TAKEN NOT TO HARM CIVILIANS. THE STRIKES WERE NECESSARY IN ORDER TO PREVENT THE PLO RAIDING ISRAELI VILLAGES. IT WAS BETTER TO HANDLE MATTERS IN THIS WAY THAN WAIT FOR A SPECTACULAR PLO ATTACK, TO WHICH ISRAEL WOULD BE BOUND TO RETALIATE.

FCO PSE PASS SAVING TO MUSCAT ABU DHABI QATAR BAHRAIN KHARTOUM  
TRIPOLI TUNIS RABAT

PARSONS

Repetition to BEIRUT  
referred for departmental decision,  
repeated as requested to other posts.

THIS TELEGRAM  
WAS NOT  
ADVANCED

MIDDLE EAST STANDARD

NENAD	MAED
MED	ES & SD
NAD	ERD
UND	ECON D
EESD	CONS D
ECD	CONS EM UNIT
WED	CABINET OFFICE

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION  
ARAB/ISRAEL DISPUTE

3

# CONFIDENTIAL



GR 200

*Prime Minister*

*MAF 26/IX*

UNCLASSIFIED

FM UKMIS NEW YORK 240600Z SEP 80

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1342 OF 24 SEPTEMBER 1980

INFO PRIORITY BAGHDAD, WASHINGTON, PARIS, MOSCOW, BONN, KUWAIT, JEDDA, ABU DHABI, AMMAN DAMASCUS.

INFO SAVING ROME, LUXEMBOURG, THE HAGUE, BRUSSELS, COPENHAGEN, UKREP BRUSSELS, DUBLIN, ATHENS, MADRID, LISBON.

**IRAQ/IRAN**

THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT WAS ISSUED BY THE FOREIGN MINISTERS OF THE NINE MEETING IN NEW YORK LATE ON 23 SEPTEMBER:-

BEGINS

1. THE NINE STATES OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY EXPRESS THEIR DEEP CONCERN AT THE MILITARY CONFRONTATION BETWEEN IRAQ AND IRAN.

2. THEY NOTE THE BILATERAL NATURE OF THE PRESENT CONFLICT AND STRESS THE NEED TO AVOID ANYTHING WHICH MIGHT GIVE IT A BROADER DIMENSION. IN THIS CONNECTIONS, THEY LOOK TO OTHER STATES, PARTICULARLY THE GREAT POWERS, TO MAINTAIN THE RESTRAINT WHICH THEY HAVE SHOWN.

3. THEY SUPPORT THE APPEAL OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE ISLAMIC CONFERENCE FOR AN IMMEDIATE CEASEFIRE AND, IN CONNECTION WITH THE CONSULTATIONS PUT IN HAND BY MR WALDHEIM, SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS, DECLARE THEMSELVES READY TO SUPPORT ANY INTERNATIONAL INITIATIVE LIKELY TO PROMOTE A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT OF THE DISPUTE.

4. THEY RECALL THE CAPITAL IMPORTANCE FOR THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY OF FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION IN THE GULF, WHICH IT IS IMPERATIVE NOT TO INFRINGE.

5. THEY DECIDE TO CONTINUE TO FOLLOW CLOSELY DEVELOPMENTS IN THE SITUATION AND THEY HOLD THEMSELVES READY TO SUPPORT THE SEARCH FOR A SOLUTION.

ENDS

F C O PLEASE PASS SAVING TO ROME, LUXEMBOURG, THE HAGUE, BRUSSELS, COPENHAGEN, UKREP BRUSSELS, DUBLIN, ATHENS, MADRID, LISBON.

PARSONS

REPEATED AS REQUESTED

**IRAN/IRAQ**

STANDARD

MED

NENAD

NAD

UND

EESD

ECD

WED

MAED

ES&SD

ERD

ECON D

CONS D

CONS EM UNIT

CABINET OFFICE

COPIES SENT TO  
No. 10 DOWNING STREET

GR 800

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FM UKMIS NEW YORK 240515Z SEP 80

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1341 OF 24 SEPTEMBER 1980

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, MOSCOW, PARIS, BONN, BAGHDAD.

INFO PRIORITY ISLAMABAD, NEW DELHI, MADRID, UKDEL NATO.

FOLLOWING FROM PRIVATE SECRETARY

SECRETARY OF STATE'S TALK WITH GROMYKO, 23 SEPTEMBER.

#### IRAQ/IRAN

1. LORD CARRINGTON SOUNDED OUT GROMYKO'S ATTITUDE TO THE POSSIBILITY OF MINISTERIAL PARTICIPATION IN SECURITY COUNCIL CONSULTATIONS, AND TO A SECURITY COUNCIL CALL FOR A CEASE-FIRE. GROMYKO WAS RELUCTANT ON BOTH COUNTS. THE SITUATION WAS UNCLEAR, AND THERE WAS A LACK OF INFORMATION. EVERYONE MIGHT BE WISER TOMORROW. HE WAS NOT SURE THAT A SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING WOULD BE WISE EVEN THEN. MOREOVER, FIGHTING MIGHT HAVE STOPPED BY THEN. SADDAM HUSSAIN HAD SAID THAT IRAQ HAD NO TERRITORIAL CLAIMS AGAINST IRAN; IT WAS STRANGE THAT THE FIGHTING SHOULD CONTINUE IN SUCH CIRCUMSTANCES. HE SUSPECTED THAT THE 1975 AGREEMENT ON SHATT AL ARAB HAD BEEN TOO HASTILY CONCLUDED, AND WAS NOT A RELIABLE AGREEMENT.

2. GROMYKO'S GENERAL ATTITUDE ON THIS SUBJECT WAS EVASIVE AND NON-COMMITTAL, THOUGH THE SECRETARY OF STATE ALSO THOUGHT THERE MIGHT BE AN ELEMENT OF GENUINE UNCERTAINTY IN HIS MIND ABOUT WHAT WAS GOING ON ON THE GROUND, AND ABOUT HOW THE RUSSIANS SHOULD RESPOND.

#### AFGHANISTAN

3. LORD CARRINGTON SAID THAT HE DID NOT PROPOSE GOING OVER THE GROUND ON AFGHANISTAN ONCE AGAIN, HAVING HEARD GROMYKO'S SPEECH. BUT HE WAS AFRAID THAT THE WHOLE SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EASTERN AREA WAS BECOMING DANGEROUS. GROMYKO RE-STATED THE SOVIET POSITION ON AFGHANISTAN IN CRISP TERMS. THERE HAD BEEN NO RESPONSE TO PAST PROPOSALS. THERE COULD BE NO POLITICAL SOLUTION WITHOUT AGREEMENTS BETWEEN AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN AND IRAN. EVEN WITHOUT A SOLUTION AFGHANISTAN WOULD CONTINUE TO DEVELOP AS AN INDEPENDENT STATE, AND ENCROACHMENTS FROM OUTSIDE WOULD CONTINUE TO BE REPULSED. SOVIET TROOPS WOULD REMAIN IN AFGHANISTAN EVEN THOUGH THERE WAS NO REAL FORCE FOR THEM TO MATCH THEIR STRENGTH AGAINST. THESE TROOPS WERE A STABILISING FACTOR, WHO WOULD LEAVE ONLY WHEN THERE WAS A COMPLETE END TO OUTSIDE INTERFERENCE.

CONFIDENTIAL

4.



4. LORD CARRINGTON SAID THAT AGA SHAHI WAS DISAPPOINTED AT THE SOVIET REJECTION OF HIS SUGGESTION FOR A CONFERENCE, EVEN THOUGH SOME PEOPLE THOUGHT THAT A CONFERENCE MIGHT BE BENEFICIAL TO PEOPLE THEY WERE NOT ANXIOUS TO RECOGNISE. GROMYKO SAID THAT THERE WAS NOTHING FOR A CONFERENCE TO DO, LEAST OF ALL DISCUSS A POSSIBLE CHANGE OF REGIME. WHAT WAS NEEDED WAS AN END TO INTERFERENCE. AFGHANISTAN WAS ALREADY NON-ALIGNED. IN THE PAST BRITAIN HAD PLAYED A ROLE IN THE SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES IN VARIOUS PARTS OF THE WORLD, BUT SHE WAS NOW FOLLOWING IN THE FOOTSTEPS OF THOSE WHO SENT ARMS TO AFGHANISTAN, INSTEAD OF APPEALING FOR REALISM. THE AFGHANS HAD NO TERRITORIAL CLAIMS, BUT NOBODY WOULD TALK TO THEM ABOUT THE NEED TO LIVE IN PEACE AND FRIENDSHIP. IF THE PAKISTANIS HAD TERRITORIAL CLAIMS AGAINST AFGHANISTAN, THEY MUST BE WRONG IN THE HEAD.

5. LORD CARRINGTON SAID THAT WE DID NOT WISH TO SEE A GOVERNMENT HOSTILE TO THE SOVIET UNION IN AFGHANISTAN. NOR DID WE WISH FOR DISTURBANCES ON SOVIET BORDERS. THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE SOVIET AND BRITISH VIEW WAS NOT ALL THAT GREAT: WE WISHED FOR A NEUTRAL NON-ALIGNED GOVERNMENT WITHOUT OUTSIDE INTERFERENCE, WHICH INCLUDED HELP GIVEN TO THE RESISTANCE IN AFGHANISTAN, FROM WHEREVER IT CAME, AND SOVIET FORCES. GROMYKO MUST UNDERSTAND THAT THE PRESENCE OF LARGE NUMBERS OF SOVIET TROOPS FRIGHTENED THE PAKISTANIS AND IRANIANS. LAST TIME THEY HAD MET LORD CARRINGTON HAD BEEN GLAD TO HEAR GROMYKO'S ASSURANCES THAT THE SOVIET UNION HAD NO DESIGNS ON OIL IN THE GULF, AND WOULD LIKE TO HEAR CONFIRMATION OF THIS. GROMYKO SAID THAT HE WAS READY TO REPEAT THESE ASSURANCES A HUNDRED TIMES. THE SECRETARY OF STATE WAS TILTING AT WINDMILLS: HE COULD NOT POSSIBLY BELIEVE THAT SOVIET FORCES WOULD REMAIN IN AFGHANISTAN AFTER AGREEMENTS HAD BEEN REACHED WITH IRAN AND PAKISTAN. EITHER WE WERE UNDER A MISAPPREHENSION OR WE WERE MERELY FOLLOWING OUR AMERICAN ALLIES, WHICH WAS WORSE. OBSOLETE CONCEPTS ABOUT SOVIET POLICIES CLEARLY PREVAILED IN LONDON. HOW WAS IT POSSIBLE TO THINK THAT THE RUSSIANS MIGHT AFTER ALL GO FOR THE OIL AND THE PERSIAN GULF, DESPITE THEIR ASSURANCES TO THE CONTRARY?

6. LORD CARRINGTON HOPED THAT THE RUSSIANS COULD UNDERSTAND THAT GENUINE DIFFERENCES OF OPINION SOMETIMES AROSE, AND REFERRED TO GROMYKO'S DISMISSIVE ATTITUDE TO THE POSSIBILITY OF A RHODESIAN SETTLEMENT WHEN THEY HAD MET IN NEW YORK LAST YEAR. THERE WERE A MILLION AFGHAN REFUGEES IN AFGHANISTAN, AND THE BORDER WAS DIFFICULT TO POLICE. WHAT WAS NEEDED WAS RECIPROCITY, AND THERE WAS NOT SUFFICIENT TRUST. THE ESSENTIAL PROBLEM WAS ONE OF TIMING. IT SHOULD NOT BE BEYOND THE WIT OF MAN TO OVERCOME THIS.

**CONFIDENTIAL** 2

/7.

# CONFIDENTIAL

7. FINALLY LORD CARRINGTON ASKED GROMYKO TO STOP JAMMING THE BBC. GROMYKO TRIED TO TURN THIS ASIDE WITH A LABOURED JOKE. THE SECRETARY OF STATE PERSISTED, POINTING OUT THAT JAMMING WAS IN RECONCILABLE WITH THE HELSINKI AGREEMENTS. GROMYKO ARGUED THAT THE FINAL ACT AT HELSINKI DID NOT PERMIT INTERFERENCE IN INTERNAL AFFAIRS. HE HOPED THAT EVERYONE WOULD KEEP THEIR COOL IN MADRID. THE SOVIET UNION DID NOT WANT DEMAGOGY OR PROPAGANDA, AND WOULD REBUFF ANYONE WHO TOOK THIS ATTITUDE. LORD CARRINGTON SAID THAT A REVIEW OF IMPLEMENTATION OF THE FINAL ACT IN MADRID WOULD BE ESSENTIAL. IT WAS NOT A GOOD BASIS FOR UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN STATES TO IGNORE THINGS THAT HAD HAPPENED, AND TO PAPER OVER CRACKS.

PARSONS

IRAN/IRAQ  
STANDARD  
MED  
SAD  
NENAD  
NAD  
UND  
EESD  
ECD  
WED  
MAED

ES&SD  
ERD  
ECON D

CABINET OFFICE

COPIES SENT TO  
No. 10 DOWNING STREET

3

# CONFIDENTIAL



IRAN/IRAQ

IMMEDIATE

ADVANCE COPIES

22

PS  
PS/SIR I GILMOUR  
PS/MR HURD  
PS/FUS  
SIR E YOUDE  
SIR J GRAHAM  
MR J C MOBERLY  
MR BRAITHWAITE  
HD/MED  
HD/NENAD  
HD/UND  
HD/CONS D  
CONSULAR EMERGENCY UNIT  
HD/ES & SD  
HD/MAED  
HD/DEF D  
FUSD (2)  
NEWS D  
RESIDENT CLERK

NO 10 DOWNING STREET  
CABINET OFFICE DIO

*Prime Minister*

*MAF-26/1x*

UNCLASSIFIED

FM HAVANA 241440Z SEPT 83

TO IMMEDIATE FCO  
TELEGRAM NO 367 OF 24 SEPTEMBER  
AND PRIORITY INFO TO BAGHDAD  
AND INFO SAVING TO UKMIS NEW YORK, WASHINGTON AND MOSCOW.

CUBA/MIDDLE EAST

- 1.. FOREIGN MINISTER MALMIERCA DEPARTED ON 23 SEPTEMBER FOR ~~IRAQ~~<sup>ACP</sup> AND IRAN WITH MESSAGES FOR BOTH HEADS OF STATE FROM CASTRO AS PRESIDENT OF NON ALIGNED MOVEMENT.
- 2.. OFFICIAL NEWSPAPER PROMINENTLY REPORTS THAT CASTRO GAVE MALMIERCA LAST MINUTE INSTRUCTIONS AT AIRPORT, AND THAT THE CUBAN MOVE IS DESIGNED TO STOP THE FIGHTING BETWEEN TWO NON ALIGNED COUNTRIES.
- 3.. FCO PLEASE PASS ALL SAVING ADDRESSEES.

CCN..... PARA 1 LNE 2.....IRAQ AND IRAN ETC

URE



LVO NR 244/24  
FDW G 080/24

52  
CRYPTIC

OO BELGRADE

GRS 1100

SECRET

FM FCO 241630Z SEP 80  
TO IMMEDIATE BELGRADE  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 201 OF 24 SEPT  
FOLLOWING TLEGRAM NOW REPEATED TO YOU AT REQUEST OF PRIVATE OFFICE  
WAS RECEIVED FROM KUWAIT TELEGRAM NO 409 OF 24 SEPT.

SECRET

AND TO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK  
AND TO PRIORITY BAGHDAD AND JIC LONDON,  
INFO MUSCAT, DOHA, BAHRAIN, JEDDA, ABU DHABI, WASHINGTON AND MOSCOW.

YOUR TEL 194 OF 23 SEPT TO ABU DHABI

IRAN/IRAQ

HAVING EXPLAINED TO THE MFA THAT I HAD BEEN ASKED FOR THE VIEWS  
OF SHAIKH SABAH AL AHMAD IN ORDER TO REPORT THEM TO THE SECRETARY  
OF STATE I WAS GIVEN AN EARLY APPOINTMENT WITH THE MINISTER OF  
FOREIGN AFFAIRS AT 1100 HOURS. I WAS ACCOMPANIED BY HEAD OF CHANCERY.

2. THE MINISTER OPENED THE CONVERSATION BY SAYING HE WOULD SPEAK  
FRANKLY FOR HIS FRIEND LORD CARRINGTON. 184/10

3. HE SAID THAT THE KUWAIT GOVT'S INFORMATION ABOUT THE ACTUAL  
HOSTILITIES BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES WERE SEVERELY LIMITED AND HE  
RELIED MAINLY ON NEWSPAPER AND RADIO REPORTS. IT OCCURS TO ME THAT  
HIS OFFICE WOULD WELCOME THE OCCASIONAL REPORT FROM US ON THE LINES  
OF EDITED JICTELS AND I WOULD BE GRATEFUL IF THIS COULD BE  
CONSIDERED.

4. SHAIKH SABAH SAID THAT NATURALLY KUWAIT AS THE SMALL AND  
NEAREST NEIGHBOUR TO BOTH STATES WAS VERY CONCERNED ABOUT THE  
FIGHTING AND WOULD LIKE TO SEE IT ENDED. THIS WAS TRUE FOR THE  
OTHER GULF STATES AND THEY WOULD WELCOME MEDIATION, BUT THERE WAS  
NO QUESTION OF ARAB COUNTRIES BECOMING MEDIATORS BECAUSE IT WAS  
OBVIOUS THEY MUST SIDE WITH THEIR ARAB BROTHER, IRAQ. HOWEVER,  
IRAN WAS A GULF STATE AS WAS IRAQ AND THE OTHER COUNTRIES. THEY  
DID NOT WANT TO BECOME ENEMIES OF IRAN AND FOR THIS REASON KUWAIT  
WOULD NOT GIVE UNNECESSARY PUBLICITY TO ITS ACTIONS IN SUPPORT OF  
IRAQ. HE DID NOT THINK THE HOSTILITIES WERE ENTIRELY OUT OF CONTROL.  
BOTH SIDES WERE AWARE OF THE LIMITS TO THEIR MILITARY CAPACITY AND  
DID NOT HAVE ALL-OUT WAR IN MIND.

5. HE THOUGHT THAT MEDIATION WHICH COULD INVOLVE THE ARAB STATES  
COULD BEST COME UNDER THE UMBRELLA OF THE ISLAMIC LEAGUE AND  
HE SAID AN INITIATIVE OF THE SORT HAD BEEN TAKEN BY THE LEAGUE  
SECRETARY TO HAVE THE SUBJECT BROUGHT UP IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL.  
HE HAD BEEN DISAPPOINTED TO LEARN OF THE RUSSIAN AND GERMAN  
ATTITUDE THAT BECAUSE THE PROPOSAL HAD NOT BEEN INITIATED BY  
EITHER IRAN OR IRAQ THERE WAS NO NEED TO TREAT THE SUBJECT AS OFFICIAL.  
THINKING ALOUD HE WONDERED WHY THE SECRETARY GENERAL COULD NOT HAVE  
INITIATED THE SUBJECT.



6. THE LOCAL PRESS CARRIES REPORTS TODAY THAT THE IRANIAN AUTHORITIES HAVE WARNED THE GULF STATES NOT TO ALLOW IRAQ TO USE THEIR PORT AND AIRPORT FACILITIES AND HAD THREATENED "SEVERE RETALIATION" AGAINST ANY STATE WHICH DOES SO. I ASKED IF THIS WAS TRUE. THE MINISTER SAID THAT A MESSAGE HAD BEEN RECEIVED BUT IT HAD BEEN MORE A REQUEST THAT A THREAT. IN ANY CASE, KUWAIT DID NOT HEED THREATS OF RETALIATION. KUWAIT HAD CERTAIN CONTRACTS CONCERNING PORT FACILITIES WITH IRAQ. THESE HAD TO BE CARRIED OUT. IF ANY THREATS RESULTED FROM THIS HIS GOVERNMENT WOULD ASK IF IT WAS INTENDED TO MAKE WAS AGAINST KUWAIT. THE MINISTER MADE NO MENTION OF THE REPORT CONTAINED IN OUR TELNO 405 OF 23 SEPTEMBER (NOT TO ALL) THAT IRAN HAD BEEN REFUSED AND IRAQ HAD BEEN GRANTED FACILITIES FOR FIGHTER AIR SPACE AND REFUELLING. THE OIC BRITISH MILITARY LIAISON TEAM WHO WAS THE ORIGINAL SOURCE NOW TELLS ME THIS HAS BEEN RESCINDED.

7. SPEAKING ABOUT HORMUS, THE MINISTER ASKED HOW THE IRANIANS COULD CLOSE THE STRAITS. I TOLD HIM HOW AND HE THEN REFERRED TO THE PRESENCE OF AMERICAN NAVAL VESSELS OUTSIDE THE GULF AND SEEMED TO IMPLY THAT THIS WOULD DETER ANY SUCH ACTION BY THE IRANIANS WHO HE THOUGHT HAD NO INTENTION OF PREVENTING THE OIL OF THE ARAB STATES PASSING THROUGH THE GULF. THIS LAST OPINION IS SUPPORTED BY LOCAL REPORTS THAT THE IRANIANS HAVE ONLY MADE THREATS AGAINST SHIPPING IN THE GULF WHICH IS CARRYING SUPPLIES FOR IRAQ. THE MINISTER MADE IT CLEAR THIS WAS THE SORT OF THREAT WHICH KUWAIT WOULD NOT NEED.

8. I ASKED IF HE THOUGHT THAT EITHER IRAQ OR IRAN WERE READY FOR COMPROMISE. THE MINISTER SAID THERE WAS NO INDICATION OF THIS.

9. WE THEN TURNED TO THE RUSSIAN AMBITIONS AND I DREW ON PARA 7 OF JICTEL 845. HE DISCOUNTED ANY IDEA THAT THE RUSSIANS WOULD WANT TO INTERVENE DIRECTLY. WHY SHOULD THEY? ALL THEY WISHED FOR WAS HAPPENING IN IRAN WHILE THEY WAITED ACROSS THE FRONTIER. IF INTERNAL ADMINISTRATION DETERIORATED IN THE COUNTRY IT WOULD HELP THE TUDEH TO POWER. KHOMEINI HAD KILLED OFF ALL THE TOP AND CAPABLE PEOPLE IN THE ARMED FORCES.

10. THIS AND THE MENTION OF THE AMERICAN NAVAL FORCES BROUGHT THE MINISTER TO ONE OF HIS FAVOURITE THEMES, NAMELY, THAT THE TWO GREAT POWERS WERE DIRECTORS OF A FILM IN WHICH ALL THE COUNTRIES OF THE GULF REGION WERE PLAYERS. ON THE MINISTER'S ANALOGY I THINK HE MEANS PUPPETS ACTIVATED BY TWO PUPPET MASTERS. WE THEN GOT ON TO THE SUBJECT OF THE THREAT TO KUWAIT AS NEAREST NEIGHBOUR TO THE TWO BIG LOCAL POWERS AT WAR. I ASKED HOW KUWAIT COULD PRESERVE ITS INDEPENDENCE AND INTEGRITY IF EITHER SHOULD VIOLATE ITS SOVEREIGNTY. THE MINISTER SAID THERE WAS NOTHING KUWAIT COULD DO BUT HOPE THAT IT WOULD NOT HAPPEN. THIS WAS WHY THE GIVT WANTED MEDIATION TO TAKE PLACE AND THE FIGHTING TO STOP. IT WAS ALSO WHY KUWAIT'S POLICY WOULD BE TO TRY AND APPEAR AS NEUTRAL AS POSSIBLE GIVEN THAT SHE WAS AN ARAB STATE LIKE IRAQ, AND IRAN WAS NOT.

11. OF COURSE, KUWAIT HAS MADE MILITARY DISPOSITIONS ON ITS FRONTIERS, GARRISONED ITS OFF-SHORE ISLANDS AND INCREASED AIR SURVEILLANCE. (MY TEL NO 405 NOT TO ALL). BUT THE MINISTER IS CORRECT IN THE IMPLICATION THAT THESE ARE COSMETIC MEASURES. KUWAIT COULD NOT BY ITSELF CONTAIN DETERMINED AGGRESSION BY EITHER IRAQ OR IRAN. THAT IS WHY ITS POLICY IS THAT OF TRYING TO BE ALL THINGS TO ALL MEN. AND THIS ACCURATELY REFLECTS MY SUMMING UP OF KUWAIT'S SITUATION AND POLICY AT THE PRESENT TIME.

12. IN CONCLUSION I THANKED THE MINISTER FOR THE FULL SUPPORT WE HAD RECEIVED FROM HIS MINISTRY IN CLEARING THE C.250 BRITISH REFUGEES FROM IRAQ THROUGH BORDER FORMALITIES YESTERDAY (23 SEPT), ALTHOUGH IN FACT THE SPIRIT OF THEIR INSTRUCTIONS WAS NOT APPARENT AT THE BORDER WHERE IT MATTERED. I ASKED IF HE STILL INTENDED TO GO TO NEW YORK. HE SAID HE HOPED SO BUT WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO MAKE UP HIS MIND FOR AT LEAST 2 DAYS. IF HE DID SO, HE HOPED HE COULD MEET LORD CARRINGTON AND HE GAVE HIS SECRETARY INSTRUCTIONS TO LET ME HAVE DETAILS OF HIS DATES AND TIMINGS.



UNCLASSIFIED

FM WASHINGTON 242222Z SEP 80

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 4093 OF 24 SEPTEMBER

INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK

INFO ROUTINE PARIS, BONN, MOSCOW, ALGIERS AND BAGHDAD

M I P T

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF PRESIDENT CARTER'S STATEMENT ON IRAQ/IRAN FOLLOWING TODAY'S MEETING OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL=

BEGINS.

I MET THIS MORNING WITH MY PRINCIPLE ADVISORS TO REVIEW THE VERY DANGEROUS SITUATION CREATED BY THE CONFLICT BETWEEN IRAN AND IRAQ. ALTHOUGH THE UNITED STATES IS IN NO WAY INVOLVED IN THIS DISPUTE -- AND CHARGES TO THE CONTRARY ARE OBVIOUSLY AND PATENTLY FALSE -- IT IS IMPORTANT TO MAKE CLEAR OUR POSITION IN THIS MATTER.

THE FIGHTING BETWEEN IRAN AND IRAQ IS CAUSING NEEDLESS HARD-  
SHIP AND SUFFERING AMONG THE PEOPLE INVOLVED. IT REPRESENTS A  
DANGER TO THE PEACE AND STABILITY OF THE REGION. THERE SHOULD BE  
ABSOLUTELY NO INTERFERENCE BY ANY OTHER NATION IN THIS CONFLICT.

THE FIGHTING SHOULD BE PROMPTLY TERMINATED. ANY GRIEVANCES  
BETWEEN IRAN AND IRAQ SHOULD BE SETTLED AT THE NEGOTIATING TABLE  
AND NOT ON THE BATTLEFIELD.

WE STRONGLY SUPPORT INTERNATIONAL EFFORTS, BOTH THE STATEMENT  
MADE BY THE SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND ALSO BY  
THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL OF THE UNITED NATIONS TO  
BRING THIS FIGHTING TO A PROMPT END AND TO OBTAIN A NEGOTIATED  
SETTLEMENT.

SECRETARY MUSKIE, IN NEW YORK, HAS CONSULTED WITH A NUMBER OF  
FOREIGN MINISTERS IN THE LAST SEVERAL DAYS. AND HE'S CONTINUING  
THESE CONTACTS THIS AFTERNOON AND TONIGHT. I AM ALSO IN CONTACT  
WITH OTHER NATIONS THROUGH OUR EMBASSIES ABROAD AND DIRECTLY  
BETWEEN ME AND THE LEADERS OF SOME OF THOSE NATIONS. WE WILL  
CONTINUE TO WORK VIGOROUSLY WITH AS MANY NATIONS AS POSSIBLE AND  
ALSO WITH INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS WHO SEEK AS WE DO, A SPEEDY  
END TO THE CONFLICT.



I KNOW THAT THE CONFLICT HAS CAUSED CONSIDERABLE CONCERN THAT WORLD OIL SUPPLIES MIGHT BE SEVERELY REDUCED, THEREFORE DRIVING UP OIL PRICES AND ENDANGERING THE CONOMIC SECURITY OF THE CONSUMING NATIONS. THIS CONCERN IS NOT JUSTIFIED BY THE PRESENT SITUATION. IT IS TRUE THAT OIL COMPANIES AND SHIPMENTS DIRECTLY TO IRAN AND IRAQ HAVE BEEN INTERRUPTED OR SUSPENDED DURING THE OUTBREAK OF THE HOSTILITIES. BUT EVEN IF THIS SUSPENSION OF IRAN AND IRAQI SHIPMENTS SHOULD PERSIST FOR AN EXTENDED PERIOD OF TIME, THE CONSUMING NATIONS CAN COMPENSATE FOR THIS SHORTFALL.

OIL INVENTORIES IN THE WORLD'S MAJOR OIL-CONSUMING NATIONS ARE NOW AT AN ALL TIME HIGH. THE WORLD'S MARGIN OF OIL SUPPLY SECURITY IS MUCH GREATER TODAY, THAN IN THE WINTER OF 1978 AND '79, WHEN THE IRANIAN REVOLUTION REDUCED OIL SUPPLIES AT A TIME WHEN RESERVE OIL SUPPLIES WERE ERY LOW.

OUR GREATER SECURITY TODAY IS DUE IN PART TO ENERGY CONSERVATION AND ALSO TO THE SUBSTITUTION OF OTHER FUELS FOR OIL, BOTH IN THE UNITED STATES AND IN OTHER CONSUMING NATIONS.

THIS HAS FACILITATED THE BUILDING UP OF RESERVE STOCKS TO MUCH MORE SATISFACTORY LEVELS THAN DID OCCUR IN 1979. HENCE, THERE IS NO REASON FOR REPETITION OF THE SHORTAGES OR THE PRICE ESCALATION THAT RESULTED IN 1979. OF COURSE, A TOTAL SUSPENSION OF OIL EXPORTS FROM THE OTHER NATIONS WHO SHIP THROUGH THE PERSIAN GULF REGION WOULD CREATE A SDRIOUS THREAT TO THE WORLD'S OIL SUPPLIES AND CONSEQUENTLY A THREAT TO THE ECONOMIC HEALTH OF ALL NATIONS.

THEREFORE, IT'S IMPORTANT THAT I ADD MY OWN STRONG SUPPORT AND THAT OF MY NATION TO THE DECLARATION WHICH THE NINE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY NATIONS MADE YESTERDAY. FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION IN THE PERSIAN GULF IS OF PRIMARY IMPORTANCE TO THE WHOLE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY. IT IS IMPERATIVE THAT THERE BE NO INFRINGEMENT OF THAT FREEDOM OF PASSAGE OF SHIPS TO AND FROM THE PERSIAN GULF REGION.

LET ME REPEAT THAT WE HAVE NOT BEEN AND WE WILL NOT BECOME INVOLVED IN THE CONFLICT BETWEEN IRAN AND IRAQ.

ONE FINAL POINT, VERY IMPORTANT TO AMERICANS, IS IN OUR CONCERN FOR THE DANGEROUS SITUATION CREATED BY THIS CONFLICT WE HAVE NOT FORGOTTEN FOR ONE MOMENT THE AMERICAN HOSTAGES STILL HELD CAPTIVE IN IRAN. WE CONTINUE OUR WORK FOR THEIR PROMPT AND SAFE RELEASE AND WE CONTINUE TO HOLD THE GOVERNMENT OF IRAN RESPONSIBLE FOR THE SAFETY AND THE WELL-BEING OF THE AMERICAN HOSTAGES.

ENDS.

2. PLEASE PASS ADVANCE COPY TO D G B JONES, DEPT OF ENERGY.

HENDERSON

NNNN

11/30/75

IRAN/IRAQ

X-20

ADVANCE COPIES

22

PS  
PS/SIR I GILMOUR  
PS/MR HURD  
PS/PUS  
~~SIR P. VON~~  
~~SIR J. GILHAM~~  
MR J C MOBERLY  
MR BRAITHWAITE  
HD/MED  
HD/NEHAD  
HD/UND  
HD/CONS D  
CONSULAR EMERGENCY UNIT  
HD/ES & SD  
HD/MAED  
HD/DEF D  
FUSD (2)  
NEWS D  
RESIDENT CLERK

NO 10 DOWNING STREET  
CABINET OFFICE DIO

Prime Minister

IMMEDIATE

MA

ADVANCE COPY

GR280

CONFIDENTIAL

FM WASHINGTON 242243Z

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 4292 OF 24 SEPT 80.

INFO IMMEDIATE UK MIS NEW YORK

INFO ROUTINE BONN, MOSCOW, BAGHDAD, PARIS AND ALGIERS.

MY TELEGRAM NO 4280 (NOT TO ALL)

IRAQ/IRAN.

1. THERE WAS A MEETING OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL IN WASHINGTON THIS MORNING TO DISCUSS THE IRAQ/IRAN CONFLICT. IT WAS EVIDENTLY DECIDED THAT MUSKIE WOULD HANDLE THE IMMEDIATE FOLLOW-UP IN NEW YORK AND LITTLE INFORMATION IS YET AVAILABLE HERE. THE MAIN DECISIONS OF WHICH WE HAVE HEARD ARE:

(A) THAT THE PRESIDENT SHOULD MAKE A PUBLIC STATEMENT TO REAFFIRM U.S. NEUTRALITY AND NON-INVOLVEMENT AND TO TRY TO CALM THE WORLD OIL MARKET (TEXT IN M.I.F.T.),

(B) THAT MUSKIE WOULD CONCERT WITH OTHER GOVERNMENTS ON FURTHER



(B) THAT MUSKIE WOULD CONCERT WITH OTHER GOVERNMENTS ON FURTHER ACTION IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL TO TRY TO SECURE A CEASE-FIRE;

(C) THE U.S. WOULD CONSULT BRITAIN AND FRANCE, AS THE ONLY OTHER WESTERN POWERS WITH NAVAL FORCES IN THE AREA, ABOUT CONTINGENCY PLANNING FOR THE CLOSURE OF THE HORMUZ STRAITS.

2. THE STATE DEPARTMENT SAY THEY HAVE NOT SPOKEN TO THE RUSSIANS IN WASHINGTON ON THE LINES ENVISAGED YESTERDAY (PARA 3 OF MY TELEGRAM UNDER REFERENCE), BUT THAT IF MUSKIE HAS NOT YET TALKED TO GROMYKO IN NEW YORK HE WILL TAKE THE SUBJECT UP WITH HIM AT THE MEETING ALREADY ARRANGED FOR TOMORROW.

3. ACCORDING TO THE STATE DEPARTMENT ALGERIA IS EMERGING AS THE FAVOURED CANDIDATE FOR A MEDIATORY ROLE.

HENDERSON

NNNN

IRAN/IRAQ

ADVANCE COPIES

~~22~~ 21

PS  
PS/SIR I GILMOUR  
PS/MR HURD  
PS/PUS  
~~SIR J MOHR~~  
~~SIR J GRAHAM~~  
MR J C MOBERLY  
MR BRAITHWAITE  
HD/MED  
HD/NENAD  
HD/UND  
HD/CONS D  
CONSULAR EMERGENCY UNIT  
HD/ES & SD  
HD/MAED  
HD/DEF D  
PUSD (2)  
NEWS D  
RESIDENT CLERK

NO 10 DOWNING STREET  
CABINET OFFICE DIO

COPIES TO  
MR D.S.B. JONES D/ENERGY.

ADVANCE COPY

IMMEDIATE

UNCLASSIFIED

FM WASHINGTON 242222Z SEP 80

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 4093 OF 24 SEPTEMBER

INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK

INFO ROUTINE PARIS, BONN, MOSCOW, ALGIERS AND BAGHDAD

M I P T

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF PRESIDENT CARTER'S STATEMENT ON IRAQ/IRAN  
FOLLOWING TODAY'S MEETING OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL:

BEGINS.

I MET THIS MORNING WITH MY PRINCIPLE ADVISORS TO REVIEW THE  
VERY DANGEROUS SITUATION CREATED BY THE CONFLICT BETWEEN IRAN AND  
IRAQ. ALTHOUGH THE UNITED STATES IS IN NO WAY INVOLVED IN THIS  
DISPUTE -- AND CHARGES TO THE CONTRARY ARE OBVIOUSLY AND PATENTLY  
FALSE -- IT IS IMPORTANT TO MAKE CLEAR OUR POSITION IN THIS MATTER.

THE FIGHTING BETWEEN IRAN AND IRAQ IS CAUSING NEEDLESS HARD-  
SHIP AND SUFFERING AMONG THE PEOPLE INVOLVED. IT REPRESENTS A  
DANGER TO THE PEACE AND STABILITY OF THE REGION. THERE SHOULD BE  
ABSOLUTELY NO INTERFERENCE BY ANY OTHER NATION IN THIS CONFLICT.

THE FIGHTING SHOULD BE PROMPTLY TERMINATED. ANY GRIEVANCES



THE FIGHTING SHOULD BE PROMPTLY TERMINATED. ANY GRIEVANCES BETWEEN IRAN AND IRAQ SHOULD BE SETTLED AT THE NEGOTIATING TABLE AND NOT ON THE BATTLEFIELD.

WE STRONGLY SUPPORT INTERNATIONAL EFFORTS, BOTH THE STATEMENT MADE BY THE SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND ALSO BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL OF THE UNITED NATIONS TO BRING THIS FIGHTING TO A PROMPT END AND TO OBTAIN A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT.

SECRETARY MUSKIE, IN NEW YORK, HAS CONSULTED WITH A NUMBER OF FOREIGN MINISTERS IN THE LAST SEVERAL DAYS. AND HE'S CONTINUING THESE CONTACTS THIS AFTERNOON AND TONIGHT. I AM ALSO IN CONTACT WITH OTHER NATIONS THROUGH OUR EMBASSIES ABROAD AND DIRECTLY BETWEEN ME AND THE LEADERS OF SOME OF THOSE NATIONS. WE WILL CONTINUE TO WORK VIGOROUSLY WITH AS MANY NATIONS AS POSSIBLE AND ALSO WITH INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS WHO SEEK AS WE DO, A SPEEDY END TO THE CONFLICT.

I KNOW THAT THE CONFLICT HAS CAUSED CONSIDERABLE CONCERN THAT WORLD OIL SUPPLIES MIGHT BE SEVERELY REDUCED, THEREFORE DRIVING UP OIL PRICES AND ENDANGERING THE ECONOMIC SECURITY OF THE CONSUMING NATIONS. THIS CONCERN IS NOT JUSTIFIED BY THE PRESENT SITUATION. IT IS TRUE THAT OIL COMPANIES AND SHIPMENTS DIRECTLY TO IRAN AND IRAQ HAVE BEEN INTERRUPTED OR SUSPENDED DURING THE OUTBREAK OF THE HOSTILITIES. BUT EVEN IF THIS SUSPENSION OF IRAN AND IRAQI SHIPMENTS SHOULD PERSIST FOR AN EXTENDED PERIOD OF TIME, THE CONSUMING NATIONS CAN COMPENSATE FOR THIS SHORTFALL.

OIL INVENTORIES IN THE WORLD'S MAJOR OIL-CONSUMING NATIONS ARE NOW AT AN ALL TIME HIGH. THE WORLD'S MARGIN OF OIL SUPPLY SECURITY IS MUCH GREATER TODAY, THAN IN THE WINTER OF 1978 AND '79, WHEN THE IRANIAN REVOLUTION REDUCED OIL SUPPLIES AT A TIME WHEN RESERVE OIL SUPPLIES WERE VERY LOW.

OUR GREATER SECURITY TODAY IS DUE IN PART TO ENERGY CONSERVATION AND ALSO TO THE SUBSTITUTION OF OTHER FUELS FOR OIL, BOTH IN THE UNITED STATES AND IN OTHER CONSUMING NATIONS.

THIS HAS FACILITATED THE BUILDING UP OF RESERVE STOCKS TO MUCH MORE SATISFACTORY LEVELS THAN DID OCCUR IN 1979. HENCE, THERE IS NO REASON FOR REPETITION OF THE SHORTAGES OR THE PRICE ESCALATION THAT RESULTED IN 1979. OF COURSE, A TOTAL SUSPENSION OF OIL EXPORTS FROM THE OTHER NATIONS WHO SHIP THROUGH THE PERSIAN GULF REGION WOULD CREATE A SERIOUS THREAT TO THE WORLD'S OIL SUPPLIES AND CONSEQUENTLY A THREAT TO THE ECONOMIC HEALTH OF ALL

... THESE ACTIONS WOULD CREATE A SERIOUS THREAT TO THE WORLD'S OIL  
SUPPLIES AND CONSEQUENTLY A THREAT TO THE ECONOMIC HEALTH OF ALL  
NATIONS.

THEREFORE, IT'S IMPORTANT THAT I ADD MY OWN STRONG SUPPORT  
AND THAT OF MY NATION TO THE DECLARATION WHICH THE NINE EUROPEAN  
COMMUNITY NATIONS MADE YESTERDAY. FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION IN THE  
PERSIAN GULF IS OF PRIMARY IMPORTANCE TO THE WHOLE INTERNATIONAL  
COMMUNITY. IT IS IMPERATIVE THAT THERE BE NO INFRINGEMENT OF THAT  
FREEDOM OF PASSAGE OF SHIPS TO AND FROM THE PERSIAN GULF REGION.

LET ME REPEAT THAT WE HAVE NOT BEEN AND WE WILL NOT BECOME  
INVOLVED IN THE CONFLICT BETWEEN IRAN AND IRAQ.

ONE FINAL POINT, VERY IMPORTANT TO AMERICANS, IS IN OUR  
CONCERN FOR THE DANGEROUS SITUATION CREATED BY THIS CONFLICT WE  
HAVE NOT FORGOTTEN FOR ONE MOMENT THE AMERICAN HOSTAGES STILL  
HELD CAPTIVE IN IRAN. WE CONTINUE OUR WORK FOR THEIR PROMPT AND  
SAFE RELEASE AND WE CONTINUE TO HOLD THE GOVERNMENT OF IRAN  
RESPONSIBLE FOR THE SAFETY AND THE WELL-BEING OF THE AMERICAN  
HOSTAGES.

ENDS.

2. PLEASE PASS ADVANCE COPY TO D G B JONES, DEPT OF ENERGY.

HENDERSON

NNNN



IRAN/IRAQ

ADVANCE COPIES

22

IMMEDIATE

PS  
PS/SIR I GILMOUR  
PS/MR HURD  
PS/PUS  
SIR E YOUDE  
SIR J GRAHAM  
MR J C MOBERLY  
MR BRAITHWAITE  
HD/MED  
HD/NENAD  
HD/UND  
HD/CONS D  
CONSULAR EMERGENCY UNIT  
HD/ES & SD  
HD/MAED  
HD/DEF D  
FUSD (2)  
NEWS D  
RESIDENT CLERK

NO 10 DOWNING STREET  
CABINET OFFICE DIO

*Prime Minister*

*MA 26/ix*

*[Handwritten signature]*

GR 450  
UNCLASSIFIED  
FM BAGHDAD 241255Z SEP 80  
TO IMMEDIATE FCO  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 428 OF 24/9/80  
AND IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK  
INFO ROUTINE PARIS, BONN, WASHINGTON AND MOSCOW.

**IRAQ/IRAN**

1. DICKSON WAS CALLED TO THE FOREIGN MINISTRY THIS MORNING. CHARGE D'AFFAIRES OF CHINA AND BANGLADESH AMBASSADOR WERE ALSO PRESENT. IN THE ABSENCE OF THE FOREIGN MINISTER, WITH WHOM THE MEETING HAD BEEN ARRANGED, AND THE UNDER SECRETARY, AL QAIS, HEAD OF THE LEGAL DEPARTMENT, SAID THE GOVERNMENT OF IRAQ WISHED TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING POINTS RELATING TO THE CALL FOR A SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING TO CONSIDER EVENTS BETWEEN IRAQ AND IRAN

2. IRAQ ACCEPTED THAT THE SECRETARY GENERAL HAD THE POWER UNDER ARTICLE 99 TO CONVENE SUCH A MEETING. BUT IRAQ WISHED TO MAKE ITS POSITION CLEAR AND STRESSED THE FOLLOWING POINTS:

(1) AS ALREADY COMMUNICATED TO GOVERNMENTS THROUGH THEIR MISSIONS IN BAGHDAD, IRAQ HAD TERMINATED THE 1975 ALGIERS AGREEMENT ON 17 SEPTEMBER. THIS WAS DONE UNDER PARA 4 OF THE

AGREEMENT WAS CONSIDERED THE AGREEMENT INVALID

MISSIONS IN BAGHDAD, IRAQ HAD TERMINATED THE 1975 ALGIERS AGREEMENT ON 17 SEPTEMBER. THIS WAS DONE UNDER PARA 4 OF THE AGREEMENT BECAUSE IRAN ITSELF CONSIDERED THE AGREEMENT INVALID. THE DETAILED EVIDENCE OF THIS HAD BEEN SENT TO THE SECRETARY GENERAL IN A LETTER FROM THE FOREIGN MINISTER WITH A REQUEST THAT THE LETTER SHOULD BE CIRCULATED TO THE MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY.

(2) OVER THE PAST THREE YEARS IRAQ HAD EXHAUSTED ALL PEACEFUL MEANS AT ITS DISPOSAL TO GET IRAN TO HONOUR THE 1975 AGREEMENT. BECAUSE IRAN HAD NOT RESPONDED IRAQ HAD NO ALTERNATIVE BUT TO TAKE APPROPRIATE ACTION UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW. IRAQ HAD NO EXPANISIONIST TERRITORIAL DESIGNS AGAINST IRAN.

(3) IRAQ HAS CLEARLY STATED THAT IT IS NOT (NOT) INTERESTED IN ESCALATING THE CONFLICT. UNFORTUNATELY IRAN HAD DONE SO AND ITS INDISCRIMINATE ACTION AGAINST THE INTERESTS OF IRAQ, THE REGION AND THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY LEFT IRAQ WITH NO CHOICE BUT TO ACT IN SELF-DEFENCE.

(4) IRAQ HAS NOTHING TO HIDE AND IS FULLY PREPARED TO PRESENT ITS POINT OF VIEW BEFORE THE COUNCIL AS SPECIFICALLY STATED IN THE LETTER TO THE SECRETARY GENERAL. IRAQ HAS TOLD THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL THAT IT CONSIDERS IT WOULD BE HIGHLY IRREGULAR AND UNFORTUNATE IF THE COUNCIL WERE TO ARRIVE AT ANY CONCLUSIONS BEFORE IRAQ WERE GIVEN ITS RIGHTFUL HEARING.

2. AL QAIS IN ASKING US TO PUT THESE FOUR POINTS TO OUR GOVERNMENTS REPEATED POINT 4 WITH GREAT EMPHASIS.

EGERTON

NNNN



IRAN/IRAQ

ADVANCE COPIES

22

PS  
PS/SIR I GILMOUR  
PS/MR HURD  
PS/PUS  
SIR E YOUDE  
SIR J GRAHAM  
MR J C MOBERLY  
MR BRAITHWAITE  
HD/MED  
HD/NENAD  
HD/UND  
HD/CONS D  
CONSULAR EMERGENCY UNIT  
HD/ES & SD  
HD/MAED  
HD/DEF D  
PUSD (2)  
NEWS D  
RESIDENT CLERK

NO 10 DOWNING STREET  
CABINET OFFICE DIO

ADVANCE COPY

GR 950

RESTRICTED

FM BAGHDAD 240922Z SEP 80

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 427 OF 24/9/80

ND PRIORITY UKMIS NEW YORK

INFO PRIORITY AMMAN, DAMASCUS, KUWAIT, JEDDA, ANKARA, WASHINGTON,  
AND MOSCOW

IRAQ/IRAN SITREP: MY TEL NO 423.

1. BY THE EVENING OF 23 SEPTEMBER IRAQ CLAIMS TO HAVE SURROUNDED MOHAMMERAH (KHORRAMSHAHR), DESTROYED OIL INSTALLATIONS AT ABADAN, CAPTURED QASR-I-SHIRIN AND TO HAVE REACHED MEHRAN. FOLLOWING A NUMBER OF AIR ATTACKS ON BAGHDAD, BASRA AND OTHER IRAQI CITIES, DURING 23 SEPT, IRAQ CLAIMS TO HAVE SHOT DOWN SIXTY SEVEN IRANIAN AIRCRAFT AND HAS AGAIN ACCUSED THE IRANIANS OF HITTING CIVILIAN TARGETS.

2. THE GENERAL COMMAND OF THE IRAQI ARMED FORCES ISSUED EIGHT STATEMENTS DURING 23 SEPTEMBER NUMBERED 3 TO 10 IN THE CURRENT SERIES. SUMMARY AS FOLLOWS:

STATEMENT 3

IN RESPONSE TO IRAN'S CLOSING OF THE STRAITS OF HORMUS, AT  
0800 HOURS ON 23 SEPTEMBER IRAQI FORCES ADVANCED ON DESIGNATED

IN RESPONSE TO IRAN'S CLOSING OF THE STRAITS OF HORMUS, AT 0300 HOURS ON 23 SEPTEMBER IRAQI FORCES ADVANCED ON DESIGNATED TARGETS AND TOOK CONTROL OF VITAL POSITIONS INSIDE IRAN. THE POSITIONS WOULD BE RELINQUISHED ONLY IF IRAN RECOGNISED IRAQ'S SOVERIEGNTY OVER ITS NATIONAL TERRITORY.

STATEMENT 4.

ON THE MORNING OF 23 SEPTEMBER IRANIAN AIRCRAFT STRUCK AT SIX IRAQI AIR FIELDS AND BOMBED CIVILIAN AREAS IN BAGHDAD, NINEVEH, BASRA AND NASIRIYA, KILLING AND WOUNDING A NUMBER OF CIVILIANS INCLUDING WOMEN AND CHILDREN. THERE WERE 20 DEAD AND 50 WOUNDED AT THE PETRO-CHEMICAL COMPLEX (KHOR AL ZUBAIR) NEAR BASRA. IRAQI FIGHTERS AND GROUND DEFENCE FORCES ALLEGEDLY SHOT DOWN 7 IRANIAN AIRCRAFT ~~DOWN~~ IN MOSUL, 5 IN BASRA, 4 IN BAGHDAD, 2 IN HABBANIYA, 2 AT KUT, 2 AT NASIRIYA.

AT 0630 IRAQI AIRCRAFT RAIDED DEZFUL AND SHAHROKH AIR BASES AND AHWAZ MILITARY AIR FIELD. HEAVY LOSSES WERE INFLICTED. ONE IRAQI AIRCRAFT WAS LOST.

STATEMENT 5

IRAQI CASUALTIES DURING THE DAWN AIR ATTACKS WERE GIVEN AS :- BAGHDAD 18 DEAD, 42 WOUNDED IN 4 RESIDENTIAL AREAS. MOSUL, 24 WOUNDED; BASRA, 29 KILLED AND 50 WOUNDED.

STATEMENT 6.

STATEMENT 6 REPEATED IRAQ'S WARNING THAT IF IRAN CONTINUED TO ATTACK IRAQI CIVILIAN AND MILITARY TARGETS IRAQ WOULD RETALIATE IN KIND.

STATEMENT 7

THE IRAQI AIRFORCE ATTACKED IRANIAN MILITARY BASES AS FOLLOWS:-

0625 HOURS      HAMADAN

0630   ,,      DEZFUL

1055   ,,      BOSHHR

1115   ,,      TABRIZ



1115 ..

TABRIZ

3 IRAQI LOST AT 1145 HOURS, TWO PHANTOMS AND TWO OTHER AIRCRAFT WERE SHOT DOWN AT UMM QASR. AT 1330 HOURS FIVE IRANIAN AIRCRAFT ATTACKED KIRKUK AND ALL WERE SHOT DOWN. A FURTHER IRANIAN AIRCRAFT WAS SHOT DOWN.

STATEMENT 8

IRAQI FORCES IN CONTROL OF SUMAR AND QASR -I - SHIRIN HAVING ISOLATED MOHAMMERAH AND ABADAN, PUTTING IRANIAN FORCES TO FLIGHT.

STATEMENT 9

ON THE AFTERNOON OF 23 SEPTEMBER IRANIAN AIRCRAFT ATTACKED IRAQI CITIES AS FOLLOWS:-

- 1645 HOURS 3 RAIDS AT RASHID AIR BASE AND BAGHDAD INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT: 9 OUT OF 20 IRANIAN PHANTOMS SHOT DOWN.
- 1850 HOURS BAGHDAD CITY: 5 AIRCRAFT SHOT DOWN. BASRA AIRPORT AND VITAL INSTALLATIONS IN BASRA ATTACKED: 6 AIRCRAFT SHOT DOWN.
- 1530 HOURS OIL INSTALLATION IN FAO ATTACKED, 2 AIRCRAFT SHOT DOWN
- 1700 HOURS ATTACK AT AL NAJHIBIYA DISTRICT OF BASRA. ONE AIRCRAFT SHOT DOWN
- 1230 HOURS ATTACK AT KIRKUK AIR FIELD AND VITAL INSTALLATIONS 6 AIRCRAFT SHOT DOWN.
- 1700 HOURS ATTACK AT KIRKUK MILITARY INSTALLATIONS: ONE AIRCRAFT SHOT DOWN
- 1730 HOURS ATTACK AT KIRKUK MILITARY INSFLLATIONS: 3 AIRCRAFT SHOT DOWN.

2 MORE AIRCRAFT SHOT DOWN, ONE FOLLOWING AN ATTACK AT ERBIL AIR FIELD AND ONE IN DOKAN.

IRAQI AIRCRAFT ATTACKED AND DESTROYED OIL INSTALLATIONS IN ABADAN AND 5 IRANIAN SHICL

FIELD AND ONE IN DOKAN.

IRAQI AIRCRAFT ATTACKED AND DESTROYED OIL INSTALLATIONS IN ABADAN AND 5 IRANIAN SHICI.

STATEMENT 10

POSITIONS REACHED BY IRAQI AIRFORCES IN IRAN ON 23 SEPTEMBER:

NORTHERN SECTOR IRAQI FORCES IN CONTROL OF SUMAR, SARBIL, THAHAB AND QASWWAUB-SHIRIN.

CENTRAL SECTOR IRAQI FORCES REACHED MEHRAN

SOUTHERN SECTOR IRAQI FORCES SURROUNDING MOHAMMERAH AND THE

ROAD FROM MOHAMMERAH TO AHWAZ CUT. IRAQI FORCES HAVE PENETRATED 15 KMS.

IRAQI LOSSES GIVEN PROVISIONALLY AS 4 AIRCRAFT LOST, ONE OFFICER AND 4 OTHER RANKS KILLED AND 11 WOUNDED.

3. IRAQ RADIO ANNOUNCED THIS MORNING (24 SEPTEMBER) THAT IRANIAN AIRCRAFT ATTACKED BASRA EARLY TODAY AND HIT THE OIL REFINERY AND THE DEEP WATER PORT. A BUSINESSMAN IN BASRA WHO TELEPHONED US AT 1030 HOURS SPOKE OF TWO AIR RAIDS AND A LARGE FIRE AT THE REFINERY, WITH A THICK PALL OF SMOKE COVERING PART OF THE CITY. IRAQI RADIO ALSO REPORTS AN ATTACK ON MILITARY INSTALLATIONS AT ERBIL. IRAQI AIRCRAFT HAVE ATTACKED IRANIAN BASES INCLUDING TABRIZ, AHWAS, KERMANSHAH AND SANADAJ, WITH FOUR PHANTOMS SAID TO HAVE BEEN DESTROYED ON THE GROUND. THERE ARE NO (NO) FURTHER REPORTS OF THE FIGHTING ROUND KORRAMSHAHR.

4. THE FIGURE OF SIXTY-SEVEN IRANIAN AIRCRAFT SHOT DOWN IS ALMOST CERTAINLY AN EXAGGERATION, ALTHOUGH WE HAVE A NUMBER OF EYE WITNESS ACCOUNTS. I MYSELF SAW SIX IRANIAN JETS SHOT DOWN, FOUR BY SAM MISSILES (PROBABLY SAM 7S), AND TWO BY ORDINARY ANTI AIRCRAFT FIRE. THIS MORNING'S RAIDS PROVE THAT IRANIAN LOSSES, HOWEVER SEVERE, HAVE NOT DISSUADED THEM FROM MOUNTING FRESH ATTACKS. THERE HAVE BEEN NO (NO) RAIDS ON BAGHDAD SINCE EARLY YESTERDAY EVENING.

5. THE ASSISTANT DA, WHO CALLED ON THE MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DEPARTMENT THIS MORNING, SAW TWO BUS LOADS OF BLINDFOLDED IRANIAN PRISONERS BEING DRIVEN IN. HE WAS TOLD THAT 128 MEN AND 4 OFFICERS HAD BEEN CAPTURED. THE WORD OF THE IRAQI OFFICERS



DEPARTMENT THIS MORNING, SAW TWO BUS LOADS OF BLINDFOLDED  
IRANIAN PRISONERS BEING DRIVEN IN. HE WAS TOLD THAT 128 MEN AND  
4 OFFICERS HAD BEEN CAPTURED. THE MOOD OF THE IRAQIS SEEMS BUOYANT,  
AT LEAST IN BAGHDAD, WHERE THOUSANDS WATCHED IRANIAN AIRCRAFT  
BEING BLOWN OUT OF THE SKY ON 23 SEPTEMBER WITH THE ENTHUSIASM  
OF A FOOTBALL CROWD.

EGERTON

NNNN

1312

RESTRICTED

GR 480

RESTRICTED

FM AMMAN 241145Z SEP 80

TO FLASH BAGHDAD

TELEGRAM NUMBER 033 OF 24 SEP

INFO IMMEDIATE FCO, PRIORITY DAMASCUS, JEDDA, KUWAIT, UKMIS  
NEWYORK AND WASHINGTON

BAGHDAD TELNO 31: DEPARTURE OF DEPENDANTS OF BRITISH BUSINESS  
COMMUNITY IN IRAQ.

1. WE HAVE BEEN IN TOUCH WITH THE PALACE AND THE JORDANIAN  
AUTHORITIES WHO HAVE PROMISED EVERY ASSISTANCE IN COPING WITH  
THE FIRST AND SUBSEQUENT PARTIES. AS SOON AS WE HEAR THAT THE  
FIRST GROUP HAVE LEFT BAGHDAD, MY CONSUL OLIVER MINTO WILL LEAVE  
FOR H4. HE WILL GO ON TO RUTBA IF IRAQI EMBASSY AGREE TO ISSUE  
A VISA (WE ARE STILL TRYING TO RESOLVE THIS PROBLEM). ON ORDERS  
FROM THE KING, THE JORDANIAN POLICE ARE OFFERING US EVERY HELP  
INCLUDING DOD AND FIRST AID AT H4 AND TO SEND TRANSPORT FROM H4  
TO RUTBA IF NECESSARY. WE SHALL HAVE RECEPTION PARTY READY AT  
THE EMBASSY TO LOOK AFTER THE GROUP WHEN THEY REACH AMMAN AND  
HAVE TENTATIVELY BOOKED SUFFICIENT HOTEL BEDROOMS TO COVER THEIR  
NEEDS FOR TONIGHT. THE BRITISH AIRWAYS REGULAR DIRECT FLIGHT TO  
LONDON LEAVES AMMAN ON THURSDAY AT 0940 BUT COULD BE DELAYED IF  
NECESSARY. THERE ARE 140 SEATS AVAILABLE ON IT AT THE MOMENT.  
BRITISH AIRWAYS REPRESENTATIVE IS ALSO ASKING HIS HEAD OFFICE  
WHETHER BA COULD PROVIDE ADDITIONAL CHARTER FLIGHTS TO FLY OUT  
SUBSEQUENT GROUPS.
2. THE MAJOR DIFFICULTY I FORESEE IS IF LARGE NUMBERS OF THE  
EVACUEES WISH TO STAY IN AMMAN RATHER THAN GOING ON TO BRITAIN  
AS HOTEL ACCOMMODATION IS UNLIKELY TO BE SUFFICIENT. THE  
SUBSEQUENT INFLUX ANTICIPATED IN YOUR PAR. 5, IT IS ESSENTIAL  
THAT WE SHOULD CONVINCING AS MANY AS POSSIBLE TO GO DIRECTLY TO  
BRITAIN, THUS VACATING SPACE IN HOTELS FOR SUBSEQUENT GROUPS.  
THERE WILL OF COURSE BE A GREAT DEAL OF COMPETITION FOR AVAILABLE  
ROOMS: I HAVE ALREADY HEARD FROM MY ITALIAN COLLEAGUE THAT A GROUP  
OF 100 ITALIANS IS LEAVING BAGHDAD TODAY FOR AMMAN AND NO DOUBT  
OTHER FOREIGN COMMUNITIES WILL FOLLOW. TO THE EXTENT POSSIBLE,  
MY EUROPEAN COLLEAGUES WHOM I SAW THIS MORNING SEE ADVANTAGE IN  
SENDING FUTURE CONVOYS ON A COMMUNITY BASIS, SO THAT WE CAN THEN  
POOL RESOURCES HERE TO COPE WITH THE INFLUX.
3. TO THE EXTENT POSSIBLE, ANY INFORMATION YOU CAN LET US HAVE  
IN ADVANCE CONCERNING CONVOYS, IE NAMES OF TRAVELLERS, WHETHER  
THEY HAVE FRIENDS OR COLLEAGUES IN AMMAN WHO MIGHT ACCOMMODATE THEM,  
HOW MANY CAN AGREE TO PROCEED TO LONDON BY FIRST AVAILABLE MEANS,  
THIS WOULD BE MOST HELPFUL IN SORTING THEM OUT WHEN THEY ARRIVE  
HERE.

RESTRICTED

/4.



RESTRICTED

4. FCO ONLY: TELEPHONE AND DWS WILL BE MANNED THROUGHOUT THE NIGHT AND WE ARE LIKELY TO HAVE MANY MESSAGES FOR RELATIVES OF PEOPLE WHO AGREE TO TRAVEL ON TO LONDON TOMORROW MORNING; NO DOUBT YOU WILL HAVE STAND-BY ARRANGEMENTS IN CONSULAR DEPARTMENT TO COPE WITH THIS.

5. UNTIL FIRST CONVOY IS SAFELY THROUGH, I THINK THE LESS SAID PUBLICLY ABOUT THE ARRANGEMENTS WE ARE MAKING THE BETTER. BUT THERE WOULD OF COURSE BE NO OBJECTION TO STATING THAT THE EMBASSY ARE MAKING PREPARATION TO RECEIVE EVACUEES WITH THE FULL COOPERATION AND HELP OF THE JORDANIAN AUTHORITIES.

URWICK

IRAN/IRAQ

STANDARD  
MED  
NENAD  
NAD  
UND  
EESD  
ECD  
WED  
MAED

COD  
ES&SD  
ERD  
ECON D  
CONS D  
CONS EM UNIT  
CABINET OFFICE

-2-

RESTRICTED

IRAN/IRAQ

ADVANCE COPY

ADVANCE COPIES

22

PS  
PS/SIR I GILMOUR  
PS/MR HURD  
PS/PUS  
SIR E YOUDE  
SIR J GRAHAM  
MR J C MOBERLY  
MR BRAITHEWAITE  
HD/MED  
HD/NENAD  
HD/UND  
HD/CONS D  
CONSULAR EMERGENCY UNIT  
HD/ES & SD  
HD/MAED  
HD/DEF D  
PUSD (2)  
NEWS D  
RESIDENT CLERK

NO 10 DOWNING STREET  
CABINET OFFICE DIO

GR 180

RESTRICTED

FM BAGHDAD 241443Z SEP 80

TO FLASH AMMAN

TELEGRAM NUMBER 32 OF 24/9/80

AND IMMEDIATE FCO AND UK MIS NEW YORK

INFO PRIORITY KUWAIT, JEDDA, DAMASCUS AND WASHINGTON.

MY TEL NO 31 TO AMMAN: BRITISH COMMUNITY DEPENDENTS.

1. BRITISH CLUB MANAGED TO CHARTER ONE DESERT BUS AND THIS LEFT BAGHDAD FOR RUTBA AT 1300Z, WITH 42 PERSONS ON BOARD (INCLUDING ONE BABY). TWELVE OTHER MOSTLY WOMEN AND CHILDREN LEFT IN TWO MINIBUSES SEPARATELY AT 1215Z.

2. BALANCE OF ORIGINAL ONE HUNDRED HAVE BEEN VACILLATING BUT NOW SAY THEY PLAN TO TRAVEL IN DESERT BUSES TOMORROW, 25 SEPTEMBER. OTHERS MAY THEN JOIN THEM. IN ANY CASE AMMAN SHOULD PLEASE NOT (NOT) DESPATCH FURTHER BUSES TO RECEIVE SECOND CONVOY UNTIL WE CAN JUDGE UPSHOT OF FIRST BATCH'S SUCCESS IN SERMOUNTING EXIT FORMALITIES AT RUTBA CONTROL POST, AND MILITARY POSTS BEFORE RUTBA.



3. POSITION WILL BE REVIEWED AT THIRD MEETING WITH BRITISH COMMUNITY LEADERS AT 0900Z 25 SEPTEMBER. EMBASSY AND COUNCIL STAFF WITH YOUNG CHILDREN CONTENT TO AWAIT OUTCOME OF FIRST BUS JOURNEY.

4. AMMAN TEL 33 JUST RECEIVED. ON HOTELS THE REDUCED NUMBER IN FIRST BATCH SHOULD HELP A LITTLE. THE TWELVE PERSONS IN THE SELTRUST MINIBUSES WISH TO TRAVEL TO THE UK AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. SO ALSO DO CAPT. WHITE AND B.A. TECHNICAL CREW WHO ARE ON THE MAIN BUS, PLUS TWO MILLROYS AND TWO RAYMENTS, TOTAL TWENTY-ONE.

EGERTON

NNNN

3

LVO 246  
FDW G 088/24

OO BELGRADE

GR 270

GYPHER

SECRET  
FM F.C.O. 241400Z SEP 80  
TO IMMEDIATE BELGRADE  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 198 OF 24 SEPTEMBER.

SECRET

FOR ALEXANDER

FOLLOWING TELEGRAM NOW REPEATED TO YOU AT REQUEST OF PRIVATE OFFICE WAS RECEIVED FROM ABU DHABI TELEGRAM NUMBER 297 OF 24 SEPTEMBER INFO IMMEDIATE DUBAI, MODUK, WASHINGTON AND BAGHDAD ROUTINE DOHA, BAHRAIN, KUWAIT, JEDDA AND MUSCAT INFO SAVING UKREP BRUSSELS, PARIS AND MOSCOW AND UKMIS NEW YORK.

YOUR TELEGRAM NO 194 OF 23 SEPTEMBER: IRAN/IRAQ.

1. I AGREE GENERALLY WITH JIC ASSESSMENT IN YOUR TELEGRAM NO 76 OF 23 SEPTEMBER TO DOHA. SUBJECT TO BAGHDAD'S VIEWS, HOWEVER, I FEAR THAT IRAQI AMBITIONS MAY GO A LITTLE FURTHER THAN INDICATED IN THE LAST SENTENCE. IN PARTICULAR, I WONDER WHETHER THE RULER OF RAS AL KHAIMAH MAY NOT HAVE ENTERED INTO SOME KIND OF DEAL WITH THE IRAQIS. MY AMERICAN COLLEAGUE HERE DRAWING ON INDEPENDENT SOURCES BELIVES THIS MAY BE THE CASE.

2. IN THE ABSENCE OF RASHID ABDULLAH I AM SEEING THE UNDER-SECRETARY IN THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AT 1000 LOCAL TIME TOMORROW. ON MY INSTRUCTIONS HM CONSUL GENERAL IN DUBAI IS SEEKING AN APPOINTMENT WITH MOHAMMED BIN RASHID OR RASHID HIMSELF, WHICHEVER IS THE QUICKER.

3. MY US COLLEAGUE HAS INSTRUCTIONS TO URGE THE UAE TO SUPPORT A CEASE-FIRE IN THE UNITED NATIONS AND AT THE ISLAMIC CONFERENCE. HE IS TO STRESS UNITED STATES CONCERN:

- (A) TO ENSURE OIL SUPPLIES;
- (B) TO PRESERVE THE TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF IRAN;
- (C) TO PREVENT SOVIET INTERVENTION.

SECRET

HE WISHED US TO KNOW OF THIS ACTION.

CARRINGTON

GYPHER

1714/24

NNNN



LVO 232/24

FD W G 068/24

OO BELGRADE

GRS 240

U KKK  
UNCLASSIFIED

FM FCO 241315Z SEP 80  
TO IMMEDIATE BELGRADE  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 193 OF 24 SEP  
FOLLOWING TELEGRAM NO REPEATED TO YOU AT REQUEST OF DEPT.  
WAS RECEIVED FROM UKMIS NEW YORK TELEGRAM NUMBER 1342 OF 24 SEP

INFO PRIORITY BAGHDAD WASHINGTON PARIS MOSCOW BONN KUWAIT  
JEDDA ABU DHABI AMMAN DAMASCUS  
INFO SAVING ROME LUXEMBOURG THE HAGUE BRUSSELS COPENHAGEN  
UKREP BRUSSELS DUBLIN ATHENS MADRID LISBON

IRAQ/IRAN

THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT WAS ISSUED BY THE FOREIGN MINISTERS OF  
THE NINE MEETING IN NEW YORK LATE ON 23 SEPTEMBER:-  
BEGINS

1. THE NINE STATES OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY EXPRESS THEIR DEEP CONCERN AT THE MILITARY CONFRONTATION BETWEEN IRAQ AND IRAN.
2. THEY NOTE THE BILATERAL NATURE OF THE PRESENT CONFLICT AND STRESS THE NEED TO AVOID ANYTHING WHICH MIGHT GIVE IT A BROADER DIMENSION. IN THIS CONNECTIONS THEY LOOK TO OTHER STATES, PARTICULARLY THE GREAT POWERS, TO MAINTAIN THE RESTRAINT WHICH THEY HAVE SHOWN.
3. THEY SUPPORT THE APPEAL OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE ISLAMIC CONFERENCE FOR AN IMMEDIATE CEASEFIRE AND, IN CONNECTION WITH THE CONSULTATIONS PUT IN HAND BY MR WALDHEIM, SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS, DECLARE THEMSELVES READY TO SUPPORT ANY INTERNATIONAL INITIATIVE LIKELY TO PROMOTE A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT OF THE DISPUTE.
4. THEY RECALL THE CAPITAL IMPORTANCE OF FOR THE GULF, WHICH IT IS IMPERATIVE NOT TO INFRINGE.
5. THEY DECIDE TO CONTINUE TO FOLLOW CLOSELY DEVELOPMENTS IN THE SITUATION AND THEY HOLD THEMSELVES READY TO SUPPORT THE SEARCH FOR A SOLUTION.

ENDS

F C O PLEASE PASS SAVING TO ROME LUXEMBOURG THE HAGUE BRUSSELS  
COPENHAGEN UKREP BRUSSELS DUBLIN ATHENS MADRID LISBON.

CARRINGTON

NNNN

1650/24



L 228

FDW G 044/24

GYPHES

CONFIDENTIAL

OO BELGRADE

GRS 360

CONFIDENTIAL

FM F C O 241207Z SEPTEMBER 80  
TO IMMEDIATE BELGRADE (FOR ALEXANDER PS/PM)  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 191 OF 24 SEPTEMBER.

FOLLOWING TELEGRAM NOW REPEATED TO YOU AT REQUEST OF P. OFF.  
WAS RECEIVED FROM MOSCOW TELNO 578 OF 23/9.

INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK, UKDEL NATO AND  
ROUTINE BONN, PARIS AND BAGHDAD.

YOUR TEL TO WASHINGTON NO 1534: IRAQ/IRAN.

1. THE IRAQI DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER AZIZ ARRIVED IN MOSCOW ON 21 SEPTEMBER. HE HAD A MEETING YESTERDAY WITH PONOMAREV AND WITH FIRST DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER MALTSEV. THE SOVIET PRESS ANNOUNCED THE FACT BUT GAVE NO DETAILS. HE LEFT AGAIN ON 22 SEPTEMBER.
2. THE SOVIET PRESS CONTINUES TO PRINT THE VIEWS OF THE OPPOSING SIDES AT ROUGHLY EQUAL LENGTH WITHOUT COMMENT. HOWEVER, SOME SLIGHT PRO-IRAQI SHADING MAY BE SEEN IN THE SELECTION OF RECENT REPORTS FROM BAGHDAD WHICH PRESENT THE IRAQI ACTION AS LARGELY DEFENSIVE. IN A RECENT CONVERSATION WITH A MEMBER OF CHANCERY, A SOVIET MFA OFFICIAL SIMILARLY APPEARED TO BE LEANING SLIGHTLY TOWARDS THE IRAQI POSITION, POINTING OUT THAT THE IRANIANS HAD BY THEIR OWN ADMISSION FAILED TO FULFIL THEIR AID OF THE 1975 ALGIERS AGREEMENT AND DESCRIBING THE IRANIAN SUGGESTION THAT THE SOVIET UNION SHOULD CEASE ARMS SUPPLIES TO IRAQ AS "ILLOGICAL" IN VIEW OF THE BILATERAL FRIENDSHIP TREATY.
3. I AGREE GENERALLY WITH THE ASSESSMENT OF THE SOVIET POSITION IN PARA 3 OF TUR. THE POSSIBILITY OF DIRECT SOVIET MILITARY INTERVENTION IS CLEARLY ONE WHICH NEEDS TO BE TAKEN SERIOUSLY. THE EXAMPLE OF AFGHANISTAN SUGGESTS THAT THEY WOULD NOT EXCLUDE THIS AS A POSSIBLE OPTION IF THEY BELIEVED IT WOULD SERVE THEIR POLITICAL AND SECURITY INTERESTS, BUT IT IS DIFFICULT TO IMAGINE THAT IN PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES THEY COULD REACH SUCH A CONCLUSION. THEIR MAIN LONG-TERM CONCERN IS PROBABLY TO SEE THE WEAKENING ON F KHOMEINI, AND A FURTHER DETERIORATION IN IRAN'S INTERNAL POSITION, WITH THE POSSIBILITY THAT THIS WOULD FURTHER WEAKEN IRANIAN OPPOSITION TO THE SOVIET OCCUPATION OF AFGHANISTAN AND IN DUE COURSE OPEN THE WAY TO A TAKE OVER BY THE PRO-SOVIET ELEMENTS IN IRAN ITSELF. THEY ARE THEREFORE LIKELY TO CONCLUDE THAT THEIR INTERESTS WILL BE BETTER SERVED BY AVOIDING INVOLVEMENT AND ALLOWING THE IRAQIS TO TEACH THE IRANIANS A LESSON RATHER THAN BY ANY OCCUPATION OF IRANIAN TERRITORY BY THEMSELVES. THEY MIGHT AT SOME POINT - BUT NOT YET - BE TEMPTED TO OFFER MEDIATION AS A MEANS OF EXTENDING THEIR OWN INFLUENCE. FOLLOWING AZIZ'S VISIT, THEY MAY HAVE GOT A REASONABLY CLEAR PICTURE OF IRAQI INTENTIONS AND HAVE INDICATED THE LIMITS OF THEIR ACQUIESCENCE.

CARRINGTON

NNNN

GYPHES  
1457/24



LVO 220/24

FDW G 021/24

OO BELGRADE

GR250

CONFIDENTIAL

FM FCO 240943Z SEP 80

TO IMMEDIATE BELGRADE

TELEGRAM NUMBER 189 OF 24 SEPTEMBER

(FOR ALEXANDER, PM'S PARTY)

FOLLOWING TELEGRAM NOW REPEATED TO YOU AT REQUEST OF DEPARTMENT  
WAS RECEIVED FROM BAGHDAD TELNO 424 OF 23 SEPTEMBER

IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK KUWAIT AND AMMAN  
INFO PRIORITY JEDDA DAMASCUS ANKARA BAHRAIN AND WASHINGTON  
MY TELNO 419: IRAQ/IRAN. MIERS DICKSON TELECON.

1. CALLED MEETING OF AS MANY HEADS OF BRITISH FIRMS OPERATING IN BAGHDAD AS WE COULD CONTACT AT 1015Z TODAY 23 SEPTEMBER.
2. WE SAID WE WERE NOT (NOT) AT PRESENT ADVISING BRITISH SUBJECTS TO LEAVE IRAQ BUT THAT WE WERE ADVISING THOSE WHO DID NOT HAVE ESSENTIAL BUSINESS TO POSTPONE THEIR TRAVEL PLANS (PARA 4 OF MY TELEGRAM UNDER REFERENCE).
3. AIRPORTS REMAIN CLOSED AND B.A. HAVE EITHER CANCELLED THEIR FLIGHTS FOR BAGHDAD OR WILL TERMINATE THEM IN AMMAN OR DAMASCUS UP TO AND INCLUDING FRIDAY 26 SEPTEMBER.
4. MOST REPRESENTATIVES AGREE THAT THEY WANTED DEPENDANTS TO LEAVE BY ROAD VIA RUTBA TO AMMAN. THEY ARE TO HAVE A MEETING AT 0600Z ON 24 SEPTEMBER AT WHICH H.M. CONSUL WILL BE PRESENT SO AS TO DISCUSS DETAILS. A FURTHER MEETING WITH H.M. AMBASSADOR IS ARRANGED FOR 0900Z TO DISCUSS THEIR CONCLUSIONS.
5. EXIT PERMITS ARE LIKELY TO BE A PROBLEM AND WE SHALL TAKE THIS UP AGAIN WITH MFA AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

CARRINGTON

NNNN

GYPHIER

CONFIDENTIAL

GYPHIER

GYPHIER

LVO 222

FDW G 026/24

OO BELGRADE

GR 370

SECRET

2a

SECRET

FM F C O 240944Z SEP 80  
TO IMMEDIATE BELGRADE  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 188 OF 24 SEPTEMBER.

FOR ALEXANDER, PM'S PARTY.

FOLLOWING TELEGRAM NOW REPEATED TO YOU AT REQUEST OF PRIVATE OFFICE  
WAS RECEIVED FROM BONN TELEGRAM NUMBER 699 OF 23 SEPTEMBER 80  
INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK PARIS WASHINGTON AND MOSCOW  
INFO SAVING BAGHDAD

YOUR TELNO 1534 TO WASHINGTON: IRAQ/IRAN

1. AT LUNCH TODAY, VAN WELL GAVE ME AND MY AMERICAN, CANADIAN AND NETHERLANDS COLLEAGUES THE FOLLOWING ACCOUNT OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT'S ASSESSMENT OF EVENTS IN IRAQ AND IRAN.
2. IN VAN WELL'S VIEW, THE IRAQI MOTIVATION IN ATTACKING IRAN WAS TWO-FOLD: FIRST, TO SEIZE A FAVOURABLE OPPORTUNITY TO REVERSE THE BORDER AGREEMENT OF 1975, WHICH, IN THE IRAQI VIEW HAD BEEN IMPOSED UNDER DURESS. NOW THAT THE KURDS WERE UNDER CONTROL AND THE IRANIAN ARMY IN DISARRAY, THE OPPORTUNITY WAS TOO GOOD TO BE MISSED. SECONDLY, THE IRAQIS WISHED TO DESTROY IRANIAN CONTROL OF THE STRAITS OF HORMUZ, ON WHICH THE IRAQIS WERE FAR MORE DEPENDENT THAN THE IRANIANS FOR THE PASSAGE OF OIL. VAN WELL TENDED TO DISCOUNT THE PROCLAIMED IRAQI INTENTION OF QUOTE SHATTERING THE KHOMEINI REGIME UNQUOTE. THIS WAS TYPICAL ARAB HYPERBOLE. KHOMEINI HAD BEEN THREATENING THE IRAQI REGIME WITH SIMILAR DIRE PROSPECTS FOR MONTHS AND IT WAS NATURAL THAT THE IRAQIS SHOULD NOW EXPRESS SIMILAR AIMS. BUT HE THOUGHT THAT THE FIRST TWO MOTIVES WERE ENOUGH IN THEMSELVES AND HE THOUGHT, ON BALANCE, THAT THE IRAQIS MIGHT WELL BE SUCCESSFUL IN ACHIEVING THEM. WHETHER OR NOT THE COLLAPSE OF THE IRANIAN REGIME FOLLOWED SUCCESS ON THE OTHER TWO FRONTS WAS ANOTHER MATTER. BUT IT WAS A LIKELY CONSEQUENCE, NOT A WAR AIM.
3. AS FAR AS THE RUSSIANS WERE CONCERNED, VAN WELL SAID THAT THE GERMAN VIEW WAS THAT WHEN MUSKIE MET GROMYKO ON 25 SEPTEMBER THEY SHOULD QUOTE EXCHANGE ASSURANCES OF NON-INTERVENTION UNQUOTE. THE FEDERAL GERMANS BELIEVED THAT THE RUSSIANS DID NOT WISH TO INTERVENE. THEY THOUGHT IT MORE LIKELY THAT THEY WISHED TO RESERVE FOR THEMSELVES THE POSSIBILITY OF MEDIATION IN THE DISPUTE. THE GERMANS HAD NOTED THAT THE IRAQI DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER, AZIZ, HAD BEEN SENT TO MOSCOW AT THE WEEKEND, DOUBTLESS TO EXPLAIN TO THE RUSSIANS WHAT THE IRAQIS WERE UP TO AND TO ASK FOR LOGISTIC SUPPORT FOR THEIR WEAPONS SYSTEMS, BUT THE GERMANS HAD ALSO NOTICED THAT AZIZ HAD BEEN RECEIVED AT A COMPARATIVELY LOW LEVEL AND WAS ALREADY BACK IN BAGHDAD. CLEARLY THE RUSSIANS WERE HOLDING BACK AND WISHED TO AVOID BEING DRAWN TOO MUCH TO ONE SIDE.

CARRINGTON

NNNN

1337/24



CONFIDENTIAL

FM JEDDA 241117Z SEP 80

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 696 OF 24 SEPTEMBER

AND IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK, ATHENS, BELGRADE  
INFO PRIORITY MUSCAT, DOHA, ABU DHABI, KUWAIT, BAHRAIN, DUBAI,  
BAGHDAD, WASHINGTON, PARIS, BOON.

YOUR TELNO 194 TO ABU DHABI: IRAQN/IRAQ

1. I TALKED TODAY WITH THE HEAD OF THE ARAB DEPARTMENT IN THE MFA. AMBASSADOR SHURA IS INTELLIGENT, EXPERIENCED AND SUFFICIENTLY SELF-CONFIDENT TO SPEAK FAIRLY FRANKLY.

2. HE SAID THE SITUATION WAS AN EXCEPTIONALLY DIFFICULT ONE FOR SAUDI ARABIA. THEY HAD INTERESTS ON BOTH SIDES. IRAQ WAS A CLOSE NEIGHBOUR AND FELLOW MEMBER OF THE ARAB LEAGUE AND AT THE MOMENT RELATIONS WERE GOOD. ON THE OTHER HAND IRAN WAS ALSO A NEIGHBOUR, AN ISLAMIC STATE AND A COUNTRY OF IMPORTANCE AND STANDING WITH WHOM IT WAS ESSENTIAL THAT SAUDI ARABIA SHOULD GET ON WELL. RECENTLY RELATIONS WITH IRAN HAD NOT BEEN GOOD BUT SAUDI ARABIA HAD RESISTED PROVOCATION AND HAD WORKED HARD TO IMPROVE MATTERS.

3. SHURA SAID I WOULD HAVE NOTICED THAT THE SAUDIS HAD ISSUED NO STATEMENT SO FAR. THEY WERE NOT SURE OF THE FACTS, THOUGH IT LOOKED TO HIM, SPEAKING ENTIRELY PERSONALLY, AS IF IRAQ HAD STARTED THE TROUBLE. THE SAUDIS' FIRST FEELING WAS THE OBVIOUS ONE OF SORRO THAT TWO MUSLEM STATES SHOULD BE QUARELLING. BUT THEY THOUGHT THAT IN ANNOUNCING THE CLOSURE OF THE STRAITS OF HORMUZ IRAN HAD GONE TOO FAR. THE MFA HAD PREPARED A DRAFT STATEMENT FOR SUBMISSION TO PRINCE FAHD. SHURA READ IT TO ME, EMPHASISING THAT FAHD MIGHT WELL CHANGE IT OR EVEN NOT AGREE TO ISSUE IT. IT CONDEMNED THE IRANIAN ANNOUNCEMENT, SAYING THAT IT WENT CONTRARY TO INTERNATIONAL LAW, TO THE RIGHTS OF OTHER GULF STATES AND TO THE CLAIMS OF FRIENDSHIP AND GOOD NEIGHBOURLINESS. IT WENT ON TO CALL ON BOTH SIDES TO FOLLOW THE PATH OF WISDOM AND RESORT TO PEACEFUL MEANS TO SETTLE THEIR DISPUTE. I ASKED WHETHER THERE WAS ANY MOVE AFOOT TOWARDS MEDIATION BY THE ARAB LEAGUE OR THE LEAGUE OF ISLAMIC STATES. SHURA SAID THE QUESTION HAD BEEN RAISED BY ALGERIA BUT HAD NOT BEEN FOLLOWED THROUGH. IT WAS DIFFICULT FOR THE ARABS TO CALL FOR MEDIATION, GIVEN THEIR OBLIGATION TO HELP A FELLOW ARAB STATE IN DIFFICULTY AND GIVEN (THIS WAS SAID RATHER CYNICALLY) THAT IRAQ SEEMED TO HAVE THE UPPER HAND AT THE MOMENT. PERHAPS A NON-ARAB MUSLIM STATE IN THE AREA OUGHT TO TAKE THE INITIATIVE - POSSIBLY PAKISTAN. BUT THE TIME WAS PROABLY NOT RIPE YET. IN ANY CASE THE FOREIGN MINISTERS OF ALL ISLAMIC STATES WERE NOW IN NEW YORK AND WOULD PRESUMABLY BE DISCUSSING THE MATTER URGENTLY.

4. AS FOR IRAQI MOTIVES, SHURA THOUGHT THEY WERE MIXED. CERTAINLY SADDAM HUSSAIN HAD BEEN PROVOKED BY IRANIAN INTERFERENCE WITH THE KURDS AND THE SHIA. HE ALSO WANTED TO GET RID OF THE 1975 AGREEMENT WHICH HE HAD DESCRIBED AS SHAMING. HE PROBABLY HOPED TO WIN DOMESTIC SUPPORT, WHICH THE BA'ATH CERTAINLY NEEDED, BY MEANS OF A VICTORY. AND HE PROBABLY HOPED TO WIN PRESTIGE AND INFLUENCE AS A NEW MILITARY POWER IN THE REGION, THOUGH HIS GAINS IN THIS DIRECTION IN THE EYES OF THE ARABS WOULD BE COUNTER-BALANCED BY THE FEELINGS OF RESENTMENT THAT WERE LIKELY TO BE RAISED AMONG THE NON-ALIGNED. ALTOGETHER, WHEN HE HAD SEEN IRAN'S MILITARY WEAKNESS, AND HER INTERNAL DIVISIONS AND HER BAD IMAGE IN THE EYES OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY BECAUSE OF THE AMERICAN HOSTAGES, HE HAD FOUND THE TEMPTATION TOO HARD TO RESIST.

5. ON THE COURSE OF THE FIGHTING AND THE FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS, SHURA HAD NO INFORMATION. THEY WERE OUT OF TOUCH WITH THEIR EMBASSY IN TEHRAN, BECAUSE (HE THOUGHT) OF IRANIAN ACTION. AND THOUGH THEY HAD ASKED OTHER GULF STATES FOR INFORMATION NONE HAD BEEN FORTHCOMING. HE WOULD BE GRATEFUL FOR ANYTHING THAT WE COULD PASS ON. I SAID THAT IT WAS OF COURSE DIFFICULT FOR ANY FOREIGN OBSERVERS TO ACQUIRE INFORMATION OF THIS SORT, GIVEN THE SECURITY RESTRICTIONS IMPOSED BY BOTH SIDES. BUT IF THERE EVER IS ANYTHING WHICH I CAN PASS ON I THINK IT WOULD HELP OUR RELATIONS WITH THE SAUDIS IF YOU COULD AUTHORISE ME TO DO SO.

6. IN CONCLUSION SHURA REITERATED THE DIFFICULTY WHICH FACED SAUDI ARABIA. EVEN THOUGH THEIR RELATIONS WITH IRAN HAD NOT BEEN GOOD FOR SOME TIME, IT WAS DIFFICULT TO TAKE SIDES AGAINST HER. I ENQUIRED WHAT WOULD HAPPEN IF THE IRAQIS REQUESTED SAUDI SUPPORT (TO-DAY'S LOCAL PRESS SAYS THAT AN IRAQI EMISSARY HAS BEEN HERE). SHURA EVADED THE QUESTION BY SAYING THAT IRAQ HAD NO NEED OF SAUDI SUPPORT. HE HAD NOTHING TO SAY ABOUT OIL EXCEPT THAT OF COURSE SAUDI INTERESTS REQUIRED SAFE PASSAGE FOR TANKERS THROUGH AND OUT OF THE GULF.

CRAIG

CCN PREAMBLE .. IRAN/IRAQ.

1405/24

NNNN



VO 247/24

FDW G 095/24

OO BELGRADE

GRS 234

SECRET

FM FCO 241645Z SEPTEMBER 80  
TO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 763 OF 24 SEPTEMBER  
INFO IMMEDIATE BELGRADE (FOR ALEXANDER)

FOR PS

1. AS REQUESTED FOLLOWING IS NAVAL DISPOSITION IN THE GULF:

IRAN:

- 3 DESTROYERS
- 8 FRIGATES
- 9 MISSILE PATROL CRAFT
- 7 LARGE AND 20 SMALL PATROL CRAFT
- 12 LARGE AND 8 SMALL HOVERCRAFT
- 2 LANDING SHIPS
- 2 LOGISTIC SUPPORT SHIPS

IRAQ:

- 12 OSA MISSILE CRAFT
- 12 MOTOR TORPEDO BOATS
- 2 FLEET MINESWEEPERS
- 3 INSHORE MINESWEEPERS
- 4 LANDING CRAFT
- 2 LARGE PATROL CRAFT
- 8 SMALL PATROL CRAFT

KUWAIT:

NIL

UAE:

- 6 MEDIUM AND 3 SMALL PATROL CRAFT
- 2 LARGE MISSILE PATROL CRAFT (NOT OPERATIONAL)

QATAR:

- 6 MEDIUM PATROL CRAFT

OMAN:

- 6 MISSILE PATROL CRAFT
- 1 LOGISTIC LANDING CRAFT
- 6 SMALL LANDING CRAFT
- 1 ARMED YACHT
- 1 FREIGHTER

BAHRAIN:

- 20 COASTAL GUARD PATROL CRAFT

SOVIET UNION:

- 1 FRIGATE (NEAR STRAITS OF HORMUZ)
- 1 DESTROYER
- 1 MINESWEEPER
- 1 INTELLIGENCE GATHERER
- 1 NUCLEAR SUBMARINE (SSN) (ALL IN NORTH ARABIAN SEA)

USA:

- 1 COMMAND SHIP
  - 1 DESTROYER
  - 2 FRIGATES
  - AIRCRAFT CARRIER
  - AMPHIBIOUS GROUP (IN NORTH ARABIAN SEA)
- } ALL AT BAHRAIN

2. IRAN IS MAINTAINING HORMUZ PATROL WITH 1-3 FRIGATES, AND NORTH GULF PATROL WITH FRIGATE, MINESWEEPER AND PATROL CRAFT.
3. THERE HAVE BEEN REPORTS OF SINKINGS BY IRAQ AND IRAN. THESE PROBABLY REFER TO PATROL CRAFT IN THE SHATT AL ARAB.

CARRINGTON

SECRET

GYPHER

SECRET



LVO 234/24  
FDW G 058/24  
OO BELGRADE  
GR 245

CRYPTIC

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL  
FM F.C.O. 241426Z SEP 80  
TO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 757 OF 24 SEPTEMBER  
AND TO BELGRADE.

UKMIS NEW YORK FOR P.S./S OF S.  
BELGRADE FOR ALEXANDER

FOLLOWING TELEGRAM NOW REPEATED TO YOU AT REQUEST OF PRIVATE OFFICE  
WAS RECEIVED FROM UKDEL OECD TELEGRAM NUMBER 57 OF 24 SEPTEMBER.

OIL MARKET SITUATION

1. IEA SECRETARIAT BRIEFED DELEGATIONS LAST NIGHT ON EFFECT OF IRAN/IRAQ HOSTILITIES ON THE OIL MARKET. THE QUOTE SPOT UNQUOTE CRUDE MARKET REMAINED QUIET. QUOTATIONS FOR PRODUCTS IN ROTTERDAM HAD MOVED UP SLIGHTLY IN THE PREVIOUS 24 HOURS THUS REVERSING THE DOWNWARD TREND. THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE OF SALES HAVING BEEN AGREED AT THESE PRICES.
2. TANKERS IN THE GULF APPEARED TO BE LOADING NORMALLY IN KUWAIT AND OTHER TERMINALS NOT IN THE IMMEDIATE AREA OF THE FIGHTING. ACCORDING TO EXXON TANKER MOVEMENTS THROUGH THE STRAIGHTS OF HORMUZ HAD BEEN NORMAL AT LEAST UP TO NOON TUESDAY.
3. AFTER CONTACTING ERSBOEL SECRETARIAT SAW NO NEED TO CONVENE GOVERNING BOARD MEETING AT THE MOMENT. THEY WILL BE IN TOUCH WITH THE SEQ CHAIRMAN MF THE SITUATION CONTINUES WITH A VIEW TO A POSSIBLE SEQ/SOM JOINT MEETING.
4. THE MAIN MESSAGE TO GOVERNMENTS WAS TO AVOID PANIC BUYING ON THE SPOT MARKET AS HAD HAPPENED AFTER THE 1979 IRAN CRISIS. STOCKS REMAIN AT AN ALL-TIME HIGH AND THERE IS STILL A CONSIDERABLE SURPLUS OF NON-DISRUPTED PRODUCTION OVER CONSUMPTION.
5. A FURTHER MEETING WILL BE HELD ON FRIDAY AT 12 NOON.

CARRINGTON

1655/24

NNNN



CONFIDENTIAL

44709 - 2

GRS

CONFIDENTIAL

FM FCO 241030Z SEPT 80  
TO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 754 OF 24 SEPTEMBER  
INFO PRIORITY JEDDA, BAGHDAD, KUWAIT

FOLLOWING FOR PRIVATE SECRETARY

IRAN/IRAQ: SAUDI FOREIGN MINISTER EN ROUTE TO UN

1. MR HURD CALLED LAST NIGHT ON PRINCE SAUD AT HIS HOTEL. HE SEEMED GENUINELY APPALLED AT THE INDISCRIMINATE FIGHTING AND THE HEAVY LOSS OF LIFE, OUT OF ALL PROPORTION TO THE IMPORTANCE OF THE LAND IN DISPUTE. FIGHTING HAD ESCALATED WILDLY EVEN THOUGH IRAQ'S DECLARED MILITARY OBJECTIVES HAD BEEN SECURED ON THE FIRST DAY. HE WAS ALSO STRUCK BY THE APPARENT NONCHALANCE OF THOSE LOOKING ON, BUT AGREED ON THE IMPORTANCE OF AVOIDING INVOLVEMENT BY SUPERPOWERS. THE SAUDIS WERE IN CONSTANT TOUCH WITH BAGHDAD BUT SAUD NO LONGER SEEMED TO EXPECT TO HAVE MUCH INFLUENCE ON EITHER SIDE.
2. HE ACCEPTED THAT THE SECURITY COUNCIL SHOULD TAKE ACTION, BUT EXPECTED ISLAMIC STATES ALSO TO BE MEETING IN NEW YORK (DR CHATTI IS THERE). HE THOUGHT THERE NEED BE NO CONTRADICTION BETWEEN PEACE-MAKING ACTION BY BOTH ORGANISATIONS IN PARALLEL. THE KUWAITI FOREIGN MINISTER TELEPHONED IN THE MIDDLE OF THE TALK. THEY DISCUSSED THE SITUATION IN GENERAL TERMS, BUT SAUD SAID SHAIKH SABAH ALSO MENTIONED IRAN'S LATEST APPEAL FOR MUSLIM SUPPORT.
3. MR HURD RAISED THE QUESTION OF THE ISLANDS. PRINCE SAUD AGREED THAT ANY FIGHTING THERE WOULD THREATEN THE SHIPPING ROUTES, BUT DID NOT RULE OUT THE TEMPTATION FOR THE IRAQIS TO SEIZE THE ISLANDS AS TOKENS OF VICTORY. AN EFFECTIVE BLOCKADE OF THE STRAITS WAS UNLIKELY: BUT ANY FIGHTING WOULD FRIGHTEN OFF THE TANKERS. PRINCE SAUD SAID THAT IN ADDITION TO CLOSING THEIR TERRITORIAL WATERS THE IRANIANS HAD HANDED NOTES TO GULF

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

44709 - 2

AMBASSADORS (EXCEPT SAUDI ARABIA) WARNING THEM NOT TO OFFER THE IRAQIS ANY HELP OR FACILITIES.

4. SAUD FLIES ON TO NEW YORK TODAY AND WILL BE AT THE WALDORF UNTIL 5 OCTOBER. HE WOULD CLEARLY WELCOME A CONTACT WITH THE SECRETARY OF STATE. HE SEEMED ANXIOUS, AND GAVE THE IMPRESSION THAT HE WAS FEELING HIS WAY.

CARRINGTON

MIDDLE EAST STANDARD  
NENAD  
MED  
NAD  
UND  
EESD  
ECD  
WED  
MAED  
ES & SD  
ERD  
ECON D  
CONS D  
CONS EM UNIT  
PS  
PS/LPS  
PS/MR HURD  
PS/PUS  
SIR J GRAHAM  
CABINET OFFICE

ADDITIONAL DISTN  
ARAB/ISRAEL DISPUTE



IRAN/IRAQ

ADVANCE COPIES

22

PS  
PS/SIR I GILMOUR  
PS/MR HURD  
PS/PUS  
SIR E YOUDE  
SIR J GRAHAM  
MR J C MOBERLY  
MR BRAITHTWAITE  
HD/MED  
HD/NENAD  
HD/UND  
HD/CONS D  
CONSULAR EMERGENCY UNIT  
HD/ES & SD  
HD/MAED  
HD/DEF D  
PUSD (2)  
NEWS D  
RESIDENT CLERK

NO 10 DOWNING STREET  
CABINET OFFICE DIO

ADVANCE COPY

GR 200

CONFIDENTIAL

FM BAGHDAD 231405Z SEP 80

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 424 OF 23/9/80

IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK, KUWAIT AND AMMAN

INFO PRIORITY JEDDA, DAMASCUS, ANKARA, BAHRAIN AND WASHINGTON

MY TEL 419: IRAQ/IRAN. MIERS DICKSON TELECON.

1. CALLED MEETING OF AS MANY HEADS OF BRITISH FIRMS OPERATING IN BAGHDAD AS WE COULD CONTACT AT 1015Z TODAY 23 SEPT.

2. WE SAID WE WERE NOT (NOT) AT PRESENT ADVISING BRITISH SUBJECTS TO LEAVE IRAQ BUT THAT WE WERE ADVISING THOSE WHO DID NOT HAVE ESSENTIAL BUSINESS TO POSTPONE THEIR TRAVEL PLANS (PARA4 OF MY TUR) .

3. AIRPORTS REMAIN CLOSED AND B.A. HAVE EITHER CANCELLED THEIR FLIGHTS FOR BAGHDAD OR WILL TERMINATE THEM IN AMMAN OR DAMASCUS

3. AIRPORTS REMAIN CLOSED AND B.A. HAVE EITHER CANCELLED THEIR FLIGHTS FOR BAGHDAD OR WILL TERMINATE THEM IN AMMAN OR DAMASCUS UP TO AND INCLUDING FRIDAY 26 SEP.

4. MOST REPRESENTATIVES AGREE THAT THEY WANTED DEPENDANTS TO LEAVE BY ROAD VIA RUTBA TO AMMAN. THEY ARE TO HAVE A MEETING AT 0600Z ON 24 SEPT AT WHICH H.M. CONSUL WILL BE PRESENT SO AS TO DISCUSS DETAILS. A FURTHER MEETING WITH H.M. AMBASSADOR IS ARRANGED FOR 0900Z TO DISCUSS THEIR CONCLUSIONS.

5. EXIT PERMITS ARE LIKELY TO BE A PROBLEM AND WE SHALL TAKE THIS UP AGAIN WITH MFA AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

EGERTON

NNNN



GR 550

UNCLASSIFIED

FM BAGHDAD 231038Z SEP 80

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 423 OF 23/9/80

AND PRIORITY UKMIS NEW YORK

INFO KUWAIT, JEDDA, AMMAN DAMASCUS, ANKARA, MOSCOW AND WASHINGTON

IRAQ/IRAN: MY TELS NO 416 AND 421.

1. ACCORDING TO A STATEMENT ISSUED BY THE GENERAL COMMAND OF THE IRAQI ARMED FORCES, THE IRAQI AIRFORCE RAIDED TEN IRANIAN AIR BASES AT 1200 HOURS ON 22 SEPTEMBER. THE BASES ARE LISTED AS: MAHARABAD (TEHRAN), SHIRAZ, BOSHAHAR, DIZFUL, SHAROKHI IN HAMADAN, KHATIMI IN ISFAHAN, TABRIZ MILITARY AIRPORT, OMIDLI IN AGHA JARI, KERMANSHAH MILITARY AIRPORT AND AHWAZ AIRPORT.
2. THE IRAQIS CLAIM TO HAVE INFLICTED HEAVY DAMAGE. THEIR OWN LOSSES ARE GIVEN AS: ONE BOMBER CRASHED IN IRANIAN TERRITORY AS A RESULT OF A TECHNICAL FAULT: CREW REPORTED TO HAVE BAILED OUT: ONE FIGHTER HIT BY ANTI AIRCRAFT FIRE, PILOT BAILED OUT OVER IRAQI TERRITORY.
3. A SECOND GENERAL COMMAND STATEMENT REPORTS FURTHER IRAQI RAIDS BETWEEN 1500 AND 1800 HOURS ON 22 SEPTEMBER AGAINST IRANIAN BASES AT BOSHAHAR, SHAROKHI, WAHDITI IN DIZFUL, KERMANSHAH MILITARY AIRPORT, OMIDLI MILITARY BASE, AHWAZ MILITARY AIRPORT AND RADAR STATIONS IN THE DEHLARAN AND NAFT SHAH AREAS. THE IRAQI AIRCRAFT ARE REPORTED TO HAVE RETURNED TO BASE WITHOUT LOSS. THE STATEMENT GOES ON TO CLAIM THAT IRAQIS SHOT DOWN SIX PHANTOMS INSIDE IRAQI AIRSPACE ON 22 SEPTEMBER: THREE AT BASRA, ONE IN THE WASIT SECTOR, ONE AT UMM QASR AND ONE AT AL SHAIBA. THREE IRANIAN PILOTS ARE REPORTED TO HAVE BEEN CAPTURED.
4. A MOD STATEMENT DESCRIBES MORE ARTILLERY EXCHANGES ACROSS THE SHATT AL ARAB AND CLAIMS THAT FOUR MERCHANT VESSELS WERE ATTACKED BY IRANIAN FORCES. A CREW MEMBER OF THE JAPANESE "CAMILA" IS SAID TO HAVE BEEN WOUNDED.
5. SELECTED GROUPS OF IRAQI RESERVISTS ARE BEING CALLED UP. THERE WAS A PARTIAL BLACK OUT IN BAGHDAD ON THE NIGHT OF 22/23 SEPTEMBER.

/ 6. THE

6. THE FOREIGN MINISTER, DR SAADOUN HAMMADI, HAS SENT MESSAGES TO THE UN SECRETARY GENERAL, THE ARAB LEAGUE SECRETARY GENERAL AND TO PRESIDENT CASTRO AS CURRENT CHAIRMAN OF THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT SETTING IRAQ'S VERSION OF THE DISPUTE WITH IRAN.

7. A WELL INFORMED BUSINESSMAN WHO RETURNED FROM BASRA ON 21 SEPT TOLD US THAT THE 300 BED PORT HOSPITAL HAS BEEN CLEARED OF ALL CIVILIAN PATIENTS. IT IS PRETTY BUSY DEALING WITH IRAQI MILITARY CASUALTIES, WHICH ARE DESCRIBED AS "HEAVY". AT UMM QASR HE SAW TWO RUSSIAN UNLOADING AMMUNITION AND TANKS. MUCH HARDWARE WAS MOVED FROM THE ARSENAL AT UMM QASR TO BASRA, THEN ACROSS THE SHATT. HE CLAIMS TO HAVE SEEN TRUCK-MOUNTED MOBILE ANTI-AIRCRAFT MISSILES AT UM QASR. STATIC ANTI-AIRCRAFT MISSILE SITES THERE HAVE BEEN UNCOVERED AND ACTIVATED.

EGERTON

[COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING ST].

MIDDLE EAST STANDARD

NENAD	MAED
MED	ES & SD
NAD	ERD
UND	ECON D
EESD	CONS D
ECD	CONS EM UNIT
WED	CABINET OFFICE

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION

ARAB/ISRAEL DISPUTE

[NOT ADVANCED]



GR 270

UNCLASSIFIED

FM BAGHDAD 230908Z SEP 80

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 421 OF 23/9/80

INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK, PRIORITY KUWAIT, JEDDA, AMMAN,  
DAMASCUS, ANKARA , WASHINGTON , MOSCOW AND UKDEL NATO.

IRAQ/IRAN

1. THE REVOLUTIONARY COMMAND COUNCIL ISSUED A STATEMENT ON 22 SEPTEMBER INSTRUCTING THE IRAQI ARMED FORCES TO "DIRECT DETERRENT STRIKES AGAINST IRANIAN MILITARY TARGETS IN ORDER TO FOIL THE RACIST PERSIAN REGIME'S DESIGNS ON IRAQ'S SOVEREIGNTY OVER ITS NATIONAL TERRITORY, BOTH LAND AND WATER".
2. THE INSTRUCTIONS WERE "IN RESPONSE TO THE IRANIANS' RECKLESS MILITARY OPERATIONS, THEIR ATTEMPTS TO INTERRUPT NAVIGATION IN THE SHATT AL ARAB BY FIRING ON MERCHANT SHIPS, THEIR EXTENSIVE AIR ATTACKS ON THE IRAQI ARMY, THEIR ANNOUNCEMENT OF A GENERAL CALL-UP, AND THE CLOSURE OF IRANIAN AIR SPACE - ALL OF WHICH INDICATES THAT THE IRANIANS INTEND TO BROADEN THE SCOPE OF THE CONFLICT UNTIL IT REACHES A STATE OF WAR". IRAQ WOULD AVOID STRIKING AT CIVILIAN TARGETS, PROVIDED THE IRANIANS CEASE ATTACKING CIVILIAN TARGETS IN IRAQ.
3. THE COMMUNIQUE GOES TO TO SAY THAT THE IRAQI ARMED FORCES WOULD "WITHDRAW FROM ANY IRANIAN TERRITORIES IN WHICH DEFENSIVE MILITARY ARRANGEMENTS MAKE AN IRAQI PRESENCE ESSENTIAL, AS SOON AS IRAN RECOGNISES IRAQ'S SOVEREIGNTY OVER ITS TERRITORY AND RESPECTS ITS VITAL INTERESTS".
4. SEVERAL OBSERVERS HERE POINT TO THIS LAST SENTENCE AS A CLUE TO IRAQ'S REAL INTENTIONS, I.E., AN OFFER TO WITHDRAW FROM CERTAIN NEWLY ACQUIRED BORDER AREAS IN RETURN FOR IRANIAN RECOGNITION, EVEN IF TACIT, OF IRAQ'S CLAIMS TO THE SHATT. LAST SENTENCE OF PARA 9 OF YR TEL NO 169 TO UKDEL NATO (NOT TO ALL) SEEMS EXACTLY RIGHT.

EGERTON

MIDDLE EAST STANDARD

NENAD	MAED
MED	ES & SD
NAD	ERD
UND	ECON D
EESD	CONS D
ECD	CONS EM UNIT
WED	CABINET OFFICE

COPIES SENT TO  
No. 10 DOWNING STREET

PP JEDDA

PP ANKARA

PP HSP1

GR 375

CONFIDENTIAL

FM BAGHDAD 230752Z SEP 80

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 420 OF 23/9/80

INFO PRIORITY KUWAIT, UKMIS NEW YORK, AMMAN, ATHENS, DAMASCUS,  
WASHINGTON, MOSCOW, JEDDA, ANKARA AND HSP1

MIPTS (NOT TO ALL): IRAQ/IRAN

1. WHEN I PAID MY FIRST COURTESY CALL ON NABIL NAJM, THE CHIEF PROTOCOL AT THE FOREIGN MINISTRY THIS MORNING, HE ASKED WHAT I THOUGHT OF THE SITUATION BETWEEN IRAQ AND IRAN. YESTERDAY, 22 SEPTEMBER, THE IRANIANS HAD BOMBED BASRAH AIRPORT AND KUT TOWN. THIS MORNING, THEY HAD MADE A SUDDEN AIR ATTACK ON THE OUTSKIRTS OF BAGHDAD. IRAQ HAD TRIED FOR OVER A YEAR TO FIND SOMEONE TO NEGOTIATE WITH IN IRAN ABOUT THE BORDER TERRITORIES WHICH THE IRANIANS HAD AGREED TO HAND OVER IN 1975, BUT HAD FAILED TO SURRENDER. PRESIDENT SADDAM'S PATIENCE HAD EVENTUALLY RUN OUT, AND IRAQ FORCES HAD TAKEN BACK PART OF THEIR LAND AND RE-ESTABLISHED SOVEREIGNTY OVER THE SHATT. IRAQ WAS PREPARED TO NEGOTIATE A SETTLEMENT IF SHE COULD FIND SOMEONE OF ENOUGH STATUS IN IRAN TO DEAL WITH. OTHERWISE, THE SKIRMISHES WOULD CONTINUE. IRAQ WAS NOW LOOKING TO MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL TO DECLARE WHERE THEY STOOD ON THE DISPUTE.
2. I ASKED IF IRAQ WAS LOOKING FOR A MEDIATOR YET, OR THINKING OF TAKING THE MATTER TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL. NAJM SAID NO. I SAID THAT I WAS WITHOUT INSTRUCTIONS, THE FACTS BEING STILL UNCLEAR. BUT IN GENERAL WE VIEWED WITH DISMAY ANY SITUATION TENDING TO ESTABLISH TRADE AND TRAFFIC IN THE GULF, PARTICULARLY SO SOON AFTER THE SOVIET INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN. IRAQ, HAVING MADE A SHOW OF STRENGTH, SHOULD NOW SHOW STATESMANSHIP AND MAKE A FIRM OFFER OF NEGOTIATION BEFORE FURTHER HOSTILITIES TOOK PLACE.
3. NAJM THEN SAID THAT SAADUN HAMMADI MIGHT HAVE TO POSTPONE HIS DEPARTURE TO NEW YORK, PLANNED FOR 28 SEPTEMBER. IT WAS UNLIKELY THAT THE THREE NEW AMBASSADORS HERE (AUSTRIA, AFGHANISTAN AND UK) WOULD BE ABLE TO PRESENT THEIR CREDENTIALS AS QUICKLY AS WAS NORMAL.
4. I SAID I WOULD BE ADVISING A LARGE NUMBER OF IMPORTANT BRITISH VISITORS WITHIN THE NEXT FEW DAYS, INCLUDING THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR HEALTH AND SOCIAL SERVICES, WHETHEWTA NOT TO PROCEED WITH PLANS TO VISIT BAGHDAD FOR THIS YEAR'S INTERNATIONAL FAIR. OBVIOUSLY NOBODY WOULD COME IF THE MAJOR IRAQI AIRPORTS REMAINED SUBJECT TO INSTANT CLOSURE WITHOUT WARNING. THIS WAS YET ANOTHER REASON WHY THE IRAQIS SHOULD GET THE SITUATION BACK TO SOME SORT OF NORMALITY. NAJM LOOKED MOROSE BUT AGREED TO KEEP IN CLOSE TOUCH.

EGERTON

NNNN



LKS 219/23

OO FCO

PP ATHENS

PP KUWAIT

PP JEDDA

PP AMMAN

PP DAMASCUS

PP ANKARA

PP WASHINGTON

PP MOSCOW

PP HSP 1

GRS 250

CONFIDENTIAL

FM BAGHDAD 230745Z SEPT 80

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 419 OF 23/9/80

FOR INFO TO PRIORITY ATHENS KUWAIT JEDDA AMMAN DAMASCUS ANKARA  
WASHINGTON , MOSCOW AND HSP 1

IRAQ/IRAN: MY IPT AND YOUR TELS 314 AND 315:

1. TEL 314, PARA 1 - LAST SENTENCE AGREED.

2. TEL 315, PARA 2 - BAGHDAD AND BASRA AIRPORTS REMAIN CLOSED SO TRAVEL TO AND FROM IRAQ BY AIR IS IMPOSSIBLE AND TRAVELLERS SHOULD BE SO ADVISED.

3. AT EC HEADS OF MISSION MEETING ON 22 SEPTEMBER IT WAS REPORTED THAT COMMUNITY NATIONALS IN SOUTH IRAQ WERE CONCERNED AT THE SITUATION ON THE SHATT, BUT WERE NOT (NOT) IN ANY IMMEDIATE DANGER AND STAYING PUT. IF FORCED TO LEAVE MANY WILL DO SO BY ROAD VIA KUWAIT PROVIDED (REPEAT PROVIDED) IRAQI EXIT PERMITS CAN BE OBTAINED. THIS HAS BEEN RELATIVELY EASY FOR THOSE WHOSE RESIDENT DEPARTMENT FILES ARE IN BASRA, BUT LESS SO FOR THOSE WHO ENTERED VIA BAGHDAD AND PROCEEDED SOUTH.

WE AGREED YESTERDAY THAT THE SITUATION WAS NOT (REPEAT NOT) SERIOUS ENOUGH TO APPROACH THE IRAQIS WITH JOINT OR SEVERAL REQUESTS FOR EXIT PERMIT VISAS. I SHALL HOWEVER BE REVIEWING THIS POINT WITH EC COLLEAGUES WITHIN THE NEXT FEW DAYS.

4. ENTRY TO IRAQ IS STILL POSSIBLE FROM KUWAIT AND BRITISH TRAVELLERS ON ESSENTIAL BUSINESS IN SOUTH IRAQ SHOULD BE ADVISED TO TAKE THE LAND ROUTE.

IF THEIR JOURNEY IS NOT (NOT) ESSENTIAL THEY SHOULD WAIT A DAY OR TWO .

THE LAND ROUTE FROM JORDAN IS ALSO OPEN, AND THE SAME ADVICE SHOULD BE GIVEN.

EGERTON

NNNN

LLG 744

LKS 218/23

OO FCO DESKBY 230915Z

PP KUWAIT

PP JEDDA

PP AMMAN

PP DAMASCUS

PP ANKARA

PP WASHINGTON

PP MOSCOW

PP ATHENS

PP HSP1

GR 150

RESTRICTED

FM BAGHDAD 230740Z SEP 80

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 418 OF 23/9/80

INFO PRIORITY KUWAIT , JEDDA, AMMAN, DAMASCUS, ANKARA, WASHINGTON  
MOSCOW AND HSP1

DESKBY 230915Z

IRAQ/IRAN

1. BAGHDAD AWOKE TODAY (23 SEPTEMBER) TO AN AIR RAID WARNING AND ELECTRICITY POWER CUT. AN ATTACK THEN TOOK PLACE BY A SMALL NUMBER OF JETS. CLOUDS OF SMOKE WERE SEEN AT SEVERAL POINTS AROUND BAGHDAD, AND WE HAVE REPORTS THAT BAGHDAD INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AND RASHID CAMP ON THE SOUTH EAST OUTSKIRTS OF THE CITY WERE HIT. ANTI-AIRCRAFT AND MACHINE GUN FIRE STARTED IMMEDIATELY, AND ONE AIRCRAFT IS REPORTED TO HAVE CRASHED NEAR THE DAWRA OIL REFINERY. AN IRAQI STATEMENT IS EXPECTED LATER TODAY.

2. ALTHOUGH WE HAVE RECEIVED A NUMBER OF PHONE AND PERSONAL CALLS, THERE ARE NO (NO) REPORTS OF CASUALTIES AMONG THE BRITISH COMMUNITY. THE RAIDS SEEM TO HAVE BEEN SMALL SCALE, BUT THE GENERAL REACTION AMONGST IRAQIS IS ASTONISHMENT THAT THEY TOOK PLACE AT ALL.

3. SEE MY TWO I.F.T'S

EGERTON

NNNN

GVVVVVVVV



IRAN/IRAQ

ADVANCE COPIES

22

PS  
PS/SIR I GILMOUR  
PS/MR HURD  
PS/PUS  
SIR E YOUDE  
SIR J GRAHAM  
MR J C MOBERLY  
MR BRAITHWAITE  
HD/MED  
HD/NENAD  
HD/UND  
HD/CONS D  
CONSULAR EMERGENCY UNIT  
HD/ES & SD  
HD/MAED  
HD/DEF D  
PUSD (2)  
NEWS D  
RESIDENT CLERK

NO 10 DOWNING STREET  
CABINET OFFICE DIO

ADVANCE COPY

IMMEDIATE

DB 240830Z

UNCLASSIFIED

DESKBY 240830Z

FM UKMIS NEW YORK 240350Z SEP

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1340 OF 23 SEPTEMBER 1980

INFO PRIORITY ATHENS (FOR PRIME MINISTER)

INFO ROUTINE WASHINGTON, PARIS, BONN, MOSCOW, BAGHDAD, NEW DELHI,  
ISLAMABAD, UKDEL NATO.

M I P T : IRAQ/IRAN

1. FOLLOWING IS STATEMENT BY PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL:  
BEGINS

MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL HAVE TODAY EXCHANGED VIEWS  
IN INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS ON THE EXTREMELY SERIOUS SITUATION  
PREVAILING BETWEEN IRAN AND IRAQ. THEY HAVE TAKEN NOTE OF THE  
SHARP DETERIORATION IN RELATIONS AND OF THE ESCALATION IN  
ARMED ACTIVITY LEADING TO LOSS OF LIFE AND HEAVY MATERIAL  
DAMAGE.

MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL ARE DEEPLY CONCERNED THAT THIS  
CONFLICT CAN PROVE INCREASINGLY SERIOUS AND COULD POSE A  
GRAVE THREAT TO INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY.

THE MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL WELCOME AND FULLY SUPPORT

M I P T : IRAQ/IRAN

1. FOLLOWING IS STATEMENT BY PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL:  
BEGINS

MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL HAVE TODAY EXCHANGED VIEWS  
IN INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS ON THE EXTREMELY SERIOUS SITUATION  
PREVAILING BETWEEN IRAN AND IRAQ. THEY HAVE TAKEN NOTE OF THE  
SHARP DETERIORATION IN RELATIONS AND OF THE ESCALATION IN  
ARMED ACTIVITY LEADING TO LOSS OF LIFE AND HEAVY MATERIAL  
DAMAGE.

MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL ARE DEEPLY CONCERNED THAT THIS  
CONFLICT CAN PROVE INCREASINGLY SERIOUS AND COULD POSE A  
GRAVE THREAT TO INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY.

THE MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL WELCOME AND FULLY SUPPORT  
THE APPEAL OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL, ADDRESSED TO BOTH  
PARTIES ON 22 SEPTEMBER 1980, AS WELL AS THE OFFER THAT  
HE HAS MADE OF HIS GOOD OFFICES TO RESOLVE THE PRESENT  
CONFLICT.

THE MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL HAVE ASKED ME TO APPEAL, ON  
THEIR BEHALF, TO THE GOVERNMENTS OF IRAN AND IRAQ, AS A FIRST  
STEP TOWARDS A SOLUTION OF THE CONFLICT, TO DESIST FROM  
ARMED ACTIVITY AND ALL ACTS THAT MAY WORSEN THE PRESENT DANGEROUS  
SITUATION AND TO SETTLE THEIR DISPUTE BY PEACEFUL MEANS.  
ENDS

PARSONS

NNNN



NO 10 DOWNING STREET ✓  
CABINET OFFICE DIO

PS  
PS/SIR I GILMOUR  
PS/MR HURD  
PS/PUS  
SIR E YOUDE  
SIR J GRAHAM  
MR J C MOBERLY  
MR BRAITHWAITE  
HD/MED  
HD/NENAD  
HD/UND  
HD/CONS D  
CONSULAR EMERGENCY UNIT  
HD/ES & SD  
HD/MAED  
HD/DEF D  
PUSD (2)  
NEWS D  
RESIDENT CLERK

IMMEDIATE

ADVANCE COPY

DB 240830Z

CONFIDENTIAL

DESKBY 240830Z

FM UKMIS NEW YORK 240345Z SEP 80

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1339 OF 23 SEPTEMBER 1980

INFO PRIORITY ATHENS (FOR PRIME MINISTER),

INFO ROUTINE WASHINGTON, PARIS, BONN, MOSCOW, BAGHDAD, NEW DELHI,  
ISLAMABAD, UKDEL NATO.

YOUR TELNO 750: IRAQ/IRAN

1. THIS MORNING (23 SEPTEMBER) THE SECRETARY GENERAL ASKED THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL (TUNISIA) TO ARRANGE URGENTLY FOR INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS OF THE COUNCIL. THESE TOOK PLACE THIS EVENING, AFTER DELAYS CAUSED BY MEETINGS OF THE ISLAMIC AND NON-ALIGNED COUNTRIES AND BY AN ABORTIVE SUGGESTION BY MUSKIE, WITH SOME SUPPORT FROM THE SECRETARIAT, THAT FOREIGN MINISTERS SHOULD TAKE PART IN THE CONSULTATIONS.
2. THE SECRETARY GENERAL SAID THAT IN SEPARATE MEETINGS WITH THE REPRESENTATIVES IN NEW YORK OF IRAQ AND IRAN HE HAD OFFERED HIS GOOD OFFICES AND ASKED THEM TO REPORT TO THEIR GOVERNMENTS HIS APPEAL FOR RESTRAINT AND A CEASEFIRE. TODAY HE HAD RECEIVED A LETTER FROM THE IRAQI FOREIGN MINISTER SETTING OUT THE HISTORY

HIS GOOD OFFICES AND ASKED THEM TO REPORT TO THEIR GOVERNMENTS HIS APPEAL FOR RESTRAINT AND A CEASEFIRE. TODAY HE HAD RECEIVED A LETTER FROM THE IRAQI FOREIGN MINISTER SETTING OUT THE HISTORY OF THE 1975 AGREEMENT ON THE SHATT AL-ARAB, DESCRIBING IRAN'S BREACHES OF THE AGREEMENT, BY SUBVERSION AND TERRITORIAL ENCROACHMENT, AND JUSTIFYING IRAQ'S DENUNCIATION OF THE AGREEMENT; IRAQ WAS ACTING IN SELF-DEFENCE AND HAD NO TERRITORIAL CLAIMS AGAINST IRAN. WALDHEIM SAID THAT HE HAD SO FAR HAD NO RESPONSE FROM TEHRAN WITH WHICH ALL COMMUNICATIONS SEEMED TO BE INTERRUPTED, BUT THE IRANIAN CHARGE HERE HAD TOLD HIM THAT THIS WAS A REAL WAR AND THAT IRAN WAS THE VICTIM OF AGGRESSION.

3. THE TUNISIAN REPORTED THAT THE SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE ISLAMIC CONFERENCE HAD OFFERED HIS GOOD OFFICES TO THE TWO PARTIES. HE THEN ASKED FOR VIEWS ON WHAT THE COUNCIL SHOULD DO. MY NORWEGIAN COLLEAGUE PROPOSED THAT THE PRESIDENT SHOULD ISSUE A STATEMENT APPEALING FOR A CEASEFIRE AND ENDORSING THE GOOD OFFICES OF THE SECRETARIES GENERAL OF THE UN AND THE ISLAMIC CONFERENCE. WITH 104 FOREIGN MINISTERS IN NEW YORK, IT WOULD BE RIDICULOUS IF THE COUNCIL SAT IDLE. WAR HAD BROKEN OUT. THE PRIORITY WAS TO STOP THE FIGHTING. I SUPPORTED NORWAY. MY SOVIET COLLEAGUE, HOWEVER, ARGUED THAT IT WOULD BE PROCEDURALLY IMPROPER FOR THE COUNCIL, WHEN MEETING INFORMALLY, TO AUTHORISE THE PRESIDENT TO ISSUE SUCH A STATEMENT AND THAT ON THE SUBSTANCE THE COUNCIL SHOULD HEAR THE PARTIES AND OBTAIN MORE INFORMATION BEFORE EXPRESSING A VIEW.

4. THERE ENSUED A LONG WRANGLE ON THE PROCEDURAL QUESTION. NORWAY WAS SUPPORTED BY THE WESTERN COUNTRIES EXCEPT FRANCE, WHICH SAT ON THE FENCE (AS DID CHINA), AND BY MOST OF THE NON-ALIGNED MEMBERS; SOME OF THE LATTER SUPPORTED THE RUSSIANS, ON THE GROUNDS THAT IT MIGHT BE COUNTER-PRODUCTIVE FOR THE COUNCIL TO TAKE A POSITION UNTIL IT KNEW MORE ABOUT THE RIGHTS AND WRONGS OF THE CASE.

5. THE PRESIDENT, WHO DID NOT DISGUISE HIS PERSONAL VIEW THAT IT WAS ESSENTIAL FOR THE REPUTATION OF THE COUNCIL THAT IT DO SOMETHING TONIGHT, EVENTUALLY DECIDED THAT THE MAJORITY FAVOURED A STATEMENT AND HE TABLED A DRAFT. IN FURTHER ARGUMENT, TROYANOVSKY (USSR) INSISTED THAT THE STATEMENT SHOULD NOT CALL EXPLICITLY FOR A CEASEFIRE, ON THE GROUNDS THAT THIS MIGHT BE PARTIAL, AND THAT THERE SHOULD BE NO REFERENCE TO THE GOOD OFFICES OF THE ISLAMIC CONFERENCE. AFTER AN ADJOURNMENT TO ENABLE HIM TO OBTAIN INSTRUCTIONS, THE STATEMENT IN MIFT WAS FINALLY AGREED. THE PRESIDENT WILL ISSUE IT TO THE PRESS TONIGHT (23 SEPTEMBER).



GRS 1200

UNCLASSIFIED

FM UKMIS NEW YORK 231610Z SEPT 80

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1332 OF 23 SEPTEMBER.

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON BAGHDAD STOCKHOLM,

INFO PRIORITY MOSCOW KUWAIT JEDDA AMMAN DAMASCUS ANKARA KABUL

PRETORIA SALISBURY,

INFO ROUTINE ROME LUXEMBOURG THE HAGUE PARIS BONN BRUSSELS COPENHAGEN

UKREP BRUSSELS AND DUBLIN.

FROM HEAD OF NEWS DEPARTMENT IN NEW YORK.

1. THE SECRETARY OF STATE THIS MORNING GAVE RADIO INTERVIEWS TO BBC AND IRN. FOLLOWING IS EDITED TRANSCRIPT OF HIS INTERVIEW WITH ANDREW MANDERSTAN OF IRN.

BEGINS

IRAN/IRAQ.

Q: JUST HOW SERIOUS IS THE SITUATION BETWEEN IRAQ AND IRAN?

A: I THINK IT COULD GET VERY SERIOUS INDEED. THE SITUATION THERE HAS BECOME A GOOD DEAL WORSE THAN JUST BORDER INCIDENTS WHEN YOU HAVE THE BOMBING OF CAPITALS. AND THEREFORE I DO THINK ITS SERIOUS: ITS SERIOUS IN TERMS OF THE MIDDLE EAST GENERALLY - IT COULD SET A MATCH ALIGHT TO THE MIDDLE EAST - AND OF COURSE IT COULD BE SERIOUS FROM THE WEST'S POINT OF VIEW ON OIL SUPPLIES.

Q: WHAT CAN THE UN DO TO SOLVE THE PROBLEM?

A: THERE ARE VARIOUS WAYS IN WHICH THE UN CAN TRY TO SOLVE PROBLEMS, THOUGH ITS NOT ALWAYS VERY SUCCESSFUL. BUT OF ONE THING I AM QUITE SURE: THE UN, SITTING HERE IN SESSION AT THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY, WITH 150 FOREIGN MINISTERS HERE, CANT SIT AROUND AND PRETEND THAT NOTHING IS HAPPENING, OTHERWISE IT MAKES A FARCE OF THE UN. THIS IS UP TO THE SECRETARY GENERAL: I HAD A TALK WITH HIM YESTERDAY AND HE IS VERY CONSCIOUS OF THIS. WHAT ONE WOULD HOPE IS THAT SOMETHING SHOULD BE DONE WHICH WOULD LEAD TO A SETTLEMENT EITHER BY MEDIATION OR IN SOME OTHER FORM. IT MAY VERY WELL BE THAT THE INTERESTS OF MOST OF US HERE IN THE UNITED NATIONS ARE IN A SETTLEMENT, AND THEREFORE IT MAY BE LESS DIFFICULT TO GET SOMETHING GOING THAT IT MIGHT BE IN OTHER CIRCUMSTANCES.

Q: COULD THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL TAKE THE MATTER UP?

A: OH YES. CERTAINLY IT COULD. USUALLY THE PARTY THATS ATTACKED BRINGS THE MATTER TO THE UNITED NATIONS THEMSELVES. BUT IN THIS PARTICULAR CASE IRAN IS HARDLY IN A POSITION TO BRING THE MATTER TO THE UN HAVING FLOUTED THE UN OVER THE HOSTAGE QUESTION. THEREFORE I THINK THERE WILL HAVE TO BE SOME OTHER PROCEDURAL DEVICE, WHEREBY IT CAN BE BROUGHT TO THE ATTENTION OF THE UNITED NATIONS, AND THE CBVIOUS WAY OF DOING IT IS THE SECRETARY GENERAL HIMSELF TO SAY THIS IS A THREAT TO PEACE. IT QUITE CLEARLY IS A THREAT TO PEACE BECAUSE ITS A WAR.

| Q: COULD

Q: COULD THE STRAITS OF HORMUZ BE BLOCKADED?

A: THEY COULD BE; BUT I THINK IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT AND I RATHER DOUBT WHETHER THAT WOULD BE ONE OF THE THINGS THAT WOULD BE DONE.

Q: THERE HAVE BEEN SUGGESTIONS THAT THE SOVIET UNION MIGHT EXPLOIT THE SITUATION OF UNREST IN IRAN AND INDEED THAT THE SOVIET UNION MAY BE BEHIND THE UNREST.

A: I THINK YOU HAVE TO ASSESS WHETHER OR NOT IT WOULD BE TO THE ADVANTAGE OF THE SOVIET UNION AT THIS PARTICULAR MOMENT TO SEE A BREAK UP OF IRAN AND THE FALL OF THE PRESENT ADMINISTRATION. I DONT SUPPOSE THEY PARTICULARLY LIKE THE PRESENT ADMINISTRATION BECAUSE BANI SADR AND KHOMEINI MADE PLAIN THEIR OBJECTIONS TO SOVIET POLICY IN AFGHANISTAN. BUT THE SOVIET UNION LOOKS A BIT FURTHER FORWARD THAN THAT AND I DOUBT WHETHER IT WOULD BE TO THE ADVANTAGE OF THE SOVIET UNION TO SEE THIS CONFLICT SPREAD VERY MUCH.

Q: IS THERE ANYTHING BRITAIN COULD DO TO HELP THE SITUATION AT THIS TIME?

A: IN CONJUNCTION WITH OUR ALLIES I THINK WE CAN USE OUR INFLUENCE TO SEE SOME KIND OF MEDIATION AND IF SOME KIND OF SETTLEMENT IS POSSIBLE. ON OUR OWN I THINK NOT VERY MUCH. WE HAVE WITHDRAWN OUR AMBASSADOR FROM TEHRAN FOR REASONS WHICH YOU KNOW, AND I DONT THINK THAT OUR INFLUENCE IN IRAQ IS GREAT ENOUGH TO MAKE A DIFFERENCE ON OUR OWN WITHOUT OUR ALLIES.

THE MIDDLE EAST.

Q: IN YOUR SPEECH YOU MENTION THE MIDDLE EAST. THERE IS AN IMPRESSION HERE IN THE USA THAT THERE ARE NOW, OR THE POSSIBILITY OF, TWO CONFLICTING PEACE PLANS: ONE EUROPEAN AND THE OTHER THE CAMP DAVID ACCORD, THE AMERICAN BACKED PROPOSAL. IS THERE A REAL CONFLICT BETWEEN THE TWO?

A: THERE MUST NOT BE A REAL CONFLICT. THERE IS NO SOLUTION POSSIBLE IN THE MIDDLE EAST WITHOUT THE INVOLVEMENT OF THE UNITED STATES. WHAT EUROPE IS SEEKING TO DO IS TO BE HELPFUL AND NOT TO CUT ACROSS WHAT THE US IS TRYING TO DO. MR THORN, THE PRESIDENT OF THE NINE FOR THE NEXT SIX MONTHS, HAS BEEN GOING ROUND ON A FACT FINDING MISSION. I HOPE THAT HE WILL COME BACK WITH A CLEARER IDEA OF WHAT IS POSSIBLE - HE HASNT QUITE FINISHED YET. WE MUST THEN SIT DOWN AND WORK OUT WHAT WE THINK WILL BE ACCEPTABLE AND WHAT POSSIBILITIES THERE ARE. I DONT BELIEVE THERE IS ANY LIKELIHOOD OF A PLAN BEING PRODUCED BY EUROPE WHICH IS OBVIOUSLY UNACCEPTABLE TO ALL THE PARTIES. WHATS THE POINT OF THAT? WHAT WE HAVE GOT TO DO IS TO TRY AND BE HELPFUL AND INFLUENCE BOTH SIDES TO COME TO A SETTLEMENT.

AFGHANISTAN.

Q: THE UN SESSION WILL UNDOUBTEDLY DISCUSS AFGHANISTAN. ARE THERE ANY PROSPECTS OF A POLITICAL SOLUTION, ANY INKLINGS THAT THE RUSSIANS MAY BE LEAVING?

A: NO I DONT THINK SO. I THINK THAT IF ANYTHING THE INDICATIONS ARE THAT THE RUSSIANS ARE PREPARING TO STAY. AND THAT I THINK IS VERY SERIOUS BECAUSE WE HAVE MADE IT CLEAR IN THE NATO ALLIANCE AND ELSEWHERE THAT WE DO NOT BELIEVE THE INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN IS ACCEPTABLE, NOR INDEED IS IT IRREVERSIBLE. I AM STILL QUITE SURE



THAT THE PLAN WE PUT FORWARD FOR A NEUTRAL AND INDEPENDENT AFGHAN-  
ISTAN WITH GUARANTEES BY BOTH SIDES OF NON-INTERFERENCE, IS THE  
BEST WAY OF PROCEEDING. FOR ALL I KNOW, SUCH AN AFGHANISTAN MIGHT  
HAVE A GOVERNMENT FRIENDLY TO THE SOVIET UNION - I DONT THINK THAT  
MATTERS AS LONG AS THE AFGHANS WANT THAT GOVERNMENT. THE DIFFICULTY  
IS TO SEE HOW YOU GET TO THAT POINT. ITS BEEN VERY DISAPPOINTING  
THAT THE SOVIET UNION HAS COME OUT OPENLY AGAINST HAVING A CONFERENCE  
ON THE SUBJECT. IN THE NEXT TWO OR THREE WEEKS HERE THE PAKISTANIS  
AND THE ISLAMIC CONFERENCE, WHO ARE OBVIOUSLY MOST CONCERNED WITH  
THIS, WILL BE HAVING DETAILED DISCUSSIONS ABOUT WHAT TO DO NEXT, AND  
WE SHALL BE INVOLVED IN THAT.

#### SOUTH AFRICA.

Q: BRITAIN HAS BEEN CRITICISED BY SOME OF THE THIRD WORLD COUNTRIES  
ABOUT HER RELUCTANCE TO INITIATE ANY CONDEMNATIONS OF APARTHEID,  
OR ACTIONS ON APARTHEID. DO YOU FIND THAT BRITAIN IS IN A SENSITIVE  
POSITION AT THIS TIME?

A: NO NOT A BIT. WE CONDEMN APARTHEID AND I HAVE CONDEMNED IT IN MY  
SPEECH. THERE IS NO QUESTION OF US SUPPORTING APARTHEID. WE ARE  
CONCERNED ABOUT GETTING A SETTLEMENT IN NAMIBIA AND GETTING A CHANGE  
OF POLICY IN SOUTH AFRICA. ITS A QUESTION OF JUDGEMENT ABOUT HOW  
BEST YOU SEE THAT BEING ACHIEVED. WE DONT TAKE THE VIEW THAT TO  
OSTRACISE, ISOLATE SOUTH AFRICA - ANY MORE THAN TO ISOLATE ANY  
COUNTRY WITH WHICH YOU DISAGREE - IS THE RIGHT WAY TO CHANGE ITS  
MIND. IF YOU PUSH THEM INTO A CORNER THEY BECOME MORE OBDURATE. WHAT  
WE WANT TO DO IS ENCOURAGE THOSE IN SOUTH AFRICA WHO DONT AGREE WITH  
THE PRESENT APARTHEID POLICY TO CHANGE IT. I DONT BELIEVE THAT THE  
KIND OF ACTIONS WHICH ARE GOING TO DRIVE THE SOUTH AFRICANS INTO A  
CORNER ARE LIKELY TO ACHIEVE THAT.

#### ZIMBABWE.

Q: ON ZIMBABWE THE AMERICANS HAVENT REALLY PRODUCED AS MUCH AID AS  
HAD BEEN EXPECTED, ECONOMIC AID. IS THERE GOING TO BE A BRITISH  
ATTEMPT TO CREATE A SPECIAL AID FUND WITHIN THE UNITED NATIONS OR  
THROUGH SOME OTHER MEDIA?

A: THERE IS A DONORS CONFERENCE GOING TO TAKE PLACE IN ZIMBABWE IN  
THE NOT TOO DISTANT FUTURE. I THINK IT HAS BEEN RATHER DISAPPOINTING  
WHAT HAS BEEN GIVEN. WE HAVE DONE OUR BEST. WE HAVE GIVEN 180 MILLION  
DOLLARS OVER THREE YEARS, AND HAVE CANCELLED OVER 50 MILLION  
DOLLARS OF DEBTS. SO I DONT THINK WE HAVE DONE TOO BADLY. I  
WISH WE COULD HAVE DONE MORE, BUT OUR SITUATION DOESNT ALLOW IT. BUT  
I DO THINK THAT OTHER COUNTRIES HAVE NOT REALLY HELPED AS MUCH AS  
THEY SHOULD. THE TROUBLE IS THAT WHEN IT LOOKED AS THOUGH EVERYTHING  
WAS GOING WRONG AND IT WAS A DANGER TO PEACE IN SOUTHERN AFRICA  
EVERYBODY WAS PREPARED TO PUT THEIR HAND ON THEIR HEART AND SAY IF IT  
ALL GOES WELL WE WILL HELP YOU. NOW THAT THINGS HAVE TURNED OUT NOT  
TOO BADLY THEY FORGET ABOUT IT AND SAY OH ITS ALL RIGHT DONT  
LETS BOTHER. I DID MAKE THESE OBSERVATIONS THIS MORNING AT THE UNITED  
NATIONS AND I HOPE PERHAPS, IF ANYBODY WAS LISTENING, IT MIGHT HAVE  
SOME EFFECT IN PERHAPS MAKING ONE OR TWO COUNTRIES MORE GENEROUS  
THAN THEY HAVE BEEN.

ENDS  
PARSONS  
FCO/JWH  
MED

LLG NR 76φ/23

FDW G φ79/23

OO ATHENS

GRS 7φφ

CONFIDENTIAL  
FM FCO 231φ55Z SEP 8φ  
TO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 728 OF 23 SEPTEMBER

FOR PS TO PM:

FOLLOWING TELEGRAM NOW REPEATED TO YOU AT REQUEST OF DEPARTMENT  
WAS RECEIVED FROM ABU DHABI TELNO 295 OF 23 SEPTEMBER  
INFO IMMEDIATE DUBAI MODUK  
PRIORITY MUSCAT DOHA BAHRAIN KUWAIT BAGHDAD JEDDA  
INFO SAVING WASHINGTON UKMIS NEW YORK PARIS UKREP BRUSSLES  
MOSCOW

DUBAI TELEGRAM NO 11φ OF 21 SEPTEMBER AND BAGHDAD TELEGRAM  
NO 413 OF 21 SEPTEMBER (NOT TO ALL)

IRAN-IRAQ.

1. IT IS NOT FOR ME TO JUDGE HOW FAR IRAN AND IRAQ WILL GO.  
WE SHOULD, HOWEVER, CONSIDER NOW WHAT MIGHT HAPPEN HERE IF THE  
WORST SHOULD COME TO THE WORST.

2. SO FAR THE PRESS HAS NOT DONE MUCH MORE THAN REPORT EVENTS  
PROMINENTLY, EXCEPT THAT IN A LEADER TODAY'S SEMI-OFFICIAL 'ITTIHAD'  
POINTS TO THE DANGER OF INTERVENTION BY THE GREAT POWERS. THE  
UAE'S RELUCTANCE TO RECEIVE A BRITISH NAVAL VISIT, I THINK,  
REFLECTS INSTINCTIVE PANIC AND A HOPE THAT THE PROBLEM WILL GO  
AWAY (MY TELEGRAM NO 293 OF 23 SEPTEMBER, NOT TO ALL). IT IS  
NOT THOUGHT OUT. HAVING ONLY RETURNED FROM LOCAL LEAVE LATE  
ON 21 SEPTEMBER I HAVE NOT YET HEARD ANY INFORMED REACTION:  
NOR WOULD IT BE HELPFUL TO GRIN LIKE A DOG AND RUN ABOUT THE  
CITY.



3. AS LONG AS A DISPUTE OR EVEN A BATTLE WAS CONFINED TO THE MAINLAND OR THE SHATT AL ARAB, I SHOULD EXPECT THE UAE TO TRY HARD TO KEEP OUT. THEY WOULD HAVE TO SUPPORT IRAQ WITH WORDS IN LINE WITH OTHER GULF STATES, BUT WOULD HOPE TO GO NO FURTHER.

4. IF IT CAME TO THE TUNBS AND ABU MUSA, HOWEVER IT WOULD BE DIFFERENT. IF THE IRAQIS "LIVERATED" THE ISLANDS THE UAE WOULD NOT ONLY HAVE TO ACQUIESCE BUT WOULD PROBABLY ALSO FEEL OBLIGED TO REESTABLISH A PRESENCE ON THEM. WHILE DUBAI WOULD HATE SUCH A COURSE BECAUSE OF HER TRADE WITH IRAN, AND RAS AL KHAIMAH WOULD REJOICE OUT OF JAWASIM IRREDENTISM, THE FEDERAL CONSENSUS WOULD SUPPORT IRAQ, ALTHOUGH DUBAI'S OPPOSITION MIGHT STRAIN ITS VERY EXISTENCE.

5. IN THIS EVENT THERE COULD BE IRANIAN RETALIATION AGAINST TARGETS SUCH AS THE OFFSHORE OIL INSTALLATIONS WHICH THE UAE IS UNABLE TO DEFEND. THIS COULD ENTAIL SOME RISK TO BRITISH LIFE AND PROPERTY.

6. THE CURRENT CONFLICT MAY BE SEEN IN BAGHDAD AS IRAQ'S GOLDEN CHANCE TO ASSERT HER LEADERSHIP OF THE ARABS OF THE GULF, WHICH HAS SEEMED FROM HERE TO BE MORE AND MORE HER AIM. PRESUMABLY THE AMERICANS WILL HAVE TO BE CAUTIOUS. FRANCE AND THE SOVIET UNION, TO WHICH THE LOCAL PRESS SAYS AN IRAQI ENVOY TARIQ AZIZ WAS DESPACHED ON 21 SEPTEMBER, CAN NO DOUBT BE RELIED UPON TO EXPLOIT THE DISPUTE IN DIVERSE WAYS TO THEIR NARROW ADVANTAGE.

7. IF WE OURSELVES WERE NOT FOUND ON THE SIDE OF THE UAE IN THE MATTER OF THE ISLANDS, LAW AND LOGIC WOULD BE OF NO ACCOUNT. FOR A LONG TIME IT WOULD BE HARD IF NOT IMPOSSIBLE FOR US TO PROMOTE ANY SCHEME OF DEFENCE OR SECURITY TO WHICH WE WERE PARTY OR TO BE REGARDED AS DDCREDIBLE PARTNER IN ANYTHING. THE EMIRATES HAVE NOT FORGOTTEN JANUARY 1968, EVEN IF WE HAVE.

8. I HOPE THIS IS ALL A FALSE ALARM. BUT IF NOT THE SOONER WE MAKE OUR MINDS UP THE BETTER. IT IS HARD TO MAKE A RECOMMENDATION BEYOND THE NEGATIVE ONE IN PARAGRAPH 7 ABOVE WITHOUT MORE LCOWLEDGE THAN I HAVE OF IRAQI AND IRANIAN INTENTIONS AND OF THE REACTIONS OF OTHER COUNTRIES IN AND AROUND THE GULF. A SWIFT AND CONCERTED WESTERN RESPONSE WOULD BE IDEAL.

9. SOLVED OR NOT, THE DISPUTE IS A SUBJECT ON WHICH MR JENKIN WILL NEED TO BE BRIEFED FOR HIS IMPENDING VISIT.

CARRINGTON

NNNN

REF MY FDW G 078/23 00 DAR ES SALAAM CAN U CANCEL PSE SHUD HAVE GONE VIA TELEX WILL MAKE NUMBER UP WITH NEXT ONE TKS VM

GR 650

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FROM ABU DHABI 230650Z SEP 80

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 295 OF 23 SEPTEMBER

INFO IMMEDIATE DUBAI, MODUK

PRIORITY MUSCAT, DOHA, BAHRAIN, KUWAIT, BAGHDAD AND  
JEDDA.

SAVING INFO. WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK, PARIS, UKREP BRUSSELS  
AND MOSCOW.

DUBAI TELEGRAM NO 110 OF 21 SEPTEMBER AND BAGHDAD TELEGRAM  
NO 413 OF 21 SEPTEMBER (NOT TO ALL)

IRAN-IRAQ.

1. IT IS NOT FOR ME TO JUDGE HOW FAR IRAN AND IRAQ WILL GO. WE SHOULD, HOWEVER, CONSIDER NOW WHAT MIGHT HAPPEN HERE IF THE WORST SHOULD COME TO THE WORST.
2. SO FAR THE PRESS HAS NOT DONE MUCH MORE THAN REPORT EVENTS PROMINENTLY, EXCEPT THAT IN A LEADER TODAY'S SEMI-OFFICIAL "ITTIHAD" POINTS TO THE DANGER OF INTERVENTION BY THE GREAT POWERS. THE UAE'S RELUCTANCE TO RECEIVE A BRITISH NAVAL VISIT, I THINK, REFLECTS INSTINCTIVE PANIC AND A HOPE THAT THE PROBLEM WILL GO AWAY (MY TELEGRAM NO 293 OF 23 SEPTEMBER, NOT TO ALL). IT IS NOT THOUGHT OUT. HAVING ONLY RETURNED FROM LOCAL LEAVE LATE ON 21 SEPTEMBER I HAVE NOT YET HEARD ANY INFORMED REACTION; NOR WOULD IT BE HELPFUL TO GRIN LIKE A DOG AND RUN ABOUT THE CITY.
3. AS LONG AS A DISPUTE OR EVEN A BATTLE WAS CONFINED TO THE MAINLAND OR THE SHATT AL ARAB, I SHOULD EXPECT THE UAE TO TRY HARD TO KEEP OUT. THEY WOULD HAVE TO SUPPORT IRAQ WITH WORDS IN LINE WITH OTHER GULF STATES, BUT WOULD HOPE TO GO NO FURTHER.
4. IF IT CAME TO THE TUNBS AND ABU MUSA, HOWEVER IT WOULD BE DIFFERENT. IF THE IRAQIS "LIBERATED" THE ISLANDS THE UAE WOULD NOT ONLY HAVE TO ACQUIESCE BUT WOULD PROBABLY ALSO FEEL OBLIGED TO REESTABLISH A PRESENCE ON THEM. WHILE DUBAI WOULD HATE SUCH A COURSE BECAUSE OF HER TRADE WITH IRAN, AND RAS AL KHAIMAH WOULD REJOICE OUT OF JAWASIM IRREDENTISM, THE FEDERAL CONSENSUS WOULD SUPPORT IRAQ, ALTHOUGH DUBAI'S OPPOSITION MIGHT STRAIN ITS VERY EXISTENCE.
5. IN THIS EVENT THERE COULD BE IRANIAN RETALIATION AGAINST TARGETS SUCH AS THE OFFSHORE OIL INSTALLATIONS WHICH THE UAE IS UNABLE TO DEFEND. THIS COULD ENTAIL SOME RISK TO BRITISH LIFE AND PROPERTY.

CONFIDENTIAL

16.



# CONFIDENTIAL

6. THE CURRENT CONFLICT MAY BE SEEN IN BAGHDAD AS IRAQ'S GOLDEN CHANCE TO ASSERT HER LEADERSHIP OF THE ARABS OF THE GULF, WHICH HAS SEEMED FROM HERE TO BE MORE AND MORE HER AIM. PRESUMABLY THE AMERICANS WILL HAVE TO BE CAUTIOUS. FRANCE AND THE SOVIET UNION, TO WHICH THE LOCAL PRESS SAYS AN IRAQI ENVOY TARIQ AZIZ WAS DESPATCHED ON 21 SEPTEMBER, CAN NO DOUBT BE RELIED UPON TO EXPLOIT THE DISPUTE IN DIVERSE WAYS TO THEIR NARROW ADVANTAGE.

7. IF WE OURSELVES WERE NOT FOUND ON THE SIDE OF THE UAE IN THE MATTER OF THE ISLANDS, LAW AND LOGIC WOULD BE OF NO ACCOUNT. FOR A LONG TIME IT WOULD BE HARD IF NOT IMPOSSIBLE FOR US TO PROMOTE ANY SCHEME OF DEFENCE OR SECURITY TO WHICH WE WERE PARTY OR TO BE REGARDED AS A CREDIBLE PARTNER IN ANYTHING. THE EMIRATES HAVE NOT FORGOTTEN JANUARY 1968, EVEN IF WE HAVE.

8. I HOPE THIS IS ALL A FALSE ALARM. BUT IF NOT THE SOONER WE MAKE OUR MINDS UP THE BETTER. IT IS HARD TO MAKE A RECOMMENDATION BEYOND THE NEGATIVE ONE IN PARAGRAPH 7 ABOVE WITHOUT MORE KNOWLEDGE THAN I HAVE OF IRAQI AND IRANIAN INTENTIONS AND OF THE REACTIONS OF OTHER COUNTRIES IN AND AROUND THE GULF. A SWIFT AND CONCERTED WESTERN RESPONSE WOULD BE IDEAL.

9. SOLVED OR NOT, THE DISPUTE IS A SUBJECT ON WHICH MR JENKIN WILL NEED TO BE BRIEFED FOR HIS IMPENDING VISIT.

10 PLEASE REPEAT FURTHER AS NEEDS BE.

FCO REGISTRY PLEASE PASS SAVING TO WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK PARIS UKREP BRUSSELS AND MOSCOW.

ROBERTS

REPEATED AS REQUESTED

## MIDDLE EAST STANDARD

MED	MAED
NENAD	ES & SD
NAD	ERD
UND	ECON D
EBSD	CONS D
EGD	CONS EM UNIT
WED	CABINET OFFICE

COPIES TO

CRE DOT  
DOT (SHIPPING POLICY)

[ COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING ST ]

2

# CONFIDENTIAL

FDW G 086/23

OO ABU DHABI

OO MUSCAT

OO DOHA

OO BAHRAIN

OO KUWAIT

OO JEDDA

OO ATHENS

OO BAGHDAD

OO DUBAI

GR 120

SECRET

FM FCO 231230Z SEP 80

TO IMMEDIATE ABU DHABI

TELEGRAM NUMBER 194 OF 23 SEPTEMBER

AND TO MUSCAT DOHA BAHRAIN KUWAIT JEDDA

INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK ATHENS BAGHDAD DUBAI ROUTINE  
WASHINGTON PARIS BONN

ABU DHABI TELNO 295 (NOT TO ALL): IRAN/IRAQ

1. YOU WILL BE RECEIVING TELEGRAPHICALLY THROUGH SEPARATE CHANNELS A CIG ASSESSMENT AGREED ON 22 SEPTEMBER.
2. WE SHOULD BE GRATEFUL FOR YOUR VIEWS ON THE CONCLUSIONS OF THIS ASSESSMENT, AND PARTICULARLY THOSE PASSAGES CONCERNING IRAQI MOTIVES AND INTENTIONS. PLEASE DISCUSS THE SITUATION (BUT NOT THE ASSESSMENT ITSELF) AS NECESSARY WITH HOST GOVERNMENTS AND REPORT THEIR ATTITUDE.
3. FOR KUWAIT. YOUR TELNO 393. SABAH AL AHMAD HAS LEFT LONDON FOR KUWAIT. GRATEFUL YOU CONTACT HIM ON HIS RETURN FOR HIS VIEWS.
4. PLEASE REPEAT YOUR REPLIES TO UKMIS NEW YORK FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

CARRINGTON

NNNN



CONFIDENTIAL

*Prime Minister*  
*MA*

GRS 360

CONFIDENTIAL

FM MOSCOW 231515Z SEP 80

TO PRIORITY F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 578 OF 23RD SEPTEMBER

FOR INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK, UKDEL NATO AND  
ROUTINE BONN, PARIS AND BAGHDAD. *ms*

YOUR TEL TO WASHINGTON NO 1534: IRAQ/IRAN.

1. THE IRAQI DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER AZIZ ARRIVED IN MOSCOW ON 21 SEPTEMBER. HE HAD A MEETING YESTERDAY WITH PONOMAREV AND WITH FIRST DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER MALTSEV. THE SOVIET PRESS ANNOUNCED THE FACT BUT GAVE NO DETAILS. HE LEFT AGAIN ON 22 SEPTEMBER.

2. THE SOVIET PRESS CONTINUES TO PRINT THE VIEWS OF THE OPPOSING SIDES AT ROUGHLY EQUAL LENGTH WITHOUT COMMENT. HOWEVER, SOME SLIGHT PRO-IRAQI SHADING MAY BE SEEN IN THE SELECTION OF RECENT REPORTS FROM BAGHDAD WHICH PRESENT THE IRAQI ACTION AS LARGELY DEFENSIVE. IN A RECENT CONVERSATION WITH A MEMBER OF CHANCERY, A SOVIET MFA OFFICIAL SIMILARLY APPEARED TO BE LEANING SLIGHTLY TOWARDS THE IRAQI POSITION, POINTING OUT THAT THE IRANIANS HAD BY THEIR OWN ADMISSION FAILED TO FULFIL THEIR AID OF THE 1975 ALGIERS AGREEMENT AND DESCRIBING THE IRANIAN SUGGESTION THAT THE SOVIET UNION SHOULD CEASE ARMS SUPPLIES TO IRAQ AS "ILLOGICAL" IN VIEW OF THE BILATERAL FRIENDSHIP TREATY.

3. I AGREE GENERALLY WITH THE ASSESSMENT OF THE SOVIET POSITION IN PARA 3 OF TUR. THE POSSIBILITY OF DIRECT SOVIET MILITARY INTERVENTION IS CLEARLY ONE WHICH NEEDS TO BE TAKEN SERIOUSLY. THE EXAMPLE OF AFGHANISTAN SUGGESTS THAT THEY WOULD NOT EXCLUDE THIS AS A POSSIBLE OPTION IF THEY BELIEVED IT WOULD SERVE THEIR POLITICAL AND SECURITY INTERESTS, BUT IT IS DIFFICULT TO IMAGINE THAT IN PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES THEY COULD REACH SUCH A CONCLUSION. THEIR MAIN LONG-TERM CONCERN IS PROBABLY TO SEE THE WEAKENING

/ON

CONFIDENTIAL

# CONFIDENTIAL

ON F KHOMEINI, AND A FURTHER DETERIORATION IN IRAN'S INTERNAL POSITION, WITH THE POSSIBILITY THAT THIS WOULD FURTHER WEAKEN IRANIAN OPPOSITION TO THE SOVIET OCCUPATION OF AFGHANISTAN AND IN DUE COURSE OPEN THE WAY TO A TAKE OVER BY THE PRO-SOVIET ELEMENTS IN IRAN ITSELF. THEY ARE THEREFORE LIKELY TO CONCLUDE THAT THEIR INTERESTS WILL BE BETTER SERVED BY AVOIDING INVOLVEMENT AND ALLOWING THE IRAQUIS TO TEACH THE IRANIANS A LESSON RATHER THAN BY ANY OCCUPATION OF IRANIAN TERRITORY BY THEMSELVES. THEY MIGHT AT SOME POINT - BUT NOT YET - BE TEMPTED TO OFFER MEDIATION AS A MEANS OF EXTENDING THEIR OWN INFLUENCE. FOLLOWING AZIZ'S VISIT, THEY MAY HAVE GOT A REASONABLY CLEAR PICTURE OF IRAQI INTENTIONS AND HAVE INDICATED THE LIMITS OF THEIR ACQUIESCENCE.

KEEBLE

**THIS TELEGRAM  
WAS NOT  
ADVANCED**

IRAN/IRAQ

STANDARD

MED

NENAD

NAD

UND

EESD

ECD

WED

MAED

ES&SD

ERD

ECON D

CONS D

CONS EM UNIT

CABINET OFFICE

2

# CONFIDENTIAL



GROUPS 350

CENTROFORM LONDON 231003Z

UNCLASSIFIED

RETRACT 23323 SEP

ITEM: LORD CARRINGTON DISCUSSES IRAN/IRAQ WITH MR WALDHEIM

BY ROBIN GORDON-WALKER LPS DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENT, NEW YORK TUESDAY SEPTEMBER 23 (TWENTYTHREE) (LPS):

BRITAIN'S FOREIGN SECRETARY, LORD CARRINGTON, DISCUSSED THE FIGHTING BETWEEN IRAQ AND IRAN DURING A MEETING HERE WITH THE UNITED NATIONS SECRETARY-GENERAL, MR KURT WALDHEIM. LORD CARRINGTON ARRIVED IN NEW YORK YESTERDAY AND WILL BE ADDRESSING THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY TODAY.

THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT IS CONCERNED ABOUT THE IRAN/IRAQ SITUATION. LORD CARRINGTON BELIEVES THAT THE UN MUST RESPOND TO THIS POTENTIALLY VERY SERIOUS SITUATION AND IN HIS MEETING WITH MR WALDHEIM THE QUESTION OF HOW IT COULD BE BROUGHT BEFORE THE SECURITY COUNCIL WAS DISCUSSED.

LORD CARRINGTON ALSO HAD A MEETING WITH THE PAKISTANI FOREIGN MINISTER MR AGHA SHAHI. THEY ALSO DISCUSSED THE UN RESPONSE TO THE IRAN/IRAQ SITUATION. PAKISTAN IS AN INFLUENTIAL MEMBER OF THE ISLAMIC GROUP AT THE UNITED NATIONS WHICH INCLUDES THE COMBATANT COUNTRIES.

THE CONTINUED SOVIET OCCUPATION OF AFGHANISTAN WAS ALSO DISCUSSED AT LORD CARRINGTON'S MEETINGS WITH MR WALDHEIM AND MR AGHA SHAHI, PARTICULARLY HOW THE ISSUE SHOULD BE HANDLED AT THE CURRENT SESSION OF THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY. SINCE THE SOVIET INVASION LAST DECEMBER THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY HAS ADOPTED RESOLUTIONS URGING WITHDRAWAL AND THE RESTORATION OF AFGHANISTAN'S INDEPENDENCE AND THE BRITISH FOREIGN SECRETARY BELIEVES THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY MUST SUSTAIN DISCUSSION OF AFGHANISTAN AT THE CURRENT SESSION.

A NUMBER OF OTHER INTERNATIONAL ISSUES CAME UP DURING LORD CARRINGTON'S MEETING WITH MR WALDHEIM - INCLUDING THE MIDDLE EAST, CAMBODIA AND NAMIBIA. THEY SPOKE ABOUT DR WALDHEIM'S LETTER OF SEPTEMBER 19 TO THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT PROPOSING THAT A TEAM OF SENIOR UN OFFICIALS GO TO SOUTH AFRICA TO DISCUSS IMPLEMENTATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS PLAN FOR NAMIBIA'S FUTURE. THE PROPOSED DATE FOR THE TEAM'S VISIT IS SEPTEMBER 29 TO OCTOBER 4.

LORD CARRINGTON IS IN NEW YORK PRINCIPALLY FOR HIS ADDRESS TO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY TODAY. HE IS ALSO SEEING A NUMBER OF OTHER FOREIGN MINISTERS AND WILL HAVE DISCUSSIONS WITH HIS EUROPEAN COMMUNITY COLLEAGUES ABOUT THE FUTURE COURSE OF THE NINE'S INITIATIVE ON THE MIDDLE EAST. (LPS)

ENDS

CENTROFORM LDN

A

M

FDW G 104/23 ~~SECRET~~

ATHENS DESKBY 231500Z

RR MOSCOW

RR BAGHDAD

GRS 415

CONFIDENTIAL

DESKBY UKMIS NEW YORK AND ATHENS 231500Z

FM FCO 231245Z SEPTEMBER 80

TO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK

TELEGRAM NUMBER 730 OF 23 SEPTEMBER

AND TO IMMEDIATE ATHENS (FOR PRIME MINISTER)

INFO TO WASHINGTON, PARIS, BONN, MOSCOW, BAGHDAD, NEW DELHI,  
ISLAMABAD, UKDEL NATO.

FOLLOWING FOR SECRETARY OF STATE  
IRAQ/IRAN

1. WE HELD A MEETING THIS MORNING TO DISCUSS THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE FIGHTING. WE AGREED A LINE FOR NEWS DEPARTMENT WHICH IS BEING TELEGRAPHED SEPARATELY. THE ADVICE TO BRITISH SUBJECTS AND SHIPPING/AVIATION INTERESTS IS ALSO BEING TELEGRAPHED SEPARATELY.
2. WE AGREED THAT IT WOULD BE IN THE INTERESTS OF THE UK AND THE WEST AS A WHOLE IF THE SECURITY COUNCIL COULD MEET SOON TO URGE AN END TO THE FIGHTING. BUT IT SEEMS POSSIBLE THAT NEITHER SIDE WILL WANT TO TAKE THE QUESTION TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL UNLESS AND UNTIL IT FINDS ITSELF CLEARLY ON THE LOSING SIDE. MEANWHILE CONTINUATION OF THE CONFLICT COULD HAVE GRAVE EFFECTS, PARTICULARLY IF THE INTERRUPTION OF CRUDE SHIPMENTS FROM THE GULF HARMS KUWAIT, WHOSE ECONOMY IS DEPENDENT ON GAS ASSOCIATED WITH CRUDE PRODUCTION, OR IF THE IRAQIS TRY TO EJECT THE IRANIANS FROM ABU MUSA AND THE TUNBS, WITH RESULTING FIGHTING IN THE STRAITS OF HORMUZ.
3. WHETHER IT IS POSSIBLE TO MOUNT AN EFFECTIVE EFFORT IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL MAY DEPEND ON THE RUSSIAN ATTITUDE. OUR INITIAL VIEW IS THAT THE RUSSIANS WILL BE VERY CAUTIOUS ABOUT SEEKING TO EXPLOIT THE SITUATION FOR SELFISH ENDS BUT YOU WILL WISH TO SOUND OUT GROMYKO ON THIS. AS IRAQ'S PRINCIPAL SUPPLIER OF WEAPONS, THEY ARE IN A POSITION TO EXERT INFLUENCE ON HER.
4. FOR YOUR DISCUSSION WITH RAO, IT MIGHT BE WORTH FLOATING THE IDEA OF AN INDIAN INITIATIVE TO MEDIATE. THE INDIANS ENJOY GOOD RELATIONS WITH THE IRAQIS AND HAVE A STRONG INTEREST IN KEEPING IN WITH THE IRANIANS AS POTENTIAL OIL SUPPLIERS.
5. THE KUWAITI AMBASSADOR TOLD MR HURD THIS MORNING THAT HIS GOVERNMENT WERE SENDING A SENIOR OFFICIAL TO SAUDI ARABIA IN AN ATTEMPT TO LAUNCH AN EFFORT AT MEDIATION BY THE ISLAMIC COUNCIL. THIS MIGHT BE A BETTER BET.
6. DESPITE OUR STRONG INTEREST IN AN EARLY SETTLEMENT, WE SEE DANGER IN ANY MOVE BY THE UK ALONE TO PROMOTE A SOLUTION OR EVEN A SECURITY COUNCIL DEBATE AT THIS STAGE. THE IRAQIS WOULD CLEARLY RESENT SUCH A MOVE AND MIGHT ACCUSE US OF SEEKING TO REVERSE OUR FORMER ROLE IN THE GULF AND RAKE UP OLD CHARGES THAT WE ALLOWED THE IRANIANS TO TAKE THE ISLANDS. IT WOULD BE BEST IF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL WERE TO TAKE THE INITIATIVE IN CALLING FOR THE COUNCIL.

CARRINGTON



ADVANCE COPY

IRAN/IRAQ

ADVANCE COPIES

22

PS  
PS/SIR I GILMOUR  
PS/MR HURD  
PS/PUS  
SIR E YOUDE  
SIR J GRAHAM  
MR J C MOBERLY  
MR BRAITHWAITE  
HD/MED  
HD/NENAD  
HD/UND  
HD/CONS D  
CONSULAR EMERGENCY UNIT  
HD/ES & SD  
HD/MAED  
HD/DEF D  
PUSD (2)  
NEWS D

NO 10 DOWNING STREET  
CABINET OFFICE DIO

*Prime Minister*

*MAD*  
*26/11*

*ms*

GR 240

CONFIDENTIAL

FROM KUWAIT 231300Z SEPT

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELNO 405 OF 23/9/80,

INFO BAGHDAD, ABU DHABI, BAHRAIN AND JEDDA.

**IRAN/IRAQ: KUWAIT MILITARY REACTION**

1. THE KUWAITIS HAVE PLACED THEIR ARMED FORCES ON A STATE OF GENERAL READINESS AND MADE A NUMBER OF PRECAUTIONARY DEPLOYMENTS (SEE PARA 2). MINISTER OF DEFENCE SHEIKH SALEM HAS SAID PRIVATELY THAT RELATIONS WITH IRAQ ARE GOOD AND THAT HE WOULD EXPECT IRAQ TO AVOID INVOLVING KUWAIT IN THE WAR. KUWAIT HAS AGREED TO AN IRAQI, BUT NOT AN IRANIAN, REQUEST FOR FIGHTER AIR SPACE AND, IF NECESSARY, REFUELLING FACILITIES.

2. DETAILED DEPLOYMENTS ARE AS FOLLOWS

(I) TANKS: 35 BDE HAS 146 CHIEFTAIN TANKS ON FULL STANDBY. THESE ARE BEING MOVED TO POSITION 10-20 MLS SOUTH OF THE NORTHERN BORDER (WITH IRAQ) AT THE RATE OF ONE REGIMENT PER DAY, UNDER COVER OF DARKNESS.

(II) INFANTRY: AT LEAST ONE INFANTRY BATTALION (AND POSSIBLY TWO) WAS MOVED TO FALLAKA ON 22 SEPT UNDER COMMAND OF COL SALEM TURKI.

(II) INFANTRY: AT LEAST ONE INFANTRY BATTALION (AND POSSIBLY TWO) WAS MOVED TO FAILAKA ON 22 SEPT UNDER COMMAND OF COL SALEM TURKI. KUWAIT'S INTENTION HERE WOULD BE TO PREVENT AN IRANIAN AMPHIBIOUS ASSAULT. THERE ARE TROOPS AND POLICE ON BUBIYAN (IN UNKNOWN BUT PROBABLY SMALL NUMBERS) ARMED WITH HEAVY MACHINE GUNS AND ANTI-TANK WEAPONS (THE LATTER AS A DEFENCE AGAINST LANDING OR HOVER CRAFT)

(III) AIR FORCE: REGULAR BORDER PATROLS AND SEARCH AND RESCUE HELICOPTER STAND BY HAVE BEEN STEPPED UP.

3. POLICE DEALT QUICKLY AND EFFECTIVELY WITH A SMALL DEMONSTRATION OUTSIDE THE IRAQI EMBASSY THIS MORNING. NO FURTHER INFORMATION YET AVAILABLE.

BALFOUR

NNNN



LLG 766/23

FDW G 095/23

OO ATHENS

GRS 270

UNCLASSIFIED

FM F C O 231325Z SEP 80

TO IMMEDIATE ATHENS

TELEGRAM NUMBER 167 OF 23 SEPTEMBER

FOR ALEXANDER

FOLLOWING TELEGRAM NOW REPEATED TO YOU AT REQUEST OF DEPT  
WAS RECEIVED FROM BAGHDAD TELEGRAM NUMBER 421 OF 23 SEPTEMBER

INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK

INFO PRIORITY KUWAIT JEDDA AMMAN DAMASCUS ANKARA WASHINGTON

MOSCOW UKDEL NATO

IRAQ/IRAN

1. THE REVOLUTIONARY COMMAND COUNCIL ISSUED A STATEMENT ON 22 SEPTEMBER INSTRUCTING THE IRAQI ARMED FORCES TO "DIRECT DETERRENT STRIKES AGAINST IRANIAN MILITARY TARGETS IN ORDER TO FOIL THE RACIST PERSIAN REGIME'S DESIGNS ON IRAQ'S SOVEREIGNTY OVER ITS NATIONAL TERRITORY, BOTH LAND AND WATER".
2. THE INSTRUCTIONS WERE "IN RESPONSE TO THE IRANIANS' RECKLESS MILITARY OPERATIONS, THEIR ATTEMPTS TO INTERRUPT NAVIGATION IN THE SHATT AL ARAB BY FIRING ON MERCHANT SHIPS, THEIR EXTENSIVE AIR ATTACKS ON THE IRAQI ARMY, THEIR ANNOUNCEMENT OF A GENERAL CALL-UP, AND THE CLOSURE OF IRANIAN AIR SPACE - ALL OF WHICH INDICATES THAT THE IRANIANS INTEND TO BROADEN THE SCOPE OF THE CONFLICT UNTIL IT REACHES A STATE OF WAR". IRAQ WOULD AVOID STRIKING AT CIVILIAN TARGETS, PROVIDED THE IRANIANS CEASE ATTACKING CIVILIAN TARGETS IN IRAQ.
3. THE COMMUNIQUE GOES ON TO SAY THAT THE IRAQI ARMED FORCES WOULD "WITHDRAW FROM ANY IRANIAN TERRITORIES IN WHICH DEFENSIVE MILITARY ARRANGEMENTS MAKE AN IRAQI PRESENCE ESSENTIAL, AS SOON AS IRAN RECOGNISES IRAQ'S SOVEREIGNTY OVER ITS TERRITORY AND RESPECTS ITS VITAL INTERESTS".
4. SEVERAL OBSERVERS HERE POINT TO THIS LAST SENTENCE AS A CLUE TO IRAQ'S REAL INTENTIONS, I.E., AN OFFER TO WITHDRAW FROM CERTAIN NEWLY ACQUIRED BORDER AREAS IN RETURN FOR IRANIAN RECOGNITION, EVEN IF TACIT, OF IRAQ'S CLAIMS TO THE SHATT. LAST SENTENCE OF PARA 9 OF YOUR TEL NO 169 TO UKDEL NATO (NOT TO ALL) SEEMS EXACTLY RIGHT.

CARRINGTON

NNNN

LLG NR 765/23

TO OO ATHENS  
OO BAGHDAD  
RR ABUDHABI  
RR ADDISABABA  
RR AMMAN  
RR ANKARA  
RR BAHRAIN  
RR BEIRUT  
RR BELGRADE  
RR CAIRO  
RR DAMASCUS  
RR DOHA  
RR DUBAI  
RR ISLAMABAD  
RR JEDDA  
RR JERUSALEM  
RR KHARTOUM  
RR KUWAIT  
RR MUSCAT  
RR ROME  
RR TELAVIV

GROUPS 37φ  
FM CENTROFORM LONDON 23 14φ5  
UNCLASSIFIED  
RETRACT 25323SEPT

FCO PRESS CONFERENCE (EXTRACT)

IRAQ/IRAN FIGHTING

SPOKESMAN SAID THAT FCO HAD JUST RECEIVED A REPORT FROM THE BRITISH EMBASSY IN BAGHDAD THAT TWO BRITONS HAD BEEN KILLED AND ANOTHER INJURED DURING AN IRANIAN BOMB ATTACK ON THE ZUBAIR PETROCHEMICAL COMPLEX NEAR BASRA EARLY TODAY. ANSWERING QUESTIONS ABOUT THE BRITISH COMMUNITY IN IRAQ, SPOKESMAN SAID THAT THERE WERE ABOUT 1,000 BRITISH CITIZENS IN BAGHDAD AND SOME 500 ELSEWHERE IN THE COUNTRY. THESE NUMBERS WERE NECESSARILY APPROXIMATE, AS A LOT OF PEOPLE HAD NOT (NOT) REGISTERED WITH THE EMBASSY ALTHOUGH THEY WERE NOW COMING TO DO SO. THE EMBASSY WAS IN CLOSE CONTACT WITH THE COMMUNITY WHICH WAS BEING ADVISED TO CARRY ON AS NORMAL BUT TO BE CAREFUL TO OBEY INSTRUCTIONS FROM THE IRAQI AUTHORITIES ABOUT STAYING IN DOORS DURING AIR RAIDS ETC. ASKED ABOUT BRITISH SHIPPING, SPOKESMAN SAID HE UNDERSTOOD THAT THE DEPT OF TRADE, THROUGH THE BRITISH COUNCIL OF SHIPPING, HAD ADVISED BRITISH VESSELS TO STAY AWAY FROM THE AREA AND THOSE IN BASRA TO STAY PUT. BRITISH SHIPPING WAS ALSO BEING ADVISED TO KEEP OUT OF IRANIAN WATERS WHICH WERE REPORTED TO HAVE BEEN DECLARED A WAR ZONE BY THE IRANIAN AUTHORITIES. ASKED WHETHER BRITAIN WOULD RAISE THE MATTER AT THE SECURITY COUNCIL, SPOKESMAN SAID HE THOUGHT THE CONFLICT WOULD BE A SUBJECT FOR DISCUSSION AMONG DELEGATES BUT WHETHER THE MATTER WAS FORMALLY BROUGHT TO THE ATTENTION OF THE UN REQUIRED FURTHER CONSIDERATION. LORD CARRINGTON WAS AT THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY AND HAD SEEN THE SECRETARY GENERAL, DR WALDHEIM YESTERDAY. FCO UNDERSTOOD THAT THE SECRETARY GENERAL WAS IN TOUCH WITH BOTH PARTIES THROUGH THEIR REPRESENTATIVES IN NEW YORK. ASKED WHETHER HE HAD ANY INFORMATION THAT THE US HOSTAGES IN IRAN HAD BEEN RELEASED, SPOKESMAN SAID THAT HE HAD SEEN THE REPORTS TO THAT EFFECT BUT HAD NO (NO) INFORMATION ABOUT THEIR ACCURACY.

CENTROFORM LONDON



FOLLOWING TELEGRAM NOW REPEATED TO YOU AT REQUEST OF PRIVATE SECRETARY WAS RECEIVED FROM UKMIS NEW YORK TELEGRAM NUMBER 1331 OF 22 SEPTEMBER

AND TO PRIORITY WASHINGTON, MOSCOW, KABUL, ISLAMABAD, PARIS, BONN, PEKING, JEDDA, NEW DELHI, TOKYO

FOLLOWING FROM PRIVATE SECRETARY

SECRETARY OF STATE'S TALKS WITH AGA SHAHI: M I P T

AFGHANISTAN.

1. AGA SHAHI SAID THAT THE RUSSIANS SEEMED OPPOSED TO HIS IDEA OF AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE, WHICH THEY HAD DESCRIBED AS VAGUE, A DIPLOMATIC TRICK AND NOT THE WAY TO SOLVE THE PROBLEM. THEY WERE INSISTING ON THEIR MAY 14 PROPOSALS. DESCRIBING THE ORIGIN OF THE PAKISTANI FOREIGN SECRETARY'S VISIT TO MOSCOW (ISLAMABAD TELNO 1295), AGA SHAHI SAID HE HAD TOLD THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR THAT HE WAS INTERESTED IN A HIGH-LEVEL DIALOGUE, PROVIDED THE RUSSIANS WERE OPEN-MINDED. BUT THE PAKISTANIS RESENTED THE SOVIET LEAK OF THEIR CONFERENCE PROPOSALS. HE HAD DECLINED AN INVITATION TO GO TO MOSCOW HIMSELF, BUT HAD AGREED TO AN ALTERNATIVE SOVIET PROPOSAL TO SEND A DELEGATION, OSTENSIBLY TO DISCUSS GENERAL ASSEMBLY BUSINESS. IT WAS DURING THIS VISIT THAT FIRYUBIN HAD REJECTED A CONFERENCE AS AN OPPORTUNITY BY THE CHINESE AND THE AMERICANS TO FISH IN TROUBLED WATERS.
2. AGA SHAHI SAID THAT THE RUSSIANS SEEMED EQUALLY OPPOSED TO A SPECIAL COMMITTEE OF THE UNITED NATIONS, OR TO THE APPOINTMENT OF A SPECIAL COMMITTEE OF THE UNITED NATIONS, OR TO THE APPOINTMENT OF A SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL. THEY MIGHT, HOWEVER, REACT DIFFERENTLY TO A REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL NOT MANDATED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY. HIS FUNCTION WOULD BE TO VISIT THE AREA AND SEE WHETHER THERE WAS ANY COMMON GROUND BETWEEN THE MAY 14 PROPOSALS AND THOSE FOR A NON-ALIGNED, INDEPENDENT AFGHANISTAN AS CALLED FOR IN THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY'S RESOLUTION OF JANUARY 1980.
3. THE RUSSIANS SEEMED TO BY TOYING WITH THE IDEA OF TWO U.N RESOLUTIONS. THE FIRST WOULD BE "PROPAGANDISTIC", CONCENTRATING ON WITHDRAWAL, AND THE SECOND WOULD SPELL OUT THE PRINCIPLES OF A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT. THE DANGER WAS THAT THEY MIGHT USE THE SECOND RESOLUTION, WHICH MIGHT SECURE A LARGER MAJORITY, TO NEUTRALISE THE FIRST, AND EQUATE SOVIET INTERVENTION WITH ALLEGED OUTSIDE INTERFERENCE. THE PAKISTANIS WERE THEREFORE THINKING OF A SINGLE RESOLUTION. THIS WOULD RECALL THE RESOLUTION OF 14 JANUARY AND REITERATE THE NEED FOR WITHDRAWAL OF FOREIGN TROOPS, BUT GO ON TO LIST THE PRINCIPLES FOR A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT, EG RESPECT FOR INDEPENDENCE AND THE NON-ALIGNED STATUS OF AFGHANISTAN: RESPECT FOR THE RIGHT OF THE AFGHAN PEOPLE TO DECIDE THEIR OWN POLITICAL SYSTEM, FREE FROM OUTSIDE INTERFERENCE; THE NEED TO CREATE CONDITIONS WHICH WOULD PERMIT REFUGEES TO RETURN TO THEIR HOMES; THE NEED TO CONSIDER THE QUESTION OF MUTUAL GUARANTEES OF NON-INTERFERENCE; AND MUTUAL RESPECT FOR TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY AND SOVEREIGNTY (AGA SHAHI THOUGHT IT POSSIBLE THAT BY MEANS OF THIS LAST FORMULA THE RUSSIANS MIGHT IN EFFECT ACCEPT THE DURAND LINE). THE RESOLUTION WOULD END BY CALLING ON ALL PARTIES AND INTERESTED MEMBER STATES TO CONTINUE THEIR EFFORTS TO FIND A PEACEFUL SOLUTION CONSISTENT WITH THESE PRINCIPLES.
4. AGA SHAHI'S INTENTION WAS TO DISCUSS THESE IDEAS FIRST WITH SELECTED ISLAMIC COUNTRIES AND ALSO WITH ONE OR TWO KEY NON-ALIGNED, EG YUGOSLAVIA, AND THEN AT THE ISLAMIC CONFERENCE ON 6 OCTOBER. IN THE LIGHT OF THE SUPPORT OBTAINED, THE RESOLUTION COULD BE LAUNCHED AND THE DEBATE ON THIS ITEM CONDUCTED IN LATE OCTOBER/EARLY NOVEMBER, BUT IN ANY CASE BEFORE 15 NOVEMBER WHEN ARAB INTEREST WOULD SWITCH TO THE ARAB/ISRAEL PROBLEM.
5. AGA SHAHI SAID THAT THE RUSSIANS HAD AGAIN TRIED TO ENGINEER A MEETING BETWEEN HIM AND THE AFGHAN FOREIGN MINISTER. AGA SHAHI HAD MADE IT CLEAR THAT HE WOULD ONLY MEET DOST IN HIS CAPACITY AS A REPRESENTATIVE OF THE STANDING COMMITTEE OF THE ISLAMIC CONFERENCE, AND IN THE PRESENCE OF CHATTY (THE SECRETARY-GENERAL) DOST HIMSELF WOULD ONLY HAVE THE STATUS OF REPRESENTATIVE OF THE PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC PARTY.

6. MEANWHILE, THE ROMANIANS WERE STILL TRYING TO PROMOTE A CONFERENCE CONCENTRATING ON IRAN, PAKISTAN AND AFGHANISTAN. THIS AGA SHAHI RULED OUT. HOWEVER, 8 OR 9 COUNTRIES COULD PROVIDE A NUCLEUS FOR A CONFERENCE. THE PAKISTANIS WANTED ALL THE PERMANENT MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL, WHICH THE RUSSIANS REJECTED AS INTERNATIONALISING A PROBLEM WHICH THEY WISHED TO KEEP LOCAL. THE NON-ALIGNED REPRESENTATIVES MIGHT INCLUDE



FIND A PEACEFUL SOLUTION CONSISTENT WITH THESE PRINCIPLES.

4. AGA SHAHI'S INTENTION WAS TO DISCUSS THESE IDEAS FIRST WITH SELECTED ISLAMIC COUNTRIES AND ALSO WITH ONE OR TWO KEY NON-ALIGNED, EG YUGOSLAVIA, AND THEN AT THE ISLAMIC CONFERENCE ON 6 OCTOBER. IN THE LIGHT OF THE SUPPORT OBTAINED, THE RESOLUTION COULD BE LAUNCHED AND THE DEBATE ON THIS ITEM CONDUCTED IN LATE OCTOBER/EARLY NOVEMBER, BUT IN ANY CASE BEFORE 15 NOVEMBER WHEN ARAB INTEREST WOULD SWITCH TO THE ARAB/ISRAEL PROBLEM.

5. AGA SHAHI SAID THAT THE RUSSIANS HAD AGAIN TRIED TO ENGINEER A MEETING BETWEEN HIM AND THE AFGHAN FOREIGN MINISTER. AGA SHAHI HAD MADE IT CLEAR THAT HE WOULD ONLY MEET DOST IN HIS CAPACITY AS A REPRESENTATIVE OF THE STANDING COMMITTEE OF THE ISLAMIC CONFERENCE, AND IN THE PRESENCE OF CHATTY (THE SECRETARY-GENERAL) DOST HIMSELF WOULD ONLY HAVE THE STATUS OF REPRESENTATIVE OF THE PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC PARTY.

6. MEANWHILE, THE ROMANIANS WERE STILL TRYING TO PROMOTE A CONFERENCE CONCENTRATING ON IRAN, PAKISTAN AND AFGHANISTAN. THIS AGA SHAHI RULED OUT. HOWEVER, 8 OR 9 COUNTRIES COULD PROVIDE A NUCLEUS FOR A CONFERENCE. THE PAKISTANIS WANTED ALL THE PERMANENT MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL, WHICH THE RUSSIANS REJECTED AS INTERNATIONALISING A PROBLEM WHICH THEY WISHED TO KEEP LOCAL. THE NON-ALIGNED REPRESENTATIVES MIGHT INCLUDE THE INDIANS, CUBANS, ROMANIANS AND YUGOSLAVS. LORD CARRINGTON POINTED OUT THAT THE APPARENTLY SYMPATHETIC ATTITUDE OF SOME OF THESE TOWARDS SOVIET ACTIONS, COMBINED WITH THE ABSENCE OF THE FREEDOM FIGHTERS, WOULD BE A TRIUMPH FOR BABRAK KARMAL. AGA SHAHI ARGUED THAT WITHDRAWAL WOULD BE A CENTRAL THEME OF SUCH A CONFERENCE, AND RECOGNITION OF BABRAK KARMAL COULD ONLY COME AT THE END OF THE PROCESS. THE MAIN IDEA WAS THAT THE RUSSIANS MUST INSTALL A NON-PUPPET AFGHAN GOVERNMENT, AND THE MUJAHIDEEN COULD BE A PARTY TO A SETTLEMENT. THE RUSSIANS HAD HINTED VAGUELY THAT THEY MIGHT NOT BE AVERSE TO CHANGING BABRAK KARMAL, BUT THEY WOULD REFUSE ABSOLUTELY IF THIS WERE MADE A CONDITION FOR A CONFERENCE.

7. AGA SHAHI COMPLAINED THAT EUROPE, WITH THE EXCEPTION OF THE UK, HAD SHOWN NO DISPOSITION TO SUPPORT PAKISTAN. GISCARD'S VISIT TO POLAND HAD BEEN PRECIPITOUS, FOLLOWED BY THAT OF SCHMIDT TO MOSCOW. SCHMIDT HAD CLEARLY OPTED OUT OF THE PROBLEM. WESTERN EUROPE HAD NOT REFUSED TO EXTEND FURTHER CREDIT TO THE SOVIET UNION, ALTHOUGH JAPAN HAD, AND SEEMED RELUCTANT TO JEOPARDISE DETENTE, PERHAPS BECAUSE OF ELECTIONS. THE DETERIORATION OF THE SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST WAS ANOTHER NEGATIVE FACTOR, AS WAS THE DEFECTION OF IRAN FROM THE ISLAMIC CONFERENCE STANDING COMMITTEE. FINALLY THERE WERE SIGNS THAT THE RUSSIANS WERE INSTIGATING INDIA TO PUT MILITARY PRESSURE ON PAKISTAN. MRS GANDHI HAD SERIOUS PROBLEMS IN THE NORTH-EAST AND CLAIMED THAT FOREIGN ELEMENTS WERE AT WORK THERE. AGA SHAHI HAD MADE IT CLEAR TO THE INDIANS IN REPLY TO A MESSAGE FROM RAO (WHICH W

S HALF APPEAL AND HALF THREAT) THAT THE PAKISTANIS KNEW OF NO CONSPIRACY TO DESTABILISE MRS GANDHI'S GOVERNMENT, AND WOULD JOIN NO SUCH CONSPIRACY. THERE HAD, HOWEVER, BEEN DOMESTIC PRESSURE IN PAKISTAN TO TAKE A STAND ON DISTURBANCES IN INDIA IN AREAS WHERE MANY PAKISTANIS HAD RELATIVES. UNFORTUNATELY THE PAKISTANI PRESS HAD BEEN RATHER EXCESSIVE ON THIS THEME, AND CRITICAL OF MRS GANDHI PERSONALLY.

CARRINGTON

NNNN

0604/26

GYPHES



CONFIDENTIAL *GL 200* CONFIDENTIAL

FM UKMIS NEW YORK 230500Z SEP 80

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1330 OF 22 SEPTEMBER 1980

AND TO PRIORITY WASHINGTON, MOSCOW, KABUL, ISLAMABAD, BAGHDAD,  
PARIS, BONN, PEKING, DAMASCUS, TEL AVIV, JEDDA, CAIRO.

*Prime Minister*

*MA*

FOLLOWING FROM PRIVATE SECRETARY

SECRETARY OF STATE'S TALK WITH AGA SHAHI (*Pakistan*)

*MT*

IRAN/IRAQ HOSTILITIES

1. AGA SHAHI THOUGHT THAT THE IRAQIS WERE WORRIED BY THE IRANIAN REVOLUTION AND HAD TAKEN THE OFFENSIVE TO TOPPLE KHOMEINI. THE IRAQIS SAW THIS AS A GOOD MOMENT BECAUSE OF THE WEAKNESS OF IRANIAN FORCES. LORD CARRINGTON POINTED OUT THE DANGER OF FRAGMENTATION IN IRAN FOLLOWED BY A COMMUNIST TAKEOVER. AGA SHAHI AGREED, BUT THOUGHT THAT MORE PRIMITIVE, SHORT-SIGHTED PASSIONS WERE PREVAILING IN BAGHDAD. IRANIAN THREATS OF EXPORTING REVOLUTION HAD ANGERED MANY ARABS. THE SAUDIS AND IRAQIS WERE CONCERTING THEIR OPPOSITION TO KHOMEINI, EG OVER OIL PRICES, TO INCREASE ECONOMIC PRESSURES. A STRIKE AGAINST IRANIAN OIL FIELDS WOULD BE CRIPPLING.

2. LORD CARRINGTON STRESSED THAT IT WOULD BE WRONG FOR THE UN TO DO NOTHING. BRITAIN DID NOT WISH TO TAKE SIDES, BUT THE SECURITY COUNCIL SHOULD TAKE A STAND. AGA SHAHI AGREED BUT POINTED OUT THAT THE IRANIANS HAD ALIENATED EVERYONE, INCLUDING THE UN AND THE ISLAMIC CONFERENCE. HE WONDERED WHETHER THE PLO OR THE NON-ALIGNED COULD MEDIATE. ALTERNATIVELY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS WAS ENPOWERED UNDER ARTICLE 99 TO CONVENE THE SECURITY COUNCIL IF HE JUDGED THAT A THREAT TO THE PEACE EXISTED. LORD CARRINGTON SUGGESTED THAT EAST AND WEST MIGHT UNITE TO PREVENT AN IRAN/IRAQ WAR, INCLUDING THE RUSSIANS. AGA SHAHI SEEMED DOUBTFUL ABOUT THIS, THOUGH HE THOUGHT THAT THE RUSSIANS WOULD PREFER TO TAKE OVER IRAN INTACT RATHER THAN ALLOW IT TO BE FRAGMENTED.

3. SEE MIPT FOR DISCUSSION OF AFGHANISTAN (NOT TO ALL).

PARSONS

MIDDLE EAST STANDARD

*ME*

*MEAD*

NAD

UND

EESD

ECD

WED

MAED

ES & SD

ERD

ECON D

CONS D

CONS EM UNIT

CABINET OFFICE

COPIES SENT TO  
No. 10 DOWNING STREET

CONFIDENTIAL

GR 110  
CONFIDENTIAL

**CONFIDENTIAL**

FM WASHINGTON 221800Z SEP 80  
TO IMMEDIATE F C O  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 4066 OF 22 SEPTEMBER  
INFO IMMEDIATE BAGHDAD  
INFO ROUTINE KUWAIT, JEDDA, AMMAN, DAMASCUS, ANKARA AND MOSCOW.

IRAQ/IRAN.

1. SECRETARY OF DEFENCE BROWN WHEN ASKED ABOUT THE IRAN/IRAQ FIGHTING IN A TELEVISION INTERVIEW ON 21 SEPTEMBER TOOK THE LINE THAT THE FIGHTING HAD GONE BEYOND SKIRMISHING BUT WAS NOT A MAJOR WAR. QUOTE I THINK IT IS VERY DANGEROUS TO BOTH OF THOSE COUNTRIES, IT IS VERY DANGEROUS TO ALL COUNTRIES IN THE REGION, AND IT IS POTENTIALLY DANGEROUS TO THE PEACE OF THE WORLD UNQUOTE.

2. STATE DEPARTMENT ADMIT THAT THEY HAVE COME TO NO FIRM CONCLUSION ABOUT WHERE THE FIGHTING MIGHT BE LEADING BUT BELIEVE THAT IT HAS ESCALATED IN THE LAST 24 HOURS.

THEY HAVE ISSUED NOTAM WARNINGS TO SHIPPING; AND ARE ADVISING US CITIZENS NOT TO TRAVEL TO IRAQ UNTIL FURTHER NOTICE.

HENDERSON  
STANDARD  
MED  
NENAD  
EEST  
SED  
ECD

UND  
NAD  
MAED  
CABINET OFFICE

COPIES SENT TO  
No. 10 DOWNING STREET

**CONFIDENTIAL**



GR 220

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FM UKMIS NEW YORK 230330Z SEP 80

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1325 OF 22 SEPTEMBER 1980

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, PARIS, BONN, MOSCOW,

INFO PRIORITY BAGHDAD, ISLAMABAD.

FROM PRIVATE SECRETARY

MEETING BETWEEN SECRETARY OF STATE AND UN SECRETARY-GENERAL:  
IRAQ/IRAN CONFLICT.

1. THE MAIN POINTS TO ARISE ON THIS SUBJECT DURING LORD CARRINGTON'S MEETING WITH DR WALDHEIM WERE AS FOLLOWS (FULL RECORD BY BAG).

2. LORD CARRINGTON ARGUED THAT THE UN HAD TO TAKE SOME ACTION. WALDHEIM THOUGHT THE IRANIANS WOULD NOT WISH TO BRING THE DISPUTE TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL. HE WAS RELUCTANT TO DO SO HIMSELF UNDER ARTICLE 99. AS A FIRST STEP HE PROPOSED TO SEND PRIVATE MESSAGES TO THE TWO GOVERNMENTS THROUGH THEIR PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVES. HE ACCEPTED THAT HE MIGHT SUBSEQUENTLY HAVE TO TAKE THE QUESTION TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL.

3. LORD CARRINGTON SUGGESTED THAT THERE MIGHT BE SCOPE FOR EAST/WEST COLLABORATION TO BRING ABOUT A SETTLEMENT. RECENT IRANIAN ACTIONS HAD INFURIATED THE IRAQIS, WHO HAD PROBABLY NOT THOUGHT THROUGH THE LIKELY CONSEQUENCES OF THE DISINTEGRATION OF IRAN. LORD CARRINGTON THOUGHT THAT THE NON-ALIGNED WOULD BE DIVIDED ON THE ISSUE AND THAT THE RUSSIANS WOULD NOT SEE THE DISINTEGRATION OF IRAN AS BEING TO THEIR ADVANTAGE. MOVES TO PROMOTE A SETTLEMENT WERE THEREFORE LIKELY TO ATTRACT WIDE SUPPORT IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL.

4. SEE MY FOUR IFTS FOR OTHER SUBJECTS DISCUSSED.

PARSONS

MIDDLE EAST STANDARD

~~MAED~~  
NENAD

NAD  
UND  
EESD  
ECD  
WED

MAED  
ES & SD  
ERD  
ECON D  
CONS D  
CONS EM UNIT  
CABINET OFFICE

COPIES SENT TO  
No. 10 DOWNING STREET

CONFIDENTIAL

GP570  
UNCLASSIFIED  
FROM UKMIS NEW YORK 230020Z SEP 80  
TO PRIORITY F C O  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1321 OF 22 SEPTEMBER  
INFO BAGHDAD, WASHINGTON

IRAN/IRAQ

1. THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ISSUED A STATEMENT TODAY (22 SEPTEMBER) IN WHICH HE NOTED WITH GROWING CONCERN THE ESCALATING CONFLICT BETWEEN IRAN AND IRAQ, EXPRESSED THE FEAR THAT IT COULD HAVE SERIOUS AND UNPREDICTABLE CONSEQUENCES, AND APPEALED TO BOTH GOVERNMENTS TO EXERCISE THE UTMOST RESTRAINT, TO DESIST FROM FURTHER ARMED ACTION AND TO DO ALL THEY COULD TO NEGOTIATE A SOLUTION.

PARSONS

STANDARD  
MED  
NENAD  
EESJ  
SED  
EOD  
UND  
NAD

MAED  
CABINET OFFICE

COPIES SENT TO  
No. 10 DOWNING STREET

THIS TELEGRAM  
WAS NOT  
ADVANCED



LLG 743

FDW 0002/23

OO ATHENS

GRS 140

CONFIDENTIAL

FM F C O 222314Z SEP 80

TO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK

TELEGRAM NUMBER 719 OF 22 SEPTEMBER

AND TO IMMEDIATE ATHENS (FOR PS TO THE PRIME MINISTER)

FOLLOWING TELEGRAM NOW REPEATED TO YOU AT REQUEST OF RESIDENT CLERK  
WAS RECEIVED FROM WASHINGTON AS TELEGRAM NO 4066 OF 22 SEPTEMBER 80.  
INFO IMMEDIATE BAGHDAD  
INFO ROUTINE KUWAIT, JEDDA, AMMAN, DAMASCUS, ANKARA AND MOSCOW.

IRAQ/IRAN

1. SECRETARY OF DEFENCE BROWN WHEN ASKED ABOUT THE IRAN/IRAQ FIGHTING IN A TELEVISION INTERVIEW ON 21 SEPTEMBER TOOK THE LINE THAT THE FIGHTING HAD GONE BEYOND SKIRMISHING BUT WAS NOT A MAJOR WAR. QUOTE I THINK IT IS VERY DANGEROUS TO BOTH OF THOSE COUNTRIES, IT IS VERY DANEGEROUS TO ALL COUNTRIES IN THE REGION, AND IT IS POTENTIALLY DANGEROUS TO THE PEACE OF THE WORLD UNQUOTE.
2. STATE DEPARTMENT ADMIT THAT THEY HAVE COME TO NO FIRM CONCLUSION ABOUT WHERE THE FIGHTING MIGHT BE LEADING BUT BELIEVE THAT IT HAS ESCALATED IN THE LAST 24 HOURS. THEY HAVE ISSUED NOTAM WARNINGS TO SHIPPING: AND ARE ADVISING US CITIZENS NOT TO TRAVEL TO IRAQ UNTIL FURTHER NOTICE.

CARRINGTON

NNNN

GR 270

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED

FM BAGHDAD 211017Z SEP 80

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 415 OF 21/9/80

INFO KUWAIT, JEDDA, AMMAN, DAMASCUS, ANKARA, WASHINGTON AND MOSCOW

IRAQ/IRAN SITREP: OUR TEL NO 407.

1. FIGHTING CONTINUED THROUGHOUT 17-20 SEPTEMBER AND ARTILLERY EXCHANGES NOW APPEAR TO BE TAKING PLACE ALONG PARTS OF THE BORDER FROM THE SHATT AL ARAB AS FAR NORTH AS KHANAQIN.
  
2. ACCORDING TO IRAQI MOD STATEMENTS, AT 1800 HOURS ON 17 SEPTEMBER, THE IRAQI OIL TANKER "KHALIDA" WAS FIRED ON BY THE IRANIANS FROM MOHAMMERAH (KHORRAMSHAHR). THE ISLAND OF UM AL RASAS IN BASRA GOVERNORATE WAS ALLEGEDLY SHELLED ON BOTH 17 AND 20 SEPTEMBER. IRAQ CLAIMS TO HAVE SHOT DOWN TWO IRANIAN FSA PHANTOMS ON THE MANDALI AND MISAN SECTORS OF THE BORDER ON 18 SEPTEMBER. THEY ALSO CLAIM A SECOND PHANTOM (CF. OUR TUR) ON 17 SEPTEMBER, MAKING A TOTAL OF FOUR IN THE 48 HOUR PERIOD. AT 0500 HOURS ON 19 SEPTEMBER IRAQI FORCES CLAIM TO HAVE CAPTURED KIHFAT AL MAUT BORDER POST IN THE MANDALI SECTOR. AT 1330 HOURS ON 20 SEPTEMBER IRANIAN PATROL BOATS ARE REPORTED TO HAVE ATTACKED IRAQI PATROL BOATS IN THE SHATT AL ARAB. THE IRAQIS CLAIM TWO IRANIAN BOATS DESTROYED WITH ONE IRAQI BOAT LISTING AND ON FIRE. AT 1800 HOURS ON 20 SEPTEMBER, IRANIAN ARTILLERY IS SAID TO HAVE SHELLED IRAQI ECONOMIC INSTALLATIONS IN THE SHATT AL ARAB AREA. IRAQ HAS WARNED THAT IT WILL RETALIKBE AGAINST IRANIAN INSTALLATIONS.
  
3. THE CLASHES ON THE SHATT AL ARAB AND THE SHELLING OF THE ECONOMIC INSTALLATIONS MARK A FURTHER ESCALATION OF THIS DISPUTE. THE RESULTANT PUBLICITY, PARTICULARLY OVER THE SHATT AL ARAB, WILL MAKE IT HARDER FOR EITHER SIDE TO BACK DOWN. IT MAY BE THAT THE IRAQIS HAVE SOMEWHAT UNDERESTIMATED THE STRENGTH-HOWEVER BELATED- OF THE IRANIAN RESPONSE.

EGERTON

[COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING STREET]

[THIS TELEGRAM WAS NOT ADVANCED]

STANDARD

MED

NENAD

EESD

SED

ECD

UND

CABINET OFFICE

RESTRICTED



GR 100

UNCLASSIFIED

FM BAGHDAD 211013Z SEP 80

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 414 OF 21/9/80

AND IMMEDIATE DOT CRE5

INFO ANKARA, MOSCOW, PARIS, KUWAIT, WASHINGTON, BEIRUT, AMMAN AND  
DAMASCUS.

DESKBY 211100Z

MIPT: IRAQ/IRAN-CLOSURE OF IRANIAN AIR SPACE.

1. WHEN AT THE MFA THIS MORNING HEADS OF MISSION WERE TOLD THAT,  
ACCORDING TO THE LATEST INFORMATION RECEIVED, IRAN HAD TODAY,  
21 SEPTEMBER, CLOSED THE MAJOR PART OF ITS AIR SPACE TO AIR  
TRAFFIC. THIS, SAID THE SPOKESMAN, INDICATED TO IRAQ THAT THE  
IRANIANS WERE QUOTE WAGING WAR UNQUOTE.

2. COMMENT: B A MANAGER TELLS US THAT THIS DOES NOT (NOT) AFFECT  
ANY OF THEIR AIRCRAFT CURRENTLY SCHEDULED TO LAND AT BAGHDAD.

EGERTON

STANDARD

MED

NENAD

DEF D

SED

EESD

ECD

UND

CABINET OFFICE

GR 310  
UNCLASSIFIED  
FM BAGHDAD 211005Z SEP 80  
TO IMMEDIATE FCO  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 413 OF 21/9/80  
AND IMMEDIATE KUWAIT, PRIORITY MUSCAT AND BAHRAIN  
INFO ANKARA, DAMASCUS, BEIRUT, AMMAN, MOSCOW, PARIS, WASHINGTON,  
ABU DHABI, DUBAI AND DOHA

DESKBY 211100Z

OUR TEL NO 402 (NOT TO ALL): IRAQ/IRAN-SHATT AL ARAB

1. AT HEADS OF MISSION MEETING AT MFA ON 21 SEPTEMBER, WHICH DICKSON ATTENDED, HEAD OF LEGAL DEPARTMENT SAID THAT WITH EFFECT FROM 17 SEPTEMBER, WHEN IRAQ ABROGATED THE 1975 ALGIERS AGREEMENT WITH IRAN, THE SHATT AL ARAB IS TO BE CONSIDERED A NATIONAL RIVER AND THAT IRAQ WOULD EXERCISE FULL SOVEREIGNTY OVER IT. WE WERE ASKED TO PASS THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION URGENTLY TO OUR GOVERNMENTS.  
BEGINS:

ALL VESSELS USING THE SHALL AL ARAB WILL BE OBLIGED TO OBSERVE THE FOLLOWING RULES:

(1) THE RULES AND REGULATIONS OF NAVIGATION IN THE SHALL AL ARAB ISSUED BY THE STATE ORGANISATION FOR IRAQI PORTS.

(2) TO FLY THE IRAQI FLAG WHEN NAVIGATING THE SHATT AL ARAB REGARDLESS OF THE PORT OF DESTINATION.

(3) TO PAY ALL DUES AND CHARGES PERTAINING TO NAVIGATION OF THE SHATT AL ARAB TO THE STATE ORGANISATION FOR IRAQI PORTS:

(4) TO USE IRAQI PILOTS ONLY FOR PILOTAGE, AND TO ADHERE TO PILOT'S ORDERS ISSUED BY THE STATE ORGANISATION FOR IRAQI PORTS.

THE GOVERNMENT OF IRAQ EMPHASISES THAT IT WILL TAKE ALL NECESSARY MEASURES TO ENSURE THE APPLICATION OF THESE RULES FROM 17 SEPTEMBER (SIC). THE GOVERNMENT OF IRAQ WILL NOT TOLERATE ANY VIOLATION OF IRAQ'S COMPLETE SOVEREIGNTY OVER THE SHATT AL ARAB BY ANY VESSELS OF WHATEVER NATIONALITY, AND WILL NOT HESITATE TO TAKE SUITABLE MEASURES INCLUDING MILITARY FORCE AGAINST VESSELS VIOLATING IT.

ENDS.

2. WE HAVE BEEN PROMISED THE ABOVE IN WRITING WITHIN THE NEXT FEW DAYS.

3. RESIDENT CLERK PLEASE ALERT CRE5 IN DOT. SEE MY I.F.T.  
EGERTON

STANDARD D  
MED ECD  
NENAD UND  
DEFENCED CABINET OFFICE  
SAD  
EESD

[COPIES SENT  
NO ID DOWNING ST]



GR 450

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FM BAGHDAD 201115Z SEP 80  
TO PRIORITY FCO  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 409 OF 20/9/80  
AND PRIORITY UKREP BRUSSELS  
INFO PARIS

IRAQ/IRAN

1. THE DUTCH CHARGE D# AFFAIRES (FOR THE PRESIDENCY) CALLED A MEETING ON FRIDAY 19 SEPTEMBER TO DISCUSS THE SITUATION AND TO DECIDE WHAT, IF ANY, SPECIFIC ADVICE WE SHOULD BE GIVING TO OUR RESPECTIVE GOVERNMENTS.

PRESENT WERE:

AMBASSADORS: FRANCE, BELGIUM AND DENMARK  
CHARGE D'AFFAIRES: NETHERLANDS, ITALY, GREECE FRG AND UK.

2. THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR HAD BEEN CALLED SEPARATELY TO SEE SADDAM HUSSAIN WHILE THE REST OF US HAD BEEN INCLUDED IN THE SUMMONING OF HEJDS OF MISSION BY THE FOREIGN MINISTER (MY TEL NO 404). THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR SAID HE WAS TOLD THAT IT WAS IN THE CONTEXT OF IRAQ AND FRANCE'S CLOSE RELATIONS THAT HE HAD BEEN ASKED BY THE PRESIDENT TO CONVEY A MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT GISCARD D'ESTAIN ABOUT THE ABROGATION OF THE 1975 ALGIERS AGREEMENT.

3. IT WAS GENERALLY AGREED THAT WE HAD TOO LITTLE INFORMATION, BOTH HISTORICAL AND CURRENT, ON WHICH TO BASE ANY REALISTIC PREDKTIION. THERE WAS A FEELING THAT THE OPPORTUNITY TO HUMILIATE KHOMEINI AND THE MULLAHS WAS AN ELEMENT IN IRAQI THINING. IT WAS AHTT AN ATTEMPT, IT WAS THOUGH, BY SADDAM HUSSAIN WHO AS VICE-CHAIRMAN OF THE RCC WAS CRITICISED HERE WHEN HE SIGNED THE AGREEMENT, TO RECOVER CONCESSIONS WHICH HAD BEEN FORCED ON HIM NOW THAT IT WAS THE IRANIANS WHO WERE VULNERABLE.

HIS SPEECH TO THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY WAS DEFENSIVE ABOUT HIS PART IN NEGOTIATING THE AGREEMENT. WITH BOTH THE BAGHDAD INTERNATIONAL FAR AND THE OPEC SUMMIT ON THE HORIZON THE EXACT TIMING OF IRAQ'S ACTIONS PUZZLED US. IT WAS ALSO THOUGHT THAT THE IRAQIS HAD BEEN SLIGHTLY SURPRISED BY THE DEGREE OF IRANIAN RESISTANCE AND COUNTER-ATTACKS.

4. IT WAS AGREED THAT IT WAS TOO EARLY TO WARN OUR CITIZENS IN THE BASRA AREA TO THINK OF LEAVING, ALTHOUGH THERE ARE REPORTS THAT RESIDENTS OF BASRA CITY CAN HEAR SOUNDS OF GUNFIRE. TWO NEARBY OFF-SHORE OIL RIGS, ON WHICH THERE WERE A SMALL NUMBER OF FRENCH AND ITALIAN WORKERS, HAVE BEEN CLOSED AND EVACUATED BY THE IRAQI AUTHORITIES.

5. THERE WAS SOME DISCUSSION ON WHETHER WE SHOULD WARN OUR SHIPPING. THE BELGIAN AMBASSADOR, WHO HAD BEEN INVOLVED IN SHIPPING AFFAIRS ELSEWHERE, SAID THAT BEFORE 196//// 1975 BELGIAN SHIPS HAD BEEN SPECIALLY EQUIPPED TO FLY BOTH THE IRANIAN AND IRAQI FLAGS SIMULTANEOUSLY AND AT THE SAME HEIGHT.

DICKSON

[COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING ST.]

STANDARD  
MED  
NENAD  
SED

EESD  
ECD  
UND  
CABINET OFFICE

CONFIDENTIAL



CONFIDENTIAL

FM WASHINGTON 201505Z SEP 80

TO ROUTINE FCO

TELEGRAM NO 4064 OF 20 SEPTEMBER

INFO UKMIS NEW YORK CABINET OFFICE (FOR JIS)

P S TO P M NO10 DOWNING ST

US/IRAN

1. THE LEAD STORY IN THE WASHINGTON POST OF 19 SEPTEMBER, HEADLINES QUOTE TOP SECRET IRAN PAPERS OUTLINE ROLE OF U S THERE UNQUOTE, CLAIMS THAT A SMALL STATE DEPARTMENT GROUP, UNDER THE DIRECTION OF TONY LAKE (HEAD OF THE POLICY PLANNING STAFF) HAS BEEN WORKING SINCE DECEMBER 1979 TO PUT TOGETHER A QUOTE MASSIVE TOP SECRET REPORT THAT DESCRIBES 4 DECADES OF US INVOLVEMENT IN IRAN UNQUOTE. THE WASHINGTON POST ASSERTS THAT THE REPORT CONSISTS OF A 500 PAGE OVERVIEW AND ABOUT 60,000 PAGES OF GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS. ONLY 2 COPIES ARE REPORTED TO EXIST, ONE BEING HELD BY BRZEZINSKI AND THE OTHER QUOTE LOCKED IN A PLACE WHERE ONLY 2 STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIALS HAVE ACCESS TO IT, APPARENTLY TO PREVENT LEAKS, OR ACCORDING TO SOME SOURCES, TO KEEP BRZEZINSKI FROM MAKING CHANGES OR DESTROYING MATERIAL. UNQUOTE THE POST ARTICLE POINTS TO SEVERAL DIFFERENT SOURCES FOR ITS STORY, SOME OF WHICH CLAIM THAT THE PAPER CONTAINS NO BOMBSHELLS AND IN NO WAY CONSTITUTES AN APOLOGY OR ADMISSION OF US GUILT, OTHERS THAT EVERY PRESIDENT FROM ROOSEVELT TO CARTER, AS WELL AS PEOPLE LIKE VANCE, BROWN, BRZEZINSKI AND KISSINGER, WILL ALL COME OUT OF IT BADLY. (FULL TEXT OF ARTICLE BY BAG.)

2. COMMENTING ON THIS REPORT LAST NIGHT, STATE DEPT SPOKESMAN SAID QUOTE THIS IS NOT THE PENTAGON PAPERS .... THERE IS NO 'STUDY' AS SUCH, ONLY A COLLECTION OF DOCUMENTS AND FACTUAL SUMMARIES ON PAST US RELATIONS WITH IRAN. THIS COMPILATION DID NOT FOCUS ON 'US MISDEEDS', AND NO CONCLUSIONS OR JUDGEMENTS WERE DERIVED. ESSENTIALLY, IT IS AN INVENTORY AND NOTHING MORE. UNQUOTE

3. SICK (NSC) HAS DESCRIBED THE WASHINGTON POST STORY TO US AS SOMEWHAT SENSATIONAL AND APPARENTLY BASED ON SECONDARY AND TERTIARY SOURCES. IT WAS TRUE THAT A COMPILATION OF PAST GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS ON IRAN HAD BEEN MADE, TOGETHER WITH SOME EDITORIAL WORK CONDENSING THE ESSENTIAL FACTS INTO A COVERING PAPER. THE RESULTING DOCUMENT WAS NOTHING LIKE SO FAT AS THE WASHINGTON POST ALLEGED. ITS PURPOSE WAS TO ENABLE THE ADMINISTRATION TO RESPOND WITH QUICK ANSWERS ABOUT THE PAST HISTORY OF US/IRAN RELATIONS IF THAT SHOULD BECOME NECESSARY AT ANY STAGE AS PART OF A SCENARIO FOR THE RELEASE OF THE HOSTAGES. THE DOCUMENT WAS NOT WRITTEN WITH A VIEW TO AN APOLOGY OR AN ADMISSION OF GUILT BUT RATHER AS A CONVENIENT ASSEMBLY OF THE FACTS. THERE WERE NO DAMAGING REFERENCES IN IT TO ANY BRITISH ROLE OVER THE PERIOD CONCERNED. IT WAS NOT THE ADMINISTRATION'S INTENTION TO MAKE THE DOCUMENT PUBLIC, ALTHOUGH THE FACT OF ITS EXISTENCE COULD OBVIOUSLY



BE EXPECTED TO LEAD TO PRESSURE FROM CONGRESS TO HAVE A SIGHT OF IT (INDEED THE SECRECY ABOUT ITS EXISTENCE HITHERTO HAD BEEN PARTLY TO HEAD OFF SUCH CONGRESSIONAL PRESSURE SO THAT IT COULD BE KEPT IN RESERVE FOR THE MOMENT AT WHICH IT MIGHT BE USEFUL IN THE CONTEXT OF THE HOSTAGES RELEASE).

4. ONE OF THE SENIOR PEOPLE IN STATE WHO WORKED ON THE PROJECT (STODDARD- DESCRIBED IN THE POST AS THE OPERATIONAL HEAD OF THE STUDY), HAS DESCRIBED IT TO US AS A COLLECTION OF DOCUMENTS ON QUOTE NEURALGIC UNQUOTE SUBJECTS ON WHICH THE US WOULD BE VULNERABLE TO ENQUIRY, SUCH AS THE SHAH'S ASSETS AND US DEFENCE EXPENDITURE (INCLUDING DISTORTED PRIORITIES). AS WELL AS THE SUMMARIES (PARA. 2 ABOVE) THERE ARE, ACCORDING TO STODDARD, TWO SHORT (20-PLUS PAGES) QUOTE OVERVIEW PAPERS UNQUOTE, BUT NO HISTORY AS SUCH. A POST ALLEGATION, THAT WHAT HAS BEEN WRITTEN IS STILL IN DRAFT FORM TO AVOID BEING SUBJECT TO RELEASE UNDER THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT, IS EVIDENTLY ACCURATE (AND MAY WELL CAUSE A LEGAL DISPUTE).

5. ALSO ACCORDING TO STODDARD, THE ONLY REFERENCES TO HMG IN THE PAPERS ARE A COUPLE OF SENTENCES ABOUT COOPERATION WITH THE BRITISH IN THE EARLY PHASES OF THE DOWNFALL OF MOSSADEQ. WE WILL RAISE THESE WITH THOSE CONCERNED. THEY APPEAR IN A HIGHLY CLASSIFIED CONTRIBUTION BY THE CIA (THE POST REPORT REFERS TO SUCH A CONTRIBUTION), AND, MORE BRIEFLY, IN ONE OVERVIEW PAPER. IT IS CLASSIFIED SECRET NOFORN (I.E. NO RELEASE TO ANY FOREIGN NATIONAL), BUT IT COULD, IN STODDARD'S PERSONAL VIEW (PLEASE PROTECT) BE DOWNGRADED AND THE MATERIAL BE RELEASED IF A FEW PARAGRAPHS WERE EXCISED. THIS PAPER, IT SEEMS TO US, COULD WELL HAVE BEEN ESPECIALLY WRITTEN WITH AN EYE TO EARLY RELEASE IN THE HOSTAGE CONTEXT.

HENDERSON

THIS TELEGRAM  
WAS NOT  
ADVANCED

IRAN STANDARD

MED	ECD
NEWAD	UND
NAD	TRED
WED	MAED
SED	CONS D
SAD	CONS EM UNIT
ERSD	

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION

TEHRAN SPECIAL

2  
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

1/19/80

EXTRACT FROM SUMMARY RECORDS OF GISCARD'S LUNCH 19.9.80

Community must now follow up the initiative by giving more precision and detail to the ideas and concepts in the Venice declaration, with a view to making further progress at the December meeting of the European Council.

The Lord Privy Seal agreed generally with Monsieur Francois-Poncet's analysis and in particular upon the need for building on, and giving greater detail and precision to, the European Council's initiative; but he emphasised the importance of ensuring that any proposals made by the European Community were at least not unacceptable to the United States, whose support was indispensable to progress towards peace in the region.

In discussion it was agreed that one of the matters which would require further discussion in the European Community was the future of the West Bank. The Prime Minister favoured federation of the West Bank in the State of Jordan: there was reason to believe that this could be acceptable to King Hussein. In her judgment the future of Jerusalem was likely to be the most intractable problem, given the views of the Saudi Government. The President of the Republic agreed that inclusion of the West Bank in a federal state of Jordan would be an acceptable solution if it were the choice of the PLO, but it could not be imposed on the PLO. He believed that it would not be possible to withhold recognition from the PLO after 1981. The Prime Minister said that recognition of the PLO must be dependent upon the PLO and the Arab states recognising the right of the state of Israel to exist. The President of the Republic agreed, and said that Arab leaders were in practice ready to accept and recognise the existence of the State of Israel. It was difficult, however, for the PLO and the Arab states to concede Israel's right to exist until the PLO was recognised: some way would have to be found of making the two steps simultaneous.

#### Iraq-Iran

The Prime Minister said that it was known that France was closer than other Western powers to Iraq: what view did France take of recent developments in relations between Iraq and Iran? Monsieur Francois-Poncet said that until recently he would have said that

/they

CONFIDENTIAL



would be likely to they/prosecute their claims upon territory held by Iran with words rather than with organised military force: in the light of recent reports that view might need to be re-evaluated. The Prime Minister asked whether there was a danger that the Iraqis might use the nuclear reactor and the weapons-grade uranium supplied to them by France to make nuclear weapons. The President of the Republic and Monsieur Giraud argued at considerable length that the French Government had considered this possibility in great detail and were satisfied that there was no such danger. It was because they were not satisfied that the same could be said about the Pakistanis and the South Koreans that they had cancelled their nuclear contracts with those countries. The fact that the uranium supplied for the Iraqi reactor was weapons-grade uranium was not itself significant: it was a research reactor, and all the thirty or so research reactors in the world used weapons-grade uranium. The amount supplied would be sufficient to make only one or two weapons, and the Iraqis had agreed to its being supplied in instalments in such a way as made it technically impossible to use it for the manufacture of weapons. The Iraqis had accepted perfectly readily all the requirements of international inspection. If their aim was to be able to make a nuclear weapon, they had chosen an unlikely and technically cumbersome way of going about it. If it was argued that Iraq's resources of oil made it unnecessary for her to develop nuclear power for the supply of energy, the Iraqis said that that oil would not last forever, and now was the time for them to begin development of a nuclear power capacity so as to be able to prolong the availability of oil and to replace it as a source of energy when it ran out.

#### Aid Policy and North-South Relations

Turning to questions of aid policy and North-South relations, there was general agreement that the resources which the industrialised countries had available to help the Third World were considerably restricted by the effects of the increase in oil prices. In international discussion of aid policies, it would be important to emphasise a number of points:

- (a) For several reasons the emphasis should be switched from multi-lateral aid more towards bilateral aid. Multi-lateral aid was in danger of becoming little more than a



LVO 259/25

FDW G 025/25

OO BELGRADE  
GRS 500  
UNCLASSIFIED  
FM F C O 250856Z SEP 80  
TO IMMEDIATE BELGRADE  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 210 OF 18 SEPTEMBER

FOR ALEXANDER  
FOLLOWING TELEGRAM NOW REPEATED TO YOU AT REQUEST OF PRIVATE OFFICE  
WAS RECEIVED FROM BAGHDAD AS TELEGRAM NUMBER 428 OF 24 SEPTYEMBER.

AND IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK  
INFO ROUTINE PARIS, BONN, WASHINGTON AND MOSCOW.

IRAQ/IRAN

1. DICKSON WAS CALLED TO THE FOREIGN MINISTRY THIS MORNING. CHARGE D'AFFAIRES OF CHINA AND BANGLADESH AMBASSADOR WERE ALSO PRESENT. IN THE ABSENCE OF THE FOREIGN MINISTER, WITH WHOM THE MEETING HAD BEEN ARRANGED, AND THE UNDER SECRETARY, AL QAIS, HEAD OF THE LEGAL DEPARTMENT, SAID THE GOVERNMENT OF IRAQ WISHED TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING POINTS RELATING TO THE CALL FOR A SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING TO CONSIDER EVENTS BETWEEN IRAQ AND IRAN

2. IRAQ ACCEPTED THAT THE SECRETARY GENERAL HAD THE POWER UNDER ARTICLE 99 TO CONVENE SUCH A MEETING. BUT IRAQ WISHED TO MAKE ITS POSITION CLEAR AND STRESSED THE FOLLOWING POINTS:

(1) AS ALREADY COMMUNICATED TO GOVERNMENTS THROUGH THEIR MISSIONS IN BAGHDAD, IRAQ HAD TERMINATED THE 1975 ALGIERS AGREEMENT ON 17 SEPTEMBER. THIS WAS DONE UNDER PARA 4 OF THE AGREEMENT BECAUSE IRAN ITSELF CONSIDERED THE AGREEMENT INVALID. THE DETAILED EVIDENCE OF THIS HAD BEEN SENT TO THE SECRETARY GENERAL IN A LETTER FROM THE FOREIGN MINISTER WITH A REQUEST THAT THE LETTER SHOULD BE CIRCULATED TO THE MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY.

(2) OVER THE PAST THREE YEARS IRAQ HAD EXHAUSTED ALL PEACEFUL MEANS AT ITS DISPOSAL TO GET IRAN TO HONOUR THE 1975 AGREEMENT. BECAUSE IRAN HAD NOT RESPONDED IRAQ HAD NO ALTERNATIVE BUT TO TAKE APPROPRIATE ACTION UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW. IRAQ HAD NO EXPANISIONIST TERRITORIAL DESIGNS AGAINST IRAN.

(3) IRAQ HAS CLEARLY STATED THAT IT IS NOT (NOT) INTERESTED IN ESCALATING THE CONFLICT. UNFORTUNATELY IRAN HAD DONE SO AND ITS INDISCRIMINATE ACTION AGAINST THE INTERESTS OF IRAQ, THE REGION AND THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY LEFT IRAQ WITH NO CHOICE BUT TO ACT IN SELF-DEFENCE.

(4) IRAQ HAS NOTHING TO HIDE AND IS FULLY PREPARED TO PRESENT ITS POINT OF VIEW BEFORE THE COUNCIL AS SPECIFICALLY STATED IN THE LETTER TO THE SECRETARY GENERAL. IRAQ HAS TOLD THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL THAT IT CONSIDERS IT WOULD BE HIGHLY IRREGULAR AND UNFORTUNATE IF THE COUNCIL WERE TO ARRIVE AT ANY CONCLUSIONS BEFORE IRAQ WERE GIVEN ITS RIGHTFUL HEARING.

2. AL QAIS IN ASKING US TO PUT THESE FOUR POINTS TO OUR GOVERNMENTS REPEATED POINT 4 WITH GREAT EMPHASIS.

EGERTON

ENDS

CARRINGTON

NNNN

1025/25



RESTRICTED

GRS 225  
RESTRICTED  
FM BAGHDAD 151003Z SEP 80  
TO PRIORITY FCO  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 391 OF 15/9/80  
INFO KUWAIT, JEDDA, DAMASCUS, ANKARA AND WASHINGTON

IRAQ/IRAN: OUR TEL NO 389

1. FIGHTING CONTINUED THROUGHOUT 13 AND 14 SEPTEMBER. THE IRAQI MOD ISSUED TWO STATEMENTS ON 14 SEPTEMBER REPORTING IRANIAN ARTILLERY ATTACKS ON THE BORDER POSTS OF SHALHA AND BAWARIN (NOT LOCATED) IN THE BASRA SECTOR. IN ADDITION AT 0530 ON 14 SEPT IRANIAN AIRCRAFT ARE REPORTED TO HAVE ATTACKED IRAQI POSITIONS IN THE SAIF SA'AD AREA BUT TO HAVE BEEN DRIVEN OFF BY IRAQI ANTI-AIRCRAFT FIRE. AT 1220 ON 14 SEPTEMBER IRAQI AIRCRAFT ARE SAID TO HAVE ATTACKED A CONCENTRATION OF TANKS AND ARMoured TROOP CARRIERS NEAR SARBAIL(?) AND INFLECTED HEAVY LOSSES. AT 1330 IRAQI FORCES LAUNCHED AN ATTACK ON SUMAR. IRAQ ADMITS TO LOSING ONE AIRCRAFT DURING THE TWO DAYS OF FIGHTING. A CORRESPONDENT FOR THAWRA NEWSPAPER ALSO REPORTS ARTILLERY FIRE AND AN ATTACK BY AN IRANIAN PHANTOM IN THE MANDALI SECTOR OF THE BORDER.

2. AN EMISSARY OF YASSIR ARAFAT, HANI AL HASSAN, ARRIVED ON 14 SEPTEMBER WITH A WRITTEN MESSAGE FOR PRESIDENT SADDAM HUSSAIN. THE MESSAGE IS REPORTED TO DEAL WITH THE LATEST ARAB AND INTERNATIONAL SITUATION, IN PARTICULAR SOUTHERN LEBANON, BUT THERE IS SPECULATION HERE THAT ARAFAT IS OFFERING HIMSELF AS MEDIATOR BETWEEN IRAQ AND IRAN.

THIS TELEGRAM  
WAS NOT  
ADVANCED

DICKSON

STANDARD  
MED  
NENAD  
DEF. D  
SED  
SRD  
EESD  
ECD  
UND  
CABINET OFFICE

COPIES SENT TO  
No. 10 DOWNING STREET

RESTRICTED

GR 320

CONFIDENTIAL

Iraqy

CONFIDENTIAL

FM BAGHDAD 190735Z AUG 80

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 351 OF 19/8/80

INFO PRIORITY DAMASCUS, AMMAN, BEIRUT, CAIRO, JEDDA, KUWAIT  
AND STOCKHOLM (FOR PRIVATE SECRETARY)

SAVING TO TEL AVIV AND WASHINGTON

MIPT: IRAQ/SYRIA

1. THE SYRIAN EMBASSY WAS SURROUNDED BY IRAQI SECURITY FORCES ON 18 AUGUST MORNING AT ABOUT THE TIME (10.00AM) THAT ALWAN, THE ACTING FOREIGN MINISTER, SUMMONED THE HEADS OF ARAB MISSIONS, WHO ARE NEARLY ALL CHARGES D'AFFAIRES. THE HEADS OF MISSION REACHED THE EMBASSY AN HOUR LATER.
2. IRAQI TV NEWS HAD A THIRTY MINUTE FILM COVERAGE SHOWING ALWAN'S MEETING AND THE SYRIAN EMBASSY. FROM THIS IT APPEARED THAT JOURNALISTS ATTENDED THE MEETING AND THAT THE EMBASSY HAD BEEN RANSACKED BEFORE THE RE-ENACTMENT OF THE SEARCH THAT WAS STAGED FOR THE BENEFIT OF THE CAMERAS.
3. THE MATERIAL SAID TO HAVE BEEN DISCOVERED COMPRISED 60 BLOCKS, 50 STICKS AND 14 KILOGRAMS OF EXPLOSIVE; EIGHT PISTOLS WITH FIVE SILENCERS; 42 SMALL CONTAINERS OF POISON; TWO GRENADES; FUSES, AMMUNITION AND TIMING DEVICES. THE ENTIRE HAUL WAS LAID OUT ON A COFFEE TABLE AND IN TWO BRIEF-CASES AT THE DOORWAY OF THE EMBASSY FOR THE BENEFIT OF THE ARAB HEADS OF MISSION, WHO DID NOT ENTER THE BUILDING.
4. THE IRAQIS HAVE NOT SAID HOW THE PRESENCE OF THE MATERIAL WAS DISCOVERED AND THEY HAVE NOT EXPLAINED THEIR VIOLATION OF THE VIENNA CONVENTION; THERE HAS BEEN NO SUGGESTION THAT THE EMBASSY WAS ACTUALLY ENTERED AT SYRIAN INVITATION.
5. THE SECURITY FORCES WERE SEEN REMOVING SEVERAL PEOPLE IN HANDCUFFS FROM THE EMBASSY. IT IS NOT KNOWN WHETHER THESE WERE SYRIANS OR LOCAL STAFF. A FRIGHTENED GROUP, APPARENTLY OF VISITORS TO THE EMBASSY CAUGHT BY THE RAID, WAS INTERROGATED ON TV. EACH PERSON GAVE HASTY ASSURANCES THAT THEY HAD BEEN SHOCKED AT SEEING THE EXPLOSIVES AND WERE GRATEFUL FOR THE CONSIDERATE BEHAVIOUR OF THE IRAQI SECURITY FORCES.

FCO PSE PASS SAVING TO TEL AVIV AND WASHINGTON

STIRLING

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]  
[THIS TELEGRAM WAS NOT ADVANCED]

MIDDLE EAST STANDARD

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION

NENAD MAED  
MED ES & SD  
NAD ERD  
UND ECON D  
EESD CONS D  
ECD CONS EM UNIT  
WED CABINET OFFICE

ARAB/ISRAEL DISPUTE

CONFIDENTIAL



GR 250  
UNCLASSIFIED  
FM BAGHDAD 190725Z AUG 80  
TO PRIORITY FCO  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 350 OF 19/8/80  
INFO PRIORITY DAMASCUS, AMMAN BEIRUT, CAIRO, JEDDA, KUWAIT AND  
STOCKHOLM (FOR PRIVATE SECRETARY)  
SAVING TO TEL AVIV AND WASHINGTON

*Prime Minister*

*MAD 2/8*

*Details in the further  
tel attached.*

*MS*

IRAQ/SYRIA.

1. THE IRAQI MFA ANNOUNCED ON 18 AUGUST THAT THE COMPETENT AUTHORITIES HAD LEARNED THAT THERE WERE HUGE QUANTITIES OF EXPLOSIVES ARMS AND POISONOUS AND OTHER MATERIAL IN THE SYRIAN EMBASSY IN BAGHDAD. THESE WERE EVIDENTLY INTENDED FOR ACTS OF MURDER AND SUBVERSION. IN ORDER TO PRESERVE THE COUNTRY FROM THESE EVILS AND IN THE INTEREST OF ARAB SOLIDARITY, THE ACTING FOREIGN MINISTER HAD SUMMONED THE HEADS OF ARAB MISSIONS INCLUDING THE SYRIAN CHARGE D'AFFAIRES AND HAD INFORMED THEM OF THE DISCOVERY. THE HEADS OF MISSION HAD BEEN INVITED TO WITNESS THE REMOVAL OF THE MATERIALS FROM THE EMBASSY. THIS HAD BEEN DONE PEACEFULLY IN THE PRESENCE OF THE SYRIAN CHARGE.

2. THE STATEMENT ADDED THAT IRAQ REGRETTED THIS SHAMEFUL BEHAVIOUR BY THE SYRIAN AUTHORITIES IN PREPARING TO MASSACRE MILLIONS OF IRAQIS, AS WAS SHOWN BY THE GREAT QUANTITIES OF POISON. THE BEHAVIOUR WAS ALSO INTENDED TO DAMAGE ARAB SOLIDARITY BY SERVING IMPERIALIST-ZIONIST PLOTS AND THE CAMP DAVID CONSPIRACY. IT GAVE EVIDENCE OF THE NATURE OF THE SYRIAN REGIME, WHICH DENIED HONOUR, BETRAYED ARAB MORALS AND FOLLOWED THE PATH OF EVIL. THE SYRIAN CHARGE HAD BEEN TOLD THAT HE AND ALL MEMBERS OF HIS STAFF MUST LEAVE IRAQ WITHIN 48 HOURS AND IT WAS UP TO THE SYRIAN GOVERNMENT TO REPLACE THEM WITH OTHER DIPLOMATS.

3. SEE MIFT.

FCO PSE PASS SAVING TO TEL AVIV AND WASHINGTON

STIRLING

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]  
[THIS TELEGRAM WAS NOT ADVANCED]

MIDDLE EAST STANDARD

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION

NENAD MAED  
MED ES & SD  
NAD ERD  
UND ECON D  
EESD CONS D  
ECD CONS EM UNIT  
WED CABINET OFFICE

ARAB/ISRAEL DISPUTE

PRIME MINISTER'S  
PERSONAL MESSAGE

SUBJECT.

RESTRICTED

SERIAL No. T.131/80.

GRS 100  
RESTRICTED  
DESKBY 220700Z  
FM FCO 211400Z  
TO IMMEDIATE BAGHDAD  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 208 OF 21 JUNE  
EMBASSY ATTACK.

1. PROVIDED YOU SEE NO OBJECTION, PLEASE ARRANGE FOR THE FOLLOWING  
MESSAGE TO BE FORWARDED TO PRESIDENT SADDAM HUSSEIN FROM THE PRIME  
MINISTER.

BEGINS.

I AM MOST GRATEFUL FOR THE PROMPT AND EFFECTIVE WAY THE IRAQI  
AUTHORITIES DEALT WITH THE ATTACK ON THE BRITISH EMBASSY ON 19 JUNE.  
PLEASE PASS ON MY THANKS AND CONGRATULATIONS TO ALL THOSE INVOLVED  
WHOSE SWIFT AND COURAGEOUS ACTION RESOLVED THE INCIDENT WITHOUT  
HARM TO OUR EMBASSY STAFF.

ENDS.

CARRINGTON

*FCO/WHITEHALL DISTRIBUTION  
MEZ*

RESTRICTED



CONFIDENTIAL



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

FLO Resident Clerk  
informed 21/6  
G. Baldwin  
Duty Clerk. (1)

20 June 1980

Prime Minister

After lunch?

Agreed

Paul 21/6

mb

Dear Michael,

Attack on our Embassy in Baghdad

/ The Prime Minister may wish to see the attached telegram from Baghdad giving an account of yesterday's attack on the Embassy.

/ In the light of a recent report of which the Prime Minister is aware, Lord Carrington thinks it would be helpful if the Prime Minister could send a message to President Saddam Hussein thanking him for the action which the Iraqi authorities took to deal with the situation. The underlying point of such a message would be to remind the Iraqi authorities of the responsibility they have for the protection of British diplomats. It might also serve incidentally to improve the climate of our general, particularly our commercial, relations. I attach a draft telegram containing a suggested text.

Yours etc

Paul

(P Lever)  
Private Secretary

M O'D B Alexander Esq  
10 Downing Street  
London SW1

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

RE

GR 540  
CONFIDENTIAL  
FM BAGHDAD 191235Z JUN 80  
TO IMMEDIATE FCO  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 261 OF 19/6/80

TOP COPY

MIPT: ATTACK ON EMBASSY

1. THE ATTACK BEGAN AT 1015 LOCAL TIME TODAY WHEN THREE OR FOUR YOUTHS FAILED TO STOP WHEN CHALLENGED BY THE POLICE AT THE MAIN GATE AND RAN UP THE DRIVE. THEY OPENED FIRE WITH PISTOLS AT LONG RANGE AT OUR ARCHIVIST WHO WAS ENTERING THE CHANCERY BUILDING. HE SOUND<sup>ED</sup> THE RIOT ALARM AND THE CONSUL WAS ABOUT TO CLOSE THE MAIN DOORS AS THE FIRST GRENADE EXPLODED, DOING MINOR DAMAGE TO THE ENTRANCE AND HALLWAY. THE DOORS WERE FULLY CLOSED AND WINDOW SHUTTERS SECURED BEFORE THE SUBSEQUENT GRENADES, THREE OR FOUR IN ALL, WERE THROWN.

2. MOST OF THE STAFF TOOK REFUGE IN REGISTRY AND THE CHANCERY WAS EFFECTIVELY BATTENED DOWN IN LITTLE MORE THAN A MINUTE. THE CONSULAR AND ADMINISTRATION STAFF HAD BARRICADED THEMSELVES IN THEIR RESPECTIVE BUILDINGS. THE ATTACKERS CIRCLED THE CHANCERY BUILDING FIRING AND THROWING THE GRENADES APPARENTLY AT RANDOM. ONE OF THEM SAW ME THROUGH A WINDOW AS I RETURNED BRIEFLY TO CHECK MY OFFICE AND FIRED TWO SHOTS, NEITHER DID MUCH DAMAGE.

3. I TELEPHONED TO THE MFA AT ABOUT 10.20 BUT REPEATED CALLS FAILED TO REACH A RESPONSIBLE OFFICIAL UNTIL ABOUT 1035 WHEN I SPOKE TO THE DG OF PROTOCOL, ASKED FOR IMMEDIATE REINFORCEMENTS FOR THE POLICE GUARD (THE POLICE HAD IN FACT ALREADY SUMMONED THESE) AND GAVE PERMISSION FOR THE SECURITY AUTHORITIES TO ENTER THE PREMISES. FIRING, SOME OF IT DIRECTED AT THE CHANCERY, CONTINUED THROUGHOUT THIS TIME AND INTENSIFIED WHEN THE MAIN SECURITY REINFORCEMENTS TOOK OVER SHORTLY BEFORE 1045. BY ABOUT 1105 THE SECURITY AUTHORITIES HAD CORNERED AND KILLED THREE OF THE ATTACKERS AND A FOURTH HAD SURRENDERED. THE DG OF PROTOCOL LATER TOLD ME THAT THE AUTHORITIES WERE NOT CERTAIN WHETHER THIS MAN HAD IN FACT TAKEN PART IN THE ATTACK. THE VISITOR'S DRIVER (PARA 2 OF MY TEL NO 258) HAD NOT BEEN HURT, BUT HAS BEEN TAKEN FOR QUESTIONING. THE ALL-CLEAR WAS GIVEN AT ABOUT 1115. A SUBSTANTIAL ARMED GUARD IS STILL IN THE GROUNDS.

4. THE ATTACKERS WERE SCRUFFY YOUTHS DRESSED IN SHIRTS AND SLACKS, INDISTINGUISHABLE FROM MOST LOCAL YOUTHS. AS THEY WENT STRAIGHT INTO THE ATTACK AND WERE PROMPTLY ENGAGED BY THE POLICE, ONE OF WHOM WAS WOUNDED, THERE WAS NO OPPORTUNITY TO IDENTIFY THEM. NOR DID THEY SPEAK AT ANY STAGE, AND I WAS UNABLE TO SATISFY THE SUBSEQUENT CURIOSITY OF THE ACTING FOREIGN MINISTER AND THE DG OF PROTOCOL WHO WERE ANXIOUS TO KNOW WHAT DEMANDS THEY HAD MADE AND IN WHAT LANGUAGE. (THE OBVIOUS BUT SO FAR UNCONFIRMED SUPPOSITION IS THAT

CONFIDENTIAL

/ THEY WERE



CONFIDENTIAL

THEY WERE IREANIAN ARABS FROM KHUZESTAN.) THE IRAQI NEWS AGENCY HAS ISSUED A BRIEF STATEMENT ABOUT THE ATTACK. I HAVE NOT SEEN THE TEXT BUT I GATHER THAT IT REFERS TO HOSTILE ELEMENTS ATTEMPTING TO DISTURB THE ELECTIONS.

5. WE HAD NO CASUALTIES OR EVEN MINOR INJURIES AND THE GRENADE DAMAGE IS SURPRISINGLY SMALL. I MOST WARMLY COMMEND THE COURAGE OF ALL MY STAFF, WHO REMAINED ENTIRELY COMPOSED THROUGHOUT THE UNPLEASANTLY NOISY ASSAULT. THE LOCALLY ENGAGED TELEPHONIST, HUSSEIN, DESERVES ESPECIAL PRAISE FOR REMAINING AT HIS POST WITHIN A FEW FEET OF THE WORST EXPLOSIONS AND GUNFIRE.

STIRLING

[COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING STREET]

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

NENAD  
MED  
NAD  
UND  
EESD  
ECD  
WED  
PSD  
POD  
SECURITY D  
MAED  
ES & SD  
FRD  
CONS D  
CONS EM UNIT  
CABINET OFFICE

File No. ....  
 Department MIDDLE EAST OUTWARD  
 Drafted by D E TATHAM TELEGRAM  
 (Block Capitals) .....  
 Tel. Extn. 3671 .....

Security Classification
RESTRICTED
Precedence
IMMEDIATE
DESKBY .....Z

FOR COMMS. DEPT. USE	Despatched (Date) ..... (Time) .....Z	POSTBY .....Z
----------------------	--	---------------

PREAMBLE

(Time of Origin) ..... Z (G.M.T.) (Restrictive Prefix) .....  
 (Security Class.) ..... (Caveat/ Privacy marking) .....  
 (Codeword) ..... (Deskby) ..... Z

TO ..... IMMEDIATE BAGHDAD ..... Tel. No. .... of .....  
 (precedence) (post)

AND TO (precedence/post) .....  
 .....

AND SAVING TO .....

REPEATED TO (for info) .....  
 .....

SAVING TO (for info) .....

Distribution:-  
 FCO/wH

[TEXT]


EMBASSY ATTACK

1. Provided you see no objection, please arrange for the following message to be forwarded to President Saddam Hussein from the Prime Minister.

Begins

I am most grateful for the prompt and effective way the Iraqi authorities dealt with the attack on the British Embassy on 19 June. Please pass on my thanks and congratulations to all those involved whose swift and courageous action resolved the incident without harm to our Embassy staff.

Ends



Copies to:-



220 JUN 1980

1 21 11 08



IMMED

ADVANCE COPY

PS  
PS/LPS  
PS/MR HORD  
PS/PUS  
Sgt D. MATTHEWS  
P.R. J. MCKEAY  
MISS BROWN  
MR ADAMS

D10  
ASSESSMENTS STAFF } Cabinet  
                                  } office

P.S. No 10 Downing St.

IMMEDIATE

(Duffell)

HD MED  
HD MENAD  
HD PUSD (4)  
HD POD  
HD PSD  
HD SECD  
HD CONSD  
HD MRED  
HD OID  
HD NEWS D  
~~RESERVAT CLERK~~

Read in full

PP HSP1

GR 540

CONFIDENTIAL

FM BAGHDAD 191235Z JUN 80  
TO IMMEDIATE FCO  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 261 OF 19/6/80

IMMEDIATE

MIPT: ATTACK ON EMBASSY

1. THE ATTACK BEGAN AT 1015 LOCAL TIME TODAY WHEN THREE OR FOUR YOUTHS FAILED TO STOP WHEN CHALLENGED BY THE POLICE AT THE MAIN GATE AND RAN UP THE DRIVE. THEY OPENED FIRE WITH PISTOLS AT LONG RANGE AT OUR ARCHIVIST WHO WAS ENTERING THE CHANCERY BUILDING. HE SOUNDED THE RIOT ALARM AND THE CONSUL WAS ABOUT TO CLOSE THE MAIN DOORS AS THE FIRST GRENADE EXPLODED, DOING MINOR DAMAGE TO THE ENTRANCE AND HALLWAY. THE DOORS WERE FULLY CLOSED AND WINDOW SHUTTERS SECURED BEFORE THE SUBSEQUENT GRENADES, THREE OR FOUR IN ALL, WERE THROWN.



2. MOST OF THE STAFF TOOK REFUGE IN REGISTRY AND THE CHANCERY WAS EFFECTIVELY BATTERED DOWN IN LITTLE MORE THAN A MINUTE. THE CONSULAR AND ADMINISTRATION STAFF HAD BARRICADED THEMSELVES IN THEIR RESPECTIVE BUILDINGS. THE ATTACKERS CIRCLED THE CHANCERY BUILDING FIRING AND THROWING THE GRENADES APPARENTLY AT RANDOM. ONE OF THEM SAW ME THROUGH A WINDOW AS I RETURNED BRIEFLY TO CHECK MY OFFICE AND FIRED TWO SHOTS, NEITHER DID MUCH DAMAGE,

3. I TELEPHONED TO THE MFA AT ABOUT 10.20 BUT REPEATED CALLS FAILED TO REACH A RESPONSIBLE OFFICIAL UNTIL ABOUT 1035 WHEN I SPOKE TO THE DG OF PROTOCOL, ASKED FOR IMMEDIATE REINFORCEMENTS FOR THE POLICE GUARD (THE POLICE HAD IN FACT ALREADY SUMMONED THESE) AND GAVE PERMISSION FOR THE SECURITY AUTHORITIES TO ENTER THE PREMISES. FIRING, SOME OF IT DIRECTED AT THE CHANCERY, CONTINUED THROUGHOUT THIS TIME AND INTENSIFIED WHEN THE MAIN SECURITY REINFORCEMENTS TOOK OVER SHORTLY BEFORE 1045. BY ABOUT 1105 THE SECURITY AUTHORITIES HAD CORNERED AND KILLED THREE OF THE ATTACKERS AND A FOURTH HAD SURRENDERED. THE DG OF PROTOCOL LATER TOLD ME THAT THE AUTHORITIES WERE NOT CERTAIN WHETHER THIS MAN HAD IN FACT TAKEN PART IN THE ATTACK. THE VISITOR'S DRIVER (PARA 2 OF MY TEL NO 258) HAD NOT BEEN HURT, BUT HAS BEEN TAKEN FOR QUESTIONING. THE ALL-CLEAR WAS GIVEN AT ABOUT 1115. A SUBSTANTIAL ARMED GUARD IS STILL IN THE GROUNDS.

4. THE ATTACKERS WERE SCRUFFY YOUTHS DRESSED IN SHIRTS AND SLACKS, INDISTINGUISHABLE FROM MOST LOCAL YOUTHS. AS THEY WENT STRAIGHT INTO THE ATTACK AND WERE PROMPTLY ENGAGED BY THE POLICE, ONE OF WHOM WAS WOUNDED, THERE WAS NO OPPORTUNITY TO IDENTIFY THEM. NOR DID THEY SPEAK AT ANY STAGE, AND I WAS UNABLE TO SATISFY THE SUBSEQUENT CURIOSITY OF THE ACTING FOREIGN MINISTER AND THE DG OF PROTOCOL WHO WERE ANXIOUS TO KNOW WHAT DEMANDS THEY HAD MADE AND IN WHAT LANGUAGE. (THE OBYIOUS BUT SO FAR UNCONFIRMED SUPPOSITION IS THAT THEY WERE IREANIAN ARABS FROM KHUZESTAN.) THE IRAQI NEWS AGENCY HAS ISSUED A BRIEF STATEMENT ABOUT THE ATTACK. I HAVE NOT SEEN THE TEXT BUT I GATHER THAT IT REFERS TO HOSTILE ELEMENTS ATTEMPTING TO DISTURB THE ELECTIONS.

5. WE HAD NO CASUALTIES OR EVEN MINOR INJURIES AND THE GRENADE DAMAGE IS SURPRISINGLY SMALL. I MOST WARMLY COMMEND THE COURAGE OF ALL MY STAFF, WHO REMAINED ENTIRELY COMPOSED THROUGHOUT THE UNPLEASANTLY NOISY ASSAULT. THE LOCALLY ENGAGED TELEPHONIST, HUSSEIN, DESERVES ESPECIAL PRAISE FOR REMAINING AT HIS POST WITHIN A FEW FEET OF THE WORST EXPLOSIONS AND GUNFIRE.

STIRLING

Iraq

GRS 370

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FM BAGHDAD 161015Z APRIL 1980

TO PRIORITY F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 156 OF 16 <sup>APRIL</sup> MARCH 1980

INFO PRIORITY TEHRAN,

INFO ROUTINE AMMAN, BEIRUT, DAMASCUS, KUWAIT AND JEDDA.

SAVING TO BAHRAIN, ABU DHABI, DUBAI AND WASHINGTON.

*me*

IRAQ/IRAN

1. IN A RAMBLING SPEECH AT THE MOSUL SPRING FESTIVAL ON 15 MARCH, SADDAM HUSSAIN CONTINUED THE IRAQI ATTACKS ON IRAN, REFERRING TO "THAT SHAH IN A TURBAN... ROTTEN KHOMEINI" AND DERIDING IRANIAN EFFORTS TO ROUSE DISSENT IN IRAQ AND THEIR CLAIMS TO SUPPORT THE PALESTINIANS, HE SAID THAT AT THE 1979 NON-ALIGNED SUMMIT IN HAVANA, THE IRANIAN FOREIGN MINISTER HAD ASKED HOW PROPER RELATIONS COULD BE ESTABLISHED: HE HAD REPLIED THAT THE GULF ISLANDS MUST BE RESTORED TO THEIR OWNERS, THAT THE PART OF THE SHATT AL ARAB UNRIGHTEOUSLY TAKEN IN SPECIAL CIRCUMSTANCES UNDER THE 1975 TREATY MUST BE RETURNED TO IRAQ AND THAT THE ARABS OF ARABISTAN MUST BE DECENTLY TREATED. SADDAM SAID THAT THE IRANIANS HAD RESPONDED BY THROWING GRENADES AT CHILDREN. HE WONDERED WHY THE IRANIANS WERE SO SOLICITOUS ABOUT 'DESCENDANTS OF THE PROPHET' IN IRAQ WHILE THEY WERE MARTYRING THE SHIA ARABS OF ARABISTAN. SADDAM WISHED THAT THE IRANIAN PEOPLE WOULD REPLACE KHOMEINI AND BANI SADR WITH SOMEONE CAPABLE OF ESTABLISHING SOUND RELATIONS WITH THE ARABS. HE DECLARED THAT ARAB SWORDS COULD REACH THE FARTHEST POINT OF THE EARTH, INCLUDING THE LAND OF BANI SADR. IRAQ WAS NOT FRIGHTENED BY THE SUPERPOWERS' MACHINATIONS AND IRAQIS WOULD DIE IN DEFENCE OF THE ARAB HOMELAND AS THEY HAD DIED IN DEFENCE OF DAMASCUS, JORDAN, LEBANON AND SINAI.

2. THERE HAS BEEN NO MENTION HERE OF BAQR SADR (MY TELELETTER 020/324/1 OF 13 APRIL) ACCORDING TO AN UNCONFIRMED LOCAL STORY, ABOUT NINETY SHIA WERE EXECUTED IN BAGHDAD LAST WEEK. THEY WERE SAID TO HAVE INCLUDED AN UNNAMED IMAM. WE HAVE NO (NO) EVIDENCE THAT THIS WAS BAQR SADR.

3. WE GATHER THAT THE BEIRUT PRESS HAVE DESCRIBED BAQR SADR AS A LEADER OF THE DAWA PARTY (DICKSON'S TELELETTER 014/2 OF 10 APRIL) ON 13 APRIL, THE IRAQI RCC DECLARED AN AMNESTY FOR DAWA PARTY MEMBER WHO SURRENDERED WITHIN TWO WEEKS.

4. F.C.O. PLEASE PASS SAVING TO BAHRAIN, ABU DHABI, DUBAI AND WASHINGTON.

THIS TELEGRAM WAS NOT ADVANCED

STIRKING  
 DEPARTMENTAL DISTN  
 MED SAD TRED  
 NENAD EESD CONS  
 NAD ECD CONSEM UNIT  
 SED UNJ

[PASSED] SAVING AS REQUESTED

CONFIDENTIAL



OR 600

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FM TEHRAN 110530Z APR 80

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 371 OF 10 APRIL

INFO PRIORITY BAGHDAD, WASHINGTON.

INFO SAVING UKMIS NEW YORK.

*ms*

*Iraq*

NY TELNO 370: IRAN/IRAQ.

1. THE INCIDENTS ON THE IRANIAN BORDER WITH IRAQ DURING THE LAST FEW WEEKS HAVE BEEN FULLY REPORTED IN THE PRESS, AS HAVE THE CLOSURE OF CONSULATES IN THE TWO COUNTRIES, THE WITHDRAWAL (AS PRESENTED IN IRAN) OF THE IRANIAN AMBASSADOR IN BAGHDAD AND THE SUBSEQUENT WITHDRAWAL OF HIS ENTIRE STAFF, MATCHED BY THE WITHDRAWAL FROM TEHRAN OF THE IRAQI EMBASSY. CLEARLY THERE HAS BEEN A SERIOUS DETERIORATION IN RELATIONS WITH IRAQ AND THE QUESTION ARISES WHO IS TO BLAME AND WHERE IT WILL LEAD.
2. IT IS DIFFICULT TO APPORTION BLAME. WITHOUT BEING ABLE TO CHECK IN OUR PAPERS OF LAST YEAR, I THINK THAT THE FIRST MOVES CAME LAST SPRING FROM IRAN, IN THE SHAPE OF CALLS TO THE IRAQI SHI'IS TO RALLY TO THE IRANIAN REVOLUTION. THIS PRODUCED THE RIOTS IN THAWRA TOWNSHIP IN BAGHDAD AND THE HOUSE ARREST OF AYATOLLAH BAHR SADR. IN RETALIATION, THE IRAQIS BEGAN TO ENCOURAGE SUBVERSION IN KURDESTAN AND KHUZESTAN AND TO TURN BAGHDAD RADIO, IN FARSI, AGAINST THE IRANIAN REGIME. DURING THE LAST MONTHS OF HIS MINISTRY YAZDI TRIED TO COOL RELATIONS DOWN AND TO PERSUADE SADDAM HUSSAIN TO CALL OFF THESE CAMPAIGNS BUT WITHOUT SUCCESS. RECENTLY IRANIAN GOVERNMENT SEEM TO HAVE DECIDED TO REACT MORE FORCEFULLY AND TO STEP UP THEIR ATTEMPTS TO INSTIGATE THE SHI'IS IN SOUTHERN IRAQ WHILE ALSO ENCOURAGING IRAQI KURDS IN THEIR FIGHT AGAINST BAGHDAD. DUA'IS THE IRANIAN AMBASSADOR TO IRAQ, WHOSE EARLIER CAREER WAS AS ANTI-SHAH PROPAGANDIST ON RADIO BAGHDAD, WAS OUTSPOKEN IN HIS CRITICISMS, ALMOST CERTAINLY WITH KHOMEINI'S BLESSING AND EARNED HIS EXPULSION. QOTBZADEH, BANI SADR AND KHOMEINI HIMSELF NO LONGER TROUBLE TO PLAY DOWN THEIR IDEAS OF EXPORTING THEIR REVOLUTION, QUITE THE REVERSE, AND IN THE LAST FEW DAYS, FOLLOWING THE RENEWED IRAQI CLAIM, ON BEHALF OF THE ARABLS, TO THE TUNBS AND ABU MUSA, HAVE BEEN VITRIOLIC IN THEIR ABUSE OF THE IRAQI BAAATH AND OF SADDAM HUSSAIN. A STATEMENT ATTRIBUTED TO A PLO SPOKESMAN IN THE RECENT SEMINAR IN BAGHDAD CLAIMING THESE ISLANDS HAS PROVOKED A DISPUTE BETWEEN IRAN AND THE PLO, THE LATTER MAKING CLEAR THAT WHILE THE STATEMENT WAS UNAUTHORISED AND UNTIMELY, IT CORRECTLY REPRESENTED THE PLO VIEW.

CONFIDENTIAL

/3. FOR

CONFIDENTIAL

3. FOR ALL THE SOUND AND FURY, I AM DOUBTFUL IF THE PRESENT TENSION WILL LEAD TO OUTRIGHT WAR. WITH ITS ECONOMIC DIFFICULTIES, THE DEMORALISATION OF ITS FORCES AND ITS TROUBLES WITH ITS MINORITIES, IRAN IS IN NO STATE TO ENGAGE IN HOSTILITIES. H M AMBASSADOR, BAGHDAD WILL HAVE VIEWS ON SADDAM HUSSAIN'S MOTIVES. AS SEEN FROM HERE, HE IS UNLIKELY TO RISK HIS ARMY, COMPRISED IN LARGE PART OF SHI'I WHOSE LOYALTY TO THE BA'ATH THE IRANIAN PRESS IS ALREADY QUESTIONING, IN THE DIFFICULT BORDER COUNTRY, UNLESS AND UNTIL THE IRANIAN ARMED FORCES AND IRAN ITSELF SHOW A CONSIDERABLY GREATER DEGREE OF DISINTEGRATION. I ALSO DOUBT IF THERE IS A REAL RISK OF AN IRAQI ATTACK ON THE TUNBS AND ABU MUSA. MOREOVER THE RISK THAT OVERT ATTACK BY IRAQ MIGHT BE USED BY THE SOVIET UNION AS A PRETEXT FOR INTERVENTION IN IRAN MUST BE A RESTRAINT, ALTHOUGH, SHOULD IRAN SHOW REAL SIGNS OF COMING APART UNDER MINORITY PRESSURES, SADDAM MIGHT EVEN SO BE TEMPTED TO SECURE KHUZISTAN.

4. INSTEAD I FORESEE A CONTINUANCE OF BORDER INCIDENTS, SOME OF THEM QUITE SERIOUS, AND A STEPPING UP OF CROSS-BORDER SABOTAGE IN KHUZESTAN ON THE PART OF IRAQ AND OF SUBVERSION AND TERRORISM ON THE PART OF IRAN. THE WAR OF WORDS WILL CONTINUE AND BOTH SIDES WILL CONTINUE TO TRY TO USE THE KURDS FOR THEIR OWN ENDS. THIS COULD GO ON INDECISIVELY FOR A LONG TIME.

FCC PLEASE PASS SAVING TO UKMIS NEW YORK.

GRAHAM

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

[THIS TELEGRAM WAS NOT ADVANCED]

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION  
MED TRED  
CONS D NAD  
CONS EM UNIT MAED  
EESD UND  
ES & SD COD  
ECD FRD  
NENAD PSD  
SAD CRD  
SED SECURITY D  
MVD

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION  
TEHRAN SPECIAL



CONFIDENTIAL

GRS 75

CONFIDENTIAL

FM BAGHDAD. 091002Z APR

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELNO 142 OF 8 APRIL 1980.,

INFO PRIORITY TEHRAN.

SAVING TO AMMAN, DAMASCUS, KUWAIT, JEDDA, AND WASHINGTON.

MY TEL NO 136: IRAQ/IRAN.

1. WE HAVE HAD RELIABLE REPORTS THAT IRAQIS OF IRANIAN ORIGIN ARE BEING ROUNDED UP IN BAGHDAD IN LARGE NUMBERS AND ARE BEING REMOVED IN LORRIES, PRESUMABLY TO THE IRANIAN BORDER.
2. IT SEEMS CLEAR THAT THESE DEPORTATIONS ARE PROCEEDING THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY, PARTICULARLY FROM KERBELA AND NAJAF. ONE DEPORTED FAMILY'S ONLY CONNECTION WITH IRAN WAS THEIR GRAND-FATHER, WHO SETTLED HERE MORE THAN 80 YEARS AGO. THIS IS APPARENTLY NOT (NOT) AN ISOLATED INSTANCE AND MANY THOUSANDS OF PEOPLE MAY BE AFFECTED.
3. THERE HAS STILL BEEN NO PUBLIC REFERENCE HERE TO THESE EXPULSIONS, BUT THE PRESS OF 8 APRIL REPORTED THAT 120 MEMBERS OF THE IRAQI COMMUNITY IN TEHRAN HAD BEEN DEPORTED AND HAD ACCUSED THE IRANIANS OF TREATING THEM INHUMANLY.
4. FCO PLEASE PASS SAVING TO AMMAN, DAMASCUS, KUWAIT, JEDDA, AND WASHINGTON.

STIRLING

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]  
 [THIS TELEGRAM WAS NOT ADVANCED]

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

MED  
 NENAD  
 N AM D  
 SED  
 SAD  
 EESD  
 ECD  
 UND  
 TRED  
 CONS D  
 CONS EM UNIT

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION

TEHRAN SPECIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PRIME MINISTER  
MS

P S TO P M NO10 DOWNING ST

CONFIDENTIAL

GRS 75

CONFIDENTIAL

FM BAGHDAD. 081000Z APR

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELNO 142 OF 8 APRIL 1980.

INFO PRIORITY AMMAN, BEIRUT, DAMASCUS, JEDDA, KUWAIT AND TEHRAN.

SAVING TO WASHINGTON

IRAQ/INTERNAL:

1. ACCORDING TO LOCAL STORIES, THERE HAVE BEEN AT LEAST TWO FURTHER EXPLOSIONS IN BAGHDAD, INCLUDING ONE AT A CINEMA, AND A BOMB INCIDENT IN BASRA. WE HAVE ALSO HAD A CIRCUMSTANTIAL REPORT OF THE ASSASSINATION OF ABDUL KARIM SHAIKHLY, THE DISGRACED FORMER FOREIGN MINISTER AND AMBASSADOR (SEE LPR).
2. TOGETHER WITH THE APPARENT MASS EXPULSIONS OF IRAQIS OF IRANIAN ORIGIN (MY TEL NO 142), THESE CONTINUING INCIDENTS ARE LIKELY TO INCREASE TENSION. BAGHDAD, HOWEVER, REMAINS CALM AND THERE IS NO (NO) PRESENT NEED TO DISCOURAGE VISITORS.
3. FCO PLEASE PASS SAVING TO WASHINGTON.

STIRLING

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]  
[THIS TELEGRAM WAS NOT ADVANCED]

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

- MED
- NENAD
- N AM D
- SED
- SAD
- EESD
- ECD
- UND
- TRED
- CONS D
- CONS EM UNIT

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION

TEHRAN SPECIAL

CONFIDENTIAL



Energy

28

CONFIDENTIAL



10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

SIR JOHN HUNT,  
CABINET OFFICE.

---

Possible Interruption of Western Oil Supplies  
from the Persian Gulf

---

The Prime Minister has read with interest the JIC paper on this subject about which you minuted to me on 1 October. She has asked me to pass on her thanks to those concerned with its preparation.

M. O'D. B. ALEXANDER

3 October 1979

CONFIDENTIAL

TCR

ow

(2)

CONFIDENTIAL

Ref. A0333

*Prime Minister*

MR. ALEXANDER

*Paul*

You will shortly be receiving a copy of JIC(79)(N) 61 entitled "Possible Interruption of Western Oil Supplies from the Persian Gulf".

You ought to know that the genesis of this paper lies in a remark which the Prime Minister made at the briefing meeting on 25th June for the Tokyo Summit when the possibility of interruption, particularly by a hostile power, was raised. Accordingly the JIC decided to take look at whether total or near total interruption of oil supplies from the Gulf area is likely or possible: and this paper is the result.

*Jeh /*

(John Hunt)

*Therbyson  
ad*

1st October, 1979



