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PREM 19/280

PART 6

SECRET

Confidential Filing

The situation in Northern Ireland.
The Northern Ireland Conference in Belfast

IRELAND

Part 1: May 1979

Part 6: March 1980

Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date
14.3.80							
20.3.80							
25.3.80							
27.3.80							
31.3.80							
11.4.80							
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9.5.80							
13.5.80							
16.5.80							
22.5.80							
30.5.80							
ends							

PREM 19/280

PART 6 ends:-

Record of meeting held in N10 of 30.5.80.

PART 7 begins:-

N10 to CAW of 5.6.80.

TO BE RETAINED AS TOP ENCLOSURE

Cabinet / Cabinet Committee Documents

Reference	Date
CC (80) 12 th Conclusions, Minute 4	20.3.80
CC (80) 14 th Conclusions, Minute 4	27.3.80
MISC 24 (80) 1 st Meeting, Minutes	27.3.80
MISC 24 (80) 1	25.4.80
MISC 24 (80) 2	25.4.80
MISC 24 (80) 2 nd Meeting, Minutes	30.4.80
MISC 24 (80) 3 rd Meeting, Minutes	6.5.80
MISC 24 (80) 3	19.5.80
MISC 24 (80) 4	20.5.80
MISC 24 (80) 4 th Meeting, Minutes	22.5.80

The documents listed above, which were enclosed on this file, have been removed and destroyed. Such documents are the responsibility of the Cabinet Office. When released they are available in the appropriate CAB (CABINET OFFICE) CLASSES

Signed *M. Wayland*

Date 23 September 2010

PREM Records Team

8
Ireland

● NIOM 80 (4)

NOTE OF A MEETING HELD IN THE NORTHERN IRELAND OFFICE
ON FRIDAY 30 MAY 1980 AT 12.00PMPresent

Mr Marshall	Chairman
Miss Kelley	} NIO
Mr Blackwell	
Miss Elliott	
Mr Avann	
Mr Benger	
Mr Stephens	} MOD
Mr Farthing	
Col Wilson	
Lt Col Bateman	
Maj Pheysey	
Mr Haydon Phillips	Home Office
Mr Newington	FCO

Meeting between the Prime Minister and the Taoiseach

1. The Chairman said that the Prime Minister and the Taoiseach had had a meeting tete a tete for about one hour; there was no one else present and hence no record of this meeting. Mr Newington said that it was clear that the Taoiseach had prepared himself well for the meeting and was anxious that it should appear to be a success. The meeting itself had resulted in a useful and constructive exchange of views and the Taoiseach's statement in the Dail had also been constructive in that while he had called for the British guarantee to the Unionists to be withdrawn he had also referred to the unique nature of the relationship between the Republic and Britain and agreed that the consent of the majority of the people within Northern Ireland is needed before Ireland can be united; which in essence is the Government's view of the position. Mr Stephens asked whether the terms of the press conference given by the Taoiseach after the meeting were agreeable. Mr Newington replied that the Prime Minister had been content. He emphasised that the meeting had been the most important event for the Taoiseach since he had taken over from Mr Lynch and he had been well satisfied with the outcome.

Area Reviews

2. Miss Elliott said the review covering the Londonderry area had been presented to the NIO Security Policy Meeting (SPM) last week. As the meeting had been chaired by Mr Alison, the Secretary of State had not yet had the chance to approve the report which should be circulated to officials during the week beginning 2 June. The Security Coordinator would be discussing its presentation to Ministers with the Secretary of State at a later date. The report of the review of East Tyrone would be sent to the GOC and Chief Constable next week with the aim of presenting it to SPM on 16 June. Finally, a lot of the fieldwork on the Belfast review had been done and it was hoped that it would be ready in final form by mid-July.

Renewal of the Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act 1978 (EPA)

3. Mr Blackwell said that no date had yet been fixed for the renewal debate on the EPA. The Secretary of State had asked officials to consider the implications should section 12 and Schedule 1 to the EPA, providing powers - unused since 1975 - for detention without trial, be allowed to lapse. NIO had written to both the GOC and the Chief Constable, neither of whom had yet replied; and had also approached the Attorney General for an opinion as to whether there would be any legal difficulties about continuing to use section 11 (permitting the police to arrest without warrant and detain for up to 72 hours persons suspected of terrorist offences) once section 12 had lapsed. The previous Attorney-General had considered that section 11 could be retained, but the point was not free from doubt and therefore the present Attorney had to be consulted.

4. The Chairman undertook that NIO would be in touch with MOD if the Secretary of State took the view that section 12 should be allowed to lapse. He emphasised that, even if it lapsed, section 12 could be revived again by Order in Council within a day if necessary. The timing

of the renewal debate was still uncertain as the Northern Ireland Constitution Act had to be renewed by 16 July and the decision was linked to the publication of the Government's constitutional proposals.

Yellow Card

5. Mr Stephens said that following NIO agreement to the proposal that instructions on opening fire at VCPs should be contained in the Army's Pink Card, Mr Stephens had written to consult the GOC. After consultation a draft would be referred to the Treasury Solicitor. The revised Yellow Card was due back from the Law Officers. The Chairman stressed that a clear line was needed soon in view of the incidents involving joyriders.

Constitutional Proposals

6. The Chairman said that the draft, which had not yet been given a title, was basically concerned with devising an acceptable method of sharing power between the two communities in Northern Ireland. There were essentially two possibilities: first, voluntary "power-sharing" similar to that adopted in 1974; and second, a scheme whereby power was shared between the Executive and another body, which would have considerable powers and where the opposition and the administration would have equal representation.

7. The Chairman hoped that the agreed proposals would go before OD on 10 June; provided OD was satisfied, it was likely that Cabinet would be content. Publication date had yet to be decided. The approach of the marching season in Northern Ireland made late June or July inopportune; but against that an early date would minimise the danger of leaks and possible accusations of sharp practice if publication took place immediately after the renewal debate. There would be widespread consultation after publication, not excluding the possibility of reconvening the political Conference for a short, intensive period.

8. Mr Stephens asked how matters stood within the OUP. The Chairman replied that although there had initially been opposition to Mr Molyneaux's refusal to attend the Conference notably from Messrs West and Ardill, this had waned as the Conference wore on, and there had been no split within the party. It was interesting that, during the Conference, the OUP had sent a paper to the Prime Minister which was definitely devolutionist rather than integrationist. Miss Elliott said that some OUP local councillors were worried that they might suffer in the local elections if their leaders refused to attend a reconvened conference thus leaving the field clear for the Rev Ian Paisley; also it was rumoured that Mr Craig might^{soon} be leaving the OUP.

Meetings with Mr Brynmor John MP

9. The Chairman said that the Secretary of State was concerned to keep the Opposition informed of developments and accordingly was making a point of seeing Mr Brynmor John from time to time. He had also arranged for officials to see Mr John fortnightly to give him confidential briefings.

Energy

10. Miss Kelley said that electricity tariffs were already higher in the Province than elsewhere and likely to get further out of line in view of the dependence on oil. An Inter-Departmental Working Group had been set up and NIO's aim was to have it accepted that Northern Ireland's electricity prices should remain in some stable relationship with those in the rest of the country. The best way to do this appeared to be to integrate the Northern Ireland Electricity Service (NIES) with the CEGB. Mr Newington asked what pricing policy would be adopted if the interconnector were re-established; Miss Kelley thought that the Republic would be charged the market price. The Chairman said that at present the Province had excess capacity whilst the Republic was short of power, whereas in the future, if the Republic built a nuclear station they would have excess capacity; it seemed only logical to link the

E.P.

systems - although this would not of itself solve the NIES's financial problems.

Other Business

11. Mr Phillips said that neither the Netheravon nor the Catford bombs were thought to be the work of Irish extremists; in fact, everything seemed very quiet, which was perhaps a little ominous although the police thought that PIRA lacked the capacity to mount a campaign on the mainland. He also noted that the Home Secretary had revoked an exclusion order as the person concerned appeared to have reformed. It was likely that in the future other exclusion orders would be revoked.

X-20

NORTHERN IRELAND: ADVANCE COPIES

PS

N IRELAND OFFICE - PS TO SEC OF STATE
RM 66 A/2 GGS

PS/SIR I GILMOUR

N IRELAND OFFICE [4 copies]

PS/PUS

MR FERGUSSON

IMMEDIATE

MR K STOWE

MR MARSHALL

HD/RID

MR P W J BUXTON

PUSD (2)

HD/IPD

CABINET OFFICE - SIR R ARMSTRONG

HD/OID (2)

MR R WADE-GERY

NEWS DEPT

DIO

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S: A Acland
.....

NO 10 DOWNING STREET

(2/23)

GRPS 1000

Pm has seen

RESTRICTED

FM DUBLIN 30:2945Z MAY 1980

TO IMMEDIATE DESKBY FCO 30:1330Z MAY 1980.

TELEGRAM NUMBER 169 OF 30 MAY 1980.

AID TO IMMEDIATE NIO (8)

Prime Minister
To glance at all

MA 30/✓

DAIL DEBATE ON NORTHERN IRELAND.

1. THE DAIL HELD AN ALL DAY DEBATE YESTERDAY ON NORTHERN IRELAND. THIS WAS THE FIRST FULL-SCALE DEBATE ON THIS SUBJECT FOR SOME YEARS, BUT ALTHOUGH DR FITZGERALD MADE SEVERAL INTERESTING POINTS THE OVERALL IMPRESSION WAS SOMEWHAT LACK LUSTRE. THE DEBATE IS EXTENSIVELY REPORTED IN TODAY'S DUBLIN PAPERS; THE EDITORIALISTS ARE UNITED IN CONSIDERING THAT THE DEBATE CHANGES NOTHING.

2. FROM OUR POINT OF VIEW THE TAOISEACH'S SPEECH WAS REASONABLY HELPFUL AND DEVELOPED THE LINE WHICH HE TOOK AT HIS RECENT PRESS CONFERENCE. HE MOVED STILL FURTHER FROM THE LINE IN THE 1975 FIANNA POLICY DOCUMENT. QUOTE IDEALLY WE WOULD LIKE TO SEE THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT EXPRESS AN INTEREST IN THE ULTIMATE ACHIEVEMENT OF UNITY..... I WOULD LIKE THEREFORE TO SEE THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT MODIFY THE PRESENT GUARANTEE BY ADDING A POSITIVE ELEMENT, A NEW DEPARTURE THAT WOULD OPEN THE DOOR TO PROGRESS. I HAVE IN MIND THAT THE NORTHERN MAJORITY WOULD BE INVITED TO LOOK AT UNITY AS A PROSPECT OFFERING THEM GREAT ADVANTAGE. HE THEN WENT ON TO SAY THAT THE WORDING OF THE DOWNING STREET COMMUNIQUE WAS QUOTE COMPATIBLE WITH OUR VIEW THAT WHILE NO PART OF THE IRISH NATION

THAT THE NORTHERN MAJORITY WOULD BE INVITED TO LOOK AT UNITY AS A PROSPECT OFFERING THEM GREAT ADVANTAGE. HE THEN WENT ON TO SAY THAT THE WORDING OF THE DOWNING STREET COMMUNIQUE WAS QUOTE COMPATIBLE WITH OUR VIEW THAT WHILE NO PART OF THE IRISH NATION HAS THE RIGHT TO OPT OUT OF THE NATION, WE RECOGNISE THAT UNITY CANNOT BE IMPOSED BY FORCE AND CAN ONLY COME ABOUT BY NEGOTIATION AND AGREEMENT. HE THEN REHEARSED HIS WELL KNOWN VIEW THAT THE PROBLEM HAS THREE DIMENSIONS BEFORE REITERATING HIS VIEW THAT A SOLUTION CONFINED TO NORTHERN IRELAND WOULD BE LIKELY TO FAIL AND THE THE CONSEQUENCES OF FAILURE WOULD BE SERIOUS. HE CLOSED WITH POSITIVE BUT VAGUE EXPRESSIONS OF HIS GOOD INTENTION AND GOOD WILL. HIS SPEECH WAS APPLAUDED BY THE FORTY OR SO FIANNA FAIL DEPUTIES PRESENT MOST OF WHOM PROMPTLY LEFT.

3. DR FITZGERALD MADE SEVERAL INTERESTING POINTS:- HE BEGAN BY OBSERVING THAT IN SEEKING TO RESTORE THE UNITY OF THE ISLAND THE REPUBLIC NEEDED TO SECURE THE CONSENT OF A MAJORITY IN THE NORTH NOT NECESSARILY THE MAJORITY; THUS UNITY BY CONSENT DID NOT GIVE THE UNIONIST MAJORITY AS A GROUP A VETO. HE THEN ATTACKED THE TAOISEACH FOR DOING NOTHING EITHER TO DISPEL UNIONIST FEARS, OR TO PRESENT THE POSITIVE ADVANTAGES TO UNITY. HE INSISTED THAT ACTION WAS NEEDED TO AMEND ARTICLE 2 AND 3 OF THE CONSITITUTION AND PLEDGED FINE GAEL TO SUPPORT ANY GOVERNMENT MOVES ON THIS FRONT. QUOTE THE TAOISEACH IS THE FIRST PERSON IN THAT OFFICE SINCE VIOLENCE BEGAN WHO HAS THE POWER TO TAKE THIS PARTICULAR INITIATIVE SUCCESSFULLY, WHICH WOULD SHOW CONCLUSIVELY THAT WE ARE SERIOUS ABOUT THE CONCEPT OF UNITY BY CONSENT. I URGE HIM TO RISE TO THAT OCCASION UNQUOTE. HE CLOSED BY A REITERATION OF HIS CALL FOR A NEW SUNNINGDALE - TYPE DECLARATION BY THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT QUOTE IT SHOULD PROCLAIM CLEARLY THAT IT WOULD INDEED BE HAPPY TO SEE THE POLITICAL REPRESENTATIVES OF THE TWO PARTS OF IRELAND REACHING AGREEMENT AS TO HOW IRELAND SHOULD BE GOVERNED UNQUOTE. DR FITZGERALD THEN LEFT WITH MOST OF HIS PARTY AND ATTENDANCE NEVER AGAIN ROSE ABOVE 15.

4. SPEAKING FOR THE LABOUR PARTY, FRANK CLUSKEY OPEMED WITH AN ATTACK ON THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT. HE SAID THERE WERE THREE POINTS ON WHICH ALL PARTIES IN THE DAIL AGREED : THAT THERE COULD BE NO RETURN TO MAJORITY RULE AS THE METHOD OF GOVERNING NORTHERN IRELAND SEMICOLON THAT THE UNITY OF IRELAND SHOULD BE ACHIEVED BY CONSENT SEMICOLON AND THAT THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT SHOULD TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE EXISTANCE OF AN IRISH DIMENSION WHEN FORMULATING PLANS FOR THE FUTURE. IT WAS NOT CLEAR WHAT THE BRITISH GOVERNMENTS PROPOSALS FOR NORTHERN IRELAND WERE, BUT IT SEEMED THAT AN UPDATED VERSION OF STORMONT WAS A POSSIBILITY, AND THAT WAS A JUSTIFIABLE CAUSE FOR THE MOST GRAVE CONCERN.

PROPOSALS FOR NORTHERN IRELAND WERE, BUT IT SEEMED THAT AN UPDATED VERSION OF STORMONT WAS A POSSIBILITY, AND THAT WAS A JUSTIFIABLE CAUSE FOR THE MOST GRAVE CONCERN.

5. THERE WERE TWO TEMPTATIONS IN THE LONDON TALKS WHICH HAD TO BE AVOIDED IF ANY LASTING CONTRIBUTION WAS TO BE MADE TO PEACE : THE CONTINUED INSISTANCE BY THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT THAT THE NORTH WAS A PURELY INTERNAL MATTER FOR THE UK, AND THE TAOISEACH'S PREDISPOSITION TO DISCUSS ANY FORM OF SHARED GOVERNMENT IN THE NORTH AS UNWORKABLE. THE IMMEDIATE REQUIREMENT FOR THE NORTH WAS A DEVOLVED FORM OF GOVERNMENT INVOLVING BOTH COMMUNITIES AS OF RIGHT- A POLICY WHICH THE FIANNA FAIL GOVERNMENT HAD SUPPORTED UNDER MR LYNCH BUT ABANDONED UNDER MR HAUGHEY. MOREOVER THE PASSAGE IN THE COMMUNIQUE WHICH SAID THAT QUOTE ANY CHANGE IN THE CONSTITUTIONAL STATUS OF NORTHERN IRELAND WOULD ONLY COME ABOUT WITH THE CONSENT OF A MAJORITY OF THE PEOPLE OF NORTHERN IRELAND UNQUOTE WAS A CONTRADICTION OF THE 1975 FIANNA FAIL POLICY DOCUMENT WHICH CALLED UPON BRITAIN TO IMPLEMENT AN ORDERED WITHDRAWAL FROM NORTHERN IRELAND.

6. THE REMAINDER OF MR CLUSKEY'S SPEECH WAS DEVOTED TO AN ANALYSIS OF THE ECONOMIC PROBLEMS IN BOTH HALVES OF IRELAND. HE CONCLUDED THAT THE WELFARE OF THE ORDINARY MEN AND WOMEN IN SOCIETY SHOULD COME BEFORE QUOTE REPUBLICAN RHETORIC AND UNIONIST CANT UNQUOTE.

7. MOST OF THE OTHER SPEAKERS ADDED LITTLE TO THE SUM OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE : NEIL BLANEY, IN A SOMEWHAT MUTED SPEECH SAID THAT ALL TALKS WITH THE UNIONISTS WERE OF NO PURPOSE UNTIL THE BRITISH REMOVED THEIR GUARANTEE AND DECLARED THEIR INTENTION TO WITHDRAW FROM IRELAND. PADDY HARTE IN A VIGOROUS, IF SOMEWHAT DISJOINTED SPEECH ATTACKED QUOTE MICKEY MOUSE POLITICIANS WHO CLAIMED TO BE ABLE TO DELIVER IRISH UNITY UNQUOTE FIANNA FAILS RECORD ON PROMOTING UNITY HAD BEEN DISASTROUS. HE ENDED WITH AN APPEAL TO THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT TO FIND A SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEMS IN H BLOCK. MICHAEL O'KENNEDY, WINDING UP FOR THE GOVERNMENT LAUNCHED INTO A LECTURE ON ECONOMICS AND AVOIDED ANSWERING ANY OF THE QUESTIONS POSED BY OPPOSITION EXCHANGES OF THE THE DAY WITH CLUSKEY AND PADDY HARTE.

8. THE MOTION TO TAKE NOTE OF THE DOWNING ST COMMUNIQUE WAS PASSED WITHOUT A VOTE.

9. SEE MY TWO I.F.T.'S

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STAPLES

NNNN

SENT AT 30:1225Z CB
RECD AT 30:1225Z TLG

CONFIDENTIAL



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Principal Private Secretary

29 May 1980

BF 9/C

Dear John,

NORTHERN IRELAND: PROPOSALS FOR FURTHER DISCUSSION

The Prime Minister has seen the Home Secretary's minute of 28 May 1980 reporting on certain points which arose in MISC 24's discussion on 22 May of the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland's proposals for further discussion. She does not wish to settle at once the question of the publication date for the Government's proposals and she would prefer to reach a decision on this issue at the meeting of OD which is being arranged for 10 June.

I am sending copies of this letter to the Private Secretaries to the other members of MISC 24, to Godfrey Robson (Scottish Office), Robin Birch (Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster's Office) and David Wright (Cabinet Office). I am also sending a copy of my letter and of the Home Secretary's minute to Murdo Maclean (Chief Whip's Office).

Yours etc.

John Williams.

J.A. Chilcot, Esq.,
Home Office.

CONFIDENTIAL

PRIME MINISTER

NORTHERN IRELAND: PROPOSALS FOR FURTHER DISCUSSION

I attach a minute from the Home Secretary reporting a discussion in MISC 24 on the publication date for Mr. Atkins' proposals for further discussion. The choice is between the end of June, which hitherto had been the preferred date, and the end of July. MISC 24, on balance, came down in favour of the later date.

Ken Stowe rang me yesterday about the MISC 24 discussion. It seems that Mr. Atkins' preference for a July publication date took everyone by surprise: until the meeting he had favoured publication in June. Ken Stowe has pointed out that there is one argument in favour of publishing in June which is not mentioned in Mr. Whitelaw's minute. This is that if we go for the later date, it will mean that we shall have the virtually final version of the discussion paper on our hands for about six weeks before it is published, and this means that it will almost certainly be leaked in the interval. If that happens, Ken Stowe fears that those political parties in Northern Ireland who are so disposed will have ample opportunity to discredit the Government's proposals before they have been officially made public. He believes that this points to publishing in June, as originally intended.

Do you want to take a view now on the publication date, or would you prefer to discuss the issue at the meeting of OD on 10 June and take a decision then?

If you are content to decide now, do you prefer June or July?

28 May 1980

Will take a view at the meeting. Mr. Jones

JWS.

I have read the paper (and that is not let fully) contents very sorry and I think they will have a very damage, well you would many of them not.

CONFIDENTIAL



PRIME MINISTER

PRIME MINISTER

MISC 24 were in two minds over publication date for the proposals. On balance, they preferred late July, but recognised case for June. Do you have a preference?

NORTHERN IRELAND: PROPOSALS FOR FURTHER DISCUSSION

We had a meeting of MISC 24 on 22 May to consider Humphrey Atkins' "proposals for further discussion". Although we generally agreed with these in relation to their substance, tone and length, we had great difficulty in deciding what would be the best publication date. The purpose of this minute is to make you aware of this problem in case you wish to express a view at this stage.

The choice lies between publishing the proposals next month, which in practice means about 23/24 June, or delaying publication until after the Renewal Debate which must be held before the present powers expire on 16 July, i.e. publication not before the latter part of July.

The arguments in favour of a later publication date mainly relate to the fact that if the proposals are published before the Renewal Debate they will form the main subject of discussion during that debate. But there will have been insufficient time for either digestion of their real meaning or further private negotiation. There will, therefore, be a risk that the representatives of the Northern Irish political parties in the House will take up entrenched attitudes in regard to the proposals which will make it very difficult to achieve a settlement.

The main argument in favour of the earlier publication date, i.e. by the last week in June, relates to the fact that there is a risk with a later publication date that there will be such a loss of political momentum that the idea may gain circulation that we simply do not know what to do. It may also be argued that your discussions with Mr. Haughey on 21 May have caused us to go back to the drawing board. He could hardly be relied on to disavow this kind of speculation. Furthermore, a publication date in the latter part of July would coincide with the marching season in Northern

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Ireland, which is a particularly bad time of year to attempt to engage in rational political processes in that part of the world.

Thus the choice is a difficult one. On balance MISC 24 felt that the later publication date was probably to be preferred, but we were very clearly aware of the difficulties attaching to both courses of action. In any case Humphrey Atkins would like OD to consider his draft proposals as soon as possible and I believe that we ought to do this at our meeting which is being proposed for 10 June: as delay would close the option for early publication. At that occasion, apart from the substance of the proposals we can reach a final view on the publication date unless you feel this is an issue which ought to be settled at once.

At our MISC 24 meeting we also considered whether the proposed Northern Ireland Assembly ought to be given legislative powers in view of the possible difficulties this might create elsewhere, notably in Scotland. Notwithstanding this possible difficulty, we concluded that the clear balance of advantage particularly in terms of securing compliance from the minority community lay in conferring some legislative powers on the new Assembly. Again almost any special arrangement for Northern Ireland might be held to offer precedents for Scotland and, paradoxically, arrangements confined to the devolving of executive tasks, so offering Northern Ireland least, might prove the most tempting to the Scottish Nationalists. It was our view that it has become sufficiently well established over the last 50 years that Northern Ireland is different to the rest of the United Kingdom for us to be able to live with this potential difficulty.

I am sending copies of this minute to the members of MISC 24, to the Secretary of State for Scotland, to the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster in view of the implications for the Parliamentary timetable of the proposed publication date of Humphrey Atkins' proposals, and to Sir Robert Armstrong.

h w

28 May 1980

28 MAY 1980

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CONFIDENTIAL

Ireland

PRIME MINISTER

NORTHERN IRELAND

When I saw Ken Stowe at lunch today, he told me that the Sunday Times are doing a major piece this weekend on Northern Ireland. The Managing Editor of the Sunday Times yesterday sent a reporter called Michael Jones to see Mr. Atkins to tell him that the newspaper had been given a full-scale briefing for the article by "a high level Irish diplomatic source". Mr. Jones left with the Secretary of State the Sunday Times' record of their discussion with their source. The NIO believe that the briefing probably took place in London rather than in Dublin, but they are not certain whether it was given by somebody from Mr. Haughey's office or by a senior member of the Irish Embassy in London.

Ken Stowe said that it was abundantly clear that the Irish Government intended that the British Government should be told about the briefing. He thought that the general message which the Irish wanted us to get from this incident was that their expectations with regard to your forthcoming meeting with Mr. Haughey were very high. This, of course, is consistent with information about Mr. Haughey's thinking which you have recently seen from quite different sources. Ken Stowe also told me that he had been told by Mr. Bill Craig, the Ulster Unionist, who apparently is close to Mr. Haughey (!), that there is a real possibility of Mr. Haughey calling a General Election as early as September of this year: again, if that is something he is seriously considering, he would want to be able to show that he had been substantially more successful than Mr. Lynch in getting things moving on Northern Ireland.

This is exactly what
I feared - and he can
only be disappointed
mt. AMH.

16 May 1980

CONFIDENTIAL

~~B/F 19.7.80~~

Ireland



RH

cc Cab Off

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

13 May 1980

Meeting with Mr John Hume

I enclose a record of the conversation which took place between the Prime Minister and Mr Hume earlier today. You will note from the penultimate paragraph that the Prime Minister would like a report on the performance of the local authorities in Northern Ireland. It would be helpful if the Prime Minister could see this before Mr Haughey's visit.

I am sending a copy of this letter and its enclosure to Paul Lever (FCO).

M. O'D. B. ALEXANDER

Roy Harrington, Esq
Northern Ireland Office

CONFIDENTIAL

RRB

CONFIDENTIAL

cc copy off

RECORD OF A DISCUSSION BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER AND MR. JOHN HUME
AT 10 DOWNING STREET ON TUESDAY 13 MAY AT 1135

Present: Prime Minister

Mr. John Hume

Secretary of State for Northern Ireland

Mr. M.O'D.B. Alexander

Mr. Hume said that there had been a wide welcome in Northern Ireland for the fact that the present Government was willing both to look at Northern Ireland's problems from the bottom up and to take action. The SDLP had had doubts about the terms of reference for the Conference. They considered them too narrow in that they dealt only with relations between the two communities. However, Mr. Atkins had handled the Conference very well. He had won the confidence of those involved and this was of great importance.

The Conference had failed to reach conclusions. In the view of the SDLP this was because it had failed to go to the root of the difficulties. Unless an attempt was made to face the fact that one part of the population feared being engulfed in a Catholic island while the other felt that the country must come together, no solution would be reached. In the view of the SDLP there were three separate but related issues:

- (a) The relationship between the two communities in Northern Ireland;
- (b) The relationship between the two parts of Ireland; and
- (c) The relationship between the two islands.

Unless the second and third problems were tackled, no final solution to the problem of security would be found. All the problems had to be on the table and all those concerned should be forced to come to the table to discuss them.

In the view of the SDLP the concerns of the Unionists could be met. The SDLP were not talking about separation. There were strong interlocking relationships between the two islands. The Prime Minister had referred to these at length in her Airey Neave lecture. It ought to be possible to express the special relationship in some way and to safeguard the position of the Unionists.

/ There were

CONFIDENTIAL

There were lessons to be learned from Benelux and the Nordic Council.

Continuation of present policies could never produce lasting peace. So far they had merely resulted in the presence of up to 20,000 troops in Northern Ireland, ^{to} 2,000 dead, to hundreds of millions of pounds of compensation and to endless special legislation. Even today there were two new prisons under construction. This was proof that the policies so far adopted had been going in the wrong direction. The key to the security issue was to develop consensus in the community. This was lacking in Northern Ireland because one section of the community had never had any sense of loyalty towards or identification with the State. It had appeared to them that law and order was not for the benefit of all but was for the benefit of one community and against the other. If a sense of commitment could be generated within the Catholic community, the presence of troops would in due course become unnecessary. Mr. Hume said that the development of this feeling of identification would only be possible if political agreements could be reached which expressed the aspirations of the Catholic community. Security in Northern Ireland would not be possible without the co-operation of the authorities in the Republic. Therefore, they should have some say in the future arrangements for Northern Ireland. Their opinions should at least be listened to and their endorsement secured for whatever settlement was made. The joint involvement of both Governments should be clear.

The Prime Minister said that it was in the interests of both Governments to eliminate violence. The terrorists would turn against the Government of the day whatever its complexion. Violence had become a way of life for them in both North and South. She was surprised to hear that the Catholic community did not think that the law was administered impartially. Surely those Protestants who had been responsible for the outrages eighteen months earlier had been dealt with severely? Mr. Hume said that the people in Northern Ireland supported the Security Forces but they would not support a transfer of responsibility for security to the UDR and RUC. The presence of British Security Forces would continue to be necessary until there was an agreement with which the population could identify. At present, for instance, Catholics would not join the Police Force in case Stormont was restored. The Prime Minister

CONFIDENTIAL

- 3 -

said that the British Forces would stay as long as they were needed.

The Prime Minister asked Mr Hume what sort of solution he would favour. Mr Hume said that he thought it would be necessary to build up trust gradually. SDLP support for power-sharing had been based on the hope that it would lead to the development of greater trust. But the Protestants would not agree to power-sharing and would not move until the British Government withdrew its guarantee to respect the wishes of the majority. Such a guarantee would never have been given to Mr Smith in Rhodesia if a situation had been created there in which the Whites had an artificial majority - which was what had been done 60 years ago in Ulster.

The Prime Minister said it was necessary to look forward rather than back. She was surprised that the two communities had not grown together in the face of their common difficulties. Mr Hume said there was no lack of willingness or effort on the part of the Catholic community. But how could one reach agreement with Mr Paisley? The SDLP wanted to create the means which would enable the communities to come closer. They had dropped their earlier insistence on the inclusion of the Irish dimension in any agreement. If they moved further in the direction of accepting compromises on majority rule the SDLP would be decimated in any future election. If they abstained from the elections they would be accused of surrendering the field to the men of violence. They were being drawn further and further into these difficulties without receiving any concessions from the Protestant side. Mr Molyneaux and Mr Paisley were engaged in a competition as to who could be tougher on the Catholics. How long were HMG prepared to allow the Unionists of North East Ireland, a tiny percentage of the total population, the right to exercise their veto and to poison relationships between Ireland and the UK. It was the more extraordinary that they should have these rights when HMG were paying £1,000 million a year into Northern Ireland.

/The Prime Minister

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The Prime Minister asked why communities which appeared to be able to live together up until 1968 and which were still able to work together, had got blown so far apart. Mr. Hume said that the Province had been run by one party. There had not been the slightest evidence that that party was willing to accommodate the views of the minority. The unemployment figures in different towns and housing throughout the Province showed how far the Catholics were discriminated against. Generosity had been necessary but had not been forthcoming. Any Unionist leader who had tried to help had been overthrown viz O'Neill, Chichester-Clark, Faulkner. The Protestants were not willing to respond to the needs of the Catholics and would only do so if they felt that the guarantee was no longer there.

The Prime Minister asked whether it was not the case that housing was now handled fairly. Mr. Hume said that the Housing Executive was completely fair. Progress had been made in dealing with education and jobs. However, little progress had been recorded in the staffing of the Northern Ireland civil service. Not one of the eight Permanent Secretaries was a Catholic. The Conference had been a dialogue of the deaf. Mr. Paisley had never brought forward his Party's proposals. He had on occasion sounded reasonable but last week's incident at Armagh underlined the difficulties involved in dealing with him.

The Prime Minister said that she could not decide who would run the Province. Mr. Hume acknowledged this but said that if the Unionists continued to make clear that they would not accept the will of Westminster, the Government was surely entitled to ask why they should continue to go on supporting them financially. The Prime Minister recalled that in Rhodesia we had provided a mechanism but that we had not tried to determine the outcome of the elections there. Mr. Hume said that he would be happy if Northern Ireland was given a mechanism provided it was a mechanism which dealt with all the outstanding problems and not merely those of inter-communal relations.

/ It would

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- 5 -

It would be necessary to include the questions of relationship between Northern and Southern Ireland and between the two islands. The Unionists had to be brought to think in a wider context. The Prime Minister said that she had to think of the relationship between the United Kingdom and Southern Ireland. Mr Atkins observed that the Irish Government's claim, in the Constitution of Eire, to sovereignty over the whole of Ireland was a problem. Mr Hume said that this point should be included in the agenda for any discussions. He was not attempting to prescribe the outcome merely to ensure that all points were covered in order that the sources of tension might be relieved.

The Prime Minister said that it was her duty to protect everyone in Northern Ireland including those who wished to remain in the United Kingdom. Terrorism was directed against all established order whether in North or South Ireland. Mr Hume said he agreed but that the terrorists fed off the absence of agreement about the future of Northern Ireland.

The Prime Minister said that so long as the majority in Northern Ireland wished to remain part of the United Kingdom, they were entitled to do so and to be protected. Of course the rights of minorities and individuals also had to be protected. Mr Hume asked whether the Prime Minister meant that if the Unionists did not want something, they needn't have it. The Prime Minister referred to the fact that there were places in England where one party or the other was in a permanent minority. Mr Hume said that he did not think that the parallel was exact. Nationally the Government changed from time to time. This did not happen in Northern Ireland. When the Prime Minister repeated that she thought progress had been made in protecting the rights of minorities, Mr Hume said that the Prime Minister should ask for a report on the performance of the local authorities in Northern Ireland. Even though the local authorities had relatively few powers, those powers were being abused in Protestant districts. He commented that while in Derry Catholic and Protestant Mayors alternated, in Magherafelt a Catholic housing estate had been named after William III! The Prime Minister said that she would have a report prepared.

/Mr Hume

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- 6 -

Mr Hume said that he was leaving in a worried frame of mind. Northern Ireland was not the same as an English locality where one party or the other was in a minority. The Prime Minister said that she did not wish to be misunderstood. So long as the majority wished to stay as part of the United Kingdom, it would be the responsibility of the United Kingdom authorities to see that the forces of law and order protected the rights of all who lived in Northern Ireland. Mr Hume said that he appreciated the point and valued the Government's willingness to face the difficulties in Northern Ireland. However, there were issues other than those of inter-communal relations which would have to be resolved. Unless a satisfactory relationship could be worked out between the two halves of Ireland there would be no peace.

The meeting ended at 12.15.

Handwritten signature

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10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

13 May 1980

Dear Roy,

Meeting on Northern Ireland

As you know there was a Ministerial meeting here yesterday to discuss policy towards Northern Ireland in the light of the Prime Minister's forthcoming meeting with Mr. Haughey. I enclose a record of the discussion.

I am sending a copy of this letter and its enclosure to George Walden (Foreign and Commonwealth Office), John Chilcot (Home Office), Bill Beckett (Law Officers' Department), Brian Norbury (Ministry of Defence) and David Wright (Cabinet Office).

Yours ever

Richard Alexander

Roy Harrington, Esq.,
Northern Ireland Office.

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Ref. A02153

MR. ALEXANDER

Northern Ireland

I attach a draft record of the meeting of Ministers which the Prime Minister held this morning to discuss Northern Ireland. The record has been seen and approved by Sir Robert Armstrong. I imagine you will wish to distribute it yourself.

(D.J. Wright)

12th May, 1980

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*cc memo let
Mtg with Tanswell
Marsh &*

Note of a meeting to discuss progress on Northern Ireland held at 10 Downing Street on 12 May 1980

Present: The Prime Minister
The Home Secretary
The Lord Chancellor
The Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs
The Secretary of State for Northern Ireland
The Parliamentary Under Secretary of State, Ministry of Defence
(Mr Hayhoe)
Mr K R Stowe, Northern Ireland Office

Secretaries

Sir Robert Armstrong
Mr R M Hastie-Smith

The Home Secretary referred to his letter to the Prime Minister dated 7 May and said that the particular reason he had requested this meeting was because of the importance of the forthcoming meeting between the Prime Minister and Mr Haughey on 21 May. Her meeting with Mr Hume, the SDLP leader, on 13 May would also be important, as what Mr Hume said would be likely to reflect the views of Mr Haughey to whom he would report back on everything the Prime Minister said. It was not clear exactly what Mr Haughey would be seeking, but he would certainly aim at extracting the maximum political advantage from the meeting. His general objective would be likely to be to carve out a major and widely recognised role for himself in negotiating the future of Ireland with Her Majesty's Government. This could create obvious difficulties both in Northern Ireland and at Westminster. Nevertheless it was important to try and keep him sweet because of the extent to which his efforts had improved the cross-border security situation in Ireland and also the extent to which he could cause that situation to deteriorate.

The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary said that it was Mr Haughey's aim to be seen to be involved in achieving political progress in Northern Ireland. It was important to show him some understanding of the preoccupation in Dublin with Northern Ireland.

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In discussion the following main points were made:-

- a. There could be no question of giving Mr Haughey any suggestion that the undertaking which had been given to the Protestant majority in Northern Ireland was open to negotiation or compromise. If that was what he wanted, he would get nothing out of the forthcoming meeting.
- b. Nevertheless Mr Haughey was a clever and pragmatic politician who needed to win an election in the fairly near future. There were a number of subjects of common interest which he would want to discuss with the Prime Minister, such as security and energy. He might also have new ideas of his own such as possible Irish membership of NATO or common citizenship. There would certainly be a price-tag attached to such ideas, but even so they might provide a basis for friendly discussion. At the meeting on 21 May, it was likely that Mr Haughey would be more interested in feeling out the position than in making proposals that would run the risk of bringing a rebuff which would frustrate his longer term aims. Nevertheless the meeting might be a difficult as well as an important one.
- c. Following the meeting with Mr Haughey on 21 May, it would be desirable to publish the Government's proposals for Northern Ireland in June. These proposals were at present being prepared by the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland for consideration by MISC 24. Although these proposals would provide a basis for further discussion and negotiation with the political parties, there would in fact be a lot of positive direction in the proposals which were eventually published. There would be one main option with two variations. Any proposals for an Assembly with legislative powers would have to be very carefully considered for their possible effect in reviving hopes for Scottish and Welsh devolution; on the other hand the political arrangements for Northern Ireland had always been different to the rest of the United Kingdom and without legislative powers it would be difficult to offer to the Northern Ireland minority some allocation of power.
- d. The tactics behind the proposals to be published would be to make it clear that power sharing was a possibility only if it was accepted by all the political parties. Such acceptance was unlikely to be achieved; but, unless the power sharing option was put forward, the SDLP would be unlikely to take any further part in the negotiations. If they could be shown that power sharing was not a possibility, they might be induced to accept the real degree of power allocation that the Council of the Assembly proposal might offer.

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The Prime Minister, summing up the discussion, said it was clear that the forthcoming meeting with Mr Haughey, and the preliminary discussion with Mr Hume would present considerable problems. To a large extent they would need to be listening sessions, but Mr Haughey could not go away believing and publicly stating that the Government was reconsidering its commitment to the Northern Ireland majority. A difficult decision would have to be taken over the question of legislative powers for the proposed new Assembly in Northern Ireland. In the longer term they would have to consider how the elected representatives of Northern Ireland in Parliament could be brought back into the process of Government from which they were at present excluded. The present situation was incompatible with real democracy.

Ans

Cabinet Office

12 May 1980

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COVERING CONFIDENTIAL
From: THE PRIVATE SECRETARY



NORTHERN IRELAND OFFICE
GREAT GEORGE STREET,
LONDON SW1P 3AJ

12 May 1980

Michael Alexander Esq
10 Downing Street
SW1

Dear Michael

MEETING WITH MR JOHN HUME

I attach a brief for tomorrow's meeting.

Yours sincerely
Mickie Hopkins
M W HOPKINS

COVERING CONFIDENTIAL

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PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING WITH MR JOHN HUME, MEP: THURSDAY 13 MAY 1980

A background note on Mr Hume and his Party is attached at Annex A. Mr Hume has taken up the long-standing invitation originally extended to Gerry Fitt (as his predecessor as leader of the SDLP) to a meeting on security with the Prime Minister to match others which she has had with Northern Ireland political leaders.

2. The meeting is nominally about security. Mr Hume's Party are against violence and against the IRA. But they are ambivalent in their attitude towards the Security Forces arguing that they cannot speak out in support of the Security Forces until the Catholic community have a role in government. They need to be tackled on this. A speaking note is at Annex B. The SDLP have a number of bees in their bonnets about security, some of which ^{may} fly out when Mr Hume sees the Prime Minister. A defensive speaking note is at Annex C.

3. Mr Hume's request for a meeting comes - not by accident - shortly before the Prime Minister's meeting with Mr Haughey and at a time when the Government's proposals for the future government of Northern Ireland are being worked up. Mr Hume will certainly wish to raise political matters. He is likely to concentrate on 3 points:-

- (i) The Constitutional Guarantee - the SDLP, and Mr Hume in particular, have consistently pressed that HMG should withdraw the guarantee whereby Northern Ireland remains a part of the UK for as long as the majority so wish, or alternatively that HMG should at least declare an "interest in Irish unity". (The guarantee is alleged to give the Unionists a sense of security, lessening the incentive to come to terms with the minority community.)

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- (ii) Power-sharing - throughout the Constitutional Conference the SDLP have maintained that no government can work in Northern Ireland unless the minority community are guaranteed a share in the exercise of power (which to them means seats at the top table). They say that they will have nothing to do with any system of government based on majority rule.
- (iii) Local government - the SDLP will also reject any attempt to strengthen the powers of local government. There are two main reasons for this:
- (a) They want power-sharing in a provincial government to guard themselves against acts of sectarian discrimination; and by the same token they would oppose giving majority-rule local councils enhanced powers (eg housing, education, planning) for fear that they too would be abused.
- (b) The distribution of Catholics in the Province does not make it possible to construct local government areas in such a way as to produce a reasonable proportion of areas in which the minority in the community would command power.
- (iv) Most of Mr Hume's Party now accept that an institutionalised Irish dimension (eg a "Council of Ireland" in the Sunningdale sense) cannot be created in the near future. But if they do not get a power sharing regime in the North they will "play the Dublin card", ie they will insist that the role of the Irish Government is crucial to any

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settlement. Hume is likely to develop these ideas to the Prime Minister. At his last meeting with the Secretary of State on 18 April he said that HMG needed to take into consideration:

- 1) relationships between the people of Northern Ireland;
- 2) relationships between the people of the North and South of Ireland;
- 3) relationships between GB and Ireland.

4. The SDLP have very close links with Dublin (both with Fianna Fail and Fine Gael) and claim to be able to control Irish policy on Northern Ireland. Hume does not like Mr Haughey but has developed a respect for him as Taoiseach. He will undoubtedly give a detailed account of his meeting with the Prime Minister to Mr Haughey in preparation for the Taoiseach's own meeting with her.

5. The Prime Minister will wish to make it clear that any future arrangements for the government of Northern Ireland will take full account of the interests of the minority, but that there can be no question of the Government of the Republic having any say in the formulation of those arrangements. A speaking note is attached at Annex D.

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BACKGROUND NOTE

John Hume

John Hume was born (1937) and received his schooling in Londonderry; his home today is on the edge of the Bogside. He graduated from St Patrick's College, Maynooth in French and Modern History, and entered the teaching profession. Hume's involvement in public life began through his holding office in the Credit Union Movement; he was President of the Credit League of Ireland from 1964-69. He was a prominent figure in the civil rights movement and became a Stormont MP in 1968; with 5 other opposition members, he formed the SDLP in 1970 and became its Deputy Leader in 1973. Elected to the Northern Ireland Assembly in 1973, John Hume became Minister of Commerce during the short-lived power sharing Executive (at which time his Permanent Secretary was Ewart Bell, now Head of the NI Civil Service, whom the Prime Minister has met). Following the Constitutional Convention in 1975-76, on which he represented Londonderry, he was granted a visiting research fellowship at Trinity College, Dublin and was an associate fellow of international affairs at Harvard. In 1978 he joined the cabinet of Edmund Burke, the Irish Commissioner at Brussels. In 1979 he was elected a Member of the European Parliament. He became leader of the SDLP in December 1979 on the resignation of Gerry Fitt MP from the Party.

2. In common with many of his colleagues in the SDLP from outside Belfast, John Hume leans towards the nationalist wing of the Party. However, he is moderate in approach and recognises the need to maintain a dialogue with the Unionists; he unreservedly condemns the activities of the IRA. His experience in the power-sharing Executive, when he was a most able Minister, confirmed his belief in the ability of the two communities to work together in Government. He blames the failure of the power-sharing experiment on the weakness

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of the British Government which, he felt, could have done more to support the embryo administration during the events leading up to the Ulster Workers Council strike. He has a romantic view of Irish history and Irish identity and firmly believes that the British and Irish Governments will have to play a strong and decisive role in resolving the political impasse in Northern Ireland. He has from time to time expressed doubts about their resolve to do so. In a recent article in Foreign Affairs Magazine he wrote "London, for its part, exercises a reluctant sovereignty in Northern Ireland, while Dublin maintains a somewhat reluctant claim to that sovereignty". He does not believe that an internal settlement within Northern Ireland can be more than a step on the road to Irish unity. Although very much a Derry man, Hume is also a committed internationalist, seeing lessons for Ireland in world history and believing it important to harness world opinion on the Irish question. He has built up a particularly close relationship with US politicians, while recognising that there are those in the United States who are not an influence for good. He also regards the European Economic Community as providing a broadening influence, giving the people of Ireland a chance to look beyond their internal squabbles.

The SDLP

3. The SDLP was founded in 1970 as a secular Party designed to attract members from both communities. In practice it has become the largest Catholic party, though it still keeps its distance from the Church.

The Party represents a wide spectrum of nationalist views, though since the departure of Gerry Fitt it is dominated by the rural and Derry faction, and does not contain many influential members from Belfast. It has always been and still remains a fragile coalition and the Party leaders including Hume are conscious of the need to

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convince their electorate that they can deliver a settlement favourable to the Catholic community by constitutional means. The SDLP have been an important factor in wooing the Catholic community as a whole away from the violent tactics of the PIRA. John Hume is the undisputed leader of the Party who recognises that his international reputation is one of their great assets. He is unlikely to be challenged. He has however to reconcile the differing views of his membership on how fast to proceed towards their agreed aim of Irish unity. The danger he has to guard against is that the Party could split if it is seen to fail, and that the more extreme members could become more sympathetic to PIRA.

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ANNEX B

SECURITY

Points to make

1. You and your colleagues sometimes criticise certain aspects of security policy in Northern Ireland: you reflect publicly the traditional apprehension felt by many of those whom you represent about the RUC and the Army. This is your privilege. But time has moved forward, and you have a responsibility to contribute positively to all the efforts which are being made to protect ordinary people and to bring to justice those who bomb and kill.
2. The Government's security policy is non-discriminatory. We are against all terrorists, whatever political beliefs - Republicanism or Loyalism - they may (sometimes cynically) profess. We want to stop violence so that both Catholics and Protestants can live normal lives free from fear.
3. The RUC and the Army conduct security operations in such a way as to minimize disruption and inconvenience to law-abiding people. They are selective, patiently building up through investigation and intelligence, an accurate picture of whomsoever or whatever they want to apprehend. As the capture of the men in the Antrim Road on 2 May showed, they do not want unnecessary bloodshed.
4. We are determined that the RUC should continue to take full responsibility for policing duties throughout the Province. Much has been done to make the force acceptable to Catholics; this is bound to be a gradual process but I hope you share my satisfaction at what has already been achieved.

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DEFENSIVE SPEAKING NOTES: SECURITYEmergency Provisions Act gives Security Forces extreme powers

The powers given by the Act are the minimum needed in the circumstances in Northern Ireland. They are brought before Parliament for review every six months. This is not a ritual; we look carefully for ways in which we can relax them.

Ill-treatment of suspects during interrogation by Police

The Government and the Chief Constable condemn absolutely any ill-treatment of suspects. We have implemented all the Bennett recommendations for supervising interviews. We will not be brow-beaten by propaganda, but we are determined to do all that can be done to ensure there is no ill-treatment.

Investigation of allegations of RUC misbehaviour

The RUC are not above the law. The DPP (who is answerable to the Attorney General, not to the Chief Constable) considers scrupulously all cases in which a criminal offence is alleged. The Chief Constable's attitude to alleged breaches of discipline is no less rigorous. I am quite satisfied that we do not need an independent tribunal.

Government should make first move in H-Block protest

Can well understand concern at conditions, but these are entirely self-inflicted. The prisoners in the H-Blocks have been provided with excellent facilities but have chosen to defile them. In order to give the prisoners concerned more opportunity for contacts with their families and friends, the disciplinary awards against them have been adjusted to allow two visits a month instead of one visit a month; and to allow a prisoner to write and receive one letter a week instead of one a month. They are also permitted to take their daily exercise period in PT kit. None of those on the "dirty" protest have taken advantage of any of these measures.

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RUC and UDR are recruited almost entirely from majority community

Anyone who meets the entry requirements is welcome to join, irrespective of where they live, or their religion or lack of it. But face fact that Catholics from some areas need considerable courage. Own neighbours and political representatives need to encourage and support potential recruits.

Security problems should be tackled in co-operation with the Government in the Republic

Agree completely. Good deal of progress made since last Autumn (meeting with Mr Lynch). Encouraging signs that Garda and RUC are working together more and more closely. But to trumpet it to the world would be counter-productive; results - arms finds, arrests - are clear enough proof.

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SPEAKING NOTE ON POLITICS

Pleased that the SDLP participated in the Conference. Valuable first step on road to a political settlement. HMG now formulating their proposals for further discussion. HMG wish to consult widely, but given the facts of political life in NI, there can be no imposed solution. A local administration in the North no obstacle to ultimate Irish unity if that were what the people wanted; but at the moment it is not what the majority want.

Points to make:

1. Guarantee: there can be no question of change; it would make things more difficult by infuriating Unionists; and a change would not be consistent with the principle that the present constitutional position of Northern Ireland remains unaltered as long as that is the wish of the majority.
2. Declaration of interest by HMG in eventual Irish unity: not on; counter-productive because it would alienate the majority in Northern Ireland.
3. Dublin's role: recognise that they have a natural interest; but must be very careful not to concede that they have any role in the negotiation of Northern Ireland's future.
4. Wider relationships: what does Hume mean exactly? The setting up of acceptable institutions for a local administration in Northern Ireland would be the essential first step to progress on a wider front.
5. Long-term future: HMG accepts and will defend the choice of the Northern Ireland people.

12 MAY 1960

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Ref. A02132

PRIME MINISTER

*I have agreed, subject to your views,
that Mr Stowe should also attend this
meeting.*

Amby 9/5

Northern Ireland

Following the Home Secretary's letter to you about Northern Ireland on 7th May, you are due to have a meeting with the Home Secretary, Lord Chancellor, Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary, Secretary of State for Northern Ireland and Mr. Hayhoe on Monday, 12th May. Although the group will wish to seek your views on all the numbered points set out in the Home Secretary's letter, their greatest immediate concern relates to sub-paragraph vi - your forthcoming meeting with Mr. Haughey.

2. There seem to me to be three possible levels for progress on and in Northern Ireland:

- (1) The continuing effort by Her Majesty's Government to reduce inter-community tensions and lay the foundations for an acceptable constitutional settlement which returns legislative and executive powers to political institutions in Belfast - the course on which we are at present engaged.
- (2) Some kind of deal between the Unionists and the SDLP: unlikely, though given the right personalities it just might emerge as a by-product of (1).
- (3) An arrangement between London and Dublin - at the risk of explosive consequences in Northern Ireland and at Westminster.

No

3. Mr. Haughey is clearly after the last of these. He sees you as a pragmatic statesman, likely to respond to his own willingness to contemplate hitherto unthinkable developments in the relationship between the United Kingdom and the Irish Republic, in the context of which (in his vision) the fears of the majority in Northern Ireland might be allayed; and perhaps ready, in the interests of a London-Dublin alliance, to contemplate a modification of the guarantee to the people of Northern Ireland.

4. On this last point, you will have to disillusion him. But how you do it will be very important, because he is in a position to make life more difficult for us in the North, both on security and in the political discussions, if he thinks that his ends will be served thereby.

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5. On the security side, he has markedly intensified the Garda's anti-terrorist effort not only in cross-border co-operation but also in self-motivated activities in the South which have led among other things to important arms finds. This represents a big improvement in the security situation which is saving lives. He would obviously weigh the political dangers for himself of being seen or thought to be reversing this development and increase the violence. But if he thought that it would serve his political interests to do so, he could do it without any overt move at all: a hint from his office to the Commissioner of the Garda would be enough.

6. On the political side, the SDLP take their lead from Dublin, and will dance to Mr. Haughey's tune. He can use his influence to lead them to continue to participate in the Secretary of State's constitutional talks and any elections that may follow. Or he could, again without any overt move, destroy the prospects of any further progress in the Secretary of State's political talks in the North; indeed, he could destroy all that has so far been achieved. Again, he would obviously calculate carefully before doing so; but he has the capacity to do it.

7. So you will have a difficult game to play with Mr. Haughey: you will be having to pour cold water on some of his more far-reaching ideas, without rebuffing his desire to contribute to the resolution of the Northern Ireland problem; and at the same time you will need to persuade him to continue to give the support he has been giving to the improvement of security and to the progress of the political discussions in Northern Ireland.

8. So far as handling the meeting on Monday is concerned, you may like to work through the numbered points in the Home Secretary's letter. Your discussion might usefully cover the following points of detail:-

- (i) In this sub-paragraph the Home Secretary suggests that the proposals should give "a firm and clear indication of the direction we intend to follow". But the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland has in mind a Green Paper with subsequent discussion and negotiation. Are these two aims really compatible? How will the Government's supporters react to a Green Paper?

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- (ii) This proposed timing for the publication of the proposals seems sensible. But, with the proposals now "Green", and the Secretary of State's conference scheduled to resume in September, there must be a high risk of missing the 1980-81 Session and not being able to legislate before 1981-82.
- (iii) The steps proposed here seem sensible but you may wish to ask how the Official Unionist Party will be brought into the negotiations. The answer may be to suggest that the resumed Conference should be under your chairmanship.
- (iv) This sub-paragraph is really an acknowledgment that there is no certainty that the proposals put forward are going to succeed. This in turn underlines the importance of the attitude of the Official Unionist Party and of the SDLP and, in connection with the latter, Mr. Haughey.
- (v) This sub-paragraph about the role of the Army in Northern Ireland underlines the desirability of keeping Mr. Haughey sweet for as long as possible. The greater the extent to which the security situation can be got under control in the next few months, the better is the chance of preventing a resurgence of terrorism later if the political negotiations break down.
- (vi) This deals with your forthcoming meeting with Mr. Haughey and represents the most important part of this meeting.
9. Points emerging from the discussion in this meeting will be reflected both in the briefs for your meeting with Mr. Haughey and in the drafting of the Green Paper in which the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland is currently engaged.

REA

(Robert Armstrong)

9th May, 1980

CONFIDENTIAL

Ireland



QUEEN ANNE'S GATE LONDON SW1H 9AT

7 May 1980

My dear Prime Minister.

NORTHERN IRELAND

We have had two meetings of MISC 24 on Humphrey Atkins' papers. We still have further work to do on detail, but at our meeting with you and Peter Carrington on 12 May Humphrey Atkins, Quintin Hailsham and I would like to discuss our provisional conclusions on the key issues which I set out below.

- (i) The Conference adjourned for the Government to put forward its own "proposals for further discussion". These proposals should give a firm and clear indication of the direction we intend to follow with options on the central issue (the role of the minority).
- (ii) We should aim to publish our proposals early in June, after your meeting with the Taoiseach but before the House is asked to renew (as we must) in June/July the powers of direct rule.
- (iii) We should continue the private negotiations during the preparation of our proposals, both to secure as much common ground as possible and to help in getting the presentation right. After publication, negotiations should continue but:-
 - (a) the first significant step would be the debate in the House;
 - (b) July and August are not negotiating months in Northern Ireland and therefore

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- (c) if, as we hope, all the parties can be brought together in a resumed Conference we should aim to do this in September.
- (iv) As to content, we cannot compromise on the right of the majority to remain in the United Kingdom for as long as they wish. Equally, they cannot have a blank cheque on the Exchequer. Our proposals should restore responsibility over as wide a range of functions as is appropriate in a way which secures the highest degree of consensus possible in a divided and impoverished community. Since there is no agreement on the central issue of how to secure some consensus, we agree with Humphrey Atkins that within otherwise firm proposals we must offer options for further discussion on this.
- (v) We must not prejudice our aim of reducing the Army profile, and subsequently its deployment in Northern Ireland. We require, therefore, a prepared but concealed fall-back position so that, if the politicians turn intransigent, we can avoid a confrontation that would threaten security.
- (vi) The Taoiseach presents a problem. He cannot have what he wants on Irish unity - a seat at the Conference table and support for Irish unity (see (iv) above). But we want him to continue cross-border security co-operation: he could not flout international opinion by blatantly withdrawing it but only one telephone call is needed to cripple its effectiveness. And we want him to persuade the SDLP to participate in the negotiations and in the subsequent elections. There is real scope, however, for co-operation between the Republic and the United Kingdom and between North and South on economic, and particularly energy matters and this may be our main card.

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3.

I am copying this letter to the Lord Chancellor, the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary, the Secretary of State for Defence, the Lord Privy Seal, the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, and to Sir Robert Armstrong.

Margaret Thatcher
Wd

The Rt Hon Margaret Thatcher MP

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1-7 MAY 1959



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Ireland

6 May 1980

AF 12.5.80

Meeting with Mr. John Hume

As you are already aware, the Prime Minister has agreed to see Mr. Hume at 1130 on Tuesday 13 May. Your Secretary of State will be attending the meeting.

I should be grateful if a brief could reach me by close of play on Monday 12 May.

MICHAEL ALEXANDER

Roy Harrington, Esq.,
Northern Ireland Office.

sd

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

6 May 1980

Meeting with Mr. Enoch Powell

As you know, the Prime Minister had a private meeting with Mr. Enoch Powell on Thursday 1 May. I did not myself attend the meeting. The Prime Minister's Parliamentary Private Secretary, Ian Gow, did however attend and has produced a note on the discussion. I should be grateful if this note could be given a particularly limited distribution.

M O'D B A

Roy Harrington, Esq.,
Northern Ireland Office.



PR. MINISTER

has seen - PA
MS

INCIDENT IN WEST BELFAST

Ken Stowe has just reported that the incident which led to the death of one SAS man has ended successfully. The four terrorists involved have surrendered and are on their way to Castlereagh to be charged with murder.

He said that two houses had been taken over by the West Belfast active service unit of the PIRA - the Ballymurphy gun team - with a view to a very considerable incident.

The plan was to use one house to shoot at a security force target and then when that house was occupied by the security forces to blow up both houses with explosives which had been planted in the second house.

Intelligence information led the SAS to approach the houses before any attack was made. At that stage one of the terrorists left the back of one house and shot dead the SAS Captain in charge of the operation before going back into the house.

Later on, when it became clear that the terrorists were surrounded and overwhelmingly outnumbered, they all surrendered peacefully. This has astonished the security forces, who expected them to shoot it out.

One of the terrorists arrested is called McKee, ^{ad} who is one of the Provisional's top killers.

One of the terrorists is a woman, and this led erroneously to reports that a family was being held hostage. No-one other than the terrorists was involved in the incident.

The general security force view is that this is the most significant success against the terrorists in the last two years.

/The Northern

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The Northern Ireland Office are coordinating a press line, which is deliberately designed to cool the situation. It simply says that a soldier has been killed and that four terrorists have been arrested.

ms

2 May 1980

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SUBJECT

PRIVATE & CONFIDENTIAL

La.
Runt
- 6/5

NOTE OF A MEETING HELD AT THE HOUSE
OF COMMONS AT 4.45 P.M. ON THURSDAY
1ST MAY, 1980

PRESENT: The Prime Minister
The Right Honourable J. Enoch Powell,
M.B.E., M.P.
Ian Gow

1. Mr. Powell started by saying that he believed that the Government might be under two serious misapprehensions about the position in Northern Ireland:-

(a) "That it is essential to do something about constitutional change in Northern Ireland now."

Mr. Powell said that if we were to do nothing, but simply to continue with Direct Rule, there would be no outcry in Ulster. To continue, as we are, would not be unwelcome to the great majority of the people of Ulster, and would be something that would be wholly manageable. Furthermore, the continuation of Direct Rule, in its present form, would be the worst possible message for the I.R.A.

(b) "That you can have an Assembly, with or without an Executive, without fearful trouble".

(i) If there was to be an Assembly, without an Executive, that Assembly would act irresponsibly, because it would have no responsibility. It would discuss any and all matters. It would be hostile and critical. Its criticism would be destructive. It would diminish the role of Ulster MPs at Westminster.

(ii) An Assembly with an Executive, could only be achieved as a result of power-sharing. Thus, the power of the majority would be negated. Any Unionists who were to participate, would have their heads cut off, as happened in the case of Faulkner. The I.R.A. would see a power-sharing Executive as a step in the ⁱⁿ direction/which they would like to go. The I.R.A. would be encouraged. They would argue that if they were to persevere, they would be able to force further Constitutional change.

2. Mr. Powell said that since the end of the Constitutional Conference, hardly a day had passed without the media being fed with reports of what the Government was about to do. Mr. Powell handed to the Prime Minister cuttings from The Times for 29th

April and for 1st May. Mr. Powell said that there was no doubt that the briefing which lay behind these two reports (attached) had come from the Northern Ireland Office. Mr. Powell asked that instructions should be given to the Northern Ireland Office to stop briefing of this kind. He said that these reports "cost lives".

3. The meeting ended at 4.55 p.m.

2nd May, 1980

Ian Gow

Times
29 April 1980



OF COMMONS
ON SWIA OAA

Ministers to study plans for Ulster devolution

From Christopher Thomas
Belfast

A number of firm proposals for the devolution of power to Northern Ireland will be studied this week by the unofficial "Whitelaw group" of five Cabinet ministers.

The meeting has been arranged to examine the result of several weeks of intensive work by officials of the Northern Ireland Office in London on a narrow range of options for restoring government to Ulster.

There remains a firm expectation that a White Paper will be published in June, followed by a parliamentary debate. The timing of the imminent talks between Mrs Margaret Thatcher and Mr Charles Haughey, the Irish Prime Minister, is therefore significant.

They are to meet formally in London in the next few weeks. That was agreed during a 10-minute encounter between the two leaders in Luxembourg on Sunday. In line with an increasing tendency towards secrecy, official Dublin sources are under strict instructions not to answer journalists' questions about the meeting.

Mr Haughey is bound to emphasize to Mrs Thatcher that the Irish Republic should be involved in the dialogue on Ulster's political future; he made that point over lunch in Dublin recently with Mr Humphrey Atkins, Secretary of State for Northern Ireland.

Times, 1 May 1980

Devolution schemes are studied

From Christopher Thomas
Belfast

The advance towards devolution of power to Northern Ireland continued yesterday as senior Cabinet ministers studied the results of several weeks' work by civil servants.

The unofficial group of five ministers known as the Whitelaw group appraised several outline models for a restoration of government to Ulster. Even the most senior local politicians, however, are not being taken into the Government's confidence.

As a result there is intensive speculation in Ulster on the possible shape of the forthcoming proposals. There are widespread rumours, most of them contradicting each other, about what is likely to emerge in the coming month or two.

The only common ground appears to be that the Government is intent on handing back a substantial measure of power to an elected assembly.

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COPY NO 1 OF 8.



PRIME MINISTER

Enoch Powell

I had a private talk this morning with my colleagues on MISC 24 about Enoch Powell's claim to have struck a deal with Airey Neave. Obviously, until we know just what this alleged deal was supposed to have been, and get some idea of Powell's intentions, it is not possible to reach any firm views on how we should play it; but it may be helpful to you to have our views on the line you might take with him when you see him tomorrow.

We suggest the first point is to rebut firmly any accusation he may make of bad faith. None of us had any knowledge of this alleged deal, and policy on Northern Ireland has therefore had to be developed without taking account of it. (Powell has in fact exacerbated matters by remaining silent for so long even though it must have been clear to him months ago that things were not going the way he - presumably - expected).

He must also be told that the Government collectively is now firmly committed to the principles set out in paragraphs 4 and 5 of Cmnd. 7763 - the Working Paper issued for the recent Conference. We cannot now go back on that, particularly the principle of "acceptability", and the need to make "reasonable and appropriate arrangements to take account of the interests of the minority". Given the facts of political life in Northern Ireland this is just real-politik. We cannot impose something which either side of the communal divide will reject. Powell will no doubt favour the "local government - British style" solution; and this too we could adopt if, but only if, both sides in Northern Ireland will agree to it. But he cannot expect us at this stage to abandon the road we are now treading and expose ourselves to what would then be well-qualified charges

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PAGE NO 1 OF 2.

SECRET
- 2 -

of having misled all concerned in Northern Ireland and in Parliament about our real intentions. Indeed, even if such a course were one we could contemplate in principle, the consequences in Northern Ireland - in terms of the ending of any hope of an acceptable settlement and of the security consequences which might follow, with the minority totally disillusioned at apparent British duplicity - would be such as to give us serious pause. We are not conducting an academic seminar.

Perhaps when you have had your meeting with Powell and we know more precisely what it is he is seeking it would be helpful if I and my MISC 24 colleagues, at our next meeting, were to consider the delicate political implications of all this further.

I am copying this to the other members of MISC 24 and to Sir Robert Armstrong.

Wor

30 April 1980

SECRET



Ireland

10 DOWNING STREET

MR ALEXANDER

John Hume is unable to come next week as he will be in Greece so I have offered him Tuesday, 13 May at 11.30 at No.10. Would you like me to

(a) Inform the Northern Ireland Office?

(b) Request briefing?

A handwritten signature in blue ink, appearing to be 'EJ'.

29 April 1980



Ephemerals

10 DOWNING STREET

Caroline.

Would you like to fix a
meeting in the week 6-9 May?

Mr Hume's phone no is
in the first letter in the file.

A.

E.R.

COVERING SECRET

MR ~~ALEXANDER~~

1/4b


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NORTHERN IRELAND OFFICE MEETING

A Note of the meeting which took mplace in the Northern Ireland Office in London at 12 noon on Friday, 25 April 1980 is attached for your information.



B A BLACKWELL
29 April 1980

COVERING SECRET

E.R.

● IOM 80 (3)

NOTE OF A MEETING HELD IN THE NORTHERN IRELAND OFFICE ON
FRIDAY 25 APRIL 1980 AT 12.00 pm

Present

Mr Marshall	Chairman
Mr Moriarty)	
Mr Davenport)	
Mr Blackwell)	NIO
Mr Bridges)	
Mr Benger)	
Mr Stephens)	
Mr Cousins)	
Mr Farthing)	
Brig. Myrtle)	MOD
Lt Col Bateman)	
Maj Martin)	
Maj Pheysey)	
Mr Newington	FCO

Area Reviews

Mr Davenport said that the first review concerning South Armagh had been completed and its conclusions had been noted by the Prime Minister. Work on the second area review on Londonderry was now complete and the draft report had been sent to the Chief Constable and the GOC. It was anticipated that the report would then be sent to the Secretary of State and dealt with in the same way as had the report on South Armagh. It was hoped that a draft report on East Tyrone would be ready by the end of May and the report on the review of Belfast should be available in draft by the end of June. Other areas, most notably Fermanagh, had been suggested for review but no decision on this was likely until summer. When all the reports had been completed it should be possible to draw them together and derive general lessons.

Yellow Card

The Chairman said that he had received a reply to his letter on this subject to MOD and would reply in due course. Mr Farthing said that

the Law Officers were aware of the Chairman's letter to Mr Stephen and were likely to agree the proposed new terms of the card.

The Chairman considered that the press was bound to learn of the revision of the Yellow Card and thought that it might be wise to issue a statement in advance to the effect that the Yellow Card had been made shorter and easier to understand whilst leaving its legal effect unaltered. Mr Stephen said that MOD would like to have time to consider this suggestion; at present they were keeping open the option of not revealing when the Card was revised.

The Electricity Interconnector

Mr Davenport said that there was general agreement in Northern Ireland on the desirability of restoring the Interconnector. In parallel with the discussions between the authorities in Northern Ireland and the Republic, the Chief Constable intended to approach the Garda Commissioner to ensure that when work was re-started the Garda would endeavour to prevent any disruption from their side of the Border. There had been further discussions with the Northern Ireland Electricity Service (NIES) who were understandably sensitive after IRA intimidation of their workers. The Managing Director was nonetheless hopeful that, given time, his workforce might be willing to resume work on the project. The security forces were very willing to provide protection for the workers but the Army, although probably capable of doing the job after training from NIES management, were not enthusiastic about undertaking the task on their own.

Mr Newington said that it had been agreed at Dublin on 15 April that both the Secretary of State and Mr Lenihan, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, would simultaneously issue statements on the restoration of the interconnector. He had recently received the draft text of Mr Lenihan's statement which was perhaps not as firm as the Irish had originally indicated. The Chairman thought it inadvisable to be too firm in our commitment

in view of the problems which we were likely to encounter if the NIES proved in the event unable to do the work themselves.

Force Levels

Mr Cousins said that there would be a House of Commons debate on Defence on Monday and Tuesday of next week (28 and 29 April). Ministers had been advised to answer questions about force levels in a general way unless the questioner exhibited specific knowledge of the proposed reductions in the Londonderry area in which case it would be necessary to admit these reductions.

Meeting between the Secretary of State and Mr Lenihan in Dublin on Tuesday 15 April

The Chairman said that there had been few concrete results arising from the meeting. There had been no problems over security and the Irish had expressed themselves as in favour of restoring the inter-connector. It was clear that the Taoiseach had taken personal control of policy with regard to the North and indeed, the DFA had been somewhat frozen out. Mr Haughey wished to meet the Prime Minister briefly at Luxembourg over the next weekend in order to arrange a further meeting to discuss matters of mutual interest, including Northern Ireland. It might well be that this timetable would also suit our interests. The remainder of the discussion had centered on cross-border economic cooperation. Mr Newington said that we could not be certain whether the Taoiseach was seeking substantive changes in Northern Ireland or whether he was merely seeking to enhance his image for domestic political purposes.

The Political Conference

The Chairman said that the Conference had adjourned at the end of March having considered the entire agenda. No agreed conclusions had been reached but then none had been expected. It was valuable that the parties had been able to propound their respective viewpoints to each other. The basic problem however remained; both the SDLP and, it

would seem, Alliance, insisted on power-sharing, by which they meant seats for the minority in the Cabinet or its equivalent. The DUP and, it must be assumed, the OUP, were totally opposed to the idea. There was no real middle course and it was not within the gift of HMG to impose power-sharing if the majority parties were not willing to accept it. NIO was now seeking to devise arrangements which would enable there to be voluntary power-sharing if that were acceptable to the majority, but which, in default of this, would provide a system of safeguards whereby the minority would be able to delay or block initiatives from the majority which the minority found unacceptable. There was no prospect that the latter proposal would be acceptable to the minority at present, as they were committed to power-sharing. It might be that they would modify their stance if, as a result of a meeting between the Prime Minister and the Taoiseach, they were convinced that nothing further could be achieved on their behalf by the Government of the Republic.

Proposals were to be put to MISC 24 which would meet on 30 April; at some stage OD would be presented with a draft Green Paper which would eventually go to the Cabinet. There was a potential problem over timing if the meeting between the Prime Minister and the Taoiseach were long delayed. Proposals could not be published before or immediately after this meeting; but, at the same time, it would be difficult for the Government to ask Parliament to renew the present constitutional arrangements in June or July (when current powers would expire) without indicating what the Government's plans for the future entailed. It was possible that the Conference would be resumed in September.

Mr Stephens said that MOD would prefer a Green to a White Paper as the latter could hardly fail to give some indications of the Government's preferred solution. The Chairman welcomed this view as there had been some backbench pressure for a White Paper. Mr Newington said that the Irish Embassy had enquired about the timetable for the publication of

either a Green or White Paper and put forward the view that specific proposals at this moment would almost certainly fail.

Mr Stephens said that he had heard of suggestions that any proposed Northern Ireland Executive or Assembly should have a committee set up to advise the Secretary of State on the exercise of his reserve powers. Although advisory committees were frequently troublesome because they tended to make irresponsible suggestions if they did not have responsibility for implementing them, in this case such a committee would be a reasonable arrangement, particularly as the Secretary of State's use of his reserve powers would be discussed in any event. The Chairman agreed that such a committee was desirable and said that NIO thought that it should be chaired by the Secretary of State who would then be in a position to receive the views of its members direct.

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R. Alexander

Mrs Stephens
arr in town with
his wife - will
inform you of
final arrangements.
25/4

GPS 070

CYPHER CAT A

FM NIO BELFAST 23/1014Z

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TO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON TELNO 001 OF 23 APRIL.
INFO ROUTINE FCO, NIO LONDON.

YOUR TELGRAM NUMBER 1537 TO FCO JOHN HUME. HUME HAD ALREADY
LEFT FOR THE STATES WHEN WE SPOKE TO HIS WIFE YESTERDAY.
HE IS STAYING IN WASHINGTON WITH THE IRISH AMBASSADOR UNTIL
24 APRIL AND CAN BE CONTACTED THERE.

HANNIGAN

[THIS TELEGRAM WAS NOT ADVANCED]

FILES
R. J.
M. FERGUSSON

Copies To
NIO LONDON

A/D NORTHERN IRELAND

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Ireland

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

22 April 1980

BF 30.4.80

Dear Roy,

Prime Minister's Meeting with Mr. Enoch Powell

The Prime Minister has agreed to see Mr. Powell on Thursday 1 May. Before making this appointment, she had read your letter to me of 18 April and was fully seized of your Secretary of State's view that she should see Mr. Molyneaux first. This problem has been finessed by arranging for it to be made clear to Mr. Powell that the Prime Minister assumed he would be informing Mr. Molyneaux of his appointment to see the Prime Minister. This removes the possibility of there being any complaint on Mr. Molyneaux's part that the Prime Minister has gone behind his back and gives him the opportunity to ask for a meeting himself if he wishes to have one.

II
The Prime Minister has not identified any particular point in your letter which she would like to have elaborated. I should be grateful, therefore, if you could let me have a full brief in the course of Wednesday 30 April.

Yours ever

Michael Alexander

Roy Harrington, Esq.,
Northern Ireland Office.

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10 DOWNING STREET

Prime Minister

John Hume is the only one of the Northern Ireland party leaders with whom you have not had a meeting to discuss security. He has now said that he would like to take up the offer. May we go ahead and fix a meeting in, say, the first week of May '84 after you have seen Mr Powell + Mr Haughey (in her-embassy) + before any bilateral with Mr Haughey?

Yes
no

Andrew
- 22/4

CONFIDENTIAL



NORTHERN IRELAND OFFICE
GREAT GEORGE STREET,
LONDON SW1P 3AJ

SECRETARY OF STATE
FOR
NORTHERN IRELAND

Rt Hon John Biffen MP
Chief Secretary
HM Treasury
Treasury Chambers
Parliament Street
London SW1P 3AG

P. Minister (2)

Paul

21 April 1980

Dear John,

NI FORCE LEVELS

On 26 March you commented on my letter of 19 March to Francis Pym about the withdrawal of Army roulement units.

I entirely agree with you about the need to contain public expenditure. We have consistently played our part in this by ensuring that any additional expenditure required for law and order has been matched by offsetting savings in other parts of the NI programme. In doing so we have done much to honour the Government's commitment to give priority to law and order without adding to the total of public expenditure. This has meant some hard decisions but is part of the approach to public expenditure to which we all subscribe.

Any reduction in the level of Army support for the police in NI inevitably throws a greater burden on to the police. Where these reductions follow improvements in the security situation, the extra burden on the police can be comparatively slight; but if the security situation does not continue to improve - and it did not improve in 1979 - further troop withdrawals place upon the police greater demands than have been previously intended or foreseen. This is not an argument against troop withdrawals but it does mean that the Government's overall security policy in NI will place a heavier burden on my budget, and incidentally may well ease that of the Defence budget.

The 1980 PESC Survey suggests that I may be able to contain within my overall programme the increase in the RUC's costs caused by the withdrawal of the two Army roulement units which were the subject of our recent correspondence. I shall certainly do my best. But beyond a certain point, which none of us can at present predict,

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it could become impossible to find the necessary offsetting savings from the programmes of NI Departments, in particular without thereby further exacerbating the security situation. The point I was therefore seeking to register with my colleagues was that, if I am placed in this position and if I cannot any longer find savings within other parts of the NI programme, I will have no alternative but to look elsewhere for support to maintain our policies in NI if the Government's policy and troop withdrawals are to proceed. We have not yet reached this stage; I hope it will not arise, but I consider it prudent to draw your attention to the problem now.

I am copying this letter to the Prime Minister, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, other members of OD and to Sir Robert Armstrong.

Yours ever

H. Humphrey

12 APR 1960

12 11 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

Published Papers

The following published paper(s) enclosed on this file have been removed and destroyed. Copies may be found elsewhere in The National Archives.

House of Commons Hansard,

21 April 1980, columns 28-34

"Northern Ireland (Security)"

Signed OWayland Date 23 September 2010

PREM Records Team

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GR 500

Prime Minister²

CONFIDENTIAL

FM WASHINGTON 190112Z APR

TO PRIORITY F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1538 OF 19 APRIL.

INFO DUBLIN, NIO BELFAST, NIO LONDON, BIS NEW YORK.

21.4.80

IRISH NATIONAL CAUCUS: MEETING WITH PRESIDENT CARTER.

1. I AM GRATEFUL TO THE DEPARTMENT FOR ALERTING ME TO THE REPORT IN THE IRISH PRESS OF 11 APRIL THAT FATHER SEAN MCMANUS, NATIONAL DIRECTOR OF THE IRISH NATIONAL CAUCUS, WAS TO MEET PRESIDENT CARTER AT THE WHITE HOUSE THAT DAY AS ONE OF 150 REPRESENTATIVES OF QUOTE ETHNIC AND FRATERNAL ORGANISATIONS UNQUOTE INVITED TO A BRIEFING ON INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS.
2. WE IMMEDIATELY TOOK THE MATTER UP WITH THE STATE DEPARTMENT, FIRST AT DEPARTMENTAL LEVEL AND SUBSEQUENTLY WITH VEST, MAKING IT CLEAR THAT WE WERE SERIOUSLY CONCERNED THAT MCMANUS, A SELF-CONFESSED SUPPORTER OF THE PIRA, SHOULD BE INVITED TO THE WHITE HOUSE AND GIVEN THE OPPORTUNITY TO CLAIM OFFICIAL RECOGNITION FOR THE AIMS OF HIS ORGANISATION. VEST, WHO SAID THAT THE STATE DEPARTMENT HAD NOT KNOWN OF THE INVITATION UNTIL WE RAISED IT WITH THEM, UNDERTOOK TO ENSURE THAT BRZEZINSKI, WHO WAS TO ADDRESS THE GROUP AFTER THEIR INITIAL MEETING WITH THE PRESIDENT, WAS ADEQUATELY BRIEFED, BUT SAID HE COULD DO NOTHING TO HAVE THE INVITATION RESCINDED AT THAT LATE STAGE.
3. MCMANUS DID ATTEND THE WHITE HOUSE MEETING (THE FIRST TIME HE HAS MET THE PRESIDENT SINCE CARTER'S UNFORTUNATE REMARKS ON NORTHERN IRELAND DURING THE 1976. ELECTION CAMPAIGN). LIKE OTHERS PRESENT, HE WAS PHOTOGRAPHED WITH THE PRESIDENT AND SUBSEQUENTLY RAISED THE QUESTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN NORTHERN IRELAND WITH BRZEZINSKI. BRZEZINSKI TOLD MCMANUS THAT THE BRITISH AND US AUTHORITIES HAD THE SAME VIEW OF TERRORISM BUT, FROM ANOTHER ACCOUNT WE HAVE RECEIVED, IT SEEMS THAT BRZEZINSKI MAY HAVE BEEN RATHER MORE EQUIVOCAL. I UNDERSTAND THE IRISH TIMES CARRIES A REPORT BEARING OUT THIS SECOND VIEW.

CONFIDENTIAL

14.

4. IT IS INTOLERABLE THAT THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES SHOULD INVITE TO THE WHITE HOUSE THE REPRESENTATIVE OF AN ORGANISATION WHICH SUPPORTS THE PROVISIONAL IRA AND WHICH IS OVERTLY HOSTILE TO THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT. THE IRISH AMBASSADOR, WHO WAS AWAY AT THE TIME, ALSO TAKES A VERY SERIOUS VIEW, AND INTENDS TO COMPLAIN.

5. WHEN I SAW BRZEZINSKI TODAY I PROTESTED STRONGLY TO HIM ABOUT WHAT HAD HAPPENED. HE SAID HE DID NOT KNOW WHO FATHER MCMANUS WAS, NOR THAT HE HAD BEEN AT THE WHITE HOUSE BRIEFING. WHEN I TOLD HIM ABOUT THE LINKS BETWEEN THE IRISH NATIONAL CAUCUS AND THE SUPPLY OF ARMS TO THE IRA AND THAT IT WAS AS BAD FOR MCMANUS TO BE RECEIVED AT THE WHITE HOUSE AS IT WOULD BE IF THE BRITISH PRIME MINISTER RECEIVED ONE OF THE IRANIAN TERRORISTS AT NUMBER 10, BRZEZINSKI ENTIRELY AGREED. SOMEONE ELSE MUST HAVE DONE THE INVITING. HE WOULD SEND A NOTE ABOUT IT. I ASKED HIM IF HE COULD GIVE ME AN ASSURANCE THAT MCMANUS WOULD NOT BE INVITED TO THE WHITE HOUSE AGAIN. HE SAID HE COULD DO SO THREE YEARS OUT OF FOUR, BUT I WOULD UNDERSTAND THE POLITICS INVOLVED. I SAID THAT IT WAS MORE THAN POLITICS. IT WAS INTOLERABLE FOR THE PRESIDENT TO BE ENTERTAINING A TERRORIST OF THIS KIND. BRZEZINSKI AGAIN SAID THAT HE ENTIRELY AGREED.

HENDERSON

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PS/LPS
PS/MR HURD
PS/MR RIDLEY

PS/MR BLAKK
PS/PUS
SIR.D.MAITLAND
SIR.A.ACLAND
CHIEF CLERK
MR FIGG
MR BULLARD
MR FERGUSSON
LORD N.G.LENNOX
MISS BROWN

ADDITIONAL DIST:
NORTHERN IRELAND

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From: THE PRIVATE SECRETARY

4



NORTHERN IRELAND OFFICE
GREAT GEORGE STREET,
LONDON SW1P 3AJ

Michael Alexander Esq
10 Downing Street
London SW1

18 April 1980

Dear Michael

Prime Minister

This is, in effect, a preliminary brief for your meeting with Mr Powell (You will see that Mr Atkins hopes you will see Mr Polymeaux first.)

PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING WITH MR ENOCH POWELL

We agreed last night that it would be impracticable to provide a full brief for this meeting by this evening: both Mr Atkins and the Prime Minister wished to reflect further about the dangers of our position and how best to meet them. I can, however, set out some background which my Secretary of State thinks the Prime Minister may wish to consider over the weekend. You may then want to direct our attention to particular points when we prepare the brief itself.

Mr Atkins explained to the Prime Minister last night that with his approval Ken Stowe recently had a discussion with Enoch Powell. At the end of it the latter unveiled his assertion that there was an agreement with Mr Airey Neave on 28 March 1979 at 9.30 pm, just before the confidence vote. Mr Powell, we presume, intends at least to press upon the Prime Minister the merits, as he sees them, of this agreement and his objections to the Government's course. Ken Stowe's record of his discussion with Mr Powell (including the supplementary note recording separately this particular point) which is enclosed (marked A) gives some indication of Mr Powell's line of thinking (which would, of course, be very much more controversial in Northern Ireland than he implies).

We have no detailed account of any agreement. It now looks, however, as if in the eyes of Mr Powell at least the words in the Conservative Manifesto have had a different (and more specific) meaning from that which we had supposed. It said "In the absence of devolved government, we will seek to establish one or more elected regional councils with a wide range of powers over local services". The Government's policy, from the Queen's Speech, through the Conference and since, is to pursue the first limb of that phrase openly, without prejudice, and constructively. In Mr Powell's eyes, however, the first limb is merely a formality to be got out of the way so that the real objective, the regional councils, can be approached. Indeed,

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to him the first limb of the phrase may merely be a description of the present position, not a condition to be satisfied if regional councils are to be attempted. Whether Mr Molyneux and the party generally share Mr Powell's understanding we do not know.

There are obvious and compelling reasons why we cannot now jettison Government policy and move to the second limb of the phrase in the Manifesto. First, all the participants at the Conference made quite clear, as Mr Atkins told the Cabinet on 24 January, that they do not want a local government solution but a devolved administration with real powers over policy and would wreck a local government solution if it was tried. So it is impossible for the Government quietly to steer down the sort of route which Mr Powell seems to want: and it is even more inconceivable to go down it if he were to attempt to twist the Government's arm under threat of publicising the agreement, which we are no longer in a position to deny (without calling Mr Powell a liar). Secondly, quite apart from the evidence that any sort of local government solution would be unacceptable, a move in that direction could in itself be enough to re-open allegations of a predetermined plan which, in good faith and broadly successfully, we have strenuously denied. Such allegations, or worse still deliberate publicity from the Ulster Unionist Party of a "deal", would call in question the Government's credibility and good faith in all its dealings on Northern Ireland. It is difficult to think of a more welcome gift to the Provisional IRA than plausible, indeed undeniable, claims that we had misled the SDLP and the Catholic community. The damage to confidence, and therefore the implications for the security situation, would be appalling: unsatisfactory though direct rule is, it is tolerable because of a basic belief in fair dealing by the Westminster government. If we were to shake that belief, the consequences would be likely to be measured in men's lives.

Thirdly, there are the international ramifications. Although it was no more than a summary of what has been said separately before, in Dublin earlier this week the Secretary of State set out seven points upon which the Government's approach is based. The Irish Minister for Foreign Affairs noted them carefully, and they have been reported repeatedly in press accounts of the meeting. Several of them would be wholly inconsistent with any implementation of an agreement with the Ulster Unionist Party, at least according to the impression which Mr Powell gives of that agreement. The text of these points, in the terms in which they were put to Mr Lenihan in ... Dublin on Tuesday, is enclosed (marked B).

The timing of Mr Powell's approach is not coincidental. The Secretary of State has announced that, following the adjournment of the Conference, the Government is considering the next steps (indeed, one of today's meetings in Belfast has been called by the Secretary of State to settle the lines of a paper for MISC 24).

SECRET

A number of factors, including this latest development, suggest that the Government will need a little time to consider their next public step on political policy for Northern Ireland. Even without this development, the crucial question was how to bring in the Ulster Unionist Party. It might not be possible, though desirable, to attract them into a new session of the Conference. It would be essential to get them to adopt a positive and constructive attitude towards the Government's next step: they are on record as saying that they would support the Government in carrying out its Manifesto. If the Manifesto means something different to them, the problem of how to attract their support or at least acquiescence becomes much more difficult. That will be a crucial element in briefing the Prime Minister for a meeting with Mr Molyneaux or Mr Powell. The Secretary of State wishes to submit further advice on that, after his discussion with MISC 24 (now planned for 30 April). But he is quite clear that the first person in the Ulster Unionist Party the Prime Minister should see about this matter is James Molyneaux. We believe he is better informed than Mr Powell about the feelings of people in Northern Ireland and does not suffer from prejudices on constitutional matters which could blind him to reason on the political implications of what Mr Powell may now be arguing for. He may well not know exactly what Mr Powell is arguing for: it is significant that any agreement was reached with Mr Powell, and the Prime Minister could expect to learn much about how to deal with Mr Powell from a discussion with Mr Molyneaux. Above all, Mr Molyneaux is the leader of the party: we may need his reasonableness, and the Prime Minister could weaken his position by going behind his back.

Yours Sincerely

J. A. Harrington

pp R A HARRINGTON

SECRET

NOTEMEETING WITH MR POWELL

Mr Powell made one comment in our conversation on 31 March which I have not recorded in my record of the meeting. Below. When, at the close, he spoke of his intention to seek a meeting with the Prime Minister he referred to the fear among the Official Unionist MPs that they were being betrayed (although he did not use this precise word) by the Government. What he said was that they were concerned that the Government seemed to be backing away from the very plain agreement which he had reached with Mr Airey Neave at 9.30 pm in Mr Neave's room in the House of Commons on 28 March in return for which the Official Unionists had agreed to support the Opposition and so bring down the Labour Government. He did not specify what this agreement was but the implication was clear, that the Government's policy towards Northern Ireland would be a Unionist policy leading towards integration rather than devolution. I was struck by the stark clarity and precise terms in which Mr Powell referred to his agreement with Mr Neave. I was also struck by the fact that he seemed not to assume that the Secretary of State was a party to, or even aware of this agreement, but plainly indicated that the Prime Minister was, hence his decision that he must go to see her.

(Sgd) KRS

K R Stowe
15 April 1980

118 APR 1960



E.R. ●
CONFIDENTIAL

NOTE FOR THE RECORD

MEETING WITH MR. ENOCH POWELL

At Mr. Powell's request I saw him on Monday 31 March (meeting broken off to attend the Prime Minister's meeting at 10 Downing Street) and again on the afternoon of Thursday 3 April - in total about 2 hours of solid talk about political policy in Northern Ireland.

2. Mr. Powell began by asking me 2 questions. First, was the Government rock-solid on defence of the union or was it not? Secondly, could I now (sic) tell him what had gone wrong about the meeting between Mr. Atkins and Mr. Molyneux on Monday 22 October (when Mr. Molyneux was left with the impression that no Government action was intended whereas Mr. Atkins thought he was conveying that a Government announcement to convene a conference was imminent.)

3. On the first I said that there was no doubt about the Government's position on this, both privately and publicly they were clear that they were not seeking to break up the union of the United Kingdom but were defending it against its attackers. Mr. Powell's response was to say that he was reassured because it meant that he had only "miscomprehension" and not malice to deal with. On the second I told him again what I told him before as to the events on that day and said we had better agree to write that meeting off as a total failure of communication between 2 people who each thought he had heard and said things different from what the other thought. I pressed on him that there was no plot in it at all.

4. Mr. Powell then said that he did not understand why the Government had made its move with the Conference. All the arguments surely were to take no initiative, to create no disturbance, and to leave passions to subside and events to

take their course. I said that au contraire Ministers judged that it was timely to make a move and we then discussed the considerations which might have justified their doing so, none of which seemed to make much impact on Mr. Powell. At this point the first meeting broke off.

5. At the second meeting I began by saying that it seemed clear to me that I was not going to convince him that Ministers actions had been well founded, and I doubted whether anything he said to me when reported (as he knew it would be) to my Secretary of State would convince Ministers that they were wrong. Nevertheless, I was pleased to continue these conversations with him, with the Secretary of State's consent because I found them helpful and stimulating. He said that he would find it helpful to hear from me the considerations which bore on the Government's policies as I saw them because he did not wish to make speeches or to comment on Government proposals from a position of ignorance or misunderstanding - the issues were too serious.

6. He then took up the point at which we had broken off, namely why did Ministers believe it was right to move now? Were they, he asked, deceiving themselves into thinking that there were "glittering prizes" to be won for he was clear that that was an illusion.

7. I replied that there were no wild illusions, nor expectations of "glittering prizes" but a solid conviction on the part of Ministers that the present position was itself unstable and unviable, not because of criticism from abroad but because of its intrinsic weaknesses. He challenged me on this and said that it seemed not so to him - and indeed by making a move all the Government had succeeded in doing with the Unionist Party was to compel them to reiterate the Convention report. They had no alternative but it would have been much better if they had never been required to re-confirm their commitment to that document.

8. I then took Mr. Powell through some of the reasons why as I saw it Ministers found the present position defective. I mentioned 3 elements: the bizarre arrangements for legislation on Northern Ireland now operated; the disconnection of Ministers' responsibility for local administration from any constituency support in the Province; and the need to give local politicians material with which to ply their trade.

9. On legislation Mr Powell took my point that he was one of the foremost critics of the present arrangements and said that the right course was to legislate for Northern Ireland as we had for Scotland, ie by means of UK legislation with special provisions for Northern Ireland where appropriate, the whole process taking place in the ordinary way in Westminster. As regards the gap between Ministers and the local administration for which they were responsible, and the influence of any local electorate, he said that if events were allowed to take their course then we would hope to see a new structure of politics developing in Northern Ireland under which the political parties would divide as they did in GB, and so it would be possible to provide for at least one Northern Ireland MP out of 17 in the next Parliament, on whatever was the winning side, to be the Minister of State responsible for Northern Ireland affairs in the relevant Whitehall department. He went on to say that meanwhile Ministers should cease to take so many local decisions, for which they were accountable to no constituency, by handing down powers, starting with planning powers, to district councils. As regards the aspirations of local politicians he thought that a first and simple step could be made by providing for elections to the regional bodies like the Housing Executive, the Health and Social Services Boards and the Education and Library Boards - he gave a good testimony to the efficient administration of some at least of these bodies, in particular the Housing Executive.

CONFIDENTIAL

E. P.

- 4 -

10. I did not comment on Mr Powell's responses and in particular forbore from pointing out that each of his proposed measures could in no way be described as leaving things alone and allowing passions to cool!

11. Mr Powell, during the course of discussion made some interesting comments about the Official Unionist Party. He explained that it was only the old style Unionist from the landed gentry who had been enthusiastic for Stormont and they had brought their own destruction down on their heads by their follies; that the ordinary Unionist people differentiated quite sharply between their loyalty to the union and their regard for Stormont, which most of them despised as a charade; that this was very much the attitude of the younger leading Unionists; that in consequence of the collapse of the Unionist Party in 1974 and its disintegration, unionism old style had been decapitated; its old guard had gone and there were no serious contenders for the modern leadership under Jim Molyneaux. He anathematised the feudal gentry who had sat at the top of the Unionist Party for half a century; emphasised that they were no longer in power and need not be regarded as of significance; and added caustically that he himself would never be invited to their black-tie dinner parties, nor would he want to go. The burden of all this was that Ministers should not be deceived by anarchistic survivors into believing that there was any desire for the old Stormont government to be returned.

12. At the end of the meeting Mr Powell said that he now saw what he had to do. There were grave dangers of the Government committing itself to the wrong course through misunderstanding and he would have to ask to see the Prime Minister. (NB He did not attempt to dress this up as advising his leader to see the Prime Minister but spoke plainly in the first person.)

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

E. B.

- 5 -

13. I registered with Mr Powell before leaving, my belief that the unfortunate misunderstanding between Mr Molyneaux and the Secretary of State could now be "exorcised": he responded that he was not sure about that but that it had better be forgotten. I also registered that this conversation was of course wholly private as between the two of us but he will be likely to use it in consultation with Mr Molyneaux and I would report on it to the Secretary of State.

rus

pp

K R STOWE

15 April 1980

CONFIDENTIAL

1. The Government were quite determined that the present position in Northern Ireland, where the Province was run by a ministerial team who did not represent Northern Ireland, must come to an end. It presented the additional difficulty that political life within the Province withered away. The Government felt the time was right to move.
2. The basis for the current initiative, and the principles upon which any move would be based, had been set out in paragraphs 4 and 5 of the Government's consultation document prepared for the Conference. Those principles were accepted by all those at the Conference.
3. The Government hoped it was now firmly established that they had not gone into the Conference with a "secret plan" up their sleeves: the process of consultation which was going on was entirely genuine.
4. A solution in Northern Ireland could not be imposed. One could not hope to find a solution that would win unqualified support on all sides, and no party in Northern Ireland could expect to get all it wanted. The Government were aiming to find a solution in which the majority of people in Northern Ireland would at least acquiesce.
5. The aim was to restore democratic control. It was not yet possible to determine to what final destination political development in the Province might eventually lead. For the moment the Government were concentrating on taking the first steps. The Irish Government needed to recognise that the British Government were not in the business of promoting Irish unity. Quite apart from anything else, all political progress would immediately collapse. On the other hand, the British Government were not erecting obstacles to that ultimate destination if that proved to be what the people of Northern Ireland eventually wanted.
6. The over-riding principle was that the choice must be made by the people of Northern Ireland, and that in turn meant that the first step along the road to a solution must take place in Northern Ireland. It was quite impossible for the process to start in or in consultation with Dublin because that would put an immediate stop to the process. The Irish Government should recognise the very real apprehensions of the Protestant community over links with the Republic. Those apprehensions might be unjustified, but as a political factor in Northern Ireland there was no doubt that they existed.
7. The Government would carry forward step by step the process they had begun.



Northern Ireland Office

Great George Street, London, SW1P 3AJ

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Fed 2505

And

*With the Compliments
of the
Parliamentary Clerk*

STATEMENT ON SECURITY IN NORTHERN IRELAND:
MINISTER OF STATE, NORTHERN IRELAND OFFICE (MR
MICHAEL ALLISON)

PA
MS

I will with permission Mr Speaker, make a statement on behalf of my Rt. Hon. Friend, who is today in Belfast consulting with his security advisers, about the unsuccessful mortar attack on Newry police station during this weekend and ^{other} ~~this~~ recent terrorist activity in NI.

On Saturday 19 April at lunch-time, an explosion occurred by the gable wall of Newry RUC station. A minute later an explosion occurred on a lorry parked some 100 yds away. Investigation revealed a number of loaded mortar tubes which the Army successfully disarmed, 26 civilians and 2 policemen were injured. I am glad to say that with one exception - a boy who suffered a broken leg - the injuries sustained were not serious and those injured were quickly released from hospital.

I cannot express ~~too~~ strongly the revulsion felt by HMG, and I feel sure by the public at large, at this callous attack, which put at risk the lives and limbs of ordinary members of the public.

~~We can only be thankful that its consequences were no worse than they were.~~

As regards other incidents, on 4 April, a part-time reserve constable was murdered by terrorist gunmen; on the morning of 9 April an RUC patrol was lured into an ambush in the Lenadoon area of Belfast. All 4 members of the patrol were hit: one constable was killed and the remaining 3 were admitted to hospital.

On 11 April a part-time reserve constable was murdered by gunmen who ambushed him at his place of employment.

On 15 April 3 hotels in Armagh, Lisburn and Strabane were attacked and extensively damaged by bombs. Only a few minor injuries to persons resulted.

On 17 April, an ex-member of the Ulster Defence Regiment was murdered by gunmen near his home at Newtownbutler.

The Government deeply deplores these cruel and senseless acts of violence and reaffirms its determination to counter terrorism by all proper means.

Since 1st April the police have succeeded, mainly through painstaking detective work, in bringing charges for terrorist activity against 28 people, including two charges for murder or attempted murder. The security forces also maintain constant efforts to deter and intercept terrorists. I will not give details now, but substantial recent arms and explosive finds are symptomatic of the professional way in which the security forces on both sides of the border are tackling the terrorist threat.

Byrnes John

Were Sats's talks helpful in stgthg x border security?

MA Was indeed touched on - helpful + constructive

Powell - Nothing concerning failure to inform Member that was to be statement

- failure to follow normal customs of making statement available

- desist from behaviour that cons to IRA Terrorism that status of Province in doubt

MA - I'm sorry that inf not given to Elwell

Paisley - v strange that statement when no lives lost?

- v strange that not made when lives lost

- condolences + sympathy to those bereaved

- how stop genocide of Protestants in border county of Fermanagh

- heads of families wiped out; then rest of families wiped out.

MA - security operations we conduct are most considered, effective, determined it is possible to to
cannot guarantee that we will prevent every murder / inhibit every assassination

SECRET

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RH

cc CO FCO
DOT LCO
LPS HO
LPO
MOD
HMT

File Ireland

11 April 1980

South Armagh Area Review

The Prime Minister has seen and taken note of Mr Atkins' minute of 2 April on this subject.

I am sending copies of this letter to the Private Secretaries of members of OD and David Wright (Cabinet Office).

M. O'D. R. ALEXANDER

R Harrington, Esq
Northern Ireland Office

gr.

SECRET

GRS 29E

UNCLASSIFIED

FM DUBLIN 101130Z APRIL 1992

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 132 OF 12 APRIL

AND NIO (BELFAST)

SAVING TO WASHINGTON B I S NEW YORK

Prime Minister

ms

INTERVIEW WITH MR HAUGHEY: NORTHERN IRELAND.

1. HAUGHEY'S FIRST MAJOR INTERVIEW SINCE TAKING OFFICE IS PUBLISHED IN TODAY'S IRISH TIMES. AS FAR AS NORTHERN IRELAND IS CONCERNED, HE SAID LITTLE AND SPOKE ONLY IN GENERALISED TERMS. THE FULL TEXT OF HIS COMMENTS IN THE NORTH IS AS FOLLOWS:-

2. QUOTE

Q. CAN YOU SEE IRELAND UNITED IN YOUR LIFETIME?

A. I AM HOPEFUL . I BELIEVE THAT THERE IS A VERY CONSIDERABLE CHANGE IN OUTLOOK AND ATTITUDES RECENTLY, PARTICULARLY IN THE NORTH OF IRELAND. WHAT IS NEEDED IS A COHERENT, MATURE, POLITICAL APPROACH AND AN ABUNDANCE OF PATIENCE, UNDERSTANDING AND GENEROSITY ALL ROUND.

Q. YOU CAN SEE A UNITED IRELAND IN YOUR LIFETIME. HOW LONG DO YOU THINK YOU WILL LIVE - TEN , TWENTY, THIRTY OR FIFTY YEARS?

A. I AM 54. IN MY EXPERIENCE STATESMEN SEEM TO LIVE LONGER THAN POLITICIANS SO ONE MUST TRY VERY HARD TO BE A STATESMAN AS WELL AS A POLITICIAN.

Q. DO YOU HAVE ANY PLANS TO MEET LEADERS OF THE NORTHERN PARTIES OR MRS THATCHER ABOUT THE NORTH AT PRESENT?

A. I AM ANXIOUS TO MEET NORTHERN POLITICIANS AND LEADERS OF OPINION IN THE NORTH AS OFTEN AS POSSIBLE. I WOULD LIKE THEM TO THINK THAT I AM ALWAYS AVAILABLE AND THAT MY DOOR IS ALWAYS OPEN. I SHALL BE MEETING MRS THATCHER AT THE NEXT EUROPEAN SUMMIT. IT WOULD NOT BE POSSIBLE , I THINK, TO DISCUSS THE NORTHERN SITUATION ON THAT OCCASION IN ANY SUBSTANTIVE WAY. I HOPE, HOWEVER, THAT SUBSEQUENT TO THE SUMMIT IT WOULD NOT BE TOO LONG BEFORE WE COULD HAVE A FULL MEETING. IN THE MEANTIME A MEETING HAS BEEN ARRANGED AND WILL SHORTLY TAKE PLACE DOWN HERE BETWEEN THE NORTHERN SECRETARY, MR ATKINS, AND THE MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS, BRIAN LENIHAN.

/Q. AND

Q. AND WHAT WILL YOU BE SAYING TO MRS THATCHER? WHAT IS YOUR
NORTHERN POLICY?

A. FOR THE MOMENT, I DON'T WISH TO SAY ANY MORE ABOUT THESE
MATTERS.

UNQUOTE

HAYDON

[THIS TELEGRAM WAS NOT ADVANCED]

F I L E S

RID
NAD
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PS/LPS

PS/MR HURD
PS/MR RIDLEY
PS/MR BLAKER
PS/PUS
SIR D. MAITLAND
CHIEF CLERK
MR FIGG
MR BULLARD
MR FERGUSSON
LORD N G LENNOX
MISS BROWN

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION
NORTHERN IRELAND

Original in QR
C.F. to note



hke

LPO

ec NIO
MOD

10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

10 April 1980

Dear Mr. McGuire,

You wrote to me on 22 March enclosing a "dossier on British Army harassment in the Armagh/Keady area" which had been compiled by Father Raymond Murray.

I am sure Father Murray acted in good faith in compiling his document on the basis of statements made to him by local residents. I must say, however, that the Army's version of what took place on each occasion is entirely different to that of Father Murray and I have no reason to doubt the Army's version.

I hope that Father Murray will not lose sight of the fact that the Army, together with the RUC, is trying to combat a campaign of vicious terrorism throughout Northern Ireland and that to a large extent youths are the perpetrators of much of the crime associated with this campaign. It is natural, therefore, that youths, whether Roman Catholic or otherwise, will attract the attention of security force patrols as they go about their tasks. This is particularly so in cases where youths are openly hostile towards the security forces which was, I am informed, the case in a number of the incidents mentioned by Father Murray.

Nevertheless, neither I nor the Government would condone deliberate harassment of the population, and Army Commanders are well aware of that fact. Army Commanders are also fully aware of the need for good community relations and they go out of their way to impress this upon their troops.

/ May I remind

AS

May I remind you that there is a well-established procedure whereby members of the public may enter a formal complaint with the police if they feel that a crime has been committed by a member of the security forces. The police will thoroughly investigate any such report and the papers will be referred to the Director of Public Prosecutions for his consideration.

Yours sincerely

Margaret Dehler

M. F. Maguire, Esq., M.P.

From: THE PRIVATE SECRETARY

① MODBA (OR) to see
② CS to deal mys



NORTHERN IRELAND OFFICE
GREAT GEORGE STREET,
LONDON SW1P 3AJ

B/F 18/4.

Michael Alexander Esq
10 Downing Street
London SW1

8 April 1980

R. A. Harrington

①

Dear Michael,

You will remember that John Hume is now the only one of the Northern Ireland party leaders who has not yet had a meeting with the Prime Minister to discuss security in Northern Ireland.

John Hume has now told us that he wants to take up the offer of a meeting. I have explained to him that pressures on the Prime Minister's diary are likely to make it quite impossible to offer him an early date. I suggest that it would be advantageous to try to find a date for a meeting to take place soon after the Prime Minister meets Mr Haughey following the European Council, if she decides to do so. This would fit in with our general purpose in handling Mr Haughey and John Hume described in my letter of 28 March to you.

I need hardly add that we cannot expect, in present circumstances, that the Prime Minister's meeting with Mr Hume could be confined to security. It will nevertheless be important, for public purposes at least, to get clear that that is a major part of the purpose of the meeting. We shall be providing briefing in due course. Now that John Hume has made quite clear to us that he is taking up the invitation to meet the Prime Minister, I suggest that the simplest way of finding a convenient date would be for someone from your office to telephone him at his home in Londonderry, telephone number 0504-65340.

I am sending a copy of this letter to George Walden at the Foreign Office and to David Wright.

*Yours ever,
R. A. Harrington*

R A HARRINGTON

SECRET

From: THE PRIVATE SECRETARY



NORTHERN IRELAND OFFICE
GREAT GEORGE STREET,
LONDON SW1P 3AJ

2

(2)

Michael Alexander Esq
10 Downing Street
London SW1

3 April 1980

Prime Minister

Paul

pro

for Paul

Dear Michael,

In Paul's box

The Secretary of State minuted the Prime Minister yesterday about the review of the security situation in South Armagh recently carried out by Sir Maurice Oldfield.

... The Secretary of State saw last night the enclosed copy (transcribed from a mufax) of a minute by Sir Maurice Oldfield about the situation in East Tyrone, which as you know remains a particularly difficult area from a security point of view, and is distinctively different from South Armagh.

The Secretary of State thought the Prime Minister might be interested to see Sir Maurice's minute and asked me to pass you a copy.

*Yours ever,
Roy Harrington*

R A HARRINGTON

P.S. I should add that we are taking up with N.O. the suggestion (paragraph 5) that there is a shortage of helicopters.

SECRET

E.R.

Transcribed from mufax.

EAST TYRONE AREA REVIEW

..... I attended with the Planning Staff a briefing session in Portadown last week. This was chaired by ACC South and by Commander 3 Brigade and attended in addition to visitors by some 15 officers from the security forces. In the morning we were given a presentation and in the afternoon I chaired a discussion of the presentation, taking as my theme "Are we Winning"?

2. The first point which was striking, particularly when compared with the first briefing I had on South Armagh, also in Portadown, some 5 months ago, was the remarkable unanimity of approach and appreciation between the Police and the Army. Not to use too strong words, it would have been well nigh impossible to have conducted such an exercise in such an atmosphere last year. It is fashionable to say this is largely a matter of personalities. I think this is only partly true. It arises from a new atmosphere of co-operation rather than competition and also equally important, a sense of direction in that the people on the ground see some progress. That this progress may be more in improving our own machinery than in tangible successes against terrorists in the area does not belittle its importance.

3. It was agreed that East Tyrone would not be an easy area to analyse and dissect. It is more complicated than South Armagh. The religious mix is more complex. The area suffers from terrorists who cross the border as well as native ones living in and having their bases there. It has a history of violence. The terrorists include many known and competent operators.

4. The intelligence picture is encouraging. We were all impressed by the extent to which both Army and particularly the Police had successfully covered the size and personalities of the terrorist organisations, both native and just across the border. Yet this picture presents its own problems - namely how to bring known murderers to book. We were told, for example, that the terrorists who had blown up the 4 Gunners near Dungannon had been identified by witnesses and their whereabouts were known. It was, however, impossible to get these witnesses to give evidence in court against the terrorists. While in this case the problem is one of overcoming intimidation, there are other cases which underline the importance which the Chief Constable has stressed on a number of occasions of getting evidence as well as intelligence.

5. So far as operational tactics are concerned, there appears to be complete agreement among the Security Forces that they should proceed on the lines recently developed throughout the Brigade area and particularly in South Armagh. This involves more flexibility both for Army and Police: the Army view their role

more as one of containment by overt troop activity whilst extensive use is made of specialist units both for surveillance and ambushes. There was a plea for more civilian vehicles to be used to transport, particularly the Army, on their patrols, and also, if they ever become available, for more generous allocation of helicopters. I understand that HQNI are optimistic about obtaining an increased number of civilian vehicles but, as you know, there is little chance of any more helicopters.

6. There is almost certainly greater scope for UDR operations in this area than we felt there was in South Armagh. We had a very spirited presentation on UDR capabilities from the CO 8 UDR who stressed that he felt that the UDR could and should be used more extensively in support of the RUC and to relieve pressure on regular units. We noted however that his Battalion is numerically the weakest in the UDR and it has suffered more casualties than any other Battalion. Nevertheless, I guess that when we come to write the report we shall propose a greater mix of the three forces than we thought was desirable in South Armagh.

7. The Security Forces emphasised the need for continued and close co-operation with the Garda. They felt that the present framework of co-operation was right but hoped that the Garda would continue to strengthen its forces in County Monaghan as the RUC was doing on our side of the border. Particular attention was given to the importance of extradition for terrorists on the run against whom evidence could be presented by both RUC and the Garda; location of "kitchens" where home-made explosives were prepared (though many of these were thought to be deeper in the south); co-ordination of quick reaction after an incident. There was very little discussion of border road closures largely because work has already been done and the procedures for such closures are understood and accepted.

8. Finally, are we winning? While recognising the difficulties and dangers of the area and of the continuous possibility of spectaculars and other incidents for which the terrorists have both personnel and equipment to hand or on call, there was a cautious optimism, particularly among the senior officers at the presentation. Some of these in the RUC had long service in the region and felt that there was a new hope born largely from more effective intelligence and operational arrangements between RUC and Army. One or two of the younger ones advocated strengthening the specialist units in the area and all paid particular attention to the need for concentration on disrupting terrorist organisations by sustained harassment and, hopefully, convictions.

SECRET

E.R.

9. Perhaps I can best summarise the feeling after this initial look at the area by saying that there is no euphoric claim to be winning in East Tyrone yet, but there is a sense of general confidence stemming from an agreement that we have a firm platform from which we can go forward.

SECURITY CO-ORDINATOR
2 April 1980

SECRET

1957

... because I can't read and I can't write
initial look at the year of 1957 in the
state to be within the year of 1957
of general veridicality and accuracy
a line between fact and fiction

1957

SECURITY (S) DIVISION
2 APRIL 1957

SECRET

1
Prime Minister

(2)

Ant

Prime Minister

Ant

SOUTH ARMAGH AREA REVIEW

When you visited the Ministry of Defence in January, you raised a number of points about security policy in Northern Ireland, particularly in relation to South Armagh which you had visited at Christmas. As was explained in subsequent correspondence between our Private Secretaries, I had already asked Sir Maurice Oldfield and his staff (composed of members of the Army, the Royal Ulster Constabulary and the civil service) to carry out reviews of four areas of the Province. The first review, covering South Armagh, has now been finished and I am sure you will want to know Sir Maurice Oldfield's main conclusions and recommendations. The Chief Constable and GOC agree, as I do, with the general thrust of all of them; and the necessary action is being taken.

In co-ordinating the fight against terrorism in Northern Ireland the Security Co-ordinator and his staff have two main, though not mutually exclusive, purposes:-

- a) To produce visible improvements in the short term; and
- b) to develop more effective measures for the long term.

The South Armagh Area

South Armagh is a sparsely populated, largely rural region which takes in some 70 miles of the border with the Irish Republic. A network of minor roads runs through the area; there are over 80 road crossings over the border itself - mostly unapproved for customs purposes, but in practice completely open to traffic. The area is overwhelmingly (though not exclusively) Catholic; and the majority of the population identify ethnically, culturally and politically with the Irish Republic. Republican sentiment is very strong; for all practical purposes the border does not exist in the eyes of the local population.

The area has a long tradition of lawlessness and violence. The forces of law and order have never had an easy task. The "black economy" has always flourished; smuggling, for example, is traditional and is still widely practised today. Active support for terrorist activity is by no means universal, but there is a traditional antipathy towards both the police and the Army. The Army, in particular, are regarded by many as an occupation force. PIRA intimidation is widespread and effective.

SECRET

The Role of the Security Forces

Against this background, the Security Forces face a small but experienced and skilled terrorist threat. The major effective terrorist "units" are based in the Republic, where they manufacture explosives, hold weapons, plan attacks and seek safe havens. The prime terrorist aim in South Armagh is to inflict casualties on the Security Forces. The terrorist attacks take 3 forms: (a) on patrols, by remote controlled explosive devices and sniping, (b) on bases, by using mortars, and (c) on individual RUC and UDR personnel, usually off-duty.

In countering these threats, the Security Forces have a difficult and dangerous task. The Army base their units on a number of police stations in the area; these have to be retained, for otherwise the rule of law in South Armagh could not be developed, and it would become virtually a "no-go" area. At the same time, these bases enable the Army to mount aggressive operations, against terrorists moving from the border through the region. Significant intelligence of terrorist plans and operations is only available in the Republic; most Security Force operations are, therefore, speculative rather than based on pre-emptive intelligence.

Cross-border co-operation is, accordingly, particularly crucial in this area. So far as the Garda are concerned, while their overall resources remain limited, their effectiveness is steadily, albeit slowly, improving. The RUC are pleased with the progress recently achieved on the exchange of information and intelligence and with the Garda's anti-terrorist activities in the border areas; but there is no doubt that we must continue to expand our co-operation with the Garda in an unobtrusive and professional fashion.

Recommendations of the Review

The study contains some 70 conclusions and recommendations. I set out the most important below.

- a) The arrangements for the co-ordination of RUC and Army operations against terrorists in South Armagh are now satisfactory.
- b) The defence of police stations is a major commitment for the Army in the area, but abandonment of these stations would be a political and military defeat. The stations also provide the Army with secure bases from which to operate against terrorists; they should be seen as forward operational bases, rather than defensive border forts.
- c) Work is continuing to improve the defence of these stations against the threat of mortar attack. There is also a case for making some overall reduction in the number of soldiers committed to police station guard duties; the Army are now examining this in detail.

- d) The Army's role in Newry could and should be reduced in the near future, with a compensating increase in police strength. The effect of this proposal, taken with reduction referred to in above, would enable soldiers to be used with greater flexibility and to better purpose.
- e) The RUC should continue to play an increasing role in anti-terrorist operations, particularly in the border villages.
- f) In the present circumstances there are good reasons for not making more use of the UDR close to the border.
- g) Co-operation, including the exchange of information, between the RUC and the Garda should be developed as improved.
- h) High priority should continue to be given to R and D on specialist equipment to counter the threat from remote controlled explosive devices.
- i) The activities of civil government in support of the Security Forces should be rationalised and improved.

Many detailed measures are being set in hand to improve the effectiveness of the various elements of the police and Army intelligence effort in the area. Some of these measures will result in a number of soldiers being released from intelligence work for operational duties.

Conclusion

In my view, this South Armagh Area Review has been a valuable exercise. So far as I know, it is the first time that an overall regional approach has been adopted to the structure of security; and I consider the results worthwhile. The study has confirmed that, in the circumstances of the fight against terrorism in the Province, there is no magic formula which would "win the war" for us. Rather, the study confirms that a steady policy of containment and attrition, with opportunities being taken to act offensively against the terrorists wherever possible, offers the Security Forces the best chance of countering terrorist violence. At the same time, efforts must continue to alienate the terrorists from the community. In South Armagh, achievement of this goal is a long way off; but, for the time being, we are doing all we can, within reasonable resource constraints and without exposing our forces to unnecessary risk, to make the going as tough as possible for the terrorists and their supporters.

SECRET

I have asked the Security Co-ordinator to continue to work with the Security Forces on the implementation of the recommendations on this, the South Armagh Area Review. The Planning Staff have already started their studies on other key areas of the province. Many of the measures proposed for South Armagh apply directly or indirectly to the whole of the southern part of the province, including East Tyrone and Fermanagh, and are already being implemented by the local police and Army commanders.

Copies of this minute go to colleagues on OD.

HA

H A

Northern Ireland Office

2 April 1980

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10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

2 April 1980

The Northern Ireland Conference

The Prime Minister has seen the Home Secretary's minute to her of 31 March reporting the conclusions of the Ministerial Group on policy on Northern Ireland about the way ahead. The Prime Minister is content with the procedure proposed by the Home Secretary.

I am copying this letter to Ian Maxwell (Lord Chancellor's Office), Brian Norbury (Ministry of Defence), Roy Harrington (Northern Ireland Office), Michael Richardson (Lord Privy Seal's Office), to the Private Secretaries to the other members of OD and to David Wright (Cabinet Office).

MA

J.A. Chilcot, Esq.,
 Home Office.

CONFIDENTIAL



NORTHERN IRELAND OFFICE
GREAT GEORGE STREET,
LONDON SW1P 3AJ

Clive Whitmore Esq
10 Downing Street
London SW1

Ian Gow
Philip 1/4
MA
2w
1 April 1980

Dear Clive,

Ian Gow and Philip Goodhart are to have lunch on Wednesday 2 April with Enoch Powell. As Powell is the principal and most effective opponent of the Government's present initiative on Northern Ireland as represented by the recently adjourned political Conference, and is widely regarded here as the Svengali to Jim Molyneaux's Trilby, he will require rather careful handling. Ian Gow might welcome some general guidance on the line which it would be helpful for him to take with Powell.

The Powell line is of course integrationist. He would say that since Northern Ireland is part of the United Kingdom there is no need for it to be treated any differently from any other part of the United Kingdom, ie no need for a devolved government but a case to be made for giving greater powers to local government. If he is allowed to get away with this simplistic argument the logic of his opposition to the Government's policies, and hence to the Official Unionists attendance at the Conference follows. His first premise is of course wrong. Other parts of the United Kingdom do not have 20,000 soldiers deployed on active service nor the historic precedent of having had their own devolved government until eight years ago. What is more, all the Parties represented at the Conference and everyone else that the Secretary of State has consulted, other than the leadership (but by no means all the membership) of the Official Unionist Party, have made it abundantly clear that they want, and the electorate they represent want, a devolved government with legislative and executive powers.

The message we want the Official Unionist Party to receive therefore is that the Government is determined to continue along its chosen course of establishing by a process of discussion, of which the Conference was only the first stage, what level of agreement can be reached on the nature and extent of powers to be devolved and of the Assembly to be established. It is in the Government's interest and in the interest of the Official Unionist Party that Mr Powell and his friends should not strand themselves

like a whale on a sand-bank as the process of discussion goes ahead. We have no desire to introduce structures of government here which are not acceptable to the electorate, of which the Official Unionist Party represent a third, and we need to have their contribution.

It has been made clear to Mr Powell that the Government is not trying to undermine the constitutional position of Northern Ireland within the United Kingdom, nor trying to undermine the position of the Official Unionist Party by leaving them isolated from political discussions. They are quite clear, however, that Direct Rule in its present form cannot and should not continue and that there must be a transfer of responsibilities to locally elected representatives of the Province so as to form a Northern Ireland administration within the sovereign state of the United Kingdom. The Government, for its part, will not leave the Official Unionists stranded, and have very much in mind how best to engage them in discussion when their own proposals are put forward. But they do not believe that it is either possible or desirable to find a solution to all that has gone before in the history of Northern Ireland by simply treating it as any other part of the United Kingdom in the hope that its inherent structural problems will then fade away.

Mr Gow is probably aware that Enoch Powell buttresses his integrationist argument by asserting that Ministers are not to blame for their inability to perceive the truth of what he propounds because they have been badly advised by people from the Foreign Office and the UK Home Civil Service who know nothing about Northern Ireland. We believe that Mr Powell now understands that it is in fact deliberate policy on the part of the Secretary of State and the Northern Ireland Office to ensure that official expertise of the Province is fully engaged in consideration of the future of the Province and this has been the practice throughout the period during which the present Government has developed its proposals. The Head of the NICS, Ewart Bell, sits at the Secretary of State's left hand at the Conference table.

Finally, Mr Gow should be aware of an important point which the Government will have to take into account in any contacts with the Official Unionist Party - even including such discussions as will take place over lunch. We should not advertise the point to Mr Powell but the Conference was much exercised about the Government negotiating privately with the OUP and on 29 February the Secretary of State gave them an assurance in the following terms:

"The Secretary of State made it clear, in response to the political parties attending the Conference, that, although the invitation to the Official Unionist Party to participate in the Conference still stood, and they would be welcome to play their part in the

discussions, neither he nor his officials would be engaging in separate talks with the Official Unionist Party during the Conference about the subject matter of the Conference. As he had already told the House of Commons, the Government intended to put before Parliament proposals on the future government of Northern Ireland formulated in the light of the Conference, and would consult a wide range of opinion in the Province before doing so. But the Government had given no commitment to any party about the content or timing of such consultations."

Mr Gow will wish to bear this in mind if conversation goes back to the Conference.

Yours sincerely
Mike Hopkins

fp
R A HARRINGTON



1 - APR 1980

Faint, illegible text, likely bleed-through from the reverse side of the page.

CONFIDENTIAL

(Ireland), March 80,
visits by the Taoiseach.



①

Prime Minister

PRIME MINISTER

Yes

Agree procedure on page 2?
(Sep minute on invitation to R. Haughey)

THE NORTHERN IRELAND CONFERENCE

Am

The Ministerial Group on policy on Northern Ireland which you agreed should be established last October has just met under my Chairmanship to consider progress in the Northern Ireland Conference and agree on the way ahead. The purpose of this minute is to let you know our conclusions.

It is our view that the Conference which has now adjourned, has made useful progress. Although the Ulster Unionist Party (UUP) have not taken part, the three parties who have attended have got to know each other's points of view better, and have reached a good working relationship with the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland. As he has already reported to the Cabinet, its major achievement is that the Government and the three political parties now know where possible areas of agreement lie, where there may be scope for compromise and where each party's position is immovable. Furthermore they have come to a better understanding of the Government's sincerity and determination to achieve a political solution in Northern Ireland. There is a general expectation that the next move lies with the Government when the Conference reconvenes.

But the Conference has made no real progress towards resolving the power-sharing dilemma. This is the central issue which has got to be settled or got round by one means or another before a political solution can be achieved. The future is not entirely without promise. Although the Conference has formally adjourned, the private bilateral talks with the parties which were being conducted in parallel with the formal business, will continue. These private talks have given the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland a much clearer view than hitherto of what the political parties do not want, which includes an extension of local government on the English pattern. They are all quite clear that they want some form of devolution.

/On procedure

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On procedure we consider that the next step should be for the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland to produce a draft White Paper which will make some rather more specific proposals than those in the original consultative document which formed the working paper for the Conference. I propose that this should be considered by my group towards the end of April, circulated for the approval of the Cabinet and published by mid May.

This White Paper would provide a basis for further bilateral discussion with all the main parties including the UUP leading perhaps to a reconvened Conference meeting in London. There might also during this stage be a Parliamentary debate on the matter. The Secretary of State for Northern Ireland would then aim before the Summer Recess to put proposals to the Cabinet in the light of this further Conference on which conclusions would be reached about content and practicalities of legislation to take place early in the next Session of Parliament, with an appropriate reference to it in The Queen's Speech.

This is obviously an ambitious timetable particularly when the solution of the central problem is still in doubt. But there seems to us to be every advantage in keeping up the pressure on the four political parties. They are unlikely to agree to our eventual proposals with enthusiasm and we shall not in any case be able to override their total opposition. But we may be able to obtain their reluctant acquiescence to proposals which they see command the agreement of the other political parties and a degree of popular support in Ireland.

If we do not maintain the pressure, we are likely to be pressed ourselves, particularly from abroad. Mr Haughey has already expressed a wish to see you as soon as possible to discuss a wide range of subjects including Northern Ireland. We do not consider that you will wish to discuss these matters with him in the margins of

/the postponed

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3.

the postponed European Council meeting and we believe that the balance of advantage lies, in inviting him to London to have talks with you as soon as your diary allows after Easter. We are not fortunately being subjected to any pressure from the United States at the present moment but this situation may change if we cannot demonstrate some signs of progress. This is another argument in favour of an early invitation to Mr Haughey.

I would be grateful for your agreement to the procedure proposed in this minute of which copies go to the Lord Chancellor, Lord Privy Seal, Secretary of State for Defence, and Secretary of State for Northern Ireland. I am also sending copies to members of OD for their information.

W.H.W.

31 March

1980

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MR FERGUSSON

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MR K STOWE

MR MARSHALL

HD/RID

MR P W J BUXTON

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CABINET OFFICE - SIR R ARMSTRONG

HD/OID (2)

MR R WADE-GERY

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FM DUBLIN 211400Z 31 MARCH

TO IMMEDIATE F C O DESKBY 1400Z
AND TO IMMEDIATE NIO (BELFAST)
TELNO 127 OF 31 MARCH 88

DR FITZGERALDS SPEECH AT THE FINE GAEL AND FHEIS.

1. WE WILL BE REPORTING THE ARD FHEIS IN DUE COURSE BUT AS USUAL THE HIGHLIGHT WAS THE LEADER'S SPEECH DELIVERED ON SATURDAY NIGHT. (FULL TEXT IN THIS MORNINGS IRISH TIMES.)

2. THE OPENING SECTION OF THE SPEECH CONCERNED NORTHERN IRELAND. AS YOU WILL NOTICE, DR FITZGERALD MADE A POINT OF CALLING FOR THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT TO REITERATE THE SUNNINGDALE DECLARATION, OR SOMETHING LIKE IT. IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE SPEECH HE EXPLAINED THIS REFERENCE TO A MEMBER OF MY STAFF. IN DR FITZGERALDS VIEW, IN THE RECENT TALKS THE SDLP HAD HINTED AS MUCH AS THEY COULD ABOUT THE SORT OF PROPOSALS FOR DEVOLVED GOVERNMENT IN WHICH THEY MIGHT BE ABLE TO ACQUIESCE IF THEY WERE IMPOSED BY THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT EVEN THOUGH THEY WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO PUT FORWARD THESE PROPOSALS THEMSELVES NOR ACCEPT THEM FORMALLY. DR FITZGERALD SAID THAT IT WAS NOW FOR THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT TO CONSULT THE VARIOUS POLITICAL PARTIES VERY CAREFULLY ON THE SORT OF PROPOSALS TO BE IMPOSED. WHILE ANY PROCESS OF FORMAL CONSULTATION WOULD OBLIGE THE POLITICAL PARTIES

CAREFULLY ON THE SORT OF PROPOSALS TO BE IMPOSED, WHILE ANY
PROCESS OF FORMAL CONSULTATION WOULD OBLIGE THE POLITICAL PARTIES
IN THE NORTH TO TAKE UP PUBLIC POSITIONS, A PROCESS OF INFORMAL
CONSULTATIONS WOULD NOT COMPEL THE PARTIES TO STRIKE POLITICAL ATTIT-
UDES. ONCE THE PARTIES' INFORMAL VIEWS HAD BEEN ASCERTAINED THE
BRITISH GOVERNMENT SHOULD THEN IMPOSE A SOLUTION WITH GREAT FIRMNESS.
HIS VIEW WAS THAT A REITERATION OF THE PRINCIPLES OF SUNNINGDALE
OR SOMETHING LIKE IT MIGHT ENABLE THE SDLP TO ACQUIESCE IN A SOLUTION
WHICH INVOLVED WEIGHTED MAJORITY VOTING. THE SDLP WERE ANXIOUS THAT
A SYSTEM OF WEIGHTED VOTING MIGHT FAIL TO PROTECT THEM. THEY MIGHT
BE WRONG AND SUCH A SYSTEM MIGHT ALLOW A MODERATE MAJORITY TO
OVERCOME UNIONIST EXTREMISTS, BUT IT WAS UNDERSTANDABLE THAT THE SDLP
SHOULD BE CONCERNED. THE IMPORTANT POINT WAS THAT A SUNNINGDALE
STYLE DECLARATION MIGHT ENABLE THE SDLP TO RELUCTANTLY MAKE A
WEIGHTED MAJORITY SYSTEM WORK.

3. WE DO NOT KNOW HOW FAR DR FITZGERALD IS RELYING ON HIS CONTACTS
WITH THE S D L P FOR THESE VIEWS.

HAYDON

MMNN

SENT AT 31/1525Z C

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From: THE PRIVATE SECRETARY

Ireland



NORTHERN IRELAND OFFICE
GREAT GEORGE STREET,
LONDON SW1P 3AJ

M. Whelan 31

3/3

Michael Alexander Esq.,
10 Downing Street,
London SW1.

31 March, 1980.

Dear Michael

NORTHERN IRELAND CONFERENCE

Although my Secretary of State has reported the outcome of the last three days of the Conference to the Prime Minister, to the other Ministers in the MISC.24 group, and briefly to the Cabinet, he thought it might be helpful if the series of accounts of the Conference which we have circulated from time to time were to be rounded off by the following.

The Conference adjourned at the end of its session on Monday 24 March. It had then held 34 half day sessions. It had become clear soon after the series of meetings which ended on 5 March (reported in my letter of 7 March) that the three parties, and especially the SDLP, did not want the Conference in that form to go on much longer, because it was clear that it was not making real progress. So it was agreed that the aim should be to reach the end of the Agenda by Easter and then adjourn so that my Secretary of State could report to his colleagues and the Government produce, in the light of the discussions at the Conference, some more closely focussed proposals for further consideration.

That background overshadowed the remaining discussions. However, there was a substantial discussion of financial arrangements in a devolved administration, which produced predictable demands for more money and more freedom to spend it, and a notable concern about the "additionality" of funds received in Northern Ireland from EEC sources. There was also a discussion of ways of testing the acceptability of any future proposals which brought out the attachment of the UDUP in particular to the use of the technique of a referendum.

The UDUP and Alliance Party both laid great stress on the point that the Conference was being adjourned and not terminated. And they are anxious that when discussions resume they should be in the context of the Conference, preferably with the additional participation of the Official Unionist Party (OUP), and that no preferential treatment shall be given to parties and interests which have not borne the burden of the Conference so far.

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To sum up the value to us of the Conference so far, it has not reached an agreed solution, but then it was never expected to do so. It is an achievement in itself that the three parties have talked to each other, mostly in a good tempered way, about issues that greatly concern and deeply divide them. There has been no walking out.

Some points have been established. It was clear that none of the three parties wanted, or would accept, a British-style local government solution - and it would be a mistake to think of that as in any way a "fall back" if no fuller agreement on devolution can be reached. All three parties want devolution of a full range of powers no less than was devolved in 1973, and a single-chamber Assembly elected by some form of proportional representation. The prime issue on which disagreement centres has become clear; it is the role of the minority in decision taking - is power to be shared among the representatives of both communities, or is there to be majority rule, albeit with some safeguards for the minority.

The Conference has also enabled more private talks to be held with the parties individually in which it has been possible to go some way towards exploring their room for manoeuvre. Additionally, the Conference has prompted the establishment of a series of "parallel talks" with the SDLP and Alliance Party which have ranged over security and economic matters. They have not told us much that we did not know, but a dialogue on these matters - especially with the SDLP - has itself been of some significance.

Looking ahead, the next step is to try to work up some proposals, drawing on what was said in the Conference, which would give each party enough of what it wants so as to secure a measure of acquiescence. Given the gap that divides the parties, that will be no mean task. It will be no use our putting forward for consideration a proposal, or even a broad area of proposals, if either side of the community is going to reject it out of hand as unacceptable. We cannot impose a solution. Hence there must be further negotiation with the individual parties first, to try to establish whether there is any middle ground.

We aim in the light of these further private talks to prepare and publish, after consideration by the MISC. 24 group and the Cabinet, a further Working Paper which would contain a hard core of proposals and a range of variants, though these would be more narrowly focussed than the series of models appended to the earlier Working Paper published in November. When published these proposals would need to be discussed bilaterally with the Northern Ireland parties, and there might well be a demand for a Parliamentary debate. It would then be right to reconvene the Conference, though not necessarily in the old form - for example, we would hope to persuade the OUP to join.

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There are too many imponderables to make it possible to be precise about the timetable of these various steps, but the aim is to have firm proposals ready, and a Bill drafted, so that there can be an appropriate mention in the Queen's Speech in November.

I am sending a copy of this letter to the Private Secretaries to OD Members, and to David Wright (Cabinet Office).

Yours sincerely
Mike Hopkins

M. W. HOPKINS

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Treasury Chambers, Parliament Street, SW1P 3AG

Rt Hon Humphrey Atkins MP
 Secretary of State
 Northern Ireland Office
 Great George Street
 London SW1P 3AJ

mt 26 March 1980

Prime Minister (2)

Dear Humphrey,

+ fa. And 26/3

You sent Geoffrey Howe a copy of your letter of 19 March to Francis Pym about the withdrawal of the roulement unit from Londonderry in mid-July. As you raise a public expenditure point, Geoffrey has asked me to reply.

As you know, ever since the policy of gradually increasing the role of the RUC and reducing that of the Army was first set in motion in 1976, it has consistently been the Treasury view that additional RUC costs have to be funded by offsetting savings elsewhere in programme 15. That, as I understand it, is also the policy accepted and implemented by the Northern Ireland Office.

While I realise that, as a consequence of the decisions on public expenditure we took at the beginning of this year, it will be more difficult in future to make such savings, I am afraid that I cannot agree to any other course. Bringing down levels of public expenditure remains of vital importance to the achievement of our economic objectives and if I were now to allow individual increases, however small when considered in isolation, I would risk nullifying all our earlier hard work.

I must therefore insist that you meet any additional RUC costs arising from the withdrawal of the roulement unit from within your existing PES allocations.

I am sending a copy of my letter to the Prime Minister, the Secretary of State for Defence, other members of OD and to Sir Robert Armstrong.

John Biffen

JOHN BIFFEN

26 MAR 1980



Ireland

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SPEAKING NOTE ON NORTHERN IRELAND CONFERENCE

The Conference, chaired by the Secretary of State, Mr Humphrey Atkins, and attended by three of the four main political parties in Northern Ireland, has proved to be extremely helpful to the Government. It was conducted in a constructive atmosphere, there was a willingness to examine issues in detail and where there was disagreement it was noticeably without rancour.

From time to time, as in any conference, clear differences of view were expressed. But the purpose of the Conference was to try to establish what level of agreement could be reached among the parties on structures of government for Northern Ireland.

It was in fact possible to identify areas of agreement although we would not wish to be specific at this stage. It would be very surprising if there had not also been areas of disagreement, but this is also helpful to the Government by enabling it to achieve a balanced perspective.

The adjournment of the Conference for the present does not indicate a breakdown. In fact it deliberated for more than 30 sessions over a period of 2½ months and has served a very useful purpose. It has been adjourned to enable the Secretary of State to report to the Cabinet with a view to producing, in the light of the Conference, proposals for further discussions.

Paymaster General's Office
Privy Council Office
68 Whitehall SW1

25 March 1980

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Ireland



MINISTRY OF DEFENCE WHITEHALL LONDON SW1A 2HB

TELEPHONE 01-218 9000
DIRECT DIALLING 01-218 2111/3

MO 19/3

20th March 1980

PA Hussein

L.A.

Ans 21/3

Dear Humphrey,

NORTHERN IRELAND FORCE LEVELS

Thank you for your letter of 19th March about future military force levels in Northern Ireland. I am grateful to you for your agreement to a further reduction which we plan to make this summer. By taking this decision now, we avoid the need for nugatory training to be carried out by troops which are at present due to start preparing for service in Northern Ireland but who will no longer be required there.

It is certainly the view of the GOC that regular Army support for the RUC in Londonderry can, from the middle of this year, be adequately provided by the Garrison Battalion that is stationed in the City (on a two year tour) without further need for reinforcements by the Roulement Troops (on a four and a half months tour). I am glad to know that the Chief Constable agrees. The Roulement unit which is currently deployed in Londonderry and Fermanagh - the second Battalion, the Grenadier Guards - will therefore not need to be replaced when it completes its tour in July.

As for presentation, I agree with the view in your letter that we should handle this reduction in the same way as the previous one. No formal announcement will be made, but careful defensive briefing will be prepared jointly by MOD and the Northern Ireland Office to be used in response to

The Rt Hon Humphrey Atkins MP

SECRET



any Press interest there may be.

Coming on top of last month's reduction, this one will mean that in the first seven months of this year we shall have taken two significant and extremely welcome steps towards enabling the Army to fulfil all its other duties without excessive overstretch. When the July reduction has been completed there will be fewer major units serving in Northern Ireland than at any time since 1971; and those on two-year tours, of which there are now six, will for the first time since 1969 outnumber those detached from Great Britain and Germany for roulement tours, of which there will then be five.

I am copying this minute to the Prime Minister, to our other OD colleagues and to Sir Robert Armstrong.

John Lyle

Francis

Francis Pym

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20 MAR 1980

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MR MARSHALL

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MR P W J BUXTON

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CABINET OFFICE - SIR ARMSTRONG

HD/OID (2)

MR R WADE-GERY

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FM WASHINGTON 192345Z

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1163 OF 19 MARCH 80.

INFO PRIORITY DUBLIN, NIO LONDON AND NIO BELFAST.

INFO SAVING BIS NEW YORK.

MY TEL NO 1046 : VISIT OF IRISH FOREIGN MINISTER : 16 - 18
MARCH : NORTHERN IRELAND.

1. FUNSETH, DIRECTOR, NORTHERN EUROPEAN BUREAU OF STATE DEPARTMENT, WHO WAS PRESENT, GAVE US THE FOLLOWING ACCOUNT OF LENIHAN'S MEETING WITH VANCE ON 18 MARCH, READING FROM A REPORTING TELEGRAM WHICH HE SAID HAD EXTREMELY RESTRICTED DISTRIBUTION.

2. LENIHAN (WHO WAS ACCOMPANIED BY DONLON, NELIGAN AND ONE OTHER OFFICIAL) HAD SAID THAT SOMETHING HAD TO BE DONE ABOUT NORTHERN IRELAND. THE TIME WAS RIPE FOR A JOINT POLITICAL INITIATIVE BY THE BRITISH AND IRISH GOVERNMENTS. HE SAID THAT YOU YOURSELF WERE RECEPTIVE TO THIS IDEA. ASKED WHAT KIND OF INITIATIVE, LENIHAN WAS NOT SPECIFIC. HE SPOKE OF SOME KIND OF POLITICAL STRUCTURE INVOLVING THE PROTESTANT AND CATHOLIC COMMUNITIES GUARANTEED BY THE IRISH AND THE BRITISH GOVERNMENTS.

3. LENIHAN HAD SAID THAT THE IRISH GOVERNMENT WAS WILLING TO EMBARK ON TALKS WITH THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT AND ASKED VANCE

EMBARK ON TALKS WITH THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT AND ASKED VANCE TO ENCOURAGE HMG TO TALK TO THE IRISH GOVERNMENT ABOUT SUCH A POLITICAL INITIATIVE. FUNSETH SAID THAT VANCE DID NOT RESPOND TO THIS REQUEST.

4. VANCE ASKED LENIHAN WHETHER HE SAW A ROLE FOR THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY. LENIHAN HAD REPLIED YES, BUT THAT EC INVOLVEMENT HAD TO BE CONFINED TO ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL ACTIVITIES. EC TRANS-BORDER PROJECTS WERE ALREADY UNDER WAY BUT THAT DID NOT STOP THE VIOLENCE OR FILL THE POLITICAL VACUUM. FUNSETH SAID THE TALK LASTED ABOUT TEN MINUTES AND COVERED NO OTHER GROUND.

5. THE IRISH EMBASSY TELL US THAT MOST OF LENIHAN'S VISIT WAS TAKEN UP BY ST PATRICK'S DAY EVENTS AND THERE WAS NO SUBSTANTIVE EXCHANGE WITH THE PRESIDENT AT THE WHITE HOUSE DINNER. BIAGGI WAS PRESENT BUT ACCORDING TO THE IRISH, THE PRESIDENT ABANDONED HIS EARLIER INTENTION TO SAY SOMETHING ABOUT NORTHERN IRELAND. HIS SPEECH (TEXT BY BAG) WAS INNOCUOUS. LENIHAN DID NOT SPEAK, OTHER THAN TO MAKE THE TRADITIONAL SHAMROCK PRESENTATION.

6. ALTHOUGH LENIHAN USED HIS VISIT TO SEEK U.S. SUPPORT FOR HAUSHEY'S POLICIES ON NORTHERN IRELAND, THE IRISH EMBASSY SAY THAT HIS PITCH WAS LOW KEY AND THAT HE ACKNOWLEDGED THE IMPORTANCE OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL TALKS, A POINT CONFIRMED BY THE STATE DEPARTMENT. IRISH EMBASSY SEE HAUSHEY'S VISIT TO PARIS AS A MUCH MORE DETERMINED EFFORT TO SEEK SUPPORT FOR THE IRISH POSITION.

HENDERSON

NNNN

CONFIDENTIAL



SECRETARY OF STATE
FOR
NORTHERN IRELAND

NORTHERN IRELAND OFFICE
GREAT GEORGE STREET,
LONDON SW1P 3AJ

The Rt Hon Francis Pym MC MP
Secretary of State for Defence
Ministry of Defence
Main Building
Whitehall SW1

fs

Prime Minister (2)

The Atkins warns that decision to cut force levels in N. Ireland further will mean increased expenditure on the R.V.C.

19 March 1980

2/3

Dear Secretary of State,

As you know, our Departments have been jointly reviewing Force levels in Northern Ireland. I am glad to be able to tell you that after taking advice from the Security Co-ordinator, the Chief Constable, and the GOC, I agree that the roulement unit allocated to Londonderry West of the Foyle can be dispensed with after mid-July 1980, and that this reduction in troop levels will not lead to any reduction in the effectiveness with which the Government's Security Policy is being implemented. There are however two other consequences with which we must be prepared to deal.

First, there is continuing political sensitivity in Northern Ireland about the security effort here - although the Orange Order demonstration on 15 March had a lower attendance than the organisers expected, it is significant that as many as 16,000 people turned out on a cold March day: that demonstration was about security policy generally, rather than force levels in particular, but the headline in today's News Letter ("Army cuts leave 12,000 troops in Ulster") increases the chance of strong criticisms being made of the Government as and when it becomes known that a further unit is being withdrawn. This is no reason to shrink from withdrawing the unit, but it does strongly underline the importance of our two departments again agreeing the line to be taken in response to Press questions, and the equal importance of all concerned adhering (as we have done in the past) to the line once it has been agreed. I understand that you would like to tell the troops concerned before Easter that they will not now be coming to Londonderry in July - and this must mean that the news of this reduction could leak at any time from then on. I am accordingly asking my officials to get in touch with yours at once to agree on how any Press interest should be handled.

The second consequence is for the Police. This reduction will, as you know, be the second loss of a major unit from Northern Ireland this year. While both reductions are justified on the facts, they

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are being achieved only at the expense of increased reliance on the Royal Ulster Constabulary in the areas in question. This increase is directly in line with our policy, but this speed of reduction in Army support will place greater strain on the RUC than had been previously anticipated. I doubt very much whether the increased RUC activity (which will probably have to include extra capital expenditure as well as the recruitment of additional full-time members of the RUC Reserve) can be contained within existing financial limits. My officials are still re-examining the public expenditure figures for Northern Ireland, but their initial conclusion is that we are most unlikely to be able to find any extra expenditure for the RUC from within our existing Law and Order and Protective Services Vote, or indeed from within any other part of the Northern Ireland Vote. The sums may not be very large but I thought I should warn my colleagues at this stage that the withdrawal of these two battalions from Northern Ireland may well force me to seek additional funds.

I am copying this letter to the Prime Minister, the Chancellor of the Exchequer and other members of OD, and to Sir Robert Armstrong.

Yours sincerely
Humph

Pp HUMPHREY ATKINS
(Signed on behalf of the
Secretary of State in his
absence)

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FM WASHINGTON 142055Z MARCH 1980
TO PRIORITY F C C
TEL NO 1085 OF 14 MARCH
INFO DUBLIN, NIO BELFAST, NIO LONDON, BIS NEW YORK.

MY TELNO 1074: ST PATRICK'S DAY DINNER AT THE WHITE HOUSE.

1. LLOYD CUTLER RANG ME THIS MORNING TO CONFIRM THAT HE HAD RAISED THIS QUESTION AT THE PRESIDENT'S BREAKFAST. CARTER HAD NOT BEEN AWARE THAT THE EVENT WAS IN HIS PROGRAMME, AND HAD COMMENTED THAT HE WOULD QUOTE NOT BE SO FOOLISH UNQUOTE AS TO SAY ANYTHING UNTOWARD AT THE DINNER. CUTLER SAID THAT HE HAD SEEN THE DRAFT REMARKS BEING PREPARED FOR THE PRESIDENT AND DESCRIBED THEM AS INNOCENT.

HENDERSON

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TELEGRAM NUMBER 1079 OF 14 MARCH 80.
INFO IMMEDIATE DUBLIN, NIO BELFAST, NIO LONDON AND BIS NEW YORK.
INFO SAVING ATLANTA, BOSTON, CHICAGO, CLEVELAND, DETROIT, HOUSTON,
LOS ANGELES, CG NEW YORK, SAN FRANCISCO AND SEATTLE.

MY TEL NO 1074 : ST PATRICK'S DAY STATEMENT BY THE FOUR HORSEMEN.

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF THE ST PATRICK'S DAY STATEMENT BY THE
FOUR HORSEMEN (SPEAKER O'NEILL, SENATORS KENNEDY AND MCYNIHAN
AND GOVERNOR CAREY) WHICH IS BEING MADE PUBLIC AT 1600Z TODAY,
14 MARCH :-

BEGINS:
AS ST PATRICK'S DAY APPROACHES, WE JOIN AGAIN WITH MILLIONS OF
AMERICANS IN CELEBRATING THE VALUED CONTRIBUTION OF IRELAND TO
THE HISTORY AND HERITAGE OF THE UNITED STATES.

FOR THE FOURTH SUCCESSIVE YEAR, WE ALSO JOIN IN OPPOSING THE
VIOLENCE IN NORTHERN IRELAND AND IN EXPRESSING OUR STRONG DESIRE

FOR THE FOURTH SUCCESSIVE YEAR, WE ALSO JOIN IN OPPOSING THE VIOLENCE IN NORTHERN IRELAND AND IN EXPRESSING OUR STRONG DESIRE FOR AN EARLY END TO THE CONFLICT THAT HAS BROUGHT SO MUCH SUFFERING AND TRAGEDY TO THE PEOPLE OF THAT LAND.

WE ARE DISMAYED BY THE INCREASE IN VIOLENCE OVER THE PAST YEAR. WE ARE DISMAYED BY THE CONTINUING LACK OF SIGNIFICANT PROGRESS TOWARD A POLITICAL SOLUTION OF THE CONFLICT.

WE CONDEMN THE VIOLENCE. WE URGE OUR FELLOW CITIZENS TO CONDEMN THE KILLING, AND TO AVOID ANY WORDS OR DEEDS THAT ENCOURAGE VIOLENCE OR PROVIDE ASSISTANCE IN ANY FORM TO THOSE ENGAGED IN VIOLENCE. THE PATH OF THE BULLET AND THE BOMB IS NOT THE PATH TO PEACE IN NORTHERN IRELAND. SUPPORT FOR THOSE WHO LIVE BY VIOLENCE CAN ONLY POSTPONE THE DAY OF PEACE AND PROLONG THE DAILY AGONY OF THE PEOPLE OF NORTHERN IRELAND.

LET EACH OF US HEED THE WORDS OF POPE JOHN PAUL II, WHO SAID ON THE FIRST DAY OF HIS HISTORIC TRIP TO IRELAND IN 1979:

PEACE CANNOT BE ESTABLISHED BY VIOLENCE: PEACE CAN NEVER FLOURISH IN A CLIMATE OF TERROR, INTIMIDATION, AND DEATH
.....EACH OF THE HISTORICAL COMMUNITIES IN IRELAND CAN ONLY HARM ITSELF BY SEEKING TO HARM THE OTHERS. CONTINUED VIOLENCE CAN ONLY ENDANGER EVERYTHING THAT IS MOST PRECIOUS IN THE TRADITIONS AND ASPIRATIONS OF THOSE COMMUNITIES.
LET NONE CONCERNED WITH IRELAND HAVE ANY ILLUSIONS ABOUT THE NATURE AND THE EMINENCE OF POLITICAL VIOLENCE.

WHILE WE WELCOME THE IMPLEMENTATION DURING THE PAST YEAR OF SOME OF THE RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE BENNETT COMMITTEE OF INQUIRY, WE ARE CONCERNED OVER THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT'S CONTINUED REJECTION OF RECOMMENDATIONS MADE BY ITS OWN STANDING ADVISORY COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS.

WE BELIEVE THAT 1980 COULD BRING SIGNIFICANT NEW PROGRESS TOWARD PEACE THROUGH A NEGOTIATED POLITICAL SETTLEMENT ACCEPTABLE TO BOTH SIDES OF THE COMMUNITY IN NORTHERN IRELAND.

A HOPEFUL SIGN FOR THE FUTURE WAS THE ELECTION IN 1979 OF A NEW GOVERNMENT IN GREAT BRITAIN WITH A CLEAR MAJORITY IN PARLIAMENT. WE BELIEVE THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT SHOULD USE THIS OPPORTUNITY TO MOVE TO THE NEXT STAGE IN THE IMPORTANT DISCUSSIONS NOW UNDERWAY WITH THE PARTIES OF NORTHERN IRELAND. SUCH AN INITIATIVE SHOULD MOVE TO END THE PRESENT CONFLICT AND TO PUT IN PLACE A SOLUTION THAT WILL ENSURE A LASTING PEACE.

WE BELIEVE THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT SHOULD REVERSE ITS LONG STANDING

TO END THE PRESENT CONFLICT AND TO PUT IN PLACE A SOLUTION THAT WILL ENSURE A LASTING PEACE.

WE FEEL THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT SHOULD REVERSE ITS LONG-STANDING POLICY OF PERMITTING THE PROTESTANT MAJORITY TO VETO EVERY REASONABLE PROPOSAL THAT COULD LEAD TO PEACE.

WE BELIEVE THAT THE SOLUTION OFFERING THE GREATEST PROMISE OF PERMANENT PEACE IS TO END THE DIVISION OF THE IRISH PEOPLE.

WE THEREFORE URGE THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT TO EXPRESS ITS INTEREST IN THE UNITY OF IRELAND AND TO JOIN WITH THE GOVERNMENT OF IRELAND IN WORKING TO ACHIEVE PEACE AND RECONCILIATION.

WE RECOGNIZE THAT THERE ARE COMPLEX QUESTIONS INVOLVING FINANCIAL ISSUES, CONSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS, AND SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS THAT MUST BE RESOLVED IN ACHIEVING THE GOAL OF IRISH UNITY.

WE MUST OF COURSE RECOGNIZE THE LEGITIMATE CONCERNS OF THE PROTESTANT COMMUNITY AND THE NEED TO PROVIDE FOR CONDITIONS IN WHICH THE TWO GREAT TRADITIONS OF IRELAND FLOURISH IN A COMMON AND MORE HOPEFUL FUTURE.

LESSER STEPS HAVE BEEN TRIED AND FAILED. THE HORIZONS OF PAST POLICIES ARE TOO LIMITED: THEY PROMISE NOTHING BUT GREATER FAILURE FOR THE FUTURE. IT IS TIME FOR BOLDER VISION IN THE NAME AND CAUSE OF PEACE.

AND WE PRAY THAT, ON THIS ST PATRICK'S DAY 1980, A HOPEFUL AVENUE TOWARD PEACE MAY AT LAST BE OPENING FOR ALL WHO SEEK AN END TO THE TRAGIC CONFLICT IN NORTHERN IRELAND.

ENDS.

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TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1046 OF 12 MARCH

INFO IMMEDIATE DUBLIN, PRIORITY NIO LONDON, NIO BELFAST AND
DIS NEW YORK.

YOUR TELEGRAM NO. 467: ST PATRICK'S DAY DINNER AT THE WHITE HOUSE.

1. THE IRISH FOREIGN MINISTER, MR LENIHAN, IS VISITING NEW YORK
AND WASHINGTON FROM 16 TO 18 MARCH IN CONNECTION WITH ST PATRICK'S
DAY FESTIVITIES AND WILL BE MAKING THE TRADITIONAL PRESENTATION OF
SHAMROCK TO PRESIDENT CARTER AT THE WHITE HOUSE ON MONDAY 17 MARCH.
LENIHAN WILL BE HAVING TALKS WITH VANCE THE NEXT DAY.

2. WE HAVE HEARD THAT PRESIDENT CARTER WILL BE GIVING A ST PATRICK
DAY'S DINNER AT THE WHITE HOUSE. THE DINNER IS A POLITICAL AFFAIR
FOR THOSE INVOLVED IN THE ILLINOIS AND NEW YORK PRIMARIES (ON 18 AND
25 MARCH RESPECTIVELY) AND THE PRESIDENT HAS APPARENTLY CONCEIVED THE
IDEA OF INVITING LENIHAN TO THE DINNER AND MAKING IT THE OCCASION
FOR THE SHAMROCK PRESENTATION. IT IS NOT USUAL FOR THE PRESIDENT TO
GIVE A ST PATRICK'S DAY DINNER AND THE PRESENTATION OF SHAMROCK
WOULD USUALLY BE MADE BY THE IRISH AMBASSADOR. LENIHAN HAD ALREADY
ACCEPTED ANOTHER ST PATRICK'S DAY DINNER ENGAGEMENT AND WILL NOW
HAVE TO APPEAR AT BOTH.

3. ALTHOUGH THE STATE DEPARTMENT AND THE NSC KNOW OF THE DINNER,
NEITHER HAS BEEN INVOLVED IN THE ARRANGEMENTS WHICH ARE IN THE

3. ALTHOUGH THE STATE DEPARTMENT AND THE NSC KNOW OF THE DINNER, NEITHER HAS BEEN INVOLVED IN THE ARRANGEMENTS WHICH ARE IN THE HANDS OF THE POLITICAL STAFF OF THE WHITE HOUSE. GIVEN THE ELECTORAL CLIMATE HERE, THERE IS A SERIOUS RISK THAT THE PRESIDENT WILL BE PREVAILED UPON, EITHER BY HIS OWN POLITICAL ADVISERS OR BY SOMEONE LIKE BIAGGI (WHO IS HELPING TO RUN THE PRESIDENT'S NEW YORK CAMPAIGN) TO MAKE A STATEMENT ON NORTHERN IRELAND WHICH WOULD BE POPULAR WITH IRISH-AMERICAN VOTERS BUT UNHELPFUL TO US AND DAMAGING TO THE PROSPECTS FOR THE CONSTITUTIONAL TALKS. THE IRISH AMBASSADOR, WHO HAS A PRIOR ENGAGEMENT IN NEW YORK AND WILL NOT BE PRESENT AT THE DINNER, HAS NOT BEEN CONSULTED ABOUT THE GUEST LIST AND SEES A RISK THAT BIAGGI AND OTHER IRRESPONSIBLE ELEMENTS MIGHT BE INCLUDED.

4. WE HAVE TOLD THE STATE DEPARTMENT AND NSC AT WORKING LEVEL THAT, WERE THE PRESIDENT'S DINNER TO BE AN OCCASION FOR A POLICY SPEECH CALLING FOR E.G. IRISH UNITY OR FOR AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE, THE CONSEQUENCES WOULD BE SERIOUS IN TERMS OF THE IMPACT ON THE NORTHERN IRELAND CONFERENCE AND ANGLO-AMERICAN RELATIONS IN GENERAL. FUNRETH, DIRECTOR NORTHERN EUROPE TOLD US THAT HE HAD ALREADY WARNED HIS SUPERIORS OF THIS RISK. I AM SEEKING A MEETING WITH LLOYD CUTLER AT THE WHITE HOUSE TO REINFORCE THIS MESSAGE AT A HIGH LEVEL.

5. WE HAVE BEEN DOING OUR BEST IN OUR CONTACTS WITH AIDES TO THE FOUR HORSEMEN (YOUR TELEGRAM UNDER REFERENCE) TO ENSURE THAT THEIR STATEMENT THIS YEAR WILL BE BETTER THAN LAST YEAR'S. SO FAR, THE IRAFTERS APPEAR RECEPTIVE TO OUR ARGUMENTS THAT THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE IS AN EARNEST OF HMG'S DETERMINATION TO PROMOTE POLITICAL PROGRESS IN NORTHERN IRELAND AND THAT BOTH POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS AND THE FOUR HORSEMENS' OWN CREDIBILITY REQUIRE THAT THE STATEMENT SHOULD RECOGNISE THIS.

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PART 6 begins:-

Washington Tel 1046 12.3.80

PART 5 ends:-

K. Stowe to RTA 7.3.80

