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PREM 19/296

SECRET.

Confidential filing

The Situation in the Middle East.

MIDDLE EAST.

Part 1: May 1979

Part 3: May 1980.

PREM 19/296

Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date
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PART

3.

ends:-

Washington tel no 2404 30/6/80.

PART

4.

begins:-

Luxembourg tel no 208 2/7/80.

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FM WASHINGTON 302305Z

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W. D. East

TO PRIORITY FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
TELEGRAM NO. 2404 OF 30 JUNE 1980
INFO TEL AVIV, CAIRO, AMMAN, HMCJ JERUSALEM AND UKMIS NEW YORK

ARAB/ISRAEL : BURG/ALI WASHINGTON MEETING.

1. THE DECISION BY THE KNESSET COMMITTEE TO SEND THE COHEN JERUSALEM BILL TO THE FULL KNESSET HAS CAUSED LINOWITZ PUBLICLY TO LOWER EXPECTATIONS THAT THE FORTHCOMING BURG/ALI MEETING WILL DEFINITELY MAKE POSSIBLE AN ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE RESUMPTION OF THE AUTONOMY NEGOTIATIONS. HE IS NOW SAYING THAT SO FAR EGYPT AND ISRAEL HAVE ONLY QUOTE AN UNDERSTANDING OF THE NEED TO TALK OUT UNQUOTE THE OBSTACLES THAT CAUSED THE NEGOTIATIONS TO BE SUSPENDED AND THAT THE PLANNED TALKS QUOTE MAY NOT BE ENOUGH TO CLEAR THE AIR. UNQUOTE

2. WALKER (LINOWITZ'S OFFICE) TELLS US THAT, PRIOR TO THE KNESSET COMMITTEE'S DECISION, A DETAILED TIME-TABLE HAD BEEN WORKED OUT WITH THE EGYPTIANS AND ISRAELIS WHICH WOULD HAVE ENABLED OFFICIAL LEVEL CONTACTS TO FOLLOW QUICKLY ON THE BURG/ALI MEETING AND THE NEGOTIATIONS TO BE FORMALLY REOPENED AT HEAD OF DELEGATION LEVEL ON OR ABOUT 23 JULY. THE KNESSET ACTION GAVE ALI AN ENTIRELY UNDERSTANDABLE REASON FOR CHANGING THE EGYPTIAN POSITION. ONE GOOD THING HOWEVER WAS THAT IT HAD PROBABLY TILTED THE BALANCE IN THE WHITE HOUSE'S CONSIDERATION OF WHICH WAY THE U.S. SHOULD VOTE IN THE CURRENT JERUSALEM DEBATE IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL. WALKER THOUGHT THAT IF THE KNESSET COMMITTEE HAD DELAYED ITS DECISION BY 24 HOURS THE SEQUENCE COULD WELL HAVE BEEN AN AMERICAN VETO IN NEW YORK IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWED BY THE PROVOCATIVE KNESSET ACTION.

3. THE LEAKED ISRAELI PROPOSALS FOR WEST BANK SECURITY HAVE NOT HELPED EITHER. ALTHOUGH SECURITY IS AN AREA IN WHICH THE AMERICANS HAVE SO FAR HAD SOME SYMPATHY FOR THE ISRAELI POSITION, SOME ASPECTS OF THE ISRAELI PLAN ARE QUITE UNACCEPTABLE, NOTABLY THE NOTION THAT THE ISRAELIS SHOULD HAVE THE FREEDOM TO PATROL ROADS ON THE WEST BANK - THIS RUNS DIRECTLY COUNTER TO CAMP DAVID'S CALL FOR THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE ISRAELI MILITARY GOVERNMENT. LINOWITZ DOES NOT PLAN TO DISCUSS THE ISRAELI PROPOSALS TRILATERALLY WITH BURG AND ALI, THOUGH THE AMERICANS MAY TAKE THEM UP BILATERALLY WITH TAMIR IN THE HOPE OF GETTING THEM IMPROVED BEFORE THEY ARE FORMALLY TABLED IN THE NEGOTIATIONS.

HENDERSON

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DECLARATIONS ISSUED BY THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL
ON 29-30 JUNE 1977

The Middle East

1. At the present critical stage in the Middle East, the Nine welcome all efforts now being made to bring to an end the tragic conflict there. They emphasise the crucial interest which they see in early and successful negotiations towards a just and lasting peace. They call on all the parties concerned to agree urgently to participate in such negotiation in a constructive and realistic spirit: at this juncture in particular all parties should refrain from statements of policies which could constitute an obstacle to the pursuit of peace.

2. The Nine set out on many occasions in the past, for example, in their statements of 6 November 1973, 28 September 1976 and 7 December 1976, their view that a peace settlement should be based on Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 and on: (i) the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by force; (ii) the need for Israel to end the territorial occupation which it has maintained since the conflict in 1967; (iii) respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of every State in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognised boundaries; (iv) recognition that in the establishment of a just and lasting peace account must be taken of the legitimate rights of the Palestinians. It remains their firm view that all these aspects must be taken as a whole.

3. The Nine have affirmed their belief that a solution to the conflict in the Middle East will be possible only if the legitimate right of the Palestinian people to give effective expression to its national identity is translated into fact, which would take into account the need for a homeland for the Palestinian people. They consider that the representatives of the parties to the conflict, including the Palestinian people, must participate in the negotiations in an appropriate manner to be worked out in consultation between all the parties concerned. In the context of an overall settlement, Israel must be ready to recognise the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people; equally, the Arab side must be ready to recognise the right of Israel to live in peace within secure and recognised boundaries. It is not through the acquisition of territory by force that the security of the States of the region can be assured; but it must be based on commitments to peace exchanged between all the parties concerned with a view to establishing truly peaceful relations.

4. The Nine believe that the peace negotiations must be resumed urgently, with the aim of agreeing and implementing a comprehensive, just and lasting settlement of the conflict. They remain ready to contribute to the extent the parties wish in finding a settlement and in putting it into effect. They are also ready to consider participating in guarantees in the framework of the United Nations.

GR 330

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FM TEL AVIV 301040Z JUN 80

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 260 OF 30 JUNE

INFO WASHINGTON CAIRO AMMAN

MY TELNO 257 (PARAGRAPH 3): LABOUR PARTY RESEARCH DEPARTMENT
"PLAN"

1. THE ISRAELI PRESS HAS REVEALED DETAILS OF A "POLITICAL PLAN" DRAWN UP BY THE LABOUR PARTY RESEARCH DEPARTMENT WHICH IS TO BE SUBMITTED TO THE PREPARATORY COMMITTEE FOR THE PARTY CONVENTION IN DECEMBER.
2. THE "PLAN" ENVISAGES A UNILATERAL ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL ALMOST TO THE 1967 BORDERS IN RETURN FOR A "SECRET" INTERIM AGREEMENT (NOT APPARENTLY FURTHER DEFINED IN THE "PLAN") WITH JORDAN. THE INTERIM AGREEMENT WOULD LEAVE THE FINAL STATUS OF JERUSALEM UNDEFINED ALTHOUGH THE JORDANIANS WOULD BE PERMITTED TO FLY THEIR FLAG IN EAST JERUSALEM.
3. THE QUESTION OF INTERNATIONAL RECOGNITION OF ISRAEL'S BOUNDARIES WOULD BE LEFT IN ABEYANCE BUT THE JORDANIANS WOULD OBTAIN SOVEREIGNTY OVER MOST OF THE WEST BANK, A DOMINANT SAY IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE ARRANGEMENTS THERE, AND ACCESS TO THE PORT OF GAZA. ISRAEL WOULD RETAIN CONTROL OF THE STRIP AS A BARGAINING COUNTER IN THE NEGOTIATIONS WITH JORDAN ON A FINAL PEACE TREATY. JORDAN WOULD ALSO DECIDE WHETHER THE JEWISH SETTLEMENTS IN THE WEST BANK SHOULD BE DISMANTLED OR ALLOWED TO REMAIN WITH EXTRA-TERRITORIAL STATUS UNDER JORDANIAN SOVEREIGNTY. FINALLY, JORDAN WOULD BE ASKED TO PROVIDE ASSURANCES THAT NO ARAB ARMY WOULD CROSS THE JORDAN AND THAT ACTS OF TERRORISM FROM WITHIN JORDAN PROPER, OR THE AREA OF THE WEST BANK UNDER ITS CONTROL, WOULD BE PREVENTED.
4. PERES IS QUOTED TODAY AS EXPRESSING RESERVATIONS ABOUT THE "PLAN": "THIS IS A PROPOSAL THAT HAS NOT YET BEEN DEBATED. AS TO CONCESSIONS PROPOSED, I DON'T THINK WE OUGHT TO YIELD ANY POINTS IN NEGOTIATIONS CONDUCTED AMONG OURSELVES RATHER THAN WITH JORDAN".
5. DESPITE THESE CAUTIOUS REMARKS, SOURCES "CLOSE TO PERES" ARE QUOTED AS INSISTING THAT, WHILE HE MIGHT HAVE RESERVATIONS ABOUT THE PROPOSED UNILATERAL WITHDRAWAL, MANY OTHER FACETS OF THE "PLAN" ARE CLOSE TO HIS THINKING. BUT RADIN, AND THE MORE HAWKISH ELEMENTS IN THE PARTY, WILL CERTAINLY FIGHT HARD AGAINST ITS ADOPTION AS OFFICIAL LABOUR POLICY.

ROBINSON

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Original L.G.R.



Middle East J.S.

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N.S.S.

10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

30 June 1980

Dear Grenville,

Thank you for your letter of 9 June signed also by other officers of the Board of Deputies.

You will have seen the European Council statement issued in Venice on 13 June. I enclose a copy for ease of reference. I believe it to be a balanced statement providing a useful basis on which the Nine can attempt to work with the parties directly concerned towards the comprehensive peaceful settlement we all seek. It should not be seen as in any way conflicting with the Camp David process but as complementary to it. Our objective is to search for ways in which the security for Israel to which we are absolutely committed can be reconciled with legitimate Palestinian rights.

We have noted with deep concern the document issued by the Fatah Congress in Damascus to which you refer in your letter. Its calls for the liquidation of the "Zionist entity" and its stress on armed struggle are quite unacceptable to us. We shall continue our efforts to bring the Palestinians, including the PLO, to accept Israel's right to live in peace. Such acceptance is essential to a negotiated settlement.

The European Council statement records our belief that the PLO will at some stage have to be associated with negotiations. The fact is that the PLO has the support of many Palestinians,

/on the West Bank

on the West Bank and Gaza and elsewhere. This cannot be ignored if a settlement is to endure. But let me emphasise again that the PLO are, like all the parties concerned, required to accept fully the principles of a negotiated settlement. These, of course, include Israel's right to live in peace and security. There is no question of Britain or the Nine giving any kind of official recognition to the PLO in present circumstances.

At the same time I would draw your attention to the emphasis placed by the Nine's statement on the need for Israel to put an end to the territorial occupation which it has maintained since 1967 - as it has done for part of Sinai - and to halt the establishment of settlements in these territories. Peace necessarily involves compromise and goodwill from both sides.

Yours sincerely
Margaret Thatcher

The Hon. Greville Janner, QC, MP.

GRS 270

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FM CAIRO 280915Z JUN

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELEGRAM NR 418 OF 28 JUN 80
INFO PRIORITY TEL AVIV AND WASHINGTON:

TEL AVIV TELNO 252: AUTONOMY TALKS:

1. THROUGHOUT THE CAMP DAVID PROCESS SADAT HAS REPEATED IN PUBLIC AND IN PRIVATE THAT IN HIS VIEW THE PALESTINIANS ARE AT THE HEART OF THE PROBLEM, AND THE FIRST STEP TOWARDS A SOLUTION IS GENUINE FULL AUTONOMY FOR THE WEST BANK AND GAZA. IF BURG (AND OTHER ISRAELIS) ARE ONLY NOW REALISING THAT HE MEANS WHAT HE SAYS, THEN I SUSPECT THEY HAVE BEEN EITHER MISLED BY WEIZMAN (WHO MAY EQUALLY HAVE MISREPRESENTED ISRAELI VIEWS TO SADAT) OR THE VICTIMS OF WISHFUL THINKING.

2. I AM SURPRISED THAT THE EGYPTIAN AMBASSADOR BELIEVES, EVEN PRIVATELY, THAT WHAT HAS BEEN AGREED WITH EGYPT (PRESUMABLY THE PEACE TREATY AND NORMALISATION) MAY NOT STICK. IN THE SHORTER TERM SADAT DOES NOT WANT TO PREJUDICE HIS CHANCES OF GETTING THE REST OF SINAI BACK. NOR DOES HE WANT TO ALLOW ISRAEL TO ESCAPE FROM ITS PALESTINIAN COMMITMENTS UNDER CAMP DAVID. ALTHOUGH ALL EGYPTIANS (INCLUDING SADAT) HAVE GIVEN UP HOPE OF BEGIN, THEY HAVE NOT GIVEN UP HOPE OF THE AMERICANS: AND TO RENEGE WOULD DESTROY THE POSITION IN US OPINION WHICH SADAT HAS PAINFULLY BUILT UP. THE ALTERNATIVE (A RETURN TO THE PRE-1977 SITUATION) IS FOR MOST EGYPTIANS EXTREMELY UNATTRACTIVE. IT IS OF COURSE PERFECTLY FEASIBLE THAT NORMALISATION WILL FAIL TO DEVELOP AS THE ISRAELIS HOPE. BUT THIS IS PRIMARILY BECAUSE RECENT ISRAELI BEHAVIOUR HAS GIVEN THE EGYPTIANS NO INCENTIVE TO DO MORE THAN OBSERVE THE STRICT LETTER OF THE CAMP DAVID ACCORDS.

3. THESE ARGUMENTS WOULD BE EQUALLY COMPELLING FOR ANY LIKELY SUCCESSOR REGIME, ESPECIALLY MUBARAK.

WEIR.

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TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 410 OF 27 JUNE

INFO IMMEDIATE TO WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK, TEL AVIV,
CAIRO, UKREP BRUSSELS, PARIS, BONN,
INFO ROUTINE TO DAMASCUS, BAGHDAD, BEIRUT, AMMAN, JEDDHA,
KUWAIT, TUNIS, RIAD, OTHER EC POSTS, TOKYO, MOSCOW, ATHENS,
LISEON, MADRID, UKDEL NATO, UKDEL STRASBOURG,
INFO SAVING JERUSALEM.

*You may have to glance
through this.*

EUROPEAN POLITICAL COOPERATION: POLITICAL COMMITTEE, ROME
27 JUNE

MIDDLE EAST - FOLLOW UP TO VENICE DECLARATION OF 13 JUNE.

SUMMARY

1. AGREEMENT THAT THE CONTACTS ENVISAGED IN THE VENICE
DECLARATION SHOULD BE BY THE PRESIDENCY SUPPORTED BY
REPRESENTATIVES FROM OTHERS OF THE NINE. SOME SUGGESTIONS
THAT THIS MIGHT BE A SMALL TEAM WITH ROTATING COMPOSITION.
M THORN READY TO TAKE ON THE TASK PERSONALLY AND DEVOTE AS
MUCH TIME TO IT AS HE CAN SPARE. NETHERLANDS EXPRESSED
HOPE THAT LUXEMBOURG WOULD REMAIN IN CHARGE AFTER THE END OF
THE LUXEMBOURG PRESIDENCY IF NECESSARY; LUXEMBOURG RESERVED
ITS POSITION ON THIS.

2. A TOUR DE TABLE ON THE PROGRAMME FOR THE CONTACTS
REVEALED FOLLOWING POINTS OF DIFFICULTY:

A) TIMING OF VISIT TO ISRAEL: ALL EXCEPT FRANCE IN FAVOUR
OF M THORN VISITING ISRAEL AT THE OUTSET.

B) RANGE OF CONTACTS: FRG WITH SOME BELGIAN SUPPORT WANTED
CONTACTS LIMITED TO CAMP DAVID PARTIES PLUS FRONT-LINE
ARAB STATES. ALL OTHERS ENVISAGED A MUCH LONGER LIST.

C) CONTACTS WITH UNITED STATES: NO CLEAR CONCLUSION, BUT
MAJORITY FAVOURED CONTINUING CONTACTS THROUGH EMBASSIES
IN LUXEMBOURG AND WASHINGTON WITH A FORMAL CONTACT BY
M THORN LATE IN THE PROGRAMME.

D) SOVIET UNION: MOST FAVOURED INFORMING SOVIET UNION
OF RESULTS OF CONTACTS, EITHER IN NEW YORK OR MOSCOW,
NETHERLANDS AND FRG WARNED OF DANGERS OF RE-INVOLVING SOVIET
UNION IN MIDDLE EAST.

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3. MIDDLE EAST WORKING GROUP TO MEET IN WEEK BEGINNING 7 JULY TO DISCUSS PRESIDENCY'S MANDATE. JULY POLITICAL COMMITTEE WILL BE BROUGHT FORWARD TO WEEK BEGINNING 14 JULY TO PREPARE FOR MINISTERIAL DECISIONS ON 22 JULY IN THE MARGIN OF THE COUNCIL MEETING. MINISTERIAL DISCUSSIONS ALSO POSSIBLE IN BRUSSELS ON 1 JULY ALTHOUGH PRESIDENCY WISHES TO AVOID THIS.

4. MERTZ (LUXEMBOURG) POSED THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS:

A) WHO SHOULD MAKE THE CONTACTS AGREED AT VENICE, ON WHAT LEVEL AND WITH WHAT SUPPORT?

B) WITH WHICH COUNTRIES SHOULD THE CONTACTS BE MADE WITH SOME OR ALL OF THE ARABS, AT THE SAME OR DIFFERENT LEVELS?

C) WHAT SHOULD BE THE TIMETABLE OF THE CONTACTS? SHOULD THEY BE SPECIALLY ARRANGED OR FITTED INTO THE MARGINS OF BILATERAL AND MULTI-LATERAL MEETINGS? WHAT SHOULD THE NINE DO AT THE UN SPECIAL SESSION ON PALESTINE?

D) DO MINISTERS NEED TO CONSIDER THESE QUESTIONS? IF SO WHEN?

5. FOLLOWING THE U.K. LEAD, THE CONSENSUS ON QUESTION (A) WAS AS IN SUMMARY. PARTICULAR POINTS WERE: DUPONT (FRANCE): WILLING TO PROVIDE A SENIOR OFFICIAL. NUMBER OF EXPERTS SUPPORTING PRESIDENCY SHOULD BE LIMITED, POSSIBLY TO A THREE-MAN ROTATING TEAM WITH EXPERTS FOR VISITS TO PARTICULAR COUNTRIES TO BE CHOSEN FROM MEMBERS OF THE NINE WHO HAD CLOSE RELATIONS WITH THOSE COUNTRIES. BLECH (FRG) PREFERENCE FOR THE TROIKA FORMULA. PAST AND FUTURE PRESIDENCIES SHOULD BE REPRESENTED AT POLITICAL (STATE SECRETARY) LEVEL. DORR (IRELAND) AND GARDINI (ITALY): UP TO PRESIDENCY TO CHOOSE ITS OWN REPRESENTATIVES. ITALY PREPARED TO SECOND A STATE SECRETARY. REININK (NETHERLANDS): M THORN SHOULD REMAIN IN CHARGE UNTIL THE EXERCISE IS COMPLETED, BOTH FOR REASONS OF CONTINUITY AND BECAUSE NETHERLANDS WOULD HAVE POLITICAL DIFFICULTIES IN HANDLING THE MISSION. MERTZ (LUXEMBOURG): M THORN HOPED TO TAKE WITH HIM A TEAM REPRESENTING A CROSS SECTION OF OPINION IN THE NINE, THOUGH EXPERTS MIGHT NOT BE ABLE TO SIT IN ON ALL HIS DISCUSSIONS.

6. ON QUESTION (B) (NUMBER AND ORDER OF CONTACTS) BULLARD (UK) SAID THAT THE NINE SHOULD MAKE IT AS DIFFICULT AS POSSIBLE FOR ISRAEL TO REJECT A VISIT BY M. THORN. CONTACT WITH ISRAEL SHOULD THEREFORE BE PROPOSED AT THE OUTSET AND IN THE FORM OF A SEPARATE VISIT. IF THE VISIT CAME LATER IT WOULD BE EASIER FOR THE ISRAELIS TO FIND EXCUSES

FOR REFUSING TO ACCEPT IT. THE NINE COULD EXPLAIN IN CONFIDENCE TO ARAB COUNTRIES THE REASONS FOR THIS PROCEDURE AND THUS AVOID THE IMPRESSION OF GIVING ISRAEL PREFERENTIAL TREATMENT OR THE RIGHT TO IMPOSE CONDITIONS OR A VETO ON THE EXERCISE.

THE PROGRAMME COULD BE:-

- (I) ISRAEL AND PALESTINIANS IN WEST BANK AND GAZA,
- (II) EGYPT, SYRIA, JORDAN AND LEBANON, AND PLO,
- (III) SAUDI ARABIA, IRAQ, TUNISIA, ARAB LEAGUE,
- (IV) UNITED STATES (THOUGH US GOVERNMENT WOULD HAVE BEEN KEPT INFORMED THROUGHOUT) AND UN HEADQUARTERS,
- (V) KUWAIT, ALGERIA AND MORROCCO, POSSIBLY AT A LOWER LEVEL.

THE SECOND HALF OF THE PROGRAMME COULD BE TREATED FLEXIBLY. THE SOVIET UNION COULD BE KEPT INFORMED BY THE PRESIDENCY EMBASSY IN MOSCOW.

7. BLECH (FRG) SAID THAT GERMAN IDEAS WERE NOT FORMED BUT THEY WERE DISPOSED TO LIMIT CONTACTS TO THE CAMP DAVID PARTIES AND THE COUNTRIES BORDERING ON ISRAEL (THIS WAS SUPPORTED BY BELGIUM). CONTACT WITH THE UNITED STATES SHOULD BE EARLY. THERE WAS NO NEED TO INVOLVE THE SOVIET UNION AT AN EARLY STAGE, PARTICULARLY IN VIEW OF AFGHANISTAN. DECISIONS ON THE SOVIET UNION COULD BE TAKEN AS THE CONTACTS DEVELOPED. AGREED WITH BULLARD THAT CONTACT WITH ISRAEL SHOULD COME FIRST. IT MIGHT HELP IN PRESENTATION WITH THE ARABS IF THE PROPOSED EURO-ARAB DIALOGUE MEETING TOOK PLACE BEFORE M THORN'S VISIT TO ISRAEL (THIS SUGGESTION WAS SUPPORTED BY BELGIUM AND ITALY).

8. DUPONT (FRANCE) SAID THAT HIS DRAFT PROGRAMME OF CONTACTS DID NOT TAKE ACCOUNT OF THE UK'S ARGUMENTS ABOUT THE RISK OF ISRAELI REJECTION AND WOULD BE REVIEWED IN THE LIGHT OF TODAY'S MEETING. SUBJECT TO THIS, FRENCH IDEAS WERE TO BEGIN CONTACTS WITH VISITS TO (I) JORDAN, SYRIA, LEBANON (WITH CONTACTS WITH THE PLO) FOLLOWED BY (II) TUNISIA, ARAB LEAGUE (III) SEPARATE VISITS TO ISRAELI AND TO EGYPT. CONTACTS WITH PALESTINIAN REPRESENTATIVES IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA SHOULD BE KEPT SEPARATE FROM CONTACTS WITH THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT, AND ARRANGED E G THROUGH CONSULS GENERAL IN JERUSALEM. IN THE LIGHT OF BULLARD'S REMARKS, A POSSIBLE COMPROMISE MIGHT BE TO VISIT JORDAN AND SYRIA FIRST, THEN ISRAEL, FOLLOWED BY LEBANON, PLO AND OTHERS. HE ATTACHED IMPORTANCE TO VISITS TO IRAQ, SAUDI ARABIA AND KUWAIT. CONTACT

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WITH THE UNITED STATES WOULD BE BETTER LEFT UNTIL AFTER THEIR ELECTIONS. THE SOVIET UNION COULD BE INFORMED AT A LATE STAGE IN NEW YORK.

9. PARTICULAR POINTS BY OTHER SPEAKERS WERE: CAHEN (BELGIUM): CONTACT WITH WEST BANK MAYORS SHOULD BE BY M. THORN SO AS NOT TO IMPLY THAT THE NINE REGARD THEM AS LESS IMPORTANT THAN THE PLO. THE NINE SHOULD ALSO CONSIDER CONTACTING WALDHEIM.

DORR: SAID CONTACTS SHOULD BE CONTINUOUS AND FLEXIBLE, AGREED WITH UK ON ORDER OF CONTACTS. M THORN'S VISITS TO JORDAN AND IRAQ ON 30 JUNE/1 JULY WOULD HELP IN PERSUADING ARABS TO ACCEPT NEED FOR AN EARLY VISIT TO ISRAEL. USA SHOULD BE KEPT INFORMED ON A CONTINUOUS BASIS. SOVIET UNION SHOULD NOT BE EXCLUDED ALTOGETHER. REININK: CONTACT WITH USA AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. ISRAEL SHOULD BE VISITED EARLY, CERTAINLY BEFORE PLO. GARDINI (ITALY): THE ARAB LEAGUE SHOULD BE INVOLVED AT AN EARLY STAGE.

10. MERTZ (LUXEMBOURG) SAID THE NINE WOULD NEED TO AGREE A LINE ON THE UK SPECIAL SESSION ON PALESTINE. THIS COULD BE LEFT FOR DECISION BY MINISTERS ON 22 JULY.

ARCULUS

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TO PRIORITY F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 942 OF 27 JUNE

INFO AMMAN, TEL AVIV, BEIRUT, CAIRO, DAMASCUS, WASHINGTON,
ISLAMABAD, JERUSALEM

YOUR TEL 485; SECURITY COUNCIL; JERUSALEM

1. IN THE EVENT THE AMERICANS SOUGHT AND GAINED AGREEMENT TO
THE POSTPONEMENT OF THE VOTE UNTIL MONDAY (30 JUNE).

2. THE NORWEGIANS AND, SO THEY CLAIMED, THE FRENCH, STILL HAD
PROBLEMS THIS MORNING WITH THE WORDING OF OPERATIVE PARA 6 AS
SET OUT IN PARA 1 OF MY TELEGRAM UNDER REFERENCE. WE THEREFORE
REOPENED NEGOTIATIONS WITH ESSAAFI AND HAVE ACHIEVED A SIGNIFICANT
FURTHER SOFTENING OF OPERATIVE PARA 6. IT NOW READS

'' REAFFIRMS ITS DETERMINATION IN THE EVENT OF NON-COMPLIANCE
BY ISRAEL WITH THIS RESOLUTION, TO EXAMINE PRACTICAL WAYS AND
MEANS IN ACCORDANCE WITH RELEVANT PROVISIONS OF THE CHARTER OF
THE UNITED NATIONS TO SECURE THE FULL IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS
RESOLUTION.''

THIS IS THE SAME WORDING AS THAT OF PARA 10 OF RESOLUTION 459
ON UNIFIL FOR WHICH ALL FIVE WESTERN MEMBERS VOTED. AT
DELEGATION LEVEL THE AMERICANS ARE VERY PLEASED WITH THIS
DEVELOPMENT AND HOPE THAT IT WILL SECURE INSTRUCTIONS FOR
AN ABSTENTION. THEY INTEND TO PRESS WASHINGTON VERY HARD FOR
AN ABSTENTION, MAKING THE POINT THAT THE EUROPEANS HAVE DONE
EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO HELP THEM AND THAT THE LEAST THEY
CAN DO IS TO COME IN WITH AN ABSTENTION BEHIND THE EUROPEAN
POSITIVE VOTES.

3. I HOPE YOU CAN AGREE THAT THE NEW WORDING OBTVIATES THE NEED
FOR AN EXPLANATION ON OUR INTERPRETATION OF THE PARAGRAPH.

PARSONS

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TELEGRAM NUMBER 485 OF 27 JUNE.

INFO PRIORITY AMMAN, TEL AVIV, BEIRUT, CAIRO, DAMASCUS, JERUSALEM,
WASHINGTON, ISLAMABAD

YOUR TELEGRAM NUMBER 934 : SECURITY COUNCIL : JERUSALEM

1. I AGREE THAT YOU SHOULD VOTE IN FAVOUR OF THE RESOLUTION IF
THE OTHER WEST EUROPEAN MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL INTEND TO DO SO
AND ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT THE US WILL ABSTAIN IF THE US
INTEND TO VETO YOU SHOULD ABSTAIN ASSUME FROM MY TALKS WITH THE
NORWEGIAN FOREIGN MINISTER TODAY THAT NORWAY WOULD FOLLOW OUR LEAD

2 I HAVE ONLY REACHED THIS DECISION WITH SOME RELUCTANCE
COMING AFTER THE RECENT ONE SIDED WEST BANK RESOLUTIONS THIS
RESOLUTION WILL ONLY CONTRIBUTE TO THE ISRAELI SENSE OF ISOLATION
WHICH I REGARD AS DANGEROUS IN PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES SECURITY
COUNCIL CREDIBILITY WILL SUFFER FURTHER AND THE ISRAELI REACTION
WILL NO DOUBT BE THE OPPOSITE TO THAT WHICH THE ISLAMIC GROUP
WOULD LIKE YOU SHOULD THEREFORE EXPLAIN YOUR VOTE MAKING THE
POINTS THAT WHILE WE FULLY ACCEPT THE SUBSTANCE OF THE
RESOLUTION ON JERUSALEM AND REGRET PROVOCATIVE ISRAELI MOVES WE
WOULD HAVE PREFERRED LESS ABRASIVE WORDING IN SEVERAL
PARAGRAPHS AND DO NOT REGARD OURSELVES AS COMMITTED TO ANY
SPECIFIC COURSES OF ACTION BY THE TERMS OF OPERATIVE
PARAGRAPH 6

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FM BEIRUT 261047Z JUN 80
TO ROUTINE F C O
TELEGRAM NUMBER 149 OF 26 JUNE 1980
INFO ROUTINE AMMAN, CAIRO, DAMASCUS, TEL AVIV, UKMIS NEW YORK AND
WASHINGTON

ms

PLO REACTION TO THE VENICE DECLARATION.

1. THE EDITOR OF THE INDEPENDENT AND INFLUENTIAL ARABIC DAILY NAHAR, TOLD A MEMBER OF MY STAFF THAT HE HAD BEEN IN DAMASCUS DURING THE WEEKEND OF 13 TO 16 JUNE AND HAD SPOKEN PRIVATELY TO ARAFAT ABOUT THE VENICE DECLARATION. ARAFAT HAD TOLD HIM THAT HE WAS EXTREMELY PLEASED WITH THE DECLARATION, BUT ADDED "OF COURSE I CAN'T SAY THAT HERE".
2. MICHEL ABU JOWDEH BELIEVED THAT THE RUSSIANS WERE PUTTING CONSIDERABLE PRESSURE ON THE SYRIANS WHO IN TURN HAD PRESSURISED THE PLO TO REACT NEGATIVELY TO THE EC DECLARATION. PLO SPOKESMAN ABU MATZAR'S COMMENTARY HAD NOT GONE DOWN WELL IN DAMASCUS AND SYRIAN DISPLEASURE HAD BEEN PARTLY RESPONSIBLE FOR THE ENSUING PLO RETRACTION.

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FM TEL AVIV 260930Z JUN

TO ROUTINE F C O

TELNO 253 OF 26 JUNE

INFO WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK, CAIRO.

mf

ISRAEL: GOVERNMENT FUTURE.

1. FOR SOME WEEKS NOW BEGIN'S GOVERNMENT HAS GIVEN OUTWARD SIGNS OF BEING ON THE POINT OF COLLAPSE. TWO SUCCESSIVE MONTHLY INCREASES IN COST OF LIVING OF AROUND TEN PERCENT AND THE FINANCE MINISTER'S DETERMINATION TO CUT GOVERNMENT, INCLUDING DEFENCE, EXPENDITURE AND BEGIN'S INABILITY TO WIN APPROVAL FOR HIS CANDIDATES FOR THE DEFENCE AND FOREIGN MINISTRIES HAVE BEEN THE MAIN FEATURES. NOW THERE ARE TO BE VOTES ON THE DISSOLUTION OF THE PRESENT ISRAELI PARLIAMENT EARLY NEXT WEEKGM

2. ACCIDENTS ARE ALWAYS POSSIBLE. BUT I CONTINUE TO BELIEVE THAT THE ODDS ARE HEAVILY IN FAVOUR OF THE SURVIVAL OF THE BEGIN GOVERNMENT. THE OPPOSITION IS IN DISARRAY, WITH THEIR LEADERSHIP IN DISPUTE. MANY KNESSET MEMBERS WANT TO HANG ON AS LONG AS POSSIBLE BECAUSE THEY KNOW THEY WILL NOT BE RE-ELECTED. IF BEGIN CAN HOLD ON UNTIL THE KNESSET RECESS AT THE BEGINNING OF AUGUST, HIS GOVERNMENT WILL BE SAFE UNTIL THE KNESSET REASSEMBLES AT THE END OF OCTOBER. THIS, UNDER ISRAELI LAW, WOULD ALREADY PUT THE EARLIEST DATE FOR NEW ELECTIONS INTO 1981. THE INTERIOR MINISTER THINKS THE SPRING OF 1981 THE MOST LIKELY DATE. BUT SPECULATION BEYOND THIS POINT IS IDLE.

3. MEANWHILE BEGIN HAS ALREADY BEGUN HIS ELECTION CAMPAIGN, CENTRING ON ISRAEL'S SECURITY: 'A VOTE FOR LABOUR WILL BE A VOTE FOR AN INDEPENDENT PALESTINIAN STATE'. AGAIN IT IS ^{IDLE} IDEAL AT THIS STAGE TO TRY TO ASSESS THE LIKELY SUCCESS OF THESE TACTICS. SO MUCH WILL DEPEND ON THE EXTENT TO WHICH ISRAELIS CAST THEIR VOTES ON ECONOMIC GROUNDS: ON THE ABILITY OF LABOUR TO OFFER A CONVINCING ECONOMIC PROGRAMME (OF WHICH THERE IS NO SIGN AT PRESENT), AND ON LABOUR'S LEADERSHIP. THERE IS AN OUTSIDE POSSIBILITY THAT PRESIDENT NAVON MIGHT RESIGN TO BECOME THE THIRD MAN TO RESOLVE THE STRUGGLE BETWEEN PERES AND RABIN. HE IS AMBITIOUS AND HE WOULD PROBABLY LIKE TO DO IT. BUT THE PARTY TIMETABLE AND OTHER FACTORS MAKE IT EXTREMELY UNLIKELY THAT THIS POSSIBILITY CAN BE SERIOUSLY CONCERNED BEFORE DECEMBER.

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FM TEL AVIV 260830Z JUNE
TO PRIORITY F C O
TELNO 252 OF 26 JUNE
INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON, CAIRO.

AUTONOMY TALKS.

1. BURG, LEADER OF ISRAEL'S AUTONOMY NEGOTIATING TEAM, IS LIKELY TO HAVE TO POSTPONE HIS DEPARTURE FOR WASHINGTON UNTIL AFTER VOTING AT THE BEGINNING OF NEXT WEEK ON TWO BILLS CALLING FOR THE DISSOLUTION OF THE ISRAELI PARLIAMENT. BURG TOLD ME YESTERDAY THAT THIS MIGHT MEAN A SHORT POSTPONEMENT OF THE 2 JULY MEETING IN WASHINGTON.

2. BURG TOLD ME THAT HE AGREED TO CONTINUE TO LEAD ISRAEL'S AUTONOMY TEAM BECAUSE OF THE POSSIBILITY THAT THE TALKS MIGHT LEAD TO A SETTLEMENT. BUT THE OMENS DID NOT LOOK GOOD. HE BLAMED WEIZMAN FOR MISLEADING THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT AND HIM (BURG) PERSONALLY. WEIZMAN HAD SAID THAT ONCE THE EGYPTIANS GOT WHAT THEY WANTED FOR EGYPT SADAT WOULD WASH HIS HANDS OF THE WEST BANK. BUT IT SEEMED THAT SADAT WAS NOT GOING TO DO THIS. BURG DID NOT KNOW WHAT THE EGYPTIANS WERE PLANNING MORE GENERALLY. ONE POSSIBLE DEVELOPMENT WAS THRISE TO POWER OF 'A YOUNG MAN CALLED MUBARAK'. EARLIER THIS MONTH HE HAD HAD A LETTER FROM ALI USING NASTY LANGUAGE ABOUT ILLEGAL OCCUPATION AND SETTLEMENTS AND EAST JERUSALEM. BURG WOULD REPLY TO ALI FIRMLY ON ALL THESE POINTS, BUT WITHOUT USING NASTY LANGUAGE.

3. ON SUBSTANCE, ALTHOUGH MODERATE IN TONE, BURG WAS UNCOM-
PROMISING: ISRAEL'S FRONTIERS SHOULD BE ON THE JORDAN 'AND
YOU BRITISH KNOW IT'.

4. THE SORT OF DOUBTS TO WHICH BURG ALLUDED ABOUT EGYPT'S MOTIVES AND WHETHER WHAT HAD BEEN AGREED WITH EGYPT WOULD STICK, ARE SHARED BY A LOT OF ISRAELIS. THEY ARE ALSO SHARED PRIVATELY BY THE EGYPTIAN AMBASSADOR HERE.

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Middle East

Subject on: Jordan:

Talks of King Hussein: June 1979.

RECORD OF A DISCUSSION BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER AND KING HUSSEIN OF JORDAN AT 10 DOWNING STREET ON TUESDAY 24 JUNE AT 0915 HOURS

<u>Present:</u>	Prime Minister	King Hussein
	Mr. J.C. Moberly	Sharif Abdul Hamid
	Mr. M.O'D.B. Alexander	Sharaf

* * * * *

King Hussein said that, although his reception by President Carter in the United States had been very warm, their talks together had not achieved a great deal. He had tried to convince the President that whatever progress might have been made in the Camp David talks, no lasting solution to the Arab/Israel dispute could be achieved through the Camp David process. It was time to think of the challenge that would remain once the Camp David stalemate had been recognised. President Carter, on the other hand, clearly remained of the opinion that no other approach to the problems had yielded results and that the Camp David effort should be continued. He and President Carter now understood each other's position better, but there was still no agreement on how to proceed. The Prime Minister said that she had discussed the Middle East situation with President Carter in Venice. She had told him about the disagreeable letter she had received from Mr. Begin and had had the impression that President Carter did not care for Mr. Begin's policies any more than she did. President Carter evidently intended to push ahead with the Camp David talks and was thinking in terms of a two or three year time scale. He was conscious that Mr. Begin had originally said he would never withdraw from the Sinai and hoped that he might also change his mind about the West Bank. President Carter did not appear to be thinking in terms of broadening the Camp David talks. He was deeply opposed to the idea of a separate Palestinian state which he thought would probably be taken over by someone sooner or later. The Prime Minister said that her own view was that it would be far better for any Palestinian political entity to be tied to another state. Confederation with Jordan would be the best outcome. An independent state would be prey to outside influences.

/ King Hussein

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King Hussein confirmed that President Carter had taken the same line with him as with the Prime Minister on the question of a Palestinian state. The matter was one of deep concern to the Jordanian Government. They were not prepared to attempt to prejudge the outcome of the exercise of self-determination by the Palestinians. But his own view was that a "Palestinian state" would not in the event prove dangerous and would not be controlled by radicals. Given the chance, he felt that the Palestinians would move to something which everyone could accept. Sharif Sharaf said that the problem of how the Palestinians would exercise their right to self-determination was academic so long as Israel pursued its present policy. The Prime Minister agreed, but said that it would nonetheless be useful to have the various options examined. If the various possible outcomes could be analysed and discussed, it might become easier for the Palestinians to see the advantages of a moderate approach. This consideration had been much in the minds of the European Heads of Government in issuing their recent declaration.

King Hussein said that there had been some discussion between him and President Carter about ways in which the Palestinians could advance their point of view. The Americans seemed to be looking for a group of Palestinians who would press the Palestinian case. King Hussein said that he, of course, had referred to the PLO. The Americans had given the usual answer about the need for the PLO to recognise Israel's right to exist. The Americans had suggested that a separate group of Palestinians might be included in the Egyptian delegation to the Camp David talks, but the Jordanians had, he hoped, dissuaded them from pursuing the idea. Sharif Sharaf said that King Hussein had instead floated the idea that West Bank opinion should be given some way to express itself. If the voice of non-violent protest could be channelled into some kind of assembly, this might one day be of great help in finding a way to peaceful self-determination. Of course the idea of such an assembly would not be practical unless international pressure was brought to bear on Israel. President Carter seemed to be only now discovering how oppressive Israeli measures in the West Bank had been.

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/ The Prime Minister

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- 3 -

The Prime Minister asked which Palestinians might be prepared to raise their voice in the way the Jordanians had in mind. Would it be for instance the West Bank mayors or Palestinian intellectuals? Sharif Sharaf acknowledged that many of the intellectuals were associated with the PLO. However, the idea of a Palestinian Congress in which the Palestinians would press their demands peacefully seemed worth pursuing. The Jordanian Government would cooperate provided that it was agreed that the Israelis would not attempt to suppress it and provided it remained outside the Camp David framework. President Carter seemed to see possibilities in this. He had concluded the discussion of the idea by saying that it should be explored while the Camp David process continued.

The Prime Minister asked what hope there was for peaceful progress when the Fatah were issuing such violent declarations as that which followed their recent meeting in Damascus. She of course understood that many Palestinians argued that a peaceful approach had got them nowhere. Sharif Sharaf commented that the PLO were more moderate in private than in public. As regards their public posture it was similar in many respects to that of the Likud. King Hussein said that, unfortunately, there were governments, e.g. those of Syria, Libya and South Yemen, whose attitude was completely unhelpful. This related to their links with the Soviet Union. The Prime Minister, noting that there was little chance of any move on the part of the United States until after the Presidential election, asked whether there was likely to be further violence on the West Bank in the coming months. King Hussein said that Mr. Begin's decision to move his office to East Jerusalem was bound to provoke trouble and might well lead to further violence. The Prime Minister asked whether all the natural leaders of the Palestinian people were now committed to the PLO and its violent policies. King Hussein said that they were all in it or sympathetic to it. Sharif Sharaf added that this would remain the case so long as the PLO represented the resistance to Israeli oppression. The Prime Minister said that she had hoped that some Palestinians would be prepared to dissociate themselves from the methods of the PLO. King Hussein said that he had been encouraging moderate Palestinians to join the PLO

/ precisely

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precisely in the hope of tempering its methods. Sharif Sharaf said that it was very difficult for any Palestinian to condemn the PLO's activities at present. The same trend to violence was, of course, apparent in Israel. Unless an alternative and peaceful road could be offered to the Palestinians to achieve their objectives, the violence would continue to escalate. Events in Rhodesia had demonstrated this. The PLO were no more extreme than other organisations which had fought for their people's independence. The Prime Minister agreed that unless people could be given the hope of achieving their objectives peacefully, they would take to terrorism. It had taken a great deal of international pressure to persuade Mr. Mugabe to opt for the ballot box. The United Kingdom could not have done it alone.

Sharif Sharaf said that he had reminded President Carter that both Mr. Begin and Mr. Shamir had terrorist backgrounds. President Carter had acknowledged the point, but had added that while the Jordanians were talking about principles, he was interested in methods. He agreed that the Palestinians should have a homeland. The question was how it could be achieved. The Jordanian reply had been that Camp David was not the way. President Carter spoke logically but he lacked experience of the events of the last 30 years. He did not seem to be conscious that the Israeli attitude to the West Bank was quite different from their attitude to Sinai. They had been prepared to give up Sinai in return for the neutralisation of Egypt, but had never indicated a willingness to make the same sort of gesture to the inhabitants of the West Bank. They were still, of course, engaged in establishing settlements there.

The Prime Minister said that everyone condemned the Israeli Government's settlement policy. Even the Jewish community in this country disapproved. There were signs that public opinion in Israel itself was turning against the policy. However, she doubted whether much progress towards an agreement would be made in the next few months. Indeed it would probably prove difficult to make progress so long as Mr. Begin remained in office. There would have to be change in the political situation within Israel. She hoped that the European initiative could achieve something. The Israelis would put themselves in the wrong if they refused to receive a

/ representative


representative of the EC Presidency. Both Sharif Sharaf and King Hussein said that the European statement had been helpful. It had encouraged moderate Arab opinion. In the long run it would help President Carter.

The Prime Minister said that President Carter had clearly learnt a lot from his meeting with King Hussein. His attitude in Venice had been different from that when he had met the Prime Minister in Washington before Christmas. It was a pity the meeting with King Hussein had not taken place earlier. King Hussein said that President Carter had acknowledged that the delay in arranging a meeting had been a mistake.

At the end of the meeting, King Hussein mentioned that he had discussed regional security, particularly in the Gulf area, during his visit to Washington. It had been agreed that the Americans and Jordanians should look at the problems together. The Prime Minister said that there was a need for contingency plans. But she doubted whether these could be worked out at Summits. Sharif Sharaf agreed.

The Prime Minister commented that the United Kingdom still remained out of favour with the Saudi Government and that this was very worrying. King Hussein said that as soon as he returned to Amman he would get in touch with the Saudi authorities and see what could be done. Sharif Sharaf said that in private the Saudis admitted that they had over-reacted. Mr. Moberly said that the latest signals from Jeddah were more encouraging.

The discussion ended at 1000 hours.



25 June 1980

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FM BEIRUT 210900Z JUN 80

TO ROUTINE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 144 OF 21ST JUNE 1980.

INFO AMMAN DAMASCUS TEL AVIV CAIRO UKMIS NEW YORK TRIPOLI AND WASHINGTON.

1. AT A PRIVATE SUPPER WITH VISITING BRITISH MPS, THE HEAD OF THE WESTERN SECTION OF THE POLITICAL DEPARTMENT OF THE PLO TOLD US THAT ALTHOUGH THE PLO HAD SOME RESERVATIONS ABOUT THE VENICE STATEMENT, THEY WERE PRIVATELY WELL SATISFIED.

2. SOONER OR LATER, HOWEVER, AND OF COURSE AFTER THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION, THEY WERE DETERMINED TO GET BACK TO THE UN AND OBTAIN A NEW RESOLUTION WHICH THEY HOPED THE EUROPEANS WOULD SPONSOR, SINCE SUCH SPONSORSHIP WOULD MAKE IT HARDER FOR THE US TO VETO. ZACHARIA ABDULRAHIM SAID THAT THEY WANTED ANY SETTLEMENT TO BE GUARANTEED BY THE WORLD COMMUNITY THROUGH THE UN. (COMMENT. THIS PRESUMABLY WOULD BE THEIR CHOSEN FORUM FOR ANY NEGOTIATIONS.) WHEN ASKED WHETHER A RESOLUTION ON THE LINES OF THE VENICE STATEMENT WOULD SUIT THE PLO, HE DID NOT DISSENT.

3. AS REGARDS THE LAST FATAH CONFERENCE RESOLUTION, ABDULRAHIM (WHO IS A FATAH MEMBER) TOOK THE SAME LINE AS DID ARAFAT IN HIS TALK WITH MESSRS CROUCH AND FAULDS TWO WEEKS AGO: THE UNIFICATION OF ALL PALESTINE AS A SECULAR STATE WAS A LONG TERM AIM WHICH THE PALESTINIANS WERE PREPARED TO WORK FOR PEACEFULLY AFTER THEY HAD SET UP THEIR OWN PALESTINIAN STATE IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES. HE WENT FURTHER:

''WE WOULD BE PREPARED TO MAKE A MUCH BIGGER GESTURE THAN SADAT AT JERUSALEM. WE WOULD BE PREPARED TO RENOUNCE VIOLENCE AND LIVE UNDER ISRAELI RULE PROVIDED THAT THE ISRAELIS WOULD ALLOW ALL OF OUR PEOPLE WHO WISHED TO, TO RETURN TO THEIR HOMELAND.''

4. FATHER IBRAHIM AYYAD, AN OLD PALESTINIAN PRIEST WHO IS CLOSE TO ARAFAT, SAID THAT THE PLO LEADERSHIP WERE EXTREMELY ANXIOUS THAT PRESIDENT CARTER SHOULD BE RE-ELECTED.

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5. I HAD A CHANCE TO REHEARSE PRIVATELY WITH ABDULRAHIM THE VITAL IMPORTANCE AT THIS STAGE OF THE PLO BEING SEEN TO BEHAVE RESPONSIBLY AS A MATURE POLITICAL ORGANISATION, AVOIDING NEEDLESS VIOLENCE AND INTEMPERATE RHETORIC. HE DID NOT DISAGREE.

6. AS REGARDS THE MEETING OF THE "STEADFASTNESS FRONT" CALLED BY LIBYA, ABDULRAHIM SAID THAT THE PLO DID NOT EXPECT EGYPT TO ATTACK, SINCE TO DO SO WOULD RISK COURTING SOVIET INTERVENTION. EGYPTIAN SABRE-RATTLING WAS PROBABLY TO PROVIDE A DISTRACTION FROM SADAT'S INTERNAL PROBLEMS.

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FM TEL AVIV 201045Z JUNE

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELNO 247 OF 20 JUNE

INFO ROUTINE WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK, CAIRO, AMMAN, AND
JERUSALEM(PASSED).

(see over)

NYTEL 245: ISRAEL'S REACTION TO VENICE.

1. DISCUSSION WITH MY COMMUNITY COLLEAGUES HERE SHOWS THAT THE SAME MAIN POINTS CAME UP WITH THEM: ISRAEL'S REFUSAL TO ACCEPT THE BASIC IDEAS IN THE VENICE DECLARATION AS A BASIS FOR NEGOTIATION; ISRAEL'S READINESS TO DISCUSS WITH THE EUROPEANS, WITH THE IMPLICATION, CONVEYED WITH VARYING DEGREES OF CLARITY, THAT THIS WOULD BE ON A BASIS OTHER THAN VENICE AND MIGHT EVEN HAVE TO BE EXPLICITLY BASED ON 242, 338 AND CAMP DAVID; AND ISRAEL'S WISH TO BE CONSULTED.

2. QUESTIONS FROM SOME OF MY COMMUNITY COLLEAGUES TO CIECHAN-
OVER ABOUT ISRAELI READINESS TO RECEIVE A MISSION ELICITED THE FOLLOWING. THE BELGIAN WAS TOLD THAT ISRAEL WANTED TO BE CONSULTED BEFORE THE MISSION'S MANDATE WAS DRAWN UP. THE ITALIAN GOT THE IMPRESSION THAT THE ISRAELIS WOULD PRESS HARD FOR TERMS WHICH WERE CONFINED TO 242, 338 AND CAMP DAVID. THE GERMAN WAS TOLD THAT NO DECISION HAD BEEN TAKEN ON RECEIVING THE MISSION BECAUSE ISRAEL HAD NOT HEARD WHAT ITS COMPOSITION WOULD BE, NOR

ITS TERMS OF REFERENCE, NOR WITH WHOM IT PROPOSED TO HAVE CONTACT. ARAFAT'S NAME WAS APPARENTLY MENTIONED AT THIS POINT, AND SOME OF MY COLLEAGUES ARE CONCLUDING THAT IF BEGIN CAN SAY THAT THE MISSION WILL SEE ARAFAT, HE WILL REFUSE TO SEE IT HIMSELF OR REFUSE TO LET IT COME TO ISRAEL ALTOGETHER. WHEN CIECHANOVER PRESSED ISRAEL'S WISH FOR A DIALOGUE WITH THE NINE, MY FRENCH COLLEAGUE SAID THAT THE MISSION WOULD PROVIDE AN OBVIOUS VEHICLE FOR THIS.

3. ALL THIS IS IN LINE WITH CIECHANOVER'S INSISTENCE WITH ALL OF US THAT THE VENICE DECLARATION DEVIATED FROM 242, 338 AND CAMP DAVID.

4. A NUMBER OF PROMINENT ISRAELIS ARE NOT HAPPY WITH THE TONE OF THE ISRAELI CABINET'S REACTION TO VENICE. IN A REMARKABLE INTERVIEW WITH ONE OF THIS MORNING'S ISRAELI PAPERS, SHAMIR SAYS THAT HE WAS NOT INVOLVED IN FORMULATING THE CABINET STATEMENT, AND THAT HE HAS A DIFFERENT STYLE OF SPEAKING FROM THAT OF BEGIN. ABBA EBAN STRONGLY ATTACKS THE CABINET STATEMENT THIS MORNING. BUT NO-ONE HERE HAS A GOOD WORD TO SAY FOR THE STATEMENT OF THE NINE, WHICHEVER END OF THE POLITICAL SPECTRUM THEY COME FROM. THE BASIC OBJECTIVES OF ISRAEL ARE GOING TO BE TO TRY TO CONTRAST THE VENICE STATEMENT WITH THE CAMP DAVID PROCESS, TO TRY DRAW THE NINE INTO PRIOR CONSULTATION WITH ISRAEL, AND INSIST THAT THE MISSION BE BASED ON CAMP DAVID AND 242 IF IT IS TO BE RECEIVED HERE, OR IF IT IS TO LEAD TO ANY USEFUL DISCUSSIONS WITH THE ISRAELIS. THIS SEEMS TO REINFORCE THE TWO RECOMMENDATIONS IN PARA SEVEN OF MY T U R.

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FM TEL AVIV 200815Z JUNE

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELNO 245 OF 20 JUNE

INFO ROUTINE WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK, CAIRO, AMMAN, AND JERUSALEM(PASSED).

Read a full

MYTEL 239: ISRAEL'S REACTION TO VENICE.

1. CIECHANOVER, DIRECTOR GENERAL OF THE ISRAELI FOREIGN MINISTRY, HAD EACH OF THE SEVEN RESIDENT E E C AMBASSADORS IN SEPARATELY YESTERDAY. MY TALK LASTED EIGHTY MINUTES. WE ARE COMPARING NOTES LATER THIS MORNING AND I WILL REPORT MORE FULLY THEREAFTER.

2. CIECHANOVER GAVE ME ISRAEL'S FORMAL RESPONSE TO THE VENICE STATEMENT BY ASKING ME TO CONSIDER THAT HE HAD READ TO ME THE ISRAELI CABINET STATEMENT OF 15 JUNE (MYTEL 238) TOGETHER WITH THE ADDITIONAL CLARIFICATIONS IN BEGIN'S REPLY TO THE PRIME MINISTER'S LETTER. (IT THEN EMERGED THERE HAD BEEN A DELAY ON THE ISRAELI SIDE IN TRANSMITTING THIS REPLY AND NO FURTHER REFERENCE WAS MADE TO IT).

3. CIECHANOVER SAID THAT THE BASIC IDEAS ON WHICH THE VENICE DECLARATION WAS BASED WERE UNACCEPTABLE TO ISRAEL, AND COULD NOT SERVE AS A BASIS FOR ANY NEGOTIATION. I REPEATEDLY ASKED HIM, IN TERMS OF THE VENICE DECLARATION AND IN THE TERMS USED BY THE PRIME MINISTER IN THE HOUSE ON 16 JUNE ("IF ONE PEOPLE EXPECTS TO EXIST BEHIND SECURE BOUNDARIES IT CANNOT DENY THAT RIGHT TO ANOTHER PEOPLE") WHETHER ISRAEL COULD ACCEPT THE PRINCIPLE THAT THE PALESTINIANS WERE ENTITLED ON THEIR SIDE OF THE FRONTIER TO THE SAME SELF-DETERMINATION, PEACEFUL EXISTENCE AND SECURE BOUNDARIES AS WE WANTED TO ENSURE FOR ISRAEL. CIECHANOVER COULD NOT AGREE TO THIS, THOUGH HE TRIED HARD TO AVOID SAYING SO IN TERMS. HE TALKED A LOT ABOUT ISRAEL'S NEED FOR TIME, THERE COULD BE NO DEVIATION FROM THE CAMP DAVID PROCESS, THE CONCEPT OF A FIVE YEAR INTERIM PERIOD WAS MOST IMPORTANT, JORDAN SHOULD SERVE AS A HOMELAND FOR THE PALESTINIANS, HE HOPED THE P L O COULD IN TIME BE NEURALISED, ONLY INTERIM ARRANGEMENTS COULD BE MADE NOW. (BEGIN EARLIER THIS WEEK TOLD THE KNESSET DEFENCE AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE THAT THE CAMP DAVID FORMULATIONS MENTIONED THE RECOGNITION OF THE LEGITIMATE RIGHTS OF THE PALESTINIANS BUT THIS IN CONNECTION WITH THE SOLUTION TO THE OPERATION OF AUTONOMY. ANY LEGITIMATE RIGHTS MUST FIND THEIR EXPRESSION ONLY WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF AUTONOMY. THIS WOULD MEAN THAT PALESTINIANS CANNOT BE ALLOWED TO CHOOSE ANYTHING GOING BEYOND BEGIN'S INTERPRETATION OF THE LIMITED AUTONOMY FORESEEN IN CAMP DAVID.).

4. AS REGARDS ISRAEL'S READINESS TO RECEIVE THE PROPOSED E E C MISSION, I THOUGHT IT WISER TO ASK NO QUESTIONS AT THIS STAGE, TO AVOID GIVING CIECHANOVER AN OPENING FOR SUGGESTING PRIOR CONDITIONS ON THE ISRAELI SIDE. I FEAR SOME OF MY COLLEAGUES MAY NOT HAVE ADOPTED THIS APPROACH. CIECHANOVER DID HOWEVER VOLUNTEER TO ME THAT ISRAEL WAS READY TO DISCUSS WITH ANY FRIENDLY COUNTRY IN EUROPE THIS OR ANY OTHER ISSUE, AND AT ANOTHER POINT THAT ISRAEL APPRECIATED EUROPE'S INTEREST AND WAS READY TO DISCUSS THE ISSUES WITH "ANYBODY." I REPEATED THESE TWO FORMULATIONS BACK TO HIM AND SAID THAT I WAS GLAD TO HEAR THE LATTER AS WELL AS THE FORMER AND WOULD REPORT ACCORDINGLY.

5. THE THIRD MAIN POINT, RAISED BY CIECHANOVER, WAS ISRAEL'S WISH TO BE CONTACTED AND CONSULTED BEFORE EUROPEAN COUNTRIES DID ANYTHING. (I REHEARSED THE MANY CONTACTS THERE HAD BEEN IN RECENT WEEKS).

6. ISRAEL WILL TRY TO EXPLOIT ANY OPENING WE GIVE HER TO MAKE

6. ISRAEL WILL TRY TO EXPLOIT ANY OPENING WE GIVE HER TO MAKE CONDITIONS FOR MEETING THE PROPOSED EUROPEAN MISSION. FOR EXAMPLE, ISRAEL MAY TRY TO INSIST THAT THE MISSION SHOULD ONLY SPEAK TO THE P L O IF THE P L O FIRST ACCEPT THE EXISTENCE OF ISRAEL AND 'SC' 242. (BUT AT THE SAME TIME ISRAEL WILL NOT ACCEPT SIMILAR RIGHTS FOR THE PALESTINIANS.).

7. TO THE EXTENT THAT WE FIND IT CONVENIENT TO DO SO, WE COULD WEAKEN ISRAEL'S STAND ON THE PROPOSED MISSION (AND STRENGTHEN THE OPPOSITION'S CASE FOR CRITICISING BEGIN IF WE CAN:

(A) NOTIFY (BUT NOT CONSULT) THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT IN ADVANCE OF THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE COMPOSITION AND START OF THE COMMISSION'S WORK;

(B) AVOID STATING PUBLICLY OR TO ANY OF THE PARTIES TERMS OF REFERENCE FOR THE MISSION BEYOND PERHAPS A GENERAL "EXPLORATION OF THE VIEWS OF THE PARTIES CONCERNED" ON THE ARAB/ISRAEL DISPUTE.

R O B I N S O N

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Middle East

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

20 June 1980

Recognition of Israel: Guarantees for the
Non-Jewish Community

The Prime Minister has seen your letter to me of 18 June and the note enclosed with it. She has confirmed that the note deals with the point she has in mind. She does not require any further work to be done on this issue at present.

MA

G.G.H. Walden, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

KRP

vb

Israel

BF 26.6.80

19 June 1980

I enclose a copy of a letter which the Prime Minister has received today from the Prime Minister of Israel. This is in reply to the Prime Minister's letter to Mr. Begin of 14 June.

Mr. Begin's letter requires a response. I should be grateful to receive in due course advice as to whether or not the Prime Minister herself should reply and, if so, in what terms.

I am sending a copy of this letter and its enclosure to Brian Norbury (Ministry of Defence).

(ESSED) MICHAEL ALEXANDER

Paul Lever, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

SC.

19 June 1980

I am writing on the Prime Minister's behalf to thank you for your letter to her of 19 June. I have, of course, brought the letter which you enclosed from the Prime Minister of Israel to Mrs Thatcher's immediate attention.

MICHAEL ALEXANDER

His Excellency Mr. Shlomo Argov



EMBASSY OF ISRAEL
2 PALACE GREEN
LONDON W8 4QB
Telephone: 01-937 8050

שגרירות ישראל
לונדון

19th June 1980

Dear Prime Minister.

I have been instructed to transmit to you the enclosed letter from Mr. Menachem Begin, Prime Minister of Israel.

Sincerely,

Shlomo Argov.

Shlomo Argov
Ambassador of Israel

The Rt. Hon. Mrs. Margaret Thatcher, MP
Prime Minister,
10 Downing Street,
London, SW1

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TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 2307 OF 19 JUNE

INFO PRIORITY AMMAN, CAIRO, TEL AVIV, DAMASCUS, HMCJ JERUSALEM,
UKMIS NEW YORK

INFO SAVING BEIRUT, BAGHDAD, JEDDA.

2 interesting ltr: Read in full.

KING HUSSEIN'S VISIT TO WASHINGTON

1. HUSSEIN ACCOMPANIED BY, AMONG OTHERS, QUEEN NOOR, ABDUL HAMID SHARAF AND GENERAL BIN SHAKER, ARRIVED IN WASHINGTON ON 16 JUNE. HIS OFFICIAL TALKS WERE ON 17 AND 18 JUNE: HE MADE A MAJOR SPEECH TO THE NATIONAL PRESS CLUB ON 19 JUNE: AND IS STAYING ON FOR TWO PRIVATE DAYS, LEAVING ON 21 JUNE. HE HAD TWO SESSIONS WITH PRESIDENT CARTER, ONE WITH DEFENCE SECRETARY BROWN AND A WORKING LUNCH WITH MUSKIE. HE ALSO SPENT TIME WITH THE SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE AND THE HOUSE FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE. THE PRESIDENT GAVE A DINNER IN HIS HONOUR ON 17 JUNE.

2. THE KING'S VISIT RECEIVED COMPREHENSIVE BUT NOT UNIVERSALLY FRIENDLY MEDIA ATTENTION (CBS SHOWED SADAT'S REMARKS DESCRIBING HUSSEIN AS A MONEY-MOTIVATED OPPORTUNIST AS PART OF A NEWS ITEM ABOUT THE KING'S ARRIVAL IN WASHINGTON). BUT THE PRESIDENT'S UNDERTAKING ON 13 JUNE THAT HE WOULD EXERCISE HIS PERSUASION ON THE KING TO JOIN CAMP DAVID (MYTEL 2253) HAS SUBSEQUENTLY BEEN MUCH TONED DOWN BY OFFICIAL BRIEFING, ONE STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL GOING SO FAR AS TO TELL THE WASHINGTON POST REPORTER THAT THIS PROMISE WAS QUOTE UNINTENDED UNQUOTE. IN HIS REMARKS TO THE PRESS AFTER THE SECOND MEETING WITH HUSSEIN, CARTER SAID QUOTE WE HAVE NOT TRIED TO CHANGE EACH OTHER'S MINDS ABOUT THE APPROACH, OR THE TECHNIQUE OR THE PROCEDURE TO BE USED. BUT WE DO AGREE COMPLETELY WITH THE ULTIMATE GOALS: THAT IS THE SOLUTION OF THE PALESTINIAN QUESTION IN ALL OF ITS ASPECTS, THE RIGHT OF THE PALESTINIANS TO HAVE A VOICE IN THE DETERMINATION OF THEIR OWN FUTURE, THE SECURITY OF ISRAEL AND A COMPREHENSIVE AND JUST PEACE FOR THE REGION. SO IN ALMOST EVERY INSTANCE OUR ULTIMATE GOALS ARE PARALLEL OR THE SAME, AND WE HAVE EXPLORED WAYS TO RESOLVE THE DIFFERENCES IN OUR APPROACH. UNQUOTE HUSSEIN IMPLICITLY ENDORSED THIS LINE DESCRIBING DISCUSSIONS AS QUOTE EXTREMELY FRUITFUL... WE UNDERSTAND BETTER THE US POSITION. WE HAVE HAD THE CHANCE AND OPPORTUNITY TO BRING TO YOU AND OUR FRIENDS IN THE US OUR FEELINGS THAT A JUST AND COMPREHENSIVE PEACE MUST COME IN THE AREA. UNQUOTE

3. GENERALLY SPEAKING THE MEDIA, ESPECIALLY ON THE FIRST DAY, CLAIMED TO DETECT A SOMEWHAT TENSE CORRECTNESS IN THE CARTER/HUSSEIN ENCOUNTERS AND TRIED TO READ DISAGREEMENT INTO THE WHITE HOUSE SPOKESMAN'S DESCRIPTION OF THE FIRST MORNING'S TALKS AS QUOTE

/Both

BOTH VERY FRANK AND EXTREMELY CORDIAL AND CONSTRUCTIVE UNQUOTE.
THE NEW YORK TIMES ALSO REPORTED ON 18 JUNE THAT HUSSEIN HAD A
HARD TIME ON THE HILL, QUOTING REPRESENTATIVE ROSENTHAL OF NEW YORK
AS DESCRIBING THE TONE AS QUOTE SHARP, THE SHARPEST I HAVE EVER
HEARD IN A MEETING WITH A FOREIGN LEADER. UNQUOTE FOR HIS PART,
HUSSEIN DECLARED HIMSELF QUOTE VERY, VERY SATISFIED WITH ALL THAT
HAS HAPPENED DURING MY VISIT HERE ... AND VERY PLEASED THAT WE ARE
FRANK WITH EACH OTHER. UNQUOTE

4. IN HIS SPEECH TO THE NATIONAL PRESS CLUB (WHICH WAS BROADCAST
LIVE ON THE NATIONAL PUBLIC RADIO NETWORK) HUSSEIN ARGUED FORCEFULLY
THAT RECOGNITION OF THE PALESTINIANS' RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION
WAS THE KEY TO THE JUST AND DURABLE PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST WHICH
JORDAN SOUGHT. WHILE ASSERTING HIS FAITH IN QUOTE STEADY AND
FRANK COMMUNICATION UNQUOTE BETWEEN THE US AND THE ARABS, HE WARNED
THAT AMERICAN COMMITMENT TO A QUOTE PECULIAR AND INDEFENSIBLE
UNQUOTE CONCEPT OF ISRAELI SECURITY WHICH APPEARED TO EQUATE
SECURITY WITH CONQUEST, THUS CONDONING ISRAELI EXPANSIONISM,
CONTAINED THE SEEDS OF A MAJOR CONFRONTATION BETWEEN THE US AND
THE ARAB WORLD. NEITHER MORALITY NOR ENLIGHTENED SELF-INTEREST
JUSTIFIED US SUPPORT FOR ISRAELI POLICIES OF ANNEXATION AND DENIAL
OF HUMAN RIGHTS, WHICH RESULTED IN QUOTE ALIENATION OF ESSENTIALLY
FRIENDLY PEOPLE, THE RADICALISATION OF THE MODERATES AMONG THEM,
AND THE POSSIBLE DISRUPTION OF THE NORMAL EXCHANGE OF INTERESTS
IN THE MAJOR AREAS OF TRADE, ENERGY AND CULTURE UNQUOTE. A
SEPARATE PEACE TREATY BETWEEN EGYPT AND ISRAEL WOULD NOT LEAD
TO A COMPREHENSIVE SETTLEMENT SO LONG AS ISRAEL INSISTED ON SETTLING
OCCUPIED LANDS; AND ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL FROM LAND OCCUPIED SINCE
1967 COULD NOT BE SEPARATED FROM PALESTINIAN SELF-DETERMINATION AND
NATIONAL FREEDOM. HUSSEIN REFERRED TO JORDAN'S RECORD AS THE MOST
ACTIVE ARAB COUNTRY IN PURSUIT OF A JUST AND COMPREHENSIVE PEACE,
TO HER COOPERATION WITH SUCCESSIVE UN AND US ENVOYS AND TO HIS OWN
TALKS WITH FOUR AMERICAN PRESIDENTS ALL OF WHOM HAD ASSURED HIM
THAT THEY UNDERSTOOD THE PROBLEM. QUOTE I AM CONVINCED THAT THE
AMERICAN PEOPLE, ONE THEY UNDERSTAND THE FACTS OF THE SITUATION
IN THE MIDDLE EAST, WILL DEMAND OF THEIR GOVERNMENT A BALANCED
POLICY AND WILL SUPPORT A PRESIDENT SEEKING TO CORRECT PAST MISTAKES
AND RE-ESTABLISH A CONSTRUCTIVE RELATIONSHIP WITH THE ARAB WORLD
UNQUOTE HE DEFENDED THE BAGHDAD AND TUNIS SUMMIT DECISIONS AS MOVES
DESIGNED TO PROMOTE PEACE; BUT THESE HAD BEEN THWARTED BY ISRAEL'S
POLICIES OF SETTLEMENTS AND REPRESSION IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES.
JORDAN'S CONSULTATIONS WITH THE PLO WERE DESIGNED TO OPEN AVENUES
TO PEACE, NOT CLOSE THEM. PROGRESS TOWARDS A FREE AND PEACEFUL
PALESTINIAN HOMELAND WAS THE PREREQUISITE TO PEACE IN THE
MIDDLE EAST: ONCE PEACE WAS ESTABLISHED, MUTUAL SECURITY GUARANTEES
COULD BE BUILT INTO IT; BUT A PEACE WHICH GUARANTEED PALESTINIAN
SELF-DETERMINATION AND FREEDOM WOULD BE NATURALLY SELF-PERPETUATING.

THE EUROPEAN COUNTRIES HAD ENDORSED THESE PRINCIPLES (HUSSEIN'S ONE OBLIQUE REFERENCE TO THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL DECLARATION). HUSSEIN CONCLUDED BY APPEALING TO THE US TO SHARE IN BRINGING ABOUT THE HONOURABLE AND GENUINE PEACE DESIRED BY JORDAN, THE PALESTINIANS AND ALL ENLIGHTENED ARAB OPINION.

5. THE QUESTION AND ANSWER PERIOD ADDED LITTLE, BUT HUSSEIN ELEGANTLY DECLINED AN INVITATION TO EXPRESS CRITICISM OF THE ADMINISTRATION'S LACK OF CONTINUITY IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS. HE INSTEAD PAID TRIBUTE TO CARTER'S COURAGE, THE INTEREST HE HAD SHOWN IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND HIS SINCERE DESIRE TO CONTRIBUTE TO THE SOLUTION OF THE AREA'S PROBLEMS. QUOTE HE HAS GIVEN ME MORE TIME OVER THIS SUBJECT THAN WAS THE CASE IN THE PAST WITH ALL THE GREAT PEOPLE THAT HELD THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES. I HOPE THAT THE FUTURE WILL SEE US WORKING CLOSELY TOGETHER UNQUOTE.

6. SEE M I F T

F C O PASS SAVING BEIRUT, BAGHDAD, JEDDA.

FRETWELL

(REPEATED AS REQUESTED)

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TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 2308 OF 19 JUNE

INFO PRIORITY AMMAN, CAIRO, TEL AVIV, DAMASCUS, JERUSALEM,

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INFO SAVING BEIRUT, BAGHDAD, JEDDA.

M I P T

1. STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIALS HAVE EXPRESSED GREAT SATISFACTION AT THE WAY THE VISIT HAS GONE, DISMISSING AS SIMPLY INACCURATE THE ATTEMPTS BY THE MEDIA TO FIND NEGATIVE ASPECTS. CARTER'S UN-HELPFUL CURTAIN-RAISING INTERVIEW WITH THE JEWISH EDITORS HAD EVIDENTLY NOT DONE ANY HARM. EVEN ON THE HILL, WHERE HUSSEIN HAD BEEN SUBJECTED TO SOME TOUGH QUESTIONING, HE HAD ANSWERED WELL AND, IF THERE WAS ANY JUSTICE, SHOULD HAVE DONE MUCH TO RESTORE HIS IMAGE.
2. SAUNDERS TOLD US THAT THE PRIME PURPOSE OF REESTABLISHING THE CARTER/HUSSEIN RELATIONSHIP WAS ACHIEVED. THIS VISIT WAS AN EXAMPLE OF HOW PERSONAL CONTACT GENUINELY COULD CLEAR THE AIR AND RE-ESTABLISH CORDIALITY AFTER A LONG PERIOD OF PUBLIC RECRIMINATION AND INCOMPLETE UNDERSTANDING. THE TWO MEN HAD FULLY EXPLORED AND DISPOSED OF THEIR MUTUAL GRIEVANCES. THE FACT THAT BOTH MEETINGS WITH THE PRESIDENT HAD LASTED TWICE AS LONG AS SCHEDULED REFLECTED THEIR RESTORED MUTUAL ESTEEM AND FRIENDSHIP, AND THE EXTENT TO WHICH THEIR DISCUSSION HAD INTERESTED THEM BOTH.
3. THERE HAD BEEN A GOOD AIRING OF HUSSEIN'S ATTITUDE TO THE CAMP DAVID PROCESS. THOUGH MAINTAINING THE POSITION THAT HE WISHED THE KING COULD JOIN IN, CARTER HAD ENDED BY ASSURING HUSSEIN THAT HE UNDERSTOOD HIS POSITION AND THAT HE WAS NOT GOING TO TRY TO PERSUADE HIM TO CHANGE IT. DISCUSSION HAD THEN MOVED TO WAYS AND MEANS OF RELATING THE PALESTINIANS TO PEACE NEGOTIATIONS. CARTER HAD ASKED HUSSEIN TO GIVE SERIOUS THOUGHT TO HOW PALESTINIAN ATTENTION COULD BE FOCUSED NOT MERELY ON WHAT THEY AIM FOR AS THE END RESULT OF A COMPREHENSIVE SETTLEMENT BUT RATHER ON THE SPECIFIC WAYS IN WHICH THEY FELT THE CAMP DAVID FRAMEWORK TO BE DEFECTIVE AND ON WHAT NEEDED TO BE DONE TO ESTABLISH A NEGOTIATION TO WHICH THEY COULD BE RELATED WITHOUT DIRECT INVOLVEMENT. THE PRESIDENT HAD EMPHASISED THAT HE WAS NOT EXPECTING ANYONE TO ABANDON THEIR ULTIMATE GOALS. BUT HE HOPED THAT HUSSEIN COULD EXPLORE WITH HIS PALESTINIAN CONTACT HOW, GIVEN THAT THEY WOULD HAVE NOTHING TO DO WITH CAMP DAVID AS SUCH, THEY MIGHT RELATE THEMSELVES TO SOME FORM OF NEGOTIATION WHICH, WHILST DIFFERENT FROM CAMP DAVID, WAS NOT IN CONFLICT WITH IT. SAUNDERS

CONFIDENTIAL*SAGREED*

CONFIDENTIAL

AGREED WITH MY SUGGESTION THAT THIS APPROACH WAS CLOSE TO THE CONCEPT UNDERLYING THE EUROPEAN INITIATIVE. (SAUNDERS MADE A PARTICULAR POINT OF ASKING ME TO ENSURE THAT WE KEPT ALL THE ABOVE TO OURSELVES. THE ADMINISTRATION HAD NOT YET DECIDED HOW TO PRESENT IT TO OTHER EUROPEANS; THEY WERE SERIOUSLY CONCERNED ABOUT THE RISK OF LEAKS WHICH MIGHT ENABLE THE ISRAELIS TO CLAIM THAT THE ADMINISTRATION WERE LOOKING FOR WAYS ROUND THEIR COMMITMENT NOT TO DEAL WITH THE PLO).

4. I ASKED SAUNDERS WHETHER HUSSEIN HAD VOLUNTEERED ANY THOUGHTS ON HOW THE PALESTINIANS MIGHT THUS BE BROUGHT IN. HE SAID THAT IT HAD BEEN EASIER TO AGREE ON APPROACHES THAT HAD TO BE RULED OUT. CLEARLY; THERE WAS NO SCOPE FOR TRYING TO INSERT THE PALESTINIANS INTO THE EGYPTIAN DELEGATION; INDEED, THEY WOULD NOT ASSOCIATE THEMSELVES WITH ANYTHING THAT WAS SEEN TO SMACK OF CAMP DAVID. HUSSEIN HIMSELF (CONTRASTING HIS OWN ATTITUDE WITH THAT OF THE IRAQIS AND THE SYRIANS) HAD BEEN PREPARED TO ACCEPT WHAT CAMP DAVID HAD SO FAR ACHIEVED BUT HAD BEEN FIRM THAT THE PROCESS WAS INCOMPLETE. SAUNDERS INTREPRETED THIS AS MEANING THAT IN HUSSEIN'S VIEW A COMPREHENSIVE SETTLEMENT WOULD REQUIRE A MOVE AWAY FROM THE CAMP DAVID FRAMEWORK, THOUGH NOT TO SOME BRAND NEW FORUM.

5. OTHER ISSUES DISCUSSED INCLUDED REGIONAL SECURITY IN THE GULF AND ARABIAN PENINSULA, IRAN, AFGHANISTAN AND LEBANON. THERE WAS LITTLE BILATERAL SUBJECT MATTER AND THE QUESTION OF U.S. ARMS SUPPLIES SEEMS NOT EVEN TO HAVE BEEN RAISED BETWEEN THE KING AND CARTER. NEUMANN (JORDAN COUNTRY OFFICER, STATE DEPARTMENT) HAS TOLD US THAT, ON THE ADVICE OF THEIR FRIENDS ON THE HILL, THE ADMINISTRATION HAVE DELIBERATELY DELAYED NOTIFICATION TO CONGRESS OF THE U.S. WISH TO SELL JORDAN 100 TANKS UNTIL 23 JUNE, IN ORDER TO AVOID ARMS SUPPLIES BECOMING THE MAIN FOCUS OF HUSSEIN'S MEETING WITH CONGRESSMEN. THE SAME NOTIFICATION WILL MENTION JORDAN'S WISH TO PURCHASE A FURTHER 100 TANKS THEREAFTER. NEUMANN ANTICIPATES TROUBLE ON THE HILL AND A CHANCE FOR ISRAELI SUPPORTERS THERE TO ERODE HUSSEIN'S SUCCESS.

FCO PASS SAVING BEIRUT, BAGHDAD, JEDDA.

FRETWELL

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Prime Minister

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

Was this what you had in mind?

London SW1A 2AH

Ans Yes

18 June 1980

Dear Michael,

Recognition of Israel: Guarantees for the Non-Jewish Community

During her recent discussions with the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary about the Arab/Israel problem, the Prime Minister mentioned that she understood that the decision to recognise the State of Israel was in some way linked to a requirement about Israel's treatment of her non-Jewish citizens.

// I enclose a short note which may explain what the Prime Minister had in mind, together with a copy of the General Assembly Resolution on Partition referred to in the note.

If the Prime Minister would like this point more thoroughly looked into you will no doubt let us know.

Handwritten signature

(G G H Walden)
Private Secretary

M O'D B Alexander Esq
10 Downing Street
LONDON

RESTRICTED

RECOGNITION OF ISRAEL: GUARANTEES FOR THE NON-JEWISH COMMUNITY

1. The United Nations Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP), which was set up to report on the Palestinian problem after it had been referred to the United Nations by the British in February 1947, published its report on 31 August 1947. The majority proposal (Canada, Czechoslovakia, Guatamala, Netherlands, Peru, Sweden and Uruguay) was that Palestine should be divided into an Arab State, a Jewish State and the City of Jerusalem. The Arab and Jewish States were to become independent, but before their independence could be recognised they must adopt a constitution in line with the Committee's recommendations and offer certain guarantees to the United Nations. The constitutions were to provide for universal suffrage and secret ballot.
2. The General Assembly resolution of 29 November 1947, which laid the basis for the partition, did not pick up UNSCOP's proposal of making recognition depend on these conditions. It did however require that each of the two new States should enact constitutions which would, among other things, guarantee equal civil, political and other rights to all citizens.
3. Israel's Proclamation of Independence on 14 May 1948 did not follow the United Nations' prescription in detail. It did however undertake to give full political equality to all citizens. (In spite of this undertaking, there was in practice discrimination; for example, the 'law of return' passed unanimously by the Knesset on 5 July 1950 discriminates between Jews and other Israeli citizens).

4. The question of recognition of Israel became a contentious political issue. The United Kingdom withheld de facto recognition until 28 January 1949 and de jure recognition until 27 April 1950. Part of the argument on recognition was whether or not Israel was abiding by the provisions of the General Assembly resolution. For example, Mr Mayhew (Under-Secretary at the Foreign Office) argued in reply to a Motion proposed in the House of Commons by Mr Lever on 10 June 1948 that Israel had failed to implement a number of United Nations' recommendations, including that providing for representation of Arabs in the Constituent Assembly of the Jewish State.

17 June 1980

18 JUN 1980



181 (III). Future government of Palestine

A

The General Assembly,

Having met in special session at the request of the mandatory Power to constitute and instruct a special committee to prepare for the consideration of the question of the future government of Palestine at the second regular session;

Having constituted a Special Committee and instructed it to investigate all questions and issues relevant to the problem of Palestine, and to prepare proposals for the solution of the problem, and

Having received and examined the report of the Special Committee (document A/364)¹ including a number of unanimous recommendations and a plan of partition with economic union approved by the majority of the Special Committee,

Considers that the present situation in Palestine is one which is likely to impair the general welfare and friendly relations among nations;

Takes note of the declaration by the mandatory Power that it plans to complete its evacuation of Palestine by 1 August 1948;

Recommends to the United Kingdom, as the mandatory Power for Palestine, and to all other Members of the United Nations the adoption and implementation, with regard to the future government of Palestine, of the Plan of Partition with Economic Union set out below;

Requests that

(a) The Security Council take the necessary measures as provided for in the plan for its implementation;

(b) The Security Council consider, if circumstances during the transitional period require such consideration, whether the situation in Palestine constitutes a threat to the peace. If it decides that such a threat exists, and in order to maintain international peace and security, the Security Council should supplement the authorization of the General Assembly by taking measures, under Articles 39 and 41 of the Charter, to empower the United Nations Commission, as provided in this

¹ See *Official Records of the second session of the General Assembly*, Supplement No. 11, Volumes I-IV.

181 (III). Gouvernement futur de la Palestine

A

L'Assemblée générale,

Après s'être réunie en session spéciale à la requête de la Puissance mandataire, en vue de procéder à la constitution, et de définir le mandat, d'une commission spéciale chargée de préparer l'examen par l'Assemblée, en sa seconde session régulière, de la question du futur gouvernement de la Palestine;

Ayant constitué une Commission spéciale, et lui ayant donné mandat d'enquêter sur toutes les questions relatives au problème de la Palestine, et de préparer des propositions en vue de la solution de ce problème, et

Ayant reçu et examiné le rapport de la Commission spéciale (document A/364)¹, où figurent un certain nombre de recommandations présentées par la Commission à l'unanimité, et un plan de partage avec union économique approuvé par la majorité de la Commission spéciale,

Considère que la situation actuelle de la Palestine est de nature à nuire au bien général et aux relations amicales entre les nations;

Prend acte de la déclaration de la Puissance mandataire, par laquelle celle-ci fait connaître qu'elle se propose d'achever l'évacuation de la Palestine pour le 1er août 1948;

Recommande au Royaume-Uni, en tant que Puissance mandataire pour la Palestine, ainsi qu'à tous les autres Etats Membres de l'Organisation des Nations Unies, l'adoption et la mise à exécution, en ce qui concerne le futur gouvernement de la Palestine, du Plan de partage avec Union économique exposé ci-dessous;

Demande

a) Que le Conseil de sécurité prenne les mesures nécessaires prévues dans le plan pour sa mise à exécution;

b) Que le Conseil de sécurité détermine, au cas où les circonstances l'exigeraient pendant la période de transition, si la situation en Palestine représente une menace contre la paix. S'il décide qu'une telle menace existe, et afin de maintenir la paix et la sécurité internationales, le Conseil de sécurité complétera l'autorisation de l'Assemblée générale par des mesures prises aux termes des Articles 39 et 41 de la Charte, qui donneront pouvoir à la Commission des Nations

¹ Voir les *Documents officiels de la deuxième session de l'Assemblée générale*, Supplément No 11, Volumes I-IV.

resolution, to exercise in Palestine the functions which are assigned to it by this resolution;

(c) The Security Council determine as a threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression, in accordance with Article 39 of the Charter, any attempt to alter by force the settlement envisaged by this resolution;

(d) The Trusteeship Council be informed of the responsibilities envisaged for it in this plan;

Calls upon the inhabitants of Palestine to take such steps as may be necessary on their part to put this plan into effect;

Appeals to all Governments and all peoples to refrain from taking any action which might hamper or delay the carrying out of these recommendations, and

Authorizes the Secretary-General to reimburse travel and subsistence expenses of the members of the Commission referred to in Part I, Section B, paragraph 1 below, on such basis and in such form as he may determine most appropriate in the circumstances, and to provide the Commission with the necessary staff to assist in carrying out the functions assigned to the Commission by the General Assembly.

B¹

The General Assembly

Authorizes the Secretary-General to draw from the Working Capital Fund a sum not to exceed \$2,000,000 for the purposes set forth in the last paragraph of the resolution on the future government of Palestine.

Hundred and twenty-eighth plenary meeting, 29 November 1947.

At its hundred and twenty-eighth plenary meeting on 29 November 1947 the General Assembly, in accordance with the terms of the above resolution, elected the following members of the United Nations Commission on Palestine:

BOLIVIA, CZECHOSLOVAKIA, DENMARK, PANAMA and PHILIPPINES.

PLAN OF PARTITION WITH ECONOMIC UNION

PART I

Future constitution and government of Palestine

A. TERMINATION OF MANDATE, PARTITION AND INDEPENDENCE

1. The Mandate for Palestine shall terminate as soon as possible but in any case not later than 1 August 1948.

¹ This resolution was adopted without reference to a Committee.

Unies prévue dans la présente résolution d'exercer en Palestine les fonctions qui lui sont assignées dans la présente résolution;

c) Que le Conseil de sécurité considère comme menace contre la paix, rupture de paix ou acte d'agression, conformément à l'Article 39 de la Charte, toute tentative visant à modifier par la force le règlement prévu par la présente résolution;

d) Que le Conseil de tutelle soit informé de la responsabilité qui lui incombera aux termes de ce plan;

Invite les habitants de la Palestine à prendre toutes les mesures qui pourraient être nécessaires de leur part, en vue d'assurer l'application de ce plan;

Fait appel à tous les Gouvernements et tous les peuples pour qu'ils s'abstiennent de toute action qui risquerait d'entraver ou de retarder l'exécution de ces recommandations, et

Autorise le Secrétaire général à rembourser les frais de voyage et de subsistance des membres de la Commission dont il est fait mention ci-dessous (première partie, section B, paragraphe 1) sur telle base et sous telle forme qu'il estimera les plus appropriées aux circonstances, et à fournir à la Commission le personnel nécessaire pour l'aider à remplir les fonctions qui lui sont assignées par l'Assemblée générale.

B¹

L'Assemblée générale

Autorise le secrétaire général à prélever sur le Fonds de roulement une somme ne dépassant pas 2.000.000 de dollars, aux fins énoncées dans le dernier alinéa de la résolution relative au gouvernement futur de la Palestine.

Cent-vingt huitième séance plénière, le 29 novembre 1947.

Au cours de sa cent-vingt-huitième séance plénière, tenue le 29 novembre 1947, et conformément aux termes de la résolution ci-dessus, l'Assemblée générale a élu les Membres suivants pour faire partie de la Commission des Nations Unies pour la Palestine:

BOLIVIE, TCHÉCOSLOVAQUIE, DANEMARK, PANAMA et PHILIPPINES.

PLAN DE PARTAGE AVEC UNION ECONOMIQUE

PREMIERE PARTIE

Constitution et gouvernement futurs de la Palestine

A. FIN DU MANDAT, PARTAGE ET INDEPENDANCE

1. Le Mandat pour la Palestine prendra fin aussitôt que possible, et en tous cas le 1er août 1948 au plus tard.

¹ Cette résolution a été adoptée sans renvoi à une Commission.

2. The armed forces of the mandatory Power shall be progressively withdrawn from Palestine, the withdrawal to be completed as soon as possible but in any case not later than 1 August 1948.

The mandatory Power shall advise the Commission, as far in advance as possible, of its intention to terminate the Mandate and to evacuate each area.

The mandatory Power shall use its best endeavours to ensure that an area situated in the territory of the Jewish State, including a seaport and hinterland adequate to provide facilities for a substantial immigration, shall be evacuated at the earliest possible date and in any event not later than 1 February 1948.

3. Independent Arab and Jewish States and the Special International Regime for the City of Jerusalem, set forth in part III of this plan, shall come into existence in Palestine two months after the evacuation of the armed forces of the mandatory Power has been completed but in any case not later than 1 October 1948. The boundaries of the Arab State, the Jewish State, and the City of Jerusalem shall be as described in parts II and III below.

4. The period between the adoption by the General Assembly of its recommendation on the question of Palestine and the establishment of the independence of the Arab and Jewish States shall be a transitional period.

B. STEPS PREPARATORY TO INDEPENDENCE

1. A Commission shall be set up consisting of one representative of each of five Member States. The Members represented on the Commission shall be elected by the General Assembly on as broad a basis, geographically and otherwise, as possible.

2. The administration of Palestine shall, as the mandatory Power withdraws its armed forces, be progressively turned over to the Commission; which shall act in conformity with the recommendations of the General Assembly, under the guidance of the Security Council. The mandatory Power shall to the fullest possible extent co-ordinate its plans for withdrawal with the plans of the Commission to take over and administer areas which have been evacuated.

In the discharge of this administrative responsibility the Commission shall have authority to issue necessary regulations and take other measures as required.

The mandatory Power shall not take any action to prevent, obstruct or delay the implementation by the Commission of the measures recommended by the General Assembly.

3. On its arrival in Palestine the Commission shall proceed to carry out measures for the establishment of the frontiers of the Arab and Jewish States and the City of Jerusalem in accordance with the general lines of the recommendations of the General Assembly on the partition of Palestine. Nevertheless, the boundaries as described in part II of this plan are to be modified in such a way that village areas as a rule will not be divided by state boundaries unless pressing reasons make that necessary.

4. The Commission, after consultation with the democratic parties and other public organizations.

2. Les forces armées de la Puissance mandataire évacueront progressivement la Palestine; cette évacuation devra être achevée aussitôt que possible, et en tous cas le 1er août 1948 au plus tard.

La Puissance mandataire informera la Commission aussi longtemps à l'avance que possible, de son intention de mettre fin au Mandat et d'évacuer chaque zone.

La Puissance mandataire fera tout ce qui est en son pouvoir pour assurer, à une date aussi rapprochée que possible, et en tous cas le 1er février 1948 au plus tard, l'évacuation d'une zone située sur le territoire de l'Etat juif et possédant un port maritime et un arrière-pays suffisants pour donner les facilités nécessaires en vue d'une immigration importante.

3. Les Etats indépendants arabe et juif ainsi que le Régime international particulier prévu pour la Ville de Jérusalem dans la troisième partie de ce plan, commenceront d'exister en Palestine deux mois après que l'évacuation des forces armées de la Puissance mandataire aura été achevée et, en tous cas, le 1er octobre 1948 au plus tard. Les frontières de l'Etat arabe, de l'Etat juif et de la Ville de Jérusalem seront les frontières indiquées aux deuxième et troisième parties ci-dessous.

4. La période qui s'écoulera entre l'adoption par l'Assemblée générale de ses recommandations sur la question palestinienne et l'établissement de l'indépendance des Etats juif et arabe sera une période de transition.

B. MESURES PREPARATOIRES A L'INDEPENDANCE

1. On instituera une Commission composée des représentants de cinq Etats Membres, à raison d'un représentant par Etat. Les Membres représentés au sein de cette Commission seront élus par l'Assemblée générale, sur une base, géographique ou autre, aussi large que possible.

2. A mesure que la Puissance mandataire retirera ses forces armées, elle transmettra progressivement l'administration de la Palestine à la Commission qui agira conformément aux recommandations de l'Assemblée générale et sous la direction du Conseil de sécurité. La Puissance mandataire coordonnera dans toute la mesure du possible son plan de retrait avec le plan établi par la Commission pour prendre en main et administrer les régions qui auront été évacuées.

Pour assurer les fonctions d'administration dont la responsabilité lui est confiée, la Commission aura autorité pour promulguer les règlements nécessaires et prendre toutes autres mesures utiles.

La Puissance mandataire ne se livrera à aucun acte de nature à gêner, empêcher ou retarder l'exécution par la Commission des mesures recommandées par l'Assemblée générale.

3. Dès son arrivée en Palestine, la Commission prendra des dispositions en vue de fixer les frontières des Etats juif et arabe et de la Ville de Jérusalem, en se conformant d'une manière générale aux recommandations de l'Assemblée générale relatives au partage de la Palestine. Néanmoins, le tracé des frontières, tel qu'il est indiqué dans la deuxième partie du plan, doit être modifié de manière qu'en règle générale, les territoires des villages ne soient pas coupés par la ligne frontière entre les deux Etats, à moins que des motifs pressants ne rendent nécessaire une telle mesure.

4. Après consultation avec les partis démocratiques et les autres organisations publiques des Etats

of the Arab and Jewish States, shall select and establish in each State as rapidly as possible a Provisional Council of Government. The activities of both the Arab and Jewish Provisional Councils of Government shall be carried out under the general direction of the Commission.

If by 1 April 1948 a Provisional Council of Government cannot be selected for either of the States, or, if selected, cannot carry out its functions, the Commission shall communicate that fact to the Security Council for such action with respect to that State as the Security Council may deem proper, and to the Secretary-General for communication to the Members of the United Nations.

5. Subject to the provisions of these recommendations, during the transitional period the Provisional Councils of Government, acting under the Commission, shall have full authority in the areas under their control, including authority over matters of immigration and land regulation.

6. The Provisional Council of Government of each State, acting under the Commission, shall progressively receive from the Commission full responsibility for the administration of that State in the period between the termination of the Mandate and the establishment of the State's independence.

7. The Commission shall instruct the Provisional Councils of Government of both the Arab and Jewish States, after their formation, to proceed to the establishment of administrative organs of government, central and local.

8. The Provisional Council of Government of each State shall, within the shortest time possible, recruit an armed militia from the residents of that State, sufficient in number to maintain internal order and to prevent frontier clashes.

This armed militia in each State shall, for operational purposes, be under the command of Jewish or Arab officers resident in that State, but general political and military control, including the choice of the militia's High Command, shall be exercised by the Commission.

9. The Provisional Council of Government of each State shall, not later than two months after the withdrawal of the armed forces of the mandatory Power, hold elections to the Constituent Assembly which shall be conducted on democratic lines.

The election regulations in each State shall be drawn up by the Provisional Council of Government and approved by the Commission. Qualified voters for each State for this election shall be persons over eighteen years of age who are: (a) Palestinian citizens residing in that State and (b) Arabs and Jews residing in the State, although not Palestinian citizens, who, before voting, have signed a notice of intention to become citizens of such State.

Arabs and Jews residing in the City of Jerusalem who have signed a notice of intention to become citizens, the Arabs of the Arab State and the Jews of the Jewish State, shall be entitled to vote in the Arab and Jewish States respectively.

Women may vote and be elected to the Constituent Assemblies.

During the transitional period no Jew shall be permitted to establish residence in the area of the proposed Arab State, and no Arab shall be permitted

arabe et juif, la Commission désignera et établira, aussi rapidement que possible, dans chaque Etat, un Conseil provisoire de gouvernement. Les Conseils provisoires de gouvernement des Etats arabe et juif agiront sous la direction générale de la Commission.

Si, au 1er avril 1948, il n'a pu être désigné de Conseil provisoire de gouvernement pour l'un ou l'autre Etat, ou si ce Conseil, une fois institué, ne peut s'acquitter de ses fonctions, la Commission en informera le Conseil de sécurité pour qu'il prenne à l'égard de cet Etat, les mesures qu'il jugera appropriées; elle en informera aussi le Secrétaire général qui avisera les Membres de l'Organisation des Nations Unies.

5. Pendant la période de transition, et sous réserve des dispositions des recommandations susdites, les Conseils provisoires de gouvernement, agissant sous la direction de la Commission, auront pleine autorité dans les zones qui dépendent d'eux, notamment en matière d'immigration et de réglementation foncière.

6. Le Conseil provisoire de gouvernement de chaque Etat, agissant sous la direction de la Commission, se verra progressivement confier par celle-ci l'entière responsabilité de l'administration de cet Etat pendant la période qui s'écoulera entre la cessation du mandat et l'établissement de l'indépendance dudit Etat.

7. Une fois les Conseils provisoires de gouvernement des Etats arabe et juif constitués, la Commission leur donnera mission de procéder à la création des organes administratifs du gouvernement central et des autorités locales.

8. Le Conseil provisoire de gouvernement de chaque Etat recrutera dans le plus bref délai possible, parmi les résidents de cet Etat, une milice armée assez nombreuse pour maintenir l'ordre dans le pays et pour prévenir les incidents de frontière.

Dans chaque Etat, cette milice armée opérera sous les ordres d'officiers juifs ou arabes résidant en cet Etat, mais la direction générale, politique et militaire de la milice, notamment la désignation du Haut commandement, sera exercée par la Commission.

9. Deux mois au plus tard après le retrait des forces armées de la Puissance mandataire, le Conseil provisoire de gouvernement de chaque Etat organisera des élections à l'Assemblée constituante, élections qui devront être conformes aux principes démocratiques.

Dans chaque Etat, les règlements concernant les élections seront établis par le Conseil provisoire de gouvernement et approuvés par la Commission. Pourront participer à ces élections, dans chaque Etat, toutes personnes de plus de dix-huit ans qui seront: a) citoyens palestiniens résidant dans cet Etat ou b) Arabes ou Juifs résidant dans l'Etat et qui, sans être citoyens palestiniens, auront, avant le vote, signé une déclaration affirmant expressément leur intention de devenir citoyens dudit Etat.

Les Arabes et les Juifs résidant dans la Ville de Jérusalem qui auront déclaré sous cette forme leur intention de devenir citoyens — les Arabes, citoyens de l'Etat arabe et les Juifs, citoyens de l'Etat juif — auront le droit de vote dans l'Etat arabe et dans l'Etat juif, respectivement.

Les femmes auront le droit de vote et seront éligibles aux Assemblées constituantes.

Pendant la période de transition, aucun Juif ne pourra établir sa résidence sur le territoire de l'Etat arabe envisagé, et aucun Arabe ne pourra établir sa

to establish residence in the area of the proposed Jewish State, except by special leave of the Commission.

10. The Constituent Assembly of each State shall draft a democratic constitution for its State and choose a provisional government to succeed the Provisional Council of Government appointed by the Commission. The constitutions of the States shall embody chapters 1 and 2 of the Declaration provided for in section C below and include *inter alia* provisions for:

(a) Establishing in each State a legislative body elected by universal suffrage and by secret ballot on the basis of proportional representation, and an executive body responsible to the legislature;

(b) Settling all international disputes in which the State may be involved by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered;

(c) Accepting the obligation of the State to refrain in its international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations;

(d) Guaranteeing to all persons equal and non-discriminatory rights in civil, political, economic and religious matters and the enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms, including freedom of religion, language, speech and publication, education, assembly and association;

(e) Preserving freedom of transit and visit for all residents and citizens of the other State in Palestine and the City of Jerusalem, subject to considerations of national security, provided that each State shall control residence within its borders.

11. The Commission shall appoint a preparatory economic commission of three members to make whatever arrangements are possible for economic co-operation, with a view to establishing, as soon as practicable, the Economic Union and the Joint Economic Board, as provided in section D below.

12. During the period between the adoption of the recommendations on the question of Palestine by the General Assembly and the termination of the Mandate, the mandatory Power in Palestine shall maintain full responsibility for administration in areas from which it has not withdrawn its armed forces. The Commission shall assist the mandatory Power in the carrying out of these functions. Similarly the mandatory Power shall co-operate with the Commission in the execution of its functions.

13. With a view to ensuring that there shall be continuity in the functioning of administrative services and that, on the withdrawal of the armed forces of the mandatory Power, the whole administration shall be in the charge of the Provisional Councils and the Joint Economic Board, respectively, acting under the Commission, there shall be a progressive transfer, from the mandatory Power to the Commission, of responsibility for all the functions of government, including that of maintaining law and order in the areas from which the forces of the mandatory Power have been withdrawn.

14. The Commission shall be guided in its activities by the recommendations of the General Assem-

résidence sur le territoire de l'Etat juif envisagé, sauf autorisation spéciale de la Commission.

10. L'Assemblée constituante de chaque Etat élaborera une constitution démocratique pour cet Etat et choisira un gouvernement provisoire qui succédera au Conseil provisoire de gouvernement désigné par la Commission. Les constitutions des Etats devront comprendre les clauses énoncées aux chapitres 1er et 2 de la Déclaration prévue à la section C ci-dessous et, entre autres, des dispositions:

a) Créant dans chaque Etat un corps législatif élu au suffrage universel et au scrutin secret sur la base de la représentation proportionnelle, ainsi qu'un organe exécutif responsable devant le corps législatif;

b) Permettant de régler, par des moyens pacifiques, tous différends internationaux dans lesquels l'Etat pourrait être impliqué, de telle manière que la paix et la sécurité internationales et la justice ne soient pas mises en danger;

c) Portant acceptation, par l'Etat, de l'obligation de s'abstenir, dans ses relations internationales, de tout recours à la menace ou à l'emploi de la force soit contre l'intégrité territoriale ou l'indépendance politique de tout Etat, soit de toute autre manière incompatible avec les buts de l'Organisation des Nations Unies;

d) Garantissant à toutes personnes, sans discrimination, des droits égaux en matière civile, politique, économique et religieuse et la jouissance des droits de l'homme et des libertés fondamentales, y compris la liberté de culte, de langue, de parole et de publication, d'instruction, de réunion et d'association;

e) Garantissant la liberté de transit et de visite en Palestine et dans la Ville de Jérusalem à tous les résidents et citoyens de l'autre Etat, sous réserve de considérations de sécurité nationale et à condition que chaque Etat exerce le contrôle de la résidence à l'intérieur de ses frontières.

11. La Commission désignera une commission économique préparatoire de trois membres chargée de conclure tous arrangements possibles pour réaliser la coopération économique, en vue d'établir aussitôt que possible l'Union économique et le Conseil économique mixte prévus à la section D ci-dessous.

12. Pendant la période qui s'écoulera entre l'adoption par l'Assemblée générale des recommandations relatives à la question palestinienne et la cessation du Mandat, la Puissance mandataire de Palestine conservera l'entière responsabilité de l'administration des régions dont elle n'aura pas retiré ses forces armées. La Commission aidera la Puissance mandataire à s'acquitter de ces fonctions. De même, la Puissance mandataire collaborera avec la Commission dans l'exécution de ses fonctions.

13. En vue d'assurer la continuité dans le fonctionnement des services administratifs et pour que, au moment du retrait des forces armées de la Puissance mandataire, toute l'administration soit entre les mains des Conseils provisoires et du Conseil économique mixte, respectivement agissant sous la direction de la Commission, la Puissance mandataire transférera progressivement à la Commission toutes les fonctions gouvernementales, y compris la responsabilité du maintien de l'ordre public dans les régions d'où la Puissance mandataire aura retiré ses forces armées.

14. La Commission s'inspirera, dans son activité, des recommandations de l'Assemblée générale et

bly and by such instructions as the Security Council may consider necessary to issue.

The measures taken by the Commission, within the recommendations of the General Assembly, shall become immediately effective unless the Commission has previously received contrary instructions from the Security Council.

The Commission shall render periodic monthly progress reports, or more frequently if desirable, to the Security Council.

15. The Commission shall make its final report to the next regular session of the General Assembly and to the Security Council simultaneously.

C. DECLARATION

A declaration shall be made to the United Nations by the provisional government of each proposed State before independence. It shall contain *inter alia* the following clauses:

GENERAL PROVISION

The stipulations contained in the declaration are recognized as fundamental laws of the State and no law, regulation or official action shall conflict or interfere with these stipulations, nor shall any law, regulation or official action prevail over them.

CHAPTER 1

Holy Places, religious buildings and sites

1. Existing rights in respect of Holy Places and religious buildings or sites shall not be denied or impaired.

2. In so far as Holy Places are concerned, the liberty of access, visit and transit shall be guaranteed, in conformity with existing rights, to all residents and citizens of the other State and of the City of Jerusalem, as well as to aliens, without distinction as to nationality, subject to requirements of national security, public order and decorum.

Similarly, freedom of worship shall be guaranteed in conformity with existing rights, subject to the maintenance of public order and decorum.

3. Holy Places and religious buildings or sites shall be preserved. No act shall be permitted which may in any way impair their sacred character. If at any time it appears to the Government that any particular Holy Place, religious building or site is in need of urgent repair, the Government may call upon the community or communities concerned to carry out such repair. The Government may carry it out itself at the expense of the community or communities concerned if no action is taken within a reasonable time.

4. No taxation shall be levied in respect of any Holy Place, religious building or site which was exempt from taxation on the date of the creation of the State.

No change in the incidence of such taxation shall be made which would either discriminate between the owners or occupiers of Holy Places, religious buildings or sites, or would place such owners or occupiers in a position less favourable in relation to the general incidence of taxation than existed at the time of the adoption of the Assembly's recommendations.

5. The Governor of the City of Jerusalem shall have the right to determine whether the provisions

des instructions que le Conseil de sécurité jugera nécessaire de lui donner.

Les mesures prises par la Commission dans le cadre des recommandations de l'Assemblée générale, prendront immédiatement effet, à moins que le Conseil de sécurité n'ait donné au préalable à la Commission des instructions contraires.

La Commission présentera tous les mois, ou à intervalles plus rapprochés le cas échéant, un rapport au Conseil de sécurité sur la situation.

15. La Commission présentera son rapport final, simultanément à la prochaine session ordinaire de l'Assemblée générale et au Conseil de sécurité.

C. DECLARATION

Avant la reconnaissance de l'indépendance, le gouvernement provisoire de chacun des Etats envisagés adressera à l'Organisation des Nations Unies une déclaration qui devra contenir, entre autres, les clauses suivantes:

DISPOSITION GÉNÉRALE

Les stipulations contenues dans la déclaration sont reconnues comme lois fondamentales de l'Etat. Aucune loi, aucun règlement et aucune mesure officielle ne pourront être en contradiction, en opposition avec ces stipulations ou leur faire obstacle et aucune loi, aucun règlement et aucune mesure officielle ne pourront prévaloir contre elles.

CHAPITRE PREMIER

Lieux saints, édifices et sites religieux

1. Il ne sera porté aucune atteinte aux droits existants concernant les lieux saints, édifices ou sites religieux.

2. En ce qui concerne les lieux saints, la liberté d'accès, de visite et de transit sera garantie, conformément aux droits existants, à tous les résidents ou citoyens de l'autre Etat et de la Ville de Jérusalem, ainsi qu'aux étrangers, sans distinction de nationalité, sous réserve de considérations de sécurité nationale et du maintien de l'ordre public et de la bienséance.

De même, le libre exercice du culte sera garanti conformément aux droits existants, compte tenu du maintien de l'ordre public et de la bienséance.

3. Les lieux saints et les édifices ou sites religieux seront préservés. Toute action de nature à compromettre, de quelque façon que ce soit, leur caractère sacré sera interdite. Si, à quelque moment, le Gouvernement estime qu'il y a des réparations urgentes à faire à un lieu saint, à un édifice ou à un site religieux quelconque, il pourra inviter la ou les communautés intéressées à procéder aux réparations. Il pourra procéder lui-même à ces réparations, aux frais de la ou des communautés intéressées, s'il n'est donné aucune suite à sa demande dans un délai raisonnable.

4. Aucun impôt ne sera perçu sur les lieux saints, édifices ou sites religieux qui étaient exemptés d'impôts lors de la création de l'Etat.

Il ne sera apporté à l'incidence des impôts aucune modification qui constituerait une discrimination entre les propriétaires ou occupants des lieux saints, édifices ou sites religieux, ou qui placerait ces propriétaires ou occupants dans une situation moins favorable, par rapport à l'incidence générale des impôts, qu'au moment de l'adoption des recommandations de l'Assemblée.

5. Le Gouverneur de la Ville de Jérusalem aura le droit de décider si les dispositions de la Constitu-

of the Constitution of the State in relation to Holy Places, religious buildings and sites within the borders of the State and the religious rights appertaining thereto, are being properly applied and respected, and to make decisions on the basis of existing rights in cases of disputes which may arise between the different religious communities or the rites of a religious community with respect to such places, buildings and sites. He shall receive full cooperation and such privileges and immunities as are necessary for the exercise of his functions in the State.

CHAPTER 2

Religious and minority rights

1. Freedom of conscience and the free exercise of all forms of worship, subject only to the maintenance of public order and morals, shall be ensured to all.

2. No discrimination of any kind shall be made between the inhabitants on the ground of race, religion, language or sex.

3. All persons within the jurisdiction of the State shall be entitled to equal protection of the laws.

4. The family law and personal status of the various minorities and their religious interests, including endowments, shall be respected.

5. Except as may be required for the maintenance of public order and good government, no measure shall be taken to obstruct or interfere with the enterprise of religious or charitable bodies of all faiths or to discriminate against any representative or member of these bodies on the ground of his religion or nationality.

6. The State shall ensure adequate primary and secondary education for the Arab and Jewish minority, respectively, in its own language and its cultural traditions.

The right of each community to maintain its own schools for the education of its own members in its own language, while conforming to such educational requirements of a general nature as the State may impose, shall not be denied or impaired. Foreign educational establishments shall continue their activity on the basis of their existing rights.

7. No restriction shall be imposed on the free use by any citizen of the State of any language in private intercourse, in commerce, in religion, in the Press or in publications of any kind, or at public meetings.¹

8. No expropriation of land owned by an Arab in the Jewish State (by a Jew in the Arab State)² shall be allowed except for public purposes. In all cases of expropriation full compensation as fixed by the Supreme Court shall be paid previous to dispossession.

¹ The following stipulation shall be added to the declaration concerning the Jewish State: "In the Jewish State adequate facilities shall be given to Arabic-speaking citizens for the use of their language, either orally or in writing, in the legislature, before the Courts and in the administration."

² In the declaration concerning the Arab State, the words "by an Arab in the Jewish State" should be replaced by the words "by a Jew in the Arab State".

tion de l'Etat concernant les lieux saints, edifices et sites religieux se trouvant sur le territoire de l'Etat, et les droits religieux s'y rapportant, sont bien et dûment appliqués et observés. Il aura également le droit de prendre, en se fondant sur les droits actuels, toutes décisions relatives aux différends qui pourraient surgir entre les diverses communautés religieuses ou les rites d'une communauté religieuse au sujet des lieux, edifices et sites susdits. Il devra recevoir une pleine coopération et jouira des privilèges et immunités nécessaires à l'exercice de ses fonctions dans l'Etat.

CHAPITRE 2

Droits religieux et droits des minorités

1. La liberté de conscience et le libre exercice de toutes les formes de culte compatibles avec l'ordre public et les bonnes mœurs seront garantis à tous.

2. Il ne sera fait aucune discrimination, quelle qu'elle soit, entre les habitants, du fait des différences de race, de religion, de langue ou de sexe.

3. Toutes les personnes relevant de la juridiction de l'Etat auront également droit à la protection de la loi.

4. Le droit familial traditionnel et le statut personnel des diverses minorités, ainsi que leurs intérêts religieux, y compris les fondations, seront respectés.

5. Sous réserve des nécessités du maintien de l'ordre public et de la bonne administration, on ne prendra aucune mesure qui mettrait obstacle à l'activité des institutions religieuses ou charitables de toutes confessions ou constituerait une intervention dans cette activité et on ne pourra faire aucune discrimination à l'égard des représentants ou des membres de ces institutions du fait de leur religion ou de leur nationalité.

6. L'Etat assurera à la minorité, arabe ou juive, l'enseignement primaire et secondaire, dans sa langue, et conformément à ses traditions culturelles.

Il ne sera porté aucune atteinte aux droits des communautés de conserver leurs propres écoles en vue de l'instruction et de l'éducation de leurs membres dans leur propre langue, à condition que ces communautés se conforment aux prescriptions générales sur l'instruction publique que pourra édicter l'Etat. Les établissements éducatifs étrangers poursuivront leur activité sur la base des droits existants.

7. Aucune restriction ne sera apportée à l'emploi, par tout citoyen de l'Etat, de n'importe quelle langue, dans ses relations personnelles, dans le commerce, la religion, la presse, les publications de toutes sortes ou les réunions publiques¹.

8. Aucune expropriation d'un terrain possédé par un Arabe dans l'Etat juif (par un Juif dans l'Etat arabe)² ne sera autorisée, sauf pour cause d'utilité publique. Dans tous les cas d'expropriation, le propriétaire sera entièrement et préalablement indemnisé, au taux fixé par la Cour suprême.

¹ La clause suivante sera ajoutée à la déclaration relative à l'Etat juif: "Dans l'Etat juif, des facilités suffisantes seront données aux citoyens de langue arabe, pour l'emploi de leur langue, soit oralement, soit par écrit, au corps législatif, devant les tribunaux et dans l'administration."

² Dans la déclaration relative à l'Etat arabe, les mots "par un Arabe dans l'Etat juif" seraient remplacés par les mots "par un Juif dans l'Etat arabe".

CHAPTER 3

Citizenship, international conventions and financial obligations

1. *Citizenship.* Palestinian citizens residing in Palestine outside the City of Jerusalem, as well as Arabs and Jews who, not holding Palestinian citizenship, reside in Palestine outside the City of Jerusalem shall, upon the recognition of independence, become citizens of the State in which they are resident and enjoy full civil and political rights. Persons over the age of eighteen years may opt, within one year from the date of recognition of independence of the State in which they reside, for citizenship of the other State, providing that no Arab residing in the area of the proposed Arab State shall have the right to opt for citizenship in the proposed Jewish State and no Jew residing in the proposed Jewish State shall have the right to opt for citizenship in the proposed Arab State. The exercise of this right of option will be taken to include the wives and children under eighteen years of age of persons so opting.

Arabs residing in the area of the proposed Jewish State and Jews residing in the area of the proposed Arab State who have signed a notice of intention to opt for citizenship of the other State shall be eligible to vote in the elections to the Constituent Assembly of that State, but not in the elections to the Constituent Assembly of the State in which they reside.

2. *International conventions.* (a) The State shall be bound by all the international agreements and conventions, both general and special, to which Palestine has become a party. Subject to any right of denunciation provided for therein, such agreements and conventions shall be respected by the State throughout the period for which they were concluded.

(b) Any dispute about the applicability and continued validity of international conventions or treaties signed or adhered to by the mandatory Power on behalf of Palestine shall be referred to the International Court of Justice in accordance with the provisions of the Statute of the Court.

3. *Financial obligations.* (a) The State shall respect and fulfil all financial obligations of whatever nature assumed on behalf of Palestine by the mandatory Power during the exercise of the Mandate and recognized by the State. This provision includes the right of public servants to pensions, compensation or gratuities.

(b) These obligations shall be fulfilled through participation in the Joint Economic Board in respect of those obligations applicable to Palestine as a whole, and individually in respect of those applicable to, and fairly apportionable between, the States.

(c) A Court of Claims, affiliated with the Joint Economic Board, and composed of one member appointed by the United Nations, one representative of the United Kingdom and one representative of the State concerned, should be established. Any dispute between the United Kingdom and the State respecting claims not recognized by the latter should be referred to that Court.

(d) Commercial concessions granted in respect of any part of Palestine prior to the adoption of the resolution by the General Assembly shall continue to be valid according to their terms, unless modified by agreement between the concession-holder and the State.

CHAPITRE 3

Citoyenneté, conventions internationales et obligations financières

1. *Citoyenneté.* Les citoyens palestiniens résidant en Palestine, à l'extérieur de la Ville de Jérusalem, et les Arabes et Juifs qui, sans avoir la nationalité palestinienne, résident en Palestine à l'extérieur de la Ville de Jérusalem, deviendront citoyens de l'Etat dans lequel ils résident et jouiront de tous les droits civils et politiques, à partir du moment où l'indépendance aura été reconnue. Toute personne de plus de dix-huit ans pourra, dans le délai d'un an à dater du jour où l'indépendance de l'Etat sur le territoire duquel elle réside aura été reconnue, opter pour la nationalité de l'autre Etat, étant entendu qu'aucun Arabe résidant sur le territoire de l'Etat arabe envisagé n'aura le droit d'opter pour la nationalité de l'Etat juif envisagé, et qu'aucun Juif résidant dans l'Etat juif envisagé, n'aura le droit d'opter pour la nationalité de l'Etat arabe envisagé. Toute personne qui exercera ce droit d'option sera censée opter en même temps pour sa femme, et ses enfants de moins de dix-huit ans.

Les Arabes résidant sur le territoire de l'Etat juif envisagé et les Juifs résidant sur le territoire de l'Etat arabe envisagé qui ont signé une déclaration affirmant leur intention d'opter pour la nationalité de l'autre Etat pourront participer aux élections à l'Assemblée constituante de cet Etat, mais non aux élections à l'Assemblée constituante de l'Etat où ils ont leur résidence.

2. *Conventions internationales.* a) L'Etat sera lié par tous les accords et conventions internationaux, d'ordre général ou particulier, auxquels la Palestine est devenue partie. Ces accords et conventions seront respectés par l'Etat pendant toute la période pour laquelle ils ont été conclus, sous réserve de tout droit de dénonciation que ces accords peuvent prévoir.

b) Tout différend portant sur l'applicabilité ou la validité continue de conventions ou traités internationaux dont la Puissance mandataire est signataire ou auxquels elle a adhéré pour la Palestine, sera porté devant la Cour internationale de Justice, conformément aux dispositions du Statut de la Cour.

3. *Obligations financières.* a) L'Etat respectera et exécutera toutes les obligations financières, de quelque ordre qu'elles soient, assumées au nom de la Palestine par la Puissance mandataire au cours de l'exercice du mandat et reconnues par l'Etat. Cette disposition comprend le droit des fonctionnaires à des pensions, indemnités ou primes.

b) L'Etat remplira celles de ces obligations qui sont applicables à l'ensemble de la Palestine, en participant au Conseil économique mixte; il remplira individuellement celles qui, applicables aux Etats, peuvent être équitablement réparties entre eux.

c) Il conviendra de créer une Cour des revendications, rattachée au Conseil économique mixte et comprenant un membre nommé par l'Organisation des Nations Unies, un représentant du Royaume-Uni et un représentant de l'Etat intéressé. Tout différend entre le Royaume-Uni et l'Etat concernant les revendications non reconnues par ce dernier, sera soumis à cette Cour.

d) Les concessions commerciales accordées pour une partie quelconque de la Palestine, avant l'adoption de la résolution par l'Assemblée générale, seront maintenues conformément aux termes des contrats, à moins que ces derniers ne soient modifiés par voie d'accord entre le détenteur de la concession et l'Etat.

Miscellaneous provisions

1. The provisions of chapters 1 and 2 of the declaration shall be under the guarantee of the United Nations, and no modifications shall be made in them without the assent of the General Assembly of the United Nations. Any Member of the United Nations shall have the right to bring to the attention of the General Assembly any infraction or danger of infraction of any of these stipulations, and the General Assembly may thereupon make such recommendations as it may deem proper in the circumstances.

2. Any dispute relating to the application or the interpretation of this declaration shall be referred, at the request of either party, to the International Court of Justice, unless the parties agree to another mode of settlement.

D. ECONOMIC UNION AND TRANSIT

1. The Provisional Council of Government of each State shall enter into an undertaking with respect to Economic Union and Transit. This undertaking shall be drafted by the Commission provided for in section B, paragraph 1, utilizing to the greatest possible extent the advice and co-operation of representative organizations and bodies from each of the proposed States. It shall contain provisions to establish the Economic Union of Palestine and provide for other matters of common interest. If by 1 April 1948 the Provisional Councils of Government have not entered into the undertaking, the undertaking shall be put into force by the Commission.

The Economic Union of Palestine

2. The objectives of the Economic Union of Palestine shall be:

- (a) A customs union;
- (b) A joint currency system providing for a single foreign exchange rate;
- (c) Operation in the common interest on a non-discriminatory basis of railways; inter-State highways; postal, telephone and telegraphic services, and ports and airports involved in international trade and commerce;

(d) Joint economic development, especially in respect of irrigation, land reclamation and soil conservation;

(e) Access for both States and for the City of Jerusalem on a non-discriminatory basis to water and power facilities.

3. There shall be established a Joint Economic Board, which shall consist of three representatives of each of the two States and three foreign members appointed by the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations. The foreign members shall be appointed in the first instance for a term of three years; they shall serve as individuals and not as representatives of States.

4. The functions of the Joint Economic Board shall be to implement either directly or by delegation the measures necessary to realize the objectives of the Economic Union. It shall have all powers of organization and administration necessary to fulfil its functions.

5. The States shall bind themselves to put into

Dispositions diverses

1. Les dispositions des chapitres 1 et 2 de la déclaration seront garanties par l'Organisation des Nations Unies et aucune modification ne pourra y être apportée sans l'assentiment de l'Assemblée générale des Nations Unies. Tout Membre de l'Organisation des Nations Unies aura le droit d'attirer l'attention de l'Assemblée générale sur les violations ou les risques de violation de l'une quelconque de ces clauses et l'Assemblée générale pourra présenter telles recommandations qu'elle estimera appropriées aux circonstances.

2. Tout différend portant sur l'application ou l'interprétation de la présente déclaration sera, à la requête de l'une ou l'autre partie, soumis à la Cour internationale de Justice, à moins que les deux parties ne conviennent d'un autre mode de règlement.

D. UNION ECONOMIQUE ET TRANSIT

1. Le Conseil provisoire du gouvernement de chaque Etat signera un engagement relatif à l'Union économique et au transit. La Commission prévue au paragraphe 1 de la section B rédigera le texte de cet engagement en faisant appel dans la plus large mesure possible au concours et aux conseils des institutions et organismes représentatifs de chacun des Etats dont on envisage la création. Cet engagement comprendra des dispositions créant l'Union économique palestinienne, et réglera également d'autres questions d'intérêt commun. Si, le 1er avril 1948, les Conseils provisoires de gouvernement n'ont pas signé l'engagement, c'est la Commission qui promulguera cet engagement.

L'Union économique palestinienne

2. L'Union économique palestinienne aura pour buts:

- a) La création d'une union douanière;
- b) L'établissement d'un système monétaire commun prévoyant un taux de change unique;
- c) L'administration, dans l'intérêt commun et sur une base non discriminatoire, des chemins de fer, des routes communes aux deux Etats, des services postaux, télégraphiques et téléphoniques, et des ports et aéroports qui participent aux échanges et au commerce internationaux;

d) Le développement économique commun, particulièrement en ce qui concerne l'irrigation, la mise en valeur des terres et la conservation des sols;

e) La possibilité, pour les deux Etats et pour la Ville de Jérusalem d'utiliser, sur une base non discriminatoire, les eaux et les sources d'énergie.

3. Il sera créé un Conseil économique mixte, composé de trois représentants pour chacun des deux Etats et de trois membres étrangers désignés par le Conseil économique et social de l'Organisation des Nations Unies. Les membres étrangers seront nommés pour une période initiale de trois ans; ils exerceront leurs fonctions à titre individuel et non pas en tant que représentants d'Etats.

4. Le Conseil économique mixte aura pour fonctions de mettre en œuvre, directement ou par délégation, les mesures nécessaires pour atteindre les objectifs de l'Union économique. Il sera investi de tous les pouvoirs d'organisation et d'administration nécessaires à l'accomplissement de sa tâche.

5. Les Etats s'engageront à appliquer les déci-

effect the decisions of the Joint Economic Board. The Board's decisions shall be taken by a majority vote.

6. In the event of failure of a State to take the necessary action the Board may, by a vote of six members, decide to withhold an appropriate portion of that part of the customs revenue to which the State in question is entitled under the Economic Union. Should the State persist in its failure to cooperate, the Board may decide by a simple majority vote upon such further sanctions, including disposition of funds which it has withheld, as it may deem appropriate.

7. In relation to economic development, the functions of the Board shall be the planning, investigation and encouragement of joint development projects, but it shall not undertake such projects except with the assent of both States and the City of Jerusalem, in the event that Jerusalem is directly involved in the development project.

8. In regard to the joint currency system the currencies circulating in the two States and the City of Jerusalem shall be issued under the authority of the Joint Economic Board, which shall be the sole issuing authority and which shall determine the reserves to be held against such currencies.

9. So far as is consistent with paragraph 2 (b) above, each State may operate its own central bank, control its own fiscal and credit policy, its foreign exchange receipts and expenditures, the grant of import licenses, and may conduct international financial operations on its own faith and credit. During the first two years after the termination of the Mandate, the Joint Economic Board shall have the authority to take such measures as may be necessary to ensure that—to the extent that the total foreign exchange revenues of the two States from the export of goods and services permit, and provided that each State takes appropriate measures to conserve its own foreign exchange resources—each State shall have available, in any twelve months' period, foreign exchange sufficient to assure the supply of quantities of imported goods and services for consumption in its territory equivalent to the quantities of such goods and services consumed in that territory in the twelve months' period ending 31 December 1947.

10. All economic authority not specifically vested in the Joint Economic Board is reserved to each State.

11. There shall be a common customs tariff with complete freedom of trade between the States, and between the States and the City of Jerusalem.

12. The tariff schedules shall be drawn up by a Tariff Commission, consisting of representatives of each of the States in equal numbers, and shall be submitted to the Joint Economic Board for approval by a majority vote. In case of disagreement in the Tariff Commission, the Joint Economic Board shall arbitrate the points of difference. In the event that the Tariff Commission fails to draw up any schedule by a date to be fixed, the Joint Economic Board shall determine the tariff schedule.

13. The following items shall be a first charge on the customs and other common revenue of the Joint Economic Board:

sions du Conseil économique mixte. Les décisions du Conseil seront prises à la majorité.

6. Dans le cas où un Etat négligera de prendre les mesures nécessaires, le Conseil pourra, par un vote affirmatif de six de ses membres, décider de retenir une partie déterminée de la part qui revient à l'Etat en question sur les recettes des douanes en vertu de l'Union économique. Si l'Etat persiste à ne pas collaborer, le Conseil pourra décider, à la majorité simple, de prendre telles sanctions ultérieures qu'il jugera appropriées, y compris notamment l'utilisation des fonds qu'il aura retenus.

7. En ce qui concerne le développement économique, le Conseil aura pour fonctions de préparer, étudier et favoriser des programmes communs aux deux Etats, mais il ne pourra pas exécuter ces programmes sans l'assentiment des deux Etats et de la Ville de Jérusalem dans les cas où la Ville de Jérusalem sera directement intéressée aux programmes de développement.

8. En ce qui concerne le système monétaire commun, les monnaies circulant dans les deux Etats et dans la Ville de Jérusalem seront émises sous le contrôle du Conseil économique mixte qui sera la seule autorité émettrice et qui fixera les réserves à conserver pour la garantie de ces monnaies.

9. Dans la mesure où le permettra le paragraphe 2 b) ci-dessus, chaque Etat pourra posséder sa propre banque centrale, assurer lui-même le contrôle de sa politique fiscale et du crédit, de ses recettes et dépenses en devises étrangères, de l'octroi des licences d'importation, et procéder à des opérations financières internationales sur la base de son crédit personnel. Pendant les deux années qui suivront immédiatement la cessation du Mandat, le Conseil économique mixte aura autorité pour prendre toutes les dispositions qui pourraient être nécessaires pour que — dans la mesure où le permettra la somme totale des revenus en devises étrangères tirés par les deux Etats de l'exportation des biens et services, et pourvu que chaque Etat prenne les dispositions appropriées pour conserver ses propres ressources en devises étrangères — chaque Etat ait à sa disposition, pour n'importe quelle période de douze mois, une somme de devises étrangères suffisante pour garantir au territoire lui-même une quantité de biens et services importés équivalente à la quantité de biens et services requis par le territoire pendant les douze mois finissant au 31 décembre 1947.

10. Chaque Etat jouira de tous les pouvoirs économiques qui ne sont pas expressément confiés au Conseil économique mixte.

11. Il sera établi un tarif douanier commun prévoyant une liberté de commerce complète entre les Etats, ainsi qu'entre les Etats et la Ville de Jérusalem.

12. Les tarifs seront établis par une Commission tarifaire, composée de représentants de chacun des Etats en nombre égal, et seront soumis au Conseil économique mixte pour approbation à la majorité des voix. En cas de désaccord au sein de la Commission tarifaire, le Conseil économique mixte tranchera les questions en litige. Au cas où la Commission tarifaire ne parviendrait pas à établir un tarif dans le délai fixé, le Conseil économique mixte l'établira lui-même.

13. Les recettes des douanes et autres recettes ordinaires du Conseil économique mixte seront affectées en priorité aux catégories suivantes:

(a) The expenses of the customs service and of the operation of the joint services;

(b) The administrative expenses of the Joint Economic Board;

(c) The financial obligations of the Administration of Palestine consisting of:

(i) The service of the outstanding public debt;

(ii) The cost of superannuation benefits, now being paid or falling due in the future, in accordance with the rules and to the extent established by paragraph 3 of chapter 3 above.

14. After these obligations have been met in full, the surplus revenue from the customs and other common services shall be divided in the following manner: not less than 5 per cent and not more than 10 per cent to the City of Jerusalem; the residue shall be allocated to each State by the Joint Economic Board equitably, with the objective of maintaining a sufficient and suitable level of government and social services in each State, except that the share of either State shall not exceed the amount of that State's contribution to the revenues of the Economic Union by more than approximately four million pounds in any year. The amount granted may be adjusted by the Board according to the price level in relation to the prices prevailing at the time of the establishment of the Union. After five years, the principles of the distribution of the joint revenues may be revised by the Joint Economic Board on a basis of equity.

15. All international conventions and treaties affecting customs tariff rates, and those communications services under the jurisdiction of the Joint Economic Board, shall be entered into by both States. In these matters, the two States shall be bound to act in accordance with the majority vote of the Joint Economic Board.

16. The Joint Economic Board shall endeavour to secure for Palestine's exports fair and equal access to world markets.

17. All enterprises operated by the Joint Economic Board shall pay fair wages on a uniform basis.

Freedom of transit and visit

18. The undertaking shall contain provisions preserving freedom of transit and visit for all residents or citizens of both States and of the City of Jerusalem, subject to security considerations; provided that each State and the City shall control residence within its borders.

Termination, modification and interpretation of the undertaking

19. The undertaking and any treaty issuing therefrom shall remain in force for a period of ten years. It shall continue in force until notice of termination, to take effect two years thereafter, is given by either of the parties.

20. During the initial ten-year period, the undertaking and any treaty issuing therefrom may not be modified except by consent of both parties and with the approval of the General Assembly.

21. Any dispute relating to the application or the interpretation of the undertaking and any treaty

a) Les dépenses des services douaniers et l'entretien des autres services communs;

b) Les frais d'administration du Conseil économique mixte;

c) Les charges financières de l'administration de la Palestine, à savoir:

i) Le service de la dette publique;

ii) Les sommes dues au titre des retraites payées actuellement ou payables à l'avenir, conformément au règlement, et dans la mesure prévue par le paragraphe 3 du chapitre 3 ci-dessus.

14. Lorsque ces dépenses auront été entièrement couvertes, l'excédent des recettes provenant du service des douanes et d'autres services communs sera réparti de la façon suivante: une somme qui ne sera ni inférieure à 5 pour 100 ni supérieure à 10 pour 100 sera attribuée à la Ville de Jérusalem; le Conseil économique mixte attribuera le reste de façon équitable aux Etats juif et arabe afin de maintenir les services gouvernementaux et sociaux de chaque Etat à un niveau suffisant et convenable; toutefois, aucun des deux Etats ne pourra, en une année, se faire attribuer une somme dépassant de plus de quatre millions de livres environ le montant de sa contribution aux recettes de l'Union économique. Le Conseil pourra réviser les sommes accordées en comparant le niveau des prix au niveau existant au moment de la création de l'Union. A l'expiration d'un délai de cinq ans, le Conseil économique mixte pourra procéder à une révision des principes de répartition des recettes communes en s'inspirant de considérations d'équité.

15. Tous les accords et traités internationaux relatifs aux tarifs douaniers, ainsi qu'aux services des communications placés sous l'autorité du Conseil économique mixte, seront signés par les deux Etats. Dans ces domaines, les deux Etats seront tenus d'agir conformément à la décision de la majorité du Conseil économique mixte.

16. Le Conseil économique mixte s'efforcera d'obtenir pour les exportations de la Palestine un accès juste et égal aux marchés mondiaux.

17. Toutes les entreprises gérées par le Conseil économique mixte devront payer des salaires équitables sur une base uniforme.

Liberté de transit et de visite

18. L'engagement devra contenir des dispositions garantissant la liberté de transit et de visite à tous les résidents ou citoyens des deux Etats et de la Ville de Jérusalem, sous réserve des nécessités de sécurité; étant entendu que chaque Etat et la Ville assureront le contrôle des personnes résidant à l'intérieur de leurs territoires respectifs.

Dénonciation, modification et interprétation de l'engagement

19. L'engagement ainsi que tout traité s'y rattachant resteront en vigueur pendant une période de dix ans. Passé ce délai, il restera en vigueur jusqu'à ce que l'une des parties les dénonce, ladite dénonciation prenant effet après une période de deux ans.

20. Au cours de la période initiale de dix ans, l'engagement et tout traité s'y rattachant ne pourront être modifiés que du consentement des deux parties et avec l'approbation de l'Assemblée générale.

21. Tout différend au sujet de l'application ou de l'interprétation de l'engagement et de tout traité

issuing therefrom shall be referred, at the request of either party, to the International Court of Justice, unless the parties agree to another mode of settlement.

E. ASSETS

1. The movable assets of the Administration of Palestine shall be allocated to the Arab and Jewish States and the City of Jerusalem on an equitable basis. Allocations should be made by the United Nations Commission referred to in section B, paragraph 1, above. Immovable assets shall become the property of the government of the territory in which they are situated.

2. During the period between the appointment of the United Nations Commission and the termination of the Mandate, the mandatory Power shall, except in respect of ordinary operations, consult with the Commission on any measure which it may contemplate involving the liquidation, disposal or encumbering of the assets of the Palestine Government, such as the accumulated treasury surplus, the proceeds of Government bond issues, State lands or any other asset.

F. ADMISSION TO MEMBERSHIP IN THE UNITED NATIONS

When the independence of either the Arab or the Jewish State as envisaged in this plan has become effective and the declaration and undertaking, as envisaged in this plan, have been signed by either of them, sympathetic consideration should be given to its application for admission to membership in the United Nations in accordance with Article 4 of the Charter of the United Nations.

PART II

Boundaries¹

A. THE ARAB STATE

The area of the Arab State in Western Galilee is bounded on the west by the Mediterranean and on the north by the frontier of the Lebanon from Ras en Naqura to a point north of Saliha. From there the boundary proceeds southwards, leaving the built-up area of Saliha in the Arab State, to join the southernmost point of this village. Thence it follows the western boundary line of the villages of 'Alma, Rihaniya and Teitaba, thence following the northern boundary line of Meirun village to join the Acre-Safad sub-district boundary line. It follows this line to a point west of Es Sammu'i village and joins it again at the northernmost point of Farradiya. Thence it follows the sub-district boundary line to the Acre-Safad main road. From here it follows the western boundary of Kafr P'nan village until it reaches the Tiberias-Acre sub-district boundary line, passing to the west of the junction of the Acre-Safad and Lubiya-Kafr P'nan roads. From the

¹ The boundary lines described in part II are indicated in Annex A. The base map used in marking and describing this boundary is "Palestine 1:250,000" published by the Survey of Palestine, 1946.

s'y rattachant sera renvoyé, à la demande de l'une ou de l'autre partie, devant la Cour internationale de Justice, à moins que les deux parties ne conviennent d'un autre mode de règlement.

E. BIENS MOBILIERS ET IMMOBILIERS

1. Les biens mobiliers de l'administration de la Palestine seront attribués aux Etats arabe et juif et à la Ville de Jérusalem sur une base équitable de répartition. La répartition devra être effectuée par la Commission des Nations Unies mentionnée à la section B, paragraphe 1, ci-dessus. Les biens immobiliers deviendront la propriété du gouvernement du territoire sur lequel ils sont situés.

2. Au cours de la période qui s'écoulera entre la date de nomination de la Commission des Nations Unies et l'expiration du mandat, la Puissance mandataire devra, pour toutes les opérations importantes, se mettre d'accord avec la Commission sur toutes les mesures qu'elle désirerait envisager, notamment en ce qui concerne la liquidation, la disposition ou l'hypothèque des avoirs du Gouvernement de la Palestine, tels que les excédents du Trésor, les produits des émissions d'obligations du Gouvernement, les terres domaniales ainsi que tous autres avoirs.

F. ADMISSION COMME MEMBRE DE L'ORGANISATION DES NATIONS UNIES

Lorsque l'indépendance de l'Etat arabe ou de l'Etat juif, telle qu'elle est prévue dans le présent plan, sera devenue effective et que la déclaration et l'engagement prévus dans le présent plan auront été signés par l'un ou l'autre de ces Etats, il conviendra d'examiner avec bienveillance sa demande d'admission comme Membre des Nations Unies conformément à l'Article 4 de la Charte des Nations Unies.

DEUXIÈME PARTIE

Frontières¹

A. L'ETAT ARABE

La région de l'Etat arabe comprise dans la Galilée occidentale est limitée à l'ouest par la Méditerranée, et au nord par la frontière du Liban, de Ras en Naqura jusqu'à un point au nord de Saliha. De là, la frontière se dirige vers le sud, englobant dans l'Etat arabe l'agglomération de Saliha, et rejoint le point le plus méridional de ce village. Elle suit ensuite la ligne formée par la limite ouest des villages d'Alma, Rihaniya et Teitaba; elle emprunte ensuite la limite nord du village de Meirun et rejoint la limite des sous-districts d'Acre et de Safad. Elle suit cette ligne jusqu'à un point à l'ouest du village d'Es Sammu'i et la rejoint au point le plus septentrional de Farradiya. Elle suit ensuite la ligne marquant la limite des sous-districts jusqu'à la route d'Acre à Safad. De là, elle suit la limite occidentale du village de Kafr P'nan jusqu'à ce qu'elle rencontre la limite des sous-districts de Tibériade et d'Acre; elle passe alors à l'ouest de l'intersection des

¹ On trouvera à l'Annexe A le tracé des frontières décrites dans la deuxième partie. On a employé la carte de Palestine au 250.000^{ème} publiée en 1946 par le Survey of Palestine pour le tracé et la description de cette frontière.

La carte à laquelle le texte se réfère étant l'œuvre des services géographiques britanniques, nous respectons l'orthographe anglaise des noms de lieu qui ne sont pas universellement connus.

south-west corner of Kafr P'nan village the boundary line follows the western boundary of the Tiberias sub-district to a point close to the boundary line between the villages of Maghar and Eilabun, thence bulging out to the west to include as much of the eastern part of the plain of Battuf as is necessary for the reservoir proposed by the Jewish Agency for the irrigation of lands to the south and east.

The boundary rejoins the Tiberias sub-district boundary at a point on the Nazareth-Tiberias road south-east of the built-up area of Tur'an; thence it runs southwards, at first following the sub-district boundary and then passing between the Kadoorie Agricultural School and Mount Tabor, to a point due south at the base of Mount Tabor. From here it runs due west, parallel to the horizontal grid line 230, to the north-east corner of the village lands of Tel Adashim. It then runs to the north-west corner of these lands, whence it turns south and west so as to include in the Arab State the sources of the Nazareth water supply in Yafa village. On reaching Ginneiger it follows the eastern, northern and western boundaries of the lands of this village to their south-west corner, whence it proceeds in a straight line to a point on the Haifa-Afula railway on the boundary between the villages of Sarid and El Mujeidil. This is the point of intersection.

The south-western boundary of the area of the Arab State in Galilee takes a line from this point, passing northwards along the eastern boundaries of Sarid and Gevat to the north-eastern corner of Nahalal, proceeding thence across the land of Kefar ha Horesh to a central point on the southern boundary of the village of 'Ilut, thence westwards along that village boundary to the eastern boundary of Beit Lahm, thence northwards and north-eastwards along its western boundary to the north-eastern corner of Waldheim and thence north-westwards across the village lands of Shafa 'Amr to the south-eastern corner of Ramat Yohanan. From here it runs due north-north-east to a point on the Shafa 'Amr-Haifa road, west of its junction with the road to I'Billin. From there it proceeds north-east to a point on the southern boundary of I'Billin situated to the west of the I'Billin-Birwa road. Thence along that boundary to its westernmost point, whence it turns to the north, follows across the village land of Tamra to the north-westernmost corner and along the western boundary of Julis until it reaches the Acre-Safad road. It then runs westwards along the southern side of the Safad-Acre road to the Galilee-Haifa District boundary, from which point it follows that boundary to the sea.

The boundary of the hill country of Samaria and Judea starts on the Jordan River at the Wadi Malih south-east of Beisan and runs due west to meet the Beisan-Jericho road and then follows the western side of that road in a north-westerly direction to the junction of the boundaries of the sub-districts of Beisan, Nablus, and Jenin. From that point it follows the Nablus-Jenin sub-district boundary westwards for a distance of about three kilometres and then turns north-westwards, passing to the east of the built-up areas of the villages of Jalbun and Faqqu'a, to the boundary of the sub-districts of Jenin and Beisan at a point north-east of Nuris.

routes d'Acre à Safad et de Lubiya à Kafr P'nan. A partir de l'angle sud-ouest du village de Kafr P'nan, la frontière suit la limite ouest du sous-district de Tibériade jusqu'à un point voisin de la ligne formée par les limites des territoires des villages de Maghar et d'Eilabun; ensuite, elle fait saillie vers l'ouest et englobe, dans la partie orientale de la plaine de Battuf, le territoire nécessaire au réservoir envisagé par l'Agence juive pour l'irrigation des terres du sud et de l'est.

La frontière rejoint la limite du sous-district de Tibériade en un point de la route de Nazareth à Tibériade situé au sud-est de la région bâtie de Tur'an; de là, elle se dirige vers le sud, suivant d'abord la limite du sous-district, puis passant entre l'Ecole d'agriculture Kadoorie et le Mont Thabor jusqu'à un point exactement au sud du pied du Mont Thabor. De là, elle se dirige franchement à l'ouest, parallèlement à la ligne horizontale 230 du quadrillage, jusqu'à l'angle nord-est du territoire du village de Tel Adashim. Elle se dirige ensuite jusqu'à l'angle nord-ouest de ce territoire, puis tourne au sud et à l'ouest pour englober dans l'Etat arabe les sources du village de Yafa qui alimentent Nazareth. En atteignant Ginneiger, elle suit les limites est, nord et ouest du territoire de ce village jusqu'à leur angle sud-ouest; elle se dirige ensuite, en ligne droite, jusqu'à un point de la voie ferrée Haïfa-Afula situé à la limite des territoires des villages de Sarid et d'El Mujeidil. C'est là le point d'intersection.

La frontière sud-ouest de la partie de l'Etat arabe comprise dans la Galilée emprunte une ligne qui, partant de ce point, se dirige vers le nord en suivant les limites est de Sarid et de Gevat jusqu'à l'angle nord-est de Nahalal. De là, elle traverse le territoire de Kefar ha Horesh jusqu'à un point central situé à la limite sud du village d'Ilut, puis se dirige vers l'ouest en suivant la limite de ce village jusqu'à la limite est de Beit Lahm. Elle s'infléchit ensuite vers le nord et le nord-est, en suivant la limite ouest de Beit Lahm jusqu'à l'angle nord-est de Waldheim, d'où elle se dirige vers le nord-ouest en coupant le territoire du village de Shafa'Amr jusqu'à l'angle sud-ouest de Ramat Yohanan. De ce point, elle oblique franchement en direction nord-nord-est jusqu'à un point situé sur la route de Shafa'Amr à Haïfa, à l'ouest de l'intersection de cette route avec la route de I'Billin. De là, elle se dirige vers le nord-est, jusqu'à un point situé à la limite sud de I'Billin, à l'ouest de la route de I'Billin à Birwa. La frontière suit alors cette limite jusqu'à son point le plus occidental et, tournant vers le nord, coupe le territoire du village de Tamra, jusqu'à l'angle le plus au nord-ouest de ce territoire et suit la limite ouest de Julis jusqu'à sa rencontre avec la route d'Acre à Safad. Elle se prolonge ensuite vers l'ouest en suivant le bord sud de la route de Safad à Acre jusqu'à la limite des districts de Galilée et de Haïfa qu'elle emprunte ensuite jusqu'à la mer.

La frontière de la région accidentée de Samarie et de Judée part du Jourdain, au confluent de l'oued Malih, au sud-est de Beissan et prend franchement la direction ouest jusqu'à atteindre la route de Beissan à Jéricho, puis emprunte le bord ouest de cette route en direction du nord-ouest jusqu'au point d'intersection des limites des sous-districts de Beissan, de Naplouse et de Jenin. Partant de ce point, elle suit la limite des sous-districts de Naplouse et de Jenin en direction de l'ouest, sur une distance de trois kilomètres environ, puis tourne en direction nord-ouest, en contournant à l'est l'agglomération des villages de Jalbun et de Faqqu'a,

Thence it proceeds first north-westwards to a point due north of the built-up area of Zir'in and then westwards to the Afula-Jenin railway, thence north-westwards along the district boundary line to the point of intersection on the Hejaz railway. From here the boundary runs south-westwards, including the built-up area and some of the land of the village of Kh.Lid in the Arab State to cross the Haifa-Jenin road at a point on the district boundary between Haifa and Samaria west of El Mansi. It follows this boundary to the southernmost point of the village of El Buteimat. From here it follows the northern and eastern boundaries of the village of Ar'ara, rejoining the Haifa-Samaria district boundary at Wadi'Ara, and thence proceeding south-south-westwards in an approximately straight line joining up with the western boundary of Qaqun to a point east of the railway line on the eastern boundary of Qaqun village. From here it runs along the railway line some distance to the east of it to a point just east of the Tulkarm railway station. Thence the boundary follows a line half-way between the railway and the Tulkarm-Qalqiliya-Jaljuliya and Ras el Ein road to a point just east of Ras el Ein station, whence it proceeds along the railway some distance to the east of it to the point on the railway line south of the junction of the Haifa-Lydd and Beit Nabala lines, whence it proceeds along the southern border of Lydda airport to its south-west corner, thence in a south-westerly direction to a point just west of the built-up area of Sarafand el 'Amar, whence it turns south, passing just to the west of the built-up area of Abu el Fadil to the north-east corner of the lands of Beer Ya'Aqov. (The boundary line should be so demarcated as to allow direct access from the Arab State to the airport.) Thence the boundary line follows the western and southern boundaries of Ramle village, to the north-east corner of El Na'ana village, thence in a straight line to the southernmost point of El Barriya, along the eastern boundary of that village and the southern boundary of 'Innaba village. Thence it turns north to follow the southern side of the Jaffa-Jerusalem road until El Qubab, whence it follows the road to the boundary of Abu Shusha. It runs along the eastern boundaries of Abu Shusha, Scidun, Hulda to the southernmost point of Hulda, thence westwards in a straight line to the north-eastern corner of Umm Kalkha, thence following the northern boundaries of Umm Kalkha, Qazaza and the northern and western boundaries of Mukhezin to the Gaza District boundary and thence runs across the village lands of El Mismiya, El Kabira, and Yasur to the southern point of intersection, which is midway between the built-up areas of Yasur and Batani Sharqi.

From the southern point of intersection the boundary lines run north-westwards between the villages of Gan Yavne and Barqa to the sea at a point half way between Nabi Yunis and Minat el Qila, and south-eastwards to a point west of Qastina, whence it turns in a south-westerly direction, passing to the east of the built-up areas of Es Sawafir, Esh Sharqiya and Ibdis. From the south-east corner of Ibdis village it runs to a point south-west of the built-up area of Beit 'Affa, crossing the Hebron-El Majdal road just to the west of the built-up area of Iraq Suweidan. Thence it proceeds southwards along the western village boundary of El Faluja to

jusqu'à la limite des sous-districts de Jenin et de Beissan, en un point situé au nord-est de Nuris. De là, elle se dirige tout d'abord en direction nord-ouest jusqu'à un point situé franchement au nord de l'agglomération de Zir'in, puis va dans la direction de l'ouest jusqu'à la voie ferrée Afula-Jenin et, de là, s'élançe vers le nord-ouest en suivant la limite du district jusqu'à sa rencontre avec la voie ferrée du Hedjaz. A partir de là, la frontière se dirige en direction du sud-ouest, englobant dans l'Etat arabe l'agglomération et une partie du territoire du village de Kh.Lid et traverse la route de Haifa à Jenin en un point de la limite du district situé entre Haifa et Samarie, à l'ouest d'El Mansi. Elle suit cette limite jusqu'à l'extrême sud du village d'El Buteimat. De là, elle suit les limites nord et est du village d'Ar'ara, rejoint la limite des districts de Haifa et de Samarie à l'oued 'Ara et se dirige ensuite en direction sud-sud-ouest, et, presque en ligne droite, rejoint la limite ouest de Qaqun en un point situé à l'est de la voie ferrée, à la limite est du village de Qaqun. De là, elle suit le bord est de la voie ferrée sur une certaine distance jusqu'à un point situé exactement à l'est de la gare de Tulkarm. Ensuite la frontière emprunte une ligne à mi-distance du chemin de fer et de la route Tulkarm-Qalqiliya-Jaljuliya-Ras el Ein, jusqu'à un point situé juste à l'est de la gare de Ras el Ein; de là, elle suit le bord est de la voie ferrée sur une certaine distance jusqu'au point de la voie située au sud de l'intersection des lignes Haifa-Lidda et Beit-Nabala; puis elle suit la bordure sud de l'aéroport de Lidda jusqu'à son angle sud-ouest; de là, elle va en direction du sud-ouest jusqu'à un point situé exactement à l'ouest de l'agglomération de Sarafand el 'Amar. Elle tourne ensuite vers le sud, en passant exactement à l'ouest de la zone bâtie d'Abu el Fadil et va jusqu'à l'angle nord-est du territoire de Beer Ya'Aqov (la frontière devra être établie de manière à permettre d'accéder directement à l'aéroport en venant de l'Etat arabe). Ensuite, la frontière longe les limites ouest et sud du village de Ramle jusqu'à l'angle nord-est du village de El Na'ana. Puis elle s'enfonce en ligne droite jusqu'au point le plus méridional d'El Barriya, en suivant la limite est de ce village et la limite sud du village de 'Innaba. Elle s'incline ensuite vers le nord pour suivre le côté sud de la route de Jaffa à Jérusalem jusqu'à El Qubab d'où elle suit la route se dirigeant vers les limites du territoire d'Abu Shusha. Elle emprunte les limites orientales d'Abu Shusha, de Scidun et de Hulda, jusqu'à l'extrémité sud de Hulda, d'où elle se dirige vers l'ouest selon une ligne droite jusqu'à l'angle nord-est d'Umm Kalkha pour suivre ensuite les limites septentrionales d'Umm Kalkha, de Qazaza et les limites septentrionales et occidentales du Mukhezin jusqu'à la limite du district de Gaza; elle traverse ensuite le territoire des villages d'El Mismiya, d'El Kabira et de Yasur, jusqu'au point d'intersection méridional qui se trouve à mi-chemin entre les agglomérations de Yasur et Batani Sharqi.

Du point d'intersection méridional, la frontière se dirige d'une part vers le nord-ouest entre les villages de Gan Yavne et de Barqa, pour atteindre la mer à un point situé à mi-chemin entre Nabi Yunis et Minat el Qila, et d'autre part vers le sud-est jusqu'à un point situé à l'ouest de Qastina, s'inclinant ensuite vers le sud-ouest pour passer à l'est des agglomérations d'Es Sawafir d'Esh Sharqiya et d'Ibdis. De l'angle sud-est du village d'Ibdis, elle se dirige vers un point situé au sud-ouest de l'agglomération de Beit 'Affa, traversant la route qui va d'Hébron à El Majdal juste à l'ouest de l'agglomération d'Iraq Suweidan. Elle suit ensuite vers le sud

the Beersheba sub-district boundary. It then runs across the tribal lands of 'Arab el Jubarat to a point on the boundary between the sub-districts of Beersheba and Hebron north of Kh. Khuweilifa, whence it proceeds in a south-westerly direction to a point on the Beersheba-Gaza main road two kilometres to the north-west of the town. It then turns south-eastwards to reach Wadi Sab' at a point situated one kilometre to the west of it. From here it turns north-eastwards and proceeds along Wadi Sab' and along the Beersheba-Hebron road for a distance of one kilometre, whence it turns eastwards and runs in a straight line to Kh. Kuseifa to join the Beersheba-Hebron sub-district boundary. It then follows the Beersheba-Hebron boundary eastwards to a point north of Ras Ez Zuweira, only departing from it so as to cut across the base of the indentation between vertical grid lines 150 and 160.

About five kilometres north-east of Ras ez Zuweira it turns north, excluding from the Arab State a strip along the coast of the Dead Sea not more than seven kilometres in depth, as far as Ein Geddi, whence it turns due east to join the Transjordan frontier in the Dead Sea.

The northern boundary of the Arab section of the coastal plain runs from a point between Minat el Qila and Nabi Yunis, passing between the built-up areas of Gan Yavne and Barqa to the point of intersection. From here it turns south-westwards, running across the lands of Batani Sharqi, along the eastern boundary of the lands of Beit Daras and across the lands of Julis, leaving the built-up areas of Batani Sharqi and Julis to the westwards, as far as the north-west corner of the lands of Beit Tima. Thence it runs east of El Jiya across the village lands of El Barbara along the eastern boundaries of the villages of Beit Jirja, Deir Suneid and Dimra. From the south-east corner of Dimra the boundary passes across the lands of Beit Hanun, leaving the Jewish lands of Nir-Am to the eastwards. From the south-east corner of Beit Hanun the line runs south-west to a point south of the parallel grid line 100, then turns north-west for two kilometres, turning again in a south-westerly direction and continuing in an almost straight line to the north-west corner of the village lands of Kirbet Ikhza'a. From there it follows the boundary line of this village to its southernmost point. It then runs in a southerly direction along the vertical grid line 90 to its junction with the horizontal grid line 70. It then turns south-eastwards to Kh. el Ruheiba and then proceeds in a southerly direction to a point known as El Baha, beyond which it crosses the Beersheba-El 'Auja main road to the west of Kh. el Mushrifa. From there it joins Wadi El Zaiyatin just to the west of El Subeita. From there it turns to the north-east and then to the south-east following this wadi and passes to the east of 'Abda to join Wadi Nafkh. It then bulges to the south-west along Wadi Nafkh, Wadi Ajrim and Wadi Lissan to the point where Wadi Lissan crosses the Egyptian frontier.

The area of the Arab enclave of Jaffa consists of that part of the town-planning area of Jaffa which lies to the west of the Jewish quarters lying south of Tel-Aviv, to the west of the continuation of Herzl street up to its junction with the Jaffa-Jerusalem road, to the south-west of the section of the Jaffa

la limite ouest du territoire du village d'El Faluja jusqu'à la limite du sous-district de Bersabée. De là elle traverse les terrains de pâture de 'Arab el Jubarat jusqu'à un point situé à la limite des sous-districts de Bersabée et d'Hébron, au nord de Kh. Khuweilifa. Elle se dirige ensuite vers le sud-ouest jusqu'à un point de la grande route de Bersabée à Gaza, situé à deux kilomètres au nord-ouest de la ville. Elle s'incline alors vers le sud-est pour atteindre l'oued Sab' en un point situé à un kilomètre à l'ouest de la ville. De là, elle s'incline vers le nord-est et suit l'oued Sab', puis la route de Bersabée à Hébron sur une distance d'un kilomètre; elle tourne ensuite vers l'est et se dirige en suivant un tracé rectiligne jusqu'à Kh. Kuseifa, où elle rejoint la limite des sous-districts de Bersabée et d'Hébron, qu'elle suit en direction de l'est jusqu'à un point au nord de Ras Ez Zuweira, ne la quittant que pour traverser la base du saillant situé entre les lignes verticales 150 et 160 du quadrillage.

A cinq kilomètres environ au nord-est de Ras Ez Zuweira, elle s'incline vers le nord pour séparer de l'Etat arabe une bande de territoire située le long de la côte de la mer Morte, dont la profondeur ne dépasse pas sept kilomètres; elle arrive ainsi à Ein Geddi, d'où elle s'incline directement vers l'est pour rejoindre la frontière de la Transjordanie à la mer Morte.

La limite nord de la partie arabe de la plaine côtière, partant d'un point situé entre Minat el Qila et Nabi Yunis, passe entre les agglomérations de Gan Yavne et Barqa pour atteindre le point d'intersection. De là, elle s'incline vers le sud-ouest pour traverser le territoire de Batani Sharqi, emprunte la limite orientale du territoire de Beit Daras, traverse le territoire de Julis, laissant à l'ouest les agglomérations de Batani Sharqi et Julis jusqu'à l'angle nord-ouest du territoire de Beit Tima. De là, elle passe par l'est d'El Jiya et traverse le territoire du village d'El Barbara en suivant les limites orientales des villages de Beit Jirja, de Deir Suneid et de Dimra. De l'angle sud-est de Dimra, la frontière traverse le territoire de Beit Hanun, laissant à l'est les propriétés juives de Nir-Am. De l'angle sud-est de Beit Hanun, la ligne se dirige vers le sud-ouest et atteint un point se trouvant au sud de la ligne horizontale 100 du quadrillage, prend ensuite la direction nord-ouest pendant deux kilomètres, reprend la direction sud-ouest et atteint l'angle nord-ouest du territoire de Kirbet Ikhza'a en suivant une ligne presque rectiligne. De là, elle suit la limite de ce territoire jusqu'à son point le plus méridional. Elle longe ensuite, vers le sud, la ligne verticale 90 du quadrillage jusqu'à l'intersection de cette dernière avec la ligne horizontale 70. Elle s'incline alors vers le sud-est jusqu'à Kh. el Ruheiba et prend ensuite la direction sud jusqu'au lieu dit El Baha, au-delà duquel elle coupe la grande route de Bersabée à El'Auja, à l'ouest de Kh. el Mushrifa. De là, elle atteint l'oued El Zaiyatin immédiatement à l'ouest d'El Subeita. Elle s'incline alors vers le nord-est puis vers le sud-est, en suivant l'oued El Zaiyatin, et passe à l'est de 'Abda pour atteindre l'oued Nafkh. Elle s'incurve alors vers le sud-ouest en suivant l'oued Nafkh, l'oued Ajrim et l'oued Lissan et atteint le point où l'oued Lissan coupe la frontière égyptienne.

La région de l'enclave arabe de Jaffa comprend la partie de la zone urbaine de Jaffa se trouvant à l'ouest des quartiers juifs situés au sud de Tel Aviv, à l'ouest du prolongement de la Rue Herzl jusqu'à son croisement avec la route de Jaffa à Jérusalem, au sud-ouest de la section de la route de Jaffa à

Jerusalem road lying south-east of that junction, to the west of Miqve Yisrael lands, to the north-west of Holon local council area, to the north of the line linking up the north-west corner of Holon with the north-east corner of Bat Yam local council area and to the north of Bat Yam local council area. The question of Karton quarter will be decided by the Boundary Commission, bearing in mind among other considerations the desirability of including the smallest possible number of its Arab inhabitants and the largest possible number of its Jewish inhabitants in the Jewish State.

B. THE JEWISH STATE

The north-eastern sector of the Jewish State (Eastern Galilee) is bounded on the north and west by the Lebanese frontier and on the east by the frontiers of Syria and Transjordan. It includes the whole of the Hula Basin, Lake Tiberias, the whole of the Beisan sub-district, the boundary line being extended to the crest of the Gilboa mountains and the Wadi Malih. From there the Jewish State extends north-west, following the boundary described in respect of the Arab State.

The Jewish section of the coastal plain extends from a point between Minat et Qila and Nabi Yunis in the Gaza sub-district and includes the towns of Haifa and Tel-Aviv, leaving Jaffa as an enclave of the Arab State. The eastern frontier of the Jewish State follows the boundary described in respect of the Arab State.

The Beersheba area comprises the whole of the Beersheba sub-district, including the Negeb and the eastern part of the Gaza sub-district, but excluding the town of Beersheba and those areas described in respect of the Arab State. It includes also a strip of land along the Dead Sea stretching from the Beersheba-Hebron sub-district boundary line to Ein Geddi, as described in respect of the Arab State.

C. THE CITY OF JERUSALEM

The boundaries of the City of Jerusalem are as defined in the recommendations on the City of Jerusalem. (See Part III, Section B, below).

PART III

City of Jerusalem

A. SPECIAL REGIME

The City of Jerusalem shall be established as a *corpus separatum* under a special international regime and shall be administered by the United Nations. The Trusteeship Council shall be designated to discharge the responsibilities of the Administering Authority on behalf of the United Nations.

B. BOUNDARIES OF THE CITY

The City of Jerusalem shall include the present municipality of Jerusalem plus the surrounding villages and towns, the most eastern of which shall be Abu Dis; the most southern, Bethlehem; the most western, Ein Karim (including also the built-up area of Motsa); and the most northern Shu'fat, as indicated on the attached sketch-map (annex B).

C. STATUTE OF THE CITY

The Trusteeship Council shall, within five months of the approval of the present plan, elaborate and

Jérusalem se trouvant au sud-est de ce croisement, à l'ouest des terres de Miqve Yisrael, au nord-ouest de la municipalité de Holon, au nord de la ligne reliant l'angle nord-ouest de Holon à l'angle nord-est de la municipalité de Bat Yam et au nord de la zone de la municipalité de Bat Yam. La Commission des frontières réglera la question du quartier de Karton en tenant compte notamment du fait qu'il est souhaitable que l'Etat juif comprenne le plus petit nombre possible des habitants arabes de ce quartier et le plus grand nombre possible de ses habitants juifs.

B. L'ETAT JUIF

La partie nord-est de l'Etat juif (Galilée orientale) est bornée au nord et à l'ouest par la frontière du Liban, et à l'est par la frontière de la Syrie et de la Transjordanie. Ce territoire comprend tout le bassin de Hula, le lac de Tibériade, tout le sous-district de Beïssan, la frontière se prolongeant jusqu'à la crête des monts Gilboa et à l'oued Malih. A partir de là, l'Etat juif s'étend vers le nord-ouest, borné par la frontière qui a été indiquée pour l'Etat arabe.

La partie juive de la plaine côtière s'étend à partir d'un point situé entre Minat el Qila et Nabi Yunis, dans le sous-district de Gaza; elle comprend les villes de Haïfa et Tel Aviv, Jaffa constituant une enclave de l'Etat arabe. La frontière orientale de l'Etat juif coïncide avec celle qui a été indiquée à propos de l'Etat arabe.

La région de Bersabée comprend tout le sous-district de Bersabée, y compris le Negeb et en outre la partie orientale du sous-district de Gaza, mais à l'exclusion de la ville de Bersabée et des zones indiquées à propos de l'Etat arabe. Elle comprend aussi une bande de territoire qui s'étend le long de la mer Morte, de la frontière du sous-district d'Hébron-Bersabée à Ein Geddi, comme il a été indiqué à propos de l'Etat arabe.

C. LA VILLE DE JERUSALEM

La Ville de Jérusalem a pour frontières celles qui ont été indiquées dans les recommandations sur la Ville de Jérusalem (voir Troisième partie, section B, ci-dessous).

TROISIEME PARTIE

Ville de Jérusalem

A. REGIME SPECIAL

La Ville de Jérusalem sera constituée en *corpus separatum* sous un régime international spécial et sera administrée par les Nations Unies. Le Conseil de tutelle sera désigné pour assurer, au nom de l'Organisation des Nations Unies, les fonctions d'Autorité chargée de l'administration.

B. FRONTIERES DE LA VILLE

La Ville de Jérusalem comprendra la municipalité actuelle de Jérusalem plus les villages et centres environnants, dont le plus oriental sera Abu Dis, le plus méridional Bethléem, le plus occidental Ein Karim (y compris l'agglomération de Motsa) et la plus septentrionale Shu'fat, comme le montre la carte schématique ci-jointe (annexe B).

C. STATUT DE LA VILLE

Le Conseil de tutelle devra, dans les cinq mois à dater de l'approbation du présent plan, élaborer et

approve a detailed Statute of the City which shall contain *inter alia* the substance of the following provisions:

1. *Government machinery; special objectives.* The Administering Authority in discharging its administrative obligations shall pursue the following special objectives:

(a) To protect and to preserve the unique spiritual and religious interests located in the city of the three great monotheistic faiths throughout the world, Christian, Jewish and Moslem; to this end to ensure that order and peace, and especially religious peace, reign in Jerusalem;

(b) To foster co-operation among all the inhabitants of the city in their own interests as well as in order to encourage and support the peaceful development of the mutual relations between the two Palestinian peoples throughout the Holy Land; to promote the security, well-being and any constructive measures of development of the residents, having regard to the special circumstances and customs of the various peoples and communities.

2. *Governor and administrative staff.* A Governor of the City of Jerusalem shall be appointed by the Trusteeship Council and shall be responsible to it. He shall be selected on the basis of special qualifications and without regard to nationality. He shall not, however, be a citizen of either State in Palestine.

The Governor shall represent the United Nations in the City and shall exercise on their behalf all powers of administration, including the conduct of external affairs. He shall be assisted by an administrative staff classed as international officers in the meaning of Article 100 of the Charter and chosen whenever practicable from the residents of the city and of the rest of Palestine on a non-discriminatory basis. A detailed plan for the organization of the administration of the city shall be submitted by the Governor to the Trusteeship Council and duly approved by it.

3. *Local autonomy.* (a) The existing local autonomous units in the territory of the city (villages, townships and municipalities) shall enjoy wide powers of local government and administration.

(b) The Governor shall study and submit for the consideration and decision of the Trusteeship Council a plan for the establishment of special town units consisting, respectively, of the Jewish and Arab sections of new Jerusalem. The new town units shall continue to form part of the present municipality of Jerusalem.

4. *Security measures.* (a) The City of Jerusalem shall be demilitarized; its neutrality shall be declared and preserved, and no para-military formations, exercises or activities shall be permitted within its borders.

(b) Should the administration of the City of Jerusalem be seriously obstructed or prevented by the non-co-operation or interference of one or more sections of the population, the Governor shall have authority to take such measures as may be necessary to restore the effective functioning of the administration.

(c) To assist in the maintenance of internal law and order and especially for the protection of the

approuver un Statut détaillé de la Ville comprenant, notamment, l'essentiel des dispositions suivantes:

1. *Mécanisme gouvernemental: ses fins particulières.* L'Autorité chargée de l'administration, dans l'accomplissement de ses obligations administratives, poursuivra les fins particulières ci-après:

a) Protéger et préserver les intérêts spirituels et religieux sans pareils qu'abrite la Ville des trois grandes croyances monothéistes répandues dans le monde entier: Christianisme, Judaïsme et Islamisme; à cette fin, faire en sorte que l'ordre et la paix, et la paix religieuse surtout, règnent à Jérusalem;

b) Stimuler l'esprit de coopération entre tous les habitants de la ville, aussi bien dans leur propre intérêt que pour contribuer de tout leur pouvoir, dans toute la Terre sainte, à l'évolution pacifique des relations entre les deux peuples palestiniens; assurer la sécurité et le bien-être et encourager toute mesure constructive propre à améliorer la vie des habitants, eu égard à la situation et aux coutumes particulières des différents peuples et communautés.

2. *Gouverneur et personnel administratif.* Le Conseil de tutelle procédera à la nomination d'un Gouverneur de Jérusalem, qui sera responsable devant lui. Ce choix se fondera sur la compétence particulière des candidats, sans tenir compte de leur nationalité. Toutefois, nul citoyen de l'un ou de l'autre Etat palestinien ne pourra être nommé Gouverneur.

Le Gouverneur sera le représentant de l'Organisation des Nations Unies dans la Ville de Jérusalem, et exercera en son nom tous les pouvoirs d'ordre administratif, y compris la conduite des affaires étrangères. Il sera assisté par un personnel administratif dont les membres seront considérés comme des fonctionnaires internationaux au sens de l'Article 100 de la Charte et seront choisis, dans la mesure du possible, parmi les habitants de la ville et du reste de la Palestine sans distinction de race. Pour l'organisation de l'administration de la Ville, le Gouverneur soumettra un plan détaillé au Conseil de tutelle, par qui il sera dûment approuvé.

3. *Autonomie locale.* a) Les subdivisions locales autonomes qui composent actuellement le territoire de la Ville (villages, communes et municipalités) disposeront à l'échelon local de pouvoirs étendus de gouvernement et d'administration.

b) Le Gouverneur étudiera et soumettra à l'examen et à la décision du Conseil de tutelle un plan de création de secteurs municipaux spéciaux comprenant respectivement le quartier juif et le quartier arabe de la Nouvelle Jérusalem. Les nouveaux arrondissements continueront à faire partie de la municipalité actuelle de Jérusalem.

4. *Mesures de sécurité.* a) La Ville de Jérusalem sera démilitarisée; sa neutralité sera proclamée et protégée et aucune formation paramilitaire, aucun exercice ni aucune activité paramilitaires ne seront autorisés dans ses limites.

b) Au cas où un ou plusieurs groupes de la population réussiraient par leur ingérence ou leur manque de coopération à entraver ou paralyser gravement l'administration de la Ville de Jérusalem, le Gouverneur sera autorisé à prendre les mesures nécessaires pour rétablir un fonctionnement efficace de l'administration.

c) Pour faire respecter la loi et l'ordre dans la Ville, et veiller en particulier à la protection des

Holy Places and religious buildings and sites in the city, the Governor shall organize a special police force of adequate strength, the members of which shall be recruited outside of Palestine. The Governor shall be empowered to direct such budgetary provision as may be necessary for the maintenance of this force.

5. *Legislative organization.* A Legislative Council, elected by adult residents of the city irrespective of nationality on the basis of universal and secret suffrage and proportional representation, shall have powers of legislation and taxation. No legislative measures shall, however, conflict or interfere with the provisions which will be set forth in the Statute of the City, nor shall any law, regulation, or official action prevail over them. The Statute shall grant to the Governor a right of vetoing bills inconsistent with the provisions referred to in the preceding sentence. It shall also empower him to promulgate temporary ordinances in case the Council fails to adopt in time a bill deemed essential to the normal functioning of the administration.

6. *Administration of justice.* The Statute shall provide for the establishment of an independent judiciary system, including a court of appeal. All the inhabitants of the City shall be subject to it.

7. *Economic union and economic regime.* The City of Jerusalem shall be included in the Economic Union of Palestine and be bound by all stipulations of the undertaking and of any treaties issued therefrom, as well as by the decisions of the Joint Economic Board. The headquarters of the Economic Board shall be established in the territory of the City.

The Statute shall provide for the regulation of economic matters not falling within the regime of the Economic Union, on the basis of equal treatment and non-discrimination for all Members of the United Nations and their nationals.

8. *Freedom of transit and visit; control of residents.* Subject to considerations of security, and of economic welfare as determined by the Governor under the directions of the Trusteeship Council, freedom of entry into, and residence within, the borders of the City shall be guaranteed for the residents or citizens of the Arab and Jewish States. Immigration into, and residence within, the borders of the city for nationals of other States shall be controlled by the Governor under the directions of the Trusteeship Council.

9. *Relations with the Arab and Jewish States.* Representatives of the Arab and Jewish States shall be accredited to the Governor of the City and charged with the protection of the interests of their States and nationals in connexion with the international administration of the City.

10. *Official languages.* Arabic and Hebrew shall be the official languages of the city. This will not preclude the adoption of one or more additional working languages, as may be required.

11. *Citizenship.* All the residents shall become *ipso facto* citizens of the City of Jerusalem unless they opt for citizenship of the State of which they have been citizens or, if Arabs or Jews, have filed notice of intention to become citizens of the Arab or Jewish State respectively, according to part I, section B, paragraph 9, of this plan.

lieux saints et des édifices et emplacements religieux, le Gouverneur organisera un corps spécial de police, disposant de forces suffisantes, dont les membres seront recrutés en dehors de la Palestine. Le Gouverneur aura le droit d'ordonner l'ouverture de crédits nécessaires à l'entretien de ce corps.

5. *Organisation législative.* Un Conseil législatif élu au suffrage universel et au scrutin secret, selon une représentation proportionnelle, par les habitants adultes de la Ville, sans distinction de nationalité, disposera des pouvoirs législatifs et fiscaux. Toutefois, aucune mesure législative ne devra être en opposition ou en contradiction avec les dispositions qui seront prévues dans le Statut de la Ville et aucune loi, aucun règlement ni aucune action officielle ne prévaudront contre ces dispositions. Le Statut donnera au Gouverneur le droit de veto sur les projets de lois incompatibles avec les dispositions en question. Il lui conférera également le pouvoir de promulguer des ordonnances provisoires, dans le cas où le Conseil manquerait d'adopter en temps utile un projet de loi considéré comme essentiel au fonctionnement normal de l'administration.

6. *Administration de la justice.* Le Statut devra prévoir la création d'organes judiciaires indépendants et notamment d'une cour d'appel, dont tous les habitants de la Ville seront justiciables.

7. *Union économique et régime économique.* La Ville de Jérusalem sera incluse dans l'union économique palestinienne et elle sera liée par toutes les dispositions de l'engagement et de tout traité qui en procédera, ainsi que par toutes les décisions du Conseil économique mixte. Le siège du Conseil économique sera établi dans le territoire de la Ville.

Le Statut devra prévoir les règlements nécessaires pour les questions économiques non soumises au régime de l'Union économique sur la base non discriminatoire d'un traitement égal pour tous les Etats Membres des Nations Unies et leurs ressortissants.

8. *Liberté de passage et de séjour; contrôle des résidents.* Sous réserve de considérations de sécurité, et compte tenu des nécessités économiques telles que le Gouverneur les déterminera conformément aux instructions du Conseil de tutelle, la liberté de pénétrer et de résider dans les limites de la Ville sera garantie aux résidents ou citoyens de l'Etat arabe et de l'Etat juif. L'immigration et la résidence à l'intérieur des limites de la Ville pour les ressortissants des autres Etats seront soumises à l'autorité du Gouverneur agissant conformément aux instructions du Conseil de tutelle.

9. *Relations avec l'Etat arabe et l'Etat juif.* Des représentants de l'Etat arabe et de l'Etat juif seront accrédités auprès du Gouverneur de la Ville et chargés de la protection des intérêts de leurs Etats et de ceux de leurs ressortissants auprès de l'administration internationale de la Ville.

10. *Langues officielles.* L'arabe et l'hébreu seront les langues officielles de la Ville. Cette disposition n'empêchera pas l'adoption d'une ou plusieurs langues de travail supplémentaires, selon les besoins.

11. *Citoyenneté.* Tous les résidents deviendront *ipso facto* citoyens de la Ville de Jérusalem, à moins qu'ils n'optent pour l'Etat dont ils étaient citoyens, ou que, Arabes ou Juifs, ils n'aient officiellement fait connaître leur intention de devenir citoyens de l'Etat arabe ou de l'Etat juif, conformément au paragraphe 9 de la section B de la première partie du présent plan.

The Trusteeship Council shall make arrangements for consular protection of the citizens of the City outside its territory.

12. *Freedoms of citizens.* (a) Subject only to the requirements of public order and morals, the inhabitants of the City shall be ensured the enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms, including freedom of conscience, religion and worship, language, education, speech and Press, assembly and association, and petition.

(b) No discrimination of any kind shall be made between the inhabitants on the grounds of race, religion, language or sex.

(c) All persons within the City shall be entitled to equal protection of the laws.

(d) The family law and personal status of the various persons and communities and their religious interests, including endowments, shall be respected.

(e) Except as may be required for the maintenance of public order and good government, no measure shall be taken to obstruct or interfere with the enterprise of religious or charitable bodies of all faiths or to discriminate against any representative or member of these bodies on the ground of his religion or nationality.

(f) The City shall ensure adequate primary and secondary education for the Arab and Jewish communities respectively, in their own languages and in accordance with their cultural traditions.

The right of each community to maintain its own schools for the education of its own members in its own language, while conforming to such educational requirements of a general nature as the City may impose, shall not be denied or impaired. Foreign educational establishments shall continue their activity on the basis of their existing rights.

(g) No restriction shall be imposed on the free use by any inhabitant of the City of any language in private intercourse, in commerce, in religion, in the Press or in publications of any kind, or at public meetings.

13. *Holy Places.* (a) Existing rights in respect of Holy Places and religious buildings or sites shall not be denied or impaired.

(b) Free access to the Holy Places and religious buildings or sites and the free exercise of worship shall be secured in conformity with existing rights and subject to the requirements of public order and decorum.

(c) Holy Places and religious buildings or sites shall be preserved. No act shall be permitted which may in any way impair their sacred character. If at any time it appears to the Governor that any particular Holy Place, religious building or site is in need of urgent repair, the Governor may call upon the community or communities concerned to carry out such repair. The Governor may carry it out himself at the expense of the community or communities concerned if no action is taken within a reasonable time.

(d) No taxation shall be levied in respect of any Holy Place, religious building or site which was exempt from taxation on the date of the creation of the City. No change in the incidence of such taxa-

Le Conseil de tutelle prendra des arrangements pour assurer la protection consulaire des citoyens de la Ville à l'extérieur de son territoire.

12. *Libertés des citoyens.* a) Seront garantis aux habitants de la Ville, sous réserve des seules exigences de l'ordre public et de la morale, les droits de l'homme et les libertés fondamentales, liberté de conscience, de religion et de culte, libre choix de la langue, du mode d'instruction, liberté de parole et liberté de la presse, liberté de réunion, d'association et de pétition.

b) On ne fera entre les habitants aucune espèce de distinctions fondées sur la race, la religion, la langue ou le sexe.

c) Toutes les personnes résidant à l'intérieur de la Ville auront un droit égal à la protection des lois.

d) Le droit familial et le statut personnel des différents individus et des diverses communautés, ainsi que leurs intérêts religieux, y compris les fondations, seront respectés.

e) Sous réserve des nécessités du maintien de l'ordre public et de la bonne administration, on ne prendra aucune mesure qui mettrait obstacle à l'activité des institutions religieuses ou charitables de toutes confessions ou qui constituerait une intervention dans cette activité, et on ne pourra faire aucune discrimination à l'égard des représentants ou des membres de ces institutions du fait de leur religion ou de leur nationalité.

f) La Ville assurera une instruction primaire et secondaire convenable à la communauté arabe et à la communauté juive, dans leur langue et conformément à leurs traditions culturelles.

Il ne sera porté aucune atteinte aux droits des communautés de conserver leurs propres écoles pour l'instruction de leurs membres dans leur langue nationale, à condition que ces communautés se conforment aux prescriptions générales sur l'instruction publique que pourrait édicter la Ville. Les établissements scolaires étrangers poursuivront leur activité sur la base des droits existants.

g) On ne fera obstacle d'aucune manière que ce soit à l'emploi par tout habitant de la Ville de n'importe quelle langue, dans ses relations privées, dans le commerce, les services religieux, la presse, les publications de toute nature et les réunions publiques.

13. *Lieux saints.* a) Il ne sera porté aucune atteinte aux droits actuels concernant les lieux saints, les édifices et les sites religieux.

b) Le libre accès aux lieux saints, édifices et sites religieux et le libre exercice du culte seront garantis conformément aux droits actuels, compte tenu du maintien de l'ordre et de la bienséance publics.

c) Les lieux saints et les édifices et sites religieux seront préservés. Toute action de nature à compromettre, de quelque façon que ce soit, leur caractère sacré, sera interdite. Si le Gouverneur estime qu'il est urgent de réparer un lieu saint, un édifice ou un site religieux quelconque, il pourra inviter la communauté ou les communautés intéressées à procéder aux réparations. Il pourra procéder lui-même à ces réparations aux frais de la communauté ou des communautés intéressées, s'il n'est donné aucune suite à sa demande dans un délai normal.

d) Aucun impôt ne sera perçu sur les lieux saints, édifices et sites religieux exemptés d'impôts lors de la création de la Ville. Il ne sera porté à l'incidence des impôts aucune modification qui constituerait

tion shall be made which would either discriminate between the owners or occupiers of Holy Places, religious buildings or sites, or would place such owners or occupiers in a position less favourable in relation to the general incidence of taxation than existed at the time of the adoption of the Assembly's recommendations.

14. *Special powers of the Governor in respect of the Holy Places, religious buildings and sites in the City and in any part of Palestine.* (a) The protection of the Holy Places, religious buildings and sites located in the City of Jerusalem shall be a special concern of the Governor.

(b) With relation to such places, buildings and sites in Palestine outside the city, the Governor shall determine, on the ground of powers granted to him by the Constitutions of both States, whether the provisions of the Constitutions of the Arab and Jewish States in Palestine dealing therewith and the religious rights appertaining thereto are being properly applied and respected.

(c) The Governor shall also be empowered to make decisions on the basis of existing rights in cases of disputes which may arise between the different religious communities or the rites of a religious community in respect of the Holy Places, religious buildings and sites in any part of Palestine.

In this task he may be assisted by a consultative council of representatives of different denominations acting in an advisory capacity.

D. DURATION OF THE SPECIAL REGIME

The Statute elaborated by the Trusteeship Council on the aforementioned principles shall come into force not later than 1 October 1948. It shall remain in force in the first instance for a period of ten years, unless the Trusteeship Council finds it necessary to undertake a re-examination of these provisions at an earlier date. After the expiration of this period the whole scheme shall be subject to re-examination by the Trusteeship Council in the light of the experience acquired with its functioning. The residents of the City shall be then free to express by means of a referendum their wishes as to possible modifications of the regime of the City.

PART IV

Capitulations

States whose nationals have in the past enjoyed in Palestine the privileges and immunities of foreigners, including the benefits of consular jurisdiction and protection, as formerly enjoyed by capitulation or usage in the Ottoman Empire, are invited to renounce any right pertaining to them to the re-establishment of such privileges and immunities in the proposed Arab and Jewish States and the City of Jerusalem.

une discrimination entre les propriétaires ou occupants des lieux saints, édifices ou sites religieux, qui placerait ces propriétaires ou occupants dans une situation moins favorable, par rapport à l'incidence générale des impôts, qu'au moment de l'adoption des recommandations de l'Assemblée.

14. *Pouvoirs spéciaux du Gouverneur en ce qui concerne les lieux saints, les édifices ou sites religieux dans la Ville et dans toute région de la Palestine.* a) Le Gouverneur se préoccupera tout particulièrement de la protection des lieux saints, des édifices et des sites religieux qui se trouvent dans la Ville de Jérusalem.

b) En ce qui concerne de pareils lieux, édifices et sites de Palestine à l'extérieur de la Ville, le Gouverneur décidera, en vertu des pouvoirs que lui aura conférés la Constitution de l'un et l'autre Etats, si les dispositions des Constitutions de l'Etat arabe et de l'Etat juif de Palestine relatives à ces lieux et aux droits religieux y afférents sont dûment appliquées et respectées.

c) Le Gouverneur a également le pouvoir de statuer, en se fondant sur les droits reconnus, sur les différends qui pourront s'élever entre les diverses communautés religieuses ou les divers rites d'une même communauté religieuse à l'égard des lieux saints, des édifices et des sites religieux dans toute la région de la Palestine.

Dans ces fonctions, le Gouverneur pourra se faire aider d'un conseil consultatif composé de représentants de différentes confessions siégeant à titre consultatif.

D. DUREE DU REGIME SPECIAL

Le Statut élaboré par le Conseil de tutelle, d'après les principes énoncés plus haut, entrera en vigueur le 1er octobre 1948 au plus tard. Il sera tout d'abord en vigueur pendant une période de dix ans, à moins que le Conseil de tutelle n'estime devoir procéder plus tôt à un nouvel examen de ces dispositions. A l'expiration de cette période, l'ensemble du Statut devra faire l'objet d'une révision de la part du Conseil de tutelle, à la lumière de l'expérience acquise au cours de cette première période de fonctionnement. Les personnes ayant leur résidence dans la Ville auront alors toute liberté de faire connaître, par voie de referendum, leurs suggestions relatives à d'éventuelles modifications au régime de la Ville.

QUATRIÈME PARTIE

Capitulations

Les Etats dont les ressortissants ont, dans le passé, bénéficié en Palestine des privilèges et immunités réservés aux étrangers, y compris les avantages de la juridiction et de la protection consulaires qui leur étaient conférés sous l'Empire ottoman en vertu des capitulations ou de la coutume, sont invités à renoncer à tous leurs droits au rétablissement des dits privilèges et immunités dans l'Etat arabe et dans l'Etat juif dont la création est envisagée, ainsi que dans la Ville de Jérusalem.

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FM CAIRO 181005Z JUN

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELEGRAM NR 387 OF 18 JUN 80

INFO PRIORITY TEL AVIV WASHINGTON JEDDA UKMIS NEW YORK

DAMASCUS AMMAN:

MIPT (NOT TO ALL): ARAB/ISRAEL

1. FOLLOWING HIS MEETINGS YESTERDAY WITH MYSELF AND THE ISRAELI AMBASSADOR, PRESIDENT SADAT TOLD THE PRESS THAT HE HAD ASKED ME TO CONVEY TO YOU AND THE PRIME MINISTER THAT EGYPT CONSIDERED THE EC DECLARATION ON THE MIDDLE EAST BALANCED AND CONSTRUCTIVE. THE PLO SHOULD NOT HAVE REJECTED IT BUT SHOULD HAVE SOUGHT TO MAKE USE OF IT. THESE REMARKS FORMED THE HEADLINES IN TODAY'S PRESS. PRESIDENT SADAT ALSO EXPRESSED OPTIMISM ABOUT THE FORTHCOMING AUTONOMY TALKS AND SAID HE WAS WILLING TO SEE THEM RECONVENED EITHER IN WASHINGTON OR IN

EUROPE. HE EXPECTED NO MAJOR CHANGES OF POSITION IN THE NEAR FUTURE BUT REFUSED TO COMMENT WHEN ASKED IF HE EXPECTED

CHANGES AFTER THE US PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION.

2. SPEAKING ABOUT PRESIDENT CARTER'S ATTEMPT TO INVOLVE KING HUSSEIN, SADAT SAID THAT AT THE TIME OF CAMP DAVID HE (SADAT) HAD REJECTED AN OPPORTUNISTIC ATTEMPT BY HUSSEIN HIMSELF TO GET INVOLVED. HUSSEIN'S CHIEF MOTIVE WAS MONEY. ASKED ABOUT HIS MEETING WITH THE ISRAELI AMBASSADOR, PRESIDENT

SADAT SAID THAT HE HAD HANDED OVER A MESSAGE FROM MR BEGIN ABOUT THE INTERNATIONAL SUPERVISION FORCE FOR SINAI AFTER FINAL WITHDRAWAL.

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TELEGRAM NUMBER 209 OF 18 JUNE
INFO ROUTINE WASHINGTON AND BEIRUT
INFO SAVING TEL AVIV, CAIRO, DAMASCUS AND AMMAN

YOUR TEL NO 98 TO BEIRUT: EUROPEAN COUNCIL-MIDDLE EAST.

1. KREISKY HAS BEEN OUT OF AUSTRIA IN OSLO AND BRUSSELS FOR MOST OF THE TIME SINCE THE STATEMENT WAS MADE. HE HAS WELCOMED IT ALTHOUGH HE HAS PREDICTABLY SAID THAT EARLIER WOULD HAVE BEEN BETTER. BUT PRIVATELY HE IS RELIEVED THAT AMONG WESTERN LEADERS HIS OWN POSITION VIS A VIS THE PLO IS NO LONGER QUITE SO ISOLATED. THE PLO'S STRONGLY NEGATIVE REACTION HAS DISAPPOINTED HIM. BUT HE HAS BEEN AT PAINS TO URGE PATIENCE. ASKED IN BRUSSELS WHETHER ISRAELI AND ARAB REACTIONS TO THE STATEMENT WERE SUCH AS TO UNDERMINE ITS ENTIRE PURPOSE, HE SAID THAT TIME WOULD TELL WHETHER ARAB REACTIONS REALLY WERE AS TOUGH AS THEY SEEMED (HE MADE NO COMMENT ABOUT THE ISRAELI REACTIONS).

FCO PLEASE PASS SAVING TO TEL AVIV, CAIRO, DAMASCUS AND AMMAN.

GORDON

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FM JEDDA 181100Z JUN

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELNO 472 OF 18 JUN 80

INFO CAIRO TEL AVIV BONN WASHINGTON AMMAN DAMASCUS AND BAGHDAD

SAVING TO RABAT

YRTELNO 334: VENICE SUMMIT AND THE MIDDLE EAST.

1. DEPUTY MINISTER MANSOURI HAS BEEN IN CONSTANT ATTENDANCE ON PRINCE FAHD SINCE SATURDAY AND HAS NOT BEEN ABLE TO SEE ME (OR A HOST OF AMBASSADORS, ACCORDING TO PROTOCOL). I THEREFORE HANDED YOUR LETTER FOR PRINCE SAUD TO ISMAIL SHURA, DIRECTOR OF THE ARAB AFFAIRS DEPARTMENT, ON 18 JUNE. HE UNDERTOOK TO PASS IT UP AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

2. I ASKED SHURA HOW THE SAUDIS HAD REACTED TO THE VENICE DECLARATION. HE SAID THAT PRIVATELY THE GOVERNMENT SEEMED CONTENT. THE EXPLICIT REFERENCE TO SELF-DETERMINATION AND THE ACCEPTANCE OF THE PLO'S ROLE IN NEGOTIATING A COMPREHENSIVE SETTLEMENT HAD LARGELY MET THE POINTS MADE TO THE EC REPRESENTATIVES BY PRINCE SAUD AND DEPUTY MINISTER MANSOURI ON 8 JUNE (MYTELNO 445).

SHURA SAID THAT PRINCE SULTAN HAD SAID PRIVATELY THAT THE DECLARATION WAS USEFUL. SHURA EMPHASISED, HOWEVER, THAT THE SAUDIS' PUBLIC REACTION WOULD BE MORE CAUTIOUS. THEY WERE BOUND TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF PLO CRITICISM OF THE DECLARATION. HE THOUGHT THAT THE DEFINITIVE SAUDI PUBLIC REACTION WOULD COME AT A PRESS CONFERENCE WHICH PRINCE SAUD WAS EXPECTED TO HOLD IN BONN ON 18 JUNE. PRINCE SAUD'S INITIAL COMMENTS IN BONN, ARE REPORTED IN THE LOCAL PRESS HERE, WERE ON THE LINES "SO MUCH FOR WORDS, NOW LETS HAVE THE ACTIONS" PRINCE SULTAN WAS REPORTED ON 18 JUNE AS SAYING THAT THE ARABS WERE ENTITLED TO EXPECT MORE THAN THEY GOT AT VENICE.

4. SPEAKING MORE GENERALLY, SHURA SAID THAT THERE HAD BEEN SIGNIFICANT SHIFTS TOWARDS MODERATION BY SOME OF THE ARAB SIDE IN THE LAST TWO YEARS. HE REFERRED PARTICULARLY TO THE IRAQI POSITION SINCE THE BAGHDAD SUMMIT WHERE THEY HAD FOR THE FIRST TIME ACCEPTED THE POSSIBILITY OF A PEACEFUL SOLUTION OF THE ARAB/ISRAEL PROBLEM WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF A COMPREHENSIVE SETTLEMENT. HE ALSO THOUGHT THAT KING HASSAN OF MOROCCO HAD CONTRIBUTED TO A CHANGE IN PLO ATTITUDES WHEN HE HAD INDICATED RECENTLY THAT THE PALESTINIANS SHOULD NOT FEEL OVER-INHIBITED BY THE AGREEMENT AT RABAT IN 1974 THAT THE PALESTINE QUESTION SHOULD ONLY BE SETTLED IN ACCORDANCE WITH AN ARAB CONSENSUS. SHURA THOUGHT THAT THESE TWO DEVELOPMENTS IN PART EXPLAIN THE PLO'S CONTINUED USE OF DIPLOMATIC PRESSURE. BUT HE WARNED THAT THERE WERE ELEMENTS WITHIN FATAH WHICH WISHED TO PUSH THAT ORGANISATION INTO MORE RADICAL POSITIONS EG

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INSISTANCE ON A SECULAR STATE COVERING THE WHOLE OF MANDATE PALESTINE.

5. WE ALSO DISCUSSED BRIEFLY THE VISIT THIS WEEK TO JEDDA OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE ARAB LEAGUE. SHURA DISMISSED THE POSSIBILITY THAT KLIBI HAD COME TO COORDINATE POSITIONS WITH THE ISLAMIC CONFERENCE ORGANISATION WHOSE MEETING ON PALESTINE ON 12 JWY IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWS THE ARAB LEAGUE MINISTERIAL CONFERENCE IN AMMAN ON 6 JULY. SHURA SAID THAT KLIBI HAD COME TO DISCUSS WITH PRINCE FAHD THE IMPLICATIONS FOR THE ARAB POSITION OF THE RENEWED ENEMITY BETWEEN SYRIA AND IRAQ; IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT FOR EITHER THE AMMAN MINISTERIAL MEETING OR THE PROPOSED NOVEMBER SUMMIT TO REACH POSITIVE UNIFIED POSITIONS IF SYRIA AND IRAQ REMAINED AT DAGGERS DRAWN.

GRAY

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MR JC MOBERLY

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FM CAIRO 180930Z JUN

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NR 386 OF 18 JUN 80
INFO IMMEDIATE TEL AVIV AND WASHINGTON
INFO PRIORITY JEDDA AND AMMAN

Helpful. Read in full.

YOUR TELNO 241: PRIME MINISTER'S MESSAGE.

I CALLED ON PRESIDENT SADAT ON 17 JUNE AT HIS BEACH-HOUSE NEAR ALEXANDRIA AND GAVE HIM THE PRIME MINISTER'S MESSAGE. I WENT THROUGH THE MAIN POINTS OF THE VENICE DECLARATION AND STRESSED OUR DESIRE TO HELP HIS OWN EFFORTS AND TO AVOID UNDERCUTTING CAMP DAVID. I ALSO EXPLAINED THE REASONING BEHIND IT, CHIEFLY THE GROWING DANGER OF RADICALISATION AND THE NEED FOR GREATER REGIONAL SOLIDARITY AFTER AFGHANISTAN.

2. PRESIDENT SADAT ASKED ME TO THANK THE PRIME MINISTER FOR HER MESSAGE AND FOR THE SYMPATHETIC HEARING THAT SHE AND YOU HAD GIVEN TO VICE-PRESIDENT MUDARAK IN LONDON. HE WAS

PARTICULARLY GRATEFUL FOR THE ASSURANCE ABOUT CAMP DAVID. FOR HIS PART HE CONSIDERED THE VENICE DECLARATION "VERY WELL BALANCED" AND WOULD SUPPORT IT (HE ADMITTED THAT HE HAD NOT YET DONE SO PUBLICLY). HE WOULD BE GLAD TO RECEIVE A EUROPEAN EMISSARY. LATER ON HE SUGGESTED THAT THE EMISSARY SHOULD COME TO EGYPT LAST.

3. SADAT CONTRASTED HIS ATTITUDE WITH THAT OF HIS ARAB BRETHREN. THEY PROBABLY SUPPORTED THE DECLARATION IN PRIVATE BUT WERE ALREADY CRITICISING IT IN PUBLIC. THE SAUDIS WERE TERRIFIED OF THE REJECTIONISTS, ESPECIALLY IRAQ. HE ASKED ME TO TELL YOU

IN CONFIDENCE THAT BEFORE PRINCE FAHD'S FAMOUS INTERVIEW HE HAD ALREADY RECEIVED A CONCILIATORY APPROACH FROM THE SAUDI REGIME. THEN AS SOON AS FAHD'S INTERVIEW WAS PUBLISHED THEY HAD BACKTRACKED. EVEN SO HE HAD OFFERED TO FLY TO RIYADH AT A MOMENT'S NOTICE TO BURY THE MATCHET, AND WAS STILL READY TO DO SO. (HE RECOGNISED THAT SUCH A DIRECT APPROACH WAS PROBABLY A NON-STARTER, AND WOULD BE GLAD TO SEE EITHER THE US OR THE UK - WHO DESPITE CURRENT DIFFERENCES HAD TRADITIONAL INFLUENCE WITH SAUDI ARABIA - PLAY AN INTERMEDIARY ROLE.)

3. KING HUSSEIN WOULD GLADLY JOIN IN THE PEACE NEGOTIATIONS IF ONLY HE COULD SQUARE HIS SAUDI PAYMASTERS. HE, SADAT AND PRESIDENT CARTER HAD CREATED A ROLE FOR HIM AT CAMP DAVID, INCLUDING GAZA AS WELL AS THE WEST BANK. EGYPT HAD NO DESIRE TO RESUME RESPONSIBILITY FOR GAZA. SADAT ADDED THAT KING HUSSEIN IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH PERES ABOUT THE FUTURE. HE WAS NOT IMPRESSED WHEN I SAID THAT HUSSEIN APPEARED TO US TO BE CONVINCED THAT IT WOULD BE SUICIDAL FOR HIM TO JOIN THE AUTONOMY TALKS. TOLD THAT ARAFAT HAD SPOKEN PRIVATELY IN FAVOUR OF A EUROPEAN INITIATIVE (AMMAN TELRG 217) SADAT SAID CRYPTICALLY THAT PLO STATEMENTS WERE DIFFERENT TO INTERPRET.

4. AS FOR THE PRESENT STATE OF NEGOTIATIONS, SADAT ASKED ME TO TELL YOU THAT HE NOW BELIEVED THEY WOULD MAKE NO PROGRESS UNTIL THE NOV ELECTIONS OR UNTIL BEGIN DISAPPEARED, OR PERHAPS NOT UNTIL BOTH. I ASKED IF HE HAD FINALLY GIVEN UP HOPE OF BEGIN AND HE SAID HE HAD, THOUGH HE WOULD NOT BE SAYING THIS PUBLICLY. HE WAS SEEING IMMEDIATELY AFTER ME THE ISRAELI AMBASSADOR BRINGING AN ALLEGEDLY URGENT MESSAGE FROM BEGIN, AND OF COURSE HE WOULD LISTEN TO HIM POLITELY. BUT BEGIN WAS TOO DEEPLY ENTRENCHED IN HIS BIBLICAL CONVICTIONS TO BE CAPABLE OF FURTHER

ENTRENCHED IN HIS BIBLICAL CONVICTIONS TO BE CAPABLE OF FURTHER MOVEMENT. SADAT SAID HIS HOPES WERE NOW PINNED ON PERES, A REASONABLE MAN WITH WHOM HE HAD ALREADY REACHED A LARGE MEASURE OF UNDERSTANDING. ALTHOUGH BEGIN'S TERM DID NOT END UNTIL NOV 1981, SADAT DID NOT BELIEVE HIS HEALTH WOULD HOLD OUT THAT LONG.

5. IN ANSWER TO MY QUESTION SADAT SAID HE NEVERTHELESS EXPECTED THE WASHINGTON MEETING IN EARLY JUL TO LEAD TO A RESUMPTION OF THE SUBSTANTIVE AUTONOMY TALKS. THE CONDITIONS POSED THE PREVIOUS DAY IN THE ASSEMBLY BY HIS FOREIGN MINISTER KEMAL HASSAN ALI (WITHDRAWAL OF THE KNESSET BILL ON JERUSALEM, FREEZING OF SETTLEMENTS, ETC) WOULD BE GOT ROUND SOMEHOW. SADAT SAID THAT TO TELL THE TRUTH, HE HAD SIMPLY ASKED JIMMY CARTER WHETHER A RESUMPTION OF THE TALKS WAS IMPORTANT FOR HIM. CARTER REPLIED YES AND THAT WAS ENOUGH FOR SADAT. THIS LED HIM INTO A DISQUISITION ON THE INIQUITY OF THE AMERICAN ELECTORAL SYSTEM, AND THE PENALTIES IT IMPOSED ON THE REST OF THE WORLD.

6. AFTER NOVEMBER HOWEVER HE BELIEVED THAT A US ADMINISTRATION OF EITHER PARTY WOULD BE PREPARED TO IMPART NEW DRIVE AND MOMENTUM TO THE PEACE PROCESS. MEANWHILE WE MUST ALL DO WHAT WE COULD TO KEEP IT ALIVE, AND HE AGREED THAT THE EUROPEAN INITIATIVE WAS AS PROMISING A METHOD AS THE AUTONOMY TALKS. BUT WE SHOULD HAVE NO ILLUSIONS THAT EITHER WOULD PRODUCE CONCRETE RESULTS.

COMMENT

7. SADAT SEEMED GENUINELY PLEASED TO RECEIVE THE MESSAGE AND WITH ITS CONTENTS. THE MOST SIGNIFICANT POINT WAS, OF COURSE, HIS ADMISSION THAT HE HAS FINALLY GIVEN UP HOPE IN BEGIN. AND IT WAS A RELIEF THAT HE WELCOMED THE EUROPEAN DECLARATION, AFTER A FEW DAYS' APPARENT HESITATION. SPEAKING TO THE PRESS AFTERWARDS HE DESCRIBED IT AS BALANCED AND POSITIVE, AND

CRITICISED THE PLO FOR FAILING TO RESPOND. SADAT APPEARS TO HAVE SHED FEW OF HIS OTHER ILLUSIONS, NOTABLY ABOUT THE PROSPECTS OF REACHING AGREEMENT ON THE WEST BANK WITH PERES, AND ABOUT THE ATTITUDES OF THE OTHER ARABS. BUT HE SHARES THESE VIEWS WITH HIS ADVISERS AND EXPRESSED THEM WITH RELATIVE MODERATION. I WAS CONFIRMED IN MY EARLIER IMPRESSION THAT HE IS NOW ALLOWING HIS ADVISERS MORE SAY AND ACCEPTING THE CASE FOR FENCE-MENDING WITH THE ARAB MODERATES, WHILE DETACHING HIMSELF SOMEWHAT FROM THE ACTION. THE SUGGESTION THAT OTHERS MIGHT HELP MEDIATE WITH THE SAUDIS WAS INTERESTING. WHEN I ASKED HIM IF HE INTENDED TO CONTINUE TO DEVOTE 512899-5-9F HIS

OTHERS MIGHT HELP MEDIATE WITH THE SAUDIS WAS INTERESTING. WHEN I ASKED HIM IF HE INTENDED TO CONTINUE TO DEVOTE 512899-3-9F HIS TIME TO DOMESTIC AFFAIRS, AS HE SAID IN HIS SPEECH A MONTH AGO, HE SAID HE DID NOT HAVE MUCH CHOICE GIVEN THE PRESENT STALEMATE IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

8. FOR SADAT'S SUBSEQUENT COMMENTS TO THE PRESS SEE MIFT.

CCM PARA 3 = READ = THAT KING HUSSEIN WAS IN CLOSE ETC ++

WEIR.

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FM TEL AVIV 180715Z JUN 80
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 242 OF 18 JUNE
INFO WASHINGTON

*Please let me see text
of PNT message again.*

Nun

MY TELEGRAM NO 235: VENICE/MIDDLE EAST

1. AT A MEETING OF THE KNESSET FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND DEFENCE COMMITTEE YESTERDAY BEGIN IS REPORTED TO HAVE SAID THAT MRS THATCHER HAD "GIVEN HIM THE IMPRESSION IN A RECENT LETTER THAT SHE UNDERSTOOD ISRAEL'S INABILITY TO LIVE WITH CERTAIN ELEMENTS OF THE VENICE RESOLUTIONS".
2. IN TELLING THE DIRECTOR GENERAL OF BEGIN'S OFFICE WHAT NEWS DEPARTMENT WOULD AND WOULD NOT SAY (MY TUR) I SAID THAT I ASSUMED THAT BEGIN'S OFFICE WOULD LET ME KNOW IF THEY INTENDED TO FOLLOW A DIFFERENT LINE. THEY HAVE NOT DONE SO. BEGIN CONTINUES TO TAKE A DEFIANT AND OUTSPOKEN LINE ON THE VENICE STATEMENT AND EUROPEAN INVOLVEMENT, AND MUST BE EXPECTED TO MISREPRESENT FOR HIS OWN PURPOSES ANYTHING SAID TO HIM.
3. I PROPOSE TO SAY, IF ASKED ABOUT BEGIN'S REFERENCE TO MRS THATCHER'S LETTER, THAT "I CANNOT CONFIRM IT".

ROBINSON

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PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T 129A/80



SUBJECT.

EMBASSY OF ISRAEL
2 PALACE GREEN
LONDON, W8 4QB
TEL. 01-937 8050

שגרירות ישראל
לונדון

②

Prime Minister

Jerusalem, June 17, 1980

(rec'd 19.6.80)

Ami, Mo

cc. Master ok
op.

"Dear Madam Prime Minister,

I thank you for your letter of June 14, transmitted to me by Ambassador Robinson.

I read its contents with the greatest attention and I express to you my appreciation for your kind and friendly words in the wake of the Venice Conference and Resolution.

However, since it is always with complete candor that we speak and write to each other, it is my duty to tell you that the Resolution hurt us deeply. You write to me: "I know some aspects of our Declaration will be very difficult for you to accept..." May I respectfully tell you, Madam Prime Minister, that "some aspects" (of that Declaration) are impossible for us to accept. I will cite but one example.

The Venice Resolution declares that the P.L.O. should be associated with the peace-making process. Being familiar for so many years as we are with the contents of the so-called "Palestinian Charter" we assume, and we have a right to assume, that all our friends know equally well that that organization preaches one, unchanged and openly declared design: The destruction of the State of Israel. They shall, of course, never achieve that aim but their failure will not be for the lack of trying.

On the eve of the Venice Conference something particular occurred. In Damascus, a Congress of Fatah, the main component of the P.L.O., commanded by Mr. Yasser Arafat who is the P.L.O. Chairman, deliberated for several days and adopted the following Resolution: "Fatah is an independent National Revolutionary Movement whose aim is to liberate Palestine completely (my emphasis) and to liquidate (again my emphasis) the Zionist entity, politically, economically, militarily, culturally and ideologically."

Madam Prime Minister, did anybody since the days of Hitler and Goebels, Goering, Rosenberg and Streicher ever declare more plainly and more precisely that the endeavour is to destroy both our people and our State ("politically" and "militarily")? Again, I repeat, this Resolution was adopted in Damascus but a few days before the Nine convened in Venice. It was distributed for everybody to read, not only in diplomatic dispatches but also in the Press. And yet, the great, free, Democratic countries of Europe assembled and asked us, the elected representatives of the people of Israel, the United States of America, and all other nations to recognize that organization as a future partner in "peace" talks. This is not only astonishing: as I said, it hurt us deeply.

/cont...



EMBASSY OF ISRAEL
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TEL. 01-937 8050

שגרירות ישראל
לונדון

- 2 -

After having signed a Peace Treaty with Egypt that put an end to a state of war which lasted thirty-one years - five wars having actually been waged on the battlefield - we, Israel, made great sacrifices in order to bring the peace about, as you know well. Now, the autonomy talks will be renewed and let it not be forgotten that the very autonomy idea is ours. We have, until now, done our best to reach an agreement without, of course, sacrificing our rights and the most vital interests of Israel's national security. I wish to assure you that we shall continue the negotiations with goodwill in order to reach an agreement on the second part of the Camp David accord.

I will be happy to be in direct touch with you in the future, Madam Prime Minister, and freely exchange views on the main issues concerning the peace-making process in the Middle East in accordance with the Camp David agreement. I still hope that not only your great country, but also other European countries - with perhaps, the likely exception of one - will positively contribute to this effort which is the only one that could lead to peace in this vital region.

May I, in conclusion, bring to your attention a certain complaint that bears upon our defence needs. I believe we are friendly countries and it is in this spirit that in the past we acquired from Britain quantities of defence items which we greatly appreciated, they being important for our security.

However, we have been confronted with refusals. I refer, specifically, to the supply of light tanks of the Scorpion type, electro-optical equipment (laser range-finders) and especially the information available on the RB-199 engine which would have matched our new aircraft requirements.

I cannot understand the reasons for these refusals, particularly when Britain is selling to Jordan hundreds of the sophisticated Chieftan tanks originally destined for Iran. May I respectfully ask you, Madam Prime Minister, to reconsider those refusals and instruct the appropriate authorities to accept the above-mentioned requests submitted by the Israel Defence Forces.

I look to your goodwill and I thank you in advance for your positive action and reply.

Please accept my very best wishes,

Yours sincerely,

Menachem Begin
Prime Minister of Israel"

The Rt. Hon. Mrs. Margaret Thatcher, MP
Prime Minister,
10 Downing Street,
SW1.

*Please find
Leaf
(Page B
attached)*

Israel

Middle East

GR 320
UNCLASSIFIED
FM TEL AVIV 170725Z JUN 80
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 241 OF 17 JUNE

for seen

FOLLOWING FOR NENAD.

MIPT: VENICE

FOLLOWING IS TEXT.

BEGINS

TWO WEEKS AGO PRIME MINISTER BEGIN SAID IN THE KNESSET THAT "THERE WAS NOT ONE NATION IN EUROPE WHICH IN SOME PART DID NOT COLLABORATE WITH THE KILLERS" - HE WAS TALKING ABOUT THE NAZI KILLERS OF JEWS, AND HE EXEMPTED ONLY DENMARK FROM THIS ALLEGATION. I MUST CONFESS TO YOU THAT WHEN I READ THIS I DID NOT BELIEVE THAT IT HAD BEEN SAID. PERHAPS YOU CANNOT BELIEVE IT EITHER. BUT I AM AFRAID THAT I HAVE BEEN INFORMED, AFTER ENQUIRING MOST CAREFULLY, THAT THIS WAS INDEED WHAT HAD BEEN SAID, AND THAT THERE HAD BEEN NO ERROR IN TRANSMISSION.

AS FAR AS BRITAIN IS CONCERNED, I WILL NOT SAY MORE TONIGHT THAN THAT I REJECT THIS ALLEGATION. IT IS OFFENSIVE TO BRITISH PEOPLE, AND I DO NOT BELIEVE, I CANNOT BELIEVE THAT IT REPRESENTS THE FEELINGS OF PEOPLE GENERALLY IN ISRAEL, LEAST OF ALL THE FEELINGS OF YOU WHO HAVE COME HERE TONIGHT, OR OF THE 30,000 BRITISH NATIONALS IN ISRAEL. I WOULD PREFER TO BELIEVE THAT ISRAEL'S FEELINGS WERE MORE TRULY EXPRESSED BY TWO ISRAELI POLITICIANS WHO ON OTHER MATTERS HAD THEIR DIFFERENCES WITH US. MOSHE SHARETT SAID THREE DAYS AFTER THE END OF THE WAR IN EUROPE

"THE PRESENT WAR WAS FOUGHT IN REJECTION OF FALSE COMPROMISES AND WON BECAUSE ENGLAND WAS READY TO FIGHT ALONE ... BLESSED BE ENGLAND WHO STOOD ALONE FOR A WHOLE YEAR WHEN ALL SEEMED LOST".

A FULL 30 YEARS LATER MRS GOLDA MEIR SAID

" I THINK EVEN NOW THAT THE BRITISH WERE RESPONSIBLE MORE THAN ANYONE ELSE FOR THE DESTRUCTION OF NAZISM AND HITLER". THAT LADIES AND GENTLEMEN IS WHAT MY COUNTRY WAS DOING, SINGLE MINDEDLY, FROM 1939 TO 1945. AND MANY OF YOU WERE WITH US.

ENDS

ROBINSON

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TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 240 OF 17 JUNE

R. Robinson spoke well

MS.

FOLLOWING FOR NENAD

MY TELEGRAM NO 239: MIDDLE EAST

1. I TOOK THE OPPORTUNITY OF A SPEECH TO THE ISRAEL BRITISH COMMONWEALTH ASSOCIATION HERE LAST NIGHT TO EXPLAIN IN A FACTUAL AND MODERATE WAY WHAT THE NINE HAD DECIDED IN VENICE AND WHY.
2. IN THE LIGHT OF FURTHER PRESS COMMENT HERE ON BEGIN'S KNESSET REMARKS (MY TEL NO 217) I ALSO COMMENTED ON THE ALLEGATION THAT BRITAIN HAD COLLABORATED WITH THE NAZI KILLERS OF JEWS. ALTHOUGH THE ASSOCIATION IS SUPPOSED TO WORK FOR ISRAELI BRITISH FRIENDSHIP, THE AUDIENCE WERE PRETTY HOSTILE ON VENICE, AND, ALTHOUGH THE PRESS WERE NOT PRESENT, WORD OF SOME OF MY REMARKS MAY CIRCULATE. MIFT GIVES THE TEXT ON BEGIN.

ROBINSON

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FM BEIRUT 171040Z JUN 80

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 142 OF 17 JUNE 1980

INFO ROUTINE DAMASCUS AND TEL AVIV

YOUR TEL NO 97 (NOT TO ALL): EUROPEAN COUNCIL.

1. BOUTROS WAS UNABLE TO RECEIVE ME UNTIL THIS MORNING. HE WAS CLEARLY DELIGHTED WITH YOUR MESSAGE, PARTICULARLY THE KEY PHRASE "ANY SETTLEMENT IN THE MIDDLE EAST MUST NOT BE AT LEBANON'S EXPENSE". HE ASKED ME TO CONVEY TO YOU HIS THANKS AND GOOD WISHES. HE WOULD CERTAINLY KEEP IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH US, PARTICULARLY AFTER HE HAD HAD A CHANCE TO SOUND OUT THE SYRIANS.

2. HE THOUGHT THAT THE EC STATEMENTS CONTAINED A NUMBER OF POSITIVE ELEMENTS AND MARKED AN IMPORTANT STEP FORWARD. HE ALSO THOUGHT THAT VIRTUALLY ALL ARAB GOVERNMENTS WOULD BE OF THE SAME VIEW, WHATEVER THEY MIGHT SAY PUBLICLY. WE SHOULD NOT TAKE TOO SERIOUSLY PUBLICLY EXPRESSED NEGATIVE REACTIONS BY THE "RADICAL" STATES. THEY AND THE PLO WOULD BE UNDER GREAT PRESSURE FROM THE RUSSIANS, WHO WOULD BE MANOEUVRING TO DISCREDIT THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY AS AN ALTERNATIVE "FRIEND" TO THEMSELVES. SOME ARAB STATES WERE SO DEPENDENT ON RUSSIA (HE WAS CLEARLY REFERRING TO SYRIA) THAT THEY WOULD FIND IT VIRTUALLY IMPOSSIBLE TO RESIST SUCH RUSSIAN PRESSURE.

3. I EXPLAINED THAT WHILE WE WOULD CONFIRM THE EXISTENCE OF YOUR MESSAGE, IF ASKED, WE WOULD NOT REVEAL ITS CONTENTS. BOUTROS SAID THAT HE WOULD SIMPLY REFER TO IT IN GENERAL TERMS. COMMENT: NEVERTHELESS, DOCUMENT SECURITY BEING VIRTUALLY ZERO HERE, I WOULD EXPECT ITS CONTENTS TO LEAK RATHER RAPIDLY.

STRACHAN

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FM TOKYO 160500Z JUN

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELNO 387 OF 16 JUNE INFO ROUTINE ROME.

SAVING TO ALL EC POSTS (EXCEPT ROME) WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK.

VENICE TELNOS 20, 24 AND 25: EUROPEAN COUNCIL DECLARATIONS

1. THE JAPANESE FOREIGN MINISTER, DR OKITA, ISSUED THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT ON 14 MAY:-

(MIDDLE EAST PEACE)

1. THE GOVERNMENT OF JAPAN IS DEEPLY CONCERNED ABOUT RECENT SIGNS OF THE DETERIORATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST SITUATION, SUCH AS SHOWN IN THE DEVELOPMENTS CONNECTED WITH NEGOTIATIONS FOR PALESTINIAN AUTONOMY AND PROBLEMS CAUSED BY ISRAELI SETTLEMENTS POLICY IN THE OCCUPIED ARAB TERRITORIES.
2. UNDER THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, JAPAN APPRECIATES HIGHLY THE DECLARATION ON THE MIDDLE EAST ISSUED BY THE EC NINE AT THE CONCLUSION OF THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL ON JUNE 13, 1980 AS A TIMELY ENCOURAGEMENT TO FURTHER EFFORTS AND THE WILL FOR PEACE ON THE PART OF ALL CONCERNED. JAPAN WELCOMES THE DECLARATION IN ITS ENTIRETY AS IT LAYS DOWN BASIC PRINCIPLES NECESSARY FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A JUST, LASTING AND COMPREHENSIVE PEACE.
3. JAPAN SUPPORTS EVERY INTERNATIONAL ENDEAVOUR TO COMPLEMENT AND PROMOTE THE EFFORTS WHICH HAVE ALREADY BEEN MADE AS WELL AS THE RESULTS WHICH HAVE BEEN ACHIEVED SO FAR. ON THIS OCCASSION, JAPAN STRONGLY URGES ALL THE PARTIES DIRECTLY CONCERNED IN THIS CONFLICT TO SHOW COURAGE AND TO FOLLOW REASON SO AS TO REFRAIN FROM ALL KINDS OF VIOLENCE, AND TO STRENGTHEN THEIR DETERMINATION TO USE WISDOM AND GOOD SENSE TO SETTLE THIS PROBLEM IN A JUST AND PEACEFUL WAY. THE SETTLEMENT SHOULD BE BASED ON SUCH PRINCIPLES AS RECOGNITION OF AND RESPECT FOR THE LEGITIMATE RIGHTS OF THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE INCLUDING THEIR RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION, THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 242, IN PARTICULAR ISRAEL'S WITHDRAWAL FROM ALL THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES, AND THE GUARANTEE OF THE RIGHT OF ALL THE COUNTRIES OF THE REGION INCLUDING ISRAEL TO EXIST IN PEACE.

/ JAPAN

JAPAN FURTHER CONSIDERS IT NECESSARY THAT ALL THE PARTIES CONCERNED INCLUDING THE P.L.O. PARTICIPATE IN THE PROCESS OF PEACE.

(LEBANON)

4. JAPAN LIKEWISE SUPPORTS THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL'S DECLARATION ON LEBANON.

(AFGHANISTAN)

5. JAPAN HAS CONTINUOUSLY DEMANDED PROMPT WITHDRAWAL OF THE SOVIET FORCES FROM AFGHANISTAN AND EARNESTLY HOPED THAT THE PEOPLE OF AFGHANISTAN SHOULD BE ABLE TO RESOLVE THEIR INTERNAL PROBLEMS ON THEIR OWN, IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PRINCIPLES OF NON-INTERFERENCE IN DOMESTIC AFFAIRS AND RESPECT FOR SELF-DETERMINATION.

FROM THIS POINT OF VIEW, JAPAN WELCOMES AND SUPPORTS THE ISSUING OF THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL'S DECLARATION ON AFGHANISTAN.

FCO PLEASE PASS SAVING ADDRESSEES.

WILFORD

(REPEATED AS REQUESTED)

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FM TEL AVIV 160755Z JUN 60

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 238 OF 16 JUNE

INFO WASHINGTON AND UKMIS NEW YORK

Read in full

MIPT: MIDDLE EAST

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF ISRAELI CABINET STATEMENT.

BEGINS:

"NOTHING WILL REMAIN FROM THE VENICE RESOLUTION BUT ITS BITTER MEMORY. THE RESOLUTION CALLS UPON US, AND OTHER NATIONS, TO INCLUDE IN THE PEACE PROCESS THE ARAB SS KNOWN AS 'THE PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION.' THE PRINCIPAL COMPONENT OF THIS ORGANIZATION OF MURDERERS RESOLVED IN DAMASCUS, ON THE EVE OF THE VENICE CONFERENCE, TO WIT: 'FATAH IS AN INDEPENDENT NATIONAL REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENT WHOSE AIM IS TO LIBERATE PALESTINE COMPLETELY AND TO LIQUIDATE THE ZIONIST ENTITY POLITICALLY, ECONOMICALLY, MILITARILY, CULTURALEY AND IDEOLOGICALLY'".

"NOT SINCE 'MEIN KAMPF' WAS WRITTEN HAVE MORE EXPLICIT WORDS BEEN SAID, IN THE EARS OF THE ENTIRE WORLD, INCLUDING EUROPE, ABOUT THE DESIRE FOR THE DESTRUCTION OF THE JEWISH STATE AND NATION."

"FOR 'PEACE' WHICH WOULD BE ACHIEVED WITH THE PARTICIPATION OF THAT SAME ORGANIZATION OF MURDERERS, A NUMBER OF EUROPEAN COUNTRIES ARE WILLING TO GIVE A GUARANTEE, EVEN MILITARILY. THE HEART OF ANYONE WITH A MEMORY WILL SHUDDER, KNOWING THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE GUARANTEE GIVEN TO CZECHOSLOVAKIA IN 1938, AFTER THE SUDENTENLAND WAS TORN FROM IT, ALSO FOR THE SAKE OF SELF-DETERMINATION. ISRAEL DOES NOT SEEK A GUARANTEE FOR ITS SECURITY FROM ANY EUROPEAN NATION. ISRAEL KNOWS, AND WILL KNOW, HOW TO DEFEND ITSELF.

"THE INITIATORS OF THE VENICE DOCUMENT AND ITS COMPOSERS EVEN TRIED TO INTERVENE IN THE STATUS OF JERUSALEM, OUR ETERNAL CAPITAL, WHICH IS NOT SUBJECT TO (NEXT WORD IN ITALICS) ANY DIVISION, AND IN OUR RIGHT TO SETTLE AND LIVE IN ERETZ YISRAEL, A RIGHT WHICH IS ALSO AN INSEPARABLE PART OF OUR DEFENCE SYSTEM IN THE FACE OF ENEMIES AND ATTACKERS.

"ANY MAN OF GOOD WILL AND ANY FREE PERSON IN EUROPE WHO WOULD EXAMINE THIS DOCUMENT WOULD SEE IN IT A MUNICH-LIKE SURRENDER, THE SECOND IN OUR GENERATION, TO TYRANNIC EXTORTION, AND AN ENCOURAGEMENT TO ALL THE ELEMENTS WHICH ARE UNDERMINING THE CAMP DAVID ACCORDS AND WHICH ASPIRE TO DEFEAT THE PEACE PROCESS IN THE MIDDLE EAST.

"ISRAEL SIGNED A PEACE TREATY WITH EGYPT, GIVING MANY SACRIFICE ON ITS BEHALF. IT IS FULFILLING THE CONDITIONS OF THE TREATY FAITHFULLY AND METICULOUSLY. IT IS WILLING TO UPHOLD METICULOUSLY AND FAITHFULLY THE SECOND PARTY OF THE CAMP DAVID ACCORDS, TO WIT:

"FULL AUTONOMY FOR THE ARAB INHABITANTS OF JUDEA, SAMARIA, AND THE GAZA DISTRICT, AND FULL SECURITY FOR ISRAEL AND ALL ITS CITIZENS."

ENDS.

ROBINSON

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FM TEL AVIV 160750Z JUN 80

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 237 OF 16 JUNE

INFO WASHINGTON CAIRO UKNIS NEW YORK AMMAN BEIRUT AND DAMASCUS

SAVING INFO JERUSALEM

MY TEL NO 236: MIDDLE EAST

1. THE EMOTIONAL STATEMENT READ BY BEGIN AFTER YESTERDAY'S CABINET WAS APPROVED BY THE CABINET UNANIMOUSLY. (FULL TEXT IN MIFT, NOT TO ALL). SOME IN CABINET APPEAR TO HAVE WANTED SOMETHING STRONGER STILL, INCLUDING A REFUSAL TO RECEIVE THE FACT FINDING MISSION, OR NOT TO RECEIVE ANY GERMAN MEMBERS OF IT. BUT SHAMIR APPARENTLY OBTAINED SOME TONING DOWN, AND LATER IMPLIED THAT THERE WERE POINTS OF MODERATION IN THE EUROPEAN STATEMENT WHICH MIGHT HAVE BEEN INFLUENCED BY SHAMIR'S VISITS TO EUROPEAN CAPITALS. OFFICIAL LEVEL REACTIONS HERE ARE CRITICAL BUT A GOOD DEAL MORE BALANCED THAN THE CABINET STATEMENT.

2. MY ITALIAN COLLEAGUE IS SEEING THE DIRECTOR GENERAL OF THE FOREIGN MINISTRY THIS MORNING. HIS INSTRUCTIONS ARE NOT TO HAND OVER THE TEXT OF THE VENICE STATEMENT, BUT TO CONCENTRATE ON EXPLAINING THE EUROPEAN APPROACH AS BEING BASED ON SC 242 AND 338, AND ON THE SECURITY OF ISRAEL, WITH GUARANTEES BY THE NINE IF ISRAEL WANTS THEM. HE WILL EMPHASISE THAT THE NINE WISH CAMP DAVID WELL AND THAT EUROPE'S FURTHER POSITION WILL ONLY BE DECIDED AFTER THE MISSION OF THE NINE. I HOPE TO REPORT THE OUTCOME OF THIS MEETING LATER TODAY.

3. SHAMIR APPARENTLY INTENDS TO CALL IN COMMUNITY AMBASSADORS HERE THIS WEEK TO TELL US OFFICIALLY OF THE CABINET REACTION.

ROBINSON

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IMMEDIATE

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FM AMMAN 160850Z JUN 80

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 226 OF 16 JUN

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON AND ROUTINE BAGHDAD BEIRUT CAIRO
DAMASCUS JEDDA TEL AVIV UKMIS NEW YORK AND CG JERUSALEM
MY TELNO 217 OF 10 JUNE: JORDANIAN REACTION TO EC STATEMENT ON
THE MIDDLE EAST.

1. IN A STATEMENT ISSUED ON THE EVENING OF 14 JUNE THE JORDANIAN PRIME MINISTER DESCRIBED THE VENICE COMMUNIQUE AS A POSITIVE STEP IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION "ALTHOUGH NOT QUITE ENOUGH IN ITSELF TO ADVANCE IN PRACTICE THE CAUSE OF JUSTICE AND PEACE IN THE AREA." HE ACKNOWLEDGED THE EMPHASIS PLACED IN THE DECLARATION ON THE CALL FOR FULL ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL FROM ARAB LAND OCCUPIED IN 1967, RECOGNITION OF THE RIGHT OF THE PALESTINIANS TO SELF-DETERMINATION REJECTION OF ISRAELI MEASURE IN OCCUPIED JERUSALEM, OPPOSITION TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF SETTLEMENTS AND PLO INVOLVEMENT IN ESTABLISHING A JUST AND COMPREHENSIVE PEACE RECOGNISING PALESTINIAN RIGHTS. SHARAF CONCLUDED HIS STATEMENT BY CALLIN ON THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY TO TURN ITS WORDS INTO ACTIONS. FULL TEXT OF STATEMENT FOLLOWS BY BAG.

2. PRESS COMMENT HAS BEEN MIXED. OF THE THREE MAIN ARABIC DAILIES AL-RAI, WHICH HAD FROM THE START TAKEN A PESSIMISTIC VIEW OF THE PROSPECTS FOR THE VENICE SUMMIT, REACTED INITIALLY BY DRAWING ATTENTION TO A LONG LIST OF WEAKNESSES AND OMISSIONS IN THE ELCARATION SEMI COLON BUT AFTER PUBLICATION OF THE PRIME MINISTER'S STATEMENT IT CONFINED ITSELF TO CALLING FOR THE PRINCIPLE ANNOUNCED IN THE DECLARATION TO BE IMPLEMENTED. AD-DUSTOUR AND AL-AKHBAR FOLLOW VERY CLOSELY THE PRIME MINISTER'S LINE IN SEEING MANY POSITIVE ASPECTS IN THE DECLARATION, BUT THEY TOO REITERATE SHARAF'S CALL ON THE EUROPEANS TO TURN THEIR WORDS INTO ACTIONS.

3. I SAW THE PRIME MINISTER YESTERDAY MORNING ON HIS DEPARTURE FOR LONDON AND WASHINGTON. HE TOLD ME THAT HE HAD DELIBERATELY TAKEN THE LEAD IN ISSUING A STATEMENT DRAWING ATTENTION TO THE POSITIVE ASPECTS OF THE DECLARATION, IN ORDER TO GET AHEAD OF OTHER AND LESS ENTHUSIASTIC ARAB REACTIONS. HE SAID HE WAS PERSONALLY WELL PLEASED WITH WITH THE CONTENTS SEMI COLON I TOOK THE OPPORTUNITY TO POINT OUT THAT IT INCLUDED ALL THE POINTS HE HAD PUT TO US (PARA 4 OF MY TUR). SHARAF SAID HE HOPED IT WOULD NOW BE FOLLOWED BY POSITIVE ACTION. THE MINISTER OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS ALSO SAID HE WAS WELL PLEASED WITH THE STATEMENT AND THAT IT PROVIDED A GOOD BASIS ON WHICH TO BUILD.

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FM WASHINGTON 152100Z JUN 80

TO PRIORITY F C O

TEL NO 2253 OF 15 JUNE 1980

INFO PRIORITY CAIRO, TEL AVIV, AMMAN, PARIS, BONN, ROME.
INFO SAVING BRUSSELS, COPENHAGEN, DUBLIN, LUMEMBOURG, THE HAGUE,
UKREP BRUSSELS, BEIRUT, DAMASCUS, JEDDA, UKMIS NEW YORK,
HMCG JERUSALEM.

MY TEL 2250 (SAVING TO EC POSTS):

ARAB/ISRAEL EUROPEAN COUNCIL STATEMENT.

1. PLO DISAPPOINTMENT WITH THE STATEMENT IS FRONT PAGE NEWS IN TODAY'S NEW YORK TIMES. SHAMIR'S REJECTION OF IT IS ALSO COVERED, AS IS ITS DISMISSAL BY THE AMERICAN JEWISH CONGRESS AS QUOTE CYNICAL AND SHAMEFUL UNQUOTE.

2. IN ITS FIRST EDITORIAL COMMENT ON THE STATEMENT TODAY'S NEW YORK TIMES IS OPENLY AND CONTEMPTUOUSLY HOSTILE. ENTITLED QUOTE A MINOR-LEAGUE MID EAST GAME UNQUOTE, THE LEAD EDITORIAL OPENS: QUOTE AS A DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE FROM AMERICAN DIPLOMACY, THE EUROPEAN ALLIES' PRONOUNCEMENT IN VENICE FRIDAY WAS MERELY PATHETIC.... THE EUROPEANS DID NOT EVEN HAVE THE DECENCY TO MENTION, LET ALONE ANALYSE, THAT ONE SOLID ACHIEVEMENT (CAMP DAVID) IN THE REGION SO FAR..... AS A DECLARATION OF STRATEGIC PURPOSE, THEIR DOCTRINE WAS ABSURD. UNQUOTE IT DESCRIBES THE WEST BANK AS QUOTE SEIZED BY ISRAEL IN A WAR IGNITED BY ARABS, IT IS VALIDLY CLAIMED BY BOTH UNQUOTE. WHILE OPINING THAT WISE ISRAELIS QUOTE PROBABLY INCLUDING THE NEXT (LABOUR) GOVERNMENT UNQUOTE, MAY BE BROUGHT TO RELINQUISH MUCH OF THE WEST BANK THROUGH THE FORCE OF AMERICAN DIPLOMACY AND THE PROMISE OF AMERICAN MILITARY AID, QUOTE THE ISRAELIS WILL NEVER HEED EVEN THE U S IF AMERICAS OWN CONFLICTED (SIC) MIDDLE EAST DIPLOMACY COMES TO BE SEEN AS DRIVEN LARGELY BY REBELLIOUS WESTERN ALLIES UNQUOTE.

3. THE WASHINGTON POST GIVES MORE SPACE TO KING HUSSEIN'S FORTHCOMING VISIT. IN A FRONT PAGE ARTICLE ENTITLED QUOTE CARTER PROMISES TO TRY INVOLVING HUSSEIN IN TALKS UNQUOTE, IT QUOTES FURTHER EXTRACTS FROM PRESIDENT CARTER'S INTERVIEW ON 13 JUNE WITH REPRESENTATIVES OF AMERICAN JEWISH NEWSPAPERS. QUOTE I (CARTER) WILL CERTAINLY ENCOURAGE KING HUSSEIN TO JOIN IN THESE TALKS AS SOON AS IT IS POSSIBLE FOR HIM TO AGREE TO DO SO. HIS POSITION HAS NOT BEEN ONE OF CO-OPERATION ON THE CAMP DAVID ACCORDS SO FAR. ONE OF THE REASONS THAT HE STATES IS THAT HE WAS NOT ADEQUATELY CONSULTED BEFORE THE TERMS OF THE CAMP DAVID ACCORDS WERE REACHED... AND THAT THIS IS AN AGREEMENT DEMANDING THAT HE JOINS THE TALKS WHEN HE WAS NOT INVOLVED IN THE DECISION ITSELF. BUT THIS WILL BE THE FIRST TIME I'VE MET PERSONALLY

| WITH

WITH KING HUSSEIN SINCE CAMP DAVID, AND I'LL USE ALL THE PERSUASIVE POWER THAT I HAVE TO ENCOURAGE HIM WITHIN THE BOUNDS OF HIS OWN DECISION - HE REPRESENTS AN INDEPENDANT NATION - TO BE CONSTRUCTIVE IN BRINGING ABOUT A COMPREHENSIVE PEACE, AND I'LL TRY TO CONVINCCE HIM THAT THE BEST PROCEDURE FOR DOING THIS IS IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE CAMP DAVID ACCORD ITSELF UNQUOTE.

4. HUSSEIN IS ALSO THE SUBJECT OF A FAIRLY VICIOUS CARTOON AND OF A NOT UNHELPFUL PIECE ON THE OP-ED PAGE IN TODAY'S WASHINGTON POST. BOTH FOLLOW BY BAG(FCO AND AMMAN ONLY)

FCO PASS SAVING TO BRUSSELS, COPENHAGEN, DUBLIN, LUXEMBOURG, THE HAGUE, UKREP BRUSSELS, BEIRUT, DAMASCUS, JEDDA, HMCG JERUSALEM.

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TO PRIORITY F C O

TELEGRAM NO 2251 OF 14 JUNE

INFO PRIORITY CAIRO, TEL AVIV, AMMAN, EC POSTS

INFO SAVING DAMASCUS, BEIRUT, JEDDA, UKMIS NEW YORK, HMCJ JERUSALEM

MIPT (SAVING TO EC POSTS): EUROPEAN STATEMENT ON THE MIDDLE EAST

1. WHEN THE DUST SETTLES AFTER WHAT IS FELT HERE AS A EUROPEAN ERUPTION, I THINK THAT THE INTERNATIONAL LANDSCAPE WILL HAVE BEEN SEEN TO HAVE UNDERGONE A CONSIDERABLE CHANGE.

2. THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, WHICH HAS NOT HITHERTO FEATURED PROMINENTLY IN AMERICAN EYES AS A FORCE IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS, HAS AT LAST BEEN PUT ON THE MAP. NO PREVIOUS COMMUNITY DISCUSSION ON FOREIGN POLICY HAS RECEIVED SUCH ADVANCE PUBLICITY HERE. MUSKIE SAW FIT TO DEVOTE 80 PER CENT OF HIS PRESS CONFERENCE YESTERDAY TO WHAT EUROPE IS DOING ON THIS SUBJECT.

3. AS THE WASHINGTON POST PUTS IT ON ITS FRONT PAGE: "THESE STATEMENTS REPRESENT THE NINE NATION EUROPEAN COMMON MARKET'S BOLDEST ASSERTION OF A SPECIAL ROLE IN THE MIDDLE EAST". THE NEW YORK TIMES FRONT PAGE REPORT SIMILARLY NOTES THAT SOME OF THE EUROPEAN LEADERS "CLEARLY SAW THE DECLARATION AS A SIGN THAT THE COMMON MARKET WAS BEGINNING TO FORMULATE A EUROPEAN FOREIGN POLICY INDEPENDENT OF THE UNITED STATES".

FCO PASS SAVING DAMASCUS, BEIRUT, JEDDA, HMCJ JERUSALEM

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TO PRIORITY FCO

TELEGRAM NO 2250 OF 14 JUNE

INFO PRIORITY CAIRO TEL AVIV AMMAN

INFO SAVING EC POSTS DAMASCUS BEIRUT JEDDA UKMIS NEW YORK
HMCG JERUSALEM

ms.

MY TEL NO 2247: EUROPEAN STATEMENT ON THE MIDDLE EAST

1. THE FIRST REACTION OF THE US PRESS AND RADIO IS RESTRAINED AND UNPOLEMICAL: AND IN THIS THEY ARE REFLECTING WHAT THEY TAKE TO BE MUSKIE'S STANCE. THE NEW YORK TIMES WRITES THAT HIS COMMENTS TO THE PRESS YESTERDAY INDICATED QUOTE WIDESPREAD RELIEF IN THE ADMINISTRATION THAT THE VENICE MEETING OF THE COMMON MARKET MEMBERS TOOK WHAT THEY REGARDED HERE AS A MIDDLE POSITION THAT, WHILE CONTRARY TO SOME AMERICAN POLICIES, ALSO FALLS SHORT OF MEETING THE MAXIMUM ARAB DEMANDS UNQUOTE.

2. THE WASHINGTON POST SUMS IT UP THUS: QUOTE THE UNSPOKEN IMPLICATION OF HIS COMMENTS WAS THAT THE EUROPEANS HAD GONE OUT OF THEIR WAY TO AVOID A FIGHT WITH THE US AND HAD COME UP WITH A DOCUMENT FAR LESS OBJECTIONABLE THAN US POLICY MAKERS ORIGINALLY FEARED WOULD BE THE CASE UNQUOTE.

3. IT IS OBVIOUSLY TOO EARLY TO LEAP TO FIRM CONCLUSIONS ABOUT HOW THE US ADMINISTRATION ARE GOING TO HANDLE THE FOLLOW-UP TO THE EUROPEAN STATEMENT. THE PRESIDENT HIMSELF MADE A NOT VERY HELPFUL REMARK TO JEWISH EDITORS YESTERDAY WHEN HE EXPRESSED SATISFACTION AT THE SUCCESS OF AMERICAN EFFORTS IN RIDING THE EUROPEANS OFF. A GOOD DEAL WILL, I THINK, DEPEND UPON HOW THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT AND THE JEWISH COMMUNITY HERE COME TO JUDGE IT.

4. MUSKIE HAS LEFT HIMSELF ROOM TO GO EITHER WAY, BUT, GIVEN THE WAY THE EUROPEAN STATEMENT IS COUCHED, AND THE INITIAL RESPONSES HERE, THERE ARE NO GROUNDS AT THE MOMENT FOR THINKING THAT HE IS GOING TO TURN MARKEDLY MORE CRITICAL.

5. PLEASE SEE MIFT.

FCO PASS SAVING BONN BRUSSELS COPENHAGEN DUBLIN LUXEMBOURG
PARIS ROME THE HAGUE UKREP BRUSSELS DAMASCUS BEIRUT JEDDA
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TO IMMEDIATE TEL AVIV
TELEGRAM NUMBER 95 OF 14 JUNE
INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON CAIRO

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**PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE**

SERIAL No. *T127/80*

*h
Rud*

EUROPEAN COUNCIL : MIDDLE EAST

PLEASE PASS THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO MR BEGIN AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. NEWS DEPARTMENT WILL REVEAL THE FACT OF THE MESSAGE IF ASKED, BUT NOT ITS CONTENT. YOU SHOULD INFORM THE PRESIDENCY THAT YOU ARE PASSING A MESSAGE WHICH WILL BE COMPLEMENTARY TO THE PRESIDENCY'S OWN EFFORTS, BUT SHOULD NOT REVEAL TO THEM ITS CONTENTS.

BEGINS:

DEAR PRIME MINISTER,

YOU WILL HAVE SEEN THE TEXT OF THE STATEMENT ISSUED BY THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL IN VENICE TODAY. I THOUGHT IT IMPORTANT TO GET IN TOUCH WITH YOU STRAIGHTAWAY TO EXPLAIN OUR THINKING FIRST AND FOREMOST I WISH TO EMPHASIZE THAT IT IS NO PART OF OUR PURPOSE TO CRITICIZE OR INTERFERE WITH THE CAMP DAVID PROCESS. WE CONTINUE TO WISH IT WELL. NOR IS IT OUR INTENTION IN ANY WAY TO IMPOSE TERMS ON ISRAEL: ISRAEL'S FUTURE IS YOUR RESPONSIBILITY AND IT IS NOT FOR US TO INTERFERE IN THIS.

I KNOW SOME ASPECTS OF OUR DECLARATION WILL BE VERY DIFFICULT FOR YOU TO ACCEPT BUT WE THOUGHT IT RIGHT TO MAKE CLEAR PUBLICLY AT THIS STAGE OUR OWN VIEW OF HOW A LASTING PEACE SETTLEMENT CAN BEST BE REACHED. WE WISH TO CREATE A BETTER ATMOSPHERE FOR PEACE EFFORTS SO THAT ALL CONCERNED CAN FEEL ABLE TO PARTICIPATE IN THEM. OUR OBJECTIVE REMAINS A SETTLEMENT WHICH WILL ENABLE ISRAEL TO TAKE HER RIGHTFUL PLACE AS AN ACCEPTED AND RESPECTED MEMBER OF THE MIDDLE EAST AND INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITIES.

IT IS MY PROFOUND HOPE THAT THE MISSION WHICH IS TO CARRY OUT SOUNDINGS WITH THE INTERESTED PARTIES ON THE NINE'S BEHALF WILL BE ABLE TO HAVE A PRODUCTIVE EXCHANGE WITH YOUR GOVERNMENT. THIS WILL BE AN OPPORTUNITY TO ESTABLISH A CONSTRUCTIVE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ISRAEL AND THE NINE, INCLUDING BRITAIN, AND PUT ANY MISUNDERSTANDINGS WHICH HAVE ARISEN FIRMLY BEHIND US.

ENDS:

CARRINGTON

DEPARTMENTAL DIST
NENAD PS/MR HURD
MED PS/PUS
NEWS, D PS/SIR D. MAITLAND
PS MR BULLARD
PS/LPS MR J.C. MOBERLY

ADDITIONAL DIST:
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PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE

SERIAL No. *T128/80*

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DESKBY 150700Z
FM FCO 142011Z JUN 80
TO IMMEDIATE CAIRO
TEL NO 241 OF 14 JUNE 1980
INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON TEL AVIV

for Amul

EUROPEAN COUNCIL: MIDDLE EAST

1. PLEASE PASS THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO PRESIDENT SADAT AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. NEWS DEPARTMENT WILL REVEAL THE FACT OF THE MESSAGE IF ASKED BUT NOT ITS CONTENTS. YOU SHOULD INFORM THE PRESIDENCY THAT YOU ARE PASSING A MESSAGE WHICH WILL BE COMPLEMENTARY TO THEIR OWN EFFORTS BUT SHOULD NOT REVEAL ITS CONTENTS:

BEGINS:

DEAR PRESIDENT SADAT, YOU WILL HAVE SEEN THE TEXT OF THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL STATEMENT ON THE MIDDLE EAST ISSUED IN VENICE TODAY. PETER CARRINGTON AND I HAVE BEEN ABLE TO EXCHANGE VIEWS WITH VICE-PRESIDENT MUBARAK AND DR KHALIL IN RECENT DAYS BUT I WANTED TO EXPRESS TO YOU PERSONALLY MY HOPE THAT THIS STATEMENT WILL BE HELPFUL TO IN YOUR CONTINUING SEARCH FOR PEACE. I BELIEVE THAT IT WILL BE: WE HAVE TAKEN CAREFUL NOTE OF YOU CONCERNS AND I THINK HAVE HAD SOME SUCCESS IN MEETING THEM. IT IS OF COURSE NO PART OF OUR PURPOSE TO CRITICISE OR INTERFERE WITH THE CAMP DAVID PROCESS IN ANY WAY. WE CONTINUE TO WISH YOUR EFFORTS WELL.

THE PURPOSE OF THE MISSION WHICH WILL BE IN TOUCH WITH ALL THE PARTIES CONCERNED WILL BE TO EXPLORE HOW SELF-DETERMINATION FOR THE PALESTINIANS CAN BE RECONCILED WITH ISRAELS SECURITY CONCERNS. I KNOW YOU ARE WORKING TOWARDS THE SAME OBJECTIVE. THE NEED FOR FURTHER PROGRESS TOWARDS A LASTING PEACE SETTLEMENT IS URGENT: WE MUST WORK TOGETHER, FOR ALL OUR ENERGIES MUST BE COMBINED IF WE ARE TO ACHIEVE THE GOAL OF PEACE. I HOPE WE CAN STAY IN CLOSE TOUCH.

ENDS.

CARRINGTON

DEPARTMENTAL DIST:

NEWAD PS/MA. HURD
MED PS/PUS
NEWS.D PS/SIR.D. MAITLAND
PS MR BULLARD
PS/LPS MR J.C. MOBERLY

ADDITIONAL DIST:
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NO 10 DOWNING ST

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Middle East



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

14 June 1980

Fils sent.

fg. Am?

Prime Minister.

The Duty Clerk
No 10 Downing Street

Approve the drafts?

Dear Duty Clerk,

Approve all drafts

*J.S.L. Laing P.
Duty Clerk.
14.6.80.*

EUROPEAN COUNCIL: ARAB/ISRAEL

I understand it was agreed after the conclusion of the European Council in Venice that it might be desirable for the Prime Minister to send messages to President Sadat and Mr Begin. I attach draft telegrams containing such messages, which have been approved by the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary.

I also attach copies of the drafts of two telegrams to Beirut and Jedda, which contain messages from Lord Carrington to Mr Butros and Prince Saud respectively.

Finally, I enclose a copy of a draft telegram which we propose to send to ~~other~~ posts in the Middle East, giving guidance on the discussions which took place in Venice and the statement which was agreed on.

I apologise for the fact that the drafts I am enclosing contain some manuscript amendments. But the changes made are all legible, and I considered it better to send you the drafts in their present state without delay.

Yours ever,

J S Laing
Resident Clerk

Department NEWS

OUTWARD

Drafted by
(Block Capitals) J E HOLMES

TELEGRAM

Tel. Extn. 233 3736

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		(Time)ZZ

PREAMBLE

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Copies to
Mr. Alexander,
Downing St.

[TEXT]

EUORPEAN COUNCIL: MIDDLE EAST

1. Please pass the following message from the Prime Minister to President Sadat as soon as possible. News Department will reveal the fact of the message ^{if asked} but not its contents. You should inform the Presidency that you are passing a message ^{which will be} complementary to their own efforts but should not reveal its contents:

Begins:

"Dear President Sadat, You will have seen the text of the European Council statement on the Middle East issued in Venice today. Peter Carrington and I have been able to exchange views with Vice-President Mubarak and Dr Khalil in recent days but I wanted to express to

you personally my hope that this statement will be helpful to you in your continuing search for peace. I believe that it will be; we have taken careful note of your concerns and I think have had some success in meeting them. It is of course no part of our purpose to criticise or interfere with the Camp David process in any way. We continue to wish your efforts well.

The purpose of the mission which will be in touch with all the parties concerned will be to explore how self-determination for the Palestinians can be reconciled with Israel's security concerns. I know you are working towards the same objective. The need for further progress towards a lasting peace settlement is urgent; we must work together, for all our energies must be combined if we are to achieve the goal of peace. I hope we can stay in close touch.

Ends.

Agreed not

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

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Drafted by
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MR BULLARD
MR J MOBERLY
Addn'it Dist
ARAB/ISRAEL

Copies to:-

Mr Alexander,
10 Downing Street

[TEXT] EUROPEAN COUNCIL : MIDDLE EAST

Please pass the following message from the Prime Minister to Mr Begin as soon as possible. News Department will reveal the fact of the message if asked, but not its contents. You should inform the Presidency that you are passing a message which will be complementary to the Presidency's own efforts, but should not reveal to them its contents.

Begin:

"Dear Prime Minister,

You will have seen the text of the statement issued by the European Council ^{in Venice} today. I thought it important to get in touch with you straightway to explain our thinking

/First

First and foremost I wish to emphasize that it is no part of our purpose to criticize or interfere with the Camp David process. We continue to wish ^{it} well. Nor is it our intention in any way to impose terms on Israel;

Israel's future is your responsibility and it is not for us to interfere in this. ^{//np} I know some aspects of our declaration will be very difficult for you to accept but we thought ^{it} right to make clear publicly at this stage our own view of how a lasting peace settlement can ^{best} be reached. We wish to create a better atmosphere for peace efforts so that all concerned can feel able to participate in them. Our objective remains a settlement which will enable Israel to take her rightful place as an accepted and respected member of ~~both~~ the Middle East and international communities.

It is my profound hope that the mission which is to carry out soundings with the interested parties ^{on the Nine's behalf} will be able to have a productive exchange with your government. This will be an opportunity to establish a constructive relationship between Israel and the Nine, including Britain, and put any misunderstandings which have arisen firmly behind us."

Ends

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

Department
Drafted by
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Tel. Extn.

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TELEGRAM

Security Classification CONFIDENTIAL
Precedence FLASH
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MR J MOBERLY
Additional dist
ARAB/ISRAEL
Copies to:-
Mr Alexander
10 Downing St

[TEXT]

EUROPEAN COUNCIL: MIDDLE EAST

1. Please pass the following message from the Secretary of State to Mr Butros. News Department will reveal the fact of the message ^{if asked} but not its content. You should inform the Presidency that you are taking action to complement their efforts, but should not reveal the message's contents:

Begins: 'You will no doubt have seen by ^{now} the text of the European Council statement issued today in Venice. As you will see, we have had very much in mind Lebanon's concerns. The Nine are in doubt that any settlement in the Middle East must not be at Lebanon's expense.'

I hope the Nine will be able to cooperate closely with Lebanon in ~~establishing~~^{exploring} how progress can now be made towards a comprehensive settlement.

Contacts with your government will be an important part of the task of the mission which is to consult with all interested parties. We must all work together in the interests of peace.' Ends

mb

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

Department NENAD
Drafted by J E HOLMES
(Block Capitals)
Tel. Extn. 233 3736

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PS/Mr Hurd
PS/PUS
PS/Sir D Maitland
Mr Bullard
Mr J C Moberly

Addnl Distn
Arab/Israel
Copies to:-

Mr Alexander, 10
Downing Street

[TEXT]

EUROPEAN COUNCIL: MIDDLE EAST

1. Please pass the following message from the Secretary of State to ~~Crown~~ Prince ^{SAUD} ~~Fahd~~ as soon as possible. News Department will reveal the fact of the message but not its contents. You should inform the Presidency that you are passing a message which will be complementary to their efforts, but should not reveal its contents:


/Begins:

Ends:

Your Royal Highness, I have asked Mr Gray to pass you the text of the European Council statement issued in Venice today. Our intention in issuing a statement is to make a contribution towards the comprehensive peace settlement which is so urgently needed.

I hope that the Nine can now work together with you towards the common goal of peace. I know of your concern that the Europeans should help. An important element in the consultations to be undertaken (on behalf of the Nine) will be to establish how Palestinian self-determination can be implemented and reconciled with the needs and concerns of the other interested parties, notably Israel. I know we will value highly Saudi Arabia's views and influence and I hope that we can work closely together in the search for a solution to this problem.

Ends.



NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

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Additional dist
ARAB/ISRAEL

[TEXT]

EUROPEAN COUNCIL: MIDDLE EAST

1. You should ^{now have} received ~~shortly~~ the text of the European Council statement on the Middle East issued in Venice today. We attach considerable importance to its presentation, ~~of the statement~~. We hope to issue ~~formal and~~ general guidance shortly. In the meantime you should be guided by the line taken with the press by the Prime Minister and Secretary of State and Mr Hurd's speech to the Institute of Jewish Affairs. You may also find the preliminary thoughts below helpful. You should liaise closely with your EEC colleagues, particularly the Presidency. No formal decision was taken at the Council on the mechanics of how relevant governments should be informed or on the line that should be taken with them.

Clear' the Presidency should take the lead but, depending on local circumstances, you should reinforce and steer them to the extent possible. Presentation is complicated by the ~~very~~ different views of the various parties but it is important that we should achieve a reasonable degree of consistency.

2. The statement develops the Nine's common position on the principles of a settlement in two principal respects:

i) reference is made to self-determination by name for the first time in a statement by the Nine (Mr O'Kennedy's statement of 25 September 1979 referred to the Palestinians' right to determine their own future as a people). Several members of the Nine, including Britain, have supported this concept already. It reflects our belief that any peace settlement not acceptable to the Palestinians as a whole ~~will not be acceptable~~ ^{cannot last.}

ii) the reference by Mr O'Kennedy to the need for all those involved, including the PLO, to accept the principles adhered to by the Nine has been built on to make clear that the PLO will have to be involved in negotiations. This is a recognition of the reality of the political role which the PLO play. It does not in any sense constitute official recognition or exclusive status.

The remainder of the substance of the statement is essentially a reiteration of previous positions of the Nine.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

3. The statement ~~also~~ marks a decision by the Nine to play a more active role in efforts to solve the Arab/Israel conflict. We are not seeking to replace the Americans or to hinder their efforts. Full US involvement is essential if a solution is to be possible. But Europe cannot stand back from the problems of the area: the dangers of inaction are too great. We are seeking to establish conditions in which urgently needed progress towards a comprehensive settlement can be made.

4. The composition and mandate of the mission to ~~carry~~ ^{carry} out soundings of the parties concerned on the Nine's behalf have not yet been decided in detail, but it will probably be a small team headed by a political figure (for your information the Luxembourg Foreign Minister, Gaston Thorn, is the most likely candidate; Luxembourg will hold the Nine's Presidency from July-December 1980). It will wish to have contacts with at least the three Camp David parties, the leading states on the Arab side, the Arab League, the PLO and representatives of the West Bankers. Its task will be to explore their positions in detail with a view to determining how the Nine should act subsequently. It will concentrate on three questions:

(i) how can Palestinian self-determination be put into practice and reconciled with the interests of the other parties, notably Israel;

(ii) how can Israel's fears for her long-term security be met in order to permit a lasting settlement;

(iii) how can eventual multilateral talks be got under way.

All options for the future remain open, including Security Council action (although this is most unlikely while the US Presidential election campaign continues).

5. The Prime Minister is sending personal messages to Mr Begin and President Sadat and I will speak to King Hussein, who is currently in London. I am ^{also} sending a message to Secretary Muskie. We are considering whether other messages would be helpful. Other posts will wish to establish what action the Presidency are taking before deciding whether to speak to their host governments separately.

GRS 800
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FM VENICE 131410Z JUN 80
TO FLASH FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 20 OF 13 JUNE
INFO FLASH WASHINGTON, IMMEDIATE TOKYO, ALL EC POSTS, UKDEL NATO,
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DHABI, RABAT, TRIPOLI, SANA'A, KHARTOUM, ALGIERS, DOHA, BAHRAIN,
ADEN, BAGHDAD, KUWAIT, MOGADISHU, TEHRAN, ROUTINE MOSCOW, UKDEL
STRASBOURG.

EUROPEAN COUNCIL, VENICE, 12/13 JUNE

MIDDLE EAST

FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF EUROPEAN COUNCIL DECLARATION ON THE
MIDDLE EAST:

QUOTE

1. THE HEADS OF STATE AND GOVERNMENT AND THE MINISTERS OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS HELD A COMPREHENSIVE EXCHANGE OF VIEWS ON ALL ASPECTS OF THE PRESENT SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST, INCLUDING THE STATE OF NEGOTIATIONS RESULTING FROM THE AGREEMENTS SIGNED BETWEEN EGYPT AND ISRAEL IN MARCH 1979. THEY AGREED THAT GROWING TENSIONS AFFECTING THIS REGION CONSTITUTE A SERIOUS DANGER AND RENDER A COMPREHENSIVE SOLUTION TO THE ISRAELI-ARAB CONFLICT MORE NECESSARY AND PRESSING THAN EVER.
2. THE NINE MEMBER STATES OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY CONSIDER THAT THE TRADITIONAL TIES AND COMMON INTERESTS WHICH LINK EUROPE TO THE MIDDLE EAST OBLIGE THEM TO PLAY A SPECIAL ROLE AND NOW REQUIRE THEM TO WORK IN A MORE CONCRETE WAY TOWARDS PEACE.
3. IN THE REGARD, THE NINE COUNTRIES OF THE COMMUNITY BASE THEMSELVES ON SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS 242 AND 338 AND THE POSITIONS WHICH THEY HAVE EXPRESSED ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS, NOTABLY IN THEIR DECLARATIONS OF 29 JUNE 1977, 19 SEPTEMBER 1978, 26 MARCH AND 18 JUNE 1979, AS WELL AS IN THE SPEECH MADE ON THEIR BEHALF ON 25 SEPTEMBER 1979 BY THE IRISH MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AT THE 34TH UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY.
4. ON THE BASES THUS SET OUT, THE TIME HAS COME TO PROMOTE THE RECOGNITION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF THE TWO PRINCIPLES UNIVERSALLY ACCEPTED BY THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY: THE RIGHT TO EXISTENCE AND TO SECURITY OF ALL THE STATES IN THE REGION, INCLUDING ISRAEL, AND JUSTICE FOR ALL THE PEOPLES, WHICH IMPLIES THE RECOGNITION OF THE LEGITIMATE RIGHTS OF THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE.
5. ALL OF THE COUNTRIES IN THE AREA ARE ENTITLED TO LIVE IN PEACE WITHIN SECURE, RECOGNIZED AND GUARANTEED BORDERS. THE NECESSARY GUARANTEES FOR A PEACE SETTLEMENT SHOULD BE PROVIDED BY THE UN BY A DECISION OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND, IF NECESSARY, ON THE BASIS OF OTHER MUTUALLY AGREED PROCEDURES. THE NINE DECLARE THAT THEY ARE PREPARED TO PARTICIPATE WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF A COMPREHENSIVE SETTLEMENT IN A SYSTEM OF CONCRETE AND BINDING INTERNATIONAL GUARANTEES, INCLUDING ON THE GROUND.
6. A JUST SOLUTION MUST FINALLY BE FOUND TO THE PALESTINIAN PROBLEM, WHICH IS NOT SIMPLY ONE OF REFUGEES. THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE, WHICH IS CONSCIOUS OF EXISTING AS SUCH, MUST BE PLACED IN A POSITION, BY AN APPROPRIATE PROCESS DEFINED WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE COMPREHENSIVE PEACE SETTLEMENT, TO EXERCISE FULLY ITS RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION.
7. THE ACHIEVEMENT OF THESE OBJECTIVES REQUIRES THE INVOLVEMENT AND SUPPORT OF ALL THE PARTIES CONCERNED IN THE PEACE SETTLEMENT WHICH THE NINE ARE ENDEAVOURING TO PROMOTE IN KEEPING WITH THE PRINCIPLES FORMULATED IN THE DECLARATION REFERRED TO ABOVE. THESE PRINCIPLES ARE BINDING ON ALL THE PARTIES CONCERNED, AND THUS THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE, AND ON THE PLO, WHICH WILL HAVE TO BE ASSOCIATED WITH THE NEGOTIATIONS.

*Original a Euro P82,
Venice Council Pt 4
Middle East*

8

8. THE NINE RECOGNIZE THE SPECIAL IMPORTANCE OF THE ROLE PLAYED BY THE QUESTION OF JERUSALEM FOR ALL THE PARTIES CONCERNED. THE NINE STRESS THAT THEY WILL NOT ACCEPT ANY UNILATERAL INITIATIVE DESIGNED TO CHANGE THE STATUS OF JERUSALEM AND THAT ANY AGREEMENT ON THE CITY'S STATUS SHOULD GUARANTEE FREEDOM OF ACCESS FOR EVERYONE TO THE HOLY PLACES.

9. THE NINE STRESS THE NEED FOR ISRAEL TO PUT AN END TO THE TERRITORIAL OCCUPATION WHICH IT HAS MAINTAINED SINCE THE CONFLICT OF 1967, AS IT HAS DONE FOR PART OF SINAI. THEY ARE DEEPLY CONVINCED THAT THE ISRAELI SETTLEMENTS CONSTITUTE A SERIOUS OBSTACLE TO THE PEACE PROCESS IN THE MIDDLE EAST. THE NINE CONSIDER THAT THESE SETTLEMENTS, AS WELL AS MODIFICATIONS IN POPULATION AND PROPERTY IN THE OCCUPIED ARAB TERRITORIES, ARE ILLEGAL UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW.

10. CONCERNED AS THEY ARE TO PUT AN END TO VIOLENCE, THE NINE CONSIDER THAT ONLY THE RENUNCIATION OF FORCE OR THE THREATENED USE OF FORCE BY ALL THE PARTIES CAN CREATE A CLIMATE OF CONFIDENCE IN THE AREA, AND CONSTITUTE A BASIC ELEMENT FOR A COMPREHENSIVE SETTLEMENT OF THE CONFLICT IN THE MIDDLE EAST.

11. THE NINE HAVE DECIDED TO MAKE THE NECESSARY CONTACTS WITH ALL THE PARTIES CONCERNED. THE OBJECTIVE OF THESE CONTACTS WOULD BE TO ASCERTAIN THE POSITION OF THE VARIOUS PARTIES WITH RESPECT TO THE PRINCIPLES SET OUT IN THIS DECLARATION AND IN THE LIGHT OF THE RESULTS OF THIS CONSULTATION PROCESS TO DETERMINE THE FORM WHICH AN INITIATIVE ON THEIR PART COULD TAKE.

UNQUOTE

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DOHA BAHRAIN ADEN BAGHDAD KUWAIT MOGADISHU TEHRAN MOSCOW UKDEL
STRASBOURG.

EUROPEAN COUNCIL, VENICE, 12/13 JUNE
LEBANON.

1. FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF EUROPEAN COUNCIL DECLARATION ON THE
LEBANON: QUOTE
THE NINE AFFIRM ONCE AGAIN THEIR FULL AND COMPLETE SOLIDARITY
WITH THE FRIENDLY COUNTRY OF THE LEBANON WHOSE STABILITY
REMAINS DANGEROUSLY THREATENED BY CONFRONTATIONS IN THE REGION,
AND RENEW THEIR URGENT APPEAL TO ALL THE COUNTRIES OR PARTIES
CONCERNED TO PUT AN END TO ALL ACTS LIABLE TO DAMAGE THE
INDEPENDANCE, SOVEREIGNTY AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF LEBANON
OR THE AUTHORITY OF ITS GOVERNMENT. THE NINE WILL SUPPORT ANY
ACTION OR INITIATIVE WHICH COULD ENSURE THE RETURN OF PEACE AND
STABILITY OF THE LEBANON, WHICH CONSTITUTES AN ESSENTIAL STABIL-
ISING FACTOR IN THE REGION.

THE NINE STRESS THE IMPORTANT ROLE WHICH UNIFIL MUST PLAY
IN THE SOUTHERN PART OF LEBANON. THE NINE RECALL THEIR DECLARATION
OF 22 APRIL 1980 AT LUXEMBOURG AND STRESS THAT IT IS ESSENTIAL
THAT ALL THE PARTIES CONCERNED PERMIT UNIFIL TO CARRY OUT THE
TASKS WITH WHICH IT HAS BEEN CHARGED, INCLUDING THE CONTROL
OF THE TERRITORY UP TO THE INTERNATIONAL FRONTIER. UNQUOTE.

EILBECK

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EUROPEAN COUNCIL DECLARATION ON THE MIDDLE EAST

1. The Heads of State and Government and the Ministers of Foreign Affairs held a comprehensive exchange of views on all aspects of the present situation in the Middle East, including the state of negotiations resulting from the agreements signed between Egypt and Israel in March 1979. They agreed that growing tensions affecting this region constitute a serious danger and render a comprehensive solution to the Israeli-Arab conflict more necessary and pressing than ever.
2. The Nine Member States of the European Community consider that the traditional ties and common interests which link Europe to the Middle East oblige them to play a special role and now require them to work in a more concrete way towards peace.
3. In this regard, the Nine countries of the Community base themselves on Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 and the positions which they have expressed on several occasions, notably in their declarations of 29 June 1977, 19 September 1978, 26 March and 18 June 1979, as well as in the speech made on their behalf on 25 September 1979 by the Irish Minister of Foreign Affairs at the 34th United Nations General Assembly.
4. On the bases thus set out, the time has come to promote the recognition and implementation of the two principles universally accepted by the international community: the right to existence and to security of all the states in the region, including Israel, and justice for all the peoples, which implies the recognition of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people.
5. All of the countries in the area are entitled to live in peace within secure, recognised and guaranteed borders. The necessary guarantees for a peace settlement should be provided by the UN by a decision of the Security Council and, if necessary, on the basis of other mutually agreed procedures. The Nine declare that they are prepared to participate within the framework of a comprehensive settlement in a system of concrete and binding international guarantees, including on the ground.
6. A just solution must finally be found to the Palestinian problem, which is not simply one of refugees. The Palestinian people, which is conscious of existing as such, must be placed in a position, by an appropriate process defined within the framework

/of the

of the comprehensive peace settlement, to exercise fully its right to self-determination.

7. The achievement of these objectives requires the involvement and support of all the parties concerned in the peace settlement which the Nine are endeavouring to promote in keeping with the principles formulated in the declaration referred to above. These principles must be respected by all the parties concerned, and thus by the Palestinian people, and by the PLO, which will have to be associated with negotiations.

8. The Nine recognise the special importance of the role played by the question of Jerusalem, for all the parties concerned. The Nine stress that they will not accept any unilateral initiative designed to change the status of Jerusalem and that any agreement on the city's status should guarantee freedom of access for everyone to the Holy Places.

9. The Nine stress the need for Israel to put an end to the territorial occupation which it has maintained since the conflict of 1967, as it has done for part of Sinai. They are deeply convinced that the Israeli settlements constitute a serious obstacle to the peace process in the Middle East. The Nine consider that these settlements, as well as modifications in population and property in the occupied Arab territories, are illegal under international law.

10. Concerned as they are to put an end to violence, the Nine consider that the renunciation of force or the threatened use of force by all the parties can create a climate of confidence in the area, and constitute a basic element for a comprehensive settlement of the conflict in the Middle East.

11. The Nine have decided to make the necessary contacts with all the parties concerned. The objective of these contacts would be to ascertain the position of the various parties with respect to the principles set out in this declaration and in the light of the results of this consultation process to determine the form which an initiative on their part could take.

VENICE, 13 JUNE 1980

UNITED NATIONS
SECURITY
COUNCIL



Distr.
GENERAL

S/RES/242 (1967)
22 November 1967

RESOLUTION 242 (1967)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 1382nd meeting,
on 22 November 1967

The Security Council,

Expressing its continuing concern with the grave situation in the Middle East,
Emphasizing the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war and the need to work for a just and lasting peace in which every State in the area can live in security,

Emphasizing further that all Member States in their acceptance of the Charter of the United Nations have undertaken a commitment to act in accordance with Article 2 of the Charter,

1. Affirms that the fulfilment of Charter principles requires the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East which should include the application of both the following principles:

(i) Withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict;

(ii) Termination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for and acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every State in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force;

2. Affirms further the necessity

(a) For guaranteeing freedom of navigation through international waterways in the area;

(b) For achieving a just settlement of the refugee problem;

(c) For guaranteeing the territorial inviolability and political independence of every State in the area, through measures including the establishment of demilitarized zones;

67-27626

3. Requests the Secretary-General to designate a Special Representative to proceed to the Middle East to establish and maintain contacts with the States concerned in order to promote agreement and assist efforts to achieve a peaceful and accepted settlement in accordance with the provisions and principles in this resolution;

4. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council on the progress of the efforts of the Special Representative as soon as possible.



UNITED NATIONS

SECURITY
COUNCIL



Distr.
GENERAL

S/RES/338 (1973)
21 October 1973

RESOLUTION 338 (1973)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 1747th meeting,
on 21/22 October 1973

The Security Council

1. Calls upon all parties to the present fighting to cease all firing and terminate all military activity immediately, no later than 12 hours after the moment of the adoption of this decision, in the positions they now occupy;
2. Calls upon the parties concerned to start immediately after the cease-fire the implementation of Security Council resolution 242 (1967) in all of its parts;
3. Decides that, immediately and concurrently with the cease-fire, negotiations start between the parties concerned under appropriate auspices aimed at establishing a just and durable peace in the Middle East.

197 JUN 1981

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RECORD OF A DISCUSSION BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER AND THE
ITALIAN PRIME MINISTER, SR COSSIGA, OVER LUNCH AT THE
PREFECTURA, VENICE, AT 1320 ON 12 JUNE

PRESENT:

Prime Minister	Sr Cossiga
The Foreign Secretary	Sr Colombo
Sir Robert Armstrong	Sr Plaja
Mr Alexander	Sr Berlinguer

PRESIDENCY OF THE COMMISSION

1. There was a brief discussion about the possible candidates to succeed Mr Jenkins as President of the European Commission. (This took place without notetakers.) In the course of the discussion it became apparent that Sr Pandolfi would not be a candidate. Sr Colombo said that the balance of the new Italian Government was such that it would be impossible to release Sr Pandolfi. The other names mentioned included Mr O'Kennedy, M. Thorn and Viscount Davignon. No consensus emerged as to which was the preferred candidate.

MIDDLE EAST

2. Sr Colombo said that the Arab/Israel question would not be the only problem in the region which was likely to be raised. He expected that the French would wish to discuss Afghanistan. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary said that he hoped the Nine could include something about Libya in the Communiqué. Sr Colombo said that this would be important for Italy. Sr Cossiga said that Italy's relations with Libya were very complex. He wondered whether a statement by the Nine would make things any easier. He thought that of the Nine, only Italy, the Federal Republic and the UK were really concerned with the Libyan problem. The Foreign Secretary pointed out that the French Embassy in Tripoli had been burnt down. It was agreed that the Foreign Ministers and Heads of Government should discuss the problem further.

3. As regards the text on the Arab/Israeli dispute, Sr Colombo said he thought the discussion of the text was likely to throw up two problems:-

- a) the references to self-determination. It would have to be made clear that these were part of an evolutionary process; and
- b) the question of whether the text should refer to a Palestinian state or a Palestinian homeland.

His own view was that it was too soon to refer to a state. The Prime Minister said that she strongly agreed with Sr Colombo on the second point.

4. Sr Colombo said that the Americans, with whom he had just been discussing the problem in Washington, would wish it to be clear that the statement of the Nine did not in any way interrupt or disturb the Camp David process. It would be important therefore for the statement to make it clear that the position taken up by Heads of Government was consistent with the positions they had taken up in the past. The present reference to preceding resolutions and statements might not be enough. The Americans would also like an explicit reference to Camp David. The existing reference in the first paragraph was too cryptic. The difficulty here was that the French would not accept an explicit reference. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary added that to include such a reference would gravely undermine the chances that the statement would be favourably received in the Middle East. The Prime Minister said that she was in favour of making it as clear as possible that the intention was not to undermine Camp David but to fill the vacuum until the Americans were able, after their elections, to resume the process of negotiation.

5. In response to a question from the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary, Sr Colombo said that he did not think the Americans would regard the statement as undermining their efforts so long as it did not propose changes in resolution 242 and so long as it did not imply that the Camp David process was exhausted or that the Europeans were taking over. The Americans had followed the evolution of European thinking on the Middle East. They would not applaud the statement but would show understanding. From the point of view of Europe's relations with the Middle East, it was of course clear that the Arabs had high expectations and that the disappointment of these expectations would be badly received. The Prime Minister remarked that there was no question of withdrawing from previous positions. It was a question of whether or not Europe moved forward.

6. Sr Colombo said that the problem of the implementation of a European initiative remained to be resolved. Who would carry out the contacts or soundings and how would it be done? He himself was hesitating between two approaches:-

- a) that the soundings should be carried out by representatives of the present Presidency, the preceding Presidency and the next Presidency; or
- b) that the present Presidency, plus three, or so, representatives or experts should be responsible.

Sr Cossiga added that there was a third possibility, viz that an eminent personality who was not a member of one of the Nine Governments, but enjoyed their confidence, should take on the task. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary said that he preferred Sr Colombo's second option. He did not think it would be possible to identify a personality who enjoyed the confidence of all Nine Governments.

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7. The discussion ended at 1415.

Prime Minister

MA 14 VI

GRS 72
UNCLASSIFIED
FM AMMAN 121005Z JUN 80
TO ROUTINE FCO
TELGRAM NUMBER 222 OF 12 JUNE 80
INFO TO BAGHDAD BEIRUT CAIRO DAMASCUS JEDDA TEL AVIV WASHINGTON
CH JERUSALEM.

ISLAMIC FOREIGN MINISTERS CONFERENCE

1. HABIB CHATTY, SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE ISLAMIC CONGRESS, WHO IS VISITING JORDAN, ANNOUNCED IN AMMAN ON 11 JUNE THAT A MEETING OF ISLAMIC FOREIGN MINISTERS CALLED BY THE PLC TO DISCUSS "LATEST DEVELOPMENTS IN THE OCCUPIED ARAB TERRITORIES", WOULD BE HELD IN JEDDA IN LATE JUNE.

URWICK

[Handwritten signature]

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TO IMMEDIATE VENICE

TELEGRAM NUMBER 17 OF 12 JUNE

FOR PS/SOS

FOLLOWING TELEGRAM NOW REPEATED TO YOU AT REQUEST OF PRIVATE OFFICE WAS RECEIVED FROM CAIRO TELEGRAM NUMBER 366 OF 11 JUNE INFO ROUTINE ROME WASHINGTON UKMIS NEW YORK UKREP BRUSSELS AND TUNIS

ARAB/ISRAEL

1. MFA UNDER-SECRETARY SALAH HASSAN TODAY SUMMONED AMBASSADORS OF WESTERN EUROPE AND CANADA TO CONVEY POINTS ABOUT EGYPT'S RELATIONS WITH ISRAEL ON THE INSTRUCTIONS OF THE FOREIGN MINISTER.
2. HE SAID THAT AMBASSADORS WOULD BE AWARE THAT THE EGYPTIANS HAD STOPPED THE NEGOTIATIONS BECAUSE OF (I) ISRAELI INSISTENCE ON CONTINUING THE POLICY OF SETTLEMENTS, AND (II) THEIR ATTITUDE ON JERUSALEM - INSTIGATING A KNESSET MEMBER TO PUT FORWARD THE RECENT PROPOSAL. NOR DID THE RECENT TERRORIST ACTION AGAINST THE MAYORS ON THE WEST BANK HELP THE ATMOSPHERE. (THE EGYPTIANS HOPED THAT ALL GOVERNMENTS WHICH HAD NOT CONDEMNED THESE TERRORISTS ACTS WOULD DO SO).
3. WHEN EGYPT/ISRAEL TALKS WERE DEADLOCKED IT WAS NECESSARY FOR THE US THIRD PARTY TO MEDIATE ACTIVELY. THE EGYPTIAN GOVERNMENT FELT THAT PRESIDENT CARTER'S PROPOSAL FOR A MEETING OF HEADS OF DELEGATION IN WASHINGTON TO DISCUSS THE OBSTACLES FACING THE NEGOTIATIONS AND TO CLEAR A WAY FOR THEIR RESUMPTION WAS ACCEPTABLE. THERE WAS TALK OF A MEETING AT THE END OF JUNE OR BEGINNING OF JULY BUT HASSAN EMPHASISED THAT THE EGYPTIANS HAD NOT YET AGREED A DATE.

4. THE EGYPTIAN GOVERNMENT WERE NOT AT ALL OPPOSED TO EUROPEAN, OR INDEED AFRICAN OR ASIAN, INITIATIVES, PROVIDED THESE FITTED IN WITH, PUSHED ALONG AND DID NOT COMPLICATE WHAT WAS ALREADY BEING DONE IN THE CAMP DAVID FRAMEWORK. ANY PROPOSALS SHOULD TAKE CAMP DAVID INTO ACCOUNT AND THE EGYPTIANS HOPED THAT ANY DECLARATION IN VENICE WOULD SPECIFICALLY MENTION CAMP DAVID BY NAME.

5. SALAH HASSAN SAID THAT THE EGYPTIANS HAD ALSO NOTED EUROPEAN STATEMENTS ON THE NECESSITY AND IMPORTANCE OF ACTIVITY IN THE EURO/ARAB DIALOGUE. HOWEVER ANY REACTIVATION OF THIS DIALOGUE AT THIS TIME WOULD NOT HELP THE PEACE PROCESS OR EGYPT'S POSITION. IF THERE WAS A NEED FOR DIALOGUE IT SHOULD BE BETWEEN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES AND ALL THE COUNTRIES OF THE ARAB WORLD, EXCLUDING NONE.

6. ALTHOUGH THERE WERE A NUMBER OF NON-EC AMBASSADORS PRESENT, (AND THERE ARE TO BE SIMILAR BRIEFINGS OF OTHER AMBASSADORS), SALAM HASSAN'S DEMARCHE SEEMED TO BE PRIMARILY AIMED AT THE VENICE SUMMIT. HE HOPED THAT THE VENICE MEETING WOULD BE FRUITFUL AND CONSTRUCTIVE. EUROPEAN RELATIONS WITH THE ARAB WORLD WENT BACK LONGER THAN THOSE OF ANY OTHER REGION AND THE EGYPTIANS WERE GRATEFUL FOR EUROPEAN EFFORTS IN THE DIRECTION OF PEACE.

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FM CAIRO 111215Z JUN 8

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 366 OF 11 JUNE

INFO ROUTINE ROME WASHINGTON UKMIS NEW YORK UKREP BRUSSELS AND
TUNIS

ARAB/ISRAEL

1. MFA UNDER-SECRETARY SALAH HASSAN TODAY SUMMONED AMBASSADORS OF WESTERN EUROPE AND CANADA TO CONVEY POINTS ABOUT EGYPT'S RELATIONS WITH ISRAEL ON THE INSTRUCTIONS OF THE FOREIGN MINISTER.
2. HE SAID THAT AMBASSADORS WOULD BE AWARE THAT THE EGYPTIANS HAD STOPPED THE NEGOTIATIONS BECAUSE OF (I) ISRAELI INSISTENCE ON CONTINUING THE POLICY OF SETTLEMENTS, AND (II) THEIR ATTITUDE ON JERUSALEM - INSTIGATING A KNESSET MEMBER TO PUT FORWARD THE RECENT PROPOSAL. NOR DID THE RECENT TERRORIST ACTION AGAINST THE MAYORS ON THE WEST BANK HELP THE ATMOSPHERE. (THE EGYPTAINS HOPED THAT ALL GOVERNMENTS WHICH HAD NOT CONDEMNED THESE TERRORIST ACTS WOULD DO SO).
3. WHEN EGYPT/ISRAEL TALKS WERE DEADLOCKED IT WAS NECESSARY FOR THE US THIRD PARTY TO MEDIATE ACTIVELY. THE EGYPTIAN GOVERNMENT FELT THAT PRESIDENT CARTER'S PROPOSAL FOR A MEETING OF HEADS OF DELEGATION IN WASHINGTON TO DISCUSS THE OBSTACLES FACING THE NEGOTIATIONS AND TO CLEAR A WAY FOR THEIR RESUMPTION WAS ACCEPTABLE. THERE WAS TALK OF A MEETING AT THE END OF JUNE OR BEGINNING OF JULY BUT HASSAN EMPHASISED THAT THE EGYPTIANS HAD NOT YET AGREED A DATE.
4. THE EGYPTIAN GOVERNMENT WERE NOT AT ALL OPPOSED TO EUROPEAN, OR INDEED AFRICAN OR ASIAN, INITIATIVES, PROVIDED THESE FITTED IN WITH, PUSHED ALONG AND DID NOT COMPLICATE WHAT WAS ALREADY BEING DONE IN THE CAMP DAVID FRAMEWORK. ANY PROPOSALS SHOULD TAKE CAMP DAVID INTO ACCOUNT AND THE EGYPTIANS HOPED THAT ANY DECLARATION IN VENICE WOULD SPECIFICALLY MENTION CAMP DAVID BY NAME.

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5. SALAH HASSAN SAID THAT THE EGYPTIANS HAD ALSO NOTED EUROPEAN STATEMENTS ON THE NECESSITY AND IMPORTANCE OF ACTIVITY IN THE EURO/ARAB DIALOGUE. HOWEVER ANY REACTIVATION OF THIS DIALOGUE AT THIS TIME WOULD NOT HELP THE PEACE PROCESS OR EGYPT'S POSITION. IF THERE WAS A NEED FOR DIALOGUE IT SHOULD BE BETWEEN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES AND ALL THE COUNTRIES OF THE ARAB WORLD, EXCLUDING NGNE.

6. ALTHOUGH THERE WERE A NUMBER OF NON-EC AMBASSADORS PRESENT, (AND THERE ARE TO BE SIMILAR BRIEFINGS OF OTHER AMBASSADORS), SALAM HASSAN'S DEMARCHE SEEMED TO BE PRIMARILY AIMED AT THE VENICE SUMMIT. HE HOPED THAT THE VENICE MEETING WOULD BE FRUITFUL AND CONSTRUCTIVE. EUROPEAN RELATIONS WITH THE ARAB WORLD WENT BACK LONGER THAN THOSE OF ANY OTHER REGION AND THE EGYPTIANS WERE GRATEFUL FOR EUROPEAN EFFORTS IN THE DIRECTION OF PEACE.

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FM AMMAN 111045Z JUN 83

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 219 OF 11 JUN

INFO TEL AVIV AND JERUSALEM

MY TELNO 212 OF 6 JUNE: MAYOR OF NABLUS

1. I SPOKE LAST NIGHT TO THE JORDANIAN SURGEON AT THE KING HUSSEIN MEDICAL CENTRE WHO IS LOOKING AFTER BASSAM SHAKA (BRIGADIER DR NABIL ATALLAH). HE TOLD ME THAT SHAKA WAS DOING WELL AND WOULD WITHIN ABOUT TWO WEEKS BE READY TO BE FITTED WITH ARTIFICIAL LEGS. IF IT HAD BEEN A CASE OF MAKING ONE LEG ONLY, THIS WOULD HAVE BEEN WITHIN LOCAL CAPABILITIES BUT HIS PRESENT INCLINATION (HE HAD DISCUSSED THE CASE WITH GENERAL HANANIA, THE DIRECTOR OF THE HUSSEIN MEDICAL CENTRE, THAT DAY) WAS TO SEND SHAKA TO ROEHAMPTON TO HAVE LEGS MADE FOR HIM THERE.

2. I THOUGHT YOU WOULD WISH TO KNOW OF THIS POSSIBILITY AND ASSUME THERE WILL BE NO DIFFICULTY ABOUT GRANTING SHAKA A VISA. EVEN IF THE ARRANGEMENTS ARE MADE ENTIRELY ON THE MEDICAL NET BETWEEN THE KING HUSSEIN CENTRE AND ROEHAMPTON, THE VISIT SEEMS LIKELY TO ATTRACT PUBLICITY.

3. I WONDER, HOWEVER, WHETHER IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE TO GO RATHER FURTHER THAN THIS AND IF I MIGHT BE INSTRUCTED TO APPROACH GENERAL HANANIA WITH AN OFFER OF WHATEVER ASSISTANCE IS NEEDED IN ARRANGING FOR SHAKA TO VISIT ROEHAMPTON, INCLUDING IDEALLY AN OFFER TO MEET THE COSTS. THIS COULD BE PRESENTED AS A PURELY HUMANITARIAN GESTURE TO A VICTIM OF TERRORISM, BUT MIGHT IF HANDLED IN THE RIGHT WAY DO US SOME GOOD WITH THE PALESTINIANS AT A TIME WHEN WE MAY HAVE TO DISAPPOINT THEM POLITICALLY.

4. THE FRENCH AND, I BELIEVE, THE AMERICANS HAVE ALREADY OFFERED MEDICAL HELP TO SHAKA.

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file 15
Middle East

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

11 June 1980

subject copy filed on: - Kuwait: call on PM by Shaikh Sa'ad : Nov: 79.

Call by the Prime Minister of Kuwait

The Prime Minister of Kuwait paid a brief courtesy call on the Prime Minister this morning. He was accompanied by the Kuwaiti Ambassador. Mr. John Moberly was also present.

After an exchange of courtesies, the Prime Minister told Shaikh Sa'ad that she was very worried by the general instability in the world at present. She thought that the next decade was likely to be more difficult than any since the last World War. There were too many centres of instability. These included South East Asia, Afghanistan, Iran, the West Bank, the Horn of Africa and the Caribbean. There was a belt of trouble girdling the world. In response to a question from the Prime Minister, Shaikh Sa'ad said that the situation in the Middle East was very complicated. Without US pressure on Israel the Israeli Government would not move. President Sadat, who had not gained much from the Camp David process, based his initiative on the hope that Israel would move but they had refused to do so. They remained in the West Bank, on the Golan Heights and in Jerusalem. Shaikh Sa'ad commented on the importance of Jerusalem not only for the Arabs but for Muslims all over the world. The Prime Minister remarked that it was important not only for Muslims but for Jews and Christians as well. Shaikh Sa'ad said that it was unclear whether, when people like Mr. Atherton said that Jerusalem would be discussed between the parties concerned, they meant the Jerusalem of 1967 or the Jerusalem of 1980.

The Prime Minister asked whether she had understood Shaikh Sa'ad correctly when he had said that he saw the main hope of movement as being through American pressure on Israel. Shaikh Sa'ad agreed but added that the Europeans could play a major role. He hoped that the Middle East would be at the top of the agenda at the European Council meeting in Venice. All the world was waiting for the outcome. The Arabs hoped that the Europeans would come out in support of the right of the Palestinians to self-determination. They could not be simply regarded as refugees. There would be dangers in seeming to squeeze them into a corner. The Prime Minister said that the Middle

/ East would

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East would certainly be discussed in Venice and a general statement issued about the outcome of the discussion. However, the Europeans would not be advocating a new UN Resolution. If they wanted the Americans to bring pressure to bear on Israel, they had to avoid creating difficulties for the US Government in the interim.

M. O'D. B. ALEXANDER

Paul Lever Esq
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

11 June 1980

Dear Michael,

Arab/Israel: Jerusalem

You asked for a note on the status of Jerusalem. The position is as follows.

In the face of conflicting claims to Jerusalem and the special problems caused by the holy places of Islam, Judaism and Christianity, the UN General Assembly passed resolutions in 1947 and 1949 reserving an area covering virtually the whole of Jerusalem for an international regime under UN administration. These resolutions were never implemented and have no legal force. But British governments have since then adhered to their spirit and taken the view that the status of this area is undetermined pending an overall peace settlement. We therefore did not recognise Israeli sovereignty over West Jerusalem when we recognised Israel in 1950 or Jordanian sovereignty over East Jerusalem when we recognised their sovereignty over the West Bank at the same time. We did however accept Israel and Jordan de facto authority over their respective halves of the city and dealt with them on that basis without prejudice to our de jure position.

Following their occupation of East Jerusalem in 1967 the Israelis took legal steps to incorporate it into Israel and declared that Jerusalem, undivided, was the capital of Israel. We did not accept these Israeli moves and have regarded Israel only as the occupying power in East Jerusalem. This is reflected in our representation: we have an Embassy in Tel Aviv, and an entirely separate Consulate General in East Jerusalem which is technically accredited to no one and deals with the Israelis on administrative matters. Our position on Jerusalem is shared by our partners in the Nine and by the US.

We have avoided taking up a stand on the city's future other than to say that in view of our formal position we do not accept unilateral moves to incorporate it into Israel, that free access to the holy places for all must be guaranteed, and that the city's future must be negotiated between the parties themselves. In practice the problem almost certainly cannot be successfully addressed until the later stages of a peace process, since without progress on the status of the West Bank as a whole it is difficult to see how the necessary good will between Israelis and Arabs can be generated.

Yours truly

Paul

(P Lever)

M O'D B Alexander Esq
10 Downing St

ROBIN DAY INTERVIEW WITH THE ISRAELI AMBASSADOR

PA

MS

Mr. Day: The nine Common Market leaders/^{who} will meet in Venice this week are expected to announce an important initiative on the Middle East with a declaration which would recognise the Palestinians' right to self-determination. The Americans like the Israelis are strongly against such an initiative by the European leaders if it means departing from the agreed Camp David framework. The Secretary of State Mr. Muskie says that the United States will oppose any effort to lay the foundations for an independent Palestinian state. I talked with the Israeli Ambassador to London, Mr. Argov, and asked his reactions to the points reported to be in the forthcoming European Summit declaration. First, the re-affirmation of Israel's right to exist within safe and recognised borders. Would Israel welcome this?

Mr. Argov: I think that is something we need not and do not ask for people to re-affirm. It is something that should be accepted as an axiom just as any other country has the right to exist.

Mr. Day: Another point is said to be they would declare that they would want to recognise the rights of Palestinians to self-determination and to recognise the rights of the Palestinians to be fully represented by people of their own choice in the final negotiation.

Mr. Argov: The Camp David agreements called for a way and method whereby Palestinians could be and will be eventually hopefully participating in deliberating some of these issues in the context and based on the principles of Camp David. There is no need for any statement calling for anything outside of that. And I fear that there may be more than just that in what the Community is contemplating.

Mr. Day: But if they recognise the rights of Palestinians to self-determination, does that mean the recognition or the laying of the foundation for the recognition of Palestine as an independent state?

Mr. Argov: Self-determination has become a code name for something else. Self-determination becomes a code name for something which inevitably must lead to some form of statehood. That was decidedly and definitely not included as a principle in the Camp David agreement, something that Israel does not accept. If it had been ever suggested as a principle for Camp David there would have been no Camp David.

Mr. Day: What about the proposed item in the declaration, reported item in the declaration, that Israel's West Bank policy, settlement policy, deserves condemnation?

Mr. Argov: Well there will be certainly nothing new in that. It has been condemned for some time and justly so. We have not contravened or violated any agreement including the Camp David agreements in pursuing a policy of settling in these parts.

Mr. Day: But isn't Senator Muskie, the US Secretary of State, reported to have said if negotiations are to succeed no party should take steps on its own which could prejudice the outcome.

Mr. Argov: We said that we have no intention of taking any steps which would prejudice the outcome. We don't believe that the establishment of a few settlements in the West Bank which subject has been inflated out of all proportion, we do not believe that this is prejudicial nor is it an obstruction to peace or anything of that sort.

Mr. Day: Do you think that it is serious for the West as a whole that Europe and the United States should apparently be divided on this very important issue ^{of whether} Palestine should become an independent state or how the problem should be settled.

Mr. Argov: I think that is something that should be cause for considerable concern. It is altogether quite mystifying and very disturbing that we should be today witnessing a spectacle whereby the two parties to the Camp David agreements and the third party to the Camp David agreement, the Americans, should today be asking the European Economic Community to desist, stay away, to allow the parties to consummate the agreements and that this call

should apparently not be heeded.

Mr. Day: Finally, Mr. Ambassador, Mr. Edward Heath, a former Prime Minister - he strongly urged the Europeans to take an initiative on the Palestinian question because he said and I paraphrase him that a settlement of the Palestinian question would make an enormous contribution to national stability.

Mr. Argov: We are attempting to find a settlement to some of these problems. This is what Camp David was signed for, what we have been trying to achieve ever since. Now attempting to substitute a set of principles that is not what Camp David established, a new set of principles which will be in place of the principles of Camp David, and principles which are absolutely unacceptable to Israel, is to our minds something that ought to be reconsidered because that may be very compromising to the advancement of the peace process and to the chances of its successful outcome.

Mr. Day: Would you be angry and would you condemn recognition of the PLO by the European nations?

Mr. Argov: Decidedly yes we would. That would be introducing into the peace process an element which is committed to something which is diametrically opposed to any peaceful resolution. It is diametrically opposed to the very existence of the Jewish state. It comes to us as a great surprise and as a great disappointment that there should be even the remotest possibility that a positive reference be made or included in the statement in Venice to the PLO in the wake of an affirmation by the PLO of its basic stand, and the basic stand of the PLO has not changed since it was formulated by the Covenant. It calls for the elimination of the Zionist entity. How any party that stands for that can be at all considered as worthy of being included in negotiations for peace is beyond our understanding

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TO PRIORITY F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 2192 OF 10 JUNE

INFO PRIORITY TEL AVIV CAIRO AMMAN AND BONN

INFO SAVING BEIRUT, DAMASCUS, JEDDA, PARIS, ROME, UKMIS NEW YORK
AND HMCJ JERUSALEM.

MY TEL 2165: ARAB/ISRAEL - BEGIN'S REACTION TO MUSKIE'S SPEECH

1. INTERVIEWED ON ABC TELEVISION THIS MORNING, BEGIN MADE THE
FOLLOWING POINTS:

(A) IT WAS A CURIOUS FORM OF QUOTE EVEN-HANDEDNESS UNQUOTE WHEN
MUSKIE APPEALED TO BOTH EGYPT AND ISRAEL TO RESUME THE NEGOTIATIONS
WHICH ONLY EGYPT HAD SUSPENDED:

(II) MUSKIE'S REMARKS ABOUT SETTLEMENTS WERE UNACCEPTABLE. HE WOULD
HAVE EXPECTED MUSKIE TO GIVE GIVEN HIM A HEARING, FOR WHICH HE
WOULD HAVE BEEN PREPARED TO GO TO WASHINGTON AT SHORT NOTICE, BEFORE
MAKING SUCH A STATEMENT:

(III) HE AND MUSKIE WERE PERSONAL FRIENDS. THEIR FATHERS HAD LIVED
ONLY 120 MILES APART. MUSKIE'S FATHER HAD BEEN FORTUNATE ENOUGH TO
GET TO AMERICA BEFORE WORLD WAR 1, WHEREAS HIS OWN FATHER HAD BEEN
DROWNED BY THE GERMANS. QUOTE AND NOW, OF ALL PEOPLE, COMES THE
GERMAN CHANCELLOR AND TRIES TO TELL US WHAT TO DO WITH OUR
SECURITY UNQUOTE:

(IV) DESPITE MUSKIE'S STATEMENT, ISRAEL WOULD BUILD TEN MORE
SETTLEMENTS. THESE WOULD BE THE LAST ONES THOUGH THE PRESENT
SETTLEMENTS COULD BE ENLARGED AND STRENGTHENED:

(V) THE QUESTION OF THE EXPELLED MAYORS WAS SUB-JUDICE, BUT PEOPLE
SHOULD KNOW THAT THE MAYORS IN QUESTION HAD INCITED TO VIOLENCE
AND BLOODSHED:

(IV) JERUSALEM WAS NOT NON-NEGOTIABLE: QUOTE THAT WORD NEVER CAME
OUT OF MY MOUTH. WHAT I SAID WAS THAT JERUSALEM WAS INDIVISIBLE, THE
CAPITAL OF ISRAEL, AND THIS IS OUR POSITION AND WE ARE NOT GOING TO
CHANGE IT UNQUOTE:

(VII) THE ASSASSINATION ATTEMPTS ON THE WEST BANK MAYORS WERE
QUOTE HORRIBLE CRIMES UNQUOTE AND THE MOST INTENSIVE INVESTIGATION
SINCE THE CREATION OF THE STATE OF ISRAEL HAD BEEN LAUNCHED.
THE PERPETRATORS WOULD BE APPREHENDED AND BROUGHT TO JUSTICE. HE
DID NOT KNOW WHO HAD COMMITTED THESE CRIMES QUOTE PERHAPS JEWS,
PERHAPS ARABS, WE DON'T KNOW YET. UNQUOTE NO ARAB RULER HAD EVER
SAID A WORD OF CONDEMNATION ABOUT ARAB ASSASSINATIONS OF JEWS, NOR
EVER PROMISED TO BRING THE CULPRITS TO COURT.

F C O PASS SAVING BEIRUT, DAMASCUS, JEDDA, PARIS, ROME AND JERUSALEM.

HENDERSON

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TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 217 OF 10 JUN

INFO ROUTINE WASHINGTON

SAVING TO BEIRUT, CAIRO, DAMASCUS, MOSCOW, PARIS, TEL AVIV,

TRIPOLI, UKMIS NEW YORK, CG JERUSALEM

MIDDLE EAST

1. I SAW KING HUSSEIN ON 9 JUNE, IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING ARAFAT'S VISIT TO JORDAN (MY TELNO 215) AND BEFORE THE KING HIMSELF LEAVES FOR LONDON ON 12 JUNE ON HIS WAY TO WASHINGTON. HE SAID HE HAD FOUND HIS TALK WITH THE PRIME MINISTER AND YOURSELF ON 28 MAY OF GREAT VALUE AND VERY MUCH HOPED THAT IT MIGHT PROVE POSSIBLE TO SEE YOU BOTH AGAIN ON HIS WAY HOME AFTER HIS TALKS WITH PRESIDENT CARTER. SEMI COLON HE WAS ALSO ARRANGING TO SEE PRESIDENT GISCARD ON HIS WAY BACK FROM THE US.

2. THE KING SAID HE THOUGHT A EUROPEAN MOVE WAS NOW MORE NECESSARY THAN EVER AND HOPED THAT THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL MEETING IN VENICE WOULD RESULT IN A FIRM AND POSITIVE DECLARATION ON THE MIDDLE EAST. HE FOUND IT DIFFICULT TO INTERPRET RECENT EVENTS IN ISRAEL AND ON THE WEST BANK, AND HE FEARED EVEN WORSE TROUBLE AHEAD. HE

IMMEDIATE

HE FOUND IT DIFFICULT TO INTERPRET RECENT EVENTS IN ISRAEL AND ON THE WEST BANK, AND HE FEARED EVEN WORSE TROUBLE AHEAD. HE ALSO EXPRESSED CONSIDERABLE UNEASINESS ABOUT HIS VISIT TO WASHINGTON IN THE LIGHT OF THE LATEST AMERICAN PROPOSAL THAT THE EGYPTIAN AND ISRAELI NEGOTIATORS SHOULD MEET IN WASHINGTON SEMI COLON HE VERY MUCH HOPED THAT THIS WOULD NOT TAKE PLACE WHILE HE WAS SEEING THE PRESIDENT, AS IT WAS LIKELY TO COMPLICATE HIS RELATIONS WITH THE OTHER ARABS SEMI COLON HE RECALLED THE EMBARRASSING HISTORY OF HIS PREVIOUS ATTEMPTED MEETINGS WITH THE PRESIDENT. KING HUSSEIN CLAIMED THAT, IN SPITE OF THE TRIPOLI MEETING OF EXTREMIST ARAB STATES, RELATIONS BETWEEN JORDAN AND THE PLO WERE SATISFACTORY AND THAT THERE WAS A BROAD IDENTITY OF VIEWS BETWEEN HIMSELF AND ARAFAT, PARTICULARLY ON THE NEED TO KEEP ARAB (INCLUDING PLO) EXTREMISTS UNDER CONTROL SEMI COLON THE KING SAID HE JUST HOPED THAT THE MODERATE AND CONSTRUCTIVE ELEMENTS WITHIN THE PLO WOULD MANAGE TO REMAIN ON TOP.

3. THE JORDANIAN PRIME MINISTER, WHEN I SAW HIM LATER THE SAME DAY, WAS MORE EXPLICIT ABOUT HIS HOPES AND FEARS CONCERNING THE VENICE MEETING. HE ENQUIRED ANXIOUSLY ABOUT THE EXTENT OF US PRESSURE ON THE EUROPEANS AND SAID THAT, MUCH AS HE HOPED HE WOULD BE PROVED WRONG, HE FEARED THAT ANY EUROPEAN DECLARATION MIGHT PROVE TO BE TOO MILD AND AMBIGUOUS TO BE USEFUL: THERE WAS WHAT HE TERMED "A WIDESPREAD EXPECTATION OF DISAPPOINTMENT" AMONG THE ARABS CONCERNING THE EUROPEAN MOVE, AND HE HAD BEEN GIVEN A DIFFICULT TIME ON THE SUBJECT AT A MEETING OF THE NATIONAL CONSULTATIVE COUNCIL EARLIER THE SAME AFTERNOON.

4. SHARAF SAID THAT WHAT WAS NOW NEEDED WAS A CLEAR AND FIRM DECLARATION AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF SOME SORT OF MACHINERY TO IMPLEMENT THE PRINCIPLES IT CONTAINED. HIS HOPE WAS THAT THE DECLARATION MIGHT COVER THE FOLLOWING POINTS:

- A. CLEAR PROVISION FOR ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL TO THE 1967 LINES SEMI COLON
- B. A STATEMENT OF THE PRINCIPLE OF SELF-DETERMINATION FOR THE PALESTINIANS SEMI COLON
- C. THE RETURN OF EAST JERUSALEM TO THE ARABS IN THE CONTEXT OF RESOLUTION 242 AND THE INADMISSABILITY OF THE ACQUISITION OF TERRITORY BY WAR SEMI COLON
- D. A STATEMENT THAT JEWISH SETTLEMENTS IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES WERE ILLEGAL AND INVALID AND WOULD BE DISMANTLED IN THE CONTEXT OF A SETTLEMENT SEMI COLON
- E. A SOLUTION TO THE MIDDLE EAST PROBLEM SHOULD BE ARRIVED AT WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND ON THE BASIS OF THE PRINCIPLES LAID DOWN IN UN RESOLUTIONS.

5. SHARAF SAID THAT ARAFAT (WITH WHOM HE HAD SEPARATE TALKS PRIOR TO KING HUSSEIN'S RETURN) WANTED A EUROPEAN INITIATIVE AND WAS ALSO HOPING THAT THE AMERICANS WOULD EVENTUALLY PROVE ABLE TO CONTRIBUTE TO A SOLUTION. BUT HE WAS NOT WILLING TO SAY SO PUBLICLY.

PRIOR TO KING HUSSEIN'S RETURN) WANTED A EUROPEAN INITIATIVE AND WAS ALSO HOPING THAT THE AMERICANS WOULD EVENTUALLY PROVE ABLE TO CONTRIBUTE TO A SOLUTION, BUT HE WAS NOT WILLING TO SAY SO PUBLICLY. ARAFAT HAD SAID THAT HIS RELATIONS WITH BOTH SYRIA AND LIBYA WERE VERY STRAINED AND INDEED THAT HIS RELATIONS WITH ALMOST ALL ARAB STATES WERE NOW POOR. HE WAS LOOKING FOR A WAY OUT OF HIS DIFFICULTIES. SHARAF TOO STATED THAT PLO/JORDANIAN RELATIONS WERE SATISFACTORY.

6. SHARAF, WHO WILL BE ACCOMPANYING KING HUSSEIN TO WASHINGTON, ALSO SPOKE OF THE DIFFICULTIES FOR JORDAN OF THE KING'S VISIT TO WASHINGTON AT THIS TIME. IT WOULD HAVE BEEN OUT OF THE QUESTION FOR THE JORDANIANS TO TURN DOWN THE US INVITATION AND CLEARLY THE KING MUST GO AND USE THE OPPORTUNITY TO RESTATE FIRMLY JORDAN'S POSITION. BUT SHARAF FEARED THAT THE VISIT MIGHT BE COMPLICATED BY US DOMESTIC POLICY CONSIDERATIONS, AND HE TOO EXPRESSED SERIOUS CONCERN THAT AN EGYPTIAN/ISRAELI MEETING IN THE US MIGHT COINCIDE WITH THE KING'S PRESENCE IN WASHINGTON. HE TOLD ME THAT THE KING HAD SERIOUSLY CONSIDERED CANCELLING HIS VISIT ENTIRELY WHEN HE FIRST HEARD OF THIS POSSIBILITY.

7. SHARAF SAID THAT JORDAN'S RELATIONS WITH SYRIA WERE STILL DIFFICULT AND THAT NO DATE HAD YET BEEN FIXED FOR THE SYRIAN PRIME MINISTER'S LONG-EXPECTED RETURN VISIT TO AMMAN. THE SYRIANS REMAINED DEEPLY SUSPICIOUS OF ALLEGED JORDANIAN SUPPORT FOR THE MOSLEM BROTHERHOOD, ALTHOUGH THE BROTHERHOOD WERE IN FACT NO MORE THAN TOLERATED IN JORDAN. THE JORDANIANS HAD, HOWEVER, UNDERTAKEN TO LOOK INTO SPECIFIC SYRIAN COMPLAINTS AGAINST NAMED INDIVIDUALS.

8. SHARAF SAID NO DATES HAD YET BEEN FIXED FOR KING HUSSEIN'S VISIT TO MOSCOW. THE PROBABILITY WAS THAT IT WOULD NOW NOT TAKE PLACE UNTIL THE AUTUMN.

FCO PASS ALL SAVING ADDRESSEES.

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MY 2 IPTS:
ARAB/ISRAEL.

1. WHEN I SAW BRZEZINSKI TODAY, I REFERRED TO MUSKIE'S SPEECH, I SAID THAT THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY WERE INTENDING TO MAKE A STATEMENT ON THIS SUBJECT AFTER THEIR MEETING IN VENICE ON 12/13 JUNE. IN ANSWER TO BRZEZINSKI'S QUESTION OF WHAT I THOUGHT OF THE SPEECH, I SAID THAT IT HAD STRUCK ME AS PRETTY NEGATIVE, A GOOD DEAL MORE SO THAN IT NEED HAVE BEEN. EUROPE WAS GOING TO TAKE A LINE ON THIS SUBJECT AND THERE WOULD BE NO GOOD PURPOSE IN FANNING THIS INTO A MAJOR NEW DISPUTE WITHIN THE ALLIANCE. THE POLITICAL REQUIREMENTS IN THE USA WERE KNOWN TO EVERYONE. NEVERTHELESS, IT WOULD BE IMPORTANT HOW AMERICA REACTED TO WHATEVER STATEMENT CAME OUT OF THE EUROPEAN SUMMIT. NO GOOD PURPOSE WOULD BE SERVED IF THIS SUBJECT HAD TO FEATURE LARGELY AT THE VENICE SUMMIT OF THE SEVEN. I NOTICED THAT MUSKIE HAD RESTATED STRONGLY THE U.S. OBJECTION TO ANY DISCUSSIONS WITH THE PLO UNLESS THEY FIRST ACCEPTED 242 ETC. BUT HOW COULD THEY BE PERSUADED TO MAKE ANY MOVE ABOUT 242 UNLESS SOMEONE DISCUSSED IT WITH THEM?

2. BRZEZINSKI SAID THAT, AS I WOULD KNOW, HE SYMPATHISED WITH THE EUROPEANS IN BELIEVING THAT THEY HAD A RIGHT TO A SAY IN THIS QUESTION. THE PROBLEM WAS WHAT TERMS THEIR STATEMENT WOULD BE COINED IN. THE U S GOVERNMENT MIGHT BE ABLE TO ACQUIESCE IN SOMETHING VERY MODERATE, ON THE SORT OF LINES THAT I COULD WELL ENVISAGE; AND INDEED A CERTAIN AMOUNT OF PRESSURE FROM THE EUROPEANS WOULD HELP THE AMERICANS IN COUNTER-BALANCING THE ISRAELIS. IT WAS A QUESTION OF DEGREE. IF THE EUROPEANS WENT TOO FAR, THE AMERICANS WOULD BE LEFT WITH NO ALTERNATIVE BUT TO COME OUT OPENLY AGAINST. HE BELIEVED THAT SADAT DID NOT WANT THE EUROPEANS TO APPEAR TO BE ATTACHING TOO MUCH IMPORTANCE TO THE PLO AS THIS WOULD MAKE THINGS DIFFICULT FOR HIM. I SAID THAT WE HAD A PRETTY FAIR IDEA OF WHAT SADAT WANTED.

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TO IMMEDIATE FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

TELEGRAM NO. 2166 OF 10 JUNE 1980

INFO PRIORITY CAIRO, TEL AVIV, AMMAN, ROUTINE UKMIS NEW YORK,
JERUSALEM, BEIRUT, DAMASCUS, JEDDA, PARIS, BONN AND ROME
INFO SAVING OTHER EC POSTS.

MY IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING TELEGRAM.

ARAB/ISRAEL - MUSKIE'S SPEECH ON THE MIDDLE EAST.

1. MUSKIE DID NOT GIVE MUCH AWAY AS FAR AS THE EUROPEAN INITIATIVE IS CONCERNED. WHILE ACKNOWLEDGING THE POSSIBILITY OF NEW INITIATIVES WHICH COULD FURTHER THE CAMP DAVID PROCESS AND THEREFORE BE UNOBJECTIONABLE, HE FOCUSSED SO STRONGLY ON CAMP DAVID THAT IT WOULD BE ALL TOO EASY FOR DECISIONS TAKEN AT VENICE TO BE PORTRAYED IN A NEGATIVE LIGHT AS FAILING TO MEET THAT CRITERION. HIS REFERENCES TO THE DANGEROUS DELAY WHICH WOULD ARISE FROM QUOTE SOME ALTERNATIVE PROCESS UNQUOTE AND TO QUOTE UNCERTAIN NEW DEPARTURES UNQUOTE IMPLY HOSTILITY TO ALMOST ANY NEW INITIATIVE INDEPENDENT OF CAMP DAVID. SEE MY IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING TELEGRAM (NOT TO ALL) FOR MY DISCUSSION WITH BRZEZINSKI ON THIS.

2. THE SPEECH WAS ALSO INTENDED TO REINSTATE THE IMPORTANCE OF THE CAMP DAVID PROCESS AND TO SET THE STAGE FOR THE REOPENING OF THE NEGOTIATIONS - THE STRONG LANGUAGE ABOUT NEITHER PARTY TAKING STEPS TO PREJUDGE THE OUTCOME SEEMS DESIGNED TO MEET EGYPTIAN ANXIETIES.

3. WALKER (LINOWITZ' OFFICE) HAS TOLD US THAT THE LIKELY SEQUENCE HEREAFTER IS THAT ON 11 JUNE, IF NOT BEFORE, IT WOULD BE ANNOUNCED THAT BURG AND ALI WILL COME TO WASHINGTON. THIS WILL IN FACT BE NOT MUCH MORE THAN THEATRE SINCE BY THEN AGREEMENT IN PRINCIPLE ON THE RESUMPTION OF NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD BE IN THE BAG.

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THERE WILL, HOWEVER, BE A DELAY SINCE THIS TIME AT LEAST THE COMPLICATION OF KING HUSSEIN BEING IN WASHINGTON ON 17/18 JUNE HAS NOT BEEN OVERLOOKED. BURG AND ALI ARE LIKELY, THEREFORE, TO FOLLOW SOON AFTER HUSSEIN'S DEPARTURE WITH A VIEW TO NEGOTIATIONS RESUMING ON OR ABOUT 25 JUNE (DESPITE AN EXPRESSED BUT PROBABLY NOT INSUPERABLE EGYPTIAN WISH TO DELAY UNTIL EARLY JULY IN ORDER TO GET THE OAU MEETING OUT OF THE WAY).

F C O PASS SAVING TO BRUSSELS, COPENHAGEN, DUBLIN, LUXEMBOURG, THE HAGUE AND UKREP BRUSSELS.

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TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 2165 OF 10 JUNE 1980

INFO PRIORITY CAIRO, TEL AVIV, AMMAN, ROUTINE UKMIS NEW YORK,
JERUSALEM, BEIRUT, DAMASCUS, JEDDA, PARIS, BONN, RCME
INFO SAVING OTHER EEC POSTS.

MY TELNO 2151 (NOT TO ALL): ARAB/ISRAEL
MUSKIE'S SPEECH ON THE MIDDLE EAST.

1. MUSKIE ADDRESSED THE WASHINGTON PRESS CLUB ON 9 JUNE ABOUT THE
CUTLOOK FOR PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST.

2. HIS SPEECH DIVIDED INTO FOUR PARTS:

(I) THE REASONS WHY PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST WAS SO IMPORTANT AND
WHY IT HAD OCCUPIED SO MUCH OF PRESIDENT CARTER'S TIME AND CONCERN
AND RANKED HIGH AMONG HIS OWN PRIORITIES AS SECRETARY OF STATE:

(II) THE ACHIEVEMENTS SINCE 1977, NOTABLY CAMP DAVID AND ITS FOLLOW
UP NEGOTIATIONS QUOTE THE FIRST NEGOTIATIONS IN 30 YEARS IN WHICH
THE CONCERNS OF THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE, ALONG WITH THE SECURITY
OF ISRAEL, ARE AT THE TOP OF THE AGENDA UNQUOTE: AND AN APPEAL

TO ISRAEL AND EGYPT TO RESUME THE NEGOTIATIONS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE:

(III) THE 5 OUTSTANDING AND CRITICAL ISSUES: SECURITY, LAND, WATER,
THE POWERS AND THE MODALITIES OF THE ELECTION OF THE SELF GOVERNING
AUTHORITY PARTICULARLY THE QUESTION OF THE PARTICIPATION OF
JERUSALEM ARABS:

(IV) A SUMMING UP QUOTED IN FULL BELOW.

3. UNDER (I) ABOVE, MUSKIE STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF PEACE TO
ISRAEL AND THE UNSHAKEABLE AMERICAN COMMITMENT TO ISRAEL'S SECURITY
QUOTE HE (CARTER) STANDS WHERE SIX AMERICAN PRESIDENTS HAVE STOOD
BEFORE HIM: ON THE ROCK OF SUPPORT FOR A STRONG, SECURE ISRAEL.
THE EXPERIENCE OF FOUR WARS HAS PROVED THAT ISRAEL'S SECURITY CAN
BEST BE ASSURED BY A JUST AND LASTING PEACE BETWEEN ISRAEL AND ALL
HER NEIGHBOURS UNQUOTE. BUT PEACE WAS EQUALLY IMPORTANT FOR THE ARAB
STATES AND THE PALESTINIANS: QUOTE THE MODERATE ARAB STATES ARE A
KEY TO STABILITY IN THE REGION. THEIR STABILITY AND INDEPENDENCE ARE
EXTREMELY IMPORTANT TO US. MANY OF THEM LOOK TO US TO BUTTRESS
THEIR SECURITY. A JUST AND GENUINE PEACE IS ALSO ESSENTIAL TO THE
PALESTINIAN PEOPLE. THEIR LEGITIMATE INTERESTS CAN BE REALISED ONLY
THROUGH AN END TO CONFLICT - NOT THROUGH WAR OR VIOLENCE. UNQUOTE
PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST WAS ALSO IMPORTANT FOR OVER-RIDING
STRATEGIC REASONS AS DEMONSTRATED BY HOW CLOSE THE ARAB/ISRAEL WARS
OF 1967 AND 1973 CAME TO ESCALATING INTO A WIDER CONFLICT. THE
CURRENT TURMOIL IN IRAN AND AFGHANISTAN REINFORCED THIS POINT. PEACE
IN THE MIDDLE EAST WOULD QUOTE MAKE A VIABLE CONTRIBUTION TO THE
ABILITY OF THE UNITED STATES TO HELP PROVIDE SECURITY AND STABILITY
IN THE ENTIRE REGION. SOVIET ABILITY TO ENLARGE ITS INFLUENCE AND TO
REFLECT ATTENTION FROM ITS INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN WOULD BE REDUCED
UNQUOTE.

14. UNDER (II)

4. UNDER (11) ABOVE MUSKIE LISTED THE ACHIEVEMENTS OF CAMP DAVID, BUT REMINDED HIS LISTENERS THAT THE CURRENT NEGOTIATIONS WERE NOT DESIGNED TO DEFINE THE PERMANENT STATUS OF THE WEST BANK AND GAZA (THIS WAS RESERVED FOR A SECOND STAGE OF NEGOTIATIONS, TO INCLUDE ELECTED PALESTINIAN REPRESENTATIVES FROM THE WEST BANK AND GAZA); NOR TO ADDRESS THE EVENTUAL STATUS OF JERUSALEM. OF COURSE THERE WAS DISAPPOINTMENT THAT THE MAY GOAL HAD NOT BEEN MET, BUT THIS WAS NOT A CAUSE FOR DESPAIR QUOTE AND IT IS NO CAUSE TO ABANDON A PROCESS WHICH HAS ACHIEVED SO MUCH UNQUOTE. HE CALLED ON EGYPT AND ISRAEL TO RESUME THE NEGOTIATIONS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE AND REMINDED BOTH PARTIES THAT THEY COULD NOT SUCCEED IF EITHER SIDE PERSISTED IN UNILATERAL ACTIONS THAT PREJUDICED THE STATUS OF THE TERRITORIES. OR ONE SIDE WAS INSENSITIVE TO THE CONCERNS OF THE OTHER. THE TALKS MUST CONTINUE TO BE SOLIDLY BASED ON RESOLUTION 242 AND THE CAMP DAVID FRAMEWORK QUOTE IT WOULD BE A MISTAKE TO CHANGE EITHER OF THOSE ESSENTIAL BUILDING BLOCKS. INDEED THE UNITED STATES WILL NOT ALLOW THAT TO HAPPEN. WE DO NOT OBJECT TO NEW INITIATIVES THAT WOULD FURTHER THE CAMP DAVID PROCESS. BUT WE WOULD STRONGLY OPPOSE ANY EFFORTS THAT WOULD DERAIL THAT PROCESS UNQUOTE.

5. AFTER LISTING THE FIVE OUTSTANDING ISSUES, MUSKIE ENDED AS FOLLOWS:

QUOTE THESE FIVE ISSUES CONSTITUTE A FORMIDABLE AGENDA. BUT IF PEACE IS TO RESULT, THESE ARE THE ISSUES THAT MUST BE SETTLED WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF A SECURE ISRAEL AND RECOGNITION OF THE LEGITIMATE RIGHTS OF THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE. INCLUDING THEIR RIGHT TO PARTICIPATE IN THE DETERMINATION OF THEIR OWN FUTURE.

TO LAUNCH SOME ALTERNATIVE PROCESS WILL NOT MAKE THESE ISSUES GO AWAY. ANOTHER ROAD WILL ONLY BRING US BACK, AFTER DANGEROUS DELAY, TO THESE SAME CENTRAL QUESTIONS. THE CAMP DAVID PROCESS IS CONFRONTING THOSE QUESTIONS: IT SHOULD CONTINUE.

LET ME MAKE SEVERAL FINAL POINTS ABOUT THE NEGOTIATIONS THEMSELVES. FIRST: WORKING WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE CAMP DAVID ACCORD AND U.N. RESOLUTION 242, THE UNITED STATES IS DETERMINED THAT AN AGREEMENT WILL BE REACHED AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. IT IS INCUMBENT UPON ISRAEL AND EGYPT TO CONTINUE THIS PROCESS WITHOUT INTERRUPTION.

SECOND: IF NEGOTIATIONS ARE TO SUCCEED, NO PARTY SHOULD TAKE STEPS ON ITS OWN THAT PREJUDGE THE OUTCOME. THUS, FOR ISRAEL UNILATERALLY TO PLACE SETTLEMENTS IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA WHILE NEGOTIATIONS ARE IN PROGRESS RUNS COUNTER TO THE VERY PURPOSE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS — TO ACHIEVE AN AGREEMENT ALL PARTIES CAN SUPPORT.

THIRD: WE SUPPORT FUTURE NEGOTIATIONS ON THE FINAL STATUS OF JERUSALEM. WE ALSO SUPPORT THE VIEW THAT THE CITY SHOULD REMAIN UNDIVIDED, WITH FREE ACCESS TO THE HOLY PLACES FOR PEOPLE OF ALL FAITHS.

FOURTH: IF NEGOTIATIONS ARE TO SUCCEED, ALL PARTICIPANTS MUST ACCEPT THE SAME OBJECTIVES. THOSE OBJECTIVES ARE EXPRESSED IN RESOLUTION 242 AND IN THE CAMP DAVID ACCORD. PALESTINIANS ARE URGED TO JOIN THE PEACE TALKS. WE WILL, HOWEVER, STAND BY A COMMITMENT WE FIRST MADE FIVE YEARS AGO: WE WILL NOT RECOGNIZE OR NEGOTIATE WITH THE PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION — UNLESS THE PLO

ACCEPTS RESOLUTION 242 AND THE RIGHT OF ISRAEL TO EXIST.
FIFTH: THE CURRENT NEGOTIATIONS, AS I HAVE SAID, ARE DESIGNED TO ESTABLISH TRANSITIONAL ARRANGEMENTS FOR A FIVE-YEAR PERIOD. THE FINAL STATUS OF THE WEST BANK AND GAZA WILL BE TAKEN UP IN FUTURE NEGOTIATIONS. THE UNITED STATES, THEREFORE, WILL OPPOSE ANY EFFORT TO USE THE CURRENT TALKS TO LAY THE FOUNDATION FOR AN INDEPENDENT PALESTINIAN STATE OR TO TIE THE HANDS OF FUTURE NEGOTIATIONS IN SOME OTHER WAY.

ONE FINAL POINT ABOUT THESE NEGOTIATIONS — THE MOST IMPORTANT POINT OF ALL. THE NEGOTIATIONS LOOK TOWARD A CERTAIN KIND OF FUTURE FOR ISRAELIS AND PALESTINIANS — A FUTURE OF PEACE AND MUTUAL COOPERATION. AN ALTERNATIVE VISION OF THE FUTURE WAS LAID BEFORE US ALL LAST WEEK. TWO ELECTED PALESTINIAN OFFICIALS WERE MAIMED BY ACTS OF VIOLENCE AS COWARDLY AS THEY WERE REPREHENSIBLE — AND THAT VIOLENCE FOLLOWED THE SAVAGE MURDER FROM AMBUSH OF SEVERAL JEWISH RELIGIOUS STUDENTS A MONTH AGO. NOW IS THE TIME FOR ISRAELIS AND PALESTINIANS ALIKE TO CHOOSE WHICH FUTURE THEY PREFER — FOR THEY WILL SURELY EITHER HARVEST THE PROMISE OF PEACE TOGETHER, OR REAP A WHIRLWIND OF DESTRUCTION.

IT MAY BE TEMPTING, GIVEN THE SLOW AND FRUSTRATING PACE OF COMPLICATED NEGOTIATIONS, TO LOSE PATIENCE: TO REJECT WHAT DOES NOT YIELD INSTANT SUCCESS AS AN UTTER FAILURE: TO ADVOCATE UNCERTAIN NEW DEPARTURES INSTEAD OF RELYING ON PATIENT DIPLOMACY.

BUT WE MUST NOT LOSE PATIENCE: WE MUST HOLD TO OUR COURSE.

TO THOSE WHO OPPOSE THE PROCESS BECAUSE THEY OPPOSE PEACE ITSELF, I SAY: LET US PUT HISTORY AT LONG LAST ON THE SIDE OF PEACE.

THE DISPUTES HAVE BEEN MOVED FROM THE BATTLEFIELD TO THE BARGAINING TABLE.

AND TO THOSE WHO OPPOSE THE CAMP DAVID PROCESS OUT OF FRUSTRATION OR SKEPTICISM, I SAY: LET US PERSIST. LET US NOT UNDERMINE THE MOST HOPEFUL AVENUE YET FOUND TOWARD PEACE. REMEMBER THAT THIS PROCESS HAD ALREADY ALTERED THE COURSE OF HISTORY. HAVING COME SO FAR, LET US NOT TURN ASIDE FROM WHAT WE HAVE BEGUN."

6. SEE M.I.F.T.

FCO PASS SAVING BRUSSELS, COPENHAGEN, DUBLIN, LUXEMBOURG, THE HAGUE AND UK REP BRUSSELS.

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TO PRIORITY TOKYO

TEL NUMBER 224 OF 10 JUNE

INFO ROME WASHINGTON PARIS BONN OTTAWA CAIRO TEL AVIV AMMAN

VENICE ECONOMIC SUMMIT: MIDDLE EAST

1.-. THE MINISTER AT THE JAPANESE EMBASSY CALLED ON BULLARD TODAY. HE RECALLED THAT AT THE ECONOMIC SUMMIT IN TOKYO THE JAPANESE HAD SUGGESTED ISSUING A DECLARATION ON THE PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF THE ARAB/ISRAEL PROBLEM. THE IDEA HAD NOT FOUND FAVOUR. THEY HAD NOTED REPORTS OF THE INTENTIONS OF THE NINE AS REGARDS A POSSIBLE DECLARATION ON THE THE MIDDLE EAST AT THEIR OWN SUMMIT THIS WEEK. THIS ENCOURAGED THEM TO REVIVE THEIR EARLIER IDEA. AN EXPRESSION BY THE ECONOMIC SUMMIT OF A DESIRE FOR AN EARLY MIDDLE EAST SETTLEMENT WOULD HAVE A FAVOURABLE EFFECT ON RELATIONS WITH THE ARAB COUNTRIES. JAPAN WOULD LIKE TO KNOW HOW THE UK THOUGHT THIS COULD BE ACHIEVED. SIMILAR ENQUIRIES WERE BEING MADE IN PARIS AND BONN.

2. BULLARD EXPLAINED THE PRESENT STATE OF PREPARATIONS OF THIS ITEM FOR THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL. WHAT WAS ENVISIAGED, SUBJECT TO DECISION BY HEADS OF GOVERNMENT AT THE TIME, WAS MORE CONCRETE AND DETAILED THAN ANYTHING LIKELY TO EMERGE FROM THE ECONOMIC SUMMIT, WHERE WE SAW THE POLITICAL DISCUSSION AS CONCENTRATING ON AFGHANISTAN AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR THE SURROUNDING REGION, INCLUDING BUT NOT SPECIALLY HIGHLIGHTING THE MIDDLE EAST. ALL THIS COULD BE DISCUSSED AT THE PREPARATORY MEETING OF OFFICIALS IN ROME ON 17 JUNE, IF JAPAN WISHED.

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3. KADOTA SAID THAT JAPAN WOULD RATHER THE EUROPEAN MEMBERS OF THE SEVEN TOOK THE INITIATIVE THIS TIME. BUT JAPAN DID NOT WANT TO BE LEFT BEHIND. SHE COULD ADD HER VOICE AND PERHAPS TAKE JOINT ACTION. SHE WOULD LIKE TO BE ADVISED OF THE INTENTIONS OF THE NINE AS FAR IN ADVANCE AS POSSIBLE. IN ANSWER TO QUESTIONS, KADOTA SAID THAT HE DID NOT ENVISAGE JAPAN SEEKING TO JOIN IN ANY DIPLOMATIC SOUNDINGS WHICH THE NINE MIGHT LAUNCH: IT WAS MORE A QUESTION OF HER PROMPTLY ENDORSING ANY PUBLIC DECLARATION, GIVEN THAT JAPAN'S POSITION ON THE PLO AND A PALESTINIAN STATE WAS FURTHER ADVANCED THAN THAT OF THE NINE. HE SPOKE AS IF THE NINE MIGHT ALSO WANT TO SEEK ENDORSEMENT OF THEIR DECLARATION BY THE UNITED STATES. BULLARD SAID THAT THIS LAST WAS UNLIKELY. NOR COULD THE DECISION OF THE NINE HEADS OF GOVERNMENT BE PREDICTED. BUT HE WOULD BE HAPPY TO KEEP IN TOUCH WITH ANY JAPANESE REPRESENTATIVES WHO MIGHT BE IN VENICE IN THE WINGS OF THE ERUOEAN COUNCIL, AS HE HAD DONE IN LUXEMBOURG ON SANCTIONS AGAINST IRAN.

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TO PRIORITY JEDDA
TELEGRAM NUMBER 323 OF 10 JUNE.
SAUDI NOTE ON PALESTINE

1. SAUDI CHARGE TODAY DELIVERED TO MED THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO ME FROM PRINCE SAUD, AND ASKED FOR A REPLY AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.
2. CHARGE SAID A SIMILAR MESSAGE HAD BEEN DELIVERED TO 'MOST OTHER EUROPEAN COUNTRIES'. WHEN PRESSED HE SAID IT HAD NOT GONE TO THE FRENCH BECAUSE THE SAUDIS HAD HAD BILATERAL TALKS WITH THEM.

BEGINS 'THE KINGDOM OF SAUDI ARABIA ATTACHES GREAT IMPORTANCE TO THE EUROPEAN ATTITUDE CONCERNING THE PALESTINIAN ISSUE, AN ATTITUDE WHICH WILL BE FORMED WITHIN THE EUROPEAN SUMMIT MEETING IN VENICE AND TO THE IMPORTANCE OF THE SUPPORT OF THE EEC TO THE LEGITIMATE RIGHTS OF THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE, PARTICULARLY THEIR RIGHT IN SELF-DETERMINATION.

THE KINGDOM, OBSERVING THE ASPECTS OF RETREAT IN THE EUROPEAN INITIATIVE IN THE PRESENT STAGE OF THE PALESTINIAN CASE, BELIEVES THAT ANY POSTPONEMENT OF THE CASE WOULD HARM ITS PROCESS. ISRAEL WILL BE THE ONLY BENEFACITOR OF SUCH A RETREAT.

THE KINGDOM HOPES THAT HER FRIENDS WILL PUSH THE EUROPEAN INITIATIVE A FURTHER STEP OR AT LEAST SUPPORT WHAT COMPRISES RECOGNITION OF THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE OF THEIR RIGHT OF SELF-DETERMINATION AT THIS STAGE.' ENDS

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TO PRIORITY WASHINGTON
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1095 OF 10 JUNE
INFO PRIORITY BONN, PARIS AND ROME,
ROUTINE THE HAGUE, BRUSSELS, COPENHAGEN, DUBLIN, LUXEMBOURG,
TEL AVIV, CAIRO, UKMIS NEW YORK
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ARAB/ISRAEL

THE UNITED STATES AMBASSADOR CALLED ON ME THIS MORNING TO ASK WHAT I EXPECTED TO BE THE OUTCOME OF THE FORTHCOMING EUROPEAN COUNCIL'S DISCUSSIONS ON THE MIDDLE EAST.

I TOLD BREWSTER THAT I THOUGHT IT A PITY THAT THERE HAD BEEN SO MUCH CONCERN EXPRESSED IN THE UNITED STATES ABOUT WHAT THE EUROPEANS MIGHT BE SEEKING TO DO. THE FACT WAS THAT NO ONE IN EUROPE WANTED TO DO ANYTHING UNHELPFUL TO THE UNITED STATES, OR TO THE CAMP DAVID PROCESS. NONETHELESS THERE WAS A DIFFERENCE OF PERCEPTION BETWEEN EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES OVER THE DANGERS INVOLVED. EUROPEAN GOVERNMENTS DOUBTED WHETHER THE AUTONOMY TALKS WOULD BE LIKELY ON THEIR OWN TO PRODUCE TANGIBLE RESULTS AND SAW A RISK THAT MODERATE ARAB OPINION WOULD BE MORE AND MORE ALIENATED FROM THE WEST. THE REACTION OF MANY ARAB AND ISLAMIC COUNTRIES TO THE SOVIET INVASION OF AFGHAN-ISTAN AND TO THE DETENTION OF THE AMERICAN HOSTAGES IN IRAN WAS TEMPERED BY WHAT THEY CONSIDERED TO BE A PARALLEL BETWEEN THESE EVENTS AND THE ISRAELI OCCUPATION OF ARAB LANDS. MOREOVER THE SITUATION ON THE WEST BANK WAS GETTING MORE EXPLOSIVE. IT WAS NECESSARY THEREFORE TO TRY TO HOLD THE SITUATION DURING THE PERIOD WHEN THE AMERICANS WOULD BE UNABLE FOR UNDERSTANDABLE ELECTORAL REASONS TO TAKE ANY NEW INITIATIVE THEMSELVES. ALL THE EUROPEANS WERE IN EFFECT SEEKING TO DO WAS TO PLAY FOR TIME UNTIL THE AMERICANS WERE BACK IN BUSINESS. THE EUROPEANS KNEW THEY COULD

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NOT SOLVE THE MIDDLE EAST PROBLEM THEMSELVES: ONLY THE AMERICANS COULD DO SO.

TALK OF AN 'INITIATIVE' BY THE EUROPEANS WAS THEREFORE MISLEADING. THERE WAS NO DISPOSITION TO THINK IN TERMS OF A NEW SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION. ALL THAT WAS ENVISAGED WAS A STATEMENT DEALING IN AN EVEN-HANDED WAY WITH THE RIGHT OF ISRAEL TO EXIST WITHIN SECURE AND RECOGNISED FRONTIERS AND THE RIGHT OF THE PALESTINIANS TO SELF-DETERMINATION. THIS COULD BE FOLLOWED BY SOUNDINGS OF ALL THE PARTIES INVOLVED, INCLUDING THE PLO AS WELL AS OTHER PALESTINIAN REPRESENTATIVES. I DID NOT HOWEVER ENVISAGE ANY BRITISH INVOLVEMENT, AT ANY RATE AT MINISTERIAL LEVEL, IN TALKS WITH THE PLO.

BREWSTER SAID THAT HE PERSONALLY SAW NO PROBLEM WITH ALL THIS, AND HIS GUESS WAS THAT THE ADMINISTRATION WOULD NOT REACT CRITICALLY TO SOMETHING ALONG THESE LINES. THERE WAS, PARTICULARLY IN AN ELECTION YEAR, AN INEVITABLE TENDENCY TO COMPARTMENTALIZE IN THE AMERICAN BUREAUCRACY AND THE INTER-ACTION BETWEEN AFGHANISTAN, IRAN AND THE ARAB/ ISRAEL DISPUTE WAS NOT UNIVERSALLY RECOGNISED IN WASHINGTON. BOTH PRESIDENT CARTER AND MR MUSKIE HAD BEEN OBLIGED IN THEIR RECENT STATEMENTS TO LOOK PARTLY TOWARDS THE US DOMESTIC AUDIENCE. MR BEGIN WOULD LIKE NOTHING BETTER THAN TO MAKE SUPPORT FOR ISRAEL A MAJOR ISSUE IN THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION CAMPAIGN. THE PROBLEM FOR THE AMERICANS WAS HOW TO APPLY SUFFICIENT PRESSURE TO UNSETTLE HIM WITHOUT SOLIDIFYING ISRAELI OPINION BEHIND HIM. BREWSTER HOPED THEREFORE THAT ANY STATEMENT WHICH WAS ISSUED AT VENICE WOULD BE EVEN-HANDED AS BETWEEN ISRAEL'S SECURITY AND THE PALESTINIANS RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION AND WOULD ALSO CONTAIN, AGAIN IN EVEN-HANDED TERMS, A CONDEMNATION OF TERRORISM.

I TOLD BREWSTER THAT I HOPED THAT THE AMERICAN CONCERN WITH THIS ISSUE WOULD NOT LEAD EITHER PRESIDENT CARTER OR MR REAGAN TO TAKE UP HARDER POSITIONS IN THEIR ELECTION CAMPAIGN THAN THEY MIGHT OTHERWISE HAVE DONE. I SAID ALSO THAT THE AMERICANS SHOULD REALISE THAT FOR THE EUROPEANS NOW TO SAY NOTHING AT VENICE ON THE MIDDLE EAST, GIVEN THE BUILD-UP WHICH

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THERE HAD BEEN, WOULD BE DISASTROUS: THE EUROPEANS WOULD LOSE ALL CREDIBILITY IN ARAB EYES. WHAT WAS BEING CONTEMPLATED WAS A VERY MINIMAL GESTURE: IT WOULD HARDLY BE POSSIBLE FOR THE EUROPEANS TO DO LESS.

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~~MR ALEXANDER, NO. 10 D.S.~~

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MR BULLARD
MR J MOBERLY

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E.E.C. NINE SUPPORT PALESTINIAN CAUSE - REPORT

BONN, TUESDAY -- COMMON MARKET FOREIGN MINISTERS HAVE AGREED ON A MIDDLE EAST POSITION, WEST GERMAN SOURCES CLAIMED THIS AFTERNOON.

IT IS SAID THE NINE-NATION MINISTERS SUPPORT PALESTINIAN SELF-DETERMINATION AND OPPOSE ISRAELI SETTLEMENTS ON THE WEST BANK.

THE SOURCES, WHO ASKED NOT TO BE IDENTIFIED, SAID THE PROPOSAL WOULD BE SUBMITTED TO THE NINE E.E.C. HEADS OF GOVERNMENT AT THEIR SUMMIT IN VENICE ON THURSDAY.

BUT THE SOURCES ADDED THE NINE LEADERS THEMSELVES WOULD DECIDE AT THE TWO-DAY SUMMIT WHETHER TO ISSUE THE DOCUMENT PUBLICLY.

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TELEGRAM NUMBER 201 OF 10 JUNE

INFO PRIORITY CAIRO, TELAVIV, WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK, BEIRUT

MY TELEGRAM NO 199: ARAB/ISRAEL

1. ANDREW FAULDS MP, WHO IS HERE WITH THE BRITISH PARLIAMEN-
TARY DELEGATION, TOLD KREISKY TODAY IN MY PRESENCE THAT HE
AND DAVID CROUCH MP HAD HAD THREE HOURS WITH ARAFAT IN BEIRUT
ON 4 JUNE. ARAFAT HAD ESSENTIALLY MADE TWO POINTS.

(A) EXTREME ELEMENTS THROUGHOUT THE PALESTINIAN MOVEMENT
WERE BECOMING INCREASINGLY POWERFUL:

(B) A RECENT MEETING OF AL FATAH HAD ACCEPTED INTER ALIA
THAT SOME (LAST WORD UNDERLINED) OF THE ISRAELI-OCCUPIED AREAS
MUST BE RETURNED TO THE ARABS: THE CLEAR IMPLICATION BEING THAT
THIS NEED NOT APPLY TO ALL (LAST WORD UNDERLINED) AREAS I.E
IT WAS TANTAMOUNT TO ACCEPTANCE OF THE CONTINUING
EXISTENCE OF ISRAEL.

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FM BONN 101515Z JUN 80

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 452 OF 10 JUNE

INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON

INFO ROUTINE PARIS, ROME, CAIRO, TEL AVIV, AMMAN, UKMIS NEW YORK.

INFO SAYING OTHER EC POSTS, JERUSALEM, BEIRUT, DAMASCUS, JEDDA.

Read in full MB

WASHINGTON TEL NOS 2155-7: ARAB/ISRAEL; EUROPEAN COUNCIL

1. IN DISCUSSION TODAY ABOUT THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL FIEDLER (HEAD OF THE NEAR EAST DEPARTMENT IN THE AUSWAERTIGES AMT) TOLD US THAT GENSCHER WAS CONCERNED THAT THE EUROPEANS SHOULD NOT AT VENICE SET UP AN ALTERNATIVE TO CAMP DAVID: THE FRG WISHED TO BE SUPPORTIVE OF CAMP DAVID AND ASSIST IN ITS DEVELOPMENT TOWARDS A COMPREHENSIVE SOLUTION. THE VENICE DECLARATION NEEDED TO PRESERVE THE COMMUNITY'S POSITION IN THE ARAB WORLD BUT ITS OPERATIVE PARTS WOULD NEED VERY CAREFUL DISCUSSION. THE FRG PREFERENCE WAS FOR A REVITALISATION OF THE EURO/ARAB DIALOGUE SINCE IT PRE-DATED CAMP DAVID, BUT THEY WERE PREPARED TO CONSIDER OTHER POSSIBILITIES. THE AMERICANS HAD RECENTLY SHOWN THEMSELVES MORE FLEXIBLE TOWARDS EUROPEAN IDEAS ON THE MIDDLE EAST: IT WAS IMPORTANT THAT THE OUTCOME OF THE COUNCIL SHOULD NOT BECOME ANOTHER FOCUS OF TRANSATLANTIC TENSION.

2. TODAY'S EDITION OF "DIE WELT" REPORTS THAT CHANCELLOR SCHMIDT TOLD HAROLD BROWN DURING THE LATTER'S VISIT HERE LAST WEEK THAT IN THE GERMAN VIEW THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL DECLARATION SHOULD BE MODERATE AND AVOID WORDING THAT COULD IMPAIR THE CAMP DAVID PEACE PROCESS.

THE GERMAN VIEW THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL DECLARATION SHOULD BE MODERATE
AND AVOID WORDING THAT COULD IMPAIR THE CAMP DAVID PEACE PROCESS.

FCO PLEASE PASS SAVING.

WRIGHT

NNNN

SENT AT 10/1541Z AJC

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From the Private Secretary

9 June 1980

ARAB/ISRAEL

The Prime Minister has seen the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary's minute to her of 6 June on this subject. The Prime Minister will wish to discuss this with Lord Carrington but has indicated that she is content with the first sentence of paragraph 5 and with the proposed objective for the soundings of the parties as summarised in paragraph 6 of the minute.

The Prime Minister has also said that the Chief Whip should be consulted about the draft communique. She is concerned that it will cause political difficulties in this country and that it will be unacceptable to a number of the Government's supporters.

I am sending copies of this letter to the Private Secretaries to the other members of OD and to David Wright (Cabinet Office).

MA

G.G.H. Walden, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

JB

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

9 June 1980

re
A.
②
Dear Michael,

The situation in the Israeli occupied territories

You asked for a note on the situation in the occupied territories and its possible wider implications in the Middle East.

Mr Begin's policies in the occupied territories since 1977 have hardened the already strong nationalist views of the Palestinians there. Prominent among the reasons for this has been their perception that Mr Begin has no intention of ceding ultimate Israeli control of the occupied territories. This has been reinforced by his conduct of the autonomy negotiations and by his policy of greatly accelerated settlement (often carried out by extremist Israeli groups), particularly in Arab inhabited areas on the West Bank, including a recent decision to establish an Israeli presence in the centre of Hebron.

Against this background the Palestinian attack in Hebron on 2 May in which six Israelis were killed is unprecedented in the occupied territories in recent years. Minor terrorist incidents have been common: small bombs, Molotov cocktails, and so on. But the Hebron incident was a direct attack apparently by a well organised group and was clearly well planned and well executed. The perpetrators have not yet been caught.

Fatah have claimed responsibility for the Hebron raid. They have for several years been committed to a policy of armed resistance in the occupied territories. Their decision now to raise this to a new level may be connected with the apparently increasing difficulty they have found in operating in Israel proper, and with the strong Lebanese reaction they have encountered when raids mounted across that border have led to large-scale Israeli retaliation involving Lebanese civilian casualties. We know of no Fatah operation in Israel since April 1979 (they were not responsible for the

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attack on the Misgav Am kibbutz). It may also be that they believe that increased resentment among West Bankers over Israeli policies creates a climate in which terrorists can more safely operate with the co-operation of the local people; their success in Hebron seems to bear this out. If this is so, and if Fatah can sustain further such successes, the level of violence will reach a new high plateau.

The repercussions are already being felt. Israeli counter-measures (expulsion of West Bank Mayors, repressive security measures, limitations on movement and press restrictions) have further increased resentment among West Bankers. The bomb attacks on Arab Mayors on 2 June have now aggravated the situation even further. It is almost certain that they were perpetrated by extremist Israelis who had vowed vengeance for the Palestinian attack in Hebron. One such group has claimed responsibility, declaring as its aim the removal of the whole Arab population from 'Eretz Israel'. This of itself can be expected to provoke Fatah retaliation.

The implications of all this for West Bank attitudes are worrying. While most West Bankers support the PLO and have rejected Camp David, the experience of occupation and the realisation that compromise is necessary to bring it to an end, have put the majority of them at the moderate end of the Palestinian spectrum. This majority would probably support a settlement based on Resolution 242 recognising Israel's right to exist but with adequate provision for Palestinian rights. The deported Mayors, for example, denounced by Israel as extremists, told FCO officials as much this week. Given the opportunity of exercise self-determination the majority would probably also support some form of close connection with Jordan. This is precisely the sort of moderate Palestinian opinion which we wish to encourage. The escalation of violence, and the feeling that the West is unable to ensure a reversal of Israeli policies on the West Bank, could have the opposite effect.

The wider reactions from the Arab countries are still coming in. We are asking the JIC to assess the implications more thoroughly. In the short term we would expect these to be political rather than military. We already have the unhelpful Security Council debate on the West Bank car bombings. We can also expect Arab demands for an EC initiative to be stepped up with increased pressure on Europe to distance itself from failed US policies and to

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move further and more quickly than may be politically possible. The immediate risk is that with emotions running high on both sides / (I attach the record of Mr Begin's intemperate speech in the Knesset on 2 June), reason - such as there is - will fly out of the window. If so, the delicate path of respecting US sensitivities and maintaining our credibility with the Arabs will be even more difficult to walk.

West Bankers are predicting a long hot summer. We do not on present evidence expect violence on any scale approaching civil war. The West Bankers do not have the means or, probably, the will to mount a general insurrection and would fear wholesale expulsion if they did. Moreover, the Israelis, while unable to prevent individual violent incidents, continue to maintain a tight grip on the territories and indulge in a little sabre-rattling themselves. The situation is clearly very worrying and we may well have entered a new phase in relations between the Israelis and the West Bankers.

Yours etc

Paul

(P Lever)

Private Secretary

Michael Alexander Esq
No 10 Downing Street
London

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FM TEL AVIV 031015Z JUNE 80

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 219 OF 3 JUNE

INFO PRIORITY CAIRO WASHINGTON UKMIS NEW YORK

INFO SAVING AMMAN DAMASCUS BEIRUT AND JERUSALEM(PAASSED).

MY TEL NO 217 (PARAGRAPH 3): ARAB/ISRAEL

1. RELEVANT PASSAGES FROM BEGIN'S SPEECH ARE AS FOLLOWS:
"MR SPEAKER, THERE EXISTS WHAT IS CALLED THE "EUROPEAN INITIATIVE". BASICALLY, IT CONSISTS OF TWO PROPOSALS PUT FORWARD BY CERTAIN EUROPEAN NATIONS, THE FIRST - RECOGNITION OF THE ORGANISATION OF MURDERERS KNOWN AS THE PLO AS A PARTNER TO NEGOTIATIONS ON THE SOLUTION OF THE PROBLEMS OF THE LAND OF ISRAEL. SECONDLY, RECOGNITION OF THE RIGHT OF THE ARAB INHABITANTS OF JUDEA, SAMARIA AND GAZA TO WHAT IS CALLED THE RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION, WHICH MEANS, IN SIMPLE LANGUAGE, TO ESTABLISH A SO-CALLED PALESTINIAN STATE.

I HAVE COME TO THIS PODIUM, MR SPEAKER, TO SAY THAT THESE PROPOSALS OF A NUMBER OF EUROPEAN STATES COULD THREATEN THE EXISTENCE OF ISRAEL, AND NOT JUST ITS SECURITY, THE FUTURE OF OUR PEOPLE, AND NOT JUST ITS SECURITY. THE PRESIDENTS AND THE PRIME MINISTERS AND THE FOREIGN MINISTERS OF THE EUROPEAN STATES SHOULD READ CAREFULLY THE DOCUMENT KNOWN AS THE PALESTINIAN CHARTER AND THE DECISION OF THE LARGEST ORGANISATION WITHIN THE PLO, KNOWN AS AL-FATAH, OF YESTERDAY, IN DAMASCUS. I WOULD ASK THE FOREIGN MINISTER TO SEND TO ALL THE PRESIDENTS, THE PRIME MINISTERS, AND THE FOREIGN MINISTERS OF THE EUROPEAN STATES THESE TWO DOCUMENTS, BECAUSE I AM CONVINCED THAT MANY OF THEM HAVE NOT READ THEM. JUST AS MANY OF THE LEADERS OF THE EUROPEAN STATES DID NOT READ "MEIN KAMPF" DURING THE 1930'S THEN THEY WILL KNOW THAT I HAVE NOT EXAGGERATED. WE ARE TALKING IN THE PLAINEST TERMS: THE EXISTENCE OF OUR PEOPLE, THE EXISTENCE OF OUR STATE.

THE ORGANISATION KNOWN AS THE PLO IS AN ORGANISATION OF MURDERERS. THERE HAS BEEN NOTHING LIKE IT IN THE ANNALS OF HISTORY. BEHIND IT LIES ALL THE POWER OF THE USSR....

WE THE JEWISH PEOPLE, LIVED IN EUROPE A THOUSAND YEARS. WE DEVELOPED ITS CULTURE, CONTRIBUTED TO ITS ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, PARTICIPATED IN ITS POLITICAL LIFE, WERE HARSHLY PERSECUTED. ASIDE FROM DENMARK, THERE IS NOT A SINGLE STATE IN EUROPE WHICH DID NOT EXPEL THE JEWS. IN THE HISTORY OF EACH, THERE IS AN EXPULSION OF THE JEWS. THEY IN TURN, WANDERED FROM LAND TO LAND AND FROM THE ATLANTIC OCEAN TO THE VOLGA, THE SOIL ABSORBED MUCH JEWISH BLOOD, IN EVERY GENERATION.

/UNTIL

UNTIL OUR GENERATION CAME ALONG, ONE OF THE EUROPEAN STATES BEARS DIRECT RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE DESTRUCTION OF SIX MILLION JEWS, AMONG THEM ONE-AND-A-HALF MILLION SMALL CHILDREN. THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THIS NATION WILL NEVER CEASE TO THE END OF ALL GENERATIONS. ALBEIT, ONE, AND ONLY ONE, PRIME MINISTER DID THE RIGHT THING - HE WENT TO THE WARSAW GHETTO, GOT DOWN ON HIS KNEES AND ASKED FORGIVENESS, MERCY AND ATONEMENT FROM THOSE WHO STOOD UP AT THE LAST REBELLION AND WITH PISTOLS DEFENDED HUMAN DIGNITY, NO LONGER THEIR LIVES, AGAINST THE MOST POWERFUL ARMY IN EUROPE, UNTIL THEY, TOO, FELL IN BATTLE. NO ONE ELSE DID WHAT MR BRANDT DID. I WOULD RECOMMEND TO SOME OTHERS TO GO TO THE WARSAW GHETTO LIKE HIM, TO GET DOWN ON THEIR KNEES AND BEG FOR FORGIVENESS AND MERCY FOR WHAT WAS DONE TO OUR PEOPLE. THEY WOUNDED THAT PEOPLE FOR ALL GENERATIONS TO COME. FOR THEY NOT ONLY DESTROYED ONE-AND-A-HALF MILLION CHILDREN, BUT ALSO SAGES, THE CEDARS OF LEBANON, SCIENTISTS. WHAT MIGHT HAVE EMERGED FROM THOSE ONE-AND-A-HALF SWEET, WISE, CHILDREN WHO WERE MOURNED AFTER THEY WERE SNATCHED OUT OF THE ARMS OF THEIR MOTHERS TO THE GAS CHAMBERS BY THAT SAME NATION. AND NOW THE GOVERNMENT OF THAT NATION COMES AND TELLS US, THE REMNANTS OF THE JEWISH PEOPLE, THAT WE SHOULD RECOGNISE A SECOND NAZI EXTERMINATORY ORGANISATION, WHICH YESTERDAY PASSED A RESOLUTION IN DAMASCUS TO LIQUIDATE THE JEWISH STATE TO LIQUIDATE THE ZIONIST ENTITY IN MILITARY AND IDEOLOGICAL TERMS, IN EVERY SENSE - BEFORE ALL FOR THE EARS OF ALL. AND NOW THE GOVERNMENT OF THIS NATION WHICH BEARS THIS HISTORICAL RESPONSIBILITY, WILL CALL ON THE ENTIRE WORLD TO RECOGNISE THAT ORGANISATION OF MURDERERS, AGAINST THE STATE IN WHICH THE REMNANTS OF THAT HOLOCAUST - A HOLOCAUST LIKE NO OTHER SINCE GOD CREATED MAN, AND MAN CREATED SATAN - HAVE GATHERED.

AND THERE IS A SECOND COUNTRY, WHICH FELL UNDER THE BLOWS OF THE NAZI ARMY AND SURRENDERED, EXCEPT FOR A SMALL GROUP WHICH DECLARED A REBELLION. THAT COUNTRY SET UP A SPECIAL REGIME WHICH DECLARED IT WOULD COOPERATE WITH VICTORIOUS GERMANY, WITH ITS OPEOPLE AND SECRET POLICE. THAT SAME GOVERNMENT, WHICH ASSEMBLED IN VICHY, WAS INVOLVED WITH TURNING OVER ALL THE FRENCH JEWS TO THE GENOCIDAL ENEMY. AND, INDEED, MOST OF THE FRENCH JEWS WERE INTERRED AND NOTHING BUT THEIR ASHES REMAINED. NOW THE GOVERNMENT OF THIS NATION, WHICH ALSO BEARS DIRECT RESPONSIBILITY - BECAUSE IT HANDED OVER THE JEWS - DEMANDS THAT WE RECOGNISE THAT ORGANISATION OF MURDERERS AND INSISTS THAT WE NEGOTIATE WITH IT. WHAT WILL WE NEGOTIATE WITH IT ABOUT? ABOUT SELF-DESTRUCTION, ABOUT THE THE LIQUIDATION OF THE ZIONIST ENTITY, MILITARY AND IDEOLOGICAL? ON THE MURDER OF THE CHILDREN OF ISRAEL? THERE WAS NOT ONE NATION IN EUROPE WHICH IN SOME PART DID NOT COLLABORATE WITH THE KILLERS. THAT'S TRUE. IN FRANCE, BELGIUM, HOLLAND AND NORWAY, THERE WERE PEOPLE WHO SAVED JEWS - AND WE CALL THEM THE RIGHTEOUS OF THE NATIONS. WE SHALL NEVER FORGET THEM. WE PLANT

FORESTS IN THEIR HONOUR. BUT THE BITTER TRUTH IS THAT MOST COOPERATED WITH THE GENOCIDAL ENEMY. AS A RESULT, ONLY A REMNANT OF EUROPEAN JEWRY SURVIVED. AND THOSE SAME NATIONS NOW COME AND TELL US HOW TO HANDLE THOSE AFFAIRS AFFECTING THE SECURITY AND FUTURE OF OUR PEOPLE, AND WILL RECOGNISE THAT ORGANISATION OF MURDERERS AND WILL TELL US: RECOGNISE THEM, NEGOTIATE WITH THEM. AND THEY WILL PROPOSE THAT THE U S A RECOGNISE THEM AND NEGOTIATE WITH THEM. THEY ARE A WORTHY PARTNER.

MR SPEAKER, I WOULD LIKE TO SAY EXPLICITLY, AS I SAID FROM THE BEGINNING AND ENUMERATED ONE COUNTRY AFTER THE OTHER: IT IS TRUE THAT AMONG THE EUROPEAN STATES THERE WERE RIGHTEOUS GENTILES AND WE SHALL BE GRATEFUL TO THEM FOREVER. BUT THE NATIONS OF EUROPE ALSO COLLABORATED WITH ANNIHILATOR AND HANDED OVER JEWS AND THEY CANNOT, THEY HAVE NO MORAL RIGHT, TO TELL US HOW TO ARRANGE OUR SECURITY. THEY HAVE NO MORAL RIGHT TO RECOGNISE THE ORGANISATION OF MURDERERS.....

WE THEREFORE REJECT WHAT IS CALLED THE "EUROPEAN INITIATIVE" AND I AM HAPPY TO ANNOUNCE AND TO POINT OUT FROM THIS PODIUM THAT THE UNITED STATES HAS LINED UP AGAINST IT WITH ALL ITS MIGHT AND (PRESIDENT CARTER HAS) ANNOUNCED THAT, IF A CERTAIN MOTION IS PRESENTED TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL, ALTERING THE BASIS UPON WHICH THE CAMP DAVID AGREEMENTS ARE FOUNDED, THE UNITED STATES WILL CAST A VETO SO THAT THE MOTION WILL NOT PASS. AND FROM THE KNESSET PODIUM, I WISH TO EXPRESS THANKS AND APPRECIATION TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES AND SECRETARY OF STATE MUSKIE ON THEIR DECLARATION AND THEIR DETERINATION TO PREVENT THIS EUROPEAN INITIATIVE FROM GAINING EXPRESSION. I WANT TO CALL UPON THE NATIONS OF EUROPE DIRECTLY. AND LET THEM NOT SAY THAT I INTERFERE WITH THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF OTHER STATES. THERE IS INTERFERENCE TODAY. IN A NUMBER OF COUNTRIES THERE IS NO END TO THE DEMANDS THAT THIS GOVERNMENT, WHICH HAS THE SUPPORT OF THE MAJORITY OF THE KNESSET, WHICH HAS BEEN GRANTED THE CONFIDENCE OF THE NATION, SHOULD GO AND IN ITS PLACE ANOTHER SHOULD COME. THIS ONE WILL BE EASIER TO DEAL WITH, THEY SAY. THAT IS INTERVENTION. I WILL ACT AS A FREE MAN AND CALL UPON ALL THE PEOPLES OF EUROPE, MOST, IF NOT ALL, OF WHICH SUPPORT ISRAEL AND WANT NEITHER ITS DESTRUCTION NOR ITS IMPERILMENT, AND CARE DEEPLY ABOUT US, BECAUSE THEY SAW HOW THEY TRIED TO DESTROY US FIVE TIMES AND HOW WE DEFENDED OURSELVES. EVEN FRANCE WAS OUR ALLY, WE FOUGHT TOGETHER WITH THE FRENCH. AND OTHER EUROPEAN NATIONS SUPPORTED US AS WELL.

I ADDRESS THEM FROM THE KNESSET PODIUM; KNOW THAT THE OFFICIAL POLICY OF YOUR COUNTRIES MIGHT IMPERIL THE JEWISH STATE AND THE REMNANTS OF THE JEWISH PEOPLE. DON'T LET THEM CARRY IT OUT. YOU ARE FREE PEOPLE, LIVING IN DEMOCRATIC COUNTRIES. I CALL ON ALL THE MEMBERS OF THE PARLIAMENTS, AMONG THEM OUTRIGHT FRIENDS OF OURS, NOT TO REMAIN SILENT, NOT STAND ASIDE, BUT TO ACT TO PREVENT RECOGNITION OF THAT ORGANISATION OF MURDERERS AND THE STATEMENT THAT A PALESTINIAN STATE SHOULD BE ESTABLISHED IN JUDEA, SAMARIA AND GAZA, WHICH WOULD BE A THREAT TO OUR VERY EXISTENCE''.

F C O PSE PASS SAVING TO AMMAN DAMASCUS AND BEIRUT.

R O B I N S O N

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

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FM COPENHAGEN 091555Z JUNE 80
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 144 OF 09 JUNE
INFO PRIORITY ROME

SAVING OTHER EC POSTS, TEL AVIV, CAIRO, AMMAN, UKMIS NEW YORK,
WASHINGTON.

ARAB/ISRAEL

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1. THE MFA (GRUNNET) GAVE A COMMUNITY BRIEFING THIS AFTERNOON ON SHAMIR'S VISIT WHICH HAD INCLUDED A BRIEF CALL ON THE PRIME MINISTER AND SUBSTANTIVE TALKS WITH THE FOREIGN MINISTER ON 6 JUNE. GRUNNET SAID HE WOULD NOT GO THROUGH SHAMIR'S PRESENTATION. IT HAD BEEN ON STANDARD LINES, AS IN THE HAGUE VISIT OF WHICH THE NINE HAD HAD AN ACCOUNT (THE HAGUE TELNO 196). PERHAPS THE MOST NOTE-WORTHY FEATURE WAS THE SERIOUSNESS WITH WHICH SHAMIR VIEWED THE FATAH CONGRESS.

2. THE DANISH FOREIGN MINISTER HAD STRESSED THAT DENMARK WAS QUOTE A FRIEND OF ISRAEL UNQUOTE, BUT HE THOUGHT IT NECESSARY TO DRAW ATTENTION TO CERTAIN DIFFICULTIES HE SAW IN THE ISRAEL GOVERNMENT'S POLICY. THESE WERE:

- A. THE WEST BANK SETTLEMENTS WERE PROVOCATIVE.
- B. THE ATTITUDE TOWARDS THE MAYORS, BOTH THOSE EXPELLED AND THOSE WHO HAD BEEN ATTACKED.
- C. OLESEN QUOTE BEGGED UNQUOTE SHAMIR TO MAKE AN EARLY POLITICAL GESTURE OVER THE EXPELLED MAYORS; DELAY MIGHT RESULT IN THE OPPORTUNITY BEING LOST IN THE WAKE OF A JUDGEMENT FROM THE SUPREME COURT.
- D. THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL SEEMED TO BE LOSING CONTACT WITH MODERATE PALESTINIAN OPINION.

3. OLESEN EXPLAINED THE DANISH ATTITUDE TO PALESTINIAN SELF-DETERMINATION IN THE TERMS OF THE COMMUNIQUE ISSUED BY NORDIC FOREIGN MINISTERS IN HELSINKI ON 28 MARCH (HELSINKI TELNO 97). DENMARK DID NOT RECOGNISE THE PLO ALTHOUGH THERE HAD BEEN CONTACTS THROUGH THE DANISH AMBASSADOR IN BEIRUT. NOR WOULD THEY RECOGNISE, SO LONG AS THE PLO RETAINED ITS PRESENT CHARTER. AT THE SAME TIME IT WAS REALISTIC TO ACCEPT THAT THE PLO WAS THE BODY MOST REPRESENTATIVE OF THE PALESTINIANS. MOREOVER, DENMARK WANTED CLOSE AND NORMAL CONTACT WITH ALL ARAB COUNTRIES; IT WAS IMPORTANT NOT TO DRIVE THEM TO SEEK SUPPORT ELSEWHERE.

4. GRUNNET COMMENTED THAT THE DANES HAD NOT FOUND SHAMIR AS HARD-LINE AS THEY HAD EXPECTED. THE REASON WAS PROBABLY THAT HE FELT HE HAD NO REAL PROBLEM WITH THEM.

FCO PLEASE PASS SAVING ADDRESSEES.

WARDURTON

NNNN

SENT AT 09/1631Z CJB

RECD AT 09/1631Z PP



Lg. [Signature]

(2)

Prime Minister

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PRIME MINISTER

[Signature]

ARAB/ISRAEL

[Signature]

I have seen the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary's minute to you of 6th June.

2. I should like to register my support for his approach. Western security interests may be put at risk, not only by the spread of violence on the West Bank itself, but by the tensions a continuing stalemate will engender among other States in this strategically vital area. If we can guide the Nine towards agreeing on a sustained peace effort which steers clear of the courses most objectionable to the US, this can only improve the general context for the US's own efforts to guarantee the region's security. It should help us maintain the standing we need to make our own distinctive contribution, both political and military, to consolidation and deterrence in face of a growing Soviet threat. It also has a considerable bearing on the prospects for our relations with individual Arab States, including the future of our defence sales effort. I would therefore welcome a statement by EEC Heads of State and Governments on the lines indicated in Peter Carrington's minute.

3. I am copying this to other members of OD and to Sir Robert Armstrong.

[Signature]

Ministry of Defence

9th June 1980



10 JUN 1899

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Secretary of Defense

Washington, D.C.

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FM TEL AVIV 091215Z JUN 80

TO ROUTINE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 230 OF 9 JUNE

INFO WASHINGTON CAIRO UKMIS NEW YORK AMMAN AND JERUSALEM

ARAB/ISRAEL

1. I HAVE REPORTED MY BELIEF THAT A CHANGE OF GOVERNMENT IN ISRAEL WILL NOT LEAD TO SUFFICIENT CHANGE IN ISRAEL'S POLICIES TO SECURE PEACE.
2. SINCE THE POINT MAY BE RELEVANT TO DISCUSSIONS IN VENICE, I HAVE TO REPORT THAT LENGTHY TALKS WHICH I HAVE HAD IN THE LAST TWO WEEKS OR SO WITH RABIN, BAR LEV (SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE LABOUR PARTY), ABBA EBAN, HERZOG AND RAPHAEL (FORMER AMBASSADOR TO LONDON AND THE UN AND CLOSE TO EBAN), AND YADIN (DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER AND LEADER OF THE DEMOCRATIC MOVEMENT), TWO SHORTER TALKS WITH PERES, AND PUBLIC STATEMENTS MADE BY RABIN AND DAYAN, GIVE LITTLE GROUND FOR SUPPOSING THAT A CHANGE OF GOVERNMENT HERE WILL PRODUCE SUFFICIENT POLICY CHANGES AS REGARDS ISRAEL'S OCCUPATION OF THE WEST BANK AND GAZA, AND RELATIONS WITH THE PALESTINIANS, TO SECURE A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT.
3. LABOUR'S POLICY ON SETTLEMENTS MIGHT LOOK SUPERFICIALLY MORE REASONABLE, AND THERE IS WIDESPREAD RECOGNITION ON THE OPPOSITION SIDE THAT ISRAEL CANNOT RULE OVER A MILLION PALESTINIANS IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES INDEFINITELY. BUT ALL LABOUR LEADERS SEE THE ALLON PLAN AS THE BASIS FOR A SETTLEMENT AND HOPE THAT KING HUSSEIN WILL BE PREPARED TO ACCEPT WHAT IS LEFT OF THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES AFTER THE EXCLUSION OF EAST JERUSALEM AND THE JORDAN VALLEY (WHICH WILL BE SETTLED, AND OCCUPIED BY THE IDF), AND OTHER BORDER ADJUSTMENTS HAVE BEEN MADE IN THE INTEREST OF ISRAELI SECURITY.
4. NO ONE LIKELY TO BE IN OFFICE AFTER THE DEPARTURE OF THE BEGIN GOVERNMENT IS PREPARED TO AGREE TO AN INDEPENDENT PALESTINIAN STATE. SOME (INCLUDING EBAN) WOULD AGREE THAT KING HUSSEIN CANNOT BE TIED FOR EVER FROM GIVING INDEPENDENCE TO THE PALESTINIANS WITHIN A PORTION OF HIS (BY THEN) ENLARGED KINGDOM. BUT THE THINKING EVEN OF THESE "MODERATES" IS THAT HE SHOULD BE PREVENTED FROM DOING SO FOR AN INITIAL PERIOD OF 5 OR 7 YEARS BY SIGNATURE OF INTERIM ARRANGEMENTS. AND ONLY EBAN OF ALL THOSE TO WHOM I HAVE SPOKEN SEES ANY POSSIBILITY OF HELPING KING HUSSEIN BY FLUFFING THE ULTIMATE FATE OF EAST JERUSALEM DURING AN INTERIM PERIOD. (NOONE HAS CONCESSION TO MAKE ABOUT ITS ULTIMATE FATE.)

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5. IT IS ALSO NECESSARY TO BEAR IN MIND THAT LABOUR IS FAR FROM BEING CERTAIN TO GET AN OVERALL MAJORITY WHICH WOULD PERMIT IT TO FORM A GOVERNMENT WITHOUT A COALITION PARTNER. THE ACCEPTED WISDOM IS THAT THE MOST LIKELY OUTCOME WOULD BE THE NEED TO FORM A COALITION WITH THE NEW RELIGIOUS PARTY (WHICH HAS STIFFENED EVEN BEGIN'S POLICIES IN RECENT MONTHS). BUT BEFORE LABOUR GETS EVEN THIS FAR, IT IS GOING TO HAVE TO UNDERGO CONSIDERABLE STRESSES AS THE FIGHT FOR LEADERSHIP BETWEEN PERES AND RABIN WORKS ITSELF OUT, WITH RABIN NOW LOOKING LIKE BIDDING FOR SUPPORT BY SUGGESTING THAT PERES WILL BE TOO WEAK.

ROBINSON

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TELNO 445 OF 9 JUN 80

*Read in full
(mentioned this tel. to you.)*

INFO PRIORITY EEC POSTS, WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK, CAIRO,
TEL AVIV, AMMAN, DAMASCUS.

SAVING BEIRUT, GULF POSTS, ALGIERS AND BAGHDAD

YRTELNO 90 TO WASHINGTON: ARAB / ISRAEL

1. I WAS CALLED IN BY THE DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER ON 8 JUNE.
2. MANSOURI SAID THAT THE ARAB WORLD EXPECTED GREAT THINGS FROM THE VENICE SUMMIT. BUT THERE WERE ALREADY DISTURBING SIGNS THAT THES EXPECTATIONS MIGHT NOT BE FULFILLED. HE REFERRED PARTICULARLY TO REPORTS THAT THE DANISH FOREIGN MINISTER, FOLLOWING SHAMIR'S VISIT, HAD TALKED OF SELF-DETERMINATION WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF RESOLUTION 242: THIS WAS A TOTALLY UNSATISFACTORY CONCEPT SINCE THAT RESOLUTION ONLY SPOKE OF PALESTINIANS AS REFUGEES. ANYTHING ALONG THOSE LINES WOULD BE A RETROGRADE

THE CONTEXT OF RESOLUTION 242? THIS WAS A TOTALLY UNSATIS-
FACTORY CONCEPT SINCE THAT RESOLUTION ONLY SPOKE OF PALESTINIANS
AS REFUGEES. ANYTHING ALONG THOSE LINES WOULD BE A RETROGRADE
STEP.

3. THE SITUATION ON THE WEST BANK WAS GROWING DANGEROUS.
WHATEVER MUSKIE MIGHT PROMISE TO SADAT, NO SUBSTANTIVE AMERICAN
INITIATIVE COULD BE EXPECTED BEFORE THE ELECTION; BUT IT WAS
NOT POSSIBLE TO WAIT TILL NOVEMBER FOR MOVEMENT. THE SAUDIS BELIEVED
THAT THE AMERICANS WANTED THE EUROPEANS TO MOVE SLIGHTLY AHEAD
OF THEM: BREZINZKI HAD TOLD THEM DURING HIS VISIT IN FEBRUARY
THAT SUCH A MOVE WOULD HAVE MORAL FORCE IN WASHINGTON AND WOULD
HELP THE ADMINISTRATION BOTH WITH ITS OWN PUBLIC OPINION AND WITH
THE ISRAELIS.

4. THE SAUDIS HAD NO WISH TO GO BACK ON THE LIMITED ACHIEVEMENTS
OF CAMP DAVID, BUT THAT PROCESS HAD NOW BROKEN DOWN IN A BLIND
ALLEY. AUTONOMY ON THE TERMS BEING DISCUSSED RECENTLY BETWEEN
EGYPT, ISRAEL AND THE US WOULD LEAD NOWHERE: WHAT WAS NEEDED
WAS TO MAKE PRECISE THE VAGUE TALK IN THE CAMP DAVID AGREEMENT
ABOUT ASSOCIATING THE PALESTINIANS WITH DISCUSSIONS ABOUT THEIR
FUTURE. IN THE SAUDI VIEW THAT MEANT ACKNOWLEDGING THE RIGHT
OF ALL PALESTINIANS OUTSIDE PRE 1967 ISRAEL TO SELF DETERMINATION,
AND RECOGNISING THE PLO AS THE SOLE REPRESENTATIVE OF THOSE PALES-
TINIANS. IF THE VENICESUMMIT CAME UP WITH ANYTHING LESS THAN THIS,
THE THE EUROPEANS WOULD BE BRANDED AS HYPOCRITES, FORCED BY
THEIR DEPENDENCE ON OIL TO MAKE FINE GESTURES BUT EFFECTIVELY
LIMITED BY THEIR SENSITIVITY TO AMERICAN PRESSURE.

5. MANSOURI ASKED THAT THESE VIEWS BE BROUGHT TO YOUR
NOTICE. I SAID THEY WOULD BE. HE ASKED HOW I THOUGHT THINGS WOULD
GO IN VENICE. IN REPLY, I RAN THROUGH THE POINTS IN PARA 2
OF TUR, SUPPLEMENTED BY PARTS OF PARA 3. I EXPLAINED OUR POSITION
ON "RECOGNITION", STRESSING THE ADVANTAGES OF PREGMATIC
RATHER THAN A LEGALISTIC APPROACH. AND I SUGGESTED THAT AMERICAN
ATTITUDES TOWARDS A EUROPEAN INITIATIVE HAD APPARENTLY CHANGED
SINCE BREZINSKI'S ALLEGED REMARK IN FEBRUARY. MANSOURI SAID
THAT THE IDEAS IN TUR WERE INTERESTING AND HELPFUL, BUT DID
NOT GO FAR ENOUGH: ON SUBSTANCE, THEY RELATED WELL-KNOWN POSITIONS;
ON PROCEDURE, THEY HAD LITTLE TO OFFER. HE ACCEPTED THAT THE
THREAT OF A US VETO MADE A SECURITY COUNCIL INITIATIVE INA-
PPROPRIATE AT THIS TIME. BUT IN THAT CASE WHY NOT PUBLISH A DRAFT
RESOLUTION WITHOUT ANY TIMESCALE FOR ITS SUBMISSION? (SUCH A
RESOLUTION TO COVER THE BASIC PRINCIPLES MENTIONED IN TUR,
PLUS SETTLEMENTS, JERUSALEM, SECURITY ON THE WEST BANK AND THE
RIGHTS OF PALESTINIANS NOW LIVING OUTSIDE MANDATE PALESTINE).
AND IF THE NINE COULD ACKNOWLEDGE THAT AT SOME STAGE THE PLO

RIGHTS OF PALESTINIANS NOW LIVING OUTSIDE MANDATE PALESTINE). AND IF THE NINE COULD ACKNOWLEDGE THAT AT SOME STAGE THE PLO, AS A FACTOR IN THE SITUATION, WOULD HAVE TO BE ASSOCIATED WITH ANY NEGOTIATIONS ON PALESTINE, WHY NOT RECOGNISE IT NOW AS THE SOLE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE?

6. I ASKED MANSOURI HOW HE READ EGYPT'S POSITION ON EUROPEAN ACTION. HE SAID THAT THE EGYPTIANS WERE NOT AS OPPOSED TO SUCH ACTION AS THE ISRAELIS OR THE AMERICANS CLAIMED. SADAT HAD USED CAMP DAVID TO GET BACK THE SUEZ CANAL, THE OIL FIELDS AND A LARGE SLICE OF SINAI: HE WAS NOW BEGINNING TO CONCENTRATE ON THE SITUATION INSIDE EGYPT AND TO SEEK A RAPPROACHMENT WITH THE OTHER ARABS. HE WOULD NOT BE UPSET BY ANY EUROPEAN ACTION WHICH BUILT ON CAMP DAVID BUT EXTENDED IT.

7. I SUBSEQUENTLY SPOKE TO THE DUTCH AND GERMAN AMBASSADORS, WHO HAD BEEN SUMMONED TO SEE PRINCE SAUD ON THE SAME MATTER. (THE ITALIAN WAS ALSO CALLED IN, BUT LEFT FOR RIYADH IMMEDIATELY AFTERWARDS: THE BELGIAN, DANISH AND FRENCH HAVE NOT BEEN SUMMONED YET: I DO NOT KNOW ABOUT THE IRISH.) SAUD HAD SPOKEN TO THEM IN BROADLY SIMILAR TERMS, THE MAIN DIFFERENCES BEING:-

A. HE DID NOT MENTION BRESINSKI'S VISIT,

B. THOUGH TWICE ASKED BY THE GERMAN AMBASSADOR TO DO SO, HE HAD NOT CLARIFIED THE POSITION ABOUT PALESTINIANS IN PRE-1967 ISRAEL:

C. THOUGH ASKED WHAT THE SAUDIS WANTED OUT OF VENICE, HE HAD NOT MENTIONED THE POSSIBILITY OF A DRAF RESOLUTION:

D. HE SEEMS TO HAVE BEEN WARMER IN HIS REFERENCES TO PRESIDENT SADAT AND THE CAMP DAVID PROCESS THAN WAS MANSOURI.

IN PART THESE DISCREPANCIES MAY REFLECT THE FACT THAT NONE OF THE OTHER EMBASSIES OF THE NINE HERE SEEM TO BE AS WELL BRIEFED AS TUR ALLOWED ME TO BE. BUT MANSOURI IS ALWAYS MORE DIDACTIC THAN SAUD, AND WAS IN ANY CASE SPEAKING TO ME AFTER ATTENDING SAUD'S MEETINGS WITH THE OTHER TWO.

8. COMMENT. MANSOURI'S ARGUMENTATION WAS UNCONVINCING, NOT LEAST HIS REPEATED AND HEAVY RELIANCE ON BREZINSKI'S ALLEGED REMARKS FOUR MONTH AGO. BUT THERE CAN BE NO DOUBTING THE THRUST OF THE SAUDI MESSAGE OR ITS FORCE: THEY EXPECT THE NINE AT VENICE NOT ONLY TO CONSOLIDATE RECENT EUROPEAN MOVEMENT ON ADAP/ISRAEL BUT ALSO TO COMMIT THEMSELVES TO SOME

THE THROST OF THE SAUDI MESSAGE OR ITS FORCE? THEY EXPECT THE
NINE AT VENICE NOT ONLY TO CONSOLIDATE RECENT EUROPEAN
MOVEMENT ON ARAB/ISRAEL BUT ALSO TO COMMIT THEMSELVES TO SOME
ACTION AT THE INTERNATIONAL LEVEL WHICH WILL GIVE PRACTICAL
EXPRESSION TO THAT ADVANCE. MANSOURI'S IDEA OF A DRAFT RESOLUTION
WAS PROBABLY AN OFF THE CUFF REACTION - BUT IT IS A GOOD INDI-
CATION OF THE SORT OF THING WHICH MIGHT SATISFY THEM IE WE
SHOULD NOT USE SOUNDINGS ONLY TO DISCOVER WHAT OTHERS THINK
ABOUT PROCEDURE BUT SHOULD ALSO HAVE SOME SUGGESTIONS OF OUR
OWN TO PUT FORWARD. AS REGARDS "RECOGNITION" OF THE PLO, I WOULD VQ

////

I WOULD

I WOULD

EXPECT THE SAUDIS TO BE HAPPY ENOUGH IF THE PLO FEATURED ON A
BASIS OF EQUALITY WITH OTHER INTERLOCUTORS IN A SOUNDINGS
EXERCISE.

9. FCO PLEASE PASS TO SAVING ADDRESSEES.

GRAY

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FM JEDDA 080930Z JUN
TO PRIORITY FCO
TELNO 442 OF 8 JUN 80

INFO AMMAN AND CAIRO

YRTELNO RETRACT 81006 JUN: EUROPEAN COMMUNITY AND THE MIDDLE EAST

1. THE PRESS HERE HAVE BEEN ALL KEYED UP FOR A EUROPEAN INITIATIVE OUT OF VENICE. THEIR EXPECTATIONS WERE ALMOST CERTAINLY TOO HIGH TO BE SATISFIED BY WHAT SEEMS LIKELY TO BE THE OUTCOME : IN SOME CASES DISILLUSIONMENT IS ALREADY SETTING IN. THEN WILL COME THE SEARCH FOR SCAPEGOATS. ANYTHING SAID BY ANY OF THE MAJOR EC COUNTRIES WHICH INDICATES RESERVATIONS ABOUT SOME POTENTIAL PLANK IN AN EC POSITION WILL BE SEIZED UPON AND FAILURE ATTRIBUTED TO IT.

2. GIVEN THE PRESENT STATE OF ANGLO-SAUDI RELATIONS, OUR OWN ATTITUDES AT VENICE WILL BE SUBJECTED TO PARTICULARLY CLOSE INSPECTION. INDEED THIS SCRUTINY HAS ALREADY BEGUN: SATURDAYS 'ARAB NEWS' HAD A FRONT PAGE ARTICLE HEADED 'BRITAIN RULES OUT EEC BID ON PLO', EMPHASISING THOSE PARTS OF TUR WHICH DEAL WITH PLO RECOGNITION. SIMILAR REPORTING OF THE STATEMENT COMES ON THE FRONT PAGE OF 'OKAZ',

3. IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, WOULD IT NOT BE BETTER FOR US TO LIMIT COMMENT IN ADVANCE OF THE VENICE MEETINGS TO THE SORT OF REMARKS MADE BY MR HURD IN HIS PARLIAMENTARY REPLY TO MR ADLEY ON 4 JUNE?

GRAY

[NOT ADVANCED]

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TO PRIORITY FCO

TELNO 2153 OF 6 JUNE 1980

M I P T: ARAB/ISRAEL

1. IF SAUNDERS' EXPLANATION OF WHERE THE U S NOW STANDS IS BORNE OUT IN MUSKIE'S SPEECH AND IN SUBSEQUENT U S ACTION THIS WILL REPRESENT A SIGNIFICANT AND WELCOME SHIFT IN U S POLICY. THE IMPRESSION CREATED HERE HAS BEEN THAT U S OPPOSITION TO ACTION THROUGH THE SECURITY COUNCIL WAS PART AND PARCEL OF A MORE GENERAL RESISTANCE TO ANY EUROPEAN INVOLVEMENT IN ARAB/ISRAELI MATTERS AT THIS STAGE.
2. BUT EVEN IF SAUNDERS IS RIGHT IT DOES NOT MEAN THAT CONFLICT OVER THIS ISSUE CAN BE EASILY AVOIDED. MUCH WILL DEPEND ON THE FINE POINTS IN MUSKIE'S SPEECH AND IN THE WAY THE EUROPEAN INITIATIVE IS FORMULATED. FOR INSTANCE A STATEMENT BY MUSKIE THAT THE U S HAS NO OBJECTION TO ACTION WHICH DOES NOT INTERFERE WITH THE CAMP DAVID NEGOTIATIONS CAN READILY BE INTERPRETED IN EITHER SENSE. IT COULD LEAVE THE U S FREE TO INDICATE GRUDGING ACCEPTANCE OF WHATEVER EMERGES FROM THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL OR TO ATTACK IT AS POTENTIALLY DAMAGING TO THE AUTONOMY NEGOTIATIONS. ANY REFERENCE BY THE COMMUNITY TO THE PLO WILL PRODUCE AN OUTBURST FROM THE JEWISH COMMUNITY HERE AND IN CONSEQUENCE FROM THE MEDIA. THE ADMINISTRATION WILL BE HIGHLY SENSITIVE TO PRESSURE OF THIS SORT IN THE PRESENT POLITICAL SITUATION.
3. I DO NOT KNOW HOW REALISTIC IT MIGHT BE TO TRY TO WORK ON JEWISH OPINION IN EUROPE TO EXPRESS A FAVOURABLE VIEW OF A EUROPEAN INITIATIVE. ONE POSSIBILITY MIGHT BE A STATEMENT OR ARTICLE FROM MARCUS SIEFF, WHO WAS OUT HERE RECENTLY DISCUSSING THIS WHOLE QUESTION. SOMETHING ON THESE LINES COULD BE A HELP IN INFLUENCING OPINION HERE.
4. I HAVE ALREADY REFERRED TO THE CARE WHICH WILL BE NEEDED IN PRESENTATION TO U S OPINION OF A EUROPEAN INITIATIVE. AN AUTHORITATIVE STATEMENT IN PARLIAMENT EXPLAINING WHY EUROPE HAS THE RIGHT AND DUTY TO INVOLVE ITSELF IN A SOLUTION OF THE ARAB/ISRAELI PROBLEM COULD BE VALUABLE IN EXPLAINING OUR POSITION IN THE U S, PARTICULARLY IF IT EMPHASISED THE STRATEGIC FACTOR AND ANSWERED THE COMMON ASSUMPTION THERE THAT THE SOLE MOTIVE IS SHORT TERM INTEREST IN OIL AND TRADE. BUT THE OTHER EUROPEAN COUNTRIES SHOULD BE PREPARED TO SPEAK UP TOO: AND THE AMERICANS MUST NOT THINK THAT WE CAN DO THEIR DIRTY WORK FOR THEM IN EUROPE ON THIS ISSUE.

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5. I WOULD NOT WISH TO UNDERSTATE THE DIFFICULTIES WE MAY FACE
HERE AND THE RISK THAT A EUROPEAN INITIATIVE WILL BE MISINTERPRETED.
NEVERTHELESS PROVIDED GREAT CARE IS TAKEN WITH THE HANDLING, I DO
NOT THINK THAT OUR INTERESTS NEED BE SO ADVERSELY EFFECTED AS TO
OUTBALANCE THE ARGUMENTS IN FAVOUR OF A EUROPEAN INITIATIVE.

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TC PRIORITY FCO

TELNO 2152 OF 6 JUNE 1980

M I P T: ARAB/ISRAEL

1. WHILE THE MINISTER WAS TALKING WITH SAUNDERS, I WAS MEETING WITH CHRISTOPHER AND THE FRENCH AND FRG AMBASSADORS FOR ONE OF OUR REGULAR TALKS.
2. I CANNOT SAY THAT CHRISTOPHER WAS ANYTHING LIKE SO FORTHCOMING AS SAUNDERS HAD BEEN. BUT I DO NOT THINK THAT THIS NECESSARILY MEANS VERY MUCH. WHAT HE HAD TO SAY NEITHER BELIED NOR SUPPORTED THE VIEW THAT MUSKIE WANTS TO PLAY DOWN RATHER THAN EMPHASISE THE CONFLICT BETWEEN THE USA ON THE ONE HAND AND THE COMMUNITY ON THE OTHER AS REGARDS THIS SUBJECT.
3. IN THE COURSE OF OUR DISCUSSION, THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR SAID THAT HE THOUGHT THAT MUSKIE'S PURPOSE IN MAKING THE SPEECH NEXT WEEK MIGHT WELL BE TO GAIN POLITICAL CREDIT IN THE USA BY ATTACKING THE EUROPEANS FOR SOMETHING THAT THEY HAD NO INTENTION OF DOING IE. INTRODUCING A NEW SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION. THE U S GOVERNMENT KNEW PERFECTLY WELL THAT THE EUROPEANS HAD NO SUCH INTENTION.
4. AFTER CHRISTOPHER HAD LEFT, THE FRENCH AND GERMAN AMBASSADORS AND I DISCUSSED THIS SUBJECT ON THE BASIS THAT IT COULD LEAD TO A GREAT DEAL OF VITUPERATION ACROSS THE ATLANTIC GIVEN THE POLITICAL SENSITIVITY HERE AT THE PRESENT TIME. THE GERMAN AMBASSADOR SAID THAT HE WAS SURE THAT IF THE CHIPS WERE DOWN GENSCHER WOULD BUCKLE. HE WOULD NOT BE PREPARED TO HAVE A ROW WITH THE USA AND ISRAEL AT THE SAME TIME. HE MENTIONED BEGIN'S INFLAMMATORY SPEECH AND IMPLIED THAT NO GERMANS COULD LIVE WITH THIS REVIVAL OF THEIR PAST.
5. THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR REFERRED TO THE VERY FORTHRIGHT LINE THAT FRANCOIS-PONCET HAD TAKEN IN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE HERE RECENTLY. BUT HE THOUGHT THAT THE AMERICANS WERE WORKING ON SOME OF THE OTHER MEMBERS OF THE COMMUNITY TO PREVENT ANYTHING VERY FORWARD COMING OUT OF THE VENICE MEETING. (THE ITALIAN FOREIGN MINISTER IS DUE HERE ON MONDAY - REPORTED SEPARATELY.)
6. SEE MIFT.
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TO PRIORITY FCO

TELNO 2151 OF 6 JUNE 1980

*Read i full
(3 tels)
mt.*

YOUR TELNO 1071: ARAB/ISRAEL

1. FRETWELL FOLLOWED THIS UP WITH SAUNDERS TODAY.

2. SAUNDERS VOLUNTEERED THAT THE PUBLIC IMPRESSION COULD HAVE BEEN GIVEN RECENTLY THAT THE U S WAS TAKING A BLANKET 'HANDS OFF' APPROACH TO ANY EUROPEAN INITIATIVE IN THE MIDDLE EAST. HOWEVER, THE MORE FLEXIBLE LINE HE HAD TAKEN WITH JOHN MOBERLY IN LONDON LAST WEEK DID REPRESENT THE ADMINISTRATION'S POSITION. THIS WAS THAT :

- A) A NEW SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION WOULD BE BOUND TO INVITE AN AMERICAN VETO AND WOULD THEREFORE BE UNHELPFUL;
- B) SO WOULD ANY ACTION WHICH RAISED FALSE HOPES IN THE ARABS AND HAD THE EFFECT OF DIVERTING THEM COMPLETELY FROM THE PRESENT PROCESS WHILE IN FACT OFFERING NO POSITIVE RESULTS; BUT
- C) CERTAIN ACTION BY THE EUROPEANS COULD BE HELPFUL.

3. ELABORATING ON 2(C) ABOVE, SAUNDERS SAID THAT HE THOUGHT WE WERE ALL AGREED THAT THE OBJECTIVE WAS TO PROMOTE A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT IN THE CONTEXT OF RESOLUTION 242. ANY PRINCIPLES ENUNCIATED IN A EUROPEAN DECLARATION COULD BE CONSTRUCTIVE IF STATED IN A WAY RELATED TO A NEGOTIATED SOLUTION. FOR EXAMPLE, IF THERE WERE TO BE A REFERENCE TO PALESTINIAN SELFDETERMINATION, IT SHOULD IDEALLY NOT BE IN A VACUUM BUT MIGHT REFER TO HOW THAT SELF-DETERMINATION MIGHT BE EXERCISED. FOR THIS REASON HE WELCOMED THE FORMULATION USED BOTH BY GISCARD AND BRITISH SPOKESMEN "SELF-DETERMINATION IN THE CONTEXT OF A NEGOTIATED SOLUTION", WHICH WOULD POINT PALESTINIANS (AND ISRAELIS) IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION. SIMILARLY, A EUROPEAN DIALOGUE WITH THE PALESTINIANS COULD BE USEFUL IF IT LED THE PALESTINIANS TO FOCUS ON HOW THEY SHOULD RELATE TO A NEGOTIATING PROCESS WHOSE OBJECTIVE WAS TO ENABLE ISRAEL AND THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE TO LIVE IN PEACE. EUROPE COULD PLAY A MORE USEFUL ROLE THAN HITHERTO IN THIS AREA. FRANKLY, WHAT HAD SOMETIMES IRRITATED THE AMERICAN LEADERSHIP IN THE PAST HAD BEEN THE EUROPEANS PRONOUNCING UNIVERSALLY ACCEPTED TRUTHS FOR WHICH THEY APPEARED TO SEEK CREDIT FOR THEMSELVES WITH THE ARABS AND WHICH LED AUTOMATICALLY TO CONDEMNATION FOR AMERICA. LIKE NEWSOM, SAUNDERS STATED HIS BELIEF THAT EUROPE COULD TALK MORE TO THE ISRAELIS.

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/4.SAUNDERS

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4. SAUNDERS SAID THAT MUSKIE COULD BE EXPECTED SOON (PROBABLY ON 9 JUNE) TO MAKE A MIDDLE EAST SPEECH, IN WHICH HE WOULD HOPE TO BE ABLE TO ANNOUNCE INTER ALIA THAT THE WAY WAS CLEAR FOR THE RESUMPTION OF THE AUTONOMY TALKS. FRETWELL EXPRESSED THE FIRM HOPE THAT THE SPEECH WOULD NOT LEND ITSELF TO PRESS INTERPRETATION THAT MUSKIE WAS TRYING TO RIDE THE EUROPEANS OFF ACTION AT VENICE. SAUNDERS ASSURED HIM THAT SUCH WAS NOT THE INTENTION NOR THE SENSE OF THE CURRENT DRAFT WHICH DID NOT MENTION THE EUROPEAN INITIATIVE BY NAME, BUT DID EXPRESS THE GENERAL HOPE THAT THERE WOULD BE NO INITIATIVE WHICH UNDERCUT CAMP DAVID. AFTER FURTHER DISCUSSION SAUNDERS SAID HE WOULD TRY TO INSERT INTO THE SPEECH THE NOTION OF POTENTIAL "COMPLEMENTARITY" BETWEEN EUROPEAN AND AMERICAN ACTION. (IN A SEPARATE DISCUSSION WITH HUNTER, THE LATTER ALSO AGREED THAT THERE WAS A NEED TO GET AWAY FROM THE CONFRONTATIONAL NATURE OF RECENT PUBLIC RHETORIC EG CARTER VERSUS FRANCOIS-PONCET, AND THAT MUSKIE'S SPEECH PROVIDED AN OPPORTUNITY).

5. SAUNDERS SAID THAT HE HOPED TONIGHT TO SEND INSTRUCTIONS TO AMERICAN EMBASSIES IN THE EC TO MAKE THE SORT OF POINTS IN PARAS 2 AND 3 ABOVE IN CAPITALS.

6. SEE ALSO MIFT.

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Lg. *Phut*

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You will want to discuss this with the Foreign Secretary soon.

PM/80/43

THE PRIME MINISTER

see the chief whip's remark Arab/Israel it will cause a lot of trouble and be unacceptable to

1. As we approach the European Council meeting in Venice on 12/13 June, I am increasingly concerned about the situation in the Middle East.

quite a lot of our M.P.s.

2. Recent events on the West Bank illustrate the dangerous frustrations which are building up. It is clear that any real progress in the Israeli/Egyptian/US autonomy talks can now be ruled out, at least until after the American election and perhaps for as long as Mr Begin is Prime Minister - judging from some of his recent language. In the absence of any political progress, President Sadat may become more isolated internationally. The bomb attacks on the Mayors of Nablus and Ramallah have produced the inevitable reaction in the Security Council. The Arabs and their supporters will have an opportunity to create more trouble at the Special Session of the General Assembly likely to be called in July and again at the regular Session starting in September. Tension may rise to a point where fundamental Western interests are at risk. There is an urgent need to assure Arab moderates that although the Americans are likely to be in baulk for many months, the path of negotiation is still the best.

not.

(if Carter loses Phut)

3. Part of the difficulty is the vacuum created by American diplomatic impotence during the election period, that is, until early 1981. We are taking special pains to keep in touch with American thinking. President Carter and Mr Muskie have both made it clear that they will be very unhappy about any recourse by their friends to the Security Council and, indeed, would be obliged to use the veto. We had, in any case, been reaching the conclusion that this was not the path to follow.



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4. But this does not mean that Europe can and should do nothing. On the contrary, I believe some diplomatic activity by the Nine in the coming months is essential if the dangers described above are to be averted. We know that many senior American officials would privately accept this view. They are, or should be, as concerned as we are at the link between the deteriorating Arab/Israel situation and the other problems of the region, and at the opportunity offered to the Russians to recover lost ground by championing a 'just cause' during the period of the vacuum.

5. There is now agreement among the Nine at official level that the European Council on 12/13 June should issue a statement, the substance of which would stress commitment to Israel's security and elaborate on the need to take into account Palestinian political rights. I attach a copy of the latest draft which is broadly satisfactory. There are two points which might be construed as a move forward by the Nine, though both have been effectively covered in previous statements by the Nine as well as following closely positions we have adopted ourselves. These are the endorsement of Palestinian self-determination, always within the framework of a negotiated settlement, and acknowledgement that the PLO, among others, must be involved in negotiations. This is of course quite different from recognising them as a Government. We have for some time been taking the line that because of the support which the PLO enjoy on the West Bank they cannot be excluded indefinitely from negotiations.

6. The major proposal in the draft statement is that the Nine should begin to take soundings of the parties concerned. Those consulted should include the United States, Egypt and Israel, as well as the other Arab states most closely concerned, and also the PLO and Palestinian opinion on the West Bank and in Gaza. The soundings would be aimed at answering the following three questions:

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- (i) How can Israeli fears about long-term security be met to permit a lasting settlement?
 - (ii) How is the principle of Palestinian self-determination to be put into practice and reconciled with the interests of the other parties, notably Israel; and in the light of these questions
 - (iii) How could eventual multilateral negotiations be got under way?

In our view the soundings could take place over many months and continue in any case until the Americans are back in play after the Presidential election. One possibility is that they could be carried out by the Luxembourg Presidency: (M Thorn would be well capable of this). Another is a specially appointed Mission. There is no question, at any rate for the foreseeable future, of a British Minister playing a direct part.

7. I am copying this minute to members of OD Committee and to Sir Robert Armstrong.


(CARRINGTON)

Foreign and Commonwealth Office
6 June 1980

CONFIDENTIAL

EUROPEAN COUNCIL: DRAFT STATEMENT OF THE NINE ON THE MIDDLE EAST

1. The Heads of State and Government and the Foreign Ministers have exchanged views [in depth] on the situation in the Middle East [including the current state of negotiations resulting from the agreements signed between Egypt and Israel in March 1979]. They agreed that the growing tensions [which affect this region constitute a growing danger] [which affect this region constitute a serious danger to peace] [affect seriously the security of this region [and]] make a comprehensive solution of the Arab/Israel conflict more than ever necessary and urgent.

2. The Nine countries of the European Community consider that the traditional links and common interests which bind Europe to the Middle East require them to play a special role and call upon them today to work towards peace in a more concrete manner.

3. [In their action] [in acting thus], the Nine countries of the Community base themselves on Resolutions 242 and 338 of the Security Council and the positions which they have expressed on numerous occasions, notably in their declarations of 29 June 1977, 19 September 1978, 26 March and 18 June 1979, as well as in the speech made on their behalf on 25 September last by the Irish Foreign Minister at the 34th UN General Assembly.

4. On the basis thus set out, the time has come to work for the recognition and implementation of the two principles universally accepted by the international community: the right to exist and to security of all the states in the region including Israel, and justice for all the peoples which implies recognition of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people.

5. All the countries of the region have the right to live in peace within secure recognised and guaranteed boundaries. The guarantees of the peace settlement should be provided by the United Nations by decision of the Security Council and, as appropriate, according to other mutually agreed procedures. The Nine once more declare themselves ready to participate in a system of international guarantees in the context of a comprehensive settlement.

Peace
option.

Not a
happy
example in
this region

Not much
use in this
region.

6. The Palestinian problem, which is not simply a refugee problem, must at last find a just solution. The Palestinian people, who are conscious of their own existence as such, must be put in a position to exercise their right to self-determination [through an appropriate process] within the framework of the comprehensive peace settlement. [The exercise of this right involves the establishment of a homeland for the Palestinian people [organised by itself and, if it so desires, a Palestinian state on the territories which Israel should evacuate in Palestine]]

7. The implementation of these aims requires the adherence and concurrence of all the parties involved in the peace settlement which the Nine are striving to promote on the basis of the principles set out in the declarations mentioned above. These principles are valid for all the parties concerned, [including the Palestinian people, [which [involves the participation] [necessitates the participation] [involves the association] of the PLO in the negotiation.]

8. The Nine recognise the particularly important role which the question of Jerusalem possesses for all the parties concerned. In the speech of the then Presidency at the then United Nations on 25 September 1979, the Nine stressed inter alia that they did not accept any unilateral move which claimed to change the status of Jerusalem and that any agreement on the status of the city should guarantee the right of free access for all to the Holy Places.

9. The Nine recall the need for Israel to end the territorial occupation which it has maintained since the conflict of 1967. They are deeply convinced that the Israel settlements represent a serious obstacle to the peace process in the Middle East. The Nine consider that these settlements [as well as demographic and property modifications in the occupied Arab territories] are contrary to international law.

10. Concerned to put an end to violence, the Nine consider that only the renunciation of force and the threat of force by all the parties can create a climate of confidence in the region, and constitutes a fundamental element for a comprehensive settlement on the Middle East conflict.

/11.

11. The Nine have decided [to undertake the necessary soundings with] [to make the necessary contacts with] [all] the parties involved. In the light of the results of this consultation the Nine will decide the precise modalities of their future action [the precise methods and timetable for an initiative on their part].

12. The Nine also stressed the importance which they attach to the Euro/Arab Dialogue on all fronts and the need to develop its political dimension. They have accordingly agreed that a meeting at the political level between the two parties would be opportune. They intend thus to contribute to the development of co-operation and mutual understanding between Europe and the Arab world.

FCS to PM 6/6/80

referred to in para 3 of draft statement.

UNITED NATIONS
SECURITY
COUNCIL



Distr. GENERAL 242

S/RES/242 (1967)
22 November 1967

RESOLUTION 242 (1967)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 1382nd meeting,
on 22 November 1967

The Security Council,

Expressing its continuing concern with the grave situation in the Middle East,
Emphasizing the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war and the
need to work for a just and lasting peace in which every State in the area can live
in security,

Emphasizing further that all Member States in their acceptance of the Charter
of the United Nations have undertaken a commitment to act in accordance with
Article 2 of the Charter,

1. Affirms that the fulfilment of Charter principles requires the
establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East which should include
the application of both the following principles:

- (i) Withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the
recent conflict;
- (ii) Termination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for and
acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political
independence of every State in the area and their right to live in peace
within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of
force;

2. Affirms further the necessity

- (a) For guaranteeing freedom of navigation through international waterways in
the area;
- (b) For achieving a just settlement of the refugee problem;
- (c) For guaranteeing the territorial inviolability and political independence
of every State in the area, through measures including the establishment of
demilitarized zones;

3. Requests the Secretary-General to designate a Special Representative to proceed to the Middle East to establish and maintain contacts with the States concerned in order to promote agreement and assist efforts to achieve a peaceful and accepted settlement in accordance with the provisions and principles in this resolution;

4. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council on the progress of the efforts of the Special Representative as soon as possible.

UNITED NATIONS
SECURITY
COUNCIL



338

Intro.
GENERAL

S/RES/338
21 October 1973

RESOLUTION 338 (1973)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 1747th meeting,
on 21/22 October 1973

The Security Council

1. Calls upon all parties to the present fighting to cease all firing, terminate all military activity immediately, no later than 12 hours after the moment of the adoption of this decision, in the positions they now occupy;
2. Calls upon the parties concerned to start immediately after the cease-fire the implementation of Security Council resolution 242 (1967) in all its parts;
3. Decides that, immediately and concurrently with the cease-fire, negotiations start between the parties concerned under appropriate auspices aimed at establishing a just and durable peace in the Middle East.

STATEMENT BY THE NINE. 26. MARCH 1979

Following their declaration of 19 September 1978, the Nine Member States of the European Community have followed with the greatest attention the negotiations which have resulted in the signature of the agreements between Egypt and Israel. They are fully appreciative of the will for peace which has led President Carter to engage himself personally in these negotiations as well as of the efforts made by President Carter and Prime Minister Begin. While a difficult road remains to be trodden before Security Council Resolution 242, is implemented in all its aspects and on all fronts, the Nine consider that the Treaty constitutes a correct application of the principles of that resolution to Egyptian/Israeli relations.

They recall, however, that as they indicated in their declaration of 29 June 1977, the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East can only take place within the framework of a comprehensive settlement. Such a settlement must be based on Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338, and must translate into fact the right of the Palestinian people to a homeland.

In this context they take due note of the will expressed by the signatories to the Treaty to consider this not as a separate peace, but as a first step in the direction of a comprehensive settlement designed to bring to an end thirty years of hostility and mistrust.

They hope that this will, to which they attach particular importance, can be given practical form soon in a comprehensive agreement in which all the parties concerned, including the representatives of the Palestinian people, would participate and to which the international Community could give its endorsement.

The Nine express the hope that all the parties concerned will avoid any statement or action which will impede the search for peace, such as the Israeli policy of settlements in the occupied territories.

PARIS: 26 March 1979

18 June 79

"The Nine have examined the situation in the Middle East.

1. They recall, in accordance with their previous declarations, in particular those of 29 June 1977 and of 26 March 1979, that a just and lasting peace can be established only on the basis of a comprehensive settlement which should be based on Security Council resolutions 242 and 338 and on:

- the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by force;
- the need for Israel to end the territorial occupation which it has maintained since the 1967 conflict;
- respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of every State in the region and their right to live in peace within secure and recognised borders;
- recognition of the fact that, to establish a just and lasting peace, account will have to be taken of the legitimate rights of the Palestinians, including their right to a homeland.

2. The Nine deplore any action or declaration which might stand in the way of the quest for peace. They consider, in particular, that certain attitudes and declarations of the Israeli government are such as to create obstacles in the search for a comprehensive settlement of this kind.

Notably:

- Israel's ultimate claim to sovereignty over the occupied territories, which is incompatible with resolution 242, which laid down the principle of the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by force;

- the policy of the establishment of settlements pursued by the Israeli Government in the occupied territories, which is illegal in international law.

3. As regards the Lebanon, the Nine support its independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity. They deplore all acts endangering the security of the population and hindering the restoration of the authority of the Government of the Lebanon throughout the whole of its territory and particularly in the south of the country. Gravely concerned at the difficulties which UNIFIL, to which some of the Nine contribute, is encountering in carrying out its mandate they appeal to all parties to respect the decisions of the Security Council.

The above are the comments which the Nine wish to make at this moment.

They reserve the right to return to all of these questions

Admiral

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF PRESS STATEMENT ISSUED BY PRESIDENCY
FOLLOWING FOREIGN AFFAIRS COUNCIL MEETING IN BRUSSELS TODAY:
BEGINS

THE NINE COUNTRIES OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY CONGRATULATE PRESIDENT
CARTER ON THE GREAT COURAGE WITH WHICH HE INITIATED THE CAMP DAVID
MEETING AND BROUGHT IT TO A SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION. THEY ALSO EXPRESS
THEIR APPRECIATION FOR THE GREAT EFFORTS MADE BY PRESIDENT SADAT AND
PRIME MINISTER BEGIN.

THE NINE HAVE FOR YEARS ADVOCATED A JUST, COMPREHENSIVE AND LASTING
PEACE-SETTLEMENT ON THE BASIS OF RESOLUTIONS 242 AND 338 OF THE
SECURITY COUNCIL OF THE UNITED NATIONS. THE POSITION OF THE NINE
WAS CLEARLY SET OUT IN THE DECLARATION OF THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL OF
JUNE 29, 1977. THIS REMAINS THEIR POSITION. ON THIS BASIS THE NINE
WELCOMED THE INITIATIVE OF PRESIDENT SADAT IN NOVEMBER 1977.

THE NINE GOVERNMENTS HOPE THAT THE OUTCOME OF THE CAMP DAVID
CONFERENCE WILL BE A FURTHER MAJOR STEP ON THE PATH TO A JUST,
COMPREHENSIVE AND LASTING PEACE, AND THAT ALL PARTIES CONCERNED
WILL FIND IT POSSIBLE TO JOIN IN THE PROCESS TO CONTRIBUTE TO THAT
END.

FOR THEIR PART THE NINE WILL LEND THEIR STRONG SUPPORT TO ALL
EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE SUCH A PEACE.

ENDS.

OWEN

FILES
NENAD
MED
DEF D
NEWS D

IPD
PS
PS/MR JUDD
PS/PUS

MR HIBBERT
MR MURRAY
MR MANSFIELD

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

u/c.

020
RESOLUTIONS. IN THIS WAY WE CAN ALL CONTRIBUTE TOWARDS
PEACEFUL CHANGE IN SOUTH AFRICA. OTHERWISE THE FUTURE PROMISES
ONLY VIOLENCE AND MISERY FOR ALL THE PEOPLE OF SOUTH AFRICA,
WHATEVER THEIR RACE.

MIDDLE EAST SPEECH BY LORD CARRINGTON AT
UN-GA ON 25 SEPT 1979

IN THE MIDDLE EAST, THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT GREATLY WELCOME WHAT
HAS SO FAR BEEN ACHIEVED THROUGH THE PROCESS BEGUN AT CAMP DAVID.
IT IS IN THE INTERESTS OF ALL PARTIES TO EXPLORE FULLY THE OPENING
CREATED THERE. WE HOPE THAT THESE CONTINUING NEGOTIATIONS WILL
LEAD TO TRANSITIONAL ARRANGEMENTS WHICH WILL LIGHTEN THE BURDEN
OF OCCUPATION IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA AND HELP TO CREATE A CLIMATE
OF CONFIDENCE AND CO-OPERATION IN PRACTICAL MATTERS. BUT THE ULTIMATE
GOAL MUST REMAIN A COMPREHENSIVE SETTLEMENT, BASED ON THE EFFECTIVE
APPLICATION OF RESOLUTION 242 IN ALL ITS PARTS. THIS INVOLVES
THE ACCEPTANCE BY ALL PARTIES OF ISRAEL'S RIGHT TO LIVE IN PEACE
WITH HER NEIGHBOURS WITHIN SECURE AND RECOGNISED BOUNDARIES.
AND, EQUALLY, IT REQUIRES THE WITHDRAWAL OF ISRAEL FROM TERRITORIES
OCCUPIED IN 1967.

THERE IS ONE AREA IN WHICH A BROAD INTERNATIONAL CONSENSUS HAS
RECOGNISED THAT RESOLUTION 242 IS INCOMPLETE: AND THAT IS IN THE
HANDLING OF PALESTINIAN RIGHTS. THE RESOLUTION TAKES NO ACCOUNT OF
THE LEGITIMATE POLITICAL RIGHTS OF THE PALESTINIANS WHICH GO WELL
BEYOND THEIR STATUS AS REFUGEES. NOR DOES IT TAKE ANY ACCOUNT
OF THE PALESTINIANS' BELIEF THAT THEY ARE A SEPARATE PEOPLE WITH
A RIGHT TO THEIR HOMELAND. THIS, I BELIEVE, IS AN AREA IN WHICH
RESOLUTION 242 MAY BE SUPPLEMENTED: NOT, I EMPHASIZE, REPLACED,
AMENDED OR DISTORTED, BUT SUPPLEMENTED TO MEET THIS POINT.

MY GOVERNMENT BELIEVE THAT A SETTLEMENT WHICH DOES NOT COMMAND THE
BROAD ASSENT OF THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE CANNOT LAST. BUT IF THE
PALESTINIANS ARE TO EXERCISE THE RIGHT TO DETERMINE THEIR OWN
FUTURE AS A PEOPLE, THIS MUST BE IN THE CONTEXT OF A NEGOTIATED
PEACE SETTLEMENT WHICH GUARANTEES ISRAEL'S RIGHT TO A PEACEFUL AND
PERMANENT EXISTENCE WITHIN SECURE BORDERS. ONLY IF BOTH
PARTIES RECOGNISE THE LEGITIMATE RIGHTS OF EACH OTHER WILL IT BE
POSSIBLE TO ACHIEVE THE DURABLE PEACE WHICH ALL THE PEOPLES OF
THE MIDDLE EAST SO DESPERATELY NEED.

IN THE MEANTIME IT IS OUR EARNEST HOPE THAT ALL PARTIES WILL
AVOID DOING OR SAYING ANYTHING TO MAKE IT HARDER TO ESTABLISH THE
MINIMUM TRUST WITHOUT WHICH SUCCESSFUL NEGOTIATIONS WOULD BE
IMPOSSIBLE. WE CALL ON THE ISRAEL GOVERNMENT TO CEASE THEIR
POLICY OF SETTLEMENT IN OCCUPIED TERRITORIES. THEIR PRESENT POLICY
PREJUDICES THE CHANCE OF PROGRESS IN THE AUTONOMY TALKS AND MAKES
THE ACHIEVEMENT OF A COMPREHENSIVE SETTLEMENT MUCH MORE DIFFICULT.
WE DEPLORE THEIR RECENT DECISION TO ALLOW ISRAELI CITIZENS TO
BUY LAND IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES. MOREOVER, WHILE WE UNDERSTAND
THE ISRAEL GOVERNMENT'S PREOCCUPATION WITH SECURITY, WE URGE THEM
TO REFRAIN FROM THEIR PRESENT POLICIES IN SOUTH LEBANON. THESE
UNDERMINE THE AUTHORITY OF THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT AND FRUSTRATE
THE EFFORTS OF UNIFIL TO FULFIL ITS MANDATE. IN THAT CONTEXT I
SHOULD LIKE TO PAY TRIBUTE TO THE DEDICATION AND COURAGE WITH WHICH
THE OFFICERS AND MEN OF UNIFIL ARE CARRYING OUT THEIR DANGEROUS
AND DIFFICULT TASK.

INDO-CHINA

MR PRESIDENT, ANOTHER AREA OF DANGEROUS TENSIONS IS INDO-CHINA, WHERE

UN Speech by the Irish Foreign Minister on behalf of the
Nine, 25 September 1979.

The Nine continue to hope that it will be possible to achieve in the Middle East the just, lasting and comprehensive settlement to which this Assembly is overwhelmingly committed. They believe that such a settlement must be based on Security Council resolutions 242 (1967) and 338 (1973), applied in all their parts and on all fronts. It must also be based on the principles set out by the Nine in their statement on 29 June 1977 and on several occasions subsequently.

These principles are as follows: first, the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by force; secondly, the need for Israel to end the territorial occupation which it has maintained since the conflict of 1967; thirdly, respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of all States in the area and their right to live in peace within secure

and fourthly, recognition that, in the establishment of a just and lasting peace, account must be taken of the legitimate rights of the Palestinians.

The Nine emphasize that it is essential that all parties to the negotiation accept the right of all States in the area to live within secure and recognized boundaries with adequate guarantees. Equally, of course, it is essential that there be respect for the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people. These include the right to a homeland and the right, through its representatives, to play its full part in the negotiation of a comprehensive settlement.

Security Council resolutions 242 (1967) and 338 (1973), together with the principles I have mentioned, taken as a whole, set the essential framework for a peace settlement. In the view of the Nine it is necessary that they be accepted by all those involved - including the Palestine Liberation Organization - as the basis for negotiation of a comprehensive settlement in which all the parties will play their full part.

Such a settlement would win the endorsement and support of the international community and would meet the legitimate rights and interests of all parties. This includes Israel, which is entitled to exist at peace within secure boundaries that are accepted and adequately guaranteed; and the Palestinian people, who are entitled, within the framework set by a peace settlement, to exercise their right to determine their own future as a people.

The Nine recognize of course that such a settlement is not easy to achieve. But they believe it must be the continuing aim of the international community to promote it. They are convinced that such a comprehensive settlement would bring peace at last to the region; and they recall that they have already expressed their readiness to consider participating in guarantees in the framework of the United Nations.

The past year has seen some major developments to which the Nine, in view of their close connexions with the region, are particularly sensitive. One of these was the signature last March of agreements between Egypt and Israel. In their declaration of 26 March last, the Nine stated their position on these agreements.

Since the signature of these agreements, which the Nine see as a correct application of the principles of resolution 242 (1967) as far as Egyptian-Israeli relations are concerned, there has been progress towards improved relations between Egypt and Israel and there have been withdrawals of Israeli forces in Sinai. The Nine note these recent developments and recall that one of the basic requirements of a comprehensive settlement is an end to the territorial occupation which Israel has maintained since the conflict of 1967. The Nine will continue to follow the situation closely and will seek in every way they can to advance the aim of a comprehensive and lasting peace settlement involving all parties and dealing with all of the fundamental issues I have mentioned.

It follows that the Nine must view with the greatest regret any action or statement which aggravates the present situation or places an obstacle in the way of a peace settlement. Accordingly, they strongly deplore continued acts of violence by any of those involved. The Nine are opposed to the Israeli Government's policy of establishing settlements in occupied territories in contravention of international law; and they cannot accept claims by Israel to sovereignty over occupied territories, since this would be incompatible with resolution 242 (1967). The security of Israel, which the Nine consider essential, can be guaranteed, and the legitimate rights of the Palestinians given effect, within the framework of a comprehensive settlement.

The Nine are fully aware, too, of the importance of the question of Jerusalem to all parties. They know that an acceptable solution to this problem will be vital to an over-all settlement on the basis I have indicated. They consider, in particular, that any agreement on the future status of Jerusalem should guarantee free access by all to the Holy Places; and they do not accept any unilateral moves which claim to change the status of the city.

The problem of Lebanon is clearly related to the larger problem of the Middle East as a whole. The Nine have frequently reaffirmed their support for its independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity. They did so most recently in a statement issued by the nine Foreign Ministers at their meeting in Dublin on 11 September. This statement also recognized the

... by the Lebanese Government to promote the security
of its people and the restoration of its authority over the whole of its
territory.

Violence has none the less continued in several parts of Lebanon as is
clear from current news reports. The Line recognize that there has been some
improvement in the situation particularly in the south of the country since
the recent meeting of the Security Council requested by the Government of
Lebanon. They are concerned however about the constant harassment of the
United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), of which certain members
of the Line form part, and about the difficulties which have been placed in
its way as it attempts to fulfil its mandate. They are particularly
disturbed about the military and financial aid from outside Lebanon to those
who have made it difficult for the United Nations Force to carry out its
mandate. They call on all parties to give full support to UNIFIL and to
respect the decisions of the Security Council.

3 Jun 80

ME/6435/A/6 216/51

SWB

classes of our country's people. The only weak point of this flank is that it believes that Khomeyni's regime will gradually, but very soon, (?shatter) from within, the way will be clear, and that this flank could win power without difficulty.

We believe that victory over Khomeyni's fascist regime, which is dependent on armed Iranian and foreign terrorists, is impossible without an armed struggle. This struggle should be all-embracing. All Iran's anti-fascist forces should take part in it. But its striking force should be the army, because under present conditions the army is the only organization which is organized, has arms at its disposal and is composed of elements who believe in a national political system. It is true that this organization appears to be one of the guarantors of the present regime. It is true that some of its leaders betrayed it and joined Khomeyni. But we saw how these same senior officers were later assassinated; how, after the army's leaders were killed, the remaining ones who had allegedly declared their neutrality were retired, dismissed or imprisoned. We saw how any opposition was answered by Khalkhali's revolutionary courts, how groups of NCOs and officers were executed, and how members of the army, the gendarmerie and the police force are being intimidated and belittled. For all these reasons, Iran's army is a wounded army which can, like a wounded tiger, thrust its claws at this reactionary-fascist regime and end the rule by pseudoclergy.

The lesson to be learned from Khomeyni is that the rift between the anti-fascist forces in Iran today must be bridged. The difference of tastes and the rift between national forces cannot be more profound than the rift between religious reaction and Marxism-Leninism, which Khomeyni was able to bridge in his way. Perhaps this is the only lesson one can learn from Khomeyni. In hopes for the Iranian nation's victory!

Mr. Orhad
Fateh + P
A-B people
J.H.
7/6

A
Fourth Fatah Conference: Political Programme (ME/6434/A/1)

"Voice of Palestine" (Clandestine) 1800 gmt 1 Jun 80

Text of report:

The fourth Fatah conference political programme reviews the history of the Zionist-colonialist invasion of Palestine, which accompanied the entry of world capitalism and the expansion of exploitation and hegemony to shatter the Arab homeland, plunder its resources and establish the Zionist entity as a base for aggression against our Arab peoples.

The programme states that the Palestinian people had been in a state of revolt for well over 30 years against the British colonizers and Zionist invaders. However, the local and Arab balance of power led to the catastrophe of 1948, as a result of which the Palestinian people have suffered a horrible state of dispersion, humiliation and loss.

When the Fatah movement was launched in 1965, our people and nation began a new historical stage. US imperialism, which is strategically allied with world Zionism, has tried since the inception of the Palestine revolution to destroy it militarily and politically. Thus the Zionist attacks to liquidate the Palestinian people, the 1971 events in Jordan and the war in Lebanon since 1975 are US attempts basically aimed at striking at the Palestinian people's revolution. After every onslaught the Palestine revolution has emerged stronger and more determined to step up the armed struggle on every inch of our occupied land.

Fatah is a revolutionary patriotic movement that aims to liberate the whole of Palestine and to establish a democratic Palestinian state on the whole of Palestinian soil.

The political programme points out that armed popular revolution and armed struggle are the only way to liberate Palestine.

Referring to relations with the Arab countries, which seek to develop the positive aspects of their position, the political programme emphasizes that the security of armed struggle and its continued stepping up must not be affected.

The political programme also focuses on the need to highlight the Palestinian character and the essence of its revolutionary struggle in the world. It also stressed the need to establish close links with the revolutionary liberation forces of the world to resist Zionism and imperialism.

In the light of this prelude, the fourth Fatah conference decided the following: Out of faith in what has been mentioned, and basing itself on Fatah's principles, aims, method and internal laws, the Fatah fourth general conference has decided the following:

First, at the Palestinian level: Basing itself on the unity of the Palestinian people, territory and political representation; to consolidate the independent national will in order to ensure the continuation and victory of the revolution; in view of the fact that armed popular revolution is the only and inevitable path to the liberation of Palestine, and that the path to liberate it is unity and the perpetuation of the democracy that governs relationships in the Palestinian arena, and that democratic dialogue is the best method to develop these relations, the fourth Fatah conference emphasizes the following:

1 To act to strengthen Palestinian national unity at all levels inside and outside the occupied land, under the leadership of our movement and within the framework of the PLO, in order to continue to step up all forms of Palestinian struggle.

2 The importance of developing the participation of the Fatah movement with basic efforts in the PLO to ensure its effectiveness, and the development of its laws and organs in such a way as to ensure the independence of all its organs.

3 To step up the armed struggle inside the occupied land and across all confrontation lines against the Zionist enemy.

4 To redouble attention to organizing our people wherever they may be, to expand the action of popular and professional organizations and unions, to protect the temporary presence of the Palestinian people in their areas, and to prevent persecution, exploitation or assimilation of the Palestinian people.

5 To support the steadfastness of our Palestinian people inside the occupied land at all levels, and to give the necessary financial support to ensure their continued steadfastness, to step up their struggle and to develop all their national establishments; to place special emphasis on strengthening links with our Palestinian masses in the territory occupied since 1948 in order to enable them to confront the plans aimed at disintegrating their Arab character.

6 To place emphasis on the need for independent Palestinian decisions, and to act to develop the abilities of the Palestine revolution groups to be committed to independent Palestinian decision-making.

7 In keeping with the leading position of our movement in the PLO and with the provisions outlined in the political programme on this topic and the legality of the PLO in the Arab and international arenas, the valid resolutions of the Palestine National Councils of the PLO must be considered as a complementary part of the Fatah political programme in view of the fact that they do not conflict with our movement's principles, aims and political programme.

8 To strengthen the role of Palestinian women in all fields of the struggle and to act to strengthen women's effective participation in all spheres and at all levels.

Second, at the Arab level:

A At the mass level: Since Palestine is part of the Arab homeland, the Palestinian people are part of the Arab nation and their struggle is part of its struggle, and since the Palestine revolution is the vanguard of the Arab nation in the battle for the liberation of Palestine:

1 Relations with the Arab masses are strategic, which makes it incumbent on these masses further to expand their participation in safeguarding the revolution and waging all

ME/6434/C1/1):
 Administration official hinted on
 anti-Afghan elements. We bring you our

forms of struggle against the imperialist-Zionist base in Palestine [words indistinct] the sons of our people and nation and to liquidate imperialist and colonialist interests in the area.

2 Unity must be strengthened with the Arab national liberation movements and Arab national and progressive forces for the joint battle to liberate Palestine and to achieve the Arab nations aims to liberate their countries and to build a progressive, unified Arab society.

3 Unity of struggle must be strengthened with the Lebanese nationalist movement and all other patriotic forces that are standing bravely in one trench with the revolution forces against the enemies of the Lebanese and Palestinian people and the Arab nation, and we must share in their struggle to safeguard Lebanon's unity, Arabism and territorial integrity. This requires emphasis on eliminating all negative aspects that threaten relations with the masses, and moves to strengthen relations with the masses through all means.

4 The solidarity and heroic stand of the Lebanese masses on the side of the Palestine revolution in the face of the war of liquidation and annihilation requires support, protection and promotion to be an example for the masses throughout the Arab homeland in view of our blood relationships, which requires further support with all our resources.

5 The Jordanian arena is of special importance to the Palestine revolution. It must be given special attention so that it may be restored as a basic springboard of struggle against the Zionist enemy. The potential of the masses must be employed to reach this aim.

6 We must strengthen the joint struggle with the Palestinian people, represented by their patriotic and progressive forces, in order to foil the Camp David plot and its consequences, and to restore Egypt to the Arab fold to take its natural position in the Arab struggle.

B At the level of relations with the Arab regimes: Since relations with the Arab regimes are aimed at developing the positive aspects of these regimes, relations must be governed by the following basic considerations:

1 The principles, aims and methods of the Fatah movement.

2 These relations must not contradict the strategic relations with the Arab masses.

3 The attitude of each regime towards the Palestine question and the Palestinian people's armed revolution, particularly recognition of and commitment to the PLO as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, and rejection of any attempt by any party to undermine this.

4 Non-intervention in our internal affairs and confrontation of any attempt to impose guardianship and subservience on our people, to persecute or exploit them or to rehabilitate the Palestinian people outside their Palestinian homeland.

5 To confront any attempt to prevent the Palestine revolution from acting freely among the ranks of our people wherever they are.

6 The revolution will exercise its responsibility for struggle at the pan-Arab level and across any Arab country towards the occupied Palestinian territory in order to restore that territory. It will act to pool the manpower and material resources of the Arab nation, especially the oil wealth, as a weapon to achieve these aims.

7 To act to develop the steadfastness and confrontation front to become a basic effective tool to support the PLO, to continue the struggle with the enemy, to confront and foil all liquidatory solutions, to consolidate the Arab position to foil all forms of settlement, and to stand firmly against any attempt to legalize the Camp David accord.

8 To act to create a broad national pan-Arab front as outlined in the steadfastness and confrontation resolutions, in order to confront all imperialist and Zionist conspiracies, primarily all forms of the Camp David plot.

Third, at the international level: Since the Palestine question is the central issue of the Arab nation in its just struggle against the Zionist imperialist enemy, and since the Middle East zone is of strategic international importance, the Palestine question was and still is - in addition to its justice and the struggle of its peoples - of importance in international policy and a subject of international conflict that has created for our people and their struggle one camp of friends and another of enemies.

The Fatah movement is part of the world liberation movements in the joint struggle against imperialism, Zionism and racialism and their agents. We are establishing our alliances with all parties in the international arena in keeping with our principles and the Palestine National Charter.

A The international organizations:

1 To act through the PLO to have resolutions on our Palestinian Arab people's rights adopted by various international forums and organizations, particularly the United Nations. To act further to increase the isolation of the Zionist and US enemies in these organizations and in the world.

2 To act to have the UN General Assembly resolution, which condemned Zionism as a form of racialism and racial discrimination, translated into measures and sanctions against the Zionist, colonialist and imperialist base in Palestine, as outlined in the UN Charter.

3 To consolidate action to retain the UN position in rejecting the Camp David accords, and to act to develop these positions in such a way as to ensure that all forms of settlement at the expense of our people and their question are foiled.

B. The friendly forces:

1 To strengthen the strategic alliance with the socialist countries, especially the Soviet Union, since this alliance is necessary in order to confront effectively and seriously the US and Zionist plots against the Palestine question and the world liberation issues.

2 To strengthen our relations of struggle with the world liberation movements which stand with us in the same trench against US imperialism, Zionism, racialism, fascism and reaction. Fatah supports the struggle of the world liberation movements and all strugglers against oppression, repression and provocation.

3 To strengthen our movement's foreign relations and to intensify its political moves, based on Fatah's principles and programme, and to establish alliances with the democratic and progressive political forces which support our just struggle and legitimate rights.

4 To strengthen our relations of struggle with the Islamic revolution in Iran, which brought down the strongest US bastions in the area and which supports our struggle to liberate Palestine.

5 To strengthen relations with the peoples of the Islamic and African countries and the non-aligned countries in order to promote their position in support of the Palestine question, our struggle, and to gain further recognition of the PLO as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people.

C The US position: The United States stands at the head of the enemies of our people and nation. It is pursuing a policy hostile to our people, our revolution, our Arab nation and to all Arab and world liberation forces. The United States supports the Zionist entity and its agents in the area, and establishes military alliances aimed at surrendering the area to its military influence so that it may continue to plunder our nation's resources. For this reason, the world front hostile to US policy must be strengthened and must fight to foil this policy and strike at US interests in the area.

D With regard to the West European countries, the EEC, Japan and Canada:

... we bring you our

1 To intensify political action in these countries and to benefit from the support of the democratic and progressive political forces in these countries so as to diminish and stop their support for the Zionist entity. To isolate the Zionist entity through their recognition of the PLO as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, and to achieve maximum political and financial support for our cause, struggle and national rights.

2 Many West European countries and Canada still pursue policies that do not recognize our people's national rights. They give all forms of support to the Zionist enemy. They pursue a policy committed to the US policy and plans in the area. Japan is near this policy, and thus efforts must be intensified to resist and foil any plan or overture that contravenes our people's national rights.

In conclusion, our movement's fourth conference stresses the need to safeguard and strengthen the political gains and achievements that have been attained at the international level, which made the Palestine question a vital issue that enjoys the largest international support, making it the vanguard of the world liberation movements and the holder of its banner. Revolution until victory.

Fatah Revolutionary Council Members (ME/6434/A/1)

"Voice of Palestine" (Clandestine) 1620 gmt 1 June 80

Excerpt from report:

The Fatah fourth conference has elected 25 Revolutionary Council members in accordance with the basic law, and so the number of Fatah Revolutionary Council members will range from 72 to 77. Their distribution is as follows [all figures as heard]:

- (1) There will be 15 to 18 Fatah Central Committee members.
- (2) The number of Fatah Military Council members must not exceed 25.
- (3) The number of qualified members will range from 10 to 12.
- (4) Twenty-five elected members.

The Fatah fourth conference elected the following [23] new members of the Revolutionary Council: Al-Haj Talal, alias Abu al-Mundhir; Anis al-Khatib, alias Abu al-Qasim; Col Abu Khalid al-Amlah; Col Abu Musa; Tayyib Abd ar-Rahim; Ribhi Awad; Umm Jihad; Col Abbud; Abu al-(?Khill); Abu Firas; Abu Ali Mahdi Busaysu; Abbas Zaki; Maj Dawud Abu al-Hakam; Uthman Abu Gharbiyah; Ilyas Shufani; Nabil Sha't; Col Abu Fawwaz; Abu Usamah Muhammad; Abu Aia; Ghazi al-Husayni; Abdullah al-Ifranji; Brig-Gen Abu al-Hakam; and Abu Shamikh.

In Brief: General **B**

Libyan deportation of British nationals (Text) Tripoli, 1st June: The General People's Committee for Justice in the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya is deporting a group of foreigners of British nationality because they have not carried out the original tasks for which they came to Libya; the group includes three diplomats. (JANA 1730 gmt 1 Jun 80)

Bourguiba's indisposition (Excerpt) In view of the exhaustion the Grand Struggler President Habib Bourguiba has suffered because of the ceremony of receiving congratulations on the occasion of Victory Day yesterday, the doctors have advised His Excellency to refrain from all activity for two days. Hence His Excellency will not be able to attend the military parade which will be held in Tunis this morning... (Tunis home service in Arabic 0700 gmt 2 Jun 80)

Kuwait gives extra contribution to UNRWA (Text) Kuwait, 1st June: Kuwait today decided to give an additional contribution of 1,500,000 dollars to UNRWA. Kuwait annually contributes 600,000 dollars to UNRWA, which is now suffering a huge financial deficit forcing it to cut down on its work for the Palestinian refugees. (KUNA 1243 gmt 1 Jun 80)

GR 700

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FM BEIRUT 060818Z JUN 80

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 137 OF 06 JUNE 1980

INFO PRIORITY UKMIS NEW YORK

INFO ROUTINE AMMAN, DAMASCUS AND TEL AVIV

Mid E

MF

Read in full.

BRITISH MPS/PLO.

1. DAVID CROUCH AND ANDREW FAULDS TALKED TO ARAFAT WEDNESDAY NIGHT AT SHAFIQ AL HUT'S FLAT FOR NEARLY THREE HOURS. THEY KINDLY BRIEFED ME BEFORE THEIR DEPARTURE FOR U K YESTERDAY. FOLLOWING ARE SALIENT POINTS WHICH THEY WILL NO DOUBT AMPLIFY IN LONDON.
2. ARAFAT SAID THAT HE RECOGNISED, IN THE LIGHT OF PRESIDENT CARTER'S THREAT TO VETO, THAT IT WOULD BE POINTLESS TO GO FOR A SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION. THIS WOULD HAVE TO BE DEFERRED UNTIL NEXT JANUARY.
3. NEVERTHELESS, HE HAD STRONG HOPES OF THE EUROPEANS COMING OUT WITH A STATEMENT IN THE INTERIM WHICH WOULD:
 - A. CALL UPON ISRAEL TO WITHDRAW FROM THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES.
 - B. SUPPORT PALESTINIAN SELF-DETERMINATION AND SOVEREIGNTY.
 - C. ACCORD RECOGNITION TO THE PLO AS AN INTERLOCUTEUR VALABLE WITH THE RIGHT TO BE A PARTY TO ANY PEACE SETTLEMENT.
4. OUR MPS CAUTIONED AGAINST EXPECTING TOO MUCH TO COME OUT OF VENICE: IT MIGHT TAKE SOME TIME TO HARMONISE THE POSITIONS OF NINE GOVERNMENTS. ARAFAT HOPED THAT THE QUEST FOR UNANIMITY WOULD NOT LEAD TO A STATEMENT REPRESENTING SIMPLY THE LOWEST COMMON DENOMINATOR. THE VIEWS OF SAY BELGIUM OR HOLLAND WERE REALLY QUITE IRRELEVANT. ONLY THE VIEWS OF GERMANY FRANCE AND BRITAIN WERE SIGNIFICANT. HE PERSONALLY WOULD BE WELL PLEASED IF THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT COULD MAKE THE STATEMENT OF POLICY AS ABOVE ON ITS OWN. OUR MPS SAID THERE WAS NO POINT IN MAKING STATEMENTS WHICH SIMPLY FLATTERED ARAB SENSIBILITIES. THE BRITISH MIGHT GET GOOD MARKS FOR IT BUT IT WOULD NOT ADVANCE THE PALESTINIANS REAL INTEREST.
5. ONCE AGAIN ARAFAT SAID THERE WAS NO QUESTION OF THE PLO RECOGNISING ISRAEL. ANYHOW WHAT WOULD RECOGNITION MEAN? ONLY STATES COULD RECOGNISE STATES AND IN ANY CASE WHAT ISRAEL WAS TO BE RECOGNISED? AN ISRAEL FROM THE NILE TO THE EUPHRATES? ONCE ISRAEL HAD WITHDRAWN AND A PALESTINE STATE HAD BEEN SET UP FOLLOWING A REFERENDUM, THEN WOULD BE THE TIME FOR MUTUAL RECOGNITION.

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6. ARAFAT REJECTED ALL IDEAS OF UNITY OR FEDERATION WITH JORDAN, BUT SAID THAT SOME SORT OF LOOSE CONFEDERATION MIGHT BE POSSIBLE DEPENDING ON THE OUTCOME OF A REFERENDUM OF THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE.

7. QUESTIONED ABOUT THE RECENT MEETING OF THE FATAH MEMBERSHIP IN DAMASCUS, ARAFAT CONFIRMED THAT IT HAD BEEN BOTH TURBULENT AND DEMOCRATIC. HE HIMSELF HAD BEEN SUBJECTED TO SCATHING CRITICISM, NEVERTHELESS HIS LEADERSHIP HAD BEEN FULLY CONFIRMED AND, MOST IMPORTANT OF ALL, THE FATAH MEMBERSHIP HAD UNANIMOUSLY ENDORSED ALL RESOLUTIONS OF THE MAIN PALESTINE NATIONAL COUNCIL OVER THE PAST NINE YEARS, WHICH INCLUDED ACCEPTANCE OF ONLY PART OF PALESTINE AS THEIR STATE.

8. ASKED ABOUT THE REVIVED CALL BY FATAH FOR A SECULAR STATE IN THE WHOLE OF PALESTINE, ARAFAT SAID THAT THIS SHOULD BE REGARDED AS A LONG TERM AIM, JUST AS WEST GERMAN LEADERS WERE NOT REGARDED AS TERRORISTS WHEN THEY AIMED AT THE LONG TERM REUNIFICATION OF EAST AND WEST GERMANY. IN HIS SPEECH IN TEHRAN, ARAFAT HAD STRESSED THAT, UNLIKE THE IRANIANS, THE PLO SOUGHT A SECULAR AND DEMOCRATIC STATE, NOT AN ISLAMIC ONE. THE PLO SUPPORTED KHOMEINY NOT FOR IDEOLOGICAL REASONS BUT BECAUSE THE SHAH HAD SUPPORTED ISRAEL.

9. HE SAID THAT THE PLO, MUCH TO THE ANNOYANCE OF THE RUSSIANS AND THE SYRIANS, HAD OPPOSED THE RUSSIAN INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN AND STILL DID.

10. A RECURRENT THEME WAS BEWILDERMENT THAT H M G, WHO OF ALL GOVERNMENTS SHOULD KNOW THE TRUTH OF THE PALESTINIAN QUESTION AND INDEED BORE MUCH RESPONSIBILITY FOR IT, SHOULD APPEAR GENERALLY TO BE SO UNSYMPATHETIC.

STRACHAN.

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FM TEL AVIV 051100Z JUNE

TO PRIORITY F C O

TELNO 222 OF 5 JUNE

INFO CAIRO, WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK, JERUSALEM(PASSED).

MYTEL 217: ARAB/ISRAEL: EUROPEAN INITIATIVE.

1. BEGIN REPEATED IN A PUBLIC SPEECH YESTERDAY HIS ATTACK ON THE EUROPEANS AND SAID THAT NO DECISION FROM THE EUROPEAN SUMMIT NEXT WEEK WILL MAKE ISRAEL NEGOTIATE WITH THE P L O.
2. THE GENERAL EXPECTATION HERE IS THAT, FOLLOWING CARTER'S PUBLIC OPPOSITION TO A EUROPEAN INITIATIVE, NO MORE WILL COME OUT OF THE VENICE MEETING THAN A STATEMENT FROM THE NINE RECOGNISING THE PALESTINIAN RIGHT TO SELF DETERMINATION, SUPPORTING FREE ACCESS TO THE HOLY PLACES IN JERUSALEM, AND CRITICISING ISRAELI SETTLEMENT POLICY. THIS MORNING'S ISRAELI PRESS REPORTS THAT SHAMIR WAS TOLD IN THE HAGUE YESTERDAY BY THE DUTCH FOREIGN MINISTER THAT THE VENICE MEETING WOULD ISSUE A DECLARATION ON THE MIDDLE EAST, NOT A NEW PEACE PLAN OR INTITATIVE.
3. SIR N HENDERSON'S POINT ABOUT PRESENTATION OF WHATEVER IS DECIDED AT VENICE (HIS TELNO 2094) WILL BE IMPORTANT IN ISRAEL TOO, PARTICULARLY IF THE VENICE OUTCOME APPEARS TO BACK AWAY FROM THE EXPECTATIONS OF THE LAST FEW WEEKS. (THE ISRAELIS WILL MAKE THE MOST OF ANY SUCH IMPRESSION, HERE AND ON THE WEST BANK). PRESENTATION OF POINTS WE NEED TO GET ACROSS IN ISRAEL SHOULD IN ANY CASE NOT BE LEFT TO THE ITALIANS, WHOSE AMBASSADOR HERE IS WEAK.

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[THIS TELEGRAM WAS NOT ADVANCED]

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FM THE HAGUE 051115Z JUN 80

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 196 OF 05 JUNE

INFO PRIORITY ROME AND PARIS

INFO SAVING ALL OTHER EC POSTS, TEL AVIV, CAIRO, AMMAN,
UKMIS NEW YORK, WASHINGTON

ARAB ISRAEL

1. ACCORDING TO MFA SPOKESMAN VAN DER KLAUW TOLD THE ISRAELI
FOREIGN MINISTER (HERE ON A TWO-DAY VISIT) THAT THERE WAS NO
PROSPECT OF THE NINE COMING FORWARD WITH A MIDDLE EAST INITIATIVE
IN THE NEAR FUTURE. THE MOST THEY WOULD DO WOULD BE TO ISSUE A
DECLARATION AT VENICE ON 12/13 JUNE.

2. MFA WILL GIVE A COMMUNITY BRIEFING ON SHAMIR'S VISIT LATE
TOMORROW 6 JUNE.

FCO PLEASE PASS TO SAVING ADDRESSEES

TAYLOR

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]
[THIS TELEGRAM WAS NOT ADVANCED]

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FM DAMASCUS 041115Z JUN 80

TO ROUTINE F C O

TELNO 162 4-6-80

INFO AMMAN, BEIRUT, CAIRO, JERUSALEM, TEL AVIV, UKMIS NEW YORK,
WASHINGTON.

WASHINGTON TELNO 2099: PLO/FATAH POLICY

1. IT IS STILL DIFFICULT TO FORM A PRECISE JUDGEMENT OF THE RESULTS OF THE 4TH CONGRESS OF FATAH, THE LARGEST GROUP WITHIN THE PLO, WHICH TOOK PLACE NEAR DAMASCUS BETWEEN 22 AND 1 JUNE. THE PROCEEDINGS WERE CONDUCTED WITH SPECIAL ATTENTION TO SECURITY, AND FULL TEXTS OF THE POLITICAL AND OTHER DOCUMENTS ARE NOT YET AVAILABLE, ALTHOUGH EXCERPTS HAVE BEEN QUOTED HERE AND IN BEIRUT. WE SHALL BE REPORTING FURTHER BY TELELETTER.
2. IT IS OF THE NATURE OF THE BEAST THAT A MEETING LIKE THIS SHOULD BE CHARACTERISED BY MUCH BELLIGERENT ORATORY, PARTICULARLY AT A TIME WHEN THE AMERICANS ARE APPEARING TO BLOCK PROGRESS ON A EUROPEAN INITIATIVE AND IN THE AFTERMATH OF RECENT EVENTS ON THE WEST BANK. BOTH THE SYRIAN AND ISRAELI GOVERNMENTS HAVE THEIR OWN REASONS FOR WISHING TO SUGGEST THAT THE MEETING TOOK AN AGGRESSIVE LINE, AND THAT IT REJECTED ANY EUROPEAN INITIATIVE.
3. OUR CONTACTS WITH PARTICIPANTS SUGGEST HOWEVER THAT THE CONGRESS, WHILE REAFFIRMING TRADITIONAL POSITIONS, MARKED NO (NO) CHANGE OF POLICY IN THE DIRECTION OF VIOLENCE AND AWAY FROM NEGOTIATION. KHALID AL-HASSAN, WHO IS ONE OF ARAFAT'S MAJOR LIEUTENANTS AND HAS BEEN RESPONSIBLE FOR CONTACTS WITH THE WEST AND FOR THE FIVE-POINT PLAN ON WHICH WE HAVE RECENTLY REPORTED, TOLD ME ON 2 JUNE THAT HE HAD ADDRESSED THE CONGRESS AT LENGTH ON THAT PLAN (WHILE WARNING

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THEM NOT TO EXPECT TOO MUCH OF AN EARLY EUROPEAN INITIATIVE) AND HAD BEEN QUESTIONED EXHAUSTIVELY ABOUT IT. HE CLAIMED TO HAVE SECURED OVERWHELMING SUPPORT FOR IT, THOUGH THERE WAS NO QUESTION OF THE CONGRESS ENDORSING IT FORMALLY. FATAH DECISIONS WERE EXPLICITLY SUBORDINATED TO DECISIONS OF THE PALESTINE NATIONAL COUNCIL WHICH REPRESENTED ALL PLO MEMBERS, THAT IS, ALL PALESTINIANS. HASSAM ALSO ARGUED THAT THE ELECTIONS TO THE FATAH CENTRAL COMMITTEE (INCLUDING HIS OWN) REFLECTED A VICTORY FOR THOSE STILL ARGUING FOR A POLITICAL APPROACH. THE FINAL DOCUMENT APPEARS TO HAVE UNDERLINED THE NEED "TO REINFORCE POLITICAL ACTION IN EUROPE".

4. IT IS REPORTED TODAY THAT THE PLO CENTRAL COMMITTEE WILL MEET IN DAMASCUS ON 7 JUNE TO DISCUSS THE EARLY CONVENING OF THE NEXT MEETING OF THE PALESTINE NATIONAL COUNCIL, WHICH WAS DUE IN LATE JANUARY BUT HAS BEEN POSTPONED LARGELY BECAUSE OF DISAGREEMENTS ABOUT THE CONSTITUTION OF THE NEW PLO EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE.

WRIGHT.

[NOT ADVANCED]

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FM TEL AVIV 040815Z JUN 80

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 221 OF 4 JUNE

INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK PRIORITY CAIRO WASHINGTON DAMASCUS
BEIRUT AMMAN AND JERUSALEM

MY TEL NO 218 : ATTACKS ON WEST BANK MAYORS

1. THE ISRAELI NEWS AGENCY ITIM WAS TELEPHONE BY A YOUNG MAN WITH A SABRA (I.E. NATIVE-BORN) ACCENT LAST NIGHT. HE DESCRIBED HIMSELF AS A SPOKESMAN FOR THE "ISRAELI FREEDOM FIGHTERS MOVEMENT - TERROR AGAINST TERROR" AND CLAIMED THAT THE GROUP HAD PROVIDED THE EXPLOSIVES USED ON 2 JUNE. HIS ORGANISATION HAD ABOUT 250 MEMBERS. ITS AIM WAS TO "EXPEL ALL THE ARABS AND SHOW THEM THAT THEY HAVE NO PLACE IN ERETZ YIZRAEL". IT WAS NOT CONNECTED WITH GUSH EMUNIM OR THE RABBI KAHANE'S "KACH" ALTHOUGH ITS MEMBERS HAD BEEN INFLUENCED BY THE LATTER'S IDEOLOGY. THE GROUP WERE PLANNING ACTION IN JERUSALEM WHICH THE ARABS WOULD "REMEMBER FOR A LONG, LONG TIME".

2. THE ISRAELI SECURITY SERVICES, WHO ARE LEADING THE INVESTIGATIONS INTO THE BOMBINGS WITH POLICE SUPPORT, ARE SAID TO HAVE ESTABLISHED THAT THE EXPLOSIVES USED WERE STANDARD IDF ISSUE. A SOURCE IN THE SECURITY SERVICES IS QUOTED AS SAYING THAT THIS, TOGETHER WITH OTHER LEADS, INCREASED THE PROBABILITY THAT A JEWISH ORGANISATION WAS RESPONSIBLE TO A "NEAR CERTAINTY". INVESTIGATORS ARE ALSO QUOTED AS BELIEVING THAT "NO RECOGNISED ORGANISATIONAL FRAMWORK" PREVIOUSLY KNOWN TO THE PUBLIC WAS INVOLVED.

3. THE MAYOR OF GAZA AND HIS TOWN COUNCIL RESIGNED IN PROTEST ON 2 JUNE.

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FM WASHINGTON 032323Z JUN 80

TO ROUTINE F.C.O.

TELEGRAM NUMBER 2099 OF 3 JUNE.

INFO ROUTINE BEIRUT, DAMASCUS, AMMAN, CAIRO, TEL AVIV, HMCG JERUSALEM
INFO SAVING UKMIS NEW YORK.

PLO/FATAH POLICY.

1. THE EVENING EDITION OF THE WASHINGTON STAR OF 2 JUNE CARRIED AN ARTICLE FROM BEIRUT BY WALTER TAYLOR, HEADLINED "KEY PLO GROUP SPURNS EUROPE'S PLAN FOR MID EAST."

2. TAYLOR REPORTS THAT DURING A CLOSED DOOR FATAH CONGRESS IN DAMASCUS THAT ENDED ON 30 MAY, THE DECISION WAS TAKEN TO REJECT PARTICIPATION IN ANY NEW MIDDLE EAST FORMULA OFFERED BY THE EUROPEANS, AND TO DOWN-GRADE GENERALLY THE PLO'S DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS TO WIN WESTERN SUPPORT, FAVOURING INSTEAD INTENSIFIED MILITARY ACTION AGAINST ISRAEL.

3. TAYLOR QUOTES PASSAGES FROM AN ALLEGED FATAH MANIFESTO ISSUED IN BEIRUT:

- (I) "THE ONLY WAY TO ACHIEVE OUR AIM IS THROUGH THE ARMED POPULAR REVOLUTION. THE ARMED STRUGGLE IS A STRATEGY AND NOT A TACTIC.... THE STRUGGLE WILL NOT STOP UNTIL THE ZIONIST ENTITY IS LIQUIDATED AND PALESTINE IS LIBERATED."
- (II) THE SO-CALLED EUROPEAN INITIATIVE IS LUMPED WITH THE CAMP DAVID ACCORDS AND UNSC RESOLUTION 242 AS MEASURES THAT WORK AGAINST THE LEGITIMATE RIGHTS OF THE PALESTINIANS.
- (III) THE PLO'S GOAL SHOULD BE THE "COMPLETE LIBERATION OF PALESTINE, THE LIQUIDATION OF THE ZIONIST ENTITY, POLITICALLY, MILITARILY, CULTURALLY AND IDEOLOGICALLY, AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A PALESTINIAN DEMOCRATIC STATE WITH JERUSALEM AS THE CAPITAL".

4. A PLO OFFICIAL IS QUOTED AS SAYING THAT THE FATAH CONGRESS "WAS OVERWHELMINGLY OF THE BELIEF THAT THE EUROPEAN EFFORT WOULD MERELY BE AN EXTENSION OF CAMP DAVID."

5. THIS STORY IS NOT PICKED UP IN EITHER THE NEW YORK TIMES OR THE WASHINGTON POST TODAY.

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TO PRIORITY F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 2094 OF 3 JUNE 1980

INFO BONN PARIS ROME UKMIS NEW YORK TEL AVIV AND CAIRO

INFO SAVING OTHER EC POSTS AMMAN BEIRUT DAMASCUS JEDDA JERUSALEM

MIPT: ARAB/ISRAEL

1. AT THE CONCLUSION OF THE BRIEFING DESCRIBED IN MIPT, I SUGGESTED THAT IT MIGHT BE USEFUL IF THE AMBASSADORS OF THE NINE IN WASHINGTON CONSIDERED THE LIKELY REACTION BY THE AMERICANS TO ANY INITIATIVE ON THE ARAB/ISRAELI DISPUTE WHICH MIGHT EMERGE FROM THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL MEETING IN VENICE. I SAID THAT GIVEN THE LINE WHICH ADMINISTRATION SPOKESMEN HAD BEEN TAKING IN PUBLIC, AND IN PRIVATE WITH EUROPEAN LEADERS, IT WAS CLEAR THAT WE WOULD HAVE TO RECKON WITH A VIGOROUS AND SUSTAINED REACTION TO ANY INITIATIVE. INDEED THERE WERE SIGNS THAT A CAMPAIGN WAS ALREADY UNDERWAY IN THE PRESS TO OPPOSE ANY EUROPEAN INITIATIVE. WHAT DID OTHERS THINK?

2. THERE WAS GENERAL AGREEMENT AROUND THE TABLE THAT WE COULD EXPECT A VIGOROUS REACTION ALTHOUGH NO ONE PRESENT CARED TO SPECULATE ON THE PRECISE FORM THIS MIGHT TAKE. THE GERMAN MINISTER THOUGHT THAT THE INTENSITY OF THE U S REACTION MIGHT DEPEND ON THE PRECISE FORM OF A EUROPEAN INITIATIVE: A DECLARATION BY THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL CONFIRMING PREVIOUS STATEMENTS OF POLICY BY THE NINE WOULD NOT GO DOWN TOO BADLY BUT ANYTHING WHICH IMPLIED EUROPEAN ACTION IN THE UN CONTEXT WOULD NOT BE WELCOME. THE ITALIAN THOUGHT THAT QUITE APART FROM THE INTRINSIC NATURE OF ANY INITIATIVE, ITS EFFECT WOULD BE CUMULATIVE, APPEARING AS ANOTHER IN A SERIES OF FAILURES BY THE ALLIES TO SUPPORT THE US OVER IRAN AND AFGHANISTAN. THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR COMMENTED THAT WHATEVER HE SAID PUBLICLY MUSKIE MIGHT IN PRACTICE FIND A EUROPEAN INITIATIVE USEFUL DOMESTICALLY IN THAT HE COULD DEMONSTRATE THAT HE WAS FORCEFULLY DEFENDING ISRAELI INTERESTS IN THE FACE OF THE EUROPEANS. IT MIGHT ALSO BE THAT SOME OF THE PROFESSIONALS WITHIN THE ADMINISTRATION WOULD WELCOME A EUROPEAN INITIATIVE, ALTHOUGH THEY COULD NOT SAY SO, BECAUSE IT WOULD BRING ADDITIONAL PRESSURE TO BEAR ON THE ISRAELIS TO MAKE THE SORT OF CONCESSIONS THAT WERE NECESSARY. BUT HE DISAGREED WITH MY ITALIAN COLLEAGUE'S REMARKS ABOUT THE CUMULATIVE EFFECT OF A EUROPEAN INITIATIVE. HE DID NOT THINK THAT THE PRESIDENT COULD AFFORD TO APPEAR TO BE AT LOGGERHEADS WITH ALL HIS EUROPEAN ALLIES. FOR THAT REASON HE SUGGESTED THAT THE ADMINISTRATION WOULD FOR THE TIME BEING CONTINUE TO CRITICISE THE FRENCH FOR TAKING THE LEAD ON THE INITIATIVE. (IN AN ASIDE OF HIGH SOLEMNITY DE LABOULAYE SUGGESTED THAT IT WAS BECAUSE THE PRESIDENT COULD NOT AFFORD TO FALL OUT WITH ALL OF HIS ALLIES AT ONCE THAT THE ADMINISTRATION HAD NOT REACTED STRONGLY TO HMG'S DIFFICULTIES OVER IMPLEMENTING IRANIAN SANCTIONS: WITH THE RESULT THAT THE BRITISH HAD RECEIVED VERY LITTLE CRITICISM IN THE USA COMPARED WITH THE FRENCH.)

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3. THERE WAS GENERAL APPROVAL FOR MY SUGGESTION THAT WE EACH RECOMMEND TO OUR GOVERNMENTS THAT IN APPROACHING DISCUSSION OF AN INITIATIVE IN VENICE, THEY OUGHT TO GIVE CAREFUL CONSIDERATION TO THE PRESENTATION HERE OF WHATEVER IS DECIDED AT VENICE. SOME COORDINATED ACTION WAS CALLED FOR BY THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE NINE IN WASHINGTON TO GET ACROSS WHAT WE WERE UP TO. THIS COULD NOT BE LEFT TO CHANCE WHEN SO MANY HAD AN INTEREST IN DISTORTING OUR AIMS. DE LABOULAYE COMMENTED THAT WE SHALL ALL HAVE TO LIVE WITH THE CONSEQUENCES OF WHATEVER IS DECIDED AT VENICE, AND THAT OUR PRIMARY AIM MUST BE TO PERSUADE OUR AMERICAN INTERLOCUTORS, PARTICULARLY AMONG THE MEDIA, OF THE VALIDITY OF THE ARGUMENTS FOR A EUROPEAN INITIATIVE AT THIS TIME: IT WOULD OBVIOUSLY BE DESIRABLE IF WE COULD ALL SPEAK TO A COORDINATED LINE.

FCO PSE PASS TO ALL SAVING POSTS.

HENDERSON

(REPEATED AS REQUESTED)

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TO PRIORITY FCO

TELNO 2093 OF 3 JUNE 1980

INFO ROUTINE PARIS BONN ROME UKDEL NATO MOSCOW TEHRAN KABUL TEL AVIV

CAIRO UKMIS NEW YORK

INFO SAVING TO OTHER EEC POSTS, AMMAN BEIRUT DAMASCUS JEDDA DELHI

HMCG JERUSALEM.

Paras 5-7 are the most interesting. See also the attached telegram.

ms

VISIT TO WASHINGTON OF FRENCH FOREIGN MINISTER

1. MY FRENCH COLLEAGUE TODAY BRIEFED COMMUNITY REPRESENTATIVES ON THE TALKS WHICH FRANCOIS-PONCET HAD HERE WITH MUSKIE ON 30 MAY.

CONSULTATIONS AND ALLIANCE SOLIDARITY

2. IN A TETE-A-TETE WITH MUSKIE, FRANCOIS-PONCET HAD EXPLAINED WHY HE HAD NOT BEEN ABLE TO INFORM MUSKIE IN VIENNA ABOUT GISCARD'S PLANS TO MEET BREZHNEV. HE SAID THAT IT HAD BEEN DECIDED IN PARIS THAT GISCARD WOULD HIMSELF INFORM PRESIDENT CARTER, HERR SCHMIDT, MRS THATCHER AND MR COSSIGA OF HIS INTENTIONS. THE INFORMATION ABOUT GISCARD'S PLANS HAD BEEN DELIBERATELY PASSED AT A LATE STAGE BECAUSE EXPERIENCE HAD SHOWN THAT LEAKS WOULD HAVE LED PEOPLE TO HAVE HAD UNFOUNDED EXPECTATIONS ABOUT THE OUTCOME OF THE MEETING. ACCORDING TO DE LABOULAYE, MUSKIE HAD EXPRESSED UNDERSTANDING FOR THIS EXPLANATION, AND BOTH MEN NOW REGARDED THE INCIDENT AS BELONGING TO THE PAST.

3. MORE GENERALLY, MUSKIE HAD REFERRED TO THE PRESENT MALAISE IN US/EUROPEAN RELATIONS. HE SAID THAT THIS WAS UNHEALTHY AND THAT STEPS SHOULD BE TAKEN TO END IT, AND TO REINFORCE THE IMPRESSION OF ALLIANCE SOLIDARITY. FRANCOIS-PONCET HAD SAID THAT THE U S AND FRANCE WERE OF ONE MIND ON THIS POINT.

IRAN

4. IN A BRIEF DISCUSSION OF IRAN, MUSKIE HAD INDICATED THAT AFTER A LOT OF THOUGHT THE ADMINISTRATION HAD DECIDED TO TRY TO KEEP THE HOSTAGE ISSUE OFF THE FRONT PAGES OF THE NEWSPAPERS, WHILE CONTINUING TO EXPLORE DISCREETLY SUCH DIPLOMATIC AVENUES AS WERE AVAILABLE.

MIDDLE EAST

5. MUSKIE HAD DESCRIBED U S EFFORTS TO PROMOTE A RESUMPTION OF EGYPT/ISRAEL NEGOTIATIONS. LINOWITZ WAS TRYING TO FIND A FACE-SAVING DEVICE, SUCH AS REFERRING THE KNESSET BILL ON JERUSALEM TO A COMMITTEE, WHICH WOULD ENABLE THE ISRAELIS TO SAY THAT IT WAS STILL BEING STUDIED AND THE EGYPTIANS TO CLAIM THAT IT HAD BEEN BURIED. HE HOPED THAT IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO MAKE ENOUGH PROGRESS ON THE

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SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES OUTSTANDING TO PERSUADE MODERATE ARAB STATES TO ASSOCIATE THEMSELVES WITH THE CAMP DAVID PROCESS. FRANCOIS-PONCET HAD SAID FIRMLY THAT THIS APPROACH HAD NO CHANCE OF SUCCEEDING. THE ISRAELIS WOULD NOT MAKE ANY CONCESSIONS TO EGYPT, BUT ONLY TO THE U S, AND THEY WOULD NOT MAKE ANY CONCESSIONS TO THEM UNTIL THE OUTCOME OF THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION WAS CLEAR. FRANCOIS-PONCET SAID THAT IN THE VIEW OF THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT, AND HE THOUGHT ALSO IN THE VIEW OF FRANCE'S PARTNERS IN THE NINE, A GAP OF SIX MONTHS WITHOUT ANY SIGNIFICANT PROGRESS WAS TOO LONG. THIS SUBJECT WOULD THEREFORE BE DISCUSSED AT THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL IN VENICE, AND HE HIMSELF THOUGHT THAT SOME INITIATIVE SHOULD BE TAKEN WHICH WOULD NEITHER CONDEMN NOR SUPPORT THE CAMP DAVID PROCESS BUT WHICH WOULD STRIKE A BALANCE BETWEEN THE SECURITY OF ISRAEL AND THE RIGHTS OF THE PALESTINIANS.

6. DE LABOULAYE WAS AT PAINS TO CORRECT THE IMPRESSION GIVEN BY THE WALL STREET JOURNAL (MY TELNO 2073, NOT TO ALL). FRANCOIS-PONCET HAD NOT, REPEAT NOT, SAID THAT THE EUROPEANS WOULD INITIATE ACTION IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL. IN FACT FRANCE DID NOT WANT TO GO TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL BECAUSE OF THE VETO. IN ANSWER TO A QUESTION FROM MUSKIE ABOUT ACTION AFTER VENICE, HE HAD SAID THAT ON THE HYPOTHESIS OF THE ARAB STATES CALLING FOR A SPECIAL SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY IT WOULD BE REASONABLE TO HAVE AVAILABLE A EUROPEAN DRAFT RESOLUTION: IF NOT THERE WAS A RISK OF BEING FACED BY A VERY EXTREME RESOLUTION PUT FORWARD BY OTHERS. "THERE WAS NO REASON" HE HAD TOLD MUSKIE "WHY EUROPE SHOULD BE PARALYSED BY YOUR ELECTIONS".

7. MUSKIE HAD ASKED FOR CLARIFICATION ON THE POSITION OF FRANCE REGARDING THE PLO AND THE CAMP DAVID PROCESS. FRANCOIS-PONCET HAD SAID THAT THE PLO SHOULD BE CONSIDERED AS ONE OF THE PARTIES IN THE NEGOTIATIONS: THIS DID NOT MEAN THAT THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT WERE READY TO DECLARE THAT THEY WERE THE ONLY LEGITIMATE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE. ON THE CAMP DAVID PROCESS HE SAID THAT A EUROPEAN INITIATIVE, IF IT CAME, WOULD BE IN PARALLEL WITH THE PROCESS: THE EUROPEANS WOULD NOT CONDEMN THE PROCESS, BUT NEITHER WOULD THEY ADHERE TO IT.

AFGHANISTAN AND EAST/WEST RELATIONS

8. MUSKIE HAD SAID THAT IT WAS NECESSARY TO CONTINUE TO EXERT PRESSURE ON THE SOVIET UNION IN ORDER TO CREATE IN MOSCOW A CONVICTION THAT THERE WOULD HAVE TO BE A CHANGE OF POLICY IF THE SOVIET UNION WISHED TO RE-ESTABLISH NORMAL RELATIONS WITH THE WEST. AT THE SAME TIME IT WAS NECESSARY TO RECONCILE A FIRM POLICY DESIGNED TO LEAD TO WITHDRAWAL OF SOVIET TROOPS WITH THE NEED TO PERMIT DISCUSSIONS ON ARMS CONTROL AND DETENTE TO CONTINUE. PRESIDENT GISCARD'S MEETING WITH BREZHNEV AND HIS OWN MEETING WITH GROMYKO IN VIENNA, TAKEN TOGETHER WITH THE FACT THAT THE SOVIET

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UNION WAS SUCCESSFULLY MAKING UP MOST OF THE WHEAT IMPORTS WHICH THE U S HAD EMBARGOED, MIGHT GIVE THE SOVIET AUTHORITIES THE IMPRESSION THAT THE WEST WAS BECOMING ACCUSTOMED TO THE SOVIET PRESENCE IN AFGHANISTAN. WE SHOULD NOT LET THIS HAPPEN.

9. FRANCOIS-PONCET HAD AGREED ENTIRELY WITH MUSKIE'S ASSESSMENT OF THE GRAVITY OF THE CHALLENGE TO THE WEST REPRESENTED BY THE SOVIET INVASION. HE REMINDED MUSKIE THAT THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT HAD DECLARED RIGHT FROM THE START THAT THE INVASION WAS UNACCEPTABLE AND THAT GISCARD HAD AGAIN TOLD BREZHNEV THIS IN WARSAW. FRANCOIS-PONCET ADDED THAT HE HAD TOLD GROMYKO THAT IF SOVIET TROOPS REMAINED IN AFGHANISTAN, THEY WOULD SOONER OR LATER FACE THE SITUATION IN WHICH FRENCH TROOPS HAD FOUND THEMSELVES IN ALGERIA. FRANCOIS-PONCET SAID THAT IT WAS IMPORTANT TO KEEP UP THE PRESSURE ON THE SOVIETS LOCALLY, REGIONALLY AND GLOBALLY. THERE HAD BEEN A BRIEF DISCUSSION UNDER THE FIRST TWO HEADINGS OF THE IMPORTANCE OF ASSISTING AFGHAN RESISTANCE TO THE RUSSIANS AND OF MAINTAINING THE MOBILISATION OF ISLAMIC OPINION AGAINST THE SOVIET ACTION. IN THE LATTER CONTEXT IT WAS GENERALLY AGREED THAT THE ISLAMABAD CONFERENCE HAD TURNED OUT BETTER THAN ANTICIPATED.

10. DE LABOULAYE SAID THAT BRZEZINSKI, WHO WAS ALSO PRESENT, HAD INTERVENED IN THIS PART OF THE DISCUSSION TO ARGUE THAT THE RUSSIANS' ORIGINAL INTENTIONS IN ENTERING AFGHANISTAN WERE NOT RELEVANT; WHAT WAS IMPORTANT TO KNOW WAS WHAT THEY INTENDED TO DO NOW THAT THEY WERE THERE. HE ARGUED THAT THE STRATEGIC CHARACTER OF THE SOVIET CHALLENGE REQUIRED TANGIBLE RESPONSES. HE AGREED THAT SUPPORTING LOCAL RESISTANCE TO THE RUSSIANS WAS IMPORTANT, BUT HE DID NOT REGARD THE MOBILISATION OF ISLAMIC FEELING AS A TANGIBLE RESPONSE; INSTEAD HE THOUGHT THAT SUCH MEASURES AS THE OLYMPIC BOYCOTT AND ECONOMIC SANCTIONS WERE MORE LIKELY TO MAKE THEMSELVES FELT IN THE SOVIET UNION ITSELF. HE EXPRESSED DISAPPOINTMENT THAT THE EUROPEAN ALLIES HAD NOT ADOPTED SUCH A STRONG POSITION AS THE U S. HE HAD ADDED THAT THERE SHOULD BE NO QUESTION OF WESTERN COUNTRIES NOT GOING TO MADRID; THE CSCE MEETING WOULD PROVIDE AN OPPORTUNITY TO CRITICISE THE USSR ON ITS HUMAN RIGHTS POLICIES AND ON ITS PAST MISDEEDS.

INDIA

11. MUSKIE HAD SAID THAT INDIA HAD A KEY ROLE TO PLAY IN RESOLVING THE AFGHANISTAN PROBLEM, BUT RECENT U S EFFORTS TO IMPROVE RELATIONS WITH INDIA HAD NOT MET WITH MUCH SUCCESS. HE NOTED IN PARTICULAR THAT CONGRESS WAS UNHAPPY ABOUT DELIVERIES OF URANIUM FOR THE TARAPUR PLANT. THERE WAS ALSO A DANGER THAT INDIA MIGHT RECOGNISE THE HENG SAMRIN REGIME IN CAMBODIA. FRANCOIS-PONCET SAID THAT GISCARD'S VISIT TO INDIA SYMBOLISED A NEW EFFORT BY THE FRENCH

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GOVERNMENT

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GOVERNMENT TO DEVELOP RELATIONS WITH INDIA AND TO PERSUADE THEM TO RECONSIDER THE NATURE OF THEIR RELATIONSHIP WITH THE SOVIET UNION IN THE LIGHT OF AFGHANISTAN.

12. PLEASE SEE MIFT (NOT TO ALL) FOR AN ACCOUNT OF THE SUBSEQUENT DISCUSSION OF THE LIKELY U S REACTION TO A EUROPEAN INITIATIVE ON THE ARAB/ISRAEL DISPUTE.

FCO PASS TO ALL SAVING POSTS.

HENDERSON

*FCO/WHITERHALL
WED*

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FM AMMAN 031025Z JUN 80

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 204 OF 03 JUN

INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK AND PRIORITY CAIRO, DAMASCUS,
TEL AVIV, WASHINGTON, CG JERUSALEM

SAVING TO BEIRUT

MIPT:

BOMB ATTACKS ON WEST BANK

Read in full

1. I WAS SUMMONED BY THE JORDANIAN PRIME MINISTER THIS MORNING, WHO ASKED ME TO CONVEY TO YOU THE VERY DEEP SHOCK WHICH RECENT EVENTS ON THE WEST BANK HAD CAUSED IN JORDAN. SHARAF SPOKE IN UNCHARACTERISTICALLY HARSH TERMS AND SAID HE WAS ALSO SUMMONING THE OTHER AMBASSADORS OF COUNTRIES WITH PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVES ON THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND WOULD BE SPEAKING TO THEM SIMILARLY. HE SAID THAT JUST BEFORE KING HUSSEIN LEFT FOR LONDON, HE HAD GIVEN HIM THE GOVERNMENT'S CONSIDERED ASSESSMENT THAT THE SITUATION IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES WAS EXTREMELY DANGEROUS AND COULD EXPLODE AT ANY TIME, BUT EVEN HE HAD NOT FORSEEN QUITE SUCH EARLY AND DRAMATIC DEVELOPMENTS AS HAD TAKEN PLACE IN THE LAST TWO DAYS.
2. WITH A GOVERNMENT LED BY FORMER HEADS OF THE IRGUN AND THE STERN GANG, IT SEEMED TO THE JORDANIANS THAT THE ISRAELIS WERE NOW COMMITTED TO SUCH METHODS AND THAT THEIR PURPOSE WAS TO PRODUCE ANOTHER EXODUS OF ARABS FROM THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES. IT WAS DIFFICULT TO BELIEVE THAT THOSE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE LATEST OUTRAGES HAD NOT ACTED AT LEAST WITH THE CONNIVANCE OF SOME MEMBERS OF THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT. BY MAIMING OR KILLING THE MODERATE LEADERS ON THE WEST BANK, THEY SEEMED DELIBERATELY TO BE TRYING TO BLOCK ANY POSSIBILITY OF A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT. IT COULD NOT

THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT. BY MAIMING OR KILLING THE MODERATE LEADERS ON THE WEST BANK, THEY SEEMED DELIBERATELY TO BE TRYING TO BLOCK ANY POSSIBILITY OF A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT. IT COULD NOT BE SUFFICIENTLY EMPHASISED THAT THE VICTIMS OF THE LATEST ATTACKS WERE REASONABLE MEN, DRAWN FROM THE MIDDLE CLASS, WHO HAD BEEN IN DAILY CONTACT WITH THE ISRAELI AUTHORITIES. IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, WHAT DID ISRAEL'S CLOSE FRIENDS AND ALLIES PROPOSE TO DO?

3. SHARAF WENT ON TO SAY THAT RECENT EVENTS HAD HAD STRONG REPERCUSSIONS IN JORDAN ITSELF. AT YESTERDAY'S MEETING OF THE NATIONAL CONSULTATIVE COUNCIL HE HAD HAD DIFFICULTY IN CALMING THINGS DOWN AND PREVENTING A SERIES OF BITTER ATTACKS ON US POLICY. FEELINGS WERE RUNNING VERY HIGH AND IT WAS BECOMING INCREASINGLY HARD FOR MODERATES TO MAKE THEMSELVES HEARD, AT A TIME WHEN ARABS IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES WERE BEING TERRORISED INTO SUBMISSION OR FLIGHT. HE THOUGHT ALL THIS WOULD MAKE KING HUSSEIN'S VISIT TO THE US PARTICULARLY DELICATE AND DIFFICULT.

4. SHARAF WENT ON TO SAY THAT CONSULTATIONS WERE GOING ON IN NEW YORK WITH A VIEW TO BRINGING THE MATTER BEFORE THE SECURITY COUNCIL, AND THAT THE JORDANIAN DELEGATE HAD BEEN INSTRUCTED TO SUPPORT EFFORTS FOR SUCH A MEETING. IT WOULD BE DEEPLY SHOCKING TO ARAB OPINION IF THE US WERE ONCE AGAIN TO ABSTAIN, AS THEY HAD DONE OVER THE EXPULSION OF THE MAYORS OF OTHER WEST BANK TOWNS. SHARAF REPEATEDLY EMPHASISED HOW DIFFICULT IT WAS LIKELY TO BE TO KEEP ANY SORT OF MEANINGFUL PEACE PROCESS GOING IN THE FACE OF THE RAPIDLY DETERIORATING SITUATION ON THE WEST BANK. HE FEARED THAT MODERATES IN THE ARAB WORLD WOULD BE SWEEPED AWAY AND IN THE LONG RUN THIS WOULD HAVE PROFOUNDLY DAMAGING EFFECTS ON ISRAEL ITSELF.

5. IN CONSIDERING WHAT THE EUROPEANS COULD DO TO HELP, SHARAF EMPHASISED (AS HE HAD DONE RECENTLY TO A PARTY OF VISITING MPS - SEE PARA 6 OF MY TELELETTER TO MILES OF 31 MAY) THAT THE EUROPEANS MUST OFFER SOMETHING POSITIVE AND SOLID. A LUKEWARM OR WATERED-DOWN DECLARATION WOULD COME AS A DEEP DISAPPOINTMENT TO ARAB MODERATES AND WOULD LEND CREDENCE TO THE VIEWS OF MORE EXTREME ARABS, WHO WERE ALREADY SAYING THAT NOTHING SIGNIFICANT COULD BE EXPECTED FROM THE EUROPEANS BECAUSE THEY WERE SO HEAVILY UNDER US INFLUENCE.

FCO PASS SAYING TO BEIRUT

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Middle East

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FM TEL AVIV 030820Z JUNE 80

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 217 OF 3 JUNE

INFO CAIRO WASHINGTON DAMASCUS BEIRUT AMMAN UKMIS NEW YORK AND JERUSALEM

ARAB/ISRAEL

MY TEL NO 214:

1. BEGIN'S FOREIGN POLICY SPEECH IN THE KNESSET YESTERDAY ATTACKED THE IDEA OF A EUROPEAN 'INITIATIVE' IN EMOTIONAL TERMS.
2. BEGIN SAID THAT IF THE NINE WENT AHEAD, NOT ONLY ISRAEL'S SECURITY BUT HER SURVIVAL WOULD BE ENDANGERED. THE EUROPEANS SHOULD READ THE PLO CHARTER AND THE RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY FATAH IN DAMASCUS ON 1 JUNE. THIS SHOULD PERSUADE THEM THAT IT WAS NO EXAGGERATION TO SAY THAT ISRAEL'S VERY EXISTENCE WAS AT STAKE.
3. AFTER STRESSING THE TERRORIST NATURE OF THE PLO, BEGIN IS REPORTED TO HAVE SAID THAT THE FRG, OF ALL NATIONS, HAD NO RIGHT TO ASK THE WORLD TO RECOGNISE THIS 'ORGANISATION OF MURDERERS', OPPOSED TO A STATE IN WHICH THE SURVIVORS OF THE HOLOCAUST HAD BEEN GATHERED. BUT ALL OTHER COUNTRIES OF EUROPE, EXCEPT DENMARK, WHICH HAD RESCUED EVERY JEW IT COULD, HAD COLLABORATED WITH THE NAZIS AND TURNED JEWS OVER TO THEM. THEY HAD NO RIGHT TO CALL ON THE US TO RECOGNISE THE PLO.
4. BEGIN ALSO DECLARED THAT ISRAEL WOULD REJECT OUTRIGHT ANY REQUEST THAT KNESSET CONSIDERATION OF GEULA COHEN'S BILL ON JERUSALEM (MY TEL NO 216) BE FROZEN.
5. SHAMIR IS REPORTED TO HAVE TOLD THE KNESSET FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND DEFENCE COMMITTEE YESTERDAY THAT ISRAEL WOULD DO ITS UTMOST TO SEE THAT EUROPEAN LEADERS AT VENICE DID NOT MAKE ANY 'HASTY AND IRRESPONSIBLE DECISIONS' ABOUT THE MIDDLE EAST. BUT HE FEARED THIS WOULD HAPPEN. ISRAEL COULD NOT PERSUADE THE NINE TO TURN A BLIND EYE TO THE MIDDLE EAST ENTIRELY; THE REGION WAS OF IMPORTANCE TO WESTERN EUROPE FOR OIL AND OTHER COMMERCIAL REASONS, AS WELL AS BECAUSE OF ITS 'PROXIMITY'.

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6. ABBA EBAN IS REPORTED TO HAVE TOLD THE COMMITTEE THAT EUROPE MUST BE REMINDED THAT MANY AGREEMENTS AFFECTING THE "MIDDLE EAST CRISIS" HAD BEEN REACHED WITHOUT ITS INVOLVEMENT AND THAT EUROPE SHOULD ALSO CONTINUE TO KEEP OUT TODAY.
7. THE DIRECTOR-GENERAL OF THE FOREIGN MINISTRY CALLED IN THE GERMAN AMBASSADOR YESTERDAY TO REHEARSE ISRAELI OPPOSITION TO A EUROPEAN INITIATIVE AND TO ASK THE NINE "NOT TO BE HASTY". BUT, IN CONTRAST TO BEGIN, HIS LANGUAGE WAS MODERATE.
8. I HAVE ASKED THE ISRAEL MFA FOR THE FULL TEXT OF BEGIN'S SPEECH, AND WILL REPORT THE VERBATIM OF THE OFFENSIVE PARA 3 ABOVE LATER TO-DAY.

ROBINSON

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FM JERUSALEM 021130Z JUNE 1980

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 73 OF 2 JUNE

INFO IMMEDIATE TEL AVIV(PASSED), CAIRO, WASHINGTON AND AMMAN

MY IPT

1. THERE IS LITTLE DOUBT AMONG WEST BANKERS THAT AN EXTREME ISRAELI NATIONALIST GROUP WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR THESE LATEST OUTRAGES, SELECTING THREE OF THE MORE RADICAL WEST BANK MAYORS AS ITS MAIN TARGETS. THERE MAY WELL BE A CONNECTION WITH THE RECENT DISCOVERY OF A CACHE OF EXPLOSIVES IN JERUSALEM (MY TEL NO 63, PARA 3).
2. THESE DIRECT ATTACKS ON MAYORS HAVE INTRODUCED A NEW ELEMENT INTO AN ALREADY TENSE SITUATION AND SEEM CERTAIN TO LEAD TO A SPARP REACTION FROM THE ARAB SIDE.

HAMLEY

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10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

2 June 1980

*Subject file Algeria
- May 80 - Benyahia visit*

Dear Paul,

MEETING WITH THE ALGERIAN MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

The Algerian Minister of Foreign Affairs, M. Mohammed Benyahia, called on the Prime Minister this afternoon. He was accompanied by the Algerian Ambassador, Mr. Abdelkrim Benmahmoud and Mr. Saadeddine Benouniche H.M. Ambassador at Algiers and Mr. Moberley were also present.

After an exchange of courtesies, in which both the Prime Minister and M. Benyahia said that they would like to see relations between the United Kingdom and Algeria deepened and extended, on the political as well as the economic level, the Prime Minister raised the question of the American hostages in Iran. She said that it was regrettable that because of the hostage problem Britain's relations with Iran were not as close as she would have wished. Traditionally relations between the two countries had been good. Moreover the general uncertainty in the region gave added importance to those relations. The Iranian people's choice of Government was no concern of ours. But we could not ignore the taking of hostages. M. Benyahia said that Algeria had excellent relations with Iran. There was a relationship of mutual trust. Nonetheless, he understood what the Prime Minister had said about the hostages. The Algerian Government felt the same way. They were trying to develop ideas for solving the problem.

The Algerian Government started from the belief that the maintenance of stability in Iran and of the unity of the country was essential. Both were essential if the advance of the Soviet Union was to be barred. If the country split into a number of minor and insignificant states, these would inevitably, over a period of years, fall under Soviet influence. If the Soviet Union penetrated into Iran in this way, the balance of power in the world as a whole would be upset. For this reason the maintenance of stability in Iran was central to the future of the world.

The revolution in Iran was anti-American and anti-Russian, but not anti-Western. However, European solidarity with the United States risked making the revolution anti-Western. This would be bad. Against this background, the Algerian Government was trying to keep a clear head. The hostage problem was, of course, complicated by the fact that we were now in the middle of a U.S.

/ election

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election campaign. However, M. Benyahia was confident that it would be solved before the end of the year. Once the Majles had organised itself and a Prime Minister had been appointed, it would tackle the problem. During the two months which it would take for the Majles to sort itself out, there was no chance of progress. This was the more so since the hostage problem had become mixed up with the internal political problems of the country. In the meantime, it would be an error for the West to pile on the pressure. The less said about the hostages, the better the chances of their being released.

Turning to Afghanistan, M. Benyahia said that his Government were concerned both because of the precedent which the Soviet invasion of a small neighbouring country represented and because of the aggravation of international tension which had resulted. They wanted to see the Soviet troops withdrawn. The structure proposed by the recent Islamic Conference could not lead to a solution. The Pakistan and Iranian Governments were too deeply involved to act as intermediaries. The Algerians were working with the Yugoslavs with a view to setting up a meeting of non-aligned countries at Foreign Minister level. They hoped that it would be possible to work out a procedure which would be accepted by representatives of all the major "tendencies". A structure approved by the non-aligned movement as a whole might prove acceptable to the super powers. This did not mean that other approaches need be discarded. The Prime Minister said that what mattered was that the end result should be a Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan. Failing this, no-one was safe. M. Benyahia said that he agreed with the Prime Minister.

The Prime Minister said that she was concerned about the lack of progress towards a solution of the Arab/Israel dispute. European Governments were anxious to help and were conscious that there might be a vacuum between now and the time of the U.S. Presidential elections in November. She was concerned about the lack of precision in much of the thinking about the problem, e.g. in the references to the desirability of "self determination". No-one had worked out what this phrase meant. She wondered, therefore, whether there was a possibility of talking with the various parties involved in order to be clearer about where the future of the region lay. The rights of both the Israelis and Palestinians had to be recognised by each. The problem was to ensure that the reciprocal acts of recognition happened simultaneously. It might help towards this if the phrase "self determination" could be filled out.

M. Benyahia said he was very happy to hear the Prime Minister's words. He agreed that the concept of self determination needed to be defined. He thought it very desirable that the Europeans should attempt to discover what the Arabs wanted before formulating a definite proposal. The Algerian Government had been concerned lest Europe should come out with a proposal which would be seen as contrary to the interests of the Palestinians. This would only

/ precipitate

precipitate a crisis between Europe and the Arabs. M. Benyahia made it clear that the view of the Palestinians would be decisive in determining the reaction of the Arab states generally.

M. Benyahia asked the Prime Minister whether it would be possible to pursue the search for a solution without talking to the Palestinian Liberation Organisation. The Algerian Government did not think so. The Prime Minister said that the British Government would not recognise the P.L.O. as the sole representative of the Palestinian people. Nonetheless, they did recognise the natural political ambitions of the Palestinians. Continued trouble in the area was against the interests of the Palestinians, of Israel, of the adjacent Arab states, of the oil states, and of the West. Therefore HM Government would keep pressing for a solution to the problem. No progress would be made until the Palestinian people and Israeli people recognised each other's rights, and until it had been established more clearly what exactly the Palestinians wanted. Great practical problems, e.g. about the status of the West Bank, remained to be solved. M. Benyahia repeated that if these problems were to be resolved and their solution achieved, the P.L.O. would have to be dealt with. No-one else could speak for them. The Prime Minister repeated that she would not be prepared to see the P.L.O. recognised as the sole representative of the Palestinians. Given the P.L.O.'s terrorist connections, past and present, there would be serious political difficulties in doing so. She wanted to work towards a position where legitimate political arguments rather than violence were listened to. M. Benyahia said that the Prime Minister was speaking to a former terrorist. He did not dissent the principle the Prime Minister was advancing. But on occasions force was the only way to make progress.

The Prime Minister ended the discussion saying that she would like to have continued it, but that she had to go into the Chamber of the House of Commons to hear a Statement by the Lord Privy Seal.

Yours ever

Michael Alexander

Paul Lever, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.



FROM: THE RT. HON. JULIAN AMERY, M.P.

112, EATON SQUARE,
SW1W 9AA

TEL: 01-235 1543
01-235 7409

Prime Minister

*Mr Amery is calling on you
to-morrow: you may like
to thank him then for this letter*

2nd June, 1980.

*Peres & Co
could find*

Dear Margaret,

Amey 26

I spent part of the recess in Jordan as the guest of Crown Prince Hassan. We had several talks together and I also had a good talk with King Hussein the day before he left for London.

I understand you have seen the King since then so I will not trouble you with a detailed account of my talks but simply send you a few general impressions derived from them. They may, possibly, help to fill in the picture.

In discussion on Iran neither the King nor the Crown Prince thought that the present Iranian leadership was capable of resisting Soviet penetration or holding the country together. The West should identify and support an alternative force which at best might take over the whole country and at least secure the vital southern areas. The Iraqis were already working hard on this. It might be wise to enlist their cooperation. This would have the added advantage of drawing them further away from the Soviets.

We were thought to have rather over-reacted in our efforts to placate Saudi Arabia over the unfortunate film. I mentioned to the King the importance we attached to our relations with the Saudis and he said he would be very ready to try and help heal any breach that might still exist. I expect you or Peter Carrington will already have discussed this possibility with him.

Most of our talks centred on the Palestinian problem and the possibility of a European initiative. There are several strands to Jordanian thinking on this and the following is simply an effort to unravel and set them out in a more or less logical order.

The basic Hashemite premise is that there is no serious business to be done with Begin over the West Bank and little prospect of American pressure on the Israel Government before the Presidential elections. The King is of course well aware of the views of Mr. Peres, the leader of the Israeli Opposition, and more particularly of his proposal to return the West Bank to Jordan with some reciprocal modifications. These, as I indicated to you in my letter of 20th February and enclosures, would involve the cession of Arab inhabited territory within Israel in return for Jordanian cession of largely uninhabited territory judged strategically important by the Israelis. These views correspond in principal to views which the King has often expressed. There is also some interesting new (or at least new to me) thinking on Jerusalem about which I attach a separate note. Clearly any progress on these lines seems likely to depend on a change of Government in Israel. The King is thus in a stalemate situation where policy is more a matter of public relations than of concrete proposals likely to lead to real results.



2.

For domestic reasons the King cannot afford to seem less concerned than the PLO with the future of the West Bank. He also is naturally anxious that the West, with which his regime is associated, should be seen as trying to find a just settlement. As you know it is fundamental to Hussein's position as to Sadat's, and indeed that of the Saudis, that the Arabs are more likely to get results from the West than the PLO are likely to get them from the Soviets. A European initiative is accordingly not without attraction to Hussein though he does not expect anything serious to come out of it. I detected however two important Jordanian reservations about such an initiative.

1. Since 1958 Hussein has become much more identified with the US than with any European power. He was Britain's ally but has never had close links with France or Germany. Any European initiative opposed by the US could therefore be damaging to him as showing that his American friends were not prepared even to try and put pressure on Israel over the West Bank. This would be grist to the PLO mill as to other radical Arabs.
2. In the absence of American support any European initiative seems unlikely to achieve concrete results. It does, however, risk increasing the prestige of the PLO and giving them a more formal role in international affairs.

As seen from Amman the PLO is not an organisation but a movement consisting of many different groups some more radical than others but all linked to Moscow in one way or another. In all the conservative Arab states, as in Egypt the PLO are regarded as the main danger. It is indeed against them that most conservative Arab rulers are so heavily guarded. Given the high proportion of Palestinians living in Jordan (apart from those on the West Bank) anything that increases the status of the PLO is bound to be a threat to the monarchy.

I would conclude therefore that the King would find it awkward to warn against a pro-PLO initiative as Sadat has done and indeed must appear to support it. It would, however, only be really acceptable to him if it carried enough American support to lead to sufficient Israeli concessions, here and now, that would show that the King has been right all along to side with the West. An unsuccessful initiative, and particularly one opposed by the US, would only be damaging to him.

My own opinion, for what it is worth, is that our initiative is not worth pursuing in the face of American and, as it seems, Egyptian opposition. If reports of a Saudi - Egypt rapprochement are confirmed this would strengthen the case for holding back. If we go ahead we shall be seen as appeasing Moscow's friends and so endangering the Western Alliance. In any case in the absence of American support we would achieve nothing, except possibly some very transient goodwill in "liberal" Arab circles.

The Arab states are hooked on self determination for the Palestinians by resolutions of the Arab league. We are not. Our position in Britain, as I understand it, has been that the West Bank has been part of Jordan since 1948. Under Resolution 242 the Israelis are committed to withdraw from most of it and so - in our eyes - return to Jordan. Would it not be wiser therefore for us, if we have to say something at Venice, to call for

- a) an immediate halt to further Israeli settlements on the West Bank
- b) to call on the Israelis to negotiate their withdrawal from the West Bank direct with Jordan which was the previous owner of the West Bank as Egypt



3.

was of Sinai.

It would then be up to King Hussein to decide in what way he wishes to bring the PLO into the picture. That is his affair and not ours. It seems doubtful moreover whether we should do anything to promote the PLO - and any commitment to Palestinian self-determination as distinct from return to Jordan does just this - until they have amended the obnoxious parts of the Charter.

Two remarks not said to me directly but reported are perhaps worth recording:

King Hussein: "So Tony Nutting is in charge of the Foreign Office again"!

Prince Hassan: "If they think King Hussein is another Bishop Muzorewa they had better think again"!

I would only add that Prince Hassan welcomed Mr. Begin's demand for an international force to police the Sinai as perhaps a useful precedent for ~~an~~ eventual transition period in the West Bank.

I am copying this letter to Peter Carrington and Francis Pym.

Julian Amery
Julian Amery

The Rt.Hon. Mrs. Margaret Thatcher, M.P.



Note on Prince Hassan's view of a possible Jerusalem settlement

I asked Prince Hassan if he had any views on a possible settlement of Jerusalem. He said that the problem was perhaps not as intractable as people thought. Could not the City remain united under a single municipality - a kind of Greater Jerusalem Council? Could it not be divided into a number of boroughs some of which would be Arab and some Israeli? Could not sovereignty over these boroughs - including political rights - correspond to the predominant nationality in each of them but without prejudice to the unity of the City. The Old City, within the walls, might have a separate status as a kind of Ecumenical Vatican. It could have sovereignty status though its municipal services would be run by the Great Jerusalem Council.

These ideas correspond rather closely to those expressed to me by the Israeli Mayor of Jerusalem, Teddy Kollek, and described to you in one of the enclosures to my letter of 20th February.

JA.

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FM PARIS 020915Z JUN 80

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 503 OF 02 JUNE 1980

AND SAVING TO EC POSTS, CAIRO, TEL AVIV, WASHINGTON

Read in full

ARAB/ISRAEL: FRENCH ATTITUDES

1. MINISTER SPOKE TO BOIDEVAIX, THE DIRECTOR FOR THE MIDDLE EAST AT THE QUAI, ON MAY 31 ABOUT FRENCH IDEAS ON A EUROPEAN INITIATIVE. BOIDEVAIX SAID THAT THE FRENCH HAD ACCEPTED CERTAIN AMENDMENTS TO THE DRAFT DECLARATION. THEY TENDED TO WEAKEN THE FORCE OF A POSSIBLE EUROPEAN INITIATIVE. BOIDEVAIX SAID THAT HE UNDERSTOOD THE NEED TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF U. S. OPPOSITION TO A NEW DRAFT SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION, BUT HE THOUGHT THERE WAS DANGER IN INACTION. THE AMERICANS SAW THE WHOLE OF THE MIDDLE EAST AT THE PRESENT MOMENT THROUGH THE PRISM OF CAMP DAVID. BUT EUROPEAN INITIATIVES WERE NOT NECESSARILY AN ALTERNATIVE TO CAMP DAVID. THEY REPRESENTED MORE THE REALITY OF MAINTAINING POLITICAL CONTACTS WITH COUNTRIES WITH WHICH EUROPE HAD LONG CONNECTIONS AND INFLUENCE. THE DANGER OF THE PRESENT US POSITION WAS THAT IN OVER-CONCENTRATING ON ONE ASPECT AND NEGOTIATION, A VACUUM WOULD BE CREATED IN THE MIDDLE EAST WHICH THE SOVIET UNION WOULD EXPLOIT.

2. ON THE SOVIET ATTITUDE, BOIDEVAIX SAID THAT THE FRENCH VIEW WAS THAT THE SOVIET UNION'S MAIN AIM WAS TO MAINTAIN THE MAXIMUM INSTABILITY IN A NUMBER OF MIDDLE EAST COUNTRIES. THERE WAS AN ELEMENT OF TRUTH IN THE SOVIET THESIS THAT NO SETTLEMENT OF THE MIDDLE EAST COULD BE MADE WITHOUT THE SOVIET UNION. THE FRENCH THOUGHT THAT THE RUSSIANS HAD NOT DONE TOO BADLY AT THE SECOND ISLAMABAD MEETING AND HAD MANAGED TO WORK THROUGH THE SYRIANS AND ALGERIANS TO GOOD EFFECT.

3. JAMES ASKED ABOUT THE SUGGESTION THAT NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD TAKE PLACE IN SEPARATE BODIES. BOIDEVAIX SAID THAT THE FRENCH POSITION WAS MUCH LESS CLEAR THAN HAD BEEN REPRESENTED. JOURNALISTS HAD EXTRAPOLATED SOME REMARKS MADE BY THE ELYSEE SPOKESMAN AND BY PRESIDENT GISCARD TO PRODUCE TOO CLEAR CUT A VERSION OF FRANCE'S THINKING. IT WAS TRUE THAT THE FRENCH THOUGHT THAT THERE WERE ROUGHLY TWO MAIN CATEGORIES OF PROBLEMS. - THE FIRST CATEGORY DEALT WITH SELF-DETERMINATION AND THE PROBLEMS OF THE PARTIES INVOLVED. THE SECOND WITH GUARANTEEING THE SECURITY OF THE AREA. THIS INVOLVED THE PERMANENT MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL. BUT THE FRENCH HAD NOT GONE AS FAR AS TO THINK IN TERMS OF NEGOTIATIONS.

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4. BOIDEVAIX SAID THAT ANOTHER REASON FOR TAKING SOME EUROPEAN INITIATIVE WAS THAT THE FRENCH THOUGHT THAT THE ARAB STATES WOULD CERTAINLY TRY TO DO SOMETHING IN THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY AND WOULD PRODUCE A FORMULA ON A PALESTIAN STATE WHICH WOULD BE OBJECTIONABLE TO THE WEST. IT WAS NECESSARY TO HEAD THIS OFF IF POSSIBLE.

5. BOIDEVAIX SAID THAT HE WOULD VALUE AN EARLY CONTACT WITH MOBERLY AND SUGGESTED A MEETING AFTER THE VENICE SUMMIT. HE COULD MANAGE JUNE 23-26 INCLUSIVE OR 1, 2, 3 JULY. HIS IDEA WAS TO COME TO LONDON IN THE MORNING AND LEAVE LATE THE SAME DAY. HE WOULD INFORM THE FRENCH EMBASSY IN LONDON OF HIS PROPOSAL. PLEASE LET US KNOW WHAT DATES ARE CONVENIENT TO MOBERLY.

FLO PASS SAVING
HIBBERT.

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TO PRIORITY FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 349 OF 31 MAY

INFO ROUTINE PARIS BONN TEL AVIV WASHINGTON JEDDA AND AMMAN

INFO SAVING DAMASCUS, KHARTOUM

YOUR TELEGRAM 221

VICE PRESIDENT MUBARAK'S VISITS TO WASHINGTON, BONN AND LONDON

1. I WENT OVER THE GROUND WITH OSAMA AL BAZ, WHO ACCOMPANIED MUBARAK THROUGHOUT. ONE OR TWO POINTS MAY BE WORTH REPORTING WHICH ELABORATE ON THOSE IN YOUR TUR AND OTHER TELEGRAMS.

2. AL BAZ SAID THE EGYPTIANS WOULD BE PREPARED TO ACCEPT THE DESIRED ISRAELI ASSURANCES INDIRECTLY IN THE NAME OF THE UNITED STATES, ON THE LINES THAT THE US UNDERSTOOD THAT THE PARTIES WERE PREPARED TO RESUME THE AUTONOMY TALKS ON THE BASIS OF THE CAMP DAVID ACCORDS AND WITHOUT PRE-CONDITIONS. BUT HE DOUBTED WHETHER THE AMERICANS COULD GET EVEN THAT MUCH OUT OF BEGIN. IF THEY DID THE EGYPTIANS WOULD NOT EXPECT THE TALKS TO GET ANYWHERE AND WOULD BE CONCERNED SIMPLY TO DEMONSTRATE ISRAEL'S UNREASONABLENESS. IF NOT THEY WOULD SIT TIGHT AND COULD EASILY HANDLE ANY ADVERSE REACTIONS WITHIN EGYPT OR FROM THE OTHER ARABS.

3. AL BAZ HAD HARSH WORDS FOR LINOWITZ, WHO HE SAID BARELY TROUBLED TO DISGUISE HIS PRO-ISRAELI FEELINGS AND HIS PREOCCUPATION WITH U.S. JEWISH OPINION IN THE ELECTORAL CONTEXT. HE CLAIMED THAT IT WAS LINOWITZ WHO WAS PUTTING IT ABOUT THAT EGYPT HAD MISUNDERSTOOD THE KNESSET ACTION ON JERUSALEM (PARA 1 OF WASHINGTON TELNO 2028) AND ALSO THAT SADAT'S VOLTE FACE HAD BEEN DUE TO FEAR OF DOMESTIC AND ARAB CRITICISM. WHEN I RECALLED THAT MUSTAFA KHALIL HAD THOUGHT MUCH MORE FAVOURABLY OF LINOWITZ THAN STRAUSS, AL BAZ SAID HE CERTAINLY DID NOT THINK SO NOW. INCIDENTALLY IT SEEMS TO ME UNREASONABLE AS WELL AS OMINOUS THAT THE AMERICANS ARE PREPARING TO BLAME THE EGYPTIAN ATTITUDE FOR THE DIFFICULTY OF KEEPING UP THE INTENSITY OF NEGOTIATIONS (PARA 6 II OF WASHINGTON TUR). SURELY THE FACT THAT THE EGYPTIANS DOUBT THE AMERICAN ABILITY TO DELIVER ISRAEL DOES NOT ABSOLVE THE U.S. FROM TRYING ?

4. ON A EUROPEAN INITIATIVE, AL BAZ APPEALED TO US TO CONSIDER INCLUDING IN ANY EUROPEAN STATEMENT SOME REFERENCE TO THE NEED FOR ISRAEL TO TRANSFER AUTHORITY TO THE PALESTINIANS IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA. THIS WOULD BE SUFFICIENT GENUFLECTION TO

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/CAMP DAVID

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CAMP DAVID. HE THOUGHT IT UNREALISTIC TO EXPECT THE KIND OF DETAILED ALLUSIONS FAVOURED BY KHALIL. I SAID THAT PERSONALLY I THOUGHT SOME REFERENCE TO THE DESIRABILITY OF A TRANSITIONAL PERIOD BEFORE SELF-DETERMINATION MIGHT BE EASIER THAN LANGUAGE MORE DIRECTLY RELATED TO THE AUTONOMY PLAN. AL BAZ ALSO HOPED THAT THE EUROPEANS WOULD NOT EXPLICITLY RECOGNISE THE PLO AS THE SOLE LEGITIMATE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE PALESTINIANS, WHICH WOULD BE SO INFLAMMATORY IN BOTH ISRAEL AND THE US AS TO BE EMBARRASSING FOR EGYPT ALSO. COULD WE NOT JUST EMBARK ON TALKS WITH THE PLO WITHOUT FORMAL PRELIMINARIES ?

5. TODAY'S EGYPTIAN PRESS REPORTS SADAT AS TELLING REPORTERS THAT EGYPT WOULD DECLARE HER POSITION AFTER SEEING THE OUTCOME OF THE EXPECTED AMERICAN INITIATIVE (SIC). HE WOULD SELCOME AN EUROPEAN INITIATIVE PROVIDED IT TOOK ACCOUNT OF THREE PRINCIPLES:

(I) THAT THE CAMP DAVID ACCORDS AND THE PEACE TREATY ARE THE CORNERSTONE OF A COMPREHENSIVE SETTLEMENT;

(II) IT SHOULD NOT UNDERMINE OR DISREGARD THESE TWO ACHIEVEMENTS;

(III) IT SHOULD HAVE THE SUPPORT OF THE UNITED STATES.

ON PRINCE FAHD'S INTERVIEW SADAT SAID THAT THE SAUDIS HAD ALWAYS SECRETLY APPROVED OF HIS PEACE EFFORTS AND THEIR OPPOSITION WAS ONLY BASED ON FEAR OF THE REJECTIONISTS.

FCO PASS SAVING DAMASCUS AND KHARTOUM

WEIR

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TO ROUTINE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 2068 OF 31 MAY

INFO CAIRO TEL AVIV PARIS BONN ROME UKREP BRUSSELS

UKMIS NEW YORK

INFO SAVING OTHER EC POSTS AMMAN BEIRUT DAMASCUS JEDDA AND
JERUSALEM

ARAB/ISRAEL: FRENCH POSITION ON A EUROPEAN INITIATIVE.

1. SPEAKING TO THE PRESS AT THE FRENCH EMBASSY ON 30 MAY AFTER HIS TALKS WITH MUSKIE, FRANCOIS-PONCET SAID HE EXPECTED EUROPE TO TAKE A MIDDLE EAST INITIATIVE QUOTE IN THE WEEKS AHEAD UNQUOTE TO MEET PALESTINIAN ASPIRATIONS. HE IS REPORTED TO HAVE ATTRIBUTED THE NEED FOR THIS TO THE BREAKDOWN IN THE CURRENT AUTONOMY NEGOTIATIONS. THE SPECIFIC LANGUAGE OF THE INITIATIVE HAD NOT BEEN DECIDED, BUT IT WOULD BE BALANCED AND PROVIDE FOR ISRAELI SECURITY AND ARAB SELF-DETERMINATION. THE MATTER WOULD BE DISCUSSED BY THE EUROPEANS AT VENICE ON 11/12 JUNE, AND WITH THE AMERICANS AT ANOTHER VENICE MEETING LATER IN JUNE.

2. ASKED WHETHER FRANCE WAS ADVOCATING A PALESTINIAN STATE, FRANCOIS-PONCET SAID IT WAS NOT UP TO FRANCE TO DECIDE: QUOTE WE DO NOT EXCLUDE A PALESTINIAN STATE IF THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE WANT A STATE. UNQUOTE

3. AMERICAN OFFICIALS IN BACKGROUND BRIEFING OF THE PRESS, TOLD REPORTERS THAT MUSKIE HAD ARGUED VIGOROUSLY AGAINST A EUROPEAN INITIATIVE AT THIS TIME, STRESSING THE AMERICAN VIEW THAT THE AUTONOMY TALKS WERE NOT DEAD.

FCO PASS SAVING BRUSSELS, COPENHAGEN, DUBLIN, LUXEMBOURG, THE HAGUE, AMMAN, BEIRUT, DAMASCUS, JEDDA AND JERUSALEM

HENDERSON

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Middle East

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FM UKREP BRUSSELS 300120Z MAY 80

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 2647 OF 30 MAY

INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON ROUTINE BRUSSELS COPENHAGEN THE HAGUE ROME
DUBLIN PARIS BONN LUXEMBOURG UKMIS NEW YORK TEL AVIV CAIRO JEDDA
INFO SAVING UKDEL NATO DAMASCUS KUWAIT

Prime Minister

*You may have discussed
this on Friday.*

*MAE
30/5*

M

FOLLOWING FROM PRIVATE SECRETARY

MIDDLE EAST.

1. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SPOKE BY TELEPHONE WITH MR MUSKIE ON THE EVENING OF 29 MAY. MR MUSKIE EXPRESSED CONCERN THAT THE NINE MIGHT BE CONTEMPLATING AN INITIATIVE ON THE MIDDLE EAST WHICH WOULD ALIENATE THE ISRAELIS. HE HOPED THAT THE NINE WOULD DO NOTHING TO JEOPARDISE THE CURRENT AMERICAN EFFORTS TO GET THE ISRAELIS BACK TO THE NEGOTIATING TABLE, AND, IN PARTICULAR, THAT THERE WOULD BE NO SUGGESTION OF ANY NEW SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION.

2. LORD CARRINGTON EXPLAINED THAT THE SUBJECT WAS NOT BEING DISCUSSED AT THE FOREIGN AFFAIRS COUNCIL WHICH HE WAS ATTENDING. IT WOULD BE CONSIDERED BY THE HEADS OF GOVERNMENT OF THE NINE IN VENICE ON 12/13 JUNE. HIS OWN PRESENT INCLINATION WOULD BE TO TRY TO AVOID ANY NEW SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION, NOT LEAST BECAUSE OF THE DIFFICULTIES THIS WOULD POSE FOR THE AMERICANS. BUT THE HEADS OF GOVERNMENT WERE COMMITTED, BY THEIR DECISION AT THE LAST EUROPEAN COUNCIL IN LUXEMBOURG, TO DISCUSS THE SUBJECT AND IT SEEMED LIKELY THAT THEY WOULD ISSUE A DECLARATION OF SOME KIND. MR MUSKIE REPEATED HIS CONCERN AT THE PROSPECT OF AN INITIATIVE BY THE NINE. LORD CARRINGTON REPEATED THAT HIS OWN EXPECTATION, ALTHOUGH HE COULD NOT, OF COURSE, SPEAK FOR OTHER COMMUNITY GOVERNMENTS, WAS THAT THERE WOULD BE NO INITIATIVE IN THE SENSE OF A RESOLUTION IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL BUT SIMPLY A DECLARATION. HE ADDED THAT VICE-PRESIDENT MUBARAK OF EGYPT, WHOM HE HAD SEEN THE PREVIOUS DAY, HAD SEEN ATTRACTION IN THE IDEA OF A DECLARATION.

3. MR MUSKIE AGAIN EMPHASIED HIS CONCERN ABOUT THE NEED NOT TO PREJUDICE THE ISRAELI RETURN TO THE NEGOTIATING TABLE. HE IMPLIED THAT THIS MIGHT TAKE A COUPLE OF WEEKS.

FCO PASS SAVING TO DAMASCUS AND KUWAIT

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10 DOWNING STREET

From the Principal Private Secretary

30 May 1980

The Middle East

The Prime Minister held a meeting at Chequers this morning with Mr. Hurd to pursue the discussion on the Middle East which she had begun with the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary on Tuesday of this week. Sir Donald Maitland and Mr. Bullard were also present.

At the end of the meeting the main points that had arisen in the discussion were embodied in the attached note. Mr. Hurd put this to the Prime Minister who approved it.

I am sending a copy of this letter to David Wright (Cabinet Office).

G. A. WHITMORE

Paul Lever Esq
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

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TR

cc C. Humphrey
Mr Hurd's Office

Middle East

copy Master set.

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ARAB/ISRAEL

1. If, as we expect, a vacuum develops, the Europeans might initiate a process on the following lines:

- (a) The European Council in Venice on 12/13 June might issue a statement, the substance of which would stress commitment to Israel's security and elaborate on the need to take into account Palestinian political rights. It might go on to instruct the Foreign Ministers to take soundings of the parties concerned as to the best means of making progress on these two elements. This might take the form of simultaneous and separate soundings aimed at answering the following two questions:
 - (i) How is the principle of Palestinian self-determination to be put into practice and reconciled with the interests of the other parties, notably Israel?; and
 - (ii) How can Israeli fears for the long-term security be met to permit a lasting settlement?
- (b) The soundings could take place over many months and continue in any case until the Americans are back in play after the Presidential Election. They could be carried out either by the Presidency (Luxembourg from 1 July and the Netherlands from 1 January next) or by an ad-hoc group or emissary selected by the European Council.
- (c) At a later stage and with American agreement the Europeans might table a resolution before the Security Council. This would be designed to supplement Resolutions 242 and 338 (which are the most widely accepted resolutions on this subject) and state the two principles on which the soundings had been made (see (b) above). The Resolution might go on to invite the

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/Secretary General

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-2-

Secretary General to appoint a negotiator (c.f. Jarring) to begin with the negotiating process on the basis of these two principles. This process would clearly take a number of years and would involve all the parties concerned.

2. The following would be the advantages of the Europeans initiating a process on these lines:

- (a) We would be taking full account of the American concern not to cut across the Camp David process and not to provoke them into vetoing any resolution in the Security Council while they are absorbed in their elections.
- (b) We would limit the Russians' ability to recover lost ground by championing a "just cause" which they could otherwise do during the period of the vacuum.
- (c) Given that the soundings would cover both elements, all the parties would have a role to play during the "vacuum" period.
- (d) The expression of European concern would encourage the moderate Arab leaders, including the more sensible elements in the P.L.O. (c.f. the SDLP).
- (e) If this process could be got under way before long, the opportunity which the Arab extremists might have to create trouble at the Special Session of the General Assembly likely to be called in July to debate the Palestine question would be limited.

3. The French draft declaration for the European Council which the Prime Minister saw yesterday has been amended by the Working Group, and will be considered further at another meeting on 4 June.

30 May 1980

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MS.

P.m.

This might be useful as a summary

ARAB/ISRAEL

✓ the procedure we are suggesting and of our thinking on next steps. ~~to~~.

1. If, as we expect, a vacuum develops, the Europeans might initiate a process on the following lines:

(a) The European Council in Venice on 12/13 June might issue a statement, the substance of which would stress

- (i) commitment to Israel's security and elaborate on the need to take into account Palestinian political rights.
- (ii) It might go on to instruct the Foreign Ministers to take soundings of the parties concerned as to the best

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/ Resolutions

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Resolutions 242 and 338 (which are the most widely accepted resolutions on this subject) and state the two principles on which the soundings had been made (see (b) above). The Resolution might go on to invite the Secretary General to appoint a negotiator (Cf. Mr. Jarring) to begin with the negotiating process on the basis of these two principles. This process would clearly take a number of years and would involve all the parties concerned.

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- (d) The expression of European concern would encourage the moderate Arab leaders, including the more sensible elements in the P.L.O.. - c.p. S.D.L.P. -
- (e) If this process could be got under way before long, the opportunity which the Arab extremists might have to create trouble at the Special Session of the General Assembly likely to be called in July to debate the Palestine question would be limited.

/ 3.

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Douglas Hurd

30 May.

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

29 May 1980

Dear Michael

Arab/Israel

/ I enclose a copy of Sir A Parsons' paper of last August on Palestine.

To give an idea of how discussion might develop at the European Council, I enclose a draft of a declaration circulated by the French at a meeting of Middle East Experts which is still going on today in Rome. The main recommendation of the French draft is that the Nine should make contact with all the interested parties in order to determine the precise form and timetable of a European initiative; the draft statement leaves the initiative itself undefined. (I should stress that the meeting in Rome is still continuing. We hope for a fuller report of the proceedings before tomorrow's meeting at Chequers.)

As a sequel to the European Council declaration the French appear to have in mind a double initiative; the Europeans would simultaneously but separately explore the two questions of Palestinian rights and the security of Israel. This would have the advantage of engaging Israel as well as the Arab parties in the process.

Another possibility would be for the European Council to send a mission, the composition of which would be for discussion, to discuss with all the parties to the dispute how progress could best be made.

Yet another possibility might be for a declaration to confine itself to principles; though a number of our partners (notably the French) would see this as inadequate.

G G H Walden

(G G H Walden)

M O'D B Alexander Esq
10 Downing Street



UNOFFICIAL TRANSLATION

EUROPEAN COUNCIL : FRENCH DRAFT DECLARATION OF THE NINE ON THE
MIDDLE EAST

The Heads of State and Government and the Foreign Ministers have exchanged views in depth on the situation in the Middle East. They agreed that the growing tensions in the region constitute a serious danger to peace and make a solution of the Arab/Israel conflict more necessary and urgent than ever.

The 9 countries of the European Community consider that the traditional links and common interests which bind Europe to the Middle East require them to play a special role. Present circumstances call upon them today to renew action towards peace in a concrete manner.

In taking this initiative, the 9 countries of the Community are inspired by the conviction and the will to act in the direction of the positions which they have taken up on numerous occasions, and in particular in their declarations of 29 June 1977, 26 March and 18 June 1979, as well as in the speech made on their behalf on 25 September last in New York by the Irish Foreign Minister. On the bases set out in these declarations, the time has come to work for the recognition and implementation of the two principles which are universally accepted by the international community: the security of all states in the region through appropriate guarantees, and justice for the peoples, which implies recognition of the right of self-determination for the Palestinian people.

All the countries of the region have the right to live in peace within securely recognised and guaranteed frontiers. Recognition of the definitive frontiers of the State of Israel presupposes evacuation of the territories occupied in 1967. Guarantees of a peace settlement will be provided by the United Nations by a decision of the Security Council and, if necessary, according to mutually agreed procedures.

/ The Palestinian problem, ...



The Palestinian problem, which is not simply a refugee problem, must at last find a just solution. The Palestinian people, who aspire to exist as such, must be put in a position to exercise their right of self-determination within the framework of the peace settlement. The exercise of this right must enable the Palestinian people to organise their country and, if they so decide, to establish a State on the territories which Israel must evacuate in Palestine.

The implementation of these principles requires the participation and concurrence of all the parties concerned. They must therefore all be associated with the negotiation which must be undertaken with this object in view, including the Palestinian people, which implies the participation of the PLO.

The Nine have decided to undertake immediately the preliminary contacts which they consider necessary with all the parties concerned. In the light of the results of this consultation, the Nine will decide the precise methods and the timetable for an initiative on their part.

The international community, and in particular the UN Security Council, must be called upon, in circumstances to be decided, to assume their responsibilities at the various stages of the negotiation and of the implementation of the peace settlement, particularly in regard to guarantees.

The 9 Community countries also underlined the importance which they attach to the Euro/Arab dialogue and the need to give it a political dimension. They have accordingly agreed to approach the Arab countries with a view to proposing joint preparation of a meeting at Ministerial level of participants in the dialogue. They intend thus to contribute to the creation of a political framework which will permit discussions and cooperation between Europe and the Arab countries to develop.



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Prime Minister

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TO PRIORITY FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 210 OF 29 MAY

INFO CAIRO WASHINGTON UKMIS NEW YORK DAMASCUS BEIRUT AMMAN AND
JERUSALEM

MY TEL NO 208: WEIZMAN'S RESIGNATION

1. THE DEMOCRATIC MOVEMENT AND THE NATIONAL RELIGIOUS PARTY ARE
CONTINUING TO MAKE DIFFICULTIES ABOUT THE PROPOSED GOVERNMENT
RESHUFFLE (MY TUR) AND IT MAY BE SOME TIME BEFORE BEGIN FINALLY
MANAGES TO BRING IT OFF. MEANWHILE BEGIN IS FORMALLY RESPONSIBLE
FOR THE DEFENCE PORTFOLIO.

ROBINSON

[Handwritten signature]

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PRIME MINISTER

Meeting on the Middle East

I can now confirm that your further meeting on the Middle East will take place at Chequers at 1100 on Friday of this week.

Those taking part will be:-

Foreign Secretary

Mr. Hurd

Sir Donald Maitland

Mr. Bullard

They are all expected to stay to lunch.

JWH.

28 May 1980

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PS
PS/L
PS/MR BLAKER
PS/MR LUCE
PS/MR HURD
PS/PUS
SIR D MAITLAND
SIR A ACLAND
~~MR GORTON~~
MR FERGUSSON
MR MURRAY
MR BULLARD

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ASSESSMENT STAFF
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original copy filed

on Afghanistan Situation p. 5.

MR P H MOBERLY
MR AUST (LEGAL ADVISER)

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Prime Minister

*To see all the
rest of a Brezhnev
speech*

MAD 29/5

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TO PRIORITY F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 365 OF 28TH MAY

FOR INFO ROUTINE WASHINGTON, UKDEL NATO, BONN, PARIS, ROME, KABUL,
CAIRO, TEL AVIV, ISLAMABAD, DELHI AND ADEN.

SOVIET POLICY ON AFGHANISTAN AND THE MIDDLE EAST

1. IN THE COURSE OF A SHORT SPEECH GIVEN YESTERDAY AT A DINNER FOR THE VISITING GENERAL SECRETARY OF THE PDPA PARTY, ALI NASER MOHAMMED, BREZHNEV INCLUDED PASSAGES ON AFGHANISTAN AND THE MIDDLE EAST.

2. THE SECTION ON AFGHANISTAN WAS COMPARATIVELY LENGTHY. WASHINGTON HAD USED AFGHANISTAN AS A PRETEXT TO JUSTIFY ITS OWN AGGRESSIVE ACTIONS. BUT NEITHER AFGHANISTAN NOR THOSE WHO WENT TO ITS ASSISTANCE HAD ATTACKED OR THREATENED ANYONE. SIMILARLY ETHIOPIA HAD NOT TROUBLED ANYONE BEFORE EXTERNAL FORCES BACKED BY THE WEST HAD DESCENDED UPON HER., AND ANGOLA HAD NOT

BY THE WEST HAD DESCENDED UPON HER., AND ANGOLA HAD NOT ATTACKED ANYONE BUT BEEN ATTACKED BY BANDS OF COUNTER-REVOLUTIONARIES AND MERCENARIES EQUIPPED BY NATO. THE SOVIET UNION HAD NOT REMAINED DEAF TO THE AFGHAN REQUEST FOR HELP, ESPECIALLY SINCE THE ACTIONS OF AFGHANISTAN'S ENEMIES " PRESENTED A THREAT TO THE SECURITY OF OUR SOUTHERN BORDER". THE REDUCTION OF SOVIET MILITARY ASSISTANCE REQUIRED ABOVE ALL THE REMOVAL OF THE REASONS WHICH HAD MADE IT NECESSARY. "A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT IS QUITE POSSIBLE. ITS ESSENCE IS A GUARANTEED ENDING OF ARMED INCURSION INTO AFGHANISTAN BY THE FORCES OF COUNTER-REVOLUTION FROM THE TERRITORY OF NEIGHBOURING STATES."

3. BREZHNEV DESCRIBED THE PROGRAMME PUT FORWARD BY THE AFGHAN GOVERNMENT AS "SOLID PROPOSALS" WHICH THE SOVIET UNION ACCEPTED AND SUPPORTED. THE FIRST MOVE WAS NOW UP TO AFGHANISTAN'S NEIGHBOURS, ESPECIALLY PAKISTAN. "THE QUESTION OF THE TIMESCALE FOR BEGINNING THE WITHDRAWAL OF SOVIET TROOPS FROM AFGHAN TERRITORY AND OF FURTHER STEPS IN THIS DIRECTION COULD BE DECIDED IN THE CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSED SETTLEMENT AND TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE APPROPRIATE INTERNATIONAL GUARANTEES OF THE ENDING AND NON-RESUMPTION OF ALL FORMS OF OUTSIDE INTERVENTION. IT WOULD ALSO, OF COURSE, BE DECIDED IN AGREEMENT WITH THE AFGHAN GOVERNMENT."

4. ON THE MIDDLE EAST, BREZHNEV ARGUED THAT THE CAMP DAVID POLICY HAD NOW CLEARLY REACHED AN IMPASSE AND THE THE US WAS PROCEEDING TO AN OPEN ASSERTION OF ITS MILITARY PRESENCE IN THE AREA AND THE SURROUNDING REGIONS OF ASIA AND AFRICA. THIS, AND ISRAEL'S AGGRESSION AGAINST THE LEBANON, HAD CREATED A SERIOUS THREAT TO THE SECURITY OF THE PEOPLES OF THE MIDDLE EAST AND CONTIGUOUS COUNTRIES. IT WAS TIME TO RETURN THE QUESTION OF A MIDDLE EAST SETTLEMENT TO THE "ONLY CORRECT CHANNEL" WITH THE COLLECTIVE EFFORTS OF ALL INTERESTED PARTIES INCLUDING THE PLO.

F C O PSE PASS TO WASHINGTON, UKDEL NATO, BONN, PARIS,

BROOK TURNER

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Original on Jordan June 1979
Visits to London by King Hussein

RECORD OF A MEETING BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER AND KING HUSSEIN OF JORDAN HELD AT 10 DOWNING STREET AT 1730 HOURS ON WEDNESDAY 28 MAY 1980

Present: Prime Minister King Hussein
Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary Ambassador of Jordan
Mr. M.A. Pattison

* * * * *

The Arab/Israel problem

The Prime Minister invited King Hussein's views on the Middle East situation after the expiry of the 26 May deadline. King Hussein said that all he had foreseen in his last discussion was evolving. The deadline would come and go with no solution. On the ground, the situation was worse than ever. Tensions in the occupied territory had heightened still further. The idea of self-government was even further off than before, and hopes and aspirations had collapsed. United States credibility had continued to disappear in the area. For the Arab and Muslim nations, their natural place was with the free world, but they were now in a state of confusion. It had been his hope that, if 26 May passed with no progress, even the United States would see a European initiative which they could support as serving their best interests. He had been invited to Washington in June and had accepted.

The Prime Minister reported that the Egyptian Vice-President had been in London the previous day. The Egyptians were upset by the Knesset move on Jerusalem. They were not proposing to continue with the autonomy talks. The Vice-President had understood that President Carter would attempt to persuade Mr. Begin to give an undertaking that there would be no change in status before the talks were concluded. He hoped that something might come of this in the next few days. If that failed, the Egyptians would try to find other initiatives to avoid leaving a vacuum. The Prime Minister had spoken of the possibility of European moves, but had explained her understanding that any move for a United Nations Security Council resolution would be vetoed by the United States. King Hussein had serious doubts about the possibility of President Carter obtaining an undertaking from Mr. Begin. But if that failed,

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this would simply demonstrate still further the current weakness of the United States. The Prime Minister asked what would happen if there was no movement on the diplomatic front. King Hussein said that the occupied territories could erupt with very little further provocation. This would lead to bloodshed and chaos on a scale which none of the parties concerned would wish to see. For example, towns were now under martial law for days on end. The tensions were not confined to the issue of settlements. Rumours and intelligence available to the Jordanians also suggested that the Israelis were planning further military action in Southern Lebanon beyond the current UN lines. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary suggested that neither Egypt or the United States had any viable alternative other than the pursuit of the autonomy talks. Neither might expect significant progress from them at present, but the run-up to the US election illiminated any other action. Israel might now feel that it had obtained all that it could from the talks. The Prime Minister commented that only the United States could pressurise Israel. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary said that there was no future in a UN resolution, if this would lead to a US veto, when only the US ultimately had the means to solve the problems. King Hussein did not want to see his country's friends embark on a course which could not produce results. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary commented that the US had not only lost face and credibility, but had antagonised the Arab world as a whole. It ran the risk of encouraging more of the Arab world to look to the USSR. In the period until the US Government could then become active after their election, there was a dangerous gap which mischief-makers might try to fill. Britain and other Western allies could only try to paper the cracks in the interim. Although there were occasionally suggestions that President Carter would attempt to take a firmer line with the Israelis after the US primaries, this seemed out of the question unless both US presidential candidates could share an approach. The US system did not encourage this.

The Prime Minister commented that there had been a similar position before the previous US election, when the problem had also required urgent attention. During King Hussein's last visit, they had discussed alternatives for the West Bank. She doubted whether enough had yet been done to sort out the various possibilities.

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She recognised the difficulty of preparing definite options, because much had to be left to evolve in the negotiations. But there was room for more work. On his last visit, King Hussein had spoken of the possibility of a loose federation with Jordan: it was after all Jordanian territory which had been annexed in 1967. King Hussein believed such an arrangement possible for the future. He and Mr. Arafat had several times discussed future arrangements. The ties between Jordan and Palestine were great. There would remain a problem of borders and Jordan had a need for and right to the same kind of border guarantees as the Israelis. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary commented that the Israelis would never accept an outside guarantor, but would need to be confident in their own security. This would require some kind of demilitarisation of the West Bank. The Prime Minister saw little prospect of genuine mutual recognition between Israel and the PLO; but if this were ruled out, there was no real hope for a solution. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary said that genuine recognition would be a long, slow process. Aims would have to be established and all would have to recognise that much time would be needed to achieve them. King Hussein said that every passing day added to the difficulties. For Jordan, there was no picture of the future. In the meantime, there were pressures in all directions. He had, for example, recently found that the PLO had been under intense pressure from Libya, and he had had to open doors to the more responsible element in the PLO to counter this. Jordan wanted Palestine to exist as a force for peace, but was given no prospect of moving in that direction. The Prime Minister said that Israel would argue that any Palestinian state would be a Marxist vehicle. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary commented that current Israeli policies only tended to make this more likely.

King Hussein said that Jordan had tried all avenues since 1957, but had found no room to manoeuvre. The basic ingredients were lacking. If Jordan were to decide to join the negotiations, there was a real risk of self-destruction, creating what Israel feared most, an extremist take-over in both Jordan and Palestine. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary recognised that King Hussein could not volunteer the federation idea: it had to evolve through

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the PLO, from discussion of self-determination. King Hussein said that, in speaking of self-determination, Jordan had always been confident that the result would move in the direction of some link with Jordan, and some promise of stability. When hope was absent, extremists thrived. The Prime Minister said that she had always stressed to the Israelis that the denial of legitimate rights bred terrorism. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary speculated that Mr. Weizman's recent resignation might be a sign of some new internal political development in Israel. It was possible to visualise a Perez/Weizman coalition being pushed in the right direction. But this kind of speculation was unacceptable in Israel.

The Prime Minister asked what could now be done. By the time King Hussein visited the US, President Carter would know whether he had made progress with Mr. Begin. King Hussein said that the Middle East were very much expecting a European initiative. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary said that a declaration might cover the political rights of the Palestinians, self-determination, Jerusalem, and the settlements issue. But the declaration was unlikely to have a lasting impact: there should be some other activity. The Ambassador said that a framework for action was necessary. The Prime Minister said that most countries in the area had recognised the PLO as the sole negotiator. This created great difficulties for some countries. Was there no-one else, less identified with terrorism, to whom they could talk? King Hussein said that the US and Israel knew that he could have got the Palestinians to agree that he could speak for them. Jordan had been ready to accept its responsibility. But Jordan could not bargain over basic rights in the territory. If Resolution 242 were implemented, Jordan could act as an intermediary for the PLO and for the Arab world. But they had no basis on which to act. Jordan had tried to secure worthwhile commitments from the US after Camp David, but the US could offer nothing, after all the time which had passed and all the attempts which had been made. The Prime Minister noted that the withdrawal provisions of Resolution 242 had not been implemented. After 13 years, there was some tendency to forget the pre-1967 structure of the area. But Resolution 242 recognised that the West Bank was not part of Israel, and by

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implication that it was Jordanian. Jerusalem and Palestine tended now to be seen as part of Israel. The US had given up much of its bargaining power, Egypt had got what it most wanted, and as a result the rest of the Arab world was alienated. The Israelis were in the territory, and apparently in no hurry to pursue changes. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary noted that the Western world were likely to be the greatest sufferers from the lack of movement. Mr. Begin had crossed the most difficult hurdle by opening discussions with the Egyptians. It now seemed that others were needed to follow this lead.

The Prime Minister said that a European statement might not contribute much to the situation but few other practical steps seemed to be open. King Hussein, apologising for the naivete of his question, asked whether Jordan and Britain were meant to be friends and partners or not. Why should Britain and the Europeans always follow in US footsteps? The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary acknowledged that a sensible step would be an even-handed Security Council resolution, supplementary to 242. But the US had warned that it would veto any resolution however sensible. Thus, while the tabling of a resolution might be a signal to the moderate Arabs, it would gain little more, and would be most damaging in the US pre-election campaigning. It could drive the candidates to give undertakings which would tie their hands for a long period after the election. There seemed little prospect of making progress with either candidate in the electoral period. Some European diplomatic activity seemed to be indicated. King Hussein said that Jordan was fighting despair in the area. This created ideal conditions both for the local radicals and for potential Russian influence. The Prime Minister said that King Hussein's talks with President Carter^{would} come at a valuable time, between the European Council and the Venice Economic Summit. The European declaration should have been settled by then, and work would be in hand on the follow-up. It would be most helpful to learn of the outcome of the King's discussions in Washington. King Hussein said that he would inform the Prime Minister from Washington of what had happened, and would endeavour to call in London on his way back.

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Other Middle East problems

In response to the Prime Minister's question about Saudi Arabia, King Hussein said that many Saudis realised that they had overlooked any relation to Britain. He sincerely hoped for a normalisation of relations before long. He found the mood in the country a little more relaxed. Saudis were beginning to address themselves to their internal problems, but not much had yet happened and the dangers remained. There was still hostility towards Saudi Arabia in the rest of the area. He saw little significance in Prince Fahd's New York Post interview, and had not interpreted it - as suggested by the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary - as an olive branch to Egypt. The Gulf was nervous about the future. Iraq seemed to be interested in returning its relationships to a more natural plane, as they prepared to host the non-aligned summit. In the area as a whole, the communist threat helped to encourage people to stand together. In respect of Algeria he had great faith in the President's wisdom and good sense, but was not sure that he had yet consolidated his position. He was still puzzled by the grouping of Saudi Arabia, Algeria, Libya and Syria.

The meeting concluded at 1830 hours.

28 May 1980

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TO PRIORITY FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 807 OF 28 MAY

INFO TEL AVIV JERUSALEM WASHINGTON AMMAN DAMASCUS BEIRUT

INFO SAVING TUNIS

Prime Minister

MA 20/1

ISALAMABAD TELNO 667 (NOT TO ALL): JERUSALEM

1. IN INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS THIS AFTERNOON (28 MAY)

THE NIGERIAN PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL SAID THAT THE PAKISTAN CHARGE HAD SPOKEN TO HIM ON 25 MAY ABOUT THE ISLAMIC CONFERENCE RESOLUTION CALLING FOR AN IMMEDIATE MEETING OF THE COUNCIL ON JERUSALEM. ESSAAFI (TUNISIA) ADDED THAT THE ISLAMIC COUNTRIES HAD HELD CONSULTATIONS HERE AND HAD DECIDED THAT THE COUNCIL SHOULD BE SEIZED OF THE MATTER SINCE THE ISRAELI PARLIAMENT WAS NOW TAKING MEASURES TO DECLARE JERUSALEM TO BE THE DE JURE CAPITAL OF ISRAEL. THERE WOULD SHORTLY BE A FORMAL LETTER REQUESTING A MEETING OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL. THIS WOULD BE FOLLOWED BY CONSULTATIONS NEXT WEEK BETWEEN THE MOSLEM MEMBERS AND THE REST OF THE COUNCIL TO AGREE ON THE DATE OF A MEETING AND IF POSSIBLE THE TEXT OF A RESOLUTION. KAISER (BANGLADESH) ASSOCIATED HIMSELF WITH ESSAAFI'S REMARKS.

2. WE UNDERSTAND THAT KAISER, ESSAAFI AND THE NIGERIAN EARLIER APPROACHED THE PLO AND JORDANIANS TO URGE THAT NO-ONE SHOULD RUSH INTO THE COUNCIL TO FOLLOW UP THE ISLAMIC CONFERENCE RESOLUTION. CAREFUL PREPARATION WAS NEEDED. KAISER COMMENTED THAT AGHA SHAHI SHOULD HAVE KNOWN BETTER THAN TO DRAFT A RESOLUTION CALLING FOR THE SECURITY COUNCIL TO CONVENE IMMEDIATELY. THE MODERATES FOUND THE PLO AND OTHER MOSLEM RADICALS (PARTICULARLY LIBYA AND PDRY) SURPRISINGLY RECEPTIVE. THE EGYPTIAN AMBASSADOR HAS SUGGESTED THAT THEIR WILLINGNESS TO MAKE HASTE SLOWLY MAY REFLECT RUSSIAN CONCERN LEST, IF THE COUNCIL ACTS SWIFTLY ON JERUSALEM, IT MIGHT DO LIKEWISE ON THE CORRESPONDING ISLAMIC CONFERENCE RESOLUTION ON AFGHANISTAN.

3. IN ANY EVENT WE HAVE A BREATHING SPACE UNTIL NEXT WEEK.

FCO PASS SAVING TUNIS

PARSONS

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]
[THIS TELEGRAM WAS NOT ADVANCED]

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Prime Minister
To see Genscher's public
comments on European
declaration - over page

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TO PRIORITY FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 416 OF 28 MAY

INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON, CAIRO, TEL AVIV

MFD
29/5

VISIT OF EGYPTIAN VICE-PRESIDENT TO BONN

1. MUBARAK HAD TALKS WITH GENSCHER IN BONN ON 26 MAY.
2. THE AUSWAERTIGES AMT HAVE TOLD US THAT HIS MAIN PURPOSE WAS TO CONVEY AN ORAL MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT SADAT AS TO WHY IT HAD BEEN NECESSARY TO INTERRUPT THE AUTONOMY TALKS. MUBARAK SAID THAT THE REASONS WERE:
 - A) THAT ISRAEL WOULD NOT DISCUSS SECURITY QUESTIONS, ON WHICH SHE CLAIMED SOLE COMPETENCE:
 - B) THAT ISRAEL'S CONTINUING POLICY ON SETTLEMENTS MADE IT IMPOSSIBLE FOR EGYPT TO CARRY ON WITH THE AUTONOMY TALKS WITHOUT BEING REGARDED BY THE ARAB WORLD AS A TRAITOR:
 - C) THAT THE ISRAELI BILL ON THE ANNEXATION OF JERUSALEM ALSO MADE IT IMPOSSIBLE FOR EGYPT TO CONTINUE WITH THE TALKS. THE BILL HAD NOT (NOT) BEEN STIFLED BY THE ISRAELI CABINET, BUT PASSED TO A COMMITTEE.
3. MUBARAK SAID THAT THE EGYPTIANS DID NOT EXPECT PROGRESS IN THE AUTONOMY TALKS IN THE NEXT 6 TO 8 MONTHS. HE QUOTED PRESIDENT CARTER AS SAYING THAT IT WOULD NOT BE POSSIBLE FOR WASHINGTON TO EXERT PRESSURE ON ISRAEL BEFORE THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS. MUBARAK SAID THAT FOR HER PART EGYPT WAS READY TO CONTINUE WITH THE TALKS PROVIDED THAT ISRAEL QUOTE RENOUNCED ITS POLICY OF PREJUDICING THE RESULTS BY ITS ACTIONS ON SETTLEMENTS AND JERUSALEM UNQUOTE.
4. MUBARAK RAISED THE QUESTIONS OF THE VENICE EUROPEAN COUNCIL. HE ASKED GENSCHER FOR EC SUPPORT FOR EGYPTIAN POLICY ON JERUSALEM. HE DID NOT EXPECT EUROPEAN HEADS OF GOVERNMENT TO COME OUT IN OUTRIGHT SUPPORT OF CAMP DAVID IN THEIR DECLARATION BUT HE ASKED THAT THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL SHOULD AT LEAST SAY NOTHING WHICH CONTRADICTED THE CAMP DAVID PROCESS. HE ALSO ASKED THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL QUOTE NOT TO TOUCH RESOLUTION 242 UNQUOTE SINCE THIS WOULD GIVE ISRAEL THE PRETEXT TO WRIGGLE OUT OF COMMITMENTS MADE SO FAR.

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5. MUBARAK TOLD GENSCHER THAT HE DID NOT EXPECT WEIZMAN'S RESIGNATION TO CHANGE ISRAELI POLICY SO LONG AS BEGIN REMAINED IN POWER. ACCORDING TO INFORMATION AVAILABLE TO GERMAN OFFICIALS MUBARAK QUOTED BURG AS TELLING KHALIL DURING THE AUTONOMY TALKS THAT BETTER PROGRESS WOULD BE MADE UNDER PERES. (GERMAN OFFICIALS ARE INCLINED TO DOUBT WHETHER BURG ACTUALLY SAID THIS IN TERMS TO THE EGYPTIANS.)

6. AT THE END OF HIS MEETING WITH MUBARAK, GENSCHER TOLD THE PRESS THAT IT WOULD BE NECESSARY FOR THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL IN VENICE TO PRODUCE A QUOTE VERY CLEAR DEFINITION OF ITS POSITION ON THE NEAR EAST QUESTION UNQUOTE. GENSCHER SAID THAT THIS SHOULD INCLUDE 3 ELEMENTS: AN EMPHATIC COMMITMENT TO THE REALISATION OF PALESTINIAN SELF-DETERMINATION: UNDERLINING THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE SOLUTION OF THE JERUSALEM QUESTION: AND REJECTION OF ISRAELI SETTLEMENT POLICY ON THE WEST BANK.

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TO PRIORITY F C O

TELNO 208 OF 28 MAY

INFO CAIRO, WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK, DAMASCUS, BEIRUT, AMMAN, JERUSALEM(PASSED).

*Prime Minister**To see all**MAD 29/5**MA*

MYTEL 206: WEIZMAN'S RESIGNATION.

1. WEIZMAN'S LETTER OF RESIGNATION HAS NOW BEEN PUBLISHED. IT CONTAINED ONE PASSAGE WHICH PARTICULARLY PROVOKED BEGIN. ("IN THE MATTER OF PEACE WITH EGYPT.....MY HEART IS NOT AT ONE WITH

THE GOVERNMENT'S POLICY. THE ROAD LEADING TO THE STRENGTHENING AND CONSOLIDATION OF PEACE IS INDEED WIDE AND OPEN, BUT IT IS NOT BEING USED. INSTEAD OF TAKING DETERMINED STEPS TOWARDS A STABLE AND COMPREHENSIVE PEACE, WE ARE MARCHING IN PLACE".).

2. BEGIN'S EMOTIONAL REPLY (ALSO PUBLISHED TODAY), INCLUDES A DIRECT REFUTATION OF WEIZMAN'S "UNFOUNDED" ACCUSATION. ISRAEL HAD CONDUCTED THE AUTONOMY NEGOTIATIONS "IN KEEPING WITH THE CAMP DAVID AGREEMENTS, IN A SPIRIT OF GOODWIL AND WITH INCESSANT EFFORT TO REACH AN AGREEMENT. IT IS THE EGYPTIANS PROPOSALS WITH RESPECT TO JERUSALEM.....SECURITY AND THE NATURE OF AUTONOMY - WHICH WHOLLY CONTRADICT THE CAMP DAVID AGREEMENTS AND WHICH ENDANGER THE SAFETY, THE EXISTENCE AND THE FUTURE OF ISRAEL - THATOO HAVERDELAYED THE PROGRESS OF NEGOTIATIONS, WHICH HAVE ALSO BEEN INTERRUPTED TWICE BY EGYPT. IF IN THE FACE OF THESE FACTS THE RESIGNING DEFENCE MINISTER, AFTER HE HIMSELF HAS HAD TO REJECT GENERAL ALI'S PROPOSALS IN THE SECURITY MATTERS (SIC), MAKES AN ACCUSATION FOR OTHER NATIONS TO HEAR, BLAMING THE GOVERNMENT FOR "MARCHING IN PLACE" THEN THERE IS NO MEASURE TO THE GRAVITY OF THIS ACT. A SHOCKING FRIVOLITY HAS GUIDED YOU, THROUGH A DESIRE TO REAPPEAR IN CERTAIN FOREIGN COUNTRIES AS THE ONLY "PURSUER OF PEACE" IN A GOVERNMENT COMPOSED OF PEACE SABOTEURS".

3. MEANWHILE, ARENS HAVING REFUSED DEFENCE, BEGIN HAS OFFERED THE JOB TO SHAMIR, AND THE LATTER'S POST TO MODA'I, THE LIBERAL MINISTER OF ENERGY (AND A FORMER REVLON REPRESENTATIVE IN ISRAEL).

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THIS MOVE, WHICH WOULD BOTH BIND THE LIBERALS FIRMLY INTO THE GOVERNMENT AND STRENGTHEN BEGIN'S GRIP ON THE CABINET IS BEING RESISTED BY YADIN AND THE DEMOCRATIC MOVEMENT. BUT THE ODDS ARE THAT IT WILL GO THROUGH, AND THAT THE ISRAELI FOREIGN AFFAIRS/ DEFENCE TEAM (BEGIN, SHAMIR, MODA'I) WILL BE MORE COHESIVE BUT ALSO EVEN MORE INFLEXIBLE.

ROBINSON

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FM JEDDAH 281102Z MAY
TO PRIORITY FCO
TELNO 412 OF 28TH MAY 1980.

MAP 21/1
MS

WASHINGTON TELNO 2008 TO YOU: MIDDLE EAST

1. PRINCE FAHD'S INTERVIEW WITH THE WASHINGTON POST HAS EXCITED MUCH COMMENT IN DIPLOMATIC CIRCLES HERE BUT SO FAR AS WE CAN SEE HAS NOT YET BEEN REPORTED IN THE LOCAL PRESS. DIPLOMATIC COMMENT TENDED TO DWELL ON THE CONCILIATORY TONE OF THE CROWN PRINCE'S REMARKS, THE ABSENCE OF ANY CRITICISM OF SADAT AND THE INDICATION THAT SAUDI ARABIA MIGHT TAKE ACTION IF ISRAEL WOULD ONLY ANNOUNCE WITHDRAWAL.

2. OUR OWN REACTION HAS BEEN LESS OPTIMISTIC. IN SUBSTANCE FAHD GAVE NOTHING AWAY: INSISTENCE ON WITHDRAWAL FROM THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES AND JERUSALEM, AND THE "JUST RIGHTS" OF THE PALESTINE PEOPLE WERE REPEATED. THE SOFTER TONE MAY HAVE BEEN MERELY A MATTER OF PLEASING THE AUDIENCE. CERTAINLY ON 25 MAY LOCAL PAPERS CARRIED THE TEXT OF A HARDER SOUNDING STATEMENT BY FAHD TO THE KUWAITI PAPER "AL RAI AL AAM" (PLEASE SEE MY TELELETTER OF 28 MAY TO MOBERLY).

3. OUR VIEW IS REINFORCED BY A SAUDI PRESS AGENCY REPORT TODAY THAT PRINCE FAHD HAD GIVEN AN INTERVIEW TO THE MAROC AGENCE PRESSE (MAP). IN THIS HE SAID THAT SOME FOREIGN AND ARAB NEWSPAPERS AND SOME STATES HAD COMMENTED ON HIS INTERVIEW WITH THE WASHINGTON POST INTERPRETING HIS REMARKS IN A WAY WHICH DISTORTED WHAT HE MEANT IN AN ATTEMPT TO MAKE IT SEEM THAT THE KINGDOM OF SAUDI ARABIA SUPPORTED THE PRESENT PEACE NEGOTIATIONS AND WAS PREPARED TO UNDERTAKE "PERSONAL OR PERSUASIVE INITIATIVES". HE REITERATED SAUDI POLICY IN FAMILIAR TERMS AND SAID THAT SAUDI ARABIA COULD NOT UNDERTAKE ANY INITIATIVE OR WELCOME ANY IDEA OR ACCEPT ANY DECISION OR NEGOTIATIONS WITH ANY PARTY OUTSIDE THE FRAMEWORK OF THE ARAB CONSENSUS.

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4. I AM INCLINED TO THINK THAT THIS LAST STATEMENT IS A BETTER REFLECTION OF THE RATHER TIMID SAUDI LINE ON ARAB/ISRAEL THAN THE WASHINGTON POST ARTICLE. IT MAY BE THAT FAHD WISHES THROUGH THE WASHINGTON POST INTERVIEW

TO GIVE SIGNALS TO SADAT (NO BITTERNESS), EUROPE (KEEP THE BALL IN PLAY), ISRAEL (PEACE IS POSSIBLE), PALESTINIANS (THERE ARE LIMITS), THE AMERICANS (BE READY TO PUSH ON WITHDRAWAL OF JERUSALEM AND PALESTINIAN RIGHTS): EACH OF THOSE PROPOSITIONS WOULD CERTAINLY FIT WITH WHAT WE KNOW OF HIS THINKING. BUT MAKING ALL THESE POINTS AT THE SAME TIME WAS ALL TOO LIKELY TO OFFEND SOME OF THOSE FOR WHOM THE SIGNALS WERE INTENDED. DIPLOMACY THROUGH THE PRESS IS NOT NORMALLY FAHD'S STYLE: CERTAINLY ON THIS OCCASION HE MISJUDGED THE LIKELY STRENGTH OF REACTION TO A LIGHTER TOUCH AND IS NOW TRYING TO REPAIR THE DAMAGE.

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TELEGRAM NR 345 OF 27 MAY 80
INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON UKMIS NEW YORK AMMAN DAMASCUS TEL AVIV
JERUSALEM AND JEDDA

SAVING TO KHARTOUM:

MY TELNO 338: ARAB/ISRAEL:

1. PRESIDENT SADAT'S INTERVIEWS WITH NEWSWEEK AND THE WASHINGTON POST HAVE BEEN HEADLINED HERE. THE EGYPTIAN LINE REMAINS THAT THE AUTONOMY TALKS SHOULD RESUME, BUT WITHOUT ISRAELI PRECONDITIONS, AND THAT IT IS NOW UP TO THE US TO MAKE THE RUNNING.
2. THE EGYPTIANS RESPONDED FAVOURABLY TO PRINCE FAHD'S REPORTED STATEMENT TO THE WASHINGTON POST (IE IN EXCHANGE FOR AN ISRAELI PROMISE TO WITHDRAW FROM OCCUPIED TERRITORY, SAUDI ARABIA WOULD TRY TO BRING THE OTHER ARABS INTO A MIDDLE EAST PEACE). THE FOREIGN MINISTER WELCOMED THE SAUDI STATEMENT AS AN EXPRESSION OF SUPPORT FOR THE LINE EGYPT WAS TAKING. SADAT HIMSELF REMARKED THAT BEGIN WAS HARDLY LIKELY TO HAND OVER THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES IN RESPONSE TO AN OFFER FROM THOUSANDS OF KILOMETRES AWAY WHEN HE HAD FAILED TO REACH AGREEMENT ON THE SECURITY ISSUES DURING MONTHS OF NEGOTIATIONS WITH EGYPT. NEVERTHELESS, HE ADDED, EGYPT HAD NO QUARREL WITH ANY ARAB STATE.
3. KAMAL HASSAN ALI ALSO ISSUED A STATEMENT OF REGRET AT MR WEIZMAN'S RESIGNATION. THOUGH THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PEACE TREATY WOULD GO ON AS BEFORE, WEIZMAN HAD CONTRIBUTED MUCH TO THE PEACE PROCESS AND HAD HAD A REALISTIC VIEW OF THE ISSUES. HIS DEPARTURE SHOWED UP THE MAJOR DIFFERENCES WITHIN THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT, PARTICULARLY ON SETTLEMENTS.
4. WEIZMAN WAS LIKED HERE AND REGARDED AS THE MOST REASONABLE ISRAELI NEGOTIATOR (KAMAL HASSAN ALI'S INCREASING INVOLVEMENT IN THE PEACE PROCESS WAS PARTLY DUE TO THE EGYPTIAN HOPE THAT THIS WOULD ALSO KEEP WEIZMAN INVOLVED). HIS RESIGNATION IS THEREFORE LIKELY TO CONFIRM THE EGYPTIAN VIEW THAT LITTLE PROGRESS CAN BE EXPECTED UNTIL AFTER THE US ELECTIONS OR A CHANGE OF GOVERNMENT IN ISRAEL.

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/5.

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5. THE CAREFUL CORRECTNESS IN RECENT EGYPTIAN PUBLIC COMMENT ON SAUDI ARABIA CONTINUES. THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS SAY THEY BELIEVE THIS HAS BEEN APPRECIATED, AS HAS ALSO THE CENSORIOUS LINE TAKEN HERE OVER THE SAUDI PRINCESS FILM, THOUGH THEY EXPECT NO EARLY RAPPROACHMENT BETWEEN THE TWO GOVERNMENTS.

NENAD REGISTRY PASS SAVING TO KHARTOUM

WEIR

(REPEATED AS REQUESTED)

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Prime Minister

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FM WASHINGTON 272300Z MAY 80

TO PRIORITY F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 2028 OF 27 MAY 1980,

INFO PRIORITY CAIRO, TEL AVIV, UKMIS NEW YORK.

MP
287

MY TEL 1959: VISITS TO WASHINGTON OF MUBARRAK AND KHALIL - ARAB/
ISRAEL

1. WALKER (LINOWITZ OFFICE) HAS TOLD US THAT IN THE EVENT MUBARRAK'S MESSAGE FROM SADAT HARDLY ADDED TO WHAT THE AMERICANS ALREADY KNEW FROM KHALIL AND THEIR OWN DIPLOMATIC CONTACTS WITH SENIOR EGYPTIANS IT AMOUNTED TO A RESTATEMENT OF EGYPT'S SUPPORT FOR THE CAMP DAVID PROCESS GENERALLY AND PRESIDENT CARTER IN PARTICULAR, TOGETHER WITH INSISTENCE THAT SOME DEVICE WAS STILL NEEDED TO GET THE AUTONOMY NEGOTIATIONS RESTARTED - PREFERABLY IN THE FORM OF SOME ASSURANCE FROM THE ISRAELIS THAT THEY WOULD CEASE UNDERCUTTING THE EGYPTIANS BY UNILATERAL ACTIONS AFFECTING E G JERUSALEM. ALTHOUGH NEITHER MUBARRAK NOR KHALIL ADMITTED IT, KAMAL HASSAN ALI HAS IN PRIVATE APPARENTLY ACKNOWLEDGED TO THE AMERICANS THAT THE CURRENT JERUSALEM CASUS BELLI WAS BASED ON A MISUNDERSTANDING AND THAT THE EGYPTIANS HAVE IMPALED THEMSELVES ON THIS PARTICULAR HOOK. UNFORTUNATELY BEGIN DID NOT FEEL INCLINED TO USE SADAT'S RECENT LETTER AS A WAY OF OFFERING SADAT A WAY OFF IT.

2. THE SHORT-TERM PROBLEM OF RESTARTING THE NEGOTIATIONS THEREFORE REMAINS, BUT WALKER WAS REASONABLY OPTIMISTIC THAT THE AMERICANS MAY BE ABLE TO INSPIRE A FACE-SAVING FORMULA TO GET THEM MOVING AGAIN WITHIN ABOUT TWO WEEKS. IF SO, THERE ARE NOW AMERICAN PROPOSALS ON THE TABLE ON THE MAIN OUTSTANDING ISSUES.

3. WALKER ADMITTED THAT THE MEDIUM-TERM, HOWEVER, LOOKS UNPROMISING. QUITE APART FROM THE PROBABLY UNHELPFUL APPOINTMENT OF MODAI, WHOM THE AMERICANS REMEMBER AS A DIFFICULT CUSTOMER DURING THE SINAI CIL NEGOTIATIONS, AS THE NEW ISRAELI FOREIGN MINISTER, THE AMERICAN ASSESSMENT OF THEIR VARIOUS RECENT TALKS WITH SENIOR EGYPTIANS IS THAT THOSE EGYPTIANS ANYWAY (AND WHO CAN SPEAK FOR SADAT?) HAVE CONCLUDED THAT:

A) THE AMERICANS CANNOT APPLY THE NECESSARY PRESSURE ON ISRAEL UNTIL AFTER THE AMERICAN ELECTION. WALKER COMMENTED THAT THE EGYPTIANS MAY BE OVERESTIMATING THE POWER OF THE PRESIDENT IN THIS AREA - ANY U S PRESSURE BOILS DOWN TO ECONOMIC AND MILITARY AID WHICH IS AS MUCH IN CONGRESSIONAL AS IN PRESIDENTIAL HANDS. BUT THE EGYPTIANS MAY WELL BE RIGHT THAT PRESIDENTIAL ACTIVITY, AS OPPOSED TO CRUDE PRESSURE, COULD INCREASE AFTER THE ELECTION:

B) BEGIN IS PROBABLY NOT, AFTER ALL, THE MAN WITH WHOM AGREEMENT CAN BE REACHED:

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/C) IT WILL NOT,

C) IT WILL NOT, THEREFORE, BE UNTIL ABOUT THE SPRING OF 1981 THAT ANY REAL PROGRESS CAN BE EXPECTED. ANY U S ADMINISTRATION CAN BE EXPECTED TO MAKE MORE CONCESSIONS TO ISRAEL THAN TO EGYPT IN THE PERIOD LEADING UP TO A PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION;

D) NEVERTHELESS CARTER AND THE CAMP DAVID PROCESS STILL OFFER THE BEST WAY FORWARD. BUT THE BEST WAY OF KEEPING BOTH ALIVE IS TO EASE UP ON THE NEGOTIATIONS UNTIL CARTER IS RE-ELECTED AND THE PROSPECT OF AN ISRAELI ELECTION A LITTLE CLOSER.

4. IF THIS ANALYSIS OF EGYPTIAN THINKING IS CORRECT, THE AMERICANS MAY SOON FIND THEMSELVES IN THE SAME UNCOMFORTABLE POSITION AS IN THE FIRST MONTHS OF THE AUTONOMY NEGOTIATIONS WHEN THE ISRAELIS COULD LEGITIMATELY QUESTION WHY THE U S SEEMED MORE KEEN ON HURRYING THE NEGOTIATIONS THAN THE EGYPTIANS.

5. ASKED WHAT IMPLICATIONS HE DREW FROM THIS ANALYSIS FOR ANY EUROPEAN ACTIVITY, WALKER SAID THAT, ALTHOUGH HE HAD NOT DISCUSSED IT WITH LINOWITZ IN THOSE TERMS, HE PERSONALLY COULD SEE ADVANTAGE PROVIDED IT WERE NOT IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL WHERE THE AMERICANS WOULD HAVE TO TAKE A PUBLIC STAND (IN THIS CONNECTION, WALKER MENTIONED THAT KHALIL HAD MADE A PASSING REFERENCE TO EGYPT BEING INTERESTED IN A NEW S C RESOLUTION - AS DESCRIBED IT SOUNDED VERY LIKE THE ONE DISCUSSED WITH GENSCHER IN MARCH THE LANGUAGE OF WHICH, WALKER SAID, WOULD INVITE THE WORST OF BOTH WORLDS.) BUT SEPARATE EUROPEAN ACTIVITY WITHIN E G THE EURO-ARAB DIALOGUE IN WHICH THE AMERICANS WOULD BE SEEN NOT TO CONNIVE COULD BE USEFUL EVEN IF ADMINISTRATION SPOKESMEN COULD NOT ADMIT IT. LINOWITZ IN HIS DISCUSSIONS WITH ISRAEL HAD ALREADY SHOWN HIMSELF NOT TO BE ABOVE HOLDING OUT THE SPECTRE OF EUROPEAN ACTIVITY.

6. SUMMING UP, WALKER SAID:

(I) THEY WERE NOT YET OUT OF THE WOODS AS REGARDS RESTARTING THE NEGOTIATIONS, THOUGH THAT SHOULD BE SOLUBLE:

(II) EVEN IF NEGOTIATIONS DID RESTART, THE EGYPTIAN ATTITUDE MIGHT MAKE IT DIFFICULT TO RETAIN THE IMAGE OF "INTENSITY":

(III) THE TWO SIDES WERE STILL TOO FAR APART FOR LINOWITZ TO BE ABLE TO RECOMMEND TO THE PRESIDENT THAT HE STOOD EVEN A 50/50 CHANCE OF PULLING IT OFF BY A FURTHER PERSONAL INTERVENTION. IF LINOWITZ WERE ABLE TO SO RECOMMEND, WALKER BELIEVED THAT CARTER MIGHT WELL BE MORE WILLING THAN MANY OF HIS WHITE HOUSE ADVISERS TO GIVE IT A GO.
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TELNO 206 OF 27 MAY

INFO CAIRO, WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK, DAMASCUS, BEIRUT, AMMAN, JERUSALEM(PASSED).

MP
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MYTEL 203(NOT TO ALL): WEIZMAN'S RESIGNATION.

1. WEIZMAN SUBMITTED HIS FORMAL LETTER OF RESIGNATION TO BEGIN YESTERDAY AND THE PRIME MINISTER IS EXPECTED TO TAKE OVER AS ACTING DEFENCE MINISTER WHEN THIS COMES INTO EFFECT TOMORROW. ALTHOUGH WEIZMAN OSTENSIBLY WENT ON THE ISSUE OF CUTS IN THE DEFENCE BUDGET, IT HAS BEEN CLEAR FOR SOME WEEKS - AS THE BITTER TERMS OF HIS LETTER OF RESIGNATION (TEXT BY BAG) CONFIRM - THAT HIS DIFFERENCES WITH THE REST OF THE GOVERNMENT WERE TOO WIDE TO BE BRIDGED.

2. RESHUFFLE FEVER CONTINUES. YADIN'S DEMOCRATIC MOVEMENT ARE HINTING THAT THEY WOULD LEAVE THE GOVERNMENT IF SHARON IS MADE (PERMANENT) DEFENCE MINISTER. ARENS REMAINS THE OTHER LEADING CANDIDATE BUT IN ORDER TO PREVEN COALITION SQUABBLING, BEGIN MAY FOLLOW THE PRECEDENT SET AFTER DAYAN'S RESIGNATION AND HOLD ON TO DEFENCE FOR SOME TIME, LEAVING EVERYDAY MATTERS TO ZIPORI, THE DEPUTY MINISTER.

3. WHATEVER THE OUTCOME, WEIZMAN'S DEPARTURE HAS REMOVED THE LAST MAN IN THE CABINET WILLING, FOR TACTICAL REASONS, TO ARGUE WITH ANY CONVICTION AGAINST JEWISH SETTLEMENT IN POPULATED AREAS OF THE WEST BANK. (YADIN, ALTHOUGH EQUALLY OPPOSED TO THE CABINET'S FORWARD POLICY, HAS PROVED INEFFECTIVE WHEN PUT TO THE TEST). IT HAS ALSO FURTHER REDUCED THE CHANCES OF A MEETING OF MINDS WITH THE EGYPTIANS ON AUTONOMY.

4. BUT, AS BEGIN'S PRIVATE SECRETARY POINTED OUT (PARA 3 OF T U R), THIS IS NOT A CRISIS OF GOVERNEMENT: THE COALITION WILL RETAIN AN ADEQUATE KNESSET MAJORITY. HURWTIZ IS TO SUBMIT FIRM PROPOSALS FOR FRESH CUTS IN MINISTERIAL BUDGETS, INCLUDING DEFENCE, TO HIS COLLEAGUES DURING THE NEXT TWO WEEKS. THESE WILL DO LITTLE TO REDUCE ISRAEL'S RAPIDLY RISING INFLATION: THE BASIC ECONOMIC PROBLEMS WHICH PROVOKED THE LATEST CRISIS REMAIN UNTOUCHED, FIRST AMONG THEM, ISRAEL'S HIGH RATE OF EXPENDITURE ON DEFENCE.

ROBINSON

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Prime Minister

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28/5
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ARAB/ISRAEL: SAUDI POLICY.

1. THE ISRAEL REACTION TO PRINCE FAHD'S INTERVIEW WITH MRS KATHERINE GRAHAM IN THE WASHINGTON POST HAS BEEN COOL.
2. GOVERNMENT CIRCLES ARE QUOTED IN YESTERDAY'S ISRAELI PRESS AS DESCRIBING FAHD'S REPORTED PROMISE TO BRING THE PALESTINIANS AND OTHER ARABS INTO A "FULL AND FINAL SETTLEMENT WITH ISRAEL" IN RETURN FOR AN ISRAELI UNDERTAKING TO GIVE UP THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES" AS "GIMMICKRY": THERE WAS "NOTHING NEW AND NOTHING SERIOUS IN IT". SHAMIR IS ALSO QUOTED AS SAYING YESTERDAY THAT IT "DID NOT REPRESENT A NEW ATTITUDE".
3. MEANWHILE, THE LEADER OF THE ISRAELI AUTONOMY DELEGATION, BURG IS REPORTED TO HAVE PROPOSED THROUGH THE U S AMBASSADOR HERE THAT HE AND HIS EGYPTIAN AND AMERICAN COUNTERPARTS SHOULD MEET "SOMEWHERE" IN ORDER TO CREATE A NEW ATMOSPHERE FOR A RESUMPTION OF THE AUTONOMY NEGOTIATIONS. BUT BEGIN IS ALSO REPORTED TO HAVE INDICATED TO THE VISITING AMERICAN SECRETARY OF TRANSPORTATION THAT ISRAEL WAS STILL WAITING TO HEAR FROM THE EGYPTIANS THAT THEY WERE PREPARED TO RESUME THE NEGOTIATIONS: THE PROSPECTS FOR A RENEWAL REMAINED DIM UNLESS EGYPT RESCINDED ITS DECISION TO SUSPEND THE TALKS "PENDING GESTURES FROM ISRAEL".

R O B I N S O N

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TO ROUTINE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 70 OF 27 MAY
INFO TEL AVIV, CAIRO, WASHINGTON, AMMAN.

Prime Minister

MS MP 28/5

TEL AVIV TEL NO 206:

RESIGNATION OF ISRAELI MINISTER OF DEFENCE: WEST BANK REACTION

1. REACTION HERE TO MR WEIZMAN'S RESIGNATION SEEMS TO BE DEVIDED ON FAIRLY PREDICTABLE LINES. MODERATES CONSIDER IT A BLOW TO POSSIBLE COEXISTENCE, WHILST THE MORE LEFT WING WEST BANKERS ATTACH LITTLE IMPORTANCE TO IT VIS-A-VIS THE PALESTINIAN QUESTION.

2. MAYOR FREIJ OF BETHLEHEM VOICES THE OPINIONS OF MANY WHO, IRRESPECTIVE OF THEIR VIEWS ON AUTONOMY ETC., ARE CONCERNED AT THE GROWING INCIDENCE OF VIOLENCE. HE IS QUOTED BY BOTH ISRAELIS AND ARABIC MEDIA AS SAYING THAT THE RESIGNATION IS A VICTORY FOR GUSH EMUNIM AND OTHER EXTREMIST ELEMENTS IN ISRAEL AND THAT HE ANTICIPATES QUOTE MORE AGRESSIVE SETTLEMENTS, AN INCREASE IN TENSION AND GREATER POLARIZATION UNQUOTE. FREIJ HAS ALSO POINTED OUT THAT WEIZMAN DURING HIS TERM OF OFFICE HAD MET MANY OF THE DEMANDS OF WEST BANK MAYORS. IN ITS EDITORIAL OF 26 MAY, AL QUDS (MODERATE, PRO JORDANIAN) COMMENTS THAT THERE IS A GENERAL FEELING THAT THE BEGIN GOVERNMENT IS ON ITS WAY TO EXTINCTION, OWING TO FAILURE TO SOLVE BOTH FOREIGN POLICY AND INTERNAL ECONOMIC PROBLEMS.

3. AL FAJR (EXTREME LEFT WING, PRO PLO) IN ITS EDITORIAL OF 26 MAY, WONDERS WHETHER WEIZMAN'S RESIGNATION WAS AN ATTEMPT TO LEAVE A SINKING SHIP. THE PAPER, WHICH CLEARLY DISAGREES WITH THOSE WHO CONSIDER WEIZMAN TO BE A DOVE, GOES ON TO SAY THAT QUOTE IF PEOPLE LIKE WEIZMAN CANNOT FIND A PLACE WITHIN THE PRESENT GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL, WHAT CAN BE THE PROSPECTS FOR THE FUTURE? ASH SHAAB (LEFT WING PRO PLO) COMMENTS ON SIMILAR LINES BUT TAKES THE OPPORTUNITY TO MAKE ITS USUAL CRITICISM OF THE UNITED STATES. QUOTE WE DO NOT RULE OUT THE POSSIBILITY THAT THE RESIGNATION IS PART OF AN OPERATION TO REARRANGE THE POLITICAL STAGE IN ACCORDANCE WITH SPECIFICATIONS MORE SUITABLE FOR THE UNITED STATES TO IMPLEMENT HER SCHEMES IN THE REGION UNQUOTE.

HAMLEY

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TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NR 338 OF 22 MAY 88

WASHINGTON TELNO 1936: ARAB/ISRAEL

*Read in full
(I have minutes separately
about a call by Mubarak)*

1. I CALLED YESTERDAY ON THE NEW FOREIGN MINISTER, MR (NO LONGER GENERAL) KAMAL HASSAN ALI. HE IS INSTALLED IN THE FOREIGN SECRETARY'S ROOM WHICH HAS BEEN UNOCCUPIED SINCE ISMAIL FAHMY RESIGNED IN 1977 AND SAID HE INTENDS TO BE A FULL-TIME FOREIGN MINISTER. TO BEGIN WITH HE WOULD BE WHOLLY PRE-OCCUPIED WITH THE NEGOTIATIONS WITH ISRAEL. HE SAID HE HAD DECLINED ANY CONTINUING ROLE IN DEFENCE AND RELATED MATTERS, THOUGH I DOUBT WHETHER THE DECISION WAS HIS.

2. ON THE CURRENT SITUATION KAMAL HASSAN ALI CONFIRMED THAT THE ISRAELI REPLY TO SADAT'S MESSAGE HAD BEEN DISCOURAGING. IT HAD MERELY RESTATED THE ISRAELI POSITION ON JERUSALEM AND SETTLEMENTS, BUT HAD NOT (CONTRARY TO SOME PRESS REPORTS) GONE INTO OTHER ISSUES LIKE SECURITY AND THE PLO. KAMAL HASSAN ALI HEDGED SLIGHTLY WHEN I QUOTED VICE PRESIDENT MUBARAK'S STATEMENT TO THE LORD PRIVY SEAL THAT THE AUTONOMY TALKS WOULD REMAIN SUSPENDED UNTIL ISRAEL PRODUCED SOMETHING NEW. THE WAY HE WOULD PUT IT WAS THAT THE ISRAELIS MUST SHOW SOME RECOGNITION THAT THEY HAD TO PAY A PRICE FOR THE PEACE TREATY. IT WAS UP TO THE AMERICANS TO MAKE THEM SEE THIS. VICE PRESIDENT MUBARAK WOULD BE TELLING PRESIDENT CARTER IN WASHINGTON THAT EGYPT WOULD BE PREPARED TO RESUME NEGOTIATIONS PROVIDED IT WAS AGREED IN ADVANCE

TELLING PRESIDENT CARTER IN WASHINGTON THAT EGYPT WOULD BE PREPARED TO RESUME NEGOTIATIONS PROVIDED IT WAS AGREED IN ADVANCE THAT ALL THE ISSUES COVERED IN THE CAMP DAVID DOCUMENTS WERE GENUINELY NEGOTIABLE, IE ISRAEL COULD NOT INSIST ON HER FOUR NO'S AS PRE-CONDITIONS.

3. FOR THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE KAMAL HASSAN ALI SAW ONLY TWO PRACTICAL POSSIBILITIES. EITHER BEGIN WOULD GO, WHICH WOULD CREATE A NEW SITUATION, OR THE AUTONOMY TALKS MUST BE KEPT TICKING OVER UNTIL NOVEMBER, WHEN THE EGYPTIANS WERE CONFIDENT PRESIDENT CARTER WOULD BE RE-ELECTED. I QUESTIONED WHETHER IT WOULD BE SO EASY FOR THE REST OF THE WORLD, IN PARTICULAR THE MODERATE ARABS AND THE PALESTINIANS, TO ACCEPT AN OPEN-ENDED CONTINUATION BEYOND 26 MAY, AND REHEARSED THE CASE FOR AN EUROPEAN INITIATIVE TO HELP FILL THE GAP. WE WERE PARTICULARLY CONCERNED THAT CONTINUING DEADLOCK TOGETHER WITH INCREASING TENSION ON THE WEST BANK WOULD PLAY INTO THE HANDS OF THE EXTREMISTS AND THE RUSSIANS AND UNDERMINE THE MODERATE ARAB REGIMES. KAMAL HASSAN ALI ACCEPTED THIS, AND DID NOT RULE OUT THE IDEA OF AN EUROPEAN INITIATIVE, BUT INDICATED THAT HE SHARED SENATOR MUSKIE'S HOPE THAT WE WOULD HOLD OFF FOR A BIT LONGER. AS TO POSSIBLE OPTIONS, HE PERSONALLY WOULD PREFER A FURTHER ATTEMPT TO DRAW JORDAN INTO THE NEGOTIATIONS RATHER THAN THE PLO. HE BELIEVED IT WAS ONLY KING HUSSEIN HIMSELF WHO WAS HOLDING OUT, AND THAT IF HE WOULD DROP HIS OPPOSITION THERE WOULD BE NO DIFFICULTY IN GETTING REPRESENTATIVE WEST BANKERS TO JOIN IN. I SAID THIS DID NOT SQUARE WITH THE EVIDENCE OF OUR OWN RECENT CONTACTS WITH THE JORDANIANS AND OTHERS.

4. SADAT HAS GOT HIMSELF INTO A DIFFICULT POSITION OVER THE RESUMPTION OF THE AUTONOMY TALKS. DESPITE THE OFFICIAL AND NO DOUBT GENUINE EXPLANATION THAT HE WAS PROVOKED BY THE KNESSET ACTION ON JERUSALEM, I SUSPECT HE MAY ALSO HAVE BEEN TOLD BY MUBARAK AND CO AT THE MEETING ON 15 MAY THAT HE RISKED ADVERSE REACTIONS AT HOME IF HE GAVE IN TOO READILY TO AMERICAN PRESSURE TO RESUME NEGOTIATIONS WHILE BEGIN CONTINUED TO MAKE PROVOCATIVE STATEMENTS. THE SURPRISE DESPATCH TO WASHINGTON OF THE HARD-LINER MUBARAK ON THE HEELS OF DR KHALIL SUGGESTS THAT THIS MAY BE HIS MESSAGE TO THE AMERICANS, AND THEY MUST AT LEAST GET BEGIN TO SHUT UP. BUT IT SEEMS CLEAR THAT THE EGYPTIANS ARE LOOKING FOR A WAY TO RESUME THE TALKS WITHOUT LOSS OF FACE, AND HAVE COME TO NO CONCLUSIONS ABOUT ALTERNATIVE COURSES.

WEIR.



I have done

so.

10 DOWNING STREET

~~Mr. Alexander;~~

Ans

Have altered
in diary but
have not told
Flo.

Ed.

22/5. Please file
22/5.

CONFIDENTIAL

Mid E.



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

22 May 1980

h.s. *[Signature]* - 23/5

Dear Michael,

Policy towards the Middle East

Thank you for your letter of 14 May.

Lord Carrington would also welcome a policy discussion along the lines of that on East-West relations. He suggests that it should focus on Arab-Israel and that participants from the FCO, in addition to himself, should be ~~the Lord Privy Seal~~, Sir Donald Maitland and John Holmes, the Arab/Israel desk officer.

I understand that the discussion will take place at 11.30 on 27 May.

Yours etc

[Signature]

(P Lever)
Private Secretary

M O'D B Alexander Esq
10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL

22 MAY 1980



PRIME MINISTER

This would be 90 minutes or
so with the Foreign Secretary, Sir
D. Nairland + two junior officials
in the same pattern ^{as} your last visit.

Paul

Michael Alexander wonders whether you would like to visit the Foreign and Commonwealth Office next Tuesday for a discussion on the Arab/Israeli situation.

Your diary at present is as follows:

0815	Hair (perm)
1130	Keep free for Royal Academy speech
1430	Visit to Maureen Baker
1615	Courtesy call by
-1630	Angolan Ambassador to Brussels (to deliver a message from Pres Dos Santos)
Evening	Royal Academy Banquet +D.T.

If your speech is finished there is a good slot at 1130. Would you agree to this?

ES.

Yes no

21 May 1980

Top copy: United Nations, April 80, Visit of Sec-General

Record of a conversation between the PM and the Sec-General of the United Nations at No 10, on Tuesday 20 May 1980 at 1630hrs.

Middle East

12. Dr Waldheim thought it his duty as Secretary-General to say he was very worried about the situation in the Middle East. The autonomy talks had collapsed. The Americans were paralysed, the Europeans hesitant. In the vacuum, many things could happen. The radical Arabs could make trouble. The Israelis were not cooperative. Major Haddad, supplied by the Israelis, was bombing UNIFIL's headquarters and killing Irish soldiers. Now was the moment for Europe to play a constructive role. He heard a lot of talk in the media about a European initiative. One option was to seek to amend Security Council Resolution 242 so as to give the Palestinians their political rights, i.e. self-determination. If this was not feasible - and a US veto would seem certain before the Presidential election - the Arabs would ask for a Special Session of the General Assembly. Mr Arafat might wait if a European initiative was in prospect, otherwise he would call for a Special Session in June or July. There would be a tough resolution, which could be opposed by the United States, but which if not too radical might get some other Western votes.

13. The Prime Minister said that at Luxembourg the Nine had decided not to discuss the options until 26 May, by which time they had thought the Camp David process would be exhausted. They were to discuss the problem at the Venice Summit, but it now looked as though the process might still be alive at the point; she was doubtful about action which would cut across the Americans. She questioned what was meant by self-determination for the Palestinians. There was no such animal in constitutional law. What were they to determine? Did their land really belong to Jordan? There were many Palestinians in Syria and the Lebanon: where were they to go? King Hussein had indicated he might be ready for some loose federation of the West Bank with Jordan: would they still be Jordanian citizens?

14. Mr Urquhart said there were no real answers to these questions. No-one had discussed with the inhabitants what all this meant. The Israelis and Palestinians, dealing only through intermediaries, had a nightmare view of each other. They could never discuss the future, only the past. There was the prior question of recognition. The Palestinians had inched forward on this. Mr Arafat was more reasonable

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- 7 -

in private contacts that he was in public. Sir A Parsons believed that only two powers, the UK and Pakistan, had ever recognised Jordan's title to the West Bank. The only way to answer the Prime Minister's questions was for someone to talk to all the parties.

15 Mr Urquhart suggested that some half-governmental/half-unofficial enterprise might break down the barriers. The Prime Minister asked if Europe could work this out? Sir D Maitland suggested that in the present vacuum only Europe could be active, not to achieve dramatic results, but to keep discussion going. The Prime Minister thought that something more was required: exactitude. Sir D Maitland said we could draw up a questionnaire and put it to the Israelis, the Egyptians and the PLO. Agreeing, Sir A Parsons pointed out that none of the studies of the options since 1967 had been written as a result of consultation with the parties. Europe could talk to all the parties; a questionnaire could help to provide the exactitude the Prime Minister was seeking. To mount a resolution at the UN this year would be a waste of time; inevitably, the Americans would veto.

16 Dr Waldheim believed that no concrete solution was possible before November. Meanwhile, there should be a revival of talks in one way or another.

The Prime Minister believed that the vacuum would extend beyond November. Both sides in the Presidential election would be courting the Jewish vote; there would be a year's delay.

Middle East

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GR 230

CONFIDENTIAL

FM TEL AVIV 151200Z MAY 80

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 189 OF 15 MAY

INFO WASHINGTON

MY TEL NO 177: ARAB/ISRAEL

1. THERE IS A FURTHER CONSIDERATION WHICH WE MUST HAVE IN MIND WHEN WE CONSIDER THE TIMING OF A EUROPEAN INITIATIVE, AND WHETHER WE CAN AFFORD TO ACCEPT ADVICE FROM ISRAELIS AND AMERICANS THAT WE SHOULD GIVE THE CAMP DAVID PROCESS MORE TIME AND/OR WAIT UNTIL THERE IS A NEW AMERICAN PRESIDENT.
2. I HAVE REPORTED THAT, BARRING AN UNFORESEEABLE ACCIDENT, AN EARLY ISRAELI ELECTION IS UNLIKELY. I THINK THAT BEGIN'S STRATEGY MAY NOW BE TO WAIT FOR THE NEXT US PRESIDENT, AND THEN, WHEN THE NEW US ADMINISTRATION HAS SORTED ITSELF OUT AND MADE KNOWN ITS MIDDLE EAST POLICY, BEGIN COULD CLAIM THAT DEMANDS WERE BEING MADE OF ISRAEL SUCH THAT HIS GOVERNMENT COULD NOT ACCEPT THEM WITHOUT A POPULAR MANDATE. BECAUSE OF THE ISRAELI REQUIREMENT OF A 100 DAYS NOTICE FOR A GENERAL ELECTION, THIS COULD ENABLE BEGIN TO STALL UNTIL THE AUTUMN OF 1981. (WHEN, FOLLOWING AN INCONCLUSIVE POINTER, I TRIED THE ABOVE SCENARIO ON A FORMER DIRECTOR GENERAL OF THE ISRAELI FOREIGN MINISTRY HE COMMENTED "YES, WE HAVE LOST 1981".)
3. BEGIN SEEM INCREASINGLY CONFIDENT AND COULD DO BETTER IN AN ELECTION FOUGHT ON CONDITIONS FOR ISRAEL'S SECURITY. THIS THOUGHT MUST BE IN HIS MIND.

ROBINSON

[THIS TELEGRAM WAS NOT ADVANCED]

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File
Middle East

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From the Private Secretary

14 May 1980

Policy Towards the Middle East

I am sending Paul Lever under separate cover an account of a meeting the Prime Minister had this afternoon with a delegation of the Conservative Friends of Israel. This discussion confirmed me in the view that it would be useful to have in the near future a small meeting, along the lines of that held earlier in the year to discuss East/West relations, on the Middle East situation. I have put this idea to the Prime Minister. She would welcome it.

It is for discussion whether such a meeting would deal simply with the Arab/Israel dispute or whether it could deal more profitably with the situation in South West Asia and the Middle East as a whole. As both the Prime Minister and the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary have made clear in recent speeches, all the problems in the region are becoming increasingly intertwined.

Perhaps we could have a word about this soon.

M. O'D. B. ALEXANDER

Orig. Filed;
Dm; mtg with Hugh Fraser MP etc.

SP

G.G.H. Walden, Esq.
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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DESKBY FCO AND UKDEL NATO 140800Z

FM WASHINGTON 132000Z MAY 80

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1849 OF 13 MAY

INFO IMMEDIATE UKDEL NATO PRIORITY CAIRO TEL AVIV AMMAN

BEIRUT DAMASCUS AND HMGJ JERUSALEM

INFO SAVING TO UKMIS NEW YORK AND JEDDA.

ARAB/ISRAEL : AUTONOMY NEGOTIATIONS

1. IN A TELEVISION INTERVIEW THIS MORNING, AMBASSADOR LINOWITZ ADMITTED THAT THERE WAS NO HOPE NOW OF MEETING THE 26 MAY DEADLINE.

FCO PASS SAVING JEDDA.

HENDERSON

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

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TO PRIORITY FCO

TELEGRAM NR 310 OF 13 MAY 80

INFO PRIORITY AMMAN DAMASCUS JEDDA TEL AVIV AND WASHINGTON:

VISIT OF LORD PRIVY SEAL

1. THE LORD PRIVY SEAL VISITED CAIRO FROM 10 TO 13 MAY. HE HAD USEFUL TALKS WITH THE VICE PRESIDENT, THE PRIME MINISTER, THE MINISTER OF DEFENCE, THE MINISTERS OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND AT THE PRESIDENCY, AND THE SPEAKER. HE ALSO MET SAYYID MAREI AND SEVERAL EX-FOREIGN MINISTERS. THE GREAT DISAPPOINTMENT WAS THAT PRESIDENT SADAT, IN RETREAT AT ISMAILIA PREPARING FOR HIS MUCH-HERALDED SPEECH ON 14 MAY, WAS UNABLE TO SEE HIM. THIS DESPITE REPRESENTATIONS TO THE PRESIDENT FROM EVERY EGYPTIAN MINISTER HE DID SEE. THE PRESIDENT'S EXCUSE WAS PROBABLY GENUINE, BUT THE VICE PRESIDENT WAS NO SUBSTITUTE. IT WAS ALSO BAD LUCK THAT THE VISIT COINCIDED WITH THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF A CABINET RESHUFFLE WHICH MAY AFFECT SOME OF THOSE HE SAW.

2. THE LPS'S CONVERSATIONS REFLECTED TWO ISSUES UPPERMOST IN EGYPTIAN MINDS: THE FUTURE OF THE AUTONOMY TALKS FOLLOWING THE HERZLIA STALEMATE AND AS THE 26 MAY TARGET DATE APPROACHES; AND THE RADICAL INTERNAL REFORMS WHICH THE PRESIDENT IS TO ANNOUNCE ON 14 MAY. MUCH OF WHAT WAS SAID ON THE LATTER TOPIC WILL PROBABLY BE OUT OF DATE WHEN THIS ACCOUNT IS READ. ON THE FORMER, THE PICTURE WAS COHESIVE BUT NOT ENCOURAGING.

3. THE PRIME MINISTER DESCRIBED THE HERZLIA TALKS IN DETAIL, AND PRESIDENT SADAT'S DECISION TO SUSPEND THE NEGOTIATIONS. THERE WOULD BE A TOP LEVEL MEETING ON 15 MAY TO DECIDE HOW TO PROCEED.

4. AS TO THE FUTURE, KHALIL SAID HE HAD BELIEVED SINCE JAN THAT BEGIN COULD GO NO FURTHER. BY GOING ON TALKING THE EGYPTIANS COULD HOWEVER PROVE THAT ISRAEL WAS NOT ABIDING BY HER OBLIGATIONS. THE 26 MAY DEADLINE WAS NOT INFLEXIBLE, AND HAD FORCED THE ISRAELIS TO NEGOTIATE SERIOUSLY FOR EXAMPLE ON SECURITY. HE EXPECTED NO USEFUL DEVELOPMENT BEFORE THE US ELECTIONS BUT WAS OPTIMISTIC ABOUT THE LONG TERM FUTURE, CHIEFLY BECAUSE HE CLAIMED TO SENSE A COMING CHANGE IN ISRAELI GOVERNMENTAL AND PUBLIC OPINION.

5. VICE PRESIDENT MUBARAK SAID THE PRESIDENT HAD DECIDED NOT TO GIVE ANY MORE GROUND BEFORE MAY 26. AFTER THAT DATE, AN EUROPEAN INITIATIVE WOULD BE QUOTE HIGHLY APPRECIATED UNQUOTE AS SUPPORT FOR THE EGYPTIAN CAUSE. PRESIDENT SADAT WAS WELL AWARE OF OUR INTENTIONS. BOTH KHALIL AND BOUTROS GHALI ALSO SAID THAT A EUROPEAN INITIATIVE WOULD BE HELPFUL, PROVIDED THAT IT TOOK INTO ACCOUNT THE ACHIEVEMENTS OF CAMP DAVID AND BUILT ON THEM (GHALI AGREED THAT AN IMPLICIT LINK WOULD SUFFICE). GAINS SUCH AS ISRAELI AGREEMENT TO THE PRINCIPLES OF WEST BANK/GAZA ELECTIONS AND ISRAELI TROOP WITHDRAWALS SHOULD BE RETAINED. KHALIL STRESSED THAT A EUROPEAN RESOLUTION MUST OFFER MORE THAN CAMP DAVID, BE ACCEPTED BY ALL PARTIES AND INCLUDE PRACTICAL PROPOSALS FOR IMPLEMENTATION. IT WAS PREMATURE TO SAY THAT CAMP DAVID HAD FAILED.

6. GHALI WAS (AS USUAL) MORE PESSIMISTIC, BUT HE TOO SAW NO ALTERNATIVE TO CONTINUING THE TALKS AFTER 26 MAY. HE BELIEVED THAT A EUROPEAN INITIATIVE - IN WHICH ALL SIR I GILMOUR'S INTERLOCUTORS EXPRESSED CONSIDERABLE INTEREST - COULD BE COMPATIBLE WITH THE CAMP DAVID PROCESS. HE WAS

6. GHALI WAS (AS USUAL) MORE PESSIMISTIC, BUT HE TOO SAW NO ALTERNATIVE TO CONTINUING THE TALKS AFTER 26 MAY. HE BELIEVED THAT A EUROPEAN INITIATIVE - IN WHICH ALL SIR I GILMOUR'S INTERLOCUTORS EXPRESSED CONSIDERABLE INTEREST - COULD WELL BE COMPATIBLE WITH THE CAMP DAVID PROCESS. HE WAS CONCERNED THAT THERE SHOULD BE A ROLE FOR EGYPT IN WHATEVER EMERGED. HE SAW NO EARLY PROSPECT OF A RECONCILIATION WITH THE OTHER ARABS NOR DID HE SEEM CONCERNED AT THIS. HE MENTIONED THAT PRESIDENT SEKOU TOURE HAD FLOATED TO HIM AT LAGOS THE IDEA OF AN AFRICAN INITIATIVE ON THE MIDDLE EAST.

7. GHALI SPOKE AT LENGTH AND ON FAMILIAR LINES ABOUT THE DANGER OF SOVIET SUBVERSION IN THE THIRD WORLD, ESPECIALLY IN AFRICA. THE RELUCTANCE OF NON-ALIGNED NATIONS EVEN TO ACKNOWLEDGE THE SOVIET THREAT WAS DISCONCERTING. EGYPT HOPED TO CONTRIBUTE BY SENDING MORE EGYPTIAN TECHNICAL EXPERTS TO AFRICAN STATES. ON AFGHANISTAN, HE CALIMED THAT PRO-AFGHAN SENTIMENT WAS SO STRONG IN EGYPT THAT SUPPORT FOR THE BRITISH NEUTRALITY PROPOSAL WOULD BE REGARDED AS DEFEATIST. HE HOPED EGYPT MIGHT BE MORE ABLE TO SUBSCRIBE TO IT WHEN AFGHANISTAN DROPPED FURTHER FROM THE HEADLINES.

8. BEFORE LEAVING THE LPS BRIEFED EC AMBASSADORS AND GAVE A PRESS CONFERENCE.

WEIR.

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PART 2 ends:-

..... Tel Aviv Tel: 185 of 9.5.80.

PART 3 begins:-

..... Cairo Tel: 310 of 13.5.80.

