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PREM 19/297

PART 4.

Confidential Filing.

The Situation in the Middle East.

MIDDLE EAST.

Part 1 : May 1979

Part 4 : July 1980.

Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date
7-7-80.							
9-7-80.							
14-7-80.							
16-7-80							
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4-8-80							
7-8-80							
13-8-80							
14-8-80							
2-9-80.							
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PART 5 begins:-

Caris tel 563 1/9/80

PART 4 ends:-

Tel Aviv tel 397 29/8/80

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Prime Minister

[Handwritten signature]
29/8

GR 100

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FM TEL AVIV 290800Z AUG 80

TO ROUTINE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 397 OF 29 AUGUST

INFO WASHINGTON CAIRO JERUSALEM AMMAN UKMIS NEW YORK AND ANKARA

OUR TEL NO 390 (NOT TO ALL): JERUSALEM

1. THE COLOMBIAN EMBASSY IS TO MOVE FROM JERUSALEM. A MOVE BY THE DOMINICANS LOOKS IMMINENT.
2. THE TURKISH GOVERNMENT IS CLOSING ITS CONSULATES-GENERAL IN WEST AND EAST JERUSALEM, LEAVING ONLY THE LEGATION IN TEL AVIV. THIS DECISION MAY BE A COMPROMISE TO AVOID CUTTING ALL LINKS WITH ISRAEL.
3. ALTHOUGH BEGIN'S OFFICE HAS AGAIN SAID THAT THE OFFICE'S MOVE TO EAST JERUSALEM IS IMMINENT, REPORTS ARE CIRCULATING THAT, UNDER PRESSURE FROM SOME CABINET COLLEAGUES INCLUDING SHAMIR, BEGIN HAS POSTPONED A DECISION, PROBABLY UNTIL EARLY OCTOBER.

ROBINSON

MIDDLE EAST STANDARD

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OBJET: PROJET DE DECLARATION COMMUNE A PUBLIER A LA SUITE DU
==== TRANSFERT DEFINITIF DES SERVICES DU PREMIER MINISTRE
ISRAELIEN A JERUSALEM - EST.

EN SE REFERANT A L'ECHANGE DE VUES QUI A EU LIEU AU GROUPE DE
TRAVAIL DU MOYEN-ORIENT LE 27 AOUT DERNIER CONCERNANT L'OBJET
SOUS RUBRIQUE, LA PRESIDENCE SOUMET CI-APRES A L'EXAMEN DE SES PAR-
TENAIRES UN PROJET DE DECLARATION COMMUNE A PUBLIER IMMEDIATEMENT
ET AUTOMATIQUEMENT APRES L'ANNONCE DU TRANSFERT DEFINITIF DES
SERVICES EN QUESTION:

' ' LES NEUF GOUVERNEMENTS DES ETATS MEMBRES DE LA COMMUNAUTE
EUROPEENNE VIENNENT D'APPRENDRE LA DECISION DU GOUVERNEMENT
ISRAELIEN DE RENDRE EFFECTIF LE TRANSFERT A JERUSALEM EST DES
SERVICES DU PREMIER MINISTRE.
LES NEUF RAPPELLENT QU'ILS N'ACCEPTENT AUCUNE INITIATIVE
UNILATERALE QUI AIT POUR OBJET DE CHANGER LE STATUT DE JERUSALEM.

LES NEUF DEPLORENT LA DECISION EN QUESTION DU GOUVERNEMENT
ISRAELIEN DESTINEE A CREER UN FAIT ACCOMPLI. PAR CONSEQUENT
ILS REGRETTENT DE DEVOIR PRECISER QUE LEUR REPRESENTANTS OFFICIELS
EN ISRAEL DEVRONT REFUSER TOUT CONTACT AVEC LE PREMIER MINISTRE ET
SES SERVICES DANS LES NOUVEAUX LOCAUX SITUES A JERUSALEM EST. ' '

LA PRESIDENCE PRIE SES PARTENAIRES DE BIEN VOULOIR LUI FAIRE
PARVENIR LEUR SENTIMENT RELATIF AU TEXTE PROPOSE AVANT LE
3 SEPTEMBRE PROCHAIN. PASSE CE DELAI LA PRESIDENCE CONSIDERERA
LE TEXTE COMME AGREE.

COREU LUXENBOURG

FIN DE MESSAGE

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GRS 130
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FM CAIRO 281215Z AUG 80
TO PRIORITY FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 549 OF 28 AUGUST
INFO WASHINGTON, TEL AVIV, KHARTOUM, JEDDA, ADDIS ABABA,
MODUK (FOR DI4).

EGYPT/US

1. THE MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS ANNOUNCED ON 27 AUGUST THAT CONSULTATIONS HAD BEGUN SOME TIME AGO BETWEEN EGYPT AND THE US ON GRANTING THE AMERICANS FACILITIES IN THE AREA OF RAS BANAS (SOME 50 MILES NORTH OF THE SUDAN BORDER) FOR USE IN DEFENCE OF ANY ARAB OR ISLAMIC STATE EXPOSED TO FOREIGN AGGRESSION. HE EMPHASISED THAT THE USE OF THESE FACILITIES WAS OF A TEMPORARY NATURE, AND THAT THE EGYPTIAN AIR FORCE WOULD PARTICIPATE. THE US WOULD UNDERTAKE TO DEEPEN THE PORT AND BUILD THE NECESSARY ROADS AND RUNWAYS ETC. THE COST WOULD BE BORNE SEPARATELY FROM THE EXISTING US LOAN TO EGYPT.

BARRINGTON

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10 DOWNING STREET

Prime Minister

had Cawington suggested
that you might read
through this note.

After his holiday, he
wants to explore with
you some further ideas
on the Middle East.

MB . MAF
28/8

La. Pmt



The President

الرئيس

Top Copy : Egypt, May 79,
Visits of Vice President Mubarak

August, 27, 1980

Dear Prime Minister Begin,

Thank you for your letter dated August 18. When I sent you my first letter, it was not my intention to start any rhetorical or polemical exchange which would not serve any useful purpose. Rather, I was motivated solely by my keen desire to explore every available avenue to ascertain whether a common ground existed for the resumption of the autonomy talks. In my opinion, such common ground would consist of the willingness of both parties to create, by their actions and deeds alike, a favorable atmosphere for reaching agreement. Having gone that far in the current exchange of letters and views, I think that it is neither necessary nor helpful to go further in arguing for this or that position.

I am certain that you know quite well that we have not violated, or attempted to violate, any commitment we made under the peace accords. Our record bears out this fact. We said repeatedly that we would honor all our commitments and you know that we always keep our word regardless of the risks or challenges involved. Our experiment in peace - making in my opinion, needs all the understanding and sincerity we can give. I am sure that you agree with me that we should spare no effort to promote confidence and friendship between our peoples. I also believe that it is a historic inevitability that we will reach agreement sooner or later, on all outstanding issues. I do not want either of us to look back and say; was it really

..!...



The President

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- 2 -

necessary to make all these complications? What was the whole point?.

Given the present circumstances, I still believe that our common interest is better served by a summit conference at the proper time. Let us look forward to a meaningful and fruitful meeting.

With best wishes,

Mohammed Anwar El Sadat

GR 658

CONFIDENTIAL

Prime Minister

CONFIDENTIAL

FM UKMIS NEW YORK 272100Z AUG 80

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1165 OF 27 AUGUST

INFO EC POSTS TEL AVIV AMMAN BEIRUT DAMASCUS CAIRO

INFO SAVING WASHINGTON JERUSALEM JEDDA KUWAIT

MA 28/8

[Handwritten signature]

MIDDLE EAST - THE THORN MISSION

1. AT A MINISTERIAL POLITICAL CO-OPERATION MEETING IN NEW YORK ON 27 AUGUST, THORN GAVE A BRIEFING ON HIS RECENT VISITS TO CAPITALS IN THE MIDDLE EAST.

2. I DO NOT THINK THAT ANYTHING FACTUAL EMERGED WHICH HAS NOT ALREADY BEEN REPORTED BY POSTS. BUT THE FOLLOWING IMPRESSIONS MAY BE USEFUL.

3. THORN HAD OBVIOUSLY BEEN PROFOUNDLY DISILLUSIONED BY HIS VISIT TO ISRAEL AND HAD TAKEN A VIOLENT DISLIKE TO BEGIN. HE DESCRIBED SOME OF THE THINGS WHICH BEGIN HAD SAID ABOUT THE HOLOCAUST EG QUOTE THE INVOLVEMENT OF CATHOLICS IN MURDERING JEWS UNQUOTE, AS INTOLERABLE. BEGIN HAD BEEN 'EXTREMELY UNPLEASANT'.

4. THORN WAS CONVINCED THAT THE PRESENT ISRAELI GOVERNMENT HAD ABSOLUTELY NO INTENTION OF MOVING ON THE WEST BANK. HE HAD FOUND THE LABOUR ALIGNMENT LEADERS MORE REASONABLE ALTHOUGH HERZOG HAD CONFIRMED TO HIM THAT THEY SHARED BEGIN'S VIEW ON NOT NEGOTIATING WITH THE PLO IN ANY CIRCUMSTANCES. THEY WERE ALSO CONVINCED THAT BEGIN HAD DELIBERATELY BROUGHT ABOUT THE RECENT JERUSALEM LEGISLATION IN ORDER TO FORCE THEM TO STAND UP AND BE COUNTED ON HIS SIDE, THUS PRE-EMPTING THE ATTITUDE OF ANY FUTURE LABOUR GOVERNMENT.

5. BY CONTRAST, THORN HAD CLEARLY BEEN CHARMED BY ARAFAT AND HIS ASSOCIATES. HE SPOKE WARMLY OF THEIR SOPHISTICATION, KNOWLEDGE OF EUROPEAN AFFAIRS AND ATTITUDES, COURTESY ETC. HE WAS 'DISGUSTED' AT AMERICAN OTHER CRITICISM OF EUROPEAN CONTACTS WITH THE PLO. THE PLO OBVIOUSLY HAD WIDE CONTACTS EVERYWHERE. FOR EXAMPLE, JOE SISCO HAD JUST BEEN TO SEE ARAFAT WHO HAD ALSO RECENTLY RECEIVED TWO CARDINALS FROM THE VATICAN.

6. WHAT THORN HAD TO SAY ABOUT HIS CONTACTS WITH THE LEBANON, KING HUSSEIN AND THE SYRIANS WAS ALL FAMILIAR. BUT HE MADE THE INTERESTING POINT THAT SADDAM HUSSEIN CLEARLY WANTED TO SUCCEED TO TITO'S MANTLE IN THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT AND WAS PURSUING THIS VIGOROUSLY AS WELL AS HIS FEUD WITH SYRIA AND HIS DETERMINATION TO LEAD THE ARAB WORLD.

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7. HIS OVER ALL IMPRESSION ON THE ARAB SIDE WAS THAT MOST ARAB LEADERS FELT THAT TIME WAS IN THEIR FAVOUR. THEY KNOW THAT THEY COULD NOT DO ANYTHING MILITARILY ABOUT ISRAEL FOR THE NEXT DECADE OR SO. BUT THE POLITICAL BALL WAS RUNNING THEIR WAY AND THEY WERE GETTING RICHER. THERE WAS THEREFORE AN INCLINATION NOT TO ACCEPT A RELATIVELY UNSATISFACTORY AGREEMENT IN THE SHORT TERM, IN THE HOPE THAT, IF THEY HUNG ON LONG ENOUGH, THEY WOULD END UP WITH SOMETHING VERY MUCH BETTER. THIS WAS DEPRESSING. THERE WAS ALSO A GENERAL FEELING THAT THE SOVIET UNION MUST BE INVOLVED AT SOME STAGE IN ANY SETTLEMENT, PARTICULARLY BECAUSE OF THEIR CONTROL OVER THE PLO THROUGH THE SYRIANS.

8. THORN'S FINAL MESSAGE WAS THAT WE MUST KEEP THE MOMENTUM OF THE EUROPEAN INITIATIVE GOING. WE MUST CONFIRM EUROPEAN CREDIBILITY WITHOUT CONTRIBUTING TO CONFRONTATION. WE COULD NOT POSTPONE THE SECOND STAGE OF THE EUROPEAN INITIATIVE INDEFINITELY

9. A PROCEDURAL DISCUSSION FOLLOWED. IT WAS AGREED THAT THE POLITICAL DIRECTORS SHOULD START WORK SHORTLY ON THE OUTCOME OF THORN'S TOUR, PARTICULARLY IN RELATION TO WHAT THORN SHOULD SAY ON THE MIDDLE EAST IN HIS STATEMENT TO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY IN LATE SEPTEMBER. THERE WAS A FEELING THAT INADEQUATE TIME HAD BEEN SET ASIDE FOR MINISTERIAL DISCUSSION ON 16 SEPTEMBER AND THAT THERE MIGHT BE A CASE FOR A MEETING ON 15 SEPTEMBER AS WELL AND POSSIBLY THE FOLLOWING WEEK (EG 2 OR 23 SEPTEMBER) IN NEW YORK WHEN MINISTERS WOULD BE HERE FOR THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY.

FCO PASS SAVING JERUSALEM JEDDA KUWAIT

PARSONS

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

MIDDLE EAST STANDARD

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CONFIDENTIAL



RECORD OF A MEETING BETWEEN THE FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH SECRETARY
AND HIS ROYAL HIGHNESS CROWN PRINCE FAHD BIN ABDULAZIZ IN TAIF,
SAUDI ARABIA: WEDNESDAY 27 AUGUST AT 12.30 PM

PRESENT:

The Right Honourable
Lord Carrington KCMG MC

His Royal Highness
Crown Prince Fahd bin Abdulaziz

Mr A J M Craig CMG

His Royal Highness
Prince Saud al Faisal

Mr G G H Walden

1. Prince Fahd said he was very interested in the role of the British, and of the Nine, in the Middle East. In his opening speech at the Conference of Arab Foreign Ministers the previous day, he had praised the European role. Lord Carrington asked whether Prince Fahd had gained the impression from his discussion with M. Thorn that Europe was on the right lines. Prince Fahd said that M. Thorn would have to consider different view points. Personally he was convinced that the Europeans had an important role to play. Lord Carrington said that M. Thorn had had a good reception so far; only the Israelis had been rather discouraging. The Americans were to some extent paralysed because of their elections. The Europeans must show that they understood the seriousness of the situation, and the rights of the Palestinian cause. The Americans had at first been rather concerned by the Venice Declaration. However, the US Government (and Mr Muskie in particular) now saw that there was some merit in what the Europeans were trying to do, and that this could ultimately be of help to them. In September M. Thorn would report to European Foreign Ministers. After that decisions would have to be taken at the European Summit in December on where to go next. Meanwhile, how did Prince Fahd anticipate developments in the Middle East?

2. Prince Fahd said that any further movement in the Middle East would depend on what the European Summit decided. Hopes in the Middle East were pinned on Europe. The Arabs wanted just solutions acceptable to all. The results of the Camp David process contradicted the UN Resolutions. It was difficult to ask the Arabs for concessions, when all the Arabs wanted was the implementation of UN Resolutions, including 242. There seemed to be a tendency to liquidate 242, but if this happened what form could a solution take? The Israelis were thinking in terms of capitalising on the present situation. It was not the Arabs who were rejecting a peaceful solution, but the Israelis. The evidence lay in the fact that President Sadat had made concessions, but had got nothing in return. President Sadat had thought that he could solve the problem simply by going to Jerusalem. Prince Fahd thought that by concentrating on Geneva-type negotiations, progress could be made. It was not the case, as President Sadat claimed, that the Saudi Arabians were against peace.

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3. It had been supposed that, when President Sadat had gone to Jerusalem, it had been agreed with the United States that the Americans would pressurise the Israelis into concessions. But nothing had happened. He had been in America when President Carter had been elected, and the President had been enthusiastic about achieving a real solution. But all that had fizzled out into Camp David. Carter had been shocked when Mr Begin had been elected Prime Minister. Even the moderate Jewish organisations in America were not in favour of Begin, who had been called a terrorist on American television. His terrorist acts against the British were well known. Lord Carrington commented that these were unlikely to be forgotten.

4. Prince Fahd said that the patience of Arab peoples was nearing the end. The Russians and their cronies in the Middle East were against peace. Nasser had paved the way for Soviet influence in the Middle East, but all Arabs knew that the Russians were not interested in helping their cause, but only in their own objectives. He repeated that the only hope for a solution lay with the Europeans. If a just solution were achieved, everyone would benefit. If the Europeans came to the right conclusions, this would help the new American President, whoever he might be. Such conclusions might not please Israeli supporters in America; but we should ask ourselves what would happen if there were no solution. Tension could only benefit the Russians, and the cost of the crisis would increase. The Saudis, as friends of the West and of the Americans, were interested in stability. Arab friendship as a whole could be secured for the West and for the Americans.

5. Arabs could not oppose the existence of Israel, since Israel had existed in the past. But the Israelis could not be allowed to devour the rights of the Arabs. The Israelis were banking on discord between Arab countries. Prince Fahd added that if they were frustrated by Israeli intransigence the Arabs could still bank together and take decisions which might be harmful. Prince Fahd said that 1102 million Arabs had the resources to buy arms from the Russians if they wished; even Israeli nuclear weapons could not subdue them. Soviet objectives in the Middle East were money and oil. If they achieved this, the West would have to react, but this might mean war, and everyone knew what war meant.

6. Israel must be given her rights. But she also wanted the rights of others. It might be difficult for the Israelis or their friends in America, to imagine that the Saudis thought the way they did.

7. The Israelis were refusing to listen to logical, reasonable opinion, designed to preserve the existenc of Israel. They gave the impression of believing that they were a dependable base of the West and of the Americans in the Middle East. But it was the Saudis who were really the reliable friends of the West. It was they, and their fellow Arabs, who had exposed Soviet aggression in Afghanistan at the Islamic Conference. Europe must press for a just solution. If her decisions were not conclusive, or if Europe tried too hard not to embarrass the Israelis or their supporters, there could be great problems. Nor

/should



should the Europeans try too hard to avoid upsetting the Americans. Firm decisions would in the end benefit the US as well as Europe.

8. Prince Saud said that the Arabs were not asking for the destruction of Israel but merely the implementation of UN Resolutions on withdrawal. He was convinced that the Israelis would respond to international pressure. Perhaps friends of Israel were telling her that the Arabs would come to accept the status quo in time. But the situation could become more serious.

9. Lord Carrington said that the factors mentioned by Prince Fahd had been in the minds of the Europeans when they had framed the Venice Declarations. On the one hand, we wished to ensure the recognition of pre-1967 Israeli frontiers; and on the other the rights of the Palestinians. Only the Russians benefited from the present situation. Resolution 242 was not enough, eg it only referred to the Palestinians as refugees. We needed to go further on self-determination. Prince Fahd said that if the Israelis withdrew to pre-1967 frontiers the Palestinians could go back and self-determination would follow.

10. Lord Carrington said that the difference between the public and private posture of the PLO made life difficult for the Europeans. If he, Prince Fahd and Arafat met together, they might not find many differences between them. But in all Western countries there was a large Jewish minority which took exception to the more extreme PLO public statements about the obliteration of Israel. Others sheltered behind such statements, and used them to whip up indignation about the Arabs. He himself was not very popular with Jewish opinion. If Arafat could soften his public stance, he would make the position of the Europeans much easier. Lord Carrington said that he was often asked how the Israelis could be expected to hand over the West Bank to an organisation which was bent on the destruction of Israel.

11. Prince Fahd said that the Israelis used such statements as a pretext. Lord Carrington said that what was needed was a simultaneous process. Prince Fahd said that the Palestinians asked what guarantees they would get, eg, from the Americans, which could persuade the PLO to take a different posture. Lord Carrington repeated that the European position was made very difficult by the rather blood-thirsty public posture of the PLO. Prince Fahd asked whether the PLO could be expected to be more flexible than President Sadat, who had even absolved the Israelis from aggression in 1956. No one could go further than Sadat, and yet the Israelis and the PLO leaders would be exposed before Palestinian opinion, which would then choose more militant leaders.

12. Lord Carrington said that the Israelis would not accept Palestinian rights until their own right to existence was acknowledged, and vice-versa. Somehow we must break through this deadlock. Prince Fahd said that the Americans and the West should intervene and lay down precisely what the Palestinians and the Israelis must accept. Lord Carrington said that this was precisely what the Venice Declaration sought to do.

/Prince



Prince Fahd said that this must be taken a step further. What would the West do if either party refused to comply? Nevertheless, he was very grateful for European interest in the Middle East. Lord Carrington said that the ability of the Europeans to solve the problem by themselves should not be exaggerated. The Europeans would try to set an example, and to influence the Americans, but in the last resort only the Americans could influence the Israelis, and any final solution must be between the Arabs and the Israelis themselves.

13. Prince Fahd then expressed regret at the BBC report of a further screening of the 'Death of a Princess' at the Edinburgh Festival. Lord Carrington explained the background briefly, and said that he would be taking this up with the BBC on his return. He hoped that the Anglo/Saudi Committee on Cultural Relations could help to improve the situation. Prince Fahd said that he understood that the Government did not control the media, but hoped that something could be done by informal action.

cc MED
 PS
 PS/LPS
 PS/Mr Hurd
 PS/PUS
 Sir J Graham
 Mr Bullard
 Mr J C Moberly
 PCS
 NENAD
 ECD(E)

Chanceries:

Jedda
 Tel Aviv
 Cairo
 Damascus
 Amman
 Baghdad
 Washington
 Bonn
 Paris
 Moscow
 Luxembourg

GRS 750

CONFIDENTIAL

Prime Minister

In the event, this came to a vote on Wednesday

CONFIDENTIAL

DESKBY 210830Z

FROM UKMIS NEW YORK 210043Z

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1147 DATED 20 AUGUST 80

INFO IMMEDIATE HELSINKI (FOR SECRETARY OF STATE'S PARTY) PRIORITY WASHINGTON, PARIS, THE HAGUE, TEL AVIV, CAIRO, DAMASCUS, BEIRUT JEDDA, JERUSALEM, TUNIS, RABAT, ISLAMABAD, KHARTOUM, TRIPOLI, ALGIERS KUWAIT, BAGHDAD, ABU DHABI, DUBAI, MUSCAT, DOHA, BAHRAIN, SANA'A, ADEN, BANJUL, JAKARTA, ABIDJAN, YAOUNDE, TEHRAN, MOGADISHU, KUALA LUMPUR, LIBREVILLE, ANKARA, DACCA.

MAD 21/8

mf

MY TEL 1139 (NOT TO ALL): SECURITY COUNCIL: JERUSALEM

attached attached

1. THE COUNCIL ADOPTED RESOLUTION 478 THIS EVENING (20 AUGUST) BY 14-0-1 (US). THE FULL TEXT, SLIGHTLY AMENDED FROM LAST NIGHT'S VERSION BY THE REINTRODUCTION OF PARAGRAPH 5(A) IS IN MIFT. THE TEXT OF MY STATEMENT AFTER THE VOTE IS IN MY SECOND IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING TELEGRAM.

2. THERE WERE NO HITCHES THIS MORNING AND THE AMERICANS WERE ABLE TO INDICATE THAT THEY COULD ABSTAIN. THE REASON FOR THE AMENDED TEXT IS THAT THEY PREFERRED TO WORK IN WASHINGTON ON THE BASIS OF MONDAY NIGHT'S POSITION RATHER THAN THE REVISED PROPOSALS SUBMITTED LAST NIGHT (19 AUGUST). AT THE LAST MOMENT IT WAS DECIDED TO SEND SECRETARY OF STATE MUSKIE HERE TO DELIVER THE US SPEECH. MUSKIE BEGAN BY LAMENTING THAT THE UN HAD BECOME THE FOCUS OF ATTEMPTS NOT TO ADVANCE BUT TO RESTRAIN THE CAUSE OF PEACE. IN EIGHT RESOLUTIONS PUT BEFORE THE BODY IN THE LAST FIVE MONTHS, NOT A SINGLE ALTERNATIVE TO THE CAMP DAVID PROCESS HAD BEEN ADVANCED. THE REST OF THE STATEMENT HAD TWO MAIN AIMS: FIRST TO APPEASE THE JEWISH ELECTORATE HERE AND SECOND TO REMIND THE AMERICAN PUBLIC AT LARGE OF THE TREMENDOUS ACHIEVEMENT OF PRESIDENT CARTER IN SECURING THE CAMP DAVID ACCORDS. THE UNITED STATES, HE SAID, WAS "UNALTERABLY OPPOSED" TO ANY ATTEMPT TO IMPOSE SANCTIONS UNDER CHAPTER VII ON ISRAEL AND WOULD VOTE AGAINST ANY SUCH RESOLUTION. THE DRAFT RESOLUTION, IN CALLING UPON STATES WITH DIPLOMATIC MISSIONS IN JERUSALEM TO WITHDRAW THEM, WAS A "DISRUPTIVE ATTEMPT TO DICTATE TO OTHER NATIONS . . . AND DID NOTHING TO ADVANCE THE CAUSE OF PEACE". ONLY BECAUSE THE UNITED STATES HAD ENCOURAGED ALL PARTIES TO REFRAIN FROM UNILATERAL ACTIONS IN JERUSALEM, HAD THE US DECIDED "NOT TO VOTE AGAINST". MUSKIE THEN OUTLINED AT SOME LENGTH THE HISTORY OF THE CAMP DAVID ACCORDS, EMPHASISING THAT THERE WAS NO ISSUE ON WHICH PRESIDENT CARTER HAD SPENT MORE TIME AND EFFORT. THE UNITED STATES WOULD NOT BE DETERRED FROM THIS HISTORIC ENTERPRISE AND WERE DETERMINED TO FINISH WHAT HAD "SO-WELL BEGUN". THE FINAL OBJECTIVE WAS CLEAR, THE RESOLUTION OF THE PALESTINIAN PROBLEM IN ALL ITS ASPECTS AND ULTIMATELY PEACE TREATIES BETWEEN ISRAEL AND ALL ITS OTHER NEIGHBOURS - JORDAN, SYRIA, AND LEBANON.

CONFIDENTIAL

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3. THE OTHER INTERESTING ASPECT OF THE DEBATE, WHICH CONTRASTED STRAGNGELY WITH THE AMERICAN OPTIMISM OVER CAMP DAVID, WERE THE EXCHANGES BETWEEN THE EGYPTIAN AND ISRAELI DELEGATIONS. MEGUID (EGYPT), IN A TOUGH SPEECH, LISTED ISRAELI ACTIONS SINCE CAMP DAVID WHICH WERE CLEARLY CONTRARY TO THE SPIRIT OF THOSE ACCORDS. SETTLEMENTS, RAIDS INTO LEBANON, EXPULSIONS, THE DISCRIMINATION AGAINST THE INHABITANTS OF THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES, AND FINALLY, THE RECENT KNESSET LAW LEFT "NO ALTERNATIVE BUT TO DELAY THE AUTONOMY TALKS UNTIL THE NEW OBSTACLE (THE KNESSET LAW) HAD BEEN REMOVED". BLUM (ISRAEL) SAID THAT NOTHING HAD BEEN CHANGED BY THE RECENT LAW. UNFORTUNATELY THE DECLARATION AND DECISION OF THE EGYPTIAN PEOPLES' ASSEMBLY OF 1 APRIL AND 1 JULY 1980 RESPECTIVELY "FOLLOWED THE PATTERN OF SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS AIMED BY THE SPONSORS AT UNDERMINING THE PEACE PROCESS IN THE MIDDLE EAST". REJECTING THE RESOLUTION ADOPTED TODAY, HE CONFIRMED THAT UNITED JERUSALEM WOULD ALWAYS BE THE CAPITAL OF ISRAEL. BOTH HE AND MEGUID, IN A SUBSEQUENT RIGHT OF REPLY, REITERATED THEIR DETERMINATION TO ABIDE BY THE CAMP DAVID AGREEMENTS WHILE CONTINUING TO ACCUSE THE OTHER OF IMPEDING THEM. MEGUID ADDED THAT NO-ONE SHOULD BE UNDER ANY ILLUSION THAT EGYPT'S NATIONAL INTERESTS ARE IDENTICAL TO THOSE OF THE ARAB AND ISLAMIC PEOPLES. AS SHE HAD DONE IN WAR, SO IN PEACE WOULD EGYPT "SAFE-GUARD AND ENHANCE THE LEGITIMATE ASPIRATIONS OF THE ARABS".

4. THE OTHER SPEAKERS (PAKISTAN, TUNISIA, GDR, USSR, JORDAN AND THE PLO) ALL REFERRED TO THE MODERATION OF THE RESOLUTION AND WARNED OF THE NEED FOR ACTION UNDER CHAPTER VII IN THE FACE OF CONTINUING ISRAELI DEFIANCE. FRANCE'S STATEMENT WAS ALMOST IDENTICAL TO MINE.

5. THE OUTCOME WAS IN THE END SATISFACTORY. THE NEGOTIATION WITH THE MOSLEM MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL LED BY TUNISIA, WAS ENCOURAGINGLY CONSTRUCTIVE AND THE SECURITY COUNCIL FINALLY TOOK PRACTICAL AND REASONABLE ACTION. THE ISRAELIS WILL HARDLY BE DETERRED BY MUSKIE'S SPEECH FROM FURTHER PROVOCATIVE ACTION, BUT THE EXPECTED TRANSFER OF MORE EMBASSIES FROM JERUSALEM SHOULD, SUBJECT TO MR ROBINSON'S VIEWS, COME AS SOMETHING OF A SHOCK TO ISRAELI PUBLIC OPINION.

MANSFIELD

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(REPETITION TO TEHRAN, LIBREVILLE & SANA'A REFERRED FOR DEPARTMENTAL DECISION REPEATED AS REQUESTED TO OTHER POSTS)

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GRS 300

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DESKBY 210830Z

FROM UKMIS NEW YORK 210050Z AUG 80

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1149 DATED 20 AUGUST 80

INFO IMMEDIATE HELSINKI (FOR SECRETARY OF STATE'S PARTY) PRIORITY
WASHINGTON, PARIS, THE HAGUE, TEL AVIV, CAIRO, DAMASCUS, BEIRUT
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KUWAIT, BAGHDAD, ABU DHABI, DUBAI, MUSCAT, DOHA, BAHRAIN, SANA'A,
ADEN, BANJUL, JAKARTA, ABIDJAN, YAOUNDE, TEHRAN, MOGADISHU, KUALA
LUMPUR, LIBREVILLE, ANKARA, DACCA.

MIPT: SECURITY COUNCIL: JERUSALEM

TEXT OF MY STATEMENT IS AS FOLLOWS:-

SUCCESSIVE BRITISH GOVERNMENTS HAVE TAKEN THE VIEW SINCE THE 1967
CONFLICT THAT ISRAELI RIGHTS IN EAST JERUSALEM DO NOT EXTEND
BEYOND THOSE OF AN OCCUPYING POWER PENDING AN AGREED SOLUTION ON
THE CITY'S FUTURE. MY GOVERNMENT SHARES INTERNATIONAL CONCERN AT
ISRAEL'S ATTEMPTS TO DETERMINE JERUSALEM'S STATUS UNILATERALLY
RATHER THAN THROUGH A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT. THEY ARE UNACCEPTABLE.

WHEN THIS COUNCIL MET SIX WEEKS AGO ON THE SUBJECT OF JERUSALEM,
MY DELEGATION VOTED IN FAVOUR OF RESOLUTION 476 WHICH AMONG OTHER
THINGS CALLED UPON ISRAEL TO "DESIST FORTHWITH FROM PERSISTING
IN THE POLICY AND MEASURES AFFECTING THE CHARACTER AND STATUS
OF THE HOLY CITY OF JERUSALEM". IN OUR STATEMENT IN THAT DEBATE
WE URGED ISRAEL TO ESCHEW FURTHER ACTIONS WHICH COULD ONLY SERVE
TO STOKE THE FIRES OF RESENTMENT AND MAKE EVEN MORE DIFFICULT THE
SEARCH FOR A COMPREHENSIVE SETTLEMENT OF THE CONFLICT IN THE
MIDDLE EAST. IT WAS THEREFORE WITH DEEP REGRET AND CONCERN THAT WE
LEARNED ON JULY 31 OF THE ENACTMENT IN THE ISRAELI KNESSET OF
THE LAW WHICH AMONG OTHER THINGS DECLARES THAT COMPLETE AND
UNITED JERUSALEM IS THE CAPITAL OF ISRAEL. MY DELEGATION CONSIDERS
THIS TO BE A HIGHLY PROVOCATIVE ACT. WE HAVE NEVER ACCEPTED ISRAELI
MEASURES PURPORTING TO CHANGE THE STATUS OF EAST JERUSALEM UNI-
LATERALLY AND HAVE MADE IT QUITE CLEAR THAT WE DO NOT REGARD THE
RECENT KNESSET LAW AS VALID OR AS CHANGING THE SITUATION IN LAW
IN ANY WAY WHATSOEVER. ISRAEL SHOULD BE LEFT IN NO DOUBT OF THE
INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY'S CONDEMNATION OF HER ACTION AND THAT IN

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THE EYES OF THE WORLD, JERUSALEM'S STATUS REMAINS UNCHANGED. WE REMAIN CONVINCED THAT THE ONLY ROAD TO LASTING PEACE IS THROUGH A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT. WE, WITH OUR PARTNERS IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, STRONGLY DESIRE TO SEE PROGRESS TOWARDS A COMPREHENSIVE SETTLEMENT. THE VENICE DECLARATION AND M. THORN'S MISSION ARE CLEAR DEMONSTRATIONS OF OUR CONCERN AND OUR COMMITMENT TO PROGRESS. WE SHALL PURSUE THESE EFFORTS WITH VIGOUR.

MY DELEGATION THEREFORE VOTED FOR THE DRAFT RESOLUTION PUT BEFORE US TODAY AND WE ARE GLAD THAT IT WAS ADOPTED. WE CONSIDER IT AN APPROPRIATE RESPONSE BY THIS COUNCIL TO THE ISRAELI LEGISLATION ON JERUSALEM.

MANSFIELD

[REPETITION TO TEHRAN, LIBREVILLE AND SANA'A REFERRED FOR DEPARTMENTAL DECISION, REPEATED AS REQUESTED TO OTHER POSTS]

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TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1148 OF 20 AUGUST 1980

INFO IMMEDIATE HELSINKI (FOR SECRETARY OF STATE'S PARTY)

INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON, PARIS, THE HAGUE, TEL AVIV, CAIRO,
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KHARTOUM, TRIPOLI, ALGIERS, KUWAIT, BAGHDAD, ABU DHABI, DUBAI,
MUSCAT, DOHA, BAHRAIN, SANAA, ADEN, BANJUL, JAKARTA, ABIDJAN,
YAOUNDE, TEHRAN, MOGADISHU, KUALA LUMPUR, LIBREVILLE, ANKARA,
DACCA.

MIPT: SECURITY COUNCIL: JERUSALEM.

TEXT OF RESOLUTION IS AS FOLLOWS:

THE SECURITY COUNCIL,

RECALLING ITS RESOLUTION 476 (1980) OF 30 JUNE 1980,

REAFFIRMING AGAIN THAT THE ACQUISITION OF TERRITORY BY FORCE IS
INADMISSIBLE,

DEEPLY CONCERNED OVER THE ENACTMENT OF A "BASIC LAW" IN THE
ISRAELI KNESSET PROCLAIMING A CHANGE IN THE CHARACTER AND STATUS
OF THE HOLY CITY OF JERUSALEM, WITH ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR PEACE
AND SECURITY,

NOTING THAT ISRAEL HAS NOT COMPLIED WITH SECURITY COUNCIL
RESOLUTION 476 (1980),

REAFFIRMING ITS DETERMINATION TO EXAMINE PRACTICAL WAYS AND
MEANS, IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE RELEVANT PROVISIONS OF THE CHARTER
OF THE UNITED NATIONS, TO SECURE THE FULL IMPLEMENTATION OF ITS
RESOLUTION 476 (1980), IN THE EVENT OF NON-COMPLIANCE BY ISRAEL,

1. CENSURES IN THE STRONGEST TERMS THE ENACTMENT BY ISRAEL
OF THE "BASIC LAW" ON JERUSALEM AND THE REFUSAL TO COMPLY
WITH RELEVANT SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS:

2. AFFIRMS THAT THE ENACTMENT OF THE "BASIC LAW" BY ISRAEL
CONSTITUTES A VIOLATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND DOES NOT
AFFECT THE CONTINUED APPLICATION OF THE FOURTH GENEVA CONVENTION
OF 12 AUGUST 1949 RELATIVE TO THE PROTECTION OF CIVILIAN PERSONS
IN TIME OF WAR IN THE PALESTINIAN AND OTHER ARAB TERRITORIES
OCCUPIED SINCE JUNE 1967, INCLUDING JERUSALEM:

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3. DETERMINES THAT ALL LEGISLATIVE AND ADMINISTRATIVE MEASURES AND ACTIONS TAKEN BY ISRAEL, THE OCCUPYING POWER, WHICH HAVE ALTERED OR PURPORT TO ALTER THE CHARACTER AND STATUS OF THE HOLY CITY OF JERUSALEM, AND, IN PARTICULAR, THE RECENT "BASIC LAW" ON JERUSALEM, ARE NULL AND VOID AND MUST BE RESCINDED FORTHWITH:
4. AFFIRMS ALSO THAT THIS ACTION CONSTITUTES A SERIOUS OBSTRUCTION TO ACHIEVING A COMPREHENSIVE, JUST AND LASTING PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST:
5. DECIDES NOT TO RECOGNIZE THE "BASIC LAW" AND SUCH OTHER ACTIONS BY ISRAEL THAT, AS A RESULT OF THIS LAW, SEEK TO ALTER THE CHARACTER AND STATUS OF JERUSALEM AND CALLS UPON ALL MEMBERS OF THE UNITED NATIONS:
 - (A) TO ACCEPT THIS DECISION:
 - (B) AND UPON THOSE STATES THAT HAVE ESTABLISHED DIPLOMATIC MISSIONS IN JERUSALEM TO WITHDRAW SUCH MISSIONS FROM THE HOLY CITY:
6. REQUESTS THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO REPORT TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS RESOLUTION BEFORE 15 NOVEMBER 1980:
7. DECIDES TO REMAIN SEIZED OF THIS SERIOUS SITUATION.

MANSFIELD

[REPETITION TO TEHRAN, LIBREVILLE & SANA'A
REFERRED FOR DEPARTMENTAL DECISION
REPEATED AS REQUESTED TO OTHER POSTS]

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TO PRIORITY FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 372 OF 20 AUGUST

INFO PRIORITY UKMIS NEW YORK, MODUK (FOR DI4), BEIRUT

ROUTINE WASHINGTON

OUR TEL NO SIC U2G/190740Z TO MODUK: LEBANON: ISRAELI ATTACK

1. THIS WAS THE LARGEST ISRAELI ATTACK ON LEBANON SINCE THE INVASION OF MARCH 1978. THE IDF ATTACKED ABOUT 18 PALESTINIAN BASES UP TO 30 KM INSIDE THE ISRAELI BORDER AND OVER A FRONT OF 15 KM. ISRAELI FORCES FROM GOLANI BRIGADE ENTERED LEBANON ON FOOT THROUGH UNIFIL LINES AND WERE SAID TO HAVE KILLED 50 TO 60 FEDAYEEN, FOR THE LOSS OF 3 ISRAELIS WITH 12 WOUNDED. THREE CAPTURED PALESTINIANS HAVE BEEN BROUGHT BACK TO ISRAEL. THE ISRAELIS SAY THE IDF ALSO DESTROYED WEAPONS, BUILDINGS AND EQUIPMENT INCLUDING ARTILLERY CAPABLE OF SHELLING NORTHERN GALILEE, AND A FATAH REGIONAL COMMAND POST. THE POWERFUL IAF ATTACK ON BEAUFORT CASTLE WAS THE FIRST GROUND ATTACK IN LEBANON SINCE THE BOMBING OF THE PICNICKERS IN JULY 1979. A UN POST AT BEAUFORT WAS ALSO DESTROYED.

2. BEGIN IS REPORTED TO HAVE SUPERVISED THE OPERATION WITH SENIOR OFFICERS IN THE IDF'S COMMAND BUNKER. HE LATER TALKED TO RETURNING TROOPS.

3. BRIEFINGS TO THE PRESS BY EITAN AND DMI INDICATED THAT THE IDF CONSIDERED THE ATTACK TO HAVE BEEN A SUCCESS. THERE HAD BEEN NO CO-OPERATION WITH HADDAD, BUT HE HAD BEEN GIVEN ADVANCE WARNING.

4. THE IDF WILL BRIEF ATTACHES ON 21 AUGUST.

**THIS TELEGRAM
WAS NOT
ADVANCED**

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TO ROUTINE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 275 OF 20 AUGUST

INFO ROUTINE DUBAI

INFO SAVING JEDDA, CAIRO, AMMAN, TEL AVIV, BAGHDAD, DAMASCUS,
BAHRAIN, KUWAIT, MUSCAT AND WASHINGTON.

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MY TELNO 272: ARAB/ISRAEL.

1. THE UAE PRESIDENT, SHAIKH ZAID, HAS NOW PUBLICLY ADDED HIS VOICE TO PRINCE FAHD'S CALL FOR A JIHAD. IN A PRESS INTERVIEW, HE HAS SUPPORTED THE CALL TO WAR AND PROPOSED THAT THE QUESTION OF A UNIFIED RESPONSE TO ISRAEL'S ANNEXATION OF JERUSALEM BE DISCUSSED AT AN ARAB/ISLAMIC CONFERENCE.

2. WE NEED NOT EXPECT THE IMMEDIATE MOBILISATION OF THE UAE ARMED FORCES. IF THE EXPERIENCE OF THE UAE CONTINGENT TO THE ARAB PEACE-KEEPING FORCE IN LEBANON IS ANYTHING TO GO BY, THE MILITARY HAVE NO ENTHUSIASM FOR FOREIGN ADVENTURES.

3. THIS IS BORNE OUT BY AN EDITORIAL IN THE SEMI-OFFICIAL AL ITTIHAD NEWSPAPER WHICH SAYS THE CALL FOR A JIHAD, "IS NOT A CALL TO BEGIN THE LIBERATION TOMORROW OR TO START FIGHTING TODAY. IT WILL REQUIRE PLANNING AND THE MARSHALLING OF ALL ARAB AND ISLAMIC CAPABILITIES."

FCO PLEASE PASS SAVING JEDDA, CAIRO, AMMAN, TEL AVIV, BAGHDAD, DAMASCUS, BAHRAIN, KUWAIT, MUSCAT AND WASHINGTON.

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FM WASHINGTON 192210Z AUGUST 1980

TO ROUTINE F C O

TEL NO 3792 OF 19 AUGUST

INFO DAMASCUS, TEL AVIV, CAIRO.

INFO SAVING AMMAN, BEIRUT.

ISRAEL/SYRIA: GOLAN HEIGHTS.

1. TODAY'S NEW YORK TIMES CARRIES AN ARTICLE BY JAMES MARKHAM WRITTEN FROM QATZRIN ON THE GOLAN HEIGHTS ENTITLED QUOTE ISRAELIS LOBBY FOR ANNEXING GOLAN HEIGHTS UNQUOTE. ACCORDING TO MARKHAM THERE IS A BROAD POLITICAL COALITION GATHERING FORCE TO ANNEX QUOTE BY LAW UNQUOTE THE 500 SQUARE MILES OF OCCUPIED LAND IN THE GOLAN HEIGHTS AND THE FORTY MEMBER GOLAN LOBBY IN THE KNESSET IS DETERMINED TO PUSH THE ANNEXATION LAW THROUGH, PERHAPS IN THE LATE AUTUMN.

2. MAKRHAM QUOTES FROM INTERVIEWS WITH A NUMBER OF GOLAN SETTLERS INCLUDING ON EYEHUDA AR-EL, DESCRIBED AS HAVING FOUNDED A KIBBUTZ IN QUNEITRA, WHO EXPRESSED THE VIEW THAT THIS WAS A GOOD MOMENT TO PUSH FOR ANNEXATION GIVEN THAT THE US IS IN AN ELECTION PERIOD, SYRIA HAS INTERNAL AND LEBANESE PROBLEMS AND EGYPT WILL NOT MAKE TROUBLE SINCE SHE HAS NOT YET RECOVERED THE WHOLE OF THE SINAI.

3. MARKHAM DESCRIBES THE GOLAN AS QUOTE AN ECONOMIC BRIGHT POINT IN ISRAEL'S SICKLY ECONOMY PRODUCING BUMPER CROPS OF WHEAT, COTTON AND VEGETABLES. CATTLE GRAZING AND A PROMISING TOURIST INDUSTRY INCLUDING A SKI RESORT ON MOUNT HERMON GENERATE IMPORTANT INCOME UNQUOTE. FULL TEXT OF MARKHAM ARTICLE FOLLOWS BY BAG (FCO, TEL AVIV AND DAMASCUS ONLY).

FCO PASS SAVING AMMAN BEIRUT.

FRETWELL

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

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TO PRIORITY FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 364 OF 19 AUGUST

INFO BEIRUT AMMAN CAIRO AND JERUSALEM

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MY TEL NO 337: THORN MISSION

1. NETHERLANDS CHARGE INFORMED OTHER EEC HEADS OF MISSION HERE THAT HE HAD BEEN TOLD THAT DEPENDING ON ARRANGEMENTS THORN WAS TRYING TO MAKE TO VISIT CAIRO ON 30/31 AUGUST, THORN PLANNED TO VISIT ISRAEL AGAIN FROM CAIRO ON 1/2 SEPTEMBER TO SEE "AMONGST OTHERS" WEST BANK AND GAZA MAYORS. THORN'S PLAN WAS TO ASK THE NETHERLANDS CONSUL GENERAL IN JERUSALEM (IN PRACTICE HE IS THE NETHERLANDS CHARGE AS WELL) TO ARRANGE A MEETING IN A PLACE TO BE CHOSEN BY THE MAYORS, EITHER IN JERUSALEM, PERHAPS IN A CONSULATE GENERAL, OR IN BEIRUT OR IN HEBRON.
2. THORN HAD BEEN GIVEN A LIST OF NAMES OF WEST BANK AND GAZA SUGGESTED PERSONALITIES BY THE JORDANIANS IN AMMAN. THORN WAS PASSING THIS LIST TO THE PLO FOR COMMENT AS IF IT WAS HIS OWN. (HE HOPED IT WOULD NOT BECOME KNOWN THAT IT WAS A JORDANIAN LIST).
3. NETHERLANDS CHARGE WAS INCLINED TO SUGGEST TO LUXEMBOURG THAT HE SHOULD ESTABLISH IN ADVANCE OF THE VISIT THAT THE ISRAELIS WOULD NOT OBSTRUCT SUCH MEETINGS. I SUGGESTED THAT IT WOULD BE A MISTAKE TO GO FURTHER THAN SIMPLY INFORMING THE ISRAELIS AS A MATTER OF COURTESY THAT THORN INTENDED TO COME HERE AGAIN FOR THIS PURPOSE. WE OUGHT TO MAKE IT AS HARD AS POSSIBLE FOR THE ISRAELIS TO OBSTRUCT, AND THAT MEANT AVOIDING ASKING THEM QUESTIONS.
4. THERE WAS AGREEMENT THAT A JOINT MEETING WITH WEST BANK AND GAZA PERSONALITIES WOULD BE MUCH LESS PRODUCTIVE FOR THORN THAN INDIVIDUAL MEETINGS.

ROBINSON

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Top Copy: Egypt, May 79,
Visits of Vice President Mubarak

ראש הממשלה
THE PRIME MINISTER

Jerusalem, August 18, 1980

Dear President Sadat,

I thank you for your letter which reached me on August 15. I have read it with no less attention than I did your previous communication and I will gladly respond to the seven points you raise. But let me start with a reflection on the passage at the end of your introduction.

You write to me: "The story of the Israelites began in the land of Egypt. It is apparent that it is the will of God Almighty that the story would find its completion in Egypt also."

His Excellency
Mohammed Anwar El Sadat
President of the Arab Republic of Egypt
Cairo

The history of the people of Israel did not begin in Egypt. It started in the country from which I write this response. In those ancient days the country was called Canaan. Abram (he was not yet Abraham) arrived in Canaan directly from Haran, which he reached after having left Ur-Kasdim (Mesopotamia). Thus, is it recorded in the Book which is the inspiration of monotheism:

"And Abram passed through the land unto the place of Schem unto Eilon Moreh and the Canaanite was then in the land. And the Lord appeared unto Abram and said, unto thy seed will I give this land..." (Genesis, Chapter 12, Verses 6;7).

Since the days of the Prophet Samuel, Canaan was called Eretz Israel, the Land of Israel ("Now there was no smith found throughout all the land of Israel" - 1 Samuel, Chapter 13, Verse 19). Only in the second century of the Christian era did the Roman Emperor Hadrianus, having crushed the revolt of Bar Kochba with the help of legions, from Britain and Germany, rename the land, Syria et Paleastina. The origin of this name stems from our ancient enemies, the Philistines, and thus did it enter into the common usage of many nations. The mighty Emperor also renamed, or misnamed Jerusalem, Aelia Capitolina. Except for students of ancient history, this name is now almost completely forgotten.

To go back to Canaan, or the Land of Israel, and to its association with Egypt - old Abram spent a short time in Egypt and then returned to Canaan. Only his grandson, Jacob, named also Israel, descended (to use the Biblical expression) with all his family to Egypt and there the events unfolded as described in the Book. In their wake the children of Israel returned to Canaan, just as we, the descendents of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob - Israel, returned through the course of history, time and again, having never severed our ties with this land of our ancestors. Throughout the generations Jews have never left the Land and have always dwelt in it.

None of us mortals can know the will of God Almighty, but surely as the history of the Egyptian people will find its completion in Egypt, so the history of the Jewish people will find both its expression and consummation in their own land, the Land of Israel.

1. "Both parties should refrain from arguing for the sake of escalating the disagreement and creating unnecessary rifts." These are your words. I agree with them without qualification. However, it is my duty to bring to your attention a quotation from an article which appeared in the Egyptian newspaper, Al-Gomhouriya, several days ago:

"Begin requested clarification. We will not give a clarification, we will offer an apology. We apologize to the late Hitler. Hitler did not kill the will for peace of the nations of the world but made of it a hope and a goal. Hitler did not kill the will of the Jews to live but intensified their dedication to life. He, above all, was responsible for the establishment of the State of Israel for it was he who brought every Jew to dream about the Land of the Return as he sees it. But

Menachem Begin is the one who kills the hope for peace in the hearts of men in Egypt, Israel and the Arab countries."

I shall withhold direct comment for a while.

You will recall that on May 27, 1980, I wrote to you a private, confidential letter in which I quoted from another article in a Cairo newspaper, Al-Akhbar, which wrote:

"Hitler was an extreme racist who called for the rule of the Aryan race over the whole world. Begin (is) an extreme racist who calls for the rule of the Jews over all races in the world, claiming that he belongs to the chosen people," etc. etc.

Our Ambassador, Dr. Eliyahu Ben Elissar, brought to you my letter. General Ali, your Foreign Minister, was present at the meeting. Since it was

a confidential diplomatic exchange, I will not now divulge its contents. But I can cite you as saying that in your opinion - which you clearly expressed - my complaint was completely justified. In the wake of that article came the cartoon in which Hitler bestows medals upon me; notably the swastika, and now comes the above-mentioned "apology" - to the late Adolph Hitler.

Mr. President, I do not complain any more. I desist from doing so. I wish, only, to analyse together with you what was said in the capital of Egypt of somebody whom you called your friend.

As you know, I did not ask for any "clarification," as the author of the above-quoted paragraph asserts. I only drew your attention to what was written in Al-Akhbar. But now we have before us for all to read the "apology". It is the most shameful profanity ever written since a long,

rambling speech was published in the form of a book called "Mein Kampf." I would wish the editor of Al-Gomhuriya success in getting the forgiveness of Herr Hitler.

He stated, moreover, that Hitler made peace a "hope and a goal;" that "he did not kill the will of peace," etc. He only killed tens of millions of people in order to make the Aryan race the ruler of the whole world. "Hitler did not kill the will of the Jews to live ...;" he only ordered to shoot them, to bury them alive, to gas them, to burn them, to drown them, to annihilate six million men, women, children and babies. He only killed a million-and-a-half Jewish children, torn from the arms of their mothers. How many Einsteins, Bergsons, Freuds, sages, philosophers, writers, poets, might, would, have emanated out of them? And yet the good Egyptian people is being informed and educated on the newest theory that Hitler "intensified the Jews' dedication to life!"

Above all, "Hitler was responsible for the establishment of the State of Israel ...". Quoting this heresy, I cannot but say, God Almighty! in whom we both believe - not the builders, the pioneers, the fighters for freedom, the prisoners, the executed heroes, the generation of the holocaust, the revolt, the heroism, the victory, the redemption - none of these are responsible for the renewal of our independence; but who is responsible? The enemy of mankind who "scientifically" massacred millions of potential citizens of that Jewish State.

After all this, you advise me that both parties "should refrain from arguing for the sake of escalating the disagreement ...". But what is even more serious and dangerous, you write in paragraph seven: "It is a law of nature, not only of physics, that every action has a reaction which is basically similar in kind and degree." In deep sorrow I must say that the venomous

campaign continues daily and even escalates, whilst your own words could, perhaps, unintentionally be construed by editors and journalists as justification for all the hostility - including that "apology" to the late Hitler - which has become the dominant tone of the Egyptian press.

2. Hostile propaganda is clearly forbidden by our mutual peace treaty, and in my previous letter, I brought clear proofs of such conduct by your Minister of State for Foreign Affairs - in Africa, in the United Nations and elsewhere. Most recently there was the communique signed by him in Bucharest which is a complete departure from the Camp David agreement. It is, therefore, my sad duty to register for the sake of truth and for the record, that Egypt is not fulfilling its commitment under the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty to abstain from hostile propaganda.

3. On settlements, you write that I gave an undertaking at Camp David "to observe a moratorium on building new settlements for the duration of the negotiations. It was understood by all sides that the negotiations referred to in this commitment were the autonomy talks."

This statement does not conform to the facts as confirmed in the minutes of the Camp David talks. The document I hold before me is a letter addressed by me to President Carter on September 17, 1978.

I quote:

"Dear Mr. President,

I have the honor to inform you that during the agreed period of negotiations (three months) for the conclusion of the peace treaty no new settlements will be established in the area of the Government of Israel.

Sincerely yours,

Menachem Begin"

Not only did I stress the negotiations for the peace treaty (meaning, of course, between Egypt and Israel) but I intentionally noted in parenthesis "three months," which was the time we allotted in the Camp David Framework for Peace to conclude our negotiations; (in fact, they took six months). This, and no other, was our commitment we gave on settlements and that undertaking came to an end on December 17, 1978. It never entered my mind to give a commitment lasting for the then indefinite duration of negotiations concerning the autonomy for the Arab inhabitants in Judea, Samaria and the Gaza District.

I do not claim that because of my letter to President Carter, as quoted above, we have the agreement of the United States Government to construct new settlements. I merely made clear both Israel's undertaking and when it would come to an end. Did not your advisors inform you of the contents of my letter on the day we signed the Camp David accords in Washington D.C.? I, for my part, made the matter crystal clear.

The statement I made in my last letter of August 4 in response to your demand that all settlements in Judea, Samaria, etc. be removed is termed by you, "negativism". I wonder. I said in the Aswan press conference: "We are no foreigners to this land ... we have a perfect right to live there." And when one says that Jews and Arabs can live together (and I remember your enthusiasm on seeing Jews and Arabs living together in Haifa) - what is that? Negativism? I believe that from the moral point of view the concepts should be reversed. We stand by our positive position.

4. On Jerusalem, I have told you everything I can, both orally and in writing. I do not wish now to repeat either the contents of the documents I attached to my previous letter nor my statements during our friendly talks. You have our position.

Jerusalem is our capital, one city, indivisible, with guaranteed free access to the holy places for all religions. Prince Fahd, of oil-rich Saudi Arabia, therefore, calls on his Arab brothers to march on Israel in a holy war - jihad. We are not impressed. You know me by now. I hate war with every fibre of my soul. I love peace. My colleagues and I made great sacrifices for the sake of peace. If there are, anywhere, ungrateful men who prefer to forget what we did and the sacrifices we made for the sacred cause of peace - then let them buy oil, let them sell arms, let them be friends of tyrants like the ruler of Iraq (to mention just one), let them sell principles and dignity - they will not change the irrefutable facts.

The threats of Prince Fahd are of no concern to us. He does not know - how can he? - what this generation of Jews, who suffered the indescribable fall and the unprecedented triumph, is capable of sacrificing

and doing in order to defend the people, the country, Jerusalem. He may have the billions of petro-dollars; we have the motivation in the service of a just cause.

But let it be known to all: We do not want military victories. We want peace - for our people and for the other nations. And we were glad to note that Egypt did not concur with Saudi Arabia's war slogan.

Jerusalem, of course, is indivisible and is a part of this peace. You write to me again that Jerusalem should be undivided under two sovereignties. This, I must admit, I do not understand. I do not blame anybody for my inability to comprehend. But I say to you, in full candor, I simply do not grasp the idea. I do not understand the project to have one city under two sovereignties, or two sovereignties over one city.

5. On Resolution 242 you mention semantics: "all the territories;" "the territories;" "territories". To us, the Israelis, these are no mere semantics. The two initial formulae (containing the definite article) were proposed in those almost forgotten days of November 1967, but they were rejected. Their rejection was deliberate and meaningful. Written into Resolution 242 are the words, "from territories," and by those words we are in no sense committed to carry out what is called "complete withdrawal."

This is also one of the reasons why we did not withdraw to the pre-1967 armistice lines on the southern sector. You mention Sinai. Of course, there we made the greatest sacrifices for the sake of peace. But, under the Camp David accords and the peace treaty, Israel did not withdraw behind the 1967 Gaza District armistice line. This fact, this example, should not be ignored when we deal with other sectors. There is

a general concensus in Israel, by all parliamentary parties except for the Communists, not to retreat in any sector, East, North or South, to the pre-4th June, 1967, armistice lines.

6. When I asked you: Can Egypt bring representatives of the Palestinian Arabs, inhabitants of Judea, Samaria and the Gaza District, to the negotiation table, you replied with another question: "And what did you do to encourage them?" Allow me to answer.

You speak about "repression." I would be interested to know what would any country, Egypt included, have done if its citizens were assassinated, its children massacred and all this under the slogan to liquidate the "Zionist entity" which is Israel? I remember certain events in your country and the inescapable reaction of the authorities in charge. Let not the blameless be blamed for the guilt of the murderers.

Permit me to remind you again what I stressed in my last letter, that the boycott by the Palestinian Arabs of the autonomy talks began ab initio, even before we started our talks and immediately after the signing of the Camp David agreement.

7. And now, I come to the final point. As I understand it, at the end of your letter you make a double suggestion:

a) Not to renew our autonomy talks until after November 4, 1980, on an undefined date following the elections in the United States.

b) After that date, to hold a tripartite summit conference in which you, President Carter and I will participate.

Dear President Sadat,

If I understood you well, I feel it my duty to ask you: Why again for the fourth time does Egypt interrupt, or suspend, or disrupt our talks? Why should we not continue with our negotiations? You always contend that a solution is urgent. Were we to accept your suggestion, we would have agreed to a suspension of nearly six months or more. That is a long time indeed. Where is the sense of urgency? You, yourself, tell me that our world is one of plurality, of different opinions. Such difference of opinion exists between us as well. Of course, it takes at least two to negotiate. However, if you persist in your negative attitude, the negotiations will remain disrupted for the simple and only reason that Egypt repeatedly suspends the talks. On our side, I repeat our suggestion to renew without any further delay the tripartite autonomy negotiations.

And, what of the "summit" idea? I understand that President Carter was not consulted. Permit me to say that both he and I should have been consulted through a diplomatic, confidential exchange. Let us at least now, however, quietly consider the matter, the venue and the date should all three parties accept the principle itself. This should not, under any circumstances, preclude the renewal and the uninterrupted continuation of the autonomy talks. This is my concrete, positive suggestion to you.

With best wishes,

M. Begin
Menachem Begin

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FM JEDDA 170835Z AUG 80

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 586 OF 17 AUGUST

INFO ROUTINE TEL AVIV, CAIRO, AMMAN, DAMASCUS, BEIRUT, BAGHDAD
 RABAT, WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK, LUXEMBOURG, THE HAGUE.
 INFO SAVING BAHRAIN, KUWAIT, ABU DHABI, DUBAI, DOHA, MUSCAT,
 ALGIERS, TUNIS, KHARTOUM, SANAA

ARAB/ISRAEL: CROWN PRICE FAHD'S IS-AL-FITR MESSAGE

1. THE DEPARTMENT HAVE ALREADY RECEIVED BY TELEPHONE OUR FULL UNOFFICIAL TRANSLATION OF PRINCE FAHD'S MESSAGE. COPIES FOLLOW BY BAG TO ALL RECIPIENTS OF THIS TEL.
2. THE MESSAGE BEGINS BY RECALLING THE SUMMONS TO A JIHAD (HOLY WAR) OVER PALESTINE IN 1948 AND THE CRITICISM WHICH THIS AROUSED IN THE WEST. IT POINTS OUT THAT "FOR VARIOUS REASONS ... THE CALL FOR HOLY WAS IS NOT ANY MORE DOMINANT IN OUR STRUGGLE WITH THE ZIONIST ENEMIES." BUT RECENT DEVELOPMENTS OVER JERUSALEM RAISE THE QUESTION, HOW HAS MODERATION HELPED AND WHERE IS THE PEACE WHICH WAS PROMISED AT CAMP DAVID? "IS NOT THE CALL OF ARABS AND MUSLIMS FOR A LONG AND PERSISTENT HOLY WAR THE ONLY ANSWER TO THIS ISRAELI RELIGIOUS AND RACIST ARROGANCE?" PEACE IS ILLUSORY, AND ISRAEL IS "HELPED BY THE GREATEST MILITARY POWER IN THE WORLD." THOSE WHO TALK OF "SELF-RULE FOR THE PALESTINIANS" "MUST RECOGNISE FAILURE" AND WITHDRAW FROM THIER POSITION WITH DIGNITY AND COURAGE. ARAB REORGANIZATION IS AN URGENT PRIORITY. SAUDI ARABIA HAS TAKEN THE LEAD "WITH OTHER ARAB BRETHERN" IN A COMMON STAND TO COMMIT EVERYTHING TO THE BATTLE: "WE WILL NOT REST PEACEFULLY UNTIL WE LIBERATE OUR OCCUPIED ARAB LAND AND THE PALESTINIAN BROTHERS RETURN TO THEIR COUNTRY TO ESTABLISH THEIR INDEPENDENT STATE WITH ARAB JERUSALEM AS ITS CAPITAL."
3. THIS MESSAGE (WHOSE BELLICOSITY SHOULD NOT BE EXAGGERATED) SEEMS TO BE AIMED AS MUCH AT THE AMERICANS AND SADAT, AS AT OTHER ARAB STATES: MODERATE POLICIES HAVE FAILED, CAMP DAVID HAS FAILED, THE ATTEMPT TO ESTABLISH SELF-RULE HAS FAILED: WHY? BEACUSE THE AMERICANS SUPPORT ISRAEL. THOSE WHO HAVE FOLLOWED THIS PATH (IE SADAT) SHOULD SEE THE ERROR OF THEIR WAYS AND RETURN TO THE BOSOM OF A UNITED ARAB FRONT.

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4. WHAT SORT OF OUTCOME DOES THE MESSAGE FORESEE? ON THE FACE OF IT FAHD IS ADOPTING A MAXIMALIST POSITION - A RIGHT OF RETURN FOR PALESTINIANS "TO THEIR COUNTRY TO ESTABLISH AN INDEPENDENT STATE WITH ARAB JERUSALEM AS ITS CAPITAL." BUT THE GENERAL DRIFT OF MUCH OF THE MESSAGE IS THAT A PEACEFUL SOLUTION, NOT EXCLUDING THE CONTINUED EXISTENCE OF ISRAEL, WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE IF ONLY IT WERE POSSIBLE. AND AT LEAST ONE LOCAL NEWSPAPER, COMMENTING ON THE SPEECH, EMPHASISES THAT A HOLY WAR CAN BE LONG IN PREPARATION - LONG ENOUGH, ONE ASSUMES, TO ALLOW THE AMERICANS A CHANGE OF HEART. THE SPEECH IS IN LINE WITH TRADITIONAL SAUDI POLICY ON PALESTINE - DECLAMATORY NOT DETAILED, OBSESSED WITH THE MEANS (ARAB UNITY) RATHER THAN THE ENDS (A SOLUTION). FAHD IS RARELY BLACK AND WHITE IN STYLE - BUT HIS MINIONS SOMETIMES CLEAN UP HIS AMBIGUITIES WITH MISLEADING RESULTS (WITNESS THE WASHINGTON POST INTERVIEW).

5. WHY MAKE SUCH A SPEECH NOW? A NUMBER OF FACTORS MAY HAVE INFLUENCED FAHD. FIRST, ARAB UNITY HAS ALWAYS BEEN PRIME CONCERN OF SAUDI FOREIGN POLICY: THEY FEAR THAT SERIOUS DIVISION AMONG THEIR NEIGHBOURS (SUCH AS THOSE AT PRESENT BETWEEN SYRIA AND IRAQ WHICH FAHD IS COMMITTED TO TACKLING IN AN ANNOUNCED VISIT TO DAMASCUS AND BAGHDAD) WILL FORCE A CHOICE UPON THEM WHICH WILL HAVE CONSEQUENCES FOR THEIR OWN INTERNAL STABILITY. SECONDLY, JERUSALEM IS A GENUINELY EMOTIVE ISSUE FOR THE GUARDIANS OF THE HOLY PLACES OF MECCA AND MEDINA, AND ONE WHICH THEY BELIEVE MUSLIMS AND ARABS LOOK TO THEM TO TAKE A LEAD - AND THE THREAT TO THE STATUS OF JERUSALEM HAS BEEN DRAMATISED AS NEVER BEFORE BY RECENT ISRAELI ACTIONS. THIRDLY, THERE ARE A NUMBER OF SIGNS THAT SADAT AND PERHAPS PRESIDENT CARTER ARE FED UP WITH BEGIN - AND PERHAPS THE SAUDIS CONSIDER THAT NOW IS THE TIME TO PUT PRESSURE ON BOTH, AND WOO THE EGYPTIANS BACK TO THE CAMP. FOURTHLY, MR CARTER AND MR REAGAN (AND PERHAPS ALSO MR THORN) MAY, IN SAUDI EYES, NEED TO BE REMINDED OF THE LIMITS OF SAUDI PATIENCE. SAUDI EFFORTS TO GET SADDAT BACK INTO THE FOLD ARE NOT NEW: FAHD TRIED IN AUGUST 1978, JUST BEFORE CAMP DAVID WAS SUMMONED: AND ONLY LAST SUNDAY, PRINCE SAUD, IN AN INTERVIEW WITH A UAE NEWSPAPER, SAID THAT THE SAUDI GOVERNMENT "WAS MAKING GREAT EFFORTS TO RETURN EGYPT TO THE ARAB CAMP". WHAT IS SURPRISING IS THAT THE SAUDIS SEEM NOT TO HAVE CLEARED THEIR LINES IN ADVANCE WITH THE EGYPTIANS: FAHD'S FINE PHRASES HAVE BEEN MET BY SADAT'S REITERATED COMMITMENT TO CAMP DAVID. IN HIS SPEECH FAHD CALLED FOR ACTION NOT WORDS: BUT THIS APPARENT APPEAL IN VACUO TO THE EGYPTIANS IS A GOOD EXAMPLE OF THE ARAB TRUST IN THE POWER OF WORDS. (BUT IN 1979, WHEN FAHD DID CONSULT SADAT FIRST, HIS UNITY TOUR WAS SABOTAGED IN MID-COURSE BY SADAT'S AGREEMENT TO GO TO CAMP DAVID).

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6. THE ARABS, INCLUDING THE SAUDIS, ARE BUILDING UP A FINE HEAD OF STEAM AT THE MOMENT - STUNG BY THE KNESSET VOTE ON JERUSALEM WORRIED BY AMERICAN INTENTIONS AFTER NOVEMBER, AND PERHAPS FEELING THAT THE TIDE OF INTERNATIONAL OPINION IS RUNNING IN THEIR FAVOUR. WE SHALL NEED TO COUNSEL MODERATION AND TO EXPLORE DISCREETLY WHAT LIES BEHIND FAHD'S AMBIGUOUS RHETORIC. MR THORN SHOULD BE ASKED TO BEGIN THIS PROCESS WHEN HE IS HERE FROM 23 TO 25 AUGUST; AND YOU, SIR, WILL NO DOUBT WISH TO DO THE SAME DURING YOUR VISIT. AND WE MAY GET SOME INDICATION OF HOW FAR THE SAUDIS ARE READY TO GO AT THE MEETING OF THE JERUSALEM COMMITTEE AND AT THE UN THIS WEEK.

7. FCO PLEASE PASS SAVING ADDRESSEES.

GRAY

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3. [PASSED] AS REQUESTED
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GRS 600
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FM CAIRO 161300Z AUG 80
TO ROUTINE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 510 OF 16 AUGUST
ROUTINE INFO WASHINGTON, TEL AVIV, JERUSALEM
SAVING DAMASCUS, BEIRUT, AMMAN, JEDDA
MY TELNO 502: EGYPT/ISRAEL

Prime Minister

*This is a further letter,
following the exchange
repeated to you by the
Egyptian ambassador.
None of this is
attached to.*

*MPD
24/8-*

1. THE TEXT OF PRESIDENT SADAT'S LETTER OF 13 AUGUST TO MR BEGIN WAS PUBLISHED HERE YESTERDAY. IT IS PRESUMABLY AVAILABLE TO YOU THROUGH THE PRESS.

2. THE LETTER IS VERY LONG, AND CAREFULLY AND COURTEOUSLY DRAFTED. AT THE END, SADAT REGRETS THAT MR BEGIN HAS NOT RESPONDED TO THE POINTS IN HIS EARLIER LETTER AND THAT SINCE THE OBSTACLES REMAIN, THE NEGOTIATIONS CANNOT BE RESUMED. HE DOES NOT WANT THE NEGOTIATIONS TO TURN INTO A MEANINGLESS EXERCISE, NOR DOES HE WANT A RHETORICAL EXCHANGE. HE THEREFORE SUGGESTS A SUMMIT TO DISCUSS THE "LINGERING DIFFERENCES" ONCE PRESIDENT CARTER'S PRESENT PRESSING PREOCCUPATIONS ARE OVER (IE AFTER THE US ELECTIONS).

3. THE MAJOR PART OF THE LETTER (AFTER A LONG INTRODUCTION CONTRASTING THE EGYPTIAN AND ISRAELI VIEWS OF THE MEANING OF "NEGOTIABILITY" AND ASSERTING THAT THE PEACE INITIATIVE IS A SACRED MISSION) CONSISTS OF WELL-ARGUED REPLIES TO POINTS MADE BY MR BEGIN, AS FOLLOWS:

(A) CONTRARY TO THE ISRAELI ASSERTION, IT WAS AGREED AT CAMP DAVID THAT ALL PROVISIONS FOR THE FIVE-YEAR AUTONOMY PERIOD WERE TEMPORARY, INCLUDING THOSE FOR ISRAELI SECURITY MEASURES IN THE WEST BANK/GHAZA STRIP.

(B) DESPITE MR BEGIN'S CLAIM, THE CAMP DAVID FORMULA IS NOT BLANK AS REGARDS JERUSALEM. EARLY EGYPTIAN AND US DRAFTS THERE DEALT SPECIFICALLY WITH JERUSALEM. MOREOVER, BY "ANY GEOGRAPHIC OR POLITICAL STANDARD" AND BY UNIVERSAL CONSENSUS THE WEST BANK INCLUDES EAST JERUSALEM. IN THE AUTONOMY TALKS, ISRAEL HAS DISCUSSED THE VOTING RIGHTS OF EAST JERUSALEM PALESTINIANS IN THE CONTEXT OF ELECTING THE SGA. AND SC RES 242 PROHIBITS THE ACQUISITION OF TERRITORY BY WAR. THE EGYPTIAN PROPOSAL ON JERUSALEM (TWO SOVEREIGNTIES AND ONE MUNICIPALITY) IS IMAGINATIVE AND LOGICAL.

(C) THE SETTLEMENTS ISSUE WAS NOT MENTIONED IN THE CAMP DAVID TEXTS BECAUSE MR BEGIN PROMISED PRESIDENT CARTER TO SEEK KNESSET AGREEMENT TO REMOVING THE SINAI SETTLEMENTS, AND TO OBSERVE A MORATORIUM ON NEW SETTLEMENTS FOR THE DURATION OF THE NEGOTIATIONS. ONLY THE FORMER COMMITMENT WAS RESPECTED. ISRAELI SETTLEMENT POLICY IS ILLEGAL, DIVISIVE AND FUTILE. TO STATE THAT SETTLEMENTS WILL NEVER BE REMOVED IS UNWISE.

(D) THOUGH THE CAMP DAVID TEXTS DO NOT MENTION SPECIFICALLY THE PALESTINIANS' RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION, THEY TALK OF THE "LEGITIMATE RIGHTS OF THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE", WHICH MUST INCLUDE SELF-DETERMINATION. SADAT HAS ALWAYS MADE IT CLEAR THAT THIS IS HIS VIEW.

(E) TO ARGUE WHETHER SC RES 242 DEMANDS TOTAL OR PARTIAL WITHDRAWAL IS POINTLESS - THOUGH "IT HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED" THAT THE FORMER CASE IS CORRECT AND ISRAEL'S COMMITMENT TO TOTAL WITHDRAWAL FROM SINAI IS A GOOD PRECEDENT.

(F) OCCUPATION IS NOT THE WAY TO WIN PEACE. ISRAEL HAS SOUGHT TO ALIENATE PALESTINIANS IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES RATHER THAN ENCOURAGE THEIR PARTICIPATION IN THE AUTONOMY NEGOTIATIONS.

4. THE LETTER CONTINUES THAT EGYPT INTENDS TO IMPLEMENT THE PEACE TREATY SCRUPULOUSLY, THOUGH THAT DOES NOT MEAN SHE SHOULD ACCEPT ISRAELI POLICIES WHEN THEY ARE WRONG. NOT CAN SADAT STOP PRESS REACTION IN EGYPT TO SUCH POLICIES. AFRICAN LEADERS TAKE THEIR OWN DECISIONS ON RELATIONS WITH ISRAEL, AND NOT, AS ISRAEL CLAIMS, AS A RESULT OF EGYPTIAN PROPAGANDA.

5. IN SUM, THE LETTER CONFIRMS THAT SADAT SEE NO PROSPECT FOR THE AUTONOMY NEGOTIATIONS AT LEAST UNTIL AFTER THE US ELECTIONS, BUT IT SUGGESTS THE HE INTENDS TO CONTINUE WITH THE PEACE POLICY.

FCO PSE PASS TO ALL SAVING ADDRESSEES

BARRINGTON

[PASSED AS REQUESTED]
[THIS TELEGRAM WAS NOT ADVANCED]

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FM TEL AVIV 190740Z AUG 80

TO ROUTINE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 365 OF 19 AUGUST

INFO CAIRO WASHINGTON JERUSALEM AND UKMIS NEW YORK

OUR TEL NO 362: EGYPT/ISRAEL

1. THE ISRAELI AMBASSADOR IN CAIRO IS DUE TO HAND OVER BEGIN'S LATEST LETTER TODAY. THE FULL TEXT HAS NOT YET BEEN PUBLISHED BUT PRESS REPORTS MAINTAIN THAT THE LETTER STATED THAT ISRAEL HAD NOT DISMISSED THE IDEA OF A TRIPARTITE SUMMIT (WHICH COULD NOT HOWEVER BE CALLED BY ONE SIDE ALONE) BUT DID NOT REGARD IT AS A SUBSTITUTE FOR THE CAMP DAVID AGREEMENTS.

2. IN HIS LETTER, BEGIN CALLED FOR EGYPT TO RESUME THE AUTONOMY TALKS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE; AND SAID THAT THE EMPHASIS SHOULD BE ON THESE TALKS, NOT ON A SUMMIT. BEGIN DISMISSED SADAT'S ALLEGATIONS THAT ISRAEL HAD PLACED OBSTACLES IN THE PATH OF PEACE; AND COMPLAINED ABOUT RECENT ATTACKS ON HIM IN THE EGYPTIAN PRESS.

ROBINSON

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TO ROUTINE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 521 OF 20 AUGUST

INFO TEL AVIV, WASHINGTON, JERUSALEM

TEL AVIV TELNO 365: EGYPT/ISRAEL

1. MR BEGIN'S LETTER WAS DELIVER YESTERDAY. PRESIDENT SADAT HAD TOLD THE PRESS THE DAY BEFORE THAT HE DID NOT PROPOSE TO REPLY SINCE EGYPT'S POSITION WAS CLEAR ENOUGH. TODAY'S AL AHAM COMMENTS THAT ISREAL HAS NOT FULFILLED EGYPT'S CONDITIONS FOR A RESUMPTION OF NEGOTIATIONS. 1

2. THE TEXT OF BEGIN'S FIRST LETTER WAS FINALLY PUBLISHED IN THE EGYPTIAN PRESS YESTERDAY.

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FM CAIRO 151200Z AUG 80

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 502 OF 15 AUGUST

INFO ROUTINE WASHINGTON, TEL AVIV, AMMAN, UKMIS NEW YORK,

HMCG JERUSALEM AND JEDDA.

INFO SAVING DAMASCUS AND BEIRUT

ms

WASHINGTON TEL TO YOU NO 3758: ARAB/ISRAEL

1. THE US AMBASSADOR CONFIRMED TO ME LAST NIGHT THAT THE AMERICANS HAVE GIVEN UP HOPE OF ANY JOINT MEETING WITH THE ISRAELIS AND EGYPTIANS, OR ANY SUBSTANTIVE ACTIVITY BY LINOWITZ, BEFORE THE US ELECTIONS. LINOWITZ MAY SEE EACH SIDE SEPARATELY IN SEPTEMBER WITH THE GROUND PREPARED THROUGH DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS. ATHERTON THOUGHT IT NO BAD THING TO LET AMBASSADORS GET INTO THE ACT AGAIN. HE SAID THAT THE AMERICANS' MAIN AIM WAS TO KEEP CHANNELS OF COMMUNICATION OPEN AND TO COUNTER ARGUMENTS THAT THE WHOLE CAMP DAVID PROCESS WAS NOW DEAD.

2. ASKED YESTERDAY IN ALEXANDRIA TO COMMENT ON PRINCE FAHD'S CALL FOR A HOLY WAR AGAINST ISRAEL, THE SENIOR DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER, DR FOUAD MOHIEDDIN, SAID THAT EGYPT COULD NOT GIVE UP HER PEACE POLICY. THERE WERE NO ALTERNATIVES. FAHD'S STATEMENT HAS STILL NOT BEEN REPORTED FACTUALLY IN THE PRESS HERE. THOUGH DR MOHIEDDIN'S COMMENT WAS CARRIED AND AL AHAM'S EDITORIAL TODAY ASKS WHETHER FAHD'S BELLIGERENT LINE IS NOT LIKELY TO RALLY ISRAEL'S SUPPORTERS TO HER CAUSE AND CLOSE ISRAELI RANKS. FAHD'S CALL COULD APPEAL TO MANY EGYPTAINS WHO WOULD FAVOUR A RAPPROCHEMENT WITH THE SAUDIS. THE EGYPTAIN GOVERNMENT APPEAR TO BE REACTING IN A GUARDED WAY, THOUGH ON PAST FORM SADAT IS LIKELY TO MISMANAGE ANY OPPORTUNITY OF MENDING FENCES WITH THE SAUDIS.

3. MEANWHILE, THE EGYPTAINS ARE TAKING PAINS TO PUT THEIR CASE CLEARLY ON RECORD FOR A PUBLIC THAT INCLUDES NOT ONLY WESTERN OPINION BUT OPINION IN THE OTHER ARAB COUNTRIES AND IN EGYPT ITSELF. THE PRESS REPORTS THAT SADAT'S LATEST MISSIVE TO MR BEGIN, WHICH IS TO BE DELIVERED TO MR BEGIN TODAY, GOES THROUGH THE POINTS IN THE ISRAELI LETTER ONE BY ONE EXPLAINING EGYPT'S CASE IN REASONED TERMS AND CONSIDERABLE DETAIL.

4. FCO PASS SAVING TO DAMASCUS AND BEIRUT
BARRINGTON

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

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Prime Minister

To see all

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TO ROUTINE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 3770 OF 15 AUGUST 1980,

INFO ROUTINE CAIRO, TEL AVIV, AMMAN, H M C G JERUSALEM

INFO SAVING BEIRUT, DAMASCUS, UKMIŞ NEW YORK, JEDDA

DEMOCRATIC PARTY CONVENTION: CARTER'S ACCEPTANCE SPEECH - MIDDLE EAST

1. FOLLOWING IS THE PASSAGE ON THE MIDDLE EAST FROM CARTER'S SPEECH: AND WE HAVE HELPED IN THE MIDDLE EAST. SOME HAVE CRITICISED THE

CAMP DAVID ACCORDS AND DELAYS IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE MIDDLE EAST PEACE TREATY.

BEFORE I BECAME PRESIDENT THERE WAS NO CAMP DAVID ACCORD AND THERE WAS NO PEACE TREATY. BEFORE, ISRAEL AND EGYPT WERE POISED ACROSS BARBED WIRE, CONFRONTING EACH OTHER WITH GUNS AND TANKS AND PLANES. AFTERWARD, THEY TALKED FACE-TO-FACE WITH EACH OTHER ACROSS A PEACE TABLE - AND NOW THEY ALSO COMMUNICATE THROUGH THEIR OWN AMBASSADORS IN CAIRO AND TEL AVIV.

THAT IS THE KIND OF FUTURE WE DEMOCRATS ARE WORKING TO BRING TO THE MIDDLE EAST.

I AM PROUD THAT FULLY HALF OF THE AID THAT OUR COUNTRY HAS GIVEN ISRAEL IN THE 32 YEARS OF HER EXISTENCE HAS COME DURING MY ADMINISTRATION. UNLIKE OUR REPUBLICAN PREDECESSORS, WE HAVE NEVER STOPPED NOR SLOWED THAT AID. AND AS LONG AS I AM PRESIDENT, WE WILL NOT DO SO. OUR COMMITMENT IS CLEAR: SECURITY AND PEACE FOR ISREAL, PEACE, FOR ALL PEOPLES OF THE MIDDLE EAST."

2. NO OTHER MIDDLE EASTERN COUNTRY (INDEED NO OTHER FRIENDLY OR ALLIED COUNTRY) IS SINGLED OUT FOR MENTION BY NAME IN THE SPEECH. THERE IS HOWEVER A REFERENCE IN A LATER PASSAGE ON ENERGY TO THE "1973 ARAB OIL EMBARGO" AND A STATEMENT THAT "LAST YEAR'S SKYROCKETTING O P E C OIL PRICES HELPED TRIGGER A WORLD-WIDE INFLATION CRISIS".

3. WE HAVE SENT SEPARATELY THE TEXT OF THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY PLATFORM. THIS CONTAINS A REAFFIRMATION OF THE PARTY'S STRONG SUPPORT FOR

/ ISRAEL

ISRAEL, INCLUDING THE 1976 COMMITMENT TO MOVE THE U S EMBASSY FROM TEL AVIV TO JERUSALEM. THIS YEAR, HOWEVER, CARTER HAS TAKEN ADVANTAGE OF A NEW PARTY RULE (ADOPTED AT THE CONVENTION) REQUIRING THE NOMINEE TO STATE IN WRITING WHICH PARTS OF THE PARTY PLATFORM HE DISAGREES WITH. WHILE NOT DILUTING THE GENERAL COMMITMENT TO ISRAEL'S SECURITY, CARTER ADDED THE FOLLOWING GLOSS ON THE JERUSALEM QUESTION:

"IT HAS BEEN OUR POLICY THAT JERUSALEM SHOULD REMAIN FOR EVER UNDIVIDED WITH FREE ACCESS TO THE HOLY PLACES FOR PEOPLE OF ALL FAITHS. IT HAS BEEN AND IT MUST REMAIN OUR POLICY THAT THE ULTIMATE STATUS OF JERUSALEM SHOULD BE A MATTER OF NEGOTIATION BETWEEN THE PARTIES."

4. IN THIS SPEECH ACCEPTING RENOMINATION FOR THE VICE PRESIDENCY MONDALE ALSO REFERRED TO THE ACHIEVEMENTS OF CAMP DAVID AND CONTINUED:

"LET ME ADD A SPECIAL WORD ABOUT ISRAEL. ISRAEL IS OUR FRIEND, OUR CONSCIENCE, OUR PARTNER. ITS WELL-BEING IS IN OUR MORAL, POLITICAL, AND STRATEGIC INTERESTS. I STAND BEFORE YOU AND SAY THAT THE PEOPLE OF THE UNITED STATES STAND BY ISRAEL - IN THIS TERM, IN THE NEXT TERM, AND ALWAYS."

F C O PASS SAVINGG BEIRUT, DAMASCUS, JEDDA.

FRETWELL.

(REPEATED AS REQUESTED)

**THIS TELEGRAM
WAS NOT
ADVANCED**

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TO ROUTINE FCO
TELNO 351 OF 14 AUG
INFO CAIRO, WASHINGTON.

MYTEL 347: ISRAELI GOVERNMENT.

1. THE KNESSET YESTERDAY APPROVED THE APPOINTMENT OF MOSHE NISSIM AS JUSTICE MINISTER BY 56 TO 39, AN UNEXPECTEDLY LARGE MAJORITY.
2. BEGIN SAID YESTERDAY THAT HE HOPED TO BE ABLE TO COMPLETE THE RESHUFFLE BY APPOINTING SHAMIR AS DEFENCE MINISTER WITHIN TWO WEEKS, WITH MODA'I MOVING TO THE FOREIGN MINISTRY. BEGIN SAID THAT HE WOULD HAVE LIKED SHARON AS DEFENCE MINISTER (WHO CONTINUES TO THREATEN RESIGNATION IF DENIED THE JOB), BUT DOUBTED THAT THERE WOULD HAVE BEEN A CABINET LEFT TO SERVE IN IF HE HAD APPOINTED HIM. SOME IN THE HERUT ARE STILL PRESSING THE CANDIDATURE OF MOSHE ARENS FOR DEFENCE.

ROBINSON

[THIS TELEGRAM WAS NOT ADVANCED]

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Middle East

FROM NO 10 TO SWITZERLAND
THURSDAY 14 AUGUST

MESSAGE NO 1

C O N F I D E N T I A L

PRIME MINISTER FROM MIKE PATTISON

HERE IS TEXT OF PRINCE FAHD'S SPEECH, FOLLOWED BY FCO COMMENT

BEGINS

(UNOFFICIAL TRANSLATION)

WHEN THE ZIONIST MOVEMENT STARTED ASSISTED BY ITS TERRORIST GANGS OF WHICH MR MENACHEM BEGIN WAS LEADER-OF ONE, WHEN THEY STARTED TO OCCUPY PART OF PALESTINE IN 1948, SOME ARAB CIRCLES ANNOUNCED AT THAT TIME THE HOLY WAR AGAINST THIS ZIONIST INVASION. EUROPE AND THE WHOLE WEST, WHICH IS CALLED THE CIVILISED WORLD, CRITICISED THE ARABS FOR GIVING A RELIGIOUS DIRECTION TO THEIR STRUGGLE WITH THE ZIONIST ENEMIES BECAUSE THEY ANNOUNCED THE SLOGANS OF HOLY WAR. FOR VARIOUS REASONS CONCERNING THE DESIRE FOR CONTROL OF AFFAIRS AND FOR MODERATION AND HOPE FOR A JUST PEACE WHICH WOULD GIVE THE ARABS THEIR LEGITIMATE RIGHTS THE CALL FOR HOLY WAR IS NOT ANY MORE DOMINANT IN OUR STRUGGLES WITH THE ZIONIST ENEMIES. TODAY AFTER THE COMPLETION OF THE OCCUPATION OF THE HOLY PALESTINE TERRITORY AND OTHER ARAB LANDS, ISRAEL HAS ANNOUNCED THAT ALL OF JERUSALEM IS A UNITED UNIFIED CAPITAL AND PERMANENT FOR HER, CHALLENGING THE FEELINGS OF ARABS AND MOSLEMS AND UN RESOLUTIONS. HERE WE HAVE TO ASK: WHAT WERE THE RESULTS OF MODERATION AND IS THIS THE UNDERSTANDING OF THE WEST OF A JUST PEACE AND WHERE IS THE FRAMEWORK FOR COMPLETE PEACE THAT THEY IMAGINE THEY HAD BOUGHT IN CAMP DAVID AND PROMISED US? IS NOT THE LONG AND PERSISTENT CALL OF ARABS AND MOSLEMS FOR A HOLY WAR THE ONLY ANSWER TO THIS ISRAELI RELIGIOUS AND RACIST ARROGANCE? WOULD WE BE BLAMED BY THE WORLD AFTER TODAY IF WE TOOK AFFAIRS INTO OUR OWN HANDS AND STOOD TO DEFEND OUR MOST HOLY SHRINE AGAINST THIS ZIONIST RELIGIOUS AND MILITARY CAMPAIGN? TALKING IS NOT ANY MORE PROFITABLE, NOR WILL DECLARATIONS BE PROFITABLE IN THIS DELICATE AND DIFFICULT MOMENT. THE ARAB AND ISLAMIC NATION IS FACING A UNIQUE CHALLENGE HELPED BY THE GREATEST MILITARY POWER IN THE WORLD: THE AFFAIR IS TO BE OR NOT TO BE. ALL THE CAMOUFLAGE HAS FALLEN DOWN: TALK ABOUT PEACE WITH ISRAEL HAS BECOME A SORT OF IMAGINATION. SELF-RULE FOR THE PALESTINIANS NEEDS FROM THE ONES WHO ARE STILL BIDDING ON IT A STAND OF DIGNITY AND THE RECOGNITION OF FAILURE AND A WITHDRAWAL WITH COURAGE FROM WHAT HAS HAPPENED. WE IN THE KINGDOM OF SAUDI ARABIA BELIEVE DEEPLY THAT THE ISRAELI ENEMY IS SWALLOWING THE ARAB LAND STEP BY STEP AND ANNEXING ALL ARAB TERRITORIES AT THE RIGHT TIME TO BECOME PART OF THE ISRAELI EMPIRE. FROM HERE I SAY THAT THE REORGANISATION OF THE ARAB HOME QUICKLY HAS BECOME A PRESSING NEED ON OUR LIST OF PRIORITIES. SAUDI ARABIA TOOK THE INITIATIVE IN THE COOPERATION WITH OTHER ARAB BROTHERS FOR ARAB SOLIDARITY SO THAT WE CAN STAND TOGETHER. WE HAVE NO WAY EXCEPT TO STAND TOGETHER. WE SHOULD PUT INTO ONE BATTLE, HOWEVER LONG AND COSTLY, ALL FAITH, DETERMINATION, RESOURCES, ABILITIES AND EVERY EXPENSIVE AND CHEAP THING. WE WILL NOT REST PEACEFULLY UNTIL WE LIBERATE OUR OCCUPIED ARAB LAND AND UNTIL THE PALESTINIAN BROTHERS RETURN TO THEIR COUNTRY TO ESTABLISH THEIR INDEPENDENT STATE WITH ARAB JERUSALEM AS ITS CAPITAL. I SAY THIS WHILE WE CELEBRATE THE FEAST OF EID EL-FITRE AND THIS IS A PROMISE TO THE ARABS AND MOSLEMS.

TEXT ENDS

FCO COMMENT

1. ACCORDING TO A WELL PLACED AND RELIABLE SOURCE (WHICH PLEASE PROTECT) THE REACTION OF THE SAUDIS IN LONDON - INCLUDING KAMAL ADHAM - TO THE NEWS WAS TO TAKE IT CALMLY. THEY EXPLAINED TO OUR CONTACT THAT THE SPEECH WAS TO SERVE AS A WARNING THAT ARAB PATIENCE WAS WEARING THIN. "THE ARABS HAD BENT OVER BACKWARDS TO BE REASONABLE, BUT MR BEGIN'S LATEST ACTIONS HAD SHOWN UP ISRAEL FOR WHAT IT WAS".

2. THE STATEMENT DOES NOT OF COURSE AMOUNT TO A DECLARATION OF WAR AS SUCH. THE PRELIMINARY VIEW OF THE DEPARTMENT IS THAT IT DOES NOT OF ITSELF IMPLY A CHANGE OF POLICY BY THE SAUDIS. OUR EMBASSY IN JEDDA HAVE POINTED OUT THAT IT IS CONSISTENT WITH THE PROGRESSIVELY SHARPER TONE OF RECENT SAUDI STATEMENTS ON THE ARAB/ISRAEL DISPUTE WHICH INDICATE THEIR INCREASING IMPATIENCE AND FRUSTRATION. IT IS UNDOUBTEDLY MEANT TO BE A STRONG SIGNAL THAT SAUDI ARABIA'S "MODERATE" STANCE IS NOT TO BE TAKEN FOR GRANTED. WE SHOULD THEREFORE TREAT IT SERIOUSLY.

3. OUR EMBASSY IN JEDDA HAVE UNDERTAKEN TO PROVIDE A CONSIDERED ASSESSMENT OF THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THIS STATEMENT AS SOON AS POSSIBLE AFTER SAUDI GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS RESUME AFTER THE PROLONGED EID HOLIDAY. WE ARE LIKELY TO RECEIVE THIS OVER THE WEEKEND.

MESSAGE ENDS



Teletype Co

Switzerland please:
covering comment:-
Here is text of Prince Fahd's
speech followed by FCO
comment

PS

SAUDI STATEMENT ON JERUSALEM

1. You told me this morning that you had heard from the Private Secretary at No 10 that the Prime Minister was concerned at what Crown Prince Fahd had said in a speech in Jedda on 13 August about a possible "holy war" to recover Arab Jerusalem.

~~2. We have obtained a copy of the Arabic text of what Prince Fahd said and I attach an unofficial translation.~~

COMMENT

1. ~~3~~ According to a well-placed and reliable source (which please protect) the reaction of the Saudis in London - including Kamal Adham - to the news was to take it calmly. They explained to our contact that the speech was to serve as a warning that Arab patience was wearing thin. "The Arabs had bent over backwards to be reasonable, but Mr Begin's latest actions had shown up Israel for what it was."
2. ~~2~~ The statement does not of course amount to a declaration of war as such. The preliminary view of the Department is that it does not of itself imply a change of policy by the Saudis. Our Embassy in Jedda have pointed out that it is consistent with the progressively sharper tone of recent Saudi statements on the Arab/Israel dispute which indicate their increasing impatience and frustration. It is undoubtedly meant to be a strong signal that Saudi Arabia's "moderate" stance is not to be taken for granted. We should therefore treat it seriously.
3. ~~2~~ Our Embassy in Jedda have undertaken to provide a considered assessment of the significance of this statement as soon as possible after Saudi government departments resume after the prolonged Eid holiday. We are likely to receive this over the weekend.

ENOS

~~Richard Palmer~~

~~R E Palmer
Middle East Department~~

14 August 1980

cc:
PS/Mr Hurd
Sir J Graham
NENAD
News Dept
PUSD

~~TEXT OF CROWN PRINCE FAHD'S SPEECH~~

"TEXT" (unofficial translation)

When the Zionist movement started assisted by its terrorist gangs of which Mr Menachem Begin was leader of one, when they started to occupy part of Palestine in 1948, some Arab circles announced at that time the holy war against this Zionist invasion. Europe and the whole West, which is called the civilized world, criticised the Arabs for giving a religious direction to their struggle with the Zionist enemies because they announced the slogans of holy war. For various reasons concerning the desire for control of affairs and for moderation and hope for a just peace which would give the Arabs their legitimate rights the call for holy war is not any more dominant in our struggles with the Zionist enemies. Today after the completion of the occupation of the holy Palestine territory and other Arab lands, Israel has announced that all of Jerusalem is a united unified capital and permanent for her, challenging the feelings of Arabs and Moslems and UN resolutions. Here we have to ask: what were the results of moderation and is this the understanding of the West of a just peace and where is the framework for complete peace that they imagine they had bought in Camp David and promised us? Is not the long and persistent call of Arabs and Moslems for a holy war the only answer to this Israeli religious and racist arrogance? Would we be blamed by the world after today if we took affairs into our own hands and stood to defend our most holy shrine against this Zionist religious and military campaign? Talking is not any more profitable, nor will declarations be profitable in this delicate and difficult moment. The Arab and Islamic nation is facing a unique challenge helped by the greatest military power in the world; the affair is to be or not to be. All the camouflage has fallen down: talk about peace with Israel has become a sort of imagination. Self-rule for the Palestinians needs from the ones who are still bidding on it a stand of dignity and the recognition of failure and a withdrawal with courage from what has happened. We in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia believe deeply that the Israeli enemy is swallowing the Arab land step by step and annexing all Arab territories at the right time to become part of the Israeli empire. From here I say that the re-organization of the Arab home quickly has become a pressing need on our list of priorities. Saudi Arabia took the initiative in the co-operation with other Arab brothers for Arab solidarity so that we can stand together. We have no way except to stand together. We should put into one battle, however long and costly, all faith, determination, resources, abilities and every expensive and cheap thing. We will not rest peacefully until we liberate our occupied Arab land and until the Palestinian brothers return to their country to establish their independent state with Arab Jerusalem as its capital. I say this while we celebrate the feast of Eid el-Fitr and this is a promise to the Arabs and Moslems. "

10 TO SWITZERLAND

PRIME MINISTER FROM NICK SANDERS

14 AUGUST 1980

C O N F I D E N T I A L

SECURITY COUNCIL VOTE ON JERUSALEM

1. THE FOREIGN SECRETARY WILL RING YOU EITHER TONIGHT OR TOMORROW LUNCHTIME TO DISCUSS THE SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION. WHEN THAT CALL COMES THROUGH, YOU MIGHT LIKE TO HAVE WITH YOU THE TEXTS OF THE RELEVANT TELEGRAMS.

2. THERE ARE THREE OF THEM. 1115 OF 11 AUGUST GIVES THE ORIGINAL DRAFT RESOLUTION: 1123 OF 13 AUGUST (WHICH YOU HAVE NOT SEEN) BRINGS THE POSITION UP TO DATE TO LAST NIGHT, AND INCLUDES A MODIFICATION OF THE DRAFT RESOLUTION: 1124 GIVES THE TEXT OF THE WESTERN FOUR DRAFT.

3. THE TEXTS ARE AS FOLLOWS:

\ as on file below.

Top copy: Egypt, May 79
Visits of Vice President Mubarak
The President
of the Arab Republic of Egypt

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August 14

Dear Prime Minister Begin,

Thank you for your letter dated August 4.

I am pleased to learn that you have fully recovered and that you are able now to assume your responsibilities.

I am glad, also, that you reiterated, anew, your commitment to a comprehensive peace in the Middle East. This commitment, which we share, constitutes the very foundation of the peace process which was set in motion by my journey to Jerusalem and was reinforced by our joint effort thereafter. However, you would certainly agree with me that, for this commitment to be meaningful, it should not stop at the verbal assertion. Rather, it must be reflected in the actual behaviour of the parties concerned.

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On the other hand, you spoke, in your letter, of the necessity for having a dialogue among us on the essential issues under consideration. I agree. But let us first agree that a real dialogue entails a genuine exchange of views for the purpose of reaching agreement. If any party raises certain points of substance, they should be examined carefully and be given adequate attention by the other party in the spirit of mutual accommodation and understanding. Both parties should refrain from arguing for the sake of escalating the disagreement and creating unnecessary rift. The overriding factor should be seeking the truth and common interest.

Let me discuss with you another side issue before getting into the main points of

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substance. Several Israeli officials have been stating, privately or in public, that Israel considers all the issues negotiable and, hence, it would be quite willing to discuss them. I know that you told former British Prime Minister Callaghan that you considered everything negotiable except one thing: the destruction of Israel. This is a healthy and positive attitude. But let us agree on the meaning of the word "negotiable". To my mind; the connotation of the term goes beyond the formal or procedural scope of placing the subject on the agenda. There is another substantive and practical aspect, namely that both parties should be open-minded and defer any judgment or action to the end of the negotiations. All actions

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or measures should reflect the outcome of the talks rather than the arbitrary will of one party. A party who acts in good faith should do his best to keep the issue in a "neutral position" throughout the talks so that the negotiators may find a happy solution freely and in the spirit of mutuality. Parties should refrain from any action which is designed or likely to predetermine the outcome of the negotiations. This is the negotiability as I see it.

Having said that, I find it necessary to set the record straight with respect to several points which you referred to in your letter. I am doing so, not only

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for the sake of the truth, but most importantly, for the sake of peace and better understanding between our peoples. Therefore, I will confine myself, as usual, to stating the facts in objective terms and in the hope that this may enable us to see events and their implications more clearly and succinctly. In all that, I am inspired by the unique surroundings. The thoughts which I am sharing with you now occurred to me as I was on the peak of Mount Moses, reciting the Koran and worshipping God in this sacred part of the land of Egypt which witnessed the birth of a great mission. As I was reciting the Koran on this unparalleled spot, I became more certain of a fact I have stated

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before ... that my peace initiative was a sacred mission. The story of the Israelites began in the land of Egypt. It is apparent that it is the will of God almighty that the story would find its completion in Egypt also. This is the destiny of Egypt and its people. Such is a sacred mission perhaps no other country is equally qualified to fulfil.

Let us proceed, now, to examine together the following facts:

First:

That the formula we agreed upon at Camp David with respect to the Palestinian question does not constitute a final solution. This is so, not only in accordance with the explicit

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language used in the Framework for Peace in the Middle East, but also because none of the participants in that summit had the right to impose a settlement on the Palestinian people. You would recall that I made a statement to that effect in the first encounter between us. What we agreed upon was merely a transitional arrangement for a limited period of time. Hence, all provisions and arrangements for this transitional period are temporary in duration. It is incorrect to claim that the insertion of the phrase "and beyond" in the section related to security measures in the "Framework" meant that any security arrangements which are agreed upon for

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the transitional period are extended ipso facto beyond the transitional period. This is merely a reminder of the need to devise certain security measures in the interest of both parties, in the course of the second phase of the negotiations.

As it is only a transitional period, certain issues were deferred to the next set of negotiations where the Palestinians can have their say and actively participate in determining the outcome. These matters are related to the final status of the West Bank and Gaza. However, several principles and criteria were laid down in the "Framework" so that the negotiators will not be starting from a vacuum.

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Second:

Related to this is the fact that the Camp David accords addressed themselves squarely to the question of Jerusalem. It would be wrong to say that the Camp David formula is blank so far as Jerusalem is concerned. You will certainly recall that, throughout our conversations in Camp David, the issue of Jerusalem figured quite prominently. The draft "Framework for Comprehensive peace in the Middle East" I presented to you and to our friend President Carter on September 6, 1978, i.e., prior to the beginning of the Camp David talks devoted an article to the subject and laid down a comprehensive formula that safeguarded the interests of all

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those concerned. Four U.S. drafts submitted on September 11, 12, 13, 16 contained similar, though not quite comprehensive, provisions. When I found the proposed text inadequate with respect to Jerusalem, I requested President Carter to delete it. Thus, the overall solution of the problem was deferred to the stage of the final settlement. While the three participants in the Camp David Summit registered their respective positions, certain aspects of the question were dealt with directly or otherwise in the Framework even during the transitional period. Section A of Framework institutes a transitional regime for the West Bank and Gaza. The term "West Bank" comprises East

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Jerusalem by any geographic or political standard. This is a universal consensus of which Israel can not detract. No nation has recognized the unilateral annexation of Arab Jerusalem. It is on this basis that your representatives at the autonomy talks have been discussing with ours such issues as the voting right of the Palestinian inhabitants of East Jerusalem within the context of electing the S G A . On the other hand, paragraph A(c) of the Framework laid down the legal foundation for the negotiated final settlements. Prominent on the list was the following item:

"all the provisions and principles of U N Security Council Resolution 242".

As you well know, that Resolution contains a total prohibition against the acquisition

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of territory by war. As East Jerusalem was seized during the 1967 war, that provision applies to it, not only in our view, but also in the view of the entire World community. How far can these realities be ignored?

In your letter, you made a distinction between the rights and sentiments of Muslims and Christians with regard to Jerusalem on the one hand and the Jewish people on the other. I think that this distinction is unwarranted and unfounded. All believers in God, the people of the scripture that is, hold the city high in their thought and heart. It is part of their cultural and spiritual heritage. All of them have both rights and strong spiritual attachment to that holy place which

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symbolizes the oneness of the Divine truth.
I need not illustrate on the historical
and spiritual aspects of this unique bond.
As to the Palestinian people, Arab
Jerusalem acquires the added dimension
of being part of their national rights
as well. This is a reality no one can
escape from or disregard.

You stated, also, that the formula
I have proposed for solving the problem
of Jerusalem constituted what you called
"a contradiction in terms". I beg to
differ. I see no contradiction whatsoever
between the existence of two sovereignties
and the administrative or municipal unification
of the City. Many Israelis and prominent

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leaders of Jewish communities abroad did not fail to see the logic of this imaginative prescription for reconciliation and harmonious coexistence between the followers of the World's greatest faiths. To insist on a rigid solution based on the logic of "all or nothing at all", as advocated by the rejectionists on both sides, would be a grave historic mistake. It does nothing but perpetuate the conflict and deepen friction among cousins who should devote their efforts to a more creative and positive endeavor.

Third:

You asked, in your letter, whether the settlements were mentioned at all in the Camp David accord. Let me seize this

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opportunity to clarify this point. You certainly remember that, in Camp David, we spoke extensively of the necessity to end all settlement activities in the occupied Arab territories and withdraw the settlers in order to rehabilitate them in their own country instead of seizing other peoples' land. In view of the stand you took and the considerations you mentioned then, the commitments you made with respect to the settlements were not entered in the main text of the accord. Instead, they took the form of two undertakings from you to President Carter which were conveyed to us. The first one referred to Israeli settlements in Sinai while the other was related to settlements in

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the West Bank and Gaza, In the former undertaking, you promised to submit a motion before the Knesset within two weeks for a vote on the removal of Israeli settlers from Sinai. In the second commitment, you undertook to observe a moratorium on building new settlements for the duration of the negotiations. It was understood by all sides that the negotiations referred to in this commitment were the autonomy talks. The first commitment was honored and it contributed greatly to the beginning of the process of implementing the peace accords. I will not dwell, here, on the fate of the second commitment, for this is not the purpose of my letter. Suffice it to say that the understanding was

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that the issue would be subject to review in the negotiations in which the Palestinians are to participate. You are aware of the universal rejection of the settlement policy pursued by your government. Its adverse reaction is not confined to a certain group of countries. Most of Israel's traditional supporters took the same critical view, including Jewish communities everywhere. It might be appropriate to mention here what I said on this point at the National Press Club in Washington on April 10, 1980:

"The policy of building Israeli settlements in Arab occupied territories is a serious obstacle to peace. It is unfounded, ill-conceived and illegal. It generates

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hatred and friction. It is the worst formula for co-existence. In fact it is an invitation to further violence and unrest. Much has been said about the right of Jews to live anywhere. Certainly, all peoples must be treated equally and without any discrimination. However, no people has any right to live in other peoples' territory without their consent and free acceptance. To say otherwise would not only run contrary to the norms of international law and legitimacy, but it would also create a dangerous precedent none of us can live with. The effort which is wasted on such futile exercises should be directed towards imaginative ways

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and means for promoting peace and good-neighborly relations".

At this point, I think that it is useful to help you recollect our conversation in El-Arish, a conversation which, in my opinion, should not have given rise to any controversy. Without getting into the details, the gist of what I told you was that we should look at the case as a whole and in all its aspects, rather than the Israeli-Egyptian dimension of it. In this context; I said that if we agree on an imaginative solution to the questions of Jerusalem and the settlements, we would be willing to consider providing you with water for the purpose of rehabilitating the settlers

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in new quarters in the Negev; i.e., in their own land. As I told you then, I was willing to do that in order to find a way out of this dilemma for all the parties involved. It is common knowledge that I take it upon myself to find a way out for my Arab brothers although I am under no obligation to do that. Here, I am motivated solely by my unshakable commitment to peace between Arabs and Jews. To this end, I have taken many risks and I remain willing to double my effort, despite the negative attitude of those who were supposed to bear this responsibility with me. This is a historic mission I fully accept. If the generous offers I make for

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the sake of peace are neither appreciated nor acted upon, we will have to start with a clean slate, but we will not be deterred in our holy search for peace and justice for all the peoples of the area.

I regret the fact that you made a sweeping statement in your letter that none of the settlements in the West Bank, the Gaza Strip and the Golan Heights will ever be removed. This is the kind of statement that should be avoided under all circumstances. By saying that, are you precluding the possibility that the parties might agree on

the removal of these settlements in the future ? Is this what you

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call "the negotiability of all issues?"

Fourth:

I think that it is a disservice to the Camp David accord to say that it did not contain one word about the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination. As you well know, the Camp David formula makes the determination of the final status of the West Bank and Gaza subject to the second stage negotiations to be held within three years. However, there are certain unmistakable indications in the "Framework" as to which form this determination should take. Let me quote here the following sentence from Section A(c) of the Framework":

The solution from the negotiations must

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also recognize the legitimate rights of the Palestinian People and their just requirements."

What are these rights if they do not include the fundamental right to self-determination which is part of the jus cogens of the contemporary world?!

When we call for recognizing the Palestinian people's right to self-determination, we are by no means taking a new position. In my address to the Israeli people on November 20, 1977 I stated our position in no ambiguous terms. I said: "If you have found the legal and moral justification for establishing a national home on a land which was not entirely owned by you, a fortiori, you should understand the determination of the Palestinian people

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to reestablish their state on their land."

Fifth:

Linked to this, is your claim that Security Council Resolution 242 does not call for the withdrawal of Israeli forces to the pre-June 5, 1967 lines. Unwilling to get into an argument of this nature, I would merely mention that we should not indulge into such semantic arguments which belong to the past. The question is not one of the insertion or absence of a definite article here or there. Ideally, it should not even be one of a given text at all. The stake is too high for all of us to hinge on a word, a sentence or even on a whole text. It is a matter of will to establish a just peace of which all the parties benefit. The remaining

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details are nothing but technicalities. But if it a matter of interpretation of Resolution 242, it has been established beyond doubt that the absence of the definite article is immaterial. In our Peace Treaty, we set a good precedent when we upheld the principle of mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity. This was a good application of Resolution 242. It produced very positive results which were considered impossible even to dream of only a few months before. Why not follow this successful example on the other fronts?

Let me also remind you of what I said in my address before the Knesset on that point:

"In all candor, and in the spirit which prompted me to come here today, I say to

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you that you should abandon for good all
expansionist designs based on conquest.

You must also stop thinking that force
is the best way to deal with the Arabs

.....
.....

There are Arab territories which Israel
occupied and still occupies. We insist
on total withdrawal from these territories,
including Arab Jerusalem Jerusalem
to which I came as the city of peace which
has been, and will always remain, the
living symbol of coexistence between all
followers of the three great religions".

Sixth:

In your letter, you asked the rather
rhetorical question whether Egypt can

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bring the Palestinians to the table of the negotiations. In turn, let me ask you what you did to encourage them to do so. Do you really believe that such actions and statements on Jerusalem and the settlements constitute any attraction for the Palestinians?

How about the escalation of repression in the occupied territory? The imposition of long curfews arbitrarily, the banishment of Mayors, the closing down of universities and other institutes of learning? Do negative statements on the future of the West Bank and Gaza provide any incentive for the most moderate elements among the Palestinians? As to what we did, you know only too well the burden we accepted to bear under the most difficult circumstances.

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We went as far as offering you our life-line, the water of the Nile if we succeed to solve the problems of Jerusalem and the settlements. No one else would have done that for the sake of comprehensive peace. We volunteered this offer despite the excesses we were subjected to from our Arab brothers and despite the misunderstanding of our intention on your part. But this is our role to play in the area and such is our commitment to peace.

Seventh:

You alleged in your letter that Egypt has violated the Peace Treaty when it took a critical view of certain aspects of the Israeli policy. Let me correct you on that point which is too serious to be

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taken lightly. We have stated repeatedly that we will honor all our commitments under the Peace Treaty. Similarly, I have not hesitated to recognize your carrying out of your undertakings arising from the Treaty in good faith. I consider it a matter of top priority to reinforce our peoples' confidence in the peace process. Therefore; I do not think that it serves any useful purpose to raise such a sensitive point outside the proper context.

The undertaking to abstain from hostile propaganda does not at all mean that either party should accept the policies or actions of the other whether he finds them right or not.

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We remain free to differ on certain issues and criticize certain policies. This is the nature of international life. It is the case in the dealings among old friends. We live in an age of diversity and multiplicity.

While I stated on previous occasions that I do not recommend personal attacks in the press for any reason, we can not possibly prevent our press from taking issue with certain actions and statements. It is a law of nature, not only of physics, that every action has a reaction which is basically similar in kind and degree. Thus, extremism and negativism can breed only sharp reactions. I wish we can do without both action and reaction.

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You made a remark that the Egyptian press is not free of government influence. This is a gross and unfortunate misrepresentation. You should know by now that we take pride in the fact that we have established a democratic system of government under which people are free to take whatever views they deem fit. The Egyptian government is being criticized daily on various issues and we consider this a shining feature of our democracy.

Finally, you complained that our officials "influence African governments not to renew diplomatic relations with Israel." This allegation is based on misinformation and on the wrong notion that African governments formulate their policy and take their decisions on the basis of the influence they fall under.

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This is far from the truth, for our African brothers who assume the responsibility in their countries are all veteran freedom fighters who are endowed with vision and high moral standards. They make their policy according to the dictates of their conscience, their own independent evaluation of events and their perception of the pan-African interest. They value their hard-won independence very highly.

Do you really believe that actions in the West Bank and Gaza and the negative statements which have been made in the past few months were likely to win for you the support of African leaders? Has it occurred to you why all governments in different parts of the World should

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take this view of your policy?

Dear Prime Minister Begin,

Perhaps what I regret most is that you did not respond to several points I raised in my previous letter. Thus, the obstacles on the road to peace remain there and I can not see how we can resume the negotiations under these circumstances. As I told you, my allegiance to the cause of peace prevents me from accepting a situation where the peace negotiations degenerate into a meaningless exercise which erodes our peoples' faith and confidence in peace. It is not my intention to get involved into a verbal or rhetorical exchange which is not likely to serve the

*The President
of the Arab Republic of Egypt*

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(34)

interests of any of us, not to mention the interest of peace. As we committed ourselves to continue our work until we end the dispute peacefully, I believe that the best course of action for us is to hold a summit conference in an attempt to stem these lingering differences before they jeopardize our mission. On the other hand, it would be unfair and discourteous to impose this problem on our friend and full partner President Carter at this point in view of his other preoccupations which are obviously more pressing. You remember that I described him at Camp David as the unknown soldier who dedicated himself to the cause of peace. The least we can do in recognition of his contribution is to appreciate his


The President
of the Arab Republic of Egypt

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(35)

position and hold the summit when these
preoccupations are over. I am sure that
you share this view with me.

With best wishes.



Mohammed Anwar El Sadat.

AUG. 14 , 1980

GR 450

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FM UKMIS NEW YORK 132317Z AUG 80

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1124 OF 13 AUGUST 1980

INFO PRIORITY PARIS, WASHINGTON.

INFO ROUTINE TEL AVIV, CAIRO, BEIRUT, JERUSALEM, AMMAN,
DAMASCUS, THE HAGUE.

MIPT : JERUSALEM

2 / TEL NUMBER 1124 OF 13 AUGUST FROM UKMIS NEW YORK
TEXT OF WESTERN FOUR DRAFT IS AS FOLLOWS:-

- A. HAVING CONSIDERED THE LETTER OF 1 AUGUST 1980 FROM THE REPRESENTATIVE OF PAKISTAN, THE CURRENT CHAIRMAN OF THE ORGANIZATION OF THE ISLAMIC CONFERENCE, AS CONTAINED IN DOCUMENT S/14084 DATED 1 AUGUST 1980.
- B. RECALLING ITS RESOLUTION 476 (1980) OF 30 JUNE 1980.
- C. REAFFIRMING AGAIN THAT THE ACQUISITION OF TERRITORY BY FORCE IS INADMISSIBLE.
- D. DEEPLY CONCERNED OVER THE ENACTMENT OF A "BASIC LAW" IN THE ISRAELI KNESSET PROCLAIMING A CHANGE IN THE CHARACTER AND STATUS OF THE HOLY CITY OF JERUSALEM.
- E. NOTING THAT ISRAEL HAS NOT COMPLIED WITH SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 476 OF 30 JUNE 1980.
- F. REAFFIRMING ITS DETERMINATION TO EXAMINE PRACTICAL WAYS AND MEANS IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE RELEVANT PROVISIONS OF THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS TO SECURE THE FULL IMPLEMENTATION OF ITS RESOLUTION 476 (1980) OF 30 JUNE 1980, IN THE EVENT OF NON-COMPLIANCE BY ISRAEL.
 1. CONDEMNS THE ENACTMENT BY ISRAEL OF THE "BASIC LAW" ON JERUSALEM, WHICH CONSTITUTES A SERIOUS OBSTACLE TO ACHIEVING A COMPREHENSIVE, JUST AND LASTING PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST;
 2. AFFIRMS THAT THE ENACTMENT OF THE "BASIC LAW" CONSTITUTES A VIOLATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW;
 3. DETERMINES THAT ALL LEGISLATIVE AND ADMINISTRATIVE MEASURES AND ACTIONS TAKEN BY ISRAEL, THE OCCUPYING POWER, WHICH HAVE ALTERED OR PURPORT TO ALTER THE CHARACTER AND STATUS OF THE HOLY CITY OF JERUSALEM, AND IN PARTICULAR THE "BASIC LAW" ON JERUSALEM, ARE NULL AND VOID AND MUST BE RESCINDED FORTHWITH;
 4. CALLS UPON ALL MEMBER STATES OF THE UNITED NATIONS NOT TO RECOGNISE THE PURPORTED ALTERATION BY ISRAEL OF THE STATUS OF JERUSALEM AND TO THAT END;

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(A)

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- (A) TO REFRAIN FROM ESTABLISHING OR MAINTAINING EMBASSIES IN JERUSALEM:
 - (B) TO AVOID DEALING WITH THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT IN THE PART OF JERUSALEM OCCUPIED BY ISRAEL SINCE 1967, AND
 - (C) NOT TO PARTICIPATE IN ANY EVENT ORGANIZED BY THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL IN THAT PART OF JERUSALEM:
5. REQUESTS THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO REPORT TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS RESOLUTION BEFORE 15 NOVEMBER 1980:
6. DECIDES TO REMAIN SEIZED OF THIS SERIOUS SITUATION.

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FROM UKMIS NEW YORK 132315Z AUG 80

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1123 OF 13 AUGUST

INFO PRIORITY PARIS WASHINGTON

INFO TEL AVIV CAIRO BEIRUT JERUSALEM AMMAN DAMASCUS THE HAGUE

YOUR TELNO 583 (NOT TO ALL): JERUSALEM

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1123 OF 13 AUGUST FROM UKMIS NEW YORK

1. PEREIRA (PORTUGAL), PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL FOR THE MONTH, CALLED THE OTHER FOUR WESTERN MEMBERS TO AN INFORMAL MEETING THIS MORNING. HE SAID THAT ESSAAFI (TUNISIA) UNDERSTOOD WELL THE WESTERN POSITION ON THE PRESENT DRAFT RESOLUTION (MY TELNO 1115 - NOT TO ALL), BUT HE CONTINUED TO APPEAL FOR A TEXT WHICH HE COULD PUT TO HIS ISLAMIC COLLEAGUES AS EVIDENCE OF WHAT WE WOULD BE ABLE TO VOTE FOR, OR AT LEAST NOT TO VETO. PEREIRA SAID THAT HE DID NOT THINK WE SHOULD GO ANY FURTHER THAN WE HAD SO FAR IN DISCUSSING A POSSIBLE RESOLUTION WITH THE ISLAMIC MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL WITHOUT BEING CLEARER ON WHAT, IF ANYTHING, THE US COULD TOLERATE.

2. VANDEN HEUVEL (US) SAID THAT IF THE PRESENT DRAFT WAS PUT TO A VOTE THE US WOULD EITHER VETO OR NON-PARTICIPATE ON THE GROUNDS THAT SANCTIONS WOULD NOT BE HELPFUL TO THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS (WE BELIEVE THAT NON-PARTICIPATION WAS A PERSONAL IDEA THAT HAS NOT BEEN SERIOUSLY CONSIDERED IN WASHINGTON). VANDEN HEUVEL SAID THAT HE THOUGHT IT WOULD BE EASIER FOR THE AMERICANS TO LIVE WITH CONDEMNATION OF THE NEW KNESSET LAW THAN WITH CONDEMNATION OF ISRAEL. HE SUGGESTED THAT THE OTHER FOUR SHOULD PRODUCE AN INFORMAL DRAFT RESOLUTION OF THE KIND WE FELT OUR GOVERNMENTS MIGHT BE ABLE TO ACCEPT AND HE WOULD UNDERTAKE TO SEEK A MORE DEFINITIVE VIEW FROM MUSKIE WHOM HE WOULD BE SEEING LATER TODAY.

3. THE WESTERN FOUR PRODUCED THE TEXT IN MIFT AND PASSED IT TO VANDEN HEUVEL INFORMALLY. IT HAS NOW BEEN OVERTAKEN. DURING THE DAY, THE TUNISIANS WITH HELP FROM OTHER MODERATE ISLAMIC COUNTRIES, EXPLAINED TO THE ISLAMIC GROUP THAT THE WESTERN FIVE WERE NOT HAPPY WITH THE CHAPTER VII LANGUAGE OF THE DRAFT RESOLUTION, BUT THAT THEY MIGHT BE ABLE TO CONTEMPLATE THE REPLACEMENT OF OPERATIVE PARA 6 BY LIMITED MEASURES CONSEQUENT UPON A DETERMINATION THAT THE KNESSET LAW ON JERUSALEM WAS NULL AND VOID. AS A RESULT THE ISLAMIC GROUP ARE NOW PROPOSING THE FOLLOWING SCENARIO.

4. THEY WILL FIRST TABLE THE DRAFT RESOLUTION IN MY TEL-NO 1115 (EXCEPT THAT PARA 6 WILL NOW READ "CALLS UPON ALL MEMBER STATES OF THE UNITED NATIONS TO APPLY MEASURES AGAINST ISRAEL AS PROVIDED IN ARTICLE 41 (CHAPTER VII) OF THE CHARTER, INCLUDING INTERRUPTION OF ECONOMIC AND MILITARY RELATIONS WITH ISRAEL") AND SUBSEQUENTLY

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/TABLE

TABLE THE SAME RESOLUTION WITH THE OMISSION OF PARA 6 AND THE EXTENSION OF PARA 5 AFTER "ALL STATES" TO READ:-

"(A) TO ABIDE BY THIS DECISION:

(B) NOT TO DEAL WITH THE ISRAELI INSTITUTIONS ESTABLISHED IN JERUSALEM:

(C) IN PARTICULAR THOSE STATES THAT HAVE ESTABLISHED DIPLOMATIC REPRESENTATIONS IN JERUSALEM TO WITHDRAW SUCH REPRESENTATIONS FROM THE HOLY CITY."

AT THE APPROPRIATE MOMENT THE PRESIDENT WOULD CALL FOR A VOTE ON THE SECOND RESOLUTION AND THE FIRST WILL NOT REPEAT NOT BE PUT TO A VOTE.

5. ESSAAFI (TUNISIA) HAS PROPOSED A MEETING WITH THE WESTERN FIVE FOR TOMORROW MORNING AT 1600Z. THE WESTERN FIVE WILL MEET PRIVATELY IN ADVANCE. THE FRENCH HAVE TOLD US THAT IF PARA 5(B) OF THE SECOND RESOLUTION IS AMENDED AFTER "ESTABLISHED" TO READ "IN THAT PART OF JERUSALEM OCCUPIED BY ISRAEL SINCE 1967" THEY WILL BE ABLE TO VOTE IN FAVOUR. MEANWHILE, THE AMERICANS HAVE TOLD US TONIGHT THAT THE PRESIDENT AND MUSKIE ARE COMPLETELY TIED UP WITH THE DEMOCRATIC CONVENTION HERE AND THAT THEY ARE CONSEQUENTLY UNLIKELY TO BE ABLE TO PROVIDE ANY REACTIONS TO THE SCENARIO BEFORE FRIDAY MORNING.

6. GIVEN THE FRENCH POSITION, WHICH IS LIKELY TO BE FOLLOWED BY THE PORTUGUESE, WE MAY HAVE DIFFICULTY IN GAINING THE FIVE'S SUPPORT FOR NEGOTIATING THE FURTHER AMENDMENTS TO THE SECOND RESOLUTION WHICH WE NEED (I.E. THE REMOVAL OF THE LAST PHRASE OF OPERATIVE PARA 4 CONCERNING THE THREAT TO INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY AND, IF POSSIBLE, OF "CONDEMNS" IN OPERATIVE PARA 1).

7. WE ASSUME YOU WOULD ALSO LIKE US TO TRY TO GET THE FIVE'S AGREEMENT TO PROPOSE TO ESSAAFI THE FORM OF WORDING OF OPERATIVE PARA 1 OF THE DRAFT IN OUR MIFT. ADDITIONALLY, FOR LEGAL REASONS, WE FEEL THAT WE SHOULD TRY TO OBTAIN AGREEMENT TO AMEND OPERATIVE PARA 3 TO READ "AFFIRMS THAT THE ENACTMENT OF THE "BASIC LAW" CONSTITUTES A VIOLATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND DOES NOT AFFECT THE CONTINUED APPLICATION OF THE FOURTH GENEVA CONVENTION OF 12 AUGUST 1949 RELATIVE TO THE PROTECTION OF CIVILIAN PERSONS IN TIME OF WAR."

8. WE SHOULD BE GRATEFUL FOR YOUR INSTRUCTIONS BY 141330Z BEARING IN MIND THAT THE FRENCH ARE NOW UNLIKELY TO TAKE THE LEAD WITH ESSAAFI, ON THE CONTENTS OF NEW PARA 5 AND THE TACTICS WE SHOULD ADOPT BOTH WITH THE WESTERN FIVE AND THE MOSLEM MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL. / y
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TO PRIORITY FCO
TELNO 309 OF 13 AUG 80
INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON

Prime Minister

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ROUTINE UKMIS NEW YORK CAIRO TEL AVIV JERUSALEM BONN
BRUSSELS COPENHAGEN DUBLIN THE HAGUE LUXEMBOURG
PARIS ROME AND UKREP BRUSSELS.

mb

SAVING TO BEIRUT AND DAMASCUS

WASHINGTON TELNO 3751: THORN MISSION

1. THE THORN/KING HUSSEIN EXCHANGES ON 10 AUGUST ABOUT A POSSIBLE CAMP DAVID SUMMIT OCCURRED AS A RESULT OF AN ARTICLE THAT DAY IN THE JORDAN TIMES HEADLINED "CARTER MAY CALL SUMMIT ON JERUSALEM QUESTION". THE KEY PASSAGE IN THIS ARTICLE READ AS FOLLOWS:

" MEANWHILE, THE AUTHORITATIVE OCTOBER MAGAZINE SAID IN AN ARTICLE TODAY THAT MR CARTER MAY CALL A SUMMIT IN WASHINGTON SOON AFTER THE DEMOCRATIC CONVENTION (WHICH BEGINS MONDAY) TO PRESS FOR TANGIBLE RESULTS IN THE STALLED NEGOTIATIONS. THE OUTCOME, THE ARTICLE SAID, MAY ALSO BOOST MR CARTER'S CHANCES OF RE-ELECTION.

" THE ARTICLE BY THE MAGAZINE'S EDITOR IN CHIEF, MR ANIS MANSOUR, A CLOSE FRIEND OF MR SADAT, SAID THE SUMMIT WOULD LIKELY CONCENTRATE ON THE CONTROVERSIAL ISSUE OF JERUSALEM".

2. GIVEN THAT THE STORY CAME FROM AN EGYPTIAN COURSE, KING HUSSEIN PRESUMABLY CONCLUDED THAT THERE MIGHT WELL BE SOMETHING IN THE WIND. AND, GIVEN THE PAST HISTORY OF US/JORDAN RELATIONS AND CAMP DAVID, KING HUSSEIN WOULD NOT NECESSARILY HAVE DECIDED THAT THE PRESS REPORT MUST BE WRONG BECAUSE HE HAD HEARD NOTHING IN ADVANCE OFFICIALLY FROM THE AMERICANS.

3. MY US COLLEAGUE TELLS ME THAT THE JORDAN TIMES ARTICLE WAS REPORTED WITH DAILY FBIS PRESS ROUND-UP BUT NOT IN ANY SEPARATE TELEGRAM TO THE STATE DEPARTMENT.

FCO PASS SAVING TO BEIRUT AND DAMASCUS

SINDALL

[PASSED AS REQUESTED]

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Middle East

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

13 August 1980

Dear Paul

The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary spoke to the Prime Minister on the telephone last night about foreign affairs questions which might require action whilst the Prime Minister is abroad on holiday.

They agreed that the only problem on which further consultation between them might be necessary was the forthcoming Security Council vote on Jerusalem. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary explained that some of his advisers were most concerned about the effect of a UK veto on our relations with the Arab world, and especially our improving relations with Saudi Arabia and Iraq. There was clearly no question of a triple veto, but in his view the UK should veto any resolution covering sanctions against Israel. There were, however, signs that the present resolution might not attract the necessary nine positive votes. It seemed likely that the sponsors would consider alternative language if they were unable to obtain nine votes. If sanctions disappeared from the text, he proposed that the UK should abstain, even though the remaining language about Israel would doubtless be harsh. There might of course be something of a grey area in the decision to switch from veto to abstention, and he would consult the Prime Minister further before giving final instructions if this seemed necessary. He hoped not to have to bother her.

The Prime Minister was content to leave matters on this basis. You will no doubt be in touch with us nearer the time of the vote if the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary wishes to consult the Prime Minister further.

I am sending a copy of this letter to David Wright (Cabinet Office).

Yours ever

Mike Pattison

Paul Lever, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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FM UKMIS NEW YORK 112235Z AUG 80

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1115 OF 11 AUGUST 1980

INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON, PARIS, TEL AVIV, CAIRO, BEIRUT, JERUSALEM,
AMMAN, DAMASCUS.

MIPT: SECURITY COUNCIL: JERUSALEM

X
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1115 OF 11 AUGUST FROM UKMIS NEW YORK

TEXT OF DRAFT RESOLUTION IS AS FOLLOWS:

THE SECURITY COUNCIL,

A. HAVING CONSIDERED THE LETTER OF 1 AUGUST 1980 FROM THE REPRESENTATIVE OF PAKISTAN, THE CURRENT CHAIRMAN OF THE ORGANISATION OF THE ISLAMIC CONFERENCE, AS CONTAINED IN DOCUMENT S/14084 DATED 1 AUGUST 1980,

B. RECALLING ITS RESOLUTION 476 (1980) OF 30 JUNE 1980, AND IN PARTICULAR PARAGRAPHS 5 AND 6 THEREIN,

C. REAFFIRMING AGAIN THAT THE ACQUISITION OF TERRITORY BY FORCE IS INADMISSIBLE.

D. DEEPLY CONCERNED OVER THE ENACTMENT OF A "BASIC LAW" IN THE ISRAELI KNESSET PROCLAIMING A CHANGE IN THE CHARACTER AND STATUS OF THE HOLY CITY OF JERUSALEM,

E. NOTING THAT ISRAEL HAS NOT COMPLIED WITH SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 476 (1980) OF 30 JUNE 1980,

F. REAFFIRMING ITS DETERMINATION TO EXAMINE PRACTICAL WAYS AND MEANS IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE RELEVANT PROVISIONS OF THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS TO SECURE THE FULL IMPLEMENTATION OF ITS RESOLUTION 476 (1980) OF 30 JUNE 1980, IN THE EVENT OF NON-COMPLIANCE BY ISRAEL.

1. CONDEMNS ISRAEL FOR ITS REFUSAL TO COMPLY WITH SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 476 (1980);

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2. DETERMINES THAT ALL LEGISLATIVE AND ADMINISTRATIVE MEASURES AND ACTIONS TAKEN BY ISRAEL, THE OCCUPYING POWER, WHICH HAVE ALTERED OR PURPORT TO ALTER THE CHARACTER AND STATUS OF THE HOLY CITY OF JERUSALEM, AND IN PARTICULAR THE RECENT "BASIC LAW" ON JERUSALEM, ARE NULL AND VOID AND MUST BE RESCINDED FORTHWITH:
3. AFFIRMS THAT THE ENACTMENT OF A "BASIC LAW" ON JERUSALEM BY ISRAEL, THE OCCUPYING POWER, CONSTITUTES A FLAGRANT VIOLATION OF THE FOURTH GENEVA CONVENTION OF 12 AUGUST 1949 RELATIVE TO THE PROTECTION OF CIVILIAN PERSONS IN TIME OF WAR:
4. AFFIRMS ALSO THAT THIS ACTION CONSTITUTES A SERIOUS OBSTRUCTION TO ACHIEVING A COMPREHENSIVE, JUST AND LASTING PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST, AND CONSTITUTES A THREAT TO INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY:
5. DECIDES TO REFUSE TO ACCORD ANY RECOGNITION TO THE "BASIC LAW" ON JERUSALEM AND CALLS UPON ALL STATES TO ABIDE BY THIS DECISION:
6. CALLS UPON ALL MEMBERS OF THE UNITED NATIONS, IN THE EVENT OF NON-COMPLIANCE BY ISRAEL WITH THIS RESOLUTION BEFORE 15 NOVEMBER 1980, TO APPLY MEASURES AGAINST ISRAEL AS PROVIDED IN ARTICLE 41 (CHAPTER VII) OF THE CHARTER.
7. REQUESTS THE SECRETARY GENERAL TO REPORT TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS RESOLUTION BEFORE 15 NOVEMBER 1980:
8. DECIDES TO REMAIN SEIZED OF THIS SERIOUS SITUATION. /x

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FM UKMIS NEW YORK 112230Z AUG 80

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1114 OF 11 AUGUST 1980

INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON, PARIS, TEL AVIV, CAIRO, BEIRUT, JERUSALEM, AMMAN, DAMASCUS.

MYTEL 1105: SECURITY COUNCIL: JERUSALEM.

1. AT THIS MORNING'S (11 AUGUST) INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS OF THE WHOLE, IT WAS AGREED, AT ESSAAFI'S (TUNISIA) REQUEST THAT THE FORMAL COUNCIL MEETING SHOULD BE SCHEDULED FOR FRIDAY. HIS FURTHER REQUEST FOR A BRIEF DEBATE AND VOTE THAT DAY WAS SYMPATHETICALLY RECEIVED. KING HASSAN HAS CALLED A MEETING OF THE COMMITTEE ON JERUSALEM FOR NEXT WEEKEND IN CASABLANCA AND THE ISLAMIC GROUP WANT THE COUNCIL TO VOTE ON THE RESOLUTION BEFORE THEN. AGHA SHAHI (PAKISTAN) WILL BE ARRIVING HERE LATER THIS WEEK TO MAKE THE ISLAMIC GROUP PRESENTATION TO THE COUNCIL BEFORE PROCEEDING TO CASABLANCA.

2. FOLLOWING THE MEETING BETWEEN THE MOSLEM AND THE NON-ALIGNED MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL EARLIER TODAY, A REVISED DRAFT RESOLUTION IS BEING CIRCULATED. THIS IS MUCH AS FORESEEN IN PARA 3 OF MY TELEGRAM UNDER REFERENCE EXCEPT THAT THE DEADLINE FOR CALLING FOR SANCTIONS HAS BEEN EXTENDED TO 15 NOVEMBER. FOR EASE OF REFERENCE THE FULL TEXT OF THE REVISED DRAFT IS IN MIFT.

3. FOLLOWING THE INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS, FUTSCHER PEREIRA (PORTUGAL) TOLD THE WESTERN FIVE THAT ESSAAFI HAD APPEALED TO HIM TO GET THE WESTERN MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL TO PRESENT COUNTER-PROPOSALS. ESSAAFI HAD EVEN SUGGESTED ON A PERSONAL BASIS THAT A WESTERN COUNTER-DRAFT WHICH WOULD OBVIOUSLY OMIT REFERENCE TO CHAPTER VII MEASURES, COULD INCLUDE A CALL TO THOSE MEMBERS OF THE UNITED NATIONS WITH EMBASSIES IN JERUSALEM TO REMOVE THEM: AND PERHAPS A CALL TO MEMBER STATES NOT TO DEAL WITH ANY ISRAELI GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENT SITUATED IN EAST JERUSALEM.

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Prime Minister

had Cawington may telephone you, about our handling of the Security Council vote, tonight. MAF 12/8

14.

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4. PEREIRA WAS INCLINED TO REACT POSITIVELY TO ESSAAFI'S PLEA BUT MCHENRY (US) SAID THAT THE MAIN PROBLEM FOR THE ARABS WAS THAT THEY WERE NOT SURE OF NINE VOTES AND THAT WE SHOULD NOT HELP THEM OFF THE HOOK (THE MEXICAN REPRESENTATIVE HAS LET IT BE KNOWN THAT HE HAS INSTRUCTIONS TO ABSTAIN ON THE ORIGINAL TEXT AND THE PHILIPPINE REPRESENTATIVE HAS ALSO VOICED HIS GOVERNMENT'S RESERVATIONS). HUSSON (FRANCE) ARGUED THAT WE SHOULD DRAFT SOMETHING ALONG THE LINES OF ESSAAFI'S SUGGESTIONS, BUT NORWAY SUPPORTED ME IN THE VIEW THAT IT WAS TOO EARLY TO ENTER THE NEGOTIATING PHASE.

5. THE FRENCH WILL NONETHELESS PROBABLY PRODUCE A DRAFT IN THE NEXT DAY OR TWO AND WILL PRESUMABLY SEEK WESTERN AGREEMENT BEFORE PASSING IT TO ESSAAFI. MEANWHILE WE HAVE NO INDICATION OF ANY REAL SOFTENING IN THE ISLAMIC GROUP'S POSITION. IT IS THEREFORE IMPORTANT NOT TO PLAY OUR CARDS TOO SOON IE NOT BEFORE THE ISLAMIC GROUP START COMING UP AGAINST THEIR SELF IMPOSED DEADLINE. MOREOVER THERE IS THE PROBLEM THAT ANY CALL FOR THE REMOVAL OF EMBASSIES FROM JERUSALEM WOULD DIRECTLY AFFECT ONE OF OUR COMMUNITY PARTNERS, THE NETHERLANDS.

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Prime Minister

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TO PRIORITY FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 497 OF 11 AUGUST

INFO PRIORITY TEL AVIV, WASHINGTON, JERUSALEM AND BUCHAREST

TEL AVIV TELNO 341 (NOT TO BUCHAREST): AUTONOMY NEGOTIATIONS

1. ON 8 AUGUST THE ISRAELI AMBASSADOR HANDED THE VICE-PRESIDENT MR BEGIN'S REPLY TO PRESIDENT SADAT'S LETTER. MUBARAK SUBSEQUENTLY TOLD THE PRESS THAT EGYPT REJECTED ALL PRECONDITIONS IMPOSED BY ISRAEL (ESPECIALLY, NOT DOUBT, AS REGARDS THE STATUS OF JERUSALEM) AND COULD NOT RESUME THE TALKS ON THE BASIS OF SUCH PRECONDITIONS. HE HAD TAKEN UP WITH THE ISRAELI AMBASSADOR THE FACT THAT PARTS OF THE MESSAGE HAD BEEN PUBLISHED IN ISRAEL BEFORE IT WAS DELIVERED. A DRAFT ANSWER IS BEING PREPARED FOR PRESIDENT SADAT.

2. TODAY'S PRESS PROMINENTLY QUOTES THE FOREIGN MINISTER AS SAYING THAT THERE COULD BE NO RESUMPTION OF NEGOTIATIONS WHILE

2. TODAY'S PRESS PROMINENTLY QUOTES THE FOREIGN MINISTER AS SAYING THAT THERE COULD BE NO RESUMPTION OF NEGOTIATIONS WHILE THE ISRAELI POSITION REMAINED AS IT WAS. EGYPT REJECTED ISRAELI ATTEMPTS TO AVOID HER COMMITMENTS ON AUTONOMY (WHICH INCLUDED THE RIGHT OF SELF-DETERMINATION FREE FROM OUTSIDE INTERFERENCE) AND TO DISTORT THE SPIRIT OF CAMP DAVID. AUTONOMY COVERED LAND AS WELL AS PEOPLE, ISRAELI SETTLEMENTS WERE ILLEGAL AND EAST JERUSALEM WAS AN INTEGRAL PART OF THE WEST BANK. HE GAVE DETAILS OF MOVES TO EXPLAIN THE EGYPTAIN CASE, INCLUDING THE VICE-PRESIDENT'S TRIP NEXT MONTH TO LONDON AND PARIS AND A SHORT VISIT BY THE MINISTER OF STATE, DR GHALI, TO ROMANIA TOMORROW. ON 17 AUGUST MR LINOWITZ, THE US ENVOY, WOULD VISIT CAIRO AND THEN ISRAEL TO ASSESS THE PROSPECTS FOR A RESUMPTION OF NEGOTIATIONS.

3. THIS IS STRONG LANGUAGE, BUT THE EGYPTIAN ATTITUDE TO A RESUMPTION OF NEGOTIATIONS WILL BE DETERMINED BY THE PRESIDENT, WHOSE VIEWS ARE NOT YET KNOWN.

BARRINGTON

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Prime Minister

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TO PRIORITY FCO

TELNO 306 OF 11 AUG 80

INFO ROUTINE WASHINGTON UKMIS NEW YORK EC POSTS BEIRUT CAIRO
DAMASCUS TEL AVIV AND JERUSALEM

MP 12/8

MIDDLE EAST THORN MISSION

1. M. GASTON THORN VISITED AMMAN FROM 7-10 AUGUST. HE SAW KING HUSSEIN, CROWN PRINCE HASSAN, THE JORDANIAN PRIME MINISTER AND THE FOREIGN MINISTER. HE ALSO HAD TWO HOURS OF GENERAL CONVERSATION WITH A REPRESENTATIVE GROUP OF WEST BANKERS, ARRANGED BY AND HELD AT THE HOUSE OF THE FOREIGN MINISTER. HE WAS TAKEN FOR A HELICOPTER TOUR OF THE JORDAN VALLEY AND ALSO FITTED IN A DAY TRIP TO PETRA. HIS AUDIENCE WITH KING HUSSEIN COULD ONLY BE ARRANGED AT THE LAST MINUTE ON 10 AUGUST AND HE DEPARTED IMMEDIATELY THEREAFTER FOR PALMA WHERE HE WAS DUE TO MEET MR. KREISKY. HE COULD ONLY THEREFORE SPARE TIME TO GIVE LOCAL REPRESENTATIVES OF THE NINE A QUICK FIVE MINUTE BRIEFING AT AMMAN AIRPORT BEFORE BOARDING HIS PLANE. M. THORN SAID THAT, BECAUSE OF THIS M. MERTZ WOULD PROVIDE A FULLER BRIEFING ABOUT THE AMMAN VISIT AFTER HIS RETURN TO LUXEMBOURG. THE MAIN POINTS OF THE BRIEFING WERE AS FOLLOWS:

2. JERUSALEM.

KING HUSSEIN HAS SAID HE WAS ABOUT TO ISSUE A "VERY STRONG" STATEMENT ON JERUSALEM. JERUSALEM WAS "HIS CONCERN" ABOVE ANYONE ELSE'S AND, NOW THAT HE WAS BACK IN AMMAN, HE FELT IT WAS ESSENTIAL FOR BOTH INTERNATIONAL AND INTER-ARAB REASONS TO MAKE A FIRM PRONOUNCEMENT. HE WAS TO DISCUSS THIS FURTHER AT A CABINET MEETING AFTER M. THORN'S DEPARTURE. KING HUSSEIN HAD REACTED COOLY TO REPORTS IN THE JORDANIAN PRESS TODAY THAT PRESIDENT CARTER MIGHT CONVENE A CAMP DAVID SUMMIT TO DISCUSS JERUSALEM. HE THOUGHT SUCH A SUMMIT MIGHT ONLY TURN OUT TO BE "A PIECE OF GADGETRY" AND WONDERED WHY, IF IT TOOK PLACE, IT WOULD ONLY CONCERN ITSELF WITH JERUSALEM.

3. EUROPEAN INITIATIVE.

KING HUSSEIN CONFIRMED HIS APPROVAL OF THE VENICE DECLARATION. HE BELIEVED THAT, IN PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES, ONLY EUROPE WAS IN A POSITION TO PLAY A SERIOUS ROLE OVER THE MIDDLE

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EAST IN WHICH THE PARTIES TO THE DISPUTE COULD HAVE ANY CONFIDENCE. HE HAD HAD SOME DIFFICULTY PERSUADING SOME OF HIS ARAB PARTNERS THAT EUROPE SHOULD BE TAKEN SERIOUSLY SEMICOLON BUT HE WOULD CONTINUE TO TRY TO CONVINCED THEM OF THIS EVEN THOUGH HE ATTRACTED CRITICISM FOR DOING SO. KING HUSSEIN STRESSED THAT THE EUROPEANS MUST NOW MAINTAIN THE MOMENTUM SEMICOLON ONE VISIT WAS NOT ENOUGH. AS PART OF THIS PROCESS, KING HUSSEIN SAID HE WOULD LIKE TO SEE A EURO-ARAB MEETING AT FOREIGN MINISTER LEVEL. THIS MIGHT BE HELD WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF THE EURO-ARAB DIALOGUE BUT NOT NECESSARILY SO. IT WOULD BE HELPFUL IF SUCH A MEETING WERE TO INVOLVE AT LEAST A WIDE GROUP OF MINISTERS FROM BOTH SIDES SEMICOLON THIS WOULD HAVE THE ADVANTAGE OF DIRECTLY INVOLVING THOSE SUCH AS THE SYRIANS WHO WERE DIFFICULT. M. THORN SAID THE JORDANIANS DID NOT NECESSARILY EXPECT IMMEDIATE RESULTS FROM HIS PRESENT MISSION SEMICOLON BUT ATTACHED GREAT IMPORTANCE TO EUROPEAN ACTIVITY BEING SEEN TO CONTINUE.

4. OCCUPIED TERRITORIES.

THE KING HAD MADE IT CLEAR THAT PEACE NEGOTIATIONS COULD ONLY TAKE PLACE ON THE BASIS OF A CLEAR AND UNEQUIVOCAL COMMITMENT IN ADVANCE BY ISRAEL TO WITHDRAW FROM ALL OCCUPIED TERRITORIES. ONLY THEREAFTER COULD THE WAY BE OPEN FOR DISCUSSION OF SECURITY BOUNDARY ADJUSTMENTS AND OTHER RELATED ISSUES. M. THORN HAD UNDERSTOOD THAT IT WAS AN ISRAELI COMMITMENT TO TOTAL WITHDRAWAL RATHER THAN AN ACTUAL WITHDRAWAL, WHICH WAS THE ESSENTIAL AND NON-NEGOTIABLE STARTING POINT FOR THE JORDANIANS, AND REFERRED TO HINTS MADE IN SIMILAR VEIN BY ARAFAT (PARA 13 OF BEIRUT TELNO 197).

5. JORDAN/PLO

THE KING HAD BEEN PARTICULARLY INTERESTED IN LEARNING WHAT YASIR ARAFAT HAD HAD TO SAY TO M. THORN. THE KING SAID THAT JORDAN'S RELATIONS WITH THE PLO CONTINUED DOWN A "NARROW BUT CLEARLY DEFINED PATH". JORDAN'S POSITION VIZ-A-VIZ THE PLO WAS ONE OF "UNDERSTANDING BUT NOT PERMISSIVENESS".

6. SUPERPOWER INVOLVEMENT

THE JORDANIANS HAD REAFFIRMED THEIR POSITION THAT NEITHER OF THE SUPERPOWERS COULD BE EXCLUDED FROM THE SEARCH FOR A MIDDLE EAST PEACE SETTLEMENT SEMICOLON IN ADDITION TO THE ROLE WHICH THE UNITED STATES WOULD HAVE TO PLAY, IT COULD BE USEFUL TO HAVE SOME SOVIET INVOLVEMENT AT SOME STAGE.

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7. M. THORN'S MEETINGS WITH CROWN PRINCE HASSAN AND THE JORDANIAN FOREIGN MINISTER WERE LARGELY DEVOTED TO A JORDANIAN PRESENTATION OF THE SITUATION ON THE WEST BANK AND ISRAELI POLICIES THERE. THE FOREIGN MINISTER MADE PARTICULAR MENTION OF JORDAN'S POLICY OF KEEPING THE BRIDGES OPEN BETWEEN THE EAST AND WEST BANKS NOTWITHSTANDING CRITICISM FROM SOME OTHER ARAB STATES. JORDAN SAW THIS POLICY AS ESSENTIAL IN ORDER TO ENCOURAGE LOCAL ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE WEST BANK AND THUS TO ENCOURAGE THE PALESTINIANS TO STAY PUT RATHER THAN EMIGRATE. JORDAN FEARED THAT THE ISRAELIS MIGHT BE TEMPTED TO IMPORT CHEAP AND DOCILE EGYPTIAN LABOUR TO THE WEST BANK IN ORDER TO UNDERMINE THE ECONOMIC PROSPECTS FOR THE WEST BANKERS. M. THORN ASKED WHETHER, IN THE EVENT OF A SOLUTION, ALL THE ISRAELI SETTLEMENTS WOULD HAVE TO GO. THE FOREIGN MINISTER FIELDDED THIS BY OBSERVING ONLY THAT A CONTINUANCE OF ISRAELI SETTLEMENTS WOULD PREVENT THE RIGHT SORT OF PSYCHOLOGICAL FEELING DEVELOPMENT AMONGST WEST BANKERS THAT THEY WOULD HAVE AN ENTITY OF THEIR OWN. HE SPECULATED THAT THE FUTURE OF ANY SETTLEMENTS MIGHT BE LINKED DIRECTLY TO THE NUMBERS OF PALESTINIANS ALLOWED BACK TO THEIR HOMES BY THE ISRAELIS SEMICOLON AND THAT IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE TO PROVIDE FINANCIAL COMPENSATION FOR ISRAEL, VIA THE OIL RICH ARAB STATES, FOR SETTLEMENTS THAT WERE DISMANTLED.

8. COMMENT.

THE JORDANIANS CLEARLY WELCOMED M. THORN'S VISIT NOTWITHSTANDING THE INCONVENIENCE TO THEM OF ITS TIMING AND THE LAST MINUTE CHANGES INFLICTED BY M. THORN ON THE ARRANGEMENTS MADE FOR HIM. M. THORN HAD OF COURSE ALREADY SEEN BOTH KING HUSSEIN AND THE LATE ABDUL HAMID SHARAF HERE ON 30 JUNE AND THUS ALREADY HAD AN IDEA OF WHAT HE COULD EXPECT TO HEAR ON THIS VISIT. HOWEVER, HE REMARKED JUST BEFORE HIS DEPARTURE THAT HE NOW UNDERSTOOD BETTER WHY JORDAN, WITH HER REPUTATION AS A MODERATE, HAD LINED UP WITH THE OTHER ARAB STATES AND HAD REJECTED INVOLVEMENT IN THE CAMP DAVID PROCESS. I DEDUCE FROM THIS REMARK THAT, PRIOR TO THIS VISIT, M. THORN MAY NOT HAVE FULLY APPRECIATED JORDAN'S LIMITED ROOM FOR MANOEUVRE AND HER UNWILLINGNESS TO COMPROMISE ON ESSENTIAL PRINCIPLES SUCH AS ISRAELI COMMITMENT TO WITHDRAWAL AND THE FULL RESTORATION OF PALESTINIAN RIGHTS. AT THE SAME TIME M. THORN APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN SUCCESSFUL IN CONFIRMING THE JORDANIAN VIEW THAT EUROPEAN INVOLVEMENT IN THE SEARCH FOR A MIDDLE EAST SETTLEMENT SHOULD BE TAKEN SERIOUSLY.

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9. POSTSCRIPT

M. WAGNER CONFIRMED TO ME THAT M. THORN STILL HOPED TO PAY A WEST BANK VISIT TO TALK TO THE MAYORS AND OTHER LOCAL PERSONALITIES SEMICOLON BUT THAT TIMING OF THIS WAS STILL UNDER CONSIDERATION.

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TO ROUTINE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 347 OF 11 AUGUST
INFO CAIRO AND WASHINGTON

MY TEL NO 329: ISRAELI GOVERNMENT

1. THE ISRAELI CABINET YESTERDAY APPROVED THE APPOINTMENT OF MOSHE NISSIM (LPR 85), HITHERTO THE LIBERAL MINISTER WITHOUT PORTFOLIO, AS JUSTICE MINISTER. HIS APPOINTMENT IS DUE FOR FINAL APPROVAL IN A SPECIAL KNESSET SESSION ON 13 AUGUST.
2. THE CABINET DID NOT APPROVE A CANDIDATE FOR THE DEFENCE MINISTRY SO BEGIN WILL CONTINUE TO DOUBLE AS DEFENCE MINISTER.
3. SHARON, WHO VOTED AGAINST NISSIM'S APPOINTMENT IN THE CABINET HAS BEEN FIGHTING HARD BUT UNSUCCESSFULLY TO GET THE DEFENCE MINISTRY. HIS MAIN ACHIEVEMENT HAS BEEN TO CONSOLIDATE THE REST OF THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT BEHIND BEGIN, WHOSE TALK OF RESIGNATION YESTERDAY WAS PURELY TACTICAL.

**THIS TELEGRAM
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TELNO 225 8-8-80

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RFI SAVING TO BEIRUT, AMMAN, CAIRO, TEL AVIV, WASHINGTON,
UKMIS NY, UKREP BRUSSELS, LUXEMBOURG, BAGHDAD, JEDDA

M THORN'S VISIT TO SYRIA , 5-7 AUGUST

1. M GASTON THORN ARRIVED IN DAMASCUS FROM BEIRUT ON 5 AUGUST AND LEFT FOR AMMAN ON 7 AUGUST, AFTER A VISIT TO PALMYRA. HE GAVE COMMUNITY HEADS OF MISSION LATE ON 6 AUGUST HIS IMPRESSIONS OF HIS TALKS THAT DAY WITH THE SYRIAN FOREIGN MINISTER, MR KHADDAM, THE PRESIDENT OF THE PALESTINE NATIONAL COUNCIL, MR KHALED FAHOUM, AND PRESIDENT ASAD. THE DUTCH AMBASSADOR, WHO ATTENDED ALL THREE MEETINGS, IS TO GIVE US A FULLER ACCOUNT ON 8 AUGUST. FURTHER DETAILS FOLLOW BY BAG.

2. M THORN WAS AGREEABLY SURPRISED BY HIS RECEPTION. ALTHOUGH KHADDAM TREATED HIM TO AN OPENING 45-MINUTE MONOLOGUE IN ARABIC, HIS TONE WAS LESS HARSH THAN USUAL. HE PREDICTABLY CRITICISED THE VENICE DECLARATION, BOTH FOR ITS OMISSIONS AND ITS ALLEGED BIAS, AND RETURNED AGAIN AND AGAIN TO OBSESSIVE CRITICISM OF CAMP DAVID AND SADAT. PRESIDENT ASAD DID THE SAME, THOUGH IN A MORE RESERVED WAY. KHADDAM DOUBTED WHETHER EUROPE COULD BRING ANY PRESSURE TO BEAR ON ISRAEL, AND WAS CERTAIN THAT THE AMERICANS WOULD NOT. HIS GENERAL LINE, HOWEVER, WAS TO WELCOME EUROPEAN INVOLVEMENT, AND TO ARGUE THAT EUROPE COULD AND SHOULD DO MORE. HE SAID THAT THE SYRIANS WERE IN PRINCIPLE READY TO CONSIDER ANY WAY TOWARDS A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT, THOUGH HE EXPRESSED PREFERENCE FOR THE UNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORK.

3. THE SYRIANS WERE CONVINCED THAT THE ISRAELIS HAD NO INTENTION OF WITHDRAWING FROM THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES, AND M THORN TOLD US THAT, AFTER HIS TALKS WITH MR BEGIN, HE FELT THAT ANY SOLUTION OF THE ARAB-ISRAEL DISPUTE WAS NOW MORE REMOTE THAN EVER.

4. THE ONE AND A HALF HOURS WITH PRESIDENT ASAD HAD CENTRED MAINLY ON LEBANON, A SUBJECT WITH WHICH ASAD SEEMED TO BE OBSESSED. HE CLAIMED THAT THE SYRIAN PRESENCE WAS COSTING THEM A LOT, AND THAT HE WISHED TO WITHDRAW FROM THE LEBANESE ENTANGLEMENT. M THORN HAD NOT BEEN TOTALLY CONVINCED BY THIS, AND CONCLUDED THAT THE SYRIANS WANTED TO RETAIN AS MUCH INFLUENCE AS POSSIBLE OVER THE LEBANESE SITUATION. HE HAD EMPHASISED THE COMMUNITY'S SUPPORT FOR A MULTI-CONFESSIONAL STATE, AND THE SPREAD OF THE LEBANESE NATIONAL ARMY.

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5. THERE WAS SOME DISCUSSIONS OF SYRIAN-SOVIET RELATIONS (SEE MY TEL NO. 223, NOT TO ALL), AND M THORN HAD WARNED KHADDAM AGAINST PUTTING SYRIA'S HEAD INTO THE SOVIET LION'S MOUTH. KHADDAM HAD REPLIED THAT EUROPE SHOULD NOT WORRY TOO MUCH. SYRIA HAD HAD TO BUILD UP HER RELATIONSHIP WITH THE RUSSIANS IN THE FACE OF ISRAELI PRESSURE, EGYPTIAN TREACHERY, ARAB INDIFFERENCE AND AMERICAN HOSTILITY. BUT THEY WOULD NEVER BECOME COMMUNISTS. THERE HAD BEEN NO TALK OF ANY SYRIAN-SOVIET TREATY, AND M THORN HAD DECIDED NOT TO PRESS THE SUBJECT.

6. PRESIDENT ASAD HAD TALKED OF THE PALESTINIANS PRIMARILY IN THE CONTEXT OF LEBANON, ARGUING THAT THEY COULD ONLY SUCCEED BY ARMED STRUGGLE, AND THAT IT WAS UNREALISTIC TO EXPECT THEM TO DISARM. HE HAD NEVERTHELESS MINIMISED THEIR EFFORTS IN COMPARISON WITH THE ANTI-COLONIALIST ACTIVITIES OF THE SYRIANS OR, MORE RECENTLY, ZIMBABWE. IN GENERAL, HIS LINE ON PALESTINE HAD BEEN HARD, COMPARED WITH THAT OF KHALED FAHOUM, WHOM M THORN DESCRIBED AS SOMETHING OF A QUOTE FAUX-MOU UNQUOTE, ALTHOUGH IT HAD BEEN USEFUL TO TALK TO HIM. ASAD HAD NOT DENIED SYRIAN INFLUENCE OVER THE PLO, AND M THORN RECEIVED THE ^MPRESSION THAT ONE ASPECT WHICH THE SYRIANS VALUED IN THEIR PRESENCE IN LEBANON WAS THAT IT GAVE THE SYRIANS ANOTHER LEVER OVER THE PALESTINIANS.

7. BOTH ASAD AND KHADDAM HAD QUESTIONED HIM CLOSELY ABOUT THE PROSPECTS FOR THE AMERICAN ELECTIONS, ASKING SEVERAL TIMES WHETHER DR KISSINGER WAS LIKELY TO RETURN AS SECRETARY OF STATE. KHADDAM NEVERTHELESS MADE IT CLEAR THAT HE HOPED THAT GOVERNOR REAGAN WOULD WIN, COMMENTING THAT PRESIDENT CARTER SEEMED TO HAVE LEARNED LITTLE FROM HIS FIRST PERIOD IN OFFICE.

8. IN GENERAL, M THORN EXPRESSED MODERATE SATISFACTION WITH HIS VISIT, AND THOUGHT THAT THE ARABS WERE BEGINNING TO ACCEPT THAT THE COMMUNITY WAS SINCERE IN WANTING TO CONTRIBUTE TOWARDS A COMPREHENSIVE SETTLEMENT, ALTHOUGH HE HAD TRIED TO GET THEM TO ACCEPT THAT THE NINE WERE NOT A PARTY TO THE DISPUTE. HE ALSO THOUGHT THAT THE SYRIANS NOW ACCEPTED THAT THE NINE WERE NOT THE TOOL OF THE AMERICANS. THERE HAD BEEN REPEATED QUESTIONS ABOUT WHEN THE EUROPEANS WERE GOING TO ISSUE THEIR NEXT DECLARATION, EVIDENTLY IN THE HOPE THAT WE WOULD ONE DAY COME OUT PUBLICLY AGAINST THE AMERICANS AND ISRAEL.

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9. ON THE PLO, M THORN COMMENTED THAT HIS CONTACTS WITH ARAFAT AND THE OTHER PALESTINIANS HAD INEVITABLY BEEN INTERPRETED AS A MOVE TOWARDS COMMUNITY RECOGNITION OF THE PLO, BUT THAT ANY TALK OF FORMAL RECOGNITION WAS UNREALISTIC. ARAFAT HAD FISHED FOR AN INVITATION TO VISIT LUXEMBOURG. HE HAD HIMSELF TRIED TO GET ACROSS THE MESSAGE THAT THE COMMUNITY WAS NEITHER FOR NOR AGAINST THE PLO.

F C O PLEASE PASS SAVING TO BEIRUT, AMMAN, CAIRO,
TEL AVIV, WASHINGTON, UKMIS NY, UKREP BRUSSELS, LUXEMBOURG,
BAGHDAD, JEDDA.

WRIGHT.

(REPEATED AS REQUESTED)

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FM BEIRUT 090700Z AUGUST 80

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELNO 202 OF 8 AUGUST

INFO ROUTINE DAMASCUS, TEL AVIV, AMMAN, CAIRO, JEDDA, WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK, EC COUNTRIES

PLO

1. ON 7 AUGUST A MEMBER OF MY STAFF WAS INVITED TO MEET MR ZAKARIA ABDUL RAHIM (ABU YAHYA), THE HEAD OF THE WESTERN EUROPEAN DEPARTMENT OF THE PLO POLITICAL OFFICE (AND A MEMBER OF FATAH).

EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

2. ABDUL RAHIM SAID THAT HE HAD BEEN PRESENT DURING THE THORN-ARAFAT MEETING. HE CONSIDERED THAT THE VISIT HAD GONE WELL. IT WAS IMPORTANT THOUGH FOR THE PALESTINIANS TO BE CONVINCED THAT THE EC REALLY HAD THE WILL TO FIND A SOLUTION AND THIS IMPLIED TACKLING THE AMERICANS. HE STRESSED THAT THE PLO WAS READY TO BE FLEXIBLE (IT HAD TO BE) AND WAS PREPARED TO BE REALISTIC. HE CONSIDERED THAT THE BRITISH POSITION WAS NOT AS "ADVANCED" AS THAT OF THE FRENCH SEMICLN BUT WHILE THE PLO WELCOMED 'POSITIVE' FRENCH STATEMENTS, IT SUSPECTED THESE HAD MORE TO DO WITH FRENCH COMMERCIAL SELF INTEREST THAN WITH A GENUINE DETERMINATION TO FIND A SOLUTION.

3. COMMENT: AS I SUSPECTED HE WOULD, M. THORN APPEARS TO HAVE MADE A MOST FAVOURABLE FIRST IMPRESSION ON THE PLO LEADERSHIP.

4. I AM SENDING ABDUL RAHIM'S LENGTHY ANALYSIS OF THE SITUATION IN SYRIA BY TELELETTER, NOT TO ALL.

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There is a row in
progress about observer
status for PLO with
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FM UK DEL IMF/IBRD WASHINGTON 082300Z

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TELEGRAM NUMBER 230 OF 8 AUG 80.

INFO ROUTINE EC POSTS, ABU DHABI, AMMAN, BEIRUT, CAIRO, CANBERRA,
DAMASCUS, DAR ES SALAAM, JEDDA, KUWAIT, TEL AVIV, TOKYO AND
WELLINGTON.

INFO SAVING UK MIS NEW YORK, UK MIS GENEVA AND UK DEL OECD.

MY TEL NO 224 — IMF/IBRD : PLO.

1. BEFORE I GO ON LEAVE, PERHAPS I COULD ADD A FEW FURTHER
REFLECTIONS ON THE SAUDI POSITION.

2. FROM MY TALK WITH JALAL, I SUSPECT THE SAUDIS PROBABLY FEEL
SWEPT UP IN THIS AFFAIR AS MUCH AS THE REST OF US, AND ARE DEALING
WITH EACH STEP AS IT COMES. JALAL STRESSED THAT SAUDI ARABIA
GENUINELY WANTED TO COOPERATE WITH THE FUND, NOT SIMPLY FOR
ALTRUISTIC REASONS, BUT IN THEIR OWN SELFISH INTERESTS.

I SEE NO REASON TO DOUBT THIS. WE ALSO HAVE THE VEILED HINTS HE
GAVE TO THE IMF MANAGEMENT, ALTHOUGH WE CANNOT PUT TOO MUCH WEIGHT
ON THAT. ON THE OTHER HAND, THEY WILL CLEARLY HAVE TO HAVE REGARD
TO THE FEELINGS OF OTHER ARAB COUNTRIES EVEN IF JALAL IS RIGHT IN
SAYING THAT THE PLO ISSUE IS NOT CENTRAL FOR SAUDI ARABIA.

3. AS THEY ARE AWAITING THE OUTCOME OF THE VOTE, WE ARE UNLIKELY
TO GET ANY FURTHER INDICATIONS OF THEIR FUTURE INTENTIONS IN THE
MEANTIME. PERHAPS FORTUNATELY, THEY ARE NOT INCLUDED IN THE
MANAGING DIRECTOR'S TRIP TO THE MIDDLE EAST, AS HE HAS ALREADY
TALKED TO THEM. IT REMAINS TO BE SEEN WHETHER OTHER ARAB STATES,
SUCH AS KUWAIT, WILL ASK THE MANAGING DIRECTOR NOT TO COME IN THE
PRESENT SITUATION. JALAL CLEARLY THOUGHT IT ON THE CARDS THAT
SOME OF THEM WOULD.

4. LOOKING BEYOND THAT, THE PROSPECTS WILL DEPEND ON THE OUTCOME
OF THE VOTE. IF THE ARABS SUCCEEDED IN FRUSTRATING THE RESOLUTION
AND THE PLO ARE INVITED, THE SAUDIS COULD PROBABLY RESTORE THEIR
RELATIONS WITH THE FUND QUITE QUICKLY. /SIMILARLY

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SIMILARLY WITH THE BANK, ALTHOUGH THEY MIGHT TAKE RATHER LONGER THERE TO INDICATE THEIR DISPLEASURE WITH IBRD MANAGEMENT FOR 'TAKING SIDES' IN THE DISPUTE. ACCORDING TO CROSS, THE AMERICANS MIGHT RESPOND TO THIS SITUATION BY SEEKING SOME FURTHER PROCEDURAL DEVICE TO KEEP OUT THE PLO, ALTHOUGH MAYBE WITH NO GREATER HOPE OF SUCCESS. BY THEN, WE WILL BE SO CLOSE TO THE ANNUAL MEETING THAT THE PUBLICITY INVOLVED IN FURTHER ATTEMPTS TO KEEP THEM OUT MIGHT BE AS DAMAGING TO THE INSTITUTIONS AS THEIR ADMISSION AS OBSERVERS. YOU MAY WANT TO CONSIDER, THEREFORE, WHETHER IN THAT SITUATION WE AND OUR EC PARTNERS SHOULD BE PREPARED TO MOVE QUICKLY TO DISCOURAGE THE AMERICANS FROM DOING SO.

5. IF, ON THE OTHER HAND, THE RESOLUTION GOES THROUGH, AND THE PLO ARE EXCLUDED THIS YEAR, IT IS DIFFICULT TO SEE HOW THE SAUDIS COULD EASILY RESTORE THE POSITION EVEN IF THEY WANTED TO.

THE PROPOSED DISCUSSION OF CRITERIA FOR OBSERVERS, WHICH IS THE NEXT STEP UNDER THE RESOLUTION, IS NOT DUE TO BE CONCLUDED UNTIL NEXT MARCH, AND EVEN THIS WOULD NOT NECESSARILY SETTLE THE MATTER.

THERE MIGHT THEREFORE BE QUITE A LONG PERIOD OF STRAINED RELATIONS, AFFECTING THE FUND'S ABILITY TO PLAY A LARGER ROLE IN RECYCLING DURING A PERIOD WHEN THIS WAS BECOMING INCREASINGLY NECESSARY.

HOWEVER, THIS CAN ONLY BE SPECULATION WHEN THEY THEMSELVES HAVE NOT YET DECIDED WHAT TO DO, AND OUR EMBASSIES IN OPEC CAPITALS MAY BE BETTER PLACED TO FORECAST THEIR REACTIONS IN THIS SITUATION.

6. IN MY TELEGRAM UNDER REFERENCE, IN PARA. 10, LINE 7, FOR QUOTE HIM UNQUOTE, READ QUOTE ME UNQUOTE. ERROR REGRETTED.

7. PLEASE ADVANCE TO TREASURY, ODA, BANK OF ENGLAND.

F C O PASS SAVING UK MIS GENEVA AND UK DEL OECD.

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TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 301 OF 8 AUG 80

INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK

ROUTINE WASHINGTON PARIS TEL AVIV CAIRO DAMASCUS BEIRUT AND
JERUSALEM

YOUR TELNO 570 TO UKMIS NEW YORK; JERUSALEM

1. IN CONVERSATION WITH ME LAST NIGHT AT HIS DINNER FOR M. THORN, THE JORDANIAN FOREIGN MINISTER MARWAN QASEM REMARKED THAT HE APPRECIATED THAT THE LANGUAGE OF THE ISLAMIC GROUP PRESENTED WESTERN MEMBERS WITH PROBLEMS. HE SAID THAT DURING HIS RECENT UN VISIT HE HAD TAKEN THE LINE WITH ARAB AND MOSLEM DELEGATIONS THAT, ON PALESTINE AND JERUSALEM RESOLUTIONS, IT WAS IMPORTANT TO SEARCH FOR LANGUAGE THAT WOULD ATTRACT RATHER THAN REPEL EUROPEAN SUPPORT. AS REGARDS THE PRESENT DRAFT, HE SAID, LOOKING AT ME HARD, THAT "HE SUPPOSED THERE WOULD BE A UK ABSTENTION". IN REPLY I SAID ONLY THAT THE LANGUAGE OF THE ISLAMIC GROUP PAPER DID INDEED PRESENT US WITH DIFFICULTIES AND THAT THESE WERE NOW UNDER FULL AND ACTIVE CONSIDERATION.

ISLAMIC GROUP PAPER DID INDEED PRESENT US WITH DIFFICULTIES AND THAT THESE WERE NOW UNDER FULL AND ACTIVE CONSIDERATION.

2. IT SEEMS CLEAR FROM HIS CONVERSATION THAT THE JORDANIAN GOVERNMENT COULD, WITH RELUCTANCE, TOLERATE A UK ABSTENTION BUT THAT THEY WOULD BE GREATLY DISMAYED BY A UK VETO. THEIR REACTION WOULD BE ALL THE STRONGER IF THERE WERE TO BE A UK VETO BUT A FRENCH ABSTENTION. THE JORDANIAN VIEW IS LIKELY TO BE THAT A UK ABSTENTION WOULD ADEQUATELY REFLECT OUR DISLIKE OF THE LANGUAGE OF THE DRAFT WHILST, AT THE SAME TIME, GIVING A CLEAR SIGNAL THAT THE UK DOES DISAPPROVE OF THE KNESSET BILL. BY CONTRAST, A UK VETO WOULD BE INTERPRETED HERE EITHER AS A UK RESPONSE TO US/ISRAELI PRESSURE OR AS UNWILLINGNESS ON OUR PART TO GO ALONG WITH THE INCREASING INTERNATIONAL CONCERN OVER ISRAELI POLICIES AND DEFIANCE OF UN RESOLUTIONS.

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TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELNO 226 8-8-80

AND TO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK

INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON, PARIS, TEL AVIV, CAIRO, AMMAN, BEIRUT
AND JERUSALEM

PARIS TELEGRAM NO 681: JERUSALEM

1. THE PRACTICAL REPERCUSSIONS IN SYRIA OF A BRITISH VETO ON THIS SUBJECT MAY PERHAPS BE OF LESS SIGNIFICANCE THAN IN SOME OTHER PARTS OF THE ARAB WORLD. BUT I WOULD CERTAINLY EXPECT SUCH A VETO, IN COMPANY WITH THE AMERICANS ALONE, TO PROVOKE VERY STRONG CRITICISM HERE, AND POSSIBLY SOME ACTION AGAINST OUR INTERESTS. IT WOULD ALSO IN SYRIAN EYES UNDO SOME OF THE EFFECT OF M THORN'S RECENT VISIT (SEE MY TELEGRAM NUMBER 225, PARTICULARLY PARA 8), AND WOULD SHOW THAT THE COMMUNITY WAS SPLIT ON THE SUBJECT OF MOST CONCERN TO THE ARAB AND MUSLIM OPINION.

WRIGHT.

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Prime Minister

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TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 346 OF 8 AUG

INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK, PARIS, WASHINGTON, AND
ROUTINE AMMAN, JERUSALEM (PASSED).

FCO TELNO 282 TO MEXICO CITY: JERUSALEM

1. IN AN INTERVIEW IN JERUSALEM POST OF 8 AUGUST, MOSHE DAYAN MAINTAINED THAT THE CLAUSE ON THE HOLY PLACES IN THE JERUSALEM LAW AS A SIGNIFICANT CHANGE FROM THE EARLIER FORMULA ACCORDING ALL RELIGIONS "ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROL OVER THEIR HOLY PLACES". THE INSERTION IN THE LAW AS PASSED OF A REFERENCE TO FREEDOM OF WORSHIP AND FREE ACCESS TO THE HOLY PLACES (FOR THE ADHERENTS OF RELIGIONS) WAS A BAD ALTERNATIVE. THE PHRASING OF THE NEW LAW MEANT THAT JEWS TOO HAD THE RIGHT TO PRAY ON THE TEMPLE MOUNT. THIS BODED ILL FOR FUTURE RELIGIOUS CO-EXISTENCE IN JERUSALEM.

2. DAYAN SAID HE WOULD HAVE PREFERRED A BILL STIPULATING THAT ALL RELIGIONS WOULD HAVE ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROL OF THEIR HOLY SITES, WITH JEWS NOT ALLOWED INTO THE TEMPLE MOUNT TO WORSHIP

ALL RELIGIONS WOULD HAVE ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROL OF THEIR HOLY SITES, WITH JEWS NOT ALLOWED INTO THE TEMPLE MOUNT TO WORSHIP EXCEPT WITH THE SPECIFIC CONSENT OF THE MUSLIMS. "AFTER ALL NO ONE CAN DENY THE SACRED NATURE TO ISLAM OF THE MOUNT WITH EL AKSA AND THE DOME". THE TEMPLE MOUNT COULD NOT BE DIVIDED UP FOR PURPOSES OF WORSHIP. IT WAS A TERRIBLY DELICATE SUBJECT WITH EXPLOSIVE RAMIFICATIONS. THE POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS COULD NOT BE IGNORED. THE MOUNT WITH THE DOME OF THE ROCK AND EL AKSA SHOULD BE UNDER MUSLIM CONTROL (FOR RELIGIOUS PURPOSES). "WE CANNOT AFFORD TO TOLERATE ANY LACK OF CLARITY IN THIS MATTER."

R O B I N S O N

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Cabinet / Cabinet Committee Document

The following document, which was enclosed on this file, has been removed and destroyed. Such documents are the responsibility of the Cabinet Office. When released they are available in the appropriate CAB (CABINET OFFICE) CLASSES.

Reference: CC(80) 32nd Conclusions, Minute 2 (-extract)

Date: 7 August 1980

Signed A Wayland Date 29 July 2010

PREM Records Team

GRS 280

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Prime Minister

FM PARIS 071525Z AUG 80

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 681 OF 07 AUGUST 1980

INFO PRIORITY TO UKMIS NEW YORK

INFO ROUTINE WASHINGTON TEL AVIV CAIRO AMMAN DAMASCUS BEIRUT
AND JERUSALEM

YOUR TELNO 570 TO UKMIS NEW YORK: JERUSALEM

MP 8/18

1. MINISTER SPOKE TODAY TO DUPONT, DEPUTY POLITICAL DIRECTOR AT THE QUAI, AND ASKED FOR FRENCH REACTIONS TO THE ISLAMIC GROUP PAPER (UKMIS NEW YORK TELNO 1088).

2. DUPONT SAID THAT THERE WAS VERY LITTLE POSSIBILITY OF THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT AGREEING TO VOTE AGAINST THIS PAPER. HE WAS AWARE OF THE UK'S OBJECTIONS TO PARAGRAPH 5, BUT FRENCH EFFORTS WOULD BE BENT TO SECURE CHANGES SUFFICIENT TO RENDER THIS PARAGRAPH INOPERATIVE OR ANODYNE. THERE COULD BE NO QUESTION OF FRANCE OPPOSING THE GENERAL THRUST OF THE CRITICISM AGAINST ISRAELI ACTIONS.

3. HE WENT ON TO SAY THAT THE FRENCH HAD BEEN RATHER SURPRISED THAT HMG WERE TAKING WHAT HE CLAIMED TO BE A RESERVED ATTITUDE TOWARDS THE IDEA OF A STATEMENT BY THE NINE ON JERUSALEM. BRITAIN WAS THE ONLY ONE OF THE NINE WHO WAS NOT PREPARED TO GO ALONG WITH THE IDEA OF A STATEMENT. THE FRENCH WOULD RESIGN THEMSELVES TO SEEKING TO AGREE A JOINT DEMARCHE TO THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT, AFTER WHICH THERE COULD BE SOME PUBLIC STATEMENT TO THE EFFECT THAT IT HAD BEEN TAKEN. HE ADDED THAT EVEN THE DUTCH WERE PREPARED TO GO ALONG WITH THE IDEA OF A DECLARATION.

4. JAMES SAID THAT HE WONDERED WHETHER THE FRENCH HAD THOUGHT THROUGH THEIR ATTITUDE ON THE ISLAMIC GROUP PAPER. IF PARAGRAPH 5 REMAINED AND THE FRENCH DID NOT VOTE AGAINST, WERE THEY PREPARED TO FACE THE CONSEQUENCES OF ACTION AGAINST ISRAEL AND THE PRECEDENTS THAT IT WOULD SET? THERE WAS AN INTERNAL FRENCH DIMENSION TO THIS PROBLEM WHICH WOULD SURELY MAKE IT DIFFICULT FOR THE FRENCH TO APPEAR TO ACQUIESCE IN ACTION AGAINST ISRAEL. DUPONT SAID THAT IN THIS CASE THE FRENCH WOULD ABSTAIN OR FUDGE THE ISSUE IN SOME OTHER WAY. BUT THEY WERE UNLIKELY TO VOTE AGAINST, EVEN IF BRITAIN AND THE UNITED STATES WERE PREPARED TO DO SO.

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File 16
Subject on Egypt: Aug 8
Mtg with the Egyptian
Ambassador.

From the Private Secretary

7 August 1980

As you know, the Egyptian Ambassador called here at 1715 today. Mr. Hurd was present.

The Ambassador handed to the Prime Minister the text of President Sadat's message to Prime Minister Begin dated 2 August. He asked the Prime Minister to treat this text as confidential until it is released from Cairo. He said that Egyptian Ambassadors in France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and Australia, were taking parallel action. Egypt believe the role of the EEC countries to be crucial at this stage, given the problems caused by the US election.

The Prime Minister said that the European countries had been conscious of the need to maintain the momentum in the Middle East despite the US election, and that this was part of the background to the Venice declaration. The new Act passed by the Israeli Parliament, followed by a move to East Jerusalem, would make the situation still more difficult for everyone concerned. It would also create acute difficulties for President Sadat, Mr. Carter, and for all those who had been Mr. Begin's staunchest friends.

The Ambassador referred to recent reports that the Israelis might now contemplate not withdrawing from the remaining Sinai territory still to be ceded under the Camp David accords. He said that Egypt was trying to keep movement in all possible directions. Egypt was striving for real peace. No peace was possible without Palestinian rights.

In reply to a question from the Prime Minister, the Ambassador confirmed that no reply had yet been received from Mr. Begin.

The rest of the exchanges were courteous but inconsequential. The Prime Minister said that she was looking forward to Vice-President Mubarak's visit.

The Ambassador did nothing to counteract the comments in the brief that he has not proved a very effective performer.

I am sending a copy of this letter and its enclosure to David Wright (Cabinet Office).

M. A. PATTISON

S. J. Gomersall, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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OBJET : DEMARCHE CONCERNANT L'ANNEXION DE JERUSALEM.
REF : CPE/MUL/ETR 2844.

LA FRANCE CONTINUE DE PENSER QUE LE PASSAGE DE LA DECLARATION DE VENISE CONCERNANT JERUSALEM NE DISPENSE PAS LES NEUF DE PROTESTER CONTRE LA DECISION ISRAELIENNE DE FAIRE DE JERUSALEM LA CAPITALE UNIFIEE DE L'ETAT D'ISRAEL.

SI UNE DECLARATION PUBLIQUE NE PEUT ETRE ENVISAGEE, LA FRANCE SUGGERE QUE LES NEUF DEMANDENT A LEURS REPRESENTANTS EN ISRAEL DE FAIRE AUPRES DU GOUVERNEMENT ISRAELIEN UNE DEMARCHE COLLECTIVE INSPIREE DES CONSIDERATIONS SUIVANTES :

" LES NEUF PAYS MEMBRES DE LA COMMUNAUTE EUROPEENNE RAPPELLENT LEUR POSITION SUR JERUSALEM TELLE QU'ILS L'ONT EXPRIMEE A VENISE A L'ISSUE DU CONSEIL EUROPEEN DES 12 ET 13 JUIN 1980 DANS LEUR DECLARATION SUR LE MOYEN-ORIENT :

" LES NEUF RECONNAISSENT LE ROLE PARTICULIEREMENT IMPORTANT QUE LA QUESTION DE JERUSALEM REVET POUR TOUTES LES PARTIES EN CAUSE.

LES NEUF SOULIGNENT QU'ILS N'ACCEPTENT AUCUNE INITIATIVE UNILATERALE QUI AIT POUR BUT DE CHANGER LE STATUT DE JERUSALEM."

LE VOTE DE LA LOI DU 31 JUILLET 1980, QUI FAIT DE JERUSALEM REUNIFIEE LA CAPITALE DE L'ETAT D'ISRAEL, CONSTITUE POUR LES NEUF UNE INITIATIVE UNILATERALE, CONTRAIRE AU DROIT INTERNATIONAL ET AUX RESOLUTIONS DES NATIONS UNIES.

/ LES NEUF

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LES NEUF RAPPELLENT QUE, DANS L'ATTENTE D'UN REGLEMENT DE PAIX, L'OCCUPATION DE GUERRE EST UN ETAT DE FAIT PROVISoire QUI NE SAURAIT COMPORTER UN DROIT DE DISPOSITION OU D'ANNEXION D'UN TERRITOIRE OCCUPE, NI CELUI D'Y APPLIQUER SES LOIS ET REGLEMENTS.

LES NEUF NE SAURAIENT TENIR COMPTE DE LA LOI DU 31 JUILLET ET NE LUI RECONNAITRONT PAS D'EFFET DE DROIT " A L'ISSUE DE LEUR DEMARCHE, LA PRESIDENCE FERAIT SAVOIR A LA PRESSE QUE LES NEUF ONT ELEVE UNE PROTESTATION FORMELLE CONTRE LA DECISION ILLEGALE DES AUTORITES ISRAELIENNES CONCERNANT JERUSALEM ET RAPPELE A CETTE OCCASION LES TERMES DE LA DECLARATION DE VENISE SUR LE MOYEN-ORIENT./.

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SUBJECT: STATEMENT BY THE NINE ON JERUSALEM

REFERENCES: CPE/MUL/ETR 2775 + CPE/MUL/ETR 2731 + CPE/MUL/ETR 2811

1. THE UK BELIEVES THAT THERE WOULD BE LITTLE ADVANTAGE IN A NEW STATEMENT BY THE NINE ON THE KNESSET JERUSALEM BILL, WHICH DOES NOT CHANGE THE SITUATION IN PRACTICE. THE VIEWS OF THE NINE WERE CLEARLY SET OUT IN THE VENICE DECLARATION AND NEITHER ISRAEL NOR ANY OTHER MEMBER OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY IS IN ANY DOUBT OF THE ATTITUDE OF MEMBERS OF THE NINE, COLLECTIVELY OR INDIVIDUALLY, TO ATTEMPTS BY ISRAEL TO CHANGE JERUSALEM'S STATUS UNILATERALLY.

2. THE UK THEREFORE BELIEVES THAT THE NINE SHOULD NOW CONCENTRATE THEIR EFFORTS ON FORMULATING A COMMON POLICY IN RESPONSE TO THE IMMINENT MOVE OF MR BEGIN'S OFFICE TO JERUSALEM (UK COREU CPE/MUL/ETR 2744 REFERS). A STATEMENT INCORPORATING A PRACTICAL RESPONSE BY THE NINE IF AND WHEN THE OFFICE IS MOVED WOULD BE MORE APPROPRIATE AND WOULD HAVE MORE IMPACT THAN ONE MADE AT THIS STAGE.

FIN DE TEXTNNNN

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TO PRIORITY FCO
TELNO 197 OF 6 AUGUST
INFO ROUTINE DAMASCUS, TEL AVIV, AMMAN, CAIRO, JEDDA, WASHINGTON,
UKMIS NEW YORK, EC COUNTRIES

Weekend box

Prime Minister

*To glance at this
account of M. Thorn's*

meetings in Beirut

M. THORN'S MISSION

1. M. THORN ARRIVED BEIRUT ON THE AFTERNOON OF 4 AUGUST AND DEPARTED 26 HOURS LATER.

PROGRAMME

2. 4 AUGUST. RECEIVED AT AIRPORT BY LEBANESE FOREIGN MINISTER AND HEADS OF MISSION OF THE NINE. BRIEFING MEETING IN HIS HOTEL WITH HEADS OF MISSION OF THE NINE. CALL ON LEBANESE FOREIGN MINISTER. CALL ON ARAFAT.

5 AUGUST CALLS ON EX PRIME MINISTER SAEB SALAM (SUNNI MOSLEM LEADER), PRESIDENT SARKIY. OUTGOING PRIME MINISTER HOSS, AND JOINTLY PIERRE GEMAYEL AND CAMILLE CHAMOUN (CHRISTIAN LEBANESE FRONT). LUNCH HOSTED BY MFA. MEETING WITH HEADS OF MISSION OF THE NINE.

3. M. THORN WAS ACCOMPANIED ON ALL VISITS BY MERTZ (THE LUXEMBOURG POLITICAL DIRECTOR), WAGNER (LUXEMBOURG AMBASSADOR IN ROME WITH RESPONSIBILITY FOR EURO-ARAB AFFAIRS) AND THE DUTCH AMBASSADOR TO LEBANON (PRESIDENCY).

MEETING WITH ARAFAT

4. ARAFAT STARTED OFF BY REVIEWING THE PALESTINIAN TRAGEDY AND REFERRING IN PARTICULAR TO 5,000 PRISONERS HELD BY ISRAELIS UNDER INHUMAN CONDITIONS.

5. HE SAID THAT THERE HAD BEEN TWO PALESTINIAN "REVOLUTIONS", THE FIRST HAD BEEN CULTURAL: PALESTINIANS HAD BECOME THE ELITE OF THE ARABS AND OCCUPIED TOP POSITIONS IN MANY ARAB COUNTRIES, PARTICULARLY IN THE GULF. "WE ARE NOT RED INDIANS". THEY HOPED TO ESTABLISH THEIR OWN UNIVERSITY IN MALTA. THE SECOND REVOLUTION WAS THAT OF ARMED STRUGGLE. HIS FATHER HAD FOUGHT FOR LIBERATION FROM THE BRITISH. PALESTINIANS HAD LOOKED TO THE WEST TO HELP THEM AGAINST ISRAELI AGGRESSION, BUT THE WEST HAD SIDED WITH THE AGGRESSORS AND NEGLECTED THE VICTIMS: "WE BELONG TO NO-ONE, WE DO NOT EVEN HAVE CEMETERIES OF OUR OWN. IT IS WE WHO ARE THE VICTIMS AND THE JEWS WHO ARE THE TERRORISTS. LOOK AT ALL THE UN RESOLUTIONS".

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6. IN 1969 THE PLO HAD OFFERED A SETTLEMENT WHEREBY PALESTINIANS AND ISRAELIS COULD LIVE TOGETHER IN A DEMOCRATIC COUNTRY WITH EQUAL RIGHTS. THIS WAS REJECTED. IN 1974 THE PLO ASKED FOR AN INDEPENDENT STATE IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES AFTER AN ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL FROM THEM. THE PLO HAD NOT ATTEMPTED TO DEFINE THE BOUNDARIES OF SUCH A STATE BUT EVEN SO IT WAS REJECTED. HE REMAINED READY TO ACCEPT SUCH A STATE.

7. THE ISRAELIS CLAIMED THAT SUCH A STATE WOULD BE A BASE FROM WHICH THEY WOULD BE DESTROYED. BUT HOW WAS THIS POSSIBLE, GIVEN ISRAELI MILITARY STRENGTH? "THEY HAVE ATOM BOMBS". THE ISRAELIS CLAIMED THAT SUCH A STATE WOULD BE COMMUNIST. THIS WAS UNTRUE. THE PLO WAS A LIBERAL DEMOCRACY, OF THE PALESTINIAN NATIONAL COUNCIL'S 302 MEMBERS ONLY FOUR WERE COMMUNISTS. THERE WERE TWO PLACES IN THE WORLD WHERE COMMUNISM WAS INCONCEIVABLE: MECCA AND JERUSALEM. IT WAS A LIKELY TO ALLEGE THAT THE VATICAN MIGHT BECOME COMMUNIST.

8. TURNING TO THE VENICE DECLARATION, ARAFAT SAID THAT THE PLO HAD EXPECTED AN INITIATIVE BUT WERE SHOCKED BY THE INEQUITY OF THE DECLARATION. WHY HAD THE PALESTINIANS' HUMAN RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION BEEN QUALIFIED BY THE CONDITION "WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF A GLOBAL SOLUTION"? THE PALESTINIANS HAD THE RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION WITHOUT STRINGS.

9. IT WAS ALSO UNFAIR TO CALL UPON THE PALESTINIANS TO CEASE VIOLENCE, WHEN IT IS THEY WHO ARE THE VICTIMS AND THE WRONGED.

10. ARAFAT WARNED OF THE DANGERS OF FAILURE TO OBTAIN A SOLUTION "AFTER THE SHAH, WHO WILL BE NEXT? TURKEY? SADAT?"

11. M. THORN REMINDED ARAFAT THAT THE PLO HAD MADE CONSIDERABLE PROGRESS WITH REGARD TO THE POLICIES OF EC GOVERNMENTS. ARAFAT CLAIMED TO BE SHOCKED BY THE VENICE DECLARATION, BUT MR BEGIN WAS ALSO SHOCKED, CLAIMING THAT SELF-DETERMINATION MEANT PREDETERMINATION. THE EC WANTED THE PLO TO JOIN THE PEACE PROCESS SEMICLN THEY PREFERRED AN OVERALL SOLUTION TO A PARTIAL ONE SEMICLN THEY DID NOT ACCEPT ISRAELI ACTIONS OVER JERUSALEM OR THE SETTLEMENTS. THEY DREW A BALANCE BETWEEN SELF-DETERMINATION FOR THE PALESTINIANS AND SECURITY FOR THE ISRAELIS. IT WOULD BE ENORMOUSLY HELPFUL IF THE PLO COULD UNILATERALLY DECLARE THAT IT ACCEPTED ISRAEL'S RIGHT TO EXIST AND THUS TO DEMONSTRATE A CHANGE IN THE PLO'S POSITION. THERE WAS NO REPLY TO THIS APPEAL. DR DAJANI (LP22, PLO EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE MEMBER AND HEAD OF THE PLO DELEGATION TO THE EURO-ARAB DIALOGUE) THEN SPOKE. (ALTHOUGH A NUMBER OF OTHER PLO OFFICIALS WERE PRESENT ONLY ARAFAT AND DAJANI SPOKE.) HE CLAIMED THAT THE PLO HAD ALWAYS ADOPTED A MODERATE POSITION IN THE EURO-ARAB DIALOGUE. THE EUROPEANS WERE GOIJNG TOO SLOW AND WERE WAVERING. THEY KEPT REFERRING TO THE PALESTINIANS AND THE PLO AS IF THEY WERE SEPARATE THINGS:

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THEY WERE NOT. THEY STOPPED THE DIALOGUE AFTER CAMP DAVID. THE PLO LOOKED FOR EUROPEAN ACTIONS, NOT WORDS. THEY COULD NOT ACCEPT THE EUROPEAN "BALANCE". THE NEXT ARAB CHAIRMAN IN THE DIALOGUE WOULD BE THE PLO REPRESENTATIVE AND WHAT WERE THE EUROPEANS GOING TO DO ABOUT THAT?

12. ARAFAT THEN DEMANDED TO KNOW WHETHER THE EUROPEANS REALLY HAD THE WILL TO FIND A SOLUTION. IF THEY HAD THE WILL, THEN THERE WERE MANY WAYS TO A SOLUTION. PLO DEMAND WAS FOR THREE PHASES:

PHASE 1 - UNCONDITIONAL ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL SEMICLN

PHASE 2 - PALESTINIAN SELF-DETERMINATION SEMICLN

PHASE 3 - NEGOTIATION WITH THE ISRAELIS ON AN EQUAL FOOTING TO AGREE BORDERS, SECURITY GUARANTEES ETC. IN THIS PHASE THE PLO WOULD BE READY TO MAKE A SPECIAL ARRANGEMENT WITH JORDAN.

13. M. THORN THEN POINTED OUT THAT WORDS WERE ALSO ACTIONS SINCE THEY REPRESENTED POLICIES. EC GOVERNMENTS HAD MODIFIED THEIR POSITION AND THERE WAS CERTAINLY THE WILL TO A SOLUTION BY EVERYONE OF THE NINE GOVERNMENTS. WITH REGARD TO ARAFAT'S THREE PHASES, WOULD THE PLO BE PREPARED TO START THE NEGOTIATIONS IN PHASE 3 IF AGREEMENT IN PRINCIPLE HAD BEEN REACHED ON PHASES 1 AND 2? ARAFAT DID NOT REPLY TO THIS DIRECTLY BUT SAID THAT THE PLO WOULD CERTAINLY BE PREPARED TO CONSIDER "A PACKAGE".

MEETINGS WITH LEBANESE

14. LITTLE NEW EMERGED ON THESE. SAEB SALAM SAID THE LEBANESE CHRISTIANS WERE MANIPULATED BY ISRAEL. ALL LEBANESE PROBLEMS WERE EXACERBATED BY THE PALESTINIAN PRESENCE. ISRAEL WAS BEHIND ALL THE ARAB INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL PROBLEMS. PRESIDENT SARKIS WAS HIS UNIMPRESSIVE AND NEGATIVE SELF; LEBANON'S ONLY PROBLEM WAS THE PALESTINIANS. FOREIGN MINISTER BOUTROS DID NOT AGREE WITH SARKIS; AN INTERMEDIATE LEBANESE SOLUTION ACCEPTABLE TO LEBANESE AND PALESTINIANS REMAINED A POSSIBILITY. M. THORN FOUND PRIME MINISTER HOSS MOST IMPRESSIVE AND BALANCED. HE SAID LEBANON'S PRIMARY NEED WAS FOR A STRONG ARMY. HE FEARED A JOINT OFFENSIVE BY THE MARONITES AND ISRAEL, WHICH MIGHT BE PRECIPITATED BY A SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL

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FROM LEBANON. CAMILLE CHAMOUN WAS SHOWING HIS AGE AND KEPT REPEATING THAT THE PALESINIANS MUST GO. PIERRE GEMAYEL WAS MORE REALISTIC: LEBANON HAD TO BE A MULTI-CONFESSIONAL COUNTRY AND GOOD RELATIONS WITH SYRIA WERE NECESSARY. HE CALLED FOR A UN FORCE TO IMPOSE A SETTLEMENT IN LEBANON.

IMPRESSIONS

15. M. THORN SAID THAT THE IMPRESSION GAINED BY HIS TALKS IN BEIRUT WAS THAT IN LEBANESE AND PALESTINIAN EYES THE EC COUNTS FOR A GREAT DEAL AND SO DOES THE EC INITIATIVE. IN VIEW OF THIS WE SHOULD HAVE TO MOVE WITH GREAT CARE.

16. HE THOUGHT THAT THE EURO-ARAB DIALOGUE WAS VERY IMPORTANT IN PLO EYES AND THEY WOULD SEEK DURING THEIR CHAIRMANSHIP TO MOVE MATTERS FORWARD IN THIS FORUM.

17. HE THOUGHT IT IMPORTANT THAT WE SHOULD IMPRESS UPON OUR CONTACTS THE SERIOUSNESS OF THIS EC INITIATIVE AS REFLECTING GENUINE EUROPEAN CONCERN AND THE WILL TO SEEK A JUST SOLUTION.

STRACHAN

[THIS TELEGRAM WAS NOT ADVANCED]

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TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1093 OF 6 AUGUST 1980

INFO IMMEDIATE PARIS

INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON, TEL AVIV, CAIRO, AMMAN, DAMASCUS,
BEIRUT, JERUSALEM.

no

YOUR TEL 570: SECURITY COUNCIL : JERUSALEM

1. AS REPORTED IN MY TELNO 1087 ESSAAFI (TUNISIA) TOLD US THAT PARAGRAPH 5 WAS NOT NEGOTIABLE. TERZI (PLO) IS OPENLY SAYING IN THE UN TODAY (6 AUGUST) THAT THE ADOPTION BY THE ISLAMIC GROUP TOMORROW OF THE TEXT AS IT STANDS IS A FOREGONE CONCLUSION AND THAT IT WILL BE PUT TO AN EARLY VOTE IN THE COUNCIL. IT REMAINS TO BE SEEN WHETHER THERE IS ANY FLEXIBILITY, BUT WE ARE NOT LIKELY TO KNOW UNTIL THE MOSLEM MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL BEGIN THE PROCESS OF CONSULTING THE OTHER REGIONAL GROUPS. MEANWHILE, SPEAKING PERSONALLY, WE HAVE ALREADY TOLD ESSAAFI THAT WE WOULD EXPECT TO BE INSTRUCTED TO VOTE AGAINST THE PRESENT TEXT.

2. THE FRENCH ASSESSMENT OF THE ISLAMIC GROUP'S WILLINGNESS TO NEGOTIATE IS CONSISTENT WITH OURS. THEY SAY THAT THE QUAI IS "EMBARRASSED" BY THE WORDING OF OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH 5 AS IT STANDS BUT THAT IT WOULD BE EQUALLY "EMBARRASSED" BY MORE ORTHODOX CHAPTER VII LANGUAGE. OUR ESTIMATE IS THAT THE FRENCH MISSION HERE WOULD BE INCLINED TO VETO, ALBEIT RELUCTANTLY. THE ADVANTAGES TO THEM WOULD BE THAT THEY COULD SHELTER IN GOOD COMPANY AT THIS STAGE AND WOULD MORE EASILY BE ABLE TO RESIST THE PRESSURES THE ARABS WOULD PUT ON THEM TO TAKE SOME KIND OF ACTION AGAINST ISRAEL IF THEY HAD ABSTAINED AND WE AND THE US HAD VOTED AGAINST. THE FRENCH MISSION HAVE ALSO POINTED OUT THAT WHEREAS FRENCH PUBLIC OPINION, NOTABLY MORE ANTI-ARAB THAN THE GOVERNMENT, CAN ACCEPT VERBAL ABUSE OF ISRAEL, IT WOULD REACT STRONGLY TO ANY MOVE BY THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT WHICH INVOLVED TAKING ACTIVE MEASURES AGAINST ISRAEL. THIS CONSIDERATION, THEY SAY, GAINS FORCE FROM THE PROSPECT OF THE FRENCH ELECTION EARLY NEXT YEAR. AS SEEN FROM HERE, THERE IS THEREFORE SOME HOPE THAT THE FRENCH WOULD JOIN IN A TRIPLE VETO. IN ANY CASE, THEY HAVE NO DISPOSITION TO NEGOTIATE A TEXT AT THIS STAGE, PARTICULARLY IN ADVANCE OF FULL ISLAMIC GROUP AGREEMENT.

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3. THE US MISSION EXPECTS INSTRUCTIONS TO VETO AND HAS INDICATED AT "EXPERT" LEVEL THEIR HOPE THAT WE WILL JOIN THEM. THEY ARE LESS OPTIMISTIC ABOUT THE FRENCH. FOLLOWING THE RUMOURS OF THE POSSIBLE DIFFICULTY IN OBTAINING NINE POSITIVE VOTES, THE US MISSION TELL US THAT ACTIVE CONSIDERATION IS BEING GIVEN TO LOBBYING IN THE COUNTRIES MENTIONED IN YOUR TELEGRAM UNDER REFERENCE. MEXICO, AS ISRAEL'S MAJOR OIL SUPPLIER, COULD BE IN AN EMBARRASSING POSITION IF SHE HAD VOTED FOR SANCTIONS AGAINST ISRAEL; AND WE BELIEVE THAT JEWISH INTERESTS IN THE USA HAVE IN THE PAST PUT EFFECTIVE PRESSURE ON MEXICO OVER MIDDLE EASTERN VOTES. THE ECONOMIC DEPENDENCE OF BOTH THE PHILIPPINES AND JAMAICA ON THE UNITED STATES WILL OBVIOUSLY BE A FACTOR (AS WE SAW LAST DECEMBER WHEN THE US WAS DRUMMING UP SUPPORT FOR ITS RESOLUTION ON THE HOSTAGES IN TEHRAN). GIVEN THEIR PUBLICLY EXPRESSED VIEWS ON THE SUBJECT OF JERUSALEM, HOWEVER, WE ARE NOT SANGUINE ABOUT THE CHANCES OF PERSUADING THESE THREE NOT TO VOTE IN FAVOUR AND WE BELIEVE THE POSSIBILITY OF THEIR FAILING TO SUPPORT THE ISLAMIC GROUP IS REMOTE: AT BEST THEY MIGHT BE PREPARED TO URGE SOME AMENDMENTS. IN ANY CASE, THE US IS IN MUCH THE BEST POSITION TO EXERT PRESSURE IN THE THREE CAPITALS AND, AS SEEN FROM HERE, IT WOULD BE WISER TO LEAVE THEM TO TAKE THE LEAD IN ANY LOBBYING.

4. TACTICALLY, I BELIEVE THAT, WHILST KEEPING IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH THE FRENCH, WE SHOULD TAKE NO FURTHER ACTION HERE UNTIL THE MOSLEM MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL APPROACH THE WESTERN FIVE. AT THAT TIME WE SHOULD INDICATE OUR DISTASTE FOR THE DETERMINATION OF THE THREAT TO THE PEACE IN THE PREAMBLE AND FOR THE WORDING IN OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH 5 AND LEAVE IT TO THEM AND/OR THE FRENCH TO TAKE THE LEAD IN ANY SUBSEQUENT NEGOTIATION.

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INFO ROUTINE WASHINGTON

SAVING TO DAMASCUS AMMAN TEL AVIV AND CAIRO

ARAB/ISRAEL

1. I CALLED ON KAMAL ADHAM, PRINCE SAUD'S UNCLE , LAST NIGHT.
2. I MENTIONED THE POSSIBILITY THAT THE SAUDIS MIGHT BE EXPECTING TOO MUCH FROM YOUR VISIT IN TERMS OF NEW LANGUAGE ON ARAB/ISRAEL. I SUGGESTED THAT THE STRENGTH OF THE NINE ON PALESTINE LAY IN ITS UNITY: NEW LANGUAGE FROM ONE MEMBER COULD PROVE AN ILLUSORY GAIN FOR THE ARABS IF IT DESTROYED THAT UNITY. ADHAM REPLIED THAT THERE WAS ALREADY A LACK OF UNITY IN INDIVIDUAL POSITIONS: HMG FOR INSTANCE HAD NOT ADVANCED AS FAR TOWARDS THE ARAB POSITION AS FRANCE OR THE FRG. I SAID THAT YOU WOULD ALSO NOT WANT TO DO ANYTHING TO PREJUDICE THE THORN MISSION: ADHAM COMMENTED THAT THE THORN MISSION WOULD PROVIDE A PERFECT EXCUSE FOR YOU TO STICK TO THE VENICE DECLARATION.
3. LATER IN THE CONVERSATION , I SUMMARISED THE EUROPEAN POSITION AS A BALANCING PAIR OF BASIC PRINCIPLES WHICH IT WAS OUR HOPE BOTH PARTIES (ISREAL AND PALESTINE) COULD BE BROUGHT TO RECOGNISE SIMULTANEOUSLY. THE PROBLEM OF HOW TO ACHIEVE THAT WAS SOMETHING TO WHICH THE THORN MISSION WAS OUR INITIAL RESPONSE. ADHAM SAID THAT WAS THE SORT OF THING THE SAUDIS WOULD WANT TO HEAR FROM YOU. (IT OCCURS TO ME THAT THE LANGUAGE USED BY THE LPS IN THE COMMONS ON 31 JULY MIGHT BE A USEFUL QUARRY).
4. ON ADHAM'S SIDE THE THEME RUNNING TTHROUGH TWO HOURS CONVERSATION WAS THAT THE ARABS, AND ESPECIALLY THE SAUDIS, WERE THOROUGHLY DISILLUSIONED WITH THE AMERICANS AND WERE NOW LOOKING TO EURIPE TO SUGGEST A WAY FORWARD FROM THE CAMP DAVID CUL'DE-SAC. HE WAS VAGUE WHEN PRESSED ON WHAT LEVERAGE EUROPE HAD ON ANY OF THE PARTIES AND SEEMED TO ACCEPT THAT ONLY THE AMERICANS (IF ANYONE) COULD BRING THE ISRAELIS TO HEEL. HE THOUGHT EUROPE'S ROLE LAY IN STAYING ONE JUMP AHEAD OF THE AMERICANS AND PERSUADING THEM TO FOLLOW.

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5. HIS OWN SUGGESTION FOR SOLVING THE PALESTINE ISSUE LAY IN SEPARATING THE CURRENT SITUATION INTO TWO ELEMENTS: THE ILLEGAL OCCUPATION OF TERRITORY, ESPECIALLY JERUSALEM TERRITORY; AND THE RIGHTS OF THE PALESTINIANS. IF ISRAEL COULD BE BROUGHT TO HAND THE WEST BANK AND EAST JERUSALEM BACK TO JORDAN, THEN JORDAN COULD BE PRESSED BY OTHER ARABS TO PROVIDE A CONSTITUTIONAL FUTURE FOR THOSE AREAS WHICH WOULD BOTH SATISFY PALESTINIAN DEMANDS AND GUARANTEE ISRAEL'S SECURITY. BUT HE ADMITTED THAT THIS ASSUMED A UNITY OF PURPOSE AMONG BOTH PALESTINIANS AND ARABS GENERALLY OF WHICH THERE WAS LITTLE SIGN.

6. SINCE HIS DEPARTURE FROM OFFICE AS ROYAL ADVISER, ADHAM NO LONGER NECESSARILY REFLECTS THE VIEWS OF THE MOST SENIOR PRINCES. BUT HE IS STILL CLOSE TO HIS NEPHEW PRINCE SAUD AND HAS AN IMMENSE EXPERIENCE OF MIDDLE EAST AFFAIRS: HE THEREFORE REMAINS A MOST USEFUL COMMENTATOR ON EVENTS.

7. FULL RECORD OF CONVERSATION FOLLOWS BY BAG.

8. FCO PLEASE PASS TO SAVING ADDRESSEES.

GRAY

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TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NO 3697 OF 5 AUGUST

INFO TEL AVIV, CAIRO, JERUSALEM, EC POSTS, UKMIS NEW YORK

YOURTEL 1348: JERUSALEM

1. POSSIBLE MOVE OF BEGIN'S OFFICE. AMBASSADOR LEWIS HAS INSTRUCTIONS NOT TO INITIATE ANY CALL ON BEGIN IN HIS EAST JERUSALEM OFFICE AND TO REFER TO WASHINGTON ANY REQUEST BY BEGIN THAT HE SHOULD CALL THERE. THE AMERICANS HAVE, HOWEVER, TOLD SADAT FORMALLY AND BEGIN INFORMALLY (THROUGH TWO PRIVATE CONVERSATIONS WITH LEWIS) THAT THEY WILL CONTINUE THEIR CURRENT PRACTICE OF NOT CALLING ON ISRAELI OFFICIALS IN EAST JERUSALEM. ANY PUBLIC STATEMENT (AND ASSISTANT SECRETARY SAUNDERS BELIEVES THAT ONE WILL BE INEVITABLE IF ONLY IN ANSWER TO PRESS ENQUIRIES) ABOUT AN ISRAELI DECISION TO MOVE THE OFFICE WILL STRESS THE CONTINUING NATURE OF AMERICAN PRACTICE RATHER THAN MAKE IT APPEAR A NEW POLICY. SAUNDERS SAID THAT THE AMERICANS HAD NOT YET ADDRESSED THE QUESTION OF CORRESPONDENCE WITH BEGIN'S EAST JERUSALEM OFFICE BUT HIS FIRST REACTION WAS THAT THE PROPOSAL IN PARA 2(11) OF TEL AVIV TEL 308 SEEMED RIGHT.

2. KNESSET LAW. THE AMERICANS PLAN NO FURTHER STATEMENT SPECIFICALLY ADDRESSING THE KNESSET LAW QUESTION, ALTHOUGH THEY MAY HAVE TO REPEAT THEIR OPPOSITION TO UNILATERAL ACTIONS OF THIS SORT IF THEY ARE CALLED UPON TO MAKE A STATEMENT ABOUT ANY FURTHER SUSPENSION/ POSTPONEMENT OF THE AUTONOMY NEGOTIATIONS.

3. SAUNDERS MENTIONED THAT WHEN LEWIS CALLED WITH SISCO ON BEGIN LAST WEEK, BEGIN TOLD HIM THAT HE WOULD NOT BE MOVING HIS OFFICE "FOR A FEW WEEKS." LEWIS, WHO IS FIRMLY CONVINCED THAT BEGIN'S MIND IS MADE UP ON THE MOVE, BELIEVES THAT THIS MERELY REFLECTS THE FACT THAT THE OFFICE IS NOT YET PHYSICALLY READY. SAUNDERS DID NOT ENTIRELY RULE OUT THAT SOME OF BEGIN'S CABINET COLLEAGUES MIGHT PERSUADE HIM THAT THE TIME WAS NOT RIGHT TO MAKE THE MOVE : BEGIN HAD TAKEN HIS DECISION TO DO SO LONG AGO - AT LEAST AS FAR BACK AS CAMP DAVID WHEN HE WAS ALREADY TALKING ABOUT IT - AND MIGHT SEE THE ADVANTAGES OF DELAYING A LITTLE LONGER.

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TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1087 OF 5 AUGUST

INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON TEL AVIV CAIRO AMMAN DAMASCUS BEIRUT
JERUSALEM

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[Signature]

MY TELNO 1083: SECURITY COUNCIL: JERUSALEM

1. THE DRAFTING SUB-COMMITTEE OF THE ISLAMIC GROUP HAS PREPARED ITS FIRST WORKING PAPER AND SUBMITTED IT TO CAPITALS. IT IS HOPING FOR COMMENTS BOTH ON THE TEXT AND ON THE TIMING OF THE COUNCIL MEETING BY TOMORROW AND HAS SCHEDULED A MEETING OF THE FULL ISLAMIC GROUP FOR THURSDAY. ESSAAFI (TUNISIA) HAS TOLD US THAT THE COUNCIL COULD MEET EITHER ON FRIDAY OR SOMETIME NEXT WEEK.

2. THE TEXT OF THE WORKING PAPER IS IN MIFT. THERE IS WHAT APPEARS TO AMOUNT TO A FORMAL DETERMINATION UNDER ARTICLE 39 OF THE CHARTER IN PREAMBULAR PARAPHRASE (F). THE WORDING OF OPERATIVE PARA 5 CALLING FOR THE APPLICATION OF MEASURES UNDER ARTICLE 41 IS STRANGE AND IGNORES THE FACT THAT IT IS FOR THE SECURITY COUNCIL TO DECIDE WHAT SPECIFIC MEASURES ARE TO BE EMPLOYED. ESSAAFI HAS TOLD US THAT THIS WORDING HAS BEEN DELIBERATELY CHOSEN SO THAT IN THE EVENT OF THE EXPECTED VETO, MEMBERS OF THE UNITED NATIONS MAY FEEL FREE TO GO AHEAD UNILATERALLY EVEN WITHOUT THE UMBRELLA OF A SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION. AT FIRST SIGHT IT IS DIFFICULT TO SEE THE POINT OF THIS: A VETOED RESOLUTION WOULD HAVE NO LEGAL FORCE AND WOULD NOT ADD TO COUNTRIES' PRESENT ABILITY, IF THEY SO CHOOSE, TO TAKE UNILATERAL ACTION AGAINST ISRAEL, EG THE ARAB BOYCOTT. ESSAAFI SAYS THAT OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH 5 IS NOT NEGOTIABLE BUT THIS WAS, OF COURSE, SAID IN ADVANCE OF COMMENTS FROM CAPITALS AND OF ISLAMIC GROUP CONCURRENCE.

3. IT WILL CLEARLY BE SOME TIME BEFORE WE HAVE TO VOTE. INDEED, ONE RUMOUR IS THAT A DRAFT RESOLUTION ON THE LINES OF MIFT WOULD NOT ATTRACT NINE POSITIVE VOTES AND THAT CONSEQUENTLY THE ISLAMIC GROUP ARE HAVING SECOND THOUGHTS ABOUT HAVING A MEETING AT ALL. MEANWHILE, THE AMERICANS ARE AGAIN UNDER INSTRUCTIONS NOT TO NEGOTIATE. THE FRENCH HAVE STRESSED THE NEED FOR OUR TWO DELEGATIONS TO CO-ORDINATE CLOSELY BUT HAVE NO INDICATION OF THE QUAI'S LIKELY REACTION TO A CALL FOR SANCTIONS. OUR EXPECTATION IS THAT THE CURRENT WORDING OF OPERATIVE PARA 5 WOULD PROBABLY CAUSE THEM PROBLEMS BECAUSE OF ITS INCONSISTENCY WITH THE CHARTER.

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TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1088 OF 5 AUGUST 1980

INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON, TEL AVIV, CAIRO, AMMAN, DAMASCUS,
BEIRUT, JERUSALEM.

MIPT: SECURITY COUNCIL: JERUSALEM

TEXT OF WORKING PAPER IS AS FOLLOWS:

THE SECURITY COUNCIL,

A. HAVING CONSIDERED THE LETTER ...

B. RECALLING AND REAFFIRMING ITS RESOLUTION 476 (1980) OF 30
JUNE, AND IN PARTICULAR PARAGRAPHS 5 AND 6 THEREIN,C. REAFFIRMING AGAIN THAT THE ACQUISITION OF TERRITORY BY FORCE
IS INADMISSIBLE,D. DEEPLY CONCERNED OVER THE ENACTMENT OF A BASIC LAW IN THE
ISRAELI KNESSET PROCLAIMING A CHANGE IN THE CHARACTER AND STATUS
OF THE HOLY CITY OF JERUSALEM,E. AFFIRMING THAT THIS ACTION BY ISRAEL, THE OCCUPYING POWER,
CONSTITUTES A FLAGRANT VIOLATION OF THE FOURTH GENEVA CONVENTION
OF 12 AUGUST 1949 RELATIVE TO THE PROTECTION OF CIVILIAN PERSONS
IN TIME OF WAR,F. AFFIRMING ALSO THAT THIS ACTION CONSTITUTES A SERIOUS
OBSTRUCTION TO ACHIEVING A COMPREHENSIVE, JUST AND LASTING PEACE
IN THE MIDDLE EAST, AND CONSTITUTES A THREAT TO INTERNATIONAL
PEACE AND SECURITY,G. RECALLING AND REAFFIRMING ITS DETERMINATION TO EXAMINE
PRACTICAL WAYS AND MEANS IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE RELEVANT PROVISIONS
OF THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS TO SECURE THE FULL IMPLEMENT-
ATION OF ITS RESOLUTION 476 (1980) OF 30 JUNE 1980 IN THE EVENT
OF NON-COMPLIANCE BY ISRAEL,1. DETERMINES THAT ISRAEL HAS NOT COMPLIED WITH SECURITY COUNCIL
RESOLUTION 476 (1980) OF 30 JUNE 1980:2. CONDEMNS ISRAEL FOR ITS REFUSAL TO COMPLY WITH SECURITY COUNCIL
RESOLUTION 476 (1980):3. DETERMINES THAT ALL LEGISLATIVE AND ADMINISTRATIVE MEASURES
AND ACTIONS TAKEN BY ISRAEL, THE OCCUPYING POWER, WHICH HAVE
ALTERED OR PURPORT TO ALTER THE CHARACTER AND STATUS OF THE HOLY
CITY OF JERUSALEM ARE NULL AND VOID AND MUST BE RESCINDED

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FORTHWITH:

4. DECIDES TO REFUSE TO ACCORD ANY RECOGNITION TO THE BASIC LAW ON JERUSALEM AND CALLS UPON ALL STATES TO ABIDE BY THIS DECISION;
5. CALLS UPON ALL MEMBERS OF THE UNITED NATIONS TO APPLY MEASURES AGAINST ISRAEL, AS PROVIDED IN ARTICLE 41 (CHAPTER VII) OF THE CHARTER;
6. REQUESTS THE SECRETARY GENERAL TO REPORT TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS RESOLUTION BEFORE NOVEMBER 15, 1980;
7. DECIDES TO REMAIN SEIZED OF THIS SERIOUS SITUATION.

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TO ROUTINE FCO
TELNO 339 OF 5 AUG
INFO CAIRO, WASHINGTON.

MYTEL 333: AUTONOMY NEGOTIATIONS.

1. DIRECTOR GENERAL AT THE ISRAELI FOREIGN MINISTRY TOLD ME
THIS MORNING THAT HE EXPECTED THAT ISRAEL'S REPLY TO SADAT'S
LETTER WOULD BE DELIVERED THIS WEEK. IT WOULD MAKE CLEAR ISRAEL'S
READINESS TO RESUME THE NEGOTIATIONS AT ANY TIME.

2. HE SAID THAT THERE HAD BEEN A GREAT DEAL OF SUGAR IN SADAT'S
LETTER. THE BARB HAD NOT APPEARED UNTIL HALF WAY THROUGH PAGE 16,
BUT THE END OF THE LETTER HAD BEEN VERY TOUGH. HE DID NOT GO
INTO DETAILS.

ROBINSON

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TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 337 OF 5 AUGUST

Prime Minister
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MY TELEGRAM NO 330. MIDDLE EAST: THORN MISSION

1. THERE WAS NO FURTHER OPPORTUNITY TO SEE THORN AWAY FROM ISRAELIS BEFORE HE LEFT AT THE END OF LAST WEEK. THE NETHERLANDS CHARGE, WHO WAS WITH HIM ON 1 AUGUST, GAVE US THE FOLLOWING ACCOUNT OF EVENTS ON THORN'S SECOND DAY.

2. BURG, INTERIOR MINISTER, SAID HE STILL HOPED FOR A SUCCESSFUL OUTCOME OF THE AUTONOMY TALKS IF EUROPE DID NOT ENCOURAGE HOPES OF SELF-DETERMINATION RATHER THAN AUTONOMY FOR THE PALESTINIANS.

3. IN A FURTHER MEETING WITH SHAMIR AND FOREIGN MINISTRY OFFICIALS THE NEW DIRECTOR GENERAL GAVE A DETAILED ACCOUNT OF INTERNAL CONFLICTS IN ISRAEL'S ARAB NEIGHBOURS, POINTING TO THE THE CONCLUSION (OFFER POINTED TO HERE) THAT SOLVING THE PALESTINIAN PROBLEM WOULD TAKE AWAY THE ONLY ISSUE ON WHICH THE ARABS COULD AGREE. SHAMIR CONCLUDED BY SAYING THAT THE PALESTINIANS HAD ALWAYS LOST AGAINST ISRAEL THROUGH EXTREMISM, AND WOULD DO SO AGAIN IF THEY DID NOT SEIZE THE OPPORTUNITY FOR AUTONOMY. THEY WOULD THEN BE LEFT IN THE MARGIN OF HISTORY. SHAMIR SAID THERE WAS NO ROOM FOR PALESTINIAN REFUGEES ON THE WEST BANK. (SHARON, AGRICULTURE MINISTER, SUBSEQUENTLY TOLD THORN THAT THERE WAS ROOM THERE FOR ONE MILLION MORE JEWS). A GLOBAL SOLUTION WAS IMPOSSIBLE IN THIS PART OF THE WORLD AND EUROPE HAD NOT EXERTED A MODERATING INFLUENCE ON EGYPT. ISRAEL WAS READY TO NEGOTIATE WITH ARAB STATES WITHOUT PRECONDITIONS, BUT WOULD NOT NEGOTIATE WITH THE PLO. THORN CONCLUDED THAT HIS TALKS HAD PROVIDED A LOT OF MATERIAL BUT WERE NOT ENCOURAGING. WHAT WOULD SHAMIR HAVE HIM SAY TO HUSSEIN? SHAMIR'S ANSWER WAS JOIN 'THE CAMP DAVID PROCESS'. WHEN ASKED WHAT IF ARAB STATES INSISTED ON INCLUDING THE PLO IN THEIR DELEGATIONS, SHAMIR REPEATED THAT ISRAEL WAS READY TO NEGOTIATE WITH ARAB STATES WITHOUT PRECONDITIONS.

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4. IN A HELICOPTER FLIGHT LASTING ONE AND A QUARTER HOURS WITH SHARON OVER THE WEST BANK, THE HELICOPTER LANDED ONCE IN AN ISOLATED SPOT OVERLOOKING THE JORDAN VALLEY. (THE PRESS HAVE NOT GOT HOLD OF THIS YET. THE FRENCH EMBASSY HAD INSTRUCTIONS TO OBJECT TO THORN VISITING THE WEST BANK WITH ISRAELIS IN ANY FORM). SHARON HAD PRESENTED THE EXTREME CASE ON ISRAEL'S SECURITY NEEDS.

5. AS FAR AS ANY OF US HERE KNOW THORN DID NOT MENTION TO THE ISRAELIS THE QUESTION OF CONTACTS WITH PALESTINIANS ON THE WEST BANK. BUT THORN TOLD THE DUTCH CHARGE THAT HE WAS PLANNING TO ALLOCATE TWO DAYS FOR THIS PURPOSE AND WAS GOING TO SEE THE PALESTINIANS IN THEIR HOME SURROUNDINGS, IE INDIVIDUALLY IN THE DIFFERENT TOWNS, RATHER THAN AT A JOINT MEETING ANYWHERE. THIS IS CERTAINLY THE RIGHT APPROACH.

6. PLEASE REPEAT THIS TELEGRAM FURTHER AS NECESSARY.

ROBINSON

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TO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1348 OF 5 AUGUST.
INFO TEL AVIV JERUSALEM CAIRO EC POSTS, UKMIS NEW YORK.

*(reply in Washington
telno 3697)*

YOUR TEL NO'S 2628 AND 2660: JERUSALEM.

1. WE ARE ANXIOUS THAT THE NINE SHOULD IF POSSIBLE KEEP IN STEP WITH THE AMERICANS IN THEIR REACTIONS TO ISRAELI MOVES. GRATEFUL THEREFORE FOR THE LATEST STATE OF PLAY ON:

(I). THE US REACTION TO MR BEGIN'S MOVE OF OFFICE.
HAS THE PRESIDENT YET PRONOUNCED ON THE STATE DEPARTMENT RECOMMENDATION?
WOULD THE AMERICANS PROPOSE TO MAKE A STATEMENT ABOUT THEIR DECISION WHEN THE MOVE TAKES PLACE?
YOU MAY SAY THAT WE WOULD SEE ADVANTAGE IN THE US AND THE NINE TOGETHER FOLLOWING THE LINE IN TEL AVIV TEL NO 308.

(II). US REACTIONS TO THE KNESSET LAW.
DO THE AMERICANS INTEND TO MAKE A FORMAL STATEMENT NOW THAT THEY HAVE HAD TIME TO STUDY THE NEW LAW?
WHAT HAS BEEN THEIR REACTION TO STATEMENTS STRONGLY CRITICAL OF ISRAEL MADE BY OTHERS, INCLUDING MEMBERS OF THE NINE?

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Top Copy : Egypt, May 19,
Visits of Vice President Mubarak

ראש הממשלה
THE PRIME MINISTER

Jerusalem, August 4, 1980

Dear President Sadat,

I thank you for your letter dated August 2, 1980, which I studied carefully yesterday evening.

Thank God, my health is good. May I tell you something of my thoughts during the illness which suddenly befell me. My good doctors put me under a machine, made in Israel, unique in its sophistication, which you saw in Haifa, and which we even export to the United States. After nearly two hours of ordeal they had a photo of my heart. The Professor decided to show it to me.

So what is the human heart? Simply, it is a pump. And I thought, God Almighty, as long as this pump is working, a human being feels, thinks, speaks, writes, loves his family, smiles, weeps, enjoys life, gets angry,

His Excellency
Mohamed Anwar El Sadat
President of the Arab Republic of Egypt
Cairo

gives friendship, wins friendship, prays, dreams, remembers, forgets, forgives, influences other people, is influenced by other people - lives. But when this pump stops - no more! What a wonder in the Cosmos is this frailty of the human body, without which the mind, too, becomes still, helpless or hapless.

Therefore, it is the clear duty of every man who is called upon to serve his people, his country, humanity, a just cause - he is duty-bound to do his best as long as the heart pumps.

I agree with you wholeheartedly that there is no nobler task than to work for peace, yes indeed, a comprehensive peace between all nations and, notably, between our nations which originate from and live in our region, known as the Middle East.

You will, I hope, forgive me for this quasi-philosophical introduction. It is relevant. Both our nations yearn for peace. I believe that both of us, too, want peace.

It is in this spirit that for the sake of sincerity and clarity, I must make several remarks concerning your detailed letter. Because, whenever you mention our meetings at Camp David, in Alexandria, in Aswan, etc., you always remind me of what you told me; but what about my response? You will agree with me that in none of our meetings was there a monologue either by you or by me. We conducted always a dialogue. You spoke; I responded. I spoke; you answered. Let us, therefore, refresh our memories.

1. You write in your paragraph 14:

"You would also recall that I offered (in El-Arish) to provide you with water that could reach Jerusalem, passing through the Negev ... You misunderstood the idea behind my offer when you said that the national aspirations of your people are not for sale."

I believe, Mr. President, that when you recreate by memory our short dialogue in El-Arish, you will agree with me that:

a) You suggested to me bringing water from the Nile to the Negev; in that conversation you never mentioned bringing the water to Jerusalem.

b) I never said that the national aspirations of my people are not for sale. That would be gross language and I never used such language in our talks. You took the initiative and made to me a double proposal. You said: We must act with vision. I am prepared to let you have water from the Nile to irrigate the Negev; and let us solve the problem of Jerusalem, because if we solve this problem, we will have solved everything.

I then responded:

"Mr. President, water from the Nile to the Negev - a good idea, indeed a great vision, but we must always distinguish between moral historical values, and such is Jerusalem, and material achievements. Let us separate the two issues: Jerusalem on the one hand, and water from the Nile to the Negev on the other hand."

2. I will, of course, come back to the issue of Jerusalem, but I would like now to respond to another point in your letter, on which you dwell rather extensively: good faith, goodwill, mutual understanding, promoting peace and cooperation.

These are the facts:

a) Your Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, Dr. Boutrus Ghali, pays visits to African countries and repeatedly influences their governments not to renew diplomatic relations with Israel. Is not this unilateral action a clear breach of the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty, annex III, article 5, section 3, which stipulates:

"The parties shall seek to foster mutual understanding and tolerance and will, accordingly, abstain from hostile propaganda against each other."

This, certainly, is hostile propaganda in third countries which used to say that they cannot renew diplomatic relations with Israel as long as there is a state of war between it and an African state (Egypt). But now there is peace between

Egypt and Israel. A peace treaty was signed between us and duly ratified. Why, then, this unilateral act of hostility towards Israel?

b) If the Egyptian delegate to the United Nations Emergency General Assembly votes for the most hostile anti-Israel resolution since that other abominable resolution was adopted in the Assembly equating Zionism - one of the most humane, national liberation movements in history - with racism, (of which we, the Jews, have been and are the first victims), is not this a unilateral act of hostility contrary to our peace treaty?

c) The Egyptian delegate voted for a resolution demanding that by November 15, Israel withdraws from Judea, Samaria, (my language), the Gaza District, the Golan Heights and Jerusalem. Is not this a flagrant contradiction of the Camp David agreement? There it is written: "A withdrawal of Israeli armed forces will take place and there will be a redeployment of the remaining Israeli forces into specified security locations" - this, following the election of the self-

governing authority (administrative council). It is also written in the Camp David agreement: "All necessary measures will be taken and provisions made to assure the security of Israel and its neighbours during the transitional period and beyond."

"The transitional period," as agreed between Egypt, the United States and Israel, is five years; "beyond" is indefinite. "The remaining forces" mean army units which remain (in Judea, Samaria and the Gaza District). Yet your delegate voted in the United Nations in favour of an "ultimatum" to Israel to commence evacuation of these territories in less than five months.

d) The Egyptian delegate made a speech at the United Nations in which he said, inter alia:

i) Israel should withdraw to the pre-June 5, 1967 lines, whether on the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, and the Gaza Strip. Where, Mr. President, is this written in the Camp David agreement? The quotations mentioned above tell us of stipulations that are completely different.

ii) Israeli withdrawal should be complete including that of the military forces, settlements should be dismantled and settlers removed. Where is this passage mentioned in the Camp David agreement? Are settlements mentioned at all in the Camp David accord?

iii) "The Palestinian people should exercise, without any external interference, the inalienable and fundamental right to self-determination, including the right to establish an independent state on the West Bank and Gaza."

Thus, the Egyptian delegate to the United Nations.

However, not one word about self-determination (which, of course, means a state), or about an independent (Palestinian) state appears in any one of the pages, paragraphs, sections, subsections etc. of the Camp David agreement. Dr. Ghali, speaking on behalf of Egypt, committed almost incomprehensible deviations from, and total contradictions to, the Camp David accord which you and I signed and which our friend President Carter signed as witness, and which all of us are obligated to carry out in good faith in accordance with the old golden rule: Pacta sunt servanda.

It is not Israel, Mr. President, which commits a breach of our peace treaty or of the other, not yet fulfilled, part of the Camp David agreement; spokesmen of Egypt, of various levels, do.

3. In this conjunction it is also my duty to turn your attention again to the fact that one of your official newspapers likened me to the "embodiment of all evil in mankind," (to use a Churchillian description), Adolph Hitler. I would not refer back to this shame, were it not for the fact that this "hostile propaganda," which Egypt undertook to abstain from conducting still goes on and on in a press which is not free of Government influence. Again I was called, by one of the Egyptian newspapers, "Shylock," an epithet hurled at the Jew by all his haters and detractors who originally, in Germany, were termed "Anti-Semites." (Of course, we Arabs and Jews are all Semites). I will refrain from listing other names, or articles, or curses. But, Mr. President, is this the way "to foster mutual understanding"?

4. On Jerusalem: With this letter I attach three documents: a) my letter to President Carter of September 17, 1978; b) the Law of the Holy Places adopted by the Knesset in June 1967; and c) the Basic Law: Jerusalem, Capital of Israel, adopted by the Knesset last week.

I am aware that you wrote a letter about Jerusalem to President Carter, who also wrote to me a letter after having withdrawn his first draft. About that draft we said to our American friends that should it become official we shall not sign the Camp David agreement which was already completed on that Sunday, September 17, 1978.

I put to you a simple, logical question: By what letter should we, Israel, stand? By yours? By President Carter's? Or by the letter of Israel's Prime Minister who, on this matter, speaks for ninety-five per cent of the Israeli people, without distinction of party affiliation?

I have never misled you, nor anybody else.

Time and again I repeated that Jerusalem, in its entirety, is the capital of Israel, a city re-united and indivisible for all generations.

Yes, indeed, there are in Jerusalem places holy to Christians and Moslems. We respect them. It was not so under Jordanian occupation as far as the Jewish Holy Places were concerned. Israel assures men and women of all religions absolutely free access to the places sacred to them, guaranteed by the Basic Law forever. We know that from the point of view of religious faith Jerusalem is holy to Christians and Moslems. To the Jewish people Jerusalem is not only holy; it is their history for three millenia, their heart, their dream, the visible symbol of their national redemption.

You assure me, Mr. President, that you are for the unity of Jerusalem, but in your speech at the National Press Club in Washington, a few months ago, you demanded that "Eastern Jerusalem" be put under Arab sovereignty. This is a contradiction in terms. Two sovereignties over one city mean its re-partition. Impossible.

Jerusalem is and will be one, under Israel's sovereignty, its indivisible capital in which Jews and Arabs will dwell together in peace and in human dignity. Whosoever declares that the sovereign acts of our democratic Parliament are null and void makes a declaration which is null and void.

The same applies to our settlements in Judea, Samaria, the Gaza District and the Golan Heights. They are legal and legitimate and they are an integral part of our national security. None of them will ever be removed. I made a statement to this effect in Aswan, in your presence, in public, before the press and media of the world. I said the same, of course, to President Carter time and again since July, 1977.

5. You mentioned Resolution 242. As you will recall, that Resolution refers to withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories - not the territories - and the Resolution's authors have consistently affirmed that it does not command Israel to withdraw to the pre-June 5, 1967 lines.

Mr. President, we travelled a long road towards peace. There were discussions, nocturnal sessions, crises, renewed efforts - and let us never forget those of President Carter - until our labours bore fruit. Let us continue. We would like to have representatives of the Arab inhabitants of Judea, Samaria and the Gaza District (not the PLO) around the table. But, incited and intimidated by the inflammatory and terrorist actions of the PLO they don't come ab initio. We cannot force them. Can Egypt bring them to the table? You know the facts as well as I do. All of us invited King Hussein; he recently declared that he will never join negotiations under the Camp David agreement. Can anyone of us change his attitude? I read your speeches on this subject.


Israel showed its good faith. We could have said: let us rather wait with the autonomy negotiations until Jordan and representatives of the Palestinian Arabs join the talks. We did not say so. You were willing to go ahead with these negotiations; we accepted and we negotiate with you.

However, four times Egypt unilaterally suspended the autonomy talks. Do these repeated suspensions contribute to the urgent need of solving the problems under the Camp David accord?

Let us, therefore, dispense with further unilateral suspensions. Let us renew our negotiations. We have differences of opinion. They do not, they should not, exclude another agreement on full autonomy for the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza (Judea, Samaria and the Gaza District) as written in the Camp David agreement.

Let us negotiate. Let us determine together the date for the renewal of the talks. Let us, as the past proves, reason together until we reach the agreement and pave the way for peace in this region, the cradle of human civilization.

With my best wishes to you and Mrs. Sadat,


Menachem Begin

Encl.

September 17, 1978.

Dear Mr. President,

I have the honor to inform you, Mr. President, that on 28 June 1967 - Israel's Parliament (the Knesset) promulgated and adopted a law to the effect: "The Government is empowered by a decree to apply the law, the jurisdiction and administration of the state to any part of Eretz Israel (Land of Israel - Palestine), as stated in that decree."

On the basis of this law, the Government of Israel decreed in July 1967 that Jerusalem is one city indivisible, the capital of the State of Israel.

Sincerely,

(SIGNED)

MENACHEM BEGIN

PROTECTION OF HOLY PLACES LAW, 5727-1967

1. The Holy Places shall be protected from desecration and any other violation and from anything likely to violate the freedom of access of the members of the different religions to the places sacred to them or their feelings with regard to those places.

2. (a) Whosoever desecrates or otherwise violates a Holy Place shall be liable to imprisonment for a term of seven years.

(b) Whosoever does anything likely to violate the freedom of access of the members of the different religions to the places sacred to them or their feelings with regard to those places shall be liable to imprisonment for a term of five years.

3. This Law shall add to, and not derogate from, any other law.

4. The Minister of Religious Affairs is charged with the implementation of this Law, and he may, after consultation with, or upon the proposal of, representatives of the religions concerned and with the consent of the Minister of Justice make regulations as to any matter relating to such implementation.

5. This Law shall come into force on the date of its adoption by the Knesset.

LEVI ESHKOL
Prime Minister

ZERACH WARHAFTIG
Minister of Religious Affairs

SHNEUR ZALMAN SHAZAR
President of the State

June 27, 1967

BASIC LAW: JERUSALEM, CAPITAL OF ISRAEL

1. Jerusalem united in its entirety is the capital of Israel.
2. Jerusalem is the seat of the President of the State, the Knesset, the Government and the Supreme Court.
3. The Holy Places shall be protected from desecration and any other violation and from anything likely to violate the freedom of access of the members of the different religions to the places sacred to them or their feelings with regard to those places.
4. (a) The Government shall diligently persist in the development and prosperity of Jerusalem and the welfare of its inhabitants, by the appropriation of special resources, including a special annual grant to the Jerusalem Municipality (Capital City Grant) with the approval of the Finance Committee of the Knesset.

(b) Jerusalem shall be given particular priority in the activities of the State's authorities for the development of the city in the financial and economic spheres and in other areas.

(c) The Government shall constitute a special body or bodies for the implementation of this Section.

July 30, 1980.

GRS 300

CONFIDENTIAL

Prime Minister

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FM TEL AVIV 041000Z AUG

TO ROUTINE F C O

TELNO 335 OF 4 AUG

INFO CAIRO, AMMAN, WASHINGTON, OTTAWA, JERUSALEM (PASSED).

MAD 8/8
MS

MYTEL 315: JERUSALEM.

1. RUMOURS WERE CIRCULATING HERE AT THE END OF LAST WEEK THAT A SECOND LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRY MIGHT MOVE ITS EMBASSY FROM JERUSALEM.

2. I UNDERSTAND THAT ECUADOR IS SERIOUSLY CONSIDERING A MOVE: AND THAT BOLIVIA AND EL SALVADOR MAY FOLLOW SUIT. THE DIRECTOR GENERAL OF THE FOREIGN MINISTRY CALLED IN LATIN AMERICAN AMBASSADORS RESIDENT IN JERUSALEM AT THE END OF LAST WEEK TO UNDERLINE ISRAEL'S APPRECIATION OF THEIR PRESENCE. BUT THE PATTERN OF THE LATIN AMERICAN VOTE AT LAST WEEK'S U N ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION HAS NOT BEEN LOST ON THE ISRAELIS.

3. THE CANADIAN CHARGE HERE MADE CLEAR CANADA'S UNFAVOURABLE REACTION TO THE JERUSALEM BILL IN A CALL ON THE FOREIGN MINISTRY ON INSTRUCTIONS ON 1 AUGUST. THE CHARGE TOLD THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR GENERAL THAT CANADA REGARDED THE BILL AS UNHELPFUL TO THE PEACE PROCESS AND WOULD NOT BE ALTERING HER STANCE ON THE STATUS OF JERUSALEM WHICH COULD NOT BE DECIDED BY UNILATERAL ACTIONS. BAR'ON RESPONDED THAT ISRAEL'S STEWARDSHIP OF JERUSALEM HAD BEEN A GOOD ONE AND THAT FRIENDLY COUNTRIES HAD NOT HELPED THE PEACE PROCESS BY DRAWING MORE AATTENTION TO THE BILL.

4. THE CHARGE ALSO TOLD BAR'ON THAT CANADA CONSIDERED THE PROPOSED MOVE OF BEGIN'S OFFICE AS "A GRAVE DISSERVICE TO PEACE" AT A TIME WHEN CAMP DAVID WAS ALREADY IN DIFFICULTIES. BAR'ON REPLIED THAT THE MOVE WOULD BE AN ADMINISTRATIVE ONE ONLY AND THAT BEGIN HAD INDICATED THAT NOONE WOULD TELL ISRAEL WHERE TO SITE HER GOVERNMENT OFFICES, PARTICULARLY SINCE JERUSALEM WAS EXTRANEOUS TO THE PEACE PROCESS.

ROBINSON

[MIDDLE EAST]

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FM CAIRO 041400Z AUG 80

TO ROUTINE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 484 OF 4 AUGUST

Prime Minister

To see all

INFO TEL AVIV, WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK, HMGJ JERUSALEM,
DAMASCUS, AMMAN, LUXEMBOURG

and MAF/8

MY TELNO 482: THE AUTONOMY TALKS

1. THE MINISTER OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS ASKED ME TO CALL YESTERDAY. BUTROS GHALI SAID THE PRESIDENT HAD ASKED HIM TO EXPLAIN TO THE REPRESENTATIVES OF A NUMBER OF GOVERNMENTS EGYPT'S ATTITUDE AS EXPRESSED IN THE 18 PAGE LETTER WHICH THE PRESIDENT HAD SENT TO MR BEGIN (WITH A COPY FOR THE AMERICANS). THE AUTONOMY TALKS HAD BECOME INCREASINGLY STERILE BUT THE EGYPTIANS HAD TRIED TO SHOW GOOD WILL BY PERSEVERING WITH THEM. THE ISRAELIS' RECENT ACTION IN RELATION TO JERUSALEM, HOWEVER, HAD MADE CONTINUATION IMPOSSIBLE.

2. THE PRESIDENT'S LETTER HAD ASKED FOR A FREEZE ON SETTLEMENTS AND RESPECT FOR THE SPIRIT OF CAMP DAVID OVER JERUSALEM AND IN THE NEGOTIATIONS GENERALLY. HE DID NOT EXPECT THAT BEGIN WOULD MAKE CONCESSIONS BUT SOME ACTION HAD BEEN NECESSARY. ONE COULD CALL IT POSTPONEMENT OR TEMPORARY SUSPENSION OF THE TALKS - THE LANGUAGE WAS DELIBERATELY VAGUE. BUT ONE HAD TO RECOGNISE THAT THERE WAS NO PRACTICAL PURPOSE IN CONTINUING THE TALKS AT THIS STAGE. THE EGYPTIAN GOVERNMENT WERE REACTING MODERATELY BECAUSE OF THE DEMOCRATIC CONVENTION AND THE AMERICAN ELECTIONS. PRESIDENT CARTER HAD DONE MUCH TO HELP THEM AND WAS FAMILIAR WITH THE PROBLEMS., THEY DID NOT WISH TO GIVE MR REAGAN AMMUNITION TO USE AGAINST HIM.

3. BUTROS GHALI SAID THAT MEANWHILE THE EUROPEAN INITIATIVE WAS AN ENCOURAGING DEVELOPMENT WHICH AT LEAST GAVE SOME PROSPECT OF FURTHER MOVEMENT. HE HAD SEEN M. THORN IN NEW YORK AND LOOKED FORWARD TO HIS VISIT TO EGYPT, THOUGH HE DID NOT YET KNOW WHEN THIS WOULD BE. (GRATEFUL FOR ANY FURTHER NEWS ON THIS.) THE EUROPEAN INITIATIVE COULD HELP KEEP THE MODERATE ELEMENTS OF THE PLO IN PLAY. IT HAD CREATED A CLIMATE FOR FURTHER RAPPROCHEMENT BETWEEN THE MODERATE ARAB COUNTRIES (WHICH MIGHT BE ACCENTUATED IF RELATIONS WORSENEED BETWEEN JORDAN AND SYRIA) THOUGH HE COULD NOT POINT TO ANY SUBSTANTIVE IMPROVEMENT AS YET. IT WAS ALSO GOOD IN ITSELF THAT EUROPE SHOULD BE MORE CLOSELY INVOLVED IN THE ARAB /ISRAEL PROBLEM.

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4. BUTROS GHALI SAID THAT THE EGYPTIANS HAD FELT IT NECESSARY TO PUT THEIR CASE STRONGLY AT MINISTERIAL LEVEL IN THE NEW YORK DEBATE AND TO SHOW THAT THEY WERE BY NO MEANS TOTALLY ALIGNED WITH THE AMERICANS. UNFORTUNATELY THE OTHER ARABS HAD BEEN DIVIDED AND HAD INSISTED UPON EXTREME LANGUAGE, THUS HE CLAIMED PREVENTING A CONSENSUS WHICH COULD HAVE INCLUDED THE EUROPEANS.

5. MEANWHILE PEACE AND THE NORMALISATION PROCESS MUST CONTINUE. THE LONG TERM HOPE WAS A SIGNIFICANT CHANGE OF OPINION IN ISRAEL. AT LEAST THE RESIGNATIONS OF DAYAN AND WEIZMAN HAD HELPED SHOW MR BEGIN'S INTRANSIGENT POLICIES IN THEIR TRUE LIGHT.

BARRINGTON

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10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

4 August 1980

Thank you for your letter of today's date about the French proposal that the Nine issue a statement condemning the Knesset law on Jerusalem passed last week.

As I told you on the telephone this evening, the Prime Minister is against issuing a statement now. The Prime Minister wishes to see the Nine prepare to move in concert with the US when the Israelis move to East Jerusalem, as I indicated in my letter to Paul Lever earlier today. But she does not consider that anything will be achieved by issuing a statement in advance of a move which is still a hypothetical event.

VAP

S.J. Gomersall, Esq.,
Lord Privy Seal's Office.

TR

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

4 August 1980

Amendment issuing a statement now. of the Israeli move to East Jerusalem. I hope we can make a contribution to U.S. & we have done.

Dear Mike,

JERUSALEM: STATEMENT BY THE NINE

As I mentioned to you on the telephone this afternoon, the French have proposed by COREU (copy attached) that the Nine issue a statement condemning the Knesset law on Jerusalem passed last week.

Our Ministers believe that we should go along with the statement. International reaction to the Knesset vote has been strong. Of the Nine, the Dutch, French, Germans and Italians have already made national statements. We have not done so, but have referred enquirers to our previous statements and votes in the Security Council in which our attitude to Israeli actions in East Jerusalem has been made quite clear. The proposed terms of the statement will come as no surprise to the Israelis. On the other hand to oppose it could lay us open to Arab accusations of failure to support their cause, since our position would probably be leaked. A statement by the Nine could also be a useful reference for our intervention in the Security Council debate.

As far as the Americans are concerned, as the Prime Minister knows, the United States share our attitude towards Jerusalem. They do /not

M A Pattison Esq
10 Downing Street

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not accept that Jerusalem is Israel's capital, nor unilateral moves^{to} change the status of the city. Since Camp David they have taken the view that the future of the city is on the agenda of the autonomy talks. The US Administration have not hidden their concern at the Knesset bill, or at the prospect of a move by Mr Begin to East Jerusalem. They have made strenuous diplomatic efforts to dissuade the Israelis from both courses. While they have not issued a formal statement, their spokesman has taken the line that the United States is opposed to unilateral actions on Jerusalem which should properly be dealt with in the autonomy negotiations and that, as far as the Administration was concerned, the Knesset vote did not change that position. Clearly they hope that the row over Jerusalem will not affect the autonomy talks and have understandably avoided public polemics with the Israelis themselves. But there is no reason to suppose that they would object to a statement by the Nine which reiterated the Nine's well-known position and is entirely consistent with their own views.

The Lord Privy Seal therefore believes that it would be appropriate to agree to a statement by the Nine, with some slight softening of the wording proposed in the French text. I attach a copy of the draft COREU telegram which should, if the Prime Minister agrees, be despatched as soon as possible. Our Resident Clerk can do this.

Yours sincerely,
Stephen Gomersall

S J Gomersall

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OUT COREU TELEGRAM

	↓	Classification DIFFUSION RESTREINTE	Precedence IMMEDIATE
ZCZC	1	ZCZC	
FM LDN C	2	FROM LONDON COREU	
TO*C Pre	3	TO LUXEMBOURG COREU IMMEDIAT	
INFO*Pre	4	INFO ALL COREU	
CPE*ETR	5		
DATETIME	6		
CLASS	7	DIFFUSION RESTREINTE	
DISTN	8	DISTRIBUTION GENERALE	
	9	SUBJECT: STATEMENT BY THE NINE ON JERUSALEM	
	10	REFERENCE: CPE/MUL/ETR 2775	
	11	1. The UK agrees that the Nine should issue a statement. It	
	12	proposes that the final sentence of the text, replacing the	
	13	present last two sentences, should read as follows 'The Nine	
	14	can therefore only deplore the vote by the Israeli parliament	
	15	on a law making this city the unified capital of Israel, a	
	16	decision which is contrary to international law and to resolutions	
	17	of the Security Council.'	
	18		
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DESKBY 050830Z

FROM UKMIS NEW YORK 041812Z AUG 80

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1083 OF 4 AUGUST

INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON TEL AVIV CAIRO AMMAN DAMASCUS BEIRUT AND JERUSALEM

MY TELNO 1081: SECURITY COUNCIL: JERUSALEM

Prime Minister

*If the Council meets
this week, we will need
to take a public position
of the bill through the
Knesset.*

MP 5/8

1. THE PAKISTANI LETTER HAS NOW BEEN CIRCULATED. WHILST REFERRING TO THE LAW RECENTLY PASSED IN THE KNESSET, IT MOSTLY CONCENTRATES ON DRAWING THE COUNCIL'S ATTENTION TO THE CHAPTER VII LANGUAGE IN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 476. IT GOES ON TO SAY THAT IN VIEW OF ISRAEL'S TOTAL DISREGARD OF THAT RESOLUTION AND OF THE SERIOUS CONSEQUENCES OF HER POLICIES FOR WORLD PEACE AND SECURITY, AN IMMEDIATE COUNCIL MEETING SHOULD BE CONVENED "IN TERMS OF PARAGRAPH 6 OF RESOLUTION 476" (IE CHAPTER VII).

ms

2. FUTSCHER PEREIRA (THE PORTUGUESE PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL) SAW THE THREE MOSLEM MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL (TUNISIA, BANGLADESH AND NIGER) THIS MORNING (4 AUGUST). THEY SAID THAT THEY WERE NOT PRESSING FOR AN EARLY MEETING DESPITE THE SERIOUS NATURE OF THE ARAB COMPLAINT BUT THAT THEY WISHED TIME FOR THE ISLAMIC GROUP TO CONSIDER THE CONTENTS OF A DRAFT RESOLUTION AND FOR ISLAMIC CAPITALS TO BE CONSULTED. THE PORTUGUESE FORMED THE IMPRESSION THAT THE COUNCIL WOULD NOT MEET BEFORE WEDNESDAY AT THE EARLIEST AND PROPOSED TO TAKE NO FURTHER ACTION UNTIL THE MOSLEM MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL APPROACH THEM AGAIN.

3. THE DRAFTING SUB-COMMITTEE OF THE ISLAMIC GROUP (THE THREE MOSLEM MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL, PAKISTAN, MOROCCO, SENEGAL, JORDAN AND THE PLO) HAVE SCHEDULED THEIR FIRST MEETING FOR LATER TODAY.

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FM TEL AVIV 040630Z AUG 80
TO PRIORITY FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 333 OF 4 AUGUST
INFO CAIRO AND WASHINGTON

Prime Minister
NAD
4/8

WASHINGTON TEL NO 3679: AUTONOMY NEGOTIATIONS

1. THE EGYPTIAN AMBASSADOR YESTERDAY HANDED BEGIN A LETTER FROM SADAT CONCERNING THE INTERRUPTION OF THE AUTONOMY TALKS. THE LETTER WAS SAID TO BE COURTEOUS AND TO RUN TO TEN CLOSELY TYPED PAGES.

2. THE ISRAELI CABINET WILL DISCUSS THE LETTER IN EXTRAORDINARY SESSION TODAY TO FORMULATE AN EARLY REPLY. AT YESTERDAY'S CABINET SESSION BEGIN IS REPORTED TO HAVE DESCRIBED SADAT'S ACTION AS INCOMPREHENSIBLE AND SAID THAT WHENEVER EGYPT WANTED TO RESUME NEGOTIATIONS THIS WOULD HAVE TO BE CO-ORDINATED AMONG ALL THREE PARTIES. THERE WAS NO REASON WHY ISRAEL SHOULD TOLERATE THE UNILATERAL INTERRUPTION OF THE NEGOTIATIONS.

ROBINSON

[THIS TELEGRAM WAS NOT ADVANCED]

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STAN DAVIS

NO 10 DOWNING STREET
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PS/MR HURD
PS/PUS
SIR J GRAHAM
MR J C MOBERLY

Prime Minister

To see all (coverleaf)

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FM CAIRO 041020Z AUG 80

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 482 OF 4 AUGUST

INFO PRIORITY TEL AVIV, WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK,
HMCG JERUSALEM, DAMASCUS, AMMAN

TEL AVIV TELNO 333: THE AUTONOMY TALKS.

1. ON 3 AUGUST THE EGYPTIAN FOREIGN MINISTER, ANNOUNCING THAT PRESIDENT SADAT HAD WRITTEN TO MR BEGIN ABOUT THE AUTONOMY TALKS, SAID THAT EGYPT WAS POSTPONING THE NEXT ROUND (DUE TO BEGIN HERE TODAY) UNTIL THE OBSTACLES CREATED BY ISRAEL WERE REMOVED. KEMAL HASSAN ALI EMPHASISED THAT EGYPT WAS NOT SUSPENDING THE TALKS AND THAT THE PROCESS OF NORMALISATION OF RELATIONS WOULD NOT BE AFFECTED. HE MADE IT CLEAR THAT THE CHIEF OBSTACLE WAS THE JERUSALEM BILL, BUT AVOIDED SAYING THAT THE BILL HAD TO BE REPEALED BEFORE THE TALKS COULD RESUME. ONE WAY ISRAEL COULD MAKE IT POSSIBLE FOR THE TALKS TO START AGAIN WAS FOR MR BEGIN TO RESTATE THAT EVERY ISSUE, INCLUDING THAT OF EAST JERUSALEM, WAS

1. ON 3 AUGUST THE EGYPTIAN FOREIGN MINISTER, ANNOUNCING THAT PRESIDENT SADAT HAD WRITTEN TO MR BEGIN ABOUT THE AUTONOMY TALKS, SAID THAT EGYPT WAS POSTPONING THE NEXT ROUND (DUE TO BEGIN HERE TODAY) UNTIL THE OBSTACLES CREATED BY ISRAEL WERE REMOVED. KEMAL HASSAN ALI EMPHASISED THAT EGYPT WAS NOT SUSPENDING THE TALKS AND THAT THE PROCESS OF NORMALISATION OF RELATIONS WOULD NOT BE AFFECTED. HE MADE IT CLEAR THAT THE CHIEF OBSTACLE WAS THE JERUSALEM BILL, BUT AVOIDED SAYING THAT THE BILL HAD TO BE REPEALED BEFORE THE TALKS COULD RESUME. ONE WAY ISRAEL COULD MAKE IT POSSIBLE FOR THE TALKS TO START AGAIN WAS FOR MR BEGIN TO RESTATE THAT EVERY ISSUE, INCLUDING THAT OF EAST JERUSALEM, WAS NEGOTIABLE.

2. THIS DECISION COMES AFTER A WEEKEND OF CONFLICTING INDICATIONS WHICH UNDOUBTEDLY REFLECTS THE PRESSURE ON SADAT. WHILE WANTING TO MARK HIS OPPOSITION TO THE JERUSALEM MEASURE, SADAT IS CLEARLY ANXIOUS NOT TO UPSET THE AMERICANS, ESPECIALLY JUST BEFORE THE DEMOCRATIC CONVENTION, AND TO LEAVE THE DOOR OPEN FOR A QUICK RESUMPTION OF THE NEGOTIATIONS.

BARRINGTON

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CONFIDENTIAL



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

4 August 1980

The Prime Minister has seen your letter of 1 August to Michael Alexander about the expected move of Mr. Begin's office to East Jerusalem.

She has noted Lord Carrington's view that, in the event of a move, H.M. Ambassador in Tel Aviv should be instructed that he cannot call on Mr. Begin in East Jerusalem but should offer to call on him in his Knesset office, and that correspondence with Mr. Begin should be routed through the Israeli Foreign Ministry. She has also noted that Lord Carrington proposes to seek the agreement of the rest of the Nine for this policy.

The Prime Minister is of the view that we should only take these steps in concert with both the United States and the Nine, and that any statement on these matters should be made jointly as far as the Nine are concerned, and simultaneously with a statement by the United States.

It would be helpful if you could clarify United States intentions.

M. A. PATTISON

Paul Lever, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CONFIDENTIAL

*The President
of the Arab Republic of Egypt*

Subject: Egypt: Aug 80
Mtg with the Egyptian Ambassador
الرئيس

August 2, 1980

Dear Prime Minister Begin,

I hope that you have fully recovered and regained your health as you assume the awesome responsibilities you bear at this crucial point. It is the duty of each one of us to cope with a multitude of problems in the light of the current state of affairs, both regionally and globally. We have no choice but to confront these problems with vision and courage. None of us can be unmindful of or indifferent to events around us and their far reaching consequences.

Above all, we have the task of completing the work we have done on the road to peace. I am sure that I need not remind you that, in our various meetings in Egypt, Israel and at Camp David, we made a firm commitment to work tirelessly for a comprehensive peace settlement in the Middle East.

*The President
of the Arab Republic of Egypt*

الرئيس

(2)

Many were those who were skeptical about the prospect for such a comprehensive peace for reasons you are certainly familiar with. However, I remained firm in my determination to pursue the noble cause of peace regardless of the enormity of the effort needed to accomplish the mission. Through determination and perseverance, we were able to achieve last year what was considered impossible by any measure. On the other hand, much remains to be done if we are to continue the peace march for the good of all the peoples of the area including the people of Israel most certainly and, in fact, for the good of all nations of the world. With this in mind, we vowed, in the letter we exchanged on March 26, 1979, to negotiate "continuously and in good faith" in order to conclude the negotiations on the establishment of the self-governing authority with full autonomy for the West Bank and Gaza at the earliest possible date.

*The President
of the Arab Republic of Egypt*

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(3)

As I pointed out time and again in the course of our talks, the making of meaningful progress in this regard is in the best interest of the Israeli people as much as it is in the best interest of the Palestinians. It would be a grave mistake of untold proportions to waste this opportunity to set in motion the process of reconciliation and harmonious coexistence between Israelis and Palestinians. It is imperative to start this process without delay so that we might finally put an end to violence and friction in the holy land while the opportunity exists, for it might not arise again in the foreseeable future.

As you well know, negotiating in good faith requires a certain operational behaviour on the part of the participants. First and foremost, they are under an obligation to apply self-restraint and refrain from taking any action which is incompatible with the spirit of negotiations

*The President
of the Arab Republic of Egypt*

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or which is likely to undermine the peace process in one way or the other. No issue should be considered, or rendered, not negotiable. No party should attempt to confront the other with a fait accompli by taking measures which purport to prejudice the outcome of the negotiations or predetermine it unilaterally. Nor should any party set precondition irrespective of his claims. In essence, the negotiating process is one which enables the parties to settle their differences and reach agreement on controversial issues in a collective manner and through an approach based on mutuality and reciprocity and not through unilateral action. It is inconsistent with this fundamental principle that any party attempts to determine a given aspect of the dispute unilaterally and outside the area of meaningful exchange of views. It is true that such unilateral actions have no legal validity whatsoever vis-a-vis

*The President
of the Arab Republic of Egypt*

الرئيس

(5)

other parties, but they certainly poison the atmosphere of the negotiations and produce a most unfavorable reaction to the process within the circles whose cooperation is vital to the success of our endeavor.

Let us view together what took place in the recent past with the objective of assessing the situation in clear terms and discussing how best we can serve our cause:

1- We started the current negotiations last year with the goal of reaching agreement before May 26, 1980. That target was not met for reasons on which I am not going to dwell. Nevertheless, we decided to continue negotiating in view of the seriousness of the issues involved and our keen desire to give you ample time to make the necessary adjustments in your position.

*The President
of the Arab Republic of Egypt*

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(6)

2- We took this attitude despite the fact that what is involved, at this stage, is merely a transitional arrangement and not a final settlement to the Palestinian problem. We are simply opening the door for such a settlement through setting up a transitional regime for a limited period in order to enable the Palestinians to assume their share of the responsibility.

3- To our disappointment and to the surprise of many of Israel's friends, events did not take the course which was likely to bring us closer to an agreement. On the contrary, provocative and negative actions have been taken unjustifiably and in open defiance to the process and its very essence. All along, we were hoping that the factors which prompted you to take this negative attitude would subside and give way to a more positive and responsive approach. To my regret,

*The President
of the Arab Republic of Egypt*

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(7)

these hopes have not materialized and the situation continued to deteriorate.

4- I am referring here to the actions which are being taken with respect to Jerusalem and the settlements, together with the repressive measures taken in the West Bank and Gaza.

5- At this point, it might be useful to refresh your memory with respect to Jerusalem. You would recall that this issue was the first one I raised with you and your colleagues since I started the peace initiative. Throughout our talks, I emphasized to you the centrality that issue occupies in the minds and hearts of 800 Million Muslims and a greater number of Christians. I pointed to you on several occasions in the clearest terms that a breakthrough in it is certain to give our peace drive more momentum than any other single action.

*The President
of the Arab Republic of Egypt*

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6- You would remember that in our meeting in El-Areesh in May 1979, I told you that there was a historic opportunity for us to proceed without delay towards the comprehensive settlement as we started the successful implementation of the Egyptian - Israeli Peace Treaty.

7- You would also recall that in that meeting and subsequent ones in Alexandria, Haifa and Aswan, I concentrated on the issue of Jerusalem and told you that if it is a matter of vital interest to 18 million Jews all over the World, it is equally vital and sensitive to 800 million Muslims. It is impossible to ignore this fact and be insensitive to this spiritual and cultural interest. Many Muslims throughout the globe are inclined to judge Israel's intentions by its behaviour on this question. Why loose their confidence and that of many others while we have a viable and attractive alternative? As I told you, I believe that it is not the most difficult

*The President
of the Arab Republic of Egypt*

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issue and that it should be possible to find a solution that respects the rights and satisfies the aspirations of both sides.

8- We are aware of the fact that an overall agreement on the status of Jerusalem can be deferred to the stage of negotiating the final settlement. However, it is also a fact that the issue of Jerusalem is overlapping with many issues which are subject to review at present. Thus, it was natural that it was raised in various meetings both at the plenary level and those of committees, notably the Legal Committee and the Elections Committee.

9- Some might argue that all the actions you have taken with respect to Jerusalem by the various branches of your Government represent no more than a negotiating position that should not be taken

*The President
of the Arab Republic of Egypt*

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seriously, especially in light of the fact that they are of no legal validity. However, we can not ignore the following facts:

- a- That such measures form a flagrant violation of Security Council Resolution 242 to which we are both committed to observe and implement.

I need not elaborate on these legal matters, but it is clear that recent Israeli actions represent a territorial expansion and an acquisition of territory by war, an act which is explicitly prohibited under the provisions of Resolution 242. It might be worth mentioning that your Government has declared on recent occasions that it will neither tolerate nor accept any tampering with the resolution.

- b- Furthermore, such actions run contrary to the letter and spirit of Camp David. It violates the letter of the "Framework for Peace in the Middle East" insofar as it is a breach of Resolution 242 which is undoubtedly the legal

*The President
of the Arab Republic of Egypt*

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base for the Accord. As to the spirit of Camp David, I believe that we vowed to settle all our differences together in a spirit of reconciliation and not by unilateral acts. It was clearly understood, as we signed the Accords, that none of us will resort to the imposition of a fait accompli on the other .

c- It goes without saying, also, that these actions contradict the provisions of the Fourth Geneva Convention which prohibits the annexation of occupied territories.

10- When I mentioned to you my belief that it is not impossible to find a happy solution to the question of Jerusalem, I stated before the entire World that such a solution should not result in dividing the city or the setting up of barriers that could curtail the freedom of movement or worship. I outlined a

*The President
of the Arab Republic of Egypt*

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formula which would set a shining model for coexistence and good neighborliness among Muslims, Christians and Jews. In essence, that formula calls for the restoration of Arab legal and historic rights in the City while keeping it united for all practical purposes.

11- In all candor, I feel that the ideas I presented and publicized in this respect have not been given due consideration on your part. I have not received any objective reaction or comment on the proposed formula which safeguards the interests of all those concerned, thus rendering an invaluable service to the cause of peace and a monumental contribution to the process of reconciliation between Arabs and Jews.

12- Your Government has also adopted a negative and counter-productive policy with respect to another sensitive issue, namely that of the settlements. I need

*The President
of the Arab Republic of Egypt*

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not elaborate on the universal rejection and condemnation of this policy; both on legal, moral and political grounds. I am not here to enumerate the serious consequences of such policy. Suffice it to reiterate what I stated before, that these settlements in the West Bank and Gaza are illegal and a real obstacle to peace. Therefore they must be removed, be them old or new.

13- I am certain that you remember that I talked to you about the settlements in Aswan I advised you, then, not to fight that lost cause because anything that you do in this respect is doomed to failure.

14- You would also recall that I offered to provide you with water that could reach Jerusalem, passing through the Negev, in order to make it easy for you to build new quarters for your settlers on your own land. You misunderstood the idea behind

*The President
of the Arab Republic of Egypt*

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my offer when you said that the national aspirations of your people are not for sale. I never had this in mind as I told you. I was merely cooperating with you in order that we might find a way out to the satisfaction of both sides.

Although the removal of illegal settlements should not hinge upon any incentive, I am willing to go that far to solve that problem as another Egyptian contribution to peace.

I know that you do not need anyone to find a way out for you. But it is always helpful to find certain openings which one was not aware of. At times, our Arab brothers need such a way out due to certain complications in their position. This is a burden I bear as the President of the Egyptian people who have been destined to be at the vanguard of events and developments in the entire region. This is the legacy of our past and the promise of our future.

15- We reached an understanding with you that Israel will take a number of confidence building measures without delay and prior to the beginning of the transitional period. The purpose of such measures

*The President
of the Arab Republic of Egypt*

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was defined among us as: alleviating the suffering of the Palestinians and improving the atmosphere in the West Bank and Gaza as a prelude to the election of the self-governing authority. We spoke specifically about a group of actions that were listed in a memorandum presented to you on October 13, 1978 during the Blair House talks. It is obvious that the conditions in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip have not improved ever since. To the contrary, they witnessed a marked deterioration. Is this the way to win the support and confidence of those who are addressed by the Camp David "Framework"?

16- Our position has been both clear and unwavering since I initiated the peace process with my mission to Jerusalem. It might be useful, however, to repeat it as follows:

First: We remain wholeheartedly committed to peace. to us, its is a sacred and strategic goal. We will

*The President
of the Arab Republic of Egypt*

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continue to work for it even if this entails doubling our efforts in this respect.

Second: We will adhere to the letter and spirit of Camp David and call for a strict observance of all the commitments under these historic documents.

Third: We remain prepared to help our partners in the peace process and provide them with solutions and way out even when they fail to see the realities of the situation and the wisdom of this or that act. We apply to Israel here the same rule we have been applying to our arab brothers.

Fourth: We firmly believe that all matters will be settled at the end, because this is the desire of all peoples of the area and the world. No one can turn the clock back or put the region again in the darkness of war and devastation.

Fifth: We reject all measure or actions taken by Israel unilaterally and against the universal consensus with respect to Jerusalem and the settlements.

*The President
of the Arab Republic of Egypt*

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These action are null and void completely.

Sixth: The historic and legal rights of the Arabs and Muslims should be respected while keeping different functions in the city united. Freedom of worship and movement should be guaranteed.

Seventh: Israel should desist from all settlement activities. Settlements built in the West Bank and Gaza should be removed together with settlements in other occupied territories.

Eighth: No nation, certainly not Egypt or Israel, can determine the future of the Palestinian people. This is their God-given right of which they can not be deprived under all circumstances. Egypt will oppose any encroachment on that right.

Ninth: If we reach agreement on the establishment of the S G A, we are prepared to begin its implementation in the Gaza Strip as a first step to be followed by implementation in the West Bank.

Dear Prime Minister Begin,

I am certain that you know, deep in your heart, that it is virtually impossible to continue


*The President
of the Arab Republic of Egypt*

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(18)

the negotiations if the present attitude continues. Hence, in the spirit of my journey to Jerusalem and the Camp David Peace Accords, I urge you to take the remedial action which is necessary for the removal of the obstacles which have been placed on the road to peace in the past few months. I leave it to you to choose the appropriate ways and means for achieving that. If we fail to remove those obstacles in due time, we will be reducing the vital process of negotiations to a meaningless exercise in futility which would be a disservice to our cherished ideal of peace. I am sure that none of us wants to or can do that. I hope to receive a positive reply from you so that the negotiations could proceed in a promising atmosphere and as soon as possible.

With best wishes to you and Mrs. Begin.


Mohammed Anwar El-Sadat

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ELLE PROPOSE A CET EGARD LE TEXTE SUIVANT :

CITATION:

"DANS LA DECLARATION DE VENISE SUR LE MOYEN-ORIENT LES NEUF ONT RAPPELE L'IMPORTANCE PARTICULIERE DE LA QUESTION DE JERUSALEM ET SOULIGNE QU'ILS N'ACCEPTENT AUCUNE INITIATIVE UNILATERALE QUI AIT POUR BUT DE CHANGER LE STATUT DE JERUSALEM. ILS NE PEUVENT DONC QUE CONDAMNER LE VOTE PAR LE PARLEMENT ISRAELIEN D'UNE LOI FAISANT DE CETTE VILLE LA CAPITALE "REUNIFIEE"

DE L'ETAT D'ISRAEL. *with our request*

LES NEUF NE TIENDRONT PAS COMPTE D'UNE DECISION UNILATERALE, CONTRAIRE AU DROIT INTERNATIONAL ET AUX RESOLUTIONS DU CONSEIL DE SECURITE FIN DE CITATION.

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/UNE AUTRE/...

UNE AUTRE POSSIBILITE, AU CAS OU M. THORN AURAIT EVOQUE
CETTE QUESTION LORS DE SON PASSAGE EN ISRAEL, CONSISTERAIT
POUR LE PRESIDENT A RAPPELER DANS UNE DECLARATION A LA PRESSE
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Prime Minister
Afex A ?

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

1 August 1980

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Dear Michael,

I believe we should only do this in concert with the U.S. and that any statement should be made jointly as far as the U.S. are concerned.

HM Ambassador in Tel Aviv has reported that a decision on the move of Mr Begin's office to East Jerusalem is imminent. There is now little doubt that Mr Begin will receive the support of his Cabinet for such a move and will seek to implement it quickly. This raises practical problems over our dealings with Mr Begin's office.

substantively with the U.S. mfb

Since the unilateral Israeli unification of Jerusalem in 1967 it has been a rule that HM Ambassador in Tel Aviv and ministerial and official visitors may not call on Israeli ministers in offices in East Jerusalem. The only such office in East Jerusalem to date has been that of the Israeli Minister of Justice. The background to this lies in our view that Israel's rights in East Jerusalem do not go beyond those of an occupying power, in contrast to West Jerusalem where we accept that Israel exercises de facto authority. It would not be consistent with that view to conduct ordinary government to government business with Israeli offices in East Jerusalem. Lord Carrington therefore believes that if the move goes ahead HM Ambassador in Tel Aviv should be instructed that he cannot call on Mr Begin in East Jerusalem but should offer to call on him in his Knesset office and that correspondence with Mr Begin's office should be routed through the Israeli foreign ministry. Lord Carrington proposes to seek the agreement of the rest of the Nine for this policy.

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The US view is similar to our own. The US Ambassador in Israel has already made strong representations to Mr Begin against moving his office. While the final US decision is difficult to predict during a presidential election year, there is good reason to believe that they will adopt a similar policy to that proposed above if the move goes ahead.

/Under-

Mr M O'D B Alexander
10 Downing Street



Under-Secretary Newsom told Sir Nicholas Henderson on 28 July that the Americans had taken the decision that American officials should not call on Mr Begin in his East Jerusalem office.

Yours etc
Paul

(P Lever)
Private Secretary

D.O/ No 10 DS.

OPS 500
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FM WASHINGTON 012345Z AUGUST 1980
TO ROUTINE F C O
TEL NO 3679 OF 1 AUGUST
INFO CAIRO, TEL AVIV
INFO SAVING BEIRUT, DAMASCUS, AMMAN, UKMIS NEW YORK.

Prime Minister

NO. MAP 4/8

ARAB/ISRAEL.

1. THE AMERICANS TODAY ARE STILL AWAITING SADAT'S NEXT MOVE AFTER THE KNESSET JERUSALEM VOTE. HE HAS ASKED AMERICAN ADVICE WHICH HAS BEEN TO URGE HIM NOT TO RESUSPEND THE NEGOTIATIONS. HE STILL APPEARS TO WANT TO BE HELPFUL TO CARTER, BUT STATE DEPARTMENT DO NOT RULE OUT THAT HE WILL GO FOR AN INTERMEDIATE SOLUTION OF REQUIRING VISIBLE HIGH LEVEL CONSULTATION WITH THE AMERICANS BEFORE RESUMING NEGOTIATIONS AT HEAD OF DELEGATION LEVEL.

2. ON SADAT'S DECISION ON THIS WILL DEPEND THE NATURE OF LINOWITZ NEXT TRIP TO THE MIDDLE EAST, CURRENTLY SCHEDULED FOR 19-21 AUGUST. IT WILL EITHER BE TWO SEPARATE BILATERAL MEETINGS (CONSTITUTING CONSULTATIONS AS IN PARA 1 ABOVE) OR THE FIRST TRILATERAL HEAD OF DELEGATION (BUT PROBABLY NOT FULL PLENARY) MEETING IN THE AREA SINCE THE RESUMPTION.

3. WALKER (LINOWITZ OFFICE) HAS TOLD US THAT THE AMERICANS BELIEVE THAT THEY ARE AT LAST DETECTING SOME SIGNS OF FLEXIBILITY IN THE PRIVATE DISCUSSIONS THEY HAVE BEEN HOLDING WITH THE ISRAELIS (PARTICULARLY WITH? QUBERSKI OF THE MINISTRY OF THE INTERIOR). THEY ARE NOW TOYING WITH CONVERTING THE QUOTE HEADS OF AGREEMENT UNQUOTE INTO A MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING AS AN INTERIM DOCUMENT SETTING OUT SOME AGREED PRINCIPLES ON THE BASIS OF WHICH NEGOTIATIONS WOULD CONTINUE. THEY HAVE DRAWN UP A COMPLETE TEXT OF SUCH A DOCUMENT WHICH THEY HAVE NOT TABLED BUT HAVE PASSED TO BURG PRIVATELY AND IN A LESS COMPLETE VERSION, TO THE EGYPTIANS. THE ISRAELIS WILL HAVE THE CHANCE TO SHOW BY THEIR RESPONSE TO THIS DOCUMENT WHETHER THEIR PRIVATE INDICATIONS OF FLEXIBILITY CAN BE TRANSLATED INTO SOMETHING CONCRETE. WALKER ADMITTED TO CONCERN THAT THE PRESIDENT MAY SEE A POLITICAL NECESSITY FOR SOME AGREEMENT BEFORE 4 NOVEMBER, WITH THE RESULT THAT A RATHER IMPERFECT DOCUMENT ENJOYING AMERICAN SUPPORT WILL EMERGE TOO EARLY.

4. MEANWHILE ACCORDING TO WALKER, THE EGYPTIANS (NOTABLY APPARENTLY BUTROS GHALI DURING HIS PASSAGE THROUGH NEW YORK FOR THE JERUSALEM SPECIAL ASSEMBLY DEBATE) ARE SHOWING RATHER ILL-DEFINED INTEREST IN THE POSSIBILITY OF PARALLEL MOVES TO INVOLVE PALESTINIANS IN SOME FORM OF PEACE DIALOGUE EVEN IF IT IS OUTSIDE THE CAMP DAVID PROCESS EG THROUGH KING HUSSEIN OR THE EUROPEAN INITIATIVE.

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15. WALKER

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5. WALKER THOUGHT THAT IN TERMS OF THE AUTONOMY NEGOTIATIONS THE RESIGNATION OF TAMIR, WHO WAS ONE OF THE MORE INTERFERING OF BURG'S TEAM, MIGHT BE NO BAD THING.

ECO PASS SAVING BEIRUT, DAMASCUS, AMMAN.

FRETWELL

[REPEATED AS
REQUESTED]

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Prime Minister

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TO PRIORITY F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1081 OF 1 AUGUST 1980

INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON, TEL AVIV, CAIRO, AMMAN, DAMASCUS,
BEIRUT, JERUSALEM.

MY TEL 1079: SECURITY COUNCIL : JERUSALEM

1. PAKISTAN, REPRESENTING THE ISLAMIC GROUP, THIS EVENING (1 AUGUST) HANDED THE PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL A LETTER ASKING FOR AN URGENT MEETING IN VIEW OF THE LEGISLATION PASSED IN THE KNESSET. THE PRESIDENT INTENDS TO CONSULT MEMBERS ON MONDAY ABOUT THE TIMING OF THE MEETING.

2. BISHARA (KUWAIT) HAS TOLD US THAT AT THE ISLAMIC GROUP MEETING THIS MORNING IT WAS DECIDED THAT THE DRAFT RESOLUTION SHOULD DEFINITELY INCLUDE CHAPTER VII LANGUAGE. HE THOUGHT IT SHOULD FOLLOW THE PRECEDENT OF OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH 6 OF THE AMERICAN SPONSORED RESOLUTION 461 ON THE HOSTAGES IN IRAN I.E. PROVIDE THAT THE COUNCIL SHOULD MEET ON A SPECIFIED DATE TO ADOPT EFFECTIVE MEASURES UNDER ARTICLES 3, AND 41 OF THE CHARTER, IN THE EVENT OF NON-COMPLIANCE BY ISRAEL.

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TO PRIORITY FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 329 OF 1 AUGUST

INFO CAIRO WASHINGTON

ISRAELI GOVERNMENT

1. SHMUEL TAMIR, THE MINISTER OF JUSTICE, ANNOUNCED ON TELEVISION LAST NIGHT THAT HE INTENDED TO RESIGN FROM THE GOVERNMENT AFTER THE CABINET MEETING ON 3 AUGUST. HE GAVE AS HIS REASON "THE INTOLERABLE SITUATION" BY WHICH HIS PARTY, YADIN'S DEMOCRATIC MOVEMENT NOW HAD ONLY THREE KNESSWT MEMBERS BUT STILL THREE CABINET MINISTERS. TAMIR INDICATED THAT HE WOULD CONTINUE TO SUPPORT THE COALITION.
2. IN THIS SOPHISTICATED POLITICAL MANOEUVRING, TAMIR HAS HIS EYE ON IMPROVING HIS OWN PROSPECTS. IT WILL NOT IMPAIR THE PROSPECTS FOR BEGIN'S GOVERNMENT NOR FOR ITS PARLIAMENTARY MAJORITY.

ROBINSON

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TO PRIORITY FCO

TELNO 295 OF 1 AUG 80

INFO ROUTINE BAGHDAD CAIRO DAMASCUS JEDDA KUWAIT TEL AVIV
UKMIS NEW YORK WASHINGTON AND CG JERUSALEM.

TEL AVIV TELS NOS 325 AND 326 TO FCO: ISRAELI LAW ON STATUS
OF JERUSALEM.

1. A STATEMENT BY AN OFFICIAL JORDANIAN GOVERNMENT
SPOKESMAN ON 31 JULY DESCRIBED THE NEW ISRAELI LAW AS CONTRARY
TO INTERNATIONAL RULES AND PRINCIPLES AND TO RESOLUTIONS OF THE
UNITED NATIONS AND ALL UN BODIES. THE SPOKESMAN SAID THAT
JORDAN DID NOT RECOGNISE THE ISRAELI DECISION IN WHOLE OR IN PART.
JORDAN CONSIDERED JERUSALEM AN INSEPARABLE PART OF THE
OCCUPIED ARAB TERRITORIES AND WOULD REVIEW ITS RELATIONS
WITH ANY STATE WHICH ACCEPTED THE ISRAELI DECISION ON THE STATUS
OF JERUSALEM OR MOVED ITS EMBASSY THERE. THE SPOKESMAN CALLED
ON ARAB STATES TO RE-EVALUATE THEIR POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC
RELATIONS WITH ANY STATE WHICH SUPPORTED THE ISRAELI DECISION.
THE SPOKESMAN ALSO CALLED ON ISLAMIC COUNTRIES TO ADHERE TO
RESOLUTIONS OF THE RECENT ISLAMIC CONFERENCE IN AMMAN SEMICOLON
AND TO BOYCOTT ISRAEL AND THOSE STATES WHICH SUPPORTED THE
ISRAELI ATTITUDE.

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FM TEL AVIV 010830Z AUG 80

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 331 OF 1 AUGUST

MIPT: MIDDLE EAST: THORN MISSION.

1. THORN COMMENTED THAT HE HAD CONCLUDED FROM HIS TALKS THAT IN ISRAELI EYES THE US ALONE WAS NECESSARY FOR ISRAEL'S SECURITY. THE OVERALL MESSAGE HE HAD BEEN GIVEN BY THOSE HE HAD SEEN WAS "EUROPE KEEP OUT". (THIS IS THE MAIN THRUST OF ISRAELI INSPIRED PRESS COMMENT HERE THIS MORNING). THORN SAID THAT HE THOUGHT THE ISRAELIS BASED THEIR STRATEGY ON THE CONCLUSION THAT WHOEVER WAS NEXT PRESIDENT IN WASHINGTON, US POLICY TOWARDS ISRAEL COULD NOT BE CHANGED AND ISRAEL WOULD CONTINUE TO GET THE SUPPORT SHE SOUGHT FROM THE US; AND ALSO THAT THE US COULD NOT AFFORD TO LET THE GULF AND THE SOUTHERN PART OF THE ARABIAN WORLD GO. IN THE COURSE OF A SEPARATE CONVERSATION AFTR THORN'S BRIEFING I TOLD THORN THAT I FEARED HIS ASSESSMENT OF ISRAEL'S BASIC POSITION WAS RIGHT AND THAT IT MEANT THAT ISRAEL FELT SHE COULD LIVE WITH TENSION IN THE AREA AS PREFERABLE TO MAKING COCESSIONS. (SEE LAST TWO SENTENCES OF MY TEL NO 287). THORN SAID THAT HE HAD NOT WANTED TO GO FURTHER INTO THIS WITH REPRESENTATIVES OF THE NINE HERE, BUT HE THOUGHT EUROPE FACED A "TERRIBLE CHOICE" IN THIS CONTEXT.

2. THORN ALSO COMPLAINED TO ME ABOUT GISCARD'S MEETINGS WITH HUSSEIN AND BUTROSE GHALI WHICH HE SEEMED TO SEE AS AN ATTEMPT BY GISCARD TO CONDUCT A PARALLEL MISSION.

3. BUTROS GHALI HAD BEEN IN TOUCH WITH HIM IN PARIS, AND, FOR WHAT IT WAS WORTH, THORN'S IMPRESSION WAS THAT ONE WAY OR ANOTHER SADAT WOULD FIND MEANS NOT TO BREAK OFF THE AUTONOMY TALKS UNTIL THE AMERICAN PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS WERE OVER.

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10 DOWNING STREET

Middle East
Correspondence
in Garden Rooms

THE PRIME MINISTER

1 August 1980

Dear Viscount

Thank you for your letter of 17 July asking for clarification of a paragraph in my letter of 3 July.

I am not sure in which respect your constituents have doubts but I will do my best to make my meaning clear. In our view there cannot be a settlement unless the Palestinians, including the PLO, accept Israel's right to existence in peace and to security. We continue to urge the Palestinians, including the PLO, to accept the Venice principles in full. We will go on doing so at every opportunity.

As far as our own dealings with the PLO are concerned, you will know that officials have occasional and informal contacts with PLO representatives. This has been the practice under successive governments. Government Ministers have not met PLO representatives except as a result of the odd accidental social encounter. "Recognition" in the diplomatic sense is not appropriate for the PLO since it is not, and does not claim to be, either a state or a government. Nor have we

/ accepted

accepted that the PLO is the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinians.

I should add that, just as we believe that the Palestinians and PLO must accept the Venice principles, so we believe that a lasting settlement will not be possible unless Israel accepts that the Palestinians have rights which must be satisfied. The Venice statement is a balanced whole. It will be acted on as such and should be seen as such.

*Y
L
Rajaw*

V.W.H. Bendall, Esq., M.P.

SAVING TELEGRAM

BY BAG

FM WASHINGTON

UNCLASSIFIED

*Prime Minister
To glance*

MAR 5/8

TO SAVING FCO TELNO. 41 OF 31 JULY AND

SAVING TO: INF UKMIS NEW YORK, PARIS, BONN, LUXEMBOURG, CAIRO,
TEL AVIV, JERUSALEM, AMMAN, DAMASCUS, BEIRUT, JEDDA.

REFERENCE: MY TEL NO: 2650

US FOREIGN POLICY: CONGRESSIONAL TESTIMONY BY SECRETARY MUSKIE:
MIDDLE EAST

1. In public testimony before the House Foreign Affairs Committee on 30 July, Secretary Muskie made the following points on the Middle East:

- (a) The autonomy negotiations had proved difficult and complex but there were hopeful signs. Both sides had demonstrated a new seriousness of purpose and willingness to consider fresh approaches to the remaining difficult issues. If the talks continued in this positive way Muskie expected the heads of delegations to meet again with Linowitz towards the middle of August. The US would continue to do all in its power to bring about an autonomy agreement, which must take full account of Israel's concerns and which must also lead to a significant and genuine change in the situation of the Palestinians.
- (b) The US would be firm in its stand against one-sided resolutions on the Middle East at the UN, such as the totally unbalanced resolution adopted at the special session. The US was pleased that a substantial number of other members had felt unable to support the resolution.

/America's

America's European friends had abstained after strong representations from Muskie personally asking them to vote against. The rationale of the Europeans' vote was that they were seeking to develop their role as middle-man and therefore wished to appear even-handed. Muskie did not agree, but recognised that this was Europe's conviction. The fact that resolutions of the kind adopted in New York altered nothing also explained why the Europeans had felt able to abstain. Those who put forward such resolutions were mischiefmakers who wanted to undermine Camp David by diversionary tactics. Were the Camp David process to collapse those who had contributed to that end would bear the burden of the dire consequences which would result, including violence on the West Bank and instability in the region.

- (c) The US welcomed initiatives which supported the Camp David process and strenuously discouraged initiatives which might undermine it. They welcomed the statement by Cossiga that the European Community wanted to support the Camp David process and understood that Thorn's mission would be a fact-finding one to enable the European Community to obtain a clearer picture of thinking in the Middle East on the peace process. The European effort would be most constructive if it built on the current negotiations. The US would welcome broader participation in those negotiations

but believed it would be a profound mistake to encourage a solution which could not be negotiated or to ignore the central fact that the complex political realities were already being addressed in the autonomy negotiations.

- (d) All the parties must avoid unilateral actions designed to prejudge the outcome of the current negotiations. No negotiations could succeed if one of the parties attempted simultaneously to obtain unilateral advantage on the ground. Israel had not yet enacted decisions on Jerusalem. The US Government was in constant communication with the Israeli Government and had repeated its position over and over again in the form of "friendly advice". If the Camp David process lasted that long, the status of Jerusalem would eventually be discussed and no-one could prejudge what form an ultimate agreement might take. Equally, the issue would have to be negotiated in due course whatever the parties might do in the meantime to try to influence the eventual result.
- (e) Muskie resisted the suggestion, made recently by former US Ambassador Eilts that the US should present its own plan for a comprehensive Middle East settlement. The issues did not lend themselves to such an approach. A US plan would be seen as an attempt to impose a settlement and would be resisted as such.

(f) The Palestinian people would have to be involved in the search for a settlement but it was not easy to sell to the Israelis the notion that an organisation committed to their destruction should be allowed to negotiate over their future. The PLO would have to take a tough decision as to where their interests lay. In the meantime, there was no change in the US position on the PLO.

(g) Muskie defended the decision to sell tanks to Jordan on the basis that Jordan made a vital contribution to Middle East stability and that she would, at some point, have to be included in the Middle East peace process.

**THIS TELEGRAM
WAS NOT
ADVANCED**

FRETWELL

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U N C L A S S I F I E D
FM TEL AVIV 300715Z JULY
TO PRIORITY F C O
TELNO 323 OF 30 JULY.

INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON, ROUTINE CAIRO, AMMAN, UKMIS NEW YORK
AND JERUSALEM(PASSED).

OURTEL 317: JERUSALEM.

1. ALL TODAY'S ISRAELI PAPERS QUOTE "U S DIPLOMATIC SOURCES"
HERE AS WARNING THAT A DECISION TO TRANSFER THE PRIME MINISTER'S
OFFICE TO EAST JERUSALEM AND THE LIKELY ENACTMENT OF THE JERUSALEM
BILL LATER TODAY MIGHT HAVE TO IMMEDIATE EFFECTS: THE SUSPENSION
OF THE AUTONOMY TALKS; AND "A BREACH IN COMMUNICATIONS" BETWEEN
ISRAEL AND THE U S. (SOME PAPERS TALK ABOUT "DIFFICULTIES" OR
"DISTURBANCES" IN COMMUNICATIONS.

2. THE SOURCES SAID THAT THE TWO ISRAELI ACTIONS WERE CONSIDERED
AN ATTEMPT TO DETERMINE UNILATERALLY THE ULTIMATE STATUS OF
JERUSALEM. THE U S HAD NO INTENTION OF ADJUSTING ITSELF TO THE
DE FACTO (LAST TWO WORDS UNDERLINED) SITUATION BEING ESTABLISHED
IN JERUSALEM. THE U S AMBASSADOR HAD DRAWN HIS ATTENTION TO THE
CONSEQUENCES OF THE ISRAELI ACTIONS.

3. BEGIN CANCELLED A MEETING WITH PERES LAST NIGHT WHEN IT
BECAME CLEAR THAT PERES WAS GOING TO EXPRESS OPPOSITION TO MOVING
BEGIN'S OFFICE TO EAST JERUSALEM.

4. THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT HAS EXPRESSED REGRET AT VENEZUELA'S
DECISION (NOW CONFIRMED) TO TRANSFER ITS EMBASSY FROM JERUSALEM
TO TEL AVIV.

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TO IMMEDIATE F C O
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1069 OF 30 JULY 1980

YOUR TELNO 556: EMERGENCY SPECIAL SESSION ON PALESTINE

1. FOLLOWING IS ENGLISH TRANSLATION OF LUXEMBOURG PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE'S EXPLANATION OF VOTE, AS IT WILL APPEAR IN THE UNITED NATIONS' OFFICIAL RECORD:

"ONLY A FEW DAYS AGO, MR GASTON THORN SET FORTH THE POSITION OF THE NINE, AND IN PARTICULAR THE GENERAL CRITERIA LAID DOWN IN THE VENICE DECLARATION OF 18 JUNE 1980, AS BEING NECESSARY TO BRING ABOUT A COMPREHENSIVE, JUST AND EQUITABLE PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST TO WHICH THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY COUNTRIES ATTACH PRIMARY IMPORTANCE.

BECAUSE OF CERTAIN ELEMENTS IN THE RESOLUTIONS AND ALSO BECAUSE OF CERTAIN OMISSIONS WHICH ARE INCONSISTENT WITH THE VENICE DECLARATION AND RESOLUTION 242 OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL, THEY NATURALLY CANNOT BE ACCEPTED IN THEIR PRESENT FORM BY THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE NINE.

THE EUROPE OF THE NINE WISHES TO BRING ITS FULL WEIGHT TO BEAR IN THIS DIFFICULT MATTER AND IT FEELS THAT ITS TRADITIONAL BONDS OF FRIENDSHIP WITH ALL THE COUNTRIES IN THE MIDDLE EAST JUSTIFIED AN INITIATIVE ON ITS PART. THE NINE MEMBER COUNTRIES OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY DO NOT WISH TO PREJUDGE IN ANY WAY THE CONTACTS THEY WILL BE MAKING IN THE NEAR FUTURE UNDER THEIR PRESENT CHAIRMAN.

IF THE NINE ABSTAINED IN THE VOTING, IT WAS BECAUSE THEY DID NOT WISH TO TAKE UP A POSITION AS TO THE SUBSTANCE OF THE RESOLUTION. THEIR POSITION, I SHOULD LIKE TO REPEAT, HAS BEEN SET FORTH IN THE VENICE DECLARATION. BY THEIR VOTE THEY WISHED ALSO TO EXPRESS THEIR DETERMINATION NOT TO TAKE A STAND JUST BEFORE THE FRIENDLY AND IN-DEPTH TALKS WHICH THEIR CHIEF IS SHORTLY TO BE HOLDING WITH BOTH SIDES".

2. THE SECOND PARAGRAPH ABOVE CONTAINS CERTAIN AMENDMENTS PROPOSED BY US, THOUGH WE HAVE NOT SUCCEEDED IN PERSUADING THE TRANSLATORS TO ACCEPT FULLY THE VERSION IN YOUR TELNO 556.

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FROM UKMIS NEW YORK 292225Z JUL 80

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1067 OF 29 JULY

INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON CAIRO TEL AVIV AMMAN DAMASCUS BEIRUT

AND EC POSTS

MY TEL 1061: EMERGENCY SPECIAL SESSION ON PALESTINE

1. THE DRAFT RESOLUTIONS IN MY TELS 1052 AND 1053 WERE ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY BY 112-7 (AUSTRALIA, CANADA, DOMINICAN REPUBLIC, GUATEMALA, ISRAEL, NORWAY, US)-26 (EC, AUSTRIA, FINLAND, ICELAND, NEW ZEALAND, PORTUGAL, SWEDEN) AND 112-5 (AUSTRALIA, CANADA, ISRAEL, NORWAY, US)-26.
2. AT THE LAST MOMENT THE SENEGALESE, ON BEHALF OF THE INALIENABLE RIGHTS COMMITTEE, INTRODUCED AN ADDITIONAL PARAGRAPH INTO THE MAIN RESOLUTION (NEW PARA 9) WHICH READS: "FURTHER DEMANDS THAT ISRAEL SHOULD FULLY COMPLY WITH ALL UN RESOLUTIONS RELEVANT TO THE HISTORIC CHARACTER OF THE HOLY CITY OF JERUSALEM, IN PARTICULAR SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 476 OF 30 JUNE 1980". SINCE THE VOTING PROCESS HAD ALREADY BEGUN ISRAEL RIGHTLY OBJECTED UNDER ARTICLE 88 OF THE RULES OF PROCEDURE TO THE INCLUSION OF THIS AMENDMENT. THE PRESIDENT (SALIM), WHO HAD BEEN PRIMED IN ADVANCE BY THE ARABS, AGAIN DEMONSTRATED REGRETTABLE PARTISANSHIP BY OVER-RIDING THE ISRAELI OBJECTION.
3. WE SHALL BE SENDING AN ASSESSMENT OF THE SESSION AND OUR VIEWS ON THE NEXT STEPS THE ARABS ARE LIKELY TO TAKE. MEANWHILE A ROW HAS BLOWN UP OVER A SPEECH MADE BY WALDHEIM AT AN ARAB LEAGUE DINNER ON FRIDAY NIGHT IN WHICH HE SAID THAT THE PALESTINIANS "HAVE A RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION, INCLUDING STATEHOOD" AND DESCRIBED THE PLO AS "THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE". BLUM (ISRAEL) HAS ISSUED A HIGHLY CRITICAL PRESS RELEASE STATING THAT THE SECRETARY-GENERAL HAD "EXCEEDED THE LIMITS OF HIS OFFICE" AND HAD "PUT HIMSELF SQUARELY ON THE SIDE OF ONE OF THE PARTIES IN THE ARAB/ISRAEL CONFLICT". THE PRESS RELEASE CONCLUDES "IT IS DIFFICULT TO ESCAPE THE CONCLUSION THAT THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S REMARKS HERALD THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF HIS BID FOR A THIRD TERM OF OFFICE". THIS IS ANOTHER EXAMPLE (CF. HIS SPEECH AT THE OAU SUMMIT IN FREETOWN) OF WALDHEIM'S UNHAPPY TENDENCY TO SAY WHAT HIS AUDIENCE WANT TO HEAR, THUS REDUCING HIS ABILITY TO PLAY AN EFFECTIVE MEDIATORY ROLE BETWEEN CONFLICTING PARTIES.

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DESKBY 291330Z (NEW YORK), 291100Z (EC POSTS)

FM FCO 290955Z JULY 80

TO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK

TELEGRAM NUMBER 556 OF 29 JULY

INFO IMMEDIATE EC POSTS

PRIORITY WASHINGTON, CAIRO, TEL AVIV, AMMAN, DAMASCUS, BEIRUT

YOUR TELEGRAM NUMBERS 1060 AND 1061 : EMERGENCY SPECIAL SESSION

ON PALESTINE

1. MANY THANKS FOR ALL YOUR EFFORTS. WE HAVE TOLD THE FRENCH THAT WE CAN ACCEPT THEIR LATEST PROPOSALS AS CONTAINED IN YOUR TELNO 1061. GRATEFUL IF YOU COULD DO YOUR BEST TO ENSURE THAT THE ENGLISH TRANSLATION OF THE FRENCH TEXT IS AS CLOSE TO THE FOLLOWING AS POSSIBLE:

'INSOFAR AS THE RESOLUTIONS, IN CERTAIN PARTS AND BY CERTAIN OMISSIONS, ARE INCONSISTENT WITH THE VENICE DECLARATION AND SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 242, THEY CANNOT AS A NATURAL CONSEQUENCE BE ACCEPTED BY THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE NINE AS PUT FORWARD'.

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GRS 160
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FM TEL AVIV 290800Z JULY
TO ROUTINE F C O
TELNO 318 OF 29 JULY
INFO CAIRO, WASHINGTON.

ms

EGYPT/ISRAEL.

1. FOREIGN MINISTER SHAMIR YESTERDAY IN A STATEMENT TO M F A MEMBERS SUBSEQUENTLY MADE PUBLIC SHARPLY CRITICISED EGYPT FOR ITS ATTACKS ON BEGIN AND FOR ITS TOUGH NEGOTIATING POSITION. THE LATTER HAD CAUSED EXCESSIVE "ASYMMETRY" IN RELATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES.
2. SHAMIR DESCRIBED ATTACKS ON BEGIN AND THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT BY "HIGH-RANKING" EGYPTIAN PERSONALITIES AND THE EGYPTIAN MEDIA AS "UNBRIDLED AND INSULTING". ASKING WHAT SADAT HAD MEANT RECENTLY BY HIS ASSERTION THAT BEGIN HAD EXHAUSTED HIS CAPACITY TO CONTRIBUTE TO PEACE, SHAMIR SAID THAT BEGIN'S ROLE WAS NOT TO STRIP ISRAEL OF ITS ASSETS, TO YIELD JERUSALEM OR TO AGREE TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN ARAFATIST STATE. EGYPT'S EFFORTS TO DRIVE A WEDGE BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT AND PEOPLE OF ISRAEL WOULD NOT SUCCEED. SHAMIR CALLED ON EGYPT TO CONDUCT THE DIALOGUE WITH ISRAEL THROUGH NORMAL CHANNELS AND NOT THROUGH THE MEDIA.

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FM TEL AVIV 280830Z JUL

TO PRIORITY F C O

TELNO 315 OF 28 JULY.

INFO WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK, ANKARA, CARACAS, CAIRO AND JERUSALEM (PASSED).

MYTELS 308 AND 309: JERUSALEM.

1. BEGIN WAS NOT PRESENT AT YESTERDAY'S CABINET. HE RETURNS TO WORK TOMORROW. NO DECISION WAS TAKEN ABOUT MOVING HIS OFFICE TO EAST JERUSALEM.

2. ON 24 JULY MY AMERICAN COLLEAGUE APPEARS TO HAVE HAD A STIFF MESSAGE FOR BEGIN OR STIFF INSTRUCTIONS ON THE EAST JERUSALEM OFFICE, AND HIS MEETING WITH BEGIN THAT DAY APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN HARD HITTING. AT YESTERDAY'S CABINET MEETING SHAMIR IS REPORTED TO HAVE DRAWN ATTENTION TO A RECENT STATEMENT BY THE TURKISH PRIME MINISTER SUGGESTING THAT TURKEY MIGHT BREAK DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH ISRAEL IF THE JERUSALEM BILL IS PASSED AND BEGIN MOVES HIS OFFICE. REPORTS HAVE ALSO APPEARED HERE THAT VENEZUELA HAS DECIDED TO MOVE ITS EMBASSY FROM JERUSALEM TO TEL AVIV UNDER PRESSURE FROM FELLOW O P E C COUNTRIES.

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 R E S T R I C T E D
 FM TEL AVIV 280645Z JULY
 TO IMMEDIATE F C O
 TELNO 314 OF 28 JULY
 INFO IMMEDIATE LUXEMBOURG, UKMIS NEW YORK, AND ROUTINE WASHINGTON,
 CAIRO, AMMAN.

OURTEL 302: THORN MISSION.

1. THE ISRAELI CABINET YESTERDAY FORMALLY AGREED THE THORN MISSION WOULD BE RECEIVED WITH "ALL DUE DIPLOMATIC COURTESIES". BEGIN WAS NOT PRESENT. ONLY ONE MINISTER IS UNDERSTOOD TO HAVE OBJECTED, AND IT HAS BEEN MADE KNOWN THAT BEGIN DID NOT SUPPORT HIS OBJECTION.
2. THE DEPUTY CABINET SECRETARY SAID AFTER THE MEETING THAT THERE WERE NO FORMAL CONDITIONS ATTACHED TO ISRAEL'S DECISION TO WELCOME THORN. BUT SHAMIR TOLD THE CABINET THAT HE WOULD "FORCEFULLY REITERATE" TO THORN ISRAEL'S REJECTION OF THE VENICE DOCUMENT.
3. IT IS CLEAR FROM THIS THAT SHAMIR WILL RECEIVE THORN ON 31 JULY. IT IS NOT YET CLEAR WHETHER BEGIN WILL DO SO.

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Middle East

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

28 July 1980

UN Resolution on Palestine

I am writing to confirm for the record, that the Prime Minister is content with the form of words proposed by the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary to M. Gaston Thorn and set out in FCO Telegram No. 93 to Luxembourg. I understand this has been accepted by our partners.

M. O'D. B. ALEXANDER

Paul Lever, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

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GRS 427
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La. Punt

FM FCO 281145Z JUL 80
TO FLASH LUXEMBOURG
TELEGRAM NUMBER 93 OF 28 JULY
AND TO FLASH OTHER EC POSTS
INFO TO FLASH BUCHAREST, IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK, ROUTINE
WASHINGTON, CAIRO, TEL AVIV, AMMAN, DAMASCUS, BEIRUT, JEDDA

UKMIS NEW YORK TELNO 1056: EMERGENCY SPECIAL SESSION ON PALESTINE
FOR LUXEMBOURG: PLEASE PASS FOLLOWING MESSAGE URGENTLY FROM
ME TO THORN:

BEGINS

I HAVE BEEN FOLLOWING CLOSELY THE PROCEEDINGS AT THE
GENERAL ASSEMBLY AND I WAS DELIGHTED WITH YOUR SPEECH THERE.
MY IMPRESSION IS THAT IT WAS WELL RECEIVED.

I AM HOWEVER STILL WORRIED THAT THE POSITION OF THE NINE
MAY BE MISUNDERSTOOD IF WE DO NOT MAKE CLEAR IN SOME WAY OUR
DISAPPROVAL OF THE TERMS OF THE RESOLUTION. WE AGREED IN
BRUSSELS THAT OUR EXPLANATION OF VOTE WOULD NOT GO INTO THE
RIGHTS AND WRONGS OF THE RESOLUTION IN DETAIL, BUT THIS DOES NOT
PRECLUDE US FROM INDICATING IN GENERAL TERMS ITS UNACCEPTABILITY.
THIS WOULD BE CONSISTENT WITH THE REFERENCE IN YOUR STATEMENT,
IN THE CONTEXT OF THE NINE'S VOTING INTENTIONS, TO THE NINE'S
HOPE THAT THE RESULTS OF THE SESSION WOULD CONTRIBUTE TO
RECONCILIATION RATHER THAN CONFRONTATION.

I DO NOT BELIEVE THAT THE ARABS WOULD REACT TO THIS IN A
WAY WHICH WOULD PREJUDICE YOUR MISSION: IT SEEMS TO ME THAT
THERE IS A MUCH MORE SERIOUS RISK OF PREJUDICE ON THE ISRAELI
SIDE IF WE ALLOW OUR POSITION TO BE MISREPRESENTED.

I THEREFORE HOPE THAT YOU CAN AGREE THAT THE PRESIDENCY
EXPLANATION OF VOTE SHOULD INCLUDE SOME SUCH FORMULA AS:

'PROPOSALS WHICH ARE INCONSISTENT WITH SECURITY COUNCIL
RESOLUTION 242 AND THE PRINCIPLES SET OUT IN THE VENICE

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DECLARATION ARE NATURALLY UNACCEPTABLE TO THE GOVERNMENTS
OF THE NINE.'

MY CABINET COLLEAGUES AND I FEEL THAT THIS IS THE
MINIMUM NECESSARY TO PRESERVE THE CREDIBILITY AND FAIRNESS
OF THE NINE'S POSITION. UNLESS THERE IS A SENTENCE OF THIS KIND
IN THE PRESIDENCY'S EXPLANATION OF VOTE, I MAY, I FEAR, BE
OBLIGED TO INSTRUCT THE BRITISH PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE AT THE
UNITED NATIONS TO MAKE A SEPARATE NATIONAL EXPLANATION OF VOTE
TO REGISTER THIS POINT. I SHOULD NATURALLY REGRET HAVING TO DO
THIS SINCE I WOULD, LIKE YOU, PREFER IF AT ALL POSSIBLE TO
MAINTAIN THE UNITY OF THE NINE.

MESSAGE ENDS

FOR OTHER EC POSTS: PLEASE MAKE SUPPORTING REPRESENTATIONS AT AS
HIGH A LEVEL AS POSSIBLE IN THE TIME AVAILABLE DRAWING ON THE
MATERIAL IN MY MESSAGE TO THORN. PLEASE ASK FOR INSTRUCTIONS TO
BE SENT TO NEW YORK BY 281400Z AND REPORT PROGRESS BY 281500Z.
UNLESS YOU JUDGE THE REACTION TO BE SATISFACTORY, PLEASE ADD THAT
I MAY SEND A PERSONAL MESSAGE TO THE FOREIGN MINISTERS OF THE
COUNTRIES CONCERNED LATER TODAY.
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TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1053 OF 26 JULY

INFO PRIORITY AMMAN BEIRUT DAMASCUS CAIRO TEL AVIV WASHINGTON

MIPT: EMERGENCY SPECIAL SESSION ON PALESTINE

TEXT OF IRAQI DRAFT IS AS FOLLOWS:-

THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY,

HAVING HEARD THE STATEMENTS BY THE CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE EXERCISE OF THE INALIENABLE RIGHTS OF THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE, AND BY THE RAPPORTEUR OF THE COMMITTEE,

1. COMMENDS THE COMMITTEE ON THE EXERCISE OF THE INALIENABLE RIGHTS OF THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE FOR ITS EFFORTS TO DISCHARGE ITS DUTIES:
2. EXPRESSES GREAT APPRECIATION FOR THE STUDIES ON THE VARIOUS ASPECTS OF THE QUESTION OF PALESTINE PUBLISHED BY THE SPECIAL UNIT ON PALESTINIAN RIGHTS OF THE SECRETARIAT UNDER THE GUIDANCE OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE EXERCISE OF THE INALIENABLE RIGHTS OF THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE AND REQUESTS THE COMMITTEE TO STUDY THOROUGHLY THE REASONS FOR THE REFUSAL OF ISRAEL TO COMPLY WITH THE RELEVANT UNITED NATIONS RESOLUTIONS, PARTICULARLY RESOLUTION 31/20 OF 24 NOVEMBER 1976, IN WHICH THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY ENDORSED THE RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE COMMITTEE CONTAINED IN ITS REPORT TO THE ASSEMBLY AT ITS THIRTY-FIRST SESSION AND THE NUMEROUS RESOLUTIONS DEMANDING THE WITHDRAWAL OF ISRAEL FROM THE OCCUPIED PALESTINIAN AND OTHER ARAB TERRITORIES, INCLUDING JERUSALEM, AND SUBMIT THE STUDY TO THE ASSEMBLY:
3. DECIDES TO ENLARGE THE COMMITTEE ON THE EXERCISE OF THE INALIENABLE RIGHTS OF THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE AND REQUESTS THE PRESIDENT OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY, IN CONSULTATION WITH THE COMMITTEE, TO APPOINT ADDITIONAL MEMBERS BEFORE 31 AUGUST 1980:
4. REQUESTS THE COMMITTEE ON THE EXERCISE OF THE INALIENABLE RIGHTS OF THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE TO REPORT ON THE PROGRESS OF ITS STUDY TO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY AT ITS THIRTY-FIFTH SESSION.

PARSONS

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FM TEL AVIV 260800Z JULY

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELNO 313 OF 26 JULY

INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK.

YRTEL 539 TO UKMIS NEW YORK: SPECIAL SESSION ON PALESTINE.

1. UNDER SECRETARY RESPONSIBLE IN ISRAELI FOREIGN MINISTRY TELE-
PHONED ME LAST NIGHT TO EXPRESS ISRAEL'S DISMAY AND ANXIETY AT
REPORTS THAT THE NINE MIGHT ABSTAIN. I SAID I DID NOT KNOW OF
ANY FINAL DECISION OF THE WAY WE WOULD VOTE, BUT WOULD REPORT
HIS APPROACH.

2. HE DID NOT REFER TO THE THORN MISSION ON WHICH THE ISRAELI
CABINET IS DUE TO TAKE A DECISION ON 27 JULY.

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TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 2591 OF 25 JULY 1980

INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK PRIORITY TEL AVIV AND EC POSTS

M I P T

1. AS YOU WILL SEE MUSKIE DOES NOT SEEM TO BE MAKING ANYTHING OF THE IDEA OF NON-PARTICIPATION (UKMIS TELNO 1045). WHAT HE IS ASKING US TO DO IS TO VOTE AGAINST. HE DOES NOT APPEAR TO THINK THAT ANYTHING LESS WILL BE APPROPRIATE: BUT, ALTHOUGH HE ASKS GOVERNMENTS TO RECONSIDER, I DO NOT THINK THAT HE REALLY EXPECTS THEM TO CHANGE. APART FROM HIS OBVIOUS DISLIKE OF THE CONTENT OF THE PROPOSED RESOLUTION, HE HAS TO MAKE A PROTEST TO US FOR THE SAKE OF HIS RELATIONS WITH ISRAEL AND FOR INTERNAL POLITICAL REASONS.
2. WE HAD A BRIEF DISCUSSION AMONG THE NINE AFTER THE MEETING WITH MUSKIE. THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR ASKED WHETHER WE SHOULD MAKE ANY RECOMMENDATION TO OUR GOVERNMENTS IN THE LIGHT OF WHAT MUSKIE HAD SAID. I TOOK THE LINE THAT I DID NOT THINK THAT THERE WAS ANYTHING IN MUSKIE'S REMARKS THAT WOULD CAUSE US TO RECOMMEND OUR GOVERNMENTS TO CHANGE THEIR DECISION. BUT, GIVEN THE WAY MUSKIE HAD SPOKEN THERE DID SEEM TO BE GREAT IMPORTANCE IN THE CONTENT OF THE EXPLANATION OF VOTE.
3. THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR SUGGESTED THAT IDEALLY WE SHOULD TRY TO GET THE MOTIVES FOR OUR POLICY ACROSS TO PUBLIC OPINION BEFORE THE VOTE.
4. AS SEEN FROM HERE, AND HAVING HAD A TALK ON THE TELEPHONE WITH SIR ANTHONY PARSONS, I SUGGEST THE FOLLOWING:
 - A. WE SHOULD TRY TO GET THE COMMUNITY REPRESENTATIVE IN THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY TO EXPLAIN FULLY THE MOTIVES FOR ABSTENTION IN THE LIGHT OF THE VENICE DECISION, I.E. THAT IT DOES NOT AMOUNT TO ANY CONDONING OF THE TERMS OF THE RESOLUTION, THAT WE DO NOT INTEND TO COMMENT UPON THE DETAILS OF THE RESOLUTION BECAUSE OUR OVER-RIDING STANDPOINT AT THE PRESENT IS TO DO NOTHING IN THE UNITED NATIONS WHEN THE FOCUS OF OUR ATTENTION IS ON THE THORN MISSION. OUR ABSTENTION IS NOT INTENDED TO IMPLY ANY CHANGE WHATEVER IN THE EUROPEAN VIEW AS EXPRESSED AT VENICE: WE WISH TO BE EVEN HANDED AS BETWEEN ARAB AND ISRAEL:

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/B. IF POSSIBLE

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B. IF POSSIBLE OUR PRESS OFFICE IN NEW YORK, AND FOR THAT MATTER THOSE OF OTHER COMMUNITY DELEGATIONS, MIGHT LET IT BE KNOWN IN ADVANCE WHY IT IS WE INTEND, WHATEVER THE CONTENT OF THE RESOLUTION TABLED ON THIS SUBJECT BY WHATEVER PARTY, TO ABSTAIN.

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FM WASHINGTON 252150Z JULY 1980

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TEL NO 2590 OF 25 JULY

INFO IMMEDIATE UXMIS NEW YORK PRIORITY TEL AVIV AND EC POSTS.

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These telegrams bring out clearly why you were right to insist on a clear explanation of vote.

Paul

UKMIS TELNO 1045: EMERGENCY SPECIAL SESSION ON PALESTINE.

1. AT THE MEETING WITH COMMUNITY AMBASSADORS HERE TODAY, SECRETARY OF STATE MUSKIE BEGAN BY STATING THAT HE HAD SOMETHING IMPORTANT TO SAY ON THE APPARENT EUROPEAN COMMUNITY ATTITUDE ON THE DRAFT ARAB RESOLUTION ON PALESTINE.

MS

2. HE BEGAN BY DESCRIBING BEGIN'S BELEAGUERED POLITICAL POSITION: HE WAS ABLE TO RALLY HIS PEOPLE TO SUPPORT HIM ON THE SUBJECT OF JERUSALEM MORE THAN ON ANY OTHER SUBJECTS. BEGIN UNDER PRESSURE WAS NO DIFFERENT FROM ANY OTHER POLITICIAN UNDER PRESSURE. NOT ALTOGETHER CONVINCINGLY, MUSKIE WENT ON TO SAY THAT THE ATTITUDE BEGIN WAS ADOPTING ON EAST JERUSALEM WAS A REACTION TO PRESSURE FROM OUTSIDE THE COUNTRY.

3. THE ARAB RESOLUTION AT THE UNITED NATIONS WAS ONE OF THE WORST EVER PROPOSED. IT DID NOT RECOGNISE ISRAEL'S RIGHT EVEN TO EXIST. IT CONTEMPLATED THE POSSIBILITY OF SANCTIONS. IF THE COMMUNITY COUNTRIES DID NOT VOTE AGAINST THE RESOLUTION THEY WOULD BE VOTING FOR SANCTIONS. THE PURPOSE OF THE RESOLUTION WAS TO UNDERMINE THE CAMP DAVID PROCESS. IF THE COMMUNITY DECIDED TO ABSTAIN THEY MIGHT JUST AS WELL VOTE FOR THE RESOLUTION. HE UNDERSTOOD THAT AT VENICE THE COMMUNITY HAD ADOPTED A POLICY THAT WOULD LEAD TO THE CREATION OF A ROLE FOR THEMSELVES IN THE MIDDLE EAST, BUT QUOTE HOW DO YOU EXPECT TO BE RECEIVED BY ISRAEL IF YOU ABSTAIN UNQUOTE? MUSKIE WENT ON TO SAY THAT BEGIN WOULD REACT QUOTE BY MOVING HIS OFFICES TO EAST JERUSALEM UNQUOTE THE KNESSET WOULD ACT SOON ON JERUSALEM. AS A RESULT OF THIS SADAT MIGHT WITHDRAW FROM THE AUTONOMY TALKS. WHAT THEN WOULD BE THE PURPOSE OF THORN GOING TO THE MIDDLE EAST TO TRY TO HOLD SOME SORT OF PLATFORM TOGETHER? BY ABSTAINING ON THIS RESOLUTION THE COUNTRIES OF THE COMMUNITY WERE QUOTE DESTROYING THEIR EVEN-HANDEDNESS BEFORE THE START UNQUOTE. WOULD THORN BE RECEIVED BY BEGIN IN JERUSALEM IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES? WOULD THE COMMUNITY LET HIM GO TO EAST JERUSALEM?

4. IN THE COURSE OF HIS REMARKS, MUSKIE SAID THAT HE UNDERSTOOD THE CONCERN OF THE EUROPEAN COUNTRIES: THE INSTABILITY IN THE AREA AFFECTED EUROPE'S INTERESTS; EUROPE HAD A ROLE; THE CAMP DAVID PROCESS WOULD AT SOME STAGE HAVE TO BE BROADENED; IT WAS NOT UNREASONABLE FOR EUROPE TO HAVE THE OBJECTIVE OF SUPPLEMENTING WHAT THE UNITED STATES WERE DOING, NOT UNDERMINING IT. BUT NOW THEY HAD TO THINK OUT THE CONSEQUENCES OF THEIR ACTION IF THEY HOPED TO HAVE ANY CHANCE OF ASSUMING A ROLE. IT WAS THE PREROGATIVE OF THE EUROPEAN COUNTRIES TO ABSTAIN IF THEY WISHED TO DO SO, BUT IT WAS HIS OBLIGATION TO POINT OUT THE CONSEQUENCES.

15. AFTER

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5. AFTER MUSKIE HAD FINISHED, THE GERMAN AMBASSADOR ASKED, VERY QUIETLY, WHETHER THE SECRETARY OF STATE BELIEVED THAT IF THE COUNTRIES OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY VOTED AGAINST THE RESOLUTION BEGIN WOULD HOLD UP HIS MOVE TO EAST JERUSALEM. WOULD HE ALSO ACT IN OTHER WAYS MORE POSITIVELY? TO WHICH MUSKIE ANSWERED THAT THERE WAS A DYNAMISM TO CURRENT EVENTS. HE THOUGHT THAT BEGIN WOULD MOVE TO EAST JERUSALEM ON SUNDAY UNLESS HE COULD SOMEHOW BE DETERRED BEFORE THEN. HE MORE OR LESS ADMITTED THAT WHATEVER THE EUROPEAN COUNTRIES DID ON THE RESOLUTION, BEGIN WAS GOING TO MAKE THIS MOVE BUT HE SAID THAT HE THOUGHT THAT THE INFLUENCE OF THE EUROPEANS IN THE FUTURE WOULD BE CONSIDERABLY AFFECTED BY THE WAY THEY VOTED ON THE RESOLUTION.

6. I SAID THAT IT WAS NOT FOR ME TO SPEAK FOR THE COMMUNITY ON THIS SUBJECT BUT AS MR MUSKIE HAD SAID THAT HE DID NOT UNDERSTAND WHAT THE EUROPEAN COUNTRIES WERE SEEKING TO DO, PERHAPS I COULD EXPLAIN THEIR INTENTIONS AS I SAW THEM. THE STARTING POINT WAS THEIR DECISION AT VENICE TO SET IN MOTION A MISSION OF ENQUIRY WHICH WOULD CONSIDER THE VIEWPOINTS OF ALL PARTIES INVOLVED. AT THIS STAGE, BEFORE THIS MISSION OF ENQUIRY HAD EVEN STARTED ITS WORK, THE COUNTRIES OF THE COMMUNITY DID NOT WANT TO BECOME INVOLVED ON THE SUBJECT IN THE UNITED NATIONS. NEVERTHELESS, IT WOULD BE A MISINTERPRETATION IF MUSKIE BELIEVED THAT AN ABSTENTION ON THE RESOLUTION WAS THE SAME AS VOTING FOR IT. THE US GOVERNMENT HAD OFTEN ABSTAINED ON RESOLUTIONS. THIS DID NOT MEAN THAT THEY HAD FAVOURED THEM. THERE WERE MANY PARTS OF THE PRESENT RESOLUTION WHICH WERE EXTREMELY DISAGREEABLE FROM THE EUROPEAN POINT OF VIEW. THE EUROPEAN ATTITUDE TO THE RESOLUTION WOULD BE MADE CLEAR WHEN THE TIME CAME FOR THE VOTE AND WHEN WE ABSTAINED. NOBODY WOULD BE ABLE TO SAY, THAT BY ABSTAINING WE HAD VOTED IN FAVOUR OF SANCTIONS. IF THE ISSUE EVER CAME TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL UNDER CHAPTER 7 THERE WOULD BE NO DOUBT WHATSOEVER THAT WE WOULD VOTE AGAINST SANCTIONS AND THE ISRAELIS KNEW THIS PERFECTLY WELL. SO FAR AS THE GENERAL INTERPRETATION OF THE EUROPEAN ATTITUDE WAS CONCERNED, IT DID NOT LOOK TO ME AS THOUGH WE WERE CONSIDERED TO BE SO UNEVEN-HANDED AS MR MUSKIE HAD SUGGESTED. I THEN READ OUT THE HEADLINE IN THE FRONT PAGE OF TODAY'S NEW YORK TIMES WHICH RAN QUOTE WESTERN EUROPE AT UN INSISTS ON ISRAELI RIGHTS. MARKET'S POSITION APPEARS TO DOOM HOPES OF ARABS UNQUOTE.

7. WARREN CHRISTOPHER, WHO WAS ALSO PRESENT, SAID THAT THE US GOVERNMENT HAD NEVER ABSTAINED ON A UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION CONTAINING CONDITIONS SUCH AS THE PRESENT RESOLUTION.

8. THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR SAID THAT WHAT THE ISRAELI AUTHORITIES WERE DOING AROSE BECAUSE OF EVENTS IN ISRAEL NOT BECAUSE OF ANYTHING HAPPENING IN THE UN. HE REFERRED TO THE NUMBER OF PROMINENT ISRAELI POLITICIANS WHO HAD VOTED AGAINST THE KNESSET RESOLUTION ON JERUSALEM. WHAT WAS ESSENTIAL WAS FOR THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY TO RETAIN A QUOTE SAFETY NET UNQUOTE TO SHOW THAT IT UNDERSTOOD THE PROBLEM. IF THE CAMP DAVID PROCESS FAILED BECAUSE SADAT WITHDREW, IT WAS IMPORTANT THAT THERE SHOULD BE SOME OTHER CHANNEL FOR TALKING.

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9. MUSKIE SAID THAT HE COULD NOT BELIEVE THAT THE EUROPEANS WOULD BE QUOTE ACCEPTABLE UNQUOTE UNLESS THEY HAD OPPOSED THE UN RESOLUTION.

10 THE LUXEMBOURG AMBASSADOR EMPHASISED THE IMPORTANCE OF THE EXPLANATION OF THE VOTE, WHICH SHOULD LEAVE NOBODY IN DOUBT OF THE EUROPEAN ATTITUDE. IT WAS IMPORTANT TO KEEP LINES OPEN TO THE ARABS AS WELL AS TO ISRAEL, PARTICULARLY AT THE BEGINNING OF THE FACT-FINDING MISSION.

11. MUSKIE DELIVERED HIMSELF OF SOME HOME-TRUTHS ABOUT THE IMPORTANCE IN POLITICS OF COMPREHENDING THE CONSEQUENCES OF YOUR ACTIONS. HE HOPED, AS A RESULT OF WHAT HE HAD SAID TO THE AMBASSADORS OF THE NINE, THAT THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE COMMUNITY WOULD RECONSIDER THE MATTER AND DECIDE TO VOTE AGAINST THE RESOLUTION. THIS MIGHT NOT CHANGE ISRAEL'S DECISION ABOUT EAST JERUSLAEM BUT IT MIGHT CHANGE THE CREDIBILITY OF THE EFFORT THE EUROPEANS WERE HOPING TO MAKE. IN RESPONSE TO A QUESTION FROM THE GERMAN AMBASSADOR WHETHER THE US GOVERNMENT WERE STILL TRYING TO PERSUADE BEGIN NOT TO MOVE HIS OFFICES TO EAST JERUSALEM, MUSKIE SAID THAT HE DID NOT THINK THERE WAS MUCH HOPE OF THIS SUCCEEDING, HE, BEGIN, WAS ALMOST AS STUBBORN AS HE WAS.

12. MUSKIE SAID HE DID NOT WANT TO END ON A NEGATIVE NOTE SO HE ASKED THAT WE SHOULD REMAIN IN TOUCH. HE WOULD LIKE TO HEAR THE REACTION OF OUR GOVERNMENTS TO WHAT HE HAD SAID AND WHETHER THERE WAS ANY POSSIBILITY OF THEIR CHANGING THEIR VIEWPOINT.

13. PLEASE SEE MIFT.

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TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1048 OF 25 JULY

INFO IMMEDIATE EC POSTS WASHINGTON CAIRO TEL AVIV AMMAN DAMASCUS
BEIRUT

TELECON MILES/FULLER: EMERGENCY SPECIAL SESSION ON PALESTINE.

1. OUR BASIC DIFFICULTY ARISES FROM THE INABILITY OF SOME OF OUR PARTNERS TO KEEP THEIR MOUTHS SHUT. THE FACT THAT THE VOTING POSITION OF THE NINE WAS KNOWN THROUGHOUT THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY WITHIN HOURS OF THE MINISTERIAL MEETING HAS SERIOUSLY RESTRICTED OUR ROOM FOR MANOEUVRE. HOWEVER, I ASSUME THAT WE ATTACH CONSIDERABLE IMPORTANCE TO MAINTAINING THE UNITY OF THE NINE, PARTICULARLY AAT THE OUTSET OF THE THORN MISSION.

2. FOLLOWING MILES' TELEPHONE CALL, WE DID OUR UTMOST TO GET OUR PARTNERS HERE TO AGREE TO THE INSERTION OF A PASSAGE IN THE DRAFT EXPLANATION OF VOTE PREPARED BY THE PRESIDENCY WHICH WOULD MAKE CLEAR THAT THERE WERE ELEMENTS IN AND OMISSIONS FROM THE RESOLUTION WHICH MADE PARTS OF IT TOTALLY INCONSISTENT WITH THE POSITION OF THE NINE. I INSISTED WITH PETERS (LUXEMBOURG) THAT THE BEST LANGUAGE WE HAD BEEN ABLE TO ACHIEVE AT WORKING LEVEL SHOULD BE TRANSMITTED TO CAPITALS, ALBEIT IN SQUARE BRACKETS (SEE TEXT IN MIFT). PETERS RELUCTANTLY AGREED BUT WAS ADAMANT THAT ANY SUCH INSERTION WAS UNACCEPTABLE. THE EXPLANATION OF VOTE MUST BE QUOTE TECHNICAL UNQUOTE AND AVOID REFERENCE TO THE RESOLUTION. I ARGUED THAT, IF SOME SUCH LANGUAGE COULD NOT BE AGREED, I MIGHT WELL HAVE TO MAKE A NATIONAL EXPLANATION OF VOTE.

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/PETERS SAID

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PETERS SAID THAT THIS WOULD BE WHOLLY UNACCEPTABLE TO THE REST OF THE NINE, PARTICULARLY TO THE PRESIDENCY IN THE LIGHT OF THORN'S FORTHCOMING SERIES OF VISITS TO THE AREA. TO REVEAL A SPLIT OF THIS KIND WITHIN THE NINE AT THIS STAGE WOULD BE DISASTROUSLY PREJUDICIAL TO THORN'S MISSION. PETERS IS CLEARLY UNDER VERY STRICT INSTRUCTIONS FROM THORN, AND THE GERMANS AND FRENCH HAVE SINCE TOLD US THAT THEY SUPPORT THE PRESIDENCY.

3. AS I SEE IT, WE NOW HAVE THREE OPTIONS OPEN TO US AS REGARDS THE EXPLANATION OF VOTE:

- (I) TO BATTLE ON IN THE HOPE OF PERSUADING OUR PARTNERS TO ACCEPT THE INSERTION OF THE LANGUAGE WE REQUIRE. THIS WOULD HAVE TO BE DONE IN CAPITALS, JUDGING BY THEIR ATTITUDE IN NEW YORK.
- (II) TO ACCEPT THE QUOTE TECHNICAL UNQUOTE DRAFT AND TO MAKE OUR OWN NATIONAL EXPLANATION OF VOTE. FROM OUR EXPERIENCE THIS AFTERNOON, THIS WILL LEAD TO A MAJOR RUMPUS WITH OUR PARTNERS
- (III) IF WE HAVE NO SUCCESS WITH (I) TO ACCEPT THE QUOTE TECHNICAL UNQUOTE DRAFT AND FOR ME TO BRIEF BRITISH PRESS REPRESENTATIVES (REUTERS, BBC AND THE TIMES) ON THE RECORD ON OUR VIEW OF THE RESOLUTION.

4. AS SEEN FROM HERE, COURSE (II) WOULD BE BY FAR THE WORST.

5. I RECEIVED YOUR TELNO 540 (TEXT OF COREU) AFTER THE ABOVE WAS DRAFTED AND HAVE NOT SO FAR ACTED ON IT. IN ANY CASE, WHETHER WE ABSTAIN OR NON-PARTICIPATE THE PROBLEM OF THE EXPLANATION OF VOTE REMAINS THE SAME.

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TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1051 OF 25 JULY

INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON BEIRUT TEL AVIV CAIRO AMMAN DAMASCUS.
MY TELNO 1046 AND 1047: EMERGENCY SPECIAL SESSION ON PALESTINE.

1. THE NON-ALIGNED/ARAB DRAFTING GROUP FINALLY REACHED AGREEMENT TODAY (25 JULY) ON A DRAFT RESOLUTION. FOR EASE OF REFERENCE THE FULL TEXT, WHICH WAS TABLED THIS EVENING WITH THE SPONSORSHIP OF 29 THIRD WORLD AND COMMUNIST COUNTRIES, IS IN MIFT (TO YOU AND WASHINGTON ONLY). APART FROM SOME ALTERATIONS TO AND DELETIONS FROM THE PREAMBULAR PARAGRAPHS, THE ONLY MAJOR CHANGE FROM THE TEXT IN MY TELNO 1047 IS A SIGNIFICANT SOFTENING OF OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH 12 WHICH NOW REQUESTS THE SECURITY COUNCIL QUOTE TO CONSIDER...THE ADOPTION OF UNQUOTE RATHER THAN QUOTE TO ADOPT UNQUOTE SANCTIONS UNDER CHAPTER VII.
2. MUCH OF THE DIFFICULTY IN THE LAST TWO DAYS HAS BEEN CAUSED BY IRAQ'S INSISTENCE ON THE INCLUSION OF LANGUAGE CALLING FOR THE ENLARGEMENT OF THE INALIENABLE RIGHTS COMMITTEE AND FOR THE COMMITTEE TO PREPARE A STUDY ON THE REASONS FOR ISRAEL'S REFUSAL TO COMPLY WITH THE RELEVANT UN RESOLUTIONS. THIS HAS BEEN OPPOSED BY MOST OF THE OTHER ARABS, INCLUDING THE PLO, WHO NO DOUBT REMEMBER THE EMBARRASSMENT THEY SUFFERED IN 1978 WHEN THE COMMITTEE WAS LAST ENLARGED.
3. THE IRAQIS THEREFORE TABLED TONIGHT A SECOND DRAFT RESOLUTION (TEXT IN MY SECOND IFT) WITH 6 CO-SPONSORS. ALTHOUGH MOST OF THE ARABS RESISTED INCLUSION OF THESE IRAQI POINTS IN THE MAIN RESOLUTION, ~~THEY AND THEIR SUPPORTERS WILL CERTAINLY VOTE FOR THE IRAQI DRAFT. IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES I ASSUME THAT THE~~ CONSIDERATIONS WHICH LED THE NINE TO DECIDE TO ABSTAIN ON THE MAIN DRAFT WILL APPLY TO THE IRAQI ONE TOO (AND THERE WOULD ANYWAY BE NO CHANCE OF PERSUADING THE FRENCH TO VOTE AGAINST IT). THE VOTE ON BOTH DRAFTS WILL PROBABLY TAKE PLACE ON TUESDAY BUT TECHNICALLY A VOTE COULD BE CALLED AT ANY TIME AFTER THE DEBATE RESUMES AT 1430Z ON MONDAY. GRATEFUL THEREFORE FOR INSTRUCTIONS BY THEN.
4. SEE MY 2 IFT'S

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TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1052 OF 25 JULY
INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON

MIPT: EMERGENCY SPECIAL SESSION ON PALESTINE

TEXT OF DRAFT RESOLUTION IS AS FOLLOWS:-

THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY,

HAVING CONSIDERED THE QUESTION OF PALESTINE AT AN EMERGENCY
SPECIAL SESSION,

CONVINCED THAT THE FAILURE TO SOLVE THIS QUESTION POSES A GRAVE
THREAT TO INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY,

NOTING WITH REGRET AND CONCERN THAT THE SECURITY COUNCIL, AT ITS
2220TH MEETING ON 30 APRIL 1980, FAILED TO TAKE A DECISION, AS A
RESULT OF THE NEGATIVE VOTE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
ON THE RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE EXERCISE OF THE
INALIENABLE RIGHTS OF THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE ENDORSED BY THE
GENERAL ASSEMBLY IN ITS RESOLUTIONS 31/20 OF 24 NOVEMBER 1976,
32/40 A OF 2 DECEMBER 1977, 33/28 A OF 7 DECEMBER 1978 AND 34/65 A
OF 29 NOVEMBER 1979,

HAVING CONSIDERED THE LETTER DATED 1 JULY 1980 OF THE PERMANENT
REPRESENTATIVE OF SENEGAL, CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE EXERCISE
OF THE INALIENABLE RIGHTS OF THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE,

HAVING HEARD THE STATEMENT BY THE OBSERVER OF THE PALESTINE LIBERATION
ORGANIZATION, THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE,

1. RECALLS AND REAFFIRMS ITS RESOLUTIONS 3236 (XXIX) AND 3237 (XXIX)
OF 22 NOVEMBER 1974 AND ALL OTHER RELEVANT UNITED NATIONS
RESOLUTIONS PERTINENT TO THE QUESTION OF PALESTINE: / 2. REAFFIRMS

2. REAFFIRMS, IN PARTICULAR, THAT A COMPREHENSIVE, JUST AND LASTING PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST CANNOT BE ESTABLISHED, IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE RELEVANT UNITED NATIONS RESOLUTIONS, WITHOUT THE WITHDRAWAL OF ISRAEL FROM ALL THE OCCUPIED PALESTINIAN AND OTHER ARAB TERRITORIES INCLUDING JERUSALEM, AND WITHOUT THE ACHIEVEMENT OF A JUST SOLUTION OF THE PROBLEM OF PALESTINE ON THE BASIS OF THE ATTAINMENT OF THE INALIENABLE RIGHTS OF THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE IN PALESTINE:

3. REAFFIRMS THE INALIENABLE RIGHT OF THE PALESTINIANS TO RETURN TO THEIR HOMES AND PROPERTY, IN PALESTINE, FROM WHICH THEY HAVE BEEN DISPLACED AND UPROOTED, AND CALLS FOR THEIR RETURN:

4. REAFFIRMS ALSO THE INALIENABLE RIGHTS IN PALESTINE OF THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE, INCLUDING:

(A) THE RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION WITHOUT EXTERNAL INTERFERENCE, AND TO NATIONAL INDEPENDENCE AND SOVEREIGNTY:

(B) THE RIGHT OF ESTABLISH ITS OWN INDEPENDENT SOVEREIGN STATE:

5. REAFFIRMS THE RIGHT OF THE PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION, THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE, TO PARTICIPATE ON AN EQUAL FOOTING IN ALL EFFORTS, DELIBERATIONS AND CONFERENCES ON THE QUESTION OF PALESTINE AND THE SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE UNITED NATIONS:

~~6. REAFFIRMS THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLE OF THE INADMISSIBILITY OF THE ACQUISITION OF TERRITORY BY FORCE:~~

7. CALLS UPON ISRAEL TO WITHDRAW COMPLETELY AND UNCONDITIONALLY FROM ALL THE PALESTINIAN AND OTHER ARAB TERRITORIES OCCUPIED SINCE JUNE 1967, INCLUDING JERUSALEM, WITH ALL PROPERTY AND SERVICES INTACT, AND URGES THAT SUCH WITHDRAWAL FROM ALL THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES SHOULD START BEFORE 15 NOVEMBER 1980:

8. DEMANDS THAT ISRAEL SHOULD FULLY COMPLY WITH THE PROVISIONS OF RESOLUTION 465 (1980) ADOPTED UNANIMOUSLY BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL ON 1 MARCH 1980:

9. EXPRESSES ITS OPPOSITION TO ALL POLICIES AND PLANS AIMED AT THE RESETTLEMENT OF THE PALESTINIANS OUTSIDE THEIR HOMELAND:

10. REQUESTS AND AUTHORIZES THE SECRETARY-GENERAL, IN CONSULTATION, AS APPROPRIATE, WITH THE COMMITTEE ON THE EXERCISE OF THE INALIENABLE RIGHTS OF THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE, TO TAKE THE NECESSARY MEASURES TOWARDS THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE RECOMMENDATIONS CONTAINED IN PARAGRAPHS 59 TO 72 OF THE REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE TO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY AT ITS THIRTY-FIRST SESSION AS A BASIS FOR THE SOLUTION OF THE QUESTION OF PALESTINE:

11. REQUESTS THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO REPORT TO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY AT ITS THIRTY-FIFTH SESSION ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PRESENT RESOLUTION:

12. REQUESTS THE SECURITY COUNCIL, IN THE EVENT OF NON-COMPLIANCE BY ISRAEL WITH THE PRESENT RESOLUTION, TO CONVENE IN ORDER TO CONSIDER THE SITUATION AND THE ADOPTION OF EFFECTIVE MEASURES UNDER CHAPTER VII OF THE CHARTER:

13. DECIDES TO ADJOURN THE SEVENTH EMERGENCY SPECIAL SESSION TEMPORARILY AND TO AUTHORIZE THE PRESIDENT OF THE LATEST REGULAR SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY TO RESUME ITS MEETINGS UPON REQUEST FROM MEMBER STATES.

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TO PRIORITY F C O

TELNO 308 OF 24 JULY

INFO WASHINGTON, AMMAN, CAIRO, JERUSALEM(PASSED).

MYTEL 297: JERUSALEM.

1. DIRECTOR GENERAL OF BEGIN'S OFFICE YESTERDAY SPOKE AGAIN TO THE MEDIA ABOUT AN EARLY MOVE OF THE PRIME MINISTER'S OFFICE TO EAST JERUSALEM. HE SAID THAT, IF BEGIN WAS ABLE TO CHAIR NEXT SUNDAY'S CABINET, A DECISION MIGHT BE TAKEN THEN AND THE OFFICE MOVED 'IN THE DAYS AHEAD'. OTHERS ARE SUGGESTING THAT THE PRIME MINISTER'S NEW OFFICE WILL NOT BE READY FOR SOME WEEKS. BUT BEGIN HAS WORKED IN MORE PRIMITIVE CONDITIONS IN THE PAST, AND AN EARLY MOVE IS ON THE CARDS.

2. SO IS THE POSSIBILITY THAT BEGIN WILL TEST OUT THE POSITION OF WESTERN DIPLOMATIC MISSIONS HERE SOON AFTER THE MOVE. YOU WILL WISH TO CONSIDER OUR RESPONSE:

(I) IF BEGIN INVITES ME TO CALL ON HIM IN HIS EAST JERUSALEM OFFICE:

(II) IN THE EVENT OF CORRESPONDENCE TO BE TRANSMITTED BY THIS EMBASSY TO BEGIN'S OFFICE OR COLLECTED FROM BEGIN'S OFFICE.

3. ON (I) WE MIGHT DECLINE TO GO TO EAST JERUSALEM BUT OFFER TO CALL ON BEGIN IN HIS KNESSET OFFICE: AND ON (II) DEAL THROUGH THE ISRAELI FOREIGN MINISTRY.

4. SEE M I P T.

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TO PRIORITY FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 464 OF 24 JULY

INFO PRIORITY TEL AVIV WASHINGTON AMMAN AND JERUSALEM

TEL AVIV TELNO 298, PARA 3: EGYPTIAN VIEWS ON JERUSALEM

1. THE FORMAL EGYPTAIN POSITION ON JERUSALEM WAS SET OUT IN THE SIDE LETTERS TO THE CAMP DAVID AGREEMENTS: ARAB (IE EAST) JERUSALEM IS AN INTEGRAL PART OF THE WEST BANK AND SHOULD BE UNDER ARAB SOVEREIGNTY, AND ALL ISRAELI MEASURES TO ALTER THIS STATUS ARE NULL AND VOID. THIS POSITION IS PERIODICALLY RE- STATED: FOR EXAMPLE - IN THE FORMAL EGYPTAIN PROPOSALS IN FEBRUARY TO THE AUTONOMY TALKS (MY TELNO 104) AN MFA STATEMENT IN APRIL (MY TELNO 246) AND MOST RECENTLY IN SADAT'S SPEECH ON 23 JULY (MY TELNO 462) AND A STATEMENT BY THE MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS YESTERDAY.

2. SADAT SUGGESTED THE IDEA OF AN ARAB MUNICIPALITY AND A JOINT MUNICIPALITY IN FEBRUARY (MY TELNO 119) . THE IDEA OF ONE MAYOR IS NEW, BUT HARDLY A MAJOR DEPARTURE. SADAT'S AIM IN MAKING THESE SUGGESTIONS SEEMS TO BE TO AVOID APPEARING UN- REASONABLE IN REACTING TO ISRAELI DEMANDS FOR A UNIFIED CITY WHILE NOT COMPROMISING HIS BASIC POSITION. HOWEVER, THE FORMAL EGYPTAIN POSITION REMAINS AS HARD AS BEGIN'S, AND THE TWO ARE INCOMPATIBLE.

3. EGYPTAINS ARE INDIGNANT OVER THE KNESSET MOVES TO CLAIM SOVEREIGNTY OVER EAST JERUSALEM. IF THE COHEN BILL IS PASSED, AND/OR BEGIN MOVES HIS OFFICE, THE EGYPTAIN GOVERN- MENT WILL PROBABLY FEEL THEY HAVE TO REACT SOMEHOW. MY US COLLEAGUE AND I ARE DOUBTFUL WHETHER SADAT WILL WISH TO GO SO FAR AS SUSPENDING THE AUTONOMY TALKS A SECOND TIME (MY TELEGRAM NO 456) LET ALONE EXPELLING THE ISRAELI AMBASSADOR, WHICH IS ONE CURRENT RUMOUR.

4. I HOPE TO SEE KEMAL HASSAN ALI IN ALEXANDRIA ON 26 JULY BEFORE GOING ON LEAVE, AND WILL REPORT IF HE HAS ANYTHING NEW TO SAY.

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Assumed by Prime Minister
with Foreign Secretary this
afternoon. Agreed to go for
non-participation - or, failing that,
abstention - with a strong
explanation of vote.

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

24 July 1980

Dear Michael,

pc. Phil - 25/7

UN Special Session on Palestine

The Prime Minister may like an account of where we now stand. The Session began on 22 July and is expected to end in a vote on an Arab draft resolution on 29 July. I attach the latest version of the Arab draft.

At the meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the Nine on 22 July, it was felt strongly that, although the Arab draft was likely to be extreme and objectionable in several respects, it would cut across the action decided upon by Heads of Government in Venice if the Nine were to vote against an Arab draft. A decision was therefore taken that the Nine should abstain in any vote, explaining that this abstention was not intended as a comment on the terms of the resolution but as a product of the fact that M. Thorn was about to set out on a mission of contact with all the interested parties and that it would be inappropriate for the Nine to take up a position at this stage. As the Prime Minister will be aware, Lord Carrington was at an earlier stage inclined to think that an abstention on an extreme draft would be insufficient and to favour the promotion of a rival European draft to demonstrate clearly the Nine's position. However, the arguments against becoming involved in negotiation on texts on the eve of M. Thorn's mission, in particular the likely failure of such a draft to achieve significant support, were strong and the Nine decided not to pursue this idea. Lord Carrington therefore decided to acquiesce in the decision to abstain since it was clear that this was the only basis in which the Nine could maintain a common position and avoid a plethora of national statements and the danger of differing votes, which would have given the worst possible start to M. Thorn's mission.

The Nine's decision to abstain, though intended to be confidential, quickly became known in New York. The Americans have lobbied us along with the rest of the Nine in strong terms on the lines of the attached speaking note. There is a danger of a damaging row. The Israelis are also likely to react strongly and there is a risk that they may refuse to see M. Thorn, which would have serious consequences for the credibility of European action. However, Lord Carrington believes that to appear to back down under US pressure would be very damaging in the Middle East and would certainly undermine the credibility of M. Thorn with his Arab interlocutors. Given the commitment we have made to the Nine, Lord Carrington therefore believes that we should maintain our decision. We are, nevertheless, exploring the possibility of the Nine not participating in the vote (as opposed to

/abstaining



abstaining) as a means of demonstrating as clearly as possible that the Nine are not giving tacit approval to the Arab resolution. In either case the Nine would make clear in explanation of vote that we were not basing our decision on the substance of the resolution but on the need to avoid taking up a position which could prejudice the Thorn mission.

Yours Esq

Paul

(P Lever)
Private Secretary

M O'D B Alexander Esq
10 Downing Street
LONDON

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FROM UKMIS NEWYORK 212314Z JULY 80

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1039 OF 21 JULY

INFO TEL AVIV AMMAN CAIRO DAMASCUS WASHINGTON BEIRUT UKREP
BRUSSELS

M I P T: EMERGENCY SPECIAL SESSION ON PALESTINE.

1. TEXT OF THE REVISED RESOLUTION IS AS FOLLOWS:

BEGINS:

THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY,

A) RECALLING ITS RESOLUTIONS 34/65A OF 29 NOVEMBER 1979, IN WHICH IT, INTER ALIA, URGED THE SECURITY COUNCIL TO CONSIDER AND TAKE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE A DECISION ON THE RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE EXERCISE OF THE INALIENABLE RIGHTS OF THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE (CEIRPP) ENDORSED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY IN ITS RESOLUTIONS 31/20, 32/40A, 33/28A AS WELL AS IN RESOLUTION 34/65A.

B) NOTING WITH REGRET AND CONCERN THAT THE SECURITY COUNCIL IN ITS MEETING NO. 2220 ON 30 APRIL 1980 FAILED TO TAKE A DECISION AS A RESULT OF THE NEGATIVE VOTE OF THE UNITED STATES.

C) RECALLING RULES 8(B) AND 9(B) OF THE RULES OF PROCEDURE OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY,

D) HAVING CONSIDERED THE LETTER OF THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF SENEGAL, CHAIRMAN OF THE CEIRPP, DATED 1 JULY 1980 (DOC. NO.

E) HAVING HEARD THE STATEMENT OF THE PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANISATION (PLO), THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE,

F) RECALLING AND REAFFIRMING ITS RESOLUTION 3236 (XXIX) AND ALL OTHER RELEVANT UNITED NATIONS RESOLUTIONS PERTINENT TO THE QUESTION OF PALESTINE,

G) EXPRESSING GRAVE CONCERN THAT NO JUST SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM OF PALESTINE HAS BEEN ACHIEVED AND THAT THIS PROBLEM CONTINUES TO AGGRAVATE THE MIDDLE EAST CONFLICT, OF WHICH IT IS THE CORE, AND TO ENDANGER INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY,

1) REAFFIRMS ALSO THE INALIENABLE RIGHT OF THE PALESTINIANS TO RETURN TO THEIR HOMES AND PROPERTY FROM WHICH THEY HAVE BEEN DISPLACED AND UPROOTED, AND CALLS FOR THEIR RETURN;

2) REAFFIRMS THE INALIENABLE RIGHTS OF THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE INCLUDING:

A) THE RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION WITHOUT EXTERNAL INTERFERENCE;

B) THE RIGHT TO NATIONAL INDEPENDENCE AND SOVEREIGNTY;

3) REAFFIRMS THE RIGHT OF THE PLO, THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE, TO PARTICIPATE ON AN EQUAL FOOTING IN ALL EFFORTS, DEBATES, AND CONFERENCES ON THE QUESTION OF PALESTINE AND THE MIDDLE EAST WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE UNITED NATIONS;

4) EXPRESSES ITS OPPOSITION TO ALL POLICIES AND PLANS AIMED AT THE RESETTLEMENT OF THE PALESTINIANS OUTSIDE THEIR HOMELAND;

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/ 5) ENDORSES

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- 5) ENDORSES AGAIN THE RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE CEIRPP AS CONTAINED IN PARAGRAPHS 59 TO 72 OF ITS REPORT A/31/35;
- 6) REQUESTS AND AUTHORISES THE SECRETARY-GENERAL IN CONSULTATION WITH THE CEIRPP:
 - A) TO TAKE THE NECESSARY MEASURES TO ENSURE THE IMMEDIATE IMPLEMENTATION OF SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 237 (1967) OF 14 JUNE 1967;
 - B) TO EMPLOY THE RESOURCES OF THE UNITED NATIONS RELIEF AND WORKS AGENCY FOR PALESTINIAN REFUGEES IN THE NEAR EAST AND OTHER HUMANITARIAN ORGANISATIONS DEALING WITH REFUGEES, IN CO-OPERATION WITH THE PLO AND THE HOST COUNTRIES, TO ASSIST IN THE SOLUTION OF ANY LOGISTICAL PROBLEMS INVOLVED IN THE RESETTLEMENT OF THOSE RETURNING TO THEIR HOMES;
- 7) CALLS UPON THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO PROCEED TO MAKE THE NECESSARY ARRANGEMENTS IN CO-OPERATION WITH THE STATES DIRECTLY INVOLVED AND THE PLO, TO ENABLE THE PALESTINIANS RENDERED REFUGEES SINCE 1947 TO EXERCISE THEIR RIGHT TO RETURN TO THEIR HOMES AND PROPERTY AND FOR THOSE WHO WISH NOT TO RETURN TO RECEIVE JUST AND EQUITABLE COMPENSATION, IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE RELEVANT UNITED NATIONS RESOLUTIONS, PARTICULARLY GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION 194 (III);
- 8) REAFFIRMS THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF THE INADMISSABILITY OF THE ACQUISITION OF TERRITORY BY FORCE;
- 9) CALLS UPON ISRAEL TO COMPLETELY WITHDRAW UNCONDITIONALLY FROM ALL THE PALESTINIAN AND OTHER ARAB TERRITORIES, INCLUDING JERUSALEM, OCCUPIED SINCE 1967 WITH ALL PROPERTY AND SERVICES INTACT, AND URGES THAT SUCH WITHDRAWAL FROM ALL THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES SHOULD START BEFORE 15 NOVEMBER 1980;
- 10) REQUESTS AND AUTHORISES THE SECRETARY-GENERAL:
 - A) TO ESTABLISH THE NECESSARY MACHINERY TO ARRANGE, SUPERVISE AND CONFIRM THE WITHDRAWAL OF ISRAEL FROM ALL THE OCCUPIED PALESTINIAN AND OTHER ARAB TERRITORIES INCLUDING JERUSALEM;
 - B) TO TAKE OVER THE EVACUATED PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES AND, SUBSEQUENTLY WITH THE CO-OPERATION OF THE LEAGUE OF ARAB STATES, HAND OVER THE EVACUATED PALESTINIAN AREAS TO THE PLO, THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE;

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- 11) REAFFIRMS THAT A COMPREHENSIVE, JUST AND LASTING PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST CANNOT BE ESTABLISHED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE RELEVANT UNITED NATIONS RESOLUTIONS WITHOUT THE WITHDRAWAL OF ISRAEL FROM ALL THE OCCUPIED PALESTINIAN AND OTHER ARAB TERRITORIES, INCLUDING JERUSALEM, AND WITHOUT THE ACHIEVEMENT OF A JUST SOLUTION OF THE PROBLEM OF PALESTINE ON THE BASIS OF THE ATTAINMENTS OF THE INALIENABLE RIGHT OF RETURN OF THE PALESTINIANS AND THE INALIENABLE RIGHTS OF THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE IN PALESTINE, TO SELF-DETERMINATION, NATIONAL INDEPENDENCE AND SOVEREIGNTY AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THEIR OWN INDEPENDENT STATE;
- 12) CALLS UPON ALL STATES TO DESIST FORTHWITH FROM SUPPLYING ISRAEL WITH ANY MILITARY AND/OR ECONOMIC AID (MATERIAL, TECHNICAL AS WELL AS HUMAN) IN VIEW OF THE CONTINUED OCCUPATION OF ARAB AND PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES, INCLUDING JERUSALEM, AND THE DENIAL OF THE INALIENABLE RIGHTS OF THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE;
- 13) REQUESTS THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO REPORT TO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY AT ITS THIRTY-FIFTH SESSION ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PRESENT RESOLUTION;
- 14) REQUESTS THE SECURITY COUNCIL, IN THE EVENT OF NON-COMPLIANCE BY ISRAEL WITH THIS RESOLUTION, TO CONVENE IN ORDER TO REVIEW THE SITUATION AND TO ADOPT EFFECTIVE MEASURES UNDER CHAPTER VII OF THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS;
- 15) DECIDES TO ADJOURN THIS EMERGENCY SPECIAL SESSION TEMPORARILY AND TO AUTHORISE THE PRESIDENT TO RECONVENE AGAIN THIS SESSION AT THE REQUEST OF THE CEIRPP.

ENDS.

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We understand that the Foreign Ministers of the community are inclined to abstain on the draft resolution which is being circulated at the emergency special session on Palestine. We are very surprised and disappointed to hear this. We ourselves, of course, will vote against the resolution. On the merits of the text, we had assumed that we would have the support of our friends and allies in opposing it. In our view, abstention on such a resolution will be badly misinterpreted in the Middle East, both by Israel and the Arabs. It will feed Israeli suspicions, and encourage the Arabs in the view that they can hope to get something for nothing if they keep the pressure up on the West.

As you know, the present text of the resolution is completely irresponsible. It calls for "unconditional" withdrawal by Israel from the occupied territories, which are then to be turned over to the PLO, so that the PLO can create an independent state. Not only does the resolution make no mention of resolution 242 and its basic equation of territories for peace, it states explicitly that Israeli withdrawal is to be "unconditional". If Israel balks, and does not begin its withdrawal by November 15, the resolution recommends the imposition of economic sanctions. The resolution contains no affirmation of Israel's right to exist. Although there are likely to be minor changes in the text of the resolution before it is introduced, these basic premises are unlikely to change.

Given these negative elements in the resolution, in particular its attempt to undermine resolution 242 and to question Israel's right to exist, we believe abstentions by the EC-9 would be contrary to the position imparted to us after the Venice meeting that the nine have no intention of undermining the Camp David negotiations and that they foresaw continued cooperation between us on encouraging moderate and constructive solutions in the Middle East. We believe such abstentions would be damaging to our common objectives in the Middle East since this would be widely perceived as a split between the U.S. and the EC-9 on the basic requirements for a peace settlement in the Middle East. We believe strongly that a responsible and balanced approach to the problems of the Middle East requires a vote against this resolution.



25 JUL 1980

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PS/MR HURD
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MR J C MOBERLY
Sir A. Hume
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ISRAEL/ BRITAIN.

1. MY TELECON WITH MILES NENAD THIS MORNING.
2. THE JERUSALEM POST THIS MORNING PUBLISHES A TRANSLATION FROM HEBREW OF THE TEXT OF A LETTER FROM BEGIN TO PROFESSOR FEIN, AN AMERICAN JEWISH LEADER, THE GIST OF WHICH IS TO ASK THAT AMERICAN JEWS SHOULD NOT CRITICISE ISRAEL PUBLICLY.
3. BEGIN'S LETTER INCLUDES THE FOLLOWING PASSAGES:

" I PERMIT MYSELF TO EXPRESS ASTONISHMENT WHY A MAN LIKE YOU HAS TO ORGANISE AMERICAN JEWS IN ORDER TO PUBLISH A STATEMENT WHICH LENDS - NOT GOD FORBID INTENTIONALLY - COMFORT TO THOSE WHO GLEEFULLY DECLARE: 'LOOK, THE JEWS OF AMERICA ARE TURNING THEIR BACKS ON ISRAEL'."

WHY SHOULD ONE ACT THUS IN THE PARTICULAR TIMES THAT CONFRONT US? DO YOU NOT SEE WHAT IS HAPPENING IN COPENHAGEN? DID YOU NOT READ THE FATAH DAMASCUS RESOLUTION? DON'T YOU HEAR THE SPEECHES FROM THE ROSTRUM OF THE UNITED NATIONS? DO YOU, WITH YOUR INTELLIGENCE, NOT PERCEIVE THAT THE WHOLE PURPOSE IS TO SQUEEZE US INTO A THIN STRIP OF TERRITORY IN PREPARATION FOR 'THE DAY'? WHAT ELSE HAS TO BE RENDERED IN WRITING OR ORALLY TO MAKE YOU AND YOUR COLLEAGUES UNDERSTAND THAT WE ARE FIGHTING FOR OUR LIVES?

YOU EMPLOY A CERTAIN TURN OF PHRASE: YOU SAY YOU ARE AGAINST

YOU EMPLOY A CERTAIN TURN OF PHRASE: YOU SAY YOU ARE AGAINST A "GREATER ISRAEL". I SHUDDER AT THESE WORDS. THIS SPURIOUSLY-APPLIED EXPRESSION TAKES US BACK TO THE NAZI DAYS. THE BRITISH USED TO CONTEND THAT THAT DEMON SLAUGHTERER WANTED TO ESTABLISH A "GREATER GERMANY". THERE ARE ENGLISHMEN NOW, ANTI-ZIONIST AND ANTI-JEWISH - MR IAN GILMOUR IS ONE OF THEM - WHO ASSERT THAT THE WRITER OF THIS LETTER, TOGETHER WITH HIS FRIENDS, WANT TO CREATE "A GREATER ISRAEL". THE INNUENDO IS CLEAR. THE PURPOSE IS BEYOND DOUBT. MUST JEWS, PROFESSORS AMONG THEM, LEND CREDENCE TO THIS NONSENSE, THIS INCITEMENT?

4. BEGIN ALSO SAYS:

"BY THE IDEA OF THE AUTONOMY, FOR THE FIRST TIME IN THEIR HISTORY THE ARABS WILL BE ABLE TO LIVE TOGETHER WITH US IN ERETZ ISRAEL IN PEACE, IN UNDERSTANDING, IN FREEDOM, IN MUTUAL RESPECT AND ADVANCEMENT, THEY THEMSELVES CONDUCTING THEIR OWN AFFAIRS. SECURITY ALONE WE SHALL RESERVE, FOR WERE WE NOT TO DO THAT, NOT ONLY WOULD OUR BRETHREN AND CHILDREN BE KILLED BUT PEACE ITSELF WOULD BE MURDERED AND BLOODSHED WOULD BE PERMANENT. FOR INTO THE VACUUM THAT WOULD BE THUS CREATED WOULD ENTER THE P L O WHICH, AS DECIDED UPON IN DAMASCUS, SEEKS TO LIQUIDATE - LIQUIDIEREN (UNDERLINED) - THE "ZIONIST ENTITY", I.E. THE STATE OF ISRAEL."

AND:

"IT IS MY DUTY TO SAY TO YOU THAT A "PALESTINIAN STATE" - A 22ND ARAB STATE - IS THE BASEST EXPRESSION OF DARK REACTION WHICH IS ON THE RAMPAGE IN OUR TODAY'S WORLD, NO LESS THAN IT WAS IN THE THIRTIES AND WHICH USES THE "BIG LIE", AS CAMOUFLAGE AND MISREPRESENTATION".

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TO PRIORITY FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 302 OF 23 JULY

INFO EC POSTS AMMAN BEIRUT DAMASCUS CAIRO JERUSALEM AND WASHINGTON

EC MISSION

1. THE ISRAELI FOREIGN MINISTRY, COMMENTING ON YESTERDAY'S DECISIONS BY THE EC COUNCIL OF MINISTERS ABOUT THE THORN MISSION, SAID THAT "ISRAEL IS INTERESTED IN A DIALOGUE WITH THE EC TO ADVANCE THE CAUSE OF MIDDLE EAST PEACE" AND WOULD THEREFORE WELCOME THE MISSION. BUT ISRAEL STILL DID NOT REGARD THE VENICE DECLARATION AS A CONTRIBUTION TO PEACE; THE DIALOGUE WITH THE EC WOULD NOT THEREFORE BE ABLE TO BE HELD ON THE BASIS OF THE VENICE DOCUMENT.

2. BUT THE FORMAL DECISION ABOUT RECEIVING THE MISSION WILL HAVE TO BE TAKEN BY THE CABINET, PROBABLY AT ITS MEETING ON 27 JULY, WHEN BEGIN MAY BE PRESENT AGAIN.

ROBINSON

[THIS TELEGRAM WAS NOT ADVANCED]

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TO ROUTINE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 297 OF 21 JULY

INFO CAIRO AMMAN AND WASHINGTON

ms

MY TEL NO 269: JERUSALEM

1. THE DIRECTOR GENERAL OF BEGIN'S OFFICE SAID YESTERDAY THAT BEGIN'S OFFICE "WILL MOVE AND I HOPE IT WILL BE SOON" TO EAST JERUSALEM.

2. EBAN TOLD ME YESTERDAY THAT HE FEARED THAT BEGIN'S INTENTION MIGHT BE TO ANNOUNCE THE MOVE AT THE END OF, OR VERY SOON AFTER, THE CURRENT KNESSET SESSION (WHICH ENDS ON 30 JULY).

h

3. GEULA COHEN'S EAST JERUSALEM BILL IS DUE FOR ITS FIRST VOTE IN THE KNESSET ON 28 JULY. BEGIN HAS MADE KNOWN HIS WHISH TO BE ABLE TO TAKE PART IN THE VOTE.

ROBINSON

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TO PRIORITY FCO

TELEGRAM NR 456 OF 18 JUL 80

INFO ROUTINE TEL AVIV WASHINGTON NEWYORK AMMAN DAMASCUS JEDDA

MY TELNO 448: AUTONOMY TALKS.

1. I DISCUSSED THE SITUATION YESTERDAY WITH THE US AMBASSADOR. ALTHOUGH HE AGREES THAT THE RECENT CAIRO MEETING WAS A FIASCO HE IS NOT YET PREPARED TO WRITE OFF THE TALKS COMPLETELY. HE SAID THAT THE EGYPTIANS SCORED A POINT OF SUBSTANCE IN WASHINGTON IN GETTING AGREEMENT THAT THE MEETING BETWEEN BORG AND KAMAL HASSAN ALI IN ALEXANDRIA ON 4 AUG (LINOWITZ MAY NOT ATTEND) SHOULD DISCUSS RESPONSIBILITY FOR SECURITY, THOUGH THE ISRAELIS REFUSE TO CALL IT A SECURITY COMMITTEE. HE HAS NO ILLUSIONS THAT IT WILL MAKE ANY PROGRESS, BUT THE EGYPTIANS MAY SCORE FURTHER PROPAGANDA POINTS. WHILE ATHERTON AGREED THAT SADAT NOW SEES THE ONLY VALUE IN THE TALKS AS BUYING TIME UNTIL AFTER NOV., HE BELIEVES THAT LINOWITZ IS STILL HOPING TO DO BETTER. APPARENTLY THE MAIN REASON FOR THE PRESENCE AT THIS WEEK'S TALKS OF HANSELL, THE EX-LEGAL ADVISER TO THE STATE DEPT., WAS TO ENGAGE IN SEPARATE QUIET NEGOTIATIONS AIMED AT PRODUCING AN AGREED DOCUMENT LISTING THE FAMOUS HEADS OF AGREEMENT. AT BEST THIS WOULD BE LITTLE MORE THAN A REHASH OF THE CAMP DAVID DOCUMENTS, 72N AS BEGIN WAS NOW UNHAPPY ABOUT SOME OF ITS PROVISIONS IT WOULD BE SOMETHING IF HE COULD BE GOT TO REAFFIRM THEM.

2. WE DISCUSSED THE POSSIBILITY THAT THE EGYPTIANS WOULD BREAK OFF THE TALKS AGAIN IN THE EVENT OF THE KNESSET PASSING THE JERUSALEM BILL, OR OF BEGIN MOVING HIS OFFICE. ATHERTON THOUGHT THAT SADAT WOULD CERTAINLY COME UNDER PRESSURE FROM HIS ADVISERS TO DO SO, AS HE HAD ON 15 MAY. BUT HE WAS INCLINED TO THINK THAT HAVING AGREED TO RESUME THE TALKS WITHOUT GETTING SATISFACTION ON ANY OF EGYPT'S CONDITIONS, IN DEFERENCE TO PRESIDENT CARTER, SADAT WAS UNLIKELY TO SUSPEND THEM A SECOND TIME, AND MIGHT TAKE THE LINE THAT TO DO SO WOULD BE TO ATTRIBUTE TOO MUCH IMPORTANCE TO TALKS IN WHICH HE HAS ABANDONED HOPE FOR THE TIME BEING.

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/3. SADAT

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3. SADAT IS SPEAKING MORE AND MORE TO FOREIGN VISITORS, EG THE LEADER OF THE AUSTRALIAN OPPOSITION AND A GAGGLE OF US CONGRESSMEN, AS HE DID TO ME, OF HIS HOPES OF AN EARLY ISRAELI ELECTION, THE ACCESSION OF PERES, THE INVOLVEMENT OF KING HUSSEIN, AND ALSO OF A GAZAA-FIRST SOLUTION. THE AMERICANS KNOW OF NO MORE FOUNDATION FOR THEM THAN DO WE.

WEIR.

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TELEGRAM NUMBER 302 OF 18/7/80

DESKBY 180900Z

FROM PS TO MR HURD.
BAGHDAD TEL NO 300: MR HURD'S MEETING WITH THE IRAQI FOREIGN MINISTER.

1. HAMMADI WAS REASONABLY RELAXED AND WELCOMING DURING AN HOUR'S CONVERSATION. HE SHOWED INTEREST IN THE EUROPEAN MOVES ON THE MIDDLE EAST BUT THERE WAS LITTLE SIGN OF FLEXIBILITY IN THE IRAQI POSITION.

2. HE SAID THAT AT THE RECENT MEETING IN AMMAN THERE HAD BEEN DISAPPOINTMENT AT WESTERN POSITIONS ON THE PALESTINE PROBLEM. HE ACCEPTED THAT THE VENICE DECLARATION REPRESENTED AN ADVANCE

IN THE EUROPEAN POSITION, BUT NO ARAB COUNTRY BELIEVED THAT IT COULD BE THE BASIS FOR A SOLUTION. IT WAS ALRIGHT IF IT WAS MEANT TO BE SIMPLY A STARTING POINT, BUT IT WOULD NEED TO BE DEVELOPED A LONG WAY TO REACH THE MINIMUM NEEDED TO RESOLVE THE PROBLEM IN A MANNER ACCEPTABLE TO THE ARABS. HE HOPED THAT THIS WOULD HAPPEN BUT DOUBTED THAT IT COULD. THE MOST LIKELY SOUCOME NOW WAS OF A HARDENING OF THE ARAB POSITION. THERE WAS AN UNSPOKEN FEELING AMONG MANY AT AMMAN THAT IT WAS USELESS FOR THE ARABS TO BE MODERATE. THIS HAD ALWAYS BEEN IRAQ'S POSITION AND HE WAS GLAD THAT THIS VIEW WAS NOW INCREASINGLY SHARED BY SOME ARAB COUNTRIES WHICH USED TO BELIEVE THAT A PEACEFUL SOLUTION WAS POSSIBLE. TIME AND PATIENCE WERE LIMITED ON THE ARAB SIDE. MR HURD REPLIED THAT THE VENICE DECLARATION WAS A SUBSTANTIAL STEP FORWARD FOR BOTH BRITAIN AND EUROPE. WE RECOGNISED THE DANGERS WHICH WAS SHY WE WERE TRYING TO PROMOTE SOME REALISTIC PROGRESS TOWARDS A PEACEFUL SOLUTION. THE ALTERNATIVE COULD BE WAR. ONLY THE SOVIET UNION WOULD BENEFIT FROM A COLLAPSE OF PEACE EFFORTS.

3. HAMMADI WAS INTERESTED TO KNOW HOW THE EUROPEAN INITIATIVE WOULD BE ORGANISED AND WHETHER THE UK WOULD TAKE AN ACTIVE PART OR WHETHER IT WOULD BE LEFT TO FRANCE AND LUXEMBOURG. MR HURD EMPHASISED THE UK'S PART IN THE EUROPEAN INITIATIVE AND SAID THAT HE HOPED THAT HAMMADI WOULD RECEIVE ANY EUROPEAN MISSION IF THEY WISHED TO VISIT HIM. HAMMADI SEEMD PREPARED TO DO THIS AND ASSUMED THAT M. THORN WOULD BE THE EMISSARY.

4. HAMMADI SAID THAT HE HAD HEARD THAT THERE WERE DIFFERENCES AMONG THE NINE ON THE ISSUE OF A PALESTINIAN STATE. MR HURD SAID THAT THIS WAS NOT SO. THE NINE WERE CONFINING THEMSELVES TO THE PRINCIPLE OF SELF-DETERMINATION WHICH AVOIDED PREJUDGING THE QUESTION OF A STATE. LINKED WITH THIS PRINCIPLE WAS THE PRINCIPLE OF SECURE FRONTIERS FOR ISRAEL. THESE TWO PRINCIPLES WERE AT THE HEART OF THE VENICE DECLARATION. IT WAS NECESSARY FOR THE PALESTINIANS AS WELL AS THE ISRAELIS TO BE MORE FLEXIBLE. WE HOPED THAT THE VENICE DECLARATION, BY GIVING THE PLO ADDITIONAL STANDING, WOULD GIVE THEM THE CONFIDENCE FOR THIS.

5. ASKED ABOUT THE SOVIET ROLE IN THE AREA, HAMMADI SAID THAT THEIR AMBITION TO MOVE IN FURTHER WAS UNCHANGED. HISTORICALLY THEY HAD EXERTED INFLUENCE THROUGH SUPPLYING ARMS AND THIS WAS CONTINUING EG. WITH KUWAIT. FRANCE WAS THE ONLY WESTERN COUNTRY WHICH HAD TRIED TO COUNTER THIS BY RESPONDING FAVOURABLY TO ARAB MILITARY NEEDS. THE US, FRG AND UK APPLIED A HIDDEN ARMS EMBARGO, REFUSING TO SUPPLY SOPHISTICATED WEAPONS. MR HURD CONTESTED THIS

, REFUSING TO SUPPLY SOPHISTICATED WEAPONS. MR HURD CONTESTED THIS POINTING TO, FOR EXAMPLE, OUR SUPPLY OF TANKS TO JORDAN, BUT HAMMADI WAS INSISTENT.

6. HAMMADI SAID THE HE WAS SATISFIED WITH WHAT HAD BEEN ACHIEVED ON THE ECONOMIC SIDE AT AMMAN. HE THOUGHT THAT THERE WOULD NOW BE AN AGREEMENT TO CHANNEL ADDITIONAL FINANCE FROM THE ARAB COUNTRIES WITH OIL TO ARAB COUNTRIES WITHOUT. CHALLENGED BY MR HURD ABOUT OPEC'S RESPONSIBILITIES TOWARDS NON-ARAB POOR COUNTRIES HE ARGUED THAT THESE WERE THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE WEST.

FCO PSE PASS SAVING WASHINGTON, PARIS, BONN, LUXEMBOURG, UK REP BRUSSELS, DAMASCUS, AMMAN, BEIRUT, CAIRO, TEL AVIV, KUWAIT, JEDDA, BAHRAIN, DOHA, ABU DHABI, DUBAI AND MUSCAT.

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TO PRIORITY FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 292 OF 17 JULY

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MY TELS NOS 286 AND 287: BRITAIN/ISRAEL

1. BRITAIN HAS COME IN FOR A DISPROPORTIONATE SHARE OF CRITICISM IN ISRAEL ON MIDDLE EASTERN POLICY RECENTLY. THE POSITIONS WE HAVE TAKEN ARE IN COMMON WITH OUR EUROPEAN PARTNERS, AND IN MANY CASES ARE SHARED BY THE UNITED STATES AND MANY OTHERS. MOREOVER SOME FRENCH ACTIONS (NOTABLY THE SUPPLY OF NUCLEAR MATERIALS TO IRAQ) ARE MORE EVIDENTLY IN CONFLICT WITH ISRAELI INTERESTS, AND SCHMIDT (MY TEL NO 252) SEEMS TO HAVE GONE FURTHER IN SPEAKING FIRMLY TO THE ISRAELIS THAN ANYTHING FROM LONDON.

2. I THINK THAT THERE ARE THREE REASONS WHY WE HAVE BEEN GIVEN SPECIAL TREATMENT BY THE ISRAELIS:

i) ISRAEL'S PROBLEM IS HOW TO BREAK THE COMMON EUROPEAN FRONT, WHICH DEPENDS IN ESSENCE ON THE JOINT VIEWS OF BRITAIN, GERMANY AND FRANCE. THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT HAS PROBABLY CONCLUDED THAT IT HAS LITTLE CHANCE OF CHANGING FRENCH POLICY, AND THAT GERMAN WAR GUILT WILL MAKE IT DIFFICULT FOR GERMANY TO STAND OUT IF BRITAIN'S POSITION CAN BE CHANGED. SO WE BECOME THE KEY TO CHANGING EUROPE'S POLICIES.

ii) BRITAIN IS ALSO REGARDED AS AN EASIER TARGET TO WORK ON BECAUSE OF SUPPOSED DIFFERENCES IN LONDON AND BECAUSE OF OUR JEWISH COMMUNITY. FRANCE'S JEWISH COMMUNITY, THOUGH MUCH BIGGER, HAS TRADITIONALLY NOT BEEN SO RESPONSIVE POLITICALLY TO ISRAELI GOVERNMENT INSPIRATION. THE BRITISH COMMUNITY KNOW BETTER "THEIR DUTY AS JEWS" AS THE PHRASE HERE GOES.

iii) LYING BEHIND ALL THIS, NEVER FAR BELOW THE SURFACE HERE, ARE MEMORIES OF THE MANDATE. TO SAY THAT THE MANDATE LEFT A LOVE HATE RELATIONSHIP IS SUPERFICIAL BUT IT CONTAINS TRUTH. THE TROUBLE IS THAT THE HATE SIDE CAN VERY QUICKLY COME TO THE SURFACE.

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FM CAIRO 161115Z JUL 80

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 448 OF 16 JULY

INFO PRIORITY TEL AVIV, JERUSALEM, WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK,
AMMAN, DAMASCUS AND JEDDA

AUTONOMY TALKS

1. IN THE FIRST ROUND OF THE RESUMED AUTONOMY TALKS THE LEGAL COMMITTEE MET IN GIZA FROM 13 TO 15 JULY. THE EGYPTAIN DELEGATION WAS LED BY BUTROS GHALI, MINISTER OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS, THE ISRAELI BY TAMIR, THE MINISTER OF JUSTICE, AND THE AMERICAN BY LEONARD, LINOWITZ'S DEPUTY.
2. THREE ENTIRELY UNPRODUCTIVE DAYS WERE ALMOST EXCLUSIVELY TAKEN UP WITH A SQUABBLE ABOUT THE AGENDA FOR THE TALKS, AND CULMINATED IN A PUBLIC ROW BETWEEN GHALI AND TAMIR ABOUT WHETHER OR NOT THE TOPIC OF JERUSALEM WAS OPEN FOR DISCUSSION. THE ONLY ITEM OF AGREEMENT (AND AN UNSURPRISING ONE) SEEMS TO HAVE BEEN THAT THE COMMITTEE COULD DISCUSS THE POWERS OF THE AUTONOMOUS AUTHORITY. SECURITY AND SETTLEMENTS, LIKE JERUSALEM, ARE STILL UNDER DISPUTE.
3. THE COMMITTEE WILL NEXT MEET AT EXPERT LEVEL ON 27 JULY AND AT MINISTERIAL LEVEL ON 30 JULY.
4. EVEN OUR AMERICAN COLLEAGUES NOW ADMIT THAT THE TALKS ARE STERILE AND LIKELY TO REMAIN SO UNTIL AFTER THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION.

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FM TEL AVIV 160840Z JUL 80

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 285 OF 16 JULY

INFO WASHINGTON CAIRO AND JERUSALEM

CAIRO TELNO 446: EGYPT/ISRAEL

1. IT WAS SADAT'S TURN YESTERDAY. BEGIN'S OFFICE LAST NIGHT ISSUED A LENGTHY STATEMENT WHICH WAS SHARPLY CRITICAL OF SADAT AND WHICH WAS PROMPTED BY AN INTERVIEW WHICH SADAT HAD GIVEN TO THE READER'S DIGEST.
2. THE MAIN POINTS OF THE STATEMENT WERE THAT (A) SADAT WAS TRYING TO DRIVE A WEDGE BETWEEN THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT AND PEOPLE; (B) UNLIKE SADAT, BEGIN HAD NO AUTHORITY ALONE TO ISSUE DIRECTIVES IN ORDER TO RESOLVE DIFFERENCES ON AUTONOMY; (C) SADAT COULD ACHIEVE AGREEMENT ON FULL AUTONOMY WITHIN A FEW DAYS OR HOURS BY INSTRUCTING HIS REPRESENTATIVES NOT TO MAKE PROPOSALS WHICH CONFLICTED WITH CAMP DAVID AND ENDANGERED ISRAEL'S SECURITY (IE ON THE STATUS OF EAST JERUSALEM; LEGISLATIVE POWERS FOR THE SGA; THE NATURE AND POWERS OF IDF FORCES IN THE AUTONOMOUS AREA); (D) SADAT MUST NOT EXPECT BEGIN TO RENOUNCE HIS BELIEF THAT ERETZ ISRAEL WAS THE LAND OF HIS FATHERS.
3. FULL TEXT BY BAG.
4. THIS IS THE SHARPEST ATTACK ON SADAT FOR SOME MONTHS. BEGIN IS USING EVERY OPPORTUNITY, IN ANTICIPATION OF ISRAEL'S ELECTIONS NEXT YEAR, TO BUILD UP HIS POSITION AS DEFENDER OF THE FAITH AND THE BEST GUARDIAN OF ISRAEL'S SECURITY.

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FM AMMAN 170830Z JUL 80

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 284 OF 16 JULY

INFO DAMASCUS, JEDDA, TEL AVIV, UKMIS NEW YORK, WASHINGTON AND
CG JERUSALEM.

SAVING TO ABIDJAN, ABU DHABI, ADEN, ALGIERS, ANKARA, BAGHDAD,
BAHRAIN, BEIRUT, DACCA, DAKAR, DOHA, ISLAMABAD, JAKARTA, KAMPALA,
KHARTOUM, KUALA LUMPUR, KUWAIT, LIBREVILLE, MOGADISHU, MUSCAT,
RABAT, SANAA, TEHRAN, TRIPOLI, TUNIS, YAOUNDE AND EC POSTS

MY TELNO 282: ISLAMIC FOREIGN MINISTERS' CONFERENCE

1. THIS WAS VERY MUCH THE PLO'S CONFERENCE. THE SINGLE SUBJECT
ON THE AGENDA WAS PALESTINE. ALTHOUGH SOME DELEGATIONS MADE REF-
ERENCE TO AFGHANISTAN IN THEIR SPEECHES, CONFERENCE DEVOTED ITS EFF-
ORTS ENTIRELY TO THE PALESTINIAN PROBLEM. THE WORK OF THE CONFER-
ENCE CENTRED ON A DRAFT PLO PAPER AND THE PLO WERE PROMINENT BOTH
IN THE GENERAL DEBATE AND IN THE DRAFTING GROUP WHICH PREPARED THE
FINAL COMMUNIQUE.

2. THE PLO APPEARS, IN THE LIGHT OF THE FINAL COMMUNIQUE, TO HAVE
BEEN SUCCESSFUL IN MOVING THE ISLAMIC WORLD TOWARDS A TOUGHER
POSTURE. THE EMPHASIS ON GA 3236 AND 3237, THE SUGGESTION THAT
THE FORTHCOMING GENERAL ASSEMBLY SPECIAL SESSION ON PALESTINE SHOULD
INCLUDE CHAPTER 7 ACTION AGAINST ISRAEL IN ITS DELIBERATIONS,
AND THE PROPOSAL TO ACT AGAINST COUNTRIES WHO DO NOT TRANSFER
THEIR EMBASSIES FROM JERUSALEM ARE ALL POINTERS TO THIS. THE PAK-
ISTANI AMBASSADOR TOLD ME TODAY THAT THE NON-ARAB ISLAMIC STATES
HAD IN GENERAL BEEN PREPARED TO GO ALONG WITH WHATEVER POSITION THE
ARAB CONSENSUS WISHED TO ADOPT SEMI COLON AND THAT THEY HAD BEEN
RECEPTIVE TO ARAB ARGUMENTS THAT THE CONTINUING ISRAELI DISREGARD
OF UN RESOLUTIONS ON THE PALESTINIAN QUESTION HAD TO BE COUNTERED
BY PRACTICAL MEASURES ON THE PART OF THE ISLAMIC WORLD.

3. THE CONFERENCE SEEMS TO HAVE RUN SMOOTHLY APART FROM A CLASH
WITH THE IRANIANS WHO ATTACKED EVERYONE ELSE PRESENT, INCLUDING THE
PLO AND THE SYRIANS, ON THE GROUNDS THAT THE RESOLUTIONS BEING
DISCUSSED WERE "TOOTHLESS" AND THAT THE CONFERENCE OUGHT TO BE
CONSIDERING A SPECIFIC SET OF MEASURES INCLUDING OIL AND TRADE
BOYCOTTS AGAINST ISRAEL AND HER SUPPORTERS. ACCORDING TO THE
PAKISTANI AMBASSADOR, THE IRANIANS WERE EVENTUALLY PERSUADED NOT TO
WALK OUT OF THE CONFERENCE BY A PROMISE THAT THEIR PROPOSALS
WOULD BE LOOKED AT AGAIN AT THE NEXT ISLAMIC FOREIGN MINISTERS'
MEETING IN SEPTEMBER. AT THIS NEXT MEETING PARTICULAR ATTENTION
IS TO BE PAID TO COUNTRIES WHO HAVE NOT BY THEN MOVED THEIR DIP-
LOMATIC MISSIONS OUT OF JERUSALEM. THE PLO DID NOT ACHIEVE AN
OUTRIGHT CONDEMNATION OF CAMP DAVID SEMI COLON THIS WAS, WE ARE
TOLD, BECAUSE OF RESISTANCE BY THE AFRICAN MOSLEM DELEGATIONS WHO,
IN AN OAU CONTEXT, ATTACH IMPORTANCE TO THEIR RELATIONS WITH EGYPT.
THE STATUS OF SC RESOLUTION 242 WAS SIDE-STEPPED BY THE DEVICE
OF REFERRING BACK TO THE ELEVENTH ISLAMIC CONFERENCE IN ISLAMABAD
WHERE THE ISLAMIC COUNTRIES' VIEW OF 242 HAD BEEN DEFINED.

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4. IT IS TOO EARLY TO GUAGE HOW FAR THE RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE AMMAN MEETING ARE LIKELY TO BE TRANSLATED INTO ACTION. IN ADDITION TO THE NEXT ISLAMIC FOREIGN MINISTERS' MEETING IN SEPTEMBER THERE IS A MEETING IN SAUDI ARABIA AT HEAD OF STATE LEVEL IN DECEMBER (WHICH WILL, OF COURSE, TAKE PLACE AFTER THE NEXT ARAB SUMMIT MEETING). SO IT COULD BE THE END OF THE YEAR BEFORE THE ISLAMIC STATES CAN MOVE ON TO ANY POSITIVE ACTION. INDEED, THE PLO SEEM TO HAVE BEEN CAREFUL NOT TO RISK PUSHING THEIR LUCK TOO FAR AND TO HAVE HELD BACK FROM DEMANDING SPECIFIC DEADLINES FOR ACTION.

5. THE AMMAN MEETING TOOK PLACE IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE DIFFICULT AND CONTENTIOUS CONFERENCE OF ARAB MINISTERS OF ECONOMY AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS. ARAB DELEGATIONS AT THE ISLAMIC MEETING SEEM TO HAVE BEEN ANXIOUS TO AVOID (OR PERHAPS TOO TIRED TO COPE WITH) A FURTHER BOUT OF WRANGLING. THE PLO LOOK TO HAVE TAKEN SKILFUL ADVANTAGE OF THIS TO PUSH THEIR CASE HARD. THE JORDANIAN FOREIGN MINISTER TOLD ME EARLIER THIS WEEK HE HAD EXCHANGED HARSH WORDS WITH ABU MAIZER OF THE PLO WHEN HE DISCOVERED THAT THE PLO WERE ATTEMPTING AT THE LAST MINUTE TO TAMPER FURTHER WITH THE FINAL WORDING OF THE COMMUNIQUE. THE PERFORMANCE OF THE SYRIANS AT THE ARAB LEAGUE MEETING AND OF THE PLO AT THE ISLAMIC MEETING SUGGEST THAT THE MORE MODERATE ARAB STATES MAY FACE A DIFFICULT TASK OVER THE NEXT FEW MONTHS IN KEEPING THE ARAB EXTREMISTS UNDER CONTROL.

FCO PASS SAVING ADDRESSEES.

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FM TEL AVIV 161055Z JUL 80
TO IMMEDIATE FCO.
TELEGRAM NUMBER 287 OF 16 JULY

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MIPT: BRITAIN/ISRAEL

1. I HAVE NO DOUBT THAT SOME OF THIS HAS BEEN STIMULATED BY THE ISRAELI AMBASSADOR IN LONDON. ABBA EBAN VOLUNTEERED TO ME THE OTHER NIGHT THAT HE KEPT ON GETTING BITS OF PAPER FROM ARGOV -- HE HAD HAD MR HURD'S SPEECH OF 11 JUNE COVERED WITH RATHER EMOTIONAL MANUSCRIPT COMMENTS. THE TROUBLE WAS THAT ARGOV HAD ALWAYS BEEN TOO EMOTIONAL.
2. BUT WE SHOULD NOT UNDER-ESTIMATE THE DEPTH AND WIDE SPREAD OF THE MOOD OF DEFIANCE HERE. ISRAEL'S RELATIONS WITH THE WEST OVER THE YEARS HAVE ENCOURAGED THEM TO BELIEVE THAT THEY CAN NEUTRALISE CRITICISM AND UNWELCOME POLICIES BY INVOKING THE HOLOCAUST AND BY PLAYING ON THE GUILT COMPLEX OF JEWS ABROAD WHO HAVE PREFERRED NOT TO MIGRATE TO ISRAEL. FRIENDSHIP FOR ISRAEL IS ACCEPTING AND SUPPORTING WHATEVER ISRAEL DOES OR WANTS. A DIFFERING VIEW IS PERSONALISED ANTI-SEMITISM. THERE ARE NOTABLE EXCEPTIONS, BUT AN ELECTION CAMPAIGN IN WHICH MODERATION IS GOING TO PLAY NO SIGNIFICANT PART, BECAUSE THE MOOD OF THE COUNTRY IS NOT MODERATE. POLLS SUGGEST THAT 65% OF PEOPLE BELIEVE THAT THERE CAN BE NO PEACE WITHOUT SOLVING THE PALESTINIAN PROBLEM BUT 68% ARE AGAINST A PALESTINIAN STATE EVEN AS A CONDITION FOR FULL AND FINAL PEACE. BEGIN AND THOSE ROUND HIM WILL BE PLAYING TO WIN NEXT YEAR'S ELECTION ON THE ISSUE OF ISRAELI SECURITY. BUT

AND FINAL PEACE. BEGIN AND THOSE ROUND HIM WILL BE PLAYING TO WIN NEXT YEAR'S ELECTION ON THE ISSUE OF ISRAELI SECURITY. BUT LOOKING FURTHER AHEAD, A MUCH WIDER RANGE OF ISRAELIS (THEIR NATIONAL TEMPERAMENT GIVEN TO HOPING THAT IN THE WORST OF CIRCUMSTANCES SOMETHING MAY TURN UP) LOOK TO THE 1980S TO SOLVE THEIR DILEMMA THROUGH A SUPER-POWER CONFRONTATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST, WHICH WILL SOMEHOW SEE ENOUGH ARABS RANGED ON THE OTHER SIDE TO ENSURE WESTERN PROTECTION FOR THEMSELVES. THERE IS NO ROOM IN THIS SCENARIO FOR COMPROMISE WITH THE ARABS.

ROBINSON

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FM AMMAN 141150Z JUL 80

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 282 OF 14 JUL

INFO DAMASCUS, JEDDA, TEL AVIV, UKMIS NEWYORK, WASHINGTON AND
CG JERUSALEM.

SAVING TO: ABIDJAN, ABU DHABI, ADEN, ALGIERS, ANKARA, BAGHDAD,
BAHRAIN, BEIRUT, DACCA, DAKAR, DOHA, ISLAMABAD, JAKARTA, KAMPALA,
KHARTOUM, KUALA LUMPUR, KUWAIT, LIBREVILLE, MOGADISHY, MUSCAT,
RABAT, SANAA, TEHRAN, TRIPOLI, TUNIS, YAOUNDE AND EC POSTS.

OUR TELNO 253: ISLAMIC FOREIGN MINISTERS' MEETING 11 - 12 JULY.

1. THE ISLAMIC FOREIGN MINISTERS' MEETING CONVENED AT THE REQUEST
OF THE PLO TO DISCUSS "THE SITUATION IN OCCUPIED PALESTINE"
WAS HELD IN AMMAN FROM 11 -12 JULY. FOLLOWING IS A SUMMARY OF
THE MAIN POINTS OF THE COMMUNIQUE (TRANSLATION OF FULL TEXT BY
BAG):

(A) REAFFIRMATION OF THE INALIENABLE NATIONAL RIGHTS OF THE
PALESTINIAN PEOPLE IN STANDARD TERMS AND OF THE NEED FOR COMPLETE
AND UNCONDITIONAL ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL FROM ALL OCCUPIED PALESTINIAN
AND ARAB TERRITORY, ESPECIALLY JERUSALEM, "CAPITAL OF PALESTINE,"
IN ACCORDANCE WITH UNRESOLUTIONS, ESPECIALLY 3236 AND 3237.

(B) CONDEMNATIONS OF ISRAEL'S "RACIST AND EXPANSIONIST POLICIES"
AND "ORGANISED OFFICIAL TERRORISM" WHICH CONSTITUTE A "CHALLENGE
TO THE WILL OF THE ISLAMIC WORLD."

(D) ALL ISLAMIC COUNTRIES SHOULD SEVER ALL FORMS OF RELATIONS WITH
ANY STATE WHICH SUPPORTS THE ISRAELI DECISION TO ANNEX JERUSALEM
AND TO MAKE IT ITS CAPITAL OR WHICH MOVES ITS EMBASSY THERE. STATES
WHICH HAVE ALREADY ESTABLISHED THEIR DIPLOMATIC MISSIONS IN JERUSALEM
SHOULD TRANSFER THEM. IF THEY DO NOT THE NEXT ISLAMIC FOREIGN
MINISTERS' CONFERENCE IS TO CONSIDER MEASURES AGAINST THEM, INCLUDING
BREAKING OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS.

(D) FORMATION OF A COMMITTEE OF LEGAL EXPERTS TO DISCUSS MEASURES
IN RESPONSE TO ISRAELI WAR-CRIMES IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES

(E) CALL ON THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY AT ITS FORTHCOMING SPECIAL
SESSION ON PALESTINE TO STUDY EFFECTIVE MEANS, INCLUDING
SANCTIONS UNDER ARTICLE SEVEN OF THE CHARTER, TO ENFORCE GENERAL
ASSEMBLY RESOLUTIONS ON PALESTINE, ESPECIALLY 3236, SINCE THESE
HAVE NOT BEEN ENFORCED BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL.

(F) CALL ON THE EC TO SUSPEND ITS BILATERAL AND COLLECTIVE ECON-
OMIC AGREEMENTS WITH ISRAEL, WHICH THE COMMUNITY PROMISED WOULD
NOT BE IMPLEMENTED IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES,, IN ORDER TO
FORCE AN ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL.

(G) CONDEMNATIONS OF PRO ISRAELI AND ANTI PALESTIAN US POLICY.
FCO PSE PASS TO ALL SAVING ADDRESSEES.

(REPEATED AS REQUESTED)

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FM TEL AVIV 161040Z JUL 80
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 236 OF 15 JULY

*2 Separating Telegrams -
Read in full.
MB*

BRITAIN/ISRAEL

1. SHARP CRITICISM OF BRITAIN'S MIDDLE EAST POLICY CONTINUES HERE, AND IS ASSUMING AN UNPLEASANTLY PERSONAL TONE.
2. YADIN, ACTING PRIME MINISTER, (AS BASICALLY DECENT AN ISRAELI AS IT IS POSSIBLE TO FIND) TOOK ME TO TASK ON MONDAY EVENING IN RATHER PERSONAL TERMS ABOUT YOUR INTERVIEW WITH ISRAEL TELEVISION AT THE END OF LAST WEEK. YADIN SAID HE HAD SEEN IT AND IT HAD INFURIATED HIM. HE WOULD NOT HAVE REACTED AS BEGIN DID - THAT WAS NOT HIS STYLE - BUT YOU HAD REMINDED HIM OF THE DAYS OF THE MANDATE. I TOLD YADIN THAT ISRAELI TELEVISION HAD CUT YOUR ANSWERS AND HAD SHOWN A SMALL FRACTION OF THE INTERVIEW. (I HAVE SENT HIM THE FULL TRANSCRIPT TOGETHER WITH YOUR SPEECH IN THE HOUSE OF LORDS ON 9 JULY AND YOUR INTERVIEW WITH ARAB CORRESPONDENTS ON 14 JULY). ABBA EBAN LATER MADE NO SUCH CRITICISM AND MADE FUN OF BEGIN'S RESPONSE. BUT HE IS A RARE EXCEPTION AND NOT REPRESENTATIVE OF OPINION HERE.
3. A PAPER REPRESENTING NATIONAL RELIGIOUS PARTY VIEWS YESTERDAY PUBLISHED A SHARP ATTACK ON BRITAIN'S "PRO-PLO POLICIES" SAYING THAT YOU WERE KNOWN AS PRO-ARAB BEFORE YOU BECAME FOREIGN SECRETARY; REHEARSING BRITAIN'S SUPPOSED PRO-ARAB AND ANTI-ISRAELI POLICIES OVER THE YEARS, SAYING THAT UNDER THE CALLAGHAN GOVERNMENT BRITAIN'S POLICY TOWARDS ISRAEL WAS MORE MODERATE. AND

SECRETARY: REHEARSING BRITAIN'S SUPPOSED PRO-AID AND PRO-
ISRAELI POLICIES OVER THE YEARS, SAYING THAT UNDER THE CALLAGHAN
GOVERNMENT BRITAIN'S POLICY TOWARDS ISRAEL WAS MORE MODERATE, AND
THAT THE PRIME MINISTER WAS KNOWN AS A FRIEND OF ISRAEL BUT
"APPARENTLY DOES NOT INTERFERE WITH THE POLICIES SET OUT BY HER
FOREIGN SECRETARY" AND CONCLUDING THAT BRITISH OFFICERS AND
POLICIES WERE BEHIND THE ATTEMPT TO ANNIHILATE THE HALF MILLION
JEWS OF ISRAEL IN 1948 AND "BRITAIN HAS NOT YET LEARNED A LESSON".

4. WHEN I LUNCHEDED YESTERDAY WITH MEMBERS OF THE LIKUD FOREIGN
AFFAIRS GROUP, ALTHOUGH THE PERSONAL NOTE WAS LARGELY ABSENT, I
WAS STRONGLY ATTACKED FOR OUR POLICIES, AND REPLIED APPROPRIATELY.

5. EVEN THIS MORNING'S JERUSALEM POST CARRIES A RATHER OFFENSIVE
ADVERTISEMENT TO PROMOTE ITS INTERNATIONAL EDITION SHOWING YOUR
PHOTOGRAPH UNDER THE TITLE "WITH FRIENDS LIKE THIS WHO NEEDS
ENEMIES" AND CONTINUING THAT YOUR "GRATUITOUS ADVICE TO MR BEGIN
ON ISRAEL TV WOULD BE TAKEN MUCH MORE SERIOUSLY IF ONE FELT HIS
(I.E. YOU) ACTIONS WERE ABOVE REPROACH AND WERE NOT PREJUDICED BY
INTERESTS OTHER THAN FRIENDSHIP FOR ISRAEL. FOLLOWING LORD
CARRINGTON'S REPEATED APOLOGIES TO SAUDI ARABIA OVER THE "DEATH
OF A PRINCESS" FILM ONE IS FORCED TO ASK: WHEN IS BRITAIN GOING
TO SUGGEST TO IRAN THAT THEY SHOULD GIVE SELF-DETERMINATION TO THE
KURDS, AND WHEN IS LONDON GOING TO SIT DOWN AND TALK WITH THE IRA".

SEE MIFT.

ROBINSON

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AMENDED COPY - 14 JULY 1980

Middle East

This is the text as broadcast. The full
text is attached.

C No 10

FM TEL AVIV 140545Z JUL 80
TO IMMEDIATE FCO TELEGRAM NUMBER 279 OF 14 JULY
INFO PRIORITY AMMAN CAIRO UKMIS NEWYORK WASHINGTON AND JERUSALEM

SECRETARY OF STATE'S INTERVIEW FOR ISRAEL TV

1. FOLLOWING EXTRACT WAS BROADCAST ON ISRAEL TV AS THE SECOND
ITEM ON THE MAIN EVENING NEWS, 12 JULY.

"NEWSREADER: BRITISH FOREIGN SECRETARY LORD CARRINGTON SAYS THAT
ISRAEL HAS NO CHOICE BUT TO NEGOTIATE WITH THE PLO"

SQFS: ONE OF THE OTHER FACTORS YOU HAVE TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT IS
THAT THE PLO DO REPRESENT A VERY LARGE NUMBER OF PALESTINIANS, AND
WHETHER YOU APPROVE OR DISAPPROVE OF THE PLO YOU CAN'T IGNORE THEM.
THEY ARE THERE. THEY WON'T GO AWAY, AND SO IF YOU ARE GOING TO
GET A SOLUTION, IF YOU ARE GOING TO TALK ABOUT THINGS WITH PEOPLE,
YOU MUST SPEAK TO THE PLO. AFTER ALL WE'D NEVER HAVE GOT ANY KIND
OF SOLUTION IN RHODESIA IF THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT HAD REFUSED TO
TALK TO MR MUGABE OR MR NKOMO. WHAT MATTERS IS WHAT YOU GET OUT
OF THE TALKS, NOT WHO YOU TALK TO.

QUESTION: ONE OF THESE IS THE QUESTION OF SELF-DETERMINATION FOR
THE PALESTINIANS. DO YOU SUPPORT STATEHOOD FOR THE PALESTINIAN
PEOPLE?

ANSWER: YOU CAN'T EXCLUDE IT BECAUSE THIS IS ONE OF THE SOLUTIONS
WHICH I SUPPOSE COULD HAPPEN. BUT NONE OF THIS CAN HAPPEN WITHOUT
THE AGREEMENT OF THE PARTIES CONCERNED: NOBODY CAN IMPOSE A SETTLE-
MENT UPON ISRAEL, NOBODY CAN IMPOSE A SETTLEMENT UPON THE PALEST-
INIANS. THERE IS GOING TO HAVE TO BE A NEGOTIATION TO WHICH EVER-
BODY AGREES. WHAT YOU HAVE TO DO IS TO FIND TO BEGIN WITH WHAT IS
THE HIGHEST COMMON FACTOR, AND BUILD ON THAT FACTOR, OTHERWISE YOU
ARE NEVER GOING TO GET A SOLUTION.

QUESTION: DOES HER MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT OBJECT TO THE RESTORATION
OF THE JEWISH QUARTER OF THE CITY, OR TO THE RENOVATIONS OF THE
ROADS AROUND THE CITY, FOR FOR THAT MATTER TO THE RESTORATION OF
FREEDOM OF ACCESS TO ALL OTHER PLACES?

ANSWER: WHAT WE SAY IS THAT IT IS A MISTAKE, UNILATERALLY TO TRY
AND DECIDE THE FUTURE OF JERUSALEM ON YOUR OWN, HAVING REGARD TO THE
VERY CONTROVERSIAL NATURE OF THE SUBJECT. IN EXACTLY THE SAME WAY
WE THINK IT'S A VERY GREAT MISTAKE TO HAVE ISRAELI SETTLEMENTS ON
THE WEST BANK BECAUSE IT MAKE THE NEGOTIATIONS OF THE SETTLEMENT

/OF THE WHOLE

OF THE WHOLE PROBLEM THAT MUCH MORE DIFFICULT. TO TRY AND PRE-EMPT THESE DECISIONS MAKES THE SETTLEMENT OF THE WHOLE ARAB/ISRAEL PROBLEM THAT MUCH MORE DIFFICULT. I THINK IT IS RIGHT AND HONOURABLE AND HONEST FOR ME TO SAY SO IN FRONT OF THE TV CAMERA.

QUESTION: GOING BACK TO JERUSALEM, DO YOU THINK ISRAEL SHOULD HAVE REFRAINED FROM DOING ANYTHING?

ANSWER: I THINK YOU OUGHT TO HAVE HAD REGARD TO WHAT I HAVE JUST SAID.

QUESTION: PRIME MINISTER BEGIN IS INTENDING TO MOVE HIS OFFICE INTO A NEW BUILDING IN JERUSALEM. WOULD YOU INSTRUCT YOUR AMBASSADOR TO REFRAIN FROM GOING THERE?

ANSWER: I THINK IT WOULD BE, IF I MAY SAY SO, A GREAT MISTAKE IF YOUR PRIME MINISTER MOVES THERE. I THINK IT WILL MAKE THINGS MORE DIFFICULT FOR YOUR FRIENDS AND VERY MUCH EASIER FOR YOUR ENEMIES."

2. WE SHALL BE USING THE FULL TEXT WITH SELECTED JOURNALISTS ON MONDAY, 14 JULY.

3. THE PRIME MINISTER'S OFFICE ISSUED THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT TODAY, 13 JULY:

BEGINS:

"THE PRIME MINISTER READ IN THE PRESS THE REMARKS MADE BY LORD CARRINGTON, BRITISH FOREIGN SECRETARY, TO ISRAELI TELEVISION.

THE BRITISH FOREIGN SECRETARY SHOULD REMEMBER THE FOLLOWING FACTS:

A) IT IS NOT HIS BUSINESS TO ADVISE THE PRIME MINISTER OF ISRAEL WHERE HIS OFFICE SHOULD BE IN JERUSALEM, THE CAPITAL OF ISRAEL, AS IT IS NOT THE BUSINESS OF ANY ISRAELI CITIZEN TO ADVISE MRS. THATCHER ON THE SAME SUBJECT ABOUT LONDON, THE CAPITAL OF THE U.K.

B) JERUSALEM WAS THE CAPITAL. A JEWISH CAPITAL, LONG BEFORE LONDON BECAME THE CAPITAL OF THE U.K., WHEN KING DAVID MOVED THE CAPITAL OF HIS KINGDOM FROM HEBRON, WHERE HE HAD REIGNED FOR 7 YEARS, TO JERUSALEM, WHERE HE RULED FOR 33 YEARS (KINGS 1. 2:11), THE CIVILIZED WORLD HAD NOT YET HEARD OF THE CITY OF LONDON."

ROBINSON


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FRIDAY

11TH JULY 198Q

MIDDLE EAST

INTERVIEW WITH LORD CARRINGTON BY ISRAELI TV ON FRIDAY ELEVEN
JULY NINETEEN EIGHTY.

QUESTION: NOW THAT THE AUTONOMY TALKS ARE RESUMED, WHAT ARE YOUR OWN EXPECTATIONS?

ANSWER: I HOPE THEY ARE GOING TO BE SUCCESSFUL. WE HAVE ALWAYS SUPPORTED THEM, BOTH CAMP DAVID AND THE AUTONOMY TALKS. I VERY MUCH HOPE THAT THEY WILL LEAD TO SOMETHING. WHETHER I THINK THAT THEY WILL BE SUCCESSFUL NOW I'M NOT QUITE SO SURE. I HOPE YOU GO ON TALKING AND SOMETHING WILL COME OF IT. BUT RECENTLY I DON'T THINK THAT THE EXPECTATIONS HAVE LOOKED SO BRIGHT AS THEY DID TO BEGIN WITH.

QUESTION: WHAT IN YOUR VIEW PREVENTED THE SUCCESS WHICH THEY DESERVE?

ANSWER: I HAVEN'T BEEN IN THE NEGOTIATIONS AND I DON'T KNOW WHAT HAVE BEEN THE STUMBLING BLOCKS. I IMAGINE THE ONE THAT IMMEDIATELY SPRINGS TO MIND IS THE QUESTION OF SECURITY AND WHETHER OR NOT YOU WILL BE ABLE TO DISCUSS THAT IN A MANNER WHICH THE EGYPTIANS FEEL IS PRODUCTIVE.

QUESTION: DO YOU FEEL THAT THE VENICE DECLARATION OF THIRTEEN JUNE IS REALLY EVEN AND BALANCED AND REFLECTS THE SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST, AS ONE CAN REALLY NOT FIND IN IT A MENTION OF THE CAMP DAVID PROCESS OF AGREEMENT, AND THERE IS A HARSH BITTER ATTACK ON SOME OF THE ISRAELI POLICIES. NOT ONE REMARK ABOUT THE PLO'S VOICES AND YET IT SORT OF ASSOCIATES OFFICIALLY FOR THE FIRST TIME IN THE EUROPEAN POINT OF VIEW, THE PLO WITH WHAT IS GOING ON. HOW DO YOU SEE IT? IS IT REALLY BALANCED?

ANSWER: IT WAS CERTAINLY INTENDED TO BE BALANCED. THERE IS NO DOUBT WHATEVER ABOUT THAT. I THINK PEOPLE ON BOTH SIDES OF THE FENCE HAVE BEEN INCLINED TO INTERPRET IT IN THE WAY THAT THEY WANTED TO. ON THE ARAB SIDE THERE HAS BEEN A GOOD DEAL OF CRITICISM OF IT, AND ON THE ISRAELI SIDE THERE HAS BEEN SOME CRITICISM. IT WAS CERTAINLY MEANT TO BE EVEN-HANDED, AND INDEED THAT IS VERY MUCH THE POLICY OF MY GOVERNMENT. YOU KNOW THAT WE BELIEVE THAT THE STATE OF ISRAEL MUST BE RECOGNISED BY THE ARABS AND MUST BE ALLOWED TO LIVE WITHIN SECURE BOUNDARIES. SO THERE IS NO DOUBT ABOUT THAT AND WE GO ALONG WITH THAT ALL THE WAY DOWN THE LINE. ON THE OTHER SIDE, AS YOU KNOW WE DON'T RECOGNISE THAT THE WEST BANK IS ISRAELI TERRITORY NOR INDEED DO YOU, THE ISRAELIS, BECAUSE YOU ACCEPT RESOLUTION TWO FOUR TWO. SO ON THE OTHER SIDE WE THINK THE PALESTINIANS HAVE RIGHTS, AND THESE TWO THINGS WE BELIEVE ARE REALLY THE ONLY WAY IN WHICH, IF YOU RECOGNISE THESE THINGS, A SOLUTION IN THE MIDDLE EAST CAN BE REACHED.

ONE OF THE OTHER FACTORS YOU HAVE TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT IS THAT THE PLO DO REPRESENT A VERY LARGE NUMBER OF PALESTINIANS, AND WHETHER YOU APPROVE OR DISAPPROVE OF THE PLO YOU CAN'T IGNORE THEM. THEY ARE THERE. THEY WON'T GO AWAY, AND SO IF YOU ARE GOING

TO GET A SOLUTION, IF YOU ARE GOING TO TALK ABOUT THINGS WITH PEOPLE, YOU MUST SPEAK TO THE PLO. AFTER ALL WE'D NEVER HAVE GOT ANY KIND OF SOLUTION IN RHODESIA IF THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT HAD REFUSED TO TALK TO MR MUGABE OR MR NKOMO. WHAT MATTERS IS WHAT YOU GET OUT OF THE TALKS, NOT WHO YOU TALK TO.

QUESTION: WOULDN'T IT BE WISER IF THE OBJECTIVE WAS TO TRY TO GET AN UNDERSTANDING WITH THE STATE OF ISRAEL, WITH THE PALESTINIANS, WITH OTHER STATES IN THE AREA, BEFORE ISSUING A DECLARATION IN THIS WAY. BEFORE DECIDING TO SEND AN EMISSARY, WITHOUT REALLY BEING SURE THAT HE WILL ENJOY THE COOPERATION OF THE PEOPLE AND THE STATES IN THE AREA?

ANSWER: I DON'T REALLY UNDERSTAND WHY ANYBODY SHOULD OBJECT TO THE PRINCIPLES WHICH THE NINE COUNTRIES ENUNCIATED IN VENICE. THE PRINCIPLE OF THE RIGHT OF ALL STATES TO BE RECOGNISED AND LIVE IN SECURE BOUNDARIES, AND THE RIGHTS OF THE PALESTINIANS, I WOULDN'T HAVE THOUGHT ANYBODY WOULD OBJECT TO THAT. HAVING DONE THAT, WHAT WE HAVE SAID IS IF THE PEOPLE WILL ACCEPT THESE TWO PRINCIPLES, LET'S GO ROUND AND TALK AND SEE WHETHER THERE IS A BASIS FOR A NEGOTIATION. I WOULD HAVE THOUGHT THAT WAS A FAIRLY CONSTRUCTIVE WAY OF APPROACHING IT, NOT ONE WHICH WAS MEANT TO BE HARMFUL TO ANYBODY'S INTERESTS. IF YOU DON'T TALK TO PEOPLE YOU NEVER FIND ANYTHING OUT.

QUESTION: IT'S NOT FOR ME TO REPRESENT OR TO ISSUE PROTESTATIONS, HOWEVER I CAN REPRESENT IN AN INTERVIEW SOME OF THE QUESTIONS REGARDING WHAT PEOPLE MIGHT FEEL AGAINST THIS. AS A MATTER OF FACT ONE OF THESE IS THE QUESTION OF SELF-DETERMINATION FOR THE PALESTINIANS. DO YOU SUPPORT A STATEHOOD FOR THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE?

ANSWER: YOU CAN'T EXCLUDE IT BECAUSE THIS IS ONE OF THE SOLUTIONS WHICH I SUPPOSE COULD HAPPEN, BUT NONE OF THIS CAN HAPPEN WITHOUT THE AGREEMENT OF THE PARTIES CONCERNED. NOBODY CAN IMPOSE A SETTLEMENT UPON ISRAEL, NOBODY CAN IMPOSE A SETTLEMENT UPON THE PALESTINIANS. THERE IS GOING TO HAVE TO BE A NEGOTIATION TO WHICH EVERYBODY AGREES. WHAT YOU HAVE TO DO IS TO FIND TO BEGIN WITH WHAT IS THE HIGHEST COMMON FACTOR, AND BUILD ON THAT FACTOR, OTHERWISE YOU ARE NEVER GOING TO GET A SOLUTION.

QUESTION: WOULD YOU RULE OUT ANY SANCTIONS OR ACTIONS AGAINST ISRAEL IF IT DOESN'T ACCEPT ANY OF THE RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE POLICIES ADOPTED BY THE EEC?

ANSWER: THE EEC ISN'T IN A POSITION TO HAVE SANCTIONS AGAINST ANYBODY. WHAT WE ARE TRYING TO DO IS TO BE HELPFUL. I DON'T BELIEVE THE WAY TO SETTLE THINGS IS SANCTIONS. I DON'T BELIEVE THAT THAT IS A POLICY WHICH LEADS TO AGREEMENT. WHAT YOU HAVE GOT TO DO IS GET THE SIDES TO AGREE TOGETHER. NOBODY CAN IMPOSE ANYTHING AND NOBODY CAN USE ANY LEVERAGE TO MAKE PEOPLE DO THINGS THEY DON'T WANT TO DO. WHAT YOU HAVE GOT TO DO IS TO GET SOME KIND OF CONFIDENCE BETWEEN THE PARTIES THAT A GENUINE SETTLEMENT IS POSSIBLE WHICH LOOKS AFTER EVERYBODY'S INTERESTS. IT'S NOT GOING TO BE EASY, IT'S NOT GOING TO HAPPEN IN MONTHS, WE ALL KNOW THAT, BUT AT LEAST WE OUGHT TO TRY. IT DOESN'T MEAN BECAUSE THE EEC HAVE ISSUED THAT STATEMENT, WHICH I THOUGHT VERY EVEN-HANDED, THAT THEY ARE EITHER AGAINST ISRAEL OR AGAINST THE ARABS. WHAT THEY ARE FOR IS A SETTLEMENT.

QUESTION: SOME OF THE REMARKS REGARDING THE EQUATION, PARTICULARLY IN THE EXPLANATIONS OF THE PRIME MINISTER WHEN SHE CAME BACK FROM

VENICE AND SPOKE IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS, EQUATING THE RIGHTS OF THE TWO SIDES, IMPLIED ONE SIDE CANNOT EXIST WITHOUT THE RIGHT OF THE OTHER. THIS IS A NEW WAY OF PUTTING IT: ISRAEL CANNOT EXPECT PEOPLE TO RECOGNISE THE STATE OF ISRAEL WITHOUT GRANTING THE SAME RIGHT TO OTHERS. IN THIS CASE OF COURSE YOU MEANT THE PALESTINIANS. IS THIS A PRE-REQUISITE TO BRITISH POLICIES TO GO ON IN SINCERE COMMITMENT TO THE EXISTENCE OF ISRAEL?

ANSWER: WE RECOGNISE THE STATE OF ISRAEL UNCONDITIONALLY. AFTER ALL WE HAVE AN ISRAELI AMBASSADOR HERE AND WE RECOGNISE ISRAEL AS A STATE. BUT THERE ARE OTHERS WHO DON'T. IF YOU ARE GOING TO GET PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST, THE FIRST THING THAT MUST HAPPEN IS THAT THE PALESTINIANS AND THE PLO -- IF YOU INCLUDE THE PLO -- HAVE GOT TO RECOGNISE THE RIGHT OF ISRAEL AS A STATE. TO LIVE WITHIN SECURE BOUNDARIES, OF COURSE. BUT EQUALLY YOU THE ISRAELIS HAVE GOT TO RECOGNISE THAT THE PALESTINIANS HAVE A RIGHT. SO THAT IS WHY I HAVE SAID IF YOU DON'T DO ONE YOU DON'T GET THE OTHER. THERE SURELY IS A CONNECTION, BECAUSE IF YOU WANT PEACE IN THE AREA YOU HAVE TO ACCEPT THAT THE PALESTINIANS ARE A PROBLEM THAT HAS GOT TO BE SOLVED.

QUESTION: TURNING NOW TO THE QUESTION OF JERUSALEM WHICH IS ANOTHER SORE POINT IN THE RELATIONS BETWEEN ISRAEL AND GREAT BRITAIN, A FEW DAYS AGO YOUR AMBASSADOR IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL DEPLORED CHANGES MADE BY ISRAEL IN THE DEMOGRAPHIC AND PHYSICAL CHARACTER OF JERUSALEM. DOES HER MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT OBJECT TO THE RESTORATION OF THE JEWISH QUARTER OF THE CITY, OR TO THE RENOVATIONS OF THE ROADS AROUND THE CITY, OR FOR THAT MATTER TO THE RESTORATION OF FREEDOM OF ACCESS TO ALL OTHER PLACES?

ANSWER: WHAT WE SAY IS THAT IT IS A MISTAKE, UNILATERALLY TO TRY AND DECIDE THE FUTURE OF JERUSALEM ON YOUR OWN, HAVING REGARD TO THE VERY CONTROVERSIAL NATURE OF THE SUBJECT. IN EXACTLY THE SAME WAY WE THINK IT'S A VERY GREAT MISTAKE TO HAVE ISRAELI SETTLEMENTS ON THE WEST BANK BECAUSE IT MAKES THE NEGOTIATIONS OF THE SETTLEMENT OF THE WHOLE PROBLEM THAT MUCH MORE DIFFICULT. TO TRY AND PRE-EMPT THESE DECISIONS MAKES THE SETTLEMENT OF THE WHOLE ARAB/ISRAEL PROBLEM THAT MUCH MORE DIFFICULT. I THINK IT IS RIGHT AND HONOURABLE AND HONEST FOR ME TO SAY SO IN FRONT OF THE TV CAMERA.

QUESTION: GOING BACK TO JERUSALEM, DO YOU THINK ISRAEL SHOULD HAVE REFRAINED FROM DOING ANYTHING?

ANSWER: I THINK YOU OUGHT TO HAVE HAD REGARD TO WHAT I HAVE JUST SAID.

QUESTION: PRIME MINISTER BEGIN IS INTENDING TO MOVE HIS OFFICE INTO A NEW BUILDING IN JERUSALEM. WOULD YOU INSTRUCT YOUR AMBASSADOR TO REFRAIN FROM GOING THERE?

ANSWER: I THINK IT WOULD BE, IF I MAY SAY SO, A GREAT MISTAKE IF YOUR PRIME MINISTER MOVES THERE. I THINK IT WILL MAKE THINGS MORE DIFFICULT FOR YOUR FRIENDS AND VERY MUCH EASIER FOR YOUR ENEMIES. I WON'T GO ANY FURTHER THAN THAT.

QUESTION: DO YOU, IN YOUR CONCEPT OF JERUSALEM, SEE ANY FORMAL LINK BETWEEN THE JEWISH PEOPLE, THE ISRAELI STATE AND THE CITY OF JERUSALEM?

ANSWER: THERE IS A LINK BETWEEN THE CITY OF JERUSALEM AND A GREAT MANY PEOPLE. IT'S A HOLY PLACE TO AN AWFUL LOT OF PEOPLE AND I DON'T THINK EXCLUSIVE TO THE JEWS. YOU HAVE TO RECOGNISE THAT TOO.

QUESTION: WE ARE RECOGNISING IT. MY GOVERNMENT REALISES THAT THERE

SHOULD BE A FORMAL LINK BETWEEN THE STATE AND THE CITY.

ANSWER: THAT HAS OBVIOUSLY GOT TO BE AN ACCOMMODATION WHICH TAKES ACCOUNT OF THE JEWISH ASSOCIATIONS AND JEWISH FEELINGS AND RELIGION, JUST THE SAME WAY THAT THERE HAS TO BE THE SAME LINK WITH OTHER PEOPLE.

QUESTION: SO IN OTHER WORDS WHICH I WON'T TRY TO PUT IN YOUR MOUTH, YOU DON'T SEE ANY POSSIBILITY OF RECOGNISING THE CITY OF JERUSALEM AS THE CAPITAL OF ISRAEL?

ANSWER: NO.

QUESTION: SHOULD IT BE THE CAPITAL OF ANY OTHER STATE?

ANSWER: NO, I THINK THERE HAS GOT TO BE SOME PARTICULAR SOLUTION FOUND FOR JERUSALEM WHICH IS SATISFACTORY TO THE ISRAELIS AND SATISFACTORY TO EVERYBODY ELSE AS WELL. IT'S PROBABLY ONE OF THE MOST DIFFICULT PROBLEMS THAT ONE CAN THINK OF. I UNDERSTAND YOUR VIEWS ABOUT JERUSALEM AND I EXPECT YOU UNDERSTAND THAT OTHER PEOPLE HAVE DIFFERENT VIEWS ABOUT IT. YOU'VE GOT TO ACCOMMODATE THOSE VIEWS OTHERWISE YOU'LL NEVER GET PEACE.

QUESTION: CROSSING THE BORDER STRAIGHT FROM JERUSALEM TO JORDAN. THIS IS A SUBJECT WHICH ALWAYS COMES UP IN INTERVIEWS WITH BRITISH GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS. IT SEEMS THAT YOU ACCEPTED THE RELUCTANCE OF JORDAN TO JOIN THE TALKS ABOUT PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST. THE EEC HAS ALSO ACCEPTED THIS AND DIDN'T FIND IT NECESSARY TO RECOMMEND JORDAN TO JOIN THE PEACE PROCESS. DO YOU ACCEPT THAT JORDAN HAS NO MORE ANY CLAIM TO THE WEST BANK?

ANSWER: YOU SAY THAT WE ACCEPTED THE FACT THAT JORDAN DIDN'T JOIN THE TALKS. IT REALLY WASN'T FOR US OR THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY TO ACCEPT OR REJECT IT. JORDAN IS A SOVEREIGN STATE AND IT WAS UP TO JORDAN TO DO WHAT SHE FELT WAS IN HER OWN INTERESTS. SO I REALLY DON'T THINK AN ACCEPTANCE OR REJECTION IS ANY FACTOR AT ALL. AS A MATTER OF FACT, IF YOU LOOK BACK IN HISTORY, I THINK PAKISTAN AND OURSELVES ARE THE ONLY COUNTRIES WHICH ACTUALLY RECOGNISE THE WEST BANK AS PART OF JORDAN, AND I IMAGINE THAT IS STILL FORMALLY THE POSITION. BUT I THINK WE ARE QUITE OPEN TO ACCEPTING ANY SOLUTION WHICH IS ACCEPTABLE TO JORDAN, ISRAEL AND THE PALESTINIANS.

QUESTION: DO YOU WANT JORDAN TO JOIN THE PROCESS?

ANSWER: I REALLY THINK THAT IS ENTIRELY A MATTER FOR THE JORDAN GOVERNMENT. IF THEY THINK THAT BY JOINING IT THERE IS A CHANCE OF MAKING THE DISCUSSIONS MORE FRUITFUL AND TO BE A SETTLEMENT WHICH WILL CARRY THE ARAB WORLD WITH IT MORE LIKELY, SO BE IT. IF THEY DON'T THAT MUST BE THEIR DECISION. BUT I DON'T THINK IT'S ANYTHING WHICH WE CAN COMMENT ON. IT MUST BE A MATTER FOR JORDAN.

QUESTION: GOING TO ONE OF THE OTHER FAMOUS CRITICISMS OF THE EUROPEAN STATEMENT IS THE QUESTION OF OIL, SOMETHING WHICH WAS DEFINED LAST WEEK BY THE ISRAELI AMBASSADOR AS ISRAELI OIL, AND BY AN ARTICLE IN THE TIMES LAST WEEK ASKING THE LEADERS OF EUROPE TO GO FORWARD TO THE PALESTINIANS IN ORDER TO SECURE HIGHER PRODUCTION OF OIL TO EUROPE. HOW DO YOU SEE THIS?

ANSWER: I THINK WHAT YOU ARE SUGGESTING IS THAT THE EUROPEAN INITIATIVE WAS DUE TO THE FACT THAT EUROPE NEEDS OIL. WAS THAT THE QUESTION?

QUESTION: PARTLY.

ANSWER: WELL THAT ISN'T TRUE. WE ARE SELF-SUFFICIENT - ALMOST - IN OIL SO THAT CAN HARDLY BE THE REASON. I THINK THE REAL REASON EUROPE DECIDED IT WAS ESSENTIAL TO HAVE AN INITIATIVE IN SENDING SOMEBODY ROUND TO FIND OUT WHAT THE HIGHEST COMMON FACTOR IS, IS THAT ALL OF US IN EUROPE ARE REALLY WORRIED ABOUT THE SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST. OIL IS A FACTOR, BUT NOT IN TERMS OF OIL PARTICULARLY BUT IN TERMS OF WHAT MIGHT HAPPEN IF THINGS GO WRONG IN THE MIDDLE EAST IN TERMS OF THE EAST/WEST RELATIONSHIP. THAT IS A FACTOR WHICH I THINK NONE OF US CAN IGNORE BECAUSE ONCE YOU GET THE SUPER POWERS IN CONFLICT, OR POSSIBLE CONFLICT, THEN YOU COULD HAVE THE START OF SOMETHING VERY SERIOUS INDEED. I THINK IF YOU LOOK ROUND THE MIDDLE EAST AT THE MOMENT AND SEE NOT JUST THE ARAB/ISRAEL CONFLICT BUT AFGHANISTAN AND IRAN, AND YOU OBSERVE THE DIFFICULTIES IN THAT PART OF THE WORLD, ANY MEASURES THAT ANYONE CAN TAKE WHICH AT ANY RATE SEEK TO SOLVE SOME OF THE HITHERTO INSOLUBLE PROBLEMS IN THE AREA ARE WORTH TAKING. I DON'T THINK WITH RESPECT IT HELPS TO INSINUATE THAT A PARTICULAR COUNTRY IS TRYING TO GET A PEACEFUL AND EVEN-HANDED SOLUTION BECAUSE OF ITS OWN SELFISH INTERESTS. I THINK THEY ARE WORLD INTERESTS, AND YOU MIGHT AT LEAST GIVE CREDIT TO EUROPE, THAT IT IS TRYING TO DO SOMETHING TO BRING ABOUT A PEACEFUL NEGOTIATION.

QUESTION: THE QUESTION OF OIL LEADS ONE TO REMEMBER, ARE YOU SATISFIED WITH THE NUCLEAR REACTOR TO IRAQ BY THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT?

ANSWER: I THINK THAT WE GENERALLY ARE RATHER CONCERNED ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION ROUND THE WORLD. THE MORE LIKELY IT BECOMES THAT OTHER COUNTRIES ARE IN A POSITION TO DEVELOP NUCLEAR WEAPONS THE MORE UNEASY THE PEACE OF THE WORLD WILL BECOME. CONSEQUENTLY I THINK I WILL SAY THAT WE WOULD LIKE TO SEE VERY POWERFUL AND STRONG SAFEGUARDS IN THE SUPPLY OF ANY KIND OF EQUIPMENT WHICH WOULD MAKE IT POSSIBLE TO MAKE NUCLEAR WEAPONS. THIS IS TRUE, NOT JUST OF ONE PARTICULAR COUNTRY, BUT OF ALL COUNTRIES.

QUESTION: THE VENICE DECLARATION TALKS ABOUT GUARANTEES FOR THE PEACE WHETHER BY UN SECURITY COUNCIL FORCE AND EVEN OF EUROPEAN PARTICIPATION ON THE GROUND. DO YOU SUPPOSE OR PROPOSE THAT THERE WILL BE A EUROPEAN FORCE TO MONITOR PEACE IN THE AREA?

ANSWER: I THINK THAT IF I WERE AN ISRAELI THIS WOULD BE THE FACTOR THAT WOULD MOST WORRY ME ABOUT A SETTLEMENT. I THINK THAT THIS ABOVE ALL IS THE ONE THAT MUST BE SOLVED TO ISRAEL'S SATISFACTION AND I THINK YOU YOURSELVES HAVE GOT TO MAKE SOME SUGGESTIONS ABOUT HOW THAT SECURITY CAN BE GUARANTEED. MAYBE YOU WILL NOT FEEL THAT ANY INTERNATIONAL GUARANTEE WILL DO AND THAT ONLY YOU CAN GUARANTEE YOUR OWN SAFETY. IF THAT IS SO IT MAY WELL BE POSSIBLE TO HAVE SOME KIND OF SITUATION ON THE WEST BANK WHICH WOULD ACTUALLY PROVIDE THAT GUARANTEE BY SOME KIND OF DISARMAMENT OR NON-MILITARY REGIME. THERE ARE VARIOUS WAYS OF DOING IT, AND IT MIGHT BE THAT A EUROPEAN PRESENCE WAS NECESSARY OR USEFUL.

QUESTION: YOU ARE BEING ACCUSED IN SOME CIRCLES THAT YOU ARE TRYING TO PUSH THE ISSUE IN THE MIDDLE EAST THE WAY YOU TRIED TO SOLVE THE RHODESIAN PROBLEM. I KNOW THERE ARE LOTS OF DIFFERENCES, BUT AS YOU MENTIONED EARLIER YOU HAD TO SIT WITH ROBERT MUGABE. HOW DO YOU REACT TO THIS SORT OF SITUATION?

ANSWER: I THINK IT'S RATHER SILLY. THE SITUATION IS QUITE DIFFERENT. BRITAIN IS NOT RESPONSIBLE. WE WERE RESPONSIBLE FOR RHODESIA AND IT WAS OUR JOB TO SOLVE IT. BRITAIN IS ONLY PART OF THE NINE AND THE NINE ARE ALL IN THIS TOGETHER. THE NINE KNOW PERFECTLY WELL THAT THE

ARAB/ISRAEL PROBLEM IS NOT SOLUBLE BY EUROPE ALONE, IT IS ABSOLUTELY ESSENTIAL NOT ONLY TO HAVE THE PARTIES CONCERNED IN THE AREA INVOLVED IN IT, BUT TO HAVE THE UNITED STATES INVOLVED. SO THERE IS NO QUESTION OF EITHER EUROPE OR BRITAIN OR MUCH LESS ME TAKING UP ANY ATTITUDE OF THAT KIND. IF IT WERE SO, IT WOULD BE OUT OF THE QUESTION. IT WOULD BE FOLLY. I REALLY JUST REMARKED THAT I DON'T THINK ON THE WHOLE THE LANCASTER HOUSE CONFERENCE DID TOO BADLY. WE HAD A FREE ELECTION, INTERNATIONALLY SUPERVISED AND A RESULT. I DON'T THINK THAT EVEN IF THE ACCUSATION WERE TRUE IT WOULD NECESSARILY BE VERY EVIL.

QUESTION: FINALLY, ARE YOU PERSONALLY SATISFIED WITH ALL THAT IS BEING ACHIEVED IN THE BRITISH FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS THE MIDDLE EAST?

ANSWER: I DON'T THINK YOU CAN POSSIBLY BE SATISFIED BECAUSE NOTHING HAS BEEN ACHIEVED. IF YOU ARE TALKING ABOUT THE ARAB/ISRAEL PROBLEM NOTHING HAS BEEN ACHIEVED AT ALL. THE ONLY TIME WHEN ANY OF US CAN EVER BE SATISFIED IS WHEN THERE IS A SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM WHICH IS SATISFACTORY TO ISRAEL AND TO THE OTHER STATES IN THE AREA. UNTIL THAT TIME COMES NOBODY CAN BE SATISFIED.

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14 July 1980

MESSAGE TO MR. BEGIN

As I mentioned to you on the telephone, the Prime Minister has decided that she would prefer not to write further to Mr. Begin at present (your letter of 9 July to me refers).

I am sending a copy of this letter to Brian Norbury (Ministry of Defence).

M. O'D. B. ALEXANDER

Paul Lever, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

Dear Prime Minister,

Thank you for your letter of 17 June, which was passed to me by your Embassy in London. May I say how pleased I was to hear that you are recovering from your recent illness.

I welcome your candour. I shall be equally frank in reply.

I understand and respect your views about the PLO. The document adopted by the Fatah Congress in Damascus was repugnant not only to my Government but, I know, to the British people as a whole. We view it with the most serious concern.

However, we must ask ourselves whether this is the whole story as far as the PLO are concerned. Who would have believed peace between Egypt and Israel possible if they had judged Egyptian policy solely on the basis of public statements by Egyptian leaders from the establishment of Israel onwards? Our policy is based on the belief that a peace settlement can be negotiated on terms which both Israelis and Palestinians can freely accept and that this is the only basis on which lasting peace will be possible. If such a settlement is to be negotiated, how can the PLO be ignored? The organisation clearly has very substantial support among the Palestinian people, both inside and outside the occupied territories. The European Council statement acknowledges the present reality that if the Palestinians are to take part in negotiations the PLO will in some way have to be associated with this process.

The European Council statement does not encourage the PLO in unacceptable policies. It makes clear that the PLO, like all other

/ concerned

concerned parties, must respect the principles of a negotiated settlement. A cardinal principle is the right of Israel to existence and to security. We have taken every opportunity to urge the PLO to accept this principle. We shall continue to do so. There can be no possibility of negotiating a settlement if the Palestinians, including the PLO, do not at some stage accept fully, openly and sincerely, Israel's right to live in peace.

We are under no illusions about the difficulty of bringing this about. But there is no alternative to the attempt. To dismiss the PLO out of hand will bring neither peace nor an end to terrorism. There are Palestinians who have shown signs of readiness to accept compromise based on co-existence with Israel. They must be encouraged.

But Israel, too, will have to moderate her position if peace is to be possible. It is not easy to reconcile the continuing expansion of settlements in the occupied territories and Israel's claim to ultimate sovereignty over the West Bank and Gaza with the principle of Israeli withdrawal embodied in Resolution 242. This Resolution is regarded by the Nine and more widely as indispensable for peace and, of course, forms part of the basis of Camp David. Nothing could contribute more to the establishment of an atmosphere of goodwill and confidence in the area than an end to the process of settlement.

I welcome your commitment to continue the autonomy negotiations with goodwill in order to reach an agreement. We continue to wish these talks well and to hope that an autonomy agreement can be reached capable of attracting Palestinian support.

Finally, you refer in your letter to Israel's defence needs and the refusal of supply of certain items of equipment. I have looked into the circumstances but regret that I cannot add to the answers already given to your Government on these items. If there are, however, any particular points on which you require further clarification, might I suggest that our respective officials discuss them? We look at every decision on arms sales on its merits. There is no bias against Israel.

/ I hope

I hope we can remain in touch. As I said in my message of 14 June, we must work together. Otherwise we will achieve nothing.

Mr. Menachem Begin

GR 280

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* AMENDED COPY 14 JULY

TO ROUTINE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 230 OF 11 JULY

YOUR TELEGRAM NUMBER 161: MIDDLE EAST.

1. I HAD THE OPPORTUNITY OF A TALK ABOUT THIS WITH THE CHANCELLOR THIS MORNING AFTER HE HAD PRESENTED TO SIR JOHN LANGFORD HOLT MP THE QUOTE GROSSE SILBERNE EHRENZEICHNUNG MIT STERN UNQUOTE FOR SERVICES TO ANGLO-AUSTRIAN RELATIONS. (KREISKY)

2. THE CHANCELLOR SAID THAT AFTER RECEIVING YOUR MESSAGE HE HAD BEEN IN TOUCH WITH ARAFAT FROM WHOM HE EXPECTED A LETTER WITH A FULL STATEMENT OF POSITION IN THE NEXT FEW DAYS. KREISKY REMARKED THAT THE VENICE STATEMENT HAD BEEN RATHER TOO LITTLE AND RATHER TOO LATE. I SAID THAT IT DID NOT MAKE IT ANY EASIER FOR US TO MAKE A STATEMENT OF THIS SORT IF THE RESPONSE FROM THE PLO WAS SO GRUDGING AND NEGATIVE. KREISKY SAID HE HIMSELF UNDERSTOOD VERY WELL THAT THE VENICE STATEMENT HAD BEEN A COMPROMISE BETWEEN THOSE WHO WANTED TO SAY MORE AND THOSE WHO WANTED TO SAY LESS. *HE HAD MADE THIS PLAIN TO ARAFAT.* THE LATTER WAS, HOWEVER, IN VERY DIFFICULT POSITION, PARTICULARLY BECAUSE RUSSIAN PRESSURE ON THE PLO WAS BECOMING INCREASINGLY STRONG.

3. KREISKY SAID HE WAS VERY WORRIED ABOUT THE MIDDLE EAST SITUATION. THE MORE EXTREME ELEMENTS IN ISRAEL SAW ADVANTAGE IN PROVOKING A CONFRONTATION AS A MEANS OF UNITING SUPPORT BEHIND THEMSELVES. SIMILARLY ON THE ARAB SIDE COUNTRIES LIKE LIBYA AND SYRIA SAW ADVANTAGE IN PROMOTING A SHOWDOWN WITH ISRAEL AS A MEANS OF OBLIGING OTHER ARAB COUNTRIES TO CLOSE RANKS. THE SYRIANS IN ANY CASE WERE NOT INTERESTED IN A SEPARATE PALESTINIAN STATE: WHAT THEY WANTED WAS A MERGER OF LEBANON, JORDAN AND THE PALESTINAIN AREA UNDER SYRIAN DOMINATION. HE WAS WORRIED THAT THERE WAS REAL DANGER OF A WAR SITUATION BEING BROUGHT ABOUT BY THE EXTREMISTS ON EITHER OR BOTH SIDES BEFORE ELECTIONS IN ISRAEL.

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TELEGRAM NUMBER 277 OF 11 JULY

INFO WASHINGTON UKMIS NEW YORK CAIRO AND AMMAN

ISRAEL/BITAIN

1. ISRAELI FOREIGN MINISTER SHAMIR LAST NIGHT SPOKE TO THE ISRAELI NATIONAL DEFENCE COLLEGE AT AN OCCASION DESCRIBED AS "CLOSED". BUT HE APPARENTLY ASKED HIS OFFICIALS TO ENSURE THAT SOME OF HIS REMARKS REACHED THE MEDIA.

2. THE REMARKS QUOTED IN THIS MORNING'S PRESS RESPONDED TO YOUR SPEECH IN THE HOUSE OF LORDS ON 9 JULY (TEXT OF WHICH ONLY REACHED US THIS MORNING). SHAMIR SAID THAT BRITAIN HAD OPPOSED THE CREATION OF ISRAEL AND THAT BRITISH FOREIGN POLICY HAD APPARENTLY NOT LEARNT FROM THE PAST. BRITAIN BEFORE 1948 NURTURED THE ILLUSORY HOPE THAT IT COULD WELD A BLOCK OF FRIENDLY ARAB STATES AND OPPOSE ISRAEL'S REBIRTH. "LATER AFTER ISRAEL HAD BECOME AN ESTABLISHED POLITICAL FACT BRITISH FOREIGN POLICY CONTINUED TO DELUDE ITSELF INTO THINKING THAT IT COULD WOO THE ARABS BY DEMANDING THAT CHUNKS OF ISRAEL BE TORN AWAY". SHAMIR WONDERED WHY YOU HAD REFERRED TO ISRAEL AS AN OCCUPIER FOR HOLDING JUDEA AND SAMARIA,

REFERRED TO ISRAEL AS AN OCCUPIER FOR THE
AREAS THAT HAD NEVER BEEN PART OF ANY SOVEREIGN STATE, AND HAD NOT
YET USED THAT TERM IN REFERENCE TO JORDAN HOLDING THESE AREAS
BEFORE 1967. COMMENTING ON YOUR REFERENCE TO BRITAIN'S COMMITMENT
TO ISRAEL, SHAMIR SAID THAT FOR A STATE TO EXIST IT REQUIRED NOT
ONLY THE RIGHT TO EXIST BUT ALSO THE MINIMUM CONDITIONS OF EXIST-
ENCE. THE PRE-1967 ARMISTIC LINES DID NOT PROVIDE ISRAEL WITH
SUCH MINIMAL CONDITIONS.

ROBINSON

NNNN

Original to GR



BY
cc 720
Cairi.
Mudhas

10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

11 July 1980

Dear Mr. Kishinev,

Thank you for your letter of 22 June enclosing a copy of a resolution passed by the Manchester and District Association of Jewish Ex-Servicemen and Women.

I quite understand the concerns expressed in the Resolution. But I believe that the text of the European Council statement, a copy of which I enclose, shows them to be unfounded. The statement is a balanced document which should not be seen as in any way conflicting with the Camp David process but as complementary to it. President Sadat has welcomed the statement as constructive and the US Administration have also reacted positively. Our objective is to search for ways in which the security of Israel, to which we are absolutely committed, can be reconciled with legitimate Palestinian rights.

I know that many of the Anglo-Jewish community are worried about the PLO. The European Council statement records the belief that the PLO will at some stage have to be associated with negotiations. The fact is that the PLO has the support of many Palestinians, on the West Bank and Gaza and elsewhere. This cannot be ignored if a settlement is to be negotiated and to endure. But let me - - - emphasise again that the PLO are, like all the parties concerned, required to accept fully the principles of a negotiated settlement. These include Israel's right to live in peace and security. Neither Britain nor the Nine are giving the PLO any official recognition or exclusive status. Moreover, there is no question of encouraging

/ them in

them in unacceptable policies. The statement makes quite clear that the path of violence must be renounced.

We wish to contribute to the achievement of a comprehensive settlement. But the key lies in the hands of the parties themselves. The PLO must accept Israel's right to a secure future, and Israel must for her part accept that Palestinian political rights must be fully taken into account and that the territorial occupation she has maintained since 1967 must be ended. We must continue to work to persuade both sides towards a compromise acceptable to both.

Yours sincerely
Raymond H. White

Ken Eastham, Esq., M.P.

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GR 530

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FM AMMAN 100715Z JUL 80

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 276 OF 10 JUL

INFO DAMASCUS, JEDDA AND LUXEMBOURG

SAVING TO CAIRO MOSCOW PARIS ROME. TEL AVIV UKMIS NEW YORK

HOLY SEE AND WASHINGTON

JORDAN/MIDDLE EAST

- Read in full*
ms
1. I SAW KING HUSSEIN LAST NIGHT ON THE EVE OF MY DEPARTURE ON MID-TOUR LEAVE.
 2. HE SPOKE AT LENGTH ABOUT ABDUL HAMID SHARAF, AND THE DIFFICULTY HE WOULD HAVE IN FINDING A SUITABLE SUCCESSOR WHO COMBINED THE ABILITY TO COPE WITH INTERNAL AFFAIRS AND THE KNOWLEDGE AND EXPERIENCE REQUIRED TO CONDUCT JORDAN'S EXTERNAL RELATIONS. WHILE SHARAF WAS PRIME MINISTER HE HAD FELT ABLE TO STAND BACK TO SOME EXTENT, BUT HE FEARED THAT THIS MIGHT NOW NO LONGER BE POSSIBLE. HE WOULD IN ANY CASE TAKE HIS TIME IN CHOOSING A SUCCESSOR TO SHARAF (SEE PARAGRAPH 9 OF MY TELELETTER OF 9 JULY TO MILES).
 3. THE KING TOLD ME THAT HE AND SHARAF HAD BOTH UNDERGONE A VERY THOROUGH MEDICAL CHECK-UP AT HOUSTON ABOUT 7 YEARS AGO, AND THAT IN SHARAF'S CASE THIS HAD REVEALED A THICKENING OF AN ARTERY WHICH WAS APPARENTLY INOPERABLE AND COULD CAUSE DEATH AT ANY TIME. THE KING SAID HE HAD NOT KNOWN OF THIS HIMSELF AT THE TIME AND DID NOT KNOW WHETHER SHARAF HAD EVER BEEN TOLD SEMI COLON IT WAS NOT NORMALLY REVEALED TO PATIENTS THAT THEY SUFFERED FROM THIS CONDITION AS THERE WAS NOTHING TO BE DONE ABOUT IT. THE KING ADDED THAT, WHETHER OR NOT SHARAF KNEW OF IT, HE HAD ALWAYS SHUNNED DOCTORS.
 4. REFERRING TO HIS RECENT MEETING WITH MRS THATCHER ON HIS WAY BACK FROM WASHINGTON, THE KING SAID HOW MUCH HE VALUED THESE TALKS AND THE ATTENTION INVARIABLY PAID TO HIM ON HIS VISITS TO BRITAIN. I REMINDED HIM OF OUR CONTINUING DIFFICULTIES WITH THE SAUDIS, AND HE SAID HE WOULD INSTRUCT HIS FOREIGN MINISTER TO SPEAK TO THE SAHUUUDI FOREIGN MINISTER WHILE HE WAS STILL IN AMMAN. IT WAS STRONGLY IN ALL OUR INTERESTS THAT THIS MATTER SHOULD BE QUICKLY CLEARED UP AND UK/SAUDI RELATIONS PUT BACK ON A NORMAL FOOTING. KING HUSSEIN LATER TELEPHONED ME AT HOME TO TELL ME THAT HE HAD PERSONALLY SPOKEN TO THE SAUDI FOREIGN MINISTER AND ASKED HIM TO CONVEY TO KING KHALID HIS HOPE THAT UK/SAUDI RELATIONS COULD BE FULLY RESTORED.

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/ 5. REFERRING TO

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5. REFERRING TO SYRIAN MISCHIEF-MAKING DURING THE CURRENT MEETING OF ARAB FOREIGN, ECONOMIC AND FINANCE MINISTERS IN AMMAN, THE KING SAID HE WAS SURE THIS STEMMED MAINLY FROM SYRIAN INTERNAL DIFFICULTIES. HE COULD NOT BELIEVE THAT THE MOSLEM BROTHERHOOD WERE REALLY RESPONSIBLE FOR ALL THAT WAS HAPPENING WITHIN SYRIA: THERE MUST BE OTHER AND WIDER CAUSES.

6. THE KING SAID HE HAD ENJOYED SEEING M. THORN AND LOOKED FORWARD TO WELCOMING HIM AGAIN IN AMMAN ON HIS EUROPEAN MISSION. EMPHASISING THE IMPORTANCE HE ATTACHED TO EUROPE'S ROLE IN THE PRESENT MIDDLE EAST SITUATION, THE KING SAID HE WAS TRYING TO ARRANGE VISITS OVER THE NEXT TWO OR THREE WEEKS TO PRESIDENT GISCARD, HERR SCHMIDT AND SIGNOR COSSIGA SEMI COLON HE ALSO HOPED TO VISIT THE VATICAN. BUT HE GAVE ME THE IMPRESSION THAT NONE OF THE DATES FOR THESE VISITS WERE YET FIRM.

7. WHEN I MENTIONED THE PLANNED VISIT OF THE RED ARROWS TO JORDAN AT THE BEGINNING OF OCTOBER THE KING SAID HE WAS DETERMINED TO BE HERE FOR IT. HE WOULD ALMOST CERTAINLY BE GOING TO MOSCOW IN EARLY OCTOBER, BUT HE WOULD TRY TO ENSURE THAT THE DATES DID NOT CLASH.

FCO PSE PASS TO SAVING ADDRESSEES.

URWICK

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]
[THIS TELEGRAM WAS NOT ADVANCED]

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FM WASHINGTON 102245Z JUL 80

TO ROUTINE F.C.O.

TELEGRAM NUMBER 2495 OF 10 JULY.

INFO ROUTINE CAIRO, TEL AVIV, MOSCOW, AMMAN, LUXEMBOURG, UKMIS
NEW YORK.

INFO SAVING BEIRUT, DAMASCUS, JEDDA, HMCJ JERUSALEM.

*Read full**MS*

ARAB/ISRAEL : EUROPEAN MISSION

1. SAUNDERS GAVE FRETWELL SOME PERSONAL THOUGHTS ON THIS SUBJECT THIS AFTERNOON, EMPHASISING THAT HE HAD NOT YET DISCUSSED THEM IN ANY DEPTH WITH MUSKIE.

2. ACKNOWLEDGING THAT THE U.S. WAS INCREASINGLY LIKELY TO BE IN BAULK AS FAR AS PRODUCTIVE NEGOTIATING WAS CONCERNED OVER THE NEXT MONTHS, SAUNDERS' PERSONAL VIEW WAS THAT THERE WERE WAYS IN WHICH THE EUROPEANS COULD HAVE HELPFULLY CHANGED THE SCENERY BY THE TIME THE AMERICANS RE-ENGAGED (WHICH WOULD NOT NECESSARILY BE AS SOON AS THE DAY AFTER ~~THE ELECTION~~, EVEN IF CARTER WON). *IN AN IDEAL WORLD, THORN WOULD HAVE BEEN ABLE TO REPORT THAT HIS MISSION ENABLED HIM TO STATE, THAT THE ARABS HE HAD SPOKE TO, INCLUDING ARAFAT, ACCEPTED THE VENICE PRINCIPLES.* COULD LIVE AT PEACE WITH ISRAEL AND RECOGNISED THAT NO IMMEDIATE CREATION OF A PALESTINIAN STATE WAS POSSIBLE BUT THAT A TRANSITIONAL PERIOD WAS NECESSARY. IF THORN WAS ABLE TO ACHIEVE NOTHING MORE THAN TO MAKE THE ARABS REALISE THAT THEIR FRIENDS IN EUROPE, IN ADDITION TO MAKING PUBLIC STATEMENTS OF SYMPATHY, ALSO LOOKED TO THEM TO GIVE THOUGHT TO HOW THEY, THE ARABS, COULD CONTRIBUTE TO THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS, THAT TOO WOULD BE A POSITIVE CONTRIBUTION (SAUNDERS CONTRASTED THIS WITH KREISKY'S FAILURE EVEN TO SOW THAT THOUGHT IN RETURN FOR RECEIVING ARAFAT). SAUNDERS BELIEVED THAT COMPLEMENTARITY BETWEEN CONTINUING EUROPEAN AND AMERICAN ACTIVITY, COMBINED PERHAPS WITH THE SORT OF DISCUSSIONS HE HOPED HUSSEIN MIGHT BE HAVING WITH ARAFAT AND OTHER PALESTINIANS, WAS BOTH POSSIBLE AND DESIRABLE. SUCH AN OUTCOME OF THE VENICE MISSION WOULD, IN SAUNDERS VIEW, BE PREFERABLE TO THE MORE LIMITED OBJECTIVE OF BUYING TIME TO TIDE THE AMERICANS OVER THEIR ELECTION, THOUGH THAT TOO WOULD BE A USEFUL CONTRIBUTION.

3. SAUNDERS SPOKE WITH FEELING ABOUT THE TIME WHICH THORN WOULD NEED TO GIVE TO THE ISRAELIS "WE SPENT 13 WHOLE DAYS WITH HIM AT CAMP DAVID AND DID NOT ACHIEVE A PERFECT RESULT". EUROPEANS WHO HAD ONE CONVERSATION WITH BEGIN AND COMPLAINED HOW UNPRODUCTIVE IT WAS (LIPKOWSKI WAS A RECENT EXAMPLE WITH WHOM HE HAD DISCUSSED THE SUBJECT), WERE NOT MAKING A REAL CONTRIBUTION. THORN WOULD NEED AT LEAST TWO TRIPS TO ISRAEL TO GET ANYTHING OUT OF BEGIN. HE OUGHT ALSO TO SEE PERES.

4. SAUNDERS DID NOT THINK THE RUSSIANS CAPABLE OF PLAYING A USEFUL ROLE IN THE PROCESS: THEY HAD NEITHER THE SKILL NOR THE

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/ INCENTIVE.

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INCENTIVE. THEY WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO BLOCK ANYTHING THE PALESTINIANS FELT ABLE TO ACCEPT. THEY SHOULD BE BROUGHT IN AT THE END AS PART PERHAPS OF ANY SECURITY COUNCIL ENDORSEMENT OF A PEACE AGREEMENT.

5. THROUGHOUT SAUNDERS WAS AT PAINS TO STRESS THAT HE HAD NO WISH TO INTERFERE WITH THE CONDUCT OF THE MISSION OR EVEN TO OFFER GUIDANCE. HE RECOGNISED THAT BOTH EUROPEANS AND AMERICANS NEEDED FOR THEIR OWN REASONS TO KEEP THEIR DISTANCE FROM EACH OTHER, THOUGH HE WOULD LIKE TO CONTINUE TO EXCHANGE IDEAS WITH THE U.K. ON A PERSONAL BASIS. HE THOUGHT IT MIGHT BE AWKWARD FOR THORN TO VISIT WASHINGTON, BUT HE HAD SENT A MESSAGE THAT HE, SAUNDERS, WOULD PROBABLY BE IN EUROPE (ON IRANIAN BUSINESS) IN THE NEXT TWO WEEKS AND HAPPY TO TALK WITH THORN.

6. SAUNDERS TWICE MENTIONED THE POSSIBILITY OF ANOTHER CAMP DAVID MEETING AT THE BEGINNING OF 1981 TO REANIMATE THE PROCESS (ON THE ASSUMPTION OF A CARTER VICTORY IN NOVEMBER).

FCO PLS PASS SAVING TO BEIRUT, DAMASCUS, JEDDA, HMCG JERUSALEM.

HENDERSON

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

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Middle East



Prime Minister

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

Would you be willing to
write to Mr Begin on the lines
suggested by Lord Carrington?
(Flag A)

Dear Michael,

9 July 1980

Paul 9/7

C. Thank you for your letter of 19 June, enclosing a copy of Mr Begin's reply to the Prime Minister.

// Lord Carrington believes that the Prime Minister should reply in person. It is clear that Mr Begin appreciated the Prime Minister's original message and it is important to maintain this high level link in good repair if a dangerous drift towards a feeling of isolation and possible desperation in Israel is to be prevented. Lord Carrington has been in touch with the Israeli Foreign Minister, Mr Shamir, separately. I enclose copies of their exchange of letters.

A. / Lord Carrington also believes that the Prime Minister's reply should address the substance of the points Mr Begin makes in his letter. There is no likelihood of making a conversion but we should not miss the opportunity to explain our views directly to him. I enclose a draft reply. I suggest that that should be transmitted through our Embassy in Tel Aviv. There is no reason for undue haste, but we understand that there is no reason to delay a reply simply on account of the state of Mr Begin's health.

B. / Mr Begin mentions in his letter three specific refusals of supply of defence equipment to Israel. They are dealt with very briefly in the draft reply. The Prime Minister may find the attached background note helpful.

I am sending a copy of this letter and its enclosures to Brian Norbury (Ministry of Defence).

Yours etc

Paul

(P Lever)
Private Secretary

M O'D B Alexander Esq
10 Downing Street
LONDON

CONFIDENTIAL



5th June 1980

"Dear Secretary of State

I am taking the liberty to draw your personal attention to the Resolution which the Al Fatah terrorist organisation adopted at its so-called National Conference, which met in Damascus at the end of May. The Resolution itself was published on June 2nd.

I hope that you will agree with me that this Resolution confirms, unfortunately, our most serious apprehension as to the goals, methods and tactics pursued by this organisation, which is the main component of the so-called P.L.O.

The aims of the Fatah as adopted and reaffirmed are in full fidelity with the "Palestinian National Covenant" and its declared central aim of bringing about the destruction of Israel.

With kind personal regards,

Sincerely,

Yitzhak Shamir
Minister of Foreign Affairs of
Israel"

n

The Rt. Hon. The Lord Carrington, PC, KCMG, MC
Secretary of State for Foreign and
Commonwealth Affairs,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office,
London, SW1.

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

27 June 1980

My Dear Yitzhak

Thank you very much for your letter of 5 June enclosing extracts from the document adopted by the Fourth Al Fatah Congress at the end of May.

I can assure you that we studied the results of the Congress very carefully in the approach to the European Council meeting in Venice on 12-13 June. We find the concluding document as unacceptable as you do. While we believe that the PLO's position in the Arab world and standing in the eyes of large numbers of Palestinians mean that it cannot be ignored if a lasting settlement is to be achieved, we have no intention of encouraging the PLO in policies such as those espoused by the Fatah Congress. The constant burden of our message to the PLO is that their hopes and aspirations will remain unrealised as long as they do not accept Israel's right to live in peace and security.

I have noted with regret your Government's official reaction to the Venice statement, which I sincerely believe is, as it was intended to be, even-handed and constructive. Nevertheless, I hope that we can stay in close touch. We must not let our differences prevent us from working closely together for peace.

Sincerely
Carrington
(CARRINGTON)

Mr Yitzhak Shamir

DRAFT: minute/letter/teleletter/despatch/note

TYPE: Draft/Final 1+

FROM:

Reference

PRIME MINISTER

DEPARTMENT:

TEL. NO:

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

TO:

Your Reference

Top Secret

Secret

Confidential

Restricted

Unclassified

MR MENACHEM BEGIN

PRIME MINISTER OF ISRAEL

Copies to:

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SUBJECT:

.....In Confidence

CAVEAT.....

Will consider further. It seems much better out

Thank you for your letter of 17 June, which was passed to me by your Embassy in London. May I say how pleased I was to hear that you are recovering from your recent illness.

I welcome your candour. I shall be equally frank in reply.

I understand and respect your views about the PLO. ~~I have of course no interest in defending the document adopted by the Fatah Congress in Damascus, which was repugnant not only to my Government but, I know, to the British people as a whole. We took careful note of what Fatah said and I can assure you that we view it with very serious concern.~~

However, we must ask ourselves whether this is the whole story as far as the PLO are concerned. ~~You draw a parallel with Hitler's openly declared aims. Cannot a parallel also be made with Egypt?~~ Who would have believed possible peace between Egypt and Israel, if they had judged Egyptian policy solely on the basis of public statements by Egyptian leaders from the

/ establishment

establishment of Israel onwards? Our policy is based on the belief that a peace settlement can be negotiated on terms which both Israelis and Palestinians can freely accept and that this is ~~indeed~~ the only basis on which lasting peace will be possible. If such a settlement is to be negotiated, ^{how} can the PLO be ignored? ~~There is little doubt that~~ ^{clearly} the organisation has support among the Palestinian people, both inside and outside the occupied territories. There are no other Palestinian representatives, credible or otherwise, to be found at present. ~~What~~ ^The European Council statement ~~does is, therefore, to~~ acknowledge the present reality that if the Palestinians are to take part in negotiations, ~~as they surely must if lasting peace is to be achieved, then~~ the PLO will in some way have to be associated with this process.

~~What~~ ^The European Council statement does not ~~do is to~~ encourage the PLO in unacceptable policies. It makes quite clear that the PLO, like all other concerned parties, must respect the principles of a negotiated settlement. A cardinal principle ~~of such a settlement, as the Nine's statement reaffirms,~~ is the right of Israel to existence and to security. We take every possible opportunity to urge the PLO to ~~take the step of accepting~~ ^{this principle} ~~Israel's right to live in peace, and~~ we shall continue to do so. There can be no possibility of negotiating a settlement if the Palestinians, including the PLO, do not at some stage accept ~~this right~~ fully, openly and sincerely ^{Israel's right to live in peace.}

We are under no illusions about the difficulty ~~of the task~~ of bringing this about. But there is no alternative to the attempt. To dismiss the PLO out of hand will ~~not~~ ^{neither now} bring peace ^{or} an end to terrorism, ~~any closer.~~ There are Palestinians who have shown signs of readiness to accept compromise based on co-existence with Israel. They must be encouraged. // ^{But} ~~And~~ Israel, too, will have to moderate her position if peace is to be possible.

^{It is not easy}
~~I find it very difficult~~ to reconcile the continuing expansion of settlements in the occupied territories and Israel's claim to ultimate sovereignty over the West Bank and Gaza with the principle of Israeli withdrawal embodied in Resolution 242, ^{This Resolution} ~~which~~ is regarded by the Nine and more widely as indispensable for peace and, of course, forms part of the basis of Camp David. ~~May I take this opportunity to appeal to you once more to put a stop to this process.~~ Nothing could contribute more to the establishment of an atmosphere of goodwill and confidence in the area ^{than an end to the process of settlement.}

I welcome your commitment to continue the autonomy negotiations with good will in order to reach an agreement. We continue to wish these talks well and to hope that an autonomy agreement can be reached capable of attracting Palestinian support.

Finally, you refer in your letter to Israel's defence needs and the refusal of supply of certain items of equipment. I have looked into the circumstances but

/ regret

regret that I have nothing to add to the answers already given to your Government on these items. If there are however any particular points on which you require further clarification, might I suggest that our respective officials discuss them? We look at every decision on arms sales on its merits. ~~We take into account, for instance, not only Israel's legitimate security needs but also the presence and activities of Israeli forces in the Lebanon.~~ But ^There is no bias against Israel.

I hope we can remain in touch. As I said in my message of 14 June, we must work together. ^{Otherwise} (We will achieve nothing, ~~by working against each other.~~

NOTE: ARMS SALES TO ISRAEL(1) Scorpion Light Tanks

No decision has been taken to refuse supply of Scorpion light tanks to Israel. Last year the Israelis asked for the loan of 2 or 3 Scorpion tanks for 3 - 6 weeks for evaluation purposes. We raised no objection to this at official level on the understanding that Ministers would have to be consulted if any question of eventual supply were to arise and that no commitment to supply could consequently be given. But Alvis, the manufacturers, equivocated. MOD believe them to be unwilling to supply vehicles for fear of the repercussions for their Arab customers; whatever the truth of this, they have avoided a firm decision one way or another. Since the Israelis pressed for a reply, MOD told them in November 1979 that there was no prospect of the manufacturers having the capacity to produce vehicles for loan, or by implication for supply, and that this situation was likely to continue for some time.

(2) RB 199 Engines

The Israelis asked some time ago for technical discussions of the Rolls Royce RB 199 engine which they were considering incorporating into a new planned Israeli-built fighter. The Secretary of State considered this request in May last year and concluded that we should avoid becoming committed to the supply of major military items of this sort to front line states in the Middle East. While on occasions exceptions might be made to this rule (eg tanks for Jordan), Israel's arsenal was already formidable and she has access to the most sophisticated types of American aircraft. Rolls Royce were also reluctant to engage in technical discussions or to be pressed to sell the engine to Israel for fear of jeopardising their substantial commercial interests in the Arab world. It was therefore thought wrong to agree to technical discussion if eventual supply was unlikely to be agreed. The RB 199 has been developed to power Tornado (MRCA) aircraft. After we had consulted our two partners in this project, Italy and the FRG, the Israelis were told that all



three Governments agreed that eventual sale of this engine would present serious difficulties in relation to their policy on arms sales to the Middle East, and that it was consequently not possible to agree to technical discussions.

(3) Laser Range-Finders

Ministers decided last August to refuse sale of laser-finding equipment against the background of Israel's continuing unhelpful policies in South Lebanon, in particular the constant artillery and other attacks on targets there. Equipment of this type, which improves the effectiveness of artillery, could have been used to good effect. The Israeli Ambassador here has already appealed against our refusal to supply laser range-finders. We have explained our reasons to him.

We doubt that Israel's defence capability is seriously hurt by these refusals. They can obtain most of their needs from the US, which is their major supplier of armaments (eg they are now reported to be negotiating with General Electric for co-production of the F404 engine for their new fighter). Mr Begin is primarily making a debating point and the Prime Minister will wish to avoid being drawn into detailed discussion. But this underlines the difficulty of obtaining Israeli confidence if we are too restrictive in the field of defence supplies. Officials are currently looking into whether there are any areas where, without detriment to our overall policy, we can be somewhat less restrictive.

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

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1980 JUL 9

Middle East

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C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM TEL AVIV 070750Z JULY

TO PRIORITY F C O

TELNO 272 OF 7 JULY

INFO WASHINGTON, AMMAN, CAIRO, AND

SAVING TO UKMIS NEW YORK, DAMASCUS, JERUSALEM(PASSED).

MS.

MYTEL 258(NOT TO ALL): PALESTINE.

1. PERES TOLD A GROUP OF POLITICAL REPORTERS HERE AT THE END OF LAST WEEK THAT HE HAD RECEIVED INFORMATION FROM SOURCES WHICH HE COULD NOT DISCLOSE THAT KING HUSSEIN WOULD CONSIDER ENTERING INTO PEACE NEGOTIATIONS WITH ISRAEL ON THE BASIS OF THE LABOUR PARTY'S JORDANIAN OPTION. PERES SAID "THE JORDANIAN OPTION IN ISRAELI FOREIGN AFFAIRS REMAINS THE ONLY VIABLE AND REALISTIC ALTERNATIVE DESPITE THE DISCOURAGING NOISES EMANATING FROM AMMAN.... I AM BASING MY STATEMENT ON INFORMATION WHICH HAS REACHED ME FROM RELIABLE SOURCES, SOME OF IT IN THE LAST FEW DAYS."

2. FOLLOWING HUSSEIN'S REMARKS AT THE OPENING OF YESTERDAY'S ARAB LEAGUE CONFERENCE IN AMMAN, THE SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE ISRAEL LABOUR PARTY, BAR LED, SAID THAT HE NEVERTHELESS BELIEVED THAT KING HUSSEIN, BY HIS ACTIONS IN THE FIELD, WOULD BE A PARTNER FOR FUTURE TERRITORIAL COMPROMISES.

3. PERES HAS AGAIN REJECTED THE MORE FORTHCOMING PROPOSALS DRAWN UP FOR CONSIDERATION BY HIS PARTY (MYTEL 257 - NOT TO ALL). AT THE END OF LAST WEEK, GALILI, (EX-CHIEF OF THE HAGANAH AND CLOSE TO GOLDA MEIR), WAS ELECTED TO BE IN CHARGE OF DRAFTING THE PARTY'S FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND DEFENCE PLATFORM. HE IS REGARDED AS A HAWK IN IN LABOUR PARTY TERMS, AND IT IS OF SOME SIGNIFICANCE THAT CHAIM HERZOG WAS PERSUADED TO STAND AGAINST HIM, AND WAS ROUNDLY DEFEATED.

4. FCO PSE PASS SAVING TO UKMIS NEW YORK AND DAMASCUS ONLY.
ROBINSON

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cc FCO

10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

3 July 1980

Dear Vivian,

Thank you for your letters of 21 May and 25 June about the Government's attitude to the PLO. Of course I share your concern about this issue.

You will have seen the European Council statement issued in Venice on 13 June. I enclose a copy for ease of reference. I believe it to be a balanced statement providing a useful basis on which the Nine can attempt to work with the parties directly concerned towards the comprehensive peaceful settlement we all seek. It should not be seen as in any way conflicting with the Camp David process but as complementary to it. Our objective is to search for ways in which the security for Israel to which we are absolutely committed can be reconciled with legitimate Palestinian rights.

We have noted with deep concern the document issued by the Fatah Congress in Damascus to which you refer in your letter. Its calls for the liquidation of the "Zionist entity" and its stress on armed struggle are quite unacceptable to us. We shall continue our efforts to bring the Palestinians, including the PLO, to accept Israel's right to live in peace. Such acceptance is essential to a negotiated settlement.

The European Council statement records our belief that the PLO will at some stage have to be associated with negotiations. The fact is that the PLO has the support of many Palestinians,


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on the West Bank and Gaza and elsewhere. This cannot be ignored if a settlement is to endure. But let me emphasise again that the PLO are, like all the parties concerned, required to accept fully the principles of a negotiated settlement. These, of course, include Israel's right to live in peace and security. There is no question of Britain or the Nine giving any kind of official recognition to the PLO in present circumstances.

At the same time I would draw your attention to the emphasis placed by the Nine's statement on the need for Israel to put an end to the territorial occupation which it has maintained since 1967 - as it has done for part of Sinai - and to halt the establishment of settlements in these territories. Peace necessarily involves compromise and goodwill from both sides.

Yours ever



V.W.H. Bendall, Esq., M.P.

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PS/SIR I GILMOUR
PS/MR BURD
PS/PUS
MR J C MOBERLY

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Read a full

THORN'S VISIT TO BAGHDAD AND AMMAN

1. I CALLED ON M THORN THIS MORNING TO GET HIS IMPRESSIONS OF HIS TALKS IN BAGHDAD AND AMMAN AND HIS VIEWS ON FOLLOWING UP THE VENICE DECLARATION ON THE MIDDLE EAST.

2. THORN SAID THAT HE HAD BEEN AGREEABLY SURPRISED BY THE AMOUNT OF INTEREST ALL THOSE TO WHOM HE HAD SPOKEN HAD SHOWN IN THE DECLARATION. HE HAD SPENT MOST OF HIS TIME ANSWERING QUESTIONS ABOUT ITS MEANING AND ABOUT THE COMMUNITY'S FUTURE INTENTIONS. HE HAD ENCOUNTERED CONSIDERABLE MISUNDERSTANDING AMONG THE ARABS AND HE HAD SPENT SOME TIME EXPLAINING THAT THE CONTACTS ENVISAGED IN THE DECLARATION WOULD BE AIMED AT ESTABLISHING THE FACTS AND ATTITUDES AS THE ESSENTIAL PRELIMINARY FOR DETERMINING THE FORM OF AN APPROPRIATE INITIATIVE.

3. IN BAGHDAD THORN HAD SEEN THE PRESIDENT, FOREIGN MINISTER AND THREE MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL. SADDAM HUSSAIN HAD STARTED OFF BY BEING SUSPICIOUS AND HAD CLAIMED THAT THE NINE HAD NOT GONE FAR ENOUGH. HE HAD TAKEN A HARD LINE WHEN OTHER IRAQIS WERE

BY BEING SUSPICIOUS AND HAD CLAIMED THAT THE NINE HAD NOT GONE FAR ENOUGH. HE HAD TAKEN A HARD LINE WHEN OTHER IRAQIS WERE PRESENT. BUT HE HAD CHANGED HIS TUNE DURING THEIR (NEXT THREE WORDS UNDERLINED) TETE-A-TETE MEETING. SADDAM HUSSAIN HAD THEN MADE IT CLEAR THAT HE WANTED TO WORK WITH THE EUROPEANS AND THAT HE WANTED TO DISTANCE HIMSELF FROM THE TWO SUPERPOWERS. THORN HAD DETECTED A CONSIDERABLE SCEPTICISM OF THE RUSSIANS AND A FEAR OF THE RADICAL ELEMENTS IN THE PLO AND OF THE SOVIET INFLUENCE ON THOSE ELEMENTS. THORN THOUGHT, HOWEVER, THAT ONE OF SADDAM HUSSAIN'S PRIMARY AIMS IN ALL HIS PUBLIC POSITIONS WAS TO APPEAR AS THE ARAB LEADER CLOSEST TO THE PLO. THORN IDENTIFIED ONE OF THE MAIN DIFFICULTIES FACING THE NINE AS BEING THE NEED TO PREVENT THE IRAQIS, AND INDEED THE ARABS GENERALLY, FROM BELIEVING OR PRETENDING TO BELIEVE THAT THE NINE HAD IT IN THEIR POWER TO SOLVE THE ARAB-ISRAEL PROBLEM AT A STROKE. QUOTE WE SHALL NEED TO LOWER HEIGHTENED EXPECTATIONS UNQUOTE.

4. IN AMMAN (WHERE HIS VISIT HAD BEEN CURTAILED BECAUSE HE HAD TO GET BACK TO BRUSSELS) HE HAD FOUND THE KING AND SHARAF QUOTE VERY SUPPORTIVE UNQUOTE OF A EUROPEAN INITIATIVE. (COMMENT: I HAD THE IMPRESSION, HOWEVER, THAT THERE HAD SCARCELY BEEN TIME TO TALK IN DEPTH.) THE KING HAD TOLD THORN THAT HE HAD TRIED TO PERSUADE THE AMERICANS NOT TO CRITICISE THE EUROPEAN INITIATIVE; AND HE HAD BEEN SORRY THAT THE UNITED STATES HAD PRESSED HIM SO HARD TO JOIN THE CAMP DAVID PROCESS; THEY SHOULD HAVE KNOWN THIS WAS IMPOSSIBLE FOR HIM.

5. THORN'S PRELIMINARY CONCLUSION WAS THAT THE COMMUNITY DID HAVE A ROLE TO PLAY; THAT THE ARABS WOULD WELCOME AN INITIATIVE; AND THAT AN INITIATIVE COULD PROVE HELPFUL TO THE AMERICANS AFTER THEIR ELECTION.

6. ON THE TIMETABLE FOR CONTACTS, THORN HOPES TO GET A MANDATE AT THE 22 JULY FOREIGN AFFAIRS COUNCIL WHICH WOULD ENABLE HIM TO START HIS MISSION AT THE END OF JULY. HIS PRESENT VIEWS ON THE ORDER OF VISITS ARE:

(A) ISRAEL (TO AVOID A VETO).

(B) REPRESENTATIVES OF THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES (THE ISRAELIS WOULD HAVE TO BE BROUGHT IN ON THE ARRANGEMENTS. SOME OF THE MAYORS MIGHT BE SEEN IN AMMAN).

(C) JORDAN.

(D) LEBANON, WHERE HE WOULD ALSO MEET THE PLO (THIS HAD BEEN KING HUSSEIN'S SUGGESTION).

(E) AND THEN SYRIA, IRAQ, SAUDI ARABIA, EGYPT AND TUNISIA (INCLUDING ARAB LEAGUE).

7. THORN SAID THAT AS A RESULT OF HIS TRIP HE HAD CHANGED HIS VIEWS ON THE COMPOSITION OF HIS MISSION. HE WAS NOW CONVINCED AT IT WOULD BE HOPELESS IF A LARGE CROWD OF WITNESSES WERE PRESENT AT THE MEETINGS WITH THE ARAB LEADERS. (SADDAM HUSSAIN HAD SPECIFICALLY ASKED THAT THE DUTCH AMBASSADOR IN BAGHDAD AND MERTZ, THE LUXEMBOURG POLITICAL DIRECTOR, SHOULD NOT BE PRESENT AT WHAT PROVED THE MOST USEFUL OF THE TALKS IN BAGHDAD). IF ALL, OR EVEN SOME, OF THE NINE WERE TO BE PRESENT, THORN FEARED WE SHOULD ONLY GET FORMAL AND UNHELPFUL STATEMENTS FOR THE RECORD. HE THEREFORE NOW PROPOSED THAT HE SHOULD HANDLE THE MEETINGS ALONE WITH ONLY A NOTETAKER PRESENT, AND THAT THE OTHER EC PARTNERS, IF THEY WANTED TO TAKE PART IN THE MISSION, SHOULD BE REPRESENTED BY THEIR AMBASSADORS OR BY OFFICIALS FROM CAPITALS WITH WHOM THORN COULD LIAISE THROUGHOUT HIS TOUR, IF NECESSARY MEETING THEM BEFORE AND AFTER HIS MEETINGS WITH THE MIDDLE EASTERNERS. IT WAS FOR HIS COLLEAGUES TO SAY WHAT ARRANGEMENTS THEY WOULD PREFER IN ORDER TO KEEP INFORMED OF THE PROGRESS OF THE MISSION. BUT HE WONDERED IF IT WAS NECESSARY FOR THE ARRANGEMENTS TO BE FORMAL OR ELABORATE. THE IMPORTANT THING WOULD BE FOR HIM TO SUBMIT THE FINDINGS OF HIS MISSION TO HIS MINISTERIAL COLLEAGUES AND THEN TO DECIDE JOINTLY ON WHAT SORT OF AN INITIATIVE TO PURSUE.

8. THORN SAID THAT HE WOULD BE REPORTING HIS IMPRESSIONS TO HIS COMMUNITY COLLEAGUES AND TO WASHINGTON. HE WANTED TO KEEP PARTICULARLY CLOSELY IN TOUCH WITH YOU IN WHAT, AS HE RATHER RUEFULLY REMARKED, WAS GOING TO PROVE A DIFFICULT REMIT. IF THE IDEA OF A COMMUNITY FOREIGN MINISTERS' MEETING WITH GENSCHER GOT OFF THE GROUND (MY TELNO 206) THAT WOULD PROVIDE AN EARLY OCCASION FOR TAKING STOCK.

9. THORN FINALLY ASKED WHETHER HMG MIGHT BE ABLE TO HELP HIM WITH AN AIRCRAFT DURING THE MISSION. HE NOW REALISED HOW DIFFICULT IT WAS GOING TO BE TO ADJUST THE PROGRAMME TO COMMERCIAL FLIGHTS. GRATEFUL FOR INSTRUCTIONS ON THIS POINT.

10. PLEASE REPEAT AS NECESSARY.

THOMAS

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PART

3

ends:-

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PART

4.

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