

SB
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PREM 19/343

MT

PART 13

Confidential Filing

The Situation in Rhodesia

RHODESIA

Part 1: May 1979

Part 13: January 1980

| Referred to | Date | Referred to | Date | Referred to | Date | Referred to | Date |
|--------------------|------|-------------|------|-------------|------|-------------|------|
| 14.1.80 | | | | | | | |
| 16.1.80 | | | | | | | |
| 21.1.80 | | | | | | | |
| 24.1.80 | | | | | | | |
| ends | | | | | | | |

PREM 19/343

PART 13 ends:-

FCS to Ch Ex FCS/80/13 24.1.80

PART 14 begins:-

Draft letters / tels FCO to MODBA 25.1.

Rhodesia

La
Prest

Prime Minister

(2)

Prest 24/1

FCS/80/13

CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER

Implementation of the Rhodesian Settlement

1. We informed Parliament on 18 December that the estimated cost of the Rhodesian settlement was £27 million. The latest indications are that the overall cost is likely to be close to £31 million. The cost of the Governor and his staff and the entire election exercise, excluding military and transport costs, is now likely to be about £5.2 million. The monitoring of the ceasefire, including the provision of accommodation and other facilities for the Patriotic Front at their assembly places and headquarters, will cost nearly £9 million, while the total cost of military and civil transport is expected to be about £16.8 million.
2. The increases are due to several reasons. Experience in the field showed that the Monitoring Force needed six additional light helicopters and two further Hercules aircraft in Rhodesia for supply drops at the Patriotic Front assembly places. This has in turn produced a need for additional supply flights from the UK to provide the maintenance equipment and spares for these aircraft. The cost of in-country flying has been revised upwards by the MOD. The Patriotic Front forces assembled in greater numbers than we had expected and we have thus incurred additional expenditure on the provision of essential facilities at the Patriotic Front assembly places. It has proved impossible to provide adequate press facilities at Government House for the very large number of journalists following events in Rhodesia and separate accommodation has had to be found to establish a press centre.
3. Your officials have agreed the inclusion in the FCO Spring Estimates of a figure of £31 million. I very much hope that this will cover everything and there will be no cause for further increases though I cannot guarantee that there will not be further unforeseen demands. I shall be reminding the Governor of the need for financial constraint. In the meantime I imagine

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you will agree that we should inform Parliament of the increased costs. I will arrange for this to be done.

4. I am copying this minute to the Prime Minister, the Secretary of State for Defence and Sir Robert Armstrong.

C
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
(CARRINGTON)

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

24 January 1980

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24 JAN 1960



[RHODESIA: POLICY: ADVANCE COPIES]

(X-28)

PS
PS/SIR I GILMOUR
PS/MR LUCE
PS/PUS
SIR D MAITLAND
MR DAY
LORD N G LENNOX
MR ASPIN

FLASH

PS/NO 10 DOWNING STREET

SIR R ARMSTRONG)
MR R L WADE GERY)
MR P M MAXEY) CABINET
MR GOULTY) OFFICE
MR P J FOWLER)
DIO)

FLASH

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HD/RHOD DEPT (4)

HD/C AF D

HD/S AF D

HD/PUSD (2)

HD/NEWS DEPT

HD/WAD

MR FREELAND LEGAL ADVISER RMK200A

MR FIFOOT LEGAL ADVISER RM K164

RESIDENT CLERK

GPS 600

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FM MAPUTO 241745 Z JAN 80

TO F L A S H FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 62 OF 24 JANUARY

AND TO F L A S H SALISBURY

MY TELNO 115 TO SALISBURY: ZANU DETAINEES

1. PLAGUED WITH COMMUNICATIONS PROBLEMS TODAY, I HAD ONLY SEEN SNATCHES OF SALISBURY TELNO 79 BY THE TIME I SAW MACHEL.
2. AFTER A LONG DIATRIBE ON FAMILIAR GROUNDS ABOUT THE OUTDATED COLONIAL MENTALITY OF THE WHITE RHODESIANS MACHEL SAID THAT HE WAS CONCERNED THAT WALLS, MITCHELL AND OTHERS WERE WORKING AGAINST PEACE. IF THEY HAD THEIR WAY THERE WOULD BE CIVIL WAR AFTER WE LEAVE. MOZAMBIQUE HAD BEEN CONSISTENT IN ITS SUPPORT FOR A PEACEFUL SOLUTION. HE RESENTED ATTEMPTS BY THE RHODESIANS TO LINK THE MISDEEDS OF ZANU WITH MOZAMBIQUE. HE INSTANCED A RECENT TELEVISION INTERVIEW WITH A SUPPOSEDLY ZANU "TERRORIST" WHO CLAIMED THAT HE AND HIS GROUP HAD CROSSED FROM MOZAMBIQUE ON 14 JANUARY. THIS COULD NOT BE TRUE. THE MAN WAS OBVIOUSLY AN AGENT OF THE RHODESIANS.
3. THE PRESIDENT ALSO CRITICISED THE USE OF THE AUXILIARIES. I COUNTERED AS I HAD DONE WITH MUGABE EARLIER TODAY (PARA 3 OF

3. THE PRESIDENT ALSO CRITICISED THE USE OF THE AUXILIARIES. I COUNTERED AS I HAD DONE WITH MUGABE EARLIER TODAY (PARA 3 OF MY TUR). MACHEL INSISTED HOWEVER THAT THE AUXILIARIES ARE SYNONYMOUS WITH MUZOREWA AND IT WAS PSYCHOLOGICALLY INEPT IF NOTHING ELSE TO DEPLOY THEM IN AREAS WHERE THEY COULD COME FACE TO FACE WITH THE PF.

4. ON DETAINEES, MACHEL SAID THAT THEY HAD ALREADY BEEN BROUGHT CLOSE TO MAPUTO (HE ASKED ME NOT TO PRESS HIM TO SAY WHERE THEY WERE). HAD MUGABE NOT BEEN RETURNING TO RHODESIA IT WOULD HAVE BEEN DIFFICULT FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF MOZAMBIQUE TO RELEASE THEM UNILATERALLY. NOW THAT HE IS LEAVING THEY WILL BE RELEASED; BUT IT WAS JUST UNREALISTIC TO PLAN FOR THEIR ARRIVAL IN SALISBURY ON THE SAME DAY AS MUGABE. HE WAS SURE THAT THE GOVERNOR WOULD NOT WISH TO HAVE RIVALS ARRIVING AT THE SAME TIME. I SAID THAT WE COULD AIRLIFT THEM ON SATURDAY 26 JANUARY. MACHEL INSISTED THAT THEY SHOULD TRAVEL ON MONDAY 28 JANUARY.

5. MUGABE'S DEPARTURE WAS A MILESTONE AND HE WOULD LIKE SOME MOZAMBIKAN OFFICIALS TO ACCOMPANY HIM ON SUNDAY. HE WOULD LET ME HAVE A LIST TOMORROW. THEY WOULD NOT BE MINISTERS OR PEOPLE OF THAT SENIORITY. THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE MFA MIGHT BE ONE OF THEM.

6. MACHEL HAD ALREADY SPOKEN TO MUGABE ABOUT THE CONTENT AND TONE OF THE VOZ BROADCASTS. WITH HIS DEPARTURE ON SUNDAY THE BROADCASTS WOULD CEASE.

7. IN DEPLOYING ALL THE ARGUMENTS IN FAVOUR OF THE IMMEDIATE RELEASE OF THE DETAINEES I MENTIONED THE GOVERNOR'S OFFER TO VISIT MACHEL. HE SAID THAT HE HAD ALREADY HEARD ABOUT THIS OFFER FROM HONWANA AND HE WAS GIVING IT CAREFUL CONSIDERATION.

8. I HAVE ARRANGED FOR THE GOVERNOR'S MESSAGE TO BE DELIVERED BUT I FEAR THAT IT MAY NOT REACH HIM UNTIL TOMORROW MORNING. I ALSO FEAR - INDEED I AM CERTAIN - THAT HE WOULD REGARD IT AS INDEFENSIBLE IF WE WERE TO INSIST ON THE DETAINEES ARRIVING WITH OR IMMEDIATELY BEFORE MUGABE. THE FACT THAT HE INSISTED ON MONDAY AFTER HEARING FROM HONWANA (SALSIBURY TELNO 81) SUGGESTS THAT HE WOULD NOT ACCEPT THAT A 24 HOUR DELAY IN THE ARRIVAL OF THE DETAINEES WOULD JUSTIFY DELAYING MUGABE'S OWN DEPARTURE. HE WOULD REGARD HIS COMMITMENT TO THEIR RELEASE - WHICH WE COULD INSIST SHOULD BE MADE PUBLIC AT ONCE - AS MEETING OUR REQUIREMENT THAT THE PROBLEM HAS BEEN "RESOLVED".

9. I WILL RETURN TO THE ATTACK TOMORROW IN THE HOPE OF PERSUADING THE MOZAMBIKANS TO RELEASE THE DETAINEES IN TIME FOR THEM TO FLY OUT ON SUNDAY AFTERNOON; BUT IF WE HAVE TO ACCEPT MONDAY 28 I RECOMMEND MOST STRONGLY THAT WE SHOULD NOT SEEK TO PREVENT MUGABE FROM TRAVELLING ON SUNDAY 27.

10. ONE OF MY PROBLEMS WILL BE TO GET MUGABE AND THE MOZAMBIKANS TO ACCOUNT FOR THE 66 DETAINEES WHOSE NAMES WE HAVE AND THE 5

THE MOZAMBICANS TO RELEASE THE DETAINEES IN TIME FOR THEM TO FLY OUT ON SUNDAY AFTERNOON; BUT IF WE HAVE TO ACCEPT MONDAY 28 I RECOMMEND MOST STRONGLY THAT WE SHOULD NOT SEEK TO PREVENT MUGABE FROM TRAVELLING ON SUNDAY 27.

10. ONE OF MY PROBLEMS WILL BE TO GET MUGABE AND THE MOZAMBICANS TO ACCOUNT FOR THE 66 DETAINEES WHOSE NAMES WE HAVE AND THE 5 UNNAMED ONES (MY TELNO 017) . I PROPOSE TO SEEK ACCESS TO THEM AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

PAPADOPOULOS

NNNN

SENT AT / RECD AT 241820Z SMAP/FC

[RHODESIA: POLICY: ADVANCE COPIES]

+ 28

PS/SIR I GILMOUR
PS/FR LUCE
PS/PUS
SIR D MAITLAND
MR DAY
LORD N G LENNOX
MR ASPIN

PS/NO 10 DOWNING STREET

SIR R ARMSTRONG)
MR R L WADE CERY)
MR P M MAXEY) CABINET
MR GOULTY) OFFICE
MR P J FOWLER)
DIO)

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HD/RHOD DEPT (4)

HD/C AF D
HD/S AF D

HD/FUSD (2)

HD/NEWS DEPT
HD/WAD

MR FREELAND LEGAL ADVISER RMK200A
MR FIFOOT LEGAL ADVISER RM K164

Ans

GPS 780

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DESKBY SALISBURY 241600Z

FM MAPUTO 241350Z

TO IMMEDIATE SALISBURY

TEL NO 115 OF 24 JANUARY 1980

AND TO IMMEDIATE FCO

INFO IMMEDIATE DAR ES SALAAM LUSAKA NAIROBI WASHINGTON

UKMIS NEW YORK GABORONE PRETORIA

MY TEL NO 112 : ZANU DETAINEES.

1. FCO TEL NO 34 ARRIVED TOO LATE FOR ME TO TAKE ACTION YESTERDAY BUT IT ENABLED ME, FIRST THING THIS MORNING, TO REINFORCE WHAT I HAD SAID TO FERRAO. HE SAW THE PRESIDENT THIS MORNING AND I HAVE BEEN SUMMONED BY MACHEL FOR 1530 LOCAL TIME TODAY.

2. I HAVE ALSO HAD A LONG TALK WITH MUGABE AT HIS REQUEST. HE ASKED WHAT THE ARRANGEMENTS WERE FOR DEALING WITH OUTSTANDING ARMED GROUPS WHO WISH TO ASSEMBLE. I SAID THAT AFTER THE DEADLINE OF 4 JANUARY SUCH PEOPLE HAD TO MAKE CONTACT WITH THE MONITORING GROUPS EG THROUGH MISSIONS, SCHOOLS ETC. THEY HAD TO SURRENDER THEIR ARMS AND, PROVIDED THEY DID SO, THEY WERE CONDUCTED TO AN ASSEMBLY POINT. I SAID THAT THIS HAD ALREADY HAPPENED IN SEVERAL INSTANCES. MUGABE ASKED WHAT HAPPENED TO THE SURRENDERED ARMS. I SAID THAT THEY WOULD BE PROPERLY LISTED AND LAWFULLY ACCOUNTED FOR.

.....
..... THE QUESTION OF THE AUXILIARIES. HE HAD

AND, PROVIDED THEY DID SO, THEY WERE CONDUCTED TO AN ASSEMBLY POINT. I SAID THAT THIS HAD ALREADY HAPPENED IN SEVERAL INSTANCES. MUGABE ASKED WHAT HAPPENED TO THE SURRENDERED ARMS. I SAID THAT THEY WOULD BE PROPERLY LISTED AND LAWFULLY ACCOUNTED FOR.

3. MUGABE AGAIN RAISED THE QUESTION OF THE AUXILIARIES. HE HAD HEARD THAT SITHOLE HAD PUT IT ABOUT THAT HE HAD CONSULTED MUGABE WITH A VIEW TO BOYCOTTING THE ELECTIONS AND THE AGREEMENTS IF THE AUXILIARIES WERE NOT MADE TO RETURN TO THEIR BASES. MUGABE SAID THAT THERE HAD CERTAINLY BEEN NO SUCH CONTACT WITH SITHOLE BUT HE WAS EXTREMELY CONCERNED ABOUT THE BEHAVIOUR OF THE AUXILIARIES AND WENT OVER FAMILIAR ALLEGATIONS. I EXPLAINED THE POSITION OF THE AUXILIARIES ADDING THAT THEIR DEPLOYMENT AS UNITS OF THE LAWFUL RHODESIAN FORCES HAD ONLY BEEN NECESSARY BECAUSE THE POLICE WERE IN MANY INSTANCES UNABLE TO COPE WITH BREACHES OF THE CEASEFIRE COMMITTED BY ZANLA. ZANLA GROUPS HAD BEEN GUILTY OF POLITICIZING AND INTIMIDATION.

4. HE WAS ALSO CONCERNED ABOUT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE RHODESIAN AIR FORCE AND ESPECIALLY ABOUT AN INCIDENT WHICH HE CLAIMED TOOK PLACE ABOUT 12 JANUARY WHEN BOMBS WERE DROPPED ON RHODESIAN SOIL NOT FAR FROM NYAMAPANDA. HE WOULD BE RAISING THIS AND OTHER CEASEFIRE BREACHES BY THE RHODESIANS WITH YOU. I SAID THAT I HAD HEARD NOTHING ABOUT SUCH AN INCIDENT AND I VERY MUCH DOUBTED THE ACCURACY OF HIS INFORMATION SINCE THE AIR FORCE IS BEING FULLY MONITORED.

5. MUGABE THEN TURNED TO WHAT I SUSPECT WAS HIS REAL REASON FOR WANTING TO SEE ME: THE DETAINEES. HE SAID THAT IN COOPERATION WITH THE MOZAMBIKAN AUTHORITIES THEY WERE BEING BROUGHT 'NEARER MAPUTO' (HE REFUSED TO TELL ME WHERE) SO THAT THEIR REPATRIATION COULD BE MADE EASIER. HE WANTED TO KNOW HOW WE WOULD TREAT THE RELEASED 'CAPTIVES' ONCE THEY RETURNED TO RHODESIA (I CONFIRMED THAT WE WOULD AIRLIFT THEM). WITH THE EXCEPTION OF 5 FORMER CENTRAL COMMITTEE MEMBERS (MUDZI, GUMBO, HAMADZIRIPI, MANDIZVIDZA AND MUSIKAVANHU) ALL HAD RECEIVED MILITARY TRAINING. HE EXPECTED THAT SOME OF THEM WOULD WISH, OF THEIR OWN FREE WILL, TO REMAIN WITH ZANU. WE WOULD HAVE AN OPPORTUNITY TO VERIFY THIS. HE IMAGINED THAT BOTH THEY AND OTHERS WOULD BE TREATED AS MILITARY PERSONNEL AND THEREFORE, PRESUMABLY, TAKEN TO ASSEMBLY POINTS. I SAID THAT I HAD NO INSTRUCTIONS ON THAT; BUT IT SEEMED TO ME THAT GIVEN THEIR LONG PERIOD OF DETENTION WE WOULD TREAT THEM AS POLITICAL DETAINEES RATHER THAN MILITARY PERSONNEL. MUGABE RETORTED THAT THIS WOULD BE AN UNFAIR DIFFERENTIATION BETWEEN THEM AND OTHER TRAINED PF PERSONNEL WHO HAVE HAD TO ASSEMBLE. I SAID THAT I WOULD PUT THIS POINT TO YOU BUT THAT, AS FAR AS I WAS CONCERNED, THE MOST IMMEDIATE PROBLEM

NO INSTRUCTIONS ON THAT: BUT IT SEEMED TO ME THAT GIVEN THEIR LONG PERIOD OF DETENTION WE WOULD TREAT THEM AS POLITICAL DETAINEES RATHER THAN MILITARY PERSONNEL. MUGABE RETORTED THAT THIS WOULD BE AN UNFAIR DIFFERENTIATION BETWEEN THEM AND OTHER TRAINED PF PERSONNEL WHO HAVE HAD TO ASSEMBLE. I SAID THAT I WOULD PUT THIS POINT TO YOU BUT THAT, AS FAR AS I WAS CONCERNED, THE MOST IMMEDIATE PROBLEM WAS THAT OF THE TIMING OF THEIR RELEASE. YOU AND HMG WERE WELL AWARE OF HIS ARGUMENTS (WHICH HE AGAIN REPEATED AT LENGTH) EG ABOUT THE NEED FOR THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE TO BE INVOLVED. THESE ARGUMENTS WERE UNACCEPTABLE. ALTHOUGH IT WAS TIME THAT PARAGRAPH 16 OF THE PRE-INDEPENDENCE ARRANGEMENTS DID NOT SET A TIME LIMIT, FIVE WEEKS HAVE ALREADY LAPSED, DJG YOU HAD RELEASED THE POLITICAL DETAINEES WHO HAD BEEN HELD ON MINISTERIAL ORDERS. THE DETAINEES MUST BE RELEASED NOW AND CERTAINLY NOT LATER THAN SUNDAY.

6. MUGABE ARGUED THAT THERE WERE ALSO PRACTICAL PROBLEMS WHICH MADE IT IMPOSSIBLE FOR THE DETAINEES TO BE RELEASED BEFORE NEXT MONDAY OR TUESDAY. HE SAID THAT THE MOZAMBICAN AUTHORITIES, WHO WERE EQUALLY CONCERNED WITH THE MATTER, WOULD EXPLAIN SOME OF THE PROBLEMS TO ME. MY FINAL WORD WAS THAT YOU AND HMG WOULD FIND THE DELAY UNACCEPTABLE.

7. MUGABE SAID THAT THE TWO WHITES (HE COULD STILL NOT GIVE ME THEIR NAMES) WOULD ALSO BE RELEASED ON MONDAY OR TUESDAY

8. I WILL REPORT FURTHER AFTER MY MEETING WITH THE PRESIDENT.

PAPADOPOULOS

NNNN

SENT/RECD AT 241435Z AR/FHC

CONFIDENTIAL

GR 120

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FM DAR ES SALAAM 241000Z JANUARY 80

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELNO 91 OF 24 JANUARY

INFO PRIORITY SALISBURY, LUSAKA, MAPUTO, GABORONE, LUANDA,
CAPE TOWN, LAGOS

INFO ROUTINE ADDIS ABABA, UKMIS NEW YORK, WASHINGTON

RHODESIA

1. THE US AMBASSADOR SAW PRESIDENT NYERERE IN BUTIAMA YESTERDAY,
23 JANUARY, WHEN ACCOMPANYING A SENIOR US OFFICIAL ON A CALL.

2. MR VIETS FOUND NYERERE IN BAD SHAPE PHYSICALLY. I UNDERSTAND
HE HAS BEEN ILL. HE HAS CERTAINLY BEEN OVERSTRAINED FOR SOME
TIME, AND MISS WICKEN HAS COMMENTED TO ME ON THIS.

3. MR VIETS SAID THAT NYERERE WAS MUCH CLAMER ON RHODESIA AND
IT DID NOT TAKE UP A LARGE PART OF THE DISCUSSION. THERE WERE
NO ALLEGATIONS OR ACCUSATIONS AND AT ONE POINT NYERERE SAID
THAT IF WE WERE READY TO BE "REASONABLY FAIR" HE THOUGHT WE
WOULD GET THROUGH.

4. THIS IS A LITTLE ENCOURAGING UNLESS NYERERE'S MOOD SIMPLY
REFLECTS HIS PRESENT POOR HEALTH.
MOON

FILES

RHOD D

OADS

NAD

PUSD

PLANNING STAFF

CCD

UND

LEGAL ADVISERS

(MR FREELAND)

(MR FIFOOT)

DEF D

IPD

OID

NEWS D

PS

PS/SIR I GILMOUR

PS/MR LUCE

PS/MR RIDLEY

PS/MR HURD

PS/MR MARTEN

PS/PUS

SIR D MAITLAND

MR HANNAY

LORD N G LENNOX

MR DAY

MR FERGUSSON

MR ASPIN

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X-27

PS
PS/SIR I GILMOUR
PS/MR LUCE
S/PUS
SIR D MALTLAND
~~.....~~
LORD N G LENNOX
MR ASPIN

PS/NO 10 DOWNING STREET

SIR R ARMSTRONG)
MR R L WADE GERY)
MR P M MAXEY) CABINET
MR GOULTY) OFFICE
MR P J FOWLER)
DIO)

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HD/RHOD DEPT (4)

HD/C AF D
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HD/PUSD (2)

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MR FREELAND LEGAL ADVISER RMK200A
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RESIDENT CLERK

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DESKBY 250830Z

FROM U K MISSION NEW YORK 250009Z JAN 80

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 170 OF 24 JANUARY

INFO IMMEDIATE SALISBURY, CAPE TOWN, LAGOS, DAR ES SALAAM, LUSAKA,
GABORONE, LUANDA, MAPUTO, PRIORITY WASHINGTON.

MIPT: RHODESIA AND THE SECURITY COUNCIL.

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY OAU LIBERATION
COMMITTEE:

THE CO-ORDINATING COMMITTEE FOR THE LIBERATION OF AFRICA MEETING
IN ITS 34TH SESSION FROM THE 21ST TO 25TH JANUARY 1980 IN DAR ES
SALAAM, TANZANIA,

HAVING CONSIDERED THE LATEST DEVELOPMENTS IN SOUTHERN RHODESIA
(ZIMBABWE)

HAVING EXAMINED THE REPORT OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT ON THE
SITUATION IN SOUTHERN RHODESIA,

HAVING HEARD THE STATEMENTS OF THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE
FRONT-LINE COUNTRIES ON THE SITUATION IN SOUTHERN RHODESIA,

HAVING HEARD ALSO THE STATEMENTS BY THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE
PATRIOTIC FRONT OF ZIMBABWE,

NOTING THAT THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED KINGDOM HAS RESUMED ITS

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NOTING THAT THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED KINGDOM HAS RESUMED ITS RESPONSIBILITY AS THE ADMINISTERING POWER FOLLOWING THE AGREEMENT REACHED AT LANCASTER HOUSE, LONDON,

GRAVELY CONCERNED AT THE GROSS VIOLATIONS BY UNITED KINGDOM, THE ADMINISTERING COLONIAL POWER IN SOUTHERN RHODESIA, IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE TERMS OF AGREEMENT REACHED AT LANCASTER HOUSE, LONDON, IN PARTICULAR, THE DEPLOYMENT OF RHODESIAN AND AUXILIARY FORCES WHO HAVE BEEN COMMITTING WANTON MURDER AND HARRASSING OF PATRIOTIC FRONT SYMPATHISERS, AND SYSTEMATIC PRESS AND RADIO PROPAGANDA AIMED AT DISCREDITING THE PATRIOTIC FRONT,

GRAVELY CONCERNED ALSO AT THE SYSTEMATIC PRESS AND RADIO PROPAGANDA BY SOUTH AFRICA AIMED AT DISCREDITING THE PATRIOTIC FRONT

DEPLORING THE DELAYING TACTICS OF THE BRITISH ADMINISTRATION IN SOUTHERN RHODESIA BY REFUSING TO FACILITATE THE EARLY RETURN OF RHODESIAN REFUGEES TO THEIR COUNTRY IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE LANCASTER HOUSE AGREEMENT,

GRAVELY CONCERNED ALSO WITH THE PRESENCE OF SOUTH AFRICAN TROOPS AND MERCENARIES IN SOUTHERN RHODESIA CONTRARY TO THE ASSURANCE EARLIER GIVEN BY THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT OF EXPELLING ALL FOREIGN FORCES IN SOUTHERN RHODESIA,

GRAVELY CONCERNED ALSO ABOUT THE THREAT SOUTH AFRICA POSES TO THE INDEPENDENCE, UNITY AND PEACE OF ZIMBABWE, AND TO THE INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY,

BEARING IN MIND THAT THE NEGOTIATIONS AT LANCASTER HOUSE IN LONDON WERE THE DIRECT RESULT OF THE ARMED STRUGGLE BY THE PEOPLE OF ZIMBABWE LED BY THE PATRIOTIC FRONT, THEIR SOLE LEGITIMATE REPRESENTATIVE,

1. HAILS THE VICTORY OF THE HEROIC PEOPLE OF ZIMBABWE AND CONGRATULATES THE PATRIOTIC FRONT FOR ITS PROSECUTION OF THE LIBERATION STRUGGLE AND FOR THE DECISIVE CONTRIBUTION IN THE NEGOTIATIONS AT LANCASTER HOUSE, LONDON AND FOR ITS IMPRESSIVE COMPLIANCE WITH THE LANCASTER HOUSE AGREEMENT;

2. DECLARES SOLEMNLY THAT A JUST AND LASTING SETTLEMENT IN ZIMBABWE IS POSSIBLE ONLY WITH THE FULL PARTICIPATION OF THE PATRIOTIC FRONT AT EVERY STAGE OF IMPLEMENTATION;

3. CONDEMNS THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT FOR ITS VIOLATIONS OF THE TERMS OF THE LANCASTER HOUSE AGREEMENT, AND FOR ITS MANOEUVRES TO ENSURE THE CONTINUANCE IN POWER OF THE SMITH/MUZOREWA GROUP IN THE TERRITORY;

4. FURTHER CONDEMNS THE DECISION OF THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT TO RENEW FOR ANOTHER SIX MONTHS THE STATE OF EMERGENCY AND TO MAINTAIN MARTIAL LAW IN THE TERRITORY, AND CALLS FOR THEIR IMMEDIATE ABROGATION;

5. CALLS UPON THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT TO COMPLY WITH AND IMPLEMENT FULLY AND IMPARTIALLY THE LANCASTER HOUSE AGREEMENT AND TO CONFINE FORTHWITH THE RHODESIA SECURITY AND AUXILIARY FORCES TO THEIR

5. CALLS UPON THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT TO COMPLY WITH AND IMPLEMENT FULLY AND IMPARTIALLY THE LANCASTER HOUSE AGREEMENT AND TO CONFINE FORTHWITH THE RHODESIA SECURITY AND AUXILIARY FORCES TO THEIR BARRACKS:
6. CALLS UPON THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT ALSO TO CREATE CONDITIONS IN SOUTHERN RHODESIA WHICH WILL ENSURE A FREE AND FAIR ELECTION AND AVERT THE DANGER OF THE COLLAPSE OF THE LANCASTER HOUSE AGREEMENT:
7. CALLS UPON THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT TO IMMEDIATELY TAKE THE FOLLOWING ACTIONS IN ORDER TO ENSURE THAT ALL ZIMBABWE NATIONALS FREELY PARTICIPATE IN THE FORTHCOMING ELECTORAL PROCESS:
 - (I) RELEASE ALL POLITICAL PRISONERS:
 - (II) ALLOW ALL ZIMBABWE EXILES TO RETURN HOME WITHOUT THE THREAT, INTIMIDATION OR ARREST IN CONFORMITY WITH LANCASTER HOUSE AGREEMENT:
8. STRONGLY CONDEMNS THE RACIST REGIME IN SOUTH AFRICA FOR INTERFERENCE IN THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF ZIMBABWE NAMELY THE CAMPAIGN BY VICIOUS PRESS AND RADIO PROPAGANDA AIMED AT DISCREDITING THE PATRIOTIC FRONT:
9. DECLARES THAT THE PRESENCE OF SOUTH AFRICAN TROOPS IN SOUTHERN RHODESIA CONSTITUTES A VIOLATION OF THE LANCASTER HOUSE AGREEMENT AND A THREAT TO INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY:
10. CALLS UPON THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT ALSO TO ENSURE THE IMMEDIATE AND COMPLETE WITHDRAWAL OF SOUTH AFRICAN TROOPS AS WELL AS ALL MERCENARIES CURRENTLY SERVING IN THE SECURITY FORCES OF SOUTHERN RHODESIA:
11. REITERATES ITS COMMITMENT TO RESPECT ONLY THE FREE AND FAIR CHOICE OF THE PEOPLE OF ZIMBABWE:
12. CALLS UPON ALL OAU MEMBER STATES NOT TO ACCORD ANY RECOGNITION TO ANY INSTITUTION SET UP IN ZIMBABWE WHICH IS NOT THE DIRECT OUTCOME OF SUCH FREE AND FAIR CHOICE BY THE PEOPLE OF ZIMBABWE:
13. REQUESTS THE AFRICAN GROUP AT THE UNITED NATIONS TO TAKE APPROPRIATE MEASURES TO CONVENE AN URGENT MEETING OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL TO CONSIDER THE EXPLOSIVE SITUATION IN SOUTHERN RHODESIA INCLUDING THE PRESENCE OF SOUTH AFRICAN TROOPS AND MERCENARIES IN THE TERRITORY:
14. REQUESTS THE FOLLOWING MEMBER STATES ALGERIA, ANGOLA, BOTSWANA, LIBERIA, MOZAMBIQUE, NIGERIA, SOMALIA, TANZANIA AND ZAMBIA IN ADDITION TO THE AFRICAN MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL TO SEND REPRESENTATIVES AT THE HIGHEST LEVEL POSSIBLE TO PARTICIPATE AT THE SECURITY COUNCIL DEBATE REFERRED TO IN PARAGRAPH 13 ABOVE:
15. CALLS UPON ALL OAU MEMBER STATES TO GRANT, AS A MATTER OF UTMOST URGENCY, ALL POSSIBLE FINANCIAL AND MATERIAL ASSISTANCE TO THE PATRIOTIC FRONT TO ENABLE IT MOUNT AN EFFECTIVE ELECTION CAMPAIGN:
16. REQUESTS THE SECRETARY GENERAL TO LOOK INTO THE POSSIBILITY OF BRINGING FORWARD THE DATE OF THE CONVENING OF THE 24TH ORDINARY

SECRETARY GENERAL TO LOOK INTO THE POSSIBILITY
OF BRINGING FORWARD THE DATE OF THE CONVENING OF THE 34TH ORDINARY
SESSION OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS TO ENABLE THE COUNCIL GIVE AN
EARLY CONSIDERATION TO THE CURRENT SITUATION IN SOUTHERN RHODESIA.

PARSONS

NNNN

SENT AT 25/0144Z RD
RECD AT 25/0144Z RPF

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GR 550

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FM UKMIS NEW YORK 250008Z JAN 80

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 169 OF 24 JANUARY

INFO IMMEDIATE SALISBURY CAPETOWN LAGOS DAR ES SALAAM LUSAKA
GABORONE LUANDA MAPUTO PRIORITY WASHINGTON PARIS LISBON OSLO
ABIDJAN TUNIS MEXICO CITY KINGSTON

MY TELNO 164 (NOT TO ALL) AND MY TELECON WITH POWELL: RHODESIA
AND THE SECURITY COUNCIL

1. SINCE MY CONVERSATION WITH POWELL, THE SITUATION HAS TAKEN A
SERIOUS TURN FOR THE WORSE. THE RESOLUTION OF THE OAU LIBERATION
COMMITTEE HAS BEEN PUBLISHED HERE (TEXT IN MIFT - NOT TO ALL) AND
WE UNDERSTAND THAT THIS EVENING THE AFRICAN GROUP DECIDED TO SEND
IMMEDIATELY TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL A LETTER CALLING
FOR A MEETING OF THE COUNCIL ON WEDNESDAY 30 JANUARY. THIS WOULD
PROBABLY MEAN INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS ON 29 JANUARY. MKAPA, THE
TANZANIAN FOREIGN MINISTER, WHO IS NOW IN HAVANA (PRESUMABLY TO
GIVE CASTRO A LETTER SIMILAR TO THAT SENT TO WALDHEIM (MY TELNO 157 -
NOT TO ALL)), IS EXPECTED BACK HERE ON MONDAY TO ORCHESTRATE THE
AFRICAN CAMPAIGN. PARAGRAPH 14 OF THE OAU RESOLUTION SUGGESTS THAT
OTHER AFRICAN MINISTERS MAY ATTEND THE COUNCIL MEETING.

2. IF THIS INITIATIVE CANNOT BE STOPPED, WE ARE IN FOR A VERY
DIFFICULT TIME. I WOULD EXPECT THE COUNCIL PROCEEDINGS TO LAST
FOR THREE DAYS, DURING WHICH THE GDR WILL TAKE OVER THE PRESIDENCY.
THE AFRICANS ARE LIKELY TO TABLE A RESOLUTION CONTAINING MUCH OF
THE LANGUAGE IN THE OAU RESOLUTION. MONSTROUS THOUGH THIS IS,
I DO NOT BELIEVE THAT WE WOULD BE ABLE TO SECURE ENOUGH ABSTENTIONS
TO AVOID HAVING TO VETO. (AND IF THE AFRICANS WERE CLEVER AND
TABLED A RESOLUTION ON BEITBRIDGE ALONE, IT WOULD PROBABLY ATTRACH
14 VOTES IN FAVOUR). IN EITHER CASE, WITH THE ARGHANISTAN PRECEDENT
SO FRESH IN EVERYONE'S MIND, THE AFRICANS WOULD IMMEDIATELY USE
THE UNITING FOR PEACE PROCEDURE AND GO TO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY,
WHERE, AFTER SEVERAL FURTHER DAYS OF ACRIMONIOUS DEBATE, A
RESOLUTION ON THE OAU LINES WOULD BE ADOPTED BY AN OVERWHELMING
MAJORITY. MY FEAR IS THAT THE HEAT GENERATED DURING THESE
PROCEEDINGS WOULD HAVE REPERCUSSIONS WHICH COULD PUT THE WHOLE
SETTLEMENT SERIOUSLY AT RISK.

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3. FOR ALL THESE REASONS, I FEEL MORE STRONGLY THAN I DID AT ANY STAGE DURING THE LANCASTER HOUSE CONFERENCE THAT IT IS OF PARAMOUNT IMPORTANCE THAT WE SHOULD TRY TO AVOID THE SECURITY COUNCIL. I STILL BELIEVE THAT IT IS ONLY BEITBRIDGE THAT HAS PROVOKED THE AFRICANS INTO MAKING THIS MOVE AND THAT THE OTHER ISSUES IN THE OAU RESOLUTION ARE OF A QUITE DIFFERENT ORDER OF IMPORTANCE TO THEM. THE MOVE TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL HAS NOW ACQUIRED A DANGEROUS MOMENTUM, BUT IT IS JUST POSSIBLE THAT, IF THE BEITBRIDGE PROBLEM CAN BE SOLVED WITHIN THE NEXT DAY OR TWO (AND ASSUMING THAT AGREEMENT CAN BE REACHED ON MUGABE'S RETURN TO SALISBURY), WE CAN STILL GET THE AFRICANS TO CALL OFF ACTION IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL, OR AT LEAST POSTPONE IT UNTIL AFTER THE OAU FOREIGN MINISTERS' MEETING ON 6 FEBRUARY, BY WHICH TIME TEMPERS MAY HAVE COOLED. I RECOMMENDED TO POWELL THIS MORNING THAT THE ONLY WAY OF STOPPING OR DELAYING THIS MOVE WOULD BE FOR YOU OR THE PRIME MINISTER TO SEND AN URGENT MESSAGE TO THE PRESIDENTS OF THE FRONT LINE STATES, EMPHASISING THE DANGERS IN EARLY PROCEEDINGS IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL. THAT REMAINS MY FIRM RECOMMENDATION.

PARSONS

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*There were one or two such reports
to the same effect during the
Lancaster House conference.*

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FM CAPE TOWN EMBASSY 231620Z JAN 1980

TO PRIORITY FCC

TELEGRAM NO 32 OF 23 JANUARY

INFO PRIORITY SALISBURY MAPUTO GABORONE LUSAKA LUANDA LAGOS
DAR ES SALAAM PRETORIA UKMIS NEW YORK

RHODESIA: SOUTH AFRICAN PRESS REPORTS OF MUGABE'S
INTENTIONS

1. THE 'CAPE TIMES' TODAY CARRIES A REPORT FROM SALISBURY OF AN EXCLUSIVE INTERVIEW WITH AN UNNAMED QUOTE TOP LIEUTENANT UNQUOTE OF ROBERT MUGABE, WHO MAINTAINED THAT MUGABE WOULD SEEK A COALITION WITH QUOTE THE WHITE POLITICAL BLOC UNQUOTE IF Z A N U (PF) GAINS THE MAJORITY OF BLACK SEATS IN NEXT MONTH'S RHODESIAN ELECTIONS.
MUGABE'S TWO REASONS FOR DOING THIS ARE SAID TO BE:-

(A) THAT AN ALLIANCE WITH THE RHODESIAN FRONT WOULD CHECK THE THREAT TO ZANU (PF) OF A POST-ELECTION DEAL BETWEEN NKOMO AND MUZOREWA WHICH MUGABE BELIEVES BRITAIN AND SOUTH AFRICA ARE ATTEMPTING TO PROMOTE;

(B) THAT MUGABE IS ALLEGEDLY HEEDING THE ADVICE OF PRESIDENT MACHEL, WHO IS ATTRIBUTED WITH SAYING QUOTE DON'T MAKE

THE MISTAKE WE DID. DON'T FORCE THE WHITES TO LEAVE UNQUOTE.

2. THE 'CAPE TIMES' REPORTER SEES THIS AS AN ENCOURAGING SIGN. TO MAKE A COALITION POSSIBLE, MUGABE WOULD HAVE TO TEMPER HIS EXTREMISM: HE HAS ALREADY SHOWN SIGNS OF DOING THIS, THE REPORTER COMMENTS, AND GIVES AS AN EXAMPLE HIS RECENT DENIAL THAT HIS PARTY HAS ANY PLANS FOR LARGE SCALE NATIONALISATION OR FOR THE MASS CONFISCATION OF WHITE PROPERTY.

3. THIS EXCLUSIVE INTERVIEW FOLLOWS ANOTHER IN THE JOHANNESBURG 'STAR' OF 21 JANUARY (SEE PARAGRAPH 2 OF DAR ES SALAAM TELN078) IN WHICH, BESIDES THREATENING TO PULL HIS MEN OUT OF ASSEMBLY CAMPS, MUGABE ALSO SAID:

IF ZANU CAME TO POWER IN RHODESIA IT WOULD ACCEPT THE THE REALITY OF AN APARTHEID REGIME IN SOUTH AFRICA AND WOULD TRADE WITH THE REPUBLIC.

THOUGH ZANU AND JOSHUA NKOMO'S ZAPU HAD FOUGHT THE WAR TOGETHER, THE TIME HAD COME FOR THEM TO SUBMIT THEMSELVES SEPARATELY TO THE TEST OF PUBLIC OPINION (IN THE ELECTION). HE INDICATED THAT THE WINNER WOULD HEAD A COALITION GOVERNMENT.

HE WOULD ACCEPT THE OUTCOME OF FREE AND FAIR ELECTIONS AND IF HE LOST WOULD TRY AGAIN TO WIN THROUGH THE BALLOT BOX THE NEXT TIME .

HIS PARTY HAD NO PLANS FOR LARGE SCALE NATIONALISATION AND NO INTENTION OF THROWING QUOTE GOOD UNQUOTE WHITE FARMERS OFF THEIR LAND.

WHITES WOULD BE ASKED TO STAY AND THERE WOULD BE NO VICTIMISATION OF ANYBODY - NOT EVEN BLACK SECURITY FORCE MEMBERS.

MR IAN SMITH AND THE OTHER QUOTE ARCHITECTS OF UDI UNQUOTE , AS WELL AS ARMED FORCES COMMANDER GENERAL PETER WALLS, WOULD BE WELCOME TO LIVE IN RETIREMENT IN RHODESIA, HE SAID.

4. MUGABE IS ALSO REPORTED TO HAVE CLAIMED THAT 90% OF HIS MEN

4. MUGABE IS ALSO REPORTED TO HAVE CLAIMED THAT 90% OF HIS MEN WERE IN ASSEMBLY CAMPS AND THAT THERE WERE 3,000 SERVING MEMBERS OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN ARMED FORCES IN RHODESIA IN ADDITION TO A FURTHER 3,000 IN THE RHODESIAN FORCES.

5. THE 'STAR'S' AFRICAN NEWS SERVICE QUOTES MUGABE AS SAYING IN MAPUTO THAT HE HAD NO INTENTION OF GOING TO WAR WITH SOUTH AFRICA AND HOPED THAT SOUTH AFRICA WOULD NOT PROVOKE A WAR.

CCN: PARA 4 FIRST LINE SHOULD READ ... CLAIMED THAT 90 PERCENT.....

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FROM SALISBURY 221825Z JAN 80
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 295 OF 22 JANUARY 1980

Prime Minister

[Signature]

INFO IMMEDIATE LUSAKA, DAR ES SALAAM, MAPUTO, GABORONE, LUANDA, PRETORIA, CAPE TOWN, WASHINGTON, LAGOS, UKMIS NEW YORK, CANBERRA, PRIORITY OTTAWA, WELLINGTON, NAIROBI AND SUVA.

MY TELNO 226/ RHODESIA: SITREP 22 JANUARY.

1. THERE HAS BEEN AN INCREASE IN THE NUMBER OF CONTACTS REPORTED BETWEEN THE SECURITY FORCES AND PF ELEMENTS OVER YESTERDAY. IN THE LAST 24 HOUR PERIOD COMINED OPERATIONS HAVE ALLEGED A TOTAL OF 17 POTENTIAL VIOLATIONS CONSISTING OF 10 CONTACTS, 4 SHOOTINGS, ONE LANDMINE EXPLOSION, ONE BORDER CROSSING AND ONE ASSAULT. 5 PF PERSONNEL AND TWO LOCALS WERE KILLED. THIS MORNING THERE WERE 21.607 IN THE ASSEMBLY PLACES.
2. THE CEASE FIRE COMMISSION MET AGAIN TODAY AND CONSIDERED 25 ALLEGATIONS OF BREACHES OF THE CEASEFIRE, MAINLY TABLED BY ZANLA. THE COMMISSION CONCLUDED THAT ONLY 6 COULD BE CLASSIFIED AS BREACHES BECAUSE THE REST WERE TOO VAGUE. THE ATTRIBUTION OF THE BREACHES WAS: ONE BY THE AUXILIARIES, TWO BY ZANLA, ONE IN THE ZANLA AREA OF OPERATIONS, ONE UNATTRIBUTABLE AND ONE DEFERRED FOR FURTHER INVESTIGATION. THERE WERE TWO INSTANCES OF INCITEMENT TO A BREACH OF THE CEASEFIRE IN WHICH THE SECURITY FORCES WERE RESPONSIBLE. THERE WERE TWO CASES OF ARMED INTIMIDATION WHICH THE COMMISSION CONSIDERED WERE BREACHES OF THE LANCASTER HOUSE AGREEMENT AND A MATTER FOR THE POLICE. (ABOUT 50 ALLEGATIONS, MAINLY MADE BY THE SECURITY FORCES, ARE OUTSTANDING.)
3. THE DEPLOYMENT OF A SECURITY FORCE COMPANY TO LOOK FOR THE ALLEGED LARGE GROUP OF GUERILLAS NEAR NKA1 IS SUPPOSED TO END ON SUNDAY. WE HAVE REASON TO BELIEVE THAT THERE IS A PLAN FOR IT TO CARRY ON COVERTLY. WE ARE TAKING APPROPRIATE ACTION. ALL OF THE ZIPRA PERSONNEL DETAINED AT KAROI HAVE BEEN RELEASED EXCEPT FOR 3.

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/ASSEMBLY AREAS.

ASSEMBLY AREAS.

4. THERE ARE PROBLEMS OVER THE BUFFER ZONES AROUND THE ASSEMBLY AREAS WHICH WE ARE URGENTLY WORKING TO RESOLVE. THE CONCEPT OF THE BUFFER ZONES WAS ORIGINALLY AN INFORMAL AND PRIVATE ARRANGEMENT BETWEEN OURSELVES AND THE SECURITY FORCES TO PROVIDE FOR AREAS IN WHICH THE LATTER WOULD NOT PATROL. IN TERMS OF THE CEASEFIRE AGREEMENT THE AREAS SHOULD ALSO HAVE BEEN FREE OF PF GUERILLAS. BUT THE ARRANGEMENT IS NO LONGER PRIVATE AND THERE HAVE BEEN MISUNDERSTANDINGS OVER PROPOSALS TO REDUCE THE SIZE OF THE ZONES TO A DISTANCE OF BETWEEN 500 AND 1500 METRES FROM THE ASSEMBLY AREA PERIMETER. RELATED ORDERS SENT OUT BY SECURITY FORCES HQS WHICH STATED THAT NO GUERILLAS SHOULD BE ALLOWED IN THE BUFFER ZONES HAVE BEEN MISUNDERSTOOD BY THE COMMANDER IN TANGENT WHO HAS INTERPRETED THEM AS ALLOWING HIS FORCES TO PATROL IN THE BUFFER ZONES THEMSELVES. THE PF ARE UNDERSTANDBABLY VERY UNHAPPY ABOUT THESE DEVELOPMENTS.

5. THE ALLEGATIONS AGAINST THE AUSTRALIANS IN ASSEMBLY AREA DELTA HAVE BEEN EXAMINED BY THE MONITORING FORCE AND FOR THE MOST PART BEEN FOUND TO BE WITHOUT FOUNDATION. THE CONCLUSION REACHED IS THAT THE COMPLAINTS AND ALLEGATIONS ARE SINISTER AND CONSTITUTE AN ATTEMPTED PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATION AGAINST THE AUSTRALIANS. AT THE SAME CAMP THE PF ALLEGED THAT THEY HAD SEEN A GROUP OF SECURITY FORCES IN THE VINCITY, WHO ON INVESTIGATION TURNED OUT TO BE WATER ENGINEERS ECLAM. THE SECURITY FORCES HAVE POSITIONED 4 HAND HELD ROCKET LAUNCHERS ON A HILL OVERLOOKING FOXTROT BUT THEY REMOVE THEM AT NIGHT. WE ARE TAKING THIS UP. THERE ARE 50 SUSPECTED CASES OF RABIES IN JULIET. WE ARE CONSIDERING MOVING ALPHA BECAUSE ITS POSITION IS UNHEALTHY.

AUXILIARIES.

6. IN THE LAST 3 DAYS 10 AUXILIARY BASES HAVE BEEN CNSPECTED AND NOTHING ONTWARD HAS BEEN FOUND.

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ZANLA.

7. A MONITORING FORCE PAPER SUMMARISING ACTIVITY IN AREA THRASHER (WHICH IS THE EASTERN PART OF THE COUNTRY BORDERING MOZAMBIQUE) CONCLUDES THAT THERE ARE POSSIBLY 1000 ZANLA GUERILLAS STILL OPERATING IN THAT AREA, IN SMALL GROUPS WHERE THERE ARE NO SECURITY FORCES AND IN LARGER GROUPS WHERE SECURITY FORCES ARE PATROLLING. ALL THE GROUPS ARE ELECTIONEERING. THE NUMBER OF FINDS OF HEAVY WEAPONS IS INCREASING: THEY CAN ONLY HAVE BEEN INTENDED BY ZANLA FOR FUTURE USE. IT IS APPARENT THAT UNLESS THE MANY INCIDENTS BY ZANLA STOP, THE SECURITY FORCES WILL INSIST ON MORE AGGRESSIVE PATROLLING, WHICH WILL RESULT IN MORE SHOOTING.

POLITICAL NEWS.

8. YESTERDAY SAW THE COMPLETION OF THE ELECTORAL REGISTRATION PROCESS NINE PARTIES LODGED THEIR CANDIDATES LISTS. THE PARTY WHICH HAS DROPPED OUT IS CHIEF CHIRAU'S ZUPOM THE RETURN OF REFUGEES FROM BOTSWANA BEGAN YESTERDAY.

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FM SALISBURY 221700Z JAN 80

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 291 OF 22/1/80

AND TO IMMEDIATE LUSAKA NAIROBI MAPUTO GABORONE DAR ES SALAAM
LUANDA LAGOS WASHINGTON PRETORIA ADDIS ABABA MONROVIA CANBERRA
OTTAWA WELLINGTON

PRIORITY PEKING MOSCOW PRGRAUE DAKAR KINSHASA KHARTOUM TOKYO
EEC POSTS KUWAIT KINGSTON BRIDGETOWN DACCA NEW DELHI SINGAPORE
GEORGETOWN FREETOWN PORT LOUIS PORT OF SPAIN LILONGWE VALLETTA
BANJUL COLOMBO ACCRA KUALA LUMPUR NICOSIA OSLO STOCKHOLM LISBON
MADRID ATHENS MBABANE ABIDJAN

INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK

INFO SAVING TO NASSAU MASERU CASTRIES SUVA PORT MORESBY HONIARA
NUKUALOFA VICTORIA TARAWA UKDEL NATO SOFICA BUDAPEST BUCHAREST
EAST BERLIN BELGRADE CAIRO ALGIERS TUNIS TRIPOLI RABAT TEHRAN.

RHODESIA: INFRINGEMENTS OF THE CEASE-FIRE AGREEMENT

1. IN VIEW OF THE LINE NYERERE HAS BEEN TAKING ABOUT INFRINGEMENTS
OF THE CEASE-FIRE AGREEMENT, YOU SHOULD BE AWARE THAT THE ZANLA
CONTINGENT AT NANCHINGWEA IN TANZANIA WERE FLOWN TO MOZAMBIQUE
DURING THE LAST DAYS OF THE LANCASTER HOUSE CONFERENCE IN ORDER
TO BE INFILTRATED INTO RHODESIA IN THE PERIOD AFTER THE CEASE-FIRE

DURING THE LAST DAYS OF THE LANCASTER HOUSE CONFERENCE IN ORDER TO BE INFILTRATED INTO RHODESIA IN THE PERIOD AFTER THE CEASE-FIRE AGREEMENT CONCERNING CROSS-BORDER MOVEMENT CAME INTO EFFECT ON 21 DECEMBER. THERE IS FIRM EVIDENCE FROM A CAPTURED MEMBER OF ZANLA THAT AT LEAST 600 DID SO.

2. AS WE HAVE ALSO REPORTED, A 48-STRONG FRELIMO CONTINGENT, WHICH HAS NOW HANDED OVER ITS ARMS TO THE RHODESIANS, CROSSED THE MOZAMBIQUE/RHODESIA BORDER ON 28 DECEMBER, IE THE DAY ON WHICH THE CEASE-FIRE INSIDE RHODESIA CAME INTO EFFECT. ANOTHER FRELIMO PATROL IS REPORTED TO HAVE CROSSED INTO RHODESIA IN THE LAST FEW DAYS. APART FROM THESE TWO GROUPS, ONLY 17 FRELIMO HAVE BEEN ACCOUNTED FOR INSIDE THE COUNTRY, OUT OF A TOTAL OF 500 AS STATED BY PRESIDENT MACHEL.

3. THE PATTERN OF ACTIVITY UNDER WHICH 80 PER CENT OF THE INCIDENTS OCCURRING IN THE COUNTRY ARE ATTRIBUTABLE TO ZANLA IS CONTINUING. APART FROM FURTHER CROSS-BORDER MOVEMENT, THERE IS EVIDENCE OF WELL ORGANISED EFFORTS BY ZANLA OUTSIDE THE ASSEMBLY AREAS TO EXERT PRESSURE ON THE VOTING POPULATION IN THE SHONA TRIBAL TRUST LANDS. THE TECHNIQUE BEING ADOPTED IS TO BREAK ARMED ZANLA FORMATIONS DOWN INTO SMALL GROUPS OR EVEN INDIVIDUALS, SUFFICIENT TO INTIMIDATE A VILLAGE BUT MORE DIFFICULT FOR THE POLICE OR LOCAL AUTHORITIES TO DETECT ESPECIALLY IF THEY HIDE THEIR ARMS. THERE ARE MANY CASES OF VILLAGERS BEING TOLD THAT IF MUGABE DOES NOT WIN THE ELECTIONS ZANLA WILL CONTINUE THE WAR AND THEY WILL BE KILLED. ALL THE OTHER PARTIES ARE PARTICULARLY CONCERNED ABOUT THE LEVEL OF INTIMIDATION IN MANICALAND (BORDERING MOZAMBIQUE).

4. ZANU(PF) MEANWHILE ARE CONTINUING TO DETAIN IN MAPUTO, DESPITE EFFORTS BY THE MOZAMBIQUE GOVERNMENT TO PERSUADE ZANU(PF) TO AGREE TO THEIR RELEASE THE 71 SIGNATORIES OF THE TWO LETTERS ADDRESSED TO HMG BY LEADING ZANU DISSIDENTS WHO WISH TO PARTICIPATE IN THE ELECTIONS (AND SOME OF WHOM HAVE BEEN NOMINATED AS CANDIDATES BY OTHER PARTIES). THIS IS IN DIRECT BREACH OF THE LANCASTER HOUSE AGREEMENT (PARA 16 OF THE AGREEMENT ON THE PRE-INDEPENDENCE ARRANGEMENTS). WE ARE INSISTING THAT THESE DETAINEES SHOULD BE RELEASED BY THE TIME MUGABE RETURNS TO SALISBURY (AT PRESENT PLANNED FOR SUNDAY 27 JANUARY).

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FM SALISBURY 221155Z JAN 80

TO IMMEDIATE MAPUTO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 278 OF 22 JANUARY

INFO IMMEDIATE FCO DAR ES SALAAM NAIROBI LUSAKA GABORONE PRETORIA
WASHINGTON

YOUR TELNO 60: RHODESIA: Z A N U DETAINEES

- MT* *Ami Amie*
1. DUFF SPOKE AGAIN TO HONWANA ABOUT THIS YESTERDAY. HONWANA SAID THAT IT WAS OF COURSE OPEN TO THE MOZAMBICAN GOVERNMENT TO RELEASE THE DETAINEES AT ANY TIME AND THEY WERE TEMPTED TO DO SO. HOWEVER, IT HAD ALWAYS BEEN THEIR PRINCIPLE TO QUOTE TRY TO PERSUADE Z A N U TO DO THE RIGHT THING UNQUOTE, RATHER THAN DOING IT FOR THEM. THIS WAS WHY THEY CONTINUED TO PRESS MUGABE HIMSELF TO RELEASE THE DETAINEES. DUFF TOLD HONWANA WHAT MUGABE HAD SAID ABOUT THE NEED FOR HIS CENTRAL COMMITTEE TO DISCUSS THE TIMING. HONWANA CLEARLY THOUGHT THIS WAS NONSENSE.
 2. HONWANA SAID THAT HE COULD NOT SEE THAT THERE WOULD BE ANY JUSTIFICATION FOR THE MOZAMBIQUE GOVERNMENT TO CONTINUE TO HOLD THE DETAINEES ONCE MUGABE HAD RETURNED TO RHODESIA. DUFF PRESSED HIM ON THIS AND HONWANA CONFIRMED THAT IN HIS VIEW THE MOZAMBIQUE GOVERNMENT SHOULD THEN RELEASE THEM. DUFF SAID THAT WE WOULD ARRANGE THEIR TRANSPORT BACK TO RHODESIA.
 3. DUFF ALSO TOOK UP THE MATTER OF QUOTE VOICE OF ZIMBABWE UNQUOTE BROADCASTS. HONWANA SAID THAT IT WAS HIS VIEW, WHICH HE HAD EXPRESSED ON HIS RECENT VISIT TO MAPUTO, THAT THESE BROADCASTS SHOULD CEASE WITH EFFECT FROM THE TIME OF MUGABE'S DEPARTURE.
 4. FOR REASONS WHICH I HAVE EXPLAINED IN OTHER TELEGRAMS, IN ORDER TO RETAIN RHODESIAN CO-OPERATION ON OTHER MATTERS OF CONSIDERABLE IMPORTANCE, AND TO RESIST DEMANDS FOR MORE DRASTIC ACTION AGAINST Z A N U (P F) IN VIEW OF THEIR CONTINUING VIOLATIONS OF THE CEASE-FIRE AGREEMENT, IT IS INDISPENSABLE THAT I SHOULD BE IN A POSITION TO DEMONSTRATE THAT WE HAVE TAKEN EFFECTIVE ACTION TO SECURE THE RELEASE OF THE DETAINEES. I SHOULD THEREFORE BE GRATEFUL IF YOU WOULD NOW PRESS THE MOZAMBIQUE GOVERNMENT TO RELEASE THE DETAINEES NO LATER THAN THE DAY OF MUGABE'S RETURN TO SALISBURY. AS HONWANA POINTS OUT, SUCH OBLIGATIONS AS THEY MAY CONSIDER THEY HAVE TO Z A N U (P F) WILL BY THEN HAVE BEEN DISCHARGED: AND THERE WILL IN ANY CASE BE NO FURTHER OPPORTUNITY FOR THEM TO PRESS Z A N U (P F) TO AGREE TO THE RELEASE. YOU MAY SAY THAT WE PROPOSE TO SEND A HERCULES TO BEIRA THAT DAY TO COLLECT

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THE DETAINEES (WHOM WE DEFINE AS THE 71 WHO HAVE WRITTEN TO YOU AND THE SECRETARY OF STATE SEEKING RELEASE IN ORDER TO PARTICIPATE IN THE ELECTION.

5. PLEASE ALSO ASK THAT THE QUOTE VOICE OF ZIMBABWE UNQUOTE BROADCASTS CEASE FROM THE SAME DAY. IF ASKED (ALTHOUGH HONWANA DID NOT MENTION IT YESTERDAY), OR IF YOU THINK IT ADVISABLE, YOU MAY SAY THAT WE WILL SEE TO IT THAT THERE WILL BE NO FURTHER BROADCASTS FROM RHODESIA DIRECTED AGAINST MOZAMBIQUE. YOU COULD ALSO DRAW ATTENTION TO THE FACT THAT THE BEIRA/UMTALI RAILWAY WILL BE OPENED AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

6. IT WILL NOT (NOT) BE SUFFICIENT FOR OUR PURPOSES TO GET AN UNDERTAKING THAT THE DETAINEES WILL BE RELEASED AFTER MUGABE'S DEPARTURE. WE MUST GET THEM BACK HERE BY SUNDAY 27 JANUARY IF WE ARE TO DEMONSTRATE THAT Z A N U (P F) ARE BEING REQUIRED TO COMPLY WITH THE LANCASTER HOUSE AGREEMENTS.

7. IN SHORT, WE ARE SUGGESTING THAT ON BOTH THESE MATTERS WE NOW SHIFT OUR SIGHTS TO THE MOZAMBIicans. WE ACCEPT THAT THEY MAY WISH TO CONTINUE FOR A DAY OR TWO (CF HONWANA) TO TRY TO CARRY MUGABE WITH THEM: BUT WHAT IS IMPORTANT TO US IS TO BE ASSURED THAT, WHETHER THEY SUCCEED WITH HIM OR NOT, THEY WILL MEET BOTH OUR REQUESTS AT THE LATEST AT THE TIME OF HIS DEPARTURE.

FCO PASS ALL

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FM FCO 211202Z JANUARY 1980

TO IMMEDIATE LAGOS

TELEGRAM NUMBER 70 OF 21 JAN

INFO IMMEDIATE SALISBURY, LUSAKA, MAPUTO,

GABORONE, WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T15A/80

RHODESIA: REPLY TO PRESIDENT SHAGARI'S MESSAGE
PLEASE PASS FOLLOWING REPLY FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO
PRESIDENT SHAGARI:
BEGINS

THANK YOU FOR WRITING TO ME SO FRANKLY ABOUT RHODESIA.
I AGREE THAT WE MUST CARRY THROUGH OUR EFFORTS TO IMPLEMENT THE
LANCASTER HOUSE AGREEMENT PEACEFULLY AND AMICABLY.

I NOTE VERY CAREFULLY YOUR MISGIVINGS ABOUT THE PRESENCE
OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN DETACHMENT AT BEITERIDGE. JULIUS NYERERE
HAS BEEN IN TOUCH WITH ME ON THIS SAME ISSUE. BUT I DO URGE
MOST STRONGLY THAT WE SHOULD VIEW THIS PROBLEM IN ITS TRUE
PERSPECTIVE. THE STRATEGIC AND ECONOMIC IMPORTANCE OF
BEITBRIDGE IS SELF-EVIDENT. DAMAGE TO IT COULD HAVE VERY
SERIOUS CONSEQUENCES, PARTICULARLY FOR RHODESIA WHICH IS
DEPENDENT ON SOUTH AFRICA FOR COMMUNICATIONS AND SUPPLIES, BUT
ALSO FOR OTHER COUNTRIES IN THE REGION. IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT
IT SHOULD BE PROPERLY PROTECTED AND SOUTH AFRICA HAS A
LEGITIMATE INTEREST IN SEEING THAT IT IS: THE BRIDGE IS JOINTLY
OWNED BY SOUTH AFRICA AND RHODESIA. THE SOUTH AFRICAN DETACHMENT
GUARDING THE RHODESIAN END OF THE BRIDGE IS SMALL AND IS THERE
EXCLUSIVELY TO GUARD THE BRIDGE. THERE IS NO QUESTION OF ITS
BEING ABLE, OR ALLOWED, TO INTERFERE IN ANY WAY IN
RHODESIA'S INTERNAL AFFAIRS OR TO PREJUDICE THE CONDUCT OF
ELECTIONS. IT MAY BE THAT DEVELOPMENTS OVER THE NEXT FEW WEEKS
WILL MAKE ITS PRESENCE UNNECESSARY, AND I CAN ASSURE YOU THAT
THE GOVERNOR WILL KEEP THE NEED FOR IT UNDER REVIEW. IN THE
MEANTIME THE PRESENCE OF A TEAM FROM THE MONITORING FORCE IN

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THE VICINITY OF THE BRIDGE WILL GIVE ALL OF US THE ASSURANCE THAT THE SOUTH AFRICAN DETACHMENT IS STRICTLY LIMITED TO THE DEFENCE OF THE BRIDGE.

YOU SUGGEST THAT THE SOUTH AFRICANS SHOULD BE REPLACED BY BRITISH TROOPS. A NUMBER OF BRITISH TROOPS ARE OF COURSE PRESENT IN RHODESIA AS PART OF THE MONITORING FORCE. BUT IT WAS MADE CLEAR DURING THE CONFERENCE THAT THE MONITORING FORCE WOULD NOT BE AN INTERVENTION OR A FIGHTING FORCE, AND IT WOULD NOT THEREFORE BE APPROPRIATE FOR THE FORCE OR ANY OF ITS UNITS TO TAKE ON DEFENCE OF THE BRIDGE. NOR DO I BELIEVE IT WOULD BE PRACTICABLE TO HAVE BRITISH TROOPS IN RHODESIA FULFILLING TWO ENTIRELY DIFFERENT ROLES, THAT IS SOME AS MEMBERS OF THE MONITORING FORCE AND OTHERS IN A FIGHTING CAPACITY.

I KNOW THAT THIS IS A SENSITIVE ISSUE. WE SHALL THEREFORE KEEP IT UNDER CAREFUL REVIEW. THE OVERRIDING NEED IS TO ENSURE THAT THERE IS NO EXTERNAL INTERFERENCE IN RHODESIA IN THIS PERIOD WHICH COULD IN ANY WAY PREJUDICE FREE AND FAIR ELECTIONS. THIS WE ARE DETERMINED TO ENSURE.

YOU ALSO RAISE THE QUESTION OF THE GOVERNOR'S USE OF RHODESIAN FORCES. THIS ARISES FROM THE FACT THAT THERE HAVE BEEN A NUMBER OF SERIOUS BREACHES IN THE CEASEFIRE, IN THE FORM OF CROSS-BORDER INFILTRATION BY PF FORCES, FAILURE ON THEIR PART TO ASSEMBLE AND ACTS OF VIOLENCE AND INTIMIDATION. IN DEALING WITH THESE INCIDENTS, THE GOVERNOR HAS MADE FULL USE OF THE PF COMMANDERS AND LIAISON OFFICERS TO DEFUSE DANGEROUS SITUATIONS. HE HAS ALSO USED THE POLICE TO MAINTAIN LAW AND ORDER, AS REQUIRED BY THE AGREEMENTS. BUT THERE HAVE BEEN INSTANCES WHERE THE POLICE HAVE NOT BEEN ABLE TO COPE WITH THE TASK: AND IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, AND TO DEAL WITH ACTS OF BANDITRY, THE GOVERNOR HAS AUTHORISED THE USE OF RHODESIAN FORCES IN SUPPORT OF THE POLICE. HE HAS ALSO BEEN COMPELLED ON VARIOUS OCCASIONS TO DEPLOY FORCES TO THE BORDER AREAS TO DEAL WITH CONTINUING INFILTRATION OF PF FORCES IN VIOLATION OF THE CEASEFIRE AGREEMENTS. I STRESS THE USE OF THE RHODESIAN FORCES IN THIS WAY IS TO DEAL WITH SPECIFIC INCIDENTS, AND THE FORCES THEMSELVES ARE MONITORED WHEN USED. IN THE SPECIFIC

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CASE TO WHICH YOU REFER, THE PATRIOTIC FRONT'S OWN MILITARY COMMANDERS HAVE INDICATED THAT THE ARMED GROUP HAD FAILED TO OBEY THEIR ORDERS AND WAS IN BREACH OF THE CEASEFIRE.

I SHOULD LIKE TO TAKE THIS OPPORTUNITY TO DRAW YOUR ATTENTION TO SOME MATTERS WHICH CAUSE ME ANXIETY. ONE WHICH IS CAUSING ME PARTICULAR CONCERN IS MR MUGABE'S FAILURE TO RELEASE SOME SEVENTY FORMER MEMBERS OF ZANU WHOM HE IS HOLDING IN DETENTION IN MOZAMBIQUE. WE HAVE MADE A NUMBER OF EFFORTS TO PERSUADE HIM TO RELEASE THEM SO THAT THEY CAN RETURN TO RHODESIA TO TAKE PART IN THE ELECTIONS: AND IT IS URGENT THAT HE SHOULD AGREE TO DO SO BEFORE NOMINATIONS FOR THE ELECTIONS CLOSE ON 21 JANUARY. THE LANCASTER HOUSE AGREEMENTS WERE VERY SPECIFIC ON THIS MATTER. THEY REQUIRE THAT ALL PERSONS DETAINED ARBITRARILY AND ON POLITICAL GROUNDS SHOULD BE RELEASED AND THE GOVERNOR HAS TAKEN APPROPRIATE ACTION BY RELEASING ALL THOSE FORMERLY DETAINED INSIDE RHODESIA UNDER MINISTERIAL ORDERS. I HOPE VERY MUCH THAT YOU WILL FEEL ABLE TO USE YOUR INFLUENCE WITH MR MUGABE TO SECURE THE IMMEDIATE RELEASE OF ALL THOSE HELD BY HIM. AT THE SAME TIME IT WOULD BE VERY HELPFUL IF YOU COULD URGE UPON HIM THE NEED FOR ZANLA FORCES TO OBSERVE THE CEASEFIRE STRICTLY.

WE KNEW THAT THE PERIOD LEADING UP TO INDEPENDENCE IN RHODESIA WOULD BE A TENSE AND DIFFICULT TIME. WE HAVE BEEN CONFRONTED WITH SERIOUS PROBLEMS AND WILL INEVITABLY FACE FURTHER DIFFICULTIES. BUT I HOPE THAT YOU WILL AGREE THAT STRIKING PROGRESS HAS BEEN ACHIEVED BY THE GOVERNOR'S ADMINISTRATION OF RHODESIA DURING THE PAST FIVE WEEKS. LEGALITY HAS BEEN RESTORED, THE LEVEL OF FIGHTING AND CASUALTIES DRASTICALLY REDUCED AND OVER 20,000 MEMBERS OF THE PF FORCES HAVE ASSEMBLED PEACEFULLY. RESTRICTIONS ON THE PATRIOTIC FRONT'S POLITICAL ACTIVITIES HAVE BEEN LIFTED AND ARRANGEMENTS SET IN TRAIN FOR THE ELECTIONS. AS YOU KNOW, MR NKOMO HAS RETURNED TO SALISBURY TOGETHER WITH THE WHOLE OF ZAPU'S LEADERSHIP AND MANY LEADING MEMBERS OF ZANU HAVE ALSO NOW GONE HOME. CONSIDERABLE PROGRESS HAS BEEN MADE TOWARDS NORMALISING RELATIONS WITH RHODESIA'S NEIGHBOURS AND ARRANGEMENTS ARE IN HAND FOR THE

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EARLY RETURN OF REFUGEES. WITHIN RHODESIA, RESTRICTIONS HAVE BEEN WIDELY RELAXED, AND AN AMNESTY DECLARED. THESE ARE REMARKABLE ACHIEVEMENTS WHEN CONTRASTED WITH THE SITUATION WHICH PREVAILED ONLY A FEW WEEKS AGO OR WHICH WOULD HAVE PREVAILED HAD WE NOT SUCCEEDED AT LANCASTER HOUSE.

MY GOVERNMENT HAS TAKEN ON A HEAVY RESPONSIBILITY. MORE THAN ANYONE, WE HAVE AN INTEREST IN INSISTING THAT ALL PARTIES SHOULD OBSERVE THE AGREEMENTS SCRUPULOUSLY AND WE LOOK FOR THE CONTINUED SUPPORT OF OUR FRIENDS IN ENSURING THAT THIS IS SO. YOU CAN HAVE CONFIDENCE IN OUR GOOD FAITH AND IMPARTIALITY DURING THIS DIFFICULT TIME AND I FEEL SURE THAT I CAN CONTINUE TO COUNT ON YOUR SUPPORT AND ADVICE.

PLEASE DO NOT HESITATE TO CONTACT ME AGAIN IF YOU FEEL CONCERNED. WE ARE APPROACHING THE END OF A GREAT ENTERPRISE, AND ARE DETERMINED TO SEE IT THROUGH TO A JUST AND SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION.

ENDS.

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LEGAL ADVISERS

(MR FREELAND)

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PS/SIR I GILMOUR

PS/MR LUCE

PS/MR RIDLEY

PS/MR HURD

PS/MR MARTEN

PS/PUS

SIR D MAITLAND

MR HANNAY

LORD N G LENNOX

MISS BROWN

MR DAY

MR FERGUSSON

MR ASPIN

MR MILLS

CPO

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION
RHODESIA POLICY

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T12B/80

Rhodesia

EMBASSY OF THE REPUBLIC OF LIBERIA
21 PRINCE'S GATE
LONDON SW7 1QB

Rec'd by FCO tel - 19.1.80

TEL. 01-589 9405
01-589 2264

La. [Signature] - 21/

76-3a-01-'80

21st January, 1980

Madam Prime Minister,

I have the honour to inscribe hereunder text of a telegraphic message from President Tolbert to your goodself dated January 19, 1980 in connection with the continued presence of South African troops in Zimbabwe Rhodesia:-

" ETATPRIORITE
THE RIGHT HONOURABLE MARGARET THATCHER
PRIME MINISTER OF THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN
AND NORTHERN IRELAND
10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON

MADAM PRIME MINISTER COLON YOUR TELEGRAPHIC LETTER OF 17TH JANUARY CURRENT CMA IN REPLY TO MY MESSAGE REGARDING THE DISTURBING STATE OF AFFAIRS IN ZIMBABWE CMA HAS BEEN DELIVERED TO ME BY AMBASSADOR DOUBLEDAY FOR WHICH I THANK YOU STOP WHILE NOTING YOUR EXPLANATION CONCERNING THE PRESENCE OF A SOUTH AFRICAN CONTIGNENT IN RHODESIA TO GUARD BE IT BRIDGE CMA I MUST MAKE CLEAR THAT OUR UNDERSTANDING OF THE LANCASTER HOUSE AGREEMENT DOES NOT ALLOW FOR THE PRESENCE OF SOUTH AFRICAN TROOPS IN RHODESIA FOR ANY PURPOSE WHATSOEVER STOP WE HAVE IN FACT BEEN INFORMED THAT SOUTH AFRICAN TROOPS ARE NOT ONLY ON THE RHODESIAN SIDE OF THE BRIDGE UNDER THE PRETEXT OF PROVIDING SECURITY BUT ALSO IN OTHER PARTS OF RHODESIA CMA ALL CONTRARY TO THE SPIRIT AND INTENT OF THE CEASEFIRE AGREEMENT STOP IT IS THE RESPONSIBILITY OF BRITAIN CMA CLEARLY ASSUMED UNDER THE AGREEMENT CMA TO ENSURE THAT CMA BARRING THE MONITORING ARRANGEMENT CMA THERE IS NO EXTERNAL INVOLVEMENT FROM ANY QUARTER WHATSOEVER AND PARTICULARLY FROM SOUTH AFRICA STOP THUS AS FAR AS WE ARE CONCERNED CMA SOUTH AFRICAS RIGHT IN PROTECTING HER INTEREST IN THAT PORTION OF BE IT BRIDGE WHICH FALLS WITHIN HER TERRITORY CAN ONLY BE EXERCISED LEGITIMATELY

...../2....

The Rt. Hon. Margaret Thatcher MP
Prime Minister
10 Downing Street,
LONDON S.W. 1.



EMBASSY OF THE REPUBLIC OF LIBERIA
21 PRINCE'S GATE
LONDON SW7 1QB


TEL. 01-589 9405
01-589 2264

-2-

FROM SOUTH AFRICAN TERRITORY AND NOT FROM RHODESIA STOP WE ARE THEREFORE AGAIN APPEALING TO YOU TO PERSONALLY USE THE FULL MEASURE OF YOUR AUTHORITY SO THAT ALL SOUTH AFRICAN FORCES IN RHODESIA WILL BE WITHDRAWN STOP IN OUR OPINION CMA WHATEVER PROTECTION MIGHT BE NEEDED BY RHODESIA IN REGARD TO BE IT BRIDGE SHOULD BE PROVIDED BY THE MONITORING FORCE STOP AS EXPRESSED IN OUR LAST CABLE MESSAGE TO YOU CMA WE CONSIDER THE DEPLOYMENT OF RHODESIAN TROOPS CMA WHO SHOULD BE STRICTLY CONFINED TO BARRACKS CMA TO BE NOT ONLY AN EXTREMELY PROVOCATIVE ACT BUT A SERIOUS BREACH OF THE LANCASTER HOUSE AGREEMENT STOP MOREOVER REPORTS REACHING US REVEAL THAT THE SALISBURY AUXILIARY FORCES WHO SHOULD HAVE BEEN INCORPORATED INTO THE RHODESIAN ARMY AND RESTRICTED TO BARRACKS ARE STILL ROAMING AT LARGE AND OCCUPYING AREAS VACATED BY THE FORCES OF THE PATRIOTIC FRONT STOP IN SPITE OF THE FACT THAT THE SIZEABLE NUMBER OF PATRIOTIC FRONT FORCES HAS CONFIRMED THE INADEQUACY OF ASSEMBLY POINTS ALLOTTED TO THEM CMA YET THE BRITISH GOVERNOR HAS APPARENTLY ELECTED TO TAKE NO ACTION TOWARDS RECTIFYING THIS SITUATION STOP IN THE CIRCUMSTANCE CMA WE FEEL THAT THE NUMBER OF ASSEMBLY POINTS ALLOWED THE PATRIOTIC FRONT FORCES SHOULD BE ADJUSTED UPWARD BY THE GOVERNOR AS PROVIDED FOR IN THE AGREEMENT STOP LET ME AGAIN EMPHASIZE CMA MADAM PRIME MINISTER CMA THAT THE CONTINUING PRESENCE OF SOUTH AFRICAN FORCES IN RHODESIA AND OTHER BLATANT VIOLATIONS OF THE LANCASTER HOUSE AGREEMENT IF NOT BROUGHT TO AN END AN APPROPRIATE CORRECTIVE MEASURES UNDERTAKEN CMA ARE BOUND TO CREATE EVEN GREATER DISAPPOINTMENTS AND MORE SERIOUS APPREHANSIONS ON THE PART OF AFRICAN STATES AS TO THE SINCERITY OF YOUR GOVERNMENTS COMMITMENT TO THE FAIR CMA IMPARTIAL AND EFFECTIVE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE LANCASTER HOUSE AGREEMENT STOP BECAUSE OF MY CONCERN THAT THE ATMOSPHERE FOR A PEACEFUL SOLUTION TO THE ZIMBABWE PROBLEM SHOULD NOT BE SULLIED AND THE POSSIBILITY FOR A FINAL AND JUST SETTLEMENT LOST CMA I AM AGAIN BRINGING THIS MATTER TO YOUR ATTENTION IN THE HOPE THAT THE PROCESS EMBARKED UPON TO BRING INDEPENDENCE TO ZIMBABWE WITH GENUINE MAJORITY RULE MAY BE FULLY REALIZED STOP WITH ASSURANCES OF MY HIGHEST CONSIDERATION AND ESTEEM
SINCERELY

WR TOLBERT JR
PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF LIBERIA AND
CURRENT CHAIRMAN OF THE OAU "

Please accept, Madam Prime Minister, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.


Francis A. Dennis
AMBASSADOR



JS
Rhodesia

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

21 January 1980

~~BF 23-180 - and has
in Telegram to V.~~

RHODESIA: REPLY TO PRESENT SHAGARI

As I have already informed a member of the Private Office on the telephone, the draft reply to President Shagari, enclosed with your letter to me of 18 January, can issue.

M. O'D. B. ALEXANDER

R.M.J. Lyne, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

sc

[RHODESIA: POLICY: ADVANCE COPIES]

28

PS/SIR I GILMOUR
PS/MP LUCE
PS/TUS
SIR D MAITLAND
MR DAY
LORD N G LENNOX
MR ASPIN

PS/NO 10 DOWNING STREET

SIR R ARMSTRONG)
MR R L WADE GERY)
MR P M MAXEY) CABINET
MR GOULTY) OFFICE
MR P J FOWLER)
DIO)

.....

HD/RHOD DEPT (4)

HD/C AF D

HD/S AF D

HD/FUSD (2)

HD/NEWS DEPT

HD/WAD

MR FREELAND LEGAL ADVISER RMK200A

MR PIPOOT LEGAL ADVISER RM K164

~~SECRETARY CLERK~~

CONFIDENTIAL

FM SALISBURY 210708Z JAN 80

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

IMMEDIATE

ADVANCE COPY

TELEGRAM NUMBER 249 OF 21 JANUARY

INFO IMMEDIATE LUSAKA DAR ES SALAAM MAPUTO GABORONE LUANDA
PRETORIA CAPE TOWN WASHINGTON LAGOS UKMIS NEW YORK CANBERRA PRIORITY
OTTAWA WELLINGTON NAIROBI SUVA

RHODESIA : SITREP 19/20 JANUARY

1. ON 19 JANUARY A HIGHER LEVEL OF INCIDENTS THAN FOR SOME TIME
WAS REPORTED. THESE WERE CAUSED LARGELY BY SECURITY FORCE PATROLS
ENCOUNTERING UNLAWFUL GROUPS OF PATRIOTIC FRONT GUERRILLAS FOR
WHOM THEY HAD BEEN SEARCHING, PARTICULARLY IN THE NKAI AREA. THERE
WERE 13 DEATHS, 11 STOCK THEFTS, 3 ARMED ROBBERIES AND 3 CASES
OF MALICIOUS DAMAGE ATTRIBUTED TO INCIDENTS INVOLVING SUSPECTED
GUERRILLAS. EIGHT ARMS CACHES WERE RECOVERED. IT WAS ALLEGED THAT
THE P F LIAISON OFFICER IN ASSEMBLY PLACE ECHO IS CONDUCTING
POLITICAL MEETINGS OF 3-400 LOCALS.

2. FAR FEWER INCIDENTS WERE REPORTED ON 20 JANUARY. ON THE MORNING OF
20 JANUARY 21,632 WERE IN ASSEMBLY PLACES.

POLITICAL NEWS

3. BISHOP MUZOREWA HAS THREATENED TO PULL OUT OF THE CEASE-FIRE
AGREEMENT UNLESS THE GOVERNOR TAKES STRONG ACTION TO PUT AN END
TO VIOLENCE AND INTIMIDATION THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY. HE ALLEGED
THAT IT WAS ABUNDANTLY CLEAR THAT Z A N L A AND Z J P R A FORCES

INTENTION OF COMPLYING WITH THE CEASE FIRE

HAD ABSOLUTELY NO INTENTION OF COMPLYING WITH THE CEASE-FIRE ARRANGEMENTS AND WERE EXPOSING THE PEOPLE TO EVEN MORE BARBARIC TERRORISM AND INTIMIDATION THAN DURING THE HOSTILITIES: THE PROSPECTS FOR PEACEFUL, FREE AND FAIR ELECTIONS WERE DISAPPEARING DAILY.

4. THE Z A N U (P F) DIRECTOR OF ELECTIONS, ZVOBGO, HAS ACCUSED THE GOVERNOR OF BEING IN COLLUSION WITH BISHOP MUZOREWA TO DISQUALIFY Z A N U FROM THE ELECTIONS.

5. CONSIDERABLE PUBLICITY HAS BEEN GIVEN TO A Z A N U CALENDER AND OTHER DOCUMENTS FOUND IN THE BUSH WHICH THE PRESS HAVE INTERPRETED AS INDICATING THAT Z A N U WILL ABOLISH CHRISTMAS AND OTHER RELIGIOUS HOLIDAYS AND REPLACE THEM WITH REVOLUTIONARY DAYS. ONE DOCUMENT SETS OUT THE PARTY LINE AND POLICY AND PROMINENCE HAS BEEN GIVEN TO A SECTION WHICH RULE OUT ANY OWNERSHIP OF PRIVATE LAND AND STATE THAT THE PRESENT WEALTH-GRABBING INSTINCT OF THE WEST WILL BE ABOLISHED AND THAT ECONOMIC COOPERATION WILL BE STRENGTHENED WITH THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES SO AS TO BRING CAPITALIST U S A, BRITAIN, WEST GERMANY, ETC, TO ULTIMATE DOOM.

FCO PASS ALL

SOAMES

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PS
PS/SIR I GILMOUR
PS/LOCE
PS/PUS
SIR D MAITLAND
MR DAY
LORD N G LENNOX
MR ASPIN

PS/NO 10 DOWNING STREET

SIR R ARMSTRONG)
MR R L WADE GERY)
MR P M MAXEY) CABINET
MR GOULTY) OFFICE
MR P J FOWLER)
DIO)

+70

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HD/RHOD DEPT (4)

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HD/PUSD (2)

HD/NEWS DEPT
HD/WAD

MR FREELAND LEGAL ADVISER RMK200A
MR FIFOOT LEGAL ADVISER RM K164
RESIDENT CLERK

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DESKBY 210530Z SALISBURY
DESKBY 210800Z FCC
FM MAPUTO 201800Z JANUARY 80
TO IMMEDIATE SALISBURY
TELEGRAM NUMBER 101 OF 20 JANUARY
AND TO IMMEDIATE FCO
INFO IMMEDIATE LUSAKA DAR ES SALAAM LAGOS PRIORITY GABORONE
CAPETOWN UKMIS NEW YORK WASHINGTON LUANDA

YOUR TELNO 74: RHODESIA/ZANU

1. I WILL OF COURSE SPEAK TO MUGABE AGAIN; BUT IN CASE MY TELNO 98 AND ALL MY PREVIOUS ONES ON THE SUBJECT WERE NOT CLEAR ENOUGH, I SHOULD EMPHASIZE THAT I HAVE BEEN PRESSING HIM VERY HARD INDEED. HE IS UNDER NO ILLUSIONS THAT HMG EXPECT ALL THE DETAINEES TO BE RELEASED IMMEDIATELY.

2. I HAVE GONE AS CLOSE TO LINKING HIS RETURN TO THE RELEASE OF THE DETAINEES AS I DARE WITHOUT PAINTING OURSELVES INTO AN IMPOSSIBLE CORNER - WHICH I THINK WE ARE ALL AGREED WE SHOULD AVOID. WITH VIRTUALLY THE ENTIRE CENTRAL COMMITTEE NOW IN SALISBURY, TO TALK OF THE TIMING OF THE RETURN OF ZANU LEADERSHIP IS TO TALK OF MUGABE'S OWN RETURN. HE WOULD EXPLOIT THIS TO THE MAXIMUM AND, WHATEVER WE SAY, HE WILL CONVINCED MANY PEOPLE THAT THIS WAS OUR LATEST PLOY EFFECTIVELY TO BAR HIM FROM THE ELECTIONS. HE WILL REPRESENT IT AS PROOF THAT OUR EARLIER OBJECTIONS TO THE RETURN OF THE ZANU LEADER-

SAY, HE WILL CONVINCED MANY PEOPLE THAT THIS WAS OUR LATEST PLOY EFFECTIVELY TO BAR HIM FROM THE ELECTIONS. HE WILL REPRESENT IT AS PROOF THAT OUR EARLIER OBJECTIONS TO THE RETURN OF THE ZANU LEADERSHIP - INADEQUATE NOTICE, INADEQUATE INFORMATION, RIVAL RALLIES (THREE TIMES) ETC - WERE MERE PRETEXTS DESIGNED TO HANDICAP HIM SEVERELY IN RELATION TO THE OTHER PARTIES. HE WILL ALSO CLAIM THAT OUR ONLY INTEREST IN THE RELEASE OF PEOPLE WHO, HE CLAIMS HE CAN PROVE, WERE GUILTY OF ATTEMPTING TO MURDER THE ZANU LEADERSHIP, IS TO ALLOW THEM MAXIMUM OPPORTUNITY TO PLOT WITH HIS ENEMIES AGAINST HIS PHYSICAL SECURITY.

3. SUBJECT TO FCO INSTRUCTIONS BY 210930Z I THEREFORE PROPOSE TO TELL MUGABE A AND B OF YOUR PARA 1 AND DEPLOY ONCE AGAIN THE OTHER ARGUMENTS - WHICH, AS I SAY, I HAVE ALREADY MADE TO HIM AD NAUSEAM - BUT MAKE NO USE OF PHRASEOLOGY WHICH WOULD GIVE HIM GROUNDS FOR INFERRING THAT YOU ARE CONSIDERING BANNING HIM FROM RETURNING. I MORE THAN HALF SUSPECT THAT HE WOULD PROBABLY WELCOME SUCH A PROSPECT AND I SHOULD NOT BE SURPRISED IF HE DID NOT DECIDE TO COME TO SALISBURY WITHOUT YOUR PRIOR AGREEMENT, HAVING FIRST MADE SURE THAT THE DATE OF HIS ARRIVAL BECAME KNOWN AND THAT CROWDS HAD BEEN ORGANISED. (HE COULD FOR EXAMPLE BOARD THE SCHEDULED SUNDAY DETA FLIGHT FROM HERE OR THE ONE FROM BEIRA ON WEDNESDAY).

4. I SHALL AWAIT FURTHER INSTRUCTIONS, WHICH I HOPE WILL TAKE INTO ACCOUNT WHAT HONWANA SAID TO YOUR STAFF ON 18 JANUARY (YOUR TEL NO 224 TO FCO) BEFORE TALKING TO THE GOVERNMENT AGAIN.

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SENT/RECD AT 221836Z AR/DP

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DESKBY 210800Z FCO, DESKBY 210600Z SALISBURY

FM MAPUTO 201600Z JANUARY 80

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 59 OF 20 JANUARY

AND TO IMMEDIATE SALISBURY

INFO IMMEDIATE LUSAKA DAR ES SALAAM GABORONE

SALISBURY TEL NO 240 TO YOU : RHODESIA/MOZAMBIQUE

1. THERE IS INDEED MUCH TO BE SAID FOR A VISIT TO MACHEL BY LORD SOAMES, AND I NEED HARDLY SAY THAT I WOULD PERSONALLY WELCOME IT, IF ONLY FOR (C) OF PARA 1 OF T U R. AS REGARDS (A), ESPECIALLY IN THE LIGHT OF HONWANA'S LATEST INFORMATION (SALISBURY TELEGRAM 224 TO YOU), I DOUBT IF WE COULD ACHIEVE VERY MUCH MORE, NOW THAT WE HAVE FIRST HAND EVIDENCE THAT MACHEL IS REALLY APPLYING THE PRESSURE. MUGABE'S CLEVER MOVE IN INSISTING THAT HIS CENTRAL COMMITTEE MUST DETERMINE THE TIMING AND PHASING OF THE RELEASES WOULD MAKE IT DIFFICULT FOR US TO GET RESULTS BEFORE 28 JANUARY. (MY TEL NO 98 TO SALISBURY. ON AN EARLIER OCCASION MUGABE HAS TOLD ME THAT HE HAD ASSURED MACHEL THAT ZANU EXECUTIVES WILL REMAIN HERE TO DEAL WITH OUTSTANDING MATTERS).

2. AS REGARDS (B) I AM SURE THAT MACHEL WOULD WELCOME A GOOD TALK. HOWEVER, THIS MAY ENCOURAGE HIM TO COME OUT WITH A SPECIFIC REQUEST FOR BRITISH AID TO MAKE GOOD THE RAVAGES CAUSED BY THE RHODESIANS IN THE LAST FEW YEARS. THE GOVERNOR MUST ALSO BE PREPARED FOR SUCH AWKWARD QUESTIONS AS VOICE OF FREE AFRICA BROADCASTS.

3. I FEEL I MUST ALSO WARN THAT, IN TALKS AT SUCH A HIGH LEVEL, WHICH WOULD ATTRACT MUCH PUBLICITY, MACHEL MAY FEEL OBLIGED TO SPEAK MORE IN LINE WITH HIS OTHER FRONT LINE COLLEAGUES THAN HE HAS DONE IN THE MUCH MORE HELPFUL, RELAXED, DISCURSIVE MANNER HE ADOPTS WITH ME - AND WHICH FRANKLY HAS SUITED US WELL ENOUGH.

4. AS THE GOVERNOR KNOWS, HIS INABILITY TO VISIT THE BORDER AT MACHIPANDA NEAR UMTALI ON 8 JANUARY (BECAUSE OF BAD WEATHER) DISSAPOINTED THE MOZAMBICANS. I BELIEVE THAT THEY GENUINELY HOPE THAT HE WILL, AS HE HAS PROMISED, PAY A VISIT THERE SOON.

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/ IT SEEMS

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IT SEEMS TO ME THAT, IF I COULD PERSUADE MACHEL TO MEET THE GOVERNOR AT MACHIPANDA, THE MEETING COULD BE REPRESENTED AS A SYMBOLIC GESTURE BY BOTH SIDES, WOULD AROUSE FEWER SUSPICIONS EG ON THE PART OF NYERERE, BUT WOULD STILL ENABLE THE GOVERNOR TO HAVE A MEANINGFUL DISCUSSION.

5. I THEREFORE RECOMMEND THAT I SHOULD APPROACH MACHEL ON THIS BASIS: BUT THAT, SHOULD HE FEEL UNABLE (OR UNWILLING - HE CAN SOMETIMES STAND FIRMLY ON PROTOCOL) TO GO TO THE BORDER I SHOULD SAY THAT LORD SOAMES WOULD BE VERY HAPPY TO CALL ON MACHEL IN MAPUTO INSTEAD.

6. MUGABE, WHO I IMAGINE WOULD STILL BE HERE IF THE VISIT IS TO TAKE PLACE THIS WEEK, WOULD INDEED BE A PROBLEM. HOWEVER, AT LEAST AS FAR AS MACHEL IS CONCERNED, IT WOULD BE EASY TO EXPLAIN THAT THE SOLE PURPOSE OF THE GOVERNOR'S SHORT VISIT WAS TO SEE MACHEL. THIS PROBLEM WOULD NOT OF COURSE ARISE IF THE MEETING WERE TO TAKE PLACE AT MACHIPANDA.

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LEGAL ADVISERS
(MR FREELAND)
(MR FIFOOT)

ECON D
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NEWS D
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PS/SIR I GILMOUR
PS/MR LUCE
PS/MR RIDLEY
PS/MR HURD
PS/MR MARTEN
PS/PUS
SIR D MAITLAND

MR HANNAY
LORD N G LENNOX
MISS BROWN
MR DAY
MR FERGUSSON
MR ASPIN
MR MILLS
CPO

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RHODESIA POLICY

S E C R E T

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GR 1150
J E D I P

SECRET

FM SALISBURY 201115Z JAN 80

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 242 OF 20/1/80

INFO IMMEDIATE CAPE TOWN (PERSONAL FOR AMBASSADOR)
FOLLOWING FOR PRIVATE SECRETARY AND DAY

MY TELNO 239 : RHODESIA/SOUTH AFRICAN FORCES

1. WE ARE PRESSING WALLS TO GO TO SOUTH AFRICA IN THE NEXT TWO OR THREE DAYS AND WILL BE PURSUING THE SUBSTANCE WITH HIM TOMORROW. IN VIEW OF THE DANGER OF THE STORY BREAKING, HOWEVER, YOU WILL NO DOUBT WISH TO CONSIDER INSTRUCTING MR LEAHY TO SPEAK TO THE SOUTH AFRICANS AT A HIGH LEVEL IN THE VERY NEAR FUTURE. IT IS IMPORTANT THAT THE PROBLEM SHOULD BE TACKLED WITH THE SOUTH AFRICANS ON THE SAME BASIS AS WITH WALLS, WHO OTHERWISE WILL CONSIDER THAT WE ARE UNDER-CUTTING HIM. SUBJECT TO YOUR AND HIS VIEWS, IT WOULD SEEM BEST FOR MR LEAHY

(A) TO EMPHASISE STRONGLY TO THE SOUTH AFRICANS OUR THANKS FOR THE COOPERATIVE ATTITUDE THEY HAVE ADOPTED THROUGHOUT THE PRESENT EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE A SETTLEMENT:

(B) THIS COOPERATION WILL REMAIN ESSENTIAL THROUGH THE DIFFICULT WEEKS AHEAD AND THEREAFTER TO THE PROSPECTS OF STABLE GOVERNMENT AND ECONOMIC COOPERATION WITH RHODESIA:

(C) AS YOU TOLD THEM THROUGHOUT THE LANCASTER HOUSE NEGOTIATIONS, WE HAVE NO REPEAT NO OBJECTION TO SOUTH AFRICAN PERSONNEL IN THE RHODESIAN FORCES. THE NUMBERS INVOLVED HAVE BEEN A MATTER BETWEEN THEM AND THE RHODESIANS:

(D) WE ALSO EXPLAINED THROUGHOUT THAT PERIOD THAT IT WOULD NOT BE POSSIBLE TO JUSTIFY (EXCEPT, AS LATER AGREED, AT BEITBRIDGE) THE PRESENCE OF FORMED AND IDENTIFIABLE SOUTH AFRICAN UNITS:

(E) WE ARE THEREFORE VERY CONCERNED ABOUT THE POSITION IN THE SENGWE AREA, WHERE THERE ARE THREE SOUTH AFRICAN COMPANIES. THE PRESENCE OF THESE COMPANIES IS BY NOW WIDELY KNOWN, FAR MORE WIDELY KNOWN THAN ANY OF US EXPECTED. WE ARE EXPECTING THE NEWS TO BREAK AT ANY MOMENT. WE DO NOT WANT THIS STORY TO COME OUT IN A WAY IN WHICH WOULD INEVITABLY CAUSE GREAT EMBARRASSMENT

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TO THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT AS WELL AS OURSELVES AND THE RHODESIANS:

(F) WE HAVE THEREFORE DISCUSSED THE POSITION FULLY WITH WALLS. WALLS DOES NOT FEEL THAT HE CAN DO WITHOUT THE PRESENT LEVEL OF SOUTH AFRICAN PERSONNEL IN HIS FORCES AND, AS WE HAVE STATED THROUGHOUT, WE HAVE NO OBJECTIONS TO PERSONNEL OR EQUIPMENT. IT IS FOR THE SOUTH AFRICANS TO DECIDE WITH WALLS HOW BEST TO ADJUST THE SITUATION, BUT IT IS ESSENTIAL TO DO SO VERY QUICKLY. AS AN ABSOLUTE MINIMUM WE MUST BE IN A POSITION IN WHICH WE CAN STATE THAT THIS IS A RHODESIAN BATTALION, WHICH HOWEVER CONTAINS SOUTH AFRICAN PERSONNEL IN ADDITION TO RHODESIANS. IT IS NOT (NOT) POSSIBLE TO DO THIS ON THE BASIS OF COMPANIES REMAINING AS FORMED SOUTH AFRICAN UNITS WITH THEIR OWN COMMANDERS. WALLS HAS IDEAS AS TO HOW THE ADJUSTMENT MIGHT BE MADE:

(G) OUR ESSENTIAL CONCERN IS TO DEFUSE THIS PROBLEM IMMEDIATELY SO THAT WE ARE NOT PLACED IN A POSITION IN WHICH WE HAVE TO ENGAGE IN A PUBLIC DISCUSSION WITH THE SOUTH AFRICANS. IF WE WERE FORCED TO DO SO IN THE NEXT 2-3 DAYS WE WOULD HAVE TO TAKE THE FOLLOWING LINE (I E AS IN YOUR TELNO 207, THE FINAL VERSION OF WHICH YOU WILL BE TELEGRAPHING TO CAPE TOWN).

(H) ON THE QUESTION OF BEITBRIDGE, WE HAVE STATED FIRMLY THAT THE SOUTH AFRICAN CONTINGENT IS THERE WITH THE GOVERNOR'S AGREEMENT IN THE DIFFICULT PERIOD LEADING UP TO THE ELECTIONS. THERE HAS BEEN AN INTERNATIONAL OUTCRY AND THERE IS THE LIKELIHOOD OF AN OAU MEETING, QUITE POSSIBLY A SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION AND THE POSSIBILITY ALSO OF THE KENYANS WITHDRAWING FROM THE MONITORING FORCE. DESPITE THE INTERNATIONAL REACTIONS, WE ARE NOT (NOT) ASKING THE SOUTH AFRICANS SIMPLY TO WITHDRAW THE CONTINGENT. THIS WOULD CAUSE GREAT ANXIETY TO THE RHODESIANS AND WOULD PUT BOTH THE SOUTH AFRICANS AND OURSELVES IN A FALSE POSITION:

(I) AT PRESENT THE UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN US IS THAT THE CONTINGENT IS THERE UP TO THE ELECTIONS AND NOT BEYOND, UNLESS THERE IS A SPECIFIC REQUEST FROM THE GOVERNOR ON BEHALF OF THE INCOMING GOVERNMENT FOR IT TO REMAIN. HOWEVER IN ORDER TO GIVE THE BEST POSSIBLE CHANCE FOR THE RESULT OF THE ELECTION TO BE ACCEPTED AS WIDELY AS POSSIBLE INTERNATIONALLY, WE THINK IT WOULD BE IN SOUTH AFRICA'S INTERESTS AS IN OURS, TO LET IT BE KNOWN NOW THAT IN ORDER TO AVOID ALLEGATIONS - HOWEVER ABSURD - THAT THE PRESENCE OF THIS COMPANY MIGHT AFFECT THE "FAIRNESS" OF THE ELECTIONS

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PROVIDED THE CEASE-FIRE HOLDS, THE PERSONNEL MAY BE REPLACED BY RHODESIANS JUST BEFORE THE ELECTION (THOUGH IN THAT EVENT WE WOULD HOPE THAT THE SOUTH AFRICANS WOULD ASSIST WITH WHATEVER EQUIPMENT WAS REQUIRED FOR THE DEFENCE OF THE BRIDGE: AND IF A SERIOUS THREAT DEVELOPED TO THE SECURITY OF THE BRIDGE THERE WOULD HAVE TO BE IMMEDIATE CONSULTATIONS BETWEEN US AND THE SOUTH AFRICANS ABOUT THE NECESSARY MEASURES FOR ITS PROTECTION).

2. YOU WILL WISH TO CONSIDER WHETHER TO INSTRUCT MR LEAHY TO TAKE ACTION TOMORROW OR TO SO SO ON TUESDAY, AS SOON AS WE HAVE HAD A FURTHER TALK WITH WALLS. IN VIEW OF LANCASTER HOUSE UNDERSTANDINGS I DO NOT THINK WE CAN PRESS FOR MORE THAN GENUINE RHODESIANISATION OF THE THREE COMPANIES AT SENGWE VERY QUICKLY INDEED. WE SHOULD NOT PRESS FOR THEIR COMPLETE WITHDRAWAL (UNLESS THE SOUTH AFRICANS THEMSELVES RAISE THIS), BECAUSE THIS WOULD SERIOUSLY IMPERIL OUR RELATIONS WITH WALLS. ON BEITBRIDGE, WE SHOULD - FOR THE SAME REASONS - ADOPT AN EXPLORATORY APPROACH AT THIS STAGE, BUT WITH THE CLEAR OBJECTIVE OF GETTING IT AGREED THAT IT SHOULD BE MADE CLEAR THAT THE SOUTH AFRICAN CONTINGENT IS HERE WITH MY AGREEMENT, BUT ONLY UP TO SOME DAYS BEFORE THE ELECTIONS: AND THAT, PROVIDED THE CEASE-FIRE HOLDS, RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE PROTECTION OF THE NORTH END OF THE BRIDGE MAY REST WITH THE RHODESIANS DURING THE ELECTION PERIOD.

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TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 240 OF 20/1/80

INFO IMMEDIATE MAPUTO LUSAKA DAR ES SALAAM GABORONE

RHODESIA/MOZAMBIQUE

1. I HAVE BEEN CONSIDERING WHETHER IT MIGHT BE A HELPFUL MOVE IF I OFFERED TO VISIT MACHEL, ONE DAY NEXT WEEK. MY PURPOSE WOULD BE THREE-FOLD:

(A) TO PUT FURTHER PRESSURE ON THE MOZAMBICANS OVER THE ZANU DETAINEES:

(B) TO HAVE A GOOD TALK WITH MACHEL ABOUT RELATIONS BETWEEN RHODESIA AND MOZAMBIQUE, AND WHAT FURTHER MEASURES MIGHT BE TAKEN TO NORMALISE THEM:

(C) TO DEAL PERSONALLY WITH THE CRITICISMS WHICH HAVE BEEN MADE (THOUGH NOT SO VOCIFEROUSLY BY THE MOZAMBICANS AS BY OTHERS) OF SOME OF THE THINGS WE ARE DOING HERE: AND TO TRY TO CONVINC AN IMPORTANT NEIGHBOUR THAT WE REALLY DO MEAN TO HOLD A FREE AND FAIR ELECTION IN WHICH ALL PARTIES CAN PARTICIPATE.

2. THIS SUGGESTION IS IN NO WAY A REFLECTION ON THE STERLING WORK THAT MR PAPADOPOLOUS HAS BEEN DOING ON ALL THESE MATTERS, BUT I THOUGHT HE MIGHT WELCOME SOME REINFORCEMENT IN THE WAY I SUGGEST: AND IN ANY CASE I THOUGHT IT WOULD BE GOOD TO DEMONSTRATE PERSONALLY AND PUBLICLY THE IMPORTANCE TO BE ATTACHED TO THE RELATIONSHIP WITH MOZAMBIQUE. THERE ARE, HOWEVER, COMPLICATIONS.

(A) MUGABE. UNLESS HE HAS BY THAT TIME RELEASED THE DETAINEES, I THINK I WOULD REFUSE TO SEE HIM.

(B) RHODESIA'S OTHER NEIGHBOURS. I DO NOT RULE OUT THE POSSIBILITY AT SOME STAGE OF SEEING KAUNDA, AND SERETSE KHAMA. BUT THE MORE IMMEDIATE NEED IS FOR A TALK WITH MACHEL. MY FEELING THEREFORE IS THAT I SHOULD LIMIT MY VISIT TO MAPUTO, EXPLAINING SIMPLY THAT THERE WERE A NUMBER OF QUESTIONS BEARING ON OUR JOINT INTERESTS THAT NEEDED SORTING OUT AND THAT WAS THE REASON FOR MY VISIT.

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3. I MIGHT TAKE ONE OR TWO RHODESIAN OFFICIALS WITH ME, DEPENDING ON THE BUSINESS TO BE TRANSACTED, AND WOULD INVITE HONWANA TO COME TOO.

4. I SHOULD BE GRATEFUL FOR YOUR VIEWS, AND THOSE OF MAPUTO. WE SHOULD HAVE TO JUDGE THE TIMING OF A VISIT IN RELATION TO MUGABE'S RETURN AND ANY PROBLEMS FLOWING FROM THAT.

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LORD N G LENNOX

MR DAY

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MR ASPIN

MR MILLS

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TO IMMEDIATE MAPUTO

TELNO 74 OF 20/1/80

INFO IMMEDIATE FCO LUSAKA DAR ES SALAAM LAGOS

PRIORITY GABORONE LUANDA CAPE TOWN UKMIS NEW YORK WASHINGTON.

YOUR TELNO 98: RHODESIA: ZANU

1. PLEASE TELL MUGABE

(A) THAT I AM GLAD THAT HE HAS NOW AGREED TO RELEASE THE DETAINEES, BUT THAT:

(B) I CANNOT ACCEPT THE TIMING OR CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH HE APPEARSS TO BE CONTEMPLATING THEIR RELEASE.

2. YOU SHOULD EMPHASISE THAT WE HAVE NO DESIRE TO DELAY HIS RETURN OR HIS ADDRESSING THE ZANU RALLY ON 27 JANUARY. BUT WE MUST RESOLVE THE PROBLEM OF THE DETAINEES. THIS CANNOT BE LEFT TO A DECISION OF HIS CENTRAL COMMITTEE AFTER HE RETURNS TO RHODESIA (WHEN THERE WOULD BE NO GUARANTEE THAT THEY WOULD BE RELEASED IN TIME AND I SHOULD HAVE TO CONSIDER WHAT ACTION TO TAKE VIS A VIS ZANU TO SECURE THIS). IF HE WISHES US TO DO SO, WE WILL INFORM THE ZANU LEADERS HERE OF HIS INTENTIONS.

3. MUGABE'S PLANS ABOUT THE TIMING FOR THE RELEASE OF THE DETAINEES ARE VERY OBVIOUSLY DESIGNED TO PREVENT THEM EXERCISING THEIR DEMOCRATIC RIGHT TO PARTICIPATE IN THE ELECTION PROCESS, IN CLEAR BREACH OF THE LANCASTER HOUSE AGREEMENT. THIS IS NOT (NOT) ACCEPTABLE. HE HAS ALREADY STALLED LONG ENOUGH TO ENSURE THAT THE LEADERS CONCERNED CANNOT BE CONSULTED BY OTHER PARTIES WISHING TO NOMINATE THEM AS CANDIDATES FOR THE ELECTIONS. IF WE DO NOT MAKE FIRM ARRANGEMENTS FOR THEIR RELEASE BY THE TIME MUGABE RETURNS, WE SHALL BE IN A VERY DIFFICULT POSITION VIS A VIS THE OTHER PARTIES.

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4 . YOU SHOULD THEREFORE MAKE CLEAR TO MUGABE THAT WE NEED AN EXPLICIT ASSURANCE THAT ALL 71 ZANU LEADERS WHO HAVE WRITTEN TO US WILL BE RELEASED AND WILL BE ABLE TO TRAVEL TO RHODESIA WITHIN THE NEXT FEW DAYS. WE NEED TO KNOW THE DATE OF THEIR RELEASE. IF THERE IS FURTHER PREVARICATION ABOUT THIS OR ATTEMPTS TO "STAGGER" OR DELAY THE RELEASE OF THE DETAINEES, WE WILL HAVE TO CONSIDER THE IMPLICATIONS FOR THE ATTITUDE TO BE ADOPTED TO THE TIMING OF THE RETURN OF ZANU LEADERS.

5. UNLESS YOU OR THE FCO SEE STRONG OBJECTION, I SHOULD BE GRATEFUL IF YOU WOULD MAKE THE POSITION CLEAR ONCE AGAIN TO THE MOZAMBIQUE GOVERNMENT , AND AT THE SAME TIME PRESS FOR THE EARLY RETURN OF THE UANC SUPPORTERS. IT REALLY IS ESSENTIAL TO RESOLVE THIS PROBLEM BEFORE MUGABE RETURNS HERE , AND I ASK MACHEL TO PRESS MUGABE VERY HARD. FOR YOUR OWN INFORMATION, WE SHALL OURSELVES BE PREPARED TO MAKE WHATEVER ARRANGEMENTS ARE NECESSARY TO ENABLE THE DETAINEES TO RETURN HERE IN THE NEAR FUTURE.

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TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 236 OF 19/1/80

INFO PRIORITY PRETORIA (PERSONAL FOR AMBASSADOR)

MY TELNO 234.

1. THE NJOC ARE MEETING ON 21 JANUARY TO DISCUSS

(A) THEIR (AND NO DOUBT OUR) ATTITUDE TOWARDS ACTION AGAINST ZANU(PF):

(B) THE ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE PATRIOTIC FRONT FORCES IN THE ASSEMBLY AREAS IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE ELECTIONS.

2. WALLS, WHO IS THE LEAST HELPFUL ELEMENT ON (A), HAS BEEN SHOWING A MORE PROGRESSIVE ATTITUDE ON (B). HE HAS BEEN TRYING TO OVERCOME THE RESISTANCE OF THE ARMY AND OTHER COMMANDERS TO THE IDEA THAT, IF THE PROBLEM OF THE PF FORCES IS TO BE DEALT WITH IN SUCH A WAY AS TO AVOID A MILITARY CONFRONTATION AFTER THE ELECTIONS, SOME EFFORT MAY HAVE TO BE MADE TO TAKE ON SOME ELEMENTS FOR MILITARY TRAINING, PROVIDED OTHER PF ELEMENTS IN THE CAMPS WILL ACCEPT CIVILIAN TRAINING.

3. THE AVOIDANCE OF A CONFRONTATION OVER (A) AND SOME PROGRESS ON (B) ARE ESSENTIAL TO OUR ABILITY TO CARRY THE ELECTION PROCESS THROUGH TO A SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION.

4. IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES DESCRIBED, AND MUCH AS I HATE DELAYING ACTION, IT WOULD BE UNWISE TO BROACH THE SUBJECT OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN FORCES WITH WALLS BEFORE THE NJOC MEETING HAS TAKEN PLACE.

I INTEND TO PURSUE THE MATTER WITH HIM AS SOON AS POSSIBLE THEREAFTER. IN HIS PRESENT MOOD THERE IS THE DANGER THAT THIS MAY PUSH HIM OVER THE EDGE, BUT WE BOTH AGREE THAT THIS IS A RISK WE HAVE TO TAKE.

5. AS I HAVE INDICATED, I BELIEVE THAT WE SHALL BE ABLE TO CONTAIN THE PRESENT DIFFICULTIES WITH THE NJOC IF - AND ONLY IF - THEY ARE NOT (NOT) GIVEN THE IMPRESSION THAT WE ARE NOT (NOT) PREPARED TO CONTEMPLATE ANY ACTION AGAINST ZANU(PF).

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WE SHALL NEED TO SECURE THE RELEASE OF THE ZANU DETAINEES: AND TO
TAKE THE NECESSARY POWERS FOR A "FLEXIBLE" RESPONSE.

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TO IMMEDIATE SALISBURY

TELEGRAM NUMBER 98 OF 19 JANUARY

INFO IMMEDIATE FCO LUSAKA DAR ES SALAAM LAGOS

PRIORITY GABORONE CAPE TOWN UKMIS NEW YORK WASHINGTON

YOUR TELNO 68: RHODESIA: ZANU (PF)

1. I SAW MUGABE THIS MORNING AND AGAIN PRESSED HIM STRONGLY ON DETAINEES. FOR THE FIRST TIME HE ASSURED ME CATEGORICALLY THAT ALL REPEAT ALL OF THEM WILL BE RELEASED. SOME OF THEM HAVE INDICATED TO THE PARTY COMMITTEE WHICH HAS BEEN REVIEWING THEIR CASES THAT THEY MAY WISH TO STAY WITH THE PARTY. MUGABE ASKED, LIGHT - HEARTEDLY, IF HMG WOULD OBJECT TO THIS. I ASSURED HIM, IN EARNEST, THAT OUR ONLY INTEREST WAS TO SECURE THEIR IMMEDIATE FREEDOM. WHAT PARTY THEY SUPPORTED AFTERWARDS WAS THEIR AFFAIR.
2. I FAILED TO PIN MUGABE DOWN ON TIMING. HE SAID THAT THIS WAS A DECISION FOR THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE, THE GREAT MAJORITY OF WHOSE MEMBERSHIP WAS NOW IN SALISBURY. A DECISION WILL BE TAKEN AS SOON AS HE RETURNS HIMSELF (SEE BELOW) AND HE EXPECTED TO LET YOU HAVE THE DETAILS ON 28 JANUARY. HE WARNED HOWEVER THAT, FOR REASONS CONNECTED WITH THE PHYSICAL SECURITY OF ZANU LEADERSHIP, THE FEW "REALLY BAD ONES", IE THOSE WHO HAD BEEN FOUND GUILTY OF ATTEMPTED MURDER, WOULD BE RELEASED LATER THAN THE OTHERS - SOMETIME IN FEBRUARY.
3. MUGABE TOOK IT FOR GRANTED THAT ARRANGEMENTS ARE BEING MADE FOR HIS RETURN ON SUNDAY 27 JANUARY. HE IMAGINED THAT THESE WOULD INCLUDE TRAVELLING BY HELICOPTER FROM THE AIRPORT TO THE RALLY AT HIGHFIELD "I SUPPOSE BECAUSE THE POLICE DO NOT WANT WELCOMING CROWDS AT THE AIRPORT". I SAID THAT SIMILAR ARRANGEMENTS FOR NKOMO HAD WORKED WELL.

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4. HAVING SPOKEN AT LENGTH TO KHAN (MFA) AS RECENTLY AS 17 JANUARY ABOUT THE ZANU DETAINEES I PROPOSE TO LEAVE A FURTHER APPROACH TO THE MOZAMBICANS UNTIL EARLY NEXT WEEK.

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HD/FUSD (2)

HD/NEWS DEPT
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MR FREELAND LEGAL ADVISER RMK20CA
MR FIFOOT LEGAL ADVISER RM K164
RESIDENT CLERK

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FM MONROVIA 192000Z JAN 80

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 10 OF 19 JANUARY

INFO PRIORITY SALISBURY LUSAKA MAPUTO GABORONE DAR ES SALAAM
LAGOS WASHINGTON UK MIS NEW YORK AND LUANDA

MIPT

1. FOREIGN MINISTER SUMMONED ME TODAY AND SPOKE FOR AN HOUR IN AMPLIFICATION OF MESSAGE. OVERRIDING CONCERN IS BEIT BRIDGE. I ASKED DENNIS ABOUT ALLEGATIONS OF SA TROOPS IN OTHER PARTS OF RHODESIA. DID HE MEAN SA UNITS OR INDIVIDUALS IN RHODESIAN FORCES. IT HAD ALWAYS BEEN MADE CLEAR THAT THERE WOULD BE NO WEEDING OUT OF INDIVIDUALS FROM ANY OF THE FORCES. DENNIS SAID ALL SOUTH AFRICANS HAD TO BE GOT OUT OF RHODESIA. I TOLD HIM THIS WAS IMPOSSIBLE. MANY SOUTH AFRICANS HAD LIVED FOR YEARS IN RHODESIA AND THEY COULD NOT NOW BE IDENTIFIED AND EXPELLED. DENNIS EVENTUALLY ACCEPTED THIS AND SAID THAT IF BEIT BRIDGE SITUATION WAS CORRECTED, PREFERABLY BY ENTRUSTING ITS DEFENCE TO MONITORING FORCE, SA ISSUE WOULD FADE AWAY.

2. DENNIS SAID THAT LIBERIA WAS CONVEYING FRIENDLY WARNING THAT WE WERE HEADING FOR DISASTER. AFRICA WAS GETTING ANGRY. THE TELEGRAPH WIRES WERE BUZZING. TANZANIAN FOREIGN MINISTER AND ATTORNEY GENERAL WERE IN MONROVIA TODAY FOR DISCUSSION.

RECALLING THE TALKING OF WITHDRAWING THE 10 TROOPS. THE ONLY AFRICAN

THAT WE WERE HEADING FOR DISASTER. AFRICA WAS GETTING ANGRY. THE TELEGRAPH WIRES WERE BUZZING. TANZANIAN FOREIGN MINISTER AND ATTORNEY GENERAL WERE IN MONROVIA TODAY FOR DISCUSSION. KENYA WAS THINKING OF WITHDRAWING THEIR TROOPS, THE ONLY AFRICAN ONES IN MONITORING FORCE. AN OAU COUNCIL OF MINISTERS MEETING WAS DUE IN ADDIS ABABA ON 18 FEBRUARY BUT THERE WERE DEMANDS FOR IT TO BE BROUGHT FORWARD SO THAT CONCERT ACTION ON RHODESIA COULD BE PLANNED. LIBERIA WAS USUALLY A FRIEND OF THE WEST BUT BY VIRTUE OF OAU CHAIRMANSHIP WOULD BE FORCED TO TAKE LEAD.

3. DENNIS CLAIMED THAT AFRICAN'S CONFIDENCE IN BRITAIN WAS FAST BEING ERODED. WE WERE NOW TOO CONCERNED WITH COMMUNISM TO BE FAIR. I SAID THAT AFGHANISTAN SHOWED WE HAD EVERY REASON TO BE CONCERNED. DENNIS AGREED BUT SAID WE SHOULD NOT BE SO WORRIED ABOUT PROSPECT OF ELECTION VICTORY. WE SEEMED DETERMINED THAT MUZOREWA SHOULD WIN BUT MUGABE IN POWER WOULD NOT BE A DANGER TO THE WEST.

4. DENNIS WAS EMOTIONAL AND ALTERNATED BETWEEN LOUD HECTORING AND SOFT BESEECHING. I THINK HE IS GENUINELY CONCERNED AT POSSIBILITY OF HAVING TO LEAD OAU MINISTERIAL PACK IN ANTI-BRITISH CAMPAIGN PARTICULARLY AS PRESIDENT IS CONFIDENT THAT HE ESTABLISHED GOOD RAPPORT IN LONDON DURING HIS RECENT VISIT. DENNIS ENDED BY ASKING FOR MATERIAL TO REBUT OAU DEMANDS FOR ACTION AND SAID THAT REMOVAL OF SA TROOPS AT BEIT BRIDGE WOULD BE BEST EXAMPLE OF THIS.

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HD/RHOD DEPT (4)

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PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T12B/80

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TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 9 OF 19 JANUARY

INFO SALISBURY LUSAKA MAPUTO GABORONE DAR ES SALAAM LAGOS WASHINGTON
UKMIS NEW YORK LUANDA

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FOLLOWING MESSAGE FOR PRIME MINISTER FROM PRESIDENT TOLBERT

QUOTE MADAM PRIME MINISTER: YOUR TELEGRAPHIC LETTER OF
17TH JANUARY CURRENT, IN REPLY TO MY MESSAGE

REGARDING THE DISTURBING STATE OF AFFAIRS IN ZIMBABWE, HAS BEEN
DELIVERED TO ME BY AMBASSADOR DOUBLEDAY FOR WHICH I
THANK YOU. WHILE NOTING YOUR EXPLANATION CONCERNING
THE PRESENCE OF A SOUTH AFRICAN CONTINGENT IN RHODESIA
TO GUARD BEIZ BRIDGE, I MUST MAKE CLEAR THAT OUR
UNDERSTANDING OF THE LANCASTER HOUSE AGREEMENT DOES NOT
ALLOW FOR THE PRESENCE OF SOUTH AFRICAN TROOPS IN RHODESIA
FOR ANY PURPOSE WHATSOEVER. WE HAVE IN FACT BEEN
INFORMED THAT SOUTH AFRICAN TROOPS ARE NOT ONLY ON THE
RHODESIAN SIDE OF THE BRIDGE UNDER THE PRETEXT OF PROVIDING
SECURITY BUT ALSO IN OTHER PARTS OF RHODESIA, ALL
CONTRARY TO THE SPIRIT AND INTENT OF THE CEASEFIRE
AGREEMENT. IT IS THE RESPONSIBILITY OF BRITAIN, CLEARLY
ASSUMED UNDER THE AGREEMENT, TO ENSURE THAT

1 BARRING THE MONITORING ARRANGEMENT, THERE IS NO
EXTERNAL INVOLVEMENT FROM ANY QUARTER WHATSOEVER AND

PARTICULARLY FROM SOUTH AFRICA. THUS AS FAR AS WE ARE CONCERNED, SOUTH AFRICA'S RIGHT IN PROTECTING HER INTEREST IN THAT PORTION OF BEIT BRIDGE WHICH FALLS WITHIN HER TERRITORY CAN ONLY BE EXERCISED LEGITIMATELY FROM SOUTH AFRICAN TERRITORY AND NOT FROM RHODESIAN. WE ARE THEREFORE AGAIN APPEALING TO YOU TO PERSONALLY USE THE FULL MEASURE OF YOUR AUTHORITY SO THAT ALL SOUTH AFRICAN FORCES IN RHODESIA WILL BE WITHDRAWN. IN OUR OPINION, WHATEVER PROTECTION MIGHT BE NEEDED BY RHODESIA IN REGARD TO BEIT BRIDGE SHOULD BE PROVIDED BY THE MONITORING FORCE. AS EXPRESSED IN OUR LAST CABLE MESSAGE TO YOU, WE CONSIDER THE DEPLOYMENT OF RHODESIAN TROOPS, WHO SHOULD BE STRICTLY CONFINED TO BARRACKS, TO BE NOT ONLY AN EXTREMELY PROVOCATIVE ACT BUT A SERIOUS BREACH OF THE LANCASTER HOUSE AGREEMENT. MOREOVER REPORTS REACHING US REVEAL THAT THE SALISBURY AUXILIARY FORCES WHO SHOULD HAVE BEEN INCORPORATED INTO THE RHODESIAN ARMY AND RESTRICTED TO BARRACKS ARE STILL ROAMING AT LARGE AND OCCUPYING AREAS VACATED BY THE FORCE OF THE PATRIOTIC FRONT. IN SPITE OF THE FACT THAT THE SIZEABLE NUMBER OF PATRIOTIC FRONT FORCES HAS CONFIRMED THE INADEQUACY OF ASSEMBLY POINTS ALLOTTED TO THEM. YET THE BRITISH GOVERNOR HAS APPARENTLY ELECTED TO TAKE NO ACTION TOWARDS RECTIFYING THIS SITUATION. IN THE CIRCUMSTANCE, WE FEEL THAT THE NUMBER OF ASSEMBLY POINTS ALLOWED THE PATRIOTIC FRONT FORCES SHOULD BE ADJUSTED UPWARD BY THE GOVERNOR AS PROVIDED FOR IN THE AGREEMENT. LET ME AGAIN EMPHASIZE, MADAM PRIME MINISTER, THAT THE CONTINUING PRESENCE OF SOUTH AFRICAN FORCES IN RHODESIA AND THEIR BLATANT VIOLATIONS OF THE LANCASTER HOUSE AGREEMENT IF NOT BROUGHT TO AN END AND APPROPRIATE CORRECTIVE MEASURES UNDERTAKEN, ARE BOUND TO CREATE EVEN GREATER DISAPPOINTMENTS AND MORE SERIOUS APPREHENSIONS ON THE PART OF AFRICAN STATES AS TO THE SINCERITY OF YOUR GOVERNMENT'S COMMITMENT TO THE FAIR, IMPARTIAL AND EFFECTIVE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE LANCASTER HOUSE AGREEMENT. BECAUSE OF MY CONCERN THAT THE ATMOSPHERE FOR A PEACEFUL SOLUTION TO THE ZIMBABWE PROBLEM SHOULD NOT BE SULLIED AND THE POSSIBILITY FOR A FINAL AND JUST SETTLEMENT LOST, I AM AGAIN BRINGING THIS MATTER TO YOUR ATTENTION IN THE HOPE THAT THE PROCESS EMBARKED UPON TO BRING INDEPENDENCE TO ZIMBABWE WITH GENUINE MAJORITY RULE MAY BE FULLY REALIZED. WITH ASSURANCES OF MY HIGHEST CONSIDERATION AND ESTEEM SINCERELY

WR TOLBERT JR
PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF LIBERIA

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D E D I P

SECRET

FROM SALISBURY 191754Z JAN 80

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 239 OF 19 JANUARY 1980

INFO IMMEDIATE PRETORIA (PERSONAL FOR AMBASSADOR).

FOLLOWING FOR PRIVATE SECRETARY AND DAY.
RHODESIA.

1. GENERAL WALLS ASKED TO SEE RENWICK PRIVATELY THIS MORNING. HE SAID THAT, AS WE KNEW, HE WAS EXTREMELY WORRIED ABOUT THE WAY THINGS WERE GOING. IF THEY CONTINUED ON THE PRESENT COURSE HE DID NOT THINK IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO GET THROUGH TO THE ELECTIONS.
2. WALLS SAID THROUGHOUT THE NEGOTIATIONS IN LONDON HIS INFLUENCE HAD BEEN EXERTED IN FAVOUR OF A SETTLEMENT. WHEN MUZOREWA HAD RUN INTO DIFFICULTIES WITH HIM OVER THE CONSTITUTION, HE HAD PULLED THE RUG FROM BENEATH IAN SMITH. HE HAD BEEN PREPARED AT EVERY STAGE TO GO ALONG WITH OUR NEGOTIATING TACTICS. HE AD ADVISED THE GOVERNMENT TO STAND DOWN AND TO HAND OVER POWER TO THE GOVERNOR. HE HAD BEEN RECONCILED TO THE PROSPECT OF BRINGING IN NKOMO. WE HAD ENDED UP WITH BOTH WINGS OF THE PF. THIS WAS TOLERABLE IF, AND ONLY IF, WE WERE PREPARED TO TAKE ACTION TO DEAL WITH OBVIOUS VIOLATIONS OF THE LANCASTER HOUSE AGREEMENTS. HE WAS UNDER VERY GREAT PRESSURE FROM WITHIN HIS OWN FORCES AND FROM THE WHITE COMMUNITY GENERALLY. THE LATTER POINTED OUT THAT THE PF WERE BEING PERMITTED TO ACHIEVE A POSITION WHICH THEY COULD NOT HAVE HOPED TO GAIN BY MILITARY MEANS. INSTEAD OF DOING ALL WE COULD TO PRESERVE THE BISHOP'S AUTHORITY AND, ABOVE ALL, HIS "FACE", WE SEEMED TO HAVE SET OUT DELIBERATELY TO DOWN-GRADE HIM SO THAT HE WAS NO LONGER SEEN BY THE AFRICAN POPULATION TO HAVE ANY ROLE OR POSITION. THE WHOLE PSYCHOLOGY WAS IN FAVOUR OF THE PF. DAILY TRIBUTES WERE PAID TO THEIR EFFORTS TO ASSIST AND PRESERVE THE CEASE-FIRE, DESPITE INNUMERABLE ZANLA VIOLATIONS. THE BISHOP'S AUTHORITY HAD BEEN DEMOLISHED. IF THIS CONTINUED WE WERE HEADING INEVITABLY FOR A PF VICTORY IN THE ELECTIONS.

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/THIS WOULD

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THIS WOULD BE BASED ON THE FACT THAT IN MATABELELAND NO-ONE WOULD DARE TO VOTE FOR ANYONE BUT NKOMO, WHILE NO ONE IN THE SHONA TRIBAL TRUST LANDS DARED TO VOTE FOR ANYONE BUT MUGABE.

3. THESE PROBLEMS HAD BEEN FORESEEN AND HE HAD THOUGHT THAT WE HAD AGREED TO WORK TOGETHER TO DEAL WITH THEM. HE HAD BEEN TOLD REPEATEDLY BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE DURING LANCASTER HOUSE NEGOTIATIONS THAT WE WOULD NOT (NOT) PERMIT A PARTY TO ENGAGE IN VIOLATIONS OF THE AGREEMENTS WITHOUT ACTION BEING TAKEN AGAINST IT. IT SEEMED CLEAR THAT THIS UNDERTAKING WAS NOT GOING TO BE HONOURED. HE WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO CONTINUE THE PROCESS IF THIS WAS IN FACT THE CASE. HE AGREED THAT THERE MIGHT BE DIFFERENCES IN OUR ASSESSMENT OF THE FIGURES OF ZANLA OUTSTANDING OR THE EXTENT OF CROSS-BORDER MOVEMENT. WHAT CONCERNED HIM WAS THAT WE SIMPLY DID NOT APPEAR TO BELIEVE A GOOD DEAL OF THE EVIDENCE BEING PLACED BEFORE US BECAUSE FOR INTERNATIONAL REASONS, WE DID NOT WANT TO KNOW ABOUT IT. WE DID NOT DISPUTE THAT CROSS-BORDER MOVEMENT HAD TAKEN PLACE ON A CONSIDERABLE SCALE, THOUGH HE HAD REPEATEDLY EMPHASISED THE IMPORTANCE OF THIS ASPECT OF THE AGREEMENT. WE KNEW THAT ZANLA HAD INSTRUCTED A PROPORTION OF THEIR PEOPLE TO REMAIN OUTSIDE THE ASSEMBLY AREAS. WHAT DID WE INTEND TO DO ABOUT IT?

4. RENWICK SAID THAT SINCE WALLS WAS SPEAKING FRANKLY SO WOULD HE. WE HAD ASSURED WALLS IN LONDON THAT THE RHODESIAN FORCES WOULD BE ABLE TO CARRY OUT NORMAL PATROLLING ACTIVITY. THIS THEY WERE DOING, AS WERE THE POLICE. THE AUXILIARIES WERE ALSO DEPLOYED AND THEIR CONDUCT HAD CAUSED US CONCERN (THOUGH WALLS WAS TAKING ACTION TO CORRECT THIS). WAS WALLS REALLY SAYING THAT WITH THIS WEIGHT OF LAW AND ORDER MACHINERY IN PLACE IT WAS STILL NOT POSSIBLE TO CONTAIN ZANLA INTIMIDATION? WALLS SAID THAT HE WAS NOT SURE THAT WE FULLY UNDERSTOOD THAT THERE WERE A GREAT MANY VILLAGES IN RHODESIA IN WHICH PEOPLE WERE TERRIFIED OF THE CONSEQUENCES IF THEY DID NOT VOTE FOR ZANU. THE SUPPORTERS OF ANY OTHER PARTY WERE BRANDED AS "SELL-OUTS" AND TOLD THEY WOULD BE KILLED. THERE WERE LIMITS TO THE EXTENT TO WHICH THE SECURITY CORCES COULD DO ANYTHING ABOUT THIS: PEOPLE WERE OFTEN TOO TERRIFIED TO TELL THEM OF THREATS MADE AGAINST THEM.

5. RENWICK ASKED IF WALLS WAS SUGGESTING THAT MUGABE WOULD BE IN A POSITION BY HIMSELF TO WIN A MAJORITY IN THE FUTURE PARLIAMENT. WALLS ADMITTED THAT MUGABE COULD PROBABLY NOT WIN BY HIMSELF. BUT OUR REFUSAL TO CONTEMPLATE ANY ACTION AGAINST ZANU, THE UNDERMINING OF THE BISHOP, PROVIDING A POLICE ESCORT, HELICOPTER ETC FOR NKOMO—WAS CREATING A SITUATION IN WHICH NKOMO AND MUGABE WOULD COMMAND AN OVER-ALL MAJORITY. A GREAT MANY PEOPLE IN THE COUNTRY, INCLUDING MOST MEMBERS OF HIS OWN FORCES, WERE CONVINCED HMG WERE BACKING NKOMO.

6. RENWICK SAID THAT HE HOPED THAT THE RHODESIANS WOULD STOP TALKING ABOUT THE PF IN THE OLD SENSE AND REALISE THAT THE TWO PARTIES WERE NOW SEPARATE AND THAT IT WAS IN THE RHODESIANS' INTEREST TO SEEK SOME KIND OF ACCOMMODATION WITH NKOMO . SINCE WALLS HAD TOLD US HIS WORRIES, HE HAD BETTER KNOW OURS. LIKE THE RHODESIANS, WE WERE CONCERNED ABOUT THE CONDUCT OF ZANU (MUGABE). WE WERE DOING EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO SECURE THE RELEASE OF THE DETAINEES IN MOZAMBIQUE. WALLS SAID THAT HE ATTACHED GREAT IMPORTANCE TO THIS. MUGABE SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO GO ON DETAINING RIVAL POLITICAL LEADERS WHO WANTED TO PARTICIPATE IN THE ELECTIONS WHEN THE RHODESIANS HAD AGREED TO THE RELEASE OF ALL HIS LIEUTENANTS INSIDE THE COUNTRY AND THE OTHER POLITICAL DETAINEES. OTHERWISE THE RHODESIANS WOULD NOT HAVE AGREED TO THE RELEASE OF THE ZANU DETAINEES. RENWICK ADDED THAT, AS THE GOVERNOR HAD TOLD THE NJOC, WE DID NOT BELIEVE THAT IT WAS RIGHT TO ADOPT A BLUNDERBUSS APPROACH TO ZANU. WE WOULD NOT BE PREPARED TO BAN ZANU OUTRIGHT UNLESS THEY GAVE US INCONTRAVERTIBLE REASONS FOR DOING SO AND THIS WAS, AS YET, FAR FROM BEING THE CASE. WALLS ASKED WHETHER THIS MEANT THAT WE PROPOSED TO TAKE NO ACTION WHATSOEVER AGAINST THEM. RENWICK SAID THAT , AS SIR A DUFF HAD EXPLAINED, WE WERE CONSIDERING AND WOULD BE WANTING TO CONSULT WITH THE RHODESIANS ABOUT A MUCH MORE SELECTIVE APPROACH DESIGNED TO DEAL WITH CANDIDATES WHO WERE IN BREACH OF THE LANCASTER HOUSE AGREEMENTS OR WERE URGING THEIR FOLLOWERS TO PUT THEMSELVES IN BREACH OF THEM: OR AGAINST A PARTY IN A GIVEN ELECTORAL OR ADMINISTRATIVE DISTRICT.

7. RENWICK SAID THAT THE OTHER TWO POINTS OF MAJOR CONCERN TO US AT PRESENT (APART FROM THE STATE OF OUR RELATIONS WITH THE NJOC) WERE:

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(A) THE FUTURE OF THE PF FORCES. IT WAS ESSENTIAL IF THE RHODESIANS WISHED TO END UP WITH A MORE STABLE SOCIETY, TO ACHIEVE A DE-ESCALATION OF THE WAR. THIS COULD ONLY BE ACHIEVED IF THE RHODESIAN COMMANDERS SHOWED MORE IMAGINATION IN TERMS OF MAKING SOME OFFER TO THE PF, IF NECESSARY IN THE FIRST INSTANCE TO ZIPRA, TO TAKE SOME OF THEIR MEN FOR MILITARY TRAINING AS WELL AS OFFERING CIVIL COURSES TO THE REST. WALLS SAID THAT HE AGREED. HE HAD BEEN TRYING TO PUSH HIS OWN COMMANDERS TOWARDS A REALISATION OF THIS. BUT BECAUSE OF THE GENERAL FEELING THAT WE WERE FAVOURING THE PF AND WOULD NOT DO ANYTHING AGAINST THEM, THE ATMOSPHERE WAS MUCH LESS FAVOURABLE THAN HE HAD HOPED. RENWICK PRESSED HIM VERY HARD ON THIS, ARGUING THAT NO OTHER PROBLEM WAS AS IMPORTANT FOR THE FUTURE THE RHODESIANS COULD NOT SIMPLY PLAN ON THE BASIS OF A CONFRONTATION WITH THE PF FORCES AFTER 1 MARCH. THAT WOULD DEFEAT ALL OUR OBJECTIVES. WALLS APPEARED TO ACCEPT THIS.

(B) SOUTH AFRICAN FORCES. RENWICK SAID THAT WE HAD ANNOUNCED THE SOUTH AFRICAN CONTINGENT AT BEITBRIDGE AND HAD TAKEN A GREAT DEAL OF DAMAGING INTERNATIONAL CRITICISM FOR DOING SO. THE KENYANS WERE THREATENING TO WITHDRAW FROM THE MONITORING FORCE. WE WOULD STILL MORE CONCERNED ABOUT THE THREE SOUTH AFRICAN COMPANIES NOT AT BEITBRIDGE. THIS WAS FAST BECOMING COMMON KNOWLEDGE AND WAS NOT COMPATIBLE WITH THE POSITION AS IT HAD BEEN AGREED WITH WALLS IN LONDON, IE THAT THERE SHOULD BE SOUTH AFRICAN PERSONNEL BUT NO UNITS. WALLS ACKNOWLEDGED THAT WE HAD FACED GREAT DIFFICULTIES OVER BEITBRIDGE. IT WOULD NOT BE POSSIBLE TO ASK THE SOUTH AFRICANS SIMPLY TO WITHDRAW NOW IN THE FACE OF AN OUTCRY ELSEWHERE IN AFRICA, THOUGH THERE WAS SOME POSSIBILITY OF THE SOUTH AFRICANS "PULLING EVERYTHING OUT, INCLUDING EQUIPMENT". RENWICK SAID THAT THE THREE COMPANIES NOT AT BEITBRIDGE MUST BE REMOVED OR REDUCED. WALLS SAID THAT HE HAD BEEN TOLD REPEATEDLY IN LONDON THAT WE DID NOT MIND SOUTH AFRICAN PERSONNEL IN THE RHODESIAN FORCES. RENWICK SAID THAT THIS STORY VERY SHORTLY WAS GOING TO BREAK. AS AN ABSOLUTE MINIMUM THE RHODESIANS MUST MAKE ARRANGEMENTS TO TURN THIS INTO A RHODESIAN BATTALION WITH RHODESIAN BATTALION AND COMPANY COMMANDERS WITH, IF NECESSARY, A PROPORTION OF SOUTH AFRICAN PERSONNEL, BUT ALSO WITH RHODESIAN PERSONNEL. AFTER A LONG ARGUMENT, WALLS SAID THAT HE WOULD "RHODESIANISE" THE BATTALION AND WOULD BE PREPARED TO GO NEXT WEEK TO SEE THE

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SOUTH AFRICANS TO ARRANGE THIS. RENWICK EMPHASISED THE URGENCY OF TAKING ACTION ON THIS PROBLEM. WE MUST BE IN A POSITION TO STATE THAT THIS WAS A RHODESIAN BATTALION WITH SOUTH AFRICAN PERSONNEL AND NOT UNITS OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN FORCES.

8. AT THE END OF A LONG WRANGLE, WALLS SAID THAT HE ACCEPTED:
(A) THAT WE WERE NOT GOING TO BAN ZANU (MUGABE) OUTRIGHT. BUT HE SAID THAT HE WOULD REGARD IT AS IN BREACH OF ALL THE ASSURANCES THE SECRETARY OF STATE HAD GIVEN HIM IF WE INTENDED TO TAKE NO ACTION WHATEVER OVER THE DETAINEES IN MOZAMBIQUE OR IN TERMS OF ENABLING US TO MAKE A SELECTIVE RESPONSE TO BREACHES OF THE AGREEMENTS BY ZANU.

(B) HE WOULD TAKE ACTION TO DEAL WITH THE PROBLEM OF THE THREE COMPANIES NOT AT BEITBRIDGE.

9. IT WAS LEFT THAT THERE WOULD BE A FURTHER DISCUSSION OF THE PRECISE WAY OF HANDLING (B) ON MONDAY. WE SHALL MEANWHILE BE IMPRESSING ON WALLS THAT THE STORY IS LIKELY TO BREAK VERY SOON. IF WE HOLD HIM TO WHAT HAS NOW BEEN AGREED WE SHOULD BE ABLE TO GET ACTION WITHIN THE NEXT FEW DAYS SUFFICIENT TO PUT OURSELVES IN THE POSITION OF BEING ABLE TO SAY THAT SOUTH AFRICAN UNITS ARE NO LONGER INVOLVED IN THE AREA AND THAT ITS DEFENCE IS BEING CONDUCTED BY A RHODESIAN BATTALION.

10. RENWICK PUSHED WALLS AS HARD AS HE COULD, DESPITE HIS DISTRAUGHT FRAME OF MIND, AND WE HAVE NOW MADE PROGRESS ON THE SOUTH AFRICAN FORCES AND ON THE FACT THAT WE ARE NOT GOING TO BAN ZANU. HE IS IN NO DOUBT THAT IF WE TRY TO PUSH WALLS HARDER AND FASTER THAN THIS AT A TIME WHEN HE IS BEING FORCED TO FACE UP TO THE RETURN OF MUGABE AND THE NEED TO CONSIDER MILITARY TRAINING FOR SOME AT LEAST OF THE PF FORCES, WE WILL NOT BE ABLE TO COUNT ON A SUFFICIENT MEASURE OF CONTINUED COOPERATION TO CARRY THROUGH THE PROCESS AS FAR AS THE ELECTIONS.

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11. I THINK THE BEST WAY TO DEAL WITH THIS AT THIS STAGE IS FOR RENWICK TO PURSUE THESE EXCHANGES WITH WALLS OVER THE SOUTH AFRICAN FORCES. HM AMBASSADOR IN CAPE TOWN WILL NEED TO BE INSTRUCTED TO SPEAK TO THE SOUTH AFRICANS BEFORE WALLS GOES THERE AND I WILL BE TELEGRAPHING SEPARATELY A SUGGESTED LINE WHICH IF YOU AGREE, MIGHT BE TAKEN WITH THEM, BOTH ABOUT THE THREE COMPANIES AND ABOUT BEITBRIDGE (ON WHICH IT SHOULD REMAIN OUR OBJECTIVE TO TRY TO GET THE SOUTH AFRICANS TO ACCEPT THAT, TO AVOID ANY ACCUSATION OF INTERFERING IN THE ELECTIONS, THE COMPANY MIGHT MOVE TO THE SOUTH AFRICAN SIDE OF THE BRIDGE BY THE TIME THE ELECTIONS TAKE PLACE).

FCO PSE PASS

SOAMES

[COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING ST]

FILES

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

HD/RHODESIA D

HD/NEWS D

PS

PS/LPS

PS/MR LUCE

PS/PUS

SIR D MAITLAND

MR DAY

D I P

ADVANCE COPY

SECRET

FM SALISBURY 191210Z JAN 80

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 235 OF 19 JANUARY

INFO PRIORITY PRETORIA (PERSONAL FOR AMBASSADOR)

MY TELNO 234: RHODESIA.

1. IN ORDER TO PROCEED WITH THE SETTLEMENT AND THE RUN-UP TO THE ELECTIONS, WE HAVE TO STEER A DIFFICULT COURSE BETWEEN CERTAIN CONFLICTING REQUIREMENTS.
2. FIRST, WE MUST CAJOLE THE RHODESIAN MILITARY HIERARCHY TO CONTINUE TO WORK ALONG WITH US TOWARDS AN ELECTION TO BE HELD IN CONDITIONS AS ACCEPTABLE TO INTERNATIONAL OPINION AS POSSIBLE; AND WE MUST SEEK TO PERSUADE THEM THAT, WHATEVER THE OUTCOME OF THE ELECTION, THIS IS BETTER THAN A RETURN TO THE WAR. (THE REVERSE TO THEIR PRESENT THINKING)
3. SECOND, IN THE COURSE OF THIS, WE MUST RESIST RHODESIANS DEMANDS (LED BY WALLS) FOR THE BANNING OF Z A N U (P F).
4. THIRD, WE MUST ATTEMPT TO OBTAIN BETTER RHODESIAN COOPERATION OVER THE DEPLOYMENT AND ACTIVITY OF THE FORCES THAT I HAVE AUTHORISED TO SUPPORT THE POLICE IN THE MAINTENANCE OF LAW AND ORDER; AND MOST IMPORTANT OF ALL, WE MUST WORK OUT WITH THE RHODESIANS A VIABLE PLAN FOR THE ADMINISTRATION AND GENERAL HANDLING OF THE Z A N L A AND Z I P R A FORCES STILL IN THE ASSEMBLY AREAS AT THE TIME OF THE ELECTIONS.
5. RHODESIAN DEMANDS TO BAN Z A N U (P F) - WHICH SOME OF THEM WOULD LIKE TO DO AT ONCE, SO THAT THE BALLOT PAPERS TO BE PRINTED SHORTLY WOULD NOT EVEN CONTAIN THE PARTY'S NAME - ARE BASED ON THE FACT THAT THERE HAS BEEN SUBSTANTIAL CROSS-BORDER MOVEMENT IN CLEAR VIOLATION OF THE LANCASTER HOUSE AGREEMENTS; THAT Z A N L A HAVE WITHHELD A PROPORTION OF THEIR FORCES OUTSIDE THE ASSEMBLY PROCESS (AND THAT THEY HAVE BEEN RESPONSIBLE FOR THE GREAT MAJORITY OF THE INCIDENTS WHICH HAVE OCCURRED IN RHODESIA SINCE THE CEASEFIRE CAME INTO EFFECT. WE ARE REPEATEDLY REMINDED THAT THE RHODESIANS WERE GIVEN FIRM ASSURANCES DURING THE DISCUSSIONS AT LANCASTER HOUSE THAT WE WOULD NOT PERMIT SIGNIFICANT VIOLATIONS OF THE LANCASTER HOUSE AGREEMENTS WITHOUT TAKING ACTION AGAINST THE PARTY RESPONSIBLE FOR THEM. THIS, IT IS STRONGLY ARGUED, WAS THE CONDITION ON WHICH THE SALISBURY DELEGATION AGREED TO THE SETTLEMENT.

6. WE HAVE MADE IT CLEAR TO THE RHODESIANS THAT THERE IS NO QUESTION OF BANNING Z A N U IN PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES OR AT ANY STAGE UNLESS THEIR CONDUCT IS SUCH AS CLEARLY TO JUSTIFY THIS. THIS IS ACCEPTED BY THE COOLER HEADS IN THE N J O C. BUT NONE OF THEM WOULD ACCEPT A SITUATION IN WHICH IT BECAME CLEAR THAT WE ARE NOT PREPARED TO CONSIDER EVEN LIMITED AND SELECTIVE ACTION AGAINST Z A N U IN RELATION TO CLEAR BREACHES OF THE AGREEMENTS.

7. THE CONTINUED COOPERATION OF THE RHODESIAN ADMINISTRATION, ESPECIALLY THAT OF THE MILITARY COMMANDERS, IS INDISPENSABLE IF WE ARE TO PROCEED WITH THE ELECTIONS AND AVOID A BREAKDOWN OF THE CEASEFIRE AND/OR A SERIOUS CONFRONTATION WITH THEM. I JUDGE THAT, IN ORDER TO MEET OUR REQUIREMENTS, WE MUST SHOW (A) THAT WE ARE PREPARED TO BE FIRM WITH Z A N U, WHO HAVE BEEN BEHAVING IN A WAY QUITE DIFFERENT TO ANY OF THE INTERNAL PARTIES OF Z A P U:

(B) THAT, WHILE WE ARE NOT PREPARED TO GO FOR SUCH RADICAL ACTION AS THE BANNING OF A PARTY, WE ARE PREPARED TO CONSIDER A QUOTE GRADUATED UNQUOTE RESPONSE TO ANY PARTY CLEARLY IN BREACH OF THE AGREEMENTS.

8. THE QUESTION OF THE DETAINEES IN MOZAMBIQUE IS A GOOD ISSUE ON WHICH TO PRESS Z A N U, WHO ARE ON VERY WEAK GROUND. THEIR REASONS FOR SEEKING TO RESIST PRESSURE, EVEN FROM THE MOZAMBICANS, TO RELEASE THE DETAINees IS THAT THEY THINK THAT THIS WILL AFFECT THEIR POLITICAL PROSPECTS IN AN IMPORTANT AREA OF RHODESIA. BY THE SAME TOKEN, THE DETAINees ARE STATING THAT THEY WANT TO PARTICIPATE IN THE ELECTION PROCESS AND THAT FREE AND FAIR ELECTIONS CANNOT BE HELD IF THEY ARE DETAINED BY MUGABE WHILE HE PARTICIPATES IN THEM. WE MUST THEREFORE CONTINUE TO RELATE RATHER THAN LINK THE QUESTION OF THE RELEASE OF THE DETAINees TO THE TIMING OF MUGABE'S RETURN.

9. THE OTHER SENIOR Z A N U LEADERS (MUZENDA AND TEKERE) ARE ALREADY IN SALISBURY. AT THE END OF THE DAY WE CANNOT ACTUALLY PREVENT MUGABE RETURNING, SINCE HE ONLY HAS TO STEP ON TO ONE OF THE TWICE WEEKLY COMMERCIAL FLIGHTS FROM MOZAMBIQUE. BUT IN MY VIEW WE SHOULD FOR THE TIME BEING CONTRIVE TO TALK TO HIM ONLY ABOUT DETAINEES AND DECLINE TO GIVE A POSITIVE REPLY TO SUGGESTIONS HE MAY MAKE FOR HIS RETURN.

10. SO FAR AS SELCTIVE (REPEAT SELECTIVE) ACTION AGAINST Z A N U (P F) (OR ANY OTHER PARTY) IS CONCERNED, OBVIOUSLY I WOULD HOPE TO AVOID THIS IF POSSIBLE. ANY ACTION TAKEN SHOULD BE AS LIMITED AS POSSIBLE IN SCOPE AND MUST BY PUBLICLY DEMONSTRABLE TO BE COMPLETELY JUSTIFIED BY CLEAR EVIDENCE OF SYSTEMATIC BREACHES OF THE AGREEMENT BY Z A N U (P F) (OR ANY OTHER PARTY) IN THE LOCALITY CONCERNED. AT PRESENT, HOWEVER, I DO NOT HAVE ADEQUATE POWERS TO TAKE LIMITED ACTION. UNDER THE PRESENT LEGISLATION I CAN ONLY BAN A PARTY AS A WHOLE: AND CANDIDATES CAN BE DISQUALIFIED FROM STANDING ONLY IF THEY ARE CONVICTED BY THE RHODESIAN COURTS OF AN OFFENCE. WE MUST AVOID INVOLVING THE RHODESIAN JUDICIARY IN THE PERIOD BEFORE THE ELECTIONS. I AM THEREFORE CONSIDERING WHAT LEGISLATION I CAN INTRODUCE IN ORDER TO GIVE MYSELF THE NECESSARY POWERS TO MAKE A QUOTE GRADUATED RESPONSE UNQUOTE TO BREACHES OF THE LANCASTER HOUSE AGREEMENTS (SEE MY TELNO 230). I HOPE THAT TO BE SEEN TO BE TAKING SUCH POWERS WOULD OF ITSELF HAVE A SALUTARY EFFECT ON THE PARTIES.

FCO PASS PRETORIA

SOAMES

FILES

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

HD/RHODESIA D

Hd / News D

PS

PS / LPS

PS/PUS

SIR D MAITLAND

MR DAY

PS / Mr Luce

S E C R E T

D E D I P

SECRET

FM SALISBURY 191200Z JAN 80

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 234 OF 19/1/80

INFO PRIORITY PRETORIA (PERSONAL FOR AMBASSADOR)

FOLLOWING FOR PRIVATE SECRETARY AND DAY : RHODESIA

1. BY WEDNESDAY OF THIS WEEK WE HAD BECOME VERY WORRIED ABOUT WALLS STATE OF MIND. AT THE FIRST TWO OF OUR THRICE WEEKLY COORDINATION MEETINGS (WALLS, ALLUM, FLOWER, DAVID YOUNG ON THE RHODESIAN SIDE) HE SEEMED WITHDRAWN, BUT SMOULDERING, AND VERY MUCH INCLINED TO QUESTION THE VALUE OF GOING ON WITH A POLICY WHICH WOULD BRING MUGABE INTO GOVERNMENT AND BE DISASTROUS FOR RHODESIA. DUFF DISCUSSED THIS SITUATION WITH DAVID YOUNG AND FLOWER SEPARATELY. THE FORMER PROFESSED HIMSELF EXTREMELY WORRIED BY THE GENERAL ATTITUDE OF "THE MILITARY". THEY HAD COME TO ASSUME A QUITE UNJUSTIFIED DOMINANCE IN ALL MATTERS OF NATIONAL POLICY AND WERE QUITE UNPERSUADED OF THE VALUE OF A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT, UNLESS IT EXCLUDED MUGABE. IN YOUNG'S VIEW THEY WOULD PREFER TO FIGHT IT OUT. HE UNDERTOOK TO TALK PRIVATELY TO WALLS IN AN ENDEAVOUR TO PERSUADE HIM OF THE IMPORTANCE OF WORKING TOWARDS A GENUINE ELECTION.

2. FLOWER REVEALED ON WEDNESDAY EVENING THAT, AT THE MEETING OF THE FULL NJOC THAT MORNING, WALLS HAD SAID THAT IN HIS VIEW IT WOULD NOW BE BETTER TO "BLOW THE WHOLE THING", GET BACK TO THE WAR AND BRING THE SOUTH AFRICANS IN. HE SAID THAT WALLS HAD CALLED A SPECIAL MEETING OF THE INNER GROUP FOR THE FOLLOWING DAY TO DISCUSS THE SITUATION.

3. FLOWER REPORTED AFTER THIS MEETING THAT THE MOOD HAD BEEN MORE RELAXED AND "WE ARE BACK ON A REASONABLE COURSE". DAVID YOUNG REPORTED THAT HE HAD A LONG TALK WITH WALLS AS A RESULT OF WHICH HE BELIEVED THAT THERE WAS NO IMMEDIATE FEAR OF ANY DISASTROUS MOVE BY THE RHODESIAN MILITARY.

4. WALLS DID NOT COME TO OUR REGULAR COORDINATION MEETING YESTERDAY AFTERNOON, HAVING SENT A MESSAGE THAT HE HAD NOTHING TO DISCUSS. WE ASKED FOR THE MEETING TO BE HELD NEVERTHELESS

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/ AND MCLAREN

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ms.

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AND MCLAREN CAME IN WALLS' PLACE. DUFF SUGGESTED THAT WE TRY TO RESUME THE CLOSE WORKING RELATIONSHIP WE HAD HAD IN THE PAST AND THEN INITIATED A DISCUSSION ON THE HANDLING OF MUGABE AND ZANU(PF) IN THE RUN UP TO THE ELECTIONS. AFTER A HESITANT START, THIS DISCUSSION DEVELOPED WELL. MCLAREN OF COURSE MADE NO SECRET OF HIS BELIEF THAT ZANU(PF) SHOULD BE BANNED FROM THE ELECTION, AND THE SOONER THE BETTER. THE OTHERS, WHILE FEARFUL THAT AN ELECTION WHICH INCLUDED MUGABE WOULD RESULT IN A "MUGABE VICTORY", WERE READY TO TALK RATIONALLY AND SENSIBLY ABOUT THE DANGERS OF SIMPLY BANNING ZANU (AS DISTINCT FROM A SELECTIVE RESPONSE): AND TO DISCUSS WAYS OF IMPROVING MUZOREWA'S POLITICAL CHANCES AND THE IMPORTANCE OF RETAINING NKOMO'S GENUINE PARTICIPATION IN THE ELECTORAL PROCESS.

5. ALTHOUGH WE MAY HOPE THAT WALLS IS INDEED "ON A MORE REASONABLE COURSE", THERE ARE OTHER DISQUIETING INDICATIONS OF HIS MOOD. TO GIVE YOU THE FLAVOUR - AND WITHOUT CATALOGUING -

A) HE WAS FURIOUS AT A PRESS REPORT THAT RHODESIAN ACTION AGAINST A ZIPRA GROUP 2 DAYS AGO HAD BEEN CLEARED BEFOREHAND WITH A PF LIAISON OFFICER AND HAS ISSUED A LONG DENIAL, WHICH INDEED SEEMS TO DENY ALSO THE ROLE OF THE MONITORING FORCE.

B) HE HAS WITHOUT CONSULTATION INSTRUCTED JOC'S TO BE READY IF NECESSARY TO PATROL NEARER THE ASSEMBLY AREAS THAN HITHERTO (WE ARE TAKING THIS UP ON THE MILITARY NET).

FCO PASS PRETORIA

SOAMES

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

F I L E S

HD/RHODESIA D
PS
PS/PUS
SIR D MAITLAND
MR DAY

Hd News Dpt
PS/LPS
PS/An Luce

- 2 -

S E C R E T

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

DESKBY 211000Z

FM SALISBURY 191055Z JAN 80

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 232 OF 19 JANUARY

AID FOR ZIMBABWE AND RHODESIAN DEBT

1. I AM GRAVELY CONCERNED AT THE IMPLICATIONS FOR H M G AND FOR ANGLO-ZIMBABWE RELATIONS WHEN IT BECOMES KNOWN HOW VERY SMALL OUR AID PROGRAMME FOR INDEPENDENT ZIMBABWE IS GOING TO BE. ONE THING THAT EMERGED CLEARLY FROM THE VISIT OF KERBY AND WINPENNY LAST WEEK WAS THAT EVERYONE HERE, NOT SURPRISINGLY, EXPECTS BRITISH AID OF A QUITE DIFFERENT ORDER OF MAGNITUDE.
2. THE FIVE-YEAR DEVELOPMENT PLAN INVOLVES FOREIGN EXCHANGE EXPENDITURE OF THE ORDER OF POUNDS STERLING 800M AT 1979 PRICES AND LOCAL CURRENCY EXPENDITURE OF TWICE THIS FIGURE. ABOUT TWO THIRDS IS NEEDED FOR RECONSTRUCTION AFTER THE WAR, AND TO DEVELOP SERVICES AND INFRASTRUCTURE SO THEY CAN COPE WITH THE POPULATION GROWTH OF 3.6 PER CENT CUMULATIVE, THE HIGHEST IN AFRICA. THE REST IS NEEDED TO LIFT THE ECONOMY, AFTER YEARS OF ISOLATION AND WAR, INTO A PHASE OF EXPANSION AND DEVELOPMENT THAT WOULD GIVE THE PROSPECT OF POLITICAL STABILITY. (THE OVERALL FIGURE DOES NOT INCLUDE INDUSTRY'S NEEDS FOR RE-EQUIPMENT, OF THE ORDER OF POUNDS STERLING 70M THIS YEAR ALONE - MY TELNO 35.)
3. AGAINST THIS REQUIREMENT OUR PROJECTED PROGRAMME OF POUNDS STERLING 40M FOR COMMITMENT OVER TWO YEARS WILL SEEM RISIBLE. WE SHOULD NEED TO GIVE SOMETHING LIKE THREE OR FOUR TIMES AS MUCH TO AVOID A GENERAL SENSE OF OUTRAGE AND CONTINUING POLITICAL EMBARRASSMENT.
4. THE PROBLEM IS MADE MORE ACUTE BY THE FACT THAT SUCH A SUBSTANTIAL PROPORTION OF THE POUNDS STERLING 40M IS ALREADY EFFECTIVELY COMMITTED, NOT LEAST FOR LAND RESETTLEMENT, LEAVING VERY LITTLE FOR INDIVIDUAL PROJECTS OF THE KIND THAT WOULD ESTABLISH OUR IDENTITY AS AID DONORS, AND VERY LITTLE INDEED FOR THE KIND OF HELP THAT BRITISH EXPORTERS ARE GOING TO NEED IF THEY ARE TO BID SUCCESSFULLY FOR ANY OF THE MAIN CONSTRUCTION PROJECTS IN THE DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME. (THE TURBO GENERATING PROJECT, WANKIE II, WHICH IS THE BEIGGEST INDUSTRIAL PROJECT IN PROSPECT IN AFRICA TODAY, THE ELECTRIFICATION OF THE RAILWAYS, THE HYDRO-ELECTRIC SCHEMES, ETC.) THE ADDITIONAL POUNDS STERLING 10M COMMITMENT TO THE RHODESIAN AFRICAN TRAINING SCHEME IN THE U K IS IMMATERIAL.

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IT IS UNPOPULAR LOCALLY BECAUSE OF THE DISRUPTION CAUSED TO WELL-RUN LOCAL EDUCATION PROGRAMMES AND IT WILL ANYWAY (RIGHTLY) BE PHASED OUT.

5. THE TASK OF RECONSTRUCTION IS DAUNTING. THE TRIBAL TRUST LANDS HAVE BEEN DEVASTATED. MEDICAL CARE FOR RURAL AFRICANS HAS VIRTUALLY BROKEN DOWN; MOST OF THE MISSION HOSPITALS AND AFRICAN COUNCIL CLINICS HAVE BEEN CLOSED. THE IMMUNISATION CAMPAIGN HAS BEEN LOST FOR 5 OR 6 YEARS. THERE ARE SEVERAL THOUSAND AMPUTEES NEEDING ARTIFICIAL LIMBS AND REHABILITATION. THE RETURN OF REFUGEES WILL MAKE THE STRAIN ON HEALTH SERVICES WORSE. 1800 AFRICAN SCHOOLS HAVE BEEN CLOSED AND SOME 350,000 CHILDREN AND 8,000 TEACHERS HAVE BEEN DISPLACED. ONLY ABOUT 18 PER CENT OF AFRICAN PRIMARY SCHOOL PUPILS ARE NOW GOING ON TO SECONDARY SCHOOL. CATTLE DIPS AND IRRIGATION WORKS HAVE BEEN DESTROYED AND THE WHOLE SYSTEM OF RURAL COMMUNICATIONS - ROADS, BRIDGES, ETC - NEEDS TO BE RESTORED. THE FLIGHT TO THE TOWNS HAS MADE MORE ACUTE AND URGENT THE NEED FOR A LARGE LOW-COST URBAN HOUSING PROGRAMME.

6. THERE IS ALSO THE PROBLEM OF RESETTLEMENT (INCLUDING EDUCATIONAL TRAINING) OF REFUGEES, 548958: 49,5 94:3' -, 5&3 .-, 6 5&97'-, 9% 17953 .7&8?-' 7,17953 - THE 12 TO 16 YEAR OLDS WHO HAVE BEEN FOLLOWING THE P F FORCES ROUND THE COUNTRY AND ARE NOW DISPLACED, IN MANY CASES HUNDREDS OF MILES FROM THEIR HOMES.

7. RHODESIA'S AID NEEDS ARE ESSENTIALLY SHORT-TERM. THE BASIC ECONOMIC POSITION OF THE COUNTRY IS VERY SOUND: IT HAS THE RESOURCES IN TERMS OF RAW MATERIALS TO PROVIDE A PROSPEROUS FUTURE, IF THEY CAN BE DEVELOPED, FOR ITS ENTIRE POPULATION. SOUND CONSERVATIVE FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT DURING THE PAST 14 YEARS HAS LEFT THE COUNTRY WITH A REMARKABLY STABLE FINANCIAL BASE, UNDER-BORROWED COMPARED WITH ALL OTHER AFRICAN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES. BUT LARGE INJECTIONS OF FOREIGN EXCHANGE ARE NEEDED NOW TO LIFT THE ECONOMY TO THE LEVEL WHERE IT CAN MAXIMISE ITS FOREIGN EXCHANGE EARNINGS AND BECOME TRULY SELF-SUFFICIENT AT A LEVEL OF OUTPUT THAT WILL PROVIDE A POLITICALLY ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF INCOME FOR ALL ITS PEOPLE.

8. I AM WELL AWARE THAT BUDGETARY CONSTRAINTS IN THE U K MAKE IT VIRTUALLY IMPOSSIBLE TO ACHIEVE THE INCREASE IN THE AID PROGRAMME THAT WOULD BE NECESSARY TO SALVAGE OUR POSITION HERE. BUT AGAINST THAT MUST BE SET THE FACT THAT IN THE EYES OF RHODESIAN OPINION BRITAIN HAS OVER THE PAST 14 YEARS BEEN QUOTE SAVING UNQUOTE MUCH LARGER SUMS THAT WOULD HAVE BEEN SPENT ON DEVELOPMENT AID FOR RHODESIA IN HAPPIER CIRCUMSTANCES. THE SUGGESTION THAT THAT CS ONLY RHODESIA'S (IE THE RHODESIA FRONT'S) FAULT WILL NOT CARRY ANY MORE WEIGHT WITH BLACK OPINION THAN IT WILL WITH WHITE. THE PROVISIONS OF THE ANGLO-AMERICAN PLAN ARE STILL IN THE FOREFRONT OF PEOPLE'S MINDS HERE AS THE SYMBOL OF OUR COMMITMENT TO MAKE GOOD THE DAMAGE DONE BY WHAT THE BLACKS AS WELL AS THE WHITES REGARD AS OUR HISTORICAL MISMANAGEMENT OF THE RHODESIAN PROBLEM. THE LANCASTER HOUSE RESETTLEMENT COMMITMENT HAS BEEN EXAGGERATED HERE TO THE POINT WHERE IT OCCUPIES THE SAME PLACE IN PEOPLE'S MINDS

9. I HOPE THAT PART OF THE LEEWAY COULD BE MADE UP BY SOFT LOAN FOR A MAJOR DEVELOPMENT PROJECT - WANKIE II OR ELECTRIFICATION - DEPENDENT UPON BRITISH INDUSTRIAL PARTICIPATION. BUT MORE WILL BE NEEDED THAN THAT.

10. THERE IS ONE FURTHER WAY THAT WOULD SALVAGE THE WHOLE SITUATION: DEBT RELIEF. I UNDERSTAND THAT WHEN D C SMITH SAW YOU IN LONDON IN OCTOBER YOU UNDERTOOK TO ASK THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER TO CAST A BENIGN EYE ON THE PROBLEM OF RHODESIAN/U K DEBT. THE PRESENT RHODESIAN U K DEBT CONTAINS SUBSTANTIAL ELEMENTS THAT A FUTURE ZIMBABWE GOVERNMENT WILL BE STRONGLY OPPOSED TO HONOURING ON POLITICAL GROUNDS. ALL OF THEM DATE FROM THE TIME OF FEDERATION. TO TAKE THE INITIATIVE IN WRITING THEM OFF WOULD MAKE ALL THE DIFFERENCE AND RESOLVE THE ACUTE EMBARRASSMENT WE SHALL OTHERWISE FACE OVER AID. IT WOULD ALSO AVOID THE WORSE EMBARRASSMENT OF A BITTER WRANGLE ABOUT THEM IN PUBLIC IF WE WAIT FOR THE ZIMBABWE GOVERNMENT TO SUGGEST WRITING THEM OFF AND THEN FIGHT IT. RHODESCANS OF ALL PARTIES ARE WELL AWARE THAT WE HAVE BEEN IN THE HABIT OF WRITING OFF LOANS FOR DEVELOPMENT IN THE PAST AND PROVIDING NEWLY INDEPENDENT COUNTRIES WITH DOWRIES IN THE FORM OF DEBT RELIEF.

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11. A GENEROUS SCHEME OF DEBT RELIEF WOULD NOT ONLY SAVE THE FUTURE ZIMBABWE GOVERNMENT USEFUL BUDGETARY RESOURCES BUT ALSO RELEASE IMPORTANT QUANTITIES OF FOREIGN EXCHANGE FOR DEVELOPMENT NEEDS. ASSUMING THAT THE CHICKENS HAVE NOT BEEN COUNTED, IT COULD ALSO PRESUMABLY BE ACHIEVED WITHOUT ACTUALLY ADDING ANYTHING TO THE FORECAST U K PUBLIC SECTOR BORROWING REQUIREMENT.

12. I HOPE THAT SOME PRELIMINARY THOUGHT CAN BE GIVEN TO THESE MATTERS AT A POLITICAL LEVEL BEFORE THE VISIT, FOR TALKS AT A TECHNICAL LEVEL, OF ELAM, WALTERS (DEPUTY SECRETARY, TREASURY) AND PARKE (DEPUTY GOVERNOR RESERVE BANK) IN THE WEEK BEGINNING 28 JANUARY. M I F T CONTAINS DETAILS OF THE POLITICALLY CONTENTIOUS ITEMS IN THE PRESENT DEBT SCHEDULE.

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PS/MR MARTEN
PS/PUS
SIR D MAITLAND

MR HANNAY
LORD W G LENNOX
MISS BROWN
MR DAY
MR FERGUSSON
MR ASPIN
MR MILLS

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RHODESIA POLICY

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FM SALISBURY 181628Z JAN 80

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 224 OF 18 JANUARY

AND TO IMMEDIATE MAPUTO

INFO IMMEDIATE LUSAKA DAR ES SALAAM GABORONE LAGOS WASHINGTON
RHODESIA/MOZAMBIQUE

1. WE HAD A MEETING TODAY WITH HONWANA (DIRECTOR OF THE MOZAMBIQUE LIAISON OFFICE HERE) WHO RETURNED YESTERDAY FROM A VISIT TO MAPUTO DURING WHICH HE MET MACHEL. THE FOLLOWING WERE THE MAIN POINTS OF INTEREST:-

(A) DETAINEES. HONWANA SAID THAT Z A N U DETAINEES WERE AN EMBARRAS-
SMENT TO THE MOZAMBIQUE GOVERNMENT: THEY WISHED TO RELEASE THEM AS
SOON

AS POSSIBLE. MACHEL HAD THEREFORE ASKED MUGABE FOR HIS PERMISSION TO RELEASE THEM AND POINTED OUT THAT IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT TO CONTINUE TO HOLD THEM WHEN MUGABE RETURNED TO RHODESIA. MUGABE HAD PROMISED TO GIVE MACHEL AN EARLY REPLY: HONWANA SAID THAT HE WAS CONVINCED THAT THE DETAINEES WOULD BE RELEASED IN THE NEAR FUTURE. WE ASKED ABOUT OTHER DETAINEES REFERRED TO IN PARA 7 OF MAPUTO TELNO 71 TO ME. HONWANA SAID THAT THE 100 OR SO U A N C SYMPATHISERS WERE NO PROBLEM: THEY WERE NOW BEING TREATED AS REFUGEES AND WOULD BE REPATRIATED AT THE SAME TIME AS THE OTHER REFUGEES. HONWANA SAID THAT HE WAS UNAWARE OF THE EXISTENCE OF THE OTHER TWO CATEGORIES MENTIONED BY MACHEL BUT PROMISED TO INVESTIGATE.

(B) Z A N U. HONWANA SAID THAT HIS GOVERNMENT WERE BECOMING IN-
CREASINGLY IRRITATED BY Z A N U. Z A N U WERE SHOWING LITTLE

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SIGN OF TRANSFORMING THEMSELVES FROM A GUERRILLA MOVEMENT
TO A POLITICAL PARTY FIGHTING A DEMOCRATIC ELECTION. THEIR PARTY
 ORGANISATION IN RHODESIA WAS DEFECTIVE AND THEY SEEMED TO BE
 DOING LITTLE TO IMPROVE IT. THEY HAD NO PROPER ELECTION STRATEGY.
 IN PARTICULAR, Z A N U SHOULD IMPROVE THEIR IMAGE IN ORDER TO
 REMOVE THE IMPRESSION THAT THEY INTENDED TO FOLLOW EXTREMIST
 POLICIES. (HONWANA COMMENTED THAT IF Z A N U ATTEMPTED TO IMPOSE
 AN EXTREME SOCIALIST REGIME ON RHODESIA THEY WOULD WRECK THE
 COUNTRY.) HONWANA SAID THAT HE HAD OFFERED TO HELP Z A N U DRAFT
 ITS ELECTION MANIFESTO BUT THIS OFFER HAD BEEN DECLINED. HOWEVER
 PRESIDENT MACHEL INTENDED TO INSIST THAT BEFORE MUGABE LEFT
 MOZAMBIQUE HE SHOULD MAKE A RADIO BROADCAST SETTING OUT HIS
 POLICIES IN MODERATE TERMS AND STRESSING THE NEED FOR RECONCILIATION.
 (C) VIOLATIONS OF MOZAMBIQUE AIRSPACE. WE SAID THAT WE WERE
 INVESTIGATING THE ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF MOZAMBIQUE AIRSPACE BY
 RHODESIAN AIRCRAFT AND WOULD LET HIM KNOW THE RESULT AS SOON
 AS POSSIBLE.

FCO PASS ALL

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[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

F I L E S

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| PUSD | PS/MR LUCE |
| PLANNING STAFF | PS/MR RIDLEY |
| ES & SD | PS/MR HURD |
| | PS/MR MARTEN |
| CCD | PS/PUS |
| FRD | SIR D MAITLAND |
| EID (E) | |
| UND | MR HANNAY |
| LEGAL ADVISERS | LORD N G LENNOX |
| (MR FREELAND) | MISS BROWN |
| (MR FIFOOT) | MR DAY |
| ECON D | MR FERGUSON |
| PCD | MR ASPIN |
| DEF D | MR MILLS |
| IPD | CHIEF PASSPORT OFFICER |

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PRIME MINISTER

Since you may well be discussing overseas affairs with the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary over the weekend, you may like to have a brief note on where we stand on various issues:-

(a) Iran and Afghanistan

The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary will of course be completely up to date in regard to the situation on the ground. As regards the position in Whitehall, OD will be meeting to discuss policy on both issues on Tuesday morning. The brief on Iran, including a telegram giving Sir J. Graham's reaction to the various proposals for action, is in your Box. The brief on Afghanistan is being submitted to Lord Carrington tomorrow morning. I hope it will be available to you in Chequers on Sunday. Enquiries about an alternative venue for the Olympics are in hand. If, as seems to ^{me} be altogether likely, no city is prepared to take on the Games as a whole, you will wish to consider whether the UK should try to offer to host one sport.

(b) Rhodesia

The situation in Rhodesia is giving rise to some anxiety. The reasons are set out in the attached internal FCO minute. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary is, I understand, very concerned. It is not easy to see what more can be done from London. (dated 18/1)

(c) Yugoslavia

President Tito's health is deteriorating. He may well die within the next 24 hours. Your message is ready for despatch and the Press Office have a statement prepared for delivery (you have approved both). No statement about the composition of the party going to Belgrade will be made until after the weekend (you have already agreed that you will go).

/(d) Community Budget

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(d) Community Budget

The Lord Privy Seal had useful talks in Bonn. I have asked that he should circulate a note on his visits as a whole before next Friday's meeting of OD. A paper on the line you might take with Signor Cossiga about the Budget, incorporating the points you made in your discussion with the Lord Privy Seal on Wednesday last, is in preparation.

Paul
-

18 January 1980

CONFIDENTIAL



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

(1)

18 January 1980

Dear Michael,
Prime Minister: This draft is modelled on your letter to President Nyerere. Agree text?

Rhodesia: Message from President Shagari

*Am
R/1*

We sent you on 16 January a copy of the message to the Prime Minister from President Shagari of Nigeria expressing concern at the presence of South African forces at Beitbridge and the Governor's use of Rhodesian forces.

The Prime Minister has already replied to a similar, though longer, message from President Nyerere. I enclose a draft reply from the Prime Minister to President Shagari. This draws on the reply to President Nyerere and has been approved by Mr Luce.

yours ever

M. Luce

Roderic Lyne

(R M J Lyne)
Private Secretary

M O'D B Alexander Esq
10 Downing Street

OUT TELEGRAM

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| 10 | GABORONE, WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK |
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| 12 | RHODESIA: REPLY TO PRESIDENT SHAGARI'S MESSAGE |
| 13 | Please pass following reply from the Prime Minister to |
| 14 | President Shagari: |
| 15 | BEGINS |
| 16 | Thank you for writing to me so frankly about Rhodesia. |
| 17 | I agree that we must carry through our efforts to implement the |
| 18 | Lancaster House agreement peacefully and amicably. |
| 19 | I note very carefully your misgivings about the presence |
| 20 | of the South African detachment at Beitbridge. Julius Nyerere |
| 21 | has been in touch with me on this same issue. But I do urge |
| 22 | most strongly that we should view this problem in its true |
| 23 | perspective. The strategic and economic importance of |
| 24 | Beitbridge is self-evident. Damage to it could have very |
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| NNNN ends telegram | BLANK | Catchword /serious |
| File number | Dept Private Office | Distribution Rhod Policy |
| Drafted by (Block capitals) C D POWELL | | |
| Telephone number 233-3644 | | |
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OUT TELEGRAM (CONT)

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1 serious consequences, particularly for Rhodesia which is
 2 dependent on South Africa for communications and supplies, but
 3 also for other countries in the region. It is essential that
 4 it should be properly protected and South Africa has a
 5 legitimate interest in seeing that it is: the bridge is jointly
 6 owned by South Africa and Rhodesia. The South African detachment
 7 guarding the Rhodesian end of the bridge is small and is there
 8 exclusively to guard the bridge. There is no question of its
 9 being able ~~to~~, or ~~being~~ allowed, to interfere in any way in
 10 Rhodesia's internal affairs or to prejudice the conduct of
 11 elections. It may be that developments over the next few weeks
 12 will make its presence unnecessary, and I can assure you that
 13 the Governor will keep the need for it under review. In the
 14 meantime the presence of a team from the Monitoring Force in
 15 the vicinity of the bridge will give all of us the assurance
 16 that the South African detachment is strictly limited to the
 17 defence of the bridge.

18 You suggest that the South Africans should be replaced by
 19 British troops. A number of British troops are of course
 20 present in Rhodesia as part of the Monitoring Force. But it
 21 was made clear during the Conference that the Monitoring Force
 22 would not be an intervention or a fighting force, and it would
 23 not therefore be appropriate for the force or any of its units
 24 to take on defence of the bridge. Nor do I believe it would
 25 be practicable to have British troops in Rhodesia fulfilling
 26 two entirely different roles, that is some as members of the
 27 Monitoring Force and others in a fighting capacity.

28 I know that this is a sensitive issue. We shall therefore
 29 keep it under careful review. The overriding need is to ensure
 30 that there is no external interference in Rhodesia in this
 31 period which could in any way prejudice free and fair elections.
 32 This we are determined to ensure.

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1 You also raise the question of the Governor's use of
 2 Rhodesian Forces. This arises from the fact that there have
 3 been a number of serious breaches in the ceasefire, in the form
 4 of cross-border infiltration by PF forces, failure on their
 5 part to assemble and acts of violence and intimidation. In
 6 dealing with these incidents, the Governor has made full use of
 7 the PF commanders and liaison officers to defuse dangerous
 8 situations. He has also used the police to maintain law and
 9 order, as required by the agreements. But there have been
 10 instances where the police have not been able to cope with the
 11 task; and in these circumstances, and to deal with acts of
 12 banditry, the Governor has authorised the use of Rhodesian
 13 Forces in support of the police. He has also been compelled
 14 on various occasions to deploy forces to the border areas to
 15 deal with continuing infiltration of PF forces in violation of
 16 the ceasefire agreements. I stress the use of the Rhodesian
 17 Forces in this way is to deal with specific incidents, and the
 18 forces themselves are monitored when used. In the specific
 19 case to which you refer, the Patriotic Front's own military
 20 commanders have indicated that the armed group had failed to
 21 obey their orders and was in breach of the ceasefire.

22 I should like to take this opportunity to draw your
 23 attention to some matters which cause me anxiety. One which is
 24 causing me particular concern is Mr Mugabe's failure to release
 25 some seventy former members of ZANU whom he is holding in
 26 detention in Mozambique. We have made a number of efforts to
 27 persuade him to release them so that they can return to Rhodesia
 28 to take part in the elections; and it is urgent that he should
 29 agree to do so before nominations for the elections close on
 30 21 January. The Lancaster House agreements were very specific
 31 on this matter. They require that all persons detained arbitrarily
 32 and on political grounds should be released and the Governor has
 33 taken appropriate action by releasing all those formerly
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1 detained inside Rhodesia under Ministerial Orders. I hope
 2 very much that you will feel able to use your influence with
 3 Mr Mugabe to secure the immediate release of all those held
 4 by him. At the same time it would be very helpful if you could
 5 urge upon him the need for ZANLA forces to observe the
 6 ceasefire strictly.

7 We knew that the period leading up to independence in
 8 Rhodesia would be a tense and difficult time. We have been
 9 confronted with serious problems and will inevitably face
 10 further difficulties. But I hope that you will agree that
 11 striking progress has been achieved by the Governor's
 12 Administration of Rhodesia during the past five weeks. Legality
 13 has been restored, the level of fighting and casualties
 14 drastically reduced and over 20,000 members of the PF forces
 15 have assembled peacefully. Restrictions on the Patriotic Front's
 16 political activities have been lifted and arrangements set in
 17 train for the elections. As you know, Mr Nkomo has returned to
 18 Salisbury together with the whole of ZAPU's leadership and many
 19 leading members of ZANU have also now gone home. Considerable
 20 progress has been made towards normalising relations with
 21 Rhodesia's neighbours and arrangements are in hand for the
 22 early return of refugees. Within Rhodesia, restrictions have
 23 been widely relaxed, and an amnesty declared. These are
 24 remarkable achievements when contrasted with the situation
 25 which prevailed only a few weeks ago or which would have prevailed
 26 had we not succeeded at Lancaster House.

27 My Government has taken on a heavy responsibility. More
 28 than anyone, we have an interest in insisting that all parties
 29 should observe the agreements scrupulously and we look for the
 30 continued support of our friends in ensuring that this is so.
 31 You can have confidence in our good faith and impartiality
 32 during this difficult time and I feel sure that I can continue
 33 to count on your support and advice.

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Please do not hesitate to contact me again if you feel concerned. We are approaching the end of a great enterprise, and are determined to see it through to a just and successful conclusion.

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With the compliments of

THE PRIVATE SECRETARY

**FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
SW1A 2AH**

Secretary of State

Private Secretary

RHODESIA

- 1 I spoke to Mr Renwick on the secure line at 3.30 p.m. this afternoon to find out about the latest developments.
- 2 Mr Renwick said that Walls and the Rhodesian military were in such an emotional state about the activities of ZANU and the refusal of the Governor to proscribe the party that it had not yet been possible to speak to Walls on the lines of our latest instructions.
- 3 Sir A Duff and Mr Renwick had, however, had a meeting this afternoon with the military commanders at which Walls was not present, as a result of which some at least of the commanders were beginning to accept that it would not be possible for us to ban ZANU outright. This more sensible attitude was, however, predicated on the assumption that we would continue to be extremely tough with Mugabe over the release of political detainees held in Mozambique. Mr Renwick said that it would almost certainly be essential for the Governor, in an attempt to encourage this more realistic attitude, to promulgate the Ordinance empowering him to take selective action against any party which consistently violated the Lancaster House agreements. Salisbury will be sending to us overnight the draft of the proposed Ordinance. They realise that it should not be promulgated without prior agreement from the Secretary of State. However, they are having to discuss the idea of such an Ordinance with the Rhodesians as a price of keeping them in play.
- 4 On the political detainees Mr Honwana has told us in Salisbury that President Machel has informed Mugabe that he must release them. However, Mugabe is still wriggling.

5 A meeting of the NJOC is to be held on Monday 21 January.

It will discuss:

- (a) what attitude the NJOC should take if the Governor does not ban ZANU. There is still a feeling that in such circumstances there would be no point in continuing with the Lancaster House settlement;
- (b) what arrangements should be made to deal with the problem of the Patriotic Front forces in the assembly areas.

Consideration of this second point by the NJOC is a constructive development. The former is worrying.

6 The feeling in Salisbury is that it would be wholly counter-productive to tackle Walls on the South African issue until the Governor has considered how the NJOC meeting on Monday goes.

7 This complex of issues is being discussed in Salisbury this evening and tomorrow morning. Mr Renwick says that the Governor will send a full telegram after he has assessed the situation.

8 Given the continuing international pressure over the South Africans at Beitbridge, it is unfortunate that Salisbury have not yet felt able to tackle Walls on this issue. It was, however, very clear from my conversation with Mr Renwick that our relations with the Rhodesian military continue to be balanced on a knife-edge and that there is a very serious risk of putting the Governor's position in Rhodesia in jeopardy if the timing of any such approach is not very finely judged. The Governor and his staff are clearly under enormous pressure and strain. Although there is every reason why we should press to resolve this issue as soon as possible, I consider that we must accept

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the judgement of the man on the spot as regards the precise timing of the approach to the Rhodesians on this issue.

D. M. Day

18 January 1980

D M Day

Copied to:

PS/LPS

PS/Mr Luce

PS/PUS

Mr Powell, Rhodesia Department

[RHODESIA: POLICY: ADVANCE COPIES]

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Rhodesia
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MR DAY
LORD N G LENNOX
~~MR ASPIN~~

PS/NO 10 DOWNING STREET

SIR R ARMSTRONG)
MR R L WADE GERY)
MR P M MAXEY) CABINET
MR GOULTY) OFFICE
MR P J FOWLER)
DIO)

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HD/RHOD DEPT (4)

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HD/NEWS DEPT
HE/WAD

MR FREELAND LEGAL ADVISER FMK200A
MR FIFOOT LEGAL ADVISER RM K164
~~RESIDENT CLERK~~

IMMEDIATE

GRS 395

CONFIDENTIAL

FROM LAGOS 181130Z

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 96 OF 18 JANUARY 1980.

RFI IMMEDIATE SALISBURY, DAR ES SALAAM, LUSAKA, MAPUTO, PRETORIA,
UKMIS NEW YORK.

PRIORITY LUANDA, GABORONE AND WASHINGTON.

CAPETWON TELNO 16: SOUTH AFRICA/RHODESIA.

1. I AM GRATEFUL FOR MR LEAHY'S EXPLANATION WHICH HELPS MY UNDERSTANDING OF THE BACKGROUND (ALTHOUGH HAVING MET BOTH PW AND PIK I HAVE SOME EXPERIENCE OF SOUTH AFRICAN IRRATIONALITY). HOWEVER I AM STILL NOT CLEAR WHY THE SOUTH AFRICANS WOULD NOT ACCEPT THAT THE SECURITY OF THE BRIDGE COULD BE ENSURED BY THE PRESENCE OF SOME OTHER TROOPS ON THE NORTH END, EG BRITISH OR AUSTRALIAN, IF THEY COULD BE MADE AVAILABLE. MORE SERIOUSLY, IF THE SOUTH AFRICANS BELIEVE THAT THERE IS A REAL DANGER OF A "TERRORIST" ATTACK ON THE BRIDGE, THIS MEANS A REAL RISK THAT IN DEFENDING THE BRIDGE SOUTH AFRICAN TROOPS MIGHT KILL BLACK RHODESIANS ON RHODESIAN SOIL UNDER THE AUTHORITY OF THE GOVERNOR. I WOULD HAVE THOUGHT THAT THIS WOULD BE AN UNACCEPTABLE RISK FROM OUR POINT OF VIEW.

2. I CAN UNDERSTAND THE SOUTH AFRICANS' DETERMINATION TO DO EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO ENSURE A MIZOREWA VICTORY. BUT THERE

OUR POINT OF VIEW.

2. I CAN UNDERSTAND THE SOUTH AFRICANS' DETERMINATION TO DO EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO ENSURE A MUZOREWA VICTORY. BUT THERE SEEMS TO ME A SERIOUS DANGER THAT IN THEIR PURSUIT OF THIS AIM THEY WILL DESTROY THE CREDIBILITY OF OUR ADMINISTRATION AND OF THE ELECTIONS, LEADING TO NON-ACCEPTANCE OF THE ELECTION RESULTS AND THE RESUMPTION OF THE CIVIL WAR WITH PROBABLY INCREASED FRONT LINE AND OTHER SUPPORT. THIS IS SURELY NOT THE RESULT THE SOUTH AFRICANS WANT. FROM OUR POINT OF VIEW OF COURSE SUCH A RESULT WOULD BE EVEN MORE DISASTROUS SINCE NOT ONLY WOULD WE HAVE FAILED TO SOLVE THE RHODESIA PROBLEM BUT OUR RELATIONS WITH AFRICAN COUNTRIES, INCLUDING NIGERIA, WOULD BE WORSENERD BECAUSE WE WOULD BE HELD RESPONSIBLE AND ACCUSED OF BAD FAITH AND CONNIVANCE WITH THE SOUTH AFRICANS.

3. I CAN BELIEVE THAT IN SOUTH AFRICA AND EVEN ON THE GROUND IN RHODESIA (EG NKOMO'S APPARENT LACK OF SERIOUS CONCERN) THE PRESENCE OF THE SMALL SOUTH AFRICAN CONTINGENT AT BEIT BRIDGE MIGHT SEEM A MINOR QUESTION. BUT IT IS CLEAR FROM TELEGRAMS FROM OTHER AFRICAN POSTS AND NEW YORK THAT IT IS A MAJOR QUESTION FOR THE REST OF AFRICA, BOTH FOR EMOTIONAL REASONS AND BECAUSE IT IS REGARDED AS A BREACH OF OUR UNDERTAKINGS (AND, AS SIR A PARSONS HAS POINTED OUT, OF A SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION). AS REGARDS THE ARGUMENT IN THE FIRST SENTENCE OF PARAGRAPH 3 OF THE CAPETOWN TUR THIS COULD BE TURNED ROUND TO POINT OUT TO THE SOUTH AFRICANS THAT IT IS TO A CONSIDERABLE EXTENT BECAUSE OF THE CONCENTRATION OF HOSTILE ATTENTION ON THE PRESENCE OF THEIR TROOPS THAT LESS ATTENTION IS PAID TO THE MAJOR BREACHES BY ZANLA. IF THE SOUTH AFRICAN CONTINGENT WERE REMOVED IT WOULD BE MUCH EASIER FOR US TO FOCUS ATTENTION ON THE MANY INIQUITIES OF ZANLA AND ZANU.

BROWN

RHODESIA PROBLEM BUT OUR RELATIONS WITH AFRICAN COUNTRIES AN INCLUDING NIGERIA, WOULD BE WORSENERD BECAUSE WE WOULD BE HELD RESPONSIBLE AND ACCUSED OF BAD FAITH AND CONNIVANCE WITH THE SOUTH AFRICANS.

* THAT IT IS TO A CONSIDERABLE EXTENT BECAUSE OF THE CONCENTRATION

IMMEDIATE

PS
PS/SIR I GILMOUR
PS/MR LUCE
PS/PUS
SIR D MAITLAND
MR DAY
LORD N G LENNOX
MR ASPIN

PS/NO 10 DOWNING STREET ✓
SIR R ARMSTRONG)
MR R L WADE GERY)
MR P M MAXEY) CABINET
MR GOULTY) OFFICE
MR P J FOWLER)
DIO)

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MR-FREELAND LEGAL ADVISER RMK200A
MR FIFOOT LEGAL ADVISER RM K164
RESIDENT CLERK

OO FCO DESKBY 180930Z
OR 320

CONFIDENTIAL

DESKBY 180930Z

FM NAIROBI 180845Z JAN 80
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELNO 44 OF 18 JANUARY
AND TO IMMEDIATE SALISBURY, DAR ES SALAAM:
PRIORITY WASHINGTON, LUSAKA, MAPUTO, UKMIS NEW YORK, GABORONE.

MY TELNO 39
SOUTH AFRICAN TROOPS AT BEIT BRIDGE

1. I HAVE JUST RECEIVED A LETTER FROM KIEREINI SAYING THAT
THE LETTERS I LEFT WITH HIM ON 16 JANUARY WERE BROUGHT
TO THE ATTENTION OF THE PRESIDENT AT KISUMU YESTERDAY.

2. KIEREINI'S LETTER CONTINUES AS FOLLOWS:-

BEGINS:

"HIS EXCELLENCY THE PRESIDENT IS STILL MOST UNHAPPY THAT
SOUTH AFRICAN TROOPS SHOULD BE INVOLVED IN THIS DELICATE
SITUATION. IN HIS OPINION, HE CANNOT SEE A BETTER WAY OF BREAKING
THE AGREEMENT AND GIVING THE OTHER PARTIES EXCUSE FOR
REACTING UNFAVOURABLY.

SITUATION. IN HIS OPINION, HE CANNOT SEE A BETTER WAY OF
THE AGREEMENT AND GIVING THE OTHER PARTIES EXCUSE FOR
REACTING UNFAVOURABLY.

KENYA IS THE ONLY AFRICAN COUNTRY WHICH HAS AGREED TO SEND
HER TROOPS TO PARTICIPATE IN THE MONITORING EXERCISE. WE
WOULD HATE TO PARTICIPATE IN THIS ENDEAVOUR ONLY TO SUFFER
THE CONSEQUENCES OF UNFULFILLED PROMISES AS AGREED IN THE
LANCASTER HOUSE AGREEMENT. WE WOULD LIKE TO GO TO THE OAU
AND TO OTHER INTERNATIONAL FORA FEELING CONFIDENT THAT OUR
PARTICIPATION WAS JUSTIFIED AND PROPER. FOR THIS REASON, HIS
EXCELLENCY THE PRESIDENT FEELS STRONGLY THAT FOR WHATEVER REASON,
THE PRESENCE OF SOUTH AFRICAN TROOPS ON RHODESIAN SOIL CANNOT
BE JUSTIFIED. HIS EXCELLENCY THE PRESIDENT IS PREPARED TO SEND
FROM KENYA THE NUMBER OF TROOPS REQUIRED TO GUARD THAT BRIGDE
IF YOUR GOVERNMENT WOULD LIKE TO SUBSTITUTE THE SOUTH AFRICAN
TROOPS WITH OUR TROOPS. THIS IS A FIRM OFFER WHICH CAN BE
EXECUTED IMMEDIATELY.''
ENDS.

3. THIS LETTER SUGGESTS TO ME THAT MOI REALISES THAT HE IS
BOXED IN BY HIS PUBLIC STATEMENT AND, TAKING OUR ARGUMENTS
ABOUT THE MILITARY NEED FOR THE SOUTH AFRICANS AT THEIR FACE
VALUE, IS TRYING TO GET HIMSELF AND US OFF THE HOOK. (THERE
IS NO DOUBT THAT THE KENYANS ARE QUITE CAPABLE OF DEFENDING THE
BRIDGE AGAINST GUERRILLAS AND HAVE THE WEAPONRY TO DO THE JOB).

4. THE LETTER INCREASES BY FEELING THAT THERE IS A REAL RISK OF
LOSING THE KENYANS UNLESS IN THE LIGHT OF WHAT SEEMS TO BE
GENEALLY ENCOURAGING DEVELOPMENTS IN RHODESIA A REVIEW OF THE
MILITARY NEED FOR THE SOUTH AFRICANS ENABLES US TO CONCLUDE
THAT THEY CAN BE REPLACED BY RHODESIANS.

WILLIAMS

IMMEDIATE

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[RHODESIA: POLICY: ADVANCE COPIES]

28

PS
PS/SIR I GILMOUR
PS/MR LUCE
PS/PUS
SIR D MAITLAND
MR DAY
LORD N G LENNOX
MR ASPIN

PS/NO 10 DOWNING STREET

SIR R ARMSTRONG)
MR R L WADE GERY)
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MR P J FOWLER)
DIO)

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HE/WAD

MR FREELAND LEGAL ADVISER FMK200A

MR FLEET LEGAL ADVISER FM K164

~~PRESIDENT CLERK~~

CONFIDENTIAL

FM MONROVIA 171815Z JAN 80

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 008 OF 17 JAN

INFO PRIORITY SALISBURY, LUSAKA, MAPUTO, GABORONE,
DAR ES SALAAM, LAGOS, WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK,
LUANDA.

IMMEDIATE

YOUR TELNO: 6 (NOT TO ALL): RHODESIA

1. I CALLED ON DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER SHERMAN TODAY AND DELIVERED PRIME MINISTER'S MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT TOLBERT. SHERMAN READ IT AND WE THEN HAD GENERAL DISCUSSION IN WHICH I SPOKE IN ACCORDANCE WITH YOUR TELS TO LUSAKA.

2. SHERMAN SAID THAT IT WAS TRAGIC THAT BRITAIN WAS PUTTING WHOLE AGREEMENT AT RISK FOR SAKE OF A FEW SOUTH AFRICAN TROOPS. SURELY AFRICAN SENSITIVITIES ON THIS SUBJECT WERE UNDERSTOOD BY NOW. WHATEVER DEFENSIVE ARGUMENTS BRITAIN PUT UP SOUTH AFRICAN TROOPS AT THE RHODESIAN END OF BEIT BRIDGE DID AMOUNT TO EXTERNAL INVOLVEMENT. HE HAD BEEN IN LONDON DURING TALKS AND KNEW THAT PF LEADERS HAD BEEN TOLD THAT THERE WOULD BE NO SOUTH AFRICAN TROOPS IN RHODESIA AFTER BRITISH GOVERNOR TOOK OVER. IF BEIT BRIDGE WAS TO BE AN EXCEPTION WHY HAD THAT NOT BEEN MADE CLEAR AT THE TIME. THE ANSWER WAS OBVIOUS.

TOOK OVER. IF BEIT BRIDGE WAS TO BE AN EXCEPTION WHY HAD
THAT NOT BEEN MADE CLEAR AT THE TIME. THE ANSWER WAS OBVIOUS.
BRITAIN KNEW THAT IF IT HAD THERE WOULD HAVE BEEN NO AGREEMENT.
WHY COULD SOUTH AFRICAN TROOPS NOT STAY ON THEIR HALF OF BRIDGE
AND RHODESIAN AND PATRIOTIC FRONT FORCES GUARD THE OTHER HALF.

3. I READ RELEVANT EXCERPTS FROM SALISBURY TELNO 191 BUT
SHERMAN WAS DEAF TO ALL ARGUMENT. HE SAID THAT AFRICA WOULD
NOT COMPROMISE ON THIS ISSUE.

DOUBLEDAY

FCO PASS ALL

IMMEDIATE

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[RHODESIA: POLICY: ADVANCE COPIES]

PS
PS/SIR I GILMOUR
PS/MR LUCE
~~MR SIR E. YOUDE~~
~~MR B. MAITLAND~~ ~~MR BULLARD~~
MR DAY
LORD N G LENNOX
MR ASPIN

PS/NO 10 DOWNING STREET
SIR R ARMSTRONG)
MR R L WADE GERY)
MR P M MAYEY) CABINET
MR GOULTY) OFFICE
MR P J FOWLER)
DIO)

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MR FREELAND LEGAL ADVISER RCK200A
MR FLEWELL LEGAL ADVISER IM K164
RESIDENT CLERK

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CONFIDENTIAL

FM SALISBURY 171825Z JAN 80

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 212 OF 17 JANUARY

INFO IMMEDIATE LUSAKA DAR ES SALAAM MAPUTO GABORONE LUANDA PRETORIA
CAPE TOWN WASHINGTON LAGOS UKMIS NEW YORK CANBERRA PRIORITY OTTAWA
WELLINGTON NAIROBI SUVA

MY TELNO 201: RHODESIA: SITREP 17 JANUARY

1. THE NUMBER OF VIOLENT INCIDENTS HAS INCREASED, ALTHOUGH ONLY
MAJOR ACTION HAS BEEN THE DEPLOYMENT OF THE FIRE FORCE NEAR ASSEMBLY
AREA ECHO, REFERRED TO IN YESTERDAY'S SITREP (SEE PARA 2 BELOW.
IN THE LAST 24 HOURS THERE HAVE BEEN 22 INCIDENTS INCLUDING ELEVEN
STOCK THEFTS AND THREE LAND MINE EXPLOSIONS, ONE CAUSED BY A MINE
THOUGHT TO HAVE BEEN LAID IN THE LAST SIX DAYS. SEVEN ARMED MEN
WERE DETAINED AND 48 GAVE THEMSELVES UP UNDER THE AMNESTY PROGRAMME.
THE TOTAL NUMBER OF MEN IN THE ASSEMBLY PLACES THIS MORNING WAS
21,279.

2. THE FIRE FORCE ACTION YESTERDAY TOOK PLACE ONLY 3 KILOMETRES
FROM ASSEMBLY AREA ECHO, THAT IS INSIDE THE INFORMAL BUFFER ZONE
THAT NEITHER SIDES FORCES SHOULD ENTER. THE FIRE FORCE KILLED THREE
GUERRILLAS AND WOUNDED THREE OTHERS; THEY SUFFERED NO CASUALTIES
THEMSELVES. IT HAS NOT YET BEEN POSSIBLE TO ESTABLISH WHETHER THE
P F GUERRILLAS WERE FROM ECHO OR NOT - THE P F COMMANDER DENIES
THAT THEY WERE. THE IMMEDIATE EFFECT ON THE ASSEMBLY POINT WAS THAT
THE GUERRILLAS TOOK UP DEFENSIVE POSITIONS BUT SUBSEQUENTLY STOOD
DOWN AGAIN AND NOW...

THAT THEY WERE. THE IMMEDIATE EFFECT ON THE ASSEMBLY POINT WAS THAT THE GUERRILLAS TOOK UP DEFENSIVE POSITIONS BUT SUBSEQUENTLY STOOD DOWN AGAIN AND NOW SEEM TO BE RELAXED ABOUT THE INCIDENT.

3. TWO BRITISH SOLDIERS WERE KILLED TODAY WHEN A WATER BOWSER OVERTURNED.

4. THERE HAVE BEEN UNCONFIRMED REPORT OF A LARGE GROUP (POSSIBLY 500) OF P F GUERRILLAS NEAR NKAI (60 MILES EAST OF QUE QUE). A SECURITY FORCE COMPANY HAS DEPLOYED TO LOOK FOR THEM. A WEAPONS CACHE HAS BEEN FOUND IN THE AREA. THERE IS EVIDENCE THAT Z I P R A CADRES FROM VARIOUS ASSEMBLY POINTS ATTENDED A MEETING IN SALISBURY ON SUNDAY.

INTIMIDATION

5. THERE HAVE BEEN SIX INDIVIDUAL REPORT OF COMBINED ELECTIONEERING AND INTIMIDATION, ALL PERPETRATED BY Z A N L A. IT HAS JUST BEEN REPORTED THAT ON 29 DECEMBER A P F GROUP ACCUSED 2 ELDERLY AFRICANS OF BEING SELL-OUTS AND ORDERED THE LOCALS TO STONE THEM. BOTH DIED OF INJURIES THUS RECEIVED ON 31 DECEMBER.

ASSEMBLY AREAS

6. IN A FEW OF THE AREAS, PARTICULARLY ALPHA AND JULIET, THE P F COMMANDERS HAVE ORGANISED THEIR MEN INTO UNITS AND ARE CONDUCTING REGULAR MILITARY TRAINING. IN THESE CAMPS DISCIPLINE IS GOOD, WHICH MAKES LIFE EASIER FOR THE MONITORS. A CONTRAST IS BRAVO WHERE THE GUERRILLAS HAVE FRAGMENTED THEMSELVES INTO SMALL GROUPS AND THE LEADERS CHANGE DAILY. TWENTY OR SO GUERRILLAS ARE MISSING FROM ROMEO; THERE HAS BEEN POLITICISING IN THE AREA BUT THERE IS NO FIRM EVIDENCE TO LINK IT WITH THE MISSING MEN. THERE ARE REPORTS FROM SEVERAL ASSEMBLY POINTS THAT THE CONTINUED DETENTION BY THE POLICE OF SOME GROUPS WHO HAVE GIVEN THEMSELVES UP UNDER THE AMNESTY IS CAUSING TENSION. IT IS ACCEPTABLE FOR THE POLICE TO HOLD SUCH GROUPS FOR QUESTIONING, BUT IN TWO CASES IN PARTICULAR THE POLICE HAVE HELD THE MEN FOR UNREASONABLY LONG PERIODS, APPARENTLY ON THE ORDERS OF GENERAL WALLS. ONE OF THESE GROUPS IS THAT AT KAROI (SEE PARA 2 OF SITREP 15 JANUARY - MY TELNO 192). THE OTHER CONCERNS A GROUP AT SHABANI.

AUXILIARIES

7. OVER THE LAST FEW DAYS WE HAVE BEEN MONITORING THE ACTIVITIES OF THE AUXILIARIES VERY HEAVILY. WE CANNOT MONITOR ALL OF THEM ALL THE TIME BUT WE WILL NOW CONTINUE WITH A REGULAR PROGRAMME OF RANDOM INSPECTIONS. WE ARE SATISFIED THAT THEY HAVE CURBED THEIR LESS ACCEPTABLE ACTIVITIES AND GENERALLY ARE NOT NOW ENGAGED IN ANYTHING UNTOWARD. THEY NORMALLY DEPLOY TO PROTECT CIVILIAN WORKERS SUCH AS WATER OFFICIALS AND PEOPLE REPAIRING CATTLE DIPS AND OFTEN HELP THEM IN THEIR WORK AS WELL. AT PRESENT THERE IS A MAJOR DEPLOYMENT OF AUXILIARIES IN GRAPPLE, BUT THERE HAVE BEEN ONLY A FEW COMPLAINTS AND THESE ARE BEING FOLLOWED-UP.

FRELIMO TROOPS

FRELIMO TROOPS

8 A GROUP OF 47 FRELIMO TROOPS WAS VISITED YESTERDAY BY A MEMBER OF THE MOZAMBIKAN LIAISON OFFICE. THE TROOPS WERE ALSO VISITED BY THE PRESS. THERE ARE CONFLICTING VERSIONS OF THEIR REASONS FOR HAVING ENTERED RHODESIA.


GENERAL NEWS

9. THE U A N C HAVE ASKED TO BE GIVEN ACCESS TO ASSEMBLY AREAS. IN A PRESS CONFERENCE IN SALISBURY YESTERDAY THE VICE -PRESIDENT OF Z A N U (P F), SIMON MUZEND, DENIED THAT HIS PARTY WAS HOLDING POLITICAL PRISONERS IN MOZAMBIQUE.

FCO PASS ALL AND PASS IMMEDIATE TO SECRETARY OF STATE (NOT CALLED OUT IN PREAMBLE)

SOAMES

NNNN



(X-26)

[RHODESIA: POLICY: ADVANCE COPIES]

PS
PS/SIR I GILMOUR
PS/MR LUCE
PS/PUS
~~SIR B MAITLAND~~
MR DAY
LORD N G LENNOX
MR ASPEN

PS/NO 10 DOWNING STREET

SIR R ARMSTRONG)
MR R L WADE GERY)
MR P M MAXEY) CABINET
MR GOULTY) OFFICE
MR P J FOWLER)
DIO)

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MR FREELAND LEGAL ADVISER ECK200A
MR FIBOOT LEGAL ADVISER EM K164

IMMEDIATE

(File)

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~~RESIDENCE CHIEF~~

CONFIDENTIAL

FM SALISBURY 171045Z JAN 80

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 204 OF 17 JANUARY

INFO IMMEDIATE LUSAKA MAPUTO DAR ES SALAAM GABORONE PRETORIA

PRIORITY LAGOS UKMIS NEW YORK WASHINGTON

RHODESIA: Z A P U

1. JOSHUA NKOMO PAID A FIRST CALL ON ME YESTERDAY AFTERNOON, ACCOMPANIED BY CHAMBATI, MUSARURWA AND OTHER OFFICIALS.
2. NKOMO HAD COME ARMED WITH A LONG LIST OF COMPLAINTS WHICH HE WISHED TO RAISE WITH ME. BUT THE TONE OF OUR DISCUSSION WAS FRIENDLY THROUGHOUT. HIS MAIN CONCERN WAS EVIDENTLY WITH THE ACTIVITIES OF THE AUXILIARIES, WHO HE CLAIMED WERE PRACTISING WIDESPREAD INTIMIDATION ON BEHALF OF THE U A N C. IN REPLY, I MADE MOST OF THE POINTS WHICH HAVE BEEN SET OUT IN TELEGRAMS TO YOU ON THIS QUESTION. NKOMO SHOWED UNDERSTANDING AND APPRECIATION OF WHAT I AM SEEKING TO ACHIEVE, BUT POINTED OUT THAT THE DIFFICULTY LAY IN CONTROLLING THE ACTIVITIES OF A FORCE WHICH WAS WIDELY SCATTERED THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY. THE ONLY ANSWER WAS, HE SAID, TO ASSEMBLY THEM IN THE SAME WAY AS THE PATRIOTIC FRONT FORCES WERE ASSEMBLED. HE DISMISSED ANY SUGGESTION THAT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE AUXILIARIES WOULD BE MORE ACCEPTABLE IF THEY FOCUSED ON SOCIAL OR DEVELOPMENTAL WORK, ARGUING THAT THIS AMOUNTED TO POLITICISATION DIRECTED AGAINST THE PATRIOTIC FRONT.
3. ON A NOTE OF SORROW RATHER THAN OF ANGER NKOMO THEN TURNED TO THE LUPANE INCIDENT. I BELIEVE I HAD SOME SUCCESS IN

TO THE LUPANE INCIDENT. I BELIEVE I HAD SOME SUCCESS IN CONVINCING HIM OF MY OWN GENUINE CONCERN ABOUT THIS CASE, AND HE SEEMED TO TAKE THE POINT THAT, TRAGIC THOUGH IT WAS, IT WAS A MIRACLE THAT DURING THE WHOLE ASSEMBLY PROCESS AND AFTER IT THERE HAD NOT BEEN MORE OF ITS KIND. THE FACT THAT IT WAS SO WELL KNOWN WAS IN ITSELF A TRIBUTE TO THE SUCCESS OF THE POST-ASSEMBLY PERIOD.

4. NKOMO COMPLAINED IN THIS CONTEXT AND OTHERS ABOUT THE ATTITUDE OF GENERAL WALLS IN PARTICULAR. COM OPS WERE NOT PROMOTING PEACE AND RECONCILIATION BY SPEAKING OF THE QUOTE SURRENDER UNQUOTE OF GROUPS OF PATRIOTIC FRONT FORCES TO THE QUOTE SECURITY FORCES UNQUOTE (A TERM TO WHICH, AS YOU KNOW, HE TAKES GREAT EXCEPTION AND I HAVE MUCH SYMPATHY FOR HIS VIEW) IN THEIR COMMUNIQUES, OR BY INSTIGATING HARRASSMENT OF RETURNING REFUGEES. HE ARGUED THAT THE SCREENING OF THE GROUP OF REFUGEES FROM BOTSWANA WHO HAD TURNED UP NEAR PLUMTREE WAS A BREACH OF THE CEASEFIRE AGREEMENT. MY OFFICIALS SUBSEQUENTLY DREW THE ATTENTION OF HIS PEOPLE TO THE REQUIREMENT IN THE CEASEFIRE AGREEMENT THAT MOVEMENT BY QUOTE PERSONNEL OF THE PATRIOTIC FRONT ARMED FORCES INTO RHODESIA WILL CEASE UNQUOTE AND POINTED OUT THAT THE ADMINISTRATION HAD A RIGHT TO SATISFY ITSELF THAT PERSONS ENTERING RHODESIA DURING THIS PERIOD, EVEN IF THEY WERE UNARMED, WERE NOT IN FACT MEMBERS OF THE PATRIOTIC FRONT FORCES.

5. NKOMO ASKED WHY THE ROUTINE CALL-UP INTO THE RHODESIAN FORCES WAS CONTINUING. I SAID THAT IT WAS NOT MY BUSINESS TO INTERFERE WITH A QUESTION WHICH WOULD BE FOR THE INDEPENDENCE GOVERNMENT TO DECIDE IN THE NEAR FUTURE.

6. NKOMO PLEADED FOR HIS PARTY TO BE ALLOWED TO IMPORT CARS, OFFICE EQUIPMENT AND OTHER MATERIAL FOR ITS ELECTION CAMPAIGN DUTY FREE. I SAID THAT WE HAD LOOKED INTO THIS QUESTION AND HAD COME TO THE CONCLUSION THAT THIS WOULD NOT BE FAIR OR PRACTICABLE. BUT WE HAD WORKED OUT WITH THE MINISTRY OF FINANCE A SCHEME FOR SIMPLIFYING IMPORTING PROCEDURES FOR ELECTION MATERIAL, THE DETAILS OF WHICH WOULD BE COMMUNICATED TO THE PARTIES VERY SOON.

7. NKOMO ROARED WITH LAUGHTER AT THE END OF OUR MEETING WHEN I TOLD HIM OF THE JEALOUSY WHICH HAD BEEN AROUSED AMONGST THE OTHER PARTIES BY THE ARRANGEMENTS WE HAD MADE TO TRANSFER HIM FROM THE AIRPORT TO HIGHFIELDS BY HELICOPTER ON 13 JANUARY. IT HAD TAKEN CHAMEATI 35 MINUTES OF PERSUASION ON THE TELEPHONE TO GET HIM TO AGREE TO THIS, HE SAID.

8. YOU SHOULD NOTE THAT NKOMO DID NOT REFER EVEN OBLIQUELY TO THE QUESTION OF SOUTH AFRICAN TROOPS IN RHODESIA IN FRONT OF HIS OFFICIALS. ALL HE SAID ON THIS QUESTION, WHEN I TOOK HIM ASIDE

THE QUESTION OF SOUTH AFRICAN TROOPS IN RHODESIA IN FRONT OF HIS OFFICIALS. ALL HE SAID ON THIS QUESTION, WHEN I TOOK HIM ASIDE FOR A FEW MINUTES ALONE BEFORE HE LEFT, WAS QUOTE YOU (REPEAT YOU) HAVE QUITE A PROBLEM THERE UNQUOTE.

9. ALL IN ALL I BELIEVE THIS WAS A VERY SUCCESSFUL FIRST MEETING, AND THAT I HAVE ENCOURAGED NKKMO TO TRUST IN MY GOOD WILL TOWARDS HIM. I ASKED HIM TO KEEP IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH ME AND TO FEEL FREE TO COME AND SEE ME AT ANY TIME WHEN THERE WAS A PROBLEM WHICH HE THOUGHT NEEDED TO BE RESOLVED BY DISCUSSION BETWEEN US.

FCO PASS ALL

SOAMES

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PEOPLE BUT I DOUBT WHETHER HE WILL BE ABLE TO DO MUCH TO HELP, AS HE LEAVES FOR NEW DELHI THIS EVENING AND WILL BE AWAY FOR TWO OR THREE WEEKS.

3. I THEN ANSWERED THE QUESTIONS HE HAD RAISED ON 12 JANUARY ABOUT AUXILIARIES, THE USE OF THE RHODESIAN SECURITY FORCES TO DEAL WITH BREACHES OF THE CEASEFIRE AND THE SOUTH AFRICAN TROOPS AT BEITBRIDGE ON THE FIRST TWO POINTS, SALIM WAS CLEARLY SATISFIED WITH MY RESPONSE AND CONFINED HIMSELF TO SAYING THAT IT WAS IMPORTANT FOR US TO GUARD AGAINST PRESS COVERAGE (EG THE EDITORIAL IN LAST SUNDAY'S OBSERVER) WHICH CAST DOUBT ON THE GOVERNOR'S IMPARTIALITY. BUT ON BEITBRIDGE, HE SAID THAT OUR POSITION WAS COMPLETELY UNACCEPTABLE AND MY EXPLANATION OF IT INCOMPREHENSIBLE. HE SIMPLY COULD NOT UNDERSTAND WHY BRITAIN, HAVING ACHIEVED SO MUCH, HAD CHOSEN TO PUT HERSELF IN FLAGRANT VIOLATION OF ASSURANCES YOU HAD GIVEN AT THE LANCASTER HOUSE CONFERENCE. IF THE SOUTH AFRICAN CONTINGENT WAS SO SMALL, WHY COULD IT NOT BE REPLACED BY BRITISH OR OTHER COMMONWEALTH TROOPS? THE TRAGEDY WAS THAT THE PRESENCE OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN TROOPS WOULD GIVE PEOPLE A PRETEXT FOR QUESTIONING THE FAIRNESS OF THE ELECTIONS, WHATEVER THE OUTCOME AND HOWEVER FAIR THEY HAD BEEN. WE HAD TO REALISE THAT IN AFRICAN EYES THIS ISSUE WAS SO SENSITIVE THAT IT WAS ERODING BRITISH CREDIBILITY AND UNDERMINING THE WHOLE SETTLEMENT.

4. I DID MY BEST WITH THE MATERIAL YOU HAVE SENT TO REBUT THESE POINTS. BUT THE FACT IS THAT EVEN A MODERATE AND COMPARATIVELY DETACHED AFRICAN LIKE SALIM IS NOT CAPABLE OF VIEWING THIS QUESTION IN OTHER THAN EMOTIONAL TERMS. IT IS NOT A QUESTION ON WHICH AFRICANS ARE PREPARED TO SEE REASON. THE ONLY CONSOLATION WAS THAT, ALTHOUGH SALIM ACCUSED US OF VIOLATING ASSURANCES GIVEN AT LANCASTER HOUSE, HE DID NOT POINT OUT THAT WE ARE IN CONTRAVENTION OF OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH 7 OF SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 460. HOWEVER, CLARK (NIGERIA) IS MAKING PLENTY OF PLAY WITH THIS POINT AND THE RISK REMAINS THAT BEFORE LONG THE AFRICANS, ENCOURAGED OBVIOUSLY BY THE RUSSIANS, WILL CALL FOR A SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING.

PARSONS

NNNN

[RHODESIA: POLICY: ADVANCE COPIES]

7 26

PS
PS/SIR I GILMOUR
PS/MR LUCE
~~PS/PUS~~
~~SIR D HAMILTON~~
MR DAY
LORD N G LENNOX
MR ASPIN

M. Bullard

PS/NO 10 DOWNING STREET

SIR R ARMSTRONG)
MR R L WADE GERY)
MR P M MAXEY) CABINET
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MR FREELAND LEGAL ADVISER RMK200A

MR FIFOOT LEGAL ADVISER RM K164

IMMEDIATE

CONFIDENTIAL

FM DELHI 170605Z JAN 80

TO IMMEDIATE SALISBURY

TELEGRAM NUMBER 002 OF 17 JANUARY.

INFO IMMEDIATE FCO.

FOLLOWING FROM PRIVATE SECRETARY: SALISBURY TELNO 59:
RETURN OF MUGABE

1. THE SECRETARY OF STATE IS NOT HAPPY ABOUT THE PROPOSAL TO DELAY MUGABE'S RETURN IN THE WAY SUGGESTED. HE RECOGNISES ALL THE DIFFICULTIES, BUT WONDERS WHETHER MUGABE COULD BE ALLOWED TO RETURN EG ON THE PREVIOUS SATURDAY. HE ENTIRELY ACCEPTS THE NEED TO RELATE THE NUMBERS OF ZANU LEADERS ALLOWED TO RETURN TO THE PROBLEM OF ZANU DETAINEES IN MOZAMBIQUE. BUT LORD CARRINGTON THINKS THAT IT WILL BE DIFFICULT TO MAINTAIN A HARD LINE ON BOTH MUGABE'S RETURN AND THE SOUTH AFRICAN FORCES SIMULTANEOUSLY. MOREOVER, HE WONDERS WHETHER WE MAY BE CRITICISED FOR NOT MAKING IT CLEAR EARLIER THAT 20 JANUARY WAS NOT A SUITABLE DATE, IF WE HAD KNOWN OF SITHOLE'S BOOKING FOR SO LONG.

2. THE SECRETARY OF STATE WOULD BE GRATEFUL FOR ANY FURTHER BACKGROUND THE GOVERNOR CAN PROVIDE, THOUGH HE ACCEPTS THAT THIS IS VERY MUCH A MATTER FOR LOCAL JUDGEMENT IN THE LIGHT OF THE CURRENT SECURITY SITUATION.

THOMSON

[RHODESIA: POLICY: ADVANCE COPIES]

IMMEDIATE

PS
PS/SIR I GILMOUR
PS/MR LUCE
PS/YUS
SIR D LAITLAND
MR DAY
LORD R G LENNOX
MR ASPIN

PS/NO 10 DOWNING STREET

SIR R ARMSTRONG)
MR R L WADE GERY)
MR P M MAXEY) CABINET
MR GOULTY) OFFICE
MR P J FOWLER)
DIO)

.....
HD/RHOD DEPT (4)

HD/C AF D
HD/S AF D

HD/TUSD (2)

HD/NEWS DEPT
HE/WAD

MR FREELAND LEGAL ADVISER EMK200A
MR FIFOOT LEGAL ADVISER FM X164

~~REGISTERED CLERK~~

DESKBY 171400Z

FM MAPUTO 171150Z JANUARY 80

TO IMMEDIATE SALISBURY

TELEGRAM NUMBER 94 OF 17 JANUARY

INFO IMMEDIATE FCO PRIORITY LUSAKA CAPE TOWN

M.I.P.T.: RHODESIAN SUPPORT FOR MOZAMBIKAN RESISTANCE

1. GUEBUZA'S ACCUSATIONS MAY BE EXAGGERATED. BUT IF ANY RHODESIAN SUPPORT WHATSOEVER FOR THE RESISTENCE CONTINUING, THIS COULD HAVE THE MOST SERIOUS CONSEQUENCES FOR OUR RELATIONS WITH MOZAMBIQUE.

2. ONE OF THE MAIN REASONS WHY PRESIDENT MACHEL PERSISTENTLY SUPPORTED OUR EFFORTS FOR A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT WAS HIS BELIEF THAT RHODESIAN BACKING FOR THE RESISTANCE WOULD END ONCE OUR AUTHORITY WAS ACCEPTED IN RHODESIA. WE HAVE OF COURSE ASSURED THE MOZAMBIKANS THAT WE WERE PREVENTING ANY CROSS-BORDER ACTIVITY FROM OUR SIDE. MOREOVER, MACHEL'S COMMITMENT TO ACCEPT THE OUTCOME OF THE ELECTIONS, EVEN IF MUZOREWA IS ELECTED, WOULD BE PUT IN JEOPARDY, IF HE BELIEVED THAT THE THREAT TO MOZAMBIQUE WOULD CONTINUE.

3. WE GAVE ASSURANCES AT LANCASTER HOUSE THAT THE RHODESIAN AIR FORCE WOULD BE MONITORED. IS THIS IN FACT THE CASE?

4. I EXPECT MACHEL TO RAISE THIS WITH ME AND SHOULD BE GRATEFUL FOR EARLY DETAILED GUIDANCE. IT IS OF THE UTMOST IMPORTANCE THAT I SHOULD BE ABLE TO GIVE HIM FULL REASSURANCE.

PAPADOPOULOS

NNNN

SENT/RECD AT 171405Z AR/I.D.

IMMEDIATE

[RHODESIA: POLICY: ADVANCE COPIES]

PS
PS/SIR I GILMOUR
PS/MR LUCE
PS/PUS
~~SIR D HATFIELD~~
MR DAY
LORD N G LENNOX
MR ASPIN

PS/NO 10 DOWNING STREET

SIR R ARMSTRONG)
MR R L WADE GERY)
MR P M MAXEY) CABINET
MR GOULTY) OFFICE
MR P J FOWLER)
DIO)

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HD/TMOD DEPT (4)

HD/C AF D
HD/S AF D

HD/TUSD (2)

HD/NEWS DEPT
HE/WAD

MR FREELAND LEGAL ADVISER BCK200A
MR FIFOOT LEGAL ADVISER IM K164

~~RESIDENT CLERK~~

CONFIDENTIAL

DESKBY 171400Z

FM MAPUTO 171230Z JANUARY 80

TO IMMEDIATE SALISBURY

TELEGRAM NUMBER 93 OF 17 JANUARY

INFO IMMEDIATE FCO PRIORITY LUSAKA CAPE TOWN MODUK (DMO, DS11)

MLO FOR MILAD

OUR TELNOS 10, 28 AND 82 AND SALISBURY TELNO 39: VIOLATIONS OF MOZAMBICAN AIR SPACE

1. MINISTER GUEBUZA SUMMONED ME TODAY WITH 15 MINUTES NOTICE TO SEE HIM. WHEN WE MET AT 11.40 HRS LOCAL, THOUGH AGREEABLE, HE INDICATED THAT COOPERATION WOULD NOT REMAIN SO GOOD IF VIOLATIONS OF MOZAMBICAN AIR SPACE CONTINUED. HE EMPHASISED THAT MANY OF THE ROUTES FLOWN WERE THOSE THAT HAD CUSTOMARILY BEEN USED BY THE RHODESIANS DURING THE WAR.

2. HE THEN HANDED ME A SCHEDULE OF 13 ALLEGED VIOLATIONS. DETAILS ARE BELOW UNDER THE HEADINGS: SERIAL, DATE, TIME, PLACE, PROVINCE, TYPE OF AIRCRAFT.

1. /30 DEC/ CHITANGA AND MACHILA/GAZA/ -
2. /31 DEC/ 1345/ CHUCHAMANO/TETE/ NORD ATLAS
3. /1 JAN/ - / CUCHAMANO/TETE/ -
4. /3 JAN/ 0835:1530/ MAPAI/ GAZA/ RECCE

4. /3 JAN/ 0835:1533/ MAPAI/ GAZA/ RECCE
5. /3 JAN/ 1030/ GOIGOI/ MANICA/ -
6. /4 JAN/ 0400/ RHODESIA-GORONGOSA/ MANICA/ 2 JETS
7. /4 JAN/ - /GOIGOI-CHIBABAVA/MANICA/SOFALA/ RECCE
8. /5 JAN/1233/ MAPAI/ GAZA/RECCE?
9. /10 JAN/1610/ CATANDICA-GORONGOSA/MANICA/-
10. /10 JAN/ 1848/ MUDEMBO-CHICUALACUALA/ GAZA/ -
11. /10 JAN/2020/ CHICUALACUALA/GAZA/ MIRAGE
12. /16 JAN/0400/RIO PUNGOW-CATANDICA/MANICA / TPT
13. /16 JAN/ AT NIGHT/CHIBABAVA-GORONGOZA/SOFALA/ -

3. THE SOURCES FOR THIS INFORMATION ARE REPORTED TO BE THE FOLLOWING BDE HQS: HQ 2 BDE MAPAI, HQ 3 BDE CHIMOIO, HQ 4 BDE TETE AND HQ 5 BDE BEIRA.

4. OBSN AGAINST SERIAL 13 WAS: "PROBABLE RESUPPLY TO COUNTER-REVOLUTIONARIES".

5. LOCATIONS OF THE LESS OBVIOUS PLACES GIVEN ARE:

- A. CHITANGA - 50 KMS NE OF CHICUALACUALA
- B. MACHAILA - 125 KMS EAST OF CHICUALACUALA
- C. CUCHAMANO - SEE COCHEMANE
- D. MAPAI - 85 KMS SSE OF COCHEMANE
- E. GOIGOI - 40 KMS NE OF ESPUNGABERA
- F. GORONGOSA - APPROX 100 KMS NE OF CHIMOIO
- G. CHIBABAVA - 90 KMS ENE OF ESPUNGABERA
- H. CATANDICA - 120 KMS NNW OF CHIMOIO
- J. MUDEMBO - APPROX 35 KMS NE OF CHICUALACUALA
- K. R PUNGOW - 50 KMS NE OF CHIMOIO

6. COMMENT: IT COULD BE THAT INFORMATION CONTAINED IN SALISBURY TELNO 39 WHICH REFERRED TO MOVEMENT OF ZANLA PERSONNEL WITHIN MOZAMBIQUE HAS LED GUEBUZA TO BELIEVE THAT PART AT LEAST OF THE INFORMATION CONTAINED IN THE TUR CAME FROM AERIAL OBSERVATION. THOUGH THIS IS MOST UNLIKELY, A REASSURANCE THAT OTHER SOURCES WERE USED WOULD BE HELPFUL.

7. FINALLY YOU WILL APPRECIATE THAT THE ALLEGATIONS ARE SUBSTANTIAL AND THAT MY OWN POSITION VIZ-A-VIZ THE MND IS GOING TO BECOME UNTENABLE IF I CANNOT PRODUCE SOME EXPLANATION FAIRLY SOON.

8 PLEASE SEE MIFT.

PAPADOPOULOS

[INDONESIA: POLICY: ADVANCE COPIES]

A 2b

PS
PS/SIR I GILMOUR
PS/MR LUCE
~~PS/FUS~~
~~SIR D. HAITLAND~~
MR DAY
LORD N G LENNOX
MR ASPIN

N. B. M. J.

PS/NO 10 DOWNING STREET

SIR R ARMSTRONG)
MR R L WADE GERY)
MR P M MAKEY) CABINET
MR GOULTY) OFFICE
MR F J FOWLER)
DFO)

HD/RHOD DEPT (4)

HD/C AF D

HD/S AF D

HD/PUSD (2)

HD/NEWS DEPT

HE/WAD

11000

MR FREELAND LEGAL ADVISER FMK200A
MR FIFCOOT LEGAL ADVISER RM K164

ADVANCE COPY

RECEIVED

FM MAPUTO 170920Z JANUARY 80

TO FLASH SALISBURY

TELEGRAM NUMBER 91 OF 17 JANUARY

INFO IMMEDIATE FCO PRIORITY GABORONE LUSAKA DAR ES SALAAM WASHINGTON
UKMIS NEW YORK LAGOS PRETORIA

YOUR TELNO 62: MUGABE'S RETURN

1. THE ARRIVAL OF YOUR TUR COINCIDED WITH A TELEPHONE MESSAGE FROM MUGABE VIA HOVE TO THE EFFECT THAT, AFTER CONSULTATION WITH THE ZANU LEADERSHIP ALREADY IN SALISBURY AND GIVEN ARRANGEMENTS ALREADY IN HAND FOR A RALLY ON 27 JANUARY, MUGABE NO LONGER "INSISTS" ON RETURNING ON 19 JANUARY. A NEW DATE, POSSIBLY THURSDAY 24 JANUARY, WILL BE SUGGESTED TO US SHORTLY.

2. I THEN DICTATED TO HOVE THE MESSAGE IN YOUR TUR ASKING HIM TO PLACE IT BEFORE MUGABE RIGHT AWAY AND LET ME HAVE A REPLY.

3. I ALSO ASKED HOVE ONCE AGAIN TO DRAW MR MUGABE'S ATTENTION TO THE LONDON AGREEMENTS AND IN PARTICULAR TO PARAGRAPH 16 OF THE PRE-INDEPENDENCE ARRANGEMENTS (PARA 2 OF FCO TELNO 169 TO YOU).

PAPADOPOULOS

NNNN



JD
file

10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

17 January 1980

Dear Mr. Raphael.

Thank you for your letter of 12 January, expressing concern at developments in Rhodesia.

As you generously acknowledge, the ceasefire process has been remarkably successful. However, the Governor has had to use the Rhodesian forces in specific cases to deal with breaches of ceasefire when the efforts of the Patriotic Front's own commanders and of the police have been unable to do so. Fortunately, despite continuing and serious breaches of the ceasefire agreement, almost all of which have been caused by ZANLA forces, it has been possible to avoid more than a few isolated incidents. In the one case to which you refer, the group concerned failed to accept the orders of their own commanders and were in breach of the ceasefire. The Patriotic Front military commanders accept that incidents caused by dissident elements have to be dealt with. A number of complaints against the auxiliaries are being investigated and, where necessary, will be dealt with appropriately. But I believe that the greatest threat to the stability of the ceasefire comes from continuing breaches of it by ZANLA forces. There has been large scale infiltration by ZANLA into Rhodesia since the ceasefire came into effect and a proportion of ZANLA's forces have remained outside the assembly process. It is essential that action be taken to correct this, and I hope that you will use your influence to this end.

/ I know

I know that Richard Luce is replying to your letter to Peter Carrington regarding the South African contingent at Beitbridge. The assurance which we gave was that there would be no external involvement in Rhodesia under the Governor. We do not accept that the presence of a small South African contingent on the border to guard Beitbridge, whose strategic and economic importance is clear, constitutes external involvement. The fact is that Rhodesia depends on South Africa for most of its communications and supplies. The bridge is vital to this. It is also half South Africa's property. In the circumstances the Governor sees the presence of a small South African contingent as necessary to defend it. He will keep the need under review. There is a team of the Monitoring Force in the immediate vicinity and their presence will give adequate assurance that the South African contingent restricts itself to defence of the bridge.

I have written in greater detail to President Nyerere on some of the issues of concern to you, and enclose a copy of my letter.

Kind regards,

Yours sincerely

Raymond White

His Excellency Mr. Shridath S. Ramphal, Kt., C.M.G., Q.C.

FILE

et

B/F 23.1.80

See attached note.
Duty Clerk to
MOBST

17 January 1980

see 15.1.80

Message from President Tolbert

I enclose the text of yet another message to the Prime Minister from President Tolbert which was received here yesterday. So far as I am aware you have not had it through diplomatic service channels.

I should be grateful, as usual, if you could let me have advice as to whether the Prime Minister should reply and if so in what terms.

M. O'D. B. ALEXANDER

R M J Lyne Esq
Foreign and Commonwealth Office



10 DOWNING STREET

~~Michael~~

See your letter to FCO 17.1.80.
(at flap), in which you asked for
advice or reply to Tolbert's telegram
of 15.1.80. (flagged).

A telegraphed response from
(on Pt 12)
P.M. to Tolbert's letter of 11.1.80
was sent on 16.1.80 (flagged).

A further message from Tolbert
of 19.1.80 has now been replied
to. (on Pt 14).

∴ ? Forget reply to telegram
of 15.1.80

OK

Steve

Steve

31.1.80.

CONFIDENTIAL

GRS 1200

FM LAGOS 170730Z JAN 80

CONFIDENTIAL

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 77 OF 16 JANUARY

RPTD IMMEDIATE INFO SALISBURY, DAR ES SALAAM, LUSAKA, MAPUTO,
PRETORIA AND UKMIS NEW YORK.

RPTD PRIORITY LUANDA, GABERONE AND WASHINGTON

MY TELEGRAMS NOS 66 AND 67: NIGERIAN VIEWS ON RHODESIA

1. THE FOREIGN MINISTER SUMMONED ME THIS AFTERNOON. HE THANKED ME FOR THE ADDITIONAL INFORMATION I HAD SUPPLIED TO HIM YESTERDAY. HE HAD DISCUSSED THE PROBLEM WITH THE PRESIDENT THIS MORNING.

IT WAS THE PRESIDENT'S EARNEST HOPE THAT WE WOULD SUCCEED IN OUR GREAT TASK OF RESTORING PEACE TO RHODESIA AND HE WAS ANXIOUS TO COOPERATE FULLY WITH US TO THIS END. BUT HE WAS STILL GRAVELY CONCERNED OVER THREE ISSUES: (A) THE PRESENCE OF SOUTH AFRICAN TROOPS; (B) THE EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE SECURITY FORCES IN SUPPORT OF THE POLICE; AND (C) THE FREEDOM WHICH WHAT HE CALLED MUZOREWA'S AUXILIARIES SEEMED TO ENJOY.

2. I REPLIED BRIEFLY TO THESE POINTS ON THE LINES OF OUR GUIDANCE. I EMPHASISED THE IMPROVEMENT OF THE SITUATION SINCE NKOMO'S RETURN, THE POSITIVE ROLE AND COOPERATION OF THE PATRIOTIC FRONT MILITARY LEADERS ON THE CEASE-FIRE COMMISSION AND THE SUCCESSFUL USE OF PF LIAISON OFFICERS TO PERSUADE RECALCITRANT GROUPS TO ASSEMBLE. I HANDED HIM A FURTHER LETTER ENCLOSING THE NOTE ON AUXILIARIES BASED ON SALISBURY TELNO 181 AND MR FENN'S SPEAKING NOTES FOR HIS PRESS CONFERENCE YESTERDAY. I SAID THE LATTER SUMMARISED THE CONSIDERABLE ACHIEVEMENTS OF THE GOVERNOR IN THE SHORT TIME THAT HE HAD BEEN IN SALISBURY AND ALSO DISCUSSED FRANKLY THE CRITICISMS THAT HAD BEEN MADE AND GAVE DETAILED ANSWERS TO THEM WHICH I HOPED WOULD GO A LONG WAY TO MEET THE NIGERIAN CONCERN.

/3

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3. THE MINISTER SAID HE WOULD STUDY THESE. HE THEN HANDED ME A COPY OF THE PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE WHICH THE NIGERIAN HIGH COMMISSIONER HAD BEEN INSTRUCTED TO DELIVER TO MRS THATCHER TODAY. AS YOU WILL HAVE SEEN, IT IS CONCERNED MAINLY WITH THE DEPLOYMENT OF SOUTH AFRICAN TROOPS ON BEIT BRIDGE AND THE USE OF THE FORMER RHODESIAN FORCES ON SECURITY DUTIES 'ALL OVER ZIMBABWE'.

4. THE MINISTER SAID THE PRESIDENT HAD ALSO EXPRESSED SURPRISE AND CONCERN OVER THE REQUEST TO DELAY THE ARRIVAL OF THE OBSERVERS. THEY HAD BEEN GIVEN THE IMPRESSION THAT THEY WERE NEEDED URGENTLY AND HAD MADE PROVISION ACCORDINGLY. NO THEY WERE BEING ASKED TO DELAY ARRIVAL UNTIL 7 FEBRUARY WHICH WAS ONLY A WEEK BEFORE THE FIRST ELECTIONS ON 14 FEBRUARY, WHICH HARDLY GAVE TIME FOR THEM TO OBSERVE THE SITUATION PROPERLY. DID I HAVE AN EXPLANATION? I SAID THE GOVERNOR NO DOUBT WISHED TO HAVE THE CEASE-FIRE FIRMLY ESTABLISHED SO THAT HE COULD ENSURE THE SAFETY OF THE OBSERVERS. FURTHER MORE THE ELECTORAL COMMISSIONERS WOULD ONLY BE PROPERLY ESTABLISHED BY THE END OF THIS MONTH. I POINTED OUT THAT THE ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE COMMONWEALTH GROUP OF WHICH NIGERIA WAS A PART WERE BEING MADE DIRECT BETWEEN THE GOVERNOR AND MR RAMPHAL.

5. OSOBASE (HEAD OF AFRICA DEPARTMENT) THEN MENTIONED THE DELAYED ARRIVAL OF NKOMO BECAUSE OF THE MUZOREWA RALLY AND THE NEWS THAT MUGABE'S PROPOSED ARRIVAL ON 20 JANUARY WAS ALSO BEING DELAYED BECAUSE OF A SITHOLE RALLY ON THE SAME DAY. I EXPLAINED THAT THE RALLIES OF THE INTERNAL PARTIES HAD BEEN ARRANGED SOME TIME IN ADVNCE AND THAT THE POLICE COULD NOT COPE WITH TWO MAJOR RALLIES IN SALISBURY ON THE SAME DAY. I THEN WENT OVER TO THE ATTACK ON MUGABE, POINTING OUT THAT IT WAS HIS FORCES WHICH HAD CAUSED MAJOR DIFFICULTIES OVER THE CEASE-FIRE. FROM THE OUTSET THEY HAD BROKEN THE CEASE-FIRE AGREEMENT BY CROSSING THE BORDER IN LARGE NUMBERS AFTER THE CUT-OFF DATE. THE MINISTER INTERVENED VIGOROUSLY TO COMPLAIN THAT THE PATRIOTIC FRONT HAD ASKED REASONABLY FOR AN EXTENSION OF THE DEADLINE AND THAT LORD SOAMES HAD BEEN UNDULY INFLEXIBLE IN REFUSING THIS. I POINTED OUT POLITELY THAT THE MINISTER WAS CONFUSING TWO ISSUES. THERE WAS NEVER ANY QUESTION OF A PERIOD DURING WHICH PF FORCES COULD CROSS THE BORDER INTO RHODESIA; THIS WAS FORBIDDEN FROM THE OUTSET. AS

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CONFIDENTIAL

/REGARDS

REGARDS THE PERIOD FOR ASSEMBLY, ZIPRA HAD IN GENERAL COMPLIED AND ZANLA SEEMED TO HAVE DELAYED NEEDLESSLY, BUT THE GOVERNOR HAD BEEN FLEXIBLE IN EXTENDING BY A DAY OR TWO AND THE ASSEMBLY OF OTHER GROUPS (THOUGH WITHOUT ARMS) HAD CONTINUED TO BE ACCEPTED SUBSEQUENTLY. I WENT ON TO CRITICISE THE CONTINUED REFUSAL OF SOME ZANU GROUPS TO ASSEMBLE, MUGABE'S FAILURE TO RELEASE POLITICAL DETAINEES HELD IN MOZAMBIQUE AND THE INFLAMMATORY PROPAGANDA OF HIS "VOICE OF ZIMBABWE". THE MINISTER DID NOT ATTEMPT TO ANSWER ANY OF THESE POINTS BUT SAID THAT TWO WRONGS DO NOT MAKE A RIGHT. I AGREED, BUT SAID THAT IT WAS IMPORTANT THAT THE MINISTER SHOULD BE AWARE OF THE ZANU/ZANLA BEHAVIOUR SINCE THIS MORE THAN ANYTHING ELSE EXPLAINED MANY OF THE DIFFICULTIES WHICH FACED THE GOVERNOR.

6. IN CONCLUSION, THE MINISTER EMPHASISED AGAIN THE GREAT IMPORTANCE OF THE QUESTION OF SOUTH AFRICAN TROOPS. HE FELT THAT WHATEVER EXPLANATIONS WERE GIVEN THEIR PRESENCE THERE WAS JUST AN EXCUSE WHICH ALSO SERVED TO DISGUISE THE PRESENCE OF OTHER SOUTH AFRICAN TROOPS IN THE COUNTRY. HE SAID FOR THE PRESIDENT THIS WAS A QUESTION OF TRUST. THE PRESIDENT HAD REFERRED TO THE MOMENT AT THE LUSAKA CONFERENCE WHEN MRS THATCHER HAD APPEALED TO THE OTHER HEADS OF GOVERNMENT TO TRUST THE BRITISH TO BRING ABOUT A JUST AND PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF RHODESIA. IT WAS THIS TRUST WHICH WAS NOW BEING PUT TO THE TEST.

7. AS BEFORE, THE MEETING WAS CONDUCTED IN AN EXTREMELY FRIENDLY ATMOSPHERE. I GAINED THE IMPRESSION THAT THE NIGERIANS ARE STILL WITH US AND VERY MUCH WANT US TO SUCCEED. HOWEVER, THEY STILL HAVE GENUINE DIFFICULTY OVER SOME POINTS AND IN PARTICULAR MIGHT FIND IT IMPOSSIBLE TO STAY WITH US UNLESS SOME WAY CAN BE FOUND ROUND THE QUESTION OF SOUTH AFRICAN TROOPS AT BEIT BRIDGE.

BROWN

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 (MR FREELAND)
 (MR FIFOOT)
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 PS/SIR I GILMOUR
 PS/MR LUCE
 PS/MR RIDLEY
 PS/MR HURD
 PS/MR MARTEN
 PS/PUS
 SIR D MAITLAND

 MR HANNAY
 LORD N G LENNOX
 MISS BROWN
 MR DAY
 MR FERGUSSON
 MR ASPIN
 MR MILLS
 CPO

**ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION
 RHODESIA POLICY**



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

16 January 1980

(2)

for
Pmt

Prime Minister

Reply is in preparation

Pmt

Dear Michael,


The Lord Privy Seal received the Nigerian High Commissioner this afternoon to take delivery of a message, of which you are aware, from his President to the Prime Minister. I attach a copy of the message, and a draft reply will be forwarded to you by 18 January.

Gomersall
S J

S J Gomersall

ms

M O'D B Alexander Esq
10 Downing Street



PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE

SERIAL No. T10B180
15TH JANUARY, 1980.....

DEAR PRIME MINISTER,

Z I M B A B W E

I AM CONSTRAINED TO WRITE AGAIN ON THE QUESTION OF ZIMBABWE.

BECAUSE I CONTINUE TO SHARE YOUR HOPE THAT A JUST, PEACEFUL AND AMICABLE SOLUTION COULD BE ACHIEVED WITHIN THE TERMS OF THE LANCASTER HOUSE ACCORD ON ZIMBABWE, I MUST LET YOU KNOW THAT WE HERE IN NIGERIA ARE VERY DISAPPOINTED THAT HER MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT ALLOWED LORD SOAMES TO DEPLOY SOUTH AFRICAN TROOPS FOR DUTY ON BEIT BRIDGE. WE THINK THAT IT WOULD BE PREFERABLE IF SOUTH AFRICAN TROOPS WERE WITHDRAWN FROM THAT VITAL BRIDGE AND REPLACED BY BRITISH TROOPS.

WE ARE ALSO UNHAPPY THAT LORD SOAMES HAS HAD TO DEPLOY THE FORMER RHODESIAN FORCES ON SECURITY DUTIES ALL OVER ZIMBABWE, PARTICULARLY AS HE HAS NOT SIMILARLY DEPLOYED SUCH PATRIOTIC FRONT FORCES AS HAVE ACCEPTED HIS AUTHORITY. IN OUR VIEW THIS IS AN AREA WHERE ALTERNATIVE ARRANGEMENTS SHOULD BE MADE. THE CIRCUMSTANCES IN WHICH THIRTEEN PATRIOTIC FRONT TROOPS WHICH CAME OUT OF THE BUSH CLEARLY IN AN ATTEMPT TO ASSEMBLE AS AGREED WERE KILLED BY SECURITY FORCES RECENTLY HAVE DONE NOTHING TO ALLAY THE FEARS OF THOSE WHO FEEL THAT LORD SOAMES SHOULD BE MORE DISPASSIONATE IN CONDUCTING THE AFFAIRS OF SOUTHERN RHODESIA.

I HOPE THAT YOU WILL FEEL ABLE EVEN AT THIS STAGE TO AGREE THAT BRITISH TROOPS SHOULD NOW BE DEPLOYED ON BEIT BRIDGE REPLACING THE SOUTH AFRICAN TROOPS AND THAT THE DEPLOYMENT OF FORMER RHODESIAN FORCES ON SECURITY DUTIES ALL OVER ZIMBABWE SHOULD BE REVIEWED.

Subject

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DESKBY DAR ES SALAAM 161330Z

DESKBY DELHI 161330Z

FM F C O 161130Z JANUARY 80

TO IMMEDIATE DAR ES SALAAM

TELEGRAM NUMBER 20 OF 16 JANUARY

AND TO IMMEDIATE DELHI (FOR PRIVATE SECRETARY)

INFO IMMEDIATE SALISBURY, MAPUTO, GABORONE, LUSAKA, LUANDA,
LAGOS, PRETORIA, WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK, ADDIS ABABA,
NAIROBI, KINGSTON, CANBERRA, MONROVIA, ISLAMABAD, EEC POSTS,
OSLO, STOCKHOLM, HELSINKI, WELLINGTON, ACCRA.

*Duty Clerk*DISTRIBUTION
FILEPRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE

SERIAL No. T 11A/80

YOUR TELS 44 AND 45: MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT NYERERE.

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF PRIME MINISTER'S REPLY TO THIS MESSAGE WHICH YOU SHOULD DELIVER AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. IN SUBSEQUENT DISCUSSION YOU SHOULD DRAW AS APPROPRIATE ON SALISBURY TELS 152, 156 AND 131. OTHER ADDRESSEES MAY DRAW ON THE TERMS OF THE REPLY AT THEIR DISCRETION IN DISCUSSION WITH GOVERNMENT TO WHICH THEY ARE ACCREDITED.

2. DEAR JULIUS,

THANK YOU FOR YOUR MESSAGE INFORMING ME OF THE SUMMIT MEETING OF FRONT LINE STATES AT BEIRA ON 10 JANUARY AT WHICH DEVELOPMENTS IN RHODESIA WERE DISCUSSED.

I AM GLAD THAT YOU HAVE EXPLAINED YOUR CONCERNS FRANKLY TO ME. I WILL TRY TO ANSWER THEM ONE BY ONE.

WE DON'T BELIEVE THAT THE PRESENCE OF A SMALL NUMBER OF SOUTH AFRICAN TROOPS TO GUARD BEITBRIDGE ON THE BORDER IS CONTRARY TO THE ASSURANCES WHICH WE GAVE. THE BRIDGE IS HALF SOUTH AFRICAN PROPERTY, AND YOU WILL KNOW ITS STRATEGIC AND ECONOMIC SIGNIFICANCE. IT IS INDISPUTABLE THAT A THREAT TO IT EXISTS AND THAT DAMAGE TO THE BRIDGE WOULD HAVE VERY SERIOUS CONSEQUENCES. RHODESIA DEPENDS FOR MOST OF ITS COMMUNICATIONS AND SUPPLIES ON SOUTH AFRICA. IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES THE GOVERNOR HAS CONCLUDED THAT THE PRESENCE OF A SMALL CONTINGENT OF SOUTH AFRICAN TROOPS TO GUARD THE BRIDGE IS NECESSARY AND JUSTIFIED. THERE IS A TEAM FROM THE MONITORING FORCE IN THE IMMEDIATE VICINITY AND THIS WILL PROVIDE SATISFACTORY ASSURANCE THAT THE SOUTH AFRICAN CONTINGENT WILL BE USED

CONFIDENTIAL

/EXCLUSIVELY

EXCLUSIVELY FOR PROTECTION OF THE BRIDGE. THERE IS NO QUESTION OF ITS INTERFERING IN RHODESIA AND/OR HAVING ANY INFLUENCE ON THE CONDUCT OR OUTCOME OF THE ELECTIONS. THE GOVERNOR WILL KEEP THE WHOLE MATTER UNDER REVIEW.

LORD CARRINGTON MADE CLEAR AT THE CONFERENCE THAT, IN THIS SHORT PERIOD, THERE WOULD BE NO PURGE OF THE FORCES OF EITHER SIDE. THERE ARE SOUTH AFRICANS IN THE RHODESIAN FORCES, TOGETHER WITH OTHER NATIONALITIES: IN THE SAME WAY THERE ARE SEVERAL NATIONALITIES IN THE PATRIOTIC FRONT'S FORCES, INCLUDING SOME 500 FRELIMO FORCES WITH ZANLA.

YOU DEAL NEXT WITH THE ASSEMBLY PROCESS. THE PERIOD OF SEVEN DAYS WAS AGREED BY ALL THE PARTIES TO THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE, AND EMBODIED IN THE CEASEFIRE AGREEMENT WHICH THEY SIGNED. THE GOVERNOR APPLIED THIS AGREEMENT FLEXIBLY AND MANY PF GROUPS ASSEMBLED PEACEFULLY DURING THE PERIOD IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE DEADLINE. SUBSEQUENTLY SOME 20 OUTSTANDING GROUPS OF THE PF FORCES HAVE BEEN PERSUADED TO COME TO THE ASSEMBLY POINTS BY THE PF COMMANDERS AND THE MONITORING FORCE. YOU ASKED WHY THE GOVERNOR HAS NOT INCREASED THE NUMBER OF ASSEMBLY POINTS. THE ANSWER IS THAT THE ACCOMMODATION AT EXISTING ASSEMBLY PLACES HAS PROVED ADEQUATE AND THE PF HAVE THEMSELVES NOT REQUESTED ANY ADDITIONAL PLACES. INDEED, WITH THE FULL AGREEMENT OF THE PATRIOTIC FRONT'S COMMANDERS, IT HAS BEEN DECIDED TO CLOSE TWO ASSEMBLY PLACES BECAUSE OF THE VERY SMALL NUMBERS PRESENT AT THEM. THE CEASEFIRE AGREEMENT MADE CLEAR THAT ANY FORCES WHICH DID NOT ASSEMBLE BY THE DEADLINE WOULD BE UNLAWFUL. I HAVE ALREADY EXPLAINED THAT THE GOVERNOR APPLIED THE DEADLINE FLEXIBLY. HOWEVER, THERE HAVE ALSO BEEN A NUMBER OF SMALL AND RECALCITRANT ARMED GROUPS WHO HAVE NOT OBEYED THE INSTRUCTIONS OF THEIR OWN COMMANDERS TO COMPLY WITH THE CEASEFIRE AGREEMENT. WHERE ARMED GROUPS HAVE FAILED TO COMPLY WITH LAWFUL ORDERS FROM THE GOVERNOR AND THEIR OWN COMMANDERS INCIDENTS HAVE OCCURRED. FORTUNATELY THESE HAVE BEEN FEW. IN THE CASE OF THE PARTICULAR INCIDENT WHICH YOU RAISED WITH OUR HIGH COMMISSIONER, THE PATRIOTIC FRONT'S OWN MILITARY COMMANDERS HAVE INDICATED THAT THE ARMED GROUP CONCERNED HAD FAILED TO OBEY THEIR ORDERS.

YOU ALSO DEAL WITH THE USE OF THE RHODESIAN SECURITY FORCES BY THE GOVERNOR. DURING THE ASSEMBLY PERIOD, THE RHODESIAN FORCES DISENGAGED TO AVOID CONTACT WITH THE PF FORCES, AND REMAINED IN THE

VICINITY OF THEIR BASES IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE LANCASTER HOUSE AGREEMENT. DURING THIS PERIOD THE GENERAL LEVEL OF VIOLENCE AND LAWLESSNESS GREATLY INCREASED. THEN AND SUBSEQUENTLY SERIOUS BREACHES OF THE CEASEFIRE HAVE TAKEN PLACE, IN THE FORM OF CROSS-BORDER INFILTRATION OF PF FORCES, FAILURE TO ASSEMBLE AND ACTS OF VIOLENCE AND INTIMIDATION. THE GOVERNOR HAS, AS REQUIRED BY THE AGREEMENTS, USED THE POLICE TO DEAL WITH THESE INCIDENTS IN THE FIRST PLACE. HE HAS ALSO MADE FULL USE OF THE PF COMMANDERS AND LIAISON OFFICERS TO DEFUSE DANGEROUS SITUATIONS. THE POLICE HAVE, HOWEVER, NOT ALWAYS BEEN ABLE TO COPE WITH THE TASK. IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES AND TO DEAL WITH INSTANCES OF BANDITRY, THE GOVERNOR HAS AUTHORISED THE USE OF RHODESIAN FORCES IN SUPPORT OF THE POLICE. HE HAS ALSO BEEN COMPELLED ON VARIOUS OCCASIONS TO DEPLOY FORCES TO THE BORDER AREAS TO DEAL WITH CONTINUING INFILTRATION OF PF FORCES, IN VIOLATION OF THE CEASEFIRE AGREEMENTS. WE ARE DISCUSSING WITH PRESIDENT MACHEL AND HIS ADVISERS HOW WE CAN COOPERATE TO LIMIT THIS INFILTRATION, WHICH THEY DO NOT DENY IS CONTINUING.

THE RHODESIAN FORCES ARE CLOSELY MONITORED. ALLEGATIONS THAT THEY HAVE BREACHED THE CEASEFIRE WILL BE INVESTIGATED. IT WAS ACKNOWLEDGED AT THE LANCASTER HOUSE CONFERENCE THAT THE AUXILIARIES WERE PART OF THE RHODESIAN FORCES AND UNDER THEIR COMMAND. THEY ARE REQUIRED TO OBEY THE CEASEFIRE IN THE SAME WAY AS OTHER FORCES. SUCH COMPLAINTS AS HAVE BEEN MADE AGAINST THEM ARE BEING INVESTIGATED AND APPROPRIATE ACTION WILL BE TAKEN.

YOU EXPRESS CONCERN ABOUT ALLEGED RESTRICTIONS IN THE WAY OF THE RETURN OF THE PATRIOTIC FRONT'S LEADERS. IT IS NOT THE CASE THAT OBSTACLES HAVE BEEN PUT IN THE WAY OF THEIR RETURN OR THAT THEY HAVE BEEN PREVENTED FROM RETURNING ON SATURDAYS AND SUNDAYS. AS YOU WILL KNOW, MR. NKOMO RETURNED AT HIS OWN CHOICE ON SUNDAY, 13 JANUARY, WHEN A LARGE RALLY HAD BEEN ORGANISED IN SALISBURY. HOWEVER, THE GOVERNOR HAS TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE CONSEQUENCES FOR PUBLIC ORDER OF MAJOR PUBLIC MEETINGS AND MANIFESTATIONS SUCH AS NATURALLY ACCOMPANY THE RETURN OF THE LEADING POLITICAL FIGURES.

MAY I DRAW YOUR ATTENTION TO THE VERY REAL DANGER WHICH ARISES FROM THE CONTINUING BREACHES OF THE CEASEFIRE AGREEMENT BY ZANLA FORCES. INFILTRATION OF ZANLA FORCES HAS CONTINUED ON A LARGE SCALE SINCE THE AGREEMENTS CAME INTO FORCE. OTHER ZANLA FORCES HAVE STAYED OUTSIDE THE ASSEMBLY PROCESS, AND THERE IS EVIDENCE OF ARMED

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INTIMIDATION OF PEOPLE IN RURAL AREAS. WELL OVER THREE-QUARTERS OF THE INCIDENTS REPORTED DURING AND SINCE THE ASSEMBLY PROCESS HAVE BEEN ATTRIBUTABLE TO ZANLA. AT THE SAME TIME, THE VOICE OF ZIMBABWE HAS CONTINUED TO BROADCAST INFLAMMATORY MATERIAL, INCLUDING ATTACKS ON "BRITISH COLONIAL TROOPS": AND ZANU CONTINUE TO DETAIN 70 LEADING MEMBERS OF THEIR OWN MOVEMENT WHO HAVE PETITIONED US TO SECURE THEIR RELEASE SO THAT THEY CAN TAKE PART IN THE ELECTIONS.

AT LUSAKA IT WAS AGREED THAT THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR CARRYING THROUGH A RESOLUTION OF THE PROBLEM OF RHODESIA FELL TO BRITAIN. WE HAVE TAKEN ON THAT DIFFICULT RESPONSIBILITY. I WAS THEREFORE A LITTLE DISAPPOINTED THAT YOUR LETTER CONTAINED NO RECOGNITION OF THE REMARKABLE ACHIEVEMENTS OF THE GOVERNOR'S ADMINISTRATION OVER THE PAST FOUR WEEKS. LEGALITY HAS BEEN RESTORED. THE MONITORING FORCE HAS BEEN DEPLOYED. AFTER MANY YEARS OF SERIOUS FIGHTING, MILITARY ACTIVITY HAS BEEN DRASTICALLY REDUCED. OVER 20,000 MEMBERS OF THE PATRIOTIC FRONT'S FORCES HAVE REPORTED TO ASSEMBLY POINTS, WHERE THEIR NEEDS ARE BEING MET BY THE MONITORING FORCE AND THE BRITISH AUTHORITIES. THE CEASEFIRE COMMISSION IS FUNCTIONING AND GOOD COOPERATION HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED BETWEEN THE PATRIOTIC FRONT'S MILITARY COMMANDERS AND THE GOVERNOR'S ADVISERS. CROSS BORDER MILITARY LIAISON ARRANGEMENTS HAVE BEEN MADE WITH THE GOVERNMENTS OF MOZAMBIQUE, ZAMBIA AND BOTSWANA.

ON THE POLITICAL FRONT, RESTRICTIONS ON ZANU AND ZAPU WERE LIFTED AS SOON AS THE LANCASTER HOUSE AGREEMENTS WERE SIGNED. ARRANGEMENTS FOR REGISTRATION OF PARTIES AND NOMINATION OF CANDIDATES HAVE BEEN MADE AND A DATE FOR THE ELECTIONS SET. THE ELECTION COMMISSIONER AND HIS STAFF ARE SUPERVISING PREPARATIONS FOR THE ELECTIONS. AS YOU KNOW, MR. NKOMO HAS RETURNED TO SALISBURY TOGETHER WITH THE WHOLE OF ZAPU'S LEADERSHIP. MANY LEADING MEMBERS OF ZANU ARE NOW ALSO RETURNING TO SALISBURY.

CONSIDERABLE PROGRESS HAS BEEN MADE TOWARDS NORMALISING RHODESIA'S RELATIONS WITH NEIGHBOURS AND RESTORING COMMUNICATIONS. ZAMBIA AND MOZAMBIQUE HAVE OPENED MILITARY LIAISON OFFICES IN SALISBURY. ARRANGEMENTS HAVE BEEN SET IN HAND FOR AN EARLY START ON THE RETURN OF REFUGEES ON A BASIS AGREED WITH THE NEIGHBOURING STATES, THE UNHCR AND THE ICRC. WITHIN RHODESIA, RESTRICTIONS HAVE BEEN RELAXED, AN AMNESTY DECLARED AND A LARGE NUMBER OF DETAINEES RELEASED.

I HOPE THAT YOU WILL GIVE FULL WEIGHT TO THESE REMARKABLE ACHIEVEMENTS AND CONTRAST THEM WITH THE SITUATION WHICH PREVAILED A FEW WEEKS AGO OR WITH THAT WHICH WOULD HAVE PREVAILED HAD WE NOT BEEN ABLE TO BRING THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE TO A SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION. I ALSO HOPE THAT YOU AND YOUR COLLEAGUES AMONG THE FRONT LINE STATES WILL DO EVERYTHING IN YOUR POWER TO ENSURE THAT ZANU AND ITS FORCES COMPLY WITH THE TERMS OF THE AGREEMENTS SIGNED AT LANCASTER HOUSE.

I SHALL ASK SIR PETER MOON TO CONTINUE TO KEEP IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH YOU AND YOUR ADVISERS, TO KEEP YOU INFORMED OF PROGRESS IN SALISBURY.

PLEASE DON'T HESITATE TO CONTACT ME AGAIN IF YOU FEEL CONCERNED. WE HAVE COME SO FAR, WE CANNOT FALTER NOW.

YOURS SINCERELY

MARGARET THATCHER

CARRINGTON

FILES

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| RHOD D | OID |
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| UND | MR HANNAY |
| LEGAL ADVISERS | LORD N G LENNOX |
| (MR FREELAND) | MISS BROWN |
| (MR FIFOOT) | MR DAY |
| ECON D | MR FERGUSSON |
| PCD | MR ASPIN |
| DEF D | MR MILLS |
| IPD | |

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION
RHODESIA POLICY

SUBJECT.

RESTRICTED

T12A/80

GRS 417
RESTRICTED
FM FCO 161710Z JANUARY 80
TO IMMEDIATE MONROVIA
TELEGRAM NUMBER 6 OF 16 JANUARY
INFO SALISBURY

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T12A/80

YOUR TELNO 4

MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT TOLBERT: RHODESIA

1. PLEASE PASS FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO
PRESIDENT TOLBERT.

BEGINS

1. THANK YOU FOR YOUR MESSAGE ABOUT RHODESIA, WHICH I HAVE CON-
SIDERED VERY CAREFULLY.

2. DURING THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE, LORD CARRINGTON GAVE AN
ASSURANCE THAT THERE WOULD BE NO EXTERNAL INTERVENTION OR INVOLVE-
MENT IN RHODESIA UNDER THE GOVERNOR.

3. WE DO NOT BELIEVE THAT THE PRESENCE OF A SOUTH AFRICAN CON-
TINGENT TO GUARD BEITBRIDGE ON THE BORDER CONSTITUTES INTERVENTION
THE FORCE IS SMALL AND IS PRESENT SOLELY FOR THE PROTECTION OF THE
BRIDGE, WHICH, AS YOU KNOW, IS OF VITAL IMPORTANCE TO THE
ECONOMIES OF RHODESIA AND OF NEIGHBOURING COUNTRIES. THE BRIDGE
IS HALF SOUTH AFRICAN PROPERTY. DAMAGE TO IT WOULD HAVE VERY
SERIOUS CONSEQUENCES TO SEVERAL COUNTRIES IN THE REGION. THERE IS
A TEAM FROM THE COMMONWEALTH MONITORING FORCE PRESENT AT
BEITBRIDGE AND I AM SATISFIED THAT THIS GIVES US SUFFICIENT
ASSURANCE THAT THE ROLE OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN CONTINGENT THERE
WILL BE LIMITED TO THE PROTECTION OF THE BRIDGE. I CAN ALSO
ASSURE YOU THAT THE GOVERNOR WILL KEEP THE NEED FOR THIS SPECIAL
MEASURE OF PROTECTION UNDER REVIEW. IN THE LIGHT OF THESE FACTS,
I HOPE THAT YOU WILL AGREE THAT AN EXCEPTIONAL MEASURE TO PROTECT
A VITAL FEATURE ON THE BORDER BETWEEN RHODESIA AND SOUTH AFRICA
DOES NOT AMOUNT TO EXTERNAL INVOLVEMENT IN RHODESIA.

/4

RESTRICTED

4. I SHARE YOUR DESIRE TO SEE THE AGREEMENTS NEGOTIATED AT LANCASTER HOUSE SUCCESSFULLY IMPLEMENTED. I AM SURE THAT YOU WILL AGREE THAT REMARKABLE PROGRESS HAS BEEN MADE. BUT IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT ALL PARTIES SHOULD COMPLY WITH THE TERMS OF THE AGREEMENTS WHICH HAVE BEEN SIGNED: IN THIS RESPECT WE ARE VERY CONCERNED ABOUT THE CONTINUING AND SERIOUS BREACHES OF THE CEASEFIRE WHICH HAVE BEEN COMMITTED, MOSTLY BY ZANLA FORCES. THEIR ACTIVITIES ARE NOT COMPATIBLE EITHER WITH THE CEASEFIRE AGREEMENT ITSELF OR WITH THE UNDERTAKING SIGNED BY ALL THE DELEGATIONS AT LANCASTER HOUSE TO RENOUNCE THE USE OF FORCE AND TO CAMPAIGN WITHOUT INTIMIDATION. I HOPE YOU WILL FEEL ABLE TO URGE ON THOSE CONCERNED THE NEED TO ABIDE BY THE AGREEMENTS.

5. I HOPE THAT YOU WILL KEEP ME CLOSELY IN TOUCH WITH YOUR VIEWS, WHICH I VALUE GREATLY. YOUR COOPERATION AND ADVICE WAS A MAJOR CONTRIBUTION TO THE SUCCESS OF THE CONFERENCE. MAY I WISH YOU, ALSO, MR PRESIDENT, A VERY HAPPY AND PROSPEROUS NEW YEAR.

YOURS SINCERELY

MARGARET THATCHER

ENDS

CARRINGTON

FILES

WAD
RHODESIA
OADS
NAD

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PLANNING STAFF
ES & SD

CCD
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LEGAL ADVISERS
(MR FREELAND)
(MR FLECOE)

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PS/MR LUCE
PS/MR RIDLEY
PS/MR HURD
PS/MR MARTEN
PS/PUS
SIR D MAITLAND

MR HANNAY
LORD N G LENNOX
MISS BROWN
MR DAY
MR BERGUSON
MR ASPIN
MR MILLS
CPO

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION
RHODESIA POLICY

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SUBJECT

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DESKBY DAR ES SALAAM 161330Z
 DESKBY DELHI 161330Z
 FM F C O 161130Z JANUARY 80
 TO IMMEDIATE DAR ES SALAAM
 TELEGRAM NUMBER 20 OF 16 JANUARY

PRIME MINISTER'S
 PERSONAL MESSAGE
 SERIAL No. TIIA/80

AND TO IMMEDIATE DELHI (FOR PRIVATE SECRETARY)
 INFO IMMEDIATE SALISBURY, MAPUTO, GABORONE, LUSAKA, LUANDA,
 LAGOS, PRETORIA, WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK, ADDIS ABABA,
 NAIROBI, KINGSTON, CANBERRA, MONROVIA, ISLAMABAD, EEC POSTS,
 OSLO, STOCKHOLM, HELSINKI, WELLINGTON, ACCRA.

YOUR TELS 44 AND 45: MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT NYERERE.

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF PRIME MINISTER'S REPLY TO THIS MESSAGE WHICH YOU SHOULD DELIVER AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. IN SUBSEQUENT DISCUSSION YOU SHOULD DRAW AS APPROPRIATE ON SALISBURY TELS 152, 156 AND 181. OTHER ADDRESSEES MAY DRAW ON THE TERMS OF THE REPLY AT THEIR DISCRETION IN DISCUSSION WITH GOVERNMENT TO WHICH THEY ARE ACCREDITED.

2. DEAR JULIUS,

THANK YOU FOR YOUR MESSAGE INFORMING ME OF THE SUMMIT MEETING OF FRONT LINE STATES AT BEIRA ON 10 JANUARY AT WHICH DEVELOPMENTS IN RHODESIA WERE DISCUSSED.

I AM GLAD THAT YOU HAVE EXPLAINED YOUR CONCERNS FRANKLY TO ME. I WILL TRY TO ANSWER THEM ONE BY ONE.

WE DON'T BELIEVE THAT THE PRESENCE OF A SMALL NUMBER OF SOUTH AFRICAN TROOPS TO GUARD BEITBRIDGE ON THE BORDER IS CONTRARY TO THE ASSURANCES WHICH WE GAVE. THE BRIDGE IS HALF SOUTH AFRICAN PROPERTY, AND YOU WILL KNOW ITS STRATEGIC AND ECONOMIC SIGNIFICANCE. IT IS INDISPUTABLE THAT A THREAT TO IT EXISTS AND THAT DAMAGE TO THE BRIDGE WOULD HAVE VERY SERIOUS CONSEQUENCES. RHODESIA DEPENDS FOR MOST OF ITS COMMUNICATIONS AND SUPPLIES ON SOUTH AFRICA. IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES THE GOVERNOR HAS CONCLUDED THAT THE PRESENCE OF A SMALL CONTINGENT OF SOUTH AFRICAN TROOPS TO GUARD THE BRIDGE IS NECESSARY AND JUSTIFIED. THERE IS A TEAM FROM THE MONITORING FORCE IN THE IMMEDIATE VICINITY AND THIS WILL PROVIDE SATISFACTORY ASSURANCE THAT THE SOUTH AFRICAN CONTINGENT WILL BE USED

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/EXCLUSIVELY

EXCLUSIVELY FOR PROTECTION OF THE BRIDGE. THERE IS NO QUESTION OF ITS INTERFERING IN RHODESIA AND/OR HAVING ANY INFLUENCE ON THE CONDUCT OR OUTCOME OF THE ELECTIONS. THE GOVERNOR WILL KEEP THE WHOLE MATTER UNDER REVIEW.

LORD CARRINGTON MADE CLEAR AT THE CONFERENCE THAT, IN THIS SHORT PERIOD, THERE WOULD BE NO PURGE OF THE FORCES OF EITHER SIDE. THERE ARE SOUTH AFRICANS IN THE RHODESIAN FORCES, TOGETHER WITH OTHER NATIONALITIES: IN THE SAME WAY THERE ARE SEVERAL NATIONALITIES IN THE PATRIOTIC FRONT'S FORCES, INCLUDING SOME 500 FRELIMO FORCES WITH ZANLA.

YOU DEAL NEXT WITH THE ASSEMBLY PROCESS. THE PERIOD OF SEVEN DAYS WAS AGREED BY ALL THE PARTIES TO THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE, AND EMBODIED IN THE CEASEFIRE AGREEMENT WHICH THEY SIGNED. THE GOVERNOR APPLIED THIS AGREEMENT FLEXIBLY AND MANY PF GROUPS ASSEMBLED PEACEFULLY DURING THE PERIOD IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE DEADLINE. SUBSEQUENTLY SOME 20 OUTSTANDING GROUPS OF THE PF FORCES HAVE BEEN PERSUADED TO COME TO THE ASSEMBLY POINTS BY THE PF COMMANDERS AND THE MONITORING FORCE. YOU ASKED WHY THE GOVERNOR HAS NOT INCREASED THE NUMBER OF ASSEMBLY POINTS. THE ANSWER IS THAT THE ACCOMMODATION AT EXISTING ASSEMBLY PLACES HAS PROVED ADEQUATE AND THE PF HAVE THEMSELVES NOT REQUESTED ANY ADDITIONAL PLACES. INDEED, WITH THE FULL AGREEMENT OF THE PATRIOTIC FRONT'S COMMANDERS, IT HAS BEEN DECIDED TO CLOSE TWO ASSEMBLY PLACES BECAUSE OF THE VERY SMALL NUMBERS PRESENT AT THEM. THE CEASEFIRE AGREEMENT MADE CLEAR THAT ANY FORCES WHICH DID NOT ASSEMBLE BY THE DEADLINE WOULD BE UNLAWFUL. I HAVE ALREADY EXPLAINED THAT THE GOVERNOR APPLIED THE DEADLINE FLEXIBLY. HOWEVER, THERE HAVE ALSO BEEN A NUMBER OF SMALL AND RECALCITRANT ARMED GROUPS WHO HAVE NOT OBEYED THE INSTRUCTIONS OF THEIR OWN COMMANDERS TO COMPLY WITH THE CEASEFIRE AGREEMENT. WHERE ARMED GROUPS HAVE FAILED TO COMPLY WITH LAWFUL ORDERS FROM THE GOVERNOR AND THEIR OWN COMMANDERS INCIDENTS HAVE OCCURRED. FORTUNATELY THESE HAVE BEEN FEW. IN THE CASE OF THE PARTICULAR INCIDENT WHICH YOU RAISED WITH OUR HIGH COMMISSIONER, THE PATRIOTIC FRONT'S OWN MILITARY COMMANDERS HAVE INDICATED THAT THE ARMED GROUP CONCERNED HAD FAILED TO OBEY THEIR ORDERS.

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I SHALL ASK SIR PETER MOON TO CONTINUE TO KEEP IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH YOU AND YOUR ADVISERS, TO KEEP YOU INFORMED OF PROGRESS IN SALISBURY.

PLEASE DON'T HESITATE TO CONTACT ME AGAIN IF YOU FEEL CONCERNED. WE HAVE COME SO FAR, WE CANNOT FALTER NOW.

YOURS SINCERELY

MARGARET THATCHER

CARRINGTON

FILES

RHOD D
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(MR FREBLAND)
(MR FILFOOT)
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PS/MR LUCE
PS/MR RIDLEY
PS/MR HURD
PS/MR MARTEN
PS/PUS
SIR D MAITLAND

MR HANNAY
LORD N G LENNOX
MISS BROWN
MR DAY
MR FERGUSSON
MR ASPIN
MR MILLS

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION
RHODESIA POLICY

RESTRICTED

GR 500

RESTRICTED

FM FCO 161559Z JAN 80

TO IMMEDIATE SALISBURY

TELEGRAM NUMBER 166 OF 16 JANUARY 1980

INFO IMMEDIATE MAPUTO, LUSAKA, DAR ES SALAAM, GABORONE, LAGOS,
WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK

MY TELNOS 22 AND 23 TO MAPUTO: ZANU DETAINEES

1. FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF A FURTHER LETTER FROM GUMBO AND THE OTHER FORMER ZANU CENTRAL COMMITTEE AND HIGH COMMAND MEMBERS AT PRESENT DETAINED BY ZANU IN MOZAMBIQUE. THE LETTER WAS ADDRESSED TO HM AMBASSADOR IN MAPUTO ON 27 DECEMBER:

QUOTE DEAR SIR, WE ARE WRITING THIS LETTER URGENTLY APPEALING TO THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT TO TAKE PRACTICAL STEPS TO SECURE OUR IMMEDIATE RELEASE SO THAT WE MAY BE READY TO FULLY PARTICIPATE IN THE FORTHCOMING GENERAL ELECTIONS IN ZIMBABWE.

WE ARE ALL TOGETHER OVER 70 ZIMBABWEANS DETAINED IN BALAWA AND BEIRA AS A RESULT OF POLITICAL DIFFERENCES WHICH OCCURRED IN ZANU IN 1977 AND 1978. OUR GROUP INCLUDES 4 MEMBERS OF THE NATIONAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE AND CENTRAL COMMITTEE, 2 OTHER MEMBERS OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE, 3 MEMBERS OF THE HIGH COMMAND, 7 MEMBERS OF THE MILITARY COMMITTEE AND THE REST MEMBERS OF THE GENERAL STAFF AND TRUSTEE COMMANDERS AND FIGHTERS.

WE HAVE BEEN ALARMED BY THE FACT THAT IN SPITE OF THE GENERAL AMNESTY PROCLAIMED BY THE NEW GOVERNOR OF RHODESIA, LORD SOAMES, IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE SIGNING OF THE CEASE-FIRE IN LONDON, WHICH RESULTED IN THE RELEASE OF ALL POLITICAL PRISONERS IN THE COUNTRY AND ALLOWED THOSE OUTSIDE ZIMBABWE TO RETURN WITHOUT PROSECUTION, WE ARE STILL BEING HELD IN RESTRICTION BY THE MOZAMBIKAN GOVERNMENT IN BALAWA, CABO DELGADO, AGAINST OUR WISHES.

WE HAVE APPEALED SEVERAL TIMES TO THE HOST GOVERNMENT TO RELEASE AND SEND US HOME BUT TO NO AVAIL. THE HOST GOVERNMENT HAS MADE OUR RELEASE CONDITIONAL. THE CONDITION IS THAT WE FIRST GO BACK TO ROBERT MUGABE'S ZANU. WE HAVE RESISTED THIS IDEA BECAUSE WE DON'T THINK THAT IT IS WITHIN THE COMPETENCE OF ANY POLITICAL PARTY OR FOREIGN GOVERNMENT TO FORCE US TO SUPPORT A POLITICAL

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PARTY AGAINST OUR WILL. WE WERE FORCED OUT OF ROBERT MUGABE'S ZANU BECAUSE OF CERTAIN POLITICAL DIFFERENCES. INTERNAL DIFFERENCES IN ZANU SHOULD HAVE NOTHING TO DO WHATSOEVER WITH OUR RELEASE AND IMMEDIATE RETURN TO ZIMBABWE. WHATEVER DIFFERENCES WE HAVE WITH MUGABE WILL BE SOLVED IN ZIMBABWE.

WE CONSIDER THE POSITION ADOPTED BY THE MOCAMBICAN GOVERNMENT UNFORTUNATE AND A COMPLETE VIOLATION OF THE LONDON ACCORD ON ZIMBABWE.

FINALLY, SINCE RHODESIA HAS REVERTED TO BRITISH COLONIAL RULE AS A RESULT OF THE LONDON AGREEMENT, WE FEEL THAT YOUR GOVERNMENT HAS A DUTY AND RESPONSIBILITY TO LOOK AFTER US REGARDLESS OF OUR POLITICAL VIEWS AND IN THIS CASE TO SECURE OUR IMMEDIATE RELEASE AND REPATRIATE US BACK TO ZIMBABWE IN TIME TO PARTICIPATE IN THE ENTIRE ELECTION PROCESS, IE THE PREPARATIONS FOR REGISTRATION OF PARTIES, THE SUBMISSION OF LISTS OF CANDIDATES AND THE ELECTION CAMPAIGN. OUR DELAY TO REACH ZIMBABWE IN TIME TO CAMPAIGN AND CONTEST THE ELECTION, LET ALONE OUR COMPLETE EXCLUSION FROM THE CONTEST WILL MAKE THE FORTHCOMING ELECTIONS NEITHER FREE NOR FAIR.

WE HAVE ALL THE CONFIDENCE THAT OUR CASE WILL RECEIVE YOUR URGENT ATTENTION.

YOURS SINCERELY, RUGARE GUMBO. UNQUOTE
CARRINGTON

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TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELNO 77 OF 16 JANUARY
RPTD IMMEDIATE INFO SALISBURY, DAR ES SALAAM, LUSAKA, MAPUTO,
PRETORIA AND UKMIS NEW YORK.
RPTD PRIORITY LUANDA, GABERONE AND WASHINGTON

MY TELEGRAMS NOS 66 AND 67: NIGERIAN VIEWS ON RHODESIA

1. THE FOREIGN MINISTER SUMMONED ME THIS AFTERNOON. HE THANKED ME FOR THE ADDITIONAL INFORMATION I HAD SUPPLIED TO HIM YESTERDAY. HE HAD DISCUSSED THE PROBLEM WITH THE PRESIDENT THIS MORNING. IT WAS THE PRESIDENT'S EARNEST HOPE THAT WE WOULD SUCCEED IN OUR GREAT TASK OF RESTORING PEACE TO RHODESIA AND HE WAS ANXIOUS TO COOPERATE FULLY WITH US TO THIS END. BUT HE WAS STILL GRAVELY CONCERNED OVER THREE ISSUES: (A) THE PRESENCE OF SOUTH AFRICAN TROOPS: (B) THE EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE SECURITY FORCES IN SUPPORT OF THE POLICE: AND (C) THE FREEDOM WHICH WHAT HE CALLED MUZOREWA'S AUXILIARIES SEEMED TO ENJOY.

2. I REPLIED BRIEFLY TO THESE POINTS ON THE LINES OF OUR GUIDANCE. I EMPHASISED THE IMPROVEMENT OF THE SITUATION SINCE NKOMO'S RETURN.

2. I REPLIED BRIEFLY TO THESE POINTS ON THE LINES OF OUR GUIDANCE. I EMPHASISED THE IMPROVEMENT OF THE SITUATION SINCE NKOMO'S RETURN. THE POSITIVE ROLE AND COOPERATION OF THE PATRIOTIC FRONT MILITARY LEADERS ON THE CEASE-FIRE COMMISSION AND THE SUCCESSFUL USE OF PF LIAISON OFFICERS TO PERSUADE RECALCITRANT GROUPS TO ASSEMBLE. I HANDED HIM A FURTHER LETTER ENCLOSING THE NOTE ON AUXILIARIES BASED ON SALISBURY TELNO 181 AND MR FENN'S SPEAKING NOTES FOR HIS PRESS CONFERENCE YESTERDAY. I SAID THE LATTER SUMMARISED THE CONSIDERABLE ACHIEVEMENTS OF THE GOVERNOR IN THE SHORT TIME THAT HE HAD BEEN IN SALISBURY AND ALSO DISCUSSED FRANKLY THE CRITICISMS THAT HAD BEEN MADE AND GAVE DETAILED ANSWERS TO THEM WHICH I HOPED WOULD GO A LONG WAY TO MEET THE NIGERIAN CONCERN.

3. THE MINISTER SAID HE WOULD STUDY THESE. HE THEN HANDED ME A COPY OF THE PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE WHICH THE NIGERIAN HIGH COMMISSIONER HAD BEEN INSTRUCTED TO DELIVER TO MRS THATCHER TODAY. AS YOU WILL HAVE SEEN, IT IS CONCERNED MAINLY WITH THE DEPLOYMENT OF SOUTH AFRICAN TROOPS ON BEIT BRIDGE AND THE USE OF THE FORMER RHODESIAN FORCES ON SECURITY DUTIES "ALL OVER ZIMBABWE".

4. THE MINISTER SAID THE PRESIDENT HAD ALSO EXPRESSED SURPRISE AND CONCERN OVER THE REQUEST TO DELAY THE ARRIVAL OF THE OBSERVERS. THEY HAD BEEN GIVEN THE IMPRESSION THAT THEY WERE NEEDED URGENTLY AND HAD MADE PROVISION ACCORDINGLY. NO THEY WERE BEING ASKED TO DELAY ARRIVAL UNTIL 7 FEBRUARY WHICH WAS ONLY A WEEK BEFORE THE FIRST ELECTIONS ON 14 FEBRUARY, WHICH HARDLY GAVE TIME FOR THEM TO OBSERVE THE SITUATION PROPERLY. DID I HAVE AN EXPLANATION? I SAID THE GOVERNOR NO DOUBT WISHED TO HAVE THE CEASE-FIRE FIRMLY ESTABLISHED SO THAT HE COULD ENSURE THE SAFETY OF THE OBSERVERS. FURTHER MORE THE ELECTORAL COMMISSIONERS WOULD ONLY BE PROPERLY ESTABLISHED BY THE END OF THIS MONTH. I POINTED OUT THAT THE ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE COMMONWEALTH GROUP OF WHICH NIGERIA WAS A PART WERE BEING MADE DIRECT BETWEEN THE GOVERNOR AND MR RAMPHAL.

5. OSOBASE (HEAD OF AFRICA DEPARTMENT) THEN MENTIONED THE DELAYED ARRIVAL OF NKOMO BECAUSE OF THE MUZOREWA RALLY AND THE NEWS THAT MUGABE'S PROPOSED ARRIVAL ON 20 JANUARY WAS ALSO BEING DELAYED BECAUSE OF A SITHOLE RALLY ON THE SAME DAY. I EXPLAINED THAT THE RALLIES OF THE INTERNAL PARTIES HAD BEEN ARRANGED SOME TIME IN ADVNCE AND THAT THE POLICE COULD NOT COPE WITH TWO MAJOR RALLIES IN SALISBURY ON THE SAME DAY. I THEN WENT OVER TO THE ATTACK ON MUGABE, POINTING OUT THAT IT WAS HIS FORCES WHICH HAD CAUSED MAJOR DIFFICULTIES OVER THE CEASE-FIRE. FROM THE OUTSET THEY HAD BROKEN THE CEASE-FIRE AGREEMENT BY CROSSING THE BORDER IN LARGE NUMBERS AFTER THE CUT-OFF DATE. THE MINISTER INTERVENED

NUMBERS AFTER THE CUT-OFF DATE. THE MINISTER INTERVENED VIGOROUSLY TO COMPLAIN THAT THE PATRIOTIC FRONT HAD ASKED REASONABLY FOR AN EXTENSION OF THE DEADLINE AND THAT LORD SOAMES HAD BEEN UNDULY INFLEXIBLE IN REFUSING THIS. I POINTED OUT POLITELY THAT THE MINISTER WAS CONFUSING TWO ISSUES. THERE WAS NEVER ANY QUESTION OF A PERIOD DURING WHICH PF FORCES COULD CROSS THE BORDER INTO RHODESIA; THIS WAS FORBIDDEN FROM THE OUTSET. AS REGARDS THE PERIOD FOR ASSEMBLY, ZIPRA HAD IN GENERAL COMPLIED AND ZANLA SEEMED TO HAVE DELAYED NEEDLESSLY, BUT THE GOVERNOR HAD BEEN FLEXIBLE IN EXTENDING BY A DAY OR TWO AND THE ASSEMBLY OF OTHER GROUPS (THOUGH WITHOUT ARMS) HAD CONTINUED TO BE ACCEPTED SUBSEQUENTLY. I WENT ON TO CRITICISE THE CONTINUED REFUSAL OF SOME ZANU GROUPS TO ASSEMBLE, MUGABE'S FAILURE TO RELEASE POLITICAL DETAINEES HELD IN MOZAMBIQUE AND THE INFLAMMATORY PROPAGANDA OF HIS "VOICE OF ZIMBABWE". THE MINISTER DID NOT ATTEMPT TO ANSWER ANY OF THESE POINTS BUT SAID THAT TWO WRONGS DO NOT MAKE A RIGHT. I AGREED, BUT SAID THAT IT WAS IMPORTANT THAT THE MINISTER SHOULD BE AWARE OF THE ZANU/ZANLA BEHAVIOUR SINCE THIS MORE THAN ANYTHING ELSE EXPLAINED MANY OF THE DIFFICULTIES WHICH FACED THE GOVERNOR.

6. IN CONCLUSION, THE MINISTER EMPHASISED AGAIN THE GREAT IMPORTANCE OF THE QUESTION OF SOUTH AFRICAN TROOPS. HE FELT THAT WHATEVER EXPLANATIONS WERE GIVEN THEIR PRESENCE THERE WAS JUST AN EXCUSE WHICH ALSO SERVED TO DISGUISE THE PRESENCE OF OTHER SOUTH AFRICAN TROOPS IN THE COUNTRY. HE SAID FOR THE PRESIDENT THIS WAS A QUESTION OF TRUST. THE PRESIDENT HAD REFERRED TO THE MOMENT AT THE LUSAKA CONFERENCE WHEN MRS THATCHER HAD APPEALED TO THE OTHER HEADS OF GOVERNMENT TO TRUST THE BRITISH TO BRING ABOUT A JUST AND PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF RHODESIA. IT WAS THIS TRUST WHICH WAS NOW BEING PUT TO THE TEST.

7. AS BEFORE, THE MEETING WAS CONDUCTED IN AN EXTREMELY FRIENDLY ATMOSPHERE. I GAINED THE IMPRESSION THAT THE NIGERIANS ARE STILL WITH US AND VERY MUCH WANT US TO SUCCEED. HOWEVER, THEY STILL HAVE GENUINE DIFFICULTY OVER SOME POINTS AND IN PARTICULAR MIGHT FIND IT IMPOSSIBLE TO STAY WITH US UNLESS SOME WAY CAN BE FOUND ROUND THE QUESTION OF SOUTH AFRICAN TROOPS AT BEIT BRIDGE.

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PS/SIR I GILMOUR
PS/MR LUCE
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~~MR B MITCHELL~~ **MR BULLARD**
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MR P M MAXEY) CABINET
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FM MAPUTO 161620Z JANUARY 80

TO IMMEDIATE SALISBURY

TELEGRAM NUMBER 89 OF 16 JANUARY

INFO PRIORITY LUSAKA DAR ES SALAAM GABORONE LAGOS WASHINGTON
SKMIS NEW YORK

YOUR TELNO 59: RETURN OF MUGABE

1. I SAW MUGABE THIS AFTERNOON AND SPOKE AS IN YOUR PARA 1. I ALSO MADE A STRONG PITCH ON DETAINEES STRESSING THAT HMG ATTACHED THE GREATEST IMPORTANCE TO THEIR VERY EARLY RELEASE. I HANDED HIM A COPY OF THE LIST WHICH I HAD ALREADY GIVEN TO MFA (MY TELNO 17).

2. MUGABE WAS IN ONE OF HIS MORE AWKWARD MOODS AND ALTHOUGH I DID NOT LINK THE QUESTION OF HIS RETURN TO THE RELEASE OF THE DETAINEES HE SAID THAT YOU HAD NO RIGHT TO BAN HIM FROM RETURNING TO HIS COUNTRY. HE WAS THE LEADER OF HIS PARTY AND, AMONG OTHER THINGS, HE HAD TO BE IN SALISBURY ON 20 JANUARY TO VET THE LIST OF CANDIDATES WHICH MUST BE LODGED BY THE FOLLOWING DAY.

3. I STRESSED THAT IT WAS NOT A QUESTION OF BANNING HIM BUT OF PLANNING HIS RETURN IN A SENSIBLE AND MUTUALLY SATISFACTORY MANNER. ACCORDING TO MY INFORMATION HIS OFFICIALS IN SALISBURY HAD BOOKED THE ZIMBABWE GROUNDS FOR THE 27TH. MUGABE PROFESSED TO KNOW NOTHING ABOUT THIS AND ARGUED STRONGLY THAT HE SHOULD RETURN ON THE

27TH HE COULD HOLD HIS PARTY AT HARARE OR NOT HAVE ONE AT ALL ON

ABOUT THIS AND ARGUED STRONGLY THAT HE COULD HOLD HIS RALLY AT HARARE OR NOT HAVE ONE AT ALL ON THAT DAY. I REHEARSED THE ARGUMENTS AGAINST THIS AND, ALTHOUGH IN THE END HE SEEMED TO CONCEDE THAT TWO POLITICAL MANIFESTATIONS ON THE SAME DAY MIGHT CAUSE PROBLEMS, HE WOULD NOT GIVE ME A DEFINITE REPLY UNTIL HE HAD CONSULTED HIS COLLEAGUES.

4. WE HAD AN EVEN STICKIER SESSION OVER DETAINEES. HE ALLEGED THAT SOME OF THEM HAD BEEN GUILTY OF CRIMES FOR WHICH THEY COULD HAVE BEEN SHOT; THEY HAD ATTEMPTED SABOTAGE AND ASSASSINATIONS, INCLUDING FOUR ATTEMPTS ON TONGOGARA'S LIFE. IF THEY WERE RELEASED THEY WOULD GO BACK TO SALISBURY, WHERE THEY WOULD BE USED BY HIS ENEMIES TO PLOT AGAINST HIM AND HIS COLLEAGUES AGAIN. HOWEVER, NOT ALL OF THOSE HELD - AND HE CLAIMED THAT THE TOTAL WAS NOWHERE NEAR 71 - WERE A SERIOUS SECURITY THREAT. A PARTY COMMITTEE WAS NOW IN THE PROCESS OF REVIEWING THEIR CASES AND, APART FROM THE DANGEROUS ONES, THE OTHERS WOULD BE RELEASED. HE SAID THAT THIS IS MORE THAN YOU WERE DOING WITH HIS JAILED OR "RESTRICTED" SUPPORTERS AND WAVED A LETTER FROM AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL DATED 11 JANUARY ACCORDING TO WHICH THERE ARE STILL 5,000 POLITICAL DETAINEES IN RHODESIA. I ASSURED HIM THAT THIS WAS NONSENSE AND THAT HOWEVER RECENT THE DATE ON AMNESTY'S LETTER THEIR INFORMATION WAS, AT BEST, HOPELESSLY OUT OF DATE. LARGE NUMBERS HAD BEEN RELEASED AND THE CASES OF THOSE REMAINING WERE BEING URGENTLY REVIEWED. I STRESSED THAT THIS WAS NOT AN INTERNAL PARTY MATTER; THE DETAINEES HAVE BEEN APPEALING TO HMG AS RHODESIAN CITIZENS AND WE HAVE EVERY RIGHT TO WANT THEM RELEASED. I REMINDED HIM THAT HE HAD SAID, AT OUR MEETING ON 13 JANUARY, THAT THEY WOULD BE RELEASED "IN DUE COURSE" AND PRESSED HIM TO SAY WHEN. HE REFUSED TO BE DRAWN FURTHER.

5. MUGABE WAS MORE FORTHCOMING ON WHITE DETAINEES, THOUGH HE CLAIMED THAT ZANU NOW HOLD ONLY TWO. HE COULD NOT GIVE ME THEIR NAMES THERE AND THEN, BUT HE PROMISED TO HAVE THEM RELEASED.

6. I DO NOT KNOW IF MACHEL HAD TALKED TO MUGABE BEFORE I SAW HIM: I SUSPECT NOT. I CAUGHT A GLIMPSE OF THE CHIEF OF PROTOCOL, WHO ARRANGES THESE MEETINGS, HOVERING OUTSIDE WHILE I WAS TALKING TO MUGABE.

7. (TO FCO): GRATEFUL FOR FURTHER INSTRUCTIONS ON DETAINEES. (WE HAVE SENT AN ORAL MESSAGE TO THE DETAINEES TO SAY THAT WE HAVE RECEIVED THEIR LETTER OF 27 DECEMBER AND ARE DOING OUR BEST).

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FM CAPE TOWN EMBASSY 161440Z JANUARY 1980

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TEL NO 16 OF 16 JANUARY

INFO IMMEDIATE LAGOS, SALISBURY, DAR ES SALAAM, LUSAKA,
MAPUTO, UKMIS NEW YORK, PRETORIA,
INFO PRIORITY GABORONE, LUANDA, WASHINGTON

LAGOS TEL NO 66: SOUTH AFRICAN FORCES IN RHODESIA

1. I HAVE SO FAR REFRAINED FROM ADDING MY VOICE TO THE DEBATE, BUT SINCE MR BROWN ASKS IN THE TUR WHY A REQUEST FOR THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE BEIT BRIDGE CONTINGENT SHOULD PROVOKE A CONFRONTATION WITH THE SOUTH AFRICANS I WILL TRY TO EXPLAIN AS BEST I CAN. I SAY "AS BEST I CAN" BECAUSE SOME OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN THINKING MAY SEEM AS EMOTIONAL AND IRRATIONAL IN ITS WAY AS THAT OF THE NIGERIAN AND OTHER AFRICAN GOVERNMENTS. MOREOVER IN TRYING TO EXPLAIN THE SOUTH AFRICAN ATTITUDE I AM NOT CONDONING IT OR FOR THAT MATTER THE CONTINUED PRESENCE OF THE BEIT BRIDGE CONTINGENT.
2. THE SOUTH AFRICANS BELIEVE THAT IN RHODESIA THEY ARE WITNESSING A CONTINUING STRUGGLE BETWEEN THE GOOD MODERATES (MUZOREWA) AND THE EVIL EXTREMISTS (MUGABE AND TO A LESSER EXTENT NKOMO). THEY ALSO BELIEVE THAT THE P F HAVE ACTIVE RUSSIAN AND OTHER COMMUNIST SUPPORT AND ARE DETERMINED TO COME TO POWER BY ONE MEANS OR ANOTHER. THEY RATE MORE AND MORE HIGHLY THE P F'S CAPACITY TO WIN THE ELECTION. EVEN IF MUZOREWA SHOULD WIN IT FAIRLY AND SQUARELY THE P F WILL NOT, IT IS THOUGHT, ACCEPT THE RESULT AND WILL SOONER OR LATER ATTEMPT A COUP. NEVERTHELESS THE SOUTH AFRICANS WANT TO DO ALL THEY CAN TO HELP MUZOREWA WIN BECAUSE RIGHTLY OR WRONGLY THEY CANNOT CONCEIVE THAT ANY OTHER GOVERNMENT WOULD BE ANYTHING BUT BAD FOR THEM AND FOR THE STABILITY OF SOUTHERN AFRICA GENERALLY.

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3. AGAINST THIS GENERAL BACKGROUND THE S A G WOULD NOT UNDER-
STAND WHY THEIR SMALL AND - IN THEIR VIEW- RELATIVELY INNOCUOUS
CONTINGENT AT BEIT BRIDGE SHOULD "TAKE THE RAP" AT A TIME WHEN
IT IS ZANLA WHO ARE PERPETRATING THE SERIOUS BREACHES OF THE
CEASEFIRE. THEY BELIEVE THAT THE BEIT BRIDGE IS A MAJOR INTEREST
OF THEIRS AND THAT IT IS EXPOSED TO REAL DANGER OF ATTACK BY
"TERRORISTS". THEY WOULD RESENT ANY REQUEST TO WITHDRAW THEIR
PROTECTIVE FORCE ALL THE MORE IF IT APPEARED THAT THIS WAS BEING
DONE BECAUSE OF THE EMOTIONAL OUTPOURINGS OF AFRICAN LEADERS WHOM
THEY DESPISE. THE SOUTH AFRICANS TOO HAVE FACES TO SAVE. THEY
MIGHT THINK TWICE ABOUT THE CONTINUED PRESENCE OF THE CONTINGENT
IF THEY COULD BE PERSUADED THAT IT WAS HARMING MUZOREWA'S ELECTORAL
CHANCES. UNFORTUNATELY MUZOREWA APPEARS TO BE ALL FOR IT STAYING.

4. THE SOUTH AFRICANS ARE NOT IMPERVIOUS TO ALL REASON AND IN THEIR
HEARTS THEY MIGHT CONCEDE THAT IT WOULD HAVE BEEN BETTER IF THEY HAD
ALREADY PULLED THEIR FORCES OUT OF RHODESIA. BUT BY TRADITION AND
INSTINCT THEY ARE STICKERS AND HAVING BEEN SO LONG IN INTERNATIONAL
QUARANTINE THEY ARE APT TO BELIEVE THAT THE BEST WAY TO DEAL WITH
THE KIND OF STORM THAT HAS NOW DEVELOPED IS TO RIDE IT OUT.

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Rhodesia

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

16 January 1980

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Prime Minister

(2)

Dear Michael, These are the telegrams mentioned by the Lord Privy Seal.

Rhodesia : South African Forces

I sent you last night a copy of the Governor's telegram no 189 (copy enclosed for ease of reference). I now enclose further telegrams on this subject which the Lord Privy Seal has sent by way of advice to the Secretary of State on how we should proceed over the sensitive matter of South African troops in Rhodesia. You may wish to know the line which we are proposing should be taken, subject of course to the Secretary of State's views.

Yours ever
Roderic Lyne

(R M J Lyne)
Private Secretary

M O'D B Alexander Esq
10 Downing Street

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16 JAN 1980

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FROM SALISBURY 151710Z JAN 80

TO F L A S H FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 189 OF 15 JANUARY 1980

INFO F L A S H ISLAMABAD (PERSONAL FOR SECRETARY OF STATE)
IMMEDIATE CAPE TOWN (PERSONAL FOR AMBASSADOR).

YOUR TELEGRAM NUMBER 136: SOUTH AFRICAN FORCES.

AS YOU KNOW, NOT ONLY DO I SHARE YOUR ANXIETIES, BUT I HATE THE WHOLE STORY. IT LIES HEAVY UPON US HERE, AND I FULLY UNDERSTAND YOUR PARLIAMENTARY DIFFICULTIES. BUT, MUCH AS I WOULD LIKE TO TACKLE IT HEAD-ON, I MUST TELL YOU OF MY ANXIETIES OF GOING FOR IMMEDIATE REMOVAL OF BEITBRIDGE DETACHMENT AND OF THE THREE COMPANIES. (I TAKE IT YOU ARE NOT CONCERNED, AS I AM NOT, ABOUT THE OTHER SOUTH AFRICANS IN THE RHODESIAN FORCES COMPRISING TWO "FIRE FORCES", AND SOME OTHER HELICOPTERS AND FIXED-WING AIRCRAFT).

2. WALLS IS NOT INTERESTED IN WORLD OPINION. HE WANTS A SOUTH AFRICAN PRESENCE FOR HIS OWN OBVIOUS REASONS AND IS CONVINCED IN HIS OWN MIND (WHATEVER THE TRUTH MAY BE) THAT HE HAD YOUR PERSONAL CONCURRENCE. IF WE INSISTED ON THEIR REMOVAL, I CANNOT BE SURE HOW FAR HIS ANGER WOULD TAKE HIM. BUT DUFF, WHO KNOWS HIM WELL, CONSIDERS IT A REAL DANGER THAT HE WOULD MAKE IT A BREAKING POINT AND REFUSE ALL FURTHER COOPERATION WITH ME. IF THE RHODESIAN FORCES GOT OUT OF CONTROL WE COULD BE HEADING FAST FOR A SITUATION IN WHICH THE WHOLE AGREEMENT WOULD BREAK DOWN, IT WOULD BE SEEN TO BE THE FAULT OF THE RHODESIANS, AND IT WOULD THEN BE IMPOSSIBLE FOR ME TO CONTINUE WITH MY MISSION. RENWICK WILL TELL YOU THAT WALLS AND HIS MATES ARE EVIDENTLY CONVINCED THAT MUGABE STANDS ALL-TOO-GOOD A CHANCE OF WINNING THE ELECTION, WHICH LEADS THEM TO QUESTION THE WISDOM OF LETTING THE OPERATION CONTINUE UNLESS THEY CAN PERSUADE ME (WHICH IS MOST DOUBTFUL ON PRESENT FORM) THAT MUGABE'S BEHAVIOUR WARRANTS MY PROSCRIBING HIM. IF HE WERE TO DECIDE TO BREAK ON THE SOUTH AFRICAN ISSUE, HE WOULD DOUBTLESS CALL A PRESS CONFERENCE AT WHICH HE WOULD STATE THAT HE HAD ONLY BEEN PERSUADED, AND HAD PERSUADED THE SALISBURY DELEGATION, TO ACCEPT THE LANCASTER HOUSE

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/ AGREEMENT ON THE

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AGREEMENT ON THE STRENGTH OF ASSURANCES HE HAD BEEN GIVEN IN LONDON THAT

(A) THE RHODESIAN FORCES WOULD NOT BE PUT AT A DISADVANTAGE, BUT WOULD BE ALLOWED TO PATROL AND REGAIN SECURITY OF THE COUNTRY:

(B) SOUTH AFRICAN MILITARY ASSISTANCE WOULD NOT BE PROHIBITED (ON THE CONTRARY) PROVIDED THE SOUTH AFRICANS WERE CONCEALED AS RHODESIANS:

(C) IT WAS A POLICY OF THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT TO DO WHATEVER COULD BE DONE TO ENSURE A MUZOREWA VICTORY AT THE ELECTION.

3. WHAT IS THE ALTERNATIVE?

4. ON BEITBRIDGE MY IMPRESSION IS THAT YOU AGREE WE CAN CLAIM THEIR PRESENCE DOES NOT AFFRONT LANCASTER HOUSE SINCE IN NO WAY CAN IT BE TERMED "INTERVENTION". SO I SUGGEST WE SHOULD TALK IT OUT: THOUGH MAKING IT CLEAR (WITH SOUTH AFRICAN AGREEMENT) THAT THE DETACHMENT WILL WITHDRAW, AT MY REQUEST, EITHER JUST BEFORE THE ELECTION (ONCE THE CALL-UP IS COMPLETE): OR, FAILING AGREEMENT ON THAT, IMMEDIATELY AFTER IF THE INCOMING PRIME MINISTER WISHES IT.

5. THE THREE COMPANIES. AS I SEE IT THIS IS MUCH MORE POTENTIALLY DANGEROUS POLITICALLY. MY INSTINCT THEREFORE IS TO HAVE A HOPEFULLY UNEMOTIONAL HEART-TO-HEART WITH WALLS AND TO PERSUADE HIM THAT, GIVEN THE MUCH-IMPROVED SECURITY SITUATION (AND GIVEN ALSO OUR ATTITUDE OVER BEITBRIDGE AND THE FIRE-FORCE) HE DOES NOT NEED TO HOLD ONTO THEM. I WOULD TRY AGAIN TO MAKE HIM SEE AND UNDERSTAND THE HIDEOUS RISKS OF THEIR REMAINING. BUT SUBJECT TO WHAT YOU MAY SAY I WOULD HAVE A FALL-BACK POSITION IN EXTREMIS THAT THEY MUST EACH BE INTEGRATED INTO A RHODESIAN BATTALION. I DON'T SEE FURTHER DILUTION AS PRACTICABLE BUT FOR THEM TO REMAIN AS THEY ARE IS SIMPLY UNACCEPTABLE.

FCO PSE PASS TO ALL

SOAMES

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

F I L E S

HEAD/RHODESIA D
PS
PS/LPS
PS/MR LUCE
PS/PUS
MR DAY
MR C D POWELL

OUT TELEGRAM

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~~DESKBY 161400Z~~ JANUARY 1980
FM FCO 161430Z
TO FLASH NEW DELHI
TELEGRAM NO

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FOLLOWING FOR SECRETARY OF STATE FROM LORD PRIVY SEAL
SALISBURY TELNO 189 TO FCO: RHODESIA/SOUTH AFRICAN FORCES
1. I have considered the Governor's telegram and discussed it with officials. I do not like the situation any more than you or the Governor. But I accept, with some reluctance, that to go straight for the immediate withdrawal of South African forces, including the contingent at Beitbridge, could have very serious consequences for the settlement as a whole.
2. I see little option therefore but to proceed as the Governor proposes. In relation to Beitbridge we must make it clear that the position will be kept under review. We should aim to secure the withdrawal of the contingent before the elections, taking advantage of any opportunity - eg the call-up of reservists - which would make it easier for Walls to agree to this. If this proves too difficult, we must nonetheless not (not) leave the

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| NNNN ends telegram | BLANK | Catchword /matter |
| File number | Dept Rhodesia | Distribution |
| Drafted by (Block capitals) R W RENWICK | | |
| Telephone number 233-5698 | | |
| Authorised for despatch <i>Thy 16/1</i> | | |
| Comcen reference | Time of despatch | |

OUT TELEGRAM (CONT)

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| | Classification and Caveats SECRET DEDIP | Page 2 |
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1 matter for the independence government to resolve, ie it should
 2 be agreed in advance with those concerned that the South
 3 Africans will withdraw their contingent before independence
 4 unless the incoming Prime Minister specifically requests that
 5 they stay.

6 3. In relation to the three South African companies not at
 7 Beitbridge, we must aim to secure their removal, reduction or
 8 as a minimum their effective "Rhodesianisation" so that we are
 9 in a position as soon as possible to state that this is a
 10 Rhodesian battalion with South African personnel.

11 4. Against this background, and subject to your views, I
 12 recommend that we send the instructions in MIPT to the Governor.
 13 I fear that we cannot go beyond this at this stage and must
 14 leave it to Lord Soames to play the hand as he judges best.
 15 HM Ambassador in Pretoria should be instructed to take action
 16 as soon as the matter has been discussed with Walls. We may
 17 be able to make more progress with the South Africans than with
 18 the Rhodesians. We should keep open the possibility of a joint
 19 visit by Walls and Duff to Cape Town.

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10 SEE MIPT - FOLLOWING ARE SUGGESTED INSTRUCTIONS TO SALISBURY

11 SALISBURY TELNO 189. RHODESIA/SOUTH AFRICAN FORCES

12 1. You should now pursue with Walls the question of the three

13 South African companies not at Beitbridge, making clear that

14 you are doing so on instructions. We will wish to instruct

15 HM Ambassador in Cape Town to take parallel action at a high

16 level with the South Africans as soon as we have had a report

17 of your conversation with Walls.

18 2. You should impress on Walls the fact that we have done

19 exactly what we agreed to do over Beitbridge and have taken a

20 great deal of damaging international criticism in consequence.

21 Throughout our conversations in London we made clear to him

22 that we were prepared to accept the continued presence of

23 South African personnel in the Rhodesian forces; that we would

24 not be seeking to carry out any purges; and that the number of

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| NNNN ends telegram | BLANK | Catchword /South Africans |
| File number | Dept Rhodesia | Distribution |
| Drafted by (Block capitals) R W RENWICK | | |
| Telephone number 233-5698 | | |
| Authorised for despatch <i>RmyL 16/1</i> | | |
| Comcen reference | Time of despatch | |

OUT TELEGRAM (CONT)

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| | Classification and Caveats SECRET DEDIP | Page 2 |
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1 South African personnel was a matter for him. We did not,
 2 however, at any point agree to accept a formed and identifiable
 3 South African units in Rhodesia under a British Governor.
 4 Indeed we specifically told him and the South African Government
 5 that this was unacceptable. We have since modified that position
 6 (at his request) in regard to Beitbridge only.
 7 3. The difficulty we face is that the presence of these three
 8 companies is now fairly widely known. If they were publicly
 9 identified, we should have no alternative but to ask Walls and the
 10 South Africans to arrange for their immediate withdrawal. We do
 11 not wish to put the Rhodesians, South Africans or ourselves in
 12 such a position, which would cause great embarrassment to the
 13 South African government as well as to HMG. We cannot put
 14 ourselves in a position of misleading Parliament by stating that,
 15 while there are South African personnel with the Rhodesian forces,
 16 there are no South African forces in Rhodesia other than the
 17 contingent at Beitbridge.
 18 4. We must therefore ask Walls to arrange with the South
 19 Africans for the removal, reduction or effective
 20 "Rhodesianisation" of this contingent. We should prefer to
 21 achieve their withdrawal. But if this is unattainable we must
 22 be in a position to state, if asked, that this is a Rhodesian
 23 battalion with South African personnel. It is for him to judge
 24 whether he is able to make use of the influx of reservists in
 25 helping to bring about such a situation. If it is impossible
 26 to do without them, we need not insist on a net reduction in the
 27 number of South African personnel (though we should of course
 28 much prefer to achieve this). But whatever South African
 29 personnel are in the Rhodesian forces must - apart from
 30 Beitbridge - be integrated with them.
 31 5. You should say that we shall be speaking in similar terms
 32 to the South Africans. We should keep open the possibility of a
 33 joint visit by Duff and Walls to Cape Town if this seemed
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OUT TELEGRAM (CONT)

Classification and Caveats
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1 likely to be helpful.
2 6. On the question of Beitbridge we shall need to make it
3 clear that the presence of this contingent will be kept under
4 review. If its withdrawal before the elections can be achieved,
5 so much the better. Failing this we should make it clear to the
6 South Africans that we shall expect them to withdraw their
7 contingent prior to independence unless the incoming Prime
8 Minister specifically requests otherwise.

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10 CARRINGTON

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Papers removed from file

Date

COMMONWEALTH SECRETARIAT

CABLES: COMSECGEN LONDON SW1
TELEX: 27678
TELEPHONE: 01-839 3411 Ext:

MARLBOROUGH HOUSE,
PALL MALL,
LONDON, SW1Y 5HX

Your ref:

Our ref:

C.151/4/5

15 January, 1980

*for
Print*

Commonwealth Committee on Southern Africa

As agreed by the Committee at its last meeting on 8 January 1980, the Secretary-General wrote to the Foreign Secretary (with a copy to the Lord Privy Seal) to convey the deep feelings and concerns outlined by members in regard to developments in Southern Rhodesia.

In Lord Carrington's absence abroad, the Secretary-General has now received the attached reply from the Parliamentary Under Secretary of State, Mr. Richard Luce, MP, which is brought to the attention of members of the Committee.

The Secretary-General continues to be in touch with the British Government and will keep High Commissioners informed of further developments.

M Malhoutra

M. Malhoutra
Committee Secretary

Copies To:

As per circular (2)

Copy of letter dated 14 January 1980
from the Parliamentary Under-Secretary
of State, Richard Luce MP

In the absence of Peter Carrington and Ian Gilmour abroad, I have been asked to reply to your letters of 8 and 9 January about the presence of South African forces at Beitbridge. The Government take careful note of the concern felt by members of the Commonwealth Committee on Southern Africa on this, and Ian Gilmour and I should be happy to discuss it further with you.

We are all agreed that it is of the utmost importance that there should be no external interference in Rhodesia if the conditions for free and fair elections are to be created. This was the objective of Peter Carrington's assurance which you quote, that there would be no external involvement in Rhodesia under the British Governor. The assurance remains valid.

The Governor has looked very carefully at the position on the ground in the light of the situation he inherited and of the response to the Ceasefire Agreement. As you know, the bridge, which is shared property between Rhodesia and South Africa, is vital to the economies of Rhodesia, South Africa and to other countries. Damage to it would have very serious consequences in the region. The South African contingent which we have agreed should guard it is small and is present uniquely for the protection of the bridge. There is no question of this contingent being used elsewhere in Rhodesia or of it being able to intervene in the internal affairs of the country. There is moreover a team from the Monitoring Force nearby and I am satisfied that this gives us sufficient assurance that the role of the South African forces there will be limited to the protection of the bridge. We do not therefore accept that the presence of a small South African contingent to guard Beitbridge amounts to external involvement in Rhodesia in a way which would prejudice conditions for elections. The Governor will however keep the need for this special measure of protection under review.

I should also like to draw your attention to the serious threat to the Lancaster House Agreements which is presented by continuing breaches of the ceasefire on the part of some Patriotic Front (and particularly Zanla) forces. These have included continued cross-border movement, refusal to move to assembly points, acts of violence and intimidation of the local population. These acts are in violation of the Agreements signed at Lancaster House. The Governor has applied the Agreement flexibly to allow the fullest possible assembly of Patriotic Front forces and has made use of the Ceasefire Commission and Patriotic Front commanders to deal with breaches of the ceasefire.

cont.....

The activities I have described are not consistent with the undertakings, to which all parties at the Conference subscribed, to renounce the use of force for political ends and to campaign peacefully and without intimidation, and make it difficult for free political activity to take place. I hope that you and the Commonwealth Governments concerned will use your influence to secure the earliest possible end to these continuing violations of the Lancaster House Agreements.

Signed: Richard Luce

18 JAN 80

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TO F L A S H FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 189 OF 15 JANUARY 1980

W. R. Wood

RC

INFO F L A S H ISLAMABAD (PERSONAL FOR SECRETARY OF STATE)
IMMEDIATE CAPE TOWN (PERSONAL FOR AMBASSADOR).

YOUR TELEGRAM NUMBER 136: SOUTH AFRICAN FORCES.

AS YOU KNOW, NOT ONLY DO I SHARE YOUR ANXIETIES, BUT I HATE THE WHOLE STORY. IT LIES HEAVY UPON US HERE, AND I FULLY UNDERSTAND YOUR PARLIAMENTARY DIFFICULTIES. BUT, MUCH AS I WOULD LIKE TO TACKLE IT HEAD-ON, I MUST TELL YOU OF MY ANXIETIES OF GOING FOR IMMEDIATE REMOVAL OF BEITBRIDGE DETACHMENT AND OF THE THREE COMPANIES. (I TAKE IT YOU ARE NOT CONCERNED, AS I AM NOT, ABOUT THE OTHER SOUTH AFRICANS IN THE RHODESIAN FORCES COMPRISING TWO "FIRE FORCES", AND SOME OTHER HELICOPTERS AND FIXED-WING AIRCRAFT).

2. WALLS IS NOT INTERESTED IN WORLD OPINION. HE WANTS A SOUTH AFRICAN PRESENCE FOR HIS OWN OBVIOUS REASONS AND IS CONVINCED IN HIS OWN MIND (WHATEVER THE TRUTH MAY BE) THAT HE HAD YOUR PERSONAL CONCURRENCE. IF WE INSISTED ON THEIR REMOVAL, I CANNOT BE SURE HOW FAR HIS ANGER WOULD TAKE HIM. BUT DUFF, WHO KNOWS HIM WELL, CONSIDERS IT A REAL DANGER THAT HE WOULD MAKE IT A BREAKING POINT AND REFUSE ALL FURTHER COOPERATION WITH ME. IF THE RHODESIAN FORCES GOT OUT OF CONTROL WE COULD BE HEADING FAST FOR A SITUATION IN WHICH THE WHOLE AGREEMENT WOULD BREAK DOWN, IT WOULD BE SEEN TO BE THE FAULT OF THE RHODESIANS, AND IT WOULD THEN BE IMPOSSIBLE FOR ME TO CONTINUE WITH MY MISSION. RENWICK WILL TELL YOU THAT WALLS AND HIS MATES ARE EVIDENTLY CONVINCED THAT MUGABE STANDS ALL-TOO-GOOD A CHANCE OF WINNING THE ELECTION, WHICH LEADS THEM TO QUESTION THE WISDOM OF LETTING THE OPERATION CONTINUE UNLESS THEY CAN PERSUADE ME (WHICH IS MOST DOUBTFUL ON PRESENT FORM) THAT MUGABE'S BEHAVIOUR WARRANTS MY PROSCRIBING HIM. IF HE WERE TO DECIDE TO BREAK ON THE SOUTH AFRICAN ISSUE, HE WOULD DOUBTLESS CALL A PRESS CONFERENCE AT WHICH HE WOULD STATE THAT HE HAD ONLY BEEN PERSUADED, AND HAD PERSUADED THE SALISBURY DELEGATION, TO ACCEPT THE LANCASTER HOUSE AGREEMENT ON THE STRENGTH OF ASSURANCES HE HAD BEEN GIVEN IN LONDON THAT

(A) THE RHODESIAN FORCES WOULD NOT BE PUT AT A DISADVANTAGE, BUT WOULD BE ALLOWED TO PATROL AND REGAIN SECURITY OF THE COUNTRY:

(B) SOUTH AFRICAN MILITARY ASSISTANCE WOULD NOT BE PROHIBITED (ON THE CONTRARY) PROVIDED THE SOUTH AFRICANS WERE CONCEALED AS RHODESIANS:

(C) IT WAS A POLICY OF THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT TO DO WHATEVER COULD BE DONE TO ENSURE A MUZOREWA VICTORY AT THE ELECTION.

3. WHAT IS THE ALTERNATIVE?

4. ON BEITBRIDGE MY IMPRESSION IS THAT YOU AGREE WE CAN CLAIM THEIR PRESENCE DOES NOT AFFRONT LANCASTER HOUSE SINCE IN NO WAY CAN IT BE TERMED "INTERVENTION". SO I SUGGEST WE SHOULD TROUGH IT OUT: THOUGH MAKING IT CLEAR (WITH SOUTH AFRICAN AGREEMENT) THAT THE DETACHMENT WILL WITHDRAW, AT MY REQUEST, EITHER JUST BEFORE THE ELECTION (ONCE THE CALL-UP IS COMPLETE): OR, FAILING AGREEMENT ON THAT, IMMEDIATELY AFTER IF THE INCOMING PRIME MINISTER WISHES IT.

5. THE THREE COMPANIES. AS I SEE IT THIS IS MUCH MORE POTENTIALLY DANGEROUS POLITICALLY. MY INSTINCT THEREFORE IS TO HAVE A HOPEFULLY UNEMOTIONAL HEART-TO-HEART WITH WALLS AND TO PERSUADE HIM THAT, GIVEN THE MUCH-IMPROVED SECURITY SITUATION (AND GIVEN ALSO OUR ATTITUDE OVER BEITBRIDGE AND THE FIRE-FORCE) HE HOES NOT NEED TO HOLD ONTO THEM. I WOULD COQQPCLG Q 2%+1683%?DQ::), % = #19. =

~~HE HOES NOT NEED TO~~
HOLD ONTO THEM. I WOULD TRY AGAIN TO MAKE HIM SEE AND UNDERSTAND THE HIDEOUS RISKS OF THEIR REMAINING. BUT SUBJECT TO WHAT YOU MAY SAY I WOULD HAVE A FALL-BACK POSITION IN EXTREMIS THAT THEY MUST EACH BE INTEGRATED INTO A RHODESIAN BATTALION. I DONT SEE FURTHER DILUTION AS PRACTICABLE BUT FOR THEM TO REMAIN AS THEY ARE IS SIMPLY UNACCEPTABLE.

FCC PSE PASS TO ALL

SOAMES

NNNN

FLASH

[RHODESIA: POLICY: ADVANCE COPIES]

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IMMEDIATE

PS
PS/MR I GILMOUR
MR LUCE
PS/PUS
SIR D. MAITLAND
MR DAY
LORD N G LENNOX
MR ASPIN

PS/NO 10 DOWNING STREET

SIR R ARMSTRONG)
MR R L WADE GERY)
MR P M MAXEY) CABINET
MR GOULTY) OFFICE
MR P J FOWLER)
DIO)

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HD/RHOD DEPT (4)

HD/C AF D
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HD/FUSD (2)

HD/NEWS DEPT
HE/WAD

MR FREELAND LEGAL ADVISER RMK200A
MR FIFOOT LEGAL ADVISER RM K164

IMMEDIATE

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CONFIDENTIAL

FM SALISBURY 151040Z JAN 80

TO IMMEDIATE FTO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 184 OF 15 JANUARY

FUTURE OF THE P F FORCES

1. WE HAVE BEEN DISCUSSING WITH THE RHODESIAN AUTHORITIES AND WITH THE P F MILITARY LEADERSHIP HERE THE FUTURE OF THE P F FORCES. THERE ARE THREE INTER-RELATED PROBLEMS:

(A) THE IMMEDIATE ONE OF HOW TO DEAL WITH THE P F IN THE ASSEMBLY AREAS BETWEEN NOW AND THE ELECTION. OUR OBJECTIVE IS TO TRY TO GET AS MANY AS POSSIBLE UNDER SOME FORM OF CIVILIAN TRAINING, EG FARMING, MINING, MECHANICS, ETC, SO AS TO REDUCE THE NUMBER OF ARMED MEN STILL IN THE ASSEMBLY AREAS AFTER THE ELECTION. (WE MUST ACCEPT, HOWEVER, THAT THIS OPERATION IS UNLIKELY TO ATTRACT AWAY MORE THAN A SMALL PROPORTION OF P F IN THE ASSEMBLY AREAS.)

(B) THE INTERMEDIATE PROBLEM OF HOW TO TREAT THE P F FORCES WHO ARE STILL IN THE ASSEMBLY AREAS ON THE DAY AFTER THE ELECTION.

(C) THE LONGER TERM PROBLEM OF THE ROLE OF THE P F FORCES IN THE ARMED FORCES OF AN INDEPENDENT ZIMBABWE AND HOW TO ACCOMMODATE, WITHIN THE NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT PLAN, THE MANIFEST NEED FOR RE-TRAINING AND RESETTLING THE SURPLUS FIGHTING MEN FROM BOTH SIDES.

2. THE RHODESIAN AUTHORITIES HAVE SET UP AN INTERDEPARTMENTAL COMMITTEE, ON WHICH WE ARE REPRESENTED, TO DEAL WITH PROBLEM (A). THE COMMITTEE HAS IDENTIFIED A NUMBER OF TYPES OF TRAINING WHICH MIGHT BE OFFERED AND HAS SUGGESTED SETTING UP SPECIAL TRAINING CAMPS TO GIVE 3-MONTH BASIC REHABILITATION COURSES. THE FIRST STEP WILL BE TO CARRY OUT A SURVEY OF THE CAMPS TO SEE WHICH P F PERSONNEL ARE INTERESTED IN CIVILIAN TRAINING AND WHAT QUALIFICATIONS THEY ALREADY

INTERESTED IN CIVILIAN TRAINING AND WHAT QUALIFICATIONS THEY ALREADY POSSESS. WE HAVE BROACHED THIS WITH THE P F MILITARY COMMANDERS. THEY ARE IN PRINCIPLE IN FAVOUR OF THE IDEA SINCE THEY ACCEPT THAT A PROPORTION OF THEIR PERSONNEL WILL WISH TO RETURN TO CIVILIAN LIFE. BUT AT PRESENT THEY ARE TAKING THE LINE THAT IT IS DIFFICULT TO DECIDE HOW MANY OF THEIR MEN SHOULD BE ENCOURAGED TO ACCEPT CIVILIAN TRAINING UNTIL THEY KNOW WHAT WILL HAPPEN TO THE REST OF THE P F FORCES AND HOW MANY OF THEM WILL BE ACCEPTED INTO THE ARMED FORCES OF INDEPENDENT ZIMBABWE. WE HAVE THEREFORE BEEN TRYING TO GET WALLS AND HIS MILITARY COMMANDERS TO FOCUS PROBLEMS (B) AND (C). WE HAVE NOT YET GOT VERY FAR WITH THIS, BUT WILL PRESS HARD. PROBLEM (B) IS OBVIOUSLY OF PARTICULAR IMPORTANCE TO US. PROBLEM (C) IS OF COURSE LARGELY FOR THE FUTURE ELECTED GOVERNMENT OF ZIMBABWE BUT UNLESS SOME THOUGHT IS GIVEN TO IT AT THIS STAGE A DANGEROUS SITUATION COULD ARISE IN THE PERIOD IMMEDIATELY BEFORE AND AFTER INDEPENDENCE. GENERAL BARNARD (THE FORMER CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE RHODESIAN ARMY AND THE RHODESIAN REPRESENTATIVE ON THE CEASE-FIRE COMMISSION) HAD SOME EXPLORATORY DISCUSSIONS UNDER OUR AUSPICES YESTERDAY WITH DABENGWA AND MASUPO, THE MILITARY COMMANDERS OF Z I P R A. HE HOPES TO HAVE SIMILAR DISCUSSION WITH NHONGO AND TUNGAMIRAI OF Z A N L A TODAY OR TOMORROW.

3. MONEY WILL BE REQUIRED FOR ALL THREE PROBLEMS: IN THE CASE OF PROBLEM (C) A GREAT DEAL OF MONEY. BUT THAT WILL BE CHIEFLY A MATTER FOR POST INDEPENDENCE TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE. THE IMMEDIATE POINT IS THAT, TO PROVIDE THE CIVILIAN TRAINING COURSES ENVISAGED AT (A), IF THEY ARE ACCEPTED BY THE P F, FINANCING WILL BE NEEDED IN THE NEAR FUTURE. IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO PROVIDE ANY FIRM ESTIMATE AT THIS STAGE: WE SHALL TELEGRAPH AGAIN WHEN OUR DISCUSSIONS WITH THE RHODESIANS AND THE P F HAVE PROGRESSED FURTHER. BUT I SHALL BE GRATEFUL IF IMMEDIATE CONSIDERATION COULD BE GIVEN AS TO HOW THE MONEY SHOULD BE RAISED. WE MIGHT CONSIDER APPROACHING OTHER FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS, PARTICULARLY THE UNITED STATES, THE E E C, THE SCANDINAVIANS AND THE COMMONWEALTH: IN ORDER TO ATTRACT MONEY FROM THEM A CONTRIBUTION FROM US WILL PROBABLY BE REQUIRED. BUT THE PROBLEM IS AN URGENT AND VITAL ONE: THE P F FORCES REPRESENT A POTENTIALLY EXPLOSIVE PROBLEM WHOSE SUCCESSFUL DEFUSING IS VITAL FOR THE FUTURE OF THIS COUNTRY.

SOAMES

NNNN

IMMEDIATE

CONFIDENTIAL



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

15 January, 1980.

Dear Rhodesia,

Rhodesia

You enclosed with your letter to me of 14 January the texts of messages from the Prime Minister to President Tolbert, President Nyerere and Mr. Ramphal.

I enclose herewith the texts of the messages to President Tolbert and President Nyerere in the form in which they have been approved by the Prime Minister. I should be grateful if you could arrange for these to be despatched telegraphically.

I will let you have tomorrow the message to Mr. Ramphal assigned by the Prime Minister.

Yours ever

Michael Alexander

R.M.J. Lyne, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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FM FCO 141853Z JAN 80

TO IMMEDIATE CANBERRA

TELEGRAM NUMBER 24 OF 14 JANUARY

INFO IMMEDIATE SALISBURY LUSAKA

RHODESIA

1. THE AUSTRALIAN DEPUTY HIGH COMMISSIONER CALLED ON DAY THIS MORNING HE HAD BEEN INSTRUCTED BY CANBERRA TO DISCUSS WITH US THE PROPOSAL MADE BY NYERERE FOR A MEETING OF COMMONWEALTH LEADERS IN LONDON. FERNANDEZ SHOWED DAY THE AUSTRALIAN HIGH COMMISSIONER'S REPORTING TELEGRAM FROM LUSAKA, WHICH REFERRED TO NYERERE'S SUGGESTION THAT A SELECT GROUP OF COMMONWEALTH HEADS OF GOVERNMENT SHOULD MEET IN LONDON AS SOON AS POSSIBLE THIS WEEK FOR DISCUSSIONS WITH MRS THATCHER.

2. FERNANDEZ SAID THAT HIS PRIME MINISTER DID NOT FAVOUR SUCH A MEETING. IF HOWEVER NYERERE PURSUED THE IDEA MR FRASER MIGHT FEEL OBLIGED TO ATTEND. FERNANDEZ INDICATED THAT MR FRASER WOULD WANT TO DISCUSS HIS ATTITUDE FURTHER WITH US IF A SPECIFIC PROPOSITION WERE PUT.

3. FERNANDEZ WENT ON TO SAY, ALSO ON INSTRUCTIONS, THAT HIS GOVERNMENT WERE DISTURBED AT THE REPORTS OF THE SHOOTING OF PATRIOTIC FRONT SOLDIERS, WHO ALLEGEDLY HAD NOT BEEN ENGAGED IN WARLIKE ACTIVITIES. THEY WERE ALSO WORRIED AT THE STRENGTH OF NYERERE'S REACTIONS AND SHARED THE CONCERN THAT HAD BEEN EXPRESSED BY OTHERS AT THE DECLARED PRESENCE OF SOME SOUTH AFRICAN TROOPS IN RHODESIA. FERNANDEZ ALSO REFERRED TO THE ACTIVITIES OF THE AUXILIARIES AND THE ALLEGATIONS THAT AUXILIARIES HAD BEEN MOVED INTO AREAS IN RHODESIA AS THE PATRIOTIC FRONT FORCES MOVED OUT TO THE ASSEMBLY PLACES. HE MENTIONED THAT THE AUSTRALIAN REPRESENTATIVE IN SALISBURY HAD REPORTED TO CANBERRA ABOUT THESE ACTIVITIES.

4. DAY INFORMED FERNANDEZ THAT NYERERE HAD NOT REFERRED TO A POSSIBLE MEETING IN LONDON EITHER IN HIS RECENT MEETINGS IN DAR ES SALAAM WITH SIR PETER MOON OR IN HIS MESSAGE TO MRS THATCHER. AS FAR AS WE WERE CONCERNED THEREFORE NO PROPOSAL FOR ANY SUCH MEETING HAD BEEN MADE TO US. THERE WAS NOTHING THEREFORE TO WHICH WE COULD REACT. HOWEVER WE WOULD NOT SEE ANY REAL BENEFIT FROM SUCH A MEETING AT THIS STAGE.

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5. AS REGARDS AUSTRALIAN CONCERN AT RECENT ALLEGED DEVELOPMENTS IN RHODESIA, DAY TOOK FERNANDEZ THROUGH THE POINTS IN SALISBURY TELEGRAMS NOS 156 AND 152. HE STRESSED THAT RECENT INCIDENTS WERE PROVOKED BY THE SYSTEMATIC AND SUSTAINED VIOLATIONS OF THE CEASEFIRE BY ELEMENTS OF THE PATRIOTIC FRONT FORCES, PRIMARILY THOSE OF ZANU. THE GOVERNOR COULD NOT SIT BACK AND ALLOW SUCH VIOLATIONS TO CONTINUE. TO DO SO WOULD UNDERMINE THE WHOLE LANCASTER HOUSE AGREEMENTS. FAR FROM ENCOURAGING VIOLATION OF THESE AGREEMENTS THE GOVERNOR WAS SEEKING TO ENSURE THAT THEY WOULD BE SCRUPULOUSLY OBSERVED. ANY SUGGESTION THAT THE GOVERNOR WAS SHOWING ANY FORM OF BIAS AGAINST THE PATRIOTIC FRONT WAS TOTALLY UNWARRANTED. WE HOPED THAT OUR FREINDS WOULD NOT BE TAKEN IN BY THE UNJUSTIFIED PROPAGANDA CAMPAIGN BEING MOUNTED AGAINST OUR ACTIONS IN RHODESIA.

6. FERNANDEZ UNDERTOOK TO INFORM HIS GOVERNMENT OF OUR VIEWS AND TO KEEP IN TOUCH ABOUT ANY FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS IN RESPECT OF A POSSIBLE HEADS OF GOVERNMENT MEETING IN LONDON.

CARRINGTON

FILES

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| RHOD D | OID |
| OADS | NEWS D |
| NAD | PS |
| MED | PS/SIR I GILMOUR |
| PUSD | PS/MR LUCE |
| PLANNING STAFF | PS/MR RIDLEY |
| ES & SD | PS/MR HURD |
| NENAD | PS/MR MARTEN |
| CCD | PS/PUS |
| FRD | SIR D MAITLAND |
| EID (E) | |
| UND | MR HANNAY |
| LEGAL ADVISERS | LORD N G LENNOX |
| (MR FREELAND) | MISS BROWN |
| (MR FIFOOT) | MR DAY |
| ECON D | MR FERGUSSON |
| PCD | MR ASPIN |
| DEF D | MR MILLS |
| IPD | |

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION
RHODESIA POLICY

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CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London S.W.1

14 January 1980

Prime Minister

A reply to President Tolbert is at A.

Dear Michael,

Ph 15/1

Rhodesia

The Prime Minister has recently received messages from the Commonwealth Secretary General and the Presidents of Tanzania (writing also on behalf of the Front Line States) and of Liberia (as OAU Chairman) about the implementation of the settlement in Rhodesia. Copies are enclosed for ease of reference.

B. The reply to Mr Ramphal has been approved by the Lord Privy Seal and refers to a letter sent by Mr Luce to Mr Ramphal. A copy of this letter, in which Mr Luce answers a letter from Mr Ramphal to Lord Carrington, is enclosed. The Prime Minister may also wish to send Mr Ramphal a copy of her reply to President Nyerere.

C. The reply to President Nyerere, which has been approved by Mr Luce, is intended to provide a detailed rebuttal of points which Nyerere made both in his letter to Mrs Thatcher and in public following the Front Line States meeting at Beira. We recommend that our posts in the Front Line capitals should be authorised to draw on the Prime Minister's reply, at their discretion, with the Governments concerned; and that other posts might be similarly instructed.

yours ever

Roderic Lyne

(R M J Lyne)
Private Secretary

M O'D B Alexander Esq
10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL

File No.
Department Rhodesia Dept
Drafted by CD Powell
(Block Capitals)
Tel. Extn.

OUTWARD **A**
TELEGRAM

| |
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| Security Classification CONFIDENTIAL |
| Precedence IMMEDIATE |
| DESKBYZ |

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| FOR COMMS. DEPT. USE | Despatched (Date) (Time)Z | POSTBYZ |
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PREAMBLE

(Time of Origin) Z (G.M.T.) (Restrictive Prefix)
(Security Class.) CONFIDENTIAL (Caveat/
Privacy marking)
(Codeword) (Deskby) Z

TO IMMEDIATE MONROVIA Tel. No. of
(precedence) (post)

AND TO (precedence/post)

AND SAVING TO

REPEATED TO (for info) IMMEDIATE: SALISBURY; LUSAKA; MAPUTO; GABORONE;
DAR ES SALAAM; LAGOS; WASHINGTON; UKMIS NEW YORK

SAVING TO (for info)

Distribution: -
Rhodesia Policy

[TEXT]

Your telegram no 4: Message from President Tolbert.

1. Please pass the following reply from the Prime Minister to President Tolbert.

"Dear Mr President,

Thank you for your message about Rhodesia, which I have considered very carefully, ~~what you say~~

During the Constitutional Conference, Lord Carrington gave an assurance that there would be no external intervention or involvement in Rhodesia under the Governor.

Copies to: -

Governor's Representative
Foreign Secretary
House of Commons
and indeed with neighbouring

~~For the record, I do not believe~~ *we don't believe*

~~I do not agree~~ that the presence of a South African contingent to guard ^{on the border,} Beitbridge constitutes intervention. The force is small and its presence ^{solely} ~~is~~ uniquely ~~placed~~ for the protection of the bridge, which, as you know, is of vital importance to the economies of Rhodesia and of neighbouring countries. The bridge is half South African property. Damage to it would have very serious consequences to several countries in the region. There is a team from the Commonwealth Monitoring Force present at Beitbridge and I am satisfied that this gives us sufficient assurance that the role of the South African contingent there will be limited to the protection of the bridge. I can also assure you that the Governor will keep the need for ^{this special} ~~such~~ measures of protection under review. In the light of these facts, I hope that you will agree that an exceptional measure to protect a vital feature on the border between Rhodesia and South Africa does not amount to external involvement in Rhodesia.

I share your desire to see the Agreements negotiated at Lancaster House successfully implemented. I am sure that you will agree that remarkable progress ^{has been}

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

CONFIDENTIAL

has been made. But it is essential that all parties should comply ~~strictly~~ with the terms of the Agreements which have been signed; and I ~~must~~ in this respect ^{was} draw ~~very concerned about~~ your attention to the continuing and serious breaches of the ceasefire which have been committed, mostly by Zanla forces. Their activities are not compatible either with the ceasefire agreement itself or with the undertaking signed by all the delegations at Lancaster House to renounce the use of force and to campaign without intimidation. I hope you will feel able to urge on those concerned the need to abide ~~scrupulously~~ by the ~~terms of the~~ agreements.

I hope that you will keep me closely in touch with your views, which I value greatly. Your cooperation and advice was a major contribution to the success of the Conference. May I wish you, also, Mr President, a very happy and prosperous New Year.

Yours sincerely

Margaret Thatcher "

File No.....

Department RHODEISA

Drafted by
Block Capitals) C. Powell

Tel. Extn. 233-3607

OUTWARD

TELEGRAM

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|---|
| Security Classification CONFIDENTIAL |
| Precedence IMMEDIATE |
| DESKBYZ |

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| FOR COMMS. DEPT. USE | Despatched | (Date) | POSTBY |
| | | (Time)Z |Z |

PREAMBLE

(Time of Origin) Z (G.M.T.) (Restrictive Prefix)

(Security Class.)CONFIDENTIAL..... (Caveat/ Privacy marking)

(Codeword) (Deskby) Z

TO IMMEDIATE DAR ES SALAAM (precedence) (post) Tel. No.of

AND TO (precedence/post)

AND SAVING TO

REPEATED TO (for info) IMMEDIATE SALISBURY, MAPUTO, GABORONE, LUSAKA,

.....LUANDA, LAGOS, PRETORIA, WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK, ADDIS ABABA

.....NAIROBI, KINGSTON, CANBERRA, MONROVIA, ISLAMABAD (for Secretary of State's party)

SAVING TO (for info)

Distribution:-

Rhodesia Policy

[TEXT]

YOUR TELS NOS 44 AND 45: MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT NYERERE

1. MIFT contains text of the Prime Minister's reply to this message which you should deliver as soon as possible. In any subsequent discussion you should draw further as appropriate on Salisbury tels Nos 152 and 156.

2. Posts in Front Line States and other posts have discretion to draw on the Prime Minister's reply with Governments.

Copies to:-

File No.

Department RHODESIA

Initiated by (Block Capitals) C. POWELL

Tel. Extn. 3607

OUTWARD

TELEGRAM

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|---|
| Security Classification CONFIDENTIAL |
| Precedence IMMEDIATE |
| DESKBYZ |

FOR COMMS. DEPT. USE

Despatched (Date) (Time)Z

POSTBYZ

PREAMBLE

(Time of Origin) Z (G.M.T.) (Restrictive Prefix)

(Security Class.) CONFIDENTIAL (Caveat/ Privacy marking)

(Codeword) (Deskby) Z

TO IMMEDIATE DAR ES SALAAM (precedence) (post) Tel. No. of

AND TO (precedence/post)

AND SAVING TO

REPEATED TO (for info) IMMEDIATE SALISBURY, MAPUTO, GABORONE, LUSAKA, LUANDA, LAGOS, PRETORIA, WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK, ADDIS ABABA, NAIROBI, KINGSTON, CANBERRA, MONROVIA, ISLAMABAD (for Secretary of State's party)

SAVING TO (for info)

Distribution:-

Rhodesia Policy

[TEXT]

MIPT: PRESIDENT NYERERE'S MESSAGE

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF REPLY

"Dear Mr President,

Thank you for your message informing me of the Summit meeting of Front Line States at Beira on 10 January at which developments in Rhodesia were discussed.

I am glad that you have explained your concerns frankly to me, because it gives me an opportunity to deal fully with them. I will try

Before dealing with the individual points which

Copies to:-

A (was) the one with

~~you raise, I must say that I was~~ (disappointed that your letter contained no recognition of the remarkable achievements of the Governor's administration over the past four weeks.

Legality has been restored. The Monitoring Force has been deployed. After many years of serious fighting, military activity has been drastically reduced. Over 20,000 members of the Patriotic Front's forces have reported to Assembly points, where their needs are being met by the Monitoring Force and the British Authorities. The Ceasefire Commission is functioning and good co-operation has been established between the Patriotic Front's military commanders and the Governor's advisers. Cross border military liaison arrangements have been made with the Governments of Mozambique, Zambia and Botswana.

On the political front, restrictions on ZANU and ZAPU were lifted as soon as the Lancaster House agreements were signed. Arrangements for registration of parties and nomination of candidates have been made and a date for the elections set. The Election Commissioner and his staff are supervising preparations for the elections. As you know, Mr Nkomo has returned to Salisbury together with the whole of ZAPU's leadership. Many leading members of ZANU are now also returning to Salisbury.

Put this last

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

Considerable progress has been made towards normalising Rhodesia's relations with neighbours and restoring communications. Zambia and Mozambique have opened military liaison offices in Salisbury. Arrangements have been set in hand for an early start on the return of refugees on a basis agreed with the neighbouring states, the UNHCR and the ICRC. Within Rhodesia, restrictions have been relaxed, an amnesty declared and a large number of detainees released.

I hope that you will give full weight to these remarkable achievements and contrast them with the situation which prevailed a few weeks ago or with that which would have prevailed had we not been able to bring the Constitutional Conference to a successful conclusion. A While problems understandably exist, they need to be seen in relation to what has been achieved.

will try to answer them one by one.
~~I turn now to the various points raised in your letter.~~
We don't believe
~~I do not agree~~ that the presence of a small number of South African troops to guard Beitbridge ^{on the border} is contrary to the assurances which we gave. You will know the ^{is} strategic and economic significance ^{# in the bridge} of the bridge which is half South African property. It is indisputable that a threat to it exists and that damage to the bridge would have very serious consequences. ~~It is also a fact of life~~ that Rhodesia depends for most of its communications and supplies on South Africa. In these circumstances the Governor has concluded that the presence of a small contingent of South African troops to guard the bridge is necessary and justified. ~~He will keep the need under~~ ~~review over the next few weeks.~~ There is a team from the Monitoring Force in the immediate vicinity and this

will provide satisfactory assurance that the South African contingent will be used exclusively for protection of the bridge. There is no question of its interfering in Rhodesia and/or having any influence on the conduct or outcome of the elections. *He will keep the whole matter under review.*

Lord Carrington made clear at the Conference that, in this short period, there would be no purge of the forces of either side. There are South Africans in the Rhodesian forces, together with other nationalities; in the same way there are several nationalities in the Patriotic Front's forces, including some 500 Frelimo forces with ZANLA.

You deal next with the assembly process. The period of seven days was agreed by all the parties to the Constitutional Conference, and embodied in the ceasefire agreement which they signed. ~~The agreement was freely negotiated.~~ The Governor applied this agreement flexibly and many PF groups assembled peacefully during the period immediately after the deadline. Subsequently some 20 outstanding groups of the PF forces have been persuaded to come to the assembly points by the PF commanders and the Monitoring Force. You asked why the Governor has not increased the number of assembly points. The answer is that the accommodation at existing assembly places has proved adequate and the PF have themselves not requested any additional places. Indeed, with the full agreement of the Patriotic Front's commanders, it has been decided to close two assembly places because of the very small numbers present at them.

The ceasefire agreement made clear that any forces which did not assemble by the deadline would be unlawful. I have already explained that the Governor applied the deadline flexibly. However, there have also been a number of small and recalcitrant armed groups who have not obeyed the instructions of their own commanders to comply with the ceasefire agreement. Where armed groups have failed to comply with lawful orders from the Governor and their own commanders incidents have occurred. Fortunately these have been few. In the case of the particular incident which you raised with our High Commissioner, the Patriotic Front's own military commanders have indicated that the armed group concerned had failed to obey their orders.

You also deal with the use of the Rhodesian Security Forces by the Governor. During the Assembly period, the Rhodesian Forces disengaged to avoid contact with the PF forces, and remained in the vicinity of their bases in accordance with the Lancaster House Agreement. During this period the general level of violence and lawlessness greatly increased. Then and subsequently serious breaches of the ceasefire have taken place, in the form of cross-border infiltration of PF forces, failure to assemble and acts of violence and intimidation. The Governor has, as required by the agreements, used the police to deal with these incidents in the first place. He has also made full use of the PF commanders and liaison officers to defuse dangerous situations. The police have, however, not always been able to cope with the task. In these circumstances and to deal with instances of banditry, the Governor has authorised the use of Rhodesian Forces in support of the police. He has

also been compelled on various occasions to deploy forces to the border areas to deal with continuing infiltration of PF forces, in violation of the ceasefire agreements. We are discussing with President Machel and his advisers how we can co-operate to limit this infiltration, which they do not deny is continuing.

The Rhodesian Forces are closely monitored. Allegations that they have breached the ceasefire will be investigated. It was acknowledged at the Lancaster House Conference that the auxiliaries were part of the Rhodesian forces and under their command. They are required to obey the ceasefire in the same way as other forces. Such complaints as have been made against them are being investigated and appropriate action will be taken.

You express concern about alleged restrictions in the way of the return of the Patriotic Front's leaders. It is not the case that obstacles have been put in the way of their return or that they have been prevented from returning on Saturdays and Sundays. As you will know, Mr Nkomo returned at his own choice on Sunday 13 January, when a large rally had been organised in Salisbury. However, the Governor has to take into account the consequences for public order of major public meetings and manifestations such as naturally accompany the return of the leading political figures.

^{Now!} ~~Finally,~~ I must draw ~~to~~ your attention ^{to} the very real danger ~~to the full implementation of the settlement~~ which arise from the continuing breaches of the ceasefire agreement by ZANLA forces. Infiltration of ZANLA forces has continued on a large scale since the agreements came into force. Other ZANLA forces have stayed outside the assembly process, and there is evidence of armed intimidation of people in rural areas. Well over

three-quarters of the incidents reported during and since the assembly process have been attributable to ZANLA. At the same time, the Voice of Zimbabwe has continued to broadcast inflammatory material, including attacks on "British colonial troops"; and ZANU continue to detain 70 leading members of their own movement who have petitioned us to secure their release so that they can take part in the elections. ^{N.P.} At Lusaka it was agreed that the responsibility for carrying through a resolution of the problem of Rhodesia fell to Britain. We have taken on that difficult responsibility. ^{A-A} I ^{also hope that} look to you and your colleagues among the Front Line States ^{will} to do everything in your power to ensure that ZANU and its forces comply ~~strictly~~ with the terms of the agreements signed at ~~the Lancaster House~~ ^{the end of the Constitutional Conference}.

I shall ask Sir Peter Moon to continue to keep in close touch with you and your advisers, to keep you informed of progress in Salisbury.

Please don't hesitate to contact me if you feel concerned. We have love is in, we cannot faller now.

B

DRAFT: minute/letter/teleletter/despatch/note

TYPE: Draft/Final 1+

FROM:

Reference

Prime Minister

DEPARTMENT:

TEL. NO:

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

TO: His Excellency
Mr Shridath Ramphal
The Commonwealth Secretary-General

Your Reference

- Top Secret
- Secret
- Confidential
- Restricted
- Unclassified

Copies to:

PRIVACY MARKING

SUBJECT:

.....In Confidence

Thank you for your letter of 12 January, expressing concern at developments in Rhodesia.

CAVEAT.....

~~In general~~, and ^{generally} as you acknowledge, the ceasefire process has been remarkably successful. However, the Governor has had to use the Rhodesian forces in specific cases to deal with breaches of ceasefire when the efforts of the PF's own commanders and of the police have been unable to do so. Fortunately, despite continuing and serious breaches of the ceasefire agreement, almost all of which have been caused by ZANLA forces, it has been possible to avoid more than a few isolated incidents. In the one case to which you refer, the group concerned failed to accept the orders of their own commanders and were in breach of the ceasefire. The Patriotic Front military commanders accept that incidents caused by dissident elements have to be dealt with. A number of complaints against the auxiliaries are being investigated and, where necessary, will be dealt with appropriately. But I ~~believe~~ ^{believe} ~~must underline once more~~ that the greatest threat to the stability of the ceasefire comes from continuing

Enclosures—flag(s).....

breaches of it by ZANLA forces. There has been large scale infiltration by ZANLA into Rhodesia since the ceasefire came into effect and a proportion of ZANLA's forces have remained outside the assembly process. It is essential that action be taken to correct this, and I hope that you will use your influence to this end.

I know that Richard Luce is replying to your letter to Peter Carrington regarding the South African contingent at Beitbridge. The assurance which we gave was that there would be no external involvement in Rhodesia under the Governor. ^{We don't do that} ~~I cannot~~ accept that the presence of a small South African contingent on the border to guard Beitbridge, whose strategic and economic importance is clear, constitutes external involvement. ~~[There are, as you will know, some 500 Frelimo soldiers with the Patriotic Front forces.]~~ The fact is that Rhodesia depends on South Africa for most of its communications and supplies, ~~and~~ the bridge is vital to this. It is also half South Africa's property. In the circumstances the Governor sees the presence of a small South African contingent to defend it as necessary, though he will keep the need under review. There is a team of the Monitoring Force in the immediate vicinity and their presence will give adequate assurance that the South African contingent restricts itself to defence of the bridge.

^{have written} I ~~am writing~~ in greater detail to President Nyerere on some of the issues ^{of which he has raised} which he has raised and shall ~~arrange~~ ^{with great care} ~~for you to receive~~ a copy of my reply. In the meantime I hope you will bear in mind the remarkable achievements of the Governor's administration over the past four weeks: the positive side needs to be stressed if the difficulties are to be kept in proportion.

enclose

[MEDIA: POLICY: ADVANCE COPIES]

30

PS
PS/SIR I GILMOUR
PS/MR LUCE
PS/PUS
~~SIR D MAITLAND~~
MR DAY
LORD N G LENNOX
MR ASPIN

PS/NO 10 DOWNING STREET

SIR R ARMSTRONG)
MR R L WADE GERY)
MR P H LAYEY) CABINET
MR GOULTY) OFFICE
MR P J POWLER)
DIO)

.....
HD/REOD DEPT (4)

HD/C AF D
HD/S AF D

HD/PUSD (2)

HD/NEWS DEPT
HE/MAD

MR FREELAND LEGAL ADVISER RMK200A
MR FIFOOT LEGAL ADVISER RM K164

IMMEDIATE

Mr. Laye
Draft reply a.s.p.

W. Miller
10/1

✓ FM MONROVIA 101530Z JAN 80.

URGENT
TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 4 OF 10 JANUARY

IMMEDIATE

INFO IMMEDIATE SALISBURY

FOLLOWING FOR PRIME MINISTER FROM PRESIDENT TOLBERT.

BEGINS

"I HAVE RECEIVED WITH GREAT CONCERN NEWS REPORT OF THE CONTINUED PRESENCE OF SOUTH AFRICAN TROOPS IN ZIMBABWE. YOU WILL RECALL, MADAM PRIME MINISTER, THAT DURING THE LANCASTER HOUSE TALKS YOUR GOVERNMENT GAVE ASSURANCES THAT UPON THE ARRIVAL OF LORD SOAMES IN ZIMBABWE ALL FOREIGN TROOPS INCLUDING SOUTH AFRICAN TROOPS WOULD BE IMMEDIATELY WITHDRAWN. WE CANNOT FORGET THAT THE QUESTION OF THE PRESENCE OF SOUTH AFRICAN TROOPS IN ZIMBABWE WAS AN ISSUE OF GRAVE CONCERN DURING THE TALKS AND BECAUSE OF THE ASSURANCES GIVEN US BY YOUR GOVERNMENT WE IN TURN REASSURED THE LEADERS OF THE PATRIOTIC FRONT THAT SOUTH AFRICAN TROOPS IN ZIMBABWE WOULD BE WITHDRAWN IMMEDIATELY UPON THE ARRIVAL OF THE BRITISH GOVERNOR IN SALISBURY.

FRONT THAT SOUTH AFRICAN TROOPS IN ZIMBABWE WOULD BE WITHDRAWN IMMEDIATELY UPON THE ARRIVAL OF THE BRITISH GOVERNOR IN SALISBURY. I AM SURE YOU WILL AGREE WITH ME THAT REPORTS OF THE CONTINUED PRESENCE OF SOUTH AFRICAN TROOPS IN ZIMBABWE, WOULD HAVE THE MOST UNFORTUNATE EFFECT OF ERODING CONFIDENCE IN THE LANCASTER HOUSE AGREEMENT AND WOULD ADVERSELY AFFECT THE PROCESS LEADING TO INDEPENDENCE WITH GENUINE MAJORITY RULE IN ZIMBABWE. I THEREFORE IMPLORE YOU, MADAM PRIME MINISTER, TO TAKE EFFECTIVE MEASURES AS WOULD ENSURE THE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL SOUTH AFRICAN TROOPS FROM ZIMBABWE IN ORDER THAT THE AGREEMENT SO PAINSTAKINGLY NEGOTIATED AND CONCLUDED IN LONDON MIGHT BE SUCCESSFULLY IMPLEMENTED. IN CONVEYING OUR VERY BEST WISHES FOR A HAPPY AND PROSPEROUS NEW YEAR FOR YOU AND YOUR FAMILY, MADAM PRIME MINISTER, PLEASE ACCEPT THE RENEWED ASSURANCES OF MY HIGHEST CONSIDERATION AND ESTEEM.

SINCERELY

W R TOLBERT JR

PRESIDENT OF LIBERIA AND CURRENT
CHAIRMAN OF THE ORGANISATION OF
AFRICAN UNITY

IMMEDIATE

ENDS

H. I. GILMOUR
PS/PS
SIR D. LAITLAND
MR DAY
LORD N. G. LENNOX
MR ASPIN

PS/NO 10 DOWNING STREET

SIR R. ARMSTRONG)
MR R. L. WADE CERY)
MR P. H. HAXEY) CABINET
MR GOULTY) OFFICE
MR P. J. FOWLER)
DIO)

..H. I. GILMOUR..

HD/RHOD DEPT (4)

HD/C AF D
HD/S AF D

HD/PUSE (2)

HD/NEWS DEPT
HE/WAD

MR FREELAND LEGAL ADVISER RMK200A
MR FIFOOT LEGAL ADVISER RM K164
RESIDENT CLERK

Deskby 131700Z

CONFIDENTIAL

DESKBY 131700Z FCO AND SALISBURY
FM DAR ES SALAAM 131515Z
TO IMMEDIATE DESKBY 131700Z FCO TELNO 45 OF 13 JANUARY
AND TO IMMEDIATE DESKBY 131700Z SALISBURY
AND INFO IMMEDIATE TO MAPUTO GABORONE LUSAKA LUANDA
LAGOS PRETORIA WASHINGTON UKMIS NEW YORK ADDIS ABABA CANBERRA
NAIROBI KINGSTON

MY IPT

RHODESIA:

FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF PRESIDENT NYERERE'S MESSAGE:

DEAR MRS THATCHER,

AS YOU WILL HAVE HEARD, THERE WAS A FRONT-LINE STATES SUMMIT
MEETING AT BEIRA ON 12TH JANUARY. WE WERE DISCUSSING DEVELOPMENTS
IN RHODESIA SINCE THE ARRIVAL IN SALISBURY OF THE BRITISH GOVERNOR,
AND IN PARTICULAR A SERIES OF ACTIONS BY, OR WITH THE ENDORSEMENT
OF, THE BRITISH AUTHORITIES THERE WHICH SEEM
TO US TO BE IN BREACH OF THE LETTER AND THE SPIRIT OF THE
LANCASTER HOUSE AGREEMENT.

WE HOPE THAT WHILE EACH GOVERNMENT MAY WISH TO MAKE A DIRECT

RECOGNISED THAT WHILE EACH GOVERNMENT MAY WISH TO TAKE A DIRECT APPROACH TO THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT, I SHOULD ALSO WRITE TO TELL YOU ON BEHALF OF ALL THE FIVE STATES BECAUSE THE LANCASTER HOUSE AGREEMENT FOLLOWED FROM THE DISCUSSIONS AND AGREEMENT LUSAKA IN WHICH YOU WERE PERSONALLY INVOLVED. INDEED IT WAS PARTLY THE LUSAKA DISCUSSIONS, AND YOUR OWN COMMITMENT TO THE AGREEMENT REACHED THERE, WHICH GAVE US CONFIDENCE THAT ANY AGREEMENT REACHED IN LONDON WOULD BE CARRIED OUT HONOURABLY BY BRITAIN.

IN PARTICULAR, MY COLLEAGUES AND I CONSIDERED AND WISH TO PROTEST ABOUT THE FOLLOWING BRITISH ACTIONS WHICH ARE A BREACH OF THE LETTER AND THE SPIRIT OF THE LANCASTER HOUSE AGREEMENT.

1. THE PRESENCE OF SOUTH AFRICAN TROOPS IN RHODESIA, CONTRARY TO ASSURANCES GIVEN IN LONDON, AND SINCE REPEATED IN A PRINTED INTERVIEW GIVEN BY LORD CARRINGTON, THAT SOUTH AFRICAN TROOPS ARE 'GUARDING BEIT BRIDGE' IS NOW ADMITTED BY THE BRITISH GOVERNOR, WHO SAYS HE HAS AUTHORISED THIS INTERVENTION. WE BELIEVE THAT THERE ARE OTHER SOUTH AFRICAN TROOPS ELSEWHERE IN THE TERRITORY; THIS IS ALSO IMPLIED BY SOME OF THE REPORTED STATEMENTS OF THE SOUTH AFRICANS THEMSELVES.

2. WHEN THE PATRIOTIC FRONT LEADERS WERE PROVED TO BE CORRECT IN THEIR STATEMENTS THAT "THE SEVEN DAYS FOR THE ASSEMBLY OF THEIR FORCES WAS TOO SHORT", AND THE NUMBER OF ASSEMBLY POINTS INADEQUATE BECAUSE THEY HAD MORE THAN THE 10000 TROOPS ESTIMATED BY THE BRITISH, THE GOVERNOR FAILED TO ACT ACCORDING TO THE ASSURANCES GIVEN IN LONDON.

2. HE DID NOT INCREASE THE NUMBER OF ASSEMBLY POINTS; NOR DID HE ACT WITH 'COMMON SENSE' AND IN A SPIRIT CONDUCTIVE TO THE SUCCESS OF THE CEASE FIRE AND THE BUILD-UP TO THE ELECTIONS. WHEN SOME THOUSANDS OF PATRIOTIC FRONT SOLDIERS WERE STILL MOVING TO THE AGREED ASSEMBLY POINTS AFTER THE DEAD-LINE

3. THE GOVERNOR RESPONDED BY DECLARING AN AMNESTY (LAST WORD IN QUOTES) ON CONDITION THAT THEY SURRENDERED THEIR WEAPONS AS IF THEY WERE REBELS GRACIOUSLY BEING PARDONED. EVEN WORSE, IT NOW APPEARS THAT THE GOVERNOR EXPECTS THEM TO SURRENDER THEIR WEAPONS TO THEIR ENEMIES AND NOT TO THE NEARBY MONITORING FORCES. ALREADY A NUMBER OF FREEDOM FIGHTERS TRYING TO JOIN THEIR ~~FORCES~~ COLLEAGUES IN THE ASSEMBLY POINTS HAVE BEEN SHOT AND KILLED IN COLD BLOOD.

4. DURING THE PERIOD OF ASSEMBLY, THE GOVERNOR TWICE CALLED UPON THE SMITH / MUZOREWA TROOPS TO DEAL WITH WHAT HE ALLEGED WERE SPECIFIC BREACHES OF THE PEACE. WITHIN TWO OR THREE DAYS AFTER THE ~~DEADLINE~~ 'DEADLINE', AND EVEN LESS TIME AFTER HIS 'AMNESTY OFFER', THE GOVERNOR THEN ANNOUNCED THE DEPLOYMENT (LAST WORD IN QUOTES) OF THE SMITH/MUZOREWA TROOPS TO DEAL WITH WHAT WERE

SMITH/MUZOREWA TROOPS TO DEAL WITH ~~THE~~ WITH WHAT ~~WAS~~ WERE
SOMETIMES CALLED 'ARMED GANGS' AND SOMETIMES 'THE ZIMB
PATRIOTIC FRONT TROOPS WHO HAVE NOT REPORTED IN'. THERE
IS APPARENTLY NO SPECIFIC INCIDENT THEY WERE SUPPOSED TO
5. DEAL WITH; THEY ARE BEING USED 'TO KEEP THE PEACE' IN DIRECT
CONTRAVENTION OF THE LANCASTER HOUSE AGREEMENT WHICH SAYS
6. THAT THEY WILL BE CONFINED TO THEIR QUARTERS AT COMPANY LEVEL
THROUGHOUT THE CEASE FIRE PERIOD. IT WAS A GROUP OF THESE
SMITH/MUZOREWA FORCES WHICH KILLED THE PATRIOTIC FRONT SOLD-
IERS WHO WERE GOING TO AN ASSEMBLY POINT. THE GOVERNOR
GOVERNOR IS REPORTED TO HAVE REGRETTED THE DEATHS BUT SAID
THE RHODESIANS WERE 'ACTING WITHIN THEIR RIGHTS' IN THE
MURDERS.

7. 4. THE SALISBURY AUXILIARY FORCES-I.E. ARMED SUPPORTERS OF
BISHOP MUZOREWA- WERE SUPPOSED TO ~~BE~~ HAVE BEEN IN-
CORPORATED INTO THE SALISBURY ARMY AND CONFINED LIKE THEM
TO THEIR QUARTERS IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE CEASE FIRE PROVISIONS
OF THE ~~LO-DON~~ LONDON AGREEMENT. INSTEAD THEY HAVE BEEN
LEFT AT LARGE, AND ARE IN FACT NOW MOVING INTO AND ~~OCCUPYING~~
OCCUPYING THE AREAS LEFT VACANT BY THE PATRIOTIC FRONT FORCES
WHEN THESE MOVED TO THE ASSEMBLY POINTS IN ACCORDANCE
WITH THAT AGREEMENT. THESE
AUXILIARY FORCES ARE NOW TERRORISING AND INTIMIDATING THE PEOPLE
OF THOSE AREAS. FURTHER, THE PATRIOTIC FRONT FORCES IN THE ASSEMBLY
POINTS ARE THEMSELVES BEING GRADUALLY ENCIRCLED BY THE FORCES OF
THEIR RACIST ENEMIES; THEIR FEARS OF SUCH A THING HAPPENING WERE
REJECTED IN LONDON ON THE GROUNDS THAT THE SALISBURY FORCES
8. WOULD ALSO BE CONFINED TO BARRACKS AND WOULD BE MONITORED THERE.
NO ACTION HAS BEEN TAKEN BY THE GOVERNOR AGAINST THE AUXILIARY
FORCES OR ANY OTHER OF THE SMITH/MUZOREWA TROOPS; NEITHER THE
PATRIOTIC FRONT FORCES UNDER HIS COMMAND, NOR ANY OTHERS, HAVE BEEN
USED TO RECTIFY THIS SITUATION.

AS FAR AS WE CAN GATHER, AT NO POINT HAS THE GOVERNOR CALLED
UPON THE CEASE FIRE COMMISSION - ON WHICH BOTH SIDES ARE REPRESENTED
- TO CONSIDER A SERIOUS BREACH OF THE CEASE FIRE. YET THE AGREEMENT
LAYS DOWN THIS PROCEDURE, AND SAYS THAT IT IS THE COMMISSION WHICH
SHOULD DEAL WITH SUCH CEASE FIRE VIOLATIONS OR SHOULD ADVISE THE
GOVERNOR HOW TO ACT.

9. 5. ON THE POLITICAL SIDE, BISHOP MUZOREWA WENT BACK TO
SALISBURY TO BEGIN POLITICAL CAMPAIGNING EVEN BEFORE THE CONFERENCE
WAS OVER. THE PATRIOTIC FRONT LEADERS ARE APPARENTLY EXPECTED TO
GET THE GOVERNOR'S PERMISSION TO RETURN TO THEIR HOMELAND. JOSHUA
NYOMO HIMSELF HAS ALREADY BEEN TOLD ONCE TO POSTPONE HIS PLANNED
ARRIVAL, BECAUSE IT WOULD CLASH WITH A RALLY BY THE BISHOP'S

ARRIVAL, BECAUSE IT WOULD CLASH WITH A RALLY BY THE BISHOP'S
SUPPORTERS. SOME ZANU LEADERS HAVE ALSO BEEN TOLD THEY COULD
RETURN AS PLANNED. ONE OF THE PERSONS NOT SO FAR ALLOWED TO RETURN
HOME IS THE ZANU DIRECTOR OF ELECTIONS. WE UNDERSTAND
THAT SOME OF THE PATRIOTIC FRONT LEADERS HAVE NOW BEEN TOLD THAT
THEY WILL NOT BE ALLOWED TO RETURN HOME ON EITHER A SATURDAY OR A
SUNDAY (EXCLAMATION MARK). ONCE AGAIN THIS IS A CLEAR POLITICAL
INTERFERENCE ON THE SIDE OF THE BISHOP AND THE SALISBURY GROUP OF
NATIONALISTS.

6. THERE ARE MANY SIMILAR BUT SMALLER EVIDENCES OF GROSS BIAS BY
THE BRITISH AUTHORITIES IN SALISBURY. BUT THE IMPORTANT THING
IS THAT ALL THESE INCIDENTS MEAN THAT BRITAIN IS ITSELF NOW
DISHONOURING THE AGREEMENT WHICH WAS REACHED UNDER ITS CHAIRMANSHIP
IN LONDON. FURTHER, THE COMMONWEALTH AT LUSAKA, AND THE SECURITY
COUNCIL WHEN IT LIFTED SANCTIONS, ENTRUSTED TO THE BRITISH
GOVERNMENT THE RESPONSIBILITY OF SEEING THAT THE LONDON AGREEMENT WAS
IMPARTIALLY ENFORCED. IT IS NOT BEING SO ENFORCED.

AS I TOLD YOUR HIGH COMMISSIONER ON 11TH JANUARY, AND REPEATED AT
MY LATER PRESS CONFERENCE, THE FRONT LINE STATES AGREED
TO ACCEPT ANY GOVERNMENT ELECTED IN RHODESIA BY FREE AND FAIR
ELECTION. BUT THAT CONDITION HAS ALWAYS EXISTED: IT STILL DOES.
THOSE ELECTIONS CANNOT BE FREE AND FAIR IF SOUTH AFRICAN TROOPS ARE
IN RHODESIA: THE VERY PRESENCE OF SUCH TROOPS IS INTIMIDATION AND AN
INDICATION OF THAT GOVERNMENT'S INTENTIONS IF THE PATRIOTIC FRONT
PARTIES SHOULD WIN THE ELECTION DESPITE EVERYTHING. THE ELECTIONS
WILL NOT BE FREE AND FAIR IF THE SMITH/MUZOREWA FORCES ARE ALLOWED
TO ROAM AT LARGE AND TO INTIMIDATE THE PEOPLE NOW THAT THEY HAVE
BEEN QUOTE DEPLOYED UNQUOTE BY THE GOVERNOR. INDEED, THE WHOLE
PEACE - MAKING EXERCISE WILL BREAK DOWN IF THE PRESENT BIAS
CONTINUES TO BE PRACTICED AND IF THE TERMS OF THE LANCASTER HOUSE
AGREEMENT ARE NOT ENFORCED.

MRS. THATCHER, MY COLLEAGUES AND I CANNOT BELIEVE THAT YOU ARE
YOURSELF A PARTY TO ANY OF THE ACTIONS WHICH CALL INTO QUESTION
BRITAIN'S GOOD FAITH SINCE LUSAKA. LORD CARRINGTON AND
HIS DEPUTY ARE, I KNOW, BOTH OUT OF BRITAIN ON OTHER BUSINESS,
WHICH ALSO PREOCCUPIED THEM BEFORE THEY LEFT. IT MAY BE, THEREFORE,
THAT THESE MATTERS - IMPORTANT AS THEY ARE - ESCAPED THEIR ATTENTION
, AND THAT YOU YOURSELF HAVE THEREFORE BEEN LEFT IN IGNORANCE OF
THE GRAVE DANGER WHICH EXISTS CONSEQUENT TO THE DISHONOURING OF THE
LONDON AGREEMENT. I AM NOW APPEALING TO YOU TO GIVE THIS MATTER
YOUR PERSONAL ATTENTION SO AS TO SAVE THE OPPORTUNITY FOR PEACE IN
SOUTHERN AFRICA WHICH YOUR OWN ACTIONS CREATED.

YOURS SINCERELY,

YOUR PERSONAL ATTENTION SO AS TO SAVE THE OPPORTUNITY FOR PEACE IN
SOUTHERN AFRICA WHICH YOUR OWN ACTIONS CREATED.

YOURS SINCERELY,
JKN

ENDS

(Sent also to Capetown)

MOON

CRRT. POINT 5 THIRD SHOULD BEPOLITICAL....

NNNN

OFFICE OF THE COMMONWEALTH SECRETARY-GENERAL
NORFOLK HOUSE · PALL MALL · LONDON SW1Y 5HX

Mr Powell (Rhodesia Dept)

No. 10 have requested advice today.
Grateful for a draft.

12 January 1980

✓ dc M
PS/LP
PS/Mr Lule
PS/PUS
Mr Day
RCD
News &

14/1

My dear Prime Minister,

I am writing out of deep concern. The prize of peace and a democratic solution in Rhodesia is close at hand and your contribution to it has been monumental. But despite major achievements and a level of success with the ceasefire that exceeds even the most optimistic forecasts, there is now a grave and present danger of its collapse, or of even worse disasters.

Two factors above all others are contributing to this. First, a situation in which the use of the Governor's 'reserve' power to call on either the Patriotic Front or Rhodesian forces to aid the civil power has produced a result that is widely understood as allowing the latter, including the highly politically partisan 'auxiliaries' to be 'at large'. The report that a Rhodesian air force strike had actually been ordered against a small number of Patriotic Front forces not yet assembled, and yesterday's killing of others, are clearly not in the spirit of the Lancaster House agreements and understandings. They only fuel the contention that the implementation of the ceasefire and the administration of the transition is not even-handed. It is in this latter area of loss of confidence that, perhaps, the greatest threat to success lies.

The second factor of danger is the continued presence of South African forces in Rhodesia despite the clearest assurances to the contrary given by the British government to the Patriotic Front - assurances which were critical to securing agreement to the ceasefire proposals and, therefore, to the Lancaster House agreements in general. As you know, they were assurances I helped to convince the Patriotic Front leaders they could accept as a sufficient guarantee of implementation. But my personal embarrassment is as nothing compared with the sense of outrage their open breach has predictably produced in Africa. It adds further


.....2

The Rt. Hon. Margaret Thatcher M. P.
Prime Minister of Britain
Prime Minister's Office
No. 10, Downing Street
London S. W. 1


pressure to the strain on confidence that I referred to earlier, quite apart from the spectre of South African 'intervention' that it inevitably raises.

I know, of course, how difficult is the Governor's role; but it will become altogether untenable unless we speedily improve the situation. I have not been pessimistic in the past. I ask you to believe that I write now only because I sense massive dangers. The Commonwealth, the Front Line states in particular, want to help. The story since Lusaka has been one of steady achievement through collective Commonwealth effort - achievement which would not have been possible without such teamwork. We could fail even now if we fail to hold the team together. I appeal for your personal help to sustain it.

Most Sincerely,



Shridath S. Ramphal



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

From the Parliamentary Under Secretary of State
Richard Luce MP

14 January 1980

In the absence of Peter Carrington and Ian Gilmour abroad, I have been asked to reply to your letters of 8 and 9 January about the presence of South African forces at Beitbridge. The Government take careful note of the concern felt by members of the Commonwealth Committee on Southern Africa on this, and Ian Gilmour and I should be happy to discuss it further with you.

We are all agreed that it is of the utmost importance that there should be no external interference in Rhodesia if the conditions for free and fair elections are to be created. This was the objective of Peter Carrington's assurance which you quote, that there would be no external involvement in Rhodesia under the British Governor. The assurance remains valid.

The Governor has looked very carefully at the position on the ground in the light of the situation he inherited and of the response to the Ceasefire Agreement. As you know, the bridge, which is shared property between Rhodesia and South Africa, is vital to the economies of Rhodesia, South Africa and to other countries. Damage to it would have very serious consequences in the region. The South African contingent which we have agreed should guard it is small and is present uniquely for the protection of the bridge. There is no question of this contingent being used elsewhere in Rhodesia or of it being able to intervene in the internal affairs of the country. There is moreover a team from the Monitoring Force nearby and I am satisfied that this gives us sufficient assurance that the role of the South African forces there will be limited to the protection of the bridge. We do not therefore accept that the presence of a small South African contingent to guard Beitbridge amounts to external involvement in Rhodesia in a way which would prejudice

HE Mr Shridath S Ramphal
Commonwealth Secretary General
Marlborough House
Pall Mall
London SW1Y 5HX



conditions for elections. The Governor will however keep the need for this special measure of protection under review.

I should also like to draw your attention to the serious threat to the Lancaster House Agreements which is presented by continuing breaches of the ceasefire on the part of some Patriotic Front (and particularly Zanla) forces. These have included continued cross-border movement, refusal to move to assembly points, acts of violence and intimidation of the local population. These acts are in violation of the Agreements signed at Lancaster House. The Governor has applied the Agreement flexibly to allow the fullest possible assembly of Patriotic Front forces and has made use of the Ceasefire Commission and Patriotic Front commanders to deal with breaches of the ceasefire.

The activities I have described are not consistent with the undertakings, to which all parties at the Conference subscribed, to renounce the use of force for political ends and to campaign peacefully and without intimidation, and make it difficult for free political activity to take place. I hope that you and the Commonwealth Governments concerned will use your influence to secure the earliest possible end to these continuing violations of the Lancaster House Agreements.

15 JAN 1980





Rhodesia
file 16

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

14 January 1980

I am replying on the Prime Minister's behalf to your letter to her of 11 January enclosing a message to the Prime Minister from President Tolbert. President Tolbert's message has, of course, been brought to the Prime Minister's immediate attention.

M. O'D. B. ALEXANDER

His Excellency
Mr. Francis A. Dennis.

R



Chandler
File 16

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

14 January 1980

I am replying on the Prime Minister's behalf to your letter to her of 11 January enclosing a message from your Prime Minister. Mr. Manley's message has, of course, been brought to the Prime Minister's immediate attention. She was most grateful to have it.

M. O'D. B. ALEXANDER

His Excellency
Mr. Ernest G. Peart, C.D.

2

X-28

IMMEDIATE

[RHODESIA: POLICY: ADVANCE COPIES]

PS
PS/SIR I GILMOUR
PS/MR LUCE
PS/PUS
~~SIR D WATLAND~~
MR DAY
LORD H G LENNOX
MR ASPIN

PS/NO 10 DOWNING STREET ✓

SIR R ARMSTRONG)
MR R L WADE GERY)
MR P M MAXEY) CABINET
MR GOULTY) OFFICE
MR P J FOWLER)
DIO)

.....

HD/RHOD DEPT (4)

HD/C AF D
HD/S AF D

HD/PUSD (2)

HD/NEWS DEPT
HE/WAD

MR FREELAND LEGAL ADVISER RMK200A
MR FIFOOT LEGAL ADVISER RM K164

GPS 140
FM MAPUTO 140800Z JAN 80
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 42 OF 14 JANUARY

YOUR TELNO 22 TO CANBERRA; RHODESIA

1. IT IS TRUE THAT MACHEL HAS ONCE AGAIN SHOWN HIMSELF MORE MODERATE AND FRAGMATIC THAN HIS FLS COLLEAGUES. BUT IT GIVES AN OVER-OPTIMISTIC IMPRESSION OF HIS VIEWS TO SAY THAT HE DID NOT "CRITICISE OUR HANDLING OF THE CEASE-FIRE", THOUGH CONSTRUCTIVE AND CRITICAL OF ZANU TACTICS, HE WAS ALSO CRITICAL OF OUR USE OF RHODESIAN FORCES TO DEAL WITH CEASE-FIRE BREACHES.

2. I ALSO THINK THAT WE SHOULD NOT READ TOO MUCH INTO HIS FAILURE TO MENTION SOUTH AFRICAN TROOPS ON THIS OCCASION. WHILE IT IS SIGNIFICANT THAT HE SHOULD NOT HAVE RAISED IT ON THIS OCCASION (LEAVING IT TO NYERERE) WE SHOULD NOT FORGET THAT THE MOZAMBICANS ALSO ARE CONCERNED WITH THIS ISSUE. THE MINISTER OF DEFENCE HAS PRESSED ME ON IT (MY TELNO 47 TO SALISBURY) AND MACHEL HAS RAISED IT BEFORE BOTH IN PUBLIC (MY TELNO 71) AND PRIVATELY WITH ME AND THE US AMBASSADOR.

PAPADPOULOS

CONFIDENTIAL

GPS 620

CONFIDENTIAL

FM MAPUTO 140543Z JANUARY 80

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 41 OF 14 JANUARY

INFO IMMEDIATE SALISBURY PRETORIA LUSAKA LAGOS DAR ES SALAAM
WASHINGTON

YOUR TELNO 17: MUGABE'S LETTER TO THE P.M.

1. IN VIEW OF YOUR PARA 3 I DECIDED TO MOVE QUICKLY AND, WITH EVETTS, I SAW MUGABE YESTERDAY AFTERNOON. HE WAS ACCOMPANIED BY MUZENDA. I SPOKE AS INSTRUCTED AND LEFT MY FAIRLY FULL SPEAKING NOTES.
2. ON THE PRESENCE OF SOUTH AFRICAN TROOPS, MUGABE CLAIMED THAT SOME THREE BATTALIONS HAD MOVED INTO RHODESIA BEFORE THE LONDON AGREEMENTS WERE CONCLUDED. THE FACT THAT WE HAVE GIVEN NO NEWS OF THEIR DEPARTURE PROVED THAT THEY ARE STILL THERE HAVING MERGED WITH RHODESIAN UNITS THOUGH STILL CAPABLE OF DETECTION. NO ONE WAS NAIVE ENOUGH TO BELIEVE THAT THEY WERE JUST INDIVIDUALS. I REPEATED THAT THE ONLY SOUTH AFRICAN MILITARY CONTINGENT WAS THE SMALL ONE AT BEIT BRIDGE. THE GOVERNOR WAS NOT RESPONSIBLE FOR WHAT MAY HAVE HAPPENED BEFORE HE ARRIVED AND WE HAD MADE IT CLEAR THAT WE WOULD NOT EMBARK ON A PRUGE OPERATION. THERE WERE INDIVIDUALS OF VARIOUS NATIONALITIES SERVING WITH THE RHODESIAN FORCES BUT THIS WAS ALSO THE CASE WITH THE PF.
3. MUGABE OBJECTED STRONGLY TO THE USE OF THE POLICE, AND EVEN MORE SO OF RHODESIAN FORCES, TO DEAL WITH OUTSTANDING PF GROUPS. THE AGREEMENTS PROVIDED FOR THIS ONLY IN THE CASE OF SERIOUS BREACHES, NOT OF BONA FIDE GROUPS MAKING THEIR PEACEFUL WAY TO ASSEMBLY POINTS. I SAID THAT THERE HAD INDEED BEEN NUMEROUS SERIOUS BREACHES BY ZANLA. I GAVE EXAMPLES OF CROSS-BORDER ACTIVITY DRAWN FROM SALISBURY TELNO 39 AND POINTED OUT THAT ALL THREE DEADLINES SET BY THE AGREEMENT - 21 AND 28 DECEMBER AND 4 JANUARY - HAD BEEN LARGELY IGNORED BY ZANLA. MUGABE BRUSHED THESE DATES ASIDE AS UNREALISTIC BUT I INSISTED THAT THE OTHER PARTIES TO THE AGREEMENT EXPECTED THEM TO BE HONOURED.

CONFIDENTIAL

/4. BOTH

4. BOTH MUGABE AND MUZENDA OBJECTED PARTICULARLY STRONGLY TO THE BEHAVIOUR OF THE AUXILIARIES WHO, THEY CLAIMED, HAD MOVED INTO AREA VACATED BY THE PF TO INTIMIDATE THE PEOPLE. THE FACT THAT THE GOVERNOR HAD NOT REPORTED A SINGLE CASE OF ILL-DOING BY THE AUXILIARIES SHOWED THAT HE WAS BIASED. I REJECTED THIS AND SAID THAT WE HAD EVIDENCE THAT IT WAS ZANLA WHO WERE GUILTY OF SUCH BEHAVIOUR. THE CEASE-FIRE MACHINERY WAS AVAILABLE TO DEAL WITH COMPLAINTS AGAINST THE AUXILIARIES WHO, THROUGH THEIR MILITARY COMMANDERS, WERE ANSWERABLE TO THE GOVERNOR. WE POINTED OUT THAT COURT ACTION HAD BEEN TAKEN AGAINST UANC SUPPORTERS FOUND GUILTY OF INTIMIDATION.

5. STILL ON THE SUBJECT OF AUXILIARIES, MUZENDA ASKED WHY THEY WERE ALLOWED TO CALL UP RECRUITS AND ENGAGE IN MILITARY TRAINING? WOULD WE ALLOW THE PF TO CARRY OUT MILITARY TRAINING AT THEIR ASSEMBLY POINTS? I SAID THAT I HAD NO INFORMATION ABOUT THIS.

6. MUGABE WAS ADAMANT THAT HE COULD NOT INSTRUCT HIS MEN STILL IN THE FIELD TO SURRENDER THEIR ARMS TO THE POLICE OR THE RHODESIAN FORCES. IF GROUPS PROCEEDING PEACEFULLY TO ASSEMBLY POINTS HAD TO GIVE UP THEIR ARMS THEY COULD ONLY DO SO TO THEIR OWN COMMANDERS. LAWFUL ZANLA FORCES SHOULD BE USED TO DEAL WITH OUTSTANDING ZANLA GROUPS. I POINTED OUT THAT ZANLA COMMANDERS HAD BEEN INVOLVED IN DEFUSING POTENTIALLY DANGEROUS SITUATIONS BUT THAT THERE WAS EVIDENCE THAT SOME ZANLA GROUPS WERE NOT OBEYING ORDERS.

7. ON DETAINEES, MUGABE INITIALLY DENIED THAT ZANU HELD ANY. SOME PEOPLE HAD BROKEN THE RULES BUT THEY HAD BEEN RE-EDUCATED AND RE-INTEGRATED. WHEN I INSISTED THAT WE HAD NAMES OF SOME 70 ZANU DETAINEES MUGABE ADMITTED THAT THERE WERE SOME "CAPTIVES" WHO WOULD BE RELEASED IN DUE COURSE.

8. AS FOR THE VOICE OF ZIMBABWE, HE WONDERED WHAT WAS WRONG WITH PARTY POLITICAL PROPAGANDA. I SAID THAT THE LANGUAGE USED WAS INFLAMMATORY AND HARDLY COMPATIBLE WITH THE SPIRIT OF RECONCILIATION AND PEACEFUL PERSUASION. HE SEEMED TO TAKE THE POINT AND PROMISED TO DO WHAT HE COULD.

9. WE TOUCHED ONLY BRIEFLY ON PAST RECRIMINATIONS ABOUT THE RETURN OF THE ZANU LEADERSHIP. I SAID THAT NOW THAT THE PROCESS HAD BEGUN MUCH OF WHAT WE HAD DISCUSSED COULD BE DEALT WITH DIRECT IN SALISBURY WHERE HE COULD SEE THE GOVERNOR. HE CONFIRMED THAT HE WANTS TO RETURN TO SALISBURY ON 20 JANUARY.

PAPADOPOULOS

FILES

| | |
|----------------|------------------|
| RHOD D | OID |
| OADS | NEWS D |
| NAD | PS |
| MED | PS/SIR I GILMOUR |
| PUSD | PS/MR LUCE |
| PLANNING STAFF | PS/MR RIDLEY |
| ES & SD | PS/MR HURD |
| NENAD | PS/MR MARTEN |
| CCD | PS/PUS |
| FRD | SIR D MAITLAND |
| EID (E) | |
| UND | MR HANNAY |
| LEGAL ADVISERS | LORD N G LENNOX |
| (MR FREELAND) | MISS BROWN |
| (MR FIFOOT) | MR DAY |
| ECON D | MR FERGUSSON |
| PCD | MR ASPIN |
| DEF D | MR MILLS |
| IPD | |

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION
RHODESIA POLICY

[RHODESIA: POLICY: ADVANCE COPIES]

IMMEDIATE

PS/NO 10 DOWNING STREET

PS/SIR I GILMOUR
PS/MR LUCE
PS/PUS
SIR D MAITLAND
MR DAY
LORD N G LENNOX
MR ASPIN

SIR R ARMSTRONG)
MR R L WADE GERY)
MR P M MAXEY) CABINET
MR GOULTY) OFFICE
MR P J FOWLER)
DIO)

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HD/RHOD DEPT (4)

HD/C AF D

HD/S AF D

HD/PUSD (2)

HD/NEWS DEPT

HE/WAD

MR FREELAND LEGAL ADVISER RMK200A

MR FIFOOT LEGAL ADVISER RM K164

RESIDENT CLERK

no

CONFIDENTIAL

FROM SALISBURY 141730Z JAN 80

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 181 OF 14 JANUARY 1980

IMMEDIATE

AND TO PRIORITY LUSAKA, DAR ES SALAAM, MAPUTO, GABORONE, LAGOS, PRETORIA, WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK, CANBERRA, WELLINGTON, SUVA AND NAIROBI.

RHODESIA: SECURITY FORCE AUXILIARIES.

1. THE FOLLOWING MATERIAL IS INTENDED FOR USE IN DEALING WITH QUESTIONS ABOUT THE ROLE OF THE AUXILIARIES SINCE THE SIGNATURE OF THE CEASEFIRE AGREEMENT ON 21 DECEMBER.

BACKGROUND.

2. THE FORMATION OF AUXILIARIES (OTHERWISE KNOWN AS PFUMO REVANHU - "SPEAR OF THE PEOPLE") BEGAN IN THE SECOND QUARTER OF 1978. THE OBJECT AT THAT TIME WAS TO EMPLOY "RETURNED" GUERRILLAS IN THE PROTECTION OF THE RURAL POPULATION IN DESIGNATED AREAS. THEY WERE ORIGINALLY WIDELY REPRESENTED, EVEN IN RHODESIA, AS "PRIVATE

ORIGINALLY WIDELY REPRESENTED, EVEN IN RHODESIA, AS "PRIVATE ARMIES" OF THE INTERNAL PARTIES. BUT THIS CONCEPT RAPIDLY BECAME UNTENABLE. IN LATE 1978 RECRUITING WAS UNDERTAKEN ON A NATIONAL BASIS. THE ORGANISATION WAS ESTABLISHED ALONG MILITARY LINES, AND COMMAND, CONTROL AND ADMINISTRATION WERE TAKEN OVER BY THE ARMY.

3. THE PRESENT ROLE OF THE AUXILIARIES IS ESSENTIALLY THAT OF A HOME GUARD. IN ADDITION TO GUARD DUTIES, AND SOME DEFENSIVE SECURITY PATROLLING (TO REINFORCE THE POLICE), THEIR FUNCTIONS INCLUDE LOW-LEVEL COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT, THE REESTABLISHMENT OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT, ETC. THEY HAVE BEEN USED TO HELP RE-OPEN CATTLE DIPS, LOCAL SCHOOLS AND CLINICS, AND IN ONE AREA AN IRRIGATION PROJECT. WITH THE EXCEPTION OF A FEW MACHINE GUNS, THEIR WEAPONRY IS RESTRICTED TO SMALL ARMS AND LIGHT MORTARS. THEY DO NOT CARRY OUT OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS AND HAVE NO TRANSPORT.

DEPLOYMENT.

4. 74 STATIC "PROTECTION UNITS" OF THE AUXILIARIES (EACH CONSISTING OF 40 MEN) ARE DEPLOYED AT PROTECTED VILLAGES (P.VS). 91 "DETACHMENTS" OF AUXILIARIES (EACH CONSISTING OF 140 MEN) ARE DEPLOYED IN THE MAJOR TTLS.

5. DURING THE ASSEMBLY PROCESS THE AUXILIARIES WERE GIVEN STRICT INSTRUCTIONS TO REMAIN IN THEIR BASES AND NOT TO INTERFERE WITH PF PERSONNEL MOVING TO ASSEMBLY PLACES. IN THE OVER-WHELMING MAJORITY OF CASES THESE INSTRUCTIONS WERE OBEYED, THOUGH THERE WERE A FEW INCIDENTS OF CLASHES. THE ARMY COMMANDERS HAVE ALSO ADMITTED THAT, FOLLOWING THE PERIOD IN WHICH THE PF WERE STAGING "VICTORY MARCHES" AND ENTERING PVS IN ORDER TO CONDUCT POLITICAL MEETINGS ON THEIR WAY TO RV POINTS AND ASSEMBLY PLACES, THE AUXILIARIES REACTED BY STAGING COUNTER-ACTIVITIES IN VARIOUS AREAS.

6. STRICT INSTRUCTIONS WERE SUBSEQUENTLY ISSUED TO THE AUXILIARIES TO OBSERVE THE CEASEFIRE, AND ABOUT THEIR CONDUCT IN GENERAL. THEIR LOCATIONS ARE KNOWN TO THE MONITORING FORCE, AND A DAILY SITUATION REPORT ON THEIR ACTIVITIES HAS NOW BEEN INSTITUTED.

COMPLAINTS ABOUT AUXILIARIES' ACTIVITIES.

7. A NUMBER OF COMPLAINTS HAVE BEEN MADE TO MY STAFF BY THE PF PARTIES AND OTHERS ABOUT MISBEHAVIOUR BY AUXILIARIES DURING THE LAST TWO WEEKS OF 1979. THESE INCLUDED ABOUT A DOZEN INCIDENTS IN WHICH AUXILIARIES WERE ALLEGED TO HAVE STOPPED BUSES AND WARNED PASSENGERS NOT TO ATTEND NON-UANC RALLIES, SOMETIMES ASSAULTING THEM. THESE WERE ALL INVESTIGATED BY MY POLICE ADVISER'S STAFF.

PASSENGERS NOT TO ATTEND NON-UANC RALLIES, SOMETIMES ASSAULTING THEM. THESE WERE ALL INVESTIGATED BY MY POLICE ADVISER'S STAFF, BUT IN NO CASE WAS IT POSSIBLE TO SUSTAIN THE ALLEGATIONS. IN OTHER CASES LAWLESS BEHAVIOUR BY AUXILIARIES HAS BEEN DEALT WITH BY THE COURTS OR THROUGH ORDINARY DISCIPLINARY CHANNELS.

CONCLUSION.

8. THE AUXILIARIES ARE ESSENTIALLY AN UNSOPHISTICATED HOME GUARD FORCE. THEIR DEPLOYMENT TO PVS CAN BE JUSTIFIED AS LONG AS PVS EXIST. THEIR DEPLOYMENT IN THE TTLS IS MORE DIFFICULT TO DEFEND, BUT MUST BE SEEN AGAINST THE BACKGROUND OF LAWLESSNESS AND VIOLENCE WHICH, THOUGH NOW MUCH DIMINISHED, ARE STILL PREVALENT IN SOME PARTS OF THE COUNTRY. THERE IS A FUNDAMENTAL NEED TO RESTORE A SENSE OF SECURITY THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY. WE SEE A REASONABLE PROSPECT OF GETTING A GRIP ON THE CONDUCT OF AUXILIARIES, AND ALSO OF PLAYING UP THEIR DEVELOPMENTAL ROLE (THOUGH WE MUST OBVIOUSLY BEWARE OF CHARGES THAT WE ARE MERELY SEEKING TO IMPROVE THEIR IMAGE). COMPLAINTS OF MISBEHAVIOUR CAN BE AND HAVE BEEN INVESTIGATED BY THE POLICE AND THERE HAVE BEEN RECENT CASES OF AUXILIARIES BEING PUNISHED BY THE COURTS FOR INTIMIDATION. THERE HAVE BEEN NO FORMAL COMPLAINTS SO FAR THAT AUXILIARIES HAVE BREACHED THE CEASEFIRE. IF THERE WERE, THEY WOULD BE INVESTIGATED BY THE CEASEFIRE COMMISSION.

FCO PSE PASS TO ALL

SOAMES

IMMEDIATE

NNNN

ADVANCE COPY
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SIR D MARRAS

MR DA-1

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PP FCO

GR 60

UNCLASSIFIED

FM SALISBURY 141604Z JAN 80

TO ROUTINE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 178 OF 14 JANUARY

PLEASE PASS FOLLOWING FROM GOVERNOR TO PRIME MINISTER

BEGINS

THANK YOU ALL SO MUCH FOR YOUR KIND AND ENCOURAGING MESSAGE AT

THIS TENSE AND PRECARIOUS TIME.

BEST WISHES TO YOU AND ALL OUR COLLEAGUES.

CHRISTOPHER

ENDS

SOAMES

[Handwritten signature]

NNNN



Prime Minister

Mr Day

You may like to see this succinct summary of the present situation. The same analysis is reflected in Lord Soames' telegram in your telegram folder.

RHODESIA

1. In the period during and following the assembly of the Patriotic Front forces, it has been possible to persuade the Rhodesian forces and the police to act sensibly and with restraint in virtually all the difficult and dangerous confrontations which have taken place with elements of the Patriotic Front forces. Phw
-15/1
2. The cease-fire so far has been a remarkable success; but it is fragile and will break down if there is precipitate action by either side.
3. Relations with the Rhodesian administration, and in particular the military commanders, are at present in a very difficult state because:
 - a. they fear that the Patriotic Front will win the elections and that there will then be no future for the white community in Rhodesia;
 - b. they do not believe that we will take any effective action to deal with violations of the Lancaster House agreements by ZANU (Mugabe).
4. On the credit side they are moving towards the conviction that it may be necessary to come to terms with Nkomo; and we may be able to push them into arrangements which amount to some integration of ZIPRA and Rhodesian forces before elections take place.
5. Our relations are further complicated by the question of the South African forces. In immediate terms, there is no need for the South African company at Beitbridge or the three other South African companies to remain. The Rhodesian military commanders, however, regard themselves as responsible for the security of the country. With 21,000 armed guerrillas in the camps - and no guarantee whatever that they will not break out of them before or after the elections - they do not consider they can afford to lose forces which would be essential to helping to contain such a situation. Walls does not believe that if we secured the withdrawal of the South African forces and there was a breakdown of the cease-fire, we would permit them to return (and he is of course right in this).
6. Despite the intense international difficulties, we are working against a very short time-scale (and must seek to remind the Kenyans and others of this). If we go bald-headed for the immediate withdrawal of the South African units, we may bring about a situation in which the Rhodesian military commanders declared a second UDI or precipitated a break-down of the cease-fire. The withdrawal of the monitoring force would lead to an immediate full-scale

/conflict



conflict between the Patriotic Front forces in the camps and the Rhodesian forces. It would, furthermore, be strongly argued that the Patriotic Front forces were under our protection and that we were therefore under some obligation to protect them militarily in the event of a show-down with the Rhodesian forces. If, as is likely, the Patriotic Front forces suffered heavy casualties, the international out-cry would be enormous.

7. This would have to be faced if the Rhodesian military commanders were so stupid as to force such a confrontation on us. But we should avoid so far as possible imperilling what has already been achieved - a pretty effective cease-fire and the return of Nkomo - by ourselves precipitating a confrontation with them. The alternative course is to seek:

- a. to promote an accommodation with Nkomo;
- b. to devote all our efforts to getting as many of the Patriotic Front forces out of the camps before or as soon as possible after the elections;
- c. to contain and reduce the problem of the South African elements in such a way as to enable Ministers to state in Parliament that no South African units are involved (except, for a very limited period, at Beitbridge).

8. An accommodation between Walls and Nkomo is the only way to achieve our objectives of:

- a. a de-escalation of the war; and
- b. a fair measure of international acceptance of the outcome.

9. The immediate withdrawal of the South African contingent at Beitbridge and the three South African companies is not likely to be negotiable. We must, however, aim to achieve:

- a. a clear understanding that the contingent at Beitbridge is there with the Governor's agreement for a very limited period only (up to the elections but not beyond, unless there is a clear demand by the independence government for it to be re-introduced);
- b. the three other companies must be "Rhodesianized" so that Ministers are in a position to state, if asked about them, that this is a Rhodesian battalion and includes South African personnel.

10. In order to secure Rhodesian co-operation over 8. and 9. above, we shall have to convince Walls that we are not prepared to allow ZANU (Mugabe) to get away with cross-border movement, intimidation etc without doing anything about it. To enable us to put pressure on ZANU to comply, but also to resist

/demands



demands for their exclusion from the elections, the Governor will need to promulgate the ordinance giving him the power to take selective action against a party in breach of the Lancaster House agreements.

11. We shall also need to pursue vigorously the question of the ZANU detainees. Since the detainees have made repeated appeals to the Secretary of State personally to secure their release, and all other political leaders have been released, we are in a good position on this "human rights" issue. Tough bargaining over the release of the detainees will get support from all the internal parties - and probably also from ZAPU. We should therefore begin to make it clear that following the arrival of virtually all the ZANU leadership except Mugabe in Salisbury today and tomorrow, the arrival of further ZANU elements will be related to the release of the detainees.

12. At the same time we must increase our efforts to tie Machel into the settlement by exploiting the difference of interest between him and Mugabe, in particular by encouraging the re-establishment of communications (to which Machel attaches great importance) between Rhodesia and Mozambique.

R W Renwick
Rhodesia Department

14 January 1980

cc: Mr Lyne
PS/LPS
PS/Mr Luce
PS/PUS

cc: Michael Alexander



10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

Thank you for your telegram about Rhodesia. I have since received your letter of 10 January.

I fear that there may be some misunderstanding about the nature of the Governor's decision. A statement issued in Salisbury on 6 January said:

"South African forces are present with the Governor's agreement at Beitbridge for the sole purpose of helping to ensure the protection of the bridge which is the essential communications link between South Africa, Rhodesia and Zambia."

As you note in your letter the Government have made it clear that there will be no external intervention in Rhodesia during the period before independence. All that has now been agreed is that a small South African contingent should be stationed at the Rhodesian end of Beitbridge. It will be there uniquely for the defence of the bridge and will remain in the vicinity of it. You will, I know, appreciate the vital importance of Beitbridge to the economies of Rhodesia and of neighbouring countries. There have, unfortunately, been continuing breaches of the cease-fire in the area near the bridge. Damage to it would have very

/serious consequences,

serious consequences, and the Governor judged it essential that adequate measures continue to be taken to ensure its protection. I cannot accept that his decision contradicts any assurances which have been given.

I am sending copies of this letter to the co-signatories of your telegram.

Robert Hughes, Esq., M.P.

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kg. 5
Pm

PRIME MINISTER'S CONVERSATION WITH THE LORD PRIVY SEAL:
1300 HOURS: SUNDAY, 13 JANUARY, 1980

LPS I would have rung before, but I wanted to have a word with Robin Renwick who's just come back.

PM Yes, I gathered he's on his way from one of the telegrams.

LPS Although I, like you, I suspect, am strongly in sympathy with what Peter proposes, Robin thinks that to put it in what's in paragraph 4 - quite as starkly as that - would produce considerable danger of Walls blowing up and refusing to cooperate and God knows what else. So he would favour turning that down.

PM Turning the opening words down?

LPS No no, it's the 3rd sentence of paragraph 4.

PM One moment. 3rd sentence. "This must be" - the one starting there?

LPS Now it's for consideration - we can either send it as it is, and it's up to the Governor to object if he thinks it's impossible to carry out, or we could tone it down a bit. Peter's ringing me between 2 and half past from Riyadh.

PM It doesn't quite answer the Beit Bridge stuff I'm so worried about, because you can't have a bridge over half a river.

PLS I agree. But the thing about Beit Bridge is that it focusses attention on the whole problem.

PM Yes it does. But tell me, can't Walls provide someone for the other end of Beit Bridge?

LPS Well of course he could, but it's just that he's being unreasonable. I mean it's become a sort of psychological issue for him.

PM Well in that case, can we please persuade Walls to provide someone else. I rather gathered from something or other, Ian,

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that there are only 30 at the other end of Beit. Well surely he can provide that.

LPS Well of course he can. But it's this, being so blooded-minded and hysterical.

PM Blooded-minded and hysterical. There's too much at issue Ian. Is there any point in you going out?

LPS Well I don't know. I don't think so. Robin thinks can be dealt with after a bit, but to tackle Walls head-on now might provoke an explosion and a refusal to cooperate. And jeopardise all that's been achieved. As I say, our alternative seems to be either to send the thing as it is, and if Christopher really feels that, he can telegraph back.

PM I doubt whether he will.

LPS Or to tone down the consultation with Peter, tone down the instructions a bit, i.e., so that aiming to get Beit Bridge settled well before the Election but not this week, and getting the action on the rest, not necessarily total removal, but.

PM Ian, I think we've got a problem now. You've seen the letter I've had from Ramphal. You've seen what every other wretched person has said, and it's all on television. We've got a problem now, and the problem is a perfectly simple one. It looks as if we are not honouring Lancaster House. Now we must honour Lancaster House, and that's that. Precisely how it's done is a matter for you and Peter and Robin and Tony Duff and Christopher to work out. But if ever you dishonour any clause of Lancaster House, the whole thing falls.

LPS I agree of course. But technically Beit Bridge dishonours Lancaster House.

PM Well not the other end of it. One end's on their territory. We can't tell them what to do.

LPS But the ones in Rhodesia are dishonouring it.

/ PM

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PM Yes. But that's only 30. Surely they could get 30 people down there.

LPS On any grounds of rationality there's no problem but they're not being rational.

PM This is a matter of persuasion. Surely Tony Duff could persuade him to do that. I mean, there's so much at stake. I myself would have dealt with that end of Beit Bridge first, because that's what they're coming at us about.

LPS But the other is ^{potentially} the/more explosive.

PM I agree. The other is potentially more explosive. But the Beit Bridge is the tricky one at the moment, isn't it. Don't you think we'd better show willing immediately on something?

LPS Show willing.

PM Yes, by removing the South Africans at the Rhodesian end of Beit Bridge.

LPS I'm strongly in favour of that, but as I say, the advice from Robin is that Walls will blow a fit at that.

PM If he's told, yes. If he's asked, specifically?

LPS But I think he might blow up even more if we just did it through the South Africans without telling him.

PM Ah, but I didn't think there was anything like that involved. He would, and he'd say what's going on behind my back? Therefore it is far better, as a matter of trust, to do it with him.

LPS But this I say is what is worrying Robin, that it might make him blow up and say to hell with you, like - I don't know whether you've seen one or two of the telegrams - I think we'd better call the whole thing off. He's behaving like a child in my view. So one can't be certain that he won't behave like a child.

PM There's something very strange. Something must have

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unnerved him very much. I tell you what it is, it's the success of the Patriotic Front when they return.

LPS Yes, but that was bound to happen.

PM Because of the novelty?

LPS Yes. Saying such silly things. Like the situation is worse than it was before the ceasefire, which, you know, at least 10 times better.

PM But Ian, I wouldn't get too worried about these things. Look, I don't half toss off some pretty sharp things, and so does Peter sometimes. No one suggests we mean them.

LPS Well I rather take that view, but he seems to be. So you'll be in favour of sending it as it is, and let Christopher.

PM Just let me have a look at that first sentence. I would say we feel this should be done now. We feel that in the interests of everyone this should be done now.

LPS We feel in the interests of everyone this should be done now.

PM Yes.

LPS As I say, that is my instinct.

PM The greater the delay. You can let it be known that that is my view is well. But never never never put the whole thing in issue for 30 bods.

LPS I quite agree, but unfortunately, as I say, logic doesn't prevail among these people. I think I quite agree.

PM No, but sense might, when he's calmed down, and when he knows that it's a specific request.

SECRET

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LPS Shall I, as Peter's ringing between 2 and.

PM I'm here.

LPS Shall I tell him what you think and hold the telegram till then?

PM Yes I think so. Now the other thing, Ian, I felt was that the message which it was suggested I send to Mugabe was a bit offside. I didn't half turn it down at the beginning, but don't forget - you've seen that, have you? That's the one that would be out in the world press even though it's only oil and can be misconstrued, and I really think we'd better get that absolutely right. What we were doing there was saying everything at Beit Bridge is justified. It's not troops, it's preservational communications links.

LPS Yes, it's both, isn't it?

PM It is, but the preservational communications link really ought to take place with South Africans at one end and Rhodesians at the other. It is perfectly justified to preserve a communications link; not merely perfectly justified, but vital.

LPS Yes, but the troops are there too. You think we went too far?

PM I think it was a bit naive. And I think that it would cause. I think it's far better, in view of what you are going to send today, to say that of course we're absolutely concerned that Lancaster House Agreement must be honoured in full. One end of Beit Bridge is in South African territory; the communications link must be preserved, but we're looking into things at the other end.

LPS Well I'm not sure the message hasn't gone, that's the only thing.

PM Well I don't know; that's why I got on this morning,

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when I got the other 2 telegrams this morning. But for heaven's sake, whatever we are Ian, don't let's be naive. Or deceptive.

LPS The thing is, we've sent a flash telegram to Papadopoulos to find out whether it's gone or not.

PM Yes, well this is why I got onto Tim Lankester this morning to say in view of the other two telegrams I really think that what we've sent to Mugabe won't necessarily stand up, and it must stand up.

LPS Yes, fine.

PM Any Ian, I'm here till I return to No.10.

LPS Well I hope I won't have to trouble you again, but if I do I will.

PM Thank you. 'Bye.

ABJ
Duty Clerk
13.1.

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[RHODESIA: POLICY: ADVANCE COPIES]

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PS
PS/SIR I GILMOUR
PS/MR LUCE
PS/PUS
SIR D MAITLAND
MR DAY
LORD N G LENNOX
MR ASPIN

~~PS/NO 10 DOWNING STREET~~

SIR R ARMSTRONG)
MR R L WADE GERY)
MR P M MAXEY) CABINET
MR GOULTY) OFFICE
MR P J FOWLER)
DIO)

IMMEDIATE

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HD/RHOD DEPT (4)

HD/C AF D

HD/S AF D

HD/PUSD (2)

HD/NEWS DEPT

HE/WAD

MR-FREELAND LEGAL ADVISER RMK200A

MR FIFOOT LEGAL ADVISER RM K164

RESIDENT CLERK

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FROM SALISBURY 131750Z JAN 80
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 159 OF 13 JANUARY 1980.

ADVANCE COPY

INFO IMMEDIATE LUSAKA, DAR ES SALAAM, MAPUTO, CABORONE, LUANDA, PRETORIA, WASHINGTON, LAGOS, UKMIS NEW YORK, CANBERRA, ISLAMABAD (FOR PRIVATE SECRETARY) PRIORITY OTTAWA, WELLINGTON, NAIROBI AND SUVA.

RHODESIA: SITREP 13 JANUARY.

1. IN GENERAL THE CEASEFIRE IS CONTINUING TO HOLD WELL AND THE LEVEL OF VIOLENCE HAS FALLEN SIGNIFICANTLY. IN THE LAST 24 HOURS THERE WERE ONLY 10 SERIOUS INCIDENTS (8 EXCHANGES OF FIRE BETWEEN POLICE OR SECURITY FORCES AND PF UNITS AND 2 LAND MINES) IN THE WHOLE COUNTRY: OF THESE 5 WERE IN THE ZANLA AREA AROUND UNTALI. THERE WAS ONE DEATH: THAT OF AN AFRICAN GIRL KILLED IN CROSSFIRE BETWEEN THE POLICE AND A GROUP OF PF. MANY OF THE VIOLENT INCIDENTS REPORTED BY THE POLICE (IE IN ADDITION TO THE 10 ABOVE) SEEM TO BE CRIMINAL RATHER THAN POLITICAL (EG STOCK THEFT AND ROBBERY), ALTHOUGH THERE HAVE BEEN A NUMBER OF INSTANCES OF POLITICAL INTIMIDATION AND ABDUCTION.

2. THIS MORNING THERE WERE 21,186 PF FORCES IN THE ASSEMBLY POINTS OF WHICH 15,537 WERE ZANLA AND 5649 ZIPRA. OF THE ZANLA FORCES A PROPORTION ARE MUJIBAS (IE YOUNG SEMI-TRAINED AUXILIARIES) BUT IT IS NOT YET POSSIBLE TO ESTABLISH HOW MANY. GROUPS OF PF (THE TOTAL YESTERDAY WAS 180) ARE CONTINUING TO SURFACE AND GIVE THEMSELVES UP EITHER TO THE MONITORING FORCE OR THE POLICE. AFTER BEING DISARMED SOME ARE STILL BEING ADMITTED TO THE ASSEMBLY POINTS BUT THE MAJORITY ARE BEING TAKEN OVER BY THE POLICE UNDER THE TERMS OF THE NORMAL AMNESTY PROGRAMME. TWO ZIPRA GROUPS WHO SURFACED YESTERDAY NEAR LADOL (BETWEEN SALISBURY AND KARIBIA) ARE BELIEVED TO HAVE

2. THIS MORNING THERE WERE 21,166 PF FORCES IN THE ASSEMBLY POINTS OF WHICH 15,537 WERE ZANLA AND 5649 ZIPRA. OF THE ZANLA FORCES A PROPORTION ARE MUJIBAS (IE YOUNG SEMI-TRAINED AUXILIARIES) BUT IT IS NOT YET POSSIBLE TO ESTABLISH HOW MANY. GROUPS OF PF (THE TOTAL YESTERDAY WAS 180) ARE CONTINUING TO SURFACE AND GIVE THEMSELVES UP EITHER TO THE MONITORING FORCE OR THE POLICE. AFTER BEING DISARMED SOME ARE STILL BEING ADMITTED TO THE ASSEMBLY POINTS BUT THE MAJORITY ARE BEING TAKEN OVER BY THE POLICE UNDER THE TERMS OF THE NORMAL AMNESTY PROGRAMME. TWO ZIPRA GROUPS WHO SURFACED YESTERDAY NEAR KAROI (BETWEEN SALISBURY AND KARIBA) ARE BELIEVED TO HAVE BEEN RESPONSIBLE FOR SHOOTING DOWN THE TWO AIR RHODESIA VISCOUNT AIRCRAFT LAST YEAR. THIRTY OF THEM HAVE GIVEN UP THEIR ARMS AND SURRENDERED TO THE POLICE. THE POLICE AND MONITORING FORCE, ASSISTED BY PF LIASON OFFICERS, ARE TRYING TO PERSUADE THE REMAINING 18 TO COME OUT OF THE BUSH AND GIVE THEMSELVES UP.

3. WE BELIEVE THAT OF THE ZIPRA FORCES IN RHODESIA ALL BUT ABOUT 600 HAVE NOW REPORTED TO THE ASSEMBLY AREAS OR SURRENDERED TO THE POLICE. BUT A LARGE NUMBER OF ZANLA (POSSIBLY 2000 OR MORE), MANY OF WHOM ARE HARD-CORE GUERILLAS, HAVE, ON INSTRUCTIONS, STAYED OUT OF THE ASSEMBLY PROCESS AND GONE TO GROUND. THEIR OBJECTIVE IS TO CARRY OUT POLITICAL INTIMIDATION DURING THE ELECTION CAMPAIGN.

FCO PSE PASS TO ALL

SCAMES

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[RHODESIA: POLICY: ADVANCE COPIES]

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PS (16)
PS/SIR I GILMOUR
PS/MR LUCE
PS/PUS
~~SIR D MITCHELL~~
MR DAY
LORD N G LENNOX
MR ASPIN

PS/NO 10 DOWNING STREET

SIR R ARMSTRONG)
MR R L WADE GERY)
MR P M MAXEY) CABINET
MR GOULTY) OFFICE
MR P J FOWLER)
DIO)

MR BUNN

HD/RHOD DEPT (4)

HD/C AF D

HD/S AF D

HD/PUSD (2)

HD/NEWS DEPT

HD/WAD

MR FREELAND LEGAL ADVISER RMK200A

MR FIFOOT LEGAL ADVISER RM K164

RESIDENT CLERK

ADVANCE COPY

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FROM SALISBURY 131605Z JAN 80

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 157 OF 13 JANUARY 1980

INFO IMMEDIATE LUSAKA AND MAPUTO PRIORITY DAR ES SALAAM,
GABORONE, LAGOS, UKMIS NEW YORK, WASHINGTON AND PRETORIA.

RETURN OF PF LEADERS.

1. NKOMO RETURNED TO SALISBURY AT 1240 LOCAL TIME TODAY
ACCOMPANIED BY CHINAMANO AND OTHER SENIOR LEADERS. THERE WERE
NO REPEAT NO DEMONSTRATIONS AT THE AIRPORT. POLICE AND ZAPU
OFFICIALS WERE WHOLLY SUCCESSFUL IN DIVERTING THE ATTENTION OF
NKOMO'S SUPPORTERS TO THE ZAPU RALLY IN HIGHFIELDS, TO WHICH NKOMO
WAS LIFTED BY A MONITORING FORCE PUMA AT 1340.

2. NKOMO SEEMED RELAXED AND PLEASED BY HIS COURTEOUS RECEPTION
BY RHODESIAN OFFICIALS, INCLUDING THE PROVINCIAL POLICE COMMISSIONER,
WHO MET HIM ON THE AIRCRAFT TO EXPLAIN IMMEDIATE ARRANGEMENTS FOR
HIS PERSONAL PROTECTION. HE GAVE A BRIEF PRESS CONFERENCE IN THE
COURSE OF WHICH HE DWELT ON THE NEED FOR A LARGER MONITORING FORCE

2. NKOMO SEEMED RELAXED AND PLEASED BY HIS COURTEOUS RECEPTION BY RHODESIAN OFFICIALS, INCLUDING THE PROVINCIAL POLICE COMMISSIONER, WHO MET HIM ON THE AIRCRAFT TO EXPLAIN IMMEDIATE ARRANGEMENTS FOR HIS PERSONAL PROTECTION. HE GAVE A BRIEF PRESS CONFERENCE IN THE COURSE OF WHICH HE DWELT ON THE NEED FOR A LARGER MONITORING FORCE (AT LEAST 5000) AND DEALT EVASIVELY WITH QUESTIONS ABOUT AN ELECTORAL ALLIANCE WITH ZANU (MUGABE). HE DISMISSED A QUESTION ABOUT ZAPU'S ELECTION PROSPECTS WITH THE WORDS "WE HAVE WON A COUNTRY".

3. NKOMO'S ARRIVAL WAS PRECEDED BY THAT OF ANOTHER ZAPU CHARTER FLIGHT CARRYING SOME 200 YOUNG WOMEN IN UNIFORM DRESSES AND BLACK BERETS. THESE WERE DESCRIBED AS POLICE, IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS OFFICIALS AND PRESENTED A DISTINCTLY PARAMILITARY APPEARANCE. THEIR PRESENCE CAN BE EXPECTED TO DRAW COMPLAINTS FROM THE INTERNAL PARTIES.

4. EDDISON ZVOBGO ARRIVED SHORTLY BEFORE NKOMO ON A SCHEDULED FLIGHT FROM MAPUTO, FOLLOWING NEWS REPORTS THE NIGHT BEFORE THAT HE HAD BEEN ARRESTED IN MOZAMBIQUE. MUNUNGAGWA WAS THERE TO MEET HIM AND LATER TOLD A SENIOR RHODESIAN SPECIAL BRANCH OFFICER THAT HE WOULD BE RECOMMENDING THAT MUGABE SHOULD RETURN TO SALISBURY ON 27 JANUARY PROVIDED SIMILAR ARRANGEMENTS TO THOSE MADE FOR NKOMO COULD BE MADE FOR HIS RECEPTION AT THE AIRPORT AND A SUBSEQUENT RALLY.

FCC PSE PASS TO ALL

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DESKBY 131700Z FCO AND SALISBURY
FM DAR ES SALAAM 131515Z
TO IMMEDIATE DESKBY 131700Z FCO TELNO 45 OF 13 JANUARY
AND TO IMMEDIATE DESKBY 131700Z SALISBURY
AND INFO IMMEDIATE TO MAPUTO GABORONE LUSAKA LUANDA
LAGOS PRETORIA WASHINGTON UKMIS NEW YORK ADDIS ABABA CANBERRA
NAIROBI KINGSTON

MY IPT

RHODESIA:

FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF PRESIDENT NYERERE'S MESSAGE:

DEAR MRS THATCHER,

AS YOU WILL HAVE HEARD, THERE WAS A FRONT-LINE STATES SUMMIT MEETING AT BEIRA ON 10TH JANUARY. WE WERE DISCUSSING DEVELOPMENTS IN RHODESIA SINCE THE ARRIVAL IN SALISBURY OF THE BRITISH GOVERNOR, AND IN PARTICULAR A SERIES OF ACTIONS BY, OR WITH THE ENDORSEMENT OF, THE BRITISH AUTHORITIES THERE WHICH SEEM TO US TO BE IN BREACH OF THE LETTER AND THE SPIRIT OF THE LANCASTER HOUSE AGREEMENT.

WE AGREED THAT WHILE EACH GOVERNMENT MAY WISH TO MAKE A DIRECT APPROACH TO THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT, I SHOULD ALSO WRITE TO TEE YOU ON BEHALF OF ALL THE FIVE STATES BECAUSE THE LANCASTER HOUSE AGREEMENT FOLLOWED FROM THE DISCUSSIONS AND AGREEMENT AT LUSAKA IN WHICH YOU WERE PERSONALLY INVOLVED. INDEED IT WAS PARTLY THE LUSAKA DISCUSSIONS, AND YOUR OWN COMMITMENT TO THE AGREEMENT REACHED THERE, WHICH GAVE US CONFIDENCE THAT ANY AGREEMENT REACHED IN LONDON WOULD BE CARRIED OUT HONOURABLY BY BRITAIN.

IN PARTICULAR, MY COLLEAGUES AND I CONSIDERED AND WISH TO PROTEST ABOUT THE FOLLOWING BRITISH ACTIONS WHICH ARE A BREACH OF THE LETTER AND THE SPIRIT OF THE LANCASTER HOUSE AGREEMENT.

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1. THE PRESENCE OF SOUTH AFRICAN TROOPS IN RHODESIA, CONTRARY TO ASSURANCES GIVEN IN LONDON, AND SINCE REPEATED IN A PRINTED INTERVIEW GIVEN BY LORD CARRINGTON, THAT SOUTH AFRICAN TROOPS ARE 'GUARDING BEIT BRIDGE' IS NOW ADMITTED BY THE BRITISH GOVERNOR, WHO SAYS HE HAS AUTHORISED THIS INTERVENTION. WE BELIEVE THAT THERE ARE OTHER SOUTH AFRICAN TROOPS ELSEWHERE IN THE TERRITORY; THIS IS ALSO IMPLIED BY SOME OF THE REPORTED STATEMENTS OF THE SOUTH AFRICANS THEMSELVES.

2. WHEN THE PATRIOTIC FRONT LEADERS WERE PROVED TO BE CORRECT IN THE IN THEIR STATEMENTS ~~THAT~~ ~~THESE~~ THAT THE SEVEN DAYS FOR THE ASSEMBLY OF THEIR FORCES WAS TOO SHORT, AND THE NUMBER OF ASSEMBLY POINTS INADEQUATE BECAUSE THEY HAD MORE THAN THE 16000 TROOPS ~~SEE~~ ESTIMATED BY THE BRITISH, THE GOVERNOR FAILED TO ACT ACCORDING TO THE ASSURANCES GIVEN IN LONDON.

HE DID NOT INCREASE THE NUMBER OF ASSEMBLY POINTS; NOR DID HE ACT WITH 'COMMON SENSE' AND IN A SPIRIT CONDUCIVE TO THE SUCCESS OF THE CEASE FIRE AND THE BUILD-UP TO ~~THE~~ THE ELECTIONS. WHEN SOME THOUSANDS OF PATRIOTIC FRONT SOLDIERS WERE STILL MOVING TO THE AGREED ASSEMBLY POINTS AFTER THE DEAD-LINE THE GOVERNOR RESPONDED BY DECLARING AN AMNESTY (LAST WORD IN QUOTES) ON CONDITION THAT THEY SURRENDERED THEIR WEAPONS AS IF THEY WERE REBELS GRACIOUSLY ~~BEING~~ BEING PARDONED. EVEN WORSE, IT NOW APPEARS THAT THE GOVERNOR EXPECTS THEM TO SURRENDER THEIR WEAPONS TO THEIR ENEMIES AND NOT TO THE ~~THE~~ MONITORING FORCES. ALREADY A NUMBER OF FREEDOM FIGHTERS ~~TRY~~ TRYING TO JOIN THEIR ~~FORCES~~ COLLEAGUES IN THE ASSEMBLY POINTS HAVE BEEN SHOT AND KILLED IN COLD BLOOD.

3. DURING THE PERIOD OF ASSEMBLY, THE GOVERNOR TWICE CALLED ~~OPE~~ UPON THE SMITH / MUZOREWA TROOPS TO DEAL WITH WHAT HE ALLEGED WERE SPECIFIC BREACHES OF THE PEACE. WITHIN TWO OR THREE DAYS AFTER THE ~~DEADLINE~~ 'DEADLINE', AND EVEN LESS TIME AFTER HIS 'AMNESTY OFFER', THE GOVERNOR THEN ~~ANNOUNCED~~ ANNOUNCED THE DEPLOYMENT (LAST WORD IN QUOTES) OF THE SMITH/MUZOREWA TROOPS TO DEAL ~~WITH~~ WITH WHAT ~~WERE~~ WERE SOMETIMES CALLED 'ARMED GANGS' AND SOMETIMES 'THE 3000 PATRIOTIC FRONT TROOPS WHO HAVE NOT REPORTED IN'. THERE IS APPARENTLY NO SPECIFIC INCIDENT THEY WERE SUPPOSED TO DEAL WITH; THEY ARE BEING USED 'TO KEEP THE PEACE' IN DIRECT CONTRAVENTION OF THE LANCASTER HOUSE AGREEMENT WHICH SAYS THAT THEY WILL BE CONFINED TO THEIR QUARTERS AT COMPANY LEVEL

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THROUGHOUT THE CEASE FIRE PERIOD. IT WAS A GROUP OF THESE SMITH/MUZOREWA FORCES WHICH KILLED THE PATRIOTIC FRONT SOLDIERS WHO WERE GOING TO AN ASSEMBLY POINT. THE ~~GOVERNOR~~ GOVERNOR IS REPORTED TO HAVE REGRETTED THE DEATHS BUT SAID THE RHODESIANS WERE 'ACTING WITHIN THEIR RIGHTS' IN THE MURDERS.

4. THE SALISBURY AUXILIARY FORCES—I.E. ARMED SUPPORTERS OF BISHOP MUZOREWA— WERE SUPPOSED TO ~~BE~~ HAVE BEEN INCORPORATED INTO THE SALISBURY ARMY AND CONFINED LIKE THEM TO THEIR QUARTERS IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE CEASE FIRE PROVISIONS OF THE ~~LO~~ LONDON AGREEMENT. INSTEAD THEY HAVE BEEN LEFT AT LARGE, AND ARE IN FACT NOW MOVING INTO AND ~~OCCUPYING~~ OCCUPYING THE AREAS LEFT VACANT BY THE PATRIOTIC FRONT FORCES ~~WHERE~~ WHEN THESE MOVED TO THE ASSEMBLY POINTS IN ACCORDANCE WITH THAT AGREEMENT. THESE AUXILIARY FORCES ARE NOW TERRORISING AND INTIMIDATING THE PEOPLE OF THOSE AREAS. FURTHER, THE PATRIOTIC FRONT FORCES IN THE ASSEMBLY POINTS ARE THEMSELVES BEING GRADUALLY ENCIRCLED BY THE FORCES OF THEIR RACIST ENEMIES: THEIR FEARS OF SUCH A THING HAPPENING WERE REJECTED IN LONDON ON THE GROUNDS THAT THE SALISBURY FORCES WOULD ALSO BE CONFINED TO BARRACKS AND WOULD BE MONITORED THERE. NO ACTION HAS BEEN TAKEN BY THE GOVERNOR AGAINST THE AUXILIARY FORCES OR ANY OTHER OF THE SMITH/MUZOREWA TROOPS: NEITHER THE PATRIOTIC FRONT FORCES UNDER HIS COMMAND, NOR ANY OTHERS, HAVE BEEN USED TO RECTIFY THIS SITUATION.

AS FAR AS WE CAN GATHER, AT NO POINT HAS THE GOVERNOR CALLED UPON THE CEASE FIRE COMMISSION — ON WHICH BOTH SIDES ARE REPRESENTED — TO CONSIDER A SERIOUS BREACH OF THE CEASE FIRE. YET THE AGREEMENT LAYS DOWN THIS PROCEDURE, AND SAYS THAT IT IS THE COMMISSION WHICH SHOULD DEAL WITH SUCH CEASE FIRE VIOLATIONS OR SHOULD ADVISE THE GOVERNOR HOW TO ACT.

5. ON THE POLITICAL SIDE, BISHOP MUZOREWA WENT BACK TO SALISBURY TO BEGIN POLITICAL CAMPAIGNING EVEN BEFORE THE CONFERENCE WAS OVER. THE PATRIOTIC FRONT LEADERS ARE APPARENTLY EXPECTED TO GET THE GOVERNOR'S PERMISSION TO RETURN TO THEIR HOMELAND. JOSHUA NKOMO HIMSELF HAS ALREADY BEEN TOLD ONCE TO POSTONE HIS PLANNED ARRIVAL, BECAUSE IT WOULD CLASH WITH A RALLY BY THE BISHOP'S SUPPORTERS. SOME ZANU LEADERS HAVE ALSO BEEN TOLD THEY COULD NOT RETURN AS PLANNED. ONE OF THE PERSONS NOT SO FAR ALLOWED TO RETURN HOME IS THE ZANU DIRECTOR OF ELECTIONS. WE UNDERSTAND

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| THAT

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THAT SOME OF THE PATRIOTIC FRONT LEADRES HAVE NOW BEEN TOLD THAT THEY WILL NOT BE ALLOWED TO RETURN HOME ON EITHER A SATURDAY OR A SUNDAY (EXCLAMATION MARK). ONCE AGAIN THIS IS A CLEAR POLITICAL INTERFERENCE ON THE SIDE OF THE BISHOP AND THE SALISBURY GROUP OF NATIONALISTS.

6. THERE ARE MANY SIMILAR BUT SMALLER EVIDENCES OF GROSS BIAS BY THE BRITISH AUTHORITIES IN SALISBURY. BUT THE IMPORTANT THING IS THAT ALL THESE INCIDENTS MEAN THAT BRITAIN IS ITSELF NOW DISHONOURING THE AGREEMENT WHICH WAS REACHED UNDER ITS CHAIRMANSHIP IN LONDON. FURTHER, THE COMMONWEALTH AT LUSAKA, AND THE SECURITY COUNCIL WHEN IT LIFTED SANCTIONS, ENTRUSTED TO THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT THE RESPONSIBILITY OF SEEING THAT THE LONDON AGREEMENT WAS IMPARTIALLY ENFORCED. IT IS NOT BEING SO ENFORCED.

AS I TOLD YOUR HIGH COMMISSIONER ON 11TH JANUARY, AND REPEATED AT MY LATER PRESS CONFERENCE, THE FRONT LINE STATES AGREED TO ACCEPT ANY GOVERNMENT ELECTED IN RHODESIA BY FREE AND FAIR ELECTION. BUT THAT CONDITION HAS ALWAYS EXISTED: IT STILL DOES. THOSE ELECTIONS CANNOT BE FREE AND FAIR IF SOUTH AFRICAN TROOPS ARE IN RHODESIA: THE VERY PRESENCE OF SUCH TROOPS IS INTIMIDATION AND AN INDICATION OF THAT GOVERNMENT'S INTENTIONS IF THE PATRIOTIC FRONT PARTIES SHOULD WIN THE ELECTION DESPITE EVERYTHING. THE ELECTIONS WILL NOT BE FREE AND FAIR IF THE SMITH/MUZOREWA FORCES ARE ALLOWED TO ROAM AT LARGE AND TO INTIMIDATE THE PEOPLE NOW THAT THEY HAVE BEEN QUOTE DEPLOYED UNQUOTE BY THE GOVERNOR. INDEED, THE WHOLE PEACE - MAKING EXERCISE WILL BREAK DOWN IF THE PRESENT BIAS CONTINUES TO BE PRACTICED AND IF THE TERMS OF THE LANCASTER HOUSE AGREEMENT ARE NOT ENFORCED.

MRS. THATCHER, MY COLLEAGUES AND I CANNOT BELIEVE THAT YOU ARE YOURSELF A PARTY TO ANY OF THE ACTIONS WHICH CALL INTO QUESTION BRITAIN'S GOOD FAITH SINCE LUSAKA. LORD CARRINGTON AND HIS DEPUTY ARE, I KNOW, BOTH OUT OF BRITAIN ON OTHER BUSINESS, WHICH ALSO PREOCCUPIED THEM BEFORE THEY LEFT. IT MAY BE, THEREFORE, THAT THESE MATTERS - IMPORTANT AS THEY ARE - ESCAPED THEIR ATTENTION, AND THAT YOU YOURSELF HAVE THEREFORE BEEN LEFT IN IGNORANCE OF

CONFIDENTIAL

THE GRAVE DANGER WHICH EXISTS CONSEQUENT TO THE DISHONOURING OF THE LONDON AGREEMENT. I AM NOW APPEALING TO YOU TO GIVE THIS MATTER YOUR PERSONAL ATTENTION SO AS TO SAVE THE OPPORTUNITY FOR PEACE IN SOUTHERN AFRICA WHICH YOUR OWN ACTIONS CREATED.

YOURS SINCERELY,

JKN

ENDS

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PLANNING STAFF

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EID (E)

UND

LEGAL ADVISERS

(MR FREELAND)

(MR FIFOOT)

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NEWS D

PS

PS/SIR I GILMOUR

PS/MR LUCE

PS/MR RIDLEY

PS/MR HURD

PS/MR MARTEN

PS/FUS

SIR D MAITLAND

MR HANNAY

LORD N G LENNOX

MR DAY

MR FERGUSSON

MR ASPIN

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION
RHODESIA POLICY

FLASH

XXX
4
Rhodesia

PS/Nº 10 D. STR.


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DWF G 885/13

LFN 695/13

ZZ FCO

OR 788



FM MUSCAT 130723Z JAN 80

TO FLASH FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 40 OF 13 JANUARY

FOLLOWING FROM SECRETARY OF STATE FOR GOVERNOR

SALISBURY TELEGRAMS NOS 149 AND 150

1. DUFF'S DISCUSSIONS WITH WALLS MAKE IT CLEAR THAT THE POSITION IS EVEN MORE SERIOUS AND DELICATE THAN I HAD ANTICIPATED. I REALISE ONLY TOO WELL THE PROBLEMS YOU FACE, AS YOU DESCRIBE THEM IN THE FIRST THREE PARAGRAPHS OF YOUR TELNO 150.

2. BUT THE RHODESIANS RISK TURNING WHAT IS BASICALLY A TENABLE SITUATION IN THE COUNTRY AS A WHOLE INTO A SITUATION WHICH IT WILL BE DIFFICULT FOR US OR THEM TO HOLD MUCH LONGER. THE FUNDAMENTAL ISSUE IS OUR ASSESSMENT OF THE SECURITY POSITION: AND I NOTE FROM PARA 1 OF YOUR TELNO 150 THAT YOU SHARE THE GENERAL VIEW THAT THE PICTURE IS NOT TOO BLEAK IN ALL THE CIRCUMSTANCES. IF THIS IS INDEED SO, AND IF WALLS IS DELIBERATELY EXAGGERATING THE PROBLEMS, IT IS HARD TO ESCAPE THE CONCLUSION THAT THE RHODESIANS HAVE TAKEN FRIGHT AT THE PROSPECT OF AN ELECTION CONTESTED BY THE PATRIOTIC FRONT AND MAY BE TEMPTED TO WRECK THE PROCESS.

3. I DO NOT WISH TO TELL YOU HOW TO PLAY THE HAND FROM DAY TO DAY, PARTICULARLY AT SUCH A SENSITIVE STAGE. BUT YOU WILL NO DOUBT JUDGE AT WHAT POINT THE TIME COMES TO REMIND WALLS OF CERTAIN FUNDAMENTAL TENETS OF BRITISH POLICY:

(A) WE REMAIN COMMITTED TO FREE AND FAIR ELECTIONS:

(B) WE CAN STAY IN RHODESIA ONLY IF THE RHODESIANS ACCEPT OUR

WE CAN START IN RHODESIA ONLY IF THE RHODESIANS ACCEPT OUR
AUTHORITY AND REMAIN DETERMINED TO MAKE THE LANCASTER
HOUSE AGREEMENTS WORK:

(C) THE CONSEQUENCES FOR A UK WITHDRAWAL IN THE WAKE OF RHODESIAN
SABOTAGE OF THESE AGREEMENTS WOULD BE WIDESPREAD CHAOS IN
RHODESIA ITSELF, SOUTH AFRICAN INVOLVEMENT, AND THE CONFRONT-
ATION BETWEEN SOUTH AFRICA AND THE REST WHICH WE HAVE ALL
ALONG BEEN SEEKING TO AVOID.

4. MEANWHILE I AGREE THAT OUR FIRST PRIORITY SHOULD BE TO HOLD
ON TO WHAT WE HAVE GOT: NAMELY A RESPECTABLE CEASEFIRE. BUT
I ALSO THINK THAT THE EXTERNAL PRESSURES BUILDING UP AGAINST
US CAN ONLY BE DEFUSED BY SWIFT MOVEMENT ON BEIT BRIDGE AND
BY THE REMOVAL OF OTHER FORMED S. AFRICAN UNITS. THIS MUST BE
DONE NOW: THE REMOVAL OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN TROOPS AT BEIT BRIDGE
WILL ONLY ENHANCE THE SENSE OF DECEPTION WHEN, AS SEEMS INEVITABLE,
THE OTHER THREE COMPANIES ARE DISCOVERED. THE GREATER THE DELAY
IN ACTING, THE MORE SEVERE THE DAMAGE TO US AND TO WALLS WHEN
WE ARE FORCED TO ACT.

5. I AGREE THEREFORE THAT THE NEXT STEP SHOULD BE TO TALK TO
THE SOUTH AFRICANS AT THE HIGHEST LEVEL. OUR AIM SHOULD BE
TO CONVINCING THEM THAT IT IS IN THEIR OWN IMMEDIATE AND LONG TERM
INTERESTS TO AVOID ANY APPEARANCE OF CONTRAVENING THE LANCASTER
HOUSE AGREEMENTS WITH OUR CONNIVANCE: AND THAT THE WITHDRAWAL
OF A FEW SOUTH AFRICANS IS NOT MUCH OF A PRICE TO PAY WHEN SEEN
AGAINST THE FUTURE SECURITY AND STABILITY OF SOUTHERN AFRICA.
THE BEST WAY TO ACHIEVE THIS IS BY IMPLEMENTING THE LANCASTER
HOUSE AGREEMENT TO THE FULL: AND INDEED THIS IS THE ONLY COURSE
WHICH THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT IS PREPARED TO FOLLOW.

6. TO AVOID ANY APPEARANCE OF GOING BEHIND WALLS' BACK, AND
TO USE THE SOUTH AFRICANS AS A DIRECT LEVER ON THE RHODESIANS,
I THINK THAT THE BEST SOLUTION WOULD BE FOR DUFF AND WALLS TO
GO URGENTLY AND, IF POSSIBLE, SECRETLY TO PRETORIA TO TALK THE
WHOLE THING THROUGH WITH P W BOTHA. (WE ARE LIKELY TO GET MORE
REALISM AND LESS HISTORICALS FROM HIM THAN FROM PIK). THE
SOUTH AFRICANS COULD BE TOLD IF NECESSARY THAT THE PRIME MINISTER
HAD PERSONALLY ASKED P W BOTHA TO RECEIVE DUFF AND WALLS.

LUCAS

NNNN

FLASH

XMM

Ps/N° 10 D. STR.

ADVANCE COPY

DWF 6 805/13

LFM 625/13

ZZ FCO

GR 783

SECRET

DEDIP

FM MUGCAT 130723Z JAN 88

TO FLASH FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 40 OF 13 JANUARY

FOLLOWING FROM SECRETARY OF STATE FOR GOVERNOR

SALISBURY TELEGRAMS NOS 149 AND 150

1. DUFF'S DISCUSSIONS WITH WALLS MAKE IT CLEAR THAT THE POSITION IS EVEN MORE SERIOUS AND DELICATE THAN I HAD ANTICIPATED. I REALISE ONLY TOO WELL THE PROBLEMS YOU FACE, AS YOU DESCRIBE THEM IN THE FIRST THREE PARAGRAPHS OF YOUR TELNO 150.

2. BUT THE RHODESIANS RISK TURNING WHAT IS BASICALLY A TENABLE SITUATION IN THE COUNTRY AS A WHOLE INTO A SITUATION WHICH IT WILL BE DIFFICULT FOR US OR THEM TO HOLD MUCH LONGER. THE FUNDAMENTAL ISSUE IS OUR ASSESSMENT OF THE SECURITY POSITION AND I NOTE FROM PARA 1 OF YOUR TELNO 150 THAT YOU SHARE THE GENERAL VIEW THAT THE PICTURE IS NOT TOO BLEAK IN ALL THE CIRCUMSTANCES. IF THIS IS INDEED SO, AND IF WALLS IS DELIBERATELY EXAGGERATING THE PROBLEMS, IT IS HARD TO ESCAPE THE CONCLUSION THAT THE RHODESIANS HAVE TAKEN FRIGHT AT THE PROSPECT OF AN ELECTION CONTESTED BY THE PATRIOTIC FRONT AND MAY BE TEMPTED TO WRECK THE PROCESS.

3. I DO NOT WISH TO TELL YOU HOW TO PLAY THE HAND FROM DAY TO DAY, PARTICULARLY AT SUCH A SENSITIVE STAGE. BUT YOU WILL NO DOUBT JUDGE AT WHAT POINT THE TIME COMES TO REMIND WALLS OF CERTAIN FUNDAMENTAL TENETS OF BRITISH POLICY:

(A) WE REMAIN COMMITTED TO FREE AND FAIR ELECTIONS;

(B) WE CAN STAY IN RHODESIA ONLY IF THE RHODESIANS ACCEPT OUR AUTHORITY AND REMAIN DETERMINED TO MAKE THE LAMCASTER HOUSE AGREEMENTS WORK

AUTHORITY AND REMAIN DETERMINED TO MAKE THE LANCASTER HOUSE AGREEMENTS WORK

(C) THE CONSEQUENCES FOR A UK WITHDRAWAL IN THE WAKE OF RHODESIAN SABOTAGE OF THESE AGREEMENTS WOULD BE WIDESPREAD CHAOS IN RHODESIA ITSELF, SOUTH AFRICAN INVOLVEMENT, AND THE CONFRONTATION BETWEEN SOUTH AFRICA AND THE REST WHICH WE HAVE ALL ALONG BEEN SEEKING TO AVOID.

4. MEANWHILE I AGREE THAT OUR FIRST PRIORITY SHOULD BE TO HOLD ON TO WHAT WE HAVE GOT: NAMELY A RESPECTABLE CEASEFIRE. BUT I ALSO THINK THAT THE EXTERNAL PRESSURES BUILDING UP AGAINST US CAN ONLY BE DEFUSED BY SWIFT MOVEMENT ON BEIT BRIDGE AND BY THE REMOVAL OF OTHER FORMED S. AFRICAN UNITS. THIS MUST BE DONE NOW: THE REMOVAL OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN TROOPS AT BEIT BRIDGE WILL ONLY ENHANCE THE SENSE OF DECEPTION WHEN, AS SEEMS INEVITABLE, THE OTHER THREE COMPANIES ARE DISCOVERED. THE GREATER THE DELAY IN ACTING, THE MORE SEVERE THE DAMAGE TO US AND TO WALLS WHEN WE ARE FORCED TO ACT.

5. I AGREE THEREFORE THAT THE NEXT STEP SHOULD BE TO TALK TO THE SOUTH AFRICANS AT THE HIGHEST LEVEL. OUR AIM SHOULD BE TO CONVINCe THEM THAT IT IS IN THEIR OWN IMMEDIATE AND LONG TERM INTERESTS TO AVOID ANY APPEARANCE OF CONTRAVENING THE LANCASTER HOUSE AGREEMENTS WITH OUR CONNIVANCE; AND THAT THE WITHDRAWAL OF A FEW SOUTH AFRICANS IS NOT MUCH OF A PRICE TO PAY WHEN SEEN AGAINST THE FUTURE SECURITY AND STABILITY OF SOUTHERN AFRICA. THE BEST WAY TO ACHIEVE THIS IS BY IMPLEMENTING THE LANCASTER HOUSE AGREEMENT TO THE FULL; AND INDEED THIS IS THE ONLY COURSE WHICH THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT IS PREPARED TO FOLLOW.

6. TO AVOID ANY APPEARANCE OF GOING BEHIND WALLS' BACK, AND TO USE THE SOUTH AFRICANS AS A DIRECT LEVER ON THE RHODESIANS, I THINK THAT THE BEST SOLUTION WOULD BE FOR DUFF AND WALLS TO GO URGENTLY AND, IF POSSIBLE, SECRETLY TO PRETORIA TO TALK THE WHOLE THING THROUGH WITH P W BOTHA. (WE ARE LIKELY TO GET MORE REALISM AND LESS HISTORIONICS FROM HIM THAN FROM PIK). THE SOUTH AFRICANS COULD BE TOLD IF NECESSARY THAT THE PRIME MINISTER HAD PERSONALLY ASKED P W BOTHA TO RECEIVE DUFF AND WALLS.

LUCAS

M:NN

3

~~FLASH~~

PS / No 10 D. 400

ADVANCE COPY

DWF G 04/13

LFN 694/13

ZZ FCO

GR 100

~~SECRET~~

~~DEDIP~~

FM MUSCAT 130703Z JAN 80
TO FLASH FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 39 OF 13 JANUARY

R

(9/1)

FOLLOWING FOR LORD PRIVY SEAL FROM SECRETARY OF STATE

1. MY IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING TELEGRAM CONTAINS DRAFT INSTRUCTIONS TO CHRISTOPHER SOAMES. SUBJECT TO ANY COMMENTS WHICH YOU OR THE PRIME MINISTER MAY HAVE, THESE SHOULD BE DESPATCHED TO SALISBURY TODAY.

2. I SHALL BE IN RIYADH (INTERCONTINENTAL HOTEL) THIS AFTERNOON AND SHALL TRY TO CONTACT YOU BY TELEPHONE BETWEEN 1400Z AND 1500Z TODAY.

LUCAS

NNNN

0726

FLASH

PS/NO 10 D. Gr

ADVANCE COPY

DWF G 04/13

LFN 694/13

ZC FCO

GR 100

SECRET

DEDIP

FM MUSCAT 130713Z JAN 60

TO FLASH FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 39 OF 13 JANUARY

FOLLOWING FOR LORD PRIVY SEAL FROM SECRETARY OF STATE

1. MY IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING TELEGRAM CONTAINS DRAFT INSTRUCTIONS TO CHRISTOPHER SOAMES. SUBJECT TO ANY COMMENTS WHICH YOU OR THE PRIME MINISTER MAY HAVE, THESE SHOULD BE DESPATCHED TO SALISBURY TODAY.

2. I SHALL BE IN RIYADH (INTERCONTINENTAL HOTEL) THIS AFTERNOON AND SHALL TRY TO CONTACT YOU BY TELEPHONE BETWEEN 1400Z AND 1500Z TODAY.

LUCAS

10/11/60

SECRET

2

D E D I P

SECRET

FM SALISBURY 121555Z JAN 80

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 150 OF 12 JANUARY

INFO IMMEDIATE CAPE TOWN (PERSONAL FOR AMBASSADOR)

MY I P T.

THERE IS NO DOUBT THAT WALLS GREATLY EXAGGERATES THE SECURITY SITUATION. WE ARE WORKING ON THIS AND HOPE TO HAVE WITHIN TWO TO THREE DAYS A BETTER PICTURE OURSELVES OF THE NUMBERS OF PATRIOTIC FRONT WHO ARE PROBABLY STILL AT LARGE. WE SHALL THEN HAVE TO TAKE THIS UP WITH WALLS, ALTHOUGH I FEEL PRETTY CERTAIN THAT HE WILL REFUSE TO ACCEPT OUR ASSESSMENT, PREFERRING TO BELIEVE (PARTLY GENUINELY AND PARTLY FOR HIS OWN PURPOSES) THE EXTRAORDINARY RUMOURS AND FIGURES THAT CIRCULATE ALL TOO EASILY AND ALL TOO QUICKLY WITHIN HIS OWN HEADQUARTERS.

2. HOWEVER THAT MAY BE, WALLS WILL CERTAINLY CONTINUE TO CALCULATE THAT HE CANNOT LET THE SOUTH AFRICANS GO BECAUSE OF

(A) THE THREAT HE PERCEIVES FROM THE VAST NUMBERS OF P F NOW IN THE COUNTRY, WHETHER ASSEMBLED OR AT LARGE:

(B) HIS DESIRE TO KEEP THE SOUTH AFRICANS TIED IN TO RHODESIAN DEFENCE:

(C) HIS BELIEF THAT IF THE SOUTH AFRICANS WITHDRAW, ANY PROMISE THEY OR WE MIGHT MAKE ABOUT THEIR RETURN IN AN EMERGENCY WOULD NOT BE HONOURED:

(D) HIS BELIEF - CONNECTED WITH (A) - THAT FIGHTING WILL CERTAINLY BREAK OUT AGAIN SOONER OR LATER.

3. IN CONNECTION WITH 2(A), I AM NOW COMING TO BELIEVE THAT, IF WE CANNOT KEEP THE RHODESIAN MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT IN HAND, THERE IS A RISK OF THEM DELIBERATELY CAUSING BLOODY INCIDENTS WHICH

WOULD LEAD TO THE P F BEGINNING TO LEAVE THE ASSEMBLY AREAS AND GIVE THE RHODESIANS THE EXCUSE TO RESUME THE WAR. THIS RISK WILL INCREASE AS AND WHEN THEY ASSESS (WHICH THEY ARE NEAR TO DOING EVEN NOW) THAT MUGABE IS LIKELY TO ACHIEVE A DOMINANT POSITION FOLLOWING ON THE ELECTION. IN OTHER WORDS, WALLS AND SOME OF HIS

SECRET

/ COLLEAGUES

S E C R E T

COLLEAGUES ARE GETTING INTO A FRAME OF MIND IN WHICH THEY WOULD PREFER A RESUMPTION OF THE WAR AND, IN EFFECT, A RETURN TO U D I, TO THE RISK OF A GOVERNMENT UNDER P F INFLUENCE. (WHETHER THEY WOULD HAVE SOUTH AFRICAN BACKING FOR THIS I CANNOT TELL.)

4. OUR OBJECTIVES MUST BE

(A) TO MAINTAIN THE CEASEFIRE AND TO CONTINUE TO PREVENT LARGE SCALE CLASHES:

(B) TO PREVENT THE MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT BEING SO STUPID AND TO CARRY THEM WITH US THROUGH THE NEXT FEW WEEKS:

(C) TO KEEP MUGABE IN THE ELECTION, UNLESS OF COURSE HIS PARTY BEHAVES IN SUCH A WAY THAT A CASE FOR RULING HIM OUT WOULD BE OBVIOUS:

(D) IF, NEVERTHELESS, MUGABE HAS TO GO, TO CONTRIVE THIS IN SUCH A WAY AS TO MINIMISE THE IMMEDIATE MILITARY RISK (IE. Z A N L A NOW IN THE ASSEMBLY AREAS) AND TO KEEP NKOMO FROM GOING WITH HIM:

(E) TO REDUCE THE DANGERS WE SHALL FACE ON MARCH 1 OR 2 IF WE GET THROUGH THE ELECTION WITH LARGE NUMBERS STILL IN THE ASSEMBLY AREAS:

(F) TO REMOVE THE DANGER OF AN INTERNATIONAL EXPLOSION OVER SOUTH AFRICAN FORCES (OTHER THAN THE BEITBRIDGE FURORE).

5. A LARGE PART OF OUR DAY TO DAY WORK IS STILL DEVOTED TO (A) AND (B). WE HAVE SO FAR BEEN SUCCESSFUL, DURING THE LAST SEVEN DAYS, IN PERSUADING THE RHODESIAN FORCES TO ACT WITH RESTRAINT DURING THE TWO DOZEN OR MORE CASE IN WHICH WE HAVE SPENT SOMETIMES UP TO 43 HOURS IN QUOTE TALKING IN UNQUOTE P F GROUPS OF VARYING SIZES.

6. BUT A MAJOR CURRENT EFFORT IS DEVOTED TO (E). THIS INCLUDES THE IMMEDIATE PROBLEM OF TRYING TO GET MEN OUT OF THE ASSEMBLY AREAS INTO TRAINING COURSES, ETC., A POLICY WHICH MAY OR MAY NOT BE SUCCESSFUL, BUT COULD NOT IN ANY CASE BE MORE THAN A PALLIATIVE. MUCH MORE IMPORTANT IS THE TASK OF GETTING THE RHODESIANS TO FACE UP TO THE FACT THAT ON 1 MARCH THERE WILL PROBABLY STILL BE MANY THOUSANDS OF Z I P R A AND Z A N L A IN THE ASEMBLY AREAS WHO, AT THE LEAST, WILL DISPERSE OVER THE COUNTRY UNLESS SOMETHING IS DONE TO KEEP THEM IN HAND IN ORGANISED AND CONTROLLED GROUPS. WE NOW HAVE SOME HOPE OF GETTING THE RHODESIANS AND THE PATRIOTIC FRONT TO DISCUSS THIS PROBLEM TOGETHER NEXT WEEK. TOGETHER WITH THE SOUTH AFRICAN ISSUE, IT IS, I THINK, THE MOST IMPORTANT MATTER CURRENTLY BEFORE US.

7. IN GENERAL, THEREFORE, OUR TASK IS MORE THAN EVER TO RETAIN RHODESIAN SUPPORT FOR THE LANCASTER HOUSE PROGRAMME AND TO LEAD THEM ALONG A PATH WHICH THEY INCREASINGLY DISLIKE AS THE REALITY

S E C R E T

OF THE ELECTION APPROACHES. AGAINST THIS BACKGROUND, HOW DO WE DEAL WITH 4(F)? THE FIRST THING I BELIEVE IS TO BEGIN TO TALK TO THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT (PARAGRAPH 4 OF MY TELEGRAM NO 143). I WILL TELEGRAPH ON THIS SHORTLY. THE SECOND THING IS TO KEEP ON AT WALLS ABOUT AMELIORATING THE ACTUAL POSITION ON THE GROUND. I AM NOT AT ALL SURE THAT ATTESTATION (PARAGRAPH 4 OF YOUR TELEGRAM NO 131) WILL ACTUALLY HELP US. IF DISCOVERED, WOULD IT NOT SIMPLY BE REGARDED AS A TRANSPARENT DEVICE, ESPECIALLY IF IT CAME OUT THAT IT HAD HAPPENED SO LATE IN THE DAY? MIXING RHODESIANS IN LARGER PROPORTION INTO THE SOUTH AFRICAN UNITS WOULD BE BETTER. TOTAL WITHDRAWAL IS, IN MY JUDGEMENT, PROBABLY IMPOSSIBLE OF ACHIEVEMENT WITH WALLS' AGREEMENT. IF WE COULD FRIGHTEN THE SOUTH AFRICANS ENOUGH THEY MIGHT DO IT THEMSELVES, BUT THEY WOULD CERTAINLY TELL THE RHODESIANS IT WAS AT OUR REQUEST.

8. GRATEFUL IF ALL THIS COULD BE DISCUSSED WITH RENWICK ON HIS RETURN. BUT LET US BE CLEAR THAT WHATEVER WE ASK THE RHODESIANS TO AGREE TO NOW MUST BE OUR BOTTOM LINE: IF WE ACHIEVE IT WE MUST THEREAFTER BE PREPARED TO STICK PUBLICLY AND PRIVATELY TO THE POSITION THAT, APART FROM BEITBRIDGE, THERE ARE ONLY RHODESIAN FORCES AND P F FORCES IN THE COUNTRY. I.E. WE WOULD FIRMLY REGARD THE RESIDUE (IF ANY) OF THE THREE COMPANIES, AND THE OTHER SCATTERED SOUTH AFRICANS SUCH AS THE TWO FIRE FORCES, AS PART OF THE RHODESIAN FORCES.

9. WE WILL TELEGRAPH OVER THE WEEKEND ABOUT AUXILIARIES AND ABOUT Z A N L A BEHAVIOUR. AS REGARDS MUGABE, I AM NOT AT ALL CLEAR WHY YOU THINK THERE WOULD BE ADVANTAGE IN GETTING HIM BACK EARLIER RATHER THAN LATER.

10. WE WILL TELEGRAPH LATER OUR COMMENTS ON THE TEXTS IN YOUR TELNO 132.

SCAMES

F I L E S

RHODESIA D
PS
PS/LPS
PS/MR LUCE
PS/PUS
MR DAY

SECRET

SALISBURY 121955Z JAN 63

M.S.

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELETYPE NUMBER 1510 OF 12 JANUARY

INFO IMMEDIATE CAPE TOWN (PERSONAL FOR AMBASSADOR)

M I P T.

THERE IS NO DOUBT THAT WALLS GREATLY EXAGGERATES THE SECURITY SITUATION. WE ARE WORKING ON THIS AND HOPE TO HAVE WITHIN TWO TO THREE DAYS A BETTER PICTURE OURSELVES OF THE NUMBERS OF PATRIOTIC FRONT WHO ARE PROBABLY STILL AT LARGE. WE SHALL THEN HAVE TO TAKE THIS UP WITH WALLS, ALTHOUGH I FEEL PRETTY CERTAIN THAT HE WILL REFUSE TO ACCEPT OUR ASSESSMENT, PREFERRING TO BELIEVE (PARTLY GENUINELY AND PARTLY FOR HIS OWN PURPOSES) THE EXTRAORDINARY NUMBERS AND FIGURES THAT CIRCULATE ALL TOO EASILY AND ALL TOO QUICKLY WITHIN HIS OWN HEADQUARTERS.

2. HOWEVER THAT MAY BE, WALLS WILL CERTAINLY CONTINUE TO CALCULATE THAT HE CANNOT LET THE SOUTH AFRICANS GO BECAUSE OF

(A) THE THREAT HE PERCEIVES FROM THE VAST NUMBERS OF P F NOW IN THE COUNTRY, WHETHER ASSEMBLED OR AT LARGE:

(B) HIS DESIRE TO KEEP THE SOUTH AFRICANS TIED IN TO RHODESIAN ~~DEFENCE~~ DEFENCE;

(C) HIS BELIEF THAT IF THE SOUTH AFRICANS WITHDRAW, ANY PROMISE THEY OR WE MIGHT MAKE ABOUT THEIR RETURN IN AN EMERGENCY WOULD NOT BE HONOURED;

(D) HIS BELIEF - CONNECTED WITH (A) - THAT FIGHTING WILL CERTAINLY BREAK OUT AGAIN SOONER OR LATER.

3. IN CONNECTION WITH 2(A), I AM NOW COMING TO BELIEVE THAT, IF WE CANNOT KEEP THE RHODESIAN MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT IN HAND, THERE IS A RISK OF THEM DELIBERATELY CAUSING BLOODY INCIDENTS WHICH WOULD LEAD TO THE P F BEGINNING TO LEAVE THE ASSEMBLY AREAS AND GIVE THE RHODESIANS THE EXCUSE TO RESUME THE WAR. THIS RISK WILL INCREASE AS AND WHEN THEY ASSESS (WHICH THEY ARE LEANING TO DOING EVEN NOW) THAT MUGABE IS LIKELY TO ACHIEVE A DOMINANT POSITION FOLLOWING ON THE ELECTION. IN OTHER WORDS, WALLS AND SOME OF HIS

S E C R E T

COLLEAGUES ARE GETTING INTO A FRAME OF MIND IN WHICH THEY WOULD PREFER A RESUMPTION OF THE WAR AND, IN EFFECT, A RETURN TO U D I, TO THE RISK OF A GOVERNMENT UNDER P F INFLUENCE. (WHETHER THEY WOULD HAVE SOUTH AFRICAN BACKING FOR THIS I CANNOT TELL.)

OUR OBJECTIVES MUST BE

- (A) TO MAINTAIN THE CEASEFIRE AND TO CONTINUE TO PREVENT LARGE SCALE CLASHES;
- (B) TO PREVENT THE MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT BEING SO STUPID AND TO CARRY THEM WITH US THROUGH THE NEXT FEW WEEKS;
- (C) TO KEEP MUGABE IN THE ELECTION, UNLESS OF COURSE HIS PARTY BEHAVES IN SUCH A WAY THAT A CASE FOR RULING HIM OUT WOULD BE OBVIOUS;
- (D) IF, NEVERTHELESS, MUGABE HAS TO GO, TO CONTRIVE THIS IN SUCH A WAY AS TO MINIMISE THE IMMEDIATE MILITARY RISK (IE. Z A N L A NOW IN THE ASSEMBLY AREAS) AND TO KEEP NKOMO FROM GOING WITH HIM;
- (E) TO REDUCE THE DANGERS WE SHALL FACE ON MARCH 1 OR 2 IF WE GET THROUGH THE ELECTION WITH LARGE NUMBERS STILL IN THE ASSEMBLY AREAS;
- (F) TO REMOVE THE DANGER OF AN INTERNATIONAL EXPLOSION OVER SOUTH AFRICAN FORCES (OTHER THAN THE BELTBRIDGE FURDRE).

2. A LARGE PART OF OUR DAY TO DAY WORK IS STILL DEVOTED TO (A) AND (B). WE HAVE SO FAR BEEN SUCCESSFUL, DURING THE LAST SEVEN DAYS, IN PERSUADING THE RHODESIAN FORCES TO ACT WITH RESTRAINT DURING THE TWO DOZEN OR MORE CASES IN WHICH WE HAVE SPENT SOMETIMES UP TO 48 HOURS IN QUOTE TALKING IN UNQUOTE P F GROUPS OF VARYING SIZES.

3. BUT A MAJOR CURRENT EFFORT IS DEVOTED TO (E). THIS INCLUDES THE IMMEDIATE PROBLEM OF TRYING TO GET MEN OUT OF THE ASSEMBLY AREAS INTO TRAINING COURSES, ETC., A POLICY WHICH MAY OR MAY NOT BE SUCCESSFUL, BUT COULD NOT IN ANY CASE BE MORE THAN A PALLIATIVE. MUCH MORE IMPORTANT IS THE TASK OF GETTING THE RHODESIANS TO FACE UP TO THE FACT THAT ON 1 MARCH THERE WILL PROBABLY STILL BE MANY THOUSANDS OF Z I P R A AND Z A Y L A IN THE ASSEMBLY AREAS WHO, AT THE LEAST, WILL DISPERSE OVER THE COUNTRY UNLESS SOMETHING IS DONE TO KEEP THEM IN HAND IN ORGANISED AND CONTROLLED GROUPS. WE NOW HAVE SOME HOPE OF GETTING THE RHODESIANS AND THE PATRIOTIC FRONT TO DISCUSS THIS PROBLEM TOGETHER NEXT WEEK. TOGETHER WITH THE SOUTH AFRICAN ISSUE, IT IS, I THINK, THE MOST IMPORTANT MATTER CURRENTLY BEFORE US.

4. IN GENERAL, THEREFORE, OUR TASK IS MORE THAN EVER TO RETAIN RHODESIAN SUPPORT FOR THE LANCASTER HOUSE PROGRAMME AND TO LEAD THEM ALONG A PATH WHICH THEY INCREASINGLY DISLIKE AS THE REALITY

S E C R E T

OF THE ELECTION APPROACHES. AGAINST THIS BACKGROUND, HOW DO WE DEAL WITH 4(F)? THE FIRST THING I BELIEVE IS TO BEGIN TO TALK TO THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT (PARAGRAPH 4 OF MY TELEGRAM NO 140). I WILL TELEGRAPH ON THIS SHORTLY. THE SECOND THING IS TO KEEP ON AT WALLS ABOUT AMELIORATING THE ACTUAL POSITION ON THE GROUND. I AM NOT AT ALL SURE THAT ATTESTATION (PARAGRAPH 4 OF YOUR TELEGRAM NO 131) WILL ACTUALLY HELP US. IF DISCOVERED, WOULD IT NOT SIMPLY BE REGARDED AS A TRANSPARENT DEVICE, ESPECIALLY IF IT CAME OUT THAT IT HAD HAPPENED SO LATE IN THE DAY? MIXING RHODESIANS IN LARGER PROPORTION INTO THE SOUTH AFRICAN UNITS WOULD BE BETTER. TOTAL WITHDRAWAL IS, IN MY JUDGEMENT, PROBABLY IMPOSSIBLE OF ACHIEVEMENT WITH WALLS' AGREEMENT. IF WE COULD FRIGHTEN THE SOUTH AFRICANS ENOUGH THEY MIGHT DO IT THEMSELVES, BUT THEY WOULD CERTAINLY TELL THE RHODESIANS IT WAS AT OUR REQUEST.

8. GRATEFUL IF ALL THIS COULD BE DISCUSSED WITH RENNICK ON HIS RETURN. BUT LET US BE CLEAR THAT WHATEVER WE ASK THE RHODESIANS TO AGREE TO NOW MUST BE OUR BOTTOM LINE; IF WE ACHIEVE IT WE MUST THEREAFTER BE PREPARED TO STICK PUBLICLY AND PRIVATELY TO THE POSITION THAT, APART FROM BEITBRIDGE, THERE ARE ONLY RHODESIAN FORCES AND P F FORCES IN THE COUNTRY. I.E. WE WOULD FIRMLY REGARD THE RESIDUE (IF ANY) OF THE THREE COMPANIES, AND THE OTHER SCATTERED SOUTH AFRICANS SUCH AS THE TWO FIRE FORCES, AS PART OF THE RHODESIAN FORCES.

9. WE WILL TELEGRAPH OVER THE WEEKEND ABOUT AUXILIARIES AND ABOUT Z A N L A BEHAVIOUR. AS REGARDS MUGABE, I AM NOT AT ALL CLEAR WHY YOU THINK THERE WOULD BE ADVANTAGE IN GETTING HIM BACK EARLIER RATHER THAN LATER.

10. WE WILL TELEGRAPH LATER OUR COMMENTS ON THE TEXTS IN YOUR TELNO 132.

SLAVES

F I L E S

RHODESIA D
PS
PS/LPS
PS/MR LUCE
PS/PUS
MR DAY

S E C R E T

GR 1304

D E D I P

SECRET

FM SALISBURY 121523Z JAN 83

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 149 OF 12 JANUARY

INFO IMMEDIATE CAPE TOWN (PERSONAL FOR AMBASSADOR)

YOUR TELEGRAMS 131 AND 132 (NOT TO CAPE TOWN): SOUTH AFRICAN FORCES. DUFF HAD A LONG TALK WITH WALLS THIS MORNING BEFORE RECEIPT OF YOUR TELEGRAM UNDER REFERENCE. HE BEGAN BY DRAWING ATTENTION TO THE WIDESPREAD BELIEF THAT THERE WERE QUOTE 3 SOUTH AFRICAN COMPANIES IN THE SOUTH EAST UNQUOTE AND HE DESCRIBED THE LINE WE TOOK IN REPLY TO ENQUIRIES ON THIS POINT (SEE MY TELEGRAM NO 53). HE SAID THAT THE REALLY DISQUIETING FEATURE WAS THAT THE PRESSURE ON THIS SUBJECT WAS NOW FROM GOVERNMENTS, RATHER THAN FROM THE PRESS. HE BELIEVED IT WAS PUTTING THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT AND THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT IN A POSITION WHICH WOULD SOON BECOME INTOLERABLE. IN ESSENCE THE DIFFICULTY WAS CAUSED BY THESE MEN BEING PRESENT IN MORE OR LESS WHOLE SOUTH AFRICAN UNITS. IT WAS THE CONCEPT OF QUOTE UNITS UNQUOTE THAT WAS UNDERMINING OUR ABILITY TO CONTINUE TO HOLD THE LINE WE HAD HELD HITHERTO. WE WERE PREPARED TO CONTINUE TO DISREGARD THE PRESENCE OF SOUTH AFRICANS IF THEY WERE SPREAD THROUGHOUT THE RHODESIAN FORCES, BUT THE PRESENCE OF WHOLE UNITS MADE THIS IMPOSSIBLE FOR OUR MINISTERS. IN THE COURSE OF THE DISCUSSION DUFF PUT TWO QUESTIONS.

(A) WERE THESE UNITS ANY LONGER REALLY NECESSARY IN SECURITY TERMS? COULD THEY NOT BE WITHDRAWN ACROSS THE BORDER AND HELD IN READINESS TO COME IN AS A FIRE FORCE IF THE SITUATION DEMANDED?

(B) WHY WAS IT NOT POSSIBLE TO DILUTE THEM WITH RHODESIAN PERSONNEL SO THAT THEY WOULD BE MORE IN KEEPING WITH THE GENERAL PATTERN OF SOUTH AFRICAN PERSONNEL SPREAD THROUGH THE RHODESIAN FORCES?

2. WALLS CONFIRMED THE POSITION AS WE HAVE RECENTLY DESCRIBED IT (MY TELEGRAM NO 57). A HEADQUARTERS UNIT AT MADALAUTA, WHICH INCLUDES RHODESIAN COMMUNICATORS, AND RHODESIAN ENGINEERS WHOSE CHIEF JOB IS TO KEEP EFFECTIVE THE MINE FIELDS ALONG THE BORDER. A

COMPANY TO THE SOUTH-WEST, ANOTHER TO THE WEST, AND A THIRD TO THE NORTH-WEST, EACH ONE ABOUT 20 MILES AWAY. THE COUNTRY IS ROUGH, BUT CONTAINS SOME PROTECTED VILLAGES. THE TRACKS INTO THE AREA (WALLS CLAIMS) ARE HEAVILY MINED. COMMUNICATION IS THEREFORE VIA THE AIR STRIP AT MABALAUTA. WALLS CLAIMS THAT THERE IS A PRESSING NEED TO KEEP FORCES IN THE AREA IN ORDER TO PREVENT, OR AT LEAST LIMIT, GUERRILLA MOVEMENT INTO THE FARMING AREAS TO THE NORTH-WEST: AND ATTACKS ON THE ROAD AND RAIL LINKS, AND THE FARMING AREAS, TO THE WEST. IN SHORT, THESE FORCES ARE REGARDED AS A NECESSARY DETERRENT TO INFILTRATION ACROSS THAT PART OF THE BORDER AND A HINDRANCE TO MOVEMENT AGAINST TARGETS TO THE WEST.

3. WALLS CLAIMS THAT, FOR THE REASONS EXPLAINED ABOVE, HE CANNOT LEAVE THE AREA EMPTY. ON THE OTHER HAND, HE SAYS, THE RHODESIAN FORCES ARE SO STRETCHED THAT HE COULD NOT DIVERT ANY RHODESIAN UNITS TO TAKE OVER THESE TASKS FROM THE SOUTH AFRICANS. THIS LEADS HIM ON TO HIS GENERAL THESIS THAT THE SITUATION IN THE COUNTRY IS WORSE THAN BEFORE THE CEASEFIRE. A LARGE NUMBER OF THE MEN IN THE ASSEMBLY AREAS ARE NOT GENUINE P F FORCES, AND INFILTRATION ACROSS BOTH THE ZAMBIAN AND MOZAMBIQUE BORDER CONTINUES ON A LARGE SCALE. (AS THE RHODESIANS ARE NOT OPERATING ACROSS THE BORDERS THEY CANNOT EFFECTIVELY PREVENT THIS, AS THEY HAVE DONE IN THE PAST.) THE NET RESULT IS THAT THE RHODESIANS HAVE NOT RE-ESTABLISHED CONTROL OVER THE SECURITY SITUATION IN THE COUNTRY, LET ALONE GOT ON TOP OF IT AS THEY MIGHT HAVE HOPED TO DO IF THE P F HAD GENUINELY ASSEMBLED AND OBSERVED THE CEASEFIRE. WALLS IS, MOREOVER, ACUTELY CONSCIOUS OF THE FACT THAT THE OVERALL THREAT IS WORSE IN THAT, BECAUSE OF INFILTRATION, THE TOTAL NUMBER OF GENUINE P F FIGHTING MEN IN THE COUNTRY (INCLUDING IN THE ASSEMBLY AREAS) IS MUCH LARGER THAN BEFORE. HE IS VERY WORRIED ABOUT THE SITUATION THAT WOULD CONFRONT HIM IF THERE WERE A MASSIVE EXODUS FROM THE ASSEMBLY AREAS, LET ALONE (AS HE SOMETIMES FEARS) A DELIBERATE ATTEMPT TO OVERWHELM THE COUNTRY WITH THE QUOTE "MASSES UNQUOTE NOW AVAILABLE TO THE P F COMMAND - MASSES WHICH WILL BE INCREASED BY THE ARMS TRAINING WHICH CAN NOW BE GIVEN WITHIN THE ASSEMBLY AREAS BY THE TRAINED FIGHTERS TO THOSE UNTRAINED MEN WHO HAVE COME IN TO SWELL THE NUMBERS.

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SEE MY I F T.

SCAMES

F I L E S

RHODESIA. D.

PS

PS/EPS

PS/MR. LUCE

PS/PUS

MR DAY

S E C R E T

GR 1304

D E D I P

SECRET

FR SALISBURY 121543Z JAN 68

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 149 OF 12 JANUARY

INFO IMMEDIATE CAPE TOWN (PERSONAL FOR AMBASSADOR)

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SECRET

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SEE MY I F T.

SGAMES

F I L E S

RHODESIA D
PS
PS/LPS
PS/MR LUCE
PS/PJS
MR DAY

OFFICE OF THE COMMONWEALTH SECRETARY-GENERAL
MARLBOROUGH HOUSE · PALL MALL · LONDON SW1Y 5HX

Mufaxed to Chequers
Copied to FCO

18.00
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ABJ.

12 January 1980

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My dear Prime Minister,

I am writing out of deep concern. The prize of peace and a democratic solution in Rhodesia is close at hand and your contribution to it has been monumental. But despite major achievements and a level of success with the ceasefire that exceeds even the most optimistic forecasts, there is now a grave and present danger of its collapse, or of even worse disasters.

Two factors above all others are contributing to this. First, a situation in which the use of the Governor's 'reserve' power to call on either the Patriotic Front or Rhodesian forces to aid the civil power has produced a result that is widely understood as allowing the latter, including the highly politically partisan 'auxiliaries' to be 'at large'. The report that a Rhodesian air force strike had actually been ordered against a small number of Patriotic Front forces not yet assembled, and yesterday's killing of others, are clearly not in the spirit of the Lancaster House agreements and understandings. They only fuel the contention that the implementation of the ceasefire and the administration of the transition is not even-handed. It is in this latter area of loss of confidence that, perhaps, the greatest threat to success lies.


The second factor of danger is the continued presence of South African forces in Rhodesia despite the clearest assurances to the contrary given by the British government to the Patriotic Front - assurances which were critical to securing agreement to the ceasefire proposals and, therefore, to the Lancaster House agreements in general. As you know, they were assurances I helped to convince the Patriotic Front leaders they could accept as a sufficient guarantee of implementation. But my personal embarrassment is as nothing compared with the sense of outrage their open breach has predictably produced in Africa. It adds further

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The Rt. Hon. Margaret Thatcher M. P.
Prime Minister of Britain
Prime Minister's Office
No. 10, Downing Street
London S. W. 1

pressure to the strain on confidence that I referred to earlier, quite apart from the spectre of South African 'intervention' that it inevitably raises.

I know, of course, how difficult is the Governor's role; but it will become altogether untenable unless we speedily improve the situation. I have not been pessimistic in the past. I ask you to believe that I write now only because I sense massive dangers. The Commonwealth, the Front Line states in particular, want to help. The story since Lusaka has been one of steady achievement through collective Commonwealth effort - achievement which would not have been possible without such teamwork. We could fail even now if we fail to hold the team together. I appeal for your personal help to sustain it.

Yours sincerely,


Shridath S. Ramphal

SUBJECT

cc. Minister
ees



PRIME MINISTER'S

PERSONAL MESSAGE

SERIAL No. T 8 A / 80

THE STATE HOUSE,
DAR ES SALAAM,
TANZANIA.

12th January, 1980.

Mrs. Margaret Thatcher,
The Prime Minister,
10 Downing Street,
London, S.W.1.

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Rund

Dear Mrs. Thatcher,

As you will have heard, there was a Front-Line States Summit Meeting at Beira on 10th January. We were discussing developments in Rhodesia since the arrival in Salisbury of the British Governor, and in particular a series of actions by, or with the endorsement of, the British authorities there which seem to us to be in breach of the letter and the spirit of the Lancaster House Agreement.

We agreed that while each Government may wish to make a direct approach to the British Government, I should also write to you on behalf of all five states because the Lancaster House Agreement followed from the discussions and agreement at Lusaka in which you were personally involved. Indeed it was partly the Lusaka discussions, and your own commitment to the agreement reached there, which gave us confidence that any agreement reached in London would be carried out honourably by Britain.

In particular, my colleagues and I considered and wish to protest about the following British actions which are a breach of the letter and the spirit of the Lancaster House Agreement.

1. The presence of South African troops in Rhodesia, contrary to assurances given in London, and since repeated in a printed interview given by Lord Carrington. That South African troops are 'guarding Beit Bridge' is now admitted by the British Governor, who says he has authorised this intervention. We believe that there are other South African Forces elsewhere in the territory; this is also implied by some of the reported statements of the South Africans themselves.
2. When the Patriotic Front leaders were proved to be correct in their statements that the seven days for the

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Assembly of their Forces was too short, and the number of Assembly Points inadequate because they had more than the 16,000 troops estimated by the British, the Governor failed to act according to the assurances given in London. He did not increase the number of Assembly Points; nor did he act with 'common-sense' and in a spirit conducive to the success of the Cease Fire and the build-up to the elections. When some thousands of Patriotic Front soldiers were still moving to the agreed Points after the dead-line, the Governor responded by declaring an 'amnesty' on condition that they surrendered their weapons, as if they were rebels graciously being pardoned. Even worse, it now appears that the Governor expects them to surrender their weapons to their enemies and not to the Monitoring Forces. Already a number of Freedom Fighters trying to join their colleagues in the Assembly Points have been shot and killed in cold blood.

3. During the period of Assembly, the Governor twice called upon the Smith/Muzorewa troops to deal with what he alleged were specific breaches of the peace. Within two or three days after the 'deadline', and even less time after his 'amnesty offer', the Governor then announced the 'deployment' of the Smith/Muzorewa troops to deal with what were sometimes called 'armed gangs' and sometimes 'the 3,000 Patriotic Front troops who have not reported in'. There is apparently no specific incident they were supposed to deal with; they are being used 'to keep the peace' in direct contravention of the Lancaster House Agreement which says that they will be confined to their quarters at Company Level throughout the Cease Fire period. It was a group of these Smith/Muzorewa Forces which killed the Patriotic Front soldiers who were going to an Assembly Point. The Governor is reported to have regretted the deaths but said the Rhodesians were 'acting within their rights' in the murders!

4. The Salisbury Auxiliary Forces - i.e. armed supporters of Bishop Muzorewa - were supposed to have been incorporated into the Salisbury Army and confined like them to their quarters in accordance with the Cease Fire Provisions of the London Agreement. Instead they have been left at large, and are in fact now moving into and occupying the areas left vacant by the Patriotic Front Forces when these moved to the Assembly Points in accordance with that Agreement. These

Auxiliary Forces are now terrorising and intimidating the people of those areas. Further, the Patriotic Front Forces in the Assembly Points are themselves being gradually encircled by the Forces of their racist enemies; their fears of such a thing happening were rejected in London on the grounds that the Salisbury Forces would also be confined to barracks and would be Monitored there. No action has been taken by the Governor against the Auxiliary Forces or any other of the Smith/Muzorewa troops; neither the Patriotic Front Forces under his command, nor any others, have been used to rectify this situation.

As far as we can gather, at no point has the Governor called upon the Cease Fire Commission - on which both sides are represented - to consider a serious breach of the Cease Fire. Yet the Agreement lays down this procedure, and says that it is the Commission which should deal with such Cease Fire violations or should advise the Governor how to act.

5. On the political side, Bishop Muzorewa went back to Salisbury to begin political campaigning even before the Conference was over. The Patriotic Front leaders are apparently expected to get the Governor's permission to return to their homeland. Joshua Nkomo himself has already been told once to postpone his planned arrival, because it would clash with a rally by the Bishop's supporters. Some ZANU leaders have also been told they could not return as planned. One of the persons not so far allowed to return home is the ZANU Director of Elections. We understand that some of the Patriotic Front leaders have now been told that they will not be allowed to return home on either a Saturday or a Sunday! Once again this is a clear political interference on the side of the Bishop and the Salisbury group of nationalists.

6. There are many similar but smaller evidences of gross bias by the British authorities in Salisbury. But the important thing is that all these incidents mean that Britain is itself now dishonouring the Agreement which was reached under its Chairmanship in London. Further, the Commonwealth at Lusaka, and the Security Council when it lifted sanctions, entrusted to the British Government the responsibility of seeing that the London Agreement was impartially enforced. It is not being so enforced.

As I told your High Commissioner on 11th January, and repeated at my later Press Conference, the Front Line States

agreed to accept any Government elected in Rhodesia by free and fair elections. But that condition has always existed; it still does. Those elections cannot be free and fair if South African troops are in Rhodesia; the very presence of such troops is intimidation and an indication of that Government's intentions if the Patriotic Front Parties should win the election despite everything. The elections will not be free and fair if the Smith/Muzorewa Forces are allowed to roam at large and to intimidate the people now that they have been 'deployed' by the Governor. Indeed, the whole peace-making exercise will break down if the present bias continues to be practiced and if the terms of the Lancaster House Agreement are not enforced.

Mrs. Thatcher, my colleagues and I cannot believe that you are yourself a party to any of the actions which call into question Britain's good faith since Lusaka. Lord Carrington and his Deputy are, I know, both out of Britain on other business, which also preoccupied them before they left. It may be, therefore, that these matters - important as they are - escaped their attention, and that you yourself have therefore been left in ignorance of the grave danger which exists consequent to the dishonouring of the London Agreement. I am now appealing to you to give this matter your personal attention so as to save the opportunity for peace in Southern Africa which your own actions created.

Yours sincerely,

Julius K. Nyerere

CONFIDENTIAL

GR 1000

CONFIDENTIAL

FM SALISBURY 121755Z JAN 80

TOP COPY

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 152 OF 12 JANUARY

INFO IMMEDIATE LUSAKA DAR ES SALAAM MAPUTO WASHINGTON UKMIS NEW YORK LUANDA GABORONE PRETORIA LAGOS EEC POSTS CANBERRA OTTAWA WELLINGTON SUVA NAIROBI

Z A N L A: OBSERVANCE OF THE CEASE-FIRE

1. ON 10 DECEMBER 1979 10-12,000 Z A N L A GUERRILLAS WERE ESTIMATED TO BE OPERATING IN RHODESIA. 6,000 OR SO WERE UNDER TRAINING IN MOZAMBIQUE, WITH ANOTHER 6,000 UNDER TRAINING ELSEWHERE (INCLUDING OVER 1,200 IN TANZANIA, 2,000 IN LIBYA AND 2,000 IN ETHIOPIA). AT LANCASTER HOUSE TONGOGARA CLAIMED TO HAVE 21,000 Z A N L A PERSONNEL IN RHODESIA. THIS EXAGGERATED FIGURE WAS PROBABLY PUT FORWARD (A) TO INCLUDE MUJIBAS, AND (B) TO JUSTIFY THE SUBSEQUENT MOVEMENT OF Z A N L A PERSONNEL INTO RHODESIA.
2. ON 12 JANUARY THERE WERE 15,000 Z A N L A PERSONNEL IN THE ASSEMBLY CAMPS. THIS REFLECTS CROSS-BORDER MOVEMENT ON A SIGNIFICANT SCALE, AND THE INTRODUCTION OF QUOTE MUJIBAS UNQUOTE INTO THE ASSEMBLY AREAS TO SWELL THE NUMBERS. THERE IS INDEED STRONG EVIDENCE OF LARGE-SCALE Z A N L A INFILTRATION BOTH BEFORE AND AFTER SIGNATURE OF THE CEASE-FIRE AGREEMENT ON 21 DECEMBER. THE PATRIOTIC FRONT THEMSELVES AGREED WITH THE RHODESIAN COMMANDERS IN ESTIMATING THAT THERE COULD BE 3,000 Z A N L A IN THE THRASHER (MANICALAND) AREA AT THE START OF THE ASSEMBLY PROCESS. THERE ARE NOW 5,700 IN THE ASSEMBLY POINT FOR THAT AREA ALONE (ASSEMBLY POINT F) RENDEZVOUS POINT F4, NEAR THE MOZAMBIQUE BORDER NORTH OF UMTALI, CLEARLY SERVED AS A COLLECTING POINT FOR PERSONNEL CROSSING INTO RHODESIA. SOME 3,000 Z A N L A PERSONNEL PASSED THROUGH THIS RENDEZVOUS POINT IN THE LAST 48 HOURS OF THE ASSEMBLY PROCESS.
3. ON HIS RETURN FROM LANCASTER HOUSE, TONGOGARA IS REPORTED TO HAVE TOLD COLLEAGUES THAT HE WOULD BE ABLE TO MOVE QUOTE ANY NUMBER OF MEN UNQUOTE, NOTIONALLY AS UNARMED CIVILIANS BUT ACTUALLY AS TRAINED GUERRILLAS, INTO RHODESIA, KNOWING THAT ARMS CACHES WOULD

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/BE WAITING

CONFIDENTIAL

BE WAITING FOR THEM. A SENIOR Z A N L A COMMANDER IN HEADQUARTERS IS REPORTED BY OTHER INTELLIGENCE SOURCES TO HAVE TOLD Z A N L A COMMANDERS IN SALISBURY THAT THE HIGH COMMAND INTENDED TO INFILTRATE 5,000 PERSONNEL INTO RHODESIA AFTER THE ASSEMBLY PROCESS. THEY WOULD DUMP THEIR ARMS IN CACHES AND QUOTE POLITICISE UNQUOTE THE POPULATION UNTIL AFTER THE ELECTIONS.

4. APART FROM INFILTRATION ON A SCALE WHICH IS INCOMPATIBLE WITH THE LANCASTER HOUSE AGREEMENTS, THERE IS ALSO EVIDENCE THAT Z A N L A COMMANDERS HAVE GIVEN INSTRUCTIONS THAT A PROPORTION OF Z A N L A INSIDE RHODESIA (INCLUDING THE MOST IMPORTANT CADRES) SHOULD STAY OUT OF THE ASSEMBLY PROCESS. IN THE MUTEMA AREA CLOSE TO THE MOZAMBIQUE BORDER SOUTH OF UMTALI, A CAPTURED Z A N L A COMMANDER HAS REVELED (ACCORDING TO THE POLICE) THAT OUT OF 9 Z A N L A SECTIONS IN THE AREA, 2 AND A HALF JOINED THE ASSEMBLY PROCESS, 4 WITHDREW FOR RE-SUPPLY INTO MOZAMBIQUE, AND 2 AND A HALF HAVE REMAINED WITH THEIR ARMS IN THE VILLAGES TO ENSURE THAT THE VILLAGERS VOTE FOR Z A N U. IT IS QUITE POSSIBLE THAT THIS PATTERN HAS BEEN REPEATED IN OTHER AREAS. QUESTIONING OF Z A N L A ELEMENTS WHO DID NOT JOIN ASSEMBLY PROCESS PROVIDES EVIDENCE OF CROSS-BORDER MOVEMENT THROUGHOUT THE ASSEMBLY PROCESS. OTHER Z A N L A ELEMENTS, BASING THEMSELVES ON MUGABE'S REPEATED STATEMENTS THAT IT WOULD TAKE 6-8 WEEKS TO BRING THE CEASE-FIRE INTO EFFECT ARE REMAINING OUTSIDE THE ASSEMBLY PROCESS IN GROUPS WITH THEIR ARMS (WHEREAS NKOMO AND THE Z I P R A COMMANDERS GAVE CLEAR INSTRUCTIONS TO THEIR FORCES TO ASSEMBLE ON THE TIMESCALE ENVISAGED AT LANCASTER HOUSE.

5. THE CONDUCT OF Z A N L A FORCES DURING THE ASSEMBLY PROCESS WAS IN MARKED CONTRAST TO THAT OF Z I P R A. OF THE AVERAGE DAILY LEVEL OF INCIDENTS SINCE 28 DECEMBER, IN WHICH VIOLENCE HAS BEEN USED OR THREATENED, 90 PER CENT HAVE BEEN ATTRIBUTABLE TO Z A N L A. LARGE Z A N L A GROUPS STAYED OUT OF THE RENDEZVOUS POINTS OR ASSEMBLY PLACES FOR THE FIRST SIX DAYS OF THE ASSEMBLY PROCESS IN ORDER TO POLITICISE AND INDEED TERRORISE THE COUNTRY-SIDE. THEY HAD A FAIR MEASURE OF SUCCESS IN DOING SO. A LARGE NUMBER OF INCIDENTS WHICH OCCURRED THROUGHOUT THIS PERIOD WERE ATTRIBUTABLE TO Z A N L A. THERE ARE INNUMERABLE INCIDENTS OF VILLAGERS HAVING BEEN TOLD THAT UNLESS THEY VOTED FOR MUGABE THE WAR WOULD CONTINUE AND THEY WOULD BE KILLED.

CONFIDENTIAL

6. THERE ARE ADMITTED BY THE MOZAMBICAN GOVERNMENT TO BE 500 FRELIMO WITH THE Z A N L A FORCES. OF THESE, HARDLY ANY HAVE SO FAR BEEN IDENTIFIED. THE ONLY SIGNIFICANT GROUP OF FRELIMO SO FAR RECOVERED CONSISTS OF 18 FRELIMO SOLDIERS WHO SURRENDERED TO THE POLICE AND SECURITY FORCES WITHIN THE LEAST 48 HOURS (LONG AFTER THE COMPLETION OF THE ASSEMBLY PROCESS).

7. THE Z A N L A MILITARY COMMANDERS AND THE Z A N U ADVANCE GUARD HAVE ALSO SOUGHT TO BRING INTO RHODESIA FOR USE IN THE ELECTION CAMPAIGN HIGHLY INFLAMMATORY PROPAGANDA MATERIAL ILLUMINATING THE THEME THAT POWER MUST BE WON BY FORCE AND INCLUDING THE SLOGAN: QUOTE DEATH TO THE BRITISH COLONIAL TROOPS UNQUOTE. THIS HAS BEEN IMPOUNDED. WHEN ASKED ABOUT THIS, Z A N U ORIGINALLY ARGUED THAT THESE PAMPHLETS WERE PRINTED A YEAR AGO. THE LATEST VERSIONS WERE REPRINTED IN MAPUTO IN DECEMBER 1979.

(A) THERE HAS BEEN CROSS-BORDER MOVEMENT BY ZANLA ON A SIGNIFICANT SCALE, IN BREACH OF THE CEASE-FIRE AGREEMENT

(B) THE COMMITMENT OF THE ZAPU/ZIPRA LEADERSHIP TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE LANCASTER HOUSE AGREEMENT IN UNMARKED CONTRAST TO THAT OF ZANU

(C) OVER 80% OF THE INCIDENTS ATTRIBUTABLE TO THE PATRIOTIC FRONT DURING AND AFTER THE ASSEMBLY PROCESS WERE THE RESPONSIBILITY OF ZANLA

(D) A PROPORTION OF ZANLA FORCES HAVE BEEN ORDERED TO STAY OUTSIDE THE ASSEMBLY PROCESS.

8. THE ABOVE MAY BE USED FREELY EXCEPT FOR THE DIRECT ATTRIBUTIONS IN PARAGRAPH 3 TO TONGOGARA. A LIST OF THE VERY LARGE NUMBER OF ZANLA VIOLATIONS OF THE CEASE-FIRE AGREEMENT SINCE 26 DECEMBER IS BEING TELEGRAPHED TO CERTAIN POSTS.
CONCLUSIONS.

CONFIDENTIAL

7. WE ARE STILL WORKING ON THE INTELLIGENCE, AND THE INFORMATION FROM THE ASSEMBLY AREAS, IN AN ATTEMPT TO MAKE UP AS PRECISE A CASE AS POSSIBLE IN REGARD TO ZANLA BEHAVIOUR AND ZANU (MUGABE) INTENTIONS. THE PICTURE PAINTED ABOVE MAY NOT BE ACCURATE IN ALL ITS DETAILS. MEANWHILE HOWEVER THE FOLLOWING CONCLUSIONS ARE JUSTIFIED, AND CAN BE BACKED UP IN DISCUSSION BY JUDICIOUS USE OF PARAS 1-7.

SOAMES

F I L E S

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|----------------|------------------|
| RHOD D | OID |
| OADS | NEWS D |
| NAD | PS |
| MED | PS/SIR I GILMOUR |
| PUSD | PS/MR LUCE |
| PLANNING STAFF | PS/MR RIDLEY |
| ES & SD | PS/MR HURD |
| NENAD | PS/MR MARTEN |
| CCD | PS/PUS |
| FRD | SIR D MAITLAND |
| EID (E) | |
| UND | MR HANNAY |
| LEGAL ADVISERS | LORD N G LENNOX |
| (MR FREELAND) | MISS BROWN |
| (MR FIFOOT) | MR DAY |
| ECON D | MR FERGUSSON |
| PCD | MR ASPIN |
| DEF D | MR MILLS |
| IPD | |

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION
RHODESIA POLICY

[RHODESIA: POLICY: ADVANCE COPIES]

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PS/SIR I GILMOUR
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LORD N G LENNOX
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MR R L WADE GERY)
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MR GOULTY) OFFICE
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DIO)

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+30

HD/RHOD DEPT (4)

HD/C AF D
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HD/PUSD (2)

HD/NEWS DEPT
HE/WAD

MR FREELAND LEGAL ADVISER RMK200A
MR FIFOOT LEGAL ADVISER RM K164

RESIDENT CLERK

CONFIDENTIAL

FROM SALISBURY 120835Z JAN 80
TO IMMEDIATE MAPUTO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 50 OF 12 JANUARY 1980

INFO PRIORITY FCO.

RHODESIA: MOZAMBIQUE.

1. HONWANA, THE HEAD OF THE MOZAMBIKAN LIAISON OFFICE IN SALISBURY, HAD A MEETING WITH GENERAL WALLS ON 10 JANUARY. HONWANA TOLD US YESTERDAY THAT THE MEETING HAD GONE WELL: HE HAD FOUND WALLS PERSONALLY IMPRESSIVE AND THE ATMOSPHERE HAD BEEN FRIENDLY. WALLS HAD EMPHASISED THE IMPORTANCE HE ATTACHED TO NORMALISING RELATIONS BETWEEN MOZAMBIQUE AND RHODESIA AND HONWANA HAD REPLIED THAT THIS WAS EXACTLY THE POSITION OF HIS GOVERNMENT. WALLS HAD COMPLAINED ABOUT CONTINUED BORDER CROSSING BY ZANLA: HONWANA HAD SAID THAT HIS GOVERNMENT WERE WELL AWARE OF THE PROBLEM AND WERE DOING EVERYTHING THEY COULD TO STOP IT. HONWANA SAID THAT HIS ONLY DISAPPOINTMENT HAD BEEN WHEN HE HAD RAISED WITH WALLS THE QUESTION OF THE FUTURE OF THE PF FORCES AND THEIR POSSIBLE INTEGRATION WITH THE RHODESIAN FORCES: WALLS HAD AVOIDED DISCUSSING THIS QUESTION AND HAD CHANGED THE SUBJECT.

2. HONWANA IS RETURNING TO MAPUTO TODAY FOR CONSULTATIONS WITH PRESIDENT MACHEL. WE HAVE RAISED WITH HIM AGAIN THE QUESTION OF

2. HONWANA IS RETURNING TO MAPUTO TODAY FOR CONSULTATIONS WITH PRESIDENT MACHEL. WE HAVE RAISED WITH HIM AGAIN THE QUESTION OF THE ZAPU DETAINEES AND THE "VOICE OF ZIMBABWE". HONWANA PROMISED TO TRY TO GET ACTION ON BOTH SUBJECTS.

FCO PSE PASS

SOAMES

NNNN

(files)

IMMEDIATE

33

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PS (6)
PS/SIR I GILMOUR
PS/MR LUCE
PS/PUS
SIR D MAITLAND
MR DAY
LORD N G LENNOX
MR ASPIN

PS/NO 10 DOWNING STREET

SIR R ARMSTRONG)
MR R L WADE GERY)
MR P M MAXEY) CABINET
MR GOULTY) OFFICE
MR P J FOWLER)
DIO)

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HD/RHOD DEPT (4)

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HD/PUSD (2)

HD/NEWS DEPT
HE/WAD

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FM MAPUTO 121200Z JANUARY 80

TO IMMEDIATE SALISBURY

TELEGRAM NUMBER 71 OF 12 JANUARY

INFO IMMEDIATE FCO

PRIORITY LUSAKA DAR ES SALAAM GABORONE LAGOS WASHINGTON

MY TELNO 44: RHODESIA/MOZAMBIQUE

1. I HAD NINETY (90) MINUTES WITH PRESIDENT MACHEL THIS MORNING. THIS WAS IN RESPONSE TO MY REQUEST. I NOW DOUBT IF HE WOULD HAVE SENT FOR ME GIVEN THAT NYERERE WAS CHARGED WITH FOLLOWING UP THE BEIRA MEETING. INDEED, MACHEL HARDLY REFERRED TO IT.

2. I BEGAN BY ASSURING THE PRESIDENT OF YOUR DESIRE TO MAKE FURTHER PROGRESS TOWARDS NORMALIZATION OF RELATIONS BETWEEN RHODESIA AND MOZAMBIQUE. A GOOD START HAD BEEN MADE WITH LIAISON ARRANGEMENTS IN THE TWO CAPITALS, THE COMMUNICATIONS MEETING IN SALISBURY AND THE REFUGEES MEETING IN LONDON ON 4 JANUARY. THE FIRST PRIORITY WAS, HOWEVER, THE PROBLEM OF CROSS BORDER MOVEMENTS BY ZANLA FORCES. WE DID NOT DOUBT THE MOZAMBICANS GOOD INTENTIONS AND WE RECOGNIZED THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF HAVING THE ENTIRE BORDER COMPLETELY SEALED BY MILITARY MEANS. HOWEVER, FURTHER EFFORTS WERE NECESSARY AND, AS !

DID NOT DOUBT THE MOZAMBICANS GOOD INTENTIONS AND WE RECOGNIZED THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF HAVING THE ENTIRE BORDER COMPLETELY SEALED BY MILITARY MEANS. HOWEVER, FURTHER EFFORTS WERE NECESSARY AND, AS I SAW IT, THE MOST EFFECTIVE ACTION NOW WOULD BE PRESSURE ON ZANU BY THE MOZAMBICANS. ACCORDING TO OUR INFORMATION MORE THAN 5,000 ZANLA HAD CROSSED THE BORDER AFTER 21 DECEMBER (YOUR TELNO 39) AND, WHILE MANY HAD ASSEMBLED, LARGE NUMBERS STILL REMAINED ARMED AND AT LARGE ENGAGING IN ACTIVITIES WHICH WERE INCOMPATIBLE WITH THE SPIRIT AS WELL AS THE LETTER OF THE LONDON AGREEMENTS. I REMINDED THE PRESIDENT THAT HE HAD FREQUENTLY ENDORSED OUR VIEW THAT INTIMIDATION AS WELL AS ACTUAL VIOLENCE MUST BE ELIMINATED. UANC SUPPORTERS HAD RECENTLY BEEN GAOLED FOR INTIMIDATION. ZANLA WERE CERTAINLY GUILTY OF POLITICIZING AND INTIMIDATING VILLAGES AND YOU THEREFORE HAD NO OPTION BUT TO USE THE POLICE, WHERE NECESSARY BACKED BY OTHER UNITS, TO BRING THE OUTSTANDING ZANLA GROUPS UNDER CONTROL.

3. I SAID THAT THE ZANU LEADERSHIP WAS VERY LARGELY RESPONSIBLE FOR THIS SITUATION MAINLY BECAUSE OF MUGABE'S UNEXPLAINED DILATORINESS IN MOVING FAST AND AS EFFECTIVELY AS NKOMO HAD DONE WITH INSTRUCTIONS TO HIS FORCES. I REMINDED THE PRESIDENT THAT MUGABE'S FIRST - AND HIGHLY UNSATISFACTORY - 'CEASEFIRE' MESSAGE DID NOT GO OUT UNTIL 27 DECEMBER; AND THAT THE MORE PRECISE INSTRUCTIONS, WHICH HE BROADCAST ONLY AFTER I HAD MADE REPRESENTATIONS TO HIM, DID NOT GO OUT UNTIL 29 DECEMBER. I ALSO POINTED OUT THAT, EVEN WHEN ONE MADE EVERY ALLOWANCE FOR THE SHOCK OF TONGOGARA'S DEATH, IT WAS INEXCUSABLE THAT SEVERAL MORE DAYS, WERE LOST BEFORE ALTERNATIVE ACTION WAS TAKEN.

4. TURNING TO ZANU'S COMPLAINTS THAT WE HAVE BEEN FRUSTRATING THEIR PLANS FOR AN EARLY RETURN TO SALISBURY I EXPLAINED YOUR CONCERN TO ENSURE ADEQUATE SECURITY AND EFFECTIVE CROWD CONTROL USING A POLICE FORCE ALREADY OVERSTRETCHED BECAUSE OF ZANLA-CREATED INCIDENTS. I GAVE THE PRESIDENT EXAMPLES OF INADEQUATE NOTICE BY ZANU, THEIR CHOICE OF UNSUITABLE DATES ETC. HOWEVER, I COULD NOW CONFIRM THAT TWO FLIGHTS, ON 14 AND 15 JANUARY, HAVE BEEN DEFINITELY ARRANGED.

5. I THEN MADE A PLEA FOR THE RELEASE OF ALL RHODESIAN DETAINEES HELD IN MOZAMBIQUE, WHETHER AT THE INSTANCE OF ZANU OR BY THE MOZAMBICAN AUTHORITIES, POINTING OUT THAT YOU HAD ALREADY DECLARED AN AMNESTY AND EVEN COMMUTED DEATH SENTENCES ON COMMON CRIMINALS.

6. THE PRESIDENT ASSURED ME THAT HE HAD FOUND MY DETAILED EXPOSE VERY USEFUL. THE UK AND MOZAMBIQUE HAD A SPECIAL RESPONSIBILITY TO ENSURE THAT ALL ASPECTS OF THE LONDON AGREEMENTS WERE PROPERLY IMPLEMENTED. HE WAS GLAD THAT WE DID NOT DOUBT THE SINCERITY OF

ENSURE THAT ALL ASPECTS OF THE LONDON AGREEMENTS WERE PROPERLY IMPLEMENTED. HE WAS GLAD THAT WE DID NOT DOUBT THE SINCERITY OF THEIR INTENTIONS AND OF THEIR ACTIONS IN TRYING TO STOP CROSS BORDER ACTIVITY BY ZANLA. THE MOZAMBICANS HAD IN FACT HAD CONSIDERABLE SUCCESS AND IN SOME CASES THEY ROUNDED UP AND DISARMED GROUPS WHICH HAD INTENDED TO CROSS THE FRONTIER. HE HAD ALREADY SPOKEN TO ZANU AND HE WILL INSIST WITH THEM THAT THERE ARE NO VIOLATIONS. HOWEVER, IT BEHOVED YOU TO SHOW MUCH MORE FLEXIBILITY: WE HAD TO MAKE ALLOWANCES FOR THE FACT THAT WE ARE NOT DEALING WITH REGIMENTED DISCIPLINED ARMIES. HE CONCEDED THAT THE ZANU LEADERSHIP HAD BEEN DILATORY. HE HIMSELF HAD TO SHAKE MUGABE OUT OF HIS STATE OF SHOCK AFTER TONGOGARA'S DEATH AND PERSUADE HIM TO USE SOMEONE ELSE TO CONVEY ORDERS TO ZANLA. HOWEVER, VALUABLE TIME HAD BEEN LOST AND THE TIME ALLOWED FOR ASSEMBLY HAD BEEN UNREALISTICALLY SHORT. HE STRESSED AGAIN THE NEED FOR FLEXIBILITY AND STRONGLY ADVISED GREATER USE OF THE ZANLA COMMANDERS ALREADY IN RHODESIA FOR DEFUSING INCIDENTS AND BRINGING OUTSTANDING GROUPS UNDER CONTROL. THE AVERAGE GUERRILLA WOULD NOT TAKE ORDERS FROM RHODESIAN POLICE AND/OR SECURITY FORCES WHOM HE HAD ENGAGED IN A LONG WAR. HE WOULD NOT SEE THEM AS LAWFUL TROOPS ACTING WITH YOUR AUTHORITY. I STRESSED THAT YOU HAD ALREADY USED THE CEASEFIRE MACHINERY, AND THE ZANLA COMMANDERS FORMING PART OF IT, IN MANY INSTANCES, BUT THAT YOU WERE ACTING WITHIN THE LONDON AGREEMENT WHEN YOU HAD NO ALTERNATIVE BUT TO CALL UPON THE RHODESIAN FORCES.

7. ON DETAINEES THE PRESIDENT SAID THAT THERE WERE FOUR CATEGORIES. FIRST, THE 70 ODD ON THE LIST WHICH I HAD SUPPLIED (MY TEL NO 17 TO FCO) THEY WERE AN INTERNAL ZANU PROBLEM AND HIS GOVERNMENT WAS IN HONOUR BOUND NOT TO INTERFERE. AS PART OF MOZAMBIQUE'S SUPPORT FOR ZANU THEY HAD, AS IT WERE, GIVEN THEM WHAT AMOUNTED TO EXTRA TERRITORIAL RIGHTS ON ONE CONDITION: THAT THERE SHOULD BE NO KILLINGS. HE REFUSED TO BE DRAWN ON ZANU'S INTENTIONS; AND HE SAID THAT THE INTERNECINE PROBLEMS WHICH HAD LED TO THESE DETENTIONS WERE SO COMPLEX THAT IT WOULD BE BETTER FOR US NOT TO INTERFERE. FOR ALL HE KNEW SOME OF THESE DETAINEES MAY HAVE BEEN GUILTY OF PLOTTING AGAINST LEADERS OF OTHER PARTIES AND WOULD POSE A REAL THREAT TO THEM IF RETURNED TO RHODESIA. SECOND, THERE WERE SOME 100 UANC SYMPATHISERS. THEY WERE TREATED AS REFUGEES, NOT AS PRISONERS, THOUGH THEIR MOVEMENTS HAD BEEN SOMEWHAT RESTRICTED DURING THE WAR FOR SECURITY REASONS (EG THEY MIGHT HAVE GUIDED RHODESIAN TROOPS TO PF CAMPS INSIDE MOZAMBIQUE). HE IMPLIED THAT THE RETURN OF THIS CATEGORY WAS A QUESTION OF A LITTLE MORE TIME. THE THIRD CATEGORY WAS OF RHODESIANS WHO HAD COMMITTED CRIMES ON MOZAMBIKAN TERRITORY AND WHO HAD EITHER BEEN TRIED OR WILL BE TRIED IN ACCORDANCE WITH MOZAMBIKAN LAW. HE DID NOT GIVE ME THE NUMBERS BUT HE STRESSED THAT THEY WERE NOT AMONG THE 71. FINALLY THERE WERE THE "SPIES" SOME

WAS OF RHODESIA WHO HAD COMMITTED CRIMES ON MOZAMBICAN TERRITORY AND WHO HAD EITHER BEEN TRIED OR WILL BE TRIED IN ACCORDANCE WITH MOZAMBICAN LAW. HE DID NOT GIVE ME THE NUMBERS BUT HE STRESSED THAT THEY WERE NOT AMONG THE 71. FINALLY THERE WERE THE "SPIES" SOME OF WHOM HAD COMMITTED CRIMES OF SUCH GRAVITY THAT THEY HAD BEEN EXECUTED.

8. HIS ONLY REFERENCE TO ZANU COMPLAINTS OF OBSTRUCTIONISM WAS AN ALLEGATION THAT WE HAD SO CONTRIVED NHONGO'S RETURN THAT HE WAS DEPRIVED OF A HERO'S WELCOME BY HALF A MILLION ZANU SUPPORTERS. I SAID THAT THIS WAS COMPLETE NEWS TO ME.

9. IN CONCLUSION MACHEL STRESSED AGAIN THE NEED FOR FLEXIBILITY AND IMPARTIALITY; AND HE WOULD URGE YOU NOT TO HESITATE TO SEEK THE ADVICE OF FERNANDO HONWANA WHO WAS ALWAYS AT YOUR DISPOSAL.

10. HE DID NOT RAISE THE SUBJECT OF SOUTH AFRICAN TROOPS NOR, I NEED HARDLY SAY, DID I.

PAPADOPOULOS

NNNN

IMMEDIATE

SENT AT/RCVD AT 121202Z AR/DP

[RHODESIA: POLICY: ADVANCE COPIES]

+ 31

PS

PS/SIR I GILMOUR

PS/MR LUCE

PS/PUS

~~SIR D MITTLAND~~

MR DAY

LORD N G LENNOX

MR ASPIN

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HD/RHOD DEPT (4)

HD/C AF D

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HD/PUSD (2)

HD/NEWS DEPT

HE/WAD

MR FREELAND LEGAL ADVISER RMK200A

MR FIFOOT LEGAL ADVISER RM K164

RESIDENT CLERK

PS/NO 10 DOWNING STREET

SIR R ARMSTRONG)

MR R L WADE GERY)

MR P M MAXEY)

MR GOULTY)

MR P J FOWLER)

DIO)

CABINET
OFFICE

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IMMEDIATE

GR 200

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BESKBY 121130Z FCO

DISK BY

FM DAR ES SALAAM 121000Z JANUARY 80

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 43 OF 12 JANUARY

INFO IMMEDIATE SALISBURY, LUSAKA, MAPUTO, GABORONE, LAGOS,

UKMIS NEW YORK, PRETORIA, WASHINGTON,

INFO PRIORITY LUANDA, ADDIS ABABA

MIPT: RHODESIA

1. AFTER THE MEETING WITH PRESIDENT NYERERE, MR MLOKA, PRINCIPAL SECRETARY MFA WHO HAD BEEN PRESENT, SPOKE TO ME. HE STRESSED HOW ANGRY NYERERE WAS, ADDING "I CANNOT TALK TO HIM". HE DREW MY ATTENTION TO WHAT NYERERE HAD SAID ABOUT THE SITUATION BEING WORSE THAN IN 1965 AND SAID THAT HE SAW THIS AS A CLEAR REFERENCE TO TANZANIA'S DECISION AT THAT TIME TO BREAK DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS.

2. I ASKED MR MLOKA ABOUT THE PROPOSAL REPORTED IN PARA 1 OF MY TELNO 40. HE CONFIRMED THAT NYERERE WISHED TO GO TO LONDON IN COMPANY WITH OTHER HEADS OF GOVERNMENT. BUT HE WOULD GO ALONE IF NECESSARY. I ASKED WHEN, AND HE SAID NEXT WEEK. I PRESUME THERE WILL BE SOME MENTION OF THIS IN THE PROMISED

DESKBY 121100Z

[RHODESIA: POLICY: ADVANCE COPIES]

PS 45
PS/SIR I GILMOUR
PS/MR LUCE
PS/PUS
SIR D MAITLAND
MR DAY
LORD N G LENNOX
MR ASPIN

730

PS/NO 10 DOWNING STREET

SIR R ARMSTRONG)
MR R L WADE GERY)
MR P M MAXEY) CABINET
MR GOULTY) OFFICE
MR P J FOWLER)
DIO)

IMMEDIATE

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HD/RHOD DEPT (4)

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HD/NEWS DEPT
HE/WAD

MR FREELAND LEGAL ADVISER RMK200A
MR FIFOOT LEGAL ADVISER RM K164
RESIDENT CLERK

GR 250

CONFIDENTIAL

FM DAR ES SALAAM 121000Z JANUARY 80

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 42 OF 12 JANUARY

INFO IMMEDIATE SALISBURY, LUSAKA, MAPUTO, GABORONE, LAGOS,
UKMIS NEW YORK, PRETORIA, WASHINGTON,
INFO PRIORITY LUANDA, ADDIS ABABA

MY TELNO 40: RHODESIA

1. I WAS SUMMONED THIS MORNING 12 JANUARY BY PRESIDENT NYERERE
ALONG WITH THE OTHER COMMONWEALTH REPRESENTATIVES

2. NYERERE EXPRESSED HIS SHOCK AND PROTEST AT THE KILLING
BY THE RHODESIAN SECURITY FORCES ACTING UNDER THE GOVERNOR'S
AUTHORITY OF A NUMBER OF PATRIOTIC FRONT FORCES WHO WERE ON
THEIR WAY TO AN ASSEMBLY POINT, AS REPORTED ON THE BBC. THIS
WAS MURDER, AND EVEN MORE SHOCKING THAN THE KILLING WAS THE
GOVERNOR'S ATTEMPT TO JUSTIFY IT. THERE WAS NO QUESTION IN
THIS CASE OF A BREACH OF THE CEASEFIRE, AND EVEN IF THERE HAD
BEEN, THE GOVERNOR SHOULD USE PEOPLE OF THE SAME PARTY TO
DEAL WITH IT. AND WHAT WAS THE MONITORING FORCE DOING WHEN
THIS HAPPENED?

3. NYERERE CONCLUDED THAT HE DID NOT KNOW WHAT TO DO. HE HAD

3. NYERERE CONCLUDED THAT HE DID NOT KNOW WHAT TO DO. HE HAD NEVER BELIEVED THAT THE BRITISH WERE GOING TO PRESIDE OVER MORE KILLINGS PERPETRATED BY THE SAME RACIST REBELS. THE SITUATION WAS FAR WORSE THAN IN 1965. THEN WE HAD JUST FAILED TO ACT; NOW WE WERE CONTINUING THE KILLING.

4. I SAID THAT THE GOVERNOR HAD EXPRESSED HIS REGRET AT THESE DEATHS WHICH I KNEW MY GOVERNMENT FULLY SHARED. I EXPLAINED THE REQUIREMENT THAT PF FORCES COMING IN AFTER THE DEADLINE WERE REQUIRED TO GIVE UP THEIR ARMS.

5. NYERERE REPEAT HIS SHOCK AT ATTEMPTS TO JUSTIFY THE KILLING. ADDRESSING PARTICULARLY THE AUSTRALIAN HIGH COMMISSIONER HE PRESSED AGAIN RHETORICALLY TO KNOW WHAT THE MONITORING FORCE WAS DOING.

6. THE CANADIAN HIGH COMMISSIONER EXPRESSED HIS GOVERNMENT'S WISH TO SEE PROGRESS TOWARDS THE HOLDING OF THE ELECTIONS. NYERERE SEIZED THE OPPORTUNITY TO REPEAT HIS COMPLAINT THAT THE ZANU POLITICAL LEADERSHIP WAS STILL BEING KEPT OUT OF RHODESIA.

HE ALLEGED THAT THE ZANU DIRECTOR OF ELECTIONS WAS STILL IN MAPUTO UNABLE TO TRAVEL TO SALISBURY WHEN THERE WERE ELECTION DOCUMENTS WHICH HAD TO BE FILED WITH THE AUTHORITIES ON MONDAY.

6. NYERERE WAS NOT IN A MOOD FOR ANY REASONED DISCUSSION.

MOON

NNNN

[RHODESIA: POLICY: ADVANCE COPIES]

+30

PS/SIR I GILMOUR
PS/MR LUCE
PS/PJS
~~SIR D MITCHELL~~
MR DAY
LORD N G LENNOX
MR ASPIN

PS/NO 10 DOWNING STREET

SIR R ARMSTRONG)
MR R L WADE GERY)
MR P M MAXEY) CABINET
MR GOULTY) OFFICE
MR P J FOWLER)
DIO)

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HD/RHOD DEPT (4)

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HD/NEWS DEPT

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MR FREELAND LEGAL ADVISER RMK200A

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RESIDENT CLERK

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GR 650

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DESKBY FCO 130900Z

DESKBY MUSCAT 130400Z

FM UKMIS NEW YORK 130006Z JAN 80

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 97 OF 12 JANUARY

INFO IMMEDIATE MUSCAT SALISBURY DAR ES SALAAM LUSAKA PRIORITY

LUANDA GABORONE MAPUTO LAGOS PRETORIA WASHINGTON

RHODESIA

DESKBY

ms

1. THE PRESIDENT OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY, SALIM OF TANZANIA, ASKED TO SEE ME THIS AFTERNOON IN ORDER TO EXPRESS CONCERN AT THE WAY THINGS ARE GOING IN RHODESIA. HE EMPHASIZED THAT HE WAS SPEAKING NOT AS THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF TANZANIA BUT AS THE PRESIDENT OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY AND AS AN AFRICAN WHO WAS PERSONALLY COMMITTED TO THE SUCCESSFUL COMPLETION OF THE PROCESS WHICH HAD BEGUN AT THE CHGM AT LUSAKA.

2. I DESCRIBED THE REMARKABLE PROGRESS THAT HAS BEEN ACHIEVED SO FAR, EXPRESSED OUR REGRET AT THE LUPANE INCIDENT AND SAID THAT THE CONCERN CURRENTLY BEING EXPRESSED BY THE FRONT LINE STATES DID NOT SEEM TO REFLECT THE ATTITUDE OF THE PATRIOTIC FRONT

THE CONCERN CURRENTLY BEING EXPRESSED DID NOT SEEM TO REFLECT THE ATTITUDE OF THE PATRIOTIC FRONT REPRESENTATIVES ON THE SPOT IN SALISBURY.

3. SALIM REPLIED THAT THERE WERE THREE POINTS WHICH CONCERNED HIM:

(A) IF THE SETTLEMENT AGREED AT LANCASTER HOUSE WAS TO STICK IT WAS ESSENTIAL THAT CONDITIONS FOR FREE AND FAIR ELECTIONS SHOULD BE NEXT WORD UNDERLINED SEEN TO EXIST. THERE HAD TO BE NO DOUBT AT ALL ABOUT THE GOVERNOR'S IMPARTIALITY. BUT DOUBTS ON THIS WERE BEGINNING TO FORM, WITH CONSEQUENT DAMAGE TO THE CREDIBILITY NOT ONLY OF THE UK BUT ALSO OF ALL THE COMMONWEALTH AFRICAN STATES WHO HAD COMMITTED THEMSELVES TO THE AGREEMENT AND ON WHOSE COOPERATION A PEACEFUL OUTCOME IN RHODESIA DEPENDED. HE ENTIRELY UNDERSTOOD THE PRACTICAL REASONS WHY LORD SOAMES SHOULD TURN TO THE RHODESIAN SECURITY FORCES TO DEAL WITH CEASEFIRE BREAKERS. BUT THE POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES OF THIS WERE POTENTIALLY DISASTROUS. COULD HE NOT USE PF UNITS, AT ANY RATE IN THE FIRST INSTANCE, TO DISCIPLINE THEIR COMMANDERS WHO FAILED TO OBSERVE THE CEASEFIRE? IF THEY FAILED TO DO SO AND THE GOVERNOR THEN HAD TO TURN TO THE RHODESIAN SECURITY FORCES, THIS WOULD BE UNDERSTOOD.

(B) THE PRESENCE OF SOUTH AFRICAN TROOPS AT BEIT BRIDGE SHOWED A DISTURBING DEGREE OF UK INSENSITIVITY TO FEELINGS IN AFRICA. I SAID I WAS AWAITING INFORMATION FROM LONDON ON THIS BUT THAT I UNDERSTOOD FROM MY SOUTH AFRICA COLLEAGUE THAT THE TROOPS WERE A SMALL UNIT COMMANDED BY A CAPTAIN ONLY. MOREOVER THEY WERE BEING MONITORED. SALIM SAID THAT THE SIZE OF THE UNIT DID NOT MATTER: IF IT CONSISTED OF ONLY ONE MAN IT WOULD BE ENOUGH TO WRECK THE LANCASTER HOUSE AGREEMENT. THE PRESENCE OF SOUTH AFRICAN TROOPS WAS BY FAR THE MOST IMPORTANT ISSUE AND THE GREATEST THREAT TO BRITISH CREDIBILITY. (I REALIZE THAT THIS MUST SOUND EXAGGERATED BUT IT IS A SINCERELY HELD VIEW WHICH IS, I HAVE NO DOUBT, SHARED BY ALL SALIM'S AFRICAN COLLEAGUES HERE).

(C) THE ACTIVITIES OF MUZOREWA'S AUXILIARIES ALSO CAST DOUBT ON BRITISH IMPARTIALITY. SALIM HAD HEARD THAT THEY WERE TAKING OVER THE RURAL AREAS VACATED BY PF FORCES. I SAID THAT I WAS UNBRIEFED ON THIS BUT WOULD FIND OUT THE FACTS FOR HIM.

4. BECAUSE OF SALIM'S INFLUENCE WITH THE AFRICANS HERE IT IS IMPORTANT THAT WE SHOULD TRY TO RESTORE HIS FAITH IN OUR FAIR-DEALING, IF WE ARE TO FEND OFF POSSIBLE ACTION HERE WHICH COULD HAVE REPERCUSSIONS ON THE GROUND. ALTHOUGH HIS TONE WAS LESS EMOTIONAL THAN NYERERE'S, AS REPORTED IN RECENT TELEGRAMS FROM

4. BECAUSE OF SALIM'S INFLUENCE WITH THE AFRICANS HERE IT IS IMPORTANT THAT WE SHOULD TRY TO RESTORE HIS FAITH IN OUR FAIR-DEALING. IF WE ARE TO FEND OFF POSSIBLE ACTION HERE WHICH COULD HAVE REPERCUSSIONS ON THE GROUND. ALTHOUGH HIS TONE WAS LESS EMOTIONAL THAN NYERERE'S, AS REPORTED IN RECENT TELEGRAMS FROM DAR ES SALAAM, HE IS UNDOUBTEDLY VERY WORRIED. I SHOULD BE GRATEFUL, THEREFORE, FOR INSTRUCTIONS IN AS MUCH DETAIL AS POSSIBLE ON WHAT I SHOULD SAY TO HIM ON BOTH THE SOUTH AFRICAN TROOPS AT BEIT BRIDGE AND ON THE AUXILIARIES. HE LEFT ME IN NO DOUBT THAT THE QUESTION OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN TROOPS TRANSCENDED ALL OTHER PROBLEMS. HE LEAVES FOR THE UNIDO CONFERENCE AT NEW DELHI ON 17 JANUARY AND I PROMISED TO SEE HIM AGAIN BEFORE THEN.

PARSONS

OMC

NNNN

PART

12

ends:-

to Salisbury tel 121 11/1/80

PART

13

begins:-

UK Min N.York tel 97 12/1/80

